

8

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מ.מ.מ.מ.

זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה
 תת זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמועון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית.
 סימול מקורי: 3 תקופת החומר: 7/1991-7/1991
 מזהה פיזי: א - 2 / 5026
 25/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמועון פרס ויצחק
5026 / 2 - א
 מזהה פיזי: 43.4/13 - 813 מס פריט: 2171848
 מזהה לוגי: 02-111-02-05-06 כתובת: 25/11/2012

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

אאא, חוזם: 28903

אל: רהמש/1522

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 510, תא: 280791, זח: 2209, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר

תאריך: 28 יולי 1991

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תהליך השלום

להלן מדברי הנשיא בוש, כפי שקיבלנו מעתונאי:

PRESIDENT BUSH, WHILE ON A GOLF OUTING PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR A U.S. - SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING, INDICATED TO REPORTERS THAT U.S. OFFICIALS WERE ENCOURAGED BY ARENS' COMMENTS ON ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE YET FROM PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR. "IT'S IN THEIR INTEREST TO GO TO THIS CONFERENCE AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER PARTIES AND IN THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE," BUSH SAID. "SO I'M JUST HOPEFUL THE RESPONSE WILL BE POSITIVE."

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 28244
אל: רהמש/1510
מ-: המשרד, תא: 280791, זח: 1149, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
113699

סודי/מידי

אל: וושינגטון
שגריר, ציר, שטיין

(א) התקשרתי עם בראון להביע דאגתנו ותדהמתנו נוכח הצהרות שה'ח סוריה
עא לפיהן הבטיח הנשיא בוש לנשיא סוריה אסאד שארה'ב תיאלץ ישראל לסגת
מהשטחים. ציינתי שהדברים נוגדים בתכלית את אשר אמר המזכיר לשה'ח בביקורו
האחרון בישראל ושהצהרות כאלו מעיבות על המאמצים לקידום התהליך המדיני.

(ב) כעבור זמן התקשר בראון למסור שהדיווחים בקשר להצהרות שה'ח סוריה
שרעא אינם נכונים. עמדת ארה'ב היא זו שבוטאה ע'י המזכיר בביקורו בישראל
ואין יסוד לטענה שהנשיא בוש נתן הבטחות לנשיא אסאד שארה'ב תפעל לאלץ
ישראל לסגת מהשטחים בהתאם להחלטת מועבי'ט 242.

(ג) בראון ראה להעיר שמן הדין שתחדל הריטוריקה ההדדית כיוון שגם בישראל
מושמעות הצהרות שאין בהן כדי לסייע לפתיחת המו'מ.

(ד) בראון אמר כי ארה'ב צופה שישראל תשיב חיובית להצעות הנשיא לרוה'מ.
המזכיר ממתין לתשובות ישראל מאז יוני ולא מקובלת עליו הנוסחה שהצדדים
ימתינו לתשובה עד השלמת ההכהרות. אמרתי לבראון שהוא יודע היטב שהעיכוב
העיקרי במתן התשובה קשור בהיעדר קבלת ההכהרות כפי שסוכם עם המזכיר בנושא
משלחת הירדנית-פלשתינאית ובהפכפכות עמדת הנציגים הפלשתינאים אשר באים
בתביעות הנוגדות תיאור עמדתם כפי שהוצגה לישראל ע'י המזכיר שוב ושוב.

בנצור

28 ביולי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

1/3

שמור/מייד

1024

אל: סמנכ"ל כלכלה
דע: מצפ"א

עמדת בוש בסוגיית חרם ערבי - התנחלויות

1. רצ"ב תשובת הנשיא בוש לחבר הקונגרס שומר אשר יחד עם 28 חברי קונגרס פנו לנשיא בנושא החרם הערבי ערב פסגת ה- 7 - G.

2. בתשובתו חוזר הנשיא ומבהיר תמיכת ארה"ב בקונצנזוס שהושג בפסגה לפיו הסיכוי הטוב ביותר לסיום החרם הוא ע"י סיום מקביל של פעילות ההתנחלות הישראלית.

3. כהישג בעל חשיבות מיוחד רואה הנשיא כעובדה שמספר מדינות ערביות אמצו את הלינקאז לעיל. גישה חדשה זו מצד מדינות ערב יחד עם הסכמת סוריה לאמץ עמדת הממשל בנושא הועידה פירושה לדברי הנשיא שאנו נצבים בפתחה של תקופה חדשה ביחסי ישראל עם שכנותיה.

4. הנשיא מסיים מכתבו בבקשת תמיכתם של אותם אלה המעוניינים בטובת ישראל במאמץ לעודד CONFIDENCE BUILDING בין ישראל לשכנותיה ע"י השעיית החרם וההתנחלויות. עד כאן נקודות ממכתב הנשיא.

פרשנות מיותרת.
המכתב העבר לידיעתנו ע"י ג'ס הורדס לידיעתנו. ביקש כי המכתב לא ימצא דרכו לעתונות. אנא.

שטיין

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name "שטיין" and various numbers and symbols.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1991

Dear Charles:

I was pleased to receive the letter that you and 28 of your colleagues sent me regarding the Arab boycott of Israel. I wholeheartedly agree with you that the elimination of the boycott is highly desirable. We have been determined in making this case with the Arab states. On his trips to the region, Secretary Baker repeatedly has told the Arab governments that they should end the boycott.

Consistent with this commitment and your letter, we took the lead in raising this issue at the recent G-7 Summit in London. What emerged was a consensus that the best chance to bring about an end to the boycott was to be found in a simultaneous end to Israeli settlement activity. This is not meant to equate the two, although we are on record opposing each, but simply to reflect a widely-shared political judgment. The summit political declaration thus called upon Israel and its Arab neighbors to adopt reciprocal and balanced confidence-building measures, and urged the Arabs to suspend the boycott and Israel to suspend building settlements in the occupied territories.

I have been very pleased, as I am sure you and your colleagues are, by the response we have seen in the Arab world. Egyptian President Mubarak publicly called for suspension of the boycott after his meeting with Secretary Baker. Saudi Arabia announced officially on 20 July that it supports Egypt's call for suspension of the boycott

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
and suspension of settlement activity. Since then a number of other Arab governments, including Jordan, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, have done the same.

In my view, this is an extremely significant accomplishment. Arab willingness to suspend the boycott is a potential turning point in the region's history. The boycott represents the symbol and substance of Arab rejection and isolation of Israel; a readiness to drop it constitutes a readiness to accept and deal with Israel.

This new attitude, along with Secretary Baker's progress in his recent mission to the region following Syria's acceptance of our proposal for a peace conference, suggests that we stand on the threshold of a new era in Israel's relations with its neighbors. Successive American administrations have argued that Israeli settlements constitute an obstacle to peace; recent Arab statements indicating a willingness to suspend the economic boycott if Israel suspends settlement activity underscore this reality.

In short, I believe we have made meaningful progress toward the objective we share. Now is the time for all concerned with Israel's well being and peace in the Middle East to support our efforts to encourage mutual confidence building between Israel and its neighbors by suspending both the boycott and settlement activity.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Charles E. Schumer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

אאא, חוזם: 28014

אל: רהמש/1485

מ-: ווש, נר: 2106, תא: 260791, זח: 2030, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי--למכותבים בלבד

א ל: סמנכל צפא-למכותב בלבד

ד ע: לש'רוה'מ-למכותב בלבד

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

תהליך השלום

להלן נקודות שעלו בשיחות (26.7) עם שני מקורות ממשליים המעורבים בתהליך:

א. אנשי שיחי חזרו פעם נוספת והבהירו החשיבות במתן תשובה ישראלית חיובית לגישה הכללית קרי תשובה בנושא מעמד האו"מ כינוסה מחדש של הועידה והקריטריונים הכלליים לגבי הייצוג הפלסטיני (משלחת משותפת שעליה ימנו פלסטינים מהשטחים המקבלים את הגישה הדו-שלבית מו'מ בשלבים ומוכנים לחיות בשלום עם ישראל).

ב. אחד מאנשי שיחי הציע שרוה'מ יתקשר לנשיא ויודיע לו על הסכמתנו לגישה ורצוננו להכנס לדיון בפרטים.

ג. בהתייחסו להתבטאויות ישראליות לפיהן תשובה ישראלית לא תינתן לפני קבלת רשימת חברי המשלחת הפלסטינית ציין אחד מאנשי שיחי כי נושא ההרכב לא יפתר בימים הקרובים. להערכתו המדובר בתהליך שימשך מספר שבועות.

ד. בהקשר זה השיחות שקיימו נציגי אש"פ בעמאן ודמשק. לדבריו שיחות אלו נועדו להכשיר את הקרקע לשיחות המלך עם נציגי השטחים הממתינים לסיגנל מאש"פ. בתשובה לשאלה ציין כי למרות שאסאד נתן הסכמתו לגישה האמריקאית המלך חוסיין זקוק גם להסכמת ערפאת. להערכתו ימשיך המלך להיות החוליה החלשה.

ה. אשר לצפוי בפסגת בוש-גורבצ'וב אחד מאנשי שיחי לא הוציא מכלל אפשרות שנופתע לטובה. בהקשר זה התייחס לאפשרות שבריה'מ תודיע על נרמול מלא של היחסים ו/או הסכמתה לפעול במשותף עם ארה"ב לביטול החלטה 3379. הוסיף בהקשר זה כי כוונת הממשל ליצור סביבה חיובית מבחינת ישראל ולהקנות לנו התחושה שאינם מנסים לבודד אותנו.

ו. המקור האחר לא הוציא מכלל אפשרות הפתעות בפסגה בהקשר להזמנות. לדבריו הכינו למזכיר מספר אופציות בנושא.

ז. הוסיף כי אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות ביקור המזכיר אחרי הפסגה גם אם שני הנשיאים לא ישגרו הזמנות לוועידה. המקור סבור כי השעיית מתן תשובה חיובית לגישה מגבירה את הלחץ על הנשיא

לשגר הזמנות עובדה שתעמיד אותנו במצב קשה.

ו. לשאלתי בנושא שיחות שה'ח צרפת-חוסייני טען איש שיחי כי הבהירו לצרפתים שהמפתח לתהליך זה נטרול אש'פ. לדבריו בקשו מהצרפתים לסייע במשימה זו. לדבריו לא בקשו מהצרפתים בקשות ספציפיות בהקשר לביקור חוסייני. בתשובה להערה על כך שתמיכת צרפת בעמדת הפלסטינים בנושא מז' י-מ אינה מסייעת טען שכוונת צרפת היא להרגיע את הפלסטינים לאחר שכל בקשותיהם נדחו. איש שיחי הסכים שתמיכה בנושא מז' י-מ אינה מסייעת.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סס

אאא, חוזם: 28016

אל: רהמש/1481

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 506, תא: 260791, זח: 2259, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

א ל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמן אובי

1. ב- 25/7 נפגש השגריר עם הקונגרסמן אובי. נכחה הח"מ.

א. השגריר עדכן את אובי לגבי ביקורו האחרון של המזכיר בייקר בארץ וציין כי השיחות והאווירה היו טובים. יתכן, שבעקבות המכתב הסורי יש עתה סיכוי לפתיחת התהליך. השגריר ציין שלא ראינו המכתב עצמו ונאלצנו לקבל הדיווח האמריקאי לגבי תוכנו. התייחס כללית לידוע לנו על המכתב הסורי והוסיף כי ארה"ב הבהירה לאסד כי מה שמחייב אותה הוא תוכן מכתב הנשיא בוש לסוריה. הבעייה העיקרית העומדת על הפרק היא הרכב המשלחת הפלסטינית. בקרב הפלסטינים קיימים חילוקי דעות רציניים. התייחס לאלימות הימים האחרונים ("רצח הרופא מג'נין וחיסולים נוספים) שמקורה ככל הנראה במאבק פנימי האם להצטרף לתהליך השלום ומי יצטרף לתהליך. עם זאת, התחושה כרגע היא כי ישנם סיכויים טובים. אם אכן יפתח התהליך, ניתן יהיה לצפות לוועידה בחודש אוקטובר. מניח שנמסור תשובתנו בשבועות הקרובים.

ב. השגריר עדכן את אובי גם בתחום הכלכלי. ממישראל קיבלה ביום א' האחרון החלטה להפרטת רוב החברות הממשלתיות. להחלטה תהיה השפעה על הכלכלה כולה. תכוונה לכלכלת שוק אשר תקל על יצירת מקומות עבודה וקליטת עלייה. בהקשר זה השגריר עדכן את אובי לגבי קליטת העולים במשק.

3. אובי התייחס, במהלך כל הפגישה לתהליך המדיני (והתעלם מההיבט הכלכלי, ערביות והתנחלויות). הביע סקפטיות ופסימיות במהלך כל הפגישה. לדבריו, יהיה מופתע אם תתקיים ועידה ואחריה השיחות הישירות. אמר כי הוא חושד בצדדים כי לא ימצאו מספיק סיבות ותמריצים להניע התהליך.

אינו רואה INNOVATIVE PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES. עוקב ומעורב מאז 1973 בתהליך. שמע כבר כ"כ הרבה מכל הצדדים ואולם תמיד עולים תירוצים של הרגע האחרון המכשילים את התהליך.

השגריר ניסה לשכנע את אובי להיות אופטימי יותר והצביע על התפתחויות שחלו במזה"ת (שלום עם מצרים וכו') אולם אובי נשאר סקפטי ועמד על שלו. השגריר ציין כי הדבר שמדאיג את ישראל הוא העובדה שאסד אינו סאדאת. האחרון פעל לריסון צבאו והורדת כמות תקציבו, ואילו אסד ממשיך להתחמש (צ'כוסלובקיה, סין צפון קוריאה).

למרות זאת, יש לקוות לפתיחת התהליך. רוה"מ מאמין שישנו סיכוי ואינו מעוניין לכולמו. אין להוציא סיכוי זה מכלל אפשרות. אולם, אם התהליך לא יזוז הרי שלא יהיה מופתע. מאידך, אם יפתח התהליך יהיה מופתע מאד.

הוסיף שאם מזכיר המדינה
 CANNOT PUT IT TOGETHER, IT WILL BE A LONG TRIP.
 עצתו לבייקר תהיה לכנס ועידה (להוציא הזמנות) ללא קשר עם עמדות הצדדים.
 אותן בעיות שהכשילו את היוזמה אשתקד מועלות גם עתה.
 אינו מאמין שלא ניתן לישוב חילוקי דעות אלה. חזר על כך שיהיה סקפטי עד
 שלא יראה התכנסות הועידה. מסכים עם השגריר שחל שינוי אולם יש לנצלו.
 "אם הייתי במקום ישראל לא הייתי מוותר על אינצ' אחד של טריטוריה עד אשר
 לא הייתי מקבל IRON CLAD RECOGNITION ACROSS THE BOARD.
 עם זאת, היה לי בוודאי מספיק דמיון מה עומד מאחורי הדלת לפני שאני סוגר
 אותה. יש לנו (לארה"ב) הזכות לצפות מכל הצדדים
 TO ACTUAL PERFORMANCE TO SIT DOWN AND TRY
 איני יכול לחשוב על שום סיבה היכולה להחיות מחדש (REVIVE) את ערפת יותר
 מאשר סירובה של ישראל לתהליך. השגריר סיכם באומרו כי ממישראל הלכה עד כה
 כברת דרך ארוכה. תחושתו שישראל תעשה הכל כדי לנסות לפתוח בתהליך. לפנינו
 משימה הסטורית של קליטת כמליון יהודים בשנים הקרובות וננסה לנצל כל
 סיכוי.

4. יצויין שלפני הפגישה סיפר לי הקונגרסמן לארי סמית על פגישה אישית קשה
 נעימה, שקיים עם אובי יום לפני כן. אובי ביקר קשות את שני הצדדים
 במזה"ת. חוסר ההתקדמות בתהליך והתנחלויות ואמר כי אינו יודע כיצד יפעל
 בנושא הערבויות, בין השאר בגלל לחץ בוחריו.
 לדברי סמית היה אובי, אמוציונלי ובלתי רציונלי לחלוטין. ביקש שאם נפגוש
 את אובי ננסה להרגיעו.
 במהלך שיחת השגריר (שידע כבר על השיחה עם סמית) אם אובי, שנמשכה כ- 45
 דקות, לא התייחס אובי לנושא ההתנחלויות וגם לא לנושא הערבויות.
 אובי היה כאמור סקפטי ופסימי ביותר אולם לא התבטא בדרכו "הציורית". נדמה
 שלקראת סוף הפגישה היה אובי נינוח יותר וסוכם שהשגריר ימשיך לעדכנו.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
 אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, רביב, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 28013

אל: רהמש/1486

מ-: ווש, נר: 2107, תא: 260791, זח: 2015, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי/מידי למכותבים בלבד

א ל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א-למכותב בלבד

ד ע: לש' רוה'מ-למכותב בלבד

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

תהליך השלום ונושא הערביות.

במהלך שיחת נציגי המועצה הלאומית למען יהודי בריה'מ עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי סקורופט התייחס קצרות לשני הנושאים לעיל.

2. לאחר שנציגי המועצה הביעו תקווה שהמימשל יתמוך בערביות ציין סקורופט קיומן של שתי בעיות: בעיה תקציבית (לא פירט) ורצון המימשל להעניק הערביות בדרך שלא תפגע בתהליך השלום. בתגובה להערה על-כך שהמדובר בנושא הומניטרי (קרי סיוע לקליטת עולימ) הביע סקורופט תיקווה שישראל מבינה שהנושא הומניטרי ולא פוליטי.

3. בקשר לתהליך ציין סקורופט כי ממתינים לתשובת ממ' ישראל. לדבריו מנסה המימשל לעשות צעד ראשון שיביא ליצירת דינמיקה. אשר לשילוב בריה'מ ציין כי היתה קואופרטיבית (לא פירט). הוסיף כי היא מביאה אתה ASSETS והשפעה שאין לארה'ב. עד כאן דברי סקורופט.

4. בהמתנה לקראת השיחה שוחחו קצרות עם פקיד בכיר במועצה לבטחון לאומי נבי האפשרות שגורבצ'וב ובוש ישגרו הזמנות עוד לפני קבלת תשובתנו. הפקיד טען שזו אופציה שנבחנת. יחד עם זאת הוסיף כי להערכתו לא תשוגרנה הזמנות (במידה ותשובתנו לא תגיע עד לכינוס הפסגה). לדבריו הנושא יבחן לאחר הפסגה. במידה והדברים לא יובהרו קרי אם ירגישו שתכלית הדחיה (במתן תשובה) הינה דרך לעקב התהליך כי אז מעריך שיוחלט על הוצאת הזמנות. רושם של איש שיחי (שהשתתף בשיחה) היא שבהעדר תשובה ישראלית לא תשוגר הזמנה בפסגה. עד כאן.

לבקשת איש שיחי שמרו נא על חסיון המידע.

אנא.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27351
אל: רהמש/1433
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 487, תא: 250791, זח: 2033, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמ"ס / מידי

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת
דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת
מאת: עתונות, ווש'

רמה"ג

ראו נא הודעה שמסר דובר הבית הלבן הערב לעתונאים בתשובה לשאלות בעקבות הפרסום ברויטרס.

STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE CONCERNING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS:

"FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS PHASE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES THAT THERE WILL BE NO ASSURANCES, SECRET OR OTHERWISE, THAT ARE MADE TO ONE PARTY AND NOT KNOWN TO OTHER. IN THIS REGARD EACH PARTY HAS BEEN FULLY BRIEFED ON WHAT THE OTHER HAS BEEN TOLD. U.S. NON RECOGNITION OF ISRAELIES EXTENTIOBN OF ITS LAW TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS WELL KNOWN. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE AND HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ONLY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS CAN DETERMINE THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES."

עתונות

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, סשהח, מנכל, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

12.8.90
מס' 9000
מס' 9000
מס' 9000
מס' 9000

אאא, חוזם: 27352

אל: רהמש/1443

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 486, תא: 250791, זח: 2032, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

דע: נספח צבאי, לשכת שהב"ט, מקש"ח

מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס

הנדון: קידום תחיקות ה- STUDIES לעבוי השת"פ (חק חקציב הפנטגון הקצבות, 1977)

להלן נקודות משיחה שניהלו שני "הקטרים" המרכזיים ב"גבעה", הפועלים לממוש התחיקה, עם האחראים על הנושא בפנטגון:

א. לאחר חודשי התלבטות, עלה הפנטגון על מסלול כוונות זהה לזה של הוגי התחיקה בסנאט. הכוונה היא למסד את ממצאי ה- STUDIES - מבחינה מקצועית, תעשייתית, תקציבית ותחקית - לטווח הארוך. המדובר ב- SUSTAINED EFFORT.

ב. תחושת ה"קטרים" היא כי שנוי הגישה בפנטגון מבוסס על הערכה מחודשת וחיובית של הפוטנציאל הישראלי מחד, ועל היענות לאיתותי הסנאט מאידך.

ג. האחראים על יישום התחיקות בפנטגון נתקלים בקולגות שלהם הטוענים כי "המלך הישראלי הוא ערום, לכל היותר הוא עטוי בגדים שגרתיים, וודאי שלא לבוש במילה האחרונה באופנה".

ד. על ישראל רובצת אחריות כבדה בנתיב לקצירת פירות התחיקה. על ישראל להפריך זלזול המקטרגים ולהצדיק התלהבות (כך מתארים "הקטרים" את התיחסות האחראים על הנושא בפנטגון) המצדדים.

ה. על ישראל להפגין התלהבות, נחישות ומעורבות לפחות כמו המופקדים על המשימה בפנטגון וכמו אבות הרעיון בסנאט.

ו. לממוש הפוטנציאל המו"פי, התעשייתי, התקציבי, המבצעי והתחקי ארוך הטווח, יש להתגייס למאמץ במסגרת לו"ז דחוס (שעון החול של הפרק הנוכחי אוזל תוך מס' שבועות!).

ז. לממוש הפוטנציאל היבט פוליטי מרחיק לכת. הגשת הממצאים ותרגומם לתחיקות ופעילות נוספים, יתרמו ליצירת אקלים חיובי אשר יצמצם נזקי מתיחות אפשרית בהקשר תהליך השלום, יקדם הסיכוי לגישה חיובית כלפי "תחיקות ישראליות" אחרות, ויקטין הנזק הפוטנציאלי מתדמית ה"פרופיל הנמוך" המפורשות לעתים כ"רלונטיות נמוכה".

ח. תרגום הממצאים לתחיקות ופעילות נוספים אינו מובטח. ציפיות האחראים בפנטגון והיוזמים בסנאט הן כי ישראל תנפיק ממצאים ברמה ובהיקף המתאימים. הם מודעים למגבלות הסווג, מכבדים אותן אך מבהירים כי קיים קשר הדוק בין רמת הנכונות לחשוף ולהפשיר לבין רמת הפירות שתקצור ישראל מן ה-STUDIES.

ט. ה"קטרים" חוזרים ומזכירים, בעקבות המפגש עם המופקדים על הנושא בפנטגון, כי אין הם מיחלים לחוברות פרסום של התעשיות, אלא לרמה, תוכן והיקף שונים. אין הם מצפים לכרכים ותיקים עבים אלא לחומר ענייני ומתומצת הערוך בשפה ובצורה "פנטגונים", אשר יקלו על העכול מבלי שתהייה סטיה בתרגום ובממוש.

יורם אטינגר

תכונה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, @ (שהבט),
@ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27207
אל: רהמש/1417
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 466, תא: 250791, זח: 1534, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש בכנס נוצרים אורתודוכסים

להלן הקטעים הרלוונטים לעניננו, מתוך נאום הנשיא בוש:-

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO THE ANTIOCHIAN ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN
ARCHDIOCESE CONVENTION, CRYSTAL GATEWAY MARRIOTT HOTEL
THURSDAY, JULY 25, 1991

NOWHERE ARE THE CHOICES MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF
AND THE MIDDLE EAST. MANY OF YOU CAME TO THIS COUNTRY FROM THAT
REGION, LEAVING FRIENDS AND FAMILIES, LEAVING A PART OF YOURSELVES
BEHIND. FOR YOU, THE SUFFERING AND TURMOIL IN THAT PART OF THE
WORLD IS NOT SIMPLY POLITICAL, BUT PERSONAL. YOU FEEL IT DEEPLY IN
YOUR HEARTS. AND I CANNOT SHARE YOUR PRIVATE ANGUISH, BUT I CAN SAY
FROM MY HEART IT PAINS ME DEEPLY TO SEE THE MIDDLE EAST, SACRED
GROUND OF THREE GREAT FAITHS, RIVEN BY HATRED AND CONFLICT.

IN IRAQ, WE CONFRONTED A COUNTRY UNDER THE RULE OF A MAN OF
BRUTAL MEANS AND, IN MY VIEW, UNMITIGATED EVIL, A MAN WHO MADE WAR
ON HIS OWN PEOPLE, MENACED HIS NEIGHBOR, AND THREATENED THE WORLD'S
PEACE. I BELIEVED THEN AND I BELIEVE NOW THAT WHAT WE AND OUR
COALITION PARTNERS DID TO STAND UP AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
AGGRESSION WAS RIGHT; IT WAS JUST; IT WAS MORAL -- (APPLAUSE) -- AND
WE DID THE RIGHT THING.

AND WHO CAN DOUBT THIS NOW, KNOWING AS WE DO JUST HOW CLOSE
SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS TO POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MEANS TO
DELIVER THEM AGAINST DEFENSELESS MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN. WE
FOUGHT NOT FOR A NARROW INTEREST, BUT FOR A NOBLE IDEAL. AND WE
FOUGHT TO LIBERATE A NATION, TO DEFEAT AN AGGRESSOR WHO BROUGHT
MISERY, WHO BRINGS IT STILL, TO MANY MILLIONS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE.

AND I'VE SAID OVER AND OVER AGAIN, AND I'LL REPEAT IT HERE TODAY, WE HAVE NO QUARREL AT ALL, NONE, WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, BUT IRAQ WILL NOT REALIZE ITS POTENTIAL AS LONG -- AS A NATION, REJOINING THE FAMILY OF NATIONS, SO LONG AS SADDAM HUSSEIN STAYS IN POWER. (APPLAUSE.)

AT EVERY POINT DURING THE GULF CONFLICT, I HELD OUT HOPE THAT OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR MIGHT COME NEW PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, AND THAT HOPE IS EVEN STRONGER NOW.

IN LEBANON, WE SEE THE FIRST TANGIBLE SIGNS OF POLITICAL PROGRESS, OF DOMESTIC RECONCILIATION AND RESTORED ORDER AFTER A DECADE AND A HALF OF NIGHTMARISH CIVIL WAR. AND THANKS TO THE TAIF ACCORDS, A TRULY SOVEREIGN LEBANON, ONE FREE OF ALL ARMED MILITIAS AND FOREIGN FORCES IS NO LONGER JUST A DREAM.

JUST LAST WEEK SECRETARY JIM BAKER UNDERTOOK HIS FIFTH MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST, FIFTH, SINCE THE GULF WAR. HIS PURPOSE, TO BRING ABOUT A PEACE CONFERENCE DESIGNED TO LAUNCH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, BUILDING ON THE POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM SYRIA, WE GAINED THE AGREEMENT -- (APPLAUSE) -- WE GAINED THE AGREEMENT OF EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON AND THE SIX STATE GULF COOPERATIVE COUNCIL, THE GCC TO ATTEND A PEACE CONFERENCE WITH ISRAEL. AS A RESULT, WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN NOW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE STUDYING OUR PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL RESPOND FAVORABLE TO THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY.

I KNOW THE PALESTINIANS ARE CLOSELY EXAMINING THEIR CHOICES, AND HERE TOO, I WOULD ASK ONLY THAT THEY DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION TO ATTAIN THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND AT THE SAME TIME FURTHER THE CAUSE OF PEACE. (APPLAUSE)

AND AS YOU ALSO KNOW, YOU ALL KNOW, WE ALSO HAVE THE PUBLIC COMMITMENT OF SEVERAL ARAB STATES INCLUDING EGYPT, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, TO SUSPEND THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL IF ISRAEL SUSPEND SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (APPLAUSE)

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS IN LEBANON, OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS A PEACE THAT IS FAIR TO ALL PARTIES, A PEACE THAT PROMOTES THE SECURITY OF OUR FRIENDS AND TRUE STABILITY IN THE ENTIRE REGION. AND AT THE SAME TIME, ALL OF US MUST UNDERSTAND THE CHALLENGES TO COME AND THE LIMITS TO WHAT WE CAN DO. NO ONE; NOT THIS PRESIDENT, NOT THE UNITED STATES, NOT THE USSR OR THE UN OR OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, NO ONE CAN IMPOSE A SOLUTION THAT THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST DO NOT WELCOME AND CANNOT LIVE WITH. BUT THE DIFFICULTIES MUST NEVER STAND IN OUR WAY. WE CAN AND WILL BE CATALYSTS FOR PEACE. THAT IS THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

AND JUST AS THE CHRISTIANS OF ANTIOCH LED BY EXAMPLE, SO TOO, WE WHO WOULD ASK OTHERS TO FOLLOW MUST BEGIN BY ASKING MORE OF OURSELVES. AS PAUL WROTE TO THE ROMANS, "LET US THEREFORE FOLLOW

AFTER THE THINGS WHICH MAKE FOR PEACE."

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעח, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), כנסיות

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 27353
אל: רהמש/1438
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 488, תא: 250791, זח: 2103, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

דע: נספח צבאי, לשכת שהב"ט, מקש"ח
מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס

הנדון: הסנטור אינוייה - בקור בישראל

1. הסנטור מבקש - כפוף למגבלות סיווג - להיות נוכח בהצגת תכלית של מערכות נשק מתקדמות אשר לא נחשפו בפניו בבקוריו הקודמים.

2. הסנטור מבקש לקבל תדרוך מפי הרמטכ"ל על המז"ת, האיום והיתרון האיכותי בעקבות "סופת המדבר".

3. בנושאים אחרים מבקש הסנטור:

- האם יוכל שר האוצר להזמין את ג'ים בונד (ישהה בדירתו של דן הלפרין) לארוחת הערב המתוכננת?

- האם אפשר לזמן את ג'ים בונד למפגשים אחרים אשר יטפלו בנושא הערכויות להלוואות?

- האם אפשר לארגן הבקור במרכז קליטה באמצעות ניל כץ מה"סוכנות"?

האם אפשר לקיים אחד המפגשים המתוכננים (ארוחת ערב?) בבית זיבנברג (הסנטור שמע על המקום מעוזריו ריצ'רד קולינס ורנדי פישביין)?

תודה,

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, רביב, מאור, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

אאא, חוזם: 25913

אל: רהמש/1361

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 451, תא: 240791, זח: 1851, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור / מידי

אל: נתיב / ברטוב, פרנקל

דע: מצפ"א, ניו-יורק / שנהר

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון / י. שירן

1. יחד עם שמואל שנהר, נפגשתי אתמול עם שיפטר כדי להיפרד ממנו ולהפגיש
תו עם שמואל. השיחה על קליטת עולי ברה"מ גלשה לנושאים מזא"תיים ושיפטר
כפי שעשה בעבר הטיף לנו בנושא ההתנחלויות. אמר שכל מה שישראל תמיד רצתה
וצריכה - שלום, עליה, כלכלה משגשגת (שלדעתו תתפתח אם יבוטל החרם הערבי)
- הינו WITHIN REACH כיום, אבל עמדתה בעניין ההתנחלויות מונעת מלהשיגם.
אמר שיהיה קשה מאד לקבל הערבויות לעשרה ביליון כל עוד אין שינוי בענין
ההתנחלויות. הוסיף שמלחמת המפרץ הוכיחה שהשטחים אינם זקוקים לבטחון;
הבעיה כיום היא טילים סוריים ועלינו לחשוב איך לצמצם את סיכון שימושם
נגדנו.

2. לגבי עמדת האמריקאים על ירושלים, הפריד בין התבטאויות בוש בנושא
והתבטאויות בייקר, תוך כדי התייחסות לעובדה שהניירות מוכנים לבוש על ידי
ריצ'ארד האס "שלא מבין את הנושא" ואילו ניירותיו של בייקר מוכנים על ידי
דניס רוס, ש"כן מבין".

י. שירן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, @ (נתיב)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 25887
אל: רהמש/1358
מ-: ניויורק, נר: 574, תא: 240791, זח: 1734, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבכ
22235
שמור/מידי
102.01

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א
לשכת שה'ח
מנהל מצפ'א
מנהל הסברה
יועץ תפוצות
מנהל תפוצות

ז'ע: השגריר - וושינגטון

מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

הנדון: ערכויות - הערכת מצב

אתמול התקיימה סידרה של פגישות של קבוצות העבודה בנושא. על התכניות האופרטביות אין טעם לדווח.
חשוב שתדעו שהקהילה התגייסה לעניין בכושר ארגון וביצוע יוצאים מן הכלל, ובהתלהבות מרשימה הן בשטח והן במרכז. אשר להערכת מצב אשר שמעתי מקרדין, הונליין, נציגת אייפק (רוטשטיין) ומס' חברי קונגרס יהודיים מאיזור ניו יורק - אין ספק שלמרות הצהרות הנשיא שאין LINKAGE בין הערכויות לבין הנושאים המדיניים, קיים קשר סמוי שהוא ברור לכל חבר קונגרס. תהליך השלום יכנס הועידה הם כיום אולי בראש סדר עדיפויות של מדיניות החוץ של מימשל, וודאי מבחינת היכולת להוכיח הישג, אשר ישלים את ההישג הצבאי במפרץ.
ההישג גם ינפץ את הביקורת הדימוקרטית הגורסת שהנשיא ניצח במלחמה והפסיד בשלום. כמו כן רווחת במימשל הערכה כי המז'ת עלול לגלוש תוך שנים לאזור הנשלט ע'י פונדמנטליזם מחד ונשק לא קונבנציונלי מאידך ומיזוג קטלני זה יש למנוע עתה. על כן המימשל ישחמש בכל דרך הנראית לו סבירה כדי להביא הצדדים לשולחן. בהקשר זה לא יהסס המימשל לעשות שימוש בערכויות ע'י רמזים לגורמים המובילים בקונגרס. נציגת אייפק בוועדת העבודה מדגישה שוב ושוב כי הסנטורים העיקריים עדיין לא הביעו עמדתם בנושא.
באותו הקשר ניתן יהיה לראות גם את נושא ההתנחלויות, אם כי לאור ההתעסקות בוועידה הוא לעת עתה נדחק מעט לשוליים.
נושא LINKAGE נוסף הוא השיטה הכלכלית הנהוגה בארץ - חברי קונגרס רבים מדגישים שירצו להוכיח בעדויות שישראל נעה לעבר משק פרטי יותר. סוכם להזמין בחודש ספטמבר איש עסקים ידוע שיוכל לדבר על כך כגון אלי הורוביץ. אולי תרצו לבוא עמו כבר במגעים ולבדוק באילו תאריכים יהיה כאן בלאו הכי. הנושא הכלכלי עולה בשלב זה ע'י סנטורים ומורשים דווקא מן השורה השניה.

בעייתיות נוספת שהועלתה בפני היא החשש של רבים מן הנבחרים כי בוחריהם יראו קשר בין מתן ערבויות לישראל לבין העדר תקציבים חברתיים בארה"ב. למרות שהמציאות האובייקטיבית ברורה לרוב הנבחרים החרדה היא מפרצפצית הציבור. אחד הסנטורים סיפר בסוף השבוע כי ראה שלט בהפגנה - לנו אין כסף לחינוך - לישראל אתם נותנים 3 ביליון דולרים.

במסע ההסברה חשוב אם כן לקהילה להבליט הגורמים הבאים -

- הדרמה ההומניטרית של הקליטה.

- שותפות הגורל, הערכים והאינטרס בין ישראל וארה"ב בנושא.

- הסברה של מה זה ערבויות והדרך לקעקע בציבור את התפיסה כי הדבר בא על חשבון צרכי האזרח האמריקאי.

- הצד האנושי של הקליטה (גם באמצעות עולים חדשים)

- ישראל עוברת בהדרגה מהפך כלכלי לעבר שוק חופשי.

לסיכומו של דבר המאבק היהודי הוא בתחילת הדרך. ההתפתחויות המדיניות החדשות והצפויות מקלות, אך אינן סותרות את כל הבעיות. הקהילה והארגונים היהודיים פעילים מאוד כדי להוכיח לנבחרים וגם למימשל חשיבות הנושא לציבור היהודי ולבוחר היהודי.

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק
אורי סביר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
הסברה, תפוצות, בן אבו, כהן, כלכליתב', ר/מרכז,
ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 24069
 אל: רהמש/1248
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 230791, זח: 1550, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
 בכבכ
 שמור/מידי

אל כל הנציגויות

הנדון ביקור מזכיר המדינה בייקר ב 21-22.7.91 בישראל

א. בשיחותיו בישראל עם רוהמ, ס/רוהמ ושהח ושהבט עמד מזכיר המדינה על הדברים דלהלן:

ת. תשובת נשיא סוריה אסאד לנשיא ארהב ניתנה ללא התניות. לפיה קיבלה סוריה עמדת הפשרה שהוצעה עי ארהב שבמיפגש השלום האיזורי ישתתף משקיף אום בעל זכות שמיעה בלבד ושהועידה תזומן מעת לעת רק בהסכמתן המלאה של המדינות למומ. המזכיר ציין כי ארהב לא נתנה לסוריה שום הבטחות או בטחונות ולא הגיעה עימה לשום הבנה שבשתיקה לגבי הסוגיות הנוגעות לעתיד רמת-הגולן ומהות השלום.

שתיים. המזכיר אמר כי הולכת ונוצרת הזדמנות בקנה מידה היסטורי למומ ישיר לשלום בין ישראל לשכנותיה, ללא תנאים מוקדמים בהתאם לעיקרי מדיניותה של ישראל (קרי יוזמת ממשלת ישראל ממאי 1989).

שלוש. המזכיר עמד על מאפייני מעמד הפתיחה של המפגש האיזורי לשלום שייארך עד יומיים וכמיועד להניע המומ הישיר הבין מדינתי וכעבור כשבועיים מיפגשים איזוריים (בנושאי מים, אקולוגיה, צמצום מרוץ החימוש ועוד).

ארבע. ארהב מבקשת היענותה של ישראל להשתתף במפגש למומ ישיר לשלום. רק עם לת תשובת ישראל ייערכו השושבינים לשיגור מכתבי ההזמנה.

ב. ממשלת ישראל תדון ותחליט בסוגיית משקיף האום וזימון הועידה מחדש בהסכמת הצדדים אך קודם לכן מתבקשות הבהרות בסוגיות הבאות:

אחת. האם סוריה אכן חותרת להסכם שלום מלא עם ישראל והאם תיטול חלק גם במיפגשים האיזוריים בהם יידונו בין השאר גם נושא צמצום מרוץ החימוש.

שתיים. האם המשלחת הירדנית-פלשתינאית כוללת נציגים פלשתינאים מיוש ועזה שאינם חברי אשף ושאינם טוענים ליצגו בשום צורה ודרך, המקבלים את עקרון הדו-מסלוליות, את המומ הדו-שלבי והמוכנים לחיות בשלום עם ישראל.

שלוש. ישראל תבקש להבטיח שהמיפגש האיזורי לשלום ייצור את התנאים למומ ישיר בין ישראל לשכנותיה ללא תנאים מוקדמים ובלא שתונח עליו חרב של אילוצי זמן. ישראל מצפה שארהב-וכל גורם המעורב בהכנות וסיוע לתהליך-ינהג כמתווך הוגן (HONEST BROKER) העושה לצמצום הפערים במובן של אי-נקיטת עמדה במהלך המומ לגבי פרוש החלטות מועביט 242 ו338 סוגיית

הגבולות ומהות ההסדר הסופי.

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, סמנכל, ממד, @ (רם),
אמן, אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ,
אמלט, מזתים, ארבל2, איר1, איר2, מזאר, כלכליתב',
כלכליתא', כלכליתג', מעת, הסברה

טס

אאא, חוזם: 24628

אל: רהמש/1297

מ-: לוסאנגלס, נר: 136, תא: 230791, זח: 1330, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפא

דע: לשכת רוה'מ

לשכת שר החוץ

לשכת השגריר

סמנכ'ל צפא

מאת: קונכ'ל לוס אנגלס

הנדון: דווח

1. בשיחה עם גיל גלייזר ביוזמתו ספר שזה עתה חזר מפגישות נפרדות בושינגטון עם הנרי קיסינג'ר ועם ברנט סקורופט. לדבריו קיסינג'ר מאד מעודכן ומתמצא בבעיותינו ונשמע תומך ורואיסט. לטענתו, קיסינג'ר יהיה מוכן ליעץ ולתרום מנסיונו כי רב בתהליך המו'מ המורכב שמתקרב. בקשני להעביר זאת לידיעתכם ולשקולכם כיצד לנצלו, אם בכלל.

2. בנוסף, ספר מר גלייזר, הידוע בקשריו הטובים וההדוקים עם הממשל ועם אנשי מפתח אמריקאים בתחומים רבים, שלקיסינג'ר השפעה רבה ויחסים קרובים עם חלק ניכר מהסובבים את הנשיא בוש ובעיקר עם גנרל סקורופט.

3. מצאתי לנכון להעביר מידע זה לידיעתכם.

רן רונן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23867
אל: רהמש/1245
מ-: המשרד, תא: 230791, זח: 1425, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בכב
60559
שמור/
10602

אל: לשכת ראש הממשלה
לידי יצחק אורן

הנדון: בקור הסנטור אינווה בישראל
רהמשך לשיחתנו מיום 23 ביולי

בתאריכים 11-14 באוגוסט יבקר בישראל הסנטור אינווה.

הסנטור הינו דמוקרט מהוואי ומכהן כיו"ר תת ועדת ההקצבות לעניני הגנה בסנאט, המשמש גם כחוד החנית בנושאי שת"פ, סיוע חוץ וערכויות להלוואות. מטרת בקורו הינה להתעדכן בנושאי עליה, קליטה, כלכלה ובטחון, תוך התמקדות בנושא הערכויות.

הסנטור מעונין להפגש עם ראש הממשלה לארוחת ערב בתאריך 14 באוגוסט. אפשרות אחרת היא לארוחת צהריים באותו היום או ב-13 באוגוסט.

לצורך תאום, מטפלת בבקור מטעם מצפ"א: אלונה קם
טלפון 303564

קורות חיים נשלחים בנפרד.

מצפ"א ומאו"ר

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס

ACTIVITIES UPDATE

ADVOCATES OF LINKAGE

*Recent Statements Advocating Linkage Between U.S. Aid or Loan Guarantees
and Israeli Settlements or Peace Process Policy*

July 23, 1991

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CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES

EDITOR, FOREIGN POLICY

"...Israel should be pressed to reaffirm its support for UN Resolution 242...and to **suspend all new settlements...**as well as all deportations of West Bank inhabitants. In the event the Israeli government is unwilling to make this commitment, **the United States should suspend its agreement to help finance the settlement costs for Soviet emigrants to Israel...**"
[Foreign Policy Magazine, Spring 1991]

GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

"...It is 'high noon,' time for George Bush to use the kind of power he used from August to March: **no settlement aid for the Israelis if they continue to lie to us...**would simply remind the world where power is, and who it is that really needs whom..."
[Washington Times, May 20, 1991]

HELENA COBBAN

"...It probably also means spelling out...that **continued Israeli inflexibility on the land issue will have concrete consequences for Israel...**[O]ver the next few years **Israel will be in need of unprecedented amounts of new American aid, to help it to settle its thousands of new Soviet immigrants...**Over the past ten years, the provision of over \$3 billion annually...has become almost totally divorced from the question of Israel's performance in the peace process...But things have changed since then..."

"...So when the Israeli government comes to Washington to ask for the billions of dollars of additional aid that it will need to help settle the Soviet immigrants, our policymakers should spell out the provision of this aid will be closely linked to Israel's performance on the peace process...If the Israel that seeks this additional help is one that is clearly seen to be contributing to the stability of the Middle East, then surely most Americans will feel that aid is well spent. But if the Israel that seeks this help is one that **continues to block the peace process, and to gobble up the land and water of the occupied territories, then no, we have many more pressing priorities for our tax revenues...**" *[COBBAN Letter, Summer 1991] (published by the Committee on Israeli-Palestinian Peace of the Commission on Peace of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington)*

"...[W]e will not be doing those [Soviet] Jews a favor if we encourage their absorption into an Israel that is not making a good-faith effort to make its peace with the Palestinians...In arranging for the absorption of these highly-talented newcomers, Israel will be in need of considerable new amounts of financial support...Congress should be aware that it bears a heavy responsibility for shaping the future of the Middle East...Do [Congressmen]...want to use the absorption aid to encourage these accommodationist' groups? Or will this aid be sent to Israel for other reasons, and in such a way that it further encourages the obduracy that this present leadership in Israel has already clearly demonstrated...Through its actions, Congress will be determining the general structure of the incentives that operate within the Arab-Israeli peace process. It will also be doing a lot to influence the kind of Israel that will exist..." [*Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, May 22, 1991*]

CHARLES PERCY

"...Our leverage point is Israel's tremendous and growing need for extra U.S. assistance to help resettle Soviet Jews...Israel is desperate and we should indeed help but only in exchange for Israel's agreement to allow UN observers and to halt settlements in the Occupied Territories." [*Cited by CNI Newsletter, March 1991, (from an undisclosed source)*]

"...Congress was too cowed by AIPAC to place any conditions on our loan guarantees...[I]t appears that AIPAC has begun attempts on the Hill to undercut the U.S. initiative...Congress must agree to set conditions on fresh assistance to Israel...one of our primary means of leverage is our assistance program..." [*Middle East Insight, May/June 1991*]

JEROME SEGAL

JEWISH PEACE LOBBY

"So vital is this issue of freezing settlement activity that the United States should make it the essential test of Israeli bona fides and a condition for any higher levels of assistance..." [*Mother Jones, May/June 1991*]

"...[W]ith respect to higher than traditional levels of Housing Loan Guarantees, the Congress should call on Israel to curtail the growth of settlements in the West Bank, and it should empower the President to withhold those higher levels if he determine that the Israeli government is not cooperating with that request...the President [should] be authorized to establish a Trust Fund for the Peoples of Israel...to place in the trust fund a segment of the appropriated economic aid monies for Israel equivalent to the amount Israel is spending on expanding settlements." *[Testimony before House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, April 17, 1991]*

"Progress toward a moratorium on settlements will require that the United States exercise its economic clout with Israel...Higher levels of aid to Israel should be made conditional on a settlement freeze, or we should establish some sort of trust fund..into which Congress can channel aid until the Israeli government enacts as settlement freeze..." *[Jerome Segal, 'The Gulf War and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,' World Policy Journal, Spring 1991]*

EPISCOPALIAN CHURCH

'The U.S. government [should] hold aid to Israel in escrow in the same amount that the Israeli governments spends "to expand, develop or further establish Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem." 'The money should be released from escrow only' "if proof is given that settlements are not being established." *[Resolution adopted at the Episcopalians' 70th General Convention in Phoenix, reported in JTA, July 22, 1991]*

CANNON MICHAEL HAMILTON

EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF WASHINGTON

"...If an aggressor or oppressor nation cannot be persuaded that it is in their own self-interest to desist, then do other nations have a moral responsibility to make that oppression unprofitable? Our Presiding Bishop, the Most Reverend Edmond Lee Browning who has visited Israel and West Bank often, has recommended that the United States threaten to curtail its foreign aid to Israel because of its continuing violations of Palestinian human rights. I believe that in this instance, while it would be difficult for Congress so to act, it is both politically possible as well as morally justified." *[COBBAN Letter, Summer, 1991 its editor, Rev. Canon Michael Hamilton]*

(SOUTH VIRGINIA) EPISCOPAL BISHOP CHARLES VACHE

"...We must speak out now...limit [US] aid to Israel until full civil and human rights are granted the one and a half million Palestinians residing in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights..." [*JTA reports on an article written by Bishop Charles Vance of the South Virginia Episcopal Diocese., May 17, 1991*]

CHURCHES FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE

"...[C]onfidence-building measures...rather than obstructionist actions need to be encouraged. A substantial concern must be raised regarding expanding Israeli settlement of the Occupied Territories...loan guarantees were made with the assurance that Israel would not settle new Soviet emigres in the Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, such settlement is occurring in clear contravention of this agreement..." [*April 22, letter to Senators from Churches for Middle East Peace*]

WALTER OWENSBY

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, USA

"...Israel shows every intention of establishing more settlements and greater control in the West Bank and Gaza...It will take a determined effort by the U.S., using its aid program for leverage to avoid this outcome..." [*Report to Presbyterians from Washington, Vol. 13, No.2, March-April, 1991*]

FRIENDS COMMITTEE NATIONAL LEGISLATION

"...Israel continues to 'create facts'...flouts the 'land for peace' principle and crushes prospects for peace...No U.S. funding or loan guarantees should contribute to Israeli settlement activities..." [*FCNL 'Washington Newsletter, April 1991*]

DAVID BIALE

Professor, Jewish History, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley

"...Given the Shamir Government's settlement policy, it is impossible at this stage to separate aid to Israel from the peace process: more money means more settlements and less chance of a territorial compromise." [*Letter to New York Times, July 16, 1991*]

DAVID CORTRIGHT

Former Executive Director, SANE

"...The opportunity exists now to exert pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians for an equitable solution. If Israel does not change, the United States should cut the \$4 billion a year in economic and military aid it provides..." [*Nuclear Times, Summer 1991*]

ALEXANDER COCKBURN

"There will never be any advance toward a settlement of outstanding issues in the Middle East unless the United States is prepared to get tough with Israel. The only way to do this is to impose or to threaten...a cutoff of aid." [*Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1991*]

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ARAB AMERICANS (NAAA)

"...There should be a linkage between US aid and loan guarantees to Israel and the ending of the Israeli occupation of Arab territory...U.S. aid to Israel should be reduced annually by the amount of money used by the Israeli government during that year for settlements in the Occupied Territories..." [*NAAA briefs on 'Status of Arab-Israeli Conflict' available at ADC's Policy Conference, May 2-5, 1991*]

"...There should also be a linkage between US aid to Israel and the latter's willingness to end its occupation of Arab lands. Aid to Israel should be given as a reward for concrete steps toward finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli policies that undermine the peace process should be discouraged...For every dollar that Israel spends on settlement activity in the Occupied Territories, the amount of U.S. aid should be reduced by an equivalent amount..." [NAAA Briefs on 'US Aid to the Middle East, available at ADC's Policy Conference, May 2-5, 1991]

"[A]ny direct or indirect assistance provided by the United States Government to help Israel colonize the occupied territories is...an obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East...The United States should exert political pressure to the fullest extent possible to persuade Israel to abandon its settlement activities in the Occupied Territories. Failure to comply should result in tangible and unmistakable penalties to Israel, including reassessment of its foreign aid allocation...Israel's failure to comply should result in tangible and unmistakable penalties...There should, in short, be a linkage between US aid and loan guarantees to Israel and the ending of the Israeli occupation of Arab territory." [Testimony by Khalil Jahshan, before House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, April 17, 1991]

"...We would also like to link US aid to Israel...to Israel's willingness to end its occupation of Arab lands and to acceptance of a just and peaceful solution to the Palestine issue." [NAAA letter to supporters, Khalil Jahshan, April 1, 1991]

AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE (ADC)

"[I]t is not U.S. military muscle but financial leverage which can be used to bring Israel to the negotiating table...Without these aid programs Israel could not afford to maintain the occupation of Arab land...As a first step, the U.S. should suspend aid in this amount [1 billion] until Israel halts all expansion of settlements." [ADC 'Action Alert', June 12, 1991]

"...In particular, ADC urged the Administration to immediately suspend aid to Israel by an amount equal to that which they spend on settlement projects - approximately \$1 billion for 1990-1993. Settlement expansion...is made possible largely because of U.S. aid to Israel..."

"...[U]rge suspension of aid to Israel by an amount equal to that which they spend on settlement projects until all settlement activity are halted...[Urge] opposition to settlements and reiterate the need to take concrete steps to halt this illegal activity including the suspension of U.S. aid." [*ADC Times, March-April 1991*]

"The U.S. can use its more than \$3 billion in annual aid to Israel as leverage -- as both carrot and stick...The Bush Administration has resisted especially exorbitant Israeli demands for aid." [ADC 'Talking Points' distributed at ADC's Policy Conference, May 2-5, 1991]

"With respect to the Israeli confiscation of land, the ADC is actively seeking out property owners who are American citizens. Such persons may have a cause of action in the United States under the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment states that any government which confiscates the property of U.S. nationals is subject to a curtailment of American foreign assistance." [*ADC President, Albert Mokhiber, press conference, July 3, 1991*]

COUNCIL NATIONAL INTEREST (CNI)

"...U.S. taxpayers are giving an **extremist government** in the Middle East over \$4 billion a year...CNI's **number one priority** is to provide the grassroots support so that Congress will **suspend aid until Israel stops violating human rights and blocking the peace process...**" [*Fundraising letter from Paul Findley & Pete McCloskey on behalf of the Council for the National Interest (CNI), May 1991*]

"...[D]emand that all U.S. foreign aid to Israel, both direct and indirect, be **terminated immediately** until the Israeli government 1) **stops illegal West Bank settlements...**3) returns stolen U.S. security documents and officially apologizes for spying against America..." [*CNI petition to President Bush, May 1991*]

"...Yet because **Israel will not negotiate without U.S. aid becoming a question rather than a certainty**, the aid issue is the one that defines commitment to peace or not..." [*Helen McCloskey, CNI, Nuclear Times, Spring 1991*]

WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS

"Any congressman who pressures the administration to give Israel one more penny...before the Israelis have promised in writing to stop subsidizing illegal Jewish settlements...is on the take from the PACs, or other AIPAC-influenced sources...any president who signs off on another cent to Israel before the US has that air tight written guarantee of no more Israeli government funding for any kind of Jewish settlement activity in the areas named above ought to be impeached..." [*Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1991*]

PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE

JEANNE BUTTERFIELD

"...Sanctions could force Israel to cease its human-rights abuses and end the occupation...we must address the question of aid and sanctions in coming weeks and months." [*Palestine Focus, May-June 1991*]

COALITION FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

NANCY MURRAY

"...The U.S. has never used its unprecedented amount of aid as leverage in the search for peace...the US should use aid as leverage over Israel...Congress should make aid to Israel contingent on that country's cooperation in an authentic peace process...Congress should refuse to mandate future housing loan guarantees for Israel with firm evidence that Israel has abandoned its settlement program..." [*From Testimony to House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, April 17, 1991*]

*NEA102

BUSH SAYS MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS "MOVING"

(Asks Israel to stop building in occupied land) (340)

by Alexander M. Sullivan
USIA White House Correspondent

Istanbul — Amid signs of gathering support for a U.S. plan to convene a Middle East peace conference, President Bush asserted July 21 "the process is moving, that's the key point."

Bush told reporters in Istanbul, in the wake of Saudi Arabia's conditional agreement to end its participation in the Arab boycott of Israel, that an Israeli freeze on building new settlements in occupied territory would mark another contribution to the process.

Saudi King Fahd endorsed the proposal by Egyptian President Mubarak calling for an end to the Arab boycott in return for an Israeli freeze on new settlements.

Bush, en route from Ankara to Istanbul, told the Air Force One pool that he viewed the king's proposal a "favorable" development.

Later, on the ground in Istanbul, Bush said during a photo opportunity that "We've put out a proposal that is now getting the kinds of support from various parties that I think the world has long awaited." The president's comments came as he met with Suleyman Demiral, leader of Turkey's opposition party, True Path.

Bush reminded reporters that U.S. policy opposes Israeli settlements in occupied territory, terming them an obstacle to peace. "I haven't encountered anybody in this part of the world,"

he said, "that thinks increasing settlements is a helpful thing."

Earlier, Bush told reporters on Air Force One the world is beginning to see "the kinds of cooperation that is necessary for peace," and again expressed confidence that Israel will agree, once it fully understands the proposal.

"It's not a question of pressuring any other country," he told a questioner. "It's a question of reasoning" and using the postwar credibility of the United States "to encourage what is a very reasonable and important step to peace."

Bush told a questioner he would travel "anywhere" if it would advance the peace process, but termed the idea "premature."
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BAKER HEARTENED BY RESPONSE TO U.S. PEACE PROPOSAL

(Transcript: Baker-Hussein news conference) (1730)

Amman — Secretary of State Baker says it is "very heartening to us" that a number of Middle East countries have said they are prepared to attend a conference aimed at bringing peace to the area.

After meeting with King Hussein of Jordan July 21, Baker expressed the hope that the positive response to the U.S. call for a Middle East peace conference "will generate even further movement" toward a settlement of the area's longstanding differences. Baker and King Hussein answered reporters' questions following talks

at the Raghadan Palace.

Emphasizing that "we want a solution to this problem," the king told questioners that the parties are "closer than we have ever been" to getting together for the proposed conference.

Baker, asked later in Jerusalem before meeting with Palestinian Representative Faisal Hussein if he might consider issuing invitations to a peace conference even if not everyone signs on, replied that "We have always indicated that that would be something we might consider.

He emphasized, however, that "we haven't made any determination in that regard at all. And, of course, it would be much better if there is going to be a conference if everybody could sign on before invitations were issued. But I do think you have to give some consideration to that question."

Following is the transcript of the remarks by Baker and King Hussein:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

HUSSEIN: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen and friends. I am very, very happy indeed to have the opportunity to speak to you again, to welcome you. And, particularly on this occasion, the third chance that we have had to welcome Secretary Baker, a dear friend, on a rather short visit to Jordan with Mrs. Baker this time as well, and his able colleagues. As usual, we have had a very frank and open discussion and I feel extremely satisfied and happy with the results and I leave it to you, sir, to start if you wish.

BAKER: Thank you, Your Majesty, very much, for receiving us, for receiving our delegation and I would agree with your characterization of

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our talks. I think they were very good talks and very productive talks and I am looking forward to continuing to work with you very closely as we move forward to try and craft a process for peace in this region.

As you know, I will be meeting this evening with Palestinians from the territories as well as with representatives of the government of Israel to discuss with them the same matters that you and I have had an opportunity to discuss here today. So, thank you for receiving us on short notice and perhaps we should best respond to questions.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, sir, why your talks were good and productive?

HUSSEIN: They were good and productive because they are dealing with very a serious, very (inaudible) problem that is of mutual concern to the United States and to ourselves and to all in this region. They are good and productive because they are frank and open as they should be amongst friends, and we have seen much change in the recent past and I believe with every visit that the secretary has made to this region, this part of the world, we have seen the will of the world, the will of people of good will force forward motion hopefully towards the fulfillment of a dream and the realization of a dream and hopes that have been within us for years and years of a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian/Israeli, the Arab/Israeli problem.

Right now, I believe the visit has come at a time when we have seen progress, both here in the region and in the world. I recall suggesting that it was possible and that there is a will and there is a desire to see us move ahead. We have always been ready.

We have been always committed to peace and I believe now with the developments regarding the attitudes of many Arab states and by the way, do not exclude us, but put us amongst the first. I hope that we will see progress towards the establishment of (inaudible)

Q: Your Majesty, President Bush wrote you asking Jordan also to take part in the peace conference that the United States and the Soviet Union intend to convene. Can you tell us today whether Jordan is prepared to attend?

HUSSEIN: I said from the outset, but probably people didn't hear me very clearly that while the process is (inaudible), the conference is (inaudible) Jordan will be amongst the first to attend it. And I repeat that. We are ready to attend. Okay? We are ready to attend the peace conference and we are very happy, indeed, that it is going to be a comprehensive one and there is a lot of dimension, of course, which I am sure I can cover now and save you asking about it.

We are in touch with the Palestinians, our brethren, to look at the possibility of what you have suggested — the umbrella of the joint delegation — Palestinian/Jordanian delegation. And I hope that we will see some progress along that track too.

Q: Your Majesty, the last time we saw you, you said that you did not say that you would attend if Syria did and you did not say that you would attend if Syria didn't. What was it that changed since the last time we saw you to now to have you make the affirmative statement you just did, even if it was only an answer to a question and was not an announcement?

HUSSEIN: Last time, and I don't want to analyze anything beyond saying that the problem is bigger than Jordan, bigger than Palestine, bigger than Israel, bigger than Syria. The problem is a big problem; it's a regional problem; it's a world problem and we are seeking a comprehensive solution. I believe that is the position of the United States in terms of the president and the administration and the world. We want a solution to this problem. We want to continue towards resolving it.

Q: What changed since the last time we saw you to make you make this statement today which you were unwilling to make (inaudible)?

HUSSEIN: More contact and more efforts and not everything can be said to our friends publicly; otherwise, we will not get anywhere. So there is a lot of work being done and we are making progress.

Q: Your Majesty, are you willing to say today that you will support Hosni Mubarak's suggestion that in return for suspending the Arab boycott, Israel suspend the building of settlements in the occupied territories?

HUSSEIN: If the dynamics of this situation can be worked out, by all means.

Q: Your Majesty, what group of Palestinians must participate in this delegation? Must Palestinians from outside the territories also be part of this delegation?

HUSSEIN: I think you will find there are Palestinians outside the territories in the government of Jordan, in Jordan itself and what we are talking about is a solution and, obviously, I think what the efforts have been, so far, concentrated on, are to try to deal

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with the plight of the people in the occupied territories and I hope, somehow, that when we speak of a comprehensive solution, it will eventually cover all aspects of this problem, both Palestinian/Israeli and Arab/Israeli and that we will have peace in this region as well.

Q: How close are we to a conference?

HUSSEIN: Closer than we have ever been.

Q: Mr. Baker, provided that Israel will accept fully your initiative, what would be the mechanism of convening the peace conference? And, if it continues to reject your proposals, how serious would the United States be to materializing its declared intention to resolve the Arab/Israeli dispute?

BAKER: Well, the last question I really have difficulty answering because it is totally hypothetical. I am going to Israel tonight to visit with the leadership of the government of Israel and see exactly what their position is with respect to a number of these issues. It is my hope — your first question, you asked how would we go about this. It would be our hope, of course, that we could see the convening of this conference within a reasonable time period. It would be preferable, of course, if we could see that upon the acceptance of all of the important parties.

But, within recent days, we have seen a number of countries come forward and basically say that they are prepared to attend a conference on the basis of the American proposals. That's very heartening to us and we hope that that will generate even further movement. And, let me take this occasion to thank His Majesty for his statement just now — for both state-

ments. One, that he will by all means attend the conference. That Jordan will be in attendance at the conference on the basis which we have suggested. And, that he would support the initiative suggested by President Mubarak.

Q: No one is talking about direct talks. Everyone is talking about the conference, comprehensive solution...

BAKER: Well, I thank you for asking that question because it gives me the opportunity to once again make clear that the purpose of this conference would be to launch direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestinians on the one hand and Israel and her Arab neighbors on the other. So, the willingness of countries to attend the conference, clearly, I think, connotes a willingness to attend on the basis that has been outlined in the American proposal.

Q: Do we hear, Your Majesty, you are prepared for direct bilateral negotiations with Israel?

HUSSEIN: (inaudible) when we attend the conference, I suppose. This is about the most ridiculous question I have ever heard, so please, with all due respect.

Q: (Inaudible)

HUSSEIN: No, I am saying, when do you attend a conference to do? Do you attend a conference to mime, to make faces at each other, or to discuss and try to resolve the problem? I have been calling for this for years and years. I assure you that this is really the intention and it is very, very clear.

(END TRANSCRIPT)
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BAKER, LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MEET IN EGYPT
(Transcript: Baker, Bouez press conf., 7/22/91) (620)

Cairo — Continuing his round of talks with Middle Eastern leaders, Secretary of State Baker expressed hope July 22 that his efforts will "convince the Israelis that there are Arab states that are now ready for direct, face to face, discussions with Israel."

Baker made the comments during a brief joint press conference here with Lebanese Foreign Minister Faras Bouez. Both officials were scheduled later to hold talks on the U.S. plan for a Middle East peace conference.

During those talks, Baker told reporters, "I would hope that the government of Lebanon would be able to give us the same kind of endorsement of the American peace proposal that we received in Damascus."

Following is a transcript of the secretary's joint press conference with the Lebanese foreign minister:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, could we ask you a few questions? What is your strategy here on this trip? It's clear you've gone to Syria first, won their approval for the conference, got President Mubarak yesterday to call for an end to the boycott, what kind of message are you trying to build-up for the Israelis before you arrive there?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I would

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hope that we would be able to convince the Israelis that there are Arab states that are now ready for direct, face to face, discussions with Israel. As you know, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who indicated that they were prepared to do this in a multilateral context during the course of our last trip here. Now I hope, and believe, there will be other Arab states that are willing to do it in a bilateral context, and specifically to talk about the political issue of peace. This is something that I think a lot of people have wanted for a long, long time. And I hope that I will be in a position to assure Israel that that is the position of some Arab governments. I haven't had a chance to talk about that here with the minister, but that's one of the things that we will be talking about, because as you know the conference that we're trying to arrange would serve to launch direct bilateral discussions between Israel and Palestinians, but also between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Q: Mr. Minister, are you prepared for bilateral talks in the context of a peace conference?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOUEZ: We think that Lebanon will go more positively with this peace process and, at the same time, Lebanon will be with the other countries in the same position with the new negotiations with Israel.

SECRETARY BAKER: Mr. Foreign Minister, if I may say, we're anxious, we haven't had a chance to even begin our discussion yet, but I would hope that the government of Lebanon would be able to give us the same kind of endorsement of the American peace proposal that we received in Damascus.

Q: Can you give that endorsement,

Mr. Minister?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOUEZ: We prefer first to hear Mr. Baker's proposal.

Q: Mr. Minister, are you prepared to drop the Arab boycott of Israel in return for a freeze on settlements? Would you be willing to do that?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOUEZ: I prefer first to hear Mr. Secretary and after I will be able to give you more precise answers.

SECRETARY BAKER: Fair enough.

Q: Mr. Baker, do you believe that Resolution (425) will be implemented this year?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't know, that's a question I can't answer right now. Let me give you the same answer the minister just gave to other question: I would like to discuss that, among other things.

(END TRANSCRIPT)
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BAKER, PALESTINIAN LEADERS MEET IN JERUSALEM
(Transcript: Baker, Hussein news conf. 7/21/91) (420)

Jerusalem — U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker met July 21 with Faisal Hussein and other Palestinian leaders at the American Consulate General in Jerusalem.

Prior to their meeting, Baker and Hussein answered reporters' questions. The following is the transcript of their remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Hussein, could you tell us if you would be willing to take part in a peace conference as part of a (inaudible).

HUSSEINI: I believe there are matters that the delegation has discussed now and in the future. You will hear from us if there is (an) answer.

Q: When would that be?

HUSSEINI: In the future, the near future.

Q: Mr. Hussein, Prime Minister Shamir says that no East Jerusalem Palestinians can participate in the delegation. Would you be willing to support talks that in effect you could not participate in?

HUSSEINI: East Jerusalem is part of the occupied territories, Mr. Shamir cannot by this way give legitimacy to an illegal decision that the Israelis took in the past.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said just now in Amman that you preference was that everyone sign on before you issued invitations for the peace conference. Does that mean that you might consider issuing invitations even if not everyone signs on?

BAKER: Well, we have always indicated that that would be something we might consider. That doesn't mean we have decided to do it because we haven't, but at some point, I think, you have to consider that. But we haven't made any determination in that regard at all. And, of course, it would be much better if there is going to be a conference if everybody could sign on before invitations were is-

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sued. But I do think you have to give some consideration to that question.

Q: At what point is that some point?

BAKER: Some point.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said earlier on another trip that you thought there was a formula between yourself and the Israeli government that would sort of take care of this Palestinian representation issue. Do you still think you have that kind of formula?

BAKER: You know that these questions involving representation and that sort of thing, I am going to be talking, as I was today, to King Hussein and the Jordanians, I will be talking to the Palestinians from the territories, as we are just about to do here, and with Israelis. So I am not going to comment beyond saying that.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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WHITE HOUSE REPORT, MONDAY, JULY 22
(Middle East, King Hassan/U.S. visit, ambassadorial nominations) (980)

There was no regular White House briefing July 22. National Security Affairs Adviser Brent Scowcroft discussed the following topic with reporters traveling on the president's aircraft en route to Washington from Istanbul.

BAKER CONFERS WITH BUSH ABOUT MIDEAST MISSION

Speaking with reporters aboard Air

Force One en route to Washington from Istanbul July 22, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said Secretary of State Baker, who was en route to Kuala Lumpur, had called the president to discuss the progress of his talks in Israel.

Scowcroft said that Baker told the president that "the Israelis took our proposals for the situation very seriously and said they would study them and then get back to us....They did not say when, but the secretary said (to the Israelis) that time was important."

Asked about press reports that have quoted senior Israeli officials as saying that their approach would be to try to indefinitely delay the latest peace proposals, Scowcroft acknowledged that "this is a tactic the Israelis have used in the past. Whether they plan to now or not, I don't know. I don't think we're prepared for indefinite delay....I think he (President Bush) would like it (the Israeli response) to be resolved by the time he gets to Moscow" next week.

Asked whether he thought it likely that Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev would be able to announce agreement to convene an Arab-Israeli peace conference at their summit talks, Scowcroft said, "I think that would depend on what the situation is with the Israelis by then. The two (U.S. and USSR) would be co-sponsors of any conference, so I think you can anticipate that they will discuss it."

Baker reported that "the tone was good" in his meetings in Israel, but Scowcroft added that, in terms of substance, "I don't want to characterize the Israeli response or potential response....I don't want to speculate on what the Israelis will or will not

do. Obviously, they're agonizing over what to do. Their press statements up to now, before the meetings with Secretary Baker, were cautious to negative."

Asked about Bush's response to Baker's readout, Scowcroft said, "I think the president is encouraged that there wasn't a rejection, but I don't think any of us want to characterize what the Israeli response will be."

He added, "I don't think it's surprising that the Israelis didn't say 'we heard what (Syrian President) Assad told you and the answer is yes.' It's a pretty serious decision for them."

Scowcroft refused to speculate about what the administration might do if Israel stalled in delivering its response. Asked whether Bush and Gorbachev might simply invite the parties to Washington or elsewhere for a peace conference to see who shows up, he said, "That, of course, would be one possibility." He added that "it's pretty difficult to have a conference" if one of the sides is not going to be there.

Asked what would happen if a peace conference cannot be arranged, Scowcroft said, "If there won't be a peace conference, I don't think it would be the end of the road, but it would require a change of tack (strategy)."

Commenting on the administration's position regarding the relationship between the Arab-Israeli peace process and Israel's request for \$10,000 million in U.S. loan guarantees to finance construction of housing for Soviet immigrants to Israel, he explained that "What the president is talking about is no conditionality, but they're obviously associated....There would not be a formal conditioning, but of course they are related issues."

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Asked whether Bush might telephone Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, Scowcroft said, "I don't know at this juncture that it's necessary."

Scowcroft noted that while Syria had wanted a conference that could be reconvened with superpower and U.N. involvement, Israel objected both to U.N. representation and to reconvening of the conference for any reason once bilateral talks had started.

"The formula that was worked out, that the president sent to both the Syrians and the Israelis, was a conference that could be reconvened by consensus of the parties...which would mean the Israelis would have a veto," Scowcroft said. "The Syrians accepted that; that's one of the things the Israelis have not accepted."

Responding to questions related to Baker's Mideast mission upon his return by helicopter to the White House, Bush said, "It's going pretty well."

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

MOROCCO'S LEADER WILL VISIT U.S.

King Hassan of Morocco will make a state visit to Washington September 26, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said in a written statement.

"The visit reflects the friendly state of a longstanding relationship between Morocco and the United States that goes back to the earliest days of American independence," Fitzwater said. "The discussions are expected to focus on bilateral relations and regional and international issues."

ENVOYS NAMED TO BURMA, EC

President Bush has announced his intention to nominate Parker Borg to be ambassador to the Union of Burma, and James Dobbins as U.S. representative to the European Communities. Both are career members of the Senior Foreign Service.

Borg would succeed Burton Levin. Since 1989, Borg has served as principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters at the State Department. Previously Borg was deputy and acting coordinator at the Bureau of International Communications and Information Policy at the State Department. He also served as ambassador to Mali.

Dobbins would succeed Thomas Niles. He currently serves as acting assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs. His earlier positions included minister and deputy chief of mission in Bonn and director of the Office of Theater Military Policy in the Politico-Military Bureau at the State Department. NNNN

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STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, MONDAY, JULY 22

(Baker trip, Iraq, Iran/planes, South Africa, Soviet seaman, Burma, Vietnam-MIAs) (1370)

NEWS BRIEFING — Deputy spokesman Richard Boucher discussed the following topics:

BAKER TO VISIT MONGOLIA, MOSCOW

Secretary of State Baker will travel from Kuala Lumpur, where he is attending the post-ministerial conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to Mongolia and then to Moscow, where he is expected to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in advance of the July 30-31 summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev, Boucher said.

In a statement in Jerusalem, department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler announced that Baker will visit Ulaanbaatar July 25-28. Because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last August, he had to cut short last summer's first-ever visit to Mongolia by a U.S. secretary of state.

"He looks forward to returning to Mongolia and meeting with Mongolian officials to continue his discussions on their move toward democracy and a free market economy," Tutwiler's statement said. Baker will depart Mongolia on July 28, arriving in Moscow on July 29. He plans to return to the United States with President Bush at the end of Bush's visit to the Soviet Union.

Pointing out that the secretary's traveling party has not announced any specific meetings with Bessmertnykh, Boucher told reporters "I assume he will see him in Moscow." Following last week's Economic Summit in London, Baker said he and the Soviet foreign minister would have to meet again to make final preparations for the Moscow Summit before the presidents get together.

Baker left Jerusalem July 22 after a whirlwind trip that took him to Syria,

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להלן מסיבת העתונאים של מזכיר המדינה בייקר היום (22.7) בשעה 10:00 כפי ששודרה ב'קול ישראל':

PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER
JERUSALEM, JULY 22, 1991, 10:00

SECRETARY BAKER: ... I WENT THROUGH WITH THEM IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL MY EARLIER DISCUSSIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THIS RECENT TRIP IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES ASKED A LOT OF QUESTIONS, WHICH I THINK IS NATURAL GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, AND THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT HE WOULD RESPOND SHORTLY TO OUR PROPOSALS. I AM SATISFIED THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL CONSIDER THEIR POSITION AND OUR PROPOSALS CAREFULLY, AND I LOOK FORWARD WITH GREAT HOPE TO THEIR RESPONSE.

LET ME SAY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THAT I THINK THAT THIS IS A MOMENT OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. FOR 43 YEARS, ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND IT HAS BEEN RIGHT TO DO SO. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS, THE ONLY WAY TO SECURE PEACE. AND NOW THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO THOSE FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL NOW HAS ARAB PARTNERS WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS REFLECTS, I THINK, POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE ARAB WORLD.

OUR EFFORT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO DO THREE THINGS: TO PRODUCE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, TO PRODUCE A PROCESS ON A BASIC APPROACH WHICH ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS SAID IS ACCEPTABLE TO IT, AND TO PRODUCE OR TRY TO PRODUCE A CLIMATE THAT HELPS THESE NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED. IN OUR VIEW, WE HAVE

DONE ALL THREE. SO WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH ISRAEL TO PROMOTE THIS PROCESS WHICH WE THINK CAN HELP ISRAEL, OUR STRATEGIC FRIEND AND ALLY, ATTAIN THE PEACE WITH SECURITY THAT IT SO RICHLY DESERVES, AND THAT THIS VOLATILE REGION SO BADLY NEEDS.

Q: (INAUDIBLE) TO THE CONFERENCE?

A: NO, WE WILL FOR NOW WAIT WITH GREAT HOPE FOR THE RESPONSE FROM PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS COLLEAGUES.

Q: MR. BAKER, WHAT IS THE SITUATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS RIGHT NOW? WHAT IS IT THAT THE U.S. IS ASKING THEM TO DO IN TERMS OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES? WHAT SORT OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD WE LIKE TO SEE THEM BRING TO THE CONFERENCE?

A: LET ME SAY THAT I AM CONTINUING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS, WITH PALESTINIANS, INDEED WITH JORDANIANS, ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FORMATION OF A JOINT PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN DELEGATION. THESE ARE IN SOME CASES SENSITIVE AND IN ALL CASES IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS, AND I DON'T PLAN TO CONDUCT THEM THROUGH THE MEDIA.

Q: IS THE CONFERENCE GOING AHEAD, THOUGH, WITHOUT A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION?

A: WELL, THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY A NUMBER OF ARAB GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATE A PEACE CONFERENCE TO BE FOLLOWED BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS, AND ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS. IT'S A TWO-TRACK PROCESS AND A TWO-TRACK APPROACH, AND I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT IF WE RECEIVE AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL THAT BOTH TRACKS WILL PROCEED.

Q: DID THE ISRAELIS CHANGE THEIR POSITION CONCERNING U.N. REPRESENTATION AND ON THE RECONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE?

A: I'M GOING TO LEAVE TO THE ISRAELI SPOKESMEN AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES QUESTIONS LIKE THAT. WE HAD VERY GOOD DISCUSSIONS, AS I SAID SERIOUS AND EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS. THEY INDICATED TO ME THAT THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND SHORTLY, AND I AM VERY HOPEFUL OF COURSE THAT THAT RESPONSE WILL BE AFFIRMATIVE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU TELL THE ISRAELIS WHAT YOU HAD EARLIER SAID THAT THERE WERE NO SIDE ASSURANCES TO THE SYRIANS?

A: YES. THERE WILL BE, AS I HAVE SAID EARLIER, THERE WILL BE NO ASSURANCES TO ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THIS PROCESS THAT ARE NOT SHARED WITH THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE PROCESS. THAT'S THE WAY WE OPERATED IN OUR EARLIER ATTEMPT TO CREATE A PEACE PROCESS AND THAT'S THE WAY WE'RE GOING TO OPERATE (INAUDIBLE).

Q: THERE HAS BEEN SOME CONCERN, AS YOU KNOW, ABOUT THE AMERICAN

POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, AND NOW HAS SURFACED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO MR. RABIN. CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THAT? WHAT IS THE POSITION ON THE SOVEREIGNTY, WHETHER YOU INTEND TO TAKE A POSITION AT ANY MEETINGS, AND WHAT ABOUT THIS LETTER?

A: THE LETTER REPRESENTS A COMMITMENT OF THE U.S. WHICH WE FULLY HONOR AND RESPECT. I HAVE SO TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER. IT IS A LETTER, OF COURSE, THAT WE WERE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. I THINK YOU KNOW OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION YOU POSE ABOUT THE GOLAN. WE THINK THAT THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY NEGOTIATIONS. THAT HAS BEEN OUR POSITION FOR QUITE A LONG TIME. WE HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED THE UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE GOLAN, BUT THE MATTER IS ONE THAT NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THAT REMAINS OUR POSITION, AND WHILE THE LETTER IS A LONG LETTER, IT'S BEEN MADE PUBLIC AND I AM HAPPY TO DELIVER A COPY OF IT TO YOU IN THE AFTERMATH OF THIS MEETING. IT'S NOT A SECRET LETTER. IT'S BEEN PRINTED MANY MANY TIMES, BUT IT'S TOO LONG FOR ME TO REPEAT RIGHT HERE. LET ME SAY ONE FINAL THING. AS INDICATED, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD, THE U.S. HAS NOT TAKEN A POSITION ON BORDERS INSOFAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE QUESTION OF THE GOLAN.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU RAISE THE SAUDI OFFER TO SUSPECT THE ARAB BOYCOTT IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE OF SETTLEMENTS, AND WHAT WAS MR. SHAMIR'S RESPONSE TO THAT?

A: THAT MATTER CAME UP DURING THE DISCUSSION, AND I THINK YOU ALREADY KNOW FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT THAT HE IS NOT OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THAT APPROACH. THAT MAY BE (INAUDIBLE) NOW, BUT IT'S AN APPROACH NEVERTHELESS THAT WE THINK IS PROPER AND APPROPRIATE AND SO WE HAVE A DISAGREEMENT ON THAT ISSUE. BUT THAT IS QUITE SEPARATE, OF COURSE, AND APART FROM THIS QUESTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND ISRAEL'S RESPONSE.

Q: IT WAS ORIGINALLY, I THINK, YOUR IDEA, THE U.S.'S IDEA, AND I'D LIKE TO KNOW IF YOU COULD TELL US WHEN YOU AND THE SAUDIS AND OTHER ARABS WANT ISRAEL TO STOP SETTLING, AS YOU PUT IT, IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AS YOU PUT IT? DO YOU MEAN YOU DON'T WANT ANY MORE SETTLERS TO GO INTO EAST JERUSALEM? IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TRYING TO STOP?

A: WHAT WE'VE SAID IS THAT THESE ARE INDEED DIFFERENT ISSUES, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT. EACH SIDE, HOWEVER, HAS EMPHASIZED THE ISSUES THAT MATTER MOST TO THEM. PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR HAS EMPHASIZED WITH GREAT FORCE THE IMPORTANCE OF ENDING THE BOYCOTT. HE SENT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT JUST BEFORE THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT. THE ARABS, OF COURSE, HAVE CONSISTENTLY EMPHASIZED SETTLEMENTS AS RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS. SO IF YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE RECIPROCAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, IT'S LOGICAL TO RAISE, I THINK, WHAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES HAVE EMPHASIZED TO US ARE THE MATTERS OF MOST SERIOUS CONCERN. NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE DETAILS, WE HAVEN'T GONE

INTO TO THAT. WE HAVEN'T GONE INTO THAT EITHER WITH RESPECT TO THE BOYCOTT SIDE OF THE EQUATION.

Q: (...) EAST JERUSALEM TO BE OCCUPIED TERRITORY? IT REALLY DOESN'T TAKE A LOT OF IMAGINATION TO MAKE THE LEAP THAT OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND THE U.S. CALL FOR FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS MEANS A U.S. CALL FOR A FREEZE ON MOVING INTO JERUSALEM, BUT I'D RATHER YOU MAKE THE AFFIRMATIVE STATEMENT (INAUDIBLE).

A: I'M DOING THE DIPLOMACY IN THE MANNER AND IN THE WAY AND TO THE EXTENT THAT I THINK GIVES US THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS WHICH WE'VE ALWAYS SAID ARE REQUIRED.

Q: YOU SAID ISRAEL NOW HAS ARAB PARTNERS READY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. DID YOU TELL PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR THAT YOU HAD BEEN TOLD FACE TO FACE BY PRESIDENT ASSAD, BY KING HUSSEIN, I PRESUME BY THE SAUDIS, THAT THEY ARE READY TO SIT DOWN AND GO BEYOND JUST A CONFERENCE AND HAVE THESE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS? WHAT I MEAN IS NOT JUST COME TO THE CONFERENCE AND THEN RAISE ANOTHER SET OF OBSTACLES TO THE DIRECT TALKS?

A: WHAT I SAID TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS EXACTLY WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD ME, WHICH IS THAT THESE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, THAT IS SYRIA, NOW LEBANON AND JORDAN, HAVE EMBRACED, ENDORSE, SIGNED ON, IF YOU WILL, TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL OR PROPOSALS. THOSE CONTEMPLATE A CONFERENCE, A PEACE CONFERENCE, INITIALLY, THAT WILL LAUNCH DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT TO THAT PROCESS AND THAT PROCEDURE. AND THEREFORE I THINK IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE WILL BE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT TO MAKE ANOTHER TRIP BACK TO THE REGION HERE BEFORE YOU HEAR FROM PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR?

A: BEFORE I HEAR, NO. AS YOU KNOW, I'M GOING NOW TO THE ASEAN CONFERENCE IN MALAYSIA AND THEN DIRECTLY TO JOIN THE PRESIDENT AT THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, SO MY SCHEDULE IS CHOCK A BLOCK FULL UNTIL THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. I CANNOT OF COURSE RULE OUT EVER COMING BACK, AND THAT WILL DEPEND I THINK IN PART UPON WHEN AND WHAT THE NATURE OF THE RESPONSE IS FROM ISRAEL.

Q: DO YOU EXPECT A RESPONSE, THEN, BEFORE THE SUMMIT?

A: NO, I DIDN'T SAY I EXPECT IT BEFORE THE SUMMIT. I SAID THAT I EXPECTED IT SHORTLY, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT I WAS TOLD. I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT YOU MEAN. I CAN'T PUT A NUMBER OF DAYS ON IT.

Q: FAISAL AL-HUSSEINI HAS BEEN IN EVERY DELEGATION THAT'S MET WITH YOU SINCE YOU STARTED THIS PROCESS. IS IT THE AMERICAN POSITION THAT PALESTINIANS FROM EAST JERUSALEM SHOULD BE PRESENT AT THESE TALKS?

A: NICE TRY. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THOSE DISCUSSIONS. I'M JUST

NOT GOING TO BECAUSE THESE ARE STILL ONGOING DISCUSSIONS THAT WE'RE HAVING WITH THE ISRAELIS, WITH PALESTINIANS AND WITH JORDANIANS.

Q: TALKING ABOUT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT DO YOU REALLY MEAN? DO YOU MEAN THAT THE ISRAELIS AND THE SYRIANS WILL SIT TOGETHER AND THE U.S. WILL WATCH THEM FROM WASHINGTON? BECAUSE WE NEVER HAD REAL DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. WE ALWAYS NEEDED SOME KIND OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT.

A: THE WAY THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED THIS IS THAT FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE THERE WOULD BE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THAT MEANS TWO PARTIES. THEY, OF COURSE, ARE FREE TO AGREE BETWEEN THEM, AMONG THEMSELVES, WITH RESPECT TO ANYBODY ELSE THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PRESENT. IF THEY WANT US PRESENT, WE'LL BE PRESENT. IF THEY WANT US AND THE SOVIETS PRESENT, BOTH OF US WILL BE PRESENT. IF THEY DON'T WANT ANY OF US PRESENT, NOBODY WILL BE PRESENT EXCEPT THE TWO OF THEM. THAT IS THE PROPOSAL THAT WE HAVE MADE AND THAT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THESE ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

Q: WHEN THE U.S. SAYS 'TERRITORIES FOR PEACE', ARE WE TALKING ABOUT TERRITORIES ON ALL FRONTS?

A: THAT HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES POSITION FOR A LONG LONG TIME. LET ME SAY THIS, AS I SAID IN DAMASCUS: IF THIS CONFERENCE HAPPENS, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WILL BE TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE BASED ON 242 AND 338, AND WE CONTINUALLY MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE ARE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT 242 AND 338 MEAN AND REQUIRE.

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT ASSAD HAS TOLD YOU THAT HE'S WILLING TO MEET MR. SHAMIR AT THE OPENING OF SUCH A CONFERENCE.

A: I'VE NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THAT.

Q: WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF ISRAEL SAYS 'NO' TO THESE PROPOSALS, AND HAVE YOU CONVEYED THIS TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR?

A: THAT'S PURELY HYPOTHETICAL, AND I WOULD RATHER WAIT, AS I SAY, WITH GREAT HOPE ON THE ISRAELI RESPONSE. I'M NOT GOING TO TRY AND PREJUDGE IT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, A FEW MONTHS AGO ASSAD WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A KIND OF TERRORIST BY ISRAEL AND BY THE STATES. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A REAL CHANGE OF CHARACTER?

A: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT I THINK THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE A CHANGE, CERTAINLY A RATHER FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE POLICY POSITION OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF TERRORISM, THAT IS A DIFFERENT ISSUE. WE HAVE OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA WITH RESPECT TO THAT ISSUE, AND WE DISCUSS THOSE DIFFERENCES WHEN WE MEET WITH THEM.

Q: IS THE ASSESSMENT AT THIS POINT THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR CAN

GIVE YOU A DIRECT RESPONSE WHEN HE DOES, OR THAT HE MAY HAVE TO GO TO HIS COUNTRY?

A: THAT'S REALLY A MATTER THAT'S INTERNAL AND NOT FOR ME TO ANSWER.

Q: WAS ISRAEL GIVEN ANY KIND OF DEADLINE FOR ITS RESPONSE, OR TIME FRAME?

A: NO, NO DEADLINE. I WAS ASKED THE QUESTION YESTERDAY WHETHER OR NOT CONSIDERATION COULD OR WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ISSUING INVITATIONS, LET'S SAY AT THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. I SAID: WE HAVE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE ISSUE INVITATIONS AT SOME POINT. NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE WITH RESPECT TO THAT WHATSOEVER. BUT NO DEADLINE HAS BEEN IMPOSED. I'VE SEEN SOME PRESS REPORTS COMING IN HERE THAT SOMEHOW WE ARE PRESSURING ISRAEL, AND PERMIT ME, IF YOU WILL, TO SET THE RECORD VERY STRAIGHT ON THAT. I HAVE TOLD YOU WHAT IT IS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. WE ARE SEEKING TO SET THE STAGE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND TO PRODUCE A PROCESS WHICH REALLY FOLLOWS THE BASIC APPROACH THAT ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS SAID IS ACCEPTABLE TO IT. NOW THAT'S NOT MY DEFINITION OF PRESSURE. WE'RE WORKING VERY HARD TO PRODUCE THAT KIND OF PROCESS.

Q: I WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND THIS. WHAT YOU BRING FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES IS A COMMITMENT TO GO ALONG WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSALS -

A: ABSOLUTELY.

Q: WHICH HAVE THESE TWO PARTS. BUT NO ONE HAS SAID TO YOU EXPLICITLY - BECAUSE WE'RE GOING BY WHAT THEY'VE TOLD US IN PUBLIC. IN PUBLIC THEY'VE EMPHASIZED ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE. YOU'VE SEEN THE DIFFICULTY WE'VE HAD IN GETTING PEOPLE TO TALK ABOUT DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL, IN PUBLIC.

A: LET ME SAY IT ONE MORE TIME. THE COMMITMENTS THAT WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN ARE COMMITMENTS TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL WHICH CONTEMPLATES A PEACE CONFERENCE ALONG THE LINES THAT YOU'RE ALL FAMILIAR WITH, WHICH WILL HAVE AS ITS PURPOSE THE LAUNCHING OF DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS NO (INAUDIBLE) TO THAT PROPOSAL.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE HOLDING OF A PLENARY CONFERENCE TO OPEN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS?

A: A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

Q: DID YOU GIVE ANY COMMITMENTS AS TO HOW LONG?

A: I'VE GIVEN ESTIMATES OF WHAT WE THINK THE APPROPRIATE TIME FRAME SHOULD BE, AND I'M GOING TO MAINTAIN THOSE IN CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS. BUT WE HAVE OBVIOUSLY GIVEN THE SAME TIME FRAMES TO ALL GOVERNMENTS. A SHORT TIME FRAME.

Q: DOES THAT APPLY TO THE REGIONAL TALKS TOO?

A: THE REGIONAL TALKS WOULD BEGIN AFTER A SLIGHTLY LONGER PERIOD OF TIME EXPIRES.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, IS THIS A CASE IN WHICH WASHINGTON AND THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ALREADY ARE IN AGREEMENT SIMILAR TO THE U.N. ISSUE, OR IS THIS STILL AN OPEN ISSUE AMONG ALL THE PARTIES?

A: IT'S A CASE IN WHICH THERE ARE, I THINK, SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT AMONG ALL PARTIES, BUT THERE ARE STILL SOME AREAS THAT NEED TO BE AGREED TO. WE'RE WORKING ON IT AND I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT FURTHER.

Q: ON THAT POINT, ARE YOU LEAVING ANY STAFF HERE IN ISRAEL TO WORK ON THAT ISSUE?

A: I'M LEAVING DENNIS (ROSS) AND JOHN KELLY, AND OF COURSE THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE HERE, AND PERHAPS A COUPLE OF OUR - DAN KURTZER MAY STAY, AND AARON. NOT TO WORK, THAT IS. NO, I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD YOU, BUT TO CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE, AND BECAUSE FRANKLY THEY ARE NOT GOING ON TO ASEAN. THAT'S NOT THEIR LINE OF WORK. AND SO THEY'RE GOING TO STAY HERE AND FLY DIRECTLY BACK TO THE UNITED STATES.

Q: WHAT IS THE AMERICAN POSITION ON RECONVENING THE CONFERENCE, AND HAVE YOU GOT SOME AGREEMENT FROM THE ISRAELIS ON THAT? AND WHAT IS THE AMERICAN POSITION (ON THE U.N.)?

A: THE AMERICAN POSITION ON RECONVENING THE CONFERENCE IS WHAT IT HAS BEEN SINCE WE PROPOSED THE COMPROMISE APPROACH, THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD RECONVENE BUT ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES. THAT IS THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL. I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER TO ISRAEL. THAT'S SOMETHING THAT I ASSUME WILL BE CONTAINED IN THEIR RESPONSE TO ME. WITH RESPECT TO THE U.N., THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL IS THAT THERE BE A U.N. OBSERVER, THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH I HAVE JUST OUTLINED TO YOU THAT RELATE TO 242 AND 338; IF AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED, THAT THERE BE A PROCESS WHEREBY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE U.N. ENDORSES THOSE AGREEMENTS. I DON'T HAVE THE EXACT WORDING OF THAT FOR YOU. AND LASTLY, SIMPLY THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE U.N. NOTIFIED FROM TIME TO TIME AS WE SEE FIT ON WHAT'S GOING ON. I MIGHT ADD, THAT'S WHAT WE DO WHEN WE COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON REGIONAL CONFERENCE WHETHER IT BE IN CAMBODIA OR ANGOLA OR AFGHANISTAN, OR WHEREVER IT IS.

22-JUL-1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,
מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזחים, מזאר, ארבל2,
ארבל1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר1, איר2,
@ (לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, מיחשוב/המשרד, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23139
אל: רהמש/1223
מ-: פריס, נר: 256, תא: 220791, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/מידי

אל: אירופה 1

מאת: עתונות

הנדון: ביקור בייקר

ממקור עיתונאי שמעתי שברציף מספרים שמזכיר המדינה בייקר התקשר במהלך סוף השבוע פעמים אחדות לשה'ח דומא וביקש ממנו להשתדל אצל גורמים שונים בצד דבי, פלשתינים ואחרים. לא ידע לפרט במי בדיוק מדובר ומה הנושאים. לא יכול היה גם לומר אם הדבר נעשה בשל צורך ממשי או פשוט כדי לתת לצרפתים תחושת מעורבות.

דני שק.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, איר1, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22130

אל: רהמש/1152

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 389, תא: 210791, זח: 1412, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בכבכ

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש במסיבת עתונאים עם נשיא תורכיה

תשומת לבכם לשאלה האחרונה, המתיחסת לתהליך השלום.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE BY: TURKISH PRESIDENT TURGUT OZAL
AND U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH/ANKARA, TURKEY
FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1991

Q MR. PRESIDENT, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT IRAQ. THERE WAS RENEWED FIGHTING THIS WEEK IN NORTHERN IRAQ BETWEEN KURDISH REBELS AND SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FORCES. CAN YOU TELL US, IS THAT A MATTER OF CONCERN FOR YOU? AND DOES THAT RISK RENEWED US INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ?

PRESIDENT BUSH: YES, IT'S A MATTER OF CONCERN TO US. ANY TIME THERE'S A CONFLAGRATION OF THAT NATURE, IT'S A MATTER OF CONCERN TO US. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE MATTER IS HOPEFULLY GETTING RESOLVED, BUT WE MOVED IN WHEN THE KURDS WERE BRUTALIZED, WITH GREAT COOPERATION FROM TURKEY AND OTHER COUNTRIES. IT WAS NOT A UNILATERAL MOVE. WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED OUR FORCES FROM THE AREA. BUT I THINK THAT THE PARTIES THERE REALIZE THAT OUR ROLE IS FOR PEACE, AND ANYTIME THERE IS AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, IT CONCERNS US. I DON'T THINK, IF THE QUESTION IMPLIED THAT WE'RE GOING BACK TO WHAT WE WERE WHEN THE WAR ENDED AND MAJOR, MASSIVE ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE KURDS, THAT WE'RE SEEING SOMETHING LIKE THAT TAKING PLACE HERE.

Q ARE YOU DEDICATED AND DETERMINED TO REMOVE SADDAM WITH

WHATEVER MEANS THAT CAN BE USED (FOR THE TIME ??)?

PRESIDENT BUSH: ONE, I'D LIKE TO SEE HIM OUT OF THERE -- SADDAM HUSSEIN. TWO, WE WILL NOT HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS AT THE UNITED STATES AS LONG AS HE'S IN THERE. THREE, IT WAS NEVER AN OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THESE MANY RESOLUTIONS, 12 RESOLUTIONS, TO GET HIM OUT OF OFFICE; IT WAS -- THE RESOLUTION WAS TO GET HIM OUT OF KUWAIT. AND WITH THE HELP OF TURKEY AND OTHER COUNTRIES, WE WERE FANTASTICALLY SUCCESSFUL THERE.

BUT WHAT HE'S DOING NOW TO HIS OWN PEOPLE BY DIVERTING FOOD AWAY FROM HIS OWN POPULACE INTO THE HANDS OF SOME SPECIAL INTERESTS THERE AND WHAT HE'S DOING NOW IN HIS ONGOING QUEST TO START FORWARD ON SOME NUCLEAR PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH HE NOW SAYS HE'S NOT DOING THAT -- BUT WHAT HE HAS DONE IS VERY BAD AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AS HE TRIES TO HID THE REMNANTS OF HIS TATTERED DEFENSE FORCES. AND SO I SEE NOTHING REDEEMING IN HIS ATTITUDE OR IN THE WAY HE HAS CONDUCTED HIMSELF.

I SEE IT AS A CLEAR CASE OF GOOD -- EVIL VERSUS GOOD, AND HE'S THE EVIL IN THIS ONE. AND YET IT WASN'T AN OBJECTIVE, AND I WOULD SAY THIS TO SOME WHO THINK IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, TO REMOVE HIM FROM POWER. WE WOULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN THE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS FROM ALL THESE RESOLUTIONS AND ALL THESE COUNTRIES IF THAT HAD BEEN AN OBJECTIVE. AND SO I AM HOPEFUL THAT HE WILL LEAVE.

AND LET ME JUST REPEAT THIS RIGHT HERE IN THIS COUNTRY: I SAID LONG BEFORE THE FIRST SHOT WAS FIRED THAT OUR ARGUMENT WAS NOT WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ, NOR WAS IT WITH IRAQ'S MILITARY, THE ESTABLISHMENT. IT IS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO RUNS THAT COUNTRY WITH AN IRON FIST WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FEELINGS OF HIS OWN PEOPLE. AND IT'S STILL THAT WAY. AND IF SOME WAY THEY COULD GET HIM TO STEP ASIDE AND GET OUT OF THERE, WE, FOR THE UNITED STATES' PART, WOULD BE WILLING TO START RIGHT IN FROM SCRATCH, NO MATTER WHO THE PERSON IS, WHAT THE ESTABLISHMENT IS. WE'D WANT PLEDGES THAT THEY WOULD HONOR THESE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. BUT THAT'S THE WAY WE FEEL ABOUT IT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WITH THE GULF CRISIS YOU HAVE STARTED USING THE TERM "THE NEW WORLD ORDER" AND ALSO REPEATED IT AT THE AIRPORT TODAY. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THIS? AND HOW DOES IT AFFECT TURKEY AND THE REGION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: IT AFFECTS IT BY PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION. IT AFFECTS IT BECAUSE, IN THE DEFEAT OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION, WE SET A NEW MORAL TONE. AGGRESSION IS NOT GOING TO STAND. AND SO NOW WE WANT TO BUILD ON THAT. WE SAID IT BY USING THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN UNPRECEDENTED WAY. I SAY "WE" -- NOT THE UNITED STATES -- TURKEY AND EVERY OTHER COUNTRY, COMING TOGETHER UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTING UNDER THE RUBRIC OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SO IT'S THAT, AND IT IS PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, AND IT IS ALSO COUPLED, THE NEW WORLD ORDER, WITH THIS INEXORABLE MOVE

TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM THAT'S TAKING PLACE. A LOT OF COUNTRIES HAVEN'T HAD THE BENEFITS OF DEMOCRACY LIKE THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY. A LOT OF THEM ARE JUST BEGINNING TO GO DOWN THAT PATH. SO IT'D BE ALL OF THOSE COMPONENTS COMING TOGETHER.

Q WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THERE WILL BE A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE? YOU SAY YOU'RE GETTING VERY POSITIVE REPORTS FROM DAMASCUS AND CAIRO, BUT THERE SEEM TO BE SIGNALS OTHERWISE FROM ISRAEL. WHAT DO YOU THINK IS GOING TO HAPPEN? DO YOU HAVE ANY FALLBACK POSITION OR OPTION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'RE NOT TRYING TO FALL BACK AT THIS JUNCTURE, BECAUSE JIM BAKER HAS ENCOUNTERED POSITIVE RESPONSES IN SYRIA. I'VE SEEN HIS REPORT. I TALKED TO HIM YESTERDAY AS A MATTER OF FACT. I'VE SEEN HIS REPORTS FROM EGYPT WHICH I WOULD INTERPRET AS POSITIVE. HE'S ON TO SAUDI ARABIA NOW. AND I BELIEVE IN MY HEART OF HEARTS THAT, WHEN THIS IS EXPLAINED ON HIS LAST STOP, WHEN THIS IS EXPLAINED IN ISRAEL, THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL SEE THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO COME FORWARD AND TALK PEACE. AND THAT'S WHAT THIS IS ALL ABOUT.

AND SO I'M NOT -- WE DON'T HAVE ANY FALLBACK POSITION. WE THINK WE'VE PUT FORWARD SOME GOOD IDEAS, AND I'M VERY HAPPY THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES HAVE NOW -- SEE THE MERIT IN THESE IDEAS. AND I HOPE THAT ALL OF THEM WILL. THERE'S STILL SOME IMPORTANT STOPS ON THIS MISSION. SAUDI ARABIA IS ONE. JORDAN ANOTHER. AND, OF COURSE, ISRAEL, TERRIBLY IMPORTANT IN THE EQUATION, TOO.

I'VE HEARD MIXED STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, BUT THAT'S NOT THE WAY THESE THINGS HAPPEN. YOU DON'T GET DETERRED WHEN ONE MINISTER OR ANOTHER RESPONDS IN ANY COUNTRY. YOU JUST GO FORWARD WITH WHAT YOU THINK IS RIGHT. AND I AGAIN SALUTE OUR SECRETARY OF STATE. I GO BACK TO BRIT'S QUESTION. I DON'T KNOW HOW -- JIM BAKER USED TO GET TIRED WHEN HE DROVE ACROSS TOWN IN WASHINGTON, DC. LITERALLY. HE'D ALWAYS CALL ME UP AND TELL ME HOW TIRED HE WAS CAMPAIGNING AND ALL OF THAT. NOW HE'S GOING ALL AROUND THE WORLD ALL THE TIME, DEDICATED TO TRYING TO HELP SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

AND SO I SEE NO REASON TO HAVE ANY FALLBACK POSITION. WHAT I SEE IS TO BE AS SUPPORTIVE AS WE CAN NOT ONLY OF WHAT BAKER IS TRYING TO DO, BUT TO GET MY INVOLVEMENT TO GET THESE OTHER COUNTRIES ALONG THE WAY TO BE SUPPORTIVE. AND WE'RE GOING TO DO JUST EXACTLY THAT. I THINK THE WORLD IS CRYING OUT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND AS LONG AS I'VE KNOWN TURGUT OZAL, HE'S TOLD ME, "YOU MUST HELP SOLVE THIS PROBLEM." AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO DO.

AND SO EVERY TIME YOU HEAR SOME NEGATIVE COMMENT OR COMMENT OF RESERVE, YOU CAN'T GET DISCOURAGED. YOU GO FORWARD ON A QUESTION

OF PRINCIPLE, AND THAT'S WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING, AND I'M
VERY PROUD OF OUR SECRETARY OF STATE.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH.

END

עד כאן
עתונות

צה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22131
אל: רהמש/1151
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 388, תא: 210791, זח: 1411, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר
אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת, ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש בתורכיה, ביום ראשון

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH PHOTO OPPORTUNITY ISTANBUL, TURKEY
SUNDAY, JULY 21, 1991

Q WELL, I ACTUALLY WANTED TO ASK, SIR, IF -- HE TALKED EARLIER ABOUT THAT ONE -- THE WORD PRESSURE IN RELATION TO ISRAEL. THERE HAVEN'T BEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS (INAUDIBLE) THIS CREATED A SITUATION WHICH REQUIRES POSSIBLY A NEW RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELIS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'RE ASKING THAT THERE BE COGNITIVE RESPONSES FROM ALL THE PARTIES, AND WE -- YOU KNOW, OUR POLICY IS WELL KNOWN WITH ISRAEL AND THE SETTLEMENTS. WE HAVEN'T CHANGED ONE BIT. AND SO THERE'S SOME STICKING POINTS THERE. BUT I THINK MOSTLY FOR THE ROUND, THE VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS POSITIVE. THE SYRIAN LETTER, THE RESPONSES OUT OF LEBANON, THE RESPONSES OUT OF EGYPT, ARE POSITIVE.

AND I AM CONFIDENT -- I HOPE IT'S NOT MISPLACED CONFIDENCE -- BUT WHEN THE SECRETARY GETS TO ISRAEL HE WILL FIND THAT THEY, LIKE ALL THESE OTHER COUNTRIES, REALIZE THE TIME FOR PEACE IS AT HAND. WE'VE BEEN TALKING, FOR EXAMPLE, ON CYPRUS HERE. I HAVEN'T HAD THE CHANCE TO HEAR FROM MR. DEMIREL'S POSITION, BUT OUR POSITION HAS BEEN THERE OUGHT TO BE A (INAUDIBLE) MEETING. AND GREECE HAS NOT AGREED TO THAT YET, AND THIS PROPOSAL WAS MADE BY THE TURKS, BUT THERE'S, YOU KNOW, THERE'S STILL DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT.

BUT THAT'S OUR COMMON -- OUR POSITION. WE GOT IT OUT THERE

ON PURPOSE AND WE'RE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. SIMILARLY, IN THE MIDEAST, WE'VE PUT OUT A PROPOSAL THAT NOW IS GETTING THE KIND OF SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS PARTIES THAT I THINK THE WORLD HAS LONG AWAITED. SO, WE'LL JUST KEEP TRYING. WE CAN'T DICTATE ON EITHER OF THESE TWO QUESTIONS, BUT WE SURE CAN BE HELPFUL.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU DID SUCCEED IN ARRANGING A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE, WOULD YOU TRAVEL TO THE REGION TO HOST THE OPENING CEREMONY?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT'S PREMATURE. I'D GO ANYWHERE IF IT WOULD BE REALLY, TRULY PRODUCTIVE, TO HELP THERE OR HELP ON ANY OTHER QUESTION. BUT I THINK IT'S WAY PREMATURE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THIS JUNCTURE, AT SOME MEETING OR OTHER, COULD BE HELPFUL. BUT WE'RE MOVING -- THE PROCESS IS MOVING, AND I THINK THAT'S THE KEY POINT. I JUST HAVEN'T THOUGHT ABOUT THAT PARTICULAR QUESTION.

Q WE KNOW THAT YOU'RE RUNNING SHORT OF SETTLEMENTS SIR, WITH THE SUSPENSION OF THE SETTLEMENTS, WOULD THAT HELP -- JUST STOPPING WHERE THEY ARE RIGHT NOW, JUST MARKING TIME? WOULD THAT BE A KEY THING FOR THE ISRAELIS TO DO NOW?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I WOULD THINK SO. WE -- YOU KNOW -- THAT'S BEEN OUR POSITION. I HAD A ONE-ON-ONE DISCUSSION WITH MR. SHAMIR ABOUT THIS A MONTH AGO, AND MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES POLICY WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE SETTLEMENTS. AND SO THAT WAS -- OUR POSITION HASN'T CHANGED ON THAT, AND --

Q MR. PRESIDENT, SURELY MR. SHAMIR HAS MADE CLEAR TO YOU --

PRESIDENT BUSH: DON'T ANSWER THAT TOM, JUST ASK THE QUESTION.

Q IT WOULD SEEM THAT MR. SHAMIR HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL, AND YET --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT SO SURE OF THAT. YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S MADE CLEAR TO ME, AND WHAT HE HASN'T. WHAT I'M SAYING IS I'M HOPEFUL HE'LL ACCEPT IT.

Q BESIDES A SETTLEMENT FREEZE, WHAT'S THE MOST THE ISRAELIS COULD DO NOW?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'M NOT SURE. THERE'S A LOT OF -- WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A CONFERENCE, THAT'LL LEAD TO ONE-ON-ONE TALKS. ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS ARE IMPORTANT. BUT JOHN'S QUESTION ON SETTLEMENTS HAS BEEN IMPORTANT. I THINK ANYBODY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL TELL YOU, AND I HESITATE TO SPEAK FOR MY GUEST THAT I JUST MET, BUT I HAVEN'T ENCOUNTERED ANYBODY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THAT THINKS FREEZING SETTLEMENTS IS A HELPFUL. AND THE U.S. POLICY HAS

BEEN OPPOSED TO IT FOR YEARS. SO THIS ISN'T ANYTHING TO DO WITH US, THIS ISN'T NEW AT ALL.

Q WHAT ABOUT THE SAUDIS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'RE HEARING POSITIVE THINGS OUT OF THE SAUDIS, AND ALL THAT IS GOOD.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- THE FACT THAT THE SYRIANS NO LONGER REQUIRING THE PLO PRESENCE. IS THAT -- IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK THAT THE SYRIAN LETTER AND BAKER'S FOLLOW-ON TALKS WITH SYRIA IS VERY, VERY IMPORTANT AND I JUST DON'T WANT TO GO INTO THE DETAILS BUT LET THE SECRETARY TALK ABOUT THAT. AND NOW, HAVING VIOLATED MY "NON-SUNDAY ANSWERING QUESTIONS THAT THROW-UP POLICY," THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH.

THANK YOU ALL.

END

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עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (דוצ)

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ACTION USIS INFO CG DFO PCL ACC

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RUEHFE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3706

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 12872

USIA

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE
FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. POPADIUK

USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, NEA

E.C. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY BAKER PRESS CONFERENCE
- ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT 7/19/91

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A CLEARED TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY BAKER'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT - 7/19/91.

BEGIN TRANSCRIPT:

PRESIDENT MUBARAK AT THIS TIME I WELCOME THE SECRETARY FOR THE SECOND TIME IN ALEXANDRIA AND HIS VISIT THIS TIME CAME AFTER THE POSITIVE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD. IT WAS VERY ENCOURAGING AND IT IS GIVING THE PEACE PROCESS A BOOST AND WE HOPE THAT WE COULD CONCLUDE SOMETHING AFTER THE TRIP WHICH THE SECRETARY IS GOING TO DO TOMORROW IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT WHAT WORRIES ME IS THE BUILDING OF THE NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. I THINK AND I BELIEVE IF ISRAEL COULD SUSPEND BUILDING THE SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, I BELIEVE THAT THE ARAB STATES SHOULD TAKE A RECIPROCAL STEP BY SUSPENDING THE BOYCOTTING. THESE STEPS COULD PAVE THE WAY FOR MUCH MORE PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. I AM VERY PLEASED AGAIN TO DISCUSS WITH THE SECRETARY SO MANY ISSUES AND MAINLY THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING BIG EFFORTS AND ALL OF US HOPE THAT WE COULD REACH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT SO AS PEACE COULD PREVAIL IN THIS AREA WHICH HAS STAYED FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS NOW. AND IF PEACE PREVAILS, IT IS MY PERSONAL OPINION, ISRAEL WILL BE THE BIGGEST WINNER IN THE WHOLE AREA. THANK YOU.

SECRETARY BAKER: LET ME SIMPLY SAY, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT

I'M VERY PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HERE WITH YOU AND TO MEET WITH YOU AND TO MEET WITH THE MINISTER. WE ARE GOING TO, AS I SAID LAST NIGHT IN DAMASCUS, WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO WORK VERY HARD TO CREATE A PROCESS THAT COULD LEAD US TOWARD THE GOAL OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND LET ME SAY WITH RESPECT TO THE STATEMENT THAT YOU JUST MADE RESPECTING RECIPROCAL STEPS, THAT IS, SUSPENSION OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL IN EXCHANGE IN EFFECT FOR SUSPENSION BY ISRAEL OF SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, I THINK IF STEPS LIKE THAT COULD BE TAKEN, CLEARLY IT WOULD EVIDENCE, I THINK, A MUTUAL DESIRE TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS -- NEGOTIATIONS OF COURSE, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS AND BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS, WHICH ARE THE FOLLOW-ON OBJECTIVES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE THAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO ARRANGE. AND THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR HOSTING ME AND OUR DELEGATION HERE IN ALEXANDRIA ON VERY SHORT NOTICE.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU PREPARED TO HOST A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE HERE IN EGYPT, AND IF SO WHEN?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HOSTING THE CONFERENCE HERE IN EGYPT. THE POINT IS, IF IT COULD CONVENE IN EGYPT, WE WELCOME THAT. IF THEY DON'T WANT EGYPT, ANYWHERE, IT'S NOT A PROBLEM FOR US. THE POINT IS, WE WOULD LIKE THE CONFERENCE TO CONVENE AND STARTING WORK FOR THE PEACE PROCESS.

Q: WHEN?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: ANYTIME.

Q: NEXT WEEK?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: MAYBE TOMORROW IF THEY COULD.

Q: WHEN DO YOU HAVE IN MIND THAT IT COULD BEGIN?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I HOPE IT SHOULD CONVENE AND MAKE GOOD PROGRESS IN A VERY SHORT TIME -- ONE MONTH, TWO MONTHS MAXIMUM.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, DID YOU SPEAK TO PRESIDENT ASSAD IN

YOUR RECENT MEETING WITH HIM ABOUT THIS RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT OF LIFTING THE BOYCOTT IN RETURN FOR AN END TO SETTLEMENTS, AND WHAT WAS HIS VIEW?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I DIDN'T DISCUSS IT VERY CLEARLY IN THAT WAY, BUT I THINK AND I BELIEVE, IF THE ARAB STATES FIND THAT ISRAEL RESPONDS TO THE SUSPENSION OF BUILDING MUCH MORE SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, I THINK THEY WILL GO THROUGH WITH THE SUSPENSION OF THE BOYCOTT.

Q: HAVE ANY OTHER LEADERS TOLD YOU THIS DIRECTLY AND CAN YOU TELL US WHO?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK SO MANY, I THINK, SO MANY COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT MY IDEA.

Q: ARE YOU SAYING, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT IF THE ISRAELIS SHOULD CONSIDER THIS, NOT AS A SUGGESTION ON YOUR PART, BUT ACTUALLY AN OFFER ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB STATES IN GENERAL? IS THIS A FIRM OFFER, OR IS THIS AN IDEA THAT YOU ARE PUTTING ON THE TABLE FOR CONSIDERATION?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: YOU CAN CONSIDER IT AN OFFER AS FAR AS I SAID IT PUBLICLY, MAYBE AN OFFER, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE RESPONSE FROM THE ARAB WORLD WILL BE POSITIVE.

SECRETARY BAKER: COULD I JUST ADD THERE, IF I MIGHT MR. PRESIDENT, THAT A SUGGESTION THAT THERE WOULD BE A SUSPENSION OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, I THINK CERTAINLY EVIDENCES A DESIRE ON THE PART OF ARAB STATES TO RECONCILE WITH ISRAEL, AND CERTAINLY SHOULD GIVE A BOOST TOWARD THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE HOPE -- DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS -- THAT WE HOPE WOULD FOLLOW A PEACE CONFERENCE.

Q: IS IT A CONDITION TO HOLDING A PEACE CONFERENCE, MUST ISRAEL STOP SETTLEMENTS AND MUST THE ARABS STOP THE BOYCOTT BEFORE A PEACE CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE? MUST THAT HAPPEN FIRST?

SECRETARY BAKER: IT'S NOT A CONDITION AS STATED, RALPH, IN THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE. IT IS NOT A CONDITION, BUT AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SAID FOR SOME TIME THAT WE THINK THAT MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES OF THIS NATURE WOULD PROMOTE A POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, HAVE THE ISRAELIS TOLD YOU PRIVATELY THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE A RECIPROCAL GESTURE IF THIS WERE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE ARABS?

SECRETARY BAKER NO, THEY HAVE NOT.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION? HOW SHOULD THE PALESTINIANS BE REPRESENTED AT A PEACE CONFERENCE? WITH JORDAN, OR SOME OTHER WAY?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I THINK WITH JORDAN. I DON'T THINK IT WILL BE A PROBLEM TO HAVE A JOINT DELEGATION WITH THE JORDANIANS. IT'S NOT A PROBLEM.

Q: AND THAT'S THE WAY YOU THINK IT SHOULD HAPPEN?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I THINK IT SHOULD HAPPEN LIKE THIS. JUST TO MAKE IT EASY FOR THE CONFERENCE TO START WITH AT LEAST.

Q: DOES THE U.S. THINK THAT MR. SHAMIR WILL ACCEPT PEACE FOR LAND?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, LET ME SAY THIS I HOPE, AND I SAID THIS LAST NIGHT, THAT I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS REGARDING THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD LAUNCH DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS AND

BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS, AND THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THAT CONFERENCE WOULD BE TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. AND HAVING SAID THAT, LET ME SAY AGAIN AS I DID LAST NIGHT, THAT DIFFERENT PARTIES HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT 242 AND 338 REQUIRE. AND THAT IS THE REASON FOR NEGOTIATIONS, IN ORDER TO SPECIFICALLY DEFINE WITH CERTAINTY, EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUIRED BY THOSE RESOLUTIONS.

Q: (INAUDIBLE)

SECRETARY BAKER: I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION.

Q: THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT THEY STILL REFUSE THE PEACE PROCESS -- LAND FOR PEACE ...

SECRETARY BAKER: LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I DON'T DO. I DO NOT NEGOTIATE THROUGH THE PRESS. I'M SORRY, THEREFORE I WILL NOT RESPOND TO WHAT YOU MIGHT HAVE READ OR HEARD OR SEEN SOMEONE ELSE SAY OR DO. I WILL BE SPEAKING MYSELF DIRECTLY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL WHEN I GET THERE SUNDAY.

Q: AS THINGS STAND THIS AFTERNOON, HOW FAR ARE YOU FROM BEING ABLE TO SEND OUT INVITATIONS TO A PEACE CONFERENCE WITH THE REASONABLE CONFIDENCE YOU WILL GET POSITIVE REPLIES FROM ALL OF THE PARTIES?

SECRETARY BAKER WELL, WE HAVE A WAYS TO GO. BUT I MUST SAY THAT I THINK THE SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS MADE HERE THIS AFTERNOON WITH RESPECT TO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES CAN ONLY BE POSITIVE IN TERMS OF CREATING A BETTER CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

Q DO YOU HAVE A MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AT THIS FAIRLY CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING A PEACE CONFERENCE STARTED? IS THERE A MESSAGE THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEND TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL AT THIS POINT?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK REALLY ALL WHAT I SAID NOW, I THINK YOU WILL HEAR AFTER THE CONFERENCE FINISHES, ALL A MESSAGE TO MR. SHAMIR, AND I AM STILL TELLING HIM THAT PEACE IS VERY PRECIOUS, AND I SAID IT SEVERAL TIMES. (INAUDIBLE) ANY KIND OF CONCESSIONS FROM THE (INAUDIBLE). SO I AM SAYING, IF HE COULD SUSPEND BUILDING MUCH MORE SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, WE ASK OUR BROTHERS IN THE ARAB WORLD TO SUSPEND, AS A RECIPROCAL STEP, THE BOYCOTT. AND THIS ISRAELI, I'M TELLING MR. SHAMIR, IS MEASURES FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING WHICH WILL HELP THE NEGOTIATIONS OR THE CONFERENCE TO CONVEIN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

Q: MR. SECRETARY PLEASE, COULD YOU TELL US IF THE UNITED STATES COULD FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION INSTEAD OF

ATTACKING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN IRAQ?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, THE UNITED STATES HAS WORKED VERY HARD TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. YOU KNOW YOURSELF HOW MANY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN PASSED RESPECTING THIS MATTER. YOU ARE AWARE, OF COURSE, THAT IRAQ HERSELF AGREED TO THE LAST, SPECIFICALLY AGREED TO THE LAST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WAS PASSED. AND WHAT WE ASK, AND WHAT I THINK MOST OF THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASKS, IS THAT IRAQ SIMPLY DO WHAT IT HAS PROMISED IT WOULD DO AND RESPECT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND BE FORTHCOMING AND COME FORWARD HONESTLY AND FULLY WITH RESPECT TO ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. AND DO NOT DENY ACCESS TO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS AND INSPECTORS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE REPORT

FROM THE U.N. INSPECTION TEAM IN BAGHDAD THAT PERHAPS IRAQ HAS FULLY DISCLOSED EVERYTHING AND THAT MUCH OF THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES WERE, IN FACT, DESTROYED DURING THE GULF WAR?

SECRETARY BAKER WELL, WE ARE ANALYZING THAT REPORT RIGHT NOW IN WASHINGTON AND THEREFORE I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO COMMENT ON IT RIGHT NOW, BUT WE WILL HAVE A REACTION WITH RESPECT TO IT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHY DO YOU BELIEVE SYRIA HAS REACTED POSITIVELY TO YOUR EARLIER SUGGESTIONS AT THIS TIME? IS THERE SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO THE TIMING?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT THIS NOW FOR QUITE SOMETIME. THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ON THE TABLE FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS AND I THINK THAT I AM NOT THE PERSON TO TELL YOU WHY SYRIA MADE WHAT I CHARACTERIZED LAST NIGHT AS A VERY, VERY IMPORTANT AND, I THINK, POSITIVE DECISION.

Q WAS THAT DECISION EXPECTED OR DID THIS COME AS A SURPRISE?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, THAT'S NOT IMPORTANT WHETHER I EXPECTED IT OR NOT. IT'S THERE. NOW LET'S SEE IF WE CAN BUILD ON IT TO CREATE A CLIMATE FOR PEACE AND A PROCESS FOR PEACE.

Q: PRESIDENT MUBARAK, DO YOU SEE ANY VALUE, PRIOR TO OPENING A PEACE CONFERENCE, IN YOU GETTING TOGETHER WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IN A BILATERAL WAY PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF A MULTILATERAL PEACE CONFERENCE?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I'M NOT AGAINST MEETING WITH MR. SHAMIR ANYWAY AND HE KNOWS THAT VERY WELL.

Q: YOU HAVEN'T MET WITH HIM?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK I HAVEN'T MET WITH HIM BECAUSE I TOLD HIM OUR MEETING SHOULD BE STUDIED, OR SHOULD BE VERY WELL STUDIED BEFOREHAND TO COME OUT WITH SOMETHING TO THE PUBLIC. BUT JUST MEETING AND COMING OUT WITHOUT ANYTHING, WITHOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS OR ANY HOPE FOR THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS, IT WILL HAVE A VERY BAD REACTION AND THIS MAY COMPLICATE THE WHOLE THING.
KEITH

EGAN
BT
#2872

NNNN

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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שמור / מייד

19/7/91

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

לקראת בקור המזכיר בייקר - מבט מן ה"גבעה"

להלן מספר נקודות על הלך הרוח ב"גבעה" לאור ההפתחויות והאחרונות בהקשר ל"מכתב התשובה הסורי" ולקראת בקורו הצפוי של המזכיר בייקר בישראל:

1. חוגי הממשל פועלים להחזרת מסרים כאילו ישראל סרבנית, כאילו ישראל חייבת לשקול קבלת החלטות קשות, כאילו הממשל יפנה אצבע מאשימה כלפי ישראל אם זו תתמיד בסירובה לקבלת נוסחאות "משקיף האו"ם הפסיבי" וה"ועידה המחכנסת", וכאילו התוצאה של "סרבנות ישראל" תהיה סיכון הערבויות להלוואות. (נמסר לי כי פעולה דומה נעשית גם בקרב עתונאים מקומיים וישראלים ופעילים יהודים).

2. ה"גבעה" מפריזה בין אי-הסכמתה עם עמדות ישראל בהקשר תהליך השלום (למרות שהניסוק בכך הוא משני לחלוטין לאור הפעילות הקדחנית בתחיקות ובמשברי פנים), לבין התהייה האם לתרגם את אי-ההסכמה (שאיננה תופעה חדשה לפחות מאז 1967) ליצירת זיקה בין תהליך השלום לבין אשור הערבויות להלוואות.

3. כדי להבין את מימדי החשיבות של ה"תשובה הסורית" (כפי שידועה מדיווחי התקשורת) וזעיני הנבחרים התומכים בתחיקות הערבויות, מן הראוי לציין את הערכתם כי קבלת הפנים חמצפה בישראל למזכיר המדינה עלולה להשפיע בצורה משמעותית יותר על התיחסותם לתחיקה. הכוונה היא לחששם כי תרחיש ה-POKE IN THE EYE עלול לחזור על עצמו, והפעם עם הדהודים שליליים ביותר (MAKE OR BREAK) אפילו בקרב התומכים המושבעים של ישראל ב"גבעה".

4. לפי תגובות ה"גבעה", חסר עדין הנופך הדרמטי בידיעות המגיעות מדמשק. הנבחרים מנתינים עדיין לגירסה המלאה של "המכתב המעורפל מדמשק", ואינם מקבלים את פרשנות הממשל או את כותרות העיתונים כתורה מסיני. אם תוגבל תימצתיהן להחרמה ר"חשהים עו"ח שחורג" רל"ונוודה מחתומם" ושינוי נרדחה

4. לפי תגובות ה"גבעה", חסר עדין הנופך הדרמטי בידיעות המגיעות מדמשק. הנבחרים מנתינים עדיין לגירסה המלאה של "המכתב המעורפל מדמשק", ואינם

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שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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5. התגובה הראשונית, והטבעית, היא של אכזבה מן הצד (ישראל) המביע ספקנות, זהירות וזשדנות. התגובה מלווה בטענות ואפילו האשמות המוטחות בישראל. יחד עם זאת, ללא מרכיב דרמטי (אסד פונה ישירות לישראל; אסד מכריז על מחוות דרמטיות בנושאי יהדות סוריה, חרם ערבי, מצב הלוחמה; אסד חוזר על צעדי סאדאת עד לבקורו בי-ם, שלא לדבר על בקור בישראל...). אפשר להניח שתחושת האכזבה לא תתורגם לצעד דרמטי שלילי כלפי ישראל. ללא צעד דרמטי מצד סוריה או מדינה ערבית אחרת, אפשר אף להניח שהמדובר בתגובות קצרות טווח.

6. אסד אינו סדאת ו אסד קרוב יותר - בתודעת הנבחרים - לצדאט מאשר לסדאתו לאור צילו המעיק של לשונו הכפולה של צדאט המעיב על נבחרים לא מעטים, אין הם נופזים למסקנות נמהרות וזוהרות לגבי ידיעות בלתי-נחרצות מדמשק.

7. התמיכה הנוסורתית בישראל (מצד ה"גבעה") מהווה בסוגי הזדהות עם מערכת ערכים רחנה הרבה יותר מתהליך השלום בכלל ופרשנות לגבי צעדים בלתי-ברווים של אסד בפרט. כדי להינתק ממסורת זו - בעלת מרכיבים רעיוניים, מוסריים, אסטרטגיים ופוליטיים - יהייה על הנבחרים לעמוד בפני התפוחות חריגה. מימדי התגובה הסורית, כפי שידועים ב"גבעה" ברגע זה, אינם מהווים התפתחות חריגה, ולכן אינם מצדיקים (אליבא דינבחרים) הצבעה חריגה בנושא הערביות להלוואות.

8. השאלה על הפרק איננה הצבעת תמיכה במדיניות ישראל כלפי תהליך השלום, אלא האם להסכים לזיקה (כפי שהמשל, כנראה, שואף) בין תהליך השלום לבין הסיוע לקליטת יהודי ברה"מ. אפשר לבחון זאת על רקע "דילמת הזיקה" מחודש אוגוסט. בנגוד לממשל (כנראה) וחלק מן התקשורת, הסתייגה ה"גבעה" מזיקה בין סיום אפשרי של משבר המפרץ לבין תהליך השלום והנושא הפלסטיני. ה"גבעה" שללה אז את עקרון הזיקה למרות שקבלתו יכולה היתה, כביכול, לחסוך מארה"ב מעורבות בעימות צבאי בעל מחיר זמים פוסנציאלי כבד. הזיקה נדחתה מכיוון שה"גבעה" התנגדה לנסיון "לערב בין תפוחים לתפוזים". הפעם עומדת על הפרק שאלת זיקה אשר איננה כה מפתה לאימוץ מכיוון שאיננה נוגעת לבטחונם הפיזי של חילים אמריקאים. רעיון הזיקה הנוכחי הוא לחבור יחדיו בין נושא אשר אין עוררין לגבי אנושיותו ובהירותו לבין נושא פוליטי מורכב ומסובך. להערכת תפגין ה"גבעה" עקביות בוזחנגדותה לזיקה, למרות שלילתה את מהות העמדה הישראלית (בתהליך השלום) כפי שמצטירת היום בתקשורת.

9. ההצבעה על תחיקות הערביות להלוואות איננה מהווה הצבעה שגרתית. על הפרק עומדות למעשה השאלה: האם תכשיל ה"גבעה" משימה אנושית היסטורית המהווה חלק בלתי-נפרד מפעילות הנבחרים בעשרים השנים האחרונות ("שלח את עמי"), על בסיס מידע מעורפל הקשור ל"קליינט מפוקפק" כאסאד, תוך הינתקות ממסורת יחסים עניפה וחיובית עם ישראל ותומכיה?

10. עיני ה"גבעה" נשואות גם לתגובות התומכים בישראל (ובמיוחד הקהילה היהודית). כל סדק בחזית היהודית (אשר אין לה תקדים בחיוביותה), בכל הקשור לשלילת הזיקה, עלול לעודד סדק דומה בהעמדת ה"גבעה". מצ"ל נייר עמדה של איפ"ק בזכות הערביות ובגנות הזיקה.

יורה אטינגר

July 12, 1991

KEY POINTS ON THE ABSORPTION LOAN GUARANTEES

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No Linkage to Settlements:

* The absorption of Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants in Israel is a *humanitarian* issue. U.S. loan guarantees to help in that absorption should not be linked to the *political* issue of Israel's settlement policy in the territories. The hundreds of thousands of Jews beginning a new life of freedom and dignity in Israel ought not to become pawns in the political campaign to stop settlements, for which they were not responsible and which are unrelated to their absorption in Israel. It was heartening to hear President Bush announce on July 1 that he would "avoid the linkage" between absorption loan guarantees and settlements and that "I don't think it ought to be a quid pro quo."

* There is no connection between the absorption of Soviet Jewish immigration and the settlements in the territories: Israel remains committed to its long-established pledge not to spend any U.S. aid money in the territories and to Foreign Minister David Levy's (October 2, 1990) commitment not to direct or settle Soviet Jews in the territories, while permitting them to live wherever they wish. According to a March 1991 State Department report, only 1.2% of the Soviet Jews arriving in Israel settled in the territories, and that low rate continues: According to a detailed statistical analysis issued by Israel's Absorption Ministry on May 15, less than one percent of the Soviet Jews who arrived in January-April 1991 settled in the territories. Indeed, Secretary Baker stated on July 2 that the Administration had "not said that there have been any commitments [in the Levy letter] that have not been kept."

* The fact that there is no peace in the Middle East is unrelated to Israel's settlement policy. The Arab governments' refusal to negotiate peace with Israel has in no way been affected by the settlement activity: They refused to negotiate even before the first settlement was established; they adhered to that refusal during the era of Labor government when few settlements were built--and even when Israel temporarily froze settlement activity altogether in 1978.

* Prime Minister Shamir has stated that settlements are negotiable: "Settlements are part of the essence of the conflict. This is the conflict: To whom belongs the land of Israel? We say it belongs to us. The Arabs say it belongs to them. And when you are faced with such a reality, you have to choose between the two options--the option of a negotiation or a confrontation. We prefer a negotiation" (*New York Times*, 6/11/91).

No Linkage to the Peace Process:

* There is no justification for any linkage between the absorption loan guarantees and the peace process. As in the case of settlements, the *humanitarian* issue of U.S. loan guarantees for immigration absorption in Israel should not be linked to the *political* issue of disagreements over the peace process.

* The Israeli government has made major concessions that have not been matched by the Arabs: Despite its conviction that direct negotiations are the only promising path to peace, it has accepted the notion of a superpower-sponsored regional peace conference; although Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh declared in Damascus that the Soviet and Arab positions are identical, it has agreed to Soviet cosponsorship; and despite long-established European hostility to Israel and support for the PLO, it has accepted European participation.

* The loan guarantees will increase stability in the region. By helping Israel absorb a million highly skilled immigrants into its economy, the loan guarantees will contribute to Israel's economic and overall strength. A strong Israel deters war and is more likely to be forthcoming in the peace process than a weak and insecure Israel.

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America's Leadership Role in the Liberation of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews:

* Having succeeded in liberating the oppressed Jews of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, America's challenge now is to do its best to facilitate their absorption in Israel. The United States worked tirelessly since the 1970s to open the gates of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia for Jewish emigration. Now that these efforts have led to massive Jewish emigration, U.S. policy has been to limit the number of Soviet Jews admitted in this country to 40,000 and encourage the immigration of the rest to Israel. As President Bush stated at a White House Passover ceremony last year, "We will continue to do everything possible for Soviet Jews to get to Israel." As hundreds of thousands of them are arriving in Israel, it is only natural that we should follow through by helping them achieve a brighter future in their new home.

No Cost to American Taxpayers:

* The U.S. government will not be asked to provide Israel a grant-or even a loan-but only a guarantee that will enable the Israelis to obtain absorption loans from commercial American banks. Under the new Budget Reform Act, U.S. government loan guarantee programs must have a budgetary impact determined by the level of risk incurred in issuing the guarantee. The only "cost" of such guarantees is a small percentage which is set aside in a "reserve fund" in case any country defaults on its loan repayment. This minimal cost will be subtracted from the foreign aid budget and will not be added to the federal deficit.

Israel Will Fully Repay the Loan:

* The government of Israel has never defaulted on any foreign or domestic debt obligation.

* The foreign-debt burden on Israel's economy is lower than that of many industrialized countries, including Canada. Its proportion in Israel's gross domestic product (GDP) has steadily decreased for several years now and continues to improve. In 1990 it amounted to only 36.1 percent of Israel's GDP--which is less than the proportion in Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and other highly developed countries. Even if Israel undertakes an additional \$10 billion debt service, that proportion will be much more favorable than it was in 1985. By all international standards, Israel is fully capable of incurring additional debt for absorption. While continued economic liberalization in Israel is important, it is not a prerequisite for Israel to fulfill its debt obligations.

* Israel's ability to repay any absorption loans will dramatically increase. Every past immigration wave has had a positive impact on economic growth--both in Israel and in the United States. Given the extraordinarily high proportion of scientists, engineers, architects, technicians, and other professionals among the current Soviet immigrants, the economic benefit for Israel will be enormous if the proper level of investment is obtained to realize the potential of this unique brainpower.

Equity:

* Loan guarantees to Israel in no way affect domestic guarantee programs. In fact, the Federal government extends hundreds of billions of dollars worth of loan guarantees to a myriad of domestic programs. As in the case of Israel, the criteria for approving such guarantees are need and the ability to repay the loan. There is no basis for the complaint that the United States would be extending loan guarantees to Israel while denying such guarantees to worthy domestic projects.

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*SUF701 07/21/91

LOG, WIRELESS FILE SUNDAY EDITION, JULY 21

SUF701. SUNDAY LOG

702. BUSH OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR MIDEAST PEACE TALKS

(Believes all countries will "talk peace").....750

703. MUBARAK, BAKER URGE ISRAELI, ARAB "RECIPROCAL STEPS"

(Transcript: 7/19 Alexandria news conference)...2,140

704. BAUCUS GETS BUSH LETTER, MFN DEBATE BEGINS JULY 22

(Transcript: 7/19 Press Conference).....6,350

705. BUSH NOT ANTICIPATING USING MILITARY FORCE ON IRAQ

(Transcript: 7/20 press conference with Ozal)...4,730

706. BUSH SAYS MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS "MOVING"

(Asks Israel to stop building in occupied land)...340

707. BUSH CALLS FOR NEW U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP

(Would blend trade, investment with military).....400

708. BUSH NOMINATES NEW AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY

(Text: White House statement).....220

709. BUSH HOPES ISRAELIS SEE TIME FOR PEACE IS "AT HAND"

(Transcripts: Remarks at two events).....1,240

710. BUSH WANTS EXPANDED TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND TURKEY

(Transcript: Remarks At Official Dinner).....1,800

711. U.S. PLEASED SAUDIS BACK EGYPT'S MIDEAST PEACE PLAN

(Transcript: Baker 7/20 Q and A in Jeddah).....460

750. BUSH, IN ATHENS, SETS NEW ARMS AID

(U.S. Press: NYT article by Dowd).....800

751. TORTURE IN TURKEY

(U.S. Press: NYT editorial).....390

752. BUSH, IN TURKEY, MUTES WAR TALK

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753. DOING BEIJING A 2ND FAVOR?

(U.S. Press: NYT article by Kristof).....800

754. A FEW DRINKS, A FEW LAUGHS, A FEW MOMENTOUS DECISIONS

(U.S. Press: NYT article by Apple).....1,430

755. SYRIA'S TACTICAL LEAP INTO THE PEACE PROCESS

(U.S. Press: NYT article by Friedman).....1,050

756. EGYPT CALLS FOR EXCHANGE ON SETTLEMENTS, BOYCOTT

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Hoffman).....770

757. LATIN LEADERS SEEK LARGER GLOBAL ROLE

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Cody).....680

758. SYRIAN TURNABOUT REMOVES OBSTACLE FOR U.S.

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Murphy).....1,190

759. GREEK LEADER PRODS U.S. TO FOCUS ON CYPRUS ISSUE

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Yang).....840

760. BUSH LISTS WAYS OF MODERATING CHINA'S POLICIES

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Gugliotta).....680

761. STILL NO SUN IN KUWAIT

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Anderson, Atta)...910

762. A STUDIED OVERTURE FROM DAMASCUS

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Murphy).....820

763. COUP IN IRAQ: WHY IT FAILED AND HOW IT MAY SUCCEED

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Ignatius).....2,660

764. CHINESE ARE SAID TO HIDE INMATES FROM U.S. ENVOY

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Southerland).....430

765. SAUDIS BACK PLAN ON BOYCOTT

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Hoffman).....1,240

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*suf702 07/21/91

BUSH OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR MIDEAST PEACE TALKS

(Believes all countries will "talk peace") (750)

By Alexander M. Sullivan
USIA White House Correspondent

The Wireless File

Ankara — When American ideas for starting the Middle East on the path to peace are understood, President Bush asserted July 20, all the parties will "come forward and talk peace."

"I believe in my heart of hearts," the president declared, "that when this is explained...in Israel, that all countries will see that it is in their interests to come forward and talk peace."

Bush said Secretary of State Baker is getting "positive responses" in Damascus and Cairo to the dual-track approach to Mideast negotiations. Baker planned to visit Saudi Arabia and Jordan before going to Israel.

The U.S. proposal calls for the United States and the Soviet Union to call a Middle East peace conference involving Israel and her Arab neighbors, with the United Nations, the European Community and the Persian Gulf states as observers. The conference would then move on two tracks, with Israel negotiating directly with Syria and perhaps other Arab nations in one track, while Israel talked with representative Palestinians on the other.

The president said he is not deterred when he reads the "mixed statements" in newspaper accounts quoting an official as rejecting the U.S. proposal. "You don't get deterred," Bush said, "you just go forward with what you think is right....I think the world is crying out for a peaceful solution in the Middle East."

The president's comments came in a joint news conference with Turkish President Ozal, conducted outside the presidential palace overlooking Ankara. Bush winds up his trip with a July 22-23 visit to Istanbul.

Citing Turkey's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and its steadfast support of the Persian Gulf coalition, Bush said Washington supports Ankara's military modernization program, including its 160-plane F-16 development project.

Asked about the new opportunities he cites for settling the Cyprus issue, Bush replied that "when you have reasonable people coping with a long-enduring problem you have a very good opportunity to work it out."

He said the issue is being addressed in a United Nations framework, "where it should be," and said he supports Ozal's call for four-party talks involving Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriote community and the Turkish Cypriote community. Cyprus, he noted, is not an issue "where the United States can dictate, nor would we attempt to dictate terms." The problem, he added, "will not be solved unless the communities get together."

Bush said the major part of his discussion with Ozal covered security on the island, "the geography of the question and how to get these talks started" among the four parties. He said any ideas he might have brought from Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis "should remain confidential."

The fighting between Iraqi forces and Kurdish rebels "is a matter of concern," Bush said, adding he understands the fighting is ending. He said he did not believe the fighting represented an incident that would require intervention.

He said he did not anticipate using the rapid deployment force being formed to guard against attacks on Kurdish civilians. He said he thinks that Saddam Hussein "having learned his lesson once, will hopefully not embark on

the kind of carnage that resulted" in coalition forces entering northern Iraq.

Bush said he sees "nothing redeeming" in the Iraqi leader's behavior, and said again that he would welcome Iraqis getting Saddam Hussein to step aside. But he warned that "No matter who the person is, what the establishment is, we want pledges that they would honor these United Nations resolutions." If that happens, he said, Washington would begin improving relations with Iraq.

At a state dinner in his honor, Bush praised Ozal and his government for their assistance during the Persian Gulf operation and asked that the countries "use the last year as a model of cooperation. As allies, we must create a new strategic relationship."

In remarks on arrival in Ankara, Bush called for closer cooperation between the Turkish and American people, especially in science and medicine, education, the environment, technology and trade, and culture and human rights. "I firmly believe," Bush said, "the years ahead will lead to even stronger and broader U.S.-Turkish ties, and we look forward to laying the foundations for the future by maintaining the alliance that has served us so well."

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*suf703 07/21/91

MUBARAK, BAKER URGE ISRAELI, ARAB "RECIPROCAL STEPS"

(Transcript: 7/19 Alexandria news conference) (2140)

Alexandria, Egypt — Egyptian President Mubarak and U.S. Secretary of State Baker suggested that the suspension of Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories and the suspension of the Arab economic

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boycott of Israel would help improve the climate for peace in the Middle East.

Mubarak and Baker discussed these "reciprocal steps" in a joint news conference following their meeting in Alexandria July 19. The previous day, Baker met in Damascus with Syrian President Assad. Baker's Middle East travel itinerary also includes meetings with officials in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel.

Baker said suspension of the settlements and boycott are not conditions for holding a peace conference on the Middle East. They would represent "mutual confidence building measures" that would clearly "promote a positive climate for negotiations for peace," he said.

Asked whether Israel will accept the land for peace formula, Baker said, "I very much hope that Israel will accept the American proposals regarding the holding of a conference" based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The secretary said that since there are different interpretations of these resolutions, that "is the reason for negotiations, in order to specifically define with certainty, exactly what is required by those resolutions."

Following is the official transcript of the news conference:

(begin transcript)

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: At this time I welcome the Secretary for the second time in Alexandria and his visit this time came after the positive answer of President Hafez Assad. It was very encouraging and it is giving the peace process a boost and we hope that we could conclude some-

thing after the trip which the Secretary is going to do tomorrow in Saudi Arabia and other countries. But what worries me is the building of the new settlements on the occupied territories. I think and I believe if Israel could suspend building the settlements on the occupied territories, I believe that the Arab states should take a reciprocal step by suspending the boycotting. These steps could pave the way for much more progress in the peace process. I am very pleased again to discuss with the Secretary so many issues and mainly the problem of the Middle East. The United States is making big efforts and all of us hope that we could reach a comprehensive settlement so as peace could prevail in this area which has stayed for more than 50 years now. And if peace prevails, it is my personal opinion, Israel will be the biggest winner in the whole area. Thank you.

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me simply say, Mr. President, that I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to be here with you and to meet with you and to meet with the Minister. We are going to, as I said last night in Damascus, we are going to continue to work very hard to create a process that could lead us toward the goal of peace in the Middle East. And let me say with respect to the statement that you just made respecting reciprocal steps, that is, suspension of the Arab boycott of Israel in exchange in effect for suspension by Israel of settlement activity in the occupied territories, I think if steps like that could be taken, clearly it would evidence, I think, a mutual desire to improve the climate for negotiations — negotiations, of course, between Israel and her Arab neighbors and between Israel and Palestinians, which are the follow-on objectives of the peace conference that we have been seeking to arrange. And thank you very much for hosting

me and our delegation here in Alexandria on very short notice.

Q: Mr. President, are you prepared to host a Middle East peace conference here in Egypt, and if so when?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Look, we have no objection to hosting the conference here in Egypt. The point is, if it could convene in Egypt, we welcome that. If they don't want Egypt, anywhere, it's not a problem for us. The point is, we would like the conference to convene and starting work for the peace process.

Q: When?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Anytime.

Q: Next week?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Maybe tomorrow if they could.

Q: When do you have in mind that it could begin?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I hope it should convene and make good progress in a very short time — one month, two months maximum.

Q: Mr. President, did you speak to President Assad in your recent meeting with him about this reciprocal arrangement of lifting the boycott in return for an end to settlements, and what was his view?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Look, I didn't discuss it very clearly in that way, but I think and I believe, if the Arab states find that Israel responds to the suspension of building much more settlements on the occupied territories, I think they will go through with the suspension of the boycott.

Q: Have any other leaders told you

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this directly and can you tell us who?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: So many, I think, so many countries will support my idea.

Q: Are you saying, Mr. President, that if the Israelis should consider this, not as a suggestion on your part, but actually an offer on behalf of the Arab states in general? Is this a firm offer, or is this an idea that you are putting on the table for consideration?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: You can consider it an offer as far as I said it publicly, maybe an offer, and I believe that the response from the Arab world will be positive.

SECRETARY BAKER: Could I just add there, if I might, Mr. President, that a suggestion that there would be a suspension of the Arab boycott of Israel, I think certainly evidences a desire on the part of Arab states to reconcile with Israel, and certainly should give a boost toward the negotiations that we hope — direct negotiations — that we hope would follow a peace conference.

Q: Is it a condition to holding a peace conference, must Israel stop settlements and must the Arabs stop the boycott before a peace conference could take place? Must that happen first?

SECRETARY BAKER: It's not a condition as stated, Ralph, in the proposals which the United States has made. It is not a condition, but as you know, we have said for some time that we think that mutual confidence building measures of this nature would promote a positive climate for negotiations for peace.

Q: Mr. Secretary, have the Israelis

told you privately that they would be willing to make a reciprocal gesture if this were made on behalf of the Arabs?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, they have not.

Q: Mr. President, what about the Palestinian delegation? How should the Palestinians be represented at a peace conference? With Jordan, or some other way?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I think with Jordan. I don't think it will be a problem to have a joint delegation with the Jordanians. It's not a problem.

Q: And that's the way you think it should happen?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I think it should happen like this. Just to make it easy for the conference to start with at least.

Q: Does the U.S. think that Mr. Shamir will accept peace for land?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, let me say this, I hope, and I said this last night, that I very much hope that Israel will accept the American proposals regarding the holding of a conference, which would launch direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors and between Israel and Palestinians, and the terms of reference of that conference would be to seek a comprehensive settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. And having said that, let me say again, as I did last night, that different parties have different interpretations of what 242 and 338 require. And that is the reason for negotiations, in order to specifically define with certainty, exactly what is

required by those resolutions.

Q: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q: The Foreign Minister of Israel announced yesterday that they still refuse the peace process — land for peace...

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me tell you what I don't do, I do not negotiate through the press. I'm sorry, therefore I will not respond to what you might have read or heard or seen someone else say or do. I will be speaking myself directly with the Foreign minister and the Prime Minister of Israel when I get there Sunday.

Q: As things stand this afternoon, how far are you from being able to send out invitations to a peace conference with the reasonable confidence you will get positive replies from all of the parties?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we have a ways to go. But I must say that I think the suggestion that President Mubarak has made here this afternoon with respect to mutual confidence building measures can only be positive in terms of creating a better climate for negotiations.

Q: Do you have a message for Prime Minister Shamir at this fairly crucial moment in the process of getting a peace conference started? Is there a message that you would like to send to the Prime Minister of Israel at this point?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Really, all what I said now, I think you will hear after the conference finishes, all a message to Mr. Shamir, and I am

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still telling him that peace is very precious, and I said it several times. (Inaudible) any kind of concessions from the (inaudible). So I am saying, if he could suspend building much more settlements on the occupied territories, we ask our brothers in the Arab world to suspend, as a reciprocal step, the boycott. And this Israeli, I'm telling Mr. Shamir, is measures for confidence building which will help the negotiations or the conference to convene in the very near future.

Q: Mr. Secretary, please, could you tell us if the United States could find a peaceful solution instead of attacking military installations in Iraq?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the United States has worked very hard to achieve a peaceful solution. You know yourself how many United Nations Security Council resolutions have been passed respecting this matter. You are aware, of course, that Iraq herself agreed to the last, specifically agreed to the last Security Council resolution that was passed. And what we ask, and what I think most of the rest of the international community asks, is that Iraq simply do what it has promised it would do and respect the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations and be forthcoming and come forward honestly and fully with respect to its nuclear activities. And do not deny access to United Nations observers and inspectors.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to the report from the U.N. inspection team in Baghdad that perhaps Iraq has fully disclosed everything, and that much of their nuclear facilities were, in fact, destroyed during the Gulf war?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we

are analyzing that report right now in Washington and therefore I would be reluctant to comment on it right now, but we will have a reaction with respect to it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, why do you believe Syria has reacted positively to your earlier suggestions at this time? Is there some significance to the timing?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we've been talking about this now for quite some time. The American proposals have been on the table for a number of months, and I think that I am not the person to tell you why Syria made what I characterized last night as a very, very important and, I think, positive decision.

Q: Was that decision expected or did this come as a surprise?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, that's not important whether I expected it or not. It's there. Now let's see if we can build on it to create a climate for peace and a process for peace.

Q: President Mubarak, do you see any value, prior to opening a peace conference, in you getting together with Prime Minister Shamir in a bilateral way prior to the beginning of a multilateral peace conference?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Look, I'm not against meeting with Mr. Shamir anyway and he knows that very well.

Q: You haven't met with him?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I haven't met with him because I told him our meeting should be studied, or should be very well studied beforehand to come out with something to the public. But just meeting and coming out

without anything, without any positive results or any hope for the public about the peace process, it will have a very bad reaction, and this may complicate the whole thing.

(end transcript)

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BAUCUS GETS BUSH LETTER,
MFN DEBATE BEGINS JULY 22
(Transcript: 7/19 Press Conference)
(6350)

Washington — Senator Max Baucus says President Bush sent him a letter July 19 outlining several steps the Administration will take to try to moderate Chinese government policies on human rights, weapons proliferation, and trade.

Baucus went over the main points for reporters in the Senate Radio and TV Gallery late July 19.

The senator told news media representatives that debate on China's MFN status would begin on the Senate floor late July 22.

"Over the last two months," Baucus said, "I have been pressing the administration to develop a package of carefully targeted rifle shots to address our concerns with China. I'm very pleased to say that those discussions with the administration have been successful. Today, the President transmitted to me a letter detailing a number of measures the administration plans to take to address our concerns with China. The letter is quite extensive. Its annexes, along with the letter itself, run at least 20 pages and they outline concrete steps that will be taken to address each of our concerns.

"But there are five provisions I'd like

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to particularly highlight. First, the administration has agreed to reinvigorate its opposition to multilateral loans to China until it improves its human rights record. The President personally pressed our G-7 allies to support the US position of multilateral lending to China at the recent London summit.

"Second, the administration has committed to use Section 301 of US trade laws to open Chinese markets. If current negotiations do not yield results next month, the US will self-initiate Section 301 investigations and other consequent actions as a result of our trade laws of major Chinese trade barriers.

"Third, the administration has committed to crack down imports of goods produced by slave labor. A major Custom Service investigation will be launched to enforce the US laws against slave labor imports. And until an agreement is concluded with China to stop all exports of slave labor goods to the United States, an embargo will be placed on imports of products suspected of having been made with slave labor.

"And fourth, the administration has outlined a vigorous policy to force China to halt its role in spreading nuclear materials and missiles. Negotiations are now under way to convince China to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime. If those negotiations fail, the President is prepared to employ unilateral trade sanctions.

"And finally, the administration has agreed to support Taiwan's application to join the GATT. This is a significant breakthrough in United States policy. It is a strong signal that the US will not allow China to dictate its

policy toward Taiwan. It's also a step that is clearly in the best economic interest of the United States and of the world trading community. The administration has also made a number of other commitments that are fully detailed in the President's letter.

"It is my view that the steps the administration is now taking with regard to China are long overdue. But they are now being taken. Make no mistake about it, I hope that further action will be taken, especially with regard to human rights, but the President has belatedly articulated a policy, a strong China policy for the first time that meaningfully addresses all of our major concerns with China.

"This leaves the Senate with a clear choice. We can make a hollow show of outrage by withdrawing MFN or we can support a positive, constructive policy that encourages reform in China, that is continuing to engage China. I, for one, am far more interested in making a difference for Chinese students and peasants than I am in making outraged speeches. We should impose carefully targeted sanctions on China to address our concerns, but we should also extend MFN without conditions so that we can continue to engage China and secure the reforms that we're all looking for.

"I'd be happy to take any questions any of you may have.

"Q When's the Senate going to vote on —

"SEN. BAUCUS: I think Monday evening. The Majority Leader has said he's going to bring Prop. MFN Monday afternoon. And because senators are customarily out of town most of Monday, probably — he's assured there'll be no votes until after

7:00 on Monday, then it really depends on how long we debate it. There's no time limit on debate so far, so if it continues too late in the night, I suppose the vote'll be Tuesday, but sometime after 7:00 p.m. this coming Monday."

Following is transcript of late July 19 press conference by Baucus:

(begin transcript)

PRESS CONFERENCE
SENATOR MAX BAUCUS (D-MT)
SUBJECT: CHINA MFN STATUS
SENATE RADIO AND TV GALLERY
WASHINGTON, DC
FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1991

SEN. BAUCUS: All Americans are rightly outraged by the recent behavior of China. How can any of us forget the stirring image of a single student holding back a line of Chinese tanks? How can we forget the horrifying images from the Tiananmen Square massacre? What's worse, China's outrages did not stop with the Tiananmen Square. In the last two years, China has eased its abuses of human rights only marginally. China has also moved toward selling very dangerous and destabilizing missiles into unstable regions and ignored international norms aimed at halting nuclear proliferation.

On top of this, China has pursued a policy of highly protectionist trade actions that has blocked US exports to China. Accordingly, US exports to China are down and the bilateral deficit is ballooning. Make no mistake about it: all of us, Democrats and Republicans, the Congress, the administration, are outraged with China.

None of us differ as to the problems, but we do differ on the solution. I

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אל: רהמש/1107
מ-: מונטריאול, נר: 71, תא: 190791, זח: 1530, דח: מ, סג: סו,
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מיד/סודי

אל: ראש ממ'ד, יועץ מדיני לשה'ח
מאת: קונכ'ל מונטריאול

הנדון: סוריה והתהליך

להלן מפרופ' סטיבן כהן שחזר מביקור בדמשק שם שוחח ארוכות עם הנשיא אסד
7.7:

1. אסד ביקש לשמוע מכהן על הקורה בישראל כמעט בכל תחום ותחום. הקשיב ושאל הרבה שאלות. בדבריו התיחס אסד בעיקר ל 242 כבסיס לתהליך הנוכחי. אמר שהחלטות האו"ם הן בעצם החלטות משפחת העמים ויש לכבדן ולישמן, ארה"ב חייבת לפעול למימוש ההחלטות אלו ועל ישראל למלא אחריהן. אסד חותר לכך שארה"ב לא תשנה את גישתה ליישום העקרון של שטחים תמורת שלום שהיא בעצם יישום 242 עפ"י תפיסת דמשק.

2. בתשובה לשאלותי ציין כהן כי אסד דיבר מפורשות על שלום עם ישראל הנשיא הדגיש שארה"ב תהיה שותפה בתהליך לא רק בועידה אלא הוא רוצה לראות אותה פעילה בועדות שיוקמו גם כן.

3. לדברי כהן אסד לא חוזר לא התיחס כלל לתפקיד האו"ם ו/או להמשכיות הועידה ובחר להתרכז בפירוש החלטה 242. גם כשדיבר על לבנון הנשיא לא חוזר לא דרש יישום 425. להערכת כהן אסד לא עושה זאת כדי להמחיש את המשקל שהוא תן ל-242.

4. לטענת כהן, אסד נתן לו אור ירוק לפגוש כל גורם סורי או אחר שבשליטת סוריה כדי להתעניין בגורל נעדרינו.

5. לדברי כהן הוא היום אופטימי יותר מבעבר באשר לנכונות הסורית לשלום.

י. לבנון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, סולטן

אאא, חוזם: 20987
אל: רהמש/1093
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 370, תא: 190791, זח: 1244, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: קונכ"לים, ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תמליל מסיבת העתונאים של מזכיר המדינה בייקר בדמשק

TRANSCRIPT RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN (DAMASCUS) PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHARA SHERATON HOTEL, DAMASCUS, SYRIA THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1991

SEC. BAKER: GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING THAT I HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD TONIGHT AND WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND MY COLLEAGUE, THE MINISTER, AND IT IS APPARENT TO ME THAT SYRIA HAS MADE A VERY IMPORTANT DECISION.

AS A RESULT OF THAT MEETING I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT SYRIA HAS AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS THAT WE HAVE MADE, INCLUDING COMING TO A PEACE CONFERENCE, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF WHICH WOULD BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. I THINK THAT THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP. IT GIVES US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, AND WE ARE GOING TO TRY AND BUILD ON IT THROUGHOUT THIS TRIP IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

MIN. SHARA: I AGREE WITH SECRETARY BAKER. THE MEETING WAS GOOD WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY HAVING AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENTS OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASSAD AND THE POSITIVE RESPONSE PRESIDENT ASSAD MADE TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY.

Q IN THE SYRIAN NEWSPAPER TODAY, PRESIDENT ASSAD DISCUSSES

THE UN OBSERVER ROLE, AND HE SPEAKS OF -- THIS IS IN A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK -- AND HE SPEAKS OF THE OBSERVER AS BEING ONE WHO DISCUSSES, EXERCISES AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE ENTIRE FUNCTION OF THE CONFERENCE. THAT DOESN'T SOUND LIKE A SILENT OBSERVER. COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO US EXACTLY WHAT KIND OF A UN PRESENCE HAS SYRIA APPROVED, AND WHAT HAVE YOU APPROVED? ARE YOU IN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA?

SEC. BAKER: YES, WE ARE IN AGREEMENT, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS HERE RELATING TO THE UN, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT, AS I'VE JUST MENTIONED, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THIS CONFERENCE AND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL FOLLOW AND THIS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN ANY INVITATION ISSUED, WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IN ADDITION TO THAT, OF COURSE, AS YOU KNOW THERE WOULD BE IN ATTENDANCE A UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER, PERHAPS AS A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

Q BUT THE POINT BEING, WOULD HE BE A PARTICIPANT?

SEC. BAKER: THE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE AN OBSERVER -- NOT A CO-SPONSOR -- AND HE WOULD BE IN OUR VIEW -- THE ROLE THAT HE WOULD PERFORM WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT PERFORMED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CONFERENCE IN CAIRO IN 1977, AND IT WOULD BE A ROLE NOT UNLIKE THE ROLE THAT OBSERVERS PERFORM IN OTHER MULTILATERAL GATHERINGS FROM TIME TO TIME.

Q WILL HE BE ABLE TO SPEAK, CONTRIBUTE, PARTICIPATE, OFFER SUGGESTIONS?

SEC. BAKER: THE OBSERVER WILL BE THERE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE NOTES. HE WILL BE ABLE, OF COURSE, TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PARTICIPANTS AND WITH THE SPONSORS, BUT HE WILL BE AN OBSERVER. THAT IS THE PROPOSAL THAT WE HAVE MADE, AND THAT IS THE PROPOSAL THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HAS AGREED WITH.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- WITH THE SYRIANS AS TO WHAT 242 MEANS, WHETHER IT MEANS FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OR PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

SEC. BAKER: LET ME ANSWER THAT QUESTION BY SAYING THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AGAIN HAVE BEEN AGREED BY ALL PARTIES. THEY WILL BE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE PARTIES WILL HAVE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THOSE RESOLUTIONS MEAN AND REQUIRE, AND WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DO IS PRODUCE THE ANSWER TO WHAT THOSE RESOLUTIONS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRE.

Q DURING THE SIX WEEKS THAT WE WAITED FOR THE SYRIAN RESPONSE, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF COMMUNICATION BACK AND FORTH THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR. HAS THE UNITED STATES GIVEN SYRIA ANY PRIVATE SIDE ASSURANCES WHATSOEVER ON ANY ISSUES? WHAT WAS THAT

DISCUSSION ABOUT? WHAT WERE YOU CLARIFYING -- QUESTION NUMBER ONE.

QUESTION NUMBER TWO IS, DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS SYRIAN TERRITORY?

SEC. BAKER: LET ME ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS THIS WAY BY SAYING THAT I HAVE REFRAINED FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS FROM NEGOTIATING THROUGH THE PRESS. I INTEND TO CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM DOING THAT. YES, INDEED, WE HAVE HAD QUITE A BIT OF QUIET DIPLOMACY DURING THE LAST SIX OR EIGHT WEEKS. WE'VE BEEN WORKING VERY HARD TO MOVE THIS PROCESS ALONG, AND I WOULD HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS EVENING INDICATE THAT WE HAVE MOVED IT ALONG.

NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF SECRET ASSURANCES, LET ME SAY THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF MY EFFORTS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE, I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ASSURANCES GIVEN TO ANY ONE PARTY THAT ARE NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE OTHERS. THAT'S THE APPROACH WE TOOK IN OUR PRIOR EFFORT, AND THAT'S THE APPROACH WE ARE FOLLOWING IN THIS EFFORT, AND WE WILL NOT BE MAKING AND GIVING SECRET ASSURANCES THAT WILL NOT BE SHARED WITH OTHER PARTIES.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- THE GOLAN?

SEC. BAKER: YOU KNOW WHAT THE POLICY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS WITH RESPECT TO THAT. WE HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BY ISRAEL.

Q MR. SHARA, WOULD YOU PLEASE ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT YOUR CONCEPTION IS OF THE ROLE OF THE UN PARTICIPANT OR OBSERVER?

MINISTER SHARA: WELL, LET ME RECALL WHAT PRESIDENT ASSAD SAID YESTERDAY IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THE ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE A ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FORM AN IMPORTANT ROLE THAT WE WANT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS A GROUP OF ELEMENTS THAT GIVES USEFUL ROLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY. THAT IS WHY WE ARE SATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASSAD.

Q WOULD THE OBSERVER BE A SILENT OBSERVER OR WOULD BE ABLE TO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS?

MINISTER SHARA: AS I HAVE TOLD YOU, THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE IS NOT ONLY REFLECTED IN THE PRESENCE OF A UN OBSERVER IT IS REFLECTED BY A PACKAGE OF ELEMENTS; THE TERMS OF REFERENCE IS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. ALSO, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE KEPT INFORMED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THROUGHOUT THE PEACE PROCESS -- FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END. AND THERE IS UNDERSTANDING AS IT WAS MENTIONED IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER, THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL BE DEPOSITED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND

THEN APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- YOU HAVE NEGOTIATED OUT WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD WILL MEET THE CONCERNS OR SHOULD MEET THE CONCERNS OF THE ISRAELIS?

SEC. BAKER: I HOPE SO, JOHN. I HOPE VERY MUCH SO BECAUSE WE THINK THAT THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE ARE GOOD PROPOSALS, REASONABLE PROPOSALS. AS YOU WELL KNOW, ISRAEL HAS HAD IN THE PAST, SOME PROBLEMS WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THEM AND, THEREFORE, I CANNOT PREJUDGE WHAT THEIR REACTION WILL BE. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHEN WE GO THERE, I THINK IT'S ON SUNDAY. BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, OF COURSE, I'VE GOT A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING WHAT THE REACTION IN THOSE CAPITALS WILL BE SO --

Q SO YOU DON'T THINK YOU ARE NECESSARILY HOME AND DRY YET ON THIS?

SEC. BAKER: WELL NO, IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT I SAID INITIALLY AND WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST DAY AND A HALF, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE PLENTY OF HURDLES LEFT TO CROSS AND I AM QUITE SURE THE MINISTER WOULD NOT DISAGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT AND WE ARE GOING TO KEEP PLUGGING AWAY HERE IN THE HOPES THAT WE CAN MOVE THIS PROCESS TO A --

MINISTER SHARA: I REMEMBER THAT AT OUR LAST PRESS CONFERENCE HERE I SAID THAT SECRETARY BAKER FOUND NO OBSTACLES IN SYRIA FOR CONTINUING FOR CONVENING THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE OBSTACLES WOULD BE IN ISRAEL AND HE DIDN'T AGREE WITH ME. (INAUDIBLE) -- INTERRUPT ME TO DISAGREE. (LAUGHTER.)

SEC. BAKER: I HOPE I CAN CONTINUE TO DISAGREE WITH YOU. THAT'S WHAT I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MIGHT ISSUE AN INVITATION TO THIS CONFERENCE? WILL IT BE TAKEN UP AS AN ISSUE THERE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I AM QUITE SURE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL TALK ABOUT THIS EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND INDEED MANY, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES TO CREATE A PEACE PROCESS HERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- SOMETHING THAT IS BADLY NEEDED. WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT INVITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED, I THINK A LOT WILL DEPEND UPON WHAT THE RESULTS ARE WHEN WE GO TO ALL OF THESE OTHER CAPITALS. I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THAT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, A PICTURE OF HOSTAGE TERRY ANDERSON WAS RELEASED HERE IN DAMASCUS TODAY. CAN YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT IT? AND WAS THE HOSTAGE SITUATION DISCUSSED TODAY IN TERMS OF A MIDDLE EAST PRE-SETTLEMENT OF THE ENTIRE ACCOMPANYING MECHANISM?

SEC. BAKER: WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION GENERALLY. I WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT A PICTURE HAD BEEN RELEASED, BUT THAT'S REALLY ALL I KNOW ABOUT IT AND I WAS INFORMED OF THAT, BILL, ONLY UPON MY ARRIVAL BACK AT THE HOTEL AFTER THE MEETING.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- GENERALLY, MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU EXPECT IT TO BE, AND IN SOME WAY CONNECTED TO AND A PART OF THIS PROCESS?

SEC. BAKER: I DON'T SEE RIGHT NOW ANY LINKAGE, BUT IF WE COULD MOVE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE UNDERLINED SO MUCH OF THE CONFLICT AND THE PROBLEMS HERE IN THIS AREA, I CAN'T HELP BUT THINK THAT WOULD MOVE US AWAY FROM SUCH THINGS AS HOSTAGE TAKING.

NOW, WHAT WAS THE FIRST QUESTION YOU ASKED?

Q THAT WAS IT.

Q MINISTER SHARA, ONE OF THE OTHER ISSUES THAT HAS BEEN A STICKING POINT HERE HAS BEEN WHETHER OR NOT THIS PEACE CONFERENCE WOULD RECONVENE IN SOME FASHION OR OTHER. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SYRIAN POSITION ON THAT SUBJECT? MUST THE CONFERENCE BE ABLE TO RECONVENE AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

MIN. SHARA: WELL, OUR INTERPRETATION IS THAT A CONFERENCE IS IN PRACTICE, DOES NOT ADJOURN -- DOES NOT FINISH, SORRY -- DOES NOT FINISH A PLENARY SESSION UNTIL IT FULFILLS ITS OBJECTIVE, THAT IS, PEACE. IT CAN ADJOURN, BUT IT DOES NOT FINISH UNTIL IT REACHES THE OBJECTIVE OR THE PURPOSE FOR ITS CONVENING.

Q IS THAT THE US INTERPRETATION, MR. SECRETARY?

SEC. BAKER: LET ME SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL WHICH WE HAVE MADE AND WHICH PRESIDENT ASSAD AND SYRIA HAVE AGREED TO -- ONE OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IS THE IDEA THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD RECONVENE WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL OF THE PARTIES. AS YOU KNOW, THAT WAS ONE OF THE PROPOSALS THAT HAD NOT BEEN AND HAS NOT, I SUPPOSE AS YET, BEEN ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE. WE WILL BE WORKING TO SEE IF WE CAN GET AN ACCEPTANCE ON IT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, JUST TO CLARIFY, THE -- THE MEMBERS OF EACH BILATERAL GROUP, I.E. IF SYRIA AND ISRAEL ARE NEGOTIATING, THOSE TWO ALL -- THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, ALL FIVE PARTIES?

SEC. BAKER: THE PARTIES TO THE ORIGINAL CONFERENCE.

Q INCLUDING THE UN OBSERVER?

SEC. BAKER: NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I SAID.

MIN. SHARA: LET ME ADD.

SEC. BAKER: NOR THE GCC OBSERVER.

MIN. SHARA: LET ME ADD THE PLEDGE WHICH WAS GIVEN BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE PEACE PROCESS TO MAKE IT SUCCEED. FOR SYRIA, THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT AND I THINK TO ACHIEVE PEACE THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, NOW AFTER THE POSITIVE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSALS, CAN YOU TELL US WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP YOU ARE PLANNING TO MAKE? AND, SECOND QUESTION, ARE YOU NOW OPTIMISTIC THAT A PEACE CONFERENCE COULD BE HELD SOON?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER I AM OPTIMISTIC, I WOULD LEAVE YOU WITH MY OPENING STATEMENT WHERE I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP. I SAID IT GIVES US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, THAT WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO BUILD ON IT TO CREATE A PROCESS AND TO PROMOTE PEACE.

FIRST QUESTION?

Q NEXT STEPS?

SEC. BAKER: NEXT STEPS ARE TO GO TO THE OTHER CAPITALS INVOLVED, TO TALK TO THE LEADERSHIP THERE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT ASSAD, IN LIGHT OF THE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND SEE IF WE CAN GENERATE A SIMILAR ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF THE OTHER PARTIES THAT ARE NECESSARY TO THIS PROCESS.

ONE HERE, THE LAST QUESTION, AND THEN WE ARE --

Q THE WORLD KNOWS, MR. SECRETARY, THAT THE UNITED STATES IS QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE AND THAT'S WHY SYRIA SENT THIS RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES. NOW, THERE ARE SOURCES IN WASHINGTON THAT SAY THAT SHAMIR IS PLANNING NOW TO PREEMPT YOUR EFFORTS. IF HE SUCCEEDS, PEACE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY CHANCE. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO THAT, SIR?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS PLANNING TO DO AT ALL AND I HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN ISRAEL, JUST AS I HAVE HERE AND IN OTHER CAPITALS, AND I THINK THAT THE DESIRE FOR PEACE IS EVERY BIT AS STRONG ON THE PART OF ISRAELIS AS IT IS ON THE PART OF SYRIANS AND ON OTHER ARAB STATES. MY HOPE IS THAT NOW THAT SYRIA HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, WE WILL SEE THE SAME TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF ALL OF THE OTHER NECESSARY PARTIES TO THIS PROCESS.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Q HAS THE US POSITION ON THE LETTER CHANGED AT ALL SINCE IT WAS ORIGINALLY ISSUED, OR HAS IT REMAINED EXACTLY AS IT WAS WHEN IT

WAS WRITTEN?

SEC. BAKER: WHICH LETTER?

Q BUSH'S LETTER.

SEC. BAKER: NO.

עד כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעח, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

21122: חוזם, אאא

אל: רהמש/1104

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 377, תא: 190791, זח: 1616, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בכב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש, בפני כתבים, ביוון

REMARKS BY: PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH PHOTO OPPORTUNITY AT THE PARTHENON
ATHENS, GREECE, FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1991

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT IS -- WHAT IS -- (INAUDIBLE) --
WITH YOUR DEAL ON ISRAEL -- (INAUDIBLE) -- PEACE TALKS?

PRES. BUSH: SURE. YEAH.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THAT THIS MORNING?

PRES. BUSH: -- (INAUDIBLE) -- (ASSAD?) HAS ACCEPTED THAT
PROPOSAL.

Q -- (INAUDIBLE) --

PRES. BUSH: (HE WAS DESPERATE?).

Q ANY REACTION AT ALL, SIR, TO THE NEWS FROM (THE
AMERICAN EMBASSY)?

PRES. BUSH: (I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THAT NOW?) BUT (I
MEAN?) I MUST SAY IT'S VERY ENCOURAGING.

I DON'T WANT TO DIVERT THIS INTO A PRESS CONFERENCE. AS WE
SAID EARLIER, IT'S A POSITIVE ASPECT AND WHAT I HAVE HEARD FROM THE
SECRETARY IS ALL POSITIVE SO FAR, SO WE'LL SEE WHERE WE GO. WE'RE
TALKING ABOUT THIS MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE NOW AND THE SYRIAN
RESPONSE.

Q (WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT IT?)

PRES. BUSH: WELL, IT'S ENCOURAGING, BECAUSE SECRETARY BAKER
HAS REALLY WORKED HARD ON -- (INAUDIBLE) -- FINAL -- (INAUDIBLE) --

END

עד כאן
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעח, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 20686
אל: רהמש/1065
מ-: המשרד, תא: 180791, זח: 0947, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בכב
112889
סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: וושינגטון
שגריר, ציר, שטיין

דון: רמי דותן
למברקי שילה בנדון

אתמול (17 דנא) העבירני השגריר בראון ה-T.P בנדון זאת לאחר שהוא הונחה
למוסרן לשה'ח ובהעדרו הביאן אלי.

בנצור

18 ביולי 1991

רצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @מנכל, בנצור, סייבל, מצפא

סססס

10/14 /31

אאא, חוזם: 19081
אל: רהמש/997
מ-: המשרד, תא: 180791, זח: 1045, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בכב
112900
סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: וושינגטון
שגריר, ציר, שטיין

יחה עם בראון אמרתי כי אנו מודאגים מהעמדה שארה'ב נוקטת בענין החלטת מועבי'ט 242 החורגת מהבטחות המזכיר לפיהן תימנע ארה'ב מליחן פרשנותה במוצהר לפני המו'מ ובמהלכו ושכל צד למו'מ ישאר נאמן לפרשנותו שלו להחלטה. בראון אמר כי אין כל חריגה שכן דוברים אמריקאיים מציינים עמדת ארה'ב בסוגיית 242 רק כאשר הם נשאלים ולא ביוזמתם, וממילא הבטחת המזכיר בענין זה בעינה עומדת. בראון סיפר על שיחה שקיים דיפלומט זר עם שה'ח סעודיה, שאמר לו כי סעודיה תשתתף במעמד הפתיחה של ועידת השלום האיזורית. אשר לנושאים האיזוריים סעודיה והמפרציות תשתתפנה לפי הנושאים הרלבנטיים להן. בדעת סעודיה להשתתף במו'מ האיזורי על פרוק נשק ואקולוגיה.

בנצור

18 ביולי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20492
אל: רהמש/1064
מ-: ווש, נר: 2079, תא: 180791, זח: 1215, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בבב
סודי ביותר / מיידי

א ל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

ד ע: לש' שה'ח, לש' רוה'מ

מאת: לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

זה עם ריצ'ארד האס.

להלן משיחה שקיים השגריר עם ריצ'ארד האס (17/7).

א. סוריה.

- לדברי האס, הסורים נסחו את מכתב הנשיא אסד ע'פ ניסוחים המיוחדים להם
שלא משקפים תמיד את אופן ודרך הבנת האמריקאים.
זאת גם הסיבה, אליבא דהאס, לצורך בביקור הנוסף של בייקר בדמשק, בו
מתכוון לברר הפער בין ההבנות מזה והדברים הכתובים במכתב, מזה.

- האס ציין שהאמריקאים לא התחייבו שהתהליך יגיע לכדי סיום תוך שנה או
ששתי השושבינות יכנסו הוועידה מחדש במידת הצורך, כפי שיש הטוענים כתוב
במכתב אסד.

- גם האס חזר על דברים ששמענו מרוס לפיהם אין במכתב התייחסות מפורטת
ידן ולפלשתינאים.

- לשאלה על המגעים שקדמו לשיגור המכתב סיפר שהסעודים והמצרים היו
מעורבים בנסוח המכתב ובקומוניקציה עם ארה'ב.

- לשאלה לפשר 'פריצת הדרכ' בעמדה הסורית ציין האס שאינו משוכנע שאכן חל
שינוי 'אסטרטגי' אצל אסד ויתכן שמדובר במהלך טקטי בלבד.
עם זאת, הוסיף, 'כדאי להעמיד במבחנ'.

- אשר לעתיד ותוצאת המו'מ עם הסורים ניתן היה לחוש מדברי האס שאינו
סבור שסוריה צריכה לקבל חזרה את הגולן, אך קשה להעריך אם דבריו אלה
מבטאים דעה אישית או הלך רוח במימשל.

ב. ירדן.

- לשאלה לגבי תפקיד המלך והפעולות סביב הרכבת משלחת משותפת ציין שהמלך
חוסין גורר רגליים בקשר להרכבת המשלחת.

ג. לבנון.

- חזר על הערכת רוס לפיה גם לבנון תשתתף במו"מ.
לש' שגריר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20362

אל: רהמש/1057

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 366, תא: 180791, זח: 1758, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מידי

אל: ממ"ד, מצפ"א.

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

תהליך השלום: בעקבות תשובת סוריה למכתב הנשיא.

יח"ה (17.7) עם קוונדט (מכון ברוקינגס).

1. מפרש את צעדו של אסאד כטקטי (לפחות בשלב זה).
2. חלק שבחים לאסאד על הדרך והעיתוי אותו בחר להודיע על החלטתו. "זהו אסאד במיטבו".
3. את תקופת ההמתנה הארוכה למוצא פיו ניצל לחזק את מעמדו בלבנון. כמו-כן טיפל ביעילות בנושא הפלסטיני (מחד-גיסא אש"פ מחזר אחריו ומאידך-גיסא תמך בפעילות צבא לבנון לפירוק הפלסטינים מנשקם).
4. לא הופתע מהמהלך של אסאד שהינו ריאליסט. קיבל ההחלטה לאחר שהגיע למסקנה שזו הדרך הטובה ביותר לקדם את האינטרס הסורי. להערכתו, עשה את הצעד ללא ציפייה שבשבוע לאחר מכן ישב עם ישראל למו"מ ישיר. יחד עם זאת סבור שאסאד אינו מוציא זאת מכלל אפשרות.
5. מעריך שממ' ישראל תאמץ בסופו של דבר הצעות ארה"ב לכינוס המפגש האיזורי.
6. להערכתו, במקרה של פתיחת מו"מ יצטרך אסאד לקבל שורת החלטות נוספות שאותן טרם קיבל.
7. סבור שההחלטה שקיבל הינה COST FREE מבחינת אסאד. הוא נמצא כיום במצב אליו שאף להגיע זה זמן רב קרי במרכז דאגתן של ארה"ב וישראל כשהוא זוכה להערצת מדינות ערב.
8. לאור המהלך הסורי סבור שהשתתפות ירדן אינה מוטלת בספק. מניח שנושא הייצוג הפלסטיני ימצא פתרונו. מעריך שארה"ב תתן לישראל הבטחונות הנדרשים. בהנחה והצדדים ינהגו באופן רציונאלי מעריך שבתוך כחודש ניתן יהיה להגיע לכינוס.

שטיין.

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20491
אל: רהמש/1063
מ-: ווש, נר: 2086, חא: 180791, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: ראש ממ'ד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

תהליך השלום בעקבות תשובת אסאד.

1. להלן מתוך שיחה (17.7) עם מקור ממשלי העוקב אחר התהליך :

א. רואה במהלך אסאד צעד טקטי. פחות בטוח לגבי המשמעות האסטרטגית ('מי בכלל יכל להיות בטוח לגבי המשמעות האסטרטגית'). אינו בטוח שהמזכיר יוכל לפקוח את עיניו לגבי המוטיבציה של אסאד.

ב. אשר לשמועות בדבר הבטחות שנתנו לסורים, סבור (ממי ששמע) ' ' THAT THERE IS MUCH LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE ' '.
אינו סבור שארה'ב נתנה ו/או תתן הבטחות אותן מבקשת סוריה.

ג. סבור שהסיכון שאסאד נטל על עצמו לכשקבל ההחלטה קטן, אם בכלל. ציין בהקשר זה הסיכון במקרה והתהליך לא יתקדם או לחילופין שהמו'מ הישראלי - פלסטיני וירדני יתקדם והמו'מ עם הישראלי - סורי יקלע כבר בשלב מוקדם לקפאון. לדבריו, עיקר המאמץ הסורי בשבועות האחרונים בשיחות עם ארה'ב נסב סביב חשש זה. ובנסיון להשיג הבטחות אמריקאיות שימנעו קפאון בחזית סורית - ישראלית. הזכיר כי אסאד מדגיש בשיחותיו את הפתרון המקיף אליו הוא חותר.

ד. סיכם הערותיו באומרו שבעוד שכולם רואים בתשובה סורית הזדמנות הרי שהרושם המתקבל מתגובות ישראל הוא שתשובת אסאד נתפסת הבעיה.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, בנצור, מצפא, ממד

אאא, חוזם: 19952
אל: רהמש/1018
מ-: ווש, נר: 2077, תא: 180791, זח: 1030, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
סודי/מידי

א ל: סמנכל מז'ת

ד ע: מצפא

מאת: לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

פסגת המים

יחה שקיים השגריר עם האס, 17.7 ציין האחרון שפעלו למען הזמנת ישראל
(כמשתתפת מלאה) לוועידת המים ולהערכתו הנושא יסדר ולא תתעורר בעייה.

עד כאן

לש' שגריר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), סולטן, מזתים, בנצור,
מצפא, סייבל, כהן, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 04812/01

ACTION USIS INFO CG DPO POL ACC

LW00EVZCZCJU0723RHU100

19-JUL-91 TOR: 09:22

CC RUFHJU

CN: 55582

DE RUEHDM #4812/01 2002920

CHRG: USIS

ZNF UUUUU ZZB

DIST: FBPA

O 190920Z JUL 91

ADD

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3118

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0933

RUEHFC/USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0825

RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0268

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1247

RUEHID/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5853

RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 9613

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8025

RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 1119

RUEHJU/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1959

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 04812

USIA

DEPARTMENT FOR PA, NEA/ARN; NEA/P
USIA FOR NEA-AMBASSADOR HUGH, P/PFN, VOA/BRN

E.C.12356:N/A

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS - PRESS
CONFERENCE

1. HERE IS THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTION OF THE JOINT
PRESS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER
AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAROUK SHARAA, WHICH TOOK
PLACE AT THE SHERATON HOTEL IN DAMASCUS ON THE
EVENING OF THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1991.

2. BEGIN TRANSCRIPT:

BAKER: GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. LET ME
BEGIN BY SAYING THAT I HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ASAD TONIGHT AND WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND MY COLLEAGUE, THE MINISTER, AND IT IS APPARENT TO
ME THAT SYRIA HAS MADE A VERY IMPORTANT DECISION.
AS A RESULT OF THAT MEETING, I AM PLEASED TO REPORT
THAT SYRIA HAS AGREED TO THE PROPOSALS THAT WE HAVE
MADE, INCLUDING COMING TO A PEACE CONFERENCE, THE
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF WHICH WOULD BE A COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. I THINK
THAT THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT AND
POSITIVE STEP. IT GIVES US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH,
AND WE ARE GOING TO TRY AND BUILD ON IT THROUGHOUT
THIS TRIP IN AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

SHARAA: I AGREE WITH SECRETARY BAKER. THE MEETING
WAS GOOD WITH PRESIDENT ASAD. THERE WAS NO
DIFFICULTY HAVING AGREEMENT ON THE CONTENTS OF
PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASAD AND THE

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 04812/01

POSITIVE RESPONSE PRESIDENT ASAD MADE TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY.

QUESTION IN THE SYRIAN NEWSPAPER TODAY, PRESIDENT ASAD DISCUSSES THE UN OBSERVER ROLE, AND HE SPEAKS OF -- THIS IS IN A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT MUEBARAK -- HE SPEAKS OF THE OBSERVER AS BEING ONE WHO DISCUSSES, EXERCISES AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE ENTIRE FUNCTION OF THE CONFERENCE. THAT DOESN'T SOUND LIKE A SILENT OBSERVER. COULD YOU DESCRIBE TO US EXACTLY WHAT KIND OF A UN PRESENCE HAS SYRIA APPROVED, AND WHAT HAVE YOU APPROVED? ARE YOU IN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA?

BAKER: YES, WE ARE IN AGREEMENT, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS HERE RELATING TO THE UN, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT, AS I'VE JUST MENTIONED, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THIS CONFERENCE AND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL FOLLOW AND THIS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN ANY INVITATION ISSUED, WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SEEKING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IN ADDITION TO THAT, OF COURSE, AS YOU KNOW THERE WOULD BE IN ATTENDANCE A UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER, PERHAPS AS A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

QUESTION BUT THE POINT BEING, WOULD HE BE A PARTICIPANT?

BAKER: THE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE AN OBSERVER -- NOT A CO-SPONSOR -- AND HE WOULD BE IN OUR VIEW -- THE ROLE THAT HE WOULD PERFORM WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT PERFORMED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CONFERENCE IN CAIRO IN 1977, AND IT WOULD BE A ROLE NOT UNLIKE THE ROLE THAT OBSERVERS PERFORM IN OTHER MULTILATERAL GATHERINGS FROM TIME TO TIME.

QUESTION: WILL HE BE ABLE TO SPEAK, CONTRIBUTE, PARTICIPATE, OFFER SUGGESTIONS?

BAKER: THE OBSERVER WILL BE THERE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE WILL BE

ABLE TO TAKE NOTES. HE WILL BE ABLE, OF COURSE, TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE PARTICIPANTS AND WITH THE SPONSORS, BUT HE WILL BE AN OBSERVER. THAT IS THE PROPOSAL THAT WE HAVE MADE, AND THAT IS THE PROPOSAL THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HAS AGREED WITH.

QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) WITH THE SYRIANS AS TO WHAT 242 MEANS, WHETHER IT MEANS FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OR PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

BAKER: LET ME ANSWER THAT QUESTION BY SAYING THAT THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AGAIN HAVE BEEN AGREED BY ALL PARTIES. THEY WILL BE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE PARTIES WILL HAVE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THOSE RESOLUTIONS MEAN AND REQUIRE, AND WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DO IS PRODUCE THE ANSWER TO WHAT THOSE RESOLUTIONS SPECIFICALLY REQUIRE.

QUESTION: DURING THE SIX WEEKS THAT WE WAITED FOR THE SYRIAN RESPONSE, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF COMMUNICATION BACK AND FORTH THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR. HAS THE UNITED STATES GIVEN SYRIA ANY PRIVATE SIDE ASSURANCES WHATSOEVER ON ANY ISSUES? WHAT WAS THE DISCUSSION ABOUT? WHAT WERE YOU CLARIFYING -- QUESTION NUMBER ONE.

QUESTION NUMBER TWO IS, DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS SYRIAN TERRITORY?
BAKER LET ME ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS THIS WAY BY SAYING THAT I HAVE REFRAINED FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS FROM NEGOTIATING THROUGH THE PRESS. I INTEND TO CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM DOING THAT. YES, INDEED, WE HAVE HAD QUITE A BIT OF QUIET DIPLOMACY DURING THE LAST SIX OR EIGHT WEEKS. WE'VE BEEN WORKING VERY HARD TO MOVE THIS PROCESS ALONG, AND I WOULD HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS EVENING INDICATE THAT WE HAVE MOVED IT ALONG.

NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF SECRET ASSURANCES, LET ME SAY THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF MY EFFORTS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE, I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ASSURANCES GIVEN TO ANY ONE PARTY THAT ARE NOT MADE KNOWN TO THE OTHERS. THAT'S THE APPROACH WE TOOK IN OUR PRIOR EFFORT, AND THAT'S THE APPROACH WE ARE FOLLOWING IN THIS EFFORT, AND WE WILL NOT BE MAKING AND GIVING SECRET ASSURANCES THAT WILL NOT BE SHARED WITH OTHER PARTIES.

QUESTION (INAUDIBLE) THE GOLAN?

BAKER: YOU KNOW WHAT THE POLICY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS WITH RESPECT TO THAT. WE HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BY ISRAEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 004812/02

QUESTION: MR. SHARA, WOULD YOU PLEASE ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT YOUR CONCEPTION IS OF THE ROLE OF THE UN PARTICIPANT OR OBSERVER?

SHARA WELL, LET ME RECALL WHAT PRESIDENT ASSAD SAID YESTERDAY IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. THE ELEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE A ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FORM AN IMPORTANT ROLE THAT WE WANT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS A GROUP OF ELEMENTS THAT GIVES USEFUL ROLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY. THAT IS WHY WE ARE SATISFIED WITH PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASAD.

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 004812/02

QUESTION: BUT THE OBSERVER BE A SILENT OBSERVER OR WOULD HE BE ABLE TO ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS?

SHARAA: AS I HAVE TOLD YOU, THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE IS NOT ONLY REFLECTED IN THE PRESENCE OF A UN OBSERVER. IT IS REFLECTED BY A PACKAGE OF ELEMENTS, THE TERMS OF REFERENCE IS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. ALSO, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE KEPT INFORMED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION THROUGHOUT THE PEACE PROCESS -- FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END. AND THERE IS UNDERSTANDING AS IT WAS MENTIONED IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL BE DEPOSITED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEN APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) YOU HAVE NEGOTIATED OUT WITH PRESIDENT ASAD WILL MEET THE CONCERNS OR SHOULD MEET THE CONCERNS OF THE ISRAELIS?

BAKER: I HOPE SO, JOHN. I HOPE VERY MUCH SO BECAUSE WE THINK THAT THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE ARE GOOD PROPOSALS, REASONABLE PROPOSALS. AS YOU WELL KNOW, ISRAEL HAS HAD IN THE PAST, SOME PROBLEMS WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THEM AND, THEREFORE, I CANNOT PREJUDGE WHAT THEIR REACTION WILL BE. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHEN WE GO THERE, I THINK IT'S ON SUNDAY. BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, OF COURSE, I'VE GOT A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING WHAT THE REACTION IN THOSE CAPITALS WILL BE SO...

QUESTION: SO YOU DON'T THINK YOU ARE NECESSARILY HOPE AND DRY YET ON THIS?

BAKER: WELL NO, IF YOU LOOK AT WHAT I SAID INITIALLY AND WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST DAY AND A HALF, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE PLENTY OF HURDLES LEFT TO CROSS AND I AM QUITE SURE THE MINISTER WOULD NOT DISAGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT AND WE ARE GOING TO KEEP PLUGGING AWAY HERE IN THE HOPES THAT WE CAN MOVE THIS PROCESS TO A...

SHARAA: I REMEMBER THAT AT OUR LAST PRESS CONFERENCE HERE I SAID THAT SECRETARY BAKER FOUND NO OBSTACLES IN SYRIA FOR CONTINUING FOR CONVENING THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE OBSTACLES WOULD BE IN ISRAEL AND HE DIDN'T AGREE WITH ME. (INAUDIBLE) INTERRUPT ME TO DISAGREE (LAUGHTER).

BAKER: I HOPE I CAN CONTINUE TO DISAGREE WITH YOU. THAT'S WHAT I AM LOCKING FORWARD TO.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MIGHT ISSUE AN

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DAMASCUS 004812/03

INVITATION TO THIS CONFERENCE? WILL IT BE TAKEN UP AS AN ISSUE THERE?

PAKER: WELL, I AM QUITE SURE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL TALK ABOUT THIS EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND INDEED MANY, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES TO CREATE A PEACE PROCESS HERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- SOMETHING THAT IS BADLY NEEDED. WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT INVITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED, I THINK A LOT WILL DEPEND UPON WHAT THE RESULTS ARE WHEN WE GO TO ALL OF THESE OTHER CAPITALS. I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT PREJUDGE THAT.

QUESTION MR. SECRETARY, A PICTURE OF HOSTAGE TERRY ANIERSON WAS RELEASED HERE IN DAMASCUS TODAY. CAN

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 004812/03

YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT IT AND WAS THE HOSTAGE SITUATION DISCUSSED TODAY IN TERMS OF A MIDDLE EAST PRE SETTLEMENT OF THE ENTIRE ACCOMPANYING MECHANISM?

BAKER: WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION GENERALLY. I WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT A PICTURE HAD BEEN RELEASED, BUT THAT'S REALLY ALL I KNOW ABOUT IT AND I WAS INFORMED OF THAT, BILL, UPON MY ARRIVAL BACK AT THE HOTEL AFTER THE MEETING.

QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) GENERALLY, MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU EXPECT IT TO BE AND IN SOME WAY CONNECTED TO AND A PART OF THIS PROCESS?

BAKER I DON'T SEE RIGHT NOW ANY LINKAGE, BUT IF WE COULD MOVE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE UNDERLINED SO MUCH OF THE CONFLICT AND THE PROBLEMS HERE IN THIS AREA, I CAN'T HELP BUT THINK THAT WOULD MOVE US AWAY FROM SUCH THINGS AS HOSTAGE TAKING. NOW, WHAT WAS THE FIRST QUESTION YOU ASKED? QUESTION THAT WAS IT.

QUESTION: MINISTER SHARAA, ONE OF THE OTHER ISSUES THAT HAS BEEN A STICKING POINT HERE HAS BEEN WHETHER OR NOT THIS PEACE CONFERENCE COULD RECONVENE IN SOME FASHION OR OTHER. WHAT IS THE CURRENT SYRIAN POSITION ON THAT SUBJECT? MUST THE CONFERENCE BE ABLE TO RECONVENE AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

SHARAA WELL, OUR INTERPRETATION IS THAT A CONFERENCE IS IN PRACTICE, DOES NOT ADJOURN -- DOES NOT FINISH, SORRY -- DOES NOT FINISH A PLENARY SESSION UNTIL IT FULFILLS ITS OBJECTIVE, THAT IS, PEACE. IT CAN ADJOURN, BUT IT DOES NOT FINISH UNTIL IT REACHES THE OBJECTIVE OR THE PURPOSE FOR ITS CONVENING.

QUESTION: IS THAT THE U.S. INTERPRETATION, MR. SECRETARY?

BAKER: LET ME SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL WHICH WE HAVE MADE AND WHICH PRESIDENT ASAD AND SYRIA HAVE AGREED TO -- ONE OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IS THE IDEA THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD RECONVENE WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL OF THE PARTIES. AS YOU KNOW, THAT WAS ONE OF THE PROPOSALS THAT HAD NOT BEEN AND HAS NOT, I SUPPOSE AS YET, BEEN ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE. WE WILL BE WORKING TO SEE IF WE CAN GET AN ACCEPTANCE ON IT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, JUST TO CLARIFY, THE -- MEMBERS OF EACH BILATERAL GROUP, I.E. IF SYRIA AND ISRAEL ARE NEGOTIATING, THOSE TWO ALL THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, ALL FIVE PARTIES?

BAKER THE PARTIES TO THE ORIGINAL CONFERENCE.

QUESTION: INCLUDING THE UN OBSERVER?

UNCLASSIFIED

DAMASCUS 004812/04

BAKER: NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I SAID.

SHARAA: LET ME ADD.

BAKER NCR THE GCC OBSERVER
SHARAA: LET ME ADD THE PLEDGE WHICH WAS GIVEN BY
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION WILL BE THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE PEACE
PROCESS TO MAKE IT SUCCEED. FOR SYRIA THIS IS VERY
IMPORTANT AND I THINK TO ACHIEVE PEACE THIS IS VERY
IMPORTANT.

QUESTION : MR. SECRETARY, NOW AFTER THE POSITIVE
SYRIAN RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSALS, CAN YOU TELL US

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DAMASCUS 004812/04

WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP YOU ARE PLANNING TO MAKE AND SECOND QUESTION, ARE YOU NOW OPTIMISTIC THAT A PEACE CONFERENCE COULD BE HELD SOON?

BAKER WELL, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER I AM OPTIMISTIC, I WOULD LEAVE YOU WITH MY OPENING STATEMENT WHERE I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP. I SAID IT GIVES US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, THAT WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO BUILD ON IT TO CREATE A PROCESS AND TO PROMOTE PEACE. FIRST QUESTION?

QUESTION NEXT STEPS?

BAKER: NEXT STEPS ARE TO GO TO THE OTHER CAPITALS INVOLVED, TO TALK TO THE LEADERSHIP THERE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT ASAD, IN LIGHT OF THE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND SEE IF WE CAN GENERATE A SIMILAR ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF THE OTHER PARTIES THAT ARE NECESSARY TO THIS PROCESS. ONE HERE, THE LAST QUESTION AND THEN WE ARE...

QUESTION THE WORLD KNOWS, MR. SECRETARY, THAT THE UNITED STATES IS QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE AND THAT'S WHY SYRIA SENT THIS RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES. NOW, THERE ARE SOURCES IN WASHINGTON THAT SAY THAT SHAMIR IS PLANNING NOW TO PREEMPT YOUR EFFORTS. IF HE SUCCEEDS PEACE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY CHANCE. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO TO THAT, SIR?

BAKER: WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS PLANNING TO DO AT ALL AND I HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN ISRAEL, JUST AS I HAVE HERE AND IN OTHER CAPITALS, AND I THINK THAT THE DESIRE FOR PEACE IS EVERY BIT AS STRONG ON THE PART OF ISRAELIS AS IT IS ON THE PART OF SYRIANS AND ON OTHER ARAB STATES. MY HOPE IS THAT NOW THAT SYRIA HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, WE WILL SEE THE SAME TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE ON THE PART OF ALL OF THE OTHER NECESSARY PARTIES TO THIS PROCESS. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

QUESTION HAS THE U.S. POSITION ON THE LETTER CHANGED AT ALL SINCE IT WAS ORIGINALLY ISSUED, OR HAS IT REMAINED EXACTLY AS IT WAS WHEN IT WAS WRITTEN.

BAKER: WHICH LETTER?

QUESTION BUSH'S LETTER. US SOMETHING TO WORK WITH,

BAKER: NO. AN EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE

END OF TRANSCRIPT

MURPHEY
BT

אאא, חוזם: 20686
אל: רהמש/1065
מ-: המשרד, תא: 180791, זח: 0947, דח: מ, סג: סב,
כבכ
112889
סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: וושינגטון
שגריר, ציר, שטיין

הנדון: רמי דותן
למברקי שילה בנדון

אתמול (17 דנא) העבירני השגריר בראון ה-T.P. בנדון זאת לאחר שהוא הונחה
למוסרן לשה'ח ובהעדרו הביאן אלי.

בנצור

18 ביולי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @מנכל, בנצור, סי יבל, מצפא

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 20328
אל: רהמש/1049
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 364, תא: 180791, זח: 1717, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבכ
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: הצהרת מחמ"ד - אזהרה לגבי מעשי טרור ביוון ותורכיה

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN
STATEMENT BY RICHARD BOUCHER/DEPUTY SPOKESMAN FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1991

THE US GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATIONS THAT TERRORISTS MAY SEEK TO
TARGET AMERICAN INTERESTS IN GREECE AND TURKEY DURING THE PERIOD
SURROUNDING PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISITS THERE.

IN GREECE, THE MAJOR THREAT IS FROM THE 17 NOVEMBER GROUP,
WHICH HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF SEVERAL AMERICAN
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING A US SERVICEMAN IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR, AND FOR
ATTACKS ON US BUSINESSES.

IN TURKEY, THE MAIN THREAT IS FROM THE DEV SOL GROUP. RECENT
TURKISH POLICE RAIDS HAVE REDUCED THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF DEV
SOL, BUT THE ORGANIZATION STILL RETAINS SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES TO
TARGET AMERICANS. DEV SOL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF TWO
AMERICANS AND NUMEROUS OTHER ATTACKS ON US INTERESTS IN TURKEY THIS
YEAR.

OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS IN EITHER COUNTRY MAY ALSO SEEK TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TERRORIST
ATTACKS.

AMERICANS ARE URGED TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHILE IN BOTH COUNTRIES
DURING THE PERIOD JULY 18-22. FOR THE LATEST INFORMATION REGARDING
THE SITUATION IN TURKEY AND GREECE, AMERICANS ARE ADVISED TO CONTACT
THE EMBASSY OR NEAREST CONSULATE IN EITHER COUNTRY.

WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT TERRORIST EVENTS MAY OCCUR FOR WHICH WE HAVE NO FOREWARNING, SHOULD FURTHER SPECIFIC AND CREDIBLE INFORMATION ON A THREAT TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN GREECE AND TURKEY EMERGE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES.

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20361
אל: רהמש/1060
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 367, חא: 180791, זח: 1759, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבבב
שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א (מצפא - העבירונא בדיפ' לפילדלפיה)

דע: קונכ"ל נ.י, פילדלפיה

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

מפגש השגריר - סנטור ליברמן

1. הסנטור ליברמן (דמוק' - קונטיקוט):

- קשה יהיה לשכנע את ה"גבעה" בעמדת ישראל לגבי משקיף או"מ פסיבי וכנוס מחודש של הועידה;

- יחד עם זאת אסד אינו פופולרי ולכן לא קל יהייה להביא לשנוי משמעותי בעמדות כלפיו;

- הוא עצמו מתלבט בהערכת הסיכויים לקידום השלום מול הסיכונים הבטחוניים המאיימים על ישראל. קל לחזות את ההשפעה השלילית או החיובית על דע"ק, אך קשה לאמוד את היקף הסיכון והמחיר הבטחוני.

- נציג מחמ"ד העיד השבוע בוע' לפקוח על פעולות הממשל וטען שאין כוונה להוציא את סוריה מרשימת מדינות הטרור.

- צופה טרוניות וקשיים - מצד חבריו - בדרך לאשור הערביות להלוואות, אך להוציא התפתחויות בלתי נראות לעין משוכנע שהאשור אכן יושג.

2. השגריר:

- מן הראוי להמתין להשלמת המידע המגיע מדמשק;

- ארה"ב התחייבה להימנע מנקיטת עמדה ביחס ל-242, ויש לקוות כי לא הפירה ההתחייבות;

- מדינות ערב לא תהיינה יותר מתונות מן הממשל;

- לפי ק.ד. ולפי נוסח 242 יש אחיזה לטענה הישראלית כי ההחלטה אינה קוראת לנסיגה מלאה;

- מדוע תובעים הערבים נוכחות נציג האו"מ אם הוא אמור להיות פסיבי? מדוע

עומדים הם על כינוס מחודש של הועידה אם המטרה היא מו"מ ישיר?;
- ישראל פועלת לשיפור איכות החיים של ערביי יש"ע;
- מ'מ' ישראל פועלת בנחישות להפרטת המשק והערבוביות להלוואות ימומשו באופן
כלכלי !

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18881
אל: רהמש/981
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 337, תא: 170791, זח: 1843, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
9,244448
9,753100
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש

תשומת לבכם, בקטע של השאלות והתשובות, להתייחסויות על ישראל.

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH WINFIELD HOUSE LONDON, ENGLAND
2:45 P.M., EDT WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: I HAVE A BRIEF STATION THEN I'LL -- STATEMENT,
THEN BE GLAD TO TAKE A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS.

BUT THIS IS AN HISTORIC DAY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR
EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE'VE TODAY CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION A
NUCLEAR ARMS TREATY THAT WILL BEGIN THE REDUCTION OF LONG-RANGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND THIS TREATY REALLY HAS BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR
MORE THAN NINE YEARS. I'VE BEEN MARGINALLY INVOLVED IN IT SINCE --
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME -- THAT PERIOD OF TIME.

I THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE TO THANK PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO STARTED
THIS NEGOTIATION BACK IN 1982, AND WHO NURTURED THE START TALKS
THROUGH THE SOMETIMES TURBULENT CHANGES IN THE US-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP.

IT'S PERHAPS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW A TREATY INVOLVING
SEVERAL HUNDRED PAGES OF DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS CAN EVOLVE DOWN TO
ONE VERY TECHNICAL AND COMPLEX ISSUE, BUT IT DID. AND I'M DELIGHTED
THAT WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THAT ISSUE FINALLY TODAY; AND IT WAS A
MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. IT WASN'T A CASE OF WINNERS OR
LOSERS OR WHO GAVE OR WHO DIDN'T GIVE, AND IT WAS A CASE OF BOTH
SIDES AGREEING TO A LIMITATION THAT WILL MEAN REAL REDUCTIONS IN

NUCLEAR LONG-RANGE MISSILES. AND I ALSO WANT TO COMPLIMENT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, WHO STUCK WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS WHILE HE WORKED TO REORIENT THE ENTIRE ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF HIS COUNTRY. HE'S SHOWN ENORMOUS LEADERSHIP IN FORGING AHEAD WITH THESE PLANS.

IT'S A STRONG SYMBOL OF THE GROWING US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP THAT WE ACCEPT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW IN ONLY A FEW DAYS TIME TO DISCUSS MANY OTHER PROBLEMS NOW OF MUTUAL INTEREST. WE WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON JULY 30TH AND 31ST TO DISCUSS ISSUES ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF THE SO-CALLED FIVE BASKETS THAT WE'VE DESCRIBED IN THE PAST -- THAT'S BILATERAL ISSUES, THE REGIONAL MATTERS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMS CONTROL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, DRUGS AND TERRORISM AND THESE KINDS OF THINGS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO THESE MEETINGS AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GIVES ME TO FOLLOW UP ON WHAT I THINK WERE PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH THE G-7, CERTAINLY PRODUCTIVE THE G-7 SUMMIT, AND THEN WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HERE FOR THE WRAP-UP OF THE G-7 SUMMIT.

TODAY, HE OUTLINED HIS PROGRAM FOR REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE G-7 HAS RESPONDED WITH THE KIND OF ASSISTANCE THAT WE BELIEVE WILL ENCOURAGE PROGRESS, MOST ENCOURAGE PROGRESS, TOWARD A FREE MARKET ECONOMY AND A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. WE HAD A VERY FRANK, INCIDENTALY -- NOT THE DIPLOMATIC USE OF THE WORD -- BUT A VERY FRANK AND GOOD DISCUSSION OVER AT LANCASTER HOUSE ON THIS SOVIET ECONOMY. HE RESPONDED VERY DIRECTLY TO QUESTIONS, AND I THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD MEETING. I THINK HE DID, TOO. AND I THINK JOHN MAJOR, FRANKLY, DESERVES A GREAT DEAL OF CREDIT, THE WAY HE CONDUCTED THE G-7 MEETINGS AND THEN THE WAY HE GRACIOUSLY CONDUCTED THE MEETINGS TODAY. HE WAS AN OUTSTANDING CHAIRMAN AND I WAS PROUD TO BE THERE AND SEE HIM IN ACTION. IT WAS GOOD STUFF.

IT'S NOT GOING TO BE QUICK OR EASY TO IMPLEMENT CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT'S ENORMOUS PROBLEMS THEY FACE. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS MADE AN IRREVOCABLE COMMITMENT, AND I WOULD LIKE TO FEEL THAT THIS COURSE THAT HE HAS EMBARKED ON, AND OTHERS, AND THE REPUBLICS ARE EMBARKED ON, IS IRREVERSIBLE.

BUT IT'S BEEN A GOOD DAY. I THINK IT'S A GOOD DAY FOR THE UNITED STATES, WHICH CONCERNS ME MOST OF ALL.

HE FOLLOWING ARE SELECTED EXCERPTS)

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU MENTIONED IRAQ EARLIER. WILL PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SUPPORT YOU IF IT'S NECESSARY TO RENEW MILITARY ACTION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT WAS NOT DISCUSSED TODAY. I THINK THAT THEY, LIKE US WOULD HOPE THAT WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO USE FORCE, BUT PERHAPS THAT MATTER WILL COME UP WHEN WE ARE IN MOSCOW, BUT I WILL

JUST REVERT BACK TO HOW THEY STOOD UP AGAINST AGGRESSION WITH US IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND I KNOW THAT THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION -- PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, BUT I DIDN'T GET INTO ANY QUESTION OF IF WE HAD TO USE FORCE WOULD THEY JOIN US. BUT CLEARLY I HAVE SAID BEFORE AND I WILL SAY IT HERE AGAIN, WE DON'T WANT TO GO -- WE ARE NOT ANY LONE RANGER OUT THERE. WE THINK WE HAVE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS TO DO WHAT IS NEEDED TO BE DONE, BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT IT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT FORCE. BUT IF THEY CONTINUE TO LIE, IF THEY CONTINUE TO HARBOR EQUIPMENT THAT COULD LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS, THEN WE HAVE TO REVIEW OUR OPTIONS. BUT IT WASN'T DISCUSSED IN THAT MANNER TODAY.

Q DO YOU FEEL YOU HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER G-7 COUNTRIES?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THOUGHT IT WAS FAIRLY WELL SPOKEN ON THAT, (TEEING OFF ?) FROM WHAT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND SAID THE DAY THAT WE ARRIVED IN PARIS. AND I THINK MOST, I DON'T WANT TO PUT WORDS IN EVERYBODY'S MOUTH, BUT I THINK MOST WOULD AGREE WITH WHAT MITTERRAND SAID. YEAH, JIM? YOU'VE DONE IT? I THOUGHT I SAW YOUR HAND AGAIN. CHARLES?

Q JUST TO FOLLOW UP ON DAN'S QUESTION, YOU MAY NOT HAVE DISCUSSED IRAQ WITH MR. GORBACHEV BUT MR. BAKER AND BESSMERTNYKH HAVE, AND IS THERE NOT A SENSE THAT MR. BESSMERTNYKH HAS CONVEYED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT AS SUPPORTIVE AS YOUR OTHER ALLIES?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK THEY MADE CLEAR THEY HOPE THAT FORCE WOULD NOT BE USED, BUT THAT'S QUITE -- THEY WERE IN THAT MODE BACK EARLY ON IN THE IRAQ DAYS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THEY WANT TO USE FORCE, I AM NOT SUGGESTING I DO. BUT -- AND I THINK

Q DOES THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ASSAD PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO COME AROUND ON THE PEACE PROCESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'RE ANALYZING THAT, AND I CAN ANSWER YOUR QUESTION BETTER WHEN I -- AFTER I SEE JIM BAKER -- I MEAN, AFTER I HEAR FROM JIM BAKER ON HIS TRIP.

BUT IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF PRESSURE, IT'S A QUESTION OF TRYING TO BRING PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT PEACE AND TALKING TO EACH OTHER IS IN EVERYBODY'S INTEREST. SO, I'M NOT GOING TO TERM IT, WHAT ACTION OR -- LACK OF ACTION IS GOING TO BRING PRESSURE ON ANY PARTY, BUT I DO CONSIDER IT FROM WHAT WE'VE SEEN, TO BE POSITIVE. NOW WE'VE GOT TO PIN DOWN THE DETAILS AND MOVE FORWARD.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, @ (מצב), ר/מרכז,
ממד, @ (רם), אמן, רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (לעמ),
מקצב2, @ (דוצ), דוצ-ים, צנזורצבאי, אומן,
סייבל, משפט, @ (וחו'ב), בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

לכין הערכויות פוגע בתהליך השלום. מדינות ערב לא יכולות להיות
מתונות יותר מארה"ב. אין לערב בין נושא פוליטי לכין נושא הומניטרי.

- ישראל לא תקבל פתרון הקורא לנסיגה לקוי 1967.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18797
אל: רהמש/971
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 323, תא: 170791, זח: 1559, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי המזכיר לבטחון לאומי, סקורופט

תשומת לבכם לשאלה האחרונה, המתיחסת לענייננו.

CBS "THIS MORNING" INTERVIEW WITH: BRENT SCOWCROFT NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 1991 LONDON

MR. SMITH: OKAY. THE LEADERS HERE THIS WEEK HAVE SENT A
CLEAR MESSAGE TO BAGHDAD, A CLEAR MESSAGE OF SOLIDARITY. SADAM
HUSSEIN HAS SAID HE HAS NOT FINALLY REVEALED ALL OF HIS NUCLEAR
FACILITIES TO THE WEST. HE HAS LIED BEFORE. DO YOU BELIEVE HIM
NOW?

MR. SCOWCROFT: NO. IT MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE CASE. I
SUSPECT IT IS NOT THE CASE. HE HAS AS YOU SAY, HE HAS LIED BEFORE,
AND WE SUSPECT THAT THIS IS NOT YET FULL DISCLOSURE.

MR. SMITH: ARE WE GOING TO HAVE TO GO BACK TO BAGHDAD?

MR. SCOWCROFT: NO, I HOPE NOT. HE -- BECAUSE, HE BEGAN TO
GET WORRIED THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN TO HIM AFTER HE
REFUSED ACCESS TO SIGHTS AND FIRED OVER THE HEADS OF THE INSPECTORS.
HE THOUGHT MAYBE WE WOULD RESPOND, SO HE HAS COME OUT NOW WITH A NEW
LIST OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. SO HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE SUBJECTED
AGAIN TO PUNISHMENT, SO HOPEFULLY WE WILL NOT NEED TO DO ANYTHING.

MR. SMITH: I'M SURE HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE SUBJECTED TO
PUNISHMENT BEFORE THE GULF WAR STARTED EITHER, BUT SOMEHOW HE
MAINTAINED AND HELD THE LINE AND DIDN'T MOVE OUT OF KUWAIT. IF YOU
HAD TO BET ON WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL HAVE TO GO BACK THERE, WHAT
WOULD YOU SAY? I MEAN HE'S MESSED UP BAD BEFORE.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'D RATHER NOT BET. I THINK HE'S LEARNED SOMETHING. AND HE'S LEARNED THAT WE DO CARRY OUT OUR THREATS.

MR. SMITH: SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER IS HEADING BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST. SYRIA HAS COME THROUGH AND --(INAUDIBLE)-- SOME OF THE IDEAS ABOUT A NEW PEACE PROCESS. SYRIA'S ON BOARD. WHAT IS IT GOING TO TAKE TO GET ISRAEL ON BOARD?

MR. SCOWCROFT: WELL, WE'LL HAVE TO SEE. ISRAEL REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, A LETTER HE SENT TO BOTH SIDES. BUT HOPEFULLY THEY WILL REEVALUATE THEIR POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE. AND THAT'S ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS THAT SECRETARY BAKER WILL BE GOING THERE.

כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, סולטן,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18837

אל: רהמש/975

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 333, תא: 170791, זח: 1703, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

הנדון: התשובה הסורית

1. להלן משיחות עם כתבים מדיניים שהתקשרו מלונדון:-

א. בשיחה ישירה (אקראית) של כתב (בכיר ומהימן) עם מזכיר המדינה בייקר, שאל הכתב האם יש התניות באגרת הסורית. לדברי אותו כתב, תשובת המזכיר היתה: "...איני יודע זאת בודאות, את זאת אבדוק בדמשק עם אסאד... הקריאה שלנו את המכתב (קרי: של הממשל) היא שאין התניות, אבל את זה אני רוצה לבדוק ולוודא בדמשק...".

ב. פקידי מחמ"ד הסבירו לכתבים שיש כוונה מהותית (ולא רק טקטית) בביקור המזכיר בבירות הערביות השונות: יש עדיין הרבה שאלות פתוחות - בעיקר בנושא הפלסטיני - אותן הם מתכוונים לבדוק. כמו הן, טענו שהם מודאגים מהעמדה הירדנית הפסיבית.

ג. בתשובה לשאלות כתב על הבטחה/כוונה אמריקנית להוציא את סוריה מרשימת זדנינות התומכות בטרור (כמופיע בסקירת התקשורת) - הכחישו פקידי מחמ"ד הבטחה כזו. הפקידים גם טענו באוזני הכתב שהנושא לא עלה בהתייעצויות עם סוריה, אך הבהירו שאין לראות בכך משום הבטחה או התחייבות שהנושא לא ייעלה ויידון BY ITS OWN MERIT.

ד. כתבים ספרו כי נרמז להם שקיימת אפשרות (בשלב זה רק בגדר אפשרות) ל"ביקור שישי" של המזכיר בעיקר בדמשק ובירושלים: המזכיר יהיה מוכן לשקול בקור נוסף במזה"ת בין סיום ועידת ASEAN לפיסגה במוסקבה, וזאת כדי לקבל תשובות ולהמשיך בתהליך ההבהרות לגבי שאלות שיועלו עם הצדדים (סוריה, ירדן וישראל) בבקור הקרוב שלו. כך יוכל המזכיר להסתפק (מפאת לו"ז) בבקור הקרוב רק בכמה שעות בכל בירה, ולהקדיש לנושא יותר זמן אח"כ.

2. מכתב וושינגטוני ששוחח עם השגריר הסורי כאן:-

א. אין באגרת שום התניות. סוריה מוכנה למו"מ ישיר לשלום עם ישראל.

ב. סוריה מוכנה "להסתפק" בנציג שקט של האו"ם מתוך הבנה:-

- (1) שנציגי ארה"ב ובריה"מ יהיו נוכחים בשיחות הביילטרליות.
- (2) ושכמידת הצורך, יוכלו אותם נציגי ארה"ב ובריה"מ לדווח למועבי"ט. קרי, תפקידי המשקיף והמדווח שבמקור רצו הסורים שימלא נציג האו"ם - ימולאו ע"י ארה"ב ובריה"מ.
- ג. אומנם אין באגרת אזכור לאש"פ ואין הרחבה בענין הייצוג הפלסטיני, אך עדיין "יש בנושא זה בעיות רבות..."

עד כאן .

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

בלמ"ס/מידי

3

1163

אל: מצפ"א
דע: קוננ"לים ל.א., ס.פ.
מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס

חנדון: הסנטורים סימור ופאקווד, תהליך השלום

1. מצ"ל מכתב הסנטורים ג'והן סימור (היוזם, רפוב'-קליפורניה)
ובוב פאקווד (רפוב'-אורגון) למזכיר המדינה. 25 סנטורים
חתמו על המכתב.

2. עקרי המכתב:

- דברי הערכה להתקדמות התהליך;
- קריאה למזכיר להימנע מהפעלת לחץ על ישראל לוויתורים לפני המו"מ;
- קריאה למזכיר לדבוק בעקרון של מו"מ ישיר.

יורם אטינגר

המזכיר לממשלה

ש"ס ס'ס'ה מ'ה'ג א'ס'ב' ב'ס'ב' ג'ס'ב'
 רב"ב רב"ב רב"ב רב"ב רב"ב רב"ב

JOHN SEYMOUR
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0503

July 16, 1991

1163

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The Honorable James A. Baker
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We commend you for your persistence in trying to develop an acceptable format that Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinian representatives use to start a dialogue on their most basic disputes.

Furthermore, we welcome the apparent willingness on the part of the Syrian government to begin negotiations with the Government of Israel.

As you begin a new series of trips to the Middle East as a result of this development, we urge you to clarify the intentions of Syria and other prospective Arab participants in any region-wide peace effort. Israel cannot be forced to make any concessions in advance or as a condition of talks with its neighbors. To the extent that any Arab government makes demands of this nature from Jerusalem, it would demonstrate an unwillingness to obtain a mutually-acceptable agreement guaranteeing the security and stability of all states in the region.

1163

In addition, we believe that direct discussions among Israeli and Arab officials ultimately remain the most effective vehicle for achieving a just and enforceable peace settlement. If all parties to the Middle Eastern conflict sincerely hope to resolve their differences, they would have no objections to this approach.

We look forward to receiving your perspective on these matters and wish you every success in your upcoming mission.

Sincerely,

Bob Packwood

John Seymour

The Honorable James A. Baker
July 16, 1991
Page Two

[Handwritten Signature]
Larry E. Craig

[Handwritten Signature]
Conrad Burns

[Handwritten Signature]
Steve Symms

[Handwritten Signature]
Mitch McConnell

[Handwritten Signature]
Robert Kasten

[Handwritten Signature]
Bob Graham

[Handwritten Signature]
Slade Gordon

[Handwritten Signature]
Phil Gramm

[Handwritten Signature]
Kit Bond

[Handwritten Signature]
Dave Durenburger

[Handwritten Signature]
Arlen Specter

[Handwritten Signature]
Dan Coats

[Handwritten Signature]
Chuck Grassley

[Handwritten Signature]
Connie Mack

[Handwritten Signature]
John McCain

[Handwritten Signature]
Alfonso D'Anato

[Handwritten Signature]
Alan Cranston

[Handwritten Signature]
Harry M. Reid

[Handwritten Signature]
Orrin Hatch

[Handwritten Signature]
Larry Pressler

[Handwritten Signature]
Richard Shelby


[Handwritten Signature]
Joseph Liberman

[Handwritten Signature]
Dennis DeConcini

1163

3
3

8207



אאא, חוזם: 16609
אל: רהמש/857
מ-: המשרד, תא: 160791, זח: 1446, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבבב
51546
סודי מיידי

אל: משרד רוה'מ

פזנר, יועץ רה'מ לתקשורת

הנדון: מוסף לניו יורק טיימס - מאמר רה'מ

מצ'ב 3 מברקים בנדון שעל פי רשימת התפוצה לא הועברו לידיעתך.
מניח שתשיב ישירות לניו יורק וושינגטון ותתדע גם אותנו.

להלן המברקים:-

** להלן מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 347, תא: 150791

אל: סמנכ'ל הסברה

דע: סמנכ'ל בנצור, שילה, הציר וושינגטון

ת: סגן הקונכ'ל, ניו יורק

הנדון: מוסף לניו-יורק טיימס.
למברק שילה 2038
למברקי 2018

1. ה-UJA הודיעוני כי ברצון יכללו מאמר בחתימת ראה'מ בנושא קליטת העלייה במוסף שיהיה כלול במגזין של הניו-יורק טיימס ב-1 בספטמבר.
2. מבקשים לקבל המאמר בהקדם האפשרי ולא חוזר לא יאוחר מסוף שבוע זה.

סגן הקונכ'ל, ניו יורק
מרדכי ידיד

** להלן מ-:ני, נר:2018, תא:110791

אל: שילה וושינגטון

דע: סמנכל הסברה, סמנכל בן צור, סביר עי' מצפא

מאת: ס. קונכל יו יורק

הנדון: מבצע אקסודוס

1. שוחחתי עם הנוגעים בדבר ב-UJA ברוח הצעתך לכלול מאמר בחתימת ראש הממשלה במוסף המיוחד ב-1 בספטמבר.

2. UJA בודקים האפשרות גם עם מערכת ה-'ניו יורק טיימס'.

מרדכי ידיד

** להלן מ-:ווש, נר:2038, תא:100791

אל: דוד פלג, כאן (הועבר)
אורי סביר, ניו יורק

דע: סמנכ'ל בנצור, סמנכ'ל רביב

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ני שומע שה-UJA מכינים מוסף מיוחד שיהיה כלול במגזין של הניו-יורק טיימס ב-1 בספטמבר. אולי כדאי להציע לכלול במוסף זה, בגלל עיתויו היוצא מן הכלל, מאמר בחתימת ראש הממשלה שנושאו: 'קליטת העליה, סיכוי יחיד במינו למדינת ישראל' ?

בדקונא והודיעונו.

שילה.

עד כאן

ב ב ר כ ה,

מ. רביב

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), רביב

סססס



U.S.I.S.
wireless file

AMBASSADOR BROWN
28 Galei Tchelet Street
Herzliya Pituach

(Home Delivery)

*NEA299 07/16/91

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE LOG

FOR TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1991

NEA ITEMS:

- 201 INTRO
- 202 LEADERS SAY U.S. PLAN "BEST HOPE" FOR MIDEAST PEACE
(London summit adopts Political Declaration) (800)
- 203 BUSH CALLS ASSAD LETTER "BREAKTHROUGH" IN PEACE
PROCESS
(Hopes for positive Israeli response) (700)
- 204 IRAQ NUCLEAR PROGRAM DATA STILL INCOMPLETE, U.N. TOLD
(IAEA to hold emergency session on violations) (890)
- 205 UNITED NATIONS REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16
(Iraq) (280)
- 206* U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE OPENS WAY FOR MIDEAST
BREAKTHROUGH
(Jordan's ambassador discusses peace process) (1170)
- 207 U.S. 1991 DEFICIT ESTIMATE LOWERED; 1992 FIGURE RAISED
(Deferred costs of war, thrift crisis the key) (700)



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, P.O.B. 920, 91008 Tel. 252376

- 208 CENSUS FINDS ASIANS FASTEST-GROWING GROUP IN U.S.
(Number boosted by influx in past decade) (1020)
- 209 SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL A "POSITIVE RESPONSE"
(Transcript: Bush remarks 7/15/91) (1620)
- 210 SUMMIT LEADERS WILL KEEP SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
(Text: Summit Political Declaration 7/16/91) (2230)
- 211 SUMMIT LEADERS VOW TO EXPAND NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES
(Text: Summit Declaration on Arms 7/16/91) (1840)
- 212* STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16
(Ambassador Glaspie) (80)
- 213* ANCIENT EGYPTIAN CARPETS ON DISPLAY IN WASHINGTON
(Exhibit highlights Mamluk, Ottoman periods) (300)
- 214 BAKER SAYS ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS MAY BE POSSIBLE
(Sees no additional movement on START) (830)
- 215 CHENEY URGES QUICK RATIFICATION OF CFE TREATY
(Says it represents a major security asset) (740)
- 216 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16
(Iraq, Philippines) (620)
- NOTES AND FS ITEMS:
- 250 (FS) NEWS ROUNDUP, TUESDAY, JULY 16 (500)
- 251* (FS) MIDDLE EAST REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (1900)
- 252 (FS) ADD NEWS ROUNDUP, JULY 16 (180)
- 299 NESA LOG (790)
- NXE ITEMS:
- 201 COHEN CITES LEGAL BASIS FOR END TO SANCTIONS
(Also satisfied with changes in S. Africa) (1,150)
- 202 EDITORIAL: WORLD BANK REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT (430)
- 203 SPECIAL IMF TIES SEEN SPURRING SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

(Text: Mulford remarks 7/16/91) (2800)

NNX FS ITEMS

- 201 A GULF WAR LESSON THE U.S. NEEDS TO LEARN
(7/15 BGlobe article by Christopher Layne) (1,010)
- 202 IRANIAN REBELS CHEERED ON HILL, CALLED TERRORISTS
(7/15 WTimes article by Nermeen Shaikh) (1,010)
- 203 IRAQ'S MALNOURISHED CHILDREN
(7/15 NYTimes article by Jean Mayer) (770)
- 204 THE PRACTICE OF SELECTIVE INDIGNATION
(7/14 LATimes editorial) (490)
- 205 BAKER RETURNING TO MIDEAST
(7/16 WPost article by David Hoffman) (1,390)
- 206 IRAQ'S WAR DEFEAT, CIVIL STRIFE CAUSING CRISIS IN
BAATH
(7/16 WPost article by Caryle Murphy) (1,780)
- 207 STATE DEPT. SEES NO PROBLEM IN GLASPIE'S CABLES
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*NEA201 07/16/91

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE

FOR TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1991

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*NEA202 07/16/91

LEADERS SAY U.S. PLAN "BEST HOPE" FOR MIDEAST PEACE

(London summit adopts Political Declaration) (800)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

London -- The world's principal democracies July 16 endorsed the U.S. Middle East peace initiative as the "best hope" for progress toward a settlement based on United Nations principles.

The seven called on Israel to suspend building of settlements in occupied territory and urged Arab states to suspend their boycott of Israel.

Speaking for the host government at the London Economic Summit, British Foreign Secretary Hurd recalled that Israel's long-term goal is "discussion with Arab states still in a state of belligerency with her" and said "it looks as if that objective is in reach" with Syria's acceptance of President Bush's ideas for the next step in the peace process.

The political declaration adopted by the seven heads of government of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy said the eventual settlement "should be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace."

The declaration said the seven "attach overriding importance" to launching of a process "designed to bring comprehensive, just and lasting peace" to the region, and it called the U.S. proposal "the best hope for progress towards a settlement. We urge all parties...to adopt reciprocal and balanced confidencebuilding measures and to show the flexibility necessary to allow a peace conference to be convened" on the basis of the U.S. initiative.

Asserting the declaration contained "rather more meat than is perhaps usual on these occasions," Hurd declared Iraq will not be allowed to pursue a nuclear weapons program and will be stopped, in one way or another, if it persists.

In a companion document on arms control, the seven declared Iraq "must fully abide" by Security Council Resolution 687, calling for destruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capacity, and they pledged "every assistance" to U.N. agencies in carrying out their responsibilities.

Hurd told reporters the seven are "not satisfied" that Iraq has been completely forthcoming on its nuclear capability, adding that "is why the president of the United States, with the support of Britain and France -- and I daresay others -- has made it clear we will use whatever means are needed to prevent Iraq becoming a nuclear power." He said that view is in accord with U.N. Resolution 687, noting that

"it is the international community which is in action to prevent and deal with this particular danger."

Hurd said that while no decision to use military force against Iraq has been reached, Great Britain would participate in such a step. He said the United Nations is evaluating a mass of information supplied by Iraq and by its own inspection teams and will make no plans until that is done.

"We will have to see," Hurd declared, whether the data "is sufficient. We doubt it. We think there is still evasiveness." He said "further demands and requests may be put to Iraq" when the assessment of data is completed.

"At the end of the day," he said, "I hope the Iraqis are not in any doubt that the international community does not intend to allow Iraq to develop nuclear facilities which might be turned to military purposes....We are going to make sure, one way or the other, that Iraq does not become -- does not even create the danger of becoming -- a nuclear power."

On other topics, the seven:

-- Urged a greater role for the United Nations in keeping the peace and coping with natural disasters. The declaration endorsed U.N. intervention in the affairs of nations, as in the case of Iraq, asserting, "The international community cannot stand idly by in cases where widespread human suffering from famine, war, oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood reaches urgent and overwhelming proportions."

-- Called for continuation of sanctions against Iraq until Iraqis and other people in the region "can live without fear of intimidation, repression or attack."

-- Declared their "strong interest" in the success of economic and political reform in central and eastern Europe.

-- Termed support for reform in the Soviet Union "as strong as ever," welcomed efforts to create a "new union" of Soviet republics "based on consent not coercion," and repeated the commitment to support Soviet attempts to "create an open society, a pluralistic democracy and a market economy."

-- Urged compliance with all aspects of the Brioni agreement on Yugoslav dialogue and invoked both the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in demanding respect for minority rights.

-- Welcomed "positive developments" in South Africa and called for the de facto elimination of apartheid to follow on legislative repeal of its legal pillars.

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*NEA203 07/16/91

BUSH CALLS ASSAD LETTER "BREAKTHROUGH" IN PEACE PROCESS

(Hopes for positive Israeli response) (700)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

London -- President Bush isn't taking Israel's "no" as the final answer in the Middle East peace process.

Although Tel Aviv has publicly rejected, sight unseen, Syria's acceptance of Bush's ideas for peace, the president told reporters, "I don't believe Israel has rejected this. They haven't had a chance to even understand what President Assad is proposing."

The ultimate Israeli response, Bush said, will prove a test of Tel Aviv's intentions.

The seven summit participants, in their July 16 political declaration, endorsed the U.S. peace initiative, saying it "offers the best chance of progress toward a settlement." The seven called on Arab states to end their boycott of Israel and called on Tel Aviv to suspend building settlements in occupied territory.

Speaking to a pool of reporters following a dinner meeting of heads of government of the industrialized democracies July 15, Bush called Assad's letter a "breakthrough" in the peace process. He said the Middle East was "the main topic" at the summit's traditional dinner discussion of political subjects. The working dinner took place in the Tower of London.

From what he knows of the Syrian letter, Bush said, "This is what we would term a breakthrough...something very important." The president is sending Secretary of State Baker on a mission to five Mideast nations, starting July 18, to follow-up on the Syrian acceptance.

Bush told the pool he sees Assad's letter "as a positive response. We're not suggesting that everything is fine and that there couldn't be some last-minute hitch to it, but we're approaching this very positively."

While continuing his refusal to discuss details of his ideas for peace, the president said most people realize that what he has in mind is "to get these parties to engage with one another" through the "starting mechanism" of a "conference of sorts." According to news accounts, the conference would involve the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel and her Arab neighbors, and a Palestinian delegation. The United Nations, the European Community and the Persian Gulf states would be observers. The conference would be based on U.N.

Resolutions 242 and 338, the Security Council measures calling on Israel to return occupied territory.

Bush noted that one of Israel's concerns, in rejecting previous conference proposals, had been Syria's refusal to come forward with acceptance of the plan.

Now, Bush said, Syria's acceptance is a test of Israel's desire for peace.

Asked how he would persuade Israel to accept the conference plan, Bush said he'd like to believe "they would get on board naturally. They've been wanting talks with people in the area, and if all goes well here, that's exactly what will happen....They've made statements to us of wanting to do these things, so now here will be a good test."

On other matters, Bush:

-- Said he's not prepared to say whether he and Soviet President Gorbachev will take up the one remaining issue in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations when they meet July 17. He said he is determined not to let START overshadow the summit, but he acknowledged he will take up the throwweight issue if Gorbachev wants to raise it. "It still remains," the president asserted, "that we want a summit agreement. It still remains that to have a summit agreement, we should have all these details worked out and to have broad agreement on START -- not every T crossed or I dotted." Bush added that if agreement on START is reached, "there could be a summit by the end of the month still. So pack your bags but don't have them zipped up."

-- Suggested there would be "strong, strong support" among the industrialized democracies for any military response to Iraq's continued lack of cooperation on nuclear matters. He noted French President Mitterrand's statements of support July 14 were "very clear, very direct" and added that the British "clearly are in that supportive mode." The president said "most countries, recognizing the terrible danger of this man (Saddam Hussein) going forward with a nuclear program, would be of the same mind."

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IRAQ NUCLEAR PROGRAM DATA STILL INCOMPLETE, U.N. TOLD

(IAEA to hold emergency session on violations) (890)

By Judy Aita

USIA United Nations Correspondent

United Nations -- The special commission overseeing the destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapons program says it has found another large multi-billion dollar uranium enrichment plant which Baghdad omitted from its declarations to the U.N. Security Council.

In a presentation to the Security Council July 15, members of the first inspection team and the special commission reported there are discrepancies in what Iraq has declared and what the experts are finding as they inspect facilities around the country. The team also said the type of facilities they have seen are not practical for peaceful atomic energy uses.

At a news conference after the private council meeting, Professor Maurizio Zifferero, deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the head of the inspection operation, called the discovery of a facility at AlSharqat puzzling. The facility, located over 300 kilometers north of Baghdad, was said to be identical to a declared enrichment plant at Tarmiyah.

"This facility has striking similarities with another facility which we have inspected and which was admittedly devoted to electromagnetic isotope separation," Zifferero said. "This second facility was not completed, but the fact that only one of the twins was recognized as the site of calutron activities is puzzling because Al-Sharqat is almost a carbon copy of the one they have declared."

IAEA Director General Hans Blix said that by Iraq's not declaring the nuclear materials now discovered, its "conduct did not constitute compliance with...obligations under the safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency." He has called for an emergency meeting of the board of governors for July 18. Should the board confirm his findings, a report will be sent to the Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly. Iraq could face suspension from the IAEA as well as be denied any technical assistance even after international sanctions are lifted.

"It would be really difficult to believe," Zifferero said, "that one would embark on electromagnetic separation for producing enriched uranium to be used for peaceful things like production of electric energy in a nuclear reactor."

"The reason is very simple," he said. "To produce one gram of uranium enriched at say 3.5 percent (which is the type of uranium needed by a nuclear power plant) through the electromagnetic approach would involve spending five times more

energy than the energy you are likely to retrieve from the reactor. So it doesn't make sense" to use that approach.

Experts think Iraq's facilities are comparable in size to the electromagnetic isotope separation of the Manhattan Project, which developed the U.S. atomic weapons in the 1940s, said Jay Davis of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who is an inspector. "That represents...a four-to eight-billion-dollar investment on the Iraqis' part."

Contrary to press reports, he explained, the technology is not obsolete, though it is expensive. "If you're building nuclear weapons, the cost of the material doesn't matter to you," Davis said. "If you're trying to use enriched uranium for nuclear power, you're competing in a world market and cost is extremely important. This technique has not been used for 45 years because it is not economic."

Once the plants at Al-Sharqat and Tarmiyah went into operation, experts have calculated, Iraq would have been able to produce enough enriched uranium for one bomb a year from each plant, Davis said.

Zifferero said IAEA believes that no industrial production had started at the two plants, but both would have been operational in 18 to 24 months. Blix added that the international community "is left with speculation" about what would have happened if the two huge facilities had been completed. The teams have found no evidence that Iraq has been able to fashion weaponry, he said. "Maybe it is somewhere, but it has not been found."

The commission members said that despite the long list of its nuclear technology Iraq submitted on July 7 and July 14, the investigations are far from over.

The group reported to the council on what the inspection teams saw as well as discrepancies, especially the missing graphite pockets and the explanation of the Al-Sharqat facility. It said that in light of Iraq's past performance the search must continue.

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering said after the council meeting that "a lot of significant questions" about the Iraqi nuclear program remain. He cited the lack of cooperation, the failure to make full declarations, and "the great deal of inconsistency in the program between its claim to peaceful purposes and what appears to be a very much military oriented program."

Pickering said that Iraq's July 14 "list" appears to be "more details addressing an earlier list, rather than new revelations of additional sites....I don't see that the new list is a great change in the present situation."

The U.S. envoy said that the five permanent members of the Security Council -- China, France, Great Britain, the USSR and

the United States -- will have "to address" Iraq's lists against the council's demand for a "full, complete declaration of all of the Iraqi nuclear activities."

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*NEA205 07/16/91

UNITED NATIONS REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16

(Iraq) (280)

IRAQI OIL SALES COULD FINANCE WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has recommended that Iraq be allowed to sell oil and petroleum products "under strict supervision" to finance the destruction of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

In a report to the Security Council released July 16, Perez de Cuellar said that "the most obvious way of obtaining financial resources for this purpose would be the sale of some Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products. The net proceeds of such sales would be deposited in a United Nations account to be used to reimburse the costs of carrying out the tasks...."

In Resolution 699, passed June 17, the council encouraged "the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind" from all states to ensure that the destruction of the weapons is undertaken effectively and expeditiously by the United Nations. So far the U.N. has received \$2 million in voluntary contributions to get the destruction process underway until Iraq can begin payments.

Perez de Cuellar acknowledged that his recommendation would take money from the Compensation Fund which also will use Iraqi oil profits to reimburse governments, companies, and individuals for war damages. The council is currently deciding on what percentage of the oil sales will be diverted to this fund but has given no indication of when such sales would begin.

His approach, he said "would also necessitate that the sanctions imposed on Iraq under Security Council Resolution 661 be lifted" temporarily and under "clearly defined conditions. It may be necessary to repeat this process in light of the ultimate costs to be reimbursed."

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U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE OPENS WAY FOR MIDEAST BREAKTHROUGH

(Jordan's ambassador discusses peace process) (1170)

By Rosalind Mandine

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- "President Bush's peace initiative and the credibility the United States has achieved as a result of the gulf crisis have opened the way for a possible breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict," Jordan's ambassador to the United States said July 15.

Speaking to a forum sponsored by Churches for the Middle East Peace held on Capitol Hill, Ambassador Hussein Hammami discussed the peace process, the spread of democracy in the region and the problem of scarcity of water resources in the Middle East. The forum was attended by members of Congress, their staff and the media.

"It is imperative that the United States pursues this objective (the peace process)...and utilize the moral high ground from which it led the international coalition to free Kuwait because another opportunity may not emerge in the region again," the ambassador stressed.

While Jordan "welcomes the president's efforts to convene a peace conference," the conference "should not be an end in itself," the ambassador underscored. "Procedural matters should not cloud the real issues at hand," he said.

Addressing two points of difference between Israel and the Arab states in convening the peace conference, the ambassador said "the Arab nations have accepted the land for peace formula and feel that United Nations representation in the peace conference is legitimate and constructive given the climate that produced effective U.N. action during the gulf crisis and the prevailing mood today of superpower cooperation."

On the question of land for peace, Hammami said "For Israel to insist that it wants both peace and land is nothing but a contradiction in terms."

The ambassador called on Israel to "put a stop to the settlement of the occupied territories." He also voiced his concern that U.S. housing loan guarantees for Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel will be used to expand settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

"Much can be done by the United States to prevent this de facto annexation of the occupied territories by Israel...We believe that the United States is in a position to exert its influence in the region by ensuring that Israel does not create irreversible acts on the ground as to render the concept of

land for peace meaningless," he said.

In order for peace to be lasting, it must be negotiated "with true representatives of both sides," Hammami stressed.

"Israel also wants to dictate who the Palestinian negotiating partners in the peace conference will be -- this is as absurd as for the Arab side to demand who the Israeli representatives in the peace conference should be," he said.

"Jordan for its part has gone on the record with its commitment to the land for peace formula and we have also declared our readiness to form a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for the peace conference if the Palestinians request that," Hammami pointed out.

"Jordan will coordinate with the Palestinians and can act as a mechanism to achieve their presence at the negotiating table if possible, but it will not replace them at that table and will not negotiate on their behalf," the ambassador explained.

"If the Palestinians do not share in the building of peace they will have no incentive to preserve it," he said.

The spread of democracy in the Middle East is a major contribution to stability in the region, Hammami asserted. He noted that Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and Yemen have made "important strides toward democracy."

The ambassador credited Jordan's democratization program for helping "to preserve our social fabric during the gulf crisis" by offering a means of expression to the people of Jordan.

Jordan's democratization program has defined the "basics of pluralistic organized political structure that can serve as a model for the region," he said.

"In addition, for the first time in the Arab world, with the recent adoption of a national charter, Jordan has achieved the securing of a commitment of every political group in the country to pluralism. This transition has been achieved in a peaceful manner," he said.

Outlining his country's moves toward democracy, Ambassador Hussein Hammami said "it is ironic that in the time Jordan has achieved a great measure of pluralism, the country, leadership and its people have not seen the support that was accorded by the world community to the Eastern European countries following their moves toward democracy."

"Specifically, the cut-off of aid to Jordan by the U.S. Congress in punishment for my country's perceived position during the gulf crisis is in our opinion counterproductive and undermines moderation in Jordan," Hammami said.

The House of Representatives voted June 19 to cut off military

aid to Jordan unless President Bush certifies that Amman is committed to the Middle East peace process.

The cut-off in aid may lead to an "increase in radicalism and extremism both on the left and the right and does not favor a revitalization of the traditional relationship between the United States and Jordan," the ambassador stressed.

In the context of Jordan's improved human rights' record and moves towards democracy, the congressional decision to cut off aid is both "unwise and untimely," Hammami said.

The cut-off in aid comes at a time of severe economic pressures in Jordan due to the gulf crisis, the ambassador noted.

On the issue of scarcity of water resources, the ambassador warned that "there will be a major conflict in the region in the next decade, even earlier, if the problem of water is not properly addressed and resolved."

The ambassador accused Israel of not fairly distributing the water resources in the area. He said Israel is taking water from Jordan's "major source for water -- the result of this is that Jordan is now incapable of meeting immediate water needs." The ambassador said Israel is also "taking water from the aquifer in the West Bank -- the result is that about 100,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank use as much water as one million Palestinians who live there."

Noting that the "the population in the Middle East is expanding at the rate of approximately four percent annually" the ambassador stressed that "it is very clear that unless the problem is resolved, the very existence of the people in the region will be threatened."

"What is needed is a fair distribution of this meager resource on the basis of international law," he said.

However, a program for water resource distribution will be difficult to negotiate in the absence of peace in the region, Hammami said.

"We need a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in order for the nations of the area to be capable to address this problem on an equitable basis," he said.

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U.S. 1991 DEFICIT ESTIMATE LOWERED; 1992 FIGURE RAISED

(Deferred costs of war, thrift crisis the key) (700)

By Ralph Dannheisser

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- This year's federal government budget deficit will be far lower than previously thought, but next year's shortfall will be higher by an even greater margin, the Bush administration says.

A mid-session review issued July 15 by the administration's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects a deficit for the fiscal year that ends September 30, 1991 of \$282,200 million -- still the highest ever, but well under the \$318,100 million predicted in February.

OMB attributes most of the difference to timing changes in paying the net costs of conducting the Persian Gulf war and resolving the savings and loan industry crisis.

Thus, the report indicates, the United States will appear to show a \$24,000 million paper profit on the war in the current fiscal year, largely due to receipt of contributions from U.S. allies. But disbursements in fiscal year 1992 and later are expected to erode that surplus over time.

Similarly, OMB says, outlays toward clearing up the savings and loan crisis will lag some \$28,000 million behind the initial February estimate. But that amount and more -- an estimated \$29,900 million -- will be shoved ahead into fiscal 1992, bringing costs that year to an expected \$118,000 million.

Lower-than-expected tax collections led OMB to cut its estimate of federal government receipts this year by \$22,800 million.

Looking ahead to 1992, the new estimate for the deficit is \$348,300 million -- \$67,400 million more than the previous estimate and an amount that would produce a second straight annual record.

And the report projects big, though declining, annual deficits all the way through 1996, in contrast to the February projection of a nearly balanced budget in 1995 and a \$19,900 million surplus in 1996.

Still, it foresees the deficit as a percentage of gross national product falling from 5.0 percent this year and 5.8 percent in 1992 to 1.0 percent by 1995. Many economists believe the deficit is most meaningfully measured that way, in relation to the overall size of the economy.

The July report sticks close to its February antecedent in terms of the economic assumptions used, a fact that OMB Director Richard Darman points out in covering letters sent to Congress.

"The administration's economic forecast used in developing the president's budget (in February) has been highly accurate to date -- and is modified only slightly herein," Darman writes.

Thus, OMB sees growth in real, or inflation-adjusted, GNP of 0.8 percent this calendar year -- down minimally from the 0.9 percent predicted in February -- and sticks with its earlier projection of 3.6 percent for 1992.

Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index fourth quarter to fourth quarter, is pegged at 3.4 percent for this calendar year -- better than the 4.3 percent February projection -- and 3.9 percent for 1992, as originally predicted.

The unemployment rate is now seen as a bit worse than before for this year, at 6.7 percent of the total labor force in the fourth quarter as against 6.6 percent estimated earlier, and slightly better in 1992, at 6.3 percent rather than 6.5 percent.

OMB projects short-term interest rates slightly lower than previously predicted, and long-term rates somewhat higher. It sees the rate on 91-day Treasury bills as 5.7 percent this year and 5.9 percent in 1992, as against 6.4 percent and 6.0 percent projected earlier. As for 10-year Treasury notes, the new estimates are 8.0 percent this year and 7.8 percent next, compared with 7.5 percent and 7.2 percent respectively in the earlier report.

Darman contends in his covering letter that the new budget discipline set out in the agreement reached last November between Congress and the president has been effective. "The budget reforms enacted in 1990 have been working," he says, with changes in estimates restricted mainly to those areas -- largely the gulf war and savings and loan resolutions -- exempted under the pact.

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(Part of series on results of U.S. census)

CENSUS FINDS ASIANS FASTEST-GROWING GROUP IN U.S.

(Number boosted by influx in past decade) (1020)

By Paul Malamud

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- A tide of immigrants fleeing political and economic insecurity in Asia and hoping for freedom and opportunity in America has helped make Asians the fastestgrowing minority in the United States in the past decade.

The 1990 census shows that Asians and Pacific Islanders number 7,273,662 -- 2.9 percent out of a total population of 248,709,873. This represents an increase of 107.8 percent

since 1980, which is due in large part to immigration.

"The political upheavals and economic hardships that beset Asian nations from Sri Lanka and the Philippines to China and South Korea have sent more than two million immigrants across the Pacific Ocean in the past decade" writes Felicity Barringer of The New York Times.

The composition of the Asian-American group is changing as well. While Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos have traditionally constituted the largest Asian-American groups, Southeast Asians, Indians, Koreans and to a lesser extent Pakistanis and Bangladeshis see their numbers in the United States growing faster. In fact, three of the fastest growing subgroups of Asians over the past decade have been Vietnamese (up 134.8 percent over the past 10 years), Indians (up 125.6 percent), and Koreans (up 125.3 percent).

Chinese are still the largest subgroup of Asian-Americans with total population of 1.6 million, then Filipinos with a population of 1.4 million, and Japanese-Americans who number approximately 848,000. However, Asian Indians now number 815,000, Koreans 799,000 and Vietnamese 615,000 -- followed in no particular order by populations of Cambodians, Hmong, Laotians, Thais, Hawaiians, Samoans, Guamanians and others.

"Asian Americans are the fastest-growing and most affluent minority market in the United States," writes William O'Hare of American Demographics Magazine -- but their level of success and affluence depends in part on what skills groups of new immigrants bring with them. Many Filipinos, for example, have integrated easily into the American economy because they already speak English. Other groups, such as the Lao Hmong have had considerable difficulty; some Hmong communities have welfare rates as high as 80 percent.

On the whole, however, the Asian immigrant story appears to be an economic success story. In 1988, as O'Hare points out, the median household income of Asians was \$31,578 compared with \$28,661 for non-Hispanic whites, \$20,000 for Hispanics, and \$16,004 for blacks. Thirty-two percent of Asian-American households have incomes of \$50,000 or more a year, compared with 29 percent of non-hispanic whites.

The relative affluence of many Asian-Americans can be traced to several factors. One is a preference for education. Among Americans age 25 or older, 14 percent of Asians have been to college for five or more years, compared to 9 percent of all Americans. An additional 21 percent of Asian-Americans have completed 4 years of college, compared to an additional 13 percent of all Americans. Their high income is enhanced by the fact that 74 percent of Asian-Americans live in married couple households, versus 72 percent of non-hispanic whites and 43 percent of blacks. In general, married couple households have the highest income levels.

In addition, Asian-Americans have larger families. The average number of people per household is 2.5 for non-Hispanic whites, 3.2 for Asian-Americans. Thus, while Asian-American personal income is slightly lower than that of non-Hispanic white Americans -- \$16,476 per year in 1988 compared to \$17,828 -- Asian households have more income earners. The relatively high income of Asians also stems in part from their concentration in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu, where salaries and the cost of living are well above the U.S. average.

Among Asian-Americans, 93 percent live in metropolitan areas -- about half in the central cities, half in suburbs (twice as many white Americans live in suburbs as in urban cores). The relatively high number of Asians who live in central cities may be due to the tendency of recent immigrants to open small shops to serve urban populations, as well as join their own ethnic communities.

Fifty-six percent of Asian-Americans own their homes as opposed to 74 percent of whites, a statistic that may reflect the relatively high housing costs in urban areas. This supposition is buttressed by the fact that in 1987 the median home value of homes owned by Asian-Americans was \$136,843 -- while the national median value of homes owned by whites was \$69,282.

Traditionally, Asian-Americans have lived on the West coast. The majority still live there, but many are moving rapidly into other regions of the country. According to the 1990 census, of the total Asian-Pacific-Islander population, 18.4 percent live in the Northeast, 10.6 percent in the Midwest, 15.4 percent in the South and 55.7 percent in the West. In the Northeast they constitute 2.6 percent of total population, in the Midwest 1.3 percent, in the South 1.3 percent and in the West 7.7 percent.

Just over 39 percent of all Asian-Americans live in California,

9.5 percent live in New York, 9.4 percent in Hawaii, 4.4 percent in Texas, 3.9 percent in Illinois, 3.7 percent in New Jersey; by now there are some Asians in all states of the union.

Such statistics showing the dispersal of Asians into different areas of the United States are further highlighted by 1990 census figures which reveal the ethnic breakdown of population in major cities. While the numbers of Asian-Americans increased 138.3 percent in Los Angeles -- a traditional center of Asian-American culture -- over the past decade, it increased 143.9 percent in Washington, D.C., 183.9 percent in Boston, 230.2 percent in Minneapolis, 298.4 percent in Dallas, and 332.7 percent in Atlanta.

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SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL A "POSITIVE RESPONSE"

(Transcript: Bush remarks 7/15/91) (1620)

London -- The United States views as a "positive response" Syria's acceptance of a proposal aimed at convening a regional peace conference in the Middle East, President Bush says.

"We're not suggesting that everything is fine and that there couldn't be some last-minute hitch to it, but we're approaching this very positively," the president told reporters in London July 15.

In his meeting with the members of the press, Bush said that despite Israel's announced refusal to match Syrian concessions on the proposal, the United States was "just going to go forward and keep pressing. And I don't believe Israel has rejected this. They haven't had a chance to even understand what President Assad is proposing."

Following is a transcript of Bush's remarks:

(begin transcript)

BUSH: Well, I was just asking what the press interest was in. And tonight at our dinner, the secretary having covered Yugoslavia and a lot of other issues at the foreign minister level, we talked about the Iraq situation and we talked mainly about conventional arms control, or how the various participants in the G-7 could show their keen interest in arms control. We didn't go into the details of START or anything of that nature.

So those were the subjects at our dinner. And you were into several other subjects, Yugoslavia --

BAKER: Yugoslavia, Asia, a whole host of regional political issues.

BUSH: And then the main topic, a main topic at our dinner was the Middle East. And with that in mind, we have received a response from Syria. We view it as a positive response. We're not suggesting that everything is fine and that there couldn't be some last-minute hitch to it, but we're approaching this very positively. And so much so that I've asked Jim Baker to go back to the area to immediately follow up.

This is what we would term a breakthrough from what we know about it and something very important. We are grateful President Assad has come forward at this point -- appears to have come forward -- willing to engage in the kinds of discussions that Secretary Baker has been pressing for, that's been part of our policy.

So, we'll see where we go from here. And I regret that Jim won't be with me at Turkey and Greece. Both countries have

been important to us. He's done a lot of work with their ministers. But this takes priority, and so he will go to several countries in the Middle East and we'll see where we come out.

Q: Mr. President, how would you describe the significance of this breakthrough? Do you see real hope here?

BUSH: Well, again, I will wait until I hear from Jim Baker after he's been in the area, been to several of these countries. But I think, in fairness to President Mubarak who worked with President Assad of Syria on this, and to others, we would say, from what we've seen, we would say breakthrough. But we've learned that you -- we want to go into all the details so that there can't been (sic) some hangup. But, clearly, it is a coming forward by President Assad that we view as very, very positive -- breakthrough, perhaps, or maybe, but I think these words, you got to be careful until the details are finalized.

Q: What is your plan, and why is it still a secret? And what will Israel respond to this, since it's already rejected it?

BUSH: Well, I don't know that Israel has rejected this. And the plan has, the major components of it are well-known. But there are details of it better kept for quiet diplomacy. So I think mostly people realize what we're talking about here and trying to get these parties to engage one with the other, the starting mechanism being a conference of sorts. But, we're just going to go forward and keep pressing. And I don't believe Israel has rejected this. They haven't had a chance to even understand what President Assad is proposing. And one of their concerns has been that Syria hasn't been coming forward. And now, if it is proper that they are coming forward, that clearly would, I would think, be good for those who want peace in the area. It is a very important step that's taken place.

Q: You mean he has made a concession on some of the --

BUSH: I wouldn't call it a concession. He's just agreed now to come forward to the kinds of meetings that are necessary to get this process going. And that is a major step if it proves to be correct.

Q: Mr. President, how will you convince Israel to get on board now that the Syrians have made this move?

BUSH: I would like to think that they, when they say they want peace, that they would get on board naturally. They've been wanting talks with people in the area, and if all goes well here, that's exactly what will happen. So, I'm not going to do anything other than -- to suggest that they'll be unwilling to. My view is that, if it's as represented that they will want to. They've made statements to us of wanting to do these things. So now here will be a good task --

Q: You mean they have not responded?

BUSH: We haven't asked Israel to respond to this Syrian response yet. We're, as I say, examining it in every detail.

Q: Mr. President, the other side of this is the possibility of renewed bombing inside Iraq. When you talked to the various leaders tonight, do you have support -- if Iraq does not come forward and give the information that we all want, do you have support for military action against Iraq?

BUSH: There would be strong, strong support for that. I would refer you to what President Mitterrand said yesterday morning, very clear, and very direct, and the British clearly are in that supportive mode. And I think most countries, recognizing the terrible danger of this man going forward with a nuclear program, would be of the same mind.

Q: Mr. President, one last question.

BUSH: Yes.

Q: Is there a possibility that by the time you meet Mr. Gorbachev later this week there will be an agreement on a strategic arms accord?

BUSH: Well, I meet him the day after tomorrow, and so I don't want to raise people's hopes, except to say this: that the hard work that went into this by the foreign secretary, Mr. Bessmertnykh, and by our secretary of state produced a lot of results, a lot of results. And we have one sticking point that is highly technical. And whether President Gorbachev and I are able to even discuss something of this technical nature without a lot of experts around, I'm not prepared to say.

This G-7 meeting was not to be dominated by some agreement or lack of agreement on START. And I'm determined to keep it that way. But clearly, if he wants to discuss it further at this meeting, we will be prepared. Maybe there will be other ways to meet. Maybe after Jim and I and General Scowcroft and others who are key to this have a chance to discuss in detail the highly technical arguments, maybe we'll be able to sit with the foreign minister when he gets here.

So we don't have a plan to try to hammer it out in that way. And again, I don't want to confuse President Gorbachev's coming to the G-7 summit with arms control, with START. It still remains, however, that we want a summit agreement. It still remains that to have a summit agreement, we should have all these details worked out and to have broad agreement on START -- not every single T crossed or I dotted. We're talking there, I'm told, in several hundred pages of documentation. That isn't necessary, but the secretary and the foreign minister, having hammered out agreement on the major sticking principles, we're now -- I think -- to use Jim's word, about 99 percent of the way there. But having said that, this last

issue is sticky and we'll have to see where we go.

But I think the Soviets want a summit. We've got many things that I want to talk to him about at a summit. And so let's hope that this matter will be resolved in the short period of time that lies ahead. I still would say to you that, if that's done, that there could be a summit by the end of this month still. So pack your bags or but don't have them zipped up.

Q: Well if it's 99 percent, what's that big hangup. It seems to me -- 10 years.

BUSH: The other one percent; you've got to deduct 99 from a hundred.

Q: When do you leave? Wednesday night or Thursday?

BAKER: Probably Thursday morning.

BUSH: No, but it's been a good meeting so far. And let me just say this since we're here at Winfield House: We are very grateful to Prime Minister Major, not just for the hospitality and the lovely evening and the arrangements and all of that, but to the time and attention that he put in, the leadership that he put into this G-7 summit. He's worked out the agenda in a good way. He's been very tolerant of dissenting views, and these discussions we've had are free wheeling. And I am very impressed with the job he has done. I think everyone else attending the summit would agree with that.

(end transcript)

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SUMMIT LEADERS WILL KEEP SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

(Text: Summit Political Declaration 7/16/91) (2230)

London -- The Economic Summit leaders pledged July 16 to maintain sanctions against Iraq until all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions "have been implemented in full and the people of Iraq, as well as their neighbors, can live without fear of intimidation, repression or attack" by the Iraqi regime.

In a political declaration, the summit participants also:

-- called for a permanent cease-fire and an end to the violence in Yugoslavia;

-- expressed support for market reforms in central and eastern Europe;

-- underscored their commitment to making the United Nations stronger, more efficient, and more effective in order to protect human rights, maintain peace and security for all, and deter aggression;

-- said the current U.S. initiative to advance the Middle East peace process offers "the best hope of progress towards a settlement";

-- expressed support for the concept of a peace conference "starting parallel and direct negotiations between Israel and representative Palestinians on the one hand and Israel and the Arab states on the other";

-- cited a commitment to work to deter and combat terrorism by all possible means within the framework of international law and national legislation;

-- welcomed the positive developments in South Africa, "where the legislative pillars of apartheid have at last been dismantled," and expressed the hope that "these important steps will be followed by the de facto elimination of apartheid."

Following is the text of the political declaration:

(begin text)

1. We, the leaders of our seven countries and the representatives of the European Community, renew our firm commitment to the ideal of a peaceful, just, democratic and prosperous world. The international community faces enormous challenges. But there is also reason for hope. We must reinforce the multilateral approach to the solution of common problems and work to strengthen the international system of which the United Nations, based on its charter, remains so central a part. We call on the leaders of other nations to

join us in that cause.

2. It is a matter for hope and encouragement that the U.N. Security Council, with the backing of the international community, showed during the Gulf crisis that it could fulfill its role of acting to restore international peace and security and to resolve conflict. With the East-West confrontation of the last four decades behind us, the international community must now build on this new spirit of cooperation not only in the Middle East but wherever danger and conflict threaten or other challenges must be met.

3. We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfill completely the promise and the vision of its founders. A revitalized United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the United Nations stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression. We will make preventive diplomacy a top priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential aggressors the consequences of their actions. The U.N.'s role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to support this strongly.

4. We note that the urgent and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian problem in Iraq caused by violent oppression by the government required exceptional action by the international community, following UNSCR 688. We urge the United Nations and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in the future if the circumstances require it. The international community cannot stand idly by in cases where widespread human suffering from famine, war, oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood reaches urgent and overwhelming proportions.

5. The recent tragedies in Bangladesh, Iraq and the Horn of Africa demonstrate the need to reinforce U.N. relief in coping with emergencies. We call on all member states to respond to the secretary general's appeal for voluntary contributions. We would like to see moves to strengthen the coordination, and to accelerate the effective delivery, of all U.N. relief for major disasters. Such initiatives, as part of an overall effort to make the United Nations more effective could include:

(a) the designation of a high level official, answerable only to the U.N. secretary general, who would be responsible for directing a prompt and well-integrated international response to emergencies, and for coordinating the relevant U.N. appeals; and

(b) improvement in the arrangements whereby resources from within the U.N. system and support from donor countries and NGOs can be mobilized to meet urgent humanitarian needs in time of crisis.

The United Nations would then be able to take the early action that has sometimes been missing in the past. The United Nations should also make full use of its early warning capacity to alert the international community to coming crisis and to work on the preparation of contingency plans, to include the question of prior earmarking of resources and material that would be available to meet these contingencies.

6. Since we last met the world has witnessed the invasion, occupation and subsequent liberation of Kuwait. The overwhelming response of the international community in reversing the forcible annexation of one small nation was evidence of the widespread preference for:

-- taking collective measures against threats to the peace and to suppress aggression,

-- settling disputes peacefully,

-- upholding the rule of law, and

-- protecting human rights.

These principles are essential to the civilized conduct of relations between states.

7. We express our support for what the countries of the Gulf and their neighbors are doing to ensure their security in future. We intend to maintain sanctions against Iraq until all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council have been implemented in full and the people of Iraq, as well as their neighbors, can live without fear of intimidation, repression or attack. As for the Iraqi people, they deserve the opportunity to choose their leadership openly and democratically. We look forward to the forthcoming elections in Kuwait and to an improvement of the human rights situation there and in the region.

8. We attach overriding importance to the launching of a process designed to bring comprehensive, just and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians. Such a peace should be based on UNSCRs 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. We support the concept of a peace conference starting parallel and direct negotiations between Israel and representative Palestinians on the one hand and Israel and the Arab states on the other. We confirm our continuing support for the current American initiative to advance the peace process, which we believe offers the best hope of progress towards a settlement. We urge all the parties to the dispute to adopt reciprocal and balanced confidence-building measures and to show the flexibility necessary to allow a peace conference to be convened on the basis set out in this initiative. In that connection we believe that the Arab boycott should be suspended as should the Israeli policy of building settlements in the occupied territories.

9. We take note with satisfaction of the prospects opened by the restoration of security in Lebanon. We continue to support efforts by the Lebanese authorities to achieve the implementation of the Taif process, which will lead to the departure of all foreign forces and the holding of free elections.

10. We express our willingness to support the development of economic cooperation among the countries of the Middle East on the basis of liberal policies designed to encourage the repatriation of capital, an increase in investment and a decrease in obstacles to trade. Such policies should be accompanied by comprehensive long-term efforts to bring about more stability for the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

11. We welcome the further substantial progress in reform, both political and economic, achieved in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the last year and recognize that these gains will need to be maintained through a difficult period of economic transition, including through regional initiatives. We have a strong interest in the success of market reforms and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and we commit ourselves to full support for these reforms. We also take note of the progress of Albania towards joining the democratic community of nations.

12. Our support for the process of fundamental reform in the Soviet Union remains as strong as ever. We believe that new thinking in Soviet foreign policy, which has done so much to reduce East/West tension and strengthen the multilateral peace and security system, should be applied on a global basis. We hope that this new spirit of international cooperation will be as fully reflected in Asia as in Europe. We welcome efforts to create a new union, based on consent not coercion, which genuinely responds to the wishes of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The scale of this undertaking is enormous: an open and democratic Soviet Union able to play its full part in building stability and trust in the world. We reiterate our commitment to working with the Soviet Union to support their efforts to create an open society, a pluralistic democracy and a market economy. We hope the negotiations between the USSR and the elected governments of the Baltic countries will resolve their future democratically and in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the people.

13. It is for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide upon their future. However the situation in Yugoslavia continues to cause great concern. Military force and bloodshed cannot lead to a lasting settlement and will only put at risk wider stability. We call for a halt to violence, the deactivation and return of military forces to barracks and a permanent cease-fire. We urge all parties to comply with the provisions of the Brioni agreement as it stands. We welcome the efforts of the European Community and its member states in assisting in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. We

therefore support the dispatch of EC monitors to Yugoslavia, within the framework of the CSCE emergency mechanism. We will do whatever we can, with others in the international community, to encourage and support the process of dialogue and negotiation in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a new Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states. The normalization of the present situation will allow us to contribute to the indispensable economic recovery of the country.

14. We welcome the positive developments in South Africa, where the legislative pillars of apartheid have at last been dismantled. We hope that these important steps will be followed by the de facto elimination of apartheid and improvement in the situation of the most impoverished among the population of South Africa. We hope that negotiations on a new constitution leading to non-racial democracy will begin shortly and will not be disrupted by the tragic upsurge of violence. All parties must do all that is in their power to resolve the problem of violence. We are concerned that the foundation for a new non-racial South Africa will be undermined by mounting social problems and declining economic prospects for the majority of the population, which have contributed to the violence. There is an urgent need to restore growth to the economy to help reduce inequalities of wealth and opportunity. South Africa needs to pursue new economic, investment and other policies that permit normal access to all sources of foreign borrowing. In addition to its own domestic efforts, South Africa also needs the help of the international community, especially in those areas where the majority have long suffered deprivation: education, health, housing and social welfare. We will direct our aid for these purposes.

15. Finally, we look for further strengthening of the international order by continued vigorous efforts to deter terrorism and hostage taking. We call for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages wherever they may be held and for an accounting of all persons taken hostage who may have died while being held. We welcome the undertakings given by governments with an influence over hostage holders to work for the release of hostages and urge them to intensify their efforts to this end. We extend our sympathy to the friends and relations of those held. We reaffirm our condemnation of all forms of terrorism. We will work together to deter and combat terrorism by all possible means within the framework of international law and national legislation, particularly in the fields of international civil aviation security and the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection.

16. This forum continues to provide an invaluable opportunity for representatives from Europe, Japan and North America to discuss the critical challenges of the coming years. But we

cannot succeed alone. We call on the leaders of the other nations to join us in our efforts to make a practical and sustained contribution to the cause of peace, security, freedom and the rule of law, which are the preconditions for trying to bring about greater justice and prosperity throughout the world.

(end text)

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*NEA211 07/16/91

SUMMIT LEADERS VOW TO EXPAND NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES

(Text: Summit Declaration on Arms 7/16/91) (1840)

London -- The Economic Summit leaders July 16 underscored their commitment to combat the dangers to world security created by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and by associated missile delivery systems.

"We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes," the leaders said in a declaration on conventional arms transfers and nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation.

In the declaration on arms issues, the leaders also:

- said they would work for the early adoption of the proposed universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations;
- advocated measures to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals and asked all countries to refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions;
- called "moderation in the level of military expenditure" a "key aspect" of sound economic policy and good government;
- pledged to provide every assistance to the U.N. Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so they can "fully carry out their tasks" associated with monitoring the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities;
- reaffirmed the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and urged all non-signatory states to subscribe to the agreement;
- encouraged all non-nuclear weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards; and
- vowed to work for "a total and effective" ban on chemical and biological weapons.

Following is the text of the Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Non-proliferation:

(begin text)

1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the heads of state and government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The Gulf crisis has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of

conventional weapons. The responsibility to prevent the reemergence of such dangers is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as the international community as a whole. As is clear from the various initiatives which several of us have proposed jointly and individually, we are each determined to tackle, in appropriate fora, these dangers both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of selfdefense is recognized in the U.N. Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self defense and threatens its neighbors. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

3. The principle of transparency should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence and security building measure.

4. The principle of consultation should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing a common approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council on 8/9 July; as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its member states. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora.

5. The principle of action requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of

advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf war illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with competing claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the means by which these may be serviced. We note with favor the recent report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the recent decisions by several donor countries to take account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programs and encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention which the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the president of the World Bank have recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expenditure.

NON-PROLIFERATION

7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes.

8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare and missile capabilities; as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant U.N. resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the nuclear field, we:

-- Re-affirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favor of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- Reaffirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement;

-- Call on all non-nuclear weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime;

-- Urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines;

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the NPT.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

-- Our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995;

-- A strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system;

-- New measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in strengthening implementation of the convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending its confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective verification measures. Each of us will encourage accession to the convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfill their obligations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to strengthened implementation of the BWC, would make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.

12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will contribute the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully concluded as soon as possible. We reaffirm our intention to become original parties to the convention. We urge others to become parties at the earliest opportunity so that it can enter into force as soon as possible.

13. We must also strengthen controls on exports which could contribute to the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We welcome the measures taken by members of the Australia Group and by other states on the control of exports of chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. We seek to achieve increasingly close convergence of practice between all exporting states. We urge all states to support these efforts.

14. Our aim is a total and effective ban on chemical and

biological weapons. Use of such weapons is an outrage against humanity. In the event that a state uses such weapons each of us agrees to give immediate consideration to imposing severe measures against it both in the U.N. Security Council and elsewhere.

15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo MTCR meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.

16. We can make an important contribution to reducing the dangers of proliferation and conventional arms transfers. Our efforts and consultations on these issues, including with other supplier countries, will be continued in all appropriate fora so as to establish a new climate of global restraint. We will only succeed if others, including recipient countries, support us and if the international community unites in a new effort to remove these threats which can imperil the safety of all our peoples.

(end text)

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*NEA212 07/16/91

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16

(Ambassador Glaspie) (80)

Washington -- There was no press briefing July 16. The Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman posted the following response to a question taken during July 15 regular noon press briefing:

AMBASSADOR GLASPIE'S SENATE APPEARANCE

Q: Has the date been set for Ambassador Glaspie to appear before Congress?

A: Acting Secretary Eagleburger and Ambassador Glaspie are scheduled to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 10 a.m. on Friday, July 19 in open session.

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ANCIENT EGYPTIAN CARPETS ON DISPLAY IN WASHINGTON

(Exhibit highlights Mamluk, Ottoman periods) (300)

By Jehan Abdel-Gawad

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- A visitor to The Textile Museum here is struck by the jewel-like reds, blues and greens that have persisted in 500-year-old Egyptian carpets on display, suggesting "almost a will to live". Though the pile has worn down, their wholeness and symmetry remain.

The evolution from maplike geometric designs to ornate floral patterns seems almost surreal. Indeed, the carpets of Mamluk Egypt (1250-1517) and the subsequent Ottoman Empire in Egypt (1517-1750) embody not only an impressive technical skill but also the mysteries of an age of wealthy courts long past.

The Textile Museum in Washington is displaying the carpets through February 16, 1992, in an exhibit called, "Beyond the Pyramids: Geometry and Design in the Carpets of Egypt, 1450-1750." Only 102 of these carpets exist in the world, and no one knows how abundant they were. According to museum officials, what is known is that this collection of 32 rarely displayed carpets is the largest exhibit ever of its kind.

The carpets were primarily collected by George Hewitt Myers, in whose home the museum was created after his death. However, several are on loan from the Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Walters Art Gallery and private collections.

Carol Bier, Curator of Eastern Hemisphere Collections at the Textile Museum says, "There's a lot that probably is specifically related to Islamic doctrines... particularly, oneness and unity." Nevertheless, experts disagree on their origin, who made them, why they were made and for whom. The fact remains that they are the oldest complete rugs in existence, Bier said.

She explained that the Islamic tradition in textile art is a central focus of the museum. Past and future planned exhibits of Islamic art from Spain, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Central Asia attest to this.

It is no surprise that the "Beyond the Pyramids" exhibit contains many carpets from the Mamluk capital, Cairo. Not only was Cairo one of the wealthiest cities in the Near East, but it was at the time a center of intellectual and artistic activity.

According to the museum's public information manager, George Rogers, the technical skill required to make one of these rugs is apparent. The jagged distortions common to other weaves are absent in these carpets. The equal number of knots per linear unit of measurement in both vertical and horizontal directions

produces perfect squares, circles and stars. This indicates that the weavers were likely artisans by trade. Of course, this is only speculation, he adds.

The Mamluk carpets are typified not only by their colors, but by their general pattern as well. They have rectangular borders, often decorated with oblong designs known as cartouches. A central medallion which often consists of a square around a circle or star, is the focus of the carpets, Bier said. The border is common to both the Mamluk and the Ottoman period rugs, as is the trend of perfect symmetry. However, the former had "four-way" symmetry, while the latter often had only "two-way" symmetry.

Unlike other textiles and rugs, there is literally "no evidence" of historical information surrounding the carpets. Since few were discovered in Egypt and most were found in Europe, this led to the belief that the rugs may have been made for commercial use and later traded overseas. Evidence, like three carpets in existence known to be exactly alike down to the number of knots per unit exists, but is according to Bier, circumstantial at best.

Upon the Ottoman invasion and conquest of the Mamluk's Egypt, the tradition in weaving seemed to evolve. Bier noted that the rugs of this period have more than the basic three colors of earlier rugs, and an imperial floral style with stylized tulips, hyacinths and jasmine flowers with "naturalistic" stems and leaves. The richness of color and ornate creative style differ from the Mamluk style which reinforced "tradition, rather than individuality".

The Textile Museum's exhibit is by far the best example of the blend between the tradition and individuality in Egyptian weaving, a craft that has almost disappeared in the country, Bier said. The mystery surrounding these carpets, including the question of why the tradition died, makes the exhibit all the more intriguing to westerners. Thus far, Rogers said, the response has been "excellent."

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*NEA214 07/16/91

BAKER SAYS ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS MAY BE POSSIBLE

(Sees no additional movement on START) (830)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

London -- Direct peace talks between Israel and Syria may now be possible, Secretary of State Baker said July 16.

Baker said the Syrian response to President Bush's suggestions on peace in the Middle East offers "the real possibility of bringing about...direct, face-to-face bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria."

At a briefing for reporters on discussions at the Economic Summit, Baker said such face-to-face talks between Arabs and Israelis are "what we've been seeking to try and produce" in months of intensive diplomacy and repeated trips to the region. Baker is to depart London for the Middle East July 18 on still another attempt to convene a peace conference.

Baker said he did not know why Syria had changed its position on a peace conference, but he suggested President Bush's persuasive powers may have played a role. He said Syrian President Assad had sent Bush "a very thoughtful response...that we have characterized as positive, and a response that is not conditioned," in response to suggestions that the president made in his letter to Assad. "Maybe the arguments the president put forth in that letter," Baker added, "together with support from other countries...and perhaps even his own decision that now is the time to pursue peace -- maybe all those things enter in."

Noting that the Syrian letter contained "suggestions," Baker said one reason for meeting with Assad once more is to make sure the suggestions are not "in any way interpreted as conditions" concerning acceptance by Damascus of a Middle East peace conference.

What Baker hopes to start is a dual-track negotiation involving Israel and Arab states on one track, Israel and representative Palestinians on the other.

"We are at a point," Baker said, "where direct bilateral negotiations may indeed be possible." Obviously, he added, that depends on the reaction of other parties to Syria's acceptance of the concept.

"Direct, bilateral negotiations are, after all, what we've been seeking to try and produce," Baker explained, cautioning however, that "there are plenty of hurdles, and we're not there by a long shot."

Baker told a questioner that Syria has not dropped its preference for a "silent" U.N. presence in any peace conference, but he added the Syrian response "is indeed a positive letter, and I think that it's fair to say that we have the possibility of seeing direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and at least some of her Arab neighbors. That is something that Israel has wanted for a very long time." (Israel opposes any U.N. presence in a peace conference.)

He said he wants to discuss with Israeli leaders his view of the Middle East situation following Assad's response. "I will want to discuss in great depth and in great detail with the leadership in Israel," Baker explained, "the situation as I see it in the aftermath of the president's receipt of a response from President Assad."

Baker said the Assad response offers "the real possibility of bringing about direct face-to-face, bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria."

Asked if the Economic Summit's endorsement of the territory for peace concept would aid his search for a solution in the Middle East, Baker said he thinks it "helpful" for the summit participants to "demonstrate their uniform commitment not only to peace but to the process for peace that we are trying to create. I don't think that can be anything but helpful."

Also commenting on arms control issues, the secretary said the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) pose "a very serious issue" which touches on "the strategic balance for the next 15 or 20 years, and we are determined to get it right."

Baker said he was not ruling out discussion of the START impasse at the summit, but he noted the "experts" had not "been able to generate anything that looks like a solution."

He said the START talks "stand where they stood" July 14 when U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Washington failed to resolve the issue of missile throwweight. He said there have been no negotiations since at the ministerial level or above, although experts on each side have been working on the problem.

He said he did not know if the deadlock would be directly addressed in any detail by Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev in their July 17 meeting in London. Baker also rejected a suggestion that the START impasse represents "a case of saving one issue" so the two presidents could resolve it in London.

On Iraq, Baker said enforced compliance with U.N. resolutions on weapons of mass destruction had been discussed "on the fringes" of the summit sessions "in a bilateral way. Suffice it to say we think we have strong support for taking steps that are required in order to see (Iraqi) compliance."

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*NEA215 07/16/91

CHENEY URGES QUICK RATIFICATION OF CFE TREATY

(Says it represents a major security asset) (740)

By Davis Brashears

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Urging the U.S. Senate to move quickly to ratify the treaty reducing Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Defense Secretary Cheney says the pact "represents a major contribution to the future security" of both Europe and the United States.

Cheney described the treaty's beneficial provisions in testimony July 16 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"It places limits on offensive military hardware within the European portion of the Soviet Union, requires the destruction of thousands of pieces of Soviet equipment, and establishes an effective verification regime," he told the committee members.

The secretary insisted that the Soviet Union still constitutes a threat to its neighbors despite the limits imposed on its military capability by severe economic problems. But with the treaty's provisions in place, he said, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies will have sufficient time in the event of any hostile Soviet action "to respond by reconstituting our own forces."

Furthermore, he added, "CFE will foster a security environment in Europe which will reassure the Soviets that NATO remains a defensive alliance posing no threat to anyone."

Cheney, who was accompanied at the Senate committee hearing by Chairman Colin Powell and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalled that in the past, the Soviets were able to mount a theater-wide campaign, using their own forces as well as those of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations. "This formidable force was positioned well forward and considered ready to fight on very short notice," he said.

But under CFE constraints, the secretary pointed out, the Soviets would be denied the ability to launch such a campaign without violating the terms of the treaty.

"Once CFE is fully implemented," he said, "we will have seen the Soviets convert or destroy vast quantities of tanks, artillery, and other military equipment. We expect ultimately to see some 10,000 tanks destroyed or converted" to peaceful uses.

On the NATO side, he noted, "CFE allows us to modernize alliance forces and improve the distribution of defense burdens within the alliance through transfers of treaty limited

equipment."

Cheney emphasized that even though there has been a basic transformation of allied military strategy with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, "NATO will continue to play a preeminent role in European security."

While the Soviet threat has diminished, it has not been eliminated, he noted, pointing out that the Soviet Union remains the largest military power in Europe and the Soviet government continues to spend "enormous sums on its military."

"It is modernizing its nuclear forces, and its conventional strength remains formidable," he said, pointing out also that the current struggle between traditionalists and reformers in the Soviet Union has not been settled. "We simply cannot rule out the possibility of changes in Soviet policy that would result in a more threatening security environment," he said.

Another reason to keep NATO strong, Cheney told the committee, "is to help ensure that Eastern Europe can make a successful transition to democracy. That transition faces tremendous hurdles, including traditional national rivalries and ethnic tensions," the secretary noted.

"NATO can be a solid security anchor in this challenging period," the secretary said, noting that such former Warsaw Pact nations as Poland and Czechoslovakia "have become among the staunchest advocates" of the alliance.

"Continued uncertainty about developments inside the Soviet Union, economic collapse, the possibility of massive flows of refugees, the potential for violent ethnic strife, all underscore the need for the stable, strong security framework provided by NATO and the U.S. presence in Europe," he said.

In joining Cheney's call for prompt ratification of the CFE Treaty, Joint Chiefs Chairman Powell described the pact as "a major success story for the Atlantic alliance." He told the committee that CFE achieves allied objectives of strengthening the stability and security of Europe by establishing a balance of conventional armed forces on the continent at a much lower level.

The pact eliminates the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe, he said. Powell maintained that the treaty "allows us to alter formally and permanently the shape of the military confrontation in Europe and to solidify the foundations of a new political and military order."

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*NEA216 07/16/91

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, JULY 16

(Iraq, Philippines) (620)

NEWS BRIEFING -- Spokesman Pete Williams discussed the following topics:

COALITION COMPLETES PULLOUT FROM IRAQ

U.S. and coalition forces July 15 completed their withdrawal from the security zone of northern Iraq, Williams announced.

"All the coalition forces are now out of Iraq," he told reporters. They leave behind 6,600 refugees who are being cared for by international humanitarian organizations, he said.

A residual force is standing by to assist if more needs to be done to help the refugees, he said. The force is about 8,000 strong, including 5,700 Americans; the other members are from Britain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Turkey, he said.

The spokesman asserted that the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is still less than forthcoming about revealing the extent of Iraq's nuclear program to international inspection teams. For example, he explained that the most recent written communication from Baghdad to the inspectors only answered some questions previously addressed to the Iraqi government and did not provide new information on nuclear facilities.

"The special (United Nations) commission and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) are still not satisfied with Iraq's declaration about its nuclear program. They will be sending another team to Iraq to inspect the remaining declared sites plus other sites suspected" of contributing to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, Williams said.

U.S. forces in the region, he said, are relaying to the international inspection teams any information they discover about Iraqi activities that could be linked to a nuclear weapons development program.

PROSPECTS FOR USE OF CLARK AIR FORCE BASE ASSESSED

Williams said that a final decision on whether to abandon Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines has not been reached, but Defense Secretary Cheney said in a speech later in the day that using the base again after the Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruptions is "just not a viable prospect."

The defense secretary told a publishing group that the massive installation at Clark is in "bad shape" and "the cost of refurbishing the base would be enormous.

"The likelihood that we will go back to Clark is pretty remote," he said.

Williams said that after conferring with President Bush and

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, Cheney will make a decision soon on the use of Clark.

"We are very pessimistic about the future of Clark Air Force Base, because of the reconstruction costs and the prospects of mud slides, flooding, and ash fall" in the aftermath of the Mount Pinatubo volcano's recent eruption, Williams said.

However, he said, "until a final decision is made about Clark, the entire base package is still on the table" in the base negotiations between the Philippines and the United States.

"We would like to remain in the Philippines. We think it is in the interest of the United States and the Philippines and the region that we do so," he said. "It is a matter of great importance to the United States. It affects our relations with the Philippines and our strategic posture in Asia," he added.

Williams pointed out that although Clark is not operational, the naval base at Subic Bay has been restored. "The base has come back to life," he said. "Ships are calling there.

"As we have said before, Subic Bay is a very important facility to the Navy and we would very much like to keep our operations" there, he said.

Williams said that U.S. negotiator Richard Armitage is continuing his talks with Philippine officials on the future of American forces at Philippine bases. "We hope that we can work out some sort of mutually acceptable agreement," he said.

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*NEA251 07/16/91

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

MIDDLE EAST REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (1900)

THE WASHINGTON POST, DAVID HOFFMAN:

President Bush launched a new push for Middle East peace today (July 15), with a White House announcement at the economic summit that opened here that he will send Secretary of State James A. Baker III back to the region. The move came amid signs that the United States is intensifying pressure on Israel to agree to attend a regional peace conference....

Bush also used today's meetings with other leaders at the summit to solidify support for the possibility of renewed military action against Iraq if President Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with the U.N.-imposed cease fire conditions requiring Iraq to destroy its nuclear and chemical weapons. Bush "has made clear and there is agreement by virtually everyone we have talked to that should action be necessary, that that is understandable and reasonable," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said....

The announcement of Baker's new mission to the Middle East followed a letter from Syrian President Hafez Assad that Bush today called "a good response" and "a breakthrough from what we know about it...."

"In our view, this is basically a yes," said a senior U.S. official familiar with the letter. "What he's doing is buying on to our general approach." The official said Assad put no conditions on attending the peace conference, but offered "suggestions," which Baker wants to discuss with him....

The Bush administration gave strong indications today that Baker, having secured a positive response from Syria, will now seek to turn up the pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to agree to attend the conference....

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT IN LONDON:

President Bush said here on Monday night (July 15) that Syria's response to his proposal for convening a Middle East peace conference represented a "very positive breakthrough" and could pose "a good test" of Israel's desire to negotiate peace with its Arab adversaries....

Bush and his advisers seemed buoyant over the response from Damascus, which followed months of frustrating dead-ends in Baker's peripatetic efforts to mediate a settlement....

In his remarks hailing the Syrian reply to his peace initiative, Bush cautioned that there could still be a

lastminute hitch. But he said Syria's decision to accept the president's compromise represented "a coming forward" by President Hafez Assad....

Bush said on Monday night that he hoped that Israel would "get on board naturally." He said Israel had "been wanting to talk with people in the area, and if all goes well here, that is exactly what will happen."

"They have made statements to us of wanting to do these things," he said, "so here will be a good test...."

Bush administration officials said in Washington that the Syrian letter posed questions on various issues but appeared to attach no conditions to accepting the American plan. The administration does not plan to make the letter public, the officials said....

THE NEW YORK TIMES, JOEL BRINKLEY IN JERUSALEM:

The Israeli government announced Monday (July 15) that it would not offer any concessions to match those made by Syria on the issue of a regional peace conference when Secretary of State James A. Baker III visits here next week.

The government greeted Syria's positive reply to the American compromise plan for the talks with heavy skepticism and deep concern.

In the only official statement issued Monday in response to the Syrian letter of acceptance, the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said, "Understandably, Israel will stand on all the positions expressed in the prime minister's letter to President Bush."

Shamir's letter rejected the compromises Bush proposed.

In fact, senior officials said they were worried that President Hafez Assad's letter was not a concession at all, but a trick intended to ensure that Israel would take the blame if the American initiative failed. The general tone of the official remarks Monday afternoon suggested that the government's intent was to debunk the view that the Syrian response was positive or important....

THE WASHINGTON POST, TREVER ROWE AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

The head of the U.N. team inspecting President Saddam Hussein's nuclear program said today (July 15) it has concluded that Iraq could have begun large-scale enrichment of uranium needed to build a nuclear bomb within two years, and that this appeared to have been the aim of the country.

"Most people would say that it is not plausible that this was a peaceful program," Hans Blix, the Swedish head of the the International Atomic Energy Agency told reporters, after

delivering the same message to the Security Council in a closed session.

Blix...estimated Iraq's expenditure on its nuclear program at \$4 billion to \$8 billion....

But Blix's statement after a U.N. inspection of just two of Iraq's many admitted or suspected nuclear weapons development facilities did not assert that Iraq had actually begun producing the vital fissile material....

"Our estimate is that each could have been able to produce enough for one bomb per year," said Jay Davis, of the Livermore Research Laboratory. "But while you have enough material to make a bomb, it's not the same as making a bomb...."

On the question of whether Baghdad has identified all of its nuclear capabilities, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering said before Blix's briefing that Iraq's latest list appeared to be incomplete.

The Iraqis "want to play games like twenty questions, hide-andseek," Pickering said....

The council meeting came on the same day as the release of another U.N. team's report recommending that political considerations not be allowed to intrude on Iraq's humanitarian needs. "Extraneous considerations must not cloud our vision about the plight of the population," Sadruddin Aga Khan, the Geneva-based U.N. envoy overseeing emergency relief in Iraq said in a statement released here. He added that every month brought a large portion of the country's population "closer to the brink of calamity...."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, PAUL LEWIS IN BAGHDAD:

Iraq's prime minister declared Monday (July 15) that a new U.S. attack on his country was "a probability" despite what he called Baghdad's full compliance with United Nations terms for ending the Persian Gulf war.

Speaking a day after President Bush and President Francois Mitterrand of France threatened military action should Iraq persist in developing nuclear arms, the prime minister, Saadun Hamadi, said Iraq was ready to provide the United Nations with whatever additional information it wants about the country's clandestine nuclear weapons program.

But at a news conference here, he avoided any firm assurance that the new list of secret nuclear installations that Iraq gave to the United Nations on Sunday covers all undisclosed nuclear operations left in the country.

Instead, he said the reason Iraq has now submitted three inventories of its secret nuclear installations over the last four months is that the government misunderstood what the

Security Council was asking it to declare. "We answered their demands as we understood them, and when the differences were explained, we gave more information," he said.

As he spoke, the Iraqi press agency reported that President Saddam Hussein had asked the Arab League or Egypt to send a team to verify that Iraq has disclosed all its weapons of mass destruction as required by the Security Council's terms for ending the war....

THE WASHINGTON POST, JOHN MURRAY BROWN IN HABUR BRIDGE,
TURKISH IRAQI BORDER:

"We'll just be a phone call away," said Lt. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the commander of allied forces, at a flaglowering ceremony today (July 15) as U.S. troops in northern Iraq ended a three-month relief operation for Kurdish refugees and withdrew across the border into Turkey.

...U.S. troops handed over control of border road blocks to Kurdish guerrillas here. At the former allied headquarters in the border town of Zakhu, a crowd of Kurdish children gathered to see the soldiers off and get first choice of what provisions they may have left behind.

"I think we have made it clear to the government in Baghdad we have a deep interest in the peace throughout Iraq, and we are prepared to take certain measures when that peace is violated, and that applies throughout Iraq," Shalikashvili said....

Bush administration officials say they do not anticipate problems from the Iraqi army in northern Iraq after the withdrawal. Saddam appears to be more concerned about a possible revival of the Shiite Muslim rebellion in southern Iraq that coincided with the Kurdish insurrection in the north. The administration has seen indications that Saddam has moved troops from the north to the south, officials have said....

THE WASHINGTON POST, JOHN GOSKO:

Faced with charges of misleading Congress, the State Department plans to argue there is no significant discrepancy between Ambassador April C. Glaspie's secret cables about her two-hour meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein last July and her later testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"The traditional way of writing a diplomatic cable about an ambassador's meeting with a foreign leader is to emphasize what the leader told the ambassador rather than the other way around," a senior department official said yesterday (July 15). "That was what Ambassador Glaspie did, and that is why her cables stress what she was told by Saddam. Later, when questions arose about what kind of message she gave Saddam on behalf of the United States, she filled in the gaps in her testimony to the committee."

He and other State Department officials, who all spoke on condition of anonymity, said that is the gist of the argument that Glaspie and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger expect to make when they appear before the Senate committee, probably next week....

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MATTHEW WALD:

A Boston-based environmental group has found five toxic hydrocarbon compounds in the smoke from burning oil wells in Kuwait, in what appears to be the first laboratory analysis of its kind to be made public.

"These numbers are indicative of serious problems," said Marco Kaltofen, the laboratory director at the National Toxic Campaign.

Short-term exposure to the chemicals does not have an affect on health, he said, but "chronic exposures could result in human health impact."

The Environmental Protection Agency has also sampled the smoke from the Kuwaiti fires but has not yet released data on toxic compounds with long-term effects....

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, SPECIAL FROM MANAMA:

Kuwait's government approved plans to borrow as much as 10 billion dinars (\$35 billion) to cover revenue losses resulting from the chaos in the country's oil industry, Kuwaiti-central bank governor Sheik Salem Abdul-Aziz al-Sabah said.

A government decree was approved Sunday (July 14) raising the borrowing ceiling to 10 billion dinars from three billion dinars and permitting the emirate to seek loans for the first time on international markets. Bankers in London say Kuwait plans to borrow about \$10 billion abroad....

Kuwait needs funds for an estimated \$20 billion to \$30 billion of reconstruction as a result of the devastation carried out by Iraqi troops during their seven-month occupation of the emirate....

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COHEN CITES LEGAL BASIS FOR END TO SANCTIONS

(Also satisfied with changes in S. Africa) (1,150)

By Kay Webb Mayfield

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- President Bush "had no choice" but to lift economic sanctions against South Africa, his chief aide on African affairs said July 12.

"One has to look at the president's action as an implementation of the law," Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said.

Cohen discussed Bush's July 10 executive order terminating some economic sanctions against South Africa in a discussion with participants in Pretoria, Lagos, Abidjan, and Kinshasa via Worldnet, the television service of the U.S. Information Agency.

Although the Bush administration is aware that apartheid continues in South Africa and that the country has not yet reached representative democracy, the president had to take action because the South African government had fulfilled the five conditions set forth in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 for ending the sanctions, the assistant secretary explained.

The conditions state that the South African government must release "all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial and (release) Nelson Mandela from prison"; repeal the state of emergency and release persons detained under the emergency decree; unban political parties and permit political activity; repeal the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act; and begin good faith negotiations with representatives of South Africa's black majority.

The State Department and the American Embassy in South Africa determined that the conditions had been met, and "informed President Bush that as of the end of June, (the South African government) had fulfilled those conditions. So the president had no choice -- it was his constitutional duty to terminate the sanctions," Cohen said.

"Of course," the secretary continued, the president lifted the sanctions "with a great deal of satisfaction, because the fulfilling of those conditions represents profound positive changes in South Africa. And, of course, it represents a victory for the members of Congress who started the sanctions in the first place, and, above all, it's a victory for the mass democratic movement of South Africa, which has been struggling all of these years to achieve the basic reforms that now are going to lead to negotiations for a new constitution."

But the termination of sanctions, he emphasized, "is an implementation of legislation. It's not an arbitrary act. However, we know very well

that the process is not over, that political apartheid continues to exist, and we will continue to be heavily involved in seeking to bring about a fair and expeditious negotiation to bring about a new constitution and a democratic South Africa."

Cohen acknowledged that as vice president, Bush had opposed economic sanctions against South Africa, believing that "such sanctions would only hurt the people we were trying to help, that it would cause mass unemployment and economic problems for the black community, which is exactly what happened under sanctions."

However, in spite of his personal opposition to sanctions, Bush was bound by the Constitution to abide by the law that imposed the sanctions. That same duty under the law meant he had to lift the sanctions once the five conditions were fulfilled, Cohen said.

"Since he became president, he insisted that we apply the law very vigorously, and we have carried out the sanctions with a great deal of energy," Cohen said. "There have been a significant number of American citizens and others who have been arrested in the United States and sent to prison because they violated the sanctions and tried to sell prohibited goods to South Africa. So we have carried out the law vigorously."

Responding to a question whether the lifting of sanctions was intended to aid the South African government, Cohen said: "We did not take into account the impact on the internal dynamics in South Africa through the termination of sanctions under the CAAA. It was an act that we had to do under our law and I do not think this will change those internal dynamics very significantly.

"The importance of sanctions, I think, should not be exaggerated. We think sanctions played a modest role in bringing about change in South Africa. But the key thing to look at in South Africa is the relationship between the black organizations such as the ANC (African National Congress) and the government. It seems to me both have a commitment to negotiate. They have agreed to go to (an) all-parties conference and write a new constitution, but lifting the sanctions does not make the government's position any stronger, nor does it make the ANC's position any weaker. I think in that sense, in the negotiating balance, United States action is essentially irrelevant. It is just a reflection of the significant progress that has already been made toward liberalizing South African society."

Regarding political prisoners -- the release of whom was one of the conditions for terminating CAAA sanctions -- Secretary Cohen explained that the U.S. defined as political prisoners "the people who had been imprisoned for what they said, for what they wrote, for belonging to a political organization, (and) all these people have been freed.... We applied the law strictly, stringently, and we are satisfied that the government

met the terms."

Political prisoners, Cohen explained in answer to another question, "are prisoners of conscience. We do not recognize people who have committed acts of violence against people or property because they did it for a political motivation. We do not recognize such people as political prisoners."

And he added that the United States uses this definition of political prisoners not just for South Africa; "it's a definition that we use in our review of human rights practices throughout the world."

An investigation of political prisoners in South Africa, Secretary Cohen said, led U.S. diplomats to conclude that "none of the people that we would define as political prisoners were still in prison."

He acknowledged that although there have been objections to the lifting of sanctions, "there are many other governments in the world that welcomed our action," and there is support in both U.S. political parties for the decision.

"We took our stand based on American laws; other countries have their laws," he said. "But we see a general trend...toward normalization in relations with South Africa because there are major, profound changes on the way."

Domestically, "there has been a certain amount of criticism of the president's action," Cohen said. "That is to be expected. A number of Democrats, especially those in the (Congressional) Black Caucus, were not very happy. But, on the other hand, there were a significant number of members of Congress who said that the president had to carry out the law, and he really had no choice."

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EDITORIAL: WORLD BANK REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT (430)

(Following is an editorial, broadcast by the Voice of America July 16, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.)

In its annual report for 1991, the World Bank notes that "more than 1,000 million people, one-fifth of the world's population, live on less than one dollar a day -- a standard of living attained by Western Europe and the United States 200 years ago." In its report, the World Bank describes a global economy in transition -- contrasting extraordinary progress in some countries with economic stagnation in others. But the lessons derived from studying these disparities make it clear that "rapid and sustained development is no hopeless dream, but an achievable reality."

The interaction between governments and markets is central to development. In recent decades, some governments embraced communist or socialist central planning, claiming that state control of the economy would provide greater efficiency. The results can be seen in the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in the utter failure of statist economies in Africa, Latin America and other parts of the developing world. Free economic competition remains the best way to sharpen entrepreneurial skills and create efficiency in the marketplace. But according to the World Bank report, "markets cannot operate in a vacuum -- they require a legal and regulatory framework that only governments can provide." The report says that "When markets and governments have worked in harness, the results have been spectacular, but when they have worked in opposition, the results have been disastrous."

According to the World Bank report, "The opportunity for rapid development is greater today than at any time in history." The report says that to promote development, governments must clearly define and protect property rights and invest in such infrastructure as roads and irrigation. Developing countries can promote economic competition by removing trade barriers and encouraging foreign investment. The industrialized countries should remove trade barriers that currently deprive developing countries of exports worth 55,000 million dollars a year --

more money than the developing countries receive in aid. Developing countries can also improve prospects for long-term prosperity by investing more in education and health, and less in weapons. As it is, many developing countries now spend more on the military each year than on health and education combined.

Above all, the World Bank report stresses that "the future of developing countries is in their own hands. Domestic policies and institutions hold the key to successful development. With strong and sustained reforms at home, the pace of development can be substantially increased -- to lift millions of people out of poverty by the end of the decade."

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*NXE203 07/16/91

SPECIAL IMF TIES SEEN SPURRING SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

(Text: Mulford remarks 7/16/91) (2800)

London -- Granting the Soviet Union a special relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank would allow these institutions to begin working with the Soviet government immediately to develop an effective economic reform program, according to U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury David Mulford.

He told a July 16 press briefing that both the participants in the Economic Summit and the Soviets agree that this is "the number one priority" for the Soviet Union.

He acknowledged, however, that the Soviet Union would not be able to draw upon the financial resources of the IMF until it negotiated full membership, a complex process that would take at least two years.

Mulford also said he expects the summit leaders to give strong endorsement to a growth-oriented economic strategy over the next year to 18 months.

Following is a transcript of Mulford's briefing:

(begin transcript)

MR. MULFORD: Good morning. I'd like to just make a few opening remarks about the discussion so far.

In the opening meetings there's been considerable discussion about the global economy. We've had in the finance ministers group a report on each country's present economy and economic prospects.

Japan and Germany look for continued growth, though at somewhat lower levels than a year ago, but nevertheless, strong, positive growth.

The United States' economy is showing signs of recovery. There was good industrial production figure, as you know, reported yesterday.

Inflation in the group is under control. There are some countries that are concerned about inflationary pressures, but in the aggregate, for the group as a whole, the view is that inflation is restrained. There have been some recent interest rate reductions, which Secretary Brady mentioned yesterday --

most recently Japan, and, of course, the decision last week by Germany not to raise its interest rates, but to keep them at present levels.

And I think we'll see, when we come out of the summit, a strong endorsement for a growth-oriented strategy for the global economy for the next year, year-and-a-half.

QUESTION: You didn't mention the other four countries. What is the prospects for them coming out of recession, and when,

and the prospect for growth over the year?

MR. MULFORD: Well, France has had a period now of zero growth, but is looking for some improvement in the second half of the year. The U.K. (United Kingdom) has been in recession, as you know, but is looking for an improvement in the second half of the year as well. And Canada, again, showing signs of recovery like the United States, and looking for stronger growth in the second half.

Q: Gorbachev's letter paints a pretty bleak picture of what's happening in the Soviet economy right now. And he says that if he doesn't get Western aid, it could threaten the process of moving toward a democratic form of government there. I know you've had a chance to review the letter. Is the U.S. moved by this appeal -- that the situation is so bleak that more needs to be done?

MR. MULFORD: I think there's a consensus view that all of us want to be helpful to the Soviet Union. That's a clearly wideshared view. And I think it's fair to say, although the Soviet issue has not been addressed formally yet by the heads, that will take place over lunch and this afternoon. But there's been discussions in subgroups and in bilateral contacts. And I would say that the feeling is that there is agreement in the group and with the Soviet Union that the fundamental issue here is the necessity for economic reform in the Soviet Union -- a comprehensive, credible reform of the Soviet economy to move it in the direction of a market-based economy. I think there's also widespread views that technical assistance will play an important role in that process.

I also believe that there's considerable sympathy for the president's (Bush's) proposal that the Soviet Union should be given some special status or special relationship with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank that would allow it immediately to begin the kinds of discussion and dialogue that focus in detail on the question of economic reform.

This would allow the Soviet Union to engage in the same kind of discussion about its economy that all the members of the IMF engage in every year and, if possible, to go beyond that to actually engage in the discussion of, and possibly the negotiations of, an economic program for policy reform in the Soviet Union. And this represents a major opportunity for the Soviet Union, and is, indeed, the thing that I think all of us, and the Soviets themselves agree is the number one priority, to really get into the substance of economic policy reform.

Q: If I could follow up. When you say "negotiate an economic program," they would have to be a member to get a economic program, wouldn't they?

MR. MULFORD: No, not necessarily. You could have a program negotiated that would be about economic reform without being

a member. There would not be resources involved in that from the IMF itself. That requires membership. But the membership negotiation with the IMF -- that would be at least a two-year exercise, very complex, and you wouldn't get resources during that period anyway.

Whereas, a special relationship would allow immediate action on the substance of economic policy reform between the Soviet Union and the international institutions. And I think that is widely to be viewed the highest priority today.

Q: Isn't the group being very niggardly toward the Soviet Union? They say, look, it took 12 years for Britain to privatize 17 percent of its economy, and we have a \$3 trillion debt, and they have \$60 billion, and yet we expect them to move -- jump -- into this brave new world right off the bat.

MR. MULFORD: I think that one has to look at what has happened in a number of countries around the world. You made the point about the United Kingdom privatizing companies over a period of years. And, of course, that was what happened in the United Kingdom, but that's a very special circumstance. There are countries, such as Mexico, where approximately 1,000 companies were privatized or closed over a period of two years. So, reform can be fast-moving and comprehensive. That's not impossible.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you give us an update on the talks and discussions surrounding a stabilization fund for the ruble?

MR. MULFORD: Well, I think that question was raised with Secretary Brady yesterday, and he indicated that a stabilization fund generally is an approach that's used when the full range of economic policies that are involved in reform are in place or being implemented in a country. And at that point, sometimes, there is also a decision to allow for the convertibility of the currency or partial convertibility, as was the case in Poland. But the thing to emphasize there is that that does not happen until much, much later in the process when economic reform is well underway. In the case of Poland, it didn't happen for two or two-and-a-half years after they joined the IMF and began discussions about economic programs.

Q: Are you saying then that we won't -- that there will not be a stabilization fund commitment of any sort from this meeting?

MR. MULFORD: I don't want to prejudge what the heads may decide or discuss with President Gorbachev. All I am saying is that the case for a stabilization fund is as I've stated it. And, generally speaking, the view is that this would not be a wise thing to do at this stage.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the U.S. position is that aid should be coordinated and channeled through the IMF, whatever. And you said it will take at least two years to negotiate membership in the IMF. Does that mean that the U.S. is saying that there

will be no need for any sort of direct financial assistance, for the next two years at least?

MR. MULFORD: No, I didn't say that, and I also didn't say that there would be a membership negotiation. I said that, if instead of addressing the question through a special relationship which can be set up immediately and be given life immediately so that policy-reform discussions begun at once in depth, that's something that we can do and produce immediate results from. On the other hand, a membership negotiation is a long, drawn-out business because it involves the renegotiation of every member's quota for participation in the IMF. And we just went through a quota negotiation which involved that issue. You remember moving Japan to number two and moving the other countries' position around. That took two years to accomplish.

So my only point was that the membership negotiation, which ultimately would allow a status where resources are made available, is something that would take a couple of years at least. And meanwhile, if progress is made on the question of economic policy reform, this will give a degree of comfort to all the countries around the world that are supporting the Soviet Union in one way or another; and it should also give comfort to private investors who will be able to see some improvement in the prospects for economic reform.

Q: So the U.S. is not ruling out direct financial assistance from the governments before membership in the IMF?

MR. MULFORD: I didn't address that at all and didn't rule it out. I didn't rule it out.

Q: Do you expect any kind of specific wording in the communique on GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)? Or do you expect it to be more in the general realm which the statements seem to be pointing toward now?

MR. MULFORD: I think it will be in the general realm because the aim really has always been to see if the heads can give further political impetus to the GATT negotiation, which, of course, is carried out by the negotiators and hopefully to be concluded by the end of this year.

Q: Will you consider that a success, however, if it stays general? Don't we need a little bit more detailed push on some of the agricultural policy of others?

MR. MULFORD: Well, obviously, one would hope for some breakthrough here or there. But the main point is to seek the political impetus to get the negotiations to move towards conclusion.

Q: Secretary Mulford, was there any serious discussion about changing the roles on the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) for assistance -- money for the

Soviet Union ... ?

MR. MULFORD: That issue has not really been discussed at this point.

Q: You said you're not ruling out the possibility of some sort of aid in the future for the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union did negotiate an agreement with the IMF that was acceptable -- some sort of economic program -- at that point, would you see the G-7 countries possibly contributing some money?

MR. MULFORD: I can't prejudge that. I mean, I think that one has to look -- to set up the relationship and get the process of consultation and discussion and negotiation under way and see what results that produces.

Q: Have the finance ministers or the heads addressed the question of exchange rate coordination? Do you expect the communique to address it? And are you happier with the level of the dollar now or before last Friday's intervention?

MR. MULFORD: I don't want to make any comment about the present level of the dollar. The issue of exchange rates is not an issue generally that is addressed in detail at summit meetings because the Central Bank governors, as you know, are not in attendance at this meeting, and they are a critical piece of that issue.

The communique might make a general reference to cooperation in exchange markets, but I don't think I would look for anything very specific.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the British have said they do not want to send Gorbachev away from here discouraged. But apart from associate membership in the IMF and World Bank, what will he be able to draw encouragement from leaving here?'

MR. MULFORD: First of all, I would say that President Gorbachev is seeking to move the Soviet Union into the global economy. That's one of his declared aims. And one way to begin that process -- probably indispensable to that movement -- is to be brought into the world's cornerstone monetary organization and its cornerstone developmental organizations. To be brought in immediately on an associate basis or a special relationship basis in order to allow those contacts, discussions, technical assistance relationships and other things to flow from that is a very great step forward. So I would not diminish the importance of that.

As to other elements and aspects, I think we have to await the deliberations of the heads, which is taking place today, and also their deliberations with President Gorbachev before we know of anything further.

Q: Secretary Mulford, all the countries of the G-7 agree with the notion of ending the GATT Round by this year. Do you

expect there to be language in the communique that says that the Round should be finished by the end of this year?

MR. MULFORD: I think there's a good chance there will be an attempt to indicate that this is something that we want finished up pretty quickly.

Q: In the late 1970s, sir, as you know, there were large Western loans to countries like Poland and Hungary; we heard about Communism with a human face. And you know the results of those large loans to Poland and Hungary. Do you see a fundamental difference between the effort that's been made to, let's say, in the Gierek period, to the Hungarians to what is now being now being requested by the Soviet Union?

MR. MULFORD: I can't really make that comparison. I think the Soviet situation today is entirely different than the period that you mentioned for all sorts of other reasons, which I think it would be too lengthy to go into here.

Also, I think I'd bear in mind that Soviet indebtedness today in relation to the total size of the economy is not particularly large.

Q: Obviously we have prevailed in our view that the IMF and World Bank should be satisfactory totally for them. But aren't there some countries that really want to give loans now like France and Germany who want a money infusion? And have we resolved that? And is this the net result, as our view will prevail?

MR. MULFORD: Well, we're not through with the summit yet, and these issues still have to be fully discussed. But I think in general there is a feeling that if countries wish to go ahead with programs of one kind or another, that's perfectly all right, but the idea of large amounts of money being central to the reform process is not a view that's really widely shared.

Q: You mentioned the stabilization fund to support currency convertibility. And you said that that would probably be premature, that they would need a whole panoply of economic reforms in place before currency convertibility could be considered. Do you think, therefore, that they are wrong -- that the Soviets are wrong to be thinking in terms of making the ruble convertible, or even partially convertible, within a sort of six-to 12-month time scale, as appeared in the Yavlinsky plan?

MR. MULFORD: I think that the process of policy reform, of economic reform in the Soviet Union is going to be large, difficult, comprehensive, and time-consuming, because it's an enormous task. And I think that the issue of convertibility is in there somewhere, but it is not in the forefront of the problem.

Q: Just a follow-up on that. If this process is going to be

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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

TODAY SHOW INTERVIEW

Guest: National security adviser Brent Scowcroft

July 15, 1991

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The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Peter Ramjug, Paul Schomer and Eric Beech also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898- 8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.

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JIM MIKLAZEWSKI: Good morning, General Scowcroft, thank you for being with us.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Sunday in Washington, Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh came this close to reaching an agreement on START.

Do you think the remaining differences can be resolved by the time presidents Bush and Gorbachev meet on Wednesday?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think it's quite possible. They did a great deal of work in Washington in resolving the remaining differences. What is left is an issue dealing with the definition of new types. It's an important issue, but it's not beyond resolution.

Q: Okay, are we talking here about fine tuning a problem, or is this a potential deal breaker?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, it's a very important issue. But the teams will continue to be working, and Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh can meet again in London if necessary.

Q: What's your best guess? Do you think it can be wrapped up and the two leaders can announce a July summit for Moscow?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm optimistic. But the foreign ministers were unable to solve it yesterday. So it is an important issue.

Q: Would President Bush agree to go to Moscow, hold a summit, unless every fine detail was resolved?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.

Q: He would not?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.

Q: Why?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, because he--as a matter of fact both sides have said that when they meet next they would like to have a START treaty to sign.

Q: Also Sunday, Syrian President Assad sent a letter of response to President Bush's peace proposals in the Middle East, and the administration so far has characterized it as positive.

Can you tell us any more about what he said?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, we're examining the text right now. And all I would say is that it is a positive response. What's in the fine print we still have to examine. But it's a very encouraging letter.

Q: I mean you think there might be some conditions hidden therein?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't know. We just have to read it very carefully in order to determine precisely what it says. But it is positive.

Q: Is this going to turn up the pressure on Israel, do you think, to respond positively?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, the Israelis have so far responded negatively to the president's proposals. We would hope that they would reevaluate in the light of the Syrian response.

Q: Is this response from Syria going to put pressure on President Bush to increase pressure on the Israelis?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think you know, President Bush is doing what he can now. But I think it's an encouraging move in the whole process.

Q: Let's turn to Iraq briefly. Over the past several days in preparation for the economic summit, the president's been in contact with many of the G-7 leaders.

But it has a familiar ring to it, it almost sounds like pre-war consultations with the leaders before the coalition struck Iraq. Is that what's going on here? Is the ground work being laid for another military strike?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I wouldn't go that far. What's happened is that the Iraqis in the past couple of weeks have been resisting the U.N. inspectors, have fired over their heads at one time and so on. And so we have been consulting what needs to be done or what possibly needs to be done in order to make sure that the inspectors can do their job without Iraqi interference.

Now Iraq has replied and said yes, they did not give full disclosure of the equipment they possess, now they've given us another letter and we'll see whether that is full disclosure.

Q: But are plans for possible military strikes being

discussed with the G-7 leaders?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I wouldn't want to talk about any military plans. But it is important that Iraq comply with the U.N. resolutions dealing with their revealing and destroying equipment that is nuclear related.

Q: One last question, back to the economic summit, which is why we're here in London.

Gorbachev has said he's not coming begging for money. President Bush says he's not going to write a blank check. So what are the Soviets going to get out of this summit?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Hopefully, I think what Gorbachev is really seeking is some kind of acceptance that the Soviet Union can be admitted if you will to the world economic system. And that's what they're after. They want a relationship with the IMF and the World Bank, and they want some kind of help in dealing with their own problems. Now, the definition of the term help is what needs to be refined.

Q: Thank you, General Scowcroft.

END OF INTERVIEW

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Brent Scowcroft interview (Today Show)
July 15, 1991
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

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NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER AT THE 1991
LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Time: 1 p.m. EDT
Location: London, England
July 16, 1991

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The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Peter Ramjug, Paul Schomer and Eric Beech also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202- 898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.

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SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to start with a brief statement, and then I'll be delighted to try to respond to your questions.

First of all, on behalf of President Bush and the entire American delegation, let me begin by thanking Prime Minister Major, Foreign Minister Hurd, and all of their colleagues for the fine hospitality and excellent work that has gone into putting together this series of very productive meetings.

Foreign Minister Hurd has of course has already released the political and non-proliferation declarations, and he has presented to you the chairman's statement in some detail. But let me highlight just a couple of points.

First of all, we have issued separately a declaration on non-proliferation. As the world's continuing problems with Iraqi weapons programs remind us daily, the proliferation of weapons is a problem that we must all work together to solve.

And we think that today's statement builds constructively on President Bush's initiative, and builds constructively on what was a very successful meeting last week in Paris.

Second, the seven made clear that they attach overriding importance to launching a process designed to bring comprehensive, just, and lasting peace and reconciliation between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. The declaration supports the concept of a peace conference starting parallel in direct negotiations between Israel and representative Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and the Arab states on the other. And our G-7 partners have confirmed their continuing support for our current initiatives to advance the peace process which we collectively believe offers the best hope of progress towards a settlement.

Third, the seven are agreed on the need for a high level official to direct and coordinate United Nations emergency and disaster relief efforts. With the recent tragedies in Bangladesh, in Iraq, and in the Horn of Africa, we hope that such a streamlined mechanism will greatly facilitate the international community's

efforts not only to cope with, but indeed to prevent such tragedies.

And fourth, as you know, tomorrow the leaders will meet with President Gorbachev. Our common aim is to support the political and economic transformation of the Soviet Union in their effort to build multi-party democracy and a free market economy. That transformation, as we have said before, will take time, and it will be difficult. So we see tomorrow's meeting not as a one-shot event, but as another step in an engagement that will extend far into the future.

Now, I'd be delighted to respond to your questions.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Baker news conference/G-7
July 16, 1991
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER AT THE 1991
LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

July 16, 1991

(First Add)

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Q: Mr. Secretary, the fact that seven summit members have signed on to the summit's principle of land for peace, does that give you an extra clout now, you can really go forward with the U.N. resolutions and getting the parties to negotiate?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think it's helpful that the seven demonstrate their uniform commitment, not only to peace, but to the process for peace that we are trying to create. And I don't think that that can be anything but helpful.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has Syria dropped its demand for a U.N. presence (inaudible) peace talks, and even though you're not going to see Mr. Levy tonight, do you expect to see him before you leave?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't believe I'll see David before I leave London, but I of course plan to see him when I get to Jerusalem. With reference to your first question, the first question was: Has Syria dropped its request for some sort of a United Nations presence at any peace conference, even a silent one --that is, a silent observer? And the answer is no, they would still like to have a silent United Nations presence.

Q: Well, then, how do you convince Israel--don't you have a problem that Israel doesn't want a United Nations presence?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't think that--

Q: (Inaudible).

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me suggest to you that I don't plan to do the rest of the negotiating that we have before us right here tonight, but the letter that we've received from the Syrians is indeed a positive letter, and I think that it's fair to say that we have the possibility of seeing direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and at least some of her Arab neighbors. That is something, as you know, that Israel has wanted for a very long time. Now, I will want to discuss in great depth and in great detail with the leadership in Israel the situation as I see it in the aftermath of the president's receipt of a response from President Assad.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has Syria made it clear that Jordan is now free to take part in peace talks?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't think there was any reference at all to that in this letter, and, as King Hussein has said to us the last time we were in Jordan, Jordan will make its own decisions. I think that has always been the case, and the king has also expressed to us his overriding interest in peace and in doing what he can to promote peace, pointing out to us that no country has any greater stake than does Jordan.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I could follow up, everybody knows that Jordan is not going to move on peace talks without some nod from Syria. Has Syria given that nod?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think that's the right way to put the question, if I might suggest it, John. What we have in the response from President Assad is the real possibility of bringing about I think direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria. Syria does not presume in that letter or otherwise to be speaking for other countries or other interests.

Q: Mr. Secretary, 10 years ago, 1981, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor of Iraq. Now, considering everything that's been said about Iraqi nuclear weapons during the past two or three days, would you praise Israel today for having done it and saved a lot of lives, and possibly the (inaudible) of Kuwait? And, secondly, do you now regret that the war in the gulf was not carried on for an extra two days?

SECRETARY BAKER: With respect to your second question, the answer is no, we do not regret it, because we clearly stated our goals and objectives, and they were embraced in solemn resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and when they had been obtained and achieved, it was the view of the United States and our coalition partners that we should, having achieved our objectives, stop it right there. So absolutely not, no regret.

With respect to your first question, I'm certainly not prepared to be critical of the action with 20-20 hindsight. We ourselves have done a great deal of destruction and bombing in Iraq of similar types of facilities. There is one significant difference, however, and that is, we did it with full approval of the international community, and we did it in a manner called for by a resolution, in fact, of the United Nations Security Council.

So just as a general proposition, it's pretty hard to sign on to the idea that you should do something and measure it by what the situation is 10 years later, whether or not there is any international legality or not.

And in answering the question that way, I am not suggesting that there was a lack of international legality. I am certainly not prepared to criticize the action.

Craig.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in President Gorbachev's letter, even though he says that they're willing to make a radical shift toward a market economy, he then goes on to talk about, we stand for a mixed economy, and says that people should have the choice of working on profitable collective farms or on private farms. Is that what you were looking for in that letter, or in the communication that he'll make tomorrow?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think we're surprised to see that in the letter. It's not inconsistent with what President Gorbachev has said before. It's not inconsistent with what, in fact, Primakov told us when he came to Washington.

Q: It's the kind of thing that eventually could get the Soviet Union U.S. financial aid?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it's a little bit difficult to put a judgment on just that portion of the letter, Craig. I made a statement in the White House briefing room before we left that I did not think that you could get to a market economy by simply providing assistance to a disintegrating command economy. That happens to be the way we feel, and what we believe.

Now having said that, I should say that we are very anxious, as are all of our G-7 partners, to do what we can to assist the very courageous reform efforts that President Gorbachev has undertaken in the Soviet Union. And I need only remind you of what has been--of what has happened over the course of the last 2 1/2, 3, 4 years, when you look at the unification of Germany, when you look at central and Eastern Europe, when you look at cooperation in the United Nations, when you look at Angola, when you look at a whole host of things.

But if you judge it strictly economically, on a pure question of economics, I think we have to state what our views are; and that's just what I've done.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Baker news conference/G-7 (first add)
July 16, 1991
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER AT THE 1991
LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

July 16, 1991

(Second Add)

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Q: And can you then a market economy through collectivized agriculture?

SECRETARY BAKER: Collectivized agriculture is not, is not the firmest basis for arriving at a market economy, if that--that's what you were looking for? The answer is, be pretty tough. Yeah.

Q: Mr. Baker, could you address the speculation, reason there's--President Gorbachev and President Bush tomorrow in a joint press conference to announce both the Moscow summit and the completion of the START treaty, and also could you tell us where the negotiations on START stand tonight?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. The negotiations on START stand where they stood when we, when I left Washington on Sunday afternoon at 5:30 or 6:00. We have had no negotiations since then. We have, we have continued to have the experts working. When I say we've had no negotiations, we've had no negotiations at the ministerial level or above. I cannot tell you whether the matter will be directly and--directly and--whether or not the matter will be directly addressed in the meeting with President Gorbachev and President Bush, and in some detail. I'm quite sure it will be discussed.

Whether there will be any effort in that meeting to try and negotiate out that remaining difference, I cannot tell you here right now.

It remains a difference. There are no--and let me say one other thing: This was not a case of saving one issue so that the two presidents could close this out in London. That's not the case.

This is a, as I said earlier this is a very serious treaty, it deals with the strategic balance for the next 15 or 20 years, and we are determined to get it right. Yes, Ralph?

Q: Is that issue one in which Mikhail Gorbachev will have to decide to scrap a new Soviet missile under development (inaudible)?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not sure that I can answer that for sure.

Q: Is that what you're waiting for, for him to make that decision?

Q: In regard to the political statement, in regard to the political statement issued today, and the portion on Iraq, does the United States regard that as constituting A, support for the use of

force if that should prove necessary to force compliance with U.N. mandates, and B, support the present position (inaudible) sanctions staying on as long as Saddam Hussein is in power?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think that we would--I don't think that we would take the position with respect to the second part, with respect to the second question, and that is in terms of whether it constitutes G-7 support for that principle.

With respect to the first, the question of northern Iraq and noncompliance with the Security Council resolutions respecting nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been discussed on the fringes of these meetings in a bilateral way, and suffice it to say that we think we have strong support for taking steps that, that are required in order to see compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Q: Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, right here. Jim.

Q: (Inaudible) about Gorbachev's courageous reform efforts, but if he leaves here empty handed, without any sort of financial incentive, is there a danger perhaps that his ability to push through those economic reforms at home may be weakened?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, first of all, I don't think there's--I would submit to you there is no chance that he will leave here empty handed.

In the first place, I think if you think back two or three years you would have considered whether or not the president of the Soviet Union would be attending an economic summit, you would probably have concluded no chance, and here he is, and he is coming, and he will not leave empty handed.

There will be any number of things, I think, that the countries here will agree should be done, and so that's just, I just don't think that's a situation that can occur. .

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Baker news conference/G-7 (second add)
July 16, 1991
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

(REFILING AT CLIENT REQUEST)

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER AT THE 1991
LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

July 16, 1991

(Third Add)

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x x x can occur.

SECRETARY BAKER (continuing): We're already talking, as you know, about, about helping integrate the Soviet economy into the world economy, we've talked at length about assistance in converting the defense industries of the Soviet Union to civilian use, something that they say they want to do, to creating investment in the energy sector, assisting in the development of that sector, which can earn them some very hard currency, helping cure their lack of an effective distribution system. So there's no chance that he will come here and leave empty-handed.

Q: Is there any chance he leaves here with any kind of direct aid?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't know what you mean by direct aid. The things that I have just mentioned are direct aid. If you mean cash grants, he's not coming here asking for those, and his letter doesn't ask for those.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if I can return to the question of Syria. When you last saw President Assad, he was not very enthusiastic about this peace conference idea. Can you tell us, has he changed any of his substantive positions in this new letter from when you last saw him? And why do you think he's now willing to come when he wasn't before?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I'm not going to answer that, David, because it would in effect have me putting him on the couch before I even get to Damascus and talk to him face to face.

Q: What about his substantive position?

SECRETARY BAKER: And so I can't read his mind, and I don't know why, you know. But the fact remains that he has sent the president a very thoughtful response, and a response that we have characterized as positive and a response that is not conditioned, in response to suggestions that the president made in his letter to President Assad.

And maybe--maybe some of the arguments that the president put forth in that letter, together with support from other countries that are convinced that peace is something that should be pursued, and perhaps even his own decision that now is the time to pursue peace, maybe all of those things enter in.

Margaret?

Q: I just want to make sure we understand here. You're saying that President Assad accepted President Bush's formula without conditions?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, what I just said was that I think that the response is a positive response, and it is not-- if you read the letter, it is not conditioned. Now, I said earlier, back in Washington, that there are some suggestions made in there that we want to discuss with him to make certain that they are not in any way interpreted as conditions, but they're certainly not so expressed in the letter.

Yes, sir, right here.

Q: Mr. Baker, can you just give us some indications of what hurdles you see, without obviously disclosing your negotiating problems--what hurdles you see coming up in the next week in each of the capitals you'll be visiting in the Arab world and in Israel?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think there are plenty of hurdles. The fact is we do not yet have agreement that the parties will sit down. We have--let me just leave it at that. I'm not going to get into specifying specific problems, because maybe they will turn out to be problems and maybe they won't. But there are plenty of hurdles any time, I think, you start talking about the Middle East peace process. Plenty, plenty of them.

Q: Just to clarify. Are there any specifically with regard to Mr. Shamir's position at the moment?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I--one thing I will simply not do, I haven't done it since we started this undertaking, is negotiate through the press. So I'm not going to begin that now.

Way down here on the end.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you please tell us, have you shared the contents of the letter with the Israeli government yet, and will you before you get there, or do you plan to--

SECRETARY BAKER: We have discussed the general contents of the letter. We have not turned over the letter to anyone, just as we wouldn't a letter that we might receive from any other head of state to a head of state, to the president. I mean, we don't do that. But we have discussed it with representatives of the Israeli government, and we have generally briefed the other governments on the contents of the letter, that is, the other governments that we will be talking to when I go to the Middle East.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you telling the Israelis that in your opinion this means Assad is willing to agree to direct negotiations with them?

SECRETARY BAKER: What I just said, Mary, was that I think we are at a point where direct bilateral negotiations may indeed be possible, but obviously it depends upon what the reaction of other governments is to this fact and to this letter. And direct bilateral negotiations is after all what we've been seeking to try and produce.

Now, there are plenty of hurdles, and we're not there by a

long shot. And this is a dual-track process, so we have not just the Israeli-Arab state negotiations to consider, but the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to consider as well.

Q: Mr. Secretary, when are you going to meet Mr. Bessmertnykh next?

SECRETARY BAKER: I will see him tomorrow night here in London. Well, wait a minute, no, I will see him--when do we have the lunch?--no, we had lunch. When is the president's lunch--tomorrow lunch. Lunch tomorrow. Lunch tomorrow, and tomorrow night for dinner.

Q: (Inaudible) the question is, what is the single issue that will keep you occupied in the next 12 or 24 hours? (Inaudible) deal mostly in the next hours?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we will--we've got--we obviously will be working to conclude the discussions here at the summit tomorrow. We will then have the president's lunch meeting with President Gorbachev, and the Minister Bessmertnykh will be in that lunch as will I, and we will touch upon a whole host of issues involving the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I will then have dinner tomorrow night with the G-7 foreign ministers, and with the Soviet foreign minister.

Q: (Inaudible) meeting with Bessmertnykh, to discuss the START treaty?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, I'm not ruling it out at all. We have plenty of opportunity to discuss it. We're fairly familiar with it, having spent hours on it in Washington, so we won't have to spend a lot of time. I don't think the experts have been able to generate anything that looks like a solution. Right there.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you consider it pretty sure that the G-7 will consider establishing a \$10-12 billion stabilization fund for the Soviet Union to help transform its-- encourage (inaudible) as the deputy foreign minister suggested yesterday?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think that you can answer that yes or not, because you don't know what you're talking about when you say a stabilization fund. Some people, when they say stabilization fund, mean just a pot full of money where you can use it to cover balance of payment problems or put consumer goods on the shelves. Other people refer to a fund that would be used only to create for instance a convertible currency, which is one necessary step of getting to a market economy.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a quick follow up. The throw-weight problem.

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm going to be late for dinner.

Q: It'll take five seconds. Throw-weight, does the problem concern, U.S. concern about the Soviets turning out a missile that's

beyond the 21 percent throw-weight tolerance?

SECRETARY BAKER (away from microphone): We have a
(inaudible).

Q: But they got new missiles coming up that goes beyond 21;
is that it?

SECRETARY BAKER: It's a problem with throw-weight.

(Laughter.)

END BAKER NEWS CONFERENCE

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The Reuter Transcript Report

Baker news conference/G-7 (third and final add)

July 16, 1991

REUTER Reut14:48 07-16

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אל: רהמש/904
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בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי מזכיר המדינה בייקר, בתדרוך לכתבים בלונדון

BRIEFING AT THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT, BY US SECRETARY OF STATE
JAMES BAKER, LONDON, ENGLAND, 1:05 P.M., EDT, TUESDAY, JULY 16, 1991

SEC. BAKER: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I'D LIKE TO START WITH A
BRIEF STATEMENT AND THEN I'LL BE DELIGHTED TO TRY AND RESPOND TO
YOUR QUESTIONS.

FIRST OF ALL, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE ENTIRE
AMERICAN DELEGATION, LET ME BEGIN BY THANKING PRIME MINISTER MAJOR,
FOREIGN MINISTER HURD, AND ALL OF THEIR COLLEAGUES FOR THE FINE
HOSPITALITY AND EXCELLENT WORK THAT HAS GONE INTO PUTTING TOGETHER
THIS SERIES OF VERY PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS.

FOREIGN MINISTER HURD, OF COURSE, HAS ALREADY RELEASED THE
POLITICAL AND NON-PROLIFERATION DECLARATIONS, AND HE HAS PRESENTED
TO YOU THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT IN SOME DETAIL, BUT LET ME HIGHLIGHT
JUST A COUPLE OF POINTS.

FIRST OF ALL, WE HAVE ISSUED SEPARATELY A DECLARATION ON
NON-PROLIFERATION. AS THE WORLD'S CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH IRAQI
WEAPONS PROGRAMS REMIND US DAILY, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS IS A
PROBLEM THAT WE MUST ALL WORK TOGETHER TO SOLVE. AND WE THINK THAT
TODAY'S STATEMENT BUILDS CONSTRUCTIVELY ON PRESIDENT BUSH'S
INITIATIVE, AND BUILDS CONSTRUCTIVELY ON WHAT WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL
MEETING LAST WEEK IN PARIS.

SECOND, THE SEVEN MADE CLEAR THAT THEY ATTACH OVERRIDING
IMPORTANCE TO LAUNCHING A PROCESS DESIGNED TO BRING COMPREHENSIVE,
JUST AND LASTING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL, THE ARAB
STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE DECLARATION SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT
OF A PEACE CONFERENCE STARTING PARALLEL AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS ON THE ONE HAND AND

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES ON THE OTHER. AND OUR G-7 PARTNERS HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR OUR CURRENT INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH WE COLLECTIVELY BELIEVE OFFERS THE BEST HOPE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

THIRD, THE SEVEN ARE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL TO DIRECT AND COORDINATE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY AND DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS. WITH THE RECENT TRAGEDIES IN BANGLADESH, IN IRAQ, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA, WE HOPE THAT SUCH A STREAMLINED MECHANISM WILL GREATLY FACILITATE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS NOT ONLY TO COPE WITH BUT, INDEED, TO PREVENT SUCH TRAGEDIES.

AND, FOURTH, AS YOU KNOW, TOMORROW THE LEADERS WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. OUR COMMON AIM IS TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THEIR EFFORT TO BUILD MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND A FREE-MARKET ECONOMY. THAT TRANSFORMATION, AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, WILL TAKE TIME AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT. SO WE SEE TOMORROW'S MEETING NOT AS A ONE-SHOT EVENT, BUT AS ANOTHER STEP IN AN ENGAGEMENT THAT WILL EXTEND FAR INTO THE FUTURE.

NOW, I'D BE DELIGHTED TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. WELL, HELEN, AND THEN YOU.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DOES THE FACT THAT SEVEN SUMMIT MEMBERS HAVE SIGNED ONTO THE SUMMIT PRINCIPLE OF LAND FOR PEACE, DOES THAT GIVE YOU AN EXTRA CLOUT NOW SO YOU CAN REALLY GO FORWARD WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND IN SETTING THE TARGETS TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE FIRST TIME?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I THINK IT'S HELPFUL THAT THE SEVEN DEMONSTRATE THEIR UNIFORM COMMITMENT NOT ONLY TO PEACE BUT TO THE PROCESS FOR PEACE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO CREATE. AND I DON'T THINK THAT THAT CAN BE ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL.

Q MR. SECRETARY, HAS SYRIA DROPPED ITS DEMAND FOR A UN PRESENCE AT EVEN A SILENT PEACE TALKS? AND, EVEN THOUGH YOU'RE NOT GOING TO SEE MR. LEVI TONIGHT, DO YOU EXPECT TO SEE HIM BEFORE YOU LEAVE?

SEC. BAKER: I'M NOT -- I DON'T BELIEVE I'LL SEE DAVID BEFORE I LEAVE LONDON, BUT I OF COURSE PLAN TO SEE HIM WHEN I GET TO JERUSALEM.

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, THE FIRST QUESTION WAS HAS SYRIA DROPPED ITS REQUEST FOR SOME SORT OF A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE AT ANY --

Q EVEN SILENT.

SEC. BAKER: -- AT ANY PEACE CONFERENCE, EVEN A SILENT ONE --

THAT IS, A SILENT OBSERVER, AND THE ANSWER IS NO. THEY WOULD STILL LIKE TO HAVE A SILENT UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE.

Q WELL, THEN, HOW DO YOU CONVINCING ISRAEL -- DON'T YOU HAVE A PROBLEM? ISRAEL DOESN'T WANT A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE.

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I DON'T THINK THAT --

Q DON'T YOU THINK THE PRESIDENT -- (INAUDIBLE) -- IMPORTANT.

SEC. BAKER: LET ME SUGGEST TO YOU THAT I DON'T PLAN TO DO THE REST OF THE NEGOTIATING THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US RIGHT HERE TONIGHT, BUT THE LETTER THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE SYRIANS IS INDEED A POSITIVE LETTER AND I THINK THAT IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT WE HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEING DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AT LEAST SOME OF HER ARAB NEIGHBORS. THAT IS SOMETHING, AS YOU KNOW, THAT ISRAEL HAS WANTED FOR A VERY LONG TIME.

NOW I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS IN GREAT DEPTH AND IN GREAT DETAIL WITH THE LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL THE SITUATION AS I SEE IT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECEIPT OF A RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT ASAD.

Q MR. SECRETARY, HAS SYRIA MADE IT CLEAR THAT JORDAN IS NOW FREE TO TAKE PART IN THE PEACE TALKS?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY REFERENCE AT ALL TO THAT IN THIS LETTER AND AS KING HUSSEIN HAS SAID TO US THE LAST TIME WE WERE IN JORDAN, JORDAN WILL MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS. I THINK THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE AND THE KING HAS ALSO EXPRESSED TO US HIS OVERRIDING INTEREST IN PEACE AND IN DOING WHAT HE CAN TO PROMOTE PEACE, POINTING OUT TO US THAT NO COUNTRY HAS ANY GREATER STAKE THAN DOES JORDAN.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IF I COULD FOLLOW UP. EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT JORDAN IS NOT GOING TO MOVE ON PEACE TALKS WITHOUT SOME NOD FROM SYRIA. HAS SYRIA GIVEN THAT NOD?

SEC. BAKER: I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE -- I DON'T THINK THAT THE RIGHT WAY TO PUT THE QUESTION, IF I MIGHT SUGGEST IT, JOHN. WHAT WE HAVE IN THE RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT ASAD IS THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF BRINGING ABOUT, I THINK, DIRECT, FACE-TO-FACE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. SYRIA DOES NOT PRESUME IN THAT LETTER OR OTHERWISE TO BE SPEAKING FOR OTHER COUNTRIES OR OTHER INTERESTS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, 10 YEARS AGO, IN 1981, ISRAEL DESTROYED THE NUCLEAR REACTOR OF IRAQ. NOW CONSIDERING EVERYTHING THAT'S BEEN SAID ABOUT IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE PAST TWO OR THREE DAYS, WOULD YOU PRAISE ISRAEL TODAY FOR HAVING DONE IT AND SAVED A LOT OF LIVES AND POSSIBLY -- (INAUDIBLE) -- THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT? AND SECONDLY, DO YOU NOW REGRET THAT THE WAR IN THE GULF WAS NOT CARRIED

ON FOR AN EXTRA FEW DAYS?

SEC. BAKER: WITH RESPECT TO YOUR SECOND QUESTION, THE ANSWER IS NO, WE DO NOT REGRET IT, BECAUSE WE CLEARLY STATED OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND THEY WERE EMBRACED IN SOLEMN RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WHEN THEY HAD BEEN OBTAINED AND ACHIEVED, IT WAS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS THAT WE SHOULD, HAVING ACHIEVED OUR OBJECTIVES, STOP IT RIGHT THERE. SO ABSOLUTELY NOT, NO REGRET.

WITH RESPECT TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, I'M CERTAINLY NOT PREPARED TO BE CRITICAL OF THE ACTION WITH 20-20 HINDSIGHT. WE OURSELVES HAVE DONE GREAT DEAL OF DESTRUCTION AND BOMBING IN IRAQ OF SIMILAR TYPES OF FACILITIES. THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, AND THAT IS WE DID IT WITH FULL APPROVAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WE DID IN A MANNER CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION, IN FACT, OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. SO JUST AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, IT'S PRETTY HARD TO SIGN ON TO THE IDEA THAT YOU SHOULD DO SOMETHING AND MEASURE IT BY WHAT THE SITUATION IS 10 YEARS LATER, WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ANY INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OR NOT. AND IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION THAT WAY, I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY. I'M CERTAINLY NOT PREPARED TO CRITICIZE THE ACTION.

Q REGARDING THE POLITICAL STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY AND THE PORTION ON IRAQ, DOES THE UNITED STATES REGARD THAT AS CONSTITUTING: (A) SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF FORCE IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH UN MANDATES, AND (B) SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION OF NO SANCTIONS -- OR SANCTIONS STAYING ON AS LONG AS SADDAM HUSSEIN IS IN POWER?

SEC. BAKER: I DON'T THINK THAT WE WOULD TAKE THE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND PART, WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND QUESTION, AND THAT IS IN TERMS OF WHETHER IT CONSTITUTES G-7 SUPPORT FOR THAT PRINCIPLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST, THE QUESTION OF NORTHERN IRAQ AND NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RESPECTING NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, HAS BEEN DISCUSSED ON THE FRINGES OF THESE MEETINGS IN A BILATERAL WAY. AND SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT WE THINK WE HAVE STRONG SUPPORT FOR TAKING STEPS THAT ARE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO SEE COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IF I CAN RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF SYRIA, WHEN YOU LAST SAW PRESIDENT ASAD HE WAS NOT VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS PEACE CONFERENCE IDEA. CAN YOU TELL US, HAS HE CHANGED ANY OF HIS SUBSANTIVE POSITIONS IN THIS NEW LETTER FROM WHEN YOU LAST SAW HIM, AND WHY DO YOU THINK HE'S NOW WILLING TO COME WHEN HE WASN'T BEFORE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I'M NOT GOING TO -- I'M NOT GOING TO ANSWER THAT, DAVID, BECAUSE IT'S -- IT WOULD, IN EFFECT, HAVE ME PUTTING HIM ON THE COUCH BEFORE I EVEN GET TO DAMASCAS AND TALK TO HIM

FACE-TO-FACE.

Q WHAT ABOUT HIS SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS?

SEC. BAKER: AND SO I CAN'T READ HIS MIND AND I DON'T KNOW WHY, YOU KNOW, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT -- THAT HE HAS SENT THE PRESIDENT A VERY THOUGHTFUL RESPONSE AND A RESPONSE THAT WE HAVE CHARACTERIZED AS POSITIVE AND A RESPONSE THAT IS NOT CONDITIONED IN RESPONSE TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT MADE IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASAD.

AND -- AND MAYBE SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS THAT THE PRESIDENT PUT FORTH IN THAT LETTER TOGETHER WITH SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES THAT ARE CONVINCED THAT PEACE IS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE PURSUED, AND PERHAPS EVEN HIS OWN DECISION THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO PURSUE PEACE, MAYBE ALL OF THOSE THINGS ENTER IN. MARGARET?

Q I JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE WE UNDERSTAND HERE. YOU'RE SAYING THAT PRESIDENT ASAD ACCEPTED PRESIDENT BUSH'S FORMULA WITHOUT CONDITIONS?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WHAT I JUST SAID WAS THAT I THINK THAT THE RESPONSE IS A POSITIVE RESPONSE AND IT IS NOT -- IF YOU READ THE LETTER -- IT IS NOT CONDITIONED. NOW, I SAID EARLIER, BACK IN WASHINGTON, THAT THERE ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THERE THAT WE WANT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE NOT IN ANY WAY INTERPRETED AS CONDITIONS. BUT THEY'RE CERTAINLY NOT SO EXPRESSED IN THE LETTER.

Q JERRY LEWIS, ISRAEL RADIO. MR. BAKER, CAN YOU JUST GIVE US SOME INDICATIONS OF WHAT HURDLES YOU SEE -- WITHOUT PROPHECY, THAT CAN OCCUR IN YOUR NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS, WHAT HURDLES DO YOU SEE COMING UP IN THE NEXT WEEK IN EACH OF THE CAPITALS YOU'LL BE VISITING IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I THINK THERE ARE PLENTY OF HURDLES. THE FACT IS WE DO NOT YET HAVE AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTIES WILL SIT DOWN. WE HAVE -- LET ME JUST LEAVE IT AT THAT. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO SPECIFYING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS BECAUSE MAYBE THEY WILL TURN OUT TO BE PROBLEMS AND MAYBE THEY WON'T. BUT THERE ARE PLENTY OF HURDLES ANYTIME I THINK YOU START TALKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS -- PLENTY, PLENTY OF THEM.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- ARE THERE ANY SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO SHAMIR'S POSITIONS AT THE MOMENT?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I -- ONE THING I WILL SIMPLY NOT DO -- I HAVEN'T DONE IT SINCE WE STARTED THIS UNDERTAKING -- IS NEGOTIATE THROUGH THE PRESS. SO I'M NOT GOING TO BEGING THAT NOW.

Q MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU PLEASE TELL US HAVE YOU SHARED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT YET, AND WILL YOU

BEFORE YOU GET THERE, OR DO YOU PLAN TO --

SEC. BAKER: WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE LETTER. WE HAVE NOT TURNED OVER THE LETTER TO ANYONE, JUST AS WE WOULDN'T A LETTER THAT WE MIGHT RECEIVE FROM ANY OTHER HEAD OF STATE TO A HEAD OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT. I MEAN, WE DON'T DO THAT. BUT WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AND WE HAVE GENERALLY BRIEFED -- WE HAVE GENERALLY BRIEFED THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER -- THAT IS THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHO -- THAT WE WILL BE TALKING TO WHEN I GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU TELLING THE ISRAELIS THAT IN YOUR OPINION THIS MEANS ASAD IS WILLING TO AGREE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS --

SEC. BAKER: WHAT I JUST SAID, MARY, WAS THAT I THINK WE ARE AT A POINT WHERE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MAY INDEED BE POSSIBLE. BUT, OBVIOUSLY, IT DEPENDS UPON WHAT THE REACTION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IS TO THIS FACT AND TO THIS LETTER, AND DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IS AFTER ALL WHAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO TRY AND PRODUCE. NOW THERE ARE PLENTY OF HURDLES AND WE ARE NOT THERE BY A LONG SHOT AND THIS IS A DUAL-TRACK PROCESS. SO WE HAVE NOT JUST THE ISRAELI-ARAB STATE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONSIDER, BUT THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS TO CONSIDER AS WELL.

עד כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, סולטן, מזתים, סייבל, ביין,
ארבל2, איר1, איר2, כהן, כלכליתב', כלכליתא',
כלכליתג', גוברין, מזאר1, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17036

אל: רהמש/884

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 300, תא: 160791, זח: 1128, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בכבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל : תפוצת תקשורת, קשר משהב"ט: נא העבירו לשהב"ט, נווה, דו"צ

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש על התשובה הסורית

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER REMARKS
UPON ARRIVAL AT WINFIELD HOUSE FOLLOWING DINNER AT THE TOWER OF
LONDON 1991 LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT MONDAY, JULY 15, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: AND THEN THE MAIN TOPIC, A MAIN TOPIC AT OUR
DINNER WAS THE MIDDLE EAST. AND WITH THAT IN MIND WE HAVE RECEIVED
A RESPONSE FROM SYRIA. WE VIEW IT AS A POSITIVE RESPONSE. WE'RE
NOT SUGGESTING THAT EVERYTHING IS FINE AND THAT THERE COULDN'T BE
SOME LAST MINUTE HITCH TO IT, BUT WE'RE APPROACHING THIS VERY
POSITIVELY. AND SO MUCH SO THAT I'VE ASKED JIM BAKER TO GO BACK TO
THE AREA TO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW UP. THIS IS WHAT WE WOULD TERM A
BREAKTHROUGH FROM WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT IT AND SOMETHING VERY
IMPORTANT. WE ARE GRATEFUL PRESIDENT ASSAD HAS COME FORWARD AT THIS
POINT, APPEARS TO HAVE COME FORWARD, WILLING TO ENGAGE IN THE KINDS
OF DISCUSSIONS THAT SECRETARY BAKER HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR. THAT'S
BEEN PART OF OUR POLICY.

SO, WE'LL SEE WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. AND I REGRET THAT JIM
WON'T BE WITH ME AT TURKEY AND GREECE, BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN
IMPORTANT TO US. HE'S DONE A LOT OF WORK WITH THEIR MINISTERS. BUT
THIS TAKES PRIORITY AND SO HE WILL GO TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND WE'LL SEE WHERE WE COME OUT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THIS BREAKTHROUGH. DO YOU SEE REAL HOPE HERE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, AGAIN, I WILL WAIT TILL I HEAR FROM
JIM BAKER AFTER HE'S BEEN IN THE AREA, BEEN TO SEVERAL OF THESE
COUNTRIES. BUT, I THINK IN FAIRNESS TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK WHO WORKED
WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD OF SYRIA ON THIS, AND TO OTHERS, WE WOULD SAY,

FROM WHAT WE'VE SEEN, WE WOULD SAY BREAKTHROUGH. BUT, WE'VE LEARNED THAT YOU -- WE WANT TO GO INTO ALL THE DETAILS SO THAT THERE CAN'T BEEN (SIC) SOME HANGUP. BUT CLEARLY, IT IS A COMING FORWARD BY PRESIDENT ASSAD THAT WE VIEW AS VERY, VERY POSITIVE. BREAKTHROUGH, PERHAPS, OR MAYBE, BUT -- I THINK THESE WORDS, YOU GOT TO BE CAREFUL UNTIL THE DETAILS ARE FINALIZED.

Q WHAT IS YOUR PLAN? AND WHY IS IT STILL A SECRET? AND WHAT WILL ISRAEL RESPOND TO THIS SINCE IT'S ALREADY REJECTED IT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I HAVE NO -- I DON'T KNOW THAT ISRAEL'S REJECTED THIS AND THE PLAN HAS, THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF IT ARE WELL KNOWN. BUT THERE ARE DETAILS OF IT BETTER KEPT FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY. SO I THINK MOSTLY PEOPLE REALIZE WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE AND TRYING TO GET THESE PARTIES TO ENGAGE ONE WITH THE OTHER, THE STARTING MECHANISM BEING A CONFERENCE OF SORTS. BUT, WE'RE JUST GOING TO GO FORWARD AND KEEP PRESSING. AND, I DON'T BELIEVE ISRAEL HAS REJECTED THIS. THEY HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO -- TO EVEN UNDERSTAND WHAT PRESIDENT ASSAD IS PROPOSING. AND ONE OF THEIR CONCERNS HAS BEEN THAT SYRIA HASN'T BEEN COMING FORWARD. AND NOW, IF IT IS PROPER THAT THEY ARE COMING FORWARD, THAT CLEARLY WOULD, I WOULD THINK, BE GOOD FOR THOSE WHO WANT PEACE IN THE AREA. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT STEP THAT'S TAKEN PLACE.

Q YOU MEAN HE HAS MADE A CONCESSION ON SOME OF THE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WOULDN'T CALL IT A CONCESSION. HE'S JUST AGREED NOW TO COME FORWARD TO THE KINDS OF MEETINGS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO GET THIS PROCESS GOING. AND THAT IS A MAJOR STEP IF IT PROVES TO BE CORRECT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, HOW WILL YOU CONVINCING ISRAEL TO GET ON BOARD NOW THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE MADE THIS MOVE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT THEY, WHEN THEY SAY THEY WANT PEACE, THAT THEY WOULD GET ON BOARD NATURALLY. THEY'VE BEEN WANTING TALKS WITH PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND IF ALL GOES WELL HERE THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WILL HAPPEN. SO, I'M NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING OTHER -- (STUTTERS) -- TO SUGGEST THAT THEY'LL BE UNWILLING TO. MY VIEW IS THAT IF IT SAYS REPRESENTED THAT THEY WILL WANT TO. THEY'VE MADE STATEMENTS TO US OF WANTING TO DO THESE THINGS. SO NOW HERE WILL BE A GOOD TASK --

Q YOU MEAN THEY HAVE NOT RESPONDED?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE HAVEN'T ASKED ISRAEL TO RESPOND TO THIS SYRIAN RESPONSE YET. WE'RE, AS I SAY, EXAMINING IT IN EVERY DETAIL.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS IS THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED BOMBING INSIDE IRAQ. WHEN YOU TALKED TO THE VARIOUS LEADERS TONIGHT, DO YOU HAVE SUPPORT IF IRAQ DOES NOT COME FORWARD AND GIVE THE INFORMATION THAT WE ALL WANT. DO YOU HAVE

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THERE WOULD BE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THAT. I WOULD REFER YOU TO WHAT PRESIDENT MITTERAND SAID YESTERDAY MORNING. VERY CLEAR AND VERY DIRECT. AND THE BRITISH CLEARLY ARE IN THAT SUPPORTIVE MODE. AND I THINK MOST COUNTRIES, RECOGNIZING THE TERRIBLE DANGER TO THIS MAN GOING FORWARD WITH A NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WOULD BE OF THE SAME MIND.

THANK YOU ALL.

Q WHEN DO YOU LEAVE? WEDNESDAY NIGHT OR THURSDAY?

SECRETARY BAKER: PROBABLY THURSDAY MORNING.

כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15766
אל: רהמש/837
מ-: ווש, נר: 2067, תא: 150791, זח: 1300, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בכב
סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ
דע: לש' רוה'מ, לש' שה'ח
מאת: לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

התהליך המדיני
=====

● התקשר (15/7) רוס מלונדון, בהמשך לשיחה טלפונית שקיים אתמול עם השגריר לאחר קבלת התשובה הסורית.

2. להלן מדבריו וממקורות נוספים :

א. הגדיר האיגרת כ-'ASTOUNDING' וכי אסד קיבל ההצעות שהעלתה ארה'ב בענין האו'מ.

ב. ידע גם לאמר שבאיגרת אסד הצעות בענין כינוסה מחדש של הועידה אך הצעות אלה אינן מנוסחות כתנאי מוקדם.

ג. לפי אחד המקורות אין באיגרת התייחסות להרכב המשלחת הירדנית - פלשתינאית או נושא ירושלים.

ד. לשאלת הידיעות על התחייבות או ערבויות אמריקאיות לפרשנות החלטות או'מ 242 ו-338 חזר רוס על דבריו משיחות קודמות (שלנו 2201) לפיהם ענינו שתוצאות התהליך צריכה להקבע במשא ומתן וכי ארה'ב אינה מכירה בהחלט החוק הישראלי על רמה'ג ובהחלטה 242 רואים 'שטחים תמורת שלום'.

ה. מניחים שבישראל ידרשו לדיון בנושא ערבויות שתנתנה לישראל כדי שתסכים להצטרף לתהליך.

ו. המזכיר מתכוון לצאת לקראת סוף השבוע לדמשק, להמשיך לירדן ומשם להגיע ביום א' לארץ.

לש' השגריר

אאא, חוזם: 14755
אל: רהמש/775
מ-: המשרד, תא: 150791, זח: 0941, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
סודי/מידי


אל: וושינגטון
שגריר, ציר, שטיין

בראון הביאני נוסח הצהרת 5 ספקיות הנשק בעקבות ועידת פאריז. עמד על
קוויה הכלליים. אמרתי שלא נוכל להעיר מהותית בטרם נלמד ביסודיות ההצהרה
ברטיה.

בנצור
14 ביולי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 15870

אל: רהמש/825

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 281, תא: 150791, זח: 1433, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול - מידי

אל: חדר מצב -- ב ה ו ל

תפוצת תקשורת, משהב"ט: שהב"ט, נווה, דו"צ -- מ י ד י

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

דון: הודעה על סיור נוסף של בייקר במזה"ת

MARLIN FITZWATER: I'D LIKE TO MAKE ONE BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT --

PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE G-7 SUMMIT RATHER THAN ACCOMPANYING HIM TO GREECE AND TURKEY AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

SINCE THE SECRETARY'S LAST TRIP, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN QUIET DIPLOMACY TO GET AGREEMENT TO A CONFERENCE THAT WOULD LAUNCH DIRECT BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING PRESIDENT ASSAD'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER, THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE AND FEEL THAT IT COULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE LEADERS IN THE REGION. THE SECRETARY WILL, HOWEVER, COMPLETE HIS PLANS TO ATTEND THE ASEAN MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR, ARRIVING MONDAY EVENING. THE SECRETARY WILL HOLD DISCUSSIONS IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: SYRIA, EGYPT, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL.

I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER DETAILS AT THIS TIME, BUT I DID WANT TO MAKE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND WE'LL PROVIDE MORE AS SOON AS WE CAN GET IT.

Q WHEN IS BAKER LEAVING, MARLIN?

MR. FITZWATER: RIGHT AFTER THE G-7 MEETING.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15393
אל: רהמש/790
מ-: המשרד, תא: 150791, זח: 1548, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בכב
58359
שמור/בהול לבוקר
11070

אל: וושינגטון

הנדון: תהליך השלום

להלן מתוך שיחה עם הסגן בשג' ארה'ב:

1. בעקבות החשובה הסורית, אנשי המזכיר שוקלים אפשרות של ביקור המזכיר באזור. בוחנים שתי אופציות:
(א) ביקור קצר בימים שבין פגישת הנשיא ובייקר עם גורבצ'וב ביום ד' הקרוב לבין שיחות אסיאן בסינגפור ביום ב', ה-22.7.
(ב) סיור ארוך יותר אחרי השיחות בסינגפור החל מסוף השבוע הבא.
2. בשגרירות מקווים לקבל מידע מוצק יותר עד מחר (יום ג').

מנהל מצפ'א

15 ביולי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, מצב, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

15465: חוזם, אאא
אל: רהמש/802
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 270, תא: 150791, זח: 0924, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל : תפוצת תקשורת, משהב"ט: שהב"ט, נווה, דו"צ

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי היועץ לבטחון לאומי, סקורופט על תשובת סוריה ועל עירק

NBC "TODAY" INTERVIEW WITH: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
MONDAY, JULY 15, 1991

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: ALSO SUNDAY, SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD SENT A LETTER, A RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S PEACE PROPOSALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE ADMINISTRATION SO FAR HAS CHARACTERIZED IT AS POSITIVE. CAN YOU TELL US ANY MORE ABOUT WHAT HE SAID?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, WE'RE EXAMINING THE TEXT RIGHT NOW. AND ALL I WOULD SAY IS THAT IT IS A POSITIVE RESPONSE. YOU KNOW, WHAT'S IN THE FINE PRINT WE STILL HAVE TO EXAMINE. BUT IT'S A VERY ENCOURAGING LETTER.

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: YOU MEAN, YOU THINK THERE MIGHT BE SOME CONDITIONS HIDDEN THEREIN?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, I DON'T KNOW. WE JUST HAVE TO READ IT VERY CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT IT SAYS. BUT IT IS POSITIVE.

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: IS THIS GOING TO TURN UP THE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, DO YOU THINK, TO RESPOND POSITIVELY?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SO FAR RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY WOULD RE-EVALUATE IN THE LIGHT OF THE SYRIAN RESPONSE.

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: IS THIS RESPONSE FROM SYRIA GOING TO PUT PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT BUSH TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, I THINK, YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT BUSH IS DOING WHAT HE CAN NOW. BUT I THINK IT'S AN ENCOURAGING MOVE IN THE WHOLE PROCESS.

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: LET'S TURN TO IRAQ BRIEFLY. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS AND IN PREPARATION FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT'S BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MANY OF THE G-7 LEADERS. BUT IT HAS A FAMILIAR RING TO IT. IT ALMOST SOUNDS LIKE PRE-WAR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEADERS BEFORE THE COALITION STRUCK IRAQ. IS THAT WHAT'S GOING ON HERE? IS THE GROUNDWORK BEING LAID FOR ANOTHER MILITARY STRIKE?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, I WOULDN'T GO THAT FAR. WHAT'S HAPPENED IS THAT THE IRAQIS IN THE PAST COUPLE OF WEEKS HAVE BEEN RESISTING THE UN INSPECTORS, HAVE FIRED OVER THEIR HEADS AT ONE TIME, AND SO ON. AND SO WE HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE OR WHAT POSSIBLY NEEDS TO BE DONE IN ORDER TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INSPECTORS CAN DO THEIR JOB WITHOUT IRAQI INTERFERENCE. NOW IRAQ HAS REPLIED AND SAID YES, THEY DIDN'T -- THEY DID NOT GIVE FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE EQUIPMENT THEY POSSESSED; NOW THEY'VE GIVEN US ANOTHER LETTER, AND WE'LL SEE WHETHER THAT IS FULL DISCLOSURE.

MR. MIKLASZEWSKI: BUT ARE PLANS FOR POSSIBLE MILITARY STRIKES BEING DISCUSSED WITH THE G-7 LEADERS?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: WELL, I WOULDN'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT ANY MILITARY PLANS, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THEIR REVEALING AND DESTROYING EQUIPMENT THAT IS NUCLEAR-RELATED.

END

כאן
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, @ (נוה/משהבט),
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14456
אל: רהמש/748
מ-: המשרד, תא: 140791, זח: 1557, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
58161
סודי/מידי
10355

אל: וושינגטון-שילה, פלג

דע: וושינגטון-ק. קונגרס

הנדון: ערביות

1. הוכנה במשרד חוברת הדנה בעליה ובערכויות שלא מהאספקט הפוליטי אלא מהאספקט הכלכלי. מטרתה להסביר את הצרכים הכלכלים של מדינת ישראל לקליטת העליה, יכולתה לעמוד בהחזר ההלוואות וההשלכות הכספיות למשלם המיסים האמריקאי.
 2. החוברת מיועדת לקהל הרחב ומתבססת בין היתר על הניירות שהכינה הסברה/ווש. בשיתוף עם הציר הכלכלי.
 3. מאחר ועד ספטמבר מנועה ממשלת ישראל מפעילות בנושא, מבקשים חוות דעתכם על הרעיון להפיצה בשם ארגון מקומי. בדיון ראשוני הועלו ההצעות של ועידת הנשיאים או הליגה לידידות. אנא שקלו הרעיונות בהתייעצותכם.
 4. מבקשים שתעינו בחוברת שטיוטא שלה נמסרה לנויבך בביקורו כאן ותתיחסו לנושא ההפצה.
- לדעתנו רצוי שההפצה תעשה מוקדם ככל שניתן.

מצפ'א-הסברה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא, בן אבו,
כהן, רביב, תפוצות, הסברה