



מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה
 תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית.

סימול מקורי: 4 תקופת החומר: 6/1990-5/1990
 מזהה פיזי: א - 2 / 5023 14/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק
א - 2 / 5023
 מזהה פיזי: 43.4/13 - 789 מס פריט: 2169108
 מזהה לוגי: 02-111-02-05-05 כתובת: 14/11/2012

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.4
מיכל מס': 5023/10
תאריך התעודה: 10/6/1990
שם מחבר התעודה: אפק 313
סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):
תיק מס': 2
שם הנמען: _____

- מכתב
- מברק
- תזכיר או מיזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.



23

official text

06/12/90

QUAYLE URGES SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE (Text: Vice President's AIPAC speech 6/11/90)

Washington -- Pledging continued U.S. support of Israel in areas of strategic cooperation, peace, and human rights, Vice President Dan Quayle June 11 urged the new Israeli government to "give its full support to a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue."

"It is just over a year since the Israeli government produced its four-part plan for peace. We encouraged this plan, and we have worked hard to make it a success," Quayle told the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in Washington.

"Israel now may have a chance, for the first time in 23 years to gain a Palestinian partner for peace. We shouldn't let this opportunity slip away," the Vice President stressed.

Quayle said the United States and Israel are in fundamental agreement that there be no imposed peace settlement in the Middle East, that Arab states demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation and peace with Israel, and that there be direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

"We agree that a solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," Quayle said. "But let me say again that the U.S. does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Following is the unofficial text of Quayle's as-delivered remarks*

(BEGIN TEXT)

As all of you know, we've just concluded a recent U.S.-Soviet summit, and now we're looking forward to the NATO summit in July.



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

Much is being made today of the amazing times in which we live. Some have compared our era to the end of World War I -- the war to end all wars. Others have gone further back in history to the year of 1848 -- "the springtime of nations" -- when democratic revolutions swept across Europe.

And I am struck by the comparison between the events happening today and the events in the Middle East after the Six-day War of 1967. The Six-day War began on Monday, June 5th and ended on Saturday, June 10th. On June 11th -- that is, exactly 23 years ago today -- Israelis savored the thrill of victory. And I think it's fair to say that not only Israelis but the entire Jewish people were seized by a justifiable exhilaration on June 11, 1967, and even non-Jews like myself rejoiced. And why not? After all, the attempt to destroy the State of Israel had failed. Jerusalem was united, its holy places open to all and Jews prayed before the Western Wall for the first time in 19 years.

In June of 1967, some Israelis believed that the future would be uniformly sunny and bright, and many believed that the suffering associated with the Jewish history had perhaps come to an end.

I think the parallels of today's situation are striking. In the aftermath of what President Bush has called "the revolutionary year of 1989," it is the West that is seized with the justifiable exhilaration.

Now scholars speculate about the "end of history" and the universal triumph of freedom and democracy. And some Americans are even declaring that having won the Cold War, it's time for us to bring the troops home, disengage from the world and enjoy the fruits of victory.

But, unfortunately, Israel's great victory in 1967 did not bring peace. Instead of the approaches to discuss peace that Israel confidently expected, Israel got the three no's from Khartoum* no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Then came the terrorism and hijackings, the war of attrition with Egypt along the banks of the Suez Canal, the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon, the increasingly expensive arms race, and more recently, the Intifada.

There were also some hopeful developments* the peace treaty with Egypt, signs that some elements in the Arab world have been coming to terms with Israel's existence, increased Soviet emigration, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with many of the nations that had broken them off after 1967.

Clearly, history did not end for Israel in 1967. And neither, I dare say, will it come to an end for the United States, despite the remarkable victories of our values and our ideals that are winning today.

Let us all bear in mind that the future of the Soviet Union is unclear, that regional conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere continue to fester, and that chemical, nuclear, biological and ballistic missile proliferation pose a real threat, not only to our allies, but also to us.

Above all, let's keep in mind that we have been surprised this past century by the rise of communism, the rise of Nazism, and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism, and I am sure that history has a few more surprises in store for us in the decades to come.

What lessons should Israel and the United States draw from these events?

I believe the single most important lesson to be learned is the need for a strong America and a strong Israel. History is not over. The world continues to be a dangerous place. And national security must remain of paramount concern to both of our governments.

It seems to me that of all the people in the world, Israelis best understand the importance of a strong national defense. But however strong both the United States and Israel are alone, we are even stronger together.

My friends, make no mistake about it. The alliance between the United States and Israel is strong and it needs to remain strong.

Everyone is familiar with the assistance the United States has provided Israel over the years. But fewer realize how a strong Israel has benefited the United States.

The benefits of our alliance with Israel have been significant. Israel has been and remains a bulwark against the forces of radicalism, instability and terror. Israel has also shared captured Soviet weapons and technology with the United States. Most important perhaps, Israeli victories have discredited the war option in the Middle East and have contributed to a growing recognition that the peace option is the only option for the Middle East.

But what of the future? What is the future agenda between the United States and Israel?

I believe that precisely because we live in times of uncertainty and rapid change a strong American-Israeli relationship will be more important than ever.

First of all, we need to continue our cooperation on strategic issues.

Let me assure you that President Bush fully appreciates the strategic importance of our close ties with Israel. During his administration U.S. military and economic assistance to Israel has been maintained despite the budgetary pressures we face. The U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation continues to progress.

When I was in the Senate, the Mayor mentioned, I sponsored legislation designed to advance strategic defenses with our allies. And I was impressed then, as I am now, with how quickly Israel seized this opportunity. And I am pleased by the progress we have made in U.S.-Israeli cooperation in SDI.

But even as Israel and the United States broaden the scope of our strategic cooperation, we must never lose sight of the reason behind this cooperation. And that reason can be summarized in one word* peace. Peace is what the Israeli people yearn for. Peace is what the American people yearn for. And peace is what our close relationship

will one day achieve.

Naturally, the road to peace can sometimes be a bit bumpy. The U.S. and Israel don't always see eye-to-eye on how best to achieve peace. And quite frankly, I find these occasions of disagreement painful. But the fundamental news is good. When all is said and done, the fact remains that the two allies -- the United States and Israel -- agree on many of the fundamentals of peace in the Middle East'

-- The U.S. and Israel agree that there will be no imposed settlement in the Middle East.

-- The U.S. and Israel agree that Arab states must follow Egypt's example and demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation and peace with Israel.

-- The U.S. and Israel both favor direct talks between Israel and Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

-- As noted in the Camp David treaties, we agree that a solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, but let me say again that the U.S. does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state.

-- And whatever our differences on Jerusalem, the U.S. and Israel agree that Jerusalem must remain united and open to people of all faiths -- and that there will be no return to the unacceptable pre-1967 situation.

It's just over a year since the Israeli government produced its four-part plan for peace. We encourage this plan and we have worked hard to make it a success.

We hope that the new Israeli government will give its full support to a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. And we intend to work with that government to move forward in the peace process. Israel may have a chance for the first time in 23 years to give a Palestinian partner a chance for peace. We shouldn't let this opportunity slip away.

In addition to fostering strategic cooperation and helping to promote peace, the U.S.-Israeli alliance has another goal, the promotion of human rights. In particular, both nations have been fully committed to the human rights struggle of Soviet Jewry.

For years, Jews in the Soviet Union have struggled to enjoy basic human rights, including the right to emigrate. Finally, the Soviet Union has acknowledged that right. But proclaiming the right to emigrate is not enough. Jews and others need the opportunity to exercise that right.

The government of the United States has made its views very clear. President Bush has called on the Soviet Union to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, and to permit direct flights to Israel. We have made it clear to Arab states and others that we deplore any campaign to block Israel's legitimate right to absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants.

The government of the United States views the immigration of Soviet Jewry to Israel as a basic human rights issue and we consider the growing exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union nothing less than a dream come true.

I don't mind telling you that when I have contacted Soviet authorities in the past about this or that refusenik, both as senator or as vice president, I sometimes wondered whether it would have any effect, whether we would ever see Soviet Jews free to enjoy their inalienable rights. But when I now meet Israelis like Natan Sharansky and Vladimir Raiz, I know that our efforts did make a difference. We can be proud of those efforts.

As you know, the U.S. government does not agree with Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories. At the same time, however, the United States strongly rejects any threat to postpone issuing exit permits to Soviet Jews until Israel changes its policy. The right to emigrate is not some privilege that a government can grant or withhold as it pleases. Rather, it is a basic human right that must be respected. And we are pleased that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has now assured Secretary Baker that the Soviet Union's liberalized emigration policy will continue and will be codified in a new law.

Another area of close American-Israeli cooperation is the struggle against terrorism. Over the years, American and Israel citizens have been the major victims of international terrorism. We have suffered together, and we have worked together, and we will continue to work together until the menace of terrorism is finally eradicated.

To be sure, we've had our differences on this issue. One area of particular concern to many of you has been the U.S. dialogue with the PLO. As you know, this dialogue was begun by the Reagan administration in December 1988, after the PLO changed its policies and adhered to our conditions for such a dialogue* recognition of Israel's right to exist, renunciation of terrorism, and acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Bush administration has continued this dialogue. We have done so because we believe in the absence of such a dialogue, Palestinians from the occupied territories would be less likely to participate in the peace process. But we have never pressed Israel to negotiate -- to negotiate with the PLO. We have never sought to bring the PLO into the peace process through the back door. We do not support the establishment of a Palestinian state, and we have continued to thwart the PLO's efforts to advance its claim to statehood in international organizations.

Of course, our dialogue with the PLO has rested on a fundamental premise, that the PLO will adhere to the commitments it made last December. But on May 30th, the Palestine Liberation Front, a group affiliated with the PLO, sought to carry out a horrifying terrorist attack on the beaches of Tel Aviv. We have condemned this attack in the strongest terms possible. We take terrorism and this attack very seriously.

As President Bush said on Friday, our dialogue is predicated on a renunciation of terror. President Bush will make a decision on that dialogue soon, and his decision will be guided by our determination to promote peace and to counter terrorism. And President Bush will make the right decision.

There is yet another item on the agenda of the American-Israeli alliance, our campaign to restore the moral integrity of the United Nations. In November 1975, the United Nations' integrity was severely compromised when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. When the General Assembly of the United Nations passed this infamous resolution the U.S. made it clear that we would never accept it.

Last December I publicly called on the Soviet Union to work with us to repeal it. And this morning I want to renew my call. This infamous resolution should be and will be repealed. And we will work to make this happen.

You know, long before this infamous resolution, some people, even sympathetic people, thought that Zionism was an impossible dream. But the people of Israel thought otherwise, and the people of America thought otherwise as well. Working together we transformed the dream of Zion into a reality. And working together, we will realize our other dreams as well.

So let us continue our struggle side-by-side until the dream we both share -- the dream of an Israel that is safe, secure and at peace -- comes to pass at last. And let us remember the words of the founder of modern Zionism, the great Theodore Herzl. "If you will it," Herzl said, "it is no legend."

Having been to Israel twice, I am always impressed by the determination of the people of Israel. In my first trip in a helicopter it was only a matter of minutes that we went from the Golan Heights to the Negev Desert. And standing in the hills outside of Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, you could see the whole country of Israel spread out before you. Ladies and gentlemen, our strategic ally, Israel, will survive and we will work to bring peace to that country. Thank you very much, and God bless you.
(END TEXT)

דחיפות: בתנל לבנקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קרי: 1
סוג: בלמים	טופס פרוק 2/1	כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור: 11.6.90		אל: מצפ"א.
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע:
1125		פאת: קיסור לקונגרס.

ועידת איפ"ק

להלן עיקרי דבריו של טל הנשיא קוויל בפני באי ועידת איפ"ק היום (10.6) לפניה"צ: -

- היום לפני 23 שנים הסתיימה מלחמת 6 הימים אולם לא הביאה לשלום. מנה שורת ההתפתחות מאז. התייחס למירוץ החימוש במזה"ת לרבות נשק כימי, והאיום לא רק על בנות בריתה של ארה"ב אלא גם ארה"ב.
- הלקח שעל ישראל וארה"ב להפיק: ישראל וארה"ב חזקות ביחד. הברית בין שתי המדינות איתנה ועליה להישאר כזו.
- כולם מדברים על סיוע ארה"ב לישראל אולם שווים לציין: *How Israel benefited the U.S.* מנה שורת תרומות וסיכס: נצחונות ישראל במלחמותיה הפחיתו אופציות המלחמה במזה"ת.
- האג'נדה בעתיד בין שתי המדינות: המשך היחסים ההדוקים. הנשיא בוש מעריך מאד החשיבות האסטרטגית של הקשרים ההדוקים.
- סיוע לישראל למרות הקיצוצים, המשך שתי"פ אט"י.
- המשותף לשתי המדינות בראיית השלום:
 - (1) מסכימות שלא יהיה הסדר כפוי במזה"ת.
 - (2) על מדינות ערב ללכת בעקבות מצרים ולחתום על שלום עם ישראל.
 - (3) מונום ישיר.
 - (4) הכרה בזכויות הלגיטימיות של הפלסטינים כפי שמצויין בק"ד.
 - (5) ארה"ב איננה תומכת בהקמת מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית.
 - (6) ירושלים - יהיו חילוקי דעות ביננו אשר יהיו, ירושלים חייבת להשאךר מאוחדת ופתוחה לכל הדתות ואין חזרה לגבולות פרה - 67.
- יוזמת רה"מ שמיר - תמכנו ביוזמה והשקענו מאמצים. הביע תקווה שהממשלה החדשה תתמוך אף היא בתכנית ובדיאלוג הפלסטיני - ישראלי.

תפוצה:

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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 2
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תאריך וזמן העבור:	טופס פרוק 2/2	אל:
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הפסרד:		
1175		פאת:

- לברית בין שתי המדינות מטרה נוספת: ז"א -

basic H.R. issue

בנוגע ליהודי בריה"מ - עליית יהודי בריה"מ

הובהר לסובייטים כי ארה"ב תתנגד למערכה הערבית לבלום העליה לישראל.

"כפי שאתם יודעים הממשל אינו מסכים למדיניות ההתנחלונית של ישראל מאידך הממשל מתנגד לכל עיכוב במתן ריזות יציאה".

- המאבק נגד טרור - הייבנ כמוכס קרובנות סבלנג ננאבקנו יחד. היו חילוקי דעות ביננו והבולט ביניהם הוא הדיאלוג עם אש"פ. המשכנו בדיאלוג בו החל הנשיא ריגן אולם מעולם לא לחצנו על ישראל לשאת ולתת עם אש"פ ולא נביא את אש"פ בדלת האחורית, איננו תומכים בהקמת מדינה פלסטינית ונמשיך להתנגד לירואמת אש"פ בארבי"ל.


- ארה"ב מגנה בכל לשון של חומרה, נסיון הפיגוע מ- 30/5 בחנטי ישראל, הנשיא בוש יחליט בהקדם ויונחה ע"י רצוננו לקדם השלום, ולהילחם בטרור.

"president Bush will make the right decision"

- "ציונות גזענות" - חזר שוב על קריאתו לבטל ההחלטה.

standing ovation - הנאום היה חם ואוהד וקוריל זכה למחיאות כפיים סוערות נל-

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר



** יוצא

סודי

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חוזם: 6,9134
 אלה: 70/ממש, 370/אביב, 634/מנמת, 448/11, 162
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 110690, חז: 1641, דח: ב, סג: 10
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75915

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון/השגריר בלבד

אתמול העביר מרק פאריס את המסמך דלהלן לסגן שה'ח:
 PRESIDENT BUSH MADE CLEAR ON SUNDAY, JUNE 3, THAT WE
 CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF DISPATCHING AN ENVOY OF
 THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION IN THE
 OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.

IN THIS CONNECTION THE SYG, WHO RECENTLY VISITED
 WASHINGTON, INDICATED TO US THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
 SEND FRANCIS BLANCHARD AND JEAN-CLAUDE AIME AS HIS
 EMISSARIES TO THE REGION TO LOOK INTO THE SITUATION AND
 REPORT BACK TO HIM. WE UNDERSTAND THE SYG WOULD NOT
 SEEK A REQUEST OR ENDORSEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SYG SAID HE BELIEVED YOUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT AGREE TO
 SUCH A MISSION ON THE BASIS OF INDICATIONS HE HAD WHILE
 AGO IN GENEVA MAY 25-26.

WE THINK THIS IS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, AND URGE YOU
 TO AGREE TO RECEIVE THE SYG'S MISSION AS A ONE-VISIT
 MISSION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A REPORT BACK ONLY TO THE
 SECRETARY GENERAL. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE
 DISPATCH OF THE SYG EMISSARIES WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT
 SECURITY COUNCIL REQUEST OR ENDORSEMENT, AND WITHOUT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

DEBATE OR RESOLUTION.

THIS SORT OF MISSION IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. POLICY AND
 HAS PRECEDENTS FOR ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE.

THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE PROMPT ISRAELI
 ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSED PROCEDURE AND MISSION, SO
 THAT WE MAY AVOID OTHER U.N. ACTION ON THE MATTER AND
 FURTHER PUBLIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

WE WOULD REPORT YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE SYG, ALONG WITH
 YOUR ASSURANCE THAT THE MISSION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN NOW,
 AND THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A DEBATE OVER THE MANDATE OF
 THE SYG'S MISSION.

(IF ASKED ABOUT THE MANDATE): THE SYG DID NOT INDICATE

THE MANDATE, BUT IT IS OUR ASSUMPTION THAT HE DOES NOT
 WANT PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS OVER A MISSION TO CHECK ON
 THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND REPORT BACK TO HIM.

לשכת מנכ"ל

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, (אמן), בנצור,
 מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* תאריך : 09.06.90 *

** נכנס

סודי ביותר

* דף 1 מתוך 6 *

* עותק 1 מתוך 8 *

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* חוזם: 6,7445 *

* למ: המשרד

* יעדים: רהמש/324, מצב/741

* מ-: נוש, נר: 2068, תא: 080690, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: ס

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* סודי ביותר / ח.ר.ב / בהול לבוקר

* אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

* יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

* דע: לשכת רוה"מ

* מאח: השגרירות, וושינגטון

* שיחת השגריר - סקורופט (יועץ הנשיא לבטחון לאומי) (8.6).

* 1. בשיחה (שהתקיימה לבקשת השגריר) השתתפו מצידם האס ועוזרו
* וולטש. מצידנו הציר והח"מ.

* 2. להלן סיכום השיחה (לפי נושאים):

* א. פסגת בוש - גורבצ'וב: הגירה יהודית ותהליך השלום:

* 1. לבקשת השגריר סיכם סקורופט הדיון שקיימו שני הנשיאים .
* התקיים דיון ער (שנשא אופי כללי) על המצב במזרח , הסכסוך
* הישראלי ועל עראפת.

* 2. גורבצ'וב סיפר על ביקורי מובארק, חושב שנשיא מצרים עובד
* קשה למציאת פתרון וכי יש לתמוך בו.

* 3. גורבצ'וב URGED הנשיא לתמוך בעראפת שמצבו הולך ונעשה קשה
* יותר , זאת לאחר שמאז התבטאותו בדצמ' 88 דבר לא קרה. לדברי

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2015

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2 דף * מתוך 6 *
עותק 1 * מתוך 8 *

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גורבצ'וב נמצא עראפת בסכנה של אבדן שליטה, דבר שיקשה על כולם לקדם התהליך.
4. בתגובה לדברי גורבצ'וב, העלה בוש את נסיון הפגוע והבעיות שהדבר מעורר.
5. בעקבות מילות הברכה של בוש לגורבצ'וב בסוגיית ההגירה ונבקשתו לאפשר ביצוע טיסות ישירות תאר גורבצ'וב הלחץ המופעל עליו מצד העולם הערבי לגבי קליטת העולים בשטחים.
6. סקורופט הבהיר כי גורבצ'וב לא השמיע בדיון האיום אותו השמיע במסיבת העיתונאים (לגבי בחינה מחודשת של מתן אשרות על ארבע מדינות ההתחלו של ישראל). גורבצ'וב אמר שזו (הלחץ הערבי ש.ש.) 'בעיה אמיתית'.
מדבריו כך סקורופט ניתן היה להבין שהוא מציע (מאחר וגם לארה"ב יש בעיה דומה) לעבוד במשותף. הנשיא דחה את ההצעה ('PUSHED IT ASIDE').
7. השגריר חזר על דאגתו מדברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים, התייחס להיעדר תגובתו של הנשיא לדברי גורבצ'וב. ציין תגובתו (מאוחר יותר) של המזכיר.
8. סקורופט בתגובה ציין שמופתע מכך שהיתה צפיה שהנשיא יגיב במהלך מסיבת העיתונאים על דברי גורבצ'וב. לדבריו העיתוי לא התאים. האס (באותו קשר) סבור שאנו 'OVER REACTED' לדברי גורבצ'וב. הופתעו לביקורת שהשמיעו מס' מנהיגים יהודיים על היעדר תגובה מצד הנשיא.
9. סקורופט טען שנושא ההגירה זוכה כיום לעדיפות גבוהה. אנו עדים כיום להיקף הגירה אותו לא ניתן היה לחזות לפני זמן לא רב. תאר את היקף היציאה כנס. מקווה שהיציאה תמשך. כדי שלא לסכן את המשך ההגירה סבור שלא כדאי להיות נוקשה לגבי השאלה היכן יתיישבו העולים. הקשה: 'האם זה עולה לכם יותר מדי לומר שהעולים לא ייושבו בשטחים?'. סבור שהנושא יצור בעיה לא רק עם ברה"מ. אלא גם עם מובארק.
*10. השגריר בתגובה ציין כי מס' העולים שהתיישבו בשטחים עד היום מגיע לכדי מחצית האחוז (מסה"כ העולים) הדגיש כי ממ' ישראל אינה מכוונת העולים ואינה מעניקה להם הטבות שונות

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- *מאלו שמוענקות לישראלים העוברים להתגורר בצפון ובנגב.*
האס ציין - שחלק על דברי השגריר טען כי מהמידע שבידם ההטבות שמוענקות לישראלים המתיישבים בשטחים שונות מאלו שמוענקות למתיישבים בנגב ובצפון.
11. סקורופט (שהדגיש שדבריו בנושא העליה אינם פורמליים) סבור שהנושא רגיש. הוסיף כי מכיוון שיש מספיק בעיות מחוזה 'TO EASE' הבעיה (יישוב העולים בשטחים) תקל. לדבריו החשש הינו לגבי הצפוי בעתיד על רקע קליטתם הצפויה של מספרים גדולים של עולים.
12. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין סקורופט כי דברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים הובהרו ע"י שווארדנזה בפגישתו עם המזכיר בקופנהאגן.
13. בהקשר לתהליך השלום, גורבצ'וב הביע תמיכתו במדיניות ארה"ב. הוסיף כי מאחר ואין תנועה, יש מקום לבדוק 'וריאנטים' שונים לכינוס ועידה בינל כדי להזיז את התהליך. בוש בתגובה חזר על עמדתם בנושא הועידה ('יכול להיות שיבוא זמן מתאים אך לא כעת'). בוש הוסיף כי מקווה שבעקבות הקמת ממשלה, ניתן יהיה להמשיך בתהליך ממקום שבו הפסיקו. ציין שהיו קרובים למפגש שרי חוץ ולקיום הדיאלוג הישראלי-פלסטיני. לדבריו זו הדרך המבטיחה תוצאה.
1. דיאלוג ארה"ב-אשף:
1. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר לגבי עמדת הממשלת בעקבות נסיון הפיגוע, הדגיש סקורופט את חומרת המעשה. בודקים המידע שקיבלו מאיתנו. משוחחים עם תוניס כדי לקבל תגובתם. זקוקים למספר ימים נוספים בטרם יקבלו החלטה. חזר וציין שמתייחסים לאירוע ברצינות.
2. השגריר הבהיר כי נסיון הפיגוע האחרון מהווה הוכחה חותכת (נוספת) למי שהיה זקוק להוכחה בדבר מעורבות אשף בטרור לאי עמידה בהבטחות שניתנו בדצמבר 88. נסיון הפיגוע הינו עדות שלא ניתן להכחישה.
*3. סקורופט חזר על כך שלוקחים המקרה ברצינות. ציין שהתגובה הכללית (האשפית ש.ש.) היא DISHEARTENING.

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- *ג. בעקבות פסגת בגדאד:*
1. השגריר הביע דאגתו מתוצאות הפסגה.
2. סקורופט הגיב שאין לראות בתוצאות ניצחון למתינות.
3. השגריר התייחס להתבטאויות שהשמיע צאדס חוסיין בזמן האחרון. הבהיר דאגתו לנוכח המאמץ העיראקי לפיתוח כושר לא קונבנציונלי. השגריר הזכיר הרמיון שנתן צאדס חוסיין שבו סיפר על ההנחיות שנתן לקצינים בשטח כיצד לנהוג במידה וישראל תתקיף מדינות ערב. השגריר המליץ שהממשל יתמודד עם האיום העיראקי בדרך שתשכנע ישראל ומדינות ערב המתונות שארה"ב מתייחסת לנושא ברצינות.
4. סקורופט בתגובה הבהיר כי לוקחים ברצינות האיום. לדבריו עיראק היא מקרה קשה. חושבים שמדיניותם נכונה. מנסים להשפיע על המשטר באורח ישיר ועקיף. לדבריו הנשיא שוחח על כך עם עיראק ועם מובארק. לדברי סקורופט בשלב זה לא ניתן להעריך האם מדיניותם כלפי עיראק תצליח. לדבריו הבהירו לעיראק שמתייחסים ברצינות להתבטאויותיו. חזר והבהיר שהם: SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM. סקורופט הוסיף כי מקווים שאנו לא ניטול העניינים לידינו.
5. סקורופט ציין שהאזור מצוי כיום במצב קשה קל להיות DISCOURAGED. ארה"ב מנסה לפלס דרכה. צריך לשמור על 'ראש קר' ולעבוד עם המצב הקיים. סבור שהמשך התהליך המדיני יסייע לשנות האקלים ולהבטיח תקווה שכרגע אינה בנמצא.
6. PLO ASIDE סקורופט הוסיף שמצפים שהממשלה שתקום תמשיך בתהליך מהנקודה שבה הוא הופסק ושהממשלה לא תצהיר על כוונתה להתחיל התהליך מחדש. אם זה יקרה 'זאת תהיה התפתחות שלילית'. אם התהליך WILL EVAPORATE המצב יהיה קשה לגביהם ולגבינו. יהיה לחץ מכל הכיוונים ללכת לוועידה בינלאומית.
7. השגריר בתגובה הבהיר שרה"מ הביע לא אחת כוונתו להמשיך בתהליך לאחר הקמת הממשלה. הוסיף כי שהח שיהיה ככל הנראה אדם חדש יקיים קרוב לודאי ביקור הכרות.
*8. סקורופט העריך שאחת הסיבות למגמת הדיסאינטגרציה בה

1954

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country. It is a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the economic and social conditions of the country at the present time. The author has done a very thorough job of collecting and analyzing the available data, and his conclusions are well supported by the facts.

2. The second part of the report deals with the specific measures which have been taken to improve the economic and social conditions of the country. These measures are very interesting and show a great deal of initiative and enterprise on the part of the government. It is to be hoped that these measures will be successful in bringing about the desired results.

3. The third part of the report deals with the future prospects of the country. The author is optimistic about the future of the country, and believes that the measures which have been taken will lead to a steady and rapid growth of the economy and a corresponding improvement in the standard of living of the people.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the international situation. The author is of the opinion that the international situation is becoming more and more favorable to the country, and that the country is well placed to take advantage of these favorable conditions.

1955

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country. It is a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the economic and social conditions of the country at the present time. The author has done a very thorough job of collecting and analyzing the available data, and his conclusions are well supported by the facts.

2. The second part of the report deals with the specific measures which have been taken to improve the economic and social conditions of the country. These measures are very interesting and show a great deal of initiative and enterprise on the part of the government. It is to be hoped that these measures will be successful in bringing about the desired results.

3. The third part of the report deals with the future prospects of the country. The author is optimistic about the future of the country, and believes that the measures which have been taken will lead to a steady and rapid growth of the economy and a corresponding improvement in the standard of living of the people.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the international situation. The author is of the opinion that the international situation is becoming more and more favorable to the country, and that the country is well placed to take advantage of these favorable conditions.

1956

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country. It is a very interesting and comprehensive survey of the economic and social conditions of the country at the present time. The author has done a very thorough job of collecting and analyzing the available data, and his conclusions are well supported by the facts.

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3. The third part of the report deals with the future prospects of the country. The author is optimistic about the future of the country, and believes that the measures which have been taken will lead to a steady and rapid growth of the economy and a corresponding improvement in the standard of living of the people.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the international situation. The author is of the opinion that the international situation is becoming more and more favorable to the country, and that the country is well placed to take advantage of these favorable conditions.

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* עותק 1 מתוך 8 *

* נתון האזור היא תוצאה של היאוש מכך שדבר לא קורה. אם ניתן
* יהיה להראות שהדברים זזים ושיש סיכוי אזי ניתן יהיה להביא
* לשינוי.

* 9. בתשובה לשאלת הציר הביע סקוקרופט דאגתם מהמצב בירדן.
* מנסים לסייע למלך. נראה שיקבל סיוע כלכלי בעקבות פסגת בגדד.
* מדיניות המלך, טוען סקוקרופט אינה עדות לתהליכים השליליים
* העוברים על האזור ועל ירדן.

* 10. בתגובה להערת השגריר לגבי הסכנה שבהתקרבות חוסיין לצאדם
* חוסיין ציין סקוקרופט כי המדובר בתהליך שהחל בעשור האחרון
* בעקבות הסיוע אותו העניק המלך לעיראק ומלחמתה. כיום זקוק
* המלך נואשות לסיוע שעה שהמתונות אינן מסייעות לו באופן
* משמעותי.

* 11. האס הוסיף שחוסיין נקלע למצב של מגמות סותרות בעולם
* הערבי. ארהב תסייע לו ככל שתוכל להערכתו הרבה תלוי
* במדיניותו בנושא ההתנחלויות ותהליך השלום. התבטאויות על
* כך שירדן היא פלשטין אינן מסייעות למלך. סבור של ישראל צריך
* להיות אינטרס בהמשך קיומה ויציבתה של הממלכה ההאשמית.

* ד. שיחת סקוקרופט - מזכ"ל האו"ם

* 1. בעקבות א'צ (שערך הנשיא למזכ"ל האו"ם) נפגש עמו לשיחה.
* המזכ"ל מסר לו על כך שבסיום ההתייעצויות שמקיים בכוונתו לשגר
* משלחת (FINDING) (FACT). חושב שהוא ישגר את מלנשארד ואיימה.
* המזכ"ל סיפר ששוחח על כך עם נתניהו.

* 2. סקוקרופט הביע תקווה שנשתף פעולה עם המזכ"ל. סיפר כי זכו
* לקיטונות של ביקורת בעקבות הוותו שהטילו.

* ה. סיכום:

* 1. לקראת סיום חזר השגריר והביע הערכתו לפועולו של הנשיא
* בנושא הגירת יהודי ברה"מ. סקוקרופט הבטיח שיעביר הדברים
* לידיעת הנשיא.

* 2. סקוקרופט הדגיש כי הנשיא מסור וכן ביחסו לישראל.
* העימותים שהיו לא גרעו במאומה מיחסו החיובי.

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* 3. סקוקרופט העריך לסיים שהמז"ת נמצא בפרשת דרכים וכי ללא
* דיאלוג אנו עלולים לעמוד בפתחה של תקופה קשה. אף אחת
* מהאלטרנטיבות לתהליך השלום הנוכחי אינם מעשית. עם הקמת
* הממשלה יש להגביר המאמץ. הממשל יעבוד עם הממשלה החדשה. שמח
* שתקופת המעבר הסתיימה.

* שטיין

* ל

* תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

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
14. ...

15. ...

16. ...

17. ...

18. ...



נא לא להזיז
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7445: חוזם
אל: רהמ/324
מ: ווש, נר: 2068, תא: 080690, חז: 2000, מ: ב, סג: ס, סב,
בבב
סודי ביותר / ח.ר.ב. / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

יועץ מדיני לשה'ח

דע: לשכת רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות, רושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - סקורופט (יועץ הנשיא לבטחון לאומי) (8.6).

1. בשיחה (שהתקיימה לבקשת השגריר) השתתפו מצידם האס ועוזרו וולטס. מצידנו הציר והח'מ.

2. להלן סיכום השיחה (לפי נושאים):

א. פסגת בוש - גורבצ'וב: הגירה יהודית ותהליך השלום:

1. לבקשת השגריר סיכם סקורופט הדיון שקיימו שני הנשיאים . התקיים דיון ער (שנשא אופי כללי) על המצב במזה'ת , הסכסוך הישראלי ועל עראפת.

2. גורבצ'וב סיפר על ביקורי מובארק, חושב שנשיא מצרים עובד קשה למציאת פתרון וכי יש לתמוך בו.

3. גורבצ'וב URGED הנשיא לתמוך בעראפת שמצבו הולך ונעשה קשה יותר , זאת לאחר שמאז התבטאותו בדצמ' 88' דבר לא קרה. לדברי גורבצ'וב נמצא עראפת בסכנה של אבדן שליטה, דבר שיקשה על כולם לקדם התהליך.

4. בתגובה לדברי גורבצ'וב, העלה בוש את נסיון הפגוע והבעיות שהדבר מעורר.

5. בעקבות מילות הברכה של בוש לגורבצ'וב בסוגיית ההגירה ובקשתו לאפשר ביצוע טיסות תאר גורבצ'וב הלחץ המופעל עליו מצד העולם הערבי לגבי קליטת העולים בשטחים.

6. סקורופט הבהיר כי גורבצ'וב לא השמיע בדיון האיום אותו השמיע במסיבת העיתונאים (לגבי בחינה מחודשת של מתן אשרות על רקע מדיניות ההתנחלו של ישראל). גורבצ'וב אמר שזו (הלחץ הערבי ש.ש.) 'בעיה אמיתית'.

מדבריו כך סקורופט ניתן היה להבין שהוא מציע (מאחר וגם לארה'ב יש בעיה דומה) לעבוד במשותף. הנשיא דחה את ההצעה ('PUSHED IT ASIDE')

7. השגריר חזר על דאגתו מדברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים , התייחס להיעדר תגובתו של הנשיא לדברי גורבצ'וב. ציין תגובתו (מאוחר יותר) של המזכיר.

8. סקורופט בתגובה ציין שמופתע מכך שהיתה צפיה שהנשיא יגיב

במהלך מסיבת העיתונאים על דברי גורבצ'וב. לדבריו העיתוי לא התאים. האס (באותו קשר) סבור שאנו 'OVER REACTED' לדברי גורבצ'וב. הופתעו לביקורת שהשמיעו מס' מנהיגים יהודיים על היעדר תגובה מצד הנשיא.

9. סקורופט טען שנושא ההגירה זוכה כיום לעדיפות גבוהה. אנו עדים כיום להיקף הגירה אותו לא ניתן היה לחזות לפני זמן לא רב. תאר את היקף היציאה כנס. מקווה שהיציאה תמשך. כדי שלא לסכן את המשך ההגירה סבור שלא כדאי להיות נוקשה לגבי השאלה היכן יתיישבו העולים. הקשה: 'האם זה עולה לכם יותר מדי לומר שהעולים לא ייושבו בשטחים?' סבור שהנושא יצור בעיה לא רק עם ברה'מ. אלא גם עם מובארק.

10. השגריר בתגובה ציין כי מס' העולים שהתיישבו בשטחים עד היום מגיע לכדי מחצית האחוז (מסה'כ העוליים) הדגיש כי ממ' ישראל אינה מכוננת העולים ואינה מעניקה להם תכנות שונות מאלו שמוענקות לישראלים העוברים להתגורר בצפון ובנגב.

האס ציין - שחלק על דברי השגריר טען כי מהמידע שבידם ההטבות שמוענקות לישראלים המתיישבים בשטחים שונות מאלו שמוענקות למתיישבים בנגב ובצפון.

11. סקורופט (שהדגיש שדבריו בנושא העליה אינם פורמליים) סבור שהנושא רגיש. הוסיף כי מכיוון שיש מספיק בעיות מחוה 'TO EASE' (הבעיה) יישוב העולים בשטחים) תקול. לדבריו החשש הינו לגבי הצפוי בעתיד על רקע קליטתם הצפויה של מספרים גדולים של עולים.

12. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין סקורופט כי דברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים הובהרו ע'י שווארדנזה בפגישתו עם המזכיר בקופנהאגן.

13) בהקשר לתהליך השלום, גורבצ'וב הביע תמיכתו במדיניות ארהב. הוסיף כי מאחר ואין תנועה, יש מקום לבדוק 'וריאנטים' שונים לכינוס ועידה בינל כדי להזיז את התהליך. בוש בתגובה חזר על עמדתם בנושא הועידה ('יכול להיות שיבוא זמן מתאים אך לא כעת'). בוש הוסיף כי מקווה שבעקבות הקמת ממשלה, ניתן יהיה להמשיך בתהליך ממקום שבו הפסיקו. ציין שהיו קרובים למפגש שרי חוץ ולקיום הדיאלוג הישראלי-פלסטיני. לדבריו זו הדרך המבטיחה תוצאה.

ב. דיאלוג ארהב-אשף:

1) בתשובה לשאלת השגריר לגבי עמדת הממשלת בעקבות נסיון הפיגוע, הדגיש סקורופט את חומרת המעשה. בודקים המידע שקיבלו מאיתנו. משוחחים עם תוניס כדי לקבל תגובתם. זקוקים למספר ימים נוספים בטרם יקבלו החלטה. חזר וציין שמתייחסים לאירוע ברצינות.

2) השגריר הבהיר כי נסיון הפיגוע האחרון מהווה הוכחה חותכת (נוספת) למי שהיה זקוק להוכחה בדבר מעורבות אשף בטרור לאי עמידה בהבטחות שניתנו בדצמבר 88. נסיון הפיגוע הינו עדות שלא ניתן להכחשה.

3) סקורופט חזר על כך שלוקחים המקרה ברצינות. ציין שהתגובה הכללית (האשפית ש.ש.) היא DISHEARTENING.

ג. בעקבות פסגת בגדאד:

1) השגריר הביע דאגתו מתוצאות הפסגה.

2) סקורופט הגיב שאין לראות בתוצאות ניצחון למתינות.

3) השגריר התייחס להתבטאויות שהשמיע צאדם חוסיין בזמן האחרון. הבהיר דאגתו לנוכח המאמץ העיראקי לפיתוח כושר לא קונבנציונלי. השגריר הזכיר הראיון שנתן צאדם חוסיין שבו סיפר על ההנחיות שנתן לקצינים בשטח כיצד לנהוג במידה וישראל תתקיף מדינות ערב. השגריר המליץ שהממשל יתמודד עם האיום העיראקי בדרך שתשכנע ישראל ומדינות ערב המתונות שארהב מתייחסת לנושא ברצינות.

4) סקורופט בתגובה הבהיר כי לוקחים ברצינות האיום. לדבריו עיראק היא מקרה קשה. חושבים שמדיניותם נכונה. מנסים להשפיע על המשטר באורח ישיר ועקיף. לדבריו הנשיא שוחח על כך עם עיראק ועם מובארק. לדברי סקורופט בשלב זה לא ניתן להעריך האם מדיניותם כלפי עיראק תצליח. לדבריו הבהירו לעיראק שמתייחסים ברצינות להתבטאויו תיו. חזר והבהיר שהס: SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM להתבטאויו תיו. סקורופט הוסיף כי מקווים שאנו לא ניטול העניינים לידינו.

5) סקורופט ציין שהאזור מצוי כיום במצב קשה קל להיות DISCOURAGED. ארהב מנסה לפלס דרכה. צריך לשמור על 'ראש קר' ולעבוד עם המצב הקיים. סבור שהמשך התהליך המדיני יסייע לשנות האקלים ולהבטיח תקווה שכרגע אינה נמצא.

6) PLO ASIDE סקורופט הוסיף שמצפים שהממשלה שתקום תמשיך בתהליך המנקודה שבה הוא הופסק ושהממשלה לא תצהיר על כוונתה להתחיל התהליך מחדש. אם זה יקרה 'זאת תהיה התפתחות שלילית'. אם התהליך WILL EVAPORATE המצב יהיה קשה לגביהם ולגבינו. יהיה לחץ מכל הכיוונים ללכת לוועידה בינלאומית.

7. השגריר בתגובה הבהיר שרה'מ' הביע לא אחת כוונתו להמשיך בתהליך לאחר הקמת הממשלה. הוסיף כי שח שיהיה ככל הנראה אדם חדש יקיים קרוב לודא ביקור הכרות.

8. סקורופט העריך שאחת הסיבות למגמת הדיסאינטגרציה בה נתון האזור היא תוצאה של היאוש מכך שדבר לא קורה. אם ניתן יהיה להראות שהדברים זזים ושיש סיכוי אזי ניתן יהיה להביא לשינוי.

9. בתשובה לשאלת הציר הביע סקורופט דאגתם מהמצב בירדן. מנסים לסייע למלך. נראה שקיבל סיוע כלכלי בעקבות פסגת בגדד. מדיניות המלך, טוען סקורופט אינה עדות לתהליכים השליליים העוברים על האזור ועל ירדן.

10. בתגובה להערות השגריר לגבי הסכנה שבהתקרבות חוסיין לצאדם חוסיין ציין סקורופט כי המדובר בתהליך שהחל בעשור האחרון בעקבות הסיוע אותו העניק המלך לעיראק ומלחמתה. כיום זקוק המלך נואשות לסיוע שעה שהמתונות אינן מסמיעות לו באופן משמעותי.

11. האס הוסיף שחוסיין נקלע למצב של מגמות סותרות בעולם הערבי. ארהב תסייע לו ככל שתוכל להערכתו הרבה תלוי במדיניותנו בנושא ההתנחלויות ותהליך השלום. התבטאויות על כך שירדן היא פלסטין אינן מסייעות למלך. סבור שיש לראות צורך להיות אינטרס בהמשך קיומה ויציבותה של הממלכה ההאשמית.

ד. שיחת סקורופט - מזכ'ל האו'מ

1. בעקבות א'צ (ערך הנשיא למז'ל האו'מ) נפגש עמו לשיחה.

המזכ'ל מסר לו כי כן שבסיום ההתייעצויות שמקיים בכוונתו לשגר משלחת (FINDING) (FACT). חושב שהוא ישגר את מלנשארד ואיימה. המזכ'ל סיפר ששוחח על כך עם נתניהו.

2. סקורופט הביע תקווה שנשתף פעולה עם המזכ'ל. סיפר כי זכו לקיטונות של ביקורת בעקבות הווטו שהטילו.

ה. סיכום:

1. לקראת סיום חזר השגריר והביע הערכתו לפועולו של הנשיא בנושא הגירת יהודי ברה'מ. סקורופט הבטיח שיעביר הדברים לידיעת הנשיא.

2. סקורופט הדגיש כי הנשיא מסור וכן ביחסו לישראל. העימותים שהיו לא גרעו במאומה מיחסו החיובי.

3. סקורופט העריך לסיום שהמז'ת נמצא בפרשת דרכים וכי ללא דיאלוג אנו עלולים לעמוד בפתחה של תקופה קשה. אף אחת מהמלטרניטינג לתהליך השלום הנוכחי אינם מעשית. עם הקמת הממשלה יש להגביר המאמץ. הממשל יעבוד עם הממשלה החדשה. שמח שתקופת המעבר הסתיימה.

שטיין

תפוצה: רהמ, שחה, סשה, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

7445:חוזם

אל:רהמ/ש/324

מ:-ווש,נר,2068:תא:080690:חז:2000,דח:ב,סג:סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / ח.ר.ב / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ"א

יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: השגרירות, רושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - סקורופט (יועץ הנשיא לבטחון לאומי) (8.6).

1. בשיחה (שהתקיימה לבקשת השגריר) השתתפו מצידם האס ועוזרו וולטס. מצידנו הציר והח"מ.

2. להלן סיכום השיחה (לפי נושאים):

א. פסגת בוש - גורבצ'וב: הגירה יהודית ותהליך השלום:

1. לבקשת השגריר סיכם סקורופט הדיון שקיימו שני הנשיאים. התקיים דיון ער (שנשא אופי כללי) על המצב במזה"ת, הסכסוך הישראלי ועל עראפת.

2. גורבצ'וב סיפר על ביקורי מובארק, חושב שנשיא מצרים עובד קשה למציאת פתרון וכי יש לתמוך בו.

3. גורבצ'וב URGED הנשיא לתמוך בעראפת שמצבו הולך ונעשה קשה יותר, זאת לאחר שמאז התבטאותו בדצמ' 88' דבר לא קרה. לדברי גורבצ'וב נמצא עראפת בסכנה של אבדן שליטה, דבר שיקשה על כולם לקדם התהליך.

4. בתגובה לדברי גורבצ'וב, העלה בוש את נסיון הפגוע והבעיות שהדבר מעורר.

5. בעקבות מילות הברכה של בוש לגורבצ'וב בסוגיית ההגירה ובקשתו לאפשר ביצוע טיסות תאר גורבצ'וב הלחץ המופעל עליו מצד העולם הערבי לגבי קליטת העולים בשטחים.

6. סקורופט הבהיר כי גורבצ'וב לא השמיע בדיון האיום אותו השמיע במסיבת העיתונאים (לגבי בחינה מחודשת של מתן אשרות על רקע מדיניות ההתחילו של ישראל). גורבצ'וב אמר שזו (הלחץ הערבי ש.ש.) "בעיה אמיתית".

מדבריו כך סקורופט ניתן היה להבין שהוא מציע (מאחר וגם לארה"ב יש בעיה דומה) לעבוד במשותף. הנשיא דחה את ההצעה ('PUSHED IT ASIDE')

7. השגריר חזר על דאגתו מדברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים, התייחס להיעדר תגובתו של הנשיא לדברי גורבצ'וב. ציין תגובתו (מאוחר יותר) של המזכיר.

8. סקורופט בתגובה ציין שמופתע מכך שהיתה צפיה שהנשיא יגיב

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במהלך מסיבת העיתונאים על דברי גורבצ'וב. לדבריו העיתוי לא התאים. האס (באותו קשר) סבור שאנו 'OVER REACTED' לדברי גורבצ'וב. הופתעו לביקורת שהשמיעו מס' מנהיגים יהודיים על היעדר תגובה מצד הנשיא.

9. סקורופט טען שנושא ההגירה זוכה כיום לעדיפות גבוהה. אנו עדים כיום להיקף הגירה אותו לא ניתן היה לחזות לפני זמן לא רב. תאר את היקף היציאה כנס. מקווה שהיציאה תמשך. כדי שלא לסכן את המשך ההגירה סבור שלא כדאי להיות נוקשה לגבי השאלה היכן יתיישבו העולים. הקשה: "האם זה עולה לכם יותר מדי לומר שהעולים לא ייושבו בשטחים?". סבור שהנושא יצור בעיה לא רק עם ברה"מ. אלא גם עם מובארק.

10. השגריר בתגובה ציין כי מס' העולים שהתיישבו בשטחים עד היום מגיע לכדי מחצית האחוז (מסה"כ העולמי) הדגיש כי ממ' ישראל אינה מכוננת העולים ואינה מעניקה להם תטות שונות מאלו שמוענקות לישראלים העוברים להתגורר בצפון ובנגב.

האס ציין - שחלק על דברי השגריר טען כי מהמידע שבידם ההטבות שמוענקות לישראלים המתיישבים בשטחים שונות מאלו שמוענקות למתיישבים בנגב ובצפון.

11. סקורופט (שהדגיש שדבריו בנושא העליה אינם פורמליים) סבור שהנושא גריש. הוסיף כי מכיוון שיש מספיק בעיות מחווה 'TO EASE' (הבעיה) יישבו העולים בשטחים) תקל. לדבריו החשש הינו לגבי הצפוי בעתיד על רקע קליטתם הצפויה של מספרים גדולים של עולים.

12. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין סקורופט כי דברי גורבצ'וב במסיבת העיתונאים הובהרו ע"י שווארדנזה בפגישתו עם המזכיר בקופנהאגן.

13) בהקשר לתהליך השלום, גורבצ'וב הביע תמיכתו במדיניות ארה"ב. הוסיף כי מאחר ואין תנועה, יש מקום לבדוק 'וריאנטים' שונים לכינוס ועידה בינל כדי להזיז את התהליך. בוש בתגובה חזר על עמדתם בנושא הועידה ('יכול להיות שיבוא זמן מתאים אך לא כעת'). בוש הוסיף כי מקווה שבעקבות הקמת ממשלה, ניתן יהיה להמשיך בתהליך ממקום שבו הפסיקו. ציין שהיו קרובים למפגש שרי חוץ ולקיום הדיאלוג הישראלי-פלסטיני. לדבריו זו הדרך המבטיחה תוצאה.

ב. דיאלוג ארה"ב-אשף:

1) בתשובה לשאלת השגריר לגבי עמדת הממשלת בעקבות נסיון הפיגוע, הדגיש סקורופט את חומרת המעשה. בודקים המידע שקיבלו מאיתנו. משוחחים עם תוניס כדי לקבל תגובתם. זקוקים למספר ימים נוספים בטרם יקבלו החלטה. חזר וציין שמתייחסים לאירוע ברצינות.

2) השגריר הבהיר כי נסיון הפיגוע האחרון מהווה הוכחה חותכת (נוספת) למי שהיה זקוק להוכחה בדבר מעורבות אשף בטרור לאי עמידה בהבטחות שניתנו בדצמבר 88. נסיון הפיגוע הינו עדות שלא ניתן להכחיש.

3) סקורופט חזר על כך שלוקחים המקרה ברצינות. ציין שהתגובה הכללית (האשפית ש.ש.) היא DISHEARTENING.

ג. בעקבות פסגת בגדאד:

1) השגריר הביע דאגתו מתוצאות הפסגה.

- 3 -

2) סקורופט הגיב שאין לראות בתוצאות ניצחון למתינות.

3) השגריר התייחס להתבטאויות שהשמיע צאדס חוסיין בזמן האחרון. הבהיר דאגתנו לנוכח המאמץ העיראקי לפיתוח כושר לא קונבנציונלי. השגריר הזכיר הראיון שנתן צאדס חוסיין שבו סיפר על ההנחיות שנתן לקצינים בשטח כיצד לנהוג במידה וישאל תחקיר מדינות ערב. השגריר המליץ שהממשל יתמודד עם האיום העיראקי בדרך שתשכנע ישראל ומדינות ערב המתונות שארה"ב מתייחסת לנושא ברצינות.

4) סקורופט בתגובה הבהיר כי לוקחים ברצינות האיום. לדבריו עיראק היא מקרה קשה. חושבים שמדיניותם נכונה. מנסים להשיע על המשטר באורח ישיר ועקיף. לדבריו הנשיא שוחח על כך עם עיראק ועם מובארק. לדברי סקורופט בשלב זה לא ניתן להעריך האם מדיניותם כלפי עיראק תצליח. לדבריו הבהירו לעיראק שמתייחסים ברצינות להתבטאויותיו. חזר והבהיר שהם: SERIOUSLY ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM סקורופט הוסיף כי מקווים שאנו לא ניטול העניינים לידינו.

5) סקורופט ציין שהאזור מצוי כיום במצב קשה קל להיות DISCOURAGED. ארה"ב מנסה לפלס דרכה. צריך לשמור על 'ראש קר' ולעבוד עם המצב הקיים. סבור שהמשך התהליך המדיני יסיע לשנות האקלים ולהבטיח תקווה שכרע אינה בנמצא.

6) DISCOURAGED סקורופט הוסיף שמצפים שהממשלה שתקום תמשיך בתהליך מהנקודה שבה הוא הופסק ושהממשלה לא תצהיר על כוונתה להתחיל התהליך מחדש. אם זה יקרה 'זאת תהיה התפתחות שלילית'. אם התהליך WILL EVAPORATE המצב יהיה קשה לגביהם ולגבינו. יהיה לחץ מכל הכיוונים ללכת לוועידה בינלאומית.

7) השגריר בתגובה הבהיר שה'מ' הביע לא אחת כוונתו להמשיך בתהליך לאחר הקמת הממשלה. הוסיף כי שח שיהיה ככל הנראה אדם חדש יקיים קרוב לודא ביקור הכרות.

8) סקורופט העריך שאחת הסיבות למגמת הדיסאינטגרציה בה נתון האזור היא תוצאה של היאוש מכך שדבר לא קורה. אם ניתן יהיה להראות שהדברים זזים ושיש סיכוי אזי ניתן יהיה להביא לשינוי.

9) בתשובה לשאלת הציר הביע סקורופט דאגתם מהמצב בירדן. מניסים לסייע למלך. נראה שקיבל סיוע כלכלי בעקבות פסגת בגדד. מדיניות המלך, טוען סקורופט אינה עדות לתהליכים השליליים העוברים על האזור ועל ירדן.

10) בתגובה להערות השגריר לגבי הסכנה שבהתקרבות חוסיין לצאדס חוסיין ציין סקורופט כי המדובר בתהליך שהחל בעשור האחרון בעקבות הסייע אותו העניק המלך לעיראק ומלחמתה. כיום זקוק המלך נואשות לסייע שעה שהמתונות אינן מסייעות לו באופן משמעותי.

11) האס הוסיף שחוסיין נקלע למצב של מגמות סותרות בעולם הערבי. ארה"ב תסייע לו ככל שתוכל להערכתו הרבה תלוי במדיניות הסייע אותו העניק המלך השלום. התבטאויות על כך שירדן היא פנשטין אינן מסייעות למלך. סבור לישראל צריך להיות אינטרס בהמשך קיומה ויציבותה של הממלכה ההאשמית.

ד. שיחת סקורופט - מזכ"ל האו"מ

1. בעקבות א'צ (שערך הנשיא למז'כל האו"מ) נפגש עמו לשיחה.

- 4 -

המזכ"ל מסר לו על כך שבסיום ההתייעצויות שמקיים בכוננתו לשגר משלח (FINDING) (FACT). חושב שהוא ישגר את מלנשארד ואיימה. המזכ"ל סיפר ששוחח על כך עם נתניהו.

2. סקורופט הביע תקווה שנשתף פעולה עם המזכ"ל. סיפר כי זכו לקיטונות של ביקורת בעקבות הווסו שהטילו.

ה. סיכום:

1. לקראת סיום חזר השגריר והביע הערכתו לפועולו של הנשיא בנושא הגירת יהודי ברה"מ. סקורופט הבטיח שיעביר הדברים לידיעת הנשיא.

2. סקורופט הדגיש כי הנשיא מסור וכן ביחסו לישראל. העימותים שהיו לא גרעו במאומה מיחסו החיובי.

3. סקורופט העריך לסיים שהמז'ת נמצא בפרשת דרכים וכי ללא דיאלוג אנו עלולים לעמוד בפתחה של תקופה קשה. אף אחת מהממלכות הנהגות בתהליך השלום הנכחי אינם מעשית. עם הקמת הממשלה יש להגביר המאמץ. הממשל יעבוד עם הממשלה החדשה. שמח שתקופת המעבר הסתיימה.

שטיין

תפוצה:רהמ, שהח, סשה, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

מיידי	דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
גלרי	סוג:		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן העבר:		אל: סמנכ"ל מזא"ר יועץ מדיני לעניני תפוצות	
כס' פרוק:		דע: קונכ"ל ניו-יורק	
הפסד:		פאת: עודד ערן	
1152			

ראו נא מכתב הנשיא בוש לאייב פוקסמן בנושא יציאת יהודי בריה"מ, שיחותיו עם גורבצ'וב
בנדון והערבויות,

ערן

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תפוצה:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1990

1152. $\frac{2}{3}$

Dear Abe:

Thank you very much for your kind letter expressing support for our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry. As you know, promoting this latter-day exodus has been an important goal of this and previous Administrations. It provides a wonderful example of what we Americans can accomplish when the executive and legislative branches, Republicans and Democrats alike, work together.

I also think we must be prepared to share credit with others. Part of it belongs to President Gorbachev. He has opened the doors to large numbers of Soviet citizens seeking to exercise their right to leave. And we must also give credit to the millions of Soviet Jews themselves, brave men, women, and children, who have sustained their identity and heritage in the face of prejudice and intimidation.


I do not mean to leave with you the impression that our work is completed. To the contrary, we cannot rest until all who wish to leave the Soviet Union can do so unconditionally, and until all who wish to remain can do so free of the evil of anti-Semitism. For our part, we will continue to provide a safe-haven for Soviet citizens who want to come to this country; as you know, some 70,000 Soviet citizens will be allowed to enter the United States this fiscal year alone. And we will also sit down with the new Israeli Government in an effort to reach understandings that would permit us to provide Israel with an additional \$400 million in housing investment guarantees that would ease the economic burden facing Israel as it struggles to accommodate this unprecedented influx.

2 1152 $\frac{3}{3}$ $\frac{3}{3}$

I appreciate the widespread concern about both the resurgence of anti-Semitism in the USSR and the possibility that the Soviet Union might once again revert to a policy of restricted emigration. I took the opportunity of my Washington summit meetings with President Gorbachev to emphasize the weight we attach to these matters. I urged that the Soviet Union institute direct flights to Israel. I reiterated too that it remains our sincere desire that a new Soviet emigration law be enacted and implemented. In so doing, I made clear that my ability to extend MFN status to the USSR depends on it. I should add here that it is my view that curtailing the freedom to emigrate would not constitute an appropriate or acceptable response to Israeli settlement activity, even though I continue to strongly oppose such activity as an obstacle to peace. Last, I also asked President Gorbachev to do everything in his power to speak out against anti-Semitism. He assured me that he would. Needless to say, we will be watching developments in these areas closely.

Abe, I hope that this letter sheds some additional light on our policies. I also hope that you will not hesitate to contact me again on these or other issues of concern to us both should the need arise.

Sincerely,



Mr. Abraham H. Foxman
National Director
Anti-Defamation League
823 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

END

חוזם: 6,7392

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/340, ניו יורק/2376, רהמש/315, מצב/714, אביב/533, מנמ

ת/376

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 88, תא: 080690, חז: 1600, דח: מ, ג: 71

תח: גס: צפא

ג: ד

בלמ"ס/מיידי

זמן חיבור: 16:30

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, מזא"ר.

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ פר"נ, ממ"ד, תפוצות, אמ"ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב דברים שאמר הנשיא בוש בנושא הגירת יהודי-בורה"מ בשני אירועים ניפרדים:-

A. PRESIDENT BUSH ADDRESSES FUNDRAISING BREAKFAST FOR GOVERNOR TERRY BRANSTAD OF IOWA, DES MOINES, IOWA.

AS ONE WHO HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE EXODUS OF SOVIET JEWS -- AND IT IS A QUESTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL INTEGRITY OF A COUNTRY, AND I'M PLEASED THAT -- I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT AFTER LAST YEAR'S RECORD-SETTING TOTAL EMIGRATION OF 72,000 SOVIET JEWS, THIS YEAR'S EMIGRATION MAY BECOME THE HIGHEST EVER. AND WE MUST KEEP THE DOOR TO FREEDOM OPEN FOR THESE SOVIET JEWS.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

B. REMARKS OF PRESIDENT BUSH AT A FUNDRAISING LUNCHEON FOR DAUB US SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN, OMAHA, NEBRASKA

TO FATHER VAL PETER (SP) WHO'S SO WELL-KNOWN, SO WELL RESPECTED BY BOTH BARBARA AND ME AND SO MANY AROUND THE COUNTRY -- MY GREETINGS TO YOU, SIR. AND TO RABBI NADOFF (SP) -- I GUESS -- AS I UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION HERE, HE'S ONE OF THE GREAT LEADERS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY ALL ACROSS THIS STATE. AND I'LL JUST MENTION, SIR, IN A MINUTE HOW PLEASED I WAS AT THE RECENT SUMMIT TO HAVE A VERY FRANK DISCUSSION WITH CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV ABOUT -- PRESIDENT GORBACHEV -- ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP THIS HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIE JEWS EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION GOING FORWARD. I AM CONVINCED WE'RE ON THE RIGHT TRACK, AND WE'RE GOING TO NOT LET UP UNTIL WE GET EVEN MORE OF THOSE PEOPLE ABLE TO GO HOME AND ABLE TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES. I -- (APPLAUSE).

AND MOREOVER, WHILE I'M PLEASED THAT THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH, I WANT TO SEE UNFETTERED EMIGRATION. AND I BELIEVE GORBACHEV IS A LEADER WILLING, AS LINCOLN SAID, TO THINK ANEW, AND I BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE -- LOOK AT THE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN EASTERN EUROPE, WITH HIS ENCOURAGEMENT AS WELL AS HIS ACQUIESCENCE. AND HE IS COMMITTED INSIDE TO REFORM, AND HE FACES THESE ENORMOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. AND AS I TOLD HIM, THOUGH, I WILL NOT SEND OUR NEW AGREEMENT ON TRADE TO CONGRESS UNTIL THE SOVIET LEGISLATURE PASSES KEY EMIGRATION LAWS.

AND I'VE OFTEN SAID WE WANT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED, AND I BELIEVE THAT. I BELIEVE IT'S IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THOSE INTERNAL REFORMS KEEP GOING FORWARD AS THEY MOVE TOWARDS ECONOMIC REFORM AND MORE HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I BELIEVE THAT THE STEPS I'VE OUTLINED CAN HELP IT TRIUMPH.

ג1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, ממד, רס, @ (אמן), בנצוד, מצפא, פרנ, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, דוצ-ים, מזאר

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק

קד: 1
כתוב: 2

דחיות: מדידי

סוג: בלמ"ס

תאריך ושפת העבור:
12:30 6.6.90

אל: מא"פ 1

כס' פרוק:

דצ: סמנכ"ל אפאסו"ק; מצפ"א

הפסד:

1096

כאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

אתיופיה

ראו-נא ההודעה המשותפת שפרסמו נשואי ארה"ב ובריה"מ.
ההודעה, לדברי הול מדסק אתיופיה, בנוזמה סובייטית.

לכא

י

עמרני

משה סג"מ דגל אדלש
תל-אביב - ארמון
הממשלה
דגל אדלש
דגל אדלש
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תפוצה: 7 -

JOINT STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA

June 2, 1990

The U.S. and USSR discussed relief requirements and the prospects for a political solution to Ethiopia's internal conflict. They welcome the Ethiopian government's agreement to permit relief food to enter northern Ethiopia through the Port of Massawa under a U.N. sponsored relief effort, and they believe that such operations would not compromise the unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. They also welcomed the agreement expressed by the Ethiopian government to have UN representatives present in the course of the negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the Eritreans.

In addition, to deal with the growing problems of starvation, the U.S. and the USSR are prepared to work together and combine their assets. U.S. food will be transported on Soviet aircraft to demonstrate our joint commitment to responding to this tragic humanitarian problem.

Recognizing the continuing political and military conflicts that exacerbate the problems of starvation and recognizing also the lack of momentum on peace talks, the U.S. and USSR will support an international conference of governments under the auspices of the UN on settlement of conflict situations in the Horn of Africa.

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1096

2/2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 06.06.90 *
 דף: 1 מתוך 3 *
 עותק: 4 מתוך 16 *
 נכנס: ** *
 סודי ביותר *
 ** *
 *** *
 חוזם: 6,3994 *
 אל: המשרד *
 יעדים: הרהמש/179, מצב/413, אביב/310, מנמת/206 *
 מ-: רוש, נר: 2035, תא: 050690, זח: 2100, רח: מ, סג: 20 *
 תח: א, ג: סממ *
 נר: א *
 * * * * *
 סודי ביותר/מידי *
 אל: ממד *
 דע: מצפא *
 מאת: אמיתי, וושינגטון *
 תהליך השלום, הפסגה הערבית: אשף *
 * * * * *
 מא'צ' עם דייויד וולש, דסקאי מזת ב-NSC (ב-5/6). *
 * * * * *

1. אמר, בנימה עגמומית כי מדיניות הממשל בתהליך קורסת, וכי נראה שמידת השפעתה של ארהב על ההתפתחויות באזור פחותה אף ממה שניתן היה לשער. נקודות הציון לכך: הקפאון בישראל, פסגת בגדאד, נסיון הפיגוע של אשף ומשמעותו מבחינת מדיניות מאשף.
 2. ייתכן שערפאת אכן החליט להקצין מדיניותו על רקע תחושתו שהדיאלוג עם ארהב לא הניב דבר. נראה שלאחר שנה ומחצה של נסיון לפעול לקידום מעמדו בתהליך החליט ערפאת לשוב ולהדגיש את נושא שלימות אשף. אם ערפאת לא יגיב לתביעת ארהב באורח מספק הממשל יהיה מחוייב להפסיק הדיאלוג עם אשף (לא פירט הנדרש מאשף אך ליגלג על ההתבטאויות המעורפלות שנשמעו עד כה מפיו דוברי הארגון). אינו רואה, אילו פלס' עשויים להשתתף בתהליך ללא גיבוי אשף. להלן ציין הלחץ הכבד המופעל על ישראל להפסקת הדיאלוג, ואמר שיש אומרים כי הלואי שישראל היתה משקיעה לקידום תהליך השלום אותו מרץ שהיא משקיעה להפסקת הדיאלוג (ראה התבטאות זהה מפיו ואן דו זן במברק ורנאי מס')

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף: 2 מתוך 3 *
 עותק: 4 מתוך 16 *
 (2029) *
 * * * * *
 3. ציין כי משמעותן המעשית של מרבית הפסגות הערביות היתה מוגבלת מאד, אך הדגיש במקביל כי הטון של הודעת בגדאד היה שלילי ביותר. עפי תחושתו, טוען זה משקף את הלך הרוח הרווח כיום בעולם הערבי מן האוקיאנוס עד למרפץ. יתר על כן, לדעתו, הפסגה שיקפה עולם ערבי הנתון בתקופת מעבר. לדידו שנות השמונים היו עידן של פרגמטיזם ומתינות, בהן בלטו נסיונותיהם של ירדן ואשף לקדם התהליך ושובה של מצרים למערכת הערבית. עתה בולטת שיבתה של עיראק למרכז הזירה הערבית - שיבה שהינה לדעתו, סימבול ולא סיבה, להקצנה הערבית. ציין כי נראה שעריראק הופכת לאויבת העיקרית של ישראל בשנות ה-90, כפי שהייתה סוריה בשנות ה-80, אך אין זה הגיוני שעיראק תתקוף את ישראל. סייג דבריו ואמר שגם תמיכת אשף במאבק המזויין איננה הגיונית לדעתו מבחינת האינטרסים של הארגון.
 4. הערבים המתונים נסוגים משום שהגיעו למקנה כי אין ביכולתם להפנות ישראל לתהליך השלום, וכי הציבור הישראלי אינו רוצה למעשה בשלום (ציין, בתוך כ, כי חוסיין אומר לארהב שבדאש סדר העדיפויות בישראל ניצבת העליה מבריהם ולא התהליך) כמו כן, לדעתם ארהב איננה מסוגלת לשמש כמתווך אפקטיבי (אין הם תובעים כדבריו, שתמש כמתווך חסר פניות). הביקורת החריפה על ארהב בהודעת הפסגה, משקפת נימות אנטיאמריקניות הרווחות כיום בעולם הערבי, הדגיש במיוחד דיווחים מירדן המצביעים על אאוירה אנטי-אמריקנית קשה בקרב עבר - ירדנים ופלסטינים גם יחד.
 5. ברקע ההקצנה הערבית מצויות גם תחושות הכשל ואי הבטחון נוכח ההתפתחויות בזאר ונוכח אי-יכולתן של החברות הערביות להתמודד עם אתגרי המאה ה-21. (הגדיר הערבים ככל BUNCH OF FAILURES)
 6. כללית, עניינה של ארהב במזהת פוחת. ציין כגורמים לכך אי יכולתה לקדם התהליך המדיני - הדגיש, בהקשר זה, את הבעיות שמציבה בפניהם מדיניות ישראל, ירידת משקלו של הקול היהודי בארהב - אמר שחברי קונגרס רפובליקנים נזקקים כיום פחות לקול היהודי אך אינם רוצים להעמיד זאת במבחן, ירידת העימות הבינמצמתי. הוסיף כי אף הטיעון כי אינטרסים שונים של ארהב באזור דוגמת ענינה בסעודיה, אינם קשורים בהכרח בשאלה הפלס'תורם את תרומתו להפחתת המעורבות.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף: 3 מתוך 3 *
 עותק: 4 מתוך 16 *
 * * * * *
 7. העלה לבסוף, מספר תרחישים שיניעו מעורבות אמריקאית מוגברת: החרפה משמעותית באינתיפאדה, התערערות המשטר ההאשמי (ציין כי בוש יחלץ לעזרת חוסיין בשל הידידות האמיצה שהוא רוחש למלך אך לא ניתן להעריך כיצד תנהג ארהב, בהקשר זה, לאחר עידן בוש), התערערות המצב במצרים, על רקע פנימי או בשל פיגיעה בהסכמי ק.ד.
 הערות *
 8. למרות נימות הביקורת ששילב וולש בהתייחסותו לערבים ברי כי מבחינתו, המצב העגום אליו נקלע האיזור נובע בראש ובראשונה ממדיניות ישראל. השבתי כנדרש.
 9. אודה על שמירת חסיון המקור והמידע.
 אמיתי *
 * * * * *
 ל7 *
 * * * * *
 תפ: שהח, סשהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, א(אמן), בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל

1945
The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on
the subject of the land owned by the United States in
the State of California, and is being furnished to you
for your information.

The total area of land owned by the United States in
the State of California is approximately 100,000,000
acres. This land is owned by the United States in
several different capacities, and is being managed
for the benefit of the people of the State of California.
The land is owned by the United States in several
different capacities, and is being managed for the
benefit of the people of the State of California.

The land is owned by the United States in several
different capacities, and is being managed for the
benefit of the people of the State of California.

אאאא, חוזם: 3994
 אל: רהמש/179
 מ-: ווש, נר: 2035, תא: 050690, חז: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סב,
 בבב
 סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : ממד

דע : מצפא

מאת: אמיתי, רושינגטון

תהליך השלום, הפסגה הערבית: אשף

מא'צ' עם דייויד וולש, דסקאי מזת ב-NSC (ב-5/6).

1. אמר, בנימה עגמומית כי מדיניות הממשל בתהליך קורסת, וכי נראה שמידת השפעתה של ארהב על ההתפתחויות באזור פחותה אף ממה שניתן היה לשער. נקודות הציון לכך: הקפאון בישראל, פסגת בגדאד, נסיון הפיגוע של אשף ומשמעותו מבחינת מדיניות מאשף.

2. ייתכן שערפאת אכן החליט להקצין מדיניותו על רקע תחושתו שהדיאלוג עם ארהב לא הניב דבר. נראה שלאחר שנה ומחצה של נסיון לפעול לקידום מעמדו בתהליך החליט ערפאת לשוב ולהדגיש את נושא שלימות אשף. אם ערפאת לא יגיב לתביעת ארהב באורח מספק הממשל יהיה מחוייב להפסיק הדיאלוג עם אשף (לא פירט הנדרש מאשף אך ליגלג על ההתבטאויות המעורפלות שנשמעו עד כה מפי דוברי הארגון). אינו רואה, אילו פלס' עשויים להשתחף בתהליך ללא גיבוי אשף. להלן ציון הלחץ הכבד המופעל על ישראל להפסקת הדיאלוג, ואמר שיש אומרים כי הלואי שישראל היתה משקיעה לקידום תהליך השלום אותו מרץ שהיא משקיעה להפסקת הדיאלוג (ראה התבטאות זהה מפי ואן דוזן במברק ורנאי מס' 2029).

3. ציון כי משמעותן המעשית של מרבית הפסגות הערביות היתה מוגבלת מאד, אך הדגיש במקביל כי הטון של הודעת בגדאד היה שלילי ביותר. עפי תחושתו, טוען זה משקף את הלך הרוח הרווח כיום בעולם הערבי מן האוקיאנוס עד למרפץ. יתר על כן, לדעתו, הפסגה שיקפה עולם ערבי הנתון בתקופת מעבר. לדידו שנות השמונים היו עידן של פרגמטיזם ומתינות, בהן בלטו נסיונותיהם של ירדן ואשף לקדם התהליך ושובה של מצרים למערכת הערבית. עתה בולטת שיבתה של עיראק למרכז הזירה הערבית - שיבה שהינה לדעתו, סימבול ולא סיבה, להקצנה הערבית. ציון כי נראה שעיראק הופכת לאויבתה העיקרית של ישראל בשנות ה-90, כפי שהיתה סוריה בשנות ה-80, אך אין זה הגיוני שעיראק תתקוף את ישראל. סייג דבריו ואמר שגם תמיכת אשף במאבק המזויין איננה הגיונית לדעתו מבחינת האינטרסים של הארגון.

4. הערבים המתונים נסוגים משום שהגיעו למקנה כי אין ביכולתם להפנות ישראל לתהליך השלום, וכי הציבור הישראלי אינו רוצה למעשה בשלום (ציון, בתוך כ, כי חוסיין אומר לארהב שבראש סדר העדיפויות בישראל ניצבת העליה מבריהם ולא התהליך) כמו כן, לדעתם ארהב איננה מסוגלת לשמש כמתווך אפקטיבי (אין הם חובעים כדבריו, שתשמש כמתווך חסר פניות). הביקורת החריפה על

מא ת'6'מ ק
 מ' 3322 1978

51

דחיפות: מילדי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1 כתוב: 4
סוג: שמור		אל: מצפ"א
תאריך וזמן חבור: 5.6.90		
פס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע:
1090	השגרירות וושינגטון	פאת:

גורבצ'וב: ויהודי בריה"מ

רצ"ב מכתבים לגורבצ'וב מטעם שני המועמדים הדמוקרטים למושלוח קליפורניה התובע הכללי ואן דה קמפ, ודיאן פיינשטיין וכן מטעם הקונגרסמנית ברברה בוקסר. המכתבים שוגרו לגורבצ'וב לבקשת קונכיל סן פרנסיסקו.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר
יהואל אטא פתור

דוד פלג

מה שכתבתי לך
ביום 14/6
הוא נכון
אולי תוכל
לשדר לי
התשובה

תפוצה:

JUN.05 '90 11:42 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL SANFRANCISCO

P.03

06/04/90 19113 2 213 302 7212

DIANNE FEINSTEIN

P.02

★DIANNE FEINSTEIN FOR GOVERNOR

2/4

June 4, 1990

1090

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev
c/o The Soviet Consulate
2790 Greene Street
San Francisco, California 94123

Dear President Gorbachev:

We are the two candidates for the Democratic nomination for Governor of the State of California in the United States of America. We jointly urge you, in the strongest possible terms, to continue free emigration of Soviet Jews from your country to Israel.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein
DIANNE FEINSTEIN

JOHN VAN DE KAMP

cc: Valentin M. Kamenev
Alexander Bosmertnykh

JUN 05 '90 11:43 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL SANFRANCISCO

P.04

BARBARA BOXER
8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
HUMAN RESOURCES TASKFORCE CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(ON LEAVE)

MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS
CO-CHAIRMAN

WHIP AT LARGE



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

301 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 226-9181

DISTRICT OFFICES:

SAN FRANCISCO
480 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
(415) 828-8948

MARIN
3301 KERNER BLVD
SAN RAFAEL, CA 94901
(415) 457-7272

VALLEJO
(707) 882-0120

BONOMA
(707) 769-4023

1090 3/4

June 4, 1990

Dear President Gorbachev:

Welcome to San Francisco. You have my best wishes and strong support for your efforts toward easing world tensions and achieving meaningful arms reductions. I also wish to congratulate you on your achievements in opening Soviet Society to greater freedoms and opportunities for your people.

I do want you to know that while I applaud many of your policies, I also have concerns in some areas. Enclosed is a petition containing important points regarding the matter of Soviet Jews with an attached list of known refuseniks. I agree with the points made in the petition, and ask you to give them your serious attention.

I wish you well for the remainder of your visit and for your future efforts toward peace and greater freedom when you return to the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

BARBARA BOXER
Member of Congress

BB/ber

1990-06-06 02:31

1409078 04

JUN.05 '90 11:42 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL SANFRANCISCO

P.02

<???

TEL:

JUN 04, 90

17:32 No.032 P.03

Van de Kamp!
GOVERNOR 1990

June 4, 1990

1090
4/4

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev
c/o The Soviet Consulate
2790 Greene Street
San Francisco, California 94123

Dear President Gorbachev:

We are the two candidates for the Democratic nomination for Governor of the State of California in the United States of America. We jointly urge you, in the strongest possible terms, to continue free emigration of Soviet Jews from your country to Israel.

Sincerely,



DIANNE FEINSTEIN

JOHN VAN DE KAMP

cc: Valentin M. Kamenev
Alexander Besmertnykh

TRANSMISSION REPORT

:FOREIGN MIN. ISRAEL (06 JUN '90 10:33)

| DATE | START TIME | REMOTE TERMINAL IDENTIFICATION | MODE | TIME | RESULTS | TOTAL PAGES | DEPT. CODE | FILE NO. |
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1990-06-06

02:33

1409076

06

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| | | |
|-------------------------|---|----------|
| דחיות: מידי | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק 91 | ק: 1 |
| סוג: בלמים | | מתוך: 9 |
| תאריך וזמן חבור: 5.6.90 | אל: מזאיר 2, מצפ"א, פריין | |
| כס' פרוק: המשרד: | | דצ: ממ"ד |
| 1092 | שגרירות וושינגטון | כאת: |

פסגת בוש - גורבצ'וב: הודעת בנושא פרוליפרציה

1. רצ"ב ההודעה המשותפת בנושא פרוליפרציה (שפורסמה ע"י חבית חלבן באיחור מה).
2. להלן נקודות ראויות לציון בתוך ההודעה:
 - א. תמיכת שתי המעצמות בקונצפט של מאמצים רגיונליים למניעת תפוצת נשק גרעיני במיוחד באיזורי מתיחות דוגמת מזחי"ת, דרו' אסיה ודרא"פ.
 - ב. תמיכת בריה"מ במטרות MTCR.
 - ג. הצעת שתי המעצמות לבחון יוזמות רגיונליות בתחום מניעת תפוצת טילים במיוחד במזחי"ת ודרום אסיה, חשתיים קוראות לספקים ולקנינים (של טילים) לנהוג בהתאםקות.
 - ד. שתי המעצמות תעשנה מאמץ פוליטי ודיפלומטי למנוע תפוצת נשק כימי.
 - ה. תמיכת שתי המעצמות בעקרון איזורים מפורזים מנשק כימי.
 - ו. הסכמה שנוכחות והמשך תפוצת נשק כימי באיזורי מתיחות דוגמת המזחי"ת חינה מסוכנת.

שטיין ll
 תפוצה: 7 3 1+1 4
 אברין אלסט
 סטיין ll
 תפוצה: 7 3 1+1 4

1092 2/9

.EOP NON-PROLIFERATION JOINT STATEMENT: FACT SHEET, THE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, MONDAY, JUNE
4, 1990 WJ-1-1-E page# 1
dest=swh,armscont,ussr,weapons,chemwar,nucweapon,missile,mideast,a
dest+=sthnafr data

BACKGROUND

The Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation underscores the importance that the US and EUSSRF attach to preventing the spread of Euclear weapons, chemical weapons, FandE missiles,F which pose a growing threat to international security and stability.

The Joint Statement reflects bilateral discussins held over the last six months, in which each area of proliferation was discussed, and mutual concerns identified. It contains commitment to work together and in parallel to prevent and to urge other states to do so as well.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION

-- The US and USSR strongly support efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, while encouraging the peaceful uses of Eatomic energy.F

-- Both countries will encourage further adherents to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They urge current NPT parties to implement scrupulously their IAEA safeguards, and support stringent export controls on nuclear-related material, equipment and technology.

-- The US and USSR support the concept of regional non-proliferation efforts, particularly in areas of tension such as the EMiddle East, South Asia and Southern AfricaF.

MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION

-- The Soviet Union affirms its support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The US welcomes this decision, and the other measures, such as export controls, which both countries are taking.

-- The MTCR, concluded in 1987 among the Economic Summit partners, limits the transfers of missiles and missile technology for systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, as well as the production facilities for these systems.

-- As a major supplier of missiles and missile technology, Soviet support will strengthen the regime, and should encourage others to observe the guidelines.

-- The US will shortly be discussing with its MTCR partners the Soviet statement of support for the objectives of the MTCR.

1092 3/9

NON-PROLIFERATION JOINT STATEMENT: FACT SHEET, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1990 WJ-1-1-E page# 2

-- The US and USSR propose to explore regional missile non-proliferation initiatives, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, and urge missile suppliers and purchasers to exercise restraint.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATIONS

-- Both countries agree that an effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons is the best long-term solution to the problem of proliferation, and that efforts to prevent proliferation complement the negotiation for a global ban.

-- To complement the bilateral Agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons, the US and USSR have declared their chemical weapons stockpiles, and committed themselves not to proliferate chemical weapons. They will pursue political and diplomatic efforts to discourage chemical weapons proliferation and use worldwide.

-- Bilateral discussions on improving the effectiveness of export controls will be held.

-- The US and USSR affirmed their support for the concept of regional chemical weapons non-proliferation efforts to:

-- broaden awareness of the dangers of such proliferation;

-- encourage other countries to destroy their chemical weapons in advance of a convention; and

-- take confidence-building steps such as the renunciation of chemical weapons production.

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END JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY
THE WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 1 MONDAY, JUNE 4,
1990

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The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technologies. The more nations that possess such weapons, the more difficult it will be to realize the desire of people everywhere to achieve effective arms control and disarmament measures and reduce the threat of war. Weapons proliferation can provoke or intensify insecurity and hostility among nations, and threatens mankind with warfare of unprecedented destructiveness.

Our discussions over the past months point the way to a new era in relations between our two countries. We have taken major steps toward concluding agreements to reduce our own strategic nuclear arsenals, to bring limits on nuclear weapons. Together with the nations of Europe, we are taking unprecedented steps to reduce existing conventional weaponry as part of a process of building a lasting structure of European security. The progress we are making and the commitments we have made in these bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts clearly demonstrate that arms reductions can contribute to increased security, even when there have been long-standing and deep-seated differences between countries.

The historic steps we have taken to improve US-Soviet relations and to cooperate in the interests of international stability create the possibility of even closer and more concrete cooperation in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and missile non-proliferation.

With these considerations in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Declare their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and certain other missiles and missile technologies, in particular those subject to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);

- o Agree to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and to put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons; and

- o Call on other nations to join in a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step

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toward the effective limitation worldwide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

The two sides have taken specific actions to advance these commitments.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 2 MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1990

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Reaffirm their steadfast and long-lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime;
- o Reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agree that it continues to make an invaluable contribution to global and regional security and stability;
- o Urge all countries which have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT;
- o Urge all NPT parties to implement scrupulously their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations under the Treaty;
- o Affirm their intention to cooperate together and with other Treaty parties to ensure a successful 1990 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which would reaffirm support for the objectives of the Treaty and its importance to international security and stability;
- o Support the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and urge all countries in the region to bring it into force at an early date;
- o Reiterate their continuing commitment to strengthening the IAEA, whose unique system of safeguards has contributed to the widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy for social and economic development;
- o Support increased international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards;
- o Call on all non-nuclear-weapons states with unsafeguarded nuclear activities to place these activities under international safeguards;

... on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear equipment and technology,

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explosive purposes, and urge all other nations capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls;

- o Continue to support efforts to improve and strengthen the international nuclear export control regime;
- o Support discussions among states in regions of nuclear.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 3 MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1990

proliferation concern for the purpose of achieving concrete steps to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, join in calling on the nations of the EMiddle East, Southern Africa, Fand E South AsiaF to engage in and pursue such discussions;

- o Agree to continue their regular, constructive bilateral consultations on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

MISSILE AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY NON-PROLIFERATION

In order to stem the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- o Have signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrating that controls on -- indeed the elimination of -- such missiles can enhance national security;
- o Reaffirm their intention that the ESTARTF Treaty be signed by the end of the year;
- o Affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Regime, covering missiles, and certain equipment and technology relating to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this regime;
- o Are taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a worldwide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures;
- o Have instituted bilateral consultation to exchange information concerning such controls and procedures and identify specific measures to prevent missile proliferation;
- o Agree to work to stop missile proliferation, particularly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East;
- o To this end, affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives;

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o Recall that they favor international economic cooperation including cooperation aimed at peaceful space exploration, as long as such cooperation could not contribute to missile proliferation;

o Appeal to all countries -- to exporters of missiles and missile technology as well as purchasers -- to exercise restraint, and express their willingness to continue their respective dialogues with other countries on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 4 MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1990

o Are resolved, on their part, to continue to work to strengthen such international restraint with respect to missile and missile technology proliferation.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION

In order to stem the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

o Declare that a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis is the best long-term solution to the threat to international security posed by the use and spread of chemical weapons, and that non-proliferation measures are considered a step toward achieving such a convention;

o Will intensify their cooperation to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date;

o Have instituted bilateral confidence building measures, including chemical weapons data exchange and reciprocal site visits;

o Have just signed a trailblazing agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

o Commit themselves, in that agreement, to take practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention;

o Having declared their possession of chemical weapons, urge other states possessing chemical weapons to declare their possession, to commit to their destruction, and to begin immediately to address, through research and

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cooperation, the need for chemical weapons destruction capability;

o State that they themselves will not proliferate chemical weapons;

o Have instituted export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons. These measures are not intended to hinder or discriminate against legitimate peaceful chemical activities;

o Have agreed to conduct bilateral discussions to improve the effectiveness of their respective export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;

o Conduct regular bilateral consultations to broaden bilateral cooperation, including the reciprocal exchange of information on the

JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 5 MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1990 problems of chemical weapons proliferation;

o Confirm their intent to pursue political and diplomatic actions, where specific cases give rise to concerns about the production, use or spread of chemical weapons;

o Join with other nations in multilateral efforts to coordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international cooperation to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;

o Reaffirm their support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law;

o Are taking steps to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by:

-- Encouraging states that are not parties to accede;

-- confirming their intention to provide active support to the United Nations Secretary General in conducting investigations of reported violations of the Protocol;

-- Affirming their intention to consider the imposition of sanctions against violators of the Protocol, including those under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

-- Agreeing to consult promptly in the event of a violation of the Protocol to discuss possible bilateral and multilateral actions against the offender, as well as appropriate assistance to the victims of such violation;

o Agree that the presence and further proliferation of chemical weapons in areas of tension, such as the Middle East, is particularly dangerous. The two countries therefore affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives in the Middle East and other areas, including the possibility of offering their good offices

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to promote such initiatives as:

-- Efforts to broaden awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and its negative impact on implementation of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

-- Bilateral or multilateral efforts to stem chemical weapons proliferation, including the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons;

-- Efforts to destroy chemical weapons in advance of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons, as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing.

The United States and the Soviet Union call on all nations of the world that have not already done so to join them in taking comparable, effective measures to stem chemical weapons proliferation.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AS RELEASED BY THE
WHITE HOUSE WN-1-1-E page# 6 MONDAY, JUNE 4,
1990

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TRANSMISSION REPORT

:FOREIGN MIN. ISRAEL (06 JUN '90 10:28)

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דיאלוג

משיחות טלפוניות עם האס וקרצר הבוקר, שארה"ב ממחינה לתוצאות הישיבה היום בבגדד של מנהיגי אש"ף. הם העבירו את המסר שלהם בשורה של פגישות בהוניס ובמקומות אחרים כקהיר, ועתה נותר רק להתמין ולראות אם תהיה לו השפעה. מבחינת לוי"ז הם ימחינו עד לשובו של בייקר מאירופה ע"מ לקיים דיון בדרך תגובתם. הדילמות הן קשות, אליבא האס וקרצר וכל החלטה תראה בעיני ארה"ב כ- Loser שממנה לא תצמח כל טובה. האס הכחיש את הפרשנות הניתנת כאן לדבריו של דובר הבית הלבן פיצוטר, כאילו הממשל החליט להתעלם מהעדר התגובה ולהמשיך בדיאלוג.

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מה ש'ט'ה ר'ה ש'הט ג'ה
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פסגת בוש - גורבצ'וב: סיכום ביניים

1. רצ"ב דיווחים והערכות עיתונאיות בעקבות סיום הפסגה.
2. העיתונאי הדריק סמית (עמד בראש משרד הניו יורק טיימס במוסקווה, נחשב למבין בנושא בריה"מ). כינה את האירוע כ"פסגת סופלה". לדבריו נעים היה לטעום, אך הרבה לא היה מבחינה סובסטנטיבית.
3. אם להמשיך קו מחשבה זה, הרי ניראה שהישגה העיקרי של הפיסג היה באוירה ומעל לכל, בהידוק הקשר האישי בין שני הנשיאים. לאורך כל הפיסגה בלט המאמץ של בוש לרכוש את אמונו של גורבצ'וב, עובדה אשר זכתה להערכה מיוחדת מצידו של האחרון במהלך מסיבת העיתונאים שקיימו השניים בסיום המפגש. תקוותו של הנשיא היא שהקשר האישי שברקם והסרת החשדות יסייעו בעתיד בפתרון בעיות.
4. המאזן הסובסטנטיבי של הפסגה לעומת זאת הינו מורכב יותר. מחד גיטא, יכולים שני המנחיגים להצביע בסיפוק על שורה ארוכה של הסכמים (ללא תקדים בתולדות היחסים מאז תחילת עידן הדטנט) שיתרמו ללא ספק להידוק היחסים. מאידך גיטא, לא עלה בידי הצדדים להתגבר על המחלוקות בנושאים המרכזיים שעומדים על סד"י הבינמעצמתי כגון נושא: * START והנושאים הקשורים לעיצובה מחדש של אירופה בעידן ^{בש}הנולחמה הקרה ^{כמו}גם עתידן של הרפובליקות הבאלטיות.
5. יש התולים את היעדר התקדמות בנושאים הגדולים במרחב התמרון המצומצם שיש לגורבצ'וב על רקע הביקורת המוטחת כלפיו מבית באן הויתורים שעשה עד כה. על רקע ועידת המפלגה הקרובה לא יכל גורבצ'וב להיראות כמי שויתר על אינטרסים חיוניים. לכך יש להוסיף את הידיעות שזרמו ממוסקווה על התבטאויות ורגישות שקיים יילצין. אט הגבירו עוד יותר את תחושת פגיעותו וחולשתו של גורבצ'וב.
6. הנשיא בוש, המודע לקשיי גורבצ'וב מבית לא ניסה לנצל זאת להפעלת לחץ

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בנושאים החשובים לארה"ב. נהפוך הוא, נושא נשען להסדרות חוזרות ונישנות. של גורבצ'וב והסכים לחתום על הסכם סחר, הישג אופו מקווה גורבצ'וב להציג למבקריו בשובו (במאמר מוסגר נציין שהמדובר בהישג, המותנה באישור חק ההגירה ע"י הסובייט העליון ובמציאת פתרון לבעיה הבאלטית. בלא מציאת פתרון מניח את הדעת לבעיה השניה יש להניח שהנשיא יתקל בקושי להשיג אישור הקונגרס לחסכם הסחר, ולמתן מעמד מדינה מועדפת).

7. להלן סיכום תוצאות הפיסגה עפ"י נושאים:
א. פיקוח על החימוש (להלן AC)

- 1) למרות מאמץ אינטנסיבי שהושקע מאז ביקור המזכיר המוסקווא, לא הצליחו הצדדים לגשר על פני המחלוקות שמנעו מילוי הבטחה שנתנו שני הנשיאים במלטה, קרי חתימה על הסכם לקיצוץ הנשק האסטרטגי ב-50%, במקום זאת, הסתפקו השניים בחתימה על הצהרה משותפת המפרטת הנושאים שיכללו בהסכם. כמו כן מתייחסת ההודעה לעתיד המו"מ בנושא הנשק האסטרטגי ולנושא יזמת ההגנה בחלל.
- 2) החתימה על הסכם להשמדת נשק כימי מהווה הישג של הנשיא, עוד טרם אישורו ע"י הקונגרס (המדובר בהסכם אקזקוטיבי הטעון אישור ברב רגיל של שני הבתים) נימתחה ביקורת על היעדר מנגנון אימות והיעדר ציוד השמדה סובייטי עובדה שתקשה על בריה"מ לעמוד בלוי"ז שמעמיד ההסכם.
- 3) הסכמים נוספים שנחתמו היו בנושא ניסויים גרעיניים ושימוש באנרגיה גרעינית לצרכי שלום.

ב. נושאים בילטרליים:
1) עיקר היבול של הפיסגה מצא ביטוי בחתימה על שורה ארוכה של הסכמים שהמו"מ עליהם החלעוד בתקופת ממשל רייגן.
בתחומי התביבות סחר כלכלה

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(2) פירוט ההסכמים שנחתמו ראה במברק נפרד.
 (3) מבין ההסכמים שנחתמו נציין את ההסכם (החמש שנתי) למכירת חיטה שהחתימה עליו התעכבה עד לרגע האחרון. יש הסבורים שגורבצ'וב עיכב החתימה עד לקבלת הבטחה לחתימה על הסכם הסחר. הסכם זה ישפר מעמדו של הנשיא בקרב ציבור החקלאים

ג. נושאים רגיונליים:

(1) על רקע הדיונים בנושאים הגדולים נדחקו המשברים האיזוריים לשוליים (מבחינת הזמן שהוקדש לדיון בסוגיא). מהמידע החלקי שבידינו נראה שלא הושגה פריצת דרך כלשהי.

(2) הנושאים שנידונו היו: אפגניסטן, אמריק"ז (דגש על פעילות קובה) דראפי המזדהיית (ראה דיווחים ניפרדים) אתיופיה (פורסמה הודעה משותפת על שתיים באספקת מזון) הודו ופקיסטן.

ד. נושאים תו מניטריים:

(1) בוש העלה נושא ז"א, בירר גורבצ'וב על ההתקדמות שנעשתה בשנים האחרונות לשנות מדיניות ההגירה.

(2) הנשיא ביקש התערבות גורבצ'וב לפתרון מהיר של מקרי רפיוטניקים. גורבצ'וב ציין שיעשה מאמץ לפתור המקרים.

(3) שני הנשיאים קיימו דיון בנושא האנטישמיות. הביעו כוונתם להתבטא נגד דעות קדומות ומגמות אנטישמיות.

(4) התקיים דיון בנושא הגירה יהודית לישראל וליעדים אחרים. נדונו צרכים להגדיל מספר היוצאים, במהלך הדיון פירט הנשיא הגידול במספרי המהגרים שיגיעו לארה"ב. (נציין בהקשר זה דברי דובר הנשיא על כך שארה"ב מעוניינת להגדיל מכסות ההגירה ועל כך שמנסים לעבד הסדרים בנושא. עוד ציין הדובר כי מספר המהגרים יגדל).

(5) הנשיא העלה נושא הטיסות הישירות. גורבצ'וב ציין כי הינו ער לבעיה ומעוניין למצוא לה פתרון.

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| תאריך וזמן תעבור: | | אל: |
| כס' פרוק: | | דע: |
| הפסרד: | | כאת: |
| 1065 | | |

ה. נושאים טרנס לאומיים:

1) למרות שלא נערך דיון בנושאים תחת הכותרת לעיל חתמו שני הצדדים על הסכמים בתחום איכות הסביבה והמאבק בסמים.

ו. כלכלה סובייטית:

1) בהמשך למסורת שהחלה במפגש שרי החוץ בוויומינג קיימו שני הנשיאים דיון לא פורמלי במצב הפרטטרויקה והסיכוי לשיפור היחסים הכלכליים.

2) חברות גרמניה בנאטו והסדרי הביטחון בחקופת כתר המלחמה הקרה: למרות התבטאויות אופטימיות מצד גורבצ'וב ובוש לא עלה בידי הצדדים לצמצם חילוקי הדעות לגבי חברותה של גרמניה המאוחדת בנאטו. שני הנשיאים ציינו כי השיחות תרמו להבנה טובה יותר של העמדות.

3) הישג מטויים יש לראות בהודעת הנשיא והמזכ"ר על הסכמה סובייטית לאיחוד גרמניה ועל כך שנושא החברות באחת משתי הבריתות (בהתאם לעקרונות ובשי"א) נתונה להחלטת גרמניה.

4) בנסיון להפיג (עד כמה שניתן) חששות/חרדות בריה"מ מפני ההשלכות שתהיינה על בטחון בריה"מ (בטחון שכנותיה של גרמניה ממזרח) בעקבות הצטרפות גרמניה מאוחדת לנאטו העביר בוש לגורבצ'וב תשע נקודות המסכמות את הצעדים שאיתם מוכנה ארה"ב (וככל הנראה בנות בריתה האירופאיות) ללנקוט כדי להפיג חששה של בריה"מ. נקודות אלה (ראה פירוט בדיווחי עיתונות שנשלחו) נועדו לסייע לבריה"מ בתחום הכלכלי, פוליטי וצבאי לבלוע הגלולה. ההנחה היא שבריה"מ תיאלץ בסופו של דבר להשלים עם הבלתי נמנע.

5) בריה"ב אשר לפי שעה מסרבת להשלים עם רוע הגזירה העבירה טיוטת תכנית להקמת מה שמכונה Greater European Council כמו גם הרחבת סמכויות ובשי"א. ארה"ב אינה שוללת הרחבת סמכויות ובשי"א אך אינה רואה באירגון תחליף לנאטו.

6) שני הנשיאים הטילו על שרי החוץ להמשיך וללבן את הנושא (השניים יפגשו ביום שלישי ה-5.6 בקופנהגן).

תפוצה:

| | | |
|------------------|--|----------|
| דתיפות: | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק | דף: 5 |
| סוג: | | כתוב: 22 |
| תאריך וזמן תגור: | | אל: |
| כס' פרוק: | | דצ: |
| הפסד: | | פאת: |
| 1065 | | |

6) בהיעדר התקדמות בנושא הגרמני התקשו הצדדים לצמצם הפער בנושא השיחות לקיצו נשק קונבנציונלי (CFE). חילוקי הדעות בנושא כ"ף ותקרות מטוסים נותרו בעינם בהודעה שפרסמו תביעו שני הנשיאים רצונם בסיום תמו"ת במהלך שנת 90. סוכם שהשלמת ההסכם הינה תנאי לכינוסה המתוכנן של ובשי"א.

ח. עצמאות הבאלטיות:

1) הדיון בנושא לא הביא (כצפוי) לתוצאות. ארה"ב חזרה והביעה תמיכתה במתן זכות הגדרה עצמית שעה שגורבצ'וב, הבהיר כי המדובר בנושא פנים טוביטי וכי ניתן לפתור במסגרת ההליך הקונסטיטוציוני.

2) מהדיון שאתו קיים גורבצ'וב עם הנשיא ומנהיגות הקונגרסהבהר לו שהיעדר התקדמות לפתרון המשבר תקשה על ארה"ב לסייע לו במחום הכלכלי. עד כאן פירוט הנושאים שנידונו. דיווחים משלימים (בעקבות שיחות הממשל) ישלחו בהמשך.

8. לסיכום, במסיבת העיתונאים לסיום הפיסגא המייתם בוש למפגש הי"פסגא לא פסגא"במלטה במהלכה סיכמוהוא וגורבצ'וב לבנות יחסים שיהיו שונים מהותית מהיחסים (שהיו קיימים עד אז) ושילכו "מעבר לבלימה" לתקופה של שתי"פ. מפגש מלטה היווה בו זמנית סיום תקופו המלחמה הקרה ופתיחתה של תקופה חדשה. בפסגת וושינגטון נעשה ניסיון להשלים סד"היי של המלחמו הקרה (נושאי AC) ולהתחיל בפתרון בעיות של תקופת המעבר מהסדר הישן לסדר החדש באירופההפרט וביחסי המעצמות בכלל. מבחינה זו לא השיגה הפסגא את מטרותיה. הבעיות שהי ערב הפיסגא נותרו ללא פתרון. נאמן להשקפתו ביחס לחשיבות הקשר האישי ניצל הנשיא בוג את הפיסגא לבנית יחסי אמון עם גורבצ'וב המזוהה עם הפרסטרואיקה שבהצלחתה יהא כדי להגשים אינטרט אמריקאי.

שטיינג

תפוצה:

Leaders Build Unusual Rapport

'Qualitatively New Relationship' May Be Central Achievement

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Over the last 12 months, the political and military walls have come down between East and West in Europe. In the last four days, to an extent unprecedented since World War II, the personal walls came down between the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The central achievement of the summit may have been the one on display for all to see in the East Room of the White House yesterday morning: the extraordinary rapport of George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev forged in many hours of intense but often very informal discussion. Both men went out of their way to advertise their new closeness.

RELATIONS, From A1

relations of leaders is a perilous thing, some U.S. officials acknowledged, especially when the Soviet leader is in serious and obvious difficulty at home. Members of the Bush team said yesterday, however, that the rapport at the summit was a sign of something deeper than friendly ties: "an identity of purpose," said one official, "to try to work through any problems that come up and to do so in a fashion that will not damage the overall relationship, even if particular issues don't work out."

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who attended all the summits at Gorbachev's side since Reykjavik in 1986, said yesterday that last week's summit was different from all the others. Until this meeting, the two parties were "if not adversaries, then competitors," Akhromeyev said; now "we are facing quite a new phenomenon." If it is too soon to declare all competition over, he added, it has certainly been greatly reduced, opening new possibilities for cooperative action.

These new underpinnings could be tested in the months ahead, especially in dealing with seemingly intractable issues as Germany's military alignment after unification, which is central to the future of Europe, and the struggle of Lithuania and the other Baltic states to secede from the Soviet Union, which is crucial to the future of the U.S.S.R. Gorbachev has heavy stakes riding on both questions, and his positions today are at odds with those of Bush.

Gorbachev, in his opening presentation, called this new rapport the manifestation of a "qualitatively new relationship" between the two nations, and he spoke with feeling about his counterpart as "a political leader who is able, in a very human way, and in a politically responsible way to engage in dialogue and cooperation."

NEWS ANALYSIS

"We have moved a long, long way from the depths of the Cold War," said Bush. "I don't quite know how to quantify it for you, but we could never have had the discussions we had at Camp David yesterday or as we sat in the Oval Office a couple of days before that with President Gorbachev, 20 years ago."

To hinge the policy of nations on the personal

See RELATIONS, A21, Col. 1

There was no tangible move toward compromise on either of those issues during the just-completed summit, but Bush and Gorbachev seem to have found ways to talk about them candidly and explore the possibility of later shifts without making such imposing problems a test or touchstone of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. This appears to represent abandonment of the policy of "linking" Soviet actions in one field to U.S. reactions in others.

Bush's decision on Friday afternoon to sign the U.S.-Soviet trade pact, a reversal of an earlier Bush decision not to do so because of the Lithuania issue, was an earnest of his determination to keep the overall relationship on track despite important differences. Gorbachev made an intense and very personal appeal for the trade agreement as the one item of summit business that could have important political clout with the Soviet people. Bush's decision was depicted by Soviet observers as extremely important to Gorbachev, showing that the U.S. president was willing to support the Soviet leader's *perestroika* program—and Gorbachev himself—even at some political cost to Bush in the United States.

The signing of the trade agreement Friday was by no means the only special consideration shown by Bush to Gorbachev. The American president went out of his way at every turn to discourage the idea that he is dealing with a weakened leader. Regardless of any calculation of weakness or strength, Bush said in the East Room yesterday, he and Gorbachev "have a unique responsibility to deal with world peace. . . . No other countries have the

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same degree of responsibility that the Soviet Union and the United States have." In another unusual gesture, Bush provided Gorbachev Saturday night with the text of the opening statement he planned to make at their joint news conference yesterday morning, some of it stating bluntly positions at odds with those of the Soviet leader.

All this is light years away from the interaction of U.S. and Soviet leaders from 1945 to 1985 and significantly different from the relationship of Gorbachev with Ronald Reagan, which broke the mold of hostility and thus made history. Philosophically and politically, Gorbachev and Reagan were an odd couple, one a scrappy pragmatist, the other a romantic who dealt in powerful symbols. A Soviet official who came here from Moscow last week recalled Gorbachev's private vow the night before the 1985 Geneva summit to treat Reagan with the respect due to an older man, and he did so throughout four summits and a farewell luncheon in New York.

Gorbachev and Bush, said a senior U.S. official who watched them in intimate meetings here, are much closer to being peers—"broadly similar kinds of people—activists, enthusiasts," both with a detailed grasp of political events around the world.

The long road that brought about the extraordinary dialogue of Soviet and American leaders in the East Room, side by side at an antique table, ran through Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, Moscow and Malta. If U.S.-Soviet summits now become a regular occurrence, as Bush and Gorbachev announced yesterday they would, successive meetings may be less fascinating and spectacular. That assumes, of course, that the new rapport between the formerly hostile powers is more than skin deep.

Staff writer R. Jeffrey Smith contributed to this report.

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Soviet Says West Can't Unilaterally Reshape Europe

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

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President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declared yesterday that they have launched superpower relations into a new phase of cooperation and stability marked by a deepened personal rapport, but acknowledged that their differences over Germany and Lithuania were not surmounted at the summit.

Seated before an audience of senior advisers and journalists in the White House East Room for a news conference televised live in both nations, the two leaders sprinkled their remarks with expressions of respect for each other. "We have established a rapport," Gorbachev said, recalling that at the last Washington summit he had concluded that Bush "is the kind of person to do business with." Bush said, "We've moved a long, long way from the depths of the Cold War."

For all the personal chemistry on display, both leaders also conceded that underlying frictions remain as the relationship changes and the Cold War map of Europe is redrawn. "I'm not sure we narrowed them," Bush said of disagreements over the future alignment of a unified Germany, which he has insisted be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "We could not resolve this issue in Washington," the Soviet president agreed.

Gorbachev delivered an emotional appeal that the Soviet Union not be isolated by the West as the new European order is shaped. He warned "in no uncertain terms" that any plan for Europe "would be doomed" without both superpowers' "active participation."

Gorbachev also insisted that the death in World War II of 27 million Soviet citizens gives Moscow "a moral right" to insist on security guarantees once Germany is reunited so that "everything that was obtained at such tremendous cost, that so many sacrifices would not spell new perils."

Asked about the emotional issue of emigration by Soviet Jews to Israel, Gorbachev raised the possibility of slowing the flow of exit visas unless Israel heeded Arab complaints about resettlement of the emigres in territories occupied by Israel. He said Moscow is being "bombarded by a lot of criti-

See SUMMIT, A18, Col. 1

2 Leaders Hail New Phase Of Cooperation, Stability

SUMMIT, From A1

cism" in "acute terms" from Arab leaders about this, Israel denies making any deliberate effort to steer the Soviet Jews to the occupied territories.

Gorbachev's comments brought quick protests from Israel and from American Jewish groups. Bush reiterated that the United States opposes settlement in the occupied territories, a long-standing matter of dispute with Israel.

Bush was on the defensive about his surprise decision at the summit to sign a trade pact with Moscow even though the Soviet Union has not relaxed its economic embargo against Lithuania. He acknowledged that he will not make Lithuania an issue in deciding whether to grant most favored nation trade status to the Soviet Union. He described Lithuania as one of "the political problems we face" from Congress. "We've got a Congress that has its rights," he said.

Bush said his only condition for approving most favored nation status is Soviet passage of a long-delayed law codifying Soviet emigration policy.

Bush said he had protested the Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania but received no assurances from Gorbachev that it would be lifted.

Gorbachev had lobbied Bush hard for approval of the trade pact from their first meeting on Thursday, even though the accord itself will have little practical affect until the trade status is approved.

Bush described the disagreement over Lithuania's efforts to gain independence as "one of the thorns" in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He noted that the United States has never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, but he did not press Gorbachev in the news conference to begin a dialogue with the Lithuanian leaders, which Bush has sought previously.

Gorbachev vowed not to give in to the demands for immediate secession. Although he had recently suggested to a group of Lithuanian legislators in Moscow that independence might be achieved in two or three years, yesterday he took a hard line, saying "no fewer than five or seven years would be required for us to sort things out" after "divorce proceedings."

Gorbachev cast the Lithuanian bid for independence as a fundamental challenge to his responsibilities under the Soviet constitution. "I keep saying that President Bush would have resolved an issue like this within 24 hours, and he would have restored the validity of his constitution within 24 hours on any state," he said.

In forceful and animated answers, Gorbachev also confronted much of the West-

ern skepticism about his program of restructuring, or *perestroika*, and the doubts about his own position in the face of public discontent and the rise of populist Boris Yeltsin to an important political post. This remarkable airing of his problems was punctuated by a question to Gorbachev about Yeltsin from a Soviet correspondent for Izvestia, the government newspaper. Seemingly startled that it even came up, Gorbachev said, "I don't think you have chosen the best place for clarifying our internal problems." He then shrugged it off with, "C'est la vie," and questioned whether Yeltsin's latest statements were sincere.

Appealing for understanding from his American audience, Gorbachev said of his reforms, "I don't think we have ever tackled a task like this in the history of our country."

"At this point in time, the Soviet Union is deep into profound change. . . . We are walking away from one particular way of life, toward different forms of life. We are changing our political system. We are introducing a new model in economy," he said, describing his goal as making the Soviet Union "more open to the outside world."

The accompanying tumult "confirms not only the fact that we're cleaning up our courtyard, we're really revamping our entire society," he said. "How long will Gorbachev stay in his office?" the Soviet president asked in a rhetorical reference to the doubts about his political survivability. "Even this, I think, fits into this process of profound change." With a twinge of irritation, he added, "And perhaps this is something we cannot do without."

From the opening ceremony of the summit last Thursday, Bush praised Gorbachev as an agent of change not only in the Soviet Union but around the globe. Gorbachev echoed this view yesterday. "Today the pivotal point of world politics is *perestroika* in the Soviet Union," he said.

The leaders promised to hold regular summits. Gorbachev invited Bush to visit the Soviet Union but Baker said a date for the next meeting had not yet been set. The two presidents also hailed the agreements they reached on reducing chemical weapons and strategic nuclear arms.

On the issue of Germany, Secretary of State James A. Baker III later disclosed that in the summit talks Gorbachev floated a "very vague" suggestion that NATO and the Warsaw Pact reach a new "political agreement" to assuage Soviet concerns about future European security arrangements. He said the Soviets offered no details and while the United States is willing to explore it, such an agreement could not supplant the security role of the Western alliance. A senior U.S. official said later that the idea was viewed as

one of many, including the possibility of Gorbachev at the summit by Bush, that would defuse Soviet fear of a resurgent Germany.

Although they did not bridge their disagreement over Germany, both leaders said they found it worthwhile to air views face-to-face. When they last met at Malta, the hard-line communist regimes of Eastern Europe were just beginning to collapse. This was the first U.S.-Soviet summit devoted to discussion of a new European security order as Moscow's old allies, Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, move toward democracy.

Bush said in his opening statement that he and Gorbachev are in "full agreement" that a united Germany's alliance membership is "a matter for the Germans to decide," as provided in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. A senior administration official said that when Bush made such a statement during the summit discussion of Germany on Thursday, Gorbachev agreed with him that it should be left to the Germans.

But as Gorbachev talked about Germany in the news conference yesterday, he also insisted that the West could not simply impose its alliance on the new German state. If Western-alliance membership for Germany is "the only option," he said, "and some would like to impose it on us," then the Soviet Union would reevaluate its willingness to reduce conventional weapons in Europe at the negotiations in Vienna.

Gorbachev again asserted that Germany's future alignment could be decided in the continuing talks by the two German states and the four victorious World War II allies. The United States has resisted this.

U.S. officials said the two leaders talked extensively about Germany on the first day of the summit and never returned to it at any length. They said the administration now assumes that months of negotiations will be required to settle Germany's status.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a top military adviser to Gorbachev who participated in many of the summit meetings, said yesterday that one option offered by the Soviet was to strip NATO and the Warsaw Pact of their military functions and make them purely political organizations. He said the military command of each alliance would be disbanded. U.S. officials said the Soviets also suggested that Germany be made a member of both alliances.

Baker, appearing on NBC News "Meet the Press," was asked about a recent Soviet suggestion that Moscow apply for NATO membership. He recalled that the Atlantic Charter, NATO's founding document, called for membership by full democracies, and the Soviet Union, "while they're moving toward democracy and openness, might have some distance yet to go to meet that qualification." Baker said he had to "wonder out loud whether Moscow would be willing to put Soviet forces under NATO control since American traditionally serves as supreme allied commander.

Staff writers R. Jeffrey Smith and Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

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The two pledged to meet on a regular basis.

No doubt things have come "a long, long way from the depths of the cold war," as President Bush commented. But there are limits on personal diplomacy, even in an era of good feelings. Between May 1972 and November 1974 four summit meetings took place, and after the fourth one, in Siberia, Gerald R. Ford spoke hopefully of "the spirit of Vladivostok."

But that proved inadequate to overcome fundamental disagreements — the next summit conference did not come until 1979 — and the "constructive spirit" of which Mr. Gorbachev spoke may not suffice in the weeks and months ahead.

A protracted debate about the rival visions of the new Europe now seems highly likely, with a substantial possibility that progress in the negotiations in Vienna on conventional forces will prove impossible to achieve and that the summit meeting of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now scheduled to take place late this year in Paris, will be delayed.

The United States is ready to see that rather inchoate organization gain a more formal structure and a larger role. But the Soviet Union, which belongs to no other important pan-European organization, wants to make it the centerpiece of the new Europe, which is an entirely different matter.

"We are talking about building an all-European security system and casting the issue of German unification, its external aspects, within the context of that larger European security framework," Vitaly Churkin, a senior adviser to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said in an interview over the weekend.

Many Western European officials, as well as many here, see that idea as "a trap that would give the Soviets a veto like the one they have in the United Nations, in fact if not in law," as a ranking Italian official argued recently. A British diplomat said that an organization with 35 members "would quickly become a talking shop, incapable of making decisions."

But there is some support, among politicians as well as policy experts, for the Soviet idea, or some modified version of it. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, has called for a pan-European "conflict-resolution center," and President François Mitterrand of France supports a loose European confederation.

U.S. Role in Europe

Leaders of the newly democratic East European countries, including President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, see the Conference on Security and Cooperation as their only chance for a link to Western Europe, so they too support the idea that something new, beyond NATO and the moribund Warsaw Pact, must be created to handle European security.

In an article in the current issue of World Policy Journal, Malcolm Chalmers of Stanford University argues for the creation of a European Security Organization, based on the Conference on Security and Cooperation, with only a

residual, transitional role for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Only such an organization, he says, would reassure the Soviet Union, buttress German sovereignty and guarantee a role in Europe for the United States.

Nearly everything about the debate remains murky. One of the things the United States has promised the Soviet Union, to combat Moscow's fear that a unified Germany would be joining an alliance hostile to Soviet interests, is that NATO will be transformed into a more political organization. The process is supposed to begin at a NATO summit conference in London in a month.

Revivifying NATO — giving it some *raison d'être* other than defense against a threat from the East that is rapidly vanishing — is a crucial matter for the United States, Mr. Bush believes, because NATO gives Washington its sole institutional voice in Europe.

But every time in the past that NATO has tried to agree on something other than the common defense against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, things have gone wrong — whether the question was the Suez invasion in the 1950's or the overflight of United States planes on the way to Libya in the 1980's.

The danger lurking down the road, in the American view, is not the application of a new Soviet noose to Berlin, or

Will the 'constructive spirit' of the talks suffice?

even a rancorous Soviet decision to break off negotiations on the German question. The positive tenor of the conversations here seems to make those two eventualities unlikely, at least for as long as Mr. Gorbachev or another reformer remains in power.

But a prolonged deadlock would carry its own sorts of perils.

"If Moscow should refuse to leave Germany," says Michael Mandelbaum of the Council on Foreign Relations, "and its refusal became a major point of conflict with the West, this would, in effect, re-create the political conflict on which the great East-West rivalry of the postwar period was based."

For Moscow, the stakes are immense. In the century since 1890, Russia and Germany, the two largest and strongest European countries, have been almost constantly at odds. Now the Soviet Union, already economically weakened, faces the prospect of losing its military power in central Europe.

"It's going to require tremendous finesse on our part to manage this kind of unsettled situation," said Robert D. Hormats, a former official of the State Department and the National Security Council. "The analogy to Germany post-World War I, is very close. We can't afford to isolate them, leave them to brood about losing the cold war, let their economy collapse. If we do, as a last resort, they'll play on neutralist emotions in Germany, which are already too widespread for comfort."

The Doubts That Linger

Question of Germany Remains Intractable

By R. W. APPLE JR.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — For months, senior American officials have expressed confidence that President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would give way, if offered enough inducements, and agree to NATO membership for a united Germany, thus settling the most intractable issue facing Moscow and Washington.

But that confidence is fading fast. After three days of talks between President Bush and the Soviet leader, which produced no real progress on the German question and the shape of post-cold war Europe, top United States policy-makers say they are beginning to believe that Mr. Gorbachev's delicate political situation may be too delicate for him to make such a concession at any time soon, and that a protracted period of ambiguity may result.

"It may well be that the only way he can resolve his dilemma is to string the process out, let Germany go ahead with political and economic reunification and stall on the military side," said an American official who played a significant role in the Bush-Gorbachev summit conference here. "West Germany would stay in NATO and the Soviet troops would stay in East Germany."

"Unfortunately, with so many security questions undecided, the situation might prove dangerous."

Fewer Cheers at Home

In domestic political terms, Mr. Bush emerged from last week's events with Germany in doubt, Lithuania unresolved and perhaps a few political problems on the trade agreement. But he will find that easy enough to live with, given his broad popularity. For Mr. Gorbachev, on the other hand, the acclaim he won in the streets of Washington is unlikely to be repeated at home. His public-relations triumph here is not likely to ease his struggle for survival.

At their news conference this morning, the two Presidents made much of the relationship they have built, and a few White House officials say they believe that personal chemistry will eventually dissolve the policy stalemate. Mr. Gorbachev promised not to "put spokes in the wheels" and said negotiations on Germany would continue.

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Conventional Arms Pact, Germany Question Tied

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The decision by U.S. and Soviet leaders not to grapple extensively during the summit with the security questions raised by the unification of Germany leaves much to be done if a new treaty on conventional arms reductions is to be signed before the end of 1990, U.S. and Soviet officials said yesterday.

The officials acknowledged yesterday that although a new treaty reducing European conventional forces has not been officially linked with an accord on Germany, the two issues are inescapably intertwined in political terms.

Previously, the United States had rejected the Soviet contention that Moscow could not participate in any demilitarization of the continent unless Germany's future military capabilities have been satisfactorily limited. But the public and private remarks of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on this score evidently won some grudging U.S. acceptance.

"We're quite comfortable proceeding with . . . [a new treaty on European conventional forces] at its own timetable," national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said on Cable News Network. "But I think the Soviets, since [the treaty] would deal with the issue of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, would like to link the two."

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a senior adviser to Gorbachev on arms matters who took part in many of Gorbachev's discussions with Bush last week, explained the Soviet position in an interview yesterday. "At this point, we do not link the Vienna talks with a solution of the German question because we do not want to interfere with the completion of the agreement," Akhromeyev said. "But once we do have a treaty prepared for signing, I personally cannot imagine how Gorbachev could sign the prepared treaty without a solution" to the German question.

Gorbachev said at a joint news conference with Bush that the conventional arms negotiations in Vienna could be slowed, if not halted, if the West imposed its own view that a unified German state must join the existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Then we should go back and see where we are: What's happening to our security? What should we be doing with our armed forces? What should we do about Vienna?" he asked.

U.S. officials interpreted this allusion to a potential withdrawal of past Soviet commitments for sweeping new arms reductions as a sign that Gorbachev wants additional leverage in negotiations with the West.

Akhromeyev said he could not accept a

Western view that the process of German reunification is "out of control" and beyond any influence by Soviet leaders distracted by immense domestic problems or undermined by defecting Warsaw Pact allies. He cited his nation's continued, post-war right to station troops in East Germany as another potent lever in the debate.

U.S. officials said the two sides may consequently be forced to settle simultaneously the issue of Germany's potential membership in the Western alliance, the future character of the alliance, the possibility of some constraints on German and allied Western troops, and the myriad details associated with a new arms accord between 23 nations. Gorbachev reiterated yesterday that he hopes to sign such an agreement at a summit involving the 35 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation before the end of the year.

Akhromeyev, reflecting comments by Gorbachev and other Soviet officials, said at one point that Moscow "could not abide" the integration of German military forces into the unified NATO military command—an act that would essentially place them under U.S. control. He said this was unacceptable even as a short term solution while NATO was undergoing reform, citing a Russian proverb: "There is nothing as permanent as something that is considered to be temporary."

But Akhromeyev also said, "What we do need is a show of goodwill," hinting, along with other Soviet officials, that a compromise may be possible if Gorbachev can tell his domestic critics of a Western concession. Indicating some new Soviet flexibility, he said "one option" may be to eliminate the military component of NATO's command structure, and allow German membership in a Western alliance structured to consider "purely" political issues. Under such an arrangement, there would be "no need for [alliance] military doctrines—they would disappear."

He said an alternative solution might be found in the proposal of West Germany's minority Social Democratic party, to establish a unified European military alliance with just five members: the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, Britain and France. Military officers from each country would be assigned to work in a headquarters at a site to be determined later.

Asked if Bush demonstrated an appreciation of Gorbachev's concerns about a potential Russian backlash to Germany's membership in NATO, Akhromeyev said: "Bush has a position of his own. He tries to convince us that the U.S. position would be beneficial for the Soviet Union." Although this is a mistake, Akhromeyev said, the two sides laid the foundation at the summit for further work that can lead to accommodation.

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GERMAN STALEMATE

Baltics and New Soviet Stand on Emigration Cloud Trade Pact

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev concluded their second summit conference today with warm talk of amity, but with little progress toward resolving their most divisive disputes over Germany and Lithuania.

A possible new difficulty emerged at a final joint news conference in the White House when Mr. Gorbachev nettled the Bush Administration with a warning that he might consider holding up Jewish emigration unless Israel guaranteed that Soviet Jews would not be resettled in the occupied territories. [Key sections from the news conference, pages A14 and A15.]

American officials said such action would further complicate what already promised to be a tough fight over approval of the trade treaty signed just two days ago, which is predicated on legal codification of improvements in Soviet emigration policy.

Reaction From Israelis

The seriousness of Mr. Gorbachev's threat remains to be seen. Israeli officials said today that they were not encouraging Soviet Jews to settle in occupied areas, and that only a very small number of the 10,000 Soviet Jews arriving monthly had sought to live there. But Israel has shown no sign so far that it would be willing to prevent immigrants from going there. [Page A11.]

Despite their words of mutual respect, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev said they remained at odds over the Kremlin's test of wills with leaders of the Baltic republics, who have declared independence from the Soviet Union. But before Mr. Gorbachev left Washington for stops in Minnesota and San Francisco, Mr. Bush did offer a gesture to the Kremlin by saying he was not formally linking the issue of Lithuanian independence with the decision on when to submit the newly signed trade agreement for Senate consideration.

The only linkage, he said, was to Soviet passage of a law permitting unfettered emigration. But other American officials have said there is little chance for approval of the trade pact while Moscow maintains its oil and

Continued From Page A1

natural gas blockade of Lithuania.

After three days of intensive talks the two Presidents said they had made no movement toward an understanding on the future alignment of the two Germans, which are headed for unification. The United States and other Western countries say a united Germany should be part of NATO, while the Soviet side wants Germany's future to be overseen by an all-Europe council.

Today, as throughout the summit meeting, there were frequent reminders of Mr. Gorbachev's domestic political and economic problems, which have shown a tendency to intrude into Soviet-American relations.

But the two Presidents' final hours together before Mr. Gorbachev's departure were marked by repeated expressions of confidence in their ability to resolve problems. They issued two additional joint statements, one about joint efforts to end the civil war in Ethiopia and the other about cooperation on environmental questions.

They announced plans to meet more frequently, perhaps in annual working meetings that lack the ceremony and political expectations of a formal summit conference, which is usually arranged for signing major agreements.

"We're now at the stage in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and, indeed, in world history where we should miss no opportunity to complete the extraordinary tasks before us," Mr. Bush said.

A 'New Relationship'

Mr. Gorbachev, who seemed to revel in Mr. Bush's respect and in the applause of the American public, spoke of a "qualitatively new relationship." He offered extraordinary praise to Mr. Bush "as a political leader who is able, in a very human way, and in a politically responsible way, to engage in dialogue and cooperation."

The summit conference ended this morning much as it began on Thursday morning, with ceremonies that dramatized the markedly different tone of the meeting itself and of Soviet-American relations.

At the North Portico of the White House, the Presidents' wives, Raisa Gorbachev and Barbara Bush, embraced as their husbands went through the formalities of a departure ceremony before the Gorbachevs left on a trip to Minneapolis and San Francisco. Mr. Gorbachev paused for a moment before a cheering crowd, his hands clasped like a victorious boxer, before sweeping off in his Zil limousine.

An hour earlier, the two leaders had walked together down a red-carpeted hallway to the East Room. They sat before reporters, certainly not as allies, but as friendly rivals talking about banishing suspicion and emphasizing the importance of the documents signed here on Friday, including commitments to reduce their long-range nuclear arms and to make deep cuts in stockpiles of poison gas.

Taking Risks to Help Gorbachev

Mr. Bush's position on Lithuania seemed to symbolize the change. Having moved from a policy of support for Soviet reform to one of backing Mr. Gorbachev personally, Mr. Bush has now demonstrated himself willing not only to have a new kind of dialogue with Mr. Gorbachev, but also to take political risks to help him.

After days of saying it would be difficult to improve commercial ties when the Kremlin was squeezing Lithuania with economic sanctions, Mr. Bush said today that the Lithuanian situation

would not keep him from offering the new trade treaty to the Senate.

Although this position seemed certain to inflame members of Congress who have already expressed doubts about the treaty, Mr. Bush said he would send the document to the Senate and recommend removing tariff and credit restrictions as soon as the Soviet Union enacted a promised new emigration law.

Mr. Bush said he did not "want to mislead the American people and say that I have lessened my concern over the Baltic states," Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. He said the Soviet Union's actions in Lithuania were "thorns in the side of an overall relationship."

But he said the only "linkage" between other issues and the granting of trade concessions to Moscow was the United States' insistence that the more liberal Soviet emigration policies be codified into law. Once the Soviet Union fulfills its promise to enact a new emigration bill, Mr. Bush said, "we go forward" on the trade agreement.

Issue of Israeli Settlements

Although American officials remain confident that the Soviet Union will enact the new law, Mr. Gorbachev added a new wrinkle to the issue when he was asked how the Soviet Union and United States could guarantee that

The two sides are still at odds over German unity and the Baltics.

Soviet Jews who emigrated to Israel would not settle on occupied land in the West Bank.

Arab leaders say they fear that if Soviet Jews move to the West Bank in massive numbers, they will inevitably displace Palestinian Arabs, making impossible their goal of an independent Palestinian entity.

Mr. Gorbachev said he had been "bombarded by criticism" from Arab governments on this issue. He said that if Israel did not offer assurances that Soviet Jews would not settle on occupied territory, "we must give further thought to it in terms of what we can do with issuing permits for exit."

Continued on Page A11, Column 1

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Joint Effort In Ethiopia Seen Vital

*Soviets to Fly In Food
Provided by the U.S.*

By Neil Henry
Washington Post Foreign Service

ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast, June 3—The agreement between the United States and Soviet Union to launch an unprecedented joint food-supply operation to northern Ethiopia signals a major breakthrough in international efforts to bring relief to a famine-plagued, war-ravaged region in which an estimated 5 million people are threatened with starvation.

The agreement, reached during the just-concluded meeting between President Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, underscores growing concern in the devastated region as the onset of Ethiopian rainy season threatens to make many roads to the hardest-hit areas impassable.

In a joint statement, the two powers—whose Cold War policies were played out in disastrous regional conflict in the Horn of Africa over the last two decades—agreed Saturday to "work together and combine their assets" by transporting an unspecified amount of U.S. food to Ethiopia aboard Soviet aircraft.

The U.S. and Soviets also agreed to seek a special United Nations conference of governments to try to mediate an end to the East African nation's 30-year-old civil war.

The U.S.-Soviet agreement came in conjunction with an announcement by the Marxist Ethiopian government of President Mengistu Haile Mariam that it is willing to allow food relief to pass through the Red Sea port of Massawa. The port, considered crucial to effective U.N. relief operations to the drought-stricken provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, has been out of operation since February, when the latest round of fighting began between government troops and rebels of the Eritrean Peoples'

Liberation Front. The rebels have held the port for three months, but it has suffered extensive damage under government bombing.

The Soviet Union, for more than a decade the chief economic and military benefactor of Mengistu's government, has sharply cut its support in recent years. Faced with shortages of equipment and beset by low morale, the beleaguered regime has suffered sharp setbacks in battles with Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels since last autumn.

The Eritrean rebels are fighting for the region's independence, while the Tigrayans are fighting to overthrow Mengistu. The government charges that the two rebel groups have fought in tandem recently.

The Ethiopian fighting has continued with little respite in the last few weeks, and rebels claimed today that they had killed 1,200 government troops in two recent battles.

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Using a formula that he employs when he wants to suggest that his options are limited, Mr. Gorbachev said, "Some people are raising the matter in these terms in the Soviet Union, namely, as long as there are no assurances from the Israelis that this is not going to be done by them, postpone issuing permits for exit."

American Jewish groups immediately protested Mr. Gorbachev's comments. The president of the American Jewish Committee, Sholom D. Comay, said, "Only a tiny fraction of the tens of thousands of Soviet Jews who have arrived in Israel recently have settled in the occupied areas."

'We Oppose New Settlements'

Mr. Bush said, "The United States policy on settlement in the occupied territories is unchanged and it is clear, and that is, we oppose new settlements." But he did not comment directly on Mr. Gorbachev's remarks.

Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, said in an interview: "The Soviets are under enormous pressure from the Arab world. I'm presuming that this is a reaction to

it on his part in hopes of getting the Israelis to restrict where immigrants will settle."

Mr. Scowcroft said that any Soviet action delaying emigration visas for Jews would complicate the fate of the trade treaty.

The seriousness of Mr. Gorbachev's warning clearly depends on Israel's response. Today, Israeli officials, already under pressure from the United States, said they would assure Mr. Gorbachev that they did not encourage Jewish settlement in the occupied territories.

Mr. Bush said today that he and Mr. Gorbachev had "intensive discussions on the transforming events in Europe." He said he had told Mr. Gorbachev repeatedly that he and other members of the Western alliance believed that a united Germany should be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

'For the Germans to Decide'

"President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view," Mr. Bush said. "But we are in full agreement that the matter of alliance membership is, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide."

The Helsinki document, which was signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and 33 other governments in 1975, recognizes the right to national self-determination. Administration officials said they did not read much significance into the comment, saying it seemed to reflect a general Soviet affirmation of the Helsinki agreement rather than a specific sign that Moscow is ready to accept German membership in NATO.

Mr. Bush said he and Mr. Gorbachev had a clearer understanding of their differences on this issue. "But I'm not sure we narrowed them," he said.

A Long Way in 20 Years

Mr. Bush demurred when asked if he thought the two countries were closer to being allies than adversaries. "We've moved a long, long way from the depths of the cold war," he said. "I don't quite know how to quantify it for you, but we could never have had the discussions at Camp David yesterday, or as we sat in the Oval Office a couple of days before with President Gorbachev, 20 years ago."

But Mr. Bush spoke passionately of his effort to persuade Mr. Gorbachev to acquiesce in the membership of a united Germany in NATO. "The threat is unpredictability and instability," he said. "We feel that a continued U.S. presence in Europe should not be seen as hostile to Soviet interests."

Mr. Gorbachev, who has said he does not oppose an American military presence in Europe but does not want NATO to be the pre-eminent security force in Europe, did not press the issue. Instead, he focused on the personal rapport between him and Mr. Bush.

"I don't know whether anyone will ever be able to say that we know each other totally well or completely," he said. "I think that would take many, many years. But now we have a good human relationship and, I think, a good human atmosphere between us."

He spoke with obvious enthusiasm about the reception he had received in Washington. He said, "I would like to say huth to the Americans and to the Soviet people that here we, the Soviet delegation, have felt very good feelings of the American people, feelings of solidarity and a lot of interest from the Americans toward what we are doing in the Soviet Union for perestroika."

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Feeding Egos

U.S. and Soviets Will Seek to Prevent Ethiopia Famine

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — The United States and the Soviet Union said today that they will work together to avert a famine in Ethiopia and announced that the Ethiopian Government has removed a major obstacle to the delivery of relief supplies.

President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, in a statement on Ethiopia issued at the conclusion of their four days of talks, said that joint diplomatic efforts had succeeded in persuading the Government of Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam to stop bombing Massawa, the Eritrean guerrilla-held port, in order to enable food to enter the country.

"This is a major advance over where the United States and the Soviet Union were a year ago in cooperation on African issues," said Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. "I'm very pleased because the port of Massawa is the highest priority for saving potential victims."

Mr. Cohen said the Soviet-allied Ethiopian Government had made its decision to stop bombing Massawa two days ago and estimated that one million people could be fed from supplies delivered to the Red Sea port.

But before food shipments begin to come through Massawa, United Nations technicians will have to survey the port to examine war damage and see if there are adequate facilities for docking and unloading. Delays could take weeks at least.

Today's announcement was the first indication that American-Soviet cooperation to end the Ethiopian war was



Ethiopia agreed to allow food supplies through Massawa.

producing results. The struggle between the Ethiopian Government and separatist guerrillas from Eritrea province has raged since 1962. Fighting has intensified in the last few months as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front has taken Massawa and encircled the provincial capital, Asmara.

The war, compounded by a second separatist war in Tigre province, immediately south of Eritrea, has exacerbated the effects of drought and collectivized economic policies to bring a series of famines to Ethiopia in recent years. Currently 3 million people, of a total population of 56 million, are at risk of starving.

Peace negotiations mediated by former President Jimmy Carter broke off in December, when Addis Ababa

refused to go along with an Eritrean proposal to include a United Nations observer in the talks.

The three-paragraph American-Soviet statement issued today indicated that the Ethiopian Government has now removed that obstacle by agreeing to include a United Nations representative in the process.

But a top Administration policymaker said Addis Ababa's decision may have come too late to resume a dialogue because the military situation has deteriorated so far in so short a time. The Eritreans are expected to mount a large-scale offensive this month to take Asmara — an action that would effectively slice off Eritrea from the rest of the country — as the rainy season grounds the Ethiopian Air Force.

Food Will Be Delivered

In their statement, the Soviet and American Presidents announced an agreement to cooperate in delivering food aid to 100,000 people living in regions isolated by the war. Soviet AN-24 transport planes, now used to deploy Ethiopian military units and supplies, will soon be used to supply American-supplied sorghum and rice. Before the airlifts can go into high gear, the Soviets must repair or replace four planes sabotaged by guerrillas last month.

The statement said the two Governments will support a United Nations conference to consider how to resolve the Ethiopian conflict. Mr. Gorbachev proposed the idea to Mr. Bush at Camp David. "Nothing is planned yet on that," Mr. Cohen said. "We'll have to flesh that out now."

Mr. Cohen expressed hope that ef-

orts by the United States and the Soviet Union to resolve the conflict in Ethiopia would soon expand to similar efforts to negotiate a conclusion to the guerrilla war in Angola.

Washington has been urging the Soviet Union to press Ethiopia to negotiate a settlement of its war for two years. About a year ago, Administration officials say, Moscow came to the conclusion that President Mengistu could not win. In the last few weeks, Moscow put Ethiopia on notice that it would significantly cut military aid next year as a pressure point to negotiate.

Baker Trip

The United States effort to enlist Moscow's cooperation in ending the conflict and relieving the Ethiopian food shortage reached a high point last month during Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d's visit to Moscow, when the Soviets agreed in principle to work together on airlifting supplies.

Since then the Soviets and Americans have coordinated efforts, with Moscow explicitly telling Addis Ababa to negotiate an end to the fighting and Washington offering to upgrade relations in return for reopening the port.

President Mengistu's problems were compounded two weeks ago when 12 senior military officers accused of involvement in an attempted coup were executed.

Representative Tony P. Hall, Democrat of Ohio, chairman of the House Committee on Hunger, hailed today's statement as a "mighty victory." He added: "Now, I think, we'll begin to see what superpower cooperation can do to benefit people all over the globe."

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OK

If Soviet Leader Harbors Worries, It Doesn't Show

By Bill McAllister and Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Staff Writers

If Mikhail Gorbachev was nervous or distracted by problems back in the Soviet Union, he did not let it show to Americans who talked or ate with him during his Washington summit with President Bush.

Guests at two formal dinners, a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy and a meeting of congressional leaders at the embassy said the Soviet president exuded self-confidence and appeared unworried by events elsewhere. Minnesotans who met him yesterday agreed. In his manner, style and words, Gorbachev surprised many who had expected to find a leader who was worn and worried.

"Gorbachev is not down in any sense," said Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "He is up, he still has his sense of humor and he has incredible energy."

"I was very struck by his confidence, his ebullience," said Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who also was in the congressional delegation that met with the Soviet leader Friday. "He doesn't seem to be a man in any state of concern about his own fate."

Whitney MacMillan, chairman and chief executive officer of Cargill Inc., dined with Gorbachev in Moscow last week and met him yesterday for the fourth time during a business roundtable in Minneapolis. "I find him a very self-confident, very energetic individual. . . . There is something that is religious about his vision for the future of Russia," MacMillan said.

Roger Hale, chief executive officer of Tennant Company, a manufacturer of industrial cleaning equipment and a roundtable participant, said he was struck by "the ability to be serious yet have a pleasant, forceful appearance about him—no peculiar twitches, no mannerisms. He's just right there."

Ian Martin, president and chief executive officer of Pillsbury Co., added that he "was enormously impressed" by Gorbachev and "found him inspiring."

Meredith Brokaw, wife of NBC-TV's Tom Brokaw, who was at the White House dinner Thursday night, said she was won over by Gorbachev's "big grin, jovial, like he was at ease." But, then, she added: "He is an old hand at this. He has been at state dinners before."

"I found him to be genuine and sincere and relaxed," said Walter V. Shipley, chief executive officer of Chemical Bank of New York, who sat two seats away from Gorbachev during that dinner. When Shipley asked about the Soviet leader's boyhood, the banker said Gorbachev launched into "a feeling discussion about his growing up in a small village and the agricultural section, the tough war years [and] how much he missed the simple life."

Shipley said he was impressed. "I commented that I felt, I could see in him that background, the sensitivity, the qualities that flow from that background."

Former Sen. Eugene McCarthy gave a mixed review to Gorbachev's luncheon meeting with a group of American intellectuals. ". . . He had no adversaries, so there was no need to be tough. It was like nuns talking to the pope," McCarthy said. ". . . He rambled a little bit, but I thought it was pretty much appropriate for the group and the event."

Roderick Hills, husband of Caria A. Hills, the U.S. trade representative who sat next to Gorbachev at the White House dinner, said his wife found Gorbachev fully in control: "He was quite precise, quite in command, quite willing to speak both philosophically and materially about the events, quite understanding about the need to move toward free economy and open trade, quite aware of the precise things that have to be done and understanding of the ambiguity with which two countries try to form a new relationship."

Washington Post Publisher Donald E. Graham, who also sat at the table with Gorbachev, said: "I was struck by how good he seemed. He makes immediate direct eye contact with each person he talks to. He's always close to a smile. . . . As he spoke at the state dinner, delivering his toast, you could see that as he read his speech, he was twiddling his thumbs the whole time."

"There is some ceremonial aspect of this that must bore him by now, but I thought he seemed engaged and interested," Graham said. "At the state dinner, he and Bush looked much more fresh and vigorous than some of their aides did, who had been up late."

James H. Billington, the librarian of Congress, a fluent Russian-speaker who met Gorbachev twice last week as well as during his earlier visit to Washington, said, "This is a man who has certain constants in his persona, who impresses you by sharing with you his problems as well as his viewpoints."

"He does have a magnetic directness, but it's always at the service of a political objective," Billington said. "By constantly comparing him to the style of previous [Soviet] leaders rather than by examining the substance of what he says and engaging in a discussion of the real problems of the day, we often miss an opportunity to make progress on real problems. . . ."

Staff Writers Tom Kenworthy and John Lancaster contributed to this report.

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Mr. Gorbachev's anxious citizenry, this summit meeting has not even performed the service that statecraft in trouble expect from such events: a distraction from what ails them.

In the former obedient Soviet press, the White House signing ceremony and Camp David golf-cart driving competed for front-page attention with stripped grocery shelves, death in Armenia and the leader of a budding Russian mutiny, Boris N. Yelstin.

Mr. Yelstin, now the President of the Russian republic, conducted his own summit with the Baltic secessionists of Lithuania and Estonia. The Lithuanian President, Vytautas Landsbergis, declared that an inter-republic trade deal was in the works that might circumvent Moscow's economic sanctions against his Baltic state.

Thus, while Mr. Gorbachev was trying to explain in Washington his plan for a rebuilt Soviet federation that would allow various degrees of freedom to the 15 constituent republics, the unruly republics seemed to be negotiating their own new federation in the Soviet President's absence.

The most tangible trophy Mr. Gorbachev takes home for his consumers is a trade agreement, which is a symbol of momentum in his quest for Western economic help. Transforming that symbol into sausage, however, will not be easy.

First, to get the agreement through Congress, Mr. Gorbachev must see an fact that the Soviets produce little that not remove the biggest barrier to increased Soviet-American trade: the emigration law through his own Parliament.

The Costs of Emigration

The emigration measure is considered a sure thing, but the costs have just recently begun sinking in. The free emigration envisioned by the law is expected to accelerate a drain of Soviet talent and of foreign currency. That is one reason the Government was unable to deliver the bill before the summit meeting and is not expected to do so until the fall.

Second, though Mr. Bush no longer links trade relations to the fate of Lithuania, Congress may.

And third, enactment of the law will pool into sausage, however, will not be easy.

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American want to buy, and cannot afford what America sells.

After five years of unkept economic promises, it will take more than a sign-tures on a trade pact to improve the moods of skeptical Soviet consumers.

On the most contentious outstanding issues of Soviet foreign policy — arms control, regional issues and the critical question of Germany's future — the two leaders seem to have found the personal rapport that Mr. Bush prizes so highly in his dealings with foreign leaders, but they did not close any of the great gaps that remain on points of substance.

In effect, Mr. Gorbachev was reconfirmed in his role as a man the West likes to do business with — in other words, the man best qualified to preside over the ebb of Soviet power.

Statements Remain Unbroken

The statements on the treaties to cut long-range nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe remained unbroken.

On arms control, Mr. Gorbachev found himself up against a resurgence of the American conservatives, who have pressed Mr. Bush to insist on further concessions regarding Soviet heavy missiles and bombers. Mr. Bush

For Mr. Gorbachev, the street-carrier adulation and shrewd summit-pleasant reprieve from his domestic troubles, and have shored up for a time his position on the world stage. But when the presidential bonding was over, Mr. Gorbachev had found no cape, and little relief, from the problems awaiting him at home.

What Mr. Gorbachev takes back, by way of the Middle West and California, is an American vote of confidence. Time and again during his meetings here, the Soviet leader sought to refute the impression that he is a man entered by economic and political crises, and his American counterpart graciously played along.

President Bush, putting the relationship above the agenda, bolstered Mr. Gorbachev with public affirmations of respect and trust. Most notably, Mr. Bush announced that he would not make the operation of Lithuania a precondition for the normal trade relations Moscow wants so desperately.

"Bush had all the trump cards, and he didn't play them," said Alexander Bovin, the well-connected Soviet newspaper and television commentator, pleased that in America, at least, there is still faith in perestroika.

But in practical terms, it is hard to see how the summit in any way arrests the Soviet Union's steady retreat from world influence or the inexorable unravelling of the domestic order.

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Back home, the Soviet leader's problems haven't gone away.

By BILL KELLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3 — The most telling moment of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's appearance at the post-summit press conference today came when the man from L'viv, the Soviet Government daily, was recognized for a question.

While the Americans were peppering the Soviet leader with questions on Germany, the Soviet writer, Stanislav N. Kondrashev, dilly dilly "a cooling of interest" back home in international affairs.

"Everybody's concerned with international matters," he told the Soviet leader, who was startled that this splash of cold water should come from the once-predictable hometown press. "Taking advantage of this opportunity, I'd like to ask you, what do you think of your relationship with Yelstin?"

Competition from Yelstin

For Mr. Gorbachev's anxious citizenry, this summit meeting has not even performed the service that statecraft in trouble expect from such events: a distraction from what ails them.

In the former obedient Soviet press, the White House signing ceremony and Camp David golf-cart driving competed for front-page attention with stripped grocery shelves, death in Armenia and the leader of a budding Russian mutiny, Boris N. Yelstin.

Mr. Yelstin, now the President of the Russian republic, conducted his own summit with the Baltic secessionists of Lithuania and Estonia. The Lithuanian President, Vytautas Landsbergis, declared that an inter-republic trade deal was in the works that might circumvent Moscow's economic sanctions against his Baltic state.

Thus, while Mr. Gorbachev was trying to explain in Washington his plan for a rebuilt Soviet federation that would allow various degrees of freedom to the 15 constituent republics, the unruly republics seemed to be negotiating their own new federation in the Soviet President's absence.

The most tangible trophy Mr. Gorbachev takes home for his consumers is a trade agreement, which is a symbol of momentum in his quest for Western economic help. Transforming that symbol into sausage, however, will not be easy.

First, to get the agreement through Congress, Mr. Gorbachev must see an

Back home, the Soviet leader's problems haven't gone away.

Gorbachev May Be a Prophet Without Honor at Home

The Vision of Need-Blind Admissions

Many private colleges face a dilemma over the high cost of need-blind admissions, the practice of accepting students regardless of ability to pay. Two colleges are now responding in different ways. Smith feels driven to cut back on the practice; Barnard vows to continue it. Their responses dramatize the larger issue of how society ought to subsidize college for able but poor students.

The public already subsidizes deserving students through community colleges and state and city universities. Students also receive government grants and loans. But to what extent is it also in the public interest to subsidize independent schools, which comprise about half of the nation's 3,000 colleges and enroll one of every five undergraduates?

At many elite private colleges, admission is divorced from financial aid. Students are admitted solely on the basis of their qualifications and desirability. If family income falls short of the school's costs, the school will make up the difference. That helps insure a diverse student body.

While wonderfully worthy, this practice is also expensive and colleges feel they can no longer afford it. Smith College, with 2,700 students, has increased its financial aid budget by 20 percent in each of the last five years. Recently, its trustees voted to limit the amount spent on financial aid.

Starting in 1991, Smith will rank students accepted for admission and distribute money down

the list, meeting the total financial need of each student until the allotted money runs out. Students deemed acceptable but who fall outside the aid allotment will be reconsidered for admission if they or Smith can scrape up extra money. By contrast, Barnard's trustees recently vowed to seek more from foundations and individuals to continue admitting desired students without regard to means.

Smith's solution is regrettable but understandable. Most private colleges are worried about increasing financial aid costs. In 1987-88, these colleges provided \$2.3 billion in aid, according to the National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities. That's twice what they provided in 1970-71, adjusted for inflation.

The increased aid burden reflects changes in Federal support. There's less of it, and more of it now comes in loans. In 1975-76, Washington made grants of \$3.4 billion. In 1987-88, grants totaled only \$1.1 billion. Taken together, grants and loans are flat at best. If Washington fails to provide even modest increases, equal opportunity for needy college students will be further threatened.

A society that pays for public higher education is not likely ever to fully subsidize attendance at private colleges. But public policy does not have to be wholly need-blind to be farsighted — by giving poor students a more meaningful choice between public and independent education.

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Summit Assessment

THERE IS a tendency in assessing summits to tote up the items agreed on and the items not agreed on, and by this calculation the Bush-Gorbachev summit was only a modest success. With the exception of important new restrictions on chemical weapons, the subjects agreed on—aviation and maritime matters, student exchanges and the like—were in the category of useful but not central. On the large questions of Germany and NATO, Lithuania and the Baltics, strategic arms control and conventional force reductions in Europe, deep differences remain. The commercial pact the two leaders signed hinges on a tariff break for the Soviets that President Bush won't ask Congress to give until Moscow completes a new emigration law—a matter itself clouded by Mideast developments—and that is also tied politically to Lithuania. The atmospherics were, by the measure of some earlier summits, restrained.

Still, it would be an error to apply the old means of measurement as though nothing had changed. (Could anyone have imagined a year ago that this spring the summit issue for the United States would be whether a united, democratic Germany would be permitted to remain in NATO?) There is an identifiable new aspect to superpower relations in the Bush-Gorbachev period. Not so much the recorded achievement of the summit as its ambitious reach is a fairer measure of what went on in Washington. The diminution of the old sense of imminent danger

and inevitable confrontation has released both sides to deal with a broader and deeper agenda. The leaders are tackling difficult and sensitive subjects touching the vital interests of their countries. Not that Mr. Bush is unmindful of political pressures at home, but the fact is, moreover, that the Soviet Union is in incredibly tumultuous internal transition—so tumultuous as to have finally reduced Mr. Gorbachev, in American eyes, to the proportions of a mortal politician.

The two men are said to call each other "President." The personal detachment seems to fit the evident mutual effort to, as Mr. Gorbachev put it, take into account each other's concerns even when the two disagree. In this spirit, for instance, Mr. Bush made specific proposals to meet some of the Soviet's objections to his insistence on keeping Germany in NATO; the matter will require much more discussion. Invited to locate superpower relations on an adversary-or-ally spectrum, Mr. Bush said he didn't know how to "quantify" it, but he knew the two countries both had moved. It is so. They are not simply exchanging their often still very different positions but, it seems, they are listening hard. This may mean that some problems will not be resolved or agreed on—not soon, at any rate. Living with differences, peacefully and respectfully, while trying hard to resolve them, has its own value.

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Side by Side at the Summit

George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev put pen to paper this weekend to draw an end to the cold war. They pledged deep cuts in nuclear and chemical arms. And Mr. Bush offered most-favored-nation trade status for the Soviets — a sign of his willingness to meet Mr. Gorbachev's urgent economic and political needs.

The two men did not write the final word on Germany. The gulf between their rival visions of post-cold war Europe won't be easily bridged. But such was the spirit of this summit meeting that even the task of devising a new framework for European security — one that would include, not isolate, the Soviets — does not seem beyond reach.

One reason for optimism was the extraordinary understanding and trust between the two men. Even as they differed on issues, they displayed respect, even deference, for each other — proof that both want to keep the process of reconciliation going.

Mr. Gorbachev wowed Washington on his last visit in 1987. This time the thrill of discovery was missing. But the results of this summit meeting were much more substantial.

The two leaders began with old business — dismantling the tools of conflict. They committed themselves to sign a strategic arms accord this fall, and they agreed on terms that will cut their long-range nuclear weapons by a third. They also agreed to halt the production of new chemical weapons and

begin destroying nearly all that they already have.

Then they turned to the new business of cooperation. In an unexpected stroke, Mr. Bush offered, and Mr. Gorbachev eagerly accepted, an agreement that could open up trade and investment. The surprise was that Mr. Bush conditioned the agreement only on Moscow's expected passage of a law easing emigration, not on ending the Soviet chokehold on Lithuania. Some in Congress won't like that, but Mr. Bush may have a more realistic grasp of what's possible in Moscow.

Moscow fears a unified Germany in NATO, while conceding that it's up to Germany to choose its allies. Washington says it can't think of an alternative, but Moscow may have the makings of one — a new, pan-European structure, including both superpowers, to deal with questions of security. The idea of a "Greater European Council," existing alongside NATO, is worth careful study.

Mr. Gorbachev is on shaky enough ground at home without having to swallow humiliation in Europe. At a news conference yesterday, an Izvestia correspondent noted that the Russian people seemed less interested in foreign affairs than in their domestic problems, and then shot Mr. Gorbachev a sharp question about his rival Boris Yeltsin.

Mr. Gorbachev obviously needed an American vote of confidence. George Bush wisely gave it to him. Now it's up to Congress and the allies to speed Moscow's military withdrawal by helping it find a new economic and political place in the world.

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Meg Greenfield

The Thrill Is Gone

The high-risk drama of summits past reflected their rarity and unpredictability. This way's better.

Summits aren't what they used to be, and I say thank God for that. True, as a great deal of commentary has pointed out over the past few days, much of the glamour, suspense and personal drama characteristic of these meetings at the political apex has been missing from the Bush-Gorbachev encounter. But the excitement of summits past was pretty much a function of more dangerous conditions. I don't pretend that what with the turmoil in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the continued deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads around the world we do not live amid dangers. But much of the high-risk drama of summit conferences used to proceed from the rarity and consequent unpredictability of the meeting itself. Would the two touchy national supremos, each incurring some domestic risk by meeting at all and each watching-jealous of his own political standing and his country's basic interests, get along? Might bad personal vibes or big misunderstandings make the relationship between their countries worse? It is that part of summit meetings which used to provide the spectator-sport fun and which is now pretty well a thing of the past.

True, summits still produce: world-class traffic gridlock; breathless saturation media coverage; lots of screaming sirens, and acres of spua

sugar and pasta. But the heart of the event has lost its thrill, which is to say, its chanceiness, its possibility of a personal chemistry-induced disaster. For one thing, U.S.-Soviet meetings at the top have become more frequent, familiar and institutionalized and thus less dependent on the quality of the contact between two previously unengaged personalities. For another, we are involved in so many continuous negotiations with each other that these things have become, in a way, more or less the diplomatic equivalent of regular senior-staff meetings. And finally, of course, there is the interesting fact that astounding developments in Eastern Europe in particular and around the world in general have made pretty plain the limits on what political leaders can do—even a leader who has taken as many cataclysmically important steps as Gorbachev. If we know anything now, it is that popular forces are loose in the world that leaders can hope only to manage or channel.

All this made the 1990 U.S.-Soviet summit the particular event it was. It had only the palest manifestations of the classic elements of great power summit confrontations down through the centuries. One of these has always been mutual curiosity and, often, an odd mutual respect on the part of larger-than-life antagonists who have been contending without

benefit of introduction for years—a sort of Smiley-versus-Karla thing. They may never actually meet but still converse and communicate through emissaries, and exchange gifts, compliments and courtesies when not trying to murder each other. Saladin, the great defender against the European crusades, and Richard Lionheart, his brilliant antagonist, were spectacular examples of this. Bush and Gorbachev already knew a lot about each other, and their curiosity was probably confined to how the other man would react to the current political pressures on him, not what kind of beast he was in the first place.

It is also in the nature of these two relatively unpretentious men—not a lot of patience on the part of either with overdone protocol, gluey formality, who-goes-first choreography—that you wouldn't have one of those status impasses that have wonderfully confounded great diplomatic events since anyone can remember. There are hilarious accounts of royal "progresses"—as the movement of an entire regal household through Europe and Asia Minor was once known—that bogged down in the most wryielding of conflicts between the petty demands of royal travelers and royal hosts for pride of place in the encounter. And this was also often true of

their representatives, especially those who felt the need to compensate for their relative disadvantage in wealth and power. Peter the Great's ambassadors did not exactly ingratiate themselves or Peter with the Sun King. Robert K. Massie informs us, by demanding "that when this foreign monarch received them, he should inquire formally after the health of the Tsar and, while so doing, rise and remove his hat." The importance the Soviets have always attached in summit proceedings to accordance of status as an equal superpower can hardly touch the hat-doffing demand.

Still, there have been modern variations on the ancient strains that marked such encounters. Where there has been stark unfamiliarity and profound antagonism to be mediated, there has always been electricity. We forget now, how in the early post-Stalin era when none of the prominent Kremlin successors had ever even been West, great drama and anxiety surrounded their first ventures and the first summit meeting between Khrushchev and Ike. Nixon in China had some of these same qualities. So did Sadat in Jerusalem. And so even did John F. Kennedy's unhappy mission to Vienna to meet Khrushchev, who took a contemptuous and hostile measure of him and for a time thereafter behaved accordingly.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 26.90
* דף 1
* עותק 4 מתוך 2
* 16 מתוך 16

* 2895
* נכנס **
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* חוזם: 6,2895

* אל: המשרד
* יעדים: רהמש/137, מצב/311, אביב/230, מנמת/148
* מ-: ווש, נר: 2030, תא: 040890, זח: 2200, רח: מ, סג: סב
* תח: @ גס: ממד
* נר: @

* סודי ביותר / מייד

* אל: ממ'ד, ערב 2

* דע: מצפ'א

* מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

* על מניעי ערפאת.

* משיחה עם ארון מילר ב - 4.6.

* 1. לשאלה לגבי מקומם היחסי של המאבק בעליה והדיאלוג עם ארה"ב בסדר העדיפויות הנוכחי של מנהיג אש"פ: ערפאת מתלבט, משכבר, בין ענינו בשמירה על שלימות אידגונו לבין הרצון לקדם את יעדי אש"פ בתהליך. עד האינתיפדה היה מרוכז בפרימאט הארגוני. בשלהי '88 נפתחה בפניו האפשרות להפוך מפוליטיקאי המרוכז בארגונו למדינאי בעל תפקיד בתהליך. עתה הוא נוטה להעדיף הנושא הארגוני ברקע לכך:

* א. הדיאלוג עם ארה"ב לא הגשים דבר.

* ב. הקפאון בתהליך המדיני.

* ג. הופעת גורם העליה מברה"מ.

* ד. החמרת המצב בשטחים: הרצח בראשל"צ והחרפת האלימות בעקבותיו.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 2
* עותק 4 מתוך 2
* 16 מתוך 16

* 2. הוסיף:

* א. מבחינת ערפאת, גינוי חש"פ יעמוד בסתירה לענינו בתמיכת עיראק ולוב.

* ב. ערפאת " MAD AT US " (קרי - זועף על ארה"ב)
* בשל עמדת ארה"ב לאחרונה, במועבי"ט, ומשום שלדעתו ארה"ב התייצבה לצד ישראל ולא לחצה עליה די במסגרת התהליך.

* 3. מילר מצפה לראות מה יביא עמו הוע'פ של אש"פ המתכנס לדבריו, היום בבגדאד.

* 4. אנא, שמרו על חסיון במקור והערכותיו.

* אמיתי.

* 17

* תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, @ (אמן),
* @ממר/ערב2, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

6406 ***** יוקר ולף ושחר בנ"מ סל 5376987

6406 ***** יוקר ולף ושחר בנ"מ סל 5376987

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אל: ממ"ד
מזא"ר 1
מע"ת

דע: מצפ"א

מאת: עיחונות, ניו יורק

הנדון: ועירת הפסגה - מזוה"ח

להלן קטע מה דצא (2 יוני) על פגישת נשיא בריח"מ עם מנהיגי הקונגרס בהתייחסות למזוה"ח.

עחונות/ניו-יורק
יובל רוטם
4 ביוני 1990

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1029

Middle East Peace

REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MICHEL... The Middle East is also a destabilizing thing. Could you help us in any way to solve that particular problem? Is it within your province to assist us in any way?

GORBACHEV... We are ready to cooperate with you, we are ready to use our influence.... We are already doing it.

We are really in a difficult situation now as a result of certain actions of the Israeli Government. We have democratized our emigration procedures, people are leaving and they settle then on the occupied territories and provoke clashes. They are provoking a problem between us and the Arabs. The Arab Presidents are remonstrating with us. This is something that I think the Israelis are doing on purpose in order to make a solution very difficult. Now, thank you for this meeting. I'm very pleased.

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|--|--|-------------------------|
| דף: _____ | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק | דחיפות: בחול לבוקר |
| פתוק: _____ | | סוג: בלמיס |
| אל: ^{דלמא} מזאיר, שירן - כאן. | | תאריך וזמן הגור: 4.6.90 |
| דע: | | פס' פרוק: |
| | | הפס'ד: 1063 |
| כארת: ק. לקונגרס. | | |

התבטאות גורבצ'וב בנושא עליית יהודי בריה"מ

1. רצייב מברק/מכתב ביוזמת הקונגרסמן לויין ובחתימת עשרה מעמיתיו שנשלח היום אחה"צ לגורבצ'וב והועבר באמצעות הקונב"ל שלנו בסאן פרנציסקו. העתק נשלח גם לשגרירות בריה"מ בווישינגטון.
2. רצייב מכתב בנדון ששיגר הבוקר הקונגרסמן שומר לנשיא בוש. החומר נמסר לעיתונות.

יהוא וטא צטרל
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

אם כוונתו פהמיק, ובתקלה הקונב"ל מסאן פרנציסקו
ומס שיקוונלנסמניי הנהנוי בקרסני מסנה פהמיק
האישן איש אקונב"ב אש בגחיליה סיוה אקבאו
אולמי אזוי היקלשונר נאני ויקה פהמיק.
ביקסו נבסיהו אשגו follow up האורה
משל אצמיה.

1063

שמה משה רהג גל גלגל בנאיה גצבו אובין גבולו

תפוצה: 7 ספרות 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

CHARLES E. SCHUMER
10TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
126 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 226-6816
TELEFAX (202) 226-4183

BROOKLYN OFFICE:
1828 KINGS HIGHWAY
BROOKLYN, NY 11228
(718) 965-5400
TELEFAX (718) 966-8266

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

June 4, 1990

COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY
CHAIRMAN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

BUDGET
CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON URGENT FISCAL ISSUES

BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS

NEW YORK STATE
DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION
TREASURER

WHIP-AT-LARGE

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United State
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

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3 1063

Dear President Bush:

I am seriously concerned by President Gorbachev's comments yesterday regarding the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. President Gorbachev indicated that unless Israel adopted a specific position banning settlers on the West Bank he would ban the emigration of Soviet Jews from his country.

Members of Congress will not accept the dismantling of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and granting the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation status if they believe that Soviet Jews are not guaranteed the right to emigrate. I hope you will communicate this fact to President Gorbachev.

It is clearly immoral and improper for President Gorbachev to use Soviet Jews as hostages to policy changes he wants to see made in Israel. We hope that you will indicate you consider this linkage inappropriate.

Gorbachev's statements cast a dark shadow over the ideal of a Soviet immigration bill which would codify the right to emigrate. If President Gorbachev is so willing to abrogate the right to emigrate it makes it doubtful that any legislation passed by the Soviets to protect the right to emigrate can give Congress much solace.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Schumer

CHARLES E. SCHUMER
Member of Congress

1063

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

June 4, 1990

Mikhail S. Gorbachev
President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

Hand Delivered

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Dear Mr. President:

As Members of Congress supportive of the dramatic improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, we are deeply distressed by your threat at the Washington press conference Sunday to slow Jewish emigration to Israel.

As you know, Mr. President, the government of Israel has no official policy for settling Soviet emigres in the West Bank and Gaza. Statements which imply the contrary only encourage those radical Arab states which have attempted to create an atmosphere of belligerence and intimidation over legitimate immigration to Israel.

We wish to reaffirm long-standing United States policy which links the granting of Most Favored Nation status to free and unfettered emigration. We urge you to make clear that the Soviet government will continue its commitment to freedom of emigration for Soviet Jews.

Sincerely,

Mel Levine (D-California)
Howard Berman (D-California)
Chairman, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus
Vin Weber (R-Minnesota)
Lawrence J. Smith (D-Florida)
Tom Lantos (D-California)
Chairman, Congressional Human Rights Caucus
Benjamin A. Gilman (R-New York)
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Soviet Jewry
Robert G. Torricelli (D-New Jersey)
Charles E. Schumer (D-New York)
Edward F. Feighan (D-Ohio)
Stephen J. Solarz (D-New York)
Henry A. Waxman (D-California)

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קונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו-יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

(212) 351-5200

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שמור/רגיל
הב 251.04

אל: מנהל הסברה, מנהל מצפ"א, יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות

דע: נציג התיירות בארה"ב - רפי פרכר - כאן
ציר הסברה - ווש' מע"ת

אזהרת מחמ"ד באשר לתיירות לישראל

כידוע, בתוך מאורעות השבוע האחרון התיחס דובר במחמ"ד לזהירות שעל תיירים היוצאים ארצה לנקוט, אך לא הוצא TRAVEL ADVISORY התייחסות זו שודרה ברשתות הטלוויזיה. נציגות התיירות בארה"ב ואל-על כאן, תוך התייחסות עימנו, הוציאו את המצ"ב המבהיר כי התייחסות מחמ"ד אינה, כאמור, TRAVEL ADVISORY וכי ישראל ממשיכה להיות יעד מרכזי ובטוח כל תייריה.

אורי פלטי

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אישור: א. סגל

1990 ביוני 4

Israel news

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
Response to Statement by U.S. Department of State

Following the statement of Margaret Tutweiler, Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State of May 31, 1990 regarding urging American citizens to exercise "special care" in the Middle East in general.

"The statement issued by the spokesperson for the US Department of State makes reference to events that have already taken place in the Middle East.

There are currently thousands of American and other tourists in Israel safely enjoying their visits. As in the past, Israel has always taken all the precautions necessary to ensure the safety and enjoyment of all visitors. The country continues to be a major and safe destination for all tourists. The Israel Festival currently taking place in Jerusalem is a major attraction and is one of many reasons that tourism to Israel is heading toward a record year."

Israel Ministry of Tourism, North America • 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10018 • 212/560 0650





INTEROFFICE CORR. מכתב פנימי

TO:

אל:

FROM:

1046/9

3
3

מאת:

OUR REF:

אסמכתא שלנו:

DATE:

תאריך:

SUBJECT-

חודון -

YOUR REF.

אסמכתא שלכם:

THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A STATEMENT REGARDING ONLY THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED.

NO TRAVEL ADVISORY HAS BEEN ISSUED REGARDING TRAVEL TO ISRAEL.

THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR AND SAFE DESTINATION FOR ALL TOURISTS.

THE ISRAEL FESTIVAL CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE NATIONWIDE IS A MAJOR ATTRACTION

AND IS ONE OF THE MANY REASONS THAT TOURISM TO ISRAEL IS HEADING TOWARD A RECORD YEAR.

EL AL FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL ARE AND CONTINUE TO BE BOOKED.

EL AL IS OFFERING AS MANY AS 15 FLIGHTS A WEEK FROM NEW YORK TO TEL AVIV, 3 FROM

LOS ANGELES, AND 2 FROM MIAMI, CHICAGO AND BOSTON.

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אל: ארב"ל 2

הנדון: פגישת הנשיא בוש ומזכ"ל האו"ם.

רצ"ב תשובת המזכ"ל לשאלת עיתונאי בדבר שיגור משקיפים
שטחים.

נאו"ם, טלי בן צבי.

4 ביוני 1990

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משה יוסף משה יהודה טהבס גל אגנס אפרת גל סייב גלס רוליס גל ר' אלן
סופר גלס סייב גלס רוליס גל ר' אלן
הטבה

1049
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10/27/23
HT/CH

The following was received from a Spokesman
accompanying the Secretary-General.

1049 $\frac{2}{2}$

Washington, 4 June 1990.

The Secretary-General was received by President Bush in the Oval Office at noon. During a brief photo opportunity, the President spoke to the Secretary-General about his recent meetings with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, saying that in general they "went well". The Secretary-General commented "I hope to take advantage of what you have achieved".

A reporter asked the Secretary-General if he intended to urge the President to agree to sending UN troops to the occupied territories. The Secretary-General responded that it was not a matter of troops, but rather of observers, and that this would be possible only with the agreement of all parties concerned, i.e. Israel and the other interlocutors.

4 June 1990

1049 $\frac{2}{2}$

10/11/14

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 6,2822

אל: המשדר

יעדים: ווש/72, רהמש/139, מצב/313, אביב/232, מנמת/150

מ-: נני, נר: 2009, תא: 040690, זח: 1730, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: & גס: צפא

נד: &

סודי/מיירי

אל: לשכת שר החוץ, סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: השגריר ווש

מאת: הקונכ'ל

הפיסגה - יהודי ברה'מ

משיחה של מנהיג יהודי עם מקור בכיר בבית הלבן - המקור הדגיש כי בשיחות עצמן בין שני הנשיאים לא בא לידי ביטוי שינוי כלשהו במדיניות הסובייטית כלפי העלייה מבריה'מ. המקור הוסיף שכדי לא להותיר סימני שאלה לגבי העמדה האמריקאית הוחלט על התבטאות בייקר בתכנית הטלוויזיה ביום א'.

17

תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, תפוצות, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, &(אמן)

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WHITE HOUSE REPORT, MONDAY, JUNE 4
(Soviet emigration; Germany; de Maiziere visit;
Barco; Salinas) (1400)

NEWS BRIEFING -- Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater discussed the following topics:

SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY DISCUSSED

Asked if President Bush was disturbed by Soviet President Gorbachev's statement June 3 at a news conference at the White House -- that Moscow might curtail the flow of Jewish emigrants to Israel unless Israel guarantees that they won't be resettled in Israeli-occupied territories -- Fitzwater said the U.S. position is to work to encourage the Soviet Union to "maximize emigration opportunities, codify the emigration law, and...allow as much emigration as fast as it can occur."

Fitzwater also was asked about the just-concluded superpower trade agreement -- which is predicated on legal codification of improvements in Soviet emigration policy -- and how that accord squares with Gorbachev's apparent threat to close the door to the exit of Soviet Jews.

Fitzwater reiterated that the United States wants the emigration of Soviet Jews, adding, "We don't want doors closed."

Asked if it is correct that Bush will not send the trade pact to Capitol Hill if Soviet Jews are not allowed to leave the Soviet Union, Fitzwater said, "That's a problem. The emigration bill is crucial to our being able to send the trade agreement forward. We assume that the emigration bill would guide their (Soviet) policy. But you don't know how that works out internally."

Asked about Gorbachev's reported statement during the summit that U.S. officials should consult with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, Fitzwater said, "Our views on Arafat have not changed. We have officially established dialogue with the PLO through our ambassador in Tunis....There will be no changes in the communications channels."

Fitzwater told questioners that the United States has not completed its review of the recent terrorist incident involving an abortive raid on Israel, reportedly by the Palestine Liberation Front, a faction of the PLO.

"There have been no conclusions from the investigation at this time," he said.

INCREMENTAL GERMAN SOLUTION SEEN

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Fitzwater predicted "the German question is clearly going to be resolved over a period of time in an incremental kind of debate and consideration. It's not going to be resolved in any dramatic announcement either from us or the Soviet Union."

On a related matter, he acknowledged there is a connection between a German solution and agreement on a treaty reducing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

"I don't want to give any kind of formal timetables and ties and yardsticks and all that sort of thing for measuring," Fitzwater said, "but clearly conventional forces is a question that's related to the unification of Europe, as it relates to NATO forces, to Soviet forces and to the CFE agreement. I think it's clear that the Soviet Union, as it considers CFE, they are also having to consider the new realities of their own conventional forces in the Soviet Union, in East Germany and in the Warsaw Pact countries. So yes, those issues are all related and that's why they should be worked out within the CFE framework."

The "challenge," Fitzwater noted, is "the management of the process that brings all these together" -- unification of Germany and negotiation of a CFE agreement -- "over the next few months." He said the administration takes some encouragement from Soviet President Gorbachev's statement that a CFE agreement is a precondition for a summit later this year of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

He said President Bush and Gorbachev emerged from their summit discussions on Germany with "better understandings" of each side's position, but with "no breakthroughs."

Fitzwater said reporters could find significance in Gorbachev's acknowledgment that a U.S. troop presence in Europe is a stabilizing factor. He said he did not see anything new in Bush's statement that he and Gorbachev are agreed that the issue of alliance affiliation will be decided by the German people themselves. "I don't think we heard anything totally new," Fitzwater asserted, going on to declare that Gorbachev's statement on the U.S. presence in Europe has "certain significance to those who are looking for their general kind of attitude."

Fitzwater declined comment on Gorbachev's suggestion that if a united Germany holds NATO membership, Soviet troop deployment would be affected, saying there are "so many different ways that this thing could be put together, so many different ways that could be calculated and so forth, so that we wouldn't want to comment on any one of them, saying we liked one better or one worse than another, because these are all issues that have yet to be decided."

He said Secretary of State Baker, in mentioning a political link between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as one solution, was citing "one of the ideas" being talked about. "There are any number of ideas, and connections and things that were talked about....It was in the general discussion of what kinds of institutions will be emerging to deal with the new Europe," he explained.

חוזם: 6,1636

אל: המשרד

יעדים: 77/מצב/168, אביב/134, מנמת/80, בטחון/78, ניו יורק/88

20

מ-: ווש, נר: 1028, תא: 030690, זח: 1600, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: 8 גס: צפא

ד: 7

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מענו, ממד, פרן.

דע: יועץ שהח לתקשורת, יועץ רוהם לתקשורת, יועץ שהבט לתקשורת, לעם, אמן/מנמת - ר' משמרת, דובר צהל, ניו-יורק,

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

במסגרת ראיון עם ג'ון סוננוו לתוכנית הטלוויזיה

(אל דייוויד ברינקלי הצטרפו סם

דונאלדסון וג'ורג' וויל) עלה גם ענייננו. רצב החלק

הרלוונטי:

MR WILL: IN ORDER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS TO CERTIFY THAT THE PLO HAS KEPT THE PROMISE IT RATHER AMBIGUOUSLY MADE 18 MONTHS AGO SAYING ALTHOUGH IT'S NEVER ENGAGED IN TERRORISM, IT WILL STOP. THAT'S ROUGHLY WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS.

THIS WEEK, THERE WAS AN ATTEMPTED TERRORIST RAID ON THE COAST OF ISRAEL. MR. ARAFAT HAS NEITHER DEPLORED THAT RAID, NOR MOVED TO DISCIPLINE THE MEMBERS OF THE PLO WHO UNDERTOOK IT. WILL THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, TO CERTIFY

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THAT THE PLO IS SOMEHOW NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUING PLO TERRORISM?

MR. SUNUNU: I THINK THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE DEPLORE THAT RAID AND THAT --

MR. WILL: THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION.

MR. SUNUNU: -- THAT -- THAT KIND OF AN ACTION IS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE IN TERMS OF GETTING PEOPLE TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THINGS, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL CERTAINLY EVALUATE BOTH THE INFORMATION THAT THEY HAVE AND OTHER PEOPLE HAVE IN DETERMINING WHAT THE PROPER STATUS AND CERTIFICATION OR NONCERTIFICATION SHOULD BE.

MR. WILL: WHAT IS --

MR. SUNUNU: AND I THINK THAT THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY BAKER, BRENT SCOWCROFT HAVE GOT TO SPEND SOME TIME ON.

MR. WILL: (FACIALLY?), DO YOU THINK THEY'RE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR UNDERTAKING?

MR. SUNUNU: I THINK THE FACT THAT SUCH A RAID AS THAT TOOK PLACE CREATES PROBLEMS NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO THE PEACE TABLE, BUT I THINK IT IS A DETRIMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.

עתונות

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MR. WILL: WHAT IS --

MR. SUNUNU: AND I THINK THAT THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY BAKER, BRENT SCOWCROFT HAVE GOT TO SPEND SOME TIME ON.

MR. WILL: (REACTIVELY) DO YOU THINK THEY'RE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR UNDERTAKING?

MR. SUNUNU: I THINK THE FACT THAT SUCH A RAID AS THAT TOOK PLACE CREATES PROBLEMS NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO THE PEACE TABLE, BUT I THINK IT IS A DETRIMENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.

10-10-73

10-10-73

חוזם: 6,1643

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ניו יורק/2091, רהמש/80, מצב/171, אביב/137, מנמת/83

מ-: נוש, נר: 1031, תא: 030690, זח: 1700, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: 2 גס: הסברה

8: נד

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, לש-שהח

דע : מעת, הסברה, ממד, לעם, דוץ, יועץ תקשורת
רוהם, אמן-מנמת-רמשמת, עתונות-ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

בייקר-אשף

להלן תשובות מזכיר המדינה לשאלות אודות אשף וערפאת.

US-USSR SUMMIT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY OF
STATE JAMES BAKER INTERNATIONAL PRESS CENTER, SMITH
CENTER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON
DC, 7:25 PM (EDT), FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1990

Q MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH ARAFAT'S
EXPLANATION FOR --

SEC. BAKER: I CAN'T --

Q SORRY, SORRY.

SEC. BAKER: SAY IT AGAIN.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

Q ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH YASSIR ARAFAT'S EXPLANATION
THAT THE PLO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ATTEMPTED
TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAEL THE OTHER DAY? AND
IF YOU'RE NOT SATISFIED, WHAT MORE ARE YOU EXPECTING
FROM THE PLO BY WAY OF AN EXPLANATION IN ORDER TO
MAINTAIN THE US-PLO DIALOGUE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE'RE NOT GOING TO BE SATISFIED
UNTIL WE KNOW EVERYTHING THAT WE NEED TO KNOW. WE
RE NOT SURE WE KNOW EVERYTHING WE NEED TO KNOW RIGHT
NOW. THE ANSWER TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, ARE WE SATISFIED
? IS NO.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT THAT ARAFAT IS THE MAN WHO
YOU CAN MAKE A SETTLEMENT WITH? AND ARE YOU READY
TO INTENSIFY YOUR EFFORTS AT THIS SUMMIT WITH THE
SOVIETS TO USE THE CURRENT VOLATILE ATMOSPHERE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND TURN IT AROUND FOR PEACEFUL
ACHIEVEMENT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELIS?

SEC. BAKER: -- LET ME SAY, WE'VE BEEN WORKING VERY
HARD IN THE PAST TO TRY AND MOVE THINGS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST TOWARD PEACE. I THINK, FRANKLY, THAT THAT'S
THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AS WELL. WE NEVER HAVE A MEETING -- THE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND I -- THAT WE DON'T TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION
IN MIDDLE EAST AND HOW WE MIGHT IMPROVE THAT SITUATION
. WE HAVEN'T HAD OUR DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST
YET WE'LL PROBABLY HAVE IT TOMORROW.

עתונות

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, 2(אמן), ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזארין, סייבל, סולטן, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ,
דוץ-ים

DATE

10-10

SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
TELEPHONE: 205-200-2000
FACSIMILE: 205-200-2000

TO: MR. BAKER, STATE DEPARTMENT

FROM: MR. ARARAT, STATE DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: ISRAELI TERRORISM

RE: 10-10-70

YOUR TELEPHONE CALL OF 10-10-70 IS RECEIVED.

US-ARAB SUMMIT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER INTERNATIONAL PRESS CENTER, SMITH CENTER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON DC, 10:25 PM EDT, FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1970

MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH ARARAT'S EXPLANATION FOR --

SEC. BAKER: I CAN'T --

Q BERRY, SORRY.

SEC. BAKER: SAY IT AGAIN.

Q ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH YASSIR ARARAT'S EXPLANATION THAT THE PLO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAEL THE OTHER DAY AND IF YOU'RE NOT SATISFIED, WHAT MORE ARE YOU EXPECTING FROM THE PLO BY WAY OF AN EXPLANATION IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE US-PLO DIALOGUE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE'RE NOT GOING TO BE SATISFIED UNTIL WE KNOW EVERYTHING THAT WE NEED TO KNOW. WE'RE NOT SURE WE KNOW EVERYTHING WE NEED TO KNOW RIGHT NOW. THE ANSWER TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, ARE WE SATISFIED?

Q MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON PRESIDENT FORSCHYER'S STATEMENT THAT ARARAT IS THE MAN WHO YOU CAN MAKE A SETTLEMENT WITH AND ARE YOU READY TO INTENSIFY YOUR EFFORTS AT THIS SUMMIT WITH THE SOVIETS TO USE THE CURRENT VOLATILE ATMOSPHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TURN IT AROUND FOR PEACEFUL ACHEIVEMENT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELIS?

SEC. BAKER: --LET ME SAY, WE'VE BEEN WORKING VERY HARD IN THE PAST TO TRY AND MOVE THINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TOWARD PEACE. I THINK, FRANKLY, THAT THAT'S THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS WELL. WE NEVER HAVE A MEETING -- THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND I -- THAT WE DON'T TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND HOW WE MIGHT IMPROVE THAT SITUATION. WE HAVEN'T HAD OUR DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST YET WELL PROBABLY HAVE IT TOMORROW.

BT

13

SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
TELEPHONE: 205-200-2000
FACSIMILE: 205-200-2000

Following are the Mideast related excerpts from the transcript of the joint press conference by President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev held Sunday, June 3 here in Washington. The full transcript of the press conference was sent by usinfo and as SUF701 in the Wireless File of Sunday, June 3.

(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

...

Q: This is a two-pronged question for both presidents. Beyond words, what guarantees can you give the Palestinians that decisions you made on emigration will not result in the further usurpation of their lands? And why is it that President Gorbachev has shown so much human sympathy for the Palestinians while the U.S. vetoes even a U.N. look at their plight under military siege?

BUSH: Did you have a particular order you wanted us to answer that question in?

Q: If you can.

BUSH: The United States policy on settlement in the Occupied Territories is unchanged and is clear, and that is, we oppose new settlements in territories beyond the 1967 lines. It is a stated, reaffirmed policy over and over again. Now, we do not oppose the secretary general sending an emissary to the Middle East to look at this important question. The question is compounded, however, when you see on the eve of the discussion of that, an outrageous guerrilla attack on Israel launched from another country. That is unacceptable to the United States.

Having said that, we don't want to -- the position of our country is we do not think that it needs U.N. troops or U.N. Security Council missions, but we do favor Mr. Goulding, a representative of the secretary general, going there.

So when the question came and we differed with the Soviet Union -- indeed, we differed with many of our other allies on this question. It is our view that the most productive way to handle that question was to have an emissary from the secretary general, not as the other countries in the security council favored, a security council delegation go there.

Q: Do you agree that there have been settlements, even though this has been our policy for many years?

BUSH: Yes, I agree there are settlements that go contrary to the United States' policy, and I will continue to represent the policy, reiterate the policy, and try to persuade the government of Israel that it is counterproductive to go forward with additional settlements

in these territories.

Our objective is to get the parties to the peace table, and our secretary of State has worked diligently with the Israelis, and I have tried to do my best to get them talking. And that's what we think is the most immediate step that is needed. And I will continue to reiterate American policy and continue to push for peace talks.

GORBACHEV: Just a moment, I'd like to respond, too. You formulated your question in precise terms; namely what kind of guarantees can we issue so that those who want to leave, those who have chosen Israel as their place of residence, those who leave from the Soviet Union should not be resettled in unoccupied territories? This is not a simple question and this is what I have to say in this connection.

The Soviet Union is now being bombarded by a lot of criticism from Arab countries. Lately, I have had meetings with President Asad of Syria and President Mubarek of Egypt. Those were very important talks with them. Nevertheless, this question -- this was the question that was also raised by them in acute terms.

The question of guarantees now, we are facing the following situation. Either after these meetings and exchanges with the president of the United States of America on this particular issue, our concern will be heeded in Israel and they will make certain conclusions. Or else we must give further thought to it in terms of what we can do with issuing permits for exit.

And some people are raising the matter in these terms in the Soviet Union, namely; as long as there are no assurances from the Israelis that this is not going to be done by them to postpone issuing permits for exit, to put it off. But I hope they will heed what the two presidents strongly advise them -- that they should act in a wise fashion. Perhaps this is what I would like to express by way of reacting.

(END EXCERPTS)
NNNN

חוזם: 6,1646

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בנטחון/77, ניו יורק/2087, רהמש/76, מצב/167, אביב/133, מנמת/79

מ: נוש, נר: 1034, תא: 030690, זח: 1900, דח: ב, סג: בל

חח: 8 גס צפא

נד: 8

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מזאר, ממד

דע : מעת הסברה, לש-שהח, יועץ תקשורת, רוהם, לעם, דוצ, אמן-מנמת-רמשמרת, עתונות ניו-יורק,

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן בקמפ-דוויד-2.6

PRESS CONFERENCE BY MARLIN FITZWATER FOLLOWING MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BUSH AND GORBACHEV AT CAMP DAVID CAMP ROUNDMEADOW FILING CENTER, CAMP DAVID

THEY SETTLED INTO THE SURROUNDINGS BY REMOVING TIES AND SEATED THEMSELVES AROUND THE LARGE PATIO TABLE WHICH OVERLOOKS THE BACKYARD AT ASPEN. THE FIRST SESSION LASTED FROM 11:15 UNTIL 12:59, DURING WHICH TIME THEY DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF REGIONAL MATTERS. THESE DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED A PRESENTATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS, A VERY RELAXED GIVE-AND-TAKE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF EACH COUNTRY'S INVOLVEMENT IN SOME OF THESE CONFLICTS AND THEIR OWN VIEWS ABOUT HOW THEIR EFFORTS MIGHT BE MESHED IN APPROACHING SOLUTIONS.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THESE TALKS FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA CUBA, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENDING PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FOR THE STRIDES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS TO CHANGE THEIR EMIGRATION POLICY AND TO OPEN SOVIET SOCIETY. THE PRESIDENT URGED A RESOLUTION OF CERTAIN CASES INVOLVING REFUSENIKS AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV DISCUSSED THESE CASES AND SAID HE WAS STILL WORKING TO RESOLVE MANY OF THEM.

THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND AGREED TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST PREJUDICE AND ANY TRENDS TOWARDS ANTI-SEMITISM. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PATTERNS OF SOVIET EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED TO CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES TO MAKE WHATEVER IMPROVEMENTS THEY CAN TO EASE TENSIONS AND TO STAY IN TOUCH WHEREVER THEY CAN TO BE HELPFUL IN A GIVEN SITUATION.

Q DID THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THE EMIGRATION LAW -- THE EMIGRATION FOR SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TENSION THAT HAS INCREASED EVER SINCE THIS OPERATION TOOK PLACE? AND SECONDLY, DID THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THE LEBANESE SITUATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF PART OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HOW THE TWO POWERS ARE GOING TO SECURE THE LEBANESE SOUTHERN BORDER WHICH THEY BOTH HAVE RECOGNIZED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY REPORT ON THE LEBANON SITUATION. THEY DID DISCUSS THE MATTER OF EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS AND THEY TALKED ABOUT WAYS OF INCREASING THE NUMBERS. PRESIDENT BUSH OUTLINED THE INCREASE THAT OCCURRED IN EMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES GOING FROM SOMETHING LIKE 14,000 A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO, TO AROUND 70,000 THIS YEAR. THEY TALKED ABOUT DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL AND TALKED ABOUT THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF ALLOWING EMIGRATION TO BE AS FREE AND

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

OPEN AS POSSIBLE. ALEXANDER?

Q (OFF MIKE.) DID PRESIDENT BUSH INDICATE THAT UNITED STATES WOULD BE WILLING TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SOVIET EMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO BE TAKEN HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, ABOVE AND BEYOND 70,000 AS YOU MENTIONED?

MR. FITZWATER: WE'VE HAD A CONTINUALLY INCREASING NUMBER. AS I SAID SOME 14,000 IN '87, GOING TO 20 000 I THINK THE NEXT YEAR, AROUND 50,000 IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, AND NOW AT A 70,000 LEVEL. IT IS AN EVER-INCREASING NUMBER. WE CONTINUALLY WANT TO TAKE MORE AND TRYING TO WORK ON THOSE KINDS OF ARRANGEMENTS. AND I THINK EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THE NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS WILL BE INCREASING. GAYLORD?

Q SINCE THEY TALKED ABOUT EMIGRATION, DID THEY GO BACK INTO THE SUBJECT OF THE SOVIET LAW, HOW TO FIND EMIGRATION PROCEDURES, AND DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV GIVE THE PRESIDENT ANY BETTER IDEA OF TIMING WHEN THAT MIGHT COME UP?

MR. FITZWATER: THE -- THAT WAS A MATTER AGAIN THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE MEETINGS YESTERDAY BUT WAS NOT DISCUSSED TODAY. THE EMIGRATION LAW, AS YOU ALL KNOW, IS RELATED TO CODIFYING THE SOVIET RULES THAT HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT CONCERNING A GREATER EMIGRATION. PRESIDENT BUSH COMMENDED THEM FOR THE INCREASES IN NUMBERS OF EMIGRANTS, MANY THOUSANDS OF THE INCREASED NUMBER IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS BUT EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THOSE RULES CODIFIED IN THE LAW. JOHN?

Q MARLIN, MORE SPECIFICALLY ON THE DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL, PRESIDENT BUSH ASK FOR THEM? DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAY YES, NO, MAYBE?

MR. FITZWATER: THE -- THERE IS NO ESSENTIAL CHANGE IN THE TWO POSITIONS OF THE COUNTRY. WE OF COURSE ARE INTERESTED IN THE DIRECT FLIGHTS. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV INDICATED THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU'RE AWARE OF IN WORKING THOSE OUT. BUT IT IS A MATTER THAT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

IS A PART OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM, AND THEY BOTH ARE AWARE OF IT AND INTERESTED IN FINDING SOME KIND OF SOLUTION. BRET?

Q YES. ON THE DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL, DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REITERATE THAT THE MAIN OBJECTION CONCERNS ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES? AND IF SO, DID PRESIDENT BUSH REACT TO THAT IN ANY WAY?

MR. FITZWATER: I JUST DON'T -- I DON'T KNOW THAT DETAIL OF CONVERSATION.

עתונות

צפ

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, (אמן), בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רבי, מעת, הסברה, לעם, דוצ-ים

MR. FITZWATER: ...

MR. FITZWATER: ...

THEY SETTLED INTO THE SURROUNDINGS BY REMOVING TIERS AND SEATED THEMSELVES AROUND THE LARGE RATIO TABLE WHICH OVERLOOKS THE BACKYARD AT ASPEN. THE FIRST SESSION LASTED FROM 11:00 UNTIL 1:00. DURING WHICH TIME THEY DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF REGIONAL MATTERS. THESE DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED A PRESENTATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS, A VERY RELAXED GIVE-AND-TAKE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF EACH COUNTRY'S INVOLVEMENT IN SOME OF THESE CONFLICTS AND THEIR OWN VIEWS ABOUT HOW THEIR EFFORTS MIGHT BE HELD IN APPROACHING SOLUTIONS.

THESE TALKS FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, CUBA, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENDING PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FOR THE STRIDES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS TO CHANGE THEIR EMIGRATION POLICY AND TO OPEN SOCIETY. THE PRESIDENT URGED A RESOLUTION OF CERTAIN CASES INVOLVING REFUGEES AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV DISCUSSED THESE CASES AND SAID HE WAS STILL WORKING TO RESOLVE MANY OF THEM.

THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND AGREED TO BREAK OUT AGAINST PREJUDICE AND ANY TRENDS TOWARDS ANTI-SEMITISM. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PATTERN OF SOVIET EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED TO CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES TO MAKE WHATEVER IMPROVEMENTS THEY CAN TO EASE TENSIONS AND TO STAY IN TOUCH WHEREVER THEY CAN TO BE HELPFUL IN A GIVEN SITUATION.

Q DID THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THE EMIGRATION LAW -- THE EMIGRATION FOR SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TENSION THAT HAS INCREASED EVER SINCE THIS OPERATION TOOK PLACE? AND SPECIFICALLY, DID THE TWO PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THE LEBANESE SITUATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF PART OF SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HOW THE TWO POWERS ARE GOING TO SECURE THE LEBANESE SOUTHERN BORDER WHICH THEY BOTH HAVE RECOGNIZED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY REPORT ON THE LEBANON SITUATION. THEY DID DISCUSS THE MATTER OF EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS AND THEY TALKED ABOUT WAYS OF INCREASING THE NUMBERS. PRESIDENT BUSH OUTLINED THE INCREASE THAT OCCURRED IN EMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES GOING FROM SOMETHING LIKE 14,000 A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO, TO AROUND 20,000 THIS YEAR. THEY TALKED ABOUT DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL AND TALKED ABOUT THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF ALLOWING EMIGRATION TO BE AS FREE AND

OPEN AS POSSIBLE. ALEXANDER: ...

MR. FITZWATER: WE'VE HAD A CONTINUALLY INCREASING NUMBER. AS I SAID SOME 14,000 IN '87, GOING TO 20,000 I THINK THE NEXT YEAR, AROUND 20,000 IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, AND NOW AT A 20,000 LEVEL. IT IS AN EVER-INCREASING NUMBER. WE CONTINUALLY WANT TO TAKE MORE AND TRYING TO WORK ON THOSE KINDS OF ARRANGEMENTS. AND I THINK EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THE NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS WILL BE INCREASING. DAYLORD:

Q SINCE THEY TALKED ABOUT EMIGRATION, DID THEY GO BACK INTO THE SUBJECT OF THE SOVIET LAW, HOW TO FIND EMIGRATION PROCEDURES, AND DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV GIVE THE PRESIDENT ANY BETTER IDEA OF TIMING WHEN THAT MIGHT COME UP?

MR. FITZWATER: THE -- THAT WAS A MATTER AGAIN THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE MEETING YESTERDAY BUT WAS NOT DISCUSSED TODAY. THE EMIGRATION LAW, AS YOU ALL KNOW, IS RELATED TO COPING WITH THE SOVIET RULES THAT HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT CONCERNING A GREATER EMIGRATION. PRESIDENT BUSH COMMENTED THEN FOR THE INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF EMIGRANTS, MANY THOUSANDS OF THE INCREASED NUMBER IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS BUT EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THOSE RULES COPIED IN THE LAW. JOHN:

Q MARLIN, MORE SPECIFICALLY ON THE DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL, PRESIDENT BUSH ASK FOR THEM? DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAY YES, NO, MAYBE?

MR. FITZWATER: THE -- THERE IS NO ESSENTIAL CHANGE IN THE TWO POSITIONS OF THE COUNTRY. WE OF COURSE ARE INTERESTED IN THE DIRECT FLIGHTS. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV INDICATED THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU'RE AWARE OF IN WORKING THOSE OUT. BUT IT IS A MATTER THAT

IS A PART OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM, AND THEY BOTH ARE AWARE OF IT AND INTERESTED IN FINDING SOME KIND OF SOLUTION. BETTY:

Q YES, ON THE DIRECT FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL, DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REITERATE THAT THE MAIN OBJECTION CONCERNING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES? AND IF SO, DID PRESIDENT BUSH REACT TO THAT IN ANY WAY?

MR. FITZWATER: I JUST DON'T -- I DON'T KNOW THAT DETAIL OF CONVERSATION.

MR. FITZWATER: ...

חוזם: 6,1637

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/78, מצב/169, אביב/135, מנמת/81, בטחון/79, ניו יורק/89

20

מ-: ווש, נר: 1029, תא: 030690, זח: 1600, דח: 1, סג: 1

תח: 8 גס: הסברה

8: 1

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מעת, ממד, פרן.

דע: יועץ שהח לתקשורת, יועץ רוהם לתקשורת, יועץ שהבט לתקשורת, לעם, אמנ/מנמת - ר' משמרת, דובר צהל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

במהלך ראיון עם מזכיר המדינה, ג'יימס בייקר, לתוכנית הטלוויזיה נשאל בנושא ההתנחלויות.
רצב השאלות והתשובות לענייננו:-

MR. DANCY: MR. SECRETARY, GORBACHEV IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO SETTLE RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT HE WOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT EXIT PERMITS. DID HE EXPAND ON THAT IN THE MEETINGS THAT HE HAD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH?

SEC. BAKER: NO, HE REALLY DIDN'T. THE --

MR. DANCY: DID THAT TROUBLE YOU THAT HE SAID THAT IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE?

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

SEC. BAKER: THE -- WELL, NO THEY'VE SAID IT TO US BEFORE IN MEETINGS THAT WE'VE HAD. MOST RECENTLY I THINK IT WAS THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WHEN I WAS IN MOSCOW. AND WE HAVE A DIFFERENT POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES, OPENLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS. WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OR ENHANCEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT WE -- BUT WE DON'T -- WE HAVEN'T LINKED THE TWO IN THE WAY THAT -- THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WAS SUGGESTING. THEY HAVE A GREAT DEAL MORE TROUBLE WITH IT, WITH THAT, THAN WE DO. BECAUSE WE UNCONDITIONALLY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF SOVIET-JEWISH EMIGRATION.

עתונות

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תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ממד, רם, (אמן), בנצור, מצפא, פרן, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, דוצ-ים, גוברין, מזאר, תפוצות, סולטן, מזתים, מתאמשטחים

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MR. DANCY: MR. SECRETARY, GOBACHEV IN HIS PRESS
CONFERENCE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT IF THE ISRAELIS
CONTINUE TO SETTLE RUSSIAN ENIGRES IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES THAT HE WOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT
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THAT HE HAD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH?

SEC. BAKER: NO, HE REALLY DIDN'T. THE --

MR. DANCY: DID THAT TROUBLE YOU THAT HE SAID THAT
ON THE PRESS CONFERENCE?

SEC. BAKER: THE -- WELL, NO THEY VE SAID IT TO US
BEFORE IN MEETINGS THAT WE VE HAD. MOST RECENTLY
I THINK IT WAS THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WHEN I
WAS IN MOSCOW. AND WE HAVE A DIFFERENT POSITION
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ALLY SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET
JEWS. WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
ENHANCEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
BUT WE -- BUT WE DON'T -- WE HAVEN'T LINKED THE
TWO IN THE WAY THAT -- THAT PRESIDENT GOBACHEV
WAS SUGGESTING. THEY HAVE A GREAT DEAL MORE TROUBLE
WITH IT. WITH THAT, THAN WE DO. BECAUSE WE UNCONDITIONAL-
LY SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF SOVIET-JEWISH EMIGRATION.

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DATE

TIME

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SENATOR [Name]
SUBJECT: [Topic]

Dear [Name],
I am writing to you regarding the situation in the Middle East. It is a complex issue that requires a balanced and fair approach. I believe that a diplomatic solution is the best path forward.

President [Name] and I have both expressed our support for a peaceful resolution. We are committed to working together to find a way forward that respects the rights of all people in the region.

FOR US HERE TODAY.
IF I HAD ONE QUESTION TO ASK -- AND I KNOW TIME IS A PROBLEM -- THE MIDDLE EAST IS ALSO A DESTABILIZING THING. COULD YOU HELP US IN ANY WAY TO SOLVE THAT PARTICULAR PROBLEM? IS IT WITHIN YOUR PROXIMITY TO ASSIST US IN ANY WAY?

AND I HAVE A LETTER HERE THAT IS SIGNED BY ALL OUR LEADERSHIP THAT I SHOULD SIMPLY LIKE TO PRESENT TO YOU WITH A RUSSIAN TRANSLATION, BUT DON'T TAKE YOUR TIME NOW, JUST SO THAT WE CAN PRESENT IT TO YOU.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, I ONCE SAID TO GEORGE SHULTZ THE FOLLOWING: WHEN THE WELL-KNOWN SHULTZ PLAN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DISCUSSED, HE CAME TO MOSCOW AND HE DISCUSSED THAT PLAN WITH US AND HE DISCUSSED HOW WE SHOULD INTERACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I SAID, NUMBER ONE, I BELIEVE THE FACT THAT YOU WANT TO DISCUSS YOUR MIDDLE EAST PLAN WITH US BECAUSE IN THE PAST IT SEEMED TO BE THAT YOU JUST WANTED TO GO IT ALONE, NOW YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU CANNOT DO IT ALONE, WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH YOU. WE ARE READY TO USE OUR INFLUENCE AND WHERE SOME -- TO COOPERATE WITH YOU, SO, MY ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THIS, I WILL SAY TO YOU JUST WHAT I SAID -- PRACTICALLY THE SAME THING THAT I SAID TO GEORGE SHULTZ, WE ARE READY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH YOU VERY CLOSELY ON THIS. WE ARE ALREADY GOING AT IT.

OUR MEMBERS ARE CONSTANTLY ENGAGING EACH OTHER ON THIS. WE WOULD BE READY TO ACT NOW TOGETHER WITH YOU USING THE CAPABILITIES -- THE ABILITIES THAT YOU HAVE AND WE HAVE, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE SITUATION THERE IS VERY DIFFICULT NOW, HAS BEEN EXACERBATED RECENTLY, WE WANT TO FIND A SOLUTION, BUT FIRSTLY I DO NOT SEE ANY OTHER WAY OF GOING ABOUT THAT PROBLEM OTHER THAN INTERNATIONALIZING THE LATTER PROCESS. WE WOULD BE READY TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

WITH ISRAEL. WE ARE READY TO DO WITH YOU THE SIGNATURE OF INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL OF ALL THE EASTERN STATES INVOLVED THERE.

I FEEL THAT YOU WOULD LIKE NOW TO BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN SOME KIND OF DIPLOMACY WITH THE PLO, AND LET ME SAY THIS TO YOU, ALL OF US MAY HAVE CERTAIN OPINIONS, MAYBE SOME OF THOSE COMPLEX ARE JUST THAT, BUT LET ME TALK TO YOU ABOUT THAT. I THINK IT IS THE PERSON WITH WHOM YOU WANT TO WORK FOR SETTLEMENTS. HE HAS THE KIND OF ATTITUDE THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND IF YOU WOULD ASK HIM TO WORK WITH YOU TO FIND SOME INTERESTS, I THINK THAT HE MAY EVOLVE EVEN FURTHER.

SO, LET ME SAY THAT THAT WILL BE THINKING ABOUT THIS. WE'RE DISCUSSING THAT WITH THE PRESIDENT. YOU CAN FULLY EXPECT THAT WE'LL WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY. I THINK THAT THIS IS A KIND OF PROBLEM THAT SHOULD BE TREATED AS SUCH AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS COMPLICATED.

WE ARE DEALING IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION NOW AS A RESULT OF CERTAIN ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR EMIGRATION PROCEDURES, PEOPLE ARE LEAVING AND THEY SETTLE THEN ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PROVOKING QUARRELS, THEY ARE PROVOKING QUARRELS BETWEEN US AND THE ARAB PRESIDENTS AND DEMONSTRATING WITH US, THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WE THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE DOING ON PURPOSE IN ORDER TO MAKE A SOLUTION VERY DIFFICULT.

MR. THANK YOU FOR THIS VERY INTERESTING MESSAGE.

SEN. MITCHELL: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT.

SEN. [Name]: THANK YOU.

SEN. [Name]: I APPRECIATE IT VERY MUCH AND WISH YOU A VERY GOOD AND SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. THE REMINDER OF YOUR FIGHT IN THIS COUNTRY. THANK YOU.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SENATOR [Name]
SUBJECT: [Topic]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1638

תאריך: 04.06.90

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 6,1638

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/80, ניו יורק/2090, רהמש/79, מצב/170, אביב/136, מנמת/

82

מ-: נוש, נר: 1030, תא: 030690, זח: 1600, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: גס צפא

נד: 8

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מענו, ממד, פרן.

וע: יועץ שהח לתקשורת, יועץ רוהם לתקשורת, יועץ שהבט לתקשורת, לעס, אמן/מנמת - ר' משמרת, דובר צהל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

נמהלך מסעת, בבית הלבן, עם הנשיא בוש והנשיא ג'ורג' ווקר בובקוב ועידת הפסגה - עלה נושא ההתנחלויות וישראל וצב החלק הרלוונטי לענייננו-:

Q THIS IS A TWO-PRONGED QUESTION FOR BOTH PRESIDENTS. BEYOND WORDS, WHAT GUARANTEES CAN YOU GIVE THE PALESTINIANS THAT DECISIONS YOU MADE ON EMIGRATION WILL NOT RESULT IN THE FURTHER USURPATION OF THEIR LANDS? AND WHY IS IT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS SHOWN SO MUCH HUMAN SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIANS WHILE THE US VETOES EVEN A EUNF LOOK AT THEIR PLIGHT UNDER MILITARY SIEGE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WOULD YOU LIKE TO --

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: (FNS TRANSLATION.) I -- PLEASE.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

PLEASE.

PRESIDENT BUSH: DID YOU HAVE A PARTICULAR ORDER YOU WANTED US TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION IN? (LAUGHTER.)

Q IF YOU CAN.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE UNITED STATES POLICY ON SETTLEMENT IN THE E OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS UNCHANGED AND IS CLEAR, AND THAT IS, WE OPPOSE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN TERRITORIES BEYOND THE 1967 LINES. IT IS A STATED REAFFIRMED POLICY OVER AND OVER AGAIN.

NOW, WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE SECRETARY GENERAL SENDING AN EMISSARY TO THE EMIDDLE EASTF TO LOOK AT THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION. THE QUESTION IS COMPOUNDED, HOWEVER, WHEN YOU SEE ON THE EVE OF THE DISCUSSION OF THAT, AN OUTRAGEOUS GUERRILLA ATTACK ON ISRAEL LAUNCHED FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY. THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

HAVING SAID THAT, WE DON'T WANT TO -- THE POSITION OF A OUR COUNTRY IS WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT NEEDS UN TROOPS OR UN SECURITY COUNCIL MISSIONS, BUT WE DO FAVOR MR. GOULDING, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, GOING THERE.

SO WHEN THE QUESTION CAME AND WE DIFFERED WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- INDEED, WE DIFFERED WITH MANY OF OUR OTHER ALLIES ON THIS QUESTION. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE MOST PRODUCTIVE WAY TO HANDLE THAT QUESTION WAS TO HAVE AN EMISSARY FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOT AS THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FAVORED, A SECURITY COUNCIL DELEGATION GO THERE.

Q WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU AGREE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN SETTLEMENTS, EVEN THOUGH THIS HAS BEEN OUR POLICY FOR MANY YEARS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: YES, I AGREE THERE ARE SETTLEMENTS THAT GO CONTRARY TO THE UNITED STATES' POLICY, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE POLICY, REITERATE

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THE POLICY, AND TRY TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THAT IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO GO FORWARD WITH ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN THESE TERRITORIES.

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GET THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE TABLE, AND OUR SECRETARY OF STATE HAS WORKED DILIGENTLY WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND I HAVE TRIED TO DO MY BEST TO GET THEM TALKING. AND THAT'S WHAT WE THINK IS THE MOST -- THE MOST IMMEDIATE STEP THAT IS NEEDED. AND I WILL CONTINUE TO REITERATE AMERICAN POLICY AND CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR PEACE TALKS.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: JUST A MOMENT, I'D LIKE TO RESPOND, TOO. YOU FORMULATED YOUR QUESTION IN PRECISE TERMS NAMELY WHAT KIND OF GUARANTEES CAN WE ISSUE SO THAT THOSE WHO WANT TO LEAVE, THOSE WHO HAVE CHOSEN ISRAEL AS THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE, THOSE WHO LEAVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE RESETTLED IN UNOCCUPIED TERRITORIES? THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE QUESTION AND THIS IS WHAT I HAVE TO SAY IN THIS CONNECTION.

THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW BEING BOMBARDED BY A LOT OF CRITICISM FROM EARABF COUNTRIES. LATELY, I HAVE HAD MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD OF ESYRIAF AND PRESIDENT MUBAREK OF EEGYPTF. THOSE WERE VERY IMPORTANT TALKS WITH THEM. NEVERTHELESS, THIS QUESTION - THIS WAS THE QUESTION THAT WAS ALSO RAISED BY THEM IN ACUTE TERMS.

THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES NOW, WE ARE FACING THE FOLLOWING SITUATION. EITHER AFTER THESE MEETINGS AND EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, OUR CONCERN WILL BE HEDED IN ISRAEL AND THEY WILL MAKE CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS. OR ELSE WE MUST GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO IT IN TERMS OF WHAT WE CAN DO WITH ISSUING PERMITS FOR EXIT.

AND SOME PEOPLE ARE RAISING THE MATTER IN THESE TERMS IN THE SOVIET UNION, NAMELY AS LONG AS THERE ARE NO ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THIS IS

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

NOT GOING TO BE DONE BY THEM TO POSTPONE ISSUING PERMITS FOR EXIT, TO PUT IT OFF. BUT I HOPE THEY WILL HEED WHAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS STRONGLY ADVISE THEM -- THAT THEY SHOULD ACT IN A WISE FASHION. PERHAPS THIS IS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS BY WAY OF REACTING.

עתונות

ג'

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, 8(אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרן, גוברין, מזאר, תפוצות, סולטן, מרתים, מתאשטחים, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, דוצ-ים

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 6,1653

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/178, רהמש/85, אביב/142, מנמח/88
מ-: ווש, נר: 2022, תא: 030690, זח: 1900, דח: מ, ג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

סודי / מיידי

אל : סמוכל צפא ופרן

דע : יועץ מדיני לשהח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

יהודי בריהם.

בעקבות דברי הנשיא גורבאצ'וב במסעת המשותפת עם הנשיא
בוש היום ביקשתי את תום דיין ואת ועידת הנשיאים לפעול
כך שנשיא בריהם' יהיה מודע לחשיבות שמירת מדיניות
הגירה חופשית. תום דיין ישוחח עם הסנטור וילסון
ודיאן פיינשטיין (מועמדים למושלות קליפורניה) לקראת
ביקור גורבאצ'וב בסנפרנציסקו. ועידת הנשיאים תצא
בהודעה. הקונכל בסן-פרנציסקו שוחח עם צ'רלי היל כך
שהדברים יועלו בפגישת שולץ-גורבאצ'וב.

ארד

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזארד, 1,
ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, @ (אמן)

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| תחילת: תיכני | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | ק: <u>4</u> |
| סוג: בלמיט | טופס פרוק | סתוק: <u>15</u> |
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| הפסד: 1021 | כאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון. | |

פסגה בוש - גורבצ'וב

1. רצ"ב לעיונכם:
 - א. דברי בייקר ותשובת גורבצ'וב בהגיעו לנמל אנדרינו (30.5).
 - ב. נאומי בוש וגורבצ'וב בקבלת הפנים הרשמית במדשאת הבית וולבו (30.5).
 - ג. קטעים מנאום גורבצ'וב במהלך א"צ שערך לכבוד "אינטלקטואלים" (31.5).
 - ד. מבחר מאמרים המסכמים ומעריכים תוצאות דיוני היום הראשון.
2. דיוני היום הראשון (שכללו שני מפגשים, תחילה בארבע עיניים ובהמשך בהשתתפות חיועצים) הקדש לדיון בנושא עויזה של גרמניה מאוחדת באירועה בעידן של בתר המלחמה קרה.
3. ^{הסקיגו} חטבות שני הנשיאים שלא לחת פומבי להבנות שהושגו. במסיבות עיתונאים מאולחרות ציינו שניהם כי במהלך שיחותיהם נדונו רעיונות והצעות שנועדו לשבור הקפארן שנוצו, הווערכות (נכון לשעה זו) אין מלמדות על כך שהושגה פריצת דרך. שני הנשיאים הטילו על שוי החוץ להמשיך וללבו הרעיונות שהעלו. שני הנשיאים הבהירו כי לא ניתן יהיה לשתור הועיה במהלך הפסגה.
4. ביונה השני של הפסגה אמורים שני הנשיאים לדון בנושא ליטואניה, המצב הכלכלי בברייה"מ נושאי פיקוח על החימוש וקיצוץ כוחות קונבנציונליים, נושאים רגיונליים ולחנות על שורת הסכמים.
5. ננשיך לדווח.

שטייג

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BARRY Mr. President, Mrs. Gorbachev, I'm delighted to welcome you to Washington on behalf of the President and Mrs. Bush, and on behalf, as well, of the American people.

Mr. President, the eyes of the world are on you, and they are on President Bush. Together our nations have the responsibility to leave behind not only the cold war but also the conflicts that preceded it.

To do that we must see a Germany unified and Europe reconciled. We must reduce the danger of war by controlling nuclear, chemical and conventional arms and by resolving regional conflicts and of course we want to see continued movement toward democracy and openness in the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, the world has looked forward since last winter to this visit, and to the promise that this visit holds. So together this week, let us seek to fulfill that promise.

Summit's Potential

GORBACHEV. Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your words of welcome and hospitality.

In these first minutes of our visit to America, I wish to convey on behalf of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., our best wishes to the people of the United States.

While looking forward to important talks with President George Bush, a lot will depend on their results in determining how things will work out, not only between you Americans and us, but also on a larger scale.

We shall also have meetings with other political leaders, public figures and, I hope, with other Americans of various positions and walks of life.

This summit stands out in its importance first of all for the promise it holds of the first major step to reduce strategic nuclear arms. Both sides have worked painstakingly together to prepare it.

This meeting is also special because this is the first time that the President of the United States and I will have enough time to reflect on and discuss not only in a formal setting but also in more informal surroundings, one on one, all questions either of us might have that fall within our responsibility.

I would like once again to wish peace and well being to every American home. Thank you.

Statements by Bush and Gorbachev

Following is a transcript of statements by President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev yesterday as the Soviet leader was welcomed to the White House, as recorded through the facilities of the Cable News Network.

BUSH STATEMENT

Friends and distinguished guests, welcome to all of you — especially our guests from the Soviet Union. It is my great honor to welcome to the White House the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mr. President, just over a year ago I said that the United States wanted to move beyond containment in its relations with the Soviet Union, toward a new era, an era of enduring cooperation.

When we last met in Malta, we agreed to accelerate our efforts on a full range of issues. Today, differences remain, of course, but in the short six months since the Malta summit, we've made encouraging progress. And I want this summit to take us further still, and I know that that is your view as well, Mr. President.

We've seen a world of change this past year, and now on the horizon we see what just one short year ago seemed a distant dream: a continent truly divided East and West has begun to heal with the dawn of self-determination and democracy.

A United Europe

In Germany, where the wall once stood, a nation moves toward unity in peace and freedom. And in the other nations of the most heavily militarized continent on earth, at last we see the long era of confrontation giving way to the prospect of enduring cooperation in a Europe whole and free.

Mr. President, you deserve great credit for your part in these transforming events. I salute you, as well, for the process of change you've brought to your own country.

As we begin this summit, let me stress that I believe we can work together at this historic moment to further the process of building a new Europe, one in which every nation's security is strengthened and no nation is threatened.

Around the world we need to strengthen our cooperation in solving regional conflicts and building peace and stability. In Nicaragua, for example, we've shown that we can work together to promote peaceful change. In Angola, our support for an early resolution of that country's tragic conflict is a resolution acceptable to the Angolan people. It's now paying off.

So let us expand this new spirit of cooperation, not merely to resolve disputes between us but to build a solid foundation for peace, prosperity and stability around the world.

The Soviet Debate

In that same spirit, Mr. President, let me quote the words of one of your nation's great minds, one of the world's great men in this or any age, Andrei Sakharov. Fourteen years ago, he wrote, "I am convinced that guaranteed political and civil rights for people the world over are also guarantees of international security, economic and social progress." Sakharov knew that lasting peace and

progress are inseparable from freedom; that nations will only be fully safe when all people are fully free. And we in the U.S. applaud the new course the Soviet Union has chosen.

We see the spirited debate in the Congress of People's Deputies, in the Soviet press, among the Soviet people. We know about the difficult economic reforms that are necessary to breathe new vigor into the Soviet economy. And as I've said many times before, we want to see perestroika succeed.

Mr. President, I firmly believe, as you have said, that there is no turning back from the path you have chosen.

Since our meeting in Malta, we've reached agreements in important areas, each one proof that when mutual respect prevails, progress is possible. But the agreements we've reached cannot cause us to lose sight of some of the differences that remain — Lithuania is one such issue. We believe that good-faith dialogue between the Soviet leaders and representatives of the Baltic peoples is the proper approach, and we hope to see that process go forward.

Goals of the Summit

Over the next four days we're not going to solve all of the world's problems. We won't resolve all of the outstanding issues that divide us. But we can and will take significant steps toward a new relationship. This summit will be a working summit in the strictest sense of the term, one where we mark the real progress we've made by signing new agreements, and where we address the differences that divide us in a spirit of candor, in an open and honest search for common ground.

In a larger sense, though, the success of this summit depends not on the agreements we will sign but on our efforts to lay the groundwork for overcoming decades of division and discourse, to build a world of peace in freedom.

Mr. President, together, your great country and ours bear an enormous and unique responsibility for world peace and regional stability. We must work together to reduce tensions, to make the world a little better for our children and grandchildren. And to this end I pledge you my all-out effort.

Mr. President, you brought us a beautiful day and you brought back Mrs. Gorbachev. That brings joy to all of our hearts — a hearty welcome to her as well. And so it is my privilege to welcome you to the White House, and may God bless our peoples in their efforts for a better world. Welcome, sir.

GORBACHEV STATEMENT

Mr. President, Mrs. Bush, ladies and gentlemen, comrades.

Thank you for this welcome. May I also greet all Americans on behalf of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

My present visit to the United States is a confirmation that Soviet-U.S. relations are acquiring greater stability, clarity and predictability. I am convinced that both the Soviet people and the Americans approve such changes. I think that they are also properly appreciated throughout the world. Therefore it is the great responsibility of the President and myself to make sure that the capital of trust and cooperation accumulated in recent years is protected and constantly increased.

I remember well my first visit to the United States, and not only because I saw America for the first time then. During those days in December 1987 President Reagan and I signed the treaty on the elimination of I.N.F. missiles. That was truly a watershed not only in our relations but in the history of modern times. It was the first step taken together by two powerful countries on the road leading to a safe and sensible world.

A Changing World

Since then our two great nations have traveled a long way toward each other. Thousands of American and Soviet citizens, dozens of agencies, private companies and public organizations are involved in political and business contacts, humanitarian exchanges, scientific and technological cooperation. In the same years the world around us has also changed beyond recognition.

Mr. President, this generation of people on earth may witness the advent of an irreversible period of peace in the history of civilization. The walls which for years separated the peoples are collapsing. The trenches of the cold war are disappearing, the fog of prejudice, mistrust and animosity is vanishing.

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I have come to the United States with the impressions still fresh in my mind of how our people celebrated the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazism and of my meetings with war veterans. I recently had many meetings with my countrymen. They all understand the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations. They look upon their improvement with the hope that the tragedies of the 20th century, those horrible wars, will forever remain a thing of the past. I think that this is what the Americans want, too.

Mr. President, living up to these hopes of our two nations is your mission and mine. This meeting is part of it. My colleagues and I have come to do serious work in order to make a decisive step toward an agreement reducing the most dangerous arms, which are increasingly losing their political significance and to provide further impetus through interaction between our two countries — interaction and of course cooperation in solving international problems, in trade, scientific, technological and humanitarian fields, in cultural exchanges, in expanding information about each other and in people-to-people contacts.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

We want progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. I am looking forward to meeting with the Americans, and to the extent possible getting to know better your unique and great country.

On behalf of Mrs. Gorbachev and myself and of all those who have come with me to your nation's capital, I thank once again President George Bush and Mrs. Bush and all those present here for this warm welcome.

Ryzhkov Hurt in a Collision

MOSCOW, May 31 (Reuters) — Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov of the Soviet Union was slightly injured when his official car collided with an army bus in Moscow, the official press agency Tass said today.

Summit in Washington: First Day

Bush and Gorbachev Talk Of New Ideas on Germany

Continued From Page A1

Soviet leader — at the luncheon, in the White House driveway, on the lawn and elsewhere.

Tonight, at the height of the rush hour, he stopped his black ZIL limousine on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Soviet Embassy and briefly worked both sides of the street, shaking hands enthusiastically.

In his news conference, Mr. Bush said the talks had been "very frank — no rancor there."

Mr. Gorbachev's spokesman, Arkady A. Maslennikov, pronounced the

A narrowing of differences over the NATO issue.

first sessions "a good beginning" and predicted that Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush would hold two more summit conferences this year to sign long-awaited treaties covering reductions in strategic arms and conventional forces in Europe.

The White House said a number of agreements would be signed after two more meetings between the leaders on Friday, including a chemical weapons accord and probably an outline of the main points of the strategic arms treaty. Negotiations on the strategic arms agreement were still under way tonight, with discussions centering on whether and how the Soviet Union would be allowed to modernize its huge SS-18 missiles, which have no United States counterpart.

On a third important question, a planned trade agreement, approval of which has been held up by the Soviet failure to pass a liberal emigration law

and by Moscow's partial economic embargo against Lithuania, senior American officials said that there was a good chance that the agreement would be signed, but that a waiver required to put it into effect would not be sent to Congress until the Administration was satisfied on emigration and on the situation in the Baltic republics.

That formula would give Mr. Gorbachev a trophy to take home without exposing President Bush to charges that he sold out Soviet Jews or Lithuania.

In contrast to his dark mood on Wednesday in Canada, and despite the phalanx of problems facing him at home, the Soviet leader smiled, deflected hard questions with soft words and exuded sweet reason. Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, a luncheon guest, spoke of Mr. Gorbachev's seeming serenity.

'The Trenches Are Disappearing'

"The trenches of the cold war are disappearing," Mr. Gorbachev said in his arrival speech. "The fog of prejudice, mistrust and animosity is vanishing."

Mr. Bush was "upbeat and animated" during the bargaining sessions, according to his spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater. In his speech of welcome this morning, the President pointedly mentioned the German problem and the need for Soviet reconciliation with Lithuania, while also saluting Mr. Gorbachev's achievements. And in his toast for the White House dinner tonight, he praised his guest for "creating within the Soviet Union a commitment to change."

While it was not clear what new ideas Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev had put forward on the question of future German military allegiance and the related question of troop reductions in Europe, including Soviet withdrawals from former satellite countries in Eastern Europe, officials on both sides said major difficulties remained, and Mr. Bush said he had not changed his basic position on the issue.

One strong possibility, experts said, was some means of suggesting in the conventional forces treaty now under

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Handwritten: The Differences
**The Differences
Narrow Slightly;
Details Unclear**

By R. W. APPLE Jr. *(CA)*

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 31 — President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union opened their second summit conference today, and both leaders later indicated that differences between the Soviet Union and the West on the difficult question of Germany's military status had narrowed slightly.

Speaking at an impromptu news conference this evening on the White House lawn, after completing his second round of conversations with Mr. Bush, the Soviet leader said the two sides had put forth "certain ideas and suggestions" for breaking the impasse on the issue. The two Presidents, he said, had asked their Foreign Ministers to give the matter further study.

Mr. Bush, speaking a few moments later on the White House steps, said he was pleased by Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion that differences "had been narrowed somewhat."

Bush Is Encouraged

"There was a proposal that President Gorbachev made," Mr. Bush said in a brief discussion with reporters. "I took some heart from that. I was encouraged by that."

But there was no suggestion from either leader that a major breakthrough had been achieved, and both stressed that other nations' wishes could not be ignored.

Indeed, late tonight, an Administration official told reporters that no significant progress had been made. Conceding that he had been told to dampen expectations, the official said Mr. Bush would call Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany on Friday to tell him that the United States had not altered its position.

Soviets Oppose NATO Role

"It is not here that the German question will be solved," Mr. Gorbachev commented, reflecting the difficulty of reconciling his opposition to NATO membership for a unified Germany and the insistence of the United States, West Germany and other Western nations that such membership be permitted.

The conference between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev opened in a swirl of military pageantry on the sun-drenched south lawn of the White House, with howitzers, bands, a five-and-drum corps in colonial dress and an enormous contingent of photographers.

In addition to a one-on-one session for the leaders this morning and a session including their aides this afternoon, the day included a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy for prominent Americans, a visit to the Library of Congress and the Children's Museum by Mr. Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, and an unstoppable torrent of words from the

Continued on Page A7, Column 1

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Gorbachev Appears Testy, Defensive ^{5/16} Speaking to Stars Invited to Embassy

GORBACHEV, From A21

of pro- and anti-reform, writers who met him would rhapsodize about the Soviet leader's intelligent eyes and his ability to mention the book titles of the various guests.

And last time, Gorbachev appealed for policies that would "express the mood of the people," and the mood of Moscow was still hopeful. But now Gorbachev finds himself in a position where politicians criticize him for being too slow and too cautious, and the mood of the people is angry, dispirited and cynical.

Henry Kissinger pronounced Gorbachev as "serene" in manner at the embassy, but Gorbachev actually seemed a bit testy as he reflected on the criticism abroad that the Soviet Union has not gone far enough to reform the economy: "For Americans, it is all so easy. You have all the mechanisms and institutions in place." But in the Soviet Union, where there has not been anything resembling a market economy in decades, people still think of markets as "speculation."

"Oh, how we have to twist our brains!" he groaned.

To an American audience Gorbachev's speech before the trays of caviar arrived may have seemed almost disturbingly disjointed. But this style of free association, leaping from a glancing economic analysis to flattering someone in the audience, is well-known to Soviet viewers who still follow Gorbachev's frequent appearances on television. Gorbachev seemed so pressed to cover all his points that his syntax made George Bush's speeches seem as smooth as the prose of Genesis.

For Gorbachev, America is a relatively easy room to work. Although he referred to the embassy audience as intellectuals, the audience looked less like the editorial board of *Partisan Review* than a banquet at the Polo Lounge. And

unlike the audiences in Moscow, which have begun to test Gorbachev's patience by challenging him on every conceivable point, from the wisdom of socialism to the need for a Lenin Mausoleum, the Americans spent no time on criticism.

After lunch, several of the guests rose to speak, "but all they did was praise Gorbachev and tell him to keep doing what he is doing. There was not one sharp question," said Dmitri Likhachev, a cultural historian from Leningrad and a former prisoner in Soviet labor camps.

Likhachev was taken aback, as well, by the small number of serious writers and artists in the room compared to the number of movie stars. Science fiction authors Ray Bradbury and Isaac Asimov represented the world of creative writing because, as the Soviet leader ex-

plained, they "are my daughter's favorite authors."

"There were a few writers there, but with all those movie stars around I admit it was an odd bunch to be called 'intellectuals,'" Likhachev said. "I guess not everyone knows what intellectual means." A White House source said Soviet officials in Moscow drew up the guest list and that Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, had especially asked to meet some Hollywood stars.

"I felt that we had to meet with members of the American intellectual community, because it is indeed the stuff of which a society is made," Gorbachev said.

There were some bona fide academics amid the stars: economist

John Kenneth Galbraith, Georgetown University President Leo J. O'Donovan and physicist Roald Sagdeyev. Jesse Jackson was the only politician in the room. The representative of religious life was televangelist Robert Schuller, who will broadcast a series of religious homilies on Soviet television this year.

Four blocks down 16th Street, Raisa Gorbachev seemed pleased to be at a White House without Nancy Reagan. Not only did she get along with the Bush family, she was a hit with the family's springer spaniel. "Mrs. Gorbachev and Millie bonded," Barbara Bush's spokeswoman said, adding that the dog "quivered with excitement whenever Mrs. Gorbachev spoke to her."

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Embassy Guests See a

By David Remnick
Washington Post Foreign Service

For months now, Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev has been taking to the Soviet airwaves in a series of rambling speeches, sounding like a man exhausted by the job of trying to build a new society in a landscape of collapse. Yesterday, American audiences got a chance to see Gorbachev in this new and tired incarnation.

NEWS
ANALYSIS

Although Gorbachev was his old energetic self at times, jumping out of his limousine to work the crowds on New York Avenue, he was also defensive, elusive and disjointed, especially in a lunchtime speech at the Soviet Embassy. He seemed particularly perturbed that Soviet and American commentators are talking freely now about the Soviet Union's increasingly weak position in the world. He warned against anyone trying to apply pressure on him or on the Soviet Union because they think it's "enfeebled."

"All the instability, all the changes, are just an indication of the fundamental nature of reform," Gorbachev said. Talk of weakness, he said, "is just not serious."

Last night at the White House, he seemed to be warning Americans that he needed their help. "We have not yet completed the task of creating a durable democratic system in our country," he said in his after-dinner toast, adding that he was confident this goal would be achieved.

As a politician praised for his theatrical flair for rhetoric and improvisation, Gorbachev yesterday could not match the performance he gave when he hosted a similar session here in 1987. Although he tried to repeat his customary routines, flattering his guests by name and breaking into a broad grin, the embassy luncheon had the feel of a not-quite-successful revival.

In those euphoric days of 1987, when Gorbachev could dazzle a crowd with a wave and Soviet political life was a matter

See GORBACHEV, A23, Col. 4

... we are now...
... that cold war which we've had, and
... considering all those...
... the situation in the world...
... different camps, different...
... but, well, we found out...
... one world, in one...
... I said
... once that I am not a...
... the theory of convergence, but I believe
... that everyone has to pray to his own
... god.

One Civilization

And the example given by the revolution proved to be an impetus, and capitalism had to prove to all that it could do something. And they used to say that regulating the economy is not a good thing, but now they are doing it. ... So, we are living in one civilization. And regardless of all of the differences that we have — and I believe the differences are not a liability. It is a plus to a certain extent because it provides a good foundation for reaching a higher-level plane of knowledge. ...

We welcome various forms of cooperation, exchanges, and we see that, in a search for positive ways, is replacing ideological competition. And we remain committed to the choice we have made. We are looking for ways to adapt it and in terms of more democracy — of greater democracy, so that we won't be polarized from intellectuals as well, and I believe that the Americans as well are faced with similar problems.

Well, if we are talking about the problems, perhaps we are in a more difficult situation right now. I said to the President and I am repeating it now, that some people say that we could apply some pressure on the Soviet Union because it's enfeebled now, but how can you say that some of these are weak when perestroika is under way, it's going on, and all the instability, all the changes is but an indication of its fundamental nature.

We are changing our political system, we are working to develop a new economic system given the situation in our country, drawing up on our own experience and we are always very specific in our endeavors. That will be not like in the United States, in Germany, because that will be our unique way, because we would founder if we decide to simply adopt the ways that are current in some other country, because we've become wiser now.

Meeting Closed

And I'm always skeptical when someone says, well, we have to adopt this or that model. I believe that we have to make the choice and following that, creation is the thing to do, drawing on the huge experience that has been amassed by our civilization. If we manage to do that, we'll be proceeding with more speed. And at any rate, we'll have to travel down this road because we have no other choice, and the only thing to decide is how quick we should — how rapid our progress should be, and what would be its modalities.

But now we are experiencing a crucial period of time. I like never before, we want to be understood right now. We would not like to see pain in our country because of very deep and profound changes.

And today, during my discussion on this particular topic, you know with whom I talk here in Washington but that was not the President, it was said

that it's difficult to be half-present with introducing a market economy. I said, I agree but at any rate one has to wait nine months before a child is born and the same thing is — otherwise it would be — (apparent off-mike comment) — yes, seven months, okay. ... So in order to have a healthy child, one has to wait nine months.

So we have to travel a certain road. We'll be traveling down this road because the major difficulty and — is that we have become accustomed to certain ways of thinking about market. Because Americans know pretty well about what a market is and about the whole intricacies about it — all the intricacies of a market, but we are innocent, so to say as far as a market is concerned, we have to start from the scratch. Because some people believe that a market is a speculation, and for your speculation, there is a market, so to say. ...

Once again, I would like to thank you. I'm glad to see all of you. Some of you, I have known for some time. And with Gregory Peck, Jane Fonda, I believe, and one I also mentioned, and other members of the intelligentsia, we have two science-fiction writers, Asimov and Bradbury. When we learned about who — decided to see the guest list — and my daughter said, well, all those writers are my favorites. I have read all of their works. So we know about all your work.

And once again, on my own behalf and on the behalf of Raisa Maksimovna, on behalf of the members of my party, I extend to you my cordial welcome and I count on your cooperation in this very critical time of change and special responsibility, and of great hopes and expectations. And on how we understand each other, much will depend. Thank you very much.

I now propose a toast during this meeting, to our being together and understanding very well what cooperation means.

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more sound conclusion, after thinking about the whole picture, I would like to say that there was a film, "A Century-Long Romance," and that was a documentary on how the friendship between our two countries has been developing during the 20th century. And it is amazing, when you see this two-hour documentary, you feel awed at how many times we initiated things and then parted our ways. That is why it's so important not to let pass the chance that we have now....

We have come to the conclusion that we have to search for new approaches, we have to adopt a new way of thinking to each other. And it looks as if we'll have to proceed from competition to cooperation.

Many Approaches

Let's not hurry, because such changes do not happen overnight. Because only in Lithuania, they can overnight decide a question about seceding from the Soviet Union, and after that they are at a loss what to do, and we are at a loss what to do. That is one way of proceeding, that is one approach.

But there is another one which is more right, it is more humane. That is to be very cautious, to consider a matter seven times, or even 100 times before one takes a decision. So let us not hasten to undertake certain measures. And if we manage to pass from confrontation to competition to cooperation, that would indeed be a major achievement. And if we manage to do that, I'm sure that our peoples will be able to live and cooperate.

The latest public polls, both in our country and in your country, show, I believe agree that people think that improved relations with the United States of America should be continued. And recall everything, the wartime years. ... We recall the 30's, when there was cooperation in building plants and factories in our countries. Memories are still alive in the minds of our people, and we feel very good feelings toward the American people.

And I once discussed certain things with President Mitterrand, and we were talking about the fact, how it is difficult to be a politician nowadays, because a politician used to be a guy who sat in his study and was an analyst, but now one cannot divorce himself from the populist sentiments, from the sentiments of those who do not want to be simple bystanders.



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Promoting Ties

And this year, during the day of my birthday, I received an enormous number of congratulations and 99 percent from the United States of America. Yes, we published one book about Americans writing to Gorbachev and we still — we have the material for a second edition. It's very interesting. This is what is happening.

So we have the atmosphere in which we could promote such trends in the relations between our two countries. This is not an easy task. And in

both our countries people ask whether the United States are genuine in their desire. And sometimes we have situations when something is done which spoils the situation for decades to come.

And that is something we have to take into account, because I have certain information and today I read in one newspaper that Gorbachev is the man who is prone to make demagogic statements and who is a closet believer in the old ways, so to say.

But it seems to me that we haven't had a better time to undertake

Excerpts From Remarks by Gorbachev

at the Soviet Embassy Luncheon

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 31 — Following are excerpts from remarks by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev at a luncheon today at the Soviet Embassy, as provided by the Federal News Service, a transcription agency:

Ladies and gentlemen — ladies and gentlemen, I am indeed happy to welcome all of you. And on my own behalf, on behalf of Raisa Maksimovna, and on behalf of my party, who have arrived to Washington for important work, for having accepted my invitation — I give you my cordial greetings.

When I recalled that we had similar meetings during our previous stay, it seemed to me that that was a landmark event of that particular visit. And I felt that we have to meet once again with the members of the American intellectual community, because it is indeed the stuff of which a society is made. . . .

We, back in our country . . . have been discussing this particular subject and I know that you are afraid sometimes and you think that the Russians should somehow quiet down and get down to work, and I believe that it shows that we have not been able for so long to realize our potential. And we are a huge nation speaking 120 languages, that means representing 120 nationalities, but that is not all.

We'll figure out how to proceed in our country. We haven't yet done that, but the main thing has been done. Having understood our country, our history, we have come to the conclusion that we cannot proceed as we have been doing all along. That was said on March 11 during the night . . . from 11th to the 12th of March, and one day later I was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And I understood well, we cannot proceed like this anymore, so how should we live? And from that particular moment we began to search for answers.

Choosing a Path

Even those who are present here, my colleagues in the perestroika drive and in my party, you will see many people who work hard to promote perestroika to make it expand and become deeper. But the main thing is to make it sure that our country becomes more open and more open to the outside world, and this is indeed a difficult task. I am constantly asked — people ask me, "After the last five years if you had found yourself back in April 1985, had you chosen the same path?"

I'm sure that especially after these five years, after all . . . ideas and today, which is the decisive moment — I will dwell on it — we have no other way to proceed, and there is no turning back.

I wouldn't like to impose on you, but I would like to brief you on what is going on in the Soviet Union at the present time. . . .

Today I said to the President that at any rate we would like to have answers to two major questions. The first one — what the Soviet Union would like to see. And I would like to tell you what — United States — we would like to see.

Being Together

In a nutshell — and I would not try to dwell in detail on what I said to the President — I would like to say that my idea boils down to the following. Being two major powerful nations at this very crucial stage in the life of our civilization, when we are involved in deep changes, we have to be together.

What does it mean — together? Let's think about it. Mr. Kissinger, my old man who always contests things, and when I want to ask — to say something critical — I turn to him, and I see that Mr. Kissinger has undergone evolution toward these kinds of ideas. And that is to his credit.

What does it mean — to be together? We could be competitors and we were, indeed, adversaries and we opposed each other. And I believe that a

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The Summit on Day One

IT WAS a more worn and subdued looking Mikhail Gorbachev whom George Bush greeted at the White House yesterday. It was not hard to imagine that his and his country's mounting cares had taken the edge off the high energy and confidence he had earlier displayed. The loss of empire, the challenge to Mr. Gorbachev's political leadership and the general erosion verging on incipient disintegration in the Soviet Union provided a sober backdrop to his evident purpose to apply some order to events otherwise apparently spinning out of control. His reception on the streets of Washington was considerably more friendly than what he gets these days in Moscow.

President Bush received his guest with personal grace and with an unprovocative but clear statement of the American interest in a deepening of the democratic trends within the Soviet Union and—a matter increasingly seen to be related to the first—a consolidation of the changes taking place in the international arena. For the United States, the requirement is to show steadiness and patience in the face of opportunities that are coming within reach but are not yet there. These opportunities center on

consummating a post-Cold War European settlement, involving security, political consultation and economic exchange—a settlement that, as Mr. Bush said in his greeting, satisfies all parties in Europe and threatens none.

It is quite likely that this is too grand a task to be achieved at one summit. It indicates the common aspiration, however, that the two leaders assigned overnight homework to their aides. Progress in important though not exactly world-shaking arms control issues had already been ensured in this summit. Any further work would perhaps best be measured in terms of momentum imparted and new formulas explored on the basic European issue.

A Soviet-American summit inevitably magnetizes the hopes and pleas of many other countries and many causes. This one is no exception, but it has its own quality. Because of contributions made by Mr. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, there is no sense of a fundamental war-or-peace choice hovering over this summit. That's been "done." Rather, the common emphasis is on clearing away the political and intellectual wreckage of the Cold War and getting on with the life that comes after.

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cow that the unified Germany should be part of the NATO alliance.

Gorbachev kept up an energetic pace reminiscent of his first visit to Washington in December 1987. He jumped out of his limousine on 15th Street NW at New York and Pennsylvania avenues to talk with on-lookers, and he spoke at length to a group of Americans invited to the Soviet Embassy for a luncheon. But, in contrast to his last visit, he seemed defensive in his luncheon remarks about his troubles at home.

Although the talks at the White House did not produce any breakthroughs, Gorbachev was upbeat last night in a toast at the state dinner in his honor. He suggested that the summit would exceed expectations and might produce "the biggest results compared to all the other" previous U.S.-Soviet summits. "Maybe I'm too optimistic," he added, "but let's wait and see. We have two days. I believe that maybe we will have those major results." Bush devoted his toast to a salute to Gorbachev "for the political and economic reforms you've introduced and for creating within the Soviet Union a commitment to change."

Emerging yesterday afternoon from the White House after his second two-hour meeting with Bush, Gorbachev provided the first substantial account of the discussions.

"I think it is not here that the German question will be resolved," he said through his interpreter, a statement seconded by Bush when he met reporters in the Rose Garden shortly after Gorbachev had departed.

Gorbachev said, however, that ideas from both sides on settling all parts of "the external aspects of German unification" gave rise to a decision to assign Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Shevardnadze and their respective experts to "in-depth" talks on "something that emerged that requires such discussion."

The idea of having Baker and Shevardnadze hold those discussions on Germany had originated with Gorbachev, Bush said, adding that he is "encouraged" by that. "I think the important point is we could talk very frankly . . . Let's hope some of the differences have been narrowed," he said.

Although both Gorbachev and Bush indicated that these talks would begin immediately, there was confusion in the Bush administration about the public statements. A

U.S. official last night quoted Baker as saying he had no plans for such talks on Friday.

Bush said his "fundamental" position on the Germany-related issues is the same as when the discussions with Gorbachev started, suggesting that no major compromises of the U.S. posture regarding full-scale German participation in NATO is in the offing.

Earlier, Bush welcomed Gorbachev to the White House in a sun-drenched ceremony on the South Lawn, saluting the Soviet leader for his role in the momentous events of the last year. At the same time, Bush vowed in his official welcoming statement to confront Gorbachev directly on their differences over Lithuania and the outline of Europe.

"In a larger sense," Bush said, "the success of this summit depends not on the agreements we will sign, but on our efforts to lay the groundwork for overcoming decades of division and discord, to build a world of peace in freedom." Bush urged Gorbachev to join him "to further the process of building a new Europe, one in which every nation's security is strengthened and no nation is threatened."

Recalling the collapse of hard-line communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the breaching of the Berlin Wall, Bush said the world has witnessed "what just one short year ago seemed like a distant dream: a continent cruelly divided, East from West, has begun to heal with the dawn of self-determination and democracy."

"In Germany," he said, "where the Wall once stood, a nation moves toward unity, in peace and freedom."

Gorbachev, joining Bush on a platform with the Washington Monument and the Jefferson Memorial behind them, also paid tribute to the end of the Cold War. Since his last visit to the White House 29 months ago, Gorbachev said, "the world around us has also changed beyond recognition."

"The worlds, which for years separated the peoples, are collapsing," Gorbachev said. "The trenches of the Cold War are disappearing. The fog of prejudice, mistrust and animosity is vanishing."

While neither leader referred directly to their differences over whether a unified Germany should remain in the Western alliance, Gorbachev made a pointed reference in his statement to the high price the Soviet Union paid to crush Hitler's Nazi Germany 45 years ago. Fears of a revived, strong Ger-

many have been at the heart of Soviet concerns about reunification.

Gorbachev said many Soviet people look on the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations "with the hope that the tragedies of the 20th century, those horrible wars, will forever remain a thing of the past. I think this is what the Americans want too."

Bush, talking with reporters late in the day, said he was "not insensitive" to the 27 million Soviet lives lost in the war. He also recalled the heavy toll in American casualties, and said, "I reminded him that I was the only one of the two of us that was old enough to remember it from being there." Bush was a Navy pilot in the Pacific.

Remaining unresolved and apparently under discussion between the two sides was the question of whether a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, the provisions of which have been agreed upon, will be signed during the summit. Soviet officials have displayed great interest in this pact, which could be a heartening symbol of future economic progress to the hard-hit Soviet consumers. But Bush has been reluctant to sign an economic accord while the Kremlin's economic embargo against the breakaway Lithuania continues.

Bush said last night he will discuss details of the trade issue with Gorbachev today.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the two leaders or their aides will sign or announce a host of accords in the East Room of the White House at 5 p.m. today. The most important are a statement of agreement on the main points of a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) and a statement of objectives for a future START II pact featuring deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals.

A U.S.-Soviet accord to slash the chemical weapon stocks of both nations and require an immediate halt to U.S. production of additional chemical arms is to be signed, Fitzwater said. Also being signed are protocols, or detailed procedures, for implementation of the unratified 1974 and 1976 U.S.-Soviet nuclear testing treaties.

Among other agreements to be signed today, according to Fitzwater, are a new student-exchange agreement, a commercial aviation pact, a new cultural agreement, a maritime agreement and an ocean studies accord.

Staff writers R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy contributed to this report.

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Bush, Gorbachev Discuss

German Unification

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Soviet Backs Council For European Security

By David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev yesterday opened a summit to come to grips with a world they described as radically changed, and began to grapple immediately with the problem of a united Germany in a post-Cold War Europe.

Gorbachev, following four hours of White House meetings with Bush, said they had assigned their foreign ministers to begin more "in-depth discussions" of ideas about Germany offered by both sides during the meetings. However, it was unclear last night when the meetings would begin, and U.S. officials said there is no sign that Bush and Gorbachev narrowed their differences on Germany during the first day of talks.

A U.S. official said Gorbachev offered a plan to base future European security on the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would replace the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. The Soviet idea is to restructure this organization to safeguard European peace under a "Greater European Council" of all 35 heads of state, including those of the United States and Soviet Union, that would meet once a year.

Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez said yesterday he had received a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on Tuesday outlining this plan. U.S. officials said a copy of the Soviet plan was given to the State Department on Wednesday by Soviet Ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh.

Shortly before the summit began, a senior adviser to Bush expressed skepticism about such a proposal, saying the 35-nation organization would be too unwieldy to guarantee the security of major nations. However, the official said Bush would propose an expanded political role for the group.

The U.S. ideas involve limitations on German and other military forces in the central zone of Europe as part of East-West negotiations on reductions in land armies in Europe. Officials said these ideas have been shared with top West German officials, and, in another sign of intensified diplomacy, Chancellor Helmut Kohl will meet Bush here next Friday.

A Soviet Foreign Ministry official said that such limits on German and other Western forces "are welcome" because they "show some movement" on the U.S. side, but that this is "clearly not enough" to convince Mos-

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
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Jose R. Lopez/The New York Times

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev included a parade of the Old Guard across the South Lawn of the White House.

public opinion opposed membership in NATO for a unified Germany "if we're talking about the kind of NATO that exists today." But he added that if changes took place in the structure of NATO, "then there will be a completely different situation."

On the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" on PBS Tuesday night, Andrei Kortunov, head of the department on United States foreign policy department of the Institute of U.S. and Canada in the Soviet Union, suggested that "the best possible solution" was to have Germany as a whole in the political institution of NATO, but the military institu-

tions of NATO somehow limited to the present West German territory.

It was Mr. Gorbachev, American officials said, who suggested turning the German issue over to the Foreign Ministers, to remove it as a potential irritant to the rest of the summit conference. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze are expected to discuss the matter at some length at meetings here over the next 48 hours.

American participants in the meetings today emphasized that there had been nothing approaching a breakthrough on the pivotal German ques-

tion, and Mr. Fitzwater described the new ideas that were raised as "embryonic."

SS-18's a Sticking Point

On strategic arms, charges by conservatives that Mr. Baker had given the Soviets too much leeway on testing and modernizing its remaining SS-18's, whose numbers are to be cut in half from 308 to 154, have made those missiles the main sticking point in trying to draw up an agreement on the main points of the strategic arms treaty, which has been under negotiation for several years.

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הנדון: דפ מצפ"א 67
לשבועיים המסתיימים ב- 3 ביוני

1. ישראל - ארה"ב: מהטבח בראש"צ ועד נסיון הפיגוע בחופי
ישראל

א. בהודעה הרשמית הראשונה שפורסמה עוד ביום האירוע בראש"צ (20/5) הסתפקה מחמ"ד בהבעת צער על הטרגדיה שנגרמה ע"י מטורף בודד והשתתפה בצער המשפחות. אך, כבר ביום שלמחרת (21) החלו להסתמן כיווני התייחסות חדשים לארוע, שבהם נוספו להבעת הצער (REGRET) מן האלימות גם דאגה (DISTURBED) מהנפגעים הרבים שנגרמו ע"י פעולות צה"ל בעת פיזור המהומות לאחר הרצח וקשיבת האירוע לחוסר ההתקדמות בתהליך השלום. ב- 22/5 כבר מוסיפה הדוברת "כי המצב זועק (CRYING OUT) לתהליך שלום, כדי שתפסק האלימות אותה ראינו על המרקעים ושאלנו יודעים שממשיכה להשתולל שם".

באותו יום פורסמה גם הודעת הנשיא בוש ובה הביע השתתפות אישית בצער משפחות הקרבנות, ודאגתו העמוקה (DEEPLY TROUBLED) מהאירועים שלאחר הרצח. עוד קרא לכוחות הבטחון הישראליים, כלאחרים, לנהוג באיפוק מירבי. בהודעה נאמר שהאלימות במזה"ת לא תפסק, ואף תגבר, כל עוד אין תהליך שלום. ארה"ב מחויבת לתהליך שלום ומצפה להקמת ממשלה בישראל שתגלה מחויבות דומה ושתהיה מסוגלת להגיע להחלטות בנושא השלום. באותו יום גם הגיש הסגן האמריקאי בת"א למנהל מצפ"א VERBAL POINTS בנושא, אשר נענו.

האווירה המתוחה נמשכה ב- 23 דנא עת הביע המזכיר בייקר במסע"ת נכונות לדון בהצעת החלטה לפיה ישוגר לישראל צוות משקיפים של האו"ם להפרדת כוחות בין צה"ל לתושבי השטחים. ראש אגף התכנון במחמ"ד רוס הזדרז להסביר לשגריר כי מדובר בנכונות לדון ולא לקבל, אך ציון כי בתנאים הנוכחיים של העדר התקדמות בתהליך השלום אין ברירה אלא לדון גם באופציות נוספות כגון שיגור שליח המזכ"ל, התייעצות חברי הקבועות במועבי"ט או אפילו וב"ל.

בראיון ל- CBS אמר בייקר (27/5) כי יתמודד "במשלחת חקר" (INVESTIGATIVE MISSION) שתשלח ע"י מזכ"ל האו"ם לבדיקת המצב בשטחים והביע תקוותו שהמנהיגות הערבית כמו גם ממשלת ישראל יתמכו במשלחת זו.



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התכנים והטון בהתבטאויות ארה"ב החלו להשתנות לאחר הפגוע במחנה יהודה. בהודעה הרשמית שפרסמה מחמ"ד בעקבות האירוע גונה המעשה והובעה השתתפות בצער המשפחות. מעשים מוגי-לב וברבריים אלה, אמרה ההודעה, מפריעים לעמלים להשגת שלום. הארוע ממחיש את חשיבות נקיטת ממשויים, ובהקדם, לקראת תהליך שלום.

בתגובתה לידיעות הראשונות על נסיון הפיגוע בחופי הארץ אמרה דוברת מחמ"ד כי ממשלת ארה"ב "מזועזעת" מהמעשה ומרוצה (PLEASED) שכל הטרוריסטים נתפסו או נהרגו. אף שהדוברת נזהרה מלהצהיר דבר כלשהו לגבי זהות המבצעים והצעדים שינקטו נגד אש"ף, חזרה מספר פעמים שבכוונת ארה"ב לחקור את כל העובדות הקשורות למעשה טרור זה הנראה "בחומרה רבה".

גם דובר הבית הלבן (31) מסר הודעה בה צויין גינוי אישי של הנשיא להתקפת הטרור על חופי ישראל ואת רוגזו ממה שנראה כנסיון פחדני לפגוע באנשים חפים מפשע. ארה"ב, ציין פיצוטר, משבחת את צה"ל על פעולתו היעילה ובודקת את המידע על מבצעי הפעולה והאחריות לביצועה.

בשיחות שניהל השגריר עם מחמ"ד הועבר המידע הרלוונטי על פעולת הטרור ומבצעה ובמיוחד הודגשו ציפיות ישראל להסכת מסקנות מצד ארה"ב באשר להמשך הדיאלוג. אישי הממשל מצידם הבהירו כי הנם מתויחסים בחומרה רבה לאירוע וכי ברור להם שאמינותם אכן עומדת על כף המאזניים. בחזית הקונגרס שלחו 8 חברי קונגרס בראשות המורשה לוין מקליפורניה מברק למזכיר בייקר ובו דרישה שהממשל יעמוד בתקיפות על גינוי אש"ף לפעולה והוצאת אבו-עבאס משורות הארגון. כ"כ, נקרא הממשל לשקול מחדש המשך הדיאלוג. בסנט יזם סנטור לאוטנברג מכתב דומה למזכיר המדינה שעליו חתמו עד עתה 33 סנטורים.

2. מראשל"צ ועד ניצנים: תגובות נוספות

הקונכ"ל בני דווח על חרדה גוברת בקרב הארגונים היהודיים מפני עימות חזיתי בין הממשל לישראל. מעריכים כי צוות הבית הלבן ומזכיר המדינה חסרי אמון וחשים כי ישראל לא משתפת פעולה בתהליך השלום והרגשתם קשה באשר לכוונות הממשל לפעולה בעתיד. לראשי הארגונים ביקורת חריפה על ישראל בנושאים שעל הפרק - תהליך השלום, פרשת הבית ברובע הנוצרי, העגלה הפוליטית הכבדה והתקועה בישראל ולמרות זאת נמצא הנושא שיאחדם בהחלצות לעניננו והוא התנגדות חד משמעית לענין הצבת משקיפי או"ם בשטחים.

הפגנות מול הקונסוליות נתקיימו כתגובה לרצח באזורים שונים של ארה"ב; במיאמי עלו מפגינים (במספר מועט) על כלי רכב והמשיכו דרכם תוך נפנוף כלי נשק בסגנון הפנטזיות מאוהלי קידר. בניו-יורק דווח על חמש הפגנות (בחלקן אלימות) כאשר מספר המפגינים מגיע למאות מדי יום ואף ה"חמאס" משתתף. בלוס אנג'לס נתקיימו שתי הפגנות. הפגנה אחת בטוסון אריזונה ובשיקגו. ההפגנות נערכו בד"כ מול משרדי הקונסוליות כאשר המשתתפים עטויי כאפיות, בד"כ ומשתמשים לעיתים בסמלים כצלב קרס, דגל ישראל מטונף וקרוע וארונות קבורה. הסיקור הוא בד"כ טלביזיוני. בהפגנה בסן-פרנציסקו (שניה) הזדהו חלק מהמפגינים כיהודים שחסמו את הכניסה לקונסוליה.

הארגון הפרו-ערבי ADC הפיץ בין חברי ביה"נ מכתב ובו הוא מטיל את האחריות על ממשלת ישראל, המעודדת בגלוי, לדבריו, את הלך הרוחות הגזעני במדינה. התגובה הברוטלית הישראלית לביטויי הכעס המובנים בשטחים העמידה באור מגוחך את הערכים האנושיים הבסיסיים המשותפים לכל מדינות העולם. עוד מאשים המכתב את הקונגרס באחריות, שאינו מוצא את האומץ הדרוש להפסיק את ההודעות הפומביות כי יתמוך בישראל בכל תנאי.



"הגיע הזמן שהקונגרס יבהיר לישראל כי לא יסבול יותר האלימות בה נוקטת ישראל". המורשה HAYES הפיץ מכתב בין עמיתיו ובו ניסה לצרף חתימות למכתבו לנשיא בוש. במכתב לבוש - גינוי הרצח ברשל"צ וכן הצעדים שנקט צה"ל לדיכוי המהומות בשטחים. המכתב קורא להגברת מעורבות הממשל בתהליך השלום.

התמונה החלה להשתנות לאחר נסיון הפיגוע בחופי הארץ כאשר הארגונים היהודים מתייצבים כאיש אחד בגינוי האירוע וקוראים לממשל להשעות/לבחון מחדש המשך הדיאלוג עם אש"פ.

3. ארה"ב: מועבי"ט - ג'נבה

האפשרות לבקשת אשרת כניסה ע"י ערפאת הציבה דילמה בפני ארה"ב. וכבר ב - 21.5 פתחה במגעים עם אנשי אש"פ בטוניס "במגמה למנוע עימות". הובהר שבקשה לאשרה לא תאושר "כעת". ככל הנראה היה זה הנשיא בוש שהחליט נגד מתן האשרה על פי המלצת ביוקר מחשש לנזק אפשרי לתהליך השלום. כלפי חוץ טענו האמריקנים, כולל הנשיא במסיבת עיתונאים ב - 23.5, שלא הוגשה בקשה רשמית לאשרה ולכן השאלה היפוטטית.

במסיבת עיתונאים ב - 23.5, אמר ביוקר בתשובה לשאלה כי "ארה"ב תהיה מוכנה לדון בשאלת צוות משקיפים אם הנושא יועלה במועבי"ט". מיד לאחר מכן טרחו פקידים שונים בממשל להבהיר פומבית לאנשינו שהמזכיר התכווון בעצם לשיגור שליח מטעם המזכ"ל מה גם שארה"ב תמיד הסתייגה בברור מהצבת צוות/ כח קבוע בשטחים מטעם האו"ם.

סברות בתקשורת העלו אפשרות כי דבריו אלה של ביוקר היו חלק מ"עסקה" שנעשתה עם אש"פ תמורת ויתור בדבר האשרה לערפאת. אגן אימות לסברה זו ומן הראוי לציון כי השגריר פיקרינג כבר העלה את רעיון שליח מטעם המזכ"ל בפני השגריר ביון ב - 21/5.

פיקרינג והמזכ"ל חזרו להצעה הנ"ל במהלך דיוני מועבי"ט בג'נבה בשיחותיהם עם סגן שה"ח נתניהו בציינם כי יש לנסות ולמנוע המשך הדיון והצעת החלטה - אולי ע"י הסכמת ישראל לשליח או למשלחת מטעם המזכ"ל, תוך מגמה מוצהרת לעשות למען רגיעה. ס/שה"ח הבהיר עמדתנו לגבי משלחות: לא נסכים למשלחת מכח החלטת המועצה או מטעמה ולא נקבל משלחת שענינה נושאי בטחון. כל שליחות אחרת מטעם המזכ"ל תבדק לגופה.

יצוין כי לפי פיקרינג ביוקר תמד בהצעה זו וישראל נתבקשה לסייע בנושא העיתוי לביצוע רעיון זה ובגמישות בהצגת התנאים. לאחר התיעצות בדרגים בכירים ביותר, מסר ביון לפיקרינג את תגובתנו השלילית. בסופו של ענין הטילה ארה"ב וסן על הצעת ההחלטה הערבית במועבי"ט עקב אי-קבילות הנוסח שקרא לשיגור משלחת משקיפים.

4. ביה"ג - שימועים על אש"פ

עוזר המזכיר קלי הופיע בפני ועדת המשנה לאירופה ומז"ת (בראשות לי המילטון) ב - 24 דנא. עדותו הכתובה וחילופי הדברים בפרק השאלות והתשובות מעניקים לנו הזדמנות טובה לרשום פעם נוספת את עמדות הממשל בהקשר זה, וזאת בטרם נסיון הפיגוע בחופי הארץ.



נקודות מרכזיות מדבריו :

- לאחר שאש"פ קבל את תנאי ארה"ב, גבשה ארה"ב מערכת ציפיות מאש"פ. אין לפרש את אלה כהתניות חדשות לעצם קיום הדיאלוג. השעיית הדיאלוג אפשרית אך תיגרם ע"י החלטה פוליטית ולא מהתניה חקיקתית.

- אש"פ ממלא תפקיד חיובי במז"ת: הדיאלוג למעשה גרם למצב שבו אש"פ נותן הסכמה שבשתיקה לדיאלוג ישראלי-פלשתינאי בקהיר. מאידך, ארה"ב לא מנסה להכניס את אש"פ לדיאלוג מבעד לדלת האחורית.

- הממשל מודע לפגמים הרציניים שבהתנהגות אש"פ במישור המעשי והדקלרטיבי ומביע את דעתו בתקיפות בנושא. עם זאת, אין בכל אלה כדי לגרום להפסקת הדיאלוג.

- הממשל לא מכסה על "פשעי" אש"פ. בנוסף, אין הסכמה עם ישראל ביחס למוצקות ובהירות העובדות שבידי ישראל באשר למעשי טרור מסויימים.

- מחויבות אש"פ להתנער מן הטרור חלה על חברי הוועד הפועל של אש"פ בלבד ובהשלכה גם על אנשי ארגונם הנשמעים להם. מחויבות זו לא חלה, לדעת ארה"ב, על "אלמנטים דיסידנטים" באותם ארגונים עצמם!

חברי הקונגרס שאלו את קלי שאלות נוקבות ביותר והתמקדו על הנקודות הבאות :

- הגדרת הטרור ע"י הממשל - בנקודה זו התנהל ויכוח נוקב כאשר המורשים המילטון, גילמן ולנטוס מתייחסים להגדת הטרור של הממשל כארכאית ומיושנת.
- העדר גינוי של אש"פ ואי-הרחקת ארגונים "סורלים" משורותיו.

- מי בכלל אחראי למילוי ההתחייבויות שנטל אש"פ על עצמו ובמיוחד עצימת העין של הממשל ממעשי טרור הגובלת למעשה ב - WHITEWASH.

- במשרד הושקעה לקראת השימועים עבודת הכנה רבה באגפי הסברה וצפ"י ובוושינגטון ע"י קצינת הקישור לקונגרס. אין ספק שמאמצים אלו תרמו לשדור מסר נוסף לממשל שאכן הקונגרס עוקב אחר המתרחש.

2. מראש"ל צועד נוצנים : תגובות נוספות

הקונכ"ל בנ"י מדווח על חרדה גוברת בקרב הארגונים היהודיים מפני עימות חזיתי בין הממשל לישראל. הערכתם כי צוות הבית הלבן ומזכיר המדינה חסרי אמון וחשים כי ישראל לא משתפת פעולה בתהליך השלום והרגשתם קשה באשר לכוונות הממשל לפעולה בעתיד. לראשי הארגונים ביקורת חריפה על ישראל בנושאים שעל הפרק - תהליך השלום, פרשת הבית ברובע הנוצרי, העגלה הפוליטית הכבדה והתקועה בישראל ולמרות זאת נמצא הנושא שיאחדם בהחלצות לענייננו והוא התנגדות חד משמעית לענין הצבת משקיפי או"ם בשטחים.



הפגנות מול הקונסוליות נתקיימו כתגובה לרצח באזורים שונים של ארה"ב: במיאמי עלו מפגינים (במספר מועט) על כלי רכב והמשיכו דרכם תוך נפנוף כלי נשק בסגנון הפנטזיות מאוהלי קידר. בנו-יורק דווח על חמש הפגנות (בחלקן אלימות) כאשר מספר המפגינים מגיע למאות מדי יום ואף ה"חמאס" משתתף. בלוס אנג'לס נתקיימו שתי הפגנות. הפגנה אחת בטוסון ארizonה ובשיקגו. ההפגנות נערכו בד"כ מול משרדי הקונסוליות כאשר המשתתפים עטויי כאפיות. בד"כ ומשתמשים לעיתים בסמלים כצלב קרס, דגל ישראל מטונף וקרוע וארונות קבורה. הסיקור הוא בד"כ מלביזוני. בהפגנה בסן-פרנציסקו (שניה) הזדהו חלק מהמפגינים כיהודים שחשמו את הכניסה לקונסוליה.

הארגון הפרו-ערבי ABC הפיץ בין חברי ביה"נ מכתב ובו הוא מטיל את האחריות על ממשלת ישראל. המעודדת בגלוי, לדבריו, את הלך הרוחות הגזעני במדינה. התגובה הברוטלית הישראלית לביטויי הכעס המובנים בשטחים העמידה באור מגוחך את הערכים האנושיים הבסיסיים המשותפים לכל מדינות העולם. עוד מאשים המכתב את הקונגרס באחריות שאינו מוצא את האומץ הדרוש להפסיק את ההודעות הפומביות כי יתמודד בישראל בכל תנאי. "הגיע הזמן שהקונגרס יבהיר לישראל כי לא יסבול יותר האלימות בה נוקטת ישראל". המורשה HAYES הפיץ מכתב בין עמיתיו ובו ניסה לצרף חתימות למכתבו לנשיא בוש. במכתב לבוש - גינוי הרצח ברשל"צ וכן הצעדים שנקט צה"ל לדיכוי המהומות בשטחים. המכתב קורא להגברת מעורבות הממשל בתהליך

5. סעודיה - ארה"ב: עסקת נשק

הממשל הגיש בראשית חודש מאי הודעה מוקדמת (PRENOTIFICATION) לקונגרס על עסקת נשק עם סעודיה הכוללת בין השאר ערכות השבחה למטוסי ה-AWAC'S, יותר מ-1000 כלי רכב ארטילריים קלים, משגרים, טילי טאו ותותחים.

עיראק-ארה"ב

סנטור דאמטו נכשל בניסיונו להעביר הצעת תיקון בדבר סנקציות נגד עיראק. התנגדות הממשל לנוסח הצעת החוק הובהרה באופן תקיף בדברי דובר מחמ"ד (18) אשר חזר וגינה באותה הזדמנות את עיראק על הצהרותיה האחרונות נגד ישראל: עמדת הממשל, אמר הדובר, תומכת ב-NON MANDATORY FLEXIBLE SANCTION BILL.

6. חוק התקציב המשלים

ה-SUPPLEMENTAL אושר סופית במליאת שני הבתים. כזכור, כלולות בו ערביות להלוואות דיוור בסך 400 מליון דולר עבור ישראל שעבורו תצטרך ישראל לשלם בין השאר גם דמי שימוש בסך 2.8 מליון דולר. הנשיא אמר לחתום על החוק בימים הקרובים.

7. אתיופיה

חברי הקונגרס ברטון, וולף, סמית וסנטור גורדון המפרי פנו לשגריר במכתב חריף המוחה על "סיוע ישראלי צבאי" לאתיופיה. דרשו מישראל בלשון ברורה ביותר להשעות כל יחסים בעלי אופי צבאי עם מדינה זו עקב הרקורד האתיופי המחריד בנושאי זכויות אדם והחזקת אוכלוסיה שלמה כבני ערובה רעבים כקלף במלחמה שמנהל מנג'יסטו מול המחתרות הבדלניות.



8. הבית ברובע הנוצרי

בניו-יורק נפגשו המנהיגים היהודיים עם הקרדינל אוקונור והחליפו דעות בנושא בעקבות מאמרו החריף של אוקונור ב - CATHOLIC .N.Y נראה שקרדינל עשוי להימלך בדעתו ולפרסם מאמר הבהרה נוסף. שר החוץ פנה באגרת אישית אל הקרדינל המביע אכזבה מעמדותיו כפי שהובעו במאמרו הנ"ל.

משלחת מטעם הכנסיה האורתודוקסית התקבלה אצל הקונכ"ל בלוס אנג'לס בו הגישו מחאתם ודאגתם מהאירועים ברובע הנוצרי; בשיחה, שבה השתתפו שלושה רבנים מהקהילה, נשזרו ביטויי אי-אמון בממשלת שמיר ודאגה מנסיונות השתלטות על רכוש נוצרי ברוח הימים האלו.

9. קונגרס - שונות

1. שימוע בנושא בטחון תעופתי וטרור : התקיים בוועדת החוץ של בית-הנבחרים ב - 17/5. הוקדש ברובו לעניני בטחון נמלי תעופה בארה"ב וכן לדו"ח הוועדה הנשיאותית לבדיקת אסון פאן-אם 103. נציג הממשל השגריר באסבי ממחמ"ד, ציין כי סוריה ואיראן ממשיכות להיות ברשימת המדינות התומכות בטרור.

2. שת"פ בנושא לוחמה בסמים, ישראל-ארה"ב : הסנטורים בידו, דאמטו, גרסלי וברנס פנו למזכיר המדינה בייקר והמליצו על תמיכת מחמ"ד בגיבוש וחיזוק שת"פ עם ישראל בנושא לוחמה בגידול סמים והפצתם.

3. טול "החץ" : פעילות השתדלנות העניפה למען החלטה חיובית בדבר מימון אמריקני גם לשלב השני של פיתוח הטיל הניב מכתב תמיכה מהסנטורים ספקטר וואלופ למזכיר ההגנה ציינו.

4. אוניברסיטאות בשטחים : סנטורים קסבאום וצ'ייפי הגישו הצעת החלטה במליאת הסנט הקוראת לישראל לפתוח את האוניברסיטאות בשטחים. בנוסח נרשמת החלטת שלטונות ישראל לפתוח על בסיס הדרגתי את המוסדות להשכלה גבוהה.

5. שימוע על הפצת נשק ופיקוח : בשימוע שיתקיים בוועדת החוץ בבית"נ ב- 17 דנא היו התייחסויות רבות לישראל ולמז"ת. חלק מהעדים כולל סגנית מנהל הסוכנות לפיקוח ופירוק הנשק, אמרו כי על הממשל לאמץ מדיניות יותר מאוזנת. ביחס לישראל מופעלים לעיתים שיקולים אחרים מאשר כלפי מדינות אחרות בנושא פיקוח על נשק גרעיני.

6. אנטישמיות : חברי הקונגרס וקסמן, לנטוס, סולארז, קרדון, פאסל, מל לוין, מילר ופורטר פנו לנשיא בוש (24) במכתב והפצירו בו להעלות את סכנת האנטישמיות הגוברת בבריה"מ בפגישת הפסגה הקרובה עם גורבצ'וב.

7. אש"פ חברי הקונגרס רוס - לטינו (פלורידה) ושומר (נ"י) פתחו ביוזמה אשר לפיה יקראו כל שבוע במליאת בית הנבחרים הפרות אש"פ את התחיבויות שנטל על עצמו בדצמבר 1988. השניים אמרו כי ינהגו כך מכיוון שמחמ"ד מתעלמת מהתנהגותו האמיתית של אש"פ.



8. ז"א - סנטור דול : בנאום במליאת הסנט (18) תקף סנטור דול, כהרגלו לאחרונה, את ישראל והזכיר את דו"ח הארגון השבדי SAVE THE CHILDREN על הרג ילדים פלש' בשטחים. שאל עד מתי יפגין הסנט DOUBLE STANDARD בטיפול בישראל...

10. ישראל - קנדה

1. הרצח ברשל"צ עלה בשאילתה בפרלמנט וזכה להתייחסות רשמית של דובר משה"ח הקנדי. אין ההודעה שונה באופיה מתגובות מערביות אחרות (תוך רמיזה עבה לאחריותה של ישראל בעיקר). עם זאת, בקטע מסויים מופיע משפט המיוחס לקלרק המדבר על "הטבח בעזה". השגריר גור-אריה בדק את מקור הציטוט ומסתבר ששה"ח קלרק לא אמר דברים אלה והמשפט הנ"ל "בטעות יסודו". כדברי פקיד בכיר קנדי אנו ביקשנו שהקנדים יוציאו תיקון להודעה. הנושא, כך הובטח, ישקל. יו"ר ה - C.I.C. שיוגר מכתב אל שה"ח קלרק ובו סדרת טיעונים נגד ניצול הפשע לעשיית הון פוליטי נגד ישראל.

2. מועבי"ט בג'נבה - שה"ח קלרק והשגריר באו"ם נשאו דברים בנושא זה. לדברי השר בשאילתה בפרלמנט קנדה תומכת מסורתית בכוחות שלום והיא תורמת קבועה להן. אם ענין זה יעלה במועבי"ט מוכנה קנדה לשקול אפשרות זו על רקע עמדתה החיובית העקרונית.

3. לקראת ביקור גורבצ'וב בקנדה ביקש השגריר גור-אריה מהקנדים להעלות עמו את ענין הגירת יהודים קרו טיסות ישירות. הקלת התהליך במכס והיתר להגדלת הצוות הקונסולרי.

4. כנס הפדרציה הקנדית של האיגודים המקצועיים התקיים במונטריאול בין ה- 14-18/5. נכח מטעמנו נספח העבודה בווש'. בכנס נעשו מספר נסיונות לפעילות עוינת לנו בין היתר הוגשה הצעה המבקשת לגנות את ח"כ אריאל שרון ולמנוע כניסתו לקנדה (נדחה ללא שהובא להצבעה). נדחה נסיון להניף רשמית את דגל אש"פ. אולם, ההחלטה המז"תית עצמה מבטאת את הסחף במעמדנו שהתמסד, ובו המרכיבים של מדינה פלסטינאית, הכרה באש"פ ותמיכה במאבק הפלסטינאי.

במשרד החוץ
ירושלים
9/10/59 למדו

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 15:06

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ניו יורק/2006, בטחון/1, רהמש/8, מצב/14, אביב/10, מנמת/10
 מ-: נוש, נר: 890, תא: 310590, זח: 1830, רח: ב, סג: בל
 תח: א גס: צפא
 נר: א

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפא, לשכת שהח

דע: מעת, הסברה, ממד, לעם, דוץ, אמן-מנמת, ר-משמרת, יועץ
 תקשורת רוהם, עתונות ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

הפגוע-הודעת הבית הלבן

להלן ממסיבת העתונאים המשותפת של דובר הבית הלבן
 עם הדובר הנשיאותי של בריהם-בפתח משהעת קרא דובר
 הבית הלבן את ההודעה הבאה:

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY ARKADY MASLENNIKOV
 SOVIET PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL
 PRESS CENTER, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SMITH
 CENTER THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1990

MARLIN FITZWATER: WE HAVE RECEIVED DIFFERING REPORTS
 ON MY COUNTERPART'S PROGRESS, AND I TRUST THAT HE
 WILL JOIN ME IN A FEW MINUTES OR AS SOON AS HE CAN
 GET FREE.

BEFORE I BEGIN WITH A MORE FORMAL READOUT OF THE
 EVENTS OF THIS MORNING, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER A

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

STATEMENT ON THE TERRORIST INCIDENT IN ISRAEL
 YESTERDAY.

PRESIDENT BUSH CONDEMNS THE TERRORIST ATTACK YESTERDAY
 IN ISRAEL, AND IS OUTRAGED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE
 A COWARDLY ATTEMPT TO TARGET INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE
 PRESIDENT BELIEVES ACTIONS SUCH AS THESE ARE MOST
 REGRETTABLE FOR THEY CAN ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE PROSPECTS
 FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT COMMENDS THE ACTION OF THE ISRAELI
 DEFENSE FORCES IN THIS INCIDENT. THE UNITED STATES
 IS REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE ACTION.
 WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESPONSIBILITY
 FOR THIS ATTACK, AND WE ARE LOOKING INTO IT.

Q MARLIN, ON YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT ISRAEL, CAN YOU
 TELL US, DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THAT THE
 EPLOF STILL RENOUNCES TERRORISM? AND WILL WE CONTINUE
 CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AFTER THIS INCIDENT?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DON'T HAVE ANY CONCLUSIONS AT
 THIS POINT. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THIS MATTER AND
 REVIEWING ALL THE INFORMATION THAT WE CAN GATHER
 ON IT. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THE RAMIFICATION
 S MIGHT BE. BUT AT THIS POINT, WE DO NOT WANT TO
 EXPRESS ANY CONCLUSIONS. WE HAVE MADE THE VIEWS
 KNOWN THAT I EXPRESSED TO YOU TO THE -- TO ISRAEL
 AND TO THE PLO THROUGH OUR DIALOGUE INTERLOCUTORS
 IN TUNIS, AND -- SO THAT ALL PARTIES ARE QUITE AWARE
 OF OUR CONCERN AND OUR POSITION. BUT NO CONCLUSIONS
 YET.

Q IS IT UP FOR REVIEW, MARLIN? THE CONTINUED CONTACTS
 -- ARE THEY UNDER REVIEW AS A RESULT OF THIS?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, NOT AT THIS POINT, BECAUSE WE
 WANT TO -- AGAIN, TO INVESTIGATE THE INFORMATION
 AND REACH CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED THERE
 AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE AND WHY BEFORE WE WOULD TRY
 TO CHANGE OUR POLICY IN ANY WAY.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ג'

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, פ(אמן), ממד, רביב, מעת,
 הסברה, בנצור, מצפא, סולמן, מזתים, גוברין, מזאר, סייבל, לעם, דוצ-ים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

27494 תאריך: 30.05.90
13 מתוך 1 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
** **
5,27494:זמ:
*מל:המשרד
*ע'ד:ס:רהמש/1452/מצב/3256
*מ-:נ:ו:ש:ת:א:873,290590:ח:מ:מ:ס:ג:10
*ח:ח:ג:ס:צ:פ:א
*נ:ד:ג:

סודי ביותר / מיידי
מל: מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, מנהל מצפ"א
ממח: השגריר, וושינגטון
סנטור ספקטור - עירק.

בהמשך לשיחתי מה - 19 דנא עם סנטור ספקטור הגיעני היום
מכתבו מה-25 דנא הרציב על צירופיו הכולל בין היתר מכתבו אל
ירוה"מ.

תשומת לבכם ששני המכתבים לנושא צדאם חוסיין ולנושא מבוראק
החתומים ע"י סנטור ספקטור וחבריו נשלחו כבר ב-16 דנא כלומר
עוד בטרם קיבלו השגותינו.

בכוונתי להעיר על כך עם שובו של הסנטור מחזופשתו בשבוע הבא.

אנר.

(הערת קשר: הערות הסנטור בכתב יד צויינו בנפרד)

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, DC

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 2 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
MAY 25, 1990
*THE HONORABLE MOSHE ARAD
*AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
*EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
*3514 INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, N.W.
*WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

DEAR AMBASSADOR ARAD: (HEART KESHER: BECHTAV
YAD: 'MOSHE')

WITH THIS LETTER, I AM HAVING DELIVERED TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I AM ALSO ENCLOSEING:

1. A LETTER DATED MAY 16 FROM SENATORS DOLE, SPECTER
ET AL. TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN,

2. A LETTER DATED MAY 16 FROM SENATORS DOLE, SPECTER
ET AL. TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK,

3. MY LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK,

4. MY LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.

SINCERELY,

ARLEN SPECTER

AS/KR
ENCLOSURES
HAND DELIVER
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC
MAY 16, 1990

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 3 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN:

WE ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE ESCALATING
TENSION IN THE MIDEAST, AND WE BELIEVE, BASED ON
MEETINGS WHICH WE HAD YOU EARLIER THIS YEAR, THAT
THESE TENSIONS COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IF
THE INTERESTED PARTIES WOULD MEET FACE - TO - FACE
FOR DISCUSSIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY AT THE
OUTSET THAT MANY AMERICANS ARE NOT FAVORABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD IRAQ BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
ON CERTAIN EVENTS AND STATEMENTS IN THE PAST.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS VITAL THAT A NEW PAGE BE TURNED
IN THE HISTORY OF THE MIDEAST, AND WE SENSE FROM
OUR MEETINGS WITH YOU THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE
COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS
JUST AS WE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH YOU
EARLIER THIS YEAR.

ON MARCH 9, 1990, AS WE BELIEVE YOU KNOW, THE UNITED
STATES SENATE HAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE A DELEGATION
OF IRAQI PARLAMENTARIANS. ON MAY 10, 1990, WE HAD
A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING WITH YOUR DISTINGUISHED
AMBASSADOR, DR. MOHAMMED AL - MASHAT. DURING THE
COURSE OF THAT DISCUSSION, AN IDEA EMERGED THAT
IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO CALL UPON PRESIDENT
MUBARAK OF EGYPT TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICIES TO CONVENE
A MEETING BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS.
WE ARE ADVISED THAT ISRAEL IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD SUCH A MEETING.

WE URGE YOU TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THIS
PROPOSAL. WITH SUBSANTIAL FIREPOWER (NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL) ON BOTH SIDES, MISUNDERSTAN
DING AND ESCALATED RHETORIC COULD PRODUCE CONFLICT
WHICH, WE BELIEVE, NO ONE WANTS. OUR CONSTRUCTIVE

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 4 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
AND PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH YOU EARLIER THIS YEAR
RAISED THE HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING WITH ISRAELI
OFFICIALS COULD REDUCE TENSIONS AND PROVIDE A FIRST
STEP TOWARD A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST.

SINCERELY,

BOB DOLE

ARLEN SPECTER

JAMES A. MCCLURE

RICHARD C. SHELBY

ALAN K. SIMPSON

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

CC: PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC
MAY 16, 1990

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
CAIRO, EGYPT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

EARLIER THIS YEAR, WE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE
MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.
FROM OUR DIALOGUE WITH HIM, WE CONCLUDED THAT IT
WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF ARRANGMENTS COULD BE MADE
FOR A FACE - TO - FACE MEETING BETWEEN IRAQI AND
ISRAELI OFFICIALS.

IN SEARCH FOR A FORMAT FOR SUCH A MEETING, WE IMMEDIATEL

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 5 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
Y THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD BE THE IDEAL PERSON TO
CONVENE AND BE THE INTERMEDIARY FOR SUCH A MEETING.

WE HAVE WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN URGING
HIS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A MEETING AND
WE ASSENTED A COPY OF OUR LETTER TO HIM. WE ARE
ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD SUCH A MEETING.

YOUR LEADERSHIP IN THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS HAS
BEEN OUTSTANDING FOR THE PAST DECADE. WE URGE YOU
TO USE YOUR POWERS OF PERSUASION TO HELP TO BRING
IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS TOGETHER IN THE INTERESTS
OF MIDEAST PEACE.

SINCERELY,

BOB DOLE

ARLEN SPECTER

HOWARD M. METZENBAUM

RICHARD C. SHELBY

JAMES A. MCCLURE

ALAN K. SIMPSON

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

ENCLOSURE

CC: PRESIDENT HUSSEIN OF IRAQ

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC
MAY 25, 1990

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 6 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR
C/O EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20008
DEAR PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR:

ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY
AND I WROTE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO EXPRESS
OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH
LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MIDEAST
AND BEYOND AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY
MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN AND OTHER
IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE
RESTRAINT, AND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE
PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED
STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS
DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED
ME IN WRITING TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, EXPRESSING
OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST
AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN IRAQI
AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. AS YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL
SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT WITH THE SHOOTINGS
AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF LAST WEEKEND.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD
IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. OTHER SENATORS AND I ARE PARTICULAR
LY CONCERNED THAT THE FORHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB
LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE
TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL, AND
BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE STRONGLY
URGED PRESIDENT HUSSEIN TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR
MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO DEFUSE
THIS SITUATION. I SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN
THAT MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ONE POSITIVE
SIGN THAT COULD LEAD IRAQ AND ISRAEL AWAY FROM
POTENTIAL CONFLICT, AND WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13 מתוך 7 דף
2 מתוך 2 עותק
AND IRAQ.
IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH IRAQI AMBASSADOR, I
HAS ASSURED THAT PRESIDENT HUSSEIN HAD ADOPTED
AND ARTICULATED A " NO - FIRST - STRIKE " POLICY
REGARDING ISRAEL. I FURTHER SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT
HUSSEIN THAT A PUBLIC REITERATION OF IRAQ'S " NO
- FIRST - STRIKE " POLICY WOULD BE HELPFUL. LAST
WEEK THERE WERE REPORTS THAT ISRAEL ASSURED EGYPT
THAT IT WOULD NOT LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST
ARAB NEIGHBORS. IF THAT IS, IN FACT, ISRAEL'S DECLARED
POLICY, THIS, I BELIEVE, COULD BE A FAVORABLE
TIME FOR PUBLIC CONFIRMATION.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN ON MY NEXT VISIT
TO ISRAEL.

MY BEST.
SINCERELY,
ARLEN SPECTER
(HEARAT KESHER: LEALAN TOSEFET BECHTAV YADO SHEL
HASENATOR) :
I HAVE URGED IRAQ TO MAKE A " NO FIRST STRIKE "
STATEMENT. RECIPROVAL COMMITMENT BY IRAQ AND ISRAEL
ON " NO FIRST STRIKE " WOULD VERY SIGNIFICANT.

(AD KAN)
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC
MAY 25, 1990

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
CAIRO, EGYPT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

Re New York letter to Bureau dated 1/15/54, captioned as above. The Bureau is requested to advise the New York Office of any developments in this matter.

Very truly yours,
[Illegible Signature]

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. The LHM contains information regarding the activities of [Illegible] in New York.

Very truly yours,
[Illegible Signature]

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. The LHM contains information regarding the activities of [Illegible] in New York.

Very truly yours,
[Illegible Signature]

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. The LHM contains information regarding the activities of [Illegible] in New York.

Very truly yours,
[Illegible Signature]

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated and captioned as above. The LHM contains information regarding the activities of [Illegible] in New York.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*DEAR MR. PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

*ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY AND I WROTE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MID- EAST AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, AND OTHER IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, AND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND UNITED STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

*LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED ME IN WRITING TO PRE- SIDENT HUSSEIN, AGAIN EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. THE FOLLOWING DAY, LEGISLATION WAS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. DEBATE IN THE SENATE FOCUSED ON IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND PRESIDENT HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT THAT HALF OF ISRAEL WOULD BE DESTROYED BY FIRE IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ.

*SENATORS METZENBAUM, MURKOWSKI, AND I URGED OUR COLLEAGUES NOT TO VOTE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMPTING BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. WE FELT THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE REALISTIC BASED ON OUR RECENT MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD. MANY SENATORS, HOWEVER, DO FAVOR SUCH SANCTIONS AND SUCH AN AMENDMENT MIGHT HAVE PASSED LAST WEEK AND MAY EVEN MORE LIKELY PASS IN THR FUTURE UNLESS WE DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE UNDELYING CONCERNS. AS YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT LAST WEEKEND WHEN A FORMER ISRAELI SOLDIER, RELIABLY DESCRIBED

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*AS EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE, SHOT AND KILLED SEVEN PALESTINIANS. IN THE CONFRONTATIONS THAT FOLLOWED OTHERS WERE KILLED IN ISRAEL, THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND IN JORDAN.

*MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT AFTER EGYPT'S GREAT START, SOME PROGRESS HAS MADE ON A DIALOUGE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN EXPANDED DIALOUGE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING, WE HOPE ISRAEL. MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES AND I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS OPPORTUNITY IMPEDED BY A SENATE VOTE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ OR ANY FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES ON EITHER SIDES.

*OTHER SENATORS AND I ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL, AND BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE STRONGLY URGED PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO FEFUSE THIS SITUATION. SUGGESTING SOME PUBLIC REITERATION OF HIS " NO - FIRST - STRIKE " POLICY. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT ISRAEL HAS ASSURED EGYPT THAT IT WILL NOT LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST ANY ARAB COUNTRY. IN GENERAL, A MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ANOTHER POSITIVE SIGN THAT COULD GO A A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ.

*THROUGH YOUR LEADERSHIP, EGYPT HAS PLAYED AN EXCEPTIONAL ROLE IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. THIS IS CRUCIAL MOMENT, AND I RESPECTFULLY ASK THAT YOU USE GOOD OFFICES TO ASSIST IN GUIDING US THROUGH THE CURRENT SITUATION.

*SINCERELY,

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*ARLEN SPECTER

*(HEARAT KESHER: LEHALAN TOSEFET BECHTAV YADO SHEL HASENATOR):

*I URGE YOU TO USE YOUR LEADERSHIP TO ACHIEVE:

*1. A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IRAQ WILL NOT MAKE A FIRST STRIKE, OR AT LEAST

*2. A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IRAQ WOULD PROMISE " NO FIRST STRIKE " IF ISRAEL MADE THE SAME PROMISE.

*I LOOK FORWARD TO ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW OUR FRIENDSHIP AND LIVELY DISCUSSIONS.

*MY BEST.

*(AD KAN).

*UNITE STAES SENATE
*WASHINGTON DC

*MAY 25, 1990

*PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
*REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
*BAGHDAD, IRAQ

*DEAR MR. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN:

*ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY AND I WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MIDEAST AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH YOU AND OTHER IRAQI OFFICIALS, AND LATER CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, IRAND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS

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11 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*BE PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

*LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATES MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED ME IN WRITING TO YOU, AGAIN EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. THE FOLLOWING DAY, LEGISLATION WAS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. DEBATE IN THE SENATE FOCUSED ON IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND YOUR OWN STATEMENT THAT HALF OF ISRAEL WOULD BE DESTROYED BY FIRE IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ.

*SENATOR METZENBAUM, MURKOWSKI, AND I URGED OUR COLLEAGUE S NOT TO VOTE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTING RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. WE FELT THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE REALISTIC BASED ON OUR RECENT MEETINGS WITH YOU IN BAGHDAD. THIS AMENDMENT FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ CAME UP WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, SO THE ABSENCE OF THE OTHER SENATORS WHO VISITED YOU SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT THEY FAVOR THAT THE SANCTIONS SINCE THEY WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE SENATE WHEN THE DEBATE OCCURED. I WAS ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY SENATORS DO FAVOR SUCH SAN- CTIONS AND SUCH AMENDMENT MIGHT HAVE PASSED LAST WEEK AND MAY EVEN MROE LIKELY PASS IN THE FUTURE UNLESS WE DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE UNDELYING COCERNS.

*THE SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT LAST WEEKEND WHEN A FORMER ISRAELI SOLDIER, RELIABLY DESCRIBED AS EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE, SHOT AND KILLED SEVEN PALESTINIANS. IN THE CONFRONT- ATIONS THAT FOLLOWED OTHERS WERE KILLED IN ISRAELN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND IN JORDAN.

*MR. PRESIDENT, WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

12 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE ON A DIALOUGE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN EXPANDED DIALOUGE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING WE HOPE, ISRAEL. MANY OF MY COLLEGUES AND I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS OPPORTUNITY IMPEDED BY A SENATE VOTE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ OR ANY FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES ON EITHER SIDE.

*OTHER SENTORS AND I PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL, AND BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES, I STONGLY URGE YOU TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO DEFUSE THIS SITUATION. IN RECENT DISCUSSION WITH YOUR DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR, I WAS ASSURED REGARDING THAT YOU HAD ADOPTED AND ARTICULATED A "NO - FIRST- STRIKE" POLICY REGARDING ISRAEL.

*I AM AWARE THAT OFTEN YOU MADE YOUR THREAT TO ISRAEL IN TERMS OF RETALIATION IN THE MEDIA. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT A PUBLIC REITERATION OF IRAQ'S "NO FIRST STRIKE" POLICY WOULD BE HELPFUL, AND I HAVE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR TO DO THE SAME.

*IN GENERAL, A MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ANOTHER POSITIVE SIGN THAT COULD LEAD IRAQ AWAY FROM POTENTIAL CONFLICT, AND WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ. IRAQ AND ISRAEL NOW HAVE UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY POWER IN THE MIDEAST. ANY OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES COULS VERY LIKELY BE CATASTROPHIC.

*MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU KNOW, SENATORS DO NOT CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS THE PROVINCE OF OUR PRESIDENT. BUT WE DO HAVE OPPORTUNITIES TO WEIGH IN ON CRITICAL MATTERS WHEN OUR EXPERIENCE

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13 דף 13 מתוך *
2 עותק 2 מתוך *

*APPLIES AND OUR CONSCIENCE DEMANDS.

*I HAVE MADE MANY VISITS TO THE MIDEAST, THE FIRST OVER 25 YEARS AGGO I HAVE MET WITH ISRAELI AND ARAB LEADERS AND WITH PALESTINIANS. AFTER ONLY TWO VISITS TO BAGHDAD, OURS IS STILL A SHORT ACQUAINTANCE, BUT I WRITE TO YOU BECAUSE I SENSE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS THAT MUST BE AVOIDED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DI- ALOUGE THAT SHOULD BE GRASPED.

*SINCERELY,

*ARLEN SPECTER

*(ECHARAT KESHER: LEHALEN DIVREI HASENATOR BETOSEFET)

*I URGE YOU TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE BAGDAD SUMMIT THAT IRAQ IRAQ WILL NOT MAKE A " FIRST STRIKE " AGAINST ISRAEL. OR THAT IRAQ WILL WOULD PROMISE " NO FIRST STRIKE " IF ISRAEL MADE THE SAME PROMISE. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU IN BAGDAD.

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ונצור, מצפא

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 22, 1980

THE HONORABLE BOB DOLE
MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: I AM PLEASED TO
REPLY TO YOUR LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980,
AND TO REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR
POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.
I AM PLEASED TO REPLY TO YOUR LETTER
OF MAY 18, 1980, AND TO REAFFIRM
MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR POSITION ON THE
MIDDLE EAST.

YOUR LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, WAS
RECEIVED AND I AM PLEASED TO REPLY
TO IT. I AM PLEASED TO REPLY TO
YOUR LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND
TO REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR
POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

I AM PLEASED TO REPLY TO YOUR
LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND TO
REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR
POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

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RECEIVED AND I AM PLEASED TO REPLY
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YOUR LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND
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POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

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LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND TO
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RECEIVED AND I AM PLEASED TO REPLY
TO IT. I AM PLEASED TO REPLY TO
YOUR LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND
TO REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR
POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

I AM PLEASED TO REPLY TO YOUR
LETTER OF MAY 18, 1980, AND TO
REAFFIRM MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR
POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

אמא, חוזם: 27494

אל: רהמש/1452

מ-: ווש, נר: 873, תא: 290590, זח: 2200, דח: מ, טג: ס, ב, נבב

סודי ביותר / מיידי

אל: מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

סנטור ספקטור - עירק.

בהמשך לשיחתי מה - 19 דנא עם סנטור ספקטור הגיעני היום
מכתבו מה-25 דנא הרצ"ב על צירופיו הכולל בין היתר מכתבו אל
רוה"מ.

לתשומת לבכם ששני המכתבים לנשיא צדאם חוסיין ולנשיא מובראק
החתומים ע"י סנטור ספקטור וחבריו נשלחו כבר ב-16 דנא כלומר
עוד בטרם קיבלו השגותינו.

בכוונתי להעיר על כך עם שובו של הסנטור מחופשתו בשבוע הבא.

ארד.

(הערת קשר: הערות הסנטור בכתב יד צוייניו בנפרד)

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, DC

MAY 25, 1990

THE HONORABLE MOSHE ARAD
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
3514 INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

DEAR AMBASSADOR ARAD: (HEART KESHER: BECHTAV
YAD: 'MOSHE')

WITH THIS LETTER, I AM HAVING DELIVERED TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I AM ALSO ENCLOSING:

1. A LETTER DATED MAY 16 FROM SENATORS DOLE, SPECTER
ET AL. TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN,

2. A LETTER DATED MAY 16 FROM SENATORS DOLE, SPECTER
ET AL. TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK,

3. MY LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK,

- 2 -

4. MY LETTER DATED MAY 25 TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.

SINCERELY,

ARLEN SPECTER

AS/KR

ENCLOSURES

HAND DELIVER

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 16, 1990

PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN:

WE ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE ESCALATING
TENSION IN THE MIDEAST, AND WE BELIEVE, BASED ON
MEETINGS WHICH WE HAD YOU EARLIER THIS YEAR, THAT
THESE TENSIONS COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IF
THE INTERESTED PARTIES WOULD MEET FACE - TO - FACE
FOR DISCUSSIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO SAY AT THE
OUTSET THAT MANY AMERICANS ARE NOT FAVORABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD IRAQ BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
ON CERTAIN EVENTS AND STATEMENTS IN THE PAST.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS VITAL THAT A NEW PAGE BE TURNED
IN THE HISTORY OF THE MIDEAST, AND WE SENSE FROM
OUR MEETINGS WITH YOU THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE
COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS
JUST AS WE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE WITH YOU
EARLIER THIS YEAR.

ON MARCH 9, 1990, AS WE BELIEVE YOU KNOW, THE UNITED
STATES SENATE WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE A DELEGATION
OF IRAQI PARLAMENTARIANS. ON MAY 10, 1990, WE HAD
A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING WITH YOUR DISTINGUISHED
AMBASSADOR, DR. MOHAMMED AL - MASHAT. DURING THE
COURSE OF THAT DISCUSSION, AN IDEA EMERGED THAT
IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO CALL UPON PRESIDENT
MUBARAK OF EGYPT TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICIES TO CONVENE
A MEETING BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS.
WE ARE ADVISED THAT ISRAEL IS FAVOABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD SUCH A MEETING.

WE URGE YOU TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THIS
PROPOSAL. WITH SUBSANTIAL FIREPOWER (NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL) ON BOTH SIDES, MISUNDERSTAN
DING AND ESCALATED RHETORIC COULD PRODUCE CONFLICT
WHICH, WE BELIEVE, NO ONE WANTS. OUR CONSTRUCTIVE
AND PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH YOU EARLIER THIS YEAR
RAISED THE HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING WITH ISRAELI
OFFICIALS COULD REDUCE TENSIONS AND PROVIDE A FIRST

- 3 -

STEP TOWARD A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST.

SINCERELY,

BOB DOLE

ARLEN SPECTER

JAMES A. MCCLURE

RICHARD C. SHELBY

ALAN K. SIMPSON

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

CC: PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 16, 1990

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
CAIRO, EGYPT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

EARLIER THIS YEAR, WE HAD CONSTRUCTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE
MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN.
FROM OUR DIALOUGE WITH HIM, WE CONCLUDED THAT IT
WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF ARRANGMENTS COULD BE MADE
FOR A FACE - TO - FACE MEETING BETWEEN IRAQI AND
ISRAELI OFFICIALS.

IN SEARCH FOR A FORMAT FOR SUCH A MEETING, WE IMMEDIATELY
Y THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD BE THE IDEAL PERSON TO
CONVENE AND BE THE INTERMEDIARY FOR SUCH A MEETING.

WE HAVE WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN URGING
HIS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A MEETING AND
WE ENCLOSE A COPY OF OUR LETTER TO HIM. WE ARE
ADVISED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED
TOWARD SUCH A MEETING.

YOUR LEADERSHIP IN THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS HAS
BEEN OUTSTANDING FOR THE PAST DECADE. WE URGE YOU
TO USE YOUR POWERS OF PERSUASION TO HELP TO BRING
IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS TOGETHER IN THE INTERESTS
OF MIDEAST PEACE.

SINCERELY,

BOB DOLE

ARLEN SPECTER

HOWARD M. METZENBAUM

- 4 -

RICHARD C. SHELBY

JAMES A. MCCLURE

ALAN K. SIMPSON

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

ENCLOSURE

CC: PRESIDENT HUSSEIN OF IRAQ

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 25, 1990

PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR
C/O EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20008

DEAR PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR:

ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY
AND I WROTE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO EXPRESS
OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH
LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MIDEAST
AND BEYOND AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY
MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN AND OTHER
IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE
RESTRAINT, AND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE
PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED
STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS
DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED
ME IN WRITING TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, AGAIN EXPRESSING
OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST
AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIAOUGE BETWEEN IRAQI
AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. AS YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL
SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT WITH THE SHOOTINGS
AND DEMONSTRATIONS OF LAST WEEKEND.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD
IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. OTHER SENATORS AND I ARE PARTICULAR
LY CONCERNED THAT THE FORHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB
LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE
TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL, AND
BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE STRONGLY
URGED PRESIDENT HUSSEIN TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR
MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO DEFUSE
THIS SITUATION. I SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN
THAT MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ONE POSITIVE
SIGN THAT COULD LEAD IRAQ AND ISRAEL AWAY FROM
POTENTIAL CONFLICT, AND WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND IRAQ.

IN A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH IRAQI AMBASSADOR, I

- 5 -

RICHARD C. SHELBY

JAMES A. MCCLURE

ALAN K. SIMPSON

FRANK H. MURKOWSKI

ENCLOSURE

CC: PRESIDENT HUSSEIN OF IRAQ

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 25, 1990

PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR
C/O EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, DC 20008

DEAR PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR:

ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY
AND I WROTE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO EXPRESS
OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH
LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MID- EAST
AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY
MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, AND OTHER
IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE
RESTRAINT, AND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE
PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND UNITED
STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS
DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED
ME IN WRITING TO PRE- SIDENT HUSSEIN, AGAIN EXPRESSING
OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST
AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE BETWEEN
IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. THE FOLLOWING DAY,
LEGISLATION WAS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. DEBATE IN THE SENATE

AS ASSURED THAT PRESIDENT HUSSEIN HAD ADOPTED
AND ARTICULATED A ' ' NO - FIRST - STRIKE ' ' POLICY
REGARDING ISRAEL. I FURTHER SUGGESTED TO PRESIDENT
HUSSEIN THAT A PUBLIC REITERATION OF IRAQ'S ' ' NO
- FIRST - STRIKE ' ' POLICY WOULD BE HELPFUL. LAST
WEEK THERE WERE REPORTS THAT ISRAEL ASSURED EGYPT
THAT IT WOULD NOT LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST
ARAB NEIGHBORS. IF THAT IS, IN FACT, ISRAEL'S DECLARED
POLICY, THIS, I BELIEVE, COULD BE A FAVORABLE
TIP FOR PUBLIC CONFIRMATION.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN ON MY NEXT VISIT
TO ISRAEL.

MY BEST.

SINCERELY,

ARLEN SPECTER

(HEARAT KESHER: LEALAN TOSEFET BECHTAV YADO SHEL
HASENATOR):

I HAVE URGED IRAQ TO MAKE A ' ' NO FIRST STRIKE ' ' STATEMENT.
RECIPROVAL COMMITMENT BY IRAQ AND ISRAEL
ON ' ' NO FIRST STRIKE ' ' WOULD VERY SIGNIFICANT.

(AD KAN)

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 25, 1990

PRESIDENT MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
CAIRO, EGYPT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY
AND I WROTE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO EXPRESS
OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH
LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MID- EAST
AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY
MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, AND OTHER
IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE
RESTRAINT, AND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE
PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND UNITED
STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS
DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED
ME IN WRITING TO PRE- SIDENT HUSSEIN, AGAIN EXPRESSING
OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST
AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOUGE BETWEEN
IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. THE FOLLOWING DAY,
LEGISLATION WAS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. DEBATE IN THE SENATE

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, DC
MAY 22, 1990

THE HONORABLE MOHAMED HOSEINI
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
1114 INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004

DEAR AMBASSADOR HOSEINI: I AM WRITING TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, IN WHICH I
EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

WITH THIS LETTER, I AM HAVING BELIEVED TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, IN WHICH I
EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

THE LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, WAS
SENT TO YOU BY AIR MAIL. I AM
HOPEFULLY THAT YOU WILL RECEIVE IT
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

YOUR LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, WAS
RECEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE. I AM HAVING BELIEVED TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, IN WHICH I
EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

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RECEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE. I AM HAVING BELIEVED TO YOU A
LETTER DATED MAY 16, 1990, IN WHICH I
EXPRESSED MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

FOCUSED ON IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND PRESIDENT HUSSEIN'S STATEMENT THAT HALF OF ISRAEL WOULD BE DESTROYED BY FIRE IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ.

SENATORS METZENBAUM, MURKOWSKI, AND I URGED OUR COLLEAGUES NOT TO VOTE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMPTING BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. WE FELT THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE REALISTIC BASED ON OUR RECENT MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD. MANY SENATORS, HOWEVER, DO FAVOR SUCH SANCTIONS AND SUCH AN AMENDMENT MIGHT HAVE PASSED LAST WEEK AND MAY EVEN MORE LIKELY PASS IN THE FUTURE UNLESS WE DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE UNDELYING CONCERNS. AS YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT LAST WEEKEND WHEN A FORMER ISRAELI SOLDIER, RELIABLY DESCRIBED AS EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE, SHOT AND KILLED SEVEN PALESTINIANS. IN THE CONFRONTATIONS THAT FOLLOWED OTHERS WERE KILLED IN ISRAEL, THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND IN JORDAN.

MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT AFTER EGYPT'S GREAT START, SOME PROGRESS HAS MADE ON A DIALOGUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING, WE HOPE ISRAEL. MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES AND I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS OPPORTUNITY IMPEDED BY A SENATE VOTE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ OR ANY FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES ON EITHER SIDES.

OTHER SENATORS AND I ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL, AND BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE STRONGLY URGED PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO DEFUSE THIS SITUATION. SUGGESTING SOME PUBLIC REITERATION OF HIS 'NO - FIRST - STRIKE' POLICY. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT ISRAEL HAS ASSURED EGYPT THAT IT WILL NOT LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST ANY ARAB COUNTRY. IN GENERAL, A MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ANOTHER POSITIVE SIGN THAT COULD GO A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ.

THROUGH YOUR LEADERSHIP, EGYPT HAS PLAYED AN EXCEPTIONAL ROLE IN MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. THIS IS CRUCIAL MOMENT, AND I RESPECTFULLY ASK THAT YOU USE GOOD OFFICES TO ASSIST IN GUIDING US THROUGH THE CURRENT SITUATION.

SINCERELY,

ARLEN SPECTER

(HEARAT KESHER: LEHALAN TOSEFET BECHTAV YADO SHEL

HASENATOR):

I URGE YOU TO USE YOUR LEADERSHIP TO ACHIEVE:

- 1. A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IRAQ WILL NOT MAKE A FIRST STRIKE, OR AT LEAST
- 2. A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IRAQ WOULD PROMISE 'NO FIRST STRIKE' IF ISRAEL MADE THE SAME PROMISE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW OUR FRIENDSHIP AND LIVELY DISCUSSIONS.

MY BEST.

(AD KAN).

UNITE STAES SENATE
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 25, 1990

PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN:

ON APRIL 3 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY AND I WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH LED TO AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN THE MIDEAST AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, ENCOURAGED BY OUR JANUARY MEETING IN BAGHDAD WITH YOU AND OTHER IRAQI OFFICIALS, AND LATER CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON, WE URGED ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, IRAND WE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BE PROMPTLY UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES.

LAST WEEK, BY LETTER DATES MAY 16, 1990, SENATORS DOLE, SHELBY, SIMPSON, MCCLURE AND MURKOWSKI JOINED ME IN WRITING TO YOU, AGAIN EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN ABOUT ESCALATING TENSION IN THE MIDEAST AND CALLING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS. THE FOLLOWING DAY, LEGISLATION WAS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ. DEBATE IN THE SENATE FOCUSED ON IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND YOUR OWN STATEMENT THAT HALF OF ISRAEL WOULD BE DESTROYED BY FIRE IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST IRAQ.

SENATOR METZENBAUM, MURKOWSKI, AND I URGED OUR COLLEAGUES NOT TO VOTE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTING RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. WE FELT THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE REALISTIC BASED ON OUR RECENT MEETINGS WITH YOU IN BAGHDAD. THIS AMENDMENT FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ CAME UP WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE, SO THE

ABSENCE OF THE OTHER SENATORS WHO VISITED YOU SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT THEY FAVOR THAT THE SANCTIONS SINCE THEY WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE SENATE WHEN THE DEBATE OCCURRED. I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT MANY SENATORS DO FAVOR SUCH SANCTIONS AND SUCH AMENDMENT MIGHT HAVE PASSED LAST WEEK AND MAY EVEN MORE LIKELY PASS IN THE FUTURE UNLESS WE DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE UNDELYING CONCERNS.

THE SITUATION BECAME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT LAST WEEKEND WHEN A FORMER ISRAELI SOLDIER, RELIABLY DESCRIBED AS EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE, SHOT AND KILLED SEVEN PALESTINIANS. IN THE CONFRONTATIONS THAT FOLLOWED OTHERS WERE KILLED IN ISRAELN THE ADMINISTERED TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND IN JORDAN.

MR. PRESIDENT , WE ALL FACE A VERY CRUCIAL PERIOD IN MIDEAST AFFAIRS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE ON A DIALOGUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH COULD LEAD TO AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING WE HOPE, ISRAEL. MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES AND I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THIS OPPORTUNITY IMPEDED BY A SENATE VOTE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ OR ANY FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES ON EITHER SIDE.

OTHER SENTORS AND I PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF ARAB LEADERS IN BAGHDAD ON MAY 28 WILL FURTHER ESCALATE TENSIONS BETWEEN ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL , AND BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES. I STONGLY URGE YOU TO TAKE SOME ACTION OR MAKE SOME FORCEFUL STATEMENT TO BEGIN TO DEFUSE THIS SITUATION . IN RECENT DISCUSSION WITH YOUR DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR, I WAS ASSURED REGARDING THAT YOU HAD ADOPTED AND ARTICULATED A 'NO - FIRST- STRIKE' POLICY REGARDING ISRAEL.

HAVING READ YOUR OFTEN QUOTED SPEECH OF APRIL 1 I AM AWARE THAT THAT YOU MADE YOUR THREAT TO ISRAEL IN TERMS OF RETALIATION IN THE MEDIA. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT A PUBLIC REITERATION OF IRAQ'S 'NO FIRST STRIKE' POLICY WOULD BE HELPFUL, AND I HAVE PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR TO DO THE SAME.

IN GENERAL, A MUTING OF HARSH WORDS WOULD BE ANOTHER POSITIVE SIGN THAT COULD LEAD IRAQ AWAY FROM POTENTIAL CONFLICT, AND WOULD GO A LONG WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ. IRAQ AND ISRAEL NOW HAVE UNPRECEDENTED MILITARY POWER IN THE MIDEAST. ANY OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES COULDS VERY LIKELY BE CATASTROPHIC.

MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU KNOW , SENATORS DO NOT CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS THE PROVINCE OF OUR PRESIDENT. BUT WE DO HAVE OPPORTUNITIES TO WEIGH IN ON CRITICAL MATTERS WHEN OUR EXPERIENCE APPLIES AND OUR CONSCIENCE DEMANDS. I HAVE MADE MANY VISITS TO THE MIDEAST, THE FIRST OVER 25 YEARS AGGO I HAVE MET WITH ISRAELI AND

ARAB LEADERS AND WITH PALESTINIANS. AFTER ONLY TWO VISITS TO BAGHDAD, OURS IS STILL A SHORT ACQUAINTANCE, BUT I WRITE TO YOU BECAUSE I SENSE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS THAT MUST BE AVOIDED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE THAT SHOULD BE GRASPED.

SINCERELY,

ARLEN SPECTER

(EHARAT KESHER: LEHALEN DIVREI HASENATOR BETOSEFET)

I URGE YOU TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE BAGDAD SUMMIT THAT IRAQ WILL NOT MAKE A 'FIRST STRIKE' AGAINST ISRAEL . OR THAT IRAQ WILL WOULD PROMISE 'NO FIRST STRIKE' IF ISRAEL MADE THE SAME PROMISE. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU IN BAGDAD.

THOUGH ON ISRAEL'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND PRESENT
SITUATION I BELIEVE THAT PART OF ISRAEL WOULD BE
DETERMINED BY THE COURSE OF ISRAELI POLICY
AND NOT ISRAEL.

SENATOR METSKER, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, AND I WOULD BE
GLAD TO VISIT THE PARLIAMENTS OF ISRAEL AND
BECAUSE OF THE INSTABILITY OF ISRAELI POLICY
AND THE UNCLARIFIED POLICY OF ISRAELI LEADERS
I BELIEVE THAT A VISIT TO ISRAEL WOULD BE
UNWISDOM. RELATIONS WERE RECENTLY BASED ON THE
MEETING IN BAGDAD. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, TO
TAKE SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE AN UNWISDOM STEP
AND I AM NOT SURE THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO
TAKE SUCH A VISIT AT THIS TIME. WE MUST FIRST
SEE THE FUTURE COURSE. AS YOU KNOW, THE
SITUATION IS VERY UNSTABLE AT THIS TIME.
WITH A FORMER ISRAELI LEADER, HILLY, WHO WAS
AN EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE, WHO WAS KILLED
IN THE COURSE OF HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
OTHERS WERE KILLED IN ISRAEL. THE AMBASSADOR
IN BAGDAD AT THE TIME WAS ABRAHAM AND IN BAGDAD.

MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE ALL TAKE A VERY
SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MR. PRESIDENT,
AND I BELIEVE THAT AFTER THE GREAT DEBATE
WHICH WAS MADE ON A BASIS OF FACTS AND
THE UNITED STATES WHICH CAN LEAD TO AN
EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES. I DO NOT
WANT TO BE OFFENDED BY A CERTAIN
OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY
AS ATTACHED TO EITHER SIDE.

OTHER COUNTRIES AND I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED
THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ISRAEL
MAY BE SUCH THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY
FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE ACTION
AND THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE
ACTION TO TAKE SUCH ACTION OR TAKE
SOME OTHER ACTION TO BRING THIS
SITUATION TO A POINT WHERE IT
WILL BE SUCH THAT IT WILL BE
NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO
TAKE ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI POLICY
IN GENERAL. A VISIT TO ISRAEL WOULD
BE A LONG WAY TO BRING
ABOUT A LONG WAY TO BRING
ABOUT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP, WHICH HAS
BEEN MAINTAINING A POLICY OF
ISRAELI POLICY, AND I BELIEVE THAT
YOU ARE ALL INTERESTED IN BRINGING US
THE CURRENT SITUATION.

SENATOR
ARMEN GEBREKJIAN

I BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI POLICY SHOULD BE
BASED ON FACTS AND NOT ISRAELI POLICY.

I BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI POLICY SHOULD BE
BASED ON FACTS AND NOT ISRAELI POLICY.
A STATEMENT BY SENATOR ARMEN GEBREKJIAN
THAT HE WOULD VISIT ISRAEL IN BAGDAD
AND THE SAME POLICY.

I DO NOT WANT TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER
OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER
OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER
OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER

MR. PRESIDENT
AS YOU ARE AWARE

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 11, 1958

SENATOR ARMEN GEBREKJIAN
REPUBLIC OF ISRAEL
BAGDAD, IRAQ

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT ARMEN GEBREKJIAN:

ON APRIL 1 OF THIS YEAR, SENATOR RICHARD SMITH
AND I WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR
CONCERN ABOUT A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH
WAS BEING TAKEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND BEYOND. AT THAT TIME, YOU AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, INCLUDING
SENATOR METSKER, WERE INTERESTED
IN BRINGING ABOUT COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.
WE WERE ALL INTERESTED IN BRINGING
ABOUT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISRAEL.

LAST WEEK, BY BETTER DATE MAY 11, 1958, SENATOR
SMITH, SENATOR METSKER AND I WROTE
TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND BEYOND. THE FOLLOWING DAY, SENATOR
METSKER IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
ON THAT DATE IN THE DEBATE ON
ISRAELI POLICY AND YOUR OWN STATEMENT
THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE DETERMINED BY
THE COURSE OF ISRAELI POLICY
AND NOT ISRAELI POLICY.

SENATOR METSKER, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, AND I
WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND BEYOND. WE FELT THAT ISRAELI
POLICY WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE
COURSE OF ISRAELI POLICY AND NOT
ISRAELI POLICY. THIS AGREEMENT FOR
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISRAEL.

SENATOR METSKER, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, AND I
WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND BEYOND. WE FELT THAT ISRAELI
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COURSE OF ISRAELI POLICY AND NOT
ISRAELI POLICY. THIS AGREEMENT FOR
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISRAEL.

MR. PRESIDENT, WE ALL TAKE A VERY
SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
AND I BELIEVE THAT AFTER THE GREAT
DEBATE WHICH WAS MADE ON A BASIS
OF FACTS AND THE UNITED STATES
WHICH CAN LEAD TO AN EXPANSION
OF THE UNITED STATES. I DO NOT
WANT TO BE OFFENDED BY A CERTAIN
OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER
COUNTRY AS ATTACHED TO EITHER
SIDE.

OTHER COUNTRIES AND I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED
THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ISRAEL
MAY BE SUCH THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY
FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE
ACTION AND THAT THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO TAKE SUCH
ACTION OR TAKE SOME OTHER ACTION
TO BRING THIS SITUATION TO A
POINT WHERE IT WILL BE SUCH THAT
IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE
UNITED STATES TO TAKE ACTION
AGAINST ISRAELI POLICY IN
GENERAL. A VISIT TO ISRAEL WOULD
BE A LONG WAY TO BRING ABOUT
ABOUT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP, WHICH HAS
BEEN MAINTAINING A POLICY OF
ISRAELI POLICY, AND I BELIEVE THAT
YOU ARE ALL INTERESTED IN BRINGING
US THE CURRENT SITUATION.

SENATOR METSKER, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, AND I
WROTE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND BEYOND. WE FELT THAT ISRAELI
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SENATOR METSKER, WASHINGTON, WISCONSIN, AND I
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ISRAELI POLICY. THIS AGREEMENT FOR
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISRAEL.

ARMEN GEBREKJIAN

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 27244 תאריך: 30.05.90 *

* דף 1 מתוך 2 *

* עותק 5 מתוך 8 *

* ** נכנס סודי ביותר *

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* 5,27244:זם:חז *

* אל:המשרד *

* יעדים:רהמש/מצב/3259, נר:834, תא:290590, זח:1100, דח:ר, סג:ס *

* מ-:ווש, זח:1100, דח:ר, סג:ס *

* תח:ג סצפא *

* נד:ג *

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* סודי ביותר/רגיל *

* מכתב *

* אל: מנהל מצפ"א *

* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון *

* הודון: סנטור ספקטר - עירק. *

* בעקבות שלכם 13183 קבעתי פגישה עם סנטור ספקטר ל-17 דנא. *

* עקב קיום הצבעה לא יצאה לבסוף הפגישה לפועל. בשיחה טלפונית *

* ב-19.5 עם הסנטור ספקטר מסרתי לו עיקרי הנקודות שהובאו *

* במברקכם הנ'ל ובהתבסס על הנקודות המצ'ב שהוכנו על ידי *

* לקראת השיחה. *

* בברכה, *

* משה ארד *

* העתק: סמוכ'ל צפ"א ופר'נ *

* ** *

* MAY 17, 1990 *

* TALKING POINTS *

* ISRAEL, COMMITTED TO ITS PEACE INITIATIVE, IS INTERESTED *

* IN OPENING DIRECT, BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT *

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* ** *

* ** *

* דף 2 מתוך 2 *

* עותק 5 מתוך 8 *

* PRECONDITIONS, WITH IRAQ, WITH A VIEW TOWARD *

* RECOGNIZING RELATIONS AND REACHING A PEACE AGREEMENT. *

* IRAQ IS IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING ITS MILITARY MIGHT *

* DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL. *

* IN ITS HISTORIC QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB WORLD *

* AND RIVALRY WITH EGYPT OVER THAT POSITION IRAQ, IN ITS *

* DECLARATIONS AND PROMOUCEMENTS AGAINST ISRAEL, WANTS TO *

* RALLY THE ARAB WORLD BEHIND IT. *

* IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, IN PUBLIC *

* APPEARANCES, THREATENED TO ATTACK ISRAEL WITH CHEMICAL *

* WEAPONS AND EVEN AUTHORIZED HIS FIELD COMMANDERS TO *

* LAUNCH SUCH AN ATTACK. A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN *

* SHOULDN'T BE INTERPRETED BY HIS AS LEGITIMIZING HIS *

* DEMAGOGIC AND AGGRESSIVE POLICIES. THE INTERNATIONAL *

* COMMUNITY SHOULD STAND UNITED AGAINST THE THREAT OF *

* USING SUCH WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO CALL UPON *

* IRAQ TO BRING TO AN END ITS ATTEMPTS O DEVELOP MASS *

* DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. ISRAEL DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO *

* IRAQ AND SUCH AN ALLEGED THREAT IS NOT A REASON FOR *

* DEVELOPING UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO *

* ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IRAQ AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES *

* THROUGH PRESIDENT MUBADRAK HAVE NOT BORNE FRJIT. EGYPT *

* AND IRAQ PRESENTLY COMPETE FOR THE LEADERHIP OF THE ARAB *

* WORLD AND AN INITIATIVE ADDRESSED TO THE IRAQI *

* LEADERSHIP VIA EGYPT, MIGHT BE COUNER-PRODUCTIVE. *

* ** *

* העתק: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח *

* מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ *

* ** *

* 17* *

* ** *

* תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכ"ל, בוצור, מצפא *

The following information was obtained from a review of the files of the
 State Department, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of American
 Democracy, regarding the activities of the Arab League in the
 Middle East.

The Arab League was established in 1945 by the Arab States of
 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.
 Its primary objective is to promote unity and cooperation among
 its member states.

The Arab League has been active in the Middle East since its
 formation. It has sponsored numerous conferences and has
 participated in various international organizations.

In recent years, the Arab League has become increasingly
 active in the Middle East. It has been instrumental in
 the formation of the Arab League Observer Mission to the
 Middle East, which was established in 1974.

The Arab League Observer Mission was established to monitor
 the situation in the Middle East and to report to the
 Arab League on its activities.

The Arab League Observer Mission has been active in the
 Middle East since its formation. It has conducted
 numerous inspections and has reported on its findings
 to the Arab League.

The Arab League Observer Mission has been instrumental in
 the formation of the Arab League Observer Mission to the
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The Arab League Observer Mission has been instrumental in
 the formation of the Arab League Observer Mission to the
 Middle East, which was established in 1974.

The Arab League Observer Mission has been active in the
 Middle East since its formation. It has conducted
 numerous inspections and has reported on its findings
 to the Arab League.

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התחנות

י.מ.ג.ג
ז.א.א.י.ר.ו.ר.ט.א.י.ן
ב.נ.ר.ו.

אאא, חוזם: 27244

אל: רהמש/1453

מ:- ווש, נר: 834, תא: 290590, זח: 1100, דח: ר, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/רגיל

מכתב

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור ספקטר - עירק.

בעקבות שלכם 13183 קבעתי פגישה עם סנטור ספקטר ל-17 דנא. עקב קיום הצבעה לא יצאה לבסוף הפגישה לפועל. בשיחה טלפונית ב-19.5 עם הסנטור ספקטר מסרתי לו עיקרי הנקודות שהובאו במברקכם הנ'ל ובהתבסס על הנקודות המצ'ב שהוכנו על ידי לקראת השיחה.

בברכה,
משה ארד

העתק: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

MAY 17, 1990

TALKING POINTS

ISRAEL, COMMITTED TO ITS PEACE INITIATIVE, IS INTERESTED IN OPENING DIRECT, BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, WITH IRAQ, WITH A VIEW TOWARD RECOGNIZING RELATIONS AND REACHING A PEACE AGREEMENT.

IRAQ IS IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING ITS MILITARY MIGHT DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL. IN ITS HISTORIC QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB WORLD AND RIVALRY WITH EGYPT OVER THAT POSITION IRAQ, IN ITS DECLARATIONS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS AGAINST ISRAEL, WANTS TO RALLY THE ARAB WORLD BEHIND IT.

IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS PRESIDENT HUSSEIN, IN PUBLIC APPEARANCES, THREATENED TO ATTACK ISRAEL WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND EVEN AUTHORIZED HIS FIELD COMMANDERS TO LAUNCH SUCH AN ATTACK. A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN SHOULDN'T BE INTERPRETED BY HIS AS LEGITIMIZING HIS DEMAGOGIC AND AGGRESSIVE POLICIES. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD STAND UNITED AGAINST THE THREAT OF USING SUCH WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO CALL UPON IRAQ TO BRING TO AN END ITS ATTEMPTS O DEVELOP MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. ISRAEL DOES NOT POSE A THREAT TO IRAQ AND SUCH AN ALLEGED THREAT IS NOT A REASON FOR DEVELOPING UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IRAQ AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THROUGH PRESIDENT MUBADRAK HAVE NOT BORNE FRUIT. EGYPT

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AND IRAQ PRESENTLY COMPETE FOR THE LEADERHIP OF THE ARAB WORLD AND AN INITIATIVE ADDRESSED TO THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP VIA EGYPT, MIGHT BE COUNER-PRODUCTIVE.

העתק: יועץ מדיני לשהח
מנכל משרד רוה'מ

חפוצה: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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MAY 14, 1950

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ISRAEL, COMMITTED TO THE PEACE INITIATIVE, IS INTERESTED
IN OPENING DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
EGYPT, WITH A VIEW TOWARD
RECOGNIZING RE ACTIONS AND REACHING A FINAL AGREEMENT.

ISRAEL IS IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING ITS MILITARY MIGHT
DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL.
IN ITS HISTORIC QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB WORLD
AND EGYPT, WITH EGYPT OVER THAT POSITION ISRAEL IS THE
SEPARATION AND PROGNOSIS AGAINST ISRAEL, WOULD TO
EVEN THE ARAB WORLD BEHIND IT.

IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS PRESIDENT NASSER, IN PUBLIC
APPEARANCES, THREATENED TO ATTACK ISRAEL WITH CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND EVEN AUTHORIZED HIS FIELD COMMANDERS TO
LAUNCH SUCH AN ATTACK. A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NASSER
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BY HIS AS INDICATING HIS
DANGER AND AGGRESSIVE POLICIES. THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY SHOULD STAND UNITED AGAINST THE THREAT OF
USING SUCH WEAPONS. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO CALL UPON
ISRAEL TO BRING TO AN END ITS ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. ISRAEL DOES NOT FEEL A THREAT TO
ISRAEL AND DOES NOT ALLEGED THREAT IS NOT A REASON FOR
DEVELOPING UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO
ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ISRAEL AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES
IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS HAVE NOT BORN FRUIT.

AND ISRAEL PRESENTLY COMMITTE FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB
WORLD AND AN INITIATIVE OFFERED TO THE ISRAELI
LEADERSHIP VIA EGYPT, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

27488

תאריך: 30.05.90

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 5,27488

אל: המשורר

יעדים: נ/1298, רהמש/1447, מצב/3249, אביב/618, מנמת/1697
מ-: ווש, נר: 867, תמ: 290590, ח: 1930, ב: 1, ג: 10
תח: גס צפא
ג: נד

סודי / בהול ליוקר

אל: ממנכ"ל

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, מצפ"א, נאו"מ

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

מועבי"ט: שיגור שליח מטעם המזכ"ל

1. ס/מזכ"ר המדינה זימן את השגריר (15:30) לשיחה בה השתתפו מצידם בולטון הירש ושני עוזרים מצדנו הח"מ.

2. איגלברג פתח בהקראת הנקודות כדלהלן:

TALKING POINTS.

== WE ARE SEEKING TO AVOID A CONTENTIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND HAVE SOUGHT TO UNDERCUT PROPOSALS FOR "INTERNATIONAL" PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE TERRITORIES.

== WE DO NOT THINK IT SERVES ANYONE'S INTERESTS NOR DOES IT HELP THE POTENTIAL TO REENGAGE IN EFFORTS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, FOR THERE TO BE CONTINUING ACRIMONIOUS--AND DEADLOCKED

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

-- DEBATE IN THE SC.

== SECRETARY BAKER HAS REITERATES OUR OPPOSITION TO A PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OR PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN THE TERRITORIES.

== AS AMBASSADOR BROWN OUTLINED FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT TODAY, WE NEED SOMETHING TO WORK WITH.

== WE NEED ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE ANOTHER APPROACH, WHICH SECRETARY BAKER HAS DISCUSSED PUBLICLY: SENDING AN ENVOY OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO OBSERVE THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RETURN TO NEW YORK, AND REPORT BACK TO INTERESTED PARTIES.

== I WOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION TO SOME QUESTIONS YOUR GOVERNMENT POSED TO AMBASSADOR BROWN ON THIS ISSUE.

== IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY FROM THE OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED TO AVOID MORE CONTENTIOUS PROPOSALAS, THE UN ENVOY WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN A MANDATE TO PBSERVE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN THE TERRITORIES, INCLUDING SECURITY MEASURES AND TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS.

== HOWEVER, WE WOULD WORK FOR REPORT THE ENVOY TO THE SYG THAT WOULD REQUIRED NO FURTHER NORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBRATION, DEBATE, RESOLUTION, OR FOLLOW UP MECHANISM OF ANY KIND.

== WE ENVISION THAT THIS WOULD BE A ONE TIME ONLY ENTERPRISE, NOT A REPETITIVE PROCESS.

== IF WE'RE TO HOLD OTHER PARTIES FIRM ON SUBSTANCE WE BELIEVE ISRAEL MUST SHOW GREATER, AND IMMEDIATE FLEXIBILITY ON ISSUES LIKE THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND TIMING OF THE ENVOY'S MISSION.

== WITHOUT THIS FLEXIBILITY, IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID A DISASTROUS OUTCOME FROM CURRENT DELIBERATIONS.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

עד כאן הנקודות שהקריא.

3. איגלברג הוסיף שככל שהדיון יארך תוצאתו תהיה גרועה יותר לכן חושב לקבל החלטה בהקדם כדי לסיים הדיון בנושא. סבורים שאנו צריכים להראות גמישות כדי (שהשליחות תהיה "ONE SHOT AFFAIR".

4. בולטון התייחס להבהרות שנתן המזכ"ר בנושא השליחות מטעם המזכ"ל בכך הסיר המזכ"ר כל ספק ביחס לאופי השליחות. לדבריו מזכ"ל האו"מ מעונין לפעול בהתאם לקו האמריקאי. אם לא תהיה לו גמישות אנו נסיים במצב גרוע יותר. גמישות מצד ישראל על רקע כינוס פסגת מדינות ערב בוגדד תאפשר לנו לראות שאנו עושים משהו בתגובה. להצעה שכולם יכולים להסכים עליה (הכונה לשיגור שליח מטעם המזכ"ל לשליחות חד פעמית שש').

5. השגריר הבטיח כי יעביר הדברים ארצה. בהמשך הודה על הבהרת המזכ"ר את עמדתם בנושא שיגור שליח מטעם המזכ"ל.

בהקשר זה התייחס השגריר לתשובת דוברת מחמ"ד (בתדרוך היומי) שהביעה תמיכת הממשל ברעיון שיגור שליח מיוחד מטעם מועבי"ט. בולטון בתגובה תאר דברי הדוברת כטעות והבטיח שזו חתוקן.

6. בהמשך לשיחת ס' שה"ח נתניהו עם בראון הבהיר השגריר כי שעה שבעבר קיבלנו שליחים מטעם המזכ"ל, הרי שבקונטקסט של הדיון במועבי"ט בשבוע החולף והיום, קבלת שליח תיצור תקדים של התערבות האו"מ בנושא הנתון בלעדית באחריות ממ"ישראל. למרות שאנו מעריכים נסיון ארה"ב להכניס השליחות לקונטקסט של מזכ"ל האו"מ הרי שכל שליחות בעיתוי הנוכחי תיצור תקדים. אנו סרבנו בעבר לקבל התערבות האו"מ בנושא הנתון בלעדית לאחריותנו.

7. איגלברג חזר על כך שאנו צריכים לתת להם מרחב תמרון "כדי לאפשר לנו להחזיר הנושא לקופסא" עד עתה לא נתנו להם מרחב תמרון. פונים אלינו כעת ביודעם שבמידה והנושא לא יסתיים אנו נשוב אליהם בעתיד בבקשה לתקן את הנזק שייגרם.

8. בולטון חזר על כך שעלינו להבין שהתארכות הדיון מאז האירוע בדש"צ זעד ליציאת שליח מקשה.

9. איגלברג הוסיף, כי ככל שהזמן חולף הלחץ גדל.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10. השגריר בתגובה סיים כי הטיעונים לעיל מחזקים חששותינו ממעורבות מועבי"ט.

11. בולטון התייחס לדיונים הנמשכים ולכוונת המזכ"ל לשגר שליח שידווח לו. שיגור שליח יתן (למזכ"ל) מרחב תמרון. הדגש הוא על שיגור שליח מטעמו. בחירת השליח מטעמו IMPLIES דחיית הצעה דומה של מועבי"ט.

12. השגריר הבטיח לעביר הדברים ארצה ולשוב אליהם עם תגובה.

שטיין

ג

תפ: שחה, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, ג(אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל, סייבל, משפט, סולטן, מזתים, מתאסשטחים

TO: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) DATE: 10/10/54

RE: [REDACTED] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

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חוזם: 5,25891
אל: 11/ש/764, רהמש/1362
מ-: המשרד, תא: 280590, זח: 1910, דח: מ, סג: סו
תח: @ גס: שהח
נד: @

סודי/מידי

מס' 74884

אל : וושינגטון
שגריר , ציר - לעיניהם בלבד

מאת: יועץ מדיני

תפוצה : חרב + ראה'מ + צפ'א

שיחת טלפון עם ביל בראון 28/5, 11:50

התקשר בעקבות שיחתו עם שה'ח בה הביע האחרון דאגה מהפסגה הערבית, כינוסה בעיראק תחת חסות צדאם חוסיין ועמדות מצרים לקראת הפסגה.

בראון ביקש למסור לשר את עיקרי ה- T.P שהועברו לפעולה לשגריריהם במדינות ערב לקראת הפסגה.

להלן עיקרי הדברים:

1. ארה'ב מחויבת לתהליך השלום.
2. מאמינים שלדרך המוצעת עתה (במרומז) כנראה דיאלוג ישראלי-פלסטיני - סלי). יש הסיכוי הטוב ביותר.
3. שינוי הדרך ומעבר מידי לועידה בינ'ל לא יכול להועיל.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4. מקווים שבפסגה יימנעו מהרטוריקה שלילית ושיאמצו גישה חיובית.
5. מצפים שיתמכו בדיאלוג ישראלי-פלסטיני בקהיר.
6. מקווים שיילכו מעבר להחלטות פסגת קזבלנקה ע"י אימוץ גישה של שלום עם ישראל באמצעות מו'מ, קבלת זכות ישראל להתקיים וקבלת החלטות 242 ו-338.
7. גישה לא חיובית בפסיגה תחזק האלמנטים המתנגדים לשלום בשני הצדדים. לעומת זאת, בגישה חיובית בפסיגה יהיה מסר חיובי לישראל.
8. ארה'ב מתנגדת להתנחלויות בשטחים שנכבשו ב-1967. הביעו עמדתם זאת גם פומבית וגם במגעים עם ישראל.
9. תומכים בזכות היהודים להגר מברה'מ.
10. אין לערב בין התנחלויות לבין עליה לישראל.
11. יש להבחין ברורות בין הזכות לעלות לישראל גופא לבין השטחים. מקווים שהבחנה זו תמצא ביטוי בהחלטות הפסגה.

סלי

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור





לגנר
[Signature]

ל.ר.א. דנהשנה
27-5-1990
נתקבל

ל.ר.א. 1
ל.ר.א. 2
ל.ר.א. 3
[Signature]

ל.ר.א.
23/5

74237
שמור/בהול לבוקר
103.01
אל: וושינגטון

הנדון: ארה"ב : הרצח בראשל"צ והמצב בשטחים

1. התקשר מרק פאריס, הסגן האמריקאי, ועל פי הנחיות מסר כלהלן :

א. ממארה"ב מודאגת מ"הארועים האלימים" בעקבות הרצח הנ"ל. (להערת שאני מבין שהכוונה היא לאלימות מצד הפלסטינאים, הגיב פאריס שאינו יודע, והעיר שהמינוח "VIOLENT AFTERMATH" פתוח לפירושים שונים).

ב. ממארה"ב מעריכה את התבטאויות בגנוי הרצח שהושמעו ע"י ישראלים רבים, החל ברוה"מ.

ג. עם זאת, ממארה"ב מודאגת ומוטרדת מההרוגים והפעוועים הנוספים בעקבות האירוע בראשל"צ וקוראת לכוחות הבטחון להימנע משימוש בכח יתר שעה שבצד הפלסטינאי הכאב גדול והרגשות מחוממים.

ד. נודע להם שהוטל איסור על השימוש בתחמושת חיה. הם מקווים שאיסור זה יישמר בקפדנות

ה. האירוע והבא בעקבותיו מדגישים ומבליטים את החשיבות שבהתקדמות תהליך השלום.

2. אמרתי לפאריס שרשמתי לפני ואעביר את הנ"ל לממונים עלי.

3. פאריס הוסיף שהבוקר השגריר ראה את מנכ"ל בטחון בנושא אחר והעביר לו את הנקודות הנ"ל.

מנהל מצפ"א
יוסף למדן
22 במאי 1990



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1/27/90

אל : שה"ח
דע : רה"ח
מאת : סלי

הנדון : שיחה עם מרשל ברייגר

בתאריך 23.5.90 נפגש הנ"ל עם הח"מ. העביר תחושות במחשל האמריקאי לגבי מחשלת ישראל. השבתי.

במהלך השיחה הבהיר דעתו כי, בשלב ראשון, לא רצוי לטפל בשורשים של מערכת היחסים בין הממשלים, אלא לשקול מספר צעדים ע"י מחשלת ישראל שיפגינו רצון טוב:

1. ישראל תציע המרת 2-5% מהסיוע לקרן משותפת ישראלית - אמריקאית לסיוע למזא"ר, כולל שילוב חברות ישראליות בפרוייקטים. (ניתן להציג הנושא גם כהקמת קרן משותפת ישראלית-אמריקאית, בלי לקשור במפורש לסיוע - סלי)
2. להפגין בהצהרות ומעשים גמישות ורגישות כלפי פלסטינים.
3. להפגין רגישות בנושא זכויות אדם ולהיות נכונים להתייעץ עם האמריקאים לגבי דרכים לטיפול באינתיפאדה ("אנחנו עושים המכסימום, אבל אם יש לכם הצעות נשמח לשמוע").
4. באותו הקשר - לזמן אישים ידועים כמו ארוין קוטלר ודרשוביץ כדי להתייעץ אתם בנושא.
5. להשמיע הצהרות פומביות רבות בשבח ארה"ב.
6. ליצור תחושה של רגישות לאינטרסים אמריקאים בנושאים שונים. להתייעץ עם המחשל בכל מיני סוגיות שוליות.

סלי

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 5,24274
אל: המשרד

יעדים: ניו יורק/117, בטחון/1190, רהמש/1295, מצב/2953, מנמת/1522
מ-: ווש, נר: 825, תא: 260590, זח: 1330, דח: 1, סג: 1
תח: 2
גס: צפא
נד: 2

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפא, לשכת שהח

דע: הסברה, ממד, לעם, דוצ', אמן-מנמ'ת-ר' משמרת

ניו-יורק-עתונות

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

הנדון: בייקר - משקיפים

רצב הקטע הרלוונטי מתוך שאלות ותשובות (בגמר פגישה עם שהח הגרמני) של עתונאים עם מזכיר המדינה בייקר.

תשומת ליבכם, להבהרתו כי אין לראות בדבריו שלשום כוונה למשקיפים קבועים, אלא נכונות לבדוק הרעיון של שיגור שליח מטעם מזכל האום, כפי שנעשה כבר בעבר.

המזכיר סירב להתייחס לנואם ערפאת (.. טרם קראתי ..)

רות ירון

SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, REMARKS TO PRESS STAKE-OUT FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING, STATE DEPARTMENT LOBBY
SS-5-1-E PAGES 5 FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1990

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

(SECRETARY BAKER SEES FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OUT AND THEN RETURNS AND RESPONDS TO A QUESTION ABOUT ARAFAT'S STATEMENT CONCERNING UN OBSERVER FORCES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.)

SEC. BAKER : (AUDIO BREAK) -- READ -- HAVEN'T HEARD OR READ. I'VE BEEN IN MEETINGS HERE FOR THE LAST 2-1/2 HOURS. I HAVEN'T HEARD THE SPEECH. LET ME SIMPLY SAY THAT, AS YOU KNOW, OUR POLICY FOR A LONG TIME HAS BEEN TO OPPOSE THE CONCEPT OF A PERMANENT OBSERVER FORCE OR A PERMANENT PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE TERRITORIES. SOME PEOPLE MINISTERPRETED MY STATEMENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING THE OTHER DAY TO SUGGEST THAT. THE QUESTION DIDN'T SUGGEST THAT, NOR DID THE ANSWER. THE IDEA OF A -- THE SECRETARY GENERAL SENDING ON OF HIS TOP AIDES TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE SITUATION AND RETURN IS SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT AND SOMETHING THAT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL OF THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED.

SO I CAN'T REACT TO A SPEECH THAT I HAVEN'T HEARD OR SEEN THE TEXT OF.

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, פ(אמן), ממד, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל, 2, סולטן, מזתים, מתאסשצחים, דוצ'ים

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נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 5,24273

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ניו יורק/119, בטחון/1192, רהמש/1297, מצב/2955, מנמח/1524
 מ-: ווש, נר: 824, תא: 260590, זח: 1330, דח: 1, סג: 1
 תח: 2 גס: צפא
 נד: 2

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מנהל מצפא, לשכת שהח

דע : מעת, הסברה, יועץ חקשורת רוהמ' לעם, דוצ', אמן - מנמח
 / ר' משמרת, ניו יורק

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

להלן מתוך שאלות ותשובות עם הנשיא בוש, הקטע הרלוונטי
 בנושאינו:

CB EXCERPT OF PRE-SUMMIT INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT
 BUSH BY FRENCH JOURNALISTS/ THE WHITE HOUSE ZF-5
 1-E PAGE 1 FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1990

Q THE SITUATION IS DETERIORATING IN THE MIDDLE
 EAST. WHAT CAN YOU AND GORBACHEV DO TO BRING BACK
 PEACE IN THE AREA?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT SURE THAT BUSH AND GORBACHEV
 WORKING AS A TEAM CAN DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. I AM
 SURE THAT WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN IS THESE TALKS HAVE
 TO GET GOING AND OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, SUPPORTED
 BY THIS PRESIDENT, HAVE BEEN DOING OUR LEVEL BEST
 WORKING WITH MUBARAK, WORKING ORIGINALLY WITH
 SHAMIR'S OWN PLAN TO TRY TO GET TALKS GOING. BUT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT IT. AND I THINK OF THE
 NEEDLESS LOSS OF LIFE AND THOSE -- AS I TOLD A PRESS
 CONFERENCE TODAY, MAYBE WHAT MOVES ME THE MOST IS
 THE CHILDREN. AND YOU KNOW, YOU SEE THESE LITTLE
 KIDS HURT, AND IT -- WE HAVE TO DO BETTER. BUT I
 DON'T THINK IT'S A US-SOVIET ROLE THAT'S GOING TO
 SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

END

דש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מונכל, ממנוכל, בונצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארובל, 27, סולטן,
 מזתיים, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, דוצ-ים, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, 2(אמן)

6406 יוקף ולקף וחותך בנרמ טל. 6406 יוקף ולקף וחותך בנרמ טל. 6406

נכנס **
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סודי

חוזם: 5,24250
אל: המשרד
יעדים: נ"י/1272, רהמש/1291, מצב/2945, מנמח/1519
מ-: גנבה, נר: 192, תא: 260590, חז: 1550, דח: מ, סג: 10
תח: 2: גס: ארבל
נד: 2

סודי/מידי

אל: ארבל 2, מצפא, נאומ
מאת: דני שק ג'נבה

הנדון: פגישת סגן שה'ח עם השגריר פיקרינג.

1. הפגישה נערכה לבקשת פיקרינג.

2. השיחה נפתחה בהחלפת דיעות קצרה בנושא עיראק. פיקרינג אמר שהם מודעים לתנועות מסויימות בצבא עיראק וכי הם מעבירים להם מסר ברור של מורת רוח גם מטון הצהרותיהם. סגן השר פירט את הסכנות הטמונות בהחייאת חזית מזרחית מאוחדת. פיקרינג הוסיף שסדאם הוא זה שיזם את השיחות עם איראן בטענה שיש להתרכז בסכנה העיקרית שהיא ממערב.

3. בנושא דיון מועבי'ט אמר שההוראות שלו הן לשמור על פרופיל נמוך עד כמה שאפשר בג'נבה ולקוות שבניו יורק כל העניין יתמסמס ויסתיים ללא החלטה. כל זאת כמובן אם לא תוגש החלטה שהממשל מוכן לחיות איתה. הרושם שלהם הוא שמטרתו של עראפת היתה לקבל בימה ותו לא. ארה'ב איננה מעונינת בהחלטה אופרטיבית כלשהי ממועצת הבטחון וכך אמרו גם לכל מי ששאל. אם המזכ'ל ירצה לשגר שליח או לבוא בעצמו לנו לא תהיה התנגדות. סגן השר הבהיר שאנו מתנגדים לכל מעורבות של מועבי'ט ולגבי שליחים של המזכ'ל כפי שהיה בעבר כל הצעת שליחות תבדק לגופה. פיקרינג הביע תקווה שישראל תסכים למתכונת כזו וסגן השר הדגיש כי בכל מקרה אסור שיהיה מנדט שייגע בנושאי בטחון בפירוש הרחב של המושג. פיקרינג אמר שעמדתם הובהרה גם בתוניס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפני כינוס המועצה וכי אש'פ יודע יפה מה הגבולות של ארה'ב.

4. השיחה עברה לאחר מכן לנושאי פנים וליחסי ישראל ארה'ב כאשר שני הצדדים הסכימו כי יש להסיר אי-ההבנות ולהדגיש - גם בפומבי - את המשותף ולא המפריד בעמדות הצדדים.

5. כעבור שעות אחדות בטרקלין בנין האו'מ שוחחו השניים בשנית. פיקרינג התייחס לנושא שליח או משלחת המזכ'ל ביתר פירוט. אמר שדרך בטוחה להוציא את השטיח מתחת לרגלי מועבי'ט היא להודיע כבר עתה על הסכמתנו העקרונית לשיגור משלחת כזאת. סגן השר הבהיר חד-משמעית שפתרון כזה לא מקובל עלינו. לא נסכים לסמיכות כזו שתתפרש כהישג של אש'פ וכניעה של ישראל ללחץ מה עוד שגם לגבי משלחת בעתיד רחוק יותר אין הוא מתחייב שנסכים משמע הבעיה אינה רק של מועד, אלא גם ובעיקר - של תוכן. פיקרינג הביע דאגתו שעמדה כזו תוביל לכך שהדיון במועבי'ט יימשך תקופה ארוכה והנושא יישאר על סדר היום שבועות וחודשים. הוסיף עם זאת שאם זו תהיה עמדת ישראל, יצטרכו לחשוב על המהלכים הבאים. בשלב ראשון על מנת לאפשר סיום הכינוס בג'נבה והעברת ההמשך לניו יורק ביקש שלא ניכנס בפומבי ליתר פירוט בנושא משלחת אפשרית ומכל מקום שלא נסגור סופית הדלת להצעה כזו.

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, 2(אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, ברנע, ארבל, רביב, סולטן, מזתיים

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| תאריך וזמן העור: 25.5.90 | | אל: מצפ"א |
| פס' פרוק:
הפס': | | דע: |
| 793 | | פאת: ק. לקונגרס |

קונגרס: Supplemental - הקצבות

1. אתמול בלילה עבר סופית (אישור דו"ח הקונפרנס) - Supplemental בשני הבטים

לסיוע פנמה וניקרואה הכולל את ערבויות הדיור.

2. היום (25/5) יועבר לחתימת הנשיא ויכנס לחוקפו כחוק.

ישראל וסנא' ז'נואר
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

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תפוצה: 7

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 24157

* תאריך: 26.05.90 *

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* דף 1 מתוך 2 *

* ** נכנס **

סודי ביותר

* עותק 6 מתוך 12 *

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* חוזם: 5,24157 *

* אל: המשרד

* יעדים: מצב/2937, דהמש/1283

* מ-: ווש, נר: 817, תא: 250590, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: 10

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* סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב. / מידי *

* אל: יועץ מדיני לשה'א, מנהל מצפ'א, מנהל ממ'ד *

* מאת: הציר, וושינגטון *

* להלן משיחה עם דן קרצר.

* 1. בתגובה ראשונית לנאום ערפאת אמר שהוא כמובן עשה לנו את
* המלאכה בהיותו קיצוני. אמר שפלטרו בטוניס העביר מסר ברור
* שארה'ב לא תוכל לקבל דרישות קיצוניות ומדינות ערב מתונות
* כערב הסעודית ומצרים לחצו אף הן אך נראה שערפאת החליט ללכת
* על הקו הקיצוני בשל רצונו לקבע את טון הפסגה בשבוע הבא.
* בחיוך אמר שטוב שקלי העיד אתמול בבית הנבחרים לפני נאומו של
* ערפאת. הם הסבירו בתוניס שאש'פ צריך למתן את התבטאויות
* מנהיגיו אך כנראה שהמסר לא עובר או אינו מותיר רשומו (נתתי
* לו בהזדמנות זו את ראיונו של האני אל חסן ב'אל אנבא').

* 2. לדבריו, גם במערכת המודיעין שלהם גוברת הדאגה למשטרו של
* חוסיין אף כי לא נדלקה עדיין נורת החרום האדומה. לפי קרצר
* הן בעיקר על רקע פונדמנטליסטי בשלוב עם התערדות רצינית של
* המצב הכלכלי. המלך פנה בבקשת סיוע לארה'ב אך ביקש שארה'ב
* תמתין עד אחרי הפסגה שכן הוא מתכוון לבקש סיוע בפסגה ומבקש
* לראות כיצד תענה בקשה זו. מיד אח'כ יבדקו דרכים בווינגטון
* לסייע לו. המלך גם פנה בבקשה לאספקה דחופה של גז מדמיע
* והאמריקאים מנסים לאתר בדחיפות כמויות שניתן לשגרן מיידית.
* קרצר סיפר שבהיותו בעמאן לפני מספר שבועות נפגש בקבוצה של
* נכבדים לא פלשתינאים שדברו בצורה בוטה ביותר כנגד האוכלוסייה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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 * עותק 6 מתוך 12 *
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* הפלשתיןאית ונדאגה רבה על הסכנה שנושקפת להשתלטות הדמוגרפית
 * שלה במיוחד על עמאן.
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* 3. מתוך השיחה מסתבר שהעסוק ברעיונו של קונדט, היינו של
 * קיצוץ בסיוע למצרים (F.M.S. - ב) מול קיצוץ בחוב לארה"ב
 * זוכה בתשומת לב רבה כולל בדרך המזכיר והטיפול בו, היינו
 * הבדיקות עם אגף התקציבים והאוצר די אינטנסיבי. הבעיה כידוע
 * היא הצורך לתקצב כבר בשנה הראשונה של כל סכום החוב שעליו
 * תותר ארה"ב. המוזר הוא, אומר קרצר שאנשי האוצר ואגף
 * התקציבים לוקחים בחשבון שמצרים במילא לע תעמוד בהתחייבותה אך
 * מבחינת ניהול החשבונות הם חייבים לתקצב את הסכום שעליו
 * תותר אם תותר ארה"ב. במקרה כזה יחול ההסדר גם על ישראל
 * שתרוויח יותר ממצרים שכן היא מתעתדת לעמוד בהתחייבותיה.
 * הבעיה תהיה כיצד להגביל ההסדר, אם ימצא לו הפתרון החשבונאי
 * זהכספי רק לישראל ומצרים וקרצר הרהר שמא אם וכאשר יתחדש
 * תהליך השלום אפשר יהיה להעביר זאת בקונגרס. קרצר הבהיר לי
 * דברי רוסי ולפי הסברו תפעל ארה"ב להקמת גוש של "ידידי
 * מצרים" אחרי שיושג הסכם בין קרן המטבע ומצרים ע"מ לגייס
 * עד כ-3 בליון דולר כמימון ביניים עבור מצרים. הכוונה היא
 * * לגייס הכסף בעיקר ביפאן ומערב אירופה.
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* ערן *
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* רש *
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* חתפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז *
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
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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חוזם: 5,24234
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 תח: 2:גס:צפא
 נד: 2

סודי ביותר מידי

אל וושינגטון השגריר
 דע/ס'שה'ח ב'י'ן ג'נבה

למכותבים בלבד

או'מ - ארה'ב - יו'ש ועזה

משיחה עם בראון היום במשרדי:

א. התיחסתי לדיבורים על שליח מזכ'ל שיבוא לכאן. אמרתי כי לדעתי יהיה עלינו שלא לאפשר בואו של שליח כזה, שהרי מה אירע השבוע:

1. רצח נורא על ידי מטורף הופך לעילה לניגוח מדינת ישראל, דבר שלא ראינו כמותו בהקשר ראס בורקה ואוטובוס 405 כלפי מצרים וערבים פלסטינאים, תוך שימוש בסטנדרט כפול מאין כמוהו.

2. מעורבות האו'מ ביו'ש ועזה אינה מקובלת עלינו כל עיקר, ואכן סירבנו לבקשת האו'מ לשלוח את בלנשארד, לרבות מתוך סברה ששליח כזה עלול להפוך למוסד קבע, כמו אונט'סו שאיש כבר אינו זוכר מדוע הוא נמצא כאן (מאז הוקם ב-1948).

3. על אחת כמה וכמה עתה, כשמדברים על שליח שהולדת שליחותו היא כנראה בהסכם אמריקני כלשהו עם אש'פ, ושאנחנו נתבקש לתת לו יד. בראון הזכיר את גולדינג. אמרתי כי אכן גולדינג היה כאן פעם גם בנושאים של אירועי יו'ש ועזה, אך כל מה שהשיג היה הסתת-יתר מכוונת על ידי גורמים ידועים במקומות בהם

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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 * עותק 4 מתוך 8 *
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* ב'יקר, וזה מה שיקרה גם עתה אם נסכים לו או לבלנשארד או כל אחד מעין זה.

* אמה שלא הצליח אש'פ להשיג על ידי האו'מ (בלנשארד) ינסה להשיג על ידי ארה'ב. בראון אמר אישית כי בגלל המצב הרציני ראוי שנסכים לביקור חד-פעמי אם יוצע, והם אתנו יפעלו לכך שיהיה בפרמטרים הנכונים, ואולי היה עדיף אם היינו מזמינים בנפשנו. אמרתי שבכך ניתן יד להסכמה לסטנדרט הכפול שהופעל נגדנו השבוע. אנו איננו לבנון ולא נהיה כזאת.

* ב. בנושא אחר: לקראת פסגת ארה'ב-ברה'מ ביקשתי, על דעת ראש הממשלה שתונחל לסובייטים על ידי ארה'ב התחושה שחשוב שלא ייסוגו מחדש לעמדותיהם הפרו-ערביות הקיצוניות המסורתיות כפי שאירע במידה רבה לאחרונה, ובראש וראשונה שהלחץ הערבי לא יפגע בעליה.

רובינשטיין

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 24.05.90

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דף 1 מתוך 4
עותק 4 מתוך 24

סודי ביותר

יוצא **

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מחוז: 5,22956

מא: 704/ווש, ני/1261, גנבה/442, רהמש/1156, מנמת/1394

מ-: המשד, תא: 240590, זח: 1923, דח: ב, סג: 30

מתח: @ גס: מזתים

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סודי ביותר/בהול

מא: השגריר, וושינגטון

דע: השגריר נאו'ם, השגריר, ג'נבה

מ.ח. 503

הנדון: מועב'ט

הינך מתבקש לנקוט בשתי פעולות באופן מיידי:

א. שיחה פורמלית במחמ'ד בדרג בכיר לפי שיקולך, במגמה:

1. לנסות ולברר איזה פרטמטרים ארה'ב קובעת לעצמה לגבי הדיון ותוכן הצעת ההחלטה.

2. להביע תקוותנו שלא יהיו צד פעיל בניסוח ההחלטה וגם שלא יפתיעו אותנו כפי שעשו בג'נבה בדצמבר 1988 (כאשר הודיעו על פתיחת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ מייד לאחר מסה'ע של *ערפאת) וכפי שעשו לא מכבר בקשר להצעת ההחלטה בדיון *האחרון במועב'ט בנושא העליה - פירוש הדבר אנו מצפים *שיחזיקו אותנו בתמונה בגנבה וגם בניו-יורק לכל אורך *הדרך.

3. להבהיר להם חד-משמעית את התנגדותנו להצבת כוח משקיפים *מטעם האו'ם בשטחים, תוך התייחסות לדברי שה'ח בנושא במס'ע *שערך היום אה'צ בירושלים (התמליל יוברק בנפרד).

4. לבקש שיטילו ווטו על כל הצעת החלטה שתקרא להקמת *ולהצבת כוח אומ'י כזה. (ראהנא הטיעונים המשפטיים בסוגיה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 4
עותק 4 מתוך 24

זו המועברים ע'י היועץ המשפטי בנפרד).

ב. גיוס האירגונים היהודיים נגד הצבת כוח כזה. כמוכן *ניתן לספק ליהודים את הטיעונים המשפטיים הנ'ל, אך עם *זאת ייתכן שיעדיפו לטעון מתוך הטיעון הבא:

1. לפי החוק הבינלאומי, ישראל אחראית לשמירת החוק והסדר *בשטחים ולהגן על התושבים המקומיים.

2. יש בשיגור כוח משקיפים משום קבלת עמדת אש'פ שמזה שנים *רבות חותר לנוכחות אומית בשטחים עד להעברתם לידי *הפלסטינאים.

3. יש בשיגור כוח כזה משום השלכה על צורת הפתרון הקבוע *בשטחים.

4. הצבת כוח כזה נוגדת יוזמת השלום הישראלית שארה'ב *תומכת בה ומנסה לקדם.

5. אי לכך הצבת כוח כזה יפריע לתהליך השלום.

6. הצבת כוח כזה אינה אלא הכנסת מועב'ט והאו'ם בכלל לתוך *תהליך השלום - כאשר האו'ם כבר הביע את דעתו לגבי הפתרון *באמצעות החלטות העצרת ומועב'ט שאינן קבילות ואינן *מקובלות.

7. נשאלת שאלה רצינית לגבי התפקיד שכוח כזה יכול לשחק *בשטחים וכפי שמזכ'ל האו'ם כבר ציין בדו'ח שלו (5/19443) *מה-21.1.88 (ראהנא מברק היועץ המשפטי), כוח כזה אינו, *מסוגל למלא תפקיד משמעותי מסיבות שונות וביניהן הצורך *ההכרחי לזכות בשיתוף הפעולה של הכוח הכובש.

מנהל מצפ'א

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תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, @ (אמן), בנצוד, *מצפא, סולטן, סייבל, ארבל2

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official text

5/25/90

ADMINISTRATION PRESENTS PLO REPORT TO CONGRESS

(Text: Kelly testimony in Congress, 5/24/90)

Washington -- Following is the text of testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John H. Kelly, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on May 24. Immediately after the text is a transcript of Mr. Kelly's responses to questions from members of the Subcommittee.

(Begin Text)

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, including issues related to PLO compliance with commitments it undertook in December 1988. In this opening statement, I would like to explain what the U.S.-PLO dialogue is, just what transpired in 1988 that led to the U.S. decision to open a substantive dialogue with the PLO, what commitments the PLO undertook at that time, what expectations the U.S. had regarding the dialogue and PLO performance, how the dialogue has progressed, and what has been the PLO's performance of the commitments.

Background to the Dialogue

U.S. policy toward the PLO over the years was shaped in large measure by an undertaking entered into by the U.S. at Israel's request in 1975. At that time, as part of the package of arrangements believed necessary to conclude a second disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, Israel asked that the U.S. not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it had met two conditions, namely recognition of Israel's right to exist and acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Subsequently, we added a third condition, namely renunciation by the PLO of terrorism.

During these years, successive American administrations maintained these conditions as policy, and the U.S. did not recognize or negotiate with the PLO. We also interpreted this policy more broadly



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

than strictly required and refrained from engaging even in a dialogue with the PLO. The only exception, as discussed with Congress at the time, related to discussions with PLO officials on the security of U.S. personnel.

Periodically, throughout these thirteen years, the State Department received messages from third parties signaling PLO interest in a dialogue. Each time this occurred, our answer was the same: when the PLO changed its policy and accepted the conditions, the U.S. would immediately respond.

In 1988, the U.S. received several such probes. Following the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers in November 1988, the administration assessed that the PLO might be serious about changing its policy and accepting the conditions for dialogue. In discussing this possibility with a friendly government which was also in touch with the PLO, the administration repeated its longstanding conditions and repeated its readiness to open a dialogue immediately after the PLO accepted the conditions. There were no deals made and no agreements concluded between the U.S. and the friendly government or between the U.S. and the PLO.

On December 14, 1988, Yasir Arafat, speaking on behalf of the PLO Executive Committee, announced a change in PLO policy. Arafat accepted the conditions for dialogue, when he accepted "...the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine, Israel and other neighbors, according to the resolution 242 and 338....We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism."

Following Arafat's statement, Secretary Shultz announced that the U.S. would open a substantive dialogue with the PLO. Secretary Shultz noted that this did not imply acceptance of an independent Palestinian state.

Two days later, the State Department issued (classified) guidance to our diplomatic posts, for our embassies to brief host governments on what had happened and why. Our objective was to encourage states friendly to the PLO to assist in preventing PLO backsliding on its commitments. In its guidance at the time, the Department also conveyed certain expectations regarding PLO behavior. These included an expectation that the PLO would condemn publicly any terrorist action anywhere, or -- if terrorism were conducted by a PLO member -- discipline those responsible for it, at least by expelling them from the organization.

In conveying these expectations, the administration noted that Arafat could not control all of the actions of all people who belong to organizations within the PLO. However, the administration did not want and has not wanted to give even a yellow light to anyone in the PLO to think that terrorism would be condoned or accepted by the United States. We wanted other countries to help convince the PLO to remain faithful to the commitments it had undertaken.

I want to stress the difference between the conditions the PLO had to meet for us to start the dialogue, and our expectations for PLO

behavior once the dialogue was launched. Neither the previous administration nor this administration imposed new conditionality on the dialogue. Neither administration decided on some automatic trigger for ending the dialogue. Neither administration wanted to hand over to any individual or minority group within the PLO the sole capability of bringing about an end to the dialogue. Rather, we told the PLO that its behavior must improve and that it must try to ensure that the entire PLO act as one in adhering to the commitment to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel.

Mr. Chairman, the object of this brief review has been to make three points:

-- First, the basis for our agreeing to a substantive dialogue with the PLO was the PLO's changing its policy and accepting the three conditions.

-- Second, there were no deals or agreements reached directly or indirectly with the PLO at the time the dialogue began.

-- Third, there were no additional conditions imposed on the dialogue itself, but rather a set of expectations that we hoped to see emerge from the dialogue.

Assessment of the Dialogue

It was against this backdrop that the Bush administration established its policy objectives for the dialogue with the PLO. From the outset the administration made clear that we would conduct the dialogue on our basic terms, namely that we had no intention of diverting the peace process onto unproductive tracks -- for example, by focusing now on an international conference -- or having the dialogue become an end in itself or a means for the PLO to separate us from Israel. Rather, our intentions have been to ensure that the PLO remained committed to the undertakings of December 1988 to promote pragmatic and realistic thinking in the PLO with regard to the peace process and to encourage the PLO and the Palestinian community at large to communicate clearly and unambiguously, in words and actions, their readiness for peace with Israel.

The dialogue has achieved its objectives thus far and benefited important U.S. policy interests. Within six months of its initiation, the dialogue was focusing on the practical plan initiated in Israel for elections leading to negotiations. An international conference, preferred by the PLO, was no longer the focus of attention. Indeed, the agenda of the peace process and the substance of our dialogue with the PLO were shaped in Washington, not Tunis.

This had far-reaching and positive consequences for the peace process.

As part of our effort to bring about Israeli-Palestinian dialogue -- an essential first step in realizing the Israeli peace initiative -- we needed to overcome several serious procedural roadblocks, among them the issue of composing the Palestinian delegation. Our assessment was that putting together a credible delegation of Palestinians from the territories depended on getting the acquiescence of the PLO, which they see as their representatives. This assessment is shared by others in the region, including in Israel. The Jaffee Center at Tel Aviv University said that Israel would have "to address

the recognized representatives of the Palestinians, that is either the PLO or West Bank and Gazan Palestinians who enjoy a mandate from the PLO." We also continued to believe, as we had stated previously in the autonomy negotiations (1979-1982), that there would need to be some representation from East Jerusalem and we believed that a delegation would also need to reflect the interests of those outside the occupied territories as a symbolic gesture to the Palestinian diaspora and the unity of the Palestinian people. In all these matters, we also made clear that nothing agreed to at this stage of the peace process would be viewed by us as a precedent for subsequent stages.

Mr. Chairman, because we understood Israeli sensitivities in this regard, and because we wanted no surprises in our relationship with Israel, we laid our cards on the table to the Israeli government before it adopted its initiative. In April 1989, a month before the Israeli government adopted its peace initiative, Secretary Baker wrote to Foreign Minister Arens and said, inter alia, that it would be necessary to come up with a creative way to include the participation of some Palestinians no longer living in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians from East Jerusalem.

So, it is clear that, from the beginning the Israeli government heard our views on composition of the Palestinian delegation. These issues remained under constant discussion between the U.S. and Israel up to the moment the Israeli government fell. It was equally clear that the PLO and Palestinians heard our views as well, for we made clear to the PLO in our dialogue in Tunis that the PLO would not be represented at the pre-election dialogue.

Mr. Chairman, periodically over the past year I have appeared before this Committee and explained our careful attempts to bring about the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We came very close indeed, when the Israeli government fell, leading to what we all hope is a temporary hiatus on the road to the dialogue in Cairo. The point of this review, however, has been to make three points:

-- First, the U.S.-PLO dialogue has served our peace process objectives.

-- Second, there was nothing in the process of reaching the dialogue that should have been a surprise to our friends in Israel regarding composition of the Palestinian delegation. Let me reiterate clearly that our intention was not and is not to bring the PLO into the Cairo dialogue through the back door.

-- Third, the U.S.-PLO dialogue helped us reach a point where the Israeli elections proposal was ready to be implemented. In other words, the U.S.-PLO dialogue had succeeded in bringing about PLO acquiescence to a process of dialogue between Israel and Palestinians from the territories.

PLO's Performance of its Commitments

The current question, then, is whether the PLO has measured up to the

three commitments it undertook in December 1988, namely, to accept U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; to recognize Israel's right to exist; and to renounce terrorism. In the three reports submitted by the administration in response to the PLO Commitments Compliance Act, the administration indicated its position that the PLO had complied with its commitments. At the same time, the administration indicated clearly that there were serious deficiencies in two key areas: first, that some PLO individuals or groups said ambiguous or inconsistent things about terrorism and recognition of Israel; and second, that some groups undertook actions that Arafat should have condemned and disciplined. The fact that Arafat did not take action in either case is regrettable, but it is not a sufficient reason to break off the dialogue.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize the complexity of dealing with these issues and the apparent inconsistencies between what Arafat says on behalf of the PLO as an organization, and what individuals or groups do that seem to violate the commitments. We have tried to call this the way we see it and to point out to the PLO in Tunis that it should exercise control over what its constituent factions do and say.

The administration scrutinizes carefully every allegation of involvement in terrorism by a PLO constituent group. We take up these questions directly with the PLO in Tunis. We seek and analyze all information provided to us by Israel or any other source. We listen carefully to what Israeli officials say, for example, the repeated statements by senior IDF officers to the effect that Fatah has not engaged in cross-border terrorism from Lebanon since 1988. We check our own intelligence carefully. We do not seek to cover up PLO behavior in the service of an over-riding policy objective. We maintain a high standard for assessing what has happened, a standard which often differs from that used by others.

The bottom line in this complex environment is that, while there have been questionable incidents noted in the report, we do not have conclusive evidence to indicate PLO violations of its commitments. And the Israeli government has not provided conclusive evidence to support its assertion that the PLO has continued to engage in terrorism against civilians. As a result of these factors, the administration has adopted the position of PLO compliance -- a position which is constantly reviewed.

Mr. Chairman, I am not here today to deliver a brief on behalf of the PLO or to act as its apologist. Indeed, the PLO has much to do to bolster its stated peaceful intentions. In the final analysis, what matters most is not whether the PLO passes muster with the United States but how it is perceived by Israelis and Palestinians. I have come before this Committee to put into perspective a complex aspect of policy and analysis -- namely, what the PLO committed to do; what the PLO has done; and what the U.S. has accomplished in its dialogue with the PLO. I hope this statement clarifies the record. I will be pleased to respond to the Committee's questions.

(Begin Q AND A)*

REP. HAMILTON* Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. And we will proceed here under the five-minute rule. Of course, the thing that's obvious to all of us is that there's a very great gap between what you have testified to on behalf of the administration, as you say, the bottom line, we do not have conclusive evidence to indicate PLO violations of its commitments; and one of those commitments was, as you have testified, that they totally, absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism. On the other hand, the position of the government of Israel, which insists that the PLO does indeed continue to engage in terrorism. Might the gap be partly explained in the perceptions of the United States and Israel here because of the way in which you define on the one hand "terrorism" and on the other hand "PLO"?

MR. KELLY* I think those are both relevant points. Our definition of terrorism, which we've had for 21 years and have not changed, is rather short. And it might be useful for the purposes of this discussion if I read it into the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* Yes, of course.

MR. KELLY* We consider terrorism to be premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

REP. HAMILTON* Now, is it your understanding that that is also the definition of the government of Israel?

MR. KELLY* I do not believe that it is, sir.

REP. HAMILTON* Do you know in what respects it differs?

MR. KELLY* I think different Israeli commentators have expressed different views, but one would, I believe, be a difference on the matter of non-combatant targets versus combatant targets.

REP. HAMILTON* Under your definition of terrorism, is it accurate that any incident in which clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli military occurred would not be classified as terrorism, even if the intention of the terrorists might have been civilian targets? If the clash were between Palestinians on the one hand, Israeli military on the other, that would not be classified as terrorism even if the intention of the terrorists were civilian targets?

MR. KELLY* Mr. Chairman, in every case we would judge the information on a specific incident before we rendered a specific decision and I think in regard to your points, something that the Israeli Defense Minister Mr. Rabin has said is relevant. This is brief and let me quote him. "Any attempt to equate the intifada with terrorism is wrong and misleading. The uprising in the territories could only be considered terrorism if the Palestinians were organized in armed terrorist squads equipped with Kalashnikov rifles, hand grenades and explosives, and the use of these weapons had become the most important element in the activity against us. Stoning and roadblocks account for 85 to 98 percent of all incidents, and 60 to 65 percent of the stonings are perpetrated by children younger than 12 years old," end

of the quotation from the Israeli Defense Minister.

Now, my point in bringing that up is that there are many Israeli politicians and commentators who would argue that the intifada, assaults against Israeli defense forces in the Occupied Territories are terrorism. I have just quoted the Defense Minister of Israel -- or the former I should say since the fall of the government of Israel on that point to indicate to you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this committee, that there are a wide divergence of views on what is terrorism both internationally and within Israel itself.

REP. HAMILTON* In your view can the PLO retain the right to go after military targets and still comply with the commitments to renounce terrorism?

MR. KELLY* I don't want to give a blanket green light to any sort of armed acts. I would say that we would examine the circumstances of any such action.

REP. HAMILTON* But your definition clearly identifies non-combatant targets, and that's what I am trying to clarify. And the way I then would read that is that the PLO, even with its renunciation would have the right to go after military targets and still be in compliance with its commitment.

MR. KELLY* I don't want to say that because I can certainly envision terrorist attacks against military targets, we have experienced them ourselves, Mr. Chairman, and I can certainly envision the Israelis experienced them. So, I would have to say that we would judge each incident on a case by case basis.

REP. HAMILTON* All right.

REP. GILMAN* Would the gentleman yield?

This definition, if a PLO group were to attack one of our military targets that would not be a terrorist operation?

MR. KELLY* No, I said I don't want to rule out that kind of thing, we'd have to look at the incident, but certainly --

REP. GILMAN* Under your definition it doesn't -- would you repeat your definition again?

MR. KELLY* Yes, I would. We consider terrorism to be premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

REP. GILMAN* So, if a terrorist attack was made on one of military installations, according to that definition it's not a terrorist thing.

MR. KELLY* This has been the US definition for 21 years --

REP. GILMAN* Well, do you --

MR. KELLY* -- sir, and I believe that the rule of common sense would

have to apply that you judge each incident on what happens to it.

REP. GILMAN* Well, would the rule of common sense then say that that's a terrorist act if a group were to shoot a missile into one of our air bases?

MR. KELLY* Let me give you a personal example, Congressman --

REP. GILMAN* Just -- I'm asking you, Mr. Kelly, would that be a terrorist act?

MR. KELLY* I'm sorry, which?

REP. GILMAN* If a group were to shoot -- fire a missile at one of our air bases, is that a terrorist act or isn't it?

MR. KELLY* I think it would depend on what happened in the incident. I think you're probably right, but let me give you an example from --

REP. GILMAN* Would depend on what, Mr. Kelly? I am asking you a simple question. A group fires a missile at one of our air bases, kills some our military personnel. According to your definition that's not a terrorist act?

MR. KELLY* Congressman --

REP. GILMAN* I don't understand, frankly this definition, and if it is a definition that's been on the books it sounds to me like it's outmoded and I certainly adopt your definition -- your analysis that it doesn't make common sense. But go ahead, I am sorry to interrupt you.

MR. KELLY* Well, the one point I wanted to make from personal experience was that while I was in Beirut I was ambushed by a group of armed men who shot a lot of bullets at me. They tried to kill me. According to the State Department's definition of terrorism, it was not a terrorist act.

REP. GILMAN* Well, there's something radically wrong with that definition, then. If the State Department is --

REP. LANTOS* Did you think -- did you think this wasn't a terrorist act?

REP. GILMAN* I did.

REP. LANTOS* Okay, good, that's the question.

REP. GILMAN* But, my point is this, they argued that it was not a premeditated act. I guess it wasn't. And, you know, in other words, there's examination of each incident.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Secretary, the confusion here is your response to the question I put and the question that Mr. Gilman put as you compare it with your definition.

Your definition clearly says, that the target must be a

non-combattant. The examples which Mr. Gilman and I have put to you clearly say that the target is military. And yet, you refuse to put that in a category of non-terrorist action. Even though your definition would, it seems to me, require that it be put in that category.

MR. KELLY* In the State Department's annual report on terrorism incidents around the world, where they list and give this definition of terrorism, Mr. Chairman, as they have -- as the US government has for 21 years -- they also note that there is no one definition of terrorism which has gained universal acceptance, or which answers -- I -- these are my languages -- which addresses or answers every case.

REP. HAMILTON* I understand that, but you have given us the definition of this administration, and, according to your testimony, previous administrations, with respect to what is a terrorist incident. And I'm having some difficulty understanding your definition as applied to certain facts --

MR. KELLY* All right, let me try --

REP. HAMILTON* -- Let me -- let me go at it again. Can the PLO retain the right to go after a military target, strictly a military target, and still comply with its commitment to renounce terrorism?

MR. KELLY* Mr. Chairman, I don't --

REP. HAMILTON* Under your definition of terrorism --

MR. KELLY* I do not want to give a blanket green light to any sort of violent acts.

REP. HAMILTON* Well, why don't you defend -- why don't you define terrorism more broadly then?

MR. KELLY* Well, this definition is not a straitjacket. As I said, there has to be a rule of common sense. For instance, let me give you an example. A member of an armed force sitting in a movie theatre in which a bomb goes off. Anybody with common sense would say that putting a bomb in a movie theater is a terrorist act. Even if --

REP. HAMILTON* But it would not be under your definition, would it? Your definition then doesn't qualify for common sense, it seems to me. (Aside to colleague) -- what?

Well, let's go on to another point. I want to ask, if I may have the indulgence of my colleagues, when Mr. Arafat said, "We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism including individual group and state terrorism," the question is in my mind, who is "we?" Now, we all know that the PLO is a complicated organization. Who is "we?" And at that time that statement was made, did we ask Mr. Arafat who is "we?"

MR. KELLY* No, Mr. Chairman, we did not ask Arafat. The administration interpreted the "we" to mean the PLO executive committee.

REP. HAMILTON* That is, the PLO executive committee of 15 people,

approximately 15 people.

MR. KELLY* Yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* And that is not Fatah, right?

MR. KELLY* No, it is not Fatah. It is -- it is -- it varies --

REP. HAMILTON* So, in order -- in order then to find a violation here, you would have to have evidence of the executive committee of the PLO being directly involved in the incident of terrorism. Is that correct?

MR. KELLY* No, sir.

REP. HAMILTON* All right. Explain it to me then.

MR. KELLY* All right. To say that we would have to have evidence of involvement of the PLO executive committee would create a loophole big enough to drive a truck through. So, we wouldn't want to limit that. We evaluate --

REP. HAMILTON* Well, okay, now -- all right --

MR. KELLY* -- each incident.

REP. HAMILTON* Excuse me -- go ahead.

MR. KELLY* We evaluate each incident and try to look at the best evidence and intelligence available to make a determination of who was involved.

REP. HAMILTON* But, the "we" in your judgment, if it is confined only to the executive committee, then it's a very, very limited renunciation because you are talking about 15 people.

MR. KELLY* Well, our interpretation was that -- is that -- as that the executive committee is the senior leadership of the PLO organization, that in the broad sense it would include most of the elements of the PLO, but the administration --

REP. HAMILTON* If the Fatah commits an element -- an incident of terrorism, does that violate the commitment?

MR. KELLY* If Fatah did?

REP. HAMILTON* Yes.

MR. KELLY* Broadly speaking, yes. But we would have to look at the details of the incident.

REP. HAMILTON* What do you mean, broadly speaking?

MR. KELLY* Because, Mr. Chairman, each incident has to be evaluated on the best evidence available to draw a judgment.

REP. HAMILTON* If the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, head by Mr. Habash, commits an act of terrorism, is that a violation?

MR. KELLY* One would look at who committed the act, whether they represent the leadership elements or whether they represent dissident elements. There are elements within the PLO and within its component organizations who disagree with Arafat's decision to accept the conditions.

REP. HAMILTON* And they're not included in the "we" --

MR. KELLY* No --

REP. HAMILTON* -- of the commitment. That -- you're referring there to the Palestinian dissident groups largely, are you not?

MR. KELLY* We are referring to people who could belong to PLO affiliated organizations but who are opposed to the decision by the leadership to recognize Israel, to accept 242 and 338. In other words, we are talking about an umbrella organization with perhaps 12,000 to 14,000 members.

REP. HAMILTON* I understand, but there are certain -- under your classifications by the administration, by the Central Intelligence Agency, you have a certain number of groups that are identified as Palestinian dissident groups. I am assuming that those dissident groups do not come under the "we". Is that a correct assumption?

MR. KELLY* I think that's a fair statement.

REP. HAMILTON* Now, there are another number of groups that you identify as PLO member groups. They include Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Liberation Front, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Communist Party. Those groups are included in the commitment, is that correct?

MR. KELLY* I think that's right, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON* In general.

MR. KELLY* Mm-hmm.

REP. HAMILTON* Okay. I've taken too much time here. Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN* Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* I apologize to my colleagues.

REP. GILMAN* Oh, I think we all welcome that opportunity to dig into these important issues, Mr. Chairman.

Now, I'm appalled, Mr. Kelly, by this loose definition of terrorism. Who adopted this definition? I understand that there is no universal acceptance for a definition of terrorism. But how is it that we are using this antiquated, obviously certainly not a timely definition of terrorism? Who adopted it? Where did this come from? Where is it set forth in the statute books? Whose definition is it?

MR. KELLY* It is a definition, Congressman, adopted 21 years ago in the Executive Branch --

REP. GILMAN* By -- is there a --

MR. KELLY* I am not aware of whether or not it exists in the statute books or not.

REP. GILMAN* But you say --

REP. LANTOS* Will the gentleman yield?

REP. GILMAN* I'd be pleased to yield to the gentleman.

REP. LANTOS* Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY* Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS* Some time ago in the Executive Branch a definition was adopted which said that the government in Taiwan is the government of China. Some of us, at that time, said that that's an insane and absurd definition because the government in Taiwan was palpably not the government in China. And people kept repeating as a mantra as you are repeating, that this definition was adopted X years ago.

Well there comes a time when even the State Department needs to open its eyes to reality. We don't want to hear anymore that we have had this idiotic definition for 21 years.

We had the definition that Taipei is the government of China for many years. And lots of rational people, myself included, said that is not the case. And then, at a moment of revelation, the State Department decided that the government of China is the government of China and not the government of Taiwan. So if all of us are as palpably appalled by your repetition of the mantra that we have had this for 21 years, please open your mind to the possibility that this definition simply is absurd and it is in need of change.

Thank you.

REP. GILMAN* I thank the gentleman. And I certainly join in that request. And I would hope that the Department would take a good look at redefining what terrorism is based on the acts of violence that have been occurring not only in the Middle East but throughout the world and against some of our own military people. I wonder why we have an anti-terrorism office in the Pentagon if terrorism against military can't be classified as terrorism. It just doesn't make any sense, as you said before. And common sense should apply and common sense should redefine this definition that's so antiquated.

The State Department's most recent report entitled, "Patterns of Global Terrorism" says that the US considers all PLO groups, including Al-Fatah, Force 17, Hawari, PLF, Abu Abbas' group, and PFLP, bound by Arafat's renunciation of terrorism. And then the State Department's "PLO Commitments and Compliance Report" concludes there have been four terrorist attacks against Israel committed by the PFLP. And yet you say that the PLO is adhering to its commitments.

How do we reconcile these conflicting State Department positions, Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY* The way we reconcile them, Congressman, is that in the matter of the attacks involving the PFLP, we believe that based on the best evidence that we have that those were not attacks that were planned, ordained, designed or commissioned by any of the PLO leadership but by members of that organization who would disagree with the statements of the PLO that it was renouncing terrorism. In other words, those are people who disagree with the leadership.

REP. GILMAN* It's a pretty vague and a far-fetched defense of that kind of an act.

MR. KELLY* No, I -- in an organization with 12 or 14,000 people, there are bound to be individuals who may not agree with the decision and will take violent acts that would undermine the decision by the leadership.

REP. GILMAN* Well --

MR. KELLY* And to allow them --

REP. GILMAN* But your departments says it, PFLP is bound by Arafat's renunciation of terrorism. Is that a correct statement, or isn't it?

MR. KELLY* It is.

REP. GILMAN* Well then, how do you account for now saying that there may be a few who don't agree with all of that.

MR. KELLY* Well, we said in December 1988 that we acknowledge that there would be members who were probably beyond the control of the organization.

REP. GILMAN* Then Mr. Arafat doesn't control his various groups under his wing that is alleged to be part of his compliance agreement?

MR. KELLY* I beg your -- I'm sorry, sir?

REP. GILMAN* Then what you're saying is Mr. Arafat cannot contend that there's going to be compliance because there's bound to be some people that disagree with him, even in that Executive Committee group that the Chairman referred to. Is that what you're now telling us?

MR. KELLY* I'm certainly saying, as we noted in December '88, that he will not have the ability to control every member of those organizations.

REP. GILMAN* So, whenever there's an act, then, that's an aberration. It's not something that is purpose --

MR. KELLY* No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying we examine every act and try to make a -- and make a determination on who was involved and what was involved and what implications should --

REP. GILMAN* All right, then what is the standards you employ in evaluating whether particular actions are authorized or approved by the PLO Executive Council, or by Mr. Arafat personally? What standards, what criteria, are you using?

MR. KELLY* Well, we use the intelligence and the information that is available to us in each case.

REP. GILMAN* And what are the criteria? I recognize what you use, but what is the criteria that you would apply as to whether or not this is an authorized act?

MR. KELLY* Well, if we had information that indicated, for instance, that an element of the PLO, like Fatah, was involved in committing the act and that there were orders from the leadership to do it, we would draw the conclusion that they had violated the statement they made in December 1988.

REP. GILMAN* Have you found, since 1988, that there were any orders coming out of the Arafat headquarters that condoned a terrorist act?

MR. KELLY* Not to my recollection, no.

REP. GILMAN* I see that my time is running -- I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might have some additional questions later on.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Lantos.

REP. LANTOS* Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelly, if the subject were not as serious as it is, this would be the best comedy show in town. And -- and I regret it because the subject is serious. Alice in Wonderland is a scientific research document compared to your testimony, with all due respect.

So, let me pursue some of the issues that our distinguished Chairman tried unsuccessfully to get an answer to.

The question the Chairman asked is, if there is an attempt by a terrorist group to attack a purely civilian target like a kindergarten, which you would agree -- does the State Department definition of civilian targets include kindergartens?

MR. KELLY* Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS* I couldn't hear you.

MR. KELLY* Yes.

REP. LANTOS* I just want to be sure we are using the same definition. So, we have now defined a kindegarten as a civilian target. Let's assume that a terrorist group has a premeditaed plan, as in fact several PLO terrorist groups have had over the years, as you well know -- do you, Mr. Kelly? Are you aware of attacks at children's homes by terrorist groups in Israel?

MR. KELLY* I am.

REP. LANTOS* So, this is not a fancy -- example. If a terrorist group has a premeditated plan to attack a kindergarten, and Israeli troops prevent this outrage from unfolding -- (pause) -- they intercept the terrorist group and prevent the terrorist groups from machine gunning children, under your definition, clearly this is not a terrorist attack because the children were not killed. Now, no one in his right mind can truly believe that this is a rational definition of terrorism by the major democratic nation on the face of this planet.

Well, let me give you a purely military example. Our distinguished Chairman, and I, and a couple of other colleagues visited our troops at Beirut Airport just shortly before they were blown up. Now there was no kindergarten there, there were just American soldiers and they were all killed. Was that a terrorist attack in your judgment, Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY* Yes, indeed.

REP. LANTOS* Well, isn't it time then, as a responsible official in the State Department that you advocate the changing of this idiotic definition rather than keep repeating it? Isn't it obvious to everybody who has eyes and who has ears that there is a series of terrorist attacks which the State Department attempts to sweep under the rug?

Let me give you a quote from your report. Since December '88 you say "There have been almost 30 mortar and rocket attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel, at least nine of which have involved constituents' groups of the PLO."

"In most cases" -- follow me closely now; I'm quoting your report -- "the intended target of the attack was unclear." Well, was the attempted -- the intended target -- of the attack the Vienna Boys' Choir? Was the intended target of the attack the Bolshoi Ballet? Was it the Congressional Women's Caucus?

No, the intended target were (sic) were targets within Israel -- children and women and communities and kindergartens. Those were the intended targets. Those intended targets are clear to everybody except to the authors of this report. That is why I believe that this report is a shameless whitewash. And the ability by the Assistant Secretary to define terrorism, when our fight against terrorism is one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy, I find absolutely unbelievable.

We don't want you to make a judgment case-by-case because we don't trust your judgment. We want you to have criteria that rational people can apply without your judgment. Your judgment has proven flawed because palpably terrorist attacks -- you say "We don't know who the intended targets are." Well, who do you think the intended targets are?

Would you care to comment, Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY* In the three incidents that you cited, they were obviously targets within Israel. In one of the incidents --

REP. LANTOS* That's not what you say. You say "In the three

instances, civilians appear to be the target." Well, let me tell you why they didn't appear to be the target. This is what the PLO group that perpetrated the terrorist attacks against civilians said. I am quoting from their report.

"The so-called 'Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine' -- and it's about as democratic as the Kremlin was under Stalin -- "The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine has claimed responsibility for the operation. A spokesman for the Front said a fedayeen group from the intifada Martyrs' Unit had carried out Operation Holy Jerusalem Number 2 along the road leading to the Zionist settlement of Zarit (sp)."

Well, the "Zionist settlement of Zarit (sp)" is made up of children and women and farmers. So you don't have to see that "it appears to be an attack against a civilian target." They say so. They named a settlement. They named a place where the kindergarten is, but you haven't made up your mind as to whether that is a terrorist attack or not.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* The second bells have rung. The vote is on passage of the conference report for supplemental appropriation. The subcommittee will stand in recess.

(RECESS)

(FOLLOWING RECESS.)

REP. OWENS* (In progress) The Chairman has suggested that I proceed, Mr. Secretary, with my questioning in his absence.

I wanted to focus on the peace process and my understanding that -- my impression that the peace process is, of course -- my strong conviction the peace process is the thing that's important out of all this, and that the dialogue that this country established nearly two years ago -- a year and a half ago -- with the PLO was, of course, aimed at bringing the peace process into fruition.

And I would say that, from my impression, you are clearly evaluating the PLO-US dialogue on other criteria than just the meeting of those traditional three conditions which Mr. Arafat announced and which the PNC sustained. Is that true -- that you're evaluating its effectiveness based on other than its compliance with those three conditions?

MR. KELLY* Our response to the legislation requiring the compliance report defines it in terms of the conditions announced in December of 1988, and that is where our focus is -- in the report. We're very interested in progress on the peace process, as I know all the members of the committee are.

I would not take the position, Congressman, that progress in the peace process would justify our turning a blind eye to any acts of terrorism. So, while we're certainly intent on seeing the process move forward, and we think there was progress in the last year, that

in no way could be a justification for this administration to ignore acts of terrorism.

REP. OWENS* I appreciate that and can certainly sustain and agree with that. Have you felt that the PLO dialogue has been helpful in pushing the peace process along?

MR. KELLY* We believe that it has, Congressman, in terms of helping focus speeches and rhetoric and attention and political activity in the Middle East on a negotiation process. The target that we've been working on has been implementation of the Israeli government's proposal of last May which could bring about talks between Israeli and Palestinian representatives in Cairo.

Now, the Israeli government in no way wants to get into a negotiation with the PLO. What the Israeli proposal did envision were talks with representatives from the Occupied Territories -- Palestinians. And I think that our dialogue with the PLO has been helpful in pushing back unproductive ideas like an international conference, and has been helpful in convincing the PLO that participation by Palestinians from the Occupied Territories in the Cairo talks are in their interest.

REP. OWENS* The -- can you give us specific examples of activity or conversations which in essence led -- for example, I was very impressed with the fact that Mubarak supposedly talked the PLO into basically staying the heck out of these negotiations which we thought were very close to starting several months ago. Would that have been a result, in essence? And can you give us some confirmation of whether it was?

MR. KELLY* I think the Egyptian role, as you mentioned Congressman, and the role of President Mubarak has been tremendously constructive. President Mubarak, the Egyptians, and other moderate Arab governments were among those who urged the PLO in 1988 to take the steps that it did in terms of recognizing Israel, recognizing the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 and renouncing terrorism.

And the Egyptians have maintained their activity throughout the process and have been very instrumental, I think, in weighing in with the PLO on -- on the side of moderation.

REP. OWENS* Thank you. I wanted to recite a statement by Ha'aretz's veteran defense correspondent, Zeev Schiff, who recently in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote the following, "Israel and the PLO must eventually come to an understanding. The search for an alternative to the PLO will, at best, lead to a partial agreement and, at worst, become a political time-bomb. Rather than striving for a substitute to the PLO, Israel must seek to change that organization."

Do you think that it's possible, in essence, for the Israelis to influence or change the PLO? And -- or is it -- and is that more realistic than trying to exclude it from any conversations?

MR. KELLY* I think that progress on the peace process, as the President remarked two days ago, can have a genuinely productive effect and a calming effect on the passions in the Middle East. The

PLO did change its policies in 1988 when it decided to recognize -- to support the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, and when it decided to recognize the existence of Israel.

And I think there's room for further alteration in their policies. So, I think movement in that direction, and realization of the Israeli government plan, and initiation of a dialogue in Cairo between Israelis and Palestinians could only prove beneficial for that result.

REP. OWENS* Do you think that -- do you think a different approach on the part of the Israelis would have greater impact on the PLO?

MR. KELLY* Well, we believe that if we can get to the dialogue in Cairo between Israelis and Palestinians, that it's bound to have a positive effect throughout the region on the attitudes of the political movements.

REP. OWENS* I've used my five minutes, we'll come back later. I -- the gentleman from California, I guess, is next.

REP. LANTOS* Mr. Chairman?

REP. HAMILTON* Yes, Mr. Lantos?

REP. LANTOS* The Secretary didn't get a chance to respond to my questions because the bells interrupted --

REP. HAMILTON* Oh, I -- all right.

REP. LANTOS* -- and I'd be grateful if you --

REP. HAMILTON* All right, I'll return -- we'll then return to the other gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos.

(To Mr. Kelly.) Do you recall his questions?

MR. KELLY* I'm sorry --

REP. HAMILTON* Why don't you go ahead, Tom.

REP. LANTOS* Well, I raised a number of questions, Mr. Secretary, and time ran out because the bells rang and I'd be grateful if you'd respond to them.

MR. KELLY* Yes, Mr. Lantos, I believe that when you were concluding, you read a statement from a spokesman for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, am I correct in that?

REP. LANTOS* I was reading from your report -- the Department of State report -- appearing on page 2 of the report, paragraph 4. (Pauses.) (quotes segments of the following.) The report says the DFLP has claimed responsibility for the operation. A spokesman for the Front said the fedayiin group from the, et cetera, unit carried out the operation along the road leading to the Zionist settlement of Zarit (sp). A spokesman said a big battle took place between the fedayiin and the occupation troops leaving four members of the unit martyred. The spokesman added that Israeli helicopters landed at the scene of the battle to evacuate the casualties among the Israeli

soldiers.

Now, this is on page 2 of the State Department Report. It's very clear to me. My question is, is it clear to you?

MR. KELLY* Our interpretation of this incident of March 2nd in which these five guerrillas were intercepted in --

REP. LANTOS* On their way to a civilian settlement.

MR. KELLY* I think that's right -- Zarit, as you mentioned.

REP. LANTOS* Well, was there a terrorist act?

MR. KELLY* I believe it was, yes.

REP. LANTOS* Well -- well --

REP. ACKERMAN* (Off mike) -- will the gentleman yield --

REP. LANTOS* -- let me -- I'll be happy to yield.

REP. SMITH* -- thank you. Why is that not listed in your report if that was a terrorist attack? I see nine things -- I see nine things listed, but this act of terrorism is not among them. Or can you find a definition that would not preclude it?

(Long pause.)

MR. KELLY* Congressman, I'm advised, this was an ex post facto assertion by the DFLP, and that the information available --

REP. LANTOS* Well, that's good enough for me, that after the terrorist attack they claimed responsibility for it. The CIA puts out this chart saying Palestinian organizations. On the left it says, "PLO member groups" -- this is one of the PLO member groups. This PLO member group claims that its terrorists were on their way to a civilian settlement, presumably not to play chamber music, and on their way to the settlement, they are intercepted and killed. Isn't that a terrorist act? Explain to me under what definition this is not a terrorist act. That's my question, Mr. Kelly.

MR. KELLY* The assertion by the DLFP was that they were heading for a settlement, which would imply a non-combatant target --

REP. LANTOS* That's right.

MR. KELLY* -- which would imply to me, based on that assertion alone, that it was an attempted terrorist attack. The people who evaluated the incident determined that based on the available evidence, the target was unclear. I guess anybody --

REP. LANTOS* Well, unless they are deranged the target is not unclear. They were headed in that direction and their statement claims that they were headed in that direction, and they were killed on their way to that civilian settlement. So, why was it unclear?

MR. KELLY* The group was intercepted in South Lebanon. They had a fight with the Israelis and were killed. Ex post facto there was an assertion that they were heading for that target. Now, in many of the incidents, there are assertions ex post facto which are not necessarily supported by the information available.

REP. LANTOS* Mr. Kelly, let me be sure I understand you. If they had claimed that they were trying to attack a military target, then you would say they have claimed that they were attacking a military target, which under your definition is not terrorism. Since they claimed that they were attacking a civilian target, you also don't believe them because that may just be a claim. Is that your position?

MR. KELLY* No. My position is that the incident was evaluated by the counterterrorism people in the government and this is the conclusion they reached.

REP. LANTOS* Yeah, but you are not here just parroting what nameless bureaucrats conclude. I don't know who are these people who concluded it, I am using my brain to analyze an incident for which the basic raw material is in your report. I am asking you to do the same. I am asking YOU (speaker emphasis) to conclude whether this is a terrorist incident or not.

MR. KELLY* I have to be guided by the weight of expert opinion that went into formulating this report, Congressman.

REP. LANTOS* Well, let me rephrase the question, Mr. Kelly. Do you agree that there was an attempted excursion by a terrorist group?

MR. KELLY* I am sorry?

REP. LANTOS* Do you agree that this incident in fact took place?

MR. KELLY* That these men were intercepted? Yes, indeed.

REP. LANTOS* And these were armed men?

MR. KELLY* Yes.

REP. LANTOS* Headed South?

MR. KELLY* I would assume, yes.

REP. LANTOS* Well, why don't you consult your experts? I am assuming that they were headed south and not headed north. So we are both assuming they were headed south. Now, they were headed south, presumably, for one of three reasons* one, to attack military posts; two, as they claim, to attack a specific civilian settlement; or three, to go to the ballgame. I mean, that's the third option. I don't think they were going to the ballgame, and I accept their statement that they were attacking a civilian settlement. They just didn't get that far.

Using your analytical faculties -- let's assume that all the experts disappeared now and you and I are just here analyzing it with God-given brains. Would you conclude that this is a terrorist attack?

MR. KELLY* On the basis of the public statement, not necessarily. I know that when there were attempts to kill me in Beirut, that various people claimed responsibility who had nothing to do with it. Over the years, there have been thousands of claims by would-be radical organizations for various attacks and incidents, some of which never happened, and others of which did. So, on the basis of an allegation, a claim alone, I think that's insufficient evidence.

REP. LANTOS* Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Levine.

And may I say -- Mr. Secretary, I've been informed you have to leave at 12:15, so I want to make sure we divide up the time among Mr. Levine and Mr. Smith and Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE* Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, you know, the fact of the matter is there is so much to get into here, and I appreciate both your thoughtfulness in ensuring that this hearing is scheduled and the Secretary's presence, and perhaps we may be able to further explore this at a time when the Secretary can spend a little longer with us.

Mr. Secretary, I must confess that in listening to your efforts to respond to the chairman, to the ranking member, to Mr. Lantos, I am very, very disappointed. I have a high regard for you. We've worked together. I know that you are a highly skilled diplomat for whom I have the highest regard, and I know that the committee does. There's a reason that you're having trouble answering these questions. There's a reason that you're consistently seeking input from staff. There's a reason that you're asking the people behind you to supply you with information. And that is that you're trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. You're trying to justify a conclusion that was achieved before the facts were in with facts that simply don't support it.

And we ought to at least be honest. The administration entered into this dialogue with some assurances to the American people, much more importantly to the people in the region, standards that would be held up to the PLO -- if we were going to maintain our credibility with the PLO, and promises that were made to the people of Israel that are extraordinarily important in terms of ensuring that we are able to move effectively toward a peace process.

Those standards included standards with regard to terror that simply have not been met and we should admit it. I for one am not calling for an end to the dialogue and I want to emphasize that to you. I do believe that if we -- I do believe that if we held the dialogue to the promises and the criteria that were established for it, we would have to end it. But rather than try to falsify a policy, falsify facts, and justify conclusions that simply are not supported by the facts, it would be a lot more honest, and candid, and open to say the PLO has not done what they said they were going to do instead of compromising our credibility, shredding our anti-terrorism policy, and causing the

Israeli people and the people in the region to lose confidence in the United States as a friend and as an ally.

Let me just -- it's hard to know where to begin with all of this, but let me just put it in context. (Laughs.)

Can I suspend, I am asked by the chief counsel, yield to one of my colleagues and then return? I have something to return to.

REP. HAMILTON* You may, indeed. Mr. Ackerman is next, I think he came in before Mr. Smith. Mr. Ackerman?

REP. ACKERMAN* Thank you very much. I am admittedly at least equally confused. I find this absolutely fascinating, it's hard to separate fact from fiction over here with what's going on and some of the things that are being said. And it is true, we have a tremendous amount of respect for you, Mr. Kelly, and the work that you have done, but you seem to be defending something that's rather indefensible. It's just a pack of lies.

One of the things that one of my colleagues had asked basically was, "Who is we," in the discussion of Mr. Arafat and some of his colleagues making assertions that they denounce terrorism. You do have a list of definitions and a list of all sorts of things, and have decided that we've gotten into this dialogue because indeed Mr. Arafat has renounced terrorism. Could you read us the list of terrorist acts that Mr. Arafat has denounced since we've entered into the dialogue?

MR. KELLY* I don't have such a list -- a comprehensive list with me, Congressman.

REP. ACKERMAN* Is there --

MR. KELLY* We can pull one together and submit it for the record.

REP. ACKERMAN* Is it an extensive list? Is there a reason why we don't have the list? I have never seen such a list, I've never heard of such a list, I've never heard of such a statement. If you could make one appear, I think I'd appreciate seeing it. You've read us a definition, and part of the reason for our consternation here is, you know, we're all professional politicians here. We've had experiences with obfuscating language and muddling the issue when we don't want to give a direct answer to something. But to cite that murders and killings and terrorizing don't go on, and just by definition rule them out of existence, is not in the minds of some the way to conduct foreign policy or to demonstrate what our position should be.

I consulted a dictionary. I used to be a teacher and that's what I did when I didn't understand what a word meant and I -- maybe I should have consulted the State Department but most people look in a dictionary. And I looked up terrorism, and it referred to "terror," an act of terror, and it said "a state of intense fear, or one that inspires fear, a frightening aspect, an appalling person or thing, an act of violence, as bomb throwing, committed by groups in order to undermine a population or government into granting their demands."

Now, I think that that's what most people think of when they think of

terrorism. They don't fall back on a 21-year old definition that the State Department once had. If time were to be the test, this dictionary by Mr. Webster dates back to 1898, this particular one. So, if we're going to go by precedent -- I don't want to submit the whole dictionary for the record, but perhaps we could send one over to the State Department and perhaps you could consult that and understand what most Americans and most of the civilized world understand terrorism to be really be.

But I have another concern that I'd like you to address. You said, and I'll quote it because I wrote it down, you said, "Israel has not demonstrated that the PLO has committed terrorism against civilians."

I'm concerned particularly about children, as are all of my colleagues. What about the terrorism that nobody is speaking about?

I've been over to Israel, I've been in the so-called Occupied Territories, and one of the things that I discovered, contrary to the media and everything that goes on at these hearings, there are grown-up people there, there are men there, there are women there, grown-up men and women, not just little children, that -- the only thing we see of Palestinians.

What about the terrorism that people commit by using their own children as pawns, as a public relations gimmick? Isn't that the cruelest form of terrorism of all, to send your own children out to taunt and tease and stone soldiers so that they would be used as bait, that once a frustration sets in to soldiers a few years older than them, and they feel threatened and fire upon? People who have their own children set up for killing? That's the vilest form of terrorism that I can think of -- just to turn the public relations page and to set themselves up as a people beset upon. The sacrificing -- I mean, is that a modest proposal? Is that what a civilized people do -- put their own children out in the trenches so that they don't have to do the things that were not successful when they tried to do them a little bit more militarily?

You cite a definition of the, of an Israeli official, of terrorism -- you have to carry a certain gun or throw a certain kind of grenade. That's not necessarily terrorism. The deliberate placing of one's -- I mean, the civilized world is trying to get peace so that our children can live in a better world. What about the terrorism of a whole group of people who are willing to sacrifice their kids for their own political agenda? That is terrorism against a civilian population.

In order to get this, as you said it, "usually intended to influence an audience" -- part of that definition you read -- imagine allowing your own children to be murdered to influence an audience. I don't see that kind of terrorism addressed in this report.

And maybe you could share some thoughts of your own on that, and I know that your thoughts don't necessarily coincide with that of the Department. You know -- if you aren't terrorized, I don't know what terrorism is. And to say it didn't happen because it isn't in the 21-year old definition -- well, you were terrorized. You knew it when you were terrorized. People don't run to the dictionary or to the

State Department for a definition, but they know what terrorism is and they know what it is to be terrorized.

And maybe you could talk about those kids that are being killed -- whose parents are putting them out there to be murdered. Maybe you could explain that. Maybe there's a definition to that -- how that is not terrorism. It's obscene.

MR. KELLY* Congressman, I'd make a couple of comments about your remarks.

The intifada, which you've been describing, a central feature of which have been children demonstrating against armed forces, I believe came about because of a profound dissatisfaction with the situation of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories. I believe the initiation of the uprising was spontaneous and was not planned by an outside force.

I believe that the Defense Minister of Israel has good credentials to speak to what is terrorism and what is not. I know that in preparing this report, we in the Department of State made a conscientious effort to evaluate these incidents and these issues.

We operate on the basis of principles in approaching this problem. And those principles include security for Israel, and political rights for the people of Palestine, and implementation of the appropriate United Nations resolutions, and a comprehensive settlement, which will be the only way that the problems that beset these nations and these peoples will be ended.

We try to be constant in our purpose. And our purpose is to try to help advance the cause of peace.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE* Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry that I had to race out. The chairman of the full committee was on the phone and it was a matter that required immediate response.

Mr. Secretary, the ultimate goal that you outlined is obviously all of our goal. And it's the fact that I believe the administration's actions are so counterproductive in terms of achieving this goal that I am as disturbed as I am.

Just to follow up the colloquy you had with my distinguished colleague from California, Mr. Lantos, it would seem to me that the obvious conclusion from that colloquy is, the only time that the State Department will come to the conclusion that there has been a terrorist attack, conclusively, is that if innocent Israeli blood is spilled.

Until that point in time you're going to be arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I mean the evidence is conclusive. As Mr. Lantos and you were discussing it, there was no other conclusion to be reached. And yet you refuse to reach the conclusion.

If this reflects administration policy, it is a sharp departure from

Reagan administration policy, and we should admit it. The Bush administration's Middle East policy has sharply departed from Reagan administration policy from top to bottom, including on the issue of terrorism.

And the only result that we can conclude from that colloquy is that the only time you will conclude a terrorist attack has happened in your official capacity is when innocent Israeli blood is spilled. It's a sad and it's a tragic commentary.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, whether the PLO has ever thus far dissociated itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group since the dialogue has begun or sought to expel those involved in terror from the PLO umbrella?

MR. KELLY* You've asked two questions, I believe, Congressman, dealing with both a disavowal of terrorism and expulsion, have you not?

REP. LEVINE* That's correct -- that's correct.

MR. KELLY* There have been disavowals by members of the PLO executive committee. There have been no expulsions that I know of.

REP. LEVINE* Could you submit to the Committee the disavowals, please?

MR. KELLY* Yes, I'd be happy to.

REP. LEVINE* Has Arafat disavowed the terrorist acts?

MR. KELLY* He has deplored them. He has criticized them on occasion.

REP. LEVINE* Did Arafat criticize the terrorist act with the Israeli bus on the highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem?

MR. KELLY* I'd like to submit that for that record.

REP. LEVINE* Well, it would be helpful, Mr. Secretary, if you would. It's very unfortunate that it doesn't come to mind that he has. And I think that, in and of itself, is instructive.

It is -- I do not recall that he has, and it has been suggested to me that he has not. And it would seem to me that particularly in contrast to the immediate Israeli response to the deplorable and outrageous individual activity that recently occurred, it is astonishing that you cannot bring to this Committee in the context of a report talking about the PLO and terrorism disavowals from the top leadership of the PLO, an explicit terrorist activity causing the death of Israeli civilians.

I guess, Mr. Secretary, what concerns me the most is the context. And this is general administration policy here. Let's look at the region.

Iraq has threatened to gas half of Israel. Mr. Mubarak made a statement that I would very much appreciate an explanation from you on today. He was reported in the New York Times yesterday as saying that the flood of Soviet Jews to Israel threatened, quote, "to blow up the peace march and put the whole region on the verge of a new bloody

confrontation," end quote. This is the President of Egypt. An unbelievable statement, unbelievable statement.

We have the PLO threatening to escalate the uprising. We have an Arab summit meeting that will take place next week with the radical and rejectionist rhetoric flying. And we have the Bush administration doing nothing, nothing. The silence is deafening. I've raised these concerns privately with your department.

I've been told that Margaret Tutwiler has made the appropriate statements. But when we have criticism of Israel, it comes from the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. And yet, when all of these other states in the region and other terrorist groups in the region are pressing Israel, we get occasional mild comments from third-level spokesmen. This is a dramatic change in policy.

And what disturbs me the most is how negatively it's going to inevitably affect the peace process. You yourself have talked, and we agree with you, about the need to ensure that the peace process moves. That's our fondest hope. It's the most fervent goal that we all have. The Israeli people need to have the confidence that if they take risks for peace they'll be rewarded both by their adversaries and by assurances and guarantees that mean something from the United States.

I guess my questions in response to this are: what are we saying to the PLO with regard to the need for them to provide these assurances? Are we making it clear that any attempt to turn the UN session that's about to occur into a propaganda effort is totally unacceptable? And what specific actions is the Bush administration, the President, the Secretary and you, taking, Mr. Secretary, to reverse this process and provide some assurances to the key people who need to take risks for peace that those risks will be rewarded by movement toward peace?

MR. KELLY* Thank you. First, President Bush has spoken out on issues. President Bush commented when the President of Iraq made his assertion about the use of poison gas. So I would submit that the statement that the President and the administration have not spoken out on issues of equal concern is not a correct description.

We have throughout our dialogue with the PLO urged moderation, moderation in political positions, moderation in dealings with the events in the area. We have recently, and this week, urged moderation upon the PLO.

You referred, Congressman, to the forthcoming Arab summit meeting, and we have made approaches to the Arab governments which will be represented there, giving our views on these issues of concern. So, the administration has been active, it has been publicly on the record on these issues, and it has been privately engaged in diplomatic approaches to the PLO and to the range of Arab governments which will be meeting at the summit in a couple of days in Baghdad.

REP. LEVINE* Mr. Chairman, I know that my time is up. Just in conclusion, can I ask one yes or no question? And that is: Did President Bush, when he spoke to President Mubarek yesterday, express

his outrage to President Mubarek over President Mubarek's statement with regard to Soviet Jews?

MR. KELLY* I have not seen the record of the conversation.

REP. LEVINE* Could you find out and let us know? Thank you.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Smith.

I want to say to my colleagues that are here, some of whom have just come in, that the Secretary has to leave very shortly, as I understand it, and we're tight on time.

Mr. Smith.

REP. LAWRENCE J. SMITH (D-FL)* Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelly, I certainly, as you would well imagine, agree with most of my colleagues in their characterizations of the very significantly deficient terrorism definition that you seem to want to apply, because it's 21 years old and the State Department has yet to update it. It doesn't make any sense. It doesn't cover anything except the capability to avoid declaring terrorist activities because the definition is so broad. But let me ask you some specific questions.

The State Department's most recent Patterns of Global Terrorism report states, quote* "The US considers all PLO groups, including Al Fatah, 417, Hawari, PLF -- which is Abu Abbas -- and PFLP, bound by Arafat's renunciation of terrorism." Is that a correct statement of the --

MR. KELLY* It sounds correct to me.

REP. SMITH* Okay. The State Department's PLO Commitments and Compliance Report, which we're here discussing, concludes there have been four terrorist activities -- attacks against Israel committed by the PFLP.

According to the CRS the PLO executive committee consists of six groups, Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine or the DFLP, Arab Liberation Front, Palestinian Communist Party, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine which is the PFLP, Habash, and the Popular Liberation Front, PLF, which is headed by Abu Abbas.

In the compliance report on page one, there are three separate incidents listed: 2/25/89, PLF, slash, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, armed infiltration attempt; 2/23/89, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DFLP, attempted attack on targets in Israel; 3/2/89, DFLP armed infiltration attempt; those three are described in newspapers as February 5th, '89, five gunmen, four from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which we have agreed is on the list of organizations which are under the umbrella of the PLO, and one from the PLF were killed by Israeli troops inside the security zone. Maps, leaflets and other materials found on the bodies of the terrorists indicated their intention to infiltrate Israel, carry out a terrorist attack.

February 23, '89, three gunmen from the Democratic Front for the

Liberation of Palestine, covered under the definition, were killed by the South Lebanon Army in Southern Lebanon. Documents found on the terrorists indicated their intention to attack the civilian settlement of Zarit -- you discussed that with Mr. Lantos.

Three-two-'89, four gunmen from the DFLP were killed by Israeli troops in South Lebanon. Documents found on the terrorists indicated their intention to attack Zarit. All of these are substantiated in terms of newspaper accounts and other accounts, and you have not denied that any of those accounts were correct.

You have made a distinction that those were not terrorist attacks, as I can understand it and one of my colleagues characterize it, and I hope you will allow us to be corrected if we are wrong, on the grounds that no Israelis died, that no one actually reached their target. What would it take -- what would it take for you to declare that any one of those terrorist attacks was a terrorist attack? That any one of those three armed incursions by

members of a group which you in the State Department identify as being controlled by Yasser Arafat, therefore covered by his November of 1988 statements in Geneva -- what would it take for the State Department to declare any of those a terrorist attack, beyond that which you know already?

MR. KELLY* You've raised a number of points. One, as in I've indicated earlier, we do not believe and we acknowledged in December 1988 that the PLO can exercise control over all of its 12 (thousand) or 14,000 members of the affiliated groups. What --

REP. SMITH* Then you've already vitiated the capability to hold Yasser Arafat to any of the statements that he made by in advance giving him the ability to tell you, because you've already decided that he can't control his own people -- all he has to do is say, "It wasn't me personally," and you have vitiated any capability to place blame on the PLO for any terrorist attack. Is that not correct?

MR. KELLY* No, that is not correct, because we evaluate each such incident based on the intelligence that we have, the information we have. We go beyond statements that individuals may or may not make, and we try to look at the hard data of what's available. And that's what we make our judgments on.

REP. SMITH* On these three, the judgments you made were that they were not terrorist attacks?

MR. KELLY* I'm sorry, which three are -- to which three are you referring?

REP. SMITH* February 5, 1989 -- I'm -- yes -- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 2/23/89 -- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 3/2/89 -- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Three listed on the first page as numbers 4, 5 and 7. The group is covered under his umbrella. The documentation is there about what happened. There is no argument that they were going south into Israel. The documentation carried on the persons of the people killed

or captured showed that they were going to attack targets inside Israel. And you have refused to acknowledge that any of these are terrorist attacks, and they've refused to attach any responsibility to Yassir Arafat or to the PLO.

And I'm asking you, what would it take for you, therefore, to do so? A dead body?

MR. KELLY* I think, Congressman, you're in error, because on the next page it says we have raised the three incidents with the PLO through our dialogue in Tunis.

REP. SMITH* Well, then let me ask you a question. You've raised them as to what? Asking for an explanation? Why would you raise them unless you asked him whether he had done them or not? Did he reject those as having been perpetrated by any of, quote, "his people"?

MR. KELLY* Well, first of all, we don't talk to him directly, as you know. We talked to members of the PLO in Tunis. We raised those incidents because of our concern of the identification of PLO-affiliated entities involved in it.

REP. SMITH* And what was their response, pray tell?

MR. KELLY* On the specifics, I don't recall them -- you know -- offhand.

REP. SMITH* But they apparently explained it away enough that the State Department therefore refused to categorize it as a violation of the statements and the promises made by Yassir Arafat. Is that correct?

MR. KELLY* I do not remember the explicit three incidents, but I do know that when we've raised incidents of a similar tenor in Lebanon, the response has been that there are dissatisfied dissident elements in Lebanon who have not responded to the guidance to eliminate activities in terrorism, and that they may well have come from these kinds of individuals.

REP. SMITH* So then you're -- I appreciate -- and just let me say, Mr. Chairman, that your answer, therefore, is, when they deny responsibility, we believe them. But when they admit responsibility, we don't believe them. That's what you said before; that's what you're saying now; and that is the most irrational, illogical thing I've ever heard from a State Department official.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Smith, I apologize to you for intervening. The Chair's in a difficult position here. I know the Secretary has to leave. I have two members so I'm -- one of whom is a member of the subcommittee and the chairman of another subcommittee. I'll ask them just to make very brief comments or questions, and then we'll have you out of here, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH (R-NJ)* Mr. Chairman, I would ask that a number of questions that I would like to pose be posed directly to the Secretary, and for the record.

REP. HAMILTON* We will be submitting a number of questions to the Secretary for a written response --

REP. SMITH* Thank you.

REP. HAMILTON* -- and we'd be glad to receive them.

REP. SMITH (R-NJ)* I'll just ask one.

REP. HAMILTON* Okay, we'll receive any you have.

REP. SMITH* Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Pickering in Israel, back in 1988 said, and I quote, "In the event of a terrorist action by any element of the PLO, or one or more of its members, we expect that you not only condemn this action publicly but also discipline those responsible for it, at least by expelling them from the PLO."

I wonder if you can tell us, was this an expression of US policy at the time or really -- or just an expression of hope? And are there any examples, as far as you know, whereby the PLO has publicly disciplined those who have engaged themselves in terrorist actions, and expelled them or took other actions?

MR. KELLY* Congressman, as I've testified earlier, there are no expulsions of which we're aware.

The statement -- or the guidance -- that Ambassador Pickering used in December of 1988 was a list of expectations that the United States had for the dialogue. They were not set out as conditions. The only three conditions for the dialogue were acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, atance of the existence of the state of Israel and renunciation of terrorism. So what you refer to by Ambassador Pickering were expectations, not conditions.

REP. SMITH* But these expectations have not been realized?

MR. KELLY* That is true.

REP. SMITH* Thank you.

REP. HAMILTON* I apologize to the distinguished Subcommittee Chairman for getting to him so late.

Mr. Solarz.

REP. SOLARZ* Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. I know the hour is late. I'll try to be very, very brief.

Just a few questions. Mr. Secretary, as you understand the law, would the administration be entitled to maintain a dialogue with the PLO if a determination was made that the PLO continued to engage in acts of terrorism?

MR. KELLY* First of all, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe it's a matter of statute, but a matter of policy. But I could be wrong. At any rate --

REP. SOLARZ* Well, if it isn't a matter of law, is it a matter of policy?

MR. KELLY* Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SOLARZ* It is the administration's policy that if the PLO engages in acts of terrorism that the administration would suspend the dialogue?

MR. KELLY* That is correct, sir.

REP. SOLARZ* Now, does that policy -- is that policy based on a pattern of terrorism, a pattern of terrorist activity, or would a single act of terrorism by the PLO under our policy require a termination of the dialogue?

MR. KELLY* I think that the latter would be the case when the evidence was there.

REP. SOLARZ* Now if a group which is clearly a member of the PLO engages in an act of terrorism and that group is not expelled from the PLO, or in some other fashion disciplined, would we consider Mr. Arafat and the PLO to be responsible for that act of terrorism, thereby, under the policy as you've described it, requiring a termination of the dialogue?

MR. KELLY* No.

REP. SOLARZ* Well, if then -- how do -- if that is the case, if you're saying that even an organization which is a member of the PLO, even if such an organization should engage in acts of terrorism, in violation of stated PLO policy, but where the PLO does nothing to discipline or expell those groups, then what meaning does the policy have, because then Mr. Arafat could say, "I'm against terrorism, but I can't help it if somebody in the PLO commits an act of terrorism." Obviously he can't control everybody, but if he isn't held responsible for taking action against those who violate his instructions, then what significance is his own renunciation of terrorism?

MR. KELLY* You've raised several issues quite at the heart of the matter. As the administration -- the then administration acknowledged in December, 1988, and as you pointed out, Arafat cannot control all the 14 thousand individual members of groups affiliated with the PLO. The test would be, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the amount of information, credible information involving -- excuse me -- indicating involvement of the PLO leadership or people involved in leadership positions. In other words, if dissident elements who, in effect, disagree with the decisions of the PLO in 1988 --

REP. SOLARZ* If such dissident elements engage in acts of terrorism and we have no reason to believe that Arafat or other top leaders were complicit in the decision to commit that act of terrorism, but we also

had evidence that they had taken no steps subsequently to discipline them after the information about the act of terrorism came to their attention, what would be our conclusion under those circumstances?

MR. KELLY* Well, the question of expulsion, which you raise implicitly, as a matter of discipline was enunciated in December 1988 as an expectation and not a condition for the dialogue.

REP. SOLARZ* That expectation has not been met.

MR. KELLY* It has not been fulfilled. There have not been expulsions.

REP. SOLARZ* So if I understand, then, in conclusion, our policy as you've explained it, it is that we would only terminate the dialogue with the PLO if elements or individuals within the PLO commit acts of terrorism with the knowledge and, presumably, the approval of the top leadership of the PLO; but if elements of the PLO engage in acts of terrorism without the knowledge or approval of the leaders of the PLO, and the leaders of the PLO take no subsequent action to discipline them or to disavow them even though we would like them to disavow them or discipline them, the dialogue would continue.

MR. KELLY* To put it another way, we do not leave it to the most extreme member of any of the affiliated groups to have the power within his own hands to terminate the dialogue by committing an act.

REP. SOLARZ* No, of course not, but at the same time, if this condition or policy is going to have any meaning, we have to expect that the top leadership will act in ways consistent with their renunciation of terrorism. I mean, if the President of the United States renounced corruption but people in his Cabinet were found to be corrupt and the President said, "Well, it's -- you know, I didn't commit the act of corruption; he can stay in the Cabinet; I didn't know about it in advance," but he's still here and there's no effort to expel or discipline him, people would rightly conclude that the President's renunciation of corruption had no meaning.

So, if top people don't take steps to discipline or disavow those who engage in acts of terrorism even without their prior knowledge, then their renunciation of terrorism has no real meaning.

REP. HAMILTON* Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for your appearance this morning. And I know we're a little late getting you out, but as you can tell, members have had much, much interest in these hearings.

So we stand adjourned.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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אאא, חוזם: 22956
 אל: רהמש/1156
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 240590, חז: 1923, דח: ב, סג: סב,
 בבב
 סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: השגריר, וושינגטון
 דע: השגריר נאו'ס, השגריר, ג'נבה
 מ.ח. 503

הנדון: מועב'ט

הינך מתבקש לנקוט בשתי פעולות באופן מיידי:

א. שיחה פורמלית במחמ'ד בדרג בכיר לפי שיקולך, במגמה:

1. לנסות ולברר איזה פרטמטרים ארה'ב קובעת לעצמה לגבי הדיון ותוכן הצעת ההחלטה.

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3. להבהיר להם חד-משמעית את התנגדותנו להצבת כוח משקיפים מטעם האו'ם בשטחים, תוך התייחסות לדברי שה'ח בנושא במס'ע שערך היום אהה'צ בירושלים (התמליל יוברק בנפרד).

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ב. גיוס האירגונים היהודיים נגד הצבת כוח כזה. כמובן ניתן לספק ליהודים את הטיעונים המשפטיים הנ'ל, אך עם זאת ייתכן שיעדיפו לטעון מתוך הטיעון הבא:

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תהליך השלום - כאשר האו"ם כבר הביע את דעתו לגבי הפתרון
באמצעות החלטות העצרת ומועב'ט שאינן קבילות ואינן
מקובלות.

7. נשאלת שאלה רצינית לגבי התפקיד שכוח כזה יכול לשחק
בשטחים וכפי שמזכ'ל האו"ם כבר ציין בדו"ח שלו (5/19443)
מה-21.1.88 (ראהנא מברק היועץ המשפטי), כוח כזה אינו,
מסוגל למלא תפקיד משמעותי מסיבות שונות וביניהן הצורך
ההכרחי לזכות בשיתוף הפעולה של הכוח הכובש.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, @ (אמן),
בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל, ארבל2

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אאא, חוזם: 22956
 אל: רהמש/1156
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 בבב
 סודי ביותר/בהול

אחראי

אל: השגריר, וושינגטון
 דע: השגריר נאו'ם, השגריר, ג'נבה
 מ.ח. 503

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א.א.א. חו.ז.מ. 22956
אל:רהמש/1156
מ-:המשרד,תא:240590,חז:1923,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבב
סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: השגריר, וושינגטון
דע: השגריר נאו'ם, השגריר, ג'נבה
מ.ח. 503

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אאאא, חוזם: 22956

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אל: השגריר, וושינגטון
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2. להביע תקוותנו שלא יהיו צד פעיל בניסוח ההחלטה וגם שלא יפתיעו אותנו כפי שעשו בג'נבה בדצמבר 1988 (כאשר הודיעו על פתיחת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ מיידי לאחר מסה'ע של ערפאת) וכפי שעשו לא מכבר בקשר להצעת ההחלטה בדיון האחרון במועב'ט בנושא העליה - פירוש הדבר אנו מצפים שיחזיקו אותנו בתמונה בגנבה וגם בניו-יורק לכל אורך הדרך.

3. להבהיר להם חד-משמעית את התנגדותנו להצבת כוח משקיפים מטעם האו"ם בשטחים, תוך התייחסות לדברי שה'ח בנושא במס'ע שערך היום אחה"צ בירושלים (התמליל יוברק בנפרד).

4. לבקש שיטיילו ווטו על כל הצעת החלטה שתקרא להקמת ולהצבת כוח אומ'י כזה. (ראהנא הטיעונים המשפטיים בסוגיה זו המועברים ע"י היועץ המשפטי בנפרד).

ב. גיוס האירגונים היהודיים נגד הצבת כוח כזה. כמובן ניתן לספק ליהודים את הטיעונים המשפטיים הנ"ל, אך עם זאת ייתכן שיעדיפו לטעון מתוך הטיעון הבא:

1. לפי החוק הבינלאומי, ישראל אחראית לשמירת החוק והסדר בשטחים ולהגן על התושבים המקומיים.

2. יש בשיגור כוח משקיפים משום קבלת עמדת אש'פ שמזה שנים רבות חותר לנוכחות אומית בשטחים עד להעברתם לידי הפלסטינאים.


3. יש בשיגור כוח כזה משום השלכה על צורת הפתרון הקבוע בשטחים.


4. הצבת כוח כזה נוגדת יוזמת השלום הישראלית שארה"ב תומכת בה ומנסה לקדם.

5. אי לכך הצבת כוח כזה יפריע לתהליך השלום.

6. הצבת כוח כזה אינה אלא הכנסת מועב'ט והאו"ם בכלל לתוך

1. 10/10/89
 2. 10/10/89





אאאא, חוזם: 23371
 אל: רהמש/1200
 מ:-ווש, נר: 767, תא: 240590, חז: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סב,
 בבב
 סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : סמנכל צפא
 סמנכל אפאסוק

דע : לשכת מנכל

מאת: השגרירות, רושינגטון

אתיופיה

1. השגריר נפגש (24/5), לבקשתם, עם חברי הקונגרס ברטון, פרנק וולף, כריס סמית והסנטור המפרי, לדיון בנושא אתיופיה. במהלך הפגישה הקרינו קלטת וידאו, שצולמה על אנשי ארגון סעד אמריקאי במאסוה וסביבותיה ומתארת נפגעי המלחמה ובמיוחד ההרס והסבל הנגרם על פצצות מיצרר. במהלך הפגישה הגישו המכתב המועבר אליכם בנר 757.

2. הפגישה התנהלה באווירה קשה, תוך הרמת קול של המורשה וולף, כאשר המסרים המועברים בה ובמכתב ברורים. לפיכך, בהרנו להעביר הדיווח כפי שנרשם במהלך השיחה.

3. להלן מהלך השיחה:

דן ברטון - ביקשנו הפגישה משום שאנו ידידי ישראל וחוששים מתגובות של עמיתינו לידיעות על סיוע צבאי ישראלי לאתיופיה. מקורות מודיעיניים מהימנים מסרו שישיראל, בין שירות או כ-CONDUIT, מעבירה סיוע צבאי לאתיופיה כולל פצצות מיצרר. אם אכן זה המצב יהיו בעיות.

השגריר ארד - אין זה המצב. בדקנו חזור ובדוק ואני יכול לחזור ולאמר, כפי שאמר שהבט רבין בינואר האחרון בשיחתו עם מזכיר המדינה, שאיננו מספקים פצצות מיצרר לאתיופיה. ברטון - כל נשק שישראל מספקת יוצר בעייה מיוחדת. אם האריתריאים ינצחו ומנגיסטו יפול, מבין התמונה הגיאופוליטית, אך כיצד אתם יכולים להיות קשורים לטיפוס רע (EVIL) רע מאד.

השגריר ארד - איני מתכוון להגן על מנגיסטו, אבל אני מבקש להזכיר מאמצינו ההומניטריים המיועדים להביא להרחבת היקף הסיוע ופתיחת מאסוה.

סנטור המפרי - אין הוכחה חותכת (CONCLUSINE) שפצצות המיצרר סופקו על ידי ישראל, אבל התמונות בסרט היו מהממות. מבין את האינטרס של ישראל, אך אם אתם אחראים למה שקורה ומסייעים צבאית, אז, למען השם, הפסיקו. אני מבין שאתם רוצים לחלץ הפלשים, אך בוודאי יש דרך אחרת שלא מביאה לטבח כזה. (שב וחוזר) אם ישראל מעורבת בסיוע כזה או אחר, אפילו נשק קל למיטטר הפושע הזה I PROTEST AND URGE YOU TO STOP IT.

ברטון - ישראל סיפקה ציוד צבאי בערך של 3 מיליון דולר ומחזיקה יועצים צבאיים.

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השגריר ארד - איני בקי בסכומים, אך חזרתי ובדקתי עם ממשלתי ואני אומר קטגורית שאיננו מחזיקים יועצים צבאיים באתיופיה. אם זו האינפורמציה שלכם, הרי שמשהו כאן אינו ברור.

סמית - אני מבין שיש נוכחות של 'המוסד' המשפרת יכולת מנגיסטו להגן על עצמו ולמנוע הפיכה. הסוכנים שלכם אם הם שם, מספקים סיוע ליצור ברברי ו-HORRENDOUS. קראתי את דוח אמנסטי ולא יכולתי שלא להזדעזע. הוא גרוע מצ'אוצ'סקו ומקבל סיוע מסוכנים אלה. אם אנחנו טועים, נשמה אם תראה לנו זאת. (חוזר על השאלה) האם נכון שנתתם סיוע בגובה 3 מיליון דולר. האם סיפקתם פצצות מיצרר דרך צ'ילה או גורם אחר?

השגריר ארד - מופתע משאלותיך. דיברנו בעבר מספר פעמים בנושא ובהיר פעם נוספת. אכן סיפקנו בעבר נשק קל ויודענו המימשל על יודע שאיננו מספקים ואין לנו כוונה לספק פצצות מיצרר, לא ישירות ולא בעקיפין.

וולף - אני רוצה לתת לך מכתב זה מארבעתנו. יש יועצים ישראליים באתיופיה וזו עובדה. היועצים שלכם פועלים בשת"פ עם הממשלה האתיופית. כולם יצאו, הסובייטים יצאו, המז' גרמנים יצאו וכך גם הקובנים, לא מתקבל על הדעת, שמדינה מערבית, ישראל, תסייע לו. מנגיסטו ברברי, רצח מיליונים, פגע בפלשים. האיש עומד ליפול ואתם עוזרים לו. אנחנו רוצים שאתם CEASE, DESIST AND LEAVE המידע שיש לנו הוא אמין ומקורות בממשלה שלנו אמרו לנו, שאתם עכשיו שם. בודקים את שרידי הפצצות ותאמר מה שאתה רוצה ותגן על הממשלה שלך, אבל אני לא מאמין. אני תומך נאמן של ישראל והנה עכשיו באתיופיה יש חברה משונה של ישראל וצפון קוריהא. מזכיר ביקורו ב-1984/5 באתיופיה ובסבל שראה שם. אני מבין העניין שלכם, אבל מבקש שתוציאו יועצים וכשיפול - נוציא הפלשים.

סמית - נכון שמקור פצצות המיצרר מוטל בספק, אך אין ספק שסיפקתם נשק קל. המשטר באתיופיה גרוע וכל סיוע לוגיסטי ואחר, למעט הומניטרי, מזיק. שמעתי שאתם מסייעים לה'א האתיופי שפעיל עכשיו בהפצצות מאסוה ויתכן שהיועצים שלכם פועלים במסוה.

ברטון - אדוני השגריר, אתה רואה את הרגש ועוצמת ההתנגדות. כולנו חברים של ישראל ויהיה זה חיובי אם תשקלו הדברים.

השגריר ארד - אני חש בעצמת הרגשות שבדבריכם, אך חובה עלינו להפריד בין עובדות לפיקציות או האשמות בלתי מוכחות. אמרתי בראשית הפגישה שאיני נמצא כאן להגן על מנגיסטו, אבל חבר הקונגרס וולף ציין שב-1984 היה רעב נורא ורבים מתו. ב-1984 לא היו לישראל קשרים דיפלומטיים עם אתיופיה ואני מקווה שלא יאשימו אותנו גם בזה. כוננו יחסים דיפלומטיים לפני חצי שנה.

וולף - מתפרץ לדברי השגריר ובהרמת קול מנסה לקטוע.

השגריר ארד - שמעתי אותך, רשמתי לפני המסר שלכם ואעביר לממשלה. (הרמות הקול של המורשה וולף נמשכו). אני מצטער מצטער אם תרים קולך עלי לא אשב כאן. אני מכבד אותך ואת דיעותיך, אך לא אסבול צעקות עלי. (מתכוון לעזוב).

סנטור המפרי ואחרים - מצטערים, אל תעזוב.

וולף - מבקש להתנצל.

- 3 -

השגריר ארד - בנושא פצצות המיצרר, אני חוזר ואומר שאיננו מספקים. אשר ליועצים, הרי שבעבר היה יועץ אחד לתקופה קצרה. אין יועצים על בסיס ארוך טווח או קצר-מועד וזה מידע מהימן. אנו עדים לנסיגה להציג את ישראל כמי שעוזרת לאתיופיה מבחינה צבאית ונדמה לי שיש נסיון להטיל עלינו האשם. בשבועות האחרונים נסיונו להפעיל השפעתנו על המימשל האתיופי כדי להביא להפסקת אש ולפתיחת נמל מאסוה ובוודאי ידוע לכם, שהפגישה בהפסקת אש המזכיר איגלברגר לבין קאסה קאבדה לא יצאה לפועל בגלל אי רצונו של האחרון לצאת בהודעה פומבית. עם זאת, אנו ממשיכים במאמצינו להביא לפתרון אשר לטענה על פעילות סוכנים ישראליים (מוסד), הרי שזו פעם ראשונה שאני שומע על כך.

סמית - האם אתם ממשיכים לשלוח נשק קל. ממליץ, בכל לשון של בקשה, שלא תעשו זאת.

סנטור המפרי - האם תעמדו לצידו של מנגיסטו בכל מקרה.

השגריר ארד - אין לנו כוונה להילחם לצידו. העניין שלנו הוא הצלת חיי אדם.

סמית - אתיופיה והנעשה בה היא 'ONE MAN SHOW'. חשוב שלא תספקו לו ציוד קשר שיסייע לו בקומוניקציה עם אנשיו.

סנטור המפרי - מבקש לדעת אם בנושא היהודי יש QUID PRO QUO.

וולף - מבקש באמת ובתמים להתנצל. היה זה בלתי ראוי שארים את קולי ואין לכך צידוק, אבל מה שמטריד אותי הוא, שאנשים באזור שלי כועסקים עלי ויש גם הרבה ערבים באזור הבחירה שלי ואני שומע דברים קשים שאיני יכול להכחיש. אני ידיד ישראל ואיני רוצה שאמינותכם, שאינה גבוהה בימים אלה, תפגע.

4. עד כאן רישום השיחה. הערכת השגריר בנפרד.

עמרני

תפוצה: שחח, מהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, הדס, תפוצות, מצפא, מאפל, רם, @ (אמן)

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אכ : סמנכל צפא
סמנכל אפאסוק

דע : לשכת מנכל

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

אתיופיה

1. השגריר נפגש (24/5), לבקשתם, עם חברי הקונגרס ברטון, פרנק וולף, כריס סמית והסנטור המפרי, לדיון בנושא אתיופיה. במהלך הפגישה הקרינו קלטת וידאו, שזכמה עי אנשי ארגון סעד אמריקאי במאסווה וסביבותיה ומתארת נפגעי המלחמה ובמיוחד ההרס והסבל הנגרם עי פצצות מיצרר. במהלך הפגישה הגישו המכתב המועבר אליכם בנר 757.

2. הפגישה התנהלה באווירה קשה, תוך הרמת קול של המורשה וולף, כאשר המסרים המועברים בה ובמכתב ברורים. לפיכך, בחרנו להעביר הדיווח כפי שנרשם במהלך השיחה.

3. להלן מהלך השיחה:

דן ברטון - ביקשנו הפגישה משום שאנו ידידי ישראל וחוששים מתגובות של עמיתינו לידיעות על סיוע צבאי ישראלי לאתיופיה. מקורות מודיעיניים מהימנים מסרו שיש, ישראל, בין ישירות או כ-CONDUIT, מעבירה סיוע צבאי לאתיופיה כולל פצצות מיצרר. אם אכן זה המצב יהיו בעיות.

השגריר ארד - אין זה המצב. בדקנו חזור ובדוק ואני יכול לחזור ולאמר, כפי שאמר שהבט רבין בינואר האחרון בשיחתו עם מזכיר המדינה, שאיננו מספקים פצצות מיצרר לאתיופיה. ברטון - כל נשק שישראל מספקת יוצר בעייה מיוחדת. אם האריתריאים ינצחו ומנגיסטו יפול, מבין התמונה הגיאופוליטית, אך כיצד אתם יכולים להיות קשורים לטיפוס רע (EVIL) רע מאד.

השגריר ארד - איני מתכוון להגן על מנגיסטו, אבל אני מבקש להזכיר מאמצינו ההומניטריים המיועדים להביא להרחבת היקר הסיוע ופתיחת מאסווה.

סנטור המפרי - אין הוכחה חותכת (CONCLUSINE) שפצצות המיצרר סופקו עי ישראל, אבל התמונות בסרט היו מהממות. מבין את האינטרס של ישראל, אך אם אתם אחראים למה שקורה ומסייעים צבאית, אז, למען השם, הפסיקו. אני מבין שאתם רוצים לחלץ הפלשים, אך בוודאי יש דרך אחרת שלא מביאה לתבח כזה. (שב וחוזר) אם ישראל מעורבת בסיוע כזה או אחר, אפילו נשק קל למישטר הפושע הזה I PROTEST AND URGE YOU TO STOP IT.

ברטון - ישראל סיפקה ציוד צבאי בערך של 3 מיליון דולר ומחזיקה יועצים צבאיים.

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השגריר ארד - איני בקי בסכומים, אך חזרתי ובדקתי עם ממשלתי ואני אומר קטגורית שאיננו מחזיקים יועצים צבאיים באתיופיה. אם זו האינפורמציה שלכם, הרי שמשהו כאן אינו ברור.

סמית - אני מבין שיש נוכחות של 'המוסד' המשפרת יכולת מנגיסטו להגן על עצמו ולמנוע הפיכה. הסוכנים שלכם אם הם שם, מספקים סיוע ליצור ברברי ו-HORRENDOUS. קראתי את דוח אמנסטי ולא יכולתי שלא להזדעזע. הוא גרוע מצ'אוצ'סקו ומקבל סיוע מסוכנים אלה. אם אנחנו טועים, נשמח אם תראה לנו זאת. (חוזר על השאלה) האם נכון שנתתם סיוע בגובה 3 מיליון דולר. האם סיפקתם פצצות מיצרר דרך צ'ילה או גורם אחר?

השגריר ארד - מופתע משאלותיך. דיברנו בעבר מספר פעמים בנושא ואבחר פעם נוספת. אכן סיפקנו בעבר נשק קל ויידענו המימשל על כך. איני יודע אם זה מגיע ל-3 מיליון דולר אם לאו, אך אני יודע שאיננו מספקים ואין לנו כוונה לספק פצצות מיצרר, לא ישירות ולא בעקיפין.

וולף - אני רוצה לתת לך מכתב זה מארבעתנו. יש יועצים ישראליים באתיופיה וזו עובדה. היועצים שלכם פועלים בשתיפי עם הממשלה האתיופית. כולם יצאו, הסובייטים יצאו, המז' גרמנים יצאו וכך גם הקובנים, לא מתקבל על הדעת, שמדינה מערבית, ישראל, תסייע לו. מנגיסטו ברברי, רצח מיליונים, פגע בפלשים. האיש עומד ליפול ואתם עוזרים לו. אנחנו רוצים שאתם בממשלה שלנו אמרו לנו, שאתם עכשיו שם. בודקים את שרידי הפצצות ותאמר מה שאתה רוצה ותגן על הממשלה שלך, אבל אני לא מאמין. אני תומך נאמן של ישראל והנה עכשיו באתיופיה יש חברה משונה של ישראל וצפון קוריהא. מזכיר ביקורו ב-1984/5 באתיופיה ובסבל שראה שם. אני מבין הענין שלכם, אבל מבקש שתוציאו יועצים וכשיפול - נוציא הפלשים. סמית - נכון שמקור פצצות המיצרר מוטל בספק, אך אין ספק שסיפקתם נשק קל. המשטר באתיופיה גרוע וכל סיוע לוגיסטיי אחר, למעט הומניטריי, מזיק. שמעתי שאתם מסייעים לח'א האתיופי שפעל עכשיו בהפצצות מאסווה ויתכן שהיועצים שלכם פועלים במסווה.

ברטון - אדוני השגריר, אתה רואה את הרגש ועוצמת ההתנגדות. כולנו חברים של ישראל ויהיה זה חיובי אם תשקלו הדברים.

השגריר ארד - אני חש בעצמת הרגשות שבדבריכם, אך חובה עלינו להפריד בין עובדות לפיקציות או האשמות בלתי מוכחות. אמרתי בראשית הפגישה שאיני נמצא כאן להגן על מנגיסטו, אבל חבר הקונגרס וולף ציין שב-1984 היה רעב נורא ורבים מתו. ב-1984 לא היו לישראל קשרים דיפלומטיים עם אתיופיה ואני מקווה שלא יאשימו אותנו גם בזה. כוננו יחסים דיפלומטיים לפני חצי שנה.

וולף - מתפרץ לדברי השגריר ובהרמת קול מגסה לקטוע.

השגריר ארד - שמעתי אותך, רשמתי לפני המסר שלכם ואעביר לממשלה. (הרמות הקול של המורשה וולף נמשכו). אני מצטער מצטער אם תרים קולך עלי לא אשב כאן. אני מכבד אותך ואת דיעותיך, אך לא אסבול צעקות עלי. (מתכוון לעזוב).

סנטור המפרי ואחרים - מצטערים, אל תעזוב.

וולף - מבקש להתנצל.

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השגריר ארד - בנושא פצצות המיצרר, אני חוזר ואומר שאיננו מספקים. אשר ליועצים, הרי שבעבר היה יועץ אחד לתקופה קצרה. אין יועצים על בסיס ארוך טווח או קצר-מועד וזה מידע מהימן. אנו עדים לנסיון להציג את ישראל כמי שעוזרת לאתיופיה מבחינה צבאית ונדמה לי שיש נסיון להטיב עלינו האשם. בשבועות האחרונים נסיונו להפעיל השפעתנו על המימשל האתיופי כדי להביא להפסקת אש ולפתיחת נמל מאסווה ובוודאי ידוע לכם, שהפגישה בין סגן המזכיר איגלברגר לבין קאסה קאבדה לא יצאה לפועל בגלל אי רצונו של האחרון לצאת בהודעה פומבית. עם זאת, אנו ממשכים במאמצינו להביא לפתרון אשר לטענה על פעילות סוכנים ישראליים (מוסד), הרי שזו פעם ראשונה שאני שומע על כך.

סמית - האם אתם ממשיכים לשלוח נשק קל. ממליץ, בכל לשון שכל בקשה, שלא תעשו זאת.

סנטור המפרי - האם תעמדו לצידו של מנגיסטו בכל מקרה.

השגריר ארד - אין לנו כוונה להילחם לצידו. הענין שלנו הוא הצלת חיי אדם.

סמית - אתיופיה והנעשה בה היא 'ONE MAN SHOW'. השוב שלא תספקו לו ציוד קשר שיסייע לו בקומוניקציה עם אנשיו.

סנטור המפרי - מבקש לדעת אם בנושא היהודי יש 'QUID PRO QUO'.

וולף - מבקש באמת ובתמים להתנצל. היה זה בלתי ראוי שארים את קולי ואין לכך צידוק, אבל מה שמטריד אותי הוא, שאנשים באזור שלי כועסקים עלי ויש גם הרבה ערבים באזור הבחירה שלי ואני שומע דברים קשים שאיני יכול להכחיש. אני ידיד ישראל ואיני רוצה שאמינותכם, שאינה גבוהה בימים אלה, תפגע.

4. עד כאן רישום השיחה. הערכת השגריר בנפרד.

עמרני

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, הדס, תפוצות, מצפא, מאפ, רם, @ (אמנ)

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