

8

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מטרה: משרד ראש הממשלה
 תחום: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
 מס תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

סימול מקורי: 5 תקופת החומר: 2/1991-2/1991
 מזהה פיזי: א - 10 / 5024 15/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר

א - 10 / 5024

מזהה פיזי: 43.4/13 - 805 מס פריט: 2169748
 מזהה לוגי: 02-111-02-05-05 כתובת: 15/11/2012

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

אאא, חוזם: 25480

אל: רהמש/2138

מ-: רומא, נר: 146, תא: 140291, חז: 1950, חר: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/רגיל

אל: אירופה א'

מאת: רומא/השגריר

הנדון: ובשי'ת ארה'ב

בשיחה עם שגריר ארה'ב שאלתיו מה באמת עמדת ארה'ב לגבי הובשי'ת כי אנו שומעים הערכות שונות.

לדבריו לא נתבקשה השגרירות ברומא להתעמק בנושא ואיננו חושב שמחמ'ד אכן קבעה עמדה בנושא. התגובה הראשונה היתה של חשדנות מחשש שמסגרת זו תשמש ללחץ על ארה'ב לפנות את צי השישי מהים התיכון. הפשרת המלחמה הקרה לא ינתה מהותית את הגישה ואירועי המפרץ מוכיחים את חיוניות נוכחות הצי האמריקאי בים התיכון. בסך הכל התרשמתי שלא התעמקו לא קבעו שום עמדה מעבר לתגובה האינטואיטיבית הראשונה. הם מתיחסים עקרונית באמון ובחירוב לדה-מיכליס ולכוונותיו, אוספים מידע וממתינים להתפתחויות.

דרורי

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, איר, 1, בנצור,

מצפא, פרנ, ביין, ארבל, סולטן, ר/מרכז,

ממד, (רם), אמן

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 23111
אל: רהמש/1948
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130291, חז: 1450, דח: ר, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/רגיל

אל: שטיין - וושינגטון
דע: בן-עמי, רומא

הנדון: ובש'ת - עמדת ארה'ב.

1. ביקרני סיגל משגארה'ב. ביקש לברר עמנו סוגית ובש'ת ועמדתנו כלפיה. פרטתי השתלשלות ההתיחסות האיטלקית-ספרדית לנושא, הכנסתנו הרשמית המאוחרת לתמונה ע"י האיטלקים והתיחסותנו החיובית למרכיב ה-CBM במכלול ושלילתנו המרכיב המדיני (שילוב 'ישויות מוכרות') בו.

2. לגבי עמדתם אמר שנמצאת ב-FLUX אך מאידך קימת התנגדות חריפה לרעיון יצד המטפלים בנאט'ו במחמ'ד וכן בנציגותיהם בבריסל ובלונדון הגורסים שאין קום לפעלתנות האיטלקית בעיקר בהקשר לסוגית פרוק ופיקוח הנשק שכן לצי השישי מרכיבים גרעיניים וע'כ אינם מוכנים בשום פנים להסכים ל'חיטוט איטלקי' בתחום זה.

מעבר לכך רואים הנ'ל בנטחון אגן הים התיכון מענינו המובהק של נאט'ו וע'כ שוללים הסדרי בטחון אזוריים פרטניים. עם זאת הם מצויים בשלבי גיבוש מחשנה בנושא וע'כ רצו לדעת עמדתנו.

עד כאן.

מנהל אירופה 1

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, איר, 1, איר, 2,
סולטן, מזתים, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, ביי, ארבל, 1,
כהן, כלכליתב', ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 24040

אל: רהמש/2028

מ-: ווש, נר: 2123, תא: 130291, זח: 1830, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: ממ'ד, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

מלחמת המפרץ.

מהאריס, ראש מחקר המזה'ת (I.N.R) ב - 13.2

1. לפרימקוב אין כל תכנית שלום, כפי שלאיראנים לא היתה, אך צדאם מבקש להשרות אוריה של התקדמות במגעים עם הסובייטים, בעוד שאת האיראנים דחה קטגורית.

2. יעדו העיקרי של צדאם לא השתנה - גרירת האמריקאים לעימות קרקעי וכאמצעותו יכול להסב אבידות כבדות לארה'ב. זה הוא מנהל מערכת דיסאינפורמציה, תוך הסתייעות ב-C.N.N, במסגרתה הוא מבליט את נושא הפגיעה בסקטור האזרחי בעיראק. בכך הוא מבקש לזכות לתהודה בעולם הערבי ובציבור המערבי, וליצור במימשל תחושה שהתמיכה הערבית בו פוחתת, תחושה האמורה להניע את האמריקאים להקדים את מועד המתקפה הקרקעית.

3. ציין נסיונות קודמים של דיסאינפורמציה עיראקית: דווח על מהומות בפקיסטאן - שלא התחוללו כלל, הגזמה בדווח על מס' טילי הסקאד שפגעו בישראל, סיפור הפגיעה בערים הקדושות לשיעה - ממנו חדל, שכן הדווח לא זכה לאישורם של חכמי הדת השיעים.

4. להערכת בן שיחי, בוש ימשיך, לפי שעה, במתקפת האויר: האבידות מועטות, והקונגרס תומך בכך. אין גם שום לחצים מתברות הקואליציה הערביות להקדים את מועד מתקפת הקרקע. מבראך, אסד ופהד מעדיפים צמצום מירבי של האבידות הצפויות לחייליהם על פני הנזק האזרחי העיראקי. לדבריו, ההפצה היתה אפקטיבית לגבי שתי דיביזיות של המשמר הרפובליקני ואחת עד שתיים דיביזיות ממוכנות נופצו (DISRUPTED), אך מרבית יחידות היבשה העיראקיות עדיין לא נפגעו.

5. יין שהארטילריה העיראקית איננה יכולה להעריך טיב פגיעותיה בשל השליטה האווירית האמריקנית.

6. בן שיחי מעריך כי ניתן להסתפק במתקפת האוויר לפחות למשך פבר' כאשר אילוץ בינערכי מסויים עלול להופיע רק במרץ עם כינוס מועצת הליגה הערבית.

7. הגדיר את הבעיות הפנימיות במצרים, סוריה, וסעודיה כניתנות לטיפול (MANAGEABLE):

במצרים - האופוזיציה מנצלת את המלחמה לניגוח המשטר - כדרכה המסורתית בסוריה - אנשים מותחים ביקורת על המשטר, אך האריס תוהה שמא התרשמותם שהביקורת רבתה נובעת מעצם היותם ממוקדים עתה בנושא יותר מכעבר. בסעודיה שככה ההתרגשות, שגברה עם נפילת טילי הסקאד הראשונים.

8. תוך התייחסות לביקור סעדון תמאדי במגרב, אמר שעיראק מנסה להרחיק את מרוקו מהקואליציה, העריך שהעיראקים לא יצליחו בכך, וציין שסעודיה עומדת לטפל בנושא.

אמיתי.

=י

תפוצה: שחח, ששהח, @רהמ), @שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חו זס: 23276
אל: רהמש/1954
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130291, חז: 1601, חמ: מ, סג: סו,
בבכ
97695
סודי/מידי
103.01
אל: שטיין, ואשינגטון

הנדון: פנטקוסטים, למברקנו מ-12

מרק פריס משגארה'ב התקשר ל'נתיב' לומר:

1. שהצליח למנוע שיגור איגרת מבייקר ללוי.
2. שימציא פרטים על מקרים בעייתיים וכו', (ומכאן ניתן להסיק שהנושא מועבר לטיפול במישור המקצועי).

אגידו-למדו

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר, @ (נתיב)

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 22553
אל: רהמש/1918
מ-: ווש, נר: 2111, תא: 120291, חז: 1600, ח: מ, סג: סו,
נבנב
סודי/מידי.

אל: גוברין, למדן

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

פנטקוסטים.

פנה אלי בענין זה חבר בית-הנבחרים האוורד ברמן עפ'י בקשת מחמ'ד. הסברתי
לו את עמדתנו והבטחתי לו שהענין מטופל עכשיו בכל הרמות. ביקש שאספר לו
מידי פעם על ההתפתחויות בפרשה.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר 1

סססס

אאא, חו זס: 21654
אל: רהמש/1831
מ-: המשרד, תא: 120291, זח: 1418, דח: ב, סג: סו,
כבב
97546
סודי/כהול
103.01

אל: שטיין, ואשינגטון

הנדון: פנטקוסטים

ברטוב נועד היום לשיחה (לפי הצעתנו) עם פריס משגארה'ב. הלה אמר שיתקשר עם עמיתיו במחמ'ד עוד היום לבקשם לפעול למניעת שיגור איגרת בייקר ללוי והעלאת הנושא בפגישתם הקרובה, וזאת במגמה להעביר את הטיפול על פסים מקצועיים.

פריס מודע לעובדה שהאמריקנים שנו, הטעו והפרו הסכמם ושהטיפול בנושא מצריך זמן לאור בדיקת המידע בארץ.

הוצע לפריס שהאמריקנים יעבירו לנו רשימה סופית של כל המקרים הבעייתיים לשם בדיקתם באורח יסודי.

פריס ידווח לברטוב תוצאות השתדלותו.

גוברין-למדן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר, @ (נתיב)

סססס

אאאא, חו זס: 20009
אל: רהמש/1692
מ-: המשרד, תא: 110291, חז: 1228, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בבב
97376
שמור/בהול לבוקר
101.01

אל: וושינגטון - שטיין, שירן

דע: נתיב - ברטוב, תבורי

הנדון: פנטקוסטים
להודעה שמסרת אמש (10.2) לחדר מצב

1. תודה על הפעולה המהירה והיעילה.

2. במקביל דיבר דוד ברטוב עם הסגן בשג' ארה'ב וסיכם עמו שהאמריקאים ישלחו רשימה מעודכנת, כאשר מצדנו ייעשה הכל כדי למצוא פתרון לבעיה. אריס היה מרוצה מסיכום זה ועמד להכריק לווינגטון.

3. לאור הסיכום הנ"ל, נשאלת השאלה באם יש עוד צורך לשלוח האיש שלנו לווינגטון. לעומת זאת, ייתכן שעתה ירצו האמריקאים לשגר נציג ארצה. אם כן נשמח לקבלו לשם הכהרת הרשימה וליבון הסוגייה בכללותה, תוך מגמה לטיים את הפרשה על הצד הטוב.

4. נושא שיגור המכתב לסובייטים נתון להחלטת האמריקאים ולא נראה שיש לנו מעמד בעניין זה. עם זאת, אם יסכים קרצר לחלוק תוכן המכתב עמך (לידיעתנו בלבד) נודה לו כמובן מאליו.

גוברין - למדן

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר, @ (נתיב)

אאאא, חו זס: 21117
אל: רהמש/1801
מ-: ווש, נר: 2106, תא: 110291, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: סו,
כבכ
סודי/בהול לבוקר.

אל: גוברין-למדן

מאת: שטיין.

פנטקוסטים.

בהמשך לשיחת טלפון עם גוברין.

1. קרצר דחה ההצעה לשגר נציג מטעמם ארצה.

2. הכהיר כי במידה ולא ימצא פתרון מהיר ישקלו שיגור מכתב מבייקר לשה'ח.

3. להערכתו המדובר בבעיה שתיפתר בתוך ששה חודשים ותכלול לכל היותר כ-1800 יהודים (בממוצע כ-300 בחודש).

שטיין.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, גוברין, מזאר, 1, בנצור,
מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 19543
אל: רהמש/1645
מ-: המשרד, תא: 100291, חז: 1728, ב, סג: שמ,
בכב
97306
שמור/בהול להזעיק
101.01

אל: וושינגטון - לשכת שגריר, שטיין, שירן

דע: ניו-יורק - קונכ'ל, שנהר
נתיב - ברטוב, תבורי

הנדון: פנטקוסטים
לברקס 196 ו-229
למברק ברטוב 2091 לווש'
להתברקות שילה בנדון

1. הלחצים האמריקאים ההולכים וגוברים והטונים הגבוהים הבוקעים מושינגטון תמוהים ואף מדאיגים.

2. לעומת זאת, כל מגמתנו היתה-ונשאר-השגת פתרון מתקבל על דעת שני הצדדים מבלי להפוך את העניין לסלע מחלוקת מדינית ולאיריטנט מזיק ומיותר בין שתי המדינות. כתמיד אנו מוכנים לשקול את הפניות האמריקאיות, אך כפי שצויין במברק ברטוב לא תחת גרזן של אולטימטום ולא במסגרת של שעות ספורות בלבד.

3. אי לכך, נהיה מוכנים לשלוח נציג הולם לושינגטון ללכך את הבעייה על כל היבטיה (לידיעתכם - גם כלפי האירגונים היהודיים). הערה: זאת בתקווה למנוע שיגור מכתב מאת המזכיר לעמיתיו בישראל ובבריה"מ וכן למנוע העלאת הנושא בשיחת השר עם בייקר ביום ו' הקרוב (15.2),

4. נא פעולתכם הדחופה אצל הגורם המתאים במחמ'ד ע'מ לקבל את הסכמתם להצעה הנ'ל - עוד היום (יום א' 10.2) אם אפשר.

מנהל מצפ'א - מנהל מזא'ר

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר1, בןאבו, תפוצות, @ (נתיב)

טסט

אאאא, חוזם: 19543
אל: רהמש/1645
מ-: המשרד, תא: 100291, חז: 1728, ח: ב, סג: שמ,
כנב
97306
שמור/בהול להזעיק
101.01

אל: וושינגטון - לשכת שגריר, שטיין, שירן

דע: ניו-יורק - קונכ'ל, שנהר
נתיב - ברטוב, תכורי

הנדון: פנטקוסטים
לברקם 196 ו-229
למברק ברטוב 2091 לווש'
להתברקות שילה בנדון

1. הלחצים האמריקאים ההולכים וגוברים והטונים הגבוהים הנוקעים מושינגטון תמוהים ואף מדאיגים.

2. לעומת זאת, כל מגמתנו היתה-ונשארת-השגת פתרון מתקבל על דעת שני הצדדים מבלי להפוך את העניין לסלע מחלוקת מדינית ולאיריטנט מזיק ומיותר בין שתי המדינות. כתמיד אנו מוכנים לשקול את הפניות האמריקאיות, אך כפי שצויין במברק ברטוב לא תחת גרזן של אולטימטום ולא במסגרת של שעות ספורות בלבד.

3. אי לכך, נהיה מוכנים לשלוח נציג הולם לושינגטון ללכך את הבעייה על כל היבטיה (לידיעתכם - גם כלפי האירגונים היהודיים). הערה: זאת בתקווה למנוע שיגור מכתב מאת המזכיר לעמיתיו בישראל ובבריה"מ וכן למנוע העלאת הנושא בשיחת השר עם בייקר ביום ו' הקרוב (15.2),

4. נא פעולתכם הדחופה אצל הגורם המתאים במחמ"ד ע"מ לקבל את הסכמתם להצעה הנ"ל - עוד היום (יום א' 10.2) אם אפשר.

מנהל מצפ"א - מנהל מזא"ר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, כנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר1, בןאכו, תפוצות, @נתיב)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18755

אל: רהמש/1597

מ-: ווש, נר: 2091, תא: 080291, זח: 2230, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול לבוקר - לא להזעיק

אל: סמנכ'ל מזא'ר, סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: ברטוב - נתיב

מאת: שגרירות וושינגטון

'פרשת הפנטקוסטימ'

משיחה עם קרצר (8.2)

1. בכוונת המזכיר לשגר מכתב לעמיתיו בישראל ובבריה'מ בנושא לעייל. מעריך שהמכתב יעבור (באמצעות בראון) ביום ראשון הקרוב.

2. במכתבו לשה'ח יבקש בייקר את סיוע (לפרק זמן מוגבל) ממ' ישראל עד יפתרו בעית הפנטקוסטליסטים עם ממ' ברה'מ. בייקר יבהיר כי הבעיה הינה מוגבלת וכין אין בכוונתם לחרוג מהמגבלות שהחקיקה הטילה על נושא מכסות הגירת יהודים לארה'ב. עד כאן.

3. בשיחה קודמת עם קרצר ציין כי המדובר במספר קטן של יהודים שיגיעו לארה'ב על מכסת הפנטקוסטים. (הנטיח להעביר לנו מיספר מדוייק). הדגיש כי הם רגישים לעניננו וכי הפרספציה לפיה יסייעו ליהודים רבים ככל האפשר לעזוב את ברה'מ בדרך זו היא מוטעית.

שטיין

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, גוברין, מזאר, 1, כנצור,
מצפא, בןאבו, תפוצות, @ (נתיב)

ססס

אאא, תוזם: 18757

אל: רהמש/1599

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 196, תא: 080291, זח: 2347, חד: מ, סג: שמ,

כבב

7/2/91

שמור / מיידי

אל: סמנכ"ל בנצור, סמנכ"ל גוברין

דע: נתיב ברטוב

ג'רי שירן - כאן

שנהר - ניו-יורק

איגלברגר צלצל לשגריר בעינין הפנטקוסטליסטים והיהודים המבקשים לצאת בדרך זו, אמר שאינו מבין מדוע ישראל אינה מגלה קצת גמישות בעינין זה, הזכיר שהעליה הגדולה לישראל היא תוצאה של תקנות אמריקניות שהגבילו את ההגירה לאמריקה ושמיילא לא מדובר על אנשים רבים ושהמכסה של 40,000 תשמר בקפידה והוסיף שפנו אליו בענין זה לא רק פקידים אלא גם יהודים אמריקנים.

שגריר השיב לו שששנה קרדין היא המוסמכת לדבר בענין זה בשם היהודים וכי החשש העיקרי הוא שאם נרשה סדק יפרצו כל הסכרים.

איגלברגר חזר ואמר שמדובר רק בכמה מאות וכי הוא ממליץ על גמישות. השגריר השיב שעוד ידבר עמו על כך בשבוע הבא.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר1, בןאכו, תפוצות, @ (נתיב)

סססס

אאא, חו זס: 14573

אל: רהמש/1511

מ-: בטחון, נר: 229, תא: 080291, זח: 1309, דח: ב, סג: סו, ,

בבב

בהול/סודי

אל: ג'רי שירן - וושינגטון

דע: שמואל שנהר - נ'י

משה'ח-מצפ'א, מזא'ר - י-ם

מאת: דוד כרטוב - נתיב

530

ב-7.2.91 בבוקר נפגשתי עם מרק פריס משג' ארה'ב בת'א. הסכרנו לפריס את הנזק העצום שנגרם לנו בעקבות השמועות שהופצו על אפשרות הגירה לארה'ב. האמריקנים מתחייבים שהרשימות, שתוגשנה בעתיד, תכלולנה רק את אותם היהודים אשר לגביהם חלה הבעיה הספציפית שהתעוררה:

1. התחילו בתהליך היציאה לארה'ב לפני 10.89.

2. מחזיקים דרישות ישראליות.

3. מחזיקים אשרות יציאה סובייטיות לישראל, ועל סמך זה אבדו את דרכונם הסובייטי ואת האזרחות הסובייטית.

האמריקנים יבדקו את היקף הבעיה - כמה יהודים סובלים מהבעיה הספציפית הנ'ל, ואינם יכולים להגיש בקשה להגירה ישירות לארה'ב.

סכום

סוכם כי האמריקניים ימסרו לנו מספר, ורשימת שמות של יהודים שלגביהם מבקשים טפול שלנו. בעת קבלת הנתונים, נבדוק אותם, ונדון בהתאם. יודגש כי לא הבטחנו דבר לאמריקניים בשלב זה, וכל החלטה תהיה טעונה בהסכמת רה'מ. אני מבקש שתביא מידע זה לידיעתכם של השגריר והציר.

ב-7.2.91 בערב הודיע מרק פריס, שנאמר לו בשיחת טלפון עם וושינגטון כי חר בבוקר תגיש השג' האמריקנית במוסקבה רשימה נוספת, שתכלול 42 'מקרים בעייתיים'. מבקשים התחשבות מיוחדת ואישור שלנו, כדי לא לעכב את טיסתם לארה'ב - 9.2.91, במקביל יערכו את הבדיקה המוצעת על ידם. התשובה שתינתן: אין לפעול במקרים כאלה בשעת אולטימטומים. אנו מציעים לתת לנו שבוע לשקול ולפתור את הבעיה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר1, בןאבו, תפוצות

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15115
אל: רהמש/1385
מ-: המשרד, תא: 070291, חז: 1414, חר: ר, סג: סו,
בנכב
רגיל/סודי

אל:מר דוד ברטוב, ר'נתיב.

מאת:מזכיר הממשלה.

שלום רב.

הנדון:פנטקוסטים ויהודים.

א.התקשר אלי היום השגריר פרינסטון ליימן מושינגטון, המתאם לנושא הפליטים במחמ'ד, בקשר לקבוצה ה'תקועה' במוסקבה (אגב, ליימן סייע לנו רבות ב'מבצע משה' בשעה שכיחן כסגן עוזר המזכיר לענייני אפריקה, ובתו חזרה בתשובה ועלתה ארצה). ביקש מאוד סיוענו בפתרון הבעיה שנוצרה.

ב.אמר כי בקבוצה הנוכחית, מעבר לפנטקוסטים, המדובר בעיקר ביהודים שהגישו בקשותיהם ל'אוכיר' לפני השינוי במדיניות האמריקנית שהעבירה את הטיפול בבקשות מבירות אחרות באירופה לשגרירות במוסקבה, ויש להם קרובי משפחה בארה"ב.

ג.אמרתי כי הנושא מעלה שתי נקודות. האחת, כי המצג שהוצג לפנינו במוסקבה היה מוטעה ולא נמסר כי המדובר ביהודים. האחרת, והיא העיקרית, הנהגיה בעצב הרגיש של חששותינו מיצירת פתחים לנשירה, שבעבר החלה בקילות זעום והפכה לגל שוטף. כל הדרגים אצלנו חזורים חשש ונחישות למנוע שהדבר יישנה.

פ.ליימן אמר, באשר לנקודה הראשונה, כי בדק במוסקבה ואכן היתה אי-הבנה כמה שנמסר לנו והוא מצטער על כך. לדבריו הסיבה היתה בלבול שנוצר עקב הפרוצדורות שלאחר שנוי מדיניות ארה"ב באוקטובר, והוא סבר שהדבר הובהר במוסקבה. לשאלתי אמר, כי בקבוצה זו המדובר בעיקר ביהודים בעלי קרובים מדרגה ראשונה שנרשמו, כאמור, לפני שנוי הפרוצדורות ושנית-קרובים מסוימים מדרגה שניה, שמבחינת ארה"ב הם ראויים למתן האשרה אך לא לפי הפרוצדורות הסובייטיים.

ז.שאלתי מה משמעות מבוקשט ומה יהיה בעתיד, והאם נוכל לדווח שהנושא לא יעלה שוב.אמר שניתן להבטיח באורח מוחלט וברור, שהמספר הכולל של יהודים שיסעו לארה"ב לא ישתנה, ולא יעלה על המכסה שאושרה של 40,000 (מתוך 50,000 שאושרו בכלל). היתר יבואו מטבע הדברים לישראל, וכך היתה התפיסה כשיתוף עם הקונגרס והארגונים היהודים. אמרתי כי שמענו שבמוסקבה כבר ישנם יהודים המבטלים, על-יסוד הסיפור הנוכחי, טיסות ארצה בתקוה להגיע לארה"ב:ולמותר לציין שהדבר מדאיג ביותר.השיב שאין סיכוי לאנשים אלה, כי זמן הציפיה ופרוצדורות האמריקניות עתה הוא שנה וחצי-שנתיים. זאת ועוד, אין לארה"ב תוכניות להעלות את המספרים מעל לקיים, ועל כך יש קונסנסוס ורק אתמול חתם על בקשת התקציב לשנה שתחל באוקטובר 1991, והמספרים נשארו בעינם.

ה.שאלתי בכמה אנשים מדובר בקבוצה הקיימת במוסקבה, ואמר שאיננו יודע. עם זאת, חזר על הבקשה לסייע להם בנסיבות אלה. הבטחתי להעביר לנוגעים בדבר.שנתי וציינתי את הרגישויות.

בכרכה,

אליקים רובינשטיין.

העתק:מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

מר א. בנצור, סמנכ"ל משה"ח
ד"ר י. גוברין, סמנכ"ל משה"ח
הציר, וושינגטון

תפוצה: e(רהמ), בנצור, גוברין, e(נתיב)

סטט

אאא, חו זס: 12755
אל: רהמש/1204
מ-: ווש, נר: 2043, תא: 050291, חז: 2030, חמ: מ, סג: סו,
כככ
סודי/מידי.

אל: אלי רובינשטיין, מזכיר הממשלה, דוד ברטוב, נתיב

דע: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון.

עוד לשאלת הפנטקוסטלים והיהודים.

קרצר אמר לנו היום שקבוצות מהגרים יהודיים מכריהם' מתארגנות ללחץ על
הקונגרס לאור מה שהם מפרשים כמכשולים ישראליים על דרך היציאה מכריהם'
לאמריקה.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, @ (נתיב),
גוברין, מזאר, תפוצות, כנאבו

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 12491

אל: רהמש/1171

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050291, חז: 2040, דח: ר, סג: טו,

בכב

סודי/רגיל

ירושלים, כ'א בשבט התשנ"א
5 בפברואר 1991

מכתב

אל: מר ד. ברטוב, ר' 'נתיב'

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: פנטקוסטים.

1.א. השגריר בראון העלה עמי הבוקר את הנושא מיוזמתו. אמר כי ממברק מושינגטון לנציגותם במוסקבה למד שמניחים שעניינם של היהודים שביקשו לנסוע לארה"ב (הרשימה שעוכבה) הוסדר. מכל מקום, מבחינתם מדגיש כל העניין את הצורך לחוץ על הסובייטים להסדיר את החקיקה שתאפשר יציאה חופשית. אמרתי שאין לי ידיעה לגבי הסדר הרשימה הנוכחית, אך הבעיה רחבה יותר, ראשית, כפי שמוסרים העוסקים בכך אצלנו, לא פנו אנשי שגרירות ארה"ב במוסקבה אל אנשינו שם ותיארו דברים כהוייתם, אלא הכניסו יהודים לרשימה שהתימרה להיות פנטקוסטית בלי לשאול אותנו. התוצאה היא, שאנו שומעים ממוסקבה כי יהודים מבטלים טיסות מוזמנות ארצה ומבקשים להכניסם לרשימות של פנטקוסטים, והדבר עשוי לפתוח פתח לנשירה. יש לנו טראומה קשה בנושא הנשירה מן העבר ועלינו להיות זהירים ביותר בעניין זה, ויש לראות במקרה הנוכחי סוף פסוק.

ב. בראון אמר כי לנושא היסטוריה ידועה, עם זאת יש להתחשב גם בעמדת ארגונים יהודיים בארה"ב. אמרתי כי בוודאי תוסבר להם עמדתנו, אך לא נוכל לפתוח פתחי נשירה. אמר שלא יוכל לומר שלא יהיו יותר כל עיקר בקשות להכניס יהודים לרשימות יציאה שמופנות בעצם לארה"ב (כמו הפנטקוסטים). אמרתי כי בקשתנו היא שיהיה זה הסוף.

2.א. אח"צ שב בראון והתקשר. אמר כי הדיווח הקודם היה שגוי, והרשימה המעוכבת טרם הוסדרה, וכינתיים באות פניות של חברי קונגרס יהודים בדבר מכתבים מבוחרים בקשר לקרוביהם וכדומה. הוא דיווח לושינגטון על שיחתנו מהבוקר. עצתו היא לשכנע כי קבוצה זו תאושר, כדי לאפשר 'מרחב תמרון', לפי הבנתו רשימה זו היא בתוך מכסת ה-40,000. לדבריו אין הם מחפשים 'תרגילים' ופרצות, אך נחוצה להם גמישות. שאלתי מה התחייבותם באשר לעתיד. אמר שאינו יכול להשיב, אך צריך לטכס עצה.

ב. אמרתי כי אעביר את בקשתם, אך הנושא, מעבר לבקשה הספציפית שתידון, נוגע לעצב רגיש ביותר, נוכח הרקע, החשש מפתחי נשירה והנסיבות הספציפיות במקרה דנן (שלא הודיעו לנו את טיב הרשימה). אמר כי האשמים העיקריים הם הסובייטים במדיניותם, והוסיף כי אין רצון אמריקני 'להגניב' אנשים לרשימות. אמרתי, כאמור, שאעביר דבריו.

בברכה

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: המנהל הכללי, משרד ראש הממשלה
מר א. בנצור, סמנכ"ל, משרד החוץ
ד"ר י. גוברין, סמנכ"ל, משרד החוץ

הציר, רושינגטון

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), כנצור, גוברין, @ (נתיב)

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 2252

אל: רהמש/1921

מ-: ווש, נר: 2113, תא: 120291, חז: 1630, חד: מ, סג: סב,

בכב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע : לשכת רה'מ', לשכת שהח, לשכת שהבט

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

ביקור שהבט

1. במהלך ביקור שהבט (11/2) התקיימו שלוש פגישות שתואמו ישירות: הנשיא, מזכירי ההגנה והמדינה.

2. בשיחת הנשיא-שהבט השתתפו מצידם: ס/הנשיא, מזכירי המדינה וההגנה, סנונו, סקוקרופט, גייטס והאס. מצידנו: הח'מ', עברי וברק. שהבט העלה חומרת האוירה השוררת בארץ כתוצאה מהמשך התקפות הטילים על ישראל והלחץ האפשרי שהממשלה עשויה למצוא עצמה נתונה בו - אם ימשכו ההתקפות לאורך זמן ואם תתרחש התקפה כימית - כדי לפעול להסרת האיום. דט להיבטים הקשורים באיום העיראקי לא הועלו בשיחה נושאים מדיניים אחרים או כלכליים. דיווח מפורט בכתב הועבר לרה'מ', לשכת רהמ' אנא העבירו לשהח וללשכת שהבט.

3. בפנטגון התקיימה ישיבה ממושכת שראשיתה בפורום רחב והמשכה בהשתתפות צ'ייני, פאול, שהבט, עברי וברק בלבד. בפגישה הרחבה הוצגה תמונת המצב עי שהבט ובמקביל הציגו האמריקאים תמונת מצב של הישגיהם עד כה וכוונותיהם לעתיד.

4. הפגישה במחמד, כשמצידם בייקר, איגלברגר, טאטווילר ורוס. מצידנו: שהבט, הח'מ', עברי ומרידור. רישום מפורט נעשה עי סלי מרידור, נודה לקבלת הרשום.

להלן עיקרי הדברים:

א. שהבט חזר ותאר חומרת המצב בארץ, כפי שעשה בפגישה עם הנשיא וכי כתוצאה מפגיעת הטילים עשוי להיווצר לחץ על הממשלה לפעול. תוך כדי השיחה הגיעה הידיעה על נפילת טיל שני בלילה האחרון באזור המרכז.

ב. שהבט ציין שיתכן ואין זהות מוחלטת באינטרסים של שתי המדינות ביחס למשבר במפרץ, אך בוודאי קיימת קרבה. ישראל אינה רוצה לפגוע בקואליציה וכן אינה מעוניינת במלחמה רבת-חזיתות.

ג. שהבט הדגיש שנחוץ תאום מירבי. עדכן מזכיר המדינה בנושאים שנדונו בשיחתו עם מזכיר ההגנה, צ'ייני. מזכיר המדינה ציין שחייבים לקחת בחשבון ההשלכות הפוליטיות השליליות, העלולות לנבוע גם מפעולה צבאית מוצלחת. מזכיר המדינה חזר והזכיר האוירה החיובית בארהב ובארץ נוכח מדיניות האיפוק של הממשלה.

ד. המזכיר התעניין במהלך שיחתו עם שהבט בנושא ההוצאות הבטחוניות המוגברות של ישראל עקב המלחמה במפרץ ונושא ה-MTCR. לא עלו נושאים נוספים.

ה. אשר ל-MTCR איגלברגר ורוס ציינו הקשיים המשפטיים, בהם נתון המימשל לאור החקיקה, שראשיתה לפי המזכיר ברצון לסייע לישראל. הבטיחו התייחסות אוהדת מצידם לבעיותינו בנושא, אך הדגישו, עם זאת, שלדעתם הפתרון הטוב ביותר יושג באמצעות המחוקקים עצמם. הבהירו שה-16/2

אינו תאריך יעד סופי. עדכנתי בדבר המצאותו של נציג מטעמנו לדיון עמם בנושא.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

ידיעות לעתונות

לע"מ

שר הבסחון לא העלה בביקורו בארה"ב בקשה לסייג כלכלי

12.02.91

(נמסר ע"י יונען שר הבסחון לענייני תקשורת)

ירושלים, כ"ח בשבט תשנ"א, 12 בפברואר 1991 (לע"מ עש"ת 10)

לאור דיווחים שונים בעתונות האמריקאית היום מבקש יונען שר הבסחון לתקשורת, מר דני נווה, להבהיר:

שר הבסחון, מר משה ארנס, לא העלה כמרוצת ביקורו בווינגסטון בקשה לסייג כלכלי לישראל. כל הידיעות, לפיהן חזרה וטלחה בקשה לסייג של שלושה עשר ביליון דולר לישראל, אינם נכונים.

הנושא המרכזי בשיחות שר הבסחון בווינגסטון היה הצורך לשים קץ להתקפות המילים על ישראל. זו הייתה מטרת שליחותו של משה ארנס לווינגסטון.

לע"מ עש"ת (דף מס' 5)

וק/וק 21:50

NNNN

JERUSALEM, 13 FEBRUARY 1991

#22 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CLARIFICATION

/91.02.13 (COMMUNICATED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SPOKESMAN)

THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATION WAS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SPOKESMAN DANNY NAVEH:

DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MOSHE ARENS DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF AN ISRAELI REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL AID. ALL REPORTS WHICH CLAIM THAT A REQUEST FOR 13 BILLION DOLLARS OF AID FOR ISRAEL WAS RAISED AGAIN ARE INCORRECT.

THE MAIN TOPIC OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON WAS THE NEED TO PUT A STOP TO THE MISSILE ATTACKS ON ISRAEL. THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S MISSION TO WASHINGTON.

DS/DF
INST
#0

08:00 HOURS

אאא, חוזם: 16095
אל: רהמש/1493
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 165, תא: 070291, חז: 2119, חד: ב, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/בהול לבקר
אל: מצפ"א
מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור משלחת קונגרסמנים

1. ביום ג' 12/2 תגיע ארצה משלחת בת 7 קונגרסמנים לביקור סולידריות עם ישראל.
המשלחת תגיע בטיסת אל-על מניו-יורק הנוחתת בשעה 14:20.
תעזוב את ישראל ביום ה' 16:30 בטיסת אל-על לניו-יורק.
2. יוזם ביקור המשלחת הוא דני אברם שפנה ל- NATPAC וביקשם לארגן הביקור והתחייב מצידו לשלם כל ההוצאות.
3. כרגע, אין עדיין רשימה סופית של חברי המשלחת שכן ממתינים לתשובות. נבריק מחר רשימת הקונגרסמנים המשתתפים.
4. אל המשלחת יתלוו: ריצ'רד אלטמן וג'ונתן קסלר מ- NATPAC ודיויד מיטצ'ל-איש עסקים מניו-יורק.
5. להלן הבקשות:

פגישות עם רה"מ, שה"ח, ס/שה"ח אולי א"ע, שהב"ט, תדרוך צבאי, ביקור/פגישה עם עולים מברה"מ, ביקור באתר טילי הפטריוט וסיור עם ר"ע ת"א באתרים שנפגעו בהתקפות הטילים.
כן מבקשים, אם ניתן, לבקר אולי אצל משפחה כדי לראות חדר אטום.
אמנם מדובר בבקשות רבות לשהות בת 48 ובהתראה קצרה, אך נודה על כל מאמצים.

6. מבקשים להזמין עבורם 10 חדרים ללינה (עפ"י תעריפי משה"ח) או בירושלים במלון המלך דוד או בת"א במלון שתמצאו לנכון. הכל בהתאם לנוחיותכם והתכנית שתקבעו.
כן מבקשים לדאוג לרכב עבורם למשך ימי שהותם.
כל ההוצאות ישולמו במקום.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, רביב, מאור

מסמך מס' 100291

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ר ג

אאאא, חוזם: 19358

אל: רהמש/1635

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 198, תא: 100291, זח: 0758, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

בהול ליום א'/שמור

אל: מצפא

מאת:ק. לקונגרס

ביקור משלחת קונגרסמנים

בהמשך למברקי 165 מ 7/2

א. להלן רשימת הקונגרסמנים שנתנו תשובה חיובית המגיעים לביקור:- הנרי וקסמן (דמו' קליפורניה), צ'אק שומר (דמו' ניו-יורק), ג'ים סקסטון (רפו' ניו-ג'רסי) סנדר לוין (דמו' מישיגן) נבריק בהמשך שמות הקונגרסמנים הנוספים.

ב. אנשי NATPAC ביקשו שתי פגישות נוספות:-

1. פגישה עם הנשיא הרצוג - דני אברם מממן הביקור יזם הרעיון.

2. פגישה עם שר האוצר מודעי - דיויד מיטצ'ל, אשר נפגש עם שר האוצר בניו-יורק הציע הפגישה. פגישה זו בעדיפות.

ג. הקונגרסמן הנרי וקסמן, המגיע עם הקבוצה לארץ (ביום ג' 12/2 בטיסת אל-על 008 הנוחתת בשעה 2:20) יעזוב את ישראל ביום א' 17/2 בשעה 16:30. אנא האריכו עבורו את הזמנת החדר במלון המלך דוד היינו מה - 12/2 עד 16/2 ועד בכלל.

יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, בןאבו, רביב, מאור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 21060

אל: רהמש/1765

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 208, תא: 110291, חז: 1723, ח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,699227

שמור / בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור משלחת קונגרסמנים
בהמשך לשיחתי הטלפונית עם משה רם להלן עדכון.

א. בסופו של דבר יגיעו ארצה רק הקונגרסמנים ג'ים סקסטון (רפובליקני מניו ג'רסי) והנרי וקסמן (דמוקרט מקליפורניה) בלווית ריצ'רד אלטמן מנכ"ל NATPAC.

ב. לאור זאת אנא בטלו ההזמנות ל- 10 החדרים במלון המלך דוד והזמינו רק 3 חדרים.

ג. מניחים שאתם ממתינים להם בתנב"ג.
לידיעתכם שאלטמן וסקסטון נוסעים ביחד - במחלקה הראשונה באל-על. וקסמן ורעייתו, מגיעים על אותה טיסה, במחלקת עסקים.

ד. בהמשך לשאלותיכם, אינם מתנגדים לסיקור תקשורתי, נהפוך הוא.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, רביב, מאור, @ (עמיקס/כנסת)

סססס

α

אאאא, חו זס: 21643
אל: רהמש/1832
מ-: המשד, תא: 120291, זח: 1413, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ'ס/בהול לבוקר
101.01

אל: וושינגטון - שגריר, דובר
ניו-יורק - קונכ'ל, דובר
מיאמי - קונכ'ל

הנדון: ביקור השר

1. להלן הודעת דובר 12.2.91

שה'ח דוד לוי דחה את פגישתו המתוכננת עם מזכיר המדינה בייקר. לנוכח הפגישות שקיים שר הבטחון עם הנשיא בוש, עם מזכיר ההגנה צ'ייני ועם מזכיר המדינה בייקר, סבור שה'ח כי עליו ללמוד את הנושאים שנדונו בפגישות אלו וכן את ההכנות והסיכומים שהושגו בהן.

2. מסרנו לשגארה'ב.

3. וושינגטון: נא להעביר למחמ'ד.

4. ניו-יורק: נא להעביר לנקרא'ק.

5. הודעה זו שודרה בחדשות השעה 13.00.

מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מעת, הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 19707

אל: רהמש/1680

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 201, תא: 100291, זח: 1445, ח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע: מצפא

מאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון

ביקור שהח.

1. להלן הצעותינו לפגישות במהלך ביקור ס/רה'מ ושהח בושינגטון:

א. מימשל:

בנוסף לפגישה עם מזכיר המדינה (15/2 שעה 1100) מציעים לבקש פגישות עם ס/הנשיא, הגנרל סקורופט. כמו-כן מציעים שנבדוק אפשרות פגישה עם הנשיא.

ב. קונגרס:

כידוע, נמצא הקונגרס בפגרה עד ה-19/2. אנשי הקישור לקונגרס יקיימו בדיקה לגבי המצאותם בעיר של חברים במנהיגות ובוועדות הרלבנטיות (חוץ והקצבות). מציעים שתסמיכו אותנו לקבוע פגישות בהתאם ליום ה' הקרוב.

ג. עתונות:

- לאחר הפגישה עם מזכיר המדינה -

(1) STAKOUT - מסר קצר ושאלות ותשובות-כתבים מדיניים במחמד למטה.

(2) ראיון לטלוויזיה הישראלית - בודקים האפשרות לראיון 'חי' למהדורת החדשות של הערב.

(3) תדרוך מערכת ה-WP.

- ביום חמישי אה'צ' ממליצים על פגישה - מעין הרצאה קצרה ושו'ת בנושא הרעיונות לקידום התוכנית המדינית עם בעלי טורים ומנהלי המשרדים BUREAU-CHIEFS.

הערה: פורום מכובד ומרשים של כ-50 עתונאים בכירים.

- ניתן לבדוק אפשרות ראיון לאחת הרשתות.

2. בודקים אפשרות אירוע חברתי למוזמנים ביום ה' בערב. נאם לא יעלה בידינו עקב קוצר הזמן נארגן ארוחת ערב - תדרוך לנציגות הישראלית הבכירה.

3. נודה על קבלה בחוזר של מועדים סופיים (לצורך הזמנת מלון), הרכב פמליה וכן אם מגיע מתורגמן מהארץ.

לשכת השגריר

אאא, חוזם: 18939

אל: רהמש/1620

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090291, זח: 2236, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון - ק' לקונגרס

דע: שגריר, ציר

הנדון: לנטוס - ברית צבאית ישראל-ארה"ב

1. כפי שבוודאי נודע לכם מהתקשורת, העלה הקונגרסמן לנטוס בפני רה"מ רעיון לפיו תיכרת ברית צבאית בין ישראל - ארה"ב. רה"מ העיר שאינו מתנגד לרעיון זה. בצאתו מהשיחה עם רה"מ, סיפר לנטוס על הנ"ל לנציגי המדיה שהמתינו לו. כ"כ חזר על העניין בחדשות הטלוויזיה הישראלית באנגלית אמש (8.2) ובמעמדים תקשורתיים נוספים (CNN ועוד). לדבריו, בכוונתו לנסות ולקדם את ההצעה בקונגרס (ואצל הממשל) נשובו לו ושינגטון.

2. בפגישה עם שה"ח (7.2) ציין לנטוס שבכך שבקשנו (לדבריו) - ושקבלנו חיילים אמריקאים ופטריוטים להגן על ישראל, 'עברנו את נהר הרוביקון'. עתה עלינו לנטוש קונספציות העבר ולהשלים עם נוכחות צבאית אמריקאית בישראל לשם הגנתנו, כפי שעשו מדינות אירופה במשך 'שני דורות' מאז תום מלחמת העולם השנייה. לא (לא) הציע בשיחה זו ברית צבאית.

3. דיווח מורחב על הביקור בנפרד.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18939

אל: רהמש/1620

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090291, זח: 2236, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון - ק' לקונגרס

דע: שגריר, ציר

הנדון: לנטוס - ברית צבאית ישראל-ארה"ב

1. כפי שבוודאי נודע לכם מהתקשורת, העלה הקונגרסמן לנטוס בפני רה"מ רעיון לפיו תיכרת ברית צבאית בין ישראל - ארה"ב. רה"מ העיר שאינו מתנגד לרעיון זה. בצאתו מהשיחה עם רה"מ, סיפר לנטוס על הנ"ל לנציגי המדיה שהמתינו לו. כ"כ חזר על הענין בחדשות הטלוויזיה הישראלית באנגלית אמש (8.2) ובמעמדים תקשורתיים נוספים (CNN ועוד). לדבריו, נכוונתו לנסות ולקדם את ההצעה בקונגרס (ואצל הממשל) בשובו לושינגטון.

2. בפגישה עם שה"ח (7.2) ציין לנטוס שבכך שבקשנו (לדבריו) - ושקבלנו חיילים אמריקאים ופטריוטים להגן על ישראל, 'עברנו את נהר הרוביקון'. עתה עלינו לנטוש קונספציות העבר ולהשלים עם נוכחות צבאית אמריקאית בישראל לשם הגנתנו, כפי שעשו מדינות אירופה במשך 'שני דורות' מאז תום מלחמת העולם השנייה. לא (לא) הציע בשיחה זו ברית צבאית.

3. דיווח מורחב על הביקור בנפרד.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס

אאא, תוזם: 18752

אל: רהמש/1603

מ-: ווש, נר: 2088, תא: 080291, זח: 2145, חמ: סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: ממ'ד, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

ירדן/סוריה/איראן

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1. בפתיחת השיחה אמר שנאומו האחרון של חוסיין ייצור לו בעיות קשות בארה"ב, בממשל ובקונגרס. הסיוע האמריקני הישיר פחות חשוב מסיוע הקרן לנפגעות המשבר במפרץ. עד כה, ארה"ב דחפה מדינות אחרות לסייע לירדן, כמעט כאילו היתה חברה בקואליציה. בהמשך אמר כי איננו יודע מה תהיינה החלטות הממשל בנושא, אך לדעתו אין לעשות מאומה (מעבר להפגנה המילולית על מורת רוח כלפי ירדן. י.א.). הסכים עם זאת שחוסיין פועל כאילו ארה"ב נמצאת בכיסו (מבחינת דבקותה בהמשך הסיוע עקב ענינה בשרידות המשטר) וכי יש להנחיל לו את התחושה שהדבר איננו כך.

2. בעקבות מאמר ה'וושינגטון פוסט' (8 פבר') שדווח על קיום שתי אסכולות בממשל, לארוך המשבר, האחת קוראת לבוא חשבון עם ירדן על סיועה לעיראק, והאחרת מצדדת בגישת התחשבות באילוצים הפנימיים של המשטר - ביקשתיו לנקוב בשמות הנמנים על שתי האסכולות. לדבריו באסכולה ה'אנטי-ירדנית' (הגדרת הח' מ) חברים רוס, קלי, דיק קלארק, והאסכולה ה'פרו-ירדנית' (הגדרת הח' מ) מונה את הנשיא סקאוקרופט, בייקר, צ'ייני ופואל.

3. העריך שהמלך ביקש הפעם 'להקדים את הרחוב', אך ביטא גם את אמונותיו שלו. הפטיר: יש להניע אותו לפחות להוות מעט מאחורי הרחוב. ציין שהמלך פופולרי, וכי ההפגנות היו עד כה, מתונות למדי, אך הסכים שהמשטר עדיין לא עמד במבחן ממשי, וצפה שהתסיסה תתגבר.

4. לדעתו, המלך שולט בצבא ובשרותי הבטחון. המודיעין הכללי (אלמח' בראת אלעמאמה) הירדני מוסיף לעבוד באורח הדוק ביותר עם השרותים האמריקאים. לאחרונה ספר [REDACTED] (?) לראש השלוחה (?) (HEAD OF THE MISSION) האמריקאית כי הרגש (SENTIMENT) האנטי-אמריקאי גובר (ברחוב הירדני י.א.). בן שיחי ייחס להתבטאות זו חשיבות רבה שכן [REDACTED] מעולם לא התבטא כך בפניהם. יומים אחר כך צימצמה ארה"ב את שגרירותה בירדן והזהירה את אזרחיה שם. ציין שהמודיעין הירדני פועל רבות לבלימת פעולות טרור נגד מטרות אמריקאיות ואף ישראליות, הזכיר, בהקשר זה, את אבו אלעבאס ולא פרט.

5. להערכתו, התסיסה האנטי אמריקאים גברה על רקע פגיעות חה'א האמריקאי במשאיות הירדניות, ובשל תחושת הציבור הירדני שהפצצות פוגעות בעם העיראקי.

6. לשאלתי קבע שירדן איננה מעניקה סיוע כלכלי או צבאי לעיראק. לא הבחין בפעילות מיוחדת של השגרירות העיראקית בעמאן להגברת השפעת עיראק בירדן. התייחסתי ל'שמועות' על חלוקת כספים עיראקיים לגורמים בירדן. השיב כי כך פועלים הערבים כולם מאז ומעולם, והדגיש, בהקשר זה: את הסעודים. לדעתו, אמצעי התקשורת הירדנים נוקטים קו פרו עיראק משום שבכך הם מאמינים, ולא על רקע הנחיות עיראקיות כלשהן בדיוק הפלסינטים בשטחים.

סוריה

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 7. בוש התקשר לאסד (ב-6.2) , בעיקרו של דבר כדי לשמור על קשר (TOUCH DASE). בין השאר הבהיר לסורי - בהנחה שהדברים יועברו לאיראן - כי ארה"ב איננה פוגעת באתרים המקודשים לשיעה, המצויים בעיראק.

8. לבקשתי, התייחס לידיעות אודות סוכני מודיעין שהוצאו להורג עקב מידע מביקר לאסד, והמנעות הבית הלבן מלמלא בקשת הפנטגון כי ילחץ על סוריה שתאפשר שימוש במרחב האווירי שלה למלחמה בעיראק (ניו-יורק טיימס 8,7 פברואר). הכחיש הידיעות, אך הוסיף כי כמו בכל דווח 'קיימת מעט אש': סוכני מודיעין הוצאו להורג בסוריה, והצבא האמריקאי מעוניין, ככל צבא, להנות ממירב האפשרויות לפעילותו הצבאית.

איראן

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 9. אמר, בלגלוג, שסעדון חמאדי ביקש מאיראן כי תשחרר את המטוסים ותצטרף למלחמה בישראל (כך). נתקבל בסרוב בוטה ובקביעה איראנית שעיראק תפסיד במלחמה.

סוריה/התהליך המדיני.

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 10. ציין הבעיתיות הכרוכה במצבם של הפלסטינים וירדן, מול התהליך על רקע משבר המפרץ, וקבע בחיך כי 'אתם עלולים עוד למצוא פרטנר למו'מ בדמותה של סוריה'. סיפר כי בעת ביקורו בישראל, תוך כדי שרותו בעבר בדמשק, חש ישראל וסוריה מהוות למעשה תמונת ראי. ציין בין השאר: אתם והם קשוחים כמו'מ ויודעים רצונכם, ישראל חוששת מהאיום הערבי, ואילו סוריה רואה בישראל ענק תאב התפשטות (למותר לציין שבתגובה הצבעתי על הבדלים מסויימים. י.א.).

מצרים.

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 11. הפטיר במהלך השיחה: מה היינו עושים לולא מצרים ? (נאמר בנימה של הכרה עמוקה בתרומה המצרית לאינטרס האמריקני במהלך המשבר. י.א.).

דמוקרטיה/איסלאם.

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 12. תוך התייחסות למתחולל בירדן ובאלג'יריה תהה על התופעה בה תהליכי דמוקרטיזציה מביאים להתחזקות הגורמים הקיצוניים. להלן הדגיש הניגוד החד בין הפתיחות והדמוקרטיה המאפיינים את ישראל לבין המתחולל בחברות הערביות, ואמר שיתכן כי קודם להצבת תיבת הקלפי יש לבצע עבודת תשתית יסודית בחינוך, חפש עיתונות וכו'.
 סיכם בנימת יאוש, אך נראה שהבעיה היא באיסלאם, שאיננו עולה בקנה אחד עם הדמוקרטיה. איני יודע מה ניתן לעשות.

אמיתי

תפוצה: שחח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מרכזאיסוף

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18541

אל: רהמש/1572

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 176, תא: 080291, זח: 1417, חד: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

8/2/91

אל: מצפ"א

דע: קונכ"ל בוסטון (לא הועבר), קונכ"ל ל.א, מקש"ח
מנהל האוצר

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

מפגשי השגריר - סנטורים ליידי וגארן (כ"א לחוד)

1. נא ראה המצ"ל.

2. הסנטור ליידי:

- מה גורל 400 מליון הדולרים? לדברי יועצו הבכיר, אריק ניוסום, ממתנה סוכנות A.I.D. לאור ירוק מלשכתו של מזכיר המדינה.

- סעיף התקציב הפחות פופולרי בעיני הצבור הוא חק סיוע החוץ, במיוחד על רקע המשבר הכלכלי החולק ומחריף. קשה מאד יהיה לשכנע הבוחרים כי ערבויות להלוואות אינן מענק או הלוואות ממשלתיים. הדגש בתקשורת יהיה על הסכום (10 מיליארד) ולא על המהות (ערבויות להלוואות).

- לדברי ניוסום (ראש צוות העוזרים בתת-הועדה האחראית על סיוע החוץ) יש לעשות כל מאמץ לגייס תמיכת הממשל (או אף יוזמתו) בסיוע לישראל.

- יו"ר ועדת ההקצבות הרחבה, בירד, ינהל הדיון על התקציב במיוחד (SUPPLEMENTAL) לממון "סערת המדבר", והודיע כי לא יניח לתקונים החורגים מן המלחמה "לתפוס טרמפ" עליו. הסכום לאשור מיליארד הדולר הנוספים לסיוע בטחוני תלוי בהגדרתם - ע"י הנשיא והקונגרס כאחד - כ"חרום לאומי" (NATIONAL EMERGENCY), ולשם כך קים צורך קריטי בגיוס תמיכת הממשל. סעיף תקציבי הזוכה להגדרה זאת אינו מהווה נטל על הגרעון. במדה והסעיף יתום מהגדרה זאת, הוא מגדיל את הגרעון, ולפי שיטת ה-SEQUESTER החדשה (PAY AS YOU GO) יגרום לקיצוץ מידי בכל סעיפי חוק סיוע החוץ. לאחרונה שמע כי יש טוענים שלמרות שמדובר בערבויות להלוואות (לגבי 10 מיליארד הדולרים בקליטה וכלכלה), הרי שיש, אולי, השלכה תקציבית מסוימת (למרות שהטענה נראית כמשוללת יסוד, נבדק הנושא - י.א.). במידה ואכן אין השלכה תקציבית לערבויות להלוואות הנחקקות במסגרת תקציב מיוחד 1991, הרי שהגדרתן כ"חרום לאומי" אינה משמעותית.

- ליידי מקיים קשר בנושא סיוע החוץ גם עם ידידיו בישראל, ועומד לשוחח בנדון (ברוח אוהדת) עם המזכיר בייקר.

- שמע מאיגלברגר תשכחות על בקורו בישראל ועל עמדות הממשלה.

- מוטריד מהנזק לתדמית ישראל מן הטענה כאילו אין מחלקים לפלסטינים מסכות גז.

- תוהה האם השליטה ביו"ש אכן קריטית לבטחון ישראל, שהרי אם תקדמנה מדינות ערב צבאותיהן לכיוון ישראל, תוכל ישראל להגיב במהירות גם אם אינה שולטת ביו"ש.

3. הסנטור גארן:

- הערכה עמוקה לריסון הישראלי. אילו היו נוחתים "סקאדים" על סאלט-לייק-סיטי היה ממריא מיד כדי להפציץ את אויבו.

- אם ישתמש צדאם בנשק בלתי קונבנציונאלי יהיה על ארה"ב להגיב בצורה דרסטית

- אינו מוכן לשהיה ממושכת של כח צבאי אמריקאי גדול במזה"ת. שואף לפתרון ארוך-טווח ערבי.

- יש להגדיר את צדאם כמטרה.
- אפשר היה למנוע את פריצת המלה"ע השניה, אם היה העולם מגיב לתוקפנות היטלר מוקדם יותר.
- המלחמה מוכיחה כי המשך אופצית הסנקציות היה עלול להיות בלתי יעיל ואף הרסני.
- התקשורת מנפחת את מימדי המחאה המצומצמת. נדהם מדרישתה הבלתי-אחראית של התקשורת להסיר מגבלות הצנזורה.
- יש להביא לפתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית, אם כי אינו יודע מה הפתרון, וודאי שאינו סבור שיש לכפות על ישראל פתרון. על ישראל יהיה לנוע מהר יותר לאתר המלחמה.
- אין ליצור לינקאג'.

4. שגריר:

- אם יובס צדאם, יש סכוי שמדינות ערב תתמודדנה עם בעיותיהן האמיתיות. אם יאפשרו לצדאם לטעון לנצחון, הרי שהרדיקליות (צדאם) תנצח את המתונות הערבית (מובארק).
- התפקיד המרכזי בעיצוב המז"ת לאחר המלחמה שייך לארה"ב. יש לקוות שווינגטון לא תניח לעוינות להמשיך ולעצב את יחס הערבים כלפי ישראל, ובמקום זאת תדרכן הערבים לפרוייקטים של שת"פ אזורי עם ישראל.
- יש להעריך מחדש סדר העדיפויות בפתרון הסכסוך: הנושא הפלסטיני אינו מרכזי, ולכן יש להתמקד בשלום ערב-ישראל אשר יסיר האיום המרכזי מעל לראשה של ישראל. הדבר יתרום להרגעת האוירה המז"תית, ויאפשר מו"מ פורה יותר בהקשר הבעיה הפלסטינית.
- אש"פ אינו שותף למו"מ לשלום.
- מדינה פלסטינית אינה מהווה פתרון, אלא מגבירה האיום. במקום התרעה של מספר דקות, יהיו לישראל מספר שניות של התרעה על ירי טילים.
- הפתרון יהיה על בסיס תכנית האוטונומיה, המעניקה לצדדים תקופת ביניים לבחינות המציאות החדשה.
- ירדן תהיה מעורבת - מעצם מהותה האתנית והאסטרטגית - בשלבי האחרונים של הפתרון.
- הבעיה האמיתית של השטחים אינה מתמקדת בחפוש בית לפלסטינים, מכיוון שיש להם בית זה-פאקטו בירדן. הבעיה האמיתית של יו"ש היא בטחון וקיום ישראל.
- פתרון של פשרה טריטוריאלית אינו ריאלי. יש ליצור שותפות אינטרסים - בין ישראל, ירדן והפלסטינים לגבי הניהול השוטף של חיי היום-יום ביו"ש.
- הבהרת נושא חלוקת מסיכות הגז לערביי יו"ש.
- בצווי "הפטריוט" מרשימים, אך התגלו גם מגבלות המבליטות את חיוניות המשך פיתוח ה"חץ".
- אם תיאלץ ישראל להגיב לתוקפנות עיראק, יתקבל הדבר בהבנה ע"י ארה"ב.
- ישראל עומדת להגיש בקשה למיליארד דולרים סיוע חרום בטחוני (למרות שכלל הוצאות המלחמה בסקטור האזרחי, גדול יותר) ולערבויות להלוואות לקליטה וכלכלה בסך 10 מיליארד דולרים. הממשל אינו מפגין נטיה לתמוך בבקשות, ואם לא ייענה לפניית ישראל, נפנה ל"גבעה".
- ישראל מהווה "מדינת חזית" כמו תורכיה, מצרים וירדן, וגם היא ראויה לסיוע מיוחד עקב נזקי המלחמה.

קוים לדמותו של הסנטור ג'ייק גארן (רפוב' - יוטה)

1. חבר בתת-ועדת ההקצבות לענייני הגנה האחראית על תקציב הפנטגון (הכולל סעיפים ישראלים). ס/יו"ר ועדת הבנקאות, שכונ ודיור. פעיל ב"קוקוס" למלחמה בסמים.
2. נבחר לסנאט ב-1974 ועומד לבחירה ב-1992. שוקל פרישה אפשרית ב-1992, אשר תאפשר לו יד חופשית יותר בהצבעות עד אז.
3. רפובליקני שמרן.
4. "נץ" בנושאים בטחוניים. תומך בעסקות נשק עם מדינות ערב. מעריך את כושרה הצבאי של ישראל, אך נוטה לצדד בעמדות בקורתיות של הממשל כלפינו, כולל נושא "התנחלויות במז' י-ס".
- נמנה על 8 הבודדים אשר הצביעו יחד עם דול ובירד בנדון במהלך חקיקת חק סיוע החוץ ב-10/1990.

5. יליד 1932. תואר ראשון מאוניברסיטת יוטה. מקצועו: סוכן ביטוח. כיהן כראש עיריית SALT LAKE CITY בשנים 1972-74. שירת כטיס בצי האמריקאי 1956-60.

6. נושאים לדיון:

- בקשה לסייע בהשגרת ה-MOA של ה"חץ" על כנו.
- הזמנה לבקר בישראל בפגרת הפסחא.
- האמת מאחורי 13 מיליארד הדולרים.

קוים לדמותו של הסנטור פטריק ליייה (דמוק' - ורמונט)

1. יו"ר תת-ועדת הקצבות ל-FOREIGN OPERATIONS האחראית על חק סיוע החוץ, יו"ר ועדת החקלאות, תזונה וייעור ויו"ר תת-ועדת המשפט לעניני טכנולוגיה.

2. נבחר לסנאט ב- 1974 ועומד לבחירה ב- 1992.

3. דמוקרט ליברל המייצג מדינה ליברלית.

4. תמך בהמשך אופצית הסנקציות נגד עיראק. שואף לחזק פוטנציאל האו"ם כגורם מרכזי ב"סדר החדש" בעולמנו.

5. ידידותי כלפי ישראל, אך ביקורתי בנושאי זכויות האדם, הבעיה הפלסטינית, דרא"פ, התנחלויות וכו'.

6. בהדרגה מגלה פתיחות ומעורבות חיוביים יותר כלפי ישראל, והיווה - יחד עם קסטן - "קטר" מרכזי בחקיקת 400 מליון הדולרים.

7. מגלה הערכה רבה לרה"מ על הריסון, אך מוטרד מן הגישה הכללית של רה"מ לפתרון הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי והבעיה הפלסטינית.

8. מוטרד מהשלכות אפשריות של פרשת דותן על הסיוע הבטחוני וגם ממנויו של גנדי לתפקיד של שר בממשלה.

9. יד ימינו בנושאי ישראל, וראש צוות העוזרים בתת-הועדה, הוא אריק ניוסום.

10. יליד 1940. תואר למשפטים מאוניברסיטת ג'ורג'טאון. מקצועו עו"ד.

11. נושאים לדיון:

- הזמנה לבקר בישראל בפגרת הפסחא
- הלוואות ערבויות (לנסות ולשכנע הממשל להגיש הבקשה).
- סיום פרשת ה- 400 מיליון.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 18253

אל: רהמש/1530

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 169, תא: 080291, זח: 0954, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / ב ה ו ל

אל : לשכת שר החוץ

דע : מנהל מצפ"א

מאת : השגריר, וושינגטון

בקור שר החוץ

משרדו של מזכיר המדינה הודיעו לי שישמח לפגוש את שר החוץ במהלך בקורו בארה"ב, ביום ו' 15 בפברואר.

הודיעוני נא אם לאשר וכן מועדי שהות השר בושינגטון. לשיקולכם קביעת פגישות נוספות לס. רה"מ ושר החוץ.

זלמן שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18596
אל: רהמש/1581
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 179, תא: 080291, חז: 1527, חמ: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמסס/מידי

אל : שר האוצר .

דע : מנכ"ל . ממונה על תקציבים .
מצפ"א .
ע. רובין - לשכת רוה"מ .

מאת : אמנון נויבך - ציר כלכלי וושינגטון .

הנדון : דרישות המידע על הסיוע הממשלתי להתנחלויות .

בעקבות הודעת מזכיר המדינה על מספר בעיות טכניות המחייבות טיפול ,
קיימנו ברורים עם מחמ"ד בנדון .

אתמול בערב התקשר דניס רוס לשגריר ובקש ממנו את המידע הבא :

EXPENDITURES BEYOND THE "GREEN LINE" - FOR AS MANY MINISTRIES. 1
AS POSSIBLE .

INFORMATION ON NEW ROAD-PROJECTS . 2

3 . כמה ישובים חדשים הוקמו בשטחים מאז אוקטובר 1990- וכמה "הורחבו"
מידע זה עונה לדעתם על המשפט במכתבו של ד. לוי מיום 2.10.90 בו נאמר
כי השר יעשה כמיטב יכולתו לספק מידע על הסיוע הכספי להתנחלויות .
בשלב זה עצר המזכיר את הטיפול הטכני בנושא עד שייתקבל המידע הנ"ל .

אמנון נויבך

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן ,
כלכליתב', אוצר

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18715

אל: רהמש/1602

מ-: ווש, נר: 2086, תא: 080291, זח: 1800, חמ: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: לש' רה'מ, לש' שה'ח

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

שיחה עם איגלברגר

1. בשיחה טלפונית עם ס/ מזכיר המדינה ציין שחשוב שנמסור האינפורמציה המבוקשת בנושא הערבויות לשיכון (400 מליון) במהירות המרבית כך שניתן יהיה להתחיל בגיוס הכסף. בתשובה לשאלתי אם בכך יבוא הנושא לכלל סיום ענה איגלברגר שהוא יכול להבטיח (ABSOLUTLY) שלא יבקשו מידע נוסף.

2. ביזמתו ביקש איגלברגר לציין שבעקבות מכתב רה'מ לנשיא, איגלברגר מבקש להרגיע חששותנו ולמסור באופן לא רשמי לראש הממשלה שעושים הכל לשמור אותנו בתמונה, שפרו התקשורת בין מערכות הבטחון וימשיכו לעשות כל מאמץ לחסל את הטילים.

3. בסיום השיחה הבעתי הערכתנו לנחישות רוחם ומאמץ החיילים האמריקאים במבצע 'DESERT STORM'

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 18596
אל: רהמש/1581
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 179, תא: 080291, זח: 1527, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמסס/מיידי

אל : שר האוצר .

דע : מנכ"ל . ממונה על תקציבים .
מצפ"א.
ע. רובין - לשכת רוה"מ.

מאת : אמנון נויבך - ציר כלכלי וושינגטון.

הנדון : דרישות המידע על הסיוע הממשלתי להתנחלויות .

בעקבות הודעת מזכיר המדינה על מספר בעיות טכניות המחייבות טיפול ,
יימנו ברורים עם מחמ"ד בנדון .

אתמול בערב התקשר דניס רוס לשגריר ובקש ממנו את המידע הבא :

EXPENDITURES BEYOND THE "GREEN LINE" - FOR AS MANY MINISTRIES. 1
AS POSSIBLE .

INFORMATION ON NEW ROAD-PROJECTS . 2

3 . כמה ישובים חדשים הוקמו בשטחים מאז אוקטובר 1990- וכמה "הורחבו"
מידע זה עונה לדעתם על המשפט במכתבו של ד. לוי מיום 2.10.90 בו נאמר
כי השר יעשה כמיטב יכולתו לספק מידע על הסיוע הכספי להתנחלויות .
בשלב זה עצר המזכיר את הטיפול הטכני בנושא עד שייתקבל המידע הנ"ל.

אמנון נויבך

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן ,
כלכליתב', אוצר

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18729

אל: רהמש/1593

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 193, תא: 080291, חז: 2029, חמ: סג: שמ,

כבכ

שמור / מידי

8/2/91

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הופעת השגריר בפני ועדת השירותים המזויינים

1. ב- 6/2 הופיע השגריר (ביוזמתנו) בפני ועדת השירותים המזויינים.

השתתפו הקונגרסמנים: בנט (פלורידה), סייסקי (וירג'יניה), מייטלי (רוד איילנד), דורנן (קליפורניה), מונטגומרי (מיסיסיפי - ניהל הישיבה), האטו (פלורידה), פיקט (וירג'יניה), בילבריי (נבדה), סקסטון (ניוג'רזי), מברוליס (מסצ'וסטס), פוגליאטה (פנסילבניה), לנקסטר (צפון קרוליינה), טנאר (טנסי), בוקסר (קליפורניה), מקררי (לואיזיאנה), ביירון (מרילנד).
 כן השתתפו עוזרים מצוות הועדה ועוזרים אישיים.
 יו"ר הועדה אספין, התנצל אולם לא יכול היה להשתתף.
 מצידנו השתתפו: אטינגר, עמרני והח"מ.

2. הדיון התקיים במתכונת שאלות ותשובות:-

דורנן - א. הביע ביקורת חריפה על CNN וניהול תעמולה מבגדד.
 ב. התייחס להתעוררות ההמונים במדינות מתונות כמרוקו ולהפגנה שם של 300 אלף איש. לדבריו העליתא האינטלקטואלית מתעלמת מסאדם ופשעיו. ביקש התייחסות השגריר לתופעת המפגינים במדינות ערב.
 שגריר - א. סאדם לא הצליח להסית ולהתסיס את העולם הערבי. בנוגע למרוקו, היו לה בעיות כלכליות קשות אולם משך שנים הצליחה להסיט את תשומת הלב של דעה"ק לעבר המלחמה בפוליסריו.
 ייתכן שההפגנות במרוקו נועדו להסיט תשומת הלב של ההמונים מהבעיות הכלכליות לעבר עירק.

ב. יש לציין שבעולם הערבי קיים תסכול בעל שורשים הסטוריים, שמקורו במשבר הנפט ב- 1974, וההכרה הערבית שהמערב היה מסוגל להתמודד עם משבר זה. רבים מהם רואים בסאדם גיבור.

לפיכך, אם המלחמה תסתיים, סאדם ישאר על כנו ויתפס כמנצח, זו תהיה סכנה אפילו לדורות הבאים. שכן סאדם יתפס כמי שהוכיח יכולתו לעמוד בפני המערב והדחף והרצון לעימות ישארו.

מאידך, אם סאדם יובס באופן מוחלט (WILL BE DECISEVELY DEFEATED) יתגברו הסיכויים לכך שאנשים בעולם הערבי יאמרו שהצדק עם המתונים. (בכל מקרה), הכל תלוי בתוצאות המלחמה.

מייטלי - א. מה צריכה להיות תגובת ארה"ב אם סאדם יודיע על נכונותו לנסיגה ויקרא להפסקת המלחמה.

ב. אם סאדם ייסוג וישמור אפילו על חלק מעצמתו, כיצד עלינו (ארה"ב) להיערך כך שארה"ב וישראל לא תמצאנה עצמן בעוד שנה במצב של סיכון.

שגריר - לא עלי לתת לארה"ב עצות כיצד לנהוג. יציאת עירק מכווית היא המטרה העיקרית אולם לא הבלעדית. השאלה האמתית היא כיצד להבטיח שעירק תחת סאדם לא תנצל הזדמנות חדשה מיד לאחר יציאת הכוחות האמריקנים מהאיזור. אם סאדם ישאר על כנו עם חלק מצבאו, ימשיך לאיים לא רק על ישראל, המסוגלת להגן על עצמה אלא על מדינות האיזור (המפרציות). מכאן, שהבסת סאדם, ולא עירק, צריכה להיות מוחלטת.

סיסיסקי - הביע דאגה לגבי המדינות הגובלות בעירק - סוריה ואירן.
 שגריר - עירק הוציאה 245 ב' דולר למלחמה באירן ובזבזה משאבים רבים ולכן

כנראה גם פלשה לכווית. שנוי במשטר בעירק יהיה לטובת האוכלוסייה. אין להתעלם מהעובדה שסאדם אינו כ"כ פופולרי בעירק אלא שולט בה באמצעי טרור.

פוגליאטה - "ריפד" את שאלתו במילות פתיחה חמות כדי להגיע ללב השאלה מבלי לפגוע בנו:-

יש לי רקורד של 100 אחוז תמיכה בישראל. בשבוע שעבר פורסמה ההודעה המשותפת של בייקר - ביסמרטינק אשר כללה התייחסות להזכרות של שלום בין 2 האומות. נראה לו שההודעה ניסתה לעקוף נושא הלינקג'. מיד לאחר פרסום ההודעה נשמעה ההתנגדות הישראלית וכן נשמעה התנגדות היהודים באיזור בחירתו. האם יש דרך כלשהי לדבר על שלום במזה"ת ללא לינקג'.

שגריר - אין דרך שבאמצעותה ניתן להשיג שלום או פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית אם קושרים אותה לכל נושא שהוא.

הסכוי היחיד של הפלסטינים להשגת חלק ממאוייהם הוא באמצעות מו"מ ישיר עם ישראל. לא סאדם ולא ערפת יביאו להם הישועה.

הפלסטינים החמיצו עד כה (במיוחד מאז ק"ד ומאז יוזמת ישראל ממאי '89) כל הזדמנות לפתרון.

לקישור נושא זה לפעולה אגרסיבית כמו זו של סאדם יכולה להיות משמעות אחת - האלימות משתלמת. סאדם לא פלש לכווית בגלל הפלסטינים. נראה לו שממארה"ב מתחילה לקבל העמדה שעל הערבים להכיר בישראל (הנמצאים עדיין במצב מלחמה עם ישראל) ושעיקר הבעיה איננה הבעיה הפלסטינית למרות שזו בעייה חשובה.

לארה"ב היכולת היום לפנות בנושא למדינות ערב ולקרוא להם לסיים התוקפנות הערבית כלפי ישראל.

בילבריי - תגובת ישראל להתקפות הטילים: נראה לו שכל תגובה ישראלית אפשרית תהיה COUNTER PRODUCTIVE לאור עוצמת פעילותה של ארה"ב. האם ישראל יכולה להמשיך במדיניות האיפוק? האם ישראל תתקוף מאוחר יותר לאחר שעירק כבר תכנע?

שגריר - התייחס למדיניות האיפוק של ישראל והוסיף כי למדיניות התגובה של ישראל שני היבטים:

א. המשך יכולת ההרתעה גם בעתיד. קיימת דאגה מאפשרות השתרשות התפיסה לפיה יאמינו מדינות ערב שאיבדנו כוחנו להגן על עצמנו.

ב. עמדת ישראל תמיד היתה כי איננה מעוניינת בחיילים אמריקנים שילחמו וימותו עבורה. אנו מעוניינים לעשות המלאכה לבדנו.

אם תהיה התקפה כימית על ישראל, ולפי הערכותינו זה עדיין אפשרי, יהיה מופתע אם ישראל לא תגיב במטרה להבטיח את אוכלוסייתה.

בילבריי - אם לא תהיה התקפה בלתי קונבנציונאלית, ישראל לא תגיב ?

שגריר - סבור שישראל לא תגיב וכך גם ענינו של הציבור הישראלי.

מברוליס - סיפר על ביקורו בישראל. לדבריו בעת פגישתו עם מוברק בקהיר שאלו "כיצד עובד הסכם השלום עם ישראל". מוברק השיב - "מצויין". הביע תקווה שלאחר המלחמה תגיע לטיפול הבעיה הפלסטינית.

שאל האם לא עדיף לחתור לקראת כמה הסכמי ק"ד, למשל ישראל - ירדן, ישראל - סוריה ולא דגש על ערפת.

שגריר - זה מה שישראל היתה רוצה. אנו מתנגדים לרעיון הועידה הבינ"ל רעיון ק"ד, אשר התהווה באיזור ולא בווינגטון הוא רעיון מצוין. התנאי

המוקדם לכך הוא שארה"ב תהנה מאמונם של שני הצדדים כ- HONEST BROKER.

בשלב זה, בגלל לחץ הזמן, שאלו המשתתפים שאלוהיהם במרוכז.

בוקסר - מודאגת מהמתרחש בתוך מצרים וירדן. מוברק קיווה שהמלחמה תסתיים תוך זמן קצר מאד והנה המלחמה נמשכת AND WE ARE RUSHING TO THE GROUND.

WAR בעקבות אבידות רבות בקרבות הקרקע יהיה לחץ לסיים מהר המלחמה. לאור דברי השגריר על הצורך בהכנסת סאדם, מנקשת לדעת הערכתו לגבי אפשרות של

DEFENSE TREATIES של ארה"ב עם מדינות האיזור, כדי שיגנו על עצמן לאחר שארה"ב תעזוב האיזור.

טאנר - מהו מצב סיום המלחמה, שיהיה מוסכם על ישראל, אם סאדם ישאר על כנו.

בירון - שיבחה את הציבור הישראלי והתנהגותו בזמן התקפות ומדיניות האיפוק של ישראל.

שגריר - אינו מומחה צבאי ואיננו שותפים לתכנון איסטרטגי אמריקני, שכן איננו חלק מהקואליציה.

אינו יודע על קרבות הקרקע. לדעתו, יש להמשיך בהתקפות אויריות עד נקודה מסוימת שאיננו יודע כרגע מהי.

לגבי הסכמים צבאיים - נשאלת השאלה מה יקרה אם מחר תנסה סוריה לכבוש את טבריה ויהיה לנו הסכם צבאי עם ארה"ב. האם נצטרך להמתין ?

בוקסר - אינה רואה הבדל בין נאטו לישראל. ישראל היא ידידה ולכן היא (בוקסר) מעוניינת לשלוח כוחות, אם יהיה צורך בכך.
 בילבריי - כוונת בוקסר היא שאם הערבים היו יודעים על הסכם צבאי כזה (בין ישראל לארה"ב) זה היה מביא ליותר בטחון (הרתעה).
 שגריר - בתשובה לשאלת טאנר: איננו מעוניינים שתלחמו עבורנו. מנקודת מבט עולמית, סאדס שנותר על כנו עם יכולתו הצבאית, יוכל לכצע שוב מעשי תוקפנות.

לסיכום, השגריר הודה לכל חברי הועדה על ידידותם וסיועם לישראל. שתה"פ בין שתי המדינות, אשר הועדה סייעה לו, היה BENEFICIAL אפילו במלחמה זו.

הפגישה היתה מאד ידידותית והמחוקקים שיבחו השגריר על הופעותיו בתקשורת. היא התקיימה מיד לאחר תדרוך סגור שקיימו צ'ייני ופאול עם חברי הועדה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
 @ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה, סולטן

סססס

15479:חו זס, אאאא
אל:רהמש/1410
מ:-המשרד, תא:070291, זח:1747, דח:ב, סג:בל,
בבב
9,035271750
9,244448
9,520517
בלמס/מיד

ושיננטון, נ'י -- בהול
הנציגויות -- מיידי
מרכזי תקשורת ת'א, י'ס -- בהול

STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOLLOWING THE STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

SOME OF THE IDEAS RAISED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR ADVANCING STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST COINCIDE WITH IDEAS WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS BEEN ADVANCING FOR SOME MONTHS. THESE IDEAS CONTRIBUTE TO CONSOLIDATING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR ACHIEVING THESE AIMS.

THE SIMILARITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES AS CAN BE DETERMINED FROM THE POSITIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS WELL AS FROM PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION, FINDS ITS EXPRESSION IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

* IN THE MIDDLE EAST A NEW REALITY MUST BE CREATED WHICH WILL NOT ALLOW FOR FUTURE WAR. THAT PERCEPTION WHICH VIEWS THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AS A COMPREHENSIVE CONFLICT REQUIRES IN TURN A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN WHICH FRAMEWORK A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WILL ALSO BE FOUND.

* RECONCILIATION WITH ISRAEL IS THE FIRST STEP WHICH THE ARAB STATES MUST TAKE.

* THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES.

* THE ARAB STATES MUST REACH A REAL, FULL PEACE WITH ISRAEL, NOT JUST AN END OF THE STATE OF WAR BUT AN EXPRESSION OF TRUST, TOLERANCE AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

* A SPECIAL EFFORT IS NEEDED TO STOP THE ARMS RACE SO THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL CEASE TO BE A DRAINAGE CHANNEL FOR THE WORLD'S SURPLUS ARMS.

* REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE -- AS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS DETAILED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS -- WITH THE EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEMS OF WATER AND ELECTRIC POWER WILL CONSOLIDATE THE PEACE.

THESE IDEAS WILL BE DISCUSSED AND MOLDED IN TALKS TO BE HELD SOON

BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO MENTIONED WITH SATISFACTION THE REMARKS OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE U.S. WILL "DEVOTE SPECIAL MILITARY EFFORTS" TO DESTROY THE SCUD MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS.

AD KAN

HASBARA/MEYDA

תפוצה: ששה, ששה, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה,
מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר,
ארבל, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר, איר, 2,
(לעמ), ארבל, פרנ, קשדן, אומן, (תקשורת/ים),
(תקשורת/תא), (המוסד/קוסמי)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14500

אל: רהמש/1359

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 123, תא: 060291, זח: 1723, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

דניס רוס הופיע אתמול בכנס ראשי איפא"ק ואמר שהמימשל מכיר בכך שנגרמו לישראל נזקים והפסדים, שהם מתכוננים לפעול אצל בנות-הברית כדי שאלו תעזורנה ואת ההפרש יצטרכו הם, האמריקנים, "לכסות איכשהו".

דניס הציע שלא להשתמש בנימוק של "למה המצרים קיבלו ואנחנו לא", נימוק זה לא יתקבל היטב. מאידך, כדאי להשתמש בנימוק של יציבות האיזור ואינטרס אמריקני.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, תוזס: 13751
 אל: רהמש/1247
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 060291, ח: 1610, ד: מ, ס: ג, סב,
 כבב
 96915
 סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: וושינגטון
 שגריר, ציר

(א) ביקרני בראון (5/2) למסור עיקרי דיווח שגריר ארה"ב בדמשק דג'רג'יאן על שיחתו עם שה"ח סוריה שרעא. עפ"י הדיווח קבל שרעא על שארה"ב תומכת בג'עג'ע ושאה"ב יוצרת לינקג' בין פתרון המשבר במפרץ למצב בלבנון. דג'רג'יאן שלל קובלנה זו מכל וכל וטען שאין ארה"ב גורסת כל לינקג' בין המפרץ ללבנון.

(ב) דג'רג'יאן אמר לשרעא שהדרך היחידה לחלץ לבנון מהמצב הטראגי בו היא שרויה היא על דרך של כיבוד ויישום הסכם טאיף. דג'רג'יאן טען שסוריה מצווה לכבד הסכם זה שיביא בכנפיו חידוש הריבונות של הממשלה המרכזית, הוצאת הכוחות הזרים - כולל כוחות צבא סוריה - מתחומה והכטחת שלמותה הטריטוריאלית. שרעא - עפ"י הדיווח הסכים לנ"ל וטען שסוריה מכבדת הסכם טאיף וחותרת למימוש יעדיו.

(ג) דג'רג'יאן העלה ירי הקטיושות מזרוע לבנון - ההתקפה החמורה מאז 1982 - לעבר ישראל ועמד על חומרת הדברים לכשעצמם ועוד בתקופה קשה זו. גם כהקשר זה טען שרעא שסוריה רוצה בהוצאת כל הכוחות מלבנון, שהיא רוצה בלבנון עצמאית (הגם שממשלתה צריכה להיות פרו-סורית) ושהיא מעוניינת בממשלה רחבה שגם ג'עג'ע יימנה עליה.

(ד) בסיום השיחה אמר בראון שבאחרונה ניכרת פעילות אירופית בסוגיית התהליך וההסדרים המדיניים שלאחר משבר המפרץ. אמר שאפילו גרמניה שקנתה לעצמה מעמד של סיענית חשובה של ישראל מעלה רעיונות מרעיונות שונים לגבי עתיד המז'ת. בראון הוסיף שהוא מקווה שגם ישראל נותנת דעתה והוגה באורח 'יצירתי' לקראת הצפוי אחרי המשבר במפרץ.

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
 @ (רם), אמן, סולטן, מזתים, @ (לוברני), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 14494
אל: רהמש/1358
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 121, תא: 060291, זח: 1705, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור / מיידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: הסברה ווש'

פגישת מועדון הנשיאים עם הנשיא

מאחד המשתתפים בשיחה.

התרשמות מספר מהמשתתפים במפגש היא שהנשיא החמיץ הזדמנות לפרט בתשובה לשאלות את מטרות המלחמה של בנות הברית בצורה שיכללו גם את חיסול הצבא העיראקי וחזר על כך שלא תהיה חזרה ל- STATUS QVO ANTE.

ביחס לערבויות אמר איגלברגר שביחס ל- 400 המיליון עדיין יש בעיות טכניות יאילו נושא ערבויות לעתיד לא עלה.

פלג

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 14523
אל: רהמש/1360
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 134, תא: 060291, ח: 2056, מ: סג: שמ,
כבב
שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א
שר האוצר - מנכ"ל

מאת: הציר הכלכלי

הנדון: ערבויות - מברק בנדון מיום 6/2/91.

לסעיף א' - מברקי מהיום בנדון מפרט את הנעיה וכן את התרופות האפשריות.
מברקי מופנה לאנשי ה אוצר שייטנו את התשובות דרך משרד רוה"מ.
לסעיף ב' - אכן דברים אלה גם לא עולים בקנה אחד עם דברי איגלברגר לשגריר
כפגישתם האחרונה עליהם דווחתם.
למרות שמכתבו של ע. רובין יצא ליעדו לפני כשבועיים-שלשה רק עתה התפנו
אנשי מחמ"ד לבחון אותו ולקבוע את עמדתם.
עמדה זו קבלה ביטוי מאד חריף בדברי המזכיר על נעיות טכניות.

נויבך

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן,
כלכליתב', אוצר

סססס

אאא, חו זס: 13720
אל: רהמש/1263
מ-: המשד, תא: 060291, ח: 1604, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
96943
שמור/מידי
103.55

אל: וושינגטון - ציר, ציר כלכלי

הנדון: ערבויות

בנפרד כתנה מעתון ג'רוסלם דהיום, לפיה מתן הערבויות (בסך של 400 מליון) עדיין מתעכב.

ודה לעידכונים בנושא.

לידיעתכם נמסר לנו כי היהודים העלו את הנושא בפגישתם עם הנשיא בשבוע שעבר וכאשר בוש הביע פליאה שהעניין עדיין פתוח, העיר איגלברגר שהישראלים טרם סיפקו את כל המידע הדרוש. (הערה: אם כן, רוח דברים אלה אינה עולה בקנה אחד עם הדברים שהשמיע איגלברגר בשיחתו עם שר האוצר לפיהם טיפול AID בנושא אינו רק UNBELIEVABLE אלא גם INTOLERABLE.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר

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הנדון: חבר הקונגרס לנטוס - פגישה עם הנשיא הרצוג

1. חבר הקונגרס, טוס לנטוס, דמוקרט מקליפורניה עומד להגיע מחר (7/2) ארצה לביקור קצר (7-10/2) עם רעייתו.
 2. המורשה לנטוס הינו יהודי יליד הונגריה, יבוא ארצה עם רעייתו (שעברה לדת המורמונית).
 3. לנטוס היה לאחרונה בביקור בארץ עם משלחת חברי קונגרס שסיירה באיזור לפני פרוץ הקרבות. הוא חבר בכיר בתת הועדה של ועדת החוץ בביה"נ לנושאי אסיה והפסיפיק וכן אירופה והמז"ת.
 4. לנטוס ידוע כתומך מובהק בישראל. הוא מרבה לנסוע באירופה ומעלה את ענינה של ישראל בכל מסעותיו.
 5. על אף היותו חבר במפלגה הדמוקרטית הרי הוא נחשב לבעל דעות 'רפובליקאיות' בנושאי חוץ והוא רכש את הערכת הנשיא בוש שאף הזמינו לפני שבוע לשיחה, יחד עם עוד מספר מחוקקים.
 6. ניתן להעזר במורשה לנטוס בנושאים הקשורים לסיוע ולכחוננו.
 7. בבקורו בארץ הוא מבקש להפגש עם הנשיא, רה"מ, שה"ח, שהבט"ח, תדרוך כאמן, פגישה עם עולי ברה"מ, סיור בשכונה שנפגעה מטילי הסקאד ובקור בפאטריוט.
 8. חבר הקונגרס מבקש פגישה עם רה"מ.
- אודה על עזרתך.

ב ב ר כ ה,

ליאורה הרצל

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא

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As Prepared For Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. (EST),
February 6, 1991

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TESTIMONY

BY

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Wednesday, February 6, 1991

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Mr. Chairman,

It is a privilege to appear before this Committee to testify on behalf of our Foreign Affairs funding proposal for FY 1992. With your permission, I would have my detailed written statement entered into the record. This year, even more so than most years, the funds requested should be seen as an investment in a better future -- a world of secure nations, free peoples, and peaceful change.

I realize that as armies fight in the Persian Gulf such a world seems far distant. Yet I believe that it is vitally important to see the challenges we face also as opportunities to build a more secure and just world order. And so, today I would like to make a few comments concerning our ideas about post-crisis challenges and arrangements.

The Gulf War

The international coalition has been waging war against Iraq for three weeks now with very clear objectives: to expel Iraq from Kuwait; to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. I want to make several observations about the course of the conflict so far.

First, the international coalition has held steadily to its purpose and its course. An outstanding achievement of the coalition is that it has held nations to

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Second, the coalition is sharing responsibility for the economic burdens of conflict. Support for U.S. military outlays covers both 1990 commitments for Desert Shield and 1991 commitments for the period of January through March for Desert Shield/Storm. In addition, funds have also been forthcoming to offset the economic costs confronting the front line states in the region.

To date, we have pledges of over \$50 billion to support our military efforts and over \$14 billion to assist the front line states and others with their economic needs.

Third, our unfolding military strategy fully reflects our political purposes. This is the place to restate, as the President has done so often, that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our goal is the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq or changes in its borders.

A thoroughly professional and effective military campaign is underway. Our young men and women and the forces of our coalition partners are writing new annals of bravery and skill. But the task is formidable, and no one should underestimate Saddam's military capabilities. Iraq is not a third rate military power. Billions have been diverted from peaceful uses to give this small country the fourth largest army in the world. Iraq has more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom and France combined. It has more combat aircraft than either Germany, France, or the United Kingdom. Ejecting Iraq from Kuwait will not be easy, but, as the President said, "So that peace can prevail, we will prevail."

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We are also trying our best to wage a just war in a just way. Our targets are military, and we are doing all we can to minimize civilian casualties and avoid damage to religious and cultural sites. And as General Schwarzkopf has pointed out, the coalition forces are even putting themselves in danger to minimize the risk to innocent lives.

In shocking contrast, Saddam Hussein's conduct of the war has been not unlike his conduct before the war: a relentless assault on the values of civilization. He has launched missiles against Israeli cities and Saudi cities, missiles aimed not at targets of military value but fully intended to massacre civilians. He has abused and paraded prisoners of war and he says he is using them as "human shields" -- actions totally in violation of the Geneva Convention. And he has even attacked nature itself, attempting to poison the waters of the Persian Gulf with the petroleum that is the patrimony of the region's economic future.

We have heard, and we take at face value, Saddam's threats to use chemical and biological weapons. We have warned him -- and he would be well advised to heed our warning -- that we will not tolerate the use of such weapons. Any use of chemical or biological weapons will have the most severe consequences. And we will continue to insist that Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention with respect to coalition POWs.

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I think that our conduct of the war is in itself a great strength, the strength that comes from doing the right thing in the right way. And Saddam's continuing brutality redoubles our resolve and the entire coalition's conviction about the rightness of our course. Ending Saddam's aggression will also be a blow to state-sponsored terrorism.

This is also the place to note our deep appreciation and great admiration for the extraordinary restraint of the Government of Israel. Israeli cities have been attacked by Saddam Hussein because part of his strategy has been to consolidate his aggression by turning the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite its clear right to respond, the Israeli government has acted with restraint and responsibility. The United States has been and will continue to be in close contact at the highest levels with Israel. We have offered and Israel has accepted batteries of Patriot missiles -- some with American crews -- to defend against Scud attacks. We continue to devote special military efforts to destroying the Scuds and their launchers.

Everyone should know: when we speak about our unshakeable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it.

The fourth observation I would make is this: the great international coalition that is now winning the war must also be strong enough to win the peace. Winston Churchill once observed that "We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common

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across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices now being made by the brave men and women who defend our freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace worthy of their struggle. And that can be done if we can hold together in peace the coalition tempered by war.

I believe that when Congress voted the President authority to use force in support of the United Nations Resolutions, it voted also for peace -- a peace that might prevent such wars in the future. I believe that the American people support our role in the coalition not only to defeat an aggressor but to secure a measure of justice and security for the future.

Post-War Challenges

Mr. Chairman, we and every nation involved in this conflict are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so. At the same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to lay out a detailed blueprint for the postwar Gulf or, for that matter, the region as a whole.

The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence both the security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now underway necessarily involve many casualties, great hardships, and growing fears for the future. Tough times lie ahead.

We should therefore approach the postwar problems with a due sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and Middle East must be uppermost. In any event, modern history has shown that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein.

Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a way, working in consultation with all of the affected nations, to set a course that brings greater security for all and enduring peace. We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region which needs it so badly.

So I would like to discuss several challenges that I believe we must address in the post war period.

One challenge will be greater security for the Persian Gulf. After two wars in ten years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements. In our view, there are three basic issues to be resolved: the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; the role of the local states, regional organizations, and the international community; and the aftermath of the war, the military requirements until local stability is achieved, and thereafter.

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I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include:

- Deterrence of aggression from any quarter.
- Territorial integrity. There must be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders.
- Peaceful resolution of disputes. Border problems and other disputes that have long histories -- and there are many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example -- should be resolved by peaceful means, as prescribed by the U.N. Charter.

These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented and aggression deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties. No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Post war Iraq could have an important contribution to play. And so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf.

There is a role, too, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them.

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As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman Administration in 1949. We had and continue to have very strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with and provided military equipment for our friends in the region. The President has said that we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes.

Before security is assured, however, important questions must be answered. We will be going through an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of the war as we try to establish stability. Let me list just a few of the questions that need to be answered.

- Should there be a permanent, locally stationed ground force made up of local troops under UN auspices or under regional auspices, such as the GCC?
- How can the international community reinforce deterrence in the Gulf, whether by contributing forces or through other political arrangements, such as resolutions or security commitments?

No one has the answers yet to these and other questions. Some may never be answered. But however we eventually proceed, we will conduct extensive consultations among all of the concerned parties to such arrangements.

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A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern countries have more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom or France. The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flows into an area that is already overmilitarized. That suggests that we and others inside and outside the region must consult on how best to address several dimensions of the problem:

- How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's post war ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and most destabilizing conventional weapons?
- How can we work with others to encourage steps toward broader regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction? What role might the kinds of confidence building measures that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and the Middle East?
- Finally, what global actions would reinforce steps toward arms control in the Gulf and Middle East? These could include rapid completion of pending international

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agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and dual-use technology into the region. And what implications does that have for arms transfer and sales policies?

A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with it. Kuwait has been looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost jobs and fled. Trade flows and markets have been disrupted.

I am confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery.

And no one should forget that for the second time in a decade, the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf must include Iraq.

Of necessity, most of the resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf. Yet, should we not be thinking also of more than reconstruction? It might be possible for a coalition of countries using both local and external resources to transform the outlook for the region -- in expanding free trade

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and investment in assisting development, and in promoting growth-oriented economic policies which have taken root across the globe.

Any economic effort must have a special place for water development. Well over half the people living in the Middle East draw water from rivers that cross international boundaries or depend on desalination plants. We have all been incensed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate poisoning of the Gulf waters, which could affect a large portion of Saudi Arabia's desalinated drinking water.

Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objective: reducing one by one the sources of conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.

A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect, tolerance, and mutual trust. As you know, I personally had devoted considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians -- an essential part of an overall peace process. Let's not fool ourselves.

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The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet in the aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there may be opportunities for peace -- if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we are committed to working closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process.

The issues to be addressed are of course familiar and more challenging than ever.

- How do you go about reconciling Israelis and Palestinians? What concrete actions can be taken by each side?
- What will be the role of the other Arab states in facilitating this process and their own negotiations for peace with Israel?
- How will regional arms control arrangements affect this process?
- What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the process underway?

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Again, we will be consulting and working very closely with our friends and all parties who have a constructive role to play in settling this conflict.

A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States: we simply must do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the

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President has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination we are now bringing to the war itself.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, some of these elements are political, some are economic, and some of necessity are related to security. That suggests that we should view security not just in military terms but as part and parcel of the broader outlook for the region. We're not going to have lasting peace and well-being without sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded -- or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And surely finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to work with each other will be crucial if we are to lift our eyes to a better future.

The Soviet Union at a Crossroads

Before closing, I would like to say a few words on another challenge we face: our relations with the Soviet Union.

The President has spoken often of a new world order in which freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears of the Cold War. We have been hopeful about such an order partly because of the growing cooperation between the

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United States and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as a search for points of mutual advantage. And this search has yielded good results.

Three examples will suffice. First, over the past year, a democratic Germany, fully a member of NATO, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has vanished and with it the Cold War. Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue democracy and economic liberty. Third, the Soviet Union has joined the international coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues to completely support the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions.

While we both have worked at finding these and other points of mutual advantage, it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation or even partnership between our countries would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reform. That is why when last fall I called for pathways of mutual advantage, not just discrete points, I also announced our desire to see a broader democratic dialogue with Soviet reformers. Not just economic reform but essential political reform could transform the Soviet Union into a very different society.

Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of

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perestroika, the enormous and daunting difficulty of changing after seventy years a society's basic direction and many of its values.

In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the Baltics; an apparent turn toward economic re-centralization; a less free media; extension of army and KGB authority; and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates.

These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real economic reform. There is simply no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic states who have acted throughout with dignity and restraint.

The President and I have had extensive discussions with President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these developments. We and our European allies have pointed out the inevitable consequences if the Soviet government continues on this path. And we have stated our belief that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own objectives if it should abandon perestroika, democratization, and glasnost.

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On the Baltics, I could do no better here than to quote the President's words from the State of the Union address: "... our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union."

We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue with the Baltics, and to creating a society ruled by law, not arbitrary force. We're going to watch this situation closely to see whether these representations become enduring realities.

I hope that the Soviet Union will relearn quickly the lesson from its own hard experience: the old ways are not the right ways. Perestroika cannot succeed at gunpoint. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters may still turn more for the worse. But at the same time, we must be careful not to jump to premature conclusions.

The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear that their last several steps have taken them down a path of no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they resume the march that has given the entire world hope of a better future.

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Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I want to sum up my comments today with this observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review our overall foreign policy, we were well on the way to a whole and free Europe, secured by expanding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in resolving the continent's outstanding political and military problems. The possibility, even the idea, of this terrible conflict in the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination. Yet now we face the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty about the course of Soviet reform.

There were two different visions of how to handle these our part, then Churchill's broad path pursued by many states in common will not be possible. And as Churchill warned, "the middle path adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bullseye of disaster." More clearly than we could have ever imagined a year or even six months ago, the world emerging from the end of the postwar era will be shaped by the United States and its international allies. Our constant purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for free peoples to live.

Thank you.

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ראש מניחם ע"ה כו

למור

מא: אל-החודש - חוקים
בני ברק, ארמון
מגיד ליה

ד"ר האיילא א גברי

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As Prepared For Delivery
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"מסמך מס' 12-12" - 12-12
"מסמך מס' 14" - 14

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act as its founders intended. Before January 15, a dozen Security Council resolutions guided the United States and other nations as together we waged a concerted diplomatic, political, and economic struggle against Iraqi aggression. We did so because we all share a conviction that this brutal and dangerous dictator must be stopped and stopped now. Since January 16, in actions authorized by Security Council Resolution 678, we have been able to wage war because we are equally convinced that all peaceful opportunities to end Saddam's aggression had been explored and exhausted.

Let me give you some idea of those exhaustive efforts, both by the United States and other nations. In the 166 days between the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the expiration of the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal on January 15, 1991, I personally held over 200 meetings with foreign dignitaries, conducted 10 diplomatic missions, and travelled over 100,000 miles. For over six and one half hours, I met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister -- six and one-half hours in which the Iraqi leadership rejected the very concept of withdrawal from Kuwait, even the mention of withdrawal. As you know, many others also tried -- the Arab League, the European Community, the UN Secretary General, Kings, Presidents, and Prime Ministers.

None succeeded because Saddam Hussein rejected each and every one.

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Second, the coalition is sharing responsibility for the economic burdens of conflict. Support for U.S. military outlays covers both 1990 commitments for Desert Shield and 1991 commitments for the period of January through March for Desert Shield/Storm. In addition, funds have also been forthcoming to offset the economic costs confronting the front line states in the region.

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We have heard, and we take at face value, Saddam's threats to use chemical and biological weapons. We have warned him -- and he would be well advised to heed our warning -- that we will not tolerate the use of such weapons. Any use of chemical or biological weapons will have the most severe consequences. And we will continue to insist that Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention with respect to coalition POWs.

I think that our conduct of the war is in itself a great strength, the strength that comes from doing the right thing in the right way. And Saddam's continuing brutality redoubles our resolve and the entire coalition's conviction about the rightness of our course. Ending Saddam's aggression will also be a blow to state-sponsored terrorism.

This is also the place to note our deep appreciation and great admiration for the extraordinary restraint of the Government of Israel. Israeli cities have been attacked by Saddam Hussein because part of his strategy has been to consolidate his aggression by turning the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite its clear right to respond, the Israeli government has acted with restraint and responsibility. The United States has been and will continue to be in close contact at the highest levels with Israel. We have offered and Israel has accepted batteries of Patriot missiles -- some with American crews -- to defend against Scud attacks. We continue to devote special military efforts to destroying the Scuds and their launchers.

Everyone should know: when we speak about our unshakeable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it.

The fourth observation I would make is this: the great international coalition that is now winning the war must also be strong enough to win the peace. Winston Churchill once observed that "We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common

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across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices now being made by the brave men and women who defend our freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace worthy of their struggle. And that can be done if we can hold together in peace the coalition tempered by war.

I believe that when Congress voted the President authority to use force in support of the United Nations Resolutions, it voted also for peace -- a peace that might prevent such wars in the future. I believe that the American people support our role in the coalition not only to defeat an aggressor but to secure a measure of justice and security for the future.

Post-War Challenges

Mr. Chairman, we and every nation involved in this conflict are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so. At the same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to lay out a detailed blueprint for the postwar Gulf or, for that matter, the region as a whole.

The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence both the security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now underway necessarily involve many casualties, great hardships, and growing fears for the future. Tough times lie ahead.

We should therefore approach the postwar problems with a due sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and Middle East must be uppermost. In any event, modern history has shown that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein.

Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a way, working in consultation with all of the affected nations, to set a course that brings greater security for all and enduring peace. We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region which needs it so badly.

So I would like to discuss several challenges that I believe we must address in the post war period.

One challenge will be greater security for the Persian Gulf. After two wars in ten years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements. In our view, there are three basic issues to be resolved: the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; the role of the local states, regional organizations, and the international community; and in the aftermath of the war, the military requirements until local stability is achieved, and thereafter.

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I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include:

- Deterrence of aggression from any quarter.
- Territorial integrity. There must be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders.
- Peaceful resolution of disputes. Border problems and other disputes that have long histories -- and there are many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example -- should be resolved by peaceful means, as prescribed by the U.N. Charter.

These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented and aggression deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties. No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Post war Iraq could have an important contribution to play. And so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf.

There is a role, too, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them.

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As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman Administration in 1949. We had and continue to have very strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with and provided military equipment for our friends in the region. The President has said that we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes.

Before security is assured, however, important questions must be answered. We will be going through an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of the war as we try to establish stability. Let me list just a few of the questions that need to be answered.

- Should there be a permanent, locally stationed ground force made up of local troops under UN auspices or under regional auspices, such as the GCC?
- How can the international community reinforce deterrence in the Gulf, whether by contributing forces or through other political arrangements, such as resolutions or security commitments?

No one has the answers yet to these and other questions. Some may never be answered. But however we eventually proceed, we will conduct extensive consultations among all of the concerned parties to such arrangements.

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A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern countries have more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom or France. The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flows into an area that is already overmilitarized. That suggests that we and others inside and outside the region must consult on how best to address several dimensions of the problem:

- How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's post war ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and most destabilizing conventional weapons?
- How can we work with others to encourage steps toward broader regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction? What role might the kinds of confidence building measures that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and the Middle East?
- Finally, what global actions would reinforce steps toward arms control in the Gulf and Middle East? These could include rapid completion of pending international

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agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and dual-use technology into the region. And what implications does that have for arms transfer and sales policies?

A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with it. Kuwait has been looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost jobs and fled. Trade flows and markets have been disrupted.

I am confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery.

And no one should forget that for the second time in a decade, the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf must include Iraq.

Of necessity, most of the resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf. Yet, should we not be thinking also of more than reconstruction? It might be possible for a coalition of countries using both local and external resources to transform the outlook for the region -- in expanding free trade

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and investment in assisting development, and in promoting growth-oriented economic policies which have taken root across the globe.

Any economic effort must have a special place for water development. Well over half the people living in the Middle East draw water from rivers that cross international boundaries or depend on desalination plants. We have all been incensed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate poisoning of the Gulf waters, which could affect a large portion of Saudi Arabia's desalinated drinking water.

Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objective: reducing one by one the sources of conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.

A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect, tolerance, and mutual trust. As you know, I personally had devoted considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians -- an essential part of an overall peace process. Let's not fool ourselves.

The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet in the aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there may be opportunities for peace -- if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we are committed to working closely with them to fashion a more effective peace process.

The issues to be addressed are of course familiar and more challenging than ever.

- How do you go about reconciling Israelis and Palestinians? What concrete actions can be taken by each side?
- What will be the role of the other Arab states in facilitating this process and their own negotiations for peace with Israel?
- How will regional arms control arrangements affect this process?
- What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the process underway?

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Again, we will be consulting and working very closely with our friends and all parties who have a constructive role to play in settling this conflict.

A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States: we simply must do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the

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President has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination we are now bringing to the war itself.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, some of these elements are political, some are economic, and some of necessity are related to security. That suggests that we should view security not just in military terms but as part and parcel of the broader outlook for the region. We're not going to have lasting peace and well-being without sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded -- or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And surely finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to work with each other will be crucial if we are to lift our eyes to a better future.

The Soviet Union at a Crossroads

Before closing, I would like to say a few words on another challenge we face: our relations with the Soviet Union.

The President has spoken often of a new world order in which freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears of the Cold War. We have been hopeful about such an order partly because of the growing cooperation between the

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United States and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as a search for points of mutual advantage. And this search has yielded good results.

Three examples will suffice. First, over the past year, a democratic Germany, fully a member of NATO, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has vanished and with it the Cold War. Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue democracy and economic liberty. Third, the Soviet Union has joined the international coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues to completely support the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions.

While we both have worked at finding these and other points of mutual advantage, it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation or even partnership between our countries would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reform. That is why when last fall I called for pathways of mutual advantage, not just discrete points, I also announced our desire to see a broader democratic dialogue with Soviet reformers. Not just economic reform but essential political reform could transform the Soviet Union into a very different society.

Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of

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perestroika, the enormous and daunting difficulty of changing after seventy years a society's basic direction and many of its values.

In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the Baltics; an apparent turn toward economic re-centralization; a less free media; extension of army and KGB authority; and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates.

These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real economic reform. There is simply no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic states who have acted throughout with dignity and restraint.

The President and I have had extensive discussions with President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these developments. We and our European allies have pointed out the inevitable consequences if the Soviet government continues on this path. And we have stated our belief that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own objectives if it should abandon perestroika, democratization, and glasnost.

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On the Baltics, I could do no better here than to quote the President's words from the State of the Union address: "... our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union."

We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue with the Baltics, and to creating a society ruled by law, not arbitrary force. We're going to watch this situation closely to see whether these representations become enduring realities.

I hope that the Soviet Union will relearn quickly the lesson from its own hard experience: the old ways are not the right ways. Perestroika cannot succeed at gunpoint. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters may still turn more for the worse. But at the same time, we must be careful not to jump to premature conclusions.

The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear that their last several steps have taken them down a path of no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they resume the march that has given the entire world hope of a better future.

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Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I want to sum up my comments today with this observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review our overall foreign policy, we were well on the way to a whole and free Europe, secured by expanding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in resolving the continent's outstanding political and military problems. The possibility, even the idea, of this terrible conflict in the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination. Yet now we face the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty about the course of Soviet reform.

There can be different views of how to handle these our part, then Churchill's broad path pursued by many states in common will not be possible. And as Churchill warned, "the middle path adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bullseye of disaster." More clearly than we could have ever imagined a year or even six months ago, the world emerging from the end of the postwar era will be shaped by the United States and its international allies. Our constant purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for free peoples to live.

Thank you.

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ארהב' - ישראל

שיחה (6.2) עם מקור במועצה לבטחון לאומי

1. מכתב רוה'מ לנשיא:

א. הגדיר את הדלפת המכתב (עוד לפני שהנשיא הספיק לעין בו) כ- UNFORTUNATE .

ב. במידה וישאלו לגבי תוכן המכתב יגיבו ב'אין תגובה'.

ג. אשר לתוכן תאר את המכתב כ- STRAIGHTFORWARD כמה שנוגע להבהרת עמדת ישראל בהקשר למלחמה. WE WILL TAKE NOTE ' ' ' OF IT . ה'נשיא' ציין איש שיחי 'מתכון לשלוח מכתב תשובה פרטי'.

ד. אשר לבקשת הסיוע ציין כי 'אנו עושים דברים רבים בתחום הבטחוני'. לדבריו מצפים לקבל מאיתנו רשימת ציוד (EXCESS EQUIPMENT)

ה. חזר על כך שאינם מעוניינים להרחיב ספלמנטל 'סערת המדבר'.

ו. מעניין לעניין ובאותו עניין ציין כי הממשל אינו שבע רצון מתשובותינו בנושא 400 מליון (ערביות לדיור). תושב שההבנה אליה הגענו (קרי מכתבו של שה'ח למזכיר) יצרה נקודת מוצא חיובית לטיפול בנושא. לדבריו האופן שבו נסדיר בעיות שעדין מעכבות העברת הכסף תסייע לממשל להמשיך בכוון זה.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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official text

02/07/91

EXCERPTS: BAKER TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE (Q-and-A on Israel-related matters)

Washington -- Following are excerpts related to Israel from the question-and-answer portion of the appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee February 6 by Secretary of State Baker.

(Begin Excerpts)

REP. FASCELL: the release of the emergency assistance that was provided ten months ago for Israel, the supplemental for Israel, which I keep hearing about, but I don't have any specifics, yes or no

SEC. BAKER: With respect to the question of a supplemental, Mr. Chairman, there has been no formal request received, I think as you know, from the government of Israel. We are very sympathetic to the costs that have been imposed upon Israel, and we have tried to respond to those, and I think have responded very generously so far in terms of the supply of Patriot missile batteries. We -- we have talked, as well, to our allies abroad about the possibility of assistance from them, economic assistance to Israel. The United States, of course, will be as generous as it has been in the past with respect to its assistance to Israel, the \$3 billion that we will -- that we will have in our forthcoming budget submission. But as yet, there is no request for a supplemental by way of economic assistance. I have said we would consider any request that was submitted.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Secretary, are you aware of some of the allegations that Mr. Arafat has been making that Israel has been responsible for some of the shelling that's been taking place against Iraq?

As a matter of fact, in a news interview just the other day with Bernard Shaw, Mr. Arafat said, "They are participating and today is an example, yesterday is an example. They are shelling, the crews in the Negev Desert, to the eastern part of Iraq while they are covering it up by these missiles are being shelled from some American Marines in the Red Sea."

This is Arafat's statement.



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, P.O.B. 920, 91008 Tel. 252376

SEC. BAKER: I haven't seen that, Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN: Of course, I assume that there's no basis for that. Am I correct?

SEC. BAKER: I'm not aware of any basis at all for it, but I hadn't even seen the report I would be very surprised if there were any basis for that, Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN: I think we all would be. Mr. Secretary, almost a year ago, Congress did pass, as you recall, a dire emergency supplemental bill which included 400 million in housing loan guarantees for the Soviet Jews settling in Israel. To my knowledge, these funds have yet to be released, despite the fact that there's been close to 200,000 refugees that arrived in Israel over the last year. Could you tell us what's causing the delay in the release of those funds?

SEC. BAKER: There are still some technical requirements, Mr. Gilman, that we're working on. A technical team from the Agency for International Development was in Israel as recently as December to gather information on Israeli housing sector and plans for immigrant absorption. We are continuing to follow up as well on various aspects of Foreign Minister Levy's letter of assurances to me -- you're probably familiar with that letter -- and we need still to receive several things that are mentioned in that letter. But we are working on it as diligently as we can because we'd like to release this at the earliest opportunity.

And I will be making a recommendation, Mr. Gilman, that once these technical requirements have been satisfied, once the information that the government of Israel promised to give us is furnished, I would like to see this assistance distributed in a single tranche, rather than in three successive tranches. But first we need to get the information that was promised after an extended negotiation.

REP. GILMAN: Well, we would hope that that would come about at an early date. Some of us who visited Israel recently recognize the almost impossible task of housing all of these new refugees that are coming on board.

And, Mr. Secretary, you testified prior -- on a prior occasion before this Committee that the administration was strongly opposed to any linkage of the Gulf crisis with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And many high administration officials have reiterated that view. However, in the last communique between yourself and the new Soviet Minister, there seemed to be some contradiction stated with regard to that policy, by discussing an open end to the Iraqi conflict and a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. What is our current policy with regard to linkage of the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Mr. Secretary?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Gilman, there is absolutely no linkage in that statement, any more than there's linkage in the remarks I read to you this morning, any more than there's linkage in the Helsinki statement between President Bush and President Gorbachev, which said the same thing, or any more than there's linkage in the President's address to the United Nations back -- General Assembly. Linkage means conditioning Iraqi withdrawal on a promise to do certain things. There isn't any linkage. That's my answer. Absolutely no linkage. And we ought to understand what linkage means.

REP. BERMAN: With respect to costs from Desert Storm, and I'm not sure whether you answered this question posed by an earlier member or not, but the whole question of Israel's vulnerability in the context of this Gulf crisis and the threats it faces. I mean, you know as well as anyone it has needed to maintain its forces at the highest state of alert. It is claiming that there are costs of nearly \$1 billion simply in terms of its military readiness in the heightened state of alert that it is now undergoing. A number of the other frontline states have received contributions from allies. You made reference to some of them in your earlier comments. Do you have any thoughts at this point about how some of those special costs that Israel is facing should be dealt with?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think I also mentioned that we have encouraged some of our coalition allies who might be inclined to do so to contribute to defray some of those costs of Israel, and there have been --

REP. BERMAN: (Off mike) -- German contributions.

SEC. BAKER: Well, there's been a significant German contribution of \$600 million here just recently in military assistance, but there -- the EC is examining this question and there I think will be additional -- there will be other contributions as well, not surprisingly, not coming from Arab states, under the circumstances. But I think that there will be contributions coming from other than the United States to help defray some of those costs that Israel is incurring. And then, of course, I have mentioned the military -- some of the military assistance that we have been providing.

REP. ACKERMAN: Yasir Arafat has very openly sided with Iraq during the course of this whole unhappy episode. Has he in any way written himself and the PLO out of the peace process in the Middle East?

SEC. BAKER: I don't think they were in it before. At least they weren't in it in terms of what we were trying to accomplish, Mr. Ackerman. But they've made a terrible mistake and a terrible misjudgment, and they certainly haven't helped themselves to any extent.

REP. SOLARZ: In the event, Mr. Secretary, that Saddam should use chemical and/or biological weapons against either our forces or our coalition partners or other countries in the region, at that point to what extent would we consider enlarging our war aims to include not simply the liberation of Kuwait, but the removal of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq in general and Saddam Hussein in particular?

SEC. BAKER: I have said, Mr. Solarz, that the use of such weapons would have the severest possible consequences. I think that that could be both military and political, but that would be a decision for the President to make that I am not prepared to prejudge here.

REP. SOLARZ: You indicated in response to Ben Gilman's question that, in terms of our ability or willingness to move forward in providing the \$400 million in housing investment guarantees for Israel, that it was contingent on receiving some additional information or assurances from the Israelis pursuant to the letter that Foreign Minister Levy sent you. And I'm sure you know that all of us believe that 10 months after the enactment of that legislation that we would hope this could move forward expeditiously. Could you let us know specifically what concrete information or assurances you're seeking that the Israelis have presumably not yet provided, because the impression, quite honestly, has been over here that the problem has been more in Washington than in Jerusalem, in terms of moving this forward. And your response seemed to suggest that the main reason for the delay was that they hadn't given us the information or assurances we were seeking rather than any bureaucratic or political problems over here.

SEC. BAKER: I don't think it's really fair to say, Mr. Solarz, that the problem is only here and not there. We have had a technical team from AID over there as recently as December, and there have been suggestions internally here -- as I've already indicated -- that we tranche this \$400 million and deliver it in three separate tranches. Now, I'm quite prepared to say no, let's don't delay this any longer by tranching it, let's do it in one tranche.

But I do believe, Mr. Solarz, that we should receive the information that the government of Israel has promised we are to receive, and for the most part, it relates to financial information. I'll be glad to get the technicians to give us -- give you a list of the specific data that we would like to receive pursuant to the promises contained in Foreign Minister Levi's letter.

REP. FEIGHAN: I'd also like to just follow up briefly with the housing guarantee program, and I think you've answered more than adequately the questions and the concerns that many members of this committee have about getting that program up and running. And I'm particularly gratified that your judgment has apparently now centered on allowing a full guarantee to flow, rather than in the tranche proposal that had been floating in the past few months.

Is it your expectation, and would we anticipate that within the budget proposals coming to us, either over the next several days or in a supplemental that we would significantly increase that housing guarantee program -- in other words, take the \$400 million and perhaps double that or even more than double that over the next year or so?

SEC. BAKER: I haven't heard any discussion of that, Mr. Feighan.

REP. FEIGHAN: Has there been any request that you're aware of Israeli officials to that effect? For any increase at all?

SEC. BAKER: No, sir. There has been no formal request from the government of Israel for any increase at all.

REP. FEIGHAN: As my question would indicate, I would expect that we will receive a request for an increase of some nature. Whether it'll be a doubling, particularly since the experience over the past year was, in terms of refugees going to Israel was even higher than expected, and I think that the events in the Soviet Union over the past few months and likely to continue into the next several months is only going to increase that flow and therefore the interest in expanding that program.

Mr. Secretary, a week or two ago when we issued a joint statement with the Soviet Union, there was a great deal of concern as to whether or not the United States was changing its policy, particularly with respect to linkage and with respect to various proposals for an international peace conference to resolve conflicts in the region.

Can you use the occasion today to clarify and I guess to underscore that American policy has not been changed, particularly with respect to an international peace conference, that your efforts over the past several years will continue, focused on direct negotiations and perhaps using now our new leverage with states like Saudi Arabia and Syria from experience in the Persian Gulf to even encourage those countries to take greater risks and make greater efforts at direct negotiations.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Feighan, there was no change in policy in that statement. If you read it, I think you would come to that conclusion very quickly. And there has been no change in policy with respect to the position of the United States vis-a-vis an international conference.

We have said for a long time that an international conference, properly structured, at an appropriate time, might be useful. That remains the policy of the United States.

REP. PAYNE: Israel and the \$400 million that we've gotten, the question has come up as to where the money will be appropriated. There are reports that South Africa will do the building for the \$400 million guarantees. I would hope that you would raise that issue with the foreign minister, because I have received a tremendous amount of resentment in my community about the fact that Israel will use South Africa to build the houses Would you relay that to the proper authorities for me?

SEC. BAKER: We'll take a look at it. I'm not familiar with that, Mr. Payne, but I'll take a look at it.

(End Excerpts)



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2/7/91

Baker: U.S. SEEKS STABILITY, SECURITY IN GULF
(Text: statement to House committee 2/6/91)

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker says the goal of the United States and its coalition partners in the Persian Gulf is "the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq or changes in its borders."

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people, Baker told the House Foreign Affairs Committee February 6 in testimony on the international affairs budget.

He said the coalition's aims are "clear" -- to expel Iraq from Kuwait and restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to ensure the stability and security of the region.

Baker noted that the Israeli government "has acted with restraint and responsibility" to Iraqi rocket attacks against it. He added that "everyone should know: when we speak about our unshakable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it."

Regarding U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Baker said that "it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation or partnership...would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reforms."

Commenting on Moscow's crackdown against the Baltic republics, he said "there is simply no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments."

Additional "unsettling events" such as economic recentralization, new media restrictions, extension of army and KGB authority, and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates have further turned back reforms in the Soviet Union, he said.

"These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real



economic reform," the secretary added.

Following is the text of Baker's statement as prepared for delivery:

(Begin Text)

It is a privilege to appear before this committee to testify on behalf of our foreign affairs funding proposal for FY 1992. With your permission, I would have my detailed written statement entered into the record. This year, even more so than most years, the funds requested should be seen as an investment in a better future -- a world of secure nations, free peoples, and peaceful change.

I realize that as armies fight in the Persian Gulf such a world seems far distant. Yet I believe that it is vitally important to see the challenges we face also as opportunities to build a more secure and just world order. And so, today I would like to make a few comments concerning our ideas about post-crisis challenges and arrangements.

The Gulf War

The international coalition has been waging war against Iraq for three weeks now with very clear objectives: to expel Iraq from Kuwait; to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait; and to ensure the stability and security of this critical region. I want to make several observations about the course of the conflict so far.

First, the international coalition has held steadily to its purpose and its course. An outstanding achievement of the current crisis has been the ability of the United Nations to act as its founders intended. Before January 15, a dozen Security Council resolutions guided the United States and other nations as together we waged a concerted diplomatic, political, and economic struggle against Iraqi aggression. We did so because we all share a conviction that this brutal and dangerous dictator must be stopped and stopped now. Since January 16, in actions authorized by Security Council Resolution 678, we have been able to wage war because we are equally convinced that all peaceful opportunities to end Saddam's aggression had been explored and exhausted.

Let me give you some idea of those exhaustive efforts, both by the United States and other nations. In the 166 days between the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the expiration of the U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal on January 15, 1991, I personally held over 200 meetings with foreign dignitaries, conducted 10 diplomatic missions, and traveled over 100,000 miles. For over six and one-half hours, I met with the Iraqi foreign minister -- six and one-half hours in which the Iraqi leadership rejected the very concept of withdrawal from Kuwait, even the mention of withdrawal. As you know, many others also

tried -- the Arab League, the European Community, the U.N. secretary general, kings, presidents, and prime ministers.

None succeeded because Saddam Hussein rejected each and every one.

Second, the coalition is sharing responsibility for the economic burdens of conflict. Support for U.S. military outlays covers both 1990 commitments for Desert Shield and 1991 commitments for the period of January through March for Desert Shield/Storm. In addition, funds have also been forthcoming to offset the economic costs confronting the front line states in the region.

To date, we have pledges of over \$50,000 million to support our military efforts and over \$14,000 million to assist the front line states and others with their economic needs.

Third, our unfolding military strategy fully reflects our political purposes. This is the place to restate, as the president has done so often, that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our goal is the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq or changes in its borders.

A thoroughly professional and effective military campaign is underway. Our young men and women and the forces of our coalition partners are writing new annals of bravery and skill. But the task is formidable, and no one should underestimate Saddam's military capabilities. Iraq is not a third rate military power. Billions (thousands of millions) have been diverted from peaceful uses to give this small country the fourth largest army in the world. Iraq has more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom and France combined. It has more combat aircraft than either Germany, France, or the United Kingdom. Ejecting Iraq from Kuwait will not be easy, but, as the president said, "So that peace can prevail, we will prevail."

We are also trying our best to wage a just war in a just way. Our targets are military, and we are doing all we can to minimize civilian casualties and avoid damage to religious and cultural sites. And as General Schwarzkopf has pointed out, the coalition forces are even putting themselves in danger to minimize the risk to innocent lives.

In shocking contrast, Saddam Hussein's conduct of the war has been not unlike his conduct before the war: a relentless assault on the values of civilization. He has launched missiles against Israeli cities and Saudi cities, missiles aimed not at targets of military value but fully intended to massacre civilians. He has abused and paraded prisoners of war and he says he is using them as "human shields" -- actions totally in violation of the Geneva Convention. And he has even attacked nature itself, attempting to poison the waters of the Persian Gulf with the petroleum that is the patrimony of the region's economic future.

We have heard, and we take at face value, Saddam's threats to use chemical and biological weapons. We have warned him -- and he would be well advised to heed our warning -- that we will not tolerate the use of such weapons. Any use of chemical or biological weapons will have

the most severe consequences. And we will continue to insist that Iraq fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention with respect to coalition POWs.

I think that our conduct of the war is in itself a great strength, the strength that comes from doing the right thing in the right way. And Saddam's continuing brutality redoubles our resolve and the entire coalition's conviction about the rightness of our course. Ending Saddam's aggression will also be a blow to state-sponsored terrorism.

This is also the place to note our deep appreciation and great admiration for the extraordinary restraint of the government of Israel. Israeli cities have been attacked by Saddam Hussein because part of his strategy has been to consolidate his aggression by turning the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite its clear right to respond, the Israeli government has acted with restraint and responsibility. The United States has been and will continue to be in close contact at the highest levels with Israel. We have offered and Israel has accepted batteries of Patriot missiles -- some with American crews -- to defend against Scud attacks. We continue to devote special military efforts to destroying the Scuds and their launchers.

Everyone should know: when we speak about our unshakable commitment to Israeli security, we mean it.

The fourth observation I would make is this: the great international coalition that is now winning the war must also be strong enough to secure the peace. Winston Churchill once observed that "We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics." If we are going to redeem the sacrifices now being made by the brave men and women who defend our freedom with their lives, then we must fashion a peace worthy of their struggle. And that can be done if we can hold together in peace the coalition tempered by war.

I believe that when Congress voted the president authority to use force in support of the U.N. resolutions, it voted also for peace -- a peace that might prevent such wars in the future. I believe that the American people support our role in the coalition not only to defeat an aggressor but to secure a measure of justice and security for the future.

Post-War Challenges

Mr. Chairman, we and every nation involved in this conflict are thinking about the post-war situation and planning for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so. At the same time, it would be both premature and unwise for us to lay out a detailed blueprint for the post-war Gulf or, for that matter, the region as a whole.

The war itself and the way it ends will greatly influence both the

security of the Gulf and the rest of the area. The deepest passions have been stirred. The military actions now underway necessarily involve many casualties, great hardships, and growing fears for the future. Tough times lie ahead.

We should therefore approach the post-war problems with a due sense of modesty. Respect for the sovereignty of the peoples of the Gulf and Middle East must be uppermost. In any event, modern history has shown that no single nation can long impose its will or remake the Middle East in its own image. After all, that is partly why we are fighting Saddam Hussein.

Yet among all the difficulties we face, one fact stands out: The peoples of the Gulf and indeed the entire Middle East desperately need peace. I truly believe that there must be a way, working in consultation with all of the affected nations, to set a course that brings greater security for all and enduring peace. We should therefore make every effort not just to heal the Persian Gulf after this war but also to try to heal the rest of the region which needs it so badly.

So I would like to discuss several challenges that I believe we must address in the post-war period.

One challenge will be greater security for the Persian Gulf. After two wars in 10 years, this vital region needs new and different security arrangements. In our view, there are three basic issues to be resolved: the purposes or principles of the security arrangements; the role of the local states, regional organizations, and the international community; and in the aftermath of the war, the military requirements until local stability is achieved, and thereafter.

I think we would find already a wide measure of agreement on the principles. They would include:

Deterrence of aggression from any quarter.

Territorial integrity. There must be respect for existing sovereignty of all states and for the inviolability of borders.

Peaceful resolution of disputes. Border problems and other disputes that have long histories -- and there are many beyond the Iraq-Kuwait example -- should be resolved by peaceful means, as prescribed by the U.N. Charter.

These principles must be put into action first and foremost by the local states so that conflicts can be prevented and aggression deterred. We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties. No regional state should be excluded from these arrangements. Post-war Iraq could have an important contribution to play. And so could Iran as a major power in the Gulf.

There is a role, too, for outside nations and the international community, including the United Nations, to encourage such arrangements and to stand behind them.

As for the United States, we have deployed small naval forces in the Persian Gulf ever since the Truman administration in 1949. We had and continue to have very strong bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia and other local states. And through the years, we have conducted joint exercises with and provided military equipment for our friends in the region. The president has said that we have no intention of maintaining a permanent ground presence on the Arabian Peninsula once Iraq is ejected from Kuwait and the threat recedes.

Before security is assured, however, important questions must be answered. We will be going through an important transitional phase in the immediate aftermath of the war as we try to establish stability. Let me list just a few of the questions that need to be answered.

Should there be a permanent, locally stationed ground force made up of local troops under U.N. auspices or under regional auspices, such as the GCC?

How can the international community reinforce deterrence in the Gulf, whether by contributing forces or through other political arrangements, such as resolutions or security commitments?

No one has the answers yet to these and other questions. Some may never be answered. But however we eventually proceed, we will conduct extensive consultations among all of the concerned parties to such arrangements.

A second challenge will surely be regional arms proliferation and control. This includes both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The terrible fact is that even the conventional arsenals of several Middle Eastern states dwarf those of most European powers. Five Middle Eastern countries have more main battle tanks than the United Kingdom or France. The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this region and to reduce arms flows into an area that is already overmilitarized. That suggests that we and others inside and outside the region must consult on how best to address several dimensions of the problem:

How can we cooperate to constrain Iraq's post-war ability to retain or rebuild its weapons of mass destruction and most destabilizing conventional weapons?

How can we work with others to encourage steps toward broader regional restraint in the acquisition and use of both conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction? What role might the kinds of confidence building measures that have lessened conflict in Europe play in the Gulf and the Middle East?

Finally, what global actions would reinforce steps toward arms control

in the Gulf and Middle East? These could include rapid completion of pending international agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as much tighter supply restraints on the flow of weapons and dual-use technology into the region. And what implications does that have for arms transfer and sales policies?

A third challenge will be economic reconstruction and recovery. An economic catastrophe has befallen the Gulf and the nations trading with it. Kuwait has been looted and wrecked. Hundreds of thousands of workers have lost jobs and fled. Trade flows and markets have been disrupted.

I am confident that the people of Kuwait will rebuild their country. As we have worked with the Kuwaitis in their moment of trial so we shall look forward to cooperating with them in their hour of recovery.

And no one should forget that for the second time in a decade, the people of Iraq will be recovering from a disastrous conflict. The time of reconstruction and recovery should not be the occasion for vengeful actions against a nation forced to war by a dictator's ambition. The secure and prosperous future everyone hopes to see in the Gulf must include Iraq.

Of necessity, most of the resources for reconstruction will be drawn from the Gulf. Yet, should we not be thinking also of more than reconstruction? It might be possible for a coalition of countries using both local and external resources to transform the outlook for the region -- in expanding free trade and investment in assisting development, and in promoting growth-oriented economic policies which have taken root across the globe.

Any economic effort must have a special place for water development. Well over half the people living in the Middle East draw water from rivers that cross international boundaries or depend on desalination plants. We have all been incensed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate poisoning of the Gulf waters, which could affect a large portion of Saudi Arabia's desalinated drinking water.

Finally, we will want to consult with governments both from the Middle East and from other regions about specific arrangements that might best serve the purposes of region-wide economic cooperation. Such cooperation would surely be helpful in reinforcing our overall objective: reducing one by one the sources of conflict and removing one by one the barriers to security and prosperity throughout the area.

A fourth challenge is to resume the search for a just peace and real reconciliation for Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. By reconciliation, I mean not simply peace as the absence of war, but a peace based on enduring respect, tolerance, and mutual trust. As you know, I personally had devoted considerable effort before the war to facilitating a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians -- an essential part of an overall peace process. Let's not fool ourselves. The course of this crisis has stirred emotions among Israelis and Palestinians that will not yield easily to conciliation. Yet in the

aftermath of this war, as in earlier wars, there may be opportunities for peace -- if the parties are willing. And if they really are willing, we are committed to working closely with them to fashion a more affective peace process.

The issues to be addressed are of course familiar and more challenging than ever.

How do you go about reconciling Israelis and Palestinians? What concrete actions can be taken by each side?

What will be the role of the Arab states in facilitating this process and their own negotiations for peace with Israel?

How will regional arms control arrangements affect this process?

What is the best diplomatic vehicle for getting the process underway?

Again, we will be consulting and working very closely with our friends and all parties who have a constructive role to play in settling this conflict.

A fifth and final challenge concerns the United States: we simply must do more to reduce our energy dependence. As the president has stressed, only a comprehensive strategy can achieve our goals. That strategy should involve energy conservation and efficiency, increased development, strengthened stockpiles and reserves, and greater use of alternative fuels. We must bring to this task the same determination we are now bringing to the war itself.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, some of these elements are political, some are economic, and some of necessity are related to security. That suggests that we should view security not just in military terms but as part and parcel of the broader outlook for the region. We're not going to have lasting peace and well-being without sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded -- or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms. And surely finding a way for the peoples of the Middle East to work with each other will be crucial if we are to lift our eyes to a better future.

The Soviet Union at a Crossroads

Before closing, I would like to say a few words on another challenge we face: our relations with the Soviet Union.

The president has spoken often of a new world order in which freedom and democracy might flourish, secure from the fears of the Cold War. We have been hopeful about such an order partly because of the growing cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1989, I described that cooperation as a search for points of mutual advantage. And this search has yielded good results.

Three examples will suffice. First, over the past year, a democratic Germany, fully a member of NATO, was united in peace. The Iron Curtain has vanished and with it the Cold War. Second, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in their own right once more, free to pursue democracy and economic liberty. Third, the Soviet Union has joined the international coalition confronting Iraqi aggression. As Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh reiterated last week, the Soviet Union continues to completely support the full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

While we both have worked at finding these and other points of mutual advantage, it has long been clear to both sides that the potential for long-term cooperation or even partnership between our countries would depend ultimately on the course of the Soviet Union's domestic reform. That is why when last fall I called for pathways of mutual advantage, not just discrete points, I also announced our desire to see a broader democratic dialogue with Soviet reformers. Not just economic reform but essential political reform could transform the Soviet Union into a very different society.

Over the course of several summits and numerous meetings, we have become much more familiar with the ups and downs of perestroika, the enormous and daunting difficulty of changing after 70 years a society's basic direction and many of its values.

In the last several months, however, we have seen a series of unsettling events. They include the tragic violence in the Baltics; an apparent turn toward economic re-centralization; a less free media; extension of army and KGB authority; and the resignation or departure from the government of key reform advocates.

These actions are completely inconsistent with the course of peaceful change, democratic principles, the rule of law, and real economic reform. There is simply no justification for the use of force against peaceful and democratically elected governments. Our hearts go out to the courageous people of the Baltic states who have acted throughout with dignity and restraint.

The president and I have had extensive discussions with President Gorbachev and other Soviet officials about these developments. We and our European allies have pointed out the inevitable consequences if the Soviet government continues on this path. And we have stated our belief that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed in meeting its own objectives if it should abandon perestroika, democratization, and glasnost.

On the Baltics, I could do no better here than to quote the president's words from the State of the Union address: "...our objective is to help the Baltic peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union."

We have had representations from the Soviet leadership about their continuing commitment to reform, to peaceful dialogue with the Baltics,

and to creating a society ruled by law, not force. We're going to watch this situation closely to see whether these representations become enduring realities.

I hope that the Soviet Union will relearn quickly the lesson from its own hard experience: the old ways are not the right ways. Perestroika cannot succeed at gunpoint. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that matters may still turn more for the worse. But at the same time, we must be careful not to jump to premature conclusions.

The Soviet leadership is at a crossroads. We have made clear that their last several steps have taken them down a path of no benefit for them or for us or for anyone else. For the sake of history and for the sake of the world, I hope they resume the march that has given the entire world hope of a better future.

I want to sum up my comments today with this observation. When I appeared before you a year ago to review our overall foreign policy, we were well on the way to a whole and free Europe, secured by expanding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in resolving the continent's outstanding political and military problems. The possibility, even the idea, of this terrible conflict in the Gulf was beyond anyone's imagination. Yet now we face the challenges of hot war in the Gulf and growing uncertainty about the course of Soviet reform.

There can be different views of how to handle these situations. I look forward to your counsel and good words on both issues. Yet on one point I believe we are in very basic agreement: the need for American leadership. If we do not do our part, then Churchill's broad path pursued by many states in common will not be possible. And as Churchill warned, "the middle path adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bullseye of disaster." More clearly than we could have ever imagined a year or even six months ago, the world emerging from the end of the post-war era will be shaped by the United States and its international allies. Our constant purpose must be to make of that world a fitting place for free peoples to live.

Overview of our Funding Request

Let me turn to our foreign affairs funding request. For FY 1992, we seek \$21,900 million in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs Budget Function 150, an increase of \$1,800 million over levels appropriated for FY 1991. In addition, we are requesting a one-time appropriation of \$12,200 million as the U.S. share of a global quota increase for the International Monetary Fund.

In accordance with the terms of the Budget Enforcement Act, our request provides for specific, stringent limits on our spending levels, in spite of unprecedented demands for U.S. leadership across the globe.

In order to achieve our worldwide objectives within these resource

constraints, additional flexibility is needed. Last year, I appealed to this committee to make constructive consultation -- not earmarking -- the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on program objectives. I am pleased to note that we made some progress toward that goal last session.

Earmarking in our Economic Support Fund (ESF) declined from 82 percent in FY 1990 to just over 68 Percent in FY 1991. In our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account, the decline was less dramatic but still significant, from 92 percent to 87 percent. This is a welcome trend, one that we want to encourage promote.

But we still have a long way to go. To support our request this year, let me express the administration's willingness to work in partnership with Congress to develop greater flexibility in our state operations and foreign assistance legislation. To guide this effort, let me suggest five broad objectives for our international cooperation programs, built around the five foreign policy challenges which I presented in my testimony before this committee last year.

First, promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the president noted in his State of the Union address, this fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples across the globe for more than two centuries.

Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential ingredients of democracy -- respect for human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and political and economic opportunity -- are also the basic building blocks of the new world order.

Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening U.S. competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies; together, these can promote U.S. economic interests abroad. By fostering market forces through deregulation, privatization, and promotion of free trade and investment, reform-minded countries can establish an appropriate complement to building and securing democracy. They also can develop into thriving markets for U.S. exports and the jobs they represent. Indeed, U.S. exports to four aid graduates -- Colombia, Chile, Taiwan, and Korea -- total more than twice the value of our entire worldwide foreign assistance budget. Our long-run goal should be to graduate more countries from foreign assistance toward mutually beneficial trade and investment relationships with the United States.

Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts, strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

As the crisis in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated, there is no substitute for strong U.S. leadership. We continue to play a vital role in bolstering the security of regional allies around the world. Egypt and Turkey -- two long-standing beneficiaries of U.S. security

assistance -- are bulwarks of the coalition against Saddam Hussein.

National and regional security are preconditions for democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's aggression is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect the security of regional states of vital interest to the United States and our allies. The proliferation of missile systems and chemical and biological weapons further sharpens our interest in promoting regional stability.

Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism.

As I noted in my first statement to Congress two years ago, "The future of our civilization demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature." This includes curbing proliferation, protecting the environment, and countering terrorism and narcotics.

We have made progress in all of these areas. We have led the international effort to tighten nonproliferation export controls on a global basis. We continue to work to advance our environmental agenda. We are actively pressing state sponsors of terrorism in an effort to thwart terrorism around the globe. And our international narcotics efforts to counter supply are complemented by reports of declining demand at home.

But progress is sometimes slow, unheralded, and hard won. Iraq's conduct following its invasion of Kuwait is a brutal reminder of the danger posed by the interaction of these transnational threats. Saddam Hussein's most recent actions illustrate how traditional concepts of threats to national security need to be extended. Indeed, Iraq has combined:

A credible threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons.

A contemptible use of missile technology as a weapon of terror against innocent civilian populations.

Perhaps the world's first deliberate use of an environmental disaster as a wartime weapon, with unknown consequences for the entire region for years to come; and

A worldwide call for terrorist actions, sometimes supported by embassies abroad in flagrant violation of the basic principles of diplomacy.

These challenges to international order can all be defeated by a committed world community, supported by firm U.S. leadership and appropriate resources as needed.

Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs will continue to reflect deep and abiding concerns of the American people. America's record for responding quickly and substantially to alleviate severe suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters is unequalled. We salute the

role played by American private voluntary agencies and private American citizens in this regard. Meeting the most pressing humanitarian needs with food aid, disaster relief, and refugee assistance will always be an essential component of U.S. assistance policies.

We are prepared to work with Congress on legislation that builds on these basic objectives to provide more flexibility and simplicity to our economic cooperation efforts, working with our global partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to advance this agenda worldwide:

One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities. We seek more flexible account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs. We hope to move toward an assistance program unified around a single set of core objectives, along the lines of those outlined above. As a first step toward this goal, we have proposed a modest \$20 million presidential contingency fund in our FY 1992 budget request.

The need for flexibility is especially urgent at a moment when developments in the world are moving so quickly and unpredictably, while our ability to respond with additional resources is severely constrained by budgetary realities. The Gulf crisis, the restoration of democratic rule in Nicaragua and Panama, and the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa over the past year illustrate that when unprecedented demands for American leadership are combined with limited resources, our need for flexibility becomes all the more urgent.

Two, we see scope for more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to advance our objectives, through both the international financial institutions and the U.N. system.

The Bretton Woods institutions have now admitted all the Eastern European countries, and are playing a central role in structuring sound, adequately financed programs to ease their transition to market economies based on private initiative. Should the Soviet Union move further along the path of structural economic and political reform, we would expect the IMF and the World Bank to play a role in facilitating its transformation as well. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will promote the development of infrastructure, environmental programs, and private sector development in the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, through our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank is expected to play a major role in promoting sound investment policy in our own hemisphere.

To support the efforts of these institutions, we are again proposing full funding for the multilateral development banks -- including all arrears -- plus a periodic quota increase for the IMF. This funding will allow these institutions to leverage other contributions in support of our objective of promoting sound, growth-oriented economic policies in the developing world.

As President Bush noted in his State of the Union address, the United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security Council's 12 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis, symbolized the unity of the international community against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era. At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the U.N. system have assisted the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Iraqi aggression. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail.

Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships with the European Community members and Japan in particular. As many in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common agenda with partners who share our values and interests.

No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to enlist worldwide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression.

In 1990, our coalition partners pledged \$9,700 million to meet Desert Shield costs, representing 88 percent of the roughly \$11,000 million in total incremental expenses we incurred. As soon as hostilities broke out, our allies again responded promptly and generously to shoulder their fair share of coalition military expenses under Operation Desert Storm. Over the past three weeks, we have received unprecedented pledges totaling in excess of \$40,000 million from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Japan, Germany, and Korea, to offset Desert Shield Storm expenses expected to be incurred during the first three months of 1991.

The world community has also responded swiftly and generously to the needs of the front-line states, especially Egypt and Turkey, as they incurred substantial costs in standing up to Saddam Hussein's aggression. Through the U.S.-chaired Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, over \$14,000 million has been pledged by the Gulf states, Europe, Japan, and Korea to ensure that the economies of affected regional states are stabilized and that their commitment to stay the course is reinforced. The United States has played its part in this effort, supported by Congress, by canceling Egypt's \$6,700 million military debt, thereby relieving a heavy burden on a critical regional ally. Other countries have followed suit and canceled an additional \$8,000 million in Egyptian debt.

Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the successful G-24 process chaired by the European Commission has mobilized more than \$18,000 million in pledges for Poland and Hungary, to ease their transition to market economies. And in the Philippines, the Multilateral Assistance

Initiative (MAI) has been responsible for nearly doubling the level of international assistance to this struggling democracy. We are also looking to our worldwide partners to assist us in clearing arrearages of Panama and Nicaragua to the international financial institutions and to assist in the financing of the enhanced debt strategy. Finally, we are encouraging Europe and Japan to join us in pledging \$100 million a year over five years to create a Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean. This fund is a key part of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and will play a crucial role in enabling countries to move from aid to trade and private investment as the principal engines of economic growth.

In each case, both strong U.S. leadership and a community of interests are essential to catalyze a broad worldwide response.

Four, we envision more creative use of trade and investment policies as vehicles to promote U.S. interests in world economic growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength.

Central to these efforts over the past four years has been our determination to pursue a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. We continue to believe that the Uruguay Round has profound political as well as economic implications for the shape of the world in the next century. Successful conclusion of the round is essential for the economic growth and stability of the emerging Eastern European democracies, as well as the wide range of developing countries who will ultimately rely on expansion of world trade -- not aid -- as the primary vehicle to generate employment opportunities and sustainable economic growth.

In our own hemisphere, the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative represents a comprehensive effort to promote economic growth and stability in the region, combining free trade and investment -- the primary vehicles for growth -- with debt relief and environmental initiatives.

As an important step toward the eventual goal of hemispheric free trade, the administration intends to seek a North America Free Trade Area with Mexico and Canada, which we are convinced promises important economic benefits for all three countries. Since the president's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free trade agreement with Mexico, we have engaged in extensive consultations with Congress and the private sector. Canada's participation in these talks will establish a free trade zone throughout the world's largest market, worth over \$6,000,000 and including more than 350 million consumers. The resulting stimulus to exports and the creation of new business opportunities would act as a significant engine of growth and employment generation.

Meanwhile, the United States has worked actively with our Asian partners in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to advance market-oriented cooperation among member states.

Our Bilateral Investment Treaty program has been an important vehicle

in ensuring an open and liberal investment climate for U.S. investors and exporters. Over the past year, we completed negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and are actively negotiating with nine other countries which are in the process of undertaking economic restructuring programs.

Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous U.S. diplomacy, in the context of a State Operations budget that reflects an activist approach to the diplomatic challenges of a changing world stage. I would again reiterate our need for funding flexibility, especially as it relates to our ability to transfer funds among accounts within our very tight State Department Operations budget.

Bilateral Assistance

Bilateral military and economic assistance will remain an essential tool in advancing U.S. interests through the 1990s, assuming the necessary flexibility can be provided to meet emerging needs. No other vehicle at our disposal is as well suited to provide timely support to our allies and friends around the world. Our interests in political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peace-making, and strengthening alliances -- all can be advanced by prudent use of bilateral assistance resources.

For FY 1992, our request for discretionary budget authority for bilateral assistance programs totals \$13,100 million. That marks a 6.5% increase over the \$12,300 million appropriated by Congress for FY 1991. Highlights of this request by category are as follows:

\$4,650 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), supporting a program level of \$4,920 million.

\$3,240 million in Economic Support Funding, up from \$3,140 million.

\$1,300 million in development assistance, the same as the prior year.

\$800 million for the Development Fund for Africa.

\$400 million for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase the FY '91 appropriation.

\$160 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiatives for the Philippines.

\$1,300 million for bilateral PL-480 food aid, supporting the export of 5.9 million metric tons of U.S. commodities.

\$171 million for anti-narcotics assistance, plus additional security and development assistance resources to support these efforts.

Multilateral Assistance

For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting \$1,700 million in FY 1992 budget authority, up from \$1,600 million in FY 1991. This includes \$1,100 million in funding for the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which provides concessionary financing to the world's poorest countries, as well as full funding for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other regional development banks.

Our FY 1992 budget request also contains \$12,200 million in budget authority for the proposed increase in the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. This is to ensure that the Fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. In the Third World, IMF arrangements support market-oriented adjustment and underpin debt reduction operations in support of the Brady Plan. The Fund has also spearheaded economic reform in Eastern Europe, and responded vigorously to assist countries seriously affected by the Persian Gulf crisis.

In addition, we are seeking \$250 million for voluntary contributions to international organizations including the U.N. Development Program (\$115 million) and UNICEF (\$55 million).

Refugees and Other Assistance Programs

The United States continues to play a preeminent role in addressing the plight of the world's refugees -- through our international assistance and domestic resettlement programs, as well as our diplomatic efforts in supporting of permanent solutions to refugee situations.

For FY 1992, we are requesting \$491 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance, up from \$486 million in FY 1991.

For our refugee assistance programs overseas, we seek \$233 million in FY 1992 funding, a \$20 million increase over the FY 1991 level. These programs will continue to focus on basic life-sustaining activities for the most vulnerable groups and support lasting solutions through opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration.

To finance refugee admission and resettlement, we seek \$192 million in FY 1992 funding. This will cover the expenses of an estimated 120,000 refugees -- about the same number as last year. Most refugee admissions will be from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, but there will also be admissions from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. Family reunification will continue to be a priority, as will the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities and former political prisoners.

In addition, we request \$20 million to replenish the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, to enable us to

respond to unforeseen refugee and migration needs worldwide.

Another important component of our international development assistance request is our \$200 million request for Peace Corps operating expenses.

Investing in Diplomacy

The Gulf crisis provides a vivid demonstration of the "front line" role played by the State Department in protecting American citizens and defending American interests abroad. This is an increasingly expensive responsibility, exacerbated by the demands on the department to expand operations to meet new political and economic opportunities around the globe. Fluctuations in exchange rates, higher rates of overseas inflation, and the continuing need to enhance the security of our posts and personnel abroad further magnify the problem. Today we face a potential and worrisome weakening of our foreign affairs infrastructure at a time when we are being called upon to meet extraordinary and new challenges.

Since January 1989, we have placed a high priority on strengthening our ability to manage scarce resources:

To better match national interests to available resources, we are taking steps to better integrate policy planning with the budget process.

To strengthen foreign service personnel management, we have begun to implement key proposals made by the Bremer and Thomas commissions.

To conserve personnel and financial resources, we have set up a new center in Rosslyn, Virginia, to process hundreds of thousands of refugee and asylum applications from the Soviet Union, which can serve as a model to meet future consular and immigration demands.

To strengthen our physical plant abroad, we have put into place a professional property management system and begun implementation of a five year integrated plan which addresses new construction, rehabilitation, repair, and maintenance.

To enhance the cost-effectiveness of our security efforts, we have begun to implement reforms to link our wide-ranging efforts at over 250 posts abroad to country-specific threat profiles.

For State Department salaries and expenses, we are requesting \$2,050 million in budget authority for FY 1992, an increase of \$179 million over the current year. This is the minimal level of resources we need to fund our overseas and domestic operations: over two-thirds of the increase compensates for price increases and exchange rate changes. The remainder will be used to support several specific funding requirements:

Expanding our diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe (\$25 million).

Responding to increased immigration processing requirements necessitated by passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 (\$24 million).

Strengthening our information and financial systems by improving our infrastructure (\$13.5 million).

In the Foreign Building account, we have requested \$570 million in FY 1992 funding. Of this total, \$440 million represents the first installment of a five-year, \$2,350 million program to address the Department of State's most urgent facility replacement priorities, including embassies in Bangkok and Bogota. Our goal is to restore the safety, security, and workability of our aging but valuable inventory of overseas facilities.

We are also seeking \$130 million in funding for the Moscow Embassy project. It is imperative that we make a decision now on a new building so we can begin to operate as soon as possible in appropriate, secure space.

Contributions to International Organizations

The president has emphasized the urgency of restoring financial viability to the United Nations and other international organizations. After several years of effort on the part of Congress and the administration, we are pleased to report significant movement toward budgetary and administrative reform with the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. No one who has witnessed the response of the U.N. Security Council to recent events in the Persian Gulf could deny the importance to U.S. interests of a financially healthy U.N. system.

We remain absolutely committed to full funding for U.S. assessed contributions, to the extent permitted by law, and to paying our prior year arrearages over the next four years. We appreciate the full funding we received for FY 1991, which included initial funding toward the necessary process of arrears clearance. For FY 1992, we are requesting \$750 million in budget authority to meet our current assessments to international organizations, plus an additional \$371 million for arrears clearance, to be paid out over the following four years. For international peacekeeping activities, we are requesting \$69 million to meet our full funding obligations, plus \$132 million for arrearages.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy will be one of our most valuable tools as we seek to encourage the worldwide tide of democracy and political pluralism. For the valuable work of the U.S. Information Agency and the Board for International Broadcasting, we are requesting \$1,300 million in FY 1992

funding, up slightly from the prior year. Within this level, a new emphasis will be placed on information and cultural programs in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Islamic world.

Conclusion

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to working with you and the members of this committee in the coming months to mobilize the resources needed to carry out our ambitious foreign affairs agenda.

(End Text)

אאאא, חוזם: 14390

אל: רהמש/1357

מ-: ווש, נר: 2052, תא: 060291, חז: 1710, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / בהול

אל: מצפ' א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

להלן מקרצר:

1. אין נטיה במימשל מהנשיא 'דרומה' לטפל עכשיו בצרכי הקליטה וב-10 ביליון הדולרים. אין זה אומר שהם מתנגדים בכלל לדיון בנושא אך אם זה יעלה, אז רק בהקשר לתהליך התקציב.

2. לגבי הוצאות הנטחון המיוחדות שנגרמו לישראל בגין המלחמה, קיים רצון לסייע, אבל לא יודעים איך. אין נטיה לתלות על תוספת התקציב של 'סופת זדבר' שום ענין שאין לו נגיעה ישירה לניהול המלחמה. יהיה קשה במיוחד למצוא כסף מזומן, אבח הרי כבר עשינו דברים בתחום האספקה הצבאית והעברת טכנולוגיה ואלה הם דברים 'שווי כסף'. לבד מזאת החליטה הקהילה על 200 מליון 'וזה תוצאה של מאמצים שלנו'. המזכיר אמר שישראל היא מדינת-חזית 'ואת זה אנחנו מנסים להנחיל לאירופים'.

3. מ'הקומה העליונה' שמע, שאם יהיה ניסיון חקיקתי, ילחם המימשל בכל עוז להכשלת החקיקה.

קרצר הוסיף שהוחלט (כאילו) לא לפנות ליפנים (בקשר לסיוע לישראל) ובו ביום שמענו פעמיים מדניס רוס שהוחלט כן לפנות ליפנים. האמת היא, כנראה, שהם מחכים עם הפניה הזו עד שידעו אם הדיאט מאשר את ההשתתפות הנוספת של יפן ב'סופת המדבר' בסך 9.5 בליון.

שילה.

אי=

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12194

אל:רהמש/1151

מ-:ווש,נר:2027,תא:050291,זח:1040,דח:ב,סג:סו,

בבב

סודי / בהול

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

פגישות היהודים

השתתפו מהצד האמריקני: הנשיא, סקורופט, איגלברגר, וולפוביץ, סונונו (נכנס ויצא אחרי 5 דקות), האס. מהיהודים: גב' קרדין, מאיר מטשל שונפלד, סלהרג(נשיא א.ד.ל.), לארי רובין, ג'ורג' קליין, גלייזר מלקולם הונליין ומכס פישר.

סקורופט פתח. הירבה בשנחים להתנהגותה של ישראל. סקר את כל מה שהשיגו ההפצות בשבועיים הראשונים למלחמה. וולפוביץ מלא אחריו והגדיר את ריסונה של ישראל כמעשה אמיץ הנשען על הברית האסטרטגית. אמר שברית זו והשת'פ צריכים להימשך ולהתחזק.

הציג ליהודים שלא לטעון שארהב' 'משלמת במטבע ישראלי' ואמר שזו טענה מזיקה. הנשיא אמר, שהשימוש שעשה סדאם בטילים נגד אוכלוסיה אזרחית, כמו גם השימוש לרעה שהוא עושה בשכויי מלחמה, רק מזיקים לעראקים. חזר על המחוייבות הגמורה לשלומה של ישראל, תאר את היחסים כטובים מאד ואיתנים, שיבח את עבודתו של איגלברגר ביצירת אוירת אמון ושיתוף פעולה והביע תקווה שרמת יחסים זו תישמר אחרי המשבר.

לגבי תוצאות המלחמה, חזר ואמר שהסטטוס-קוו של טרום אוגוסט 90 שוב אינו קביל ואינו מבטא את כל מטרות המלחמה של האמריקאים. סקורופט אמר שארהבם עושה 'שעה-שעה' בחינה והתאמה של היתרון האיכותי של ישראל למען לא יישחק. איגלברגר אמר שהישראלים הגיעו בעצמם למסקנה שהריסון מתיישב עם האינטרס הפוליטי שלכם ולא עשו זאת ל'מען אמריקה'.

בוש אמר שארהב' לא תכתיב לאף אחד מהלכים ובודאי שלא למדינה ידידותית. היהודים העלו את נושא הסיוע והצורך לפצות את ישראל על נזקיה והפסדיה והזכירו את הסופלמנטל של 'סופת המדבר'. בוש פנה את סקורופט ושאל אותו מה יש לו לומר וסקורופט התנגד לענין זה בכל תוקף והסביר שתוספת תקציב זו יש ליחד לצרכים הממשיים של 'סופת המדבר' ולא לדברים נוספים. הנשיא היה קצת יותר רך ואמר ליהודים: 'נבדוק'.

שילה

לבח

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@ (רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,בןאבו,תפוצות

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12762

אל: רהמש/1207

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 101, תא: 050291, חז: 2109, חמ: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

למ'ס/מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

דע: מע'ת, הסברה, קונכ'לים.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

המושלים - הזדהות.

1. בטקס התמיכה של המושלים בישראל שנערך בשגרירות אתמול נכחו עתונאים (המושלים והשגריר נשאו דברים).

עיקרי הדברים:

א. מושל איווה - קרא מכתב התמיכה והוסיף שעבודת החתימה על המכתב נעשתה מתוך אהבה IT WAS A LABOUR OF LOVE. עוד אמר שישראל זוכה עתה בהערצה ובתמיכה בארה"ב, משני צידי הקשת הפוליטית.

ב. מושל ארקנסו - מעריכים האיפוק בו נוהגת ממ' ישראל. בטוח שמדיניות זו תשא פירות בטווח הרחוק. ציין כי כמושל של מדינה - שלה חיילים רבים נחזית לכבוד לו תחשב העובדה שנוכחות של חיילים אמריקנים תורמת להגנת העם בישראל.

ג. מושל מיסיסיפי - הדגיש העובדה שנמספנות מיסיסיפי נבנות הספינות החדשות לישראל שתרומנה לבטחון ישראל.

ד. מושל מרילנד - ציין השתתפותו והשתתפות השגריר ב-SUPER SUNDAY וההיענות הגדולה של התורמים - כביטוי לתמיכת היהודים בישראל.

ה. מושל מסצ'וסטס - ציין העליה מכריה'מ והאתגר ההסטורי העומד בפני העם ישראל. ציין תמיכת מדינתו בישראל והדגיש הנושא היחיד עליו הצליחו להסכים פה אחד כל באי הועידה השנתית של המושלים הוא התמיכה בישראל. והראיה - חתימת כל המושלים על מכתב התמיכה.

2. השגריר, בדברי תשובתו, הביע הערכה לתמיכה זו של המושלים החשובה לישראל במיוחד - מכיון שהיא מבטאת את תמיכת העם האמריקני ולא רק הדרג הפוליטי - אמריקני בישראל.

"אנחנו יודעים" אמר השגריר "שגם אם נאלץ להגיב לתוקפנות העיראקית, העם האמריקני יבין וימשיך לעמוד מאחורינו". השגריר הבטיח כי יעביר הודעת התמיכה לעם ולממשלה בישראל.

3. למצפ'א - נודה על קבלת הידיעות על האירוע מהתקשורת הישראלית.

רות ירון.

10/9

FEB 06 '91 12:24AM 2029645607

P.1/5

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4.2.91

גלוי/מידי

10/9

אל: מנהל חצפ"א
מנהל הסברה

דע: קוניכלים (הוצאה)
מאת: הסברה, וושינגטון

הצהרת סולידריות - מושלי מדינות.

1. שבעה חושלים ששמותיהם רצ"ב באו לשגרירות כדי למסור לשגריר המכתב חצ"ב, שניזום ע"י מושל איובה ושעליו חתמו כל 50 מושלי המדינות וחטריטוריות (פורטו-ריקו, סמואה וכו').
2. בסגישה ובמפגש עם העתונאים, שבעקבותיה דיברו כל החושלים שנכתו וחשגרי ענה. מושל מסצ'וסטס ציין התמיכה הרבה לה זוכה ישראל ומשלחות החזדהות מבוסטון ארצה. העיר בחיור, שזה הנושא היחידי שעליו מסכימים כל 50 החושלים. מושל מרילנד ציין התרשמותו מהתגייסות הקהילה היהודית לטובת ישראל כפי שבלט ב-Super Sunday. מושל אוקנסו ומיסיסיפי ציינו האחוז הגבוה ממדינותיהם בין החיילים במפץ וגאוחתם שהם גם מגינים על ישראל. הדגישו הפרוייקטים המשותפים עם ישראל.
3. מושל קליפורניה, פיט וילסון, הגיע לאחר סיום הטקס ונפגש עם השגריר (פרטים על הסגישה בנסוד).
4. הארוע היה מרשים והרבה מהאשראי מגיע לקונסוליה הכללית בשיקגו ובמיוחד לצביה שמעון על העבודה שחושקעה בהבטחת החצלחה המירבית ליוזמת מושל איובה.

פלג

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FEB 06 '91 12:25AM 0029645607

P.2/5

2/5

10/9

List of Governors

Governor Tommy Thompson (R-WI)

Governor Terry Brandstead (R-IOWA)

Governor Ray Mabus (D-MISS)

Governor William Weld (R-MASS)

Governor Carol Campbell (R-S.C.)

Governor Bill Clinton (D-ARK)

Governor Bill Clinton (D-ARK)

Governor William Schaefer (D-MD)

FEB 05 '91 12:25AM 1013645607

NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION

Booth Gardner
Governor of Washington
Chairman

John Ashcroft
Governor of Missouri
Vice Chairman

F. B. F.
Raymond C. Scheppach
Executive Director
Hall of the States
444 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20001-1972
Telephone (202) 624-1300

1019



February 4, 1991

His Excellency Zalman Shoval
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As we gather for our winter conference in Washington, D.C., the Governors of the United States want to express our admiration and continuing support for the Israeli people in the face of repeated and indiscriminate missile attacks by Iraq.

We commend the way in which your government has handled the situation as well as the exceptional restraint with which it has reacted to these horrendous attacks. We condemn these missile attacks by Iraq on Israel and its civilian populations.

We, the Governors of the United States, ask you to express to the people of Israel our continuing concern for their well being and safety.

Sincerely,

Terry E. Brandstad
TERRY E. BRANDSTAD, IOWA

Evan Bayh
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA

John Ashcroft
JOHN ASHCROFT, MISSOURI

Booth Gardner
BOOTH GARDNER, WASHINGTON

Carroll A. Campbell, Jr.
CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR.,
SOUTH CAROLINA

Bill Clinton
BILL CLINTON, ARKANSAS

George A. Sinner
GEORGE A. SINNER, NORTH DAKOTA

Guy Hunt
GUY HUNT, ALABAMA

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10/9

5/11

Michael N. Castle

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, DELAWARE

Bob Miller

BOB MILLER, NEVADA

John R. McKernan

JOHN R. MCKERMAN, JBY MAINE

Bruce Sundlun

BRUCE SUNDLUN, RHODE ISLAND

Tommy G. Thompson

TOMMY G. THOMPSON, WISCONSIN

Roy Romea

ROY ROMEA, COLORADO

David Walters

DAVID WALTERS, OKLAHOMA

George S. Mickelson

GEORGE S. MICKELSON, SOUTH DAKOTA

Barbara Roberts

BARBARA ROBERTS, OREGON

John Waihee

JOHN WAIHEE, HAWAII

William F. Weld

WILLIAM F. WELD, MASSACHUSETTS

Jim Edgar

JIM EDGAR, ILLINOIS

Stan Stephens

STAN STEPHENS, MONTANA

Peter T. Coleman

PETER T. COLEMAN, AMERICAN SAMOA

Arne H. Carlson

ARNE H. CARLSON, MINNESOTA

Lorenzo I. Guerrero

LORENZO I. GUERRERO, NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

Robert P. Casey

ROBERT P. CASEY, PENNSYLVANIA

Cecil D. Andrus

CECIL D. ANDRUS, IDAHO

James G. Martin

JAMES G. MARTIN, NORTH CAROLINA

Buddy Roemer

BUDDY ROEMER, LOUISIANA

Ann Richards

ANN RICHARDS, TEXAS

Ray Mabus

RAY MABUS, MISSISSIPPI

John Engler

JOHN ENGLER, MICHIGAN

Judd Gregg

JUDD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE

אאא, חוזם: 10511
אל: רהמש/1033
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 68, תא: 040291, חז: 2058, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בבב
19331
בלמ'ס/רגיל
251.04

אל: מנהל הסברה, מנהל מצפ' א', יועץ שה' ח לתפוצות
דע: ציר הסברה, קישור לקונגרס - וושינגטון
מאת: קונסול ההסברה - ניו-יורק

לאוטנברג: לא ללינקג', לא לועידה בין לאומית

מנטור פרנק לאוטנברג, בדברו אתמול בעצרת הזדהות מרשימה בקליפטון
יו-ג'רסי, הדגיש חשיבותם של אי יצירת הלינקג' וההתנגדות לועידה בין
לאומית. בדברו בפני מאות רבות ציין הסנטור כי חשוב שזה המסר יגיע למזכיר
המדינה. לאוטנברג סיפר לקהל על שיחתו הטלפונית עם רוה' מ', בה תאר
לרוה' מ' התמיכה הקיימת בישראל בימים אלו.

בנוסף לסנטור, נאם בחמימות בעצרת המורשה בוב טוריז'לי והח' מ' הביא
דברנו.

אורי פלטי

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, רביב, מעת, הסברה, בנצור,
מצפא, סולטן, תפוצות, בנאבו

טסטט

אאא, חוזם: 10198
אל: רהמש/1002
מ-: המשרד, תא: 040291, חז: 2205, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בבב
9,244448
9,520517
9,035271750

בלמ'ס/בהול לבוקר

אל: כל הנציגויות

מרכזי התקשורת - י-ס/שמי צור, ת'א/מאיר שלמה

הנדון: תגובת ישראל לשימוש בנשק כימי ע"י עירק

מברק דגשי הסברה מ-3/2

1. אין להיכנס לפרשנות כלשהי של דברי מזכיר ההגנה האמריקאי צ'ייני.

2. שימת לבכם לשתי התבטאויות ישראליות בהקשר:

רה"מ שמיר נדרש בראיון ל-CNN ב-31/1 לשאלה אפשרית שסדאם חוסיין ישתמש בנשק כימי (מטוסים או טילים) באמרו:

THIS WILL BE A TREMENDOUS ESCALATION, AND IN SUCH A CASE THE RULES WILL BE CHANGED. THE RULES WILL BE DIFFERENT. I CANNOT SAY WHAT WE WILL DO IN SUCH A SITUATION, BUT IT WILL BE NOT AS IT IS TODAY.

שהב"ט ארנס התייחס אתמול (3/2) בראיון ל-NBC לדברי שר ההגנה האמריקאי ריצ'ארד צ'ייני, שהזהיר את עירק כי אם תשתמש בנשק כימי, ישראל עלולה להגיב בנשק לא קונבנציונאלי. 'אני חושב שהוא אמר שלסדאם חוסיין יש סיבה לדאגה - כן, יש לו מה לדאוג', ענה שר הביטחון. בתשובה לשאלה האם זה כולל נשק גרעיני? השיב ארנס: 'צ'ייני לא דיבר במפורש, כפי שגם היית מצפה ממנו בנסיבות הנוכחיות. אבל, אם תאמר שלסדאם חוסיין יש סיבה לדאגה, זה כוון'.

3. רק במידה והנושא עולה יש לחזור על דברי רה"מ ושהב"ט בלא פרשנויות נוספות. אין חוזר אין לשלול במפורש שום אופציה לתגובה ישראלית.

הסברה/מידע

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה,
מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר,
ארבל, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר, איר, 2,
@ (לעמ), ארבל, פרנ, קשדן, אומן, @ (תקשורת/ים), @ (תקשורת/תא)

10998: תוזם: אאאא

אל: רהמש/1053

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 65, תא: 040291, חז: 2215, ח: מ, סג: כל,

בכב

כלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ON FISCAL YEAR 1992 BUDGET/BRIEFERS:
RICHARD CHENEY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DONALD ATWOOD, DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; SEAN O'KEEFE, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COMPTROLLER
THE PENTAGON/MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1991

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY:

THE OTHER ITEM THAT NEEDS TO BE MENTIONED, OF COURSE, IS THE
FACT THAT WHEN ALL OF THIS PLANNING WAS DONE FOR OUR LONG-RANGE
FORCE STRUCTURE, IT WAS DONE AT A TIME WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE FACT
THAT TODAY WE FIND OURSELVES AT WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE BUDGET
WAS PREPARED AND PUT TOGETHER PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES,
AND THE FUNDING OF THAT EFFORT WILL BE COVERED BY A SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATION THAT IS OVER AND ABOVE THE NUMBERS I AM SHOWING YOU
HERE TODAY. THERE'S THE SUPPLEMENTAL TO FUND DESERT STORM, AND THE
AUTHORIZATION TO USE THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS THAT WE'RE
RECEIVING FROM ALLIES, WILL BE HANDLED IN A SEPARATE PIECE OF
LEGISLATION APART FROM THIS BUDGET THAT WILL BE PRESENTED TO
CONGRESS AT THE TIME THEY RETURN FROM THE LINCOLN DAY RECESS WITHIN
ABOUT TWO WEEKS.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. I CAN'T THINK OF A BETTER
ARGUMENT FOR THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF DEALING WITH THE
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THAN WATCHING THE NIGHTLY SCUD ATTACKS
AGAINST TEL AVIV AND RIYADH. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, FUTURE
SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE ABLE TO DEPLOY
DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. AND WHETHER THAT IS THE KIND
OF THEATER THREAT THAT WE FACE TODAY WHERE OUR FORCES AND OUR
FRIENDS IN THE REGION ARE THREATENED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SCUD AND
SCUD VARIANTS, OR FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED THREATS THAT WE ANTICIPATE
IN THE FUTURE, THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE IS WHERE THOSE
PROGRAMS ARE LOCATED THAT ARE GOING TO ALLOW US ULTIMATELY TO FILL
THAT REQUIREMENT.

SDI IS VERY IMPORTANT. IT REMAINS A HIGH-PRIORITY ITEM FOR THE
DEPARTMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION. THE PRESIDENT MADE REFERENCE TO
IT IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH. AND WE'LL CONTINUE TO PUSH
VERY HARD TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO ALLOW US TO PROCEED WITH
DEVELOPING THE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH THIS
EVER-INCREASING THREAT. TRIDENT MISSILE BASICALLY REFERS TO THE
MISSILES THAT WE'RE PURCHASING FOR THAT PROGRAM. PEACEKEEPER RAIL
GARRISON. THE FUNDING THERE TAKES US THROUGH THE FIRST TEST SHOT OF
THE RAIL GARRISON SYSTEM. THE SMALL ICBM CONTINUES IN ITS
DEVELOPMENT STAGES. NEITHER IN THE CASE OF PEACEKEEPER OR THE SMALL
ICBM ARE WE RECOMMENDING DEPLOYMENT AT THIS POINT, BUT BOTH OF THOSE

PROGRAMS WILL BE KEPT ALIVE. ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE, OF COURSE, IS OUR LATEST GENERATION CRUISE MISSILE, DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES, BUT WE THINK IT'S A VERY IMPORTANT PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR SHRINKING INVENTORY OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

עד כאן.

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

טסט

אאא, חוזם: 10687
אל: רהמש/1067
מ-מיאמי, נר: 12, תא: 040291, חז: 1400, דח: מ, סג: בל,
כבב
9, 250890

בלמס/מיד

אל: מצפא

דע: הסברה, תפוצות, מקצ'ב, מעת
ושינגטון פלג

מאת: הקונכל מיאמי

קנדון: ביקור ראש העיר מיאמי ביץ

1. ראש העיר ALEX DAOUD חזר כמתוכנן בתאריך 4 פברואר מביקורו בן שבוע הימים בארץ.
2. בהגיעו לשדה התעופה ערך ראש העיר מסיבת עיתונאים רבת משתתפים: 6 תחנות טלוויזיה, 5 תחנות רדיו ו-2 עיתונים יומיים בשפות האנגלית והספרדית.
3. ראש העיר מסר בהרחבה על התנהגותה המופתית של האוכלוסיה בישראל שיבח את איפוק הממשלה נוכח התקיפות, מסר על ביקורו אצל צוותי הסקאד ושיבח את קבלת הפנים והכנסת האורחים להם זכה.
4. עמדתי בדברי על נתוני היסוד במז'ת, על מלחמה ערבית-ערבית הנכפית עלינו, על אופיים המכוער של תקיפות נגד אוכלוסיה אזרחית ושיבחתי את המחווה של ראש העיר שערך ביקור אצל הערים התאומות רמת גן והרצליה שבאו תחת אש.
5. בסיום מסיבת העיתונאים נערכו ראיונות נפרדים לכל אמצעי התקשורת הנ"ל. הכיסוי היה מיידי ומלא ומשודר במשך כל היום באמצעי התקשורת.
6. מר דאוד ביקשני להודות לס'שה'ח מר נתניהו, למנכל ממתיירות וליתר האישים איתם נפגש. כמוכן ביקש להעביר הערכה מיוחדת למארחו ראש עירית הרצליה מר אלי לנדאו. בודאי תרצו להעביר כנ"ל.
7. קבלונא תודה עבור חלקכם החשוב בקיום הביקור וכתאום פגישות. היה בכך משום תרומה נכבדה למאמצי ההסברה שלנו אשר הביאו לכיסוי חיובי במשך כמעט שבועיים ימים.

ליבה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מעת, הסברה, מקצב, מאור, בןאבו, תפוצות,
@שובל/תיירות)

אאאא, חוזם: 11982
אל: רהמש/1131
מ-: המשרד, תא: 050291, זח: 1638, דח:ר, סג:סו,
בבב
מכתב/מברק
=====
סודי/

217.15

אל: וושינגטון

מאת: מנהל ארכל' 1

הנדון: ביקור חבר הקונגרס CHARLES RANGEL. מברק ניו יורק 738.

מזכיר הממשלה ויו"ר מועצת הרשות למלחמה בסמים ארח ב-4 דנא לארוחת בוקר את רנגל. השתתפו מצידו עוזרו שיינר ו-FINVER משגארה'ב. מצדנו בני ארד ונכ'ל הרשות והח'מ.

רובינשטיין הציג מדיניות הרשות ומסר על כוונתנו להעביר בתוך זמן קצר לממשל הצעת נוסח למזכר הבנה בין ממשלות ישראל וארה'ב שענינו ש'פ במאבק בסמים. הבטיח להעביר העתק המסמך לעיונו של רנגל ובקש תמיכתו באימוץ המסמך ע"י הממשל. האורח הגיב שישמח להעלות הנושא עם לויצקי והציע לשמור שגארה'ב בראון בתמונה. רובינשטיין התייחס למעורבות הסורית בנושא הסמים (לאורח נמסרה החוברת בנדון) ופרט תחומי ש'פ המוצע בכללם החלפת מידע, מחקר, הכשרת כח אדם וכן טיפול ומניעה. רנגל רמז לביקורת שיש לו על טיפול הממשל בהקשר הפדרלי ואמר שיעביר לנו חומר רלבנטי בכלל זה מדיוני הועדה בקונגרס. הדגיש שמעוניין לנצל החומר על המעורבות הסורית תוך הקפדה שלא להשאיר 'טביעות אצבעות' של ישראל אך יתייעץ עם לויצקי לגבי העתוי תוך התחשבות בשיקולי השעה.

במהלך השיחה נתן האורח ביטוי לרחשי הידידות שיש לו כלפי ישראל. בהתייחסו למלחמה במפרץ שיבח מדיניות ההכלגה שלנו וטרח להוסיף כי 'אין הוא מחבב את כל השותפים לקואליציה וחשוב לו להבטיח האינטרסים הישראלים מול אלה של האמירים למיניהם מקרב בעלות הברית'.

ב ב ר כ ה

אבי מילוא

העתק: הקונכ'ל, ניו יורק
מר א. רובינשטיין, מזכיר הממשלה ויו"ר מועצת הרשות למלחמה בסמים
מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: ארכל'1, מצפא, @ (רהמ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 136

אל: רהמש/29

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 785, תא: 310191, זח: 2100, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ"א

דע: הקונסוליה - ניו יורק

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור הקונגרסמן רנגל

1. התקשר עוזרו של הקונגרסמן, ג'ון שיינר ואמר כי לרנגל, כיו"ר ועדת הסמים, יש ענין להפגש עם אלי רובינשטיין (אולי לאותה א"ב שביקשנו מברקנו הקודם, לפני הפגישה עם רה"מ) גם בנושא הסמים וגם בנושא המלחמה במרץ.

הבטחתי להעביר בקשתו מבלי להתחייב. כן סיפר, שרנגל לא יצטרף לביקור במרכז הקליטה במבשרת אלא יסע עם השגריר בראון לבקר באתר טילי הפטריוט.

2. נודה על התייחסותכם במידי למברקי הקודם בנדון ומברקי זה. משרד הקונגרסמן מבקשים לקבל אישור לבקשותיהם אם אפשר לפני יציאתם לארץ.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 34774
אל: רהמש/3799
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 738, תא: 310191, חז: 1657, חז: ב, סג: שמ,
בבב
19276
שמור/בהול לבוקר
106.02

אל: משה רם - מצפ"א

דע: יהודית ורנאי - דרנגר, וושינגטון

מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

חבר הקונגרס צ'רלי רנגל מבקש לקבוע פגישה בנושא מלחמה
בסמים בזמן שדינקינס מסייר בעיר העתיקה.
מציע פגישה עם אלי רובינשטיין (הפגישה הבאה היא עם רוה"מ ב
08:30). רנגל הינו יושב ראש ועדה בקונגרס בנושא המלחמה
בסמים.

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), בנצור, מצפא, ביינ, ארבלו, רביב, מאור

סטסט

Press bulletin

JERUSALEM, 2 FEBRUARY 1991

#21 TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF NEW YORK MAYOR DINKINS AND CONGRESSMAN RANGEL

 /91.02.02 (COMMUNICATED IN ENGLISH BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF THE TRIP TO ISRAEL BY NEW YORK
 MAYOR DINKINS AND CONGRESSMAN RANGEL:

SUNDAY 3.2.91

- 15:30 MEET THE PRESS AT THE VIP LOUNGE AT BEN-GURION AIRPORT.
- 18:30 PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHAIM HERZOG AT
 HIS RESIDENCE.
- 19:30 PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO DINNER HOSTED BY JERUSALEM MAYOR TEDDY
 KOLLEK AT THE KING DAVID HOTEL.

MONDAY 4.2.91

- 07:00 TOUR OF OLD JERUSALEM WITH MAYOR TEDDY KOLLEK
- 08:15 PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRIOR TO MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK
 SHAMIR AT HIS OFFICE. COMMENTS TO PRESS UPON DEPARTURE.
- 09:30 GREET NEWLY ARRIVED ETHIOPIAN AND RUSSIAN IMMIGRANTS AT MEVASSERET
 ZION ABSORPTION CENTER
- 11:30 VISIT US AND ISRAELI SOLDIERS AT A PATRIOT MISSILE BATTERY NEAR
 TEL-AVIV POOL COVERAGE
- 12:30 TOUR DAMAGED AREAS IN TEL-AVIV NEIGHBORHOOD WITH MAYOR SHLOMO
 LAHAT
- 14:00 PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE TEL-AVIV HILTON PRESS CENTER

MAYOR DINKINS WILL ALSO MEET IN JERUSALEM WITH THE RAIZ AND MAGARIK
 FAMILIES FORMER SOVIET REFUSENIKS WHOSE CASES HE ADOPTED TIME AND
 LOCATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED

PLEASE NOTE JOURNALISTS ARE ADVISED TO CONFIRM WITH THE TEL-AVIV OR
 JERUSALEM PRESS CENTERS, TEL: 02-520934 OR 03-5371094 THE FINAL TIMES OF
 THE ABOVE EVENTS A FEW HOURS BEFOREHAND

--/DB
 #0

16:00 HOURS

אאא, חוזם: 27622

אל: רהמש/3088

מ-: נר, 2057: תא: 250191, זח: 2200, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפא, מנהל הסברה, יועץ תפוצות - תפוצות

דע: שגריר - פלג - וושינגטון

מאת: קונכל / ניו יורק

הנדון: פגישות וארועים בביקור ראש עירית ניו יורק.

להלן הפגישות והארועים שראש העיריה דינקינס מבקש לקבוע-

הגעה עם אל על 3/2 008 ב-15.50

יציאה עם אל על 5/2 001

מבקש ללון במלון המלך דוד.

פגישות:

הנשיא

רה'מ

שה'ח

שהב'ט

קולק

להט

שגריר ארה'ב

ארועים:

ביקור בכותל

פגישות עם עולי בריה'מ (נתב'ג ?)

עולי אתיופיה

ביקור אצל חיילים אמריקאים המאיישים הפטריוט.

חנוכת ככר ניו יורק בירושלים.

מסיבת עתונאים.

אל ראש העיר יצטרפו מספר (קטן) של מנהיגי יהודים. סה'כ הפמליה כ-15 איש

(נבריק הפרטים לכשנדע). כן צפוי כי תצטרף משלחת עתונאים. ראש העיר ילווה

ע'י שני אנשי (אנשי) בטחון. אחד או שניים יקדימו את המשלחת ויגיעו ביום

ד' כחלוץ.

ביום ב' נפגש עם אנשי ראש העיר ונדווח על בקשות נוספות במידה ויש.

תודה

אורי סביר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), כנצור,
מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, מאור, תפוצות, בנאכו

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27514
אל: רהמש/3058
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 609, תא: 250191, חז: 1806, דת: ר, סג: בל,
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אל: מצפ'א, יועץ שה'ח לעניני תפוצות, הסברה
לשכת עירית י-ם
לשכת עירית תל אביב

דע: וושינגטון, קונגרס

מאת: לשכת קונכ'ל/ניו יורק

נדון: נסיעת ראש עירית ניו-יורק לארץ

היום ערך ראש עירית ניו-יורק, דיויד דינקינס, מסיבת עתונאים בה הודיע כי הוא נוסע לארץ במוצאי שבת 2/2, לסמל תמיכה בישראל. כמו כן יסע קונגרסמן CHARLES RANGEL מניו-יורק, מיכאל מילר-JCRC ונציגי המגבית ניו-יורק ילוו את המשלחת.

הביע תקווה כי הקונכ'ל יצטרף אליו. בין תכניותיהם לסייר בשכונת התקווה, פרויקט של המגבית- ניו-יורק. בתשובה לשאלה מה היא תועלת הביקור ענה ראש העיריה שניו-יורק רוצה להביע סולידריות עם ישראל ולהרים את המורל בארץ. כתשובה לשאלה על אפשרות של הדים פוליטיים שליליים כתוצאה מהביקור ענה שאת ההחלטה לנסוע עשה מתוך ההכרה שזהו הדבר הנכון לעשותו ולא מתוך שיקולים פוליטיים.

לשכת קונכ'ל/ניו יורק
בטי ארנברג

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות,
בןאבו, רביב, מעת, הסברה, מאור, @ (פדון/עיריה)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27499

אל: רהמש/3048

מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 597, תא: 250191, חז: 1612, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

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שמור/בהול לבוקר

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אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מנהל הסברה

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, סמנכ"ל הסברה לשכת שה"ח, שגריר - פלג - אטינגר, וושינגטון

מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

הנדון: ביקור ראש העיר דינקינס בארץ

אחר מספר ימים של מגעים שקטים הודיע לי הבוקר ראש העיר דינקינס כי הוא מתכוון להגיע ארצה לביקור של 24 שעות ביום א' (3/2) הבא. הזמין אותי לפגישה בצהריים ולקיום מסיבת עתונאים משותפת. אנא הודיעו גם לטדי קולק ולצ'יץ'. לאחר פגישתי עמו אבריק בקשות לו"ז. אל דינקינס יתלווה חבר הקונגרס השחור מהארלס צ'רלי רנגל (RANGEL).

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

אורי סביר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, מאור

סססס

FEB 01 '91 16:14 CONSULAT ISRAEL BOS.

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FEB 01 '91 13:51 SPEAKER'S OFFICE

P.2

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety-one

RESOLUTIONS EXPRESSING DEEP RESPECT AND STRONG FRIENDSHIP FOR THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL DURING THIS TIME OF CRISIS.

WHEREAS, THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE SOUGHT TO REVERSE THE TRAGIC DISMEMBERING OF KUWAIT BY THE NATION OF IRAQ; AND

WHEREAS, NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD AND THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR COLLECTIVE CONSENSUS THAT PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS AND THE DIGNITY OF THEIR PEOPLE IS PRESERVED; AND

WHEREAS, THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT STEMS FROM THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT AND FROM THAT INVASION ONLY; AND

WHEREAS, THE NATION OF ISRAEL HAS PURSUED AND MAINTAINED A LEVEL OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT DESPITE IRAQ'S LONG STATED OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST; AND

WHEREAS, IRAQ HAS ATTACKED CIVILIAN AREAS IN ISRAEL WITHOUT PROVOCATION, THREATENING THE LIVES OF ARABS AND JEWS CAUSING MANY CASUALTIES AND SOME DEATHS; AND

WHEREAS, IRAQ HAS STATED ITS INTENT TO TURN TEL AVIV INTO A CREMATORIUM PROVOKING HORRIBLE ALLUSIONS TO THE NAZI HOLOCAUST AND ITS INTENT TO EXTERMINATE THE JEWISH PEOPLE; THEREFORE BE IT

RESOLVED, THAT THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT, ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS, DOES HEREBY EXPRESS ITS DEEP RESPECT AND STRONG FRIENDSHIP FOR THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL DURING THIS TIME OF CRISIS WHEN ISRAEL IS REPRAYEDLY UNDER UNPROVOKED AND DEADLY ATTACK BY A NATION THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE AND MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD VIEW AS AN OUTLAW NATION AND WITH THE HEARTFELT HOPES AND PRAYERS FOR PEACE FROM ALL AMERICA TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE INJURED OR KILLED IN RECENT DAYS AND TO ALL PEOPLE IN ISRAEL WHO HAVE SOUGHT PEACE AND SECURITY SINCE ITS BIRTH; AND BE IT FURTHER

RESOLVED, THAT COPIES OF THESE RESOLUTIONS BE FORWARDED BY THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO YAAKOV LEVY, CONSUL GENERAL OF ISRAEL AND LEONARD SARIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ANTI DEFAMATION LEAGUE, NEW ENGLAND REGION.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ADOPTED, JANUARY 31, 1991.

Robert J. Flaherty
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

Robert J. Flaherty
CLERK OF THE HOUSE

SENATE, ADOPTED IN CONCURRENCE, JANUARY 31, 1991.


William D. Bolger
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

Charles B. O'Neill
CLERK OF THE SENATE

OFFERED BY:

CHARLES F. FLAHERTY
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

Robert J. Flaherty
END



מגילת בוג' שינאר

43

IRAQ'S ABUSES SHOW DANGERS OF REPRESSIVE REGIME

(Report cites rights progress in East Europe)

By Edmund F. Scherr and Russell Dybvik

USIA Diplomatic Correspondents

Washington -- Iraq's actions in Kuwait remind the world community "of the dangers that repressive regimes can pose to regional security and international order," the State Department says in its annual human rights report released February 1.

Richard Schifter, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, said Iraq's "brutal" invasion of Kuwait "initiated a reign of terror and human rights abuses" that was even more flagrant than in previous years.

Across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, "the process of democratization was in some areas hampered by the totalitarian legacy and by inter-ethnic antagonisms that have been suppressed for decades," Schifter noted in the introduction to the State Department's report on human rights for 1990.

Moscow's moves to reassert authority over the Baltic republics -- particularly the use of military force -- "raised concern over the future of the recent (Soviet) reforms, with dangerous implications for the entire country," he emphasized.

He also pointed to human rights repression in China and Burma, but he noted gains in Mongolia and Nepal, South Africa and Nicaragua.

The State Department's annual report to Congress is mandated by law and reviews human rights practices in 168 countries. Originally devoted to countries that receive U.S. aid, the report now covers all members of the United Nations. It judges each country by international human rights standards.

While Europe was struggling to consolidate its democratic gains, new democratic ferment "was most clearly evident in Africa," Schifter noted. "There was significant movement away from apartheid in South Africa and (in) many other sub-Saharan African countries important steps were taken toward democratic rule," he said.

In the Western Hemisphere, he said, "the election and inauguration of a democratic government in Nicaragua left the repressive dictatorship of Fidel Castro the only Marxist-Leninist regime in the region."

Turning to Asia, Schifter noted that Marxist-Leninist Mongolia and Nepal, traditionally a monarchy, moved toward democracy last year.

However, "in China, serious human rights abuses continued" and "severe and brutal repression of all forms of political dissent characterized the situation in Burma," he said.

The report made the following points about these countries:

AFGHANISTAN -- Arbitrary killings and other acts of violence against suspected opponents of the regime still occur. On the surface, the human rights situation in regime-controlled areas improved in 1990. However in practical terms, virtually all the main categories of human rights remain restricted by the regime.

IRAN -- Iran in 1990 continues to be a major violator of human rights. Abuses included summary executions of political opponents; widespread torture; repression of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association; arbitrary detention; lack of fair trials; continuing repression of the Baha'i religious community; denial of citizens' rights to change their government; and severe restrictions on women's and workers' rights.

IRAQ -- Iraq's abysmal record of repression of human rights was even more flagrant in 1990. Following its invasion and takeover of Kuwait in August, Iraq flaunted the Fourth Geneva Convention on Civilians and other established norms of civilized behavior by detaining hundreds of foreign civilians in both Iraq and Kuwait, and dispersing many of them to strategic sites as "human shields" against possible military attacks. Nationals of some other countries were also denied permission to leave and there were credible reports of mass extra-judicial killings, summary executions and widespread arrests and torture of Kuwaiti citizens by Iraqi forces.

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES -- In 1990, despite noteworthy improvements, Israel's most significant human rights problem remained its practices in confronting the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

The year 1990 witnessed a significant increase in violence by Palestinians against Palestinians, including 165 murders that appear to have been politically motivated. This number is greater than the 130 Palestinians killed in 1990 by Israeli security forces and civilians.

Israeli occupation policies and anti-intifada practices, combined with escalating Intifada violence, continue to be of serious concern to the United States.

BULGARIA -- There was significant progress in human rights, particularly in urban areas. Much progress was made in reversing the previous policy of forcibly assimilating ethnic Turks and Bulgarian Muslims, although they continue to

experience some societal discrimination.

ROMANIA -- Observance of human rights and civil liberties improved significantly in 1990. However there were abuses -- for example, the failure to deal effectively with ethnic violence in Tingu Mures in March; the use of excessive force during the June demonstrations in Bucharest; the mistreatment of the June detainees; and the inadequacy of procedural safeguards at time of arrest. Some issues pertaining to the rights of minorities remain to be resolved, especially the rights of the ethnic Hungarian minority.

SOVIET UNION -- The year saw a dramatic growth in the exercise of political and civil rights in the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities continued to relax travel restrictions, and emigration increased dramatically to record levels, although by year's end this progress had not been institutionalized. About 180,000 Jews emigrated to Israel; 150,000 ethnic Germans to Germany; and approximately 55,000 Soviet citizens to the United States.

Marring the positive elements of improvement in human rights practices were the rise in the number of violent ethnic clashes; further grass-roots manifestations of anti-Semitism; increasing fears that economic decline and political disorder could undo the progress achieved and suggestions in December that President Gorbachev would increasingly rely on traditional instruments of force (the army, KGB, Ministry of Interior and party apparatus) rather than persuasion and bargaining to impose the central government's will on independence-seeking republics.

Reforms were unevenly implemented as a whole, and many of them were not secure by law. The judiciary is neither independent nor powerful enough to act as a guarantor of human rights.

YUGOSLAVIA -- In most of the country, there were significant advances in human rights. In the province of Kosovo, Serbian authorities continued and intensified repressive measures that featured thousands of political arrests; tens of thousands of politically motivated job dismissals; and widespread police violence against ethnic Albanians. This violence included the use of excessive force by the police to disperse peaceful demonstrators; including random and at times unprovoked shooting by police, resulting in at least 30 deaths and hundreds of injured.

ARGENTINA -- Argentines enjoy a wide range of constitutionally protected freedoms and individual rights. Principal human rights concerns during the year were incidents of torture and unlawful killing by police; President Menem's pardon of former junta members convicted of human rights violations and 1989 pardons of military officers accused of human rights

violations, intimidation of judges and other officials by rightwing and left-wing groups and police, and discrimination against women rooted in traditional social attitudes.

CUBA -- The government sharply restricts virtually all the basic human rights, including freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement, as well as the right to privacy, the right of citizens to change their government, and worker rights.

The document noted that Americas Watch in a March report stated that "Cuba's human rights practices are sharply at odds with international standards."

EL SALVADOR -- In 1990 both the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) and the ESAF (El Salvador Armed Forces) committed serious human rights violations, including political and other extra-judicial killings. The FMLN also engaged in forced recruitment and caused civilian casualties by the indiscriminate use of land mines and attacks launched on and in residential areas.

With some notable exceptions, the judicial system was unable to prosecute most of those responsible for human rights violations. The FMLN and the ESAF continue to avoid or resist legal accountability for such violations.

Virtually all human rights monitors agree that there were fewer human rights violations by FMLN and ESAF during 1990 than in 1989.

HAITI -- The army, particularly its rural Section Chiefs and provincial units, committed serious human rights violations, including political and other extra-judicial killings, widespread torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and violence against opposition political supporters and rural residents. The army remained virtually unaccountable to civilian authorities for human rights abuses.

NICARAGUA -- There was a marked improvement in human rights conditions. The country made important strides toward democratic freedoms, including the holding of elections which reflected the popular will, the growth of a critical opposition press, and the ability of independent trade unions to organize freely. Major human rights concerns during the year included the discovery of clandestine graves, continuing politically motivated killings, some involving members of the security forces, police abuse of detainees, and a lack of effective prosecution of military and police personnel who commit human rights violations.

BURMA -- Burma's deplorable human rights situation did not improve. Torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and

detentions, unfair trials, and compulsory labor persisted, according to numerous credible reports. Freedom of speech, press and assembly were severely curtailed, as were worker rights.

Despite holding -- and losing -- a free election, the military made it abundantly clear that the people do not have the right to change their government. Treatment of the population remained capricious and apparently unrestrained by legal, institutional or moral considerations.

CAMBODIA -- Reliable reports indicate that widespread and serious human rights violations continued in areas under the control of the Phnom Penh regime, despite evidence of improvement in some areas.

Serious human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge also continued to be reported. Khmer Rouge forces attacked trains inside Cambodia, killing military and civilian passengers. There were also credible reports of some human rights abuses by both non-Communist groups.

CHINA -- Security forces were responsible for human rights abuses, including torture and arbitrary arrests, as part of a heightened emphasis on the role of security forces in maintaining political control and social order.

China's human rights climate remained repressive, if less overtly so than in 1989. Observance of human rights fell far short of internationally recognized norms, although some overt aspects of repression eased. The government announced the release of nearly 900 persons detained in 1989 during the prodemocracy movement, lifted martial law in Beijing and Lhasa, and apparently ended investigations of most participants in the protests. However, serious human rights abuses continued. Progress toward most political and legal reforms offering protection for individual rights were halted and even reversed.

NORTH KOREA -- The North Korean regime subjects its people to rigid controls and in 1990, North Korea continued to deny its citizens the most fundamental human rights and to enforce a draconian penal code.

VIETNAM -- Responding to internal and perceived external pressures, the government intensified an ongoing campaign against dissent in 1990. Arbitrary detentions and widespread torture and mistreatment of detainees continued, as did severe restrictions on basic freedoms.

ANGOLA -- The civil war has resulted in widespread human rights abuses by both sides and many civilian casualties throughout the country.

ETHIOPIA -- Human rights in Ethiopia continued to be affected seriously by the long civil war, which again took an extraordinary cost in lives and property.

LIBERIA -- The overall human rights situation in Liberia was appalling. All combatants routinely engaged in indiscriminate killing and abuse of civilians, looting, and ethnically based executions. Leaders of all the armed groups did little or nothing to stop the killings and, in some cases, may have encouraged them or may have been directly responsible for the abuses.

SOUTH AFRICA -- Dramatic improvements in human rights, particularly with regard to political expression coincided with an equally dramatic increase in deaths and injuries due to politically related violence. The possibility of genuine negotiations leading to establishment of truly democratic institutions was all the more compelling against the backdrop of the laws which continued to enforce the system of apartheid and otherwise restrict individual freedoms and due process rights. Powers of detention, in particular under the International Security Act (ISA) continued to be widely exercised. There were some positive developments in the area of worker rights, but legal inequities, wage disparities, and societal attitudes continued to disadvantage South African women.

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IRAQ'S ABUSES SHOW DANGER OF REPRESSIVE REGIME

(Text: introduction 1990 human rights report)

Washington -- The human rights abuses initiated by Iraq's "brutal invasion" of Kuwait remind the world "of the dangers that repressive regimes can pose to regional security and international order," the State Department says.

In the introduction to its 1990 Human Rights Report, issued February 1, the department said that for most of the year, "the gains of 1989 were being largely consolidated, in spite of major problems encountered by the countries making difficult transitions from command to market economies and from totalitarian communism to democracy."

Following is the text of the report's introduction:

(begin text)

INTRODUCTION

1990 Human Rights Report

This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The legislation requires human rights reports on all countries that receive aid from the United States and all countries that are members of the United Nations. In the belief that the information would be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have also included reports on the few countries which do not fall into either of these categories and which thus are not covered by the congressional requirement.

Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act with the foregoing sections of law so as to be able to consult these reports when considering assistance programs for specific foreign countries. One of the very important consequences -- perhaps unintended -- of these legislative provisions is that they have made human rights concerns an integral part of the State Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A human rights officer in an embassy overseas who wants to write a good annual human rights report on the country in which he or she works must carefully monitor and observe human rights developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a consequence he or she will report on such developments whenever something of human rights significance happens in the country of assignment. In the past 12 years, the State Department has become decidedly better informed on and sensitized to human rights violations as they occur around the globe.

A year ago in this space we posed the question whether the human rights gains of 1989 in Eastern Europe and other parts of

the world would be lasting achievements, or whether there was danger of relapse. For most of the year 1990, the gains of 1989 were being largely consolidated, in spite of major problems encountered by the countries making difficult transitions from command to market economies and from totalitarian communism to democracy. Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, initiated a reign of terror and human rights abuses that reminded the world of the dangers that repressive regimes can pose to regional security and international order.

In Europe, multiparty elections had taken place in the countries which had been joined to the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact. Following such elections, the former German Democratic Republic had, by decision of a democratically elected government, joined the Federal Republic of Germany. Freely contested elections had also taken place in all of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia. Even in hardline Albania, there was evidence of increasing popular pressure for greater freedom.

Across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the process of democratization was in some areas hampered by the totalitarian legacy and by interethnic antagonisms that had been suppressed for decades. The United States expressed concern about violence against social and ethnic groups in Romania. The repressive measures taken by the Serbian republic against ethnic Albanians were among the worst in Europe in 1990. Yet, there were also some positive developments in interethnic relations in the region. Under the impact of democratization and increasing concern for human rights, Bulgaria was able to improve significantly the treatment of its ethnic and religious minorities.

In the Soviet Union in 1990, vast numbers of citizens continued to exercise newly won political rights, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion. Hundreds of thousands were permitted to emigrate. However, reforms were unevenly implemented in the country as a whole, and many are not yet secured by law or buttressed by an independent judiciary. Toward the end of the year and in early 1991, the central government's moves to reassert authority over the republics, particularly the use of military force in Latvia and Lithuania, raised concern over the future of the recent reforms, with dangerous implications for the entire country.

While Europe was struggling to consolidate its democratic gains, new democratic ferment was most clearly in evidence in Africa. There was significant movement away from apartheid in South Africa and in many other sub-Saharan African countries important steps were taken toward democratic rule. Following multiparty elections, Namibia joined the ranks of independent states in March. A government pledged to democracy and human

rights succeeded the regime of Benin. Laws authorizing new political parties, which would thus allow for free, contested elections were enacted in Gabon, Cote D'Ivoire, Congo, and Zambia. Contested elections were indeed held in Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. In Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, the oneparty governments lost free elections and have said they will honor the results. However, the intergroup rivalries that beset many parts of the continent resulted in larger-scale death and devastation. The hostilities surrounding the fall of President Doe of Liberia, clan-based or intratribal warfare in Somalia, civil strife in Ethiopia with Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents, the civil war in Sudan, the measures taken by Mauritania against its black population in the south, and the violence in South Africa among black groups, caused many hundreds of deaths in some countries and thousands in others. The Sudanese government's failure to cooperate in food deliveries may lead to widespread starvation in southern Sudan in 1991.

In the Western Hemisphere, the election and inauguration of a democratic government in Nicaragua left the repressive dictatorship of Fidel Castro the only Marxist-Leninist regime in the region. After close to 17 years of military rule, a democratically elected president and Congress took office in Chile. A new president was elected in Haiti in a free and fair election. Democratic government and respect for human rights were further consolidated in other countries of the hemisphere, though the struggle for democracy continued in Suriname. In four democratic countries -- Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru -- leftist insurgencies (in Colombia and Peru at times in alliance with narco-traffickers) and excessive responses by government security forces have resulted in scores of noncombat deaths in El Salvador, hundreds in both Colombia and Guatemala, and 3,000 to 4,000 in Peru.

Cultural patterns and political systems differ widely on the huge Asian continent. Yet some of the developments, both positive and negative, which could be noticed elsewhere in the world affected a number of Asian countries as well. Two widely different countries, Marxist-Leninist Mongolia and the traditional monarchy of Nepal, moved toward democracy in the course of the year. There is hope now that democracy will gain a foothold in Bangladesh. In China, North Korea, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, Marxism-Leninism continues to be the official political ideology. North Korea remains one of the most severely repressive regimes in the world.

In China, serious human rights abuses continued in 1990. As the year ended, hundreds of Chinese people remained imprisoned for their role in the democracy movement, while students and intellectuals who took leadership roles in the 1989 protests were being brought to trial and sentenced to prison terms.

Severe and brutal repression of all forms of political dissent characterizes the situation in Burma. Their military government had allowed free elections and then refused to accept the outcome, thus rejecting the overwhelming desire of the people to return to parliamentary democracy.

Two South Asian democracies, India and Sri Lanka, were beset by domestic conflict based on ethnic, religious, and political differences, leading to thousands of deaths in each of these countries.

In the Occupied Territories, the Palestinian intifada continues. In both Israel and the Occupied Territories, a total of 148 Palestinians and 17 Israelis were killed in violence between Palestinians and Israelis, while 165 people were killed in intra-Palestinian violence.

As the human rights balance sheet for 1990 is drawn and as we look for further progress in 1991, one of the key questions will be posed by the Soviet Union. Will the combination of entrenched conservative forces, economic turmoil, and social upheaval bring the reform era to an end? Or alternatively, will the disparate democratic forces and proponents of the free market overcome the counterattack of the hardliners and solidify and institutionalize the human rights progress thus far achieved? If they do, their success will be felt not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere in the world as well.

Another important region to watch is sub-Saharan Africa. Will the initial democratic stirrings ripen into further significant political movements? Will the region's authoritarian regimes allow free and fair elections to be held and then surrender power peacefully to the choices of the people?

And, finally, there is the question of the aftermath of the world community's move to halt the international outlawry perpetrated by Saddam Hussein. What will be the spillover effect for international support for human rights principles?

Definition of Human Rights

Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, include freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the security of the person.

Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include (A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and

(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

In addition to discussing the topics specified in the legislation, our reports, as in previous years, cover other internationally recognized political and civil rights and describe the political system of each country.

In applying these internationally recognized standards, we seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that the right of self-government is a basic political right; that government is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of the governed; and that government thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement, without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their government by peaceful means. The reports also take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible if committed by violent opponents of the government than if committed by the government itself.

We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that, in order to promote these "rights," they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights. There exists a profound connection between human rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and social development; it is repression that stifles it. Those who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development are not reached either. This is a point which the Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.

U.S. Human Rights Policy

From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned with the limitations on the powers of government that are required to protect the integrity and dignity of the individual. Further, it is in our national interest to promote democratic processes in order to help build a world environment more favorable to respect for human rights and hence more

conducive to stability and peace. We have developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations wherever they occur, but at the same time active in working over the long term to strengthen democracy.

In much of the world, the United States has a variety of means at its disposal to respond to human rights violations. We engage in traditional diplomacy, particularly with friendly governments, where frank diplomatic exchanges are possible and productive. Where we find limited opportunities for the United States to exert significant influence through bilateral relations, we resort to public statements of our concerns, calling attention to countries where respect for human rights is lacking. In a number of instances, we employ a mixture of traditional diplomacy and public affirmation of American interest in the issue.

The United States also employs a variety of means to encourage greater respect for human rights over the long term. Since 1983 the National Endowment for Democracy has been carrying out programs designed to promote democratic practices abroad, involving the two major U.S. political parties, labor unions, business groups, and many private institutions. Also, through Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, funds are disbursed by the Agency for International Development for programs designed to promote civil and political rights abroad. We also seek greater international commitment to the protection of human rights and respect for democracy through our efforts in the United Nations and other international organizations, and in the process devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Preparation of these annual reports constitutes an important element of our human rights policy. The process, since it involves continuous and well-publicized attention to human rights, has contributed to the strengthening of an international human rights agenda. Many countries that are strong supporters of human rights are taking steps of their own to engage in human rights reporting and have established offices specifically responsible for international human rights policy. Even among countries without strong human rights records, sensitivity to these reports increasingly takes the form of constructive response, or at least a willingness to engage in a discussion of human rights policy. In calling upon the Department of State to prepare these reports, Congress has created a useful instrument for advancing the cause of human rights.

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ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty political system and free elections. There is no constitution, but a series of basic laws defines the responsibilities of government institutions. The legislature (the Knesset) can limit the government and force its dissolution. Israel has an independent judiciary. Public debate on issues of concern to Israelis is open and lively. A vigorous free press scrutinizes all aspects of Israeli life and politics.

Since Israel's founding in 1948, it has been in a formal state of war with most of its Arab neighbors, except Egypt, with which it concluded a peace treaty in 1979. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel has occupied the territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

Throughout its history as a state, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist incidents, within and outside its borders. In this atmosphere of hostility and threat, Israel has relied heavily on its military and related services for security and has retained many of the security-related emergency regulations from the preindependence British mandate period.

Internal security is the responsibility of the general security service (Shin Bet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the authority of a separate minister. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--which include a significant portion of the Israeli adult population in either active duty or reserve status--also play a role in maintaining internal security. The IDF is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee reviews the activities of the IDF and the Shin Bet.

Israel has a predominantly market economy with substantial government regulation; subsidies for basic commodities have been largely phased out. Economic policy has a strong social welfare orientation. Israel enjoys a relatively high standard of living.

Israeli citizens exercise a wide range of civil and political rights. Israel's Arab citizens have, nonetheless, not shared fully in the rights granted to, and the duties levied on, Jewish citizens.

In 1990, despite noteworthy improvements, Israel's most significant human rights problem remained its practices in confronting the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. (For a detailed discussion, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

* Because the legal status and the political and human rights conditions of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem differ sharply from those in Israel, the situation there is dealt with in a separate report following the report for Israel.

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ISRAEL

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political killings in Israel are neither practiced nor officially sanctioned. In the context of the extreme political tension between Israel and the Palestinians, intercommunal killings are often assumed to have political motivation. For example, in 1990, in a single incident, seven Palestinians were killed by an apparently deranged Israeli civilian. Although there was no specific evidence indicating political motivation for these killings, the fact that the killer chose Palestinians cannot be separated from the atmosphere of Israeli-Palestinian political tensions. Immediately after the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York, a Gaza resident was shot to death inside Israel, apparently by an Israeli, in what appeared to be an anti-Arab reprisal for the assassination.

Following the October 8 incident on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Palestinians stabbed to death seven Israelis and wounded a number of others in separate incidents. Although some Palestinian leaflets distributed at the time in support of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories extolled "the intifada of the knives," most of these assaults appear to have been randomly targeted. Also in 1990, a bomb on a Tel Aviv beach killed one person. This kind of attack, aimed at Israelis, appeared designed to exploit Israeli-Palestinian political tensions.

b. Disappearance

The Israeli Government does not practice or condone disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit such practices. (See the occupied territories report for a discussion of allegations of torture and mistreatment of Palestinians from the occupied territories who are incarcerated in detention facilities located in Israel.)

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Israeli law and practice guarantee against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. Writs of habeas corpus and other procedural and substantive safeguards are available. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty.

Administrative detention, with no formal charge or trial, is permitted under emergency regulations. The Minister of Defense may issue a detention order for a maximum of 6 months. Within 48 hours of issuance of such an order, a district judge must review the case and may confirm, amend, or overturn the detention order. Failing review within the designated time period, the detainee must be released. The detainee may be represented by counsel and may appeal to the Supreme Court. The Government may withhold evidence from the detainee and counsel on security grounds. Two Israeli Arabs were administratively detained in 1990, one under a 6-month

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order issued in 1990 and the other under a 6-month order that carried over from 1989 into 1990, followed by a second such order issued in 1990. Both were released near the end of 1990, and, at the end of the year, no Israeli citizens were held in administrative detention. In 1990 Israel continued to hold most Palestinian administrative detainees from the occupied territories in detention centers inside Israel. (For a full discussion of administrative detention of Palestinians, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

Israel does not exile its citizens.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal with representation by counsel is provided for by law and enshrined in practice. The judiciary is independent and effectively insulated from political interference. All nonsecurity trials are open. Security cases may be tried before a military court or a civil court and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The burden of justifying nonpublic proceedings falls on the prosecution. Defense counsel is present, even during closed proceedings, but may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds. In security cases in which access to some evidence is denied, that evidence is not usable during a court trial.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Privacy of the individual and the home is protected by law within Israel. Emergency regulations permit mail to be stopped, opened, and even destroyed on security grounds. A 1979 law allows tapping of telephones for security reasons, with confirmation by the Prime Minister or Defense Minister. Interference with mail and the tapping of telephones are practiced infrequently.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

(See the separate report on the occupied territories.)

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Individuals, organizations, the press, and the electronic media freely debate a wide range of public issues and criticize government officials and policies with few restrictions. However, publications and press articles for domestic or foreign publication dealing with security-related matters must be submitted to the military censor. Arabic-language publications and press are censored more strictly than Hebrew-language equivalents. In 1990 an Arab poet was put on trial for a book of poems alleged to incite violence. The trial was still in progress at the end of 1990. An Arabic-language weekly was closed for 3 months for alleged anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist incitement. Recent High Court of Justice rulings have narrowed the range of material that may be censored on security grounds.

Statements or writings expressing or encouraging support for outlawed organizations are illegal. The infrequent prosecutions pursued on these grounds have most often been

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directed against Israeli Arabs. For example, in 1990 three young Arab men were sentenced to 4 to 6 months for flying Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) flags and painting hostile slogans. Provisions against maintaining contact with, or accepting support from, outlawed organizations apply to the media as well as to individuals, although no media organization was prosecuted on these grounds in 1990.

All newspapers are privately owned and managed. All of the electronic media are government-controlled, and many are run by the quasi-independent Israel Broadcast Authority, whose chief is appointed by the Government.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Israelis representing almost any point of view are free to assemble and associate. The law and court rulings protect these rights. However, emergency regulations prohibit membership in, or contact with, outlawed organizations, their subdivisions, or their individual members. In 1990 an Israeli peace activist, who was jailed in 1989 for such an offense, was charged again for repeating the same offense. Court proceedings had not yet begun as of the end of 1990.

c. Freedom of Religion

In Israel there are strong guarantees of freedom for all faiths. Approximately 82 percent of Israeli citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members of other minority religions make up the remaining 18 percent. Travel to visit religious sites or perform religious obligations in and outside Israel is widely permitted. In 1990 Israel approved the pilgrimage to Mecca of about 6,400 Israeli Muslims, rejecting a small percentage of applications and restricting the age of male applicants to 40 or over on security grounds. However, restrictions imposed by Jordan and Saudi Arabia limited the numbers to approximately 3,600.

Each recognized religious community in Israel has legal authority over its members in matters of marriage, legitimacy, inheritance, and conversion. Orthodox religious authorities have exclusive control over these matters in all sectors of the Jewish community, whether or not they are Orthodox.

Missionaries are allowed to work in Israel. A 1977 antiproselytizing law, prohibiting the offering and receipt of material benefits as an inducement to conversion, was not enforced in 1990.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Israeli citizens may move freely within Israel as well as the occupied territories, except in military or security zones or if they are restricted to their neighborhood or village by administrative order under emergency regulations. In 1990 one Israeli Arab was restricted in this fashion. Israeli citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they have no outstanding military obligations or are not restricted by administrative order. In 1990 the Israeli Government lifted a longstanding ban on the travel of an Israeli Arab political activist but imposed temporary restrictions on four other Israeli Arab activists, including one prominent figure who was twice prevented from traveling.

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Israel welcomes Jewish immigrants, including Jewish refugees, to whom it gives automatic citizenship, residence rights, and a package of financial and other benefits to facilitate their integration into Israeli society. Israel accepts the return of Israeli citizens who have emigrated. Israel has allowed the return of some Palestinians on the principle of family reunification but has rejected the great majority of requests by Palestinians for return.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Israel is a parliamentary democracy, with a multitude of parties representing a wide range of political views. Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. All adult Israeli citizens have the right to participate in the political process and to vote by secret ballot. Participation of eligible voters, including Israeli Arabs, in recent national and local elections has been relatively high.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Israel is responsive to international and nongovernmental interest in its human rights situation. It hosts and works with a delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and permits regular visits by a wide range of private and international organizations concerned about human rights such as Amnesty International (AI), Middle East Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and others. The Ministry of Justice has a human rights office which responds to human rights inquiries. The Government has designated specific points of contact within the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to give timely responses to human rights inquiries from foreign governments, international bodies, and human rights organizations. Israel refused, however, to accept a mission from the United Nations to investigate the incident at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on October 8. The Israeli Government insisted that this event took place in Jerusalem, over which it claims sovereignty, and was an internal matter.

Private Israeli organizations are active in publicizing and litigating human rights issues and cases. The Government and the courts treat seriously responsible challenges to its human rights practices.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

Women's rights in Israel are protected by the equal opportunity law, which forbids sex discrimination. For example, it requires employers to pay male and female workers equal wages for equal work. Other laws and regulations give protection to women employees regarding pregnancy, childbirth, and child care. The Government includes a senior adviser on the status of women, and the Civil Service Commission and several government ministries have officers responsible for women's rights. Nongovernmental women's organizations work actively in promoting women's rights and welfare. Women are drafted into the army but do not fill combat-related positions.

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Domination of personal status law by religious courts (whether Jewish or Muslim) means that women may be subject to restrictive interpretations of their marriage and divorce rights. For example, it may be more difficult for a woman than for a man to initiate successful divorce proceedings.

The courts in Israel deal firmly with persons convicted of violence, including violence against women. Human rights groups, especially women's groups, are increasingly active in dealing with the issue of domestic violence against women, and the Government provides some funding for intervention activities.

Israeli Arabs, who comprise approximately 18 percent of Israel's population, have made substantial educational and material progress since the founding of Israel. A few have risen to responsible positions in the civil service, generally in the Arab departments of government ministries. There are six Arab members of the Knesset. The Arabic-speaking community has access to the local and foreign Arabic press, publications, and media. However, Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education, housing, or other services as Israeli Jews.

The Israeli Druze and Circassian communities, at their initiative, are subject to Israel's military draft, and some Bedouin Arabs serve voluntarily in special units. However, most Israeli Arabs are not subject to the draft, and few volunteer. Consequently, they have less access than do other Israelis to such social and economic benefits as subsidies for housing and children, and government or security-related industrial employment for which military service is either a prerequisite or an advantage.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Israeli workers have freely established organizations of their own choosing. Most unions belong to the powerful General Federation of Labor in Israel (Histadrut) or to a much smaller rival federation. About 60 percent of adult Israelis, including Israeli Arabs, are members of Histadrut trade unions, and still more are covered by Histadrut social and insurance programs and collective bargaining agreements.

Histadrut members democratically elect national and local officers and those of its affiliated trade unions and women's organizations from political party lists. Plant or enterprise committee members are elected individually.

The right to strike is exercised regularly. A 15-day notice prior to a strike or lockout is legally mandated, unless otherwise specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Histadrut tries to maintain discipline with a central strike fund, but unauthorized strikes do occur. If essential public services are affected, the Government may appeal to labor courts, which include employer and employee representatives, for back-to-work orders while negotiations continue. Such orders are not always granted.

Strike activity in 1990 was relatively low. Among the more important strikes were two Histadrut-sponsored strikes, one a 24-hour strike to protest the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the second a 2-day strike to protest a Ministry of Finance proposal to alter the minimum wage law.

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Labor laws applicable in Israel also apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem (see the occupied territories report for further discussion of worker rights in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza).

Unions are free to form federations and confederations and to affiliate internationally. Histadrut is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

Nonresident workers, most of whom are the approximately 109,000 nonresident Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza working in Israel, may not be members of Histadrut and may not organize their own trade unions within Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not permitted to operate in Israel. However, nonresident workers in the organized sector, including Palestinians from the occupied territories, are entitled to Histadrut contract and grievance protection, and may join, vote for, and be elected to shop level workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments pass a minimum threshold. During the uprising in the occupied territories, Palestinian participation in these committees has dwindled to near zero.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Israelis fully exercise their legal right to organize and bargain collectively. The majority union (generally Histadrut) is the exclusive bargaining agent.

Nonresident workers may not organize on their own or bargain collectively, but those (primarily Palestinians) that are hired through official channels and thus work in the organized sector are entitled to representation by the bargaining agent and the protection of collective bargaining agreements. Most such workers are not in the organized sector.

While there is no law prohibiting antiunion discrimination, the politically powerful Histadrut organization has never felt a need to promote such a law. Local sources indicate that the basic law against discrimination could be used in the courts to contest discrimination based on union membership. Collective Histadrut pressure, including but not limited to strikes, would be another means of resolving complaints. No antiunion discrimination has been observed. There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and neither Israeli citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel are subject to such practices.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

By law, children under age 15 may not be employed. Schoolchildren aged 15 may not be employed without special permission, except as apprentices or during school vacations. Employment of those aged 16 to 18 is restricted to ensure time for rest and education. Israeli labor exchanges do not process work applications for West Bank or Gaza Palestinians under age 17. A Labor Inspection Service enforces these provisions, though enforcement is difficult in smaller, unorganized enterprises.

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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Wage income in Israel is generally sufficient to provide workers and their families a decent standard of living. Legislation in 1986 established a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average salary, calculated periodically. At the most recent adjustment, that figure was \$508 a month. Most wages and salaries are established in collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Ministry frequently uses the 1987 Collective Agreements Law to extend private sector wage settlements to the public sector and sectoral wage settlements to other, uncovered enterprises. Along with union representation, the Labor Inspection Service effectively enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace.

By law, maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours per week, 8 per day, and 7 the day before the weekly rest, which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and should include the Sabbath. Exceptions may be approved by the Labor Ministry but may not exceed 10 hours per day, or an average of 47 hours per week. By national collective agreements, the private sector established a maximum 45-hour workweek in August 1988 while the public sector moved to a 5-day, 42.5-hour workweek in April 1989. About half the private sector work force was working a 5-day week by the end of 1990.

Only about 33,000 of the estimated 105,000 nonresident West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Israel are hired legally through Israeli employment service labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza. In many respects, these workers are covered by the laws and collective bargaining agreements that cover Israeli workers, including minimum wage, sick leave, severance pay, paid vacations, and pensions administered by the Ministry of Labor. They are paid through the employment service, which receives their wages and benefits from employers and pays the recipient after deducting taxes, a 1-percent union fee, and contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII). The same percentage (5.35 percent) for NII contributions is deducted from the pay of legally hired nonresident Palestinians and from Israeli workers. These Palestinian workers receive some of the benefits of these contributions that Israeli workers receive: full coverage for workmen's compensation, employer bankruptcy insurance, and maternity benefits (only for births in Israeli hospitals). However, they do not receive a number of benefits that require residence in Israel: NII old-age, survivors, and disability pensions; unemployment compensation; insurance for long-term care or injury in nonoccupational accidents; NII children's allowances; or NII-administered welfare programs.

Because of these benefit restrictions, only 1.2 percent of nonresident Palestinian workers' pay goes to the NII. The remaining 4.15 percent is nonetheless deducted from their pay in order to equalize the labor costs of Palestinians and Israelis and goes to a special fund earmarked for social and development expenditure in the West Bank and Gaza. This deduction has been criticized by Palestinians, who estimate that hundreds of millions of dollars in deductions have gone to the Israeli Government, with no public accounting for the Government's use of the funds. The Government insists that all money thus collected is used exclusively in the West Bank and Gaza, but it has not made budget figures public.

Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories but working inside Israel have the same benefits as all other Israeli workers.

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Histadrut has defended Palestinian workers against dismissal for absences caused by official curfews or Palestinian-called general strikes, but with limited success. Histadrut has used plant-site visits, public announcements, and worker rights seminars to inform legally hired Palestinians of their rights. In 1990 Histadrut and a private organization independently established legal aid centers designed to protect Palestinian workers' rights.

The majority of nonresident Palestinians find work in Israel outside the official hiring system. They work primarily in day labor, seasonal agriculture, and small enterprises where wages are generally low, where protections (including minimum wage) and social benefits available in the organized sector are often absent, and where taxes and other deductions are not taken from their pay. Nonresident Gazan males working in Israel are required to have permits to enter Israel. All nonresident Palestinians must have a permit in order to remain overnight in Israel; these are rarely granted, forcing those who do remain overnight to do so illegally, often in substandard housing. Official enforcement of these requirements during most of 1990 was flexible and did not interfere significantly with Palestinians' access to work in Israel.

In 1989 the Director General of the International Labor Organization and the ICFTU called for steps to equalize the benefits and protections available to Israeli and nonresident Palestinian workers. They also called for steps to revamp the social security system to give nonresident Palestinians full social benefits or to reimburse them for those deductions that did not go to direct social benefits. These recommendations were not met in 1990.

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ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Whereas almost all other reports in this volume deal with the relationship between governments and their own citizens, this report concerns the practices of the authorities of one country in the exercise of governmental functions in territories outside that country and under military occupation. The lands known as the "occupied territories" (the West Bank, Gaza strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem) were occupied by Israel in the 1967 war and have been under military occupation since then.

Israel is not recognized internationally to have sovereignty over any of the occupied lands, but has asserted sovereignty over and annexed East Jerusalem. The West Bank and Gaza are governed under Jordanian, Egyptian, and British law, modified by military orders. Israeli law and administration have been extended to the Golan Heights.

The United States considers Israel's occupation to be governed by the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Israel does not consider the Convention applicable but states that it observes its humanitarian provisions.

Israel governs the West Bank and Gaza through a Civil Administration (CIVAD), which reports to the Minister of Defense. There are Arab municipalities with both elected and Israeli-appointed mayors, but municipal and local elections have not been held since 1976. Palestinian political activity is severely restricted. The CIVAD does not afford Palestinians the opportunity to participate meaningfully in significant political or economic decisions in the occupied territories. Israeli settlers in the territories (about 5 percent of the population) are subject to Israeli law, which in most cases treats them more favorably than Palestinians are treated under occupation laws and regulations. Economic policies often discriminate against Palestinians in favor of Israeli interests and Israeli settlers in the territories.

The security forces in the occupied territories consist of the army (Israel Defense Forces - IDF), the Shin Bet (General Security Service), the police, and the paramilitary Border Police. Security crimes are tried in military courts staffed by IDF officers.

Since 1967, Palestinians have protested, often violently, against Israel's occupation. The massive civilian unrest known as the intifada erupted in late 1987, and the ensuing Palestinian violence and Israeli crackdown continued in 1990. Violence directed at Israeli security personnel and civilians in the territories has been both organized and spontaneous. Israeli authorities have responded with a variety of measures, some of which the United States has opposed.

Security authorities sought to reduce the levels of violence during the summer of 1990 by measures designed to avoid confrontation, and Palestinian and Israeli casualties declined during July, August, and September. During the last quarter of 1990, however, a series of incidents, including the X immolation of an IDF reservist in Gaza and the killing of 17 Palestinians on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, and widespread Palestinian support for Iraq's Saddam Hussein

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ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

led to an emotional heightening of tensions on both sides and an increase in incidents and casualties. These included a rash of politically motivated but generally spontaneous random stabbings of Israelis in Israel by Palestinians from the territories. Israeli authorities responded to this violence with intensified security measures such as broadly barring the entry of Palestinians from the territories into Israel and Jerusalem, and deciding to resume deportations of Palestinians alleged to be extremist leaders.

The year 1990 witnessed a significant increase in violence by Palestinians against Palestinians, including 165 murders that appear to have been politically motivated. This number is greater than the 130 Palestinians killed in 1990 by Israeli security forces and civilians.

The continuing unrest and violence in the occupied territories underlines the need for a political solution, which has been strongly advocated by the United States.

X Israeli occupation policies and anti-intifada practices, combined with escalating intifada violence, continue to be of serious concern to the United States. Although conditions generally improved during the first three quarters of the year, they deteriorated in the fourth quarter. The United States remains concerned about the continuing violence, death, and injuries on both sides, including the killing of Palestinians by fellow-Palestinians, the excessive use of force by security forces, and certain restrictive CIVAD and IDF measures, including restraints on nonviolent political activity and expression, the continued closure of four universities, travel bans and restrictions, deportations, administrative detention, restrictions on family reunification, and discriminatory policies or practices affecting land, resource use, and trade and commerce.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political killing is not practiced or condoned by the Government of Israel. However, several human rights groups alleged that in 1990 Israeli security forces intentionally killed five wanted Palestinian activists in circumstances in which the use of force was unnecessary, inappropriate, or unauthorized. Israeli officials state that their investigations determined that two of the killings were accidental, two occurred when security forces fired at fleeing suspects, and one was in self-defense when the victim pulled out a grenade (later discovered to be a tear-gas grenade).

X Israeli settlers killed 10 Palestinians in 1990 in what appeared to be politically related circumstances. A leader of the settler movement, who killed a Hebron storeowner and wounded a customer in 1988, was sentenced in 1990 to 1 year in prison (with 7 months of the sentence suspended) for negligent homicide and aggravated injury. He was released in August under Israel's Administrative Release law after serving 3 1/2 months.

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ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Endorsements of "all forms of struggle" against Israel, including "massive martyrdom" and "suicide operations," appeared in intifada-related literature during the last part of 1990. These were accompanied by an increase in the violence of attacks by Palestinians against Israeli security personnel and civilians in both the territories and Israel proper. Palestinians killed 4 Israeli security officials and 6 Israeli civilians in the occupied territories in 1990.

During 1990, 165 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians (compared to 128 in 1989). Many others were wounded, and there were frequent threats and acts of intimidation by Palestinians against fellow-Palestinians. These included Palestinians killed because of alleged "collaboration" with Israel, interfactional political disputes and private feuds, and some for alleged crimes against public morality. Some of the victims were village officials and Arab policemen. Israeli authorities allege that many of these attacks and acts of intimidation were carried out under the direction of the covert leadership of the uprising. Others were by individuals or gangs operating autonomously, though these acts were often accompanied by claims of pre-Palestinian political motivations. Charges of so-called collaboration have been made (and murders subsequently committed) carelessly and for trivial reasons, deliberately, and at times to settle personal scores. On several occasions during 1990, Palestinian leaders called for a halt to unauthorized executions and other such actions.

Israeli authorities prosecute Palestinians accused of murder of other Palestinians, and sentences are severe. In one instance, members of the "Black Panthers" and "Red Eagles," convicted of killing alleged "collaborators," were given multiple life sentences in 1990 for the 1989 murders of eight Palestinians. However, much intra-Palestinian violence goes unpunished because of the problems of law enforcement in the territories, particularly the refusal of many Palestinians to cooperate in any way with Israeli investigations. Israelis, both civilians and members of the security organizations, generally have received relatively lenient sentences from both civilian and military courts for killing Palestinians.

b. Disappearance

Israel does not sponsor or condone disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Torture is forbidden by Israeli law, and Israeli authorities assert they do not authorize or condone its use in the occupied territories. IDF orders forbid the use of force after the detention of a suspect and the cessation of violent resistance, although Israeli courts have ruled that "moderate physical and psychological pressure" during interrogation is permissible. Reports continue of harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners under investigation or interrogation, as well as beatings of suspects. Critics state that prisoner mistreatment takes the form of slaps and blows and similar practices, including enforced standing in one position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation, cold showers, and incarceration in unclean and physically confining spaces. These practices reportedly have continued since they were confirmed in the 1987 report of the officially appointed

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ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Landau Commission. This Commission condemned "torture," but distinguished this from "a moderate measure of physical pressure" which it said is necessary and acceptable in order to secure confessions and obtain information from suspects concerning terrorism.

During 1990 Israeli authorities received three complaints of Palestinian deaths allegedly attributed to beatings, although none of them involved persons in Israeli custody. Israeli authorities state that each case is being investigated and that interim findings based on medical reports and testimony by family members suggest that the complaints are unwarranted. In March two Shin Bet (Israeli state police) officers were charged with the December 1989 beating death of a Gazan during interrogation. Their trial continues.

In 1990 a Palestinian suspect who claimed to have signed a confession to murder as a result of beating and other duress by Israeli authorities was released when another suspect believed to be the actual murderer was arrested.

Most convictions in security cases are based on confessions. An attorney is normally not allowed to see a client until after interrogation is completed and a confession, if obtained, has been made. Persons may be held up to 14 days after arrest before the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is permitted access.

According to the IDF, 10,862 Palestinians were being held in IDF prisons as of December 31, 1990. Although conditions at the Ketziot facility, a major detention center, have improved, serious overcrowding continues. Conditions at other detention facilities vary. The IDF claims that all meet minimum acceptable standards for short-term incarceration and are often equal to facilities available for IDF guard forces at the detention centers. Some facilities that meet only short-term standards are used for long-term detainees.

Israeli authorities state that 18 or 19 Palestinians in Israeli prisons were murdered by other Palestinians during 1990, primarily for political reasons, and mostly at Ketziot. They also state that they have increased security procedures to prevent further attacks.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

No deportation orders were executed in 1990, but in December, despite the urging of the United States and the United Nations Security Council, the Government of Israel announced that it would resume deportations as a deterrent to intifada violence.

Authorities ordered four Gaza leaders of Hamas (an Islamic resistance movement) deported, alleging that they were intifada field commanders who had actively incited violence. Under relevant decisions of the Israeli High Court, deportation orders are subject to judicial review, and, in accordance with these rulings, appropriate legal petitions were filed in these cases. Defense counsel complained, however, of inadequate time to prepare the case and the handicap of litigating a case in which the Government's evidence is secret (and thus unavailable to the defense). The High Court of Justice has never reversed a deportation order. The United States considers deportations to contravene Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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Administrative detention for alleged security reasons without formal charges declined from 1,271 detainees held at the beginning of 1990 to 817 as of September. However, by the end of 1990 they had again risen to 1,263. Israeli officials state that administrative detention is used only when IDF legal advisors have determined that there is sufficient evidence to detain a person, and that the evidence has been corroborated by two sources, but that the evidence cannot be presented in open court because to do so would compromise the method of acquiring the evidence, which is often provided by informers whose lives would be jeopardized if their identities were known. Most administrative detention orders are for 6 months. The maximum length is 12 months, and several dozen Palestinians have been detained on 1-year warrants. Each detention order is subject to judicial scrutiny with access by the court to all evidence, including secret evidence, and each order must be approved by the Minister of Defense. There are no restrictions on the number of times an administrative detention order may be renewed, but at each renewal, a new order must be issued, which is subjected to at least the same judicial scrutiny as the original order. Approximately 10 percent of all detention orders were extended beyond their original term. Israel denies imposing administrative detention on Palestinians for the expression of political views or nonviolent activity, claiming that administrative detention is imposed only for activity that is both dangerous and serious. However, it broadly defines conspiracy or incitement to violence so that in many cases persons appear to be arrested for activity which is nonviolent but which nevertheless is deemed by Israel as involving participation in a conspiracy leading to violent acts.

District military commanders may order administrative detention without formal charges. An order for detention or renewal of detention may be appealed to a military judge. In appealing detention orders, detainees or their attorneys do not have access to secret evidence that may be used against them, but they may be informed of its general nature and may question security service witnesses concerning the general nature of that evidence. Nonsecret evidence may be challenged directly. Rulings by military judges may be reviewed by the High Court, which also may see the secret evidence. According to the IDF, approximately 30 percent of the detention orders appealed in 1990 were reduced or reversed on appeal.

The authorities continued to transfer detainees and prisoners out of the occupied territories to detention facilities in Israel, especially to the Ketsiot camp in the Negev Desert and Megiddo Prison near Afula, about 15 miles from the occupied territories in northern Israel. Because Israel established the Ketsiot facility, its principal administrative detention center, in a "closed military security zone," strict rules governing family visits to Ketsiot are in effect. Disputes between Palestinians and Israeli authorities, including Israeli insistence on notification before visitors enter the Ketsiot military zone and orders by Palestinian leaders forbidding family members from having any dealings with CIVAD or the IDF, have effectively prevented these visits. Despite efforts by the authorities and the ICRC to improve this situation and logistic preparations by Israel to accommodate up to 20,000 visitors per month, the problem of family visits to Ketsiot remained unresolved at the end of 1990. In the view of the United States, the transfer of prisoners from the occupied territories to Israel contravenes Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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Any soldier may arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense. Persons arrested for common crimes in the occupied territories are usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an attorney, and a statement of charges, although these rights are sometimes delayed. Bail is rarely available to those arrested for security offenses. Persons may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours and then must be released unless a warrant is issued. A warrant may be issued by a police officer for two periods of 7 days each. For extensions beyond 18 days from the date of arrest, the detainee has to be brought before a military judge, where he is entitled to defense counsel. A military judge may extend the detention for a period of no longer than 6 months from the date of arrest. If there is no indictment during this period, the detainee must be released. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite detention until the end of the trial.

A detainee has the right to see a lawyer as soon as possible. However, in the cases of security detainees, an officer may issue a written order to delay access to counsel for no longer than 15 days for reasons of security or the efficiency of investigation. Higher ranking officials or judges may extend this period by up to 75 more days, for the same reasons. In practice, security detainees are usually denied access to a lawyer during the initial investigation for periods of a week to 15 days. Israeli regulations also permit prisoners to be held in isolation from family and from other detainees during interrogation.

Notification procedures established in 1987 have resulted in an improved system of notifying families of arrests and incarceration. However, one means of notification (postcards) depends on the postal service, which is unreliable in smaller villages of the West Bank. Because of this problem, Israeli authorities also post the names of detainees and those transferred to another facility at CIVAD offices. A separate notification is made to the ICRC, as well as to the appropriate local bar associations. Denial of notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular officials

under the law may be extended by a senior officer for up to 12 days. A military commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time. While Israeli authorities assert that they attempt to post notification within 48 hours, Palestinians assert that families and lawyers are normally notified much later and often locate the detainee through their own efforts. The ICRC generally receives notification 12 days after arrest, with access on the 14th day.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses are tried publicly in local courts by Palestinian judges, except where jurisdiction has been transferred by military order. However, since the beginning of the uprising regular local law enforcement has deteriorated seriously. Many Arab policemen and judges have quit under orders from the intifada leadership, and Palestinian courts have functioned only sporadically.

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Palestinians accused of security offenses are tried in Israeli military courts. Serious charges are tried before three-judge panels, and defendants are entitled to appeal the judgments of such courts as a matter of right. Charges are brought by military prosecutors, and suspects are entitled to counsel. Lesser offenses are tried before single-judge courts, and the Court of Military Appeals may accept appeals of decisions by those courts based on the law applied in the case, the sentence imposed, or both. As of October 31, the Military Appeals Court had heard 681 appeals. As of that date, 481 appeals had been completed, of which 335 were accepted and 117 rejected, with 29 appeals canceled. "Acceptance" of an appeal can mean anything from a complete reversal of the prior decision to an alteration of the punishment (which could include either shortening or lengthening a sentence). Articles 64 and 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention govern security offenses that may be tried in military courts. Security offenses are sometimes broadly defined by Israel, and, as administered, may include charges of Palestinian political activity of a nonviolent character. Israeli authorities assert that much of the nonviolent political activity in question amounts to serving as an accomplice in violent or terrorist activities.

In 1990 long delays before trials sometimes occurred because military courts are still overburdened by the large numbers of uprising-related security cases. To relieve this court congestion, the IDF opened new courts and appointed additional judges, which it states have accelerated hearings. The IDF reported that by June 1990, 54 percent of Palestinians in detention were awaiting trial as against 90 percent in January 1989. The IDF also states that it has reduced delays in producing defendants for trial, which had been a major factor in postponing trials in 1989. Authorities noted that in January 1990, over 88 percent of defendants were delivered to court as scheduled, and that the average period from the filing of a charge sheet to trial was 2 months, except for cases involving terrorist charges in which the delay was 1 to 2 years. An Israeli human rights group observed that in its efforts to complete cases more quickly, the military courts have adopted expedited trial procedures in which defendants in some cases have not had an opportunity to retain an attorney. Israeli authorities state that some 30-40 percent of Palestinian defendants plead guilty under this expedited "plea-and-release" process, which usually results in a guilty plea and fine in lieu of detention and trial.

Most military trials are public, though access is controlled and in some cases limited. Consular officers are allowed to attend military court proceedings involving foreign citizens, but there have been delays in gaining admission. Acquittals are very rare in security cases, with about 96 percent of defendants being convicted of the original security charge. Charges in security cases can be very general, making it difficult for the accused to defend himself. For example, charges may allege involvement in numerous offenses such as throwing stones or Molotov cocktails over a period of several months, without specifying an exact date or time for each incident.

Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions. Physical and psychological pressures, and reduced sentences for those who confess, contribute to the likelihood that security detainees will sign confessions. Confessions are

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usually recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants are unable to read. Israeli authorities state that confessions are made by and repeated to the defendants in Arabic, although they are written down in Hebrew because Israeli court personnel often can speak Arabic without being able to write it. Israeli authorities assert that they are trying to resolve this problem.

During much of 1990, crowded facilities and arrangements for attorney-client consultations in prisons hindered effective legal defense efforts. Palestinian attorneys asserted that appointments to see clients were difficult to arrange, and that prison authorities often failed to produce clients as arranged, resulting in delayed consultations. In addition, prison authorities often limited the time authorized to meet with clients. In September military authorities, prompted by a petition to the Israeli High Court, agreed that attorneys could bring papers and other defense materials to their clients at Ketzior. Prison authorities also improved facilities for attorney-client consultations at Ketzior, in Gaza, and elsewhere. Israeli authorities claim, and at least some Palestinian attorneys agree, that defense lawyers generally now have adequate time and acceptable conditions to meet with clients.

Nonjudicial administrative orders of the military government may be appealed to area military commanders and to the High Court. The IDF confirms that the court has reversed very few of the CIVAD or military orders issued on security grounds.

Israeli settlers in the occupied territories accused of security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried in the nearest Israeli district court under Israeli law. These courts are presided over by civilian judges, and standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are stricter than in military courts.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Military authorities in the occupied territories may enter private Palestinian homes and institutions without a warrant in pursuit of security objectives. However, new procedures require an authorization by an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel prior to entry. Forced entries are regularly used in IDF operations, and are sometimes accompanied by beatings and destruction of property. Israeli authorities claim that forced entry may lawfully occur only incident to arrest when entry is resisted. Beatings and arbitrary destruction of property during searches are punishable violations of military regulations, and compensation is due to victims in such cases. Human rights organizations allege that such violations often go unpunished. Security officials frequently questioned Palestinians about their political activities and temporarily detained people.

During 1990 security authorities demolished 94 houses and sealed 83 houses for security reasons. The number of demolitions was slightly above that in 1989, when 86 houses were demolished, despite Israeli authorities' stated intention to employ reversible house sealings more frequently as an alternative to demolition. Security forces assert the right to demolish or seal the home of a suspect, whether he is the owner or only a tenant, a practice that has generated

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litigation by affected landlords. Under the presently applied regulations, military commanders may order the demolition or sealing of any house from which they suspect a firearm has been discharged or bomb thrown, or any house situated in an area, town, village, quarter, or street whose inhabitants they are satisfied have committed offenses against the regulations. Authorities assert (a) that they demolish or seal only those houses occupied by Palestinians known to have actively participated in a murder or caused serious physical injury; and (b) that most such demolitions or sealings are aimed at Palestinians who have killed or attempted to kill other Palestinians. Owners of houses ordered to be demolished have 48 hours to appeal to the area military commander, and final appeals may be made to the High Court. In 1990 some 90 percent of demolition orders were appealed. Of those, 10 percent in Gaza and about 25 percent in the West Bank were changed, although in most cases the order was altered to a sealing. Owners of properties that are demolished or sealed are not allowed to rebuild, making the punishment one of indefinite duration.

Following the mob killing of an IDF reservist in al-Bureij refugee camp in Gaza in September, the IDF demolished or sealed 7 houses and 24 shops and other structures without providing owners the 48 hours to appeal. The Israeli High Court rejected the claims of Palestinians and human rights groups that the demolitions were punitive, and hence entitled to the 48-hour appeal period, and accepted the IDF's claim that the demolitions were necessary measures required to widen the road for security reasons. Military authorities stated that compensation will be paid to the owners. As of December, compensation had been paid to all but 3 of the approximately 30 owners. Demolitions usually are carried out prior to the trial of the accused. The United States believes the demolition or sealing of a home as punishment of families contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention and has urged the Israeli Government to end the practice. This type of house demolition or sealing is enforced only against Arab residents of the occupied territories.

Mail and telephone conversations are sometimes monitored. Telephone service to specific areas is sometimes interrupted by the authorities for security reasons or in connection with a military operation.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

Casualties attributed to IDF use of standard ammunition and rubber and plastic bullets dropped significantly in 1990 as a result of a decline in IDF-Palestinian confrontations during the first three quarters of the year, more restrained troop deployment, and stricter enforcement of the rules of engagement concerning the use of firearms. IDF regulations permit the use of standard ammunition only when soldiers' lives are in real and immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, or to disperse a violent demonstration. Only a specific attacker may be fired on, except when facing immediate danger; fire is to be directed at legs only; and fire may be directed at a fleeing suspect only if a serious felony is suspected and as a last resort. Soldiers may fire at any fleeing masked person, but may fire standard ammunition only after exhausting other methods, including tear gas, rubber bullets, and warning shots.

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In December the IDF announced that it had begun to deploy hidden snipers to counter stonethrowing and ambushes against Israeli vehicles. The IDF said that the new tactic did not signify a change in the rules of engagement, although the new policy liberalizes the interpretation of what constitutes a life-threatening situation. The United States opposes the practice as excessive use of force. IDF troops receive little training in riot control, and the IDF does not appear to maintain sufficient riot control equipment (i.e., helmets with face masks, shields, riot batons, water cannon, etc.) in its inventory.

Although violent confrontations between Israeli security forces and Palestinians declined overall in 1990, serious incidents involving the excessive use of force by Israeli security personnel continued to occur. The most serious occurred on October 8 when Border Police clashed with demonstrators and rock-throwers on the Temple Mount/M Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. In this incident 17 Palestinians were killed and at least 140 wounded. In clashes following the May 20 murder of 7 Gaza workers by a deranged Israeli civilian at Richon Lezion, 13 Palestinians were killed by IDF gunfire. On the whole, however, IDF troops showed greater restraint in 1990 than they did in 1989 in dealing with confrontations. In Gaza, the IDF changed to less frequent but larger patrols, which resulted in fewer confrontations with residents. Gaza military commanders also required that only officers could authorize soldiers to open fire. IDF troops in the West Bank also showed more restraint in an effort to avoid confrontations.

Estimates vary of the number of casualties from violence in the occupied territories. Figures compiled from press, Palestinian, international organization, and Israeli Government sources indicate that a total of 130 Palestinians were killed by security forces in 1990, compared to 292 in 1989; 10 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians, compared to 11 in 1989; and 165 were killed by other Palestinians, significantly more than the 128 in 1989. Estimates of the number of Palestinians wounded varies from 4,000 to over 10,000. IDF figures report approximately 4,500 Palestinians injured by the security services and 550 injured by other Palestinians.

Figures compiled from the above sources indicate that 10 Israelis were killed by Palestinians and at least 212 Israeli civilians were injured in the occupied territories during 1990, fewer than in 1989. The IDF reports that 1,340 Israeli security personnel and 413 Israeli civilians were injured by Palestinians in 1990.

There were many charges of unjustified beatings and physical abuse by Israeli security forces. However, the number of complaints of such beatings declined in 1990. The IDF states that every fatality is automatically investigated. Nonlethal violent incidents are not routinely investigated unless a complaint is made, and then, due both to the volume of incidents and lack of cooperation by Palestinians, not all complaints are fully investigated. Investigations into fatal incidents are lengthy, so that investigations begun in the early months of the uprising are only now being completed. Human rights organizations charge that the IDF does not make sufficient effort to obtain testimony from Palestinian witnesses, while the IDF states that Palestinians refuse to cooperate with its investigations. The IDF reports that as a result of its investigations into soldiers' conduct, 40 charges

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shots were filed against 55 soldiers in 1990. Other cases were sent to unit commanders for consideration of disciplinary action below the level of court-martial.

Not all investigations result in disciplinary action. When disciplinary actions were taken in death cases, either administrative or judicial, some punishments appeared lenient. For example, soldiers were often disciplined for lesser charges, such as improper use of weapons rather than the more serious charges of murder or manslaughter, especially in cases in which several soldiers were involved but the death could not be attributed to a specific soldier or the precise cause of death could not be legally established.

In August the Judge Advocate General's office explained to an Israeli human rights organization that no disciplinary action could be brought against a soldier who allegedly shot a 13-year-old girl in the Dahaiens refugee camp in April 1988 because the body had been buried by the family before an autopsy could be performed and consequently no legal connection between the girl's death and the shots could be made.

In June an IDF officer threw a tear gas grenade into the door of the waiting room of a Gaza United Nations Relief and Works Agency clinic where between 100 and 200 women and babies were present. IDF authorities immediately acknowledged the officer had acted contrary to orders, and disciplined him with 10 days of detention. However, the detention order was reversed by the commanding officer.

Four Givati Brigade soldiers were convicted of the August 1988 beating of a Gaza resident who later died. They were convicted of abuse rather than murder or manslaughter because the victim's body had been taken from the hospital and buried before the cause of death could be legally established. The battalion commander, a major, was demoted to lieutenant and sentenced to 3 months' suspended imprisonment, a captain was demoted to sergeant and sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment (of which 6 months was suspended), and two sergeants were demoted to private and sentenced to 3 months' suspended imprisonment.

Following a 1989 petition to the High Court by an Israeli human rights organization, a court-martial was held in 1990 for an IDF colonel who had previously received relatively mild discipline for ordering his troops to break the bones of Palestinians. The trial had not yet concluded at year's end.

IDF use of tear gas has continued to be controversial. Misuse declined in Gaza in 1990, as commanders there used it primarily to disperse demonstrators. However, allegations continue of misuse by the IDF in the West Bank and especially by the Border Police in East Jerusalem. The IDF states it has not received any allegations of death attributed to improper use of tear gas in 1990, while Palestinian human rights organizations claimed there were such deaths.

Reports of serious incidents of Israeli interference with medical care have declined in 1990, due partly to the reduced number of confrontations and to better IDF discipline. The IDF continued to enter hospitals and clinics on security grounds and to stop ambulances in search of suspects. Sometimes, ambulances have been used to transport uninjured

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Palestinians away from an area of confrontation, leading to Israeli charges that ambulances are used to evade pursuit of those suspects.

The IDF sometimes imposed temporary curfews on, or created closed military areas in, towns or villages in order to facilitate the collection of taxes from Palestinians. Authorities assert that they face widespread opposition to tax payment, which necessitates extraordinary collection methods. Palestinians claim that these measures are excessive and that such tactics are not used in Israel. Palestinian residents of the occupied territories do not have recourse to the Israeli judicial system which serves as the arbiter of tax disputes within Israel; rather, appeals must be made to a special review board appointed by the military commander. Palestinians may petition the High Court for redress of any administrative action.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

East Jerusalem is an active center of Arabic publication, including of newspapers. There is no press published in the West Bank or Gasa, but Jerusalem papers are distributed there. Israeli authorities impose tight restrictions on the Arabic press, citing broadly defined security reasons. Publications in East Jerusalem must submit to military authorities for prior censorship all copy relating to the security, public order, and safety of Israel and the occupied territories. Some reports and editorials related to the uprising and Palestinian political goals were permitted, but articles and editorials were also routinely expurgated. Arabic translations of news stories related to the uprising, including items that had previously appeared in the Hebrew-language press, were routinely censored from the Arabic press on security grounds such as incitement to violence.

The display of Palestinian political symbols, such as flags, national colors, and graffiti, is punishable by stiff fines (usually the equivalent of \$175 for graffiti), detention, or imprisonment. Palestinians are at times forced to erase graffiti found by security forces, regardless of whether they are responsible for it. Public expression of support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), its component factions (such as Fatah), Islamic extremist groups (such as Hamas), and other banned organizations is prohibited.

No broadcast media originates from the occupied territories. The authorities have jammed radio broadcasts from neighboring countries that they deemed inflammatory. In December a prominent Palestinian press service, which had been allowed to reopen in March and which submitted its product to the government censors, was closed for publishing a newspaper without a license. This was the second closure of a press service in Jerusalem in 1990. In September a press service allegedly affiliated with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was ordered to stop disseminating an unlicensed newsletter.

In July Israel closed two offices of a well-known Arab studies society and extended the closure order on a third office because of the society's alleged role as a center for Fatah field operations. More than 30 Palestinian journalists were arrested in 1990 on security charges such as filming in a

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closed military area. Numerous other journalists were interrogated, press offices were raided, and occasionally phones were cut off in connection with Israeli security investigations. At least three journalists complained of being beaten while attempting to cover the news. Israeli authorities deny that anyone is arrested for writing news stories or acting as a press service and state that journalists are subject to the same laws as all other Palestinians.

A permit is required to import publications into the occupied territories, and imported materials may be censored or banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli content, support for the intifada or Palestinian nationalism, or when deemed a threat to state security. In February Israeli censors banned the import of a U.S.-based newsletter because it allegedly encouraged continuing violence in the occupied territories. Possession of banned materials, such as uprising leaflets, is punishable by fine and imprisonment. The IDF periodically declared all or parts of the West Bank and Gaza closed military areas, one effect of which was to exclude journalists except under military escort. Reports by foreign journalists are subject to censorship under a system of self-regulation.

In 1990 Israel began to lift some of the closure orders that had affected West Bank and Gaza colleges and universities since the beginning of the uprising. In June Israel allowed the Arab College of Health Professions in al-Birah to reopen, and in July the technical college of Abu Dis (both affiliated with al-Quds university) was allowed to reopen. West Bank community colleges and vocational schools reopened in 1990. Bethlehem University reopened in October. The other four West Bank and Gaza universities remained closed. Off-campus university programs were banned on security grounds, but an underground system operated throughout the year. Secondary and elementary schools in the West Bank reopened in January, although some remained closed for extended periods. Authorities continued to close individual schools for short periods in reaction to alleged security problems emanating from those schools. Schools in Gaza and East Jerusalem were open for most of the school year, although all schools in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem were closed temporarily following the October 9 Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif incident. Schools are also closed 3 to 4 days each month because of the observance of Palestinian "strike days."

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Military orders ban public gatherings of 10 or more people without a permit. Political parties and other groups are banned, including some labor unions viewed as being affiliated with banned organizations such as the PLO. Private organizations are supposed to be registered with the CIVAD, though some operate without either licenses or interference from Israeli authorities. Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-help organizations are permitted to operate unless their activities are viewed as overtly political or as endangering security or supporting the uprising. Persons involved in intifada activities are often arrested, interrogated, administratively detained, or denied permission to travel, regardless of their profession or affiliation.

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c. Freedom of Religion

Freedom of religion is respected in the occupied territories. No group or sect is banned on religious grounds. Muslim and Christian holy days are observed, as are Jewish holy days in Jerusalem and the settlements. Muslim, Christian, and Jewish holy places are respected. All faiths operate schools and institutions (although religious schools were subject to the same extended closure as other schools in the occupied territories). Religious publications circulate, subject to the laws for publications detailed in Section 2.a. Israeli authorities restrict access to the al-Aqsa Mosque area of Jerusalem as a precautionary security measure from time to time during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and the Id al-Adha holiday.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Freedom of movement was restricted frequently in the West Bank and Gaza by IDF curfews, although the number of curfews and their duration declined in 1990. In Gaza, there has been a nightly curfew since the beginning of the uprising. This curfew was upheld by the High Court of Justice. Night curfews that had been in force in Jenin and in Dohaisha refugee camp every night since August and September 1989, respectively, were lifted on March 27 in response to a High Court petition brought by an Israeli civil rights organization. During curfews, people were usually allowed to leave their houses to obtain food and medical care for short, defined periods. On several occasions authorities closed the West Bank and Gaza completely for security reasons to prevent access by Palestinians to East Jerusalem and Israel.

Following an Israeli human rights organization's petition to the High Court, the authorities agreed to lift collective travel bans that had been imposed on the residents of 25 West Bank villages, some for as long as 2 years. Despite the High Court's ruling in that case, the Israeli Government in September imposed a travel ban on the residents of three West Bank villages.

A 6-month ban on entry into Israel was issued against most working age males who live in the al-Bureij refugee camp in Gaza following the murder there of an IDF reservist in September. Indictments have been issued against individual suspects in this case, but the ban remains for the others.

Approximately 15,000 Palestinians are affected by the Government's issuance of distinctive identity cards which prohibit the bearer from entering or transiting Israel or East Jerusalem. These cards have been issued for several years to Palestinians considered to be security risks. In November the Government began to issue several thousand more such cards to any Palestinian ever detained or incarcerated. Some of those who received such cards at that time claim to have been administratively detained for their political views. Others, including lawyers, human rights organization employees, and journalists, say they had never been arrested or administratively detained. Such identity cards not only prevent Palestinians from working in Israel or East Jerusalem, but also from visiting the many key Palestinian institutions.

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located there, such as hospitals, schools, and religious institutions.

Thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories travel abroad each year. Citing security concerns, Israel has imposed travel restrictions on some political activists. The United States has protested a number of these travel bans to the Israeli Government. There were numerous cases in which young men were denied permission to travel unless they agreed to remain abroad for an extended time. All Palestinian males between the ages of 16 and 35, for example, generally must stay outside the occupied territories at least 9 months if they cross the bridge into Jordan, unless special permission for a 1-month stay has been obtained in advance. Palestinians must obtain several different clearances in order to obtain a travel permit. Israeli authorities sometimes prevented Palestinians with permits from crossing the bridge without offering a reason or revoked the traveler's permit on asserted security grounds. According to figures from the Islamic Waqf, all Muslims who applied were permitted to make the pilgrimage (hajj) in 1990.

There are no obstacles to emigration. Israel sometimes refuses to renew laissez-passeurs of Palestinians from the occupied territories who live or work abroad on the grounds that they have abandoned their residence, even though they may not have acquired foreign citizenship. Palestinians who obtain foreign citizenship are ordinarily not allowed to resume residence in the occupied territories; those who acquire the right to residence elsewhere, or who remain outside the territories for more than 3 years are often also not permitted to resume residence in the territories. They are permitted to return only as tourists and sometimes are denied entry entirely. Enforcement of the 3-month limit for tourist visas for Palestinians is uneven. Permanent residency permission is usually denied to foreign-born spouses and foreign-born children of Palestinian residents of the occupied territories, although they are allowed to reside as temporary residents with renewable permits.

Many Palestinians abroad during the 1967 war, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons, are not generally permitted to return to reside permanently with their families. According to Israeli authorities, in 1990 some 326 family reunification applications were approved for Palestinians to reside in the West Bank and Gaza and 269 were rejected. Adjudication of these applications is at the discretion of the CIVAD. Israeli officials acknowledge that family reunification is limited for demographic and political reasons. They assert that the laws of occupation do not require Israel to permit the return of former Palestinian residents who were abroad in 1967 or who have lost their residency status by protracted absence and relocation of domicile, even if they were born in the territories. Restrictions on residence, tourist visas, reentry, and family reunification do not apply to Jews resident in the occupied territories, whether or not they are Israeli citizens.

In June, in response to a petition to the High Court, Israel decided to allow foreign wives and minor children, deported in 1989 for overstaying tourist visas, to return to the West Bank. In addition, the Government stated that it would allow these women and their minor children, as well as those in illegal status who had not been deported, to remain in the

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West Bank on extended tourist visas. (Foreign husbands of Palestinian residents generally will not be covered by this decision.) The Government has not agreed to provide these Palestinians with permanent residency rights that would guarantee them the right to travel and return and access to local health and educational resources, although it has said it does consider humanitarian cases on an individual basis.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The West Bank and Gaza are governed under occupation by Israel's Ministry of Defense through a military government and civil administration. Palestinians have no means to participate in most significant policy decisions concerning land and resource use and planning, taxation, trade, and industry. Municipal elections were last held in 1976 in the West Bank, and most mayors elected then were later dismissed, and some deported, on security grounds. Palestinians appointed by Israel have filled most vacancies, some appointed mayors, however, have resigned or stopped working because of the uprising and threats from other Palestinians.

East Jerusalem is governed as part of Israel. Arab residents of East Jerusalem are permitted to vote in municipal elections but have largely boycotted them at the direction of Palestinian leaders. No Arab resident of East Jerusalem sits on the city council. In the last municipal election in 1984, less than 4 percent of Jerusalem's Arab population voted.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Israel normally permits international human rights groups to visit the occupied territories. Israel actively cooperates with a number of such organizations, and officials are generally available for meetings on human rights issues. Israel, however, refused to accept a United Nations mission to investigate the October 9 incident at Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and mixed--are concerned with human rights. Their publications and statements are generally allowed to circulate in the occupied territories. They are allowed to hold press conferences.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

Israeli law has been extended to cover most activities of Israeli settlers who live in the occupied territories, while Palestinians live under military occupation law. Under the dual system of governance, Palestinians--both Muslim and Christian--are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues, including the right to due process, right of residency, freedom of movement, sale of crops and goods, land and water use, and availability of health and social services. Israeli settlers involved in security violations have been treated far more leniently than Palestinians accused of similar offenses. Offenses against Israelis are investigated and prosecuted more vigorously than offenses against Palestinians, due in part, Israeli authorities claim, to Palestinian refusal to cooperate with investigating authorities. Israeli agriculture and

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Manufacturing are protected against Palestinian competition from the territories, whereas all markets in the territories are theoretically open to Israelis, subject to extensive Palestinian boycotts.

Israeli citizens have been accorded the right to reside in the occupied territories under Israel's Law of Return. Palestinians who were born in the territories but live abroad and have lost, according to Israeli laws and regulations, their right to reside in the territories may regain the right to reside and be reunited with their families only with permission of the Israeli occupation authorities.

Israel continued to place land under its control for military purposes, roads, settlement of Israelis, and other purposes which restrict use by Palestinians and discriminate in favor of Israeli settlers against Palestinians. Permits are tightly restricted for new Palestinian housing construction in the occupied territories and for expanding town boundaries for development to meet population growth. Palestinians do not participate in the Higher Planning Council, the Regional Planning and Building Committee in Gaza, or their subcommittees, which plan land use in the occupied territories, issue permits, and exercise planning powers that were transferred from local, municipal, and village councils in 1971. In 1990 the authorities demolished approximately 130 houses in the West Bank which were built without licenses. An Israeli human rights organization estimated that at least 2,000 new housing permits a year are needed to accommodate Palestinian housing needs in the West Bank, and the low number of new housing permits has been a standing complaint by Palestinians. CIVAD officials assert they are taking steps to improve the situation and issued 712 permits in 1990, up from approximately 200 in 1989. The CIVAD provides basic services for Palestinians under occupation. There is no public accounting of its revenue and expenditure in the occupied territories.

Palestinians and persons of Arab descent entering the West Bank via the Jordan River bridges, regardless of citizenship, are often subject to extensive searches, including strip searches, and many complain of harsh or humiliating treatment. Israel limits the funds that Palestinian residents may bring into the occupied territories to about \$300 per person per month without official permission and about \$600 with advance notice. There are no limits on funds that Israeli settlers may bring into the territories.

There is no legal discrimination against women. Violence against women is not legally condoned. The participation rate of women in the labor force is low, and they are employed primarily in traditional professions and occupations, although there are exceptions. Women's societies flourish and play an important social role.

Section 4 Worker Rights

The applicable sections for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Israel are contained in the country report for Israel.

a. The Right of Association

The labor law in the West Bank is Jordanian Law no. 21 of 1960, as amended by military orders. It permits workers to

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join unions without government authorization. It also permits the formation of unions by any group of 20 or more from the same trade or workplace, with prior government authorization. The 1990 report of the the International Labor Organization (ILO) Director General noted that Israeli authorities have approved no new union applications since 1979. No petitions were submitted in 1990. Approximately 31 of the 90 labor unions that function in the West Bank are officially licensed.

The labor law in Gaza is Egyptian Military Order 331, which supplements the prior British Mandate labor law and which has been amended by Israeli military orders. It allows the organization of unions on a workplace or craft basis. However, the Israeli authorities barred unions from operating in Gaza until 1979. Since 1979, unions have been permitted to operate under strictly enforced restrictions that, among other things, prevent elections of new union leaders and opening of branch offices. As a result, only the seven unions that existed in 1967 operate in Gaza, out of one office in Gaza City.

Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are governed by the same law as workers in Israel and are free to establish their own labor unions. Israeli authorities officially bar East Jerusalem unions from joining the West Bank trade union federations, though this restriction has not been enforced. Individual Palestinian workers in East Jerusalem may belong to both local unions, some of which are affiliated with a West Bank federation, and the Israeli Histadrut labor federation.

Israeli authorities state that the West Bank umbrella federations and many individual unions are not legitimate trade unions but rather fronts for illegal political organizations. Citing security concerns, the authorities actively discourage many activities by unions in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel stated that no legitimate union activities are disrupted and that Israeli actions are intended to prevent illicit political activity. The 1990 report of the ILO Director General, however, complains that Israeli officials often do not substantiate these claims.

More than 100,000 West Bank Palestinians, representing a full range of blue-collar and white-collar professionals, were members of approximately 90 trade unions in 1990. The great majority of West Bank unions belong to either the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank (GFTU) or the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank - Workers Unity Bloc (WUB), which supports the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The split in the GFTU, which took place in 1981, was significantly healed in 1990 when all factions except the WUB reunified under the leadership of a pro-Fatah secretary general. The GFTU participates in meetings of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and has observer status in the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), although it is not formally affiliated to either. Both the GFTU and the WUB have applied for membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The West Bank unions are independent of the Government of Israel and do not have fraternal relations with the Israeli Histadrut labor federation.

Military Order 825 Of 1980, officially applied in the West Bank and unofficially in Gaza, requires that Palestinian unions present lists of candidates for union office to the

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CIVAD for approval 30 days before elections. The order authorizes the CIVAD to remove from the lists any candidates who have been convicted of a felony, including those sentenced for security-related offenses. The CIVAD has said that it will enforce this order by disallowing the election of candidates not approved in advance. Because Palestinian trade unionists fear that the CIVAD will use the order to exclude those candidates who have served in administrative detention, they refuse to adhere to the order and hold elections at the workplace level without the approval of the authorities. The GFTU has petitioned the ICFTU to intervene with the Israeli authorities to allow federation-level elections and to act as observers at such elections.

Like all organizations in the occupied territories, Palestinian labor unions are subject to disciplinary measures for engaging in political and security-related activities. All meetings of 10 or more non-Israeli citizens in the occupied territories must have prior CIVAD approval. The CIVAD has invoked this requirement to break up many union meetings that were held without prior approval in the past year. The CIVAD also raided and forced the temporary closure of at least two union offices in the West Bank in 1990, though the GFTU central office in Hebron reopened in August after the expiration of a 2-year CIVAD closure order.

Union leaders have been among those detained for alleged security offenses. The WUB leadership has been particularly subjected to such detentions. In addition, many union leaders and representatives have been denied permission to travel abroad in 1990 to attend trade union conferences and training programs. The Secretary General of the GFTU was permitted to travel to both the ILO Conference in Geneva and the WFTU Congress in Moscow in 1990. The GFTU Secretary General of the GFTU and other members of GFTU's executive committee were issued green identity cards in December, prohibiting entry into East Jerusalem where the GFTU has a large office. Other union officials reportedly also received green identity cards.

There has been no dissolution of unions by administrative or legislative action. Under prevailing labor law, unions have the right to strike only after submitting a complaint to the CIVAD for mandatory arbitration. No strikes have been authorized under this procedure. However, authorities have not interfered with unauthorized strikes called over strictly labor issues. More such strikes took place in the West Bank in 1990 than in previous years, owing to the worsening economic situation of West Bank workers. Widescale or local "strikes" called by Palestinian factions to promote the intifada are not labor actions.

Palestinian unions in the occupied territories are barred from organizing the thousands of Palestinian workers who have jobs in Israel (whose work conditions are described in the worker rights section of the Israel country report).

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Applicable labor laws in the occupied territories protect collective bargaining. The CIVAD does not record collective agreements because some unions and some union leaders are not legally recognized. However, most union-employer agreements are honored without interference from the authorities, and the number of such agreements in force has increased over the past year. The only forum for labor grievances in the West Bank

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legal system is the CIVAD's military court system. Palestinians view the system as unsympathetic and prefer to use the traditional technique of mediation by community notables.

There are no export processing zones in the occupied territories.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied territories.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

A 1978 military order raised the minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza to 14, though this order is not effectively enforced and underage labor is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

In the West Bank, Jordanian law prescribes a maximum workweek of 48 hours, except for certain hotel, food service, and cinema employees, whose workweek is 54 hours. In Gaza, Israeli authorities amended this law to provide for a 48-hour workweek for day laborers and a 40-hour week for salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum workweek laws. There is no minimum wage provision in the West Bank or Gaza. The Ministry of Labor's inspection service is charged with enforcing health and safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry of Labor Report (Annex 2 of the 1990 ILO Report) claims that about 15 labor inspectors visit each plant in the occupied territories at least once a year, while Palestinian sources state that Ministry of Labor inspectors stopped visiting West Bank factories during the last 3 years of the intifada. According to international labor organizations, health and safety conditions in some factories do not meet industry standards established by the ILO.

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מצ"ב הודעתו של עוזר מזכיר המדינה, שיפטר, במסיבת עיתונאים, עם הגשת הדו"ח השנתי על מצב זכויות האדם בעולם.

מו כן, מצ"ב תשובותיו לשאלות הנוגעות בישראל ולמצב זכויות האדם במדינות ערב, חברות הקואליציה.

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ON ITS ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990/ BRIEFER: RICHARD SHIFTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1991

SPOKESMAN: GOOD AFTERNOON. I THINK WE'RE READY TO START. ONCE AGAIN, THIS IS AN ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990. THE BRIEFER WILL BE RICHARD SHIFTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. THANK YOU.

MR. SCHIFTER: JUST A FEW INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS. BEFORE WE GET TO THE INDIVIDUAL TREES, I'LL SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FOREST FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS BUREAU.

AS WE TRY TO ANALYZE THE TRENDS OF THE YEAR 1990, THERE IS BOTH GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS. THE GOOD NEWS RELATES TO DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY CONCERN THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS AND RESPECT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS ENSHRINED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN DICTATORSHIPS ARE ON THE DECLINE WORLDWIDE, AND DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BY GOVERNMENTS ARE ON THE RISE. WE HAVE NOT ONLY SEEN THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE, BUT 1990 HAS ALSO SEEN PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN SUCH WIDELY DIFFERING COUNTRIES AS BENIN, CAPE VERDE, CHILE, NEPAL, NICARAGUA, MONGOLIA, AND SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE. APARTHEID IS ON THE WANE, AS WE HEARD TODAY, AND THERE'S A GREAT DEAL OF DEMOCRATIC FERMENT THROUGHOUT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE END OF HISTORY HAS BEEN REACHED AS FAR AS THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY IS CONCERNED. WE STILL HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO AND THERE ARE INDEED SITUATIONS IN WHICH TWO STEPS FORWARD

ARE FOLLOWED BY ONE STEP BACK, TO COIN A PHRASE. BUT AS I'VE SAID, THE OVERALL TREND IS DISTINCTIVELY POSITIVE.

NOW, LET ME TURN TO THE PROBLEM WHICH HAS MOVED TO THE FOREGROUND OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS. IT IS THE PROBLEM OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION ASSOCIATED WITH INTERETHNIC AND INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT. THIS IS NOT A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. HOWEVER, AS INTERETHNIC CONFLICTS FREQUENTLY INVOLVE EXCESSES OR DISREGARD OF HUMAN LIFE FOR SECURITY FORCES, THEY HAVE BECOME PART OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA. THEY INCLUDE SOME CONFLICTS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED MEDIA ATTENTION, AS WELL AS OTHERS WHICH TEND TO BE OVERLOOKED.

FEW AMERICANS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE TRAGIC RESULTS OF THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA; IN SOMALIA, FOR INSTANCE; OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY MAURITANIA AGAINST ITS BLACK POPULATION; OF CONTINUING INTERCOMMUNAL STRIFE IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA. IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES, THE YEAR 1990 SAW MANY HUNDREDS AND SOMETIMES THOUSANDS OF NONCOMBATANTS DIE AS A RESULT OF INTERCOMMUNAL STRIFE. IN SUDAN, LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS ARE NOW THREATENED WITH STARVATION BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE CIVIL WAR TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS.

NOT IN THE SAME CATEGORY BUT ALSO INVOLVING THE MASS KILLINGS OF NONCOMBATANTS HAS BEEN THE IRAQI OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT. A REGIME COMMITTED TO TOTALITARIAN PRACTICES AT HOME STRUCK OUT AGAINST ITS NEIGHBOR AND APPLIED ITS BRUTAL PRACTICES TO THE POPULATION NOW SUBJUGATED TO ITS RULE.

LET ME CONCLUDE WITH A FEW WORDS ABOUT US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WE SEEK TO ASSESS HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS WORLDWIDE. THE COMPILATION WHICH WE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS LAST NIGHT CONSTITUTES SUCH AN ASSESSMENT. NEXT, WE TRIED TO DETERMINE WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP END THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM OR AT LEAST AMELIORATE CONDITIONS. NOW, ACTION CAN TAKE THE FORM OF A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT, A PRIVATE DEMARCHE, OR INCREASINGLY, A PROGRAM TO ASSIST COUNTRIES WHICH WANT TO INITIATE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES DESIGNED TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.

WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT WE BASE OUR FOREIGN POLICY EXCLUSIVELY ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS. THIS GOVERNMENT HAS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WHICH MUST BE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT. BUT WHILE SEEKING TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, WE ALSO WEAVE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS INTO OUR RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THESE AREAS OF OUR CONCERN COINCIDE.

Q EXCUSE ME, SIR, I WONDER IF YOU CAN -- COMMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS AND THE MOVE TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS THEY APPLY TO MANY OF AMERICA'S COALITION PARTNERS, ARAB COALITION PARTNERS IN THE GULF. HOW IS SAUDI ARABIA DOING IN MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN ITS HUMAN RIGHTS, HOW ABOUT SYRIA, HOW ABOUT EGYPT?

MR. SCHIFTER: YOU HAVE DIFFERING SITUATIONS IN THESE COUNTRIES. I THINK OUR REPORT WILL INDICATE THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM THAT EXISTS IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH HASN'T -- DIDN'T CHANGE IN 1990. WHETHER THERE WILL BE CHANGE IN THE FUTURE WE CANNOT TELL.

THEY SYRIAN SYSTEM, THE RULE OF THE -- BY THE BA'ATH PARTY OF SYRIA HAS NOT CHANGED, AND THAT'S FULLY DESCRIBED IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. THE SITUATION IN EGYPT IS ONE IN WHICH YOU HAVE AN ELECTED PRESIDENT. THE SYSTEM IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE OPEN THAN IT IS IN THE OTHER STATES I'VE JUST MENTIONED.

Q SO THE SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA, IN SYRIA IS GOOD?

MR. SCHIFTER: IF YOU ARE SPEAKING FROM A POINT OF VIEW OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ANSWER IS NO. AND I THINK YOU WILL FIND THAT OUR REPORT CLEARLY DESCRIBES THE SITUATION IN BOTH OF THESE COUNTRIES.

Q CAN I FOLLOW UP ON THAT? ON THE SAME AREA OF THE WORLD, I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS. I REVIEWED YOUR REPORT ON IRAQ FOR 1989 AND IT WAS VERY SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS. SO I WONDER IF YOU COULD TELL ME HOW HUMAN RIGHTS AFFECTED US POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ PRIOR TO AUGUST 2ND. THAT'S THE FIRST QUESTION. SECOND QUESTION -- YOU DESCRIBE IN YOUR REPORT THE DEATHS OF 72 PREMATURE BABIES IN KUWAIT, IN OCCUPIED KUWAIT, QUOTING A DOCTOR. CAN YOU TELL ME HOW THIS ACCOUNT WAS OBTAINED? DID SOMEBODY FROM THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPEAK PERSONALLY TO THIS DOCTOR? WAS HIS ACCOUNT CORROBORATED BY OTHER WITNESSES?

MR. SCHIFTER: YEAH. LET ME SIMPLY SAY THAT AS FAR AS THIS PARTICULAR BRIEFING IS CONCERNED, IF YOU ASK ME WHERE DID WE GET CERTAIN DATA IN OUR INDIVIDUAL REPORTS, I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THAT ANSWER. I CANNOT KEEP UP WITH ALL OF THAT. IF YOU WANT ME TO TAKE THIS QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT, I WILL BE HAPPY TO DO THAT, AND WE'LL BE ABLE TO FURNISH YOU WITH THAT KIND OF INFORMATION. THE OTHER QUESTION WAS CONCERNING WHICH COUNTRY?

Q US POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS --

MR. SCHIFTER: ON IRAQ.

Q -- IN IRAQ.

MR. SCHIFTER: YES. LET ME JUST TELL YOU WHAT OUR SITUATION WAS WITH REGARD TO THAT. IF YOU TAKE A LOOK AT THE VARIOUS LAWS THAT ARE NOW ON THE BOOKS CONCERNING WHERE WE ARE REQUIRED OR WHAT THE CONTEXT IS IN WHICH WE ARE SUPPOSED TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, YOU WILL FIND THAT THE LAWS DIFFER AS WE MOVE FROM AGRICULTURE -- AGRICULTURAL SALES, CCC ON THE ONE HAND, TO EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS, AND ON TO SUCH MATTERS AS APPROVING SALES ON THE MUNITIONS LIST.

WHAT YOU WILL FIND IS THAT IN THE LAST CATEGORY WE PROCEEDED AS IF WE HAD FOUND IRAQ TO BE A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATOR, A VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ON THAT BASIS DENIED LICENSE APPLICATIONS THAT WERE SUBMITTED TO US OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT YOUR REPORT ON -- YOUR CRITICISM OF ISRAEL FOR ITS CONDUCT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS SOMEWHAT MUTED THIS YEAR COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS YEAR. IS THAT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION?

MR. SCHIFTER: YES. THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES.

Q WOULD YOU TALK A LITTLE ABOUT THAT?

MR. S SPRING AND SUMMER, IN THAT THE PATROLLING BY THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN THE GAZA IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AND ALSO IN THE WEST BANK BEGAN TO BE LIMITED TO MAJOR HIGHWAYS, WITH JUST OCCASIONAL SHOWING OF THE FLAG IN PREDOMINANTLY ARAB AREAS. AS A RESULT OF THAT, THERE WAS BASICALLY A VERY SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS.

IN OTHER WORDS, IF NO PATROL SHOWS UP, THERE'S NO ONE TO THROW ROCKS AT, AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE NUMBER OF CLASHES SIGNIFICANTLY DROPPED, AND EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH YOU HAD CERTAIN POINTS IN -- DURING 1990, MAJOR INCIDENTS, LIKE THE ONE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF AN ISRAELI RESERVIST AND THEN AGAIN THE PROBLEM OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT, IN BETWEEN, YOU HAD A VERY, VERY SHARP DROP IN THE NUMBER OF CLASHES AND THEREFORE THE NUMBER OF DEATHS AND INJURIES.

Q WHAT IS THE OVERALL TREND IN THE ARAB WORLD, I MEAN, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KUWAIT? COULD YOU DEAL WITH THE GULF, WHAT SEEMS TO BE GOING ON IN TERMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT DIRECTION THEY'RE MOVING IN IN THE GULF AND IN --

MR. SCHIFTER: YEAH.

Q -- OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD.

MR. SCHIFTER: YOU'RE DEALING -- YOU'RE DEALING IN QUITE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, WITH A VERY TRADITIONAL PATTERN TO A CULTURE BASED ON A LONG-STANDING TRADITION WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHERE, LET'S SAY, A MILITARY REGIME IMPOSES ITSELF ON A SOCIETY WHEN THERE'S NOTHING, REALLY, THAT TRADITION AND CULTURE HAVE IN COMMON WITH THAT PARTICULAR MILITARY REGIME. YOU CANNOT, IF I MAY LOOK AT THE ARAB WORLD PURELY AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT, YOU CANNOT COMPARE THE BA'ATH REGIME AND SADDAM HUSSEIN IN IRAQ WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, SAUDI ARABIA. AS FAR AS THE SAUDI ARABIAN MONARCHY IS CONCERNED, IT REALLY SORT OF COMES OUT OF THE CULTURE, OUT OF THE RELIGION. SADDAM HUSSEIN UNTIL AUGUST 2ND WAS -- PRIDED HIMSELF OF HIS SECULAR IDENTIFICATION AND REALLY HAD ESTABLISHED A TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP MORE OR LESS ON A LENINIST MODEL, EVEN THOUGH HE HADN'T ENDORSED LENINISM. SO YOU HAVE THESE DIFFERENCES.

Q BUT WHAT IS THE TREND? I MEAN, WHAT DIRECTION --

MR. SCHIFTER: I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY PARTICULAR TREND THAT'S NOTICEABLE AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT. WHAT THE FUTURE WILL BRING WE DON'T KNOW.

Q BUT IT'S CERTAINLY NOT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY. I MEAN, YOU DON'T SEE AN OUTBREAK OF --

MR. SCHIFTER: WELL, I'VE JUST SAID -- WHAT I'VE SAID IS THAT -- NO, I DO NOT SEE A TREND.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- COMPARE PERHAPS PRE-INVASION IRAQ TO THE -- OUR ARAB COALITION, GIVEN THAT YOUR REPORTS POINT OUT THAT IN EGYPT, SYRIA, AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES -- SAUDI ARABIA, AS WE'VE MENTIONED, THERE IS NO DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, THERE IS NO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THERE IS NO FREEDOM OF WORSHIP, ET CETERA.

MR. SCHIFTER: YEAH. LET ME JUST SAY THIS, AND YOU KNOW, THIS IS NOW AFTER AUGUST 2ND, 1990, BUT YOU WILL FIND IF YOU HAD ASKED ME A YEAR AGO OR TWO YEARS AGO, I WOULD HAVE LISTED IRAQ RIGHT UP THERE -- AND I DID LIST, AS A MATTER OF FACT, IRAQ AS ONE OF THE WORST OPPRESSORS. IT WAS IN MANY RESPECTS A TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM IN TERMS OF THE MEASURES IT HAD TAKEN AGAINST ITS OWN CITIZENS. I DO NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN

THE WORLD THAT APPLIED CHEMICAL WARFARE TO ITS OWN CITIZENRY. THAT REALLY CHARACTERIZED SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME AS LONG AGO AS, IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE, 1988.

Q TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAEL. DO YOU SEE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES? THAT'S ONE. AND THE SECOND IS, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE APPARENT IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAS AFFECTED THE APPARENT IMPROVEMENT IN AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS?

MR. SCHIFTER: AS FAR AS THE FIRST QUESTION IS CONCERNED, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. AS FAR AS ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IS CONCERNED, IT -- DURING 1990, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, IT STARTED AT ABOUT 1200, IT THEN WENT DOWN TO ABOUT 800, AND IN LIGHT OF THE -- OR FOLLOWING THE MOST RECENT OCCURRENCES, WENT BACK UP TO WHERE IT WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR. I THINK THE IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS ARE REALLY -- REALLY DERIVED FROM OTHER FACTORS.

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סיוט אישטון

לשיחתך עם איגלברגר. שלך 2012 סעיף 4.
החילוננו בהתיעצויות לקראת גיבוש המלצות בהתאם לבקשתך.

נצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

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בבב

סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע: לשכת שהח, לשכת רה'מ'

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

משיחה עם לארי איגלברגר:

1. נפגשתי לשיחה במסגרת א'צ' עם סגן מזכיר המדינה (1/2), במהלכה סיפר על התרשמויותיו בעקבות הדיונים שקיים בארץ, סיוע כלכלי, נושא MTCR, מחשבי-על ומחשבות על האזור בעקבות המשבר במפרץ.

2. איגלברגר הביע סיפוק מהשיחות שקיים בארץ, מהאווירה בדיונים ומשיתוף פעולה שהתהדק בין שתי המדינות. ציין כי בימים שאחרי המפרץ נמצא עצמנו, ישראל וארהב, במדרגת יחסים גבוהה יותר מאשר לפני ה-2/8. חזר והביע התרשמותו מרה'מ' והאימון לו הוא זוכה בממשל. בהקשר של שפור היחסים, הציע שלא נייתס חשיבות רבה מידי להודעה המשותפת שפורסמה בעקבות פגישות בייקר-ביסטמרניק.

3. בשאלת הסיוע הכלכלי, ציין שמבינים שישראל זקוקה לסיוע, אך זו היתה טעות לערב צרכי הסיוע הבטחוני והסיוע לקליטת עליה. איגלברגר, ביוזמתו, הציע שרה'מ' יתקשר באופן דחוף לנשיא כדי להעביר לו תחושת הדחיפות וגודל הצרכים עקב המלחמה.

4. באותו נושא הביע דעתו שלא רצוי שנפעל להשגת הצרכים הכלכליים באמצעות התקציב הנוסף (SUPPLEMENTAL) משום שהדבר יעורר התנגדות עקרונית במישל לקשר בין סיוע לישראל לתקציב נוסף ל-DESERT STORM. ביקש אף שנאמר שלאיפאק שדרך זו עשויה לעורר בעיות לא נחוצות. איגלברגר הוסיף שהנשיא ומזכיר המדינה (במיוחד האחרון) מקדישים מאמץ לגייס סיוע לישראל בקהיליה האירופית ובעולם הרחב. לא מקיימים עדיין שיחות עם יפאן מטעמים טקטיים. ציין, עם זאת, כיוזמתו שאינו יכול להתחייב לגבי התוצאות.

ערה: ברור שהממשל אינו מעוניין בקשור זה, בעיקר מסיבות פנים. מעדיפים לנסות ולגייס סיוע בקרב מדינות שונות, כאשר מבחינתנו אנו עשויים להסתכן מחד, בהחמצת המנוף של התקציב המיוחד, ומאידך, באי גיוס משאבים מספיקים בקהיליה הבינל. נדרשת החלטה והתייחסותכם.

5. בנושא הערבויות לדיור והעברתן בחלק אחד, ציין שמאמין שהעניין יוסדר לשביעות רצוננו. לדברי בנושא ערבויות נוספות, בסך 10 מיליארד דולר, לא התייחס.

6. בנושא ה-MTCR אותו העליתי בפניו, ציין ש-WAIVER נשיאותי הוא בהחלט מבחינת אפשרות, אלא שמבין ששהבט מתנגד לכך. הבטחתי לחזור אליו בנושא.

7. בשאלת אשור מחשבי-על למוסדות המחקר בישראל, רשם לפניו לבדוק הנושא עם ברתולומיאו.

8. בהקשר לאפשרות תגובה של ישראל, ציין שבמקרה של התקפה כימית יוכן ALL 'ש-BETS ARE OFF'.

9. אשר לתהליך השלום, ציין שחסיד הגישה של פתרון בעיות אחת לאחת ובהקשר

זה שאל אם ניתן להערכתנו להגיע להסדר כלשהו עם הסורים. מאידך, הביע פסימיות לגבי סיכוי השגת שלום עם סוריה. עוד באזור, מייחסים לתורכיה תפקיד נכבד יותר בעידן שאחרי המפרץ. לעומת זאת חוששים ממגמות איראן להפך למעצמה אזורית.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, תוזם: 809

אל: רהמש/95

מ-: ווש, נר: 2001, תא: 010291, זח: 1130, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול.

אל: נתיב-ברטוב

דע: אליקים רובינשטיין, א. בנצור, גוברין, שירן (כאנ)

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

1. אמש דיברו איוון סליון, תת מזכיר במחמ'ד ודן קרצר, עוזר תת-המזכיר עם השגריר והבוקר התקשרו עמי בקשר לפרשת הפנטקוסטלים. שתי השיחות היו בוטות ונרגזות.

2. קרצר אמר לי הבוקר, שנכון שבקבוצה האחרונה כמעט כולם יהודים והם מבינים את הבעיה שיש לנו, אבל אלה אנשים שכבר קיבלו הודעה על טיסתם ולכולם קרובים בארה"ב וממש ברגע האחרון סרבה הקונסוליה להחתיים את יירותיהם.

ביקש להפריד את הבעיה לשניים: לאפשר קודם כל ל-75 האנשים הרשומים לטיסה הזאת להמריא מיידית ואילו לגבי העתיד לקיים דיון משותף.

3. התייעצתי עם ג'רי שירן ועם שמחה דיניץ וחזרתי אח'כס לדן קרצר בהצעה ששירן יבוא אליו ויסביר את מצבנו ועמדתנו. הוספתי, שאני מבין שיש מגעים מקבילים בארץ המנוהלים על ידי השגריר בראון וסגנו פריס. קרצר השיב ברוגז ואמר: למען האמת, אין לי כל ענין לשמוע הסברים משירן. אני מעוניין רק בדבר אחד והוא 'כנ' או 'לא'.

השבתי, שבודאי שמע משגרירי בתל-אביב והוא ענה שקיבל טלפון 'לפני רבע שעה' מבראון שניסה לטפל בנושא באמצעות אלי רובינשטיין וקיבל תשובה שלילית. השבתי לו שגם אני התייעצתי עם המטפלים בענין ולצערי התשובה באמת שלילית.

4. לדעתי הפרשה אינה סגורה והם עוד יחזרו אלינו.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, בןאבו, תפוצות, @ (נתיב), @ (דיניץ/סוכנות)

סססס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 1206

*תאריך : 02.02.91

* ** נכנס

סודי ביותר

*דף 1 מתוך 2
*עותק 1 מתוך 2

* **

*חוזם: 2,1206

*אל: המשרד

*יעדים: רהמש/159, בטחון/175, מצב/257, אביב/182, מנמת/144

*מ-: ווט, נר: 2012, תא: 010291, זח: 2300, דח: מ, סג: 10

*תח: 0 גס: צפא

*נד: 0

*סודי ביותר/מידי

*אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

*דע: לשכת שהח, לשכת רה"מ

*מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

*משיחה עם לארי איגלברגר:

*1. נפגשתי לשיחה במסגרת א'צ' עם סגן מזכיר המדינה (1/2), במהלכה סיפר על התרשמותיו בעקבות הדיונים שקיים בארץ, סיוע כלכלי, נושא MTCR, מחשבי-על ומחשבות על האזור בעקבות המשבר במפרץ.

*2. איגלברגר הביע סיפוק מהשיחות שקיים בארץ, מהאווירה בדיונים ומשיתוף הפעולה שהתהדק בין שתי המדינות. ציין כי בימים שאחרי המפרץ נמצא עצמו, ישראל וארה"ב, במדרגת יחסים גבוהה יותר מאשר לפני ה-2/8. חזר והביע התרשמותו מרה"מ והאימון לו הוא זוכה בממשל. בהקשר של שפור היחסים, הציע שלא נייחס חשיבות רבה מידי להודעה המשותפת שפורסמה בעקבות פגישות בייקר-ביסטמרניק.

*3. בשאלת הסיוע הכלכלי, ציין שמבינים שישראל זקוקה לסיוע, אך זו הייתה טעות לערב צרכי הסיוע הבטחוני והסיוע לקליטת עליה. איגלברגר, ביוזמתו, הציע שרה"מ יתקשר באופן דחוף לנשיא כדי להעביר לו תחושת הדחיפות וגודל הצרכים עקב המלחמה.

*4. באותו נושא הביע דעתו שלא רצוי שנפעל להשגת הצרכים הכלכליים באמצעות התקציב הנוסף (SUPPLEMENTAL) משום שהדבר יעורר התנגדות עקרונית בממשל. לקשר בין סיוע לישראל לתקציב נוסף ל-DESERT STORM, ביקש אף שנאמר שלא יפאק שדרך זו עשויה לעורר בעיות לא נחוצות. איגלברגר הוסיף שהנשיא ומזכיר המדינה (במיוחד האחרון) מקדישים מאמץ לגייס סיוע לישראל בקהיליה האירופית ובעולם הרחב. לא מקיימים עדיין שיחות עם יפאן מטעמים טקטיים. ציין, עם זאת, ביוזמתו שאינו יכול להתחייב לגבי התוצאות.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* **

*דף 2 מתוך 2
*עותק 1 מתוך 2

*הערה: ברור שהממשל אינו מעוניין בקשור זה, בעיקר מסיבות פניים. מעדיפים לנסות ולגייס סיוע בקרב מדינות שונות, כאשר מבחינתנו אנו עשויים להסתכן אחד, בהחמצת המנוף של התקציב המיוחד, ומאידך, באי גיוס משאבים מספיקים בקהיליה הבינל. נדרשת החלטה והתייחסותכם.

*5. בנושא הערבויות לדיוור והעברתן בחלק אחד, ציין שמאמין שהעניין יוסדר לשביעות רצוננו. לדברי בנושא ערבויות נוספות, בסך 10 מיליארד דולר, לא התייחס.

*6. בנושא ה-MTCR אותו העליתי בפניו, ציין ש-WAIVER נשיאותי הוא בהחלט מבחינת אפשרות, אלא שמבין ששהבט מתנגד לכך. הבטחתי לחזור אליו בנושא.

*7. בשאלת אשור מחשבי-על למוסדות המחקר בישראל, רשם לפניו לבדוק הנושא עם ברתולומיאו.

*8. בהקשר לאפשרות תגובה של ישראל, ציין שבמקרה של התקפה כימית יובן ALL ש-BETS ARE OFF.

*9. אשר לתהליך השלום, ציין שחסידי הגישה של פתרון בעיות אחת לאחת ובהקשר זה שאל אם ניתן להערכתנו להגיע להסדר כלשהו עם הסורים. מאידך, הביע פסימיות לגבי סיכוי השגת שלום עם סוריה. עוד באזור, מייחסים לתורכיה אתפקיד נכבד יותר בעידן שאחרי המפרץ. לעומת זאת חוששים ממגמות איראן להפך למעצמה אזורית.

*שובל

*17

*תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(2), רס(0), אמן(1), בנצור(1), מצפא(1)

אאא, חוזם: 726

אל: רהמש/86

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 3, תא: 010291, חז: 1034, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: מא"פ 1

דע: מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

מפגש משולש

1. התקשר היקס בעקבות שיחה טלפונית עם כהן שמסר כי לא יוכל לקיים המפגש המשולש כפי שתוכנן מראש.

הן שיהיה בלונדון 18-19/2 לשיחות עם ה- E.P.L.F מציע לקיים שיחות ג'נבה או פאריז ב- 20-21/2.

2. אם לדעתי תבקשו, מציע שנענה שנשמח לקיים המפגש גם במועד מתאים אחר בירושלים.

3. אנא בחוזר.

עמרני

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, יגר, מאפ, בנצור,
מצפא, בןאבו, תפוצות, @ (לוברני), @ (רם)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 1672
אל: רהמש/200
מ-: המשרד, תא: 030291, זח: 1523, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/מידי

אל: עמרני/ווישינגטון

דע: אדיס/השגריר

הנדון: מפגש משולש. לשלך 3

מסכימים עם הצעתך שבס' 2 ונעדיף לקיים את המפגש בירושלים או באדיס במועד שיתאים לו.

מא'פ 1-מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בןאבו, תפוצות, יגר,
מאפ1, בנצור, מצפא, @ (לוברני), @ (רם)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10449
אל: רהמש/1027
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 52, תא: 040291, ח: 1714, ד: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/מידי

אל: מא'פ 1, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

מפגש משולש - שלכם 75.

מסרתי הדברים להיקס.
כהן אמור לשוב מחר לארה'ב וייתיעצו עמו.

עמרני.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, יגר, מאפ1, בנצור,
מצפא, @לוברני), @רם)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 1100

אל: רהמש/145

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 17, תא: 010291, חז: 1616, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

מלחמת המפרץ: סיוע לישראל.

1. בשיחתם עם הנשיא העלתה משלחת מועדון הנשיאים נושא הסיוע לישראל. הציעו לכרוך זאת לסיוע הנוסף שאותו בכונת הממשל להגיש שנועד לכסות הוצאות מבצע "סופת המדבר".

2. סקורופט בתגובה טען שלממשל עשויות להיות בעיות עם ההצעה (לכרוך הסיוע לישראל עם סיוע החירום).

3. בשיחה עם מקור במועצה (שהשתף במפגש) ציין כי ההצעה לעיל מעוררת שתי בעיות אחת ספציפית והשניה פוליטית. הבעיה הספציפית היא שבכונתם (בהמשך להבנה שהושגה סביב להסכם התקציבי) להגביל את בקשתם לכיסוי הוצאת הבטחון בגין מבצע "סופת המדבר" בלבד. אינם מעוניינים שהבקשה תהפוך כלשונו ל"עץ חג מולד". בעייתם הפוליטית היא שהרעיון לסיוע חירום לישראל יזכה ככל הנראה לאהדה בקרב הדמוקרטים שינסו לנצל ההזדמנות לצרף בקשות תקציביות נוספות. לכך הממשל מתנגד.

4. העריך כי יבחנו דרכים אחרות לסייע לנו. הצעה אחת היא לעודד מדינות אחרות לסייע לישראל. ציין בהקשר זה כי בשיחה שקיים הנשיא עם הקנצלר קוהל (ערב ביקור שה'ח גנשר בישראל) העלה עימו את נושא הסיוע לישראל. לדבריו ינסו לעודד מדינות נוספות ללכת בדרכה של גרמניה.

5. לסיכום איש שיחי חזר מס' פעמים על כך שהנשיא מודע לבעיתנו וינסה כמיטב יכולתו לסייע.

6. הערה: כיצד בכוונתו לעשות זאת לאור האילוצים הפנימיים שצויינו לעיל? תשובה חלקית ניתן למצוא בכונה לגייס מדינות מערביות לסייע. ע"י כך מקווה הממשל להקטין הנטל התקציבי שיוטל עליו במידה והסיוע המערבי לא יספיק לכיסוי בקשת ישראל.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב'

סססס

2/4

7



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
PHILADELPHIA

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
פילדלפיה

1/4

DATE 1/2/91

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TO: רסקר מוסר, מ"ר

FROM: סילבסטר

NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE 4

SUBJECT:

שינוי אק נר מסמך 3-

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אל:המשרד,

מ-:פילדלפיה,נר:3,תא:010291,זח:1500:ח:ט,סג:בל,

בבב

אל:הסברה, מצפ"א, מע"ת

זע:הסברה וושינגטון

סאג:א, ארנן - פילדלפיה

הדיון:עזכר - 1.2.91

א.תקשורת

1.כותרות היום עוסקות בפרנות הקרע.

בעמוד הפנימי של ה- PHILA. INFO (1.2) תחת הכותרת:

"ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS TRADE SALVOS NEAR BORDER"

כתבתו של טרטר מרדד פרושלים על שיגור הקטיושות מלבנון ותגובת ישראל, ופושט אבחנה בין תגובתנו בצפון לאי תגובתנו על טחפת טרטר הסקאד. השקט בשטחים לעומת זאת הושג כתוצאה מהעוצר.

2.פרודי רובין PHILA. INFO (1.2) בעמוד סאמרי המערכת כותבת תחת

הכותרת: "A PALESTINIAN IS ARRESTED AND THE HOPE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IS DIMMER"

מעצרו של נוסעיה עורר תפילה בין חבריו שתנועת השלום בישראל, כמו במשה"ח האמ"י, איך יכול היה לאסוף מידע סודי עיני בהיותו תחת עוצר בירושלים, ואם הואשמות כנגדו כאלה כבדות מדוע לא הובא למשפט ועוד, למרות שהפליסטינים בשטחים חונגים על כל נפילת סקאד בת"א, מנהיגים ישראלים ופסידים אמריקאים כבר זנים בפתרון בעתיד לבעיית השטחים וחושבים על יוזמת שלום חדשה לאחר סיום המלחמה במפרץ. מאחר ראש"ף אבד מעמדו בשל חמיכתו בסדאם, מאמינים רבים כי גברו סיכויי ההזדברות עם מנהיגים פלסטינאים בשטחים, אך קשה יהיה למצוא מנהיגים שתזנים יותר מסרי נוסעיה בפרט כשמסתמנת עליות הגורמים הקיצוניים המוסלמים.

3.בכתבה אחרת ב- PHILA. INFO (1.2) ראיונות עם "הכוכבים" רובין מהט

טופול וג'וני מייסון שחזרו מביקור בארץ.

4. הקונכ"ל המראיון בהריסבורג (1/2) לרשת הדייו הפופולרית ביותר באיזור KYW, לרשת הטלוויזיה ABC ולעמון המקומי "פטריוט".

פעילות בערבובות

1. הקונסול נפגשה (31/1) עם מנהיגי ארגוני סטודנטים יהודים שהמפוסים (8) ברחבי פילדלפיה. הוקטת ועדה משותפת לתאום פעילות לכל המפוסים אם כי לא ניתן יהיה לקיים ארוע אחד עבור כל המפוסים. (דווח בנפרד להסברה/אקדמאים).
2. הקונכ"ל נפגש (ארוחת בוקר) עם ראשי הקהילה והתורמים הגדולים של הפדוציה של האריסבורג. סקר המצב המדיני והערכת מצב לנוכח המשבר במפרץ.

מסיבה והנצחה

1. בפגישת (2/1) הקונכ"ל עם מושל פנסילבניה רוברט קויסי. העובר המושל מכתב תמיכה מטעמו לרה"מ שמיר. רצ"ב.
- העתק המכתב העבר ל-12 נציגי תקשורת במא הכתבים שליד בית המושל בהאריסבורג.

בברכה
אסירה ארנון

גגגג

4/4



COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
HARRISBURG

THE GOVERNOR

February 1, 1991

Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister
State of Israel

Dear Prime Minister Shamir:

The families of Pennsylvania have watched in horror the despicable acts of terrorism launched by Saddam Hussein against the innocent people of Israel.

We recognize, as does the entire world, the enormous restraint the State of Israel has exercised by not retaliating immediately in response to Iraq's aggression. Even with a moral right and a respected ability to defend itself, Israel has given the international coalition opportunity to defeat the Iraqi war machine and bring peace and security to all nations of the Middle East.

Pennsylvanians pray for a swift and just end to the terror and tyranny imposed upon all innocent lives.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert P. Casey".

Robert P. Casey
Governor