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# מדינת ישראל

## משרד הממשלה

משרד

זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה  
 תת זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה  
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

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סימול מקורי: 4 תקופת החומר: 1/1991-12/1990  
 מזהה פיזי: א - 7 / 5024  
 15/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק  
**א - 7 / 5024**  
 מזהה פיזי: 2169708 מס בריט: 43.4/13 - 802  
 מזהה לוגי: 15/11/2012 כתובת: 02-111-02-05-05

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

אאא, חוזם: 17959

אל: רהמש/1420

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 282, תא: 191290, זח: 0947, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / בהול לבוקר

(בעקבות תקלה טכנית לא הועבר אתמול)

18/12/90

אל : מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח / משהב"ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור פט שרודר

1. הבוקר התקשר עמי סא"ל ברי המל מחה"א האמריקני והודיעני על ביקור משלחת קונגרסיונאלית בראשותה של הקונגרסמנית פט שרודר (דמו. קולורדו. חברת ועדת השירותים המזויינים). שוחחתי גם עם אנשי צוותה של פט שרודר ולהלן הפרטים:-

המשלחת יוצאת ב- 4/1 לסיור בן 14 יום בעיקר באפריקה, ותגיע (עם מטוס צבאי) מקהיר לביקור בן יום אחד ב- 9/1. ינחתו בשעה 09:10 וכרגע מתוכננים לעזוב בשעה 16:00 לניירובי, אולם גמישים מספיק כדי לדחות יציאתם ל- 17:00.

לדברי ברי המל ההחלטה על כך נפלה ביום ו' האחרון (14/12) כנראה בין השאר בעקבות שיחתי עם הקונגרסמן ביל גריי (ראו בהמשך).

2. מסלול סיורה של המשלחת הוא: אנטיגואה, קהיר (ישהו מספר ימים כדי להשתתף בוועידת ה-AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE. גם ביל גריי ישתתף בוועידה), ביקור קצר למספר שעות בדמשק, ביקור של יום בישראל, קניה, סיישל, דיאגו גרסיה, אנקרה ומרוקו. ממתנינים עדיין לקבלת אישור לבקר בסעודיה (משלחת ביל גריי תבקר בסעודיה. עומדים עמה בקשר כדי לנסות הכליל גם את ישראל בביקור).

3. במשלחת משתתפים הקונגרסמנים: אנדי איירלנד (רפוב. פלורידה. חבר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים), פלויד ספנס (רפוב. דרום קרולינה. חבר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים) סולומון אורטיז (דמו. טקסס. חבר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים), ביל דיקינסון (רפוב. אלבמה. חבר ועדת השירותים המזויינים), בן בלאז (רפוב. גואם. חבר ועדת השירותים המזויינים), לארי הופקין (רפוב. קנטאקי. חבר ועדת השירותים המזויינים), גלן בראודר (דמוק. אלבמה. חבר ועדת השירותים המזויינים).

כן יתלוו חלק מרעיות הקונגרסמנים וצוות עוזרים וקונגרסיונאליים וצבאיים). סה"כ המשלחת מונה 26 איש.

4. הודיעו לשגרירותם בת"א על הגעתם.

5. להלן הבקשות: פגישות עם רה"מ, שה"ח ושהב"ט. ישמחו לקבל תדרוך מודיעין, ואולי בשילוב של תדרוכים מחה"א. כן, לדבריו של עוזרה של שרודר, ישמחו לקבל תדרוך על רכש אמריקני מישראל ושת"פ בטחוני. יקדמו בברכה כל תוספת פגישה/תדרוך שנמצא לנכון "תוך התחשבות בכך שיש להאכילנו" אולי כדאי לחשוב על אפשרות של א"צ בכנסת מטעם ועדת החוץ והבטחון אם יוותר זמן, או א"צ במערכת הבטחון.

6. ויזות - פועלים להנפקת דרכונים נוספים לחברי המשלחת (בשל נסיעתם לדמשק ואולי לסעודיה) והסדרת האשרות לישראל עוד בטרם נסיעתם. עם זאת, הם מאד לחוצים בזמן ולחוצים מהעובדה שעליהם לארגן הביקור בכלל ונושא הדרכונים בפרט בשעה שרוב חברי הקונגרס לא בעיר, וחג המולד והשנה החדשה מתרגשים עליהם לפני יציאתם. כאמור, יעשו מאמצים להנפיק דרכונים נוספים ואשרות, אולם מבקשים סיוענו להנפיק אשרות עם נחיתתם בישראל, למקרה שלא יספיקו לעשות זאת טרם צאתם. נדברנו לעמוד בקשר.

7. ביקור זה כמו כל הביקורים הנוספים (ראו בנפרד), מותנה בהחלטת מנהיגויות שני הבתים להחזיר הקונגרס מפגרתו ב- 3/1 ולא ב- 23/1.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,  
מאור, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 22294

אל: רהמש/1783

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 364, תא: 241290, חז: 1401, חמ: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,699227

שמור / מיידי

אל : מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח / משהב"ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור CODEL פט שרודר

1. הבוקר התקשר עמי סא"ל ברי המל מחה"א האמריקני והודיעני על ביקור שלחת קונגרסיונאלית בראשותה של הקונגרסמנית פט שרודר (דמו. קולורדו. חברת ועדת השירותים המזויינים). שוחחתי גם עם אנשי צוותה של פט שרודר ולהלן הפרטים:-

המשלחת יוצאת ב- 4/1 לסיור בן 14 יום בעיקר באפריקה, ותגיע (עם מטוס צבאי) מקהיר לביקור בן יום אחד ב- 9/1. ינחתו בשעה 09:10 וכרגע מתוכננים לעזוב בשעה 16:00 לניירובי, אולם גמישים מספיק כדי לדחות יציאתם ל- 17:00. לדברי ברי המל ההחלטה על כך נפלה ביום ו' האחרון (14/12) כנראה בין השאר בעקבות שיחתי עם הקונגרסמן ביל גריי (ראו בהמשך).

2. מסלול סיורה של המשלחת הוא: אנטיגואה, קהיר (ישהו מספר ימים כדי להשתתף בוועידת ה-AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE. גם ביל גריי ישתתף בוועידה), ביקור קצר למספר שעות בדמשק, ביקור של יום בישראל, קניה, סיישל, דיאגו גרסיה, אנקרה ומרוקו. ממתינים עדיין לקבלת אישור לבקר בסעודיה (משלחת ביל גריי תבקר בסעודיה. עומדים עמה בקשר כדי לנסות להכליל גם את ישראל בביקור).

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כן יתלוו חלק מרעיות הקונגרסמנים וצוות עוזרים וקונגרסיונאליים (וצבאיים). סה"כ המשלחת מונה 26 איש.

4. הודיעו לשגרירותם בת"א על הגעתם.

5. להלן הבקשות: פגישות עם רה"מ, שה"ח ושהב"ט.

ישמחו לקבל תדרוך מודיעין, ואולי בשילוב של תדרוכים מחה"א. כן, לדבריו של עוזרה של שרודר, ישמחו לקבל תדרוך על רכש אמריקני מישראל ושת"פ בטחוני.

יקדמו בברכה כל תוספת פגישה/תדרוך שנמצא לנכון "תוך התחשבות בכך שיש להאכילנו" אולי כדאי לחשוב על אפשרות של א"צ בכנסת מטעם ועדת החוץ והבטחון אם יוותר זמן, או א"צ במערכת הבטחון.

6. ויזות - פועלים להנפקת דרכונים נוספים לחברי המשלחת (בשל נסיעתם לדמשק ואולי לסעודיה) והסדרת האשרות לישראל עוד בטרם נסיעתם. עם זאת, הם מאד לחוצים בזמן ולחוצים מהעובדה שעליהם לארגן הביקור בכלל ונושא הדרכונים בפרט בשעה שרוב חברי הקונגרס לא בעיר, וחג המולד והשנה החדשה מתרגשים עליהם לפני יציאתם. כאמור, יעשו מאמצים להנפיק דרכונים נוספים ואשרות, אולם מבקשים סיוענו להנפיק אשרות עם נחיתתם בישראל, למקרה שלא יספיקו לעשות זאת טרם צאתם. נדברנו לעמוד בקשר.

7. ביקור זה כמו כל הביקורים הנוספים (ראו בנפרד), מותנה בהחלטת מנהיגויות שני הבתים להחזיר הקונגרס מפגרתו ב- 3/1 ולא ב- 23/1.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, רביב, מאור, @ (עמיקם/כנסת), @ (מקשח/משהבט)

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 3390  
אל: רהמש/235  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 55, תא: 030191, חז: 1902, מ: סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור / מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: ציר כלכלי (הועבר)

מאת: ראש יחידת הקונגרס

בקר הסנטור קסטן

1. הסנטור הרפובליקני בוב קסטן, הרפובליקני הבכיר בתת-הועדה האחראית על סיוע החוץ, יחד עם ראש צוות העוזרים הרפובליקנים בתת-הועדה, ג'ים בונד, יגיעו ארצה מקהיר במטוס אל-על מיד לאחר חצות של ה-10/1/91 (כלומר מוקדם ב-11/1/91).

2. יש אפשרות כי יקדימו הגעתם אם יגייסו מטוס ח"א אמריקאי לשעות הבוקר המוקדמות של יום חמישי ה-9/1/91. ימריאו מן הארץ ב-06:30 ב-12/1/91 (טיסת פן-אם). יתכן ויאריכו שהותם עד לטיסת אחר חצות של אל-על במוצ"ש (מוקדם ביום א').

3. הנושא המרכזי הוא הקליטה, הצרכים והערבויות להלוואות. כמו כן, ירצו לשמוע בנושאי המפרץ.

4. בקשותיהם לשהות המקוצרת: רה"מ, שה"ח, שהב"ט ושר האוצר. מן השגרירות האמריקאית יסדירו מפגש קצר עם בראון. קסטן מקורב לנליל קץ מן הסוכנות היהודית וירצה להיפגש עמו, אולי לארוחת ערב בבית זיבנברג. ישהו בקינג דיויד כפי שהוסדר ע"י השגרירות האמריקאית.

5. תוספות לשהייה הארוכה יותר:  
רדוד אמ"ן, בסיס ח"א, ראש עיריית רעננה - זאב בילסקי אשר נפגש בעבר עם קסטן, סיור באתרים נוצריים בירושלים עם דני בהט ומפגשים נוספים עם שר המשפטים, סגן שה"ח, הח"כים פרס ורבין, דני הלפרין ועודד ערן.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, e(שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, רביב, מאור, כהן

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אאא, חוזם: 10368

אל: רהמש/780

מ-: המשרד, תא: 100191, זח: 1800, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

מברק

סודי/בהול

כ'ד בטבת תשנ"א  
10 בינואר 1991

94456

אל : דוד גרנית, לשכת רה"מ

מאת : ס/מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: ביקור סנטור רוברט קסטן .

1. סנטור רוברט קסטן מויסקונסין, הינו הרפובליקאי הבכיר בתת ועדת ההקצבות לפעולות זרות. ועדה זו אחראית לסיוע החוץ ממנו נהנית ישראל.

אל הסנטור יצטרף העוזר הבכיר בתת הועדה, ג'ים בונד. הסנטור ועוזרו הינם מהכוחות המובילים ב'גבעה' בנושא ישראל.

2. נושאים לשיחה:

ביקורו של הסנטור יתמקד מבחינתו בשני נושאים:

א. המצב במפרץ.

ב. העליה מברה"מ וקליטתה בארץ.

יש להוסיף לכך דיון במס' נקודות נוספות:

- יש מקום להחשת העברת הערבויות לשכון (400 מיליון דולר) ולהזכיר כי ישראל תזדקק ל'סבוב שני' בנושא הערבויות כדי לאפשר קליטתם של העולים בתנאים נאותים. המלצות תואמו ע"י מר עמוס רובין עם האוצר ומשה'ח).

- בתחום הסיוע אחראי סנטור קסטן (יחד עם סנטור אינוויה) ל-DRAW-DOWN, השניים רצו לחייב 'משיכה מנדטורית' עד לתאריך ספציפי (הדבר לא התקבל בנוסח זה).  
ה-DRAW-DOWN - משיכת ציוד ממלאים בארה"ב, טרם התממש. יש להודות לסנטור על מאמציו עד כה ולבקש עזרתו בהחשת העברת הציוד.

- על אף ההבטחות האמריקאיות טרם קבלנו את טילי הפטריוט.

- על אף דחיית חלקה השני של העסקה הסעודית יש לחזור ולהתריע מפניה וכן מפני השארת ציוד צבאי אמריקאי בסדר גודל משמעותי בסעודיה לאחר המשבר.

- יש להצביע על הצורך הבלתי נמנע מבחינתנו לבקשה לסיוע צבאי מוגדל לנוכח המשבר גם השנה.

ליאורה הרצל

תפוצה:מצפא,@(רהמ)

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 22297

אל: רהמש/1782

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 363, תא: 241290, זח: 1400, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,699227

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח / משהב"ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהנ"ב: ביקורים

למען הסדר הטוב, ולנוחיותכם, רצ"נ סיכום הביקורים הקונגרסיונליים אשר  
דוע לנו עליהם והצפויים בינואר 1991:-

1. CODEL שרודר:- מגיעים ב-9/1 ליום אחד. 8 קונגרסמנים חברי ועדת  
השירותים המזויינים וצוות עוזרים. סה"כ 26 איש. ראו בנפרד פרטים.

2. משלחת ADL: מגיעים ב-6/1 עוזבים ב-15/1.

משתתפים 7 קונגרסמנים: לגורמסינו (רפוב'. קליפורניה), לאורי (רפוב.  
קליפורניה), מולינרי (רפוב. ניו-יורק), דון ריטר (רפוב. פנסילבניה),  
ג'ים סקסטון (רפוב. ניו-ג'רסי), פרנק מקלוסקי (דמו. אינדיאנה), צ'אק  
שומר (דמו. ניו-יורק - ככל הנראה יצטרף למספר ימים).

3. הקונגרסמן שוייר: יוצא לארץ ב-26/12 (אל-על) ועוזב את ישראל ב-2/12.  
עדיין ממתנינים לשמוע מקונגרסמן ניו-יורקי נוסף, מייג'ור אואנס האם  
מצטרף. שוייר מצטרף למשלחת מחוקקים מדינתיים מניו-יורק אשר תלווה ע"י  
מלקולם הונליין.

4. פרוג'קט אינטרצ'יינג': משלחת עוזרים המגיעה לישראל ב-6/1. כוללת  
בינתיים 7 עוזרים שנתנו אישורים סופיים ושני עוזרים שטרם החליטו סופית:  
ריס מיסק - פקווד; קריס דייטצ'י - צייפ'י; לורי ריץ' - פיל גרהם; טים  
היי - ברייאן; רושל דורנן - טים ווירת'; טים ניואל - קונג' מינטה; דיוד  
מייסון - קונג' מורלה; ארני כריסטיאנסון - קונג' ובר (?); דיוד סאליבן  
- הלמס (?);

5. משלחת עוזרים - מטעם ה-JCRC ניו-יורק.

ה-JCRC בניו-יורק מארגן משלחת עוזרים של חברי המשלחת הקונגרסיונאלית  
מניו-יורק (קונגרסמנים וסנטורים) סה"כ מקווים ל-22 איש. יתלווה אליהם  
מייקל מילר. נפגשת עמם מחר כדי לעבד טיוטת תכנית ולהעבירה אליכם.  
מבקשים טיפול משה"ח בביקור.  
המשלחת מתכוננת להגיע לישראל ב-6/1 ולעזוב ב-13/1.

6. CODEL גריי (מנהיגות)

עדיין לא ידוע האם לאחר ביקורם בסעודיה ובמצרים יגיעו גם לישראל. אנו  
עובדים על כך. נודיעכם לאחר קבלת פרטים. בכל מקרה, אם הביקור יצא לפועל,  
הוא, יחפוף את התקופה של קודל שרודר.

7. להזכירכם שהביקורים בחודש ינואר תלויים בהחלטת המנהיגות האם להחזיר  
הקונגרס מפגרתו ב-3/1/91. (גם פולי וגם מיטצ'ל טרם קיבלו החלטה

בנדון).

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, רביב, מאור, @ (עמיקס/כנסת), @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 5857  
אל: רהמש/430  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 070191, זח: 1631, דח: ב, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון - אטינגר

הנדון: בקר סנטור ניקלס

יום ג' 8.1

15.15 - הגעה

17.30 - פגישה עם שה'ח

ערב: אייפ'ק

יום ד' 9.1

09.00 - יד ושם

10.30 - אתרים ארכיאולוגיים

12.00 - שר האוצר

15.00 - בקור במוזיאון ישראל - היכל הספר.

16.30 - שהב'ט

18.30 - תדרוך אמ'ן

20.00 - א'ע שר המשפטים (טרם אושר)

יום ה' 10/1

09.15 - רה'מ

11.00 - מוזיאון מגדל דוד

13.00 - א'צ קולק יחד עם משלחת ADL.

15.30 - בקור בבסיס ח'א

19.00 - א'ע בבית זיבנברג.

יום ו' 11.1

הקונסוליה האמריקאית.

יום שבת 12/1

06.15 - יציאה.

ס. מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,  
מאור

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 25379

אל: רהמש/1977

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 426, תא: 271290, זח: 1641, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מיידי

27/12/90

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ראש יחידת הקונגרס

מפגש השגריר עם הסנטור ניקלס (המגיע ארצה ב- 8/1)

1. ניקלס:

- מתעניין בניבכי הפוליטיקה הישראלית.
- מוטרד ממשקל האגודים המקצועיים במערכת הכלכלית בישראל.
- מודאג מטווח ודיוק הטילים העיראקים.
- אין בלבו אשליות לגבי מדיניות אסד, ומוטרד מהשלכותיה לגבי לבנון.
- מה היקף השת"פ המודיעיני בין ישראל לארה"ב, והאם נכונה גירסת אוונס ונובאק כאילו תפגין ישראל איפוק, גם אם תותקף ע"י עיראק, תמורת הרחבת זרימתו של המידע המודיעיני מארה"ב? לאוונס ונובאק מוניטין בכל הקשור להמצאת תאוריות משוללות יסוד סביב פירור מידע אמין.
- מסתיג מהצבעת ארה"ב במועבי"ט, ותוהה על היקף התגובה בארץ.

2. השגריר:

- אין בסיס לחשש ארה"ב כי יבולע לה אם תשתף פעולה עם ישראל.
- חלוקי דעות בין ידידים יש לישב באופן קונסטריקטיבי ולא מעל בימת האו"ם.
- אופן הצבעת ארה"ב במועבי"ט עלול לדחוק את ישראל לפינה, ולחזק את אלו הטוענים כי אין לסמוך על ארה"ב בכל הקשור לתגובה צבאית ותוקפנות צדאם.
- אופן ההצבעה היה חמור בכל הקשור לירושלים, למעמדה של ישראל, להיעדר האיזון המוסרי ולנצחון אשר הוענק למחנה תומכי צדאם.
- הטילים העיראקים מהווים סכנה לרכוזי אוכלוסין גם אם אין הם מדויקים.
- היקף ואתגר העליה וקליטתה גדולים ודחופים יותר מן המשוער. מחצית הנטל לממון האתגר על תושבי ישראל ומחציתו תגויס ממדינות, מוסדות פיננסיים בעולם והפזורה היהודית. הפניה לארה"ב תסתכם בבקשה לערבויות להלוואות בהיקף של מספר מיליארדי דולרים. הערבויות לא תשפענה על הגרעון התקציבי, תגרומנה לצמיחה כלכלית בישראל ותאפשרנה החזר ההלוואות. בעקבות כל גל עליה - ולא כל שכן גל כה איכותי כמו הנוכחי - הגיעה צמיחה כלכלית.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

11/11/11



אאא, חוזם: 24144

אל: רהמש/1902

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 406, תא: 261290, זח: 1644, זח:מ, סג:שמ,

בבב

שמור / מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: נספח צבאי (הועבר)

מאת: ראש יחידת הקונגרס

ביקור הסנטור הרפובליקני הבכיר דון ניקלס (מצ"ל קוים לדמותו).

1. מועדי הביקור: נוחת ביום ג' ה- 8/1 ב- 14:30 (יהיה אורח איפ"ק לארוע  
ערב) וימריא מוקדם בבוקר ב- 21/1.

2. לסנטור יצטרף יועצו לחו"ב, מייק קונברס.

3. צפיות הסנטור:

- יום אח"מים (רה"מ, שה"ח, שהב"ט, שר האוצר) כולל תדרוכי אמ"ן וקליטת  
עולים (האם אפשר להסדיר תדרוך תוך כדי בקור בנתב"ג?);

- יום ירושלים וסביבתה, כולל ר"ע, יד ושם, סיור עם דן בהט (ניקלס הקתולי  
מעריך הסטוריה ודת) באתרי הסטוריה, ארכיאולוגיה ונוף, ובקור בית זיבנברג  
(אולי לארוחת ערב בהשתתפות דורי גולד, עמוס רובין ואחרים);

- יום נוסף לסיורי שטח (שילוב אתרים נוצרים היסטוריים, ובסיס צבאי להמחשת  
השת"פ).

- השגרירות מתאמת, לפי בקשת ניקלס, מפגש עם פלסטינים (כנראה עם  
פרייג').

היות והסנטור מכהן בתת-הועדה העוסקת בסיוע החוץ, ולאור השתלבותו  
הנהגת הסיעה הרפובליקנית, מן הראוי לראות בבקורו אמצעי לקידום היעדים  
כדלקמן:

- ערבויות נוספות להלוואות (המחשת היקף ודחיפות המשימה וגודל הצרכים,  
מבלי שהדבר ישפיע על הגרעון הפדרלי) כיעד תחיקתי-אנושי מרכזי;

- ממוש ה-700 מליון דולר;

- הבהרת ההתנגדות לעסקת הנשק הסעודית;

- בקשה לפעול בתחום המכשולים השרירותיים בהקשר מחשבי העל והתעשיות  
הבטחוניות;

קוים לדמותו של הסנטור הרפובליקני מאוקלהומה - דון ניקלס:

1. נחשב לכוכב עולה בין הסנטורים הרפובליקנים. נבחר לאחרונה ע"י סנטורים  
למשרת ההנהגה הבכירה CHAIRMAN - REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, המופקדת  
על התווית קוי עמדה לגבי נושאים שעל סדר היום. בבחירות האחרונות כיהן  
בתפקיד היוקרתי של יו"ר ה- REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE.

2. נמנה על המחנה השמרני במפלגתו, וגבר בבחירות הפנימיות (יחד עם מועמדים שמרנים נוספים) על מועמדו ומקורבו של הממשל, הסנטור הבכיר פיט דומיניצ'י.

3. עומד לבקר בישראל (בלבד!) ב- 8-12/1/90 יחד עם עוזרו לענייני חו"ב, מייק קונברס.

4. תומך עקבי בישראל. שלח, יחד עם 5 רפובליקנים נוספים (קסטן, גראס, ד'אמאטו, מק והלמס), מכתב הקורא לממשל להטיל וטו על החלטת מועבי"ט. אינו שולט עדיין ברזי המז"ת וישראל.

5. עומד לבחירה מחודשת ב- 1992. נבחר לראשונה ב- 1980, במסגרת "הפיכת החצר" השמרנית של רייגן.

6. חבר בוועדת התקציב ותת-ועדת ההקצבות המופקדת על סיוע החוץ (FOREIGN OPERATIONS), כולל נושא הערבויות להלוואות.

7. בהיותו נציג מדינת נפט, הוא מקבל בברכה את עליית מחירי הנפט. מן הראוי להדגיש - על רקע משבר המפרץ - את הצורך לפתח מקורות נפט בארה"ב (ולו ע"י הגנת היצרן), כדי להבטיח את יציבות השוק, עצמאות מדיניות בטחון של ארה"ב ושל בעלות בריתה.

8. יליד 1948. מאמין קתולי. איש עסקים. בוגר אוניברסיטת אוקלהומה.

9. נושאים לדיון: ערבויות להלוואות, מימוש ה- 700 מליון דולר, עסקת הנשק הסעודית, הקשיים השרירותיים בדרכן של התעשיות הצבאיות ומחשב העל.

עד כאן  
קונגרס

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, רביב, מאור, כהן

סססס

11409:חוזם,אאא  
אל:רהמש/906  
מ:-המשרד,תא:100191,זח:1554,דח:ר,סג:סו,  
בנב  
סודי/בהול

להלן נר 2138 לווש

EL WASHINGTON: SHOVAL, SHILO, STEIN

SECRETARY BAKERS ORAL MESSAGE

--I WANTED TO PROVIDE YOU QUICKLY MY IMPRESSIONS OF MEETING TODAY WITH FM AZIZ.

--I EMPHASIZED AT OUTSET THAT I HAD COME NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT TO COMMUNICATE, TO LISTEN AS WELL AS TALK.

--THE MESSAGE THAT I CONVEYED FROM PRESIDENT BUSH AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS WAS A SIMPLE ONE : IRAQ MUST EITHER COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY FROM KUWAIT, OR BE EXPELLED BY FORCE.

--THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AND NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, IRAQ WILL LEAVE KUWAIT.

--I EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY TO FM AZIZ OUR STRONG AND GENUINE PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. THE ROAD TO THAT OUTCOME HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR IN TWELVE UNSC RESOLUTIONS :

- IMMEDIATE, UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT.

--RESTORATION OF KUWAITI SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

--I REITERATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ATTACK IRAQ OR ITS MILITARY FORCES IF IRAQ COMPLIES FULLY WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND MAKES NO FURTHER PROVOCATION.

--I NOTED THAT THE LARGE US FORCES IN THE GULF ARE THERE BECAUSE OF THE THREAT CREATED BY IRAQI ACTIONS. AS WE HAVE STATED PUBLICLY, AND DISCUSSED WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF MAINTAINING SUCH FORCE LEVELS THERE ONCE IRAQ WITHDRAWS AND THE THREAT RECEDES.

--AND AS WE HAVE ALSO SAID PUBLICLY, WE SUPPORT UNSCR 6604S CALL ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY AFTER REPEAT AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL.

--HAVING MADE CLEAR THAT THE PATH TO PEACE IS STILL OPEN, I ALSO TRIED TO CONVEY THE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ OF FAILURE TO COMPLY FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

--I OUTLINED IN DETAIL FOR FM AZIZ THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST IRAQ. PUT BLUNTLY, IF IRAQ CHOOSES TO CONTINUE ITS BRUTAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, IT WILL CHOOSE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH IT CANNOT WIN, AND WHICH WILL HAVE DEVASTATING RESULTS FOR IRAQ.

--I WARNED FM AZIZ THAT, IN THE EVENT OF WAR, IRAQ COULD EXPECT NO BREATHING SPACE OR PREMATURE CEASEFIRE. THERE WILL BE NO STALEMATE; IF WAR BEGINS, IT WILL BE FOUGHT TO A SWIFT, DECISIVE CONCLUSION.

--I ALSO WARNED OF THE HARSH CONSEQUENCES OF ANY IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. NOR WILL WE TOLERATE TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICANS OR THE DESTRUCTION OF KUWAIT'S OIL INSTALLATIONS.

--I MADE THESE POINTS NOT TO THREATEN, BUT TO INFORM. AND I DID SO WITH NO SENSE OF SATISFACTION, FOR WE SINCERELY WANT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ.

--I SIMPLY WANTED TO LEAVE AS LITTLE ROOM AS POSSIBLE FOR YET ANOTHER TRAGIC MISCALCULATION BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP.

--I STRESSED THAT THIS IS A CONFRONTATION WHICH IRAQ CAN STILL AVOID. BUT THE CHOICE IS IRAQ'S TO MAKE.

--REGRETABLELY, FM AZIZ GAVE NO INDICATION DURING OUR MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS OF ANY FLEXIBILITY OR READINESS TO COMPLY WITH RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

--AZIZ REFUSED THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT I GAVE HIM AT THE OUTSET OF THE MEETING. HE DESCRIBED THE LETTER'S LANGUAGE AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR A COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HEADS OF STATE. HE DECLINED TO ACCEPT IT AND COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE FREE TO PUBLISH IT. I TOLD HIM THAT IN BEING THE ONLY IRAQI TO READ THE LETTER AND THEN REFUSE TO ACCEPT IT, HE WAS ACCEPTING A LARGE RESPONSIBILITY, BUT IF HE WANTED TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY, SO BE IT.

--AZIZ SAID IRAQ HAD MADE NO MISCALCULATIONS. IRAQ UNDERSTANDS FULLY THE FORCES ARRAYED AROUND IRAQ AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WEAPONS WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED BY THE COALITION FORCES.

--AZIZ SAID THE IRAQI LEADERS KNOW THE U.S. CONGRESS, READ OUR PRESS, AND WATCH U.S. TELEVISION, SO THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING AMERICAN INTENTIONS.

--HE SAID IRAQ HAS EXPECTED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IT SINCE THE BEGINNING (I.E., AUGUST 2).

--AZIZ MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESENT IRAQI LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE AND THAT IRAQ WILL EMERGE

FROM A WAR VICTORIOUS.

6. AZIZ ARGUED AT LENGTH THAT PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 IRAQ HAD BEEN FACED WITH ECONOMIC STRANGULATION. HE NOTED THAT AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT IN MAY, SADAM HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN ABOUT OIL OVERPRODUCTION AND SAID THAT ANY NATION WHICH DID NOT MEAN WAR BY THIS ACTION, SHOULD REFRAIN.

--AZIZ SEVERAL TIMES DESCRIBED ALLEGED KUWAITI ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ.

--HE THUS DESCRIBED IRAQ4S AUGUST 2 ACTION AS A 'DEFENSIVE MOVE.'

--AZIZ SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ARAB-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES. HE ARGUED THAT IRAQ4S ACTION 'IN THE GULF' PROVIDED A 'GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP.'

--I REBUTTED THAT IRAQ HAD NOT INVADED KUWAIT TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PALESTINIANS AND THAT IRAQ4S AGGRESSION HAS PRODUCED CONTRARY RESULTS.

--I TOLD HIM HIS JUSTIFICATION OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT AS 'DEFENSIVE' WAS LUDICROUS AND THAT NO ONE BELIEVED IT.

--I TOLD HIM THE WAY TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WAS NOT THROUGH AGGRESSION BUT THROUGH WITHDRAWAL.

--AZIZ COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT U.S. MAGAZINES IN JUNE OF 1990 HAD DESCRIBED SADDAM HUSSEIN AS THE 'MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN THE WORLD' AND HAS 'PUBLIC ENEMY NO. ONE.' I RESPONDED THAT IRAQ4S SUBSEQUENT AGGRESSION PROVED THAT THOSE DESCRIPTIONS WERE CLOSE TO THE MARK.

--AZIZ MAINTAINED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD NEVER TOLD KING FAHD, KING HUSSEIN, OR PRESIDENT MUBARAK THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT ATTACK KUWAIT IN THE DAYS PRECEDING AUGUST 2. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS DISINFORMATION BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ARAB COALITION. HE DENIED THAT ANYONE TOLD THE U.S. IRAQ WOULD NOT MOVE MILITARILY. IN REBUTTAL WE QUOTED FROM TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH ON JULY 28 AND JULY 31, STATING CLEARLY KING HUSSEIN4S 'ASSURANCES' THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONFLICT.

--AZIZ STATED THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR, ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WILL BE INVOLVED INCLUDING ISRAEL.

--AZIZ ARGUED THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660 WAS SOMEHOW INVALID BECAUSE THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN WAS NOT PRESENT. I POINTED OUT THAT THE IRAQI CHARGE WAS INDEED THERE. AZIZ ARGUED THAT RESOLUTION 678 AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE AFTER JANUARY 15 WAS INVALID BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT.

--I RAISED WITH AZIZ IRAQ4S BRUTALITIES IN KUWAIT AND THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT DESCRIBING THESE. AZIZ BELITTLED THE REPORT.

--AZIZ STATED THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE IMPORTANT ONLY TO POLITICIANS, DIPLOMATS, LAWYERS, AND JOURNALISTS. HE SAID THAT THE FIGHTERS IN ANY WAR WILL NOT REMEMBER THESE RESOLUTIONS.

--AZIZ ALLOWED THAT WAR MAY BE 'DESTINY' OR 'FATE.'

--AZIZ ARGUED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ4S AGGRESSION ARE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT UNANIMOUS.

--IN THE LAST HOUR OF OUR MEETING AZIZ PROPOSED THAT HE COME TO WASHINGTON AND THAT I VISIT BAGHDAD, BUT USING THE SAME FORMULA WE HAD HEARD FROM THEM BEFORE (YOU PICK A DATE FOR WASHINGTON; WE PICK A DATE FOR BAGHDAD) HE SPECIFIED NO DATES. I POINTED OUT THAT RESOLUTION 678 WAS PASSED 40 DAYS AGO. PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PROPOSED SUCH MEETINGS IN A STATEMENT ON DECEMBER 1. THE U.S. HAD OFFERED 15 DIFFERENT DATES FOR MY TRIP TO BAGHDAD BETWEEN DECEMBER 20 AND JANUARY 3 INCLUDING CHRISTMAS DAY AND NEW YEAR4S DAY. IRAQ HAD REJECTED THEM ALL.

--I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD ALREADY STATED THAT I WOULD NOT NOW BE GOING TO BAGHDAD. TO PROPOSE SUCH MEETINGS ONLY SIX DAYS BEFORE THE JANUARY 15 DEADLINE IS A CLEAR ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE DEADLINE AND TO EXTEND THE PROCESS BEYOND.

--I TOLD AZIZ THAT THE U.S. WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FIVE REMAINING AMERICAN PESONNEL FROM OUR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD ON JANUARY 12. I ASKED HIM TWICE FOR HIS ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPART WITHOUT DELAY OR HINDRANCE ON THAT DATE. THE FIRST TIME AZIZ PASSED OVER ANY RESPONSE. THE SECOND TIME HE STATED THAT 'WE WILL ABIDE BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LIVE UP TO IT.' I SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN THEY COULD LEAVE UNIMPEDED.

--I CLOSED BY CALLING AGAIN FOR IRAQ TO OBSERVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I STRESSED THAT JANUARY 15 IS A REAL DEADLINE. I SAID THAT WE HAVE HAD FIVE AND ONE HALF MONTHS FOR DIPLOMATIC STEPS AND NOW IS THE TIME FOR ACTION : IRAQ4S IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. I SAID THAT IRAQ TOOK ONLY TWO DAYS TO MOVE A HUGE FORCE INTO KUWAIT AND IT SHOULD REVERSE THAT DEPLOYMENT NOW. END OF SECRETARYS ORAL MESSAGE.

4. ATMOSPHERE : THE SIX AND ONE HALF HOURS OF TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THERE WAS A HIGH DEGREE OF INTENSITY AND THE STATEMENTS WERE BLUNT AND UNEQUIVOCAL. AT NO TIME DID ANYONE RAISE A VOICE OR CUT ANOTHER OFF. CONSIDERING THE SOMBER AND CRITICAL STAGE, THE TONE WAS COOL BUT CLEAR. BOTH SIDES DID INDEED LISTEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND EXPLAINED POSITIONS IN DEPTH. THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH WITH CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATIONS.

AD KAN.  
BENTSUR.



תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

טטטט

אאא, חוזם: 15301  
אל: רהמש/1273  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 150191, זח: 1809, דח: ר, סג: סו,  
בבב  
94916

מברק / בהול / סודי

אל : וושינגטון - ציר

מאת : מנהל מצפ'א

נא להעביר דחופות מכתב זה למזכיר מאת השר, בזו הלשון :

(תשומת לבכם לסיווג המכתב (כסודי) שחייב להופיע בראש הטקסט).

S E C R E T

JERUSALEM, 15 JANUARY 1991

DEAR JIM,

I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR YOUR LETTER OF 11 JANUARY, 1991, ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ IN GENEVA, WHICH REACHED ME AFTER RECEIVING THE DETAILED 'TALKING POINTS' TRANSMITTED BY YOUR AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL. I HAVE STUDIED BOTH THESE MESSAGES CAREFULLY AND I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THE FIRM AND UNEQUIVOCAL POSITION YOU ADOPTED IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA WITH TARIQ AZIZ - NAMELY, THAT THERE CAN BE NO REWARD FOR AGGRESSION, VIOLENCE AND THREATS TO THE PEACE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. I AM SURE THAT YOU CONVEYED CLEARLY TO TARIQ AZIZ THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE ONE HAND, TO PUT AN END TO THE RESULTS OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION AND THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH WILL BEFALL IRAQ IF SADDAM HUSSEIN CHOOSES THE WAY OF CONFRONTATION.

TRUE TO YOUR POSITION SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THIS CRISIS, YOU TOTALLY REJECTED THE ATTEMPTS BY TARIQ AZIZ TO TIE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN WITH THE CRISIS IN THE GULF AND IMPOSE AN ARTIFICIAL LINKAGE ON THEM. TARIQ AZIZ'S WORDS EMBODY THE HEIGHT OF IRAQI AFFRONTERY CLAIMING, AS HE DID, THAT THE INVASION OF KUWAIT WAS AIMED AT SERVING AND ADVANCING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. FOR YOUR PART, YOU VERY EMPHATICALLY AND ELOQUENTLY REBUTTED HIS ASSERTIONS AS GROUNDLESS, SINCE THERE IS INDEED NO BASIS FOR ANY COMPARISON WHATSOEVER BETWEEN IRAQ'S AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT AND THE DEFENSIVE WAR FORCED ON ISRAEL IN 1967 BY ARAB STATES BENT ON LIQUIDATING US. IN

ADDITION, YOU MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR TO TARIQ AZIZ THE SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE THREATENED AND HE THAT THREATENS, AND BETWEEN THE ATTACKED AND THE ATTACKER. WITH REGARD TO THE VISIT OF DEPUTY-SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, THE TIMING WAS CRITICAL AND HIS TALKS WERE VERY IMPORTANT. I ASSUME THAT LARRY HAS REPORTED TO YOU THAT I WAS ABLE TO RE-AFFIRM THE ASSURANCE ALREADY GIVEN TO YOU THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT TAKE PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. MOREOVER, HE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE REPORTED TO YOU THAT WE REACHED COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING REGARDING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO FULFIL ITS FUNDAMENTAL AND ELEMENTARY DUTY TO PROTECT AND DEFEND ITS CITIZENS AND TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE IN THE EVENT OF BEING ATTACKED BY IRAQ. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, AND GIVEN THAT PRINCIPLE, WE ALSO REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE NEED TO SET UP A MECHANISM AND APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND, GOD FORBID, INADVERTANT CONTACT BETWEEN OUR FORCES. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT WE ARE WITH YOU AT THIS FATEFUL HOUR. AS YOU KNOW, THE LIVES OF YOUR SOLDIERS ARE AS PRECIOUS TO US AS THE LIVES OF OUR OWN.

AT THIS MOMENT, LITERALLY HOURS BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE DEADLINE SET BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I - AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL - STILL HOPE THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. BUT, SHOULD YOU BE LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE AND IF THERE BE NO WAY TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN ORDER TO ROUT A CRUEL DICTATOR WHOSE RULE AND AMBITIONS THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND ITS FUTURE, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN COUNT ON OUR FULL COOPERATION. AS I TOLD YOU IN OUR FIRST CONVERSATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, YOU WILL FIND THAT ISRAEL STANDS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND AT ITS SIDE, AS OUR SUPPORT FOR, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH, AMERICA IS NOT TRANSITORY AND A MATTER OF EXPEDIENCE, BUT ABIDING AND UNCHANGING ANCHORED, AS IT IS, IN THE DEEP FRIENDSHIP AND COMMON VALUES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SINCERELY YOURS,

DAVID LEVY

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MR. JAMES A. BAKER III  
STATE DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON D.C.

®(רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15320  
אל: רהמש/1274  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 150191, זח: 1825, דח: ב, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/בהול

הנרים הנ'ל מבוטלים חוזר מבוטלים:

מנמת 1206  
בטחון 1610  
אביב 1551  
רהמש 1273

קשר ים  
אנש שגו' אסיק

פוצה: e(רהמ), e(רם)

ססס

האסף יק א סהו אמכא זנליו

אאא, חוזם: 15735  
אל: רהמש/1323  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2173, תא: 150191, זח: 1700, דח: ב, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי / בהול

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

שלך 2219.

המכתב נמסר.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 9844  
אל: רהמש/749  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 100191, חז: 1353, דח: ב, סג: סו,  
בבב  
94356

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון, שגריר, ציר, שטיין

בראון הביאני הבוקר מסר בע'פ מהמזכיר לשה'ח, בעקבות מיפגש ג'נבה.

בנפרד מבריקים המסר.

בנצור

פוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11229  
אל: רהמש/898  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 110191, חז: 1417, דח: ב, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
3229  
שמור/בהול

אל: וושינגטון

הנדון: פינוי מרצון של בני משפחה של עובדי שגרירות ארה"ב

1. השגריר בראון התקשר עם סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'ן השכם בבוקר והודיעו כי בכוונת מחמ"ד לעדכן ולהחמיר את האזהרה לנוסעים (TRAVEL ADVISORY) הקיימת הנוגעת לאיזורנו. ובתוך כך להודיע גם על מתן אישור ליציאה מרצון מצד בני משפחה של עובדי מדינה ושל אנשי סגל שהמצאותם באיזור איננה חיונית במספר ארצות וביניהן בחריין, קטאר, האמירויות, ישראל, השטחים (המחוז המזרחי של סעודיה. בראון הדגיש שלא יחדו את ישראל והיא נכללת בתוך רשימה ארוכה.
2. להערכתו כ-80 נלווים לאנשי הסגל שלו יבחרו לעזוב את הארץ בימים הקרובים.
3. בנפרד (בפאקס) הודעה לעיתונות שפורסמה הבוקר ובתוכה עניין האישור לפינוי מרצון של בני משפחה של אנשי שג' ארה"ב (איכות הפאקס איננה טובה ומניחים שניתן להשיג נוסח קריא בווישינגטון).

מצפ"א

פוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, טקס,  
רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס



שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון  
טופס מברק

4

בלמ"ס/מידי

תאריך: 11 בינואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 15.00

אל: מצפ"א

דע: ניו-יורק/תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

לשמה - 1139

כסחון - 243

כ"א-זמק - 08

מצ"ב ה- Travel Advisory שפירסם מחמ"ד היום - מדובר באזהרה כללית ל  
האזור - תוך אזכור שמות מדינות האזור וכולל ישראל והשטחים.  
לידיעתכם.

עיתונות

102

|| 28 29 || שהח (2) ששהח (1) רהמ (2) מונכל (1) ממוכל (1) בנצור (1) מצפא (2) סולטן (1) רביב (1)  
מעח (1) הסברה (2) לעמ (2) קשדן (1) ר/מרכז (1) ממד (4) רם (1) אמן (4) אומן (1)

END

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PA/PRS

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# Travel Advisory

United States Department of State  
Bureau of Consular Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20520



## Middle East, Africa and South Asia — Warning

MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA - WARNING  
January 11, 1991

This replaces the previous advisory, issued October 8, 1990.

1132  $\frac{2}{2}$

The Department of State advises all U.S. citizen residents of and travelers to the countries of the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa that increased tensions due to Iraq's failure to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions may lead to demonstrations, terrorist attacks, and other hostile actions against the United States Government and U.S. citizens in the area. Should hostilities occur in the Persian Gulf, this threat will be heightened. Americans are urged to keep in mind the possibility of sudden changes in the security situation when making travel plans for these areas.

Travelers and resident Americans throughout the region should exercise caution and contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate to register their presence and receive information on the local situation.

In light of this situation the Department of State has taken steps to reduce the number of American citizens in affected areas.

All U.S. Government personnel and their dependents have been evacuated from Kuwait. Our Embassy in Iraq will be closed January 12. Non-essential Government personnel and all dependents have been ordered to depart Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. Voluntary departure of U.S. Government dependents and non-essential personnel has been authorized for Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia; voluntary departure of dependents only has been authorized for the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and now Israel and the Occupied Territories.

Consistent with advice in previous travel advisories, American citizens should consider deferring all travel to all of these areas, and those already in these areas who do not have essential reasons for staying should consider departing. Americans should also be aware that scheduling their departure out of the region may take some time because of the limited availability of airline seats.

To facilitate the departure of Americans from the region, the U.S. Government has taken steps to ensure continued insurance coverage for American-flag airlines. This action was taken as a result of a steep increase in insurance rates, which prompted several airlines to discontinue or consider discontinuing service to certain cities in the area.

For more detailed information, travelers are urged to consult the Department of State's current travel advisories for the countries they wish to visit.

PRESIDENT BUSH CONTINUES SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

(Text: Bush letter to Congress, 1/11/91)

Washington -- President George Bush has informed the U.S. Congress that he will continue the economic sanctions enacted against Libya in 1986.

In a January 11 message to the legislators, the president said that since "the policies and actions of the government of Libya continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," he will continue the economic sanctions against that country.

The following is the text President Bush's letter to Congress:

(BEGIN TEXT)

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. I hereby report to the Congress on developments since my last report of July 13, 1990, concerning the national emergency with respect to Libya that was declared in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986. This report is submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c); section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) ("IEEPA"); and section 505(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9(c).
2. Since my last report on July 13, 1990, there have been no amendments to the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 550 (the "Regulations"), administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("FAC") of the Department of the Treasury. Additionally, since July 13, 1990, there have been no amendments or changes to orders of the Department of Commerce or the Department of Transportation implementing aspects of Executive Order No. 12543 relating to exports from the United States and air transportation, respectively.
3. During the current 6-month period, FAC approved only one license application authorizing the renewal of a patent. Twenty licensing decisions were made prohibiting transactions in connection with Libya.
4. Various enforcement actions mentioned in previous reports continue to be pursued. In October 1990, based upon violations of IEEPA, the U.S. Customs Service seized 3 million dollars in funds at a New York bank and 800,000 at a bank in Florida. The U.S. attorneys for the respective jurisdictions utilized 18 U.S.C. 1956, the Money Laundering Control Act, to effect the seizures. This marks the first time that this statute has been used to effect seizures based upon an IEEPA violation. This

continuing investigation centers around an alleged conspiracy to invest Libyan funds in various U.S. businesses and technology.

In November 1990, FAC blocked a letter of credit in the amount of 332,124 dollars, drawn on the account of a U.S. manufacturer to pay a South Korean firm for the shipment of industrial equipment to Libya. The funds have been placed into a blocked account, and the investigation into the actions of the U.S. firm continues.

5. The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 6month period from July 13, 1990, through December 14, 1990, that are directly attributable to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by the declaration of the Libyan national emergency are estimated at 407,603 dollars. Personnel costs were largely centered in the Department of the Treasury (particularly in the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Customs Service, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, and the Office of the General Counsel), the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Federal Reserve Board, and the National Security Council.

6. The policies and actions of the Government of Libya continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. I shall continue to exercise the powers at my disposal to apply economic sanctions against Libya as long as these measures are appropriate, and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments as required by law.

(END TEXT)

NNNN

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אל:רהמש/906  
מ:-המשרד,תא:100191,זח:1554,דח:ר,סג:סו,  
בבב  
סודי/בהול

להלן נר 2138 לרוש

EL WASHINGTON: SHOVAL, SHILO, STEIN

SECRETARY BAKERS ORAL MESSAGE

--I WANTED TO PROVIDE YOU QUICKLY MY IMPRESSIONS OF MEETING TODAY WITH FM AZIZ.

--I EMPHASIZED AT OUTSET THAT I HAD COME NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT TO COMMUNICATE, TO LISTEN AS WELL AS TALK.

--THE MESSAGE THAT I CONVEYED FROM PRESIDENT BUSH AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS WAS A SIMPLE ONE : IRAQ MUST EITHER COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY FROM KUWAIT, OR BE EXPELLED BY FORCE.

--THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AND NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, IRAQ WILL LEAVE KUWAIT.

--I EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY TO FM AZIZ OUR STRONG AND GENUINE PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. THE ROAD TO THAT OUTCOME HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR IN TWELVE UNSC RESOLUTIONS :

- IMMEDIATE, UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES FROM KUWAIT.

--RESTORATION OF KUWAITI SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

--I REITERATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ATTACK IRAQ OR ITS MILITARY FORCES IF IRAQ COMPLIES FULLY WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND MAKES NO FURTHER PROVOCATION.

--I NOTED THAT THE LARGE US FORCES IN THE GULF ARE THERE BECAUSE OF THE THREAT CREATED BY IRAQI ACTIONS. AS WE HAVE STATED PUBLICLY, AND DISCUSSED WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF MAINTAINING SUCH FORCE LEVELS THERE ONCE IRAQ WITHDRAWS AND THE THREAT RECEDES.

--AND AS WE HAVE ALSO SAID PUBLICLY, WE SUPPORT UNSCR 6604S CALL ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY AFTER REPEAT AFTER IRAQI WITHDRAWAL.

--HAVING MADE CLEAR THAT THE PATH TO PEACE IS STILL OPEN, I ALSO TRIED TO CONVEY THE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ OF FAILURE TO COMPLY FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY WITH THE UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

--I OUTLINED IN DETAIL FOR FM AZIZ THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST IRAQ. PUT BLUNTLY, IF IRAQ CHOOSES TO CONTINUE ITS BRUTAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, IT WILL CHOOSE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH IT CANNOT WIN, AND WHICH WILL HAVE DEVASTATING RESULTS FOR IRAQ.

--I WARNED FM AZIZ THAT, IN THE EVENT OF WAR, IRAQ COULD EXPECT NO BREATHING SPACE OR PREMATURE CEASEFIRE. THERE WILL BE NO STALEMATE; IF WAR BEGINS, IT WILL BE FOUGHT TO A SWIFT, DECISIVE CONCLUSION.

--I ALSO WARNED OF THE HARSH CONSEQUENCES OF ANY IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. NOR WILL WE TOLERATE TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICANS OR THE DESTRUCTION OF KUWAIT'S OIL INSTALLATIONS.

--I MADE THESE POINTS NOT TO THREATEN, BUT TO INFORM. AND I DID SO WITH NO SENSE OF SATISFACTION, FOR WE SINCERELY WANT A PEACEFUL OUTCOME AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ.

--I SIMPLY WANTED TO LEAVE AS LITTLE ROOM AS POSSIBLE FOR YET ANOTHER TRAGIC MISCALCULATION BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP.

--I STRESSED THAT THIS IS A CONFRONTATION WHICH IRAQ CAN STILL AVOID. BUT THE CHOICE IS IRAQ'S TO MAKE.

--REGRETABLELY, FM AZIZ GAVE NO INDICATION DURING OUR MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS OF ANY FLEXIBILITY OR READINESS TO COMPLY WITH RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS.

--AZIZ REFUSED THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT I GAVE HIM AT THE OUTSET OF THE MEETING. HE DESCRIBED THE LETTER'S LANGUAGE AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR A COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HEADS OF STATE. HE DECLINED TO ACCEPT IT AND COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE FREE TO PUBLISH IT. I TOLD HIM THAT IN BEING THE ONLY IRAQI TO READ THE LETTER AND THEN REFUSE TO ACCEPT IT, HE WAS ACCEPTING A LARGE RESPONSIBILITY, BUT IF HE WANTED TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY, SO BE IT.

--AZIZ SAID IRAQ HAD MADE NO MISCALCULATIONS. IRAQ UNDERSTANDS FULLY THE FORCES ARRAYED AROUND IRAQ AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WEAPONS WHICH COULD BE EMPLOYED BY THE COALITION FORCES.

--AZIZ SAID THE IRAQI LEADERS KNOW THE U.S. CONGRESS, READ OUR PRESS, AND WATCH U.S. TELEVISION, SO THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS REGARDING AMERICAN INTENTIONS.

--HE SAID IRAQ HAS EXPECTED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IT SINCE THE BEGINNING (I.E., AUGUST 2).

--AZIZ MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESENT IRAQI LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE NOW AND IN THE FUTURE AND THAT IRAQ WILL EMERGE

FROM A WAR VICTORIOUS.

6. AZIZ ARGUED AT LENGTH THAT PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 IRAQ HAD BEEN FACED WITH ECONOMIC STRANGULATION. HE NOTED THAT AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT IN MAY, SADAM HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN ABOUT OIL OVERPRODUCTION AND SAID THAT ANY NATION WHICH DID NOT MEAN WAR BY THIS ACTION, SHOULD REFRAIN.

--AZIZ SEVERAL TIMES DESCRIBED ALLEGED KUWAITI ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ.

--HE THUS DESCRIBED IRAQ4S AUGUST 2 ACTION AS A 'DEFENSIVE MOVE.'

--AZIZ SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND ARAB-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES. HE ARGUED THAT IRAQ4S ACTION 'IN THE GULF' PROVIDED A 'GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP.'

--I REBUTTED THAT IRAQ HAD NOT INVADED KUWAIT TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PALESTINIANS AND THAT IRAQ4S AGGRESSION HAS PRODUCED CONTRARY RESULTS.

--I TOLD HIM HIS JUSTIFICATION OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT AS 'DEFENSIVE' WAS LUDICROUS AND THAT NO ONE BELIEVED IT.

--I TOLD HIM THE WAY TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WAS NOT THROUGH AGGRESSION BUT THROUGH WITHDRAWAL.

--AZIZ COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT U.S. MAGAZINES IN JUNE OF 1990 HAD DESCRIBED SADDAM HUSSEIN AS THE 'MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN THE WORLD' AND HAS 'PUBLIC ENEMY NO. ONE.' I RESPONDED THAT IRAQ4S SUBSEQUENT AGGRESSION PROVED THAT THOSE DESCRIPTIONS WERE CLOSE TO THE MARK.

--AZIZ MAINTAINED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD NEVER TOLD KING FAHD, KING HUSSEIN, OR PRESIDENT MUBARAK THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT ATTACK KUWAIT IN THE DAYS PRECEDING AUGUST 2. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS DISINFORMATION BY PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ARAB COALITION. HE DENIED THAT ANYONE TOLD THE U.S. IRAQ WOULD NOT MOVE MILITARILY. IN REBUTTAL WE QUOTED FROM TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH ON JULY 28 AND JULY 31, STATING CLEARLY KING HUSSEIN4S 'ASSURANCES' THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONFLICT.

--AZIZ STATED THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR, ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WILL BE INVOLVED INCLUDING ISRAEL.

--AZIZ ARGUED THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 660 WAS SOMEHOW INVALID BECAUSE THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN WAS NOT PRESENT. I POINTED OUT THAT THE IRAQI CHARGE WAS INDEED THERE. AZIZ ARGUED THAT RESOLUTION 678 AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE AFTER JANUARY 15 WAS INVALID BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT.

--I RAISED WITH AZIZ IRAQ4S BRUTALITIES IN KUWAIT AND THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT DESCRIBING THESE. AZIZ BELITTLED THE REPORT.

--AZIZ STATED THAT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE IMPORTANT ONLY TO POLITICIANS, DIPLOMATS, LAWYERS, AND JOURNALISTS. HE SAID THAT THE FIGHTERS IN ANY WAR WILL NOT REMEMBER THESE RESOLUTIONS.

--AZIZ ALLOWED THAT WAR MAY BE 'DESTINY' OR 'FATE.'

--AZIZ ARGUED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ'S AGGRESSION ARE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT UNANIMOUS.

--IN THE LAST HOUR OF OUR MEETING AZIZ PROPOSED THAT HE COME TO WASHINGTON AND THAT I VISIT BAGHDAD, BUT USING THE SAME FORMULA WE HAD HEARD FROM THEM BEFORE (YOU PICK A DATE FOR WASHINGTON; WE PICK A DATE FOR BAGHDAD) HE SPECIFIED NO DATES. I POINTED OUT THAT RESOLUTION 678 WAS PASSED 40 DAYS AGO. PRESIDENT BUSH HAD PROPOSED SUCH MEETINGS IN A STATEMENT ON DECEMBER 1. THE U.S. HAD OFFERED 15 DIFFERENT DATES FOR MY TRIP TO BAGHDAD BETWEEN DECEMBER 20 AND JANUARY 3 INCLUDING CHRISTMAS DAY AND NEW YEAR'S DAY. IRAQ HAD REJECTED THEM ALL.

--I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD ALREADY STATED THAT I WOULD NOT NOW BE GOING TO BAGHDAD. TO PROPOSE SUCH MEETINGS ONLY SIX DAYS BEFORE THE JANUARY 15 DEADLINE IS A CLEAR ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE DEADLINE AND TO EXTEND THE PROCESS BEYOND.

--I TOLD AZIZ THAT THE U.S. WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FIVE REMAINING AMERICAN PERSONNEL FROM OUR EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD ON JANUARY 12. I ASKED HIM TWICE FOR HIS ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPART WITHOUT DELAY OR HINDRANCE ON THAT DATE. THE FIRST TIME AZIZ PASSED OVER ANY RESPONSE. THE SECOND TIME HE STATED THAT 'WE WILL ABIDE BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LIVE UP TO IT.' I SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN THEY COULD LEAVE UNIMPEDED.

--I CLOSED BY CALLING AGAIN FOR IRAQ TO OBSERVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. I STRESSED THAT JANUARY 15 IS A REAL DEADLINE. I SAID THAT WE HAVE HAD FIVE AND ONE HALF MONTHS FOR DIPLOMATIC STEPS AND NOW IS THE TIME FOR ACTION : IRAQ'S IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. I SAID THAT IRAQ TOOK ONLY TWO DAYS TO MOVE A HUGE FORCE INTO KUWAIT AND IT SHOULD REVERSE THAT DEPLOYMENT NOW. END OF SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE.

4. ATMOSPHERE : THE SIX AND ONE HALF HOURS OF TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THERE WAS A HIGH DEGREE OF INTENSITY AND THE STATEMENTS WERE BLUNT AND UNEQUIVOCAL. AT NO TIME DID ANYONE RAISE A VOICE OR CUT ANOTHER OFF. CONSIDERING THE SOMBER AND CRITICAL STAGE, THE TONE WAS COOL BUT CLEAR. BOTH SIDES DID INDEED LISTEN TO ONE ANOTHER AND EXPLAINED POSITIONS IN DEPTH. THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH WITH CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATIONS.

AD KAN.  
BENTSUR.



תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

טסט

אאא, חוזם: 11844  
אל: רהמש/992  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 236, תא: 110191, זח: 1711, חמ: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/מידי

תאריך: 11 בינואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 17.00

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY/ TEXT OF THE  
PRESIDENT'S OPEN LETTER TO COLLEGE STUDENTS/ DATED: JANUARY 9, 1991  
RELEASED: THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 1991

IF ARMED MEN INVADED A HOME IN THIS COUNTRY, KILLED THOSE IN  
THEIR WAY, STOLE WHAT THEY WANTED AND THEN ANNOUNCED THE HOUSE WAS  
NOW THEIRS -- NO ONE WOULD HESITATE ABOUT WHAT MUST BE DONE.

AND THAT IS WHY WE CANNOT HESITATE ABOUT WHAT MUST BE DONE  
HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD: IN KUWAIT.

THERE IS MUCH IN THE MODERN WORLD THAT IS SUBJECT TO DOUBTS OR  
QUESTIONS -- WASHED IN SHADES OF GRAY. BUT NOT THE BRUTAL  
AGGRESSION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN AGAINST A PEACEFUL, SOVEREIGN NATION  
AND ITS PEOPLE. IT'S BLACK AND WHITE. THE FACTS ARE CLEAR. THE  
CHOICE UNAMBIGUOUS.

RIGHT VS. WRONG.

THE TERROR SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS IMPOSED UPON KUWAIT VIOLATES  
EVERY PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN DECENCY. LISTEN TO WHAT AMNESTY  
INTERNATIONAL HAS DOCUMENTED. "WIDESPREAD ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
HAVE BEEN PERPETRATED BY IRAQI FORCES... ARBITRARY ARREST AND  
DETENTION WIHOUT TRIAL OF THOUSANDS... WIDESPREAD TORTURE...  
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION OF  
HUNDREDS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS, INCLUDING CHILDREN."

INCLUDING CHILDREN. THERE'S NO HORROR THAT COULD MAKE THIS A  
MORE OBVIOUS CONFLICT OF GOOD VS. EVIL. THE MAN WHO USED CHEMICAL  
WARFARE ON HIS OWN PEOPLE -- ONCE AGAIN INCLUDING CHILDREN -- NOW  
OVERSEES PUBLIC HANGINGS OF DISSENTERS. AND DAILY HIS TROOPS COMMIT  
ATROCITIES AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS.

THIS BRUTAILTY HAS REVERBERATED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE WORLD.  
IF WE DO NOT FOLLOW THE DICTATES OF OUR INNER MORAL COMPASS AND  
STAND UP FOR HUMAN LIFE, THEN HIS LAWLESSNESS WILL THREATEN THE  
PEACE AND DEMOCRACY OF THE EMERGING NEW WORLD ORDER WE NOW SEE:  
THIS LONG DREAMED-OF VISION WE'VE ALL WORKED TOWARD FOR SO LONG.

A YEAR AFTER THE JOYOUS DAWN OF FREEDOM'S LIGHT IN EASTERN EUROPE, A DARK EVIL HAS DESCENDED IN ANOTHER PART OF THE WORLD. BUT WE HAVE THE CHANCE -- AND WE HAVE THE OBLIGATION -- TO STOP RUTHLESS AGGRESSION.

I HAVE BEEN IN WAR. I HAVE KNOWN THE TERROR OF COMBAT. AND I TELL YOU THIS WITH ALL MY HEART: I DON'T WANT THERE TO BE WAR EVER AGAIN. I AM DETERMINED TO DO ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS -- BUT ONLY IF THE PEACE IS GENUINE, IF IT RESTS ON PRINCIPLE, NOT APPEASEMENT.

BUT WHILE WE SEARCH FOR THAT ANSWER, IN THE GULF YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN ARE PUTTING THEIR OWN LIVES ON HOLD IN ORDER TO STAND FOR PEACE IN OUR WORLD AND FOR THE ESSENTIAL VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE ITSELF. MANY ARE YOUNGER THAN MY OWN CHILDREN. YOUR AGE, MOST OF THEM. DOING TOUGH DUTY FOR SOMETHING THEY BELIEVE IN.

LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT ONE OF THE SOLDIERS OVER THERE, S.F.C. TERRY HATFIELD, A YOUNG MAN FROM GEORGIA. HE SENT ME A CHRISTMAS CARD. AND THIS IS WHAT HE WROTE.

"MR. PRESIDENT, I JUST WANTED YOU TO KNOW MY SOLDIERS AND I AM READY TO DO WHATEVER MISSION YOU DECIDE. FREEDOM AS WE KNOW AND ENJOY HAS BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY AND MUST BE RESTORED. ALTHOUGH WE ARE SEPARATED FROM FAMILY, FRIENDS, LOVED ONES, WE WILL DO WHAT MUST BE DONE... WE STAND READY AND WAITING. GOD BLESS YOU AND THE U.S.A."

TERRY UNDERSTANDS THE MORAL OBLIGATION THAT HAS COMPELLED OUR EXTRAORDINARY MULTINATIONAL COALITION TO MAKE THIS STAND IN THE GULF. TO LOOK THIS INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST STRAIGHT IN THE EYE AND SAY: NO CONCESSIONS. TO PROCLAIM FOR NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE: NO COMPROMISE. TO BEAR WITNESS BY OUR PRESENCE TO THE FACT THAT AGGRESSION WILL NOT BE REWARDED.

TERRY WAITS THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, YET WE SHARE THE SAME THOUGHTS. WE DESPERATELY WANT PEACE. BUT WE KNOW THAT TO REWARD AGGRESSION WOULD BE TO END THE PROMISE OF OUR NEW WORLD ORDER. TO REWARD AGGRESSION WOULD BE TO DESTROY THE UNITED NATIONS' PROMISE AS INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPER. TO REWARD AGGRESSION WOULD BE TO CONDONE THE ACTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD DESECRATE THE PROMISE OF HUMAN LIFE ITSELF.

AND WE WILL DO NONE OF THIS. THERE ARE TIMES IN LIFE WHEN WE CONFRONT VALUES WORTH FIGHTING FOR. THIS IS ONE SUCH TIME.

EACH DAY THAT PASSES MEANS ANOTHER DAY FOR IRAQ'S FORCES TO DIG DEEPER INTO THEIR STOLEN LAND. ANOTHER DAY SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN WORK TOWARD BUILDING HIS NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND PERFECTING HIS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. ANOTHER DAY OF ATROCITIES FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO DOCUMENT. ANOTHER DAY OF INTERNATIONAL OUTLAWS, INSTEAD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

I ASK YOU TO THINK ABOUT THE ECONOMIC DEVASTATION THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD CONTINUE TO WREAK ON THE WORLD'S EMERGING DEMOCRACIES IF HE WERE IN CONTROL OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE WORLD'S OIL RESERVES. AND TO REFLECT ON THE TERRIBLE THREAT THAT A SADDAM HUSSEIN ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ALREADY POSES TO HUMAN LIFE AND TO THE FUTURE OF ALL NATIONS.

TOGETHER, AS AN AMERICA UNITED AGAINST THESE HORRORS, WE CAN,

WITH OUT COALITION PARTNERS, ASSURE THAT THIS AGGRESSION IS STOPPED AND THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THIS NATION AND THE REST OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD ARE PRESERVED.

AND SO LET US REMEMBER AND SUPPORT TERRY HATFIELD, ALL OUR FINE SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN, AS THEY STAND READY ON THE FRONTIER OF FREEDOM, WILLING TO DO THEIR DUTY AND DO IT WELL. THEY DESERVE OUR COMPLETE AND ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT -- AND LASTING GRATITUDE.

עד כאן  
עתונות

תפוצה: ששה, ששהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 9273  
אל: רהמש/717  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 174, תא: 090191, זח: 1746, דח: ב, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר  
תאריך: 9 בינואר 1991  
שעת חיבור: 1700  
א ל: תפוצת תקשורת  
דע: ניו-יורק  
מאת: עתונות וושינגטון  
חלק 1 מתוך 2 חלקים

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH FOLLOWING BAKER-AZIZ MEETING IN GENEVA, THE WHITE HOUSE, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: I HAVE A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT, AND THEN I WILL TAKE A FEW QUESTIONS.

I HAVE SPOKEN WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, JIM BAKER, WHO REPORTED TO ME ON HIS NEARLY SEVEN HOURS OF CONVERSATION WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, TARIQ AZIZ. SECRETARY BAKER MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DISCERNED NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT IRAQ WAS WILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DEMAND TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT AND COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.

SECRETARY BAKER ALSO REPORTED TO ME THAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTED MY LETTER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, REFUSED TO CARRY THIS LETTER AND GIVE IT TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HERE IN WASHINGTON DID THE SAME THING. THIS IS BUT ONE MORE EXAMPLE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS DESIGNED TO SETTLE THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT WHETHER THE DIPLOMACY IS INITIATED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, THE ARAB LEAGUE, OR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME. UNFORTUNATELY. THE CONCLUSION IS CLEAR. SADDAM HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO REJECT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

I SENT SECRETARY JIM BAKER TO GENEVA NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT TO COMMUNICATE. AND I WANTED IRAQI LEADERS TO KNOW JUST HOW DETERMINED WE ARE THAT THE IRAQI FORCES LEAVE KUWAIT WITHOUT CONDITION OR FURTHER DELAY. SECRETARY BAKER MADE CLEAR THAT BY ITS FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 12 RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IRAQ WOULD GAIN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REJOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AND HE ALSO MADE CLEAR -- WAS JUST -- HE ALSO MADE CLEAR HOW MUCH IRAQ STANDS TO LOSE IF IT DOES NOT COMPLY.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I HAVE NOT GIVEN UP ON A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. IT'S NOT TOO LATE. I'VE JUST BEEN ON THE PHONE, SUBSEQUENT TO THE BAKER PRESS CONFERENCE, WITH KING FAHD, WITH

PRESIDENT MITTERAND, TO WHOM I'VE TALKED TWICE TODAY, PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY AND OTHERS ARE CONTACTING OTHER COALITION PARTNERS TO KEEP THE MATTER UNDER LIVELY DISCUSSION.

IT ISN'T TOO LATE. BUT NOW, AS BEFORE -- AS IT'S BEEN BEFORE, THE CHOICE OF PEACE OR WAR IS REALLY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TO MAKE.

AND NOW I'D BE GLAD TO TAKE A FEW QUESTIONS.

Q YOU SAID IN AN INTERVIEW LAST MONTH THAT YOU BELIEVE IN YOUR GUT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT BY JANUARY 15TH. AFTER THE FAILURE OF THIS MEETING TODAY, WHAT DOES YOUR GUT TELL YOU ABOUT THAT? AND IN YOUR GUT DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS GOING TO BE WAR OR PEACE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I CAN'T MISREPRESENT THIS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I AM DISCOURAGED. I WATCHED MUCH OF THE AZIZ PRESS CONFERENCE

AND THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ARE ABOUT THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT. THEY ARE ABOUT THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, ABOUT THE LIQUIDATION OF A LOT OF THE PEOPLE IN KUWAIT. IT'S ABOUT THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT TO KUWAIT. AND HERE WE ARE LISTENING TO A 45 MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE SECRETARY STATED -- SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES HAD A SIX HOUR -- SIX HOURS WORTH OF MEETINGS OVER THERE, AND THERE WAS NOT ONE SINGLE SENTENCE THAT HAS TO RELATE TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT. AND SO, TERRY, I'D HAVE TO SAY, I CERTAINLY AM NOT ENCOURAGED BY THAT, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE UP. AND I TOLD THIS TO OUR COALITION PARTNERS, AND I'LL BE TALKING TO MORE OF THEM WHEN I FINISH HERE. WE'VE GOT TO KEEP TRYING. BUT THIS WAS A -- THIS WAS A -- A TOTAL STIFF ARM. THIS IS A TOTAL REBUFF.

Q LET ME FOLLOW UP PLEASE. HAVE YOU DECIDED IN YOUR MIND TO GO WAR IF HE'S NOT OUT OF THERE BY THE 15TH?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I HAVE NOT MADE UP MY DECISION ON WHAT AND WHEN TO DO. I AM MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER THAT THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING 678, BE -- IS IMPLEMENTED FULLY.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, AZIZ MADE A PLEDGE THAT HE WOULD NOT MAKE THE FIRST ATTACK. WOULD YOU MATCH THAT? AND ALSO, WHAT'S WRONG WITH A MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE IF IT COULD AVOID A BLOODY WAR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I WOULDN'T MAKE IT, AND WE OPPOSE LINKAGE. THE COALITION OPPOSES LINKAGE, AND THE ARGUMENT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN IS ABOUT KUWAIT. IT IS ABOUT THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, THE LIQUIDATION OF A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. AND IT IS LONG BEEN DETERMINED BY NOT JUST THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT BY THE ENTIRE UNITED NATIONS, THAT THIS IS ABOUT KUWAIT. AND THAT IS THE POINT THAT WAS MISSING FROM HIS -- HIS EXPLANATIONS HERE TODAY. AND SO THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE ON THESE ITEMS, AND THAT'S BEEN THE FIRM POSITION OF ALL OF THE ALLIES -- THOSE WITH FORCES THERE -- AND INDEED, OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SO WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT HIS ALLIES THERE, I DON'T KNOW WHO STOOD UP AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND STOOD AGAINST THE RESOLUTION THAT SO OVERWHELMINGLY PASSED CONDEMNING IRAQ. SO THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE, PUT IT THAT WAY.

Q TARIQ AZIZ, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LETTER, SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS RUDE IN ITS USE OF LANGUAGE AND SOMEHOW INAPPROPRIATE TO A

DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION. I WONDER, SIR, IF YOU ARE WILLING TO RELEASE THE LETTER NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN -- RUN ITS COURSE, APPARENTLY. AND IF -- WHETHER YOU ARE OR NOT, WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE IT FOR US AND TELL US WHAT IT SAID?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL LET ME FIRST DESCRIBE WHY I WANTED TO SEND A LETTER. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED, FAIRLY OR UNFAIRLY, THAT THOSE AROUND SADDAM HUSSEIN REFUSE TO BRING HIM BAD NEWS OR REFUSE TO TELL IT TO HIM STRAIGHT. AND SO I MADE THE DETERMINATION THAT I WOULD WRITE A LETTER THAT WOULD EXPLAIN AS CLEARLY AND FORCEFULLY AS I COULD EXACTLY WHAT THE SITUATION IS THAT HE FACES.

THE LETTER WAS NOT RUDE; THE LETTER WAS DIRECT. AND THE LETTER DID EXACTLY WHAT I THINK IS NECESSARY AT THIS STAGE. BUT TO REFUSE TO EVEN PASS A LETTER ALONG SEEMS TO ME TO BE JUST ONE MORE MANIFESTATION OF THE STONEWALLING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE. WE GAVE HIM 15 DATES FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MEET WITH HIM, AND HE'S OFF MEETING WITH MR. A, MR. B, MR. C AND HAS NO TIME FOR THAT.

SO THE LETTER WAS PROPER. I'VE BEEN AROUND THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK FOR A LONG TIME. THE LETTER WAS PROPER. IT WAS DIRECT. AND IT WAS WHAT I THINK WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO HIM TO SHOW HIM THE RESOLVE OF THE REST OF THE WORLD, CERTAINLY OF THE COALITION.

IN TERMS OF RELEASING IT, BRIT, I HAVEN'T GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO THAT. IT WAS WRITTEN AS A LETTER TO HIM, BUT LET ME THINK ABOUT IT. I -- I MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO IT; I MIGHT NOT. I JUST DON'T KNOW. IF I THOUGHT IT WOULD HELP -- HELP GET THE MESSAGE OUT TO HIM AND THROUGH AN INDIRECT WAY, MAYBE -- MAYBE IT MAKES SOME SENSE, ALTHOUGH WE'VE BEEN SAYING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT WAS IN THE LETTER.

Q WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, WAS THE REFUSAL BY THE AMBASSADOR HERE TO EVEN ACCEPT THE LETTER -- WAS THAT PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE REFUSAL OF TARIQ AZIZ? I MEAN, IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT WAS AFTER HE HAD MADE THAT -- I THINK IT WAS AFTER THE -- THE LETTER HAD BEEN REJECTED IN -- IN -- AT THE TABLE THERE IN GENEVA. IT'S JUST ONE MORE EFFORT TO TRY TO GET THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION TO HIM -- YES. NOT SURE ON THAT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT'S CORRECT -- YES, THAT IS CORRECT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT YOU ARE CONSIDERING A CALL-UP OF UP TO A MILLION RESERVISTS TO REINFORCE THE FORCES THAT ARE SERVING IN THE PERSIAN GULF. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I CAN TELL YOU, NOBODY'S EVER SUGGESTED THAT TO ME.

Q IS THERE ANY RESERVE CALL-UP BEING CONTEMPLATED --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I'LL DO -- I'LL ASK THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO RESPOND TO THAT QUESTION WHEN I GET FINISHED HERE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOUR ATTITUDE NOW IS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE RESOLUTION THAT YOU ASKED FOR YESTERDAY WITH THE CONGRESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH CERTAIN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. I HAVE TALKED TO ALL FOUR LEADERS THIS AFTERNOON -- SENATOR MITCHELL, SENATOR DOLE, SPEAKER FOLEY,

CONGRESSMAN MICHEL, I TALKED TO HIM IN PERSON HERE -- AND I'M NOT SURE WHERE IT STANDS. WE ARE -- I AM ANXIOUS TO SEE AND WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME A RESOLUTION THAT SAYS, "WE ARE GOING TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS TO A @T'."

I DON'T THINK IT'S TOO LATE TO SEND A CONSOLIDATED SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND I THINK THAT WOULD BE A CONSOLIDATED SIGNAL. I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL STILL. I'VE TOLD THE CONGRESSMEN BACK IN DECEMBER, AS I THINK I TOLD EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM, THAT I WOULD HAVE WELCOMED A RESOLUTION BACK THEN, PROVIDED IT WOULD SEND THIS SOLID SIGNAL. BUT IF IT CAN DO IT TODAY, I WOULD WELCOME IT.

SO, I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHERE IT STANDS, BUT I KNOW THAT THERE IS A GOOD FEELING UP THERE. I THINK PEOPLE SEE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF THE POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY. I THINK THEY SEE THAT WE HAVE TRIED THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. I HOPE THEY KNOW THAT I AM AS COMMITTED TO PEACE AS ANYONE. BUT I HOPE THEY ALSO KNOW THAT I AM FIRMLY DETERMINED TO SEE THAT THIS AGGRESSION NOT STAND. AND I THINK THEY'RE BACKING ME IN THAT. SO MAYBE THAT INGREDIENT, WHICH HASN'T ALWAYS BEEN QUITE AS CLEAR AS IT IS NOW, WILL HELP AS THIS DEBATE -- PROPER DEBATE GOES FORWARD IN THE CONGRESS.

Q A FOLLOW-UP IF I MIGHT. CONSTITUTIONALLY, SIR, DO YOU THINK YOU NEED SUCH A RESOLUTION, AND IF YOU LOSE IT, WOULD YOU BE BOUND BY THAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK I NEED IT. I THINK SECRETARY CHENEY EXPRESSED IT VERY WELL THE OTHER DAY. THERE ARE DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF THIS QUESTION, BUT SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD BE UNDER NO QUESTION ON THIS, I FEEL THAT I HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.

Q AND ON THE QUESTION OF BEING BOUND -- THE SECOND PART OF THAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I STILL FEEL THAT I HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, MANY ATTORNEYS HAVING SO ADVISED ME.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, BUT WYATT'S QUESTION OPENS UP A WHOLE NEW -- (INAUDIBLE) -- YOU TALK ABOUT YOU DON'T WANT THIS TO BE ANOTHER VIETNAM. IF CONGRESS --

PRESIDENT BUSH: IT WON'T BE ANOTHER VIETNAM.

Q -- IF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO GIVE YOU A RESOLUTION, REFUSES TO GIVE YOU -- EVEN GIVE YOU A GULF OF TONKIN-TYPE RESOLUTION, HOW CAN YOU GO TO WAR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK THEY'RE GOING TO REFUSE.

Q MAY I ASK YOU ABOUT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND? YOU SAY THE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: THERE HAVE BEEN 200 -- I WOULD JUST REPEAT FOR THE RECORD THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF USES OF FORCE IN OUR HISTORY AND VERY FEW DECLARATIONS OF WAR. BUT I HAVE TRIED. I HAVE DONE MORE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS THAN ANY OTHER PRESIDENT. SOME OF THESE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS HAVE TOLD ME THAT. AND I HAVE TRIED TO REACH OUT TO THEM IN VARIOUS WAYS, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO DO IT BECAUSE I WANT TO SEE A SOLID FRONT HERE AS WE STAND UP AGAINST THIS AGGRESSOR.



Q LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT SOLID FRONT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: AND I THINK IT ENHANCES THE PEACE. I THINK IT -- I THINK -- I REALLY BELIEVE, JOHN, THAT HE IS LIVING UNDER A DELUSION. I THINK HE DOESN'T THINK THAT FORCE WILL BE USED AGAINST HIM. I THINK HE'S MISINTERPRETED THE DEBATE. I ALSO THINK HE'S UNDER A DELUSION ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A CONFLAGRATION BREAKS OUT. I BELIEVE THAT FIRMLY, AND I'VE HAD MANY, MANY PEOPLE WHOM I RESPECT TELL ME THAT. SO, I WOULD HOPE THAT WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE WOULD DISSUADE HIM FROM THAT.

Q WELL, YES, SIR --

PRESIDENT BUSH: JUST A FOLLOW-UP.

Q YOU SAID THAT THE COALITION IS UNITED AGAINST ANY LINKAGE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. YOU TALKED TO FRANCOIS MITTERRAND TWICE TODAY BUT IN PUBLIC HE SAYS HE IS FOR THIS INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE, AND HE SEEMS TO HAVE NO OBJECTION AT ALL IF SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTS TO USE THAT AS A FIG LEAF TO PULL OUT OF KUWAIT. YOU DO HAVE AN OBJECTION.

MITTERRAND ALSO SAYS THAT APPARENTLY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS WANT TO MEET WITH AZIZ APPARENTLY IN ALGIERS. WHAT IF THEY GO IN THERE AND SAY, "WELL, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDEAST"?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE EC HAVE BEEN VERY SOLID, AND SO HAS PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, THAT THERE WILL BE NO LEAKAGE. SO YOU'RE ASKING ME A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION THAT WON'T -- THAT I WON'T HAVE TO ANSWER -- BECAUSE HE'S NOT GOING TO DO THAT.

Q HE SAID TODAY HE DISAGREES WITH YOU. I MEAN, I --

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OVER THE YEARS HAVE HAD SOME DIFFERENCES IN HOW THE BEST WAY TO BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS. WE HAD A VERY ACTIVE INITIATIVE UNDERWAY BY JIM BAKER BUT THAT DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. AND FRANCOIS MITTERRAND KNOWS THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE TO DO WITH THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT, AND I KNOW HE KNOWS THIS AND HE'S BEEN VERY FORTHRIGHT ABOUT IT.

BUT YES, HE'S VERY FRANK IN SAYING COUNTRIES HAVE A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO HOW YOU SOLVE ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM. AND WE'VE NEVER -- I WOULD SIMPLY REFER YOU BACK TO WHAT I'VE SAID ON THAT SUBJECT. I THINK YOU WERE WITH US OVER IN THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WHEN I ADDRESSED MYSELF TO THIS.

SO -- BUT I AM GOING TO AVOID LINKAGE. I LISTENED TO THAT AZIZ MEETING, AND ALL HE TRIED TO DO IS OBFUSCATE, TO CONFUSE, TO MAKE THE -- TO MAKE EVERYBODY THINK THIS HAD TO DO WITH THE WEST BANK, FOR EXAMPLE. AND IT DOESN'T. IT HAS TO DO WITH THE AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT, THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, THE BRUTALIZING OF THE PEOPLE IN KUWAIT. AND IT HAS TO DO WITH A NEW WORLD ORDER, AND THAT WORLD ORDER IS ONLY GOING TO BE ENHANCED IF THIS NEWLY-ACTIVATED PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROVES TO BE EFFECTIVE. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY THE NEW WORLD ORDER WILL BE ENHANCED.

YEAH?

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU SAY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DOESN'T UNDERSTAND YET. WHY NOT A MEETING FACE TO FACE? WHY REFUSE ANY MEETING FACE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: BECAUSE HE'S HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY, AND HE KEEPS STIFF-ARMING. WE FINALLY SAID, "THIS IS THE LAST STEP." WE TRIED 15 DATES IN BAGHDAD. WE TRIED TO SET UP THESE MEETINGS. AND NOW WE TRIED THIS ONE, AND THERE WASN'T ONE SINGLE REASON TO MAKE ME THINK THAT ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD DO -- AND THE IRAQIS WOULD DO ANY GOOD AT ALL. IF I FELT IT WOULD, FINE; BUT IT WILL NOT. I TALKED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY, AND THERE IS A CHANCE THAT HE MIGHT UNDERTAKE SUCH A MISSION. CERTAINLY WE'D HAVE NO OBJECTION.

THERE'S ONE OTHER REASON -- AND I CITE THAT BECAUSE THIS IS NOT IRAQ AGAINST THE UNITED STATES; IT IS IRAQ AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD. IT IS THE UNITED NATIONS THAT PASSED 12 RESOLUTIONS, NOT THE UNITED STATES. IT IS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 100-PLUS COUNTRIES, STANDING SOLIDLY AGAINST THE DICTATOR. AND THEREFORE, IT DOESN'T NEED TO BE A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION HERE. WE TRIED THAT, AND WE WERE STIFF-ARMED BY AN INTRANSIGENT FOREIGN SECRETARY.

AND SO THE ANSWER IS, IF -- IF DIPLOMACY CAN BE EFFECTIVE NOW, LET'S KEEP IT IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THESE RESOLUTIONS WERE PASSED. AND I WOULD HOPE THAT MAYBE IT WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT, BUT I CAN -- I'D HAVE TO LEVEL WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. NOTHING I SAW TODAY -- NOTHING -- LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MAN IS GOING TO BE REASONABLE.

SO BACK TO TERRY'S QUESTION, I'M LESS -- I HAVE LESS OF A FEELING THAT -- THAT -- THAT HE'LL COME AROUND, BUT WE OUGHT TO KEEP TRYING. WE OUGHT TO KEEP TRYING RIGHT DOWN TO THE WIRE.

YEAH, ANN?

MR. FITZWATER: A FINAL QUESTION HERE --

Q YOU REPEATED KEEP TRYING AND YOU CITED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS; SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER CITED HIM THREE TIMES. WHAT EXACTLY COULD HIS MISSION BE IF THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT SECRETARY BAKER LAID OUT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT SURE, MAYBE THE WHOLE -- WHAT -- WHAT WOULD A MISSION OF JIM BAKER HAVE BEEN? IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TO CONVINCE THE MAN THAT HE IS UP AGAINST AN IMMOVABLE FORCE. HE'S UP AGAINST SOMETHING THAT IS NOT GOING TO YIELD. HE IS UP AGAINST A SITUATION UNDER WHICH THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE, AND THERE WILL BE NONE.

BUT, BECAUSE YOU SEE, ANN, I GO BACK TO MY POINT. I DON'T THINK HE HAS FELT THIS UP TILL NOW, ON BOTH POINTS. I DON'T THINK HE'S FELT THAT FORCE WILL BE USED AGAINST HIM, AND I DON'T THINK HE'S -- AND I THINK HE HAS FELT THAT IF IT WERE HE'D PREVAIL. AND HE'S WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT SADDAM BELIEVES THAT IF IT COMES TO WAR, EVEN IF HE'S DRIVEN OUT OF KUWAIT MILITARILY, HE CAN SURVIVE IN POWER. IS HE WRONG?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I -- I THINK HE'S WRONG ON ALL OF HIS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF IT CAME TO WAR -- GOD FORBID.

IN THE MIDDLE AND BACK HERE, AND THEN WE'VE GOT THREE MORE AND THEN I'VE GOT TO GO. THESE -- ELLEN --

Q WOULD HE BE KILLED, MR. PRESIDENT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: HUH?

Q WOULD HE BE KILLED?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER THAT. I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU SEEM TO HAVE RULED OUT -- FURTHER DIPLOMACY AS A --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO. YOU MISSED WHAT I SAID, MA'AM -- ELLEN -- ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL, POSSIBLY. THE EC HAS TRIED. I'LL GET BACK TO YOU -- LET ME FINISH THIS ONE TRAIN OF THOUGHT, AND THEN I'LL COME TO YOUR QUESTION. THE EC HAS TRIED, AND, INDEED, WE SEE AZIZ SAYING NO, HE WOULDN'T MEET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. YOU'VE SEEN PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID OF ALGERIA TO TRY. I TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN, I WANT TO SEE US GO THE LAST STEP FOR PEACE. I WANT TO USE EVERYTHING AT MY POWER TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO TRY. AND, INDEED, THERE HAVE BEEN. ARAB LEAGUE HAS TRIED. OVER AND OVER AGAIN, PEOPLE HAVE TRIED. AND THEY RUN UP AGAINST THE SAME ANSWER.

I REMEMBER THE SPECULATION THAT CAME OUT HERE IN OUR PAPERS, IN THIS COUNTRY, ABOUT A VISIT BY A FRENCH DELEGATE THAT WAS GOING OVER THERE. THE HOPES WERE RAISED. NOTHING HAPPENED. SO I JUST HAD TO ARGUE WITH THE PREMISE, BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF DIPLOMACY, AND THERE MAY BE MORE. NOW, EXCUSE ME FOR INTERRUPTING YOU.

Q SIR, YOU SEEM TO BE VERY SKEPTICAL THAT FURTHER DIPLOMACY WOULD WORK, AND YET YOU'VE SAID HERE TODAY THAT YOU HAVEN'T GIVEN UP ON A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I WONDER WHERE IT IS YOU'D FIND THIS HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT SURE I HAVE GREAT HOPE FOR IT, BUT I THINK WHEN HUMAN LIFE IS AT STAKE, YOU GO THE EXTRA MILE FOR PEACE, AND THAT'S WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO DO. AND I'LL CONTINUE TO THINK OF REASONS -- I TOLD -- I TOLD PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, I SAID, "LOOK, IF YOU THINK OF A NEW APPROACH OR I DO, PLEASE, LET'S ONE OR THE OTHER GET ON THE PHONE AND TRY." BUT WE REMAIN DETERMINED THAT THESE RESOLUTIONS ARE GOING TO BE COMPLIED WITH.

I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT SANCTIONS -- WELL, I KNOW SANCTIONS ALONE AREN'T GOING TO GET THIS JOB DONE, AND SO WE'RE -- WE'RE PUSHING HERE, AND THAT'S WHAT THE BAKER MEETING IN -- WITH AZIZ WAS ABOUT. I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE UP, THOUGH. KAREN?

Q YEAH. A LOT OF PEOPLE, IN LOOKING AT THE SITUATION ON THE OUTSIDE, WILL SAY THERE MUST MORE THAN THIS. THERE MUST BE SOME BACKGROUND DIPLOMACY, THERE MUST BE SOMETHING GOING ON, YOU CAN'T BE RUSHING HEADLONG INTO WAR THIS WAY. CAN YOU TELL US IF THERE IS NOTHING, IF IT IS WHAT WE APPEAR TO BE GETTING, THAT IF SADDAM ISN'T GOING TO MOVE THEN WE'RE GOING TO WAR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT GOING TO USE THAT PHRASE. I AM GOING TO SAY, IF SADDAM DOESN'T MOVE WE ARE GOING TO FULLY IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 678, AND IT'LL BE FULLY COMPLIED WITH.

BUT I -- I WISH I COULD TELL YOU I'M MORE HOPEFUL. THERE IS NO BACK CHANNEL. WE'VE TRIED IT DIRECTLY. I'VE HAD TO LEVEL, AND PROPERLY SO, WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS AS TO WHAT I'M DOING AND THEY'VE LEVELED WITH US, LEVELED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE COALITION WITH FORCE -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS. AND A LOT OF AVENUES HAVE BEEN TRIED.

BUT I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT THERE'S ANY HIDDEN AGENDA OUT THERE, SECRET NEGOTIATIONS; THERE IS NOT. AND IT WOULDN'T BE RIGHT FOR US TO BE OFF TELLING YOU ONE THING OPENLY HERE AND THEN GOING AROUND BEHIND THE CORNER WITH SOME SECRET CHANNEL. SO, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY, IF THERE'S ANY FEELING THAT THAT'S HAPPENING, IT ISN'T HAPPENING.

Q THE ENTIRE HOPE FOR PEACE THEN RESTS ON SADDAM BACKING OFF --

PRESIDENT BUSH: AND IT HAS SINCE AUGUST 2ND. EXACTLY. BECAUSE THIS AGGRESSION IS NOT GOING TO STAND.

Q MR. PRESIDENT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: AND THERE'S AN AWFUL LOT AT STAKE IN TERMS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER THAT IT DOESN'T STAND. AND THERE'S A LOT AT STAKE IN TERMS OF A LOT OF HUMAN LIFE IN KUWAIT THAT IT DOESN'T STAND. AND THERE'S A LOT AT STAKE IN TERMS OF HOW THE COALITION LOOKS AT THIS THAT IT DOESN'T STAND. SO IT WON'T.

Q YOU SAID WHEN YOU FIRST PROPOSED BI-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WAS BECAUSE YOU WERE CONVINCED THE MESSAGE HAD NOT GOTTEN THROUGH, HAD NOT GOTTEN ACROSS. ARE YOU NOW CONVINCED THAT THE MESSAGE HAS GOTTEN ACROSS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I DID LISTEN CAREFULLY TO -- TO MR. AZIZ, AND -- WHO I THOUGHT SPOKE QUITE WELL. I DIDN'T AGREE WITH WHAT HE'S TRYING TO DO OBVIOUSLY, TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE BY REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE POINT AT HAND WHICH IS THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, BUT I THOUGHT HE DID IT WELL. (SOME LAUGHTER.) AND I THOUGHT HE -- I THOUGHT HE KIND OF SENT A SIGNAL THAT THEY DO UNDERSTAND WHAT'S UP AGAINST THEM, BUT I STILL DON'T BELIEVE THAT THEY THINK THE WORLD COALITION WILL USE FORCE AGAINST THEM. I MAY BE WRONG, BUT THAT'S WHAT I -- THAT'S WHAT I THINK AND HEAR.

AND I ALSO STILL BELIEVE, AS I SAID EARLIER, THAT HE -- HE SOMEWHAT HAS THIS FEELING THAT HE WILL PREVAIL OR THAT HE WILL PROLONG. THIS WILL NOT BE THAT. I -- I'VE HEARD SOME WILD PREDICTIONS ON THIS HORRIBLE HUMAN EQUATION THAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED IF FORCE WERE USED, AND I WOULD SAY I DON'T AGREE WITH SOME WHO ARE ARGUING THE LOUDEST BECAUSE IT'S PUTTING THE WORST CASE OUT IN TERMS OF LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, I MUST SAY THAT. BUT, I DON'T KNOW. I THINK HE -- I THINK HE -- I THINK AZIZ UNDERSTANDS IT, BUT I'M NOT SURE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN DOES.

Q IS THERE ANY CHANCE, MR. PRESIDENT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- FOLLOW-UP QUESTION. I'M SORRY, I'M GOING TO HAVE ONE MORE -- AND THEN, CHARLES; I TOLD HIM -- AND THEN I'M LEAVING. THANK YOU VERY MUCH THOUGH. I'M AWFULLY --

Q IF I MAY FOLLOW -- WHEN -- WHEN YOU WERE LISTENING TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AZIZ, DID YOU GET ANY KIND OF PARTICULAR FEELINGS OF ANGER OR --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I DIDN'T. I THOUGHT IT WAS A VERY RATIONAL PRESENTATION, BUT WRONG. AND I THOUGHT HE -- I THOUGHT -- I MUST SAY I THOUGHT HIS STYLE WAS GOOD. FROM TALKING TO JIM BAKER, I THOUGHT HE -- I MEAN, WHEN I TALKED TO JIM, HE SAID, "LOOK, THE MAN PRESENTED HIS CASE." CLEARLY, WE DIDN'T AGREE WITH IT. I THOUGHT HE WAS QUITE COMPLIMENTARY OF THE WAY THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID IT. SO THE ATMOSPHERICS, I THINK, WERE ALL RIGHT. BUT HE DOESN'T HAVE IT. HE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND IT. AT LEAST FROM WHAT HE SAID, HE DOESN'T, BECAUSE THIS IS NOT ABOUT SOME OTHER QUESTION OF LINKAGE. THIS IS ABOUT THE INVASION AND THE AGGRESSION ABOUT KUWAIT, THE DISMANTLING OF KUWAIT, THE BRUTALITY ABOUT KUWAIT.

AND SO I DIDN'T GET A SENSE OF SECURITY FROM LISTENING TO THAT, BUT I WILL SAY THAT I THOUGHT THAT HE PRESENTED HIS VIEWS IN A REASONED -- REASONABLE -- REASONABLE WAY. HE HAD A TOUGH AGENDA. HE HAD SOME TOUGH TALKING POINTS THERE. HE WORKS FOR A TOUGH MAN.

Q WHAT, EXACTLY, ARE YOU TRYING TO CONVEY HERE TO SADDAM

ופ חלק 1

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,  
@ (נוה/משהבט), @ (דוצ),

סססס

9272:חוזם,אאא

אל:רהמש/718

מ-:ווש'נגטון, נר:175, תא:090191, זח:1746, דח:ב, סג:בל,

בנב

חלק 2 מתוך 2 חלקים של נר 174

HUSSEIN ON WHAT HE DOES HAVE TO LOSE? IS IT THE DECIMATION OF HIS SOCIETY? IS IT THE LIQUIDATION OF THE MILITARY? IS IT LOSING HIS OWN POWER? CAN YOU BE SPECIFIC ON THIS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I CAN'T BE MORE SPECIFIC, BUT I CAN BE THAT HE'LL BE LOSE -- HE WILL -- HE WILL GET OUT OF KUWAIT, AND HE WILL GET OUT OF KUWAIT ENTIRELY, AND HE WILL GET OUT OF KUWAIT WITHOUT CONCESSION. THAT, I THINK, IS THE UNDERLYING PART OF THE MESSAGE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL. TARIQ AZIZ WAS EMPHATIC THAT IF IRAQ IS ATTACKED, ISRAEL WILL BE ATTACKED. WHAT ARE YOUR OBLIGATIONS TO ISRAEL? ARE YOU PREPARED TO FIGHT A WAR THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT IS TOO HYPOTHETICAL A QUESTION FOR ME TO ANSWER. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO IMPLICATE -- TO FULLY IMPLEMENT 678, AND I WOULD THINK THAT HE'D THINK LONG AND HARD BEFORE HE STARTED YET ANOTHER WAR. THERE IS ONE WAR ON. THAT'S HIS WAR AGAINST KUWAIT. THAT'S HIS AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT. AND I DON'T THINK HE WANTS TO START ANOTHER ONE. SO I'M NOT GOING TO BUY INTO THAT HYPOTHESIS, BUT THE UNITED STATES WOULD OBVIOUSLY FEEL THAT THAT WAS A MOST PROVOCATIVE ACT. MOST PROVOCATIVE.

Q IF I MAY, I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL --

Q THE QUESTION WAS, WHAT ARE YOUR OBLIGATIONS TO ISRAEL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: MY -- WE HAVE FRIENDS ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE HAVE FRIENDS IN THIS COALITION. AND I'M DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS THERE. AND, CLEARLY, IF A FRIEND IN THAT AREA WAS ATTACKED -- WANTONLY ATTACKED -- FOR NO CAUSE WHATSOEVER, NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, BUT I THINK MANY PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD WOULD VIEW THAT AS A FLAGRANT PROVOCATION. AND I'LL LEAVE IT STAND RIGHT THERE.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. THANK YOU.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), @אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

~~אח"כ~~  
ג.מ.ש.  
~~הגוי~~  
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אאא, חוזם: 9266

אל:רהמש/715

מ-:וושיןגטון, נר:171, תא:090191, זח:1744, זח:ב, סג:בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

חלק 1 מתוך שני חלקים

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, THE HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1991

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: (IN PROGRESS) -- YOU WERE EXPECTING ME EARLIER, BUT SECRETARY BAKER WAS A BIT LATE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, AND THEN I HEARD THAT PRESIDENT BUSH INTENDS TO HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. I PREFER TO LISTEN TO HIM. THEN I WAS TOLD THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE PRESIDENT -- PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEEN POSTPONED FOR A WHILE, SO I WANTED TO USE THE TIME TO TALK TO YOU.

WHEN I ARRIVED LAST NIGHT IN GENEVA, I SAID THAT I HAVE COME WITH OPEN-MINDEDNESS, AND THAT WAS MY INTENTION, AND I ALSO CAME IN GOOD FAITH. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT ABOUT THESE TALKS I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO IS THAT THEY ARE TAKING PLACE AFTER FIVE MONTHS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE LATEST EVENTS IN THE GULF. AND I DREW THE ATTENTION OF SECRETARY BAKER TO THAT IMPORTANT FACT. ALSO THAT THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE AFTER THE LAST RESOLUTION THAT WAS TAKEN UNDER AMERICAN PRESSURE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH GIVES -- WHICH MAKES LIMITS TO DIPLOMACY.

IF WE HAD AN EARLIER OPPORTUNITY SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, I TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REMOVE A LOT OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN US, IF THERE WAS A CHANCE OR THERE IS A CHANCE FOR THAT, BECAUSE HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSUMPTIONS OF MISCALCULATIONS BY IRAQ. AND WHEN I CAME TO THAT POINT, I MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE HAVE NEVER -- WE HAVE NOT MADE MISCALCULATIONS. WE ARE VERY WELL AWARE OF THE SITUATION. WE HAVE BEEN VERY WELL AWARE OF THE SITUATION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAVE HEARD A LOT OF TALK ON HIS HIS SIDE AND ON THE SIDE OF PRESIDENT BUSH THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT GOT THE MESSAGE, THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING AROUND THEM, ET CETERA. YOU KNOW WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING IN THIS REGARD. I TOLD HIM IF WE HAD MET SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, I WOULD HAVE TOLD YOU THAT WE DO KNOW EVERYTHING.



WE KNOW WHAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF YOUR FORCES IN THE REGION MEAN; WE KNOW WHAT THE RESOLUTIONS YOU IMPOSED ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEAN; AND WE KNOW ALL THE FACTS ABOUT THE SITUATION -- THE POLITICAL FACTS, THE MILITARY FACTS AND THE OTHER FACTS.

SO TALKING ABOUT MISCALCULATION IS INCORRECT. WE HAVE TO CONVEY TO EACH OTHER OUR VIEW ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND THAT REMOVES THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON EITHER SIDE. I HEARD SECRETARY BAKER DESCRIBING OUR MEETING -- INFORMED (?). AND I SAY ALSO THAT, FROM THE PROFESSIONAL POINT OF VIEW, IT WAS A SERIOUS MEETING. WE BOTH LISTENED TO EACH OTHER VERY CAREFULLY. WE BOTH GAVE EACH OTHER ENOUGH TIME TO EXPLAIN THE VIEWS WE WANTED TO EXPLAIN, TO CONVEY THE INFORMATION WE WANTED TO CONVEY.

FROM THIS ASPECT, ABOUT THIS ASPECT IN THE TALKS, I AM SATISFIED. BUT WE HAD GRAVE OR BIG DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE ISSUES WE ADDRESSED. MR. BAKER REITERATED VERY WELL KNOWN AMERICAN POSITION. HE IS INTERESTED IN ONE QUESTION ONLY, THAT'S THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ABOUT THAT SITUATION.

I TOLD HIM VERY CLEARLY, AND I REPEATED MY IDEA AND EXPLAINED IT AT LENGTH, THAT WHAT IS AT STAKE IN OUR REGION IS PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY. WHAT'S AT STAKE IS THE FATE OF THE WHOLE REGION, THAT REGION WHICH HAS BEEN SUFFERING FROM WARS, INSTABILITIES, HARDSHIPS FOR SEVERAL DECADES. IF YOU ARE READY TO BRING ABOUT PEACE TO THE REGION -- COMPREHENSIVE, LASTING, JUST PEACE TO THE WHOLE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST -- WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE.

I TOLD HIM I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE PRINCIPLES ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, AND THEY ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ARAB NATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING FOR DECADES TO HAVE THOSE PRINCIPLES RESPECTED AND IMPLEMENTED IN OUR REGION. BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN RESPECTED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE ISRAELIS, AND IN THAT THEY HAVE GOT A CONTINUOUS STRONG AMERICAN SUPPORT. IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION CHANGES ITS POSITION AND IT WORKS WITH US AND WITH THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED IN THE REGION TO BRING ABOUT PEACE -- COMPREHENSIVE, LASTING, JUST PEACE -- WE WILL BE VERY GLAD AND VERY ENTHUSIASTIC TO PARTICIPATE IN THAT EFFORT.

CONCERNING THE NEW WORLD ORDER, OR THE INTERNATIONAL WORLD ORDER, I SAID I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT ORDER AND WE WOULD LOVE TO BE PARTNERS IN THAT ORDER. BUT THAT ORDER HAS TO BE IMPLEMENTED JUSTLY AND IN ALL CASES, NOT USING THAT ORDER IN A SINGLE MANNER, IN A SELECTIVELY MANNER, IMPOSE IT ON A CERTAIN CASE WITH THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND NEGLECT THE OTHER ISSUES AND NOT SHOW SINCERITY AND SERIOUSNESS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING IT ON OTHER ISSUES.

HE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAPPENED ON THE 2ND OF AUGUST AND LATER WAS FOR THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION OR TO HELP THE PALESTINIANS. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE HISTORY OF IRAQ'S INTEREST IN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY TO IRAQ. IF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS NOT RESOLVED, WE DO NOT FEEL SECURE IN OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN WARS IN THE PAST. IRAQ PARTICIPATED IN THOSE WARS. ISRAEL ATTACKED IRAQ IN 1981 AND WE WERE EXPECTING ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ THIS YEAR -- LAST YEAR. IN MARCH AND APRIL LAST YEAR WE WERE EXPECTING SUCH AN ATTACK. AND THAT WAS THE MAIN THEME IN THE ARAB SUMMIT THAT WAS HELD IN BAGHDAD LATE

MAY. THEREFORE IT IS A MATTER OF IRAQI SECURITY AS WELL AS ARAB SECURITY TO SEE THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS SOLVED IN A JUST MANNER, ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS. HE SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT. I TOLD HIM, "OKAY, TEST US. YOU CAN TEST US AND SEE WHETHER WE ARE SINCERE IN THAT OR NOT."

I SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ISSUES IN THE REGION. AND I TOLD HIM THAT WHEN WE SPEAK ABOUT THE LINKAGE WE ARE SERIOUS AND SINCERE, BECAUSE WHAT WAS HAPPENING BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST HAS A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH WHAT HAPPENED LATER. AND I TOLD HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED THE EMBARGO ON IRAQ BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST. WE HAD DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF FOODSTUFFS WE USED TO BUY -- MORE THAN DOLLAR 1 BILLION OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS -- QUESTION IS NOT RESOLVED, WE DO NOT FEEL SECURE IN OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE THERE HAVE BEEN WARS IN THE PAST. IRAQ PARTICIPATED IN THOSE WARS. ISRAEL ATTACKED IRAQ IN 1981 AND WE WERE EXPECTING ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ THIS YEAR -- LAST YEAR. IN MARCH AND APRIL LAST YEAR WE WERE EXPECTING SUCH AN ATTACK. AND THAT WAS THE MAIN THEME IN THE ARAB SUMMIT THAT WAS HELD IN BAGHDAD LATE MAY. THEREFORE IT IS A MATTER OF IRAQI SECURITY AS WELL AS ARAB SECURITY TO SEE THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS SOLVED IN A JUST MANNER, ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS. HE SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT. I TOLD HIM, "OKAY, TEST US. YOU CAN TEST US AND SEE WHETHER WE ARE SINCERE IN THAT OR NOT."

I SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ISSUES IN THE REGION. AND I TOLD HIM THAT WHEN WE SPEAK ABOUT THE LINKAGE WE ARE SERIOUS AND SINCERE, BECAUSE WHAT WAS HAPPENING BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST HAS A STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH WHAT HAPPENED LATER. AND I TOLD HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED THE EMBARGO ON IRAQ BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST. WE HAD DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF FOODSTUFFS WE USED TO BUY -- MORE THAN DOLLAR 1 BILLION OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS -- AND WE WERE FAITHFUL AND ACCURATE IN OUR DEALING WITH THE AMERICAN RELATIVE INSTITUTIONS.

EARLY IN 1990 THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION SUSPENDED THAT DEAL, WHICH WAS PROFITABLE TO BOTH SIDES. AND WE WERE DENIED FOOD FROM THE UNITED STATES. THEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO DENY IRAQ THE PURCHASE OF A VERY LARGE LIST OF ITEMS. THAT WAS DONE ALSO BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. SO, THE BOYCOTT WAS THERE BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST. THE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF IRAQ WAS THERE BEFORE THE 2ND OF AUGUST. THE THREAT TO THE PALESTINIANS WAS THERE BEFORE THAT DATE. THE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF JORDAN WAS THERE BEFORE THAT DATE. AND THAT WAS, AS I SAID, THE MAIN THEMES IN THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT WHICH TOOK PLACE LATE -- IN LATE MAY.

SO, IF YOU WANT TO BRING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION, TO THAT PERIOD PRIOR TO THE 2ND OF AUGUST, THAT MEANS THAT WE WILL BE THREATENED, WE WILL BE BOYCOTTED, AND THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDIA CAMPAIGN AGAINST US WOULD CONTINUE.

SO WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE? WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE? IF WE HAVE TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF EVENTS, IF WE HAVE TO BRING ABOUT PEACE, LET US ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES.

IF THE MATTER IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OR THE RESPECT OF THE

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, THE RESPECT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, WE HAVE A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THEY HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED FOR DECADES. THE LAST TWO IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS, 242 AND 338, THE FIRST WAS ADOPTED IN 1967, THE OTHER IN 1973, AND THEY ARE NOT YET IMPLEMENTED. AND THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE COALITION, AS MR. BAKER CALLS IT, HAVE NOT SENT TROOPS TO IMPOSE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS. THEY HAVE NOT TAKEN MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL BECAUSE ISRAEL WAS INTRANSIGENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS COVERED THE ISRAELI POSITION, PROTECTED IT POLITICALLY AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT'S VERY WELL KNOWN TO EVERYBODY. AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STILL SUPPLIES ISRAEL WITH THE MILITARY AND FINANCIAL MEANS TO STICK TO ITS INTRANSIGENCE. SO, IF THE MATTER IS RESPECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SHOW THE SAME ATTENTION TO ALL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AND IF YOU DO THAT, A LOT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US WILL BE REMOVED.

CONCERNING THE THREATS OR NO THREATS WHICH THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO IN HIS ADDRESS TO YOU, THE TONE OF HIS LANGUAGE WAS DIPLOMATIC AND POLITE. I RECIPROCATED. BUT THE SUBSTANCE WAS FULL OF THREATS AND I TOLD HIM, ALSO IN SUBSTANCE, THAT WE WILL NOT YIELD TO THREATS. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GENUINE, CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN US, BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS, IN ORDER TO MAKE PEACE IN THE REGION AND BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

WHEN WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS I TOLD HIM IN 1990 WHEN THIS QUESTION WAS RAISED VERY, VERY STRONGLY BY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WE MADE IT PUBLIC, MY PRESIDENT MADE IT PUBLIC, AND HE ALSO INFORMED A NUMBER OF PROMINENT AMERICAN SENATORS, LED BY SENATOR BOB DOLE WHO CAME TO SEE MY PRESIDENT IN APRIL 1990, HE TOLD THEM, AND HE MADE IT PUBLIC ALSO, THAT IRAQ IS READY TO JOIN AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE ALL MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS IN THE WHOLE REGION, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

AND I TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT YOU ONLY CONCENTRATE ON WHAT IRAQ HAS, AND YOU DON'T SHOW ANY CONCERN ABOUT WHAT ISRAEL HAS. ISRAEL DOES HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND YOU CANNOT GIVE ME ANY ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL IS NOT GOING TO USE THEM AGAINST US OR AGAINST OTHER ARABS. THE ONLY INSURANCE, CREDIBLE ASSURANCE, IS THAT WE REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS. AND I TOLD HIM YOU HAVE GOT A PLEDGE FROM ME TO THAT, AND MY GUESS IS THAT YOU CANNOT GET SUCH A PLEDGE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL OR FROM HIS PRIME MINISTER. AND IN SPITE OF THAT, YOU DON'T SHOW CONCERN.

THIS RAISES, AS WELL AS THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE QUESTION OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. I TOLD HIM WE IN IRAQ AND THE ARAB WORLD, WE FEEL STRONGLY AGAINST THE DOUBLE STANDARDS YOU USE IN ADDRESSING THE QUESTIONS IN THE REGION. WHEN IT COMES TO ISRAEL, YOU ARE CALM, YOU ARE NOT WORRIED, YOU CAN WAIT FOR MONTHS AND YEARS TO TRY TO PERSUADE. IF THEY ARE NOT PERSUADED AND IF THEY CONTINUE THEIR POSITIONS, YOU DON'T DO ANYTHING, YOU CONTINUE YOUR SUPPORT. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO THE ARABS, THERE YOU RAISE THE STICK.

AND WE ARE FED UP WITH THIS POLICIES OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. WE SHALL NOT ACCEPT TO BE TREATED AS A NATION AS UNDERDOGS. WE ARE A PROUD NATION, WE HAVE OUR HISTORY, WE HAVE OUR CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN

CIVILIZATION, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO BE TREATED IN A DIGNIFIED AND JUST MANNER.

YOU HEAR THAT I DECLINED TO RECEIVE THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO MY PRESIDENT. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER TOLD ME THAT HE CARRIES A LETTER FROM HIS PRESIDENT TO MY PRESIDENT, AND HE HANDED OVER A COPY TO ME. I TOLD HIM I WANT TO READ THIS LETTER FIRST, AND I READ IT -- AS HE SAID, CAREFULLY AND SLOWLY -- AND I KNEW WHAT IT WAS ABOUT. I TOLD HIM I AM SORRY, I CANNOT RECEIVE THIS LETTER. AND THE REASON IS THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THIS LETTER IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE LANGUAGE THAT SHOULD BE USED IN CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HEADS OF STATE.

I HAVE NO OBJECTION THAT MR. BUSH WOULD STATE HIS POSITION VERY CLEARLY. A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN LEADERS AND POLITICIANS CAN, OR SHOULD, CONTAIN THE POSITION OF EACH PARTY. BUT WHEN A HEAD OF STATE WRITES TO ANOTHER HEAD OF STATE A LETTER, AND IF HE REALLY INTENDS TO MAKE PEACE WITH THAT HEAD OF STATE OR REACH GENUINE UNDERSTANDING, HE SHOULD USE A POLITE LANGUAGE. AND POLITENESS DOES NOT CONTRADICT WITH SUBSTANCE.

THEREFORE, BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE OF THAT LETTER WAS CONTRARY TO THE TRADITIONS OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HEADS OF STATE, I DECLINE TO RECEIVE IT.

Q CAN YOU GIVE US AN EXAMPLE OF THE LANGUAGE --

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: WELL, I READ IT ONLY ONCE, AND I HAVE NOT REHEARSED THAT LETTER BUT THE CONTENTS OF THAT LETTER WAS PARAPHRASED IN A WAY OR ANOTHER IN THE DIFFERENT STATEMENTS THE SECRETARY MADE DURING THE TALKS.

THIS IS THE INTRODUCTION I WANTED TO MAKE ABOUT THE MEETING, AND I AM READY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q MR. MINISTER, WOULD IRAQ LEAVE -- WOULD IRAQ AGREE TO LEAVE KUWAIT IF PROMISED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: I DID NOT PUT IT THAT WAY. I HEARD SUCH A QUESTION DURING MR. BAKER'S MEETING WITH YOU. I TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT IF YOU ARE READY TO RESPECT AND IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS AS FAR AS ALL THE ISSUES IN THE REGION ARE CONCERNED, YOU WILL FIND US VERY COOPERATIVE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU SPEAK WITH YOUR PRESIDENT AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER? AND IS IT YOUR CONCLUSION AFTER THIS MEETING THAT WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES IS INEVITABLE?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: I BEG YOUR PARDON? I DIDN'T GET THE FIRST PART OF YOUR ANSWER -- OF YOUR QUESTION.

Q AFTER YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY BAKER, DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH YOUR PRESIDENT ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: NO. NO, I THINK OFFICIALS IN THIS HOTEL KNOW THAT I HAVEN'T MADE ANY PHONE CALLS -- OVERSEAS PHONE CALLS.

Q DO YOU WANT TO ANSWER THE SECOND PART OF THE QUESTION? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES IS INEVITABLE?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: WELL, THAT'S UP TO THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO DECIDE. I TOLD MR. BAKER THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR ALL EXPECTATIONS. WE HAVE BEEN PREPARED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IF THEY DECIDE TO ATTACK IRAQ, WE WILL NOT BE SURPRISED. WE HAVE OUR EXPERIENCE IN WAR. AND I TOLD HIM THAT IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DECIDES TO ATTACK IRAQ MILITARILY, IRAQ WILL DEFEND ITSELF IN A VERY BOLD MANNER.

WE ARE A COURAGEOUS NATION AND WE DEEPLY FEEL THAT WE HAVE BEEN TREATED UNJUSTLY. THE IRAQI PEOPLE, THE ARAB NATION, AND THE NATION WHICH FEELS THAT IT HAS BEEN TREATED UNJUSTLY FOR DECADES, AND THE NATION AS COURAGEOUS AS THE ARAB NATION -- THE IRAQIS PART OF THAT NATION -- AND THE NATION WHICH HAS A GREAT DETERMINATION TO TELL THE OTHERS THAT IT DOES NOT ACCEPT TO BE TREATED AS IT WAS TREATED, SUCH A NATION HAS THE DETERMINATION AND THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT AS LONG AS NEEDS BE TO PROVE TO ACHIEVE ITS RIGHTS.

Q MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, IN YOUR OPENING STATEMENT -- IN FACT, UNTIL THIS VERY MOMENT, YOU HAVEN'T MENTIONED THE IRAQI INVASION -- (TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY WITH MICROPHONE OCCURS; TESTING OF MICROPHONE FOLLOWS).

Q MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, SORRY ABOUT THAT. IN YOUR OPENING STATEMENT, AND IN FACT UP TO THIS VERY MOMENT YOU HAVE NOT MENTIONED IRAQ'S ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT. I'M CURIOUS TO KNOW WHETHER YOU ACTUALLY EVER DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT DURING THE COURSE OF THE SIX OR SO HOURS OF TALKS WITH SECRETARY BAKER. DID THE IRAQI SIDE IN ANY WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM EVEN DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: WELL, THE SECRETARY SPOKE A LOT ABOUT THAT SITUATION IN THE --

Q DID THE IRAQIS, THOUGH?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: YES. MR. BAKER SPOKE A LOT ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, AND I MADE OUR POSITION VERY CLEAR. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS SITUATION IS PART AND PARCEL OF A GENERAL SITUATION IN THE REGION. IF YOU ARE READY TO ADDRESS IT ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES, ON THE SAME CRITERIA, I AM READY TO DO THE SAME.

Q DO YOU DENY THAT IRAQ HAS STRIPPED KUWAIT OF ALL ITS POSSESSION, ITS WEALTH, ITS PEOPLE, ITS HUMANITY?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: WELL, YOU CAN PUT YOUR QUESTION THE WAY YOU LIKE, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO RESPOND TO ALLEGATIONS. THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAVE THEIR OWN HISTORICAL RIGHTS, AND WHEN THEY DEAL WITH THOSE RIGHTS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN VIEW ABOUT IT AND THEY HAVE THEIR OWN STANDARDS ABOUT IT. YOU MIGHT HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW, THAT'S UP TO YOU.

Q MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, IF THE WAR STARTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN THE GULF, WILL YOU ATTACK ISRAEL?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: YES. ABSOLUTELY YES.

Q MR. MINISTER, ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IRAQ WOULD WITHDRAW WITH KUWAIT? AND IF SO, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THEY WOULD BE?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: I AM NOT GOING TO ANSWER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS. I HAVE A LINE WHICH I MADE VERY CLEAR IN MY TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY. IF THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO ADDRESS ALL THE ISSUES IN THE REGION ON THE SAME PRINCIPLES, ON THE SAME CRITERION, IRAQ WILL DO ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THAT EFFORT IN A SERIOUS AND SINCERE MANNER.

Q MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, IF -- THERE HAVE BEEN QUOTES FROM BAGHDAD IN THE PAST QUESTIONING -- THERE HAVE BEEN QUOTES FROM BAGHDAD IN THE PAST, MR. MINISTER, QUESTIONING AMERICA'S WILL AND ITS RESOLVE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN ITS VIETNAM EXPERIENCE. I WONDER IF YOU WOULD GIVE US YOUR READING OF AMERICA'S WILL. DO YOU THINK THAT -- YOU SAY MR. BAKER HAS -- THAT MR. BAKER DISCUSSING IRAQ'S MISCALCULATIONS -- DO YOU -- COULD YOU TELL US HOW YOU CALCULATE AMERICA'S RESOLVE AT THIS POINT? DO YOU THINK THEY ARE INDEED READY TO FIGHT YOU IN A PROLONGED MANNER?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: I DEALT WITH THIS QUESTION AT LENGTH IN THE TALKS. I TOLD MR. BAKER THAT YOU HAVE MENTIONED THAT IN YOUR STATEMENTS. AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE FOLLOW WHAT'S BEING SAID IN THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CONGRESS, WHAT'S BEING PUBLISHED IN THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, AND THAT'S PART OF OUR DUTY, TO FOLLOW THE EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD VIS-A-VIS THE SITUATION IN OUR REGION.

BUT I TOLD HIM THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES IS YOUR PROBLEM OR YOUR -- THAT'S YOUR BUSINESS, YOU SEE. IT'S UP TO THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION. WE HAVE PREPARED OURSELVES FOR THE WORST FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THEREFORE WE ARE NOT MAKING MISCALCULATIONS ABOUT THAT.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME, I AM TELLING YOU NOW THAT ANY SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES OR ELSEWHERE FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE IS A NOBLE PHENOMENON, AND SUCH A NOBLE PHENOMENON HAS TO BE APPRECIATED. WE DO APPRECIATE THE REASONABLE STATEMENTS MADE BY AMERICANS IN THE VIDEOS, BY AMERICAN POLITICIANS, ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION, EVEN IF THEY DIFFER WITH US, EVEN IF THEY DIFFER WITH OUR POINT OF VIEW. WE DO APPRECIATE THAT.

AND IN THIS WORLD -- IN THIS WORLD WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND MEANS OF INFORMATION, PEOPLE LISTEN TO EACH OTHER. AND THERE IS NOTHING WRONG ABOUT THAT. BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT WE ARE CALCULATING ON THAT OR MAKING OUR CALCULATIONS ON THAT, THAT AMERICANS DON'T HAVE THE RESOLVE TO DO THIS OR THAT. THAT'S UP TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. AS FAR AS THE IRAQI PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED, AS FAR AS THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP ARE CONCERNED, WE ARE PREPARING OURSELVES, AND WE HAVE BEEN PREPARING OURSELVES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING FOR THE WORST KIND OF EXPECTATIONS.

Q MR. MINISTER, DURING YOUR STAY HERE -- AND I -- WE DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL LAST -- ARE YOU INTENDING TO MEET WITH OTHER EUROPEAN OFFICIALS?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: NO, I DON'T HAVE ANY PLANS OF MEETING FOREIGN OFFICIALS. I MIGHT MEET ARAB COLLEAGUES WHO HAPPEN TO BE HERE IN GENEVA. THE EUROPEANS MADE A PROPOSAL TO RECEIVE ME IN ROME WHEN ITALY WAS THE PRESIDENT OF THE GROUP. I ACCEPTED THAT INVITATION IMMEDIATELY AND APPRECIATED THAT INVITATION. WHEN THERE

WAS A PROBLEM BETWEEN US AND THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE DATES OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND MR. BAKER'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD, THEY WITHDREW THAT INVITATION. AND WHEN THEY INVITED ME TO LUXEMBOURG ONCE AGAIN AFTER WE AGREED TO MAKE THIS MEETING HERE IN GENEVA, I SAID, "SORRY, I CANNOT ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION BECAUSE YOUR TREATMENT, YOUR POSITION IN WITHDRAWING THE PREVIOUS INVITATION, WAS HUMILIATING. AND IF YOU WANT TO TALK WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP, YOU ARE WELCOME IN BAGHDAD." THIS IS STILL MY POSITION ABOUT THAT.

Q MR. MINISTER, DID TODAY'S TALKS CHANGE YOUR MIND IN ANY WAY ABOUT THE --

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: THE TALKS WITH SECRETARY BAKER?

Q YES, AND DID YOU GET ANY NEW INFORMATION THAT YOU FEEL OBLIGATED TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: NO, HONESTLY -- HONESTLY, I SAY -- I HAPPEN TO KNOW SOME ENGLISH, AND I CAN LISTEN TO STATEMENTS MADE BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS WITHOUT TRANSLATION -- SOMETIMES -- MANY TIMES -- WITHOUT TRANSLATION. AND WE LISTEN TO THE AMERICAN RADIO AND I HAVE ADVANTAGE OF SEEING THE CNN WHICH IS VERY ACTIVE IN COVERING THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY THE STATEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

I HAVE HEARD SECRETARY BAKER TALKING SEVERAL TIMES IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. I HAVE HEARD ALMOST ALL THE STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH. I DIDN'T FIND ANYTHING IN WHAT -- ANYTHING NEW -- IN WHAT MR. BAKER SAID IN OUR MEETINGS BUT, AS I SAID AT THE BEGINNING, THE TONE HERE IN GENEVA WAS DIFFERENT. IT WAS A DIPLOMATIC TONE, NOT THE HARSH TONE WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH RECEIVING TO THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU RULE OUT ANY ATTACK ANY ISRAEL BEFORE A US ATTACK ON IRAQ, NUMBER ONE? TWO, COULD YOU GIVE ANY MORE DETAIL --

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: IRAQ IS NOT GOING TO --

Q EXCUSE ME, SIR, I'LL JUST FINISH -- CAN YOU GIVE US ANY MORE DETAILS? YOU SAID THAT YOU HAD INFORMATION THAT ISRAEL WAS GOING TO ATTACK IRAQ LAST MARCH OR APRIL. I WAS WONDERING IF YOU COULD ELABORATE ON THAT. AND FINALLY, WHY NOT HAVE FACE-TO-FACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL -- YOURSELF OR YOUR HEAD OF STATE -- EITHER IN JERUSALEM OR BAGHDAD? YOU'VE TALKED ABOUT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR DECADES. WHY HASN'T THAT HAPPENED? AND WHY AREN'T YOU FOR IT?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: ABOUT THE FIRST HALF OF THE QUESTION, IRAQ IS NOT GOING TO ATTACK ANYBODY ANY PARTY BEFORE IT IS ATTACKED. SO, OUR ACTION IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE IN RETALIATION TO ATTACKS AND A DEFENSIVE ACTION.

AS FAR AS THE TALKS YOU MENTIONED ARE CONCERNED, THERE IS NO BILATERAL DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE ISRAELIS. THERE IS THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION; THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN LANDS, THE ISRAELI SUBJUGATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

IF THEY ARE READY TO RESORT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS, AND TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEY HAVE TO TALK TO THE PALESTINIANS. AND WHEN THE PALESTINIANS WANT THE HELP

OR THE SUPPORT OF THEIR ARAB BROTHERS, AND THEY WANT ANY KIND OF

סופ חלק 1

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס



9265: תוזם, אאא  
אל: רהמש/716  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 172, תא: 090191, זח: 1745, זח: ב, סג: בל,  
בבב  
חלק 2 מתוך 2 חלקים של נר 171

SUPPORT FROM THE SIDE OF IRAQ, WE WILL BE ALWAYS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- DIDN'T THE ISRAELIS ATTACK LAST YEAR?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: THE ISRAELIS WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK IRAQ LAST YEAR, YES.

Q DO YOU ALSO FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GOOD OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITHIN THE LAST -- WITHIN THE NEXT SIX DAYS?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: WELL, SEVERAL DAYS AGO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK MET WITH MR. PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND HE INFORMED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE WELCOME IN BAGHDAD IF HE WISHES TO COME. AND THIS POSITION IS STILL THERE. I HEARD ON THE NEWS THAT HE MIGHT DECIDE TO COME TO BAGHDAD, BUT I HAVEN'T YET RECEIVED A FORMAL LETTER OR A FORMAL SUGGESTION IN THIS REGARD.

Q MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, YOU STRESSED TWICE NOW DURING THIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT YOU WERE SATISFIED WITH THE "PROFESSIONAL STYLE," AS YOU PUT IT, AND THE TONE AND THE LANGUAGE OF TODAY'S TALKS WITH SECRETARY BAKER. BUT THEN YOU EXPLAINED TO US THAT YOU REJECTED THE LETTER BECAUSE OF THE LANGUAGE PRESIDENT BUSH USED, SUPPOSEDLY, IN THIS LETTER. ARE YOU IMPLYING THAT SECRETARY BAKER AND PRESIDENT BUSH USED DIFFERENT LANGUAGE ON THE SAME ISSUE?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: THE TONE OF OUR TALKS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE LANGUAGE THAT WAS USED IN THE LETTER, ALTHOUGH THE SUBSTANCE DOESN'T CHANGE VERY MUCH. I AM NOT, AS I SAID, AGAINST THE SUBSTANCE. EVERY HEAD OF STATE CAN CONVEY TO HIS COUNTERPART WHATEVER HE WANTS TO CONVEY. BUT THE QUESTION OF -- IS A QUESTION OF LANGUAGE, OF POLITENESS AND RESORT TO DIPLOMATIC MEANS OF CORRESPONDENCE.

I CAME TO SEE MR. BAKER.

HE WANTED TO SEE ME, AND I WANTED TO SEE HIM, AND WE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT ALL THE QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST OR OF THE INTEREST OF THIS SIDE AND OF THE OTHER. AND WE HAD A LONG DISCUSSION, AS I SAID, FROM THE PROFESSIONAL POINT OF VIEW. THEY WERE GOOD DISCUSSIONS.

Q MR. MINISTER, BEFORE LEAVING BAGHDAD, YOU SAID YOU WOULD HAVE NEW PROPOSALS AND IDEAS. WHAT YOU'VE JUST SAID THIS EVENING YOU'VE SAID MANY, MANY TIMES BEFORE. WHY DID YOU HAVE NO NEW PROPOSALS OR IDEAS?

FOREIGN MIN. AZIZ: I RAISED A LOT OF IDEAS WITH MR. BAKER. I

TOLD HIM; "WHY DON'T YOU WORK WITH US TOGETHER AND WITH THE OTHER PARTIES TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL, COMPREHENSIVE, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE WHOLE REGION." THIS IS A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE IDEA. I RAISED WITH THE SECRETARY THE QUESTION OF THE ARAB SOLUTION. I TOLD THEM; "WHY ARE YOU AGAINST THE ARAB SOLUTION?" AND HE SAID THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE AGAINST THE SO-CALLED ARAB SOLUTION. I TOLD HIM, "WAIT A MINUTE. I WILL COUNT ONE COUNTRY AFTER THE OTHER WHO HAS SHOWN INTEREST IN AN ARAB SOLUTION." AND WHEN I COUNTED THE STATES, WHICH SHOWED INTEREST IN AN ARAB SOLUTION, THE NUMBER WAS ELEVEN. AND THIS SHOWS THAT THERE IS A MAJORITY AMONG THE ARAB WORLD TO TRY AN ARAB SOLUTION. BUT HE STRONGLY REFUSED THAT PATH, AND HE EVEN DENIED THAT THERE IS AN ARAB SOLUTION, THE IDEA OF AN ARAB SOLUTION.

I TOLD HIM THERE IS AN ARAB SOLUTION. WHY NOT? THIS IS AN ARAB PROBLEM -- BETWEEN ARABS. AND WHAT IS WRONG IF A NUMBER OF LEADERS IN THE ARAB WORLD MEET AND TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM? WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT? AND THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THIS AND THEM TAKING THAT SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SEEK SOME SORT OF ENDORSEMENT WITH.

AND THERE IS A PRECEDENT IN THAT, A VERY RECENT PRECEDENT. WE HAVE THE SITUATION ON LEBANON, AND THAT SITUATION WAS A VERY CRITICAL SITUATION, AND IT HAS BEEN DEALT WITH SEVERAL TIMES BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES. THEN THE ARABS MET IN CASABLANCA IN 1988, AND THEY DECREED A COMMISSION OF THREE LEADERS, AND THOSE TRUE LEADERS, WITH THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS REACHED SOME SORT OF -- OF A SOLUTION, WHICH WAS CALLED THE FIVE SOLUTION. AND THAT SOLUTION WAS ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WAS SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES. WHY NOT IN THIS CASE? HE STRONGLY REFUSED. WHICH MEANS, AS I TOLD HIM CLEARLY -- HE SAYS THAT THIS IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY VERSUS IRAQ, THIS IS THE COALITION VERSUS IRAQ. I TOLD HIM, BUT THE MEETING IS BETWEEN YOU AND ME. THE MEETING IS NOT BETWEEN MYSELF AND MR. DE CUELLAR. THE MEETING IS NOT BETWEEN ME AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE MEETING IS NOT BETWEEN ME AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE IVORY COAST, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ADOPTION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS. THE MEETING IS NOT BETWEEN ME AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ETHIOPIA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE FACT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ AND THE SECRETARY (OF STATE) OF THE UNITED STATES ARE MEETING HERE IN GENEVA DISCUSSING THE SITUATION SHOWS THAT THIS IS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES.

YOU HAVE YOUR ALLIES ON YOUR SIDE AND WE DO HAVE OUR ALLIES ON OUR SIDE. YOU CAN COUNT A GREAT -- A BIGGER NUMBER. YOU HAVE THE CAPABILITIES. AND WE ALL KNOW HOW THAT NUMBER OF THE COALITION WAS INCREASED. A LOT OF MONEY, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE SPENT TO CREATE THAT COALITION. WE ARE NOT -- WE DON'T HAVE SUCH MONEY TO MAKE A PARALLEL COALITION, BUT THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING IRAQ, THEY ARE SUPPORTING IT GENUINELY. THEY ARE NOT MERCENARIES WHO ARE BEING PAID EVERY MONTH AND WHO ARE COMPETING WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF PAYMENT AND MAKING THEIR COMPLAINTS, ONCE TO THE AMERICANS AND OTHER TIME TO THE SAUDIS AND TO THE OTHERS THAT THE MONEY IS NOT ENOUGH, YOU'VE GOT TO PAY MORE AND MORE. WE DON'T HEAR SUCH THINGS FROM THOSE WHO SUPPORT US.

AND I TOLD HIM, WHO ARE THE STAUCHEST SUPPORTERS OF IRAQ NOW? THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THOSE PEOPLE WERE THE MOST AFFECTED FINANCIALLY BY THE EVENTS IN THE GULF. AND IN SPITE OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS, THEY SUPPORT

IRAQ. WHY? BECAUSE THEY FIND IN THIS CONFLICT A GOLDEN CHANCE FOR THEMSELVES, THAT THEIR COUNTRY, THEIR LAND, THEY THEMSELVES MIGHT BE LIBERATED.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. GOOD NIGHT.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), @אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

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בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר

תאריך: 9 בינואר 1991

שעת חיבור: 1630

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות ווש'נגטון

חלק 1 מתוך 2 חלקים

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ, THE HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1991

SEC. BAKER: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I HAVE JUST GIVEN PRESIDENT BUSH A FULL REPORT OF OUR MEETING TODAY. I TOLD HIM THAT MINISTER AZIZ AND I HAD COMPLETED A SERIOUS AND EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATION IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN THE GULF.

I MET WITH MINISTER AZIZ TODAY NOT TO NEGOTIATE, AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WE WOULD NOT DO -- THAT IS, NEGOTIATE BACKWARDS FROM UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS -- BUT I MET WITH HIM TODAY TO COMMUNICATE. AND COMMUNICATE MEANS LISTENING AS WELL AS TALKING, AND WE DID THAT, BOTH OF US.

THE MESSAGE THAT I CONVEYED FROM PRESIDENT BUSH AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS WAS THAT IRAQ MUST EITHER COMPLY WITH THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY FROM KUWAIT OR BE EXPELLED BY FORCE. REGRETTABLY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I HEARD NOTHING TODAY THAT -- IN OVER SIX HOURS, I HEARD NOTHING THAT SUGGESTED TO ME ANY IRAQI FLEXIBILITY WHATSOEVER ON COMPLYING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

THERE HAVE BEEN TOO MANY IRAQI MISCALCULATIONS. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT MISCALCULATED THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE INVASION OF KUWAIT, EXPECTING THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO STAND IDLY BY WHILE IRAQI FORCES SYSTEMATICALLY PILLAGED A PEACEFUL NEIGHBOR. IT MISCALCULATED THE RESPONSE, I THINK, TO THE BARBARIC POLICY OF HOLDING THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN HOSTAGES, THINKING THAT SOMEHOW CYNICALLY DOLING THEM OUT A FEW AT A TIME WOULD SOMEHOW WIN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. AND IT MISCALCULATED THAT IT COULD DIVIDE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND GAIN SOMETHING THEREBY FROM ITS AGGRESSION.

SO LET US HOPE THAT IRAQ DOES NOT MISCALCULATE AGAIN. THE

IRAQI LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE 28 NATIONS WHICH HAVE DEPLOYED FORCES TO THE GULF IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BOTH THE POWER AND THE WILL TO EVICT IRAQ FROM KUWAIT. IF IT SHOULD CHOOSE -- AND THE CHOICE IS IRAQ'S -- IF IT SHOULD CHOOSE TO CONTINUE ITS BRUTAL OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT IRAQ WILL BE CHOOSING A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH IT CANNOT WIN AND WHICH WILL HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ.

I MADE THESE POINTS WITH MINISTER AZIZ -- NOT TO THREATEN BUT TO INFORM -- AND I DID SO WITH NO SENSE OF SATISFACTION. FOR WE GENUINELY DESIRE A PEACEFUL OUTCOME. AND AS BOTH PRESIDENT BUSH AND I HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ.

I SIMPLY WANTED TO LEAVE AS LITTLE ROOM AS POSSIBLE FOR YET ANOTHER TRAGIC MISCALCULATION BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP. AND I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT THIS IS STILL A CONFRONTATION THAT IRAQ CAN AVOID.

THE PATH OF PEACE REMAINS OPEN, AND THAT PATH IS LAID OUT VERY CLEARLY IN 12 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OVER A PERIOD OF OVER 5 MONTHS. BUT NOW THE CHOICE LIES WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP. THE CHOICE REALLY IS THEIRS TO MAKE. AND LET US ALL HOPE THAT THAT LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE THE WISDOM TO CHOOSE THE PATH OF PEACE.

JIM, AND THEN BARRY?

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DO YOU -- WHAT DO YOUR ALLIES PLAN TO DO NEXT TO BRING THIS MESSAGE HOME?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, YOU SAY, "WHAT DO THE ALLIES PLAN TO DO NEXT," AND I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT FOR EVERYONE TO NOTE THAT THIS IS A COALITION, THIS IS NOT IRAQ VERSUS THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS IRAQ VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS HAPPENS TO HAVE BEEN THE FIRST TIME THAT WE'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO FIND AGREEMENT ON MEETING, US AND IRAQ.

SO I DON'T WHAT THE NEXT STEPS ARE, JIM. I DO KNOW THIS, THAT TIME IS RUNNING ON, AS I SAID A DAY OR SO AGO. AFTER FIVE MONTHS AND TWELVE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT IS ALMOST EVIDENT THAT THE TIME FOR TALK IS RUNNING OUT. IT'S TIME FOR IRAQ TO ACT, AND TO ACT QUICKLY BY GETTING OUT OF KUWAIT.

BUT THIS IS A COALITION, AND WE ARE SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT SOLOMN RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AND SO PERHAPS THERE MAY BE A WAY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COULD USE HIS GOOD OFFICES HERE IN THE REMAINING SIX OR SO DAYS THAT WE HAVE LEFT.

I WILL SAY THAT -- I'VE ALREADY MENTIONED THAT I DIDN'T HEAR ANYTHING THAT TO ME DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY, NOR DID I HEAR ANY NEW PROPOSALS, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE MINISTER DID RESTATE THEIR PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED STATES PICK A DAY FOR HIM TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ PICK A DAY FOR ME TO GO TO BAGHDAD.

THOSE OF YOU WHO HAVE BEEN TRAVELING WITH US KNOW WHAT OUR ANSWER IS TO THAT. WE'VE GIVEN IT OVER THE PAST FOUR OR FIVE DAYS AND I GAVE IT TO THE MINISTER TONIGHT. WE OFFERED 15 SEPARATE DAYS

FOR A VISIT TO BAGHDAD. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MADE THE PROPOSAL FOR FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS. WE ARE GLAD THAT IRAQ ACCEPTED THIS ONE, BECAUSE WE DID HAVE SIX HOURS DURING WHICH WE COULD MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN TO THEM (AND) THEY COULD MAKE THEIR POSITION KNOWN TO US.

BUT AS FAR AS NEXT STEPS ARE CONCERNED, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT BECAUSE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A COALITION AND WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT PERHAPS THERE COULD BE -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WOULD BE ON THIS -- BUT PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE SOME ROOM FOR US TO SEEK THE USE OF THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER REITERATE HIS DEMANDS FOR WHAT HE CALLS "JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS FOR THE PALESTINIANS?" I MEAN, WAS THERE ANY WAVERING IN THE US POSITION, AS YOU MAY HAVE EXPRESSED IT TO HIM, THAT THE TWO ISSUES ARE NOT RELATED, ARE NOT LINKED?

*Linboys* SEC. BAKER: NO. THERE WAS -- HE EXPRESSED HIS POSITION. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN OUR POSITION WHICH IS THAT THE TWO ISSUES ARE NOT LINKED. I DID MAKE THE POINT THAT I DON'T THINK THAT MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT IN ORDER TO HELP THE PALESTINIANS. AND IF THEY DID, IT WAS ANOTHER MISCALCULATION, BECAUSE IT HASN'T HELPED THE PALESTINIANS.

I THINK MOST PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT FOR IRAQ'S OWN AGGRANDIZEMENT. AND I THINK MOST PEOPLE REALIZE THAT IRAQ IS TRYING TO USE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE TO SHIELD ITS AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT, WHICH, IN MY VIEW AT LEAST, REMAINS AN OBSTACLE TO BROADER PEACE IN THE REGION RATHER THAN A CATALYST FOR ACHIEVING THAT BROADER PEACE.

AND I MADE THE POINT, AS WELL, THAT REWARDING IRAQ'S AGGRESSION WITH A LINK TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS WOULD REALLY SEND A TERRIBLE SIGNAL, NOT ONLY TO GENUINE PEACEMAKERS IN THE REGION, BUT ALSO TO OTHER WOULD-BE AGGRESSORS AT WHAT WE THINK IS A DEFINING MOMENT IN HISTORY.

Q MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU WILLING -- IS THE UNITED STATES WILLING -- TO TALK AGAIN TO IRAQ BEFORE THE JANUARY 15TH DEADLINE? AND DID YOU DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT THE POSSIBILITY THAT YOU MAY STILL GO TO BAGHDAD?

SEC. BAKER: I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THAT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, AND I HAD ALREADY TOLD YOU WHAT OUR VIEW WAS. AND THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, I THINK, SAID, "THERE WILL BE NO TRIP TO BAGHDAD." THE PROPOSAL WHICH HE ORIGINALLY MADE WAS, IN EFFECT, REJECTED BY IRAQ. WE OFFERED 15 SEPARATE DAYS. THEY CONTINUED TO INSIST UPON ONLY ONE, THE 12TH OF JANUARY, WHICH WE THINK WAS AND STILL IS AN OBVIOUS EFFORT TO -- TO AVOID THE DEADLINE OF JANUARY THE 15TH. AND WE ARE NOT -- WE'RE NOT INTERESTED IN THAT. WE THINK THIS -- WE THINK THIS DEADLINE IS REAL. AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS THINK THE DEADLINE IS REAL.

Q DID YOU BRING IT UP WITH THE PRESIDENT TODAY?

SEC. BAKER: NO.

Q MR. SECRETARY --

SEC. BAKER: I REPORTED FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT, OF COURSE.

Q COULD YOU RUN THROUGH FOR US -- YOU SPOKE FOR SIX HOURS -- COULD YOU GIVE US A SENSE OF HOW THE DISCUSSIONS EVOLVED OVER THOSE SIX HOURS? WHAT DID YOU BEGIN WITH? WHAT DID HE COUNTER WITH? WHY DID YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY AFTER TWO HOURS TO CALL THE PRESIDENT?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE BROKE FOR LUNCH -- (LAUGHTER) -- AND I THINK THIS IS -- I THINK THIS MEETING IS SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT THAT I SHOULD CALL THE PRESIDENT, AND SO I DID, JUST AS I DID AS SOON AS WE WERE FINISHED.

Q DID YOU BEGIN BY READING YOUR LETTER -- HOW DID --

SEC. BAKER: BUT I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I WAS HERE TO -- NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT TO COMMUNICATE, AS I'VE JUST TOLD YOU, THAT I WAS HERE FOR A SERIOUS DIALOGUE AND AN EFFORT TO FIND A POLITICAL AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT EXPECT THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WALK BACKWARDS FROM UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THAT THE TERMS OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN -- HAVE BEEN SET. AND I TOLD THE MINISTER I WANTED TO HANDLE THE MEETING IN WHATEVER WAY HE WANTED, AND I GAVE HIM THE CHOICE AND HE CHOSE FOR ME TO GO FIRST, JUST AS HE -- I GAVE HIM THE CHOICE AS WELL AS TO HOW TO REPORT TO YOU, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT I COME DOWN HERE FIRST. SO THAT'S HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE HERE TONIGHT.

BUT LET ME SAY THAT I -- I TALKED TO HIM ABOUT HOW WE SAW THE SITUATION, ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, ABOUT WHAT I THOUGHT COULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF OBSERVANCE OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS, AND WHAT I FEARED WOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF IRAQ'S NON-OBSERVANCE OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS. HE THEN PRESENTED THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. AND HE WILL BE DOWN HERE IN A FEW MOMENTS AND HE CAN -- NOW WE CAN'T RUN THROUGH SIX HOURS OF DIALOGUE HERE. NOBODY ELSE WOULD GET TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS.

Q ONE QUICK FOLLOW UP. HOW DETAILED WERE YOU ABOUT THE EXTENT OF FORCE THAT WOULD BE USED AGAINST IRAQ IF IT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS BY JANUARY 15TH?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I DIDN'T GIVE -- I DIDN'T GET INTO THINGS THAT -- THAT WOULD PROPERLY BE IN THE REALM OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. I HOPE I -- I HOPE I EFFECTIVELY MADE THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO WHAT AT LEAST OUR OPINION WAS OF THE 28-NATION MULTINATIONAL FORCE THAT IS THERE IN THE GULF.

LET'S GO OVER HERE TO CRAIG.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IS THE UNITED STATES INTERESTED IN ANY SORT OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL, BE IT ONE SUPERVISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS? AND IF THIS WITHDRAWAL BEGAN BY JANUARY 15TH, WILL THE UNITED STATES GUARANTEE THERE WILL BE NO MILITARY ATTACK ON IRAQ?

SEC. BAKER: LET ME SAY -- I SHOULD HAVE SAID THIS IN ANSWER TO TOM'S QUESTION -- I ASSURED THE MINISTER THAT IF THEY IMPLEMENT THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, AND IF THEY WITHDRAW FROM IRAQ (SIC) AND PERMIT THE RESTORATION -- FROM KUWAIT -- AND PERMIT THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT, THAT I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MILITARY ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES. AND THAT I FELT THAT THERE WOULD, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BE NO MILITARY ACTION BY ANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION.

Q FOLLOWING THE QUESTION --

SEC. BAKER: ON THE FIRST QUESTION, THE -- THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WE ARE NOT HERE -- AFTER ALL, WE ARE PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION. WE ARE PART OF 28 COUNTRIES, EVEN MORE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN HELPING FINANCIALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. AND IT IS NOT UP TO US TO WALK BACKWARDS FROM SOLEMN RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE SAID, IN THE PAST -- YOU HAVE SAID IN THE PAST THAT YOU WOULD SEEK APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF FORCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. ARE YOU NOW AT THAT STAGE IN THE PROCESS IN WHICH YOU WILL BE USING THE USE OF FORCE FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS?

SEC. BAKER: NO, BUT THE CLOCK IS TICKING ON, JOHN, AND I MADE THAT POINT TO THE MINISTER TODAY. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, WE HAVE NOT TAKEN THE -- THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO ALONE UNDER -- UNDER -- IN OUR -- WHO, ALONE IN OUR EXECUTIVE BRANCH UNDER OUR SYSTEM CAN MAKE THAT DECISION, HAS NOT TAKEN THAT DECISION. AND I'M NOT AWARE THAT ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE. YES, SIR.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IN THE REMAINING SIX DAYS BEFORE THE UN DEADLINE, WOULD YOU WELCOME AN INITIATIVE BY SOME OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES, OR EVEN ARAB COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, THAT WOULD PERHAPS INCLUDE SENDING A EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO BAGHDAD TO SEEK A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION, LET ME SAY IT ONE MORE TIME, AND, THEREFORE, AS I'VE JUST INDICATED TO YOU, IT'S AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT SOLOMN RESOLUTIONS OF THE WORLD'S PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY BODY, AND THEREFORE THERE MIGHT, IT SEEMS TO ME, BE SOME USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY PERHAPS THE SECRETARY GENERAL -- SECRETARY GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES. BUT I SAID LAST NIGHT AND I HAVE SAID FOR MONTHS, WE WELCOME ANY AND ALL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS CRISIS PEACEFULLY AND POLITICALLY. WE WANT IT SOLVED PEACEFULLY AND POLITICALLY.

I'M DISSAPPOINTED, OF COURSE, THAT WE DID NOT -- DID NOT RECEIVE ANY INDICATIONS TODAY WHATSOEVER OF ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE POSITION OF IRAQ, SO WE WOULD WELCOME ANY AND ALL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. WE DO THINK IF THERE ARE EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION THAT THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE UNIFORM, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR FIVE MONTHS, AND IT SHOULD NOT BE A MIXED MESSAGE. BUT WE WANT A PEACEFUL AND POLITICAL SOLUTION. YES, MARY.

Q MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US -- YOU KEEP SAYING YOU SAW NO INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY.  
DID THE FOREIGN MINISTER ACTUALLY TELL YOU THAT IRAQ INTENDS TO KEEP KUWAIT AND WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT?

SEC. BAKER: HE DID NOT MAKE THAT STATEMENT BUT HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW, MARY. BUT I DID NOT SEE, FRANKLY, ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR POSITION. WELL, YOU CAN ASK HIM QUESTIONS WHEN HE GETS DOWN HERE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU DISCUSS IN ANSWER -- IN ANSWER TO ANY OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PROBLEMS RAISED ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER -- DID YOU DISCUSS THE EFFORTS THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE IN THE PAST TO SEEK ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE --

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SEC. BAKER: YES.

Q -- TO PERSUADE IRAQ THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SERIOUS -- GENUINELY INTERESTED -- IN RESOLVING THOSE PROBLEMS?

SEC. BAKER: YES, WE WENT THROUGH THE -- WE WENT THROUGH A GOOD BIT OF THE HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL EFFORTS THAT I MADE FOR 14 MONTHS TO BRING ABOUT A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ARAB -- BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS. WE WENT THROUGH THE -- THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES -- IN BRINGING ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. AND WE HAD A FULL DISCUSSION OF THAT ISSUE, A COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF IT.

I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I MADE IT VERY CLEAR THROUGHOUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LINKAGE HERE OF THAT ISSUE TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT, AND WE WOULD NOT AGREE, AS A CONDITION OF THEIR WITHDRAWING, TO ANY SUBSEQUENT SPECIFIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO THAT. BUT WE DID HAVE -- THEY BROUGHT IT UP, AND WE HAD A VERY FULL DISCUSSION.

Q WHAT WAS THEIR ANSWER? WHAT WAS --

SEC. BAKER: WE DISAGREE. WE FRANKLY DISAGREE WITH RESPECT TO THAT, AS I THINK YOU KNOW. AND I'VE ALREADY TOLD YOU WHY I THINK LINKAGE IS A BAD IDEA. I THINK THAT IT DOESN'T -- IT WILL NOT TEND TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE REGION. IT WILL TEND TO BE READ AS A REWARD FOR AGGRESSORS, AND IT WOULD JEOPARDIZE FUTURE PEACE IN THE REGION.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DID YOU TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO GO TO WAR AND THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONMAKING?

SEC. BAKER: I SAID DON'T MISCALCULATE THE RESOLVE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO ARE VERY SLOW TO ANGER BUT WHO BELIEVE STRONGLY IN PRINCIPLE AND WHO BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOT REWARD AGGRESSION, AND THAT BIG COUNTRIES WITH POWERFUL MILITARY MACHINES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INVADE, OCCUPY AND BRUTALIZE THEIR PEACEFUL NEIGHBORS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU'VE TOLD US WHAT YOU DIDN'T HEAR. YOU DIDN'T HEAR ANY FLEXIBILITY. AND YOU TOLD US THAT THERE WAS QUITE A BIT OF DISCUSSION OF HISTORY. COULD YOU TELL US WHAT YOU DID HEAR? DID YOU HEAR JUSTIFICATIONS FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER? DID YOU HEAR A REPEAT OF WHAT THEY'VE BEEN SAYING IN PUBLIC FOR SOME TIME?

SEC. BAKER: I HEARD SOME THINGS THAT I, QUITE FRANKLY, FOUND VERY HARD TO BELIEVE, BUT I'LL LET HIM GO INTO THE DETAIL HERE. BUT I HEARD, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THEIR ACTION IN INVADING KUWAIT WAS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, THAT THEY WERE BEING THREATENED BY KUWAIT. AND I WILL TELL YOU THE SAME THING I TOLD THE MINISTER, WHICH IS I FIND IT VERY HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ANY NATION IN THE WORLD WILL BELIEVE THAT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, EVEN THOUGH YOU DID SPEND SIX HOURS HERE TODAY TALKING TO FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ, IN THE PAST FIVE AND A HALF MONTHS YOU HAVEN'T HAD MUCH CONTACT WITH IRAQ. WHAT'S TO PREVENT THE HISTORIANS OF THIS CONFLICT FROM CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY HERE, AND WE SLID TOWARD WAR WITHOUT TRYING?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF IRAQ, ALL TO NO AVAIL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ALREADY HAD ONE FAILED MISSION. THERE HAVE BEEN ANY NUMBER OF ARAB

EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS CRISIS, ALL TO NO AVAIL. THERE'VE BEEN EFFORTS BY OTHERS -- OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS TRIED VERY HARD. THEY'VE HAD MEETINGS. WE HAVE NOW HAD A MEETING.

AND SO, YOU KNOW, PEOPLE CAN WRITE WHATEVER THEY DECIDE THEY MIGHT WANT TO WRITE. BUT THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS WE HAVE BEEN -- WE HAVE BEEN VERY, I THINK -- THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION -- VERY RESPONSIBLE AND MEASURED IN OUR APPROACH TO THIS. WE HAVE NOT, AS SOME MIGHT SUGGEST, "GONE OFF HALF-COCKED." WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS PATIENTLY WORKING FOR CONSENSUS WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND IT IS ONLY AFTER FIVE AND A HALF MONTHS AND THE PASSAGE OF 12 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS THAT WE FIND OURSELVES AT THE POINT OF USE OF FORCE, DAVID. SO I THINK THAT THERE'S BEEN MORE DIPLOMACY EXERCISED IN THIS -- IN THIS CRISIS THAN IN -- IN ALMOST ANY THAT I CAN THINK OF. AND THE ONE THING I WOULD ASK YOU ALL NOT TO DO IS TO EQUATE DIPLOMACY AND APPEASEMENT. WE MADE THAT MISTAKE IN THE '30S. AT LEAST FOR OUR PART, WE DON'T INTEND TO MAKE IT AGAIN.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IN A SENSE TWO QUESTIONS. DID THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGEST IRAQ MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT IF THERE WERE LINKAGE AS, LET US SAY, THE FRENCH HAVE SUGGESTED, OR OTHERS HAVE SUGGESTED? AND IF HE DID, IS LINKAGE -- THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE -- A REASON FOR THE LOSS OF -- AND THE INSISTENCE ON THAT PRINCIPLE -- A REASON FOR THE LOSS OF LOTS OF LIVES?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I DON'T THINK HE SAID THAT EXPLICITLY, SAUL. I THINK, PERHAPS, IT WAS IMPLICIT IN HIS COMMENTS. BUT HE'LL BE HERE, AND YOU CAN ASK HIM. BUT IT'S -- IT'S MORE THAN JUST THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE, AS I UNDERSTAND THEIR POSITION. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT TO CONFERENCES AND THAT SORT OF THING THAT GET YOU BEHIND -- THAT GET YOU BEYOND JUST THE SIMPLE FACT OF LINKAGE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID MINISTER AZIZ MAKE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL UNDER WHICH IRAQ WOULD GET OUT OF KUWAIT? HOWEVER UNACCEPTABLE IT WAS TO YOU, WAS THERE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL?

SEC. BAKER: NO. THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. HE RESTATED THE POSITIONS THAT IRAQ HAS STATED PUBLICLY IN THE PAST. HE DEFENDED THEIR ACTION IN INVADING AND OCCUPYING KUWAIT. HE EXPLAINED HOW HE FEELS THAT WAS JUSTIFIED. AND AGAIN, HE'LL BE DOWN HERE AND YOU CAN ASK HIM YOURSELVES.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU MADE IT CLEAR THAT YOU WERE NOT GOING TO BAGHDAD, BUT DID YOU AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER TALK ABOUT FUTURE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AT YOUR LEVEL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ, OR DID THIS ONE 6-1/2 HOUR MEETING REPRESENT THE CONCLUSION OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES BY THE UNITED STATES?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS THROUGH OUR CHARGE IN BAGHDAD UNTIL THE 12TH OF JANUARY. I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED THE PERSONAL ASSURANCE OF THE MINISTER THAT JOE WILSON AND THE FOUR OTHER AMERICANS IN OUR EMBASSY THERE WILL BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE BAGHDAD ON THE 12TH OF JANUARY AND WILL NOT BE RESTRAINED FROM SO DOING.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOUR MOOD, IF I MAY SAY, SEEMS PRETTY SOMBER AT THIS POINT. CAN YOU KIND OF DESCRIBE YOUR STATE OF MIND AND YOUR MOOD AFTER WHAT HAS OCCURRED TODAY?

SEC. BAKER: SOMBER.

Q SOMBER.

SEC. BAKER: YOU GOT IT.

Q ARE YOU ADVISING AN EVACUATION?

SEC. BAKER: I'M NOT SAYING THAT. I'M SAYING -- I'M TELLING YOU THAT WE ARE -- THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED -- WE HAVE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES FOR OUR REMAINING FIVE DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO LEAVE ON THE 12TH OF JANUARY, WHICH IS THE DATE THAT YOU WELL KNOW IS VERY CLOSE TO THE JANUARY 15 DEADLINE AND HAPPENS TO BE THE DATE THAT IRAQ HAS BEEN INSISTING ON FOR THREE WEEKS FOR THE MEETING.

Q WHAT ABOUT OTHER AMERICANS -- WHAT ABOUT OTHER AMERICANS, SIR?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I THINK MOST ALL AMERICANS ARE OUT OF IRAQ. ALL THAT WANT TO LEAVE ARE GONE, AS FAR AS I KNOW.

Q MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US NOW ABOUT THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH? WAS IT IN FACT IN ARABIC? WHAT WAS THE TONE OF IT? DID IT CONTAIN GRAPHIC MILITARY SCENARIOS INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE?

SEC. BAKER: I REGRET TO INFORM YOU, JOANNA, THAT THE MINISTER CHOOSE NOT TO RECEIVE THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. HE READ IT, VERY SLOWLY AND VERY CAREFULLY, BUT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. NOR WOULD THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ACCEPT AN ARABIC COURTESY TRANSLATION. YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK THE MINISTER WHY HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE LETTER.

MY OWN OPINION, FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, AND IT'S ONLY AN OPINION, WAS THAT HE CAME HERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT A LETTER THAT WALKED AWAY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT WE CANNOT AND OF COURSE WILL NOT DO.

Q DID THEY TELL YOU OR DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING THE UNITED NATIONS AGAIN TO DISCUSS THE GULF CRISIS? YOU KNOW THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, HE HAS PROPOSED THAT MOST PROBABLY A NEW DISCUSSION IS POSSIBLE, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. HAVE YOU DISCUSSED THIS EVENTUALITY WITH THE IRAQI MINISTER?

SEC. BAKER: NO, IT DID NOT COME UP IN MY MEETING TODAY WITH THE IRAQI MINISTER. I DID SPEAK TO THAT QUESTION AND THAT ISSUE A DAY OR SO AGO, AND I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAS SPOKEN TO IT AS WELL. I DON'T KNOW WHAT AN ADDITIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT THIS STAGE COULD DO, BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS FAITHFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, THE LAST ONE OF WHICH SAYS THAT IF IRAQ DOES NOT WITHDRAW BY MIDNIGHT ON JANUARY THE 15TH, FORCE CAN BE USED TO EFFECT THAT WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE HAD TWELVE RESOLUTIONS --

Q WHAT ABOUT --

SEC. BAKER: -- OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.

Q -- OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S SUGGESTIONS?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I CAN'T ANSWER YOU QUESTION, YOU OUGHT -- I WOULD REFER YOU TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, BUT I HAVE JUST SAID THAT

PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE SOME UTILITY IN TRYING TO USE THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BOB?

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY WAY TO AVOID A WAR AS OF RIGHT NOW?

SEC. BAKER: YES. I HOPE THERE IS. THERE'S BEEN NO DECISION TAKEN FOR THAT EVENTUALITY, AND AS I -- AND I WOULD SIMPLY REFER YOU TO MY OPENING STATEMENT, WHERE I MADE THE POINT THAT I HOPE WE DO NOT HAVE YET ONE MORE MISCALCULATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. I WOULD ALSO REFER YOU TO THE STATEMENTS WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH AND I AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COALITION HAVE MADE OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS OR WEEKS, AND WHICH I REPEATED TODAY TO THE MINISTER AGAIN, NOT IN A THREATENING WAY, BUT SIMPLY SO THAT HE WOULD KNOW WHERE OUR HEAD IS AND HOW WE FEEL AND WHAT WE THINK. AND THAT IS THAT THIS JANUARY 15TH DEADLINE, IN OUR MINDS, IS REAL. IRAQ CAN CHOOSE TO BELIEVE THAT OR NOT, BUT IT IS REAL IN OUR MINDS AND IN THE MINDS OF OUR COALITION PARTNERS. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BELIEVE THAT WE THINK IT'S REAL AND THAT THEY WILL ACT TO IMPLEMENT THE SOLEMN RESOLUTIONS

סופ חלק 1

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

9264:חוזם,אאא

אל:רהמש/714

מ:-וושנינגטון, נר:170, תא:090191, זח:1744, דח:ב, סג:בל,

בכב

חלק 2 מתוך 2 חלקים של נר 169

OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU REGRET THAT YOU WOULD HAVE -- STILL LIKE TO GO, EVEN ON THE 12TH, AND MEET INSTEAD OF MR. TARIQ SADDAM HIMSELF, STILL A DIFFERENCE OF THREE DAYS?

SEC. BAKER: THE 12TH -- WE'VE SAID FOR THE LAST THREE WEEKS THE 12TH OF JANUARY WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US BECAUSE IT IS JUST AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE DEADLINE. IT'S OBVIOUS THAT'S WHY THE 12TH WAS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED. WE'VE SAID FOR A LONG TIME THAT DATE IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU SPELL OUT YOUR VISION OF WHAT THE GULF WOULD LOOK LIKE IF THEY WITHDREW PEACEFULLY? IN OTHER WORDS, SOME OF THE RESTRICTIONS THAT YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT THAT MUST BE IMPOSED UPON IRAQ EVEN IF THEY DID WITHDRAW, DID YOU LAY THAT PLAN OUT FOR HIM IN SOME WAY?

SEC. BAKER: YES, I DID IN MY ORIGINAL PRESENTATION THIS MORNING, JOHN. AND I CAN'T -- I DON'T HAVE TIME TO GO THROUGH ALL OF THAT WITH YOU NOW, BUT THAT FALLS RIGHT IN THE -- IN THE CATEGORY OF THE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE MILITARY FORCE USED AGAINST IRAQ BY THE UNITED STATES IF THEY WITHDREW FROM KUWAIT AND PERMITTED THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

Q DID YOU TALK ABOUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE SIZE OF THE IRAQI MILITARY, THINGS THAT ARE A CONCERN TO MANY IN THE WESTERN COALITION BEYOND THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT?

SEC. BAKER: WE HAD A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTIONS OF -- OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. I POINTED OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AS WE'VE EXPRESSED BEFORE IN ADDRESSING THAT ISSUE, AND ADDRESSING THAT SUBJECT. AND WE TALKED ABOUT THE PRESENCE -- THE MULTINATIONAL PRESENCE THERE, AND THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAS SAID THAT WE DO NOT DESIRE NOR WANT A PERMANENT MILITARY GROUND PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT -- I MEAN IN THE GULF. THAT WE ARE NOT -- WE WANT TO SEE OUR TROOPS COME HOME JUST AS FAST AS THE SECURITY SITUATION WILL ALLOW. I MEAN, THOSE ARE THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT WE DISCUSSED, AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU JUST PLEASE DESCRIBE TO US THE POINT AT WHICH THE MEETING BROKE OFF, AND WHY AND HOW DID IT HAPPEN? WAS IT THAT YOU FINISHED OFF, DID MR. AZIZ FINISH OFF, WAS THERE JUST NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT ANY MORE? PLEASE DESCRIBE THAT.

SEC. BAKER: WELL, IT WAS SIMPLY A CASE, I THINK, THAT AFTER SIX HOURS OF DISCUSSION WE BOTH HAD PRETTY WELL MADE THE POINTS THAT WE HAD COME TO MAKE AND THAT WAS IT. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS

ANYTHING LEFT UNSAID. HE SAID EVERYTHING I THINK HE CAME TO SAY, AND I HAD SAID EVERYTHING THAT I HAD COME TO SAY. SO, IT -- WELL I THINK FRANKLY IT LASTED LONGER THAN MANY OF YOU MIGHT HAVE ANTICIPATED AT THE BEGINNING.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU MENTIONED THAT YOU ARE GOING TO CALL BACK THESE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS? WILL YOU ALSO ASK THE IRAQI DIPLOMATS TO LEAVE THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY THE 12TH?

SEC. BAKER: NO. WE WILL ASK THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO DRAW DOWN THEIR DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE 12TH, BUT I -- AS I INDICATED TO THE MINISTER, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PERMIT THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL DIPLOMATIC CONTINGENT IN WASHINGTON.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU FEEL THAT IF YOU WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THE FACT OF THE LINKAGE, THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A PROPOSITION OF IRAQ RETIRING FROM KUWAIT?

*linkage*  
SEC. BAKER: I DON'T KNOW. WHY DON'T YOU ASK THE MINISTER THAT BECAUSE WHEN YOU SAY ACCEPTED LINKAGE, I'M NOT ENTIRELY SURE EXACTLY WHAT YOU MEAN. AND -- I MEAN, DO YOU MEAN IF WE HAD ACCEPTED -- IF WE HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO GO TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO HANDLE THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST? ASK HIM THE QUESTION. IT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTING. YOU KNOW WHAT OUR POSITION HAS BEEN FOR A LONG TIME. IT WOULD SET AN EXTRAORDINARILY UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENT, WE THINK, AND THAT -- AND WOULD NOT, IN THE LONG-RUN, CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN THE REGION, BUT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO INSTABILITY BECAUSE AGGRESSORS WOULD BE SEEN TO BE REWARDED FOR THEIR AGGRESSION. IT'S SOMETHING WE SIMPLY CANNOT CONSIDER.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WAS THERE ANY SINGLE ISSUE ON WHICH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ WAS NARROWED DURING THIS 6-1/2 HOURS?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT I -- I THINK THAT THE DISCUSSIONS -- I'VE ALREADY INDICATED IT WAS A SERIOUS ONE. I THINK THAT THE TONE OF IT WAS GOOD, NORM, UNDER THE -- AS GOOD AS YOU COULD EXPECT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WEREN'T POUNDING THE TABLE AND SHOUTING AT EACH OTHER. IT WAS A VERY REASONED AND, I THINK, RESPONSIBLE DISCUSSION BY TWO DIPLOMATS WHO REALLY WOULD LIKE TO FIND A PEACEFUL AND POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. BUT I'VE -- I'VE ALREADY SAID TO YOU I DID NOT DETECT FLEXIBILITY IN THE POSITION OF IRAQ AS THEY HAVE STATED IT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

NOW, WE -- AGAIN I INVITE YOU TO MY OPENING STATEMENT. WE STILL HAVE SIX DAYS. I JUST HOPE THAT THEY WILL THINK ABOUT THIS MEETING, THAT THEY WILL FOCUS ON IT, THAT WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ GETS BACK AND REPORTS TO HIS PRESIDENT, THAT PERHAPS THERE COULD BE SOME CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. BUT THE -- THERE CANNOT BE A NEGOTIATION HERE BECAUSE THE TERMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS WERE WORKED OUT IN THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IS BOUND TO THOSE RESOLUTIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO MEET SADDAM SOMEWHERE ELSE APART FROM BAGHDAD, IF YOU -- AND WAS THAT --

SEC. BAKER: THAT WAS NOT -- THAT WAS NOT DISCUSSED. IT HAS NEVER BEEN PROPOSED BY IRAQ. THE IRAQI PROPOSAL, AS YOU KNOW, FOR SOME WEEKS HAS BEEN, "WE PICK A DATE FOR BAKER TO COME TO BAGHDAD. YOU PICK A DATE FOR AZIZ TO COME TO WASHINGTON. AND WE'LL WORK IT THAT WAY." THAT'S BEEN OUT THERE FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. THERE'S

NEVER BEEN ANY SUGGESTION OF THE OTHER.

THANK YOU.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), @אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

BAKER DISAPPOINTED IN IRAQ'S LACK OF FLEXIBILITY

(Says mood "somber" after talks with Aziz)

By Robin Newmann

USIA European Correspondent

Geneva -- Secretary of State Baker said six hours of talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz January 9 left him "disappointed" with Iraq's lack of flexibility in accepting a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.

"The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait, or be expelled by force," Baker told a late evening news conference summing up the three sessions of talks that had taken place that day.

"Regrettably...I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions" calling for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

Baker termed his mood as "somber" as a result of the talks, but he said that war was still not inevitable.

"The path of peace remains open," he said, recalling that it was clearly laid out in the 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted since the gulf crisis began last August when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait.

Baker called on Iraq's leadership to think over seriously what he had told Aziz during the meeting, and not to make a further miscalculation about the United States' determination to obtain Kuwait's independence, including by the use of "all necessary means" as spelled out in the last U.N. resolution on the gulf crisis.

The January 15 deadline is "real," Baker said, and he expressed the hope that Iraq "will act" before that date to implement the "solemn resolutions" of the U.N. Security Council.

Baker said there had already been "too many" Iraqi miscalculations concerning the gulf crisis. Iraq miscalculated the international response to its unjustified invasion of Kuwait, "expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor," he said. It also miscalculated the response to its "barbaric policy" of taking foreigners hostage as human shields, and that the international community would be divided over its response to the invasion of Kuwait.

"So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again," Baker



said.

There should be "no doubt" in Iraq's mind that the 28 nations that have deployed forces in the gulf "have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait," the secretary said.

"If it should choose -- and the choice is Iraq's -- to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq," Baker declared.

And, he added, time is running out with only six days remaining before the January 15 deadline.

Baker said the tone of the meeting was "as good as you could expect" under the circumstances -- "a very reasoned and responsible discussion" with no pounding on the table.

Baker explained that he had started the meeting by telling Aziz that he had come "not to negotiate but to communicate" the United States' desire for a peaceful outcome to the crisis rather than the need to use force. Baker said he went over the history of the U.N. resolutions on Kuwait, explaining what would happen if they were observed by Iraq and what would happen if they were ignored. And he said he "assured" Aziz that if the U.N. resolutions were fully implemented by Iraq, there would be "no military action" by the United States and other members of the gulf coalition.

Baker said that Aziz repeated the Iraqi position linking the resolution of the Kuwaiti situation to the Palestinian question and Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. There is "no change in our position that the two issues are not linked," Baker said, adding that it was clear that Iraq did not invade Kuwait to help the Palestinians but rather for Iraq's own aggrandizement.

Aziz, in a separate news conference, said that the United States' refusal to consider the two issues together was a "double standard" on the U.S. part.

He also said the United States was "raising the stick" to Iraq and treating it "unjustly" over the gulf crisis, and that it was still up to the U.S. to decide whether there would be a war. And if there is one, Iraq would be prepared to defend itself and attack Israel as well, Aziz said.

Baker said he told Aziz that rewarding Iraq for its aggression by allowing linkage with the Middle Eastern peace process "would really send a terrible signal, not only to genuine peacemakers in the region, but also to other would-be aggressors."

Baker said he listened to Aziz recounting that Iraq invaded Kuwait for defensive reasons because it felt "threatened by Kuwait," and answered that it was "very hard to believe that any nation in the world would believe that."

Aziz also restated the proposal for Baker to go to Baghdad to see Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and for Aziz to go to Washington to talk to President Bush. Baker said the U.S. position had not changed and that such meetings were now excluded following Iraq's refusal to agree to any of the 15 dates already proposed by the United States for a Baker trip to Baghdad.

Baker said that Aziz also "chose not to receive" a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein, although he read it carefully. Aziz later said that the language used in the letter was "not compatible with language that should be used in correspondence with a head of state."

Baker said he also received assurances from Aziz that the five remaining U.S. diplomats in Baghdad would be allowed to leave the country on January 12.

And then after six hours of discussions, both sides had said everything they had expected to say, Baker noted, and the meeting came to an end.

Baker said he did not know what the next steps would be in the gulf crisis. He mentioned the possibility of the U.N. secretary general using his good offices during the next six days to find a peaceful solution, and said the United States would also welcome any other diplomatic efforts to bring the crisis to a peaceful end.

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NO IRAQI FLEXIBILITY SEEN ON COMPLYING WITH U.N.

(Transcript: Baker news conference 1/9/91)

Geneva -- Secretary of State Baker says that during six hours of talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, "regrettably...I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the U.N. Security Council resolutions" on the Persian Gulf crisis.

The purpose of the January 9 meeting in Geneva, Baker told a news conference, was not to negotiate with Iraq but to communicate. "There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations," the secretary said, listing the miscalculation on the international response to the invasion of Kuwait; the response to the "barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages," and the belief that Iraq could divide the international community.

"Let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again," Baker said. "The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

"If it should choose -- and the choice is Iraq's -- to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq," he said.

Baker said "the time for talk is running out" with January 15 being the U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, but he added that "the path of peace remains open" and the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership."

Following is a transcript of Baker's news conference:

(begin transcript)

BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen. I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today. I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political solution to the crisis in the Gulf.

I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have made clear we would not do -- that is, negotiate backwards from United Nations Security resolutions -- but I met with him today to communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking, and we did that, both of us.

The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the

will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait or be expelled by force. Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today that -- in over six hours I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi government miscalculated the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor.

It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the international community and gain something thereby from its aggression. So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again.

The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait. If it should choose -- and the choice is Iraq's -- if it should choose to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq.

I made these points with Minister Aziz not to threaten but to inform, and I did so with no sense of satisfaction, for we genuinely desire a peaceful outcome, and, as both President Bush and I have said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.

I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership. And I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a confrontation that Iraq can avoid.

The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very clearly in 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of over five months.

But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice really is theirs to make, and let us all hope that that leadership will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace.

QUESTION: What do your allies plan to do next to bring this message home?

ANSWER: Well, you say, "What do the allies plan to do next," and I think it's important for everyone to note that this is a

coalition. This is not Iraq versus the United States. This is Iraq versus the international community. This happens to have been the first time that we've had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting -- U.S. and Iraq.

So I don't know what the next steps are. I do know this: that time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After five months and 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost evident that the time for talk is running out. It's time for Iraq to act and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait.

But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may be a way that the secretary general of the United Nations could use his good offices here in the remaining six or so days that have left.

I will say that -- I've already mentioned that I didn't hear anything that to me demonstrated flexibility, nor did I hear any new proposals. But I would like to take note of the fact that the minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day for him to come to the United States and Iraq pick a day for me to go to Baghdad.

Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our answer is to that. We've given it over the past four or five days, and I gave it to the minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a visit to Baghdad. The president of the United States made the proposal for face-to-face discussions. We're glad that Iraq accepted this one, because we did have six hours during which we could make our position known to them; they could make their position known to us.

But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about implementing resolutions of the United Nations, that perhaps there could be -- I don't know what the position of the Government of Iraq would be on this -- but perhaps there would be some room for us to seek the use of the good offices of the secretary general of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the Iraqi foreign minister reiterate his demands for what he calls "justice and fairness" for the Palestinians? I mean, was there any wavering in the U.S. position, as you may have expressed it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked?

A: No. There was -- he expressed his position. There was no change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked. I did make the point that I don't think many people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians, and, if they did, it was another miscalculation,

because it hasn't helped the Palestinians.

I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq's own aggrandizement, and I think most people realize that Iraq is trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against Kuwait, which in my view at least remains an obstacle to broader peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader peace.

And I made the point as well that rewarding Iraq's aggression with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a terrible signal not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining moment in history.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you willing -- is the United States willing to talk again to Iraq before the January 15 deadline, and did you discuss with the president the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad?

A: I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had already told you what our view was. And the president himself, I think, said, "There will be no trip to Baghdad." The proposal which he originally made was in effect rejected by Iraq. We offered 15 separate days. They continued to insist upon only one -- the 12th of January -- which we think was and still is an obvious effort to avoid the deadline of January 15, and we're not interested in that.

We think this deadline is real, and our coalition partners think the deadline is real.

Q: Did you discuss this with the president today?

A: I reported fully to the president, of course.

Q: Could you run through for us -- you spoke for six hours -- could you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those six hours? What did you begin with? What did he counter with? Why did you feel it necessary after two hours to call the president?

A: Well, we broke for lunch. And I think this meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the president, and so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished.

Q: Did you begin by reading your letter --

A: But I began by saying that I was here to -- not to negotiate but to communicate, as I've just told you -- that I was here for a serious dialogue in an effort to find a political and peaceful solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared to walk backwards from U.N.

Security Council resolutions; that the terms of those resolutions had already been set.

And I told the minister I wanted to handle the meeting in whatever way he wanted. And I gave him the choice, and he chose for me to go first, just as he -- I gave him the choice as well as to how to report to you, and he suggested that I come down here first.

So that's how we got where we are here tonight. But let me say that I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions, and what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq's non-observance of those resolutions.

● then presented the position of the Government of Iraq. And he will be down here in a few moments, and he can -- now, we can't run through six hours of dialogue here. Nobody else would get to ask any questions.

Q: One quick follow-up: How detailed were you about the extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply with the U.N. resolutions by January 15?

A: Well, I didn't get into things that would properly be in the realm of operational security matters. I hope I effectively made the case with respect to what at least our opinion was of the 28-nation multinational force that is there in the Gulf.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the United States interested in any sort of phased withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this withdrawal began by January 15, will the United States guarantee there will be no military attack on Iraq?

A: Let me say, I should have said this in answer to Tom's question. I assured the minister that if they implement the U.N. resolutions, and if they withdraw from Iraq and permit the restoration -- from Kuwait -- and permit the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition.

Q: Following the question --

A: On the first question, the U.N. resolutions speak for themselves. We are not here -- after all, we are part of an international coalition. We are part of 28 countries. Even more countries that have been helping financially and

economically. And it is not up to us to walk backwards from solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said in the past that you would seek approval for the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in the process in which you will be seeking the use of force from other governments?

A: No. But the clock is ticking on, and I made that point to the minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken the president of the United States, who, alone in our Executive Branch under our system can make that decision, has not taken that decision. And I'm not aware that any other governments have.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the remaining six days before the U.N. deadline, would you welcome an initiative by some other European allies, or even Arab countries such as Algeria that would perhaps include sending a European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution?

A: Well, this is an international coalition, let me say it one more time, and therefore, as I've just indicated to you, it's an international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the world's peacekeeping and security body. And, therefore, there might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps the secretary general's good offices.

But I said last night, and I have said for months, we welcome any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically. I'm disappointed, of course, that we did not receive any indications today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq.

So we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do think if there are efforts by members of the international coalition, that the message should be uniform, as it has been for five months, and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and political solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us -- you keep saying you saw no indication of flexibility. Did the foreign minister actually tell you that Iraq intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait?

A: He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate that there was any chance that they would withdraw. But I did not see, frankly, any flexibility in their position. You can ask him questions when he gets down here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss -- in answer to any of the discussion about the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle



East by the Iraqi foreign minister, did you discuss the efforts the United States has made in the past to seek Arab-Israeli peace --

A: Yes.

Q: -- to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious, genuinely interested, in resolving those problems?

A: Yes. We went through a good bit of the history of the personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Arab -- between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through the experience of the United States in bringing about the Camp David accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt, and we had a full discussion of that issue -- a complete discussion of it.

I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. And we would not agree as a condition of their withdrawing to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with respect to that. But we did have -- they brought it up, and we had a very full discussion.

Q: Well, what was their answer?

A: We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I think you know. And I've already told you why I think linkage is a bad idea. I think that it will not tend to promote peace in the region. It will tend to be read as a reward for aggressors, and it would jeopardize future peace in the region.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you tell the foreign minister about the willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact of political pressure on the president's decision-making?

A: I said don't miscalculate the resolve of the American people who are very slow to anger but who believe strongly in principle and who believe that we should not reward aggression, and that big countries with powerful military machines should not be permitted to invade, occupy, and brutalize their peaceful neighbors.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've told us what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any flexibility, and you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion of history. Could you tell us what you did hear? Did you hear justifications from the foreign minister? Did you hear a repeat of what they've been saying in public for some time?

A: I heard some things that I, quite frankly, found very hard to believe, but I'll let him go into the detail here. I heard,

for instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in nature; that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell you the same thing I told the minister, which is I found it very hard to believe that any nation in the world will believe that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, even though you did spend six hours here today talking to Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past five and a half months you haven't had much contact with Iraq. What's to prevent the historians of this conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here and we slid toward war without trying?

A: There's been a lot of conversations with the leadership of Iraq, all to no avail. The secretary general has already had one failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by other Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard. They've had meetings. We have now had a meeting. So people can write whatever they decide they might want to write.

But the truth of the matter is, we have been very, I think -- the international coalition -- very responsible and measured in our approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, gone off half-cocked. We have gone through the United Nations patiently, working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only after five and half months and the passage of 12 Security Council resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force.

So I think that there's been more diplomacy exercised in this crisis than in almost any that I can think of. The one thing I would ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We made that mistake in the '30s, at least, for our part. We don't intend to make it again.

Q: In a sense two questions. Did the foreign minister suggest Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us say, the French have suggested, or others have suggested? And, if he did, is linkage -- the principle of linkage -- a reason for the loss of -- and the insistence on that principle -- a reason for the loss of lots of lives?

A: Well, I don't think he said that explicitly. I think, perhaps, it was implicit in his comments. But he'll be here and you can ask him. It's more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences, and that sort of thing, that get you beyond just the simple fact of linkage.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which Iraq would get out of Kuwait? However unacceptable it was to you, was there a specific proposal?

A: No. There was no specific proposal. He restated the positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he feels that was justified. Again, he'll be down here and you can ask him yourselves.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But did you and the foreign minister talk about future diplomatic contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq? Or did this one 6-1/2 hour meeting represent the conclusion of diplomatic initiatives by the United States?

A: We will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our Charge in Baghdad until the 12th of January. I asked for and received the personal assurance of the minister that Joe Wilson and the other Americans in our embassy there will be permitted to leave Baghdad on the 12th of January and will not be restrained from so doing.

Q: Mr. Secretary, your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point. Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after what has occurred today?

A: Somber.

Q: Somber?

A: You got it.

Q: Are you advising an evacuation?

A: I'm not saying that. I'm telling you that we have asked for and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel to leave on the 12th of January, which is a date that you well know is very close to the January 15 deadline and happens to be the date that Iraq has been insisting on for three weeks for the meeting.

Q: What about other Americans?

A: I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want to leave are gone, as far as I know.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush? Was it, in fact, in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate?

A: I regret to inform you, that the minister chose not to receive the letter from President Bush. He read it very slowly and very carefully, but he would not accept it nor would the Iraqi Embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy

translation. You will have to ask the minister why he did not accept the letter.

My own opinion, for what it's worth -- and it's only an opinion -- was that he came here not authorized to accept a letter that walked away from the United Nations resolutions, which is something that we cannot and, of course, will not do.

Q: Have you discussed the possibility of convening the United Nations again to discuss the Gulf crisis? You know that President Mitterrand, he has proposed that most probably a new discussion is possible; it might be helpful. Have you discussed this eventuality with the Iraqi minister?

A: No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi minister. I did speak to that question and that issue a day or so ago, and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well.

I don't know what an additional Security Council meeting at this stage could do. Because what we are talking about here is faithful implementation of resolutions of the Council, the last one of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January 15, force can be used to effect that withdrawal. We have had 12 resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

Q: President Mitterrand is suggesting this.

A: I can't answer your question. I would refer you to President Mitterrand. But I have just said that perhaps there would be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the secretary general.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you have any reason to believe that there is any way to avoid a war as of right now?

A: Yes, I hope there is. There has been no decision taken for that eventuality. I would simply refer you to my opening statement where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more miscalculation by the Government of Iraq.

I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course of the last several days, or weeks, and which I repeated today to the minister, not in a threatening way, but simply so that he would know where our head is, and how we feel, and what we think, and that is that this January 15 deadline, in our minds, is real.

Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they will believe that we think it's real and that they will

act to implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you regret that you would have still liked to go, even on the 12th, and meet -- instead of Mr. Tariq -- Saddam himself? It's still a difference of three days.

A: We've said for the last three weeks, the 12th of January was unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline. It's obvious. That's why the 12th was originally suggested. We've said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains unacceptable to us.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you spell out your vision of what the Gulf would look like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon Iraq even if they did withdraw? Did you lay that plan out for him in some way?

A: Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning. I don't have time to go through all of that with you now. But that falls right in the category of the assurance that there would not be military force used against Iraq by the United States if they withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait.

Q: Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the size of the Iraqi military -- things that are of concern to many in the Western coalition beyond the occupation of Kuwait?

A: We had a full discussion of the questions about weapons of mass destruction. I pointed out the interest of the United States, as we have expressed before in addressing that issue and addressing that subject. We talked about the the multinational presence there and the fact that President Bush has said we do not desire nor want a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East -- I mean in the Gulf. We want to see our troops come home just as fast as the security situation will allow. Those are the kinds of things that we discussed, as you might expect.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you just please describe to us the point at which the meeting broke off? Why and how did it happen? Was it that you finished off? Did Mr. Aziz finish off? Or was there just nothing to talk about anymore? Please describe that.

A: It was simply a case, I think, that over six hours of discussion, we had both had pretty well made the points that we had come to make, and that was it. I don't believe that there was anything left unsaid. He said everything, I think, he came to say and I had said everything that I had come to say.

I think, frankly, it lasted longer than many of you might have anticipated at the beginning.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you are going to call back the American diplomats. Are you also asking the Iraqi diplomats to leave the United States on January 12?

A: No. We will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12. As I indicated to the minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a small diplomatic contingent in Washington.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from Kuwait?

A: I don't know. Why don't you ask the minister that. Because when you say "accepted linkage," I'm not entirely sure exactly what you mean. Do you mean if we had accepted -- if we had indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to handle the question of the Middle East, ask him the question. It would be very interesting.

You know what our position has been for a long time. It would set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and would not, in the long run, contribute to peace in the region, but would contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be rewarded for their aggression. It's something we simply cannot consider.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there any single issue on which the difference between the United States and Iraq was narrowed during this 6-1/2 hours?

A: Well, let me say that I think that the discussions -- I've already indicated it was a serious one. I think that the tone of it was good; as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We weren't pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very reasoned and, I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this problem.

I've already said to you, I did not detect flexibility in the position of Iraq, as they have stated it over the past several days.

Again, I invite you to my opening statement. We still have six days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting; that they will focus on it; that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and reports to his president, that perhaps there could be some change in their position.

There cannot be a negotiation here because the terms of the

U.N. Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in the United Nations, and the international coalition is bound to those resolutions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else, apart from Baghdad? And was that suggested?

A: That was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been, we pick a date for Baker to come to Baghdad; you pick a date for Aziz to come to Washington, and we'll work it that way. That's been out there for a long, long time. There's never been any suggestion of the other.

(end transcript)

NNNN

9043:חוזם,אאא  
אל:רהמש/690  
מ:-וושיןגטון,נר:159,תא:090191,זח:1355,דח:ב,סג:בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/בהול לבוקר  
א ל: תפוצת תקשורת  
דע: ניו-יורק  
מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

THE WHITE HOUSE FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, EXECUTIVE  
ORDER NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY  
9, 1991

BY THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS PRESIDENT BY THE CONSTITUTION  
AND THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INCLUDING 50 USC APP.  
468, 10 USC 4501 AND 9501, AND 50 USC 82, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS  
FOLLOWS:

SECTION 101: POLICY. THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE THE  
CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY MOBILIZE ITS RESOURCES IN THE INTEREST OF  
NATIONAL SECURITY. THEREFORE, TO ACHIEVE PROMPT DELIVERY OF  
ARTICLES, PRODUCTS, AND MATERIALS TO MEET NATIONAL SECURITY  
REQUIREMENTS, THE GOVERNMENT MAY PLACE ORDERS AND REQUIRE PRIORITY  
PERFORMANCE OF THESE ORDERS.

SECTION 102. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER 50 USC APP. 468.

(A) SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION, THE AUTHORITIES  
VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT, UNDER 50 USC APP. 468, WITH RESPECT TO THE  
PLACING OF ORDERS FOR PROMPT DELIVERY OF ARTICLES OR MATERIALS,  
EXCEPT FOR THE TAKING AUTHORITY UNDER 50 USC APP. 468(C), ARE HEREBY  
DELEGATED TO:

(1) THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE WITH RESPECT TO ALL FOOD  
RESOURCES;

(2) THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY WITH RESPECT TO ALL FORMS OF  
ENERGY;

(3) THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL FORMS  
OF CIVIL TRANSPORTATION; AND

(4) THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE WITH RESPECT TO ALL OTHER  
ARTICLES AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.

(B) THE AUTHORITIES DELEGATED BY PARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SECTION  
SHALL BE EXERCISED ONLY AFTER:

(1) A DETERMINATION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT PROMPT  
DELIVERY OF THE ARTICLES OR MATERIALS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE  
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL  
SECURITY, OR



(2) A DETERMINATION BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY THAT THE PROMPT DELIVERY OF THE ARTICLES OR MATERIALS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAMS IS IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

(C) ALL DETERMINATIONS OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION AND ALL DELEGATIONS -- MADE PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ORDER UNDER THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, AS AMENDED, AND UNDER ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS -- SHALL BE CONTINUED IN EFFECT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO APPROVED PROGRAMS LISTED UNDER THE DEFENSE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS SYSTEM (15 CFR PART 700).

SEC. 103. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER 10 U.S.C. 4501 AND 9501 AND 50 U.S.C. 82.

(A) SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS SECTION, THE AUTHORITIES VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT UNDER 10 U.S.C. 4501 AND 9501 WITH RESPECT TO THE PLACING OF ORDERS FOR NECESSARY PRODUCTS OR MATERIALS, AND UNDER 50 U.S.C. 82 WITH RESPECT TO THE PLACING OF ORDERS FOR SHIPS OR WAR MATERIALS, EXCEPT FOR THE TAKING AUTHORITY VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT BY THESE ACTS, ARE HEREBY DELEGATED TO:

(1) THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE WITH RESPECT TO ALL FOOD RESOURCES;

(2) THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY WITH RESPECT TO ALL FORMS OF ENERGY;

(3) THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL FORMS OF CIVIL TRANSPORTATION; AND

(4) THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE WITH RESPECT TO ALL OTHER PRODUCTS AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS.

(B) THE AUTHORITIES DELEGATED IN PARAGRAPH (A) OF THIS SECTION MAY BE EXERCISED ONLY AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE THE STATUTORILY REQUIRED DETERMINATION.

SEC. 104. IMPLEMENTATION. (A) THE AUTHORITIES DELEGATED UNDER SECTIONS 102 AND 103 OF THIS ORDER SHALL INCLUDE THE POWER TO REDELEGATE SUCH AUTHORITIES, AND THE POWER OF SUCESSIVE REDELEGATION OF SUCH AUTHORITIES, TO DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE AUTHORITIES DELEGATED IN THIS ORDER MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ADMINISTERED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, DEFENSE, ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, AND COMMERCE, AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, AS APPROPRIATE.

(B) ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES DELEGATED AUTHORITY UNDER THIS ORDER ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO AMEND THEIR RULES AND REGULATIONS AS NECESSARY TO REFLECT THE NEW AUTHORITIES DELEGATED HEREIN THAT ARE TO BE RELIED UPON TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS. TO THE EXTENT AUTHORIZED BY LAW, INCLUDING 50 U.S.C. APP. 468, 10 U.S.C. 4501 AND 9501, AND 50 U.S.C. 82, ALL RULES AND REGULATIONS ISSUED UNDER THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, AS AMENDED, WITH RESPECT TO THE PLACING OF PRIORITY ORDERS FOR ARTICLES, PRODUCTS, SHIPS, AND MATERIALS, INCLUDING WAR MATERIALS, SHALL BE DEEMED, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO IMPLEMENT THE AUTHORITIES DELEGATED BY SECTIONS 102 AND 103 OF THIS ORDER, AND SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL AMENDED OR REVOKED BY THE RESPECTIVE SECRETARY. ALL ORDERS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED, TAKEN, OR CONTINUED IN EFFECT PURSUANT TO THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT

OF 1950, AS AMENDED, SHALL, UNTIL AMENDED OR REVOKED BY THE RESPECTIVE SECRETARIES OR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, AS APPROPRIATE, REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT, TO THE EXTENT SUPPORTED BY ANY LAW OR ANY AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO THE RESPECTIVE SECRETARY OR THE DIRECTOR PURSUANT TO THIS ORDER.

(C) UPON THE REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO PARTICULAR ARTICLES, PRODUCTS, OR MATERIALS THAT ARE DETERMINED TO BE NEEDED TO MEET NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, ANY OTHER OFFICIAL RECEIVING A DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER TO PLACE ORDERS OR TO ENFORCE PRECEDENCE OF SUCH ORDERS, SHALL EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY WITHIN 10 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST; PROVIDED, THAT IF THE HEAD OF ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY HAVING DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITIES HEREUNDER DISAGREES WITH A REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SUCH DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY HEAD SHALL, WITHIN 10 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, REFER THE ISSUE TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHO SHALL ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.

(D) PROPOSED DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY UNDER THIS ORDER, AND ANY NEW DETERMINATIONS MADE UNDER SECTIONS 102(B)(1) OR (2), SHALL BE COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY WITH ALL APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

SEC. 105. JUDICIAL REVIEW. THIS ORDER IS INTENDED ONLY TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND IS NOT INTENDED TO CREATE ANY RIGHT OR BENEFIT, SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL, ENFORCEABLE AT LAW BY A PARTY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS AGENCIES, ITS OFFICERS, OR ANY PERSON.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE  
JANUARY 8, 1991

עד כאן.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7382  
אל: רהמש/549  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 080191, זח: 1750, דח: מ, סג: סב,  
בבב  
סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב / מידי

אל : וושינגטון - שובל - לנמען בלבד  
ד ע : משהב'ט - מקש'ח חנן אלון

דרא'פ

מסרתי היום (8.1) לשגריר בראון תשובתינו לפנייתם בנדון מתאריכים 21 בדצמבר 1990 ומה-24 בדצמבר 1990. רצ'ב נוסח התשובה :

1 WE WERE SURPRISED AND DISTURBED BY THE CONTENTS AND TONE OF THE MESSAGE WHICH GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR SHOVAL IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY DECEMBER 21 1990, BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE BARTHOLOMEW, AND HANDED OUT TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS, BY U.S AMBASSADOR BROWN, ON MONDAY DECEMBER 24 1990 IN TEL-AVIV.

2 THE SUBJECTS WHICH WERE RAISED IN THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE. OUR POSITIONS ARE THUS WELL KNOWN TO YOU.

3. YOUR MESSAGE SUGGESTS HOWEVER THAT IN YOUR VIEW, THERE ARE NONETHELESS SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION.

4. WE SHALL WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS, AT A MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

עד כאן .

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

BUSH ASKS CONGRESS FOR "ALL NECESSARY MEANS" IN GULF

(Text: Letter to House, Senate 1/8/90)

Washington -- President Bush January 8 called on the U.S. Congress to adopt a resolution stating that it "supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678."

In a letter to the speaker of the House of Representatives, Representative Thomas Foley, Bush said that such a resolution "would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait.

"Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression," Bush said.

Following is the text of President Bush's letter to Foley. (Identical letters were sent to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole and House Minority Leader Robert Michel.)

(BEGIN TEXT)

Dear Mr. Speaker:

The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the U.N. Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's foreign minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the U.N. position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council

Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

(signed) George Bush

(END TEXT)

NNN

אאא, חוזם: 7590  
אל: רהמש/577  
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 154, תא: 080191, זח: 1415, דח: ר, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
18770  
שמור/רגיל  
202.01

אל: מנהל ארב'ל 2  
מנהל מצפ'א

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ין  
ראש אגף ארב'ל  
וושנינגטון

מאת: אהרן יעקב - נאו'ם

הנדון: שיחת השגריר עם ג'ק שטיין

1. בשיחה שקיים אתמול עם השגריר ארידור אמר ג'ק שטיין כי מדיניות ארה'ב כלפי ישראל במועבי'ט נובעת מאילוצי המשבר במפרץ. הערכתו היא שעם סיום המשבר, תשתפר העמדה האמריקאית כלפינו.

2. מסר כי ראש צוות הבית הלבן, סוננו, יוחלף בקרוב. זאת משום שבשתי שנות כהונתו צבר סוננו אויבים רבים.

3. נודע לו כי בבחירות לנשיאות ב-1992 עשוי ג'ק קמפ להיות המועמד לסגן נשיא במקום דן קוייל.

אהרן יעקב - נאו'ם

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, ביינ, ארבבל, בנצור,  
מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

307  
Handwritten signature

1/3

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~~1068~~  
1168

שמור / מיזוי  
אל: מצפ"א  
דע: מקש"ח / משהב"ט  
מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהנ"ב: ביקור משלחת ADL  
בהמשך מברקנו בנדון.

רצ"ב התכנית הטנטטיבית של ביקור הקונגרסמנים.  
אל המשלחות יתלווה מייק ליברמן ממשדוד-ADL ברושינגטון.

ישראל ומח' זכנ"ר  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

להת' סלטה רה"א א"ס אמ"ס בנ"ר א"ס  
רב"ב א"ר תפוזי א"ב

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January 7-15 Congressional Mission  
 1990-12-18 23:08

Monday January 7

8:00 a.m. Arrival  
 11:00 Orientation with Harry Wall  
 Michael Leiberman  
 Laura Kam  
 12:30 Lunch with Bill Brown  
 Afternoon free or visit Museum of Jewish Diaspora  
 8:00 Dinner with Simcha Dinitz  
 Overnight: Tel Aviv Hilton, Tel Aviv

Tuesday January 8

8:00 a.m. Breakfast Senior IDF Intelligence Officer  
 10:00 Visit Israel Aircraft Industries - self related equipment  
 Briefing on "Arrow"  
 12:00 Briefing with Minister of Defense Moshe Arens  
 1:00 Lunch in Old Jaffa/Tour Tel Aviv  
 8:00 Dinner with Shimon Peres  
 Overnight: Hilton Tel Aviv

Wednesday January 9

8:00 a.m. Breakfast on own  
 10:00 Visit West Bank town  
 12:30 Lunch with Mayer Shlomo Lehat  
 6:00 Meeting with Minister of Finance Yitzhak Moda'i  
 8:00 Dinner in Jaffa with invited guests  
 Overnight: Hilton, Tel Aviv

Thursday January 10

Early departure for Jerusalem  
 10:00 a.m. Tour Old City of Jerusalem  
 1:00 p.m. Lunch with Teddy Kollek  
 2:30 Meet Prime Minister Shamir  
 3:30 Briefing with Bibi Netanyahu or Levy  
 8:00 Dinner with Abraham Burg

Friday January 11

8:00 a.m. Breakfast with Benny Begin or Dore Gold  
 9:30 Visit Yad Vashem  
 12:00 p.m. Meet Natan Sharansky  
 1:00 Lunch with Neville Hamdan  
 2:30 Visit Bethlehem

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2/3

END



1168

318

~~1068~~ 3/3

4:30 Visit Western Wall for Commencement of Shabbat  
8:00 Dinner with Rabbi David Rosen  
Overnight: King David Hotel

Saturday, January 12

Tour Masada  
Lunch and "Flout" in Dead Sea  
6:00 Meet Palestinian Representatives at American Colony  
Hotel  
Dinner with Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak  
Overnight: King David Hotel

Sunday, January 13

Early departure for north via Jericho  
Tour Sam of Gullies - *Golan*  
Visit Kibbutz  
Overnight Kfar Giladi

Monday, January 14

8:00 a.m. Breakfast on own  
9:30 Visit Base on Lebanon Border  
11:30 Visit Naharia - *Haifa?*  
12:30 Lunch with Soviet immigrants  
Return to Tel Aviv (Day rooms in Hilton)  
9:00 Farewell Dinner

Tuesday, January 15

1:00 a.m. Departure

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MRSHRBT KESHER

20:11

1990-12-18

אאא, תוזם: 6400

אל: רהמש/477

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 111, תא: 070191, זח: 1612, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מיידי

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

6-5  
ABC "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY"/HOST: DAVID BRINKLEY/WITH:  
SAM DONALDSON, ABC NEWS; GEORGE WILL, ABC NEWS, SYNDICATED  
COLUMNIST/INTERVIEW WITH: SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER III  
SUNDAY, JANUARY 6, 1991

MR. BRINKLEY: MR. SECRETARY, THANKS FOR COMING IN.

SEC. BAKER: THANK YOU, DAVID. I'M GLAD TO BE HERE.

MR. BRINKLEY: NOW, WE KNOW YOU DON'T WANT TO GIVE IT AWAY IN  
ADVANCE, BUT WHAT CAN YOU TELL US -- WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO SAY TO  
AZIZ WHEN YOU MEET HIM IN GENEVA? HOW MUCH OF IT CAN YOU TELL US  
NOW?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THE PRESIDENT, I THINK, HAS MADE IT CLEAR,  
DAVID. THIS IS NOT A NEGOTIATION IN THE SENSE THAT THAT TERM IS  
NORMALLY USED. WE WILL NOT BE GOING TO NEGOTIATE. I WILL BE GOING  
TO MAKE THE POINT FACE-TO-FACE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF IRAQ THAT THERE  
ARE TWO OPTIONS HERE. ONE IS TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS FULLY AND WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT, AND IF  
THEY TAKE -- PICK UP ON THAT OPTION, TO GIVE THEM ASSURANCES AGAINST  
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THEY ARE NOT  
WILLING TO DO THAT, THEN TO MAKE THE POINT AS FORCEFULLY AS I CAN TO  
THEM THAT THEY, IN ALL PROBABILITY, WILL HAVE FORCE USED AGAINST  
THEM TO EJECT THEM FROM KUWAIT.

MR. BRINKLEY: YOU JUST WANT TO TELL THEM FACE-TO-FACE WHAT  
THEY'VE ALREADY HEARD OVER --

SEC. BAKER: YES.

MR. BRINKLEY: -- AND OVER.

SEC. BAKER: YES, TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY HEAR IT FACE-TO-FACE,  
AND, FURTHERMORE, TO GIVE FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ A LETTER FROM  
PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN MAKING THOSE POINTS  
SPECIFICALLY AND MAKING IT VERY, VERY CLEAR WHAT THE RESOLVE OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS.

MR. WILL: WITH REGARD TO TELLING -- SORT OF GETTING THE  
MESSAGE THROUGH IN ONE FINAL WAY, THE ORIGINAL DISCUSSION WAS THAT  
THIS WAS TO SHOW SADDAM HUSSEIN EVEN YOUR BODY LANGUAGE -- THAT WAS  
HOW VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE PUT IT -- THAT, AS MR. ASPIN SAID EARLIER,  
TO CUT THROUGH THE SYCOPHANTS --

SEC. BAKER: MM-HMMM. (IN AGREEMENT.)

MR. WILL: -- AND GO STRAIGHT TO THE MAN.

SEC. BAKER: YEAH.

MR. WILL: WHY IS THE 9TH IN GENEVA WITH AZIZ ACCEPTABLE, AND THE 12TH IN BAGHDAD WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN NOT ACCEPTABLE?

SEC. BAKER: BECAUSE SADDAM HUSSEIN, IN EFFECT, REJECTED THE PRESIDENT'S -- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR HOME-AND-HOME VISITS. THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED THAT AZIZ COME AND MEET WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I GO TO BAGHDAD AND MEET WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE OFFERED -- OVER A PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS, WE OFFERED 15 SEPARATE DATES, INCLUDING CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR'S, FOR SUCH A MEETING. AND THEY REFUSED TO PICK UP ON ANY OF THOSE, INSISTING ALL THE WHILE THAT ONLY THE 12TH OF JANUARY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE 12TH OF JANUARY IS TOO CLOSE TO A DEADLINE THAT WE THINK IS A REAL DEADLINE AND THAT THEY DO NOT RECOGNIZE OR OBSERVE. SO, THERE WILL BE NO MEETING IN BAGHDAD, SADDAM HUSSEIN HAVING REJECTED THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER.

MR. BRINKLEY: IF INVITED, THIS TRIP, WOULD YOU GO? WE UNDERSTAND --

SEC. BAKER: NO, THE PRESIDENT--

MR. BRINKLEY: -- YOU'RE GOING TO BE INVITED.

SEC. BAKER: THE PRESIDENT -- WELL, THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO MEETING IN BAGHDAD; THAT IS -- THAT PROPOSAL OF HIS IS NOW OFF THE TABLE, SINCE THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES --

MR. DONALDSON: BAGHDAD, WHAT ABOUT SOMEPLACE ELSE?

SEC. BAKER: -- SINCE THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES REJECTED IT. AND FURTHERMORE --

MR. DONALDSON: WHAT ABOUT SOMEPLACE ELSE, MR. SECRETARY?

SEC. BAKER: FURTHERMORE, WE'RE TALKING IN TERMS OF TIMING HERE, TOO, SAM. I MEAN THIS, THIS JANUARY 15 DEADLINE IS REAL. WE'VE BEEN DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE -- WE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE UNPRECEDENTED CONCENSUS THAT SUPPORTS US HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THIS MATTER NOW FOR OVER FIVE MONTHS.

MR. DONALDSON: BUT --

SEC. BAKER: SO IT'S NOT A CASE OF NOT HAVING BEEN --

MR. DONALDSON: BUT HOW CAN YOU REFUSE TO GO, MR. SECRETARY? IF NOT --

SEC. BAKER: -- NOT HAVING BEEN PATIENT; IT'S NOT A CASE OF ACTING PRECIPITOUSLY. AND TO FOLLOW-UP ON YOUR REASONING, SAM--

MR. DONALDSON: YOU HAVEN'T HEARD IT YET.

SEC. BAKER: -- ALL THEY NEED TO DO -- NO, YOU SAID, "HOW CAN YOU REFUSE?" WELL --

MR. DONALDSON: WELL, LET ME ASK YOU -- LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I MEAN.

SEC. BAKER: LET ME JUST TELL YOU WHY.

MR. DONALDSON: WHY CAN YOU -- HOW CAN YOU REFUSE TO GO IF IN FACT --

SEC. BAKER: YOU CAN REFUSE BECAUSE -- YOU CAN REFUSE -- WE ALREADY HAVE IN FACT BY SAYING, "THAT IS TOO CLOSE TO THE DEADLINE, YOU ARE TRYING TO MANIPULATE THE DEADLINE, WHICH IN OUR VIEW AND THE VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS REAL. IT MAY NOT BE IN YOURS. BUT PLEASE UNDERSTAND, WE ARE SERIOUS."

TO FOLLOW YOUR LOGIC, IF THEY PROPOSE THE 16TH, IN THE AFTERMATH OF A MEETING ON THE 12TH, HOW COULD WE REFUSE? OR THE 17TH, OR THE 18TH, OR THE 3RD OF MARCH. SO, @AT SOME POINT, SAM, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE HAVE BEEN AS FORTHCOMING AS WE HAVE, WE HAVE GOT TO GET THE MESSAGE THROUGH TO THEM THAT THIS IS THE LAST --

MR. DONALDSON: WELL, ARE BOTH SIDES ACTING LIKE TWO SCHOOL BOYS --

SEC. BAKER: NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT.

MR. DONALDSON: -- IN THE SCHOOLYARD, AND IS THAT GOING TO SERVE THE --

SEC. BAKER: (LAUGHTER.) ABSOLUTELY NOT.

MR. DONALDSON: IF AZIZ SAYS TO YOU, "MR. SECRETARY, WILL YOU SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN TOMORROW?" WHICH IS THE 10TH --

SEC. BAKER: SAM, LET ME EXPLAIN IT, LET ME EXPLAIN IT TO YOU THIS WAY. THERE IS ONLY ONE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, IN MY OPINION. I'VE BEEN SAYING THIS IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE CONGRESS; I'VE BEEN SAYING IT PUBLICLY, SO HAS THE PRESIDENT FOR A LONG TIME. AND THAT CHANCE FOR PEACE IS IF THEY FINALLY BEGIN TO REALIZE OVER THERE IN IRAQ THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS SERIOUS. THEREFORE, YOU MUST -- YOU KNOW, ALL OF THE INITIATIVES FOR FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVES; NONE OF THEM HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY IRAQ. AND, IN FICT, AS WE SIT HERE THIS MORNING, THERE'S NO PROPOSAL FROM IRAQ FOR A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING.

MR. WILL: MR. SECRETARY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE PHRASE, TH UNITED STATES IS REAL AND IT'S 90 PERCENT OF THE FORCE. SO THE QUESTION SURELY IS WHETHER OR NOT THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS. WHEN (OU WALK INTO THAT ROOM WITH MR. AZIZ WOULD NOT YOUR HAND BE STRENGTHENED AND YOUR SERIOUSNESS MORE MANIFEST IF YOU WERE CARRYING WITH YOU A RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS, AS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED, AUTHORIZING THE USE OF FORCE?

SEC. BAKER: YES, IT WOULD BE.

MR. WILL: WHY HAVEN'T YOU ASKED FOR IT?

SEC. BAKER: AND THE PRESIDENT -- AND THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID FOR A LONG TIME WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH A RESOLUTION. BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT WANTED TO ASK FOR A RESOLUTION UNLESS THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS COULD ASSURE HIM THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING, BECAUSE YOUR HAND WOULD BE WEAKENED IF IT WERE NOT FORTHCOMING.

THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT RULED OUT ASKING THE CONGRESS FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. I HAPPEN TO AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS OF SENATOR DOLE HERE A FEW MINUTES AGO WITH RESPECT TO HOW THAT WOULD -- HOW THAT WOULD SORT ITSELF OUT, AND WE FRANKLY ARE WELCOMING THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS. BUT LET ME SAY ONE FINAL THING. THE CONGRESS IS A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. NOTHING HAS PREVENTED THE CONGRESS FROM ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST. NOTHING HAS PREVENTED THE CONGRESS --

MR. WILL: BUT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE IT IF THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED.

SEC. BAKER: -- FROM ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE FOR FIVE MONTHS. CERTAINLY NOTHING HAS PREVENTED IT SINCE THE 8TH OF NOVEMBER WHEN -- WHEN THE FORCES WERE AUGMENTED.

MR. WILL: TWO SHORT QUESTIONS. FIRST, WOULD A 60-40 VOTE BE MORE HELPFUL OR LESS HELPFUL THAN NO VOTE AT ALL?

SEC. BAKER: MORE HELPFUL.

MR. WILL: OKAY. NOW, YOU HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS HERE THIS MORNING AS A HELPFUL TACTICAL MATTER. OTHER PEOPLE SAY IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF TACTICS; IT'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY, THAT YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO LAUNCH ONE OF THE LARGEST MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM A STANDING START WITHOUT ASKING CONGRESS IF -- AWFULLY CLEAR ABOUT THIS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND SINCE THEN. WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THAT?

SEC. BAKER: WHAT I SAY TO THAT IS THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL DEBATE ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES ON THIS ISSUE. WHAT I SAY TO THAT FURTHER IS THAT IN OUR HISTORY WE HAVE COMMITTED FORCES IN EXCESS OF 200 TIMES. THERE HAVE ONLY BEEN FIVE DECLARATIONS OF WAR. BUT WHAT I SAY BEYOND THAT IS, WE RECOGNIZE THE CONGRESS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DECLARE WAR. I ALSO SAY TO YOU, AS I'VE JUST SAID, THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT RULED OUT GOING TO THE CONGRESS. THE ONLY THING WE'VE RULED OUT IS GIVING THE CONGRESS A CARTE BLANCHE PROMISE IN ADVANCE THAT UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, SOME OF WHICH WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO FORESEE HERE TODAY, SUCH AS A PROVOCATION THAT REQUIRES RETALIATION, WE WOULD FIRST COME TO CONGRESS.

MR. WILL: MR. SECRETARY, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THOSE 200 OR SO TIMES FORCE HAS BEEN USED, IT'S NOT BEEN USED AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES. IT'S BEEN EPISODIC VIOLENCE: PRESIDENT WASHINGTON SENDING TROOPS TO FIGHT THE INDIANS, SHIPS TO FIGHT THE BARBARY PIRATES, ISN'T THIS DIFFERENT? I MEAN, EVEN IF YOU GRANT, IN THE GRAY AREA EVERYTHING GOES TO THE PRESIDENT --

SEC. BAKER: WELL --

MR. WILL: -- IS THIS GRAY?

SEC. BAKER: -- IN MANY TIMES -- MANY TIMES PERHAPS YOUR STATEMENT IS CORRECT. BUT, MANY TIMES IT HAS BEEN USED AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES. AND YOU GO BACK AND YOU LOOK AT RECENT EXPERIENCES, AS A MATTER OF FACT.

MR. DONALDSON: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TOUGH SPEECH TODAY IN BAGHDAD ON HIS ARMY DAY WHEN HE SAID

ONCE AGAIN, "KUWAIT IS, AND WILL REMAIN PART OF IRAQ."

SEC. BAKER: WELL, HE MAY -- HE MAY INDEED MEAN THAT, SAM. AND THAT MAY BE JUST FURTHER EVIDENCE OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN -- WHAT WE HAVE FEARED FOR SOME TIME AND THAT IS THAT HE REALLY DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS SERIOUS, THIS DEADLINE IS REAL. AND, IF I MAY SAY SO, GEORGE, I DON'T BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES IS 90 PERCENT OF IT. WE ARE A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY OF THE FORCE THERE, BUT LOOK, THERE ARE 200,000 OTHER COMBAT TROOPS -- COMBAT TROOPS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN ADDITION--

MR. WILL: ARE THEY ALL COMMITTED TO GO FORWARD ON AN ADVANCE?

SEC. BAKER: AND MOST OF THEM ARE COMMITTED. AND MOST OF THEM ARE --

MR. DONALDSON: WHAT ABOUT THE FRENCH?

SEC. BAKER: -- AND LET ME SIMPLY SAY THAT ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS FINAL SWING OF MINE THROUGH THE REGION -- INTO THE REGION AND INTO EUROPE IS TO -- IS TO EXPLORE QUESTIONS SUCH AS YOU HAVE JUST --

MR. DONALDSON: WHAT ABOUT THE FRENCH? NOW THEY -- THEY AGREE HE HAS TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT UNCONDITIONALLY, BUT THEY ARE PROPOSING THEN THAT THERE BE A MIDEAST PEACE CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. WOULD WE AGREE?

SEC. BAKER: WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE LINKAGE OF THE KUWAIT-IRAQ PROBLEM TO OTHER PROBLEMS.

MR. DONALDSON: NO, THEY SAY THAT HE HAS TO GET OUT OF KUWAIT, UNCONDITIONALLY.

SEC. BAKER: YES, BUT -- BUT YOU CANNOT -- BUT IN EFFECTING THAT WITHDRAWAL YOU CANNOT MAKE PROMISES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE LINKAGE.

MR. WILL: BUT WE'RE IN THE MIDDLE --

SEC. BAKER: WE THINK THAT IS A TERRIBLE MISTAKE. WE JUST HAD A FULL FLEDGED DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ABOUT THAT.

MR. WILL: DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES VOTED THAT THE WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM CONSTITUTE PALESTINIAN LANDS. NOW IF THAT'S NOT IN EFFECT BRINGING THIS --

SEC. BAKER: NO, WE DIDN'T VOTE THAT IT CONSTITUTED PALESTINIAN LANDS --

MR. WILL: THAT'S THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE RESOLUTION.

SEC. BAKER: NOT "PALESTINIAN" LANDS, NO, NO. THE VOTE ON THAT -- ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM WAS NO DIFFERENT THAN -- OR THE PROVISION THERE IN THAT RESOLUTION WAS NO DIFFERENT --

MR. DONALDSON: MR. --

SEC. BAKER: -- THAN OTHER RESOLUTIONS THAN THE UNITED NATIONS -- THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS VOTED FOR IN THE PAST.

MR. DONALDSON: MR. SECRETARY, I KNOW I'M SOUNDING LIKE A

BROKEN RECORD; LET ME SAY IT CALMLY. ARE YOU TELLING US THAT AFTER YOU MEET WITH TARIQ AZIZ NEXT WEDNESDAY, THAT THAT'S IT AS FAR AS ANY FURTHER MEETINGS, CERTAINLY AT A HIGH LEVEL, BETWEEN US OFFICIALS AND IRAQI OFFICIALS?

SEC. BAKER: I'M TELLING YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES, ON THE INITIATIVE OF PRESIDENT BUSH, HAS TRIED FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS TO --

MR. DONALDSON: WELL, I UNDERSTAND --

SEC. BAKER: -- GENERATE MEETINGS --

MR. DONALDSON: YOU'VE MADE THE POINT. I'M JUST TRYING TO--

SEC. BAKER: THAT'S RIGHT, AND WE HAVEN'T HAD ONE PROPOSAL FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ --

MR. DONALDSON: SO YOU'RE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR?

SEC. BAKER: -- AND I -- I AM CLOSING THE DOOR.

SEC. BAKER: THANK YOU.

MR. BRINKLEY: GOOD LUCK ON YOUR TRIP. LET US KNOW WHAT HAPPENS.

SEC. BAKER: THANK YOU.

עד כאן.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6407

אל: רהמש/483

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 117, תא: 070191, זח: 1614, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מיידי

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXCERPT REGARDING ISRAEL AND THE GULF CRISIS

ABC "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY" WITH HOST: DAVID BRINKLEY  
WITH: SAM DONALDSON, ABC NEWS; GEORGE WILL, ABC NEWS, SYNDICATED  
COLUMNIST/GUESTS: SEN. BOB DOLE, R-KANSAS; SENATE MINORITY LEADER;  
REP. THOMAS FOLEY, D-WASHINGTON, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE  
SUNDAY, JANUARY 6, 1991

MR. BRINKLEY: SADDAM KEEPS SAYING, AND SAID AGAIN THIS  
MORNING, THAT IF THERE IS A WAR, IT WILL INVOLVE NOT ONLY A WAR WITH  
THE TROOPS NOW IN THE SAUDI DESERT, IT WOULD ALSO INVOLVE PALESTINE,  
PALESTINIANS, ISRAELIS, AND THAT WHOLE AREA. DO YOU FIND THAT  
UPSETTING, DISTURBING, DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH?

SPEAKER FOLEY: I FIND IT INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT SADDAM  
HUSSEIN WOULD WANT TO DRAW ISRAEL DIRECTLY INTO A WAR WITH IRAQ. IT  
DOESN'T MAKE ANY SENSE TO ME AT ALL IN TERMS OF IRAQ'S MILITARY  
SITUATION SINCE ISRAEL HAS ENORMOUS POWER THAT COULD BE BROUGHT TO  
BEAR IN THE REGION.

SEN. DOLE: PLUS, HE DIDN'T GO INTO KUWAIT TO LIBERATE THE  
PALESTINIANS, TO ADDRESS THEIR PROBLEMS. HE WENT INTO KUWAIT FOR A  
DIFFERENT REASON. THERE SHOULDN'T BE ANY LINKAGE --

MR. BRINKLEY: NO, HE DIDN'T. BUT HE KEEPS SAYING THIS.  
WHAT'S HE DOING, TRYING TO FRIGHTEN US? WHY DOES HE KEEP SAYING  
THAT? IS HE TRYING TO FRIGHTEN US?

SEN. DOLE: OH, I THINK HE'S ALWAYS HAD THE ISRAELI CARD THAT  
HE THOUGHT HE COULD FRIGHTEN US WITH BUT HE WILL NOT FRIGHTEN US,  
NOR WILL HE FRIGHTEN THE ISRAELIS, AND HE'D BETTER UNDERSTAND THAT  
THEY'RE WELL-PREPARED. I THINK HE DOES UNDERSTAND THAT -- IT'S  
ANOTHER REASON HE'D PROBABLY BACK OFF.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)



אאא, חוזם: 6499

אל: רהמש/501

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 120, תא: 070191, זח: 2031, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

הנדון: ביקור בייקר בדמשק

1. דובר הבית הלבן מסר ( בתדרוכו היומי ) שמזכיר המדינה יפקוד את דמשק במהלך מסעו הנוכחי.
2. מקורות במחמ"ד עממ שוחחתי ציינו כי ביקור המזכיר בדמשק משתלב ביעדים שאותם הציב הממשל לעצמו עד ל-15.1 שהם :
  - א. להגביר את עצבנותו של סדאם.
  - ב. להפגין אחדות הקואליציה.
3. תכלית היעדים לעיל להבהיר לסדאם ( פעם נוספת ) כי התעלמות מהחלטות מועבי"ט תביא למהלך צבאי (הערה: דוברי הממשל משוכנעים שסדאם עדיין אינו מבין מה תהיינה תוצאות סירובו לסגת מכווית ).
4. אנשי שיחי הבהירו כי אינם צופים ששיחת בייקר-אסאד תגלוש לכיוון סובסטנטיבי בנושאים שמעבר לנושא המשבר.
5. דמשק תהיה תחנתו האחרונה בסיוורו באיזורנו. קודם לכן יפקוד המזכיר את ריאד, אבו-דבי, טאיפ ( מפגש עם הכוויתים ), קהיר ודמשק. המזכיר ישוב לווינגטון ביום ראשון הבא.

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 5153  
אל: רהמש/394  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2050, תא: 060191, זח: 1400, זח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי/מיד

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

משיחה עם ארון מילר:

- אנחנו מקווים שדחיית ביקור רוס התקבלה בהבנה בישראל. בדעתנו לקבוע מועד חדש מיד כשהמצב ירשה זאת.

- נושא השיחות יהיה לא רק 'חידוש התהליך', אלא גם 'הסדר בטחון אזורי אחרי משבר המפרץ'. ישראל לא היתה עד כה חלק מן התפיסה הבטחונית של המפרץ, אבל מעכשיו יהיה צורך בסדר חדש לריסון כל חוזר כל תוקפנות ( ולא רק תוקפנותה של עיראק ) והשאלה תהיה: איך ישראל משתלבת בזה.

- יש תחושה של תזוזה קטנה אצל הסורים הנובעת מכך שהשלימו עם העובדה שלא יגיעו לשוויון עם ישראל. קשה יהיה להגיע במהירות לשלום, אבל אולי אפשר לעסוק בבניית-אמון ובצמצום הסכנות לפריצת מלחמה. אולי אפשר להסכים למשל על דרכי תקשורת או אפילו טלפון-אדום למניעת התפרצות אלימה כתוצאה מטעות או אי-הבנה.

- המחשבה ששיפור יחסי ארה"ב עם הערבים חייבת לבוא על חשבון ישראל היא פשוט שגויה. התמיכה בישראל מובטחת והיא אינה נשענת על היותה נכס אסטרטגי, התמיכה בישראל ערכית ומוסרית. אבל היחסים אינם כשהיו. בינתיים נאכל רק הריבית של היחסים המיוחדים, אבל אם לא יפסקו הדיבורים הפרובוקטיביים והמעשים הפרובוקטיביים, תתחיל להיאכל גם הקרן.

- אשר לתהליך. אי אפשר לרדת לגמרי מהתהליך הקודם, כלומר, אי אפשר יהיה לוותר על השתתפות פלסטינאית כלשהי, אבל צריך לעלות על פס מקביל זה של מו"מ עם המדינות הערביות. אנחנו מקווים שלא אתם ולא אנחנו נתפתה להשתמש במכשיר של ועידה בינלאומית.

עד כאן

שילה

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 5153

אל: רהמש/394

מ-: ווש, נר: 2050, תא: 060191, זח: 1400, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

משיחה עם ארון מילר:

- אנחנו מקווים שדחיית ביקור רוס התקבלה בהבנה בישראל. בדעתנו לקבוע מועד חדש מיז כשהמצב ירשה זאת.

- נושא השיחות יהיה לא רק 'חידוש התהליך', אלא גם 'הסדר בטחון אזורי אחרי משבר המפרצ'. ישראל לא היתה עד כה חלק מן התפיסה הבטחונית של המפרץ, אבל מעכשיו יהיה צורך בסדר חדש לריסון כל חוזר כל תוקפנות ( ולא רק תוקפנותה של עיראק ) והשאלה תהיה: איך ישראל משתלבת בזה.

- יש תחושה של תזוזה קטנה אצל הסורים הנובעת מכך שהשלימו עם העובדה שלא יגיעו לשוויון עם ישראל. קשה יהיה להגיע במהירות לשלום, אבל אולי אפשר לעסוק בבניית-אמון ובצמצום הסכנות לפריצת מלחמה. אולי אפשר להסכים למשל על דרכי תקשורת או אפילו טלפון-אדום למניעת התפרצות אלימה כתוצאה מטעות או אי-הבנה.

- המחשבה ששיפור יחסי ארה'ב עם הערבים חייבת לבוא על חשבון ישראל היא פשוט שגויה. התמיכה בישראל מובטחת והיא אינה נשענת על היותה נכס אסטרטגי, התמיכה בישראל ערכית ומוסרית. אבל היחסים אינם כשהיו. בינתיים נאכל רק הריבית של היחסים המיוחדים, אבל אם לא יפסקו הדיבורים הפרובוקטיביים והמעשים הפרובוקטיביים, תתחיל להיאכל גם הקרן.

- אשר לתהליך. אי אפשר לרדת לגמרי מהתהליך הקודם, כלומר, אי אפשר יהיה לוותר על השתתפות פלסטינאית כלשהי, אבל צריך לעלות על פס מקביל זה של מו'מ עם המדינות הערביות. אנחנו מקווים שלא אתם ולא אנחנו נתפתה להשתמש במכשיר של ועידה בינלאומית.

עד כאן

שילה

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1,4313

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/326, מצב/504

מ-: ווש, נר: 2048, תא: 040191, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: אוצר, נוייבך גס: משרדים

נד: @

בהול ליום א' / סודי

אל: שר האוצר, מנכ"ל, חשב כללי

דע: מצפ"א

מאת: א. נויבך - ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

הנדון - 400 מ' ערבויות

נפגשתי היום עם ביל בראו ממחמ"ד לדון בנושא מימון הערבויות. בעקבות פנית השגריר אל מזכיר המדינה בעת הפגישה עם ראש הממשלה נראה כי קיימת נכונות מצידם לגייס את הכסף בשתי מנות, אחת במרץ 1991 והשניה בספטמבר 1991.

מבחינתם קיימת עדיין בעיה עם החוק מאחר ונאמר כי הגיוס יהיה של לא פחות מ-150 מ' דולר או לפי בקשת הלווה, אך לפי הנמוך ביניהם. כמוכן יש כאן מעין סתירה פנימית בחוק המאפשרת להם להתלות בה.

נראה שההחלטה על צורת הגיוס היא פוליטית בעיקרה ותלויה באיכות המידע אשר נעביר לסוכנות AID. למרות שהוא מודע שהחוק אינו מחייב אותם לדווח לקונגרס, הם נתלים בבקשתו של הקונגרסמן ד. אובי לדווח עד 1.2.91. (מאחר ונושא הדיווח כידוע חשוב להם ביותר נראה לי שעלינו לעשות כל מאמץ לסיים את הדווח בהקדם כלומר לפני 1.2.91).

מרוח דבריו ניתן היה להבין שקימת כיום נכונות רבה בממשל לטפל במקביל בנושא, הן במישור הטכני והן במישור הפוליטי.

במהלך השיחה ניסיתי להבהיר שמבחינה כלכלית עדיף לגייס במנה אחת ולאחר מכן להעביר את הסכומים בשתי מנות, תשובתו היתה שאנשי AID טוענים ששערי הריבית יורדים וירדו ולכן עדיף לגייס בשני חלקים.

הגבתי שאם נקבל מהם ערבויות לשערי ריבית נמוכים יותר בספטמבר נהיה מוכנים לחשוב על כך. עמדתנו כרגע שיש לבצע את הגיוס במנה אחת.

מדבריו הבנתי שאנשי AID טוענים שמאחר ומבחינתם השימוש העיקרי בכסף יהיה למשכנתאות אין כל סיבה למהר מאחר והמימוש להערכתם יהיה איטי. הבהרתי לו שלפי לשון החוק אנחנו יכולים להשתמש בכסף לתשתית לבניה ולמשכנתאות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ומבחינתנו הכסף ישמש למטרות אלה ולאחר מכן יגולגל כמשכנתאות לעולים.

מאחר ונראה שהנושא הוא פוליטי נצטרך להפעיל לחץ על מחמ"ד על מנת לגייס את הכל מוקדם ככל האפשר ולאחר מכן לממש את הכסף בהקדם האפשרי.

א. נויבך

AA

17

תפ: אוצר (3), שהח (2), סשהח (1), רהמ (0), מנכל (1), ממנכל (1), בנצור (1), מצפא (4), כהן (1)

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אאא, חוזם: 3408

אל:רהמש/240

מ-:ווש, נר: 2024, תא: 030191, זח: 1900, חמ:מ, סג:סו,

בבב

סודי/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא, סמנכל ארבל

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

משיחה עם שיפטר:

הדוח יהיה מוכן ב-31/1 וילך לגבעה ומשם לכריכה ומשם לעתונות... האם יהיו בו (גם) שבחים לישראל? לא ברור אם יהיו שבחים, אבל בהחלט יהיה איזכור לאותם נושאים שבהם חל שיפור'.

האם יהיה איזכור לפרובוקציות ולאינצידנטים שבמסגרתן נאלץ צהל לפעול? כן, יהיו איזכורים כאלה'.

'היה שינוי משמעותי מאד לטובה אחרי כניסת ארנס למשהבט ומספרי הנפגעים ירדו משמעותית, אבל תקרית הר-הבית באוקטובר וההרוגים בעזה בסוף דצמבר העיבו על השיפור הזה והגרוע מכל - החלטת שהבט על גירוש הארבעה. הבעיה אינה חומרת העונש אלא היותו מנוגד בתכלית לסעיף 49 באמנת ג'נבה. לא יעזרו כל הדיבורים שלכם על כוונת המחוקק לגירוש המוני ולא גירוש - בודדים, אני עצמי עורך דין ואני יודע לכופף חוקים לכל הצדדים. במקרה זה שום כיפוף לא יעזור, לשון הסעיף ברורה כשמש ואני חושב שדוקא זהו סוד זעמו של המזכיר ולא היות העונש חמור מידי ולא העובדה שכאילו נפלה ההחלטה יומיים בלבד אחרי שהעלה את הנושא עם רה"מ'. בענין זה אל תצפו לשום ויתורים. צלצלתי לארנס ואמרתי לו את דעתי. הוא טען שזו ההרתעה היעילה ביותר, אבל אצלנו לא משוכנעים שגרושם של ארבעה ירתיע ביריונים עם סכינים הפועלים מתוך דחפים פונדמנטליסטים. אפילו שימוש בצלפים אפשר להצדיק, אבל בשום אופן לא גירושים...'

'זה לא הדוח שמזיק לכם אלא פרסומו הסלקטיבי בעתונות ובעיקר בניו-יורק טיימס. עליכם להתרכז בחמישה עתונים עיקריים ולהוכיח להם שהם מבליטים את ישראל מעל לכל פרופורציה. אייב רוזנטל שאל אותי למה אני לא מספר על הזוועות שעושים העיראקים והראיתי לו שזה מופיע בהרחבה בראש הדוח שלי, אלא שהכתבים והעורכים שלו בוחרים להתעלם מזה'.

'יש הבדל גדול בין דיווחיה של הקונסוליה בירושלים והשגרירות בתל אביב. וילקוקס בודאי לא יהיה מרוצה כשיראה את הדוח ואתה יכול לצפות שפברואר תהיה הדלפה מירושלים (והפעם לא ממקורות ישראלים...) עם השמחה מגמתית שתאמר שהדוח מתון מידי...'

'תהליך השלום, זכויות האדם בשטחים וההתנחלויות הם נושאים מאד חשובים למימשל. ישראל נמצאת בצומת היסטורית בגלל העלייה ואף-אחד בעולם לא יסייע לכם מלבד משלם המיסים האמריקאי. אבל עליכם לדעת שהסיוע הזה יהיה בהחלט על תנאי והתנאי יהיה התקדמות משמעותית בנושאים אלה'.

'אנטישמיות אפשר לכלול בדוח רק אם אפשר לקשור אותה למעשה או מחדל של ממשלה. הסברתי זאת לאליקים רובינשטיין. כל מה שתביאו לתשומת ליבנו ושיהיה 'ממשלתי', נוכל לשקול להכליל בדוח'.

'היתה לי שיחה עם המזכיר. הדבר האחד שגורם לו להתפוצץ מכעס הוא ההדלפות אצלכם. באמת אין להעלות על הדעת שמכתב שהוא כותב לשר החוץ יופיע למחרת בעתון. הענין הזה יכול לגרום לכם נזקים שלא ישוערו וכדאי לכם לחשוב על דרכי דיווח לתקשורת אלטרנטיביות כדי להתגבר על המכה הזו'.



התרשמתי, כמו שמתרשמים גם אחרים שהאיש שוחר-טוב, ליבו במקום הנכון הוא  
משתדל לאזן דברי כיבושין בדברי ניחומין והיה מאד רוצה שיתייעצו עמו  
וישעו לעצותיו.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור,  
מצפא, ביינ, סולטן, רביב, הסברה, מזתים,  
סייבל, משפט

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 1981  
אל: רהמש/131  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 25, תא: 020191, זח: 1748, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמ"ס/מיידי

תאריך: 27 בדצמבר 1990

שעת חיבור: 1700

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY/STATEMENT  
BY THE PRESS SECRETARY/WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1991

NATO DECIDED TODAY, AT A MEETING OF ITS DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE, TO DEPLOY THE AIR COMPONENT OF THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE TO TURKEY. TURKEY ASKED THE ALLIANCE FOR THIS HELP IN ORDER TO DETER THE THREAT POSED BY IRAQ AND DEMONSTRATE NATO'S SOLIDARITY WITH TURKEY IN THIS CRISIS. THE NATO UNIT THAT WILL GO TO TURKEY INCLUDES SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT FROM GERMANY, ITALY AND BELGIUM.

THIS ALLIANCE MOVE IS SIGNIFICANT IN THREE RESPECTS: FIRST, THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN DEPLOYED IN A CRISIS TO DEFEND AN ALLY. SECOND, THE DECISION DEMONSTRATES THE ALLIANCE'S SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION EFFORT AND TURKEY'S PART IN IT AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. THIRD, THE DEPLOYMENT CONFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזתים,  
הדס, איר, 2, איר, רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 1766  
אל: רהמש/139  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2002, תא: 020191, זח: 1230, דח: ב, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי / בהול

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

להלן משיחה עם דן קרצר הבוקר :

1. אין החלטה סופית לשליחת המזכיר למז'ת, אבל ההחלטה תיפול היום ותהיה ככל הנראה חיובית.

2. אם המזכיר יסע יהיה זה כנראה בסוף השבוע ועל-כל-פנים ברור שהמסע צריך להסתיים הרבה לפני ה-15 בינואר.

3. דניס יסע עם המזכיר ואז ישנה אפשרות להצמיד את ביקורו בארץ למסע זה. האחרים יבואו ישר לירושלים וימתינו שם להגעתו של דניס אבל כאמור אי-אפשר לסכם תאריכים כרגע.

4. לשאלתי, האם נכונים דברי הפרשנים האומרים שאחת הסיבות לנסיעת המזכיר היא 'להיות בסביבה' למקרה שסדאם בכל זאת 'יתפנה' לשיחה עמו, השיב שמכל מה שהוא שומע, ההיפך הוא הנכון, ישנה ארוזיה אירופית שמובלת ע'י צרפת, גרמניה והותיקן ושעכשיו עלולה להצטרף אליה גם אמביציה אישית של הלוכסמבורגי ושמסע המזכיר מיועד לבלום את הארוזיה הזאת ולא להצטרף אליה ויש לראות את המסע כצעד של תקיפות ולא של התקפלות....

שילה

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 1940

אל: רהמש/140

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 13, תא: 020191, חז: 1654, חמ: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מיידי

14:00 2/1/91

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן

דע: מנכ"ל רה"מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

בקור רוס.

1. דניס רוס התקשר (021300) בעקבות הנחיית המזכיר להודיע שדוחה את בקורו בארץ עד לאחר ה-15/1 מהסיבות הבאות:

(א) אם המזכיר יבקר בכל זאת בנגדד ירצה שרוס יתקשר אליו.

(ב) המזכיר מודאג מהיווצרות רושם של לינקייג' אם בסמיכות לבקורו שלו בנגדד יתקיים ביקור של רוס אצלנו.

2. דניס הוסיף שישוב אלינו בשבוע הבא לתאם תאריך חדש לבקורו.

3. אשר לתוכן הדיונים עמו ישמח אם ישראל תציע סדר יום. הוא עצמו ירצה לדון, בין היתר, בנושא פקוח נשק.

4. בתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הפעילות האירופית בנושא המפרץ השיב שלארה"ב לא אכפת אם האירופים ידברו עם סדאם ובלבד שיעבירו לו המסר במלוא תקיפותו וישמר התאום עם ארה"ב.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס