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משרדי הממשלה

משרד

זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה

זת זטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה

זשם זתיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

זסימול מקורי: 1 תקופת החומר: 5/1991-5/1991

זמזהח פיזי: א - 5 / 5025

21/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק

א - 5 / 5025

מזהח פיזי: 43.4/13 - 809

מזהח לוגי: 02-111-02-05-05

מס פריט: 2171288

כתובת: 21/11/2012

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

MIDEAST CONFERENCE "A MEANS TO AN END," BAKER SAYS

(Text: Congressional testimony 5/22/91)

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker says the Middle East peace conference which the United States is seeking to convene would help to achieve the ultimate objective of direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors.

"Quite simply," Baker told a congressional panel May 22, "it's a means to an end; a tool in our effort to get the parties to sit down face-to-face to sort out their differences and to break anachronistic taboos."

Baker emphasized that such talks "offer the only way to make any progress; and we would not accept any proposal that would lead any party to believe that it could avoid negotiations or have others relieve it of the need to negotiate."

In prepared testimony before the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Baker also made these points:

-- The United States will never normalize relations with Iraq, and will continue to maintain the United Nations sanctions against Iraq, so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.

-- The so-called "new thinking" in the Soviet Union continues to guide Soviet behavior in many aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. He cited Soviet helpfulness in the Middle East, Angola, Central America and Cambodia.

-- The North American Free Trade Agreement which the U.S. is seeking with Mexico and Canada "promises important economic benefits for all three countries" and will enhance American exports, job opportunities and global competitiveness.

Bilateral military and economic assistance, Baker said, will remain an essential tool in advancing U.S. interests through the 1990s. He said the administration is requesting for fiscal year 1992:

-- \$6,200 million for the Near East and South Asia, primarily to promote peace and stability in Egypt and Israel.

-- \$702 million for East Asia and the Pacific, principally for the Philippines.

--- \$1,600 million for Europe, primarily for Turkey and Greece.

-- \$2,100 million for Latin America and Caribbean; the bulk of which would be used to support the Andean Narcotics Initiative and the emerging democracies of Central America.

-- \$1,000 million for Africa to promote broadly based economic growth.

Following is the text of the secretary's testimony as submitted to the subcommittee:

(begin text)

I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee to testify on behalf of our foreign assistance funding proposal for Fiscal Year 1992. With your permission, I would like to have my written statement entered into the record.

With you now, I would like to report on my recent trips to the Middle East, devoting the bulk of my remarks to the Middle East peace process and to the situation in Iraq. I would also like to make some brief observations about the Soviet Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Peace Process

Let me begin with the peace process.

For the past two months, we've been engaged in an intensive effort to find a path to a comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations between Israel, the Arab states and Palestinians. Since we began that effort, I have had no illusions about the challenges and difficulties involved. But I have also had a strong sense that the Gulf War may have created some new possibilities for peacemaking in the region and that the United States has a unique obligation to help explore them. While it would be sad if it turns out that old obstacles are more formidable than new opportunities, it would be sadder still if the United States failed to energetically pursue a chance for peace. Those chances do not come along very often in the Middle East.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought together an historic international coalition. The United States, the Soviet Union, Europeans, Arabs, and others joined to reverse Iraq's aggression. The United Nations played the role its founders had intended. And through its restraint in the face of Iraqi provocation, Israel became a silent partner in the coalition's success. The net result was a staggering defeat for Saddam Hussein and the path of violence and intimidation that he represented -- and new hope for the alternative path of diplomacy and negotiations.

To test the moment and transform the ground rules for Arab-Israeli peacemaking, we felt it important to engage in a process that would break the taboos on direct dialogue. If the impulse to make peace was different, we needed to overcome the

barriers to Israelis, Arabs, and Palestinians meeting directly. We needed to establish that dialogue and diplomacy -- not violence or rejectionism -- could become the currency of politics in the region.

The war provided a grim reminder of the dangers of conflict in an era of escalating military competition. It was a reminder that the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians was still at the core of the Arab-Israeli problem -- but that the state-to-state dimension also had to be addressed. And it was a hopeful reminder that Israel and the Arab states sometimes find common ground between them -- common ground which might provide room for maneuver to encourage Israeli-Palestinian accommodation.

Our postwar task, therefore, was to try to blend what was new and promising following the crisis with the enduring principles of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. That was the purpose of my first three trips to the region after the war. The result was a consensus among the parties on five key points:

-- First, general agreement that the objective of the process is a comprehensive settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

-- Second, broad understanding that the negotiating process would proceed simultaneously along two tracks, involving direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and Palestinians from the Occupied Territories.

-- Third, agreement that the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians would proceed in phases, with talks on interim self-government preceding negotiations over the permanent status of the Occupied Territories.

-- Fourth, agreement that Palestinians would be represented in the process by leaders from the Occupied Territories who accept the two-track process and phased approach to negotiations and who commit to living in peace with Israel.

-- Fifth, general acceptance that a conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, would break the old taboos about public contacts between the parties and be the launching pad for direct negotiations between the parties.

These are not insignificant areas of consensus. And they certainly provide a baseline for progress. But they still have to be translated into a practical process, and that was the purpose of my most recent trip to the area. Let me give you a sense of the key issues we are still trying to resolve.

The first set of issues relates to modalities of the peace

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conference.

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this question so let me lay out simply what we have in mind. Our objective is to launch direct negotiations. That's what this effort is all about. We believe the best way to do this is through a peace conference that would lead directly to bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and multilateral negotiations on issues such as arms control and regional security, the environment, and water.

Let me be clear about this. We are not considering an international conference with a plenary that has the power or authority to impose its views, nor are we considering any mechanism that would interfere in any way with negotiations. In fact, as I've told those in the region, the conference is not a forum for negotiations. Quite simply, it's a means to an end, a tool in our effort to get the parties to sit down face to face to sort out their differences and to break anachronistic taboos.

This conference would be co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinians from the Occupied Territories would attend. As you know, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has already taken a very important step and agreed to send its secretary general as observer. In addition, each of the member states of the GCC, the six Gulf states, have announced they will participate in the direct negotiations on multilateral issues.

We also believe the European Community could play a constructive role in support of this process, and especially in the hard work of economic development that would follow a negotiated peace. The EC should be able to participate in the conference. Similarly, the United Nations should have some role; a formula ought to be found that is acceptable to all the parties, that prejudices none, and that channels the newfound potential of the United Nations in ways that can be helpful in promoting peace and reconciliation in the area. The exact nature of EC and U.N. involvement is still unresolved. Another open question is the ability of the conference to reconvene. The United States believes it should be able to do so, if all the parties agree, in order to hear reports from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups.

The point is that none of this will in any way interfere with direct negotiations. Indeed, face-to-face negotiations offer the only way to make any progress, and we would not accept any proposal that would lead any party to believe that it could avoid negotiations or have others relieve it of the need to negotiate.

The other set of issues deals with the question of Palestinian representation in the negotiations.

From the beginning of this administration, we have made it clear that our objective is to get Israel and Palestinians from the Occupied Territories into negotiations. Of course, Palestinians must choose their representatives, but our view is -- and many other parties agree -- that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could be a useful vehicle to get to the conference as well as to handle any number of issues that might arise during the negotiations.

So the purpose of my recent trip to the region was to continue to explore these issues with the parties and to determine where there was consensus and which areas required more work. Overall, I found that there is more agreement than disagreement on the key elements of our approach. And I found a willingness to continue looking for ways to resolve those areas that are still not nailed down.

I also had extremely useful discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in the Soviet Union and in Cairo. The Soviets have been very supportive of our approach. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States are in basic agreement about how to proceed on the peace process creates a new factor -- one that improves the chances of getting this process launched.

Nonetheless, we are obviously not at the point I would like to be. There are areas of disagreement, particularly between Israel and Syria over the modalities of the conference, both on the issue of the U.N. role and over the issue of reconvening the conference. I'm not going to pretend that sorting these out will be easy or that it will be done quickly.

But I will say that we will continue to try so long as we believe that all parties are working in good faith and are serious about finding ways to resolve differences. The president and I have talked about our next steps, and we believe we should continue to press ahead and see if we can overcome the gaps and get to negotiations.

Finally, let me conclude by saying that I believe the parties in the region do appreciate that there's a real chance to launch a process. We've defined a workable pathway to negotiations that would enable Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians to capture that chance and make a real break with the past in favor of peace. It is there for the taking, but it will not last forever.

What remains to be seen is whether the parties are willing to seize this chance. The United States is there, ready and willing to help them try. But we cannot create the political

will to act, if it does not exist in the region.

Iraq

Let me now discuss the situation in Iraq.

With his aggression outward against Kuwait defeated, Saddam Hussein turned his terror inward in the aftermath of the Gulf War and drove hundreds of thousands of Iraqis out of their homes and into foreign lands. This created, as the United Nations recognized in Resolution 688, a new threat to international peace and security. The issue for all of us can no longer be just Kuwait.

Today, I want to review with you the three-pronged strategy that we and our allies have pursued to cope with this terrible situation. First, we have worked to relieve the immediate suffering of Iraqi refugees. Second, we are working to prevent another round of terror by creating safe and secure conditions within Iraq so that the refugees can return to their homes and live in safety. Third, we will continue to isolate Saddam Hussein as long as he holds power. Let me discuss each of these aspects of our strategy.

The first has been aimed at the immediate problem: saving the lives of refugees by providing them food, water, medicine, blankets, and housing. Through Operation Provide Comfort, we have airdropped and trucked supplies to refugees on the mountains in northern Iraq and southern Turkey, have built refugee camps in both Iraq and Turkey, and have re-secured portions of northern Iraq so that they could begin to return to their homes.

The president has contacted the leaders of the major industrial countries and our coalition partners from the Arab world and urged them to make generous pledges to the various U.N. appeals. We appreciate the conference committee's action on Tuesday, and we hope the Congress will act expeditiously on our supplemental refugee request.

As a result of our efforts, the situation has improved considerably. Death rates among the refugees have dropped markedly, and well over half the refugees have come down from the mountains.

It has not been enough, however, to provide only for the immediate needs of the refugees. We also have a duty to try to prevent a greater tragedy: a situation where Saddam could exercise his terror once again.

This second aspect of our strategy requires uniting the world community to ensure international access to the affected regions throughout Iraq in strict conformity with Security

Council Resolution 688, which calls for respect for the humanitarian and political rights of the Iraqi people.

Saddam's ruthless suppression of his own people is yet another reminder that he cannot be trusted. We remain concerned that Saddam would, if conditions altered, resume a systematic extermination of regime opponents and innocent Iraqi civilians. The world community is not moving to save these poor, innocent people now, so that they can be slaughtered by Saddam Hussein later.

That is why we warned Iraq not to interfere with humanitarian relief efforts underway in Iraq. That is why in support of Resolution 688, we have urged the United Nations to move quickly to provide personnel to ensure the safety of those refugees returning to Iraq. The United States does not seek to keep its forces in northern Iraq any longer than is absolutely necessary; we look forward to their early replacement by an effective international presence.

It is our firm conviction that some kind of international presence, however organized, must take over for the job now being done by American and coalition forces. We hope that this international presence will serve as the international community's watchdog to inhibit Saddam from repeating his most recent atrocities.

In the future, we hope that Iraq can fully rejoin the community of nations. Iraq has a tremendously talented, creative, and diverse population. I believe that a new Iraqi political compact which reflects the pluralistic make-up of its population and its rich historical and cultural traditions is possible. And such a compact must be arrived at by negotiations among all Iraqis, not by force.

We respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and do not wish to see a fragmented state. We have said repeatedly that we have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. And our actions reinforce our words. While our soldiers have been feeding and caring for refugees, Saddam's soldiers were strafing and shelling them.

Thus, I can say without equivocation or doubt: Saddam Hussein himself is the single greatest obstacle to any hopeful future for the people of Iraq -- whether in terms of their own development as a society or their reintegration into the international community. Left alone, free to reconsolidate his brutal dictatorship and military machine, we know Saddam will act again to brutalize his own people and threaten his neighbors. Without constant international monitoring of and pressure against Saddam, this Iraqi government will continue to pose a danger to the peace and security of the Middle East.

That's why we can have a formal cease-fire but no genuine peace with the government of Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.

Let me be absolutely clear about this third aspect of our strategy:

Saddam Hussein is a pariah whose actions put him beyond the pale of civilized international society. Therefore, we will act with others to continue to isolate Saddam's regime.

That means we will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.

That means maintaining U.N. sanctions in place so long as Saddam remains in power.

And that means Iraqis will not participate in post-crisis political, economic, and security arrangements until there is a change in regime.

With a new government, however, new possibilities will emerge for Iraq to rejoin the international community. With a new government, we may well be able to lift most sanctions, save those that constrain Iraq's military potential. And in that new Iraq, tolerance must replace terror, and the fear that so long has gripped the Iraqi people must give way to peaceful realization of the vast potential of the Iraqi people and their homeland.

Soviet Union

I'd now like to make three observations about our relations with the Soviet Union.

First, the president and I feel it is important to stress that Soviet new thinking continues to guide Soviet behavior in many aspects of our relations. In the Middle East, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's help has been invaluable to our attempts to reinvigorate the peace process. Soviet cooperation has also been critical to the historic agreement that will end the Angolan civil war -- an agreement that I will join in signing in Lisbon next week. The Soviets have also been helpful in other regional areas -- most notably, Central America and Cambodia.

And in arms control, we hope to resolve our differences over the CFE treaty, prepare CFE for ratification, and move forward with S.T.A.R.T. and preparations for a Moscow Summit.

Second, the so-called "one-plus-nine" agreement of April 23 between Gorbachev and the republics creates an opportunity for a positive shift toward new political arrangements in the

Soviet Union. If Gorbachev and the nine follow up this agreement in the way they have suggested -- through an all-union treaty and a new constitution -- then this would be an important step toward establishing a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union. These steps, along with the on-going talks between Moscow and the Baltics, create new opportunities for reconciliation to replace the political polarization that has characterized Soviet politics since last September.

We also welcome enactment of new emigration legislation. For almost two decades, we have made the right of emigration a central part of U.S.-Soviet relations. We regard passage of the new law as a major step in Soviet reform and in fulfillment of Soviet CSCE commitments.

For our part, we continue to expand our contacts with all levels and segments of Soviet society, ranging from reformers and democrats to traditionalists and the military. Not only will this increase our understanding of Soviet society, but it will allow us -- through what I have called a "democratic dialogue" -- to help promote political pluralism and economic freedom and the success of Soviet reform. And as the president and I have made abundantly clear by now, the continuation and success of Soviet reform is in everyone's interest.

Third, even with the tentative steps toward political accommodation, Soviet economic reform still has a long way to go. We and almost everyone else who has looked at it are convinced that Prime Minister Pavlov's anti-crisis program will not work. We believe the Soviet leadership urgently needs to embrace fundamental market economic reform.

Without a commitment to fundamental reform, we expect the Soviet economy to continue its severe decline -- and that is in no one's interest. We continue to study various ways we can assist Soviet economic reform, but the usefulness of our efforts still depends above all on the choices the Soviets themselves make.

NAFTA and Fast Track

Let me close my oral statement with a few words about the NAFTA and fast track. We are seeking a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada because we are convinced such an agreement promises important economic benefits for all three countries. Since the president's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free trade agreement with Mexico, we have engaged in extensive consultations with Congress and the private sector.

Mr. Chairman, I believe there is a tremendous amount at stake here -- in terms of both foreign and economic policy and in terms of our growing cooperative work with Mexico on important

regional and transnational issues. It will also enhance American exports, job opportunities as well as global competitiveness. In order to achieve global markets and hemispheric trade cooperation, it is critical that fast track negotiating authority be extended by the Congress. Without this step, our foreign and economic leadership position will be seriously impaired.

Overview of our Funding Request

Let me turn to our foreign assistance funding request. For FY 1992, we seek \$21,900 million in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs Budget Function 150, an increase of \$1,700 million over levels appropriated for FY 1991. In addition, we are requesting a one-time appropriation of \$12,200 million as the U.S. share of a global quota increase for the International Monetary Fund.

For the accounts under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, we are requesting \$15,200 million in FY 92 discretionary budget authority, a \$455 million increase over FY 1991 appropriations.

In accordance with the terms of the Budget Enforcement Act, our request falls within specific, stringent limits on our spending levels, despite unprecedented demands for U.S. leadership across the globe.

In order to achieve our worldwide objectives within these resource constraints, additional flexibility is needed. Last year, I appealed to this subcommittee to make constructive consultation -- not earmarking -- the primary vehicle for achieving consensus on program objectives. I am pleased to note that with the cooperation of this subcommittee, we made some progress toward that goal last session.

Earmarking in our Economic Support Fund (ESF) declined from 82 percent in FY 1990 to just over 68 percent in FY 1991. In our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account, the decline was less dramatic but still significant, from 92 percent to 87 percent. This is a welcome trend, one that we want to encourage and promote.

But we still have a long way to go. To support our request this year, let me express the administration's willingness to work in partnership with Congress to develop greater flexibility in our foreign assistance authorization and appropriations legislation. To guide this effort, let me suggest five broad objectives for our international cooperation programs, built around the five foreign policy challenges which I outlined to Congress last year.

First, promoting and consolidating democratic values, including free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the

president noted in his State of the Union address, this fundamental American principle has stood as a beacon to peoples across the globe for more than two centuries.

Transitions toward democracy, however difficult, cannot be accomplished in isolation from the rest of the world. The essential ingredients of democracy -- respect for human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, and political and economic freedom -- are also the basic building blocks of the new world order.

Second, promoting free market principles and strengthening U.S. competitiveness. Sustainable economic development cannot be separated from the pursuit of sound, growth-oriented policies; together, these can promote U.S. economic interests abroad. By fostering market forces through deregulation, privatization, and promotion of free trade and investment, reform-minded countries can establish an appropriate complement to building and securing democracy. They also can develop into thriving markets for U.S. exports and the jobs they represent. Indeed, U.S. exports to recent aid graduates -- Chile, Taiwan, and Korea -- total more than twice the value of our entire worldwide foreign assistance budget. Our long-run goal should be to graduate more countries from foreign assistance toward mutually beneficial trade and investment relationships with the United States.

Third, promoting peace by helping to defuse regional conflicts, strengthening the security of our regional partners, and pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

As the crisis in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated, there is no substitute for strong U.S. leadership. We continue to play a vital role in bolstering the security of regional allies around the world. Egypt and Turkey -- two long-standing beneficiaries of U.S. security assistance -- have been bulwarks of the coalition against Saddam Hussein.

National and regional security are preconditions for democracy and free enterprise to flourish. Saddam Hussein's aggression is a dramatic reminder of the continuing need to protect the security of regional states of vital interest to the United States and our allies. The proliferation of missile systems and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology further sharpens our interest in promoting regional stability.

Fourth, protecting against transnational threats, especially to the environment and from narcotics and terrorism.

As I noted in my first statement to Congress two years ago, "The future of our civilization demands that we act in concert to deal with a new class of problems, transnational in nature." This includes curbing proliferation, protecting the

environment, and countering terrorism and narcotics.

We have made progress in all of these areas. We have led the international effort to tighten nonproliferation export controls on a global basis. We continue to work to advance our environmental agenda. We are actively pressing state sponsors of terrorism in an effort to thwart terrorism around the globe. And our international narcotics efforts to counter supply are complemented by reports of declining demand at home.

But progress is sometimes slow, unheralded, and hard won. Iraq's conduct following its invasion of Kuwait is a brutal reminder of the danger posed by the interaction of these transnational threats. Saddam Hussein's actions during the Gulf War illustrate how traditional concepts of threats to national security need to be extended. Indeed, Iraq has combined:

- A credible threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons;
- A contemptible use of missile technology as a weapon of terror against innocent civilian populations;
- Perhaps the world's first deliberate use of an environmental disaster as a wartime weapon, with unknown consequences for the entire region for years to come; and
- A worldwide call for terrorist actions, sometimes supported by embassies abroad in flagrant violation of the basic principles of diplomacy.

These challenges to international order can all be defeated by a committed world community, supported by firm U.S. leadership and appropriate resources as needed.

Finally, meeting urgent humanitarian needs will continue to reflect deep and abiding concerns of the American people. America's record for responding quickly and substantially to alleviate severe suffering caused by natural and man-made disasters is unequalled. We salute the role played by American private voluntary agencies and private American citizens in this regard. Meeting the most pressing humanitarian needs with food aid, disaster relief, and refugee assistance will always be an essential component of U.S. assistance policies. Indeed, our current effort to mobilize a broad international response to alleviate the suffering of Iraqi refugees is another illustration of U.S. leadership in this area.

We have submitted legislation to Congress that builds on these basic objectives to provide more flexibility and simplicity to our economic cooperation efforts. Working with our global partners, we envision the use of five principal mechanisms to

advance this agenda worldwide:

One, more flexible and integrated bilateral assistance authorities. In authorization legislation which we recently submitted to Congress, we seek more flexible account structures and greater ability to transfer funds both within and among accounts to meet pressing, unexpected needs. We hope to move toward an assistance program unified around a single set of core objectives, along the lines of those outlined above. As a first step toward this goal, we have proposed a modest \$20 million presidential contingency fund in our FY 1992 budget request.

The need for flexibility is especially urgent at a moment when developments in the world are moving so quickly and unpredictably, while our ability to respond with additional resources is severely constrained by budgetary realities. The Gulf crisis, the restoration of democratic rule in Nicaragua and Panama, and the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and South Africa over the past year illustrate that when unprecedented demands for American leadership are combined with limited resources, our need for flexibility becomes all the more urgent.

Two, we see scope for more creative use of multilateral mechanisms to advance our objectives, through both the international financial institutions and the U.N. system.

The Bretton Woods institutions moved quickly to liberalize and expand their programs to assist countries seriously affected by the Gulf crisis. The IMF and World Bank have now admitted all the Eastern European countries except Albania and are playing a central role in structuring sound, adequately financed programs to ease their transition to market economies based on private initiative. Should the Soviet Union move further along the path of structural economic and political reform, we would expect the IMF and the World Bank to play a role in facilitating its transformation as well. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will promote the development of the private sector, as well as infrastructure and environmental programs, in the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, through our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank is expected to play a major role in promoting sound investment policy in our own hemisphere.

To support these efforts, we are again proposing full funding for the multilateral development banks -- including all arrears -- plus a periodic quota increase for the IMF. This funding will allow these institutions to leverage other contributions in support of our objective of promoting sound, growth-oriented economic policies in the developing world.

As President Bush noted in his State of the Union address, the United Nations has played a historic role in the Gulf crisis, one that is close to fulfilling the vision of its founders. The Security Council's 14 resolutions, which laid the basis for ending the crisis, symbolize the unity of the international community against Iraq's aggression and established the principle of collective security as a cornerstone of the post-Cold War era.

At the same time, the humanitarian organizations of the U.N. system -- together with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration -- are coordinating a broad international effort to assist the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Iraqi aggression.

The United States has a vital interest in strengthening this new, revitalized United Nations as a full partner in the building of a post-Cold War world where peace, stability, and prosperity prevail.

Three, we foresee greater reliance on creative responsibility sharing as we strengthen our global partnerships, especially with the European Community and its members and with Japan. As many in Congress have noted, our own difficult budgetary situation makes such efforts especially important for the advancement of a common agenda with partners who share our values and interests.

No effort so well illustrates the collective response of the world community to defend world peace as our successful efforts to enlist worldwide support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and for the front-line states whose economies have been set back by the effects of Saddam Hussein's aggression.

In 1990, our coalition partners pledged \$9,700 million to meet Desert Shield costs, representing 73% of the roughly \$13,200 million in total incremental expenses we incurred. As soon as hostilities broke out, our allies again responded promptly and generously to shoulder their fair share of coalition military expenses under Operation Desert Storm. Indeed, we have received unprecedented pledges totaling in excess of \$44,000 million from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Germany, and Korea, to offset Desert Shield/Storm expenses for 1991.

The world community has also responded swiftly and generously to the needs of the front-line states, especially Egypt and Turkey, as they incurred substantial costs in standing up to Saddam Hussein's aggression. Through the U.S.-chaired Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, over \$16,000 million has been pledged by the Gulf states, Europe, Japan, Korea, and other countries to ensure that the economies of affected

regional states are stabilized. The United States has played its part in this effort, supported by Congress, by cancelling Egypt's \$6,700 million military debt, thereby relieving a heavy burden on a critical regional ally. Other countries have followed suit and canceled an additional \$8,000 million in Egyptian debt.

Similarly, in responding to the urgent needs of Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, the international community is in the process of mobilizing more than \$500 million, under U.N. and ICRC auspices, for urgent humanitarian relief efforts.

Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the successful G-24 process chaired by the European Community Commission has mobilized more than \$18,000 million in pledges for Poland and Hungary to ease their transition to market economies. And in the Philippines, the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) has been responsible for nearly doubling the level of international assistance to this struggling democracy.

In our own hemisphere, we are working with our worldwide partners to assist in clearing arrearages of Panama and Nicaragua to the international financial institutions, and to help finance the enhanced debt strategy. And just last month, the United States and the OECD countries joined together with Central America, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela to create the Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America, a new multilateral grouping designed to support regional democratization and economic development. Finally, we are encouraging Europe and Japan to join us in pledging \$100 million a year over five years to create a Multilateral Investment Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean. This fund is a key part of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and will play a crucial role in enabling countries to move from aid to trade and private investment as the principal engines of economic growth.

In each case, both strong U.S. leadership and a community of interests are essential to catalyze a broad worldwide response.

Fourth, we envision more creative use of trade and investment policies as vehicles to promote U.S. interests in world economic growth, as well as to enhance our own economic strength.

Central to these efforts over the past four years has been our determination to pursue a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. We continue to believe that the Uruguay Round has profound political as well as economic implications for the shape of the world in the next century. Successful conclusion of the round is essential for the economic growth and stability of the emerging Eastern European democracies, as well as the wide range of developing countries

who will ultimately rely on expansion of world trade -- not aid -- as the primary vehicle to generate employment opportunities and sustainable economic growth.

In our own hemisphere, the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative represents a comprehensive effort to promote economic growth and stability in the region, combining free trade and investment -- the primary vehicles for growth -- with debt relief and environmental initiatives.

As I noted above, as an important step toward the eventual goal of hemispheric free trade, the administration is seeking a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada, which we are convinced promises important economic benefits for all three countries. A North American Free Trade Agreement will create the world's largest market, worth over \$6,000,000 million a year and including more than 360 million consumers. There is a tremendous amount at stake for our economic future, foreign policy, trade policy, and historic reconciliation with Mexico.

Meanwhile, the United States has worked actively with our Asian partners in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), to advance market-oriented cooperation among member states.

Our Bilateral Investment Treaty program has been an important vehicle in ensuring an open and liberal investment climate for U.S. investors and exporters. Over the past year, we completed negotiations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and are actively negotiating with nine other countries which are in the process of undertaking economic restructuring programs.

Finally, we will be challenged to pursue more vigorous U.S. diplomacy, and will seek a State Department Operations budget that reflects an activist approach to the diplomatic challenges of a changing world.

Bilateral Assistance

Bilateral military and economic assistance will remain an essential tool in advancing U.S. interests through the 1990s, assuming the necessary flexibility can be provided to meet emerging needs. No other vehicle at our disposal is as well suited to provide timely support to our allies and friends around the world. Our interests in political pluralism, market-driven economic development, peace-making, and strengthening alliances -- can all be advanced by prudent use of bilateral assistance resources.

For FY 1992, our request for discretionary budget authority for bilateral assistance programs totals \$13,100 million. That marks a 6.5% increase over the \$12,300 million appropriated by Congress for FY 1991. Highlights of this request by category

are as follows:

- \$4,650 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), supporting a program level of \$4,920 million.
- \$3,240 million in Economic Support Funding, up from \$3,140 million.
- \$1,300 million in development assistance, the same as the prior year.
- \$800 million for the Development Fund for Africa.
- \$400 million for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase over the FY 91 appropriation.
- \$160 million for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative for the Philippines.
- \$1,300 million for bilateral PL-480 food aid, supporting the export of 5.9 million metric tons of U.S. commodities.
- \$172 million for that portion of the administration's international counternarcotics program implemented by the State Department.

Near East and South Asia (\$6,200 million)

The Middle East has been profoundly affected by the Gulf War and the economic turmoil associated with the conflict. Although the war is now over, the economic dislocations and hardships continue. In our bilateral assistance request, we continue to focus our efforts to promote peace and stability on our traditional partners, Israel (\$3,000 million) and Egypt (\$2,300 million). Additional costs which regional states have incurred as a result of the crisis are being compensated through efforts of the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, bilateral donors, and the international financial institutions. In partnership with our friends and allies, we are working on developing mechanisms to catalyze the resources needed to support the efforts of these countries to achieve sustained economic growth.

Reflecting developments associated with the crisis and our own budgetary limitations, assistance levels for Jordan and Yemen have been set at \$57 million and \$3 million respectively. We are also requesting \$24 million in assistance for Tunisia for FY 92. We hope to be able to support Pakistan's development and security needs with a substantial assistance program, and have set aside \$260 million in total FY 92 resources for this purpose. Provision of this assistance, however, will be contingent on the ability of Pakistan to satisfy the standards set in the Pressler Amendment.

East Asia and the Pacific (\$702 million)

In Asia, our principal assistance request is for the Philippines; for which we seek a total of \$556 million in total FY 1992 bilateral funding, including a commitment of \$160 million toward the Multilateral Assistance Initiative. This funding is designed to strengthen a fragile democracy and promote economic reform. We are also nearing conclusion of negotiations that we hope will make possible our continued use of Philippines military facilities and help build a new, more balanced relationship.

Other highlights of our request for East Asia include \$27.5 million for Cambodia to support the achievement of a comprehensive settlement based on a U.N. supervised free election. We expect to support community development, leadership and human rights training, and election efforts -- as well as continuing to meet the very special needs of the children of Cambodia.

Europe (\$1,600 million)

The administration's FY 1992 request for Europe includes \$400 million for the Special Assistance Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe, a slight increase over our FY 91 appropriation. In accordance with authorizing legislation, these funds support a broad spectrum of activities, including democratic initiatives to assist with political and social reform, and support for economic reform, including environmental and energy projects, enterprise funds, and technical assistance.

Contributing to the military capabilities of our NATO allies in the Southern Flank remains a central concern for U.S. policy in the Mediterranean. Recognizing the pivotal role played by Turkey in the Persian Gulf crisis, we seek \$625 million in FMF and \$75 million in ESF funding for FY 92, a combined increase of \$150 million over FY 1991 levels. Turkey took the lead in the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq, and has taken a courageous position in support of the U.N. resolutions despite severe domestic economic costs. This crisis has demonstrated Turkey's ongoing need for air defense support and other military equipment to bolster its role as a key regional partner, both in Europe and the Middle East.

For Greece, we seek \$350 million in FMF to assist with Greek force modernization. We also seek \$125 million in FMF and \$40 million in ESF for Portugal to support force modernization efforts and assist in the development of the Azores region where U.S. forces are based.

Latin America and the Caribbean (\$2,100 million)

For foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, we seek \$2,100 million in total funding, the bulk of which will be used to support the Andean Narcotics Initiative and the emerging democracies of Central America.

To implement the President's Andean Strategy, we are seeking a total of \$481 million in combined narcotics control, development assistance, and security assistance funding. These programs provide funding for bilateral counter-narcotics efforts, coordinated military assistance, and economic aid to offset the dislocations of successful counter-narcotics operations and provide alternatives to narcotics production.

To support democratization and economic growth in Central America, we are seeking \$783 million in total bilateral assistance, down from \$906 million the prior year. As in prior years, over three fourths of this amount will support economic as opposed to military assistance. We believe that sustaining these programs is crucial to the opportunity to end the conflicts in both El Salvador and Guatemala this year.

We are also seeking \$310 million in budget authority to cover the debt reduction provisions of the President's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and, as discussed above, \$100 million for the proposed multilateral investment fund.

Africa (\$1,000 million)

For FY 1992, the fifth year of the Development Fund for Africa, we seek \$800 million in resources to promote broadly based and sustainable economic growth. Priority attention will continue to be given to those countries pursuing sound economic policies. We are also proposing modest amounts of Economic Support Funds for Africa (\$29.3 million), including a new regional "Support for African Democracy Fund." Our \$34 million request for Foreign Military Financing request supports maintaining and replacing equipment supplied to our friends in past years and is almost exclusively non-lethal. In addition we are seeking almost \$150 million in PL-480 food assistance.

The United States has already provided approximately \$550 million in debt forgiveness for qualifying African countries. In addition to bilateral assistance, the United States also provides important financial resources to Africa through institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank (about half of concessional disbursements), the African Development Bank and Fund, and many U.N. agencies.

Our FY 92 request for Africa is designed to encourage the growing movement toward responsible governance in Africa, particularly the trend toward pluralistic democracy.

Multilateral Assistance

For the multilateral development banks, we are requesting \$1,700 million in FY 1992 budget authority, up from \$1,600 million in FY 1991. This includes \$1,100 million in funding for the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank, which provides concessionary financing to the world's poorest countries, as well as full funding for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other regional development banks.

Our FY 1992 budget request also contains \$12,200 million in budget authority for the proposed increase in the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. This is to ensure that the Fund has the resources necessary to fulfill its responsibilities as the world's principal monetary institution. In the Third World, IMF arrangements support market-oriented adjustment and underpin debt reduction operations in support of the Brady Plan. The Fund has also spearheaded economic reform in Eastern Europe, and responded vigorously to assist countries seriously affected by the Persian Gulf crisis.

In addition, we are seeking \$250 million for voluntary contributions to international organizations including the U.N. Development Program (\$115 million) and UNICEF (\$55 million).

Counternarcotics Assistance

For the international narcotics control programs administered by the State Department, we are seeking \$172 million, an increase of \$22 million over FY 1991 levels. These funds serve as a critical element in motivating and assisting cooperative foreign governments to fulfill their narcotics control responsibilities.

Over two thirds of the increased funding requested for FY 1992 will support expanded programs in Latin America, with an emphasis on helicopters. Indeed, Latin American and regional aviation programs will absorb fully 80% of our total FY 1992 request.

Refugees and Other Assistance Programs

The United States continues to play a preeminent role in addressing the plight of the world's refugees -- through our international assistance and domestic resettlement programs, as well as our diplomatic efforts in support of permanent solutions to refugee situations.

For FY 1992, we are requesting \$491 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance, up from \$485 million in FY 1991.

For our refugee assistance programs overseas, we seek \$233

million in FY 1992 funding, a \$20 million increase over the FY 1991 level. These programs will continue to focus on basic life-sustaining activities for the most vulnerable groups and support lasting solutions through opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration.

To finance refugee admission and resettlement, we seek \$192 million in FY 1992 funding. This will cover the expenses of an estimated 120,000 refugees -- about the same number as last year. Most refugee admissions will be from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, but there will also be admissions from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East. Family reunification will continue to be a priority, as will the resettlement of persecuted religious minorities and former political prisoners.

In addition, we request \$20 million to replenish the President's Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund, to enable us to respond to unforeseen refugee and migration needs worldwide.

Another important component of our international development assistance request is our \$200 million request for Peace Corps operating expenses.

Conclusion

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to working with you and the members of this Subcommittee in the coming months to mobilize the flexible resources we need to carry out our ambitious foreign affairs agenda.

(end text)

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BUSH CW INITIATIVE BOOSTS CD TALKS, OFFICIAL SAYS

(Text: Lehman remarks to Senate panel 5/22/91)

Washington -- President Bush's new proposals should "accelerate the negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons ban that are taking place at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva," Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 22.

The president's goal, Lehman said, is to "achieve an effective, global chemical weapons ban as soon as possible." In order to accomplish this, Bush has called on participants in the Geneva talks to complete a Chemical Weapons (CW) Convention within 12 months and to remain in continuous session, if necessary, the ACDA director explained.

The United States "will formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation," once the CW Convention enters into force, Lehman said. Such a commitment should "help remove any pretext of any other nations for obtaining or keeping chemical weapons," he added.

In addition, the United States "will unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of our stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force" of the CW treaty, he said.

Following is the text of Lehman's prepared testimony:

(begin text)

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss efforts by the United States to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare. I am pleased to note that this is an objective shared by both the administration and the Congress.

On May 13, President Bush announced a series of new steps that the United States will take to accelerate the negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons ban that are taking place at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. His goal is to achieve an effective, global chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. Toward this end, the president called for completion of the convention within 12 months and recommended that the conference stay in continuous session to meet this target.

To demonstrate the commitment of the United States to banning chemical weapons, and to help remove any pretext of any other nations for obtaining or keeping chemical weapons, the United States will formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the convention enters into force. We will propose that all other states follow suit. Further, the United States will

unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of our stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and will propose that all other states do likewise. We will offer technical assistance to others to enable them to do this efficiently and safely.

To provide tangible benefits for those states that join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it, the United States will propose the convention require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not join in the convention within a reasonable time after entry into force. The United States reaffirms our position that there should be sanctions against those states that violate the Chemical Weapons Convention and that we will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons. The United States also will propose new verification measures for inspecting sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons.

The president's new initiative is a further demonstration of his continued strong personal efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement banning chemical weapons. As vice president, he addressed the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1984 and introduced the draft Chemical Weapons Convention in 1984 which established the U.S. leadership role in the negotiations. This draft, along with subsequent U.S. proposals, has served as the focus of discussion and is largely reflected in the present draft text, or "rolling text," being elaborated in Geneva.

Over the coming months we intend to continue to play a leading role in forging sound solutions to the remaining issues in the negotiations. We expect others to demonstrate an equal willingness on their part to overcome the differences that have bedeviled the negotiators in the past.

Achieving agreement on verification remains one of the major difficulties, particularly agreement on provisions for investigation of suspected violations. A number of approaches to challenge inspection have been under consideration. Discussions have centered on managed access to challenged sites. While views on the degree of access have varied, we have sought to balance the need for access to support verification with a need to protect sensitive national security activities not associated with chemical weapons. We remain committed to a strong verification regime, and we have been working hard to achieve a satisfactory balance between intrusiveness and protection of national security interests.

Our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union are an important part of the U.S. effort to achieve a multilateral agreement prohibiting chemical weapons. These talks are intended to facilitate the multilateral negotiations on a CW

ban, not to substitute for them. I believe, in fact, that a multilateral ban cannot be achieved unless the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate very closely. As you know, the head of the Soviet CD delegation, Ambassador Sergei Batsanov, is also chairman of the multilateral negotiating committee this year. This year, therefore, there are even greater reasons for working closely with the Soviet delegation. We have assured him of our support and cooperation in seeking rapid conclusion of a convention which will be effective and will add to the security of the United States and other parties.

We are working with the Soviet Union on a number of problems:

In September 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to promote greater openness about the CW capabilities of the two sides and to provide practical experience that would facilitate implementation of a multilateral ban. Under this memorandum the two sides have exchanged general information on their CW stockpiles and CW production facilities and have made reciprocal visits to relevant industrial and military facilities. At a later stage the two sides will exchange detailed stockpile information and carry out inspections of declared and undeclared facilities. I should note that a series of 10 challenge inspections will be permitted by the Soviet Union and the United States for each other in the period before and after signature of the multilateral CW Convention, taking into account the ratification process of the two countries, to address any specific concerns which may arise.

In June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement that marks a major step toward a chemical weapons ban. By pledging to stop CW production and to begin destruction of CW stocks, the two sides agreed in effect to begin implementation of two key provisions of the multilateral ban even before that ban enters into force.

Since last summer the two sides have been working on detailed procedures for implementing the June 1990 bilateral agreement. The Soviet Union has been experiencing difficulties developing a destruction program which can win approval. Thus, the Soviet Union has been unable to provide necessary instructions to its negotiating delegation which could permit us to conclude the protocol.

The difficulties in the Soviet CW destruction program have raised serious concerns about the ability of the Soviet Union to begin destruction by December 31, 1992, as required by the bilateral agreement. We have made clear that we will not be satisfied with tokenism; the destruction effort must begin in a serious way. We have also made clear our willingness to share our experience and expertise.

We understand that President Gorbachev directed the relevant ministries to prepare a revised destruction plan to take into account the comments of the Supreme Soviet and the practical difficulties that have been encountered. This plan is to be completed in May and submitted to the Supreme Soviet in June. We do not yet know the content of the revised program.

The delay in completing the protocol for the June 1990 Agreement has, of course, led to a delay in submitting the Agreement to the Congress for approval. At this point, I cannot predict when we will be able to do so. I do want to assure you that we will not submit the agreement until we are satisfied that the Soviet Union has resolved the difficulties with its CW destruction program, and that there is good reason to believe that the provisions of that agreement can be achieved by both sides. The bilateral agreement, however, has already served an important role in bringing attention to the need for the Soviet Union to move out quickly on a destruction program which will be necessary for the multilateral CW Convention.

The June 1990 Agreement also commits the two sides to carry out trial challenge inspections. While work on the protocol has had priority, the two sides have had useful preliminary discussions on modalities for carrying out trial challenge inspections. Such modalities must, of course, be based on a common approach to challenge inspection. I expect that, during the next bilateral round, work on achieving a common approach will intensify with a view to completing the modalities as soon as possible. Needless to say, resolving U.S. and Soviet differences over challenge inspection is also essential for progress in the multilateral negotiations.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate the commitment of the administration to achieving a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. We look forward to working closely with the Congress to accomplish this important goal.

The proposals contained in the president's recent initiative are meant to break the logjam on key issues and to provide incentives for countries to join the convention. We have attempted to engender a sense of urgency by setting a target date for completion of the convention and by calling for continuous negotiations.

We cannot achieve a convention by ourselves. We are one of 39 formal participants in the negotiations. Conclusion of the convention will require the cooperation and commitment of the CD observer-states and other countries as well. We look to them to join us in a final push to complete the convention and thereby help to ensure that future generations are not faced with the specter of chemical warfare.

(end text)

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AFGHAN ENDGAME

(5/22 CSMonitor editorial)

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL APPEARED ON PAGE 20 OF THE MAY 22 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

For great powers engaged in limited wars the hardest part often is the "endgame." In the messy, confused, indecisive wind-down of a limited conflict, how does a nation disengage from the war gracefully, while preserving gains it no longer is willing to fight for?

That's the dilemma that confronts the United States and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Both patrons are weary of the seemingly interminable war between a puppet government installed by Moscow and the guerrillas (mujahideen) that pushed the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan in 1989. With the end of the cold war, the Afghan conflict doesn't hold its former proxy significance for Moscow and Washington. Yet both governments have made commitments to their respective clients that they cannot, in good conscience, simply abandon.

The case for continuing U.S. arms aid to the mujahideen (more than 200 million dollars last year) is getting ever weaker, however. No major U.S. national interests are at stake anymore. And most U.S. aid is directed by the Pakistani conduit to Muslim fundamentalist factions. The ascendancy of these factions is more in Pakistan's interest than that of the U.S. Some of the fundamentalist guerrilla groups even supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war.

The U.S. has been trying to negotiate with the USSR a mutual cutoff of military aid to Afghanistan, and to broker a deal between Kabul and the guerrillas including an internationally supervised election. But the talks have foundered, largely over the future role of Afghan President Najibullah. Now there are hopeful signs that, even without a pact, the U.S. may be trying to entice Moscow into cutting back its military aid to Kabul by a unilateral reduction in U.S. arms shipments.

Perhaps the best way to break the diplomatic logjam would be to enlist the United Nations -- its prestige greatly enhanced by its firm action against Saddam -- to settle the dispute. The U.N. in the past has signaled its willingness to become involved. Hardliners on all sides would resist this step. But it's past time to end this fierce little war -- "little" to everyone except the hundreds of thousands of Afghan civilians who have lost their lives or been turned into refugees.

(END TEXT)

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KIMMITT: COLLECTIVE ACTION NEEDED IN POSTWAR MIDEAST

(Text: testimony before House panel 5/22/91)

Washington -- A key lesson of the Gulf war is that "nothing succeeds like collective action" as the world continues to grapple with difficult intermediate-term consequences of the turmoil in Iraq, Under Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt told Congress May 22.

In the post-war period, the United States will need to continue to work closely with other countries, "particularly our friends in the region and our allies in the West...as we help our friends shape the future," Kimmitt said in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.

In his prepared statement on U.S. export control policy toward Iraq, Kimmitt said President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have outlined four key postwar challenges for the region:

- To seek with U.S. allies and the United Nations to create shared security arrangements in the region;
- To control the proliferation of both destabilizing conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction;
- To pursue new opportunities for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and (peace) between Israel and the Arab states; and
- To foster post-war economic development in the region.

Following is the text of Kimmitt's prepared statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Mr. Chairman, nearly three months have passed since the United States and its coalition partners reversed Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm, supported at home and abroad by the strongest coalition in 50 years, sent a clear message to both allies and adversaries that the United States will defend its vital interests.

The coalition victory was a major achievement for what the President has termed the New World Order. This Order is based on the belief that the most effective means of protecting and promoting common interests is collective action. We are now pursuing new opportunities for using collective action to achieve our policy goals in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of the Subcommittee have questions about U.S. policy prior to Saddam Hussein's August 2 invasion. I will do my best to answer those

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questions. But like you, Mr. Chairman, I spend most of my time dealing with the present and trying to anticipate and shape our future policy. So I would like to take this opportunity to discuss briefly the current direction of U.S. policy in the Middle East, with focus on Iraq.

At the beginning of this Administration, we undertook a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. Three basic options emerged regarding policy toward Iraq:

First, full normalization of relations -- a choice we rejected because of continuing concerns regarding Iraqi behavior and lingering suspicions of Iraqi intentions. Second, isolation of Iraq -- an option also rejected since it would have found no support from either our European allies or our friends in the Arab world. Since we could not effectively isolate Iraq by acting unilaterally, this option offered us little leverage over Iraqi behavior while potentially undercutting our broader interests in the region.

We chose the third option: to test Iraqi intentions and behavior by offering Baghdad a mix of economic and political incentives and disincentives. We established a correct, if cool, political relationship with Baghdad, as we probed for ways to encourage Iraq to improve its human rights performance, respect our non-proliferation goals for the region, and cooperate in our search for peace in the Middle East. However, we did maintain extensive trade restrictions toward Iraq -- by far the strictest controls on trade of any nation exporting to Iraq, and one of the most rigorous control regimes against any country with whom we had relations.

We had no illusions about Saddam Hussein's regime, though in retrospect it is clear that he had illusions about us. In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I would note that while the Administration and Congress had differences over tactics in attempting to influence Iraq's behavior, I believe we both shared the same goal: to encourage collective action to temper Saddam's aggressive intentions.

By the end of 1989, we were seeing some Iraqi movement in the right direction, though this proved short-lived. Iraq joined with Egypt and others in creating the Arab Cooperation Council. Iraq announced its intention to liberalize its political system and decentralize major parts of the economy. Iraq also agreed to pay compensation for the victims on the USS Stark.

Early in 1990, however, we began to see a number of very troubling developments. Saddam declared that he would "burn half of Israel" with chemical weapons if attacked. He set up missile launchers in range of Israel. He pursued clandestine means to obtain non-conventional weapons capabilities. He publicly attacked the longstanding U.S. naval presence in the

Gulf.

As the extent of Iraqi irresponsibility became clearer, the U.S. responded in a number of areas. In February 1990, the Administration sharply criticized Iraq's human rights record in the U.N. Human Rights Committee and in the annual Human Rights Country Report. We alerted our allies to Iraqi procurement activities in support of its proliferation programs. We also expelled an Iraqi U.N. diplomat for involvement in a murder plot. In March, U.S. Customs, working with the British, successfully interdicted an attempt to smuggle capacitors with possible missile and nuclear applications into Iraq.

In April and May, the Administration began to toughen our approach toward Iraq. First, we suspended the second tranche of CCC agricultural credits, amounting to \$500 million. Second, we began to develop a plan to tighten existing export controls against Iraq -- focusing on proliferation concerns in a way that would encourage our allies to do the same. In July, before the invasion, the Administration formally initiated the process of implementing a revised set of export controls, with particular focus on Iraq. This effort came to be known as the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative.

In sum, without seeking explicitly to isolate Iraq, we were toughening our stance across the board with Iraq in a manner designed to encourage our friends, both in the West and in the region, to join with us. But while the United States was hardening its position against Baghdad in the first half of 1990, we were still receiving pleas from a number of our friends in the region that we were being too harsh with Iraq.

Indeed, until the date of the invasion itself on August 2d, the leaders of the region assured us that Iraq would not invade. But the invasion revealed Saddam's true intent and galvanized our Arab friends and our Western allies.

With Iraq in possession of Kuwait, poised to menace our other friends in the region, the Administration worked to assemble the most formidable coalition of nations devoted to combating aggression in the post-world War II period. The diplomatic coalition assembled at the United Nations was complemented by an unprecedented coalition of military forces arrayed against Saddam Hussein. And when our own military forces were sent into battle, they did so supported both by a U.N. resolution and a strong, bipartisan political foundation that never buckled.

The war is now over, but we continue to grapple with the difficult intermediate-term consequences of the turmoil inside Iraq.

Through Operation Provide Comfort, the United States has been

working with our coalition partners and the United Nations to alleviate the plight of refugees in the North and to make it safe for them to return to their homes. Coalition forces have constructed camps and way stations and have enhanced security to assist the refugees who are steadily returning from the Turkish border areas. We intend to turn over the administration for these sites as soon as possible to the United Nations, a process that has already begun. In the South, the United States and its coalition partners have been working closely with international relief organizations that have assumed responsibility for the thousands of displaced persons there.

At the same time, the President and Secretary Baker have outlined four key challenges that are the focus of the Administration's overall policy for the post-war Middle East.

First, working with our allies and the United Nations, we seek to create shared security arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the region must bear the principal responsibility for regional security. It cannot be imposed from the outside, though most regional states accept as legitimate, and even desirable, the participation of nonregional countries. Secretaries Baker and Cheney have already taken initiatives to strengthen our security relationships in a manner designed to protect our vital interests there, both now and in the future.

The second challenge concerns weapons proliferation, an issue that I know is of particular concern to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your Subcommittee. We must control the proliferation of weapons, both destabilizing conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. In this regard, Iraq requires special vigilance. Accordingly, U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 calls for a special commission to oversee the dismantling of Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs. Resolution 687 also imposes a continuing embargo on Iraq subject to the periodic review of the Security Council.

But our non-proliferation efforts must reach beyond Iraq to the larger issue of weapons proliferation in the Middle East. The President recently announced a major initiative to conclude an effective global treaty banning all chemical weapons within a year. The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, referred to above, is now largely in place. We are pressing our partners in the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group to adopt measures comparable to EPCI. We also need to enlist the cooperation of other major suppliers, especially the Soviet Union and China. The Gulf war has made clear to other exporting countries that a united front is needed for effective enforcement of export controls. In this regard, Mr. Chairman, we have been actively exploring a number

of approaches to address the problem of Mideast arms control and proliferation.

Third, we must continue our work, frustrating though it may be at times, to pursue new opportunities for peace: peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and the Arab states. I want to underscore the Secretary's basic point that while the United States will not waver in its effort to help resolve this most intractable of regional conflicts, the United States cannot impose peace on the parties in the region. As the Secretary's extensive travels in the region make plain, the United States stands ready to help foster negotiations -- for it is only through negotiations that true peace can be achieved.

Fourth, we must foster economic development in the region. During the crisis, the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group helped funnel exceptional economic assistance to states that were seriously affected by the economic sanctions against Iraq. Looking ahead, greater attention to regional economic problems can contribute to mutual trust and a more appropriate climate for resolving outstanding security issues. Indeed, our economic and security goals are interrelated. As Secretary Baker said before the full Committee in February: "We're not going to have lasting peace and well-being without sound economic growth. We're not going to have sound economic growth if nations are threatened or invaded -- or if they are squandering precious resources on more and more arms."

As we help our friends shape the future of the Middle East, there will surely be lessons to be learned from the immediate past. The merits of our pre-August 2d policy toward Iraq will be debated, but we believe that the fundamental goals of that policy were sound. While these goals were not achieved, a go-it-alone strategy by the United States, in which we would try single-handedly to isolate Iraq, would not have worked and would likely have made it even more difficult to assemble the coalition when the time came.

Of course, our policy ultimately did not achieve its goals in large measure because Saddam miscalculated far more profoundly than anyone imagined he could. In the end, he ignored the repeated demands of the international community and he did not believe us when we said that we would defend our vital interests. Henceforth, we are more likely to be taken at our word; a lesson for others to remember.

Perhaps the key lesson to be learned, however, is that nothing succeeds like collective action, very frequently led by the United States. Collective action served us admirably in defeating Saddam's aggression and galvanizing the world community. And if we are to meet the four post-war challenges laid out above, we need to continue to work closely with other countries, particularly our friends in the region and our allies in the West. This is a lesson for all of us to remember.

(END TEXT)

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MIDEAST PEACE POSSIBLE BUT SHRINKING, SAY EXPERTS

(SFRC panels discusses Arab-Israeli issues)

By Rosalind Mandine
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- The so-called "window of opportunity" for peace in the Middle East exists, but it is shrinking, a panel of experts at a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing agreed May 22.

However, the panelists sharply divided on who will keep the window open and exactly how they will do so.

The panelists included: Samuel Lewis, president of the U.S. Institute of Peace and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; Lucius Battle, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; George Ball, former Undersecretary of State and former U.S. Representative to the United Nations; Martin Indyk, Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Professor Ian Lustick, Department of Government at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire; and Helena Cobban, Scholar-in-Residence at the Foundation for Middle East Peace.

The hearing was chaired by Senator Terry Sanford, Democrat from North Carolina.

"The window of opportunity is closing, but it is not quite closed. Peace can be achieved between Israel, Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, and other Arab states only in stages. Another stage now remains possible, and worthy of tenacious pursuit," Ambassador Lewis told the panel.

Noting that the "list of obstacles to peace seems endless," Lewis commended Secretary Baker's repeated trips to the Middle East in the hope of narrowing differences and moving the peace process forward.

"What are his chances? Seemingly slim, but not hopeless. And the effort is eminently worthy, for the war did shake some elements of the Arab-Israeli stalemate. President Bush and the United States do have unprecedented political weight in the region, at least for the moment; and the United States has too much at risk in the region not to make every reasonable effort to change the self-destructive course of this endemic conflict," Lewis said.

"There is an improved climate for peace. But the slightly improved conditions will not last long. If we do not succeed there will be a lengthy and dangerous situation which will not be in our interest or the world's," Ambassador Battle said.

George Ball questioned whether the United States should

continue its role in the Middle East peace process. He asserted that the United States is "too one-sided in its policies, particularly on Israel....We have become completely discredited in the peace process. We should hand over the process to the United Nations Security Council, with a settlement based on the UN Charter and international law."

Professor Lustick questioned the practicality and relevancy of using diplomacy to move the peace process forward. In order for diplomacy to work, all parties must be able to envision a mutually acceptable end -- at present this is impossible, Lustick said.

"It is a political problem, not a diplomatic problem....Progress is not Secretary Baker going back and forth to the region. Progress is political change in Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab states that allow parties to accept a mutually acceptable agreement," he said.

Lustick put the major burden of this political change on Israel, saying "Creating political change in Israel is what is needed. Under a (Labor Party leader Shimon) Peres government both sides could conceive mutually acceptable ends."

Martin Indyk challenged Lustick's assertion, saying that the Shamir government is in a strong position to negotiate peace with the Arab states.

"The political reality is the Likud is in government and is in a stronger position than ever. A large majority of Israelis want the Likud to negotiate 'land for peace.' The Likud government can deliver; the problem is whether they want to deliver," Indyk said.

"Interim arrangements between Israelis and Palestinians can be arranged. But the Israelis won't give up territory in advance (of negotiations). The Israelis do want to change their political relationship with the Palestinians," Indyk added.

Helena Cobban strongly disagreed with Indyk, saying that Israeli government practices of deportation, land expropriation and a growing number of settlements in the occupied territories did not add up to a desire for an improved relationship with the Palestinians. Indyk quickly countered her assertion, saying that the Israeli government has recently released a large number of Palestinian detainees, instituted economic reform measures in the territories and allowed Palestinian universities to re-open.

"The settlements, however, are a straightforward provocation by (Housing Minister) Ariel Sharon to derail the peace process," Indyk said.

In continuing the discussion on the need for political change in Israel, Lewis stressed the issue of Israeli feelings of "fear and anger" and its impact on Israeli policy.

Lewis noted an Israeli pollster's conclusion that "the overwhelming hostility of Arabs to Israel has the cumulative effect of making Israelis both angry and scared, making the Israeli electorate very conservative."

"There is a lot of fear and anger in all the communities," Cobban said, adding that, "it is important to build relationships with people that you fear -- we should be urging this to our Israeli friends."

Cobban suggested that the U.S. aid to Israel should be tied to the concessions it is ready to make for peace. The United States, while avoiding interference in the Israeli domestic political scene, should "structure incentives for the Israeli public so that they do what is in the best interest of their country," she said.

Lewis asked "why no one is asking the Arabs about what incentives it will take for them to make concessions?"

Cobban suggested putting the issue of the Golan Heights on the negotiating table as an incentive for Syria to participate in negotiations. Lustick said that the Arab states have adhered to U.S. policy on the peace process for some time now and that there is not much else the United States can ask of them -- a suggestion which brought strong reactions from Indyk and Lewis.

Lewis said Syria's policies in Lebanon and ties to terrorism, including past acts against U.S. military personnel, is an important issue to be addressed.

Indyk continued, "The idea that there is nothing to imagine to ask of Arabs to do on the peace process is ludicrous. They must give peace and security -- there have been no such offers of peace coming from the Arabs."

Cobban countered Indyk's comments, saying the Palestine Liberation Organization did make such an offer in 1988 by recognizing Israel's right to exist and renouncing terrorism and that this offer "was rebuffed" by the Israeli government.

Indyk scoffed at Cobban's remarks, responding, PLO leader Yassir "Arafat managed to blurt out a few words we extracted from him in order to get a dialogue with the United States. The PLO is a non-starter." He added that the Shamir government is ready to talk to Palestinian representatives from the occupied territories.

Palestinian representatives from the territories "see

themselves as representing the PLO," Cobban underscored. "There is no possibility of any Palestinian to come forward with any credibility to challenge the role of the PLO," she said.

The panelists agreed that Palestinians in the territories should be allowed a "free political life" and that this opening would encourage local leadership to emerge.

Ambassador Battle concluded: "The issue of who represents these people is a crucial issue in the procedure. But until Israel permits normal political gatherings on the West Bank and Gaza Strip no local leadership can emerge."

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BAKER REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON MIDEAST PEACE EFFORTS

(Excerpts of Transcript: Questions and Answers: 05/22/91)

Washington -- Secretary of State James A. Baker says it would be tragic if the Middle East peace process fails because negotiators cannot agree on U.N. involvement.

"It would be a tragedy, I think, if the whole effort (fails) because the parties cannot agree on what the exact role, if any, for the U.N. should be," Baker said in testimony May 22 before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

The following is an unofficial transcript of the congressional hearing:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS)

REP. OBEY: Well, Mr. Secretary, good morning. We welcome you here this morning after your rather short trip.

Mr. Secretary, since 1948 we have been in the middle of the Middle East cauldron. We helped create the State of Israel. We've had a responsibility to assure its survival. We've seen five wars -- in '48, '56, '67, '73 and '82. During that period we have provided more than \$100 billion in aid to the Middle East. We have sold more than \$110 billion of weapons to the Middle East. Up until Saddam went beserk we had lost not quite 300 American lives in that region, mostly through acts of terrorism. We have now fought a war to liberate Kuwait, a war that was supposed to usher in a new world order. It's been estimated that over 100,000 people were killed in that war, including 265 Americans.

You have traveled over 40,000 miles to explore the possibilities of ending business as usual in that region. You have indicated that we ought to be pursuing a two-track approach; the promotion of talks between Israel and the Palestinians, and the promotion of direct talks between Israel and its neighbors.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, I've told you that I would cooperate with you fully in any efforts that you try to pursue to bring any of the many sides to the table. It seems to me that we've crossed the threshold. Americans died protecting one country from another in the region and I think we have a right to expect conduct from each of the parties in the region that will assure that tomorrow will be different than yesterday.

It seems to me that the US pulled the Saudi chestnuts out of the fire, and they owe us their cooperation in return in efforts to stabilize the region. And I don't believe that there will be true stability in that region until the Arab

world is willing to recognize Israel's right to exist. We've also eliminated the major threat to Israel's security, and I think we have a right to expect their cooperation in eliminating another source of instability in the region, a core source; the unresolved question of the Palestinians.

But it seems to me that we've gotten little but lip service from any of the major parties involved. The Saudis, at least to me, do not appear willing to be major players in any public discussion of core Middle East problems, and the Israelis seemed mired in a tiresome debate on process. The Syrians seem to be trying to decide whether they want a deal with the West or become the new leaders of radical forces in the Arab world, and this committee would like to know what specific progress has been made with each of the parties on those two questions.

We also have the problem of arms deliveries to the region. I know the administration is planning to announce its proposals for an arms policy in the region. During the Gulf crisis, administration witnesses talked about the necessity to control the flow of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction in the region. We had ten different witnesses appear before this committee from a wide variety of political philosophies, from the far left to the far right and everybody in between. Every single witness agreed that the most important thing we could do in the Middle East would be to severely and stringently limit both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weaponry. But for the last three months, frankly, it has seemed that the administration is backing off somewhat from its comments on conventional weaponry.

We welcome any limitation of course on long-range missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons and others, but Mr. Secretary, I'm reminded of President Reagan's lines in one of his old movies, "King's Row," when he woke up and said "Where's the rest of me?" What I'd like to know is when are we going to see administration recommendations on limiting the weapons that have caused the most problems in the Middle East, namely the conventional weapons? And I guess I would ask what would be wrong with the United States announcing its unilateral intention to suspend for a period of four months or so any arms deliveries to any party in the Middle East, meanwhile with the United States providing leadership in calling for an international discussion with other arms suppliers to try to deal with that question for the entire region?

And above all, Mr. Secretary, we'd also like to know what America's plans are to deal with the most important foreign policy problem we face, namely, the turmoil within the Soviet Union. We will be saving billions of dollars annually in our defense budget because of the reduced military threat from the Soviet Union, but an uncontrolled unraveling of the Soviet Union can force us to spend billions more to deal with a new

threat from the Soviet Union -- the international spillover from economic, ethnic and social chaos.

The Soviets have asked for American help in the form of a billion and a half dollars in agricultural credits. It seems to me we have an opportunity to try to shape the change now occurring in the Soviet Union. We've been very good at spelling out what we would not do, namely, pour billions of dollars down a rat hole without needed reforms. But it seems to me we've really not spelled out in the West what the West would if the Soviet Union pursued what we perceive to be correct policies on economic reforms, on human rights and the rest.

As you know, Jeffrey Sachs and a number of others have been promoting the kind of policy initiatives under which the West could offer in the context of a real Soviet commitment to change significant conditioned economic assistance in order to be a catalyst for reform rather than to simply allow matters to unfold without any effort on our part to direct them. I frankly don't know whether the situation is beyond anything we can do, but it seems to me we have an obligation to take a look at the situation very hard. And frankly, it seems to me that Mr. Sachs and others are right in the suggestions they're making about the kind of carrot that the West could hold out for proper Soviet conduct.

So, very briefly, the Committee would be interested in knowing whether the administration is in fact reviewing any such proposition. We'd like to know what we would be willing to do under what conditions to try to shape what's happening in the Soviet Union. After all, that relationship is still by far the most important relationship between any two nation-states in the world, and it's important that we try to move it forward in a constructive direction. We welcome you and ask -- and I would ask you to insert your statement in the record, make whatever statement you feel appropriate, and we'll be happy to have you as long as you can stay to answer questions.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will take you up on the offer to insert my full statement in the record, and I would spend a few minutes, if I might, reporting to you on my recent trips to the Middle East, devoting the bulk of my remarks to the Middle East peace process and to the situation in Iraq. I would also like to make one or two observations about the Soviet Union, which should come close, I think, to answering some of the questions you posed, and I'd like to make a comment about the North American Free Trade Agreement. But let me begin with the peace process.

For the past two months, we've been engaged in a rather intensive effort to find a path to a comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations between Arabs, Palestinians and

Israel. When I say Arabs, I mean Arab states. Since we began that effort, I've had no illusions, Mr. Chairman, about the challenges and difficulties involved. In fact, I had no illusions about that before the process began. But I also had a strong sense that the Gulf war might have created some new possibilities for peacemaking in the region and that the United States has a unique obligation to help explore those possibilities. It would be very sad, of course, if it turns out that old obstacles are more formidable than new opportunities, but I think it would be sadder still, Mr. Chairman, if the United States failed to energetically pursue a chance for peace, because those chances don't come along very often in the Middle East, as you pointed out.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait did bring together an historic coalition. The United States, the Soviet Union, Europeans, Arabs and others joined to reverse Iraq's aggression. The United Nations played, perhaps for the first time, the role that its founders had intended. And through its restraint in the face of Iraqi provocation, Israel became a silent partner in the coalition's success. The net result was a staggering defeat for Saddam Hussein and the path of violence and intimidation that he represented, and I think new hope for the alternative path of diplomacy and negotiations.

To test the moment and to transform the ground rules for Arab-Israeli peace-making we felt it was important to engage in a process that could break the taboos on direct dialogue between the parties. If the impulse to make peace was different we needed to overcome the barriers to Israeli, Arabs and Palestinians meeting directly. We needed, in fact, to establish that dialogue and diplomacy, not violence or rejectionism, could become the currency of politics in the region of the Middle East.

The war provided a grim reminder of the dangers of conflict in an era of escalating military competition. It was a reminder that the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians was still at the core of the Arab-Israeli problem, but that the state-to-state dimension also had to be addressed. And it was a hopeful reminder that Israel and the Arab states sometimes find common ground between them, common ground which might provide room for maneuver to encourage Israeli-Palestinian accommodation.

So our post-war task, therefore, was to try to blend what was new and promising following the crisis with the enduring principles of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. That was the purpose of my first three trips to the region after the war, and I think that the result was a consensus between the parties on five points. And I would say that they are five key points.

First of all, general agreement that the objective of the

process is a comprehensive settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Second, broad understanding that the negotiating process would proceed simultaneously along two tracks involving direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories.

Third, agreement that the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians would proceed in phases with talks on interim selfgovernment preceding negotiations over the permanent status of the occupied territories.

Fourth, agreement that Palestinians would be represented in the process by leaders from the occupied territories who accept the two-track approach, who accept the phased approach, and who commit to living in peace with Israel.

And fifth, general acceptance that a conference co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union would break the old taboos about public contacts between the parties and be the launching pad for direct negotiations between the parties.

Mr. Chairman, I would submit to you that these are not insignificant areas of consensus, and they certainly provide a baseline for progress. But they still have to be translated into a practical process, and that was the purpose of my most recent trip to the area.

Let me give you, therefore, a sense of the key issues that we are still trying to resolve. The first set of issues relates to modalities of the peace conference. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this question, so let me lay out simply what we have in mind. Our objective is to launch direct negotiations. That's what this effort is all about and what this effort has been all about. We believe that the best way to do this is through a peace conference that would lead directly to bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab and Palestinian neighbors, and multilateral negotiations on issues such as arms control and regional security, the environment and water.

Let me be very clear about this. We are not and never have been considering an international conference with a plenary that has the power or authority to impose its views on the parties, nor are we considering any mechanism that would interfere in any way with negotiations. In fact, as I have told those in the region, the conference is not a forum for negotiations. Quite simply, it is a means to an end. A tool in our effort to get the parties to sit down face to face to sort out their differences and to break anachronistic taboos.

The conference would be sponsored jointly -- co-sponsored, if you will -- by the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinians from the territories would attend. As you know, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have already taken a very important step, and they have agreed to send the Secretary General of that organization as an observer. In addition, and equally as importantly, each of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, that is, the six Gulf states, have announced that they will participate in the direct negotiations on multilateral issues.

We also believe that the European Community could play a constructive role in support of this process, and especially in the hard work of economic development that would follow a negotiated peace. So, the EC should be able to participate in this conference.

Similarly, it is our view that the United Nations should have some role. A formula should be found that is acceptable to all the parties, that prejudices none, and that channels the newfound potential of the United Nations in ways that can be helpful in promoting peace and reconciliation in the area. The exact nature of European Community and United Nations involvement is still unresolved.

Another open question is the ability of the conference to reconvene. The United States believes it should be able to do so if all the parties agree, in order to hear reports from the bilateral and multilateral negotiating groups.

The point is that none of this will in any way interfere with direct negotiations. Indeed, face-to-face negotiations offer the only way to make any progress, and we would not accept any proposal that would lead any party to believe that it could avoid negotiations or have others relieve it of the need to negotiate.

The other set of issues deals with the question of Palestinian representation in the negotiations. From the beginning of this administration, we've made it clear that our objective is to get Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories into negotiations. Of course, Palestinians must choose their representatives, but our view is, and many other parties agree, that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could be a useful vehicle to get to the conference as well as to handle any number of issues that might arise during the negotiations.

So the purpose of my recent trip to the region was to continue to explore these issues with the parties and to determine where there was consensus and which areas required more work. Over all, Mr. Chairman, I found that there is far more agreement than disagreement on the key elements of our approach, and I

found a willingness to continue looking for ways to resolve those areas that are still not nailed down.

I also had extremely useful discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, both in the Soviet Union and in Cairo. Let me say that the Soviets have been very, very Nations' role and on the issue of reconvening the conference. I'm not going to pretend that sorting those out will be easy or that it will be done quickly, but I will say that we will continue to try so long as we believe that all of the parties are working in good faith and are serious about finding ways to resolve differences.

The President and I have talked about our next steps and we believe, Mr. Chairman, that we should continue to press ahead to see if we can overcome the gaps and actually get to negotiations.

Finally, let me conclude by saying that I believe the parties in the region do appreciate that there is a real chance to launch a process. We've defined a workable pathway to negotiations that would enable Israel, Arab states and Palestinians to capture that chance and to make a real break with the past in favor of peace. It is there for the taking but it will not last forever. What remains to be seen is whether the parties themselves are willing to seize this chance. The United States is there, ready and willing to help them try. But Mr. Chairman, we cannot create the political will to act if that will does not exist in the region.

Let me now discuss the situation in Iraq. With his aggression outward against Kuwait defeated, Saddam Hussein turned his terror inward in the aftermath of the Gulf War and he drove hundreds of thousands of Iraqis out of their homes and into foreign lands. This created, as the United Nations recognized in Resolution 688, a new threat to international peace and security, so the issue for all of us can no longer simply be just Kuwait. Today, I want to review with you the threepronged strategy that we and our allies have pursued to cope with this terrible situation. First of all, we have worked to relieve the immediate suffering of Iraqi refugees. Secondly, we are working to prevent another round of terror by creating safe and secure conditions within Iraq so that the refugees can return to their homes and live in safety. And third, we will continue to isolate Saddam Hussein as long as he is in power.

Let me discuss each of these aspects of our strategy. The first, of course, has been aimed at the immediate problem, which is saving the lives of refugees by providing them with food, water, medicine, blankets and housing. Through Operation Provide Comfort, we have airdropped and trucked supplies to refugees on the mountains in northern Iraq and southern Turkey, have built refugee camps in both Iraq and Turkey, and have

resecured portions of northern Iraq so that they could begin to return to their homes. The President has contacted the leaders of the major industrial countries and our coalition partners from the Arab world and has urged them to make generous pledges to the various United Nations appeals. We appreciate the conference committee's action on Tuesday and we hope the Congress will act expeditiously on our supplemental refugee request.

As a result of these efforts, the situation has improved considerably. Death rates among the refugees have dropped markedly, and well over half the refugees have come down from the mountains. It has not been enough, however, to provide only for the immediate needs of the refugees. We have also have a duty to try to prevent a greater tragedy, a situation where Saddam could exercise his terror once again. So this second aspect of our strategy requires uniting the world community to ensure international access to the affected regions throughout Iraq in strict conformity with Security Council Resolution 688, which calls for respect for the humanitarian and political rights of the Iraqi people. Saddam's ruthless suppression of his own people is yet another reminder that he cannot be trusted. We remain concerned that he would, if conditions altered, resume a systematic extermination of regime opponents and of innocent Iraqi civilians. The world community is not moving to save these poor innocent people now, simply so that they can be slaughtered by Saddam Hussein later on. That is why we've warned Iraq not to interfere with humanitarian relief efforts underway in Iraq, and that is why in support of Resolution 688 we've urged the United Nations to move quickly to provide personnel to ensure the safety of those refugees returning to Iraq.

The United States does not seek to keep its forces in northern Iraq any longer, Mr. Chairman, than is absolutely necessary. We look forward to their early replacement by an effective international presence. It is our firm conviction that some kind of international presence, however organized, has to take over the job now being done by American and coalition forces. We hope that this international presence will serve as the international community's watchdog to inhibit Saddam Hussein from repeating his most recent atrocities.

In the future, we would hope that Iraq can fully rejoin the community of nations. This country has a tremendously talented, creative, and diverse population. I believe that a new Iraqi political compact which reflects the pluralistic makeup of it's population and its rich historical and cultural traditions is possible, and such a compact must be arrived at by negotiations among all Iraqis, and not by force.

We respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, we do

not wish to see Iraq fragmented as a state. We have said repeatedly that we have no quarrel with the people of Iraq, and our actions reinforce our words. While our soldiers have been feeding and caring for refugees, Saddam Hussein's soldiers were strafing and shelling them.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I can say without equivocation or doubt, Saddam Hussein himself is the single greatest obstacle to any hope for the future of the people of Iraq, whether in terms of their own development as a society or in terms of their reintegration into the international community. Left alone, free to reconsolidate his brutal dictatorship and military machine, we know that he will act again to brutalize his own people and to threaten his neighbors.

Without constant international monitoring of and pressure against this leader, this Iraqi government will continue to pose a danger to the peace and security of the Middle East. That's why we can have a formal cease-fire, but we'll not be able to have any genuine peace with the government of Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.

Let me be absolutely clear about this third aspect of our strategy. This man, we think, is a pariah whose actions put him beyond the pale of civilized international society. Therefore, we intend to continue to act with others to isolate Saddam Hussein's regime. That means that we will never normalize relations with Iraq so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, and that means maintaining United Nations sanctions in place so long as he remains in power. And it means further, Mr. Chairman, that Iraqis will not participate in post-crisis political, economic, and security arrangements until there is a change in regime.

With a new government, new possibilities will emerge for Iraq to rejoin the international community. With a new government, we may well be able to lift most sanctions, save those sanctions that constrain Iraq's military potential. And in that new Iraq, tolerance must replace terror, and the fear that has so long gripped the Iraqi people must give way to peaceful realization of the vast potential of that people and their homeland.

Let me make three observations, Mr. Chairman, about the Soviet Union and about our relations with the Soviet Union. First, the President and I feel that it is important to stress that Soviet new thinking continues to guide Soviet behavior in many aspects of our relations. In the Middle East, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's help has been invaluable to our attempts to reinvigorate the peace process. Soviet cooperation has also been critical to the historic agreement that will end the Angolan civil war, an agreement that I will join in signing in Lisbon next week. The Soviets have also been helpful in other

regional areas, most notably Central America and Cambodia. And in arms control, we hope to resolve our differences over the CFE treaty, prepare CFE for ratification, and move forward with START in preparations for a Moscow summit.

Secondly, the so-called "One Plus Nine" agreement of April 23rd between Gorbachev and the Republics creates an opportunity for a positive shift toward new political arrangements in the Soviet Union. If President Gorbachev and the Nine follow up this agreement in the way that they have suggested through an all-union treaty and through a new constitution, then this would be a very important step toward establishing a new political legitimacy in the Soviet Union.

These steps, along with the ongoing talks between Moscow and the Baltics, create new opportunities for reconciliation to replace the political polarization that has characterized Soviet politics since roughly last September. We also welcome enactment of new emigration legislation. For almost two decades now, we have made the right of emigration a central part of United States-Soviet relations. We regard passage of the new law as a major step in Soviet reform and in fulfillment of Soviet-CSCE commitments.

For our part, we continue to expand our contacts with all levels and segments of Soviet society, ranging from reformers and democrats to traditionalists and the military. Not only will this increase our understanding of Soviet society, but it will allow us, through what I have called a "democratic dialogue," to help promote political pluralism and economic freedom and the success of Soviet reform. And as the President and I have made abundantly clear by now, the continuation and success of Soviet reform is in everyone's interest.

Third, even with the tentative steps toward political accommodation, Soviet economic reform still has a very long way to go. We, and almost everyone else who has looked at it, are convinced that Prime Minister Pavlov's anti-crisis program will not work. We believe the Soviet leadership urgently needs to embrace fundamental market economic reform. Without a commitment to fundamental reform we expect the Soviet economy to continue its severe decline. And that, of course, is in no one's interest.

We continue, Mr. Chairman, to study various ways in which we can assist Soviet economic reform, but the usefulness of our efforts still depends above all on the choices that the Soviets themselves have to make.

Let me close with a few words about the North American Free Trade Agreement and fast track. We are seeking this agreement with Mexico and Canada because we are convinced that such an agreement promises important economic benefits for all three

countries. Since the President's announcement last June of his desire to seek a free trade agreement with Mexico we've engaged in extensive consultations with Congress as well as with the private sector.

Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a tremendous amount at stake here in terms of both foreign and economic policy and in terms of our growing cooperative work with Mexico on important regional and transnational issues. It will also enhance American exports, job opportunities, as well as global competitiveness. In order to achieve global markets and hemispheric trade cooperation we think it is critical, Mr. Chairman, that fast track negotiating authority be extended by the Congress. Without this step our foreign and economic leadership position could be seriously impaired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. OBEY: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I hadn't intended to comment on fast track, but since you brought it up let me simply explain to you why I'm going to be voting against it. I totally agree that it would be desirable to have a free trade arrangement with Mexico and the rest of this hemisphere. My problem is that I don't think this country can afford to play Winston Churchill abroad and Scrooge at home. And my problem is that most of the time when people talk about necessary economic adjustment and necessary -- the acceptance of temporary job losses, it's usually people in suits talking about somebody else losing their jobs.

And my problem is simply this. I would be a whole lot more inclined to support the administration's position on fast track and their argument, which runs like this, which goes, "Well, look at, fellows, we have to be willing to accept some job loss on the low end of the income scale. We ought to be going after the high income jobs. That's our natural future. And we ought to be arranging the economics around the world to accelerate that and promote it." That's an absolutely legitimate argument provided that we are doing something effectively to transition this economy into that kind of a situation.

But given the fact this country has cut in half our own job training fund since 1980, it seems to me that the Congress would be ill-advised and in fact spectacularly negligent if it would give the administration carte blanche in negotiating until we know not only what it intends to pursue in those negotiations but what it intends to pursue at home to provide the kind of legitimate foundation that can transition low-paid workers into other jobs. And absent that kind of policy, and that policy is spectacularly absent at the moment, I think that we have an obligation to the workers who are going to be crunched to respectfully demure until we do have that kind of

policy in place. With respect to the Middle East, let me simply say I fully support everything that you are trying to do. I think it's an admirable pursuit, and as you know, I have told you that since you've indicated that the administration wants until after Labor Day maximum freedom to be able to pursue progress in the Middle East, I have told you that I would during that period give you what I regard as an effective veto on anything this committee does with respect to the Middle East. And I have told you that I would be -- that if it appeared to me that any action were about to be taken by this committee, or any amendment about to be adopted by this committee that would get in the way of the administration's ability to pursue those efforts, that I would simply adjourn the markup and delay it until after Labor Day to give you that time, simply moving to a continuing resolution rather than a foreign aid bill. I would hate to do that, but I think the Congress has a responsibility to cooperate in assuring that the two branches of government are marching down absolutely the same road, and I am deeply committed to that.

Having said that, I just have to express skepticism with the results of your recent trip. As I said many times, my favorite philosopher is Archie the cockroach. And Archie said once that "an optimist is a guy who ain't had much experience." And when it comes to the Middle East, I've had enough experience to be skeptical of everything that anybody says in that region.

And what it appears to me is this, and I'd like you to argue with me and please prove that I'm wrong. I want to be wrong on this. What it appears to me is this. The administration was after the Gulf War in hot pursuit of a different set of arrangements in the Middle East. They were sending signals that they were going to be very insistent in their efforts, they were going to press very hard. But then it seems to me that Mr. Scowcroft went to the Middle East, talked to the Saudis, the Saudis, in effect, indicated to him and to you that we ought to lower our expectations in terms of their willingness to participate in any -- in any public way in peace discussions. And it seems to me that that gave the rejectionists within the Israeli government an opportunity to talk about process without having to actually confront much else. And so it seems to me that we are dangerously close at this point to stepping into the old practice of talking about talks to create the atmospherics of progress without any real likelihood that any of the parties are going to be significantly forthcoming, or at least sufficiently forthcoming to actually get discussions going. I hope I'm wrong. I don't mean by that question to in any way argue with anything you've done. My argument is with the parties in the region. I'm especially concerned, frankly, at this point about what appears to be the inability of the Saudis to take the same kind of actions to any significant degree that Mr. Sadat did a number of years ago. And I'd like your response on that.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just very quickly say that of course with respect to the fast track issue, this is not an issue that relates only to the North American free trade accord. It relates to the Uruguay Round and it's not an issue of free or fair trade, it's an issue of trade or no trade, as we see it. And the Congress will have its right to vote on these agreements after they're negotiated.

But without getting into a debate with you on fast track, let me say that with respect to the peace process, we are skeptics, too. We know what the track record has been. We know how long the parties have been arguing and fighting. We know how far back this issue goes, and we know the intense emotions that lie at the foundation of it. But the only thing worse -- well, let me back up and say, as I said so many times during the course of my visits to the region, nobody can impose peace in the Middle East, the parties have got to want it. Certainly the United States can't impose it. But the only thing worse, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, than trying and failing would be if we were unwilling to try in the first instance, particularly in the aftermath of this gulf conflict.

Now, turning to the question you raise about the Saudis, let me say that I'm not at liberty to go into the exquisite details of the visit that General Scowcroft made to the Kingdom, beyond saying to you that it was not a peace process mission. So, I would like to totally eliminate from your thinking that that was the reason for the visit. And secondly --

REP. OBEY: Let's do that. But if -- excuse me for interrupting, but let's then focus on your discussions with them. An article by Jackson Diehl and David Hoffman in the Post indicated that during your third trip to the region, you met with key Saudi leaders. The article reads as follows: "Sources said he was appalled to hear them indicate they would have nothing to do with the proposed regional peace conference. The statements reportedly were not coming from Prince Saud Faisal, the Foreign Minister, as much as some subordinates, but it became clear to Baker that traditionalists were making a move, and the leadership was not fighting them." Is that story inaccurate?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I wouldn't -- first of all, I don't think we should judge it on the basis of what we might read from analysis press reports, let's judge it by the actions that have been taken. What's happened is that the Gulf Cooperation Countries -- who do not take action without leadership from Saudi Arabia, and without the concurrence of Saudi Arabia -- have agreed to do something that no Arab governments have agreed to do in the past.

If there's any substantial progress in the efforts that we've

made, it's the fact that the Gulf Cooperation countries have agreed to sit down at the same table face to face with Israel -- something no other Arab governments have done except Egypt when it negotiated peace with Israel -- sit down face to face with Israel and talk about issues of interest region-wide such as arms control, the environment, water.

In addition to that, of course, they offered and have agreed to send through the -- send the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council as an observer to any peace conference that might be held.

Now, these are very, very significant steps, I think, of a nature that had not been taken before. So I would like very much to disabuse you of the impression that somehow the Saudis have not been willing to move here. The Gulf Cooperation countries have indeed moved, and what remains for us to do is bring some other Arab governments into a willingness to sit down and to resolve the remaining differences between -- particularly between Syria and Israel with respect to the question of UN involvement and continuity of the conference.

REP. OBEY: Well, Mr. Secretary, I'll get back to that because I have two other brief questions I want to ask before I ask other members here their questions.

With respect to arms sales in the region, as I said, I know that the administration is planning shortly to announce its own policies and proposals. I'd like to lobby you again. As you know, Mr. Hamilton, and I, and Mr. Fascell, and Mr. Gephardt, sent you a letter -- sent the administration a letter, I should say -- asking the administration to consider in its package a unilateral announcement of our own to suspend all arms deliveries to the region for a short period of time in order to try to dramatize our concern about the problem and force other trading countries and selling countries to publicly confront the issue. What would be wrong with the administration including that kind of proposal in whatever it is that the President is going to be putting together?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, the United States will not be able to regulate arms sales in the region by acting unilaterally, it won't happen.

REP. OBEY: Well, I understand that. But I'm not suggesting we act unilaterally. I'm suggesting that we take a unilateral action for a short duration to set an example to the rest of the world. I can't believe that we're going to lose any serious advantage in four months' time.

SEC. BAKER: Well, it might not send a signal that would be the most appropriate signal, Mr. Chairman. I mean, all I can do -- without pre-announcing the President's decisions it's pretty

hard for me to debate this particular issue with you, except to say that we do believe it's important that our friends in the region have the ability to maintain and enhance their own capabilities, the ability to defend themselves. And we think that it is much better to work in a multilateral context in connection with restraint, whether it's conventional or whether its weapons of mass destruction.

Again, I don't want to make an announcement here this morning but I think that I will be very surprised if you're not reasonably pleased with the administration's initiative regarding weapons of mass destruction. You may not be as pleased with respect to the administration's initiative on conventional weapons, but I don't think that the suggestion that you've made would move us in the direction that we should go. And I will be pleased to come up and discuss it with you after the President's announced his initiative, when I'm a little bit more free to speak.

REP. SIDNEY YATES (D-IL): Mr. Secretary, welcome. I want to join my friend Mickey Edwards in expressing my admiration as well for your energy and for your determination in trying to bring about better relations with the Soviet Union and between the countries in the Middle East. I don't know of a more frustrating mission than trying to bring peace between the countries in the Middle East, but it's one that's a necessary one and I certainly want to give you a pat on the back for what you've done.

I said it was a frustrating mission; it seems to be "Mission Impossible" to me, rather than a mere frustrating mission, because the Arab nations don't seem to be disposed to change their ancient ways, let alone make peace with Israel. I remember during the recent war it was hoped that the war might persuade them to change some of their attitudes; it was hoped that because Israel was showing restraint in not replying to the attack by the Scuds -- of the Scuds, that maybe they'd have a different attitude toward Israel once the war was over.

But I can't help thinking of the French truism: *Le plus ca change, le plus, c'est la meme chose* -- the more things change the more they are the same. And I can't escape the conclusion that Israel really does want peace with the Arab nations, the Arab nations don't want peace with Israel, that they're using the Palestinians, they're advancing the Palestinians as a foil to prevent really their own participation in any kind of a peace treaty. Unless I'm mistaken, doesn't a state of war still exist between the Arab nations and Israel?

SEC. BAKER: Yes, sir.

REP. YATES: It is. It's still a terrorist state.

Is there any kind of a deal that we have gone with Syria? Why didn't we get -- why did Syria become a so-called "ally"? I say a "so-called ally" because Newsweek for March 18th, in discussing the secret history of the war, says this on page 30, "Finally, there was the sheer complication of mounting such an enormous air operation with sorties averaging 2,000 to 3,000 a day. AWAC and ground radar crews had to devise sophisticated computerized flight plans to keep planes from running into one another. An armada of tankers had to be kept in the air practically around the clock to act as mobile gas stations for jet engines. This test task was complicated when Syria refused to let allied planes fly through its air space, forcing bombers based in central Turkey to take a round-about route to the targets." Well, this is the first time I've read of that. I hadn't seen that in the papers before. Is that -- that isn't common knowledge, is it, that Syria refused to cooperate with our -- our flying missions to attack Iraq?

SEC. BAKER: I don't know whether that's common knowledge or not, Mr. Yates. It's not -- that's not the whole picture. But I can't go into any more detail than that.

Let me comment on some of the -- some of the things you've said though. First of all, I think that -- I really do believe both sides are serious. They may not be. They may just be hiding behind these two symbolic issues. But I think that they're serious. I think that I've already mentioned, in answer to the Chairman's question, that it's very significant that these Gulf states would -- would come forward and say, yes, they are going to break with some years and years and years of tradition and custom and be willing to sit down face to face with Israel. That is a significant step.

The question of the state of war is very -- is a very disturbing one. Let me -- let me say to you that I have approached both sides with the idea that perhaps there could be some -- there could be some steps taken by each that would -- that would promote a better atmosphere for peace negotiations, and I suggested -- I suggested to the Arabs, for instance, that they consider suspending -- agreeing to suspend the state of belligerency during the tendency of any peace discussions if the Israelis would, on the other hand, suspend settlement activity, the -- the action of settling the West Bank -- the occupied territories.

I didn't get any takers on either side. I've also suggested that they -- that they perhaps consider agreeing to suspend the boycott -- the Arab boycott of Israel against a suspension by Israel of settlement activity, and I haven't gotten any takers on either side. These things are all impediments to peace, in my view, and we ought to keep working. I'm not saying the fact that we don't have takers yet means that we'll never have -- that we will never have takers.

In the Gulf War, the United States happened to share a common goal with Syria, and -- and Syria sent forces to the Gulf, actually fought in that war, fought alongside US forces, Egyptian forces, Gulf forces. But we still have Syria on our terrorism list because we have some fundamental problems with -- with their approach to this issue.

I will say that we've had some discussion with them which have been, I think, productive, Mr. Yates. And our intelligence --

REP. YATES: Productive in what way?

SEC. BAKER: There has been a -- there has been a very clear reduction in terrorist activity by groups resident in that country since the outbreak of the -- of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

REP. YATES: May I interrupt you, Mr. Secretary, and just point up a -- a couple of instances, since it seemed to me to be marked irritants than anything else? Kuwait, for example, still observes the boycott of Israel, as far as economic relationships between Israel and American corporations are concerned or other corporations are concerned.

The word I get, too, is that a Senator wanting to visit Saudi Arabia -- United States Senator wanting to visit Saudi Arabia was -- was barred, boycotted because he had an Israeli stamp in his passport -- Saudi Arabia, our close friend. And the United States Senator couldn't get in there because of the Israel stamp. Why such things as that happen still?

SEC. BAKER: Because we don't have peace in the Middle East. It's the same -- it's part of the fundamental problem. We -you know, that's inexcusable -- Senator Lautenberg's experience -- and we speak out against that and weigh in against that.

Let me say this one thing and make certain there's no misunderstanding on what I said regarding Syria. The -- there -- there have been a clear reduction in terrorist activities by these groups resident in Syria against US and western interests since the -- since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That still has not been enough for us to remove Syria from the terrorism list for other reasons.

But we have -- if we're going to have peace in the Middle East, we really are going to have to make every effort to bring all of the important parties to the table. Israel has been very anxious to see a two-track approach, and this approach is what we have embraced and been -- and been pursuing. They would like very much to sit with their Arab neighbors and negotiate the differences they have. One of those Arab neighbors with whom they have the most significance difference is Syria. This is different than the approach we took last year or a year and a half or so ago, Mr. Yates, when we were trying to create an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, solely one track. So we must work to -- if you're going to -- if we're going to be instrumental in trying to get such a process going, we have got to talk to both sides.

REP. OBEY: The gentleman's time has expired.

REP. YATES: I just want to terminate -- conclude my time, Mr. Chairman, by pointing out that there's only one Arab country that sat down with Israel, and that was Egypt, and Egypt and Israel were able to work it out, and Israel proved very generous in connection with its negotiations with Egypt. It gave back every inch of land that it had taken from Egypt during the 1973 war, and while they don't have a -- a -- while they have a cold peace rather than a hot war going at the present time, at any rate, they have a relationship with which they can get along.

I want to conclude by -- by pointing out what some wise man said. He said that in the Middle East, even the past is unpredictable.

REP. OBEY: Mr. Porter.

REP. PORTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary of State, you must be absolutely exhausted. The American people and the members of Congress very much appreciate your tremendous efforts to find the key to peace in the Middle East, and we hope you get a chance to get some rest.

I've been informed I'm now under the five-minute rule, even though we haven't observed it up to this point, and so I'm going to ask my questions as quickly as I can.

I want to -- I want to go back to something my colleague from Illinois raised, and that is the -- the Kuwaiti adherence to the boycott of Israel -- the Arab boycott of Israel. Prior to the -- to the war, they were one of the most strict adherents to the boycott and -- and to the secondary boycott, that is, refusing to do business with companies that traded at all with Israel. Have you had any discussions with the Kuwaiti leaders regarding this -- the boycott and secondary boycott? And aren't US firms put at a competitive disadvantage because US

law forbids them from complying with the Arab boycott?

SEC. BAKER: The -- the issue has been discussed, Mr. Porter, and -- and there has been, in my view, some change in the attitude and approach of the government of Kuwait, particularly with respect to the question of negative certification, and we would -- we would have to see that as a positive result.

REP. PORTER: Just last week, the Arab League's Boycott of Israel Office added 110 companies to the black list of companies that do business with Israel. What reaction -- was there any official reaction by the State Department to that list, and has that -- that issue been raised in meeting with Arab leaders?

SEC. BAKER: I don't think we had any -- any reaction from the podium at the State Department.

REP. PORTER: Well, if I could --

SEC. BAKER: Let me -- let me -- let me reserve on that, Mr. Porter. I was out -- I was in -- out of the country, so let me check and see. It may very well have been.

Obviously, we do not -- we do not support the idea of the boycott, and adding 100 companies is not something that we would look on with any favor whatsoever. At the same time that that announcement was made, if I recall correctly, there was a deletion of a major company or two. But that doesn't excuse adding a whole host of other countries. We do not support the boycott and --

REP. PORTER: And we -- and we raised this in our discussions with the Arab leaders as often as possible.

SEC. BAKER: We raised it all the time.

REP. MATTHEW MCHUGH (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me quickly add my voice to those of my colleagues who have complimented you on your work. It is clearly in the interest of the United States to try to resolve some of the underlying issues in the Middle East and certainly in the interest of the parties out there, and I wish you much success, as difficult as it is.

There is -- you've given us a -- I think, a clear and fairly comprehensive statement on your progress to date and the obstacles you face. There's one area that I'm a little unclear about. Perhaps you can clarify it for me. In listing the points of consensus, you indicated that one of the points was

that the Palestinians would be represented by Palestinian leaders in the territories. Then you had a second category of issues which remained unresolved, and in that category I also heard that Palestinian representation was one of the issues unresolved. You indicated that your preference, although the Palestinians themselves should choose their leadership, your preference was that there be negotiations including a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. So I'm a little confused. Is the question of who represents the Palestinians a settled issue? Or is it one of the remaining unresolved issues? And, if so, what remains unresolved?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. McHugh, I think it is settled in terms of the generic approach, but that does not mean that, as -- when the time comes for Palestinians to determine what their representation will be, that questions might not arise. I can't give you an absolute guarantee here this morning that that issue would not -- that there would not be some difficulties as that issue were approached in practice. It is the view, I think, of almost everyone with whom I have talked, including Palestinians in the territories, Israel, Egypt, the United States, the Soviet Union, Jordan, that a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation would be the best way to proceed, and that would be the way that we would hope would be the route that would be chosen.

What I'm saying is I can't sit here this morning and tell you that a question might not come up involving Palestinian representation. But the truth of the matter is, if we could get agreement between Israel and Syria on two issues, I think we would be in a position to see direct negotiations begin. And those two issues are: Should there be any role for the UN? And, secondly, should this conference be a one-time meeting, or should it have the ability to reconvene? Those are the two issues right now that I think stand in the way of progress. And because they are primarily, in my view at least, issues of form rather than substance, I would hope that the parties could get together and find away to bridge their differences on these two issues.

REP. MCHUGH: Is King Hussein now prepared to participate in a joint delegation? Because, as you recall, after making substantial efforts to put one together some years ago, he in effect washed his hands of that effort. And what you're suggesting, I think, is that he's changed his mind and is now prepared to participate. Is that -- did you get an indication from him that he will?

SEC. BAKER: No. What I -- the indication from King Hussein is that he thinks this is a very important time. He thinks that having a peace process is very, very important. It is important, and I'm not going to quote him now by saying this, but make this our view -- it is important that there be a peace process if we are going to resist radicalization in the Arab world. The King is willing to come to the conference as part of a joint Palestinian- Jordanian delegation if that's what the Palestinians want. And so far at least, in the discussions that I've had with Palestinians, it would appear that that's an approach that they would be favorably disposed toward. And it would -- it's an approach that others are favorably disposed toward.

REP. MCHUGH: One other question on this, and then I'd like to pass on, given our limited time, to another area. Has the subject in your discussions of participation by Palestinians in East Jerusalem, a very sensitive issue, been raised? Would a Palestinian delegation include or exclude Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem?

SEC. BAKER: Well, the question -- the subject has been raised, and it is very sensitive, and I'm not going to get into it here. (Laughter.)

REP. MCHUGH: It has not been resolved then, I assume?

SEC. BAKER: I didn't say that. (Laughter.) It may not have been, but then again, it might've. (Laughter.)

REP. SMITH: -- one little -- (laughter) -- one little piece at a time. And it's very difficult for you to do it in any rapid significant fashion. I think it's going to take (a piece of time?). But I'd like to put it in some context and get your feelings about the context.

The context of Saudi Arabia -- and the chairman started out with this question and I think it's important to follow up it -- the context of Saudi Arabia is that over the last number of months we basically have to a large degree saved Saudi Arabia from the possibility of a significantly disastrous fate at the hands of Saddam Hussein. Taking what the President and you had to say at the beginning, America sacrificed men and a great deal of money. It appears to me that what you have described as the Gulf Coordinating Council approach -- that is, to send an observer -- and the fact that thereafter Saudis and/or other GCC members may send a participant to a regional conference -- while not to be dismissed, I think it is something very, very different than it had been before, although there were other Arab states that attended the 1973 December peace conference face to face with Israel -- at least Jordan, if not others -- I don't know that in the context of what's happened in the last few months, it's really enough. And I believe that there are a

lot of Americans who are extremely disappointed in what they conceive to be the lack of real response on the part of Saudi Arabia.

There was a quote from you about the fact that Saudi Arabia is really not a front line state, and coming out of Aqaba you would say something about where you would draw the line. I think that a lot of people perceive -- I perceive -- that Saudi Arabia is a front line state. It's financed the Jordanians, it's financed the Syrians on and off times, it's financed the PLO and the Palestinians on and off times. It certainly has a great deal to do with everything that happens in that region. It is not Kuwait or Oman or Bahrain, it's an entirely different state. And I think the American people would like to see more of a forthcoming nature by the Saudis.

Is there still by you and others, an attempt to bring them to any peace conference, or do you believe that the best you're going to be able to secure, in the context of what we have done for the Saudis in the last few months, is that they say they'll participate in a regional conference, whether it's on water or arms or some such other -- ecology -- some such other regionally shared interest, but have nothing to do with the peace process?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Smith, let me say that in addition to what the Saudis have said they're going to do publicly -- which I do think is significant, and I'm glad you recognize it as such, that is, being willing to sit down face to face with Israel and others and talk about these regional issues -- in addition to that, they're doing some things privately that we have asked them to do that I think advanced the peace process.

Secondly, it is the view of the so-called front line states, that is those that border Israel and with whom Israel has these major disputes -- such as with Syria the Golan, with Jordan the territories, and with Lebanon the border there -- it is the view of those countries that they should sit directly with Israel and negotiate out their differences with Israel, without having other states in attendance. So, you shouldn't put that -- you really should not lay that at the feet of the Saudis.

And I still feel that it's valid to say, if you suggest that somehow the Saudis should attend the conference, where do you draw the line?

REP. LARRY SMITH: Well, didn't you ask them to?

SEC. BAKER: Hmm?

REP. LARRY SMITH: Didn't you ask them to originally? Wasn't this one of the original --

SEC. BAKER: No, no sir.

REP. LARRY SMITH: Never?

SEC. BAKER: We have always been of the view that they should attend the regional working groups. We have -- we have had at one time, I think, contemplated that they might attend the conference, but not participate in the negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. That was never contemplated. And so, they are attending the conference in an observer role through the GCC, but they're going beyond that. And the real significance of what they're doing is not that observership attendance through the General Secretary of the GCC, but rather through their direct -- as a state -- participation in the negotiations on regional issues.

REP. SMITH: So you're satisfied with what the Saudis are doing at the moment. Is that correct?

SEC. BAKER: I think that the -- if you -- if you measure what they have been willing to step forward here and say they would do against the entrenched positions that have been taken for so long by many countries, it is a very significant thing, yes, sir.

REP. SMITH: Well what about the Syrians now? We have a situation where apparently you have been to some degree rejected even more significantly on this latest visit than you were on the visit before that.

SEC. BAKER: Subjected to what?

REP. SMITH: Rejected even more significantly. Now they may have stepped backwards while you were trying to press them forward. How is the Syrian position at the moment now different than it's been before? I mean, were they at all forthcoming? You're telling us now that there's only those two items as a hang up -- UN participation and --

SEC. BAKER: Well, there are only those two items as a hang up. The Syrians historically have, like most all of the Arabs, said before we will agree to sit with Israel we want them out of the territories and out of the Golan, that's a precondition. That has not been expressed as a precondition to me. The only conditions that are out there that I have -- that we are unable to satisfy is this requirement that the -- that there be a significant UN role, or as they have characterized it on some occasions, an important UN role; and the second requirement that the conference have some degree of continuity. The positions of Syria and Israel on these two issues have been directly opposed. Israel says no UN role, and only a one-time meeting.

So what I keep saying, Mr. Smith, is I see this -- I see these two issues as being primarily symbolic because the purpose of this conference, and everyone agrees to this, is not to impose solutions, or dictate results, or to veto results that the parties might arrive at, but simply to get the parties talking face to face in direct negotiations.

So I have said that -- you heard me say in my opening remarks, we think it's important that there be some role for the UN. After all, we're talking about implementing UN resolutions.

But the exact nature of that role is not going to, I don't think, affect the process of getting the parties engaged face to face. And we ought not to -- we ought not to let the -- it would be a tragedy, I think, if the whole effort goes down the tube, because the parties cannot agree on what the exact role, if any, for the UN should be.

And, it would be equally tragic if they couldn't agree on this question of whether or not the conference is just a one-time meeting or might perhaps have the ability to reconvene, particularly if all the parties were willing to agree to it.

REP. SMITH: Is Syria the last piece of this puzzle?

SEC. BAKER: I think these two issues, Mr. Smith, are the last pieces of this puzzle.

REP. SMITH: Suppose they are intransigent to the point where you can't get Syria to come; are we prepared to proceed without Syria?

SEC. BAKER: I think we might be, but I don't think the other parties would be.

REP. SMITH: Well, let me ask you one more question?

SEC. BAKER: But we would be, as indicated by the efforts we made two years ago, or a year or so ago to get an Israeli Palestinian dialogue going.

REP. SMITH: Well, but you'd have Jordan at the table as well. Of course, without Syria, you probably wouldn't have Lebanon, would you?

SEC. BAKER: You wouldn't have -- you wouldn't have Lebanon in my opinion, and I don't know whether you would have Jordan.

REP. OBEY: All right. One last pitch, and then two questions with respect to the content of this bill.

You indicated that you thought when the administration came out with its announced arms policy, that I would be happy about its position on weapons of mass destruction, perhaps not so happy about the conventional weapons. I'd simply make the point -I've got a cartoon here which shows a road, on one side troops coming out, cops standing in the middle, and there's a sign here pointing in the other direction saying, "The Middle East." And the cop is saying, "Homeward-bound troops to the left, new arms sales to the right," going in opposite directions.

And I'd simply suggest that these are all conventional weapons, and so I would hope again that the administration would really take a look at the possibility of trying to jump start a policy of arms denial to the region on the conventional level by the moratorium that we've suggested.

With respect to -- I have to raise, because our committee asked the State Department last year to provide a report on the issue of Israeli settlements. And that report indicated to us that there are now over 200,000 settlers in some 20 settlements in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem; in the West Bank, about 90,000 settlers, an increase of 9,000 to 10,000 during the past year; perhaps as many as 40,000 since '84. According to that report, West Bank settlements are growing at a rate of 10 percent a year, and last year it suggested the government of Israel spend at least 83 million dollars in identifiable allocations for settlements.

On April 5th, the (Washington) Post reported that Israeli Minister said 14,000 new housing units would be placed in the settlements outside of Jerusalem in the next two years. We then have a number of other newspapers articles, including one by Jackson Diehl which says "Israel Boosts Land Seizures." And it says -- and I have no idea whether this is accurate. I want to ask you if it is. But it says while the Palestinians of Artis (ph) waited out a 40-day curfew after January 15, teams of Israeli land agents began staking out tracts on the hillside outside the village. Then, two weeks after the war ended, a notice arrived. Israel's government had decided to seize 360 acres of traditional village land, wiping out much of the agriculture on which the community depends.

The confiscation was one of a sudden rash of land takeovers initiated by Israel in the West Bank in the two months after the Persian Gulf War, amounting to at least 7,500 acres so far that appears linked to a vast new program for construction of Jewish settlements. It then goes on to suggest the rationale under which Israel allegedly takes the land, saying that Israel

bases their land seizures on an interpretation of 19th century Ottoman Turkish law, which required villages and families who wanted to register their ownership of land to prove they had cultivated the property for 10 consecutive years. And because it's difficult for a number of reasons for them to do so it sets it up for confiscation. So alleges the article.

I would like to know, number one, whether this is true, and secondly, if it is, in concert with the other reports that -- the other report you sent us -- frankly, it gets under my skin, because I guess my question is this: What specifically is US policy with respect to settlements? Because my understanding is that this activity is in violation of US policy. What bothers me is the Israeli government says that the desperately need funds for other purposes, including bringing Soviet Jews to Israel for resettlement. But then they appear to be spending money like this, which I don't think they ought to be spending. It seems to me that if in fact this article is true, it also represents significant human rights violations.

I would simply like to have your assessment of what the situation is. Can we expect to see action on the part of the Israeli government that will reflect -- let me put it another way. I think we have a moral obligation to try to help Israel resettle every Soviet Jew who wants to leave Israel. But I think Israel has an obligation to us and to their own future security not to settle them in such a way that it proves either an obstacle to the peace process or it proves to be a major embarrassment to you and to anybody trying to jump start peace talks.

And my question is and to their own future security not to settle them in such a way that it proves either an obstacle to the peace process or proves to be a major embarrassment to you and to anybody trying to jumpstart peace talks. And my question is, how in God's name do you tell what Israeli policy is when you've got six different stories coming out of the same government on their policy, and what can we do about it to achieve a constructive result?

SEC. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs -- Arab governments, the first thing the Palestinians in the territories -- whose situation is really quite desperate -- the first thing they raise with us when we talk to them. I don't think that there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace. And nothing has made my job of trying to find Arab and Palestinian partners for Israel more difficult than being greeted by a new settlement every time I arrive.

The Arabs and the Palestinians, of course, argue that this proves that the Israeli government is not interested in creating -- in negotiating outcomes, but it's really interesting in creating (facts on the ground?). And it substantially weakens our hand in trying to bring about a peace process, and creates quite a predicament.

Now, I've raised the issue on any number of occasions with the leadership of the government of Israel, to no avail. I've even raised it in the context of perhaps a tradeoff for a suspension of the state of belligerency or suspension of the boycott, as I've mentioned to you. And I haven't gotten any takers on that, either. So, it makes it tough.

I have about decided that we're not going to get any movement on settlement activity before we -- at least before we have an active peace process going, and it's going to be just that much more difficult to get a peace process going if we can't get any action on settlement activity.

Someone told me, and I don't want to -- I don't want to say this as being an absolute fact, because I haven't checked it, but I believe that there's only about 35 percent of the occupied territories that has not been in one way or another utilized, or is being utilized, by Israel, either through settlement activities or appropriation in the manner that the article you just mentioned outlines. I can't tell you that everything in that article is accurate, because I don't know whether it is or not. I suppose we could have it analyzed and send you a report.

REP. OBEY: I would like you to do that.

Let me simply say that if I were Israel, I would not give back one square inch of any of the territory without explicit, clear, emblazoned in gold letters -- recognition on the part of Arab states. But, I think the Israeli government has an obligation to try to deal with this resettlement issue in such a way that it makes possible US support for Soviet refugees in Israel because I very badly want to see that happen. But, I also have to say, as I said in Milwaukee last week, that I think it is dangerous negligent nonsense for the Arab world itself to continue to play what I regard as a "cat and mouse game" on the entire issue, and it just seems to me that if the Arab world cares about the settlements issue as much as they ought to, that the Arab world as well ought to take some action which makes it very difficult politically for the Israelis to justify continuing their settlement policy on the West Bank. So, I frankly think we've gotten very little out of either side.

Let me -- just one last question. The administration has said, and you said in your testimony and in other statements, that you want flexibility from the Congress. And as Mr. Edwards indicated, we have tried to do that, and I think we've made significant progress. But, there's one area where the administration is in fact totally eliminating congressional flexibility in five-year lumps -- that is with respect to arms sales -- and I refer specifically to Egypt. In '86, Egypt was finally unable to pay the US even within the one-year leeway allowed by the Brooke-Alexander Amendment. So, they were forced to reach an agreement with the IMF on economic reform. They went to the Paris Club, got a rescheduling of their official debt. That rescheduling meant that once again they avoided having to repay foreign aid. They avoided the cutoff required under the amendment by going to the Paris Club. But, the IMF agreement wasn't worth the paper it was written on. Egypt continued to resist reform. Now there's further debt relief negotiation going on again at the Paris Club. Egypt has already been the beneficiary of major forgiveness of its military debt.

I have two questions. What assurance do we have, what assurance does the IMF have that this time around Egypt really means it with respect to economic reform? And with respect to arms sales it seems to me that we are in this box, we forgave Egypt's military debt because they couldn't pay us, then the administration went ahead and essentially provided 46 new F-16s to Egypt. That means that the administration is, in effect, earmarking foreign aid for Egypt for the next five years at at least existing levels because Egypt clearly can't afford to repay us without that aid guarantee. We know Egypt can't afford to pay for those planes without additional aid.

I guess I don't understand right now what is the principal military threat to Egypt in light of what just happened in the Iraq war? Why was it necessary to proceed to lock the Congress into a five-year commitment to Egypt in terms of debt by these sales? And why shouldn't the Congress insist on Egyptian economic reform by shifting resources from the military account to the economic account rather than continuing to be locked in when the administration makes a decision on the military side which in effect says, "Boys, for five years you have no flexibility with respect to that aid."

SEC. BAKER: Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the F-16s was the fourth of four tranches in a 10-year program that began quite some time ago to modernize the Egyptian air force. We think the program made sense then and we think it makes sense now. The security relationship we have with Egypt as the largest Arab nation, as our ally in the Gulf War, if you will, is in both of our national interests. Egypt is the only nation

that has made peace with Israel. The sale that we're talking about is consistent with the Camp David agreements, and it's not going to have any adverse impact on the nations -- I mean on the region's military balance. Now, yes, it does, to the extent that they've got to pay for those airplanes, lock us in with respect to the division of economic and military assistance.

REP. OBEY: But they're not paying for the airplanes. We're paying for the airplanes through a Rube Goldberg program that pretends there's an aid program, when what we're really doing is buying American airplanes.

SEC. BAKER: That same statement could be made, Mr. Chairman, about a whole host of other countries.

REP. OBEY: Absolutely, absolutely.

SEC. BAKER: A whole host of other countries -- and when we get into the business of talking about -- well I won't get into it.

REP. OBEY: Well, again, I would simply urge you to take a look at the possibility of an arms moratorium in the region. I have a couple of other questions that I would like to ask you with respect to Salvador and other countries, but we don't have the time so I'll submit them for the record except to ask this question.

We don't want to rock the boat with respect to what's happening in Salvador. I've talked to a lot of people, including the UN negotiators. We recognize that we would like to keep pressure on both sides.

SEC. BAKER: Yes, sir.

REP. OBEY: I would ask you to consider one possibility. What is we were to keep roughly the same process that we had last year, provide aid in accordance with the same understandings; half would be made available immediately, the other half to be held in abeyance as it was last year, depending upon what happens. But what if in addition to the uses to which that money can now be put we can also add one other use; potential use for demobilization or resettlement if an agreement is reached with the rebels? Would that be at all useful?

SEC. BAKER: If it was an optional use it would be a very good thing, I think, Mr. Chairman, to monitor a cease-fire, or for reintegration, or what have you, provided it's stated as an optional -- I mean, that the administration has the option.

REP. OBEY: Thank you very much. We appreciate it.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

אאא, חוזם: 21929

אל: רהמש/1324

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 425, הא: 220591, זח: 2117, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: קונגרס, מדינית

הנדון: המערכה על מחשבי על - הסנטור דורנברגר

1. הסנטור דורנברגר (רפוב' - מינסוטה) ממשיך לנסות ולקדם הנושא באמצעות קשר עם חברת "קראיי" במינסוטה, ועם חוגי הממשל (מחמ"ד, מסחר ו- ACDA).

2. להערכתו, מהווה ACDA את המשוכה המחמירה והמסככת.

3. לדבריו, הועבר ב- 17.5 מסמך ה- SECURITY PLAN הנספח לאישור רכישת מחשב על (ומחייב חתימת הרוכש כתנאי לביצוע העסקה) לעיון ממ' יפן. המסמך יוחזר לארה"ב, בתוספת הערות תוצרת יפן, תוך 30 יום, ואז יועבר לרוכש (אוניברסיטה עברית ובר-אילן).

4. הסנטור סבור - על בסיס שיחותיו עם רונלד ליימן, מנהל ACDA - שהמסמך כולל מגבלות קשיחות ביותר על השמוש במחשב, והוא צופה טרוניות ישראליות בנדון.

יורם אטינגר שמעון שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא,
פרג, סייבל

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 19332
אל: רהמש/1140
מ-: המשרד, חא: 210591, זח: 1055, דח: מ, סג: סו,
ככב
107563
סודי/מידי
106.02

אל: וושינגטון - ק. לקונגרס

פגישת סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן עם חבר הקונגרס אואנס (דמוקרט מיוטה).

תתפו: השגריר בראון, פט פטרסון, דני אברמס, סטיב כהן והח'מ.

חבר הקונגרס חזר מבקור בירדן ודיווח על שיחתו עם המלך חוסיין. על הבקור נודע לנו ערב הגעתו ולבקשת השגרירות האמריקאית קיבלו סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן לשיחה.
הנקודות המרכזיות בדבריו היו:

- התחושה שהועברה אליהם בזמן השיחות היתה כי המלך מעוניין בהמשך השיחות. לדבריו כעת הוא הזמן המתאים לכך לירדן ולפלסטינים ועל סוריה להבין כי יתכן ומבחינתם זה הזמן היחיד הקיים.

- המלך נתן להם להבין שבנושא האו'ם לא נשאר פער גדול בין הצדדים. ניתן להסתפק באו'ם כמשקיפים ולא דווקא חסות. כאשר להשתתפות ירדנית ללא השתתפות סורית לא ניתנה תשובה מחייבת. הגרסה בה נקט היחה שהוא מעדיף סוריה לא תהווה מכשול לתהליך.


- המלך טען ששיחותיו בדמשק עולה כי הסורים חוששים מכשלון בתהליך. לדעתם לא יוכלו לעמוד בכשלון והמצב באיזור יוחמר. אסאד התבטא שכשלון יחייבם להיות עוד יותר קיצוניים מהקיצוניים.

- הנקודה החשובה ביותר לאסאד היא להבטיח המשכיות הועידה האיזורית ותיפקוד האו'ם בתהליך.

- המלך הזכיר את מאמציו להידוק הקשרים עם מוברק העומדים גבוה בסדר העדיפויות שלו. המלך גם הזכיר התייעצותיו עם הפלסטינים וכי קיימות עדיין שאלות פתוחות לגבי יצוג הפלסטינים.

- המלך הדגיש מס' פעמים כי הוא מעוניין בנטילת חלק קונסטרוקטיבי בתהליך, וכי הוא מדבר על חוכניות שלום ממשיות.

- המלך טען שאסאד כבר נמצא ב-98 אחוז בתוך התהליך.



תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, @ (שהבט), כנצור,
מצפא, סולטן, מזחים, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 19750
אל: רהמש/1155
מ-: המשרד, תא: 210591, זח: 1513, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
107668

סודי/מידי

אל: וושינגטון
השגריר

ביקרני בראון.

אמר שקיבל הודעה שהנשיא יישא נאום על צמצום מרוץ החימוש ביום ו'
הקרוב ושאין כל דרך לדחות הנאום למועד אחר.

חזרתי על חביעתנו לכלול תשומתנו בנאום זה.

2. אשר לעיסקת הטנקים הציכית-סורית אמר שממשלת צ'כוסלובקיה טוענת במגעיה
עם המימשל כי ביטול העיסקה יגרום לאבטלה של 70 אלף פועל, שהמפעל ממוקם
בסלובקיה באיזור רגיש ובעל שיעור אבטלה גבוה ושאם ארה"ב רוצה להביא
לביטול העיסקה שתרכוש היא הטנקים או שתדאג להשקעות בצ'כוסלובקיה בשעור
תמורת העיסקה.

בנצור
21 במאי 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, מצב, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 19309
אל: רהמש/1128
מ-: המשרד, תא: 200591, זח: 1539, דח: ב, סג: סב,
בכבב
107497

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

ח.ר.ב.

אל: זושינגטון (יצא בחוזם 18867)

השגריר

משך לשלי מהיום להלן ה- T.P שמסר השגריר בראון לשהב'ט.

OUTLINE OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE'
(TO BE ANNOUNCED END OF NEXT WEEK)

1. IRAQ-SPECIFIC

A. A SPECIAL COMMISSION WILL SUPERVISE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD).

B. WE WILL CONTINUE A CONVENTIONAL ARMS EMBARGO ON IRAQ.

2. SUPPLIERS' CONFERENCE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND WMD TO THE REGION COMPOSED BY PERM FIVE OF UNSC:

-- WILL DRAFT GUIDELINES ON EXPORTS.

-- WILL REQUIRE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS.

3. CWC

-- ACHIEVEMENT OF GLOBAL TREATY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

-- REGIONAL STATES TO ANNOUNCE WILLINGNESS TO SIGN (AS ISRAEL HAS)

-- EARLY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS), E.G., TRIAL INSPECTIONS.

4. BW

-- GLOBAL TREATY TO BE IMPROVED/FIXED REGARDING VERIFICATION


AND CBMS.

-- CONFERENCE WOULD CONVENE IN SEPTEMBER

5. MISSILES

-- A BAN ON ALL BALLISTIC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY RANGE IN THE REGION

-- INITIAL STEP: FREEZE ON PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION AND TESTING



בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), ששהח, מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, בנצור

סבסב

אאא, חוזם: 18048
אל: רהמש/1029
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 376, חא: 170591, זח: 1506, דח: ר, סג: שמ,
כבכ
20155
שמור/רגיל
אהב 182.50

אל: מנהל ארב'ל 2

דע: ראש אגף ארב'ל
מנהל מצפ'א
משפט

שטיין, וושינגטון

מאת: אהרן יעקב, נאו'ם

הנדון: כינוס הצדדים לאמנת ג'נבה: תשובת ארה'ב

1. התקשר הריס שונברג מבני ברית ומסר כי לפי ידיעות שהגיעו אליו מסתמן שינוי לרעה בעמדת ארה'ב כלפי ההצעה לכנס את הצדדים לאמנת ג'נבה. לדבריו, נשקלת במימשל האפשרות לשלוח למזכ'ל תשובה שאינה שוללת את רעיון הכינוס.

2. פניתי בענין זה לפרנק אורבנצ'יק. סיפר כי משלחתו שלחה תשובת כינייים למזכ'ל, בה נאמר כי בגלל נסיעת מזכיר המדינה למזה'ת תשלח תשובת ארה'ב באיחור של חודש ימים (באיגרת המזכ'ל נחבקה כזכור תשובה עד 1/5). אורבנצ'יק סיפר כי במחמ'ד עוסקים בימים אלה בהכנת תשובה, אולם הוא אינו יודע מה ייאמר בה.

אהרן יעקב, נאו'ם

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בייץ, ארב'ל2, בנצור,
מצפא, סייבל, משפט, סולטן

אאא, חוזם: 18048
אל: רהמש/1029
מ-: ניויורק, נר: 376, תא: 170591, זח: 1506, דח: ר, סג: שמ,
בבכ
20155
שמור/רגיל
אהב 182.50

אל: מנהל ארב'ל 2

דע: ראש אגף ארב'ל
מנהל מצפ'א
משפט

שטיין, וושינגטון

מאת: אהרן יעקב, נאו'ם

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הרן יעקב, נאו'ם

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, ביין, ארבכל2, בנצור,
מצפא, סייבל, משפט, סולטן

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

BUSH MAY SEND BAKER BACK TO MIDEAST

(U.S. Press: NYTimes article by Rosenthal)

The following article by Andrew Rosenthal appeared in the New York Times on page A-3 on May 18 under the above headline.

BEGIN TEXT)

WASHINGTON -- Despite four inconclusive trips to the Middle East by Secretary of State James A. Baker III, President Bush said Friday that there was "real cause for optimism" about the regional peace process and left the door open for a fifth round of shuttle diplomacy.

Bush declined to say what had caused his optimism, and administration officials said Bush and Baker had not settled on new steps to take toward resolving the major outstanding obstacles to a Middle East peace conference.

But Bush nevertheless declared that "progress has been made" and added, "When you're working a problem this complicated, you just keep plugging away."

Officials who insisted on anonymity described Bush's remarks as a kind of "holding action" to keep his diplomatic efforts alive while he waits for countries that could play a central role in a Middle East peace conference to make their intentions clearer.

The official said Bush was waiting in particular for a response from King Hussein to Bush's recent efforts to bring the Jordanian leader into the peace process by holding out the prospect of improving relations with the United States and other Western countries that were strained by Jordan's support of Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis.

"What it's aimed at is to discourage speculation that things aren't going too well, even though things aren't going that well," one official said of Bush's comments to reporters, which he made before he left for a weekend at Camp David.

"The idea is to try to get everything back on the middle ground while we wait to see if this latest trip produced anything significant," the official said.

Asked whether Baker might return to the Middle East for a fifth visit, Bush said, "We're going to keep on working it from here and if there's reason to go back, he will. It might kill him. He's been traveling all the time, but he's been doing a firstclass job."

Bush has often said there is a new "window of opportunity" for

the Middle East peace process after the Persian Gulf war and declared Friday that this opportunity still exists.

"I think the credibility of the United States is higher in the Middle East than it's ever been," Bush said, adding, "I don't think there's an erosion to it."

But administration officials said Bush was increasingly concerned about the fundamental conflict between American interests and the political realities of the Middle East: the time period for achieving a breakthrough on the region's longintractable problems is limited, while Israel and the Arab countries seem bent on taking their time and making sure all of their bets are hedged before agreeing to any radical new steps.

Administration officials said Baker, who briefed Bush on his trip to the Middle East during a lunch in Bush's study off the Oval Office, was unable to report any resolution to the major stumbling blocks to a Middle East peace conference.

Among them are the lack of agreement on what role the United Nations would play in such a conference and how it would be structured. The Syrians insist that the United Nations sponsor and run the conference, while the Israelis do not want the United Nations to play a role.

Israel wants the conference to be a one-time, largely ceremonial event, followed by bilateral discussions, while the Syrians want it to be an ongoing affair. "We're still working on the Syrians," an American official said.

It also remains to be seen whether Jordan would agree to proposals for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to a peace conference and whether King Hussein will actively join Bush's diplomatic efforts in other ways.

Bush refused to reveal what the next step would be in his efforts to convene a peace conference. But officials said Bush and Baker reviewed a series of options, including the possibility of inviting Arab and Israeli leaders to Washington, or simply calling a peace conference in the region and seeing who attends.

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NNNN

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

U.S. MISCALCULATED READINESS FOR PEACE

(5/17 WPost article by Diehl; Hoffman)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY JACKSON DIEHL AND DAVID HOFFMAN APPEARED ON PAGE A-1 OF THE MAY 17 WASHINGTON POST UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

JERUSALEM, May 16 -- Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, both President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III have insisted that a "window of opportunity" had been created for Arab states and Israel to advance toward the comprehensive settlement that has eluded the Middle East for the last four decades.

But as Baker today completed his fourth diplomatic mission to the Middle East since the war ended, it became apparent that if his exhaustive tours have clarified anything, it is that the war brought about, at best, only small changes in the way Arabs and Israelis perceive the regional order and their place in it.

Contrary to the Bush administration's expectations in its efforts to broker a regional peace, Israel and Syria have sized up the postwar situation -- which has left them both relatively strengthened -- and found it preferable to making major concessions for peace.

In the wake of these frustrations, some U.S. officials have concluded that the missing element in the postwar equation was strong regional leaders. Although there was sentiment among the Saudi elite, the Israeli public, and the Palestinians in favor of a peace process, in the view of these U.S. officials, the region lacks dynamic actors willing to make it happen.

In a reference to the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who catalyzed a peace process with Israel in the 1970s, a U.S. official said, "There are no Sadats," only leaders committed to long-term defense of the status quo.

Jordan and the Palestinians, although chastened by the defeat of ally Iraq, have failed to dispose of leaders seen by the Americans as obstructive, such as Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. And while some of the gulf state elite seemed prepared to support far-reaching diplomatic initiatives, conservative establishments in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere have proven dominant.

As a result, attempts by Baker to exploit the postwar situation have repeatedly seemed to backfire. First, a plan for

"confidence-building measures" by the two sides stalled when neither Israeli nor Arab leaders proved willing to initiate the first concession. Then, an attempt by Baker to overcome the thorny problems of launching Israeli-Palestinian talks through a "second track" of Israeli-Arab negotiations only succeeded in creating a second thicket of procedural disputes to be solved.

As Baker headed back to Washington today for a reassessment of the peace process, U.S. officials insisted that he was not ready to abandon his efforts, and they said they hoped that some kind of talks between Israel and Arabs would eventually be arranged. Still, it was clear that the initial, hopeful phase of postwar U.S. diplomacy had ended. If the peace process does continue, officials suggested, it will probably be more modest and seek more limited aims: in effect, it will return to the old ideas and realities with which Baker grappled before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

"What's happening is that the Americans are finally beginning to realize that they are not going to be able to bring about any big breakthrough, as part of some new world order, because the Arabs are just not ready for that," a senior Israeli official said. "That doesn't mean that the process can't continue and we can't have progress. But no one is expecting miracles anymore."

In retrospect, the very American perception of a "window of opportunity" seemed driven as much by political imperatives as by facts. During the buildup to the war, as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein appealed to Arab sentiment by repeatedly raising the issue of Israel's occupation of Arab lands, Bush countered by pledging, in a speech to the United Nations and in talks with Arab allies of the United States, that the Israeli-Arab dispute would be high on the postwar agenda.

In fact, neither Israelis nor Palestinians, embroiled in increasingly bitter conflict during the gulf crisis, believed the postwar period would open the way to solving their long struggle. Instead, Israelis hoped the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria might allow for postwar American pressure on those states to drop their hostility to the Jewish state. The Arabs, conversely, believed that their wartime partnership with Washington would be rewarded with postwar U.S. pressure on Israel.

U.S. officials point out that, beyond these self-interested expectations, there were several signs of more fundamental change in the region. Following decades of superpower competition in the Middle East, the Soviet Union appeared anxious to cooperate with the United States in a peace effort, using its substantial influence with Arab leaders and its improving relationship with Israel.

In addition, the alignment of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the United States suggested to the Americans a new alliance in the region that could be directed toward Arab-Israeli peace as well as against the menace of Iraq. Israel's agreement not to counterattack Iraq for its Scud missile attacks, and the gratitude with which its people received U.S. Patriot missile defense units as well as the eventual U.S. victory, seemed to create new possibilities for progress with the government of Israel.

Still, officials now concede that they may have overestimated the degree to which these changes might weigh against the longstanding obstacles to peace in the region. At the same time, critics of the Bush administration in Israel and other parts of the region say that Baker's tactics over the last two months failed to exploit some of the opportunities that existed.

The administration's basic approach was to get Israel and the Arab states to consider taking a series of incremental steps toward each other. The thinking behind this was that any largescale American peace plan would instantly become a target and be attacked in its particulars. So, instead, Baker began putting together, in great secrecy, an approach in which he would attempt to get the various players to take small steps toward peace on their own.

During the first year of the Bush administration, Baker had failed in a similarly low-profile, painstaking effort to implement an Israeli plan for elections in the occupied territories and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. But U.S. officials said they believed that the change in the posture of Arab states brought about by the war could be exploited to jump start the Israeli-Palestinian process.

Israeli leaders had long complained that the emphasis on the Palestinian problem ignored the larger Arab-Israeli dispute. Baker believed that if Arab states could be induced to take steps toward peace with Israel, this could give Israel the incentive it needed to move toward a settlement with the Palestinians.

Baker first tried to implement this "dual track" strategy by encouraging Israel and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Syria to take mutual confidence-building measures. During his first trip to the region, Baker suggested that Israel could freeze the building of settlements in the occupied territories in exchange for a relaxation by Arab states of their economic boycott against Israel.

Israel, however, was uninterested in making such far-reaching concessions, and both Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's government and Arab leaders told Baker it was up to the other side to make the first move. The developing impasse promoted

U.S. officials to seize on a more dramatic idea, floated by Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy in his first meeting with Baker in Jerusalem: a regional peace conference in which direct Arab-Israeli negotiations would proceed in parallel with Israeli-Palestinian talks.

But it became clear in Baker's last three trips that the procedural problems of the peace conference soon became as formidable as the disputes that caused last year's Palestinian election plan to break down.

In Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad heard out Baker's proposals, but made clear that Syria had no intention of changing its prewar policy of seeking military parity with Israel and a peace imposed by international powers rather than negotiated bilaterally.

In Jerusalem, Shamir was anxious not to be blamed, as he was last year, for blocking a U.S. peace initiative. But, much as during Baker's earlier initiative, he took advantage of the secretary's closed-door style and concern with incremental steps to focus the talks on often arcane procedural issues. This served to largely neutralize the potential pressure of Israeli public opinion on the government.

The biggest disappointment to the Americans, however, involved the Saudis. Baker had stopped there on his first postwar trip and after his meetings, officials said King Fahd had agreed to play an "active" role in the peace process. But then, in late March, the Bush administration effectively lost touch with Fahd.

In fact, with the war over, Fahd faced strong new pressures from traditionalists in the monarchy. Despite the war, Saudi society had not really changed, "with the exception of a small group which really runs the country," said Mordechai Abir, an expert on Saudi Arabia at Jerusalem's Hebrew University. The Saudi liberal group, Abir said, "cannot swim against the stream" in the country's broader oligarchy, which is much more conservative.

In late March, Fahd summoned Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, to the kingdom. Although the mission was never publicly explained by the United States or the Saudis, a source said Fahd told Scowcroft to tell Bush that the Saudis wanted the United States to stop pressing for democracy in liberated Kuwait. According to this source, Fahd was concerned that any such liberalization in Kuwait would spill over into the conservative Saudi kingdom and fuel the thirst for modernization.

As this was happening, Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador in Washington and the key link between the two governments, was hospitalized, reportedly for back problems. Bandar is a leader

of a faction that wants greater liberalization at home and a higher-profile foreign policy, and he had done much to encourage U.S. expectations that Saudi Arabia would be prepared to take an active role in an Arab-Israeli peace process.

Then, during his third trip to the region last month, Baker met with key Saudi leaders. Sources said he was appalled to hear them indicate they would have nothing to do with the proposed regional peace conference. The statements reportedly were not coming from Prince Saud, the foreign minister, as much as some subordinates. But it became clear to Baker that the traditionalists were making a move and the leadership was not fighting them.

Frustrated, Baker located Bandar in Geneva, where he was recuperating, sources said, and tried to get him to come to Riyadh immediately to help argue the case for Saudi participation in the peace conference. But Bandar could not come.

When Bandar eventually returned to Washington, Baker and Bush reportedly pressed him hard to return to Riyadh and win its agreement for the more modest gesture of sending an observer to the peace conference. But while the Saudis and Kuwait and the other gulf emirates eventually agreed to this step, it was not enough to attract Israel, which seeks direct negotiations with Arab states.

(END TEXT)

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(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

BAKER ENDS MISSION WITH LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE
(5/17 WPost article by David Hoffman)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY DAVID HOFFMAN APPEARED ON PAGE A-20 OF THE MAY 17 WASHINGTON POST UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

SHANNON, Ireland; May 16 -- Secretary of State James A. Baker III left the Middle East today having found little basic change in attitudes and having made almost no progress toward a regional peace conference.

"You're not going to have a conference until the countries that are the participants...make a firm decision that this is what they want and take the decision to move forward," Baker told reporters at Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv prior to his departure for Washington after a 13,827-mile trip through the region. The trip had been designed by the administration to gauge support for convening the peace conference, and Baker found Israel and Syria still far apart on procedural issues and Jordan uncertain about whether it would participate without Syria.

He acknowledged that "we cannot know today who the participants might be" in the peace conference, which has been at the center of U.S.-led regional diplomacy since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

Baker is scheduled to report to President Bush on Friday and they are expected to make decisions soon about the direction of U.S. diplomacy.

Officials said there are several possibilities, including Bush summoning Middle East leaders to a conference, perhaps in Washington, or the United States changing its approach and trying to set up talks just between Israel and Palestinians instead of the broader goal of a regional conference.

Although there was little movement on the procedural roadblocks to a conference, Baker and other officials sought to put the best possible face on the outcome of four trips he has made to the region since the gulf cease fire.

"I am not disappointed," he said. "I do think we are making progress."

He cited the statement from Saudi Arabia and five gulf emirates last week that they would be willing to send an observer to the peace conference, and he said general agreement had been

reached on a "broad range" of other issues.

Baker's final hours in Israel were spent with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Defense Minister Moshe Arens and Foreign Minister David Levy, going over Israel's negotiating positions.

Baker and his aides took down careful notes that were compiled into a confidential memo for the record.

Although the document was not made public, the administration official said it will be taken to Arab capitals. Baker decided to draw it up because he wants "to go back to the other side and say, 'Now look, here are the things that I can guarantee you that Israel will do.'" the administration official said.

According to officials, the main differences between Israel and Syria remain over the U.N. role, which Syria wants to maximize and Israel opposes, and whether the full conference would reconvene after an opening session, which Syria wants and Israel does not.

More fundamentally, however, officials believe that for different reasons, Shamir and Syrian President Hafez Assad are not yet ready to come to a conference.

(END TEXT)

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FROM INDIA'S MEANEST STREETS, SHE FIGHTS CITY HALL
(5/17 Nyt article by Barbara Crossette)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY BARBARA CROSSETTE APPEARED ON PAGE A4 OF THE MAY 17 NEW YORK TIMES UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

CALCUTTA, India -- Mamata Bannerjee is riding around south Calcutta in a small car stuffed with campaign workers looking for her election rally.

Ignoring her loyal but inexperienced staff, she flags down wilted bystanders to ask directions. The mercury is nosing toward 100, and it's just as well that nobody around here has heard of the temperature-humidity index.

By the time the sun has begun to sink, the small caravan led by this energetic Congress Party candidate is pitching and yawning up a rutted back alley lined with the red banners of her communist rival.

"Where do they get all this money?" she asked rhetorically. The Communists are in power in the state of West Bengal and Ms. Bannerjee accuses them of using government funds for party expenses.

Ms. Bannerjee, 32, symbolizes for many the future of India's oldest party in this teeming, crumbling city. A street-smart dynamo with an eighth-grade education, she lives in a two-room bamboo house in Kalighat, Mother Teresa's neighborhood, near a building materials depot and her late father's bakery.

She takes on the Communists where their power is all but complete: on the streets. In a demonstration last August, she was severely beaten by leftist thugs. Her popularity soared.

Ms. Bannerjee, who was first elected to Parliament in 1984 at the age of 26, and lost her seat in 1989, is in a tight fight this year. Calcutta political reporters expect violence, and say every party is armed.

On Monday, West Bengal will hold elections not only for members of the national Parliament but also for a state assembly. For the Communist Party of India-Marxist, the larger of two major communist organizations in national politics, these votes are crucial tests of the party's viability.

Nationally, the party and its leader in West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, have lent important support to the National Front

BUSH: PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

(Transcript: Bush-Baker press remarks 5/17/91)

Washington -- After consulting with Secretary of State Baker on his latest mission to the Middle East, President Bush said May 17 there is "good reason" to be optimistic about the peace process.

Speaking briefly with reporters at the White House, Bush reiterated the U.S. commitment to "continue to work this process," emphasizing: "We're not about to stop...and progress has been made."

Following is the transcript of remarks by Bush and Baker:

(begin transcript)

BUSH: Let me just say that I've just received a full report from Secretary Baker on his travels to the Middle East. I've also been on the phone, as has Secretary Baker, with President Mubarak of Egypt. And my assessment after hearing the report from Secretary Baker is that there is real cause for optimism.

And we will continue to work this process. We're not about to stop. We're going to continue to do that. And progress has been made. And so, when you're working a problem this complicated, you just keep on plugging away. And as I said to some of you all yesterday or the day before, a lot of this has got to be conducted with quiet diplomacy.

It's a very difficult problem the secretary has been working. I thank him for this endless amount of travel he's put in. But the point I wanted to make, after assessing his report, is that there's reason for optimism. Good reason for optimism.

QUESTION: What is the reason?

BUSH: A lot of these things have to be quiet when you're talking about diplomacy.

Q: Why can't we have any reasons?

BUSH: You've got some. You can see what's already been done. Everybody was writing off Saudi Arabia earlier on, and the GCC countries have made a pretty good statement.

So there's plenty of reason. But I'm not going to go into any detail with you, because I've told you that the way to solve this conundrum is to not get these parties' position by public statements.

Q: Well, will there be a peace conference?

Q: What is the next step?

Q: Will Secretary Baker go on another trip?

Q: Mr. President, are you giving any thought to inviting them to a conference in Washington?

BUSH: We're going to keep on working it, from here, and if there's reason to go back, he will. It might kill him; been traveling all the time, but he's doing a first-class job on it.

Q: Are you going to invite anyone here?

Q: What about a Washington peace conference -- are you considering that still?

BUSH: That's a detail I'm not discussing -- along with all the other details I'm not discussing.

Q: Mr. President, is that window of opportunity that was opened after the Iraq war closing? Are you losing some of that advantage?

BUSH: I don't think so. I think the credibility of the United States is higher in the Middle East than it's ever been. I think it's still there. I don't think there's an erosion to it.

Q: Are you standing by 338 and 242? Do you continue to expect a peace conference?

BUSH: Well, that's -- the United States' position is there.

BAKER: Let me say something about 242 and 338, which is a very good question. The parties have -- the parties with whom we've been talking have agreed that the objective is a comprehensive settlement based on 242 and 338. And that represents, I think, a pretty important agreement. That doesn't bring you to a peace conference, because you've got to get agreement on everything before -- every last thing has to be agreed to before you can have a peace conference. But that first fundamental agreement has to be made. And it has been made.

Q: Well, Mr. Secretary, the parties don't even agree on what 242 and 338 require.

BAKER: If there was an agreement on what 242 required you wouldn't have to have a conference. You wouldn't even, indeed, have to have negotiations. That's what the negotiations are for -- is to determine exactly what's meant by 242.

Q: You're saying everyone's committed to those?

BAKER: To 242 and 338 --

(end transcript)

BUSH OPTIMISTIC ON SOLVING MIDDLE EAST "CONUNDRUM"

Says "quiet diplomacy" a necessity)

By Alexander M. Sullivan
USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- Stressing the need for "quiet diplomacy" in the complicated Middle East "conundrum," President Bush said May 17 "there is real cause" to be optimistic about achieving progress.

Speaking briefly with reporters after hearing a report from Secretary of State Baker, Bush declared that "after assessing his report...there's good reason for optimism." Bush also said he had just concluded a telephone conversation with Egyptian President Mubarak, but he gave no details of their talk.

Baker returned to Washington May 16 after a six-day journey to Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt, his fourth trip to the region since the Persian Gulf war ended. Baker has been attempting to arrange the ground rules for a peace conference between Israel and her Arab adversaries.

Bush refused requests for details about the "good reason for optimism," explaining, "I've told you the reason for the conundrum is to not get these parties positioned by public statements." Bush added, "A lot of these things have to be quiet."

The president denied the "window of opportunity" for progress toward peace is closing as the end of the Persian Gulf war becomes more distant. "The credibility of the United States," he said, "is higher than it has ever been."

Baker said the fact that the parties concur that the objective is a comprehensive settlement based on United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 "represents a pretty important agreement." But he admitted, "That doesn't bring you to a peace conference."

Baker added, "You've got to get agreement on everything -- every last thing has to be agreed to -- before you can have a peace conference. That first fundamental agreement (on a comprehensive solution) has to be made, and it has been made."

Reminded that the parties do not agree on the meaning of the resolutions, Baker replied, "If there was agreement on what 242 required, you wouldn't have to have a conference; you wouldn't, indeed, have to have negotiations. That's what the negotiations are for, to determine exactly what's meant by 242." Bush said the United States will continue to work on the Mideast "conundrum," adding that Baker would return to the region if the need arises.

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SCHOLAR EXPECTS AGREEMENT SOON ON KURDISH AUTONOMY

(But warns self-rule could be temporary)

By Berta Gomez
USIA staff writer

WASHINGTON -- The real problem for the dissatisfied Kurdish population in northern Iraq is in the long term, according to a noted U.S. scholar, since the prospects of what he saw as a "temporary" autonomy would be limited unless democracy is introduced by Baghdad's one party-regime.

Briefing Journalists May 16 at the Foreign Press Center here, political scientist Michael Gunther suggested that the establishment of democracy in Iraq could be the only real means of resolving current difficulties.

"Although there is hope for Kurdish autonomy in the short-run, the long-run looks less hopeful, unless -- and this is a big maybe -- Iraq becomes a democracy in which human rights are respected," Gunther said. "Then," he said, "the Kurdish problem would be solved."

Gunther, a professor at Tennessee Technological University, said his prediction of an imminent Iraqi-Kurdish autonomy agreement derives from the fact that the Kurds in Iraq "retain some bargaining power" despite the quick defeat of their Spring uprising.

Not only are there still Kurdish guerrillas operating in the mountains of northern Iraq, but the Baghdad government can be expected to restrain itself for fear of another allied invasion, Gunther said. Baghdad is also aware that efforts will be made to maintain strict economic sanctions against Iraq as long as the Kurdish issue remains unresolved, he added.

Moreover, remaining obstacles to an agreement -- such as the Kurds' demands for international guarantees -- and the question of whether the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is included in the autonomous region -- are solvable, Gunther stressed.

Given that scenario, he said, "there is reason to believe that the current negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurds will result in a temporary agreement on autonomy."

He warned, however, that such an agreement would not resolve the issue once and for all.

"The real problem is the long-term," Gunther said. He noted that Baghdad's historical tendency is to make concessions to the Kurds when it is weak, "only to retract them later when it regains its strength." Gunther predicted that such would probably be the case for any agreement reached with a nondemocratic Iraq.

Perhaps the only way to guarantee such an agreement, he said, is through a popularly elected government. "If there could be democracy in Iraq, like what we have in the west, then a lot of these problems -- by definition -- would be resolved," he said.

Asked to evaluate the real prospects for democracy in Iraq, Gunther said he was "willing to be cautiously optimistic." He acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy is skeptical about the possibility, but stressed that "we should give more credit to the Arabs" and to Arab political culture.

He pointed to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and to the very dramatic changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union, and noted that neither was -- or really could have been -- predicted by outsiders.

Gunther was also asked to clarify U.S. policy towards Iraq, particularly the implications of providing "safe havens" for the Kurdish refugees in the northern part of the country.

While Gunther agreed with reporters that the deployment of allied forces to protect and resettle the Kurdish refugees has created "a de facto Kurdish state," he stressed that the United States has not and will not support the establishment of a permanent Kurdish state.

Not only would the international community strongly oppose such an outcome, but Washington's obvious goal at this point is withdrawing its forces from Iraq, Gunther said.

Under these circumstances, he added, the idea of an independent Kurdish state is "almost inconceivable."

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CONFIDENCE, RISK-TAKING NEEDED FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS

(Teleconference on Women in Business)

By Joanne L. Nix
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- A woman president and executive producer of her own telecommunications company in the United States told a group of women in Saudi Arabia they can succeed in business if they trust in themselves and are willing to take risks.

Antoinette Ford, President and Executive Producer of TELSPAN INTERNATIONAL, INC., a video production company, spoke from her office in Washington with a group of 25 businesswomen from Dhahran through the teleconferencing facilities of the United States Information Agency.

Many of the Saudi women own their own businesses; others work for Aramco in managerial positions and now wish to open their own enterprises. On May 14 they discussed the problems involved in starting a business, marketing techniques and creating a network of contacts with Ford.

Before she stated TELSPAN INTERNATIONAL INC., Ford was the administrator for Near Eastern, North African and European programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development. In that position, to which she was appointed by President Reagan, her responsibilities included a budget of 2,600 million dollars and world-wide staff numbering 650 employees.

She was also the Agency's liaison with the Arab donor banks and economic development funding organizations. These included the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Development Fund, the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund.

Ford came to government service from private industry where she was a plant manager for General Motors Corporation, with responsibility for a 60-million-dollar pressed-metal and metal fabricating facility.

When asked why she decided to start her own business after such success in private industry and government, Ms. Ford replied: "I recognized that I would not become president of General Motors very soon, or -- in government -- not secretary of state. I decided that if I were as capable as I believed and there were other opportunities, I should take them.

"I had been very fortunate in my career," she said. "My father and mother taught me that consistent luck was talent and we had a responsibility to use it."

She created TELSPAN INTERNATIONAL INC. in 1985 and incorporated it in 1986. During the first year, she volunteered her videotape production services to people she knew. "I believed

BAKER SEES CHANCE FOR DIRECT ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS

(Transcript: Baker; Levy remarks; 5/16/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State James Baker, ending his fourth Middle East mission since the end of the Gulf war, said there is "a chance to produce a process which can result in direct negotiations" between Israel and Arab states, and Israel and Palestinians.

"I still believe that a peace process is possible... There is a very, very broad range of issues with respect to which there is agreement," Baker told reporters May 16, before flying home to Washington.

Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, who joined Baker at the Ben Gurion international airport news conference, expressed satisfaction that "progress is being made toward shared understandings among all."

"The steps being taken toward peace are more beautiful, more commendable, more remarkable than any preparations that can possibly be made for war," Levy said.

Following is the transcript of the joint news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me thank the Minister and the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister for the time which they have given us during the course of the last two days to permit us to work very hard toward the development of a process for peace. I think we have been able to substantially clarify and obtain clearly better understandings of the broad areas of agreement, and we have been able to clarify as well the rather few areas with respect to which there is still some disagreement.

I plan now to return to Washington directly from here, and I hope to be able to consult tomorrow with President Bush and to brief him in full on where I think this process now is. I believe that there is a chance to produce a process which can result in direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states, and between Israel and Palestinians.

There are, of course, issues -- remaining issues -- that have to be resolved, and there is additional work, I think, that has to be done if we are to be able to achieve that goal. But we have had some very useful and good discussions over the course of the past two days, for which I thank the government of Israel.

MINISTER LEVY: Mr. Secretary of State, you are returning now to your home, to the United States, after hard work, but I

trust it will be a fruitful endeavor. The fruitful endeavor will be in the form of a chance of peace to this area which has suffered so many wars. We discussed various ideas and the elements which are part of this initiative. We devoted considerable time to several notions which will undoubtedly help us progress toward this goal. We are pleased with the progress, and we support your efforts to continue along the lines of the effort you have assumed responsibility for. Whatever we do for the sake of promoting these understandings was done in an atmosphere that was sometimes not all that good, but now I am pleased that progress is being made toward shared understandings among all of us. We were in need of a great deal of patience and perseverance, and in both these regards I believe that our determination proved very evident. Now what is needed for the Arab states to prove their determination and their aspiration for a meeting which will involve direct negotiations in the interest of solving a conflict which has been long and brutal. True, there are other issues to be dealt with still, but do not think that the difficulties are immense as it may seem. As you yourself said, we have made a great deal of progress, more than what still lies ahead.

A year ago I was in Washington representing my government. We had frank and candid talks about our goals, and I am pleased that the talks proved that the way ahead of us will be a viable one for the both of moving toward real progress.

As we approach the eve of a Jewish holiday, we pray that just

as we received the Torah, the sacred Bible, on that holiday, so tomorrow will our prayers be answered. Our efforts will not have been in vain, and this road will lead us to the one awaited peace which we all pray for. And let us wish all of us a great deal of faith, perseverance and success.

Q: Mr. Secretary, after your talks in Jerusalem, do you believe now that there will be soon some kind of peace conference in the Middle East, and do you know now who the participants will be?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we cannot know today who the participants might be. Of course, we are very hopeful that there can be a peace conference. That is an objective that we share. That is an objective, I think, that is shared as well by others, and we intend to continue working toward that end.

Q: At the conference, will there be any role, even a token role, to the United Nations, or is this still a stumbling block? And what about the role, what about the participation of Syria?

MINISTER LEVY: We agreed not to give any specific details, but clearly Syria must prove its willingness to participate. We intend at long last to enter into further progress on this process despite the many stumbling blocks since we have overcome many stumbling blocks already. Let us not seek pretext -- let Syria not seek pretext for impeding this process. We have done everything possible to help it along. Let Syria help the process along, as well, for its benefit and for the benefit of the entire region. Israel has proven willing to do so.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if we take Israel at its word that it feels the United Nations will show bias at a peace conference, what can the United States do to allay these fears so things can get moving already.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think one thing that could be done is to make it clear, as we have in our discussions with all countries, including Israel, that a peace conference would not be convened with the authority to impose solutions to veto results or to command the parties. That is not the purpose of the conference we have in mind. The purpose of the conference we have in mind is to launch direct negotiations between the parties. And I might say that this understanding of the purpose of the conference is shared as far as I can determine by all the countries with whom I have discussed the matter.

Q: Mr. Baker, you've been here four times now. You haven't been able to get the parties to the peace table. Have you failed? Are you disappointed? And who's to blame?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I am not disappointed, because I do think that we are making progress. When you consider that as we embarked upon this trip, for the first time ever we had Arab governments evidencing a willingness to sit with Israel in direct discussions, face-to-face. And I'm speaking, of course, about the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

I still believe that a peace process is possible, and I should point out that as we indicated when I spoke outside the Prime Minister's office earlier today, there is a very, very broad range of issues with respect to which there is agreement. There are, yes, some issues still out there to be resolved, and you're not going to have a conference until those issues are resolved. And, of course, it goes without saying that you're not going to have a conference until the countries that are the participants in such conference make a firm decision that this is what they want, and take the decision to move forward.

Q: Mr. Baker, are you satisfied with Israel's reply about a U.N. role --

MINISTER LEVY: The Prime Minister of Israel, who is responsible for making peace with Egypt, Menachim Begin, once uttered a sentence which should reverberate in the ears of all those who wish to promote peace in the world. "Wars can be prevented. Peace is inevitable." And I should like to add something. With respect to the question that was asked to Secretary of State Baker as to whether he feels bad about the fact that progress has not been sufficient, fortunate is the man who works for peace. Better to be accused to working for peace than to sit by idly. The steps being taken toward peace are more beautiful, more commendable, more remarkable than any preparations that can possibly be made for war.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

NNNN

אאא, חוזם: 17289

אל: רהמש/973

מ-: ווש, נר: 2087, תא: 160591, זח: 1815, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבבב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופרנ'

דע: מקשח' / משהבט'

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

עמדת ישראל בנושא הנשק הכימי

1. סטיב סיימון התקשר (16.5) ובפיו המסרים הבאים אותם התבקש להעביר (ככל הנראה ע'י קלארק):

א. עיתוי פרסום עמדתנו בנושא הכימי :

1. למרות הפרסום בניו-יורק טיימס ממליצים כי ניתן פומבי לעמדתנו רק אחרי הודעת הנשיא. (לדבר סיימון המסתמך על מקורות בבית הלכן בכונת הנשיא לפרסם התכנית ביום ששי הבא).

ב. תוכן ההודעה שנפרסם בנושא הכימי:

1. עם שובו של קלארק התקיים דיון (בינמשרדי) במהלכו בחנו הערות/הבהרות שנמסרו לקלארק (עי בנצור במהלך מפגש 'גיאוח' ש.ש.) לגבי הצטרפותנו לאמנה.

2. חלק מהתנאים שהעלנו דומים לנתאי ארהב' (הצורך בהצטרפות כל מדינות האזור לאמנה ומילוי קפדני של ההתחייבויות הכלולות באמנה). לעומת זאת העלנו תנאים נוספים (התייחס באופן ספציפי לסוגיית הרכב המועצה שתפקח על יישום האמנה) שאותם ניתן יהיה לדבריו 'TO WORK' 'OUT' (לא פירט).

3. סבורים כי פירוט כל תנאינו בהודעה הראשונה שנפרסם לא זו בלבד שלא תסייע אלא תקטין את האימפקט של השינוי בעמדתנו. הוסיף כי קלארק בדעה שטוב נעשה אם בהודעתנו הראשונה לא נכנס לפירוט יתר (הערה: מניח שכונתם לכך שבהודעתנו נסתפק בהצגת עמדתנו מבלי להכנס לפירוט ההסבר לעמדתנו).

4. לדברי סיימון 'בשלב מסויימ' ינחו את שגרירם להעלות עמנו באופן רשמי המלצתם לעיל ביחס לתוכן ההודעה שנמסור. לפי שעה המדובר בהתראה.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, @ (מקשח/משהבט),
פרנ, סייבל

טססס

BAKER REPORTS MORE AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT

(Text: Baker; Shamir remarks; 5/16/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State James Baker reported there was more agreement than disagreement on the Middle East peace process. He made his assessment May 16, during a joint news conference with Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir following their meeting in Jerusalem.

"I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about," Secretary Baker said.

Baker said there are "many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement."

The "only two areas of continuing disagreement" between the United States and Israel are the questions of the role of the United Nations in the peace process and the "extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of the parties," Baker noted.

The following is a transcript of Baker's and Shamir's remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: The Prime Minister has asked me to begin and I'm very pleased to do that. I would like to begin by thanking him for all of the time that he has made available and by thanking as well the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister for the time that they have made available for these consultations.

We met, as you know, yesterday, for a considerable period of time, the four of us, and we have met again today. I think we've had some very, very good and very useful discussion. I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process that we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of, the remaining areas, of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about.

And having said that, let me say that I think, as I have indicated to those of you travelling with me, that there are many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement.

I intend to return to the United States. I hope to be able to meet with President Bush tomorrow to give him a full briefing on where I think we are and where I think this process stands, and we will together, of course, decide what our next steps are. Let me say that I think we have a much cleaner and much better understanding of the range of agreement -- and it is extensive -- as well as a much cleaner and better understanding of the few areas with respect to which there is still disagreement.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. It was a great pleasure to work together with the secretary of state for many hours yesterday and today and to invest many efforts in the success -- I think it will be success -- of the peace process. And we will continue our work. We are sure that the secretary will continue his great efforts and I wish him, and ourselves, full success and positive results in getting this peace process to a successful end.

Thank You.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what are the remaining areas of disagreement, please?

SECRETARY BAKER: There remains to be resolved the question of the role, if any, of the United Nations in the process; and the question of the extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of all the parties. Those are the only two areas that I am aware of, of continuing disagreement. Now the foreign minister has been engaged in active consultations with the European community. And those consultations and discussions, as I understand it, will be continuing.

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ISRAEL REJECTS BAKER'S PLAN FOR MIDEAST PEACE TALKS

(5/16 NYTimes article by Thomas L. Friedman)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN APPEARED ON PAGE A-17 OF THE MAY 16 NEW YORK TIMES UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

JERUSALEM, May 15 -- Israel today rejected Secretary of State James A. Baker III's proposals for bridging the differences between Israel and Syria on how a Middle East peace conference should be organized and on what role the United Nations should play in it, American and Israeli officials said.

President Hafez al-Assad of Syria had rejected virtually the same proposals from Baker when the two met in Damascus on Sunday.

Baker will meet again with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on Thursday before returning to Washington, and some Israeli officials hinted that Shamir might show a little more flexibility at the 11th hour to give Baker something to go back to the Syrians with and to avoid any suggestion that Israel and Syria were equally to blame for holding up the conference. But American officials said Baker received no such proposals from Shamir on Wednesday.

Baker is expected to return to Washington later Thursday and sit down with President Bush to decide what their next move should be in their effort to follow up the Persian Gulf war with some kind of Arab-Israeli peace negotiation.

Since American officials believe that some of the other Arab states and the Palestinians are prepared to be more flexible than Syria, they are beginning to

Since American officials believe that some of the other Arab states and the Palestinians are prepared to be more flexible than Syria, they are beginning to think more seriously about trying to convene a smaller Arab-Israeli conference in which the Syrians would not be involved, at least initially. But American officials say they still very much want to see the Syrians take part and have not given up yet.

After spending much of the day in talks with Shamir, Foreign Minister David Levy and Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Baker suggested that the two sides draw up an informal document spelling out the terms for a peace conference on which they had already agreed and spelling out those areas where they still disagreed.

Baker wanted to do that, officials said, for several reasons. To begin with, Shamir, Arens and Levy are all political rivals. Mr. Baker has often in the past had to negotiate with each one separately, and, officials said, he wanted to nail down what all three agreed on Wednesday, so that if the negotiations resume in a few days he will not find himself having to start all over again with three different ministers.

"This is just an informal understanding between Baker and the Israeli ministers," said an American diplomat. "It won't be used for anything other than to make sure that positions don't change. We don't consider it a formal Cabinet decision, but an informal understanding."

Both sides, though, intend to use the document for their own purposes. The Americans hope that it will highlight to the world how insignificant are the procedural issues on which Israel is refusing to compromise in order to make a peace conference possible.

The Israelis, for their part, are expected to point to the other part of the document -- all the areas they agree on with Washington -- in order to emphasize that they are being much more flexible than the Arabs.

As Mr. Levy said today: "I am optimistic about peace because that is the center of our political activities and Israel, in fact, was the one to float the peace initiative. It is the Arabs that are making it difficult."

Israeli and American officials said differences remain over what role the United Nations should play in any conference and whether the conference should be a one-day session or have a permanent status.

The Israelis believe the United Nations has a long record of bias against them and they refuse to have it play any role, even as an observer. The Syrians want the United Nations to play a major role, so that United Nations resolutions will be sure to apply during the negotiations.

Shamir also insisted that the conference be simply a one-day ceremonial opening to direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and its Arab neighbors, while the Syrians demanded that the conference be an ongoing affair and that the cosponsors, the United States and the Soviet Union, be able to intervene to help the parties overcome obstacles.

Baker had proposed as a compromise that the Israelis and the Syrians agree that the United Nations be represented by an "observer" who would have no functional role in the talks, and that the conference reconvene periodically, provided both sides

were amenable, to hear reports of progress but not to interfere in the talks in any way. It was that compromise that was rejected by Shamir and Assad.

The areas where the United States, Israel and the Arabs agree are that there should be a peace conference to promote direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and the surrounding Arab states....

(END TEXT)

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(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

BAKER, SHAMIR DRAW UP TALKS PAPER

(5/16 WPost article by David Hoffman, Jackson Diehl)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY DAVID HOFFMAN AND JACKSON DIEHL APPEARED ON PAGE A-33 OF THE MAY 16 WASHINGTON POST UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

JERUSALEM, May 15 -- Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today drew up a confidential document that acknowledges the obstacles to holding a regional peace conference but points toward a fresh attempt to start Israeli-Palestinian talks.

According to sources from both countries, the document is intended to be an internal record of the areas of agreement and disagreement as Baker winds up his fourth trip to the region since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

The sources said the document indicates that the United States and Israel may now focus more attention on getting a dialogue started between Israel and Palestinians, rather than on the convening of a regional peace conference, which had been at the center of Baker's recent diplomacy.

Details about the document were sketchy and the sources said neither government intends to make it public. Baker, frustrated by the procedural stalemate over the peace conference proposal, wanted to get a written record from the Israelis of what issues had been settled so far, sources said.

The sources said the document notes the two big obstacles to a peace conference: disagreement between Israel and Syria over the role of the United Nations and over whether a conference should periodically reconvene. But, the sources said, the

document includes on the agreement side of the ledger a general consensus on a formula for Israeli-Palestinian talks.

The formula, the sources said, envisions the creation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to negotiate with Israel. This formula would allow the parties to overcome problems that have caused plans for negotiations to break down in the past, such as the question of whether Palestinians from East Jerusalem or those associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization would participate.

Officials suggested that creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would allow the inclusion of Palestinians from Jordan who also have ties to the PLO or East Jerusalem. This might satisfy Israel's demand that the delegation not include Palestinians from the occupied territories with ties to the PLO, without alienating the Palestinian leadership.

The sources said that Baker had completed much work on this formula even before coming to the region and that aides to Baker and Shamir were working late into the night on details of the plan. Israeli officials stressed that the consensus reached by Baker and Shamir did not represent a solution to the problem of Palestinian representation, which has plagued the peace process for the last decade.

"I wouldn't say there is agreement on it, but they are discussing it in a positive spirit," one official said.

The decision to work on the document came as Baker's trip neared a conclusion without resolving the hurdles to the peace conference. U.S. officials were worried about the perception that U.S. Middle East diplomacy was foundering, while Israelis were concerned that Baker would abandon his diplomacy and publicly accuse Shamir's government of intransigence.

The fact that Baker was preparing a document outlining the positions of the two sides, an Israeli official said, shows that "the Americans did not give up on the process yet or decide that it's going nowhere. You don't draft a document if you are going to announce failure of the talks."

U.S. officials said the document was not intended to be a joint statement or agreement between the two countries, and that Israel was not being asked to make formal decisions about what went into it.

"We are simply spelling out areas of common understanding," said one official. "It's not intended to be used for anything other than making sure positions don't change. We are putting hard questions to them and putting the answers in writing."

The officials said that Baker has no illusions about reversing

Syria's hard-line position on a peace conference, and that he will return to Washington on Thursday to take stock of his effort and plot a new approach.

(END TEXT)

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אאא, חוזם: 15789

אל: רהמש/889

מ-: ווש, נר: 2080, תא: 150591, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: ממ'ד -ערב, איסוף

דע: לשכת סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ
מח' מצרים

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

הנדון: מצרים /טילים ארוכי טווח (לשלכם 2096)

טואלר (מח' מצרים N E A) ב- 15.5

1. תהה כיצד מידע אודות טילי הסקאד שהיה מסווג ביותר, הגיע לעיתון הלבנוני. סיפר כי המצרים יצרו קשר עם צפון קוריאה במגמה ליצר סקאד B. טואלר מאמין שהמצרים החליטו להקים קו ייצור, אך יסתפקו בקו ייצור מוגבל בשל מחסור בכסף. יורידו את משקל הרש'ק כדי להשיג טווח בן 500 ק"מ.

2. האמריקאים מודאגים מעט ושוחחו עם המצרים בנושא. המצרים טענו שטווח הטיל ומשקל הרש'ק תואמים את הגבלות ה-MTCR. עם זאת, כך טואלר, קיימת בעית מערכת ההנחיה שהינה מתוחכמת מאד.

3. ציין שדיק קלארק ביקר בקהיר, בדרכו לשיחות 'גאות' וגילה שהמצרים פתוחים מאד לתפיסה האמריקאית של ה-AC במזה'ת. טואלר מעריך שאם זו גישתם ניתן יהיה לדון בנושא טילי הסקאד במסגרת זו (שכן על פי התוכנית האמריקאית יאסר על החזקת טילי ק'ק בעלי טווח של למעלה מ- 90 מייל, י.א.).

4. אינו יכול לאמת שאר המידע שבשלכם, אמר שיתכן שהידיעות על כונה מצרית לבקש מהמפרציות 2 מיליארד דולר קשורות לתוכנית ראשונית להציב בחצי האי ערב שתי דיווזיות, בבחינת מילארד לדיווזיה.

5. אנא שמרו על חסיון המקור והמידע. תודה.

אמיתי

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), מרכזאיסוף, בנצור,
מצפא, סולטן, מצרים, ערב



15 במאי, 1991

מכתב/בלמ"ט

אל: מצפ"א

דע: שה"ח, ס/שה"ח, מנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, ממ"ד בינלי - ירושלים
שגריר, ציר מדיני, נספח צבאי, ציר כלכלי, ציר הסברה - וושינגטון

מאח: ציר קונגרס, נספח עבודה

הנדון: עם הפנים לנובמבר 1992

1. הניתוח להלן, מהווה המשך לסדרת דיווחים אשר התייחסו למערכת הבחירות של נובמבר 1990 והשלכותיה. כפי שצויין בדיווחים אלו, היוותה ההתמודדות ב-1990 חזרה כללית להצגה הגדולה של 1992. הניתוח אינו דן בבחירות לנשיאות הנראות, בשלב זה, כמופקדות בידי הנשיא בוש.

2. עיקרי הדברים:

- לבחירות 1992, תהייה השפעה רבה על המפה הפוליטית של ארה"ב בעשור הקרוב (לפחות), כמו גם על מרחב תמרונה של ישראל במבוך פוליטי זה (והשלכות הארגוניות הנגזרות מכך).

- הבחירות לסנאט ב-1992, מהוות מחזור בלתי שגרתי (בהשוואה ל-1990, 1988 וכו'), מבחינת הזעזועים הצפויים בקרב 35 הסנאטורים העומדים לבחירה מחודשת.

- סמיכות הזמנים בין המיפוי המחודש של אזורי הבחירה (Redistricting) לבין הבחירות לנשיאות, מחדדת עוד יותר את השפעתן של התנודות הגיאוגרפיות, הדמוגרפיות והפוליטיות המשמעותיות, ומבשרת אפשרות לתמורות מרחיקות לכת בביה"נ.

- יתכן, ו-100-150 מרוצי ביה"נ, יהיו צמודים/פתוחים ב-1992, לעומת 30-40 בשנה שגרתית.

- המיפוי המחודש של אזורי הבחירה, מהווה מקפצה לקידום משמעותי של ייצוג ההיספאנים והשחורים.

3. בחירות 1992 וישראל:

לבחירות 1992 תהייה השפעה מכרעת על המפה הפוליטית של ארה"ב (בעשור הקרוב לפחות) ברמה המקומית, המדינתית והפדרלית, על משקלן היחסי של שתי המפלגות הגדולות, על ההתמודדות המסורתית בין הזרוע המחוקקת למבצעת, על סדר העדיפויות הלאומי והמקומי, על מקומם של חקציב הבסחון



וסיוע החוץ בסדר היום התחיקתי והממשלי, ועל מקומה - ויכולת תמרונה - של ישראל במבוך פוליטי זה. שתי המפלגות נמצאות בעיצומו של תהליך שידוד מערכות רעיוני וארגוני, אשר החל לקראת בחירות 1990. התהליך נועד לאבחן התמורות הגיאוגרפיות, הדמוגרפיות והפוליטיות בארה"ב, ולהערך לקראת המערכה הקריטית של נובמבר 1992. בחינה יסודית של תמורות אלו, עשויה לתרום להגדרה מעודכנת של ציבורי היעד של ישראל בארה"ב, לריענון אפיקי ותכני התקשורת עם ציבורי יעד אלה ולהתאמה בין נתונים אלו לבין הערכותה של הנוכחות הישראלית בארה"ב.

4. המרוצים לסנאט:

- משך השנה (לפחות) הקודמת לבחירות, מוגדר גורלם של לפחות 10 מושבי סנאט כ"מוטלים בספק" (היקף "המועדון" וזהות חבריו משתנים מידי יום). כך הוגדרו ב-1990 מושביהם של הדמוקרטים פאל, סיימון, אקסון, הארקין, לוין וג'ונסטון והרפובליקנים האספילד, הלמס, מקקונול ופרסלר. למרות התחזיות, זכו כולם בבחירות וחלקם אף ברוב משכנע. Incumbent בודד הפסיד מקומו, והוא באשוויץ שהצטרף לליגת ה"מוטלים בספק" רק בשלב האחרון למרוץ.
- בבחירות ה"שגרתיות" של 1982, 1984, 1988 ו-1990 התמודדו 115 Incumbents ו-106 (92.1%) נבחרו מחדש.
- בבחירות ה"בלתי שגרתיות" של 1980 ו-1986, הפסידו מושביהם 20 סנאטורים (13 ו-7).
- ב-1980 התחילה "מהפכת רייגן", אשר כללה גם את הסתערות הימין השמרני הרפובליקני על הסנאטורים הליברלים הדמוקרטים. ב-1986 החיצבו מפחיעי/מנצחי 1980 הרפובליקנים לבחירות - מבלי שיהנו מן ה"טרמפ" הרייגני והאווירה האנטי דמוקרטית - ולא עמדו במבחן. תופעה דומה התרחשה אף ב-1982 בביה"נ, וגם שם נוצחו חלק מן המנצחים הרפובליקנים מ-1980.
- ב-1992, צפוי מחזור נוסף, "בלתי שגרתית", למנצחי 1986. מכיון שמרבית חברי המועדון ה"בלתי שגרתית" של 1986 הם דמוקרטים, ומכיון והברומטר הפוליטי הנוכחי נראה כאילו מאיר פניו למפ' הרפובליקנית, הרי שאפשר להניח כי (בתנאים של מאי 1991) צפויה לדמוקרטים מערכת בחירות קשה לסנאט.
- המתמודדים הדמוקרטים חוששים מהשפעה שלילית על סיכוייהם מכיוונו של המתמודד הדמוקרטי לנשיאות, הצפוי (בתנאי מאי 1991) לתבוסה קשה מידי של הנשיא בוש.



- הצבעת הדמוקרטים (להוציא את ברו, גראהם ושלבי) נגד ההרשאה לפתוח במלחמה נגד צדאם, עלולה להחמיר מצבם ביום הבחירות.
 - יחד עם זאת, ככל שמחעמעמים רישומי המלחמה במפרץ, ככל שמתקדרים ענני הספק בנחרצות הנצחון וככל שגובר משקל הנושאים הפנימיים והמשבר הכלכלי, כן גם מתעשת המחנה הדמוקרטי.
 - על הדמוקרטים בסנאט מעיקה העובדה כי 35 מרוצי 1992 מורכבים מ-20 מושבים דמוקרטים לעומת 15 רפובליקנים.
 - הדמוקרטים העומדים לבחירה: אדאמס, ברו, במפרט, קונראד, קרנסטון (פורש), דאשל, דיקסון, דאד, פורד, פאולר, גלן, גראהם, הולינגט, אינוייה, ליהי, מיקולסקי, ריד, סנפורד, שלבי ווורת'.
 - הרפובליקנים העומדים לבחירה: בונד, קואסט, ד'אמאסו, דול, גארן, גראסלי, קסטן, מקיין, מרקאוסקי, ניקלס, פאקווד, ראדמן, ספקטר, סימס, סימור (מונה ב-1990).
 - 7 המושבים הדמוקרטים ה"מוטלים בספק": מושבו המתפנה של קרנסטון (קליפורניה), וורת' (קולורדו), פאולר (ג'ורג'יה), סנפורד (צ' קרוליינה), הולינגט (ד' קרוליינה), אדאמס (אורגון), קונראד (צ' דקוטה).
 - 7 המושבים הרפובליקנים ה"מוטלים בספק": סימור (קליפורניה), ד'אמאסו (ניו-יורק), קסטן (וויסקונסין), קואסט (אינדיאנה), ספקטר (פנסילבניה), פאקווד (אורגון) וסימס (איידהו).
 - הסנאטורים הרפובליקנים דול, ראדמן וגארן עדין לא הכריזו רשמית על כוונות להתמודד ב-1992.
5. השפעות ספירת האוכלוסין והמיפוי המחודש של אזורי הבחירה:
- מערכת הבחירות ב-1992, היא היחידה עד 2012 המשלבת תוצאות מידיות של מיפוי-מחודש (Redistricting) ובחירות לנשיאות.
 - מטרת השנים האחרונות מלמדת, כי למועמד רפובליקני יש יתרון מסוים בהתמודדות על מושב פנוי או חדש. נצחון סוחף של הנשיא בוש, עשוי לטייע לרפובליקנים, אם כי בחירות 1988 ו-1990 המחישו המגבלות על השפעתו של בוש.



- 21 מדינות מפסידות או מרויחות מושבים, כתוצאה מספירת האוכלוסין המתקיימת מידי עשור. המשמעות היא כי 38 מושבי ביה"נ ינועו ממדינה למדינה.
- מרבית 435 אזורי הבחירה ישנו גבולותיהם במהלך הדיונים הפנים-מדינתיים (בין המושלים ובתי המחוקקים, ולעיתים אף במעורבות הזרוע המשפטית). המערכה על המיפוי המחודש חוצה קווים מפלגתיים, ומהווה עבור חלק מהנבחרים שאלת חיים או מוות פוליטית.
- המדינות המושפעות ביותר ע"י המיפוי המחודש:
- קליפורניה (7 או +8 מושבים; איזון בין מושל רפובליקני לבתי מחוקקים דמוקרטים ימנע "מיפוי דמוקרטי"), פלורידה (+4; המושל ובתי המחוקקים דמוקרטים, אך הבוחר הרפך לרפובליקני יותר), סקסס (+3; המושלת ובתי המחוקקים דמוקרטים, אך שת"פ בין הרפובליקנים, השמרנים הדמוקרטים והמיעוטים יתרום לאיזון), אריזונה (+1), ג'ורג'יה (1 או +2), צ'קרוליינה (+1), וירג'יניה (+1), וויסינגטון (+1), ניו-יורק (-3), אילינוי (-3), מישיגן (-2), אוהיו (-2), פנסילבניה (2 או -3), איובה (-1), וויסקונסין (-1), קנטס (-1), מסצ'וסטס (-1) וכו'.
6. השפעת ה- Grandfather Clause על מרוצי 1992 ופרישת Incumbents:
- לפי הרפורמה בחוק האתיקה מ-1989, ניתן היתר לצירי ביה"נ אשר נבחרו לפני 1980, לפרוש לפני בחירות 1992 ולהעביר את קופת הבחירות שלהם - לא יותר ממאזן 30.11.89 - לחשבונם הפרטי.
- ההערכה היא כי ההיתר אכן ימומש ע"י מספר צירי ביה"נ ותיקים, החוששים מכרסום מעמד ה-Incumbency, מהשפעה שלילית של המיפוי המחודש על סיכויי הבחירה שלהם, מהשלכות התנודות הדמוגרפיות והרעיוניות באזורי בחירתם, ואלו העיפים משגרת ה"גבעה" והרוצים לנצל ההיתר המפתה.
- מתוך 160 צירים הזכאים להנות מן ההיתר הנ"ל הצהירו 97 (באופן בלתי מחייב מבחינה חוקית!), שלא יפעלו למימושו. ההערכות המוקדמות הצביעו על 50-100 ממששים, ואילו ההערכה הנוכחית היא כי פרישתם של 20 (על רקע ההיתר הנ"ל), תהייה תופעה מרשימה בהיקפה הרחב.
- בנוסף לפורשים הפוטנציאליים הנ"ל, יתמודדו מספר צירי ביה"נ על מושבי הסנאט (לדוגמא: לוין, מסצ'וי, בוקסר, קמפבל, דורנאן, דננמאיר בקליפורניה) ומשרות אחרות. מושבים אחרים יתפנו ויבצבצו על רקע המיפוי המחודש ולאור פרישה סבעית מטעמים שונים (לדוגמא: יודול מאריזונה וברנד מג'ורג'יה). הציניקנים סוענים כי המשבר הכלכלי,



המאפיין את ארה"ב, תורם למיתון הרהורי הפרישה ממשרה בטוחה ומכובדת. המסקנה היא כי יתכן ש-150-100 מושבים (מסך 435) יהיו פנויים/צמודים ב-1992. המפלגה הרפובליקנית מתמקדת ב-170 אזורי בחירה המוגדרים על ידי כפנויים/צמודים.

- בעוד שמדי שנתיים מתרכזת תשומת הלב ב-40-30 מרוצים פנויים (ללא Incumbent) וצמודים, הרי שב-1992 צפויים 150-100 מרוצים כגון אלו, יותר מכל מערכת בחירות במאה הנוכחית.

7. השפעות המיפוי המחודש (Redistricting) על המועמדים ההיספאנים והאשורים:

- ייצוגן האתני ב"גבעה" של 15 מדינות יושפע ע"י התיקון לחוק זכויות האדם מ-1982 (Voting Rights Act), אשר קבע כי יש להתוות - ככל האפשר - אזורי בחירה המעניקים ייצוג הולם למיעוטים.

- בקליפורניה צפוי גידול של 1-3 מושבי ביה"נ למיעוט ההיספאני, בטקסס מדובר על אפשרות של 2 היספאנים ו-1 שחור, בפלורידה 1-היספאני ו-1 שחור, היספאני נוסף באריזונה, אולי אף (יתכן בסיוע הזרוע המשפטית) מושב היספאני באילינוי ומושב שחור נוסף בארקנסו, אלבמה, ג'ורג'יה, צ'וד' קרוליינה, וירג'יניה ומרילנד.

- 26 שחורים (4 מקליפורניה ו-4 מניו-יורק, 3 מאילינוי וכו') ו-12 היספאנים (4 מטקסס, 3 מקליפורניה וכו') מכהנים היום בביה"נ. לעומת זאת, ב-1978 נבחרו לביה"נ רק 15 שחורים.

- המפ' הרפובליקנית חותרת ליצירת אזורי בחירה של מיעוטים, כדי לכרסם בבטיט הכח של צירי ביה"נ דמוקרטים שאינם מיעוטים (הנהנים מתמיכה סוחפת של הבוחר ההיספאני והאשורי), וע"י כך להעניק יתרון למועמדים הרפובליקנים. לדוגמא התוית אזור היספאני-שחור ביוסטון יכולה ליצור 3 אזורים רפובליקנים. ראש החץ הרפובליקני, הוא היועץ המשפטי ל-RNC, בנג'מין גינזברג, המציין כי רק 6 מתוך 116 צירי ביה"נ ב"דרום העמוק" הם שחורים, בעוד שייצוגם באוכלוסיה הוא 17.4%. שותפים למאמציו הם בעלי ברית "מוזרים" כגון ה-NAACP השחור, ה-ACLU הליברל, וה-MALDEF ההיספאני.

- בעוד שהרפובליקנים שואפים לחוספת של כ-30 אזורי בחירה למיעוטים, מעריכים הדמוקרטים כי הגידול הריאלי יהיה כ-17.

אלי כהן-קגן

יורם אטינגר

BUSH: PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

(Transcript: Bush-Baker press remarks 5/17/91)

Washington -- After consulting with Secretary of State Baker on his latest mission to the Middle East, President Bush said May 17 there is "good reason" to be optimistic about the peace process.

Speaking briefly with reporters at the White House, Bush reiterated the U.S. commitment to "continue to work this process," emphasizing, "We're not about to stop....and progress has been made."

Following is the transcript of remarks by Bush and Baker:

(begin transcript)

BUSH: Let me just say that I've just received a full report from Secretary Baker on his travels to the Middle East. I've also been on the phone, as has Secretary Baker, with President Mubarak of Egypt. And my assessment after hearing the report from Secretary Baker is that there is real cause for optimism.

And we will continue to work this process. We're not about to stop. We're going to continue to do that. And progress has been made. And so, when you're working a problem this complicated, you just keep on plugging away. And as I said to some of you all yesterday or the day before, a lot of this has got to be conducted with quiet diplomacy.

It's a very difficult problem the secretary has been working. I thank him for this endless amount of travel he's put in. But the point I wanted to make, after assessing his report, is that there's reason for optimism. Good reason for optimism.

QUESTION: What is the reason?

BUSH: A lot of these things have to be quiet when you're talking about diplomacy.

Q: Why can't we have any reasons?

BUSH: You've got some. You can see what's already been done. Everybody was writing off Saudi Arabia earlier on, and the GCC countries have made a pretty good statement.

So there's plenty of reason. But I'm not going to go into any detail with you, because I've told you that the way to solve this conundrum is to not get these parties' position by public statements.

Q: Well, will there be a peace conference?

Q: What is the next step?

Q: Will Secretary Baker go on another trip?

Q: Mr. President, are you giving any thought to inviting them to a conference in Washington?

BUSH: We're going to keep on working it, from here, and if there's reason to go back, he will. It might kill him; been traveling all the time, but he's doing a first-class job on it.

Q: Are you going to invite anyone here?

Q: What about a Washington peace conference -- are you considering that still?

BUSH: That's a detail I'm not discussing -- along with all the other details I'm not discussing.

Q: Mr. President, is that window of opportunity that was opened after the Iraq war closing? Are you losing some of that advantage?

BUSH: I don't think so. I think the credibility of the United States is higher in the Middle East than it's ever been. I think it's still there. I don't think there's an erosion to it.

Q: Are you standing by 338 and 242? Do you continue to expect a path for peace?

BUSH: Well, that's -- the United States' position is there.

BAKER: Let me say something about 242 and 338, which is a very good question. The parties have -- the parties with whom we've been talking have agreed that the objective is a comprehensive settlement based on 242 and 338. And that represents, I think, a pretty important agreement. That doesn't bring you to a peace conference, because you've got to get agreement on everything before -- every last thing has to be agreed to before you can have a peace conference. But that first fundamental agreement has to be made. And it has been made.

Q: Well, Mr. Secretary, the parties don't even agree on what 242 and 338 require.

BAKER: If there was an agreement on what 242 required you wouldn't have to have a conference. You wouldn't even, indeed, have to have negotiations. That's what the negotiations are for -- is to determine exactly what's meant by 242.

Q: You're saying everyone's committed to those?

BAKER: To 242 and 338 --

(end transcript)

18197: חו"מ, אאא
אל: רהמ"ש/1041
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 343, תא: 170591, זח: 1536, דח: מ, סג: בל,
כבכ
בלמ"ס/מיירי

אל : תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות רושינגטון

PRESS STAKEOUT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR CAMP DAVID WHITE HOUSE SOUTH LAWN FRIDAY, MAY 17, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: LET ME JUST SAY THAT I'VE JUST RECEIVED A FULL REPORT FROM SECRETARY BAKER ON HIS TRAVELS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. I'VE ALSO BEEN ON THE PHONE, AS HAS SECRETARY BAKER, WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT. AND MY ASSESSMENT, AFTER HEARING THE REPORT FROM SECRETARY BAKER, IS THAT THERE IS REAL CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK THIS PROCESS. WE'RE NOT ABOUT TO STOP. WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE TO DO THAT. AND PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. AND SO WHEN YOU'RE WORKING A PROBLEM THIS COMPLICATED, YOU JUST KEEP ON PLUGGING AWAY. AND AS I SAID TO SOME OF YOU ALL YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE, A LOT OF THIS HAS GOT TO BE CONDUCTED WITH QUIET DIPLOMACY. IT'S A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM THAT THE SECRETARY'S BEEN WORKING. I THANK HIM FOR THIS ENDLESS AMOUNT OF TRAVEL HE'S PUT IN.

BUT THE POINT I WANTED TO MAKE, AFTER ASSESSING HIS REPORT, IS THAT THERE IS REASON FOR OPTIMISM. GOOD REASON FOR --

Q WELL WHAT IS THE REASON?

PRESIDENT BUSH: A LOT OF THESE THINGS HAVE TO BE QUIET WHEN YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT DIPLOMACY.

Q (WHY DO WE HAVE ?) -- (INAUDIBLE)?

PRESIDENT BUSH: YOU'VE GOT SOME. YOU CAN SEE WHAT'S ALREADY BEEN DONE. EVERYBODY WRITING OFF SAUDI ARABIA EARLIER ON, AND THE GCC COUNTRIES MADE A PRETTY GOOD STATEMENT. SO THERE'S PLENTY OF REASON, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO GO INTO ANY DETAIL WITH YOU, HELEN, BECAUSE I TOLD YOU THAT THE WAY TO SOLVE THIS CONUNDRUM IS TO NOT GET THESE PARTIES' POSITION BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

Q WELL, WE'LL NEVER BE ABLE --

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT'S THE NEXT STEP?

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WILL SECRETARY BAKER GO ON ANOTHER TRIP?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE'RE GOING TO KEEP ON WORKING IT, FROM HERE, AND IF THERE'S REASON TO GO BACK, HE WILL. IT MIGHT KILL HIM; HE'S BEEN TRAVELING ALL THE TIME, BUT HE'S DOING A FIRST CLASS JOB ON IT.

Q ARE YOU GOING TO INVITE ANYONE HERE?

Q WHAT ABOUT A WASHINGTON --

Q (ARE YOU CONSIDERING ?) A WASHINGTON PEACE CONFERENCE? ARE YOU CONSIDERING THAT STILL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT'S A DETAIL I'M NOT DISCUSSING.

Q MR. PRESIDENT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHER DETAILS I'M NOT DISCUSSING.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, IS THAT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, THAT WAS OPENED AFTER THE IRAQ WAR, CLOSING?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IS HIGHER IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAN IT'S EVER BEEN. I THINK IT'S STILL THERE, JIM. I DON'T THINK THERE'S AN EROSION TO

Q IS THERE GREATER OPTIMISM --

Q ARE YOU STANDING BY 338 AND 242?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THAT'S --

Q DO YOU SUPPORT --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- THE UNITED STATES POSITION IS THERE.

Q -- LAND FOR PEACE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: ANYBODY WANT TO ASK THE SECRETARY A QUESTION BEFORE I --

Q YEAH, I WANT TO.

SEC. BAKER: LET ME SAY SOMETHING --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- BEFORE WE FIRE THIS MACHINE UP. (REFERRING TO HELICOPTER.)

SEC. BAKER: -- ABOUT 242 AND 338, WHICH IS A VERY GOOD

QUESTION. THE PARTIES HAVE -- THE PARTIES WITH WHOM WE'VE BEEN TALKING HAVE AGREED THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON 242 AND 338. AND THAT REPRESENTS, I THINK, A PRETTY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. THAT DOESN'T BRING YOU TO A PEACE CONFERENCE, BECAUSE YOU'VE GOT TO GET AGREEMENT ON EVERYTHING BEFORE -- EVERY LAST THING HAS TO BE AGREED TO BEFORE YOU CAN HAVE A PEACE CONFERENCE. BUT THAT FIRST FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT HAS TO BE MADE, AND IT HAS BEEN MADE.

Q BUT, MR. SECRETARY, THE PARTIES DON'T EVEN AGREE ON WHAT 242 AND 338 REQUIRE.

SEC. BAKER: IF THEY -- IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT ON WHAT 242 REQUIRED, YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TO HAVE A CONFERENCE. YOU WOULDN'T EVEN, INDEED, HAVE TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT'S WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE FOR, IS TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT'S MEANT BY 242.

Q SO YOU'RE SAYING EVERYONE HAS --

Q MR. SECRETARY --

SEC. BAKER: TO 242 AND 338.

עתונות

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18137
אל: רהמש/1044
מ-: ווש, נר: 2091, תא: 170591, זח: 1530, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א, מצפ'א
מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

אומר אחד מאנשי הפמליה שחזר אמש עם המזכיר :-

(א) לא השגנו כל מה שרצינו אבל השגנו לא מעט וכייקר די מרוצה מהתוצאות בישראל ובירדן.

(ב) המזכיר שמח שהשיחות היו משותפות לה'ה שמיר, לוי וארנס, חבל שמאמצי הניסוח לא היו כל כך פורדוקטיביים. היתה תחושה של כאילו קושי לבטא את ההבנות במילים.

(ג) העיתונאים היו צינים מראש, בייקר עצמו בילה עימם זמן רב בגמר השיחות ובשעת הטיסה, אך לא הצליח לשכנעם והאווירה אצלם נשארה צינית, דבר שמצא ביטוי בכתיבתם.

(ד) התחושה כאילו הסורים בחוץ אינה לגמרי מוצדקת. נכון שהשיבו 'לא' לכל דבר, אבל אמרו עם זאת שהיו רוצים להיות 'בפנים'. מוקדם להספידם.

(ה) הירדנים רוצים את הסורים בפנים ואם בכל זאת ירצו לפרוש יבקשם חוסיין לדחות ככל האפשר את מועד הודעתם על פרישה. לשם כך הוא נוסע מחר לסוריה.

(ו) נושא המשכיות עודנו קשה (והוסיף: 'אם היתה בנקודה זו הבנה בין נושא השרים למזכיר, וזה יתכן, הרי אנו המלווים לא הוכנסנו בסוד הבנה זו').

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

BAKER EXPECTED TO ASK SHAMIR ABOUT BUILDUP
(5/15 WTimes article by Bill Gertz)

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE BY BILL GERTZ APPEARED ON PAGE A-3 OF THE MAY 15 WASHINGTON TIMES UNDER THE ABOVE HEADLINE.

(BEGIN TEXT)

Secretary of State James A. Baker III is expected to urge Israel to show restraint toward Syrian-backed militias following U.S. intelligence reports of an impending Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.

A State Department official said it would be "logical" for Mr. Baker to raise the issue during a meeting scheduled today with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Mr. Baker is in Jerusalem as part of U.S. efforts to broker an international peace conference.

Publicly, White House and State Department spokesman declined to comment on a report in The Washington Times yesterday that Israeli military forces are poised to take large-scale military action against Syrian-backed militias and terrorist groups in Lebanon.

State Department deputy spokesman Richard Boucher, citing the department's policy on intelligence matters, would neither confirm nor deny the report. Asked about reports of growing tension in the region, Mr. Boucher said the administration is keeping in close contact with governments in the region.

"We've spoken before about the cycle of violence that continues and that we think should come to an end," Mr. Boucher said. He added that the United States supports the 1989 Taif accord calling for the disarming of Lebanon's warring factions.

Mr. Baker met with Lebanon's foreign minister in Egypt earlier this week.

The Israelis, according to U.S. officials, are concerned that Christian and Druze militias have agreed to disarm but that Palestinian and pro-Iranian Hezbollah armed forces are refusing.

A State Department Middle East affairs specialist said the administration is very concerned about any Israeli moves against Lebanon and is continuing to urge the Israelis not to take military action.

The administration also is urging all factions in Lebanon not

to conduct attacks or military action against Israel, the official said.

"The proof is in the pudding as far as what the Israelis are doing and not doing," the official said. "And right now they're not doing anything and that's good."

Asked about progress toward a regional peace conference in the Middle East, President Bush said yesterday he does not regard Syria's refusal to participate in a peace conference as a failure of U.S. diplomacy.

"I wouldn't say it's a failure," Mr. Bush told reporters. "Everybody that's ever dealt with the Middle East knows that there are ups and downs in the process, but I'm not discouraged."

Mr. Bush said he would like Syrian President Hafez Assad to accept Mr. Baker's offer for Syria to join the international peace conference, "but we'll just keep working on this."

"I can't give you a very optimistic report, but I'm about where I was last week to say there's room for optimism," Mr. Bush said.

The president declined to go into details about the negotiations for the peace conference "at this critical time."

An Israeli Defense Forces official told a U.S. military attache in Israel last week that the Israelis view the situation in south Lebanon as "intolerable."

The officials also said Lebanese-based terrorists are preparing a seaborne attack on Israel, which could prompt the Israelis to retaliate with a large military strike. U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that the Israelis could mobilize a brigade -- up to 4,000 troops -- on short notice.

(END TEXT)

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אאא, חוזם: 5854
אל: רהמש/354
מ-: ווש, נר: 2042, חא: 060591, זח: 1900, דח: ב, סג: סו,
ככב
סודי/בהול

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: לשכ' שה'ח, לשכ' רוה'מ

מאת: לשכ' השגריר, וושינגטון

ביקור המזכיר

משיחה במחמ'ד (061820)

טרם סוכמו סופית הפרטים השונים בביקור המזכיר. ממתנינים לחשובות לכמה מהצעותיהם שנשלחו למדינות השונות.

לפיכך, מדובר במידע ראשוני בלבד.

2 לוח זמנים:

יום ו' 10.5 בערב - יציאה מווינגטון
שבת 11.5 - יום א' 12.5 בערב - דמשק, תחנה ראשונה.
יום א' 12.5 בערב - יום ג' בבוקר-קהיר. השיחות יתקיימו ביום ב'.
יום ג' 14.5 - יום שיחות בירדן.

יום ג' 14.5 אחרה'צ המאוחר או בערב- הגעה לישראל.
יום ד' 15.5 - יום ה' 16.5 בבוקר-שהות בישראל.

השיחות בארץ יתקיימו ביום ד'.

בחשובה לשאלה, ציין שקבלו מידע ששה'ח יהיה באירופה ביום ג' אך לוח הזמנים של המזכיר מחייב חזרתו לארה'ב לפני סוף השבוע. מקווים לפגוש השר ביום ד'.

הוסיף שהשגריר בראון במגעים עמנו בנושא.

4. מקווים לארגן פגישה עם שה'ח בריה'מ בקהיר. ציין שעוד בפגישה הקודמת בין השניים סכמו שישובו ויפגשו.

5. הרכב הנוסעים כבעבר.

6. סיים כרגיל בבקשה שלא נפרסם המידע דלעיל.

לשכ' שגריר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), כנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14046
אל: רהמש/790
מ-: המשרד, תא: 140591, זח: 1726, דח: מ, סג: סו,
כבכ
107108
סודי/מידי

אל: בריסל
ס/רה'מ ושה'ח

א) מוקדם אחה'צ התקשר אלי בראון להודיעני שהמזכיר ופמליתו יבואו ביבשה
ך הגשר ולא במטוס לנמל בן-גוריון. בראון הוסיף שאין צורך שנציגי ישראל
קדמו פני המזכיר בגשר. גם סגנו פאריס אמר דברים דומים ללמדן.

ב) אחרי הטיפול בסידורים הטכניים באמצעות משרד הבטחון הודענו לשגרירות
ארה"ב שראש הטקס ומנהל מצפ'א יקבלו פני המזכיר בגשר ושלישראל תהיה, חד
משמעית, נציגות רשמית בגשר בבוא המזכיר ופמלייתו. זאת למרות בקשתם שלא
תהיה נוכחות ישראלית רשמית במקום.

בנצור
14 במאי 1991

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא,
רביב, מאור, טקס

BAKER TELLS REPORTERS OF HIS TRIP TO WEST BANK

Jerusalem -- Following is the transcript of Secretary of State Baker's responses to questions by reporters about his trip to the Israeli occupied West Bank. Baker made the remarks before his talks with the Palestinian representatives:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, did that drive across the West Bank give you any greater appreciation of the stakes for this meeting?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I think it does. You realize when you drive like that, rather than flying, just how short the distances are and how important, therefore, it is to promote peaceful coexistence.

Q: Is it significant, sir, that you drove through largely Palestinian areas?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well we did drive through Palestinian areas -- of course -- we drove through Jericho, and we drove through the West Bank, and we decided to do that so we could get a better feel for exactly what the situation on the ground is.

Q: Were you surprised by the size of the settlements you saw -- the Jewish settlements?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, I had seen those before. I had flown over a number of those by helicopter.

Q: Thank you.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE MEETS WITH BAKER

Jerusalem -- Following is the transcript of remarks of Palestinian representative Faisal Hussein May 14, after his meeting with Secretary of State Baker:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Mr. Hussein: Just a moment, I will give you my statement. It will be my statement, not to answer your questions. It is you who will hear my statement. Okay.

This second we have just finished a long meeting of three hours which was a frank meeting -- an extremely frank meeting -- which we discussed through it the most difficult issues. We understand, or we know now, more the American position. We will deliver this position to the Palestinian decision-maker, and then after that and after discussing it we will find a way to implement the desire, and the real desire, of the Palestinian people -- the leadership and the people -- to push the peace process forward, to implement a comprehensive peace, and a just one. So we hope that we will be able to overcome some obstacles which is facing now, not because of us, but because of others. But in the same time, I can say that the Palestinian leadership is proving flexibility and in the same time, insists to reach to a comprehensive peace in the area. We hope that the Israel people will understand this position of the Palestinians, and make something to make pressure on (their) own government to let them be also having the same position and the same flexibility toward peace. Thank you.

Q: Did you discuss national representation?

A: (no response)

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER SEES CHANCE FOR DIRECT ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS

(Transcript: Baker, Levy remarks, 5/16/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State James Baker, ending his fourth Middle East mission since the end of the Gulf war, said there is "a chance to produce a process which can result in direct negotiations" between Israel and Arab states, and Israel and Palestinians.

"I still believe that a peace process is possible... There is a very, very broad range of issues with respect to which there is agreement," Baker told reporters May 16, before flying home to Washington.

Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, who joined Baker at the Ben Gurion international airport news conference, expressed satisfaction that "progress is being made toward shared understandings among all."

"The steps being taken toward peace are more beautiful, more commendable, more remarkable than any preparations that can possibly be made for war," Levy said.

Following is the transcript of the joint news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me thank the Minister and the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister for the time which they have given us during the course of the last two days to permit us to work very hard toward the development of a process for peace. I think we have been able to substantially clarify and obtain clearly better understandings of the broad areas of agreement, and we have been able to clarify as well the rather few areas with respect to which there is still some disagreement.

I plan now to return to Washington directly from here, and I hope to be able to consult tomorrow with President Bush and to brief him in full on where I think this process now is. I believe that there is a chance to produce a process which can result in direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states, and between Israel and Palestinians.

There are, of course, issues -- remaining issues -- that have to be resolved, and there is additional work, I think, that has to be done if we are to be able to achieve that goal. But we have had some very useful and good discussions over the course of the past two days, for which I thank the government of Israel.

MINISTER LEVY: Mr. Secretary of State, you are returning now to your home, to the United States, after hard work, but I

trust it will be a fruitful endeavor. The fruitful endeavor will be in the form of a chance of peace to this area which has suffered so many wars. We discussed various ideas and the elements which are part of this initiative. We devoted considerable time to several notions which will undoubtedly help us progress toward this goal. We are pleased with the progress, and we support your efforts to continue along the lines of the effort you have assumed responsibility for. Whatever we do for the sake of promoting these understandings was done in an atmosphere that was sometimes not all that good, but now I am pleased that progress is being made toward shared understandings among all of us. We were in need of a great deal of patience and perseverance, and in both these regards I believe that our determination proved very evident. Now what is needed for the Arab states to prove their determination and their aspiration for a meeting which will involve direct negotiations in the interest of solving a conflict which has been long and brutal. True, there are other issues to be dealt with still, but do not think that the difficulties are immense as it may seem. As you yourself said, we have made a great deal of progress, more than what still lies ahead.

A year ago I was in Washington representing my government. We had frank and candid talks about our goals, and I am pleased that the talks proved that the way ahead of us will be a viable one for the both of moving toward real progress.

As we approach the eve of a Jewish holiday, we pray that just

as we received the Torah, the sacred Bible, on that holiday, so tomorrow will our prayers be answered. Our efforts will not have been in vain, and this road will lead us to the one awaited peace which we all pray for. And let us wish all of us a great deal of faith, perseverance and success.

Q: Mr. Secretary, after your talks in Jerusalem, do you believe now that there will be soon some kind of peace conference in the Middle East, and do you know now who the participants will be?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we cannot know today who the participants might be. Of course, we are very hopeful that there can be a peace conference. That is an objective that we share. That is an objective, I think, that is shared as well by others, and we intend to continue working toward that end.

Q: At the conference, will there be any role, even a token role, to the United Nations, or is this still a stumbling block? And what about the role, what about the participation of Syria?

MINISTER LEVY: We agreed not to give any specific details, but clearly Syria must prove its willingness to participate. We intend at long last to enter into further progress on this process despite the many stumbling blocks since we have overcome many stumbling blocks already. Let us not seek pretext -- let Syria not seek pretext for impeding this process. We have done everything possible to help it along. Let Syria help the process along, as well, for its benefit and for the benefit of the entire region. Israel has proven willing to do so.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if we take Israel at its work that it feels the United Nations will show bias at a peace conference, what can the United States do to allay these fears so things can get moving already.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think one thing that could be done is to make it clear, as we have in our discussions with all countries, including Israel, that a peace conference would not be convened with the authority to impose solutions or to veto results or to command the parties. That is not the purpose of the conference we have in mind. The purpose of the conference we have in mind is to launch direct negotiations between the parties. And I might say that this understanding of the purpose of the conference is shared as far as I can determine by all the countries with whom I have discussed the matter.

Q: Mr. Baker, you've been here four times now. You haven't been able to get the parties to the peace table. Have you failed? Are you disappointed? And who's to blame?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I am not disappointed, because I do think that we are making progress. When you consider that as we embarked upon this trip, for the first time ever we had Arab governments evidencing a willingness to sit with Israel in direct discussions, face-to-face. And I'm speaking, of course, about the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

I still believe that a peace process is possible, and I should point out that as we indicated when I spoke outside the Prime Minister's office earlier today, there is a very, very broad range of issues with respect to which there is agreement. There are, yes, some issues still out there to be resolved, and you're not going to have a conference until those issues are resolved. And, of course, it goes without saying that you're not going to have a conference until the countries that are the participants in such conference make a firm decision that this is what they want, and take the decision to move forward.

Q: Mr. Baker, are you satisfied with Israel's reply about a U.N. role --

MINISTER LEVY: The Prime Minister of Israel, who is responsible for making peace with Egypt, Menachim Begin, once uttered a sentence which should reverberate in the ears of all those who wish to promote peace in the world. "Wars can be prevented. Peace is inevitable." And I should like to add something. With respect to the question that was asked to Secretary of State Baker as to whether he feels bad about the fact that progress has not been sufficient, fortunate is the man who works for peace. Better to be accused to working for peace than to sit by idly. The steps being taken toward peace are more beautiful, more commendable, more remarkable than any preparations that can possibly be made for war.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

NNNN

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(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER REPORTS MORE AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT

(Text: Baker, Shamir remarks, 5/16/71)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State James Baker reported there was more agreement than disagreement on the Middle East peace process. He made his assessment May 16, during a joint news conference with Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir following their meeting in Jerusalem.

"I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about," Secretary Baker said.

Baker said there are "many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement."

The "only two areas of continuing disagreement" between the United States and Israel are the questions of the role of the United Nations in the peace process and the "extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of the parties," Baker noted.

The following is a transcript of Baker's and Shamir's remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: The Prime Minister has asked me to begin and I'm very pleased to do that. I would like to begin by thanking him for all of the time that he has made available and by thanking as well the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister for the time that they have made available for these consultations.

We met, as you know, yesterday, for a considerable period of time, the four of us, and we have met again today. I think we've had some very, very good and very useful discussion. I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process that we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of, the remaining areas, of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about.

And having said that, let me say that I think, as I have indicated to those of you travelling with me, that there are many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement.

I intend to return to the United States. I hope to be able to meet with President Bush tomorrow to give him a full briefing on where I think we are and where I think this process stands, and we will together, of course, decide what our next steps are. Let me say that I think we have a much cleaner and much better understanding of the range of agreement -- and it is extensive -- as well as a much cleaner and better understanding of the few areas with respect to which there is still disagreement.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. It was a great pleasure to work together with the secretary of state for many hours yesterday and today and to invest many efforts in the success -- I think it will be success -- of the peace process. And we will continue our work. We are sure that the secretary will continue his great efforts and I wish him, and ourselves, full success and positive results in getting this peace process to a successful end.

Thank You.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what are the remaining areas of disagreement, please?

SECRETARY BAKER: There remains to be resolved the question of the role, if any, of the United Nations in the process; and the question of the extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of all the parties. Those are the only two areas that I am aware of, of continuing disagreement. Now the foreign minister has been engaged in active consultations with the European community. And those consultations and discussions, as I understand it, will be continuing.

NNNN

BAKER REPORTS MORE AGREEMENT THAN DISAGREEMENT

(Text: Baker, Shamir remarks, 5/16/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State James Baker reported there was more agreement than disagreement on the Middle East peace process. He made his assessment May 16, during a joint news conference with Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir following their meeting in Jerusalem.

"I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about," Secretary Baker said.

Baker said there are "many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement."

The "only two areas of continuing disagreement" between the United States and Israel are the questions of the role of the United Nations in the peace process and the "extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of the parties," Baker noted.

The following is a transcript of Baker's and Shamir's remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: The Prime Minister has asked me to begin and I'm very pleased to do that. I would like to begin by thanking him for all of the time that he has made available and by thanking as well the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister for the time that they have made available for these consultations.

We met, as you know, yesterday, for a considerable period of time, the four of us, and we have met again today. I think we've had some very, very good and very useful discussion. I think we have been able to clarify considerably those areas of understanding between the United States and Israel with respect to the exact nature of the process that we have been discussing. I think we've also been able to clarify the areas of, the remaining areas, of disagreement with respect to the process that we are working to bring about.

And having said that, let me say that I think, as I have indicated to those of you travelling with me, that there are many more areas of agreement with respect to this process on the part of Israel, and indeed on the part of many Arab governments, than there are areas of disagreement.

I intend to return to the United States. I hope to be able to meet with President Bush tomorrow to give him a full briefing on where I think we are and where I think this process stands, and we will together, of course, decide what our next steps are. Let me say that I think we have a much cleaner and much better understanding of the range of agreement -- and it is extensive -- as well as a much cleaner and better understanding of the few areas with respect to which there is still disagreement.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. It was a great pleasure to work together with the secretary of state for many hours yesterday and today and to invest many efforts in the success -- I think it will be success -- of the peace process. And we will continue our work. We are sure that the secretary will continue his great efforts and I wish him, and ourselves, full success and positive results in getting this peace process to a successful end.

Thank You.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what are the remaining areas of disagreement, please?


SECRETARY BAKER: There remains to be resolved the question of the role, if any, of the United Nations in the process; and the question of the extent to which any conference might reconvene with the consent of all the parties. Those are the only two areas that I am aware of, of continuing disagreement. Now the foreign minister has been engaged in active consultations with the European community. And those consultations and discussions, as I understand it, will be continuing.

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222 - סמחון

בלמי'ס/בהול (לא להזעיק)
אל: סטנכיל צ'מ'א וסר'ן
דע: מקש'ח מסחב'ס
מאת: העג'ריות, ורשינגטון.

1/23
2/21
1. אלוניניטי
2. 2/21



יזמת הנשיא בוש בנושא הנשק הכימי.

1. רצ'ב הודעה שפרסם הנשיא (13.1) ובה פירט יוזמתו בנושא הנשק הכימי. שני החידושים בעמדה האמריקאית הם:
 ויתור על שני אחוזים הנותרים (בהו'ם 10 שנים מיום כניסת האמנה לתוקף) ויתור על זכות תגובה (retaliation) בנשק כימי. שינויים אלו נועדו לחסיר שני ממשולים בדרך לסיומם המהיר של הדיונים על האמנה.
2. עוד אומר הנשיא כי ארה'ב תבקש לכלול באמנה סעיף שיאסור על חברות לסחור בחומרים כימיים עם מדינות שלא הצטרפנה. ארה'ב קובע הנשיא תטיל סנקציות (WILL IMPOSE ALL APROPRIATE SANCTION) כתגובה להפרות של האמנה ובמיוחד במקרה של שימוש בנשק כימי.
 בהודעתו מפרט הנשיא שורת צעדים עליהם מתכוונת ממשלת ארה'ב להודיע בפתחה מושב האביב (14/5) של ה-CD.
3. בעקבות פרסום יזמת הנשיא נערך הדרך רגע לעיתונאים (רצ'ב)
4. יום לאחר פרסום הודעת הנשיא התפרסם בניו יורק טיימס (14.5) כתבה (רצ'ב) בנושא לעיל הכוללת גם התייחסות לקטעים מתוך תכנית הממשל ל-AC במזה'ת שעליה עתיד הנשיא להודיע פוטבית (ככל הנראה לאחר שובו של המזכיר מסיוור במזה'ת).
5. מקידי ממשל (עלומי שם) מסרו לכתב העיהון הנקודות העיקריות הכוללות בתכנית:
 א. הצטרפות מדינות ערב לאמנה הכימית כאשר בשלב ראשון יתירו מדינות המזה'ת ביקורת לקבוע נוחלי אימות לפני סיום הדיונים על האמנה וכניסתה לתוקף.
 ב. ותסכים לכחונות (קרי פיקוח) על מתקנה הגרעיני בדימונה וזאת כצעד ראשון לקראת חקמת איזור מסורז ונשק גרעיני במזה'ת.
 ג. איסור על החזקת טיליבטק'ק בעלי טווח של למעלה מ-90 מייל. במידה ויתקלו בקשיים ביישום הכניחתם יש כונח לאסור ניסוי והצבה של טילי טק'ק חדשים.
 ד. קריאה לחמש הקבועות לרווח על טכירות נשק קרובנציונאלי למזה'ת.

שטיין.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the name 'שטיין' (Stein) and other illegible text.

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result of that war that allows you to take this step, that you saw that there was no intention of using chemical weapons; or they were ineffective -- what was the experience of this war that said we can go ahead to this, we can foreswear retaliation?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say before I turn the podium over that while you've been facing this way we've been watching Madonna, but it's over now. (Laughter.)

Q What was her bi-lateral position? (Laughter.)

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try again. Without Maddona maybe I'll do better. I think what was suggested earlier is there is an effort made to make clear -- to not take options off the table with respect to Saddam Hussein. I think there's a premise in your questions that somehow we learned something and made some conclusions based on the Gulf, and that that was somehow pivotal in the changed position, and -- I stand to be corrected by my colleagues -- I think that is not the case.

I think what you really had is a judgement that our objective was one, a CWC, and two, a CWC that would maximize incentives for people to join and disincentives if they didn't. We thought this 2 percent device in preserving the right of retaliation was a way to do that, that we could both get a CWC and if it were a feature of the CWC, it would provide real incentives to get countries on board. And we concluded that whatever the brilliance of the device, it was not working and indeed had become a barrier to getting a CWC.

So what the President has decided basically is to come around from another angle. First we've got to get the CWC and try and build in a different set of incentives and disincentives that will try and get maximum participation in the CWC. So I think it's a different approach to that objective.

There are views you can hear all over town about why Saddam did or did not, whether he was prepared, whether he was not prepared to use CW, what we would have done had he used it. The fact is we didn't have to come to definitive judgments on those decisions. Blessedly enough the President wasn't faced with that decision. And hopefully, if we get the kind of CWC we want, a future president won't be either.

Q Thank you.

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serves US security interests and the interests of international peace and stability than continuing to insist on a right of retaliation if it looks as though that is an obstacle to achieving that chemical weapons convention.

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Q So the right if retaliation is blocked by this?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Leo, Leo, hold it. I'm going to take two last questions, Leo --

Q Can I just follow up on this?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is a a running diatribe. Leo, we'll take your question and we'll have one more.

Q All right. Isn't the right of retaliation barred by CWC? Therefore, aren't you forswearing something that you'd be required under the treaty to do anyway?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, an issue under negotiation -- and indeed in dispute -- in Geneva is precisely whether chemical weapon states would retain the right to retaliate with CW so long as they had CW stocks. What the President has announced today is that the United States will forswear the right of CW retaliation. So that from the US point of view -- in Geneva, now -- that is no longer an issue, it is a change.

Q But, at the same time, tomorrow aren't you going to propose a provision in the prospective treaty that would also require other countries not to retaliate either?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q So therefore, you're proposing a kind of a treaty that would require you not to retaliate, right?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's exactly right. We are proposing -- we will change our position in Geneva from one in which chemical weapon states would be allowed to retaliate to one in which no state would be allowed to retaliate.

Q So, less a unilateral thing by us, it would be a requirement.

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is both. The President announced that the US will forswear CW use for any reason, including retaliation. He at the same time has called upon other states to follow the same prohibition, and our delegation in Geneva will be proposing a treaty provision to that effect.

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay Charles, take the last question.

Q I need to come back to the Iraq War, although it gave Mr. Hadley (sp) some difficulties. If you could be in some way more specific as to whether there was something that you learned as a

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, no. Purely artifactual. On the contrary.

Q On the contrary?

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Q If I could go back to a question that a number of us have tried and have not, I don't think, gotten an answer. During the Gulf War, at one point, Governor Sununu seemed -- excuse me -- at one point, Governor Sununu seemed to rule out retaliation with chemical weapons. Immediately, there was speculation he had goofed by ruling it off the table. The President, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all came in and made it very clear that we would rule out nothing, including use of chemical weapons, if Saddam Hussein were to use them.

What I think a lot of us are trying to understand is why now do we suddenly think we don't need that threat? What changed our mind?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Remember what our objective is, and the relationship between dropping the right of retaliation with respect to achieving that objective. Our objective is to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons through the vehicle of the chemical weapons convention. The US is prepared to forswear the use of chemical weapons, including in retaliation against chemical weapons attacks, when the chemical weapons convention enters into force. It's not effective immediately. It's effective when --

Q But do you do anything else under the CWC as he proposed it?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Let -- I mean, it's a way to create another incentive to complete an effective chemical weapons convention as early as possible.

Q You have the possibility that -- I would think the likelihood -- that Iraq is not likely to sign this.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would not -- I would not speculate on that at all. Particularly in the wake of the Gulf war, particularly in the wake of UN Resolution 687 and the provisions under 687 for the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it seems to me that Iraq has a very strong incentive.

Q To put it in a different context, you certainly have the possibility that the treaty will enter into force at a time when somebody who either has chemical weapons or is capable of making them is not a signatory, where we would be in exactly the same position we were in during the Gulf War, where somebody might be threatening to use them and we would now have forsworn the retaliation. Why do we now think we can do when we clearly didn't during the Gulf War? What have we learned?

SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that the security environment in which we would be operating, and the context of an effective chemical weapons convention, once it's entered into force, combined with our other military capabilities, on balance better

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Q Yes, but except for dropping the two percent issue, did somebody come to him and say, "This would be a good time to do it?" or --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm obviously not going to get into a discussion about who said what to whom when.

Q How many countries do you think have chemical weapons?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 countries either have chemical weapons or the capability to produce them.

Q Frequently when the administration has something --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's an estimate that Director of Central Intelligence Webster has given.

Q Are they all involved in the Geneva talks?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q Are all 20 countries among the 40 involved in the Geneva talks, or 39?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I don't want to do a crosswalk.

Q Can we get a list of the 39 though?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We can certainly provide you with a list of the participants in the conference on disarmament.

Q Did I understand your remarks to say --

Q But the list doesn't specify countries that may be CW capable, and this --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Let me be clear that the purpose of the convention is not simply to gain the adherence of those countries that happen to be in Geneva negotiating it. The goal of the convention is universal adherence.

Q Frequently when the administration has a change of position that they want to call attention to, someone speaks about it publicly, the President or a Cabinet officer or something, and yet today, the President is at Camp David, you're speaking on background. Why, if this is a significant development, is no one speaking publicly about this?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It's an artifact of the President's schedule, and the changes in his schedule. Purely artifactual.

Q (Off mike.)

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 dest=swh,mwh,chemwar,armscont,defense,forpolus,iraq,tchass
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Q What about the nuclear weapons issue as it relates to CW ban? The underlying premise of the Geneva negotiations was that the major powers, the nuclear powers, would make corresponding efforts to denuclearize. There is no mention of any of this in either the President's statement or the fact sheet. Aren't you still going to run up against what you called a stumbling block, or (bedrock?) or whatever it may be, where third world countries say, "Okay, why should we give up chemical weapons when you keep nuclear weapons?"

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Let me make some initial comments, and ask my colleagues also to respond. The chemical weapons convention is about chemical weapons. The nonproliferation treaty, which draws a clear distinction between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers, deals with that subject. If countries want to find an excuse or a pretext to -- not to participate in the global ban on chemical weapons, there are a variety of pretexts available. I suppose they can seize on that one, too. But it's a pretext, it's not a reason.

Q What is the current status of the US chemical weapons stockpile? US chemical weapons, what's the current status? Are any of them being destroyed or anything? Are we looking towards that, or is it we're just holding onto them and waiting?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The US is beginning to destroy some of its chemical weapons now, so-called older unitary stocks, and the destruction right now is being carried on at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific.

Q Along those same lines, could you give sort of a ranking of which countries are the largest holders of chemical weapons stocks now?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. The only two countries that have declared they have CW stocks in the context of the negotiations in Geneva are the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe that many more countries either have chemical weapons or have the capability to produce them.

Q Are there any countries that you think are major CW holders that aren't among the 39 that are participating in these talks?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's not an issue I can get into.

Q Did the President himself initiate this change in position, or was it recommended to him?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The President's commitment to ban chemical weapons is longstanding, personal and deeply felt. He didn't need anybody to give him this idea.

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involved in the CWC who have said that they are engaged in this negotiation with the intent not to reach an agreement. They have all indicated that they're trying to work towards an agreement. There are some differences among nations. For example, we take an "anytime, anywhere" approach to inspections. There are some countries that have been far more less forthcoming in this regard.

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So, there are a number of issues like that out there. There are differences on the question of how we organize the body. But I don't think those are show-stoppers. The show-stoppers are going to be if you've got a country out there that wants chemical weapons or has chemical weapons and is intent upon keeping them, and they haven't identified themselves yet.

Q What about --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Can I say -- add a footnote to that? If other nations are willing to show even a part of the will to change positions and compromise that is represented by the President's decisions to drop the right of retaliation, to go to zero in 10 years without conditions, then we will have achieved our main purpose, which is to accelerate the negotiations and get this treaty done. I think it has to be seen in that context.

Part of what we're trying to do here is get other people ready to give up some pet rocks. When you have 40 nations, there are pet rocks in negotiations as to this detail or that detail inevitably, including with the observers. And I think we have to have a full appreciation -- I know that other nations will -- even from the beginning of the consultations that we've had, of the far-reaching nature of these decisions; more than that, what they connote in terms of the willingness of the United States to compromise the changed positions to get it done. And I think it gives us a right to call on the other nations to act in kind.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There was a lot of discussion about that issue. I think two things are clear. One, the President has basically said, through this initiative, that is a situation we don't want to have to be in. What we want is a CWC that is going to get rid of these things off the face of the earth. Two, -I think - nobody really knows what deterred Saddam Hussein. There's a lot of speculation, there's a lot of argument you can make. I don't think anybody really knows and I'm not aware of a definitive judgment. Others may have one. And three, in terms of the bottom-line decision as to what we would have done had CW been used, that was a choice, blessedly, that the President was not faced with. And again, I don't think there is broad-scale conclusions that have been reached on that. I think there's a lot of speculation and discussion, and I think the thing that has motivated this change is the one I described, a different strategy for obtaining broad-scale participation in the CWC.

Q (Inaudible) -- that saying ahead of time that we will not retaliate and you use chemical weapons, that this might give somebody a free hand to use chemical weapons, that it might be -- you know, and then the same argument about why you don't have no-first-use for nuclear weapons?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the goal of this of course is to get a CWC that has the kinds of incentives and disincentives in it so that you get broad-scale participation, so that in fact the President's objective is achieved -- a ban on CW. You get a ban on CW, you don't have to deal with these issues, and that's clearly where the President is trying to head.

Q I assume that Iraq is one of the countries that's a problem at the talks. What other countries are stumbling blocks?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Do you want to speak to that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, let me say what I said before. I think if there are going to be stumbling blocks we're going to find out fairly soon. But what we are making clear is that we have consulted closely with quite a number of nations around the world, both in Geneva and in capitals, we think this is a way to break through any blockages, and if there are going to be new issues out there that are going to be obstacles, we should find out soon. But it is our hope that in fact this will get us on the right path.

Q Which countries have been the most, you know, unwilling -- to come around so far?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well --

Q The United States and the Soviet Union have been pushing some of these --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There are no nations that I am aware of

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Q I'd like to get back to this change of heart.

Q Can you spell his name?

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: L-e-d-o-g-a-r.

Q Thank you.

Q I'd like to get back to this change of heart. During the war with Iraq, did the administration decide that chemical weapons or the threat of use of chemical weapons were no longer needed as a deterrent, or whether to use them even in retaliation would be politically unacceptable?

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: I think I'm going to let -- (name of briefer deleted) -- answer that.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: I think by way of context, what motivated the change is the following. The 2 percent rule was designed as a device to encourage broad-scale participation in the CWC, and it was going to reassure some friends and also, hopefully, put some pressure on potential CW-capable states outside the convention to join, because basically, they would have to join before, in fact, there really would be a global ban. So it was conceived as a device to encourage participation in the CWC, and as various people have said up here, it did not appear to be accomplishing that objective.

And what the President decided was that still remained a very important objective but it is an objective that we are going to approach and pursue in a different way, with a balance of incentives to join and disincentives for those states that do not. But the objective is really the same. If we want to get a CWC convention, you've got to have a convention before this regime can go into place, and the kind of legal prohibitions -- (name of briefer deleted) -- was talking about in effect.

And secondly, we want broad-scale participation in the CWC, and a number of the things in the President's initiative today, both hortatory and also in terms of the kinds of provisions he is going to seek in the CWC, are supposed to -- are going to try and give a new and, hopefully, effective incentive -- incentives and disincentives.

I think it is that, much more the tactics of what we need to get a good CWC and to work the participation issue, rather than any conclusions about the Persian Gulf War.

Q Can you deal with that Gulf question, though? Was there some determination or conclusion or calculation made that using chemical weapons in the Gulf War, even in retaliation to Iraq using chemical weapons, would have been politically unwise and militarily futile? In other words, has there been some broad conclusion that chemical weapons don't get you that much militarily even in retaliation?

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SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: No, no. I'm --

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Q This came from the Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements Report.

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SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Well, let me say with respect to the biological weapons convention, as you know, that convention has been in effect for many, many years. In a number of compliance reports, we have come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was not in compliance with the biological weapons convention, and that is an issue we continue to raise with the Soviet Union.

Q I'm sorry, but this statement three months ago refers specifically to chemical, biological and toxic research and production.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Well, you're reading from a press clipping.

Q This is a direct quote from this report that came out three months ago that said that -- the report was entitled Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Agreements.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Let me get back to you on that because I've got to see the exact text of what you're talking about.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Let me just add that chemical weapons, as distinct from biological weapons, it is legal for any state to manufacture and store, make munitions out of chemical weapons. That's legal now. The 1925 Geneva Convention bans the first use of chemical weapons. What the chemical weapons convention that the President is calling for would do is ban not only use but also manufacture, acquisition, storage and transfer. The problem is it is now legal to do everything except first use. The President is pushing for a global ban across the board on everything related to CW.

Q Is Iraq one of the members of the --

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Yes, they are a member of the conference on disarmament in which this is being negotiated.

Q When do the talks get underway again? Is it tomorrow, as the paperwork says, or Wednesday, as you have said?

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Wednesday the 14th in Geneva.

Q Wednesday is the 15th.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Is it tomorrow? Tomorrow's the 14th. They start tomorrow. I'm sorry.

Q Who is the US representative?

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Ambassador Steven Ledogar is the US ambassador.

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 data

Now, with respect to other states --

Q Is that simply because of their overall funding problem or is that because of military reluctance to move?

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: I think it's more the funding problem and coming up with a safe and environmentally sound program that they can get through the Supreme Soviet.

Let me say that with respect to other nations -- I mean, in a sense, we're going to find out now. We have, hopefully, broken the back of a number of key issues, and we should be able to find out now whether or not there are nations that are going to look for a pretext for not going ahead with the CWC. The President's calling for a very fast track on this negotiation, and if there are nations that don't want to be parties, they're going to have to reveal it fairly soon.

Q If I can follow up on the Soviets, what has changed since March of this year when the administration warned in a report that the Soviets were continuing to produce chemical and biological weapons in violation of the 1972 convention, and that report said, quote, "Soviet capabilities in this area remain a concern and may provide the Soviet Union a militarily significant advantage." That was three months ago.

SR. ADMIN OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, this is the chemical weapons convention that we're talking about here, and in that regard, we have received data from the Soviet Union, we have visited some of their sites, they are agreeing in negotiating both the bilateral and the multilateral agreement to cease the production of chemical weapons and to destroy all of the stocks that they have. We've been working both bilaterally and multilaterally on verification of that. So that's the approach we've taken, and we believe that with respect to chemical weapons, that they intend to abide by their agreements and to proceed in a positive way.

Q Your feelings have all changed in the last three months? Have these inspections occurred? What's happened --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, no. We've actually been visiting their sites now for over a year, and we've had an exchange of data in great detail as to where stocks are located and what kind are there, what weapons, what munitions. So we have continued to work on solving the problem of chemical weapons. And the ultimate solution to that problem, though, quite clearly has to be the chemical weapons convention, which ultimately deals with the ban.

Q Was this just too cynical an assessment in March, then?

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Q (Off mike) -- can I pick up on a couple points here.
Where are you vis-a-vis the Soviets, specifically, and secondly,
when you lay these things out, do you feel you're at a point where
you can just sort of nudge this set of negotiations into an agreement,
or is it really something that's going to need a much more dramatic
breakthrough?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, let me say first of all, that with
respect to the Soviets, we've actually had a very cooperative
approach. You may remember that in the Wyoming ministerial, that
the two sides agreed to a data exchange and some verification
experiments. Last year at the summit here in Washington, there was
the bilateral agreement in which the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed to implement early destruction.

Let me say, by and large, the Soviet Union has been very
cooperative and their representative to the Committee on Disarmament
chairs the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons at this time. So
they have been helpful, and we are looking for them to help lead in
this process.

Having said that, as you know, one problem we have had is with
the pace of the Soviet ability to get funding and approval for a
specific chemical weapons destruction program. But they are working
on that problem, and we hope to have some more information on that
before too long. So they have been, basically, I think, helpful.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I can assure you that we will keep to it, that is, the President has announced a series of steps that have clear benchmarks, clear yardsticks, and I'm sure you will hold us to it.

I can't guarantee you that we will achieve the chemical weapons convention on the timetable the President has set out. It is an ambitious timetable, but the President has taken a series of bold steps in order to give us a realistic opportunity to achieve the goal that Reg Bartholemew has laid out, and as Reg has said, this is part of a continuing effort. This is not something that has come out of the blue.

Q What is the hang-up in Geneva? Why is there not a treaty yet? What's holding things up?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think I'll let Ron do that. He's the expert -- (inaudible.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's right. We have actually 39 nations now, with German reunification, and 34 observers in that. So in multilateral negotiations, you have an inherent difficulty. But among the major issues have been the issues which the President is seeking to address today in this initiative, to try to build upon what may be a window of opportunity as a result, not only of the outcome of the Gulf War, but, in fact, of the United Nations resolutions on Iraq.

And I should point out this is not a near term initiative for the President. When he was Vice President in 1984, he tabled the draft treaty that is the basis now of these negotiations. The issues that have been out there have been: Would nations retain a right of retaliation after the convention goes into force? The President has said that we are prepared to change our position on that issue. The question of whether or not nations would have the right to, in essence, put a pause in the destruction schedule if not all chemical weapon-capable states were a party, the President has taken an initiative on that.

There was the issue of what would be the benefits of joining the regime and the disadvantages of not joining the regime. And the President has taken an initiative on that, that is to say, that if you want to be involved in a legitimate chemical industrial trade, you ought to be a party to this convention because there will be severe limits on those -- chemical trade among those who are not party to the convention.

There are a number of other issues that we will still have to deal with: Exactly what kind of international body is established with respect to managing the regime, issues like that. But I think the President today in his initiative has made a major step on the major issues.

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 been received with wide favor in Geneva.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you need to put what we're doing, the President is doing today, in the context of his policy of the last two years. I mean, we've already taken a remarkable series of steps -- I say remarkable for anybody who has followed this kind of issue in the past -- in the last two years, in the two years of the administration, including for example the United States decision to cease totally the production of chemical weapons. Remember how contested an issue that was three or four years ago -- big-eye and binaries and all of that -- including the United States decision to do the bilateral agreement with the Soviets, which would have us not only halt production but also begin destruction of these weapons even before the global convention came into effect.

So that what the President is doing today is part of a continuing cranking up of the United States effort, as it were, to get this global convention into place. The 2 percent did encounter opposition, but it was also tied up with the fact that we wanted to retain weapons down to that level, so long as all CW-capable states had not joined the treaty, because we were at that point still wrestling with the problem as to whether it made national security sense to give up the nation's right to retaliation with these weapons, particularly in response to a chemical attack.

We've now decided, the President has decided, that looking at the national security, that our interests are far more powerfully served by going ahead, accepting the obligation not to use these weapons under any circumstance, and indeed taking the lead in it, and accepting the obligation to reduce to zero over ten years, or without any conditions, that this is the best way to bring -- create a more secure situation -- yes, for the world, various regions -- but also for ourselves. So there's a perspective here.

STAFF: In back, there.

Q Could you elaborate on what you call, the "tangible costs" on those countries that do not join? At first glance, what you're talking about, a narrow ban on just trade involving chemical components doesn't seem like much of a tangible cost for (the assessment?)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, on the contrary. The scope of this ban could, in fact, be very wide and could encompass a broad spectrum of chemicals that are used in everyday commercial business. And so the scope of the ban, in fact, could have an important and demonstrable economic effect on the trade of those countries who choose not to become parties.

Q Sir, I hate to say this but, I heard from this same platform Mr. Nixon say these same things some years ago, and I saw them destroy the weapons and all that at -- (inaudible) -- but now we're back. How are we going to be assured that you are going to keep to this?

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ban on chemical trade that you mentioned? And what was it that really pushed President Bush to do this at this point?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We don't know whether there will be holdouts or who the holdouts will be. What we're trying to do is construct a set of incentives to join, and a set of sanctions if people don't join. And we're hoping this mix will in fact bring in all the relevant states into the convention. As for what inspired the President to take these steps now, as I said at the outset, we think that the Gulf war and the specter that chemical weapons would be used -- would be used in combat, would be used on American troops as well as allies and civilians -- really, we thought, galvanized world opinion to make the time right for a serious, sustained push for an early conclusion.

Q Two questions. One, you mentioned that certain steps might be taken by Middle East states in advance of completing a treaty banning chemical weapons, to deal with the problem. Could you just say what those steps might be? And then just in response to this question, the United States invested a lot of capital trying to get the Russians and others to agree that we could maintain this 2 percent stockpile. Are you giving that up simply because it was unpopular and an obstacle to completion of the treaty in Geneva, or did the Gulf war lead you to rethink that, since we deterred the use of chemical weapons without threatening the use of chemical weapons? Can you give a fuller explanation of the previous question -- those two things?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Let me make a couple introductory remarks, then ask my colleagues to join in.

As for which steps we would ask Middle East states to take on now, before the convention is finalized, in the first instance that is a decision for them to make individually and collectively, we hope in dialogue with us and other countries. There are certain measures, though, you could think of as almost confidence-building measures. For example, trial inspections, looking for or practicing looking for chemical weapon stocks and facilities.

As for why the President decided to change the US position on 2 percent, we've concluded that a different mix of incentives and disincentives would be more likely to facilitate early agreement and widespread adherence to the chemical weapons convention. I'm not telling you anything you don't know, namely that the 2 percent position was in fact widely unpopular. We had hoped in part that it would provide incentives for chemical weapons capable states to join the convention, by allowing essentially intermediaries to pressure reluctant states to join the convention as a device for getting us to eliminate our final 2 percent. Thus far, at least, it has not

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the right to retaliate against chemical weapons attacks with chemical weapons of our own. What we've said today is that we will forswear that right; we will not use chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation against chemical weapons attack once the convention enters into force. Those are two important changes in the US position. And these are changes which we think can, should and will facilitate early agreement.

Q What is the response you've gotten so far?--Have the other countries been sounded out on your proposal?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've just begun to take soundings. -- The real work here will occur in Geneva in the negotiations, and those begin Wednesday -- they resume Wednesday.

Q Part of the reason for keeping the 2 percent was because you didn't believe countries like Iraq and others would ever really sign on, you'd never get 100 percent participation. Where are the -- are there still holdouts who you suspect will never sign, who would be subject to the kind of

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stocks and facilities in a safe and environmentally sound manner.

Taken together, these measures and other measures listed in the fact sheet should make clear that the United States is committed to eliminating chemical weapons, including our own. Now we not only want to ensure the Chemical Weapons Convention is completed as soon as possible, but also to ensure that it is effective when it enters into force. And the President reaffirmed his commitment to a strong and forthright verification regime. And in this regard, the US delegation in Geneva will be offering some new proposals related to the inspection of sites at which CW activities are suspected. And our delegation will be calling upon its counterparts in Geneva to adopt our proposed approach to suspect site inspections.

We also want to enhance the effectiveness of the CWC by creating clear incentives for states to join it and to impose tangible costs on those countries that do not join the Convention. And to this end, the United States will be proposing a provision to the Chemical Weapons Convention that would ban trade in chemical weapons-related materials with states that do not become members of the Convention.

Finally, let me just note that although the problem of chemical weapons is clearly a global problem and the solution requires a global approach, as I said at the outset, it nowhere is more pressing than in the Middle East. And in this connection, we believe it would be particularly appropriate if states in the region announced today, now, that they will join the President in his initiative and that they will even take the extra step of putting into place selected provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention even before the Convention is completed and enters into force.

That's the end of my opening remarks. Myself and my colleagues are here to take questions.

Q Won't the convention itself spell out the terms under which these weapons will be banned or eliminated? So what's the point of saying we will ban all chemical weapons once a ban on chemical weapons is put in force? Where do we go here? What's new?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: What's new is, with respect to change in the US position, the US heretofore has insisted that we retain the right to have 2 percent of our stockpile in existence essentially until all chemical weapon states join the treaty. We are now saying we are prepared to forego that and get rid of all of our chemical weapon stocks within 10 years after the treaty enters into force, no matter what, unconditionally.

Q But we never held -- we never have maintained that we would always in perpetuity, you know, hold the right to keep 2 percent, did we? It was --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Our position has been, until today, that -- until all CWC-capable states become parties to the convention, we would retain 2 percent of our chemical weapon stocks.

Q So that's a major --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We're now giving that up. We previously had said that as long as we retain any chemical weapons we reserve

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay, I think you've all received a copy of the President's statement and a copy of the fact sheet. And, as you know, the President today announced several new steps to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and to achieve this ban as soon as possible. Such a global ban has been a longstanding goal of US policy, but the Gulf War has given the achievement of this objective a new urgency and we think, as well, has provided a new opportunity.

Achievement of the global ban depends upon the successful conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention is being negotiated in Geneva among 40 nations in the Conference on Disarmament. And the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CWC, would ban the use, production, acquisition, transfer and storage of chemical weapons.

And what the President wants to do is to seize the opportunity and press for an early conclusion of the CWC. And today, the President announced that the United States will become an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and he called upon all other states to make that same commitment and to do what the United States already has done, namely, to publicly declare their CW stocks.

The negotiations resume on Wednesday and the President has called for these negotiations to remain in continuous session until the work is done. And his goal is to have all the major outstanding issues settled by the end of this year and to have the entire convention completed within 12 months of today.

But it's important to emphasize that the goal of early conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and our efforts to press for it are more than rhetorical. And today the President announced several specific steps that he hopes will in fact facilitate the early conclusion of an effective Chemical Weapons Convention.

First, the United States will forswear the use of its own chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation against chemical weapons attacks, as soon as the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force.

Second, the United States will commit itself to the unconditional destruction of all of its chemical weapons and chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapons facilities within 10 years after the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force. And 10 years is the period that has been provisionally agreed in Geneva as the period to complete this destruction. We previously had said that we would need to keep 2 percent of our chemical weapon stocks until all chemical weapon states, all chemical weapon-capable states, had become parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Today the President announced that we were dropping that and we would unconditionally destroy our stocks within 10 years.

The President called on all other states to follow our lead and, to this end, he has offered to provide practical and effective technical assistance to help other states destroy their chemical

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lead and to begin the destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as possible. We will propose provisions for the CWC that require all parties to begin the unconditional destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as the CWC enters into force, and to complete their elimination within ten years of that date.

6. The US will provide practical and effective help to other states to assist in the speedy, safe, and environmentally sound destruction of CW wherever they may be found. We will:

-- Create a task force comprised of US government and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the US can advise and assist states in CW destruction.

-- Provide technical destruction assistance (a.g., visits to US destruction facilities, blueprints, and technical advice) to states parties that have CW located on their territory.

-- Propose the creation of a CD working group on CW destruction and offer to provide US experts to it.

7. The US will provide extensive information to other states on US export controls on CW-related materials and technology and our domestic legislation to enforce them. We will call on all states to enact similar controls, thereby enhancing the control of CW proliferation as we work toward a complete and formal ban.

8. Aside from the significant intrinsic benefits that will flow to all parties from a total ban on CW, there should be tangible benefits for those states that join the Convention and enhance its strength, and specific penalties for those states that fail to support it in the most fundamental and important way by not joining it. Therefore, the United States will propose provisions for the CWC that require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with states that do not become parties within a reasonable time after entry into force.

9. The United States will reaffirm our position that there should be sanctions against those states that violate the CWC, and especially severe sanctions against any state that initiates the use of CW. The US declares that it will consider violations of the CWC, especially the initiation of the use of CW, as extremely grave breaches of international law, and that the US will impose all appropriate sanctions.

10. The United States will reaffirm our commitment to a strong and forthright verification regime. We will offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of inspecting suspect sites. We will call on the CD to adopt our position for challenge inspections of such sites.

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Noting that the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf had brought into play once again the specter of the use of chemical weapons against innocent populations, the President announced a new series of steps in his long-term goal of ridding the world of these weapons of terror. The President reiterated his belief that the best hope for achieving that goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- a multilateral treaty that would completely ban the production, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons -- under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

The primary purposes of this initiative are to strengthen the prospects of an early successful conclusion of the Convention, to demonstrate the commitment of the United States to achieving an effective ban on CW as soon as possible, and to provide incentives to other nations to commit themselves equally to this critical objective. To this end, the President declared that the United States delegation to the CD would take the following actions when the next session of the talks on the CWC resumes May 14, 1991:

1. The United States will call for the resolution of all major outstanding issues in the CD talks in Geneva on the CWC by the end of 1991 and the completion of the CWC within twelve (12) months.
2. To help reach these goals and to ensure that no time is lost and no opportunity is wasted to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion soon, the United States will propose that the CW ad hoc negotiating committee of the CD stay in continuous session in Geneva, beginning with the May session. The United States is prepared to keep its ambassador at the table and to reinforce its delegation as necessary to support this schedule.
3. The United States will formally declare its intention to become an original party to the CWC and will call upon all states publicly to commit to becoming original parties to the treaty and to declare their CW stocks.
4. The US will drop its position that states retain a right of retaliation with CW as long as they have CW stocks if CW are used against them first. The US will formally forswear the use of CW for any reason, including retaliation in kind with CW, against any state, effective when the CWC enters into force. The United States will also propose a provision for the CWC prohibiting the use of CW for any reason.
5. The US will drop its position that we must be allowed to keep two percent of our CW stockpile (500 tons) until all CW-capable states have joined the Convention. The United States will unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of its CW stocks and former production facilities within ten years of entry into force of the CWC. We will call upon all states to follow our

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STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT BUSH ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS INITIATIVE
 RELEASED BY THE OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
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The Gulf War has once again raised the specter of chemical weapons and demonstrated that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten innocent populations with these weapons of terror so long as we permit them to exist. These stark events renew and reinforce my conviction, shared by responsible leaders around the world, that chemical weapons must be banned -- everywhere in the world.

The world's best hope for this goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention now being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The United States is committed to the early, successful completion of this convention and I am today announcing a number of steps we will take to accelerate the negotiations and achieve an effective chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. I hope this initiative also will spur other nations to commit themselves equally to this critical objective.

I have instructed the United States negotiating team in Geneva to implement my decisions at the next session which begins May 14. To demonstrate the United States commitment to banning chemical weapons, we are formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the convention enters into force, and will propose that all states follow suit. Further, the United States unconditionally commits itself to the destruction of all our stocks of chemical weapons within ten years of entry into force and will propose that all other states do likewise. We will offer technical assistance to others to do this efficiently and safely.

In addition, we will call for setting a target date to conclude the Convention and recommend the Conference stay in continuous session if necessary to meet the target. The United States also will propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons. To provide tangible benefits for those states that join the Convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it, the United States will propose the Convention require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapon-related materials with states that do not join in the Convention. The United States reaffirms that we will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the Convention, especially the use of chemical weapons.

These steps can move the world significantly closer to the goal of a world free of chemical weapons. I call upon all other nations to join us in the serious and cooperative pursuit of this important goal.

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Limiting Ballistic Missiles

All Middle East nations would also be required to give up ballistic missiles with a range of more than 30 miles.

Administration officials said the long-term goal was to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, from the Middle East. But American officials said that as a practical matter, Israel could not be expected to give up its existing nuclear arsenal until a durable peace is established in the region.

The Israelis have resisted calls for giving up any nuclear force on the ground that they need a deterrent against larger Arab armies. As a result, Israel is not being asked at this time for a commitment to give up the nuclear arsenal.

Balancing Security Needs

"It is an attempt to balance the security requirements of the players in the region," an American official said. "Everybody would be better off if they accepted the package."

The Administration officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, outlined the plan as President Bush announced today in a major policy reversal that the United States was "for-swearing" the use of chemical weapons "for any reason," including retaliation.

Mr. Bush also pledged that Washington would destroy all of its stocks of poison gas once a chemical weapons treaty is signed.

Reversal of Policy

Until now, the United States had insisted on the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation to an attack. It had also planned to keep a stockpile of 300 tons of poison gas until all nations capable of producing chemical arms had agreed to join a treaty banning

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**U.S. WEIGHS PLAN
TO BAN SOME ARMS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

EFFORT TOWARD STABILITY

**Israeli Atomic Arsenal Would
Be Frozen — Arabs Would
Give Up Chemicals**

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 13 — The Bush Administration has prepared an arms control plan that would ban Israel producing material for nuclear weapons and would require Arab nations in the Middle East to give up their chemical weapons, Administration officials said today.

President Bush hopes to announce the plan, which is certain to cause problems with the Israeli Government, in a coming speech. The announcement has been delayed pending the return of Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d from a peace mission in the Middle East.

Administration officials said the plan was an effort to devise an arms-control formula for the Middle East and was not aimed solely at Israel, the only nation in the region that is understood to have nuclear weapons. The plan would also prevent Arab nations that do not have nuclear weapons from making them and would remove their capability to attack Israel with chemical weapons.

U.S. Prepares Plan to Ban Middle East Production of Nuclear Arms

Continued From Page A1

production and possession of poison gas.

The shift in policy removes two major obstacles in the Geneva talks on a treaty banning chemical weapons, which Mr. Bush is seeking to have completed within a year. It is also intended to lay the groundwork for the new initiative to eliminate chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles from the Middle East.

In addition to promoting stability in the region, Administration officials said, the Middle East arms-control initiative is intended to bolster the peace efforts undertaken since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

Arab nations have previously said that they would be unwilling to give up their chemical weapons as long as Israel has nuclear weapons. The Administration plan for countries in the region to stop producing material for nuclear arms is partly intended to meet that concern, though Israel would still retain a small but potent arsenal of nuclear weapons if it stopped production.

Reactor at Dimona

Israel has a military reactor at Dimona that is not subject to international safeguards.

Although Israel is the only nation in the Middle East that is believed to have nuclear weapons, the plan would apply to Arab nations that seek to develop a nuclear arsenal.

Though the Administration's goal for arms control in the Middle East are ambitious, officials said that the initial steps could be gradual.

Administration officials familiar with the plan said it involved these elements:

Arab nations, along with other nations, would agree to join a treaty requiring the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons over a 10-year period. As a first step, Middle East nations could allow inspections to establish

Bush renounces use of chemical weapons.

procedures for verification before the treaty is completed and takes effect.

Israel would stop producing material for nuclear weapons and would agree to safeguards at its military reactor at Dimona, in a possible first step toward declaring the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Ballistic missiles with a range of more than 50 miles would be banned. If nations did not want to prohibit all missiles of this type, an Administration official said, more modest constraints could be worked out that would ban the testing and deployment of new types of

ballistic missiles.

In addition to the constraints on Middle East nations, the Administration plan calls for the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to notify each other of conventional arms sales to the region.

If a Middle East peace conference is held, a subcommittee could be established to take up arms control issues, Administration officials suggested. The Administration's plan could be used as a basis for discussion about what sort of arms control arrangements might be acceptable.

Mr. Baker is encountering difficulties arranging a peace conference between Israel and Arab nations.

Hinging on Conference

If no peace conference is held, the prospects for arms control in the Mid-

dle East would be uncertain, and it is not clear how hard the Administration would press its initiative.

One Administration official said Israeli officials had told the United States that the arms-control initiative would depend on the Administration's success in working out a lasting peace settlement in the region, an Administration official said.

If the peace process were stymied, the permanent members of the Security Council — the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China could proceed with their plans for negotiations on arms sales and transfers.

China's desire to sell arms to the region, however, presents a potential obstacle to setting up a system of notification.

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בוושינגטון ביולי הקרוב בנושאי השיחות התקופתיות.

ב. SINGEL הינו חס, ידידותי, והתרשם מאוד ממראה עיניו ומשמע אזניו, הלה
נח ביותר להעמקת הקשרים עמו ואנו מניחים שכך פעלתם בעבר ותמשיכו לפעול
בעתיד.

מצפא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא,
פרג, כהן, כלכליתב', ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14122
אל: רהמש/798
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 253, תא: 140591, זח: 1109, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור / מידי
אל: מצפ"א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

שמענו שהשר שרון יבקר בווינגטון בתאריכים 24-26 ביוני.
אנא בידקו משאלותיו ותכניותיו והודיעונו.

שילה

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

BAKER TELLS REPORTERS OF HIS TRIP TO WEST BANK.

Jerusalem -- Following is the transcript of Secretary of State Baker's responses to questions by reporters about his trip to the Israeli occupied West Bank. Baker made the remarks before his talks with the Palestinian representatives:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, did that drive across the West Bank give you any greater appreciation of the stakes for this meeting?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I think it does. You realize when you drive like that, rather than flying, just how short the distances are and how important, therefore, it is to promote peaceful coexistence.

Q: Is it significant, sir, that you drove through largely Palestinian areas?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well we did drive through Palestinian areas -- of course -- we drove through Jericho, and we drove through the West Bank, and we decided to do that so we could get a better feel for exactly what the situation on the ground is.

Q: Were you surprised by the size of the settlements you saw -- the Jewish settlements?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, I had seen those before. I had flown over a number of those by helicopter.

Q: Thank you.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE MEETS WITH BAKER

Jerusalem -- Following is the transcript of remarks of Palestinian representative Faisal Husseini May 14, after his meeting with Secretary of State Baker:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Mr. Hussein: Just a moment, I will give you my statement. It will be my statement, not to answer your questions. It is you who will hear my statement. Okay.

This second we have just finished a long meeting of three hours which was a frank meeting -- an extremely frank meeting -- which we discussed through it the most difficult issues. We understand, or we know now, more the American position. We will deliver this position to the Palestinian decision-maker, and then after that and after discussing it we will find a way to implement the desire, and the real desire, of the Palestinian people -- the leadership and the people -- to push the peace process forward, to implement a comprehensive peace, and a just one. So we hope that we will be able to overcome some obstacles which is facing now, not because of us, but because of others. But in the same time, I can say that the Palestinian leadership is proving flexibility and in the same time, insists to reach to a comprehensive peace in the area. We hope that the Israel people will understand this position of the Palestinians, and make something to make pressure on (their) own government to let them be also having the same position and the same flexibility toward peace. Thank you.

Q: Did you discuss national representation?

A: (no response)

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BUSH "NOT DISCOURAGED" BY BAKER'S MIDEAST TALKS TO DATE
(Transcript: Bush news conference 5/14/91)

Washington -- President Bush says he is "not discouraged" by the lack of success to date in Secretary of State Baker's attempts at arranging peace talks in the Middle East.

"Anybody that's ever dealt with the Middle East knows that there are ups and downs in the process," Bush said. The United States would keep working on the effort, he said, adding "there's room for optimism."

Bush was asked about the Baker mission May 14, during a news conference at which he announced the nomination of Robert Gates to be the next director of central intelligence. He said his deputy national security adviser has a background of "professionalism, dedication and integrity."

Bush also told a news conference Asked about a U.S.-Soviet summit, the president said there was "no set time, no agreement" but added he has "made clear that I would like to go to Moscow under certain conditions and I'd like to think I will."

Following is a transcript of Bush's news conference:

(begin transcript)

BUSH: Well, I'm pleased to nominate Robert Gates to be the Director of Central Intelligence. As most of you know, Bob Gates has served as Deputy National Security Adviser for the last two and a half years. And before that, he dedicated more than 20 years to the service of the CIA and the important task that it performs for our country. It's with this background of professionalism, dedication and integrity that I'm asking the Senate to approve his nomination to be the next director.

He follows in the distinguished footsteps of Bill Webster. And I know that Bob will maintain a strong and responsive Central Intelligence Agency that will provide the kind of intelligence America needs to maintain its role as leader of the free world.

In the last two and a half years, Bob has lent a steady hand to the deliberations of our National Security Council. He's directed, as all of us know, the Deputies Committee, a group of interagency leaders who in times of crisis have met continuously to provide the basic decisions and recommendations that have protected America's security interests. In Panama and in Liberia, and perhaps most importantly, in Operation Desert Storm, Bob Gates has performed with wisdom and precision in laying out the options for presidential action. He's a good man, and I'm proud to send his name up to the Senate.

QUESTION: Mr. President, it's pretty clear that there are no qualms in this administration about opening up the Iran-Contra scandal again; and questions to Mr. Gates as to what he knew and when he knew it; in terms of --

ANSWER: What's your question to me?

Q: My question is, do you have any qualms about --

A: No.

Q: -- this question being opened up?

A: No qualms at all.

Q: And do you think that he'll be able to --

A: In fact, we've had consultation with --

Q: Why did he bow out --

A: May I finish, please? We've had consultation with the people on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and so far I'm very, very pleased with the way they've gone.

Q: Well, why did he bow out before?

A: Well, all that can-- everybody gets a hearing up there. All will be well.

Q: Mr. President, could I ask you a question about the Middle East? Mr. President, are you taking the lead as has been reported in pressing for a Middle East arms control plan that would freeze Israel's nuclear arsenal and require all states in the Middle East to give back chemical weapons?

A: We'll, we're in the process of working this arms control problem. And I'm not prepared to give any details on it today at all. But there are all kinds of options out there.

Q: May I follow up? Are you consulting now with allies? And when do you think you might have something?

A: We are consulting with allies, but -- and I can't give you -- I just don't want to predict on the time frame. But we are discussing it, and I think there's a lot of sympathy for the idea of trying to get control of weapons. And I'm strongly for it.

Q: The CIA was once a Cabinet position, and under William Casey, the last time that Mr. Gates was there, he was considered fairly much a director who advocated his own policies. Will Mr. Gates become a Cabinet member, or will you

keep the CIA in the kind of support role it was --

A: I will keep it the way it was when I was there. And it will be -- he will be at the table when matters of -- or we need the intelligence of make critical decisions on foreign affairs. He will not be a political -- trying to shape policy. But he will do a superb job as a professional intelligence officer, heading the Intelligence Agency. That's the way it's going to be.

Q: Mr. President, would you care to give us your reaction to the clash between British troops and Iraqi troops, first? And do you think it will be necessary for American troops to actually occupy Iraq to prevent any more difficulties between the refugees and the Iraqi troops?

A: No, I think the way I'd do this is to say that it's surprising there have been so few flare-ups of this nature. Tempers are high; it's very difficult for these refugees. And so I don't expect any more. And we're working with -- we're starting consultations with the United Nations. I think you saw Prince Sadruddin Khan's comments yesterday about trying to put -- getting U.N. flags over some of the convoys. So we're moving. I want to see this internationalized. But it is to a degree because we have British and French forces there.

Did that -- did I leave out a part of that?

Q: Do you think the Iraqi troops should be disarmed -- should voluntarily lay down their weapons or at least pull back?

A: Well, I'd leave that to the people that are trying to separate the forces there. And I don't -- what they should do is be careful not to put any of these refugees or any allied troops into harms's way.

Q: Has President Assad of Syria pretty much slammed the door shut on any peace talks in the Middle East? And is the United States willing to seek a scaled-down version of that -- perhaps talks between the Palestinians, Jordan and Israel instead of a wider peace conference? And are you growing the least bit discouraged by the failure so far of Secretary

Baker to get this thing going?

A: Well, I wouldn't say it's a failure; but there are ups and downs in this process. There always have been. Anybody that's ever dealt with the Middle East knows that there are ups and downs in the process. But I'm not discouraged. I would like to see President Assad do what the secretary of State has asked. But we'll just keep working on this. I can't give you a very optimistic report; but I'm about where I was last week or whenever we last talked to say there's room for optimism.

But you go forward and then you get some setbacks in this process. But it's always been that way.

Q: Are you seeking a scaled-down version of talks, perhaps, between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians?

A: We will just leave that to the secretary. And it won't help for me to be advocating from here what I think. One of the reasons is that when you're dealing with a problem of this complexity, you do need to have certain things kept quiet for negotiation. I don't want to duck your question, but just don't feel that it would be helpful for me at this critical time to go into the details.

Q: Mr. President, after your conversation with President Gorbachev last Saturday, a Soviet spokesman said there would be a U.S.-Soviet summit this summer. Can you confirm that, sir? And secondly, would you support inviting Mr. Gorbachev to the economic summit of the G-7 in London in July?

A: On the first part, I can't confirm it. There's no set time, no agreement. I've made clear that I would like to go to Moscow under certain conditions and I'd like to think I will. On the second part of it -- what was the second one on Gorbachev?

Q: Would you favor having Gorbachev come to the economic summit?

A: Well, this is a matter that we must discuss with the G-7 allies. I think that they've evidenced an interest in this -- the Soviets have -- but I think it's important that if he go there something positive will happen. So this is a matter that I will be discussing with the various leaders of the other six countries.

Q: Considering the controversy over Mr. Gates' nomination last time and considering your own ethical standards for your administration, can you tell us on what you base your feeling that there is no problem with what Mr. Gates' role was at the CIA during the Iran-Contra -- your own knowledge, or did you have an investigation done, or what?

A: I know Bob Gates and I know him to be a man of honor. These matters have been discussed. And I have absolutely no qualms whatsoever. This matter has been investigated over and over again, this Iran-Contra. It's been going on for years. If I were worried about opening up Iran-Contra you might suggest I wouldn't send that name forward. But this man has my full trust. He's honest. He's a man of total integrity. And that's the way I'd answer the question. And they'll have hearings -- they can ask any questions they want.

Q: Just briefly, sir, can I follow up?

A: No, I'm awful sorry, I've got to go meet the Queen -- get ready to meet the Queen.

GATES: Mr. President, I'd just like to thank you. This is a great honor for me. I appreciate the opportunity that it represents. And if confirmed, I look forward to doing my best to more fully develop what is already the best intelligence service in the world. Thank you, sir.

A: Thank you very much.

(end transcript)

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GULF EVENTS REAFFIRMED U.S.-U.K. ALLIANCE, BUSH SAYS

(Transcript: Bush; Queen Elizabeth remarks 5/14/91)

Washington -- Events in the Persian Gulf, President Bush asserted May 14, have "reaffirmed" the "alliance of shared principles" between the United States and Great Britain.

Welcoming Queen Elizabeth to the United States, the president told a South Lawn arrival ceremony that because ties between London and Washington "have never been closer, today our alliance has perhaps never been stronger."

The queen, in a separate Rose Garden ceremony, presented Bush with the Winston Churchill award for fostering better British-American relations.

Later, the two heads of state planted a linden tree on the South Lawn, replacing one destroyed in a storm last September. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had planted the tree in 1937 in honor of the queen's father, King George VI. Bush dedicated the new linden "to a truly great and good man, King George VI."

Following is a transcript of the remarks by Bush and Queen Elizabeth:

(begin transcript)

BUSH: Your Majesty and Your Royal Highness, ladies and gentlemen, and friends of what is indeed our special relationship. Your Majesty, on behalf of the American people, it is an honor to welcome you to the United States and to the White House.

You have been freedom's friend for as long as we remember -- back to World War II when, at 18, you joined the war against fascism. It was then that America first began to know you as one of us -- came to love you as standing fast with us for freedom, summoning across the oceans our values and our dreams.

George Bernard Shaw once joked that Britain and America are two countries separated by a common language. In truth, we are joined by a common heritage and culture, civilization and soul.

On the occasion of your first state visit to the United States, Dwight Eisenhower spoke of these bonds of friendship. He said, "Those ties have been tested in the crucible of war when we have fought side by side to defend the values we hold dear." That was true in 1957 -- and just as true today.

For nearly 400 years, the histories of Britain and America have been inseparable. The first permanent English settlement in America was created at Jamestown, in Virginia, 384 years ago this week. Thirteen years later, the Pilgrims landed far to

the north at a place they called Plymouth Rock, named after your great naval port from which they sailed.

From those events sprang the American nation -- believing, as you do, in the sanctity of the individual, and enriched by family ties that make our nations one. Because those ties have never been closer, today our alliance has perhaps never been stronger. For evidence, look to the sands and seas of the Persian Gulf. Our countries have long sought the real peace which means the triumph of freedom, not merely the absence of war. We know that you can't lock people behind walls forever when moral conviction uplifts their souls. So like Monty and Ike, and Churchill and FDR, we linked hands and hearts in the Gulf to do what was right and good.

Years from now, men will speak of American and British heroism in the Gulf, as they do today of our cooperation in two World Wars and 40 years of peacetime alliance. They will talk of the 1st Infantry Division and the Desert Rats -- and of the finest sons and daughters any nation could ever have. They will praise those who assured that naked aggression would not stand -- and in so doing, salute Britain's help and leadership in forging our great coalition.

The past year has reaffirmed our alliance of shared principles; our fidelity to democracy and to basic human rights; the fact that there will always be a Britain and that Britain will always be our friend.

In that spirit, let me close with your words from a 1947 radio broadcast, when, in the aftermath of another war, you issued both a pledge and a request. You told the British people: "My whole life, whether it be long or short, shall be devoted to your service and the service of our family to which we all belong." And then, you concluded: "But I shall not have strength to carry out the resolution alone unless you join it with me."

Your Majesty, your example helped inspire a nation -- and helped your nation inspire the world. Because of what you are -- because of what Great Britain means -- all freedom-loving people stand ready to carry out your resolution: to achieve what is just and honorable for the nations of the globe.

With great pleasure, then, on behalf of an American people which reveres their mother country, I welcome you and Prince Philip to this country, the United States of America. Thank you very much.

QUEEN ELIZABETH II: Mr. president, thank you for your warm welcome to Washington and to the White House. We are both delighted to be back in the United States and to find you in the best of health. It gives me particular pleasure that this

visit comes so soon after a vivid and effective demonstration of the long standing alliance between our two countries.

It is 15 years since our last visit to Washington when, with a gallant disregard for history, we shared wholeheartedly in the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the founding of this great nation. But it is 40 years since our first visit to this country, when Mr. Truman was president. It made such a deep impression that I can hardly believe that so many years have slipped past in the meanwhile.

By now, I fully understand what Winston Churchill meant when he spoke of the inspiration and renewed vitality he found every time he came here.

This country means more to the rest of the world than a rich and thriving community. In her third, as in her first century, the United States represents an ideal, an emblem, and an example. An ideal of freedom under the law, and emblem of democracy, and an example of constant striving for the betterment of the people.

I know that our days in Washington will be full of interest. And, once again, we expect to be inspired and surprised by the warmth and generosity of the people of America. We are looking forward to renewing old friendships and to making new ones.

Friendships need to be kept in good repair. Not just the personal friendships between heads of state, but the more diffused friendships between the governments and peoples of two nations. There is a symbolism in the events of such a visit that defies analysis, but which has a way of reaching the hearts of people far and wide.

At your kind invitation, Mr. President, we are here to celebrate and to reaffirm that friendship. I can assure you that we are truly happy to do so.

(end transcript)

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KING: JORDAN OPEN TO DELEGATION WITH PALESTINIANS

(Transcript: Baker, King Hussein, 5/14/91)

Amman -- King Hussein of Jordan says his government will look "very favorably and positively" at any Palestinian request for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to negotiate with Israel.

With Secretary of State Baker at his side, King Hussein told reporters in Amman May 14 that "I believe we share a total commitment to the cause of peace in this region that is long overdue."

The Jordanian monarch said it was his belief that the "chance that now exists" for a process to start to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli problem and Arab-Israeli regional peace "will probably never come again."

"We will do our utmost to see an end to this state of turbulence in the region and hopefully for a beginning of a different kind for all concerned," King Hussein said. Acknowledging "there is some ground to be covered," he said he would be in touch "with some of our Arab brethren."

Baker thanked the king for his "very forthcoming statement" and emphasized that the United States "wants to do anything and everything we can to contribute to the establishment...of a peace that has been so long denied and which is so badly needed."

Earlier this week Syrian President Assad told Baker that Syria insists on a major role for the United Nations in a peace conference and King Hussein indicated that Jordan also believes a U.N. role is essential. "I believe that in the final analysis, when peace is achieved," the Jordanian leader said; "it will end up with Security Council guarantees and with the blessing of the world community in terms of the United Nations."

The king said he hoped Syria would not stay out of a peace conference, but declined to say definitively that Jordan would participate if Syria does not.

Following is the transcript of remarks by King Hussein and Secretary of State Baker at Raghadan Palace in Amman:

(begin transcript)

HUSSEIN: It's a pleasure to see you again. I'd like to seize this opportunity to welcome the secretary of state on his second visit to Jordan. We've had an extremely interesting discussion, and I know that what has brought him over to the area once again after a very intense period of consultations with our other colleagues in the Arab world and return to the

war to try to establish "a system" there to help the Kurds leave the mountains where humanitarian relief is difficult to provide.

On the subject of Kurdish security, Williams said, "We obviously are not going to leave until we are satisfied that some arrangement can be worked out that will safeguard the Kurdish refugees."

There are two Kurdish camps in Zakhu. A second temporary tent village is located two kilometers northeast of the earlier one, he said, "because of the growing number of refugees that are leaving the mountain camps." He said there are 8,280 Kurds living in 1,075 tents.

The first camp was set up to accommodate 18,500 refugees in 3,300 tents, the spokesman said.

Williams said there are currently 204,000 Kurds inside Turkey or along the Turkish-Iraqi border. On May 13, he said, 25,000 Kurds left the mountain camps.

The spokesman also noted that the United States has approved an Iraqi request to spray crops aeri ally with insecticide in the Mosul Province of northern Iraq.

Polish pilots and helicopters will distribute the chemical, Sumition, beginning May 14 and continuing for several days, he said.

U.S. officials will inspect the six Polish helicopters before their missions to ensure that no other chemicals are substituted, Williams noted.

U.S. HELICOPTER CRASH IN HONDURAS INVESTIGATED

Williams said two U.S. military service personnel were killed in a helicopter crash in Honduras May 13.

The spokesman told reporters that it was an apparent accident and that "initial reports do not indicate (that) there was any hostile action."

One crew member of the UH-1 Huey helicopter was evacuated, and a fourth is missing.

The crash occurred in the mountains west of Comayagua as the helicopter was heading in a southwesterly direction toward the Honduran community of La Pas.

A U.S. Army team from Fort Rucker, Alabama, will investigate the accident, Williams said.

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United States:

I am aware of all the contacts and all the efforts. I believe we share a total commitment to the cause of peace in this region that is long overdue. And I believe that this chance that now exists for a peace process to start to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli, Arab-Israeli, regional peace in this region will probably never come again. I hope that others have the same approach and the same feeling. And I can only say that we will do our utmost to see an end to this state of turbulence in the region and hopefully a beginning of a different kind for all concerned -- Palestinians, Arabs, Israelis -- in an atmosphere of peace and security with all that it offers in terms of the future.

I know we are not there yet. I know that there is some ground to be covered and we will be in touch with some of our Arab brethren. As I mentioned earlier, if our Palestinian brethren approach us for a joint delegation to address themselves to the Palestinian-Israeli dimension of this problem, that will be something we will look at very favorably and positively.

And I'd like to say as well that amongst the recent developments is the announcement by the Gulf Cooperation Council that they will be a part of this effort. I believe this is a very, very positive development and essentially what I am saying is that, as I've said earlier, it is time to move away from cliches and taboos and to see exactly who is genuinely committed to the cause of peace, a just peace, a lasting peace in this area and who isn't, and who has the courage to make the necessary gestures and moves to ensure a better future for all concerned and generations to come in this region. It's going to be hard and tough but let's see what can be done and certainly we won't be lacking.

BAKER: Your Majesty, thank you very much, first of all, for your hospitality today, for entertaining myself and my colleagues here during the course of our visit to the region. Thank you as well for that very forthcoming statement and let me simply say by way of echoing what you have said that the United States wants to do anything and everything we can to contribute to the establishment of a process for peace in this region, to the **establishment** of a peace that has been so long **denied** and which is so badly needed.

I appreciate the time and the detailed attention that you have given to the issues today during the course of our discussions and deliberations. I would like to tell my colleagues here with me and the travelling press that's been accompanying us that I am very, very pleased with the discussions, both the discussions we've had in the larger groups and the discussions we have had in a *tete-a-tete* form today. And I just want to conclude by saying, thank you very much for your very

forthcoming approach to peace, for your willingness to engage and to receive us here today. I would be pleased to try and respond to questions, as I know you would, Your Majesty.

QUESTION: Your Majesty, Secretary Baker told us that Syria will not attend a peace conference unless the United Nations has a significant or important role and the conference has continuity. Is that also Jordan's position?

HUSSEIN: We haven't had a chance to discuss in any great detail with our Syrian brethren their approach. But I believe that all, hopefully, will be as committed to the cause of peace and will realize the importance of movement as soon as possible. And after all, I believe that in the final analysis when peace is achieved, if it is achieved God willing, it will end up with Security Council guarantees and with the blessing of the world community in terms of the United Nations. I can't go into all the details at this stage, but we will hopefully have a chance to discuss them with our Syrian brethren and all, and I hope that everybody will be there to make their contribution for peace.

Q: Sir, what is Jordan's position on those two questions: U.N. participation and continuity of the conference?

HUSSEIN: Well, we definitely feel very, very strongly that once the process starts we can't afford to turn back. And if we do so for any reason, then the side that is responsible for that will have to take a historic responsibility for obstructing a solution to a problem that has affected so many people for over such a long time, and I cannot simply wait any longer. The United Nations, well, we are talking of 242 and 338 U.N. resolutions, and I am sure the United Nations will certainly be there at all stages, including the final stage because 242 does end up with Security Council guarantees and blessings as well.

Q: Your Majesty, excuse me, but evidently the secretary didn't have this pleasant a time in Damascus as he had speaking to you. Would Jordan go into peace talks, of course with the Palestinians and with Israel, if Syria were to stand out, to stay out?

HUSSEIN: I personally hope that Syria will not stay out and I hope that everyone concerned will be there, not only in terms of the Arab states immediately surrounding Israel, but also in terms of the Palestinians. After all, it is the root cause of the instability in the region and I think they've suffered enough and suffered for such a long time everywhere. And it's about time their problem was addressed. Beyond that, there are other factors such as the interest of the whole world as we see it now, as evidenced by the fact the secretary is with us for the second visit in such a short space of time, and the visits

of many other important figures in this world to this region. So we have that as well, and beyond that we have also the broadening picture when the Gulf Cooperation Council comes into it as well. And I am sure others will come along too.

Q: Allow me, Your Majesty, to ask you and Mr. Baker. I mean, if Israel is refusing to negotiate the U.N. role, the Syrian role, the PLO role, then what is the nature of Mr. Baker's visit and what kind of approach can we exercise on Israel in order to apply what is going on?

HUSSEIN: The basic question that I was asked was, are we ready for peace. We have been ready for peace, we are totally committed to it. We've had very intense and, I believe, constructive discussions so far. I think that a lot of ground has been covered, and I hope that if any remains to be addressed, and I not lessening the importance of that, then that will happen in the future.

BAKER: Well, I'll answer the question, too, because you addressed it to both of us. But let me say that it is my understanding that all of the parties with whom we have had discussions have agreed essentially to attend a conference sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union for direct negotiations between Israel and the states neighboring Israel, and for direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, the latter negotiations being for the purpose of achieving a comprehensive settlement based on 242 and 338. Now, I think we should not lose sight of the fact that all of the parties have agreed to those specific terms and provisions.

Q: We haven't heard King Hussein say that, sir, I'm afraid. Have you agreed to attend a conference, to sit down and negotiate in a conference as Secretary Baker has just described it? Could you say those words, perhaps?

HUSSEIN: I can only say that we have not sort of welcomed the secretary just to waste his time and ours. We've been talking substance, and I believe that the situation will become clearer in the very near future.

BAKER: Let me make sure that you understand. I am not assuming that there is still not a question out there, because there is with respect to the possibility of a U.N. role. What I am really saying is there is no argument with respect to the sponsorship by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the terms of reference are all agreed to and the question of direct negotiations both Arab states and Israel, and Israel/Palestinian, is agreed to.

Q: Your Majesty, can we assume from your answer or non-answer, with all due respect, that you will not go to a peace conference if Syria is not there. Is that correct?

HUSSEIN: I haven't said that.

Q: And will you go to a peace conference if Syria is not there?

A: I haven't said that either.

Q: (inaudible) Syria, you said there are clearly these two problems that divide Israel and Syria: the U.N. role and the continuity of the conference. Now that you've talked to King Hussein, what would you define as the problems that divide Jordan and Israel?

BAKER: I will let His Majesty speak for His Majesty's position; obviously.

HUSSEIN: Well, let me put it this way. I believe that Jordan has been more involved with the Palestinian dimension of this problem than any, historically, in terms of the present, the past, and probably the future. So, obviously that dimension has to be addressed and it is very, very important to us that it be. Our sense of responsibility towards our Palestinian brethren, be they in the occupied territories or anywhere, is such as to compel us to suggest that this is an opportunity and maybe the last for a long time to come to address this problem. You asked for a question in terms of how do we go from here, well, obviously we have made it clear that if our Palestinian brethren approach us, we will look at that and we will look at the possibility of a joint delegation if that's the only way to facilitate rapid progress towards a solution. That hasn't happened until now, and let's wait and see how it develops in the future.

Q: (inaudible) is that the PLO? Are you saying the PLO?

HUSSEIN: Are you trying to create difficulties?

Q: I am trying to clarify the situation....

HUSSEIN: I am saying Palestinians. And as far as the Palestinians are concerned, I am talking about the Palestinians as such; all the Palestinian people.

(end transcript)

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מ-: ווש, נר: 2072, חא: 130591, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בכבכ

סודי ביותר / מיידי

אל: ממ'ד, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

על סיור צ'ייני בסעודיה ובמפרציות.

משיחה עם קין מנהל מחלקת חצי האי ערב (N.E.A) ב - 13.5.

כללי.

1. הביקור היה חיובי יותר מתאורי העתונות האמריקאית. עם זאת טרם הגיעו לסיכומים עם סעודיה ומאע'מ. בשאר המפרציות לא היו בעיות. פרוט:

2. סעודיה.

צ'ייני תכנן לבקר בה פעם אחת, אך פהד ביקש לראותו רק לאחר שיבקר את השאר. מפגש צ'ייני-סלטאן (בעת הביקור הראשון) לא היה טוב במיוחד: בתגובה לבקשות האמריקאים הגיב סלטאן שמומחיהם צריכים לבדוק וכיו'ב - התייחסות בלתי מחייבת. הסתבר שהבעיה העיקרית נוגעת להצבה מראש.

3. פגישת צ'ייני - פהד, בתום הסיור הייתה טובה מאוד (כהגדרת קין). ציין כי מעובדת המתנתו של צ'ייני לפהד במשך 45 דקות אין להסיק דבר שכן משתלבת בנוהגיהם של שליטי האיזור), אך אף היא לא פתרה את הבעיות שהתגלעו במפגש פהד - סלטאן.

● הסעודים קשרו במרומוז (IMPLIED LINKAGE) בין ההצבה מראש לבין מכירות נשק (קרא משפט זה מתוך דו"ח כתוב). לשאלתי ציין שהסעודים לא נקבו בכמויות האמל'ח המבוקש על ידם והדגשי שוב שהסתפקו ברמז.

העריך שהם מעוניינים ברכש עקב תוכניותיהם להגדיל הצבא. הזכיר שהפנטגון מבצע כיום JOINT SECURITY REVIEW עם הסעודים להערכת צרכיהם הצבאיים, והעריך שסקירה זו תמשך מס' חודשים.

5. הסעודים מוכנים להגדלת נוכחות צי ארה'ב, ולשת'פ בינה לבין שאר מדינות המשפ'מ, ורמזו על נכונות לתרגילים משותפים עם צבא ארה'ב.

6. צ'ייני הדגשי ענינו בהחלטה סעודית מהירה לגבי ההצבה מראש, שכן ארה'ב מצוייה בתהליך פינוי. פהד הבטיח החלטה בתוך שבועיים. לפי שעה, ארט יוז, סגן עוזר מזכיר ההגנה למז'ת ודרום אסיה, יצא (12.5) לסעודיה כדי לקבל את פרטי התפיסה הסעודית (יצויין שיוז מיועד לשמש כשגרירם בתימן החל בקיץ הקרוב. טרם קיבל אישור הקונגרס).

7. ארה"ב מעוניינת להציב בסעודיה ציוד לדיביזיות קרקע ולחמש טייסות טקטיות.

כווית.

8. צ'ייני נתקל בבעיה הפוכה. הכוויתים ביקשו מהאמריקאים להשאיר כוחותיהם. צ'ייני סרב, אך הסכים להותיר חטיבה עד ה-1 בספטמבר. הכוויתים בקשו להאריך המועד עד -1 בינואר לפחות. השיב שאין לו סמכות לכך. להערכת קין הבקשה הכוויתית תבחן אצל הנשיא ויתכן שתענה בחיוב.

9. הכוויתים שאלו מה בדבר הצבה מראש. האמריקאים - נעיין בכך. לדברי קין, צבא ארה"ב איננו מעוניין בהצבת ציוד בקירבה כה גדולה לגבול העיראקי. לא תהיה בעיה בקיום תרגילים משותפים עם כווית. כן הציעו הכוויתים בסיס ימי. האמריקנים - נבקר מדי פעם.

10. האמריקנים-אם אתם כה מודאגים, מדוע לא תקימו הסדרי בטחון עם מצרים? הכוויתים השיבו שיתקשרו ישירות עם המצרים, ובן שיחי מעריך שידובר על הצבת חטיבה שתשמש כ'תיל ממעיד'. הוסיפו שיזדקקו גם לכוח סמלי סורי.

11. הביקור היה טוב ומבטא השנוי במערכת היחסים, שהיתה קרירה למדי לפני המשבר. הקטרים ביקשו תחילה שההסכם יחתם באמצעות המשפ'מ, אך בסופו של דבר הוחלט במשפ'מ שהארגון יאשר את ההסכמים הביטוראליים שיחתמו בין ארה"ב לחברותיו. הבקשות האמריקניות מקטר: אחסון דלק וציוד לוגיסטי לצי, תרגילים משותפים, ביקורי צי. הקטרים שגרו לאחר תום הביקור אגרת בה אשרו הבקשות. עתה נותר לעבד הפרטים (להערכת בן שיחי - במשך שנה לפחות).

בחריין.

12. מבחינת נכונות הבחרינים אין כל בעיות. בעיית ארה"ב: להימנע מנוכחות יתר העלולה לסכן היציבות הפנימית (שליטי בחריין סונים, אך למעלה משני שלישי מאוכלוסייתה שיעיים. הנוכחות המערבית באי תרחב ממילא משום שוועדת האו"ם המטפלת בהשמדת הנשק העיראקי מתכוונת להתבסס במקום). ארה"ב תוסיף הנות מהשירותים הצבאיים עפ"י ההסכם הקיים בין השתיים, תקיים תרגילים משותפים, ויתכן שתרחיב ההצבה מראש.

13. מא'עם.

אזירת הביקור דומה לזו ששררה בסעודיה. שיח' זאיד נשא נאום חם מאוד אך לא התחייב לדבר ספציפי. העלה אף הוא, ברמז, את עניינו ברכש מארה"ב. האמריקאים מעוניינים להקים את המפקדה הקדמית של פיקוד מרכז במאע'מ, עקב דאגתם ליציבות הפנימית בבחריין, אך עשויים לשוב לבחריין אם העניין לא יסתייע. כן מבקשת ארה"ב להציב מראש ציוד לשתי טייסות טקטיות. ארט יוז אמר עדיין לקבל את פרטי עמדות מאע'מ - בדומה למצב עם סעודיה.

עומאן.

14. הסלטאן קאבוס הסכים לכל בקשות ארה"ב. זו תרחיב ההצבה מראש משלוש טייסות טקטיות (כיום) לחמש, ומתכוונת לשגר 1-2 אוניות תובלה מדייגו גרסייה שתעגונה מחוץ למעגן (OFF SHORE) בעומאן, כנראה ליד מצירה.

נקודות נוספות.

15. ארה'ב מבקשת שסעודיה ומאע'מ תקמנה בעצמן את המתקנים לציוד ההצבה מראש שעלותם עלולה להגיע למאות מליוני דולר. אין היא מבקשת זאת מעומאן.

16. חברות המשפ'מ הרגיעו את ארה'ב כי אין מייעדות לאיראן תפקיד משמעותי בהסדרי בטחון באיזור.

17. צ'ייני שמע מבני שיחו, בסעודיה ובמפרציות, דעות שליליות על יעילות הצבא המצרי, וקביעות כי אין לסמוך של הסורים. האמריקנים ציינו העזרה שהשתיים הושיטו בעת המשבר. התשובה - אמנם הודינו ושילמנו להן על כך.

18. המארחים הביעו דאגה רבה נוכח המשך קיומו של צדאם, והדגישו הצורך לחסל נשק ההשמדה ההמוני שברשותו.

19. הסלטאן קאבוס לוחץ להקמת כוח משפ'מ בן 100 אלף איש. איש מהאחרים לא שלל את ההצעה, אך איש גם לא נענה בחיוב...

שיחי ממילא אינו מייחס חשיבות כלשהי למשקלו הצבאי של המשפ'מ. לדעתו זה יוסיף להוות מסגרת פוליטית גרידא, שתספק לגיטימציה להסתמכות על ארה'ב.

20. בקרב חברות המשפ'מ, קטר תופסת עתה את מקום 'הילד הרע' שמילאה בעבר עומאן, שכן הקטרים חידשו את סכסוך האיים בינם לבין בחריין.

הערות.

21. קין ישמש כציר בשגרירותם בירדן החל מיולי 1991.

22. אנא שימרו על חסיון הנ'ל.

אמיתי.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אשרי
עם
מספר
704

אאא, חוזם: 12297
אל: רהמש/704
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130591, זח: 1349, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/בהול

אל : לש' רה'מ - דוד גרנית

מאת : מצפ'א

המכללה האמריקנית לבטחון לאומי - בקשת פגישה עם רה'מ
(NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE)

1. תלמידי המכללה (כ-15 איש) מסיירים באזורנו והגיעו הבוקר לביקור בישראל (דרך גשר אלנבי). מתוכננות להם פגישות עם גורמי הבטחון (כולל שהב'ט), מנכ"ל משה'ח וכן סיורים.

2. המכללה מכשירה קצינים ופקידי ממשל ממשרד ההגנה, מחלקת המדינה וסוכנויות ממשל אחרות. עניינם בנושאים הכרוכים בבטחון לאומי תוך התייחסות להקשרים הבינלאומיים. (במסגרת זו יוצאים לסיורי שטח מחוץ לארה"ב).

3. מן השגרירות פנו עתה וביקשו להסדיר עבור המשלחת פגישה עם רה'מ. הסבירו שהינם רואים צורך בכך מאחר שהמשלחת נפגשה למשך שעה עם המלך חוסיין ולמשך שעתיים עם יורש העצר חסן.

4. אנא תשובתכם הדחופה.

מצפ'א
13 במאי 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12297
אל: רהמש/704
מ-: המשרד, תא: 130591, זח: 1349, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בבבב
שמור/בהול

אל : לש' רה'מ - דוד גרנית

מאת : מצפ'א

המכללה האמריקנית לבטחון לאומי - בקשת פגישה עם רה'מ
(NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE)

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4. אנא תשובתכם הדחופה.

מצפ'א
13 במאי 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס

U.S.; SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SEEK MIDEAST CONFERENCE
 (Transcript: Baker; Bessmertnykh comments 5/13/91)

Cairo -- Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh will continue to try to organize a Middle East peace conference, although important differences between Israel and Syria remain unresolved, they said May 13 in Cairo.

Speaking with reporters following a second round of talks in the Egyptian capital, Bessmertnykh said he and Baker had "a good discussion" of bilateral issues, including arms control, the treaty to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the still incomplete U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction (S.T.A.R.T.) Treaty, curbs on chemical weapons, and other regional issues including El Salvador and Afghanistan.

"We have also agreed to coordinate further action as far as the Middle East area is concerned. We shall be in close touch within the days to come," the Soviet official said.

Following their initial round of talks in Cairo on May 12, Baker told reporters: "There is a substantial degree of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to what is required, and with respect to what should be done, and, of course, with respect to the overall goal and objective of peace through direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Arab states on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians on the other."

After the May 13 talks, Baker pointed out that "a number of issues" concerning a possible peace conference "are substantially agreed to," but acknowledged that "some issues" are not agreed. "Significant differences" remain between Syria and Israel on whether there should be any United Nations involvement in such a conference and on whether the conference should be "a one-time affair" or have some sort of continuity, the secretary said.

On other issues:

-- Bessmertnykh said he hoped that high-level military and political discussions scheduled later this week in Washington "would be helpful" in resolving problems which have prevented the coming into force of the CFE Treaty which was signed last November in Paris.

-- Baker said they agreed "to continue working toward" a summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, who both want one. "Whether or not there can be a summit by the middle of the summer will depend, of course, upon the progress on these arms control discussions," the secretary added.

-- Baker said he and Bessmertnykh are "looking into the

possibility" of both attending a ceremony in Lisbon later this month at which an Angolan peace agreement is scheduled for formal signature.

Following is a transcript of the Baker-Bessmertnykh comments to reporters following their May 13 meeting in Cairo:

(begin transcript)

BESSMERTNYKH: Ladies and gentlemen, we have just finished the second round of talks with Secretary of State Baker. This time, we have concentrated on quite a large agenda of issues. But have continued briefly the discussion, of course, of the situation in the Middle East and the approaches to the comprehensive settlement which we have reported to you last night.

This time, we had time to talk about bilateral issues, including arms control, CFE, and the S.T.A.R.T., and the chemical weapons and some other issues in that category. We have also talked about some other regional areas, including El Salvador, and Afghanistan and some other things which we believed were worth discussing. I would like also to mention that when we were talking about bilateral issues, we have had a chance to exchange views on some delegations that are going to visit both countries and some particular areas of interest in the economic sphere.

So that was a good discussion, very helpful. And we have also agreed to coordinate further action as far as the Middle East area is concerned. We shall be in close touch within the days to come.

BAKER: I think that's a very good summary of our discussions, and so, perhaps, we should just respond to your questions.

QUESTION: It seems we were a little premature on our last meeting about CFE. There was still an amphibious element missing from agreement. Do you now have an agreement on CFE, or is that dependent on the general's visit to Washington?

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, we have discussed the CFE situation again, and we hope that the forthcoming discussions which are going to be held in Washington (inaudible) military and political level would be helpful. So we shall wait for those discussions to happen.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment about the news that came out from your plane coming down from Damascus that you were unhappy with the results of your meetings with President Assad?

BAKER: Well, I've commented on that by saying that there are a

number of issues with respect to the possibility of holding a peace conference, a number of issues that are substantially agreed to. There are some issues that are not agreed to. There are significant differences, for instance, between the positions of the governments of Syria and Israel with respect to the question of whether or not there should be any U.N. involvement, and with respect to the question of whether or not the conference should be a one-time affair or should have some sort of continuity.

The minister and I will continue to work on those issues and see if we can bring them closer together.

Q: (inaudible) will be a summit sometime in the last week of June? Have you agreed on that?

BAKER: We have agreed to continue working toward the possibility of a summit. I think it's fair to say that both leaders -- both President Bush and President Gorbachev -- would like to hold a summit. But whether or not there can be a summit by the middle of the summer will depend, of course, upon the progress on these arms control discussions which the minister referred to.

Q: Can we say that as a result of your talks here we can see the light at the end of the Middle East tunnel?

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, I can say that our talks on the Middle East here have reached a rather large plateau. And as a result, I think that the possibilities for a conference that we have in mind are growing, and the number of problems is fewer than before. And I would also emphasize that there is no stop in the process and the movement. The movement is continuing, and that gives ground for hope.

Q: (inaudible)

BAKER: We did discuss the Angola agreement and the fact that there is going to be a ceremony to wrap up that agreement in Lisbon the latter part of this month. We are both looking into the possibility of attending that ceremony, since we spent some time working on the agreement.

Q: Do you need S.T.A.R.T. and CFE before a summit?

BAKER: I'm going to leave that where the president left it the last time he answered the question.

Q: Mr. Baker, (inaudible) in your talks President Assad, is Assad ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel and Egypt, please, or just give it non-belligerency, if Israel agrees to withdraw from the territories.

BAKER: The discussions with the governments that we have both been visiting have revolved primarily around the question of whether or not they will attend a conference designed to launch bilateral negotiations for peace.

So the question you pose is a very -- that's a bottom line question. And it's not a question that can be answered in the absence of direct negotiations between the parties. The first thing that has to happen is that the parties have to sit down with good intentions, and with true reconciliation in mind to negotiate peace.

Q: Did aid and credit to the Soviet Union come up today? And, Mr. Bessmertnykh, what is it that the Soviet Union would like?

BESSMERTNYKH: What is the first part of your question?

Q: Aid and credit to the Soviet Union.

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, we have discussed earlier (inaudible) the area of economic cooperation and possibilities of some projects and (inaudible). And we have discussed that element, as well.

Q: (inaudible/cross-questioning) ...did you two agree on some kind of procedure for cutting arms sales to each side's allies in the region?

BESSMERTNYKH: No, we haven't reached that stage of the discussions. We know that there is a subject for further consideration. And we both recognize the necessity to dwell on it. And we have some ideas about it, but it is not yet, I think, at this stage, of comparing them.

Q: Mr. Minister, did you discuss the security arrangements that the United States and Egypt and the Gulf states are currently talking about for the Gulf? And how does the Soviet Union view the possibility that American troops may be stationed in the Gulf more or less permanently?

BESSMERTNYKH: We have discussed this issue before and we have touched upon this subject this morning. And since we have already accumulated what you call a level of discussions and understandings with respect to that issue, we didn't need to spend as much time this time. We understand that this is an important part of the regional situation. And, of course, we pay a lot of attention to it and we shall probably go discussing it. But I have nothing to report on that this morning.

BAKER: Let me say that we also talked this morning about the situation in northern Iraq, the situation with respect to humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and about the importance of seeing the international community assume the responsibility

for humanitarian relief to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

I pointed out to the minister that the United States stepped into the breach in this connection because we did not feel that anyone else was in a position to do what had to be done to save lives. It is our desire to see U.S. forces removed from northern Iraq, just as soon as we can do so with due regard for the safety of the Kurdish population, and with due regard for the safety of international humanitarian relief workers. It is very important, in our view, that the United Nations and other international relief agencies come into northern Iraq and pick up the responsibility for humanitarian relief for the Kurdish population there.

Q: Mr. Baker, do you have in mind a conference without Syria, because of their attitude?

SECRETARY BAKER: We would, obviously, much prefer to see a conference with Syria. Because it would be -- Syria is a very, very important country on this issue and to this process. And it would be our hope that we could continue to work to narrow the differences between Syria and Israel so that we can have a conference that is comprehensive, that includes all of the countries affected, and that would, thereby, be much more effective in moving toward peace in the Middle East.

Q: Mr. Minister, would you support a U.N. resolution authorizing an international peace-keeping force to northern Iraq?

BESSMERTNYKH: As the secretary just said, we have discussed the situation in northern Iraq and about, what I have said, a thin line that separates the necessity for humanitarian support and the concerns for the sovereignty of a country. And it is a very intricate balance, and I think it's good that we have discussed it. And we are going to be in touch on that further.

BAKER: Let me also say that we discussed, as I think perhaps the minister mentioned, the question of chemical weapons and a global ban on chemical weapons. And there has been some progress in this regard. And we are both optimistic that the world can begin to move toward a global ban on chemical weapons.

Q: (inaudible) ...some progress on Afghanistan?

BAKER: We talked about Afghanistan. There are still some things to talk about on Afghanistan.

(end transcript)

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TRADE IMBALANCES TO NARROW IN 1991, MAY WIDEN IN 1992

(Japan; Germany may increase trade surpluses)

By Jon Schaffer

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Relatively strong growth in Germany and Japan and weaker growth in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom should produce a narrowing in the trade and current account imbalances of the major industrial countries this year.

However, the gradual reductions in German and Japanese surpluses in recent years may be reversed in 1992, according to a new report produced jointly by the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

The Annual Trade Projection Report, released May 13, is required by the 1988 Trade Act. It will be followed in several days by the Treasury Department's semi-annual report on exchange rate developments, also mandated by the 1988 Trade Act.

"The relatively weak economies should see reduced external deficits this year, as should Germany given its special circumstances," the trade report says. "The expected return to a more uniform growth pattern in the major economies in 1992, however, suggests that substantially less adjustment may be in prospect; indeed, a lull in the foreign adjustment process, or even a reversal in some cases, cannot be ruled out."

In 1990, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit narrowed by \$6,200 million to \$108,700 million, while the current account deficit -- a broader measure of a country's external position -- fell \$10,700 million to \$99,300 million. The U.S. trade imbalance with Japan declined by almost \$8,000 million to \$41,800 million, and the United States registered its first trade surplus -- \$4,900 million -- with the 12 European Community member nations since 1982. The U.S. trade deficit with the four Asian newly industrializing economies -- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore -- narrowed by a total of \$14,000 million to \$21,000 million. But the U.S. deficit with the member nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) rose substantially, and the U.S. deficit with most countries of the Western Hemisphere also increased.

The report says that continued weak demand in Japan's key foreign markets is expected to slow that country's export growth this year. However, import growth in Japan is also likely to slow due to a less robust pace of domestic demand, thus limiting the scope for further trade surplus reduction in 1991.

Given the still-substantial gap between Japan's imports and exports, the report continues, a reduction in that nation's trade surplus in 1992 will require total imports to grow at

U.S. WILL FORSWEAR CW USE ONCE TREATY IS IN FORCE

(Text: Bush statement on CW 5/13/91)

Washington -- The United States is "formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state," says President Bush, effective when the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force.

The convention, which is now being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, represents "the world's best hope" for the total ban of chemical weapons worldwide, the president said in a statement May 13.

Bush also announced that to accelerate the negotiations, the United States will:

- unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force.
- offer technical assistance to other nations to destroy their stockpiles efficiently and safely.
- propose requiring that parties to the convention refuse to trade in chemical weapon-related materials with states that do not join in.
- impose "all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons."

Following is the text of Bush's statement:

(begin text)

The Gulf war has once again raised the specter of chemical weapons and demonstrated that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten innocent populations with these weapons of terror so long as we permit them to exist. These stark events renew and reinforce my conviction, shared by responsible leaders around the world, that chemical weapons must be banned -- everywhere in the world.

The world's best hope for this goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention now being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The United States is committed to the early, successful completion of this convention and I am today announcing a number of steps we will take to accelerate the negotiations and achieve an effective chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. I hope this initiative also will spur other nations to commit themselves equally to this critical objective.

I have instructed the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva to implement my decisions at the next session which begins May 14. To demonstrate the U.S. commitment to banning chemical weapons,

we are formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the convention enters into force, and will propose that all states follow suit. Further, the United States unconditionally commits itself to the destruction of all our stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and will propose that all other states do likewise. We will offer technical assistance to others to do this efficiently and safely.

In addition, we will call for setting a target date to conclude the convention and recommend the conference stay in continuous session if necessary to meet the target. The United States also will propose new and effective verification measures for inspecting sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons. To provide tangible benefits for those states that join the convention and significant penalties for those that fail to support it, the United States will propose the convention require parties to refuse to trade in chemical weapon-related materials with states that do not join in the convention. The United States reaffirms that we will impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the convention, especially the use of chemical weapons.

These steps can move the world significantly closer to the goal of a world free of chemical weapons. I call upon all other nations to join us in the serious and cooperative pursuit of this important goal.

(end text)

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PRESIDENT BUSH'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS INITIATIVE

(Text: White House fact sheet 5/13/91)

(The White House May 13 issued the following fact sheet on President Bush's chemical weapons initiative.)

Noting that the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf had brought into play once again the specter of the use of chemical weapons against innocent populations, the president announced a new series of steps in his long-term goal of ridding the world of these weapons of terror. The president reiterated his belief that the best hope for achieving that goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- a multilateral treaty that would completely ban the production, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons -- under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

The primary purpose of this initiative are to strengthen the prospects of an early successful conclusion of the convention, to demonstrate the commitment of the United States to achieving an effective ban on CW as soon as possible, and to provide incentives to other nations to commit themselves equally to this critical objective. To this end, the president declared that the U.S. delegation to the CD would take the following actions when the next session of the talks on the CWC resumes May 14, 1991:

1. The United States will call for the resolution of all major outstanding issues in the CD talks in Geneva on the CWC by the end of 1991 and the completion of the CWC within twelve (12) months.
2. To help reach these goals and to ensure that no time is lost and no opportunity is wasted to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion soon, the United States will propose that the CW ad hoc negotiating committee of the CD stay in continuous session in Geneva, beginning with the May session. The United States is prepared to keep its ambassador at the table and to reinforce its delegation as necessary to support this schedule.
3. The United States will formally declare its intention to become an original party to the CWC and will call upon all states publicly to commit to becoming original parties to the treaty and to declare their CW stocks.
4. The United States will drop its position that states retain a right of retaliation with CW as long as they have CW stocks if CW are used against them first. The United States will formally forswear the use of CW for any reason, including retaliation in kind with CW, against any state, effective when the CWC enters into force. The United States will also propose a provision for the CWC prohibiting the use of CW for any

reason.

5. The United States will drop its position that we must be allowed to keep 2 percent of our CW stockpile (500 tons) until all CW-capable states have joined the convention. The United States will unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of its CW stocks and former production facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the CWC. We will call upon all states to follow our lead and to begin the destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as possible. We will propose provisions for the CWC that require all parties to begin the unconditional destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as the CWC enters into force, and to complete their elimination within 10 years of that date.

6. The United States will provide practical and effective help to other states to assist in the speedy, safe, and environmentally sound destruction of CW where ever they may be found.

We will:

-- Create a task force comprised of U.S. government and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the United States can advise and assist states in CW destruction.

-- Provide technical destruction assistance (e.g., visits to U.S. destruction facilities, blueprints, and technical advice) to states parties that have CW located on their territory.

-- Propose the creation of a CD Working Group on CW destruction and offer to provide U.S. experts to it.

7. The United States will provide extensive information to other states on U.S. export controls on CW-related materials and technology and our domestic legislation to enforce them. We will call on all states to enact similar controls, thereby enhancing the control of CW proliferation as we work toward a complete and formal ban.

8. Aside from the significant intrinsic benefits that will flow to all parties from a total ban on CW, there should be tangible benefits for those states that join the convention and enhance its strength, and specific penalties for those states that fail to support it in the most fundamental and important way by not joining it. Therefore, the United States will propose provisions for the CWC that require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with states that do not become parties within a reasonable time after entry into force.

9. The United States will reaffirm our position that there should be sanctions against those states that violate the CWC

and especially severe sanctions against any state that initiates the use of CW. The United States declares that it will consider violations of the CWC, especially the initiation of the use of CW, as extremely grave breaches of international law, and that the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions.

10. The United States will reaffirm our commitment to a strong and forthright verification regime. We will offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of inspecting suspect sites. We will call on the CD to adopt our position for challenge inspections of such sites.

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EIGHT NATIONS SEEK COOPERATION ON ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT

(June ministerial cited as "milestone")

By Jim Fuller

USIA Science Writer

Washington -- The upcoming ministerial meeting of eight Arctic nations represents the first opportunity for region-wide cooperation on measures to protect the environment of the northern polar region, according to a U.S. official.

Curtis Bohlen, assistant secretary of state for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, told a Senate subcommittee May 13 that the pioneering meeting, to be held next month in Rovaniemi, Finland, "is a milestone for Arctic countries."

He said the ministerial will consider an Arctic environment protection strategy, an Arctic monitoring program, and measures to protect the region's marine environment, fauna and flora.

Bohlen said that aside from a 1973 agreement on polar bears, there currently are no Arctic multilateral agreements or cooperative arrangements.

"The Arctic countries -- Finland, Canada, Denmark (representing Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and the United States -- are now embarked on discussions about regional cooperation" he said. "There is also a mutual understanding of all parties to involve Arctic indigenous peoples in this process."

Bohlen said that the Arctic environmental protection strategy, discussed at a working level meeting May 6-8 in Helsinki, Finland, is a plan for cooperation and coordination of national efforts to protect the environment. The strategy is based on "state of the environment" reports prepared by individual countries and reviewed by all participants.

In addition, the Arctic countries are expected to agree to establish an Arctic monitoring and assessment program. The goals of this program are to coordinate existing and future monitoring efforts and to develop an Arctic data directory. The Environmental Protection Agency is the lead U.S. agency for this program.

"Countries recognize that this first step of cooperation is essential to the future coordination of our response to pollution threats," Bohlen said. "We also will consider the coordination and sharing of information and research on Arctic fauna and flora."

Bohlen said that another major effort in circumpolar cooperation in the Arctic occurred last January with the first

BUSH SAYS U.S. TO FORSWEAR USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

(Pledges no use once CW pact in force)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- The United States will not use chemical weapons for any reason, President Bush asserted May 13, as soon as the pending Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force.

Bush said he has instructed U.S. negotiators in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament talks to call for setting a target date for concluding the convention, and he suggested that negotiators stay in session until the pact is completed, instead of recessing after several weeks. Negotiations resume May 14 on the international agreement to ban production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Bush wants all major issues settled by the end of this year and the convention completed by May 1992.

In a written statement, Bush said Washington "unconditionally commits itself" to destroy all its chemical weapons and production facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. Washington had previously said it would retain two percent of its chemical weapons arsenal until all nations capable of producing chemical weapons had signed the convention. The president said the United States would not use chemical weapons, once the convention is in force, even to retaliate against a chemical weapons attack.

Bush declared the Persian Gulf war had shown once again that unscrupulous states like Iraq "can and will threaten innocent populations with these weapons of terror" for as long as the world permits their existence. He said the war reinforced his conviction "that chemical weapons must be banned everywhere in the world."

A senior administration official told reporters Bush was yielding on points which had troubled some of the 36 other nations involved in the Geneva conference, adding that the president shifted position in an effort to "seize the opportunity" for agreement presented by the attention focused on Iraq's chemical arsenal. In addition to direct participants, 34 other nations are observers at the Geneva talks.

"We think this is a way to break through any blockages," the official said. "It's a different strategy for obtaining broadscale participation. If there are going to be stumbling blocks, we should find out fairly soon."

The conference has not yet agreed on the composition of the international body which will supervise the convention, or on the extent of verification inspections.

While only the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly declared possession of chemical weapons, U.S. officials believe some 20 other nations have, or could make, chemical weapons. The 1925 Geneva Convention bans the first use of chemical weapons, but the manufacture and possession of chemical weapons is legal.

The United States has halted production of chemical weapons and has signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to begin reducing its chemical weapons stockpiles before the global convention comes into force.

The United States is destroying some of its older, unitary chemical weapons at a special incinerator on Johnson Island in the South Pacific. In modern, binary chemical weapons, components are kept separate until actual use for safety reasons.

The official described Bush's decision to drop the two percent exception as an effort to encourage widespread participation in the convention. The reason Bush had originally proposed retaining two percent of the U.S. arsenal, he said, "was a device to encourage broad-scale participation. It was to reassure some friends, and also to put some pressure on potential CW-states to join, because they would have to join before there was a global ban" leading to destruction of the last two percent of U.S. stocks. "It was conceived as a device to encourage participation, but did not appear to be accomplishing that objective," he said.

Replacing the two percent exception is a Bush proposal to ban trade with non-signatory states in materiel related to chemical weapons production. The official said that would mean inclusion of chemicals used in "everyday, commercial business. The ban would have an important and demonstrable effect on the trade of those countries which choose not to become parties."

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EDITORIAL: U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A NEW WORLD

(Following is an editorial, broadcast by the Voice of America May 11, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.)

The 20th century is ending with the collapse of the old order and the tentative emergence of the new, according to U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates. In a recent speech, Gates said the huge transformation the world is going through was largely unanticipated by the experts because they overlooked three key elements: the incredible force of courageous peoples who would be free; the political and moral bankruptcy of despotic governments; and the steadfastness of the united democracies.

Now there is the opportunity of creating a new order in which the United States must find its proper role. "Clearly," said Gates, "neither isolationism nor unilateralism is the answer." The United States faces a dual challenge: first, to fashion an enduring international commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity against aggression; and second, to encourage and support newly free states to strengthen their democracy and rebuild their economies and societies.

Gates pointed out that "with the end of the Cold War, in the Persian Gulf for the first time an international body -- the United Nations -- has played the role dreamed of by its founders -- orchestrating and sanctioning collective resistance to an aggressor. The potential for the United Nations to continue to play this role, and the new willingness of many nations to contribute money and military units, are the foundation stones of a new era of international security." This new world order, Gates said, is "characterized by a growing consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes and that when the consensus is broken, the burdens and responsibilities are shared by many nations."

Gates also focused on the opportunities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He called for continued aid to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and, most especially, the engagement of the U.S. private sector in assisting those countries. In the Soviet Union, he said, societal tensions and economic pressures "hold the potential on the one hand to move the USSR toward pluralism and economic rationality or, on the other, to create significant instability, repression and perhaps even greater hardship and civil war."

Gates said the U.S. approach to the Soviet Union "has shifted from containment of an enemy to constructive cooperation internationally and supporting democratic trends and desperately needed economic reforms." While continuing to do business with the Soviet leadership, the United States must also continue to expand contacts with democratic reformers at the republic and local level. Gates said the U.S. approach to

U.S., SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SEEK MIDEAST CONFERENCE

(Transcript: Baker, Bessmertnykh comments 5/13/91)

Cairo -- Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh will continue to try to organize a Middle East peace conference, although important differences between Israel and Syria remain unresolved, they said May 13 in Cairo.

Speaking with reporters following a second round of talks in the Egyptian capital, Bessmertnykh said he and Baker had "a good discussion" of bilateral issues, including arms control, the treaty to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the still incomplete U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction (S.T.A.R.T.) Treaty, curbs on chemical weapons, and other regional issues including El Salvador and Afghanistan.

"We have also agreed to coordinate further action as far as the Middle East area is concerned. We shall be in close touch within the days to come," the Soviet official said.

Following their initial round of talks in Cairo on May 12, Baker told reporters: "There is a substantial degree of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to what is required, and with respect to what should be done, and, of course, with respect to the overall goal and objective of peace through direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Arab states on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians on the other."

After the May 13 talks, Baker pointed out that "a number of issues" concerning a possible peace conference "are substantially agreed to," but acknowledged that "some issues" are not agreed. "Significant differences" remain between Syria and Israel on whether there should be any United Nations involvement in such a conference and on whether the conference should be "a one-time affair" or have some sort of continuity, the secretary said.

On other issues:

-- Bessmertnykh said he hoped that high-level military and political discussions scheduled later this week in Washington "would be helpful" in resolving problems which have prevented the coming into force of the CFE Treaty which was signed last November in Paris.

-- Baker said they agreed "to continue working toward" a summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, who both want one. "Whether or not there can be a summit by the middle of the summer will depend, of course, upon the progress on these arms control discussions," the secretary added.

-- Baker said he and Bessmertnykh are "looking into the

possibility" of both attending a ceremony in Lisbon later this month at which an Angolan peace agreement is scheduled for formal signature.

Following is a transcript of the Baker-Bessmertnykh comments to reporters following their May 13 meeting in Cairo:

(begin transcript)

BESSMERTNYKH: Ladies and gentlemen, we have just finished the second round of talks with Secretary of State Baker. This time, we have concentrated on quite a large agenda of issues. But have continued briefly the discussion, of course, of the situation in the Middle East and the approaches to the comprehensive settlement which we have reported to you last night.

This time, we had time to talk about bilateral issues, including arms control, CFE, and the S.T.A.R.T., and the chemical weapons and some other issues in that category. We have also talked about some other regional areas, including El Salvador, and Afghanistan and some other things which we believed were worth discussing. I would like also to mention that when we were talking about bilateral issues, we have had a chance to exchange views on some delegations that are going to visit both countries and some particular areas of interest in the economic sphere.

So that was a good discussion, very helpful. And we have also agreed to coordinate further action as far as the Middle East area is concerned. We shall be in close touch within the days to come.

BAKER: I think that's a very good summary of our discussions, and so, perhaps, we should just respond to your questions.

QUESTION: It seems we were a little premature on our last meeting about CFE. There was still an amphibious element missing from agreement. Do you now have an agreement on CFE, or is that dependent on the general's visit to Washington?

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, we have discussed the CFE situation again, and we hope that the forthcoming discussions which are going to be held in Washington (inaudible) military and political level would be helpful. So we shall wait for those discussions to happen.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment about the news that came out from your plane coming down from Damascus that you were unhappy with the results of your meetings with President Assad?

BAKER: Well, I've commented on that by saying that there are a

number of issues with respect to the possibility of holding a peace conference, a number of issues that are substantially agreed to. There are some issues that are not agreed to. There are significant differences, for instance, between the positions of the governments of Syria and Israel with respect to the question of whether or not there should be any U.N. involvement, and with respect to the question of whether or not the conference should be a one-time affair or should have some sort of continuity.

The minister and I will continue to work on those issues and see if we can bring them closer together.

Q: (inaudible) will be a summit sometime in the last week of June? Have you agreed on that?

BAKER: We have agreed to continue working toward the possibility of a summit. I think it's fair to say that both leaders -- both President Bush and President Gorbachev -- would like to hold a summit. But whether or not there can be a summit by the middle of the summer will depend, of course, upon the progress on these arms control discussions which the minister referred to.

Q: Can we say that as a result of your talks here we can see the light at the end of the Middle East tunnel?

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, I can say that our talks on the Middle East here have reached a rather large plateau. And as a result, I think that the possibilities for a conference that we have in mind are growing, and the number of problems is fewer than before. And I would also emphasize that there is no stop in the process and the movement. The movement is continuing, and that gives ground for hope.

Q: (inaudible)

BAKER: We did discuss the Angola agreement and the fact that there is going to be a ceremony to wrap up that agreement in Lisbon the latter part of this month. We are both looking into the possibility of attending that ceremony, since we spent some time working on the agreement.

Q: Do you need S.T.A.R.T. and CFE before a summit?

BAKER: I'm going to leave that where the president left it the last time he answered the question.

Q: Mr. Baker, (inaudible) in your talks President Assad, is Assad ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel and Egypt, please, or just give it non-belligerency, if Israel agrees to withdraw from the territories.

BAKER: The discussions with the governments that we have both been visiting have revolved primarily around the question of whether or not they will attend a conference designed to launch bilateral negotiations for peace.

So the question you pose is a very -- that's a bottom line question. And it's not a question that can be answered in the absence of direct negotiations between the parties. The first thing that has to happen is that the parties have to sit down with good intentions, and with true reconciliation in mind to negotiate peace.

Q: Did aid and credit to the Soviet Union come up today? And, Mr. Bessmertnykh, what is it that the Soviet Union would like?

BESSMERTNYKH: What is the first part of your question?

Q: Aid and credit to the Soviet Union.

BESSMERTNYKH: Well, we have discussed earlier (inaudible) the area of economic cooperation and possibilities of some projects and (inaudible). And we have discussed that element, as well.

Q: (inaudible/cross-questioning) ...did you two agree on some kind of procedure for cutting arms sales to each side's allies in the region?

BESSMERTNYKH: No, we haven't reached that stage of the discussions. We know that there is a subject for further consideration. And we both recognize the necessity to dwell on it. And we have some ideas about it, but it is not yet, I think, at this stage, of comparing them.

Q: Mr. Minister, did you discuss the security arrangements that the United States and Egypt and the Gulf states are currently talking about for the Gulf? And how does the Soviet Union view the possibility that American troops may be stationed in the Gulf more or less permanently?

BESSMERTNYKH: We have discussed this issue before and we have touched upon this subject this morning. And since we have already accumulated what you call a level of discussions and understandings with respect to that issue, we didn't need to spend as much time this time. We understand that this is an important part of the regional situation. And, of course, we pay a lot of attention to it and we shall probably go discussing it. But I have nothing to report on that this morning.

BAKER: Let me say that we also talked this morning about the situation in northern Iraq, the situation with respect to humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and about the importance of seeing the international community assume the responsibility

for humanitarian relief to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

I pointed out to the minister that the United States stepped into the breach in this connection because we did not feel that anyone else was in a position to do what had to be done to save lives. It is our desire to see U.S. forces removed from northern Iraq, just as soon as we can do so with due regard for the safety of the Kurdish population, and with due regard for the safety of international humanitarian relief workers. It is very important, in our view, that the United Nations and other international relief agencies come into northern Iraq and pick up the responsibility for humanitarian relief for the Kurdish population there.

Q: Mr. Baker, do you have in mind a conference without Syria, because of their attitude?

SECRETARY BAKER: We would, obviously, much prefer to see a conference with Syria. Because it would be -- Syria is a very, very important country on this issue and to this process. And it would be our hope that we could continue to work to narrow the differences between Syria and Israel so that we can have a conference that is comprehensive, that includes all of the countries affected, and that would, thereby, be much more effective in moving toward peace in the Middle East.

Q: Mr. Minister, would you support a U.N. resolution authorizing an international peace-keeping force to northern Iraq?

BESSMERTNYKH: As the secretary just said, we have discussed the situation in northern Iraq and about, what I have said, a thin line that separates the necessity for humanitarian support and the concerns for the sovereignty of a country. And it is a very intricate balance, and I think it's good that we have discussed it. And we are going to be in touch on that further.

BAKER: Let me also say that we discussed, as I think perhaps the minister mentioned, the question of chemical weapons and a global ban on chemical weapons. And there has been some progress in this regard. And we are both optimistic that the world can begin to move toward a global ban on chemical weapons.

Q: (inaudible) ...some progress on Afghanistan?

BAKER: We talked about Afghanistan. There are still some things to talk about on Afghanistan.

(end transcript)

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BAKER, MUBARAK, MEGUID DISCUSS MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS
(Transcript: Cairo press conference 5/13/91)

Cairo -- Secretary of State Baker met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid May 13 to discuss the Middle East peace process.

Afterwards, Baker and Meguid held a news conference, at which they discussed the progress and difficulties involved in organizing an international conference that would pave the way for comprehensive peace in the region.

Following is a transcript of their remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID: Ladies and gentlemen, it is once again our pleasure to be with Secretary Baker this afternoon. Secretary Baker, myself, I think we had a very fruitful meeting with President Mubarak and then a tripartite meeting of the three foreign ministers with the President. I think we can feel, all of us, satisfied about the progress achieved in the peace process. There are still some problems but we cannot consider them insurmountable. This has to be worked out, it will be worked out, and reach, I'm sure, a happy conclusion for all of us, for we are very much keen on the peace to be established in our area. We appreciate the effort this is done by the United States, President Bush and Secretary Baker. He has been traveling a lot to welcome that, we hope he can keep on with that determination because we believe that this is a very important matter for all of us: peace and stability in this area. He has received the blessing of President Mubarak for what the United States is doing. I think I will repeat myself in saying, wishing, that the United States is very serious in this endeavor and we certainly continue to work hand in hand until we see the peace conference start and will continue for the benefit of all countries in the area. I once again welcome Secretary Baker in Cairo. Thank You.

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me simply thank my friend and colleague here who will, rumor has it, no longer be the Foreign Minister of Egypt as of the day after tomorrow. He will instead be the Secretary General of the Arab League and, in our opinion, the Arab League could not find a better, more capable, more respected Secretary General.

I want to thank President Mubarak for hosting this tripartite meeting this afternoon and for ~~the~~ the working lunch that we just concluded along with Minister Bessmertnykh.

We will continue as my colleague Esmat Abdel Meguid has said, we will continue to work toward bringing about a peace conference that can deal on two tracks with the issues of

Mideast peace. As I have said a couple of times before, there are more issues with respect to which there is agreement than there are issues with respect to which there is disagreement. But of course, in order to have a conference you've got to resolve all of the issues satisfactorily, including those with respect to which there is disagreement. Egypt has been very, very active in trying to resolve some of these issues. Egypt is going to continue to be active in trying to resolve these issues, as are the Soviet Union and the United States.

Q: Mr. Baker, Israeli radio said yesterday that you would be sending out invitation to five nations, including Jordan, and there was no mention of a Palestinian delegation. Does that mean that the Palestinians will come under the Jordanian flag at the conference?

A: Well, the discussions are still continuing with respect to whether a Palestinian delegation should be a freestanding delegation, whether it should be part of an all-Arab delegation, or whether it should be a joint Palestinian/Jordanian delegation. That decision ultimately, of course, will be made by the parties involved, that is the Palestinians -- and if it's part of an all-Arab delegation, the Arab countries that would be a part of the delegation, or Jordan if the case were a joint delegation with Jordan.

Q: What is a major stumbling block?

A: Well, the major differences right now appear to me to be the question of what role, if any, the United Nations might have in any peace conference. And secondly, whether or not the conference would be simply a one-time meeting, a one-time affair, or whether it would have the ability to reconvene with the consent of all of the parties. Syria and Israel adopt different positions with respect to these issues, and it is our job and our responsibility to see what we can do to try and move them together.

Now I don't mean to suggest that all other issues have been resolved, but these are the two primary issues, at least as I see it, that now stand in the way of a possible conference on Mideast peace. And it would seem to me, that these issues being of the nature that they are, relating strictly to a question of modality, that the parties would make every effort to try and resolve them satisfactorily so that there can be some progress toward peace.

But I said right here on this same terrace, I think the last two times I was here, nobody can impose peace upon the parties. They have got to want it. So they have got to find a way to come together on issues such as this. You have one party saying there should be absolutely no involvement whatsoever of the United Nations and the conference should be a one-time

affair with no ability to reconvene; you have another party saying there should be full United Nations participation and a conference of a continuing nature. I'm optimistic enough to think that there ought to be some way that we can resolve those two questions; perhaps with the good offices of Egypt. Egypt has made peace. Egypt has made peace with Israel. Israel has made peace with Egypt.

FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID: I think we will try to help, as Secretary Baker is saying, in trying to find an answer to these two difficulties. Discussions will go on and we certainly will work with all our strength to try to bridge this gap and see, as I said a few minutes ago, that this conference of peace will start and have a good start for the betterment of all of us. Thank you.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER, BESSMERTNYKH CONFER ON MIDEAST, BILATERAL ISSUES

(Transcript: news conference 5/12/91)

Cairo -- Secretary of State James Baker met with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh May 12 to discuss options for peace in the Middle East and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Speaking with reporters at the conclusion of the first round of talks with his Soviet counterpart at the Semiramis hotel, Baker said that "there is a substantial degree of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to what is required and what should be done...with respect to the overall goal and objective of peace through direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Arab States, on the one hand and Israel and Palestinians, on the other."

Following is a transcript of the Baker-Bessmertnykh comments to reporters after their May 12 meeting in Cairo:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SEC. BAKER: Let me begin by saying that I'm very pleased to have had the opportunity to meet this evening with my colleague, Minister Bessmertnykh. We have spent our time this evening talking about our joint efforts to create a peace process regarding the issues of Middle East peace, and specifically, to promote our joint efforts to promote a peace conference.

There is a substantial degree of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to what is required, and with respect to what should be done, and, of course, with respect to the overall goal and objective of peace through direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Arab States on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians on the other.

Now we will resume our meetings tomorrow morning. I was late, of course, arriving this evening from Damascus. But we will resume tomorrow. We will talk further about the questions of Middle East peace, but we will also tomorrow discuss issues -bilateral issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, and other issues of a nature that we quite frequently discuss such as arms control and that sort of thing.

FOR. MIN. BESSMERTNYKH: I am glad we've had this chance in Cairo to continue the discussions of the Middle East which is now on our agenda, and that is an attempt to convene a peace conference to deal with a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. We have discussed the practical aspects and the modality of the efforts that we are trying to materialize. We have already decided on the parameters of the concept, and that

means that the conversation was very practical and precise. And as the Secretary just said, we have a very large area of mutual feeling about what could be done and what should be done. And I think, as co-sponsors of a possible conference, we have reached a very high degree of mutual understanding on that subject. And we shall go on discussing some of the aspects, as well as a number of issues which we always do discuss when we have a chance to be together. So I consider that this meeting was very good, and productive, and serious. And I would like to thank the government of Egypt which gave us this chance to get together and to discuss those important matters. Thank you.

SEC. BAKER: Now before we take questions, let me just make one further comment. I've had an opportunity to hear from the Minister with respect to his travels in the region. I have filled him in with respect to my travels -- my prior travels in the region and my travels on this trip. And while there are still still differences between the parties, there are significantly more areas of agreement -- substantially more -- than there are areas of disagreement. We still have work to do if there is going to be a conference -- work to do by way of trying to bring the parties together. And I think we agree that we will continue to work toward that end.

Q: Secretary Baker, Prime Minister Shamir's statements yesterday seemed quite categorically to rule out the entire concept of land for peace. That being the question, haven't you reached an impasse that cannot be bridged between Israel and the Arabs?

SEC. BAKER: I don't think that we have reached an impasse that simply cannot be bridged. As I said a minute ago, there are substantial areas of agreement between the various parties involved. One of the areas of agreement, for instance, is that the terms of reference of any conference should be to seek to achieve a comprehensive settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Now the parties will interpret those resolutions in different ways. Israel will have one interpretation. Some Arab governments will have another interpretation. And the point of the negotiations is to determine, once and for all, the exact meaning of 242.

Q: Sir, if Israel declines to carry the negotiations on the basis of the land for peace, what is in it for the Arabs, actually? Shamir has said, "no land." What is in it for Syria, for the Palestinians, for Jordan?

SEC. BAKER: Well, you're making an assumption that I don't think is necessarily warranted until after the parties have sat down at the table in direct negotiations. And I would refer you to the statements that were made before Egypt and Israel sat down and talked peace, and, in fact, reached peace.

Q: But sir, Israel defines Resolutions 242 and 338 as though they have already fulfilled that condition of returning the lands to the Arabs by giving Sinai back to Egypt.

SEC. BAKER: I think I just agreed with you that there are differing interpretations of 242. And the purpose of direct negotiations is to resolve those questions and to determine -for the parties themselves to determine what is required by those resolutions.

Q: Can I ask you if there's any possible compromise on the UN role? Is there any possible compromise on the UN role after your talks in Damascus?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I don't know. I think we need to continue to work on that. This is one of the issues that the Minister and I spent quite a bit of time talking about this evening.

Thank you all very much.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER SAYS SYRIA TALKS WERE NOT A FAILURE

(Transcript: Baker-Bessmertnykh remarks 5/13/91)

Cairo -- U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III said May 13 that his talks with Syrian President Hafez Assad the previous day were not a failure, as some had suggested.

"I don't think that's a proper characterization," Baker said in response to a reporter's question prior to his meeting here with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh.

Following is the transcript of the news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: (Through Interpreter) What about yesterday's statement by Aharon that they cannot recognize those seven countries as participants in the talks with Israel?

FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH: (Through Interpreter) We'll have to look at those statements, including also the statement by the six. I have not yet studied the details and we'll have to look at that and discuss that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you think about that?

Secretary Baker: I haven't seen the statement.

Q: Mr. Baker, are you going to open the window of possibilities a bit wider after, or not? A second question, if you don't mind: Are you going to discuss the problem of the place and time of a conference?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we have been discussing all of the issues that might relate to a possible conference. And we will continue to do that. As I said last night, there are a number of issues with respect to which there seems to be agreement between the parties -- far more issues with respect to which there is agreement than there are issues with respect to which there is not yet agreement. We intend to continue to work on those issues where there is not yet agreement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are wide-spread reports this morning that you got nothing in Syria, that the Syrian government did not move, and that your party is extremely frustrated. Is that so?

A: I don't think that's a proper characterization. The issue of whether or not there would be United Nations involvement and the degree of that involvement is an issue with respect to which there is significant difference of opinion between Syria, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. And it's just that kind of issue that the Minister and I are going to work to try

and close.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if you were unable to achieve an agreement on that issue, perhaps among others, with Assad, that would lead us to believe that you spent much of your time with Assad discussing other issues. Did you discuss with the Syrians and through them, the Lebanese, and perhaps through both of them with the Iranians, release of prisoners being held by Israel and release of remains being held by Lebanon, and freedom for Westerners being held in Lebanon?

A: Well, I'm not going to go into detail with respect to what we might or might not have discussed regarding hostages. But we did discuss with the Syrians issues other than simply the question of a possible peace conference.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER, MUBARAK, MEGUID DISCUSS MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

(Transcript: Cairo, press conference 5/13/91)

Cairo -- Secretary of State Baker met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid May 13 to discuss the Middle East peace process.

Afterwards, Baker and Meguid held a news conference, at which they discussed the progress and difficulties involved in organizing an international conference that would pave the way for comprehensive peace in the region.

Following is a transcript of their remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

FOREIGN MINISTER ABDEL MEGUID: Ladies and gentlemen, it is once again our pleasure to be with Secretary Baker this afternoon. Secretary Baker, myself, I think we had a very fruitful meeting with President Mubarak and then a tripartite meeting of the three foreign ministers with the President. I think we can feel, all of us, satisfied about the progress achieved in the peace process. There are still some problems but we cannot consider them insurmountable. This has to be worked out, it will be worked out, and reach, I'm sure, a happy conclusion for all of us, for we are very much keen on the peace to be established in our area. We appreciate the effort this is done by the United States, President Bush and Secretary Baker. He has been traveling a lot to welcome that, we hope he can keep on with that determination because we believe that this is a very important matter for all of us: peace and stability in this area. He has received the blessing of President Mubarak for what the United States is doing. I think I will repeat myself in saying, wishing, that the United States is very serious in this endeavor and we certainly continue to work hand in hand until we see the peace conference start and will continue for the benefit of all countries in the area. I once again welcome Secretary Baker in Cairo. Thank You.

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me simply thank my friend and colleague here who will, rumor has it, no longer be the Foreign Minister of Egypt as of the day after tomorrow. He will instead be the Secretary General of the Arab League and, in our opinion, the Arab League could not find a better, more capable, more respected Secretary General.

I want to thank President Mubarak for hosting this tripartite meeting this afternoon and for the working lunch that we just concluded along with Minister Bessmertnykh.

We will continue as my colleague Esmat Abdel Meguid has said, we will continue to work toward bringing about a peace conference that can deal on two tracks with the issues of

Mideast peace. As I have said a couple of times before, there are more issues with respect to which there is agreement than there are issues with respect to which there is disagreement. But of course, in order to have a conference you've got to resolve all of the issues satisfactorily, including those with respect to which there is disagreement. Egypt has been very, very active in trying to resolve some of these issues. Egypt is going to continue to be active in trying to resolve these issues, as are the Soviet Union and the United States.

Q: Mr. Baker, Israeli radio said yesterday that you would be sending out invitation to five nations, including Jordan, and there was no mention of a Palestinian delegation. Does that mean that the Palestinians will come under the Jordanian flag at the conference?

A: Well, the discussions are still continuing with respect to whether a Palestinian delegation should be a freestanding delegation, whether it should be part of an all-Arab delegation, or whether it should be a joint Palestinian/Jordanian delegation. That decision ultimately, of course, will be made by the parties involved, that is the Palestinians -- and if it's part of an all-Arab delegation, the Arab countries that would be a part of the delegation, or Jordan if the case were a joint delegation with Jordan.

Q: What is a major stumbling block?

A: Well, the major differences right now appear to me to be the question of what role, if any, the United Nations might have in any peace conference. And secondly, whether or not the conference would be simply a one-time meeting, a one-time affair, or whether it would have the ability to reconvene with the consent of all of the parties. Syria and Israel adopt different positions with respect to these issues, and it is our job and our responsibility to see what we can do to try and move them together.

Now I don't mean to suggest that all other issues have been resolved, but these are the two primary issues, at least as I see it, that now stand in the way of a possible conference on Mideast peace. And it would seem to me, that these issues being of the nature that they are, relating strictly to a question of modality, that the parties would make every effort to try and resolve them satisfactorily so that there can be some progress toward peace.

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Thank you all very much.

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"I don't think that's a proper characterization," Baker said in response to a reporter's question prior to his meeting here with Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh.

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and close.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if you were unable to achieve an agreement on that issue, perhaps among others, with Assad, that would lead us to believe that you spent much of your time with Assad discussing other issues. Did you discuss with the Syrians and through them, the Lebanese, and perhaps through both of them with the Iranians, release of prisoners being held by Israel and release of remains being held by Lebanon, and freedom for Westerners being held in Lebanon?

A: Well, I'm not going to go into detail with respect to what we might or might not have discussed regarding hostages. But we did discuss with the Syrians issues other than simply the question of a possible peace conference.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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BAKER, BOUEZ BRIEF REPORTERS ON LEBANON ISSUES

Cairo -- Following is the official transcript of Secretary of State Baker's and Lebanese Foreign Minister Faris Bouez's exchanges with reporters prior to their May 13 meeting in the Egyptian capital:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, you're not anticipating going back to Syria, are you?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm anticipating going tomorrow to Jordan and to Jerusalem. That's the schedule so far as we know it today.

Q: So it's still an open option, then?

A: Well, that's the schedule so far as we know it today.

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, can you tell us how Lebanon is being helpful to the United States in securing an exchange of prisoners from Israel and hostages from Lebanon?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOUEZ: I think that, in any case, the security of Lebanon will be benefit for the security for all the area, and particularly, for the security of maybe the citizens of Europe and the Middle East.

Q: In what way is the government of Lebanon attempting to assist in speeding the process of freedom for not only the people of Lebanon, but perhaps other held in the region as well?

A: First, the objective for the Lebanese government was to implement his authority on the Lebanese territory. And I think that with the help of several friends and the United States, particularly, we arrived to a very progressing situation in this field.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you want to say anything further about that issue?

SECRETARY BAKER: The United States is very interested, as you know, in implementation of the Taif agreement. And I'll be talking here to the Minister in a few moments about the status of their efforts to implement the Taif agreement. A major part of that, of course, involves the extension of control over Lebanon's territory. And to the extent that there can be security -- better security achieved, to the extent that a

Finances, however, are only half the equation, says Van Bernuth. The other, he says, is human resources. CARE's longterm and extensive involvement in development projects in Bangladesh meant the organization was ideally situated to put relief operations in gear even before the cyclone hit.

About 1400 nationals and 20 expatriates work for CARE in Bangladesh, and the organization has an established contingency plan for emergencies.

"When they heard the cyclone was on its way, they deployed personnel to regions that would be hit and brought emergency rations," says Van Bernuth. "Twenty-four hours after the storm, they were putting in food supplies and had 24 medical teams at work.... And we will be back in the development business in Bangladesh very, very quickly."

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL IS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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central government in Lebanon can control the territory or the state of Lebanon, that hopefully, will be helpful with respect to the question of hostages and hostage-taking. We'll be talking about that.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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EDITORIAL: CUBA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

(Following is an editorial, broadcast by the Voice of America May 14, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.)

Dictatorial governments rarely respect human rights. They often use terror and force to maintain their rule. Cuba has such a government, headed by Fidel Castro.

Human rights activists in Cuba suffer persecution and many languish in prison. Despite this repression, Gustavo Arcos continues his work as secretary general of the Cuban Committee for Human Rights. Three decades ago, Mr. Arcos was an associate of Fidel Castro. Today he is considered an enemy of the state because he advocates human rights.

In 1959, there was great rejoicing in Cuba at the fall of the Batista government. Cubans hoped to build a better Cuba. But their joy quickly turned to disillusionment and horror as the revolution was betrayed by Fidel Castro. As Gustavo Arcos recently wrote, "We blindly trusted one man, Fidel Castro, who ignored the proven truth contained in Lord Acton's phrase: 'Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.'"

One result of Castro's imposition of Communism on Cuba has been an unceasing economic crisis. According to Gustavo Arcos, Castro's government increasingly shows signs of desperation and has rejected all appeals to save Cuba from complete collapse. Castro has responded to the growing crisis by further institutionalizing repression and by telling Cubans that they must choose either "socialism or death."

As Gustavo Arcos said: "The era of Castro has been the gravest mistake of our history, and we still don't know what additional suffering we must yet endure before arriving at the inevitable point of democratic change. We can only hope that the suffering wrought by this 'traumatizing experiment' will have sown the seeds for a mature and effective democracy."

Like Gustavo Arcos, the United States believes that one day Cuba will be free. As U.S. delegate Kenneth Blackwell said in a speech to the United Nations Human Rights Commission earlier this year, "Repressive societies have a very limited future."

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(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

BAKER SEES HOPE FOR PEACE TALKS

(U.S. Press: WPost article by Hoffman)

The following article by David Hoffman appeared in the Washington Post on page A-1 on May 12 under the above headline.

BEGIN TEXT)

DAMASCUS, May 11 -- Secretary of State James A. Baker III said today the announcement that Saudi Arabia and five other Persian Gulf states would send an observer to a Middle East peace conference would lead to direct talks with Israel and thus "break at least one major taboo" of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Baker expressed hope the announcement will create some momentum for a peace conference, which Baker has been trying to arrange in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, but which still faces major obstacles.

The chief problems left to be resolved before a conference could be scheduled are: the role of the United Nations, which Syria wants to maximize and Israel wants to minimize; the nature and composition of a possible Palestinian-Jordanian delegation; whether and how the conference could reconvene periodically; and what role European observers should play.

The statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council, Baker said, "indicates fairly clearly that there will be Arab governments participating," which Israel has long sought.

In a statement issued in Luxembourg, the group, which includes Saudi Arabia and five other Arab gulf states, offered to attend the opening session of the peace conference as an observer represented by the group's secretary general. The countries would then participate individually in a series of regional working groups on water resources, economic development and arms control that would include Israel, Baker said.

Officials said the observer status was an effort to differentiate the gulf states from the Arab nations directly bordering Israel -- Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon -- which would have their own seats at the table. Egypt already has a peace treaty with Israel, but the concept of the conference, as envisioned by U.S. officials, is that it would be followed by negotiations on peace between Israel and the Arab border states, and the opening of a dialogue between Israel and Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel reacted cautiously to the move, welcoming the news but questioning why the gulf nations would confine their participation to peripheral issues and not also negotiate peace

in a proposed conference; the Associated Press reported from Jerusalem.

In Cairo, Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh held two hours of meetings with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and was expected to discuss the proposed U.S.-Soviet sponsored talks with Baker and Mubarak in Cairo Sunday.

As Baker flew here today for a meeting Sunday with Syrian President Hafez Assad, a senior U.S. official told reporters: "I think this should help -- not just with Israel, because it does produce something from the Arab side that has never been produced before -- but it should have some influence, hopefully, with respect to Syria because it shows that there are Arab countries who heretofore have been unwilling to sit with Israel and you have them sitting here" at the conference and in its working groups. "So hopefully that will have some impact with Syria. I don't know whether it will or not."

The senior official also disclosed that the United States has been attempting unsuccessfully to broker a trade-off between the Arab states and Israel -- a suspension of the Arab boycott of companies that do business in Israel in exchange for a suspension of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The idea was raised with Israeli and Arab leaders, the official said: "and we haven't gotten anything from either side."

Senior U.S. officials said the statement by the gulf states came after pressure from the Bush administration, which had been angered by Saudi Arabia's refusal to come to the peace conference. The official said they believe there has been intense internal jockeying over the direction of Saudi foreign policy in the aftermath of the war.

The United States had sought to encourage the kingdom to take a more activist approach to the peace process, and this effort was championed within the royal family by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. President Bush today phoned King Fahd to thank him for the council's action, which the president called a positive step, the Associated Press reported.

The gulf statement clearly pleased Baker, who had just begun his fourth trip to the Middle East in two months and had been frustrated with the peace process. Copies of the statement -- which Bandar had given to Baker only a few hours earlier and which had not yet been formally issued by the GCC -- were distributed to reporters by State Department aides. The statement bore the seal of the Saudi kingdom.

When Saudi Arabia balked at participating in the peace conference during Baker's last trip to the region, senior U.S. officials had sought to minimize the importance of King Fahd's

reluctance to take a more active role. But today, the officials were heralding the new position as an important step forward.

The statement stopped short of saying that Saudi Arabia and the five other members -- Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates -- would engage in direct peace negotiations with Israel. Rather, according to a second U.S. official, the gulf states would attend the opening session of the conference as observers through their representatives, and then individually attend the working sessions on regional issues.

It was left unclear whether Saudi Arabia would also be expected at some point to engage in peace talks on its own with Israel.

Baker acknowledged that such direct talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel would not be expected at the outset, although in the past some Saudi officials have raised the possibility that the kingdom would seek to improve relations with the Jewish state.

According to officials, Baker's three previous trips have produced a fair amount of agreement on the details of a peace conference, but some major questions remain.

"I think that we are narrowing the differences and at some point we ought to know what the differences are," Baker said. "And when we conclude that we can no longer make progress in narrowing them, then I think we ought to stop flying around and decide then what to do next."

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NNNN

11
רה"מ
נ"ר ה"ק
הכ"ג ש"ג
12/5
1/10
7/3

אאא, חוזם: 9945

אל: רהמש/565

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 173, תא: 090591, זח: 1250, דח: כ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור/כהול לבקר

א ל: מצפ"א

ד ע: דוד גרנית, לש' רה"מ, נתיב - דוד כרטוב.

מאת: שגרירות וושינגטון - י. שירן.

בחשובה למברקם חוזם 9384 מ-9 מאי 91

1. השגרירה לפונטון - מנקריוס הינה הפקידה בדרג הגבוה ביותר בתחום טיפול בפליטים מצד ארה"ב. בתוקף הפקידה משפיעה בין היתר על קביעת מכסות ותנאי כניסה לארה"ב ליהודי ברה"מ. מכחינתנו חשוב ביותר שהשגרירה תשתכנע מדברים שתשמע בארץ, בדרג הגבוה ביותר, שמדינת ישראל מסוגלת להביא ארצה ולקלוט מספר בלתי מוגבל של עולים מברה"מ ושתיבין מכך שאין צורך שארה"ב תגביר את מכסותיה, דבר, שאם הוא יקרה, יפגע קשות בעליה. הוצע לשגרירה על ידינו לפני צאתה למוסקבה (שממנה תגיע ארצה) שתבקר שם אצל הקונסוליה שלנו ותשוחח עם אריה לוין. טרם שמענו אם ביקור זה התקיים מציעים שחתאמו עם אנשי נתיב בארץ בנושא הנ"ל.

2. השגרירה מינוי פוליטי, ורגישה לענייני כבוד. כידוע לכם היא כושיח (מקורה בהאיטי) ויש לה אוריינטציה אפריקאית חזקה. כוודאי תתעניין בטיפול יהודי אתיופיה, בעזרתנו לארצות אפריקה, וגם במצב העברים השחורים.

3. כל הנ"ל ללא קשר עם העניין שבוודאי תגלה בארץ השגרירה בנושאים אחרים בתחום האחריות שלה, כגון המענק השנתי שמקבלת ישראל מארה"ב לקליטת עולים, פליטים פלסטינאים וכו'.

4. הנ"ל על דעת השגריר.

י. שירן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, @ (נתיב)

אאא, חוזם: 9384
אל: רהמש/535
מ-: המשרד, חא: 090591, זח: 1356, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בכב
106632
שמור/בהול לבוקר
106.02

אל: ווש'

דע: דוד גרנית, לש' רוה'מ

הנדון: שגרירת ארה'ב לענייני פליטים - בקשת פגישה עם רוה'מ

1. משגרירות ארה'ב כאן ביקשונו להסדיר פגישה עם רוה'מ לנ'ל. (ל-13.5).
2. השגרירה JEWEL LAFONTANT - MANKARIOUS עורכת ביקור באזור ולדברי השגרירות תיפגש עם ראשי מדינות.
3. אנא הבריקו בבהול (לבוקר יום שישי) חוות דעתכם כאשר לנחיצות המפגש עם רוה'מ.

מצפ'א

9 במאי 1991

תפוצה:@(רהמ), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9945

אל: רהמש/565

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 173, תא: 090591, זח: 1250, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבקר

א ל: מצפ"א

ד ע: דוד גרנית, לש' רוה"מ, נתיב - דוד ברטוב.

מאת: שגרירות וושינגטון - י. שירן.

בחושה למברקכם חוזם 9384 מ-9 מאי 91

1. השגרירה לפונטון - מנקריוס הינה הפקידה בדרג הגבוה ביותר בתחום טיפול בפליטים מצד ארה"ב. בתוקף תפקידה משפיעה בין היתר על קביעת מכסות ותנאי כניסה לארה"ב ליהודי ברה"מ. מבחינתנו חשוב ביותר שהשגרירה תשתכנע מדברים שחשמע בארץ, בדרג הגבוה ביותר, שמדינת ישראל מסוגלת להביא ארצה ולקלוט מספר בלתי מוגבל של עולים מברה"מ ושחבין מכך שאין צורך שארה"ב תגביר את מכסותיה, דבר, שאם הוא יקרה, יפגע קשות בעליה. הוצע לשגרירה על ידינו לפני צאתה למוסקבה (שממנה תגיעה ארצה) שחבקר שם אצל הקונסוליה שלנו ותשוחח עם אריה לוין. טרם שמענו אם ביקור זה התקיים מציעים שתחאמו עם אנשי נתיב בארץ בנושא הנ"ל.

2. השגרירה מינוי פוליטי, ורגישה לענייני כבוד. כידוע לכם היא כושיח (מקורה בהאיטי) ויש לה אוריינטציה אפריקאית חזקה. בוודאי תתעניין בטיפול יהודי אתיופיה, בעזרתנו לארצות אפריקה, וגם במצב העברים השחורים.

3. כל הנ"ל ללא קשר עם העניין שבוודאי תגלה בארץ השגרירה בנושאים אחרים. חום האחריות שלה, כגון המענק השנתי שמקבלת ישראל מארה"ב לקליטת עולים, פליטים פלסטינאים וכו'.

4. הנ"ל על דעת השגריר.

י. שירן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא,
@ (נתיב)

אאא, חוזם: 9945

אל: רהמש/565

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 173, תא: 090591, זח: 1250, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול לבקר

א ל: מצפ"א

ד ע: דוד גרנית, לש' רוה"מ, נתיב - דוד ברטוב.

מאת: שגרירות וושינגטון - י. שירן.

בחשוכה למברקכם חוזם 9384 מ-9 מאי 91

השגרירה לפונטון - מנקריוס הינה הפקידה בדרג הגבוה ביותר בתחום טיפול בפליטים מצד ארה"ב. בחוקף חפקידה משפיעה בין היתר על קביעת מכסות ותנאי כניסה לארה"ב ליהודי ברה"מ. מבחינתנו חשוב ביותר שהשגרירה תשכנע מדברים שתשמע בארץ, בדרג הגבוה ביותר, שמדינת ישראל מסוגלת להביא ארצה ולקלוט מספר בלתי מוגבל של עולים מברה"מ ושחבין מכך שאין צורך שארה"ב תגביר את מכסותיה, דבר, שאם הוא יקרה, יפגע קשות בעליה.

הוצע לשגרירה על ידינו לפני צאתה למוסקבה (שממנה תגיעה ארצה) שתבקר שם אצל הקונסוליה שלנו ותשוחח עם אריה לויין. טרם שמענו אם ביקור זה התקיים

מציעים שתתאמו עם אנשי נתיב בארץ בנושא הנ"ל.

2. השגרירה מינוי פוליטי, ורגישה לענייני כבוד. כידוע לכם היא כושיית (מקורה בהאיטי) ויש לה אוריינטציה אפריקאית חזקה. בוודאי תתעניין בטיפול יהודי אתיופיה, בעזרתנו לארצות אפריקה, וגם במצב העברים השחורים.

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4. הנ"ל על דעת השגריר.

י. שירן

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא,
@ (נתיב)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11612

אל: רהמש/675

מ-: המשד, תא: 120591, זח: 1532, דח: ר, סג: סו,

בכב

106804

סודי/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון, לונדון, פריס, קהיר, בריסל, בון, רומא, האג, קנברה, אוטבה,

השגריר, הציר, ציר יועץ/מדיני

1. הפעילות המדינית הבינלאומית להשגת הסדרים לייצוב המזה'ת בסיום מלחמת עפרץ כוללת בתוכה מאמץ לקדם הסדרים לפירוק ובקרת נשק (ARMS CONTROL) באזור.

2. גורמים רשמיים בכירים בארה'ב, בריה'מ, מערב אירופה ומדינות ערביות שונות התבטאו לאחרונה כי הסדרים אלה בתחום פיקוח ובקרת נשק יהיו חייבים לכלול גם את ישראל.

3. קיים ערפול לגבי העמדות המפורטות של הגורמים השונים ביחס לפירוק ובקרת נשק איזורי, הן בכל הקשור לתכנים והן לגבי העדיפויות, הדגשים והמתכונת לתהליך המו'מ בנושא.

4. על מנת לאפשר גיבוש מדיניות ישראלית בנושאים אלה יש לנו ענין לקבל מידע והערכות על עמדות הגורמים הבינלאומיים השונים העוסקים בנושא.

5. להלן רשימה של שאלות להן אנו מחפשים תשובות.

נודה אם תקדישו מזמנכם לברור התשובות אם בשיחותיכם השונות ואם מתוך יאה בתקשורת וכד'. השאלות:

1. איזו עדיפות לטיפול בסוגיית בקרת נשק במזה'ת ניתנת על ידי הגורמים הבאים: ארה'ב, בריה'מ, מדינות מערביות (דגש על בריטניה, צרפת, גרמ'ע והולנד, קנדה, אוסטרליה), מדינות ערב (דגש על מצרים וסוריה).

2. מה הן עמדות הגורמים הנ'ל בסוגיות הבאות:

א. האם הדגש צריך להיות על פירוק ובקרת נשק קונבנציונלי, בלתי-קונבנציונלי או שניהם גם יחד.

ב. בתחום הבלתי קונבנציונלי - האם הדגש על תחום הכימיה, הביולוגיה, גרעין, כל אחד בנפרד או כולם ביחד (במסגרת מכלול נשק השמדה המוני).

ג. מה היא ההתייחסות לטיילי קרקע-קרקע.

ד. האם מו'מ על הסדרי פירוק ובקרת הנשק צריך להיות במקביל, לפני או אחרי

הסדרים ישראלים-ערביים בתחומים אחרים (הפסקת לוחמה, יישוב הבעיה הפלשתינאית).

ה. אלו רעיונות מושמעים לאמצעים לבניין אימון הדדי (C.B.M).

ו. האם המו"מ צריך להיות על בסיס אזורי, דו-צדדי או בינלאומי (בהקשר לאמנות בינלאומית).

ז. מה מבקשות המדינות להשיג כמו"מ ומה הן מוכנות לשלם בתמורה.

ח. אלו סידורי אימות (VERIFICATION) מוצעים לפיקוח על ביצוע ההסדרים בתחום הפר'ן.

ט. אלו רעיונות מושמעים בהקשר להסדרים להגבלת מכירות ולריסון תפוצת טק'ק ונשק בלחי קונבנציונלי למזה'ת.

7. האם איראן ותורכיה רואות עצמן חלק מההחליך ומה עמדתן לגביו? מה עמדת גורמים אחרים בשאלות אלו?

8. האם הגורמים השונים כורכים יחד את ההסדרים בתחום פירוק ובקרת נשק לאיזור המזרח התיכון והמפרץ הפרסי וכיצד הם מגדירים את גבולות האיזור/איזורים.

האם קיימת נכונות אצל הגורמים לעיל להפלות (לטובה או לרעה) ביחס למדינות השונות באיזור בהקשר זה.

9. האם קיימת אצל הגורמים הכרה במצבה האסטרטגי המיוחד של ישראל והצרכים הבטחוניים הנובעים ממנו, או בסכנה המיוחדת המקופלת במדינות קיצוניות באיזור.

10. האם נזכרים אצל הגורמים המערביים השונים תמריצים אפשריים למדינות האיזור בגין הצטרפות למשטר פירוק ובקרת נשק איזורי.

11. האם קיימים הבדלים בגישה לנושא בתוך הממסדים במדינות השונות ומהם.

12. מה היא הערכת הגורמים לעיל לגבי האפשרות לצרף להסדרי-בקרת היצוא של נשק רגיש לאיזור מדינות באמל'ט (ברזיל, ארגנטינה) ובאסיה (סין, צפון ודרום קוריאה).

ס/מנהל פר'ן
מרים זיו

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא,
פרנ, הדס, איר1, איר2, סולטן, מצרים, יגר,
אוקיאניה, סייבל, משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

אאא, חוזם: 10826
אל: רהמש/638
מ-: ניויורק, נר: 210, תא: 100591, זח: 1223, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
1392
שמור/מידי

אל: המשרד ווש',
מצפ'א

דע: כלכלית ציר
ק. קונגרס

ת: קונכ'ל בוסטון

הנדון: פעילות כויית ברוד-איילנד ביוזמת המורשה MATELY

1. המורשה מייצ'לי פנה לחברות מקומיות ברוד-איילנד בהצעה להשתלב בשקום כויית. קיבל 200 פניות והפנה הנושא למשרד לענייני כלכלה במדינה (השרויה במיתון עמוק).

2. ביום ב' (13) למאי יתקיים מפגש אנשי העסקים בחסות מח' הכלכלה בו יופיע שגריר כויית בווש'.

3. מייצ'לי שביקר לאחרונה בארץ והשתתף באירועים פרו - ישראלים עמנו, פנה לקהילה בבקשת עצה. הקהילה פנתה אלינו ברעיון שישתתפו ואף יודו לשגריר שמדינתו הקלה החרם על חברות יהודיות.

4. בחשובה יעצתי להם לפעול כפי שפעלנו בארוע דומה במסצ'וסטס לפני כחדש - י:

א. לבקש המושל להתבטא פומבית נגד מדיניות החרם כפי שהתבטא המושל WELD כאן.

ב. לציין כי הליגה הוסיפה השבוע מאה חברות לרשימת החרם.

ג. אין מקום להודות לכווייתים על הקלת החרם, אלא להעמידם על הצפיה בארה'ב לצעדים בוני אמון כביטול החרם.

ד. להכשיר דעת הקהל המקומית ערב הארוע לגבי משמעות החרם ורקעו.

5. כאם חרצו להנחותנו בנוסף לקוים אלו הבריקונא עד יום ב' בבוקר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא,
כהן, כלכליחב, כלכליחג, סייכל, סולטן, אוצר

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10735
אל: רהמש/611
מ-: ניו יורק, גר: 206, תא: 100591, זח: 1059, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
20876
שמור/מידי
109.26

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: שילה וושינגטון

מאת: ס/קונכ'ל ניו יורק

הנדון: תהליך השלום

1. הארייט מונדייל סיפרה כי נפגשה עם דוד וולש מנהל מחלקה לאזורנו במועצה לבטחון לאומי. מצטרף לבייקר למסעו הנוכחי. הביעה בפניו דאגת הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית על לחץ בלתי מאוזן על ישראל והעלתה סוגיית החרם הערבי.

2. וולש אמר כי המימשל לא חוזר לא הפעיל עלינו לחץ וכי אפילו בנושא ההתנחלויות הם לא יצאו כהודעה ציבורית בקורחית. כאשר לחרם הערבי אמר כי הכוונות עשו ויתורים וזה דווח לנציגי ישראל.

ס/קונכ'ל ניו יורק
מרדכי ידיד

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
כהן, סייבל

1/10

- 1 -

המ"ס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MINISTER (ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
ציר כלכלי

משה'ה - 1058 - נ"י - יורק -

10/5/1991

אל: לשכת שר אוצר
מונכ"ל - אוצר - (אנא העבירו עותק אל א. נוייבך - ציר כלכלי)
חשב כללי

מאת: כלכלית וושינגטון - מגן אלטוביה

דע: לשכת שגריר-ושינגטון (פא/בי)
סרוסי - נ"י יורק

מצ"ב עותק הסכם הסיוע האזרחי המיוחד בשל משבר המפרץ (650 מיליון\$).

ההסכם נחתם היום (10/5/1991) במשרדי A.I.D בשעה 14:00. (לאחר שבשעות
הבוקר נפטרה בעית תקלה במחשב A.I.D). מסיבה זו יועבר הסכום לחשבוננו
כפדול בנק בניו יורק רק ביום שני.

אל ההסכם נספו מכתב הישום - הכל בנוסח כפי שהודענוכם ב-19/4/1991.

במעמד חתימת ההסכם נחננו גם ההסכם המתקן את סכום הסיוע האזרחי השנתי
ומעמיד אותו עתה על סך 1.2 מיליארד דולר - מצ"ב נוסח התיקון. אף סכום
זה יועבר ביום שני-13/5/1991 לוועדון ה E.S.F הנפרד.

לידיעתכם

מגן.

מ/א/אלטוביה

3 אצ"ה
2 אצ"ה
1 קרן
1 אצ"ה
1 אצ"ה
2 אצ"ה
1 אצ"ה
2 אצ"ה
אצ"ה - אוצר, אצ"ה

2/10

1058, 1

A.I.D. Grant No: 271-K-630

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTING THROUGH

THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Dated: May 10, 1991

1058, 1

3/4

- 2 -

Agreement, dated May 10, 1991 between the Government of Israel ("Israel") and the Government of the United States of America, acting through the Agency for International Development ("A.I.D."), together referred to as the "parties".

ARTICLE I

The Grant

To provide reimbursement for additional costs resulting from the conflict in the Persian Gulf, A.I.D., pursuant to Public Law No. 101-27 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, agrees to grant to Israel under the terms of this Agreement not to exceed six hundred fifty million U.S. dollars (the "Grant").

ARTICLE II

Conditions Precedent to Disbursement

SECTION 2.1. Conditions Precedent to Disbursement.

Prior to the disbursement of the Grant, or to the issuance by A.I.D. of documentation pursuant to which disbursement will be made, Israel will, except as the parties may otherwise agree in writing, furnish to A.I.D., in form and substance satisfactory to A.I.D.:

- (a) A statement of the name of the person holding or acting in the office specified in Section 5.2, and of any additional representatives, together with a specimen signature of each person specified in such statement.
- (b) A designation of the bank account to which the Grant proceeds are to be deposited, together with Israel's statement that such bank account is established and will be maintained in the manner required by Section 4.1 of this Agreement.
- (c) Evidence of additional costs incurred by Israel as a result of and associated with the conflict in the Persian Gulf in an amount equivalent to the amount of this grant. Such costs shall be restricted to the geographic areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967.

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SECTION 2.2. Notification

When A.I.D. has determined that the conditions precedent specified in Section 2.1. have been met, it will promptly so notify Israel.

SECTION 2.3. Terminal Date for Conditions Precedent

If the conditions specified in Section 2.1 have not been met within ninety (90) days from the date of this Agreement, or such later date as A.I.D. may agree to in writing, A.I.D., at its option, may terminate this Agreement by written notice to Israel.

ARTICLE IIIDisbursementSECTION 3.1. Disbursement of the Grant

After satisfaction of the above conditions precedent, A.I.D. will deposit in the bank account designated by Israel pursuant to Section 2.1 (b) above the sum of six hundred fifty million United States Dollars (\$650,000,000).

SECTION 3.2. Date of Disbursement

Disbursement by A.I.D. will be deemed to occur on the date A.I.D. makes deposit to the bank account designated by Israel in accordance with Section 2.1(1).

ARTICLE IVSpecial CovenantsSECTION 4.1. Accounting For Grant Proceeds

The parties agree on the following applicable procedures:

(a) Grant proceeds will be deposited to a bank account established by Israel solely for the receipt of this cash transfer assistance from A.I.D. and not commingled in that account with other funds. Should any interest be earned on such account, such interest will be treated as though it were principal (i.e., Grant proceeds) received under the terms of this Agreement.

1058, 1

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- 4 -

(b) Israel will maintain financial documentation, books, and records, in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices, concerning the costs specified in Section 2.1(c) of this Agreement for a period of three years from the date of this Agreement. The documentation, books and records required hereunder will be available for examination by A.I.D. or any of its authorized representatives at all times as A.I.D. may reasonably request for a period of three (3) years after the date of final disbursement by A.I.D. under this agreement.

ARTICLE V

Miscellaneous

SECTION 5.1. Communications

Any notice, request, document, or other communication submitted by either party to the other under this Agreement will be in writing or by telegram or cable, and will be deemed duly given or sent when delivered to such party at the following address:

To Israel:

Economic Minister
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

To A.I.D.

Director, Office of Project Development
Bureau for Europe and Near East
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

All such communications shall be in English, unless the parties otherwise agree in writing. Other addresses may be substituted for the above upon the giving of written notice.

SECTION 5.2. Representatives

For all purposes relevant to this Agreement, Israel will be represented by the individual holding or acting in the office of Economic Minister, Embassy of Israel, and A.I.D. will be represented by the individual holding or acting in the office of Director, Office of Project Development, Bureau for Europe and Near East, each of whom, by written notice, may designate additional representatives for all purposes.

1058, 1

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- 5 -

The names of the representatives of Israel, with specimen signatures, shall be provided to A.I.D., which may accept as duly authorized any instrument signed by such representatives in implementation of this Agreement, until receipt of written notice of revocation of their authority.

SECTION 5.3. Amendment

This Agreement may be amended by the execution of written amendments by the authorized representatives of both parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Israel and the United States of America, each acting through its duly authorized representative, have caused this Agreement to be signed in their names and delivered as of the day and year first above written.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By: Magen Altuvia
Title: Magen Altuvia
Assistant Economic
Minister
Embassy of Israel

By: Carol C. Adelman
Title: Carol C. Adelman
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Europe and
Near East
Agency for International
Development

Agency for International Development

Washington, D.C. 20523

1058

7/3

His Excellency
Mr. Magen Altuvia
Assistant Economic Minister
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Subject: Program Implementation Letter No. 1
Cash Transfer Agreement
A.I.D. Project No. 263-K-630

Dear Mr. Altuvia:

This letter will confirm detailed arrangements and undertakings relative to the above Agreement, which is scheduled for signature on May 10, 1991.

Use of Grant Proceeds

It is understood that the Grant proceeds will be used by your Government ("the Grantee") for additional costs resulting from the conflict in the Persian Gulf as agreed in writing between the Parties on or after the effective date of the agreement.

Conditions Precedent

Section 2.1(c) of the Grant Agreement requires evidence of additional costs incurred by Israel as a result of and associated with the conflict in the Persian Gulf in an amount equivalent to the amount of the grant. Such evidence may be in the form of a letter evidencing such costs and signed by an official authorized to verify these costs on behalf of the Government of Israel.

Accounting for Proceeds

Section 4.3 of the Grant Agreement addresses the legislative requirement for a separate bank account for Cash Transfer proceeds. We expect that your Government will, on reasonable request, during the next three years make available appropriate records to our representatives. Financial records should at least be suitable to support the evidence of incremental costs submitted by the Government in satisfaction of Section 2.1(c) of the grant agreement.

1058

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Interest on Separate Account


As noted in Section 4.1 (a) of the Grant Agreement, interest earned on the dollar proceeds placed into the separate account or accounts shall be treated as if it were principal (i.e., Grant proceeds). Should there be a period of time between the disbursement of the cash transfer and ultimate disposition of the proceeds in the separate account, it is agreed that in the interest of good cash management principles, the Grantee may place the Grant proceeds in various low-risk, non-speculative financial instruments in the United States pending ultimate use of those proceeds. Such interest-bearing financial instruments might include United States Treasury securities, certificates of deposit, and high quality money market accounts. However, prior to the time of ultimate disposition of the separate account proceeds, Grant proceeds should not be converted to or exchanged for the currencies of countries other than the United States or otherwise placed in international financial markets. The temporary placement of Grant proceeds in financial instruments, other than those stipulated above, shall be a matter of consultation and agreement between the two parties. Prior to ultimate use, grant proceeds and interest earned thereon invested as described above shall be returned to the separate account.

Ineligible Costs

Costs ineligible for reimbursement under this Grant include the following: costs not within the geographic areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967; surveillance equipment; abortion equipment and services; luxury goods and gambling equipment; commodities and services for support of police or other law enforcement activities; or weather modification equipment.

If your Government has any questions concerning these limitations, I invite you to consult with me or my staff so that we can provide further detail or clarification.

Sincerely yours,



Robert W. Nachtrieb
Director
Office of Project Development
Bureau for Europe and Near East

1058
1

g/c

A.I.D. GRANT No. 271-K-629

AMENDMENT NO. 1

TO

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTING THROUGH

THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Dated: May 10, 1991

105g

10/k

AMENDMENT Number 1, dated May 10, 1991, between the United States of America, acting through the Agency for International Development ("A.I.D.") and the Government of Israel ("Israel");

WHEREAS, Israel and A.I.D. entered into a Grant Agreement, dated November 19, 1990; and

WHEREAS, Israel and A.I.D. desire to amend the Agreement to increase the amount of the grant;

NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby agree that the Agreement shall be amended by deleting the words and figures "one billion, one hundred seventy seven million, two hundred thousand United States Dollars" and "\$1,177,200,000" wherever they occur and substituting the following therefore: "one billion, two hundred million United States Dollars" and "\$1,200,000,000."

Except as amended herein, the Agreement between Israel and A.I.D., dated November 19, 1990, remains in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Israel and the United States of America, each acting through its respective duly authorized representative, have caused this Amendment to be signed in their names and delivered as of the day and year first above written.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

By: Magen Altuvia
Magen Altuvia
Assistant Economic Minister
Embassy of Israel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By: Carol C. Adelman
Carol C. Adelman
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Europe, and Near East
Agency for International Development

אאא, חוזם: 11049

אל: רהמש/646

מ-: ווש, גר: 2066, חא: 090591, זח: 1930, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בכב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: ממ'ד, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

הנדון: המפרציות והתהליך.


=====

מגורם בממשל המקורב לתהליך: בחשובה לשאלה על עמדת המפרציות בנושא התהליך וישראל מסר על השינויים במדיניות כוויית בנושא החרם: הפסיקה לטפל הוצאת תעודות מקור והחברות האמריקאיות אינן נידרשות להכניס ס' החרם בעת ההתקשרויות עמן. בקש לשמור על חשאיות הנ'ל משום שהאמריקאים מנסים להרחיבו גם לשאר חברות המשפ'מ.

אמיתי

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), כנצור, מצפא,
כהן, כלכליחג', סולטן, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 10095

אל: רהמש/582

מ-: אטלנטה, נר: 26, תא: 090591, זח: 1000, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

א ל: מנהל מצפא

ד ע: ווש הסברה מנהל הסברה

מאת: הקונכל אטלנטה

פגישה עם הנשיא קארטר

חברי משלחת התקשורת המבקרים כעת באטלנטה התקבלו היום לפגישה בת 45 דקות עם הנשיא קארטר. בפגישה נכתו גם רעייתו רוזלין ופרופ קנת שטיין יועצו לעיניני מזת. אל המשלחת נלוו מלבד צוות הקונסוליה גם ציר ויועץ ההסברה בוש והקונסולים להסברה ועיתונות בניו יורק.

קארטר עדיין מאמין בנושא הועידות הבנלאומיות ובנושא הבחירות כמכשיר לפתרון קונפליקטים פוליטיים. מלבד מערכות הבחירות עליהן כבר פיקח בעבר בניקרגואה האיטי פנמה ועוד הוא עתיד לפקח בקרוב גם על מערכות הבחירות בגינאה ובסוריה וישתדל לקדם רעיון של בחירות כפיתרון של סיכסוכים פנימיים באנגולה ובפקיסטן.

בנושא שלנו קרט נשאר מאמין גדול באוטונומיה כולל צעדים חד צדדיים מצידנו בכיוון זה בעיקר בתחום הבדיאות החינוך והחקלאות. צעדי בניות האמון צריכים באופן עקרוני להעשות במקביל אך לא מחוות שיכולות להנמיך את רמת השנאה כלפי ישראל בקרב הפלשתינים מבלי שיהיה בהן סיכון ביטחוני. הצעדים המתבקשים מן הצד השני יצטרכו להיות זניחת האלימות באנתיפדה ונטישת החרם הערבי.

לטענת קארטר יש מהלכים מדיניים שאסאד כבר הסכים להם בעבר (בשיחות עימו) כמו ועידה בינל בחסות אמריקניה סובייטית בלי מעורבות האום אך הוא נמנע מלהכריז על כך נוכח הודעתו שאין כיום סיכוי לקדם פיתרון שהעולם הערבי יוכל לחיות עמו.

הנשיא קארטר העלה שורה של דוגמאות לגבי מקרים הנראים בעיניו בלתי הוגנים ולא הגיוניים בתחום הענישה, המיסוי ומשק המים בשטחים.

חלק מהנתונים שהציג נשענים על מקורות פלשתינים. הבטחנו לבדוק עם הגורמים הנוגעים בדבר ולחזור אליו עם תשובות מוסמכות. במפרץ חוזה קארטר הגברת המתח בין עיראק ואיראן על רקע המטוסים שמחזיקה איראן והפליטים הכורדיים והשיעים.

להערכת איראן היא עדיין המדינה היחידה באיזור המפרץ המסוגלת להחמוד עם צדאם חוסיין. הנשיא קארטר שיבח את מדיניות האיפוק של ישראל במלחמת המפרץ. טען שהוא מקבל עידכונים שוטפים מבייקר וצוותו על המום המדיני. נושא המזת מטבע הדברים קרוב לליבו וישמח כמובן להיות לעזר (יחד עם מרכז קארטר) בכל סוגיה שנמצא לנכון בעתיד.

אלון ליאל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא,
רביב, הסברה, סולטן, מזתים, ר/מרכז, ממד,
@ (רם), אמן

סססס

105
1/2

בלמים / מירי

אל: מצ"א

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

חידושי דובר מחמ"ד - סנקציות

בחדרון דובר מחמ"ד היום (ושלח בנסרד) נשאל חדובר בדבר האפשרות להטלת סנקציות (בחידה והתחלין לא מחקדם) כפי שהציע שה"ח הסובייטי לשעבר שורדנזה בהוצאותיו כאן.

כתשובה ענה הדובר כי מחמ"ד פיוסם בעבר עמדו בנושא סנקציות. מצ"ב הודעתם בחדרון שבועם מבהירה שהם רואים בסנקציות צעד קיצוני וחמור ביותר.

עתונות

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word "מחמ"ד" and other illegible text.

For Immediate Release
5/7/91 TAKEN QUESTION

May 7, 1991

SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTS ON SANCTIONS

42 1054

- Q: Former Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze has proposed that sanctions be imposed on those governments which refuse to negotiate on any point with respect to a decision taken by the U.N. Security Council and that the time has come for such thinking in regard to the peace process in the mid-east. What is the U.S. position on such a proposal?
- A: AS A FORMER SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL AND A STATESMAN OF HIGH REGARD, MR. SHEVARDNADZE'S OPINIONS ARE CERTAINLY WORTH HEARING.

SANCTIONS ON ANY GOVERNMENT ARE AN EXPRESSION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND CARRIED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN USED ONLY IN EXTREME CASES, SUCH AS THE RECENT INVASION AND OCCUPATION BY IRAQ OF KUWAIT.

THEIR USE IN OTHER INSTANCES IS THE RESULT OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AND PURELY SPECULATIVE AT PRESENT.

AS A GENERAL POLICY, SECRETARY BAKER SAID YESTERDAY, "NO ONE CAN IMPOSE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THERE WILL NOT BE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL THE PARTIES THEMSELVES DECIDE THAT THEY REALLY WANT TRUE RECONCILIATION AND PEACE."

אאא, חוזם: 8874
אל: רהמש/506
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 162, תא: 080591, זח: 1900, דח: ר, סג: בל,
כבב
בלמס / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס, וושינגטון

ביהנ"ב: "שלום עכשיו"

אחמול והיום 7-8.5 נפגשו חברי כנסת (ביילין, צוקר, צבן וירשובסקי
אחרים) עם חברי הקונגרס לנטוס, לויין, סמית המילטון ואובי וכן עם
אייפא"ק.
הפגישות אורגנו ע"י נציג "שלום עכשיו" בווינגטון.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7754
אל: רהמש/441
מ-: המשרד, תא: 080591, זח: 1249, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
106414
סודי/מידי

אל: וושינגטון, פראג
השגריר

התקשרתי לבראון להעמידו על חומרת ראייתנו את עיסקת הנשק הצ'כית-סורית
לאספקת 300 טנקים טי 72 לסוריה. אמרתי כי על רקע מאמצי הנשיא לריסון
מרוץ החימוש במזת - עליהם דווחנו באחרונה ושיבוטאו בקרוב בהודעה פומבית
בעודה עושה לקידום ועידה איזורית לשלום בהשתתפות סוריה מן הדין שארה'ב
תחפש דרכים להניא ממשלת צ'כוסלובקיה מביצוע עיסקה זו. אמרתי כי אך אתמול
המחשנו במסגרת 'גיאות' מימדי האיום הסורי על ישראל וכל תוספת כח לסוריה
היא משמעותית. הוספתי שיש לעצור מגמת מכירות הנשק המזארית המחודשת
באיבה בטרם ייקשרו עסקות בהיקף גדול עוד יותר. בראון אמר כי למיטב
ידיעתו כבר היו מגעים בין ממשלות ארהב לצ'כוסלובקיה בעניין זה. יבדוק
ויעדכנו.

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, מצב, @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, סולטן, גוברין, מזאר2

סססס

8468:חודם,אאא
אל:רהמש/467
מ:-וושיןגטון,נר:133,תא:080591,זח:1111,דח:מ,סג:בל,
כבכ
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש

THIS IS THE LAST ONE, AND THEN I REALLY DO HAVE TO GO.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, CAN YOU TELL US YOUR FEELINGS NOW TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST, YOU'VE GOT SECRETARY BAKER HEADING BACK FOR YET ANOTHER TRIP --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YEAH.

Q -- THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH IS GOING TO BE THERE AT THE SAME TIME: DOES THIS SIGNAL SOME SORT OF BREAKTHROUGH IN THE OFFING? IS THERE SOMETHING THAT GIVES YOU CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WOULDN'T SAY BREAKTHROUGH. I WOULDN'T SAY BREAKTHROUGH, BUT CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM -- I THINK THERE'S REASON TO BE OPTIMISTIC. I WON'T GO INTO THE DETAILS RIGHT NOW, BECAUSE WHEN YOU'RE DEALING WITH A SITUATION OF THIS COMPLEXITY AND OF THIS ENDURANCE, YOU HAVE TO USE SOME QUIET DIPLOMACY, WHICH SECRETARY BAKER IS VERY EFFECTIVELY USING.

BUT I SAW AFTER HIS LAST TRIP SOME VERY QUITE NEGATIVE REPORTS. AND I DON'T THINK IT'S NEGATIVE. I THINK THERE'S STILL A REAL OPPORTUNITY HERE. AND I DON'T SAY THAT JUST WISHFULLY, I SAY IT AFTER TALKING TO HIM AND TALKING TO SOME LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD.

SO IT'S -- I'D LIKE TO SAY OPTIMISM, BUT I DON'T WANT TO GO OVERBOARD ON IT, BECAUSE THERE'S STILL A COMPLEX PROBLEM.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, SOME FOLKS THINK THAT YOU MAY BE BEING MISLEAD, AND THEY CITE FOR PROOF OF THAT, THAT ACTION SUCH AS THE ISRAELIS CONTINUING TO ESTABLISH SETTLEMENTS, THAT PEOPLE MAY BE TELLING THE SECRETARY ONE THING, BUT UNABLE TO -- EITHER UNABLE TO DELIVER OR AREA CTUALLY NOT TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT THEIR

INTENTIONS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: AS WE KNOW, THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE CASE, THAT SOMEBODY'S SAYING ONE THING AND THEN GOING OFF AND, YOU KNOW, JUST DOING SOMETHING BEHIND HIS BACK. BUT -- NO, IT'S COMPLEX.

BUT I WOULDN'T -- I DON'T ACCEPT THAT -- THAT CRITICISM. THERE'S PLENTY OF ROOM TO CRITIQUE THIS AND TO WISH FOR MORE PROGRESS FROM ONE COUNTRY OR ANOTHER.

BUT THERE'S A LOT GOING ON. AND IT -- I WANT TO STAY INVOLVED MYSELF, I WANT TO BE A PART OF THIS, BECAUSE I THINK WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY NOW. AND I THINK COUNTRIES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS HELPED RECOGNIZE THAT. AND I THINK ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS THAT, I THINK THE SAUDIS UNDERSTAND THAT, I THINK THE EGYPTIANS UNDERSTAND THAT. AND SO I WANT TO USE THAT GOOD WILL TO FURTHER PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND SO I AM -- PUT IT THIS WAY, MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH.

עתונות

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

9/5/91

~~סמך יום ק' לתן
מ"ל מ"ל מ"ל מ"ל~~

~~7~~

\$ 650 : המ"ק

מ"ב המ"כ - המ"ל :

1) ה"ל צ"ל ל"ל אב"מ
בע"מ מ"ל ה"ל אב"מ

2) ר"מ - המ"מ המ"מ

+ ר"מ המ"מ מ"ל

מ"ל אב"מ

מ"ל מ"ל
מ"ל מ"ל

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MINISTER (ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
ציר כלכלי

7/5/1991

אל: השב כללי-א. יונס

מאת: כלכלית וושינגטון - מ. אלטוביה

אני מצ"ב נוסח מכתב השימושים בקשר עם הסכת הסיוע המיוחד בשל משבר המפרץ, אשר תוקן מספר פעמים לאחר דיונים שנערכו עם אנשי משרדך ועם חשב משרד הביטחון.

נוסח זה הועבר באופן לא פורמלי לידיעת חדסק הישראלי ב-A.I.D לאחר שהוגשו בעל פה הבחרות באשר לחששות שהתעוררו הן באשר להוצאות שבפועל לא שולמו עדיין (אך נוצרה כבר התחייבות להוצאתן) והן באשר לחשש כי לא בכל משבצת של הוצאה ישנה "קבלה" ולעיתים המדובר בתחשיב שנעשה על ידי הגורח המוסמך במשרד המתאים (כגון באשר להוצאות עודפות של דלק עקב שעות טיסה נוספות וכדומה)

על אף שהנוסח המצ"ב טרם הופץ בין המשרדים השונים הן ב-A.I.D וטרם קיבל את האישור הסופי של ה State Department סברו האישים עימם היינו בקשר ב A. I. D כי הוא יאושר ואין הם צופים בעיזח, עד כדי כך שכבר וקדענו להשלים את החימת ההסכם והעברת הכספים ליום חמישי הקרוב.

בנוסח מכתב השימושים האחרון נמחקה הפיסקה בענין מקום השימוש בכספים לאחר ששיכנענו את A.I.D בחוסר הניחצות שפיסקה כאמור לאור נוסח ההסכם עצמו. כמו כן הוכנסה פיסקה המרככת את הדרישה שבחסכם באשר למיסמכים המתעדים את ההוצאות והובהר כי לעיתים, כאמור לעיל, במקום מיסמך מתעד ("קבלה") יופיע תחשיב. בשיחה בעל פה הובהר לנו, על ידי A.I.D, כי תחשיב המשקי באופן סביר את ההוצאה די בו כדי לענות על דרישות ההסכם. מטעם זה ולבקשתכם במכתב הלואי שהעברתם לידינו ביחד עם הנתונים מאח המשרדים השונים (בטחון, בריאות, מס רכוש), הוספה פיסקה זו אשר נוסחה אף תואם עם חשב משרד הביטחון.

עוד הוסף לנוסח זה תקון באשר לסכומים עצמם כאשר סכומי ההוצאה בשל האצח פרויקטים להגוה בפני טק"ק הוצאו (סכום של 116 מיליון \$) וסכום ההוצאה בשל הגנה אזרחית הוקטן ב 34 מיליון \$ הכל על פי הוחרומיכם

בנוסח זה הוסף סכום הוצאה של 100 מיליון \$ תשלומים שהוצאו (ושצפויים להיות מוצעים) מתוך קרן הפיצויים שליד מס רכוש בגין וזקי רכוש בשל התקפות הטילים. בנוגע לסכום זה התעוררו חששות (שהועברו לידיעתנו זה עתה) משום שלא הופיע בדרישה המקורית ששלה השגוריר שובל אל דניס רוס עבור המזכיר נייקו (העתק ממכתב השגוריר ופיוט והוצאה של 910 מיליון \$ העברתי ב 22/4/91 לידיכם). חשב משרד הביטחון סובר כי הסיוע כולו נולד בשל צרכים צבאיים שהוצגו למימשל כאן ולכן נועד לכסות הוצאות אילו בלבד. משיחה מסופה שחיתה לי עתה עם השגוריר שובל בה עזרתה ופניו הרעיתיות ובה ביקשתי להבהיר האם עשויים להתעורר איזה שהם קשיים דיפלומטיים בשל הכללת

הפיצוי האזרחי (קרן הפיצויים) סבר השגריר כי יש להישאר צמודים לפריטים שפורטו במכתבו, לאו בהכרח בנוגע לסכומים אלא באשר לפירוט עצמו, ולא לכלול עתה ברגע האחרון אלמנט חדש. השגריר חשש מאינטרפטציה לא טובה של הוספת פריט זה על ידי מחלקת המדינה כאילו ישראל שוב "חסדות" את ארצות הברית בכך שהיא מבקשת דבר אחד ולבסוף משתמשת בכספים למטרה אחרת.

השגריר הביע דעתו אך אמר כי אין זו המילה האחרונה ויעץ כי תהקיים התיעצות עם אושי משרד הביטחון באשר לכך.

למען הסדר הטוב עלי לציין כי הן נוסח החקיקה שדן בסיוע המיוחד והן לשון ההסכם אינם מציינים את היות הסיוע סיוע צבאי או אזרחי, על אף הורתו הצבאית. הנוסח הוא של סיוע בשל הוצאות נוספות שנוצרו בשל המשבר במפרץ. (ראה נוסח ההסכם). יחד עם זאת השימוש בטכניקה של מתן סיוע בדרך של Cash Transfer אפשרי רק באמצעות סוכנות ה A.I.D, סוכנות אשר המיד מספלת בסיוע אזרחי וצופה הוצאות עתידיות (דבר המסביר חלק מנוסח הסעיפים שבהסכם). רק בשימוש בנוסח שאינו צובע את הסיוע בגוון צבאי או אזרחי ניתן היה להשתמש בכלי של A.I.D.

משום החששות האמורים והגלישה של הסוגיות מעבר לנושאים כלכליים-משפטיים טהורים, אבקשן להודיעני בחוזר כי מכתב השימושים האמור מאושר על ידי שר האוצר או להודיעני בהקדם באם ישנם שינויים נוספים. אמנם חספסים כבר זמינים בידי A.I.D וכל המגעים עם סוכנות זו הושלמו אך משום הרגישות הדיפלומטית האמורה נקפיא ההליך עד קבלת הבהרות כאמור.

מצפה לתשובתך

מגן.

מגן

B.C. Defence	36	
Spare Parts, P.O.L.		
Transportation	66	
Munitions	36	
Reserve Manpower	37	
Other assets	11	
Total Ground Forces		200
<u>Civil Defence</u>		
Total Civil Defence		106
<u>Additional Costs to Health Establishment¹</u>		
Total		50
<u>Payments out of the Property Tax Compensation Fund²</u>		
	120	100
Grand Total		650

Regarding Article IV, section 4.1 (b), wherever possible, documentation will be presented and will be available, at all times, for inspection. In other cases estimated costs are based on generally accepted parametric calculations and principles, as practiced by the Israeli Government Departments.

On behalf of the Government of Israel I would like to thank you for your time and effort.

Sincerely,

Magen Altuvia
Assistant Economic Minister

¹Includes special alert status to the health service workers, public and private health institutions (hospitals- geriatric, mental health, regular), central emergency units, medicines and other health related materials for victims of missile attacks. Lost income of hospitals and other health institutions.

²Compensation for property damage incurred by missile attacks.

A

FACSIMILE COVER LETTER

8/5/91

Send to : *ר"מ י"א*

From : Economic Minister - Embassy of Israel,
Washington D.C.

מ"מ אלוואב

Date : _____

*ר"מ י"א
מ"מ אלוואב
מ"מ אלוואב*

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Total number of pages 3.

If you do not receive all pages please call # 202 364 5692

DRAFT *מ"מ אלוואב* *מ"מ אלוואב* *מ"מ אלוואב* *מ"מ אלוואב*

ARNOLD & PORTER

May 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Embassy of Israel,
Mr. Magen Altuviya

FROM: Nancy S. Abramowitz

RE: Israel -- Desert Storm Appropriations

You have asked us to consider briefly whether or not the \$650 million ESF cash grant to Israel contained in the recent Desert Storm Appropriations law (P.L. 102-27) is limited to reimbursement of defense costs or can be used more broadly (e.g., for governmental property cost reimbursements to individuals who incurred property damage as a result of the SCUD missile attacks).

Under the literal language of the law, it would appear that the money is not limited to defense costs only. First, the legislation authorizes the money "for additional costs resulting from the conflict in the Persian Gulf". Second, the legislation provides that the money "may" be used by Israel for incremental costs . . . notwithstanding Section 531(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act. This proviso would allow money to be spent for military purposes, but does not require that the money be so spent.

You have asked us whether the legislative history could be read to suggest a different result. Copies of the relevant parts of the House Report, the Senate Report, and the Conference Report are attached hereto.

The House Report speaks of assistance for "military preparedness, war damage and other costs" associated with the conflict. The Senate Report does speak of military costs. In part, this focus may be due to the reference to Israel's submission to the Administration of military losses associated with the Gulf crisis in connection with its request for assistance. The list shared with the Administration was, presumably, not inclusive of all Gulf-related costs. In addition, the Senate Report notes that the

ARNOLD & PORTER

grant is in response to a request from the Government of Israel for assistance in meeting "defense and related costs".

The same statutory provision authorizing money for Israel also authorizes money for Turkey with the same legislative language. The legislative history of the grant with respect to Turkey discusses in somewhat greater detail compensation for both military and economic costs. Because the same legislative language governs the grants to Israel and to Turkey, it cannot be argued that the law as written or intended is subject to military cost limitations.

The agreement drafted by A.I.D. in order to provide the grant is in keeping with the statute itself. The agreement notes that the monies are for additional costs incurred by Israel as a result of and associated with the conflict in the Persian Gulf. There is no attempt in the draft agreement to limit spending to military purposes. This agreement, prepared by A.I.D., would suggest that the Administration does not consider the grant to be limited to military costs.

Based upon the statute itself and the agreement, it would seem that the monies are not limited to defense costs only. While the legislative history might be read in a somewhat different light, the legislative history generally is not to be relied upon where a statute is clear, and, even if relied upon, when read in its entirety and with respect to both Israel and Turkey, would seem to be suggest that the law providing the assistance is not intended to be limited to military costs.

Should you require anything further, please let us know.

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, MONDAY, MAY 6
(Iraq/refugees, Bangladesh, Israel, Iran,
Arab boycott, taken questions/Mideast)

NEWS BRIEFING -- Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher discussed the following topics:

IRAQI REFUGEES CONTINUE HOMEWARD TREK

Boucher noted that the Kurdish refugee population inside Turkey and along the Turkish-Iraqi border now numbers about 321,000, considerably less than the number reported earlier in the area. "There are another 200,000-300,000 displaced people receiving relief in Iraq north of the 36th parallel," he told reporters.

"What this results from," the deputy spokesman said, "is the flow of people back to their homes and back to the towns and cities that they came from."

In Zaku, he said, there are now more than 4,000 refugees located at the temporary relief site. "There has been a constant stream of refugees coming down from the mountains by automobile or other means, and heading for their homes....We believe that many are using Zaku as a way station as they continue homeward," he added.

The delivery of relief supplies by fixed-wing aircraft has been suspended indefinitely, he said. Stocks at the various camps are sufficient for three-to-ten days and are being supplemented by truck and helicopter deliveries as necessary, the deputy spokesman added.

Boucher said the refugee security zone now extends about 40 kilometers eastward from Zaku to Sirsenk near Al-Amadiyah. The zone includes all territory "within 30 kilometers of this line, and to the south, the zone extends to a ridge line north of the city of Dahuk," he noted, adding that "we understand from coalition military forces that Iraqi forces in the Dahuk area are withdrawing."

Near Al-Amadiyah, Boucher said, coalition forces are building a forward logistics base to facilitate future operations. "But at this point, no determination has been made concerning the need for a second temporary relief site," he told reporters.

In the south, he said, U.S. forces have moved more than 8,000 displaced persons from the Safwan area to a temporary refugee camp in Saudi Arabia. There are now 12,300 people at the Saudi-administered camp, he said.

Boucher had few details about the situation in Iran, but he noted that Iranian officials have spelled out their need for medical supplies and other items, which various countries and

לינו

הוא נא זמ' 10
המיון נוסף הארה
האמורה אהיה קיבוץ

10

international organizations are contributing.

The allied request that Iraq withdraw its forces from the areas around each refugee camp, the deputy spokesman explained, has been made "to assure that the Iraqi military not interfere with relief operations....We think it's necessary for the humanitarian purposes of these operations."

However, Boucher emphasized, "we're not taking over the civil administration in these places, nor are we trying to set up any sort of enclaves. We intend to hand over our operations to the United Nations and to withdraw our troops from these areas as soon as possible."

He told questioners that although the U.N. officials have not taken over the operation of the camp in Zakhu, they have "set up a presence outside" the camp and "have taken over responsibility for the food distribution system." He expressed the hope that the United Nations would act quickly to take over the relief operations in northern Iraq. Emphasizing that the coalition efforts are humanitarian, he said, "We've described many times our presence as being a temporary one....Our primary focus now is to deliver relief to people who need it where they need it."

U.S. REVIEWING RELIEF ASSISTANCE FOR BANGLADESH

U.S. officials have received an assessment of relief requirements in the cyclone-affected areas of Bangladesh based on the findings of a U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) team which went to the country in response to the disaster, Boucher told reporters.

"We are now reviewing on an urgent basis our disaster relief assistance and how best to deliver it," he said. He noted that rail and road lines in the affected region have reopened, and large numbers of motorized barges, trawlers and naval vessels are responding to the crisis.

"Food stocks in the country appear to be adequate for the near term," he said. "We are focusing on how best to deliver drinking water, dry food and shelter materials to the flood victims."

Noting that U.S. officials are "making full use of the extensive network of aid resources we have in the country," Boucher pointed out that local and international organizations with many years of experience in dealing with similar disasters "are already actively providing relief."

"Our assessment at this point is that disaster preparedness apparently saved millions of lives," he told questioners. The deputy spokesman said the U.S. assistance package will focus on

first meeting the immediate needs of food and water, which will be distributed by non-governmental organizations, and subsequently also address the long-term issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

"Within the past three months," he said, "\$14 million of U.S. donated food and commodities arrived the the port of Chittagone, and they are available in warehouses for the government of Bangladesh to distribute throughout the country."

"While distribution to the isolated victims on the offshore islands continues to be of the utmost urgency," the deputy spokesman added, "having sufficient food in the country, historically a critical problem in Bangladesh, is apparently not a critical problem in this current disaster."

U.S. "FIRM AND UNYIELDING" AGAINST ARAB BOYCOTT

Reacting to the Arab League's weekend announcement that it was removing the Coca-Cola Company from its official boycott list while adding more than 100 other companies which do business with Israel, Boucher reminded questioners that "the position of the United States against the boycott has been firm and unyielding."

"As we've said many times, the Arabs should end their boycott, and end their challenges to Israel's legitimacy," he said.

He pointed out the United States has legislation in place which reflects the nation's strong stand against the boycott, but he declined to offer any specific characterization of the Arab League's action. "We have often and long held that the boycott should end," he said.

The deputy spokesman also declined to link the expansion of the boycott list to Israel's construction of new settlements in the occupied territories. When a reporter noted that Secretary of State Baker had termed the latest settlement an obstacle to peace during his last trip to the Middle East, Boucher acknowledged that "when the secretary has chosen to do so, he has characterized different events.

"But by and large, as various things have happened, whether good or bad, we have not tried to link these to the peace process," Boucher pointed out. "We have tried to talk about getting the process going; we said that specific confidencebuilding steps aren't an end in themselves, but rather they are something to move the process forward, and we're focused on whether we can move that process forward," he said.

Later, in a written response to a reporter's question, spokesman Margaret Tutwiler said the Bush administration

remains "unalterably opposed to the boycott and to its continuation.

"It has no place in a process of reconciliation and dialogue," Tutwiler's statement said. "The boycott certainly does not contribute to creating the kind of climate we are seeking to promote now," the statement noted.

Boycott lists are maintained by the Arab Boycott Office in Damascus and compliance is up to each individual member of the Arab League, the statement said, pointing out that Egypt stopped honoring the boycott when it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

Tutwiler also recalled that a Kuwaiti government spokesman recently said Kuwait plans to ease its boycott practice and would urge Gulf Cooperation Council countries to do the same. "We welcome such news as a step in the right direction," the spokesman's statement concluded.

NO HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEE TALKS UNTIL SEPTEMBER

Asked about an assertion by the Israeli ambassador to the United States that his country would ask the United States for \$10,000 million in loan guarantees to help deal with the problem of housing a continuing influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants, the deputy spokesman said no discussions are planned with Israel on new housing loan guarantees until after Labor Day in September.

The ambassador, Zalman Shoval, made the remark before a New York audience May 5. Boucher pointed out that in March, when agreement was reached for Israel to receive \$400 million in housing loan guarantees and \$650 million to compensate for economic costs of the Persian Gulf war, "we also agreed that the discussion of loan guarantees for Soviet Jewish absorption would be addressed after Labor Day.

At this point," he told questioners, "I don't have any further comment; that was what was agreed, so that's the time at which we would discuss it." Labor Day falls on September 2 in the United States this year.

U.S. SUPPORTS GULF SECURITY ROLE FOR IRAN

Boucher said Iran "has an important contribution to make" to regional security in the Persian Gulf area. His comments were in response to questions about the Gulf Cooperation Council's weekend suggestion that Iran has a role to play in regional security.

The deputy spokesman recalled that Secretary of State Baker, in February testimony before Congress, said the U.S. expects

the states of the gulf and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to "take the lead in building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties.

"He also said at the time that Iran could have an important contribution to make as a major power in the gulf," Boucher said of Baker's testimony. "It's up to the states to discuss the roles and we hope that all countries will take a responsible role in this," the deputy spokesman added.

TAKEN QUESTIONS

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman at the State Department May 3 posted the following responses to questions taken during that day's regular noon press briefing regarding Mideast:

(begin text)

FOLLOW ON SAUDI ARMS SALE

Q: What is the status of the follow-on Saudi arms package?

A: -- On March 21, 1991, the president approved three urgent foreign military sales cases for Saudi Arabia. Due to the urgency of these cases, the president elected to exercise his authority under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act to waive the normal 30-day congressional waiting period thus enabling the sales to be processed immediately.

The three cases were for repair parts and other logistical support for equipment already in the Saudi inventory. None of the cases involved new weapons or systems. Their total value was 919 million dollars.

These three cases are exceptions. The administration is continuing to study a number of measures to enhance the longterm security and stability in the gulf region. As the president has said, "we're not going to let any friend come into a role where its security is threatened."

A decision on a major follow-on Saudi arms sale would have to be considered in the context of those considerations and in consultation with the Saudi Government. No decision on such a sale has yet been made.

We will, of course, consult fully with the congress.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN KUWAIT

Q: Is the Emir credible? Do you believe him when he says everything is under control or are abuses continuing?

A: -- We believe that the government of Kuwait is making good faith efforts to eliminate incidents of human rights abuse. The government continues, in the aftermath of liberation, to establish an effective security force which enables the government to implement its policy. That being said, we take all reports of abuses seriously.

-- When our embassy receives reports of abuse, we provide the information to the government of Kuwait. In cases we have brought to the attention of the authorities, prompt action has been taken to correct the situation.

-- Cases of individuals taking the law into their own hands and settling scores continue to be reported. While the international security situation has improved, any such actions are too many.

NORTHERN IRAQ: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q: What happens if Iraqi Troops decide to shoot at us in northern Iraq?

A: We will take the necessary precautions to protect our forces.

ARAB BOYCOTT --

Q: Did the Arab League give us any advance information about the addition of 110 companies to the boycott list?

A: No.

Q: What is the U.S. attitude to the boycott?

A: We are unalterably opposed to the boycott and to its continuation. It has no place in a process of reconciliation and dialogue. The boycott certainly does not contribute to creating the kind of climate we are seeking to promote now.

Q: Which Arab countries are not fully complying with the boycott?

A: Boycott lists are maintained by the Arab boycott office in Damascus. Compliance is up to each individual member of the Arab League and varies from member to member.

Egypt ceased honoring the boycott when it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Other countries honor it with a wide variance in compliance.

With the exception of Egypt, there has historically been little correlation between the policy of an Arab Government towards the peace process and its observance of boycott regulations.

Indeed, some of the most hardline states are well known for breaching the Arab boycott when they believe it serves their self-interest to do so.

We consistently urge Arab governments not to comply with boycott regulations. We do not characterize any individual country's compliance so as not to highlight non-compliance. We note, however, that a Kuwaiti government spokesman has said publicly that Kuwait plans to ease its country's boycott practice and would urge other Gulf Cooperation Council countries to do the same.

(END TEXT)

NNNN

אָאָא, חוּזָם: 8749
אָל: רֶהֶמֶשׁ/508
מ-: וּוּשׁ, נֶר: 2049, תֵּא: 080591, זַח: 1200, דַּח: מ, סֵג: סֵב,
בִּכְבֵּב
סוּדִי בִיּוֹתֵר/מִיִּידִי

אָל: סִמְנֵכ׳ל צִפ׳א וּפִר׳נ
דַּע: לֶשׁ׳ רֶה׳מ, לֶשׁ׳ שֶׁ׳ח
מֵאֵת: הַשְּׁגִרִיר, וּוְשִׁינְגִטוֹן

סִימּוֹר רֵיִיךְ, הִיוּ׳ר הַקּוּדֵם שֶׁל וְעִידַת הַנְּשִׂאִים, קִיָּים בִּיוֹם ו׳ 3.5 שִׁיחָה
טִלְפוֹנִית מִמוֹשְׁכַת עִם דְּנִיס רוּס. לְהֵלֵן עֵיקְרֵי דְבָרָיו שֶׁל רוּס :

1. הַעִיתוֹנוֹת טוֹעָה לְגַבִּי סוּרִיָּה, יֵשׁ סִיכּוּי סְבִיר שֶׁסוּרִיָּה אֵכֵן תִּשְׁתַּחֲףּ בּוֹעִידָה
הַמוֹצֵעַת. הֵיחָה הַתְּקֵדְמוֹת - אִפִּילוֹ לְגַבִּי סוּרִיָּה, אֵךְ בְּרִצּוֹנָנוּ לֹא לְפִרְסָם פְּרִטִים.

2. מְדִינּוֹת הַמִּפְרָץ תִּשְׁתַּחֲפְנָה בְּקִבּוּצוֹת עֲבוּדָה מוֹלְטִילְטְרִלִּיּוֹת.

3. הַכֵּל רוֹצִים שֶׁהָאָו׳מ יִכַּלֵּל בּוֹעִידָה בְּצוּרָה זוֹ אוֹ אַחֵרָת. עֲלִינוּ לְרֹאוֹת אִם
דְּרִיֶּשֶׁה זוֹ יִכּוּלָה לְבוֹא עַל סִיפּוּקָה, מְבִלִּי שִׁיּוֹעֵנֵק לוֹ תְּפִקִיד מִמִּשִׁי כִּלְשָׁהוּ.

4. לְגַבִּי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם - הַפְּלִשְׁתִּינִיִּים מִבְּקִשִׁים דְּבָרִים ׳׳סִימְלִיִּים׳׳ בִּלְבַד הֵם רוֹצִים
בְּכֹל מֵאוּדָם שֶׁאֵיזָשָׁהוּ תִּהְלִיךְ יִתְחִיל.

5. אֵרֶה׳ב אֵינָה רוֹצָה בְּנִפְיִלַת הַמִּמְשָׁלָה בִּישְׂרָאֵל.

6. אֵרֶה׳ב אֵינָה מְרוֹצָה מְעַמְדַת הָעֵרֻבִים בְּקֶשֶׁר ל-C.B.M. לְעוֹמַת זֹאת, הֵם מְרוֹצִים
מֵאֵד מֵהַצְעָדִים שֶׁנִּנְקְטוּ ע׳י שֶׁר-הַבְּטָחוֹן בְּתַחוּם זֶה.

כְּמוֹ כֵּן הָעֵלָה רוּס אֵת שֶׁאֵלַת הַפְּקַעַת הַקְּרַקְעוֹת בְּאֵיזוֹר חֲבֵרוֹן - שֶׁלְּדְּבָרָיו גּוֹרֵמַת
נְזָקִים לְכוֹרְמִים הַמְּקוֹמִיִּים.

שׁוּבֵל

רוֹצָה: שֶׁחַח, סֶשֶׁהַח, @ (רֶהֶמ), מְנַכֵּל, מְמַנְכֵּל, בְּנִצּוֹר, מִצְפָּא

סִסִּס

אאא, חוזם: 8889

אל: רהמש/509

מ-: ווש, נר: 2054, תא: 080591, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ג

מאת: ק. לקונגרס, וושינגטון

תהליך השלום.

1. אתמול, 7/5, נפגש דניס רוס לבקשתו עם קבוצת קונגרסמנים יהודים ופרו-ישראלים: מל לויין, לארי סמית, תום לנטוס, הווארד ברמן, הנרי וקסמן, בן גילמן וויין ובר. הפגישה ארכה כשעתיים.

2. להלן דיווח שקיבלתי מהקונגרסמן מל לויין עימו נפגשתי היום, וכן מהקונגרסמן לנטוס בפגישתו היום עם השגריר. בשתי הפגישות נכחה גם ליאורה רצל.

א. רוס ביקש הפגישה עם המחוקקים כדי לעדכנם לגבי ההתפתחויות בהקשר לתהליך השלום, ובעיקר לומר שאינם כה פסימיים כפי שמנסים לצייר זאת בתקשורת, וכי המזכיר בייקר לא היה חוזר לאיזור אלמלא היה רואה אפשרות להתקדמות.

לטענתו, הטיפול של אמצעי התקשורת בתהליך הוא OVERLY PESSIMISTIC ואולם ישנם היבטים חיוביים רבים הנמצאים בדיונים, והוא רואה אפשרות להתקדמות. (לויין העיר בשיחה עימי כי אינו יודע מה הבסיס לאופטימיות).

ב. סעודיה -

WE SHOULDN'T WRITE OFF THE SAUDIS. סעודיה לא חשתתף במו'מ בילטרלי אולם יתכן חוזר יתכן שתשתתף במו'מ מולטיטרלי (רוס ציין שאין עדיין התחייבות). ימשיכו ללחוץ על סעודיה בנוגע לאספקט המולטיטרלי רוס סבור שהחרם מצד כוויית וסעודיה נחלש.

רדן -

שחקן קריטי וגם ישראל חושבת כך. השתתפותה חשובה בעיקר משום שהיא מקלה על הגדרת הפלסטינים. השתתפות ירדן תאפשר לארה'ב להסכים על השתתפות פלסטינים המקובלים על ישראל (למשל הירושלמים יהיו ירדנים). בנוגע לירושלים, עדיין מתחבטים בנושא, וזאת כדי לספק (SATISFY) רצונו של רוח'מ שמיר.

סוריה -

מבחינים יותר בשנוי באוירה (MOOD) מאשר בשינויים משמעותיים (TANGIBLE CHANGES). שמעו הצהרות שונות לעומת העבר. אסד אמר לבייקר: 'לא תמיד רצינו שלום עם ישראל, אולם עכשיו אנחנו רוצים. אי ההסכמה הבולטת - תפקיד האו'מ. סוריה מתעקשת על השתתפות אומ'ית ואילו ישראל מתנגדת. אחד הרעיונות של רוס, כדברי לויין הוא

שיהיה U.N. NOTE KEEPER/REPORTER כמו בשיחות עם מצרים.

לאו'מ תהיה נוכחות רק בתפקיד של דווח ולא יותר מכך.
לנטוס הוסיף כי דובר גם על החייאת קונייטרה ע'י הסורים כחלק מ-CBM.
לדברי רוס, אם סוריה לא חשתתף בתהליך, מוכנים להמשיך גם בלעדיה.

מתכונת הועידה -

ניתן יהיה לזמנה מחדש רק באישור ישראלי. (זאת בתשובה לשאלה).

ההסדר הסופי -

לשאלה כיצד רואה המימשל את ההסדר הסופי השיב דניס 'AUTONOMY .PLUS'

ג. המחוקקים שאלו מה יקרה אם התהליך יכשל.
לויין הבהיר כי יהיה זה שלילי אם יפנו אצבע מאשימה כלפי ישראל.
תשובת רוס היתה כי בשלב זה WE ARE SOFT PADDLING AND LOW KEYED.

למשל בסוגיית ההתנחלויות. עושים הכל כדי למנוע חיכוכים פומביים. אולם אם התהליך יכשל נסביר לעולם מדוע הוא נכשל, בין אם תהיה זו סוריה או ישראל כנאשמות.

לדברי לויין, התשובה היוותה מקור לדאגה עבור הנוכחים, אולם הוסיף כי דניס לא העלה הנושא ביוזמתו אלא בתשובה לשאלה שכן, 'הוא בא לפגישה כדי להרגיע ולומר לנו אל תאמינו לדיווחי התקשורת'. רוס אמר כי הם מעוניינים 'שהתהליך יעבוד. אנו חושבים שגם שמיר רוצה בכך ואנו מעוניינים לעבוד עימו'. הוסיף כי שומעים גם מהפלסטינים דברים חיוביים.

ד. לגבי הגישה הדו-מסלולית.

ימשיכו ללחוץ על סעודיה והם סבורים שהם זוכים להצלחה בנושא החרם וגם באירופה. אולם כדברי לויין, יש להם (למימשל) מה לומר יותר על המסלול הפלסטיני. 'הם רוצים את אש'פ - בחוץ ואינם מעוניינים לדון עימו. אלה הם נעימות חדשות המושמעות ע'י המימשל'.

ה. לדברי לויין, עיקר המסר של רוס היה כי הם מנסים לפעול במסגרת מה שרוה'מ שמיר מעוניין ולהיות רגישים כלפיו וימשיכו לעשות כן.

WE'LL CONTINUE TO PURSUE IT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT SHAMIR WANTS

כאמור, רצה רוס להשאיר מסר חיובי ולהרגיע הנוכחים שארה'ב לא תעזוב התהליך. בנוגע למאמרו של חום פרידמן, אמר רוס כי לא אמרו הדברים שפרידמן מצטט, מדובר בהעשמותו של הכתב.

ו. חוזה הגנה ישראלי - אמריקני -

לנטוס העלה הרעיון. הוא לא נדחה ע'י רוס שציין כי אינו יודע עמדת המזכיר. המשתתפים ציינו כי יש להמחיש לישראל שארה'ב ניצבת לצידה ומחוייבת לבטחונה.

ז. פירוק נשק (AC) -

הנושא עלה בקונטקסט של שת'פ איזורי. המזכיר ורוס מעוניינים שה-AC יהיה חלק מהשיחות הביילטרליות (4 קבוצות העבודה: שלום, כלכלה, AC, סביבה

- כולל מים).

ח. ערבויות לקליטת עלייה -

הנושא הועלה ע'י לויין, לנטוס, וסמית בתום השיחה ולאחר שאר המשתתפים עזבו.

תגובתו המיידית של רוס לנושא (כך סיפרו לויין ולנטוס) היתה ההתנחלויות.

לדברי רוס, כיצד ישראל יכולה להיות רצינית לגבי הערבויות ולבקש עזרת הממשל, בשעה שהיא משקיעה 120 מיליון דולר בהתנחלויות.

כדברי לויין, ברור שהממשל עושה לינקג' בין ההתנחלויות לערבויות עם זאת הדגיש שרוס לא נתן התשובה בקונטקסט של השלום, והנושא לא הועלה ביוזמתו אלא ביוזמתם.

(מל סיפר כי שמע כבר מעחונאים, אשר חלקם פנו אליו, שבכוונתם לכתוב על נושא ההתנחלויות והלינקג' של הממשל).

3. מחר אחה' צ יפגש המזכיר בייקר עם חברי ועדת החוץ, בפגישה סגורה כדי לקבל עדכון על מסעותיו.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, כנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 5781
אל: רהמש/343
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 92, חא: 060591, זח: 1625, דח: מ, סג: בל,
כבכ
בלמס/מידי

אל: הפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש וסנטור רודי בושביץ

REMARKS DURING PHOTO OPPORTUNITY PRESIDENT BUSH MEETS WITH
RUDY BOSCHWITZ/THE WHITE HOUSE OVAL OFFICE/MONDAY, MAY 6, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: I MIGHT JUST MAKE ONE COMMENT HERE, TO SAY HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATE SENATOR BOSCHWITZ GOING TO ETHIOPIA. THE CONCERN OF THE FALASHAS, THE JEWS THERE IN ETHIOPIA THAT WANT TO GO OUT AND GO TO ISRAEL, IS A CONCERN THAT I SHARE. AND RUDY TOOK A GOOD STEP FORWARD THERE, IN TALKING TO THE ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES. IT'S A MISSION OF CONSCIENCE, A MISSION OF COMPASSION, AND WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR UNDERTAKING IT.

I'M ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM YOU HOW YOU FEEL THINGS WILL GO, BUT I KNOW YOU'VE GOT SOME WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT, AND I THINK IT'S A MISSION THAT MANY IN THIS COUNTRY, WHEN THEY UNDERSTAND IT, WILL APPRECIATE IT. I'M GRATEFUL FOR YOUR DOING IT.

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: WELL, YOU'VE BEEN ACTIVE IN THAT MATTER BEFORE, VERY ACTIVE, MR. PRESIDENT, SO THIS IS A CONTINUATION. OF COURSE, ETHIOPIA IS ALSO IN GREAT TURMOIL, SO IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WE BRING PEACE THERE.

Q IS THERE SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ETHIOPIANS ARE GOING TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION?

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: WELL, THERE IS SOME HOPE THAT WE WILL. IT'S A PRETTY TENUOUS SITUATION. BUT I THINK THAT THEY'RE ANXIOUS TO MEET WITH SOME OF THE REBELS, AND I THINK WE CAN BRING THEM TOGETHER, AND I THINK SOMETHING WILL HAPPEN OVER THERE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, CAN THE WORLD DEAL WITH THREE CRISES AT A TIME, WITH ETHIOPIA, BANGLADESH AND THE KURDS? ARE THEY UP TO THAT RELIEF EFFORT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, IT'S -- RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE STRETCHED, BUT THE COMPASSION IS NOT. AND SO I EXPECT WE CAN DO

WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS DONE.

SEN. BOSCHWITZ: THE UNITED STATES MOVED IN DOLLAR 170 MILLION WORTH OF FOOD IN THIS PAST YEAR TO ETHIOPIA. WE'VE PLAYED A VERY ESSENTIAL ROLE IN PREVENTING MORE EGREGIOUS STARVATION THERE.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU ALL. THAT'S REALLY GOOD, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.


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עד כאן

עתונות

פיוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1777
מסוק 2 מחוק 7 מחקים
מסוק 1 מחוק 2 מסוקים

Handwritten notes:
1777
מסוק 2 מחוק 7 מחקים
מסוק 1 מחוק 2 מסוקים
מסוק 1 מחוק 2 מסוקים



אל: סמנכ"ל בנצור
מזכיר הממשלה, אליקים רובינשטיין
סלי מרידור, יועץ שה"ט
מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

הנדון: התנחלויות וערבויות.

דברים שרואים מכאן לא תמיד נראים מירושלים ועל כל פנים, לא מאותה זווית ולא באותה עוצמה,

מדיניות ההתנחלויות של ישראל מלכדת את המימשל והקונגרס, את התקשורת עם היהודים בהסכמה חסרת תקדים, לא ידועה לי הסכמה כללית כזאת בשום נושא אחר.

הנשיא רגיש גם לעניינים אחרים כגון: מעצרים, גרושים וכיו"ב, אבל בהתנחלויות הוא רואה הכרזת מלחמה וקריאת תגר אישית עליו.

בכל נושא אחר חמצאו לישראל מליצי-יושר ומלמדי-זכות. יאמרו שהמעצרים הם כורח בטחוני והגרושים הם תגובה הכרחית לאלימות הערבית; ועוד יאמרו שבנושא "התהליך" ישראל מגלה נדיבות מסוימת ורצון להתפשר. בנושא ההתנחלות, לא ראיתי מאמר אחד, לא שמעתי סנטור אחד או מורה ולא פגשתי מנהיג יהודי אחד, שיצדיקו את המעשה. בענין זה אנחנו לבדנו.

אני מניח שקראתם את הדיווחים היוצאים מכאן. ישנם לא מעט סימנים מבשרי-רע. - אחד המורשים הציץ לנכות מהסיוע כל דולר המושקע בהתנחלויות. הצעתו הוסרה, אמנם, מסדר היום, אך כל עשרה הדוברים (ובתוכם ידידים גדולים של ישראל) שללו את מעשי ודיבורי ההתנחלות שלילה גמורה.

- שני סנטורים העלו הצעה להחלטה קונגרס בגנות החרם הערבי. מינייה וביה קמו מולם שני סנטורים אחרים ונתבעו לקשור דיון זה בדיון על ההתנחלויות.

- איפא"ק, שאזנו כרויה היטב למחרש בגבעה ובמימשל, משגר לנו מסרים קשים.

כך גם הא.ד.ל (וראה רישום שיחה פוקסמן עם שהיח ב- 7 באפריל) וועידת הנשיאים.

- אנחנו שומעים שבייקר מתבטא בחימה עפוכה על מה שהוא מכנה "הקיעה אצבע בעינינו".

ערב ביקורו הראשון יצאו ממשרד השיכון דיבורים על 13,000 יחידות דיור חדשות ביו"ש;

ערב ביקורו השני - קמה רבה, ערב ביקורו השלישי קמה טלמון ב' ובשורבו ארצה לקבל

תשובותיו מיהרו המחייטבים והוסיפו קראוונים לטלמון ב'. כל ידידנו בקונגרס,

בתקשורת ובין היהודים אומרים שבייקר לעולם לא ישכח זאת ויום הפרעון יגיע.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כל זה מחקטו במיטרין למשימה הקשה מאד לגיוס ערבויות למלווח קליטה בסך עשרה מיליארד דולר. היתה לנו תקווה מטוימת שנצליח ליצור הפרדה (דה-לינקג') בין ענין זה לענין ההחישבות ביו"ש. תקווה זו הולכת ונגוזת. מוטב שנדע מעתה, שצפויות לנו התניות ברורות ושבמאבק הספציפי הזה הקונגרס יעמוד לימין הנשיא והמזכיר. מכתב לוי לבייקר וכל חילופי הדברים בכתב ובע"פ בקשר לערבויות 400 המיליון, השאירו משקע מר ולכן לא יסתפקו עוד בהחייבות זו כשנגיש את בקשתנו בספטמבר.

אני חושב שרה"מ ושה"ח והשרים האחרים צריכים לדעת את המציאות הזאת ולכלכל דרכנו בהתאם.


מיכאל שילה

העתק: השגריר - כאן

סודי

נכנס **

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חוזם: 5.3534

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/217, מצב/294

מ-: ווע, נר: 2037, תא: 030591, ח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: e: סצפא

נד: e:

סודי / מלידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרי"נ

דע, לע' שה"ח / לע' רוה"מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

התהליך המדיני.

1. סימור ריך נפגש הבוקר (3.5) עם ריצ'ארד האס ושוחח עימו בנושא. להלן עיקרי דיווחו אלי:

א. סוריה.

1. האס סובר שלא תתכן ועידה בלא השתתפותה של סוריה. הוסיף שהשיחות שקיים מזכ"ר המדינה עם הסורים היו 'פרודוקטיביות' וציין שבשלב זה אינו יכול להרחיב הדיבור על-כך.

2. מפנה תשומת לבכם בהמשך לאמור לעיל, לדיווחי שטיין - אמיתי (2030 ו - 2031) ולהבדלי הגירסאות בנושא הפעמה הסורית.

ב. הנציגות הפלשתינאית.

שאלת השתתפותו של פייצל אל-חוסייני בשיחות תלויה בהחלטת הפלשתינאים אם לעמוד על השתתפותו או בהחלטתו שלו עצמו להיותר בצל.

ג. מעורבות האו"ם.

האס ציין שהאו"ם חייב להיות מעורב בדרך כלשהי בוועידה ולו בתור משקיף. המשך ואמר שנוכחות האו"ם יכולה להיות גם בדמותו של מישו מהמזכירות.

ד. המשך הפעילות.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לשאלת ריך אמר האס שלנשיא אין כל כוונה, בשלב זה, להיות מעורב אישית בתהליך. להערכתו, יחזור, כנראה, בייקר לאיזור בעוד כשלושה שבועות.


2. ריך גם העלה עם האס נושא ערבויות קליטת העלייה ושמע ממנו שבמימשל GREAT UNHAPPINESS מפעילות ההתנחלויות ומכך שלתפיסתם, ישראל לא סיפקה המידע המובטח במכתב שה"ח למזכ"ר.

אישור ה - 400 מיליון לדבריו נבע מכך שנפגש קצה בהמשך הטיפול בעניין. הוסיף ע"ה הישראליים לא אמרו אמת בעניין ההתנחלויות והיה עדיף שיאמרו העובדות גם אם אינם נוחות'.

שובל.

אס

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), מצב(0), בנצור(1), ר/מרכז(1)



אאא, חוזם: 3534

אל: רהמש/217

מ-: רוש, נר: 2037, תא: 030591, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע, לש' שה'ח / לש' רוה'מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

התהליך המדיני.

1. סימור רייך נפגש הבוקר (3.5) עם ריצ'ארד האס ושוחח עימו בנושא. להלן עיקרי דיווחו אלי:

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שאלת השתתפותו של פייצל אל-חוסייני בשיחות תלוייה בהחלטת הפלשתינאים אם לעמוד על השתתפותו או בהחלטתו שלו עצמו להיותר בצל.

ג. מעורבות האו"מ.

אס ציין שהאו"מ חייב להיות מעורב בדרך כלשהי בוועידה ולו בתור משקיף. המשיך ואמר שנוכחות האו"מ יכולה להיות גם בדמותו של מישו מהמזכירות.

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
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אישור ה - 400 מיליון לדבריו נבע מכך שנפשם קצה בהמשך הטיפול בעניין. הוסיף ש'הישראלים לא אמרו אמת בענין ההתנחלויות והיה עדיף שיאמרו העובדות גם אם אינם נוחות'.

שובל.

תפוצה: שחח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), כנצור, ר/מרכז

סססס



חסוי



חסוי

אאא, חודם: 3534

אל: רהמש/217

מ-: ווש, נר: 2037, תא: 030591, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע, לש' שה'ח / לש' רוה'מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

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לשאלת רייך אמר האס שלנשיא אין כל כוונה, בשלב זה, להיות מעורב אישית בתהליך. להערכתו, יחזור, כנראה, בייקר לאיזור בעוד כשלושה שבועות.

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שובל.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, ר/מרכז

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 3533

אל: רהמש/211

מ-: ווש, נר: 2036, תא: 030591, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לש' שה'ח, לש' רוה'מ, ממ'ד

מאת: לש' שגריר, וושינגטון

סוריה.

גורדי זקס נכח בא'ע בהשתתפות שגרירי מצרים וכוויית כאן.

מהלך הארוחה נדון תפקיד סוריה בתהליך השלום. השגריר המצרי סבר סוריה עשויה להשתתף בסופו של דבר בוועידה בעוד השגריר סבאח היה בדיעה, שאין לה כל אינטרס להשתתף בוועידה ובתהליך, משום שעתה היא נהנית מכל העולמות, מחזרת ע'י המעצמות ומקבלת הסיוע הדרוש לה, ובה בעת שומרת על מקומה ודימויה הרדיקלי בעולם הערבי.

גם בענין הגולן כחמריץ למעורבות בתהליך היו חלוקים אל רידי וסבאח. הראשון, ראה בכך חמריץ בעוד האחרון, המעיט בחשיבותו.

עד כאן.

לש' שגריר.

הפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מצרים

סססס



שמו

כלכלית ב'
טל' 3222

כ"א באייר תשנ"א
5 במאי 1991

21643

הנדון: סיכום ישיבה עם השגריר האמריקאי בנושא ש"פ כלכלי-אזרחי

ב- 2.5.91 נערכה במטה"ח ישיבה בהשתתפות השגריר האמריקאי BROWN וצוותו - היועץ הכלכלי הקלרה, האיש המדיני פ. פטרסון, הנספח המזרחי צ. לאוסון ואיש המחלקה הכלכלית ד. רוזינשטיין.

מצדנו השתתפו: ד"ר י. כהן - יושב ראש, מר י. למדן, מר א. בייקר, מר ד. הלל והח"מ ממטה"ח, פרופ' י. פולמן, ד"ר א. שסקין - משרד החקלאות, מר ש. המתי - משרד האנרגיה, ד"ר ע. פרוז'נין - המשרד לאיכות הסביבה, מר מ. בנארי - משרד התירות, ד"ר א. רוזנבלט וד"ר י. ורדי - נציבות המיס, מר ד. שרף - עיריית אילת.

ד"ר כהן פותח בישיבה ומציג באופן כללי הקונספציה שבש"פ כלכלי איזורי. מטרתנו בפרוייקטים ישימים, הטנים יחסים בהיקפם, שיש בהם תועלת הדדית למדינות שיהחו בו חלק. הפרוייקטים שנציג הינם תוצאה של התייעצויות משרדיות ובינמשרדיות בממשלה שארכו זמן רב ומהובלים על כל המשתתפים. זאת בניגוד לפרוייקטים ויוזמות המוצעים ע"י גופים פרטיים ואקדמאיים.

השגריר בראון מודה על זימון הישיבה, התייחס לשירותו בדרום מזרח אסיה שבה נוכח בחשיבות של ש"פ כלכלי איזורי ובאופן שהתבצע.

ד"ר כהן - מאחר ואנו מייחסים למצרים חשיבות כמדינת מפתח לכל התהליכים הקשורים לש"פ איזורי, נתחיל בהצגת הפרוייקטים החקלאיים שכבר מבוצעים שם.

ד"ר א. שסקין - ש"פ החל ב-1980 לאחר חתימת הסכם השלום והפרוייקטים המבוצעים מוערכים בעלות של 26 מיליון דולר המהווים 50 אחוז מסך שה"פ האיזורי בים התיכון.

1. פיתוח איזורים צחיחים - פרוייקט CALAR - פרוייקט מוצלח הפועל מזה 9 שנים בשיתוף אוניברסיטת בו-גורדיון, אוניברסיטת סן-דייגו ומשרד החקלאות המצרי.

2. פרוייקט MARYUT - לפיתוח אגרו-תעשייתי - פיתוח השטחים החדשים כולל חקלאות, תעשייה והתיישבות. הפרוייקט נמצא בשנתו השלישית ויכול להוות דגם לכל האיזור בין אל-עלמיין ו-NUBARIA. ש"פ בין אוניברסיטת בו-גורדיון, אוניברסיטת סן-דייגו ומשרד החקלאות המצרי.



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3. פרוייקט NUBASEED - פיתוח ירקות ופירות וזרעים לקבלת תנובה גבוהה תוך התאמה לתנאי האיזור. הפרוייקט משותף למשרד החקלאות המצרי, אגרידב ו-1. USDA.
4. חילופי טכנולוגיה חקלאית לגבי איזורים בעלי ECOSYSTEM דומים. פרוייקט משותף לפהולטה לחקלאות באוניברסיטה העברית ומשרד החקלאות המצרי.
5. השבחת בע"ח - לדוגמא, הצלבת גזעים של עיזים להגברת תפוקת החלב והבשר.

מעבר לפרוייקטים אלו שכבר פועלים, אנו מגישים בעת עיז שלוש פרוייקטים ל-A.I.D. המתייחסים לשלב השני של פרוייקט MARYUT, פרוייקט TALAYA המתייחס בעיקר לבע"ח ופרוייקט NUBASEED המהווה הרחבה לפרוייקט הקיים והגדלתו לשטח של 500 אקר לעומת 50 אקר כיום. לסיכום, שה"פ הקיים מהווה הצלחה ויוצר אווירה נוחה המקרנה גם לדמה האישיות ביו הצוותים והחוקרים בשטח.

פרופ' י. פולמן סוקר הפרוייקטים המוצעים על ידינו בש"פ חקלאי בתחומים השונים והט:

- א. גידול עצי פרי נשירים באהלים חס.
- ב. גידול פירות וירקות תוך התאמה לתנאי האיזור וניצול המשאבים הקיימים לקבלת תפוקה גבוהה ביבולים.
- ג. בנה גנים של צמחי הים התיכון.
- ד. שיטות חדשות להשקייה וניצולת מים גבוהה, כבר כיום אנו משתמשים בהרבה פחות מים ליחידת תפוקה, מבשר.
- ה. ש"פ בע"ח - מדינות האיזור מוציאות סכומי עתק על יבוא בע"ח בעיקר צאן, פיתחנו שיטות גנטיות היכולות להביא להגברת הפריון ושיטות נוספות שמדינות האיזור יהיו מעוניינות בהן בהקשר הנ"ל.
- ו. הגנת הצומח - טיפול במזיקים בהדברה באמצעים ביולוגיים ואחרים המונעים גם השימוש באמצעים כימיים ומקטינים הפגיעה האקולוגית כולל בני תהום.
- ז. שיטות לשימור ירקות ופירות לאחר הקטיף וטיפול במחלות לאחר הקטיף.

ד"ר רוזנטל מציא הצעות בתחום המים:

1. חלוקה סופית של מי הירמור לאחר הגמת סכר המקרו (האחוזה).
2. ש"פ בנוגע לתפיסת מים עודפים.
3. תפעול משותף של משאבי המים בערבה.

שלושת הפרוייקטים הנ"ל מתייחסים לש"פ עם ירדן. לגבי מצרים מציעים תפעול ובהרה משותפת במאגר המים "העתיקים" מטחת לנגב המצרי וסיני.

הצעה נוספת - ניהול המים במערב הנגב-צפון סיני ואיזור עזה - כולל התפלה וטיהור מי שפכים על ידינו.



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לגבי ש"פ איזורי כולל - ניהול מים בצורה יעילה - גם מדינות ערב וגם אנו נוכל לנצל את הידע שיש לנו וליישמו בצורה טובה. לגבי נושא זה - נוכל אף להוות דגם לאיזורים אחרים בעולם שיש להם אותם תנאים אקלימיים ופזיזיים באיזורנו.

נושא נוסף בעל משמעות איזורית כוללת הינו זריעת עננים והגברת הגשם. בנוסף נוכל לתרום מהידע שלנו לגבי ניצול מים שוליים.

ד"ר א. פרוז'נין מציג הפרוייקטים הנוגעים לש"פ איזורי בתחום שמירת איכות הסביבה.

1. לגבי מפרץ אילת:
 - א. הקמת מערכת איזורית למינהל סביבתי ותכנון סביבתי המשותפת למצרים, ירדן, סעודיה וישראל.
 - ב. מרכז מדעי ותיירותי במסגרת פרויקט משותף של שיקום ושמירה על ריף האלמוגים לאורך חופי ים סוף.
 - ג. ניהול ופיקוח לגבי שמורות טבע ימיות וחופיות.
 - ד. הערכת משותפת לטיפול באסונות ימיים למניעת זיהום ים משמנים וחומרים כימיים.
 - ה. תיאום וש"פ במלחמה במזיקים וניהול וציונלי של שימוש במדבירים וכימיקלים כנגד מזיקים אלו.
 - ו. פרויקט ביוט משותף בין עקבה ואילת הן בניצול והן בטיפול.

2. לגבי הים התיכון:
 - א. ש"פ בהביעת עקרונות תכנון חוף וקו חוף.
 - ב. ניטור הסעת חולות, ניטור הרס ובניה לאורך החופים.
 - ג. מחקר איזורי על שינויי אקלים וניתוח ההשפעות על האיזור.
 - ד. הקמת מערכת משותפת לניטור איכות אוויר באיזור.
 - ה. בחינת האפשרות להקמה והפעלה של מספר מרכזים איזוריים לטיפול בפסולת העילה.
 1. פיתוח שווקים איזוריים לח"ג ממוחזרים.
 2. שימור ושיקום נופים ים תיכוניים מסורתיים. בהקשר זה ניהול משותף של ה-FOREST ECOSYSTEMS בים התיכון.
 3. כבהצעה ד' לגבי מפרץ אילת ליישם זאת גם לים התיכון.

3. לגבי בקעת הירדן:
 - א. פרויקט משותף לשמירה על איכות המים וההקדע ושימור מערכות אקולוגיות בירדן הדרומי.
 - ב. ניהול סביבתי משותף של איזור ים המלח, תוך דגש על SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

4. ש"פ בהתמודדות ובטיפול של פסולת מסוכנת, פיקוח על פסולת כזו.

מר שרף מציג הפרוייקטים המתייחסים לאיזור אילת - איזור זה הוצג כמיקרוקוסמוס הן לבעיות משותפות למס' מדינות והן לנחיצות שבטיפול משותף לגביהן. מדגיש הנחיצות שבש"פ והתועלת לכל הנזדים לאור הפיתוח המואץ בעיקר באילת אבל גם בעקבה ולאור המיידיות ותחושת הדחיפות שבטיפול בבעיות. מתייחס להצעות שהועלו ע"י הוועדה לדיון לאיזור זה כאפשרויות לפרוייקטים לש"פ.



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מ"ר רמתי מציג הצעות בתחום האנרגיה -

1. שילוב מערכת החשמל של ישראל, ירדן ומצרים. לאפשר גיבוי במקרה של תקלות בייצור החשמל באחת מהמדינות ואספקת עודף ייצור ממדינה אחת במקרה של ביקושי שיא במדינה אחרת.
2. הגברת גשם באגן הים התיכון המזרחי באמצעות שיטה שנחקרת עתה ומתבססת על מתקנים שתוכננו לעירבוב מי הים בהטעים מוגדרים באיזורנו.
3. חידוש הובלת נפט סעודי לבתי הזיקוק בחיפה באמצעות הטפליין תוך אפשרות לייצור מוצרי לוואי מהנפט בחיפה.
4. אפשרות להובלת נפט מסעודיה במיכליות גדולות דרך הצא"א.
5. הקמת תחנה בת מגהואט אחד של חב' לוז באחת ממדינות האיזור. התחנה תשמש להדגמה ולבדיקת התאמת הטכנולוגיה לתנאים המקומיים.
6. הקמת תחנת כח בת 80 מגהואט של לוז באתר עין עברונה. התחנה תוכל לספק חשמל נקי למצרים, ירדן וסעודיה.
7. הצעה של חב' פז להקמת מערכת אנרגיה משולבת.
8. מחקר סייסמוגרפי משותף לאתרעה כנגד רעידות אדמה במיוחד לגבי איזור השבר הסורי-אפריקאי.
9. ש"פ במיפוי מינרלים טבעיים ובמיוחד פוספטים.
10. ניצול מים גיאותרמיים לחממות בעיקר באיזור הערבה.

מ"ר בנארי מציג הפרוייקטים בתחום התיירות -

בשלב זה הצעותינו מתמקדות במאמצים לעידוד והגברת התיירות ממדינות שלישיות למדינות האיזור. לאחרונה נוצר ש"פ כזה בין האחדאי המצרי בנושא בניו-יורק לבין אנשינו שם.

בתחום ש"פ מציעים פתיחת אשר יבשתי מעקבה לאילת כפי שקיים כיום במעבר אלנבי. זהו עניין פשוט יחסית לביצוע בעלויות מינימליות ויכול לתת דחיפה בנושא התיירות הזרה.

נושא נוסף הינו שילובה של אילת בקו המעבורת בין עקבה ונוואיבה כך שהתיירים יוכלו לסייר ולהנות גם מהאתרים היחודיים שיש באילת.

הצעה לש"פ בין ישראל ומצרים הינה יישום הסעיף ב-M.O.U. בינינו למצרים לגבי הפעלת מעבורת בין אשדוד לפורט-סעיד. הפרוייקטים הנ"ל מהווים שלב ראשון שאנו מקווים שיוכל לשלב השני והוא קידום ופעולה משותפת בתיירות של מדינות האיזור (תנועת תיירים ממדינה אחת לשניה באיזורנו).

ד"ר כהן - העלינו בפניכם מכלול של הצעות ופרוייקטים לש"פ כלכלי איזורי בתחומים שונים ומגוונים.

בפגישות שהיו לנו עם נציגי הקהיליה האירופאית בזמן האחרון העלנו בפניהם גם כן נושא הש"פ אם כי לא בצורה מפורטת כפי שעשינו כאן.

ידוע לנו שארה"ב הקדישה מאמץ וזמן ללימוד נושא ש"פ האיזורי - והראנו בעניין רב הדו"ח המסכם 10 שנות מחקר. הדו"ח ממליץ על הרחבת ש"פ הקיים בין ישראל ומצרים לתחומים נוספים מעבר להיים כיום. אנו מקווים כי דו"ח זה יתרום תרומתו להגברת ועידוד שה"פ האיזורי. מעבר



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לבעיה התקציבית הקיימת לגבי יישום הפרוייקטים עולה גם השאלה כיצד להתחיל ולפעול בכיוון זה. אנו רואים לפנינו שני מסלולים אפשריים - ש"פ בין ישראל והמדינות השכנות וש"פ בין ישראל ומדינות הים התיכון בכלל. אנו משתפים פעולה עם הצוות של השגרירות האמריקאית ונמשיך לפתח רעיונות בכיוון זה במיאום עמכם.

השגריר האמריקאי - מצ'ין בסיפוק ובעניין הדיון והצגת הפרוייקטים. ברור שמדינות ערב מעוניינות באופן עקרוני בש"פ כזה, צ"ן את ירדן שמצבה הכלכלי קשה במיוחד, אולם אי אפשר לקדם ש"פ כלכלי איזורי בלא התקדמות בתהליך השלום.

הדו"ח האמריקאי היבל תשומת לב ותמיכה מצד הקונגרס ואף כי נפויים לנו ימים קשים מאוד מבחינה תקציבית בארה"ב והשיים בהקצאת מקורות כסף נוספים לרעיונות כאלו אני בטוח שאם תהיה פריצת דרך בתהליך השלום הדברים ישתנו ותהיה תמיכה בארה"ב בפרוייקטים אלו.

רשם: אלי לב