

1. J. A. Russell, 'Introduction to special section: on defining emotion', *Emotion Review* 4 (2012) 337: 'Emotion researchers face a scandal. We have no agreed upon definition of the term – *emotion* – that defines our field.'
 2. P. E. Griffiths, *What emotions really are: the problem of psychological categories* (Chicago 1997) 200: we need a model of 'how concepts would evolve if the only aim of those using them were scientific understanding'.
 3. **Surprise not a prototypical emotion:** P. Shaver, J. Schwarz, D. Kirson, and C. O'Connor, 'Emotion and emotion knowledge: further explanations of a prototype approach', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (1987) 1061-86 (esp. 1068).
 4. **Category formation:** see E. Rosch, 'Principles of categorization', in *Cognition and categorization*, ed. E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Hillsdale NJ 1978) 27-48; G. Lakoff, *Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind* (Chicago 1987).
 5. M. Kundera, *The book of laughter and forgetting* (London 1996) 166-9: 'Litost is an untranslatable Czech word . . . I have looked in vain in other languages for an equivalent, though I find it difficult to imagine how anyone can understand the human soul without it.' *Litost* is 'a state of torment caused by the sudden sight of one's own misery'; it 'works like a two-stroke engine. Torment is followed by the desire for revenge. The goal of revenge is to make one's partner look as miserable as oneself.'
- Cf. D. L. Cairns, *Aidōs: The psychology and ethics of honour and shame in ancient Greek literature* (Oxford 1993), dustjacket blurb: 'Commonly rendered "shame", "modesty", or "respect", *aidōs* is notoriously one of the most elusive and difficult Greek words to translate'.
6. **Scripts:** see D. L. Cairns, 'Look both ways: studying emotion in ancient Greek', *Critical Quarterly* 50.4 (2008), 43-62 (at 46): 'A script is a mini-narrative that will usually encompass (at least) the conditions in which emotion X occurs, the perceptions and appraisals of those conditions, and the responses (whether symptomatic, expressive, or pragmatic) that result.' On the utility of the notions of 'scripts' or 'paradigm scenarios' in the analysis of emotion concepts, see R. de Sousa, *The rationality of emotion* (Cambridge MA 1987); R. A. Kaster, *Emotion, restraint, and community in ancient Rome* (Oxford 2005); E. Sanders, *Envy and jealousy in classical Athens: a socio-psychological approach* (New York 2014). The script-based approach to emotions is an aspect of the approach based on category-structure [4 above]; as J. A. Russell notes: 'A script is to an event what a prototype is to an object', 'Culture and the categorization of emotion', *Psychological Bulletin* 110 (1991) 426-50 (at 443).

7. *Iliad* 22. 104-10:

“νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὄλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμήσιν,
αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρωάδας ἐλκεσιπέπλους,
μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμείο:
Ἔκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὄλεσε λαόν.
ὣς ἐρέουσιν: ἐμοὶ δὲ τότ' ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη
ἄντην ἢ Ἀχιλῆα κατακτείναντα νέεσθαι
ἢ κεν αὐτῷ ὀλέσθαι ἐὺκλειῶς πρὸ πόλης.”

'Now, since by my own recklessness I have ruined my people,
I feel shame before the Trojans and the Trojan women with trailing
robes, that some baser person than I will say of me:

‘Hektor believed in his own strength and ruined his people.’
Thus they will speak; and as for me, it would be much better
at that time, to go against Achilleus, and slay him, and come back,
or else be killed by him in glory in front of the city.’¹

8. *Iliad* 10. 234-9:

“Τυδείδη Διόμηδες ἐμῶ κεχαρισμένε θυμῶ
τὸν μὲν δὴ ἔταρόν γ' αἰρήσεαι ὃν κ' ἐθέλησθα,
φαινομένων τὸν ἄριστον, ἐπεὶ μεμάασί γε πολλοί.
μηδὲ σύ γ' αἰδόμενος σῆσι φρεσὶ τὸν μὲν ἀρείω
καλλείπειν, σὺ δὲ χείρον' ὀπάσσεαι αἰδοῖ εἰκῶν
ἐς γενεὴν ὀρόων, μηδ' εἰ βασιλεύτερός ἐστιν.”

‘Son of Tydeus, you who delight my heart, Diomedes,
pick your man to be your companion, whichever you wish,
the best of all who have shown, since many are eager to do it.
You must not, for the awe that you feel in your heart, pass over
the better man and take the worse, giving way to modesty
and looking to his degree – not even if he be kinglier.’

‘Getting/receiving *aidōs* (and *timē*)’: bards, at *Od.* 8. 480, war heroes at Tyrtæus 12. 39-40
W), a lover/mentor at Theognis 253-4.

9. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4. 9, 1128b10-35:

Shame (*aidōs*) should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling (*pathos*) than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling (*pathos*) rather than of a state of character. The feeling (*pathos*) is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame [i.e. be *aidēmōn*] because they live by feeling (*pathos*) and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame (*aidōs*); and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling [i.e. are *aidēmōn*], but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace [for being *aischyntēlos*], since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace (*aischynē*) is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace (*aischynē*) should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced (*aischynomai*) if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame (*aidōs*) is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily do bad actions. But shame (*aidōs*) may be said to be conditionally (*ex hypotheseōs*) a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced (*aischynomai*); but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification. And if shamelessness (*anaishyntia*) – not to be ashamed (*aideomai*) of doing base actions – is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed (*aischynomai*) of doing such actions.

10. ‘Shame’ + ‘respect’ in a single term: see e.g. L. Abu-Lughod, *Veiled sentiments: Honor and poetry in a Bedouin society* (Berkeley and LA 1986) 103-17 (on Arabic *hasham*).

¹ Translation by R. Lattimore, *The Iliad* (Chicago 1951).

11. K. Scherer in P. Lombardo and K. Mulligan, ‘The Geneva school of emotions: an interview with Klaus Scherer’ *Critical Quarterly* 50.4 (2008), 26-39 at 29: ‘Respect is a form of anticipatory shame – if I did that, I would feel ashamed, so I don’t do it.’

Cf. E. Goffman, *Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior* (New York 1967); P. Brown and S. C. Levinson, *Politeness: some universals in language usage* (Cambridge 1987); for an application to Homer, see R. Scodel, *Epic facework* (Swansea 2008).

On challenges to Brown and Levinson on the universals of politeness, with conclusions that support their thesis, see S. Kiyama, K. Tamaoka, and M. Takiura, ‘Applicability of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory to a non-western culture: evidence from Japanese facework behaviors’, *SAGE Open* 2012.2, <http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/2/4/2158244012470116>.

12. Reverentia, pudicitia, verecundia, and pudor: see R. A. Kaster, *Emotion, restraint, and community in ancient Rome* (Oxford 2005), esp. 13-65.

13. Cicero, De officiis 1. 99:

Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

Towards other people, therefore, we should show a certain respect (*reverentia*) – not only towards the best, but towards others as well. For indifference to what others think of us is the mark not merely of the arrogant person, but rather of someone who is utterly dissolute. There is, moreover, a difference between justice and *verecundia* in one’s relations towards others. It is the function of justice not to wrong them; of *verecundia*, not to insult them; and it is in this that the essence of *decorum* (honour/propriety) is especially evident.

14. Livy 30. 31. 9: ‘nulla sum tibi verecundia obstrictus’, with Kaster, *Emotion, restraint, and community* 156 n. 28.