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# מדינת ישראל

## משרד הממשלה

משרד

חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה  
 תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה  
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברות

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סימול מקורי: 2 תקופת החומר: 10/1990-10/1990  
 מזהה פיזי: א - 2 / 5024  
 15/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק



**א - 2 / 5024**

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מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

## טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות\*

חטיבה מס': 43.4  
מיכל מס': 5024/10  
תאריך התעודה: 14/10/1990  
שם מחבר התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):  
תיק מס': 2  
שם הנמען: \_\_\_\_\_

- מכתב
- מברק
- תזכיר או מיוזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

\*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

אאא, חוזם: 15781  
 אל: רהמש/1073  
 מ-: המשד, תא: 211090, זח: 1840, דח: ר, סג: סו,  
 בכב  
 מכתב  
 סודי

כ'ח בתשרי תשנ"א  
 19 באוקטובר 1990  
 913.11  
 86953

אל : נציגויות  
 מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א מס' 76  
 לתקופה 1-19 באוקטובר 1990

I. ארה"ב  
 א. כללי

בעוד ארה"ב מוסיפה להיות טרודה במשבר במפרץ ובשאלת התקציב הפדרלי מבית, גברו והתרחבו המתיחויות והקולות הצורמים במערכת היחסים בין ישראל לארה"ב. שני המוקדים העקריים שמצאו בטוי, לא רק בצינור הדיפלומטי, היו:  
 א. סוגיית ערביות הדיור והפרשנויות השונות הניתנות למכתב שה'ח והנוגעות לבנייה בירושלים 'מעבר לקו הירוק' ואף למדיניות ההתיישבות בשטחים בכלל.

ב. החלטת מועבי'ט בדבר אירועי הר הבית, חלקה של ארה"ב בעניין זה ובעמדתה של ישראל כלפי ההחלטה ומשלחת מזכ"ל האו"ם.

בתוך כך, פורסמו 'אזהרות לנוסעים' (TRAVEL ADVISORIES) בקשר לביקורים בישראל ובשטחים, חלו התפתחויות לגבי העיסקה הסעודית והוגבר קצב הפעילות בקונגרס בנושאים הנוגעים לישראל ישירות ובעקיפין (חוקי ההקצבות לסיוע חוץ ותקציב הפנטגון ועוד)

בעקבות שיחת השר עם המזכיר בייקר (26.9.90) ואגב ההתרחשויות הנ"ל ניתן בטוי להיבטים שונים של מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל והסיכסוך, לפעמים עם ניואנסים חדשים - ובכך נתחיל:

א. מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל והסכסוך

1. מחוייבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל ויתרונה האיכותי

בתקופה הנדונה שב הממשל לא פעם והדגיש מחוייבות זו. לדוגמא:

- במהלך ביקורו של שה'ח בעצרת (23.9-2.10) טען ה'ניו-יורק טיימס' בעמודו הראשון כי ארה"ב התחייבה בפני ישראל שתגיב בכח אם עיראק תקוף את ישראל. יו"ר ועידת הנשיאים שמע דברים ברוח זו בשיתות שקיים עם ראשי מערכת הבטחון האמריקנית. פומבית, נמנעים האמריקנים מלאמר מפורשות מה תהיה תגובתם. המזכיר בייקר, בשיתו עם השר בעצרת, הבהיר כי מחוייבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל בלתי ניתנת לעירעור ואם תותקף, אזי 'תהיה תגובה אמריקנית מתאימה'.

- הנשיא בוש אמר לשגריר היוצא ארד (28.9.90) כי הוא מחוייב לבטחונה

ושלומה של ישראל ויפעל, נתפקידו כנשיא, כמיטב יכולתו להבטיח בטחונה של ישראל.

- במכתב ערבויות הדיור (2.10.90) מוצגים בין היתר סיכומי שיחת לוי-בייקר באשר למחוייבות ארה"ב לשמירת יתרונה האיכותי של ישראל והעובדה שישראל יכולה 'לסמוך על ארה"ב, בעת זו של סכנה שתעמוד במחוייבותה ותגיב באופן מתאים'.

- תת מזכיר המדינה לבטחון בינ"ל, רג'ינלד כרתולומיאו, אמר בעדותו בבית הנבחרים אודות העיסקה הסעודית (3.10.90), כי ארה"ב מחוייבת לסייע בשמירת עדיפותה האיכותית של ישראל על פני אויביה הפוטנציאליים.

ובמכתב מה-10.10 לסנטור ארלן ספקטר, כתב בוש כי 'מחוייבות הממשל לבטחון ישראל הינו כלל ברזל (IRONCLAD). כוונתו לדאוג לכך שישראל תקבל את ה'סיוע הדרוש ע"מ לשמר את יתרונה האיכותי הצבאי'. וכראייה לכך התייחס בוש להחלטתו לספק לישראל את מערכת הפטריוט להגנה אווירית.

- ואכן הנשיא בוש חתם ב-30.9.90 על צו נשיאותי המורה על העברת סוללות פטריוט לישראל. היחידה הראשונה תועבר בעוד מספר שבועות. בהודעת הבית הלבן (1.10.90) נאמר, כי מערכת הפטריוט תסייע לישראל לשפר הגנתה האווירית, כולל נגד איום גובר של טילים בליסטיים המצויים במאגר העיראקי. צוין גם כי בקבלו החלטה זו הנשיא מאשר מחדש מחוייבותו העזה לידידות ישראל-ארה"ב ולבטחון ישראל. דובר הפנטגון (2.10.90) הבהיר כי לארה"ב 'אינטרסים בטחוניים ארוכי טווח (LONGSTANDING) בישראל... אנו מעוניינים בקיום היתרון האיכותי של ההגנה הישראלית'.

## 2. שאלת זיקת הסיכסוך למשבר המפרץ

בנאומו בעצרת (1.10.90) הכריז הנשיא בוש כי לאתר יציאתה ללא תנאי של עיראק מכווית, הוא מאמין שעשויות להיות אפשרויות לעיראק וכווית להסדיר באופן קבוע את המחלוקת שלהן, למדינות המפרץ עצמן לבנות הסדרים חדשים למען יציבות ולכל המדינות והעמים באזור' להסדיר את הקונפליקט שמפריד (DIVIDES) את הערבים מישראל'. בוש כרך דבריו אלה בהצהרתו כי הוא שואף לפתרון המשבר במפרץ בדרכי שלום ודיפלומטיה. פרשנים רבים ראו בכך שינוי טון - ואולי כיוון - הן כלפי אופן פתרון המשבר והן בהתייחסות לזיקה בין פתרון המשבר במפרץ להסדרת הסיכסוך הישראלי-ערבי. עקב זאת גורמים בכירים בממשל הבהירו חד-משמעית כי אין שום זיקה בין הדברים ולא היתה כל כוונה שכך ישתמע.

למרות זאת, במסר לשה"ח מה-14.10 (בקשר להחלטת מועב'ט) התייחס המזכיר בייקר בנשימה אחת לישראל ולעיראק ושוב התעוררו סימני שאלה. בבית הנבחרים הקונגרסמן הוארד ברמן שגר מכתב ב-16.10 לבייקר והביע תרעומת על נוסח המסר הנ"ל, ואילו הקונגרסמנים צ'אק שומר ומל לוין יזמו הצעת החלטה (בצורת 'תחושת הקונגרס') הקובעת שיש לטפל במשבר במפרץ בנפרד משאר הסיכסוכים באיזור המז'ת. הצעה זו נידונה בוועדת החוץ ב-18.10, התקבלה פה אחד והועברה למליאת הבית.

## 3. הסיכסוך

- בפגישה עם נציגי האירגון של הערבים-האמריקנים (24.9.90) ציין והדגיש הנשיא בוש כי המו'מ לפתרון הסיכסוך הישראלי-ערבי חייב לערב 'שטחים תמורת שלום' - וזאת לצד בטחון, הכרה בישראל וזכויות פוליטיות לגיטימיות לפלסטינים.

- ארה"ב שותפה להודעת שרי החוץ של 5 חברות מועב'ט הקבועות (29.9.90). אלה מדגישות נחישותן לתמוך בתהליך מו'מ פעיל לפתרון הסכסוך בו ישתתפו כל הצדדים הרלבנטיים, מכוסס על 242 ו-338 תוך לקיחה בחשבון את זכותן לבטחון של מדינות האיזור, כולל ישראל, והזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלסטיני.

- במסיבת עיתונאים (9.10.90) השתמש הנשיא בוש פעמיים במונח 'שאלת פלסטין' (PALESTINE). ס/שה'ח העלה העניין בשיחה עם השגריר בראון (10.10.90) והביע פליאה ותקווה שלא מדובר בשינוי מדיניות.

ב. פגישת שה'ח ומזכיר המדינה 26.9.90 (לא מדווח בדף מצפ'א הקודם).

בשיחת שה'ח ומזכיר המדינה בעצרת (26.9.90) העלה המזכיר על נס את עמדתה האחראית של ישראל במשבר המפרץ. לדבריו, כך גם אמר בביקוריו בבירות ערב. המזכיר תולה תקווה מסוימת שהקואליציה שהתגבשה תתן הזדמנות לארה'ב לקדם השלום במז'ת.

המזכיר אמר שאת עסקת הנשק עם סעודיה חלקו לשניים כשיושם דגש בחלק הראשון על פריטים שיש בהם פוטנציאל של הגנה על חיילי ארה'ב בסעודיה. הוא הזכיר שהם מכינים חבילת סיוע לישראל שיהיה בה כדי לאזן ולהקל על ישראל במצב הנוכחי. מכל מקום ארה'ב מכירה בעובדה של ישראל צרכי בטחון ושיש להבטיח את יתרונה האיכותי.

שה'ח עמד על הצורך בהתייעצות ובתאום גלוי בין ארה'ב וישראל ושעל ארה'ב לתבוע ממדינות ערב להפסיק מצב המלחמה עם ישראל. כמו כן הדגיש הסכנות שנוטלת על עצמה ישראל נוכח אויב חסר מעצורים המצויד כהלכה והמאיים עלינו רק משום שאנו מתחשבים בצרכי בת בריתנו ארה'ב. חזר על הסכנות שבסיוע לסעודיה והציע הקמת צוות משותף שיבדוק האם העדיפות האיכותית מתערערת ואם ניתן לעשות לשימורה.

שה'ח גם הדגיש את אתגר העליה.

סוכם שהמזכיר ישקול מינוי אדם או צוות לבדיקת צרכיה הבטחוניים של ישראל לאור ההתפתחויות האחרונות במפרץ, כשאבן הבוחן לבדיקה היא שמירת יתרונה האיכותי של ישראל. סוכם גם שהממשל יעבד חבילת סיוע כפולה עבורנו (לטווח קצר-מיידי ולטווח ארוך שאחרי המשבר).

בנושא המדיני ביקש המזכיר שישראל תגלה חשיבה יצירתית לקראת חידוש התהליך המדיני כשיווצרו התנאים לכך.

ג. ערביות דיור

המו'מ בנדון הסתיים במהלך ביקור שה'ח בארה'ב והסיכומים נוסחו במכתב שהעביר שה'ח לעמיתו האמריקני ב-2.10. כעבור ימים מספר טען בייקר כפומבי שבסיכומים בין הצדדים הושגו מישראל התחייבויות מרחיקות לכת לעומת התחייבויות שניתנו בעבר. דיעה זו עוררה סקרנות בארה'ב - ובהמשך סערה פוליטית בישראל. כתוצאה משאלות חוזרות ונישנות בתדרוכים היומיים של הדובר במחמ'ד, פורסם מכתב השר (על דעתנו) ב-10.10. בעקבות הויכוח הציבורי בארץ שיגר השר איגרת בסוגייה לבייקר ב-17.10.

שני המסמכים מצורפים כנספח.

ד. ארועי הר הבית והחלטת מועב'ט  
1. ממשל

עיקר מאמצי הממשל בטיפולו במשבר במפרץ מכוונים לשמירת קואליציה בינלאומית רחבה כשברה'מ הינה שותף חשוב בה והנתמכת במעורבות אקטיבית של מדינות ערב. ארועי הר הבית נתפשים כמסכנים קואליציה זו שהוקמה בעמל רב. ארה'ב מוכנה לספוג ביקורת בעקבות מעורבותה בהעברת החלטה אנטי ישראלית ובלבד שתוכל לשמור על הקואליציה. הנשיא בוש והמזכיר בייקר נזפו בישראל בהתבטאויות פומביות וטענו שהיתה צריכה לנהוג ביתר איפוק ולהיות מוכנה לטיפול במצבים כאלו. עם זאת הטעימו כי אינם רואים כל קשר בין המשבר במפרץ לבין הבעיה הפלשתינית. הממשל מסביר עמדתו לגבי החלטת המועצה ומשלחת מטעם מזכ'ל האו'ם במסר ששיגר המזכיר בייקר לשר החוץ ב-14.10 (שעה קלה לפני קיום ישיבת

הממשלה בנושא). במסר עומד המזכיר על הצורך לקבל המשלחת ולהסב תשומת הלב הבינלאומית חזרה לתוקפנותו של סאדאם חוסיין. השר העיר באזני השגריר בראון שבהחלטת מועצת הבטחון אלמנטים חמורים מבחינתנו (אי איזכור ההתקפה על מתפללים יהודים, ציון הר הבית בשמו הערבי, גנוי חד-צדדי). הנשיא בוש נדרש לנושא ואמר לעתונאים (15.10) כי הממשל האמריקאי מעוניין לראות את החלטת מועצת הבטחון מיושמת במלואה. דוברת מתמ'ד הביעה אכזבה מהחלטת ישראל שלא לשתף פעולה עם משלחת האו"ם (15.10), בה כרכה תקווה שנציגי מזכ"ל האו"ם יוכלו לקיים שליחותם. סגן הנשיא קווייל התבטא ב-CBS בענין ועדת החקירה שהוקמה בארץ ובתשובה לשאלה אמר שתיתכן 'A WAY THAT YOU CAN HAVE THIS COOPERATION...' במסיבת עיתונאים שקיים מזכיר המדינה ב-16.10.90 הוא אמר שהממשל מלא תקווה שממשלת ישראל תאפשר למשלחתו של מזכ"ל האו"ם להשלים משימתה. ועוד הוסיף המזכיר כי ארה"ב היתה מצביעה בעד ההחלטה גם אם לא היה קיים משבר המפרץ וזאת בשל ההרג שהתרחש בירושלים. הודעת שר השכון על החלטת וועדת השרים לקליטה (14.10) לאשר הקמת 15 אלף יחידות דיור בירושלים מחדדת את הבעיה ומעוררת מחלוקת עקרונית מחדש. הממשל הגיב (ב-15.10) במסרים אודות החומרה בה הוא רואה המצב והאפשרות של משבר חמור ביחסים אם לא נמצא דרך לקבל את משלחת המזכ"ל - זאת באמצעות סימור רייך ממועדון הנשיאים (שביקר בישראל בתחילת השבוע הזה) ותום דאין מאייפ'ק.

## 2. הארגונים היהודיים

ניתן לאמר שאלו התייצבו לימיננו באופן אמיץ ונחרץ תוך אימוץ עמדותינו ופרסום תגובה מיידית למאורעות, ובהמשך בהבעת ביקורת על ממשל ארה"ב בעקבות פעילותה במועצת הבטחון. ההודעות פורסמו ע"י ה-JCRC של נ"י, א.ד.ל, הקונגרס, הקומיטי, נקרא'ק והפדרציות (בערי השדה) - כאשר אלו מביעים צער על אבדן חיי אדם ומבליטים את ההתגרות של ההמון המוסלמי ביהודים ביום חגם ומתייחסים לשמועות על פעילותה הנחזית כביכול של קבוצת נאמני הר הבית. ה'ווישינגטון טיימס' (11.10), מציין את תחושת הזעם שהביעו הארגונים היהודיים על תפקודה של ארה"ב בדיוני המועצה שנבעו מצרכים פוליטיים, ואילו ה'נ"י טיימס' תאר התבטאויות על 'בוגדנות אמריקאית' והדגיש אחדות הדעים של הארגונים היהודיים השונים - תוך ציון כי אירגון 'שלום עכשיו' הצטרף לקואליציה היהודית בנושא והבלטת עמדותיה המתנגדות לנוכחות ישראלית בשטחים.

## 3. הפגנות

התקיימו מספר הפגנות בעקבות ארועי הר הבית - בווישינגטון, בשיקגו, בהיוסטון כאן דווח על הפגנה מעוטת משתתפים שזכתה לסיקור באמצעי התקשורת ובסן-פרנסיסקו שם השתתפו כ-450 איש ששרפו את דגלי ישראל. מאידך, התקיימה הפגנה של כ-400 יהודים בניו-יורק מול בנין האו"ם במחאה על החלטת מועצת הבטחון.

## 4. תקשורת

כסוי נרחב לנושא שלווה בצילומים, דיווחי טלוויזיה קשים וכותרות חריפות כאשר התחושה השוררת היא שדמוי ישראל נפגע דווקא לאחר תפנית משמעותית לטובתה. ההיקף הגדול של הנפגעים מיקד את מירב תשומת הלב כאשר ההתפרצות הפלשתינית מוסברת לעתים ככזאת שבאה בעקבות פרובוקציה של נאמני הר הבית. דיוני מועצת הבטחון והתבטאויותיהם הנחרצות של הנשיא בוש והמזכיר בייקר מיקדו המשך הסיקור למיכלול יחסי ישראל ארה"ב. ברשתות הטלוויזיה השונות דווחים נרחבים מהשטח עם תמונות קשות של הרוגים, בפגיעת אנשים במנוסתם, תחנת המשטרה השרופה, והרס ברחבת הכותל. מירב הכתבות בעתונות חריפות ומפנות אצבע מאשימה כנגד ישראל. לדוגמא, ה'ווישינגטון טיימס' (10.10) הביא ציטטה מדברי טדי קולק להגדרת המאורע 'מתנה לסאדאם חוסיין', כאשר ה'פילדלפיה אינקווייר' במאמר מערכת (10.10) קובע שהכח המסוכן במזה'ת הינו האמונות הדתיות, ועל ישראל מוטלת החובה לרסן את קנאות נאמני הר הבית המאיימים על המקומות הקדושים לאיסלאם. יש לציין כי ב'מיאמי הרלד' (10.10) הופיע מאמר מערכת שקול המנתח ומקבל הסברינו, אך לא פוסח מלבקר את התגובה המופרזת, וב'ווישינגטון פוסט' (10.10) מאמר מערכת המקבל הסברינו

ומזהיר מפני יצירת מצב שישחק לידי סדאם חוסיין.

5. תיירות

בסוף השבוע של ה-6 וה-7 דנא פרסם הממשל שני TRAVEL ADVISORIES בנושאינו - האחד שהינו כללי לאזור המזה'ת ובו פיסקה מורחבת ומיוחדת על ישראל המציינת החלטת הממשלה לחלוקת מסכות גז; השני הינו מיוחד לנושא השטחים וממליץ לאזרחים שלא להגיע לאזורים אלו, ובו הערה מיוחדת ומורחבת על הארועים בהר הבית ואף 'התרעה' לגבי הטיפול באמריקאים בעלי שמות ערביים המגיעים לנתב'ג ולגשר אלנבי.

הודעת הממשלה על חלוקת מסכות גז ובעקבות זאת TRAVEL-ADVISORIES ה-נ'ל ואירוועי הר הבית זכו לתהודה בתקשורת ובקהילות היהודיות, שהמיטה מכה קשה על התיירות מתקבלות הודעות על ביטולים ודחיות סיורים רבים לארץ. בכלל זה בוטלו הגעתן של משלחות סולידריות גדולות מפילדלפיה, מושינגטון, וממקומות נוספים. השגרירות והקונסוליות התגייסו למבצע עידוד תיירות בתיאוסלעם כל הגורמים העוסקים בתחום זה.

ה. חקיקות בקונגרס ועוד

1. סיוע לישראל

לאחר תקופה ארוכה של המתנה לקראת קבלת חוק התקציב (שטרס אומץ) נכנסה ועדת ההקצבות בסנאט, על ועדות המשנה שלה, להילוך גבוה במגמה לסיים מלאכת הכנת חוקי ההקצבה בטרם פזור הקונגרס, ערב הבחירות הכלליות (7.11). בכלל זה עובדים כיום על שני חוקי ההקצבה הנוגעים ישירות להיבטים שונים של הסיוע עבור ישראל:-

א. חוק סיוע חוץ עצמו;

ב. חוק תקציב הפנטגון, שיש בו אלמנטים רבים הנוגעים לבטחוננו ישירות ובעקיפין.

יצוין ששר הבטחון ומנכ'ל משרדו בקרו בוושינגטון בשכועות האחרונים והציגו רשימות נוספות של בקשות המיועדות לפצותנו לנוכח השינוי במאזן הכוחות במז'ת כתוצאה מהמשבר במפרץ ואף לנסות ולשמור על יתרונו האיכותי בעקבות העסקה הסעודית. חלק מבקשות אלו נמצא בסמכותו של הממשל להענקה (לדוגמא, הפטריוט) ללא אשור הקונגרס-וחלק טעון אשורו ואף חקיקה מיוחדת.

1. חוק סיוע חוץ (הקצבות)

כבר עבר את שלב הועדה. הדיון על הצעת החוק במליאת הסנאט נפתח ב-12.10 וחודש ב-19.10 אך טרם הסתיים. בדיון (19.10) במליאת הסנאט הגישו הסנטורים דול ובירד הצעה שלפיה יחוייב הממשל לדווח לקונגרס בקביעות על פעילות ההתנחלות של ישראל. עפ'י ההצעה יוחלט כי ההתנחלויות (כולל מז' ירושלים) אינן חוקיות עפ'י 242 ו-338 וישוב יהודי ברה'מ בהן נוגד את מכתב מערבויות. ההצעה נדחתה ברב של 90 לעומת 8.

ההצעה כוללת מספר אלמנטים חדשים. מעבר ל-3 ביליון דולר נסיוע המסורתי לישראל ואלמנטים 'קבועים' כמו תיקון ברמן בנושא מש'ב (7.5 מליון דולר), תיקון וקסמן לשת'פ איזורי (7 מליון דולר) ועוד ועוד.

האלמנטים החדשים כוללים:

- הגדלת PRE-PO (הצבה מראש) ב-100 מיליון דולר. (עד סך של 200 דולר) - OSP ('רכש מעבר לים' קרי בישראל) בגובה של 475 מיליון דולר (פירוש הדבר, תוספת של 75 מיליון דולר)
- אפשרות שימוש ב-200 מיליון דולר מתוך כספי הסיוע האזרחי (ESF) לרכישת ציוד בטחוני (כאילו FMS).
- שחרור מהיר של עודפי ציוד צנאי עבור ישראל (ותורכיה).

- משיכת ציוד ממלאי כוחות ארה"ב בסך 700 מיליון דולר .

2. הצעת חוק תקציב הפנטגון (הקצבות) .

כבר אומצה ב-16.10 ע"י מליאת הסנאט.

מצד אחד ההצעה כוללת שורה של נושאים שכבר היו בטפול בשנים הקודמות וגם זכו להקצבות, כגון:-

- טיל ה'חץ' - 42 מיליון דולר .
- מערכת ראיית לילה למסוק הקוברא.

הנושאים החדשים המופיעים בהצעת חוק זה כוללים בין היתר:-

- 15 מיליון דולר להרחבת נמל חיפה.

- מאגרי נפט מזוקק לטובת ארה"ב וישראל שיוקמו בישראל ותכולתם 4.5 מיליון חביות.

2. שמיטת חובות למצרים

בתחילת ספטמבר העניק בית הנבחרים (ועדת ההקצבות) בהחלטה שאושרה במליאה, פטור (WAIVER) של 3 חודשים מתיקון ברוק (השולל סיוע ממדינות המפגרות בפרעון חובותיהן ואילולא הביטול, התיקון היה פוגע במצרים). במהלך שלושת החודשים מספטמבר ועד ה-31.12.90 מתבקש הממשל האמריקאי לבחון את האופציות העומדות בפניו.

בסנאט הועלה הנושא (12.10) ע"י סנטור ריד בועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות. הסנטור ביקש לחפש אופציות אחרות להתגייס לעזרת מצרים באם לא תהיה שמיטת חובות במתכונת עליה דיבר הנשיא. סנטורים רבים מוצאים את הנושא בעייתי בעיקר בגלל החשש מתקדים של מחיקת חובות וע"כ לבקשת הסנטור לייחי (יו"ר וועדת המשנה) החליטו שלא להגיש תיקונים בשלב הועדה ולדחותם למליאה.

התיקון התקבל במלאת הסנאט ב-19.10.

3. עסקות הנשק עם מדינות ערב

א. ערב הסעודית

כזכור, הממשל החליט לפצל ל-2 חלקים את עיסקת הנשק עם סעודיה (במתכונתה המקורית כ-20 מיליארד דולר). החלק הראשון (כ-7.5 מיליארד) הועבר לאישור הקונגרס ב-27.9.90. לקונגרס נתונים 30 יום, במסגרתם הוא יכול להצביע נגד מימוש העיסקה או חלקים ממנה. ב-3.10 נתקיימו בבית הנבחרים שימועים בנדון ולמחרת (4.10) בסנאט. מטעם הממשל העידו ברתולומיאו (תת מזכיר המדינה לענייני בטחון בינ"ל במחמ"ד) ופול וולפוביץ' (תת מזכיר ההגנה למדיניות בפנטגון). ברתולומיאו הנהיר כי עסקת הנשק עם סעודיה תתבצע בשלבים. החלק הראשון (לצרכים המידיים של סעודיה, כביכול) נדון עתה, ואילו החלק השני יוגש לקונגרס בינואר 1991.

בשלב זה מתגברת בקונגרס הפעילות נגד העיסקה, גם בהיקפה המצומצם (בעקבות הפיצול), ומצדו הממשל נערך כנגד. לדברי הסנטור אלן קרנסטון, עורך הממשל מתקפה עזה בנושא באמצעות התעשיות הבטחוניות ומקשה על ידי ישראל. כמו כן מפיץ הממשל שמועות כאילו הוסרו אי ההבנות בין ישראל לממשל בנושא הבקשות הישראליות.

כדיון מיוחד (COLLOQUY) שקויים במליאת הסנאט ב-11.10 (בו השתתפו שמונה סנטורים) הועלו הנקודות המרכזיות נגד העסקה, וביניהן: התנהגות סעודיה (אינה מתנהגת כבעלת בית אמיתית של ארה"ב), החשש מנפילת הנשק לידיים עוינות, הנאמנויות והבריתות המשתנות תכופות במזה"ת, עוינות סעודיה לישראל, הפרת המאזן העדין באיזור והקטנת סיכויי השלום. הועלתה דרישה להתניית העיסקה בהצטרפות סעודיה לתהליך השלום עם ישראל



וכ'כ דובר בצורך לשקול מגבלות על השימוש בנשק ובאפשרות להסדרים מיוחדים (במקום מכירה), כגון ו-BUY-BACK ו-LEASE-LEND ואף באבחנה בין פריטים דחופים ודרישות לטווח הארוך.

למחרת (12.10) הגיש קרנסטון במליאת הסנאט הצעת החלטה המתייחסת לאיסור ולהגבלת מכירת פריטים מסויימים המוצעים בעיסקה (המפוצלת) וביניהם משגרי הטיל טאו-2, טנקים מדגם M1A2, מסוקים מדגם אפאצ'י ומערכת לשיגור טילים מסוג MLRS. הסנטורים ספקט, סיימון ופקווד הצטרפו ליוזמת קרנסטון.

בבית הנבחרים, הקונגרסמן דייב אובי, יחד עם עמיתו, מל לוין, הגישו הצעת החלטה דומה ב-17.10, בה הם מביעים התנגדות ל-3 מרכיבים בעיסקה: הטנקים והמסוקים הנ'ל ו-6 סוללות ה'פטריוט'.

### ב. בחריין ומעא'מ

הממשל העביר לאישור הקונגרס (27.9) פרטי עיסקת נשק עם בחריין בשווי 37 מליון דולר (27 טנקי M60A3 ועוד). בנוסף לכך החל הממשל בתהליך התייעצויות בקונגרס לגבי מכירת 20 מסוקי אפצ'י למעא'מ ו-8 לבחריין. תגובת המחוקקים היתה נזעמת והמתדרכים מטעם הממשל אמרו שיקצו בכמויות או יבטלו את המכירה לחלוטין.

### II. קנדה

#### א. פגישת שרי החוץ לוי-קלרק - בעצרת 3/10

לדברי שה'ח קלרק, היחסים בין שתי המדינות טובים מאוד. בהקשר זה הזכיר את פעולתה של קנדה לסייע לישראל בחידוש הקשרים עם מדינות באפריקה. במענה לדברי שה'ח לוי, הציע קלרק שיקיים ביקור בקנדה בהקדם האפשרי, אולי בראשית השנה הבאה. הזכיר את ספרו של אוסטרובסקי והביע חשש מתגובות שליליות העלולות להיגרם בעקבות הפצתו.

ביחס למשבר המפרץ, ציין שישראל היתה הראשונה להזהיר מפני סאדאם חוסיין, אולם למרבה הצער אזהרתה לא נתקבלה ברצינות הראויה. לדעתו, רצוי שהעולם יעריך כראוי את האחריות שמגלה ישראל במדיניות הפרופיל הנמוך שלה. מקווה שהסכסוך יסתיים באופן הנכון, אחרת עלול להיוצר מצב מסוכן מאוד. קנדה מודאגת ממצבה של ירדן ומיכולת המשטר לשרוד. משום כך חשוב לגלות מתינות כלפי ירדן. מצב הפלסטינים ובעייתם חזקו לדבריו את סאדאם חוסיין ועזרו לו לגייס את דעת הקהל הערבית לטובתו. יש יותר ויותר גורמים המחזיקים בדעה שפתרון בעיית המפרץ צריך לכלול גם את פתרון השאלה הפלסטינאית. בפגישה האחרונה של ה-7-G ביוסטון (יולי ש.ז.) התברר שוב כי הן תומכות בועב'ל לא כתנאי מוקדם אלא כחלק מתהליך מדיני. שאל מה עמדת ישראל בנדון. עוד סיפר על בקשתו ממנהיגי יהדות קנדה שיתנו דעתם לפתרון פוליטי של כסוך במז'ת. גם אמר כי השאלה איננה אם להשלים עם עיראק, אלא הדרכים והאמצעים שבהם יש לנקוט. על כולם לאמר לא ללינקג' בין המשבר לסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי, ואולם יש רבים הסבורים שיש קשר ודבר זה חל גם על האירופאיות. אפשר שיהיה קונצנזוס שיש לחסל את סאדאם אך קלרק באופן אישי חושב שיש בכך סיכון גדול, שכן האיש מוכן להשתמש בנשק כימי. דווקא בגלל הסיכון יש חשיבות גדולה להסכמה במסגרת האו"ם. בסוף דבריו קלרק חזר והדגיש שחשוב שהיציבות בירדן תשמר, אם ירדן תיפול, עלולות להיות לכך השלכות חמורות.

שה'ח לוי ציין שאנו מלאי הערכה לפעילות קנדה למעננו באפריקה. הדגיש שיחסינו עם קנדה חשובים לנו מאד וחשוב שנמשיך לטפחם. חשוב איפה לעודד שת'פ בתחומים שונים כגון חילופי מדענים וכיו"ב. אשר לספר של אוסטרובסקי שהזכיר קלרק, הספר אינו רציני וברובו פרי דמיון. מכל מקום נושא זה אינו עומד בראש סולם העדיפויות.

ביחס למשבר המפרץ, השר הרחיב על השלכות ה'פרופיל הנמוך' והסיכונים שאנו נוטלים, וכ'כ הביא את טיעוננו לגבי השינויים המתבקשים בעיראק ובאיזור לאחר פתרון המשבר במפרץ.

#### ב. ארועי הר הבית והחלטת מועב'ט

ארועי הר הבית היוו כותרת ראשית בתקשורת הכתובה והאלקטרונית כאחת, במשך ימים אחדים. היתה התייחסות לפעולה היזומה מצד הערבים והתגובה שלנו. הפרשנות היתה ביקורתית מאד כלפי ישראל והאשמתה בשימוש בכח מופרז. התייחסויות אחרות קשרו את ארועי המפרץ לבעייה הפלסטינאית תוך ציון שאמנם לא ניתן להתעלם מהלינקג'.

במישור המדיני שה'ח קלרק ביצע מהלך חסר תקדים, מבחינתו לפחות, כאשר התקשר אישית לשגריר באוטבה ב-9.10 וביקש להעביר מסר לממשלת ישראל. לדבריו, הוא קיבל מאיתנו את המידע המפרט גירסתנו לארועים. עם זאת הוא מבקש למסור שלדעת קנדה הארועים האחרונים הם מסוכנים ביותר במצב שגם לפני התקריות התמורות היה כחבית אבק שריפה. ציין שבדיון במועבי'ט קנדה תהיה חייבת לנקוט בעמדה של 'גילוי לב'. לדעתו אין ליצור לינקג' בין המפרץ לנושא הפלסטינאי, יש לפתור את שתי הבעיות בנפרד, אך יש לפותרן. ציין שגם בקרב העמיתים האירופיים משתרשת הדעה בדבר הצורך בפתרון דחוף.

השגריר ניצל הזדמנות זו להסביר לשר את הרקע לארועים. קלרק מסר שהסברים אלה ישמשו אותו כחמר למענה לשאלות בפרלמנט שבודאי ישאלו. בו ביום בהודעה רשמית ציין קלרק שהקנדים מזועזעים מהתפרצות האלימות. יש לקנדה השגות כבדות באשר למידת הכח שהופעל ע"י ישראל בהר הבית. הארועים מצביעים על הצורך בפתרון הבעייה הפלסטינאית.

במהלך דיוני מועבי'ט בנושא נאם גם שגריר קנדה. בדבריו הוא מציין שהדיון מקורו אמור היה לעסוק בהריסת בתים במחנה פליטים בעזה. כשם שקנדה מגנה דצח חסר הגיון של חיילי ישראלי, כך הדבר ביחס להריסת בתים, שהוא מעשה של ענישה קולקטיבית המחזק את העוינות בקרב המתונים הפלסטינים. האלימות ורצף הארועים שבאו אחריו בירושלים שהיא ביתם של 3 הדתות הגדולות בעולם ראויים לגינוי. קנדה מביעה הסתייגותה החמורה על מידת השימוש בכח של הרשויות הישראליות כמענה לארועים אלה. נדרשים איפוק וכיבוד הסטאטוס קוו הדתי. השגריר סיים באומרו שעל הקהילה הבינ'ל להתגייס למציאת תהליך שלום מעשי עכשיו.

כידוע, קנדה הצביעה בעד הגינוי לישראל. ב-16.10 הקנדים פנו למשרד החוץ בבקשה מיוחדת (APPEAL) שנמצא נוסחה כלשהי שתאפשר שת'פ עם המזכ'ל ומשלחתו-וזאת משתי סיבות עיקריות: הצורך למנוע לינקג' קונספטואלי בין המשבר במפרץ לסכסוך וכן הצורך לשמור על הידידות, המשותפת לנו ולהם עם ארה'ב, שכן קנדה סבורה שתוצאות מוצלחות למשכרי המז'ת נתנים להשגה רק בהכוונה אמריקאית. להערכתם המצב טומן בחובו משבר ביחסי ישראל עם ארה'ב.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יוסף למדן

הנספחים יועברו בנפרד מחר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, e(שהבט), סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, ארבל2, איר1, איר2, פרנ, מזאר, e(רס), אמן, ממד/בינל1

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 16597  
אל: רהמש/1105  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 221090, זח: 1631, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
נכב  
87054  
בלמ'ס/מיד  
913.11

אל: נציגויות

הנדון: ערבויות דיור  
לסעיף I ג' בדף מצפ'א מס' 76  
(חוזם 10,15781 מיום 21/10)

י מכתבי השר בנדון למזכיר בייקר מה-2.10 ומה-17.10 הועברו אליכם במברק  
סמנכ'ל הסברה חוזם 10,15483 מ-21.10.

מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), סמנכל,  
אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט,  
מזתים, ארבל, איר, איר, פרנ, מזאר, @ (רס), אמן, ממד/בינל

סטסט

אאא, תוזם: 15183

אל: רהמש/1051

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 288, תא: 201090, חז: 1703, חמ: סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס.

ביהנ'ב: פגישת השגריר עם ראשי ועדת החוץ.

1. אתמול (19.10) הזמין יו"ר הוועדה, פאסל, את חברי ועדת החוץ לפגישת היכרות עם השגריר שובל. יש לזכור שמחווה זה של הזמנת כל חברי הוועדה היה מחווה מיוחדת.

נכחו: פאסל, המילטון, לארי סמית' לויין, בוסקו, אקרמן, ברומפילד, לגומרטינו, גוס, סולרז, לנטוס, לוקנס, ברמן, שוייר, פיין, גילמן, וולפה, ליוט אנגל, וג'ון מילר. כן נכחו עוזרים מצוות הוועדה.

2. דברי הפתיחה של השגריר:-

לבקשת הנוכחים סיפר השגריר בפתח דבריו על עצמו ורקעו. ציין כי מאז עזיבת הכנסת יושב לראשונה בצד השני של השולחן.

מודע לעליות ומורדות ביחסי ישראל ארה"ב ואולי יש מקום ל- FENCEMENDING אולם אין לשכוח שאנו באותו צד של ה- FENCE. מאחר ואנו ידידים אנו יכולים להרשות לעצמנו לעתים דיונים נוקבים.

3. להלן חלק השאלות וששובות:

המילטון - הערותיך RIGHT ON TARGET אנו מאחלים לך הצלחה בתפקידך.

(הערה: המילטון לאורך כל המפגש לא התבטא מעבר לדברים אלה).

ברומפילד: הצטרף לפאסל והמילטון בברכותיו. נהנה מדברי השגריר. אין ספק שישנן הרבה בעיות ואין ספק שאנו באותו צד של המתרס. שאל האם חל שינוי בעמדת ישראל לגבי משלחת האו"ם?

שגריר - לגבי העובדות אין מה להוסיף. איננו יודעים עדיין בדיוק מדוע זה קרה (התקרית בהר הבית), אבל נדע כאשר ועדת הבירור תגיש מסקנותיה. היה זה חן סוכות כאשר אלפי יהודים התפללו ליד הכותל (הסביר כי הר הבית גובל ותל).

כאשר מזרח ירושלים שוחררה ב-67' הוציא דין הנחיות נוקשות לפיהן יהודים לא יתפללו על הר הבית ולא יתערבו בענייני המוסלמים אלא יסתפקו בכותל. אין לשכוח שעבור הערבים זהו המקום השלישי בחשיבותו מבחינת קודשתו ואילו עבורנו זהו המקום המקודש ביותר, הראשון בחשיבותו. ישנם פה ושם קיצוניים המעוניינים להתפלל על הר הבית אולם בג'צ אסר זאת. ערבים, מסיבות הנחקרות עתה החלו לזרוק אבנים על המתפללים. בתחילה היה מספר מועט ביותר של שוטרים אשר יתכן שנכנסו לפניקה. יתכן ששגינו בהצבת מספר השוטרים והיינו אולי צריכים לזכור שביו"כ היה נסיון מסוג זה שנמנע מבעוד מועד. (השגריר ציין שאם היינו מציבים כוחות רציניים ליד הר הבית זו היתה הבעייה, מאחר שלא הצבנו כוחות, זו ג'כ בעייה כך שבכל מקרה היינו מואשמים).

מכל מקום ישראל לא פתחה, יזמה התקרית ואיננה מאושרת מן התוצאות, אולם אין מקום להטיל עליה האשמה.

זו טרגדיה אנושית ואנו מבכים על אדם וילד שנהרגו. לא היינו מרוצים מהחלטת האו"ם מכמה סיבות:-

א. גם בבית המשפט (למרות שאין זה ביי"מ) אינך מאשים מישהו ואח'כ קורא לעדים אלא להיפך.

ב. ירושלים - זו מדינת ישראל. אני יודע שאין זו מדיניות ארה"ב. אולם אין כל עיר אחרת בעולם שכה קרובה להסטוריה של עם כלשהו כמו ירושלים לעם

היהודי. לשגר משלחת מטעם האו"ם, ארגון שעדיין מחזיק רשמית בהחלטה המשווה ציונות - גזענות, כדי שהם יהיו השופטים שלנו, היה בלתי מקובל עלינו לחלוטין. אנו מנסים עתה למצוא דרכים שונות. אתמול שוחח על כך עם איגלברגר והציע הצעות. איננו אופטימי מידי. אולם ראה'מ מינה ועדת בירור עצמאית הכוללת אנשים שאינם פוליטיקאים ואינם עסקנים מפלגתיים. הם אמורים לסיים עבודתם תוך יומיים שלושה. חושב שעלינו להגיש את הממצאים למזכ"ל האו"ם אפילו אם לא יהיו אטרקטיביים מבחינת ישראל). אם יהיה צורך בחומר נוסף, ניתן יהיה למצוא דרכים לספקו. כל דרך פעולה אחרת תפגע בריבונותינו.

לויין - הודה על תגובת השגריר שהיתה - THOUGHTFUL ON THE MERIT ואשר הביע צער ועצבות. התגובות מירושלים כפי שהשתקפו בתקשורת השמיטו חלק זה וגרמו לכעס בדעה'ק האמריקנית.

מודאג מהתדרדרות יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב לשפל כזה חסר תקדים. הנשיא פיתח כעס (ANGER) כלפי ישראל וההודעות הפומביות שלו הרבה יותר נוקשות (THOUGHTER). בייקר גמיש יותר מהנשיא. הרבה מזה (הנאמר לעיל) הוא לא הוגן. מאוד מודאג להיכן יתפתחו יחסים אלה בין שתי המדינות. התגובה בישראל (UNFORTUNATELY) היא האשמת בייקר והנשיא והמצב שנוצר הוא POCKING EACH OTHER IN THE EYE ה-CYCLE הפוליטי שהתפתח מסוכן מאוד ליחסים. יש לנסות לתדור מבעד למעגל זה. הביע תקווה שהשגריר יוכל להעביר זאת לירושלים ובשל מעמדו יוכל להשמע ולהשפיע.

תה נמצא כאן בזמן הקריטי ביותר של היחסים בין ישראל לארה"ב. התמיכה פומבית האמריקאית בישראל יורדת (DROPPING). אתה נימצא בחדר עם אנשים המעוניינים לעזור. המצב כרגע הכי מסוכן ובלתי יציב (PRECASION) שמעולם ראיתי. שגריר מבקש להשיב במלוא הכנות:-

א. מודה שלישראל בעיית P.R. הביא כדוגמא סקר דע'ק מסויים לפיו קיימת תמיכה בישראל חזקה ובאותו סקר קיימת גם תמיכה במדינה פלסטינית. שני דברים שאינם עולים בקנה אחד.

ב. הפוליטיקה הישראלית הפנימית מאוד אינטנסיבית. נושא כמו 400 מליון דולר ערביות דוור מהווה נושא מרכזי בפוליטיקה הפנים של ישראל. מודע לכך הממשלה הישראלית הנוכחית מאופיינת ע"י התקשורת כממשלת ימין ואף קיצונית אולם אין זה כך. (הסביר הבדלים בין עמדות לגבי מדיניות פנים לחוץ).

ג. התגובה הישראלית להר הבית - כאשר כל העת תוקפים אותך אתה בועט בסופו של דבר. יתכן אולי שהיתה תגובת יתר מסויימת אולם על שני הצדדים 'לקרר' מצב העניינים. לגומרסינו - הצטרף למברכים. מסכים שלישראל בעיה עם דעה'ק האמריקנית. הביא שתי דוגמאות:

א. קיבל בשבוע שעבר אות כבוד מקהילה יהודית. רבים לדבריו ביטלו השתתפותם באירוע ואחרים אמרו לו שעליו לסרב לקבל האות.

ב. בעת הופעה נתכנית רדיו אחד המאזינים שהתקשר אמר שתומך בקונגרסמן בכל מעשיו להוציא תמיכתו בישראל ולפיכך יצביע נגדו. לגומרסינו שאל כיצד רואה השגריר התפתחויות אפשריות לגבי עיראק וכווית. שגריר - (התייחס ל- INPUT של ממשלים באופן כללי) באמצעות התקשורת איננו תמיד מאושרים מהצהרות שניתנו בפומבי או מידע רקע הנמסר (ע"י הממשל). לצערנו אנו נימצאים במצב של היעדר תקשורת בין רה"מ שמיר לנשיא בוש AND IT SHOULD BE RECTIFIED. אולם ישראל, בטווח הארוך תישאר ותמשיך להיות בת הברית העיקרית של ארה"ב במזה"ת. בטווח הארוך בריתות יכולות להמשך רק בין דמוקרטיות. על שני המנהיגים TO COMMUNICATE. היו אי הבנות ויש למנען.

יש לנסות (פנה לקונגרסמנים) לתקן תופעה זו. לא ברור כיצד יכול הנשיא בוש להתקשר לכל מנהיג במזה"ת, כולל דיקטטורים כאסד, ולא להתקשר עם רה"מ שמיר.

אני יודע שאיננו ניראים תמיד טוב. אולם אנחנו עדיין 3.5 מליון איש מול 120 מליון ערבים שרובם עדיין לא מוכנים TO ACCOMODATE אלא אם כן ידעו שלא ניתן להרוס את ישראל. בינתיים העליה מתגברת ואנחנו שם ונישאר שם. ישראל מבקשת לשמור על יתרונה האיכותי ובזכותם עושה כן. אולם אח"כ אנו

נישאלים מדוע אנו מודאגים. יש לציין שסך הכוחות האמריקנים בסעודיה גדול יותר מסך הכוחות של ישראל המוצב מול כל צבאות ערב. אנו מודאגים לגבי העתיד. הכוחות האמריקנים לא ישארו שם תמיד. אנו מעוניינים להשיג היכולת להלחם עבור עצמנו. לגבי עיראק אינו יודע מה יהיה אולם אסור לתקופן להנות מפרי תוקפנותו. אם יאפשרו לו כדבר הזה, יהיה REPLAY בעוד מספר שנים בתנאים חמורים יותר.

לארי סמית - יש כאלה המאמינים שאלו זמנים קשים עבור ישראל בארה"ב. יש מביננו המוכנים לבקר את הממשל שלנו. אין זה ממשל רייגן. המאפיין ממשל זה הוא ניהול מדיניות החוץ על פני העמודים הראשונים של ה- W.P. T.V.N- וה- כאשר הדבר נוגע לישראל ובעמודים הראשונים והאחוריים כאשר הדבר נוגע למדינות או לנושאים אחרים. סמית ביקר בחריפות את בייקר על תעלול מסירת מס' הטלפון:

I WOULD URGE YOU TO URGE UPON THIS ADMINISTRATION TO USE DIPLOMACY AND NOT THE FIRST PAGES OF THE PAPER.

וכן לא השתמש בהודעות פומביות ומרחבים נוסח בייקר - לוי. אין זה מועיל. בו זמנית, קיימת מידה רבה של תסכול מישראל לאחר 3 שנים וצפיה שתטפל בצורה טובה יותר באינתיפאדה. התמונות המופיעות בטלוויזיה הן הגרועות ביותר. מקווה שניתן יהיה לעלות על מסלול של 'שפיות' ביחסים. המדיניות האמריקנית של החזקת הקואליציה תשפיע לרעה על ישראל. יש להעלות את עם הממשל. על ממש' ישראל להיות מודעת לביקורת כלפיה בשעה זו. גריר - הסכים לדברי סמית והוסיף כי אין צורך בנקודות חיכוך והסכמה נוספים.

גילמן - שאל על יחסי ישראל - בריה"מ. שגריר -

א. פתיחת שערי בריה"מ להגירה היא התפתחות הסטורית. עמדו על הפערים העמוקים משך השנים בין מטרות התנועה הקומוניסטית מחד והציונות מאידך. לכך יש להוסיף כמובן את הצעד וההיבט הפוליטי. בריה"מ פועלת בצורה זו על מנת לגלות רצון טוב כלפי ארה"ב.

ב. בריה"מ הסכימה על כינון יחסים קונסולריים מלאים אולם עדיין לא דיפלומטיים. במשה"ח הסובייטי יש עדיין מגמה פרו - ערבית חזקה. יתכן וגורבצ'וב והמנהיגות היו מעוניינים לזרז התהליך אך נבלמים ע"י הגורמים הללו במשה"ח.

ג. יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים חייבים להכין אם בריה"מ מעוניינת ליטול חלק במאמצי תהליך השלום.

אקרמן -

א. אחד הנושאים המדאיגים היא התגברות האנטישמיות. ניתן היה להבין מדבריו שהוא כורך זאת (אם כי לטענתו לא התכוון לכך) במדיניות ישראל.

ב. בעית ה- P.R של ישראל - צריך לשנות את מעטפת החבילה ולהציע הצעות. מאד התעודד מדרך הצגת הדברים ע"י השגריר. לא רואה הדברים מוצגים היטב ב- T.V.

שגריר -

א. לגבי האנטישמיות הנמצאת בעליה - היתה לצערנו ברב החברות הלא יהודיות וגם בארה"ב.

ב. לגבי הצעות ישראל - הצגנו לפלסטינים הצעות במשך השנים (מאז הצהרת בלפור). התייחס לק"ד. מיישראל מעולם לא אמרה שתטפח את יו"ש ועזה אלא שנשב למו"מ לשלום ללא תנאים מוקדמים. וכ"א מהצדדים יציג את עמדותיו. לפני מו"מ כזה הצענו תקופת ביניים כ- C.B.M. ולימוד חיי דו קיום. כל הצעותינו נידחו מראש שכן הצד הערבי, כולל המלך חוסיין, התנגדו לפשרה. הם תמיד רצו הכל או לא כלום.

הצעותינו ממאי 1989 עדיין תקפות. התייחס לאש'פ ואי רצונו במו'מ אלא בהרס ישראל. ברור שאנו רוצים לשבת עם הפלסטינים. מהם הסכמי ק'ד לגבי האוטונומיה אם לא מו'מ עם הפלסטינים. הפלסטינים לא ניצלו ההזדמנות. הם מעוניינים להנציח את מצבם. בהקשר זה הביא כדוגמא את החלטות האו'מ נגד בניית דירות במחנות הפליטים בעזה. וולפה -

א. לאחר פלישת עירק לכווית, מנהיגים יהודיים כאן נשמו לרווחה ואמרו כי כל דברי ישראל בנוגע התאמתו והלחץ עליה יקטן. לדבריו אמר להם וולפה כי עתה תהיה ישראל יותר פגיעה מאשר אי פעם. מעבר לזאת, ומעבר להקמת הקואליציה הערבית ע'י בוש, יחסי בוש - שמיר בעייתיים ומקווה שיוכל להכנות גשר בינהם. לדעתו קיים ENORMOUS EROSION מבחינת הפרספציות בארה'ב כלפי ישראל. התמונות ב-TV על השימוש בנשק חם - מזיקות. סבור שזו יותר מאשר בעיית P.R. אלא שאלה של כיצד מטפלים בבעיות אלה.

ב. דרא'פ - הנושא נוגע גם ליחסי יהודים שחורים - יחסים שעתה מתוחים. סיפר לשגריר על הפגישה על הקוקוס השחור עם רה'מ. לא קרה דבר בעקבות זאת.

מודע לכך שקיימת תפיסה לפיה דברים משתנים בדרא'פ ולכן הנושא פשוט חשוב. אולם זוהי תפיסה קצרת רואי שכן העניינים יכולים להתדרדר בדרא'פ במהירות צומה ואז כל הנושא יחזור אלינו. מודאג לא רק מהקשרים הצבאיים בין ישראל דרא'פ אלא גם מאמינות ישראל בעיני קונגרסמנים ובמיוחד אלה שנפגשו עם רה'מ.

שגריר - לפני 13 שנים כאשר ייצג את ישראל בעצרת הכללית של האו'מ, בועדה הרביעית, הותקף קשות ע'י מדינות שסחרו כלכלית וצבאית עם דרא'פ יותר מאשר ישראל. (כולל ירדן אשר מכרה טנקים עודפים לדרא'פ).

- ישראל מאוד מאוד מודעת לנושא זה בדרא'פ ואף יותר מכ'א אחר מתנגדת לכל אפליה גזעית  
- אך יש לנו קהילה יהודית גדולה בדרא'פ המותקפת ע'י שני הצדדים.  
- ישראל הסכימה TO PHASE OUT בתחום הצבאי.  
- בתחום הכלכלי - לאור השינויים, ביקור זה קלרק בושינגטון ובמערב, ישראל תהיה חלק מהשינויים.

שגריר לסיכום -

#### 1. מדוע אנחנו לא מסיימים את האינתיפאדה

איש אינו אוהב זאת, ומעבר לבעיות P.R. נישאלת השאלה כיצד נוכל לעשות זאת:

א. יש כאלה הטוענים שבראשית האינתיפאדה היה עלינו לפעל במהירות בכח רב כדי לחסל האינתיפאדה: לירות בנשק חי איננו מתירים בקלות, על שימוש במכות - מגנים אותנו.

ב. אחרים טוענים שיש צורך בפתרון פוליטי - בודאי שיש צורך. אך מה הכונה מאחורי זה? לותר על הכל? זה יהיה אסון.

ג. לא מצאנו עדיין התשובה המלאה, אם כי היתה רגיעת מה דוקא תקרית הר הבית זאת דוגמא לכך. והדבר קשה במיוחד במדינה דמוקרטית.

2. הלינקאג' (בין המשבר במפרץ לסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי) אין לשכוח שב-67' ישראל היתה אמורה להיות כווית ולא עיראק. מטרת הערבים היתה להרוס את ישראל, אך מנענו זאת. לא היינו עיראק אך רצו להפוך אותנו לכווית. הפגישה ארכה שעתיים באוירה פתוחה ומאוד ידידותית. למרות הצבעות שהתקיימו במהלך הפגישה חזרו המחוקקים לפגישה ונכחו ברוב מהלכה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, סולטן, רביב

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 15183

אל: רהמש/1051

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 288, תא: 201090, חז: 1703, חמ: סג: שמ,

נכב

שמור/מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס.

ביהנ'ב: פגישת השגריר עם ראשי ועדת החוץ.

1. אתמול (19.10) הזמין יו"ר הועדה, פאסל, את חברי ועדת החוץ לפגישת היכרות עם השגריר שובל. יש לזכור שמחווה זה של הזמנת כל חברי הועדה היה מחווה מיוחדת.

נכחו: פאסל. המילטון, לארי סמית' לויין, בוסקו, אקרמן, ברומפילד, לגומרסינו, גוס, סולרז, לנטוס, לוקנס, ברמן, שוייר, פיין, גילמן, וולפה, אליוט אנגל, וג'ון מילר. כן נכחו עוזרים מצוות הוועדה.

● דברי הפתיחה של השגריר:-

לבקשת הנוכחים סיפר השגריר בפתח דבריו על עצמו ורקעו. ציין כי מאז עזיבת הכנסת יושב לראשונה בצד השני של השולחן. מודע לעליות ומורדות ביחסי ישראל ארה"ב ואולי יש מקום ל- FENCEMENDING אולם אין לשכוח שאנו באותו צד של ה-FENCE. מאחר ואנו ידידים אנו יכולים להרשות לעצמנו לעתים דיונים נוקבים.

3. להלן חלק השאלות ושתשובות:

המילטון - הערותיך RIGHT ON TARGET אנו מאחלים לך הצלחה בתפקידך. (הערה: המילטון לאורך כל המפגש לא התבטא מעבר לדברים אלה). ברומפילד: הצטרף לפאסל והמילטון בברכותיו. נהנה מדברי השגריר. אין ספק שישנן הרבה בעיות ואין ספק שאנו באותו צד של המתרס. שאל האם תל שינוי בעמדת ישראל לגבי משלחת האו"ם? שגריר - לגבי העובדות אין מה להוסיף. איננו יודעים עדיין בדיוק מדוע זה קרה (התקרית בהר הבית), אבל נדע כאשר ועדת הבירור תגיש מסקנותיה. היה זה חג סוכות כאשר אלפי יהודים התפללו ליד הכותל (הסביר כי הר הבית גובל בכותל).

● אישר מזרח ירושלים שוחררה ב-67' הוציא דיין הנחיות נוקשות לפיהן יהודים יתפללו על הר הבית ולא יתערבו בענייני המוסלמים אלא יסתפקו בכותל. אין לשכוח שעבור הערבים זהו המקום השלישי בחשיבותו מבחינת קודשתו ואילו עבורנו זהו המקום המקודש ביותר, הראשון בחשיבותו. ישנם פה ושם קיצוניים המעוניינים להתפלל על הר הבית אולם בג' צ' אסר זאת. ערבים, מסיבות הנחקרות עתה החלו לזרוק אבנים על המתפללים. בתחילה היה מספר מועט ביותר של שוטרים אשר יתכן שנכנסו לפניקה. יתכן ששינוי בהצבת מספר השוטרים והיינו אולי צריכים לזכור שביו"כ היה נסיון מסוג זה שנמנע מבעוד מועד. (השגריר ציין שאם היינו מציבים כוחות רציניים ליד הר הבית זו היתה הבעייה, מאחר שלא הצבנו כוחות, זו ג'כ בעייה כך שבכל מקרה היינו מואשמים).

מכל מקום ישראל לא פתחה, יזמה התקרית ואיננה מאושרת מן התוצאות, אולם אין מקום להטיל עליה האשמה. זו טרגדיה אנושית ואנו מבכים על אדם וילד שנהרגו. לא היינו מרוצים מהחלטת האו"ם מכמה סיבות:-

א. גם בבית המשפט (למרות שאין זה בי"מ) אינך מאשים מישהו ואח"כ קורא לעדים אלא להיפך.

ב. ירושלים - זו מדינת ישראל. אני יודע שאין זו מדיניות ארה"ב. אולם אין כל עיר אחרת בעולם שכה קרובה להסטוריה של עם כלשהו כמו ירושלים לעם

היהודי. לשגר משלחת מטעם האו"ם, ארגון שעדיין מחזיק רשמית בהחלטה המשווה ציונות - גזענות, כדי שהם יהיו השופטים שלנו, היה בלתי מקובל עלינו לחלוטין. אנו מנסים עתה למצוא דרכים שונות. אתמול שוחח על כך עם איגלברגר והציע הצעות. איננו אופטימי מידי. אולם ראה'מ מינה ועדת בירור עצמאית הכוללת אנשים שאינם פוליטיקאים ואינם עסקנים מפלגתיים. הם אמורים לסיים עבודתם תוך יומיים שלושה. חושב שעלינו להגיש את הממצאים למזכ"ל האו"ם אפילו אם לא יהיו אטרקטיביים מבחינת ישראל). אם יהיה צורך בחומר נוסף, ניתן יהיה למצוא דרכים לספקו. כל דרך פעולה אחרת תפגע בריבונותינו.

לויין - הודה על תגובת השגריר שהיתה - THOUGHTFUL ON THE MERIT ואשר הביע צער ועצבות. התגובות מירושלים כפי שהשתקפו בתקשורת השמיטו חלק זה וגרמו לכעס בדעה'ק האמריקנית.

מודאג מהתדרדרות יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב לשפל כזה חסר תקדים. הנשיא פיתח כעס (ANGER) כלפי ישראל וההודעות הפומביות שלו הרבה יותר נוקשות (THOUGHTER). בייקר גמיש יותר מהנשיא. הרבה מזה (הנאמר לעיל) הוא לא הוגן. מאוד מודאג להיכן יתפתחו יחסים אלה בין שתי המדינות. התגובה בישראל (UNFORTUNATELY) היא האשמת בייקר והנשיא והמצב שנוצר הוא POCKING EACH OTHER IN THE EYE ה-CYCLE הפוליטי שהתפתח מסוכן מאוד ליחסים. יש לנסות לחדור מבעד למעגל זה. הביע תקווה שהשגריר יוכל להעביר זאת לירושלים ובשל מעמדו יוכל להשמע להשפיע.

הנה נמצא כאן בזמן הקריטי ביותר של היחסים בין ישראל לארה"ב. התמיכה הפומבית האמריקאית בישראל יורדת (DROPPING). אתה נימצא בחדר עם אנשים המעוניינים לעזור. המצב כרגע הכי מסוכן ובלתי יציב (PRECASION) שמעולם ראיתי. שגריר מבקש להשיב במלוא הכנות:-

א. מודה שלישראל בעיית P.R. הביא כדוגמא סקר דע'ק מסויים לפיו קיימת תמיכה בישראל חזקה ובאותו סקר קיימת גם תמיכה במדינה פלסטינית. שני דברים שאינם עולים בקנה אחד.

ב. הפוליטיקה הישראלית הפנימית מאוד אינטנסיבית. נושא כמו 400 מליון דולר ערביות דוור מהווה נושא מרכזי בפוליטיקה הפנים של ישראל. מודע לכך הממשלה הישראלית הנוכחית מאופיינת ע"י התקשורת כממשלת ימין ואף קיצונית אולם אין זה כך. (הסביר הבדלים בין עמדות לגבי מדיניות פנים לחוץ).

ג. התגובה הישראלית להר הבית - כאשר כל העת תוקפים אותך אתה בועט בסופו של דבר. יתכן אולי שהיתה תגובת יתר מסויימת אולם על שני הצדדים 'לקרר' מצב העניינים. ליומרסינו - הצטרף למברכים. מסכים שלישראל בעיה עם דעה'ק האמריקנית. יא שתי דוגמאות:

א. קיבל בשבוע שעבר אות כבוד מקהילה יהודית. רבים לדבריו ביטלו השתתפותם באירוע ואחרים אמרו לו שעליו לסרב לקבל האות.

ב. בעת הופעה בתכנית רדיו אחד המאזינים שהתקשר אמר שתומך בקונגרסמן בכל מעשיו להוציא תמיכתו בישראל ולפיכך יצביע נגדו. לגומרסינו שאל כיצד רואה השגריר התפתחויות אפשריות לגבי עיראק וכווית. שגריר - (התייחס ל- INPUT של ממשלים באופן כללי) באמצעות התקשורת איננו תמיד מאושרים מהצהרות שניתנו בפומבי או מידע רקע הנמסר (ע"י הממשל). לצערנו אנו נימצאים במצב של היעדר תקשורת בין רה"מ שמיר לנשיא בוש AND IT SHOULD BE RECTIFIED. אולם ישראל, בטווח הארוך תישאר ותמשיך להיות בת הנרית העיקרית של ארה"ב במזה"ת. בטווח הארוך בריתות יכולות להמשך רק בין דמוקרטיות. על שני המנהיגים TO COMMUNICATE. היו אי הננות ויש למנען.

יש לנסות (פנה לקונגרסמנים) לתקן תופעה זו. לא ברור כיצד יכול הנשיא בוש להתקשר לכל מנהיג במזה"ת, כולל דיקטטורים כאסד, ולא להתקשר עם רה"מ שמיר.

אני יודע שאיננו ניראים תמיד טוב. אולם אנחנו עדיין 3.5 מליון איש מול

120 מליון ערבים שרובם עדיין לא מוכנים TO ACCOMODATE אלא אם כן ידעו שלא ניתן להרוס את ישראל. בינתיים העליה מתגברת ואנחנו שם ונישאר שם. ישראל מבקשת לשמור על יתרונה האיכותי ובזכותם עושה כן. אולם אח"כ אנו נישאלים מדוע אנו מודאגים. יש לציין שסך הכוחות האמריקנים בסעודיה גדול יותר מסך הכוחות של ישראל המוצב מול כל צבאות ערב. אנו מודאגים לגבי העתיד. הכוחות האמריקנים לא ישארו שם תמיד. אנו מעוניינים להשיג היכולת להלחם עבור עצמנו. לגבי עיראק אינו יודע מה יהיה אולם אסור לתוקפן להנות מפרי תוקפנותו. אם יאופשרו לו כדבר הזה, יהיה REPLAY בעוד מספר שנים בתנאים חמורים יותר.

לארי סמית - יש כאלה המאמינים שאלו זמנים קשים עבור ישראל בארה"ב. יש מביננו המוכנים לבקר את הממשל שלנו. אין זה ממשל רייגן. המאפיין ממשל זה הוא ניהול מדיניות החוץ על פני העמודים הראשונים של ה-W.P. T.Y.N- וה- כאשר הדבר נוגע לישראל ובעמודים הראשונים והאחוריים כאשר הדבר נוגע למדינות או לנושאים אחרים. סמית ביקר בחריפות את בייקר על תעלול מסירת מס' הטלפון:

I WOULD URGE YOU TO URGE UPON THIS ADMINISTRATION TO USE DIPLOMACY AND NOT THE FIRST PAGES OF THE PAPER.

וכן לא השתמש בהודעות פומביות ומרחבים נוסח בייקר - לוי. אין זה מועיל. זו זמנית, קיימת מידה רבה של תסכול מישראל לאחר 3 שנים וצפיה שתטפל בצורה טובה יותר באינתיפאדה. התמונות המופיעות בטלוויזיה הן הגרועות ביותר. מקווה שניתן יהיה לעלות על מסלול של 'שפיות' ביחסים. המדיניות האמריקנית של החזקת הקואליציה תשפיע לרעה על ישראל. יש להעלות זאת עם הממשל. על ממש' ישראל להיות מודעת לביקורת כלפיה בשעה זו. שגריר - הסכים לדברי סמית והוסיף כי אין צורך בנקודות חיכוך והסכמה נוספים.

גילמן - שאל על יחסי ישראל - בריה"מ. שגריר -

א. פתיחת שערי בריה"מ להגירה היא התפתחות הסטורית. עמדו על הפערים העמוקים משך השנים בין מטרות התנועה הקומוניסטית מחד והציונות מאידך. לכך יש להוסיף כמובן את הצעד וההיבט הפוליטי. בריה"מ פועלת בצורה זו על מנת לגלות רצון טוב כלפי ארה"ב.

ב. בריה"מ הסכימה על כינון יחסים קונסולריים מלאים אולם עדיין לא דיפלומטיים. במשה"ח הסובייטי יש עדיין מגמה פרו - ערבית חזקה. יתכן וגורכצ'וב והמנהיגות היו מעוניינים לזרז התהליך אך נבלמים ע"י הגורמים הללו ש"ח.

ג. יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים חייבים להכין אם בריה"מ מעוניינת ליטול חלק במאמצי תהליך השלום.

אקרמן -

א. אחד הנושאים המדאיגים היא התגברות האנטישמיות. ניתן היה להבין מדבריו שהוא כורך זאת (אם כי לטענתו לא התכוון לכך) במדיניות ישראל.

ב. בעית ה-P.R של ישראל - צריך לשנות את מעטפת החבילה ולהציע הצעות. מאד התעודד מדרך הצגת הדברים ע"י השגריר. לא רואה הדברים מוצגים היטב ב-T.V.

שגריר -

א. לגבי האנטישמיות הנמצאת בעליה - היתה לצערנו ברב החברות הלא יהודיות וגם בארה"ב.

ב. לגבי הצעות ישראל - הצגנו לפלסטינים הצעות במשך השנים (מאז הצהרת בלפור). התייחס לק'ד. ממישראל מעולם לא אמרה שתספח את יו'ש ועזה אלא שנשב למו'מ לשלום ללא תנאים מוקדמים. וכ'א מהצדדים יציג את עמדותיו. לפני מו'מ כזה הצענו תקופת ביניים כ-C.B.M. ולימוד חיי דו קיום. כל הצעותינו נידחו מראש שכן הצד הערבי, כולל המלך חוסיין, התנגדו לפשרה. הם תמיד רצו הכל או לא כלום.

הצעותינו ממאי 1989 עדיין תקפות. התייחס לאש'פ ואי רצונו במו'מ אלא בהרס ישראל. ברור שאנו רוצים לשבת עם הפלסטינים. מהם הסכמי ק'ד לגבי האוטונומיה אם לא מו'מ עם הפלסטינים.

הפלסטינים לא ניצלו ההזדמנות. הם מעוניינים להנציח את מצבם. בהקשר זה הביא כדוגמא את החלטות האו'מ נגד בניית דירות במחנות הפליטים בעזה. וולפה -

א. לאחר פלישת עירק לכווית, מנהיגים יהודיים כאן נשמו לרווחה ואמרו כי כל דברי ישראל בנוגע התאמתו והלחץ עליה יקטן. לדבריו אמר להם וולפה כי עתה תהיה ישראל יותר פגיעה מאשר אי פעם. מעבר לזאת, ומעבר להקמת הקואליציה הערבית ע'י בוש, יחסי בוש - שמיר בעייתיים ומקווה שיוכל להבנות גשר ביניהם.

לדעתו קיים ENORMOUS EROSION מבחינת הפרספציות בארה'ב כלפי ישראל. התמונות ב-TV על השימוש בנשק חם - מזיקות. סבור שזו יותר מאשר בעיית P.R. אלא שאלה של כיצד מטפלים בבעיות אלה.

ב. דרא'פ - הנושא נוגע גם ליחסי יהודים שחורים - יחסים שעתה מתוחים. סיפר לשגריר על הפגישה על הקוקוס השחור עם רה'מ. לא קרה דבר בעקבות זאת.

מודע לכך שקיימת תפיסה לפיה דברים משתנים בדרא'פ ולכן הנושא פשוט חשוב. אולם זוהי תפיסה קצרת רואי שכן העניינים יכולים להתדרדר בדרא'פ במהירות עצומה ואז כל הנושא יחזור אלינו. מודאג לא רק מהקשרים הצבאיים בין ישראל - דרא'פ אלא גם מאמינות ישראל בעיני קונגרסמנים ובמיוחד אלה שנפגשו עם רה'מ.

שגריר - לפני 13 שנים כאשר ייצג את ישראל בעצרת הכללית של האו'מ, בועדה הרביעית, הותקף קשות ע'י מדינות שסחרו כלכלית וצבאית עם דרא'פ יותר מאשר ישראל. (כולל ירדן אשר מכרה טנקים עודפים לדרא'פ).

- ישראל מאוד מאוד מודעת לנושא זה בדרא'פ ואף יותר מכ'א אחר מתנגדת לכל אפליה גזעית

- אך יש לנו קהילה יהודית גדולה בדרא'פ המותקפת ע'י שני הצדדים.

- ישראל הסכימה TO PHASE OUT בתחום הצבאי.

- בתחום הכלכלי - לאור השינויים, ביקור דה קלרק בושינגטון ובמערב, ישראל תהיה חלק מהשינויים.

שגריר לסיכום -

1. מדוע אנחנו לא מסיימים את האינתיפאדה

איש אינו אוהב זאת, ומעבר לבעיות P.R. נישאלת השאלה כיצד נוכל לעשות זאת:

א. יש כאלה הטוענים שבראשית האינתיפאדה היה עלינו לפעל במהירות בכח רב כדי לחסל האינתיפאדה: לירות בנשק חי איננו מתירים בקלות, על שימוש במכות - מגנים אותנו.

ב. אחרים טוענים שיש צורך בפתרון פוליטי - בודאי שיש צורך. אך מה הכוונה מאחורי זה? לותר על הכל? זה יהיה אסון.

ג. לא מצאנו עדיין התשובה המלאה, אם כי היתה רגיעת מה דוקא תקרית הר הבית זאת דוגמא לכך. והדבר קשה במיוחד במדינה דמוקרטית.

2. הלינקאג' (בין המשבר במפרץ לסכסוך הערבי ישראלי) אין לשכוח שב-67'

ישראל היתה אמורה להיות כוויית ולא עיראק. מטרת הערבים היתה להרוס את ישראל, אך מנענו זאת. לא היינו עיראק אך רצו להפוך אותנו לכוויית. הפגישה ארכה שתיים באוירה פתוחה ומאוד ידידותית. למרות הצבעות שהתקיימו במהלך הפגישה חזרו המחוקקים לפגישה ונכחו ברוב מהלכה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), e(שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
e(רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, סולטן, רביב

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15062

אל: רהמש/1036

מ-: ווש, נר: 2167, תא: 191090, זח: 1830, דח: ב, סג: סב,

כבב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: ממנכ'ל

דע: השגריר-נאו'מ, לשכת רוה'מ, מצפ'א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: מועבי'ט

1. שוחחתי טלפונית עם ע. מזכיר קלי ועם דניס רוס כדי להעלות בפניהם החומרה שבהתייעצויות מועבי'ט והמשך הדיון שם בסוגיית דו'ח המזכ'ל.

2. קלי ורוס ציינו הפתעתם מהיוזמה לקיים התייעצויות במועבי'ט ולדברי ס, התפתחות זו היא UPSETTING כאשר מתכוונים לעבוד עם נשיא המועצה (שגריר בריטניה), כדי לדחות את הדיון. אינם בטוחים בהצלחתם, אך יעשו כל מאמץ.

3. הוספתי, שחשוב שמועבי'ט תמנע מהחלטה כדי לאפשר זמן נוסף לפתרון הנושא. רוס ציין שההצעה שהבאתי בשיחתי עם איגלברגר נראית לו מועילה ומהווה מוצא אפשרי מהמשבר, חזר על כך שיעשה כל מאמץ, אך לא יכול היה להבטיח דבר.

4. קלי מצידו הוסיף שינחו פיקרינג לפעול בהתאם עם מזכ'ל האו'מ.

שובל.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,

@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, ארבל2, סייבל,

סולטן, הדס

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15054  
אל: רהמש/1037  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2158, תא: 191090, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סב,  
כבב  
סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

תגובות הממשל למכתבי רה'מ' ושהח.

1. להלן משיחה (19/10) עם קרצר:

א. תגובת הנשיא למכתב רה'מ':

(1) למיטב ידיעתו מכתב התשובה מונח על שולחן הנשיא לחתימה.

(2) לא הוציא מכלל אפשרות שהמכתב יצא עוד היום.

ב. תגובת בייקר למכתב שהח:

(1) בניגוד להערכה מוקדמת (על כך שפרסום מכתב למזכיר יחייב תגובתו) נראה שהמזכיר ביקש שהות בטרם יחליט.

(2) הפנה תשומת ליבי להודעת דוברת מחמד בנושא ערבויות לדיור, שבו מציינת הדוברת שאין במכתב שהח כדי לשנות ההבטחות שניתנו.

(3) במידה והמזכיר יחליט בסופו של דבר להגיב למכתב שהח מקווה שיסתפק בהפניית תשומת ליבו לדברי הדוברת.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15054  
אל: רהמש/1037  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2158, תא: 191090, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סב,  
נכב  
סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

תגובות הממשל למכתבי רה'מ' ושהח.

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א. תגובת הנשיא למכתב רה'מ':

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שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

ססס



אאא, חוזם: 15054  
אל: רהמש/1037  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2158, תא: 191090, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סב,  
כבב  
סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

תגובות הממשל למכתבי רה'מ' ושהח.

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א. תגובת הנשיא למכתב רה'מ':

1) למיטב ידיעתו מכתב התשובה מונח על שולחן הנשיא לחתימה.

2) לא הוציא מכלל אפשרות שהמכתב יצא עוד היום.

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שטיין

פוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14462  
אל: רהמש/990  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 191090, זח: 1345, דח: ב, סג: סו,  
בבב  
2993  
סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון - שטיין

הנדון: ערבויות לדיור - שלך 2130

1. בהמשך לשיחתך עם מנהל מצפ'א חזרה הבוקר (19.10) עוזרת מנכ"ל משרד השיכון ואישרה שאין אמת במידע שבידי קורצר כפי שתואר בשלך.
2. העברנו כתבה העוסקת בסוגיה זו מ 'כל העיר' (19.10) המדברת בעד עצמה. עוזרת המנכ"ל הנ"ל הביעה תדהמתה מהפירסום והטעימה כשלמיטב ידיעתה לא יצא מכתב כאמור בכתבה.
3. הנושא עדיין טעון בדיקה אך בשל העדרות השר ומנכ"לו מהארץ דומה שנאלץ להמתין עד יום ראשון.

עוד נבריקכם.

מצפ'א/יוסי אוריין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14632  
אל: רהמש/997  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 191090, חז: 1623, דח: מ, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/מיידי

אל: עמרני וושינגטון

דא: מצפא, ארבל 1

מפגש בענייני סמים

השגריר בראון הודיעני כי התאריכים 5-6 בנובמבר מקובלים על לויצקי, המבקש שמות משתתפים והנושאים.  
נשוב ונבריק במהלך השבוע הבא, אך תוכל לשוחח לגבי הנושאים לפי ההנחיות שהעברנו שעתו.  
אנא הזכר גם תצוגת אמצעי מלחמה בסמים ע"י התעשיות.

טבת שלום  
רובינשטיין

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), כנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל 1

סססס

## From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage: Next Steps in Soviet-American Relations



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, DC

*Address before the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, Washington, DC, October 19, 1990.*

I am honored to address this important audience and to share with my friend Eduard Shevardnadze [Soviet Foreign Minister], the distinguished George Kennan Award. It is an honor because Ambassador Kennan has served his country long and ably as both diplomat and historian.

Ambassador Kennan, you have been an eyewitness to and a participant in the historic events of our time: the establishment of relations with the Bolsheviks; the construction of the Marshall Plan; and the ebb and flow of the Cold War.

I was particularly struck, however, by an account in your *Memoirs* about that spring day in Moscow in 1945 when the happy crowd swarmed around you simply because you were an American and the war was over. Your Russian words captured the moment: "Congratulations on the day of victory. All honor to the Soviet allies."

But that moment, that springtime, was fleeting. It was soon chilled by the excesses of Stalinism. The grand alliance and its hopes for a post-war order turned into a long Cold War.

Now, we live in new days of promise. The epoch of the Cold War is over. Any lingering doubts have been dispelled by the events of the past month.

The Cold War in Europe ended quietly in New York on October 1: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I joined with our German, British, and French colleagues in signing away the rights of the World War II victors, recognizing a new united Germany and the trust among former adversaries that made it possible.

The Cold War that was played out across the rest of the globe ended more dramatically. It was closed by the partnership against Iraqi aggression that President Bush and President Gorbachev forged at the Helsinki summit.

But the new epoch is just beginning. An important determinant of its future will be the change in the Soviet Union itself—a revolution that is transforming both Soviet foreign policy and Soviet society. While the people of the United States can take justifiable pride that their nation was a trustee of freedom throughout the Cold War, I am also pleased to recognize that President Gorbachev's revolution of new thinking and *perestroika* is, in large part, respon-

sible for the end of the Cold War. And that is why President Gorbachev is so deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize.

### From Containment to Points of Mutual Advantage

Five years ago, the internal contradictions of Stalinist power, successfully contained, started to lead to what Ambassador Kennan once termed a mellowing, and what President Gorbachev calls *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and new thinking. Eighteen months ago, President Bush gave our government a new direction, too. He told us to move beyond containment. And a year ago this week, I presented the details of the President's new course. Before the Foreign Policy Association in New York, I advocated that the United States pursue a creative search for points of mutual advantage with the Soviet Union. This, I believed, was the surest way to turn the promise of *perestroika* and new thinking into the reality of Soviet policy beneficial to the West. By standing pat, I contended, we would gain nothing and lose this chance to transform East-West relations. So together, we began a revolution in US-Soviet relations. We helped end the Cold War.

Now, we need to look forward to the time after the Cold War: we began with a search for points of mutual advantage. Next, we need to mark pathways of cooperation for addressing the post-Cold War challenges. This could prove a unique historical opportunity.

I should start by examining how our pursuit of points of mutual advantage has achieved results on which we can build. Over the past year, we broadened and deepened our relationship with the Soviet Union by working on five topics: making Europe whole and free; resolving regional conflicts; stabilizing and reducing the arms competition; promoting human rights and democratic institutions; and assisting economic reform. In each, we've begun a fundamental change.

First, the changes in Europe over the past year may be the most hopeful ones of this century. Germany has unified, peacefully and freely. The peoples of Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, and even Bucharest are struggling to establish democracies and ensure economic liberty.

This movement of, by, and for the people could not have succeeded peacefully without the courageous, far-sighted cooperation of President Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and the other new thinkers in Moscow. They were the first Soviet leaders to understand that security ultimately rests on the legitimacy that can only be granted by the consent of the governed.

But this also came to pass because the United States and others in the West simultaneously reached out to Moscow. We developed new mechanisms and adapted longstanding institutions to handle this sensitive transition. For example, we initiated the Two-Plus-Four mechanism to

reconcile competing interests into a common European interest. President Bush called for and then led the first stage of NATO's adaptation that culminated in the London Summit Declaration. We supported the people power revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in a way that assured Moscow that a free Europe would better serve true Soviet interests than a steel curtain or a concrete wall. And we worked to strengthen the Helsinki process, the conscience of the continent, so it can better support political freedom and economic liberty from North America to the Soviet Union.

Second, we have made great progress in resolving regional conflicts outside Europe. Most notable has been the solidarity we have shared with Moscow over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, especially in the Helsinki joint statement [see *Dispatch*, p. 92]. In it, President Bush and President Gorbachev set the international community's bottom line: "Nothing short of complete implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions is acceptable."

Yet Iraq is only the most obvious example of a regional conflict resolution policy we've built, step by step, since the spring of 1989.

Our first real effort was in Central America, where we combined a US diplomatic approach toward Nicaragua with limits on Soviet arms shipments to give the people of that wounded nation a chance to determine their own future. The Soviets joined us in a commitment to respect both the electoral process and its result. Peace and democracy were the outcome. Now we are trying to stop the killing in El Salvador, too, so as to give democracy a chance there as well.

In Africa, our joint efforts with Moscow led to full Namibian independence. Now, we are working together to achieve a cease-fire and multi-party elections in Angola. And we have tried to bring basic, humanitarian aid to the war-torn Horn of Africa.

In Asia, we began a [UN] Permanent Five process to draw the Cambodian factions together behind another elections plan. In Southwest Asia, we have narrowed our differences over Afghanistan and are working to find a way to help move this conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box under UN auspices. I'm hopeful we'll get there soon.

Third, our points of mutual advantage may be most noticeable in conventional arms control. The Soviet conventional force imbalance, which for decades spawned fears of a continent-wide offensive, will disappear through a CFE (conventional armed forces in Europe) treaty. Tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment will be destroyed. A military revolution this fall will match the political revolutions of last autumn.

We also continue to make progress on START (strategic arms reduction talks)—an agreement that will lock-in substantial reductions, including a roughly 50% cut in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. And nuclear testing treaties that were hung up for 15 years have now been ratified.

Perhaps even more important for the post-Cold War world, the Soviet Union and the United States are making a concerted effort to address the problems of spreading weapons of mass destruction. We are cooperating in implementing the chemical weapons initiative the President presented to the United Nations last year. Soviet and American bilateral

destruction of the bulk of each of our chemical weapons stockpiles will move us along a realistic path toward our mutual goal: a global ban on these weapons of horror. The two of us are also working multilaterally on the control of missile technology.

**Fourth**, we have supported Soviet political reform. We have made real progress on "zeroing" out human rights cases, although our work is not yet done. We have also instituted programs to help the Soviets build democratic institutions and the rule of law.

**Finally**, we have launched a wide range of economic contacts. Our technical economic cooperation already covers a breadth of activities—from market education to small business development. We are making efforts to introduce American businesspeople to the Soviet Union and to introduce the Soviets to the steps that will create a conducive climate for private investment. Some of these businesses are also helping to train Soviet managers. Over time, we hope to expand our efforts to help [Soviet] republic and even some city leaders. In the international sphere, we have helped open up possibilities for the Soviets to participate in and learn from international market institutions.

### **From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage**

Our search for points of mutual advantage has been productive. And the search must continue—in new, more ambitious ways. We now need to pursue our hopes for the post-Cold War future. We need to build a new international order—what the President has called a "new partnership of nations."

Any policy toward the Soviet Union, however, must begin with a sober appreciation of the twin revolutions in motion: the first—the

Soviet government's relations with the outside world; the second—the changes within Soviet society.

I will begin with the external revolution—the transformation of Moscow's foreign and defense policies. New thinking and reasonable sufficiency have become essential elements of this leadership's policy. We have never enjoyed greater possibilities for cooperation between our governments.

US-Soviet relations always will be unique. But our relations could become more like those we have with many other governments. Cooperation could become the norm, and disagreements could be limited to specific disputes.

A "normal" relationship—possibly even a genuine partnership—may be in reach. In our search for points of mutual advantage, we have tested whether new thinking could guide Soviet policy, even when it confronted hard choices.

This Soviet leadership has shown it can make the right hard choices. Now, we need to pose a different question: Can we build on our points of mutual advantage to create something more durable, something that strengthens and accelerates our ability to achieve results to our mutual advantage?

An answer to this question will depend to a great degree on continued new thinking in Moscow. But for our part, we hope to build pathways of mutual advantage from the points we've begun.

The notion of pathways assumes that continuous, even lasting cooperation, not just intermittent or episodic agreements, may be possible. This idea assumes cooperation can operate in a regular, almost day-by-day fashion, to manage problems as they evolve. A pathway assumes that cooperation may prevent future problems as well as resolve past ones.

And the pathways concept assumes that mechanisms and processes—built on democratic values and practices—will be the key to maintaining US-Soviet cooperation as we search for answers to the complex problems of the future.

This concept, in short, proceeds from the premise that cooperation can become the norm, not the exception; that common problems can best be solved mutually, not unilaterally; and that many of our difficulties may stem not from US-Soviet differences but from the complications inherent in leaving behind the Cold War and building a new international order. We might look to build pathways and mechanisms of cooperation in three broad areas: eliminating the old vestiges of Cold War; addressing the new threats to the post-Cold War order; and dealing with the transnational dangers to peoples all over the globe.

**One**, we need to chart pathways to eliminate the remnants of the Cold War and prevent a resurgence of the conflicts that preceded it. Some of these concerns will be alleviated by CFE and its follow-on talks; by the adaptation of NATO and the EC [European Community] to new needs; and by strengthening CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], politically and institutionally.

But working in concert with our allies and the new European democracies, we can do more. We can deepen our dialogue with the Soviets to exchange regularly our ideas about European challenges that concern all of us. We should focus our dialogue on ways democracy, economic liberty, reconciliation, and tolerance could be fostered across Europe within the CSCE context. We also might address our common interest in easing the economic transition of the new democracies in Central and

Eastern Europe, which face problems of energy supply, disrupted markets, and debt, among others.

The Cold War could also be left further behind—as I stressed last fall in a speech in San Francisco—by broadening our dialogue to explore more fully the “software” side of the arms competition: strategy and doctrine. This would be a natural addition now to our attempts to constrain or reduce destabilizing military capabilities—the “hardware” side. In US-Soviet arms control negotiations, we are working to constrain and reduce weapons. We should open up a complementary mechanism to learn more about the doctrine and strategy Soviet leaders follow for use of those weapons, in peace and war.

Therefore, I will propose to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we also set up a working group on deterrence, reassurance, and stability. This would complement discussions the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense are pursuing with their counterparts.

Our dialogue must also be broadened by talks on defense conversion. The Secretary of Defense is exploring this topic in his meetings in Moscow this week. A defense conversion dialogue with the Soviets can be a pathway to greater openness as well as to building down the possibilities of future war even further.

Two, the United States and the Soviet Union need pathways and mechanisms for managing new threats to the emerging international order. Iraq's brutal subjugation of Kuwait leaves no doubt that even though the danger of US-Soviet confrontation has eased, the world remains a dangerous place. The world community's condemnation of Iraq also demonstrates that when the United States and Soviet Union lead, others are likely to follow.

US, Soviet, and multilateral cooperation needs to anticipate regional conflicts and to try to resolve

them before they lead to war. Regional conflict prevention must become a goal of US-Soviet cooperation.

Hand-in-hand with these discussions of regional conflicts, we plan to move more vigorously to cope with the new security agenda I detailed in San Francisco last October. The incipient nuclear programs of Iraq and North Korea are the best argument that our nonproliferation effort needs a new impetus to cope with a new danger. We cannot approach proliferation in a business-as-usual manner. I believe Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agrees.

We both see proliferation as perhaps the greatest security challenge of the 1990s. We concur that it is unconscionable that Iraq, with a leader who used chemical weapons against his own people, should be in a position where it could acquire nuclear weapons in the future. And we agree that stopping and countering proliferation must be a central part of our agenda.

Working together, we may be able to inspire a more comprehensive approach to nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Just as our bilateral agreement on destroying our chemical weapons stocks set a critical example—and makes a global ban more achievable—so now the two of us can help lead the way on the other weapons of mass destruction.

We must work with others, improving existing mechanisms and developing new ones to cut off the supply of necessary technology and reduce the demand for acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Our experience in Europe in developing confidence-building measures may also be useful in different regions of the world, possibly providing mechanisms for gradually reversing proliferation where it has occurred.

And we will work with the Soviets to explore sanctions, both bilateral

and multilateral, that might be imposed against those states that violate international non-proliferation norms or use weapons of mass destruction.

Developing together a pathway for countering the danger of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation will be essential to any new, peaceful order. Here, again, I'll propose a ministerial working group to keep channels open and promote continual cooperation.

One instrument for fashioning a new international order is the United Nations. The Iraqi conflict has shown how much the Security Council can do when the Permanent Five, especially the old adversaries the United States and the Soviet Union, are united. We are particularly pleased with the US-Soviet joint statement on the United Nations that we issued in New York during the General Assembly [see *Dispatch*, page 151]. We hope to build on it in the months ahead.

Three, we need to build pathways to cope with those transnational dangers that threaten all peoples and all nations. That's why I added the transnational issues of drug trafficking, terrorism, and environmental degradation to the formal US-Soviet agenda early in 1989. But we need to achieve greater results.

We should explore the idea of an international center for ecological research at Lake Baikal. The center could become a pathway to more precise knowledge of our global environment for Soviet, American, and other scientists. Situated on Lake Baikal, the world's largest body of fresh water, it could stand for our commitment to end man's despoiling of nature's resources.

In addition, I propose that we advance energy efficiency as a topic for discussion. This could enhance prospects for economic growth, limit environmental degradation, and reduce our vulnerability to supply

disruptions. We would invite the private sector and non-governmental organizations and develop new US-Soviet exchanges. Oil extraction would be another potential area for discussion.

We will also continue to build a pathway with Moscow to cooperate to counter international terrorism. On civil aviation, we have already begun discussions on procedures for handling crises such as hijackings. We are also exploring possibilities for cooperation in ending state-supported terrorism.

### Pathways to a Democratic Dialogue

Let me turn now to the other Soviet revolution—the changes in Soviet society.

The internal revolution, in contrast to the new thinking in foreign and defense policy, presents an altogether different challenge to American policy. And it presents a novel opportunity for the American people.

Like most revolutions, *perestroika* has become a mix of paradoxical elements. On one side, we see remarkable, previously unthinkable progress. The Supreme Soviet is asserting its parliamentary powers. In key cities and regions, democrats—with a small “d”—run the government. The Communist Party has formally surrendered its political monopoly, and alternative parties are beginning to form. The ideas of private property and market pricing are accepted now in mainstream Soviet economic debates. And Moscow is abandoning the Stalinist principle of empire—where the center dictated everything—and seems to be moving toward a confederation through negotiation.

All of this is fundamentally to the good. It represents the “normalization” of Soviet society: the pluralization of political power, the decentralization of economic life, and the long-overdue recognition of the need for a voluntary multinational union.

Unfortunately, this “normalization” is matched and oftentimes exceeded by a deterioration in Soviet life. Fragmentation equals or exceeds pluralization in many Soviet political debates. Standards of living are deteriorating, shortages are spreading, and the harvest is rotting. Freedom has unleashed age-old ethnic animosities that often shout down the voices of tolerance.

This other, darker side of the Soviet revolution concerns all of us. We all must be understanding of the hardship a great people is now enduring. In this, all must remember that democratic change must come through peaceful, democratic means—as Andrei Sakharov, another Nobel Laureate, so often reminded us.

The Cold War image of a single totalitarian monolith is gone, replaced by a confusing, jumbled mosaic that presents danger as well as hope.

The danger is that the breakdown of the old Stalinist system will outstrip the development of a new system—one built on universal democratic values and the rule of law. The hope is that devolution of political authority and decentralization of economic power will prevail over deterioration and decay. As President Gorbachev has stated plainly, the Soviet future depends ultimately on the choices the Soviet peoples make. He is right. Their choices are their own. Building a new system will take all the courage and hard work and hope the men and women of the Soviet Union can muster.

But their choices will be less hard if we in the West stand by their side. Our influence may only be marginal. But help, however offered and however marginal, can still make a difference. The American people can make a difference. Here is how they can help.

At the height of the Cold War, dialogue was practically impossible. The Iron Curtain had few openings. This made it necessary for most contacts with the Soviet Union to pass from our diplomats in Washington to Soviet leaders in Moscow. The path of formal government-to-government contact was often the only one.

But this was, as we always knew, abnormal. Indeed, the determination of Stalin and his successors to close off the Soviet people to normal exchanges and dialogue with the outside world stood as both hallmark and linchpin of Stalinist repression. And it is perhaps the main reason for the backwardness and poverty in which much of the Soviet economy is mired today.

*Glasnost* and democratization have created an opportunity our people have long sought: the chance to reach out to the Soviet people directly. The Cold War destroyed much, but it never destroyed the good will or hope between our peoples—peoples who fought and died together in World War II.

Almost from the very outset of this administration, I have stood on the side of hope—hope for a new Soviet Union built on democratic values. I intend to continue to stand there. That's why today I urge the American people—along with state and local governments—to join us in reaching out to the Soviet Union to help the Soviet peoples build better lives.



We can build pathways between peoples—pathways built on mutual respect for universal democratic values and a common interest in freedom, security, prosperity, and justice. Pathways to a true democratic dialogue.

These paths should cross at all levels: among persons, groups, firms, institutions, cities, and states. In joining at the local or city level, we can help create models or demonstrations of success. That can give hope.

To lend momentum to this effort, I want to announce today the President's decision to include the Soviet Union in the Citizens Democracy Corps.

We know a Europe whole and free must include the Soviet Union. We know Soviet reform can be accel-

ated by multiplied contacts with the American people. Through the Citizens Democracy Corps, we will try to help the leaders of the new Soviet Union by increasing their knowledge of democratic processes and market economics, by increasing their opportunities for interchange with our citizens and institutions, and above all, by giving them greater hope.

#### After the Cold War

Ambassador Kennan, I began by recounting a different time of hope 45 years ago. Now, we are at the end of another war—the Cold War.

But today Stalin and his perverse ideology are truly gone.

Instead, new Soviet leaders welcome us. They welcome us to join with the peoples of the Soviet Union in a new revolution—a revolution of openness, of growing democratic change.

We should accept their invitation. For if by our example and assistance, their world is made the better, both our peoples and our governments will be the better. And if by our work, we rekindle some of the values of our experience—hard work, individual liberty, initiative, and tolerance—that will be all for the good, too. ■

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October 1990 • Editor: Jim Pinkelman  
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ראו הכתבות הרצי"ב, פרי עטם של חוקרי המכון הוושטינגטוני למדיניות במזרח"ת.

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תפוצה:

# GULFWATCH

*Analysis of the Gulf Crisis from the scholars and associates of* THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

Number Twenty-One

1222 45

October 18, 1990

## DOUBTS ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY by Martin Indyk

As the President nears his moment of decision in the Gulf crisis, he is being urged by many policy experts to adopt a long-term, diplomacy-only strategy for dealing with Iraq's aggression. But Secretary of State Baker's dismissal of "partial solutions," the President's refusal to rule out force, and reports of the movement of additional troops to the Gulf, suggest that the administration is not willing to adopt this approach. This does not mean that the administration has decided on war. Abandoning the threat of force as backing for his diplomacy, however, would leave the President with a strategy which is much less likely to succeed in reversing Iraq's aggression.

### Punitive Deterrence?

Zbigniew Brzezinski made the strongest argument for the no-war route in an October 7, *New York Times* op-ed piece. The former National Security Adviser argued that war would be costly in casualties, economically devastating and unpredictably destabilizing to the region. War should therefore be ruled out as an option in favor of a strategy of "punitive deterrence"—the patient and prolonged application of international sanctions to punish Iraq while credible force is maintained in the region to deter any Iraqi military counter-moves. Eventually, Saddam Hussein might be persuaded by the impact of sanctions to negotiate withdrawal from Kuwait. But Brzezinski contends that the international coalition would in turn have to agree to financial and territorial concessions. Iraq's military capabilities would be left intact, but regional security talks could curb Iraq's strategic weapons programs while a continued U.S. military presence deterred any further Iraqi aggression.

### Problem #1: Shifting Objectives

This approach has important flaws. First, the President would have to shift his objectives. Rather than reversing Iraq's occupation in the short term, we would be attempting to use sanctions over time to punish Saddam for his aggression. At best, if the sanctions held, Saddam Hussein might negotiate a partial withdrawal. But it would not be the total and unconditional withdrawal to which the President has committed the United States and the international community. And it could not be achieved in any reasonable time frame (current estimates suggest that it will take at least a year for the sanctions to bite).

If the President had adopted this strategy, with its more modest objectives, from the beginning of the crisis, it might be viable now. But to adopt the strategy at this point—after 200,000 troops have been despatched to the Gulf—would effectively hand Hussein a victory. For at least a year, he would be seen in the Arab world to have succeeded in absorbing Kuwait. And in the long run, even if he is eventually persuaded to negotiate withdrawal, he would be compensated with treasure and territory. The image of an Iraq weakened over time by the economic and military embargo would be less impressive and visible than the ongoing perception of Iraq's obliteration of Kuwait as a case of successful aggression. If Saddam looks like a winner, he will be treated like a hero in the Arab world.

**GULF WATCH**

In these circumstances, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would find it particularly difficult to maintain their support, even for a reduced American military presence. They have been among the strongest advocates of military action in the short term precisely because of nervousness about their own staying power. As long as the objective is the liberation of Kuwait—a sister Arab state—they can justify their dependence on foreign forces. But if the objective shifts to deterrence of further Iraqi aggression, requiring a prolonged ground presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, our Arab allies will be increasingly vulnerable to the charge that they have surrendered control of Arab oil and holy places to the infidel while also failing to roll back Iraq.

This would have serious consequences for regional stability. Egypt's leadership role would be undermined, the Gulf states would come under intense pressure to seek the best deal possible with Saddam, and Israel would feel more threatened. U.S. credibility would also be seriously damaged, having despatched such a large force only to fail to achieve its stated objectives.

**Problem #2: Coalition Cohesion**

Because the diplomacy-only strategy requires time to work, it runs the considerable risk that the international coalition will be undermined in the process. The longer the time required, the more likely that cheating will occur, rendering the sanctions less effective in the process. Differences over the terms of a diplomatic settlement are also bound to weaken the coalition's resolve. Already, France has indicated that it would settle for much less than the United States can accept. The Soviet Union, with concern about its 5,000 citizens in Iraq uppermost, might also seek a compromise formula before the sanctions achieved their full potency. Saddam Hussein has already shown an awareness of this vulnerability by hinting to French and Soviet envoys that he might be ready to compromise. Since the diplomatic strategy places him under no military pressure to withdraw, he would be free to exploit cracks already appearing in the coalition.

The volatile nature of the Middle East ensures that other issues will also intrude on the coalition's agenda, be it assassinations, terrorist attacks, the *intifadah* or instability in Jordan. In each case, coalition solidarity will be tested because the interests of our partners will be affected in diverse ways.

American public support for a prolonged troop presence in the Gulf is likely to dwindle as no visible progress is made on the President's stated objectives, allies begin to go their own way and American troops swelter under the desert sun for an uncertain purpose. Moreover, if the coalition is undermined by all of these factors it is unlikely to be in any position to curb Iraq's strategic weapons programs after the issue of Kuwait is resolved.

In sum, the longer it takes for sanctions to work, the harder it will be to hold the coalition together and the more confident Saddam Hussein will become that he can wait us out. Far from persuading him to withdraw, the diplomatic strategy may thus only encourage him to stay.

**An Alternative?**

This is not to suggest that the military strategy is free of serious risks and drawbacks. However, if the President's objectives are to be achieved short of war, he will have to be ready to go to war. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that he only speaks and understands the language of force. Coercive diplomacy—the application of sanctions backed by the threat of force—is therefore likely to be the only effective way of liberating Kuwait. As both the Soviet and British foreign ministers have made clear, Saddam Hussein is only likely to leave Kuwait at the point of a gun. If we insist on keeping our gun holstered, he will be sure to stay.

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# GULFWATCH

*Analysis of the Gulf Crisis from the scholars and associates of* THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

Number Eighteen

October 10, 1990

## MEASURING SADDAM'S ARAB SUPPORT

By Barry Rubin

The recent violence in Jerusalem has again raised fears that Iraq can utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to break the coalition opposed to its aggression. An accurate assessment of Saddam Hussein's support among non-Iraqi Arabs is critical to understanding this question, as well as the impact of the Gulf crisis on regional stability and the Arab response to American actions. Saddam Hussein and many Western pundits seem to overrate his support among Arabs. These assessments may contribute to Saddam's confidence that he can successfully annex Kuwait.

Public opinion polls in the Arab world are neither accurate nor permitted. Instead, the Western analyst or journalist must rely on personal knowledge and comprehension of its political culture and sociology; newspaper articles; statements by leaders; private conversations; and anecdotal information. To make sense of frequently contradictory information, one must understand some basic principles.

The first principle is that the "Arab street" is of secondary importance to political outcomes. Mass sentiment has never overthrown an Arab regime. Moreover, Arab public opinion is not so independent as many Westerners seem to think. It is not just that, as in other countries, the rulers, not the masses, make policy. In the Arab world, the rulers have far more influence on public opinion and the mass media than in the West. What is important is not what a taxi driver says about how Arabs feel, but the fact that many Arab states have deployed military forces in opposition to Iraqi aggression.

Second, the formal, public importance of pan-Arab nationalism, Islam, and support for the Palestinians has a relatively narrow impact on actual viewpoints and policymaking. Public, on-camera, interviews produce the "proper" social response, fulfilling what one might call a "ceremonial" function. However, in private discussions Arabs provide far more negative views of Iraq, the PLO, Libya, and other controversial actors. The willingness of Arab states to punish the PLO for supporting Iraq indicates their view -- with the significant exception of Jordan -- that such action has little effect on domestic opinion.

Arab states like Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia understand that linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict is an Iraqi ploy to distract attention and stall for time. Focussing attention on this issue would undermine America's position, push Iraq to the forefront as the defender of the Palestinian cause, and deflect attention away from Kuwait -- all undesirable outcomes. While pushing for symbolic resolutions at the United Nations, they will resist pressing the Arab-Israeli conflict to the front burner today. Neither will an Iraqi attack on Israel alter their orientation to the Gulf crisis, as they will not be pulled into an Arab-Israeli conflict to save Baghdad.

In distinguishing between the formal, public point of view and real Arab sentiment, one should also remember that there is, to put it politely, a strong tendency toward exaggeration in Arab speech and writing. Stories about tens of thousands of Jordanians "volunteering" to fight for Iraq make a great impression, but these coffee house heroes will not turn up on the front lines. Similarly, demonstrations supporting Iraq have generally, even in Jordan, been surprisingly small, consisting of hardcore activists.

## GULF WATCH

1222 5/5

Third, the opinion of individuals and masses are conditioned by which state they live in due to both the repressive apparatus and "local" patriotism. Obviously, a citizen in Baghdad will support Saddam Hussein, while a Syrian in Damascus will probably oppose Iraq. As long as Jordan expresses sympathy for Iraq's position, Jordan's citizens will feel free (that is, permitted by the regime) to take a similar position. Amman-based Western reporters should resist extrapolating what they hear to other Arab states and situations.

While some may see "hypocrisy" in these differences among Arabs, they should understand such differences reflect as much loyalty to local rulers as the system can generate. Indeed, over time, Syrians are becoming more Syrian, Iraqis more Iraqi, Egyptians more Egyptian, and Saudis more Saudi. Saddam may call for overthrowing Arab governments, but few will listen. It was hard enough to generate genuine pan-Arab action in the 1940s and 1950s when all could remember a time before many of these states existed. Over the decades, each state has developed its own history, economic system, political culture, and set of experiences which diminish a wider sense of identity. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's request for U.S. troops exemplify the fact that each state acts in its own interest.

Fourth, the main exceptions to this tendency to back one's own country are interest groups. These limited groups provide Iraq's main constituency. For example, in Jordan those most supportive of Saddam tend to be either Palestinians hoping Iraq will liberate Palestine or Islamic fundamentalists hoping Saddam will undermine Jordan's government. By contrast, East Bank Jordanians, the elite, and the army support King Hussein and mistrust Iraq and the Palestinians. Some tribes have historic (and financial) links inclining them toward Saudi Arabia.

In Egypt, where local nationalism is strongest, there is broad support for President Mubarak's policy because he is the leader who must be obeyed, and because Iraq is seen as a competitor for Arab leadership. Mistreatment of Egyptian workers by Iraq also creates popular anger. Islamic fundamentalists are a minority whose pro-Iraq sentiments are dulled by Saudi subsidies.

Fifth, measurements of public opinion and support depend on the yardstick one uses. Thus, the observer's predispositions and prior expectations affect what he observes. An average American might be astonished that anyone supports Iraqi aggression, and would consider any expressions of support significant and newsworthy. By contrast, many students of the Middle East, weaned on stories of Arab solidarity and opposition to alliances with the West might have expected far more support for Iraq. How could the Saudis dare call for American forces to protect them? How could Egypt, Syria, and Morocco dare join hands with the "imperialist, pro-Zionist" camp?

Sixth, genuine opposition to America's presence in the region should not be confused with support for Saddam. Many Arabs fear that the United States intends to recolonize the Arab world, seize the oil fields, and occupy Moslem holy places. Since the U.S. has no such intention, it may be able to overcome these concerns with the eventual reduction of American ground force presence.

Seventh, there is a strong tendency in the Arab world to support the winning side. The motivating factor here is not love -- of Iraq or the United States -- but fear. Thus, Arabs will be constantly assessing whether the United States will stand up to Saddam Hussein or whether Saddam may prevail.

Saddam Hussein overrates his support in the Arab world. It would be a mistake for the United States to join him in this miscalculation.





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## United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1801

October 19, 1990

## Reply To

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Dear Colleague:

We write to urge you to join us in a letter to the President commending him for his commitment to keep the Persian Gulf crisis separate from any other conflict in the region. In the midst of the Persian Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein and his supporters are trying to shift the world's attention away from his unjustifiable aggression and occupation of Kuwait toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.


A careful examination of history refutes the validity of any linkage of the two issues. Iraq occupies Kuwait as a result of an entirely unprovoked aggression of a stronger power against a weaker one for financial and territorial gain. In contrast, Israel's presence on the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted from a war of aggression launched by Arab armies to destroy her.

Any linkage of the issue would play into the hands of Saddam Hussein. It would also divert world attention from his egregious and unprovoked attack.

This letter reaffirms our steadfast opposition to any linkage. If you would like to sign the letter, please let us know or have your staff contact Diana Rubin (Lautenberg) at 4-6822 or Diane Cohen (Grassley) at 4-6736.

Sincerely,

  
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

  
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

3

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

1221

3/3

October 19, 1990

President George Bush  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We commend your statement that it is United States policy to keep the Persian Gulf crisis separate from any other conflict in the region. We urge you to remain steadfast in this policy as Saddam Hussein and his supporters try to shift the world's attention away from his unjustifiable aggression and occupation of Kuwait toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A careful examination of history refutes the validity of any linkage of the two issues. Iraq occupies Kuwait as a result of an entirely unprovoked aggression of a stronger power against a weaker one for financial and territorial gain. In contrast, Israel's presence on the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted from a war of aggression launched by Arab armies to destroy her. In defending her very existence, Israel repelled the invading troops and captured territories.

We believe that the crisis created by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on its own terms, separately from other conflicts in the region. Linkage plays directly into Saddam's hands. It would only divert world attention from his egregious acts and divide the consensus you have so carefully constructed in opposition to Iraqi actions.

We will remain steadfast in our opposition to any linkage between the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict. We understand this to be your view and hope it will continue.

Sincerely,

  
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

  
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

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שלוש. עם זאת מעודדים אותנו לחלק מימצאי ומסקנות ועדת החקירה שלנו עם המזכל. אם אנו מבקשים לצורך זה לשגר שליח שלנו אל המזכל ראוי לעודד אותנו ואת המזכל לבצע הצעה זו.

4. לפי הוראות הממשל יבקש פיקרינג בשיחתו עם המזכל לשכנעו ולעודדו לקבל העמדות כדלקמן:

א. שהוא מקבל בשמחה הצעת ממישראל לחלק דוחה עימו.  
ב. עד שיקבל את דו"ח ישראל - ידחה שיגור שליח לארץ.  
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ד. לא מקובל ששליח המזכל יגיע ארצה במעמד תייר.  
ה. ניתן למנוע פרסום יתר וחשיפה של שליח המזכל אם יגיע, למשל, דרך גשרי הירדן.

ימליץ למזכל כי יאמר לי כי הוא דוחה פגישתנו וממתין כמה ימים נוספים שיוכל אז לקבל את דוחנו. ע"י כך ייתן גם למצב ל'התקרר' ולרוחות להרגע. (בעקבות שיחתנו הטלפונית אמרתי לפיקרינג כי אין צורך שהמזכל ידחה פגישתנו. יוכל לאמר כי קיבל תשובותינו ועתה ממתין לשליחנו ולדוח ועדת החקירה שלנו לפני שימשיך לפעול).

ז. ברור שאם שליחותנו לכאן ושליחותו אלינו תהיה מוקדמת ולא תידחה זמן רב - ניתן יהיה TO DEFUSE את המצב. ימליצו בפניו שלא לקבוע שום DEADLINES. (אתמול אמר שמצפה לתגובתנו אתמול או היום - ינסו למנוע התבטאויות כאלה לעתיד).

5. קבעתי עם פיקרינג שניפגש היום לאחר פגישתו עם המזכל.

6. עם סיום שיחתי עם פיקרינג, ושיחתנו הטלפונית, התקשר המזכל. שאל אם יש לי תשובות ממשלת ישראל עבורו. אמרתי כי יש לי תשובות חלקיות, אך דרושות לי עוד כמה שעות לקבלת תגובות נוספות מכס. הוספתי כי אני מבין שהוא נפגש עם פיקרינג הבוקר.  
לא ידע על כך - עיין בלוח פגישותיו ואישר שאמנם פיקרינג ייפגש עימו ב-12:00.

הצעתי כי ייפגש תחילה עם פיקרינג וישקול אז האם הוא מכקש שניפגש היום או שאולי ירצה להחליט על מועד אחר.  
אמר שכך יעשה.

הסברתי כי אנו עובדים במרחב שבין שתי החלטות - מועביט וממשלת ישראל וכולנו מנסים TO DEFUSE את המצב כדי לאפשר לו למסור דו"ח ולמועביט להתמסר לנושא העיקרי: תוקפנות עיראק. אמר כי נראה לו שדרושים ניסים כדי שאמנם נצליח. אמרתי כי אנו, היהודים, חיים בכל ההסטוריה שלנו על בסיס של ניסים, שרבים מהם היו למציאות.

7. שוחחתי שוב עם פיקירנג לפני פגישתו עם המזכל. אמר כי שמע עתה הדים מנוגדים מן הבלמ'ז. המלזי אמר שאין דוחקים לפעולה עתה, ואילו מאחרים שמע כי כבר היום נפגשות הבלמ'זיות לניסוח הצעת החלטה חדשה. הוא מציע לכן כי יציע למזכל להמתין ולראות כיצד יפעלו הבלמ'זיות ואז נשקול כולנו כיצד לפעול, האם רצוי שאמסור למזכל עתה את תשובותינו - או שנמתין עוד יום יומיים.

נודיעכם.  
ברכות.

יוחנן בייך - נאום

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור, מצפא,  
סייבל, משפט, סולטן, מזתים

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 13804

אל: רהמש/958

מ-: ווש, נר: 2144, תא: 181090, ח: 1300, ד: ב, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי - בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ערבויות לדירור: בעקבות מכתב שה'ח לבייקר

בהמשך ל- 2139 מ- 17.10

1. במהלך שיחה עם קרצר ( ראה דווח ניפרד ) שאלתי לתגובת המזכיר בעקבות קריאת מכתבו של שה'ח.

2. קרצר השיב כי בעקבות הקריאה שאל המזכיר שתי שאלות:

א. האם המכתב רשמי ( סיפר כי הורו לבראון לברר הנושא. לדבריו המכתב שהועבר בפאקס לשגרירותם בת'א לא נשא חתימתו של שה'ח).

ב. האם תוכן המכתב פורסם ? ( קרצר הפנה תשומת לבי לכך שהמכתב פורסם ב'הארץ' ).

3. במידה והתשובה לשתי השאלות היא חיובית, בכונת המזכיר להשיב לשה'ח. לכך הוסיף קרצר כי ככל שנדגיש את נושא ירושלים, יגרור הדבר תגובה מצידם. טרח לחזור ולהזכיר קיומם של חילוקי דעות בנושא.

שטיין

לבח

וצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סטסט

חסוי



חסוי

חסוי



חסוי



חסוי



חסוי

חסוי



חסוי

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA  
4 East 34th Street  
New York, New York 10016  
Tel. (212) 481-1500/FAX (212) 481-1515

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: OCTOBER 18, 1990

TO: THE HON. HARRY HURWITZ

FAX NO.: 011-973-2-385401

FROM: SIDNEY SILVERMAN, PRESIDENT

Number of pages including this cover sheet 3

PLEASE CALL IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES

# Zionist Organization of America

Office of the President

October 16, 1990

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I respectfully write to express our concern about the initiative taken by the United States in the United Nations to condemn the State of Israel as a result of the violence perpetrated by a mob which attacked innocent worshipers in the holy city of Jerusalem. This sends an unfortunate message to the world.

The Zionist Organization of America strongly supported your correct and courageous decision that Saddam Hussein's oppression against Kuwait could not be accepted by the world community.

Mr. President, we fully agree with your insistence that there is no linkage between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the problem of the Palestinian Arabs. Unfortunately, the initiative the United States has taken in the United Nations undermines its credibility for in an effort to preserve the coalition it has formed in the Middle East, it has harmed a loyal ally and distracted attention from Iraq's perfidious behavior.

The United States and the nations of the world joined in formulating a resolution critical of Israel. They have permitted themselves to be exploited by a plan which undoubtedly was conceived by Saddam Hussein in concert with Yasir Arafat and the PLO. As a consequence, the anger of the world today is misdirected at Jerusalem and not Baghdad.

The loss of life in the Jerusalem confrontation is regrettable. At the same time, those who turned to violence took the risk of its consequences. Permit me to repeat the question posed by our Executive Vice President to Egypt's Ambassador to Washington, with whom he met this past week—"When 50 policemen in your country are confronted by a frenzied mob of 2-3,000 people who have no regard for their own lives, how do you contain the situation with 'restraint'". Egypt's representative had no answer. Mr. President, the same question can be asked of any police official in the United States, as that of any other nation. We believe that the standard of behavior expected of Israel is not only unrealistic but terribly unfair and unjustified. We regret that the U.S. rushed to condemn Israel in the U.S. before evidence was ascertained and verified.

The President  
page 2  
October 16, 1990

Mr. President, you are aware of the dramatic reduction in the level of violence in the territories due primarily to Israel's sincere desire to avoid bloodshed based on a non-confrontational strategy developed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens.

Mr. President, the decision by the United States to be critical of Israel under these circumstances at this point in time, may seriously damage the stature of the United States as being the champion of world morality.

Mr. President, the United States should reaffirm its special ties with Israel so that its action taken at the United Nations should not be misinterpreted as a diminution in the long and trusted relationship both countries enjoy.

Respectfully yours,

*Sidney Silverman*  
Sidney Silverman  
President

אאא, חוזם: 13805

אל: רהמש/959

מ:- ווש, נר: 2145, תא: 181090, זח: 1310, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי - בהול לבוקר

אל: ממנכ'ל

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט

בהמשך ל- 2129 מ- 16.10

1. קרצר התקשר הבוקר ( 18.10 ) כדי למסור שהרעיונות אותם העלה בשיחתו  
מו ( דאה מברק לעיל ) באופן לא פורמלי קיבלו גושפנקא רשמית. סיפור כי  
בכונת פיקרינג להציג עמדתם בפני ביין.

( הערה: עדכנתי את ביין אשר בנתיים שוחח עם פיקרינג ).

2. למען הסדר הטוב חזר על עמדתם ולפיה:

- א. ארה'ב לא ויתרה על רעיון שיגור שליח
- ב. אינם עומדים על כך שהשליח יתקבל ע'י ממ' ישראל
- ג. השליח אינו יכול לבוא כתייר
- ד. השליח אינו חייב להגיע 'היום או מחר'. ניתן לתאם מועד ביקורו בסמוך  
לפרסום דו"ח הועדה הבודקת.

עד כאן

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14182

אל: רהמש/982

מ-: ווש, נר: 2154, תא: 181090, זח: 2300, חמ: סג, סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לשכת שה'ת, לשכת רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - ס/מזכיר במדינה איגלברגר (18.10)

1. השגריר נפגש עם איגלברגר ומסר לו עותק כתב האמנתו.

2. בפגישה השתתפו: קרצר, נציג טקס, עוזרי איגלברגר, והח'מ.

3. הנושאים העיקריים שעלו בשיחה היו: שיגור שליח המזכ'ל, נושא ירושלים והתקשורת בין בממשל לממ' ישראל.

4. להלן סיכום השיחה:

א. לאחר שאיחל לשגריר הצלחה במילוי תפקידו, ציין איגלברגר כי 'אנו עוברים כעת תקופה קשה'. הביע תקווה שאנו מבינים עד כמה סדר יומו של הממשל עמוס, כאשר משבר המפרץ אינו הנושא המרכזי. עיקר המאמץ כיום מتركז בנושא התקציב.

ב. בתגובה לדברי איגלברגר על כך שגם סדר יומה של ירושלים עמוס הביע השגריר חשש מכך שאנו (ארה"ב וישראל) עלולים להכנס לתסבוכת אלא אם כן, נמצא דרך לצאת מכך בעוד מועד. לשתי המדינות צריך להיות אינטרס לצנן את האוירה.

ג. בהתייחסו להחלטת מועב'יט בהקשר לנושא השליח העלה השגריר הצעה פרטית אותה יעלה עם רוה'מ במידה ויקבל מהם תגובה חיובית.

ד. להלן פרטי ההצעה: עם פרסום מסקנות ועדת הבדיקה או בסמוך לפרסומן השגריר העריך שהועדה תסיים עבודתה תוך שבוע או פחות, יצא יו'ר הוועדה, או פקיד בכיר לניו יורק כדי למסור הדו"ח למזכ'ל האו"מ. במידה שלמזכ'ל (לאחר עיון בדו"ח) יהיו שאלות יוכל לשגר איש מטעמו לישראל לקבלת הבהרות.

ה. השגריר הבהיר, כי שיגור שליח בניגוד לרצון ממ' ישראל יחייב תגובה מצד רוה'מ. השגריר ציין כי מודע לקיומה של הצעה לשגר שליח אשר, להוציא את ממשלת ישראל, יפגש בין היתר עם פלסטינאים וארגוני ז'א. סבור שהצעה זו הינה COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. מקווה שניתן עדיין לעצור הצעה זו ולהתקדם בכיוון שהציע.

ו. איגלברגר ביקש שהות להתייעץ על כך עם כמה אנשים כולל עם המזכיר. תגובתו הטנטאטיבית היא שהסיכוי לאימוץ הצעת השגריר על רקע הלחץ בנוי יורק קטן. הוסיף כי יש בניו-יורק מדינות שממתינות לתשובתה השלילית של ממ' ישראל כפי שיוכלו לבחון העלאת הצעות החלטה שיטילו סנקציות. להערכתו הצעת השגריר לא תסיר הלחץ.

ז. קרצר הביע גם כן ספק לגבי האפשרות שההצעה תקל הלחץ. הוסיף כי המידע לגבי האירועים ברפית יגבירו עוד יותר את הלחץ בנוי-יורק. על כך הגיב השגריר כי אם אכן זה המצב, כי אז כל שבוע נזכה לכינוס מועב'יט באמתלה זו או אחרת. איגלברגר הגיב באמרו שאכן המדובר ב - VICIOUS CIRCLE.

ח. השגריר התייחס למציאות הפוליטית הפנימית בישראל.

ט. איגלברגר בתגובה ציין כי מבין את האילוצים המופעלים על רוח'מ. לדבריו היעדר פתרון עלול להוביל חלק מהמדינות המעורבות בפעילות במפרץ, וכאלה שאינן מעורבות ליצור לינקאז' (בין המפרץ למזה'ת). זאת ועוד, חלק מהמדינות האירופאיות תראינה בסירוב ישראל הזדמנות לנסות ולממש מדיניותן.

י. השגריר הביע הערכתו לטון המרגיע של דברי המזכיר בעדותו אתמול (17.10) בסנאט.

יא. אינו בטוח האם המימשל (או חלקים ממנו) מודעים לכך שרוה'מ הינו האיש שבסופו של דבר מקבל את ההחלטות. השגריר התייחס לקצר בתקשורת הקיים בין הנשיא לרוה'מ. סבור שיש לעשות מאמץ ולתקן מצב עניינים זה.

יב. איגלברגר בתגובה עמד על הצורך בדיאלוג כן וגלוי עם. מודע לכך שרוה'מ הוא שמקבל את ההחלטות. הוסיף כי חש מזה זמן שהתקשורת בין הממשל וממשלת ישראל טעונה תיקון. לדבריו אין טעם להתעסק בסיבות לכך. במקום זה יש לעשות מאמץ וולתקן המצב. מעוניין לשוחח על כך עם השגריר. הוסיף כי להערכתו חוסר היכולת להסביר עמדות היא בעיה הדדית וכי דרושה רמה מסוימת של עידון (FINESSE). חזר על כך שהתקשורת הלקויה הינה בעיה רצינית אותה יש לנסות ולתקן.

יג. בהתייחסו לבעית ירושלים הדגיש איגלברגר הצורך להמנע מדיון פומבי בנושא. ציין כי מבין רגישות נושא ירושלים בישראל. מקווה שנוכל להגיע להדברות שקטה בנושא.

יד. השגריר הדגיש כי ירושלים אינה נושא לויכוח בישראל. (NOT DEBATABLE) להערכתו חלק מהמחלוקת בנושא היתה נמנעת אילו היו מדברים פחות. מבין שזו גם עמדת המזכיר שאותה העביר לידיעת שה'ח לפני כתיבת מכתבו למזכיר. כעת הוסיף השגריר יש לנסות ולהשקיט הנושא. עד כאן באשר לנושאי השיחה העיקריים.

טו. לדיון בנושאים לעיל קדמה שיחה כללית במהלכה ציין איגלברגר כי מאחורי המשבר בנושא התקציר מסתתרים חילוקי דעות בסיסיים ביחס לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של ארה'ב. ויכוח זה, מחריף על רקע השיפור שחל במישור הבינ'ל בעקבות סיום המלחמה הקרה.

א. איגלברגר העריך כי הדיון לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של המדיניות האמריקאית ימשך עוד זמן מה. צופה שבסיום הדיון יגיעו למסקנה שיצטרכו להפנות יותר שאבים לנושאי פנים מאשר לנושאי חוץ.

טז. איגלברגר הסכים לדברי השגריר על כך שהמשבר הנוכחי מצביע על כך שבמערכת השלטונית יש יותר בלמים ופחות איזונים. לדבריו המדובר בתופעה שכיחה בפוליטיקה האמריקאית בהבדל אחר והוא שבעבר לא היו לכך השלכות בינ'ל והיום יש לכך (השלכות). הוסיף כי מאז וייטנאם נמצא מוסד הנשיאות במצור. נשיאים רבים סבלו מכך וכיום תורו של בוש.

יח. לסכום נושא זה הביע איגלברגר תקווה ש-דיון בשאלה לאן פני ארה'ב יסתיים בכי טוב.

עד כאן תוכן השיחה שנמשכה כ-45 דקות והתנהלה באוירה ידידותית.

שטיין



אאא, חוזם: 14182

אל: רהמש/982

מ-: ווש, נר: 2154, תא: 181090, חז: 2300, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לשכת שה'ח, לשכת רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - ס/מזכיר במדינה איגלברגר (18.10)

1. השגריר נפגש עם איגלברגר ומסר לו עותק כתב האמנתו.
2. בפגישה השתתפו: קרצר, נציג טקס, עוזרי איגלברגר, והח'מ.
3. הנושאים העיקריים שעלו בשיחה היו: שיגור שליח המזכ'ל, נושא ירושלים והתקשורת בין במימשל לממ' ישראל.
4. להלן סיכום השיחה:

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ב. בתגובה לדברי איגלברגר על כך שגם סדר יומה של ירושלים עמוס הביע השגריר חשש מכך שאנו (ארה'ב וישראל) עלולים להכנס לתסבוכת אלא אם כן, נמצא דרך לצאת מכך בעוד מועד. לשתי המדינות צריך להיות אינטרס לצנן את האוירה.

ג. בהתייחסו להחלטת מועב'יט בהקשר לנושא השליח העלה השגריר הצעה פרטית אותה יעלה עם רוה'מ במידה ויקבל מהם תגובה חיובית.

ד. להלן פרטי ההצעה: עם פרסום מסקנות ועדת הבדיקה או בסמוך לפרסומן (השגריר העריך שהועדה תסיים עבודתה תוך שבוע או פחות), יצא יו'ר הועדה, או פקיד בכיר לניו יורק כדי למסור הדו'ח למזכ'ל האו'מ. במידה למזכ'ל (לאחר עיון בדו'ח) יהיו שאלות יוכל לשגר איש מטעמו לישראל לקבלת הבהרות.

ה. השגריר הבהיר, כי שיגור שליח בניגוד לרצון ממ' ישראל יחייב תגובה מצד רוה'מ. השגריר ציין כי מודע לקיומה של הצעה לשגר שליח אשר, להוציא את ממשלת ישראל, יפגש בין היתר עם פלסטינאים וארגוני ז'א. סבור שהצעה זו הינה COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. מקווה שניתן עדיין לעצור הצעה זו ולהתקדם בכיוון שהציע.

ו. איגלברגר ביקש שהות להתייעץ על כך עם כמה אנשים כולל עם המזכיר. תגובתו הטנטאטיבית היא שהסיכוי לאימוץ הצעת השגריר על רקע הלחץ בנוי יורק קטן. הוסיף כי יש בנוי-יורק מדינות שממתינות לתשובתה השלילית של ממ' ישראל כפי שיוכלו לבחון העלאת הצעות החלטה שיטילו סנקציות. להערכתו הצעת השגריר לא תסיר הלחץ.

ז. קרצר הביע גם כן ספק לגבי האפשרות שההצעה תקל הלחץ. הוסיף כי המידע לגבי האירועים ברפיח יגבירו עוד יותר את הלחץ בנוי-יורק. על כך הגיב השגריר כי אם אכן זה המצב, כי אז כל שבוע נזכה לכינוס מועב'יט באמתלה זו או אחרת. איגלברגר הגיב באמרו שאכן המדובר ב - VICIOUS CIRCLE.

ח. השגריר התייחס למציאות הפוליטית הפנימית בישראל.

ט. איגלברגר בתגובה ציין כי מבין את האילוצים המופעלים על רוח'מ. לדבריו היעדר פתרון עלול להוביל חלק מהמדינות המעורבות בפעילות במפרץ, וכאלה שאינן מעורבות ליצור לינקאז' (בין המפרץ למזה'ת). זאת ועוד, חלק מהמדינות האירופאיות תראינה בסירוב ישראל הזדמנות לנסות ולממש מדיניותן.

י. השגריר הביע הערכתו לטון המרגיע של דברי המזכיר בעדותו אתמול (17.10) בסנאט.

יא. אינו בטוח האם המימשל (או חלקים ממנו) מודעים לכך שרוה'מ הינו האיש שבסופו של דבר מקבל את ההחלטות. השגריר התייחס לקצר בתקשורת הקיים בין הנשיא לרוה'מ. סבור שיש לעשות מאמץ ולתקן מצב עניינים זה.

יב. איגלברגר בתגובה עמד על הצורך בדיאלוג כן וגלוי עם. מודע לכך שרוה'מ הוא שמקבל את ההחלטות. הוסיף כי חש מזה זמן שהתקשורת בין הממשל וממשלת ישראל טעונה תיקון. לדבריו אין טעם להתעסק בסיבות לכך. במקום זה יש לעשות מאמץ וולתקן המצב. מעוניין לשוחח על כך עם השגריר. הוסיף כי הערכתו חוסר היכולת להסביר עמדות היא בעיה הדדית וכי דרושה רמה מסוימת לעידון (FINESSE). חזר על כך שהתקשורת הלקויה הינה בעיה רצינית אותה יש לנסות ולתקן.

יג. בהתייחסו לבעיית ירושלים הדגיש איגלברגר הצורך להמנע מדיון פומבי בנושא. ציין כי מבין רגישות נושא ירושלים בישראל. מקווה שנוכל להגיע להדברות שקטה בנושא.

יד. השגריר הדגיש כי ירושלים אינה נושא לויכות בישראל. (NOT DEBATABLE) להערכתו חלק מהמחלוקת בנושא היתה נמנעת אילו היו מדברים פחות. מבין שזו גם עמדת המזכיר שאותה העביר לידיעת שה'ח לפני כתיבת מכתבו למזכיר. כעת הוסיף השגריר יש לנסות ולהשקיט הנושא. עד כאן באשר לנושאי השיחה העיקריים.

טו. לדיון בנושאים לעיל קדמה שיחה כללית במהלכה ציין איגלברגר כי מאחורי המשבר בנושא התקציר מסתתרים חילוקי דעות בסיסיים ביחס לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של ארה'ב. ויכוח זה, מחריף על רקע השיפור שחל במישור הבינ'ל בעקבות סיום המלחמה הקרה.

ז. איגלברגר העריך כי הדיון לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של המדיניות האמריקאית משך עוד זמן מה. צופה שבסיום הדיון יגיעו למסקנה שיצטרכו להפנות יותר משאבים לנושאי פנים מאשר לנושאי חוץ.

טז. איגלברגר הסכים לדברי השגריר על כך שהמשבר הנוכחי מצביע על כך שבמערכת השלטונית יש יותר בלמים ופחות איזונים. לדבריו המדובר בתופעה שכיחה בפוליטיקה האמריקאית בהבדל אחר והוא שבעבר לא היו לכך השלכות בינ'ל והיום יש לכך (השלכות). הוסיף כי מאז וייטנאם נמצא מוסד הנשיאות במצור. נשיאים רבים סבלו מכך וכיום תורו של בוש.

יח. לסכום נושא זה הביע איגלברגר תקווה ש-דיון בשאלה לאן פני ארה'ב יסתיים בכי טוב.

עד כאן תוכן השיחה שנמשכה כ-45 דקות והתנהלה באוירה ידידותית.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 13804

אל: רהמש/958

מ:- ווש, נר: 2144, תא: 181090, זח: 1300, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי - בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ערבויות לדיור: בעקבות מכתב שה'ח לבייקר

בהמשך ל- 2139 מ- 17.10

1. במהלך שיחה עם קרצר ( ראה דווח ניפרד ) שאלתי לתגובת המזכיר בעקבות קריאת מכתבו של שה'ח.

2. קרצר השיב כי בעקבות הקריאה שאל המזכיר שתי שאלות:

א. האם המכתב רשמי ( סיפר כי הורו לבראון לנרר הנושא. לדבריו המכתב שהועבר בפאקס לשגרירותם בת'א לא נשא חתימתו של שה'ח).

ב. האם תוכן המכתב פורסם ? ( קרצר הפנה תשומת לבי לכך שהמכתב פורסם ב'הארצ' ).

3. במידה והתשובה לשתי השאלות היא חיובית, בכונת המזכיר להשיב לשה'ח. לכך הוסיף קרצר כי ככל שנדגיש את נושא ירושלים, יגרור הדבר תגובה מצידם. טרח לחזור ולהזכיר קיומם של חילוקי דעות בנושא.

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, כנצור, מצפא

זססס

ACTION USIS INFO CG DPD POL ACC

VZCZCJUG0748AD421  
 PP RUFHJU  
 DE RUEHC #3295 2910709  
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
 P R 180709Z OCT 90 ZEK  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY  
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 2088  
 INFO ALL OSGD CAPITALS  
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2875  
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1878  
 BT  
 UNCLAS STATE 353295

18-OCT-90 TOR: 07112  
 ON: 64865  
 CHR: USIS  
 DIST: PBPA  
 ADD:

NICOSIA FOR BSD, ROME FOR VATICAN, GENEVA FOR BRIERSON

E.O. 12356: 4/A

TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON/SYRIA: SECRETARY BAKER'S REMARKS AT OCTOBER 16 PRESS CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF THE SECTION OF SECRETARY BAKER'S OCTOBER 16 PRESS CONFERENCE DEALING WITH LEBANON AND SYRIA.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE:

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE UNITED STATES HAS OFTEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORISM. ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED THAT SYRIA HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS HAND TOO FAR INTO LEBANON? DO YOU EXPECT SYRIA PERHAPS TO PROVIDE THE MILITARY FORCE FOR HRAWI TO SUCCEED IN FORMING A UNITY GOVERNMENT, AND HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO PRESS REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES BASICALLY TOLD SYRIA IT WOULD NOT BLOCK EFFORTS TO COME TO HRAWI'S DEFENSE?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE REGRET THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE, JUST AS WE HAVE REGRETTED VIOLENCE IN LEBANON FOR A LONG TIME. I SHOULD POINT OUT

THAT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON DID REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM THE SYRIANS IN THIS INSTANCE.

BUT I SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF GIVING GREEN LIGHTS FOR VIOLENCE ANYWHERE, INCLUDING IN LEBANON. FOR 15 YEARS WE'VE ARGUED AGAINST VIOLENCE IN LEBANON, MOST RECENTLY IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON ON THE 29TH OF SEPTEMBER AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN MY MEETING WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK AT THE SAME TIME.

QUESTION: THERE WERE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO LEBANESE OFFICIALS, SAYING THAT THEY BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND WERE IN EFFECT TOLD, 'GO AHEAD

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AND DO IT AND GET IT OVER QUICKLY, AND WE'LL CONGRATULATE YOU.' THOSE ARE INCORRECT?

SECRETARY BAKER: THERE'S A HISTORY OF THAT, JOHN, AS YOU KNOW, HAVING COVERED THIS DEPARTMENT FOR AS LONG AS YOU HAVE. ANY TIME ANYTHING HAPPENS OVER THERE, SOMEHOW THERE'S A SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES GAVE A GREEN LIGHT. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, WE DIDN'T.

BUT WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS NOT FOCUS ON THE PAST HERE. WE'D LIKE TO FOCUS ON THE FUTURE. WE'D LIKE TO FOCUS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THANK YOU.

END TEXT OF CONFERENCE. BAKER

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*Mr. du Chateau*

BAKER TESTIFIES ON U.S. GULF POLICY BEFORE CONGRESS  
(Transcript: Baker 10/18/90 Q and A at HFAC)

Following is an unofficial transcript of the question and answer session from the Secretary of State Baker testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee October 18:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

REP. FASCELL: (Bangs gavel.) The committee will come to order, please. May we take seats and close the door?

Thank you.

We meet this afternoon to hear from the distinguished Secretary of State on the current situation in the Persian Gulf and related issues. As we all know, there have been significant developments throughout the region since the Secretary was last with this committee on September the 4th. There's been the assassination of the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, the plundering of Kuwait, high-level diplomacy on the part of the Soviet Union, France, and other countries, escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians which may have been intended to strain the multinational alliance against Iraq.

The actual practice of establishing and implementing US foreign policy, Mr. Secretary, as you know, over the years has been reflected in an ongoing process of give and take between the Executive Branch and the Congress. The invitation to struggle between the two branches as envisioned by our Forefathers has resulted in a sharing of power and responsibility between the branches, and in this time of crisis there is need not just for better consultation, but for agreeing to a mechanism for consultation.

As you know, over the past four years or so, I have promoted the concept of establishing a leadership consultative group consisting of the House and Senate leadership and the chairmen of the -- and ranking members of the relevant committees of the House and Senate. And that group -- the purpose of it would be to meet on a regular basis with the President, other representatives of the government such as the Secretary of State, in closed session to review national security and foreign policy matters. In addition to that, the consultative group would meet at the request of the President in times of crisis, whenever force or the use of force is contemplated, and, if needed, when Congress is in recess or has adjourned.

It seems to me that our best chance for a continuation of bipartisan foreign policy is to follow that course of action. And I think that was clear in the other committee yesterday when you testified as to how the Congress -- the Senate feels

about the use of force in the context of the Congress and carrying out its responsibility. And I know that no administration wants to consult with 535 members of Congress. That's impossible, and that's a difficult task. But I believe that on an informal basis, with agreement with the President, the Congress, the leadership, that such a primary and important consultation mechanism would be useful.

It is a real effort here to avoid a crisis atmosphere, and the administration has done an excellent job, Mr. Secretary. The President met with members of Congress. We've had meetings with you. The House leadership and a consultative group, if you will, has met with the President. And I respectfully recommend that, before we leave here, and I've sent for my absentee ballot by the way for November the 5th -- I recommend that we have -- that the administration have another briefing for the Congress, Mr. Secretary.

And I think it would be very useful that we could have another meeting of the -- let's call it the congressional consultative group with the President. And I would hope thereafter that we could come together in an announcement by the President and the leadership of Congress, that this would be on some kind of regular, informal basis or whatever seems to be appropriate. Now, I've made that suggestion to the Speaker of the House. If my colleagues will indulge me and let me put his letter in the record here, but let me read it so it'll be absolutely clear.

It says: "I agree with the suggestion you made to me that the Congress provide in the adjournment resolution for the possibility of reconvening to consider developments in the Persian Gulf requiring our attention. Such a provision, while unusual, is not unprecedented. Further, the nature of current relations between the United States and Iraq provides cause for concern. The Congress has a duty to exercise its constitutional role with regard to possible exigencies in that region. Accordingly, I support making appropriate arrangements for the possibility of reconvening the Congress after it has adjourned sine die."

"You had also written me proposing the designation of a leadership consultative group to review national security and foreign policy matters with the President on a regular basis. I take the position that the President is required to consult with the Congress on matters involving war powers. As a practical matter, such consultations should occur through a bipartisan and representative leadership group drawn from both houses. The makeup of the group may vary, depending on the subject matter. I will communicate to the President your suggestion and urge that he continue to communicate and consult with Congress on possible developments in the Gulf.

"With great appreciation, et cetera --

And I understand that the Speaker of the House has so communicated with the President. And I went through all of that simply to be sure that the Secretary of State was brought up into the loop on everything that has been transpiring in the last day or so.

Mr. Broomfield.

REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD (R-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, your appearance today is especially significant at a time of growing concern over the potential use of military force in the Persian Gulf. The House of Representatives, on the recommendation of the Committee, overwhelmingly, as you know, passed a resolution in support of the President's action in response to the Iraq aggression. The House resolution also unequivocally endorsed the administration's objectives in the Persian Gulf area. We all hope that continued diplomacy will succeed in turning back Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf. But as you know, based on your appearance yesterday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the one thing that is most on our minds is the possibility that US forces may have to be ordered into action against Iraq. The administration has done -- as the Chairman has indicated -- an excellent job so far in notifying the Congress of US action in the Gulf and consulting about the possible use of force. I wish to stress the importance of continued consultation. I, for one, take for granted that the administration will continue to make frequent contacts with the Congress on this issue during the upcoming recess.

Right at the outset, however, Mr. Secretary, I want to raise one issue. That is about the talk of Congress forming this special group to consult with the President about the situation in the Persian Gulf and possibly also the future War Powers issue. I, for one, do not agree that it would be desirable -- and I hate to say this, because I usually agree with the Chairman -- would be -- I do not agree that it would be desirable to form such a group.

On the contrary, I believe that creating a formal mechanism for consultation could distract from the broad context and a give and take required for consultation. Forming a special group -- or what you might call a "supercommittee" -- would depart from the normal congressional procedures laid out in our rules and in the Constitution.

Formal consultations would inevitably lead to calls for greater congressional involvement in military decisions, raising constitutional issues and possibly creating security problems.

Now, forming a new congressional organization could also result



in special privileges for certain members of Congress, and -God help us -- more staff. And I think a good example of that is what happened in the summit conference when they met down at Andrews Air Force Base.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you have indicated your opposition and that of the administration to this approach. I wish to hear further about your views on this important issue. I'm also concerned that these actions by Congress could be misinterpreted overseas as a sign of potential weakness by the United States.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, let me say that to my mind, as important as consultation is -- and I think everybody on this committee recognizes it -- we should never be placed in a situation where a single American life is risked, in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, because a requirement to consult with Congress tipped the President's hand to our adversaries.

And I want to thank you very much for being here, we look forward to your statement.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Secretary, I'd like for you to go ahead and make your statement and I'll respond to the remarks of my distinguished colleague and ranking Republican member, because I wouldn't dream of doing what he's talking about, and I don't know anybody who is. (Laughter.)

Mr. Secretary, we'd be delighted to hear from you.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me -- let me suggest that in order to save -- or recoup the 15 minutes that I was late -- and I apologize for being late, but something came up that I simply could not get loose from -- let me dispense with reading my statement, Mr. Chairman, because it's no different than the statement I gave in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and I would ask that it be included in its entirety in the record and we can therefore recoup --

REP. FASCELL: The entire statement will be in the record, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. BAKER: -- we'll recoup the 15 minutes that I have cost us by being late. So, if it's alright with you, I'm prepared to go to questions.

REP. FASCELL: You can respond extemporaneously for a minute or two if you like to kind of set the stage.

SEC. BAKER: All right, sir. Let me pick up on the central thrust Mr. Chairman, both of your comments and Mr. Broomfield's comments. And it will not come as any surprise to the panel to learn -- particularly in light of my testimony yesterday -- that I agree with what Mr. Broomfield has said, and the

administration agrees.

And we had quite a discussion yesterday in Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the constitutional issues that are involved here -- and they are difficult issues. We certainly acknowledge that. There are issues that perhaps at some time the executive and legislative branches of government will find a way around, or find a way to work out.

Let me elaborate on that by saying that we believe in consultations. The President has been very, very diligent -- as I think you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in your remarks, about consulting throughout this crisis. Indeed, during the August recess we spent quite a bit of time consulting. I committed yesterday in the Senate that we would expect to continue that process and we will. And the reason we will is quite simple. We would not want to take action of the nature that you alluded to, Mr. Chairman, except under circumstances in which we felt there was a reasonably good chance of strong support from the American people and from their elected representatives.

At the same time, we do have concerns with respect to what happens in the event of provocation. We have concerns about operational security. We have concerns about setting up formal mechanisms outside of your current leadership structure that would have the -- we think, the downside impact that Mr. Broomfield has alluded to. I would hope that today I could convince you that we are serious when we say we will consult. We will consult whether you're in recess or whether you're in session, just as we have been doing on this issue. And I would expect those consultations, of course, to begin with your normal regularly elected leadership.

REP. FASCELL: Well, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for that assurance. You see I was trying to broaden that just a wee bit, and I detect that that's what you don't want to do, and I may be wrong about that and I hope I am. Just to clarify my own position, I have never been for legislating a new mechanism or creating a staff or putting all those straw people up that my ranking Republican member has just put up. I'd be against all of that myself.

So I join him on that. But he and I are both agreed, I'm sure, on consultation requirements. But I don't want to limit that simply to four people in the United States Congress in -- at a time of either a crash or a crisis. I'm talking about a broader aspect, not just a crisis. I'm not interested in the exact moment that the departure has taken place, but by the same token, I'm not interested in learning about it after the point of no return has been reached. Now, somewhere between those two extremes has to be a reasonable sense of consultation without putting the country in jeopardy or the life of a single person in uniform in jeopardy or violating the confidence of

the administration. So it's a question not of nuance; it's just a question of practical, working something out. I think that that practicality has been seen by this administration, and I can understand why the Secretary had to be very precise in the other body, because you got legislation pending there and some different views about the consultative mechanism.

Now, I think the mechanism that the President has used up till now is very satisfactory. The last meeting we had of what you might call a consultative group of the Congress was an excellent meeting. It had the leadership of both houses, both parties, the ranking member of each of the relevant committees, plus the chairmen there. And the President was very gracious, as were the Cabinet members, in hearing us out. We expressed our views. We did not get into scenarios of, What would do you if? When would you do it? How many troops would you send? I don't know if anybody's interested in that, except the relevant, important committees, whether they're Intelligence or maybe Armed Services. From a policy standpoint, this committee is interested, but consultation means getting in on the discussion early enough so that you don't find about what's gone on afterwards.

And of course we expect the administration to perform its constitutional function. We would expect that, just like we would expect that we would carry out our constitutional responsibility. Both of us will do that. We're responsible, we're accountable. In that in-between area, though, of making sure that we're all communicating properly and that we have the same understanding of the facts and the actions, then there is no substitute for the kind of hard work that went into the discussions, the dialogue and the meetings that have taken place up till now. And so, all we're saying at this point, it seems to me, is that particularly now, if and when Congress adjourns here shortly, in the next 10 days or so, we just don't leave it in limbo. I think that's the only difference that we're saying right now.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, let me just add --

REP. FASCELL: I've asked my questions and I've made my speech and that's it.

SEC. BAKER: Let me just add, if I could, that I don't mean to be -- when I say "the leadership," I do not mean to suggest that the consultations would be limited to four individuals. They haven't been in the past. There might be circumstances under which that would be appropriate in a particular case, but that's not what I'm intending to suggest by that statement here today.

REP. FASCELL: Well, I thank you for the clarification, and that's the reason I raised the issue.

Mr. Broomfield, do you have a question?

REP. BROOMFIELD: Yes, I have one question here, Mr. Secretary.

You referred in your written testimony to the Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait. I know that the President and you have met with the emir of Kuwait and his government. Some of us in Congress have also received some information on this, but I believe the American people are still not aware of the level of hardship imposed on the nation of Kuwait. Could you give us more information on the full extent of damages to Kuwait as a result of the Iraqi invasion? And what does this mean in terms of our ability to negotiate with Iraq about a resolution of this situation?

SEC. BAKER: Well, Mr. Broomfield, what Iraq is doing to Kuwait is indecent and inhumane, and it's absolutely outrageous. They are eradicating Kuwait as a country and as a society. They are taking identity papers, requiring Iraqi identity papers. They are stealing everything that's not bolted down and taking it back to Iraq. There are reports of summary executions. There are reports of rapes and other violence to people. And I was delighted, as I indicated in my statement, to see that the Congress had hearings on this issue and was able to develop some of the specifics with respect to what Iraq is doing to Kuwait.

REP. BROOMFIELD: In your testimony, Mr. Secretary, you indicated that a critical element of our US policy in the Persian Gulf was to maintain a unified international coalition. To that end, we have seen extraordinary and unprecedented cooperation in the United Nations as well as a united position with the Soviet Union with regard to the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

There remains some criticism that our allies are still failing to pull their share of the load in this crisis. Are you satisfied with the contribution our allies are giving us?

SEC. BAKER: The President has spoken to this, Mr. Broomfield, and we are generally satisfied with the -- particularly with the overall level of contribution for the balance of 1990. If this matter should extend into the -- into the next year, then, as I indicated in the other body yesterday, we would expect responsibility-sharing to extend into 1991, and we would expect to see further commitments by the countries involved.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Hamilton?

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for joining us this afternoon, Mr. Secretary.

If I may add just one word, a number of members have spoken to me, and I'm sure to Mr. Fascell and Mr. Broomfield, about the desirability of having a briefing before we break here for the adjournment, from you or from some other high-ranking official. And I just make that suggestion to you as something that I think would be helpful for members, before we go back to our homes.

SECY. BAKER: I certainly think we can arrange that, Mr. Hamilton.

REP. HAMILTON: Very good.

You mentioned in your statement, the political and economic isolation of Iraq. And I wanted to ask you about what the next steps are for us to pursue in a political or economic sense, to further that isolation.

Specifically, are we talking about further action in the United Nations to pass a resolution, perhaps with respect to military action or reparations to Kuwait, or do we support more coordination on the military staff committee at the United Nations?

What's our next move in this area to isolate Iraq further?

SECY. BAKER: Well, politically and economically, our next moves, Mr. Hamilton, would be to see what could be done within the Security Council by way of additional resolutions -- additional resolutions that might address the questions of resupply of our nationals in Kuwait with basic necessities of life, with questions of compensation that might be owing from Iraq to Kuwait and the citizens thereof, and with respect to the issue of war crimes.

Those are the topics that have been discussed and talked about with some of the members of the international consensus that is aligned against Iraq.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we talking about any kind of resolution authorizing military action?

SECY. BAKER: That's over on the military -- the military side. You started out, I think, asking me about political and economic -- that's the political and economic.

On the military -- or -- with respect -- let me put it this way: With respect to the question of the option of force, we have had some informal discussions with members of the international coalition concerning their views about whether or not they might or might not support some sort of a resolution in the United Nations that would support the use of force at such time as it might be appropriate; at such time as the

economic sanctions, for instance, had been given a suitable opportunity to work.

And I said two weeks or so ago -- 10 days or so ago, when I was at the United Nations, that I was struck, frankly, by the degree of support that seemed to exist in favor of that, if that was a -- if that had to be resorted to; if all the other measures that have been taken did not work, particularly in light of the pillage, and rape, and eradication of Kuwait that was taking place.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, I've had some hearings recently in a subcommittee with regard to the opinion on the Arab street, as the phrase goes. And a lot of the non-government experts, academics and others, think that Saddam Hussein is making quite a bit of progress in the -- on the Arab street with respect to his propagandist themes: Have and have-not nations, Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and other matters.

Is that your impression? That he is, in fact, making quite a bit of progress? And what, in the way of public diplomacy, are we thinking about to counter his themes in the Arab world?

SEC. BAKER: It's my sense, Mr. Hamilton, that the -- that the state of play is not as favorable to Saddam Hussein as we anticipated it might be in the early days or weeks of this crisis. We recognize that those themes do play well on the street in some countries.

We understand that they are playing very well with Palestinians wherever they are located. We know they -- they have played well to some extent in Jordan, to some extent in Yemen, indeed, even to some extent in Syria, which is a country which is supporting the international effort against Iraq.

On the other hand, we think that public opinion in Egypt, in the Gulf states, is quite solid in support of the governments there and in opposition to the message that Saddam Hussein is attempting to send.

We have suggested to other governments, Arab governments, primarily, that they pick up the pace of their public diplomacy. Those suggestions were made many weeks ago, and many of them have done so and, I think, done so with good effect. I don't mean to suggest that this is not an issue and/or a potential problem, but I do think that it's not as -- initially the feeling was that it would just be a bonfire that would run through the entire world, and I don't think we've seen that.

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LAGOMARSINO: Mr. Chairman.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Lagomarsino.

REP. LAGOMARSINO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate the President and you and Secretary Cheney for the absolutely unprecedented effort -- successful effort you made in getting all of these 50-some nations together in this effort. It has never happened before in the history of at least the modern world. And I want to thank you also for your description of the damage and hardship inflicted on Kuwait during this Iraqi invasion.

How could the countries opposing Iraq possibly reach a settlement -- there's been some speculation about this, including only a partial Iraqi withdrawal -- in light of these atrocities and in light of, as you said, the Iraqis stealing everything that isn't nailed down? And I suspect they're even stealing some of that.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think you know our position on a partial solution. We are very much opposed to the idea of rewarding someone for their aggression, particularly at a time when we are talking about creating a new world order, or particularly at a time when we are talking about dealing with the first real crisis of the post-Cold-War era. It would be a fundamental mistake, we think, to walk away from principle to the extent of rewarding Saddam Hussein for his aggression through some sort of partial solution.

So the sine qua non as we have articulated it is that he leave Kuwait unconditionally and that there be a restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Then there can be discussions about long-simmering problems and things like that.

REP. LAGOMARSINO: But shouldn't he be required to pay for his actions against the people of Iraq?

SEC. BAKER: Well I've already said that we are looking, in the United Nations, at this very moment at the possibility of a resolution requiring compensation, yes sir.

REP. LAGOMARSINO: Well certainly -- I would certainly hope so.

SEC. BAKER: Yes, sir.

REP. LAGOMARSINO: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Yatron?

REP. YATRON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in reviewing the series of resolutions which have passed the Security Council, there seems to be little reference to the massive human rights violations committed in Kuwait by Iraqi forces. And we have all heard of reports of the brutal killings of children and pregnant women, among others.

I do chair the Subcommittee on Human Rights, and I think that this is one of the worst cases of brutality that I have seen.

Has the administration considered pressing for a Security Council resolution dealing primarily with human rights? And are we doing everything possible to compel Iraq to stop these atrocities?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we're doing everything possible to compel Iraq to stop the atrocities, Mr. Yatron, by pulling together this rather unprecedented consensus against what's taking place there and, if I may say so, by building a deterrent military force in the region that would have the potential for that should that be required. So I think we're doing everything that we can.

I don't think there's been any conscious decision made not to include more forceful language on human rights in the resolutions. There has been a feeling that we should take these resolutions one at a time, that the -- that the resolutions should, if possible, have some impact in terms of something that might happen if the resolutions are not complied with, to the extent that that can be done. And we're trying to deal with the abominable human rights situation in the manner that I've just outlined -- by getting the world community mobilized against it and mobilized in favor of reversing it.

REP. YATRON: Well I agree with you, Mr. Secretary. I believe that focusing attention on the world community will certainly help towards that end, and I thank you.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Leach?

REP. LEACH: Mr. Chairman, I'll be brief. And I don't have a question, Mr. Secretary. But let me just say that in terms of consultation it strikes me there are two issues at stake. One is the legal, one's the strategic one. Legally, it's this member's view it would be preferable if the administration could achieve an Article 42 sanction, but recognizing that may not come into play, it is clear that there is sufficient legal sanction under Articles 51, 52 and 106 of the Charter and therefore legally there should be no challenge to any kind of American action at this point in time.

In terms of the strategic issue, everybody in America knows that there is grave risk of almost any action or inaction that



the United States will take. My own sense is that this administration has proceeded with a great deal of carefulness in not only consulting the United States Congress but a whole spectrum of American public opinion and public professionals, and it will be the view of this member to be supportive of the acts of the administration, as I foresee that they make come to take, and will not second-guess even if the results are less than perfect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Leach -- Mr. Chairman, may I just thank Mr. Leach for that statement, because we have tried to proceed in an appropriate way, and we've tried to proceed in a manner that would marshal the greatest international support for what we're doing and frankly the greatest domestic support, and we've tried to proceed in a manner that would resolve this politically and diplomatically and peacefully.

But if we can't get there -- we've all talked about what is happening to Kuwait. Mr. Yatron just pointed out the abominable and outrageous human rights abuses that are taking place. We have diplomats and other American citizens being held hostage in violation of all international norms of behavior. And I just hope that the unity that was so prominently displayed four or five weeks ago by members of this panel, by members in the other body, by the American people will remain there, will be there.

And I will appeal to this body, just as I did to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for patience, because we have to resolve this problem, we have to do it in a manner that does not reward aggression, and we've got to do it in a manner that will set a principled precedent for dealing with these crises in the post-Cold War era.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Solarz.

REP. SOLARZ: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, since the inception of this crisis, I think it's fair to say that you and your associates in the administration have handled the challenge posed by Iraq magnificently. But I also have to say that prior to the inception of this crisis, you and your associates in the administration handled the potential challenge of Saddam Hussein miserably.

In effect, I think you made the same mistake that Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur made 40 years when they read South Korea outside of the American defense perimeter in Asia, thereby inviting Kim Il Sung to go to war against the South.

When Ambassador Glaspie, presumably acting under your

instructions, told Saddam Hussein that the United States takes no position on these intra-Arab disputes, such as your border dispute with Kuwait; when Assistant Secretary Kelly (sp), presumably acting under your instructions, told our Committee that we have no defense commitment to Kuwait, we, in effect, invited Saddam Hussein to take matters into his own hands.

Having said that, I'd like to begin my questioning by observing that during the war in Vietnam, an American officer once said that, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it." Is it the position of the administration now that we have to wait for Kuwait to be destroyed before we save it, or are we prepared to move before that time should come?

SEC. BAKER: Move in which way, Mr. Solarz? Militarily?

REP. SOLARZ: If that should be necessary.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I would be happy to visit with you after this session and tell you exactly where we are, with those plans. I don't want to do that here now, for obvious reasons.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, Mr. Secretary, you've spoken about the cooperation we've gotten from other countries in imposing the sanctions. If it turns out the sanctions are not successful in getting him out of Kuwait, is it your view that the Arab countries that have so far cooperated with us would be prepared to join in the use of military force to get him out?

SEC. BAKER: That is my view, yes, sir.

REP. SOLARZ: Is it your view that the European countries that have joined with us would be prepared to participate in a multinational effort to use force to get him out?

SEC. BAKER: Some of them would, Mr. Solarz. Some of them would, depending upon the exact circumstances of the -- at the time.

REP. SOLARZ: Do you think it would be possible to get a resolution through the Security Council authorizing the use of force if the members feel that the sanctions have not been sufficient to get him out?

SEC. BAKER: I think I just said that I was struck when I was up at the United Nations with the degree of support that such a course seemed to have. But of course, we were only talking then informally and we were talking about it on a what-if basis. So it's pretty hard to predict that.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, do we support Prime Minister Thatcher's demand that Iraq be -- that we should insist that Iraq pay compensation to Kuwait for the damage they've done there as one

of the conditions for the removal of sanctions?

SEC. BAKER: We are in the process today, Mr. Solarz, of discussions with the United Kingdom, who is in the chair of the Security Council this month, for a United Nations resolution that would call for compensation.

REP. SOLARZ: And finally, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, is there any indication whatsoever that Saddam Hussein is seriously considering a negotiated settlement in which he would agree to withdraw his forces from Kuwait in exchange for the two islands of the Ramallah oilfield or the withdrawal of foreign forces from Saudi Arabia or some combination --

SEC. BAKER: There are some indications, Mr. Solarz, that he might be receptive to some sort of a partial solution approach like that, something along those lines, nothing definitive.

REP. SOLARZ: And would that be acceptable to us?

SEC. BAKER: No, we've said that we don't think a partial solution is acceptable. We think it would be an extraordinarily bad principle to set here, as we're trying to deal with this first crisis of the post-Cold War era, and that we should not succumb to the siren song of partial solutions.

REP. FASCELL: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN (R-NY): Mr. Secretary, on a prior occasion, we asked about the number of Soviet technicians and military advisors in Iraq. Have they been removed now? Are they still there? What is the status of these --

SEC. BAKER: Some of them have been removed, Mr. Gilman, and they are being removed as their contracts expire.

REP. GILMAN: Well that could go on and on, couldn't it?

SEC. BAKER: But according --

REP. GILMAN: I say they -- if they have long contracts that could go on indefinitely.

SEC. BAKER: They could go on -- it could go on till their contracts expire.

REP. GILMAN: And how long are their contracts?

SEC. BAKER: There are a lot of Soviet citizens in there that they can't get out, Mr. Gilman, just like we can't get our citizens out. But let me finish the answer.

There are more than 5,000 Soviet workers remaining in Iraq,

which is down from about 7,000 before the invasion of Kuwait. And it's our understanding that an additional 1,500 or so will be permitted to depart within a month.

Now, the question of what a -- how you define an advisor is an interesting question. They have some military advisors in there, about a hundred and -- I think now it's a hundred and fifty or so. But a lot of these other people are advisors of one type or another, some of them in the economic field.

But, to respond to your second question, it could be a while before those contracts expire.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us something about the Chinese proposed shipment of lithium to Iraq? There was a report in the London newspaper about 7 tons of lithium that could be used in the manufacture of hydrogen bombs, atomic bombs, chemical weapons --

SEC. BAKER: Is that a proposed shipment, Mr. Gilman?

REP. GILMAN: Well, we saw a document that had the sale -- the selling document that was in the "Independent Observer," I believe it's called.

SEC. BAKER: Yeah. No, I don't personally know anything about that. Let me say that we have a very active sanctions enforcement effort ongoing, both inter-agency within our government and with other governments. When we see reports of things like this we normally check them out carefully with other governments.

I don't know how something like that could get in the -- imports into Iraq by ship have been pretty well -- have been pretty well cut off --

REP. GILMAN: Well, one of the --

SEC. BAKER: -- by the sanctions and exports have been almost totally cut off.

REP. GILMAN: One of the newspapers reported, and I quote, "Intelligence reports relating to possible sales to Iraq by Norinco, a Chinese company, have already roused concern in Washington. Earlier this week, the US Embassy in Beijing advised the Chinese of US anxiety over the company's activities. It is not known if this is related to the lithium hydride deal."

Apparently, the Embassy was aware of this --

SEC. BAKER: It may very well be. Why don't you let me have it and I'll get it to the inter-agency committee that checks

up on sanctions violations.

REP. GILMAN: We'll be pleased to provide you with that information. Now, Mr. Secretary, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UN accused Saddam Hussein and the PLO of inciting the riot on the Temple Mount.

Do you believe that the PLO and Saddam Hussein encouraged the Palestinian rioting, or are they simply the beneficiaries of Palestinian violence? And how will the administration respond if the Palestinians engage in further provocations and violence of this nature?

SEC. BAKER: I can't answer the first question. I don't know. There are investigations ongoing now, one by the Israeli government, as you know, to determine -- to see if the answers can be obtained to the question of provocation. I simply don't know.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Studds.

REP. STUDDS: Mr. Secretary, let me begin by very briefly saying that I support the President's decision to deploy troops to the Gulf; I applaud your efforts to gain UN support for our policy; and that I would oppose any offensive US military strikes in the region without both congressional consultation and UN sanction. I also support, incidentally, the statements and actions you have taken in response to the recent tragedy in Jerusalem.

Now, the questions I had for you, I think I know the answer, having heard your exchange with Mr. Solarz, and I must say that, I don't think one has to read very far beneath the lines or between the lines in that exchange to tremble a bit with respect to the likelihood of a military confrontation in the not too distant future.

But, anyway, let me -- let me see how you would respond. Are you able to assure us that the United States will not -- without UN sanction and prior consultation with the Congress -- attack Iraq or Iraqi forces in Kuwait, unless it is in response to or to deter the imminent threat of an attack on US forces?

SEC. BAKER: No.

REP. GILMAN: That's what I -- that's what I expected. The President has set out a list of goals for his policy in the Persian Gulf, and I'd like to clarify the relative importance of those goals, because it seems to me that they ranged from the clearly essential, namely Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and

the release of the hostages; to the general stability in the Persian Gulf; to what I perceive to be the controversial, namely the restoration of the monarchy in Kuwait; to --

SECY. BAKER: Yes.

REP. STUDDS: -- the merely rhetorical; the one the President added when he was here; the creation of a new world order.

I assume our troops will not be tied up in the desert awaiting a new world order to emerge from the chaotic present there; and I certainly would oppose any policy that risks American lives for the sole purpose of restoring the Emir of Kuwait to his throne.

And my question is this. Is it fair to say that there is only one fundamental, not four or five; reasons that there are 200,000 American lives on the line in the Gulf; and that reason is the need to contain Iraqi aggression?

If we are sure we have done that; wouldn't the military mission at least for the moment be accomplished; and the other objectives left for diplomats like yourself to work out?

SECY. BAKER: Mr. Studds, I don't think so; and the reason that restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait is in there as one of the President's objectives; and a fundamental objective; is because we believe so strongly that we cannot make the same mistake we made in the '30s; and permit unprovoked aggression to succeed.

That's the reason I answered Mr. Sularz's question the way I did. I don't think we can go for a partial solution here. That's what we did in the '30s; with tragic consequences.

So we say that the legitimate government ought to be restored; and that doesn't bless the form of government. It's not the form of government that we or you would prefer. It's not democracy. But we really should not let an aggressor change the political nature of a government through aggression. So that's why that's in there; and stated -- stated as a purpose.

On the question that you originally asked me; about -- that I answered with a simple no; I want to make sure that we are -- that I understood the question correctly; and I think I did. It was broad enough to include; for instance; action that the Commander-in-Chief might decide to take; as a consequence of American citizens being harmed or being put in extreme danger. And therefore; we cannot give any assurances such as the one you ask for.

REP. STUDDS: I understand the impossibility of being precise; Mr. Secretary. But I must say; and I don't think it's

unreasonable to say so, that having, as I say, heard your response, Mr. Solarz, and to me, that if I were a soldier, either American, Iraqi, or otherwise, in the Gulf, I think I would put my helmet on.

SEC. BAKER: I think their helmets are on, Mr. Studds. I think that's -- I think they well understand that's what they signed up for and that's why they're there. We cannot rule out the option of using force. We cannot rule it out. We haven't ruled it in, and you should not interpret my answers to Mr. Solarz or anybody else as ruling it in. But we can't rule it out.

REP. STUDDS: Thank you.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Roth?

REP. ROTH: Mr. Secretary, others on the committee have complimented you and -- for the job that you're doing in this area and we all appreciate it and I want to join in those remarks. As I see it, you and the others have Saddam Hussein corralled pretty well, but there seems to be a couple of weak spots in the corral, and one is Jordan, it seems, and the other is Iran. Is there anything being done now to sort of mend that fence?

SEC. BAKER: There's a lot being done diplomatically, Mr. Roth, with respect to both. And let me say that we believe the Iranian government when they say they are going to observe the sanctions, and we believe other countries in the region when their representatives tell us the Iranian government is going to observe the sanctions. And we believe the Jordanian government when they tell us they are going to observe the sanctions, and in fact we see substantial evidence of major efforts on their part to observe the sanctions notwithstanding the fact that they are in very difficult circumstances. And we can -- and we understand those, and with respect to Jordan, a part of the responsibility-sharing effort that we've initiated was to benefit frontline states like Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, who will have a very difficult time complying with sanctions.

REP. ROTH: In this very room, just before you came, an hour before you came, our committee was marking up the old Export Administration Act, that you are well familiar with, dealing with sanctions and so on. Are our laws today -- do we have sufficient laws on the books to do what we need to do as far as -- in the area of sanctions? SEC. BAKER: In the area of sanctions? You mean generally --

REP. ROTH: I mean --

SEC. BAKER: -- or with respect particularly to the Gulf?

REP. ROTH: I'm talking generally -- well, in both instances -- generally, but I was focusing on the Gulf more than anything, of course. I mean, do you have enough controls, you and the President, as far as imposing sanctions and doing what you want in the area of sanctions?

SEC. BAKER: I think there's enough authority there, under IEEPA and other laws, I think the President has fairly broad authority to invoke and initiate sanctions. We have of course supported the Chairman's bill with respect to that issue in the chemical and biological weapons field.

REP. ROTH: Well, thank you. I was just going to mention to you, Mr. Secretary, on Sunday I was with the 870th, that's the transportation unit on its way to Saudi Arabia with their families. And I'm sure that their families and the youngsters I was with are not anxious to have a shooting war -- you know, in response to some of the other members of the committee who said, "Well, let's," you know, or who are implying, "Let's go in and take them out."

I think before we do, I'm glad that you're at the helm, because I think you're a cool person, and I just want to leave this thought with you, that before we start a shooting war I think we have to calculate. It's easy to get into a war. It's hell to get out of a war, many times. And I think that you're a man that understands that and I think I'm speaking for those families when I say, they're there to do the job and they'll do anything you ask them to do. But before we start pulling the trigger, I think we want to have a cool head.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Roth, I think we all agree with you on that, and that's why we've been working so hard to build this consensus that can set up politically, economically and militarily incentives of each type to convince Saddam Hussein he ought to leave Kuwait.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Dymally.

REP. MERVYN M. DYMALLY (D-CA): Mr. Secretary, in response to Mr. Solarz' questions, you suggested that an answer would be appropriately given in executive session. Are you suggesting that if you're about to wage war that the American public is not entitled to know, that this is going to be a big secret that you would share with a few members in executive session?

SEC. BAKER: No, that's not what I'm suggesting, Mr. Dymally. What I'm suggesting is I'm not going to talk about matters that could affect operational security, readiness, and status of forces in an open session.

REP. DYMALLY: Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Payne, and if he has any left I would like to reclaim it.



REP. FASCELL: Mr. Payne.

REP. DONALD M. PAYNE (D-NJ): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a specific question, but I too would like to indicate that I think that the majority of people from my congressional district -- Newark, New Jersey, the 10th Congressional District -- very strongly support those four first items that you have on the first page of your statement. I think that we certainly feel that this kind of aggression can no longer be tolerated.

We do have some concern, though, and I have just listened to your last statement about the fact that fellows have or have not -- and women -- their helmets on or off, and you mentioned, too, you know, they sign up for it, and that's why they're there. They wouldn't be there if they didn't sign up for it. And that's true. But like in Vietnam, where there were 58,000 casualties, there were an extraordinary number of those casualties that were African Americans.

In the Army, there are 30.1 percent African American men and women in the Army; 20.1 percent in the Marines. And we agree. And the reason that they are over there putting their helmets on is because we've cut HUD by 75 percent from 1981 to 1990, where from 32 billion dollars down to less than 8 billion dollars has been spent for low-rent housing. So maybe they need a place to live, or maybe they need a place to work. Or when they finish school there is no job in Newark. And so, sure, they join the Army and they have to put their helmets on; that's why they're there.

But I'd just like to mention to you that we support strongly your four points. I reiterate that, because I'm very patriotic. We're good Americans.

By the same token, we have some concerns that an awful number of African Americans will be involved in a situation where we can't get an accurate count for the census, but we find we've got large numbers of people that can show up in the armed services. So I just want to say that, as the New Jersey Baptist Convention made up of several hundred African American church leaders in New Jersey, we too have a strong concern about teaching him a lesson. "Let's go in now and do the job." "We do it now so we don't have to do it later." I hear a lot of these cliches being thrown around.

I'd certainly like to commend you for the outstanding job you did to get the whole world to support our position, but I think we should dwell on that. We should build on that. We should look for a diplomatic solution. We should try to get more troops from foreign countries there and perhaps have a gradual

withdrawing of US troops. And that's the question, statement, whatever.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Payne, let me say that I don't know anybody in the administration that disagrees with your statement that we should do everything we can to achieve a peaceful diplomatic and political solution to this crisis. That is our preferred approach, strongly so, and that's what we've been working to try and do for the two-plus months since the crisis broke.

REP. PAYNE: Mr. Chairman, do I have half a minute left?

REP. FASCELL: Well, I'm afraid you don't, but maybe we can get somebody to yield you some time in a little while.

How about Mr. Hyde?

REP. HYDE: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and because the newest members on the Committee never get a chance to ask questions, following Mr. Dymally's fine example, I yield to Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Could you tell us what was achieved in the recent visits of the Israeli officials, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, and what was discussed, and also what the US has in mind in dealing with Israel in the next steps in the peace process in the Middle East?

SEC. BAKER: Well, let me say that with respect to the Defense and Foreign Ministers, we reached some agreements regarding security assistance for Israel over and above the regular security assistance.

The regular security assistance, as you know, is \$1.8 billion per year. But in addition to that, following consultations that I had with David Levy and that Dick Cheney had with Moshe Arens, we agreed on the 30th of September and the 4th of October that we would send to Israel as quickly as we possibly could on a grant basis two Patriot air defense units. That's a package that totals about \$114 million in value, and it will enhance Israel's defense against aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles. We're going to send them as well 15 F-15 aircrafts and 10 CH-53 helicopters. And in addition to that, we are going to be accelerating delivery of \$100 million worth of munitions to be placed in a stockpile in Israel.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Do you think that this is going to be beneficial in the sense that Israel will now be able to maintain its edge with the -- with all of the nuclear --

SEC. BAKER: Absolutely. And let me say that our commitment to the security of Israel is unshakeable as is our commitment to

its qualitative edge as far as security is concerned -- military security is concerned. I think that -- it's my view that Israel's security is not diminished but, in fact, enhanced by the presence of 200,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. FASCELL: Let's see. Mr. Lantos.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, allow me at the outset to commend you for the outstanding manner in which you have conducted this affair so far.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you.

REP. LANTOS: I think you deserve the gratitude of the Congress and the American people.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, sir.

REP. LANTOS: I'd like to deal with three issues which are, I think, in a way interrelated. At the opening, you made reference to the hearing of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on the mind-boggling violations of human rights by Iraq in Kuwait. As you know, we held a 2-1/2-hour hearing. We had witnesses ranging from the Kuwaiti Ambassador to American-born wives of Kuwaiti citizens and a 15-year old girl from Kuwait, and the horror story that they presented is something we have not seen since the killing fields of Cambodia or the Holocaust.

So I'm really wondering what some of my colleagues are calling for in terms of additional provocations. If the bayoneting of pregnant women and the burning out of eyes and the killing of children and the removing of incubators from premature infants and the rape of a whole country is not sufficient provocation, I don't know what more is required.

I do have a question concerning your description of the effectiveness of sanctions, and I fully support the policy that you have followed so far. But I think it's obvious to you, Mr. Secretary, as it is obvious to many of us, including the Ambassador of Kuwait, that while sanctions may be inconvenient to Saddam Hussein, it is really absurd to expect that sanctions will bring him down to his knees.

Far more difficult circumstances could be tolerated by totalitarian governments during the Second World War and at other times.

And while I think the policy we are pursuing is a correct one, we need to look at the timeline, because Kuwait is

disappearing. As a matter of fact, when occasionally Saddam Hussein opens up the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, what in fact is happening is Kuwait's indigenous population leaves.

And there is a real danger, Mr. Secretary, that there will be a plebiscite organized by Saddam Hussein involving his loyal Iraqi population, who will then vote to make Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq. I know you are aware of this, but I think it's extremely important to understand that a whole country and a whole people are disappearing while the clock keeps moving.

My final question which I would like you to react to relates to the almost tragic impact of this development on the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. You and I have rejoiced in seeing Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Poland and the others become free and democratic after 50 years of totalitarian rule. And now the doubling of energy prices, the loss of Iraqi indebtedness to them, which the Iraqis will not now pay, might bring these countries down to their knees economically and might make them turn towards a new right wing totalitarian system.

As you know, the Prime Minister of Hungary is here this week telling this same story. The Iraqi crisis is destroying the economy of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Have you given some thought of requesting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the Emirates to consider these newly independent countries as frontline states, not in the sense that Turkey is a frontline state, in a physical sense, but in an economic sense, because the economic hardship inflicted on them is destroying their social and economic structure.

SEC. BAKER: Very quickly, Mr. Lantos -- first of all, thank you for what you said. I've just spent an hour and a half with the Prime Minister of Hungary before I came to this hearing. We talked about this very issue. You are absolutely right. I can't think of any place where we have any more at stake than we do in Central Europe and in the success of those emerging democracies. And we talked about the -- the very, very severe impact that this crisis -- particularly the fact that Soviet oil production is down, their deliveries are down below contracted levels, they're going to go to market prices at the end of the year -- you add all of that together and put \$40 on it, and it's going to put a lot of those countries in a very, very difficult situation. So the answer to your last question is yes, we have thought about seeing -- doing what we can -- seeing what we can do -- maybe not characterizing them as a frontline state but at least pointing out what's at stake here.

Further to that point, I have personally had discussions with the Soviet foreign minister about this problem, and I am

convinced and I think the Hungarian prime minister is convinced, that the Soviets are not doing this in any way in some punitive fashion. The fact of the matter is, their production is down because they themselves are trying to reform their system. And I think they are going to take a look to see what can -- what, if anything, can be done.

On the timing of sanctions, the effectiveness of sanctions, the eradication of Kuwait, I do not disagree with you. All I said was -- and I think this is true -- sanctions are beginning to be effective. We are beginning to see some effect, and we do know that Iraq cannot affect foreign exchange transactions in financial markets -- they cannot affect financial transactions. They can't export oil; they can't get any foreign exchange; and we know that the imports are substantially restricted. So we know that they're beginning to bite.

With respect to their biting to the point of bringing him down, I quite agree with you. That is something that is going to take, if it happens, a substantial period of time. And that is why I said what I said about the eradication of Kuwait. And I think it's very, very important that the Congress had those hearings, that your subcommittee had those hearings. I hope you can have further hearings so that we can focus public attention on the atrocities that this man is committing on fellow Arabs because if it should ever become necessary to use the option of force, it is important that people know what's involved.

So I -- I don't disagree with what you've said with respect to either one of those three subjects, and I thank you for your statement.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Bereuter?

(No response.)

Okay, Mr. Smith?

(No response.)

Mr. Burton?

REP. BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first of all, I want to thank you very much for being so accessible to me and other members of the House. In the past, that hasn't been the case, and I want to thank you for making that effort.

I would just like to say that I understand the need to be

sensitive to the attitudes of the various Arab nations over there. But I have been very concerned about the condemnation by the UN and the resolution that we supported that passed, condemning Israel for their actions.

I have -- I was in Israel not too long ago, and I was at the Wailing Wall. And I saw the proximity of the mosque there to the Wailing Wall, and actually they were stoning some of the people at the Wailing Wall at that particular time. And I was very concerned about the safety of those people, and there were only about 100 people throwing those stones.

The police were called in, and they gassed those people, and they were able to break it up with minimal problems. But there were 3,000 people organized. They had equipment with them to preclude the possibility of them being run off by tear gas. They had those stones stored, and they were literally raining those stones down on those people at the Wailing Wall.

It was a deliberate attempt to try to kill or maim people. And when they used rubber bullets and gas to drive them off, they were ineffective, and they had to resort to very strong action to stop that -- that activity, and to keep people at the Wailing Wall from being killed.

And what my question, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, is, why did we condemn Israel for this action, when Iraqi -- when Iraq gassed the Kurds in their country, and there was no resolution at the UN to condemn Iraq, that I recall, for that gassing, using chemical weapons, to kill their own people?

In Kashmir, India has been killing and persecuting people there and in the Punjab for some time. There has been actions by the PLO -- a number of other things that have taken place. Masawa, Ethiopia, where they bombed innocent women and civilians, and children and there's been no activity like this, and I don't know why, Mr. Secretary, Israel was singled out because they were defending people at the Wailing Wall and some people were killed. And if you could explain that to me I'd sure appreciate it.

SEC. BAKER: I guess the best way to explain it, Mr. Burton, is to say that we were deeply disturbed at what we see as an excessive use of force -- 21 people killed, 150 people injured by live fire. We were disturbed by the violence against innocent worshippers as well, as we made clear during the debate at the United Nations.

Some people have suggested that we voted for this resolution because we were concerned about the Arab consensus that's supporting us on the Iraq-Kuwait matter. I want you to know that we would have voted for that resolution, Mr. Burton, even if there hadn't been an Iraq-Kuwait issue, because there was

excessive force and excessive violence and we simply could not find a way not to condemn those killings.

REP. BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Kostmayer?

REP. KOSTMAYER: Mr. Secretary, can you tell me a ballpark figure of what the percentage of the troops on the ground are American in the Persian Gulf now?

SEC. BAKER: I'll get it for you, Mr. Kostmayer.

REP. KOSTMAYER: Ballpark figure?

SEC. BAKER: So far?

REP. KOSTMAYER: Yes, sir.

SEC. BAKER: The vast majority so far are American. That is with respect to those that have arrived. There are commitments for substantial other forces that have not as yet arrived.

REP. KOSTMAYER: What would you anticipate it might be, say the middle of next year, if we're there by the middle of next year, in terms of what percentage American and what percentage non-American?

SEC. BAKER: Well, if you're talking about with respect to only the commitments that have been made to date, the majority would be American.

REP. KOSTMAYER: As high as --

SEC. BAKER: No, I wouldn't want to put a figure. I can get you an exact figure, because we know what the commitments are and we know what we've got there and will have there, and I'll get that for you if you'd like me to.

REP. KOSTMAYER: Is it a figure we --

SEC. BAKER: But let me suggest to you before you go on that --

REP. KOSTMAYER: Yes, sir.

SEC. BAKER: -- that might change. There could be additional commitments as we move along here.

REP. KOSTMAYER: Well, I hope there will be. I'm told -- and I don't know whether it's correct -- that the Saudis will realize an additional \$58 billion in revenue because of the increase in the price of oil. Don't you think they should be helping out a bit more in terms of their financial assistance --

SEC. BAKER: We talked about that --

REP. KOSTMAYER: -- than they are?

SEC. BAKER: We talked about that yesterday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have to say that the Gulf states were very, very forthcoming when we first approached them some weeks ago. That was before, quite frankly, there was as much of an increase in the price of oil as there has been. And I would refer you to my comment earlier where I said, "As we move into another year -- assuming we do -- the --" in other words, the commitments to date are commitments for 1990.

And the commitments that we obtained, Mr. Kostmayer, were not the only commitments that the Saudi government and other Gulf state governments are making. They're making some other commitments to countries that are being hurt by what's happened and that are furnishing support.

REP. KOSTMAYER: Well I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. Now I'd just conclude by saying that I find it extraordinary that the American people would not be more concerned about that presence of over 200,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf, and yet concerned as they are about the potential increase in the price of gasoline.

I find it befuddling that there's opposition to increasing the price of gasoline in the Congress and in the country when we're prepared to risk those lives in the Persian Gulf. I think oil is still an issue here, and I hope the President will continue to speak out to raise the price of gasoline, which is something he ought to do. And if you tell anybody in Pennsylvania I said that, I'll deny it.

SEC. BAKER: (Laughs.)

REP. KOSTMAYER: Thank you.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Secretary, we'll take an informal recess for three or four minutes -- oh, Mr. Hamilton is right here and he has some questions he wants to ask, and I'll go vote -- (leaving his seat.)

REP. HAMILTON: (To Rep. Fascell) -- Vote right, Mr. Chairman. (To Sec. Baker) -- Everybody gets a break but you, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. BAKER: The Chairman is my proxy, Mr. Hamilton. (Laughter.)

REP. HAMILTON: You better be careful with those proxies. (Laughter.) I've had a little experience with that.



SEC. BAKER: (Laughs.)

REP. HAMILTON: I wanted to raise a question about our commitment. We've had some testimony in the subcommittee about the nature of our commitments in the Gulf. And one of the things I asked in the subcommittee was whether or not there were any written documents which spelled out our commitments.

I'm aware of course of the objectives which you set out in your statement. I'm aware of the general commitment to defend and deter aggression. What kind of long-term commitments is the United States taking on in the Gulf; are we saying to all of the countries in the Gulf that we are going to defend those countries against aggression for unlimited amount of time here?

What is the extent of our commitment?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Hamilton, we are sending, and have sent, just in the last couple of days, copies of the agreements that have been entered into with the Saudi government. I think we may have sent them to the Senate; maybe they haven't come over here; but I'd like to request -- we're sending them up under the Case Act, and as well, I think, letters. And that, I think, represents the extent of the commitments that we have beyond those that the President has articulated.

Now, within what the President's articulated, there could be -- there could be a host of -- of additional countries involved. In other words, securing the stability and -- assuring the security and stability of the Gulf could mean that in addition to having said we would defend Saudi Arabia, we will defend Bahrain, for instance, or a country that is close by. But I would like -- I would prefer rather than -- than going through it on that basis, to send you copies of the agreements.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we have -- do these documents you're sending to us spell out the full extent of the commitment of the United States? Are there any secret commitments that have been made that we are not advised of?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Hamilton, it's my understanding we're obligated to notify under the Case Act all agreements that are entered into. We've done it over in the other body; we'll do it here, and there are none --

REP. HAMILTON: And those agreements --

SEC. BAKER: Let me say that there are no secret agreements of which I am aware. And I'll --

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I tell you if we've got agreements out there that you're not aware of, we're in more trouble than most of us think, I suspect.

SEC. BAKER: And I would -- I would be willing to add that I would -- I would expect to be aware of any such agreements.

REP. HAMILTON: I would hope so. Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, again, welcome to the committee.

Mr. Secretary, it's abundantly clear that energy prices are having a devastating impact on individual Americans and on the economy in general. As a matter of fact, the price for oil per barrel was \$16.10 in July and now it's approximately \$36 a barrel. And, of course, the blame can be firmly fixed on Saddam Hussein, who is probably taking a perverse satisfaction in spiraling oil prices, worsened inflation, and nose-diving financial markets.

Mr. Secretary, it's my understanding that the Saudis have pledged approximately \$6 billion to help defray the cost of the Gulf crisis. However, I have also read some reports that the Saudis stand to earn considerably more in profits from increased oil prices.

And I wonder -- over the years OPEC has routinely dictated the price of oil, largely by regulating supply and then targetting the price of oil, in addition to enhancing oil output, which normally, in a free market exchange would lead to deflated prices. We are in a crisis and perhaps it might be time suspend those normal market forces and perhaps look to some temporary price fixing for oil.

And I was wondering if you might speak to that issue and what can we do and what should the Saudis be doing with regard to those excess profits? How do we get that back to the consumer so that they don't have a bonanza in term of reaped excess oil profits?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think, the one thing -- one thing we've asked them to do, Mr. Smith, is to increase output in order to try and beneficially impact the price. That is, keep the price from rising. It's our sense, I believe -- if you talk to the Energy Department and others -- that -- that the rise has been due pretty much to speculation in the spot market. And it fluctuates with respect to whether or not there is anticipation of conflict in the Gulf and that sort of thing.

The Saudis have agreed to increase their output, so have a number of other countries, I should quickly add. Venezuela, Mexico, and others are doing the same thing in an effort to try and mitigate this problem. And as I just mentioned to Mr. Kostmayer, while the Saudis have been very forthcoming in their support, and, indeed, have done what we have asked, if we move

into 1991 all of the countries that are involved in this effort are going to have to understand that responsibility sharing for 1990 is one thing and responsibility sharing for 1991 is something else.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, obviously output alone is not working, and it may work over the long run, but since we are in a crisis and whole markets stand on the brink of continued nose dive -- look what has happened in the stock market, the Nikkei and elsewhere in the world -- and this is exacerbating inflation, interest rates are being negatively impacted -- what about the idea of a temporary price fix?

I mean, Saddam Hussein, for all of his wrongs -- and they are legion -- has offered -- and I'm glad no one has taken him up on it -- oil at a certain set price. Why is that not an option that ought to be pursued at this point to put a lid on the price of oil? Particularly during this crisis?

And if Mr. Kostmayer had mentioned some of these, or gotten to some of these questions -- I was delayed on the floor during the -- (inaudible) -- on China, so I --

SEC. BAKER: I thought you were foremost among the free market advocates, Mr. Smith?

REP. SMITH: I am, except for the present crises. And even the stock market has certain mechanisms built into it to stop a free fall, and if the price continues to spiral upwards, I'm very fearful it'll have an extremely negative impact on our deficit --

SEC. BAKER: Well, we are fearful as well that it will have an extremely negative impact, and that's why the President has taken the steps he has with respect to our strategic petroleum reserve and that's why we have been as forceful as we have been in our diplomacy with producer countries to increase their production to make up for the shortfall that is occasioned by the sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, every American is concerned about the hostages, about the human shields -- could you update the committee as to our embassy in Kuwait and the -- how our people who are deployed there are faring?

SEC. BAKER: Well I mentioned an answer to the -- I think it was Mr. -- maybe Mr. Broomfield's question early on that one of the resolutions we are pursuing -- or one of the matters we that we are pursuing through a resolution at the United Nations has to do with the possibility of resupplying our nationals in Kuwait with the .ETX basic necessities of life.

What the Iraqis have done is cut off the water, cut off food

deliveries, cut off energy sources to our embassy, and they are basically trying, in violation of all international norms of behavior, to starve us out and to starve out our diplomats. They have been successful with respect to a lot of the other embassies in Kuwait City, and our -- our diplomats in that embassy, and the Americans in that embassy, have demonstrated extraordinary courage. They have hung in there.

The Ambassador has said that the one way I think we can show them what we think of them is to keep our flag flapping in their face, or flying in their face. But they can -- they can go just so long.

But this is inhuman behavior that we are seeing, and therefore, I want to say one more time that I hope that this committee, that the Congress as a whole, and that the American people will understand what we're dealing with here. We're dealing with inhumanity, we're dealing with brutality, and we're dealing with someone who is extraordinarily ruthless.

We're hopeful that we will be able to find a way to get some supplies and provisions to our -- to our people in Kuwait, assuming that the Security Council will go along with it.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Smith of Florida?

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the time that you're going to spend with us today, and the difficulty all of these things poses for American foreign policy balancing.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, because it is pertinent, and it has been of significant interest, certainly, to the news media, who seem to focus on it more than they focus on just about anything else -- do you believe there is a moral equivalency between those dastardly acts of Saddam Hussein which you have described for us today, and as we know them, and the recent events in the State of Israel?

SEC. BAKER: No, I don't, Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: All right. If there isn't, and I believe that is what you would say, why did the US move to sponsor or cosponsor what many of us, and many in this country, considered to be a very unbalanced resolution condemning Israel, not even mentioning Palestinian violence? Was it because of the need to maintain the coalition? I mean, what was the driving force behind pushing through that resolution, which had the effect, notwithstanding any other effect, of driving an enormous wedge in the relationship?

SEC. BAKER: I've already said it wasn't to -- it wasn't

because of the Iraq-Kuwait issue, Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: I apologize. I believe that was a missed impression; I wasn't here for that.

SEC. BAKER: Yeah, well, I said -- I think I'll repeat it -- We would have voted for that resolution whether there had been an Iraq-Kuwait crisis or not because we cannot find any way not to condemn the killings that took place and what we see as an excessive use of force.

Twenty-one people killed and 150 people wounded through the use of live fire. That's why we voted for the resolution.

REP. SMITH: Even though the evidence is significantly clear that if there was an overreaction, it was to Palestinian violence in the first place, which was most likely -- even according to some of that evidence -- preplanned. Is that correct?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Smith, I'm not sure the evidence is that clear. It's my understanding that there are investigations going on now to determine. But, without regard to the question of provocation, we think that the response was excessive when 21 people were killed and 150 people wounded through the use of live fire.

REP. SMITH: I agree that the death of people is a terrible tragedy -- Palestinians, Jews, anyone, Africans, Kuwaitis. But, if, in fact, there wasn't any evidence, why were we so quick to rush on a sanctions -- on a condemnation motion? You just said the evidence isn't there yet. If the evidence isn't there, why do you feel it was necessary --

SEC. BAKER: There is very -- there is abundant evidence, Mr. Smith, that 21 people were killed and 150 people were injured through the use of live fire. That is not subject to debate.

REP. SMITH: Okay.

SEC. BAKER: That is -- that is -- the evidence is quite clear on that --

REP. SMITH: So, if you differentiate this resolution from any kind of moral equivalency with Saddam Hussein, why is it that you personally subjected -- suggested to Shamir that there might be a chance that he or Israel would be charged with acting like Saddam Hussein if they didn't comply with the UN resolution?

Do you believe the signal that sends?

SEC. BAKER: That's not what I did, Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: You did not?

SEC. BAKER: Nope.

REP. SMITH: There isn't a letter which you sent in which you suggest that if they do not --

SEC. BAKER: There's a letter that I sent that said that I would be afraid that they would unjustly -- I said "unjustly" -- and unfairly compared by some if they were unwilling to admit the Secretary General's mission.

I sent that letter as a private communication to the Foreign Minister of Israel. Someone in the Israeli government leaked the letter, Mr. Smith, it was not intended to be a public statement. But it was intended -- it was intended to convey to my friend David Levy my sincere worry about what would happen if the Secretary General's mission was not admitted to Israel.

MR. SMITH: And don't you believe that the kind of signal that that sends, with your saying that there's a chance that people will make this equivalency, is a signal to other people that they should make that charge?

SEC. BAKER: There was no signal sent to anyone, Mr. Smith, other than a private message to the Foreign Minister of Israel.

REP. HAMILTON: The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Bereuter.

REP. BEREUTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony, your responses to questions. I want to commend you and the administration on all the actions that you've taken since the Iraqi invasion. I want to particularly pay tribute to you and the administration and Ambassador Pickering for, I think, what has been an outstanding string of successes at the United Nations. And I'm -- I think about the fact that the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China could have exercised the veto at any time during the Security Council proceedings. I think of that in particular today as we vote to deny MFN to the People's Republic of China.

I noted in your --

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Bereuter, let me interrupt and say thank you for saying that because what we've been able to accomplish we've been able to accomplish only through some rather extraordinary cooperation among the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, something that has never happened before in the history of the United Nations.

REP. BEREUTER: It's an extraordinary success, and it's led to so many other things that are going very positively for the United Nations and the world as a result of it.

You mentioned the kind of financial commitment that Japan has now pledged to make with respect to actions in the Persian Gulf to support the multilateral force, and I certainly think that's appropriate. I'd ask for even more, but that's a remarkable success given the reluctance there.

On Tuesday, a bill was introduced in the Japanese Diet which would purportedly permit the deployment of Japanese soldiers abroad for the first time since World War II. I am concerned about that. I know leaders throughout Southeast Asia would be concerned about that. I understand there may be some discussion in the Japanese government about deploying military and noncombatant roles to be supportive, but I'm wondering if there -- is this an initiative in any way responding to American action, or is this something that is being introduced which may not be a part of the Japanese government's intention?

Can you -- are you able to answer?

SEC. BAKER: No, I think it's part of the Japanese government's intention. I think -- I may be wrong about this, but I believe, Mr. Hyde (sic), that it is limited to deployments in connection with United Nations sanction efforts, not deployments that might be unilateral by the Japanese government.

REP. BEREUTER: It may be. Are we encouraging them in any way to do this, or is this an action they're taking unilaterally?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we encourage them if they possibly could to present some physical presence in the Gulf as a matter of sending a very important political signal. This is the second largest economy in the world. They are more and more important in world economic and political affairs, and it was our sense that it would be important for them to contribute not just financially but, if they could, militarily; if they couldn't, through hospital personnel. And I think they are, in fact, sending some medical personnel.

REP. BEREUTER: I understand the motivation. Let me express my deep concern about pushing the Japanese to deploy military forces abroad for any reason.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being very responsive.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My mike seems to be stuck, so --

Mr. Secretary, can you give us clarification that the US opposes linkage between a solution to the Gulf crisis and a solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis?

SEC. BAKER: I can refer you to our public statements -- consistent public statements to that effect, Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE: Do you want to elaborate on those at all or just refer us to the past ones?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we think it would -- we've said over and over again we think it would be a mistake to do that, and quite frankly, the Soviets and others have joined us in taking that position. There are some countries that have said that that I'm not sure really believe it. We do.

REP. LEVINE: What is our position on -- SEC. BAKER: I don't mean to suggest the Soviet Union, either. I'm not referring to --

REP. LEVINE: I understand that, and I appreciate your response. What is your position on the Mitterrand proposal? Is it fair to say that this is not US policy?

SEC. BAKER: Well, you know, they tell us that -- they tell us that the proposal that Mr. Mitterrand made in his speech to the General Assembly does not walk back in the slightest from the UN Security Council resolutions, and we accept that, and therefore, we think that it comports with United States policy.

REP. LEVINE: If the French or others were to suggest a policy that did move toward linkage, I take it that we would reject that position?

SEC. BAKER: We don't think these two things ought to be linked, Mr. Levine. We think it would -- as I've said, we think it'd be a mistake.

REP. LEVINE: Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. I think it's a helpful clarification. I would say, with all due respect, that at times perhaps through inadvertence -- I don't believe intentionally -- but perhaps through inadvertence we may have sent signals -- the President's speech at the United Nations, the unfortunate reference in the letter to Mr. Levy -- that at least gave the impression of linkage. And I think it's important to put that to rest.

SEC. BAKER: Well, wait a minute, now. That -- let me get back to that a minute. That was a private message that was not



intended to create linkage or to suggest linkage or anything else. So I don't think it does. Now, with respect to the President's speech, again, what the President said was, after we take care of this Iraq-Kuwait problem, there may be opportunities with respect to other issues. You and I have supported for 20 months efforts to reinvigorate a peace process, and you have been foremost in the Congress, I think, in recognizing the importance of having a peace process. So it doesn't constitute linkage, in my view, for us to say, "When we take care of this problem, we think we need to address the Arab-Israeli problem and get a viable peace process going." That's all I'm saying.

REP. LEVINE: Well, and I share that, as you know. I think it is important, though, to be drawing a very clear line, as you have done, between these two issues which are so separate and which Saddam and others whose goals are completely contradictory from ours would like to blur together. I would hope that, once the Gulf crisis is resolved, and presumably satisfactorily, that when we move toward reinvigorating a peace process, which I frankly hope we do, that we will do that in the context of emphasizing that nothing will weaken the US-Israel relationship and that any subsequent resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be predicated on both public and unequivocal Arab recognition of Israel. And I would be interested in knowing whether in the course of our dealings and communications with the Arab states at this point in time we are trying to move that along, or if we intend to do that after the Gulf crisis is over.

SEC. BAKER: Well, we -- as you know, we tried very hard to move that along for 14, 15 months, both -- not just an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, but we took every occasion we could to suggest to Arab governments that they ought to recognize Israel as, indeed, Egypt has done. And that's a -- that is a component, and a very important component, we think, of ultimately achieving peace in the region. So it's something that's -- that we think is very important.

We're not having detailed discussions now for obvious reasons -- because of the situation that exists in the Gulf.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Goss.

REP. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, your written testimony today indicates how helpful Egypt has been to us; you've just alluded to it. We're all aware of the recent assassination of the speaker of the Egyptian parliament. I wonder if you would like to elaborate a little bit on the debt forgiveness question that is before us.

It's certainly not without controversy on this side, and I'd like to hear some of the arguments that you'd like to proffer for it.

SEC. BAKER: Let me say, of all the pieces of legislation that are up here now, from the standpoint of foreign and security policy I can't think of one that is more important than the Egyptian debt proposal.

President Mubarak has taken a very, very courageous stand in this Gulf crisis. He has not only taken a courageous stand; he is sending two full divisions of troops -- an armored and, I think, a mechanized -- division. There are 55 million Arabs in Egypt; they represent far and away the greatest Arab population, by country. This is a matter of some real urgency and importance to President Mubarak.

It will not create a major budget hit as far as the United States is concerned. The impact on our budget will be de minimis, really, and it will be far less than the principal amount of the debt. We've known for a long time that this debt was basically uncollectible, and we've gotten value received, frankly, for the loans that are represented by this debt in the form of actions that Egypt has taken through the years, including its actions at Camp David in making peace with Israel. It's very important that we get this -- this Egyptian debt proposal passed.

REP. GOSS: I agree with you that it's very important, and I think we're going to have considerable debate and we need to have all the best points to the argument.

I would like to go to one other area of your written testimony, Mr. Secretary, under "The Need for Time" in your written remarks. And my point, I think, is very simple. We've had a lot of information, as we have been kept very well up to speed, I believe, as members of Congress, on what's been going on. And I congratulate the administration on that. We are told often that time is working against us in the "Iraqization" of Kuwait every day. We are told that time may be working against us because of the frictions of the different cultures, the different background, the religious traditions in our host country -- Saudi Arabia -- with our armed forces over there. And on the other hand, we know that time is what we need for the sanctions to work.

My question to you is, do you believe time is our ally?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I don't think that time has been our enemy, so far, to the extent that we originally feared it would be. And -- and I -- so I think you can make good arguments on both sides of that -- of that question, Mr. Goss. But there are also considerations that have to be -- that have to be

evaluated, concerning the readiness of forces and status of forces and things like that that I'm not prepared to talk about here.

REP. GOSS: I certainly understand that and I appreciate your candor. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

REP. : Will -- will the gentleman yield to me for just a few seconds?

REP. GOSS: Be happy to.

REP. : Mr. Secretary, when you were talking to Mr. Lantos about Hungary and other countries in Eastern Europe, one country that didn't get mentioned by name is Bulgaria. And I know that when the President of Bulgaria was here he made a point of explaining to us just how seriously this was effecting their economy -- they're going along with us --

SEC. BAKER: They get more oil from Iraq, I think, than any other eastern or central European country and they are being very adversely affected. And I did not exclude any countries when I said central --

REP. : No -- no -- I know, but I just wanted to make sure it got into the record. Because I think that it's an act of extraordinary courage, in light of what they're facing now.

SEC. BAKER: I agree with you.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Feighan.

REP. FEIGHAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome to the committee. And let me associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle who have commended you and the other members of the administration who've chartered our very difficult course over the past couple of months in the Middle East.

I would like, in the interest of time, to just probe, perhaps with one question or -- or several if I can, one new -- relatively new dimension and that is our changing relationship with Syria.

You -- last month -- visited with President Assad of Syria. Over the past several days, I have been particularly disturbed, as I think a large number of Americans have been, by the events unfolding in Lebanon. And I wonder if you could share with us your views of our changing if it is, relationship with Syria, the posture that we have taken or should be taking with respect to the very significant loss of life over the past two days in Lebanon. It is reported that some 200 to 300 civilians have

been killed with the introduction of Syrian troops into Lebanon in order to oust General Aoun. And what all of this means in the context of what you described for us at your last meeting before the committee as a new security arrangement in the region --

SEC. BAKER: Yeah, sure.

REP. FEIGHAN: -- how Syria fits in?

SEC. BAKER: I'll be glad to. Let me say, first of all, that we are appreciative of the role that Syria is playing in support of the international coalition in the Gulf. And its commitment of troops to that effort is particularly welcome. We would like to think that this could lead to a more constructive Syrian role on other issues.

Perhaps that remains to be seen, but I was -- I spent a fair amount of time in my visit with President Asad in Damascus, Congressman, emphasizing the fact that we have some serious differences with the Syrian government pertaining primarily to the issue of terrorism. I've since met with Foreign Minister Shara' in New York at the United Nations. Better relations between Syria and the United States are really going to depend upon their being willing to take action to curb some of the activities of terrorist groups.

Now, I will say that the Syrians have said for the first time publicly -- the Foreign Minister when I was in Damascus, that if we can and will present them with the evidence, the action will be taken. They've never been willing to say that before. So we're exploring that and we're going to see the degree to which we can get better cooperation on that front because that's critical to a substantial improvement in the relationship.

Notwithstanding that, we still want Syria's assistance and Syria's help in the endeavor that we are engaged in in the Gulf in an attempt to reverse Saddam Hussein's aggression. And we're appreciative of the support that they're giving.

REP. FEIGHAN: At this point, Mr. Secretary, we would have no plans to remove Syria, however, from the list of those countries that --

SEC. BAKER: Not --

REP. FEIGHAN: -- supports terrorism?

SEC. BAKER: Not now.

REP. FEIGHAN: And, Mr. Secretary, just finally, I would hope that we would have a statement from the administration

expressing at the least our deep concern at the loss of life that has resulted because of the introduction of troops into Lebanon. I'm sure that those reports are probably underestimated, and it does seem ironic that as we are proceeding to encourage the UN to condemn the loss of Palestinian life -- and appropriately so -- of 19 Palestinians, it seems appropriate that we should be pursuing a condemnation of the loss of so many innocent civilians in Lebanon as well.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Feighan, let me say we've condemned violence in Lebanon for a long time. Most recently, we argued against that in President Bush's meeting on the 29th of September with the Prime Minister of Lebanon in New York, so suggestions that somehow we've given a green light for this are wrong. That's not the case. We simply have not done that.

I do think we should recognize that Syria was there at the request of the legitimate government of Lebanon, a government that we recognize, and a government that we support.

REP. FEIGHAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Weiss.

REP. WEISS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, as you know, I have commended the President and you for the role that you've played and he's played in standing up against naked, brutal aggression, and I want to reaffirm that. However, I think that there is a great deal of concern that I share with my constituency, and I think people across the country, that we've gone from the point of defending against aggression to being determined to undertake offensive military action.

There is a great deal of distrust, I think, across the country that in fact there's going to be a bypassing of normal representational constitutional processes in undertaking that kind of military action, and my question, I guess, to you is are you ready to follow the normal constitutional processes if in fact determination is made to undertake offensive military action, so that the Congress can in fact play its constitutional role in the declaration of war?

SEC. BAKER: We are quite prepared to fully consult with the Congress, Mr. Weiss. We -- let me say one more time, we would really prefer to find a peaceful political and diplomatic solution to this. We simply cannot rule out the use of force -- nor can we -- can we, you and I, in the few minutes we've got, solve the constitutional problem presented by the War Powers Act. But, the Congress has been supportive of the President. It's been supportive of what we've tried to do. And there are a lot of people --

REP. WEISS: (Off mike) -- (Not on this point ?)

SEC. BAKER: -- if I may say this -- that are up there, sitting up there with you who are -- who've indicated some impatience with the fact that the helmet hasn't been fully put on yet.

REP. WEISS: But it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that if in fact you make the decision as the Executive Branch that you want to go to war, in offensive military fashion, that you would find -- you ought to find that you have support of the public -- of the American people through their elected representatives.

I don't understand why you have such little faith in the democratic process that you would -- you would say, "Well, we'll consult." The Constitution is quite clear. It is up to Congress to declare war.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Weiss is it -- is it war if we respond in what we think is an -- and what you would probably think -- is an appropriate way to the murder of some American civilians in Iraq?

REP. WEISS: Again, I -- what I -- I was very careful in saying offensive military action on the part of the administration --

SEC. BAKER: Well, the response would --

REP. WEISS: -- on the part of our government.

SEC. BAKER: The response in all probability would not be defensive.

REP. WEISS: Even in that instance it seems to me that you would want to come to the Congress and have the Congress tell you, "Yes, this is such a serious violation we want you to go to war."

SEC. BAKER: We would --

REP. WEISS: Do you want to do that?

SEC. BAKER: We would expect to consult, and we will consult, but as I said in the other body yesterday, I really think it would be self-defeating if we came back, the Congress was called back into session -- take the example I've just given you --

REP. WEISS: Yes.

SEC. BAKER: -- called back into session, and we have days of debate about whether and what we should or should not do.

REP. WEISS: But you know, Mr. Secretary --

SEC. BAKER: No, don't use these -- don't use this Air Wing, use this one over here. Or don't use that division, use this one over here.

REP. WEISS: No, no. Mr. Secretary, I'm old enough to remember December 7th of 1941. And I remember that under the face of an unprovoked attack -- a sneak attack is what we -- by Japan, President Roosevelt on December 8th came to Congress and asked for a declaration of war. I don't see why you can't --

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Weiss, that's a totally different situation. And you and I might under the circumstances like that find ourselves immediately in agreement. What I can't do is make a general, across-the-board commitment here today.

Just like you're not going to want to make a commitment that the Executive Branch should go out and do whatever it deems necessary under the circumstances. You're not going to bless our action in advance, and I really -- I don't think you should ask us to give you carte blanche in advance.

REP. WEISS: I'd just like you to be more sensitive to the constitutional responsibilities that we each have. Thank you.

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you, Mr. Engel?

REP. ENGEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I too have been vocal in supporting the President and yourself in what we've done in the Persian Gulf, but I must say, I'm very much chagrined along with my colleagues over what I consider to be the shameful United States sponsoring of the UN resolution condemning Israel. Why do we ignore evidence to show that the rock throwing was orchestrated to, first of all, crack the alliance against Iraq, to get Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait off center stage, and to bring the PLO back onto center stage? The UN resolution, which we sponsored, makes no mention that innocent people that were worshipping at the Western Wall had rocks thrown on them and that that led -- the rock throwing started the whole process. And I just think it's shameful that we not only voted for it, but actually sponsored it.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Engel, I don't think -- what you're really saying is, you think the resolution was unbalanced, and I have to tell you, I think the response was unbalanced, and the resolution condemns the response. The response was the killing of 21 people and the wounding of 150 other people through live fire in response to rock throwing. Now, we did not see how we could refuse to condemn that.

REP. ENGEL: But Mr. Secretary, how can you condemn a response that makes no notion of the provocation which led to the response, makes no mention of the provocation?

SEC. BAKER: We think the response was excessive, Mr. Engel. We think that there is really no excuse for what happened, and we think that the killing of 21 people and the wounding of 150 others through the use of live fire simply was not excusable. So we voted, along with the rest of the Security Council, to condemn the action.

REP. ENGEL: We -- what you're saying, Mr. Secretary, is that we look at one side and we don't look at the other, and I just think that --

SEC. BAKER: That's not what I'm saying at all.

REP. ENGEL: -- that's inexcusable.

At the start of your testimony, which you didn't read, Mr. Secretary, you gave us four of the President's goals, and I won't mention that again. One of them was not any discussion regarding Saddam Hussein. If Saddam Hussein withdrew from Kuwait tomorrow and went back to Iraq, wouldn't we simply leave him there with all his chemical weapons, possibly atomic weapons, and other weapons? That certainly couldn't be acceptable to us, could it?

SEC. BAKER: Well, that's hypothetical. We have in the past talked about how we might want to address the threat, the remaining threat that would be represented by his continuing there with a disproportionate military capability and with weapons of mass destruction. And we've talked about why for that reason it might be important to consider regional security arrangements with countries in the region; of course, at the forefront of those, why it might be important to consider whether or not the -- an international arms embargo should continue to be maintained against someone who has built up a military capability like this, and weapons of mass destruction and shown no compunction about using them.

REP. ENGEL: Finally, Mr. Secretary, I -- I think that as the United States were spending billions to protect Saudi Arabia, that we could seize the opportunity to press for Saudi moderation with regard to -- to Israel. I've seen none of that, and I'm wondering if such discussions have been conducted with the Saudis.

SEC. BAKER: We've had discussions with the Saudis to that effect before this -- before this matter surfaced, Mr. Engel -- without -- without good effect.

REP. ENGEL: Which matter, Mr. Secretary? I'm sorry.

SEC. BAKER: Well about the -- about showing -- improving their attitude toward Israel and acknowledging Israel's right to



exist.

REP. HAMILTON: The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. Secretary, I understand you're running out of time. We do have Mr. Ackerman here.

The chair recognizes Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Yes. Thank you very much.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate this private meeting with you -- (general laughter). I heard -- I heard things were a little testy over in the other -- the other house yesterday. But you didn't have to bring your own drinking water, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. BAKER: Own drinking what?

REP. ACKERMAN: Your own drinking water. I noticed you brought your own glass.

SEC. BAKER: It's Dr. Pepper, Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Oh -- no -- I -- I understand but I've already tested this. You can share our water. There's no threat here. (Sec. Baker laughs)

Let me -- let me, Mr. Secretary, congratulate you on the way that you have skillfully pulled together the international community behind our military and economic efforts, vis a vis the situation we're -- we're talking about. I noticed from your testimony that you've been successful to the extent that we have received pledges of \$20 billion from other nations of the world. I guess this makes us the world's historically largest recipient of foreign aid on the planet. And I also noticed that -- from your statement you've saved --

SEC. BAKER: Only ten of that's coming to us, Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: I -- I understand. But you're still doing better, aren't you? You're still working at it?

SEC. BAKER: Yeah.

REP. ACKERMAN: I noticed also that it's running us about a billion dollars a month, and if you equate the 20 with -- with the one and you put the war on budget, I think we would be able to resolve the deficit crisis and you'd be accomplishing as Secretary of State what you were unable to do as Secretary of the Treasury --

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, sir, thank you again.

REP. ACKERMAN: It's remarkable.

A couple of less serious questions: at what point does an action become a war?

SEC. BAKER: That gets to the question that I was just -- the colloquy I was just having with Mr. Weiss -- and I'm not sure I can define that for you, Mr. Ackerman. I don't think it can be defined particularly precisely.

He gave the example of Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war that followed Pearl Harbor. That would be, it seems to me, one extreme and it would be very clear that -- that --

REP. ACKERMAN: Are there any circumstances in the current situation that you see that could cause you to seek a declaration of war?

SEC. BAKER: I think I just indicated yes to Mr. -- in answer to Mr. Weiss's question -- that if you had a repeat of something like Pearl Harbor, that without committing the President and -- because I can't -- that's something that would certainly -- you would very definitely want to consider. And you'd want to consider it because of the beneficial effect of having the support of the Congress and having the Congress behind you.

REP. ACKERMAN: Is anything short of massive destruction of US lives and US property on US soil or bases that could bring us into a war situation that --?

SEC. BAKER: Perhaps.

REP. ACKERMAN: I think --

SEC. BAKER: But it's very imprecise. I mean, I don't know --

REP. ACKERMAN: No, I understand, it's imprecise and we all realize that it's very, very serious. And I think that part of the frustrations that you're hearing on the part of a lot of my colleagues, Mr. Secretary, is that the American people at this point seem to be aboard, and a lot of us are on board. And some of us are basically saying that while the going is good, we think you should be looking to sign some of us up because if we go down the road to an extent that public opinion starts diverting from our effort, you're going to see a lot of divisions, and the getting may be as good as it's going to get right now.

SEC. BAKER: Yes, sir, I don't disagree with that. I think you're right, and I agree with you.

REP. ACKERMAN: The --

REP. HAMILTON: The gentleman's time has expired.

REP. ACKERMAN: May I try one more question, Mr. Chairman?

REP. HAMILTON: The Secretary is way over time, Mr. Ackerman. Go ahead quickly, if you would. We still have Mr. McCloskey here.

REP. ACKERMAN: Just on the situation vis-a-vis Israel. You did make mention, in response to somebody else's question, that an investigation is going to commence and a determination will be made. I have some serious concerns about the UN or any other body, and it seems to offend my sense of justice, for a determination to be made, and then an investigation to take place. It's like giving out the sentence and then having the trial.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I don't think we agree with that, Mr. Ackerman, primarily because under almost any set of circumstances you could imagine, it is our view at least, that the response was -- was -- was excessive.

REP. ACKERMAN: The --

SEC. BAKER: The response to what happened was excessive because 21 people were killed, 150 were wounded with live ammunition.

REP. ACKERMAN: Was the US response of our troops at Kent State excessive?

SEC. BAKER: There were four people killed at Kent State, and it was clearly excessive.

REP. ACKERMAN: Was there a condemnation at the UN of the United States?

SEC. BAKER: No, but there wasn't a debate, either, about whether or not it was sovereign United States territory.

REP. HAMILTON: The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. McCloskey.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your patience, and --

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. McCloskey, may you use the microphone, please?

REP. MCCLOSKEY: I appreciate your patience and the excellent responses you've basically given today. Two or three basic

points, and some of this may have been covered in all the coming and going today, but you mentioned that the Egyptian debt was really in -- reality an incidental item. I just want to say in all due respect I understand that, but given the trends in the American budget and given the way the American people feel about foreign aid generally, perceptions of that are not good. I mean, a lot of people are seeking us out as to that item and others, but particularly --

SEC. BAKER: I know it's a hard vote, Mr. McCloskey. I really understand that. But it is an important vote, and it is a principled vote. And it is very important to our success in the Gulf.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: Well --

SEC. BAKER: I can't overemphasize that.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: That's exactly what I want to talk about, a basic principle in all of this. Is there a principle that the Saudis would agree to that, given the world hike in oil prices, that they should not be in a position to have any economic windfall from this, in effect, their public and family revenues and so forth should essentially be the same coming out of this, or less, given they should sacrifice also, as it -- as it would --

SEC. BAKER: Well, so far, let me say I think the Saudis have been very generous in the support that they've offered to us, and -- as well they should be -- and to other nations, including frontline states. And I think that that generosity will continue, and it will continue with particular reference to what's happening to their income.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: Can you assure us, then, that they won't come out ahead economically? SEC. BAKER: No, of course I'm not going to assure you that. I'm not going to assure you that other oil producers won't, either, because I can't make that assurance.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: I would suggest that when we're dealing with things like the Egyptian debt that that would be a good principle to proffer to them both ethically and politically.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. McCloskey, let me say to you one more time that the cancellation of Egyptian debt will have a de minimis impact on our budget, because it's already been written down. The Saudis are providing us with more funds than it actually costs us to maintain troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia. So we are getting valued received, in that sense, from the Saudis.

REP. MCCLOSKEY: Well, I understand that, and all due respect, sir, you're not -- you're not really answering the principle

I'm raising. But as to another concern, I'm very concerned about any possible clash if this goes on as to -- let's call it Islamic sensibilities vis-a-vis the freedom and the dignity, if you will, of our service personnel. For example, the other night on Nightline -- I don't know if you saw it or not, but there was an interview interrupted by one of our military PR people, because the soldier involved was referring to his faith in God. Similarly speaking, our soldiers and young men and women get their mail checked for customs as to Bibles, magazines, et cetera. Are there efforts being made --

SEC. BAKER: Yeah, we've cured a lot of that. We've cured the problem of religious material coming into our troops so that they can worship and practice their religion. And we have to recognize, I think, that that is a totally different culture and society. They have to make adjustments. They are making those adjustments. And it is a problem and it's something that we discuss with them quite frequently.

REP. HAMILTON: The gentleman's time is expired. The Secretary's time is expired. We thank you, sir, for your testimony. And we stand adjourned until five minutes after five, when the Committee will reassemble for consideration of several matters.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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*Mr duChateau*

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF IRAQ ACHIEVED  
(Transcript: Baker Senate testimony 10/17/90)

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker says "the political and economic isolation" of Iraq for its aggression against Kuwait has been achieved and the "costs and responsibilities for enforcing this isolation are being fairly distributed" among nations worldwide.

"Economic leakage is minimal," Baker said in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee October 17 in which he summed up U.S. and multinational efforts in the Persian Gulf crisis. He added that "The Iraqi economy will suffer badly and the Iraqi war machine will be hurt, too."

On the military track, he noted that soldiers and sailors from 25 countries, including major units from Egypt and Syria, are now deployed in the gulf "to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to ensure the effective implementation of the U.N. sanctions."

Baker cautioned that "we must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions tightens" against Iraq and that "unity remains essential" and "the best hope for a peaceful solution to this conflict as well."

Following is the text of Baker's prepared statement to the committee along with Senators Pell and Helms' opening statements and the transcript of the Q and A session:

(Begin Baker's statement)

Six weeks ago, it was my privilege to speak to this committee and through you, to the American people, about Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. At that time, I outlined the president's goals:

First, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 660;

Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;

Third, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and

Fourth, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

I also described our strategy for achieving these goals.

The key element of that approach is American leadership of a global alliance that isolates Iraq -- politically, economically, and militarily.

Today, I would like to discuss with you what we have done to carry out that strategy since early September, including how responsibilities are being shared and what results have been achieved.

#### Maintaining the Coalition

First, we have been working successfully through the U.N. Security Council to isolate Iraq politically and to impose penalties for its refusal to comply with the U.N. resolutions. That effort is continuing today as the Council considers its tenth resolution on the Gulf.

Second, we have secured notable cooperation from the Soviet Union. We have described this conflict as the first real crisis of the post Cold-War period. The positive approach of the Soviet Union has validated that label. In their Helsinki Joint Statement, President Bush and President Gorbachev declared, "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors."

Since then, I have met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on several occasions, both in Moscow and in New York, and have talked to him on the phone frequently. The Soviets continue to support the objectives of the Security Council Resolutions.

Third, from the beginning, we recognized that maintaining such an unprecedented international coalition would necessitate special efforts. The United States could lead -- indeed, had to lead -- but we should not carry the responsibility alone. The principle of shared responsibility had to be observed.

We must jointly face the military threat. But we must also act collectively to support the many nations observing the economic embargo or contributing forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia. Iraq's pillage of Kuwait continues to displace hundreds of thousands of workers, straining the resources of neighboring states and the fragile economies of their homelands.

Immediately after testifying before this committee early last month, I left at the president's request to visit our major allies and partners in the Arabian Peninsula, the European Community, Italy, and Germany to put responsibility sharing into effect. The secretary of the Treasury led a similar mission to London, Paris, Tokyo, and Seoul. This exercise in sharing responsibilities produced commitments of 20,000 million dollars in resources, equally divided between support for the front line states of Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan and assistance to the multinational military effort. This includes support for a substantial portion of our incremental defense costs, now running about 1,000 million dollars per month.

I would summarize the results of our on-going efforts as follows:

Fifty-four nations have contributed or offered to contribute militarily and/or economically to the Gulf effort.

The three Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have agreed to contribute more than 12,000 million dollars to this effort in 1990. All of the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have contributed troops to the multinational force in Saudi Arabia and are providing access and services in support of U.S. forces. Host nation support for our deployed forces includes the free use of ports, logistical facilities, bases, and fuel.

The United Kingdom is deploying over 6,000 combat troops, over 50 aircraft, and 12 warships.

France has deployed over 4,000 combat troops, 30 aircraft, and 12 warships.

Japan has pledged 4,000 million dollars: 2,000 million dollars in support of the military effort plus 2,000 million dollars in economic aid. And we hope to see that commitment fulfilled promptly and in a form immediately usable.

Germany has pledged 2,000 million dollars: 1,000 million dollars in support of the military effort plus 1,000 million dollars in economic aid.

The European Community has pledged 670 million dollars in economic aid, along with member state commitments of an additional 1,300 million dollars.

Italy has deployed four warships and eight aircraft.

Korea has pledged 220 million dollars: 95 million dollars in support of the military effort plus 125 million dollars in economic aid.

To coordinate timely and effective economic assistance to the front line states, the president launched the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordinating Group on September 25. This group unites the major donors of Europe, Asia, and the Gulf under U.S. chairmanship, with technical support from the IMF and World Bank. We see it as an important vehicle for maintaining the international coalition.

The most important demonstration of America's commitment to bolstering the economic stability of our front-line allies is the president's proposal to cancel Egypt's FMS debt. No other signal would send the same powerful message to our friends in the region that we are determined to stand by them, even on the toughest issues. Last Thursday's (October 11) assassination of the speaker of Egypt's Parliament is a tragic reminder of how far Egypt's enemies are prepared to go to divert President Mubarak from his responsible and courageous course. Strong Congressional endorsement of Egyptian debt cancellation would



provide Egypt critical economic relief and send a powerful and timely signal that the United States stands by its friends.

Mr. Chairman, the political and economic isolation of Iraq has been achieved. The costs and responsibilities for enforcing this isolation are being fairly distributed. Economic leakage is minimal. The Iraqi economy will suffer badly and the Iraqi war machine will be hurt, too.

#### The Military Track

A discussion of diplomacy and economic sanctions, however, should not blind us to the other essential track of our policy: the military build-up in the gulf. I have just detailed for you the contributions made by our allies, including combat units, aircraft, and warships. In addition, Arab states such as Egypt and Syria are sending major units. There are now many thousands of Arab and Muslim soldiers deployed with the multinational forces in and around Saudi Arabia. And, of course, very large numbers of American marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen are there already. All told, over 25 countries are now supplying men or materiel in support of the Security Council resolutions.

Our military objectives are to deter an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and to ensure the effective implementation of the U.N. sanctions. Economic sanctions against an aggressor like Saddam Hussein would never be effective unless the international community could help ensure the security of those nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who must apply those sanctions. Our military forces are also there to protect American lives and to provide an effective and decisive response should Iraq escalate its aggression to active combat with the multinational force.

Saddam Hussein must know that he lacks not only the political and economic options of holding Kuwait but also the military option to succeed with his aggression. The political, economic, and military aspects of our strategy reinforce each other.

#### The Need for Time

As the strategy takes effect, we face a difficult task. We must remain firm, not wavering from the goals we have set or our focus on the blatant aggression committed by Iraq. We must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions tightens with increasing severity.

Some may urge action for action's sake. But the only truly effective action we can take now is to continue to heighten

Iraq's political, economic, and military isolation. Every day -- in Washington, in New York, in the region -- we continue our search for a peaceful solution.

Action that moves toward a partial solution would be selfdefeating appeasement.

And should there be any doubt about the awful consequences of a partial solution, I would urge a close look at what Saddam Hussein is doing to the people of Kuwait. Because Saddam Hussein controls access to the true story of Kuwait, this is a story that is not told frequently enough. So I commend the Congress' effort to secure eyewitness testimony of the brutalities now taking place.

It is the rape of Kuwait. Hospitals have been looted without regard for the sick. Parents have been tortured and executed in front of their children. Children have been tortured and executed in front of their parents. Even after his military conquest, Saddam has continued to make war on the people of Kuwait.

Let me be blunt: Saddam Hussein has invaded and tortured a peaceful Arab neighbor purely for self-aggrandizement. He is not raping Kuwait to advance the Palestinian cause.

We cannot allow this violent way to become the wave of the future in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein must fail if peace is to succeed. The prospects for a just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors will be shattered if he prevails.

It is time to clear the air once and for all about the relationship between Saddam's aggression in Kuwait and other conflicts and problems in the region. I will put it to you simply: Does anyone seriously think that if this aggression succeeds, that prospects will be better for peace between Israel and the Palestinians? Can anyone seriously believe that if Iraq wins this contest with the international community, it will be easier to eliminate chemical weapons or biological weapons or nuclear weapons in the region?

Of course not.

Every hope for peace in this conflict-ridden region depends on stopping Iraq's aggression and ultimately reversing its capacity for future aggression.

Defeating Aggression

Let me sum it up.

Since we met last, a great coalition of nations has gathered to isolate Iraq and its dictator. Where before his aggression Saddam Hussein found allies of consequence, today he finds none. Where before the invasion, the Iraqi economy had important international links, today it has none. And where once there were prospects for successful Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia, today there are none.

Unity remains essential. I do not believe we could have come this far if most nations did not agree with President Bush that we all have a stake in a world where conflicts are settled peacefully. And that unity, expressed in political, economic and military terms, remains the best hope for a peaceful solution to this conflict as well.

Mr. Chairman, it is gratifying that the vast majority of Americans have rallied behind the president in support of both our goals and our strategy in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, most of the world has done so, as well. Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to ruin the region. He cannot be allowed to spoil this time of hope in the world for a more secure and prosperous future. There is a morality among nations. That morality must prevail.

(End Baker's statement)

(Begin Pell's remarks)

SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL (DEMOCRAT OF RHODE ISLAND): The committee will come to order. Mr. Secretary, we extend a warm welcome to you, congratulate you on the excellent work you've done to marshal multilateral support for a strong stand against Iraqi aggression. Our country and Congress support the administration's actions to date in response to the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait.

I scheduled this hearing because of real concern that many Americans have -- which we share -- that we may soon go to war in the Persian Gulf. We should understand that a war with Iraq would entail thousands of lost American lives and expenditure of billions of dollars in the military.

So far, President Bush has maintained a steady hand on the helm, a steady course, using tough economic sanctions and concerted diplomatic action to isolate Iraq. The president has counseled patience as the embargo squeezes Iraq and as the diplomatic offensive isolates it.

I believe though, that with patience, these actions stand a strong likelihood of achieving our objectives, and I applaud the president of resisting the advice of those who would urge unilateral military action. This is a dangerous situation in the Persian Gulf, and obviously military action against Iraq cannot be ruled out.

If military action is required, it's my view the president should act in a multilateral context and under a UN mandate. The UN approach has been successful so far and we should stay that course with all further steps, including any military ones.

In addition, a formal mechanism should be developed for consultation with the Congress if and when military options are considered. It is in the administration's interest that Congress share the responsibility for taking the nation to war. If there's one clear lesson we learned from the Vietnam experience, it is that the support of the American people, as expressed through their representatives in Congress, is vital. More fundamentally, shared responsibility is what the founding fathers of our countries intended, and we should be faithful to that intent.

Finally, I would urge the administration to conduct a search and review of United States policy and actions preceding Hussein's aggression. As we know, the Senate on four occasions, in the two years prior to the invasion of Kuwait, approved legislation to sanction Iraq for its repeated violations of international law, including the use of poison gas against its own citizens. Unfortunately, these efforts were successfully resisted by the Reagan and the Bush administrations with no compensating improvement in Iraq's conducts.

I bring this up not to assign preterit blame to a particular view, rather I believe the administration would benefit from determining why the policy of business as usual with Iraq failed. Finding the answers to that question could help to insure past mistakes and not repeat it.

These are dangerous times, Mr. Secretary, and we, the president and the Congress, must work together to forge a bipartisan consensus to bring the crisis to a successful conclusion. I hope you will share with us your views, and how we can do it, and I will now turn to ranking minority member, Mr. Helms, and ask him for his opening statements.

(End Pell's remarks)

(Begin Helms' remarks)

SEN. JESSE HELMS (REPUBLICAN OF NORTH CAROLINA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When President Bush ordered the U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf after Iraq troops brutally overran Kuwait, and threatened to invade Saudi Arabia, I, along with the vast majority of the American people, supported him because it was a brave and courageous act of leadership, enlightened forthright and decisive in principle. Now I applauded the president, as did the American people, for it is just such leadership that draws the support and friendship of other nations.

When I went over to the Gulf, well, I could read pride in the faces of our troops. And in speaking to leaders such King Fahd, and President Mubarak, I detected a new respect for the United States, and a willingness to seek common interests, despite the pressures of the so-called Arab League.

So the president acted correctly because he acted on principle. He completely reversed the State Department's wrong headed policy of cozying up to Saddam Hussein three times. In 1988, the United States Senate voted overwhelmingly for Iraq sanctions, sponsored by the distinguished chairman and me, and twice this year for similar measures. Yet, the State Department ignored these messages and up to the day before the Kuwait invasion, the State Department was still trying to support this madman.

Apparently, only the State Department could not see that Saddam Hussein was and is an international criminal supported and equipped by the Soviet Union. Only the State Department could not see that he is a murderer, a torturer, an assassin, willing to use poison gas against his own people, and willing to build nuclear weapons to attack his neighbors.

The president acted correctly when he reversed his policy. But, now we have another Saddam Hussein in the Mideast, only his name is Hafez Asad, whatever Saddam does, Asad does better. He, too, is an international gangster, a drug producer, a supporter of terrorists, and a possessor of dangerous military equipment, supported and equipped by the Soviet Union.

And he is like Saddam in one other respect, he has just completed the military occupation of a neighboring state, liquidating the courageous last stand of the leader of the majority of the Christian community opposing Muslim rule and Syrian denomination (sic).

Of course, Asad got the quisling Christian Lebanese President elected under the guns of the -- barrels of the Syrian Army to ask -- and I put that in quotes -- for assistance just as the Soviets got their puppet regime in Afghanistan to ask for assistance.

So, I think, Mr. Chairman, it may be proper to ask what happened to our principles? Isn't the sovereignty of Lebanon just as important as the sovereignty of Kuwait? Why have 150 Christian leaders been sent to Damascus for prison and torture and death? How could Asad have done this only a few days after a high-level visit from the U.S. secretary of state?

Maybe we'll get some answers to that today. Doesn't the presence of the criminal Asad in our coalition of Mideast allies call into question our whole mission in the Gulf? And finally, there's the question of Israel, which is bound to come up: Why does the United States insist on Israel accepting the sovereignty of the United Nations? Is our Arab coalition so fragile that we can no longer uphold Israeli sovereignty?

What kind of policy do we have when it turns anti-Christian and anti-Jewish in one week's time? I'm delighted that our friend the secretary of state is here to help us answer some of these questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(End Helms' remarks)

(Begin Q and A session transcript)

SEN. PELL: I would add, in view of the fact that the secretary needs to leave at about quarter past 12 or 12 (o'clock), we would limit ourselves to eight minutes in this round of questioning, and I would ask the timekeeper to keep score.

Several of us in the Senate have discussed the idea of establishing a bipartisan Senate-House leadership group to consult with the president prior to any decision that might be made of offensive military action.

I would note in this regard that Monday, yesterday -- day before yesterday -- Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze promised his government would consult the Soviet Parliament before participating in any military action against Iraq, and we have this story here in "The New York Times" to that effect.

Would you, Mr. Secretary, be prepared to be as forthcoming as Mr. Shevardnadze is with regard to informing the Congress of any military action against Iraq prior to the takeoff?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, let me say that, first of all, I want to thank this committee, and I would like to thank the Senate as a whole, and the other body as well, for the resolution of support for the president's policy in the Persian Gulf. It is extraordinarily important that we remain united in this effort, not just united internationally, but united here at home, as well.

President Bush, as you know, is committed to extensive consultations with the Congress. There have been extensive consultations in connection with what we have done in the Persian Gulf -- quite extensive, I think. I think we have a good track record. We've done a lot of consulting in August. We would expect to continue to consult fully with the Congress on all important matters of interest to the Congress, and particularly with respect to matters regarding the Gulf.

We don't know what's going to happen, Mr. Chairman. We don't know the degree, extent, or scope of response that might be required, for instance, to a provocation that might involve threats to American citizens, or what the president might have to do to protect American lives.

So I would like to assure you that we will continue to consult fully. We understand the importance of consultation with respect to this matter. It's pretty hard for me to say that the president would not under any circumstances take any action or do anything that he, as commander in chief, felt was necessary to protect American citizens; for instance, without first having some sort of a consultation procedure or process formally in place. That's difficult to do. But we want to consult. We understand the important role that consultations play in maintaining a unified approach to this problem. And every since I've been in this office I've talked about how important it is, if we're going to accomplish anything in foreign policy, that the legislative and executive branches march down the road together.

SEN. PELL: The headline here reads, "Shevardnadze Promises to Consult Parliament on Gulf Involvement." You can make the same assurance; the same promise?

SEC. BAKER: Well I think I just did. We have been consulting and we will continue to fully consult.

SEN. PELL: Right. Would -- in view of the fact we're going out of session for about 10 weeks, 8 weeks, would you think it would be a good idea if some form of consultative group were set up with whom the administration could consult in the absence of Congress?

SEC. BAKER: I would have a little bit of reservation, as I expressed earlier, Mr. Chairman, about a formal mechanism. I would certainly think that it would be appropriate for the president -- whether it's in recess or not -- as he always has and will continue, in my view, to do, to consult with the appropriate leadership on matters as they develop. Are you -- I don't know whether you're talking about a mechanism that would go beyond the leadership. I mean, we have certain consultative procedures that are well understood, I think, both up here and downtown.

SEN. PELL: No, this would be a group that would be set up with some of the leadership and some people chosen by the leadership from outside of it that would be there and ready to be called on. There are a couple of amendments to this effect -- resolutions to this effect have been offered by some of my colleagues. Just want to get your reaction.

SEC. BAKER: My reaction is the president has done a very good job of consulting. He was a member of the Congress. We understand the importance of full consultations, and maintaining unity, and so we understand how important it is to consult, and I think he will continue to consult. If you want him to go outside of the leadership structure, or to consult with respect to a group that is not as yet formed, then I think you need to let us know, and let us look at that, and respond at that time.

SEN. PELL: I appreciate your reply. Another specific question. On August 23, I wrote the president requesting that we be provided with copies of correspondence with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia regarding their requests. In other words, correspondence from them for American assistance. And I also asked for copies of similar correspondence exchanged with other Gulf states. These are matters which we, as a committee, should be apprised of, I believe. Yesterday, our committee received a copy of a classified agreement signed on August 17 with the government of one Persian Gulf state. Since it's classified, I won't give the name. No text of agreements with other Gulf states have been received. Will we receive these copies of these agreements?

SEC. BAKER: You will receive copies of agreements that we should furnish you, Mr. Chairman, under the Case Act, and I think that's the authority under which that agreement was sent up, and we will be sending -- to you, as I think we are obligated by law to do, all agreements that are entered into, and that fall within the purview of that requirement.

SEN. PELL: And would the text of the requests from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait fall within that -- that requirement?

SEC. BAKER: I don't know because I'm not sure I've seen your letter. You say you sent the letter to the president?

SEN. PELL: Correct, on August 23.

SEC. BAKER: I haven't seen it. Have you received a reply?

SEN. PELL: Not to the best of my knowledge.

SEC. BAKER: I was going to gear my answer to your reply, but if you haven't gotten a reply, I can only tell you I haven't seen the letter. It didn't come to me.

SEN. PELL: But we will try to get the letter to you, and we'd love to get a reply.

SEC. BAKER: All right, sir.

SEN. PELL: So we're urging both. Could you describe for us some of the circumstances under which our government and the president might consider offensive military action in Kuwait?

SEC. BAKER: Well, the president has spoken to this, Mr. Chairman, in some very general terms. First of all, he -- as I've indicated in my formal statement -- one of the goals that he has articulated is the protection of American citizens. And therefore, as I just indicated a moment ago, if there were a provocation that the president deemed sufficiently threatening to American citizens or to the lives and welfare of American citizens, I think the president would feel that his



responsibilities as president would require some appropriate response. Now that's -- I realize that's very general; the question you've asked me is very sensitive and it embraces many, many different types of hypothetical situations.

But clearly, if there were a sufficient provocation, I think the president views it as his responsibility as President of the United States to protect American citizens. So there's one example. He has also said, and we have said many times, we cannot and should not rule out the use of force as an option to resolve this matter.

I just mentioned again in my remarks how important it is that the political, the economic and the military aspects of our strategy be looked at as a whole. And therefore, we cannot and will not rule out the possible use of force. But I can't sit here this morning and tell you under each and every circumstance when that might happen.

SEN. PELL: Thank you, my time has expired. Senator Helms?

SEN. HELMS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have an historic document here. It's the hearings on the nomination of James A. Baker III, on January 17, 1989. And you may recall that I brought up a subject that I'm going to bring up again.

And I said on that day, "What I'm asking, Mr. Secretary -- and I know you'll be glad to do it -- will you report back to the committee on whether you agree that these companies have been in fact involved in Libya's or Iraq's chemical weapons program."

Well, that sort of got lost in the shuffle and we've gone back and forth. But here again, Mr. Secretary, there's a list of foreign companies that have been identified as having assisted Saddam Hussein gain the capability to threaten our troops in the Gulf -- the Persian Gulf -- with poison gas. It continues to be a matter of great concern to me. I call this the Saddam "Foreign Legion," and a similar list was recently released by the Wiesenthal Center, as you may know.

In any case, on Monday, the president suggested that the Iraq leadership be brought before a Nuremberg-type war crimes tribunal. Good idea. But I would point out to you, sir, that during those Nuremberg trials -- and I'm old enough to remember them -- senior Nazi officials and private companies which assisted the Nazis were tried.

So I guess the question is, in calling for a war tribunal for the purpose of dealing with Iraqi atrocities, is it the intention of the president that, as in the Nuremberg trials, corporate suppliers of the Iraqis would also be held accountable?

And on down -- "We urge the conferees --

SEC. BAKER: Yeah, yeah, okay, now you've told me what it's about.

SEN. HELMS: I recognize your signature on it. You signed it, unless you've got an awfully -- Well, I don't -- I'm sure I signed it.

SEC. BAKER: -- good automatic pen down there.

SEC. BAKER: I'm sure I signed it, but let me say that it should go on to say -- I don't know whether -- I mean, I can't remember each and every sentence in there, but we support the House bill to do this job, we don't support the Senate bill.

SEN. HELMS: Tell me why.

SEC. BAKER: Well, because it doesn't give the President of the United States any flexibility at all to look at the particular facts and circumstances that might be applicable to a particular case. We have supported for some time, even before the Gulf crisis, the bipartisan sanctions bill that the House passed last summer. So I don't think it's quite accurate to say that we are against sanctions legislation, we're not. We support the House bill. We think it's a better bill.

I mean, it's not a case of being against some form of legislation, it's a case of being for a bill that we think is better than the bill that came out of this body. It gives --

SEN. HELMS: Well, I don't want to engage in a debate with you on this thing, but we've been going at this for a long time and all we have gotten on the Chairman's and my bill is opposition from the State Department -- no suggestion about tempering it that I know anything about, no suggestion about changing it.

And in any case, the House bill which you seem to be supporting is full of loopholes, Mr. Secretary, which would allow these companies to get off the hook and continue to do what they do. Now, maybe it's time for us to sit down and talk about the realities of life with respect to what's going on, but we haven't had that opportunity --

SEC. BAKER: Senator, let me say that in the aftermath of this Gulf problem and once it's resolved, I have made the suggestion that we should have a very -- we should mount a major nonproliferation effort for this area of the world and that it should contain some very, very intrusive measures of inspection and verification and that sort of thing, because I think proliferation in the Middle East is a major problem. It's a major problem in many places, but it certainly is in the Middle East.

SEC. BAKER: I think that would depend entirely, Senator Helms, on what the culpability or malicious intent of companies might or might not have been in particular circumstances. I don't think that I can't give you a generic answer to that. I don't think anybody could.

SEN. HELMS: Well, I think they could, given the evidence, Mr. Secretary. And you and I are friends and all like that, but I know you don't want to get into this. But the fact is that it was called to their attention time and time again, from this country, by this country, that they were supplying the deadly stuff to Iraq. And sometime, we've got to get down to the nitty-gritty on the thing and decide whether we mean what we say.

In any case, without the assistance of these foreign companies, I don't believe Saddam Hussein would have had the means and the courage, if you want to call it that -- the brass, maybe -- to use chemical weapons against Iraq's own citizens, and to invade Kuwait, and commit the atrocities that we all talk about and lament.

Now, the Senate has passed twice -- two times -- once by a vote of 92 to nothing -- legislation to impose tough sanctions on these kinds of foreign companies that are doing this sort of thing. But I find it a little bit difficult -- and I mentioned it to you earlier -- I received your letter indicating that you would recommend the president veto this bill. Now, Mr. Secretary, if that happens, what kind of signal really is being sent to companies contemplating assisting Iraq when the administration threatens to veto tough chemical weapons legislation?

SEC. BAKER: Senator Helms, what is the date of that letter, and which legislation are you specifically talking about, because you've got about three bills here?

SEN. HELMS: Well, it arrived yesterday, but -- no -- October the 16. Apparently you folks use some sort of stamp for the date. It's not typed in.

SEC. BAKER: When -- just came up?

SEN. HELMS: You want me to read it to you?

SEC. BAKER: No, just tell me which legislation it's referring to.

SEN. HELMS: "Dear Jesse, You and your colleagues will soon address differing House and Senate chemical weapons sanctions legislation, H.R. 3033 and S. 195, in the context of a conference on the Export Administration Act. I want to take this opportunity to convey directly to you the administration position on these bills. We have conveyed specific comments to your staff on the differences in the two bills."

And I grant you that the point that you're making here is valid, and we do support sanctions legislation. It ought not to be limited to chemical weapons. It ought to cover nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology. And it's going to have to include all of the countries in the region. But it is something that we really should pursue.

One of the problems that we've had with legislation that has been suggested in the past here in the United States is that it has been unilateral in scope and effect. Sanctions don't work unless you get a fairly high degree of participation by countries around the world, because if we bar exports by United States companies, people will go elsewhere and they'll acquire the material from somebody else. That's one reason we think the effort we now have going in the Gulf has been so successful is because we have such a broad range of support for it. So we will support sanctions legislation that we think is proper and reasonable.

SEN. HELMS: Again, not debating with you, Mr. Secretary. You're talking about sanctions against countries; I'm talking about sanctions against companies. And there's a difference. Now, these -- the countries, Germany, for example, said, "Gee whiz, we didn't know about this," and they hesitated because these were big political contributors, I reckon. Maybe they had PACs or whatever. And they didn't do anything about it until they were pushed and pushed and pushed, and then they found, oh, yes, they were doing it. Now, I'm talking about companies; you're talking about countries.

SEC. BAKER: No, sir, I was really talking about both, and what I'm saying is --

SEN. HELMS: You said "countries."

SEC. BAKER: -- we need a major, multilateral effort. We need all countries involved in this. And I think that in the aftermath of what's happened in Kuwait, we have an excellent opportunity for a multilateral initiative that could really be effective. That's all I'm saying.

SEN. HELMS: Well, let's work together and get -- (inaudible) -- Mr. Secretary.

SEC. BAKER: Be delighted to.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Biden.

SEN. JOSEPH BIDEN (DEMOCRAT OF DELAWARE): Mr. Secretary, to follow up on what Senator Helms was just talking about, and I might note parenthetically that failure to have other countries participate hasn't stopped us in having embargoes on Cuba. That's never gotten in our way. Sometimes our ideology does not get in the way of our rationality, but that's another question.

SEC. BAKER: I wouldn't argue that, senator. My only point is that they're much more effective if they're multilateral.

SEN. BIDEN: No question about that. Let me ask it from, I think, a different perspective, although maybe it's the same thing my colleague from North Carolina is saying. And that is that the idea of getting the countries in the region to sign on to a non-proliferation agreement that covers all of what you said is one thing. But what about the idea of getting the countries with whom we deal to sign on? Forget the countries in the region signing on --

SEC. BAKER: Absolutely.

SEN. BIDEN: And what about the prospect of saying to our European friends and to our new-found Soviet collaborators -- to use a term from the past in a positive way -- to participate in the hope that maybe even the China policy will have borne some fruit in terms of supply?

I mean, what is going on in that arena? That is, what kind of cooperation are we getting? Are the discussions underway? Are we sitting down with the Germans and saying, "Not again, if you do, we've got a big problem with you if you allow any of your countries -- not again," you know, so on?

SEC. BAKER: What I just said in answer to Senator Helms is not limited to an effort among the countries in the region. It is -- what I'm talking about, and we ought to seriously consider, is a major non-proliferation effort for the region that would involve as many countries as we could get involved.

And I think, again, in the aftermath of what's happened there, and when you look at the disproportionate military power of Iraq versus the other countries in the region, and the way that power has been used, and the weapons of mass destruction that have been accumulated, the -- the ground should be right for some serious progress. But, it wouldn't be limited, senator, to the countries in the region.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, I -- I --

SEC. BAKER: No, it cannot be because the source of the material and equipment is from without the region.

SEN. BIDEN: No, that's the point I'm making.

SEC. BAKER: And it also ought to -- if I might say this -- I think that we ought to explore, at least, whether or not conventional weapons should be included in such an effort.

SEN. BIDEN: Well, Mr. Secretary, it seems to me -- you know, it's once step at a time here -- what I'm trying to get at is, what negotiations are going on now between the United States and Germany to say, "Whether or not anyone else signs on, Germany, do we have a deal? No more chemical weapons technology into the region, period. Is that a deal, Germany?"

And then turn to the French. "No more missile technology," assuming they are providing it into the region, "do we have a deal?" I mean, the reason I ask the question is this, Mr. Secretary, and then I'll let you comment, is that everyone is making the assertion here that, "Obviously, we cannot let Saddam Hussein benefit from his aggression." So far, so good.

Then, everyone makes the assertion, "And when it's over, Saddam Hussein cannot be left in a position where he will be able to continue to intimidate the region regardless of whether or not he withdraws."

Now, one of two things flows from that -- one of three things -- it seems to me. And correct me if I'm wrong. One, Saddam Hussein unilaterally disarms -- pulls out and unilaterally disarms. Number one. Number two, the United States, hopefully in concert if it occurred -- but the United States, with 250,000 troops in the region, goes in and, to use the terminology used around this town so easily today, blows away Saddam Hussein and eliminates him from power, dismantles his military, and all will be well -- except we'll be there for the rest of our lives, in my view. And, thirdly, there's a possibility Saddam Hussein has an embargo work on him; he pulls out, and then there is a new embargo imposed upon him making it impossible for him to be able to maintain that military establishment, because he no longer has the external support.

So my question is, with regard to the third possibility, as I see it anyway -- maybe I'm the only one that views it that way -- with regard to the third possibility, what negotiating effort is underway vis-a-vis the supplier nations to, a) stop supplying now and, b) committing to no longer supply in the future, whether it's technology or weaponry -- conventional or otherwise?

SEC. BAKER: Let me -- yeah, let me answer it by saying that there have been a lot of discussions about stopping immediately and ceasing for quite a long time any supply of weapons to Iraq. And there are no weapons, there are no spare parts, there is no equipment -- nothing is going in along those lines, except maybe some very, very minimal leakage. And those discussions have, as I indicated in my opening statement -- have been very successful in the sense that we do have a global consensus behind that.

There are talks going on today in Geneva that you're well aware of in which considerable progress is being made toward a global ban on chemical weapons, primarily because of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to get together on an approach that give us a realistic chance of bringing a lot of other countries along. Those talks are continuing.

You have raised a point that has been discussed, Senator Biden, and that is the idea that even after withdrawal, if you assume that withdrawal takes place without the destruction of Iraq's disproportionate military capabilities, there should be consideration given to maintaining an international arms embargo upon a country that has such a disproportionate amount of power in the region and has shown a willingness to use it, including weapons of mass destruction. There have been some informal discussions along those lines.

SEN. BIDEN: You need not have my advice, and I don't mean this in terms of advice, but I have an expectation and a hope. It seems to me that absent the assurance that that would follow on from a withdrawal if the embargo works, we are left, as some of my colleagues will soon tell you, with -- who are convinced that we must decapitate Saddam Hussein. In addition to him withdrawing, we must decapitate him. And not necessarily literally, but in the hope of some, maybe literally, as well as figuratively, that there's only one of two ways to do that. One of three: he voluntarily says, "I'm standing down", which I think is unlikely; or we go in with military force to do it; or -- not withstanding he is withdrawn -- or we come out with some mechanism by which we are assured that he is going to wilt on the vine in terms of spare parts and new technology.

But let me move on, I only have a few seconds left; I guess I have one minute left. I have drafted a resolution, actually with the help of the Committee staff, and let me just read it to you. And it's about the authorization of the use of force. And it says that, "The President is authorized to continue to deploy U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, for the following reasons: one, to deter, and if necessary to defend against further Iraqi aggression; two, to respond as may be necessary, proportionate and effective to any acts intended to harm American citizens, or nationals, and three, to participate in collective security actions in the event the United States directs the use of military force to counter a threat to regional security posed by Iraq.

B) Further authorization: before initiating the use of force against Iraq beyond those three purposes, the President shall a) consult and seek the advice of the Congress, and b) set forth the Congress and the American people his explanation, and c) seek a declaration of war.

Now, Mr. Secretary, how would you respond to us giving you the clear grant of authority that you think you already have, and arguably you do, to defend American citizens in the region,

stop Iraqi aggression, and move multilaterally. But say if you're going to move on your own, you've got to come back to us and say, "We want a declaration of war."

SEC. BAKER: I'm not sure what you mean by move multilaterally, Senator.

SEN. BIDEN: I mean if there is a joint decision made by the forces involved, that's necessary to use military force, essentially under the UN umbrella, not the flag that exists now, that the Congress would pre-authorize that, but if you conclude, absent the willingness of the other nations that are in now, that you have to invade Iraq or Kuwait or use force in any way, other than the three reasons mentioned, you'd have to come back and say to us, "We're going to send those 250,000 folks, a portion of them in, and here's the deal."

SEN. : What are you reading from, Senator? What are you reading from?

SEN. BIDEN: I'm reading from an authorization that I think we should be voting on in the Senate as opposed to the one that was put forward.

SEN. : Ok.

SEN. BIDEN: It's a proposal of mine.

SEN. : A proposal?

SEN. BIDEN: A proposal of mine. Excuse me.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, let me say that I've already expressed our gratitude and appreciation for the one that was voted.

SEN. BIDEN: I'm just worried what you think it means.

SEC. BAKER: No. Well, I thought it was fairly clear in its terms. But let me ask you -- you're not the witness, I am, but did -- and I haven't seen your language, so I have to ask you this question. What would be permitted under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter under your language?

SEN. BIDEN: You would be permitted -- the president would be permitted, assuming it was in concert with other nations (in/and?) the multinational force, pursuant to the Charter and a Security Council resolution, to move. Absent that, you would not be permitted to do that unless you came back to the Congress and the American people.

SEC. BAKER: Well Article 51 would not require a specific resolution. I'd have -- you'd have to let me look at that language, but I think we'd have some major reservations with it, Senator, which is why we didn't support it before.



SEN. BIDEN: I think you might, too.

SEN. PELL: Senator Lugar?

SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (REPUBLICAN OF INDIANA): Mr. Secretary, let me follow on with the -- the dialogue that you were having with my colleague Senator Biden.

You've stressed in your statement the need for unity of the people in the United States. And our Chairman, in his introductory statement, has gone through, I think correctly, the litany that all of us hope for peaceful resolution of the Middle Eastern situation, that it's a dangerous situation and we have great commitments there now. And we've applauded the president for how well he has handled things, and likewise, your own leadership.

But I come back to the chairman's paragraph that we learned from the Vietnam experience that the support of the American people, as expressed through 535 representatives in Congress, is essential. And more fundamentally, shared responsibility for war is what the founding fathers of our country intended and we should be faithful to that intent.

We've come down to, I think, the fine point of how this is to work out. One might be that force could be authorized or even directed by the United Nations in resolutions that we or others seek. And, in fact, we have been aggressive in seeking those, and as you pointed out today, the tenth such one may account -- gives some multilateral force possibilities. Likewise, it may be that American citizens will be attacked. And I think the president in other contexts has said whether it's an American soldier in uniform in Saudi Arabia or an American human shield, a hostage in Iraq, or an American walking through the Washington airport, a victim of a terrorist attack, an American is an American, wherever that person is. And that the president takes that very seriously, and you've reiterated that and underlined that.

I see, however, this situation, and this is simply a personal point of view. It has no official standing, but it's a personal gut reaction. That sometime between the time that we recess or adjourn in the next week or so, and the time the new Congress is sworn in, that there is likely to be military activity in that area. And that is an ominous prospect.

Now, you might estimate that there will not be, and that is a matter of judgment. But we know that Kuwait, as you've stated, is being raped. Literally, there are some estimates, half of the population may have been dispersed from the country. Almost everything not bolted down is being taken out. We believe that there are Iraqis coming in; that there are fundamental situations being created there where if a

referendum or plebiscite occurred, it's not clear who would vote and what the result might be. That before our eyes, Kuwait is disappearing, and rapidly, and the Emir and others have so testified in their visits with you and with us.

SEC. BAKER: Right.

SEN. LUGAR: We know that Saudi Arabia and Egypt are -- have never been ambiguous -- but they clearly are very forceful in saying that victory by Saddam Hussein, partial victory, any victory anything other than the statements you have made of our four objectives, make their regimes very vulnerable. And their presence in the area then becomes dicey, too, quite apart from what occurred before. And it's not at all clear that the United Nations sanctions will perfectly fit the situation, nor that even with 54 countries there, that we will have a perfect coordinated military situation.

The point I suppose I am making is that at some point, it may be that the hypothetical situation Senator Biden posed, that the President of the United States decides for a large number of reasons that we need to act in a military fashion, and we ought to do that. Now, my own judgment, and this you'll have to weigh along with Senator Biden, Senator Pell and others, is that in the event that we come to that conclusion, the Congress ought to come back into session and ought to entertain a declaration of war. There ought to be a formal commitment of the American people to share that responsibility with President Bush and with yourself because the undertaking will be massive and it must be successful. To leave the impression that somehow on the run, in retaliation for the killing of hostages or American soldiers or a terrorist attack, that we have a massive military intervention that really has not had the votes of a majority of us, standing behind it for a time period uncertain -- because we don't know that the action will be over, as some have suggested, in two weeks, three weeks or an air strike or two and the Iraqis fold -- it could be a long affair and it has to be successful -- and my own judgment, without knowing the text precisely of the senator's resolution, is that we have to seriously think now about the structural aspects of how the Congress' vote would be invoked in the circumstances of our coming back to do it.

Now, absent that or in the intervening period, I think the president -- and you would be well advised to think through not only the consultation, which has been extensive and which we all appreciate, but a formal mechanism that may be four people, six people, 12 people or what have you from the Congress to bear a responsibility to meet regularly during this interim period when we are not all here -- that with the president, with yourself, with others, simply so that there is a support for the chief executive during this interim period. And I hope serious consideration will be given both to the declaration of war situation and how it would come about, given a recess and a coming back, and to the consultation procedure.

Let me just finally ask this question. And that is, you have suggested in your statement that indeed we must meet the four objectives and quite rightly, you've said a partial solution would be fatal in this, but you've also suggested in your statement that some reversal of the potential of Iraq must be thought of. You say we'd -- on stopping Iraq's aggression -- ultimately reversing its capacity for future aggression. Do you have any further light you can shed on that subject, which is more of an endgame situation, but important, certainly, to those in the region? You've spoken of the regional security idea in your last appearance, and do you have anything more to say on that today?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I can elaborate on that some but let me simply say, the point I'm making there is the point that Senator Biden raised and it's about -- it is something that we must consider. And that is, that even if you get -- let's suppose that he should decide tomorrow to leave -- that he will still represent a very disproportionate power in the region and he will have weapons of mass destruction, and somehow we must deal with those.

And ways in which that could be approached are the concept of regional security arrangements. Someone said a minute ago that they thought we'd be there -- "forever," did you say senator, or --

SEN. PELL: No, I said --

SEC. BAKER: Let me say that we do not -- we do not want, and the president has made it very clear -- we want our forces out of Saudi Arabia as soon as we can get them out, and we are not seeking a presence on the ground in the Middle East. We've been in the Gulf since 1949, in the naval presence, and we would expect, certainly, that that might continue. But there ought to be some regional security arrangements, primarily among the countries in the region, but -- but if those -- if the countries in the region concluded that assistance would be required from countries outside the region, we ought to at least be willing to consider whether we're willing to provide that assistance.

The idea that there should be a continuing restraint upon the war making potential of Iraq is one that we need to look at in the future, and one that we have been considering, and I think I've said before that a continuing -- some sort of a continuing arms embargo going even to the conventional would be something that had -- that should be considered and thought through.

Let me say -- I don't know whether that's answered your specific question, Senator Lugar, but let me comment on your prior statements because they are important, and let me say one more time, I know that the president wants the support of the American people for any commitment of American military forces.

That goes without saying. And that means that we want and would seek the support of the elected representatives of the American people. And we will consult, as we have been consulting. And we will consult fully.

I don't really think that's at issue. What you decide to do with respect to the mechanism that you would like to construct in consultation with us is something, I think, we could talk about. But normally on something like this, we would expect to consult with the leadership, whether they were in session -- whether you were session, or whether you were out of session.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Senator Sarbanes?

SEN. PAUL SARBANES (DEMOCRAT OF MARYLAND): Well, Mr. Secretary, let me pursue the point that was first raised by the Chairman, and then by Senator Biden, and now Senator Lugar.

There's a difference between consultation and authorization. It's my very strongly held view following along with -- Senator Biden said that the use -- the commitment of American forces by the president in a major assault to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait would require an authorization from the Congress. Now, he set out certain instances in which the president might use force to respond to specific situations, but if you go beyond that, it seems to me that the consultation is not enough, you need an authorization. You, in effect, need to come to the Congress, lay out what it is you're proposing to do and for what purposes and get a judgment by the Congress that the administration ought to be given the authority to do that.

Now, some say, "Well, if you get a declaration of war, you lose the element of surprise." Well, you don't have to exercise the force immediately upon the declaration. You can pick the time and opportunity thereafter if you get the proper authorization from the Congress to do it. But the notion that the president alone would be able to commit American forces in a major assault without receiving, in effect, a shared decision by the Congress in that regard, it seems to me is contrary to what the Constitution calls for. I think it's clearly contrary to what makes good sense in terms of a national commitment to the effort.

I want to ask you about the assertions that one is seeing in the press, and I think we need to address it and respond to it, and if there's a good response, I'd like to hear it, that the Saudis are realizing from the increase in the price of oil on their existing production and from the additional production which they have now instituted, far more in terms of a financial gain than they are investing in -- or committing in order to address the crisis.

I've seen stories that say that, you know, they're getting an additional 60,000 million dollars a year from the higher price and their increased production and that their commitment of funds is, you know, 15,000 or 20,000 million dollars or even 30,000 million dollars, and that the consequence of this crisis and the burden they're undertaking, even though it seems forthcoming when they undertake the burden, if you put it in the context of the additional return they're getting on the oil, they're really getting quite a large windfall, as it were, out of the crisis.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, I think that -- I mean, I don't have the exact figures, but I think that when you see the price of oil doing what it's done over the past six or seven weeks, in all likelihood, you are correct. The commitments that were given, of course, were given at an earlier time. We think the commitments have been forthcoming and they should not be looked at in isolation because the Saudis are doing a lot more than just what I referred to in my opening remarks.

But I would not argue with your general conclusion, although I guess there might be some question about the increased production that they are anticipating, which I don't think has yet quite all come on line or that they're seeing or anticipating. That was done -- they are doing that at the request of the international community in order to make up for any shortfall from Iraq and Kuwait and to hopefully bring down the price of oil and stabilize the market. So they're doing that at the request of the international community.

SEN. SARBANES: Well I know, but --

SEC. BAKER: But they are indeed receiving --

SEN. SARBANES: -- it's a financial bonanza for them.

SEC. BAKER: -- they are indeed receiving -- yes, they are. I don't know whether they would argue that that has an adverse impact on their reservoir or capacity in the long run or not. But I grant the point you're making, which I think is a valid one. Let me say one other thing on that score. While granting --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, do you think it argues for going back at --

SEC. BAKER: I was about to answer -- I was about to say that --

SEN. SARBANES: -- this question of how much of the burden is to be borne?

SEC. BAKER: I was about to say this. Granting that the commitments we've received for the most part are for assistance for calendar 1990. We only have 60 days more in calendar 1990 and it -- we don't know how this thing will unfold.

And I don't think that anyone ever contemplated that if it was -- if there was an ongoing problem in the Gulf that there would not be ongoing responsibility-sharing by all the countries involved.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I -- as this story gains wider circulation and the public comes to understand it more and more, I think you're going to get a sharper and sharper reaction to it. I mean, you know, the Saudis have made a major contribution towards meeting these costs, but then when you view it in the perspective of the additional revenues that are flowing in of -- the end result of that is that they are really coming out well ahead financially -- I know there are other strains on their society -- but coming out well, well ahead financially as a consequence of the crisis. And I do think that you need to continue to address that issue.

SEC. BAKER: I think you're right, senator. I mean, I think you're right that we need to continue to be alert to that and continue to address the issue of responsibility sharing as we move forward here. And you know, responsibility sharing on the part of all.

SEN. SARBANES: What is your scenario making favorable assumptions as to how the situation will unfold?

SEC. BAKER: That's very hypothetical, senator. I really don't want to engage in that here. I think that, frankly, Senator Biden made some comments earlier about three ways that this thing could unfold. I think those are valid observations.

SEN. SARBANES: In any event, as it unfolds, is it your expectation that the United States will continue to address it within the framework of the United Nations?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I -- when you "address it" within the framework of the United Nations, I'm not sure entirely what you mean. That's why I asked the question a few minutes ago about Article 51. Suppose there is a clear provocation that endangers American citizens.

SEN. SARBANES: Putting that to one side, how about beyond that?

SEC. BAKER: Well, suppose we know from informal consultations that a particular course of action that we and perhaps a number of others think is the appropriate course to reverse this aggression is not accepted, for one reason or another, by some who are in a position to block it.

SEN. SARBANES: In other words --

SEC. BAKER: I don't think we should forswear the possibility that we could move forward. Now, we have said many times --

SEN. SARBANES: Well, that would only happen if someone exercised the veto power, is that correct?

SEC. BAKER: Well, that's possible, although there are other ways that blocks can prohibit action being taken by the Security Council. But let me say this, Senator Sarbanes, so I'm not misunderstood: We've said all along that we want to move in a manner that preserves as much of our international and domestic consensus as we can. And we think so far, so far at least we've been very fortunate in terms of the international support that's been marshaled for this.

We do see this as the first real crisis of the post-Cold War era. We see it having the potential for establishing a new world order, if you will, in terms of the way we respond to these crises. We are very -- we remember well what we didn't do in the 1930s with respect to Ethiopia, for instance, and with respect to Hitler's aggression in Europe, and we don't want to repeat that mistake.

And what happens in this instance is going to have significant precedential effect, we think, on the way international affairs are going to be conducted in the future.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much indeed.

Senator Kassebaum.

SEN. NANCY KASSEBAUM (REPUBLICAN OF KANSAS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to follow on just a moment on Senator Sarbanes' comments, Mr. Secretary, because I think you and President Bush have both done an excellent job in keeping this an international effort. I personally feel that this conflict should and must remain one of Iraq against the international community.

I was interested in, a couple of weeks ago I believe it was, some reported comments of yours regarding the operation under UN-flagging. And that you indicated in those remarks, I believe, that you felt there was good support for that.

Now this kind of goes back to this discussion, but I would like to ask you if you have pursued that, if others are pursuing that, and exactly what the pluses and minuses of that would be?

SEC. BAKER: Senator Kassebaum, it was not operations under UN-flagging, because we have made it very clear in our informal discussions with other countries, during the time of the UN General Assembly sessions in New York, and other times, that we would have difficulties with a United Nations command, representing as we do, at this stage, at least, such a disproportionately large element of the multinational force.

But there are many ways in which UN authority can be conferred with respect to the possible use of force without putting the multinational force under a UN command. We have not run into -- let me say this, we have not run into major objections in our informal discussions with others about that.

I don't think that the situation has changed from the time when I made those remarks, which was probably about 10 days or two weeks ago; it was when I was up in the United Nations talking to a lot of different countries. And what I said was that I was rather surprised at the degree to which there was international -- there seemed to be international support for a possible option involving force, if other things did not succeed.

And let me say one more time, it's our hope that we can -- that this matter can be resolved politically, peacefully, and diplomatically. Everyone wants to talk about the military option, I know. And we can't rule it out, but that's our fervent hope, and that's the hope of most people at the UN. However, I think they are willing to discuss possible uses of force after we've given sanctions a change to work, to see whether or not they're effective.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: Well, it would be the fervent hope, I think, of everyone.

SEC. BAKER: Yes.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: I think we all agree. On the other hand, it just seems to me it's an important opportunity to be explored, going back, I think, to the only time that there's been a conflict under the UN flag, which was Korea. Is that correct?

SEC. BAKER: I think that's right.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: Perhaps looking at that to see what, perhaps, could be improved on, from that operation. What indeed might be necessary here. It just seems to me that it's worth really giving some attention to, and perhaps you are, as an option.

So that we know it's --

SEC. BAKER: Well, we are giving some attention to the possibility that if we conclude that force is required, the possibility that we might be able to accomplish it under authority from the United Nations. We are doing that.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: Well, there is a distinction, isn't there?

SEC. BAKER: There's a distinction in the sense that --

SEN. KASSEBAUM: It's very important as far as the authority in flagging.

SEC. BAKER: I understand, Senator Kassebaum, but let me make



sure I make this very clear. We are very concerned about putting the lives of our American men and women over there in the hands of someone other than an American military commander.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: Well, I understand that, Mr. Secretary, but let me ask you, if it is under a UN commander, would not the numbers of our forces be reduced while other nations' would increase?

SEC. BAKER: Not necessarily. There is a large contingent of other forces there --

SEN. KASSEBAUM: True.

SEC. BAKER: -- as I indicated in my remarks. Twenty-five nations have sent forces. Hopefully there will be other forces. That is not dependent really on whether or not we are willing to see a United Nations command in the event that force has to be used. So far at least, it has not been dependent. Two Egyptian divisions, a Syrian division, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the GCC countries -- there are quite a few Arab and Muslim forces there now. None of this has been dependent upon a United Nations command for the multinational force.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: That's true. I just thought perhaps that might even expand if there was that. But I just would urge and hope that this is being pursued as far as the details of it if it becomes a valid option, because I think it's an important one.

I would just like to comment on Senator Lugar's comments. The administration is to be commended for a lot of consultation, that's true, but it goes, I think, beyond more than just leadership. We have seen what's happened as far as just the summit on the budget. And I think even more in this respect, the Congress represents, for better or worse, 535 of us who represent constituents. And I feel very strongly that what Senator Lugar was saying is terribly important for the administration to remember. It isn't just the consultation of the few, which I think is important, but it's a voice of all of us, which is representative of the public, even though they might disown us at this point.

SEC. BAKER: I agree with that, but may I just also say, and in partial response to what Senator Sarbanes said, which I didn't say at the time because we didn't have time, but we do have a disagreement, of course, that we should not have a constitutional argument, it doesn't seem to me, about whether or not the president, as commander-in-chief, has the constitutional authority to commit forces.

It's been done going all the way back, I think, to World War Two. You can look at Grenada or Panama or Libya or even the unhappy experiences, too -- Vietnam and so forth. And I'm not

sure -- we're not going to resolve that constitutional argument here, but it is important; I've said it's important -- we think, the president thinks -- I know that it is important that we have the support of the American people. And one way you get that is to have the support of the elected representatives. Therefore, we will consult.

But if we were under an obligation to come back here and have hearings that might extend -- hopefully not as long as the budget hearings, but that might drag out for awhile while we debate: "Well now, wait a minute. If you're really talking about sending this force here and that one over there, is this the right thing to do? And you really ought not to do that."

I just want to make sure we all understand the position that that would put the commander-in-chief in.

So we do have a constitutional -- a different view, I suppose, on the constitutional question of the authority to commit forces. But we don't have any difference of view on the importance of being unified and the importance of trying to move together.

SEN. KASSEBAUM: Well I'm not a supporter of the War Powers resolution, but it is the law of the land. And since it is, I think that, again, we've got to make sure it works, or else some of us would like to see it, of course, banned. But that's a legislative action that there's serious disagreement. But as long as it's there and as long as it's the law of the land, I think we have to adhere to it.

Thank you.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Kerry?

SEN. KERRY: Mr. Secretary, following up on Senator Kassebaum and the thrust of a good deal of the questioning here, I'm not sure that we have simply a difference of opinion with respect to the responsibility on the consultation, and I'm deeply concerned about it.

We've had consultation here before, and it took place, I believe, if I recall correctly, a matter of hours. In fact, I think bombers were in the air when the leadership was, quote, "consulted with." And there was very little choice at that point in time. We've had consultation within a matter of hours of Panama.

And I think many of us here who sit on the Foreign Relations Committee, and many of us who represent the constituencies to which Senator Kassebaum has referred to, are deeply concerned that consultation in this case be something considerably more than that. That's the first point I'd make.

Secondly, the difference of opinion is, we're really not talking about any of those kinds of situations. This is the most significant buildup and the most cooperative buildup under the broadest consent of the United Nations since, certainly, you had the kind of buildup of World War Two. And even in Korea we had an American commander in command of the UN forces. But it seems to me that what you're talking about here is not an emergency response, not --

SEC. BAKER: Well, we don't know that, Senator, do we?

SEN. KERRY: No, I agree, but everybody has signed off at this point on the notion that if American lives are suddenly in jeopardy, or if there were an attack, everybody understands that the rules of engagement are such that we would respond. And the Congress has basically approved that in the resolution that we passed.

But if we're talking about affirmatively moving in some way, I think the concern everybody is expressing is -- and given what happened in Iowa yesterday and the polls now showing a slippage in what was 75-percent support; it's now diminished somewhat -- I think the lessons have taught us that foreign policy works when it's bipartisan and there's consensus.

SEC. BAKER: Absolutely.

SEN. KERRY: Therefore, I would reiterate whether or not -- if what we're really talking about is going to war, and we're doing it because all else has failed, and in keeping with the notion that was made public, I think about a week ago, that we would be going to the United Nations and consulting with other countries -- would we not come to the Congress under those circumstances and ask for a declaration?

SEC. BAKER: The -- any approach that we might determine we were going to make to the United Nations would be -- would be -- would in all probability, Senator, be prospective in its operation. And if we chose to go that way, we would be looking for authority to move in the future if it became necessary. And we just went through this up here with respect to the resolution that I have thanked the Congress for, and for which we're very grateful, but it was -- it was -- it was the view, I think in both bodies, that there should be nothing in there that could even suggest authority to move in the future -- and there isn't.

So, I don't think what you're suggesting, what Senator Sarbanes is suggesting, is the same thing. If the Congress were willing to give the president, as commander in chief, authority to do what he thinks is required under the circumstances that occur in the two-and-a-half months' period that you're going to be gone, in the exercise of his duties and responsibilities as commander in chief, that's something different.

But if we're saying, "We want you to agree that nothing will happen while we're gone unless you get the approval of a majority of 535," that's -- that's something that's -- that we can't agree to right now. I mean -- and I think you -- I don't think you'd disagree with that -- I hope you wouldn't. But it would -- it would certainly -- it would certainly make that option far less of an option in the eyes of Saddam Hussein.

SEN. KERRY: I understand that.

Do you consider that the meetings that took place in New York and the reports of the discussions with respect to potential use of force at the UN were that kind of UN approach, or they'd be something separate?

SEC. BAKER: Those were very informal discussions that were had during the course of bilaterals with representatives of various countries, really seeking to -- to gauge or measure the -- the potential support that might be there if sanctions fail, and, frankly, many of the countries themselves raised the issue. We didn't -- you know, we didn't raise it in every case.

SEN. KERRY: Mr. Secretary, do the events in Israel of the last few days raise potential pitfalls that are, perhaps, larger than might have been assumed originally and conceivably place a pressure on earlier resolution and, therefore, perhaps action of some kind in order to avoid longer-term disturbances and the potential of splitting the coalition in some way?

SEC. BAKER: I think that we want to see this Gulf issue resolved in the quickest -- in the shortest possible time, Senator Kerry, and we always have. If you're suggesting that somehow the events to which you've referred would move up a timetable for military action and so forth, I think our first -- our first consideration in considering the -- the option of using force has to be for the success of any such operation and the -- and the security of our forces, so something like this would not necessarily move up that timetable.

SEN. KERRY: Also, Mr. Secretary, reading through your testimony today, you summarized the results of our ongoing efforts, so far, and I -- I read back, and I think mostly you were obviously referencing the -- the burden-sharing part of it, and you -- but most of the results that you've summarized so far are really just references to financial sharing and -- and military burden sharing, and so forth.

Where would you -- how would you summarize the diplomatic effort so far, and how would you summarize the impact of the sanctions at this point in time?

SEC. BAKER: I think the diplomatic efforts have been very successful, Senator Kerry, for the reasons I pointed out in there.

If by "diplomatic efforts" you mean direct discussions with Iraq or through intermediaries with Iraq --

SEN. KERRY: No.

SEC. BAKER: -- that's something -- that something --

SEN. KERRY: I'm not -- I don't mean that.

SEC. BAKER: Yes, you don't mean that. Well, then I think -- I frankly think diplomacy in capitals -- here in Washington and in the United Nations -- has, so far at least, been reasonably successful. I think sanctions are having -- beginning to have an impact. We believe that the sanctions on exports have been particularly successful. There is no oil getting out. We think the sanctions on financial transactions have been particularly effective. Iraq is not able to affect financial transactions in financial markets around the world. The sanctions on imports have been pretty darn successful, although there is some slight leakage of, primarily, food supplies across borders.

But I don't think that -- I don't think that major industrial products, that equipment, supplies, spare parts -- those kinds of things are not coming in. And from what we've heard from others -- Arab leaders, and others who have a better sense of the situation within Iraq, the sanctions are beginning to bite.

SEN. KERRY: Are we perceiving at this point, at least that you can talk about publicly, any diminishment in their military capacity as a consequence of them?

SEC. BAKER: I haven't -- I can't really comment on that, senator.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Senator.

SEN. PELL: Fine. The senator from Alaska.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, welcome. I'm going to depart from the first question because I think you've addressed it several times. I want to talk a little bit about the defense costs. I notice on page 3, you indicate defense costs are now running \$1 billion per month. I'm curious to know if you have any figures on what the shortfall is in relationship to what you're generating in contributions. You're theoretically 4,000 million dollars from Japan. Other countries are putting a specific amount in. Is the U.S. picking up the difference, so to speak?

SEC. BAKER: I was of the impression -- I was under the -- I haven't gone back and looked at that since before my trip, Senator Murkowski, but I was under the impression that the costs are about a 1,000 million. Our direct incremental costs are about a billion a month. And we picked up more than that for the balance of 1990 during the course of my trip.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: So you feel it's more or less of a wash and -- within the -- understanding within the UN -- somebody's keeping track who puts in what, and how there's a sharing --

SEC. BAKER: Well, we have -- we have a financial coordination group that is meeting. It's a multinational group, and we are looking at pledges, we're looking at the performance of pledges, and we're trying to make sure that the -- that the proceeds are allocated equitably among the frontline states. Half of what we raised on my particular trip comes to us to defray our direct military -- our incremental costs of being there.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: Well that's reassuring.

Moving over to page four --

SEC. BAKER: Now some of it -- excuse me. But to make sure you understand, some of it comes in the form of equipment.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: I understand that.

SEC. BAKER: But it's equipment that is very -- that is useful over there that we can -- particularly in terms of logistic and other support for Arab forces that are a part of the multinational force.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: When you more or less, I guess, have a general discussion on who contributes what, recognizing that you've got a cost of a billion dollars a month, or thereabouts, and some countries prefer to contribute funds rather than personnel, is there some -- I'm talking particularly about Japan and the debate that's going on over there and whether Kaifu is going to be successful in getting the Japanese government to basically support defense troops. We've got Germany that is precluded -- or they can maintain a force in NATO but not in this regard.

And, obviously, everybody should share, but it's a lot easier to write a check than it is to put lives on the line. And this is something that disturbs everybody as to the equity of this and the relationship of the return. Because Japan maybe gets 70 or 80 percent of their oil from the Mideast; they're writing a check for 4,000 million dollars. It's not up to us to tell them what to do; they're a major world power and should feel comfortable with what they're doing.

Is there -- how do you -- how do you relevelate this to some equity, or is it just one of those things that you do the best you can?

SEC. BAKER: Well I think where governments have constitutional prohibitions you do the best you can, and that's what we've done in the case of Germany and Japan, and we've gotten commitments -- pledges, at least, for substantial sums of money. We want to make sure, as I mentioned in my statement, that those things are forthcoming promptly.

Both those countries, I think, would like to change those provisions in their constitution that -- at least to the extent of permitting them to support United Nations-supported efforts -- multinational efforts. Chancellor Kohl made a very impassioned statement to that effect, as a matter of fact, when I met with him in Germany. And I think particularly in the aftermath of German unification he agrees with us when we say that being more means doing more. And they'd like to see Germany do more, and he thinks Germany ought to be able to play a role in these kinds of efforts from a personnel standpoint, not just a financial standpoint.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: Oh, I certainly agree. And I think Prime Minister Kaifu is to be congratulated in his effort to push this in Japan.

Over on page seven you note -- about the only note of optimism that I think stands out: "We continue our search for a peaceful solution."

There has been shopped around from time to time a discussion about the two islands that are unoccupied -- the Kuwait islands of Bubiyan and Warba. And also thrown into that equation is a discussion over the oil fields of Rumailah.

SEC. BAKER: Rumailah -- (corrects pronunciation).

SEN. MURKOWSKI: Rumailah. And it's my understanding that the two islands are unoccupied. Obviously, the Iraqis look at them from the standpoint of a strategic capability as well as perhaps access. It's my understanding that nearly 90 percent of the oil that flows from the field of Rumailah actually is Iraqi oil.

Now, we have more or less put a line in the sand that says that there's not going to be any conditions on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; they're going to simply withdraw and there's no room for negotiation, arbitration or otherwise. That's, of course, understood, and the rationale is one that I support.

I'm wondering, though, in the search for a peaceful solution, is there some alternative that could be explored of a commercial solution? If everybody's looking for a -- potentially a way out because the other alternative that we've discussed here today isn't very pretty -- it's body bags, it's a reality of a war, and you know, we want to avoid that at all consequences if possible.

I'm floating -- and I'm not proposing -- but has there been any consideration of trying to encourage the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis to negotiate a commercial deal on the islands, whereby there would be an actual sale, the Kuwaitis would put a dollar price on them, and the Iraqis would be free to pay the price? Because, you know, all this conversation is preparatory to a conflict. And you've suggested a peaceful solution, in general terms, but is this kind of thinking so far removed from present reality that it's absolutely out of the question?

SEC. BAKER: Senator Murkowski, we think that the best chance for a peaceful solution is to -- is for everyone to strictly observe the sanctions and for the sanctions to begin to work and thereby affect behavior in Iraq. We think it would be a terrible mistake in terms of setting or establishing a new world order if we began by making the same mistakes we made in the 30's, and that is working deals that would permit unprovoked aggression to pay. And I know you're not suggesting that.

What we've said is, if Iraq would get out of Kuwait and the legitimate government were restored, then there could be discussions of all of the old problems that they have. It's really a matter, frankly, for the Kuwaiti government to determine, not a matter for the United States to determine, and I'm not sure that the United States is a particularly appropriate mediator under the circumstances that exist there. But we really must, as I said yesterday, we have to resist, I think, the siren song or call for partial solutions. We cannot say to the Kuwaiti government in exile, "If you don't give Saddam Hussein something, you're going to lose our support." That would be a terrible precedent for us to set, and it would be a terribly unprincipled stand for us to take. And I don't think we can take it, and I don't think the international community -- the majority of the international community -- is ready for that.

SEN. MURKOWSKI: Well, I don't disagree with your bottom line. Just the reality is if you seek peaceful solutions, what alternatives do you have available. Obviously, very few. And if a commercial arrangement could be made between the two parties, why, it would obviously offer a way out if they wanted that as a way out. And it may not even be conceivable, but --

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski, Senator Simon.

SEN. SIMON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I join in welcoming you here. This is our chance to lobby you, as you know.



I think there are two themes here. One is the administration has handled this very well up to this point. And the second is real concern about where we go from here. And I would simply like to underscore that consultation and authorization really are two very different things, and the resolution that was adopted by the Senate is not authorization. It is -- and there was a phrase in there -- and I had some dialogue with Senator Moynihan on this -- there was a phrase in there I wish had not been in there, where we support "continued action by the president." Now it was qualified, but I don't think -- I think as you read the dialogue on the floor of the Senate, it is very clear we're not -- this isn't any blank check to the president.

My own feeling is that we have to be patient, but firm and tough in the Iraq situation; that we should respond, but not attack, with possible exceptions if there is evidence that chemical weapons are going to be used or nuclear capability is a potential there.

Now, I do not expect you to respond to that suggestion, on my part. I think it is important that Iraq not know what options are under consideration.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, not withstanding threats to Americans?

SEN. SIMON: Well, if there are -- I don't know what the scenario's going to be, but in general, but I don't want to have a created incident, or a minor incident, that is an excuse for unilateral response, on our part.

SEC. BAKER: You see, that's why, in my view, it's practically impossible to judge the circumstances over a two and a half month period. We don't know --

SEN. SIMON: I know.

SEC. BAKER: -- what's going to happen there. We know that this man is extremely unpredictable, and we know -- and we feel very, very strongly an obligation to protect Americans.

So, it's pretty hard for me -- for you to give us a blank check, and I understand that. By the same token, we can't give you one.

SEN. SIMON: But I think that the message from Senator Biden, from Senator Lugar, from Senator Kassebaum, from Senator Sarbanes, has been, "Let's use some restraint in this whole process."

The second area, Senator Kerry referred to the situation in Israel. And I was pleased to see Mayor Teddy Kollek indicating that he would work with the UN Committee. I do get concerned when UN resolutions refer to Jerusalem as Occupied Territory. Or six or eight months ago, when the president referred to East Jerusalem in the way that he did.

I can conceive of a dozen different scenarios for resolving the Middle East situation; I cannot conceive of any scenario where Israel gives up Jerusalem. And when we refer to Jerusalem as Occupied Territory, or when the president makes references to East Jerusalem, as he did, I think it brings us unneeded fears in Jerusalem and false hopes in other quarters. I don't know if you care to comment on that.

SEC. BAKER: Well, Senator, my comment on that is that the subject is, as you pointed out, an extremely sensitive issue for all sides. And I really think no one should make it more of a problem by focusing on it now.

I agree with you. Our position -- you know the policy of the United States, for decades has been that Jerusalem should remain united, that -- that one of our aims is to insure that the city is never divided again. It's been our policy, as well, that the precise status should be subject -- should be determined through negotiation. But it's also been the policy of the United States that every aid agreement that we've ever negotiated with Israel, we both agree in those agreements, that the use of United States funds will be restricted to the geographic areas which were subject to the government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967. Now I think that fairly states United States policy and I accept your suggestion that discussions of it would not be productive in the current context.

SEN. SIMON: Let me finally -- and I will not take my full ten minutes. You said partial solutions in the Iraq-Kuwait situation are not desirable, and I agree with that. Ultimately, as we look at a solution it should not only be, it seems to me, the pulling out of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but some dealing with the chemical weapons potential and the nuclear weapons potential of Iraq. I don't know that you want to comment on that at this point, but I think that is very much to be a desired part of the ultimate resolutions.

SEC. BAKER: I think I've already commented on that by saying that if there is a withdrawal that is not accompanied by some some sort of a diminution in the military capacity of Iraq, then we need to -- as a part of addressing the question of regional security arrangements -- we need to be thinking about what we do about the disproportion of military power that's represented there and about the fact that they possess these weapons of mass destruction. It's something I think the international community has to focus on.

SEN. SIMON: I thank you.

SEC. BAKER: Yes.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much. Senator Boschwitz?

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly agree with my friend from Illinois that the diminution of their capacity to act thereafter is an important part of the whole eventual arrangement. I agree with you too, Mr. Secretary, that I think there is a chance for a new world order. And I congratulate the president and you for moving us towards the ability to see that actually happen. The world has been pulled together -- both Russia and ourselves -- and the UN is finally acting the way we had always hoped it would, and I hope there will be a negotiated settlement.

I very much like the idea of ongoing consultation with the leadership of the Congress, perhaps including the leadership of this committee and the leadership of the Intelligence Committee, not the night of some type of action but on some kind of ongoing basis.

But the idea of a declaration of war, or having one in reserve as Senator Sarbanes suggested, that kind of a debate, in my judgment, would be terribly divisive. It could take days and weeks, and I think that American lives in Saudi Arabia could clearly be jeopardized. Somebody has to have the authority to act. So I take a little bit different view than you have heard around the table this morning. And I think that there should be ongoing consultation.

But if there is going to be an opportunity to successfully bring this to a conclusion, somebody has to have the ability to act, and the action might have to be taken quickly, otherwise we would forewarn the Iraqis who would be able to arm some of their weapons, perhaps with chemicals, and have quite a destructive impact on the Middle East, and also on our forces over there. So I take a different view, and I would be supportive of the president having that authority. I believe that he should have that authority. But I also believe that there should be some ongoing and some thorough consultation.

Some say, too, that we shouldn't act unilaterally. I don't know how to inform all of the people that we're engaged with over there and still retain the element of surprise and not endanger, not only them, but our own people. So that this is when you're dealing with the Saddam Husseins of the world, you know, you just have to be fairly tough-minded in your approach to that whole thing. Otherwise, you're going to do not only damage to yourself, but more damage to his people, many of whom are soldiers and innocents and young people and so forth.

I wonder if you would comment on my comment, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think I've already made comments, Senator Boschwitz, that would indicate that I largely agree with you. It's very difficult, putting aside for the moment, the constitutional issue, as Senator Sarbanes I think pointed out, there is the issue of surprise, there is the issue that lives are at stake. We've had some references here today to the fact

that there were consultations on actions such as Grenada and Panama within hours prior to the operation, and that is true. I participated in those consultations. But there was -- it was very important that the element of surprise be maintained to the extent possible, and to the extent that surprise was maintained, I think American lives were saved. So all of these things enter in, Senator Boschwitz, and I'm inclined to agree with the general thrust of your remarks.

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: Let me turn, if I may, for a moment, to the Israeli situation, and I was pleased to hear Senator Kerry -- I see he's no longer here -- and he said if American lives are in jeopardy, then no one argues about the necessity to respond. Perhaps those are not his precise words, but if that is the exception that's to be made, consultation I think could be quite fruitful if there's an understanding here in the Congress that, if American lives are in jeopardy, that somebody has to have the power to act.

Just as aggression can't be rewarded in this instance, aggression can't be rewarded in other parts of the Middle East. And when you say that, prior to June 5, that the lines that existed at that time in Israel, lines change, as you well know, in wars of aggression. They have throughout history, and they should change, because aggressors must be penalized for their aggression. Otherwise, if you just returned to the status quo ante and there is no penalty, then aggression is perhaps not rewarded, but certainly not discouraged.

So that, while I understand that some elements of the lines that existed prior to the 5 of June, some of those lines, are meaningful than others, I think that Jerusalem, as Senator Simon pointed out, there is no question in the minds of the Israelis, or I think in my mind or the minds of others, that that's going to be the capital of Israel.

And I would say to you that, in the event that, after Watts or after some of the riots that occurred in our country, if the UN came down with some kind of a declaration that -- making some comment about that and wanted to send a commission, I think that that would not have been very well received. Perhaps Jerusalem is different in our eyes than Los Angeles or Detroit or New York or wherever, but I'm not sure that it's different in the eyes of the Israelis. And so that I can understand their reluctance to do so.

Does that look like it's going to be resolved in a friendly fashion? And is that going to be resolved, that entire issue between the Israelis and the UN and ourselves? We've had some bumpy relationships as of late, but that's not so unusual.

SEC. BAKER: Well, I said yesterday, Senator Boschwitz, I certainly hope it is. It's very important that it be so

resolved, and I was interested to hear Senator Simon comment on Mayor Kollek's statement of willingness to receive a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, something that, of course, Israel has done as recently as June of this year.

I won't get into a debate with you. I've already articulated what United States policy is and what the policy of all other countries is. I recognize and accept the fact that Israel's policy position on this is different. We have a difference. We have had differences in the past. We will overcome those differences.

One difference we don't have is the commitment of this country to Israel's security. That is unshakable. You know it, and I know it, and I think that we can and are demonstrating that. That will, of course, remain, Senator Boschwitz. There will be other differences. We have differences on settlements; it's no secret. We think that settlements move in the wrong direction, and we think settlements are an obstacle to peace, but we will manage these differences.

And I agree with Senator Simon's suggestion that on these very sensitive and complex issues, sometimes it's better that we don't have as much debate about them. We don't -- we try not to raise this particular issue, but we have a policy position that frankly is not the same as that of the government of Israel. And our policy position corresponds with the policy position of other countries.

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: If I could say, in conclusion, if the Mayor of Los Angeles had said that yes, he would welcome the UN coming to Los Angeles, this may not have sat very well with -- with you or the President -- and while Mayor Kollek is a different guy because he's been there so long and has something of an international standing, nevertheless I can understand some of the sensitivity that the Israelis have.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, Senator Sanford.

SEN. SANFORD: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Thank you for being here.

I hope, as we talk about the new world order, we'd look at this particular situation we're in right now, that we take a longrange view that not only do we have to settle this situation, but we set the precedent for what that world order will be. And I take it that the fundamental of the world order is that we will find ways collectively to settle aggression -- stop aggression -- settle disputes without warfare, and --

SEC. BAKER: And in a manner that would not permit the aggressor to gain from his aggression.

SEN. SANFORD: Which -- exactly. So I think that everything done so far except, perhaps, the size of the military there, strikes me as being executed extremely well and properly done. And I share the nervousness that somebody's going to get trigger-happy, but I'll just have to share that nervousness.

Let me ask you, though, about the goals. It bothered me when the initial statement was that the goal is to -- to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Now, we had some other things, such as hostages, but the -- get out of Kuwait and -- that's what we're asking. And it was obvious -- it's obvious to you -- very obviously, from what you've said -- that that's not enough. But that's all we've asked and if he pulled up tonight and went out, he could say "Well, I've done what you said. Pick up the embargo."

Now, I kept waiting for the United Nations, with the prompting of the United States perhaps, to go a step further toward the new world order doing things they hadn't done before. In reading the Charter, it seems to me, that the United Nations has the authority to require, as part of the price for lifting the embargo, the destruction of these weapons; second, on-site verification for any ensuing years that the UN decides is an appropriate time.

Also the UN can lay on its members the terms of the embargo of such weapons in the future, because you are violating -- or they are violating certainly one international accord on atomic energy and soon to be on chemical weapons. In any event, whether they are or not, those kinds of weapons can't be tolerated. So my question is, can we put that now as one of the conditions and shouldn't we put it as one of the conditions?

SEC. BAKER: Senator Sanford, we've spoken to this. In fact, I think I may have alluded to it earlier today, the idea that even if they should voluntarily withdraw, they will still be a disproportionately --

SEN. SANFORD: Well, of course, but I'm trying to pin it down in advance.

SEC. BAKER: Yeah, but what we've said is that consideration should be given to an international -- continuing international arms embargo on them even after they're out and perhaps a very intrusive non-proliferation regime. Now, you could expand that and we have also suggested this in the past, that we might want to take a look at some sort of a build-down requirement, which is what you're talking about, that as a condition of releasing the sanctions, Iraq would have to agree to build down or destroy.

SEN. SANFORD: Well, I don't think there's any doubt in my mind that you've been thinking in those terms. My point really is if we allow him to withdraw from Kuwait, since that's the only real hard condition we put down, then it's going to be very difficult for us to pick up again the kind of control of these weapons that we want to control, and furthermore, it seems to me that the United Nations and the world would be well served if the United Nations asserted its authority to do this kind of thing. And so, instead of waiting until we get him out of Kuwait, we would say now, "This is a condition. You're not going to have the power to be an aggressor."

SEC. BAKER: I think the better time to do it -- I think the objectives the president has articulated are the right ones, senator, and we don't know whether the withdrawal's going to take place voluntarily or involuntarily. If it takes place voluntarily, and he still maintains -- he still has in possession this substantial disproportionate military power, then we, I think, can look at the possibility of getting the United Nations --

SEN. SANFORD: Well, it doesn't cost any more to look at it now, and I'll just leave that thought --

SEC. BAKER: Yes sir.

SEN. SANFORD: Mr. Chairman, I would like, for the record, to have three or four other questions to be able to ask the Secretary, for the record, and I'll put those in if I may.

SEN. PELL: Without objection. The record will be kept open.

SEN. SANFORD: Now, let me talk about surprise. We surprised them at Normandy, all right, though they knew for a couple of years we were coming. Who you (are) going to surprise is not Hussein, you're going to surprise the American people. And that's going to be a very dangerous surprise. And I think this talk of surprise is bad talk; I don't think that we ought to pick this --

SEC. BAKER: Use the term, "Operational Security", if you'd prefer.

SEN. SANFORD: Well, I don't mind "Operational Security", and I don't want them to know where or when, but I want them to know "if", and I want --

SEC. BAKER: But, Senator, if we have a big long debate up here about whether, we're going to have to talk about where and if. And what with --

SEN. SANFORD: Well --

SEC. BAKER: -- and who with.

SEN. SANFORD: Well --

SEC. BAKER: I'm not saying that we shouldn't have it, quietly, privately, through consultation, as we have in the past. We should, but it's very difficult, you know, to do it in too large a forum.

SEN. SANFORD: I quite agree with that, but I don't want to be -- in the first place I feel very strongly, absent some severe provocation, that it would be a tragic mistake of lasting proportions, if we started the shooting. Now, I have that position that it's -- that we can settle this without military -- not without the military embargo, of course, but we can settle it without military invasion. In fact, I hardly see from a military point of view, how we can liberate Kuwait without destroying Kuwait.

SEC. BAKER: Our chances of settling it without resort to the use of force will be much improved --

SEN. SANFORD: -- if we've --

SEC. BAKER: -- if the opposition knows that we're not reluctant --

SEN. SANFORD -- if we've got it there --

SEC. BAKER: -- we got it there, and that we would not be reluctant to use it, so we shouldn't --

SEN. SANFORD: I think that's correct, and I don't think they're hanging on my every word, so I don't think I'm doing security any damage, but I think we better examine the need for surprise very carefully.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, Senator Sanford.

Senator Moynihan.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Mr. Secretary, first of all, congratulations for having got through the morning. You've done -- you've been very cheerful, and accommodating. Let me see if I can't give another perspective on the subject that we have all of us returned to over and again: surprise, authorization, consultation.

And I was -- I was struck by your written testimony by the fact that in all of 10 pages at no point did you use the term, "international law", and in no time in your subsequent testimony, have you used it. And this, I was struck because there was no more distinct fact of President Bush's reaction to



the Iraq invasion; than the sudden appearance of this term in his language. On the day after the invasion, he said, "Iraq" -- "What Iraq has done violates every norm of international law." On August 20, he urged Iraq to "adhere to international law." In a press conference on August 23, he claimed that the occupation of Kuwait is illegal under international law. He said, "International law must be enforced." "Iraq", he said, "is an outrageous violator of international law. International law has condemned the Iraqi attack, and -- Iraq makes demands are are unacceptable under international law."

Now, there has not been such a litany of invocation since Harry S Truman. The word almost disappeared from the vocabulary of American presidents, and from the vocabulary of American secretaries of state, if I may say it, sir. And, we had thought that this was something different; we had thought we heard -- we were hearing the President say, "Well, we -- we have -- that we've changed our minds about certain important things."

(I'll) give you an example: when your assistant secretary for this region came up, and I asked if wasn't the Iraqi's poison gas a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, he said, "I'm -- I'm not a lawyer." As if you have to be a lawyer to recognize poison gas. And in our resolution, the first thing we said -- the concurrent resolution, is that whereas on August 20, the armed forces of Iraq, and so forth, all in clear violation of the United Nations charter, and fundamental principles of international law.

And it is -- just as it was reassuring to the Congress that we would know the patterns on which the President would use force, or not use force, under the treaty, under the UN procedures, for you to come today and just have the subject disappear, is to ask had there been a change of view, or was the president's use of this an aberration?

SEC. BAKER: No, there's not change of view at all, Senator Moynihan, and I would -- I've got to dig in here through my prior statement to the committee when I was up here about a month ago. And I may not have made a reference to international law in there, but I'll be surprised if I didn't, maybe I didn't --

SEN. MOYNIHAN: They're working, I can tell you --

SEC. BAKER: They're -- well, if you've already looked at it, then they can stop -- stop looking. But let me say, I've never suggested today, nor have I implied action in violation of international law. We would -- we're not -- that subject is not being debated. That's why I guess maybe I haven't -- I haven't said anything about it, although we do constantly talk

about the gross violations of international law that Iraq has been perpetrating.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Well, right.

SEC. BAKER: I talked about the rape of Kuwait. Those are all violations of what's happening to our hostages and our diplomats.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: But the words -- the word that was so conspicuously -- the term so conspicuous in the president's announcement has suddenly disappeared. And you said that the president has the constitutional right to commit the forces. I'm disposed to agree with you, but many of my colleagues don't.

But would you -- let me ask you this: does the president have the constitutional right to violate international treaties?

SEC. BAKER: My off-the-top-of-my-head response to that, Senator, would be no.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: A treaty's the supreme law of the land.

SEC. BAKER: Yes, that's right.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Well, can I get you just to hear us say that, you know, we heard the president and we thought we were hearing something different, and you had reinforced that persuasion if we --

SEC. BAKER: International treaties to which the United States is a party.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Of course.

SEC. BAKER: Yes. No, go ahead. I'm sorry.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: That, you know, this matter to us, in our deliberation, and we're sitting in our rooms talking about a resolution. We say, "Well, the president is invoking international law. The laws are -- these are the treaties, supreme law of the land." The argument was made that the War Powers Resolution didn't arise here because he's acting -- under Article 25 of the Charter, we are bound to comply with the UN Security Council resolution, and that's what the President was doing. And we're making that kind of argument.

SEC. BAKER: Yes.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: And that mattered to us. And I hope you knew that we were.

SEC. BAKER: We're not walking -- we're not changed -- there's been no change at all, well, Senator, in our approach, in our analysis of the circumstances under which any of these options, be they forceful or peaceful, could be utilized, nor has there been the slightest change in our view of the gross behavior of Iraq in violation of international law. If I have not articulated that sufficiently today, then let me remedy it by repeating it here. It's absolutely true.

And let me -- I mentioned a minute ago to -- in answer to a question from Senator Sarbanes, I asked him whether or not he was talking about Article 51 under the --

SEN. MOYNIHAN: But Article 51 is that catchall of, you know, the right of individual -- collective self-defense.

SEC. BAKER: Collective self-defense.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: That's not what we're pursuing. We're under Chapter 7. And I think you've done very well under it.

SEC. BAKER: But we have not -- we have not said, Senator Moynihan, that we would not utilize Article 51.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: No, but is --

SEC. BAKER: In fact, we have said we have Article 51 authority as --

SEN. MOYNIHAN: By definition.

SEC. BAKER: By -- as things now stand. Well, because we were requested by the legitimate government of Kuwait to take some action.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Now one point, and I hope you take this away with you, and it's not meant to be supportive.

You opened up by thanking us for our resolutions. Sir, you don't have a resolution. You have a joint resolution on the House side; we have a concurrent resolution on our side. They are not the collective statement of the Congress -- jointly of the Congress. There's nothing gone to the President. Part of the reason you don't is that the first reaction from the White House is, "We don't want any of your resolutions." And it was a -- it was a very hard job getting even -- I mean, getting any agreement on language whatever. And the simple fact is that had there been a little more forthcoming, I think -- the Chairman, Ranking Member might not agree -- I see the Chairman nodding at least, as he understands -- heard what I said -- a little more forthcoming attitude and you'd be -- we'd be leaving here with you -- with a document you could show the world and show us for the month to come.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, I understand what you're saying. Nevertheless, we do have a resolution from each body that has been passed and that people can look at. And that is certainly a lot more than we had when we began to engage on the subject. And I know you worked on it and I worked on it, and I think it's, frankly, good for the nation that we have a resolution from each house.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: Would you agree it might be better if you had a common document?

SEC. BAKER: It might be better, but I still think we have something that's very meaningful and to which we can point without having gotten ourselves mired down in a constitutional debate about the applicability of War Powers or without getting ourselves mired down in suggestions that somehow we were asking for a totally unlimited blank check.

SEN. MOYNIHAN: A fair answer. And good luck.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEC. BAKER: We note your vote "for", Senator Moynihan.

SEN. PELL: I'd just to acknowledge the presence of a guest here of -- Senator --

SEN. METZENBAUM: Oh, Mr. Chairman --

SEN. PELL: Senator Metzenbaum?

SEN. METZENBAUM: Mr. Chairman, I have three written questions I'd like to give the Secretary.

SEN. PELL: The record will be kept open for questions of any of the Senators or our guest -- anybody else.

I would just like the record to show that I, for one, am not giving advance approval of a U.S. unilateral military action. And moreover, I hope out of this hearing may come some sort of consultative group that may be developed to cover us in the recess period.

I would turn to the Ranking Minority member Senator Helms.

SEN. HELMS: Just one final note, Mr. Secretary. Going back to the INF -- and you will recall the concerns I had about that --- that treaty.

SEC. BAKER: About which treaty, Senator?

SEN. HELMS: The INF.

SEC. BAKER: INF.

SEN. HELMS: You are familiar, of course, with those 24 SS-23s that were found in East Germany, given to them by the Soviets, and I just wonder, now, the Soviets claim that they transferred these SS-23s to East Germany before the treaty was signed. You know, they always got a little excuse for everything they do. That's neither here nor there, but what I want to know is, did the Soviets take back those 24 SS-23s just before the reunification of Germany?

SEC. BAKER: Senator, we have no reason to believe that there's been any change in the location of those weapons systems, but I do have some other information that I can impart to you in executive session that I can't give you here, and I'll be delighted to do that when we finish, if you want.

SEN. HELMS: Well, I'd like to have that because I understand that these SS-23s had nuclear warheads on them.

SEC. BAKER: I have other information I'd be delighted to give you when we're finished.

SEN. HELMS: Okay, all right, I understand.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much. One point I'd like to make in addition is -- and I'm glad Senator Moynihan is here -- is the satisfaction one has from having been in San Francisco 45 years ago, seeing the UN Charter developed, not having been invoked all these years in between, we thumbed our noses at it; and now to find it being used and referred to and discussed is of great satisfaction to that small band of us who are still alive, who were there those years ago.

Our guest Senator Metzenbaum has a brief question, I believe.

SEN. METZENBAUM (D-OH): Mr. Secretary, one very elementary question. The majority of the members of the Senate joined in a letter to the President, and Senator Dole sent a separate letter drafted a little bit differently, but both of them had the same thrust, and that has to do with the rising price of oil and the fact that, although the Saudis are helping us financially, the fact is that the price of oil today is literally clobbering our economic situation in this country.

The 51 senators' letter urged the president to speak with King Fahd about bringing down the price of oil. The letter from Senator Dole addressed itself in a different manner, but talked about calling upon some of our -- those Arab nations to -- or rather, the Saudis to pick up some of the obligations to some of the countries that we're trying to help who would have been hurt by the situation.

Could you inform us as to whether or not this matter has been discussed by the President with you and whether or not we can look forward to any action along this line?

SEC. BAKER: I'm not -- I have not discussed specifically with the President your letter -- or the letter that he's received, Senator Metzenbaum. I know that he has been very concerned about the price of oil and what he sees as a speculative rise in the price of oil that's out of proportion to the actual supply and demand equation.

It's my sense from separate -- well, from things that I have heard from others that the Saudis and other major producers themselves are concerned about this because it makes more difficult the achievement of the goals of implementing the United Nations resolutions. Because with the significant increases in the price of oil comes major economic problems for frontline states, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and others, but also, for countries around the world that -- that are just now emerging from -- from the shadow of communism, for instance.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are being very adversely impacted. Many countries -- not -- I mean, there's some producer countries in Latin America -- but many other countries in Latin America are being adversely impacted. So, it is a matter of some concern.

I can't answer whether or not there have been specific discussions by the President with King Fahd about that. When did the letter go down?

SEN. METZENBAUM: It came in about five days ago --

SEC. BAKER: I'm not --

SEN. METZENBAUM: -- I -- (inaudible) -- Senator Dole's about the same time.

SEC. BAKER: It is a matter that the President is concerned about and has been devoting some time to -- that matter generally.

SEN. METZENBAUM: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. PELL: Senator Helms?

SEN. HELMS: One more -- one final question. Back in September, Prince Bandar of -- Ambassador for Saudi Arabia came up here and he and I were having a conversation. At that time, there were a lot of complaints from people all across the country about the Saudi interference and restrictions -- with -- interference with and restrictions on the religious services of our military personnel over there.

He said, "Look, Jesse, I'll take care of that right now. As soon as I leave here I'll call the Pentagon. That's not going to happen."

Well, we're still getting reports that there are restrictions and there is interference with -- are you hearing this?

SEC. BAKER: I know that there were some initial problems, Senator Helms. It was my understanding that -- that the Department of Defense had worked most of those out so that our -- our men and women over there are free to -- to practice their religion and their religious beliefs. But, I am not upto-date on --

SEN. HELMS: Well, will you have somebody on your staff --

SEC. BAKER: Yes, sir, we will.

SEN. HELMS: We're getting -- find out about this and let me know.

SEC. BAKER: Sure.

SEN. HELMS: Because I want to tell the folks who are contacting me what --

SEC. BAKER: Absolutely.

SEN. HELMS: Good. Thank you very much.

SEN. PELL: Thank you very much, gentlemen, the hearing's adjourned.

(End O and A session transcript)

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WHITE HOUSE REPORT, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17  
(Gulf; civil rights bill)

NEWS BRIEFING -- White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater discussed the following topics:

U.S. POLICY ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL REITERATED

Fitzwater reiterated that Iraq should comply with the United Nations resolution calling for total Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government.

He made the remark in response to questions regarding Secretary of State Baker's comments October 16 firmly rejecting as "the siren song" of appeasement suggestions that the United States should seek a compromise solution to the Persian Gulf crisis, permitting Iraq to keep some of Kuwait's strategic islands and oil fields in exchange for withdrawing from the rest of its tiny neighbor.

Baker, in a news conference, made clear that forcing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to pull his troops out of Kuwait remains the top goal of U.S. diplomacy. Baker stressed that the administration is not prepared to consider a "negotiated arrangement that would enable (Saddam Hussein) to claim benefits from his unprovoked aggression."

Fitzwater was asked if the administration would consider anything before complete and total Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. "Secretary Baker was very clear on that," Fitzwater replied, adding that "the terms of the U.N. resolution should be complied with. And that calls for (Iraqi) withdrawal and restoration of the legitimate (Kuwaiti) government."

Asked if the Soviets agree with the policy outlined by Baker October 16 and if they would settle for anything less than total Iraqi withdrawal, Fitzwater said he could not speak for Soviet policy. "But they certainly were a party to the United Nations resolutions and support them," Fitzwater added. "They told the president that in Helsinki; and we have no reason to think otherwise."

Fitzwater said late October 16 that Yevgeny Primakov, a senior aide to Soviet President Gorbachev, will meet with President Bush at the White House on Friday, October 19. Primakov recently met with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and also conferred with British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterrand. Fitzwater told reporters Primakov would be briefing Bush on all three conversations but noted he did not know what, if any, particular message Primakov is carrying.

Asked at the October 17 briefing if the Soviets had already communicated to U.S. officials the content of Primakov's



meeting with Saddam Hussein, Fitzwater said, "We have had some indications of what it was about....but nothing like (what) the president will get firsthand on Friday."

Asked if the "indications" had been encouraging, Fitzwater replied, "No." Asked what was not encouraging, Fitzwater said Primakov "has explained all this publicly. He's talked at length about it. And I simply was reflecting his observations that there is no real change in the situation as a result of the meetings."

### CIVIL RIGHTS BILL VETO THREAT REITERATED

Fitzwater said President Bush and his senior advisers have worked hard with both the House of Representatives and the Senate to forge a civil rights bill that the president could sign. But the the civil rights bill, "as amended in conference, is neither sound nor practical and will have the effect of forcing businesses to adopt quotas in hiring and promotion," the press secretary said.

"It will also foster divisiveness in litigation rather than conciliation and do more to promote legal fees than civil rights," he said. "This bill in its current form will be vetoed. The administration does support the Kassebaum-Gorton substitute and urges the conference committee to allow this to be offered. The president is determined to eliminate racial bias and to guarantee equal opportunity for all."

The Senate late October 16 approved a compromise civil rights bill by a vote of 62 to 34, less than the two-thirds majority necessary to override the president's threatened veto. The bill, which would reverse six recent Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the scope and remedies of federal laws against job discrimination, will go to the House for final approval before going to Bush.

Fitzwater said the Senate vote shows that there is "strength there to sustain a veto," adding that the administration is pleased that "a number of people agree with us that this is a quota bill and not a civil rights bill."

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דתיקות: סדר י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קר: 1
סוג: שמר		פתוק: 2
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 17.10.90		אל: מע"מ
פס' פרוק: הפסד: 1190		דע:
		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרס ברום ושכתב בדיוור לשח"ח לנו - לזנקאג'

דע"ב שכתב חרף ששיגר אתמול (16.10) הקונגרס ברום למזכיר ביוקר אודות  
שכתב חבוטה לשח"ח לנו והלינקאג' ברום סאדאם חוסנין לישראל.

יוסף גונאי דננר.  
יחודית ודנאי דננר.

ש"ח 9  
סנסמ 1  
הקד 1  
גיש 1  
ג/גיש 1  
בנסוא 1  
ג/גיש 2

תפוצה:

1990-10-17

21:09

KESHER-WASHINGTON

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26TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA  
 COMMITTEE  
 BUDGET  
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
 JUDICIARY  
 CHAIRMAN, ARMS CONTROL  
 AND FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS

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# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

HOWARD L. BERMAN

October 16, 1990

1190  $\frac{2}{2}$

The Honorable James A. Baker, III  
 Secretary of State  
 Department of State  
 Washington D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was genuinely incensed at reading the text of your message to Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy which, notwithstanding the disingenuous disclaimer, compares Israeli leaders to Saddam Hussein, Israel to Iraq. You "worry" that "some" will "unjustly" make the comparison. By so doing, Mr. Secretary, you are manifestly and insidiously comparing the two. If you do not think Saddam Hussein will see it that way, you continue to underestimate the perspicacity of your new enemy. ...

No one begrudges you the right to criticize Israeli behavior in any arena. You have at your disposal relevant and substantive material to do so if you wish. Why, therefore, this conjectural contrast which is not only entirely inappropriate, but so obviously plays into the hands of Saddam Hussein? What greater reward could Saddam hope to reap at this juncture than to have the United States compare these two utterly incomparable "occupations"?

The not-so-stealthy approach this administration has made over the last two weeks toward embracing this nefarious linkage risks damaging the support the administration has garnered in its handling of the crisis so far. If the attractiveness of the approach is that it assists in building solidity into our coalition with the Arab world, it is evidence that there is something deeply wrong with that coalition. If that is the case, let us address that directly. Linkage is inappropriate and unwise, and the U.S. would do well to get that word to Saddam Hussein before he capitalizes on our inexplicable ambiguity.

Sincerely,

*Howard L. Berman*  
 HOWARD L. BERMAN  
 Member of Congress

HLB/lh

אאא, חוזם: 12735  
אל: רהמש/926  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 245, תא: 171090, חז: 2211, דח: מ, סג: שמ,  
כבב  
שמור/מיידי  
אל: מצפ'א, מזא'ר  
דע: ממ'ד

ביקור פרימקוב בארה"ב

1. כשיחה (13.10 אחה'צ) עם האוזלונר (עוזרו של רוס לנושא בריה"מ) סיפר כי נכון למועד שיחתנו נקבעה לפרימקוב פגישה (מחר ה-18.10) עם הנשיא בלבד.

2. התחמק מלהשיב לשאלתי מדוע לא ניקבעה לפרימקוב פגישה עם בייקר. לא ציא מכלל אפשרות שפגישה עם המזכיר תצא לפועל.

3. לשאלתי לפרש הביקור, לאחר ששה"ח שווארדנצה דיווח למזכיר בהרחבה על תוצאות שיחות פרימקוב בבגדאד, העריך האוזלונר שהביקור מתקיים בעקבות נקשת שווארדנצה לאפשר לפרימקוב לעדכן ישירות את הנשיא וכל זאת למה? לדברי איש שיחי מתנהל במוסקווה ויכוח בין גורמים החולקים על עמדת גורבצ'וב ושווארדנצה התומכים בנסיגת עיראק ללא תנאים מוקדמים. אותם גורמים שאינם שוללים מו'מ עם צדאס. פרימקוב, טוען האוזלונר, נמנה על האחרונים.

4. המסקנות אליהן הגיע פרימקוב בשיחותיו עם צדאס היו שעמדתו מותירה מרחב תמרון אותו יש לנסות ולמצות. על כך ירצה פרימקוב לשוחח עם הנשיא. עד כאן הערכת האוזלונר.

שטיין.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12713

אל: רהמש/917

מ:- ווש, נר: 2139, תא: 171090, זח: 2010, דח: ב, סג: סב,

כבב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א -- לנמען בלבד

ערבויות לדירור: בעקבות מכתב שה'ח לבייקר

1. במהלך שיתתי עם מילר (ראה דווח נפרד) התייחס למכתב ההבהרה של שה'ח למזכיר. להערכתו אין במכתב דבר ש-'UNDERCUTS' ההבטחות שנתן שה'ח במכתבו.
2. לבקשתי התקשר מילר (1830) כדי למסור שהמזכיר טרם עיין במכתב. הוסיף כי ההמלצה שיעביר הדרג המקצועי למזכיר תהיה ברוח דבריו לעיל.
3. הבעתי תקווה כי במידה וזו תהייה גם דעת המזכיר יסתפקו באישור קבלת מכתב.

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

12411, תוזם: אאאא  
אל: רהמש/900  
מ:- המשרד, תא: 171090, זח: 1925, דח: ב, סג: שמ,  
נבב  
שמור/בהול  
אל : ווש'  
השגריר

להלן נוסח בלתי מוסמך של מכתב השר למזכיר המדינה מהיום (17.10.90).  
נוסח זה כבר הועבר לידי שג' ארה"ב כאן, ולכן אין צורך להעבירו לנמען.  
המקור התתום יועבר דיפ'.

JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 17, 1990  
86726

DEAR JIM,

IN THE WAKE OF VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS, SOME OF THEM WITH DIFFERING AND PERPLEXING INTERPRETATIONS OF MY LETTER TO YOU OF OCTOBER 2, 1990 WITH REGARD TO THE HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES, I WISH TO DEFINE OUR POSITION:

YOU ARE WELL AWARE THAT IN THAT LETTER THERE IS NO UNDERTAKING, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO REFRAIN FROM CONSTRUCTION IN JERUSALEM -- OR TO LIMIT CONSTRUCTION WITHIN JERUSALEM -- OR ANYWHERE ELSE, INCLUDING JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA.

THIS POSITION FINDS ITS FULL EXPRESSION, CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY, BOTH IN THE CONVERSATIONS WE HELD TOGETHER AND IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF SEPTEMBER 21.

PERMIT ME TO QUOTE MY WORDS FROM THE RECORD OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WHICH WE HELD IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1990, AS FOLLOWS: 'MY GOVERNMENT HAS AN IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION. IF YOU THINK THAT WE WILL CHANGE OUR CREDO ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAS ELECTED BECAUSE OF THESE INVESTMENT GUARANTEES, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN.' ELSEWHERE IN THE RECORD, I REPEATED AND EMPHASIZED: 'IF YOU EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE THAT IT WILL HALT THE SETTLEMENT ENDEAVOR AND THAT NO ONE WILL SETTLE IN THE TERRITORIES -- THAT WILL NOT BE.' INDEED, YOUR REACTION WAS: 'YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE ANY STEP WHICH CONTRADICTS YOUR PLATFORM AND YOUR POSITION.'

MOREOVER: IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF SEPTEMBER 21,

1990, YOU WRITE INTER ALIA: 'I LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO WHAT YOU TOLD ME IN WASHINGTON.... YOU PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NOT BEING PUT IN A POSITION ... TO GIVE UP THE PRINCIPLE OF SETTLEMENTS.' YOU CONCLUDED YOUR LETTER BY REEMPHASIZING THAT YOU HAD MY COMMENTS TO YOU VERY MUCH IN MIND. IN THE COURSE OF THE LETTER YOU SAID THAT YOU HAD ISRAEL'S 'CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN MIND' ... 'AND NOTWITHSTANDING OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, I HAVE MADE AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID PUTTING YOU IN A POSITION WHERE A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IS BEING OVERTLY CHALLENGED.'

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, JIM, WE AGREED THAT THE FUNDS DERIVING FROM THE LOAN, WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT, WILL BE USED IN KEEPING WITH THAT COMMITMENT GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, YEAR BY YEAR, UPON RECEIPT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND GRANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS COMMITMENT STATES THAT '... USES OF THE GRANT SHALL BE RESTRICTED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967.'

THIS COMMITMENT HAS NOT -- AND HAS NOT HAD IN THE PAST -- ANY BEARING WHATSOEVER ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM.

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS DETERMINED IN THE JERUSALEM LAW WHICH STATES THAT JERUSALEM, WHOLE AND UNDIVIDED, IS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL.

JERUSALEM IS NOT DIVIDED EITHER BY A WALL OR BY ANY SEPARATING LINE.

MY DEAR JIM, THE TWO OF US AGREED AT THE OUTSET OF OUR TALKS THAT THE BASIS OF OUR WORK WILL BE POSITED ON TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. HENCE I THINK IT CORRECT TO HAVE TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE RECORD ABSOLUTELY STRAIGHT, BOTH IN LETTER AND IN SPIRIT.

LET US NOT PERMIT EXTRANEOUS INTERPRETATIONS TO UNDERMINE THIS BASIS, WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN US PERSONALLY.

SINCERELY YOURS,

DAVID LEVY

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

7327:חוזם,אאא  
אל:רהמש/566  
מ-:וושיןנטון,נר:170,תא:101090,חז:2130,דח:מ,סג:בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/מיידי

תאריך: 10.10.90

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרנ

דע: מצפ"א, לש-שה"ח, ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות, וושיןנטון

להלן נוסח מכתב שה"ח למזכיר המדינה בנושא הערבויות לדיור כפי ששוחרר  
היום לפרסום ע"י מחמ"ד

T OF OCTOBER 2, 1990 LETTER FROM ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY  
US SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, RELEASED BY THE US DEPARTMENT OF  
TE, WASHINGTON, DC/ WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1990

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN DETAIL THE  
RANGE OF ISRAELI CONCERNS REGARDING THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. IT  
WAS REASSURING TO HEAR YOU REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED  
STATES TO ISRAEL AND TO THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS QUALITATIVE EDGE.

I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED TO HEAR YOUR VERY STRONG  
REAFFIRMATION OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, AND THAT  
IN THIS TIME OF DANGER, ISRAEL CAN COUNT ON THE UNITED STATES TO  
STAND BY ITS COMMITMENT AND RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE.

JIM, I WAS IMPRESSED WITH YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S NEEDS  
AND YOUR EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEM IN AN ORDERLY, TIMELY, AND  
COORDINATED FASHION.

IT IS A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY THAT WE BOTH SHARE, AND I  
LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU CLOSELY ON THIS.

IN THIS RESPECT, OUR DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE OF HOUSING  
INVESTMENT GUARANTEES PRODUCED RESULTS. AS I SAID IN OUR MEETINGS,  
I CAN CONFIRM THAT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL  
WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSORPTION OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION  
IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IN HIS  
JUNE 27, 1990 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH, AND THE STATEMENT BY  
MINISTER OF HOUSING SHARON ON JUNE 25, 1990, NAMELY, THAT THE  
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT TO DIRECT OR SETTLE SOVIET JEWS  
BEYOND THE GREEN LINE.

CONSISTENT WITH THE TRADITIONAL ASSURANCES WHICH THE GOVERNMENT  
OF ISRAEL PROVIDES IN OUR ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS THOSE IN  
THE "IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, SEPTEMBER 1980, BETWEEN THE



GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACTING THROUGH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT", USES OF THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967. I ALSO WANT TO RECONFIRM WHAT I TOLD YOU IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION THAT NO SPECIAL INCENTIVES EXIST TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO SETTLE BEYOND THE GREEN LINE, NOR ARE WE PLANNING TO PROVIDE SUCH INCENTIVES IN THE FUTURE.

AS I KNOW YOU WILL BE REPORTING TO CONGRESS ON THIS LOAN PROGRAM, LET ME SAY FURTHER, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT WE WILL PROVIDE YOU PERIODICALLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S BUILDING PLANS FOR HOUSING FOR IMMIGRANTS INCLUDING SPECIAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES. I WILL ALSO USE MY BEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ANNUALLY AS COMPLETE INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, AND PERIODICALLY AS WELL TO INFORM YOU OF ANY GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

I BELIEVE THAT THESE POINTS, THESE UNDERSTANDINGS, WILL HELP US FURTHER THE GREAT CHALLENGE OF ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWS IN ISRAEL.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK PRESIDENT BUSH AND YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE EXTENSION OF THIS HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES PROGRAM.

SINCERELY, DAVID LEVY. (SIGNED "DAVID".)

END

סופ

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 11487

אל: רהמש/855

מ-: ווש, נר: 2129, תא: 161090, חז: 2100, חמ: מ, סג: סב,

נכב

סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב./מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לש' שה'ח

הנדון: בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט

1. בשיחה ( 16.10 ) עם קרצר נסקרו הנושאים הנאים : הבהרות לתגובות ישראל וארה'ב בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט והמהלכים הצפויים.

2. להלן סכום השיחה :

תגובות ארה'ב וישראל

א. לאחר שפירטתי הסיבות לתגובת ממ' ישראל הבהיר קרצר כי הפרספציה לפיה מאמצי ארה'ב במועבי'ט לניסוח הצעת החלטה שתאפשר להמנע מהטלת וטו וכו' קשורים במשבר במפרץ מוטעית. לדבריו, בייקר במכתבו ( והיום בתשובות לעתונאים ) השגריר בראון ( בשיחותיו ) ודוברת מחמ'ד הבהירו שארה'ב היתה פועלת כפי שפעלה ללא כל קשר למשבר במפרץ. כל פרשנות אחרת אינה מבטאת את עמדת הנשיא והמזכיר. הוסיף כי הדבר המרכזי בגללו הגיבו כפי שהגיבו היא עובדת הריגתם של 21 איש. 'אל לה לישראל להניח שהיא נדרשת לשלם את המחיר של רצון ארה'ב לשמור על אחדות המחנה האנטי עיראקי. אם זו דרך חשיבתכם כי אז אני מבין את תגובתכם'. מקווה שלאחר שהבהירו לנו שעמדתם לא נקבעה בגין משבר המפרץ אנו נגיב אחרת.

ב. אשר לתוכן החלטת מועבי'ט, קרצר טען שהנוסח שהתקבל היה המירב שניתן היה להשיג בנסיבות הקיימות. 'האלטרנטיבות היו הרבה יותר גרועות'. כראיה לכך שהחלטה היתה סבירה ציין את העובדה שאש'פ רואה בה ( בהחלטה ) כשלון ומכאן כך קרצר 'שכשלון אש'פ אינו יכול להיות גם כשלונכם'. באשר לסוגיית שיגור שליח וסוגיית הריבונות ניסה קרצר להסביר שאין לראות בקבלת שליח מטעם המזכ'ל משום ויתור על תביעתנו לריבונות על העיר. בתגובה הערותיו חזרתי ( כמפורט בהנחיות שקיבלנו ) על עמדתנו.

ג. מעניין לעניין סיפר על שיחת רובינשטיין עם רוס במהלכה הבהיר האחרון כי לשתי המדינות ( 'לא בהכרח מאותן סיבות ' כד קרצר ) עניין שישראל לא תהפוך ל' FOCAL POINT באו'מ.

מהלכים צפויים:

א. כתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הערכתנו את שעתיד להתרחש עשה הכחנה בין מה שהוא ' DOABLE ' קרי בר עשייה מבחינת הנשיא והמזכיר.

ב. אשר לקטיגוריה הראשונה סבור שהמזכ'ל לא יוכל לוותר בנושא שיגור שליח. באותה מידה כמו ששיגור שליח 'עם שיניימ' לא יצא לפועל בגלל התנגדותכם. להערכתו, קיים מרווח שמאפשר למצוא מוצא שישיב רצון הצדדים.

ג. בהקשר לעיל הוסיף כי אינו משוכנע שמזכ'ל האו'מ עומד על כך שהשליח יפגש עם נציגי ממ' ישראל. למזכ'ל חשוב שהשליח לכשיבוא יוכל לנוע בחופשיות ( 'לא כתייר ' ) ולהפגש עם כל גורם שירצה לפגשו. סבור כי המזכ'ל ירצה לעיין בדו'ח הועדה שהוקמה. אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות שהמזכ'ל עשוי להסכים לדחות ( 'בהנחה שמדובר בדחייה סבירה ' ) ביקור

השליח. לסכום שיחה זו ציין כי המזכ"ל אינו מעוניין להקשות עלינו.

ד. אשר לבוש ובייקר, קרצר ציין כי השניים מייחסים תשיבות לשיגור השליח ( הערה: הערכת קרצר עולה בקנה אחד עם התבטאויותיהם של החד משמעיות של הנשיא והמזכיר ביומיים האחרונים ).

ה. בהתייחסו למכתב רוה"מ לנשיא סיפר כי דרגי העבודה התלו לנסח טיוטת תשובה של הנשיא לתוכן המכתב שלהערכתו יחייב את הנשיא להתייחס לתוכן אשר אינו מותר שום ספק ושום מרחב תמרון. קרצר הביע תקווה שבמידה והנשיא יתליט להשיב הוא לא יסתפק בתגובה לתוכן המכתב אלא יסכים להוסיף פסקא או שתיים שבהן יבקש מרוה"מ לעשות מאמץ לפתור נושא השליח כדי שאפשר יהיה לסגור הנושא. עד כאן תוכן שיחתנו.

ו. הערה: בהנחה וקצר סכס בדבריו את הלך הרוח בממשל בנושאים לעיל כי אז ניתן לקבוע כדלקמן :

(1) עיקר 'זעממ' של הנשיא והמזכיר יצא על הריגתם של כ-21 ערבים ופציעתם של כ-150. פציעה בלבד או אישפוז בגין גאז מדמיע לא היה גורר תגובה דומה.

(2) למרות המאמץ להבהיר כי למשבר במפרץ לא היתה השפעה על עמדתם אין ספק שהחשש מפני ההשלכות שעלולות להיות לנושא על המאמץ האמריקאי לשמור על זית האנטי-עיראקית היתה השפעה על המאמץ האינטנסיבי אותו השקיעה ארה"ב ונכונותה לספוג ביקורת מאתנו ( להשגת קונצנזוס על הצעת החלטה שהתקבלה.

(3) שיגורו של שליח מטעם המזכ"ל ( גם אם ממשלת ישראל תסרב לקבלו ) הינו מינימום הכרחי מבחינתם של הנשיא והמזכיר. מעבר לכך יהיה הממשל פתוח להצעות להקל על ממ' ישראל להשאר נאמנה להחלטתה.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11442

אל: רהמש/853

מ-: ווש, נר: 2128, תא: 161090, זח: 1740, דח: מ, סג: סב,

נבב

סודי ביותר - מידי -- ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ"ל ראה'מ

מנכ"ל משה'ח

דע: השגריר, שובל - הועבר

סמנכ"ל צפ"א

יועץ מדיני לשהב"ט -

מאת: עודד ערן

שיחה עם סגן הנשיא

הבוקר קיימתי שיחת פרידה בת 40 דקות עם סגן הנשיא קוויל. השיחה נערכה בארבע עיניים. בפתיחה ביקש קוויל בכל לשון של בקשה שנאפשר למשלחת האו"ם היכנס לישראל.

"הדבר חיוני כדי לנסות ולהסיר את המתחות בין שתי המדינות", אמר קוויל. "מוטב שתניחו להם להיכנס גם אם לא תקיימו עמם כל מגע". קוויל ביקש להעביר מסר זה במיוחד לראה'מ והבטחתיו שאעשה זאת (בתום הפגישה התקשרתי עם מזכיר הממשלה ע'מ לעשות זאת - ע.ע.).

במהלך השיחה אמרתי, שקשה לנהל כך יחסים בין שתי מדינות. אנו עומדים ביחד ובנפרד בפני איום אדיר וגם מול אפשרויות שעשויות להיפתח עם פתרונו של המשבר ואי אפשר לטפל לא במשבר ולא בהזדמנויות שפתרונו עשוי ליצור, ללא הידברות רצינית בין שתי המדינות וההנהגות הפוליטיות שלהן. קוויל אמר שהוא מסכים עם דברי והוסיף, שהדברים האישיים שהוא שומע בישיבות הקבינט האמריקאי והפרסומים בעתונות האמריקאית והישראלית, גורמים לו דאגה רבה. הוא שאל לדעתי, מי בשני הצדדים יוכל לנסות ולהפסיק את הסחף הזה ועניתי שאיני רוצה להיכנס לכך אבל עליהם ליטול היזמה בנדון.

בהמשך השיחה הצגתי לו בפרוט את הדאגות הבטחוניות שלנו לטווח המידי ולטווח הקצר ובמיוחד את הסחף שנוצר בכל מה שקשור ליתרוןנו האיכותי. קוויל ידע במעומעם על ה-DRAWDOWN והסברתי לו, שעל אף שזו עשויה להיות תרומה חשובה, צריך לחשוב על דרכים אחרות כמו ההצבה מראש, אבל במיוחד סיוע לישראל

קוויל התעניין בנושא העראקי ובמחשבותינו על ההשלכות של כשלונו האישי של צדאם חוסיין. אמרתי לו שלדעתי, הבעיה אינה מתמקדת באיש עצמו, אלא בעצמה שהוא בנה ומבקש לבנות ושעמה יאלץ האיזור להתמודד בין אם בעיראק צדאם חוסיין או שליט אחר.

בסוף השיחה חזר קוויל וביקש שנאפשר למשלחת המזכ"ל להיכנס. הוא התעניין גם בשגריר החדש ועדכנתיו בנושא.

ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11191

אל: רהמש/817

מ-: ווש, נר: 2120, תא: 161090, ח: 1300, דח: כ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

1. בשיתה (16.10) עם ארון מילר תאר את תוכן השדר של רזה'מ לנשיא כ -  
"STRAIGHTFORWARD" לדבריו תוכן השדר מעביר 'הרבה אמוציות'.

2. בהמשך לשדר ולחילופי הדברים של הימים האחרונים הבהיר כי יש למצוא  
דרך - TO COOL DOWN לכמה ימים. לאחר מכן ינסו לשכנע אותנו לאפשר כואו של  
שליח מטעם המזכ'ל. סיפר כי שמע על נכונות טדי קולק להפגש עם המשלחת.  
(הערה: מדברי מילר ניתן להבין שביקור שליח חשוב יותר משאלת שתה'פ ממ'  
ישראל עם השליח).

לדברי מילר חשוב לעשות מאמץ TO DIFFUSE את המצב שנוצר ביחסי ישראל -  
ארה'ב. המשך המתיחות עלול להביא לסחף במאמצי ארה'ב למקד תשומת הלב  
למפרץ, כמו גם לחזק את הלינקאז' בין שני האיזורים דבר שלא להם ולא לנו  
יש ענין.

4. לסיום, בהמשך לפירסומים בדבר החלטת ועדת השרים בראשות השר שרון לעודד  
יישוב עולים ולהגדיל מספר יחידות הדיור שיבנו, ביקש לדעת האם מדובר  
בהחלטות חדשות או שמא המדובר במתן פרסום להחלטות שהתקבלו בעבר ?

שטיין.

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, סשהח, כנצור

סססס



# official text

10/17/90

SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER ON MIDDLE EAST SUBJECTS  
(Anti-terror rewards/Iraq/UNSC Israel Resolution/  
Israeli settlement policy)

Washington -- Following is a transcript of Secretary of State James Baker's October 16 news conference:

(begin transcript)

BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome all of you this morning to the Department of State. And let me start by saying it's a pleasure to be here to boost our Terrorism Information Rewards Program. This array of distinguished guests from the private sector and from the executive and legislative branches of government testifies to our strong nation-wide commitment to counter-terrorism.

At the outset of this administration, we made a solemn pledge to integrate counter-terrorism into our global foreign policy efforts, and I want to reaffirm that pledge today. We will do all that we can to ensure that everyone everywhere understands that terrorists are criminals -- international criminals. Their targets are mankind's most fundamental values: a respect for human life, for legitimate processes of government, and for peaceful international relations.

In short, terrorism is a crime really against civilization itself.

The United States will accept no rationalization for terrorism. We will not make deals with terrorists. We and the rest of the civilized world must give no outlet, nor quarter to terrorists. Acts of terror are meant to brutalize and to bully and to demoralize and to destroy.

Pan Am 103 and the assassination last week of the speaker of the Egyptian Parliament all are meant to seize us with horror, to bring



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USIS

daily life to a standstill, and to hold entire nations hostage.

Even as we recoil in horror at the carnage, there are ways that governments and citizens can work together to ensure that the warped psychology of the terrorist does not dominate our lives or distort our policies.

Every government and every citizen has a stake in bringing terrorists to justice. Every government and every citizen can take a stand. Programs such as Terrorism Information Rewards play a key role.

Role-playing comes naturally to Charlie Sheen, Charles Bronson, and Charlton Heston, all of whom have volunteered their time and talent to make public-service announcements for radio and television about the Terrorism Information Rewards Program. As concerned citizens, they are doing their part and that matters very much.

The announcements will be aired at home, and they will be announced as well abroad. They will help spread the message that the U.S. government can now pay rewards of up to four million dollars for information that prevents or resolves an act of terrorism or brings terrorists to justice.

Our program also involves a unique public-private partnership. The government can pay up to two million dollars for each reward. The Air Transport Association and the Airline Pilots Association, represented today by Mr. Robert Aaronson and Captain Henry Duffy, each pledge up to one million dollars in matching funds for terrorism against U.S. civil aviation.

I also want to, particularly this morning, acknowledge the vital work done by Bruce Smith. Bruce is a Pan Am pilot whose wife was murdered in the Pan Am 103 bombing. Bruce has successfully lobbied the Congress to raise the fund ceiling for our rewards program. As you can see, we have posters advertising the program.

Mr. George Hughes, president of the George King Company, printed 7,000 of these posters for free. The posters will be distributed to airports, to airline offices, to U.S. embassies, and to other government facilities worldwide.

The rewards program itself, which has Interpol's unqualified endorsement, has been working very effectively. So we have scored some important victories.

Recently, the largest rewards to date were paid to people who provided information that facilitated the successful prosecution of an international terrorist.

In the past year, we have paid 500,000 dollars in rewards and more are under consideration. We can also relocate people who provide helpful information, and this has been done as well.

Moreover, the U.S. government continues to expand its intelligence

exchanges with other governments, its police-to-police liaison work, and its training of foreign law enforcement personnel in anti-terrorism techniques.

Our gathering today and the launching of our public campaign marks another step forward in our on-going counter-terrorism effort. Advertising the Terrorism Information Rewards Program can help save lives. It can help put terrorists behind bars, increase public awareness, and show the world where we stand.

So the president and I would like to thank each and every one of you for your interest, and thank you for your participation. Ambassador Busby and the panel will be available to take your questions. But before we turn to that, I would be willing to take some questions from the press.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, last June the United States ceased its discourse with the PLO, concluding that the PLO had not fulfilled its commitment renouncing terrorism. Is there any evidence the State Department has found of PLO involvement in the disorders on the West Bank and in Jerusalem, especially the melee last Monday (October 8) in which Jewish worshippers were injured and 21 Palestinians were killed?

ANSWER: There is no evidence that I am aware of, that we now have, although as you know, the investigation of this incident has just begun by the Israeli government itself. The U.N. Security Council, as you are aware, has passed a resolution asking that a mission from the secretary general go to the region and report back. There is, again, as you know, to say the least, some question about whether that mission will take place.

Q: How do you feel, sir -- may I follow up quickly -- about Israel's reluctance to give more than just tourist attention to the U.N. investigators?

A: We are hopeful that the Israeli government will make it possible for the secretary general's team to complete its mission. I think our reaction -- the spokesman characterized it for you yesterday -- our reaction to the initial response of the Israeli Cabinet.

Let me simply say that this resolution is one that the United States would have voted for had there been no Iraq-Kuwait issue or crisis because we were and remain deeply disturbed by the killings that took place. At the same time, we were also disturbed by the violence against innocent worshippers at the Western Wall. We don't think there's any excuse for that either. The resolution does refer to the attacks on innocent worshippers.

Q: Can you give us an assessment at this date of the extent to which we believe Saddam Hussein has deployed terrorists for potential terrorist acts as a result of the crisis? Are we as concerned as we were a while ago, more concerned?

A: I think we are concerned about particularly the threats that have



come from Baghdad to utilize terrorist actions and activities to further Saddam Hussein's interests. We take those statements very seriously, and we are quite concerned about them.

I can't, obviously, get into specific intelligence or evidence.

Q: Can you bring us up to date on the moves in the U.N. to pass a new resolution that might call for reparations for countries damaged by Iraq?

A: I'll be glad to. Let me say that you heard me say the week that we were up at the U.N. recently that I thought that there were additional non-forceful resolutions, or resolutions that would not speak to the question of the use of military force, that might be appropriate to consider.

We think that the focus at the Security Council really should be on the rape of Kuwait, which is continuing, as well as on the plight of foreign nationals that are still there and are still held hostage in Iraq.

So we would like to see priority given to a humanitarian resolution on the resupply of food and water and basic necessities of life to those in embassies in Kuwait, including diplomats. And we'd like to see that resolution passed promptly, and that resolution is under discussion at the United Nations as we speak here today.

At some point, as we have indicated in the past, and as the president, I think, may have mentioned yesterday, we think it would be appropriate to consider resolutions that spoke to the question of reparations from Iraq for what they've done to Kuwait, and that spoke to the question generally of war crimes responsibility.

Q: Do you feel that the diplomatic situation between the rest of the world and Saddam Hussein is stagnant at this time? Or do you see any activity on Saddam Hussein's part that suggests he might be willing to make a move that could bring an end to the crisis in the Gulf?

A: Well, there's been a lot of speculation about that, as you know. Let me say that our diplomatic agenda, I think, is quite clear. It has been clear from the very beginning. We seek full implementation of the Security Council's resolutions.

So I hope no one is judging the pace of our activity from the standpoint that we are unwilling to participate in a search for partial solutions. We are, indeed, unwilling to participate in a search for partial solutions.

We have spoken to this continuously. We think that the U.N. resolution should be implemented and implemented fully. That doesn't equate, in my view, to an absence of diplomatic activity. We are engaged every day quite actively, diplomatically, in Washington, in New York at the United Nations, and in foreign capitals in search for a peaceful and political resolution to this crisis as opposed to a military or

forceful resolution which, of course, has to be an option we maintain.

Q: But my question was about the other side, sir. What about Saddam Hussein? Do you see any reciprocal activity on his part?

A: All we've seen so far has suggested that somehow there may be some interest in what we would characterize, quite frankly, as a partial solution. That is, some interest in a negotiated arrangement that would enable him to claim benefits from his unprovoked aggression against a small neighbor. This is the principle that the United States of America, and most of the international community, are standing for, and standing up for, and standing against, or defending in principle. So it's a case, from our standpoint, of not wanting to succumb to the siren song of a partial solution to this crisis.

We think there should be full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions if, indeed, we are going to move to a principled new order in international affairs.

Q: If I could follow up on that question, when you say the "siren sound," is it coming from the Soviet Union's mission to Baghdad? Is that where you picked up these signs that he's interested in some sort of partial solution?

A: Well, the first signs came straight out of Baghdad when he made some proposals about withdrawing if certain other things happened. It's our position -- again, let me restate it -- that he should not in any way be rewarded for his aggression.

We made this mistake in the '30s. We did not stand up for principle. We did not stand up in opposition to unprovoked aggression. And we remember what happened in Ethiopia and we remember what happened in Europe when we refused to take a principled stand. Now, happily, the entire international community, for the most part, is standing firm with the United States in this stand.

Q: On Israel again, how far is the United States willing to push Israel to follow the U.N. resolutions? There are some suggestions in the Arab world that unless you push as hard as you're pushing against Saddam Hussein, there's a double standard here.

A: Well, you know, we've made clear, I think, our view that it would be good if Israel would admit the secretary general's representative. We've said that it is only in that way, we think, that Israel will be able to make its case to the secretary general's mission, and not to admit the mission; we think, moves Israel and moves our effort in the gulf in the wrong direction. We've made that very clear.

Q: Yes. If Israel decides to build apartments in East Jerusalem, would that be in keeping with the spirit or letter of the agreement that we have regarding the 400 million dollars in loan guarantees for housing?

A: Well, if they decide to build apartments or if they decide to do

something beyond just building apartments? Let me simply say that you have the letter of assurances that we have received from the foreign minister of Israel. We've received those assurances on the 2nd of October.

The minister's letter responded to the concerns that we had expressed prior to receiving the letter. We think that the United States is and should be entitled to rely upon assurances received in writing from the foreign minister of Israel, and we are relying upon those assurances, and you have the letter.

Q: I have the letter, and I've read it a number of times, and I can't tell from reading the letter whether the assurances against settling Soviet Jews beyond the Green Line applies to East Jerusalem or not. Can you clear that up?

A: Well, let me say that the assurances that are given in that letter are the same assured in substance that Israel has given the Jewish Agency, which is an agency that helps subsidize the cost of the absorption of Soviet Jewish immigrants.

The letter is quite clear, I think, in speaking about areas outside of the Green Line. It says -- and let me quote it to you -- "The government of Israel's policy is not to direct or settle Soviet Jews beyond the Green Line." It says that, "Use of the housing loan guarantees will be restricted to the geographic areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 7, 1967."

The Green Line ran through Jerusalem, and we know that East Jerusalem was not subject to the administration of the government of Israel prior to June 5, 1967. I don't understand why you're having trouble with it.

Q: If I may, it's quite clear that part of the letter that speaks of the administration prior to the war, that that certainly includes East Jerusalem. That's the part about the spending the 400 million dollars.

The part that you read previously that said the government of Israel's policy is not to settle Soviet Jews beyond the Green Line, I think that full sentence cited previous statements by Housing Minister Sharon Prime Minister Shamir, which I do not believe was intended to include East Jerusalem. And that's what I was wondering, what -- we're talking about the Israeli government's definition of the Green Line --

A: Look, I'm not going to interpret it for the government of Israel. I think the letter speaks for itself, and I would invite you to draw your conclusions from the letter.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a clarification and a question. These overtures from Saddam Hussein regarding a partial solution, are you referring to his earlier call that somehow if we link the two crises, that that would provide -- the Arab/Israeli conflict, a settlement there, and a

settlement in the Gulf -- you would consider a solution, or are you speaking about something more recent in which he has said, "Well, if I could just keep the islands or if I could just keep some oilfields, then I'd be ready to deal"? That's the clarification.

My question is: It's obvious from all these questions and even a cursory reading of the newspapers today that there is enormous tension in the U.S.-Israel relationship. How did we get there and how are we going to get out of there?

A: Is your question about the Gulf, the signals that are coming out of Baghdad, first?

Q: First.

A: Well, you're quite right when you point to the fact that the original signal was, "I'll get out if others will get out of the Occupied Territories." That goes back almost to the beginning of this crisis. Since that time, we have seen some suggestions that would indicate that other things are negotiable as far as Baghdad is concerned. I don't know how firm those signals are, but you mentioned some of them in your question -- Bubiyan Island, access to the Gulf and things like that.

These are the kinds of things that we say, if we negotiated that -- in the first place, it's really not up to us to negotiate it, but if the international community were willing to go for that -- we'd be permitting an aggressor to profit from his unprovoked aggression.

And the second question is that -- would we like to see things a bit smoother at this time?

Q: Basically, how did we get to this point in the U.S.-Israel relationship. First of all, obviously, the tension we see today isn't the result of this single incident.

A: You're the expert. You wrote the book on the region. I'm nowhere near as well equipped to answer that question as you are. But let me go back to the answer I gave you a minute ago on this question of the U.N. Security Council resolution. I said that the United States would have voted for this resolution if there had been no Gulf crisis. And the suggestion that somehow we are voting to condemn the killings that took place -- the killing of 20 people and the injuring of some 150 through live fire, simply because we want to maintain a coalition on the Gulf is not -- it's not accurate to suggest that.

Do we want to maintain the coalition on the Gulf? Yes.

Do we think it is appropriate that world attention be focused upon the rape of Kuwait? Yes.

Do we think it's inappropriate to link that with the Arab-Israeli problem? Yes.

Have we said for the full 20 months that we've been in office that we think it's extraordinarily important that there be a peace process?  
Yes.

Would we like to see a peace process develop? You bet.

Do we think that is in the interest of the United States and Israeli?  
Yes, we do.

G: The suggestion for a partial solution was apparently made to Mr. Primakov when he was visiting with Saddam Hussein. Two questions.

Has Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that perhaps a partial solution would, in fact, be a good idea? That is, is he breaking with the solidarity of the international movement? And secondly, do you believe that was Saddam Hussein's intention when he made the suggestion to Primakov?

A: I'm not sure that I can confirm for you that that suggestion was made to Primakov. I'm not sure we have confirmation that that was the case, number one. Number two, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has remained as solid as the United States on the issue of partial -- no partial solutions; that is, full implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. And I think the Soviet Union is still committed to full implementation of the resolutions.

G: Mr. Secretary, yesterday you were quoted in the Israeli press as saying that if Israel does not comply with the latest U.N. resolution and allow this U.N. team in, it would be that some would compare them to Saddam Hussein's not abiding by U.N. resolutions.

First of all, do you stand by those words? And second of all, are you concerned that the Israelis, whom you had asked to remain silent when this crisis first began, might now feel that the deal is off and begin to be more public?

A: Well, let me say -- I've said a number of times since the Gulf crisis started that we are very appreciative of the approach that was taken by the Israeli government -- that is, the low-profile approach to -- that they took to this issue. And I would hope, and we would hope, that we would be able to get back to that. And that was one of the points of my message to the foreign minister that I sent before the Israeli cabinet had met because I wanted to -- I wanted to tell the foreign minister personally that I thought that it was important that the Security Council -- that the secretary general's mission -- be allowed to come to Israel, just as a similar mission was allowed to come in June of this year.

I do not stand by the quote as you have expressed it because it is not accurate. What I said was, "I fear that some will try to make that comparison," I said, "quite unjustifiably," or something like that -- words to that effect, that it would be unfair and unjustified but that I would worry that that argument would be made in New York if the secretary general -- his mission is not permitted to come to Israel.

Q: Previous announcements in the anti-terrorism campaign have mainly focused overseas. Now you have PSAs on American television. Are you concerned that terrorism is in fact coming to Washington?

A: We are concerned about terrorism all around the world. I mentioned, in answer to an earlier question, we're quite concerned about the threats that have emanated from Baghdad since the invasion of Kuwait and since the international community's response to that. And we will be very alert and alert to the possibility that there could be some expansion of terrorism worldwide.

I don't mean to imply by that that we have any specific concerns at this moment about particular activities within the --

Q: This campaign seems to be very much directed on national television here, which would suggest you want to raise the consciousness of the American people. Is there a concern it could come to an American airport?

A: We want to raise the consciousness of people all around the world to the threat that's represented by terrorism.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the United States has often expressed concern about Syria's involvement with terrorism. Are you at all concerned that Syria has now extended its hand too far into Lebanon? Do you expect Syria perhaps to provide the military force for Hrawi to succeed in forming a unity government? And how do you respond to press reports that the United States basically told Syria it would not block efforts to come to Hrawi's defense?

A: Well, in the first place, we regret the violence that has taken place, just as we have regretted violence in Lebanon for a long time. I should point out that the legitimate government of Lebanon did request assistance from the Syrians in this instance, but I should also point out that the United States is not in the business of giving green light -- green lights for violence anywhere, including in Lebanon.

For 15 years, we've argued against violence in Lebanon; most recently, in President Bush's meeting with the prime minister of Lebanon on the 29 of September at the United Nations, and in my meeting with the Syrian foreign minister in New York at the same time.

Q: But the remarks attributed to the Lebanese officials stating that they brought this to the attention of the United States and were in effect told, "Go ahead and do it and get it over quickly, and we'll congratulate you." Those are incorrect?

A: There's a history of that, as you know, having covered this Department for as long as you have. Any time anything happens over there, somehow there's a suggestion that the United States gave a green light. The fact of the matter is we didn't. But what we want to do is not focus on the past here. We'd like to focus on the future. We'd like to focus on national reconciliation and the removal of all foreign

forces from Lebanon.

G: Out of curiosity, if this campaign extends all over the world, including the Middle East, why is it not in Hebrew also?

A: It is -- it is going to be -- it is going to be run in Israel, and I will leave to Ambassador Busby the answer -- to the duty of answering your question about why it's not in Hebrew. Maybe it's that there's a lot of people who can be reached and will be reached by having it run in English.

(end transcript)

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\*\* TOTAL PAGE.011 \*\*

אאא, חוזם: 11488  
אל: רהמש/854  
מ:- ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 161090, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
נבב  
סודי/מיד

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

הנדון: ערבויות לדיור.

1. בשיחה עם קרצר התייחס לפרסומים בדבר החלטות ועדת השרים בראשות השר שרון.

2. מהמידע שבידו עולה שהועדה החליטה על מתן תמריצים נוספים לעולים שיתיישבו מעבר לקו הירוק. החלטה כזו ( במידה והתקבלה ) אינה עולה בקנה אחד עם המשפט במכתבו של שה'ח לוי שבו נאמר :

' I ALSO WANT TO RECONFIRM WHAT I TOLD YOU IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION THAT NO SPECIAL INCENTIVES EXIST TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO SETTLE BEYOND THE GREEN LINE NOR ARE WE PLANNING TO PROVIDE SUCH INCENTIVES IN THE FUTURE '.

3. ציין כי בכוונתו להמליץ בפני המזכיר לבקש הבהרות משה'ח. (הערה: להשכלתנו נודה על קבלת עדכון לגבי החלטה שהתקבלה ).

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא



אאא, חוזם: 11488  
אל: רהמש/854  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 161090, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

הנדון: ערבויות לדיור.

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שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11355  
אל: רהמש/841  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 218, תא: 161090, זח: 1629, מ:מ, סג: שמ,  
בכב  
שמור / מידי  
אל : מצפ"א  
דע : הסברה, תפוצות

הנדון : בניה חדשה בירושלים

כדיון היום ישבתי ליד סטויארט איזנשטאט שהעביר לי את המסר הבא:

"תהיה זו טעות אמיתית אם נתחיל בבניית התנחלויות (SETTLEMENTS) בירושלים. במיוחד לנוכח הרקע של מכתב ההתחיבויות, בחתימת שה"ח, בקשר ל"וואות". הוסיף כי התוצאות השליליות תהיינה כלפי הממשל, הקונגרס והקהילה היהודית.

לגבי המינוח - "התנחלות" - אמר שזו לא דעתו האישית, יש לו קרובי משפחה הגרים בשכונות החדשות של ירושלים.

עודד בן - חיים

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, רביב, מעת, הסברה,  
בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

סססס



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman**

**For Immediate Release**

**October 15, 1990**

**STATEMENT BY MARGARET TUTWILER/SPOKESMAN**

This past Saturday, Secretary Baker instructed that a verbal message be sent through the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to Foreign Minister Levy concerning UNSC resolution 672.

- While recognizing that Israel would have preferred no resolution, the US voted for the Security Council Resolution because we felt Israel should have been prepared to deal with violence and a riot without there being 21 dead and 150 wounded.
- That Israel has accepted the Secretary General's representative as recently as JUNE of this year and that, therefore, this mission would not be precedential.

The Secretary's message made clear that our sense of concern over Israel's handling of the situation would have led us to support UNSC action, regardless of the situation in the Gulf.

We would like to see this issue concluded and hope that Israel will find a way to work with the Secretary General's representative.

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10050: תוזם: אאאא

אל: רהמש/751

מ-: המשרד, תא: 151090, זח: 2330, דח: ב, סג: טכ,

בבב

סודי ביותר / בהול טפל - חרב חרב חרב

השגריר, הציר - לעיניהם בלבד

להלן שדר רה"מ לנשיא. הינך מתבקש למסרו לבית הלבוך עוד היום.

JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 15, 1990

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I THOUGHT I SHOULD SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE BACKGROUND TO OUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION RELATED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RECENT RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT WE WERE APPALLED BY THAT UNFAIR RESOLUTION AND PAINED BY THE U.S. POSITION ON IT.

I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE SOME OF THE ELEMENTS THAT PROMPTED OUR DECISION. FIRST, THE COUNCIL IGNORED THE FACT THAT JEWISH WORSHIPPERS AT THE WESTERN WALL, JUDAISM'S HOLIEST SHRINE, WERE SUBJECTED TO AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY AN ARAB MOB ON A JEWISH FESTIVAL DAY WHEN THOUSANDS COME TO JERUSALEM FOR THE PILGRIMAGE.

WE WERE HORRIFIED AND DEEPLY OFFENDED THAT THE COUNCIL REFERRED TO OUR HOLIEST SHRINE - THE TEMPLE MOUNT - BY ITS MUSLIM-ARAB NAME, AS IF DELIBERATELY TO NEGATE ITS JEWISH CONTENTS. TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, IT WAS DECIDED TO SEND A TEAM TO INVESTIGATE EVENTS IN JERUSALEM, OUR SOVEREIGN CAPITAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL CENTER OF ALL JEWS. SUCH A STEP WAS BOUND TO BE REGARDED HERE AS AN AFFRONT TO OUR SOVEREIGNTY, AND UNWARRANTED INTERVENTION IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND AN UNJUSTIFIED SUPPORT OF AN ARAB BID TO UNDERMINE OUR PRESENCE IN JERUSALEM AND SET A PRECEDENT OF U.N. INVOLVEMENT IN OUR MOST SENSITIVE NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE STATEMENT BY ITS PRESIDENT RELATED TO OUR CAPITAL AS OCCUPIED TERRITORY. MR. PRESIDENT, JERUSALEM IS NOT OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IT HAS BEEN OUR CAPITAL, THE CENTRE OF OUR DAILY PRAYERS, THE FOCUS OF OUR HOPES, IN JOY AND IN GRIEF, FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS, EVEN WHEN OUR PEOPLE WERE IN EXILE AND CAPTIVITY. HENCE, FOR US TO RECEIVE A U.N. INVESTIGATING COMMISSION WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE MOST ELEMENTARY TENETS, OF OUR BELIEF. WE THEREFORE DECIDED NOT TO RECEIVE THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION, BECAUSE RECEIVING IT WOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A SURRENDER OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY IN JERUSALEM.

OUR RECORD IN PROTECTING THE HOLY PLACES AND FREE ACCESS TO THEM SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS BUILT INTO OUR LAWS, ROOTED IN OUR PRACTICE AND ENSHRINED IN OUR CONVICTIONS. IT STANDS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE YEARS OF DESECRATION AND DESOLATION DURING THE

JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF THESE SHRINES, WHEN JEWISH TOMBSTONES WERE USED IN TOILETS OF A MILITARY CAMP.

WE REGRET VERY MUCH THE LOSS OF LIFE THAT RESULTED FROM THE POLICE ATTEMPT TO PUT DOWN THE RIOT ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE WHOLE AFFAIR IS BEING INVESTIGATED NOW BY AN INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY COMMITTEE. WE CHALLENGE ANY NATION, INCLUDING MANY OF THOSE WHO JOIN IN OUR CONDEMNATION, TO APPLY THE SAME STANDARDS IN THEIR PUBLIC BEHAVIOUR. WE SHALL CONTINUE MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF WHORSHIP FOR ALL RELIGIONS IN THEIR HOLY PLACES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING SECURITY FOR ALL.

MR. PRESIDENT, I KNOW, HIGHLY APPRECIATE, AND TOTALLY SUPPORT THE GREAT CAMPAIGN YOU ARE WAGING IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EVIL REGIME. WE HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF YOUR EFFORTS TO BREAK ONCE AND FOR ALL SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO THREATEN HIS NEIGHBOURS. INDEED, WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN THE FRONT LINE FACING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S THREATS AND WE HAVE JUST BEGUN TO DISTRIBUTE GAS MASKS TO OUR ENTIRE POPULATION. HOWEVER, ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SIT BY AND PERMIT THE ARABS AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM AT THE U.N. TO EXPLOIT THIS SENSITIVE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO HARM ISRAEL'S VITAL INTERESTS.

I THEREFORE SHARE SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S VIEW THAT WE NEED TO PUT THIS UNFORTUNATE EPISODE BEHIND US AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO FOCUS ON THE REAL ISSUES CONFRONTING US. I SINCERELY HOPE THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. ON OUR PART, WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL SO AS TO HELP CONSOLIDATE THE FRONT YOU HAVE BUILT AGAINST THE AGGRESSION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

SINCERELY,

YITZHAK SHAMIR

PESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC  
U.S.A

לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

תפוצה: 8 (רה"מ), שהח, טשהח

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דתיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
מונ: גלוי		כתוך: 2
תאריך וזמן חבור: 15.10.90		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע:
1136		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרסמן מרוק

רצ"ב סאקס שהגיע אלי מאחד מבוחריו של הקונגרסמן מרוק ורמיועד לרח"מ.  
ממשרדו של מרוק החקשרו וביקשו שנעביר חסקס ללשכת רח"מ.

אנא ובע"פ פסקי  
יחודית ורנאי דרנגר

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תפוצה:

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1136

FAX 011-972-(02) 666-303  
Office of the Prime Minister (Yitzhak Shamir)  
Jerusalem, Israel

Although the last thing Israel needs now, is another American with "suggestions" with a daughter living in Jerusalem I am concerned, so, still submit for your evaluation:

- a) Despite asking many, during my last two trips to Israel, I have still been able to understand, why, for crowd/riot control Israel can not use mounted police (on horseback); which might also function well in patrolling the occupied territories. Three or four such groups could be stationed at various key points in the country, and (as in the U.S.) horse vans could move them from point to another. I believe this would also be less costly (and possibly more effective) than a larger (more vulnerable and more provocative) group on foot.
- b) Limit access in potential trouble spots (by potential trouble makers; to smaller groups. For example, 50 or 100 or even 200; but the second group (or, number of people) do not enter; until the first group (or portion of that group) leaves.
- b) Now, for once let Israel, use "linkage"; so that if you intend to accept a UN Observer, base the acceptance on a similar Observer/Group visit and reporting on Human Rights Abuses in Kuwait. Such a UN Delegation to Kuwait should/could include representatives from: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Your UN Delegate could not only request all of this, but also advise the Members of "Reports" that Iraqi Forces (under direct orders to break any resistance) are deliberately defiling Moslem Shrines/Mosques. This Statement could also be repeatedly given to the News Media; and brought up at every opportunity, and that you are requesting the UN Observer Force to confirm these charges. Any reluctance/hesitation by Iraq; should then loudly be viewed as a confirmation of these charges. Should such a delegation actually arrive at a specific Kuwaiti Mosque it would be "interesting" if they could find, inside:
- several Kuwaiti's fleeing from Iraqi torture
  - and
  - several Kuwaiti "Freedom Fighters" having been pursued there, minutes before, by Iraqi Forces.

Unfortunately, having been a repeat visitor to Israel, (and having briefly worked in the U.S. for Israel Aircraft Industries) I am hopeful (but dub that you will ever see this.

M. Gradstein  
Melville, Long Island, N.Y.

*M. Gradstein*





1990-10-15

21:18

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10-15-90 10:26 AM FROM SEN. ARLEN SPECTER

PG2

2/6 1154

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1990

Dear Arlen:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing concern about the military balance between Israel and the Arab states. The Administration's commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. It is my intent to see that Israel receives the assistance necessary to maintain its qualitative military superiority. Toward this end, I decided on September 29 to provide the Patriot Air Defense system to Israel under the emergency authority available to me.

A fundamental part of our Middle East policy is providing all our friends with appropriate military assistance so that they can defend themselves. At this critical time, Saudi Arabia has a distinct need for additional military assistance. A long term benefit of meeting Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs will be to provide the Saudis with the means to defend themselves and thereby reduce the need to deploy U.S. military forces for that purpose.

I hope I can continue to count on your support for our Gulf policy and these related issues.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Arlen Specter  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

131012.459

S.L.C.

2

1 (c) may be proposed for transfer, as provided for in the Arms  
2 Control Export Act, to a country in the Persian Gulf region  
3 if the President certifies to Congress that--

4 (1) such defense articles are needed by the recipient  
5 country to counter an immediate threat or to contribute  
6 to the protection of United States personnel, facilities,  
7 or operations;

8 (2) no other appropriate system is available from the  
9 United States;

10 (3) the recipient agrees to safeguards, as required  
11 in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance by the United  
12 States Government, to protect against diversions; and

13 (4) the recipient country has agreed to a United  
14 States buyback, at a time to be determined by the United  
15 States Government, of all the remaining defense articles  
16 and components which have not been destroyed or fired in  
17 order to return them to the possession and control of the  
18 United States.

19 (c) Defense Articles Covered.--The defense articles  
20 referred to in subsection (a) are Apache helicopters, Patriot  
21 anti-aircraft missiles, TOW II A anti-tank missiles, and  
22 electronic security equipment.

3  
1150

101st CONGRESS  
2d Session

S. \_\_\_\_\_

416 1159

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Cranston introduced the following bill; which was read twice  
and referred to the Committee on

-----  
A BILL

to prohibit the transfer of certain defense articles to Persian  
Gulf region countries during fiscal year 1991.

1        Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives  
2        of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3        SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF CERTAIN DEFENSE  
4        ARTICLES TO PERSIAN GULF REGION COUNTRIES.

5        (a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b),  
6        no defense articles specified in subsection (c) may be  
7        provided, directly or indirectly, by sale, lease, grant or  
8        otherwise, during fiscal year 1991, to any country in the  
9        Persian Gulf region.

10       (b) Exception.--Notwithstanding the prohibition in  
11       subsection (a), any defense article specified in subsection

5/6 1153

101st CONGRESS  
2d Session

S. J. RES. \_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Cranston introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

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JOINT RESOLUTION

Prohibiting the proposed sales to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and defense services, pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of  
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the  
3 proposed sales to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles  
4 and defense services (including the TOW II missile launchers,  
5 the M1A2 tanks, the AH-64 APACHE attack helicopters, and the  
6 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)) described in the  
7 following certifications transmitted to the Congress pursuant  
8 to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act on  
9 September 27, 1990, are prohibited:

131012.460

2

S.L.C.

1 transmittal numbers 98-77, 98-78, 98-80, and 98-82.

5/6 1154

1156-2021

1/3

20

שמו / מייד

אל : מצפ"א

מאת : קונגרס

הנדון : אירועי הר הכית והכותל - עיבוי סיוע חוץ

1. כדי לנסות ולצמצם את הנזק למערכת לעיבוי סיוע חוץ - כתוצאה מן הפרסומים על האירועים בהר הכית ובכותל - תועברו הנקודות המצ"ל, ולמחרת האירוע, במקסימלית לכ - 150 נבחרים בכירים ב"גבעה".

2. לפי שעה אין לאירועים ולפרסומים הדים משמעותיים ב"גבעה". הסיבה לכך נעוצה בעיקר בסדר העדיפויות והקונגרסיונלי הכורע תחת נטל דיוני התקציב, ותחיקות החקלאות, זכויות האזרח, איכות הסביבה, משיעה, בינוי, הסלייה הנכס, ביטוח רפואי, חינוך, CHILD - CARE, ממון הבחירות ועוד עשרות נושאים הכרוכים במיליארדי דולרים, וחשוב מכל : כגורלו האישי של הנבחר לקראת יום הדין (בחירות) בתחילת נובמבר.

יורם אטינגר

מחלקת קשרים עם הר הכית  
הר הכית 4  
מחלקת קשרים עם הר הכית  
הר הכית 4  
מחלקת קשרים עם הר הכית  
הר הכית 4  
מחלקת קשרים עם הר הכית  
הר הכית 4

2/3  
1156

TALKING POINTS ON THE SADDAM-ARAFAT-HAMMAS  
PERPETRATED TRAGEDY AT THE TEMPLE MOUNT

1. Every sensible observer must express deep regret at the loss of life and injuries caused during the tragic incident at the Western Wall.
2. In order to derive the proper conclusions from the incident, one should examine the regional context surrounding the incident, and try to identify the parties which stand to gain from such a tragic chain of events.
3. Thus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, opposing Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, have recently been plagued by systematic Saddam-inspired domestic violence.
4. The tragic incident constitutes another link in the chain of the Saddam-Arafat connection. Saddam attempts to shift attention away from his invasion of Kuwait, to gain time required to consolidate his control of "Iraq's Southern Province," and to undermine the anti-Saddam Arab coalition. Arafat desperately seeks to regain his eroded credibility among Palestinians, to improve his standing among Westerners, and to demonstrate his usefulness to the Patron from Baghdad. Both have been consistent with their own practices - as demonstrated in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, Judea and Samaria - exploiting civilians as a weaponry to advance violent goals.
5. The major forces carrying out the "Baghdad (Saddam-Arafat) Design" have been the Saddam-supported Unified National Command (of the Intifadah) and the recently resurrected on-again off-again PLO-(Islamic fanatic) Hamas axis.
6. Was it a spontaneous act of violence, or a premeditated act of violent provocation?

- Several thousand Muslims assembled at the Temple Mount on a regular (Muslim) week day, at a time when no prayers were scheduled, which otherwise would suggest a sparse attendance there.

- The mob was urged by its leaders to be there at a time when a most vulnerable target of 20,000 Jewish pilgrims prayed at the Western Wall (just underneath the Temple Mount compound), celebrating the Holiday of Tabernacles.

- Muslim preachers incited the rioters, via the loudspeakers of the mosques, using such emotionally-charged terms as Holy War, Allah the Great and Slaughter the Jews.

....Cont/-



8/3  
1156

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- Stockpiles of incendiary material and rocks were found at the Temple Mount.

- Faisal al-Husseini, who has been personally implicated in past violent activities, entered the Temple Mount compound about half an hour before the mob of thousands stormed the nearby police station, set it on fire, and hurled rocks, iron bars, knives and shards of glass at the Jewish pilgrims gathered at the Western Wall, the holiest Jewish site.

- 7. The policemen stationed at the entrance to the Temple Mount tried to repel the mob by rubber bullets; when proved insufficient they resorted to tear gas. And when their lives were endangered they were forced to use live ammunition.
- 8. The failure to comprehend the regional context surrounding the tragic incident, and the unwillingness to point the finger at the responsible parties, rather than scapegoating Israel, sends the wrong message to radical forces (such as Saddam and the PLO) throughout the world. Rather than solidify an opposition to Saddam, it rewards him and his allies; it vindicates their tactics; and it proves that violence may indeed pay off. It may thus undermine the justifiable and historically critical battle - launched by the U.S. - against regional radical powers, such as Saddam, which attempt to exploit the subsided East-West confrontation in order to satisfy their own ambitions of territorial grandeur.

אאא, תוזם: 9066  
אל: רהמש/695  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 151090, זח: 1303, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
נכבב  
סודי/מיידי

אל: משרד הבטחון - היועץ המשפטי  
דע: משרד המשפטים - יהודית קרפ/פליאה אלבק  
דע: רע'ן דבל'א/מפצ'ר - בטחון העבירונא

מאת: לשכת היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: SOFA - הצעת החלטת ממשלה

להלן הנוסח המוצע בהמשך לישיבה מיום 15/9.

עה לחלטת ממשלה

מחליטים:

א. לאשר חתימה, בכפוף לאשרור, על שני ההסכמים הבאים:

1. ההסכם בין ארצות הברית של אמריקה ומדינת ישראל בדבר מעמדם ש אנשי סגל ארצות הברית.

2. ההסכם בין ישראל וארצות הברית של אמריקה בדבר מעמדם של אנש סגל ישראל.

ב. להסמיך את סגן ראש הממשלה ושר החוץ או מי שיסמיך על ידו לחתום, בש מדינת ישראל על ההסכמים הנ"ל.

דברי הסבר

במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה האסטרטגי בין ישראל לארה"ב נערכים בארץ ביקורים של אוניות ארה"ב וביקורי כוחות של ארה"ב, מתבצעים תרגילים משותפים, מוצב מראש ציוד לעת הצורך, כולל אמל"ח ובית חולים שדה ואף הוקמה תשתית להצבת מטוסי קרב אמריקניים בבסיס חיל האויר.

ב. במסגרת שיתוף פעולה זה, דרשו האמריקנים ואנו התחייבנו להקנות מעמד מיוחד לכוחות האמריקניים הנמצאים בשטחנו במסגרת זו מבחינת חסינויות, זכויות יתר, פטורים, סמכויות שיפוט, התנהגות וכו'. וזאת כמפורט בהסכם המוצע שתמציתו מצ'ב כנספח א'. ההסכם דומה בתוכנו להסכמים אחרים עליהם חתמה ארה"ב עם מדינות שונות והידועים כ-STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS (SOFA).

ג. ההתחייבויות שישראל מקבלת על עצמה בהסכם הנ"ל (להלן: הסכם ה-SOFA) מחייבת חקיקה המשנה מהמצב החוקי הקיים בישראל בתחומים שונים בהם ניתנות ההתחייבויות בהסכם.

ד. בשנת 1985 התחייבה ישראל לפי דרישת ארה"ב, לאפשר לקבלנים אמריקניים להשתתף בכל המכרזים לבנייה אמריקנית בישראל במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה. תמורת הסכמת ישראל להשלים את המו"מ על הסכם ה-SOFA הסכימה מצידה ארה"ב לוותר על זכותם של קבלניה להשתתף במכרזים והתחייבה שכל עבודות

הבניה יבוצעו על ידי קבלנים ישראלים.

ה. כ'כ הסכימו האמריקנים לערוך הסכם 'שכנגד' שיחול על אנשי צה'ל בארה'ב. הסכם זה שהוא ההסכם השני הנ'ל איננו מעניק לאנשי צה'ל מעמד הדומה למעמד המוקנה לכוחות ארה'ב בישראל, אלא הקלות מעטות המתאפשרות לפי החוק האמריקני הקיים. תמצית ההסכם מצ'ב כנספח ב'.

ו. מוצע שהממשלה תאשר חתימה, בכפוף לאשרור, על שני ההסכמים הנ'ל.

ז. נוסחם המלא של שני ההסכמים הנ'ל נמצא במזכירות הממשלה לעיון השרים.

ח. לאחר החתימה, יובאו שני ההסכמים הנ'ל לאשרור מליאת הממשלה וכן תובא לכנסת הצעת חוק הנדרשת.

הצעה זו מוגשת ע'י שר הבטחון על דעת סגן ראש הממשלה ושר החוץ ועל דעת שר המשפטים.

כת היועץ המשפטי

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, (מזכירהממשלה),  
ממשפטים/קרפ, מממשפטים/אלבק

סססס

10050: חוזם: אאאא  
אל: רהמש/751  
מ:- המשרד, תא: 151090, זח: 2330, זח: ב, סג: סב,  
כנב  
סודי ביותר / בהול טפל - חרב חרב חרב  
השגריר, הציר - לעיניהם בלבד  
להלן שדר רה"מ לנשיא. הינך מתבקש למסרו לבית הלבן עוד היום.

JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 15, 1990

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I THOUGHT I SHOULD SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE BACKGROUND TO OUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION RELATED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RECENT RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT WE WERE APPALLED BY THAT UNFAIR RESOLUTION AND PAINED BY THE U.S. POSITION ON IT.

I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE SOME OF THE ELEMENTS THAT PROMPTED OUR DECISION. FIRST, THE COUNCIL IGNORED THE FACT THAT JEWISH WORSHIPPERS AT THE WESTERN WALL, JUDAISM'S HOLIEST SHRINE, WERE SUBJECTED TO AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY AN ARAB MOB ON A JEWISH FESTIVAL DAY WHEN THOUSANDS COME TO JERUSALEM FOR THE PILGRIMAGE.

WE WERE HORRIFIED AND DEEPLY OFFENDED THAT THE COUNCIL REFERRED TO OUR HOLIEST SHRINE - THE TEMPLE MOUNT - BY ITS MUSLIM-ARAB NAME, AS IF DELIBERATELY TO NEGATE ITS JEWISH CONTENTS. TO ADD INSULT TO INJURY, IT WAS DECIDED TO SEND A TEAM TO INVESTIGATE EVENTS IN JERUSALEM, OUR SOVEREIGN CAPITAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL CENTER OF ALL JEWS. SUCH A STEP WAS BOUND TO BE REGARDED HERE AS AN AFFRONT TO OUR SOVEREIGNTY, AND UNWARRANTED INTERVENTION IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND AN UNJUSTIFIED SUPPORT OF AN ARAB BID TO UNDERMINE OUR PRESENCE IN JERUSALEM AND SET A PRECEDENT OF U.N. INVOLVEMENT IN OUR MOST SENSITIVE NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE STATEMENT BY ITS PRESIDENT RELATED TO OUR CAPITAL AS OCCUPIED TERRITORY. MR. PRESIDENT, JERUSALEM IS NOT OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IT HAS BEEN OUR CAPITAL, THE CENTRE OF OUR DAILY PRAYERS, THE FOCUS OF OUR HOPES, IN JOY AND IN GRIEF, FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS, EVEN WHEN OUR PEOPLE WERE IN EXILE AND CAPTIVITY. HENCE, FOR US TO RECEIVE A U.N. INVESTIGATING COMMISSION WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE MOST ELEMENTARY TENETS, OF OUR BELIEF. WE THEREFORE DECIDED NOT TO RECEIVE THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION, BECAUSE RECEIVING IT WOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A SURRENDER OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY IN JERUSALEM.

OUR RECORD IN PROTECTING THE HOLY PLACES AND FREE ACCESS TO THEM SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS BUILT INTO OUR LAWS, ROOTED IN OUR PRACTICE AND ENSHRINED IN OUR CONVICTIONS. IT STANDS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE YEARS OF DESECRATION AND DESOLATION DURING THE

JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF THESE SHRINES, WHEN JEWISH TOMBSTONES WERE USED IN TOILETS OF A MILITARY CAMP.

WE REGRET VERY MUCH THE LOSS OF LIFE THAT RESULTED FROM THE POLICE ATTEMPT TO PUT DOWN THE RIOT ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE WHOLE AFFAIR IS BEING INVESTIGATED NOW BY AN INDEPENDENT ENQUIRY COMMITTEE. WE CHALLENGE ANY NATION, INCLUDING MANY OF THOSE WHO JOIN IN OUR CONDEMNATION, TO APPLY THE SAME STANDARDS IN THEIR PUBLIC BEHAVIOUR. WE SHALL CONTINUE MAINTAINING THE FREEDOM OF WHORSHIP FOR ALL RELIGIONS IN THEIR HOLY PLACES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING SECURITY FOR ALL.

MR. PRESIDENT, I KNOW, HIGHLY APPRECIATE, AND TOTALLY SUPPORT THE GREAT CAMPAIGN YOU ARE WAGING IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EVIL REGIME. WE HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF YOUR EFFORTS TO BREAK ONCE AND FOR ALL SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO THREATEN HIS NEIGHBOURS. INDEED, WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN THE FRONT LINE FACING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S THREATS AND WE HAVE JUST BEGUN TO DISTRIBUTE GAS MASKS TO OUR ENTIRE POPULATION. HOWEVER, ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SIT BY AND PERMIT THE ARABS AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM AT THE U.N. TO EXPLOIT THIS SENSITIVE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO HARM ISRAEL'S VITAL INTERESTS.

I THEREFORE SHARE SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S VIEW THAT WE NEED TO PUT THIS UNFORTUNATE EPISODE BEHIND US AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO FOCUS ON THE REAL ISSUES CONFRONTING US. I SINCERELY HOPE THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. ON OUR PART, WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL SO AS TO HELP CONSOLIDATE THE FRONT YOU HAVE BUILT AGAINST THE AGGRESSION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

SINCERELY,

YITZHAK SHAMIR

PESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC  
U.S.A

לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

תפוצה: (רה"מ), שהח, סשהח

0000

10050

אל: ווישינגטון

דפים \_\_\_\_\_ סתוד \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_

סיווג בטחוני: סודי / ליווי חיר

דחיפות: גבוה / טכני

תאריך וזמן: \_\_\_\_\_ } לשימוש  
מס. מברק: \_\_\_\_\_ } חתי  
הקשר

השגריר, רובו איתנוהם לזרוב  
לכלן שנים רבה אנושי. הנק איתקט אמרו לגיו האן  
סוג היום.  
  
לטה אנכ רבה  
  
יבואר: רבה שהג ששה (בלגני)

Jerusalem, October 15, 1990  
978-7

Dear Mr. President,

I thought I should share with you some of the background to our government's decision related to the United Nations Security Council recent resolution on Jerusalem.

I must tell you that we were appalled by that unfair resolution and pained by the U.S. position on it.

I would like to underline some of the elements that prompted our decision. First, the Council ignored the fact that Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest shrine, were subjected to an unprovoked attack by an Arab mob on a Jewish Festival day when thousands come to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage.

We were horrified and deeply offended that the Council referred to our holiest shrine - the Temple Mount - by its Muslim-Arab name, as if deliberately to negate its Jewish contents. To add insult to injury, it was decided to send a team to investigate events in Jerusalem, our sovereign capital, and the spiritual centre of all Jews. Such a step was bound to be regarded here as an affront to our sovereignty, an unwarranted intervention in our internal affairs and an unjustified support of an Arab bid to undermine our presence in Jerusalem and set a precedent of U.N. involvement in our most sensitive national and religious issues.

President George Bush  
The White House  
Washington DC  
U.S.A.

The Security Council resolution and the statement by its President related to our capital as occupied territory. Mr. President, Jerusalem is not occupied territory. It has been our capital, the centre of our daily prayers, the focus of our hopes, in joy and in grief, for thousands of years, even when our people were in exile and captivity. Hence, for us to receive a U.N. investigating commission would run counter to the most elementary tenets, of our belief. We therefore decided not to receive the U.N. Secretary General's mission, because receiving it would be construed as a surrender of our sovereignty in Jerusalem.

Our record in protecting the holy places and free access to them speaks for itself. It is built into our laws, rooted in our practice and enshrined in our convictions. It stands in stark contrast to the years of desecration and desolation during the Jordanian government's control of these shrines, when Jewish tombstones were used in toilets of a military camp.

We regret very much the loss of life that resulted from the police attempt to put down the riot on the Temple Mount. The whole affair is being investigated now by an independent enquiry committee. We challenge any nation, including many of those who join in our condemnation, to apply the same standards in their public behaviour. We shall continue maintaining the freedom of worship for all religions in their holy places, while at the same time maintaining security for all.

Mr. President, I know, highly appreciate, and totally support the great campaign you are waging in maintaining international pressure on Saddam Hussein's evil regime. We have a vital interest in the success of your efforts to break once and for all Saddam Hussein's capacity to threaten his neighbours. Indeed, we believe we are in the front line facing Saddam Hussein's threats and we have just begun to distribute gas masks to our entire population. However, Israel cannot be expected to sit by and permit the Arabs and those who support them at the U.N. to exploit this sensitive set of circumstances in order to harm Israel's vital interests.



I therefore share Secretary of State Baker's view that we need to put this unfortunate episode behind us as quickly as possible so as to focus on the real issues confronting us. I sincerely hope this objective can be achieved through close consultation and cooperation between our two governments. On our part, we shall do everything possible to attain this goal so as to help consolidate the front you have built against the aggression of Saddam Hussein.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

אאא, תוזס: 10109

אל: רהמש/769

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 201, תא: 151090, חז: 2102, חמ: סג: שמ,

כבב

שמור / מיידי

אל : מצפ"א

מאת : ק. לקונגרס

הנדון : מפגש עם הסנאטור בוב קארי - DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY

הסנאטור הביע תמיכתו בהעברת הצידוד הצבאי לישראל (לפי תיקון אינווייה-קאסטן), חושש מהגברת אי היציבות במזה"ת כתוצאה מהעימות הנוכחי במפרץ, מכיר באיום הגובר על ישראל, אינו שלם עם המעורבות הצבאית של ארה"ב במפרץ עם הסמכויות המורחבות המופקדות בידי הנשיא.

יורם

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @רהמ), @שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, תוזם: 9066  
אל: רהמש/695  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 151090, זח: 1303, דח: מ, סג: סו,  
בבב  
סודי/מיידי

אל: משרד הבטחון - היועץ המשפטי  
דע: משרד המשפטים - יהודית קרפ/פליאה אלבק  
דע: רע'ן דבל'א/מפצ'ר - בטחון העבירונא

מאת: לשכת היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: SOFA - הצעת החלטת ממשלה

הלן הנוסח המוצע בהמשך לישיבה מיום 15/9.

הצעה לחלטת ממשלה

מתליטים :

א. לאשר חתימה, בכפוף לאשרור, על שני ההסכמים הבאים:

1. ההסכם בין ארצות הברית של אמריקה ומדינת ישראל בדבר מעמדם ש אנשי סגל ארצות הברית.

2. ההסכם בין ישראל וארצות הברית של אמריקה בדבר מעמדם של אנש סגל ישראל.

ב. להסמיך את סגן ראש הממשלה ושר החוץ או מי שיסמיך על ידו לחתום, בש מדינת ישראל על ההסכמים הנ'ל.

דברי הסבר

א. במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה האסטרטגי בין ישראל לארה"ב נערכים בארץ ביקורים של אוניות ארה"ב וביקורי כוחות של ארה"ב, מתבצעים תרגילים משותפים, מוצב מראש ציוד לעת הצורך, כולל אמל"ח ובית חולים שדה ואף הוקמה תשתית להצבת מטוסי קרב אמריקניים בכסיס חיל האויר.

ב. במסגרת שיתוף פעולה זה, דרשו האמריקנים ואנו התחייבנו להקנות מעמד מיוחד לכוחות האמריקניים הנמצאים בשטחנו במסגרת זו מבחינת חסינויות, זכויות יתר, פטורים, סמכויות שיפוט, התנהגות וכו'. וזאת כמפורט בהסכם המוצע שתמציתו מצ'ב כנספח א'. ההסכם דומה בתוכנו להסכמים אחרים עליהם חתמה ארה"ב עם מדינות שונות והידועים כ-STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS (SOFA).

ג. ההתחייבויות שישראל מקבלת על עצמה בהסכם הנ'ל (להלן: הסכם ה-SOFA) מתייבת חקיקה המשנה מהמצב החוקי הקיים בישראל בתחומים שונים בהם ניתנות ההתחייבויות בהסכם.

ד. בשנת 1985 התחייבה ישראל לפי דרישת ארה"ב, לאפשר לקבלנים אמריקניים להשתתף בכל המכרזים לבנייה אמריקנית בישראל במסגרת שיתוף הפעולה. תמורת הסכמת ישראל להשלים את המו"מ על הסכם ה-SOFA הסכימה מצידה ארה"ב לוותר על זכותם של קבלניה להשתתף במכרזים והתחייבה שכל עבודות

הבניה יבוצעו על ידי קבלנים ישראלים.

ה. כ'כ הסכימו האמריקנים לערוך הסכם 'שכנגד' שיחול על אנשי צה'ל בארה'ב. הסכם זה שהוא ההסכם השני הנ'ל איננו מעניק לאנשי צה'ל מעמד הדומה למעמד המוקנה לכוחות ארה'ב בישראל, אלא הקלות מעטות המתאפשרות לפי החוק האמריקני הקיים. תמצית ההסכם מצ'ב כנספח ב'.

ו. מוצע שהממשלה תאשר חתימה, בכפוף לאשרור, על שני ההסכמים הנ'ל.

ז. נוסחם המלא של שני ההסכמים הנ'ל נמצא במזכירות הממשלה לעיון השרים.

ח. לאחר החתימה, יובאו שני ההסכמים הנ'ל לאשרור מליאת הממשלה וכן תובא לכנסת הצעת חוק הנדרשת.

הצעה זו מוגשת ע'י שר הבטחון על דעת סגן ראש הממשלה ושר החוץ ועל דעת שר המשפטים.

ישכת היועץ המשפטי

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, @ (מזכירהממשלה),  
@ממשפטים/קרפ, @ממשפטים/אלבק

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9022

אל: רהמש/689

מ-: המשרד, תא: 151090, חז: 1226, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול

מס' 86361

אל : ווש' - הממונה

דע: נאו'ם, ביין

משלחת מטעם מזכ"ל האו"ם

בהמשך למברקנו מהבוקר (14.10)

1. השר נפגש הערב עם שג' ארה"ב אחרי שוודא שבראון כבר קבל את החלטת הממשלה מהיום, הרחיב השר על הסיבות העקריות שהביאו את הממשלה להחליט כפי חליטה (סיבות הסתייגותנו כבר הוזכרו ע"י השר בקצרה בפגישה עם בראון הבוקר).

2. במהלך דבריו אמר השר כי 'יהיה מכובד יותר אם המשלחת לא תצא לדרך'. לא פירט לגבי מה יהיה אם המשלחת אכן תגיע, אך נתן להבין שאין זה רצוי. הביע תקווה שעמדתנו תובן בושינגטון.

3. בראון אמר שיידווח נאמנה על דברי השר ויראה בהם בכללותם תשובה בע'פ למטר הכתוב שהעביר מבייקר הבוקר. כמו-כן אמר שאין ברצונו לנהל עם השר ויכוח מפורט לגבי תוכן החלטת מועבי'ט. לעומת זאת מבקש להפנות תשומת הלב להתבטאויותיהם של הנשיא ואחרים, ובייחוד לדברי ההסבר של פיקרינג אחרי ההצבעה. עמד על מורכבות העניין כי הרי מדובר לא רק בנושא הנוגע ליחסינו הביטורליים, אלא גם בהחלטת או"ם ומועבי'ט, על כל המשתמע מכך. תוך התייחסות לוועדת החקירה שלנו ובהבעת תקווה שתסיים את עבודתה באופן מהיר, שאל בראון אם יש לשר הצעה שתאפשר יציאה מהסבך שנוצר.

4. השר אמר שאין לו הצעה כעת, אך עם זאת 'עלינו לעבוד ביחד ונתגבר'.

5. דיווח משלים מחר.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור, מצפא,  
סייבל, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 8479

אל: רהמש/653

מ:- המשרד, תא: 141090, זח: 1659, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בכב

סודי ביותר / בהול - ח.ר.ב.

אל: וושינגטון - הממונה

בשלנו נר 2128 (חוזם 8304) נפלה טעות בפסקה השניה של מסר בייקר.

להלן הפסקה מחדש:

WHILE I'M SURE YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE HELD THE LINE, INCLUDING THREATENING VETOS, AGAINST A MUCH TOUGHER ONE. WE SUPPORTED THIS RESOLUTION BECAUSE, FRANKLY, WE FELT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND ABLE TO HANDLE VIOLENCE AND THE RIOT WITHOUT KILLING TWENTY PEOPLE AND WOUNDING 150. BY NOT BEING PREPARED, ISRAEL PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF SADDAM HUSAYN.

עד כאן

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 8304  
 אל: רהמש/647  
 מ:- המשרד, תא: 141090, זח: 1514, דח: ב, סג: סב,  
 נבב  
 86284

ח.ר.ב.  
 סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר  
 103.05

אל: וושינגטון - הממונה

הנדון: החלטת מועב'ט  
 למברק ערן נר 2109 מה-13.10

1. להלן המסר מאת בייקר, שנראון מסר לידי השר הבוקר עוד לפני ישיבת הממשלה.

DAVID,

I HAVE ASKED BILL BROWN TO SEE YOU ON MY BEHALF. I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, TO CONVEY TO YOU SOME OF MY PERSONAL THOUGHTS.

WHILE I'M SURE YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE HELD THE LINE, INCLUDING THREATENING VETOS, AGAINST A MUCH TOUGHER ONE. WE SUPPORTED THIS RESOLUTION BECAUSE, FRANKLY, WE FELT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND ABLE TO HANDLE VIOLENCE AND THE RIOT WITHOUT KILLING TWENTY PEOPLE AND WOUNDING 150. NOT BEING PREPARED, ISRAEL PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF SADDAM HUSSAYN.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH UNSC ACTION THAT WOULD HAVE, OR COULD HAVE HAD THAT VERY SAME EFFECT. SADDAM HUSSAYN'S AGGRESSION IS THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE THAT MUST CONCERN THE WORLD. WE WANT TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON THAT AND SO SHOULD YOU. IF YOU ACCEPT THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE, I BELIEVE WE CAN GET THE FOCUS BACK WHERE IT BELONGS: ON SADDAM'S AGGRESSION. YOU RECEIVED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE, AND THUS THIS MISSION WOULD NOT BE PRECEDENTAL.

I'M CONCERNED THAT IF YOUR REJECT SUCH A MISSION NOW YOU WILL KEEP ISRAEL, NOT IRAQ, IN THE FOREFRONT OF WORLD ATTENTION. IF YOU REJECT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, SOME WILL UNFAIRLY COMPARE YOU TO SADDAM AND HIS REJECTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. YOU DON'T NEED THAT AND WE DON'T EITHER. LET'S GET THIS ISSUE BEHIND US. WE WANT TO GO BACK THIS WEEK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A NEW RESOLUTION ON IRAQI AGGRESSION. LET'S NOT LET SADDAM OFF THE HOOK.

JIM BAKER

2. מבלי להתייחס לעצם הנקשה שבמסר זה העיר השר שהחלטת מועב'ט, שבגיבושה הובילה ארה"ב והכוללת מרכיבים חמורים מבחינתנו (הגינוי החד-צדדי, אי-איזכור ההתקפה על המתפללים היהודים, ציון הר הבית בשמו הערבי ואלמנטים נוספים שיש בהם משום תקדים) גרמה לזעזוע ומורת רוח בישראל בכלל ובממשלה בפרט.

3. השר הוסיף כי נכון שצריכים להחזיר את צאדאם ל'שולחן הניתוחים' אך לצערנו הניתוח שבוצע בשבוע שעבר במועב'ט נערך על ישראל ואנו שלמנו המחיר. עוד אמר שיבדוק את הנושא (בקשת בייקר) עם עמיתיו בממשלה והציע שיפגש עוד היום (בשנית) עם בראון.

4. בראון מסר שיש לו מספר נקודות להעביר בע'פ אך בשל קוצר הזמן (לפני ישיבת הממשלה) סוכם שיעבירן לסמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן (דיווח בנפרד).

5. ציין גם שהוא ער לתגובת ישראל להחלטת מועב'ט מהתקשורת. כמו כן שמע מהתקשורת שועדת החקירה שלנו תתחיל את עבודתה היום, ובאופן אישי הביע תקווה שתסיים את עבודתה 'בקרוב'. (בצאתנו מהפגישה, נתקלנו במר חיים ברסקי ובראון חזר על תקוותו האישית הנ"ל. כששאל קוברסקי לפרש המילה 'קרוב', חייך בראון ולא פרט).

6. גם במעמד זה חזר בראון לנושא החלטת מועב'ט, והביע תקווה שרשמנו לפנינו את דברי ההסבר של פיקרינג אחרי ההצבעה, שלדעתו מהווים מעין מקשה אחת יחד עם לשון ההחלטה. שם נאמר כי ארה"ב מגנה מעשי אלימות 'פרובוקטיביים ורה-אקטיביים' כאחת, ושארה"ב מצפה שהמשלחת מטעם המזכ"ל תבדוק נסיבות האירועים ב-8.10 ותו לא.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס