14

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מס, תיק

מחלקה

מס, תיק מקורי

סודי יוצא **
**
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חוזם:6,13904
אל:וש/239,רהמש/631
מ-:המשרד,תא:170690,זח:1355,דח:מ,סג:סו
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

76334
סודי/מידי

אל: וושינגטון

השגריר

השגריר בראון ביקש לראות שה'ח ביום כניסתו לתפקידו (ה-13 דנא) כדי להביאו איחוליו האישיים וברכת המימשל.

שה'ח הודה על הברכות ואמר שעוד היום שיגר אגרת תשובה לאיגרת המזכיר בה עמד על כוונתו להתמיד במאמצים לקידום היוזמה המדינית המקורית של ממשלת ישראל על בסיסה הראשוני ושהוא מקווה שאיגרתו תביא להיזון חוזר מצד המימשל הרוצה כמונו בקידום התהליך המדיני. שה'ח הוסיף שהוא מקווה שהברור ביננו ייעשה באורח אמיץ, גלוי וכן והביע צערו על שאנו שרויים במצב של כמעט חוסר תקשורת ישירה בדרגים הבכירים. זה מצב חדש ולא כל 'חידוש' הוא לטובה. זה אנומלי ליחסים, אין זה עולה בקנה אחד עם הידידות ומסורת היחסים שגיבשנו ביחד. ואין זה מסייע לתהליך השלום.

שה'ח הטעים כי ממשלת ישראל נבחרה בהליך דמוקרטי ולדבר ערך בפני עצמו הנערך גם ע'י ארה'ב ונחשב בעיניה. עשיית 'דמונידזציה' מממשלת ישראל איננה מסייעת והיא פוגעת לא רק בממשלה אלא בעם כולו. שום תועלת לא תצמח מהטחת דימוי מעין זה אלא רק עוגמת נפש ותחושה כבדה. לפיכך, הטעימה ממישראל דיקתה ונאמנותה לתהליך השלום המושתת על יוזמתה המדינית והסכמי קמפ-דיוויד.

שה'ח אמר שהוא מצפה מטבע הדברים שישראל וארה'ב ילבנו הנושאים הקשורים בקידום התהליך במשותף. הממשלה החדשה משולה לרכבת שאחד מקרונותיה ניתק ועתה היא מתבקשת לשעוט קדימה ממקום שם אין פסי רכבת. שה'ח הוסיף שהוא מצר על שמתפתח מצב בו דרגים בכירים מתקשרים לדרגים בכירים במצרים, וישראל - יוק. היעדר ההידברות הישירה בלתי מובנת, פוגעת בתהליך ואין לה צידוק בשום פנים. יש לפתוח במגע ישיר, מקיף ומלא ולא על דרך של הצגת שאלות גרידא. זו איננה דרך נכונה גם לגבי בריה'מ. מכל מקום אין הצדקה להיעדר המגע ושיטת 'הברוגז' איננה מקובלת ואיננה מסייעת. שה'ח ישאף לחוש האוירה, לשפרה ולשוחח גלויות כדי להתקדם יחד.
בראון אמר שיעשה כמיטב יכולתו לשפר היחסים והביע הערכתו שהוא השגריר הראשון ששה'ח נפגש עמו ביומו הראשון לתפקיד. בראון יודע שישראל מתמודדת עם בעיות כבדות משקל בעלות השלכה על עצם קיומה. סיפר על שיח צוות שגרירותו לפני ימים אחדים בו ניסרה השאלה היאך הגענו עד הלום - במובן של ירידה רצינית בהדיקות היחסים בין שתי המדינות. בראון הסביר לצוותו שלאורך היסטורית יחסי ישראל-ארה'ב היו עליות ומורדות, אך בסה'כ עלה בידינו לפתח אריג עשיר גוונים.

והוא מנה: היחסים האסטרטגיים הגיעו לשיא שלא נודע כמוהו. השת'פ בתחומי המדע הגיע לשיא שבכל הזמנים והוא הדין לגבי הקרן לשת'פ לפיתוח תעשייתי. סה'כ 350 מליון דולר. בראון הוסיף שהוא מקוה שגם קרן פולברייט תיגדל. על יסודות אלה ננסה לשוב למסלול התקין, לדו-שיח ישיר שיתנהל ביסודיות, באמון, בפתיחות, גילוי לב ואמינות - ובעיקר בערוצים הנכונים, ולא דרך התקשורת.

שה'ח הודה לבראון על דבריו לסגל עובדיו בזכות יחסי ישראל-ארה'ב וציין שלאור סקירה זו היעדר מגע ישיר בדרג בכיר הוא אנומליה מזדקרת לעין. שה'ח הטעים כי יש להבטיח אמינות שכן ללא אמון הדדי ייקשה להתקדם. אמינות פירושה שארה'ב קרובה אלינו יותר מאשר לאחרים סביבנו. יכולות להיות לכם טענות הרבה. שישראל לא נהגה כפי שציפיתם, שאין היא מתכוונת למה שהיא אומרת וכו' - אבל אז גם אנו יכולים להשמיע לא מעט טענות שכנגד שהרי אי אפשר לומר לנו דבר אחד ולנהוג כהיפוכו. אמרתם לא נכפה עליכם את אש'ף והנה אתם עוסקים בתיאום אינטנסיבי עם אש'ף. אמרתם שעיסוק בטרור הוא הקו האדום לדיאלוג והנה ארה'ב יודעת שאש'ף עוסק בטרור. הפעולה בחוף ניצנים היתה הוכחה חותכת לכך ורק בנס נמנע אסון גדול שאולי היה גורר האיזור למלחמה שהרי איזו ממשלה היתה יכולה לעבור לסדר היום אחרי מה שפעולה כזו היתה עלולה

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לגרום.

שה׳ח ציין שארה׳ב ממשיכה בדיאלוג למרות התנגדות נרחבת בקונגרס ובניגוד להחלטות קודמות של המימשל על הפסקת הדיאלוג אם אש׳ף יימצא עוסק בטרור.

שה׳ח אמר שהחלטות באגדד החריפו המצב עוד יותר. האם לא היה נכון לצפות שבעקבותן תצהיר ארה׳ב שדרישתה של ישראל לשיחות ישירות היא צודקת. ארה׳ב גורסת שעמידתה על עקרונותיה הביאה בסופו של דבר לתמורות המתחוללות במזא׳ר. האין זה נכון לגבי המזה׳ת? היעדר תגובה כזו יוצרת הרגשה לא נוחה. שומה עלינו לשוחח פנים אל פנים בכנות ובאמינות.

נכחו: ס/שה׳ח, אורן, גורן והח׳מ.

בנצור

לב

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

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12715 תאריך : 15.06.90
דף 1 מתוך 3
עותק 1 מתוך 8 סודי ביותר נכנס

*חוזם:6,12715
*אל:המשרד
*יעדים:רהמש/556,מצב/1238
*מ-:ווש,נד:2096,תא:140690,זח:1600,דח:ר,סג:סב
*תח:@ גס:צפא
*נד:@

*סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב./רגיל

*אל: מנכ"ל משה"ח

*דע: מנכ"ל ראה"מ

*מאת: עודד ערן

*ישראל - ארה"ב.

*1) בא"צ עם ריצ'רד האס אמרתי, שמה שעשה בייקר הביא את
*מערכת היחסים למישור זר למערכת יחסים מתוקנת בין שתי מדינות
*ובוודאי שתי בנות ברית. אם יש להם ובוודאי יש להם, חילוקי
*דעות עמנו, יש דרך לטפל בהם ואם נגלוש לדו-שיח כדוגמאת זה
*שאליו התייחס המזכיר, בוודאי לא נגיע רחוק. הוא אמר שהוא
*מבין את דברי (ובמאמר מוסגר אוסיף, שהוא וגם רוס מבינים
*היטב שנעשתה כאן שגיאה).

*המשכתי ואמרתי, שלא ניתן ללכת לתהליך שלום כה מסובך ועדין,
*מבלי שקיימת הבנה מירבית לגבי מרכיבי יסוד בתהליך והא ראיה,
*דברי הנשיא על ירושלים ושאלת השתתפותם של התושבים הערבים של
*ירושלים. האס אמר, שגישה כזו מסוכנת משום שאם הכוונה היא
*לנסות ולהסכים על נושאים מסויימים עוד בטרם סוף המו"מ, הרי
*שהדבר לא יוכל להעשות ובכך יתפוצץ התהליך עוד לפני שיתחיל.
*עניתי שוודאי נשמח אם יסכימו עם עמדותינו, אבל כוונתי היתה
*להבהרה הדדית היכן ארה"ב וישראל עומדות ואם ישנם חילוקי
*דעות מהותיים, רצוי שישראל וארה"ב תדענה זאת לפני שנכנסים
*לתהליך. (אגב, בנושא ירושלים אמר האס, שלפחות דעתו האישית

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* דף 2 מתוך 3
* עותק 1 מתוך 8
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*היא, שתושבי מזרח ירושלים צריכים להשתתף בבחירות וכי אין
*הדבר עומד בסתירה לצורך לשמור על אחדות העיר). האס השתכנע
*בנקודה זו ואמר שהוא יפנה לסקוקרופט במגמה לנסות לשכנע
*לקיים דו-שיח כזה. הוא דיבר במונחים של שליחות שלו ו/או
*דניס רוס, אך אמר שקיימות כמובן אפשרויות אחרות.
*
*2) האס אמר, שייתכן שיש צורך גם בהצגה פומבית רצינית של
*עמדות ארה''ב, מאחר וזו לא נעשתה מאז נאום המזכיר במאי 1989
*בפני איפא''ק. עניתי, שדווקא נאום זה מצביע על צורך להימנע
*מדו-שיח פומבי, אלא בליבון הדברים בדו-שיח רציני בין שני
*הממשלים. האס טען מצידו שאין סתירה בין שני הדברים.
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*3) העלתי גם את שאלת היחסים האישיים ואמרתי שצריך לשים לכך
*סוף פסוק ולמחוק פרשיה זו המעכירה ללא צורך היחסים. האס
*אמר, שלדעתו, כאשר יהיה מפגש בין ראה''מ והנשיא, ראה''מ
*חייב להבהיר בארבע עיניים מה היתה כוונתו בתשובה שנתן לנשיא
*ושהוא יכול להבין כיצד הם יכולים להתפרש בצורה אחרת. האס גם
*הוסיף שלדעתו בנושא ההתנחלויות קיימת אולי אפשרות אם ישראל
*תבחר להגיע להבנה שקטה שלפיה ראה''מ לא יכריז אמנם על
*הפסקתן, אך בפועל לא יופנו משאבים נוספים לנושא
*זה. האס אמר, שהממשל רוצה לסיים בנושא הקליטה. הממשל היה
*מוכן אפילו להגדיל הסיוע ולתת אותו כמענק אילו ניתן היה
*להגיע להבנה שכזו. הסבתי את תשומת ליבו בנקודה זו, הן למצע
*הממשלה והן לדברי רובינשטיין לכל אנשי שיחו במימשל ביום ג'
*האחרון.
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*4) שאלתי לגבי הדיאלוג והחלטת המימשל והאס חזר על
*התלבטויותיהם ונסיונותיהם לחלץ ''משהו'' מאש''פ. הסבתי
*תשומת ליבו לכך, שממשלת ישראל, על אף עמדתה הברורה לגבי
*דיאלוג זה, מאופקת במתן ביטוי פומבי לכך ולא נתנה מספר
*הטלפון של משרד ראה''מ תוך בקשה שהמימשל יתקשר כאשר הוא
*יחליט לנתק את הדיאלוג.
*האס: 'TOUCHE'.
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*5) האס חזר על דאגת המימשל לגבי הקורה בירדן. אמר שפנו
*לסורים להפסיק נסיונות החדירה.
*
*ערן
*
*לב

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*
* דף 3     מתוך 3
* עותק 1    מתוך 8
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*תפ: רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל
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אאאא,חוזם:28450
אל:רהמש/1188
מ-:רוש,נר:2153,תא:280690,זח:1000,דח:ב,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / בהול

ח.ר.ב ח.ר.ב ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ''ל משרד ראה''מ

דע: מנהל מצפ''א

מאת: עודד ערן

איגרת ראה''מ - תגובות ראשוניות.

אמש אמר לי רוס כי הוא רואה את הפסקה האופרטיבית (לגבי הנוסחה המדברת על השתתפות הפלשתינאים בדיאלוג) כמאפשרת לפחות בדיקה בין שתי הממשלות לגבי תרגומה המעשי. כוונתו היא להציג זאת הבוקר. הוא טוען שהחלק הראשון של הפסקה שבה מביעה ישראל נכונות לקבל כל תושב יש''ע מאפשרת המשך דיאלוג זה. כך הוא התכוון אמש להציג את המכתב לבייקר. לעומתו, היה ריצ'ארד האס קצת יותר מסוייג. הוא ציין לחיוב את החלק שבו מסביר ראה''מ לנשיא את פרשת אי ההבנה בינהם בעניין ההתנחלויות. מאידך, הוא ראה את הפסקה בדבר השתתפות הפלשתינאים כסוגרת את האפשרות לגמישות בנקודה זו. בשיחה אמרתי לו, שאם הפסקה מעוררת שאלות, הרי שזו בדיוק הסיבה מדוע שתי הממשלות צריכות להיכנס לדו - שיח ביניהן. אמר שלאור דברי יקרא פעם שלישית את המכתב לפני שיציגו לנשיא הבוקר.

ערן.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

ססס

ניו-יורק	קטחון	יום
39	634	1529

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון
טופס מברק

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע : יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת,
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ,
אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, נ"י.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

דף 1.מתוך. 2
דחיפות:מיידי
סווג: בלמ"ס

תאריך,זמן:
מספר המברק:

המשרד:

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן ליום 29.6.90

רצ"ב התדרוך

שרת סנשרה רה"מ מנע ממנו בנדר מדפא רבוב מעת
פרק - 11 - הסברה ומרכז מחר רם אמן עלמ בוקר

2/2.

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM
FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1990

1529
634
39

Q Yeah, Mr. President, on another subject. Prime Minister EShamirF has sent --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Good, Michael. I was hoping we'd get to another one. (Laughter.)

Q Well, we can go back to these taxes later -- (laughter). But Prime Minister Shamir has sent you a -- what appears to be a pretty tough letter ruling out flatly talks with any Palestinian with any sort of authority. Do you feel the peace process is deadlocked and are you concerned that the hardliners, the voices of extremism now have the upper hand throughout the region?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I am concerned about a deadlock in the peace process. We have received the Shamir letter. It came over to me late last night. The analysis process between NSC and State has just started so I can't give you -- or provide the American people with a response to that letter. But, yes, I am very concerned about a high centering of the peace process. And we've had a plan and it is a sound plan and I want to see it go forward. So we will be analyzing the Shamir response very, very carefully and hopefully, I would
then go back and say, find some -- find some way -- find some material in the response that permit us to get these talks going again. It is essential; the status quo is unacceptable to everybody. But I can't give you right now whether I think the letter is negative or positive or something of that nature.

Q Well, can you see any way to get this peace process going unless the Israelis show some willingness to talk to the EPalestiniansF with some authority?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I think there has got to be discussion with Palestinians, and that has to happen, and we will push and find ways to make it happen if we can. We're half way across the world, but we are going to not -- we are not going to give up on that kind of solution to this problem. We have to do that. But if we get totally stiff-armed on the Baker approach or what was the Shamir plan, Mubarak's help on it -- he could have his name on it -- and then we go back to the drawing board, because we're not going to sit here and do nothing.

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:28669
אל:רהמש/1225
מ-:רוש,נר:2156,תא:280690,זח:1315,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר / מיידי

ח.ר.ב ח.ר.ב ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ''ל ראה''מ, מנהל מצפ''א, לשכת שה''ח

מאת: עודד ערן

תשובת ראה''מ לנשיא.

מדניס רוס הבוקר (11:00).

הוא מבודד בהערכה שאותה מסר לבייקר, היינו, שהתשובה מאפשרת לפחות סיבוב הבהרות בין ישראל לארה''ב. גם בדרג המקצועי במחמ''ד ובמיוחד בבית הלבן (נקב בשמו של סקוקרופט), הגישה היא נגטיבית, אך הוא חושב שיוכל לשכנע את בייקר לשכנע את הנשיא, שהתשובה מצריכה מפגש בינו לבין שה''ח לוי.

מאהרן מילר. הביע אכזבה עמוקה מהתשובה. הוא רואה בה תשובה שלילית המנסה להתחמק ממתן תשובה אבל גם ממשבר בין שתי המדינות. הוא רואה סוף פסוק לתהליך. יחד עם זאת, בתשובה לדברי, הוא מסכים שאין טעם בסגירת הדלת וארה''ב בודאי לא תצא ניזוקה אם יהיה סיבוב נוסף של הבהרות הדדיות בנושא.

דן קרצר. הביע דעה זהה. אמר שהוא מושפע גם מהעתונות הישראלית, שנתנה פרשנות המציגה את התשובה כ''לא'' לשאלת בייקר. קרצר הוסיף, שהתשובה לשאלה האופרטיבית אינה מובנת לו. אם הדאגה היא שירושלים תעמוד במרכז הדיונים כבר בפתיחת הדיאלוג, הרי שניתן לפתור זאת. אם לגבי שאלת המגורשים הבעיה היא ''זכות השיבה'', הרי שברור שארה''ב לא תומכת בכך וגם בנקודה זו אינה רואה בעיה. חזרתי על פזמוני, היינו, שכל זה מצביע על הצורך בהמשך הדיאלוג ביננו.

ערן.

תפוצה:@(רהמ),שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:26958
אל:רהמש/1134
מ-:המשרד,תא:270690,זח:1736,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי/מידי
913.11

אל: וושינגטון - השגריר, שטיין

א. סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן הפגיש בלשכתו (ב - 26 דנא) את השגריר בראון עם נציגנו במוסקבה אריה לוין. כמו כן נכחו ג'ק סיגל ודן ארבל.
השיחה נסבה סביב מכלול ההיבטים הקשורים להגירת יהודים מבריה'מ כאשר השגריר בראון מגלה ענין רב במתרחש.

ב. להלן נקודות עיקריות שעלו בשיחה :

1. בנושא חוק ההגירה החדש ציין השגריר בראון כי להערכת שגרירותם במוסקבה נובע העיכוב בקבלת החוק ע'י הסובייט העליון מפחד סובייטי ממחסור במט'ח (HARD CURRENCY COST) בעקבות הגירה צפויה של 2-3 מליון אזרחים סובייטים בשנה, מפחד סובייטי מ'בריחת מוחות' ואנשים העוסקים בתפקידים חשובים/מסווגים ולבסוף מן הלחץ הערבי.

2. השגריר בראון סיפר על טפטוף (TRICKLE) של פניות לשגרירותם מצד אנשים שהגיעו מבריה'מ כעולים שטוענים כי למעשה אינם יהודים, כי העמידו פנים וכי ברצונם להגיע לארה'ב. סיפר כי כמובן שלא מעניקים להם ויזות, אך לאור הנ'ל ולאור דיווחים דומים משגרירויותיהם במזא'ר מקווה שלא יראו תורים ארוכים של עולים העומדים בתור לקבלת ויזה בשגרירותם בת'א.

3. בראון התענין במצב כוח האדם במשלחתנו והופתע מכך שלא חל כל שינוי במצבת כוח האדם. לוין השיב כי הסובייטים טרם נענו לפניותינו להגדלת מספר הנציגים במשלחת וכי הוא חש שנעשה לינקג' בין מדיניותנו (כביכול) לישוב עולים בשטחים לבין הסכמתם של הסובייטים להגדלת מצבת כוח האדם. בשיחותיו במשה'ח הסובייטי נתקל לוין בתופעה מענינת לפיה מתיחסים ומצטטים פקידים סובייטים דוברי הממשל האמריקני וטוענים כי 'אם ארה'ב מקשה עליכם (בהתניית מתן הערבויות לדיור ד.א) מדוע אנחנו צריכים לנהוג אחרת'.
ללוין התחושה כי בריה'מ פונה לארה'ב ל - GUIDANCE בכל הקשור לעמדתם כלפינו. בראון הגיב בהבנה וציין כי הוא חש שהסובייטים נוקטים לאחרונה בטשטוש מכוון (OBFISCAION) במדיניותם (הביא לדוגמא את הפעילות הסובייטית סביב הדיון במועבי'ט בו הציעו נוסח ההחלטה והותירו את העבודה ה'שחורה והמפרכת' לאחרים). מדיניותם כלפי המז'ת אינה ברורה ואף מבולבלת. להערכתו המומחים הסובייטים מתוסכלים מכך שלבריה'מ אין עוד את אותו משקל במז'ת.

4. בראון התענין במספר היהודים העוברים מדי יום בנציגות, בקשיים הטכניים והתקשורתיים של הנציגות ולבסוף בהערכת לוין למספר היהודים החיים בבריה'מ.

5. בראון התענין במסכת קשרים של לוין עם משה'ח הסובייטי ושאל אם לוין נתקל בקבוצה או יחידים שגישתם כלפי ישראל מאוזנת יותר. לוין השיב שישנם פקידים סובייטים המגלים גישה מאוזנת אך שירותם של רבים מהם במדינות ערב והיותם מנותקים מענייננו במשך למעלה מעשרים שנה נותנים את אותותם. לפקידים אלה קושי בהתיחסות אלינו. ככלל, ציין לוין, כי ניכרת הרעה ביחסים בין ישראל ובריה'מ שניצניה לאחר פסגת מלטה. בעיות הפנים בבריה'מ יכולות אף להחמיר המצב.

לשכת סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,גובריו,
מזאר1,ר/מרכז,ממד,@(רם),אמן

ססס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

תרשומת על שיחת השגריר עם מזכיר המדינה, בייקר - 27.6.90

המזכיר פתח באומרו שהוא מצפה בעניין רב לפגישתו עם שה"ח ולעבוד עימו בשתוף פעולה כדי לקדם התהליך.

אנו זקוקים לתשובה מכם אשר תאפשר לנו להמשיך לפעול לקדום תהליך השלום. שמתי לב היטב לנוסח דבריו של שה"ח לוי מאתמול, ואני מקווה שהוא משקף מחשבה ונסוח זהיר של עמדותיו. אם דברים אלו יכולים להיות תמצית תגובתו של רה"מ, נראה לי שזה יתן לנו משהו שעמו נוכל לעבוד.

הכרזות שנמסרו ע"י ראשי הממשלה החדשה עם כניסתה (לפני כ-9 ימים) יצרו הרושם שאתם משנים את קו המטרה (moving the goal post) אין אנו רוצים לפתוח מחדש את כל החבילה, אנו רוצים להמשיך מהנקודה בה הפסקנו את המו"מ ומעוניינים לקדם תהליך אמין. אם לעומת זאת, תשובתכם תהיה שלילית התהליך יגווע, ילך וימות.

אני רוצה להדגיש לפניך , הוסיף המזכיר, ומסור נא זאת בשמי לרה"מ ולשה"ח כי המחוייבות הטוטלית של ארה"ב לבטחונה של ישראל לא צריכה להיות מוטלת בספק ואף פעם נושא זה לא עלה לדיון בישיבות ובדיונים שאנו מקיימים בנושא התהליך.

המזכיר חזר שוב לנוסח דבריו של שה"ח מאתמול (תרגום לאנגלית מדברי שה"ח לקול ישראל היה מונח על שולחנו) והקריא מתוכו שני המשפטים הראשונים. הוא אמר כי אם דברים אלה משקפים מחשבה מגובשת ומעודנת (carefully and subtle) כי אזי יש בהצהרה אלמנטים שיכולים לסייע לקידום התהליך. אנו רוצים לקבל תשובתכם במועד קרוב (reasonable prompt response).

הפסקת הדיאלוג בין ארה"ב לאש"פ צריכה לאפשר לרה"מ מרחב תמרון רחב יותר מאשר לפני כן. ארה"ב איננה רוצה לדחוף את ישראל או להביא אותה לדיאלוג עם אש"פ, ואנו נכונים לתת הבהרות והתחייבות בכתב בנושא זה.

אם רה"מ מעוניין לנצל התנאים החדשים שנוצרו, עם הפסקת הדיאלוג הרי עם תשובה מתאימה נוכל להעלות הדברים על מסלול מחדש. תתכן גם הוספה של תנאי זה או אחר בתנאי שנוכל לקדם תהליך שלום אמין. הפלשתינאים מוכנים - אנו מעוניינים בתשובה חיובית ישראלית אפילו אם תשובה חיובית זו מותנית או אם התשובה היא חיובית אבל... (a qualified yes or a yes but...) אם לא, הכדור יהיה במגרש שלכם ואתם תצטרכו לשאת בתוצאות.

השבתי באריכות כי הממשלה החדשה זקוקה לשהות כדי להשיב וכן לאפשר לשה"ח החדש ללמוד היטב את הסוגייה שעל הפרק. אין לצפות שהממשלה תתייחס בצורה מכנית בתשובה כן או לא לשאלה שהוצגה ויש לאפשר לממשלה לגבש מחדש מדיניותה בנושא.

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המזכיר חזר כי הוא מקבל אומנם ששה"ח רוצה ללמוד הנושא ושיוכל לגבש את מחשבותיו, אך רה"מ מעורב בתהליך למעלה משנה וכן גם שר הבטחון, ארנס. כך שמבחינתם זה איננו חומר חדש.

אם תשובתכם תהיה שלילית הנושא ימות, על כל התוצאות שדבר זה יגרום, עובדה ששה"ח נכנס רק עתה לתפקידו איננה סיבה לא להשיב.

בשלב זה חזר בייקר לדבריו של שה"ח מאתמול ולאחר שהשבתי בחיוב על שאלתו האם יש לראות בדבריו של השר לוי הצהרה מחושבת היטב הוסיף בייקר, כי דברים אלו יכולים להוות בסיס לתשובה (the kind of response) שיכול לתת מצד אחד את הכסוי הפוליטי הדרוש לרה"מ ומצד שני, האלמנטים החיוביים אשר יאפשרו לארה"ב להמשיך בתהליך.

הוא מעודד מאד מדבריו של שה"ח, ובשיחות שהיו לו אתמול עם שה"ח המצרי שמע גם ממנו דברים אשר מעודדים אותו ונותנים לו יסוד איתן לחשוב שהוא יוכל לעבוד בשת"פ הדוק וגלוי עם שה"ח החדש, והוא מצפה לפגישה עמו במועד מתאים.

לקראת סוף השיחה העליתי נושא הערבויות לדיור, וציינתי שאנו מעוניינים לקדם הנושא בהקדם לנוכח גל העלייה העצום והצרכים הגואים בתחום השכון.

המזכיר ציין כי הם טרם סיכמו הנושא ולכן לא יוכל להשיב לי עתה . הדיונים נמשכים במשרד החוץ האמריקאי וכן יצטרך להעלות זאת עם הנשיא.

אאאא,חוזם:27407
אל:רהמש/1168
מ-:ווש,נר:2147,תא:270690,זח:1430,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב./מידי

אל: סמנכ''ל צפ''א -- ח.ר.ב.

דע: לש'שה''ח -- ח.ר.ב.

לש' רה''מ -- ח.ר.ב.

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - היועץ לבטחון לאומי סקוקרופט (25.6).

1. השיחה התקיימה לבקשת השגריר לקראת נסיעתו ארצה. השתתפו בשיחה מצידם : גייטס, (סגנו של סקוקרופט), האס. מצידנו הציר והח'מ.

2. בפתח השיחה חזר השגריר והביע הוקרתנו על החלטת הנשיא בנושא הפסקת הדיאלוג עם אש''פ. ההחלטה שהתקבלה בעיתוי הנכון שולחת מסר של אמינות, מסר שמשתלב במאבק ארה''ב בטרור. רוה''מ, ציין השגריר, ימצא הדרך להביע הוקרתו להחלטת הנשיא. משוכנע שהחלטתו תסייע לבניית האמון בין ישראל לארה''ב.

3. השגריר דיווח על ביקורו של ס/מזכ''ל האום איימה בישראל וציין שההחלטה לקבלו באה - בהיענות לפניית ארה''ב.

4.השגריר מסר עותק ממכתב ששיגר רוה''מ לראשי הקהיליה האירופית. תוכן המכתב יאפשר ל-12 (ולארה''ב) לקבל תחושה טובה יותר לגבי התייחסותו הרצינית של רוה''מ לתהליך.

5. לאחר עיון במכתב ציין סקוקרופט שהמכתב רציני. בהתייחסו לנושא ההתנחלויות הזכיר את דברי שר השיכון אותם קראו בזהירות.

6. סקוקרופט הביע הערכה לדברי השגריר (בנושא החלטת הנשיא להשהות הדיאלוג). הנשיא CALLED THE SHOTS .
קיבל החלטה לאחר שהגיע למסקנה שתנאי הדיאלוג הופרו. לא היתה לו ברירה. זו לא היתה החלטה קלה. ההחלטה לא תקל על המו''מ עם הצד הערבי. ולמרות זאת, ארה''ב נחושה בדעתה לקדם את התהליך. הביע תקווה שהשגריר יעביר את המסר בדבר נחישותם לקדם התהליך. הזכיר את המסר שהעביר הנשיא לרוה''מ. הביע תקווה שכעת (לאחר כינון הממשלה) ניתן יהיה להמשיך (בתהליך ש.ש.) ממקום שהוא הפסק. אין להם כוונה לחזור ולהתחיל התהליך (שהחל לפני פחות משנה) מחדש. לדבריו, היינו ON THE VERGE של עשיית צעד אמיתי. רוצים לעשות צעד זה.

7. סקוקרופט ציין שהפסקת הדיאלוג לא תסייע. (למרות זאת) מאמין שיוכלו TO MANAGE . מקווים שרוה''מ יסכים ויאמר כן לצעדים הבאים.

8. בנושא הטרור באופן כללי הביע סקוקרופט דאגתם לנוכח סימנים (באיזור ובמקומות אחרים) מעליה בטרור. מגמה זו נובעת להערכתם ממספר סיבות: תסכול מהיעדר התקדמות בתהליך

ובחלקו תוצאה של היעדר בר שיח פלסטיני משולחן המו''מ. מודאגים מכך.

9. סקוקרופט ציין שמבינים הפרובוקציה החמורה של ה 30.5 (נסיון הפיגוע של חש''פ). יחד עם זאת מפצירים (URGE) בנו לנהוג באיפוק במה שנוגע להוצאה לפועל של מדיניותנו המסורתית של פעולות תגמול ובמיוחד כעת, כשהמצב בכללו כה רגיש ושתהליך השלום תלוי על חוט דק. חשוב להתרכז בנושא התהליך ובעשייה צעד קדימה שיתן תקווה לכל האיזור על כך שיש התקדמות (ולכן) חשוב להיות מעורב ולא להרוס. חזר והדגיש הנקודה לעייל במיוחד כעת. הוסיף כי קשה להדגיש עד כמה המשך התהליך חשוב לארה''ב אשר אינה יכולה להרשות לעצמה '' BENIGN NEGLECT '' במידה והמאמץ הנוכחי שנבנה על יוזמת רוה''מ יתמוטט יצטרכו למצוא אלטרנטיבות להמשיך בתהליך. זו אחריות בסיסית שלקחו על עצמם. סקוקרופט ציין שאיננו יודע מה תהיה האלטרנטיבה, אך ימצאו אלטרנטיבה אם התהליך (הנוכחי) יתמוטט. זה המסר, ציין, אותו יוכל השגריר להעביר לרוה''מ.

10. השגריר הבטיח להעביר הדברים. הוסיף כי משיחותיו עם י-מ ובעקבות קריאת מכתבו של הנשיא, מבין שהמכתב נילמד בזהירות. ציין כי אין לו ספק ביחס לנחישות רוה''מ להמשיך ביוזמה. בעקבות הקמת הממשלה ומינוי שה''ח חדש יצטרך רוה''מ להכניס את חברי ממשלתו בפרטי התהליך, דבר שידרוש זמן מה. הוסיף כי לדעתו רצוי ששהח''ח החדש יפגש עם מזכיר המדינה הן כדי ליצור מגע אישי וכן כדי לשמוע ממנו ישירות עמדת ארה''ב. השגריר ציין כי רוה''מ חש שמגיע לו זמן מה כדי להשיב למכתב הנשיא. מכתבו ל-12 משקף הרצינות בה הוא מתייחס לנושא. הזכיר התבטאות שר השיכון המבטאת רצון להסיר מטרד (IRRITANT) מהיחסים.
רוה''מ מייחס חשיבות רבה לתהליך. חושב שלא ניתן להתמודד עם הנושא (קרי מתן תשובה על מכתב הנשיא) באופן מיכני ע''י שליפת הנייר שהוכן במרץ ודרישה למתן תשובה חיובית או שלילית לשאלות.

11. סקוקרופט השיב כי מבין את בעייתו של רוה''מ בהקמת ואירגון הממשלה. סבור שבחירת השרים הינו ענין פנים ישראלי שלארה''ב אין ענין בו. חושב ששליפת מיכנית של הנייר הינו דבר שבא בחשבון (''זהו צעד סביר'') מה גם שאינם רואים שמשהו השתנה באופן ממשי מאז ה 1.4. אינם חושבים שפתיחתו מחדש של התהליך (לפני מתן תשובה. ש.ש.) הוא הכרחי או מוצדק (WARRANTED). חושב שיש להדגיש מחוייבות ישראל וארה''ב לתהליך השלום. מקוים לתגובה נילהבת בהקדם (SOON) וזאת ללא PREJUDICE לגבי ביקור של שה''ח. ביקורו אינו צריך לשמש תירוץ/סיבה שלא להמשיך בתהליך.

12. השגריר הבטיח להעביר המסר לרוה''מ. ציין כי במקביל להתקדמות בנושא הפלסטיני, רה''מ מייחס חשיבות רבה להתקדמות במישור היחסים עם מדינות ערב.

13. סקוקרופט השיב כי לא שכחו הנושא. מוכנים לנסות ולקדמו. כעת זה חסר סיכוי. הדרך לקדם הנושא היא ע''י השגת התקדמות בתהליך השלום. גם הפלשתינאים הדבר יאפשר להם לפנות (למדינות ערב) ולהצביע בפניהן על רצינות ישראל ולבקשן לשנות יחסן לישראל. כעת אין להם מספיק בשר עימו יוכלו לעבוד (במישור יחסי מדינות ערב - ישראל ש.ש.), זאת ועוד, החלטת ארה''ב בנושא הדיאלוג עם אש''פ לא הגדילה המנוף (האמריקאי) מול מדינות ערב. השגריר בהערת ביניים ציין שהחלטת הנשיא הגדילה את אמינות ארה''ב בהקשר למאבק בטרור. על כך השיב סקוקרופט כי בעקבות החלטת הנשיא על ארה''ב וישראל להבהיר שביכולתן לזוז קדימה.

14. השגריר העלה דאגותינו לגבי עסקת הנשק המתוכננת עם סעודיה. ציין כי הטיעונים אותם השמיעו נציגי הממשל (בהודעתם בקונגרס) בזכות העיסקה לא היו משכנעים. הזכיר במיוחד הכללת 2000 טילי טאו והשיפורים באלקטרוניקה של מטוסי אייוקס.

15. סקוקרופט השיב כי למרות שהמדובר בעסקה בהיקף גדול הרי שלא מדובר ב''חבילה הגורמת להתרגשות'' (EXCITING PACKAGE) במידה וארה''ב לא תמכור, יש לסעודיה מספר גדול של אלטרנטיבות אחרות כאשר חלק יישמו (הסעודים) בעבר למורת רוחם ורוחנו. העובדה שארה''ב תהיה ספקית נשק עיקרית של סעודיה הינה דבר מועיל. חשוב שארה''ב לא תוותר על תפקיד זה לאירופאיות, לסין או למדינות אחרות.

16. השגריר השיב כי רשם לפניו הדברים ששמע. מקווה שסקוקרופט רשם עמדתנו.

שטיין

אא

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

ססס

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פברוק	עמ': 1 מתוך: 3
סווג: סודי ביותר ח.ר.ב.		
תאריך ושעת תעבור: 25.6.90	אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א	
פס' פברק: המשרד:	דע: לש' שה"ח לש' רה"מ.	
	מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.	

שיחת השגריר - היועץ לבטחון לאומי סקוקרופט (25.6)

1. השיחה התקיימה לבקשת השגריר לקראת נסיעתו ארצה. השתתפו בשיחה מצידם: מיילס (סגנו של סקוקרופט), האס. מצידנו הציר והחיים.
2. בפתח השיחה חזר השגריר והביע הוקרתנו על החלטת הנשיא בנושא הפסקת הדיאלוג עם אש"פ. ההחלטה שהתקבלה בעיתוי הנכון שולחת מסר של אמינות, מסר שמשתלב במאבק ארה"ב בטרור. רוה"מ, ציין השגריר, ימצא הדרך להביע הוקרתו להחלטת הנשיא. משוכנע שהחלטתו תסייע לבניית האמון בין ישראל לארה"ב.
3. השגריר דיווח על ביקורו של ס/מזכ"ל האו"ם איימה בישראל. הייתה שההחלטה לקבלו באה בהיענות לפנית אלה"ב.
4. השגריר מסר עותק ממכתב ששיגר רוה"מ לראשי הקהיליה האירופית. תוכן המכתב יאפשר ל-12 (ולארה"ב) לקבל תחושה טובה יותר לגבי התייחסותו הרצינות של רוה"מ להליך.
5. לאחר עיון במכתב ציין סקוקרופט שהמכתב רציני. בהתייחסו לנושא ההתנחלויות הזכיר את דברי שר השיכון אותם קראו בזהירות.
6. סקוקרופט הביע הערכה לדברי השגריר (בנושא החלטת הנשיא להשהות הדיאלוג). הנשיא called the shots. קיבל החלטה לאחר שהגיע למסקנה שהנאי הדיאלוג הופרו. לא היתה לו ברירה. זו לא היתה החלטה קלה. ההחלטה לא תקל על המו"מ עם הצד הערבי. ולמרות זאת, ארה"ב נחושה בדעתה לקדם את התהליך. הביע תקוה שהשגריר יעביר את המסר בדבר נחישותם לקדם התהליך. הזכיר את המסר שהעביר הנשיא לרוה"מ. הביע תקווה שכעת (לאחר כינון הממשלה) ניתן יהיה להמשיך(בתהליך ש.ש.) ממקום שהוא הפסק. אין להם כונה לחזור ולהתחיל התהליך (שהחל לפני פחות משנה) מחדש. לדבריו, היינו on the verge של עשיית צעד אמיתי. רוצים לעשות צעד זה.
7. סקוקרופט ציין שהפסקת הדיאלוג לא הסייע. (למרות זאת) מאמין שיוכלו to manage מקווים שרוה"מ יסכים ויאמר כן לצעדים הבאים.
8. בנושא הטרור באופן כללי הביע סקוקרופט דאגתם לנוכח סימנים (באיזור ובמקומות אחרים) מעליה בטרור.

תפוצה:

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 2 פתון: 3
סווג:		
תאריך וזפן תצור:		אל:
פס' פבוק: הפשרד:		דע:
		פאת:

מגמה זו נובעת להערכתם ממספר סיבות: תסכול מהיעדר התקדמות בתהליך ובחלקו תוצאה של היעדר בר שיח פלסטיני משולחן המויים. מודאגים מכך.

9. סקוקרופט ציין שמבינים הפרובוקציה של ה-30.5 (נסיון הפיגוע של חשיפ). יחד עם זאת מפצירים (urge) בנו לנהוג באיפוק במה שנוגע להוצאה לפועל של מדיניותנו המסורתית ובמיוחד כעת, כשהמצב בכללו כה רגיש ושתהליך השלום תלוי על חוט דק. חשוב להתרכז בנושא התהליך ובעשיית צעד קדימה שיתן תקווה לכל האיזור על כך שיש התקדמות (ולכן) חשוב להיות מעורב ולא להרוס. חזר והדגיש הנקודה לעיל במיוחד כעת. הוסיף כי קשה להדגיש עד כמה המשך חשוב לארהייב אשר אינה יכולה להרשות לעצמה " benign neglect ". במידה והמאמץ הנוכחי שנבנה על יוזמת רוהיים יתמוטט יצטרכו למצוא אלטרנטיבות להמשיך בתהליך. זו אחריות בסיסית שלקחו על עצמם. סקוקרופט ציין שאיננו יודע מה תהיה האלטרנטיבה, אך ימצאו אלטרנטיבה אם התהליך (הנוכחי) יתמוטט. זה המסר, ציין, אותו יוכל השגריר להעביר לרוהיים.

10. השגריר הבטיח להעביר הדברים. הוסיף כי משיחותיו עם י-ם ובעקבות קריאת מכתבו של הנשיא, מבין שהמכתב נילמד בזהירות. ציין כי אין לו ספק ביחס לנחישות רוהיים להמשיך ביוזמה. בעקבות הקמת הממשלה ומינוי שהייח חדש יצטרך רוהיים להכניס את חברי ממשלתו בפרטי התהליך, דבר שידרוש זמן מה. הוסיף כי לדעתו רצוי ששהייח החדש יפגש עם מזכיר המדינה וכדי לשמוע ממנו ישירות את עמדת ארהייב. השגריר ציין כי רוהיים חש שמגיע לו זמן מה כדי להשיב למכתב הנשיא. מכתבו ל-12 משקף הרצינות בה הוא מתייחס לעשות. הזכיר התבטאות שר השיכון המבטאת רצון להסיר מטרד (irritant) מהיחסים. רוהיים מייחס חשיבות רבה לתהליך. חושב שלא ניתן להתמודד עם הנושא (קרי מתן תשובה על מכתב הנשיא) באופן מיכני עייי שליחת הנייר שהוכן במקור. מתן תשובה חיובית או שלילית לשאלות.

11. סקוקרופט השיב כי מבין את בעייתו של רוהיים בהקמת ואירגון הממשלה. סבור שבחירת השרים הינו ענין פנים ישראלי שלארהייב אין ענין בו. חושב ששליחת מיכניות של הנייר

נפוצה:

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פברק	דף: 3 פתוח: 3
סווג:		
תאריך ושעת מעבר:		אל:
פס' פברק: הפשרד:		דע:
		פאת:

הינו דבר שבא בחשבון ("זהו צעד סבירי") מה גם שאינם רואים שמשהו השתנה באופן ממשי מאז ה-1.4. אינם חושבים שפתיחתו (לפני מתן תשובה ש.ש.) חדש של התהליך הכרחי היא או מוצדק (warranted). חושב שיש להדגיש מחויבות ישראל וארה"ב לתהליך השלום. מקווים לתגובה נילהבת בהקדם (soon) וזאת ללא prejudice לגבי ביקור של שה"ח. ביקורו אינו צריך לשמש תירוץ/סיבה שלא להמשיך בתהליך.

12. השגריר הבטיח להעביר המסר לרוה"מ. ציין כי במקביל להתקדמות בנושא הפלסטיני עם להתקדמות במישור היחסים מדינות ערב

13. סקוקרופט השיב כי לא שכחו הנושא. מוכנים לנסות ולקדמו. כעת זה חסר סיכוי. דרך לקדם הנושא היא עי"י השגת התקדמות בתהליך השלום עם הפלשתינאים הדבר יאפשר להם לפנות (למדינות ערב) ולהצביע בפניהן על רצינות ישראל ולבקשן לשנות יחסן לישראל. כעת אין להם מספיק בשר עימו יוכלו לעבוד (במישור יחסי מדינות ערב - ישראל ש.ש.). זאת ועוד, החלטת ארה"ב בנושא הדיאלוג עם אש"פ לא הגדילה המנוף (האמריקאי) מול מדינות ערב. השגריר בהערת ביניים ציין שהחלטת הנשיא הגדילה את אמינות ארה"ב בהקשר למאבק בטרור. על כך השיב סקוקרופט כי בעקבות החלטת הנשיא על ארה"ב וישראל להבהיר שביכולתן לדוז קדימה.

14. השגריר העלה דאגותינו לגבי עסקת הנשק המתוכננת עם סעודיה. ציין כי הטיעונים אותם השמיעו נציגי המשל (בהודעתם בקונגרס) בזכות העיסקה לא היו משכנעים. הזכיר במיוחד כללת 2000 טילי טאו והשיפורים באלקטרוניקה של מטוסי אייוקס.

15. סקוקרופט השיב כי למרות שהמדובר בעסקה בהיקף גדול הרי שלא מדובר ב"חבילה הגורמת להתרגשות" (exiting package) במידה וארה"ב לא תמכור יש לסעודיה מספר גדול של אלטרנטיבות אחרות כאשר חלק יישמו (הסעודים) בעבר למורת רוחם ורוחנו. העובדה שארה"ב תהיה ספקית נשק עיקרית של סעודיה הינה דבר מועיל. חשוב שארה"ב לא תוותר על תפקיד זה לאירופאיות, לסין או למדינות אחרות.

16. השגריר השיב כי רשם לפניו הדברים ששמע. מקווה שסקוקרופט רשם עמדתנו.

שטיין

פוצה:

69 נספח 3

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

1 ביולי 1990
103.01

78580

העמדות במכתב רוה"מ שמיר (27.6.90)

א. התנחלויות

- אינן מכשול למו"מ ולשלום.

- מניעת התיישבות יהודית בשטחים היתה קובעת מראש תוצאות מו"מ עתידי.

- ערבי החפץ באמת ובתמים בשלום לא יתנגד לנוכחות יהודים בשטחים.

- בשום מקרה אין לצפות מישראל שתקבל את עקון ה"יודנריין" ואין הדבר תלוי במעמד הסופי של השטחים - ישראל עושה כל מאמץ להתחשב בעמדות הנשיא בסוגיית ההתנחלויות

ב. יוזמת השלום של ישראל מ-14.5.89

- הממשלה החדשה מחוייבת ליוזמה.

- חיוני להתקדם בכל 4 הנקודות שמרכיבות את היוזמה.

- על מדינות ערב לנוע במונחים קונקרטיים לקראת השלמה עם ישראל. צעד כזה יגביר הסיכוי להתקדמות במרכיבים האחרים של היוזמה ובמיוחד - הדיאלוג עם הפלסטינים וקיום הבחירות (הנושא הדומיננטי נותר מצב המלחמה שנכפה ע"י הערבים, יצר וקיים את הבעייה הפלסטינית). - ללא התקדמות בסוגיית הדיאלוג והבחירות, ארה"ב תיאלץ לשקול האלטרנטיבות לקידום התהליך.

ג. אש"פ

- אש"פ לא יכול להיות צד למו"מ הן ישירות והן בעקיפין.

- טענה זו אינה מקובלת על ישראל זו גישה מסוכנת עקרונית ומעשית.

- שום תהליך שלום רציני לא יוכל להיפתח כאשר יש מעורבות של אש"פ אפילו ברקע המרוחק. אש"פ אינו מייצג את הפלסטינים. יש ליצור אוירה קומית ובינ"ל שתעודד פלסטינים הדוחים את גישת אש"פ לצאת קדימה. עמדת ארה"ב בסוגיה זו - בעלת חשיבות קריטית.

ד. משלחת פלסטינית

- יוזמתנו לא מכוונת לפלסטינים מחוץ לשטחים.

- כל צעד שנועד לכלול תושבים של י-ם בדיאלוג יציב מיידית במרכז את מעמד י-ם ויביא לעצירת התהליך. התעקשות אש"פ על הכללת אנשים מן החוץ (מגורשים או אחרים) משקפת את תביעתם ל"זכות השיבה" (שפירושה סיכון קיומנו) ולכן לא נוכל לקבל הצעה זו. - נשקול באהדה השתתפות כל פלסטיני המתגורר בשטחים ושאינו מעורב בטרור. מועמדים לדיאלוג על סדרי הבחירות יכולים להישקל על בסיס: שם אחר שם.

אבי גיל

69 מס' 1

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

4 ביולי 1990
103.01

78491

- שמור -

הנדון: תגובות ראשוניות למכתב רוה"מ לנשיא ארה"ב

1. שה"ח בייקר הבהיר במסיבת עתונאים (28/6) כי המכתב מאת רה"מ מקיף שורה רחבה של נושאים ויש ללמדו בדקדקנות ובזהירות..."לו המכתב היה לחלוטין דפינטיבי - לא היה צורך ללמוד אותו". בייקר ציין כי אין מדובר בסוגיה קלה "שחור ולבן".

- הנשיא בוש השיב לעתונאים (29/6) כי ניתוחו של המכתב רק החל ולכן אין ביכולתו להגיב. הנשיא הביע תקווה כי בתשובת רוה"מ תימצא דרך "שתאפשר לנו לחדש השיחות. הדבר חיוני כי הסטטוס-קוו איננו קביל על איש". הנשיא הדגיש כי אם יתברר שידי ארה"ב כבולות בנסיונה לקדם את גישת בייקר..."נחזור לשולחן השרטוט מאחר שאיננו מתכוונים לשבת כאן ולא לעשות דבר".

- בראיון נוסף לעיתונים אירופאים המתפרסם ב - 29/6, אומר בוש כי: "יש לקחת בחשבון שלממשלה בישראל יש כיום קשיים...אינני בטוח שהפתרון טמון בלחצים...ישראל - אחת מבעלות בריתנו החשובות ביותר...קורה שאין הסכמה עם ידידים על דרכי הפעולה...מדובר בנושא טעון רגשות..."

2. התגובות הראשונות בתקשורת היו שליליות.
- הכותרת לדיווח כתב רוייטר בישראל (כבר ב - 28.6):
SHAMIR REBUFFS U.S. PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE. ("שמיר הציב תנאים שהם בלתי קבילים על הפלסטינים ובלתי פופלאריים בוושינגטון").

- הכותרת "בניו יורק טיימס" (ג'ואל ברינקלי 29/6):
"SHAMIR AGAIN OPPOSES U.S ON PLANS FOR MIDEAST TALKS". ("שמיר שוב סרב לקבל 2 הפשרות האמריקניות, שפלסטינים רבים קיבלו כדרך להתחלת השיחות").

- הכותרת "בוושינגטון-פוסט" (ג'קסון דיל 29/6):
SHAMIR REJECTS U.S PEACE TALK PLAN.

על רקע זה הינחו יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת ודובר המשרד את השגרירות לשלול פרשנות זו ולהציג המכתב כתגובה חיובית בעיקרה. טון דיווחי הסוכנויות השתפר בהמשך.

יצויין שבעתוני יום א' כמעט ולא היה איזכור של הנושא.

עפ"י התקשורת האמריקנית גורמי ממשל מתבטאים בשיחות פרטיות כי אגרת רוה"מ הותירה סדק צר מאוד של תקווה. עם זאת, הנטייה המסתמנת אינה לנתק מגע אלא לגשת לסיבוב הבהרות נוסף.

3. מרבית הארגונים היהודיים בארה"ב פנו לממשל ולהביע שביעות רצון מתגובת בייקר ודוברי ממשל אחרים למכתב רוה"מ.

אבי גיל

BUSH JOINS CALL TO REPEAL U.N. "ZIONISM" RESOLUTION
(Signs Resolution on Renouncing 1975 U.N. Action)

Washington -- President George Bush June 29 signed a congressional resolution calling for the repeal of the 1975 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism to be "a form of racism."

In signing Senate Joint Resolution 246, Bush said in a statement that the administration continues to work actively for the renunciation of the "pernicious" proposition.

He underscored U.S. determination in working for peace in the Middle East and again urged both Palestinians and Israelis to redouble their efforts to achieve a lasting peace -- based upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 -- that would guarantee Israeli security and Palestinian political rights.

The following is the text of the president's statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

I have today signed S.J. Res. 246, a joint resolution of Congress "calling upon the United Nations to repeal General Assembly Resolution 3379," which declared Zionism to be "a form of racism and racial discrimination." S.J. Res. 246 requests the President to report periodically to the Congress on progress made to repeal the resolution.

The United States vigorously opposed the 1975 adoption of the pernicious proposition, in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3379, that Zionism is a form of racism. We continue to work actively for its renunciation. It is long overdue that all of the member states of the United Nations join us in renouncing UNGA Resolution 3379.

For these reasons, I wholly agree with the sentiments underlying this congressional repudiation of a totally counterproductive UNGA resolution. By signing S.J. Res. 246, I add my full endorsement as President of the United States, and the person charged by the Constitution with maintaining the foreign relations of this Nation, to this otherwise nonbinding expression of congressional sentiment.

At this time, I also want to reaffirm U.S. determination to pursue efforts toward a comprehensive, just, and lasting Middle East peace. In our view, this peace must be achieved on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. It must provide for Israel's security and recognition and for Palestinian political rights. We strongly hope that Israelis, Palestinians, and the Arab states will take the necessary steps to create an environment in which a viable peace process can thrive.

(END TEXT)
NNNN

The man who runs what the human rights group Middle East Watch calls "one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in power today" has designs on immortality....

THE WASHINGTON TIMES, ANDREW BOROWIEC:

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein appears to be pushing the Middle East to the brink of war with his repeated threats to retaliate against Israeli military action against any Arab country.

Experts here believe Mr. Hussein sees himself as new leader of the Arab world, mixing a grotesque personality cult at home with the image of a saber-rattling Arab warrior backed by a vast array of conventional and unconventional weaponry.

The latest assessment followed an interview with Mr. Hussein by the Wall Street Journal in which the Iraqi leader reiterated his threats against Israel and said another war in the Middle East is "inevitable" unless the United States blocks what he described as Israel's "aggressive policies...."

The latest warnings by Mr. Hussein come at a time when Israel, Egypt and Jordan are making efforts to organize arms-control talks before the situation in the Middle East deteriorates further.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, PHILIP SHENON IN TEHERAN:

An Iranian official involved in diplomatic affairs said June 28 that Iran was unlikely to provide further help to the United States in obtaining the freedom of American hostages in Lebanon and that "the level of hostilities" was rising.

The official also criticized the level of the American contribution to relief efforts after last week's devastating earthquake in northwestern Iran.
"Your government gave only 295,000 dollars," he said, speaking with two American reporters he had invited to meet with him. He described the sum as so small that it was "funny."

The official has access to information from senior levels of the government of President Hashemi Rafsanjani, but he did not say who in the faction-riven government shared his views.

He spoke on condition he not be identified, and did not say why he insisted on anonymity.
But the official insisted the fate of American hostages in Lebanon was an issue separate from earthquake aid.
The Iranian said there was still a desire in his government to improve relations with Washington but added, "The field is not ready right now."
(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
NNNN

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אאאא,חוזם:27427
אל:רהמש/1165
מ-:פרנציסקו,נר:49,תא:260690,זח:1120,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבבב
שמור מיידי

מנהל מצפא

דע:סמנכל צפא,מז'אר,לשכת שה'ח שגרירות וושינגטון

שיחה עם סגן הנשיא דן קוייל

א.סגן הנשיא השתתף באירוע סגור למען מבצע אקסודוס (גיוס כספים עבור העליה הסובייטית) בסקרמנטו. נמנתי על הועדה המצומצמת שקיבלה אותו בסקרמנטו והזדמן לי לשוחח במשך כמה דקות על יחסינו.

סגן הנשיא העיר:

אא.יחסי ארהב ישראל חזקים,מושתתים על אינטרסים וערכים משותפים.קוויל התייחס לישראל כאל בעלת ברית אסטרטגית של ארה'ב.

אב.הודה בקיום חילוקי דעות אך הדגיש כי אין בהם כדי לערער היחסים המורכבים הטובים בין שתי המדינות

אג.ישנה סקרנות רבה בוושינגטון לגבי שה'ח החדש של ישראל.וושינגטון לדברי קוייל יודעת מעט מאוד לגבי דוד לוי.

אד.בשיחות סגורות בין בוש לגורבצוב לא השמיע המנהיג הסובייטי שום איומים לגבי המשך העליה לישראל ולא התנה אותה בהתחייבויות ישראליות כלשהן.הממשל מאמין כי גורבצוב לא יעשה מאומה שלא ישרת את האינטרס שלו לזכות בהקלות במסחר עם ארה'ב.

ב.הודיתי לסגן הנשיא על דבריו ועל ידידותו לישראל. קוייל השיב IT IS COMING FROM MY HEART

קני טל

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,@(רם),
אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן,גובריין,מזאר

ססס

אאאא,חוזם:25667
אל:רהמש/1066
מ-:המשרד,תא:260690,זח:1712,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי/מיידי

אל: וושינגטון השגריר

מא'צ עם עם בראון :

1). אמר שבוושינגטון מצפים להגעת שדר התשובה של ראה'מ עד סוף החודש. אולם הוסיף מייד שאין הם מאיצים בנו להחיש שיגורו בהבינם משקלו של השדר והשלכותיו האפשריות בפרשת דרכים זו. העיר שדברי סם לואיס בטלביזיה בליל שבת רמזו נאמנה על עמדת וציפיות הממשל בקשר לישראל והתהליך המדיני.

2). סיפרתי לבראון שקיבלנו בקשה ממשלת בולביה להדריך את משטרתה בלוחמת סמים. בידינו בקשות דומות משתי מדינות אמלטיות נוספות. אמרתי כי אנו שוקלים הבקשה באהדה כשלנגד עיננו גם תרומת ישראל למלחמה בסמים, ושותפות במאמץ למנוע חדירתם לארה'ב.

בנצור

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:26554
אל:רהמש/1112
מ-:המשרד,תא:270690,זח:1334,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון
ערן

שלך 2132 לשה'ח

עפ'י הנחית שה'ח הנך מתבקש להמנע מהידברות עם רוס על מועד פגישת שה'ח-בייקר. כאשר יבשילו התנאים לפגישה נשכיל לפעול להסדרתה.

בנצור

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

ססס

מברק נכנס מסווג

אאאא,חוזם:24589
אל:רהמש/1011
מ-:רוש,נר:2132,תא:250690,זח:1230,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/ בהול לבוקר

אל: שר החוץ

מאת: עודד ערן

משיחה עם דניס רוס.

(השיחה התקיימה טלפונית ב-10:30)

א. אמר שיגיבו בחיוב בתדרוך של טטוילר על דברי שר השיכון והבינוי לגבי הפנית העולים ויאמרו שזו HOPEFULL DEVELOPMENT. שאלתי כיצד זה ישפיע על הערבויות למלווה לבנית שיכונים ואמר, שאמנם אין כל קשר בין הדברים, אך ימתינו לראות כיצד יתגלגלו הדברים לגבי תשובת ישראל לאיגרת בוש.

אמרתי שהם יוצרים כאן LINKAGE שלא היה קיים והדברים על אף שא, רוס אומר לי שאין קשר ביניהם, יראו כלחץ על ישראל. רוס אמר שהוא מקבל דברי ומחר בפגישתו עם השגריר ארד, ינסו לגבש את הרשימה המדויקת של בקשותיהם בנושא לפני האישור הסופי של מתן הערבויות.

ב. לגבי התשובה לאיגרת בוש אמר שהם מבינים את ההתלבטויות, אך היו רוצים שבתשובה תהיה התייחסות ואפילו כללית האומרת כי ישראל מבינה את גישתה של ארה'ב לענין המשלחת הפלשתינית לדיאלוג וכי היא תעשה מאמץ לתת תשובה לדאגות (CONCERNS) ארה'ב בנקודה זו.
רוס אמר שזו כמובן לא התשובה האופטימלית שאותה היו רוצים לקבל, אך היא תאפשר המשך הדיאלוג בינינו לבינם. באשר לפגישה בין שה'ח והמזכיר אמר רוס, שעל אף שהוא עדיין לא דן על כך עימו, הוא בדיעה שלאור לוח זמנים צפוף של המזכיר ביולי (נסיעות ללונדון, לפריז, למפגש ה-7 בהיוסטון ולאסיה) - מפגש בפריז בסביבות ה-17/7 הוא המעשי ביותר.

ג. אש'פ - מצרים

רוס אמר שלא מינו את בריטניה או כל גורם אחר להיות המקשר בינם לבין אש'פ, אך כמובן שאם מישהו יבוא לדווח להם על אש'פ, עמדותיו וכו', הם לא יטרקו את הדלת בפניו. חזר על הידוע לנו, היינו, שמובארק התקשר לבוש וביקשו לאפשר למגיד ואל-באז לבוא לוושינגטון ע''מ להציג רעיונות מצרים לגבי ההמשך ולשמוע מה הן כוונות המימשל. לגבי אלו אמר, שבשלב זה יציגו רק את הקווים הכלליים של איגרת בוש לראה'מ וכי הם ממתינים לתשובה.

ערן

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

ססס

23859:דדתת,אאאא
996/ותתת:אא
אב:אמתת,תתתת:-מ
,יב:אב,מ:תת,1418:תד,240690:את,תתתת:-מ
ד
מדרפ מבבמ מאמד
מדרפ/מבבמ
אא תתבבת
אאא מבבב,ב אבא ידבד,ד.
ד.פ ב'תת אב ,י מ ב'תץ מתיבדדי בב,מ ש,י מד, אדמ,ב:
ב'תתא מבבב,ב אבא ידבד,ד.

PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCED JUNE 20 THE SUSPENSION OF THE U.S. PLO DIALOGUE. HIS STATEMENT PROVIDES THE REASONS FOR THIS ACTION AS WELL AS RELEVANT BACKGROUND ON THE DIALOGUE ITSELF.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO STRESS OUR HOPE THAT NO ONE WILL SEIZE UPON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TODAY TO ERECT NEW OBSTACLES IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE OR TO AVOID TAKING DECISIONS TO MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE.

IN THIS REGARD,THE U.S. IS DETERMINED TO PURSUE EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN OUR VIEW THIS SETTLEMENT MUST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, AND PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS.

OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO HAD CONTRIBUTED POSITIVELY TOWARD THIS END. AND IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DO MORE IN THE FUTURE. BUT IT CANNOT DO SO IF THE PLO DOES NOT LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS. OUR CREDIBILITY, AS WELL AS THE PLO'S IS AT STAKE.

AT THE SAME TIME, OUR DIALOGUE HAS RESTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PLO WILL ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS IT ACCEPTED WHEN WE BEGAN OUR DIALOGUE IN DECEMBER 1988. WE ARE PREPARED TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE PENDING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE PLO OF STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM , IN PARTICULAR THE MAY 30 PLF ATTACK.

IN THE MEANTIME , WE URGE ALL PARTIES INTERESTED IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO COUNSEL RESTRAINT AND URGE THAT ALL SIDES AVOID FURTHER VIOLENCE AND PROVOCATIONS. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO START A REAL DIALOGUE FOR PEACE
, AND ALL PARTIES SHOULD DIRECT THEIR ENERGIES TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE.
WE ARE PREPARED TO PUSH HARD FOR PEACE, BUT WE CANNOT DO

IT ALONE.

דדתת
אבגדה:מבבב,מבבב,מ(בבא),מבבא,מבבב,מבבב,ב/מבבד,בא,
מ(אבא),מבב,מבבב,מ(בבא),תבבא,אבגא

אאאא,חוזם:29122
אל:רהמש/1229
מ-:המשרד,תא:290690,זח:1358,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי מיידי

וושינגטון הממונה

א.בשיחה עם השגריר בראון אתמול (27) התייחסתי ל-TALKING POINTS שמסר ב-24 דנא (חוזם 23859 של סמנכ'ל צפ'א).

ב.אמרתי כי הרוח הנושבת מן הנייר מטרידה,וזאת בנקודות אחדות:

1.ראשית,ארה'ב קובעת כאן את הבסיס להסדר שלום במזה'ת בהחלטות מועביט 242 ו-338 והעקרון של 'שטחים תמורת שלום'.בחינת 'עיקר שכחתי',אין צל צלו של רמז לקמפ דיויד,שעוד ב-20.4.82,ערב פינוי סיני, התחייבה ארה'ב חגיגית במכתב הנשיא רייגן לראש הממשלה בגין בהקשר למחויבות אליו בתהליך.

2.קמפ דיויד מחייב בודאי את השותפות לו:ישראל,מצרים וארה'ב ואי אפשר להתעלם ממנו,כיוון שהדבר מטיל צל על אמינות הסכמים עתידיים.

3.המסמך יוצר 'איזון' בין בטחון ישראל ל'זכויות הפוליטיות' של הפלסטינאים.למה כוונת ארה'ב ב'זכויות' אלה שכזכור כונו בעבר בשם 'זכויות לגיטימיות'?

4.ארה'ב קובעת כי הדיאלוג עם אש'פ 'תרם תיובית' למטרה זו.במה?

5.אפשר להוסיף עוד:החשוב הוא הרוח,ועלינו לפעול יחד לחיוביותה.

רובינשטיין

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,@(רם),
אמן,ממד,סולטן,סייבל,בנצור,מצפא

ססס

דחיפות: מ.ל. דחוף	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פברוק	קד: 1 פתוח: 2
סווג: סמ"ל		
תאריך וזמן תעבור: 21.6.90	אל: מנהל מצפ"א	
כס' פברוק: הפשרד:	דע:	
1/2 1403	פאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון	

הודעות בוש ובייקר

להלן מתוך ניתוח שנעשה בדיון בשגרירות:

א. ניתוק הדיאלוג

תאמירת חחד משמעית ביותר אולי חיא של בייקר על המטוס לאירופה "חזרנו לאמיתו של דבר לסטטוס קוו שלפני 1988".

ב. לגבי התנאים לחידושו הנשיא מציב שלושה כאלו: א. גינוי, ב. התנערות, ג. התחלה של נקיטת באמצעים משמעתיים כנגד אבו אלעבאס. בוש עצמו קובע שהתנאי השני שהתמלא אינו מספיק. ראוי גם להדגיש את הקונטקסט האידיאולוגי שבו שם בייקר את ההחלטה ואת הקשר שהוא עושה בין תהליך השלום והטרור. "... We really could not let our pursuit of peace stand in the way of our commitment to fight terrorism"

למשפט זה יהיו להערכתנו משמעות ושימוש רבים בעתיד הקרוב. צריך לציין כי הנשיא אומר כי ייחדש את הדיאלוג על אף דעתה של ישראל ומציין שגם כמה פלסטינאים היו מודאגים מדיאלוג זה.

ב. מקום אש"ם בתהליך השלום

יחד עם זאת גם הנשיא וגם המזכיר מדגישים את חשיבות הדיאלוג ותרומתו לתהליך. הנשיא ציין "On balance we believe that these exchanges contributed to progress on the P.L.O"

ואילו בייקר הסביר את החשיבות באומרו: "I think everyone recognizes that without a recognition there won't be a dialogue partner for Israel"

למשפט זה משמעות חמורה משום שהוא למעשה מפקיד את המפתח להמשך הדיאלוג בידי אש"ם ויש בו מעין מתן לגיטימציה לאי הוסעתם של פליסטינאים לדיאלוג. גם בוש וגם בייקר מציינים כי ישראל אינה מתבקשת לשבת לשולחן הדיונים עם אש"פ ובייקר מוסיף כי ארה"ב תיתח ועדיין נכונה לתת ערבויות בכתב בנקודה זו. לתשומת לב ראוית גם הרעת המחמאות על ערפאת מצד הנשיא וציון מצעדים החיוביים שבהם נקט כביכול.

[illegible]

תפוצה: [illegible]

END

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פברק	דף: 2 פתון: 2
סווג:		
תאריך וזמן חעבור:	אל:	
כס' פברק: הפסרד: 2/2 1463	דע:	
	פאת:	

ג. התנחלויות וערבויות

נקודה זו בולטת בדברי הנשיא והוא חוזר עליה שלוש פעמים כאשר באחת מהן הוא מדגיש ההתנגדות להתנחלויות חדשות ולמימונן. הנשיא גם נדרש לענין הערבויות למימון בניית השיכונים וענה בחיוב לשאלה האם לבקש ממשלת ישראל ערבויות שלא ינתנו כספים לעולים מבריה"מ שיתישבו בשטחים. הנוסח של הנשיא בנקודה זו מבולבל למדי אך מגמתו הכללית ברורה.

ד. התהליך

בוש ובייקר ציינו את מכתב הנשיא לרוה"מ בדבר הרצון להמשיך בתהליך לקראת חדיאלוג בין ישראל והפלסטינאים, הנשיא גם מציין 'And it is going to be difficult for him [Shamir] but it must go forward. And it must go forward along the original..... the lines of what ~~the~~ originally was the Shamir plan"

בייקר בתידרוכו מציין כי היה רוצה לראות תשובת "כן" לשאלתו, שלה, כפי שהוא עצמו מציין ניתן פומבי בעדותו בביהנ"ב.

ה. הערות כלליות:

1. בשני התידרוכים ובמיוחד אצל הנשיא בולטת מחד התחיסות תחד משמעית לטרור אבל גם הרצון לראות את אש"פ נוקט במינימום המתבקש כדי לכונן חדיאלוג מחדש עלאף ידיעת עמדתה של מ"מ ישראל בנקודה זו.
2. מאידך הצבת התנאים בפומבי על אף ניסוחם הכוללני תקשה על נסיגת הממשל מעמדתו הנוכחית לעצם חידוש הדיאלוג.
3. אצל הנשיא והמזכיר בולט כמובן הרצון לחדש הדיאלוג תוך נסיון ליצור הרושם כאילו הנקודה המקשה על ישראל להתקדם בתהליך היא כביכול חששה של ישראל שתאולץ לשבת לשולחן הדיונים אם אש"פ ותוך הבעת נכונות לתת תשובה לחשש זה.
4. אצל הנשיא בולטת כאמור ההתיחסות החוזרת על עצמת בענין ההתנחלויות.

ערן

תפוצה:

END

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס מברק	דף: 1 מתוך: 3
סווג: שמור		
תאריך ושעת תצור: 21.6.90	אל: מצטייא	
כט' מברק: 1380	דע:	
	מאת: ק. לקונגרס	

החלטת הסנט - דיאלוג עם אשיים

1. מצייל התקון להחלטה, בעקבות החלטת הנשיא להשעות הדיאלוג. התיקון אושר היום ע"י ועדת החוץ.
2. 50 סנטורים חתמו על התקון לפני הגשתו לחצבעה בועדה.
3. הכדור למעשה בידי מנהיג הרוב ג'ורג' מיטצ'ל חעלול להימנע מהגשה להצבעה במליאת הסנט עקב השעיית הדיאלוג, או עשוי להגיש להצבעה כדי לשבח הנשיא ולהגיש את נחרצות הסנט בנדון.

יורם אטינגר

[illegible]

תפוצה: -7-

2

2/3 1380

AMENDMENT NO. _____ EX. _____ Calendar No. ___

Purpose: To commend President Bush for suspending the US-PLO dialogue

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES -- 101 CONG. 2ND SESSION
S. Con. Res. 138
H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____)

(title) _____

( ) Referred to the Committee on _____ and ordered to be printed
( ) Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

Intended to be proposed by Mr. _____

Viz:

1. At the end of the Preamble, add the following:

"Whereas on June 20, 1990 President Bush, recognizing the failure of the PLO to abide by its commitment to renounce terrorism, suspended the dialogue between the United States and the PLO."

2. Strike all in (3) of the Resolved Clause through "the United States should suspend its dialogue with the PLO" and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"President Bush is commended for suspending United States dialogue with the PLO and should continue the suspension"

3/3 1386

3

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 138--REQUESTING CERTAIN ACTIONS BY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Mr. MACK, for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. NICKLES) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 138

Whereas, Section 1302 of Public Law 99-83 states that "no officer or employees of the United States Government . . . shall negotiate with the PLO or any representatives thereof . . . unless and until the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism";

Whereas, on May 30, 1990, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a member organization of the PLO, attempted a terrorist attack against Israel;

Whereas, the leadership of the PLO has yet to condemn the May 30 terrorist attempt or to expel PLF leader Abul Abbas from PLO's Executive Committee; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) declares that—

(1) the PLO should condemn the May 30 PLF attack on Israel;

(2) the PLO should expel PLF leader Abul Abbas from the PLO Executive Committee given his role in the attack; and

(3) if these PLO actions are not taken in the immediate future, the United States should suspend its dialogue with the PLO until the PLO has fully demonstrated by concrete actions, including condemning the recent attack and expelling Abul Abbas from its Executive Committee, the PLO's commitments to recognize Israel's right to exist and renounce the use of terrorism.

Current cosponsors: (~~41~~) ~~47~~ 50

Republicans (~~19~~) 23

Connie Mack
Charles Grassley
Don Nickles
Pete Wilson
Arlen Specter
Trent Lott
William Cohen
Phil Gramm
Bob Packwood
Dan Coats
John Warner
John McCain
Slade Gorton
David Durenberger
Larry Pressler
Alfonse D'Amato
Conrad Burns
Warren Rudman
Christopher Bond
Mitch McConnell
Malcolm Wallop
JESSE HELMS
GORDON HUMPHREY

Democrats (~~22~~) 27

Joseph Lieberman
Frank Lautenberg
George Mitchell
Bob Graham
Howard Metzenbaum
Alan Cranston
Alan Dixon
Dennis DeConcini
John Kerry
David Boren
Tom Harkin
Herb Kohl
Brock Adams
J. James Exon
Albert Gore
Charles Robb
Daniel Akaka
Daniel Inouye
Claiborne Pell
John Breaux
John Rockefeller
Daniel Moynihan
Richard Bryan
Kent Conrad
Carl Levin
Sam Nunn
PAUL SIMON

אאאא,חוזם:25239
אל:רהמש/1047
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:248,תא:220690,זח:1404,דח:מ,סג:בל, @
בבבב
להלן עבור יועץ רהמ טרור

בלמ"ט/מיידי

אל : מצפ'א

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ, מע"ת, הסברה,יועץ רוה'מ לתקשורת,
יועצת שה'ח לתקשורת, יועץ שהב'ט לתקשורת, לע'מ, פר'נ,
מזא'ר, אמ'ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק. @

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

בהמשך למברקנו נר 1378 ו-1379 מיום 21.6.90,

למען הסדר הטוב שולחים בשנית עותק מ"ודר וקריא של דברי
המזכיר בייקר בתדרוך לעתונאים בחניית הביניים באירלנד.

NOTE: PORTIONS ON BACKGROUND ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL.

Q CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS? THE PRESIDENT SAID 'AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF MY SECRETARY OF STATE,' SO HE POINTS A FINGER AT YOU, SO WHY DON'T WE GO THROUGH THAT IN A PUBLIC RECORD KIND OF SENSE ABOUT WHAT THE CONSULTATIONS WERE AND WHEN YOU MADE THE DECISION.@

SEC. BAKER: IF YOU GO BACK AND LOOK AT WHAT I SAID IN THE COURSE OF TESTIMONY TWICE LAST WEEK, THAT OUGHT TO GIVE IT TO YOU PRETTY CLEARLY, BECAUSE I RAN THROUGH THE EVENTS THAT TRANSPIRED ON THE 30TH OF MAY, WHAT WE HAD DONE SINCE THEN, WHAT WE'D DONE UP UNTIL THE TIME OF THE TESTIMONY. THERE WERE NO DRAMATIC EVENTS THAT OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TIME OF MY TESTIMONY AND TODAY. BUT THREE WEEKS HAVE GONE BY, DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH WE HAD HOPED TO SEE A CLEAR CONDEMNATION OF THIS SPECIFIC INCIDENT, AS I INDICATED IN MY TESTIMONY. AND AS THE PRESIDENT INDICATED, I THINK, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS IN ALABAMA, WE STILL HOPE THAT WE WILL SEE THAT AND THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THIS DIALOGUE -- WHICH IS WHAT IT IS, NOT A CANCELLATION OR A TERMINATION, BUT A SUSPENSION -- CAN BE REVOKED. BUT THAT WILL DEPEND UPON WHETHER OR NOT WE RECEIVE THE ASSURANCES THAT WE'VE LAID OUT THERE FOR ALL TO SEE. SO THAT WE KNOW THAT THE COMnITMENT TOWARD RENUNCIATION OF ETERRORISMF IS FIRM AND CONTINUING AND LASTING.

Q. FIRST OF ALL, WAS THE PLO INFORMED IN TUNIS OF THIS DECISION IN ADVANCE AND CAN YOU GIVE US -- IF THEY

WERE, WHAT THEIR REACTION WAS -- AND DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE THAT THEY ARE ANY CLOSER TO MEETING THE STANDARDS THAT YOU LAID OUT?

SEC. BAKER: I'M GOING TO LET THEM GIVE YOU THEIR REACTION. I'M SURE THAT THERE WILL BE A REACTION BY THEM AND FROM THEM. THEY WERE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE, AS WERE OTHERS, THAT IS, NOTIFIED, SO THAT THEY DIDN'T LEARN OF IT FIRST THROUGH PRESS.

Q. IT'S NEVER BEEN CLEAR TO ME DID THE ADMINISTRATION WANT SOMETHING PUBLIC FROM THEM, WOULD IT HAVE BEEN GOOD ENOUGH IF THEY HAD GIVEN THEIR ASSURANCES PRIVATELY THAT YOU WERE LOOKING FOR? AND ALSO, HAVE WE MISSED SOMETHING? FOR INSTANCE, WHAT THEY PUT OUT THROUGH THE IRAQI -- THROUGH BAGHDAD LAST WEEK? DID THEY COME ANY CLOSER PRIVATELY THAN WE'RE AWARE OF FROM WHAT THEY SAID PUBLICLY?

SEC. BAKER: IF THEY HAD, IT'S NOT SOMETHING I WOULD GET INTO HERE, AND OBVIOUSLY WHAT WE WERE SEEKING WAS A CLEAR, PUBLIC RENUNCIATION OF THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT.

Q. -- TRY AGAIN AFTER YOUR PUBLIC TESTIMONY? DID THEY FINE-TUNE IN ANY WAY? WE KNOW WHERE THINGS STOOD WHEN YOU TESTIFIED. @

SEC. BAKER: I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO A LOT OF FURTHER DETAIL, I THINK IT'S PRETTY CLEAR HOW IT'S ALL UNFOLDED.

Q DID YOU GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO NOT RECOMMENDING THIS STEP BASED ON SOME OF THE ADVICE THAT YOU HAD GOTTEN ABOUT THE UTILITY OF KEEPING UP CONTACTS AND IF YOU DID -- WHETHER YOU DID NOT NOT -- TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN THIS DECISION, SINCE NOTHING IS HAPPENING ANYWAY?

SEC. BAKER: I THINK I REALLY SPOKE TO THAT AT LENGTH IN MY PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND I SAID THAT WE REALLY COULD NOT LET OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE STAND IN THE WAY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO FIGHT TERRORISM. BECAUSE IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS A RESORT TO TERRORISM WOULD WORK TO UNDERMINE ANY PEACE PROCESS THAT WAS UNFOLDING. AND THAT'S OUR VIEW, I STATED THAT QUITE CLEARLY, I THINK, IN TESTIMONY TWO DAYS RUNNING.

Q. WHAT ADVICE TO THE CONTRARY OF BREAKING OFF THE CONTACT?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, AGAIN, I SPOKE TO THAT BY SAYING THAT THE NATIONS FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES HAD ENCOURAGED US, FIRST OF ALL, NOT TO RUSH THINGS, AND I THINK THAT IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT. WE WENT ABOUT THIS IN A MEASURED AND DELIBERATE WAY.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: LET ME GO ON BACKGROUND AND SAY THAT I THINK THAT YOU WILL PROBABLY SEE IN REACTIONS FROM SOME NATIONS, THAT THEY EVEN SO, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT PERHAPS WE HADN'T TAKEN THIS ACTION. BUT THAT'S FOR THEM TO SAY, REALLY.

Q. IN TERMS OF REACTION DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIVE THAT THERE MIGHT BE TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICAN TARGETS AS A RESULT OF THIS DECISION?

SEC. BAKER: NOT SPECIFIC -- NOT ANYTHING SPECIFIC. WE WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE NOT. BUT AGAIN, AS I SAID IN TURNBERRY, WHEN I WAS QUESTIONED ON WHERE WE WERE AND WHAT WE MIGHT ULTIMATELY DO, I MADE THE POINT, I THINK, THERE, THAT TERRORISM IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE HAVE IN THE PAST SEEN MANY AMERICANS VICTIMIZED BY IT.

Q IS THERE ANY CONCERN TO WHAT THIS DOES TO THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK? DOESN'T THIS LEAVE HIM SOMEWHAT EMPTY-HANDED AND PLAY TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SADDAM HUSSAYN?

SEC. BAKER: THERE WAS CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO WHAT COULD BE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AS I TESTIFIED -- I THINK THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE MENTIONED THIS TODAY DOWN IN ALABAMA -- THAT WOULD RUN TO THOSE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO PROMOTE A DIALOGUE -- TO EGYPT, TO MODERATE PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE BEEN SUPPORTIVE AND THAT'S UNFORTUNATE. BUT AGAIN, WE CANNOT LET OUR DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARD PEACE INHIBIT OR DILUTE OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO FIGHT TERRORISM, BECAUSE IF WE DID, WE'D END UP WITH A PROCESS THAT WOULD BE UNDERMINED BY TERRORISM.

Q. CAN I FOLLOW UP ON THAT, PLEASE? ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT THROUGHOUT THE REGION THAT THE MODERATES ARE LOSING CONTROL, THAT THE EXTREMISTS ARE ON THE RISE -- BOTH ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND THE ARAB SIDE --

SEC. BAKER: THERE ARE A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT. I THINK, AGAIN, I DIDN'T ANSWER THAT SPECIFIC QUESTION IN TESTIMONY, BUT I DID SAY THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION WAS -- I THINK I EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE COURSE OF MY TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE. I THINK THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO THAT AS WELL TODAY WHEN HE DEPLORED THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. LET ME SAY ONE FINAL THING, AND I WANT TO REPEAT WHAT I SAID IN TESTIMONY -- WE CAN'T MAKE IT HAPPEN, WE CAN'T IMPOSE IT. THE PARTIES IN THE REGION HAVE TO WANT IT. WE CAN'T WANT IT ANY MORE THAN THEY DO. THAT'S WHAT IT REALLY BOILS DOWN TO.

Q. ARE YOU AT ALL HOPEFUL THAT PERHAPS YOU CAN REENGAGE WITH THE PLO ANY TIME SOON?

SEC. BAKER: ARE WE HOPEFUL? WE'VE LAID OUT QUITE CLEARLY OUR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO WHAT IT WOULD TAKE AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE ACTIONS THAT WE'VE ASKED OR SUGGESTED WOULD BE TAKEN, SO THAT WE COULD RESUME THE DIALOGUE. BECAUSE WE DO THINK, AGAIN AS THE PRESIDENT SAID TODAY, THAT THE DIALOGUE CAN BE HELPFUL IN TERMS OF ULTIMATELY MOVING TOWARD A PEACE PROCESS. I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR, AS I SAID IN TESTIMONY, WE WEREN'T

SEEKING A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO AND WE WERE QUITE PREPARED, AND REMAIN QUITE PREPARED, TO GIVE WRITTEN ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO THAT. THAT IS NOT THE SAME THING AS SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIALOGUE DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROGRESS WE MADE OR COULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO FUTURE PROGRESS.

AND I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT THAT WE REACHED A POINT BACK IN LATE FEBRUARY OR MARCH, WHERE PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES WERE READY TO COME TO THE TABLE WITH ISRAELIS. AND TO POINT OUT SOMETHING ELSE THAT WE HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS, AND THAT IS THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLO ACQUIESENCE AND PLO APPROVAL. I THINK EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT WITHOUT PLO ACQUIESENCE THERE WON'T BE A DIALOGUE PARTNER FOR ISRAEL. THEY'VE BEEN SEEKING TO DEVELOP ONE FOR 22 YEARS AND NONE HAS COME FORWARD. SO, I THINK THAT POINTS UP THE WAY IN WHICH THIS DIALOGUE COULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARD PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACE PROCE"S.

Q. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TODAY RELEASED A STATEMENT HAILING THIS MOVE AND SAYING THAT NOW AN OBSTACLE TOWARD MOVING FORWARD IN THE PEACE PROCESS HAS BEEN REMOVED. IN FACT, THEY'RE SAYING NOW THAT THERE IS NO DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO WE CAN SOMEHOW MOVE FORWARD. CAN YOU ENVISION ANY WAY THAT YO CAN MOVE FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS -- WHETHER YOUR PLANS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS HAVE BEEN AIDED BY SUSPENDING THIS DIALOGUE?

SEC. BAKER: I HAVEN'T SEEN THE STATEMENT FROM THE ISRAELI EMBASSY BUT FROM THE SOUND OF IT, AS YOU QUOTE IT, IT SOUNDS VERY, VERY POSITIVE.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: LET ME GO ON BACKGROUND AND SAY THAT WE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED IF THAT COULD TRANSLATE INTO ONE SIMPLE WORD -- YES. THERE IS ONE QUESTION OUT THERE, I PUT IT OUT IN MY TESTIMONY, YOU ALL KNOW WHAT IT IS AND IF THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION WERE YES, WE MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO SOME DIALOGUE.

Q. EVEN IF YOU'RE NOT TALKING TO THE PLO ANYMORE?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE.

Q GIVEN WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT NOW, GIVEN WHAT'S HAPPENED TODAY, WHERE DO YOU GO FROM HERE? IT SE DON'T LIKE THE PLO, THEY DON'T LIKE YOU TALKING TO THE PLO, YOU'RE NOT TALKING TO THE PLO. IF YOU'RE NOT TALKING TO THE PLO DON'T THEY BECOME A MORE LIKELY PARTNER IN THE PROCESS?

SEC. BAKER: YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK THEM THAT QUESTION.

Q BASED ON THE EMBASSY STATEMENT -- I HAVEN'T SEEN IT -- WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THE EFFECT OF BREAKING OFF THE DIALOGUE ON THE PEACE PROCESS, SOME OF US THINK THAT HAS A POSITIVE EFFECT.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: LET ME GO ON BACKGROUND AND SAY, WE

HAVEN'T GOTTEN A FORMAL ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION. WE DIDN'T GET A YES, BUT WE HAVEN'T GOTTEN A NO. NOW IF WE GET A NO, WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THE NO?

Q. WHAT EFFECT DO YOU THINK THIS IS GOING TO HAVE ON ARAFAT'S OWN POSITION? WHAT'S YOUR ANALYSIS? DON'T YOU THINK HE'S GOING TO BE WEAKENED INTERNALLY? JUST AS HE FEARED HE WOULD HAVE BEEN HAD HE SAID WHAT HE HAD TO SAY?

SEC. BAKER: I WOULD CERTAINLY FEAR FOR THAT AND I THINK THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY FORCES OF MODERATION WITHIN THE PLO OR AMONG PALESTINIANS GENERALLY ARE WEAKENED, I THINK THAT'S A VERY UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT.

Q. HAVE YOU GOTTEN ANY SORT OF INDICATION FROM THE PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES WHO YOU SAID A FEW MINUTES AGO, WERE READY TO TALK TO THE ISRAELIS IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH -- ARE THEY STILL READY TO TALK TO THE ISRAELIS?

Q. THAT'S ANOTHER QUESTION THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN. I SAID A MINUTE AGO THAT I THINK THAT EVERYBODY WHO'S BEEN CLOSE TO THIS PROCESS, EVERYBODY WHO HAS BEEN DEALING IN THIS AREA FOR YEARS, OR ANY LENGTH OF TIME FOR THAT MATTER, UNDERSTANDS IT'S QUITE UNLIKELY THAT ANY PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL FEEL FREE TO STEP FORWARD FOR A DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL UNLESS THERE IS AT LEAST SOME AQUIESCENCE, SOME TACIT ACQUIESCENCE, BY THE PLO. THAT WILL NOT COME AS A SURPRISE TO ANYONE.

Q. THERE'S ONE SCHOOL OF ARGUMENT THAT BY CUTTING OF (SIC) THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO YOU ESSENTIALLY REWARD THE ABU ABBAS FACTION AND PUNISH THE SO-CALLED MODERATES. THAT ANY TIME ABU ABBAS OR AHMED JIBRIL OR ANY OF THESE GUYS CAN KNOCK THIS OFF, THAT THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THEY WANT TO SEE HAPPEN. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

SEC. BAKER: I THINK THAT IT'S A VERY LEGITIMAT┐ POINT TO THIS AND WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY, I THINK, IS ALL THAT NEED BE DONE IS THAT THE SPECIFIC INCIDENT ITSELF BE CONDEMNED AND THAT THERE BE SOME COMMENCEMENT OF STEPS TOWARD DISCIPLINE. THOSE ARE THE TWO CONDITIONS THAT WE'VE LAID OUT THERE WHICH WE THINK ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT THE RENUNCIATION OF ETERRORISMF CONTINUES.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WROTE TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR. HAS HE HAD ANY CONTACT, WRITTEN OR OTHERWISE, WITH ANY OF THE OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED, WHETHER IT BE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK OR TO ARAFAT?

SEC. BAKER: I'VE ALREADY TOLD YOU THAT A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS WERE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE THAT THIS WAS COMING AND I HAD INDICATED THAT WE SENT THAT NOTIFICATION THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR IN TUNIS AS WELL.

Q. IF THE DIALOGUE IS RESUMED, IS THAT GOING TO BE OOZED INTO? WILL THERE BE ANY FURTHER CONTACT NOW BETWEEN THE

US AND THE PLO AT ANY LEVEL UNTIL SOME ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE REVERSING THIS?

SEC. BAKER: WE ARE REALLY BACK TO A STATUS QUO ANTE OF DECEMBER 1988.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,פרנ,
רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,גרברין,מזאר,ר/מרכז,
ממד,@רם,@(אמן),סולטן,מזתים,@(יועץרהמ/טרור)

ssssss

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון
טופס מברק

בלמ"ס/בהול

זמן חיבור: 10:15

אל: לשכת רה"מ - קשר י-ס: נא העבירו בבהול למקס:
02-~~[illegible]~~
385 491

דע:
(ים העבירו נא)

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב דברים שאמר בייקר בתדרוך לעתונאים באירקנד, ביניהם לגבי, לתשומת ליבכם מזכיר המדינה פנתה בתדריך ואחר"כ מתדריך פקיד בכיר.

עתונות

1378 1/10

Q: -- try again after your public testimony? Did they fine-tune in any way? We know where things stood when you testified.

A: I don't want to go into a lot of further detail, I think it's pretty clear how it's all unfolded.

Q: Did you give serious consideration to not recommending this step based on some of the advice that you had gotten about the utility of keeping up contacts and if you did -- whether you did or not -- to what extent did the current state of the peace process play in this decision, since nothing is happening anyway.

A: I think I really spoke to that at length in my public testimony and I said that we really could not let our pursuit of peace stand in the way of our commitment to fight terrorism. Because in the final analysis a resort to terrorism would work to undermine any peace process that was unfolding. And that's our view, I stated that quite clearly, I think, in testimony two days running.

Q: What about advice to the contrary of breaking off the contact?

A: Well, again, I spoke to that by saying that the a of nations friendly to the United States had encouraged us, first of all, not to rush things, and I think that it's quite clear that we did not. We went about this in a measured and deliberate way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go ON BACKGROUND and say that I think that you will probably see in reactions from some nations, that they even so, would have preferred that perhaps we hadn't taken this action. But that's for them to say, really.

Q: In terms of reaction do you have any reason to believe that there might be terrorism directed against American targets as a result of this decision?

A: Not specific -- not anything specific. We would certainly hope not. But again, as I said in Turnberry, when I was questioned on where we were and what we might ultimately do, I made the point, I think, there, that terrorism is extremely important because we have in the past seen many Americans victimized by it.

Q: Is there any concern to what this does to the position of President Mubarak? Doesn't this leave him somewhat empty-handed and play to the advantage of Saddam Hussein?

A: There was concern with respect to what could be an adverse impact on the peace process, as I testified. I think the President may have mentioned this today down in Alabama -- that would run to those moderate Arab countries that have worked very hard to promote a dialogue -- to Egypt, to moderate Palestinians who have been supportive and that's unfortunate. But again, we cannot let our desire to move forward toward peace inhibit or dilute our firm commitment to fight terrorism, because if we did, we'd end up with a process that would be undermined by terrorism.

1378 3/10

Q: Can I follow up on that, please. Are you concerned that throughout the region that the moderates are losing control, that the extremists are on the rise -- both on the Israeli side and the Arab side --

A: There are a lot of people who have suggested that. I think, again, I didn't answer that specific question in testimony, but I did say that I thought that the situation was -- I think I expressed concern about the situation in the Middle East during the course of my testimony before the House. I think the President spoke to that as well today when he deplored the fact that there is not movement toward peace in the Middle East. Let me say one final thing, and I want to repeat what I said in testimony -- we can't make it happen, we can't impose it. The parties in the region have to want it. We can't want it any more than they do. That's what it all really boils down to.

Q: Are you at all hopeful that perhaps you can reengage with the PLO any time soon?

A: Are we hopeful? We've laid out quite clearly our views with respect to what it would take and we would hope that the actions that we've asked or suggested would be taken, so that we could resume the dialogue. Because we do think, again as the President said today, that the dialogue can be helpful in terms of ultimately moving toward a peace process. I want to make it clear, as I said in testimony, we weren't seeking a dialogue between the Israelis and the PLO and we were quite prepared and remain quite prepared to give written assurances with respect to that. That is not the same thing as saying, however, that the dialogue did not contribute to the progress we made or could not contribute to future progress.

And I think it's important to point out that we reached a point [illegible] late February or March, where Palestinians from the territories were ready to come to the table with Israelis. And to point out something else that we have made very clear throughout this process, and that is there is a difference between PLO acquiescence and PLO approval. I think everyone recognizes that without PLO acquiescence there won't be a dialogue partner for Israel. They've been seeking to develop one for 12 years and none has come forward. So I think that points up the way in which this dialogue could contribute toward progress toward a peace process.

Q: The Israeli embassy in Washington today released a statement calling this move and saying that now an obstacle toward moving forward in the peace process has been removed. In fact, they're saying [illegible] that there is no dialogue between the United States and the PLO so Israel can somehow move forward. Can you envision any way that you can move forward on the peace process -- whether your plans for moving forward on the peace process have been aided by suspending the dialogue?

A: I haven't seen the statement from the Israeli embassy but from the sound of it, as you quote it, it sounds very, very positive.

1378 2/10

Q: That's another question that remains to be seen. I said a minute ago that I think that everybody who's been close to this process, everybody who has been dealing in this area for years, or any length of time for that matter, understands it's quite unlikely that any Palestinians in the territories will feel free to step forward for a dialogue with Israel unless there is at least some acquiescence, some tacit acquiescence, by the PLO. That will not come as a surprise to anyone.

Q: There's one school of argument that by cutting of the dialogue with the PLO you essentially reward the Abu Abbas faction and punish the so-called moderates, that any time Abu Abbas or Ahmed Jibril or any of these guys can knock this off, that this is exactly what they want to see happen. How do you respond to that?

A: I think that it's a very legitimate point to this and what you have to say, I think, is all that need be done is that the specific incident itself be condemned and that there be some commencement of steps toward discipline. Those are the two conditions that we've laid out there which we think are required in order to show that the renunciation of terrorism continues.

Q: You said that the President wrote to Prime Minister Shamir. Has he had any contact written or otherwise, with any of the other parties involved whether it be to President Mubarak or to Arafat?

A: I've already told you that a number of governments were notified in advance that this was coming and I had indicated that we sent that notification through our Ambassador in Tunis as well.

Q: If the dialogue is resumed is that going be zeroed into? Will there be any further contact now between the U.S. and the PLO at any level until some announcement is made reversing this?

A: We are really back to a status quo ante of December 1988.

Q: Can I ask on something else? The East German Prime Minister yesterday made a proposal about a Warsaw Pact-NATO summit meeting to discuss the military status of Germany. Is this something that you would be interested in at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: ON BACKGROUND, because I don't want to be out there dumping on it before he has a chance to run it past us, but it's extraordinarily unlikely that we would be interested in that.

Q: On the two-plus-four meeting, understanding that your experts are still meeting, so the fine-tuning of it is still up in the air -- at the first two-plus-four meeting you had several things that I would categorize as the easy things that you can knock over the wall. Have you pretty much dealt with the easy ones? Do you have some of those which you figure you're going to be able to wrap up in this meeting? And then where do you feel the specific areas of contention are going to be at this one?

1378 6/10

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Staying ON BACKGROUND, we're going to be dealing primarily on this one with questions of the final settlement agreement. There is still, I think, some question about whether some want a peace treaty, whether some might want a peace settlement. Our view is that it ought to be characterized as a final settlement, that is the view as well, we think of the German government. We will be dealing with those issues. We will be dealing with the nature of the final settlement, what kind of a document, who should sign it, when should it be signed, what should be the substantive terms of it.

Q: You have a position on who should sign it, for example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's probably going to be limited -- if they're successful in getting agreement that it should be a final settlement, it should be signed by the four powers and the unified Germany. That's it. You know why the German government doesn't want a peace treaty. It's sort of rubbing their noses in it. They make the point quite logically, I think, that if you had a peace treaty you'd have to have countries like Namibia sign it because they were a part of South Africa when the war was on and South Africa was on the other side.

Q: Do all of the issues of German membership in NATO and troop limitations and all of that, that does not get into the final status?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was about to get into that. Another of the issues that I think will probably be fleshed out here -- bear in mind that I haven't talked to our people, Bob Zoellick or Ray Seitz since they left a day or so ago -- is the question of political/military issues. There could be on the part of some a desire to deal with those issues.

Q: -- a final document --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know are view is that those are issues that are better handled under other fora and that that gets into the question of singularising Germany and German sovereignty. But I think that that would be a point of real difference.

Q: In other words, a real difference between the U.S. and Soviet Union in particular, but the Germans are willing to be flexible on some of these issues in terms of stating membership in alliances and all of that. Without being specific they are willing to get into those issues --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they too share the view that these are not things that ought to be written into a final settlement, but these are things with respect to which there can be assurances properly given outside of such an agreement.

Q: So you still expect the Soviets to press for some kind of pollitical/military inside the two-plus-four document?

1378 7/10

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not really fair to ask me that now because I haven't talked to them in 48 hours and I know that they now have a better feel, but it was our sense -- we knew going into this meeting that the Soviets would likely want to include some political/military issues in the final settlement. That's where we were 36 hours ago.

Q: What's your reaction to something that's floating around out there which would put an overall troop limitation for Europe in the CFE and then say that no nation could have more than 20%, and settle it that way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: That is a suggestion that has been made. There have been other suggestions made about how to settle this -- I'm staying on background on all this -- but this is a matter of great importance to the Soviet Union. They will want to know what is the status of forces in the Central region of Europe is going to be before they acquiesce to a CFE I agreement or on the other hand, agree to the final details of the external aspects of German unification. They're going to want to know the answer to that question. And one approach is the one that you have suggested.

Q: What is your understanding of any progress that Genscher and Shevardnadze made in all these hours of meetings they've had and has there been any progress in Vienna, for instance, in dealing with this issue or any of the other outstanding ones?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think there's been any a lot in Vienna since the last go around. I think they're still working on armour definitions and tanks and equipment.

Q: But hasn't Shevardnadze promised you that he was going to have some either answers to your proposals or some new proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're supposed to be getting someand I'll be very frank and tell you I don't know whether these have come in or not because I haven't been concentrating on that the last week.

Q: Given it's vague at this point, the French/German or German/French idea of an aid package. Can it be said now that the United States or the administration is favorably disposed to some sort of an aid package for the Soviet Union and is there anything about a package you'd like to tell us.

A: Let me repeat some of the things the President said this afternoon, one of which was there's got to be a significant amount of reform in the Soviet Union before any such assistance could be put to good use. There are political problems involved for the United States and issues that we have been talking to the Soviets about for over a year that I spoke about before the Supreme Soviet -- to wit Cuba and other countries. When I testified before the Supreme Soviet there was $15 billion going out to the likes of Cuba, North Vietnam, Cambodia, countries like that, North Korea.

1378 8/10

so that creates an obvious political problem for us. There are as well, and the President didn't speak to this, but there are as well legal problems that we have in the United States. There will be, I think, a full discussion of this at the Economic Summit. The French and the Germans as you pointed out, have indicated they will probably raise it and I think the President said today we'll have a discussion.

Q: Back to the two-plus-four thing -- do you expect Shevardnadze to come this time with some further refinement of this vague notion of Pact to Pact agreement. And a subsidiary question which is does the U.S. think it ought to be signed -- whatever it is, if it turns out to be satisfactory, ought to be signed Pact to Pact or by individual nations or perhaps by all the CFE --

A: You're jumping way ahead by saying it ought to be signed. That's going way to far. I have received the response from him, but I won't get into that.

Q: Do you expect him to bring that up -- that response, at this meeting? Would that be an issue for discussion?

A: It's an issue for us to discuss with our allies, but I'm quite sure that we will talk about it when I meet with him because he has followed through on what we requested which was to give us the specifics of what you have in mind. I don't want to get into before I talk to him about it.

Q: To go back to that economic package that the Germans and the French are talking about, one of their arguments, I understand, is that if you want to offer aid to Central Europe and Eastern Europe, you shouldn't isolate the Soviet economically any more than you want to isolate them militarily. I'd like you to speak to that point, and also, if the United States is not inclined to go on by cooperating with the Soviet Union, is this a situation where you might say for domestic political reasons we can't participate with the rest of you guys -- (inaudible).

A: The second question is jumping the gun because what we need to do is a) talk about it among ourselves, and b) talk about it with our allies. What was the first question?

Q: The argument that some of the parties are making that you should isolate the Soviets economically.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's an argument that we have heard and we will hear. But the situation is different in the respects that I just pointed out. The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are not funneling the kinds of assistance to Cuba or North Korea, Vietnam, like the Soviet Union is. And we don't have the legal restraints with respect to most of those countries.

Q: Don't you run the risk of being left out in the cold? It sounds like the Europeans are very positive about (inaudible) this. If you raise these objections and the Soviets don't meet these conditions --

1378 9/10

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you mean is it not possible that we would not be a part of any such package? That is a distinct possibility.

Q: You're going into your 14th meeting with Shevardnadze now, which is a very intense, concentrated thing in the past 15 months or so, can you give us some sense of this right now of what it's like to deal with this guy. You've established quite a working relationship. Can you tell us a little bit of what it's like to deal with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATON OFFICIAL: Couch question. No. I will direct you to Garrick Utley's piece where he did a whole interview with me on that. We'll get you a transcript.

Q: Thank you.

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END

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אל:רהמש/814
מ-:המשרד,תא:210690,זח:1227,דח:ר,סג:בל,
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בלמס/רגיל

הנציגויות

להלן הודעת דובר משה'ח:-

'השעיית דו-שיח ארה'ב - אש'פ

ישראל מאמינה שארה'ב נקטה בצעד נכון בהשעיית הדיאלוג בינה לבין אש'פ. אי אפשר היה לצפות שאש'פ יזכה להתעלמות בלתי מוגבלת מפעילות הטרור שלו בשנה וחצי האחרונה.
אנו מקוים שיהיה זה התחלת תהליך של התפכחות במדינות אחרות בעולם - והוא יתרום לקידום תהליך השלום

עתונות

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,
מצפא,אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,הדרכה,
מעת,הסברה,ממד,איר1,איר2,לעמ,ארבל1,פרנ,מזאר

ססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס

אאאא,חוזם:21402
אל:רהמש/819
מ-:המשרד,תא:210690,זח:1728,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבבב
שמור/מיידי

אל: שגריר וושינגטון

ישראל ערב

בשיחה עם השגריר בראון אמרתי לו, על דעת ראש הממשלה, כי אנו שומעים ממדינות ערב קולות שונים המאשימים אותנו בכוונות מלחמתיות ר'ל, ויוצרים 'רוחות מלחמה'שאין להן שחר כלשהו. ביקשתי כי האמריקנים ירשמו לפניהם ויאמרו בכל בירה ערבית, שאין כוונות כאלה מצדנו, והמאשים בהן - כוונתיו שלו אינן טהורות, שכן לא היו דברים מעולם.

רובינשטיין

רי

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,@(מזכירהממשלה)

ספסס

אאאא,חוזם:21938
אל:רהמש/878
מ-:ווש,נר:2124,תא:210690,זח:2000,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / מיידי

אל:מצפ'א, ממ'ד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

תהליך השלום

מדן קרצר ב-21.6:

1. לאחרונה שחקה ארה'ב בשני מגרשים שונים: האחד- מגרש הדיאלוג עם אש'פ השני - המגרש הישראלי - מצרי - פלסטיני במאמץ לקדם התהליך ולהרכיב המשלחת הפלסטינית. עתה היא מצוייה בשלב של ציפיה לתשובה משני ה''מגרשימ'' , מאש'פ - בהקשר של פיגוע אבו אל עבאס. מישראל - תשובה חיובית לאגרת בוש.

2. ציין שהכדור לקידום התהליך מצוי עתה במגרש הישראלי אך הסיטואציה הנוכחית מענינת: תשובה חיובית ישראלית תציב את הממשל בפני הקושי של הרכבת המשלחת הפלסטינית בנתונים קשים מבעבר (על רקע השעית הדיאלוג. עם אש'פ י.א.) עם זאת, להערכתו, לראה'מ קשה יותר, כיום , להשיב תשובה חיובית, מאשר בעבר על רקע השינוי בממישראל.

3. לקרצר לא ברורה התנהגות עראפת סביב הפיגוע - אם באשר לעתוי האירוע, ואם באשר להתנהגותו אח'כ. עקב הפיגוע , מנקודת המבט של האינטרסים שלו החמיץ עראפת הזדמנות לחדד הלחץ על ישראל. במחמ'ד הופתעו מהתגובה המתונה , יחסית (לדעתמ) של הערבים ואש'פ להשעית הדיאלוג. עם זאת, הפלס' בשטחים נתקו מגעיהם עם הקונכ'ל האמריקאי במזרח ירושלים, ופיצל אל חוסייני העושה בוושינגטון לא ביקש פגישות בממשל.

4. מצרים מתוסכלת מאוד . לישראל יש עתה הזדמנות לנסות לחמם יחסיה עם המצרים. אלה מבינים כי הסיוע האמריקאי קשור הדוקות במעורבותם בתהליך, ולא מן הנמנע כי בשלב הנוכחי ינסו להפגין מאמץ לשפר היחסים עם ישראל, ולהשפיע על מדיניותה.

5. הסכים כי לדימוי המוקרן ע'י גורמים ערבים שונים כאילו האזור מצוי בתהליך הדרדרות למלחמה, אין אחיזה מבחינת המצב בשטח. עם זאת, המצב הנוכחי טומן בחובו סיכונים. אש'פ עלול להחריף את האינתיפאדה, וגורמים רדיקאלים פלסטינים - מאש'פ ומחוצה לו - עלולים לפתוח בפעולות טרור.

6. הקשר העיראקי - אש'פי הינו מקור דאגה. לא ברורה לו מידת השפעתם של העיראקים על צעדיו האחרונים של אש'פ.לעומת זאת יתכן בהחלט תרחיש לפיו ארגונים פלס' רדיקלאים , שבסיסם בעיראק, יבצעו פעולות טרור אנטי ישראליות כדי לגרור תגובה ישראלית נגד עיראק ולסבך את שתי המדינות בעימות צבאי.

7. כן מוטרד קרצר מאפשרות של הסחפות ירדן לעבר בגדאד. המלך שגה בכך שפיתח אוריינטציה על עיראק , במקום לדבוק במדיניות התמרון בין בגדאד לדמשק. נראה כי עתה הוא מצוי באחת מתקופות דכאונותיו.

8. אנא שמרו על חסיון המקור והמידע.

אמיתי

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),
ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן

סססס

בוש: הדו־שיח עם אש"ף הוכיח כי הוא יכול לקדם את תהליך השלום הערבי־ישראלי

"כאשר אש"ף ינקוט את הצעדים הנחוצים, נהיה מוכנים לחדש בהקדם את הדו־שיח". בהתייחסו לשאלת אחד הכתבים האם השעיית הדיאלוג תחזק הקיצונים באש"ף, השיב הנשיא: אני חושש שכן

מסמך

להלן הנוסח המלא של הודעת הנשיא בוש על השעיית הדו־שיח עם אש"ף וקטעים מחילופי הדברים עם עיתונאים במסיבת עיתונאים בעיר האנטסוויל, במדינת אלבמה, אתמול ב-9:30 בערב לפי שעון ישראל:

הנשיא ג'ורג' בוש: על יסוד המלצת מזכיר המדינה, החלטתי להשעות את הדו־שיח בין ארה"ב לאש"ף, בהמתנה לתגובה מניחה את הדעת מאש"ף, שתכלול צעדים אשר ינקוט כדי ליישב בעיות הקשורות במעשי הטרור האחרונים – במיוחד התקפת הטרור של ה-30 במאי על חופי ישראל בידי "חזית השחרור הפלשתינית", אחד מארגוני אש"ף.

ב-14 בדצמבר 1988 הכיר ערפאת בזכות ישראל להתקיים, על דעת הוועד הפועל של אש"ף. הוא קיבל את החלטות מועצת הביטחון 242 ו-338 והתנער מטרור.

בעקבות זה הודיעה ארה"ב, כי הואיל ואש"ף עמד בתנאינו לדו־שיח, אנו נתחיל דו־שיח מהותי עם אש"ף. בו בזמן הוקרנו את ערפאת על כך שנקט את הצעדים ההכרחיים האלה, וניהלנו דו־שיח כזה עם אש"ף באמצעות שגרירותנו בתונים.

לאש"ף היה די זמן לגנות

במרוצת 18 החודשים האחרונים החליפו נציגי ארה"ב ואש"ף דיעות באורח סדיר על המצב הפוליטי והביטחוני באזור. בסיכום, אנחנו מאמינים כי חילופי־הדברים האלה תרמו להתקדמות בתהליך השלום.

ב-30 במאי 1990 ניסתה "החזית לשחרור פלשתין" לבצע חדירת טרור מן הים אל תוך ישראל. מנהיג "החזית לשחרור פלשתין" מייצג את ארגונו בוועד הפועל של אש"ף. גודל הכוח ואזור היעד הגיאוגרפי מעידים בבירור, כי אזרחים עמדו להיות המטרה. כאותו היום פירסמנו הודעה בגנות ניסיון ההתקפה הטרוריסטית.

ב-31 במאי העלינו את עניין ההתקפה באוזני אש"ף בתונים. אמרנו להם כי אין הם יכולים להתעלם מ־אחריות לניסיון ההתקפה הטרוריס־סית מצד אחד מארגוניהם, ועליהם לנקוט צעדים כדי לטפל בעניין ב־אמצעות גינוי הפעולה, התנערות ממנה וגם בנקיטת צעדים להענשת מבצע הפעולה, אבו אל־עבאס.

הענקנו לאש"ף שפע של זמן לטפל בעניין הזה. עד היום לא סיפק לנו אש"ף דין־וחשבון מהימן על הת־קרית הזו, או נקט את הפעולות שפירטתי לעיל.

ארה"ב רושמת לפניה את העובדה שאש"ף התנער מן ההתקפה ופירסם הצהרה עקרונית בגנות התקפות נגד אזרחים. אבל, כפי שאמרנו מקודם, אין די בזה – זה כשלעצמו אינו מספיק.

הדו־שיח בין ארה"ב לאש"ף הו־כיח, כי הוא יכול לקדם את תהליך השלום הערבי־ישראלי. בו בעת הדו־שיח מיוסד על ההנחה, כי אש"ף מוכן לעמוד בתנאים אשר קיבל בדצמבר 1988, ובכללם התנערות מטרור.

כל אימת שיהיה אש"ף מוכן לנקוט את הצעדים הנחוצים, נהיה מוכנים לחדש בהקדם את הדו־שיח. לפי שעה, אנחנו מקווים ומצפים שתהליך השלום יימשך, כמקווה, לשם השגת הסדר כולל לסכסוך הערבי־ישראלי ולמען שלום צודק ובר־קיימא.

כפי שהצהרנו לעתים תכופות, דעתנו היא כי שלום כזה חייב להתבסס על החלטות האו"ם 242 ו-338, והעיקרון המשתמע מזן של שטח תמורת שלום, ועל מתן ביטחון לישראל וזכויות פוליטיות לפלשתינאים.

אנו מאמינים כי השתתפות פלש־תינית חיונית להצלחת התהליך, וכי טמונות בו הזדמנויות של ממש לפלשתינאים. אנחנו מקווים עד מאוד שזישראלים, הפלשתינאים ומדינות ערב יכירו בהזדמנויות האלה, וינקטו את הצעדים הנחוצים כדי ליצור אווירה אשר בה יוכל לפרוח שלום בר־קיום.

אנחנו מגנים אלימות באזור וקוראים לכל הצדדים לזנוח אלימות וטרור, ותחת זאת לפנות אל דו־שיח ואל משא־ומתן. אנחנו מוכנים להו־סיף ולעבוד עם הצדדים למען התכלית הזו.

ארוני הנשיא, הודעתך מהיום, בצירוף דברי מזכיר המדינה בייקר שעל ישראל לטלפן אל הבית הלבן באשר תהיה רצינית – האין משמ־עותה, שעמדת ארה"ב היא כי תה־ליך השלום במזה"ת שריר כרגע בתרדמה?

בוש: אין הוא מתקדם כרגע וה־הצעה עומדת בעינה. שיגרתי מכתב אל ראש הממשלה שמיר. שאלתי ב־פירוט רב שאלות הנוגעות לרצינות תהליך השלום. אבל הייתי רוצה לראות את תהליך השלום מתקדם. שום דבר שאמרתי אינו מביע דיעה שונה, מפני שאנחנו פשוט עוסקים כאן במאבק בטרור.

בעלי בריתנו לא יסכימו

הנכון הוא שאף לא אחד מבעלי בריתנו, מחוץ במובן לישראלים, רצו שתשעה את השיחות האלה עם אש"ף? ואתה אומר שהענקת לאש"ף די זמן. מדוע אם כן עכשיו? היש סיבה כלשהי להקשחה היום?

בוש: לא, אינני יכול לחשוב על סיבה היום. ואני לא קבעתי לעצמי מספר מסוים של ימים להמתנה לתשובת אש"ף. אבל אני חושב כי תהיה אי־הסכמה מצד בעלי בריתנו העיקריים עם מה שעשיתי כאן. ואני יודע שהוא הדין במדינות הערביות ההגיוניות והמתונות ביותר. אבל אני פשוט אזכיר להם את התנאים, שעל יסודם התחלנו את הדו־שיח. אזכיר להם גם, כי אם הם יעיינו בה־צהרה הזו, ופעולת תיקון תינקט, הדו־שיח – עד כמה שהדבר נוגע לארה"ב – יכול להתחדש בהקדם.

ארוני הנשיא. בו בזמן שיש לך בעיות עם אש"ף. יש לך גם ממשלה חדשה בישראל. שלה מדיניות מוצ־הרת של יישוב הגדה המערבית במהירות גדולה יותר ממה שנעשה בעבר. כיצד ברעתך לנהוג במ־משלה הזו? מה עומות להיות מדיני־יות הסיוע שלך לממשלה זו. ביחוד בעניין הערובות להלוואות השיכון למהגרים סוביטים?

בוש: עמדתי בשאלת יישובים בשטחים ידועה כנראה היטב. מדיניותנו היא שלא יהיו יישובים חדשים, ומדיניותנו היא בוודאי שלא למען יישובים חדשים.

ערבויות משמיר

האם תפסק ערובות של 400 מי־ליון דולר למהגרים סוביטים?

בוש: לא לצורך התיישבות מעבר לגבולות 1967.

האם ברעתך לבקש ערובות חד־שות ספציפיות מן הממשלה החדי־שה. שזה אמנם לא יקרה?

בוש: אעשה כן, ואני מקווה שאצ־ליח. אבל אני חושב כי אין ספק שמ־משלת שמיר יודעת את עמדת ארה"ב בעניין.

בחזרה לאש"ף. אחת התיאוריות הרווחות בממשלך היא שבוונתה של התקפת הטרור היתה לחבל בת־הליך השלום. האין אתה חושש שב־אמצעות השעיית הדו־שיח אתה תחזק את ידי הקיצונים. דוגמת אבו אל־עבאס?

בוש: כן, אני אמנם חושש.

אם הנך חושש בל כך, מדוע נקטת את המהלך הזה?

בוש: מפני שהיה עלינו לשקול את השאלה במלואה, ואת השאלה סיבכה העובדה שהיו שלוש התחיי־בויות ספציפיות, שאחת מהן – חשובה מאד בעיני – הופרה בבירור. אבל אין זו החלטה קלה, מפני שאני יודע כי אחדים מרגישים שהדו־שיח עם אש"ף אינו מועיל כלל. אבל כפי שאמרתי בהצהרתי, אני אינני חושב כך. והשאלה אשר עמדה על הפרק היא האם יסכימו בעלי בריתנו עם הצעדים האלה. והתשובה היא שכמה מהם לא יסכימו, מפני שהם אכן מר־גישים, כי הדו־שיח עזר במידה מסוימת לצנן יצרים בחלקים מסוי־מים של המזרח התיכון.

התשובה לשאלה היא, אפוא, שעל אש"ף לנקוט את הפעולה שקראנו לה, ולהניח את דעתנו, שהאחראים למעשה הטרור ייענשו ולגנות את המעשה הספציפי הזה. אין זה די לחזור ולהביע רק דאגה מפני טרור.

האין כאן סכנה שאותם הפלש־תינאים אשר תלו תקוות בדו־שיח, עלולים עכשיו להרים את ידיהם בייאוש ולפנות לאלימות?

בוש: אני מקווה שלא כך יהיה, ועם זאת אני אפנה אותך אל הפסקאות האחרונות של הצהרתי, כאשר קראתי להימנע מאלימות. אני חושב כי ראוי לומר, שכל אימת שאתה עוסק במשהו מורכב כמו המז־רח התיכון, אתה מודאג. אבל אני מקווה שלא כך יקרה. ואני מקווה כי הם יראו בהצהרתי משום השקפה מתונה, כי ברגע שהם יגנו את מעשה הטרור המסוים הזה, בהתאם להתח־ייבות ערפאת, נוכל לחדש את השיחות.

שורר תסכול בעולם הערבי שה־דו־שיח הזה לא הניב יתר התקדמות, ואני מבין את התסכול. אינני מסכים אתו. אני חושב ש־ש שיפור בזכות הדו־שיח, אבל ישראל התנגדה לו, ויש כמה פלשתינאים המודאגים ממנו. אני מאמין, כי עלינו לנסות ולמצוא דרך לחזור אליו בנקודה מסוימת.

ארוני הנשיא. מה על הצד השני של המטבע? כאשר התחבטת בזה, האם דאגת. והאם אתה מודאג עכ־שיו. שמא ישראל פשוט תשתמש בזה ותגיד: "אתם רואים. צדקנו בע־ניין אש"ף מלכתחילה"?

בוש: אינני מודאג מזה ביותר, מפני שאינני מקבל את ההנחה ששום דבר טוב לא נבע מהשיחות עם אש"ף.

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס

אאאא,חוזם:20570
אל:רהמש/788
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:214,תא:200690,זח:1617,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד.

דע: הסברה, יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ
פר"נ, מזא"ר, אמ"ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת , דובר צה"ל,
ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב הודעת הנשיא בוש, בזמן שהייתו באלבמה, על השעית
הדיאלוג עם אש"פ, לאחר ההודעה חלק השאלות והתשובות.
.20.6.90

PRESIDENT BUSH: ARE WE READY?

WELL, BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I HAVE DECIDED TO SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EPLOF PENDING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE PLO OF STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RECENT ACTS OF ETERRORISMF; IN PARTICULAR, THAT MAY 30TH TERRORIST ATTACK ON EISRAELF BY THE EPALESTINIANF LIBERATION FRONT, A CONSTITUENT GROUP OF THE PLO.

BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, ON DECEMBER 14TH, 1988, YASSIR EARAFATF, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EPLOF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, RECOGNIZED EISRAEL'SF RIGHT TO EXIST. HE ACCEPTED THE EUNITED NATIONSF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AND HE RENOUNCED TERRORISM.

NOW SUBSEQUENTLY, THE UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED THAT BECAUSE THE PLO HAD MET OUR LONGSTANDING CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE WE WOULD BEGIN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. AND AT THE TIME WE APPLAUDED CHAIRMAN ARAFAT FOR TAKING THESE ESSENTIAL STEPS, AND WE HAVE CONDUCTED SUCH A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TUNIS.

OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO REGULARLY EXCHANGED VIEWS ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION. ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE THAT THESE EXCHANGES CONTRIBUTED TO PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

ON MAY 30TH, 1990, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION FRONT ATTEMPTED A SEABORNE TERRORIST INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION FRONT LEADER ABU ABBAS

REPRESENTS THE PLO ON THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PLO. THE SIZE OF THE FORCE AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL TARGET AREA STRONGLY INDICATE THAT CIVILIANS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE TARGET.

THAT DAY WE ISSUED A STATEMENT DEPLORING THIS ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK.

ON MAY 31ST, WE RAISED THIS INCIDENT WITH THE EPLOF IN TUNIS. WE TOLD THEM THAT IT COULD NOT AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ACTION BY ONE OF ITS CONSTITUENT GROUPS AND NEEDED TO TAKE STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER BY CONDEMNING THE OPERATION, DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM IT, AND BY ALSO BEGINNING TO TAKE STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS, THE PERPETRATOR.

WE'VE GIVEN THE PLO AMPLE TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE. TO DATE, THE PLO HAS NOT PROVIDED A CREDIBLE ACCOUNTING OF THIS INCIDENT OR UNDERTAKEN THE ACTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE US DOES TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE PLO HAS DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THIS ATTACK AND ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN PRINCIPLE, BUT AS WE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED, THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT -- THIS ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

THE US-PLO DIALOGUE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN ADVANCE THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE DIALOGUE IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PLO IS WILLING TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS IT ACCEPTED IN DECEMBER 1988, INCLUDING RENUNCIATION OF TERROR.

AND ANY TIME THAT THE PLO IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS, WE ARE PREPARED TO PROMPTLY RESUME THE DIALOGUE. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD PROCEED AS INTEND TO THE PURSUIT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

AND AS WE OFTEN STATED, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUCH A PEACE MUST BE BASS, EUNF RESOLUTION 242 AND 338, AND THE PRINCIPLE IMPLICIT THEREIN OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS.

WE BELIEVE THAT EPALESTINIANF PARTICIPATION IS VITAL TO ANY SUCCESSFUL PROCESS AND THAT THERE ARE REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR PALESTINIANS IN THIS PROCESS. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT EISRAELISF, PALESTINIANS AND THE EARABF STATES WILL RECOGNIZE THESE OPPORTUNITIES AND TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS CAN THRIVE. WE DENOUNCE VIOLENCE IN THE AREA, AND CALL UPON ALL PARTIES TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND TERROR, AND OPT INSTEAD FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE PARTIES TOWARD THIS END.

I'LL BE GLAD TO TAKE A FEW QUESTIONS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ABOUT YOUR ANNOUCEMENT --

Q MR. PRESIDENT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YES, JOHN. SORRY, NORM.

Q -- DOESN'T YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF TODAY, COUPLED WITH SECRETARY EBAKER'SF WORDS THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD CALL THE WHITE HOUSE WHEN THEY ARE SERIOUS, MEAN THAT THE US POSITION ON THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE EMIDDLE EASTF IS DORMANT RIGHT NOW?

PRESIDENT BUSH: JOHN, IT'S NOT MOVING FORWARD RIGHT NOW, AND THE OFFER STILL STANDS. I HAVE SENT A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER ESHAMIRF. I HAVE VERY SPECIFICALLY ASKED QUESTIONS THAT RELATE TO SERIOUSNESS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PEACE PROCESS MOVE FORWARD. NOTHING HEREIN SHOULD INDICATE ANYTHING DIFFERENT, BECAUSE HERE WE ARE SIMPLY TAKING (AN ARROW/A NARROW ?) SHOT AT ETERRORISMF.

NORM, EXCUSE ME. I FORGOT MY PROTOCOL HERE.

Q IS IT TRUE THAT NONE OF OUR ALLIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION, OF COURSE, OF THE ISRAELIS, WANTED YOU TO SUPSEND THESE TALKS WITH THE EPLOF? AND YOU SAID YOU HAVE GIVEN THE PLO ENOUGH TIME. I MEAN, WHY NOW? I MEAN, IS THERE SOME REASON TO TOUGHEN IN TODAY?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I DON'T THINK OF ANY REASON TODAY. AND I DIDN'T SET IT, YOU KNOW, IN MY MIND, X NUMBERS OF DAYS. BUT, JOHN, I THINK THERE WILL BE A LACK OF AGREEMENT WITH WHAT I'VE DONE HERE ON (THE) PART OF OUR STRONGEST ALLIES. AND I KNOW THIS IS TRUE ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE MOST REASONABLE AND MODERATE ARAB STATES. BUT I WOULD SIMPLY REMIND THEM OF THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH THE DIALOGUE STARTED IN THE FIRST PLACE. AND I WOULD ALSO REMIND THEM THAT IF THEY LOOK AT THIS STATEMENT AND REMEDIAL ACTION IS TAKEN, THE DIALOGUE, FROM THE US SIDE, CAN PROMPTLY BE RESTORED.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, AT THE SAME TIME YOU'RE HAVING THIS TROUBLE WITH THE PLO YOU'VE ALSO GOT A NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT HAS AN AVOWED POLICY OF SETTLING IN THE EWEST BANKF MORE RAPIDLY THAN IT'S BEEN SETTLED IN THE PAST. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO DEAL WITH THAT GOVERNMENT? WHAT'S YOUR POLICY GOING TO BE ON AID FOR THAT GOVERNMENT, SPECIFICALLY ON HOUSING GUARANTEES FOR SOVIET IMMIGRANTS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, JERRY, I THINK I PROBABLY -- MY POSITION ON SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES IS PROBABLY AS WELL KNOWN AS ANYTHING. AND OUR POLICY IS NOT TO HAVE NEW SETTLEMENTS, AND OUR POLICY IS CERTAINLY NOT TO FINANCE NEW SETTLEMENTS.

IS THAT RESPONSIVE, OR WAS THERE ANOTHER PART TO YOUR QUESTION?

Q THERE'S A SPECIFIC QUESTION NOW, THOUGH, OF WHETHER WE'LL PROVIDE HOUSING GUARANTEES FOR SOVIET IMMIGRANTS OF (DOLLAR 100 MILLION ?).

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, BUT NOT TO SETTLE IN THE -- IN THE POST - '67 TERRITORY -- IN THE TERRITORIES, BEYOND THE '67 LINES.

Q ARE YOU GOING TO SEEK SPECIFIC NEW GUARNATEES FROM THIS NEW GOVERNMENT THAT THAT WON'T HAPPEN --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I WILL, AND I HOPE I'M SUCCESSFUL. BUT I THINK THEY -- THEY -- THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SHAMIR GOVERNMENT KNOWS MY POSITION ON THIS, KNOWS THE STANDING POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Q BACK ON THE PLO, ONE OF THE THEORIES PASSED AROUND IN YOUR OWN ADMINISTRATION WAS THAT THE INTENT OF THIS TERRORIST ATTACK WAS TO DERAIL THE PEACE PROCESS. ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED THAT BY SUSPENDING THE DIALOGUE YOU'RE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE HARD-LINERS LIKE ABU ABBUS? AND IS THERE ALSO A DANGER --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YES. LET ME STOP YOU THERE, JUST TO RESPOND, SO I DON'T GET -- FORGET THE QUESTION. YES I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THAT.

GO AHEAD. (SCATTERED LAUGHTER.)

Q WELL, IF YOU'RE SO CONCERNED ABOUT IT, THEN WHY DID YOU -- WHY DID YOU TAKE THIS ACTION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, BECAUSE WE HAD TO WEIGH THE WHOLE QUESTION AND THE QUESTION WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THERE WERE THREE SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS, ONE OF WHICH, A VERY IMPORTANT ONE IN MY VIEW, HAS CLEARLY HAS BEEN VIOLATED. SO -- BUT -- IT'S NOT AN EASY CALL, BECAUSE I KNOW SOME FEEL THAT THE PLO DIALOGUE IS TOTALLY UNPRODUCTIVE, AND AS I INDICATED IN THIS STATEMENT, I DON'T. AND THE QUESTION UP HERE WAS, WELL, DO OUR ALLIES -- WILL THEY AGREE WITH THE STEPS THAT I'VE TAKEN HERE IN HUNTSVILLE TODAY? AND THE ANSWER IS, NO, SOME OF THEM WILL NOT AGREE, BECAUSE THEY DO FEEL THAT THE DIALOGUE HAS KIND OF HELPED CALM THINGS IN SOME PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

SO -- SO, WHAT THE ANSWER TO IT IS, IS FOR THE PLO TO TAKE THE ACTION THAT I'VE CALLED FOR AND TO SATISFACTORILY -- TO SATISFY US THAT THOSE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE WILL BE DISQCIPLINED, AND CONDEMN THIS SPECIFIC ACT. IT'S NOT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY REITERATE ONE'S CONCERN ON TERROR.

Q IF I MAY FOLLOW UP?

PRESIDENT BUSH: PLEASE.

Q IS THERE A DANGER, TOO, THAT THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO WOULD PUT SOME HOPE IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE US MIGHT NOW THROW UP THEIR HANDS IN DESPERATION AND RESORT TO VIOLENCE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I HOPE THAT'S NOT THE CASE, AND YET -- I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE VERY LAST PAGE OF MY --

LAST PARAGRAPH OR TWO OF THE STATEMENT, WHEN I DID CALL FOR NO VIOLENCE, AND I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT AT ANY TIME YOU'RE DEALING WITH SOMETHING AS COMPLICATED AS THE EMIDDLEF E EASTF, YOU WORRY ABOUT THAT. BUT I HOPE THAT'S NOT THE CASE, AND I HOPE THEY'LL SEE IN MY STATEMENT A RATHER TEMPERATE VIEW HERE THAT, THOUGH WE'RE SPECIFIC IN CALLING FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF THIS PARTICULAR TERRORIST ACT, THAT ONCE THAT IS DONE, IN KEEPING WITH THE ARAFAT'S -- ARAFAT'S UNDERTAKING, THAT WE CAN RESUME TALKS.

THERE HAS BEEN A FRUSTRATION, JIM, IN THE EARABF WORLD THAT THIS DIALOGUE HAS NOT RESULTED IN MORE PROGRESS, AND I UNDERSTAND THE FRUSTRATION. I DON'T HAPPEN TO AGREE WITH IT. I THINK THINGS ARE BETTER BECAUSE WE'VE HAD THE DIALOGUE, BUT ISRAEL HAS STRONGLY OBJECTED TO IT AND SOME PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN, AS WE CAN CLEARLY SEE, CONCERNED ABOUT IT. BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO GET IT BACK AT SOME POINT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT --

Q FOLLOW UP, SIR? WHAT ABOUT THE FLIP SIDE OF THAT COIN, IF I MIGHT? AS YOU GRAPPLED WITH THIS, DID YOU WORRY AND ARE YOU WORRIED NOW THAT ISRAEL WILL JUST TAKE THIS AND SAY, "SEE, WE'VE BEEN RIGHT ABOUT THE PLO ALL ALONG," AND --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT SO TROUBLED ON THAT BECAUSE I THINK THEY WILL SEE HERE THAT I AM NOT ACCEPTING THE PREMISE THAT THERE IS NO GOOD TO COME FROM TALKING TO THE PLO. SO I DON'T WORRY TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT POINT.

Q BUT DO YOU SEE MR. SHAMIR AS TOO HARD LINE, AS THE KIND OF LEADER WHO IS GOING TO SAY, "WELL, WE WERE RIGHT, AND THEREFORE, WE'LL STAY AWAY FROM -- (INAUDIBLE)."

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I AM HOPING THAT'S NOT THE CASE, AND ONE OF THE REASONS I SENT HIM THIS LONG, LENGTHY LETTER WAS TO MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT IT IS OUR VIEW THE PEACE PROCESS OUGHT TO GO FORWARD. AND IT'S GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM, BUT IT MUST GO FORWARD. AND IT MUST GO FORWARD ALONG THE ORIGINAL -- THE LINES OF WHAT ORIGINALLY WAS THE SHAMIR PLAN. AND THEN IT BECAME EMUBARAKF GOT INTERESTED, AND HE PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN IT. THEN JIM BAKER GOT INVOLVED, AND HAS DONE A HEROIC JOB IN TRYING TO GET THE TALKS GOING. SO WE ARE -- WE ARE -- I HOPE THAT THE US WILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY, REGARDLESS OF THE STEP I HAVE TAKEN HERE IN THE PLO, BECAUSE, AS WE ALL KNOW, WE WERE NOT PROPOSING THAT THE PLO BE AT THE TABLE. THIS WAS A CHARGE MADE AGAINST US BY SOME OF THE -- SOME IN ISRAEL, AND THAT ISN'T -- THAT DOESN'T HAPPEN TO BE THE CASE. AND I THINK THE GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT.

YES, RITA. EXCUSE ME. I SHOULDN'T HAVE GOTTEN (YOU) EARLIER.

Q YOU SPECIFIED THAT THE PLO DIALOGUE HAS BEEN POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, BUT YOU HAVEN'T REALLY TOLD US IN WHAT WAY. COULD YOU BE A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THAT?

WHAT PRODUCTIVITY DO YOU SEE IN IT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK THE VERY FACT WE ARE TALKING CAN -- AND THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS I HOPE THAT IT CAN BE RESTORED -- CAN ELIMINATE DIFFERENCES. AND I WOULD LIKE TO FEEL THAT THE PLO, BECAUSE OF OUR DIALOGUE, DOESN'T SEE US AS QUITE THE HOSTILE COUNTRY THAT ONCE THEY DID. AND THERE'S ALL KINDS OF SMALL POINTS THAT ARE TAKEN UP BY OUR AMBASSADOR PELLETREAU IN TUNIS THAT I THINK HAVE REDUCED THE LEVELS OF MISUNDERSTANDING.
I DON'T WANT TO LEAVE YOU THE WRONG IMPRESSION, THAT I THINK THE DIALOGUE HAS RESULTED IN A MORE DYNAMIC PEACE PROCESS. BUT I DO THINK IT'S -- I DO THINK THAT IT'S GOOD, AND I THINK THAT IT ENCOURAGES MODERATION IN THE PALESTINIAN -- WITHIN THE EPLOF RANKS. I THINK THE -- WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT EARAFATF DID SOMETHING THAT WAS PREDICTED NO PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD DO WHEN HE RECOGNIZED EISRAEL'SF RIGHT TO EXIST AS A STATE. AND SOME MIGHT SAY, "WELL, IT'S ABOUT TIME," AND I'M ONE OF THEM. BUT THAT WAS QUITE A STEP FORWARD.

IT WAS QUITE A STEP FORWARD WHEN HE RECOGNIZED RESOLUTION 242, AND I THINK THAT WAS POSITIVE. AND THEN I THINK WE'VE HAD A CHANCE TO SOLIDIFY THOSE GAINS, MODEST THOUGH THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN, THROUGH DIALOGUE.

BUT I CAN'T POINT TO THE FACT THAT THAT HAS REALLY SOLVED THE QUESTION OF EMIDDLE EASTF PEACE. I JUST FEEL THAT TALKING OFFERS MORE POTENTIAL THAN STIFF-ARMING EACH OTHER. AND YET, WE CAN'T DIGEST IT AS LONG AS THIS -- THIS TERRORISTIC ACT -- IS STICKING IN OUR THROAT, AND PROPERLY SO, AS A COUNTRY THAT DECRIES INTERNATIONAL TERROR.

Q WAS THERE NOT A NEED HERE, SIR, TO NOT APPEAR TO BE INDULGENT OF THE PLO AT A TIME WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TOUGHER THAN PERHAPS ANY RECENT ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TO ISRAEL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT'S NOT WHAT MADE MY DECISION, AND I DON'T KNOW THAT WE'VE BEEN TOUGHER. I'M THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED STATES HAS A POLICY AND I'M SUPPOSED TO, I THINK, GO FORWARD WITH OUR POLICY. AND ONE OF THE BIG PROBLEMS WE HAVE HAD IS THE QUESTION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS THIS QUESTION OF SETTLEMENTS. BUT, I DON'T -- I WOULDN'T READ MY DECISION HERE TO GO AS FOLLOWS: "HE MADE THIS DECISION BECAUSE HE'S CONCERNED ABOUT A COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AT THIS POINT." THAT'S NOT WHY I MADE THE DECISION. BUT, SOME MAY READ IT AS THAT. BUT, WE ARE -- WE ARE STAYING WITH OUR CONCEPT ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND WE ARE STAYING -- AND ARE STAYING WITH OUR POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS. AND THIS ACTION THAT I HAVE TAKEN TODAY IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY ON ANTI-TERROR.

Q DO YOU FEEL THAT ISRAEL HAS COMMITTED ACTS OF TERRORISM (UPON PALESTINIANS ?)?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE SPOKE OUT IN THE -- ON RECENT

-- RECENT VIOLENCE IN THE EGAZAF AND PLEASE NOTE MY LAST COMMENT TO CALL FOR CALLING FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THESE QUESTIONS AS OPPOSED TO VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERROR. AND THAT'S THE WAY I WOULD RESPOND ON THAT.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,
@(אמן),מעת,הסברה,קלוורי,לעמ,דוצ-ים,
דוצ,צנזורצבאי,מצפא,מזאר,פרנ,@(יועץרהמ/טרור)

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 20, 1990

FOR POST'S INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT THIS AFTERNOON IN HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA.

BASED ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, I HAVE DECIDED TO SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO, PENDING A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE PLO OF STEPS IT IS TAKING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM, IN PARTICULAR THE MAY 30 TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAEL BY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, A CONSTITUENT GROUP OF THE PLO.

BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, ON DECEMBER 14, 1988 YASAR ARAFAT, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, RECOGNIZED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. ACCEPTED UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, AND HE RENOUNCED TERRORISM . SUBSEQUENTLY THE UNTIED STATES ANNOUNCED THAT BECAUSE THE PLO HAD MET OUR LONGSTANDING CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE. WE WOULD BEGIN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO.

WE APPLAUDED CHAIRMAN ARAFAT FOR TAKING THESE ESSENTIAL

STEPS, AND WE HAVE CONDUCTED SUCH A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TUNIS. OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PLO REGULARLY EXCHANGED VIEWS ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION. ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE THESE EXCHANGES CONTRIBUTED TO PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

ON MAY 30, 1990, THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT ATTEMPTED A SEABORNE TERRORIST INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL. PALESTINE

LIBERATION FRONT LEADER ABU ABBAS REPRESENTS THE PLO ON THE PLO'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. THE SIZE OF THE FORCE AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL TARGET AREA STRONGLY INDICATED THAT CIVILIANS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE TARGET.

THAT DAY WE ISSUED A STATEMENT DEPLORING THIS ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK. ON MAY 31, WE RAISED THIS INCIDENT WITH THE PLO IN TUNIS. WE TOLD THE PLO THAT IT COULD NOT AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ACTION BY ONE OF ITS CONSTITUENT GROUPS AND NEEDED TO TAKE STEPS TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER, BY CONDEMNING THE OPERATION, DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM IT, AND BY ALSO BEGINNING TO TAKE STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS, THE PERPETRATOR. WE HAVE GIVEN THE PLO AMPLE TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE.

TO DATE, THE PLO HAS NOT PROVIDED A CREDIBLE ACCOUNTING OF THIS INCIDENT OR UNDERTAKEN THE ACTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE US DOES TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE PLO HAS DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM THIS ATTACK AND ISSUED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS IN PRINCIPLE. BUT AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THIS ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

THE U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN ADVANCE THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DIALOGUE IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PLO IS WILLING TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS IT ACCEPTED IN DECEMBER 1988, INCLUDING RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM. AT ANY TIME THAT THE PLO IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS, WE ARE PREPARED TO PROMPTLY RESUME THE DIALOGUE.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD PROCEED AS INTENDED AND WITHOUT DELAY. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE PURSUIT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. AS WE HAVE OFTEN STATED, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUCH A PEACE MUST BE BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, AND PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. WE BELIEVE THAT PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IS VITAL TO ANY SUCCESSFUL PROCESS AND THAT THERE ARE REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR PALESTINIANS IN THIS PROCESS. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND THE ARAB STATES WILL RECOGNIZE THESE OPPORTUNITIES AND TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS CAN THRIVE. WE DENOUNCE VIOLENCE IN THE AREA AND CALL UPON ALL PARTIES TO ESCHEW VIOLENCE AND TERROR AND OPT INSTEAD FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE WORKING WITH THE PARTIES TOWARD THIS END. EAGLEBURGER

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#0234

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JUNE 19 WEEKLY CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
(Spies, poison gas, flag, Zionism)
By Berta Gomez and Bruce Carey
USIA Congressional Correspondents

CONGRESS ASKS REPEAL OF U.N. ZIONISM RESOLUTION

The House of Representatives June 18 joined the Senate in voting to call for a repeal of the 1975 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism "a form of racism and racial discrimination." The measure passed the House by roll-call vote, as it did in the Senate May 3, and now goes to President Bush for signing.

Democratic Congressman Mel Levine, in introducing the measure, said bipartisan action by the Congress "will strongly support" U.S. efforts toward repeal of the 15-year-old U.N. resolution.

"The repeal will send a positive signal to the Middle East peace process," said Republican Congressman Benjamin Gilman. He said the resolution has been a "clear and fundamental violation of the principles of the U.N. charter" and prevents the United Nations from playing a credible role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

SENATORS OFFER ANTI-ESPIONAGE MEASURE

A bipartisan group of senators introduced legislation June 13 to strengthen the government's ability to catch and prosecute spies. The bill aims to improve the government's personnel security system, provide additional penalties for espionage and enhance counter-intelligence.

The bill would require those given top secret access to make personal financial reports during that period and for five years afterward. It would make some federal employees subject to random polygraph tests and establish new criminal offenses for possessing espionage devices where intent to spy can be proved, or for selling or transferring top secret materials or removing them without authorization. It would authorize rewards of up to one million dollars and permit the FBI to obtain information from telephone companies on persons with unlisted numbers who are called by "foreign powers" or their agents.

An independent panel that made the recommendations concluded that most modern spies are motivated by financial rather than ideological reasons and so are unlikely to be discouraged by the political changes in the Eastern bloc.

POISON GAS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE FORMAL TREATY

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has asked Congress for 12 million dollars for the West Bank and Gaza in the 1991 fiscal year, primarily to support PVO activities.

These funds would help improve health, water, sanitation, and education systems, and private sector activities.

In Lebanon, since 1983, USAID has put more than 235 million dollars into food programs, housing projects, health care, training, and reconstruction. During this fiscal year ending August 31, more than 22 million dollars will be provided -- 14.7 million dollars for food aid under the of food-for-peace plan, and 7.5 million dollars for emergency relief.

USAID is asking Congress to maintain the current level of food funding during the coming fiscal year beginning September 1 so that rice, lentils, and vegetable oil can continue to reach those in need. According to USAID figures, over 135,000 families now receive food aid from the agency.

The U.S. declared Lebanon a disaster area on April 29, 1989, which permits Congress to supplement relief allocations with special emergency funds. Violence, however, has severely hampered relief efforts in Beirut and made food distribution virtually impossible there. Save the Children continues to feed people throughout the rest of the country as well as to assist farmers and businessmen.

Several other American PVOs play an important role in Lebanon: Catholic Relief Services and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) provide blankets, cooking utensils, and other necessities; the American Red Cross contributes its emergency medical response capabilities; and the World Rehabilitation Fund helps the handicapped.
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U.S. PROPOSES MAJOR ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA
(Text of DAS Rope testimony in Congress 6/19)

Washington -- The United States plans three major arms sales to Saudi Arabia valued at 4,000 million dollars, Bush Administration officials told the House Foreign Affairs Committee June 19.

The U.S. decision was made after a lengthy assessment of the impact of these sales on U.S. interests in the Middle East and the security situation there, William F. Rope, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, said. "The Administration has considered carefully all facets of these sales."

He said the transaction is aimed to modernize the Saudi National Guard and includes 1,110 Light Armored Vehicles and related ammunition; software and hardware modifications for the radar and computer systems onboard the Saudi AWACS planes and aerial refueling tankers and 12 M-88A1 tank recovery vehicles.

After a lengthy assessment, said Rope, "we concluded that Saudi Arabia has a legitimate need for this equipment, that the sales will not have a negative impact on regional stability, and that they will not pose a risk to Israel's security.

"In addition to fostering closer security relations with the Saudis, these sales will directly enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to defend its vast oil reserves -- a resource in which we will have a major interest for many years."

Following is the text of Rope's prepared testimony:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Chairman Fascell, Chairman Hamilton, and members of the Committee:

It is a pleasure for me to appear before you this afternoon, along with Mr. Covey from our Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Bureau and Mr. Smith from the Department of Defense, to discuss the Administration's plans to proceed with three major arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

These sales include:

-- Approximately 1100 Light Armored Vehicles and related ammunition and support equipment,

-- Software and hardware modifications for the radar and computer systems onboard the Saudi AWACS and aerial refueling tankers, and

-- 12 M88 tank recovery vehicles.

The Light Armored Vehicles and the AWACS modifications items were listed in the Javits Report submitted last February. Informal

notification of the sales was made on May 4 and the formal notification was delivered on June 5.

Our decision to notify was made after a lengthy assessment of the impact of these sales on U.S. interests in the Middle East and the security situation there. As a result of our assessment, we concluded that Saudi Arabia has a legitimate need for this equipment, that the sales will not have a negative impact on regional stability, that they will not pose a risk to Israel's security, and that they will serve a number of important U.S. interests.

1. General Background

The largest of these three sales is the light armored vehicle or LAV package which totals approximately 3,400 million dollars in value, of which about 75 percent, or 2,500 million dollars, will come from the U.S. The principal component of this package will be 1,117 LAVs. The LAV is a lightly armored, wheeled vehicle -- not a tank. LAV denotes a family of vehicles which vary as to armament and function. About two-thirds of the LAVs to be purchased by the Saudis are armed variants and one-third will be support vehicles.

Machine guns constitute the primary weapon on most of the LAV variants; however, some are equipped with heavier guns and about 10 percent are equipped to fire TOW anti-tank missiles. The armor on the LAV is sufficient to protect against small arms fire and shrapnel from artillery.

Also part of the LAV package are 2,000 TOW 2A missiles, 116 TOW launchers which will be mounted on some of the LAVs, 27 155mm towed howitzers, and related logistical, training and construction support. Delivery of the LAVs could start in 1992 and would continue throughout the 1990s.

The second of these packages involves modification of Saudi Arabia's five AWACS and eight tanker aircraft. This package is valued at approximately 600 million dollars.

Modifications to all 13 aircraft will enhance their navigation and self-protection capabilities. Seven additional modifications to the AWACS aircraft will involve hardware and software upgrades to the radar and computer systems.

These modifications represent a modest increase in operational capability and are fully consistent with the Presidential assurances given to Congress concerning the Saudi AWACS program. Their greatest value lies in ensuring the Saudi AWACS continued interoperability with the U.S. Air Force and in increasing the reliability and maintainability of the Saudi AWACS.

The third package includes the sale of 12 M88A1 tank recovery vehicles. It has a total value of approximately 26 million dollars.

We have sold the M88 to Saudi Arabia on several occasions in the past.

II. Military Justification and Impact on the Regional Balance

In deciding to proceed with these sales, we looked first at the Saudi need for each system. The LAVs are to be used by the Saudi Arabian National Guard. This is a separate organization from the Royal Saudi Land Forces (i.e., the Saudi army), and does not fall under the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. We have been closely involved in assisting the modernization of the National Guard since 1973.

The Saudis need the LAVs to replace a similar type of vehicle, the V-150 Commando Car, that has been in the National Guard inventory since the mid-1970s and is becoming increasingly difficult maintain. As such, the acquisition of the LAV does not signify an expansion of force structure or mission; it represents the necessary replacement of aging equipment.

The LAVS will be employed primarily in an internal security role. The National Guard is charged with securing a number of fixed sites which could be vulnerable to terrorist attack and subversion. These include: the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, government facilities in Riyadh and elsewhere, the oil fields in the oil-rich Eastern Province, and various oil pipelines. The LAV's combination of mobility, armor protection, and firepower make it ideal for this mission.

The secondary mission of the National Guard is to support the Royal Saudi Land Forces in case of external attack; accordingly, a number of the LAVs will have an anti-tank capability. In performing this mission, the LAVs could be moved quickly by road, since they can travel at speeds up to 60 mph and are not be dependent upon tank transporters, to take up forward blocking positions until such time as the Royal Saudi Land Forces deploy. The TOW missile would provide the firepower necessary to engage attacking armored forces; however, the LAV's light armor would limit its long term effectiveness in this role. It is with this secondary mission in mind that the National Guard has also requested 155mm towed howitzers as part of LAV package.

The modifications to the AWACS and tanker aircraft are also being applied to U.S., U.K. and French AWACS aircraft. For the most part, these modifications represent modest improvements in existing system capabilities. As a result of these modifications, the onboard computers will be able to process data faster and more accurately, and the radar will be better able to identify targets. However, since the radar operates on a line-of-sight basis, its range will remain unchanged. The only new capability that these modifications will provide is the ability to detect, but not jam or interfere with, emissions from air defense and other radars and electronic emitters.

These modifications constitute the first update of the software on the Saudi AWACS since their delivery. They will advance the 1960s and 70s

technology currently found on these aircraft to that which is now standard on U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft. Without these modifications, it would be necessary to operate a separate supply and maintenance system just to support the Saudis -- an inefficient arrangement for us and a less responsive system for them.

These modifications are also essential to ensuring continued interoperability between U.S. and Saudi aircraft. This paid off during our Persian Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988; and it remains important today that Saudi aircraft be compatible with, and able to operate with, our own.

The modifications would be applied in three phases starting in the fall of next year and continuing through the end of the century.

Finally, the M88 Recovery vehicles are required by the Royal Saudi Land Forces to support their armored forces. These vehicles serve a strictly logistical support function. The Saudis are buying them now because the U.S. production line will be closing.

We believe that each of these packages is well suited to specific Saudi defense needs. Given the type of equipment and the role in which it will be employed, the impact of these three sales on the regional balance and, in particular, on the security of Israel, will be minimal. None in any way undercut our unshakable commitment to the security of Israel.

III. U.S. Interests Served by the Sales

All three sales will serve important U.S. interests and objectives. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a 45-year-old security relationship, which has been vitally important to our economic and strategic interests.

A key facet of our relationship has been U.S. willingness to provide the weapons the Saudis require to meet their legitimate defense needs. It should be noted, however, that of the more than 50,000 million dollars in U.S. sales of defense equipment and services to Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, less than 15 percent has gone to the purchase of actual weapons systems. The rest has been used to purchase non-lethal equipment, construction and other support services.

In addition to fostering closer security relations with the Saudis, these sales will directly enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to defend its vest oil reserves -- one-quarter of the world's proven reserves -- a resource in which we will have a major interest for many years.

By tangibly demonstrating our commitment to Saudi security, these sales will strengthen our political ties with Saudi Arabia, which will also advance U.S. interests.

The Saudis have helped shift the Arab consensus from the

"rejectionism" of the 1970s to a search for a "just settlement" which included recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace, in the 1981 Fahd Plan. They have worked quietly to have these principles reaffirmed in the Arab League summits at Fez, Algiers, and Casablanca.

Saudi Arabia worked to achieve Egypt's return to the Arab League with its ties to Israel intact and played an important role in encouraging PLO leader Arafat to make his statements recognizing Israel's right to exist, renouncing terrorism and accepting U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

They have long been active in seeking a settlement of the now-15-year-old civil war in Lebanon. Although last year's Taif Accord has still to be fully implemented, the Saudis worked extremely hard to bring it to fruition.

They have also been instrumental in promoting the resolution of disputes in North Africa; and with the U.S. and Pakistan, they have provided vital support for the Afghan resistance which has been instrumental in the Afghan peoples' struggle for self-determination.

And most recently, they worked hard with Egypt to moderate the tone of last month's Arab League summit in Baghdad.

Finally, these sales will yield substantial economic benefits. Their cumulative value is approximately 4,000 million dollars of which slightly more than 3,100 million dollars will come from the United States. Though the LAV is being assembled in Canada by GM of Canada, approximately 75% of the total package will be U.S. in content and will yield over 11,000 worker-years of employment in at least 24 states. The AWACS modifications will generate additional employment in eight states. These are all cash sales that will involve no cost to the American taxpayer.

In sum, the Administration has considered carefully all facets of these sales. We do not mean to imply that 4,000 million dollars in defense equipment and services in inconsequential. The Saudis will be getting equipment for which they have a legitimate defense need and will be getting their money's worth. Given the nature of the equipment included in these sales, we believe that they will serve Saudi Arabia's security needs and U.S. interests well without upsetting the regional balance or posing a threat to Israel. Under these circumstances, we have elected to proceed.

I thank you and, with my colleagues, will be happy to respond to your questions.
(END TEXT)
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U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID FLOWS TO TERRITORIES, LEBANON
(Article on aid to West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon)
By Charles F. Hunter
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- As the intifada continues in the Israeli occupied territories and warfare grinds on in Lebanon, so does the physical hardship and uncertainty of life for the those living there -- and so does the U.S.-funded assistance program to alleviate their suffering. In the occupied territories, inadequate Palestinian institutional capacity hinders efforts to solve basic problems, and violence only worsens the situation, a State Department official said in a USIA interview.

Aid for the territories is therefore more critical than ever, the official said, because economic self-reliance will also serve the cause of moderation in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon.

First approved by Congress in 1975, American direct economic and humanitarian aid to the occupied Arab territories has totaled almost 150 million dollars to date. Approximately 65 percent of the villages in the territories receive U.S. assistance, while more than a third of Lebanon's population has benefited from a feeding program run by the Save the Children Foundation.

Save the Children is one of a number of American private voluntary organizations (PVOs) that deliver most of the U.S. government aid in the region. PVOs, because they are non-governmental and nonpartisan, are better suited to providing that assistance.

Other U.S.-based PVOs in Jerusalem and Gaza are AMIDEAST (American-Mideast Educational and Training Services), Agricultural Cooperative Developments International, American Near East Refugee Aid, and Catholic Relief Services. Numerous Palestinian voluntary organizations, such as the Society for the Care of Handicapped Children, are active in providing assistance as well.

The U.S. government extends even more support to the area through contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The United States is the largest donor, contributing about one-third of the 100 million dollars the agency spends in the occupied territories every year for education, vocational training, medical care, and relief services.

Over the past two years, the United States has also given four million dollars to a special U.Sn. emergency program to deal with urgent needs in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

The American government continues to encourage economic development and upgrade living conditions there.

PLANNED ARMS SALE TO SAUDIS OPPOSED IN CONGRESS
(Article on HFAC hearing, 6/19/90)
By Rosalind Mandine
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Bush Administration officials faced tough congressional opposition June 19 to a proposed 4,000-million-dollar arms sale to Saudi Arabia, during a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee hearing.

While State and Defense Department officials defended the sale on the grounds of Saudi Arabia's security needs, some members of Congress questioned the necessity of the sale and called the amount of money and equipment involved "overkill."

The proposed sales are aimed at the modernization of the Saudi National Guard and include 1,110 Light Armored Vehicles and related ammunition; software and hardware modifications for the radar and computer systems on board the Saudi AWACS planes; and aerial refueling tankers and 12 M-88A1 tank recovery vehicles.

"In addition to fostering closer security relations with the Saudis, these sales will directly enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to defend its vast oil reserves -- one-quarter of the world's proven reserves -- a resource in which we will have a major interest for many years," William F. Rope, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, said in his prepared testimony.

Also testifying were Jack Covey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Frederick C. Smith, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Conceding that "4,000 million dollars in defense equipment and services" is not "inconsequential," Rope stressed the Saudi's "legitimate defense need." He said the sales "will serve Saudi Arabia's security needs and U.S. interests without upsetting the regional balance or posing a threat to Israel."

Representative Mel Levine (Democrat from California) questioned the administration's view that arms sales to Saudi Arabia do not affect the balance of power in the Middle East. "It is increasingly difficult to swallow these pronouncements," Levine said.

Representative Lawrence Smith (Democrat from Florida) also challenged the administration's position and said the continuation of arms sales to Saudi Arabia "increases the possibility of aiding war, rather than restricting war" in the Middle East. The sale of arms to Saudi Arabia also decreases Israel's "qualitative edge of superiority in modern weapons of war," Smith said.

Smith is the chief sponsor of three House resolutions opposing the proposed sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. He sharply questioned the Saudi's need for 1100 LAV's for the purpose of internal security.

without breaking any laws," asserted Gary Milhollin, head of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a Washington research firm....

U.S. controls banning direct sale to proliferation-prone countries remain in effect, according to the Commerce Department.

The best-known item removed from the 17-nation COCOM's controls is probably krytrons, fast switching devices that have featured in previous U.S. criminal cases against Pakistani agents who tried to smuggle them out of the country and an Israeli agent who succeeded.

Krytrons are used in a variety of commercial devices, including copying machines, but more sophisticated versions have been used in the trigger mechanisms of U.S. nuclear weapons, which require exact timing of electronically triggered explosive charges....

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
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Saudi Arabia is "buying weapons at a faster rate than it can absorb them," he added.

In response to Smith's questions, Deputy Assistant Secretary Covey noted that the LAV's are important to Saudi Arabia in that it must defend a large landmass with a small population. He also noted the external threats to Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region and the Saudi role as the protector of oilfields and the holy places of Mecca and Medina.

In his prepared testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary Rope noted that the LAV's will replace a similar type of vehicle the Saudis now have and therefore do not "signify an expansion of force structure or mission; it represents the necessary replacement of aging equipment."

Pressed by Representative Benjamin Gilman (Republican from New York) on the issue of who represents an external threat to Saudi Arabia, Covey replied, "it is neither in the Saudi's interest, nor our own, for them to appear to be an easy mark to assault, subversion or other kinds of mischief."

Gilman called the amount of weapons and money involved in the proposed sales "overkill" and questioned the Saudi's ability to absorb the equipment into their defense system. Deputy Assistant Secretary Smith reiterated the administration's position that the Saudi's have legitimate defense needs, the arms will be used for strictly defensive purposes and that the Saudis will have no problem in absorbing the weapons and equipment into their defense system.

Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat from Indiana), the chairman of the House subcommittee on the Middle East, sharply questioned the administration officials as to why the United States has not linked the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia to assurances that it will not deploy the CSS2 Chinese missiles it has in its defense program.

These missiles "pose a real threat to the stability of the area.... We have a major interest in stopping the proliferation of these missiles. Why don't we link" the arms sales to access to the missile sites, Hamilton asked.

The Saudis have assured the United States that the Chinese missiles have not been equipped with non-conventional weapons, Covey answered. Although the Saudi's have issued no assurances that these missiles will not be transferred to another country, the United States "can't plausibly see such a scenario" occurring, Covey said. The United States does not have access to these missile sites, he added.

Pressing on with this issue, Hamilton asked, "Why should we further arm the Saudis if they won't cooperate with us on these missiles?"

The United States "has done quite well in terms of assurances" from the Saudis on the Chinese missiles, Rope said. It is "well understood by the Saudi Government...how strongly we feel about missile proliferation in the Middle East," he said. "Linkages can be

counter-productive. We have made a strong effort on this issue," he added.

Formal notification of the proposed arms sale was issued to the Congress on June 5. Congress has 30 days to consider the three proposals.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stressed the importance of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia in recent speeches to two major Jewish American organization, the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) and B'Nai B'rith. Cheney said Israel will benefit in the long term when nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, are helped by the United States to "satisfy their own legitimate national security requirements."
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

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מאת : מ"מ מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: דף מצפ"א

1. התבטאות בייקר

ב - 13/6 העיד המזכיר בפני ועדת החוץ של הקונגרס. המזכיר חזר על עמדתו (אותה הביע, בין היתר, לאחר הרצח ברשל"צ) לפיה התרבות מעשי האלימות לאחרונה נובעת מהעדר תהליך שלום. לדבריו, כרגע על הצדדים לעלות שוב על דרך השלום. פירוש הדבר שישראל תאמר "כן" לרעיון הדיאלוג עם הפלסטינים, ותעשה זאת בדרך שתאפשר למשלחת פלסטינית ראויה להתגבש. הפלסטינים, מצידם, צריכים להביט מעבר לאבידות ולסבל, על אש"ף להבהיר מחדש התנגדותם לטרור ועל מדינות ערב לסייע ביצירת אוירה תומכת לפיוס ישראלי-פלסטיני.

בהמשך ענה המזכיר לשאלת קונגרסמן מל לוין, ותשובתו עוררה סערה בישראל ובארה"ב. המזכיר אמר כי קשה להבין מדוע לא קיבלה ארה"ב תשובה חיובית לשאלה אם תהיה ישראל מוכנה לשקול הכללת פלסטיני תושב השטחים במשלחת. התנאים המוקדמים הישראליים למו"מ הם כאלה שלא יוכל להיות דו-שיח ולא שלום, וארה"ב אינה יכולה לגרום לדבר להתרחש. "על כולם שם לדעת: מספר הטלפון הוא 1-202-456-1414 (מס' הטלפון של הבית הלבן); כאשר תהיו רציניים בענין השלום, התקשרו עמנו".

תגובות לעדות

ממשל - בדברי הדוברים השונים נכרה נטייה לרכך ולאזן את הדברים, כך שיהיו בעלי גוון מאוזן יותר כלפי הצדדים לסכסוך ולא יצטיירו כביקורת וכאיום בהפסקת המעורבות כלפי ישראל בלבד.

דוברת מחמ"ד בתדרוכה (14/6) הכחישה כי המזכיר קרוב להפסקת מאמצי התווך שלו במזה"ת וחזרה על העמדה כי כל עוד הצדדים יהיו מעוניינים בכך, ארה"ב תשאר מחוייבת לתהליך השלום. בפרשה את דברי המזכיר אמרה כי ארה"ב אינה יכולה לרצות בשלום יותר מהצדדים לסכסוך, וכי לא ניתן להשכין שלום באיזור אם האיזור אינו רוצה בכך.

לשאלות כתבים ענתה הדוברת כי בנותנו את מס' הטלפון התכוון המזכיר לשני הצדדים לסכסוך, ולא לישראלים בלבד.

גם בדברי דובר הבית הלבן מ - 14/6 ניכר נסיון לרכך את הרושם הקשה והחד צדדי של דברי המזכיר: לדבריו, המזכיר אך חזר על העמדה האמריקנית הקבועה לפיה על הצדדים במזה"ת לרצות בשלום כדי שהתהליך להשגתו יתקיים; ארה"ב מוכנה לעזור ולתמוך, אך אינה יכולה לרצות את השלום במקום הצדדים. עוד הוסיף כי ישראל היא בת ברית וחברה נאמנה של ארה"ב, ודבר זה אינו עומד להשתנות. ארה"ב נזהרת מאוד, לדבריו, שלא להצביע על צד כלשהוא כאשם בקיפאון.

<u>התקשורת</u> : התקשורת האלקטרונית והכתובה עסקה בדברי המזכיר בהרחבה ובהבלטה. כל הרשתות שידרו את דבריו של המזכיר שוב ושוב, מלווים בפרשנויות קשות מבחינתנו. בדברי הפרשנות ששודרו הודגשה החומרה שבמילותיו של המזכיר, והעובדה שהם מבטאים את תיסכולי הממשל וציפיותיו מישראל. ברוח זו היו גם תגובות העתונות הכתובה: במאמרים בולטים בוש' פוסט, וש' טיימס, ונ"י טיימס הודגשה חומרת הדברים, האזהרה המובלעת בהם לישראל והעובדה שהם משקפים את כעסה של מחלקת המדינה מחוסר התזוזה באיזור.

<u>ארגונים יהודיים</u> : ב - 14/6 פרסמה ועידת הנשיאים הודעה המבקרת את דברי בייקר. הביקורת הופנתה לעובדה שהדברים נאמרו יום אחד בלבד לאחר הצגת הממשלה, תוך התעלמות מצעד חיובי של אותה ממשלה - נכונותה לקבל שליח מועבי"ט וכן התעלמות מקיצוניות החלטת ועידת בגדד. הממשל גילה סבלנות - אולי מוגזמת - בצפייתו לגינוי אש"פי של נסיון ההתקפה בחוף ניצנים. סבלנות דומה כלפי ממשלתה החדשה של ישראל היתה מועילה יותר. כל הארגונים היהודיים, מלבד האמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס, סמכו ידיהם על הודעה זו.

2. <u>הדיאלוג עם אש"פ</u>

בעת שהייתו באלבמה (20/6) הודיע הנשיא בוש על השעיית הדיאלוג עם אש"ף.

<u>הודעת הנשיא</u>

בהודעתו אמר הנשיא כי בהתבסס על המלצת מזכיר המדינה הוא החליט להשעות את השיחות עם אש"ף עד לקבלת תגובה מספקת מאש"ף על הצעדים שינקוט כדי ליישב את הבעיות הקשורות לפעולת הטרור (פעולת החש"פ 30.5). בהמשך סקר הנשיא את תולדות המו"מ עם אש"ף ואת הדרישות שהציבו בפניו ב - 31/5 (התנערות וגינוי מהמעשה וסילוק אבו-עבאס) כדי שניתן יהיה להמשיך בדיאלוג.

ארה"ב נתנה לאש"ף זמן מספיק לפעולה אך עד כה לא סיפק אש"ף הסברים לפעולה ולא נקט באמצעים המתבקשים. ארה"ב אינה מסתפקת בהתנערות אש"ף מהפעולה ומהגינוי הכללי להתקפות על אזרחים. לדברי הנשיא הדיאלוג בין ארה"ב לאש"ף הוכיח שבאפשרותו לקדם את תהליך השלום, אולם הוא מבוסס על ההנחה שאש"ף מוכן לעמוד בתנאים שקיבל על עצמו בדצמבר 1988. ארה"ב תהיה מוכנה לחדש את הדיאלוג ברגע שאש"ף ינקוט בצעדים הדרושים. בינתיים, אנו מקווים שתהליך השלום ימשך. אנו מאמינים שהשתתפות הפלסטינים הכרחית להצלחת התהליך, ומקווים שהפלסטינים, הישראלים ומדינות ערב יצרו אוירה בה ניתן יהיה לקדם את תהליך השלום משמעותי.
לשאלת כתבים ענה הנשיא כי הצעד אינו סותר את הכרזת המזכיר בעדותו מה-13/6 ואת מכתבו לרה"מ בו העלה שאלות לגבי מידת הרצינות של ישראל לגבי תהליך השלום. זהו צעד המכוון רק נגד טרור. כן אמר שאף שבעלות ברית חזקות של ארה"ב ומדינות ערב המתונות אינן מסכימות עם הצעד, הרי שאש"ף פשוט לא עמד בתנאים שהוצבו, ובנוסף - הדיאלוג יוכל להתחדש, עד כמה שהדבר נוגע לארה"ב, אם ינקטו הצעדים "המתקנים".

הנשיא אמר שההחלטה לא היתה קלה, שכן היה צורך לקחת בחשבון את העובדה שהצעד עלול לשחק לידי הקיצוניים במחנה הערבי וכן שהדיאלוג לא היה בלתי פרודוקטיבי. הדיאלוג סייע בעודדו את המתונים שבפלסטינים ובהבהירו לאש"ף שארה"ב אינה מדינה עוינת; עם זאת, ניתן להצביע עליו כגורם שהביא לתהליך שלום דינמי יותר. לגבי ישראל אמר הנשיא כי הבהיר במכתבו לשמיר שהתהליך חייב להימשך, על אף שהדבר קשה ביותר לישראל. המזכיר בייקר מילא תפקיד הירואי בנסותו לקדם את השיחות, ואנו מקווים שנמשיך להיות לעזר בנושא. הנשיא הדגיש כי התנגדות הממשל להתנחלויות בכלל ולישוב עולים בשטחים בפרט בעינה עומדת, וחזר על הקריאה לכל הצדדים באיזור להימנע מאלימות ולהתרכז בדרכי שלום לסיום הסכסוך.

תגובות

התקשרת : ההודעה זכתה, מטבע הדברים, לכיסוי טלויזיוני מפורט בכל הרשתות. רב הדיווחים הביאו עובדות וציטוטים (דברי בוש, התגובות הישראליות, הערביות ותגובת סנטור דול), ונמנעו מפרשנויות.
חרגה מכלל זה רשת CBS אשר בכתבת רקע ידעה לספר כי לידי הנשיא הגיעה הערכה מודיעינית על ידיעת ערפאת על תכנון הפעולה בזמן הצהרתו על הפסקת הטרור לידיעה זו היה תפקיד בגיבוש ההחלטה. בשיחות עיתונאים עם הדוברת התרכזו דוקא בנקודות שאינן חיוביות לישראל: נושא ההתנחלויות (לנושא זה, אגב, הסב גם ריצ'רד האס ממחמ"ד תשומת ליבו של הציר), הקריאה להפסקת האלימות משני הצדדים, שבחים לערפאת על הכרתו בישראל, והבהרה שהדיאלוג יחודש לאחר תגובה הולמת מאש"ף. עוד הערכה שנשמעה היתה שעתה, לאחר "מחווה" זו לישראל, הטיל הממשל את כל האחריות לקידום התהליך על כתפי ישראל בדרישה ל"תמורה" בויתורים ישראליים.

הקונגרס : בביה"נ כונסו שתי מסיבות עיתונאים, אחת של הדמוקרטים והשניה של הרפובליקנים, שמשכו קהל עתונאים גדול. כל חברי הקונגרס שהשתתפו ברכו על החלטת הנשיא, וקבעו שההחלטה תסייע לישראל להתקדם בתהליך השלום, ושעתה על הממשל להתמקד בהבאת מדינות ערב לשולחן המו"מ. הדגישו שעל ערפאת לגרש את אבו-עבאס מארגונו ולגנות הפעולה.

ארגונים יהודיים : נשיא וועדת הנשיאים בירך על הכרזת הנשיא וקבע שזו "השיבה את האמינות האמריקנית ומנהיגותה במאבק נגד טרור". דברים ברוח דומה פורסמו ע"י כל אחד מהארגונים החשובים בנפרד. בנוסף, כתבו מרבית הארגונים מכתבי ברכה לנשיא בוש.

הרקע להכרזה

להכרזתו זו של הנשיא קדם תהליך שהחל ממש ביום נסיון הפיגוע בחוף ניצנים (ר' דף מצפ"א 67) והמשיך משך שלושת השבועות שעד ל - 20/6 : בדבריו בעדויות בפני ועדת החוץ של הסנט ובפני ועדת החוץ של ביה"נ (13/6) חזר המזכיר על דרישתו מאש"ף להתנער מהמעשה ומטרוריזם בכלל באופן שלא ישתמע לשתי פנים. המזכיר נמנע מלהציב מגבלת זמן להיענות לדרישתו, אך גם אמר שהדיאלוג בסכנה, אם לא ינהג אש"ף כמתבקש.

עתוני שטוקהולם צטט (6/6) את שה"ח השוודי, אנדרסון, שהביע חשש מהפסקה - אולי זמנית - בדיאלוג. נודע עוד כי בשיחה בין נציג מחמ"ד ונציגי ה"טרויקה" האירופאית הביעו האירופאים את דעתם כי אל לארה"ב להפסיק את הדיאלוג.

הקונגרס והסנט התגייסו למאבק בדיאלוג: ביום הארוע שוגר מברק למזכיר עליו חתומים 10 קונגרסמנים ובעקבותיו מברק בחתימת 33 סנטורים (ביזמת סנטור לאוטנברג) בשני המברקים נקרא הממשל להסיק מסקנות מנסיון הפיגוע. בשני הבתים הוצגו הצעות חוק להפסקת הדיאלוג וסנטורים וחברי קונגרס כינסו מסיבות עתונאים בנושא. פרשנים ועוזרים לחברי הקונגרס מעריכים שדאגת הקונגרס נקלטה בממשל.

יצויין עוד, שמאמרים כמעט בכל העתונים החשובים לא חסכו שבטם מאש"ף, וכן הוסיפו שהאמינות האמריקנית בסכנה. תגובות ישראל והארגונים היהודיים, שנחלצו מיד לפעולה, פורסמו בהבלטה רבה.

3. ועידת איפא"ק

בועידת איפא"ק, שהתקיימה בוושינגטון ב - 11/6 נאמו :

מושל וירג'יניה, דגלאס ווילדר, ששמו מוזכר כמועמד מטעם הדמוקרטים למשרת הנשיא או סגן הנשיא; מנהיג הרוב בסנט, סנטור מיטשל; מזכיר ההגנה צ'ייני וסגן הנשיא קוויל.

המושל ביקר קשות את ממשל בוש על יחסו הרך לאש"ף והזכיר את התחייבות הנשיא שלא לדבר עם הארגון כל עוד נמשכת הפעילות הטרוריסטית שלו. עתה מקוים ידידי ישראל בקונגרס כי הממשלה החדשה תתקדם לקראת שלום. הסנטור אמר כי ארה"ב לא תוותר על קשריה עם ישראל כדי "להרוויח" בקשריה עם הערבים. הקרבה בין המדינות אינה ניתנת לערעור, והויכוח הנוכחי אינו אלא תופעה רגילה בין שתי דמוקרטיות.

סגן הנשיא נשא נאום חיובי ביותר. מנה את הדרכים בהן מועילה ישראל לארה"ב, וציין כי הנשיא מעריך את החשיבות האסטרטגית של היחסים ההדוקים בין ישראל וארה"ב ומתכוון להמשיך בכך.

הדגיש את המשותף בהשקפות שתי המדינות לגבי תהליך השלום וביניהן מנה השארות ירושלים כעיר מאוחדת ופתוחה לכל הדתות, כשלא תהיה חזרה לגבולות 1967.

מזכיר ההגנה אמר בדבריו כי ארה"ב נשארת מחויבת להבטחת בטחונה של ישראל והבטת יתרונה האכותי הצבאי. אך היא גם מחוייבת להשגת שלום כולל. בטחונה של ישראל תלוי בתהליך השלום. בטחון אמת לישראל יבוא רק דרך מו"מ מוצלח עם הפלסטינאים עם מדינות ערב שיביא לשום יציב; זו המטרה אליה שואפת ארה"ב.

4. <u>קונגרס - שונות</u>

- ב - 13/6 התקבלה הצעת חוק סיוע החוץ לשת"א 1991 בועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בראשות קונגרסמן אובי. בוטלו השריונים, מלבד לירדן, מצרים, וישראל. לישראל אושר סיוע של 3 מיליארד דולר. החוק יועבר למליאת ביה"נ ב- 26/6. בשיחות שקיימו נציגינו בקונגרס טרם ההצבעה, הובעה מספר פעמים דאגה מניצול כספי הסיוע - והערבויות - לשם בניה בשטחים.

- נציגי המורדים האריתריאים נפגשו עם עוזרי חברי הקונגרס החברים בקוקוס למען יהודי אתיופיה, וציינו בפניהם מחוייבותם לתהליך איחוד המשפחות. עוד נמסר כי חברי הועד האמריקני למען יהודי אתיופיה ימשיכו בלחציהם על הממשל, באמצעות חברי קונגרס, לזרוז יציאת היהודים.

5. <u>ממשל - שונות</u>

בפגישת מזכיר ההגנה צ'ייני עם חה"כ יצחק רבין, העלה שהב"ט לשעבר את הנקודות הבאות :

- הצורך בשימור מערכת היחסים הבטחוניים-אסטרטגיים בין ישראל וארה"ב.

- ישראל כמדינה חזקה מבחינה צבאית היא ערובה לתהליך שלום אמיתי.

- מר רבין ביקש עזרת ארה"ב להמשך פיתוח ה"חץ", שנחיצותו גוברת עתה לאור הצטיידות העיראקים בטילי קרקע-קרקע.

- בנוסף, סקר מר רבין בפני מזכיר ההגנה את המצב הבטחוני במזה"ת, ואת המצב הפוליטי הפנימי בישראל ביחס לתהליך השלום.

מזכיר ההגנה צ'ייני עמד בדבריו על כוונת הפנטגון להמשיך ולטפח את היחסים הטובים עם מערכת הבטחון הישראלית. בנוסף הביע תמיכה בתכנית "החץ" והבטיח לסייע כמיטב יכולתו.

בנאמו בפני ועידת ADL (15/6) אמר מזכיר ההגנה: אף מדינה אינה יכולה להסתכן למען השלום אלא אם היא חשה עצמה בטוחה - וארה"ב מחוייבת לבטחון ישראל. אף שלארה"ב חילוקי דיעות עם ישראל בנושא תהליך השלום, חילוקי דיעות קיימים עם כל בעלות בריתה, שכן אף מדינה אינה מסכימה ב - 100% עם ארה"ב. כן בירך המזכיר את רוה"מ על הרכבת הממשלה והביע תקווה להמשיך ולעבוד עימו בנושא השלום.

6. עסקות נשק עם סעודיה

- הממשל ביקש אישור הקונגרס לעסקות נשק עם סעודיה בסד"ג של כ- 4 ב' $. מרכיבי העסקה כוללים : כ - 1100 שריוניות למשמר הלאומי הסעודי תותחי הוב-צר 155 מ"מ ארוכי טווח, כ- 2000 טילי טאו משופרים, השבחת מטוסי האווקס וטנקי חילוץ עבור השריון הסעודי.

- המשמעות הבטחונית של הרכש הסעודי הנ"ל; בתחום האווירי - שיפור והעמקה של יכולת מערך הגילוי, השליטה והבקרה של סעודיה והגברת יכולת ההתערבות והתרומה הסעודית במיתאר של מלחמה נגד ישראל. טילי הנ"ט המשופרים נועדו נגד שריון ריאקטיבי המצוי כיום לדברי הממשל בידי ישראל בלבד... וכלל לא ברור לשם מה נזקק המשמר הלאומי הסעודי לטיל מתקדם שכזה.

- בנימוקיו בפני הקונגרס מציין הממשל שיש בעסקאות אלה תרומה לבטחון הסעודי לאינטרס האמריקאי ואין בו לערער את המאזן האיזורי או סיכון לישראל. הממשל מציין את הסכנות האורבות לסעודיה מבחוץ איראן-עיראק ומבית טרור המחייבים חיזוק כוחה הצבאי. הוא מציין גם את תרומתה החיובית של סעודיה בתחום המדיני - הפלת חזית הסרוב הערבית לתהליך של חיפוש אחר "הסדר צודק", פעולות להשבת מצרים לליגה הערבית בתנאים של מצרים, תפקיד בהבאתו של ערפאת להצהרת ג'נבה 89, סיוע למען הסדר בלבנון, סיוע לארה"ב ופקיסטן במאבק באפגניסטן, ולאחרונה מיתון הטון בפיסגת בגדד. הממשל גם מדגיש את היתרונות הכלכליים המשמעותיים הנובעים מעסקה זו.

בברכה

ליאורה הרצל

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*ΣΜΜΙΙ Υ.ΣΙ. ΣΙΣΣΙΘ. ΙΣΜΙ.Α ΑΜΑΜΙΙ..Α  ΣΙΙ  ΝΣΙ  ΜΣΝΑ  Ι.Ν  *
*ΙΙ.ΝΖΙΥ ΜΑ ΝΜ,Θ' ΙΙΑ ΙΜ.Σ Σ. ΖΑΑΜΙ ΙΙΙΑΖΜΙ ΖΙΘΑ.Σ  ΙΙ.ΝΖΙΥ  *
*Ψ' ΙΣΜΙ. ΙΑ.ΙΙ.  ΙΙΘΙΜΙ.  ΜΖ  ΙΙ.Ι.Ι  ΣΣΖΙ  ΙΙΙΙΖΜΙ  ΖΙΘΑΣΙ  *
*                                                                      *
*ΙΙΝ .ΙΙΙ ΑΙΙ ΙΙΙΜΙΙ ΙΑΙ.Σ.ΙΙ ΜΖ ΙΑΑΜΖΙ ΣΣΙΜΝ ΙΙΙΙΖ.Ι'        *
*ΑΙΣ' ΝΙ Ν.ΣΙ ΣΑΙΙ ΜΣ..ΣΙ .Ι.Ι ΑΙΣΙ ΖΣΣΖ ΙΙΜ.ΙΙ ΣΖ ΜΙΙ Ν.Ι  *
*ΖΑΑΣΣ.Ι ΙΑΙ.ΣΙ' ΙΜ.Σ ΙΙΑ' Σ. ΙΙΝ  Ν.Μ.Ι  ΙΙΜΣ  ΜΣΙΙ  ΙΜ.ΙΙ  *
*ΣΙΙΙΥ ΙΥΣΙΙ Σ.ΙΙΙ' ΣΙΥΣΙΣ ΖΜΝΖΙ. ΖΥΣ. ΝΣΜΙΙΙ ΑΘΥΜ Σ.Ι ΜΙ,Ι  *
*.ΙΣΖΙ ΖΙΙΙΖ.Α ΜΖ ΑΙΜΣΙΙ ΜΙΜΖΙ. ΖΥΣ.  ΙΣΙΙΙ  ΣΑΥΜ.Α  Ν.Μ..Α  *
*ΜΑΙΙΜ.Ι ΜΖ .ΜΙΝΖ ΖΥΣ. ΙΑΜΙ ΣΙΙΙΖ.Ι ΙΑΙ ΜΑΙΣΣΜ  ΑΝΙΙ,Σ'  ΙΙΑ  *
*ΜΙΙ,Α Ν.ΣΙΙ ΙΙΣΙ ΖΣΙΑ ΙΙΙΙΖ.Ι' ΖΣΙ' ΙΙ ΖΝΙΙ ΜΙΙΑ .ΜΑΜΙ  ΑΙΙ  *
*ΣΣΙΙΑ ΜΙΙΖ.Ι ΙΜΖΙΑ' ΙΙΜΜΜ ΙΑΣΣΙ  ΣΖ.ΣΑ  ΜΖ  ΣΙΜ  ΙΣ.ΣΙ  ΙΙΝ  *
*ΖΣΙΙΙ.Α .ΑΙΙ.Α Μ.Ζ ΙΑΙΥ.ΙΙ ΝΖΝ ΝΑ .ΙΙΙΣΙ ΜΙΙΙ,Α ΝΣΙ ΑΜΙΣ.Ι  *
*ΝΖΙ ΙΑ ΜΙΣΙ.ΝΙ ΖΑΜΣΙ ΙΣΙΖ.Α.' ΙΑΑΣΣ.Ι Ν.ΣΙ ΙΙΙΝΙ  ΖΙΣΣΑ  ΜΙΣ  *
*ΙΑΑΜΖΙ ΙΙΙΙΜΙ ΣΣΙΣΣ ΖΣΑΙ ΖΣΣΜ ΜΑΙΙΙ ΙΙΙΜΙΙ - ΑΙ ΥΑ  ΜΣΙΜΝ.Α  *
*ΙΣΣΙΙΑΙ (ΙΙΙ,Α' ΜΙ ΙΣΑΑΙΣ) ΙΖΣΙ Ν.ΣΙ  ΑΣΣΖ.Α  ΙΜΑΙΙ  ΣΝ.ΖΙ  *
*ΙΙΖΣ ΣΣΣΙ ΑΙΙΖΙ.ΙΙ ΙΑΙΣΣ.ΙΙ ΣΑΑΜΖΙ ΙΙΙΙΜΙ  ΘΜΖΙ  ΥΑ  ΣΑΑΜΖΙ  *
*ΖΥΣΣΙΜ ΑΙ.Σ.ΙΙΜΙ ΣΙΙΣΣΑΝΙ.ΙΙ Σ.ΣΙΙΙ.ΙΙ ' ΙΜ.Σ  ΙΙΙΑ'  Σ.  ΙΙ.  *
*ΙΑΑΜΖΙ ΙΝΙ.Ι ΙΣΣΙΣΣ ΖΣΙΑΙ ΖΙΙΜΝΙΥΣΙΙ  ΙΣ.  ΜΖ.ΙΑ  ΖΙΜΣΙΜ  ΜΙ  *
*ΙΣΙ.Ι ΜΖ ΜΙ,Ι ΙΙΙΙΜ ΣΑΣΑ ΣΣ.ΑΙΙ ΖΙΘΑΣ.Ι)' ΣΙΥΙΣΣ ΖΙΜΙΙΙ. Σ.  *
*ΙΘΙΑΣ.Ι ΣΥΙΙ ΣΙΣΣ.Ι ΜΖ ΙΙΙ,Α ( ΙΝ.ΙΙ ΙΙΙ,Α ΣΥ,ΙΙΑΖΑ ΘΙΑΑ'  *
*Ζ.ΜΙΝΖ ΙΜ.Σ ΙΙΑ  ΜΖ.ΣΙ  ΜΖ  ΙΜΣΣ.Ι  ΣΣΙ  ΜΖ.Ι  ΜΖ  ΙΣΣΣΙΙΙ  *
*Ε' ΖΙΜΙΙΙ. ΙΣΣΣΙΙΙ.ΙΙ ΙΙΙΙΣΙΙΙ ΜΝ.Ι ΣΙ  ΙΙΙΙΙ  ΖΙΜΣ.Ι  ΑΑΙ.Α  *
*                                                                      *
*ΣΣΙΝ ΙΜΙ ΣΑΙ. ΘΙΑΣ.'                                                *
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* ΜΙΜΡ 2    ΑΜΙΓ 2                                                     *
* ΓΡ 3    3 ΓΙΜΑ                                                       *
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*ΝΑ ΖΝΙ' ΙΜΣΣ.Ι ΖΝ ΑΙΥ.Μ Μ.Μ ΑΜΑ ΣΜΜΙΙΣΙΙΙ ΣΙΙΖ.Ι Ι.ΙΙ ΖΣΙ  *
*ΙΜΙΣΙΙ ΜΖ ΑΑΜΖΙ .ΜΙΝΖ ΙΣΙΖΙΑ' ΝΙΑΙ ΙΜΣΣ.Ι ΖΙΣΣ.Ι ΜΖ  ΙΙΑ'  *
*ΜΣΙΣΖ ΖΙΜΜ.Ι ΣΜΜΙΙΣΙΙΙΙ ΣΙΙΖ.Ι Σ. ΝΣ ΝΣΙ ΑΜΙΣ..Σ.Α  ΖΜΑΙΜ  *
*ΣΝΜΙΙΙΙΙ ΙΙΜΙΣΙ ΜΙ.Ν ΖΙΣΑ.ΑΑΣΑ.Ι  ΜΑ  ΑΙ  ΜΝΣΙ  ΧΙ.Σ.Α  ΣΙ.  *
*.ΜΙΝΖ Ν.ΣΙ ΑΙΣΣΙ ΖΙΜ.Σ ΜΖ ΙΜΝΖΙ ΙΣ,Ζ'  ΝΙ  ΖΜΙΑΑ  ΣΝΙ  .Μ  *
*ΖΙΑ.Ζ ΟΑΖ ΣΣΙ ΙΜΣ.Σ ΖΙΝ ΝΙ ΣΙΑΑ ΙΜΝΖΙ ΣΑΙΜΣ.Σ ΣΑΙΙΙΙ'  ΝΑ  *
*.ΜΙΝΖ ΜΝΣΙ ΜΙ..Ι ΑΑΙ.Σ.Α ΖΙΜΙΣΙ ΜΖ  ΙΜΝΖΙ  ΜΖΣΙ'  ΣΙ.  ΖΝ  *
*ΣΙΙΙΜ ΑΝ.ΙΣΙ ΣΙ. ΜΣΙΣΖ  ΖΙΜΜ.Σ  ΣΙΙΖ.Ι'  ΑΙΣΙ  ΙΙ.  ΖΜΜΜΖΙ  *
*ΣΑ.Α ΙΙΣΣΙΙΙ ΜΙΙΜΙΣΙ ΑΧΑ.Α ΜΙΙΙ,Α .ΝΑΙ ΖΣΙ ΙΝΙ ΙΣΙ .ΣΙ.Ι ΑΙ  *
*ΣΙΙΙΜ ΑΙΛ' ΙΝΑ ΜΙΙ ΙΙΙ,Α ΑΣΙΙ Σ. Ν.Ι ΙΙΝ .ΣΙΖ  ΖΙΜΜ.Ι  ΜΖ  *
*Ζ' ΝΣΙ ΙΣΝΣΙ Σ.ΙΙ ΙΙΙΙΖ.Ι ΙΑΙ.Σ. ΜΙ ΖΣΣΙΙΙΙ ΜΣΙ  ΙΙΝ  ΙΙΑΑΜ  *
*                                                                      *
*ΙΙΑΑΣΙΖ ΜΖ ΙΜΣΣ.Ι Ι.Ν .ΜΙΝΖ'                                       *
*ΙΙΣΙΙ.Α ΝΣΙ ΑΜΙ.Μ ΝΜ.ΣΙΙ ΖΑΙΜΣΙΙΙ'  ΜΙΣΣΙΙΣΙ  ΙΜ.ΣΙ.Ι  ΖΣΑΙ.  *
*ΜΙΙ ΙΙΑΖΜΙ.ΣΝ.Α Σ.ΜΙΝΖ' ΜΑ ΙΝΙ' ΙΙΙΙΙ Σ. ΙΙΣΣΜΙ  ΜΣΙ  ΣΝΑΙΙ  *
*ΣΖΣΙ' ΝΖΝ ΣΑ.ΙΜΙΙ ΖΣΖ ΙΖΙΙ.Α ΙΑΜΙΙΣ.Α ΣΑΣΙΙΙ' ΖΙ.' ΑΙ.ΣΙΙ  *
*ΙΑΙ.ΣΙ' ΜΜ' ΙΙΑ ΜΝΖ ΖΣΙ ΖΙΝΙΙ ΙΣΣΙΙΙ ΣΑΙΙΣΙ.Ι  ΣΖΖ.  .ΜΙΝΖ  *
*1' ΣΙΥΙΣΙ ΖΣΣΙΙΙ ΜΙΜΜΜΙ. ΣΝΙΣΣ.Ι ΜΙ ΙΙΣΣΑΝΙ.ΙΙ.Ι ΜΖ  ΑΣΣ.Ι  *
*                                                                      *
*ΖΙΖΙ ΑΜ.ΙΙ ΙΙ ΑΙ (14.6) ΜΙΑΝΙ Μ.ΣΙΙΘΝ ΑΑΙΜ (9.4)  :ΟΙΙ Ο.ΣΙ ΙΙ  *
*                                                                      *
*ΑΝΙ: ΙΜΥΙ.Ι ' ΙΙΜ.ΣΥΑΙΙ                                             *
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*ΝΖ: ΙΙ,Α ' ΜΙ,Ι                                                      *
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*Ι'Ι'Σ'                                                                *
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*ΑΙΙ. Σ.ΙΙΙ / Α..Ι.                                                   *
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*ΣΙ:Θ                                                                 *
*ΙΙΙ:Θ ΥΑ:ΧΘΝ                                                         *
*Α-:ΙΙΙΜ'ΣΙ:ΣΙΟΣ'ΙΝ:Α'ΑΥ:ΣΣ'1930:ΝΙ'150690:ΝΙ'2105'ΙΙ:Α'ΑΥ:ΣΣ          *
*.ΜΙ.Ο:ΙΙΙΑΜ/617/ΑΑΣΣ/1256                                            *
*ΝΖ:ΙΑΜΙΙΙ                                                            *
*ΙΙΙΖΟ:ΖΖ1256'9                                                       *
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*                                                               **    *
* ΜΙΜΡ 2    ΑΜΙΓ 2          ΑΙΙ. Σ.ΙΙΙ          ΣΣΙΑ **              *
* ΓΡ 1    3 ΓΙΜΑ                                                     *
*   ΙΙΝΙ.Ι : 06'ΣΣΣ.90                                               *
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[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:13632
אל:רהמש/617
מ-:וש,נר:2105,תא:150690,זח:1930,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבב
סודי ביותר / מיידי

ח.ר.ב.

אל: רה'מ , שה'ח

מאת: השגריר , וושינגטון

להלן משיחה טלפונית אתמול (14.6) עם דניס רוס:

1. בתגובה לבקורת שהשמעתי באוזניו עת התבטאויותיו של מזכיר המדינה, טען רוס שאל לנו לראות הבקורת כמופנית כלפי ישראל בלבד, אלא כמיועדת לכל הצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך, קרי, מדינות ערב והפלשתינאים בישראל. עם זאת, הודה כי ההקשר שבו נאמרו הדברים אכן מעניק אמינות לפרשנות, שהכתובת העיקרית לבטוי התסכול של המזכיר היא ישראל.

2. אנו הבאנו ביחד התהליך המדיני עד לנקודה שבה הוא הופסק בחודש מרץ, ואם עתה רוה'מ סבור כי אין הוא יכול להמשיך על בסיס ההבנות שהושגו מצפים שרוה'מ יאמר לנו זאת וכן יבהיר מה נדרש מאיתנו כדי שנוכל להמשיך בתהליך. מובן הרי לממשלת ישראל שאנו עדיין ממתינים לתשובה על השאלה שלנו, כדי לא להטיל ספק בכך המזכיר קרא את נוסח השאלה בפומבי בעדותו. אם ישראל אינה מוכנה להשיב על השאלה הנ'ל, אך לעומת זאת יש באמתחתה תשובה שהיא קונסיסטנטית עם מה שאנו צריכים כדי שנוכל להמשיך במעורבותנו בתהליך כי אז אנו מעוניינים לשמוע תשובתה של ממשלת ישראל ובהקדם, אומר המזכיר לדבריו של רוס. אם לאו, המזכיר לא מרגיש שיש טעם במעורבותו בתהליך ויתן לכך בבוא העת בטוי פומבי.

3. להערותי הבקורתיות החוזרות שאין זו הדרך להעביר מסרים לישראל השיב רוס שליבו של המזכיר כבד עליו על הבקורת הפומבית נגדו בדבריו של רוה'מ (ראיון רוה'מ בג'רוסלם פוסט, דבריו של שה'ח החדש בטקס כניסתו לתפקיד). בתגובה להערותי כי הממשלה ראויה וזקוקה לזמן להתארגנות וכי עליהם להמנע עד לגבוש מדיניותה בהתבטאויות ביקורתיות , השיב רוס, כי הרי חלק נכבד מהדמויות המרכזיות בממשלה החדשה פעלו גם בממשלה הקודמת (רוה'מ, שר הבטחון) ולכן אינם מקבלים העמדה כאילו הממשלה החדשה זקוקה לזמן לגבש עמדות חדשות - מה גם שנושאים אלה הם שהביאו למשבר הפוליטי. המזכיר אינו רוצה להכנס שוב לברורים יסודיים של הסוגיות אלא אם יווכח שרוה'מ אכן מעוניין בקדום תהליך השלום. החשש המקנן בליבם של בוש וביקר הוא שרה'מ איננו רוצה לקדם התהליך. לכן, רק לאחר שהם ישמעו מהן עמדותיה של ישראל לגבי המשך התהליך ומה שמתבקש מארה'ב, הם יוכלו להחליט על מחשבות שהעלתי לגבי הצורך במגעים אישיים בדרג הגבוה ביותר. בתגובה לשאלתי לגבי אפשרות מפגש בין שה'ח למזכיר המדינה, השיב רוס, כי הוא אישית חושב שזהו רעיון טוב, אך איננו בטוח שבייקר יהיה מוכן לקבל הרעיון כל עוד אין הוא יודע מהן ההצעות המדיניות של הממשלה בנושא התהליך.

4. הבעתי תמיהתי והפתעתי על דחיית קבלת ההחלטה להפסקת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ. רוס השיב כי למעשה ההחלטה להפסיק הדיאלוג

בהעדר גינוי קונקרטי וצעדים משמעותיים נגד אבו עבאס היא לדעתו בלתי נמנעת, אך לנוכח פניות שהגיעו אליהם ממס' מדינות אירופאיות לתת שהות נוספת בידי עראפת הוחלט לתת שהות נוספת על למתן הודעה פומבית.

רוס סבור שלא ניתן היה להתעלם מפניה זו של מדינות כמו בריטניה , שבדיה, צרפת ואחרות. אך אינו מאמין כי הדחייה תביא לשינוי כלשהו. הזכרתי לו כי עברו למעלה משבועיים מאז נסיון הפגוע ודחייה נוספת בקבלת החלטה פורמלית לגבי הפסקת הדיאלוג רק פוגעת באמינותה של ארה'ב ובמחויבותה למאבק נגד הטרור.

ארד

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

סססס

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:13632
אל:רהמש/617
מ-:ווש,נר:2105,תא:150690,זח:1930,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר / מיידי

ח.ר.ב.

אל: רה'מ , שה'ח

מאת: השגריר , וושינגטון

להלן משיחה טלפונית אתמול (14.6) עם דניס רוס:

1. בתגובה לבקורת שהשמעתי באוזניו עת התבטאויותיו של מזכיר המדינה, טען רוס שאל לנו לראות הבקורת כמופנית כלפי ישראל בלבד, אלא כמיועדת לכל הצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך, קרי, מדינות ערב והפלשתינאים בישראל. עם זאת, הודה כי ההקשר שבו נאמרו הדברים אכן מעניק אמינות לפרשנות, שהכתובת העיקרית לבטוי התסכול של המזכיר היא ישראל.

2. אנו הבאנו ביחד התהליך המדיני עד לנקודה שבה הוא הופסק בחודש מרץ, ואם עתה רוה'מ סבור כי אין הוא יכול להמשיך על בסיס ההבנות שהושגו מצפים שרוה'מ יאמר לנו זאת וכן יבהיר מה נדרש מאיתנו כדי שנוכל להמשיך בתהליך. מובן הרי לממשלת ישראל שאנו עדיין ממתינים לתשובה על השאלה שלנו, כדי לא להטיל ספק בכך המזכיר קרא את נוסח השאלה בפומבי בעדותו. אם ישראל אינה מוכנה להשיב על השאלה הנ'ל, אך לעומת זאת יש באמתחתה תשובה שהיא קונסיסטנטית עם מה שאנו צריכים כדי שנוכל להמשיך במעורבותנו בתהליך כי אז אנו מעוניינים לשמוע תשובתה של ממשלת ישראל ובהקדם, אומר המזכיר לדבריו של רוס. אם לאו, המזכיר לא מרגיש שיש טעם במעורבותו בתהליך ויתן לכך בבוא העת בטוי פומבי.

3. להערותי הבקורתיות החוזרות שאין זו הדרך להעביר מסרים לישראל השיב רוס שליבו של המזכיר כבד עליו על הבקורת הפומבית נגדו בדבריו של רוה'מ (ראיון רוה'מ בג'רוסלם פוסט, דבריו של שה'ח החדש בטקס כניסתו לתפקיד). בתגובה להערותי כי הממשלה ראויה וזקוקה לזמן להתארגנות וכי עליהם להמנע עד לגבוש מדיניותה בהתבטאויות ביקורתיות , השיב רוס, כי הרי חלק נכבד מהדמויות המרכזיות בממשלה החדשה פעלו גם בממשלה הקודמת (רוה'מ, שר הבטחון) ולכן אינם מקבלים העמדה כאילו הממשלה החדשה זקוקה לזמן לגבש עמדות חדשות - מה גם שנושאים אלה הם שהביאו למשבר הפוליטי. המזכיר אינו רוצה להכנס שוב לברורים יסודיים של הסוגיות אלא אם יווכח שרוה'מ אכן מעונין בקדום תהליך השלום. החשש המקנן בליבם של בוש וביקר הוא שרה'מ איננו רוצה לקדם התהליך. לכן, רק לאחר שהם ישמעו מהן עמדותיה של ישראל לגבי המשך התהליך ומה שמתבקש מארה'ב, הם יוכלו להחליט על מחשבות שהעלתי לגבי הצורך במגעים אישיים בדרג הגבוה ביותר. בתגובה לשאלתי לגבי אפשרות מפגש בין שה'ח למזכיר המדינה, השיב רוס, כי הוא אישית חושב שזהו רעיון טוב, אך אינו בטוח שבייקר יהיה מוכן לקבל הרעיון כל עוד אין הוא יודע מהן ההצעות המדיניות של הממשלה בנושא התהליך.

4. הבעתי תמיהתי והפתעתי על דחיית קבלת ההחלטה להפסקת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ. רוס השיב כי למעשה ההחלטה להפסיק הדיאלוג

בהעדר גינוי קונקרטי וצעדים משמעותיים נגד אבו עבאס היא לדעתו בלתי נמנעת, אך לנוכח פניות שהגיעו אליהם ממס' מדינות אירופאיות לתת שהות נוספת בידי עראפת הוחלט לתת שהות נוספת על למתן הודעה פומבית.

רוס סבור שלא ניתן היה להתעלם מפניה זו של מדינות כמו בריטניה , שבדיה, צרפת ואחרות. אך איננו מאמין כי הדחייה תביא לשינוי כלשהו. הזכרתי לו כי עברו למעלה משבועיים מאז נסיון הפגוע ודחייה נוספת בקבלת החלטה פורמלית לגבי הפסקת הדיאלוג רק פוגעת באמינותה של ארה'ב ובמחויבותה למאבק נגד הטרור.

ארד

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

סססס

13375 תאריך: 16.06.90

דף 1 מתוך 2

עותק 2 מתוך 2 סודי ביותר נכנס **

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חוזם:6,13375

אל:המשרד

יעדים:רהמש/615

מ-:וש,נר:2101,תא:150690,זח:1200,דח:מ,סג:סב

תח:@ גס:צפא

נד:@

סודי ביותר/מיידי

חרב

אל : ראש הממשלה

שר החוץ

דע : מנכל ראה'מ'

מזכירות הממשלה

ללא תפוצה נוספת

מאת: א. רובינשטיין

1. משיחה עם דניס רוס (13/6 - השכם בבוקר, דיווח על שיחות אחרות יימסר בנפרד).

השיחה היתה שעות אחדות לפני דברי המזכיר בקונגרס:

א. חזרתי והצרתי, בהמשך לשיחה קודמת, שלא יעבירו לנו מסר מדיני שיגרום בעיות וקשיים מיותרים ('בקשה לתשובה' לשאלת בייקר), לפני שתהיה הזדמנות לשוחח עמם בימים הקרובים על כל הנושאים במסגרת הממשלה החדשה שבקושי הספיקו שריה לאיש משרדיהם. אמרתי שאנו מבקשים זאת בכל לשון. אמר כי ינסה אך הוא מסופק. סיפר לי כי שוחח עם בייקר בעקבות שיחתנו מן היום הקודם ובייקר מסופק בכלל לגבי יעילותן של התייעצויות חדשות עמנו, כולל באמצעות רוס (שהעלה עוד לפני כן ובשיחתנו הקודמת רעיון של ביקורו והוא חשב שכדאי שיוזמן בכתב) עם זאת, אם אינו יודע שהדבר יוביל למקום כלשהו ושיש תקוה ממשית למשהו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2

עותק 2 מתוך 2

ולא למבוי סתום, כי אם הדברים מכוונים 'למשוכ' אין בכך טעם. רוס הוסיף, כי עוד לפני שיגיע מכתב משהח לבייקר, עשוי להגיע מסר מן המימשל. (הערה: בדיעבד יש להבין כי כנראה כבר היתה ההכנה לאקט של ההופעה. החלפנו כאן דברים על אפשרות ביקור ס/רה'מ' ושהח בקונגרס). אמר שהדבר נראה לו. רוס הוסיף, כי לו עצמו יש בעיה אישית כיוון שהוא זה ששיכנע את הנשיא והמזכיר כי גישתנו רצינית, אך נוכח החדשים האחרונים מצבו בעייתי.

2. אחר הצהריים, משנודעו דברי המזכיר בקונגרס, שוחחתי אתו ברוח קשה, שהדבר כולו היה מיותר מתחילה ועד סיף, מכל הבחינות. אמר שלא היתה הכוונה אלינו בלבד, אלא לכל הצדדים. אמרתי, שהנזק נעשה והבעדה תהיה גדולה, אך רצוי שיסבירו אצילו זאת. אמר שהוא מוכן שעתונאים ישראלים יתקשרו מייד. בשאלה לאן הולכים הלאה, דיברנו על-כך שיהיה צורך להפגיש את שהח עם בייקר בהקדם.

רובינשטיין

לב

תפ: רהמ,שהח

* תאריך : 6.8.88
* דף 1 מתוך 2
* עותק 1 מתוך 4 סודי ביותר נכנס **
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*חוזם:6,13375
*אל:המשרד
*יעדים:רהמש/615
*מ-:וש,נר:2101,תא:150690,זת:1200,דת:מ,סג:סב
*תח:@ גס:צפא
*נד:@
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*סודי ביותר/מיידי
*
*חרב
*
*אל : ראש הממשלה
*שר החוץ
*
*דע : מנכל ראה'מ'
*מזכירות הממשלה
*
*ללא תפוצה נוספת
*
*מאת: א. רובינשטיין
*
*1. משיחה עם דניס רוס (13/6 - השכם בבוקר, דיווח על שיחות
*אחרות יימסר בנפרד).
*השיחה היתה שעות אחדות לפני דברי המזכיר בקונגרס:
*
*א. חזרתי והפצרתי, בהמשך לשיחה קודמת, שלא יעבירו לנו מסר
*מדיני שיגרום בעיות וקשיים מיותרים ('בקשה לתשובה' לשאלת
*בייקר), לפני שתהיה הזדמנות לשוחח עמם בימים הקרובים על כל
*הנושאים במסגרת הממשלה החדשה שבקושי הספיקו שריה לאייש
*משרדיהם. אמרתי שאנו מבקשים זאת בכל לשון. אמר כי ינסה אך
*הוא מסופק. סיפר לי כי שוחח עם בייקר בעקבות שיחתנו מן היום
*הקודם ובייקר מסופק בכלל לגבי יעילותן של התייעצויות חדשות
*עמנו, כולל באמצעות רוס (שהעלה עוד לפני כן ובשיחתנו הקודמת
*רעיון של ביקורו והוא חשב שכדאי שיוזמן בכתב) עם זאת, אם
*אינו יודע שהדבר יוביל למקום כלשהו ושיש תקוה ממשית למשהו

*
* דף 2 מתוך 2
* עותק 1 מתוך 4
*
*ולא למבוי סתום, כי אם הדברים מכוונים 'למשוכ' אין בכך טעם.
*רוס הוסיף, כי עוד לפני שיגיע מכתב משהח לבייקר, עשוי להגיע
*מסר מן המימשל. (הערה: בדיעבד יש להבין כי כנראה כבר היתה
*ההכנה לאקט של ההופעה. התלפנו כאן דברים על אפשרות ביקור
*ס/רה'מ' ושהח בקונגרס). אמר שהדבר נראה לו. רוס הוסיף, כי
*לו עצמו יש בעיה אישית כיוון שהוא זה ששיכנע את הנשיא
*והמזכיר כי גישתנו רצינית, אך נוכח החדשים האחרונים מצבו
*בעייתי.
*
*2. אחר הצהריים, משנודעו דברי המזכיר בקונגרס, שוחחתי אתו
*ברוח קשה, שהדבר כולו היה מיותר מתחילה ועד סוף, מכל
*הבחינות. אמר שלא היתה הכוונה אלינו בלבד, אלא לכל הצדדים.
*אמרתי, שהנזק נעשה והבערה תהיה גדולה, אך רצוי שיסבירו
*אפילו זאת. אמר שהוא מוכן שעתונאים ישראלים יתקשרו מייד.
*בשאלה לאן הולכים הלאה, דיברנו על-כך שיהיה צורך להפגיש את
*שהח עם בייקר בהקדם.
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*רובינשטיין
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*לב
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*תפ: רהמ,שהח

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:13375
אל:רהמש/615
מ-:ווש,נר:2101,תא:150690,זח:1200,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/מיידי

חרב

אל : ראש הממשלה
שר החוץ

דע : מנכל ראה'מ'
מזכירות הממשלה

ללא תפוצה נוספת

מאת: א. רובינשטיין

1. משיחה עם דניס רוס (13/6 - השכם בבוקר, דיווח על שיחות אחרות יימסר בנפרד).
השיחה היתה שעות אחדות לפני דברי המזכיר בקונגרס:

א. חזרתי והפצרתי, בהמשך לשיחה קודמת, שלא יעבירו לנו מסר מדיני שיגרום בעיות וקשיים מיותרים ('בקשה לתשובה' לשאלת בייקר), לפני שתהיה הזדמנות לשוחח עמם בימים הקרובים על כל הנושאים במסגרת הממשלה החדשה שבקושי הספיקו שריה לאייש משרדיהם. אמרתי שאנו מבקשים זאת בכל לשון. אמר כי ינסה אך הוא מסופק. סיפר לי כי שוחח עם בייקר בעקבות שיחתנו מן היום הקודם ובייקר מסופק בכלל לגבי יעילותן של התייעצויות חדשות עמנו, כולל באמצעות רוס (שהעלה עוד לפני כן ובשיחתנו הקודמת רעיון של ביקורו והוא חשב שכדאי שיוזמן בכתב) עם זאת, אם אינו יודע שהדבר יוביל למקום כלשהו ושיש תקוה ממשית למשהו ולא למבוי סתום, כי אם הדברים מכוונים 'למשוכ' אין בכך טעם. רוס הוסיף, כי עוד לפני שיגיע מכתב משהח לבייקר, עשוי להגיע מסר מן המימשל. (הערה: בדיעבד יש להבין כי כנראה כבר היתה ההכנה לאקט של ההופעה. החלפנו כאן דברים על אפשרות ביקור ס/רה'מ' ושהח בקונגרס). אמר שהדבר נראה לו. רוס הוסיף, כי לו עצמו יש בעיה אישית כיוון שהוא זה ששיכנע את הנשיא והמזכיר כי גישתנו רצינית, אך נוכח החדשים האחרונים מצבו בעייתי.

2. אחר הצהריים, משנודעו דברי המזכיר בקונגרס, שוחחתי אתו ברוח קשה, שהדבר כולו היה מיותר מתחילה ועד סוף, מכל הבחינות. אמר שלא היתה הכוונה אלינו בלבד, אלא לכל הצדדים. אמרתי, שהנזק נעשה והבערה תהיה גדולה, אך רצוי שיסבירו אפילו זאת. אמר שהוא מוכן שעתונאים ישראלים יתקשרו מייד. בשאלה לאן הולכים הלאה, דיברנו על-כך שיהיה צורך להפגיש את שהח עם בייקר בהקדם.

רובינשטיין

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח

סססס

13200 תאריך: 15.06.9[illegible]
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 4 מתוך 20 סודי ביותר יוצא

חוזם:6,13200
אל:וש/224,נ/96,רהמש/577,אביב/940,מנמת/690
מ-:המשרד,תא:150690,זח:1624,דח:ב,סג:סב
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: השגריר , וושינגטון.
הקונכל , ניו יורק.

ארה'ב-ישראל - תהליך השלום.

1. בנפרד הועבר אליכם לשמוש גלוי נייר מקיף הכולל חזרה על מחויבותה של ישראל לתהליך השלום, לתוכנית השלום ולחשיבות הדיאלוג עם ארה'ב למטרת קידום תהליך זה.

2. במקביל מבקשים כי בתדרוכי רקע (לא לייחוס למקורות ישראליים), ובתגובה על דברי מזכיר המדינה לא תמתח בקורת על המזכיר. יש להתרכז בבקורת עניינית על הצורה והתוכן של התבטאותו החריפה בהופעתו לפני ועדת חוץ של בית הנבחרים.

3. מוצע כי תדרוכי הרקע יתמקדו לאורך שלושת הצירים דלהלן:

א. בעוד הממשל מגלה סבלנות וסובלנות רבה כלפי הצד השני ובודק באורך רוח אחריות אש'פ לנסיון הפגוע של פלג אבו-עבס, הוא מגלה חוסר סבלנות לגבי ממשלת ישראל שזה אך הוקמה, ולא היה סיפק בידה לגבש מדיניותה ולנהל דיאלוג עם הממשל.

ב. על צד המהות מתעלם הממשל האמריקאי משאלות כבדות משקל כמו השאלה מי באמת מעכב את תהליך השלום. הסרבנות הערבית כפי שבאה לידי ביטוי בפיסגת בגדד, התגובה הערבית ההיסטרית נגד העליה ונסיון הפיגוע בחופי הארץ הן רק דוגמאות לרקע הסביבתי מאפיין את אזורנו לאחרונה.

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 4 מתוך 20

ג. מטרתה של ישראל היא קידום תהליך השלום בהסתמך על יזמת השלום שלה. רה'מ שה'ח וכל דובריה של הממשלה חזרו על מחוייבותנו המלאה לכך. מסלול ההדברות עדיף על מסלול העימות, שלא ישרת את המטרות המשותפות של ארה'ב וישראל.

4. כאמור, יש להמנע מהסלמת הרטוריקה ומהתייחסויות אישיות.

5. כל הנ'ל כאמור לתדרוכי רקע בלבד ובודאי לא להתייחסות רשמית מצדנו.

מצפא-הסברה

לב

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),בנצור, מצפא,רביב,הסברה,סייבל,סולטן

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:13200
אל:רהמש/577
מ-:המשרד,תא:150690,זח:1624,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: השגריר , וושינגטון.
הקונכל , ניו יורק.

ארה'ב-ישראל - תהליך השלום.

1. בנפרד הועבר אליכם לשמוש גלוי נייר מקיף הכולל חזרה על מחויבותה של ישראל לתהליך השלום, לתוכנית השלום ולחשיבות הדיאלוג עם ארה'ב למטרת קידום תהליך זה.

2. במקביל מבקשים כי בתדרוכי רקע (לא לייחוס למקורות ישראליים), ובתגובה על דברי מזכיר המדינה לא תמתח בקורת על המזכיר. יש להתרכז בבקורת עניינית על הצורה והתוכן של התבטאותו החריפה בהופעתו לפני ועדת חוץ של בית הנבחרים.

3. מוצע כי תדרוכי הרקע יתמקדו לאורך שלושת הצירים דלהלן:

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5. כל הנ'ל כאמור לתדרוכי רקע בלבד ובודאי לא להתייחסות רשמית מצדנו.

מצפא-הסברה

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),
בנצור,מצפא,רביב,הסברה,סייבל,סולטן

סססס

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:13370
אל:רהמש/593
מ-:המשרד,תא:150690,זח:2010,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב

BALMAS/BAHUL

EL: WASHINGTON, TSIR HASBARA, DOVERET
KONKALIM

YISRAEL, ARHAV VETAHALICH HASHALOM.

LEHALAN NEYAR BANOSEI SHEHUCHAN LASHIMUSHCHEM.

ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

FOLLOWING U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S COMMENTS IN CONGRESS ON JUNE 13, THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE:

'NO OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD HAS DONE MORE FOR PEACE AND NO OTHER COUNTRY HAS SACRIFICED SO MUCH FOR PEACE AS ISRAEL. THEREFORE, THE TONE OF THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS IS SURPRISING, AS IF THERE ARE NO SERIOUS INTENTIONS FOR PEACE HERE. THE PRIME MINISTER, UPON PRESENTING HIS GOVERNMENT TO THE KNESSET, REITERATED A NUMBER OF TIMES THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE INITIATIVE OF MAY 1989 REMAINS IN FORCE, AND THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS CUSTOMARY IN THE WORLD TO GIVE A 100-DAY PERIOD OF GRACE TO A NEW GOVERNMENT. WE DID NOT RECEIVE EVEN 100 HOURS OF GRACE, AND A LITTLE PATIENCE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HARMFUL, SO THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POLICY.

'ISRAEL IS CONFIDENT THAT THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND US WILL CONTINUE AS BEFITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES SO THAT WE CAN FIND THE BEST PATH FOR ADVANCING TOWARDS PEACE.'

THE POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS TO GIVE THE PEACE PROCESS TOP PRIORITY AND TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND UNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE POLICY OBJECTIVES WERE GIVEN FULL EXPRESSION IN THE BASIC POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED ON JUNE 11, 1990, AND IN PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR'S ADDRESS TO THE KNESSET UPON PRESENTING HIS GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE ALSO VOICED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY ON JUNE 13.

THE BASIC POLICY GUIDELINES STATE THE FOLLOWING REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS:

* THE GOVERNMENT WILL PLACE THE DESIRE FOR PEACE AT THE TOP OF ITS CONCERNS AND WILL NOT SPARE ANY EFFORT IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE.

* THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS ALONG THE LINES OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AGREED UPON AT CAMP DAVID, AND OF ITS PEACE INITIATIVE OF MAY 5, 1989, IN ITS ENTIRETY.

* ISRAEL WILL ENCOURAGE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARABS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA TO TAKE PART IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

* ISRAEL WILL CALL UPON ALL THE ARAB STATES TO ENTER INTO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO TURN OVER A NEW LEAF IN THE REGION, SO THAT IT MAY PROSPER AND FLOURISH.

* THE GOVERNMENT WILL ACT FOR THE FURTHERANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH EGYPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO STATES.'

ON THE SUBJECT OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, THE GUIDELINES DECLARE:

* THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AND WILL SEEK TO DEEPEN THEM IN ALL AREAS, INCLUDING STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

ADDRESSING THE KNESSET ON JUNE 11, PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR STATED THE FOLLOWING REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS:

'THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE INCLUDE GOOD PROPOSALS TO THIS END (PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS).

'THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO PEACE AND THE FURTHERANCE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, THE AIM OF WHICH IS (TO ACHIEVE) TRUE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS. OUR STRIVING TOWARD PEACE AND OUR BELIEF IN THE BLESSINGS INHERENT IN PEACE, DO NOT STEM FROM MILITARY WEAKNESS OR FEAR OF POLITICAL PRESSURE. WE HAVE STRETCHED OUT OUR HAND IN THE PAST AND WE DO SO IN THE PRESENT AS WE WILL IN THE FUTURE, TO OUR ARAB NEIGHBORS. WE WILL GLADLY ACCOMODATE ANYONE WHO WISHES TO LIVE WITH US IN PEACE. TO THIS END WE WILL WORK VIGOROUSLY.

'THE HISTORY OF WARS AND PEACE TREATIES CLEARLY SHOW THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT DIALOGUE IN ENDING A WAR OR STATE OF WAR AND IN ACHIEVING PEACE BETWEEN PEOPLES AND STATES.'

ON THE SUBJECT OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, PRIME

MINISTER SHAMIR SAID:

'THE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE A CORNERSTONE IN ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY. WE BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL IS THE UNITED STATES' MOST RELIABLE ALLY IN OUR COMPLEX AND TENSION-FILLED REGION.

'WE ARE CONVINCED THAT CLOSE AND FRUITFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE WILL TRY TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY TO CONVINCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OF THE JUSTNESS OF OUR POSITION AND WE WILL STRIVE TOWARD UTMOST UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION, IN ORDER TO FURTHER PEACE IN THIS, OUR REGION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL WORK HAND IN HAND WITH THE U.S. TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN VARIOUS FIELDS; THE STRATEGIC FIELD, REALIZATION OF THE FREE TRADE ZONE AGREEMENT, AND CLOSE COORDINATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA.'

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY, UPON TAKING OFFICE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON JUNE 13, STATED THE FOLLOWING:

'THIS PEOPLE (ISRAEL) HAS KNOWN A PERIOD OF PIONEERING, HAS KNOWN A PERIOD OF TREMENDOUS IMMIGRATION, OF MASSIVE ABSORPTION, HAS KNOWN PERIODS OF DISTRESS, AND HAS MET THE GREAT AND DIFFICULT CHALLENGES OF ALL PERIODS. HOWEVER, ONE THING HAS UNITED IT AND KEPT IN ITS HEART A LIVING HOPE -- ITS ASPIRATION FOR PEACE. ...IF WE HAVE NOT REACHED PEACE TO THIS VERY DAY AS WE WOULD LIKE -- WITH EVERYONE -- THIS IS BECAUSE OF THE REFUSAL OF THE ARAB STATES TO REACH A RECONCILATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL -- THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL -- AND TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES AT ANY PLACE AND AT ANY TIME, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS... THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS ACTED AND WILL ACT TO EXAMINE WAYS FOR ADVANCING ITS PEACE INITIATIVE... ISRAEL WANTS PEACE, AND WILL SEARCH EVERY WAY.

SPEAKING ON U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE 'MUST BE CANDID BETWEEN US.'
'THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN US, BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SUCH SPECIAL RELATIONS -- THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.

'WE SHALL HAVE TO WORK, TO WORK HARD, SO THAT THESE THINGS WILL BE MILESTONES TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING AND THE STRENGTHENING OF UNDERSTANDING, FOR RENEWING THE DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT -- VITAL. WE WANT THE SAME THING -- THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE.'

AD KAN.

HASBARA/MEYDA

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל,רהמ,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,מעת,
הסברה

ססס

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:12976
אל:רהמש/564
מ-:המשרד,תא:150690,זח:1313,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
13102

בלמ'ס/בהול לא להזעיק

אל: כל הנציגויות

דברי מזכיר המדינה בייקר

להלן דברים שאמר אתמול יועץ רה'מ לתקשורת, אבי פזנר:

אין מדינה אחרת בעולם שעשתה יותר למען השלום ואין מדינה אחרת שהקריבה כל כך למען השלום כמו ישראל. לכן, מפתיעה נימת דבריו של המזכיר, כאילו אין פה כוונות רציניות לשלום. רה'מ, בהציגו הממשלה לפני הכנסת, חזר מספר פעמים על כך שמחוייבותנו ליוזמת השלום של מאי 89' בעינה עומדת ושנעשה כמיטב יכולתנו לקדם תהליך השלום. נהוג בדרך כלל בעולם לתת מאה ימי חסד לממשלה חדשה. לא קיבלנו אפילו מאה שעות של חסד וקצת סבלנות לא היתה מזיקה, כדי לתת לממשלה החדשה זמן לגבש מדיניותה.
ישראל בטוחה שהדו-שיח בינה לבין ארה'ב יימשך כיאה לידידים ובעלי ברית על מנת למצוא הדרך הטובה ביותר להתקדם לשלום.

מנהל הסברה

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,אוקיאניה,מצרים,
מצפא,אסיה,מאפ,אמלט,מזתים,ארבל2,הדרכה,
מעת,הסברה,ממד,אירו1,אירו2,לעמ,ארבל1,פרנ,מזאר

סססס

1990-06-15 15:45 KESHER-WASHINGTON 1480126 02

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פבוק	עמ': 1 פתוח: 4
סווג: שמור		
תאריך ושעת תעבור: 15.6.90 15:30	אל: לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רה"מ	
פס' פבוק: המסרד: 1268	דע: מצפ"א	
	כאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון	

סנטור מצנבאום.

ראו-נא מכתביו לרה"מ ולשה"ח.

לשכת השגריר

שהם קשרים רחב גשם גלגל בשאר בעבור
2 1 3 1 1 1 2

תפוצה: 7

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Ohio

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

1268 2/4

2

June 7, 1990

His Excellency Moshe Arens
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Moshe:

On several occasions I've attempted to share with you and other representatives of the Israeli government my concern about the dwindling support for Israel in the United States Congress. The enclosed letter from Congressman Louis Stokes speaks for itself. Louis Stokes is a long-time member of the United States Congress and a most respected member of the Congressional Black Caucus. He was formerly Chairman of the House Ethics Committee as well as the House Intelligence Committee. I've known him for a period of years and have nothing but the highest regard for him.

I can't tell you strongly enough that the "Bob Dole's" of the senate aren't the problem as I see it, because they're out in the open. What does concern me are the dozens of continuing comments that I pick up from my colleagues in both the House and the Senate.

This letter is not intended to urge you to take any specific action, but one. Getting to the peace table itself would be extremely helpful. I need not comment on the other issues that have been brought to your attention. You are more aware of them than I. However, the point is: our support for Israel is in jeopardy.

As you already know, you have my continued support and concern.

Very sincerely yours,

Howard M. Metzenbaum
United States Senator

cc: Yitzhak Shamir

Howard M. Metzenbaum
Ohio

United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

-3

1268
3/4

June 7, 1990

His Excellency Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister
Republic of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

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As you already know, you have my continued support and concern.

Very sincerely yours,

Howard M. Metzenbaum
United States Senator

cc: Moshe Arens

4

1268 4/4

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

LOUIS STOKES
TWENTY-FIRST DISTRICT
OHIO

May 25, 1990

Honorable Howard Metzenbaum
United States Senate
140 Russell Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Howard:

As you know you and I have stood together for many years on issues related to Israel and the entire Middle East problem. I continue to be committed to the necessity for the United States to be committed to the existence and protection of Israel in her role as our greatest ally in the Middle East.

However, recent events in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are distressing; abhorrent and intolerable. Many of my colleagues in the House are now discussing these events with much regret.

I share this concern with you because as a friend and colleague I know how much time and effort you have devoted to bringing about peace in the Middle East. I personally urge you to not only continue your efforts in this regard but to do so with a sense of urgency.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Member of Congress

LS/jl

דחיפות: מיידי	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1 מתוך: 5
סיווג: שמור	אל: מצפ"א, תל אביב	
תז"ח: 151800		
מס מברק: 1191	דע: וושינגטון	
49- ווש	מאת: לשכת הקונכ"ל	

מצ"ב דברי דיק צ'יינ'י שנאם היום בא"צ של ה-ADL בנוכחות חה"כ יצחק רביו.

בטי ארנברג

15.6.90

שהה סלטה רחג שהבל בשל בנשמה בנשמה בנבנו
קבוצה הלהבים נתת רק אותן רבים בעת הסברה

מ. [illegible]

תאריך: שם השולח: מל אל נרס אישור:

1191-49 2/5

SUMMARY OF MEETING
SPEECH MADE BY DICK CHENEY
ADL NATIONAL COMMISSION MEETINGS
LUNCH WITH YITZCHAK RABIN
NEW YORK CITY
JUNE 15, 1990

Secretary Cheney began by stating that in view of the recent changes in Eastern Europe causing easing of tensions and lowering of threats, the choices the United States makes now in terms of policy direction will define this direction in the future for a long time.

Perestroika in the Soviet Union still has a long way to go and Soviet military capability is still impressive. Its capabilities, like all military capabilities, has taken a long time to be built. The democratic reforms will positively affect Soviet military attitudes as democratic countries are less prone to extreme shifts of direction - the Soviet reforms will be good for Soviet internal affairs but also good for international behaviour. Systems that use aggressive force at home also do abroad. The Soviets are heavily built up militarily and the direction towards internal reform has begun but it has a long way to go. James Baker has said that democracy in the USSR is the best guarantee of solving international problems.

These would be the desired immediate steps we'd like to see and would be good indicators that the necessary changes are truly taking place:

1) A better response to the Baltic states desiring freedom
2) An end to the ecomomic blockade of Lithuania
3) Honoring promises to speak out forcedfully against anti-Semitism
4) Free immigration for Soviet Jews
5) Verifiable arms reduction treaties

We are optimistic that changes are possible.

German Reunification

The reunification is inevitable and at hand. It is easy to understand why Jews would be uneasy about this. The World Jewish COngress took a difficult step and met in Berlin, emphasizing that it is important not to forget but it is also time to talk about the future. Helmut Kohl and the FRG have taken

many steps to confront the past and as soon as democratic elections took place in the GDR acknowledment of their responsibility during the Holocaust occurred. A unified Germany should be in NATO in order to keep stability.

Israel

No country can take risks for peace unless it feels secure - the U.S. remains commited to Israel's security - it is a commitment that remains solid and unshakable.

We are also interested in pursuing a peace settlement. Weapons and technology cannot achieve peace - talks must take place as well. The US and Israel have differences of opinion about the peace process but we have differences with all of our allies - no one agrees 100% of the time.

The underlying plan was the Shamir plan. We congratulate the Prime Minister on the new government and look forward to working with him in seeking peace.

Changes in Eastern Europe

How will these changes affect Israel? There are many fears and misconceptions about the US role in the global sweep. In 1983 the US and Israe signed a strategic co-operation agreement. There is a day-to-day sharing of information and working relationship - this was not meant only to involve heads of state. There are a number of research and development projects that are ongoing, including SDI. Financially, Israel is the largest foreign participant in the SDI program.

Our relationship doesn't flow in one direction - the U.S. derives a great deal of benefits from this co-operation.

The U.S. defense budget is shrinking, but we can co-operate more to use the funds wisely. Fortunately, the basis for strong co-operation has not changed. The situation in the USSR has not changed that much as of yet nor has it in other parts of the world. Terrorism, low-intensity conflicts, the sophisticated weapons of mass destruction that have proliferated all command our attention and energy.

Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lybia are trying to develop advanced missiles which might be used in carrying chemical, biological, nuclear and conventional warheads. U.S. allies and bases across the board could be threatened. Iran and Iraq used hundreds of ballstic missiles in their war - they claim to possess chemical weapons, have threatened Israel with them, and have recently televised the testing of a stage of a booster rocket. SDI should be supported to deter ballistic missiles - it is the best hope of defense against proliferation of a third world missile threat.

The defense budgget can and will be cut but not irresponsibly - the US global interest and commitments must be kept up. There are other eruptions globally that threaten US and allied interests and they will require US military power.

The U.S. commitment to Israel is unshakable but our commitment is only as good as our ability to back it up. Some friends of Israel wish to weaken the defense budget - that is irresponsible, and a contradiction to safeguarding Israel's security - both Israel and the U.S. would suffer.

Q & A

1) In light of your interest in Israeli security, why sell a $4 billion package of arms to the Saudis?

A - Tanks will not tip the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel's security depends in part also on the other Middle East nations feeling secure as well. We made a mistake in the past with the Saudis and they went elsewhere to buy arms. They also have legitimate national security requirements.

2) a) What are we doing in order to prevent France and Germany from supplying chemical weapons to our enemies? b) What are we doing to cut the amount of sensitive technology we are selling to the USSR and Eastern European countries?

A - a) The President is working agressively on a world-wide chemical weapons ban. There is significant progress on this. A chemical ban treaty for the US and USSR is a tougher problem.

b) We have agreed to relax some of the standards for Eastern European countries but distinguish between them and the USSR. Many Eastern European countries are now democracies, severing ties with the KGB. Investors will be needed there to advance democracy and will want to use the technology - we will be cautious. The USSR still supports Castro, still have nuclear warheads pointed at us - it is different.

Q - Why has the US goaded the Israelis to the peace talks and not done the same with the Arab League?

A - The US has worked hard in the past 18 months on the peace process, on the Shamir proposal, to start the talks. We are ready to pick up where we left off when the government fell. We will continue to try to move things forward. The people in the region have to want that, too.

Q - In view of Arafat's failure to condemn the PLO raid on Tel Aviv beaches, is the US ready to stop the dialogue with the PLO?

A - We are concerned with the PLO's failure to do that but we have the matter under review - no decision yet.

End.

BETTY EHRENBERG
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL, NEW YORK

12795 תאריך : 15.06.90

** נכנס סודי /
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חוזם:6,12795
אל:המשרד
יעדים:רהמש/555,מצב/1237,אביב/910,מנמת/668
מ-:ווש,נר:2098,תא:140690,זח:1800,דח:מ,סג:10
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

סודי /מיידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דע: לשכת רוה"מ, לשכת שה"ח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

פגישת דיניץ וראש מטה הבית הלבן ג'ון סנונו

בפתיחת השיחה אמר דיניץ כי הוא שמח על המפגש ועל האפשרות לדווח על פעילות הסוכנות היהודית בנושא העלייה, שהוא הנושא החשוב ביותר העומד על סדר היום הלאומי של מדינת ישראל. פעילות הסוכנות מתבטאת במספר תחומים:

1. הסוכנות מחזיקה עתה שני משרדים ואחד עשר שליחים בבריה"מ המלמדים עברית ומכינים את העולים לקראת עליתם ארצה. לדוגמא: בחודשים האחרונים הם קיימו קורסים לכ-850 רופאים סוביטיים לקראת בואם לארץ.

2. ארגון עליתם וסדרי הסעתם של העולים, דרך הונגריה רומניה פולין ופינלנד.

3. סיוע לעולים בשלבי קליטתם.

דיניץ הביע הערכתו לנשיא בוש ולממשל האמריקאי על תמיכתם ופעלותיהם למען הבטחת חופש ההגירה מברי"הם. הוא ציין חשיבות מאמצים אלה במיוחד על רקע הלחצים של מדינות ערב להביא

להפסקת העלייה. התנגדותם של הערבים אינה להתישבות העולים בשטחים אלא התנגדות כוללת לעצם בואם לישראל. עובדה אין שחר לטענה כאילו פוגעים בזכויותיהם של הפלשתינאים או מנשלים הערבים מזכויותיהם. עובדה היא לשמעלה מ-65 אלף עולים עלו ארצה מאז אפריל 1989 עד סוף מאי 1990 ורק 215 עולים התיישבו בשטחים, כלומר פחות מחצי אחוז. אין כאן אלא נסיון מצד הערבים ליצור דמוי של פגיעה בזכויותיהם בפועל אין בזה אמת. בתשובה לשאלתו של סנונו ציין כי הנתון הנ"ל איננו כולל את העולים שמתגוררים בירושלים וציין שבתקופה לעיל נקלטו בירושלים כ-2687 עולים שהם כ-7.1אחוז מכלל העולים. דיניץ הדגיש כי בפעילותה של הסוכנות אינם מבחינים בין מזרח למערב ירושלים. לשאלה נוספת של סנונו כיצד מתיישבים דברים אלו עם הקביעה שהסוכנות היהודית איננה משקיעה כספים כלשהם מעבר לקו הירוק הבהיר יו"ר הנהלת הסוכנות והח"מ את עמדת ישראל בנושא ירושלים ואת תחומי גבולותיה המוניציפליים של ירושלים כפי שנקבעו בסוף יוני 1967.

בשלב זה של השיחה הצטרף ג'נרל סקוקרופט.

סנונו התעניין לדעת על פרוייקטים של מר רייכמן מקנדה לפיו הוא מתכוון להשקיע כספים רבים לצורך הקמת מערכת חינוך יהודית ופעולות אחרות למען הקהילה היהודית המתכוונת להשאר בבריה"מ ובקש לדעת מה יחסו של דיניץ לנושא ומה צריכה להיות גישתה של ארה"ב.

דיניץ השיב כי אכן רייכמן וכן הרב יעקוביץ מבריטניה סבורים שעתה זה הזמן לבנות מחדש את חיי הקהילה היהודית בברה"מ. בדצמבר 1989 ציין דיניץ, התקיים מפגש ראשון של ראשי הקהילות היהודיות בבריה"מ ושם אומנם נדונו נושאים קהילתיים כאלה, אך המסר החד משמעי של כל המשתתפים - ובמיוחד בשחות שבשולי דיוני המפגש היה שהרוב הגדול והמכריע מעוניינים לצאת ולעלות לישראל. באשר להצהרות הערבים כאילו העלייה מגדילה הסכויים למלחמה השיב דיניץ כי ההפך הוא הנכון - העלייה רק מחזקת את
הסכויים לשלום וחוזקה של ישראל. הוא עצמו תמיד האמין שישראל תנהל מו"מ לשלום רק מעמדה של עוצמה ולא תחת איומים של מלחמה. עלייה והעולים מוסיפים לישראל תחושה של בטחון וישראל איתנה יותר תהיה נכונה להיות נדיבה יותר בהקשר של מו"מ לשלום. ערבים המעוניינים בשלום עם ישראל היו צריכים לעודד את העלייה משום שזה יחזק את האלמנט לשלום בישראל. עם עוד מליון עולים יהיה קשה יותר לזרוק אותה לים. ג'נרל סקוקרופט ציין שאכן סכויי השלום טובים יותר עם ישראל חזקה, אך הסכויים

לשלום ישברו רק אם יהיה ברור היכן העולים מתיישבים. עובדה היא שהערבים פוחדים וחוששים שישראל תצור עובדות בשטחים ושום הסכם שלום שיבוא לאחר מכן לא יוכל לשנות מציאות זו.

דיניץ השיב כי הסוכנות היהודית איננה מוציאה כסף בשטחים והנתונים שציין על המס' הזעום של העולים שהולכים לגור בשטחים מצביעים שאין לזה שחר.

סקוקרופט: '' אם כך מדוע שישראל לא תצא בהצהרה שכל עת שימשך המו"מ לשלום, ישראל לא תיישב עולים בשטחים''.

סנונו הוסיף שהצהרה כזו תקל על שתוף הפעולה בין ישראל לארה"ב במטרה לקדם את המטרה המשותפת והיא: הוצאת היהודים מבריה"מ.

דיניץ השיב כי בפועל אין נטייה בין העולים מבריה"מ ללכת להתיישב ביו"ש. הוא התייחס להצהרה שנתן בישראל (אשר היתה ידועה למארחים) כי לנוכח החשיבות העליונה של נושא העליה, על הממשלה לנקוט בכל הצעדים שיבטיחו שלא יפגע חופש היציאה והעלייה מבריה"מ, אך אין הוא יכול לדבר בשם ממשלת ישראל.
הח"מ חזר וציין הצהרותיו של רוה"מ שאין לממשלת ישראל מדיניות של הכוונות עולים לשטחים וכי בפועל זהו מאמץ מצד הערבים לתאר איום שאיננו קיים בפועל. דיניץ התייחס לדבריו של הנשיא מובארק לגורבצ'וב כדי שהאחרון יפעיל השפעתו על בוש להגדיל שת מכסת העולים מבריה"מ שיוכלו להכנס לארה"ב.
בסיום השיחה הודה שוב מר דיניץ לנשיא בוש ומחמ"ד על מאמציהם בהבטחת יציאה בטוחה של יהודי בריה"מ ובסדורים הלוגיסטיים בבירות במעבר במזרח אירופה. לסכום, ברור היה משיחה שסנונו וסקוקרופט מוטרדים למדי מהמסרים המתקבלים אצלם מראשי מדינות ערב בנושא העלייה ובקשו לעמוד בשיחה זו על מרחב התמרון שלהם מולנו ולסכויים ''להוציא'' מאיתנו הבהרה נוספת על מדיניות הממשלה בנושא זה מעבר להצהרות שניתנו ע"י רוה"מ ושרים אחרים בסוגייה זו.

ארד

לב

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),
ממר/ביולן,בנצור,מצפא,גוברין,מזארז

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:12703
אל:רהמש/531
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:148,תא:140690,זח:1520,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפ'א ,מע'ת , ממ'ד

דע: יועץ רוה'מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהבט לתקשורת, לעמ
פרנ, מזאר, אמן/מנמת - ר' משמרת , דובר צהל,ניו יורק.

מאת : עתונות וושינגטון

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום : 14.6.90

חלק 1 מתוך 2.

Q ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, FOLLOWING UP THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY YESTERDAY BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE --

MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM. (IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.)

Q -- IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY IS CLOSE TO SUSPENDING HIS ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT?

MS. TUTWILER: NO. HE SAID CLEARLY THAT AS LONG -- WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE HAS SAID EVER SINCE HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THIS OVER HIS TENURE HERE AS SECRETARY OF STATE -- AS LONG AS THERE IS SINCERE INVOLVEMENT AND DESIRES ON THE BEHALF OF THOSE PARTIES, HE WILL BE ENGAGED. AND THAT IS THE EXACT MESSAGE THAT HE WAS STATING AGAIN YESTERDAY.

Q WELL, THE QUESTION ARISES BECAUSE SOME TIME AGO, I GUESS IT WAS ALMOST A YEAR AGO, YOU SAID THAT WHEN THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO MORE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS HE WILL MAKE PUBLIC THE -- HIS QUESTIONS TO THE VARIOUS PARTIES. YESTERDAY HE DID MAKE PUBLIC ONE OF THOSE QUESTIONS, THE FINAL ONE --

MS. TUTWILER: CORRECT.

Q -- AND GOING BACK TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT IT WOULD SEEM, THEN, THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP.

MS. TUTWILER: WRONG. HIS MESSAGE YESTERDAY, WHICH I DON'T NEED TO INTERPRET FOR YOU, SAYS THAT WE CANNOT WANT PEACE MORE THAN THE PARTIES. WE CANNOT BRING PEACE TO THE REGION IF THE REGION DOES NOT WANT IT. THAT WAS WHAT HE WAS ARTICULATING. HE DID NOT SAY IT ANYWHERE

THAT I HEARD IN YESTERDAY'S TESTIMONY, OR THE DAY BEFORE, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, THAT HE WAS THROWING IN THE TOWEL. HE IS NOT, BUT HIS CLEAR MESSAGE WAS -- IS, WE CAN'T WANT THIS MORE THAN THE PEOPLE ON THE GROUND IN THE REGION, AND THAT YES HE IS -- WILL AND INTENDS, AS THE PRESIDENT, TO STAY ENGAGED, INVOLVED AS LONG AS THERE WAS A REASON TO BE.

Q WHAT IS HE DOING PRECISELY TO BE ENGAGED AND INVOLVED?

MS. TUTWILER: I CAN'T POINT TO A SPECIFIC THAT HE PERSONALLY IS INVOLVED IN AT THIS MOMENT IN TIME, NORM, BUT AS YOU KNOW HE HAS WORKED VERY, VERY HARD AND GIVEN AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF HIS TIME AND ENERGY TO THIS EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE AND HE IS WILLING TO CONTINUE TO DO SO.

Q MARGARET, YESTERDAY HE GAVE A VERY PUBLIC MESSAGE TO THE ISRAELIS. DID HE GIVE ANY PRIVATE MESSAGE PRIOR TO THAT? WAS THERE ANY PRIVATE COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO THAT PUBLIC MESSAGE WITH THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SINCE IT WAS FORMED?

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q WHY DID HE CHOOSE TO MAKE HIS FIRST COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SO PUBLIC?

MS. TUTWILER: HIS FIRST COMMUNICATION WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS NOT THAT, ALAN. HE SENT ON MONDAY A CONGRATULATORY LETTER TO THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT IN THE CONGRATULATORY LETTER THE CUSTOM IS THAT YOU DO NOT, IN YOUR CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES, IMMEDIATELY DELVE INTO SUBSTANCE. SO, AS FAR AS COMMUNICATION, HE HAS COMMUNICATED, ON MONDAY TO HIS NEW COUNTERPART IN ISRAEL.

Q WELL WHY WAS HIS FIRST SUBSTANTIVE COMMUNICATION IN PUBLIC?

MS. TUTWILER: AS HE SAID WHEN HE BEGAN HIS EXPLANATION YESTERDAY, HE HAD JUST READ A NUMBER OF WIRE REPORTS ON PUBLIC COMMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, BY THE NEW POLICE MINISTER, BY THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, THEY WERE VERY PUBLIC COMMENTS AND HE IN TURN DECIDED TO RESPOND PUBLICLY HIMSELF.

Q WELL, I AM VERY FLATTERED AS A WIRE REPORTER THAT YOU PUT SUCH CREDENCE IN OUR REPORTING, BUT SURELY, I MEAN, THE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC PROCESS THAT YOU, YOURSELF HAVE FOLLOWED IN THE PAST WOULD BE TO CLARIFY THESE THINGS FIRST THROUGH YOUR OWN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND THEN REACT.

MS. TUTWILER: HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ON THE RECORD YESTERDAY THAT HE HAS NOT CONSISTENTLY SAID IN PRIVATE.

Q MARGARET, IF I COULD FOLLOW-UP ON THIS --

MS. TUTWILER: EXCUSE ME, THERE WERE NO SURPRISES IN WHAT

HE SAID, ALAN. IT MAY HAVE BEEN A SURPRISE TO YOU BECAUSE HE PUT IT ON THE RECORD, THE QUESTION, FOR INSTANCE, ET CETERA. BUT HIS VIEWS ARE -- ON THE PEACE PROCESS ON THIS QUESTION ARE VERY WELL-KNOWN IN ISRAEL.

Q IS IT THE SECRETARY'S VIEW THEN THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF WIRE SERVICES? I'M VERY HAPPY IF IT IS, BUT -- (LAUGHTER) --

Q YOU JUST SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S BELIEF (IS) THAT AS LONG AS THE PARTIES ARE WILLING TO CONTINUE, THE US AND HE WILL. WHAT HE SAID YESTERDAY LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES -- THAT'S ISRAEL -- DOES NOT WANT TO CONTINUE AND THAT'S WHY HE GAVE THEM THE NUMBER TO CALL WHEN THEY DECIDE TO RETURN OR RESUSCITATE THE PEACE PROCESS? IS THAT A WRONG UNDERSTANDING?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT'S YOUR INTERPRETATION AND YOUR CONCLUSION AND IF YOU WILL LOOK CLOSELY AT HIS PUBLIC TRANSCRIPT, HE'S SAID ANY NUMBER OF TIMES 'PARTIES' IN THE PLURAL, AND SAID, 'WE CANNOT WANT PEACE MORE THAN THE PARTIES THERE IN THE REGION.' THAT'S A PLURAL THAT HE SAID AND IT'S IN THE PUBLIC TRANSCRIPT.

Q BUT DON'T YOU THINK HE WAS A BIT TICKED OFF WITH THE ISRAELIS MORE THAN OTHER PARTIES? LIKE HE REFERS THIS TELEPHONE NUMBER -- BY THE WAY, THE WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD REFERRED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT SWITCHBOARD.

MS. TUTWILER: AND HE SENT ROSES TO THE WHITE HOUSE OPERATORS THIS MORNING.

Q CHANGE THE NUMBER. BUT HE REFERRED THIS --

Q THAT WON'T DO IT.

Q MARGARET, HE REFERRED THIS TELEPHONE NUMBER TO THE ISRAELIS.

MS. TUTWILER: THAT IS YOUR INTERPRETATION. HE --

Q THIS IS IN THE TEXT.

MS. TUTWILER: I'VE READ THE TEXT. I KNOW WHAT HE THINKING WAS, WHAT HIS INTENTION WAS, IS, 'IF YOU'RE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, THERE IS ONLY SO MUCH THAT WE CAN DO. WE HAVE WORKED HARD. WE HAVE TRIED. YOU ALL, HERE'S THE NUMBER. CALL US, IF YOU'RE SERIOUS.' (PARAPHRASING.)

Q THIS WAS DIRECTED ONLY TO THE ISRAELIS OR TO ALL SIDES?

MS. TUTWILER: I'VE ANSWERED, I THINK, NOW THREE TIMES THIS MORNING. HE TALKED ABOUT ALL PARTIES --

Q WHEN HE OFFERED THE TELEPHONE NUMBER?

MS. TUTWILER: EXCUSE ME. LET'S ALSO FOCUS -- SINCE YOU'RE FOCUSING ON ONE TESTIMONY YESTERDAY BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, LET'S ALSO REMIND OURSELVES THAT HE PUBLICLY AT THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS (SIC, RELATIONS) COMMITTEE PUBLICLY STATED ON THE RECORD THE TWO THINGS THAT HE HAS STATED TO THE EPLOF THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ASKING THEM AND PUT THAT RIGHT OUT THERE ON THE RECORD AND SAID EXACTLY WHAT HE EXPECTED FROM THEM.

Q SO HE'S OFFERING THE TELEPHONE NUMBER TO ALL THE SIDES?

Q THAT PHONE NUMBER WAS PLAINLY TO THE ISRAELIS AND NOT TO ANYBODY ELSE.

MS. TUTWILER: WELL, I HAVE ASKED HIM AND I HAVE SAID, 'DID YOU MEAN TO PINPOINT SPECIFICALLY THE ISRAELIS?' HIS ANSWER TO ME WAS, 'I INTENDED THE PHONE NUMBER TO BE USED BY ALL.'

Q WHICH PARTIES YOU ARE MEANING --

Q (OFF MIKE.)

Q -- THE PLO? EEGYPTF?

MS. TUTWILER: OUR CHANNEL IS -- IS PELLETREAU.

Q WHICH PARTIES YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT? CAN YOU BE SPECIFIC?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT GOING TO BE ANY MORE SPECIFIC --

Q PLO? EGYPT? ARE ISRAELIS EGYPT NOW --

MS. TUTWILER: -- THAN THE PEOPLE THAT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN TRYING TO PURSUE PEACE HERE.

Q YOU SAID, AS LONG AS THERE ARE SINCERE DESIRES BY THOSE ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS --

MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM.

Q -- THE US WILL BE -- WILL REMAIN INVOLVED. ARE YOU SAYING, THEREFORE, THAT YOU DO BELIEVE RIGHT NOW THAT ISRAEL HAS A SINCERE DESIRE TO BE ENGAGED, AND IS THAT THE MESSAGE THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO GET ACROSS?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK FOR ISRAEL, BUT I DO NOT HAVE ANY REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT HAS EMERGED IS NOT SINCERE IN WORKING TOWARDS PEACE.

Q BUT HAVE YOU HAD ANY -- HAVE YOU HAD ANY RESPONSE OR REPLY PRIVATELY FROM THE ISRAELIS SINCE THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY?

MS. TUTWILER: THE SECRETARY HAS NOT. I'M SURE THAT OFFICIALS HERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUREAU HAVE TALKED, AS

IS NORMAL, WITH OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS. BUT I DON'T HAVE A SPECIFIC FOR YOU.

Q NO, I'M TALKING ABOUT A SPECIFIC RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL IN PRIVATE --

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q -- NOT THEIR PRESS STATEMENT -- TO THE SECRETARY ABOUT HIS TESTIMONY YESTERDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: NOT THAT I AM AWARE OF, JOHN, NO.

Q THE NEW ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION MISREAD THE ISRAELI POSITION, ON MR. SHAMIR'S PLAN, ACCORDING TO THE STORY THIS MORNING. WILL YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT, THAT YOU MISREAD THEIR INTENTION, AND YOU CAME WITH YOUR POINTS AND PLANS?

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT I AM REALLY GOING TO REFRAIN FROM DOING, I AM NOT GOING TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET OR SAY FOR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT FROM THIS PODIUM WHAT THEY DO OR DO NOT MEAN. YOU CAN GET THAT FROM SOMEPLACE ELSE.

Q THE SECRETARY AND THE US SPOKESPERSONS HAVE SAID MANY TIMES THAT THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT -- NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT -- TO BE FORMED.

MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM. (IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.)

Q THERE IS A NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT NOW.

MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM. (IN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.)

Q ARE YOU STILL WAITING FOR THEM TO REPLY TO MR. BAKER'S -- TO SECRETARY BAKER'S QUESTION? OR ARE YOU GOING TO ASK THEM TO REPLY? WHAT'S NEXT?

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT WE HAVE SAID CONSISTENTLY, SINCE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FELL -- I BELIEVE IT WAS, WHAT, THREE MONTHS AGO? -- WHEN ASKED THIS QUESTION, 'WHERE DO YOU ANTICIPATE PICKING BACK UP?' WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY ON THE RECORD ANSWERED, 'WE WOULD HOPE THAT WE WOULD PICK UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF.'

THE SECRETARY YESTERDAY STATED AND PUT ON THE RECORD FOR ALL OF YOU THE QUESTION THAT -- WHICH IS WHERE WE LEFT OFF. THAT IS OUR HOPE IS WHERE WE WOULD BEGIN AGAIN.

Q NOW, WHAT IS NEXT THEN, MARGARET? EXCUSE ME. WHAT -- I MEAN, ARE THE ISRAELIS WAITING FOR YOU TO PROCEED, OR ARE YOU WAITING FOR THE ISRAELIS TO PROCEED?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT EXACTLY SURE WHAT YOU'RE ASKING ME.

Q WHAT I'M ASKING IS -- IN A WAY, ACTUALLY, I'M ASKING MY QUESTION ONCE AGAIN. THERE IS AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

MS. TUTWILER: CORRECT. AND WE HAVE SAID, AND THE

PRESIDENT HAS SAID, WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS EMERGED.

Q OKAY, BUT YOU ALSO SAID PREVIOUSLY, MARGARET, THAT YOU WERE -- WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED, YOU WOULD BE WAITING TO HAVE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE FIVE POINTS OF SECRETARY BAKER. YESTERDAY, IN A WAY, THE ISRAELIS SAID THIS IS ALL GONE, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO START FROM ZERO.
MS. TUTWILER: THE FIVE POINTS WERE AGREED TO.

Q I'M SORRY?

MS. TUTWILER: THE FIVE POINTS, IF YOU REMEMBER, WERE AGREED TO. THIS IS ANOTHER QUESTION, THIS WAS THE QUESTION.
Q OKAY, OKAY, BUT --

MS. TUTWILER: WE HAD HAD AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE FIVE POINTS, REMEMBER?

Q ALL RIGHT. MARGARET, LET ME ACTUALLY PHRASE IT ONCE AGAIN, THEN. THE ISRAELIS YESTERDAY SAID, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE AMERICAN PLAN IS FINISHED, IS -- IN A WAY WE HAVE TO GO TO GROUND ZERO. THEN, DO YOU WAIT FOR THEM NOW TO COME WITH NEW PROPOSALS, OR WHO IS GOING TO START THE PEACE PROCESS ONCE AGAIN?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT WILL BE A DECISION THAT WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MAKE. WE HAVE BEEN VERY CONSISTENT, AS I JUST STATED TO YOU, OF WHERE WE HAD SAID WE HAD HOPED TO PICK BACK UP WHEN A NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT EMERGED.

(CROSS TALK.)

Q AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED -- MARGARET, AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED THAT THE POINT -- THE PLAN FOR -- (INAUDIBLE) -- THE -- (INAUDIBLE) -- PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE YOUR FIVE POINTS THAT MR. BAKER PRESENTED?
MS. TUTWILER: THAT --

Q THEY ARE THE THING THAT YOU ARE WORKING WITH NOW?

MS. TUTWILER: THE FIVE POINTS ARE NOT WHAT WE'RE DISCUSSING RIGHT NOW. IF YOU ALL WILL READ BACK ONTO THE RECORD, THE FIVE POINTS WERE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE. WE MOVED BEYOND THE FIVE POINTS, IF YOU'LL REMEMBER. WHAT WE HAD REFRAINED FROM DOING WAS PUTTING ON THE RECORD THE QUESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POSED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, TO DATE, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO SAY A YEA OR NAY TO.

Q WELL, MARGARET, DO YOU MEAN AT THIS POINT THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MUST ANSWER THAT QUESTION BEFORE THE PEACE TALKS CAN GO FORWARD?

MS. TUTWILER: I'VE NOT ANSWERED THAT QUESTION FOR YOU. I HAVE SAID THAT IS SOMETHING THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES WOULD ARTICULATE. I HAVE SAID WHAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID IS THAT IT WOULD BE OUR HOPE, AS THE SECRETARY SAID YESTERDAY IN TESTIMONY AND I BELIEVE THE DAY BEFORE, IS THAT WE PICK UP IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE SHAMIR INITIATIVE TO MOVE TOWARDS A DIALOGUE, TO MOVE TOWARDS ELECTIONS WHERE WE LEFT OFF.

Q WELL, HAVING A HOPE --

MS. TUTWILER: THAT HASN'T CHANGED.

Q HAVING A HOPE IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM MAKING THAT A CONDITION OF RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS. WHICH IS IT, A HOPE OR A CONDITION?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT GOING TO TAKE IT FURTHER FOR YOU TODAY, JOHN, AND LAY DOWN A CONDITION. THAT IS SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE AT A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL THAN MINE, WHICH WOULD BE THE PRESIDENT.

Q LET ME ASK THE QUESTION A DIFFERENT WAY, MARGARET --

MS. TUTWILER: YOU'RE GOING TO GET THE SAME ANSWER.

Q YOU SAID WHERE YOU LEFT OFF. IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT NOW COMES AND SAYS THAT, WHERE YOU STARTED 11 MONTHS AGO, IT DOES NOT EXIST ANY MORE, AND THIS IS A NEW BALLGAME THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT, WHEN THEY SAY THAT IT'S NOT RELEVANT, THE FIVE POINTS ARE NOT RELEVANT, AND ALL THAT YOU ACHIEVED IN THE 11 MONTHS IS NOT RELEVANT.

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW WHY YOU KEEP TALKING ABOUT THE FIVE POINTS. THE FIVE POINTS, WE GOT OVER THAT, THAT'S WHY WE HAVE SAID ALL THE THINGS THAT YOU CAME TO CLOSURE ON, WE WOULD HOPE NOT TO HAVE TO REOPEN, TO REDO.

Q BUT MARGARET, TWO WEEKS AFTER THE ATTACK IN ISRAEL, DON'T YOU THINK THAT IT'S ABOUT TIME TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO?

MS. TUTWILER: THE SECRETARY OF STATE ANSWERED THAT QUESTION YESTERDAY IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND THE DAY BEFORE.

Q BUT THERE IS NO DECISION YET.

MS. TUTWILER: HE WAS VERY CLEAR ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES' POLICY WAS ON THIS. HE WAS VERY CLEAR ABOUT PUTTING ON THE RECORD ON TUESDAY EXACTLY WHAT IT IS THAT WE ARE -- WE HAVE TO HAVE AS FAR AS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ASKING THE PLO TO DO. THE PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN THIS WEEK ON THE RECORD ABOUT THIS. AND THE SECRETARY HAS SAID, IN PUBLIC TESTIMONY, AND I'D JUST REFER YOU TO HIS RECORD YESTERDAY, EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE DOING AND HOW WE WERE HANDLING THIS. HE LAID IT ALL OUT THERE.

Q BUT YOU -- YOU GAVE SOME FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS A LITTLE BIT MORE TIME, AS HE SAID, OKAY? NOW --

MS. TUTWILER: AND HE SAID HE WASN'T GOING TO BE DRIVEN BY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES.

Q SO, THIS IS UNLIMITED TIME?

MS. TUTWILER: HE DIDN'T SAY THAT, DID HE?

Q NO, I'M ASKING YOU.

MS. TUTWILER: I'M GOING TO REFER YOU TO HIS TESTIMONY. HE WAS VERY PRECISE, VERY CLEAR, AND VERY DISTINCT, IN HOW HE ANSWERED ALL OF THOSE QUESTIONS.

Q SO ONE DAY THERE WILL BE A DECISION?

MS. TUTWILER: HE NEVER SAID THERE WOULD NOT BE ONE, DID HE?
Q MARGARET, FOLLOWING UP FROM THAT, HE SAID THAT THE PLO HAD TO BEGIN TO TAKE STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS. NOW, TODAY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES THERE'S A REPORT THAT THE PLO'S SAID TO HAVE STARTED AN INQUIRY INTO THE RAID AND THAT THEY HAVE TOLD YOU, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, WHAT THEY'RE PLANNING TO DO. IS THIS CONSIDERED TO BE A STEP, OR THE BEGINNING OF A STEP, TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS?

MS. TUTWILER: THIS DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE TWO THINGS THAT HE HAS PUT ON THE RECORD THAT MUST BE DONE. THIS SPECIFIC ATTACK MUST BE CONDEMNED, NUMBER ONE, AS HE SAID TWO DAYS RUNNING HERE IN OUR COUNTRY. AND TWO, THEY MUST, AS YOU'VE JUST QUOTED TO ME, HE SAID, BEGIN TAKING DISCIPLINARY ACTION --

Q YEAH, I KNOW --

MS. TUTWILER: -- AGAINST ABU ABBAS.

Q I'M NOT ASKING WHETHER THIS ELIMINATES THE CONDITIONS. WHAT I'M ASKING IS WHETHER OR NOT THIS CONTRIBUTES TO ONE OF THOSE CONDITIONS.

MS. TUTWILER: IT MAY CONTRIBUTE, BUT IT DOES NOT SUPERSEDE THE TWO THINGS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS ASKING.
Q THAT'S NOT MY QUESTION.

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT IS YOUR QUESTION? I'M ANSWERING YOU.

Q I'M TRYING TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS CONSIDERING -- WHETHER YOU CONSIDER THAT IF THEY DO THIS

MS. TUTWILER: AND I'M ANSWERING YOU NO.

Q -- THAT THIS IS A STEP TOWARDS FULFILLING ONE OF THOSE CONDITIONS.

MS. TUTWILER: HAVING AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE ANSWERS QUESTION ONE OR TWO. THOSE TWO QUESTIONS HAVE TO BE ANSWERED BY THE -- TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION AND THEY ARE VERY CLEAR: ONE, CONDEMN, TWO, DISCIPLINE.

(CROSS TALK.)

Q (OFF MIKE) -- TO THIS INTERNAL INVESTIGATION THAT --

MS. TUTWILER: THAT'S RIGHT BACK TO HIS QUESTION. I REFER YOU TO SECRETARY BAKER'S TESTIMONY.

Q MARGARET, THERE ARE PUBLISHED REPORTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL IS SELLING A GREAT VOLUME OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA , FILLING THE GAP LEFT BECAUSE THE US WILL NOT SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT?

MS. TUTWILER: CAN I LOOK INTO THAT FOR YOU? I'M SORRY, I DIDN'T BRING IT WITH ME.

Q DOES THE US ACCEPT AVI PAZNER'S EXPLANATION? HE CLAIMS THAT SOME OF THE REPORTS WERE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT, THE REPORTS OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS SAID.

MS. TUTWILER: I'M SURE THAT'S TRUE. THAT HAPPENS TO US ALL OF THE TIME.

Q (OFF MIKE.)

Q SO DO YOU THINK THERE IS A -- DO YOU THINK THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THEN, THAT --

MS. TUTWILER: YOU KNOW HOW ACCURATE YOU ALL ARE --

Q EXCEPT FOR REUTERS.

Q (INAUDIBLE.)

MS. TUTWILER: COME ON ALAN (SP?)!

Q NO, DO YOU THINK THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT ANYTHING THAT THE ISRAELIS SAID WAS MISINTERPRETED?

MS. TUTWILER: SECRETARY BAKER RESPONDED TO A NUMBER, AS HE SAID IN THE PLURAL YESTERDAY, OF WIRE REPORTS, COMMENTS THAT HE HAD READ. I HAVE SAID FOR YOU IN THE SPIRIT OF FAIRNESS, YOU SAID THAT THEIR SPOKESMAN HAD SAID SOME OF IT COULD BE MISCONSTRUED. THERE'S SOME. I'M NOT STATING TO YOU THAT ALL OF IT WAS MISCONSTRUED. AND I DON'T BELIEVE THEY'RE SAYING THAT.

Q MARGARET ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE OTHER ANSWER OF THE OTHER PARTIES, LIKE EGYPT AND THE PALESTINIANS, TO YOUR QUESTIONS?

MS. TUTWILER: AS YOU KNOW, AND SECRETARY BAKER POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, YOU HAD GOTTEN TO A POINT WHERE PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES HAD SAID THEY WOULD COME TO A MEETING, A DIALOGUE AND BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON ELECTIONS.
Q SO ARE YOU SATISFIED --

MS. TUTWILER: THERE WAS SATISFACTION TO THAT DEGREE,

YES, YOU KNOW THAT --

Q YES, AND WITH OTHER PARTIES. SO ONLY ONE PARTY YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THEIR ANSWER, YET? BECAUSE YOU SAID, HE MEANT ALL THE PARTIES TO RESPOND, NOW YOU SAID YOU ARE SATISFIED WITH THE PALESTINIAN ANSWER. WHAT OTHER PARTIES YOU ARE EXPECTING THEIR ANSWER FROM? EGYPT? FROM WHOM?
MS. TUTWILER: HIS QUESTION ON PEACE WAS TO THE BIG PICTURE. HE HAS ALSO POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, YOU REALLY SHOULD READ HIS TESTIMONY --

Q I READ IT --

MS. TUTWILER: -- ON WHAT ALL THE ARAB NATIONS SHOULD DO. FOR ONE, YOU COULD START BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL. NUMBER TWO, TO TONE DOWN THEIR RHETORIC. NUMBER THREE, THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION. HE SPOKE YESTERDAY QUITE EXTENSIVELY TO THE ENTIRE SITUATION -- ARAB NATIONS, PALESTINIANS, ISRAEL. AND HIS MESSAGE WAS, WHICH WAS VERY CLEAR, THAT, IF YOU ARE SINCERELY, SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN PEACE, WE'LL BE THERE. WE WILL WORK, WE WILL BE ENGAGED, WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO BRING PEACE TO THIS REGION. BUT IF YOU ARE NOT, CALL US.
Q BUT I THOUGHT HE SAID TO THEM, 'I SAY TO MY FRIENDS, THE ISRAELIS, THE NUMBER IS SO-AND-SO.' HE DID NOT SAY FOR THE ARABS --

Q 'IF YOU ARE.'

MS. TUTWILER: IF YOU AREN'T -- YEAH, IF YOU ARE, RIGHT.

Q HE DIDN'T SAY THAT MY FRIEND, THE ARABS, CALL ME. HE SAID, 'MY FRIENDS, THE ISRAELIS, PLEASE CALL ME.' THAT'S WHAT I REMEMBER FROM THE TRANSCRIPT. AM I WRONG?

MS. TUTWILER: SO WHAT'S YOUR QUESTION?

Q HE DID NOT INVITE THE ARABS TO RESPOND, HE HAD ONLY ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO RESPOND.

MS. TUTWILER: HE'S ASKING EVERYONE TO RESPOND WHO IS --

Q I DON'T REMEMBER THAT.

MS. TUTWILER: -- SINCERELY INTERESTED IN FINDING A WAY TO --

Q YOU ARE SAYING THAT NOW. HE DID NOT SAY IT, YOU MEAN.

MS. TUTWILER: IF YOU READ HIS ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT, HE TALKED ABOUT ALL PARTIES.

Q NO, HE DID NOT --

Q JUST TO FOLLOW THAT -- IN DETERMINING THE SERIOUSNESS OF ALL OF THE PARTIES, WILL A MAJOR CRITERION BE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE UP THE DIALOGUE PRECISELY WHERE IT LEFT OFF IN FEBRUARY? WILL THAT BE A KEY FACTOR IN

DETERMINING THE SERIOUSNESS?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT'S THE SAME QUESTION THAT JOHN DANCY ASKED ME -- THAT I SAID 'I'M GOING TO STATE FOR YOU WHAT WE HAVE SAID CONSISTENTLY FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS ON THE RECORD.' I AM NOT, WITHOUT PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, GOING TO GO OUT AND LOCK OUR PRESIDENT INTO A POSITION THAT HE HAS NOT ARTICULATED.

Q MARGARET, DO YOU -- DO YOU HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES ARE STILL READY TO TAKE THE STEP THEY WERE READY TO TAKE IN FEBRUARY IF ISRAEL RESPONDS IN A WAY IT HAS NOT SINCE FEBRUARY?

MS. TUTWILER: I WOULDN'T WANT TO VENTURE A GUESS ON THAT, NORM, BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE THAT ANY OF US HAVE A CORRECT READING ON THAT IN THE THREE MONTHS THAT HAVE TRANSPIRED.
Q HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THE PROGRAM, THE PLATFORM, OF THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND SPEAKS OF A DESIRE TO INCREASE THE SETTLEMENTS?
MS. TUTWILER: IF WE HAVE, I DON'T HAVE AN ANALYSIS OF IT FOR YOU. OUR VIEWS ON SETTLEMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN. THAT WOULDN'T ALTER THOSE.

Q MARGARET, ARE YOU SAYING -- EXPECTING ANY HIGHER-LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ISRAELIS TO CLARIFY ACTUALLY AS TO WHERE TO START FROM, WHERE THEY LEFT BEFORE, OR IS THERE SOMETHING NEW? WHAT I'M TRYING TO ASK IS, IF THE PRESIDENT, OR THE SECRETARY IS ABOUT TO MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OR IS THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV ABOUT TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS TO CLARIFY WHAT IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO PROCEED? OR WHAT IS NEXT? I MEAN --

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER FOR YOU FOR NEXT STEPS.
Q MARGARET, DO YOU THINK THAT THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN A VACUUM NOW?

סוף חלק (א).

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,בנצור,
מצפא,פרנ,רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים

סססס

אאאא,חוזם:12704
אל:רהמש/532
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:148,תא:140690,זח:1520,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמס בהול

חלק (ב) : המשך לחוזם 012703.

MS. TUTWILER: IS IN A WHAT?

Q VACUUM. IS THERE THE LOSS OF MOMENTUM AS A RESULT OF THIS CRISIS?

MS. TUTWILER: I THINK THAT SECRETARY BAKER GENERATED QUITE A BIT OF MOMENTUM YESTERDAY. (LAUGHTER.)

Q I KNOW THAT HE WAS PROVIDING IT. (LAUGHTER.) AND DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE EUNITED NATIONSF ENVOY TO THE -- THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, 'A COMMENT'? I DON'T HAVE A TIME FRAME OF WHEN HE'S GOING. I REFER YOU TO THE UN. I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE IT IS YOU'D LIKE ME TO COMMENT ON.

Q I WANT YOU TO -- THE MISSION -- I'M ASKING --

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT?

Q -- ABOUT HIS MISSION THAT WAS BLESSED BY THE UNITED STATES, OR IT WAS SENT ONLY BY THE INITIATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, OR WHAT DO YOU SAY THE SCOPE OF HIS WORK THERE IN THE TERRITORIES?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M SORRY, WHAT DO YOU WANT TO KNOW?

Q HIS MISSION, THE ENVOY THAT WAS SENT BY THE SECURITY -- BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE TERRITORIES.
MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM?

Q WHAT DO YOU EXPECT THAT THIS WILL BRING, BECAUSE YOU WERE SUPPORTING THAT POSITION --

MS. TUTWILER: WE DID SUPPORT IT, AND WE REFER YOU TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO GET HIS ARRANGEMENTS, TIMING, ET CETERA, ET CETERA. WE DON'T HAVE THAT.

Q MARGARET, STAYING ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT A DIFFERENT SUBJECT. WAS THERE A STATMENT RELEASED BY THE PRESS OFFICE HERE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT THE TEAR GASSING OF 66 PALESTINIAN BABIES IN GAZA?

MS. TUTWILER: THE WHAT?

Q TEAR GAS.

MS. TUTWILER: WAS THERE SOMETHING RELEASED HERE YESTERDAY? NO.

Q WELL, CAN I PLEASE ASK THAT AND HAVE -- EXPECT SOME ANSWER SOMETIME?

MS. TUTWILER: MM-HMM (AFFIRMATIVE).

Q DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON ALGIERIAN ELECTIONS, SINCE WE ARE ON THE MIDDLE EAST?

MS. TUTWILER: WHILE THE FINAL VOTE TALLIES ARE NOT YET IN, WITH ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE RESULTS IN, IT APPEARS THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST PARTY HAS A SUBSTANTIAL LEAD OVER OTHER PARTIES. WE WOULD NOTE THAT THE TURNOUT RATE OF 60 PERCENT WAS RELATIVELY LOW BECAUSE A NUMBER OF GROUPS BOYCOTTED THE ELECTION. WHILE IT WILL BE PRUDENT NOT TO COMMENT UNTIL WE SEE MORE COMPLETE RESULTS, WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THESE LOCAL ELECTIONS DEMONSTRATE ALGERIA'S COMMITMENT TO AN OPEN, MULTIPARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM.

Q MARGARET, ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED BY IT BEING AN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT IN AN AREA THAT WAS KNOWN FOR BEING MORE MODERATE AND MORE OPEN THAN, SAY, OTHER AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST?

MS. TUTWILER: BEYOND THE COMMENT THAT WE HAVE MADE, I DO NOT HAVE A FURTHER COMMENT FOR YOU ON THE ALGERIAN ELECTION.

Q MARGARET, PLEASE, A FOLLOW-UP. WHY YOU ONLY COMMENT ON THE ALGERIAN ELECTION AND YOU REFUSE TO COMMENT ON THE SYRIAN ELECTION WHICH HAPPENED ON THE 30TH OF MAY, WHICH I ASKED YOU A COUPLE OF TIMES?

MS. TUTWILER: DID WE POST IT?

Q THERE WAS NO ANSWER, NO.

MS. TUTWILER: OKAY, WE'LL BE ABLE -- LET US LOOK INTO IT AGAIN.

Q YES, THANKS.

Q HAS ANY QUESTION BEEN ASKED ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT YESTERDAY -- (LAUGHTER) --

MS. TUTWILER: YOU MISSED A LOT OF IT, JOE, WE'VE BEEN AT IT FOR 35 MINUTES.

Q JUST A MINUTE, JUST A MINUTE PLEASE. THERE MAY BE SOME OTHER POINTS.

MS. TUTWILER: I BET THERE ARE.

Q HAVE YOU -- JUST A MINUTE, PLEASE --

MS. TUTWILER: ONE QUESTION.

Q HAVE YOU ANY QUESTION -- HAVE YOU ANY RESPONSES TO THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT HE WILL WORK WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE LOAN GUARANTEE, AS SOON AS -- NOW THAT IT'S GOVERNMENT IS FORMED?

MS. TUTWILER: DO I HAVE A FURTHER ELABORATION OF WHAT HE SAID YESTERDAY?

Q YES.

MS. TUTWILER: NO, SIR, I DO NOT.

Q HAVE THE ISRAELIS BEEN ASKED TO MEET WITH ANYBODY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS IT?

MS. TUTWILER: HE ANSWERED THAT YESTERDAY AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY HAD AND THAT THAT IS SOMETHING THEY WOULD BE WORKING OUT.

Q HOW WAS THAT? WAIT A MINUTE! WAIT A MINUTE, THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE WORKING OUT? HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD START WORKING ON IT AS SOON AS THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT WAS IN OFFICE, WHICH IT IS.

MS. TUTWILER: I'M SURE IT'S THE MICROPHONE. I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE WORKING OUT.

Q WORKING OUT. OKAY. NEXT QUESTION. HAVE YOU SOMETHING ON THE -- IS THE SECRETARY REGRETFUL NOW THAT HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS NOT SINCERE IN SEEKING PEACE?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, SIR, HE STANDS BY HIS COMMENTS OF YESTERDAY.

Q SO HE THINKS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS INSINCERE, IS THAT RIGHT?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M SORRY. YOU WERE LATE. I APOLOGIZE. BUT WE REALLY HAVE SPENT ABOUT 35 MINUTES ON THIS AND I'VE REALLY, I BELIEVE ELABORATED FULLY ON WHAT SECRETARY BAKER SAID.

Q HAVE YOU SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE REPORT THAT THE -- THERE IS TRADE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ECHINAF ON CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS OR TECHNOLOGY ?

MS. TUTWILER: UHM-HMN (IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT), I WAS ASKED THAT THIS MORNING, AND I SAID I WOULD GET THE ANSWER FOR MR. PLANTE.

סוף.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,בנצור,
מצפא,פרנ,רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים

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אל:רהמש/530
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:147,תא:140690,זח:1520,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מעת, ממד, יועץ שהח לתקשורת.

דע: יועץ רוהמ לתקשורת, יועץ שהבט לתקשורת, לעמ,
פרנ, מזאר, אמן/מנמת - ר' משמרת , דובר צהל,ניו יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן ליום : 14.6.90

MR. FITZWATER: -- FIRST OF ALL, THE WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE OPERATORS HAVE ASKED ME TO GIVE OUT THE HOME PHONE NUMBERS OF THE TOP TEN -- (LAUGHTER) --

Q BAKER?

Q HAVE THEY GOT A LOT OF CALLS? HAVE THEY GOTTEN A LOT CALLS?
MR. FITZWATER: THEY HAD SEVERAL THOUSAND. THEY WERE SAYING SIX (THOUSAND) TO EIGHT THOUSAND LAST NIGHT. (LAUGHTER.) AND --

Q ON ANY TOPIC IN PARTICULAR?

MR. FITZWATER: -- (INAUDIBLE) -- OFFICE IS SWAMPED THIS MORNING.
(CROSS TALK, LAUGHTER.)

Q YEAH, I KNOW, BUT HOW MANY WAS THAT?

Q SIX (THOUSAND) TO EIGHT THOUSAND, MARLIN?

Q SIX (THOUSAND) TO EIGHT THOUSAND LAST NIGHT?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DIDN'T HAVE CALL CALLING, SO -- CALLER ID.
Q WHAT WAS THE --

Q ANY PARTICULAR TOPIC?

Q YOU'RE KIDDING? YOU'RE KIDDING?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, I'M NOT KIDDING.

Q 6,000 TO 8,000?

MR. FITZWATER: THE SWITCHBOARD WAS FINALLY BLOCKED TO THE POINT WHERE IT JUST COULDN'T HANDLE ANY MORE, AND THEY HAD TO --

Q AIPAC HAD THEIR -- (INAUDIBLE) --

MR. FITZWATER: -- PUT IT ON AUTOMATIC THANK-YOU TAPE.

Q WERE THEY SYMPATHETIC TO JIM BAKER, OR SYMPATHETIC --

MR. FITZWATER: THEY WERE ON ALL SIDES OF THE ISSUE. I REALLY COULDN'T --

Q WAS IT JUST ON THE MIDEAST QUESTION? OR WERE THEY CALLING ABOUT --

MR. FITZWATER: ON THE MIDEAST QUESTION.

Q DOES THAT MEAN BAKER GOES TO THE WOODSHED?

MR. FITZWATER: (LAUGHS.) NO.

Q DOES THAT MEAN THE WHITE HOUSE OPERATOR TOLD SHAMIR THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD GET BACK TO HIM?

MR. FITZWATER: IT MEANS THE WHITE HOUSE OPERATORS CAN EXPECT A BIG CHRISTMAS PRESENT THIS YEAR FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. (LAUGHS.)

Q MARLIN, WAS THE PRESIDENT FURIOUS ABOUT THE TANTRUM, OR WAS HE -- HOW DID HE FEEL ABOUT IT?

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT AGREES WITH HIS POSITION, ABSOLUTELY.
OKAY. LET'S GO THROUGH HERE.

Q HOW ABOUT THE ISRAELIS ? DID THEY CALL?

Q HOW MANY CALLS DO THEY USUALLY GET A NIGHT?

MR. FITZWATER: OH, I DON'T -- YEAH, I DON'T HAVE THE NUMBER.
Q SIX HUNDRED, YOU MEAN?

MR. FITZWATER: OH, PROBABLY LESS -- NOT VERY MANY -- NOT

Q DID SHAMIR CALL?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T --

Q MARLIN -- YEAH, WAS ONE OF THOSE CALLS FROM SHAMIR OR A MEMBER OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY NAMES OF WHO CALLED.

Q HOW MANY OF THOSE CALLS WERE CLAIMED TO BE FROM SHAMIR?
MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT ARE NORMAL, BUT I WOULD SAY 100 OR 200, SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

Q HAS THERE BEEN CONTACT, THOUGH? HAS THERE BEEN ANY? NONE?
MR. FITZWATER: NO.

Q I JUST WANT TO DOUBLE CHECK ON THAT AND MAKE SURE YOU WERE SERIOUS ABOUT THAT 6,000 TO 8,000 CALLS. IS THAT --

MR. FITZWATER: YES. THEY DON'T KEEP EXACTLY TRACK, BUT THAT'S WHAT THE OPERATORS ESTIMATED.

Q IS THERE ANY WAY TO TELL WHETHER THOSE CALLS WERE GENERATED BY PEOPLE SEEING IT ON TV, HEARING IT ON RADIO, OR WERE SOME OF THEM ACTUALLY FROM ISRAEL?

Q IT WAS ALL RADIO.

MR. FITZWATER: IT'S MY ASSUMPTION THAT -- THAT THEY ALL HEARD THIS ON -- ON RADIO.

Q WERE SOME OF THEM ACTUALLY FROM ISRAEL?

Q (INAUDIBLE.) (LAUGHTER.)

MR. FITZWATER: (LAUGHS.) AND THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY STIRRED TO ACTION.

Q WERE SOME OF THEM ACTUALLY FROM ISRAEL?

Q IT'S LATE PM NEWSPAPERS.

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW. WE DON'T WHERE THEY WERE FROM.

Q BACK ON THE PHONE CALLS. CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED, YOU KNOW, HOW IT DIVIDED, AND WHETHER IT WAS EITHER PRO OR CON WHAT BAKER HAD SAID?
MR. FITZWATER: I CAN'T. WE DON'T HAVE ANY -- ANY WAY OF KNOWING THAT. THE OPERATORS AFTER VERY SOON WERE JUST SAYING -- WELL, THANK PEOPLE FOR CALLING IN AND THAT WAS ABOUT IT. AND THEY WERE ALL OVER THE ISSUE, ON ALL SIDES.
Q IS THIS UNUSUAL VOLUME, OR HAS THIS HAPPENED BEFORE?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, YES, I THINK IT'S A FAIRLY INCREDIBLE VOLUME. I NEVER ENCOUNTERED THIS MANY CALLS BEFORE. OF COURSE, WE'VE NEVER HAD -- I DON'T RECALL EVER HAVING A PHONE NUMBER PLASTERED ACROSS ALL THE NETWORK NEWS AND THE RADIO SHOWS BEFORE EITHER, SO --

Q PARTICULARLY THE RADIO SHOWS.

MR. FITZWATER: PARTICULARLY THE RADIO SHOWS.

Q HOW DO THEY PLASTER IT ACROSS THE RADIO?

Q WHAT -- ONE OTHER THING, HAVE YOU RECEIVED A DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL?

MR. FITZWATER: I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY, NO. NO. I DON'T

THINK WE HAVE.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- DIPLOMATIC RESPONSES.

MR. FITZWATER: THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PUBLIC RESPONSES. AVI PAZNER WAS ON -- QUOTED YESTERDAY, BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING I'M AWARE OF.

Q MARLIN, THE THRUST OF BAKER'S COMMENTS, AS I HEARD THEM, WAS TO MAKE THE CASE THAT, WHILE THERE MAY BE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE EPLOF AND AMONG THE PALESTINIANS , THAT THE CHIEF BLAME FOR THE BREAKDOWN IN THE PEACE PROCESS RESTS WITH ISRAEL. IS THAT CORRECT? I MEAN, IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW?

MR. FITZWATER: NO. THE THRUST OF SECRETARY BAKER'S COMMENTS AND OUR VIEW IS THAT WE HAVE WORKED LONG AND HARD FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, WE HAVE WORKED WITH ALL THE PARTIES IN THE REGION IN TRYING TO GET A DIALOGUE GOING, BUT THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE PARTIES OF THE REGION HAVE TO WANT PEACE FOR IT TO HAPPEN. AND WE CAN'T WANT IT FOR THEM. AND WHAT HE WAS SAYING, BASICALLY, THAT IF THEY WANT PEACE ENOUGH TO GET A DIALOGUE GOING, IT WILL HAPPEN, AND GIVE US A CALL.

Q WELL, TO FOLLOW ON THAT, I MEAN --

MR. FITZWATER: IN OTHER WORDS, WE'RE READY TO HELP, WE'RE READY TO BE SUPPORTIVE IN ANY WAY WE CAN, BUT IT'S THE PARTIES IN THE REGION THAT HAVE TO WANT IT TO HAPPEN TO MAKE IT HAPPEN.

Q DOES HE FEEL THE PROBLEM RESTS EQUALLY WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES, OR DOES HE NOT FEEL THAT PERHAPS ISRAEL SHARES A GREATER BLAME?

MR. FITZWATER: WE PLACE NO BLAME.

Q BACK TO ISRAEL, WHY IS THE PRESIDENT DEPARTING FROM HIS USUAL PRO FORMA CUSTOM OF HAVING A CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE OR PHONE CALL TO A NEWLY-INSTALLED LEADER AND STILL NOT HAVING CALLED SHAMIR?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T THINK THE EXACT -- I DON'T THINK IT'S HAPPENED YET IN THE OFFICIAL SENSE.

Q DO YOU EXPECT HIM TO DO THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: HE'LL -- YES, I DO. WHATEVER -- WHATEVER

Q THE OTHER THING I WANT TO ASK YOU IN TERMS OF BAKER'S PUBLIC COMMENT YESTERDAY, WHICH YOU STATED THE PRESIDENT ENDORSES. IN CONDUCTING --

MR. FITZWATER: HE JUST STATED OUR POLICY, YEAH.

Q WELL, BUT IN CONDUCTING DIPLOMACY, FOR INSTANCE, WITH THE GERMANS, THIS WHITE HOUSE HAS BEEN VERY SENSITIVE TO GERMAN FEELINGS -- WE DON'T WANT TO SINGULARIZE THEM, WE DON'T WANT TO SINGLE THEM OUT IN ANYTHING, AND WE DO IT

QUIETLY. WITH ISRAEL WE ARE GOING INCREASINGLY PUBLIC IN VOICING OUR DISAGREEMENTS AND CRITICISM. WHY ARE WE NOT AS SENSITIVE TO ISRAELI SENSIBILITIES AS WE ARE TO GERMAN?
MR. FITZWATER: WE ARE -- WE ARE -- WE ARE AS SENSITIVE, WE ARE EVEN MORE SENSITIVE. WE ARE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO POINT OUT, TO TAKE SIDES, AND TO PLACE BLAME AND SO FORTH. ISRAEL IS A STRONG AND LOYAL ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES, THEY ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE ONE, A STAUNCH FRIEND. WE WILL NOT CHANGE THAT POLICY ONE IOTA. AND WE SIMPLY POINT OUT THAT THEY HAVE GOT TO WANT THE PEACE PROCESS FOR IT TO MOVE FORWARD.

Q YEAH, AS THE -- BECAUSE OF THE TONE OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS AND YOUR EXPLANATION OF WHAT HE MEANT, HAS THERE BEEN ANY SIMILAR COMMUNICATION TO ISRAEL THAT THAT'S WHAT HE MEANT AND HAVE WE HAD ANY KIND OF OBJECTIONS FROM THEM AT ALL ABOUT THE TONE?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Q EITHER WAY?

MR. FITZWATER: WENDELL?

Q YES, MARLIN, IF I COULD MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT THESE CALLS. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS A FAIRLY INCREDIBLE VOLUME AND IF I HAVE QUOTED YOU PROPERLY, 'YOU HAVE NOT SEEN THIS AMOUNT OF CALLS,' DOES THAT INCLUDE FOR THINGS LIKE OLLIE NORTH'S TROUBLES? BECAUSE HE ATTRACTED A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT AND THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER ISSUES.

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW, I DON'T -- I HAVEN'T GONE BACK TO CHECK EVERY ONE, I COULDN'T GIVE YOU AN ABSOLUTE TALLY, I JUST DON'T RECALL IT, BUT WHO KNOWS?

Q THAT'S WHAT I WAS -- (LIGHT LAUGHTER).

MR. FITZWATER: MICHAEL?

Q THAT WAS MY QUESTION.

Q IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASN'T TAKING SIDES OR PLACING BLAME YESTERDAY, WHY DIDN'T HE GIVE THE PLO THE PHONE NUMBER AND TELL THEM TO CALL IF THEY'RE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE? (SCATTERED CHUCKLES.)

Q YEAH,

Q YEAH,

Q WHY WAS IT ONLY DIRECTED AT -- WHY WAS THAT STATEMENT ONLY DIRECTED TO ISRAEL?

MR. FITZWATER: LONG TESTIMONY DISCUSSING THE ISSUE, WITH VARIOUS --

Q WELL, IS THERE ANY CONCERN -- IS THERE ANY CONCERN ABOUT PERCEPTION THAT MAYBE PEOPLE HAVE THE WRONG PERCEPTION ABOUT WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION IS TAKING

SIDES?
MR. FITZWATER: NO. WE HAVE WORKED LONG AND HARD FOR THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EVERYONE KNOWS OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL, AND THE PEACE PROCESS, AND OUR LOYALTY TO THEM AS A STRONG ALLY.

Q MARLIN, JUST ONE MORE THING ON THIS. WAS THERE A DESIRE, WAS THERE AN INTENTION FOR THE SECRETARY TO SEND A STRONG MESSAGE ON THIS -- IN ANY WAY EITHER CALCULATED OR EVEN THIS SPONTANEOUS -- WHAT I'M TRYING TO DISCERN IS WHETHER THIS WAS SPONTANEOUS OR WHETHER IT WAS CALCULATED.
MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW. YOU HAVE TO ASK HIM THAT, BUT THE MESSAGE IS THE SAME ONE WE'VE BEEN SENDING ALL ALONG: WE WAMT TO HELP. IF THEY WANT THE PEACE PROCESS, WE'RE WILLING TO HELP.

Q BUT WAS THERE ANY DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO RATCHET IT UP A BIT BY MAKING A STRONG STATEMENT OF THAT SORT?

MR. FITZWATER: FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, IT'S THE SAME THING WE'VE BEEN SAYING ALL ALONG.

Q SECRETARY BAKER PLANNED -- DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHY HE GAVE THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE WHITE HOUSE?
(LAUGHTER.)
Q WOULD YOU CARE TO GIVE OUT STATE'S NUMBER?

Q -- THE STATE DEPARTMENT?

MR. FITZWATER: NO. I THINK HE JUST WORKED HERE LONG ENOUGH -- HE REMEMBERED IT WELL. IT'S EASY TO REMEMBER.

Q I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU IF THERE IS SERIOUS QUESTION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT WHETHER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE, WANTS THE PEACE PROCESS. THERE'S BEEN AN ASSUMPTION HERE BEFORE THAT THEY DO -- IT'S THEIR PLAN. YOU HAVE COUCHED EACH STATEMENT 'IF THEY WANT PEACE THEY CAN CALL.' IS THERE A QUESTION?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE CERTAINLY HOPE THEY DO, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN THE DIALOGUE START, SO WE'LL JUST HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

Q SO THERE IS QUESTION?

MR. FITZWATER: THERE IS QUESTION, CERTAINLY, ON BOTH SIDES.
Q AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENT IN PALM SPRINGS ABOUT EAST JERUSALEM THAT CREATED A FUROR IN ISRAEL, HE MET WITH SOME JEWISH LEADERS IN THIS COUNTRY AND ALSO MADE SOME PHONE CALLS TO TRY TO EXPLAIN THE US POSITION. HAS HE DONE THAT IN THE WAKE OF BAKER'S TESTIMONY YESTERDAY, OR DOES HE INTEND TO MEET WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN --

MR. FITZWATER: NOT SINCE YESTERDAY, ALTHOUGH HE HAS MET WITH JEWISH LEADERS CONTINUALLY OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND MONTHS. EVEN THIS WEEK HE HAD SOME MEETINGS,

LAST WEEK, WEEK BEFORE LAST, SO HE HAS A CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERSHIP.

Q MEL LEVINE YESTERDAY IN THE QUESTIONING THAT CAUSED BAKER TO GET A LITTLE HOT, SUGGESTED -- OR SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT REALLY HAD UNDERMINED THE PEACE PROCESS WITH HIS REMARKS ON EAST JERUSALEM BACK, I THINK IT WAS IN FEBRUARY. DO YOU HAVE A RESPONSE TO THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: HE'S WRONG.

Q WHEN YOU SAID THERE WAS A QUESTION ON BOTH SIDES. ARE YOU REFERRING ABOUT THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS?

MR. FITZWATER: WHAT?

Q WHEN YOU SAID THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT PEACE -- ABOUT THE DESIRE FOR PEACE ON BOTH SIDES, DID YOU MEAN BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS, OR --

MR. FITZWATER: ALL PARTIES.

Q INCLUDING US?

MR. FITZWATER: ALL PARTIES.

Q WE HAVE -- WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT OUR OWN DESIRE FOR PEACE?
MR. FITZWATER: NO.

Q WOULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY THAT? THAT'S A SERIOUS QUESTION, MARLIN.

MR. FITZWATER: OUR STATEMENTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. WE CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE PEACE PROCESS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN HELPING IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN.

Q I DON'T UNDERSTAND SOMETHING. THESE 6,000 TO 8,000 PHONE CALLS YOU GOT LAST NIGHT, WHERE THEY BASICALLY CRANK CALLS, OR WHERE THEY PEOPLE SERIOUSLY EXPRESSING VIEWS ON --

MR. FITZWATER: JUST PEOPLE WITH VIEWS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER.
Q REALLY? SO, THERE WERE A LOT OF PEOPLE CALLING SAYING THIS IS ISRAEL, OR --

MR. FITZWATER: NO, THEY WERE PEOPLE WHO WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE.

בנצור,מצפא,פרנ,רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים

ssssss

Media

TOM BROKAW: [redacted] And a provocative question comes to soccer: Is sexual abstinence a way to victory? Arthur Kent tells us the Italians, of all people, think so.

HIT: COMMERCIAL

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: The United States and Israel are in the middle of a nasty war of words tonight over Israel's slow approach to the peace process in that part of the world. We showed you the opening salvo last night by Secretary of State James Baker. He told a Congressional committee it is time for Israel to get serious about talking with the Palestinians.

SECRETARY BAKER: Everybody over there should know the telephone number is 1-202-456-1414. When you're serious about peace, call us.

BROKAW: In response, Israel today appealed for patience, saying its new government is only three days old, after all. But it is the new government that is the latest stumbling block. Israel's leadership has gone from conservative to ultra-right wing. These are the people setting tough conditions for a dialogue with the Palestinians. More now, from NBC's Martin Fletcher.

HIT:

MARTIN FLETCHER: This 11-year-old Jewish boy was waiting in line at a bus stop today, when he was stabbed in the back by a Palestinian woman who escaped. More ammunition for Israel's new leaders. They're promising to give tough new orders to the Army to end the two-and-a-half-year Palestinian uprising. Itzhak Shamir has put together the most right-wing coalition in Israel's history. Some of his new colleagues make him look moderate and

Palestinians here fear a crackdown that will lead to even more violence.

MAN: From the statements of the partners of this government, it looks like...decision for war.

FLETCHER: Rabbi Eleazar Shach, 96-year-old, is Shamir's silent partner in the new right-wing Orthodox coalition, although he isn't even in the government. He is the spiritual mentor of seven members of Shamir's cabinet, Orthodox Jews, who won't vote on anything without his approval.

They make strange bedfellows. The Communications Minister refuses to watch television. The Minister of Interior is under criminal investigation for fraud. And Shach himself doesn't recognize the state of Israel, because it was founded before the arrival of the Messiah. His aim is simply to make Jews more religious.

MAN: He would be willing to make substantial concessions. He's a dove.

FLETCHER: Shach would give up land for peace. It's Shamir and the right-wing elements of the coalition who refuse. The right-wing even plans more Jewish settlements on occupied Arab land, regardless of what Washington says. Shamir has an impossible task: to try to balance demand from his right wing with demands from Washington to make peace with the Palestinians. The new government's honeymoon with the White House is over before it even began. Martin Fletcher, NBC News, Tel Aviv.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: This past year has seen growing strains in U.S.-Israeli relations and not all of them are due to differences over a peace plan. Now, there's still another dispute between these two countries.

NBC News has learned that the United States has repeatedly rebuked Israel for helping Ethiopia's dictatorship. A confidential Congressional memo obtained by NBC News says that Israel has supplied Ethiopia with cluster bombs and other sophisticated

gear, all used in recent attacks on Ethiopian cities held by rebel forces.

According to the memo, Israeli security agents are now training the presidential palace guard, a job which had been held by North Koreans. The level of military aid, according to the memo, is tied to an increase in the number of Ethiopian Jews being released by the government.

In addition, Israeli military ties to South Africa have triggered strong U.S. criticism and State Department officials are still angered over the help former Israeli intelligence agents gave Colombian drug lords, as well as the training that former Mossad agent Mike Harari gave Panamanian strong man Manuel Noriega's palace guard.

NBC's Diplomatic correspondent John Dancy, at the State Department tonight. John, just how calculated was this statement by Secretary of State Baker before Congress last night?

HIT:

JOHN DANCY: Tom, it was very calculated. It was not accidental. He did not fly off the handle. Baker chose to use this method to reply to the Israelis who had put out some very public statements, saying that they were changing the conditions for negotiations, that previous agreements which had brought them that close to negotiations with the Palestinians are now irrelevant. So, it was a calculated move on Baker's part. It was not accidental.

TOM BROKAW: But in fairness to the Israelis, the PLO also has a role in this and, so far, Arafat has failed to condemn that failed Palestinian attack on Israel just a few days ago.

DANCY: The people here at the State Department make it very clear that Baker's statement yesterday was all of a piece with his statement the previous day, condemning the PLO, because the PLO has not yet denounced the attempted terrorist incident and has not taken any move to discipline Abu Abas, who is the man responsible for the incident.

BROKAW: Thank you very much, John Dancy, at the State Department tonight.

By the way, the telephone number that Baker is mentioned in his testimony was the White House number and it triggered as many as eight thousand calls to the White House, forcing the switchboard to shut down for a while. Needless to say, it was a busy night for the operators, who are famous for their efficiency. And today, Secretary Baker sent them roses.

HIT:

HIT: COMMERCIAL

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Columbia, South Carolina now has joined Florida in calling that rap album by Two Live Crew obscene. The whole Two Live Crew has focused national attention on the question: How dirty is too dirty? As NBC National correspondent Bob Kur reports tonight, the lid does seem to be off. But the fight is nothing new in this country.

HIT:

MAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we have a big show, a real big show. Here is Elvis Presley.

(ELVIS PRESLEY SINGS)

BOB KUR: Elvis, the Pelvis, they called him, because he moved so suggestively. The next time he was on the Sullivan show, he was shot from the waist up. And controversy about words and music, nothing new.

MAN: And go it does at KWK. We're all through playing rock 'n' roll records.

In Romania today, a strange new coalition: thousands of miners and other workers joined authorities in putting down anti-government demonstrators. The miners took things into their own hands, beating people who were protesting the large number of former Communists in the new government. Over two days of rioting, at least five people have been killed and hundreds more have been injured.

Our Commentator, John Chancellor tonight has been watching this war of words between the United States and Israel, has some thoughts. John.

HIT:

JOHN CHANCELLOR: I have, indeed, Tom. Several things to keep in mind about the Secretary of State's broadside against the Israeli government. It wasn't off the cuff and it had to have been cleared with the President. Jim Baker is one of Washington's most skilled politicians. He's also a very close associate of George Bush. When he said the Israeli government isn't serious about peace, that was a carefully calibrated statement of American policy and it came from the top.

Is it going to have much effect on Prime Minister Shamir? Hard to say. He's got big political problems. Shamir's new government is filled with tough and ambitious men who will throw him out if he's too soft on the peace process.

Keep your eye on men like David Levi, the new Foreign Minister and Moshe Ahrens, the new Defense Minister. They could easily lead a hard-line revolt that could topple Shamir. That's one reason why Shamir has been so inflexible for the last eighteen months and that year-and-a-half of frustration is what led to Secretary Baker's stunning statement yesterday.

All of this couldn't come at a worse time. The military strength of the Arab world is increasing. So is the danger of another war. Israel is stuck with the most conservative government in its history. Washington has now publicly lost patience with Jerusalem. The Secretary of State is saying: Call us when you're serious about peace.

And Americans who were worried that their country might be drawn into another Middle Eastern war are saying, rightly, will somebody please call somebody. Tom.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Thank you, John. Speaking of the Middle East, it was five years ago today in the Middle East when Shiite Moslem hijackers commandeered TWA Flight 847. For the hostages, it was seventeen days of hell.

JOHN TESTRAKE: They are beating a passenger. They are beating a passenger. They are threatening to kill him now.

BROKAW: The pilot was John Testrake and all of America was held hostage with him. Now retired from TWA, Testrake flies for a Christian aviation ministry, delivering food and medicine to the Third World. Recently, he was in Idaho on a fund-raising mission. His memories of Beirut, still vivid.

TESTRAKE: It was an ugly, hate-filled situation. It was set to explode at any minute, any number of times.

BROKAW: But now, the bitterness has passed.

TESTRAKE: I can look back in perspective and I can say: Well, sure, it might have been a tough seventeen days. But the blessings since have long since wiped out the pain or the anxiety. I think all kinds of good things have come out of it.

BROKAW: Now 62 years old, Testrake lives near a lake in a small town just outside of Kansas City, Missouri.

When we come back, we'll go to Rome and you'll be surprised at just how seriously Italians take the game of soccer.

HIT:

HIT: COMMERCIAL

HIT:

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דע: מנכ''ל ראה''מ

מאת: עודד ערן

ישראל - ארה''ב.

1) בא''צ עם ריצ'רד האס אמרתי, שמה שעשה בייקר הביא את מערכת היחסים למישור זר למערכת יחסים מתוקנת בין שתי מדינות ובוודאי שתי בנות ברית. אם יש להם ובוודאי יש להם, חילוקי דעות עמנו, יש דרך לטפל בהם ואם נגלוש לדו-שיח כדוגמאת זה שאליו התייחס המזכיר, בוודאי לא נגיע רחוק. הוא אמר שהוא מבין את דברי (ובמאמר מוסגר אוסיף, שהוא וגם רוס מבינים היטב שנעשתה כאן שגיאה).

המשכתי ואמרתי, שלא ניתן ללכת לתהליך שלום כה מסובך ועדין, מבלי שקיימת הבנה מירבית לגבי מרכיבי יסוד בתהליך והא ראיה, דברי הנשיא על ירושלים ושאלת השתתפותם של התושבים הערבים של ירושלים. האס אמר, שגישה כזו מסוכנת משום שאם הכוונה היא לנסות ולהסכים על נושאים מסויימים עוד בטרם סוף המו''מ, הרי שהדבר לא יוכל להעשות ובכך יתפוצץ התהליך עוד לפני שיתחיל. עניתי שוודאי נשמח אם יסכימו עם עמדותינו, אבל כוונתי היתה להבהרה הדדית היכן ארה''ב וישראל עומדות ואם ישנם חילוקי דעות מהותיים, רצוי שישראל וארה''ב תדענה זאת לפני שנכנסים לתהליך. (אגב, בנושא ירושלים אמר האס, שלפחות דעתו האישית היא, שתושבי מזרח ירושלים צריכים להשתתף בבחירות וכי אין הדבר עומד בסתירה לצורך לשמור על אחדות העיר). האס השתכנע בנקודה זו ואמר שהוא יפנה לסקוקרופט במגמה לנסות לשכנע לקיים דו-שיח כזה. הוא דיבר במונחים של שליחות שלו ו/או דניס רוס, אך אמר שקיימות כמובן אפשרויות אחרות.

2) האס אמר, שייתכן שיש צורך גם בהצגה פומבית רצינית של עמדות ארה''ב, מאחר וזו לא נעשתה מאז נאום המזכיר במאי 1989 בפני איפא''ק. עניתי, שדווקא נאום זה מצביע על צורך להימנע מדו-שיח פומבי, אלא בליבון הדברים בדו-שיח רציני בין שני המימשלים. האס טען מצידו שאין סתירה בין שני הדברים.

3) העליתי גם את שאלת היחסים האישיים ואמרתי שצריך לשים לכך סוף פסוק ולמחוק פרשיה זו המעכירה ללא צורך היחסים. האס אמר, שלדעתו, כאשר יהיה מפגש בין ראה''מ והנשיא, ראה''מ חייב להבהיר בארבע עיניים מה היתה כוונתו בתשובה שנתן לנשיא ושהוא יכול להבין כיצד הם יכולים להתפרש בצורה אחרת. האס גם הוסיף שלדעתו בנושא ההתנחלויות קיימת אולי אפשרות אם ישראל תבחר להגיע להבנה שקטה שלפיה ראה''מ לא יכריז אמנם על הפסקתן, אך בפועל לא יופנו משאבים נוספים לנושא
זה. האס אמר, שהמימשל רוצה לסייע בנושא הקליטה. המימשל היה מוכן אפילו להגדיל הסיוע ולתת אותו כמענק אילו ניתן היה להגיע להבנה שכזו. הסבתי את תשומת ליבו בנקודה זו, הן למצע הממשלה והן לדברי רובינשטיין לכל אנשי שיחו במימשל ביום ג'

האחרון.

4) שאלתי לגבי הדיאלוג והחלטת המימשל והאס חזר על התלבטויותיהם ונסיונותיהם לחלץ ''משהו'' מאש''פ. הסבתי תשומת ליבו לכך, שממשלת ישראל, על אף עמדתה הברורה לגבי דיאלוג זה, מאופקת במתן ביטוי פומבי לכך ולא נתנה מספר הטלפון של משרד ראה''מ תוך בקשה שהמימשל יתקשר כאשר הוא יחליט לנתק את הדיאלוג.
האס: 'TOUCHE'.

5) האס חזר על דאגת המימשל לגבי הקורה בירדן. אמר שפנו לסורים להפסיק נסיונות החדירה.

ערן

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

סססס

12042 * תאריך : 14.06.90
* דף 1 מתוך 2
* עותק 1 מתוך 8 סודי ביותר נכנס **
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*חוזם:6,12042
*אל:המשרד
*יעדים:רהמש/מצב,486/1098
*מ-:ווש,נר:תא,2089,130690:זח,1730:דח:ב,סג:סב
*תח:@ גס:מנכל
*נד:@
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*סודי ביותר/בהול ח.ר.ב
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*אל: מנכ''ל ראה''מ, מנכ''ל משה''ח
*
*מאת: עודד ערן
*
*דברי בייקר בבית הנבחרים:
*
*התקשר דניס רוס ע''מ להסביר השתלשלות הענינים סביב דברי
*בייקר בבית הנבחרים. לדבריו, בייקר צלצל אליו בבוקר בסערה
*בהתייחסו לדברים שאמר, כביכול, רוני מילוא לפיהם שאלות
*בייקר אינן רלבנטיות ('מדוע אני צריך להיות בלתי רלבנטי?
*' הוא שאל רטורית את רוס) וראה''מ בראיון ל''ג'רוזלם
*פוסט'', לפיהם ישראל תישא ותיתן רק עם ערביי יהודה ושומרון
*שיסכימו לאוטונומיה . רוס אמר לו, שהראיון של ראה''מ כלל גם
*כמה התייחסויות חיוביות, אך לבייקר נותר רק הרושם מהפסקה
*שאליה התייחס. רוס, שהתלווה למזכיר לבית הנבחרים אמר
*שהמזכיר החליט על דעת עצמו לקרוא את השאלה בדבר הקטגוריות
*למשלחת, אף כי בדיון מוקדם לפני הופעתו היתה המלצה נגד. רוס
*מוסיף, שכדאי שנשים לב, מעבר כמובן לקטע של מספר הטלפון,
*שמתבקשת מכל הגורמים, ולאו דוקא ישראל היא התשובה ברוח GOOD
*FAITH EFFORT (כשהדגש הוא לא דווקא על תשובה של ''כן''
*לשאלה המתייחסת לקטגוריות של המשלחת הפלשתינאית . ע.ע.).
*אמרתי לרוס, שמעבר לאכזבה ואולי אפילו תחושת העלבון בשל
*הקטע שבו התייחס למספר הטלפון של הבית הלבן, יש כאן יחס
*פוגע בשה''ח החדש ובעצם הממשלה החדשה, שאפילו לא ניתנה לה
*האפשרות לחמם את הכסא. רוס חזר לרושם שהותירו הדברים שיוחסו
*לראה''מ ומילוא והוסיף, שתגובה הנחיות לשטווילר לקראת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

*
* דף 2 מתוך 2
* עותק 1 מתוך 8
*
*הופעתה מחר להדגיש שהפניה היתה לכל הגורמים במזה''ת
*(פלשתינאים מדינות ערב וישראל).
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*ערן.
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*אש
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*תפ: רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

אאאא,חרזם:12042
אל:רהמש/486
מ-:רוש,נר:2089,תא:130690,זח:1730,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/בהול ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ''ל ראה''מ, מנכ''ל משה''ח

מאת: עורך ערן

דברי בייקר בבית הנבחרים:

התקשר דניס רוס ע''מ להסביר השתלשלות העניינים סביב דברי בייקר בבית הנבחרים. לדבריו, בייקר צלצל אליו בבוקר בסערה בהתייחסו לדברים שאמר, כביכול, רוני מילוא לפיהם שאלות בייקר אינן רלבנטיות ('מדוע אני צריך להיות בלתי רלבנטי? הוא שאל רטוריית את רוס) וראה''מ בראיון ל''ג'רוזלם פוסט'', לפיהם ישראל תישא ותיתן רק עם ערביי יהודה ושומרון שיסכימו לאוטונומיה. רוס אמר לו, שהראיון של ראה''מ כלל גם כמה התייחסויות חיוביות, אך לבייקר נותר רק הרושם מהפסקה שאליה התייחס. רוס, שהתלווה למזכיר לבית הנבחרים אמר שהמזכיר החליט על דעת עצמו לקרוא את השאלה בדבר הקטגוריות למשלחת, אף כי בדיון מוקדם לפני הופעתו היתה המלצה נגד. רוס מוסיף, שכדאי שנשים לב, מעבר כמובן לקטע של מספר הטלפון, שמתבקשת מכל הגורמים, ולאו דוקא ישראל היא התשובה ברוח GOOD FAITH EFFORT (כשהדגש הוא לא דווקא על תשובה של ''כן'' לשאלה המתייחסת לקטגוריות של המשלחת הפלשתינאית . ע.ע.). אמרתי לרוס, שמעבר לאכזבה ואולי אפילו תחושת העלבון בשל הקטע שבו התייחס למספר הטלפון של הבית הלבן, יש כאן יחס פוגע בשה''ח החדש ובעצם הממשלה החדשה, שאפילו לא ניתנה לה האפשרות לחמם את הכסא. רוס חזר לרושם שהותירו הדברים שיוחסו לראה''מ ומילוא והוסיף, שתנתנה הנחיות לטטווילר לקראת הופעתה מחר להדגיש שהפניה היתה לכל הגורמים במזה''ת (פלשתינאים מדינות ערב וישראל).

ערן.

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

סססס

אאאא,חוזם:12042
אל:רהמש/486
מ-:ווש,נר:2089,תא:130690,זח:1730,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/בהול ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ''ל ראה''מ, מנכ''ל משה''ח

מאת: עודד ערן

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ערן.

תפוצה:רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל

ספסס

12192 תאריך: 14.06.90

נכנס בלמס

חוזם:6,12192
אל:המשרד
יעדים:ניויורק/198,רהמש/490,מצב/1105,אביב/828,מנמת/591
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:138,תא:130690,זח:1843,דח:ב,סג:בל
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

להלן חלק א'

אל :סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ,מנהל מצפ"א

דע : מע"ת, הסברה,ממ"ד,לע"מ, יועץ תקשורת רוה"מ,

מאת: ק. לקונגרס, וושינגטון.

מזכיר המדינה-מזה"ת

להלן הקטעים אודות המזה"ת מתוך פרק השאלות ותשובות עם מזכיר המדינה בייקר בעדותו בפני וועדת-החוץ של בית-הנבחרים.

HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SUBJECT: US-SOVIET SUMMIT, CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE DANTE FASCELL, WITNESS: SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, 2172 RAYBURN,
REP. BROOMFIELD: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. SECRETARY, THE SITUATION IN THE EMIDDLE EASTF IS PROBABLY THE MOST DANGEROUS IT'S BEEN SINCE 1967. A NEW RIGHT-WING GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FORMED IN EISRAELF THAT IS CONFRONTED BY AN INCREASINGLY UNITED AND HARDENED ARAB POSITION ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THERE ARE NOW REPORTS THAT THE EARABF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS ON THE RISE. IT SEEMS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UNITED STATES REVIEW OUR POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. MY QUESTION TO YOU IS, DO YOU THINK MY CONCERNS ARE WELL-FOUNDED AND WHAT STEPS ARE YOU TAKING TO ENSURE THAT OUR POLICY CONTRIBUTES TO THE GOAL OF STABILITY IN THE REGION?

SEC. BAKER: WE, TOO, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MR. BROOMFIELD, AND I CANNOT SAY THAT YOUR CONCERNS ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED, BECAUSE I THINK THEY ARE.

LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY, IF I COULD, TO REVIEW FOR THE COMMITTEE WHERE WE'VE BEEN WITH RESPECT TO A MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND WHERE, I THINK, WE ARE TODAY. I WOULD LIKE TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE THE STATEMENT I MADE YESTERDAY BEFORE THE SENATE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF THE DIALOGUE THAT WE HAVE WITH THE EPALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,F THE APPROACH WE'RE TAKING TO THAT, THE REQUIREMENTS THAT WE HAVE PUT FORTH IN TERMS OF PLO BEHAVIOR, IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THAT DIALOGUE. AND I WOULD LIKE TO INCORPORATE ALL OF THAT, IF I MIGHT HERE THIS MORNING BY REFERENCE, AND I THINK THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WELL AWARE OF WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY.

BUT LET ME START BY SAYING THAT WHEN I APPEARED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE LAST FEBRUARY, WE WERE VERY, VERY CLOSE, MR. BROOMFIELD, TO PUTTING TOGETHER AN HISTORIC, FIRST-TIME-EVER DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND EPALESTINIANSF. THIS DIALOGUE, HAD IT BEGUN, I THINK WE WOULD -- HAD THE DIALOGUE ACTUALLY BEGUN, I DON'T THINK WE WOULD BE FACING THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE FACING IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. AND I THINK THAT THE PRE-ELECTION DIALOGUE THAT WE WERE -- THAT WE WERE PUSHING AND TRYING TO IMPLEMENT, AN INITIATIVE QUITE FRANKLY SUGGESTED INITIALLY BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR OF ISRAEL, OFFERED THE POTENTIAL FOR A REAL BREAKTHROUGH THAT WOULD HAVE -- THAT WOULD HAVE PERMITTED US TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S 1989 INITIATIVE IN FULL, AND IT WOULD HAVE CREATED THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE. AS WE ALL KNOW, THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ISRAEL INTERVENED, PREVENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FROM MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS.

NOW, THE INTERVENING PERIOD HAS BEEN MARRED, AS YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR QUESTION, BY A REAL DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION. WE'VE SEEN A CYCLE OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; A PLO FACTION HAS NOW ATTEMPTED A VERY SERIOUS ACT OF TERRORISM, RAISING SERIOUS QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS AND IN THE MINDS OF MANY ABOUT THE PLO'S RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM; AN ARAB SUMMIT HAS TAKEN PLACE WHICH REALLY HAS NOT FOSTERED MODERATION. EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THE EUNITED NATIONSF IN A PRACTICAL WAY HAVE NOT AS YET SUCCEEDED, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THIS MORNING, AS PERHAPS YOU ARE AWARE, THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO SEE SOMETHING ACCOMPLISHED THERE.

THESE EVENTS, MR. BROOMFIELD, REFLECT SOME REALITIES IN THE REGION, MOST OF WHICH -- MANY OF WHICH -- PROBABLY MOST OF WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. BUT THEY ALSO REFLECT THE FACT THAT THERE'S GREAT FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN, I THINK, OVER THE LACK OF A PEACE PROCESS. SO, I THINK THE CHALLENGE, IF I MAY SAY SO, FOR ALL SIDES IS TO TRY TO PUT BACK ON TRACK THE PROCESS THAT WE HAD SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING SO CLOSE TO SUCCESS AND TO SEE IF WE CAN'T CREATE A BETTER ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACE MAKING.

NOW, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR THE PARTIES? FOR ISRAEL, THAT MEANS SAYING YES TO THE IDEA OF A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS, AND I HOPE THAT THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD TO SUCH A DIALOGUE AND DO SO IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR A CREDIBLE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION TO PARTICIPATE. WE, ON OUR PART, MR. BROOMFIELD, ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND IMPLEMENT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE, BUT LET ME SAY ONE MORE TIME, WE CAN'T DO IT ALONE.

FOR PALESTINIANS, THIS MEANS, I THINK, LOOKING BEYOND THE TRAGIC HUMAN LOSSES THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND RECOMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. AS I'VE INDICATED, THE OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK OF MAY 30TH HAS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT COMMITMENT, AND SO THE PLO HAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ITS POLICY OF RENOUNCING ETERRORISMF STILL STANDS, AND IT MUST DO SO IN AN AUTHORITATIVE AND UNAMBIGUOUS WAY, AS I SAID YESTERDAY OVER IN THE SENATE. SO FAR, IT HAS NOT DONE SO.

FOR THE ARAB STATES, I THINK THIS MEANS DOING MORE TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN SUPPORT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION. WE'RE STILL WILLING TO BE ENGAGED, MR. BROOMFIELD, BUT IF THE POLITICAL WILL TO MOVE AHEAD DOESN'T EXIST IN THE REGION, WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO CREATE THAT POLITICAL WILL FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION. AND THE SOONER EVERYBODY RECOGNIZES THAT, THE BETTER OFF I THINK WE ALL WILL BE.

REP. FASCELL: MR. HAMILTON.

REP. HAMILTON (D-IN): THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. SECRETARY, WE WELCOME YOU TO THE COMMITTEE AND COMMEND YOU AND PRESIDENT BUSH FOR YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT THE SUMMIT. THAT'S THE 18TH SUMMIT, I BELIEVE, AND CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MORE SUCCESSFUL ONES FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. I WANT TO FOLLOW ALONG WITH MR. BROOMFIELD'S QUESTION. I VERY MUCH SHARE HIS VIEW THAT EVENTS DO NOT SEEM TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE REASONS THAT BOTH HE AND YOU HAVE SPELLED OUT. AND AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR RESPONSE TO MR. BROOMFIELD, THE CENTER OF OUR STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON THE SHAMIR ELECTION PROPOSAL, I GATHER.

SEC. BAKER: IT WILL BE, MR. HAMILTON, PROVIDED WE GET SOME INDICATION THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE WILLING TO BE ENGAGED IN A POSITIVE WAY AND MOVE FORWARD PROMPTLY IN AN AFFIRMATIVE FASHION. OTHERWISE I HAVE TO SAY WHAT I JUST SAID, WE CAN'T DO IT FROM THE OUTSIDE.

REP. HAMILTON: I ASSUME THAT UNLESS THE PLO ACTS MORE FORTHRIGHTLY, THAT WE WILL HAVE TO CUT OFF OR SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR POLICY. IS THAT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION?

SEC. BAKER: I MADE IT VERY CLEAR IN THE SENATE YESTERDAY THAT THE FUTURE OF THE DIALOGUE IS IN GREAT JEOPARDY, MR. HAMILTON, AND I LAID OUT IN SOME DETAIL WHAT WE'VE DONE IN THE PAST 10 OR 11 DAYS IN TERMS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH MANY, MANY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND WITH SOME THAT MIGHT NOT -- YOU MIGHT NOT PERHAPS CHARACTERIZE IN THAT FASHION. THERE IS A FEELING ON THE PART OF MANY COUNTRIES THAT WE SHOULD TAKE -- WE SHOULD TAKE OUR DECISION IN A RESPONSIBLE AND MEASURED WAY, THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN BY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES. AND WE WON'T BE.

REP. HAMILTON: WHAT -- WHAT IS --

SEC. BAKER: HOWEVER, OUR COMMITMENT -- OUR COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING TERRORISM WILL NOT BE DIMINISHED OR DETERRED BY WHATEVER IMPACT A -- WHATEVER IMPACT MIGHT BE THERE WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. I DON'T WANT TO SUGGEST FOR ONE MINUTE THAT THERE'S ANY BALANCING WITH RESPECT TO THAT HERE.

REP. HAMILTON: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE -- TO THE PEACE PROCESS IF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS CUT OFF?
SEC. BAKER: I THINK THAT THERE COULD BE SOME -- THERE COULD BE SOME ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PEACE PROCESS TO ADVANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS I JUST SAID, I THINK THAT FIRST AND FOREMOST HAS TO BE OUR COMMITMENT TO FACE UP TO THE QUESTION OF TERRORISM.

REP. HAMILTON: MR. SECRETARY?

SEC. BAKER: AND WE'VE MADE THAT VERY CLEAR TO THE PLO, MR. HAMILTON. AND WE HAVE SAID, AS YOU KNOW, THAT WE MUST SEE A CONDEMNATION OF THIS PARTICULAR ACT IN ITS OWN RIGHT, AND WE MUST SEE THE BEGINNING OF SOME STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS WHO HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILTY.

REP. SOLARZ: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN.

MR. SECRETARY, A SHORT WHILE AGO, THE CONGRESS ENACTED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE EISRAELF WITH DOLLAR 400 MILLION IN HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES TO HELP ABSORB THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ERUSSIAN JEWSF WHO HAVE RECENTLY ENTERED THEIR COUNTRY. IS THERE ANY REASON WHY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS LEGISLATION IS BEING HELD UP?

SEC. BAKER: WE WERE WAITING ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL, WHICH WAS FORMED YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE -- I'VE LOST TRACK OF THE DATE, MR. SOLARZ -- BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING THAT'S BEEN HOLDING IT UP.

REP. SOLARZ: AND ARE WE GOING TO BE SEEKING ANY ASSURANCES FROM ISRAEL, OTHER THAN THE CUSTOMARY ASSURANCES WE HAVE ALWAYS OBTAINED IN THE PAST ABOUT WHERE THE MONEY WILL BE SPENT?

SEC. BAKER: WE ARE GOING TO BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN THE VERY NEAR TERM. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO TALK THIS MORNING ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF THE ASSURANCES THAT WE MIGHT REQUEST, MR. SOLARZ.

REP. SOLARZ: BUT DO YOU EXPECT TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCES THAT GO BEYOND THOSE THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO GIVE IN THE PAST?

SEC. BAKER: I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, BECAUSE, QUITE FRANKLY, I HAVEN'T SAT DOWN OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS AND REVIEWED THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN, AS YOU CAN SEE, PRETTY BUSY ON US-SOVIET BUSINESS. BUT I CAN CHECK AND FIND OUT AND LET YOU KNOW.

REP. SOLARZ: WELL, I HOPE WE CAN MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY ON THIS BECAUSE THERE ARE TREMENDOUS NUMBERS COMING OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION. ISRAEL DOESN'T CURRENTLY HAVE THE FACILITIES TO ABSORB THEM. AND IF THEY CAN'T HOUSE THEM, IT'S ENTIRELY POSSIBLE WORD WILL GO BACK TO THOSE WHO REMAIN IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEY ARE BETTER OFF STAYING WHERE THEY ARE. AND GIVEN THE EMERGENCE OF A RATHER VOCAL AND VIRULENT STRAIN OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAS CREATED SOMETHING LIKE A STATE OF PANIC IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY THERE, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS. MR. SECRETARY --

SEC. BAKER: MAY I JSUT ADD, I'M NOT TRYING TO DUCK YOUR QUESTION. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS I REALLY HAVEN'T SPENT ANY TIME AT ALL ON THIS ISSUE FOR WEEKS, AND I AM NOT ENTIRELY SURE, MR. SOLARZ, THAT THE LEGISLATION PROVIDES THE ADMINISTRATION WITH ANY FLEXIBILITY TO GO BEYOND ASSURANCES THAT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED IN THE PAST. I JUST NEED TO FIND OUT.

REP. SOLARZ: SURE. COULD YOU TELL US WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET ENACTED THE EMIGRATION LEGISLATION WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AS A CONDITION FOR EMFN?F I ASSUME THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MR. GORBACHEV AND MR. SHEVARDNADZE. INASMUCH AS THEY'RE ALREADY LETTING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE LEAVE, WHAT REASON DO THEY GIVE US FOR THEIR FAILURE TO HAVE ENACTED THE LEGISLATION SO FAR?

SEC. BAKER: THE REASON THAT THEY GIVE US IS THAT THE SUPREME SOVIET HAS BEEN LOADED DOWN WITH A LOT OF -- WITH A VERY, VERY HEAVY LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR. THEY ARE, AFTER ALL, RESTRUCTURING THAT SOCIETY EXTENSIVELY, CREATING AN ENTIRELY NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE LIKE. AND THAT'S THE EXPLANATION THAT WE'VE RECEIVED.

REP. MILLER: OKAY. GETTING BACK TO THE SUBJECT THAT REPRESENTATIVE SOLARZ MENTIONED IN EEMIGRATIONF FROM THE ESOVIET UNIONF TO EISRAELF, AND WE REALIZE THIS IS A SENSITIVE TRIANGULAR PROBLEM AND ARRANGEMENT. BUT CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ BROUGHT IT UP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES THAT MOST PEOPLE ON THIS COMMITTEE HAVE SUPPORTED. BUT OF COURSE, THERE IS ANOTHER WAY TO FREE PEOPLE FROM ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT IS TO BE WILLING TO TAKE MORE INTO THE UNITED STATES. THE MAIN OBJECTION HAS BEEN THAT, WELL, WE HAVE FISCAL LIMITS.

MR. SECRETARY, FROM YOUR FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO SUPPORT AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF EREFUGEESF FROM POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION COMING INTO THE UNITED STATES, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING SOVIET JEWS, BUT ALSO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY IF ADMISSION WAS TIED, NOT TO EXTENSION OF REFUGEE BENEFITS, BUT ADMISSION WAS TIED MORE TO SPONSORSHIP BY GROUPS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS?

SEC. BAKER: MR. MILLER, WE HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING INCREASED LEVELS IN EACH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. AGAIN, IT'S PRIMARILY A QUESTION OF RECONCILING FUTURE INCREASES WITH THE LIMITED BUDGET FUNDS THAT WE HAVE, AND WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. AND AGAIN, TELL US WHERE WE CAN GET THE MONEY. NOBODY WOULD ARGUE WITH THE PURPOSE AND THE GOAL. BUT LET ME JUST TELL YOU THAT THE EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION -- JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE UNITED STATES HAS GONE FROM 14,000 IN 1988, TO 50,000 IN 1989, AND IF WE KEEP ON THE SAME PACE THAT WE ARE THIS YEAR, WE WILL TAKE 70,000 THIS YEAR, WHEN YOU COUNT NOT JUST REFUGEES, BUT THOSE ADMITTED UNDER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAROLE AUTHORITY. SO, WE'RE DOING A PRETTY GOOD JOB.

REP. MILLER: I DON'T QUESTION THE INCREASES, I DON'T QUESTION THE FACTS OF YOUR STATEMENT, BUT I THINK WE'RE AWARE OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND I THINK, WE'RE AWARE THAT EFFORTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AS WELL AS ISRAEL, MAY BE NEEDED IF THAT FLOOD OF REFUGEES CONTINUES TO INCREASE. WE MAY HAVE TO EXPAND OUR EFFORTS AS WELL.

SEC. BAKER: YOU'RE - YOU'RE AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD -- WOULD NOT LOOK FAVORABLY UPON AN EXPANSION OF OUR NUMBERS.

REP. MILLER: I'M AWARE OF THAT. BUT THIS -- AND WE'VE ENCOURAGED ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO RESETTLE, AND I'M SUPPORTIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE A TRADITION IN THIS COUNTRY, GOING BACK HUNDREDS OF YEARS, OF TAKING THOSE THAT FLEE FROM RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PERSECUTION. AND I THINK WE HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT TRADITION AS WELL.

REP. GEJDENSON: LET ME JUST DO QUICKLY ONE ADDITIONAL ITEM, AND I'M NOT SURE THIS WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE EARABSF. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME, REVIEWING THE SITUATION IN THE EMIDDLE EASTF, ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN TRYING TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IS NOT WHO IS IN CONTROL OF NABLUS AND HEBRON OR WHETHER OR NOT THERE'S A EPALESTINIANF ENTITY OF ANY FORM THERE, THE REAL PROBLEM IS THAT THE CONFRONTATION STATES, EIRAQF, ESYRIAF, EVEN EJORDANF AND SOME OF THE MORE, QUOTE, UNQUOTE, "MODERATE STATES" HAVE IMMENSE MILITARY CAPABILITIES.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO DO WHAT WE'VE JUST DONE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND THAT IS TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO BUILD DOWN THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION, AND THEN IT WOULD BE, I THINK, MUCH EASIER TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES ON THE EWESTF E BANKF AND EGAZAF.

ADDITIONALLY, I THINK WE OUGHT TO PRESS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE IT MAY BE EASIER, AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EASIER, TO REACH A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF THERE WERE MORE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, IF WE REALLY HAD ELECTIONS IN THOSE COUNTRIES. AND SO PART OF WHAT MAYBE WE OUGHT TO BE DOING IS PRESSING FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN SYRIA, IRAQ, AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AS OUTRAGEOUS A THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE AT THIS TIME.
THANK YOU.

SEC. BAKER: CONGRESSMAN, LET ME JUST SAY THAT I DON'T THINK WE CAN -- I MEAN I THINK THAT THAT MAY BE PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. I THINK THAT IT MIGHT BE GOOD TO TRY AND ACCOMPLISH SOME OF THAT, AND I SPOKE TO THAT IN MY STATEMENT, AND I SAID WHAT I THOUGHT ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DO. BUT I DON'T THINK YOU CAN BUILD DOWN THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS YOU HAVE SOME HOPE THAT A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS CAN EMERGE.

AND I THINK THAT YOU COULD SEE A LESSENING OF TENSIONS IF THERE WERE A PEACE PROCESS OR IF THERE WERE HOPES OF A PEACE PROCESS. AND THAT'S WHY I THINK IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO TRY AND ACHIEVE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS.

REP. GEJDENSON: I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT ON GETTING A DIALOGUE GOING. I QUESTION WHETHER IT REALLY HELPS THE OTHER AREAS. IF YOU LOOK AT AFTER CAMP DAVID, I'M NOT SURE THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TENSION.

REP. LEVINE: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

MR. SECRETARY, I'D LIKE TO JOIN WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN COMPLIMENTING YOU AND THE PRESIDENT ON A VERY SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. FRANKLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CHILLING STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ON ESOVIET JEWSF, I THOUGHT IT WAS A MARVELOUS SUMMIT, AND I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR COMMENTS TODAY WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET JEWS.

BRIEFLY, I'D LIKE TO MAKE TWO POINTS AND THEN ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. I'D LIKE TO JUST ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH MR. SOLARZ'S URGING YOU TO MOVE PROMPTLY WITH REGARD TO THE EEL SALVADORF DISCUSSIONS. I THINK THAT THEY ARE CRITICAL, AND I HOPE THAT WE'LL BE ABLE TO SIT DOWN ON THAT BIPARTISAN BASIS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

SEC. BAKER: I'VE ASKED THE LEADERSHIP, CONGRESSMAN, ON THAT POINT, TO PLEASE DESIGNATE -- BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE -- DESIGNATE, AS WE DID IN ENICARAGUAF, A SMALL GROUP WITH WHOM WE CAN NEGOTIATE, BECAUSE WE CAN'T DO IT WITH 40 PEOPLE. AND I HAVE RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE SENATE SIDE -- AND NOW ON THE HOUSE SIDE.
SO I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WOULD BE GETTING UNDERWAY, AND OUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARONSON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULLINS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COME UP QUITE QUICKLY.

REP. LEVINE: VERY GOOD. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO URGE YOU TO MOVE AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE ON THE SOVIET JEWRY LOAN GUARANTEE, AND YOU'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED THAT. I JUST WANTED TO ADD MY OWN THOUGHTS ON THAT.

WITH REGARD TO YOUR COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE'S ASSURANCES ON SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION, IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS, BOTH HERE AND YESTERDAY TO THE SOVIET LEGISLATURE, IS IT YOUR VIEW THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SHOULD OR WILL UNDERSCORE HIS COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION FOR SOVIET JEWS?

SEC. BAKER: YOU KNOW, I WAS ASKED THAT QUESTION ON THE SENATE SIDE YESTERDAY, AND I SAID, "LOOK, I'M REPORTING THIS FACTUALLY. I'M NOT GIVING YOU ANY GUARANTEE HERE, AND I DON'T WANT TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE DOING THAT." YOU ASKED ME WHETHER WE'VE RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WON'T FOLLOW THIS COURSE, AND I'M GIVING YOU AS BEST I CAN MY REACTION TO WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD. AND THAT'S THE WAY IT IS, CONGRESSMAN. I DON'T KNOW ANY OTHER WAY TO PUT IT.

REP. LEVINE: WELL, HOPEFULLY, YOU'LL --

SEC. BAKER: YOU KNOW, THEIR -- IN OTHER WORDS, I DON'T KNOW WHAT PRESSURES THEY MIGHT DEEM THEMSELVES SUBJECT TO IN THE FUTURE THAT WOULD CAUSE THEM TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON A STATEMENT LIKE THAT. BUT RIGHT NOW, MOST RECENTLY, IN MY PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, WITH MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE LAST WEEK IN COPENHAGEN, HE SAID THAT THAT WAS -- THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO SHUT IT OFF. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT REPEATING WHAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAID HERE IN WASHINGTON. THAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY.

REP. LEVINE: I TRUST YOU ARE COMMUNICATING TO THEM THE INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT ON THIS, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR JEOPARDIZING THE ETRADEF SITUATION --

SEC. BAKER:
ABSOLUTELY.

REP. LEVINE: -- IF THERE'S ANY BACKSLIDING.

SEC. BAKER: NO QUESTION ABOUT IT, AND I SAID AS MUCH YESTERDAY IN THE SENATE.

REP. LEVINE: I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY TIME AND QUESTIONS TO THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUE, AND I -- FIRST OF ALL, I LISTENED CAREFULLY TO YOUR RESPONSE TO MR. BROOMFIELD, AND I WELCOME IT. I FULLY SUPPORT AND SHARE YOUR GOALS, AS I'M SURE -- AS I BELIEVE YOU KNOW. I THINK THE WAY YOU OUTLINE THE SITUATION AT THIS TIME, THE NEED FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE IN TERMS OF A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO MOVE IN A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, AND THE NEED FOR THE ARAB STATES TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT ARE EXACTLY THE RIGHT EQUATION.

I PARTICULARLY WELCOMED YOUR FINAL COMMENT. I BELIEVE THAT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO BE REMINDING THE ARAB STATES IN THE REGION THAT THEY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY AS WELL IN IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE THAT THEY CAN DO TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THIS PROCESS. SO I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR ANALYSIS, AND I HOPE THAT THE PARTIES WILL FOLLOW IT.

I ALSO AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE DIALOGUE HAD BEGUN, AS IT APPEARED TO BE SO CLOSE TO DOING, WE MIGHT NOT BE IN THE SITUATION THAT WE'RE IN TODAY. AND, MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE THAT THAT COULD WELL HAVE OCCURRED, IN LIGHT OF HOW CLOSE WE APPEARED TO BE WHEN EVERYTHING UNRAVELED, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE INTEMPERATE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT WITH REGARD TO EAST JERUSALEM. I DON'T THINK HE INTENDED ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS AND THE UNRAVELING, BUT I CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT HIS STATEMENT, MORE THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE THING, HELPED TO PULL THIS PROCESS APART.

INCIDENTALLY, MR. SECRETARY, AS I'M SURE YOU KNOW, THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON JERUSALEM WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENT. SO IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHEN -- FIRST OF ALL, WHEN WE MOVE TO DIRECT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, AS HAS OCCURRED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR-AND-A- HALF, IT SERVES TO UNDERMINE THE VERY SOLID PROGRESS YOU MAKE THROUGH THE PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THAT YOU'VE BEEN PURSUING AND WHICH MOVE THIS PROCESS SO CLOSE TO EITHER FRUITION OR MOVEMENT TO THE NEXT STEP.

SO, I WOULD HOPE THAT AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD DO A COUPLE OF THINGS TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS. FIRST, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE WOULD MOVE TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS THAT WE WILL BE WORKING FOR THE KIND OF ATMOSPHERE THAT HAD GOTTEN US AS CLOSE AS WE WERE.

AND, SECONDLY, MR. SECRETARY, I HEARD ON NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO YESTERDAY THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, NOW THAT HE HAS FORMED A GOVERNMENT, WANTS TO FIND A WAY TO IMPROVE HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, WHICH OBVIOUSLY IS NOT THE CLOSEST. AND I WAS -- I'M INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER THE PRESIDENT IS RECEPTIVE, IN LIGHT OF VARIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, TO DEVELOPING SOME FORM OF A PROCESS BY WHICH THOSE TWO INDIVIDUALS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLARIFY WHATEVER MISUNDERSTANDINGS THEY'VE HAD, IMPROVE THEIR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP, AND THEREFORE, HOPEFULLY, IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE SO THAT WE CAN MOVE ALONG THE, I THINK, VERY CONSTRUCTIVE LINES THAT YOU'VE OUTLINED TODAY.

SEC. BAKER: MR. LEVINE, THANK YOU FOR WHAT YOU SAID. IN WHAT YOU SAID, I HAVE TO TAKE EXCEPTION TO YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, BUT THE REST OF WHAT YOU SAY, I DON'T THINK I DISAGREE WITH.

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תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,@(אמן),בנצור,
מצפא,סולטן,סייבל,רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים

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HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SUBJECT: US-SOVIET SUMMIT, CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE DANTE FASCELL, WITNESS: SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, 2172 RAYBURN,

REP. BROOMFIELD: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. SECRETARY, THE SITUATION IN THE EMIDDLE EAST IS PROBABLY THE MOST DANGEROUS IT'S BEEN SINCE 1967. A NEW RIGHT-WING GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FORMED IN EISRAEL THAT IS CONFRONTED BY AN INCREASINGLY UNITED AND HARDENED ARAB POSITION ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THERE ARE NOW REPORTS THAT THE EARAB ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS ON THE RISE. IT SEEMS IMPERATIVE THAT THE UNITED STATES REVIEW OUR POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. MY QUESTION TO YOU IS, DO YOU THINK MY CONCERNS ARE WELL-FOUNDED AND WHAT STEPS ARE YOU TAKING TO ENSURE THAT OUR POLICY CONTRIBUTES TO THE GOAL OF STABILITY IN THE REGION?

SEC. BAKER: WE, TOO, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MR. BROOMFIELD, AND I CANNOT SAY THAT YOUR CONCERNS ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED, BECAUSE I THINK THEY ARE.

LET ME TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY, IF I COULD, TO REVIEW FOR THE COMMITTEE WHERE WE'VE BEEN WITH RESPECT TO A MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND WHERE, I THINK, WE ARE TODAY. I WOULD LIKE TO INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE THE STATEMENT I MADE YESTERDAY BEFORE THE SENATE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF THE DIALOGUE THAT WE HAVE WITH THE EPALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,F THE APPROACH WE'RE TAKING TO THAT, THE REQUIREMENTS THAT WE HAVE PUT FORTH IN TERMS OF PLO BEHAVIOR, IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THAT DIALOGUE. AND I WOULD LIKE TO INCORPORATE ALL OF THAT, IF I MIGHT HERE THIS MORNING BY REFERENCE, AND I THINK THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE WELL AWARE OF WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY.

BUT LET ME START BY SAYING THAT WHEN I APPEARED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE LAST FEBRUARY, WE WERE VERY, VERY CLOSE, MR. BROOMFIELD, TO PUTTING TOGETHER AN HISTORIC, FIRST-TIME-EVER DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND EPALESTINIANS. THIS DIALOGUE, HAD IT BEGUN, I THINK WE WOULD -- HAD THE DIALOGUE ACTUALLY BEGUN, I DON'T THINK WE WOULD BE FACING THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE FACING IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. AND I THINK THAT THE PRE-ELECTION DIALOGUE THAT WE WERE -- THAT WE WERE PUSHING AND TRYING TO IMPLEMENT, AN INITIATIVE QUITE FRANKLY SUGGESTED INITIALLY BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR OF ISRAEL, OFFERED THE POTENTIAL FOR A REAL BREAKTHROUGH THAT WOULD HAVE -- THAT WOULD HAVE PERMITTED US TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S 1989 INITIATIVE IN FULL, AND IT WOULD HAVE CREATED THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE. AS WE ALL KNOW, THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ISRAEL INTERVENED, PREVENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FROM MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE THIS PROCESS.

NOW, THE INTERVENING PERIOD HAS BEEN MARRED, AS YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR QUESTION, BY A REAL DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION. WE'VE SEEN A CYCLE OF ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; A PLO FACTION HAS NOW ATTEMPTED A VERY SERIOUS ACT OF TERRORISM, RAISING SERIOUS QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS AND IN THE MINDS OF MANY ABOUT THE PLO'S RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM; AN ARAB SUMMIT HAS TAKEN PLACE WHICH REALLY HAS NOT FOSTERED MODERATION. EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THE EUNITED NATIONS IN A PRACTICAL WAY HAVE NOT AS YET SUCCEEDED, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THIS MORNING, AS PERHAPS YOU ARE AWARE, THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO SEE SOMETHING ACCOMPLISHED THERE.

THESE EVENTS, MR. BROOMFIELD, REFLECT SOME REALITIES IN THE REGION, MOST OF WHICH -- MANY OF WHICH -- PROBABLY MOST OF WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. BUT THEY ALSO REFLECT THE FACT THAT THERE'S GREAT FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN, I THINK, OVER THE LACK OF A PEACE PROCESS. SO, I THINK THE CHALLENGE, IF I MAY SAY SO, FOR ALL SIDES IS TO TRY TO PUT BACK ON TRACK THE PROCESS THAT WE HAD SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING SO CLOSE TO SUCCESS AND TO SEE IF WE CAN'T CREATE A BETTER ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACE MAKING.

NOW, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR THE PARTIES? FOR ISRAEL, THAT MEANS SAYING YES TO THE IDEA OF A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS, AND I HOPE THAT THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL BE WILLING AND ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD TO SUCH A DIALOGUE AND DO SO IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR A CREDIBLE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION TO PARTICIPATE. WE, ON OUR PART, MR. BROOMFIELD, ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND IMPLEMENT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE. BUT LET ME SAY ONE MORE TIME, WE CAN'T DO IT ALONE.

FOR PALESTINIANS, THIS MEANS, I THINK, LOOKING BEYOND THE TRAGIC HUMAN LOSSES THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND RECOMMITTING THEMSELVES TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. AS I'VE INDICATED, THE OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK OF MAY 30TH HAS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THAT COMMITMENT, AND SO THE PLO HAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ITS POLICY OF RENOUNCING ETERRORISM STILL STANDS, AND IT MUST DO SO IN AN AUTHORITATIVE AND UNAMBIGUOUS WAY. AS I SAID YESTERDAY OVER IN THE SENATE, SO FAR, IT HAS NOT DONE SO.

FOR THE ARAB STATES, I THINK THIS MEANS DOING MORE TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN SUPPORT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION. WE'RE STILL WILLING TO BE ENGAGED, MR. BROOMFIELD. BUT IF THE POLITICAL WILL TO MOVE AHEAD DOESN'T EXIST IN THE REGION, WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO CREATE THAT POLITICAL WILL FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION. AND THE SOONER EVERYBODY RECOGNIZES THAT, THE BETTER OFF I THINK WE ALL WILL BE.

REP. FASCELL: MR. HAMILTON.

REP. HAMILTON (D-IN): THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. SECRETARY, WE WELCOME YOU TO THE COMMITTEE AND COMMEND YOU AND PRESIDENT BUSH FOR YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AT THE SUMMIT. THAT'S THE 8TH SUMMIT, I BELIEVE, AND CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MORE SUCCESSFUL ONES FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. I WANT TO FOLLOW ALONG WITH MR. BROOMFIELD'S QUESTION. I VERY MUCH SHARE HIS VIEW THAT EVENTS DO NOT SEEM TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE REASONS THAT BOTH HE AND YOU HAVE SPELLED OUT. AND AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR RESPONSE TO MR. BROOMFIELD, THE CENTER OF OUR STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON THE SHAMIR ELECTION PROPOSAL, I GATHER.

SEC. BAKER: IT WILL BE, MR. HAMILTON, PROVIDED WE GET SOME INDICATION THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ARE WILLING TO BE ENGAGED IN A POSITIVE WAY AND MOVE FORWARD PROMPTLY IN AN AFFIRMATIVE FASHION. OTHERWISE I HAVE TO SAY WHAT I JUST SAID. WE CAN'T DO IT FROM THE OUTSIDE.

REP. HAMILTON: I ASSUME THAT UNLESS THE PLO ACTS MORE FORTHRIGHTLY, THAT WE WILL HAVE TO CUT OFF OR SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR POLICY. IS THAT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION?

SEC. BAKER: I MADE IT VERY CLEAR IN THE SENATE YESTERDAY THAT THE FUTURE OF THE DIALOGUE IS IN GREAT JEOPARDY, MR. HAMILTON, AND I LAID OUT IN SOME DETAIL WHAT WE'VE DONE IN THE PAST 10 OR 11 DAYS IN TERMS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH MANY, MANY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND WITH SOME THAT MIGHT NOT -- YOU MIGHT NOT PERHAPS CHARACTERIZE IN THAT FASHION. THERE IS A FEELING ON THE PART OF MANY COUNTRIES THAT WE SHOULD TAKE -- WE SHOULD TAKE OUR DECISION IN A RESPONSIBLE AND MEASURED WAY, THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN BY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES. AND WE WON'T BE.

REP. HAMILTON: WHAT -- WHAT IS --

SEC. BAKER: HOWEVER, OUR COMMITMENT -- OUR COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING TERRORISM WILL NOT BE DIMINISHED OR DETERRED BY WHATEVER IMPACT A -- WHATEVER IMPACT MIGHT BE THERE WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. I DON'T WANT TO SUGGEST FOR ONE MINUTE THAT THERE'S ANY BALANCING WITH RESPECT TO THAT HERE.

REP. HAMILTON: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE -- TO THE PEACE PROCESS IF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS CUT OFF?

SEC. BAKER: I THINK THAT THERE COULD BE SOME -- THERE COULD BE SOME ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PEACE PROCESS TO ADVANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS I JUST SAID, I THINK THAT FIRST AND FOREMOST HAS TO BE OUR COMMITMENT TO FACE UP TO THE QUESTION OF TERRORISM.

REP. HAMILTON: MR. SECRETARY?

SEC. BAKER: AND WE'VE MADE THAT VERY CLEAR TO THE PLO, MR. HAMILTON. AND WE HAVE SAID, AS YOU KNOW, THAT WE MUST SEE A CONDEMNATION OF THIS PARTICULAR ACT IN ITS OWN RIGHT. AND WE MUST SEE THE BEGINNING OF SOME STEPS TO DISCIPLINE ABU ABBAS WHO HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY.

REP. SOLARZ: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN.

MR. SECRETARY, A SHORT WHILE AGO, THE CONGRESS ENACTED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE EISRAEL WITH DOLLAR 400 MILLION IN HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES TO HELP ABSORB THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ERUSSIAN JEWS WHO HAVE RECENTLY ENTERED THEIR COUNTRY. IS THERE ANY REASON WHY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS LEGISLATION IS BEING HELD UP?

SEC. BAKER: WE WERE WAITING ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL, WHICH WAS FORMED YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE -- I'VE LOST TRACK OF THE DATE, MR. SOLARZ -- BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING THAT'S BEEN HOLDING IT UP.

REP. SOLARZ: AND ARE WE GOING TO BE SEEKING ANY ASSURANCES FROM ISRAEL, OTHER THAN THE CUSTOMARY ASSURANCES WE HAVE ALWAYS OBTAINED IN THE PAST ABOUT WHERE THE MONEY WILL BE SPENT?

SEC. BAKER: WE ARE GOING TO BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN THE VERY NEAR TERM. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO TALK THIS MORNING ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF THE ASSURANCES THAT WE MIGHT REQUEST, MR. SOLARZ.

REP. SOLARZ: BUT DO YOU EXPECT TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCES THAT GO BEYOND THOSE THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO GIVE IN THE PAST?

SEC. BAKER: I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, BECAUSE, QUITE FRANKLY, I HAVEN'T SAT DOWN OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS AND REVIEWED THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN, AS YOU CAN SEE, PRETTY BUSY ON US-SOVIET BUSINESS. BUT I CAN CHECK AND FIND OUT AND LET YOU KNOW.

REP. SOLARZ: WELL, I HOPE WE CAN MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY ON THIS BECAUSE THERE ARE TREMENDOUS NUMBERS COMING OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION. ISRAEL DOESN'T CURRENTLY HAVE THE FACILITIES TO ABSORB THEM. AND IF THEY CAN'T HOUSE THEM, IT'S ENTIRELY POSSIBLE WORD WILL GO BACK TO THOSE WHO REMAIN IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEY ARE BETTER OFF STAYING WHERE THEY ARE. AND GIVEN THE EMERGENCE OF A RATHER VOCAL AND VIRULENT STRAIN OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAS CREATED SOMETHING LIKE A STATE OF PANIC IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY THERE, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS, MR. SECRETARY.

SEC. BAKER: MAY I JUST ADD, I'M NOT TRYING TO DUCK YOUR QUESTION. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS I REALLY HAVEN'T SPENT ANY TIME AT ALL ON THIS ISSUE FOR WEEKS, AND I AM NOT ENTIRELY SURE, MR. SOLARZ, THAT THE LEGISLATION PROVIDES THE ADMINISTRATION WITH ANY FLEXIBILITY TO GO BEYOND ASSURANCES THAT HAVE BEEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED IN THE PAST. I JUST NEED TO FIND OUT.

REP. SOLARZ: SURE. COULD YOU TELL US WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET ENACTED THE EMIGRATION LEGISLATION WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AS A CONDITION FOR EWAIVER? I ASSUME THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MR. GORBACHEV AND MR. SHEVARDNADZE, INASMUCH AS THEY'RE ALREADY LETTING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE LEAVE. WHAT REASON DO THEY GIVE US FOR THEIR FAILURE TO HAVE ENACTED THE LEGISLATION SO FAR?

SEC. BAKER: THE REASON THAT THEY GIVE US IS THAT THE SUPREME SOVIET HAS BEEN LOADED DOWN WITH A LOT OF -- WITH A VERY, VERY HEAVY LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR. THEY ARE, AFTER ALL, RESTRUCTURING THAT SOCIETY EXTENSIVELY, CREATING AN ENTIRELY NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE LIKE. AND THAT'S THE EXPLANATION THAT WE'VE RECEIVED.

REP. MILLER: OKAY. GETTING BACK TO THE SUBJECT THAT REPRESENTATIVE SOLARZ MENTIONED IN EMIGRATION FROM THE ESOVIET UNION TO EISRAEL. AND WE REALIZE THIS IS A SENSITIVE TRIANGULAR PROBLEM AND ARRANGEMENT. BUT CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ BROUGHT IT UP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES THAT MOST PEOPLE ON THIS COMMITTEE HAVE SUPPORTED. BUT OF COURSE, THERE IS ANOTHER WAY TO FREE PEOPLE FROM ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT IS TO BE WILLING TO TAKE MORE INTO THE UNITED STATES. THE MAIN OBJECTION HAS BEEN THAT, WELL, WE HAVE FISCAL LIMITS.

MR. SECRETARY, FROM YOUR FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO SUPPORT AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF EREFUGEES FROM POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION COMING INTO THE UNITED STATES, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING SOVIET JEWS, BUT ALSO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY IF ADMISSION WAS TIED, NOT TO EXTENSION OF REFUGEE BENEFITS, BUT ADMISSION WAS TIED MORE TO SPONSORSHIP BY GROUPS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS?

SEC. BAKER: MR. MILLER, WE HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING INCREASED LEVELS IN EACH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. AGAIN, IT'S PRIMARILY A QUESTION OF RECONCILING FUTURE INCREASES WITH THE LIMITED BUDGET FUNDS THAT WE HAVE, AND WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS. AND AGAIN, TELL US WHERE WE CAN GET THE MONEY. NOBODY WOULD ARGUE WITH THE PURPOSE AND THE GOAL. BUT LET ME JUST TELL YOU THAT THE EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION -- JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE UNITED STATES HAS GONE FROM 14,000 IN 1988, TO 50,000 IN 1989, AND IF WE KEEP ON THE SAME PACE THAT WE ARE THIS YEAR, WE WILL TAKE 70,000 THIS YEAR. WHEN YOU COUNT NOT JUST REFUGEES, BUT THOSE ADMITTED UNDER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAROLE AUTHORITY. SO, WE'RE DOING A PRETTY GOOD JOB.

REP. MILLER: I DON'T QUESTION THE INCREASES, I DON'T QUESTION THE FACTS OF YOUR STATEMENT, BUT I THINK WE'RE AWARE OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND I THINK, WE'RE AWARE THAT EFFORTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AS WELL AS ISRAEL, MAY BE NEEDED IF THAT FLOOD OF REFUGEES CONTINUES TO INCREASE. WE MAY HAVE TO EXPAND OUR EFFORTS AS WELL.

SEC. BAKER: YOU'RE - YOU'RE AWARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WOULD -- WOULD NOT LOOK FAVORABLY UPON AN EXPANSION OF OUR NUMBERS.

REP. MILLER: I'M AWARE OF THAT. BUT THIS -- AND WE'VE ENCOURAGED ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO RESETTLE, AND I'M SUPPORTIVE OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE A TRADITION IN THIS COUNTRY, GOING BACK HUNDREDS OF YEARS, OF TAKING THOSE THAT FLEE FROM RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PERSECUTION. AND I THINK WE HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT TRADITION AS WELL.

REP. GEJDENSON: LET ME JUST DO QUICKLY ONE ADDITIONAL ITEM, AND I'M NOT SURE THIS WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE EARABS. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME, REVIEWING THE SITUATION IN THE EMIDDLE EAST, ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN TRYING TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IS NOT WHO IS IN CONTROL OF NABLUS AND HEBRON OR WHETHER OR NOT THERE'S A EPALESTINIAN ENTITY OF ANY FORM THERE. THE REAL PROBLEM IS THAT THE CONFRONTATION STATES, EIRAQ, ESYRIA, EVEN EJORDAN AND SOME OF THE MORE, QUOTE, UNQUOTE, "MODERATE STATES" HAVE IMMENSE MILITARY CAPABILITIES.
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO DO WHAT WE'VE JUST DONE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND THAT IS TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO BUILD DOWN THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION, AND THEN IT WOULD BE, I THINK, MUCH EASIER TO MOVE FORWARD TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES ON THE EWEST E BANK AND EGAZA.

ADDITIONALLY, I THINK WE OUGHT TO PRESS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE IT MAY BE EASIER, AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EASIER, TO REACH A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF THERE WERE MORE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS. IF WE REALLY HAD ELECTIONS IN THOSE COUNTRIES. AND SO PART OF WHAT MAYBE WE OUGHT TO BE DOING IS PRESSING FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN SYRIA, IRAQ, AND OTHER COUNTRIES. AS OUTRAGEOUS A THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE AT THIS TIME.
THANK YOU.

SEC. BAKER: CONGRESSMAN, LET ME JUST SAY THAT I DON'T THINK WE CAN -- I MEAN I THINK THAT THAT MAY BE PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. I THINK THAT IT MIGHT BE GOOD TO TRY AND ACCOMPLISH SOME OF THAT, AND I SPOKE TO THAT IN MY STATEMENT, AND I SAID WHAT I THOUGHT ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DO. BUT I DON'T THINK YOU CAN BUILD DOWN THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS YOU HAVE SOME HOPE THAT A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS CAN EMERGE.

AND I THINK THAT YOU COULD SEE A LESSENING OF TENSIONS IF THERE WERE A PEACE PROCESS OR IF THERE WERE HOPES OF A PEACE PROCESS. AND THAT'S WHY I THINK IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO TRY AND ACHIEVE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS.

REP. GEJDENSON: I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT ON GETTING A DIALOGUE GOING. I QUESTION WHETHER IT REALLY HELPS THE OTHER AREAS. IF YOU LOOK AT AFTER CAMP DAVID, I'M NOT SURE THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TENSION.

REP. LEVINE: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

MR. SECRETARY, I'D LIKE TO JOIN WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN COMPLIMENTING YOU AND THE PRESIDENT ON A VERY SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. FRANKLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CHILLING STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ON ESOVIET JEWS, I THOUGHT IT WAS A MARVELOUS SUMMIT, AND I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR COMMENTS TODAY WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET JEWS.

BRIEFLY, I'D LIKE TO MAKE TWO POINTS AND THEN ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. I'D LIKE TO JUST ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH MR. SOLARZ'S URGING YOU TO MOVE PROMPTLY WITH REGARD TO THE EEL SALVADOR DISCUSSIONS. I THINK THAT THEY ARE CRITICAL. AND I HOPE THAT WE'LL BE ABLE TO SIT DOWN ON THAT BIPARTISAN BASIS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

SEC. BAKER: I'VE ASKED THE LEADERSHIP, CONGRESSMAN, ON THAT POINT, TO PLEASE DESIGNATE -- BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE -- DESIGNATE, AS WE DID IN ENICARAGUA, A SMALL GROUP WITH WHOM WE CAN NEGOTIATE. BECAUSE WE CAN'T DO IT WITH 40 PEOPLE. AND I HAVE RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE SENATE SIDE -- AND NOW ON THE HOUSE SIDE.
SO I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WOULD BE GETTING UNDERWAY, AND OUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARONSON AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULLINS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COME UP QUITE QUICKLY.

REP. LEVINE: VERY GOOD. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO URGE YOU TO MOVE AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE ON THE SOVIET JEWRY LOAN GUARANTEES. AND YOU'VE ALREADY DISCUSSED THAT. I JUST WANTED TO ADD MY OWN THOUGHTS ON THAT.

WITH REGARD TO YOUR COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE'S ASSURANCES ON SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION, IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS, BOTH HERE AND YESTERDAY TO THE SOVIET LEGISLATURE, IS IT YOUR VIEW THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SHOULD OR WILL UNDERSCORE HIS COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION FOR SOVIET JEWS?
SEC. BAKER: YOU KNOW, I WAS ASKED THAT QUESTION ON THE SENATE SIDE YESTERDAY, AND I SAID, "LOOK, I'M REPORTING THIS FACTUALLY. I'M NOT GIVING YOU ANY GUARANTEE HERE, AND I DON'T WANT TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE DOING THAT." YOU ASKED ME WHETHER WE'VE RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WON'T FOLLOW THIS COURSE, AND I'M GIVING YOU AS BEST I CAN MY REACTION TO WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD. AND THAT'S THE WAY IT IS, CONGRESSMAN. I DON'T KNOW ANY OTHER WAY TO PUT IT.

REP. LEVINE: WELL, HOPEFULLY, YOU'LL --

SEC. BAKER: YOU KNOW, THEIR -- IN OTHER WORDS, I DON'T KNOW WHAT PRESSURES THEY MIGHT BEEN THEMSELVES SUBJECT TO IN THE FUTURE THAT WOULD CAUSE THEM TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON A STATEMENT LIKE THAT. BUT RIGHT NOW, MOST RECENTLY, IN MY PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, WITH MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE LAST WEEK IN COPENHAGEN, HE SAID THAT THAT WAS -- THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO SHUT IT OFF. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT REPEATING WHAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAID HERE IN WASHINGTON. THAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY.

REP. LEVINE: I TRUST YOU ARE COMMUNICATING TO THEM THE INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT ON THIS, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR JEOPARDIZING THE BROADER SITUATION --

SEC. BAKER:
ABSOLUTELY.

REP. LEVINE: -- IF THERE'S ANY BACKSLIDING.

SEC. BAKER: NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. AND I SAID AS MUCH YESTERDAY IN THE SENATE.

REP. LEVINE: I WOULD LIKE TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY TIME AND QUESTIONS TO THE PEACE PROCESS ISSUE. AND I -- FIRST OF ALL, I LISTENED CAREFULLY TO YOUR RESPONSE TO MR. BROOMFIELD, AND I WELCOME IT. I FULLY SUPPORT AND SHARE YOUR GOALS. AS I'M SURE -- AS I BELIEVE YOU KNOW, I THINK THE WAY YOU OUTLINE THE SITUATION AT THIS TIME, THE NEED FOR THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE IN TERMS OF A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO MOVE IN A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, AND THE NEED FOR THE ARAB STATES TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT ARE EXACTLY THE RIGHT EQUATION.

I PARTICULARLY WELCOMED YOUR FINAL COMMENT. I BELIEVE THAT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO BE REMINDING THE ARAB STATES IN THE REGION THAT THEY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY AS WELL IN IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE THAT THEY CAN DO TO BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THIS PROCESS. SO I WAS HEARTENED BY YOUR ANALYSIS, AND I HOPE THAT THE PARTIES WILL FOLLOW IT

I ALSO AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE DIALOGUE HAD BEGUN, AS IT APPEARED TO BE SO CLOSE TO DOING, WE MIGHT NOT BE IN THE SITUATION THAT WE'RE IN TODAY. AND, MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE THAT THAT COULD WELL HAVE OCCURRED, IN LIGHT OF HOW CLOSE WE APPEARED TO BE WHEN EVERYTHING UNRAVELED, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE INTEMPERATE REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT WITH REGARD TO EAST JERUSALEM. I DON'T THINK HE INTENDED ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS AND THE UNRAVELING. BUT I CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT HIS STATEMENT, MORE THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE THING, HELPED TO PULL THIS PROCESS APART.

INCIDENTALLY, MR. SECRETARY, AS I'M SURE YOU KNOW, THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON JERUSALEM WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENT. SO IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHEN -- FIRST OF ALL, WHEN WE MOVE TO DIRECT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, AS HAS OCCURRED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR-AND-A-HALF, IT SERVES TO UNDERMINE THE VERY SOLID PROGRESS YOU MADE THROUGH THE PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THAT YOU'VE BEEN PURSUING AND WHICH MOVE THIS PROCESS SO CLOSE TO EITHER FRUITION OR MOVEMENT TO THE NEXT STEP.

SO, I WOULD HOPE THAT AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD DO A COURSE OF THINGS TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS. FIRST, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE WOULD MOVE TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS THAT WE WILL BE WORKING FOR THE KIND OF ATMOSPHERE THAT HAD GOTTEN US AS CLOSE AS WE WERE.

AND, SECONDLY, MR. SECRETARY, I HEARD ON NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO YESTERDAY THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, NOW THAT HE HAS FORMED A GOVERNMENT, WANTS TO FIND A WAY TO IMPROVE HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, WHICH OBVIOUSLY IS NOT THE CLOSEST. AND I WAS -- I'M INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER THE PRESIDENT IS RECEPTIVE, IN LIGHT OF VARIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, TO DEVELOPING SOME FORM OF A PROCESS BY WHICH THOSE TWO INDIVIDUALS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLARIFY WHATEVER MISUNDERSTANDINGS THEY'VE HAD, IMPROVE THEIR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP, AND THEREFORE, HOPEFULLY, IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE SO THAT WE CAN MOVE ALONG THE, I THINK, VERY CONSTRUCTIVE LINES THAT YOU'VE OUTLINED TODAY.

SEC. BAKER: MR. LEVINE, THANK YOU FOR WHAT YOU SAID. IN WHAT YOU SAID, I HAVE TO TAKE EXCEPTION TO YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, BUT THE REST OF WHAT YOU SAY, I DON'T THINK I DISAGREE WITH.

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WE HAVE SAID -- I'VE JUST SAID HERE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO -- WE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE -- CONTINUE TO MOVE THIS PROCESS FORWARD IF WE CAN, BUT WE MUST HAVE THE GOOD FAITH ENGAGEMENT OF ALL PARTIES, AND WE MUST HAVE IT PROMPTLY. WE WORKED AT THIS FOR 11 MONTHS, AND WE GOT EXTRAORDINARILY CLOSE. AND I WOULD LIKE TO -- I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU THE QUESTION THAT WE ASKED FOR A RESPONSE TO THAT ENDED UP BRINGING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. WE COULD NOT GET A YES ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, MR. LEVINE.

WE COULD NOT GET A YES ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, "AS REGARDS THE PARTICIPATION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BE READY TO CONSIDER ON A NAME-BY-NAME BASIS ANY PALESTINIAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF THE TERRITORIES?" AND, AT THE SAME TIME, I MADE IT CLEAR TO MINISTER ARENS THAT WE POSED THIS QUESTION WITH AN ASSUMPTION, NAMELY THAT IN THE END THERE WILL BE A FEW NAMES SELECTED THAT FIT THE CATEGORIES OF DEPORTEES WHO WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO RETURN AND THE CATEGORIES OF DUAL ADDRESSEES. NOW, THAT'S HOW CLOSE WE GOT.

AND IT'S REALLY VERY HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND, IN THE FACE, AS WELL, OF THE FACT THAT PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES, AS YOU KNOW, WERE PREPARED TO COME TO THE TABLE, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK WITH ISRAELIS ABOUT ELECTIONS -- IT'S HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE DIDN'T GET A YES ANSWER.

I HAVE TO SAY THAT. WE HAVE NOT SAID THAT FOR LO, THESE MANY MONTHS. AND I THINK IT'S HARD FOR A LOT OF PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULDN'T GET A YES ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT WE'RE WILLING TO LET BYGONES BE BYGONES, YOU BET WE ARE. AND WE'VE SAID AS MUCH AND SO HAS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT, FOR THE REASONS THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED HERE THIS MORNING, THAT THERE BE A PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

MORE IMPORTANT, PERHAPS TO ISRAEL, THAN TO ANYBODY. BUT THAT'S GOING TO MEAN A GOOD FAITH ENGAGEMENT, WITHOUT DELAY. OR OTHERWISE, WE CAN'T BE EFFECTIVE. AND IT'S GOT TO MEAN A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES, THAT THEY REALLY WANT PEACE.

AND I HAVE TO TELL YOU, THAT BEFORE I CAME TO THIS HEARING THIS MORNING, I WAS GIVEN A COPY OF SOME WIRE REPORTS, ONE OF WHICH QUOTES ONE OF THE MINISTERS IN THE NEWLY FORMED GOVERNMENT AS -- THEY'RE SAYING -- SOMEONE ASKED HIM, "WHY COULDN'T YOU MOVE FORWARD ON THE PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED STATES MADE FOR A DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES?" AND HE SAID, "THAT QUESTION IS NO LONGER RELEVANT," HE SAID. I THINK THIS WAS -- MAY HAVE BEEN THE PRESS SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HE WAS SOMEBODY.

AND THEN THE WIRES ARE FULL OF REPORTS THIS MORNING, THAT THERE WILL BE NO DIALOGUE, UNLESS THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM WE SIT DOWN ACCEPT THIS AND THIS AND THIS, IN ADVANCE AS THE POSITION -- UNLESS PALESTINIANS ACCEPT THESE POSITIONS AS POSITIONS THEY WILL TAKE DURING THE COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

NOW, IF THAT'S GOING TO BE THE APPROACH, AND THAT'S GOING TO BE THE ATTITUDE, THERE WON'T BE ANY DIALOGUE. AND THERE WON'T BE ANY PEACE, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CAN'T MAKE IT HAPPEN. YOU CAN'T, I CAN'T, THE PRESIDENT CAN'T. AND SO, IT'S GOING TO TAKE SOME REALLY GOOD FAITH, AFFIRMATIVE EFFORT ON THE PART OF OUR GOOD FRIENDS IN ISRAEL, AND IF WE DON'T GET IT AND IF WE CAN'T GET IT QUICKLY, I HAVE TO TELL YOU, MR. LEVINE, THAT EVERYBODY OVER THERE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE TELEPHONE NUMBER IS 1-202-456-1414. WHEN YOU'RE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE, CALL US.

REP. DYMALLY: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. NUMBER THREE, THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN, AND JUSTIFIABLY SO, ABOUT THE ATTEMPT AT ASSASSINATING INNOCENT PEOPLE IN ISRAEL BY THE PLF. AND THERE IS A LETTER BEING CIRCULATED HERE, A "DEAR COLLEAGUE" LETTER, WHICH SHOULD RESULT IN A HOUSE RESOLUTION WHICH WILL PROBABLY PASS THIS COMMITTEE, IF NOT THE HOUSE, URGING YOU TO CEASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EPLOF.

NOW, I THINK THAT'S ILL-ADVISED --WE -- DESPITE OUR REGRETS AND OUR DISAPPOINTMENTS THAT THE PLO HAS NOT YET DENOUNCED THAT FORM OF TERRORISM, THEY DID IT IN A GENERAL MANNER, NOT IN SPECIFICS, WE NEED TO CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE EXPERIENCING IN THE EMIDDLE EASTF NOW IS WAR FEVER. AND I WANT TO URGE YOU, THE CONGRESS NOTWITHSTANDING, TO CONTINUE TO FIND EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO CONTINUE THAT DIALOGUE.

I NOTE WITH SOME INTEREST THAT MY GOOD FRIEND FROM CALIFORNIA IS URGING SOME RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIALOGUE. AND IF WE CEASE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO, WE'LL HAVE NO ONE TALK TO. BECAUSE I DON'T THINK YOU COULD FIND A SINGLE PALESTINIAN WHO DOES NOT SAY, PUBLICLY IF NOT PRIVATELY, THAT THE PLO REPRESENTS THEIR POINT OF VIEW IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,ממד,רם,@(אמן),בנצור,
מצפא,סולטן,סייבל,רביב,מעת,הסברה,לעמ,דוצ-ים

I NOTE WITH SOME INTEREST THAT WE SOON FRIEND FROM CALIFORNIA IS URGING SOME RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIALOGUE, AND IF WE CEASE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO, WE'LL HAVE NO ONE TALK TO, BECAUSE I DON'T THINK YOU COULD FIND A SINGLE PALESTINIAN WHO DOES NOT SAY, PUBLICLY IF NOT PRIVATELY, THAT THE PLO REPRESENTS THEIR POINT OF VIEW IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

POSSIBLE WAY TO CONTINUE THAT DIALOGUE.
THE CONGRESS NOTWITHSTANDING, TO CONTINUE TO FIND EVERY MIDDLE EASTER WHO IS WAR WEARY, AND I WANT TO URGE YOU, THIS DIALOGUE BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE EXPERIENCING IN THE GENERAL MANNER, NOT IN SPECIFICS, WE NEED TO CONTINUE DEMONSTRATED THAT FORM OF TERRORISM, THEY DID IT IN A REPRIS AND OUR DISAPPOINTMENTS THAT THE PLO HAS NOT YET WON, I THINK THAT'S ILL-ADVISED --WE -- DESPITE OUR

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO.
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ABOUT THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATING INNOCENT PEOPLE IN THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN, AND JUSTIFIABLY SO, REP. DYMALLY: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. NUMBER THREE,

PEACE, CALL US.
NUMBER IS 1-202-225-1414, WHEN YOU'RE SERIOUS ABOUT THAT EVERYBODY OVER THERE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE TELEPHONE CAN'T GET IT QUICKLY, I HAVE TO TELL YOU, MR. LEVINE, FRIENDS IN ISRAEL, AND IF WE DON'T GET IT AND IF WE GOOD FAITH, AFFIRMATIVE EFFORT ON THE PART OF OUR GOOD

PRESIDENT CAN'T, AND SO, IT'S GOING TO TAKE SOME REALLY AMERICA CAN'T MAKE IT HAPPEN, YOU CAN'T, I CAN'T, THE AND THERE WON'T BE ANY PEACE, AND THE UNITED STATES OF GOING TO BE THE ATTITUDE, THERE WON'T BE ANY DIALOGUE, WON, IF THAT'S GOING TO BE THE APPROACH, AND THAT'S

COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.
THESE POSITIONS AS POSITIONS THEY WILL TAKE DURING THE ADVANCE AS THE POSITION -- UNLESS PALESTINIANS ACCEPT WHEN WE SIT DOWN ACCEPT THIS AND THIS AND THIS, IN THAT THERE WILL BE NO DIALOGUE, UNLESS THE PEOPLE WITH AND THEN THE WIRES ARE LOUD OF REPORTS THIS MORNING,

GOVERNMENT, HE WAS SOMEBODY.
WAS -- WAS HAVE BEEN THE PRESS SPOKESMAN FOR THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER RELEVANT," HE SAID. I THINK THIS PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES," AND HE SAID, "THAT PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED STATES MADE FOR A DIALOGUE WITH WEWLA FORMED GOVERNMENT AS -- THEY'RE SAYING -- SOMEONE ASKED HIM, "WHY COULDN'T YOU MOVE FORWARD ON THE REPORTS, ONE OF WHICH QUOTES ONE OF THE MINISTERS IN THE HEARING THIS MORNING, I WAS GIVEN A COPY OF SOME WIRE AND I HAVE TO TELL YOU, THAT BEFORE I CAME TO THIS

THEY REALLY WANT PEACE.
TO MEAN A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES, THAT DELAY, OR OTHERWISE, WE CAN'T BE EFFECTIVE, AND IT'S NOT THAT'S GOING TO MEAN A GOOD FAITH ENGAGEMENT, WITHOUT MORE IMPORTANT, PERHAPS TO ISRAEL, THAN TO ANYBODY, BUT

PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
THAT WE'VE DISCUSSED HERE THIS MORNING, THAT THERE BE A UNITED STATES, BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT, FOR THE REASONS WE'VE SAID AS MUCH AND SO HAS THE PRESIDENT OF THE MILLING TO GET BYGONES BE BYGONES, YOU BET WE ARE, AND QUESTION, NOW, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT WE'RE TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE COULDN'T GET A YES ANSWER TO THAT WANA MONTHS, AND I THINK IT'S HARD FOR A LOT OF PEOPLE I HAVE TO SAY THAT, WE HAVE NOT SAID THAT FOR LO, THERE

DIDN'T GET A YES ANSWER.
ABOUT ELECTIONS -- IT'S HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE TABLE, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO TALK WITH ISRAELIS TERRITORIES, AS YOU KNOW, WERE PREPARED TO COME TO THE PACE, AS WELL, OF THE FACT THAT PALESTINIANS FROM THE AND IT'S REALLY VERY HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND, IN THE

CLOSE WE GO.
AND THE CATEGORIES OF DUAL ADDRESSEES, NOW, THAT'S NOW CATEGORIES OF DEPORTEES WHO WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO RETURN THERE WILL BE A TEM NAMES SELECTED THAT FIT THE QUESTION WITH AN ASSUMPTION, NAMELY THAT IN THE END MADE IT CLEAR TO MINISTER ARENS THAT WE POSED THIS A RESIDENT OF THE TERRITORIES," AND, AT THE SAME TIME, I CONSIDER ON A NAME-BY-NAME BASIS WHY PALESTINIAN WHO WAS

DIALOGUE, WOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BE READY TO REPEAT THE PARTICIPATION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN WE COULD NOT GET A YES ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, "AS

THIS QUESTION, MR. LEVINE.
THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, WE COULD NOT GET A YES ANSWER TO RESPONSE TO THAT ENDED UP BRINGING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF LIKE TO TELL YOU THE QUESTION THAT WE ASKED FOR A EXTRAORDINARILY CLOSE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO -- I WOULD PROMPTLY, WE WORKED AT THIS FOR IT MONTHS, AND WE GOT FAITH ENGAGEMENT OF ALL PARTIES, AND WE MUST HAVE IT PROCESS FORWARD IF WE CAN, BUT WE MUST HAVE THE GOOD TO -- WE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE -- CONTINUE TO MOVE THIS WE HAVE SAID -- I'VE JUST SAID HERE THAT WE WOULD LIKE

DCG (C) : NWMC CMIYD 890520.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[illegible]

[illegible]

מלת מפתח:ביטחון
6,12210:מספר
מדור:חוץ
מדור,830/ב'בא,1107/בא,492/מחלה,200/חוקה,1,569/נתונים:מ'תר'
593/ח
בא:מ,ב:ח,1843:חר,130690:אח,139:ב1,נמצא,מדינה:מ
אנש:מא מ:חח
מ:ב1

מכתב מרחוב-פתח תקוה / מדור

הקשר חוקה / מדינה

:138 ב1 בא מ'בא ב'חח ר'חקר

AND SO IT IS IMPORTANT, DESPITE ALL THE PROBLEMS YOU HAVE AND YOUR OWN PERSONAL REGRET, AND THAT OF THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE AND CONGRESS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE PLO TO DENOUNCE THAT ACT OF ETERRORISM, WE MUST FIND WAYS OF CONTINUING THAT DIALOGUE.

REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I WANT TO PUBLICLY STATE MY ADMIRATION FOR A GREAT DEAL OF WHAT YOU HAVE DONE. LET ME ALSO SAY, I WANT TO COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR STYLISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS BECAUSE YOU HAVE CLEARLY BECOME THE MOST UNFLAPPABLE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE IN HUMAN HISTORY, AND I WANT TO COMMEND YOU FOR THAT. THAT'S A BRITISH TRAIT, AND YOU HAVE SURPASSED THEM.

I'D LIKE TO RAISE THREE ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, SOME OF THE TANGENTIALLY. ONE OF THEM RELATES TO THE QUESTION OF CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE. I AM AS COMMITTED AS YOU ARE AND THE PRESIDENT IS FOR CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE UNDER THE PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THERE IS A GREAT DANGER THAT IF WE SWEEP UNDER THE RUG CONDITIONS THAT WE OURSELVES ESTABLISHED FOR CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE, THE DIALOGUE AND WHEREVER IT

MIGHT LEAD WILL BE BUILT ON QUICKSAND.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE COMES A POINT WHERE WE CANNOT SQUARE THE CIRCLE, AND OUR DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AND OUR DESIRE TO LIVE UP TO OUR OWN COMMITMENTS AND FIGHT TERRORISM CONFLICT. AS AN OLD HUNGARIAN PROVERB SAYS, "YOU CAN'T RIDE TWO HORSES WITH ONE REAR END." AND I BELIEVE THAT THAT'S REALLY WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO DO FOR SOME TIME. AND IF YOU THINK ABOUT IT, THAT'S AN AWKWARD POSTURE.

SEC. BAKER: I'VE NEVER SEEN TWO HORSES WITH ONLY ONE REAR END.

REP. LANTOS: NO, RIDING -- THE RIDER HAS TO HAVE ONE REAR END.

SEC. BAKER: I UNDERSTAND -- (HE LAUGHS).

REP. LANTOS: TWO SEPARATE HORSES, ONE RIDER.

SEC. BAKER: I UNDERSTAND. I WAS ONLY --

REP. LANTOS: OKAY, I JUST WANT TO BE SURE -- (LAUGHTER).

I WONDER WHETHER THE POINT HAS BEEN REACHED WHERE THIS RATHER UNGAINLY IMAGE COMPELS US TO DO WHAT WE SAID WE WOULD DO: SUSPEND THE DIALOGUE AND RESUME IT WHEN, IN FACT, THE CONDITIONS SET BY US ARE RESUMED.

SECOND QUESTION I HAVE, MR. SECRETARY, RELATES TO AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION BY THE EJUSTICE DEPARTMENTF OF CORRUPTION AND ABUSES BY THE EIRAQIF GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO CREDITS AND GUARANTEES BY THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION. WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WAS PRESSING THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO GO EASY ON THIS CASE, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, INVOLVES AN ITALIAN BANK. MY QUESTION HERE IS, IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE BEEN BENDING BACKWARDS OVER THE MONTHS TRYING TO GIVE IRAQ EVERY CONCEIVABLE BREAK IN OUR INTERPRETATION OF BOTH THEIR OUTRAGEOUS ACTIONS, THEIR PREPOSTEROUS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AND NOW THIS CORRUPTION CASE. AND I

WONDER IF YOU COULD TELL US, CAN WE EXPECT SOME STRAIGHT TALK WITH RESPECT TO THE DICTATOR SADDAM HUSAYN?

MY FINAL QUESTION RELATES TO ECHINAF. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT CHINA IS EITHER CONSIDERING THE SALE OF ECHEMICALSF TO ELIBYAF OR HAS IN FACT PROCEEDED WITH THE SALE, CHEMICALS THAT ARE USED IN THE MAKING OF POISON GAS. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THE STATUS OF THESE SALES IS? HAVE WE EXPRESSED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME IN BEIJING? AND IF IN FACT THE SALES TAKE PLACE, WHAT WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THAT'S A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, AND LET ME SEE IF I CAN ADDRESS THEM, MR. LANTOS. FIRST, THOUGH, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY GENEROUS INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS. SECOND, LET ME -- WITH RESPECT TO THE DIALOGUE, LET ME AGREE WITH WHAT YOU'VE SAID. THE TIME, OF COURSE, DOES COME AT SOME POINT WHERE YOU DO NOT WALK AWAY FROM PRINCIPLE. AND I HOPE AND BELIEVE I'VE SAID THAT BOTH IN THE OTHER BODY YESTERDAY AND HERE TODAY. WE WILL NOT, MR. LANTOS, SACRIFICE OUR COMMITMENT TO COUNTERING TERRORISM FOR THE SAKE OF PURSUING A PEACE PROCESS. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT WE SHOULD NOT APPROACH THIS MATTER IN A MEASURED AND APPROPRIATE WAY. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE, AND IT DOES HAVE IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ISSUE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EASTF.

WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF IRAQ, I SAID IN THE OTHER BODY YESTERDAY, THAT -- THAT THE RECENT -- THAT RECENT EVENTS, WILL OF COURSE, CAUSE US TO TAKE A DIFFERENT LOOK AT THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ. I WAS QUESTIONED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT IRAQ'S HARBORING OF THE -- HARBORING OF ABU ABASS. WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AS THEY RELATE TO IRAQ, AND I THINK YOU ARE AWARE OF THAT.

I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY STATEMENT BY A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL OF -- TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, ABOUT CONCERN OVER AN INVESTIGATION BECAUSE OF SOME ITALIAN BANK. I MEAN -- I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT IT IS YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THERE. I'LL BE DELIGHTED TO LOOK INTO

THAT.

AND I DO NOT HAVE ANY UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION FOR YOU.
THAT I CAN SHARE WITH YOU IN THIS FORUM. REGARDING THE
QUESTION YOU POSED CONCERNING CHINA. I WILL SEE IF I CAN
SHARE WITH YOU WHATEVER INFORMATION WE DO HAVE. IN A --
IN A PRIVATE SESSION.

REP. GILMAN: I WANT TO JOIN IN WELCOMING OUR GOOD
SECRETARY OF STATE. I'D LIKE TO JUST MAKE A COUPLE OF
COMMENTS. I HAD A BATCH OF QUESTIONS AND I'LL SUBMIT IT
IN WRITING. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL MOVE QUICKLY ON THE
CUTOFF OF LARGE WITH THE EXPORT CERTAINLY INSTITUTABLE
NOW WITH ALL OF THE INFORMATION WE'VE HAD ON THE LAST
RAID.

THE HOUSING GUARANTEES FOR EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL. IT'S
BEEN APPROVED BY THE CONGRESS. I WOULD HOPE THERE NOT BE
AN UNDUE DELAY. THERE'S CERTAINLY A LOT OF PRESSURE ON
EISENER. WITH REGARD TO THE OPEN DOOR POLICY NOW. AND I
THINK IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
DATE. AND WITH REGARD TO EMIGRATION. I RECOGNIZE YOU'VE
RAISED THE ISSUE WITH MR. GORBACHEV. AND LINKAGE THAT HE
MAKES WITH REGARD TO THE SETTLEMENT IS ONLY GOING TO DO
HARM TO THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS PROPOSAL AND WE HOPE
YOU CONTINUE TO MAKE THAT CLEAR TO HIM.

dmc 5/11/89 jmb

MR.

REP: MCCLOSKEY: I'D LIKE TO ASK A COUPLE OF
QUESTIONS. I'LL GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO ANSWER THEM.
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BECOME THE MOST UNLAPPARABLE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR STATISTIC ACHIEVEMENTS BECAUSE YOU HAVE CLEARLY
YOU HAVE DONE. LET ME ALSO SAY, I WANT TO COMMEND YOU
TO PUBLICLY STATE WA ADMIRATION FOR A GREAT DEAL OF WHAT

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נאום בייקר: "קשה לנו להבין מדוע לא קיבלנו תשובה של 'הן' מהישראלים"

מסמך

להלן התרגום המלא של דברי מזכיר המדינה בייקר בנושא ישראל והמזה"ת בעדותו לפני ועדת החוץ של הקונגרס ב-13 ביוני, בתשובה לשאלה של חבר ועדת החוץ של בית הנבחרים, מל לוויין:

"היינו רוצים להמשיך להניע את תהליך השלום קדימה, אך חייבת להיות בידינו התחייבות של תום־לב מכל הצדדים, והיא חייבת להיות בידינו במהירות.

"הייתי רוצה לומר לכם מה היתה השאלה שביקשנו תשובה עליה, ואשר גרמה בסופו של דבר להתפרקות הממשלה הישראלית. לא יכולנו לקבל תשובה של 'הן' לשאלה, 'האם ממשלת ישראל תהיה מוכנה לשקול – על בסיס של שם־אחר־שם – פלשתינאי כלשהו שהוא תושב השטחים?' הבהרתי לשר ארנס, כי הצגנו את השאלה הזו בהנחה שבסופו של דבר ייבחרו כמה שמות שיתאימו לקטגוריה של מגורשים שיותר להם לשוב, וכן לקטגוריה של בעלי כתובת כפולה. עד כדי כך התקרבנו.

"בהתחשב בעוברה שפלש־תינאים מהשטחים גילו נכונות לבוא לשולחן, והיו מוכנים לדבר עם הישראלים על בחירות, קשה לנו להבין מדוע לא קיבלנו תשובה של 'הן'. עלי לומר זאת. לא אמרנו זאת עד כה, במשך החודשים הרבים הללו. ואני סבור כי לאנשים רבים קשה להבין מדוע לא יכולנו לקבל תשובה חיובית לשאלה הזו.

"אני חייב לומר לכם, שלפני בואי לשימוע הבוקר קיבלתי עות־קים של כמה דיווחים בסוכנויות הידיעות, ואחד מהם מצטט את אחד השרים בממשלת ישראל החדר־שה. מישהו שאל אותו, 'מדוע לא תוכלו להתקדם בעניין הצעת ארה"ב לדו־שיח עם פלשתינאים מהשטחים?' והוא אמר, שהשאלה שוב אינה רלוואנטית.

"הדיווחים החדשותיים מלאים בידיעות הבוקר, שלפיהן לא יהיה כל דו־שיח, אלא אם כן האנשים שעמם נשב יקבלו כך־וכך מראש, והפלשתינאים יקבלו את העמדות האלה כעמדות שיצטרכו לנקוט במשך הדו־שיח. אם זו תהיה הגישה, לא יהיה כל דו־שיח, ולא יהיה כל שלום, וארצות־הברית של אמריקה אינה יכולה לגרום לכך שהדבר יתרחש. לפיכך, הדבר באמת יצריך תום־לב, מאמץ רציני מצד ידידינו הטובים בישראל. אני חייב לומר לך מר לוויין, כי על כולם שם לדעת, שמספר הטלפון הוא 1-202-456-1414 וזהו מספר הטלפון הראשי של הבית הלבן, ובכללו הקידומת הבין־לאומית. כאשר תהיו רציניים בעניין הש־לום, התקשרו אלינו".

"איננו יכולים ליישם לבדנו את יוזמת ממשלת ישראל"

טרם דבריו אלה, אמר בייקר לחברי ועדת החוץ של הקונגרס: "הרשו לי לפתוח ולומר שכאשר הופעתי בפני הוועדה הזו בחודש פברואר, היינו קרובים מאוד־מאוד לכינון דיאלוג היסטורי בין ישר־אלים לפלשתינאים. אני סבור כי אילו הדיאלוג הזה היה מתחיל למ־עשה, לא היינו עומדים מול המצב שאנו רואים היום במזרח התיכון. נראה לי שהדו־שיח בטרם קיום בחירות שניסינו לממש, יוזמה שלמען האמת הוצעה בראשיתה על־ידי ראש הממשלה שמיר עצמו, הציעה פוטנציאל לפריצת־דרך אמיתית, שהיתה מאפשרת לנו להתחיל לממש את יוזמת ממשלת ישראל מ-1989 במלואה. דבר זה היה יוצר בסיס למשא־ומתן לש־לום. כפי שאנו יודעים היטב, המשבר הפוליטי בישראל התרחש, ומנע מממשלתה לקבל החלטה אם להמשיך בתהליך הזה או לא. תקופת הביניים הזו התאפיינה בהי־דרדרות ממשית במצב באזור...

"האתגר לכל הצדדים הוא לנ־סות להחזיר אל המסלול את התה־ליך שאנחנו הצלחנו להביא קרוב כל־כך להצלחה. לגבי ישראל, מש־מעות הדבר היא לומר הן לרעיון של דיאלוג עם פלשתינאים, ואני מקווה שהממשלה החדשה בישראל תהיה מוכנה לנוע לקראת דיאלוג שכזה, וכי היא תעשה זאת בדרך שתאפשר למשלחת פלשתינית אמינה להשתתף. אנו, מבחינתנו, מוכנים להמשיך ולנסות ליישם את יוזמת ממשלת ישראל, אך איננו יכולים לעשות זאת לבד.

"כאשר לפלשתינאים, משמעות הדבר היא להישיר מבטם אל מעבר לאבדות הטראגיות בנפש שסבלו, ולהיות מחויבים מחדש לתהליך השלום. ההתקפה המסוכנת של ה-30 במאי העלתה שאלות רצי־ניות לגבי המחויבות הזו, כך שאש"ף חייב להבהיר כי מדיניותו, הגורסת התנערות מטרור, עדיין עומדת בתוקפה. עליו לעשות זאת בדרך סמכותית וחד־משמעית. עד כה הוא לא עשה זאת. אשר למדי־נות ערב, אני חושב שמשמעות הדבר היא לעשות יותר, כדי ליצור אווירה שיכולה לתמוך בפיוס ישר־אלי־פלשתיני.

"אנחנו עדיין מעוניינים להי־רתם, אך אם הרצון הפוליטי לנוע קדימה אינו קיים באזור, הרי אנו לא נוכל ליצור אותו מחוץ לאזור. ככל שהכל יכירו בכך מהר יותר, כן ייטב לכולנו".

תרגם והביא לדפוס: אורי ניר

נאום בייקר: "קשה לנו להבין מדוע לא קיבלנו תשובה של 'הן' מהישראלים"

מסמך

להלן התרגום המלא של דברי מזכיר המדינה בייקר בנושא ישראל והמזה"ת בעדותו לפני ועדת החוץ של הקונגרס ב-13 ביוני, בתשובה לשאלה של חבר ועדת החוץ של בית הנבחרים, מל לוויין:

"היינו רוצים להמשיך להניע את תהליך השלום קדימה, אך חייבת להיות בידינו התחייבות של תום־לב מכל הצדדים, והיא חייבת להיות בידינו במהירות.

"הייתי רוצה לומר לכם מה היתה השאלה שביקשנו תשובה עליה, ואשר גרמה בסופו של דבר להתפרקות הממשלה הישראלית. לא יכולנו לקבל תשובה של 'הן' לשאלה, 'האם ממשלת ישראל תהיה מוכנה לשקול – על בסיס של שם־אחר־שם – פלשתינאי כלשהו שהוא תושב השטחים?' הבהרתי לשר ארנס, כי הצגנו את השאלה הזו בהנחה שבסופו של דבר ייבחרו כמה שמות שיתאימו לקטגוריה של מגורשים שיותר להם לשוב, וכן לקטגוריה של בעלי כתובת כפולה. עד כדי כך התקרבנו.

"בהתחשב בעוברה שפלש־תינאים מהשטחים גילו נכונות לבוא לשולחן, והיו מוכנים לדבר עם הישראלים על בחירות, קשה לנו להבין מדוע לא קיבלנו תשובה של 'הן'. עלי לומר זאת. לא אמרנו זאת עד כה, במשך החודשים הרבים הללו. ואני סבור כי לאנשים רבים קשה להבין מדוע לא יכולנו לקבל תשובה חיובית לשאלה הזו.

"אני חייב לומר לכם, שלפני בואי לשימוע הבוקר קיבלתי עות־קים של כמה דיווחים בסוכנויות הידיעות, ואחד מהם מצטט את אחד השרים בממשלת ישראל החד־שה. מישהו שאל אותו, 'מדוע לא תוכלו להתקדם בעניין הצעת ארה"ב לדו־שיח עם פלשתינאים מהשטחים ?' והוא אמר, שהשאלה שוב אינה רלוואנטית.

"הדיווחים החדשותיים מלאים בידיעות הבוקר, שלפיהן לא יהיה כל דו־שיח, אלא אם כן האנשים שעמם נשב יקבלו כך־וכך מראש, והפלשתינאים יקבלו את העמדות האלה כעמדות שיצטרכו לנקוט במשך הדו־שיח. אם זו תהיה הגישה, לא יהיה כל דו־שיח, ולא יהיה כל שלום, וארצות־הברית של אמריקה אינה יכולה לגרום לכך שהדבר יתרחש. לפיכך, הדבר באמת יצריך תום־לב, מאמץ רציני מצד ידידינו הטובים בישראל. אני חייב לומר לך מר לוויין, כי על כולם שם לדעת, שמספר הטלפון הוא 1-202-456-1414 [זהו מספר הטלפון הראשי של הבית הלבן, ובכללו הקידומת הבין־לאומית]. כאשר תהיו רציניים בעניין הש־לום, התקשרו אלינו".

"איננו יכולים ליישם לבדנו את יוזמת ממשלת ישראל"

טרם דבריו אלה, אמר בייקר לחברי ועדת החוץ של הקונגרס: "הרשו לי לפתוח ולומר שכאשר הופעתי בפני הוועדה הזו בחודש פברואר, היינו קרובים מאוד־מאוד לכינון דיאלוג היסטורי בין ישר־אלים לפלשתינאים. אני סבור כי אילו הדיאלוג הזה היה מתחיל למ־עשה, לא היינו עומדים מול המצב שאנו רואים היום במזרח התיכון. נראה לי שהדו־שיח בטרם קיום בחירות שניסינו לממש, יוזמה שלמען האמת הוצעה בראשיתה על־ידי ראש הממשלה שמיר עצמו, הציעה פוטנציאל לפריצת־דרך אמיתית, שהיתה מאפשרת לנו להתחיל לממש את יוזמת ממשלת ישראל מ-1989 במלואה. דבר זה היה יוצר בסיס למשא־ומתן לש־לום. כפי שאנו יודעים היטב, המשבר הפוליטי בישראל התרחש, ומנע מממשלתה לקבל החלטה אם להמשיך בתהליך הזה או לא. תקופת הביניים הזו התאפיינה בהי־דרדרות ממשית במצב באזור...

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תרגם והביא לדפוס: אורי ניר

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BAKER TESTIFIES ON MIDEAST TO HOUSE COMMITTEE
(Mideast excerpts of transcript, 6/13/90)

Washington -- The following are the Middle East excerpts of Secretary of State James Baker III's testimony to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee June 13:

(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

REP. BROOMFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the situation in the Middle East is probably the most dangerous it's been since 1967. A new right-wing government has been formed in Israel that is confronted by an increasingly united and hardened Arab position on regional issues. There is now reports that the Arab anti-American sentiment is on the rise. It seems imperative that the United States review our policy toward the Middle East. My question to you is, do you think my concerns are well-founded and what steps are you taking to ensure that our policy contributes to the goal of stability in the region?

SEC. BAKER: We, too, are concerned about the situation in the Middle East, Mr. Broomfield, and I cannot say that your concerns are not well-founded, because I think they are.

Let me take this opportunity, if I could, to review for the committee where we've been with respect to a Middle East peace process and where, I think, we are today. I would like to incorporate by reference the statement I made yesterday before the Senate with respect to the issue of the dialogue that we have with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the approach we're taking to that, the requirements that [illegible] put forth in terms of PLO behavior, if we are to maintain [illegible] dialogue. And I would like to incorporate all of that, if I might [illegible] members of the committee [illegible] and I think that the well aware of what [illegible] yesterday [illegible] the Middle East are

But let me start by saying that when [illegible] testified before this committee last February, we were [illegible] very closely [illegible] Broomfield, to putting together an historic first-time peace dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. This dialogue had it begun, I think we would -- had the dialogue actually [illegible], I don't think we would be facing the situation that we are facing in the Middle East today. And I think that the pre-election dialogue that we were -- that we were pushing and trying to implement, an initiative quite frankly suggested initially by Prime Minister Shamir of Israel, offered the potential for a real breakthrough that would have -- that would have permitted us to begin implementing the government of Israel's 1989 initiative in [illegible] and it would have created the basis for negotiations on peace. [illegible] know, the political crisis in Israel intervened, preventing the government of Israel from making a decision on whether or not to [illegible] this process.

[illegible] the intervening period has been [illegible] red, as you pointed out in

your question, by a real deterioration of the situation in the region. We've seen a cycle of escalating violence in the Occupied Territories; a PLO faction has now attempted a very serious act of terrorism, raising serious questions in our minds and in the minds of many about the PLO's renunciation of terrorism; an Arab summit has taken place which really has not fostered moderation. Efforts to involve the United Nations in a practical way have not as yet succeeded, although there are indications this morning, as perhaps you are aware, that we may be able to see something accomplished there.

These events, Mr. Broomfield, reflect some realities in the region, most of which -- many of which -- probably most of which are outside the control and influence of the United States of America. But they also reflect the fact that there's great frustration and concern, I think, over the lack of a peace process. So, I think the challenge, if I may say so, for all sides is to try to put back on track the process that we had succeeded in bringing so close to success and to see if we can't create a better environment for peace making.

Now, what does that mean for the parties? For Israel, that means saying yes to the idea of a dialogue with Palestinians, and I hope that the new Israeli government will be willing and able to move forward to such a dialogue and do so in a way that makes it possible for a credible Palestinian delegation to participate. We, on our part, Mr. Broomfield, are prepared to continue to try and implement the Israeli government's initiative, but let me say one more time, we can't do it alone.

For Palestinians, this means, I think, looking beyond the tragic human losses that they have suffered and recommitting themselves to the political process. As I've indicated, the outrageous attack of May 30th has raised serious questions about that commitment, and so the PLO has to make clear that its policy of renouncing terrorism still stands, and it must do so in an authoritative and unambiguous way, as I said yesterday over in the Senate. So far, it has not done so.

For the Arab states, I think this means doing more to create an environment that can support Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. We're still willing to be engaged, Mr. Broomfield, but if the political will to move ahead doesn't exist in the region, we are not going to be able to create that political will from outside the region. And the sooner everybody recognizes that, the better off I think we all will be.

REP. FASCELL: Mr. Hamilton.

REP. HAMILTON (D-IN): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you to the Committee and commend you and President Bush for your accomplishments at the summit. That's the 18th summit, I believe, and certainly one of the more successful ones from my perspective. I want to follow along with Mr. Broomfield's question. I very much share his view that events do not seem to be moving in the right direction in the Middle East for the reasons that Mr. Broomfield and you have spelled out. And as I understand your response

to Mr. Broomfield, the center of our strategy will continue to be on the Shamir election proposal, I gather.

SEC. BAKER: It will be, Mr. Hamilton, provided we get some indication that the parties themselves are willing to be engaged in a positive way and move forward promptly in an affirmative fashion. Otherwise I have to say what I just said, we can't do it from the outside.

REP. HAMILTON: I assume that unless the PLO acts more forthrightly, that we will have to cut off or suspend the dialogue in order to maintain the credibility of our policy. Is that a correct assumption?

SEC. BAKER: I made it very clear in the Senate yesterday that the future of the dialogue is in great jeopardy, Mr. Hamilton, and I laid out in some detail what we've done in the past 10 or 11 days in terms of our diplomatic efforts with many, many friendly countries and with some that might not -- you might not perhaps characterize in that fashion. There is a feeling on the part of many countries that we should take -- we should take our decision in a responsible and measured way, that we should not be driven by artificial deadlines. And we won't be.

REP. HAMILTON: What -- what is --

SEC. BAKER: However, our commitment -- our commitment to fighting terrorism will not be diminished or deterred by whatever impact a -- whatever impact might be there with respect to the peace process. I don't want to suggest for one minute that there's any balancing with respect to that here.

REP. HAMILTON: What are the implications of the -- to the peace process if the dialogue with the PLO is cut off?

SEC. BAKER: I think that there could be some -- there could be some adverse effect on the potential for the peace process to advance. On the other hand, as I just said, I think that first and foremost has to be our commitment to face up to the question of terrorism.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary?

SEC. BAKER: And we've made that very clear to the PLO, Mr. Hamilton. And we have said, as you know, that we must see a condemnation of this particular act in its own right, and we must see the beginning of some steps to discipline Abu Abbas who has taken responsibility.

REP. SOLARZ: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, a short while ago, the Congress enacted Legislation to provide Israel with 400 million dollars in housing investment guarantees to help absorb the tens of thousands of Russian Jews who have recently entered their country. Is there any reason why the implementation of this legislation is being held up?

SEC. BAKER: We were waiting on the formation of a new government in

Israel, which was formed yesterday or the day before -- I've lost track of the date, Mr. Solarz -- but that's the only thing that's been holding it up.

REP. SOLARZ: And are we going to be seeking any assurances from Israel, other than the customary assurances we have always obtained in the past, about where the money will be spent?

SEC. BAKER: We are going to be discussing this with the government of Israel in the very near term. I am not in a position to talk this morning about the specifics of the assurances that we might request, Mr. Solarz.

REP. SOLARZ: But do you expect to be seeking assurances that go beyond those that Israel has always been willing to give in the past?

SEC. BAKER: I am not in a position to answer your question one way or the other, because, quite frankly, I haven't sat down over the course of the past two or three weeks and reviewed this issue, because I have been, as you can see, pretty busy on U.S.-Soviet business. But I can check and find out and let you know.

REP. SOLARZ: Well, I hope we can move forward expeditiously on this because there are tremendous numbers coming out of the Soviet Union. Israel doesn't currently have the facilities to absorb them. And if they can't house them, it's entirely possible word will go back to those who remain in the Soviet Union that they are better off staying where they are. And given the emergence of a rather vocal and virulent strain of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, which has created something like a state of panic in the Jewish community there, I think it is important for us to move forward on this. Mr. Secretary --

SEC. BAKER: May I just add, I'm not trying to duck your question. The truth of the matter is I really haven't spent any time at all on this issue for weeks, and I am not entirely sure, Mr. Solarz, that the legislation provides the administration with any flexibility to go beyond assurances that have been requested and received in the past. I just need to find out.

REP. MILLER: Okay. Getting back to the subject that Representative Solarz mentioned in emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, and we realize this is a sensitive triangular problem and arrangement. But Congressman Solarz brought it up in the context of the housing loan guarantees that most people on this committee have supported. But of course, there is another way to free people from anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, and that is to be willing to take more into the United States. The main objection has been that, well, we have fiscal limits.

Mr. Secretary, from your foreign policy perspective, would you be willing to support an increase in the number of refugees from political or religious persecution coming into the United States, obviously including Soviet Jews, but also others, particularly if

admission was tied, not to extension of refugee benefits, but admission was tied more to sponsorship by groups and/or individuals?
SEC. BAKER: Mr. Miller, we have been supporting increased levels in each of the past three years. Again, it's primarily a question of reprofiling future increases with the limited budget funds that we have and with budget constraints. And again, tell us where we can get the money. Nobody would argue with the purpose and the goal. But let me just tell you that the emigration from the Soviet Union -- Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to the United States has gone from 18,000 in 1988, to 50,000 in 1989, and if we keep on the same pace that we are this year, we will take 70,000 this year, when you count not just refugees, but those admitted under the Attorney General's parole authority. So, we're doing a pretty good job.
REP. MILLER: I don't question the increases, I don't question the facts of your statement, but I think we're aware of rising anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. And I think, we're aware that efforts of this country, as well as Israel, may be needed if that flow of refugees continues to increase. We may have to expand our efforts as well.
SEC. BAKER: You're - you're aware that the government of Israel would -- would not look favorably upon an expansion of our numbers.
REP. MILLER: I'm aware of that. But this -- and we've encouraged Israel's efforts to resettle, and I'm supportive of that. But we have a tradition in this country, going back hundreds of years, of taking those that flee from religious and political persecution. And I think we have to keep in mind that tradition as well.
REP. GEJDENSON: Let me just do quickly one additional item, and I'm not sure this would receive support from either the Israelis or the Arabs. But it seems to me, reviewing the situation in the Middle East, one of the problems in trying to resolve the crisis is not who is in control of Nablus and Hebron or whether or not there is a Palestinian entity of any form there, the real problem is that the confrontation states: Iraq, Syria, even Jordan and some of the more, quote, unquote, "moderate states" have immense military capabilities. It seems to me that we ought to try to find a way to do what we've just done in Eastern Europe, and that is to try to find a way to build down the military confrontation, and then it would be, I think, much easier to move forward to resolve the issues on the West Bank and Gaza.
Additionally, I think we ought to press for democratic governments throughout the region of the Middle East because it may be easier, and I believe it would be easier, to reach a solution to the crisis in the Middle East if there were more democratic governments if we really had elections in those countries. And so part of what maybe we ought to be doing is pressing for democratic elections in Syria, Iraq, and other countries, as outrageous a thought that might be at this time. Thank you.
(END EXCERPTS)
(THE TRANSCRIPT WAS INCOMPLETE AT NESA FILE DEADLINE. THE REST OF THE MIDEAST EXCERPTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO POSTS WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.)
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בלמס נכנס

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יעדים:רהמש/482,מצב/1094,אביב/822,מנמת/585
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:140,תא:130690,זח:1955,דח:ב,סג:בל
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל:מצפא

מאת ק. לקונגרס

ביהנ'ב: עדות המזכיר בייקר בפני ועדת החוץ (13/6)

הבוקר הופיע המזכיר בייקר בפני וועדת החוץ כדי לדווח על תוצאות הפסגה. חלק לא מבוטל מהשאלות שהופנו למזכיר התמקדו בנושאים הבאים שמעניינינו:-

- המצב במזה'ת והקמת הממשלה החדשה בישראל.

- הפסקת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ.

- קידום תהליך השלום ותכנית בייקר.

- זירוז הטיפול הממשלתי בערבויות הדיור.

- התבטאויות גורבצ'וב בנוגע להיתר יציאת יהודי ברה'מ.

- המאזן הצבאי במזה'ת.

- עירק והאשראי שמקבלת מבנקים אמריקנים.

- מכירת נשק בימי ע'י סין ללוב.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בנפרד התמליל המלא של חלק השאלות והתשובות בנושאים שלעיל. אין ספק ששלושת הנושאים הראשונים בלטו בשאלות ובמיוחד תשובתו של המזכיר לקונגרסמן לויין בנושא המשך תהליך השלום שזכתה כבר לסיקור תקשורתי.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

אש

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),ממד,
בנצור,מצפא,רביב,מעת,הסברה

14 JUN '90 04:06 FOREIGN MINISTRY JERUSALEM

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM

Communication department

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

מחלקת הקשר

פקסימיליה:
Facsimile

בהול לבקר.
שמור

Date: תאריך:	13/6/90
No. מספר-(נר):	1048

To: אל: וושינגטון

Att: לידי: השגריר

Sender: חתימה: לש סמנכ"ל בפאו לפרן

Number of pages including cover: מספר העמודים כולל העליון: 3

מלב אירגון משהר ממצביר המדינה האמריקאי

לש סמנכ"ל בפאו לפרן.

הרמ"ל שולח מברק מנכ"ל ממנכ"ל
בנדון מדפו
2

Our com. numbers: מספרי התקשרות שלנו:

Tel: -טל	Telx:	Fax: פקסימיליה:
02-303365	English: 25224 : לועזי	972-2-303367
02-528842	Hebrew: 25241 :עברי	Area code: 91950 :מיקוד

1/3

June 12, 1990

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY BAKER TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER LEVY

Dear Mr. Deputy Prime Minister:

I would like to extend my congratulations on the establishment of the new government and on your appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I look forward to working with you to implement your Government's peace initiative. We are committed to doing all we can to implement the initiative and to produce a credible peace process. I am confident that, in the context of our strong, supportive bilateral relationship, we can find solutions which will bring peace to the region and security to Israel.

Sincerely,

James A. Baker, III

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11984 תאריך: 14.06.9

יוצא ** סודי
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חוזם:6,11984
אל: ווש 207 .
מ-:המשרד,תא:130690,זח:2210,דח:ב,סג:סו
תח:@ גס:שהח
נד:@

בהול/סודי

13 JUNE 1990

אל: וושינגטון
מאת: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

רצ'ב נוסח האגרת לבייקר:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY,

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR BEST WISHES UPON MY APPOINTMENT AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE LONGSTANDING FRIENDSHIP AND THE STRONG BONDS THAT HAVE MADE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES SO SPECIAL WILL BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED AND ENHANCED.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU, MR. SECRETARY, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS STRIVING AS EVER TO ATTAIN PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT WE WILL PURSUE AND EXPLORE ALL POSSIBLE AVENUES IN ORDER TO ADVANCE OUR PEACE INITIATIVE OF MAY 1989.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD, MR. SECRETARY, TO WORKING TOGETHER WITH YOU ON WAYS FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN

THE REALIZATION OF OUR INITIATIVE BASED ON MUTUAL ENDEAVORS AND AGREED PRINCIPLES.

I BELIEVE THAT THE INITIAL UNDERSTANDING THAT LAY AT THE FOUNDATION OF OUR PEACE INITIATIVE WILL BE REAFFIRMED.

I WILL SPARE NO EFFORT, MR. SECRETARY, TO ENGAGE IN A CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE AND DISCUSSION WITH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE REGION WHILE ENSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL.

YOURS SINCERELY,

DAVID LEVY

THE HONORABLE,
MR. JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATES
WASHINGTON D.C.
U.S.A

אק

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

[redacted] מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס [redacted]

אאאא,חוזם:11984
אל:רהמש/471
מ-:המשרד,תא:130690,זח:2210,דח:ב,סג:סו,
בבבב
בהול/סודי

13 JUNE 1990

אל: וושינגטון
מאת: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

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YOURS SINCERELY,

DAVID LEVY

THE HONORABLE,
MR. JAMES A. BAKER, III
SECRETARY OF STATES
WASHINGTON D.C.
U.S.A

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

ططط

BAKER: NO DECISION TO SUSPEND U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE
(Text: Baker PLO statment before SFRC 6/12/90)

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker said June 12 that the United States has not reached a decision on whether to suspend its 18-month-old dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) even though the PLO's responses to an abortive May 30 terrorist attack near an Israeli beach "have fallen short of the mark."

Baker told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "in reaching our decision, we want to weigh matters carefully and do so without the pressure of artificial deadlines." But he warned if the PLO does not respond to U.S. calls for specific actions, "it would be very difficult for us to sustain this dialogue."

Following is the text of Baker's statement on the PLO, as delivered to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee:

(begin text)

We have not taken a decision on this issue yet, but I'd like to take this opportunity to lay out our thinking and bring the committee up to date on where we stand on this issue.

As soon as we heard about the attempted seaborne infiltration against Israel's coast by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), we condemned the action and we stated publicly that we were horrified by this terrorist act.

On May 31, we approached the PLO through our ambassador in Tunis, which is the only channel that we utilize for that dialogue.

We told the PLO that the United States was outraged by this attempted terrorist attack. We said that given Abu Abbas' membership on the PLO's executive committee, we made it clear that the PLO:

-- would need to condemn the attack in unambiguous terms and disassociate itself from it.

-- would also need to begin to take steps to discipline Abu Abbas to show unmistakably that the PLO does not countenance this kind of activity and will live up to its commitments.

Subsequently, we were approached by a number of friendly governments who were concerned about the continuation of the Middle East peace process and who offered their assistance.

Last week, while I was in Europe, I told Minister Hurd of the United Kingdom, Minister Dumas of France, Minister Andersson of Sweden, Minister Van Den Broek of the Netherlands, and Minister Bozer of Turkey that we viewed this situation very, very seriously and that if the PLO did not act, it would be very difficult for us to sustain this dialogue.

I told Minister Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union the same thing while in Europe and I have telephoned Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid of Egypt to the same effect. Each and every one of these ministers responded by saying that they would go to the PLO and urge it to take steps to condemn this act and to dissociate from it.

To date, the PLO's public and private responses have fallen short of the mark. We take note that the PLO official statements have disassociated the PLO from the May 30 attack. But neither the May 31 statement in Baghdad, issued after the executive committee meeting, nor yesterday's statement condemned the PLF attack in its own right. And moreover, they give no indication that the PLO intends to begin to take steps to discipline Abu Abbas, who organized the operation.

When the PLO accepted U.S. conditions for dialogue in December 1988, it took an important and positive step. We took PLO commitments -- the recognition of Israel's right to exist, the acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and the renunciation of terrorism -- seriously and we expect the PLO to live up to them.

The issue that's on the table is a very serious and important issue. Friendly governments, with which we have been in touch and which have urged the PLO to deal with our concerns, have asked us not to rush our decision.

And indeed, as I said in Scotland on Friday, this issue also has important implications for the Arab-Israeli peace process. So in reaching our decision, we want to weigh matters carefully and do so without the pressure of artificial deadlines. At the same time, you should understand -- the committee should understand -- that we will not allow our pursuit of peace to undercut our commitment to fight terrorism. And I think that the PLO understands that.

(end text)
NNNN

BAKER: NO DECISION TO SUSPEND U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE
(Says PLO actions have fallen short of mark)
By Russell Dybvik
USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker said June 12 that the United States has not reached a decision on whether to suspend its 18-month-old dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) even though the PLO's responses to an abortive May 30 terrorist attack near an Israeli beach "have fallen short of the mark."

Later in the day at the White House, President Bush declined a request from reporters to say when such a determination might come, explaining, "There's quite a bit going on behind the scenes."

Bush said the subject arose earlier in the day during a telephone call with Egyptian President Mubarak, adding, "I'm not prepared to make my decision known on that yet."

Asked if he was giving PLO leaders more time to denounce the raid, Bush replied, "Well, I want to see that terroristic act condemned, and those who did it condemned."

Baker told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "in reaching our decision, we want to weigh matters carefully and do so without the pressure of artificial deadlines." But he warned if the PLO does not respond to U.S. calls for specific actions, "it would be very difficult for us to sustain this dialogue."

At the same time, he said, the committee should understand that the United States "will not allow our pursuit of peace" in the Middle East "to undercut our commitment to fight terrorism," adding "the PLO understands that."

Baker had been testifying on the Washington summit between Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev and on world developments since then. His prepared remarks and the bulk of questioning from senators dealt with U.S.-Soviet relations and issues relating to European security.

In response to questions, the secretary, reading from a prepared statement, said the United States approached the PLO May 31 through U.S. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau in Tunis, the only channel the United States utilizes for that dialogue. The May 30 apparent attempt to infiltrate a beach not far from Tel Aviv was carried out by Abu Abbas' Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the PLO.

"We told the PLO that the United States was outraged by this attempted terrorist attack," Baker told the committee. "Given Abu Abbas' membership on the PLO's executive committee, we made it clear that the PLO

-- would need to condemn the attack in unambiguous terms and disassociate itself from it.

-- would also need to begin to take steps to discipline Abu Abbas to show unmistakably that the PLO does not countenance this kind of activity and will live up to its commitments."

"To date, the PLO's public and private responses have fallen short of the mark," Baker said. "We take note that the PLO official statements have disassociated the PLO from the May 30 attack," Baker said. "But neither the May 31 statement in Baghdad, issued after the executive committee meeting, nor yesterday's statement condemned the PLF attack in its own right. And moreover, they give no indication that the PLO intends to begin to take steps to discipline Abu Abbas, who organized the operation," he said.

When he was in Europe last week, Baker told the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Turkey that the United States "viewed this situation very, very seriously and that if the PLO did not act, it would be very difficult for us to sustain this dialogue.

"I told Minister Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union the same thing while in Europe and I have telephoned Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid of Egypt to the same effect," Baker told the committee. "Each and every one of these ministers responded by saying that they would go to the PLO and urge it to take steps to condemn this act and to dissociate from it."

When the PLO accepted U.S. conditions for dialogue in December 1988, the secretary said, "it took an important and positive step. We took PLO commitments -- the recognition of Israel's right to exist, the acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and the renunciation of terrorism -- seriously and we expect the PLO to live up to them."

Republican Senator Connie Mack of Florida, who has called for a cut-off of the dialogue with the PLO, asked Baker why the administration has not yet done so.

"I indicated in my remarks that I think it will have some impact on the peace process," the secretary replied. "And there are an extraordinarily large number of our allies and friendly governments that want us to do this with a sufficient degree of examination and consideration rather than moving too precipitously."

Baker noted that he had outlined in his statement "the responses that we expect from the PLO. And we are hopeful that we will get those responses -- not optimistic, but hopeful."
Senator Paul Simon, an Illinois Democrat, said he liked Baker's statement. "I think it is important that they understand clearly that terrorism not only kills innocent people, it jeopardizes any possibility of dialogue with the United States as well as jeopardizes the very, very shaky prospects we have for peace in that area."
NNNN

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 12.06.90 9821

סודי יוצא **
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חוזם:6,9821
אל:וש/175,רהמש/390,אביב/676,מנמת/477
מ-:המשרד,תא:120690,זח:1359,דח:מ,סג:סו
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

76083
סודי/מידי

אל: וושינגטון
השגריר, שטיין

התקשר בראון להודיע כי הונחה לפנות ולבקש להיענות להמלצת ארה'ב לקבל נציג מיוחד של המזכ'ל לדיווח על המצב בשטחים. המועמדים למשימה הם בלנשארד וג'אן קלוד אימה. בראון העיר שאימה חיובי בגישתו וישכיל לשוות לשליחותו הגדרה מצומצמת ביותר. בראון הוסיף שגורם הזמן משחק תפקיד שכן היענות מוקדמת שלנו תסכל התפתחויות בלתי רצויות בזירת האו'ם. יבקש להעלות הנושא בהקדם עם כניסת שה'ח החדש לתפקידו.

בראון סיפר שבדיווחי נציגויות ארה'ב בבירות מדינות ערב מצטיירת ביקורת נוקבת על ארה'ב אולי הקשה והחמורה מאז 1967.

בנצור

לב

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),ממד, בנצור,מצפא,ברנע,ארבל2,סולטן,מזתים,סייבל

ΟΙΤΓ ΓΙΧΗ ++
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ΠΙΓΟ:12589,6
ΗΣ:ΓΙΜ\ΣΥΓ,ΓΠΦΩ\ΟΡΣ,ΗΓΓΕ\ΦΥΦ,ΦΙΦΠ\ΥΥΦ
Φ-:ΠΦΩΓΓ,ΠΝ:09ΦΟΣΙ,ΙΠ:9ΣΣΓ,ΓΠ:Φ,ΟΙ:01
ΠΠ:6 ΚΟ:ΣΦΗ
ΓΓ:6

ΣΦΟΦΣ
ΟΙΓΓ\Φ'Γ'

ΗΣ: ΓΙΜ'ΕΙΦΓΙ
ΠΦΙΓ'Γ, ΦΦ''Γ

ΠΦΦΦΓ ΕΓΗΙΓ ΣΠΙΓ'Φ Ε' ΠΙΓΙΠΗ ΣΦΕΙΗ ΓΣΕΦΦ ΣΠ'ΦΙΕΙΗ ΣΠΦΣΥΗ ΗΓΓ'Ε ΣΦΕΣ ΕΥ'Φ Φ'ΙΠΓ ΦΓ ΠΦΥΕ'Σ ΣΓ'ΙΙΗ ΦΓ ΠΦΥΕ ΣΦΦΠ'Φ. ΠΦ'ΙΦΦΓ'Φ ΤΦΦ'ΦΠ ΠΦ ΕΓΙΦΗΓΓ ΓΙ'ΗΓ ΦΓΙΓ Η'ΦΠ. ΕΓΗΙΓ ΠΦ'Γ ΦΗ'ΦΠ Π'ΙΕ' ΕΥ'ΦΗΓ Γ'ΦΕ'Σ ΣΦΙΙΗ ΣΦΣ'ΠΙΓΙΓ ΠΙΓΙΠΗ ΦΥΙΦΥΦΠ Ε'ΙΗΓ. ΕΓΗΙΓ ΠΙΟ'Β ΦΙΓΙΠ ΠΙΥΙ ΦΦΗΠ ΠΕΦ'Γ ΦΣΙ Π'ΦΙΙΗ ΦΙΓΙΥΦΠ ΦΣΙΓ ΠΟΣΣ ΠΦΕΠΠΙ'ΙΗ ΕΥΠ' ΓΥΙ'ΙΗ ΕΥ'ΙΠ ΠΗΙ'Π. 'ΕΓΦΦ ΣΠΦΣΙΗ ΠΙΓΙΦΗ ΕΠΙΓΙΠ ΦΠ ΕΓ'ΙΠΗ ΦΠ'Ι' ΠΗΙΓΦ ΣΠΕΦ'ΙΙ.

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ΕΙΥΙΓ

ΣΕ

ΠΕ: ΦΠΠ,ΟΦΠΠ,ΙΠΦ,ΦΠΕΦ,ΦΙΓΣ,ΦΦΙΓΣ,Γ\ΦΓΕΣ,ΓΠ,Φ\ΗΦΙΙ,ΦΦΓ,
ΕΙΥΙΓ,ΦΥΕΗ,ΕΓΙΙ,ΗΓΕΣΣ,ΟΙΣΦΙ,ΦΙΗ'Π,Π''ΣΓ

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פנוק	קו: ___ פתוח: ___
סווג: שמור		
תאריך ודפן העבר: 12.7.90		אל: מנהל מצפ"א
פס' פברק:	מקש"ח / משהב"ט, רמש"ן-ניו-יורק ציר כלכלי - כאן	מע:
המשרד: בטחון משק 29 153 1159	ק. לקונגרס	מאת:

חוק סיוע חוץ ותיקון אובי — ה- 78 ? לעיין.

1. בתחילת השבוע קיימו נאמני איפ"ק, במסגרת ביקורם החודשי בוושינגטון, סדרת פגישות עם סנטורים בהכנה לדיון בחוק סיוע חוץ בסנאט. בכל השיחות העלו את נושא תיקון אובי.

2. נשיא איפ"ק, מיטציל, לארי ויינברג, תום דיין, ואסתר קורץ נפגשו (ביום ב' 9/7) עם הסנטור לייהי, יו"ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות. העלו עמו כאמור את נושא תיקון אובי. לייהי אשר לא היה בקיא בנושא, אמנם לא התחייב, אולם הרושם שהשאיר על ברי שיחו היה כי לא צפויות בעיות מבחינתנו (סביב הבסת התיקון). אריק ניוסום שנכח אף הוא בפגישה העיר כלפי אובי שנמאס להם to pull obey's calls from the fire.

3. נאמני איפ"ק תשונים נפגשו גם עם הסנטורים אינווה, ספקטר והארקין (שאף הם חברי הועדה) והרושם בסה"כ של כולם שהתיקון לא חוזר לא יתקבל.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

שם מקום חקר נשל נגנשל מנשה גבריאל מן פלגית ה' אלדר

תפוצה: — ל —

9157 תאריך : 11.06.90
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 1 מתוך 8 סודי ביותר יוצא

חוזם:6,9157
אל: רה"מ/368, ות/163, נ/56
מ-:המשרד,תא:110690,זח:1652,דח:ב,סג:סב
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק

מס' 75969

אל : וושינגטון
שגריר/ציר/קונגרס (לעיניהם בלבד)
ניו-יורק/ קונכ'ל (לעניו בלבד)
דע : מנכ'ל ראה'מ

מאת: יועץ מדיני לשה'ח

דיאלוג ארה'ב/אש'פ

1. גורמים שונים עוסקים באינטנסיביות בנסיון להביא להבנה בין אש'פ לבין הממשל כדי למנוע הפסקת הדיאלוג.

2. בנגוד להבטחות דוברי הממשל, הבנה כזו סביר שתהיה בבחינת טאטוא הענין מתחת לשטיח.

3. ספק רק אם הבנה כזו תכלול את העיקר והוא גרוש חש'פ כולו ואבו אל עבס אישית מאש'פ , כמתחייב מה- T.P. שנמסרו ע'י האמריקאים בתחילת הדיאלוג.

4. עפ'י סימז'ת מקהיר מהיום, הערב בשעה 18:00 תפורסם הודעה מטעם אש'פ בענין נסיון ההתקפה על חוף ישראל, מאמצי השלום והממשלה הישראלית. ההודעה, לפי סימז'ת, תימסר ע'י דובר פלסטיני רשמי ותכלול:

א. גינוי פעולת אבו אלעבס. בנוסח ההודעה יצויין כי

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 1 מתוך 8

עמדות אש'פ ממשיכות להיות נגד כל פעולה צבאית נגד אזרחים, יהיה אשר יהיה אופי הפעולה, והוא מגנה אותה. (לא ברור אם גינוי פעולת אבו אלעבאס כפעולת טרור יופיע בצורה מובהקת - סלי).

ב. אש'פ דבק בדרך השלום המבוססת על יוזמות השלום שלו מ- 88' בג'נבה וכן ב- 10 הנקודות המצריות ובתכנית בייקר.

ג. גינוי מדיניות ממשלת ישראל החדשה ותכניותיה להפריע לתהליך השלום.

5. איננו יכולים לאשר כי זהו נוסח הודעה מוסכם אך ברור שזהו עוד סימן למגעים מאחורי הקלעים ולאפשרות שתפורסם הודעה שאין בה מענה לדרישות היסודיות.

6. בנוסף מוסר אלקבס אלכוותי כי ממשל בוש עודד בחשאי את ההנהגה הפלסטינית להקים ועדת חקירה בענין הפעולה.

7. להזכירכם ובהמשך לשלנו מיום ו' 8/6, גם אחרי פעולת אקילה-לאורו הוקמה ועדת חקירה שמצאה את אבו אלעבאס זכאי. אבו אלעבאס חזר לועד הפועל וחש'פ המשיך לפעול במסגרת אש'פ כשערפאת ממן פעולותיו.

8. אנא שיקלו צעדים דחופים למניעה מראש של נסיונות להגיע לפשרות בנושא זה, תוך דגש שבמבחן עומדים אמינות הממשל והנחישות נגד הטרור. במסגרת זו מציע שתתדרכו מיידית ידידים וחברי קונגרס על קיום מהלכים מאחורי הקלעים.

9. נראה שחשוב מאוד שהממשל ישמע מראש מגורמים שונים שלא ישלימו עם WHITE-WASH.

אק

תפ: @רהמ,שהח,סשהח,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

KEYES: APPLY FAIRNESS RULE TO MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS
(Keyes, Levine, Gephardt at AIPAC conference)
By Norma S. Holmes
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- There is one simple test that more often than not achieves the right answer in foreign affairs, according to former Assistant Secretary of State Alan Keyes: "It is the simple rubric of fairness. Is it fair?"

Addressing the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's annual policy conference here June 12, Keyes said that to apply that rubric to the Middle East is to view the region "in its historic context."

"If we are willing to take account of that (historical) record," Keyes stressed, "then our understanding of human rights will be an understanding that encompasses all of Palestine and demands that the rights and participation of the whole Palestinian people be addressed."

But he also stressed, "I think we should make it an unequivocal principle of our policy that we understand that peace cannot begin until terror ends...." He said the United States should suspend its dialogue with the PLO until it expels Abul Abbas, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, suspected in organizing the recent unsuccessful raid on Israel, and it disavows the goal of destroying Israel.

For all the years of Israel's existence, he noted, "there has been no greater will in the American Jewish community than the will for peace." But he said it is also clear that Israel's years of war "have wrought their ravages materially, physically and spiritually. It is a great task to be always embattled, to be struggling, to fear always for tomorrow that you may not survive. It is a great burden for any state, any people," he said.

"Is it fair of those in pursuit of peace in the Middle East to focus on the responsibilities, tests, challenges to Israel but to pass over in silence the challenges and responsibilities of the Arab states?" Keyes asked.

Keyes, who also served as the U.S. representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (1985-87), said that in his work in southern Africa and the Middle East he discovered that the aspirations of the people are "very much the same."

Americans also expect fairness of their leaders and in the policies of their government, Keyes noted. "It is basic to what we are." He said it was the historic sense of right, justice and decency that made Jewish Americans an instrumental part of the fight in America for civil rights.

"We should be very concerned, as Americans, for the Middle East -- as we are in Central America, in Africa, and in Europe -- that the light

of freedom not go out," Keyes said, because "it is the little match that lights the candle, it's the candle that will light the darkness not only for Israelis, but for Palestinians and Arabs and all the people of the Middle East who have yet to begin their march toward liberty."

"It is important for the future of freedom that we insist on a policy from our government that will respect the basis of our partnership with Israel be for its survival," Keyes said, "because that survival is not just a beacon of hope for Jewish people, but a beacon of hope for every people and every person crushed beneath the heel of circumstance...for the dignity that belongs to all people as human beings. For that cause, Israel was founded and it survives."

The three-day annual policy conference featured more than 20 prominent U.S. officials -- including Vice President Quayle and Defense Secretary Cheney -- members of the U.S. Congress, two state governors, and drew over 2,000 participants from as far as Hawaii and Jerusalem.

U.S. Representative Mel Levine (Democrat of California) told the closing session that peace and stability in the Middle East are best achieved by the unmistakable message that the United States and Israel are allies that cannot be divided."

Levine said last week the House of Representatives passed an amendment linking improved trade with the Soviet Union to freer emigration as a part of the Export Administration Act. "It is time for the administration to tell the Soviet Union, and every Arab state in the region, that Soviet Jewish emigration remains a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East," Levine said.

In discussing U.S. economic policy and Soviet Jewish emigration in an earlier session, Representative Richard Gephardt (Democrat of Missouri), said that members of Congress "pressed President Gorbachev on the need to codify the freedom of emigration" during the recent U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington.

"I support the trade agreement President Bush signed with President Gorbachev; I support a great expansion of our economic relationship," he said. "But the trade benefits must come with strings attached -- strings that pull the Soviets toward freedom of movement, free government, and free markets," he added.

Gephardt said the recent trade agreement's linkage to emigration reform "sent a message to the Soviets: If you want to deal with the United States, you must deal with human rights."
NNNN

official text

06/12/90

ONLY PEACE TALKS CAN BRING ISRAEL "REAL SECURITY"
(Transcript: Cheney AIPAC remarks 6/11/90)

Washington -- Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney says that while the United States remains committed to ensuring Israel's security and qualitative military edge, it is also committed to pursuing a comprehensive peace settlement.

"Israel's security depends upon the success of this process," Cheney's told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee annual policy conference June 11.

"Real security (for Israel) can only come through successful negotiations with Palestinians and Arab states that leads to a durable peace. This is the objective that the United States has pursued this year," he said.

Cheney said the United States has sought to develop a step-by-step process designed to translate the principles of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 into reality. The starting point, he stressed, is "a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in Cairo leading to elections and negotiations."

Following is an unofficial transcript of Cheney's remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

I know there are a lot of people who think that the Middle East is a tough policy area, full of frustrations and political land mines. But, in some ways, this is a piece of cake. If I weren't here I'd probably be negotiating this morning with Congress about my defense budget.

Earlier this morning, I know that Vice-President Quayle gave you an

overview of the administration's policies on the Middle East. And I do not intend to go over that ground again. Suffice it to say that the U.S. commitment to Israel remains absolutely solid and unalterable.

We have, from time to time, had our differences of opinion. There is not an ally in the world with whom we have not had an occasional disagreement, but show me a marriage in which there have never been disagreements and I'll show you a couple with no personality.

The important thing in a good relationship is to remember that disagreements are not all there is. As long as the foundation remains strong, the relationship will, too. We understand that Israel has had to struggle to preserve itself. We understand that no country can be expected to take a risk for peace unless it feels secure. Rest assured, therefore, that the United States remains committed to insuring Israel's security, and we will continue to support Israel's qualitative military edge in the region.

At the same time, we are also committed to pursuing a comprehensive peace settlement. Israel's security depends upon the success of this process. Israel must remain strong to secure that peace, but weapons and technology alone are not sufficient. Real security can only come through successful negotiations with Palestinians and Arab states that leads to a durable peace. This is the objective the U.S. has pursued this year.

The principles underlying our approach are well known. They build on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, on the concept of territory for peace. They are built on the understanding that Israel must have secure and defensible borders. And they are built on the recognition that there must be a comprehensive peace that creates peace not only between Israel and the Palestinians but between Israel and all its Arab neighbors.

We have sought to develop a step-by-step process designed to translate those principles into reality¿ the starting point· A Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in Cairo leading to elections and negotiations. The process will enhance Israel's security, and the process built on the premise of Israel's May 14, 1989, initiative deserves a positive response. It also requires the Arab states, besides Egypt, to demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation with Israel. There are no easy alternatives.

Peace clearly also has to mean an end to terrorism. The United States is horrified by the May 30th attack off the beaches near Tel Aviv. As President Bush said last Friday, the dialogue between the U.S. and the PLO is predicated on a renunciation of terrorism. To make peace, of course, Israel needs to be strong, and the United States has always been committed to helping Israel preserve that strength through our special relationship.

We will continue to be committed to that relationship. Like any good relationship, this one has many sides· cultural, political, military, economic. Today I'm going to talk specifically about the flourishing security side of that relationship, but to do so, I would like first to say a word about the overall strategic context, the big picture, if

you will.

Last week President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev had a successful and productive summit meeting here in Washington. The meetings reflected the historic changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union over the last year. The relationship between the two superpowers clearly has been moving to a new footing. I think we can safely say that the Warsaw Pact is no longer a dangerous military alliance, and that NATO's fear of sudden Soviet invasion of Western Europe has been dramatically reduced. Obviously, these changes have been for the good. However, there remain many uncertainties, and some of these have been unsettling to our non-NATO allies. For example, our friends throughout the Asian Pacific region have told me that they are worried that changes in Europe might cause us to withdraw from our global responsibilities. I have assured them that this will not happen, but we cannot pretend that this concern does not exist. It must be addressed.

Such concerns, obviously, are not limited to the Asian Pacific region. A few months ago, a Washington Post headline said that partly because of the changes in U.S.-Soviet relations, an anxious Israel fears that the world and especially the U.S. is losing interest in it. Sometime later, a Washington Jewish Week headline wondered whether the end of the Cold War will mean that Israel will be less of a strategic asset. These concerns, in my opinion, are based on misconceptions about the nuts and bolts of strategic cooperation and about the global sweep of US national security interest. I'll speak about strategic cooperation first.

In 1983, President Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir agreed to a formal relationship of strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel. Since then, the two countries' strategic ties have become closer than ever. Let me be clear that I am talking not only about what goes on at the top levels of government. I am also talking about a day to day working relationship and information sharing all up and down the line.

For example, our military services have been conducting valuable exercises with the Israelis for some time, and will continue to do so. In addition, Israel is slated to get 35 percent of the administration's fiscal 1991 budget request for security assistance. Israel is due to begin taking delivery on its third order of F-16 aircraft in 1991. We also expect the Israeli Defense Force to be getting its first Apache attack helicopter soon, and we are funding a portion of Israel's naval modernization program.

There was also a significant increase during the 1980s in the U.S. procurements of Israeli defense products. These procurements went from a level of 51 million dollars in 1984 to almost 351 million dollars last year. That's a concrete demonstration of the level of cooperation and mutual support between our two nations. Of course, future spending levels may depend in part on the size of the overall U.S. defense budget.

Finally, the United States has a number of joint research and development projects underway with Israel, including several that are part of our Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. In fact, in dollar terms Israel has been the largest foreign participant in the SDI

program. Major SDI projects in Israel have included:

-- An Israeli test bed program to develop a computer-based analysis center to evaluate theater missile defense designs;

-- The hypervelocity gun program, to explore methods of achieving very high rates of projectile acceleration;

-- And, of course, the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile experiment, aimed at determining the feasibility of developing a defensive capability against tactical ballistic missiles.

Of course, SDI is only one of several sources for U.S.-Israeli cooperative research and development. Other programs include ones:

-- to develop anti-armor warhead technology;

-- to improve the self-propelled Howitzer;

-- to modify the laser night attack system used in Cobra helicopters, and

-- to develop and produce and improved tactical air-launched decoy system.

And that's just a sample of some of the projects we have underway.

I mentioned all of these specific programs because I want it to be understood that we do not consider our relationship with Israel to flow in only one direction. The United States provides aid and assistance to Israel but we also get national security benefits in return. The relationship has been cooperative in the truest sense of that word.

So far I have been talking about ongoing programs, but I'd also like to look ahead for the moment. How should we expect changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe to affect the security relationship between Israel and the United States. That is perhaps the key question that has been on the minds of many supporters of Israel since the dramatic changes began just a little over a year ago.

If we look only at specific programs along the lines of the ones I've just mentioned, the answers are not obvious. The U.S. defense budget is shrinking, that clearly will mean less money available for all sorts of military projects. On the other hand, the need to use defense dollars efficiently will probably push us even more toward cooperative research, development and co-production. The specific impact, therefore, will vary by country and by program. But on a broader level, the answers are much more clear cut. The threat of a Soviet land invasion in Europe may have declined, but the Soviet strategic arsenal is still a threat and perestroika has a long, long way to go.

More importantly, as you in this audience well know, what has been happening in Eastern Europe does not do away with the threat of violence erupting in other parts of the world, and many of those threats could easily bear upon interests that are vital to the United

States.

As we look around at the world potential tinderboxes, perhaps the most disturbing development we can foresee is the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Ten years from now, by the year 2000, the number of developing countries producing their own ballistic missiles is expected to be up to 15. Some of the 15 are already producers, and others are likely to have this capability by the end of the decade. And that list of 15 does not count the countries that could end up buying missiles on the international arms market. Included among the 15 are such countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea. That is hardly a list that can make an American audience feel comfortable.

And at least 6 of the 15 will have intermediate-range missiles by the turn of the century -- not merely short-range missiles. Missiles can be equipped to carry a wide variety of warheads -- chemical, biological, and nuclear, as well as conventional. Some of the countries now developing missiles are ones that have nuclear weapons programs. By the end of the decade, the list of nuclear club members with missiles almost surely will be longer than it is now. As for chemical and biological weapons, 23 foreign countries have confirmed or suspected chemical warfare programs. And 10 have or may have biological warfare programs.

Many of these countries have, or soon will have, ballistic missiles. Once again, that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Most of these ballistic missiles could not reach the continental United States. However, that should not leave us feeling safe. The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Our allies could certainly be threatened. So could our overseas bases and our forward-deployed forces. Any of these could easily be in the range of a missile fired by a potential adversary.

Who among us is willing to bet that such missiles will never be used? In fact, the threshold has already been crossed. In 1986, Libya fired two Soviet-made SCUD missiles at a U.S. Coast Guard station on an offshore Italian island. Fortunately, the Libyan missiles fell short of their targets. In addition, Iraq and Iran used hundreds of ballistic missiles during their recent war.

Iraq has been the source of some particularly disturbing news in recent months. Witness, for example, their attempts to acquire electronic trigger mechanisms suitable for nuclear weapons, its claim to possess sophisticated chemical weapons and its implied threat to use them against Israel, and its recent televised test of a first-stage booster rocket. The booster looked as if it was made up of five short-range rockets. Together, the rockets could give the booster a range of about 1,000 kilometers. Baghdad Television has claimed that Iraq has developed two missiles with ranges of 2,000 kilometers. Although we do not believe that claim, it is a fact that Baghdad is now producing missiles that can reach Israel.

One of the reasons I am such a staunch supporter of the strategic defense initiative is that SDI will be able for the first time to give

protection against ballistic missiles. SDI deserves your support, not only because it will ultimately allow us to defend against and deter a Soviet first strike, but also because programs that are a part of SDI offer the best hope of being able to defend the United States and our friends and allies against the proliferating Third World ballistic missile threat.

The point about SDI could also be generalized. There is a great temptation among many in the United States to say that the Cold War is over and that it's time to slash away at the defense budget. That would be extremely short-sighted. Yes, the defense budget can and will be cut, but those cuts should be managed in a way that will still let the U.S. continue to act as a global power, to protect our global interests and live up to our global commitments and responsibilities.

It does not take a very vivid imagination to see what would happen if an American withdrawal were to let international power vacuums develop in regions where our strength now exerts a positive influence. Countries have claims or counter-claims against each other's territories and interests in just about every part of the world.

As friends of Israel well know, these claims can endanger the peace and threaten the stability of an entire region. If those kinds of situation threaten important interests of the United States or our allies, we must be prepared to exert a restraining influence. And sometimes, unavoidably, that will require us to use American military power.

I said earlier that the U.S. commitment to Israel is absolutely unshakable, and it is. But the real-world value of our commitments to any ally depends on our ability to project American power. To put it simply, our commitments are only as good as our ability to back them up. At a time when budgets are shrinking, that will require a highly trained, mobile and flexible force supported by sophisticated equipment, developed and forward-looking research and development efforts.

Some who like to portray themselves as great friends of Israel are also in the forefront of those who want to cut the heart out of the United States defense budget. They seem to think that we can weaken our position globally without harming our ability to help our close friends. I believe those two positions are fundamentally incompatible. We in the United States must not let ourselves become just another regional power. If we do, we and our friends such as Israel may ultimately have to suffer the consequences.

The United States role in the postwar world has been a very proud one. Our relationship with Israel has been one of the elements that has helped to make it proud. I look forward to working with you to help strengthen that relationship as we move forward together into the next era of this country's military and diplomatic history.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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official text

06/12/90

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States.

As we look around at the world potential tinderboxes, perhaps the most disturbing development we can foresee is the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Ten years from now, by the year 2000, the number of developing countries producing their own ballistic missiles is expected to be up to 15. Some of the 15 are already producers, and others are likely to have this capability by the end of the decade. And that list of 15 does not count the countries that could end up buying missiles on the international arms market. Included among the 15 are such countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea. That is hardly a list that can make an American audience feel comfortable.

And at least 6 of the 15 will have intermediate-range missiles by the turn of the century -- not merely short-range missiles. Missiles can be equipped to carry a wide variety of warheads -- chemical, biological, and nuclear, as well as conventional. Some of the countries now developing missiles are ones that have nuclear weapons programs. By the end of the decade, the list of nuclear club members with missiles almost surely will be longer than it is now. As for chemical and biological weapons, 23 foreign countries have confirmed or suspected chemical warfare programs. And 10 have or may have biological warfare programs.

Many of these countries have, or soon will have, ballistic missiles. Once again, that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Most of these ballistic missiles could not reach the continental United States. However, that should not leave us feeling safe. The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Our allies could certainly be threatened. So could our overseas bases and our forward-deployed forces. Any of these could easily be in the range of a missile fired by a potential adversary.

Who among us is willing to bet that such missiles will never be used? In fact, the threshold has already been crossed. In 1986, Libya fired two Soviet-made SCUD missiles at a U.S. Coast Guard station on an offshore Italian island. Fortunately, the Libyan missiles fell short of their targets. In addition, Iraq and Iran used hundreds of ballistic missiles during their recent war.

Iraq has been the source of some particularly disturbing news in recent months. Witness, for example, their attempts to acquire electronic trigger mechanisms suitable for nuclear weapons, its claim to possess sophisticated chemical weapons and its implied threat to use them against Israel, and its recent televised test of a first-stage booster rocket. The booster looked as if it was made up of five short-range rockets. Together, the rockets could give the booster a range of about 1,000 kilometers. Baghdad Television has claimed that Iraq has developed two missiles with ranges of 2,000 kilometers. Although we do not believe that claim, it is a fact that Baghdad is now producing missiles that can reach Israel.

One of the reasons I am such a staunch supporter of the strategic defense initiative is that SDI will be able for the first time to give

protection against ballistic missiles. SDI deserves your support, not only because it will ultimately allow us to defend against and deter a Soviet first strike, but also because programs that are a part of SDI offer the best hope of being able to defend the United States and our friends and allies against the proliferating Third World ballistic missile threat.

The point about SDI could also be generalized. There is a great temptation among many in the United States to say that the Cold War is over and that it's time to slash away at the defense budget. That would be extremely short-sighted. Yes, the defense budget can and will be cut, but those cuts should be managed in a way that will still let the U.S. continue to act as a global power, to protect our global interests and live up to our global commitments and responsibilities.

It does not take a very vivid imagination to see what would happen if an American withdrawal were to let international power vacuums develop in regions where our strength now exerts a positive influence. Countries have claims or counter-claims against each other's territories and interests in just about every part of the world.

As friends of Israel well know, these claims can endanger the peace and threaten the stability of an entire region. If those kinds of situation threaten important interests of the United States or our allies, we must be prepared to exert a restraining influence. And sometimes, unavoidably, that will require us to use American military power.

I said earlier that the U.S. commitment to Israel is absolutely unshakable, and it is. But the real-world value of our commitments to any ally depends on our ability to project American power. To put it simply, our commitments are only as good as our ability to back them up. At a time when budgets are shrinking, that will require a highly trained, mobile and flexible force supported by sophisticated equipment, developed and forward-looking research and development efforts.

Some who like to portray themselves as great friends of Israel are also in the forefront of those who want to cut the heart out of the United States defense budget. They seem to think that we can weaken our position globally without harming our ability to help our close friends. I believe those two positions are fundamentally incompatible. We in the United States must not let ourselves become just another regional power. If we do, we and our friends such as Israel may ultimately have to suffer the consequences.

The United States role in the postwar world has been a very proud one. Our relationship with Israel has been one of the elements that has helped to make it proud. I look forward to working with you to help strengthen that relationship as we move forward together into the next era of this country's military and diplomatic history.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון
טופס מברק

תאריך: 12.6.90

זמן חיבור: 12:00

בלמס/מיזי

דף 1 מתוך 13

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.

דע : יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, עתונות-ניו-יורק, ממ"ד

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

ועידת אייפא"ק - נאום סגן הנשיא

רצ"ב הנאום שנשא ס/הנשיא, קוויל, בפני באי ועידת אייפא"ק מאתמול, 11.6.90.

עתונות

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Embargoed until delivered -- 9:40 AM EST, June 11, 1990

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

31ST ANNUAL POLICY CONFERENCE
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL
COTILLION ROOM

Thank you, Mayer Mitchell, for that very kind introduction. And let me congratulate you, once again, on assuming the Presidency of AIPAC. I've already had the chance to congratulate you two months ago, when you and the members of AIPAC's President's Club came to our residence and presented Marilyn and me with a lovely Mezuzah, which we treasure deeply.

I'd also like to extend my congratulations on a job well done to AIPAC's former President, my good friend, Ed Levy. While I served in the Senate, and as Vice President, Ed and I enjoyed an exceptionally close working relationship. Incidentally, I can't help but notice that both Ed and his successor are solid Republicans -- that's the way all Presidential successions should be handled!

As all of you know, we've just concluded the recent U.S.-Soviet Summit, and we're looking toward the NATO Summit in July.

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Much is being made today of the amazing times in which we live. Some have compared our era to the end of World War I -- "the war to end all wars." Others have gone further back in history, to the year 1848 -- "the springtime of nations" -- when democratic revolutions swept across Europe.

But I'm struck by the comparison between the events happening today, and the events in the Middle East after the Six-Day War of 1967. The Six-Day War began on Monday, June 5, and ended on Saturday, June 10. On June 11 -- that is, exactly 23 years ago today -- Israelis savored the thrill of victory.

I think it's fair to say that not only Israelis, but the entire Jewish people, were seized by a justifiable exhilaration on June 11, 1967. Even non-Jews like myself rejoiced. And why not? After all, the attempt to destroy the State of Israel had failed. Jerusalem was united, its holy places open to all, and Jews prayed before the Western Wall for the first time in 19 years. In June of 1967, some Israelis believed that the future would be uniformly sunny and bright -- and many even believed that the suffering associated with Jewish history had perhaps come to an end.

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I think the parallels to today's situation are striking. In the aftermath of what President Bush has called "the revolutionary year of 1989," it is the West

that is seized with a justifiable exhilaration.

Now, scholars speculate about the "end of history" and the universal triumph of freedom and democracy. And some Americans are even declaring that having won the Cold War, it's time for us to bring the troops home, disengage from the world, and enjoy the fruits of victory.

But unfortunately, Israel's great victory in 1967 did not bring peace. Instead of the approaches to discuss peace that Israel confidently expected, Israel got the "three no's" of Khartoum: no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Then came the terrorism and the hijackings, the War of Attrition with Egypt along the banks of the Suez Canal, the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon, the increasingly expensive arms race, and, more recently, the Intifada.

There were also some hopeful developments: the peace treaty with Egypt, signs that some elements in the Arab world have been coming to terms with Israel's existence, increased Soviet emigration, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with many of the nations that had broken them off after 1967.

Clearly, history did not end for Israel in 1967. And neither, I dare say, will it come to an end for the U.S., despite the remarkable victories our values and ideals are winning today.

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Let us all bear in mind that the future of the Soviet Union is unclear; that regional conflicts, in the Middle East and elsewhere, continue to fester; and that chemical, nuclear, biological, and ballistic missile proliferation pose a real threat not only to our allies, but to us.

Above all, let's keep in mind that we have been surprised this past century by the rise of Communism, the rise of Nazism, and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism. I'm sure history still has a few more surprises in store for us in the decades to come.

What lessons should Israel and the United States draw from these events?

I believe the single most important lesson to be learned is the need for a strong America and a strong Israel. History is not over. The world continues to be a dangerous place. And national security must remain the paramount concern of both our governments.

It seems to me that of all the people in the world, Israelis best understand the importance of a strong national defense. But however strong both the U.S. and Israel are alone, we are even stronger together.

My friends, make no mistake about it: The alliance between the U.S. and Israel is strong and needs to remain strong.

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Everyone is familiar with the assistance the U.S. has provided to Israel over the years, but fewer realize how a strong Israel has benefited the United States.

The benefits of our alliance with Israel have been significant. Israel has been, and remains, a bulwark against the forces of radicalism, instability and terror. Israel has also shared captured Soviet weapons and technology with the U.S.

Most important, perhaps, Israeli victories have discredited the war option in the Middle East, and have contributed to a growing recognition that the peace option is the only option for the Middle East.

But what of the future? What is the future agenda of the U.S.-Israeli relationship?

I believe that precisely because we live in times of uncertainty and rapid change, a strong American-Israeli relationship will be more important than ever.

First of all, we need to continue our cooperation on strategic issues. Let me assure you that President Bush fully appreciates the strategic importance of our close ties with Israel. During his Administration, U.S. military and economic assistance to Israel has been maintained, despite the budgetary pressures we face. And U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation continues to progress.

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When I was in the Senate, I sponsored legislation designed to advance strategic defenses with our allies. I was impressed then, as I am now, with how quickly Israel seized this opportunity, and I am pleased by the progress we have made in U.S.-Israeli cooperation on SDI.

But even as Israel and the U.S. broaden the scope of our strategic cooperation, we must never lose sight of the reason behind this cooperation. And that reason can be summarized in one word: Peace. Peace is what the Israeli people yearn for. Peace is what the American people yearn for. And peace is what our close relationship will one day achieve.

Naturally, the road to peace can sometimes be a bit bumpy. The U.S. and Israel don't always see eye to eye on how best to achieve peace. Quite frankly, I find these occasions of disagreement painful. But the fundamental news is good: when all is said and done, the fact remains that the two allies, the U.S. and Israel, agree on many of the fundamentals of peace in the Middle East:

-- The U.S. and Israel agree that there will be no imposed settlement in the Middle East.

-- The U.S. and Israel agree that Arab states must follow Egypt's example and demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation and peace with Israel.

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-- The U.S. and Israel both favor direct talks between Israel and Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

-- As noted in the Camp David treaties, we agree that a solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

-- But let me say again that the U.S. does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state.

-- And whatever our differences on Jerusalem, the U.S. and Israel agree that Jerusalem must remain united and open to people of all faiths -- and that there will be no return to the unacceptable pre-1967 situation.

It is just over a year since the Israeli government produced its four-part plan for peace. We encouraged this plan, and we have worked hard to make it a success.

We hope that the new Israeli government will give its full support to a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. And we intend to work with that government to move forward in the peace process. Israel now may have a chance, for the first time in 23 years, to gain a Palestinian partner for peace. We shouldn't let this opportunity slip away.

In addition to fostering strategic cooperation and helping to promote peace, the U.S.-Israeli alliance has another goal: the promotion of human rights. In

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particular, both nations have been fully committed to the human rights struggle of Soviet Jewry.

For years, Jews in the Soviet Union have struggled to enjoy basic human rights, including the right to emigrate. Finally, the Soviet Union has acknowledged that right. But proclaiming the right to emigrate is not enough. Jews and others need the opportunity to exercise that right.

The government of the United States has made its view very clear. President Bush has called on the Soviet Union to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, and to permit direct flights to Israel. And we have made it clear to Arab states and others that we deplore any campaign to block Israel's legitimate right to absorb Soviet Jewish emigrants.

The government of the United States views the emigration of Soviet Jewry to Israel as a basic human rights issue. We consider the growing exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union nothing less than a dream come true.

I don't mind telling you that when I have contacted Soviet authorities in the past about this or that refusenik -- both as a Senator and as Vice President -- I sometimes wondered whether it would have any effect -- whether we would ever see Soviet Jews free to enjoy their inalienable rights. But when I now meet new Israelis like Natan

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Scharansky and Vladimir Raiz, I know that our efforts have made a difference. We can be proud of these efforts.

As you know, the U.S. government does not agree with Israel's settlement policy in the Occupied Territories. At the same time, however, the United States strongly rejects any threat to postpone issuing exit permits to Soviet Jews until Israel changes its policy. The right to emigrate is not some privilege that a government can grant or withhold as it pleases. Rather, it is a basic human right that must be respected. We are pleased that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has now assured Secretary Baker that the Soviet Union's liberalized emigration policy will continue, and will be codified in a new law.

Another area of close American-Israeli cooperation is the struggle against terrorism. Over the years, American and Israeli citizens have been the major victims of international terrorism. We've suffered together and we've worked together. And we will continue to work together until the menace of terrorism is finally eradicated.

To be sure, we've had our differences on this issue. One area of particular concern to many of you has been the U.S. dialogue with the PLO. As you know, this dialogue was begun by the Reagan Administration in December 1988, after

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for such a dialogue -- recognition of Israel's right to exist, renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Bush Administration has continued this dialogue. We have done so because we believe that in the absence of such a dialogue, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories would be less likely to participate in the peace process. But we have never pressed Israel to negotiate with the PLO; we have never sought to bring the PLO into the peace process "through the back door"; we do not support the establishment of a Palestinian state; and we have continued to thwart the PLO's efforts to advance its claim to statehood in international organizations.

Of course, our dialogue with the PLO has rested on a fundamental premise: that the PLO will adhere to the commitments it made in December 1988. But on May 30, the Palestine Liberation Front, a group affiliated with the PLO, sought to carry out a horrifying terrorist attack on the beaches of Tel Aviv. We have condemned this attack in the strongest terms. We take terrorism and this attack very seriously.

As President Bush said on Friday, "Our dialogue is predicated on a renunciation of terror." President Bush will make a decision on that dialogue soon. His decision will be guided by our determination to promote peace and

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counter terrorism. And President Bush will make the right decision.

There is yet another item on the agenda of the American-Israeli alliance -- our campaign to restore the moral integrity of the United Nations. In November 1975, the United Nations' integrity was severely compromised when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with Racism. When the General Assembly of the United Nations passed this infamous Resolution, the U.S. made it clear that we would never accept it.

Last December, I publicly called on the Soviet Union to work with us to repeal it. This morning, I want to renew my call: this infamous Resolution should be -- and will be -- repealed. And we will work to make this happen.

You know, long before this infamous Resolution, some people -- even sympathetic people -- thought that Zionism was an impossible dream. But the people of Israel thought otherwise. And the people of America thought otherwise, as well. Working together, we transformed the dream of Zion into a reality. And working together, we will realize our other dreams as well.

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So let us continue our struggle side by side until the dream we both share -- the dream of an Israel that is safe, secure and at peace -- comes to pass at last.

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And let us remember the words of the founder of modern Zionism, the great Theodor Herzl. "If you will it," Herzl said, "it is no legend."

Having been to Israel twice, I am always impressed by the determination of the people of Israel. In my first trip, it was only a matter of minutes by helicopter from the Golan Heights to the Negev desert. From the hills of Judea and Samaria, you can see the land of Israel stretched out before you.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Israel, our strategic ally, will survive -- and we shall continue to work for peace.

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official text

06/12/90

QUAYLE URGES SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE
(Text: Vice President's AIPAC speech 6/11/90)

Washington -- Pledging continued U.S. support of Israel in areas of strategic cooperation, peace, and human rights, Vice President Dan Quayle June 11 urged the new Israeli government to "give its full support to a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue."

"It is just over a year since the Israeli government produced its four-part plan for peace. We encouraged this plan, and we have worked hard to make it a success," Quayle told the American Israeli Public Affairs Committe (AIPAC) conference in Washington

"Israel now may have a chance, for the first time in 23 years to gain a Palestinian partner for peace. We shouldn't let this opportunity slip away," the Vice President stressed.

Quayle said the United States and Israel are in fundamental agreement that there be no imposed peace settlement in the Middle East, that Arab states demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation and peace with Israel, and that there be direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

"We agree that a solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," Quayle said. "But let me say again that the U.S. does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Following is the unofficial text of Quayle's as-delivered remarks:

(BEGIN TEXT)

As all of you know, we've just concluded a recent U.S.-Soviet summit, and now we're looking forward to the NATO summit in July.

United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

Much is being made today of the amazing times in which we live. Some have compared our era to the end of World War I -- the war to end all wars. Others have gone further back in history to the year of 1848 -- "the springtime of nations" -- when democratic revolutions swept across Europe.

And I am struck by the comparison between the events happening today and the events in the Middle East after the Six-day War of 1967. The Six-day War began on Monday, June 5th and ended on Saturday, June 10th. On June 11th -- that is, exactly 23 years ago today -- Israelis savored the thrill of victory. And I think it's fair to say that not only Israelis but the entire Jewish people were seized by a justifiable exhilaration on June 11, 1967, and even non-Jews like myself rejoiced. And why not? After all, the attempt to destroy the State of Israel had failed. Jerusalem was united, its holy places open to all and Jews prayed before the Western Wall for the first time in 19 years.

In June of 1967, some Israelis believed that the future would be uniformly sunny and bright, and many believed that the suffering associated with the Jewish history had perhaps come to an end.

I think the parallels of today's situation are striking. In the aftermath of what President Bush has called "the revolutionary year of 1989," it is the West that is seized with the justifiable exhilaration.

Now scholars speculate about the "end of history" and the universal triumph of freedom and democracy. And some Americans are even declaring that having won the Cold War, it's time for us to bring the troops home, disengage from the world and enjoy the fruits of victory.

But, unfortunately, Israel's great victory in 1967 did not bring peace. Instead of the approaches to discuss peace that Israel confidently expected, Israel got the three no's from Khartoum: no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Then came the terrorism and hijackings, the war of attrition with Egypt along the banks of the Suez Canal, the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon, the increasingly expensive arms race, and more recently, the Intifada.

There were also some hopeful developments: the peace treaty with Egypt, signs that some elements in the Arab world have been coming to terms with Israel's existence, increased Soviet emigration, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with many of the nations that had broken them off after 1967.

Clearly, history did not end for Israel in 1967. And neither, I dare say, will it come to an end for the United States, despite the remarkable victories of our values and our ideals that are winning today.

Let us all bear in mind that the future of the Soviet Union is unclear, that regional conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere continue to fester, and that chemical, nuclear, biological and ballistic missile proliferation pose a real threat, not only to our allies, but also to us.

Above all, let's keep in mind that we have been surprised this past century by the rise of communism, the rise of Nazism, and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism, and I am sure that history has a few more surprises in store for us in the decades to come.

What lessons should Israel and the United States draw from these events?

I believe the single most important lesson to be learned is the need for a strong America and a strong Israel. History is not over. The world continues to be a dangerous place. And national security must remain of paramount concern to both of our governments.

It seems to me that of all the people in the world, Israelis best understand the importance of a strong national defense. But however strong both the United States and Israel are alone, we are even stronger together.

My friends, make no mistake about it. The alliance between the United States and Israel is strong and it needs to remain strong.

Everyone is familiar with the assistance the United States has provided Israel over the years. But fewer realize how a strong Israel has benefited the United States.

The benefits of our alliance with Israel have been significant. Israel has been and remains a bulwark against the forces of radicalism, instability and terror. Israel has also shared captured Soviet weapons and technology with the United States. Most important perhaps, Israeli victories have discredited the war option in the Middle East and have contributed to a growing recognition that the peace option is the only option for the Middle East.

But what of the future? What is the future agenda between the United States and Israel?

I believe that precisely because we live in times of uncertainty and rapid change a strong American-Israeli relationship will be more important than ever.

First of all, we need to continue our cooperation on strategic issues. Let me assure you that President Bush fully appreciates the strategic importance of our close ties with Israel. During his administration U.S. military and economic assistance to Israel has been maintained despite the budgetary pressures we face. The U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation continues to progress.
When I was in the Senate, the Mayor mentioned, I sponsored legislation designed to advance strategic defenses with our allies. And I was impressed then, as I am now, with how quickly Israel seized this opportunity. And I am pleased by the progress we have made in U.S.-Israeli cooperation in SDI.

But even as Israel and the United States broaden the scope of our strategic cooperation, we must never lose sight of the reason behind this cooperation. And that reason can be summarized in one word: peace. Peace is what the Israeli people yearn for. Peace is what the American people yearn for. And peace is what our close relationship

will one day achieve.

Naturally, the road to peace can sometimes be a bit bumpy. The U.S. and Israel don't always see eye-to-eye on how best to achieve peace. And quite frankly, I find these occasions of disagreement painful. But the fundamental news is good. When all is said and done, the fact remains that the two allies -- the United States and Israel -- agree on many of the fundamentals of peace in the Middle East.

-- The U.S. and Israel agree that there will be no imposed settlement in the Middle East.
-- The U.S. and Israel agree that Arab states must follow Egypt's example and demonstrate their commitment to reconciliation and peace with Israel.
-- The U.S. and Israel both favor direct talks between Israel and Palestinians and between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
-- As noted in the Camp David treaties, we agree that a solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, but let me say again that the U.S. does not support the establishment of a Palestinian state.
-- And whatever our differences on Jerusalem, the U.S. and Israel agree that Jerusalem must remain united and open to people of all faiths -- and that there will be no return to the unacceptable pre-1967 situation.

It's just over a year since the Israeli government produced its four-part plan for peace. We encourage this plan and we have worked hard to make it a success.

We hope that the new Israeli government will give its full support to a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. And we intend to work with that government to move forward in the peace process. Israel may have a chance for the first time in 23 years to give a Palestinian partner a chance for peace. We shouldn't let this opportunity slip away.

In addition to fostering strategic cooperation and helping to promote peace, the U.S.-Israeli alliance has another goal, the promotion of human rights. In particular, both nations have been fully committed to the human rights struggle of Soviet Jewry.

For years, Jews in the Soviet Union have struggled to enjoy basic human rights, including the right to emigrate. Finally, the Soviet Union has acknowledged that right. But proclaiming the right to emigrate is not enough. Jews and others need the opportunity to exercise that right.

The government of the United States has made its views very clear. President Bush has called on the Soviet Union to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, and to permit direct flights to Israel. We have made it clear to Arab states and others that we deplore any campaign to block Israel's legitimate right to absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants.

The government of the United States views the immigration of Soviet Jewry to Israel as a basic human rights issue and we consider the growing exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union nothing less than a dream come true.

I don't mind telling you that when I have contacted Soviet authorities in the past about this or that refusenik, both as senator or as vice president, I sometimes wondered whether it would have any effect, whether we would ever see Soviet Jews free to enjoy their inalienable rights. But when I now meet Israelis like Natan Sharansky and Vladimir Raiz, I know that our efforts did make a difference. We can be proud of those efforts.

As you know, the U.S. government does not agree with Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories. At the same time, however, the United States strongly rejects any threat to postpone issuing exit permits to Soviet Jews until Israel changes its policy. The right to emigrate is not some privilege that a government can grant or withhold as it pleases. Rather, it is a basic human right that must be respected. And we are pleased that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has now assured Secretary Baker that the Soviet Union's liberalized emigration policy will continue and will be codified in a new law.

Another area of close American-Israeli cooperation is the struggle against terrorism. Over the years, American and Israel citizens have been the major victims of international terrorism. We have suffered together, and we have worked together, and we will continue to work together until the menace of terrorism is finally eradicated.

To be sure, we've had our differences on this issue. One area of particular concern to many of you has been the U.S. dialogue with the PLO. As you know, this dialogue was begun by the Reagan administration in December 1988, after the PLO changed its policies and adhered to our conditions for such a dialogue' recognition of Israel's right to exist, renunciation of terrorism, and acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Bush administration has continued this dialogue. We have done so because we believe in the absence of such a dialogue, Palestinians from the occupied territories would be less likely to participate in the peace process. But we have never pressed Israel to negotiate -- to negotiate with the PLO. We have never sought to bring the PLO into the peace process through the back door. We do not support the establishment of a Palestinian state, and we have continued to thwart the PLO's efforts to advance its claim to statehood in international organizations.

Of course, our dialogue with the PLO has rested on a fundamental premise, that the PLO will adhere to the commitments it made last December. But on May 30th, the Palestine Liberation Front, a group affiliated with the PLO, sought to carry out a horrifying terrorist attack on the beaches of Tel Aviv. We have condemned this attack in the strongest terms possible. We take terrorism and this attack very seriously.

As President Bush said on Friday, our dialogue is predicated on a renunciation of terror. President Bush will make a decision on that dialogue soon, and his decision will be guided by our determination to promote peace and to counter terrorism. And President Bush will make the right decision.

There is yet another item on the agenda of the American-Israeli alliance, our campaign to restore the moral integrity of the United Nations. In November 1975, the United Nations' integrity was severely compromised when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. When the General Assembly of the United Nations passed this infamous resolution the U.S. made it clear that we would never accept it.

Last December I publicly called on the Soviet Union to work with us to repeal it. And this morning I want to renew my call. This infamous resolution should be and will be repealed. And we will work to make this happen.

You know, long before this infamous resolution, some people, even sympathetic people, thought that Zionism was an impossible dream. But the people of Israel thought otherwise, and the people of America thought otherwise as well. Working together we transformed the dream of Zion into a reality. And working together, we will realize our other dreams as well.

So let us continue our struggle side-by-side until the dream we both share -- the dream of an Israel that is safe, secure and at peace -- comes to pass at last. And let us remember the words of the founder of modern Zionism, the great Theodore Herzl. "If you will it," Herzl said, "it is no legend."

Having been to Israel twice, I am always impressed by the determination of the people of Israel. In my first trip in a helicopter it was only a matter of minutes that we went from the Golan Heights to the Negev Desert. And standing in the hills outside of Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, you could see the whole country of Israel spread out before you. Ladies and gentlemen, our strategic ally, Israel, will survive and we will work to bring peace to that country. Thank you very much, and God bless you.
(END TEXT)

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