5784/10/3ת

4784/10-ירושלים
25/12/2018 הוספה לאחר הפקדה
2-120-4-3-1 :מספר הפקדה
ספרית מרכז :מיקום הפקדה
000lqxu :ברקוד
עיר ירושלים - אגף נכסים ומכרזים (2) עיריית ירושלים מרכז הדוכן

5784/10/3ת

(כל הנושאים ב- 1982)

(2) ירושלים

מרכז הדוכן

1310

ירושלים בימי הביניים

סגן ה-רמטכ"ל

הנדון: מפגש הפסקת האש עם מצרים
מפגש מס' 4

כללי

1. המפגש התקיים ב-1 נוב' שעה 1200.

השתתפו:-

א. מטעם המצרים - גנרל גמאסי, קולונל הווידי.

ב. מטעם ישראל - אלוף טל, אלוף אייל, אל"מ שיאון, אל"מ לב-רן.

החלפת פצועים

2. השבויים - פצועים יוחלפו בו זמנית משלשה מקומות - מישראל למצרים וממצרים לישראל במטוסי הצלב האדום ומארמיה 3 ומהעיר סואץ ברכב ביבשה.

3. הקבוצה הראשונה שלנו תכלול 27 פצועים קשים ותצא יחד עם הקבוצה הראשונה של המצרים מן הארץ, מארמיה 3 ומסואץ.

4. הקבוצה האחרונה שלנו, שתכלול 18 פצועים תצא ממצרים במטוס כשהקבוצות האחרונות מיכראל, מארמיה 3 ומסואץ העזובנה.

5. אם יימצאו פצועים שלנו בסואץ הם יפונו במסגרת ההסדר לגבי פינוי הפצועים שלהם בסואץ. הובטח שיודיעו ב-2.11.73 אם אמנם ישנם פצועים, ומספרם.

חללים

6. הובטח להרשות לאנשי הצלב האדום להכנס לשטחים המוחזקים על-ידם ממזרח לתעלה ובסואץ החל ב-5.11.73 כדי לאתר, לזהות ולפנות את הגופות.

7. הובטח כי אם ישנם חללים שלנו בסואץ יחול עליהם ההסדר לגבי כלל החללים.

8. הבטיחו לבדוק אפשרות לצרף רבנים לאנשי הצלב האדום, כדי שיעסקו בפינוי חללים.

שבויים

9. הודיעו כי היום 1.11.73 נמסרה לצלב האדום רשימה ראשונה של שבויים ישראליים הכוללת כ-שבעים שמות. שאר הרשימות תועברנה תוך תקופה קצרה מבלי להתחייב על מועד.

10. המצרים סרבו למסור המספר הכולל של שבויינו אצלם והודו כי הסיבה לכך הינה פוליטית. הודגש להם שסרובם למסור הרשימה הכוללת, למרות שאנו מסרנו רשימה מלאה של 6,796 שמות של שבויים שלהם, מהווה הפרה של העקרונות ההומאניים ואמנת ג'נבה.

2/...

החלפת פצועים וחללים

11. הוסכם לקיים מחר, 2 נוב', שעה 1200 ב-ק"מ ה-101 כביש קהיר-סואץ, פגישת נציגי מצרים ויישראל עם אנשי הצלב האדום לקביעת הסידורים המפורטים לביצוע החלפת הפצועים ואיסוף החללים.

12. המצרים הציעו כי פינוי הפצועים מסואץ ומארמיה 3 יבוצע באמצעות אמבולנסים ורכב לפינוי פצועים, במכוניות מצריות נהוגות ע"י אנשי או"ם ו/או צלב אדום לא ימצאו כאלה מבקשים שנסכים לנהגים מצריים אזרחים ואליהם יחלוו נציגי צלב אדום או או"ם ואנשי צה"ל.

אספקה לעיר סואץ

13. השיבונו לפנייתם בקשר לאספקה לאזרחים בסואץ כי בעיקרון אנו מקבלים שיש להרשות אספקה סדירה, אולם הבעיה היא כיצד לוודא פיקוח שהיא לא תועבר ליחידות הצבא. האפשרויות הן חייץ בין העיר לבין ארמיה 3 באמצעות משקיפי או"ם ונציגינו, או פינוי התושבים.

14. הנציג המצרי דחה בכל תוקף אפשרויות אלה בטענות:-

א. הוסכם לספק מים, מזון והרופות לארמיה 3, לא כל שכן שהאזרחים המכופרים בסואץ זכאים לאספקה סדירה.

ב. האספקה לעיר תמסר בפיקוח או"ם, אין כל חשש שהאזרחים יעבירו לחיילים, אלא להיפך, אם יחסר להם הצבא ימנע מעצמו ויעביר להוסבים.

ג. אין להם כל כוונה להעתר להצעה בדבר פינוי איזשהם אזרחים מאדמתם.

15. לדרישה לקבל נתונים שהובטחו על התושבים והצרכים שלהם מסרו כי יש בידם הפרטים שקיבלו ממשרד הבריאות והאספקה שלהם:-

א. אינם בטוחים במספר התושבים, אולי 30 אלף אך אינם בטוחים בכך, לאחר שהוזכר כי במפגש קודם נקבו בכמה אלפים.

ב. דרישתם לאספקת העיר מסתכמת בשיירה יומית של 7 משאיות:

1 משאית קמח

1 משאית אורז

1 משאית דלק לרכב המושל ואמבולנס

1 משאית תרופות

1 מכונית קטנה - דס. ופלסמה

2 מכוניות פריסי אספקה שונים

16. דרישתם לגבי אספקת מים לעיר סואץ כללה שתי אלטרנטיבות:-

א. תיקון העלת המים המתוקים שפוצצה ב-21.10.73. הדבר יצריך עובדים רבים וכלי הנדסה ומשך זמן ניכר, אולם בדרך זו פיתרון גם לצרכי התקלאות לאיכרים בשטח שבשליטה ישראלית.

ב. תיקון המשאבות בזייתיה שסיפקו מים בצינור קהיר-סואץ, יצריך כ-50 טכנאים, 8 מכוניות, 2 משאבות. הצוות יצטרך להשאר קבע במקום ולהפעיל את המשאבות. בדרך זו ניתן לפתור בעיית המים במהירות. הצוות יהיה בפיקוח ישראלי.

ג. לדעתם רצוי לפעול בשתי דרכים כדי לפתור את הבעייה המיידית ולהתחיל בתיקון העלת המים המתוקים שיצריך זמן רב.

17. השובתינו היתה ששיירת האספקה תכלול משאיות ג'ריקנים או מכליות מים. המצרים דחו ההצעה כאינה עונה לצרכי אוכלוסיה אזרחית. אנו דחינו דאגתם לאוכלוסיה בשטח שבשליטה שלנו שהיא באחריותנו. הובטח להעביר דרישותיהם לגבי סואץ לשלטונות שלנו ולמסור השובה במפגש הבא.

18. לאחר קבלת הוראות טלפוניות, הצענו להם שיירה חד-פעמית מיידית של אספקה לעיר כמחווה הומאני תמורת מחווה מצידם - העברת רשימה מלאה של השבויים כלנו שבידיהם. הנציג המצרי דחה את ההצעה בטענה כי הוא לא מוכן לקבל הסדר זמני לגבי נושא אזרחי הומאניטרי. נציגנו הדגיש כי אין הסתייגות לגבי אספקת תרופות ורופאים מיד וכי אין אנו מסרבים להכיר בזכות האזרחים לאספקה ולמים.

שבויים לאחר הפסקת האש

19. הנציג המצרי העלה כנושא דחוף דרישה להחזרת 4 קצינים מצריים אשר נשבו אתמול. הם לא רואים בהם שבויי-מלחמה. השבנו כי דרישתם איננה תואמת את ההגיון והנוהלים המקובלים - כל מי שנמצא בשטח שבשליטת הצד השני ובידיו נחשב כשבוי.

20. שמות הקצינים השבויים הם:-

א. קולונל ממדוח חלים גרגס.

ב. קולונל אחמד חלמי סאלם סאהב.

ג. לט/קול אסעיד מייסור מוחמד עבאס.

ד. קפטן חמדי זיין אל עבידין פרג.

21. בשלב מאוחר יותר הוצע להחליף את ארבעת השבויים ה-נ"ל תמורת אנשינו בסואץ, שהם מאותה קטיגוריה. המצרים לא השיבו במישרין להצעה זו ולשאלה ישירה ענה בנציג כי אינו בטוח שישנם שבויים ישראליים בעיר, אחרת המושל היה מדווח עליהם. אם ימצאו פצועים או חללים ינהגו בהם במסגרת מה שסוכם לגבי החלפת פצועים והעברה חללים.

אספקה לארמיה 3

22. הנציג המצרי הצהיר כי לארמיה הוקל עכשיו, אולם היא זקוקה לאספקה קבועה והזכיר כי האלוף יריב הבטיח כי השובה תינתן ב-5 נובמבר. אולם בינתיים ביקש להחיש פריקת השיירה הראשונה - אם על-ידי הקמת גשר ארעי או תוספת כלים אמפיביים, מקומות פריקה וסבלים.

23. אושר להרחיב את מקום הפריקה הנוכחי או להוסיף מקום פריקה שני סמוך, להגדיל את מספר הכלים האמפיביים ל-10 ואת הסבלים ל-100. הסידורים המעשיים יעשו ע"י הנציגים במקום.

חדירות

24. העלינו בעיית החדירות שלהם לשטחינו, שגורמות להקריות אש ולהפרות הפסקת האש ותבענו שיודו את הכוחות שלהם להמנע מכך. תגובתם היתה כי יש להם טענות דומות לגבינו - לחדירה שלנו ל-ג'בל עתקה אחרי ה-25.10.73, היו להם כוחות שם אבל הם נמנעו מלירות. השבנו כי ענינו לשדר שלהם בקשר ל-ג'בל עתקה, שבטעות יסודו כי כוחותינו היו שם לפני הפסקת האש, אולם לא כדאי להפריד בעייה זו מן הכוללת של קוי הפסקה האש ב-22.10.73. התפתח ויכוח על מהו כיס - מובלעת עצמאית ובשליטה וענה כיס בשבי או כוחות זה לצד זה. הוצטח כי החדירות הן יוזמה מקומית של קבוצות קטנות או בודדים ולא מדיניות.

המפגש הבא

25. סוכם כי המפגש הבא יתקיים בשבת, 3 נוב', שעה 1200 במקום הקבוע. לדרישת המצרי הוסכם כי במפגש זה יקבע מקום המפגשים הבאים. הם הציעו מקום כ-2-3 ק"מ בשטח שלהם.

26. נציגי הצלב האדום ושני הצדדים יפגשו מחר, 2 נוב', שעה 1200 במקום המפגש הקבוע כדי לקבוע פרטי הסידורים להחלפת הפצועים.

מצרים

רובי הלוי

הנדון: פגישה עם נציגי הצבא המצרי
דו"ח פגישה מס' 3 מ-30.1300 אוק' 73

1. נוכחים:

א. המשלחת המצרית:- גנרל גמסי, קול' הוידי, מר אבראשי (מה"ח).

ב. המשלחת הישראלית:- אלוף א. יריב, אל"מ א. לברן, אל"מ ד. שמון, רל"ש הרמטכ"ל.

ג. לבקשתם הוצגו היום המשלחות בצורה רשמית.

2. עיקרי דברים

א. החלפת שבויים פצועים

(1) המצרים מסכימים להחלפת השבויים הפצועים. העבירו כבר הרשימה ל-צל"א (בנוסף למה שמסרו לנו).

(2) מבקשים רשימת השבויים הפצועים שלהם אצלנו בארץ.

(3) המצרים יפנו ל-צל"א שיקבע רשימת הפצועים קשה בסואץ ובארמיה 3.

(4) החלפת השבויים תחבצע בהקדם האפשרי מבחינתם. יאפשרו לצל"א לבקר אצל פצועינו לפני החזרתם.

(5) מסרו לנו כג'סטה את סרן רן אבידן. ביקשו לא לפרסם מסירתו לידינו עד שכל החלפת השבויים הפצועים תחבצע.

ב. שבויים:

(1) היום מעבירים המצרים רשימת שבויים שלנו ראשונה ל-צל"א. תכלול כ-64 שמות.

(2) יתר רשימות השבויים יועברו ל-צל"א תוך 2-3 ימים.

(3) הצל"א יוכל לבקר השבויים שלנו במצרים ברגע שיקבל כל רשימה לידיו.

(4) אנו נכשיר מסירת שבוייהם אצלנו לצל"א ואיפשור בקוריהם.

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ג. מואץ (מים, רפואות ומזון):-

(1) הופתעו אמש להיוודע כי המים לסואץ נחתכו ע"י הסורים. רואים בזה Set back , ויש חשש שהאנשים עם ימותו.

(2) בסר נ.צ. של מיום הפיצוץ.

(3) הובטח מצידנו כי נבדוק בעניין ונשיבם הלילה או מחר בבוקר.

(4) כמרו כי בסואץ הם זקוקים לרופאים, תרופות ומזון בצורה טוספת. מבקשים להסדיר העברה דרך האו"ם. ביקשנו כי יעבירו לנו מברק מיפרט מספר הרופאים וכמות התרופות והמזון הדרושה להם ואז נשתדל להשיב להם במברק או בפגישה הקרובה.

(5) מסרו מספר בלתי נחייב של 5000-4000 תושבים בסואץ (נראה כי הגזימו- הח"מ).

ד. שאלת ההיזק בין הצבאות, אספקה לארמיה 3 וכו':

(1) בשלב ראשון הציעו המצרים את 3 הצעדים הבאים לקראת התקדמות במו"מ וניהול מיחות ברדג יותר גבוה:-

(א) הפסקת אש.
(ב) הצבת כוחות או"ם בין שני הצדדים.
(ג) נסיגת צה"ל לקו 22/10.

} קיים לטוב לשני הצדדים

(2) הצד הישראלי אמר כי לא היתכן נסיגה חד-צדדית לקוי 22/10 ומצדנו אנו מקפים בדעתנו כי צריך להיות disengagement רציני ובנוסף יזור חיץ בין שני הצדדים שיכול להחפס ע"י האו"ם היינו מכל צד יחזור למקומו שלפני פרוץ המלחמה.

(3) הצד המצרי ניסה להעלות מחדש האפשרות לצמצם ראש הגשר שלנו במערב התעלה כדי שלפחות כאן יהיה Disengagement.

(4) הצד הישראלי טען שאי אפשר להסכים לשינוי הסטטוס-קוו. אפילו מיעוט האו"ם נמסר כי אי אפשר לקבוע המצב של ה-22/10. אם לזוז ולסגת מהמצב הקיים כדי לא להיכנס לקשיים, אזי למשהו רציני, היינו יש לעשות Major move משהו הדומה ל- Interim settlement המדובר בו בעבר. גם במקרה זה אפשר ליצור אזור חיץ כדי להסיר חששות.

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(5) הצד המצרי הסכים שקשה לדבר על קו"י ה-22/10 ויקשה לצה"ל לזוז מקומותיו אך הוא מעלה האפשרות שנראית לו שישראל תיסוג לפחות 30 ק"מ ממזרח לתעלה (טווח ארטילריה) ושכוחות מצרים יעבו בצד המזרחי של התעלה. באשר לסוג הכוחות וכמותם וכן אמצעי הלחימה שיהיו שם ניתן להגיע להסכם. מסר כי סמכותו למסור כי אם הצעה זו תתקבל יהיה אפשר לעבור למו"מ בדרג פוליטי והכי גבוה.

(6) הצד הישראלי מסר כי ימסור הצעה זו לשלטונותיו וכי מניח שאפשר יהיה להשיב ביום ראשון ולכל המאוחר ביום שני.

(7) הצד המצרי העלה השאלה מה יהיה עד מתן התשובה מבחינת אסקה לארמיה 3. נענה כי גם בקשר לזה יקבל תשובה יחד עם נושא ה- Major move ואולי אף קודם לכן.

(8) להבהרה הוסיף הצד המצרי כי לא יוכלו שלא להעביר חיילים לצד המזרחי של התעלה מבחינה פסיכולוגית, באשר לכמות וסוג הכוחות והאכל"ח, יוכלו להיות צמצומים.

ה. שונות

(1) חללים

(אא) יסדירו בהקדם העברת גויות 6 חיילינו שאת שרותיהם מסרו לנו וזאת בציר סואץ-קהיר.

(בב) ביקשנו כי יאפשרו לנו כמו בעבר סיור של רבנים צבאיים בשיתוף עם הצל"א באזורי הלחימה ממזרח לתעלה כדי לזהותם ולקברם. המצרים הטיבו כי עקרונית אינם מתנגדים ויבדקו זאת עם הצל"א. יתנו ההשובה לכך כשיעבירו לנו התשובה ביחס למה שדרוש להם בסואץ (רופאים תרופות ומזון).

(גג) ביקשנו מספרים ושמות של החללים, השבויים והנעדרים שלנו בעיר סואץ. אמרו שיבררו דרך מושל סואץ ויודיעונו.

(2) הבונקר בעגרוד - העלינו נושא זה שהועבר אלינו מטעמם ע"י הצל"א, אך הם לא ידעו עליו דבר.

(3) מסרו כי שמעו שחושבים של אאאא החזיר החללאי מצפון לסואץ הוכנסו למחנות. הכחשנו.

לשכת הרמטכ"ל

ש מ ו ר

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם המצרים בתאריך 3 נוב' 73 -
ב-ק"מ ה-105

1. נוכחים: מצידם - גנרל ג'מסי +קול' הורידי.
מצידנו - אלוף ש. אייל, אל"מ ד.שיאון ו-אל"מ א' לברן. כן השתתף תא"ל א.אבנון. ייצג את הצד הישראלי אל"מ א' לברן.

2. כללי:-

א. בהתאם להנחיות המוקדמת של שרהב"ט, הדגש עיקרה של הפגישה להבהיר למצרים, כי כל עוד אינם עומדים בדיבוריהם בענין מסירת רשימות שבויינו יקשה עלינו לבוא לקראתם במיוחד בנושא האספקה לעיר סראן.

ב. בסוף הפגישה גובשו 2 הצעות ברורות שיש לתת עליהן תשובות ברורות אם דרך ה-או"מ ואם בפגישה הבאה:-

1) הגשת רשימת כל שבויינו תמורת אספקה לעיר סראן.

2) החלפת שבויים פצועים.

3. פירוט ההצעה בענין קבלת רשימת שבויינו תמורת האספקה לעיר סראן:-

א. מצרים תמסור לנו ברשימה אחת את שמות כל שבויינו שבמצרים (כולל דרגות ומספרים אישיים), לרבות אלה שבסראן וארמיה 3. עבן תגובה בעקרון תקבל.

ש מ ו ר 2/..

ב. תמורת זאת: (ראשית שהסדיל הישפין יתבקש):-

1) נרשה אספקת מזון ותרופות לעיר סראן ע"י טיירות יומיות של 7 מכוניות (שתכלולנה 1 מכונית קמח, 1 מכונית אורז, 1 מכונית תרופות, 1 מכונית דלק, 1 מכונית קטנה לדם ופלסמה, 2 מכוניות לשונות בשמדובר בדברי מזון שונים).

2) נרשה בנוסף ל-7 המכוניות אספקת מים יומית לעיר סראן במכוניות מצרות, בהתאם למספר התושבים שבסראן (המספר יקבע ע"י "הצלב האדום" והכמות הנדרשת תיקבע על ידינו ו"הצלב האדום").

4. פירוט ההצעה בענין חילופי שבויים פצועים:-

א. חזרו על ההצעה הקודמת להחליף 45 פצועינו שבמצרים בפצועים שלהם בישראל ובארמיה 3 (לפי החלטת ה-צלי"א המספר שהוזכר עד כ-75 איש).

ב. הוסיפו דרישה שבמסגרה זו יפונו כל הפצועים קשה שבסראן לפי החלטת ה-צלי"א (למדנו בנפרד מה-צל"א, כי מדובר בכ-300 איש) כשהמספר כולל חיילים ואזרחים.

ג. הבהרנו וקיבלנו, כי פצועים קשה שלנו הנמצאים בסראן או בארמיה 3 נכללים במסגרת החלפת הפצועים, היינו, בנוסף ל-45 שבמצרים.

ד. מאחר והעלו הנקודה הנכללת בסעיף ב' לעיל אמרנו, כי אנו צריכים להתייעץ בשלטונותינו וניתן להם תשובה אם באמצעות ה-או"מ או בפגישה הקרובה, כמובן לאחר שנתברר מענין שהדרת הפצועים.

5. פירוט והוספות:-

א. כשנאמר להם, כי לא עמדו בדיבורם בקשר למסירת רשימת השבויים שלנו הראשונה ובקשר למסירת כל רשימות השבויים תוך 3 ימים הודו בכך ואמרו, כי זה הפך להיות ענין פוליטי. עם זאת מסר, כי ישתדל לעמוד בדיבורו וישלים בהקדם מסירת הרשימה הראשונה שצריכה לכלול 64 שמות (נמסר לו, כי הם מסרו רק אתמול ורק 29 שמות וגם אותה בצורה משובשת).

ב. כמשקל-נגד לדרישתנו לקבל רשימת כל שבויינו במצרים אמר, כי הדבר הוא פחות-ערך ושלמעשה נושאי הפגישות שלנו צריכים להיות הפסקת האש וחזרה לקווי 22 אוק'.

ג. בהקשר לקווי 22 אוק' הזכרנו, כי אלוף יריב אמר שימסור תשובה בנדון ביום ראשון או שני.

ד. בקשר לבעיות הפסקת האש מסר על התקריות הבאות:-

1) ביצוע סיורי אויר שלנו מעל ארמיה 2 שבעקבותיהם יורה ההגנה האוירית שלהם ואנו עונים על כך.

2) תנועות של טנקים ו-חי"ר שלנו אתמול ליד מאחז המבֻדד ב"בוצר".

3) ירי כוחותינו הבוקר באיזור הג'ידי על כוחותיהם.

ה. העלה שוב בקשתם להמשך האספקה לארמיה 3 לאחר שהשיירה הראשונה תסתיים. נענה שהובטחה לו תשובה ע"י האלוף יריב ביום ראשון או שני. בהקשר זה מסר, כי כ-50 מכוניות שלהם מחכות כבר ליד המחסום (ב-ק"מ ה-101) ע"פ אישור הדרג הגבוה". מכוניות אלה כוללות מנות מזון, מים, ובגדי חורף לארמיה 3. נענו שלא ידוע לנו על שום אישור של דרג גבוה לשיירה זו.

ו. ביקשו, כי נרשה לחיילים שלהם לעבור לשטחנו ולהוציא לשהם חיילים לכודים שלהם. נענה, כי החיילים הלכודים (שכמובן לא רצה לפרט טיבם ומקומם) צריכים להיחשב עליהינו כשבויי מלחמה ושאנו ניתן להם הטיפול הטוב ביותר האפשרי.

ז. הוסכם כי ה-צל"א יבדוק בסראץ, ימיין וימסור לנו כמה חיילים פצועים וכמה אזרחים פצועים יש להם שם.

6. <u>פגישה נוספת</u>:-

א. פגישה נוספת נקבעה ל-6 נוב' שעה 1200.

ב. הסבירו התאריך בכך שמניחים כי אז יחזרו רוה"מ ויריב מ-ארה"ב ואפשר יהיה למסור להם תשובות ברוב הנושאים.

אהרון לברן - אל"מ.

M E E T I N G

November 29, 1973

GEN. YARIV: May I congratulate Gen. Gamasy for the high distinction he got from the Minister of War.

GEN. GAMASY: That's General Abdul Ramid Gamasy, not General Hamer Abdul Gamasy.

(Laughter).

GEN. YARIV: I suppose he is at least a close relative of yours.

ISRAELI MEMBER: A twin brother.

GEN. YARIV: Toexplain, I have the Hebrew translation - this was a very high compliment paid to the General by the Minister of War onthe occasion of a conference on the lessons of the last war.

GEN. GAMASY: It would be a good compliment for me if we would succeed in these meetings. (laughter) Then I could quit the army after that, I mean if everything did go right with separation and disengagement.

GEN. YARIV: Well, to settle everything in one meeting would be difficult, you know. But perhaps we can make some progress.

GEN. GAMASY: I hope.

GEN. YARIV: Well, General, you are always very cautious towards me and you let me start. But I am ready. Could we- we are waiting for a couple of answers from Brig. Sharif, I believe.

GEN. GAMASY: Brig. Sharif is here, if we can leave that now until we finish our work and we will-

GEN. YARIV: That's all right. Because you remember there are a couple of important questions on which we were waiting for answers. But this can wait.

November 25, 1972

SEN. YARIV: May I congratulate Gen. Dunary for the duty distinction he got from the Minister of War.

GEN. GAVISH: That's General Abdul Hadi Gandy, not General Hakem Abdul Ghaney.

(Laughter).

GEN. YARIV: I suppose he is at least a close relative of yours.

ISRAELI MEMBER: A dark brother.

GEN. K DIV: To explain, I have the Labor translation - this was a very plain compliment paid to the General by the Minister of War during occasion of a conference on the lessons of the last war.

GEN. CLARK: It would be a good compliment for me if we would succeed in these meetings. (Laughter) Then I could quit the army after that, I mean if everything did go well with separation and disengagement.

GEN. YARIV: Well, to settle everything in one meeting would be difficult, you know. But perhaps we can make some progress.

GEN. CLARK: I hope.

GEN. YARIV: Well, General, you've always very cautious counsels me and you let me speak, but I am ready. Shall we - we are talking for a couple of answers each side. Clark, I believe.

GEN. CLARK: Well, should I here, if we can leave that now until we finish our work and we will-

GEN. YARIV: That's all right. Because you remember there are a couple of important questions on which we were waiting for answers. But this can wait.

We'd like to start with the problem, that we had a little concert just now - the question of the problem of cease fire. It is true that we have not yet reached an agreement on disengagement, we are battling on disengagement, but I think in your mind, as well as in ours, the first paragraph of the agreement is a very important one, because otherwise we can't get anywhere, if we cannot maintain the cease fire. And I think that whatever difficulties we are having in discussing various matters, and we might have here or in Geneva later, I think the maintenance of the cease fire is very important. Because otherwise we can slide into a real conflagration, which no one has an interest in. And when we speak about the cease fire, we are speaking about the cease fire in the air, on land and at sea. And when I say at sea, I don't want to be too general, and what we speak about is the movement of our ships through Babl Mandeb, through the straits of Babl Mandeb, which is also part of the cease fire. But I would like to be more specific about the cease fire in this area, in this area along the cease fire lines. Unfortunately, I have to emphasize that there have been very serious breaks in the cease fire and especially yesterday, and they have been along the Canal at the following points: at Kilo 139, Kilo 141, Kilo 142, Kilo 143.5, at Kilo 144 and the Ismayiliya area. Eppecially I want to stress the case of a soldier that was killed by sniper fire, not far away from the unloading area, and it was only because of the intervention of Gen. Tal, and my personal intervention, that unloading was not stopped. The unloading was not stopped only

because of our intervention, when I said that I am meeting you today and we can discuss it, and I am sure that Gen. Gamasy will take all the necessary steps to prevent it. And then another special area is this area 101. We have had trouble several times, this morning again. I can't under any circumstances accept that the fact of our forces mining positions is a reason for opening fire. It cannot be a reason for opening fire. The agreement doesn't say anything about mining or fortifications. If someone tries to move forward the line, this is something different. This is a breach of the cease fire itself; then there is a reason for opening fire. But the circumstances as we have checked them, and I am not bringing up the whole list, did not warrant any breach of the ceasefire. I think we should do everything in our power to try to stop this. If this necessitates more intensive contacts or between the local commanders, we are all for it, in any formthat will be suitable. If you think a meeting between Gen. Tal and the parallel commanders from your side is necessary, we'll be ready for it. This is the first point I wanted to take up at this meeting.

GEN. GAMASY: May I answer? We are very interested in the cease fire. I mentioned that before, in article'a of the six-point agreement. I also learned yesterday that there were clashes very close to the unloading area close to the UN flag, and especially in this area which we are interested in for the Third Army. I admit myself I was surprised yesterday when I received that message. I called the commander here and the local commander, both of them, by

because of our intervention, which I make that I am meeting you today and to don discuss it, and I am sure that Gen. Clancy will take all the necessary steps to remove it. And then another special area is this area DMZ. We have had trouble several times, this morning again. I don't under any circumstances accept that the face of our forces during operations is a reason for opening fire. It cannot be a reason for opening fire. The agreement doesn't say anything about shots or forcefirestops. It remains quiet to move forward the line, while is something different. This is a breach of the cease fire agreement; then there is a reason for opening fire. But the circumstances as we have checked them, and I am not bringing up this media list, did not warrant any breach of the cease-fire. I think we should do everything in our power to try to stop this. If this necessitates more intensive contacts or between the local commanders, we are all for it, in any format will be suitable. If you think a meeting between Gen. Tai and the Marine commander from your side is necessary, we'll be ready for it. This is the first point I wanted to take up at this meeting.

GEN. CLANCY: May I answer? We are very interested in the cease fire. I mentioned that before, in article 4 of the six-point agreement. I also learned yesterday that there were clashes very close to the unloading area close to the ship, and especially in this area which we are interested in, for the Third Army. I admit myself I was surprised yesterday when I received that message. I called the commander here and the local commander, both of them, by

telephone, yesterday. Made the investigation. They said we didn't have any clashes at all in 138 or in 141 it was in 161, yes, at 10 o'clock, and then one o-clock and then three o'clock, and we gave strict orders to stop all this nonsense. That's from local commanders. I assured and told Gen. Siilasvuo that we have no intention at all to make these small things, for what reason I don't know. And also, about this area here. Now, I called the commander, the army area commander, and then the brigade commander, and then the division commander. We said we don't have any firing , although I hear it myself. But our post here is doing that, and then he called our post. They said there are 3 M-113 coming towards me and shooting against me so I am shooting. That's a small thing adn we will see how our liaison officer will come back. If he is mistaken we will punish him. There is no need for that. And we are giving strict orders, I am sure, especially from the minute ? you said Gen. Tal interefered by himself to call at the area to see what is going on. And I did it, and still we have two majors there that were killed,

GEN. YARIV: Where?

GEN. GAMASY: At the base. Itold you, two officers.

GEN. YARIV: When? Then?

GEN. GAMASY: Yes, then. With all that that we gave strict orders especially in this area.

GEN. YARIV: I am glad.

GEN. GAMASY: For the two armies, if there are some clashes we should investigate each case by itself-

GEN. YARIV: Same here.

GEN. GAMASY: So we can stop it. So I want to make it sure to

you both that we have no intentions at all of that. The army commanders have strict orders. The division commanders have from the local commanders. Although there are some good things from local commanders. They've got contacts with one another.

GEN. Y: Yes, they have?

GEN. SIILASVUO: I was yesterday south of Abu Suwei with the Austrian area, and it seems that at least there, although there was also yesterday some firing on rather nonsensical reasons, the local commanders Meet. And I think the UN is also doing - I got a very favorable impression of the Austrian company commander there. He really tries to stop unnecessary firing.

GEN. Y: I think I met the company commander once.

GEN. S: Maybe.

GEN. Y: All right, if there is a common understanding I am sure we can see how we can restrict it. And we are all for letting-- we have not restricted under any circumstances our local commanders within the general framework of the area to do whatever they can, of their orders, on the spot to contact your local commanders in order to limit it.

GEN. G: That's a very good idea. To do that through the United Nations if there is any fire to stop it.

GEN. Y: All right.

GEN. G: And we will give orders like that.

GEN. Y: Now, if I am not mistaken, I am sure that the problem of disengagement, you would like to bring it up of course and to discuss it. Now, we have problems, General, we have problems. And the problems are, we have listened to the announcement of the President in Algiers, ina ddition to all that we have discussed.

Amongst other things, I am very sorry - the President is a President of course and I can't complain about it or discuss anything with the President. But among other things, he said that what is the use of going to a peace conference if there is daily firing. I hope that as far as the daily firing is concerned, this will not be an obstacle to going to the peace conference. I hope so. Another thing the President said is as far as Israel is concerned, and he mentioned, he referred especially to Km. 101, as far as Israel is concerned, Israel is still utilizing the method of evasion and of deception. I am not for one moment saying that we don't have disagreements and differences of opinion, for one moment I am not saying that. I think I have never tried to give you the impression that we agreed to something and then denied it. I think I was very clear in saying that we cannot accept your position on the size of your forces/ East of the Canal that we cannot accept your position on the distance of our forces from the Canal, and that we cannot accept the timetable you have presented here for everything, this in connection with the first line of disengagement. So, and I think I have never tried to create a wrong impression, whether it was on the problems of supplies, whether it was talking of the prisoners of war, whether it was on the problems of cease fire.

The third point the President made in Algiers yesterday, the President said that, and I think in this he confirmedyour position, he made it very clear, the crossing of your forces of the Suez

Canal is a fait accompli - this is of course true - but that there is no return, and that you will not be ready to discuss it. We were not speaking about a return of the forces to the West Side. We were speaking, yes, in our proposal, but we were also ready to discuss the question of the size of your forces. Now on the question of return, our proposal contains a return of your forces, this is true, or part of your forces. If you remember our proposal, for which we got your clear negative answer, the proposal of each side evacuating the ground taken during the war and permitting UNEF to take over the ground taken during the war, this includes a certain return of your forces to the other side, it's true. The President clearly states that you will not accept it under any circumstances.

I would like to point out theproblem we have in this connection. And this is that we are speaking about the line of disengagement, which has to dowith cease fire. It has not to do directly with hte question of our withdrawal. We do not deny it. That is to say, I have stated with full authority from my government that this is a first line of disengagement and there will be further lines. Line or lines, that dexpends on angotiations about withdrawal. NOw, within the context of withdrawal you can I think rightfully maintain that there is no question of mutuality in territory. There might be a question of mutuality in other things, territory versus other things, but not in territory. But when we speak about the disengagement in connection with the cease fire, in connection with separation

of forces, it is the position of my government that the question of mutuality has a bearing on the problem, has a bearing on the problem. And here I see a great difficulty. And I have to tell you that I have no new proposal. I have no new proposals on disengagement. That is to say, in order to be clear, the official proposal is the proposal I just mentioned, of each side giving up the conquered ground taken during the war-

GEN. G: Each side?

GEN. Y: Each side evacuates the area taken during the war and UNEF takes overthe area. On this, I got your clear negative answer which I reported to the government. We still have an unofficial proposal which the government ~~apparently~~ authorities did not agree to make official, which was a 10 km. line, which you have clearly turned down. Now, if I may with your permission, I would like to have a five-minute break because all ~~the~~ today over Israel people are going to the cemetery to honor our fallen and our missing soldiers. And we have a little ceremony with our soldiers here. And with your permission, I would ask five minutes, and we'll be back.

(B R E A K)

GEN. SIILASVUO: As I understood when we parted last Monday, Israel rejected the Egyptian proposal of 35 km. from the Canal.

GEN. Y: Yes.

GEN. S: Egypt has then rejected the idea of , the Israeli idea of 10 km. from the Canal. And as I understood, you thought you could find out from your authorities some other line or lines

and then we could discuss the question of the reduction of the Egyptian troops on the Eastern side of the Canal. Nothing came out of this?

GEN. Y: No.

GEN. S: I must say that I feel rather disappointed, personally.

GEN. Y: I understand your point of view, General.

GEN. G: Just about the comments about the speech in Algeria, I don't see taking this speech as the basis of the discussion here, because if we hear all that has been said during the few days, by both the Egyptians and the Israelis, we would have started to be at war. So let us better leave these speeches for the political leaders to discuss it-

GEN. Y: In Geneva.

GEN. G: In Geneva, through their channels and so on. But it won't be an excuse for stopping our discussions today. As far as I understand you want to stop it, and there is only one official positon, that the United Nations will take over the positions of our troops. That means we came to a deadlock on the disengagement and separation of troops. If this is so, we would like to go back to the 22nd of October line. I think it is the responsibility of the United Nations to take over on that problem, according to the spirit of their resolutions and according to the six-point agreement. If also, you don't want to discuss these lines, so then everything is clear .

GEN. Y: Well, I would say so. May I for one minute leave no, I'll say like this on the disengagement, unfortunately, I see it is difficult for us to progress. As you said, General, we have a deadlock on disengagement. And I agree with you that things should be clear, always clear. And I have always tried my best to be clear. And that means, as you mentioned in one of our last meetings, that perhaps we still have to

and then we continue the discussion of the reduction of the Dry Dam
capacity on the Eastern side of the Canal, starting where we left off.

GEN. Y: Go.

COL. S: I must say that I feel rather disappointed, personally,

COL. Y: I understand your point of view, General.

GEN. X: Just where the agreements about the Spanish in Algeria, I don't see taking this approach on the basis of the Mediterranean here, because if we start out that has been true during the two days, by both the Egyptians and the Israelis, we would have another 48 hours before we could leave these agencies for the political leaders to discuss.

COL. Y: In Geneva.

COL. S: In Geneva, because their economy rushes on. So it would be an excuse for stopping our discussions today. So for a moment I would ask that we stop it, and there is only one effective weapon, that the United Nations will take over the problems of the troops. That means we come to a deadlock on the disengagement and separation of forces. If that is so, we would like to go back to the 22nd of October time. I think it is the responsibility of the United Nations to take over our problems, according to the spirit of that resolution, as according to the six-point agreement. If not, you may I want to close on these lines, so that everything is clear.

GEN. Y: Well, I would say that I for one think we have had a very interesting, constructive, I was as it was difficult for us to participate, as you said General, we have a decision on disengagement. And I have already said that it is clear. And I would like to be clear. Now during the discussions in all of our last meetings, that during the until now to

discuss things in Geneva.

GEN. G: Which things?

GEN. Y: Disengagement.

GEN. G: I said so?

GEN. Y: I think in one of our meetings you mentioned it, but it doesn't matter. I think this is what will have to happen.

GEN. G. first temporary line so that we can separate our troops, so that we can have a fair cease fire, and that will be the concept of the six-point agreement. And all other things - like prisoners or war and supplies and so on will in putting the cease fire into effect.

GEN. Y: Yes, but on this we have come to a deadlock. I hope that the problem, if it can't be solved here, andif neither of our authorities changes its opinion, then it will have to be solved at a later stage. But this is above my head already.

Before we talk about the 22nd of October line, I would like to bring up a couple of points with your permission, General. Because until further discussion on disengagement is reached, or we get to that stage, life has to continue here. And we want to see that despite the difficulties we have that life does continue in such a way that we can minimize problems and that we can find ways to continue the maintenance of the cease fire. In spite of the differences that we have and the deadlock. So I would say there are a couple of outstanding problems for the continuation of life under the present conditions from your side and from our side. From your side, there is the problem of kabrit, correct?

Please adjourn the meeting.

CHAN. K: Motion carried?

CEN. Y: Unanimously.

CEN. C: I said so?

CEN. Y: I think in view of our meetings you understand it, but it doesn't matter; I think this is what will have to happen.

CHAN. K: Give temporary life so that we can separate our crowds, so that we can have a fair-cause fire, and that will be the answer of the six-point agreement. And all other civilian prisoners of war and appellees and so on will be putting the cease fire into effect.

CEN. Y: Yes, but on this we have come to a deadlock. I hope that the problem, if it can't be solved here, would-be-return of our materials changes the opinion, then it will have to be solved at a later stage. But this is above my head already.

Before we talk about the 22nd of October line, I would like to bring up a couple of points with your permission; namely, because until further discussion or disengagement is reached, or we get to that stage, this has to continue here. And we want to see that despite the difficulties we have that five days constitute by such a way that we can minutes problems and that we can find ways to control the maintenance of the cease fire. In spite of the differences that we have and the deadlock. So I would say that a couple of outstanding problems for the continuation of life under the present conditions from your side and from our side. From your side, there is the problem of [illegible] control[illegible]

And the problem ofthe list of things that you want us to let through to the city of Suez, which has been handled by Gen.Siilasvuo, and the details you gave us about the supply of fuel, correct? These are the two major outstanding items for the continuation of daily life.

On our side, we have two problems. One is one that the General always said is a problem between us but we have come to that-

GEN. G: What?

GEN. Y. Mr. Mizrachi and Levy . And the second problem where we are stuck in the problem of the evacuation of dead bodies and the answers to inquiries about missing soldiers. Now, although we are stuck on disengagement - and I won't forget that I owe the General an answer onthe 22nd, I'll come back to that - although we are stuck on disengagement, we think that we can discuss these problems, and if we can find a solution,both to Tobruk and both to the items to be included inthe daily supplies to the city of Suez. But this is also contingent upon the solution of the two outstanding problems from our side, which I mentioned. One, Mizrachi and Levy. Levy is, I don't know how to call him, an unfortunate, innocent person. And the second thing has to do with the question of the missing and the dead bodies. If we can come today to an understanding of principle on these matters, I will be ready as early as possible to give a full detailed answer

about kabrit? and about the supplies to Suez.

Now, about the 22nd of October. I have the authority only to say that, you know our position, that the line of the 22nd of October has to be discussed within the framework of disengagement. Now, on disengagement we are locked. But - and now I am saying something for which I don't have authority, I do not have authority - but I am ready to go back to the authorities and to propose to them to check thoroughly and to see whether we could find some way of minimizing the danger of incidents and of friction in the present lines with the help of the UN and . But I want to say right away that I can't commit myself on it, because perhpas my ideas will not be accepted, and I don't want you, General, to have a misunderstanding that here I am giving you an idea, and the next day I am saying, no, I am going back on it. There are many question marks and I didn't have the time to check it thoroughly. I only threw out very briefly that perhaps I will bring it up. I didn't get an okay on it, but I said I would bring it up. And as I was in a hurry, there was no time to get okay or no, so I am in a position to do this.

So if we can talk about what I called the question of the continuation of daily life, in principle, then I'll try my best to give you a detailed answer as soon as possible. What do you say about it, in principle?

GEN. G: I say that on daily life items, it will go according to the six-point agreement which was signed by both of us. If there

are any obstacles to that, then theUnited Nations should interfere. So, I want to leave it now, this daily life. We may live or we may not live. Thosepeople there in the city of Suez, theymay live or theymay not live. But the main problem is the disengagement and the 22nd of October line. Finish with the diesngagement line now. So I want to hear a specific thing about the 22nd of October line. As I understood, it is difficult to define this line. And then you will see with the United Nations how daily life will work or how these lines can be done, or how to ease the situation here. Am I right or wrong on that?

GEN. Y: I will try, yes. I have no authority.

GEN. G: Yes.

GEN. Y: General, I don't want to promise anything. Otherwise, I'll be accused again.

GEN. G: I want to clear myself only that the Egyptian delegation understands that we are in a deadlock also onthe 22nd line.

GEN. Y: At this time and this point, yes.

GEN. G: So then it's up to Gen. Siilasvuo to make any comments if he'd like.

GEN. Y: I understand you don't want to discuss anything about the city of Suez, because I want to point out, General, as-

q GEN. G: I think these small things can be solved automatically when we solve the main problem. We are now solving the small, minor details, the small things, and then leaving the main problem. The main progblem of the six-point agreement as we understood it is

especially the separation of troops and to make the cease fire fair. And all these small things, the supply of the troops, and this, and prisioners of war and wounded helped in making the cease fire fair. Now we finished with all these items and we are stuck with the main problem. We should have started with that and then started with the small things. But it helped and it was of big benefit to both sides, that we finished the four points of the six-point agreement.

GEN. Y: Five.

GEN. G: Four. We still have two, A and B.

GEN. Y: Ah, A, yes.

GEN. G: So we can't say anything. That's up to you. Because we fulfilled all that was needed from us according to the agreement. These two points are up to you. If you want to fulfill them, all right. If not, we can leave them to other authorities, higher authorities.

GEN. Y: But, General, I can't add very much more to what I have said on these problems of disengagement and the 22nd of October at this point. If the question of the supply of Suez does not interest you, that is up to you General. As I understand, the people on the East Bankand the people in Suez are really quite well, and there is no urgent problem apparently, from your point of view. So perhaps there is no need to go into the problem of supplies to Suez.

GEN. G: There are many, many problems. But I don't want to start talking about matches, blankets - that's what happened yesterdy-

jam was away.

GEN. Y: Jam?

GEN. G: Jam.

GEN. Y: That's not fair. That's part of food.

GEN. G: Cheese, white cheese in cans, 3 lorries? were kept yesterday. I really don't want to-

GEN. Y: Where in Suez or Ferdown?

GEN. G: Feirdown. And in Suez some of these itemswere also kept back. I don't know why but I left all these minor details in order not to interfere with the main problems we are discussing. But even so, we are not linking the bodies with anything. The minute we find the bodies we will send them, even if we cut the discussions today.

GEN.Y: I appreciate that very much.

GEN. G: That's our responsibility from all aspects. Everything we promised, we fulfilled it.And we will do it. There is no need to keep the dead bodiws in our hands. Why? We have there chaplains, we have your church, and they will be respected at any time, at all times, and we will send them back. There is no need to discuss that. So many items here - I listed, seven or eight items for the daily life of people in Suez and also in the theater.

GEN. Y: Right.

GEN. G: But also I don't want to discuss all these details because still it is not the main object of our discussions. So what-they can stay without jam, they can stay without blankets-

GEN. Y: That is up to you, General.

GEN. G: Any initiative is yours now, as I told you before, not any the initiatie xxxxxx isyoum now, because there is nothing needed from you.

GEN. Y: Including Cabrit?

GEN. G: I will be very glad, General, if you solve any item fromthese items. I will be glad. You can say no. I will be very, very glad personally glad, as an Egyptian delegation very glad, as Egypt will be very glad, to solve the Cabrit problem, to solve any of these problems. They will be very glad of it, I am sure. They will appreciate itpersonally and they will appreciate it as a delegation and as a country.

GEN. Y: We know each other for some time now, General.

GN. G: I think so.

GEN. Y: And I understood perfectly well what you said. So, as you say, I have - we, not I personally - what small measure I can contribute I try - we have the initiative on what you call the small items, as in a similar measure you have the initiative on what you call the problem between us, on the line. Because the last positbn was that there is a decision in principle, and this is it.

GEN. G: It's still the principle.

GEN. Y: So on this you have the initiative.

GEN. G: On the problem of the line, we could have solved this before we started the six-point agreement.

GEN. Y: How? General, if you prefer not to discuss it in a full forum-

GEN. G: No. We started talking with each on the 28th-

GEN. Y: One o'clock at night.

GEN. G: On the 28th of October, and we solved some problems.

GEN. Y: But we did not succeed in solving that problem.

GEN. G: Because itis very recently.

GEN. Y: (laughs) Let us not discuss - then we raised it, but ma'alesh.

Before I move further, only how dp you want to understand this? Because, on the problem of Mizrachi, because I have to report that. If I tell the Prime Minister that Gen. Gamasy told me thatthe question of Mizrachi could have been solved long ago, she willsay: well, then why didn't you solve it? What do I answer? It's not only the question of the PRIME Minister, but it's his wife. I went to see her.

GEN. G: On the principle we agree.

GEN. Y: This we know, but the wife is not happy with the principle. Enough is enough, she wants her man back.

GEN. G: But when how, it will be carried out, I am not authorized to discuss.

GEN. Y: This complicates matters. I am telling you very frankly, General, this complicates matters. But perhaps I will have a word with you later on that, with your permission of course. But on Cabri, how doyou envisage the supply of Cabrit? Because we haven't worked it out yet. Before we work it out, I would be glad to hear your idea, how you want to work that out.

GEN. G: We made two proposals that the Third Army should give Cabrit supplies by land or by sea, or through the United Nations.

GEN. S: I think the most practical proposal, Gen. Gamasy, was this supply separately from the unloading area.

GEN. Y: I haven't checked it, I didn't go into details, but I think that we would prefer not by way of water.

GEN G: If it is by land /Well, it is very easy. The distance is small. They can carry the food, once a week, even under the United Nations flag once again, although it is only 5 or 6 km. So it won't make any problems for us or problems for you. Just inform the local commander and we'll give them supplies. And it will be supplied from the bridgehead.

GEN. Y: All right, now how about my having a word with the General?

GEN. S: As I understand that the discussion on para. b of the agreement has at this stage ended in a stalemate. I would like, however, to say that the agreement, para. b, stipulates that the discussions between the parties should begin immediately to settle this question. There is no stipulation that the matter should be left to the peace conference, and that is my item as the representative of the United Nations at this conference.

GEN. Y: I will duly report it.

GEN. G: I would like to say for the record also that para. b affects para a. Although we will take all the precautions, but still maybe some local commanders willbe in a bad situation for any?

reason. Because I am feeling from Gen. Yariv's talking about some x itemslinked with other things he is interested in, maybe for taking other steps, maybe against the supply of the Third Army, or the supply of Suez and so on, which is charly stated in the six-point agreement. I hope not. I don't want to be wrong on that.

GEN. Y: I think you are.

GEN. G: I have the impression now that it is a threat that if you don't do that, we will do that. This is what I understood. I want to make it clear that this will not affect any other item in the agreement which we signed. That's all.

GEN. Y: Gen. Gamasy, I appreciate that verymuch. But, first of all in principle I am against threats. Threats will be of no use to anybody. And I did not intend to, I did not phrase it as a threat. Not only did I not phraseit as a threat, I did not mean it to be a threat.

GEN. G: That is good to hear.

GEN. Y: Because first of all, daily supply to Suez is going on. Secondly, the daily supply to the Third Army is going on. Anyway. And this goes on as long as we have maintenance of the cease fire. What I meant is that there are outstanding, additional problems. We are not sticklers to the word. The word says food, medical supplies and water to the Suez. What we are discussing now are additional items to the very words. Because as far as food, medical supplies and water are concerned, no problem, so far, General. An occasional

wounded, no problem. Wehave not made any difficulties on that, and we won't make any difficulties. On the Third Army supplies, okay, so we have a discussion here and a discussion there. Of course, we will make sure, General, we will make sure that no military supplies go to either of these places. Thise does create some problems for us and I think it is only legitimate for us to take all the necessary measures to see that military supplies will not enter. I am not so sure that up to now no military supplies have entered, but let us leave this point. I don't say that howitzers have entered or that tanks have entered, but - so there is no threat about it. What we are discussing is a change in the situation, an increase inthe situation. Cabrit up to now was in a certain position. We are discussing, we have made the proposal. This proposal has not been accepted by you. So far we are in a status quo. Now we are speaking about a change in the status quo of Cabrit. And speaking of a change inthe status quo of the list of supplies to Suez. In this connection, I brought up a point about the missing dead bodies - I'm very, very appreciative of what you said, General, very appreciative. I see it as a very fine gesture and a very honorable position on your part, and I am really very appreciative of what you said. There is still an outstanding problem, so I suggest we have two or three words, with your permission, and perhaps we can then-- because I want to go back and try to move these things, which you would not like to discuss at this moment. And I also would like to give you - not to draw out in time the question of Cabrit, but to try to finish it as soon as possible, so that at least Gen. Gamasy can come back and say that in principle Cabrit is solved. So may I have a few words? (Gen. G. and Gen. Y. leave the meeting).

GEN. S: I suggest that we say, because it will leak out anyway in a few hours, so it is better to say something, like the discussions on para b have not led to an understanding and that - what should we say?

UN MEMBER: First of all, have you reached an understanding to meet again on Sunday or would you like to discuss that? You have not reached that.

GEN. G: But we promise if we have the authority to meet each other again, we will do it, on the problems we discussed. That's on Mizrachi, and on Cabrit and on the supplies for Suez.

GEN. Y: And if we have any other ideas, we'll let you know.

GEN. G: That's a special-

GEN. Y: Open-

GEN. G: meeting. If it will be under the UN auspices, I think so.

GEN. S: You can meet always under my auspices anyway, I am not against it. What shall we say to the press?

GEN. Y: I will accept whatever the General proposes.

UN MEMBER: I think in view of the importance attached to b, which is between the parties under the auspcies of the United Nations that the world press, it would be better and to come from the General at this point. I would prefer if that be avoided. I know it will leak to the press, I realize that.

GEN. S: I am ready to face this failure.

UN MEMBER: But then it's very difficult. You may have some people .. .. .. Could we say that both sides will consult and a meeting will be arranged at a later date?

GEN. G: I don't accept that.

UN MEMBER: How would you put it then?

GEN. G: Just that we came to a deadlock. Let's face facts because it will be leaked to the press by any means, or formulated by-

GEN. Y: Don't despair, don't despair. It's a long road.

GEN. G: Up to this point, that's true.

GEN. S: That no concrete results have been reached. Can we say that?

GEN. S: Yes.

GEN. Y: On that question.

GEN. S: Yes. Discussion on para b of the agreement have been held and no concrete results have been reached. I think we could still say that-I am still hopeful - everything is possible in the world, you know. We can say at this stage, no concrete results have been reached.

GEN. Y: At this stage, no agreement has been reached. Or any other phrase that leaves it open, but I don't want to put the General into any reaction that is not acceptable to him.

GEN. S: No firm date for a next meeting has been-

GEN. G: Better to say meetings. To saymeeting gives the ide that we will meet again. But I have a feeling that it will take a long time until the politicalleaders will-

GEN. Y: Not necessarily, General.

GEN S: Let's say no firm date for a next meeting has yet been fixed.

GEN. Y: I'm not saying goodbye, General, I am just saying au revoir.

GEN. G: I don't accept that.

UN REPORTER: How would you put it then?

GEN. G: Just that we came to a deadlock. Let's face those because it will be leaked to the press by any means, or formal ones by-

GEN. Y: Don't despair, don't disparage. It's a long road.

GEN. G: Up to this point, that's true.

GEN. S: That no concrete results have been reached. Can we say that?

GEN. S: Yes.

GEN. Y: On that question.

GEN. S: Yes. Discussion on para 5 of the agreement have been held and no concrete results have been reached. I think we could still say that-I am still hopeful - everything is possible in the world, you know. We can say so-this stage, no concrete results have been reached.

GEN. G: At this stage, no agreement has been reached. Or any other phrase that leaves it open, but I don't want to put the general idea any reaction that is not acceptable to him.

GEN. S: No firm date for a next meeting has been-

GEN. G: Better to say meetings. To say meeting gives the idea that we will meet again. But I have a feeling that it will take a long time until the politicians agree with-

GEN. Y: Not necessarily, General.

GEN S: Let's say no firm date for a next meeting has yet been fixed.

GEN. Y: It's not saying goodbye, General, I am just saying au revoir.

GEN. S: Discussion of para b of the agreement continued today. No concrete results have been reached. No firm date for a next meeting has yet been fixed.

UN MEMBER: Is that agreeable to both generals?

GEN. G? I want to say something. The announcement of Gen. Siilasvuo is stated inthe name of the United Nations here, right? So you can formulate it as you like. But that is not my opinion, I didn't participate-

GEN. S: The Secretary-General told me the other day that the parties decide what to say. (laughter). But at least I have your agreement that this is all right.

I will thank the press, however, fortheir patience and their endurance. Thier life here at 101 has been much more monotonous than ours. Right?

ARCHIVE

פגישה ה- 26 אוק. 1973

Egt:- We think that it's good that we discuss this matter and we think it is a good idea the disengagement between the troops by leding your troops one step back, it will be a good step forward. What I mean is this:- acording to the security council decision you go back to the 22nd Oc. line if your troops move back for a line which will be determined by both of us and it won't be diffienlt to determine that line as one step, most of this problem will be solved. I mean all the steps which will be taken by us, it will be gradually for the last discussion which will be done at negotiation or whatever you like between the two governments (on the political) for the whole political situation. The very step of that from our military point of view to make one step forward to the 22nd line, it means, if we define this line, your troops will move to that line, we will make the disengagement between the troops. That's one step and that's the other step - we will see how it will go. If we say (that) our troops on the east bank of the Canal will go to the west bank, again further on we are looking forward that they will go again to the western bank when the negotiations start between the two governments and settle the whole problem, as far as I know.

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ארכיון צה"ל

So, if you agree with that it will be a very good step from you to solve so many problems for us both.

IL:- May I first ask a question - I understood your proposal which was that the idea of disengagement of forces looks positive and in order to carry it out you suggest that we withdraw first of all to the line of 22nd of October. This is clear. I understand. Then you said that later on there might be or you consider, I've not understood it clearly, a more general withdrawal of forces, or did I misunderstand you.

Eg:- On this point - here is the canal, here is Ismailiya, here is Suez. We have our troops here, and here is Deversoir. You have your troops somewhere here till Adabiya, or will we put it on the map if you like. Red line, that is our troops, a different line - that is your troops.

IL:- .... That's something to debate.

Eg:- Yes, according to our opinion the Israeli troops were here on the 22nd at 1852 hours. We may be wrong.

IL:- But

Eg:- That's right, and then here the 23rd and here the 24th. It doesn't make any difference between the lines if it is one km, 10 km or 5 km. All right - if we make this disengagement and that taking from the political point of view and

and from the military point of view and both of them.
If your troops have pushed forward to that area, the whole problems here will be solved and then that is the first step. Still, you have your troops on our side and we still have our troops on the other side (In) the period the negotiation will be done between the two governments, and I am sure of that it is very active now between the two governments through the U.N. or whatever they are doing. I don't know how they are, and then, the second step will be how it will go after that step.
Your troops, as I understand from the political point of view, will go to any line in Sinai, as one step. Another line in Sinai, how it will go, that is the political personell will define that. So, the first step will solve so many problems between us, between the convois, the 3rd army, the P.O.W's the dead personell, all our military, any clashes between both sides never will be. Our authorised local comanders from here to your local comanders to solve that problem. So, everything will be easy for both sides, as we understand.
IL:- I understand from your proposal that, and I don't propose to go into discussions about the lines, but my instructions are that we still want to discuss the proposal I brought forward the last meeting, and if this is not acceptable at our level between two generals, my government has asked for a

discussion at the political end of this proposal. The proposal I meant was a mutual switch of 10 Km.

Egt:- On both sides?

IL:- Yes. Where the main points, of course, is not what is it is 10 Km or 5 Km, in between the U.N.E.F or the U.N observers or somebody else or anything else, but the main ~~thing~~ point is the general switch all along the Canal on both sides. I understand the answer to that ~~point~~ proposal is that you accept the point of disengagement of forces, but ... which means that only us who disengage, and your troops stay in their present position. So there is no mutual anything. If we two cannot discuss this point any further, I cannot understand you, but then I have been instructed to ask you for a discussion of the proposal at the political end.

Egt:- I ~~have~~ given that your proposal to my government and they discussed it. I didn't take a definite answer for that until now because it is still under discussion by the political personell. So, there is no definite answer yet about that. But, as far as I understand, and I'm authorized with the political men, working with them, and I hope that you will remain also in order not to change the ~~so~~ personalities.

IL:- I know.

Egt:- We don't like to change it also.

יבמ
ישראל בע"מ

IL:- Here we are only military men.

Cpt:- We are only military men, I don't know how it will go.

IL:- Excuse me general, there is only one difference between the two of us. You are a military man still in service and I am a military man recalled to active service.

Cpt:- It doesn't make any difference; so, as far as I understand from our political men, why do we get our troops back to the west ~~land~~ while we are trying to solve the whole problem by the withdrawal of the Israeli troops through Sinai as a result to negotiation between the two governments.

I.B.M.
ישראל בע"מ

until the negotiation has been done, we can settle the
no matter here on the west, if we make that
disengagement. They took it your proposal as a
disengagement between the troops first of all. So,
we stop any clashes between each other, and it will
be very good for the political personell to start
their way on a firm base, that is: their point ...
H.:- I understand the answer general now, but still
I would ask you to transmit the government

442—001—200 מס' קבל חדש

my government's proposal for meeting at a political level concerning the idea. I, of course, transmit the answer.

Eyt:- Just to make it clear, that is an important point. Let us discuss it more thoroughly, just to facilitate their work. of the political men. You mean both armies or just only part of our troops.

U:- I mean both armies, but if you have any counter proposal

Eyt:- At any rate in future you may withdraw your troops to any line here in Sinai. May be here, may be there, at any line. So, at all cost our

442-(10)-300 5/70 SP 200

troops will be on the eastern bank, so there is no need to take them back and then send them here as far as they are concerned, and we are keen to put it in effect as soon as possible.

M.:- General - I will be very frank with you, you know we understand very well as generals at the general staff in your position and experience, that your inter political negotiations your military position is of utmost importance, so, of course, our interest in maintaining a good military position is also of great importance even though at a further stage we might go back across the Canal but when we start a negotiation you want

442-001-200 מדינת ישראל

to be in a good position. I understand your point of view as well.

Eph:- And I understand your point very well. O.K. just one point. As military men we want to make disengagement between the troops to stop any clashes. right? the cease fire is in effect know and it's very good. this situation. In case we stay here for longer time and we don't solve the military sides, what will happen? There troops will be in a bad situation and you know that you are stoping and plains going there, you are stoping any trial (to do) to give them rations through the water or

442-001-100 מ"מ 100 מ"מ 00

through the gulf. Even our wounded personnel we couldn't take them, so the result we will be in a corner to start a fight again for the benefit of these troops or to stop it. We are going on way for peace, thus our political personal as I understand. The military situation is effecting the political situation now. The negotiation will take time and you know them. They will take time. The U.N here and there may take weeks. Will you take over the supply of the 3rd army until the negotiation stop?

442—001- 200 שיטין 100

do you have any recomendation like to the disengagement of our troops. keep them away, how? so I am afraid that in the coming period there must be clashes here some where for any small reason so our proposal from our military point of view to make them away and to make them away to clear a way allan is Suez and the 3rd army.

I: 1, 2, 3 roads?
E; this road?
I; Adabia, and the cairo Suez
E; we may discuss
I; General,
E; maybe one way may be one road may be two roa
the aim is to make the disengagement to the troops on the western bank to keep the troops awa of each other to help the political men to start their talks, how they will talk how

they will resolve it up to them.

I; General, I have very well understood very clearly understood your proposal

E; Very Well

I; But, I have also got instructions and the instructions are on the matter of 22 and supplies etc. We, my political authorities still stand by the proposal that you told me you don't accept at this stage.

And they would like to discuss this at a political level

E; All right, that clear

I; So I think think we past to other points now.

E; all right

I; If there is any questions because as I said I want to do my best that even we can't solve this disagreement there will be

no missunderstandings, so I think we are clear?

E; yes

I; Although we don't agree on the counterery we disagree very much on the point. There is no misunderstanding

E; All right

I; Some thing has come up which is very diffical to us, I don't wether you heard announcem of our goverment that we have to discontinue the evacuation of wounded people from Suez and the 3rd Israeli armie

E; yes

I; And I think it is very important that I explain to you the position we have taken medical supplies to the the area and we have agreed that the number of

Wounded people, the number that was settled
in the be evacuated correct
E; think so
and I understand that the intention was to
evacuate the whole 2000 wounded, meanwhile
we have asked for the following things,
We have asked the red cross since the
outbreak of war until today,
We asked to have a list of our p.o.w
in Egypt, we have asked the R.C. to visi
our wounded prisoners and prisoners and the R.C
had come up until today until I
left with a negative answer on all these
points.
Now general, we can't accept this we have
given you a list of prisoners we have

permitted a visit of the R.C. to the W.P
have agreed we have took plasma to the
wounded people in the Suez and 3rd arm
we agreed to evacuat wounded pe
so we musst, there is GENEVA convention
and I think you know the GENEVA
convention as well as I do and there is
need to but we can't proceed wi
the evacuation of the wounded people
unless the following things are taking c
of.

A. We must get a list of the P.W.
you have.

B. We want a visit and an immediate
of the R.C of all our wounded prisoners
all our prisoners.

C. We want to have our wounded priso
released as soon as possible, then

can continue the evacuations of the wounded people that was talked about and everyth. of course we asked for will be under

and the last point is that we have to set up as soon as posible a time table for the total release of the P.O.W.'s on both sides we are now holding 7000 Egyptian P.O.W's, excuse me, over 6000

E; A.a.

I; I am not sure of the numbers, I think included but I might be wrong.

E; civilians?

I; I am not sure 100% so this is a very

difficult point, general, with us it is a major point of principle we must, I think I am stressing it, because I think we must settle this as soon as possible.

Ej. all right, as I promised you last time we are been to solve all the military problems. first of all the names of your wounded P.O.W's is with me now, it can be given to you and it will be given to * to R.C. to day. They will be visited by the R.C authorities, and their names will be given to you through the R.C.

I j. Only the wounded?

Ej. The wounded and the P.O.W will give the names also.

I; When general?

E; during the comming 3 days the names will be given to the R.C. but giving you back the P.O.W. and taking our P.O.W. although it is very important for both sides. I can't of give a word. now for the timing to do it.

I; How about the wounded P.O.W?

E; The wounded are under ~~the~~ our medical supervision and under the R.C. and they are treated very very nice in all aspects and we are responsible for that in front of all authorities we can do anything for them we are giving them medical support in the best of our hospitals and so on you will hear from the

how they are treated from the medical point of view or from any other point of view.

I; But please general let us for a moment leave the question of total exchange of P.O.W aside. Let us take talk about the wounded prisoners. Now what you have said general is first of all you have with you a list of the wounded.

E; yes

I you will permit a visit by the R.C. to the wounded prisoners today I understand

E; from tomorrow everybody will be visited by the R.C.

I; From tomorrow every wounded prisoner or so every prisoner?

E; Every wounded prisoner

I; I see, there are a number of points belonging to the Geneva convention except the exchange of prisoners.

E; Yes

I; There is, the R.C. has to have a list of all the P.o.W. and we have already given this list perhaps it's not full as yet but we have given most of the names, perhaps by now it is....

E; The majority of them

I; But there is a visit, there should be a visit of the R.C. to the place where the P.o.W are kept

and we have permitted ~~it~~ that
third, a visit of the R.C. to
the wounded P.O.W to see how they are
treated, now no. 4, the Geneva convention
stipulates with the cessation of active hostilities
it stipulates a release of all P.O.W.
but we are now talking first of all of ~~the~~ an
exchange of the wounded prisoners, this has
been done in 67 this has been done in 5
and other wars we have had. it ~~has~~ is
hard for me to understand general why you are
holding back on the list of all the P.O.W.
you told me within 3 days

E Yes

I and why you are holding back on a visit
to the P.O.W., not only the wounded and
why you are holding back on the evacuation
of the wounded P.O.W.

these are P.O.W that cannot go back to their units they are wounded people. we are ready to send back to you wounded P.O.W. immediately as well, and it has been done in the past, it is not the question of a president, it has been done between us in the past. this is a very important point

E our wounded persons which you have some of them are there in the Suez area and some of them may be in your hospitals but those who are here on the eastern bank of the canal are not POW

I that is right but they are wounded, surrounded wounded soldiers, excuse me, I'll let you finish

E So, changing the wounded POW in your hospitals and in our hospitals

they are still P.O.W.

I Excuse me, would you like some more coffee?

E no thank you, that's enough for me.

I anybody for coffee?

E. So the prisoners, the wounded P.O.W, we call it, the wounded P.O.W. with us or with you, will keep them to be treated as P.O.W. Right?

I those wounded personal here, in our the eastern bank of the canal, we don't consider them POW, maybe surrounded yes, but they will be treated as their brother military men there on the eastern bank so we don't want to make any exchange between the POW, the wounded POW now, until they'll be treated there

or until the problem of P.O.W will be settled as one .....

I I understand general. I understand what you sais but it is very difficult for me to see your point of view. I will to agree with you and tell you why. You don't not agree with us for an exchange of wounded POW but you want us to persist the evacuation of wounded soldiers. I have all sympathy for wounded people, this is of course clear, but there is something that I think is inconsistent, that on exchange of wounded POW that are in a status of P.O.W you say no, but on the other hand you insist on our agreeing with the evacuation of people who are wounded people, sick people, I understand

but are still in the status of fighting soldiers, there's something that doesn't click

E can we make that proposal, you want to evacuate youre wounded POW on the other side you give us our wounded POW in Israel and us on the eastern bank of the canal. Right?

I this is a proposal I think that we can work on, as I don't have a definite yes on it, I'll let you know as soon as possible, I think it will be all right.

E And I will also let you know as possible.

I all right

E Please, and that means the plasma and the blood which is needed for civilians in Suez to be given

to the civilians in Suez under the supervision of the U.N. because the civilians need it badly.

I general, when do you think you can have an answer on that?

E If you want it tomorrow

I perhaps today

E, perhaps today, as soon as I go back and you go back, we make communication through the U.N.

I Yes

E and then we'll start working on it

I good, I want to be loyal to my principle of avoiding any misunderstanding. Can I assume the following:

A. that in case we have an exchange of wounded prisoners, and that can be done immediately, within 1, 2 days I hope

In case we have an exchange of the

wounded prisoners we shall agree to the evacuations of wounded civilians and soldiers from the 3rd army area on the east bank, yes?

E Yes

I and we shall agree to medical supplies for the civilians in Suez

E Yes

I in addition to this, can I assume that we will have, if possible today, if not tomorrow, a list of all our prisoners, and can I assume that the R C will be able to visit all our prisoners in the camps where they are

E Yes

I and visit our wounded POW before they are evacuated

E before their evacuation?

I if they are evacuated immediately,

X ~~عاجلة~~, then it's all right, no problem

but if, let us say, the evacuation takes

2 day with all the preparations we

would like, because we want the

R.C. if possible even today to visit them

So I want to summarize the parts

If we agree, in case we agree

to an exchange of wounded POW

and B. to the evacuation of your

wounded from the third army area and from

Suez and if we agree to give you

medical supplies for the civilians in

Suez you undertake 1) to give us

without delay a list of all our POW

2) a visit by the R.C. to all our POW

3) a visit of the R.C. to our wounded POW and 4) the evacuation of our wounded POW yes?

E yes.

I all right.

E very clear

I now I promise you our answer, today. I will do my very very best to give you an answer today through the U.N. I hope it won't take time. I hope it won't have any difficulties of communication from Tel Aviv to Cairo through U.N. (to go to)

E it will go

I because I had difficulty last night, great difficulty last night in setting up communication with the U.N

before the convoy, I assume you will want to discuss the convoy

E discuss this?

I the convoy? all right, if this point is clear we can go further.

E it is clear now and I will do my best to make it so this problem will be solved

I I will be glad, we will be very glad, this will facilitate a lot of matters

E Yes, We want to facilitate all our military matters.

I anything else, general?

Yes, and then there's a last point, that is, we would like to have a time table on the general exchange of

prisoners

E It's very hard to discuss it now that's a very difficult problem

I Why is it so difficult?

E Let's solve one thing and then go to the other

I You are going to gain much more by it than we

E Maybe so

I many many more soldiers

E We want to keep these P.O.W. for, not to keep them, I mean when we settle the other matters we will settle that on other firm bases.

I I'll tell your general, you see that I was less urgent on the gener exchange of P.O.W. than on the other

points
~~posta~~ concerning the P.O.W. and I only asked for a timetable, but here again, according to the Geneva Convention, to any accepted procedure ~~and~~ a general exchange of P.O.W. is something that one wants the active hostilities ceased, it is an accepted principle and we are not dealing ~~with~~ in hundreds of thousands of people, we are dealing in relatively small numbers and for us it is very important point. ~~Here for I urge you to consider it as more serious~~ there for I urge you to consider it ~~as a serious~~ seriously as possible and as soon as possible, ~~so~~

E. all right we'll consider it, but I want to tell you general.

I yes

all though there is a cease of fi
but still there are so many complicatio
from the military paint of view tha
as you feel in this area especialy
in this area we still have some of
our troops here, we have difficults
for their supplies, we didn't do
any thing against your plains coming
for supplies here or for EVACUATION
your plains are crossing the area
for supply arms and for EVACUATION here
if we for start, any trial done by us i
opposed by you for help for the 3RD
army by land by air untill the last
night, yes the helicopters and so on,
and the helicopters are not for sup
lies, as you know, may for medical

serious medical evacuation, ~~5 or 3~~ because 5 or 3 or 4 helicopters doesn't make a good help for the troops here so the presoners of war as we feel still one part of the whole thing going on in this area, so we make a ~~agreat~~ schedule if we come back to the main point which we started how we disengage the troops away from each others by any means to any distence as military men, most of these problems will be ~~solved~~ solved, and I promised you I will explain it back to my government until they make their negotiations on the political ~~for~~ level. so just postpone it please for a while until everything goes better on

I I understood General ~~that so~~ what you said. but still I want to urge you to explain our point of view to your government and I will explain your point of view which I understood very clearly to my authorities. now I hope that if the matter of the P.O.W.'s ~~we~~ that we have discussed that you will talk today to your authorities and to I to my authorities and let you have an answer by today, then the ~~matter~~ question of evacuation of the wounded people here will be solved.

E. Alright, In this case the evacuation from israel to our ~~eyget~~ egypt or from egypt to israel, or from here to there if it will be arranged by the R.C.

I Yes, As we start all means are possible

E. About the convoy

I Yes please. On the Convoy I want to make a general remark and this is that I hope or I want to make it clear that once we undertook ~~the~~ we agread that we let pass this convoy, we didn't talk about other convoys, we took it seriously. I want to help you

me when I say that to there was no back thoughts in our minds, and that we didn't fool around with it. I want to ask you generals that in this case we played straight forward and I can assure you that in any the we will have to do together. If I shall disagree I shall tell you so, If I say this we ~~shall~~ do, will do, I shall do ~~to~~ my utmost to assure that we will do it properly.

E - Now we have 100 Lorrys to be sent to the other side as you accepted, up till now 30 Lorrys went to the western bank, 20 yesterday and 10 to day.

I I want to ask the general do you know what is the situation now

E. now I saw the Convoy there with your ~~soldier~~ soldiers ~~at~~ on one side, our soldiers on other side. 10 Lorrys were taken to the canal zone the ~~bad~~ bank of the Canal

I today.

I Now this is the point that I told you I have difficulties in comunicateins because you wanted already to do it last night. what the General ~~said~~

says is: the UN. ONLY HAS 25 DRIVERS this TAKES A LONG TIME NOW WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSE, to TAKE THE 25 DRIVERS, TAKE 25 TRUCKS UP TO, NOT 38, WE WILL TAKE IT UP TO HERE. WE M WILL HAVE DRIVERS READY. THE MINUTE THAT 25 DRIVERS HAVE BROUGHT THE LORRYS HERE OUR DRIVERS WILL TAKE THEM IMMIDIATLY THERE, THE 25 UN PEOPLE WILL GO BACK ACROSS, AND SO ON THIS WILL LESSEN VERY MUCH THE LORRYS TO ~~REAH~~ REACH 138. KM. KM THIS IS ALREADY BEEN DONE

E. ALRIGHT

I WE SHALL NOT POST DETAIN BECAUSE IT TOOK THE ONLY 25 DRIVERS UNTIL THEY GET BACK IT TAKES A LONG TIME SO BY THIS PROCEADER YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FERRY YOUR LORRYS ACROSS ~~THE~~ WITH THE UN DRIVERS VERY QUICKLY, I MISLEAD YOU, THE CHECK POINT IS HERE,

E YES

I OUR DRIVERS WILL TAKE THE LORRYS FROM THE ~~CHEC~~ CHECK POINT UNTIL HERE, WE CAN TAKE ENOUGH DRIVERS TO TAKE ALL YOUR LORRYS AT ONE TIME UNTIL HERE. SO YOU WILL STAND HERE AND THEN

THE UN DRIVERS WILL TAKE THEM THE SHORT WAY, ONE MINUTE, THEN THE 25 CAN COME BACK, AND THEY WOUNT HAVE TO GO BACK TO HERE. THAT IS ALRIGHT WITH YOU?

E. THAT IS ALRIGHT

E - WHEN DO WE EXPECT TO FINISH THAT CONVOY, THE GENERAL KNOWS.

I FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, THIS IS ONLY PART OF THE PROBLEM. THE BIG PROBLEM IS THE UNLOADING AND THE FERRYING ACROSS

E - YES

I - SO HOW DO YOU SEE THIS PROBLEM, BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE ONLY ONE AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE ENGAGED FOR THE OPERATION.

E - BUT WE AGREED ONE AT A TIME

I BUT THIS DOSEN'T MEAN PERHAPS IT IS MY FAULT, IF YOU CAN EMPLOY MORE, WE WILL AGREE TO MORE

E. PLEASE, IF WE CAN MAKE IT MORE THAN ONE POINT, WE WILL USE MORE THAN ONE CAR

I. BUT IF YOU CAN HAVE IT. WOULD YOU LIKE ANOTHER POINT OR AT THE SAME POINT?

E. IF IT IS

I AT SAME POINT IF YOU CAN USE 3, 4 ALRIGHT

E. AT THE SAME POINT MAY BE EASIER FOR THE UN

I YES, HOW MANY MORE CAN YOU ENGAGE?

E. WE HAVE SO MANNY THERE, I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY

I. 5?

E. IF CAN MAKE IT UP TO TEN IT WOUNT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE BECAUSE ONE GOING THERE AND ONE GOING HERE

I UP TO TEN

E. UP TO TEN.

I BUT HOW MANNY PEOPLE DO YOU WANT TO CROSS FOR THE UNLOADING? WOULD YOU, I THINK, HERE AGAIN, THAT IT WAS ~~THE~~ BECAU~~-DETAILS~~ I HAVE THE DETAILS I DETERMINED SO ONE WE SAY YOU WILL ENGAGE TEN IN THE OPERATION

E. YES

I. BUT YOU HAVE ONLY TEN MEN TO UNLOAD THE TRUCKS

E. WE WANT 100, ~~100~~ TEN IN THIS CASE

TEN FOR EVRY LORRY YOU UNLOAD AND TO USE AND EVERY CAR TO USE TEN PEPSONS TO UNLOAD FOR UNLOADING UNARMED AS WE ~~SAID~~ SAID., SO IT WILL BE EASIER

I I WANT TO CHECK AND WILL GIVE YOU AN ANSWER IN A MINUTE

E. ALRIGHT, AND THE LOCAL COMMANDER IF IT IS, IF 100 ALRIGHT, WE CAN MAKE IT SEVEN FOR EVRY LORRY, BUT NOT LESS THAN THAT

I NOT LESS THAN SEVEN

E - YES

E (אאא ילין) ~~אאא~~ I AM GOING TO PHONE

E ALRIGHT (יש/יע)

I (אאא ילין) PLEASE, WE WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO EAT, OTHERWISE WE WILL STARVE

- פּ'אא -

I - DO YOU EAT SOMETHING PLEASE

E - NO I DON'T EAT TOO MUCH THAT IS WHY I AM VERY THIN

- פּ'אא -

I SO YOU ENDURE LONGER

E - I DRINK COFFEE AND SMOKE CIGARETTES THAT IS VERY BAD I KNOW

I HOW ABOUT YOU (אאא ילין שם)

GIK מפקד הכל

I 50 PEOPLE, WE SHALL BRING THE 25 LORRYS OR THE 30 IF YOU WANT AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE AREA WHICH I UNDERSTAND IS 3 KM FROM THE CANAL BECAUSE, I(הוא יודע) THE JUNCTION ~~יודע~~, THE JUNCTION TO ADRIA

I NOT THE JUNCTION ~~HE KNOWS~~ TO THE LEFT HE KNOWS, YOU TAKE ON. THE STAGING AREA AND ANY GIVEN TIME 5 LORRYS ARE BEING UNLOADED SO YOU WILL HAVE 10 MEN PER LORRY TO UNLOAD E. OR.

I NOW I HAVE AN ANSWER ON THE DEAL ~~WITH~~ WITH THE PRISONERS. WHAT MY AUTHORITY SAY IS THE FOLLOWING

A: WE ARE READY TO GIVE YOU THE PLASMA FOR SUEZ AS YOU ASKED. WE ARE READY TO EXCHANGE OF COURSE ~~THE~~ WOUNDED PRISONERS TO GIVE YOU ALL YOUR WOUNDED PRISONERS. NOW THE EVACUATION OF WOUNDED HERE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT I TOLD YOU AND WHAT I HAVE BEEN AUTHORISED NOW, AS FAR AS THE EVACUATION OF THE 3RD ARMY AND OF SUEZ ARE CONCERNED WE ARE READY TO LET YOU EVACUATE ALL THE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED

NOT ALL THE WOUNDED BUT ~~A~~ THE SERIOUS WOUNDED. I WAS TOLD THAT THE RC TOLD US YOU HAVE IN THE SUEZ AREA ABOUT 70 OR 75 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PEOPLE. IF THEY ARE MORE, PLEASE TELL US. NOW AS TO OUR PROPOSITIONS I HAVE TO ADD ONE OTHER POINT. YOU REMEMBER ALL MY PROPOSITIONS?

E YES

I ~~AND AUTHORITIES. THOU~~ AND THE POINT IS THAT AND AMONG THE WOUNDED PERSONS WE ALSO WANT KPT. AVIDAN;

E. KPT. DAN AVIDAN

I: YES.

E. THAT IS THE FIRST ~~PLESONE~~ P.O.W FOR A LONG TIME.

I. YES

E. I ~~HOWW~~ KNOW

I: IS HIS HEALTH BAD HEALTH AND WE WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE HIM IN THE GROUPE OF THE WOUNDED

PETSOVERS.

E. ITPT DAN AVIDAN (אבי).

I. YES SO I ALREADY HAVE GIVEN YOU AN ANSWER, I ~~H~~AVE TO GO BACK TO TEL-AVIV NOW, ~~TO CHE~~ I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE TO CHECK IT.

E. AGAIN PLEAS, ABOUT THE COMING CONVOIES,

I: YES

E: *** PLEAS GIVE ME ONE MUNITES WHILE ~~MM~~ TRYING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMES I WANT TO GIVE ~~A~~ PIRIOD FOR CONTINUING THE CONVOIES UNTILL WE SETTEL THIS METTERS VERY URGENTLY, AND VERY QUICKLY WE WILL SETTLE ALL THE THE MATTERS

VERY QUICKLY, IF ~~WAS~~ WE STOP THE CONVOIES, THE COMING CONVOIES, THAT AGAIN WILL COME BACK TO THE LAST SITUATION. SO PLEAS WE WANTED TO CONTINU UNTILL THE NEGOTUIATION OR THE discussions ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL STARTS OR FINISHES TO go TO A ONE A.. TEARNING POINT IF THEY AGREE EVERYTHING WILL be FINISH. ALLRIGHT,

I * BUT I UNDERSTAND, EXCUSE ME, [illegible]

(אחר) E.: IS HE SERIOUSLY ILL,

(" ") I: YES FOR A LONG TIME

(" ") E: HE WAS ALLRIGHT, BUT HE IS SERIOUSLY ILL NOW.

I: I THING ~~M~~ WE better ARANGE FOR

A PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO GENERALS CAN WE?

E. I'll do my best.

WHAT ARE THE TIME FOR OUR TAPE?

I: EXCUSE ME! WE WERE ON THE POINT OF THE CONVOY, I HAVE CHECKED again and AS I TOLD you before GENERAT THIS IS THING TO THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL LEVEL, I THINK, AND THIS IS MY PRIVAT OBSERVATION, I THINK THAT IF WE CAN PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION OF "THE ~~PRESONERS~~ P.O.W I THINK THIS MIGHT help but I'M NOT ~~given~~ GIVING you A PROMISS, NOT ONLY THAT HE IS LATE THIS HELICOPTER IS DESTERBING US, M

E. YOU MEAN THIS PROBLEM IS LINKED TO THE PROBLEM OF P.O.W.

E. TO THE EXCHANGE OF P.O.W.

I WOULD PUT IT LIKE THAT THE POSITION NOW IS THAT FIRST OF ALL WE HAVE TO HAVE THIS MEETING ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

E. YES

I, I THIS ~~MY EPRESSIATE~~ MY PERSON ESTIMATE IS IF WE ADVANCE ON THE QUESTION OF P.O.W'S IT MIGHT HELP, I DON'T WANT TO PROMISS YOU ANYTHING

E. ALL RIGHT

I. I SAID 3 TIMES I DON'T WANT TO PROMISS

E THE EXCHANGE OF P.O.W

E. CONCERNING THE WOUNDED PEOPLE

I NO

E. BUT WE DID DECIDED.

I MY OBSERVATION WAS IN ANSWER TO THE GENERALS QUESTION ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONVOIES.

E. THIS IS LINKED WITH THE EXCHANGE OF P.O.W ~~OF~~ W BUT NOT WITH THE WOUNDED P.O.W

I: THIS IS MY PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND I MIGHT BE WRONG, BECAUSE AS I TOLD YOU THE ANSWER THAT WE HAVE TALK ON THE POLITICAL LEVELS ABOUT THE GENERAL PLANES, WHICH THEN CAN PERHAPS BE AWAY WITH THE CONVOY AND THE QUESTION OF THE LINES

E. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AS MILITARY MAN MEN, WE ARE NOW MAKING IT

DIFFICULT FOR THE POLITECAL AUTHORITIES TO START, BUT IF WE SOLVE ~~THIS~~ ~~FIT~~ THIS PROBLEM IT WILL BE EASIER FOR THEM. THIS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW

I I UNDERSTAND GENERAL WHAT YOU SAY, BUT THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT I HAVE VERY VERY CLEAR. NOW ANOTHER QUESTION, IS IT POSSIBLE GENERAL, I HAVE GIVEN YOU ~~MY~~ THE ANSWER OF MY AUTHORITIES ON THE QUESTION OF THE WOUNDED ETC.

E. YES

I ~~IF~~ IF IT POSSIBLE FOR YOU., I AM GLADLY WAIT HERE. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO GO BACK AND CONTACT AND THEN COME BACK?

E. I AM SURE THAT EVERYTHING WILL BE FACILITÉ.

I THE QUESTION IS WHEN CAN WE HAVE AN ANSWER

E. TODAY YOU WILL HAVE AN ANSWER

I TODAY AT NIGHT ?

E. ~~AT FOR~~ AT NIGHT

I ALRIGHT

E. I CAN GO THERE AND GET CONTACT WITH THEM

I KNOW THE SITUATION FROM BOTH SIDES.

I P. I AM SURE THAT IF YOU WOULDN'T HAVE KNOWN YOU WOULDN'T BE HERE

(P'∧3)

E. I WANTED TO FACILITATE MY JOB BECAUSE STILL I FEEL I WILL BE HERE FOR A LONG TIME. AND EVEN THE POLITICAL MATTERS I THINK I WILL PARTICIPATE IN IT ALSO. I WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK WITH GOOD RESULT ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONVOY SO WE CAN FACILITATE THE MATTERS. I DON'T KNOW IF WE CAN START THE NEGOTIATIONS TO MORROW ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL OR WHAT THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW, THEY MAY SAY AFTER 5 OR 6 DAYS AND SO ON THANK YOU VERY MUCH

I. GENERAL, I UNDERSTAND BUT UNFORTUNATELY I CAN'T HELP YOU

E. ALRIGHT. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT WE ARE TAKING THIS KIND OF MEETING VERY SERIOUSLY A LOT OF THINGS DEPEND ON THE RESULT ~~OF IT~~ WE CAN GET OUT OF IT, AND I BELEIVE THAT FROM THIS POINT EVRY THING COULD PROCEED. MINOR THINGS AND

FACILITATED WOULD DEVELOP A KIND OF ATMOSPHERE WE LOOK FORWARD TO ~~REACH~~ REACH TO MAKE A REAL POLITICAL ADVANCE

I . I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND THEREFORE I WANT TO MAKE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SO THAT THE PRESENT CONVOY IS ON IT'S WAY AS SPEEDY AS POSSIBLE . AS AS FAR AS THE CONTINUATION OF CONVOYS IS CONCERNED I UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY WHAT THE GENERAL SAID, BUT HERE I HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS ,

E . I AM ~~ON~~ JUST SAYING THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE MILITERY SIDE CONSERNING THE ~~THIRD~~ 3RD ARMY IN PARTICULAR. TO FACILITA ANY POLITICAL NEGOTIATION . WE CAN'T ADVANCE ~~IN~~ ON THE 3RD ARMY EXPENSE IN POLITICAL ASPECTS .

I I UNDERSTOOD YOU VERY CLEARLY , SO AS ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONVOYS WE ARE AT THE POINT OF NECESITY OF FOR A MEETING ~~IN~~ AT A POLITICAL LEVEL . TO THIS I AM ADDING MY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. PERHAPS I AM WRONG BUT I THANK SO IFEEL THAT TO GET FURTHER , OR IF WE CAN ADVANCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GENERAL EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS I FEEL

THAT IT WILL HAVE A GOOD INFLUNCE ~~OF~~
ON THE QUESTIONS OF * CONVOYS

(1) 3.11.73

A - Ghamsi

B -

C -

I know that it is very important to you the prisonners of war - their names and the lists and this and that, But still there is a diversion now about our way that we are talking about the details of so many things that we want to concentrate on the main object of this delegation. As far as we are concerned we think that this delegation should deal with 2 main problems; cease-fire arrangements ~~and discussion~~ - that's number 1; number 2 - discussion on the lines to which Israeli troops can withdraw on the western bank of the canal according to security-council resolution 338 and 339.

Under the first item - that's number 1 - cease-fire arrangement - we feel that there are so many incidents or cases, I'll give some examples which makes us feel that a cease fire is not effective or it will not be effective

very soon. First of all, just examples - that's all -. First one - air reconnaissance in the northern area starts the day before yesterday. Our air defence means shot at these planes because it was on our troops and then again your planes started shooting our air-defence battalions. Just one case. I don't want to make any comments, just an example.

B - You mean disposing ... the second army

A - Yes, we didn't make any complaints to the U.N but I just listing. That's number 1. Number 2: in Kabrit area you know that we have a strong isolated point. On the eastern side of the lake. It is isolated, yes. But still it is considered that it is part of the base bridge-head of the third army on the eastern bank. Yesterday some of your tanks starts going towards them to surround them although they already near the lake ...

B - When was it?

B - Yesterday morning. One of your tanks was stuck in a minefield there, it was damaged, and then back again came some infantry with their

machine-guns near our strong point there to cut it by the object (!), to cut it. That point from the bridge-head - there is about 5 kms. This point is away from the bridge-head for about 5 kms. In the distance between this point and the bridge-head they put the machine-gun and 5 or 6 soldiers there. For one purpose - to cut the point and for another purpose in the near future to surround them or take the P.O.W's or something like that.

This morning from 6 o'clock to 8 o'clock in the morning the Israeli troops on the Eastern side bank of the canal start shooting sub-machine-guns against our troops in Gidi direction. I gave three incidents, only an example, we didn't make any complaints. We made a complaint about yesterday because they did it when I was here or I was out through the U.N but the rest we didn't. So that's the first point. We should agree that we must control our troops to make cease-fire effective. And, we are doing so severely.

The second point on the cease-fire arrangements thus continuation of supply to the third-army. Today or tomorrow we consider that the first convoy will be finished. We hope - it was 120 lorries, there are still 47-40 in the bridge-head there to be unloaded

and still 7 on the way going there. Are we going to be permitted

B - Do things being improved last days?

A B - Yes, after making 5 cars better than 1 and 18 cars better than 5 the 2 gaps better than 1. But still very slow because we started this work for 1 week now

B - How many cars are being loaded per day? Since we met last?

A B a difference between one day and another. But still, as far as I know, they told me 17, about 17 cars a day. So now we still have 7 here waiting and 40 there, maybe unloaded - finished unloading, or still loading 5 They are going alright now. So I asked before if we will have the permission to continue the supply of the third army or not? And I put it under cease-fire arrangements as B because the situation may be affected - the cease fire will be affected sooner or later by that situation.

B - Will you please elaborate on that when you say the cease-fire will be affected.

A I mean we started 7 days now for 1 convoy and as you know 7 or 8 days for 1 convoy

it means nothing. It means something yes, but it won't help. many = many complications are put in front of this convoy. So during the 7 days we were supposed to push forward more and more, but now this convoy won't help in the situation. What will happen if we don't continue that work we'll come back again to the 22nd situation. No supply - then you knew the rest how it can go.

See under the s cease-fire arrangements permanent supply of Suez City by food, water, medical support and ---- I promise to give you the answer today.

And then item number 2 - I finished with the cease-fire arrangements - Item number 2 discussion the lines on which the Israeli troops can go, and I am afraid it will be very difficult to discuss that question today unless the political situation will be cleared in the near future - in the coming few days; but I am raising that point if you have something to say about that, we can start as it is our mission. According to the P.O.W's and the list, as I said, we accepted all or agreed on the main items and the principals and today they are carrying out the schedule and the procedure will be done. If they finished all these

works - that's alright. If there is any complications - we can solve them. So that's my opinion about the meeting of today. If we can discuss it one by eachother through our point of view it will be alright.

B - Good, then let's go one by one, it will be easier First thing you mentioned - cease-fire problem clashes in the area. And ..... something there. Now I think this is the easiest point. I think we can come to a situation in which we don't have clashes. This is the easiest point but you mentioned that the list of the P.O.W's is a minor thing to compare with the other major issues. It's not a minor thing to us. And you mentioned the other time I important phrase and you were quite right. When you go back to your people you are pro-Israelis and when we go back to our people we are pro-Egyptians. That's quite true, really, and we are on the pressure. I believe you are on the pressere and we were as well. And let's be frank as we have been till now. We have to solve this problem otherwise we can't go an inch further, really, because you said that this issue of the P.O.W's list has been principally concluded -.

A - Yes.

B - But we don't see any progress. You promised, you promised, General, I must tell you and stress it, really I must stress it. You said - I that we would have a list of all people, and this was a few days ago. And you said that we will depatch (?) ~~another~~ the other list in 2 days and we are not progressing. So we are blocked and we have to break through this block.

A - I promised that we would give you the list and as I said the last time we will give them list after list a until all the matters will be settled on that. We will not keep them forever. We know that. Geneva convention is clear to us as it is clear to you; and be sure that you will have the list of their names in the right time.

B - You said the right time.

B You realise, General, that this is

A I know that this is important and complicated and how it is pressing you

B No, just a moment please. I am not saying that it is complicated and pressing. This is known. But what I want to say is

that this is entirely different to what you said the other two times before. That's the point.

A I said that we will give you a list and we gave you one list. And I think you had before 2 lists.

B What we have been fetched (!) is only 1 list of 45 wounded P.O.W's which Colonel Ouabi gave me personally. Is that right Colonel Ouabi?

A The wounded people we didn't discuss. There is no objection about that. I said about 60 or something like that

B 64. You mentioned the number of 64. and this will be handed over on the same day.

A It was handed but not the whole names. Instead of -

B C We got yesterday, only yesterday, only 29 names without their military numbers and we can't identify the names even - because we don't have any military numbers and ~~these~~ all together were 29.

A That's a mistake.... I'll see Colonel Sherif,

Brigadier Sherif because I am not working on the names and the list. That's a mistake. I'm sorry for that. If they didn't put the numbers or...

C no, no serious here is the list. You can see how they put it. This is the Red Cross list. That's it. No more.

(מראה לו את הרשימה)

B This is my handwriting which...

C This is the first...

B 45 wounded which you gave me personally. You remember? And this is what we have been handed over by the R-C. Yesterday.

C Through the R.C. in Tel-Aviv and now also Mr. Broisard told us that this is the only list they got. They have no more.

A General Sherif is here; I will check with him.

C He is here and he told me that is what they have no more.

B General, Sherif - can he be summoned?

A. Yes! Sure! He is outside waiting.

B We will make a break and ask him.

A No. He will not do anything. And he will not do anything more than that.

C We want him to be about neat.

A B He is carrying out as orders said. We told him to give you these names, that's one list, but, he did it the wrong way - that's all. He is not responsible for not giving you the 64.

B But you realise, General, that you are stuck. Really, you are stuck. Because someone is making errors and instead of progressing we are retarding.

A Thus list will be changed today, putting the numbers and all the different, their ranks and ....

C But what about the 64 you mentioned.

A? What 64?

C No, no the General said that 64 would be transfered days ago. Only yesterday we got 29. But we are asking the whole list.

A There will be another list handed to you.

the second and third and forth list.

B General, allow me. Do you recall that you promised us that the full list of our P.O.W's would be handed over not later than 3 days from a couple of days before, and we are on the fifth day since then. Am I right or am I wrong? Let's clarify this point please

(מרעיש — דבר נקודה).

A We consider that although I said that I'll give you the list of the names and this and that; but still the P.O.W's and their names and handing — that's a political question which I can't —

B Although you promised?

A Yes I promised for 6 - 40 names. You have already 23 right? - 29. The rest of the 64 will be handed to you.

B Let's please clarify ...

A So I said 64 names will be handed to you. That's 1 list - 29. The rest of these 64 will be handed to you at another session But the rest ..

C. But you have already just now said - you promised ... the whole list.

B If I am wrong - please say it. But that's what we we went away with the impression with.

A As I said now - it is a political question now and it is linked with so many things; so many other things. And now I again, back again, all the time the 4 meetings we are talking about the P.O.W's and wounded soldiers and this and dead bodies and not the main mission of this delegation - we didn't start anything about that. Although I know it is very important to you.

B I am ready to say a word about the other topics. General Yariv said that you will be given an answer not before Sunday or Monday. Do you remember that?

A - Yes

B - The major issues. I mean the borders of the 22nd of october, and all the major problems And what we should do is to execute this thing of the P.O.W lists of exchange of P wounded

P.O.W's, Suez matter and all that. So please let's stay with the schedule. So the major thing of the 22nd of oct. boundries, yes, we'll leave it.

A - That's a complicated thing. Let's ~~leave~~ link all the other things with each other to see how it will go.

B O.K.

A ~~is~~ the continuation of the supply of the third army will be continued or not?

B Now I must remind you that this is a major issue that General Yariv said - the answer will be given on Sunday or Monday. Do you remember that please General?

A Alright. The second thing. There will be any reply today about the Suez city or not? Supply of Suez city.

B No. we were authorized not to go into details about this issue until we are given a list, the full list of the P.O.W's

C and the permission to the R.C. to visit them.

A Of course

B Now I will say all the minor things that are linked with it like visits of the R. C. people

A Right. So you are...

B Because you realise that the issue of the people in the third army and the Suez city - as you mentioned once before - they are not prisonners of war - it's a special issue, a special problem. So we have to deal with this apart from the exchange of wounded and the other things. Yes. I interrupted you; you wanted to say something. Please.

A No. As far as I understand now you are linking now the permanent supply of the third army and permanent supply of Suez city with the names of the P.O.W's. Am I right or wrong?

B No, not the permanent supplys of the third army I believe.

A - The third army is connected with the 22 question is it.?

C If General Tal said this is human thing. Why make these poor families more poor than they should be. And he doesn't understand why you are doing what you are doing, I mean by

delaying these lists, from, denying these lists from us. And of course we have to link these ~~lists~~ things with the issue of the town of Suez.

A Issue of Suez City

C Suez City

A Suez City. How About the continuation of supply of the 3rd army.

C This is a major issue and this will be answered....

[illegible]

A So back again, you are linking this with that and this with that, all of them, So better leave the meeting today and make another meeting, that's a proposal, with a decision of your General Headquarters and my G.H.Q. on all these items once and for all, if you don't have any reply also for Suez City as I understand. I understand there is no reply for a sapply of. Suez Coty

B. Yes you are quite right, once we haven't solved the 1st problem of the lists of our P.O.W. being kept by you we unfortunately can't make any progress, really and we came to know each other these meetings and I'm really sorry about it and I hope you share the same feeling and it's a pity

ב. כן, אתה צודק לגמרי שמשעה שלא פתרנו את הבעיה הראשונה של הרשימות של שבויי המלחמה שלנו שנמצאים אצלכם, אנחנו לא יכולים להתקדם, באמת, ואנחנו הכרנו זה את זה בפגישות האלה ואני באמת מצטער על כך ואני מקווה שגם אתה חש כך ואני מקווה שגם אתה חש כך ואני מצטער

A - If you can link all of them as follows, the continuation of the supply of the 3rd army, supply of the Suez City, on the opposite hand we'll give you the list of the names, can it go?
I. mean supplying it with food and water and medical supplies support.
The water means the pipeline here as I mentioned last time and ## mending the Canal from there, by our people.

B- These are 2 problems to be solved as against what ?

A- The list of names of the P.O.W. That's as far as I understand from you. you have linked ... this with that, am I wrong or right ?

B - Now could I clarify a couple of things : We discussed the other time the Suez city problems - citizens and wounded and all that . Have you any answers - How many citizens are there, How many wounded are there .

A The wounded, The R.C. told me now, there are 1400 . in Suez city . Soldiers and citizens .

B How many people are living except the wounded ?

A I don't know exactly how many people are there. because it's very difficult to get into in contact with the government there . Very , very difficult

B - Now to speak frankly . Do you think that this is a deal , I mean, is it a fair deal to have just lists because according to the Geneva convention

you are obliged to give us the names, the ranks and the personnal numbers of our P.O.W's being kept by you. This is an international law. So we have to separate things. We have to see first a good faith, a good will from your side, and it's not a far-fetched thing. It's only a thing that should be done according to international law. So what really happens! Let's get down to the facts. There are forces of your army that are on the eastern bank. Right? They lack food, they lack water. You know that. We made a special and exclusive move. We were willing to let a convoy of about 100 trucks move to the third army and unload it there. We started by 100 trucks, then there were added 20 to 30 vehicles. How many are there all together?

C - 127

BA - we started with 120

B - alright. As far as I know we started with 100 but this is really a minor thing. And we did it as a special favour.

Just to show good will. Why won't you show us good-will by having these lists of P.O.W.s which you are obliged by international law to give us !! We are not talking now about exchange of P.O.W's which is special issue.

A I know. We started our talks with good faith and we tried to show you our good faith and be sincere with these talks to be succesful. And even a when we felt - as an example - that Cpt. Dan Avidan is important for you - we handed him on the second day just to let you feel that we are sincere on that.

B We appreciate it very much

A Thank you very much. It was just a symbol and that's alright, In order to go ahead, step by step forward. Now, according to the international law, our citizens in Suez should live and they have their right to have their supplies and their water. and we didn't hear in any war up to now of any army captured a city and cut the water from it, that's very sensitive for us, so if the international law gives you the right to have the list of names and Geneva

convention - we admit that and also on the other side - the civilians have their rights according to the international law. We wanted not to link all these problems with each-other but we are feeling now that you are linking this with that and this with that until we come to a conclusion that we will not do anything and all our meetings will come to vain. I'm sorry to say that. Only one thing - that is the convoy to the third army, and we appreciate that very much and it is a good thing to do; and we suppose, or we hope that this will be continued. If you want to stop it - it's up to you. If you want to link it also with the names.

B No, we didn't say that the continuation of supply to the third army is linked. This is a special thing and General Yariv promised you that on Sunday or on Monday you would get an answer about it and I said it again today. I hope that we started .. and depends on progress two issues one is the handing over of the lists of the P.O.W.s which you promised. It's not only an obligation to an international law but you personnally - you promised and our people back-home are very disappointed about not having these lists. at least the first one of 66

you mentioned wasn't given to us ; so you can really imagine how my people back-home are disappointed.
So how can we go any further and make some progress when things that are being concluded here are not being executed actually?

A You are stressing these points so many times now. I promised to give you the list of about 64 and we gave you the list of 29 - that's 1 list. And I promise now that I will give you the list that will make it 64 or 63 or 65 as it goes just to have the list of names. But it is not - the whole list of names. As ~~as~~ I said before we'll send that ...

B Could you tell us please how many P.O.W's, at least the total number of our people that are with you?

A I have been asked that question so many times and I couldn't answer it

This P.O.W - to be frank - it is raised by all the political levels. Up to your president, prime-minister and up to our president. And even in N.Y. everybody is talking about that. And I think both parties are linking this with that. I am not talking about the list I'm talking about exchange of the prisonners of war -

how it is important ; and it is a political situation. If I am authorised to give the list- I won't have any objection to do it as fast as I can do it for the benefit of our meetings everytime to fulfil any mission or to facilitate our work , but also that everybody has his own limits and that's my own limits up to now .

B Now you mentioned that you were ready to give us the rest of the names ; I mean from 29 to 64. When will it be done ?

A We left our work just working on the P.O.W s

B The impression we got with the first meeting and we recollected that we are going through all the problems simultanously and will reach a real agreement which would back each- other in each aspect , I mean we got the impression that there would be no problem of continuation of supplying the third army and the Suez city. Maybe we were wrong , but that's the impression we got - that we are standing on a good firm base of mutual interest to reach an agreement on all these aspects just to create the atmosphere we hoped to do for peace and political talks . But I believe that after that we were stuck

in ~~the~~ ~~moved~~ on the minor things of just we got to give deliver or offer the lists and to go and exchange and the question of the third army and the city still has no answer. While we had this impression .. everything is minor except the P.O.W's It's not one thing. I wonder if we can just put it plain like that. These problems got to be solved if there is something we have to offer each-other, not only for the present, but for the future. I mean concerning the P.O.W's, the wounded people the, third army, the Suez city. These things got to be avoided as obstacles and we've got to get through simultaneously and by one word, and we will not have any problem,

B O.K. Just now with Brig. Sherif. We, I do believe, solved all technical problems, and there is one big plan - how to start accept the new subject he raised today with the 1400 wounded.

A This is a technical problem.

B But we never heard it before. We knew about a wounded ... third army, around 75, but never we heard about this. O.K. We, prepare everything it is clear. From technical point of view we have the

answers. But for us the problem of ~~the~~ our list - the full list of prisonners of war is more than essential.

A - Why don't we discuss the situation of the thousands of people starving in the Suez city. But the p.o.w are in our hands, under complete supervision, medical aid for them, they are eating, they have a good time there in their places.

B It is not what the convention says. The convention says that they have to be released. Must be given to the R.C. and that the R.C. can protect it.

A We were going to concentrate only on one point and leave the other points..

B No, we'll not leave the other points. If we get for example the whole list and we know that the R.C. representative can come and see them - we immediately start to solve the all rised problems. Everything.

A Just make a deal from your point of view and we'll have that proposal. Do so and so and so; we'll do so and so and so.. And this will solve all these problems.

B we gave you a full list of all the P.O.W as from the 11th of October till yesterday; everyday you get a list, a full list of the P.O.W's. And we feel that this shouldn't be a major issue. The major issue is the exchange of the P.O.W's. But we have a right to this grace according to the convention the same way you had a right to this grace according to the convention. And we supplied you with a list every day, you have an example here of a list, it's almost a book, of 7000 today, it's almost 7000 P.O.W and we can't even get the total figure of our prisonners. I think this is unfair This is against the convention and it's very difficult to start any other problems - to solve them when such a basic issue - we are not talking about the exchange - the exchange will be another problem - but we have now a problem A - of proceeding from the first basic right that both sides have - to know how many and who are the P.O.W's in the other camp. And that the R.C. should be authorised to visit them according to the convention. You claim that there is a problem of the civilians. We agree to that and we admit that there is a humanitarian problem of Suez, and we are ready to solve it today and to go into all

details - provided that the first issue of the list is solved. I mean - this is basic. We have many more problems to solve. But this is such an obsticle that we have been waiting for 5 days, for 6 days to be solved. We see that we can't progress. Of the names you make a political issue. I mean the political issue could be whether you are going to exchange or not exchange. But the sheer names - I mean how many we have and who they are is not a political issue - this is a basic right of both sides and that is why it is in the convention; and both sides have agreed. And we agree that the city of Suez is not going to starve and will have enough water provided that we get satisfaction for this basic principle, I mean for this basic demand - right. This is a right by the convention.

C I would like to add something; That General Tal, the other time, wasn't authorised to allow a first convoy to the Suez city you mentioned and he did it. Because we wanted to make even the tiniest progress. Really; and I admit it, so you should take it into consideration that we are really going further than sometimes we are

allowed. And this was a ~~thn~~ thing that you, I don't know why, because maybe of your own reasons you rejected it.

A No, I can see or I understand that there is a proposal to solve the problem of Suez city. On the other hand we will give you the list of the P.O.W's. Right?

B Right. the whole list

A The whole ~~link~~ list.

B Including a link with a visit of the R.C. people.

A The minute we hand the names - they go automatically.

CB yes, so it's very clear.

B Just to show you a small thing you know - I told you about ~~the~~ - also I told you the least. we got of the 29. But this is the least. We transfered to the R.C. every day, you see the numbers, the names, the rank, everything They get it very clear. Every day they get. We can't even, you see, identify ---

A That's a technical mistake from General Sherif. We'll correct it soon, really quickly.

B O.K.

(illegible)

B we will allow
Now, a daily convoy of 7 vehicles. The contents of which you mentioned last time and we can remind the contents. This will be allowed daily - a convoy of 7 vehicles to the city of Suez. This will be executed when we receive the full list of our P.O.W I mean that when we have the last name this can be done daily. Is it a fair deal, General?

A Yes, I want to clarify something about this That includes supply and water. Now

B Now, I was talking only about supply mean food and medical supply. This was mentioned by the contents of the 7 vehicles by day. Now once you mentioned the problem of water. We would like to make it like this. We will be given the number of inhabitants, the city citizens who live in the Suez city by the waters. Unfortunately, you don't know. You mentioned different numbers. We will leave it for the R.C to ~~find out~~ decide how many

(Jews) 3/11/73 N

inhabitants are living in the Suez city and we will be ready to allow them also a daily supply of water coming by water tank-cars.

A Tank? coming from Cairo?

B Yes.

A That's more than the 7 vehicles which will be allowed for supplies!

B In addition to the 7 vehicles you mentioned. But it will be decided according to the number of the citizens living in the Suez city. Being determined by the R.C. people. I think it's quite a fair deal.
Now to be frank and honest and clear - this can be executed only after we have the full lists of all our prisonners in Egypt. Everywhere. I think this is clear..

A - Very clear.

C ~~and~~ It's a big step forward

B and I think it's quite a step forward.
At least we know where we live.

A Alright I'll see my authorities - how it will work on that. And I promise I will give you the decision

through the U.N. when they will agree to that I will send a cable to inform you about that decision. Through

B Through the observers? Very good. the best.

A About the continuation of the third army. As far as know there is some talks, some agreements, maybe on higher levels, that there is another convoy consisting of 50 lorries. That's what they said. So when we finish with this convoy we'll start with another 50 lorries.

B This is a total surprise for us. We learned about it when I over there to the check-point and we learned ....

A I asked my people here if the military commanders here know that. They say that they don't know anything about that, so I am raising that question just to ask the political authorities in Israel if they will admit that or submit that - it will be alright. If not we have our lorries - they can go back easily. But as far as I know - before I come here that there is acceptence to push forward 50 more lorries with supply, the same thing. In this case, if you would accept I would like to have in these lorries

rations, water and winter ~~uniform~~ clothes. and that's non-military equipment. I mean undershirts, heavy clothes but not —

B So, as I told you, we were totally surprised to learn it ~~hear~~ here, so we will have to fetch it - forward it to our authorities and we can give you an answer in about it through the U.N or in the next meeting.

A Alright - if you can send it through the U.N or in the second meeting - alright. We still have 40 lorries here are still waiting so we still have 1 or 2 days to work.

B It is not us to be blamed. The people who are reloading

A No. I am just giving you information because if it is true it is up to the political levels.
I want to raise 1 question: Suppose that we have some of our military personnel in one of the areas under your control. We want to make sure of their situation before we start on their problem. I mean - we will call the U.N to tell them we now have 7o soldiers here or 100 soldiers here or 5 soldiers here. Maybe 5, maybe 10, maybe 100. Just an order, not to make them P.o.w. we would

like to have your acceptance to ~~assure~~ show the U.N people where they are so they can return them back to us. Can it be accepted or not? They are not working against you. They are not from our ranges. They are not. Just living in one area under your control.

B You mean that there are still Egyptian soldiers spread all over the area here. and groups of ..

A Just only one group

B Are you talking about a specific group?

A Yes.

B Where?

A If I have the answer I will say where. and you will take them today.

B What do you think is their status?

A Just living there.

B Talking frankly. Don't you think they should be considered P.O.W when they are found? really. Let's take the ?'s. Our strong point. in the ?. They were surrounded= and they surrendered there. Remember?

A - Yes. Port Tawfik. 37 people.

B and we didn't say a word. It was according to the law. Now the option is either they have food - let them eat or they don't have food. After all they are here in our territory. If we had people in your territory, I don't think we could bear it in mind - .. (...) To

C To make you assured that if they will need for example medical treatment they will get it - excellent and they will be in the best hands...

B If you ask my advice, if you'll allow me to advise you - Please let them know # and advise them to surrender and everything will be O.K. We at least, you can say a lot of things about Israelis, but one thing is ~~true~~ proved - we treat P.O.W the best ... that the whole people in the world have ever heard. # we are famous and known for that.

A Alright. Very good. Just another question. I heard from the General that in Suez there is 1400

B 300 of them - a rounded figure - are seriously wounded. That means that 300 seriously wounded will be evacuated only - or there will be permission for 1400

B As I mentioned - it is the first time I learned of this fact. I would like to check it and give you the answer.

A That means that we will not start the exchange of the wounded P.O.W.s until we finish that.

B If we (for example) agree and we get the whole list of our P.O.W - immediately to start with the evacuation of the wounded. So there is no ~~prep~~ problems with the 14 or: how many you have in the 3rd army. I will give you the answer today about the 300.

A Now again you are linking the P.O.W.s with the seriously wounded P.O.W

B Well this you raised juster this morning and even you don't know who they are - soldiers or civilians

A I don't know even if they or soldiers or civilians, it doesn't ~~matter~~ (make any difference) - we made a deal

B Well, still General, we are waiting for you to answer us. You promised that an answer would ger yesterday about our wounded soldiers or captured soldiers ~~on~~ or killed soldiers in Suez. Still we are waiting for this answer.

A We couldn't get contact with the Governer, honestly. And I told General Sherif, with the R.C. the R.C. can go there and see the Governer and ask him if he has P.O.W's he is a civiliam man - he will not keep them; if he has wounded he will not deny that from the R.C. If he has dead bodies - he doesn't care for keeping them. Up to the R.C. If you permit one of our officers to go with the R.C. that Sherif was responsible for that. & he can go to Suez and settle the matter there; so this point I couldn't get any answer to it really.

(הערת המתרגם)

all right I'll do another thing. That's up to the R.C. The R.C. can go there and see them and inquire. If they are P.O.W's they will be kept as P.O.W's and you will know their names and status and everything through the R.C. Wounded - the same thing. Dead - the same thing. Up to the R.C. you can start it from now. Because we couldn't get in touch with the governer to have the names of any of them, information about any of them.

(הערת המתרגם)

B The question of the 300 seriously wounded in Suez city -

is a new issue because I would like to remind you that we were concluding something like this: We have the 45 wounded with you and we have now in Israel 400 wounded, the list of which we dispated you yesterday. And we agreed upon 70-75 being seriously wounded in taking out from the 3rd army and the Suez city. Right?

A No. Sorry to say that. We said ... or 30 or 1 or 1000 in the 3rd army. We put it clearly. I think you can hear it back again. 45 wounded, against 400 you have. We didn't know that there were 400 in your hospitals in Israel

B But you got the lists?

A yes, Again the number of wounded in your hospitals, the seriously wounded in the 3rd army, the seriously wounded in Suez city. We didn't make any numbers because we didn't know and up to that minute we knew that number from the R.C. only. So seriously wounded, or wounded from both sides - we agreed to exchange them. So if there is any change - we can start back again on that problem.

(-37- המשך)

B according to the R.C. there are 300 seriously

wounded in the Suez city.

A That's what I said

C What are they - soldiers ? citizens?

A Some of them are soldiers, some of them are civilians. As the General said - I heard it from the R.C for the first time now. It doesn't make any difference if they are soldiers or civilians. Because seriously wounded as a human-being - that's all.

B O.K.

(הפסקה קצרה)

B Now when do you think you will have an answer to the lists of our P.O.W.s?

A I don't know. That's up to the authorities which will decide when we can start back.

(B So I think - please clarify and check how many seriously wounded there are of the army and how many are civilians in Suez city.

A It has to be done by a representative of the R.C.

(B All right. the R.C. will go. We'd like to know how many seriously wounded there are among the

seriously wounded in Suez city and how many are of the armed forces.

A would it make any difference?

B I don't know. Really I don't know. After all we are soldiers and we have to check it with our authorities. But at least

A we will not ask that question because it is very difficult for us to get into contact with the government So please let the R.C. give that answer, and we'll let the R.C. go there and ask how many soldiers! How many civilians?. How many seriously wounded in the city. Up to the R.C. what he says - we accept it. In order not to wait a word from us.

B In order to be frank and not to confuse things - to my best knowledge - this issue of 300 seriously wounded is for me and for you, I think

C for all of us

B I agree with your correction. Once you raised it you had a point. But still this is a new item and we'll have to check it with our purpose. Do you understand?

A Yes, just check what General Yariv. I think because he started the talk about the wounded, as far as I can remember, or General Tal. You will see that we mentioned it more than once, without any numbers. We said that we would exchange the seriously wounded or the wounded P.O.W's that is the # 45 from our hospitals and then we will have 1-2-3 - Fourth 1 - That's number of people in Israel, which we didnt know. Second - that in the 3rd army. But somebody here said about 70. I don't know from where this number.

B It had been determined by the R.C. You remember?

A Yes. Those seriously wounded in the Suez city, we didn't say a word who is soldier who is civilian, how many, we didn't know

B Anyhow, maybe we missed this point, I don't think, but still there's a chance that we missed this point. We have one sign(?) we think it's a new item, we have to check it . . . I believe this thing will be smoothed

A I hope so. So we can come to a conclusion of the meeting of today as follows

C yan.

B Please, and lets make it very very clarifying, make it a real progress, not waste

C שעות, תלוי עד היכן שהם ...

B

C

B

C

B

C

B

C

A Sirs, please. That proposal is, that proposal and it is not a decision, proposal. That Egypt will hand over the list of all prisoners of war in our country

B Yes!

A On the other hand, we'll permit

B In one bulk

A In one bulk (חוזר על הדבר בטרחה)

B Names and military numbers and all details

A Names, military numbers, ranks and every-

thing, yes...

B According to law

C yes!

A According to law. And on the other side 4 lorries will be admitted to the- every day to Suez city: carrying different supplies and medical supplies

B Now if you let me

A just a moment please

B yes!

C yes!

A About the water for the Suez city, according to the Red-Cross decision, about the quantity of water, needed to Suez, this quantity will permitted to go to Suez by Egyptian lorries

B Water tank cars yes

A Water tanks, is it water tankers or just only lorries with Jericans and so on. That is the first item. And this up to their authorities, to give the decision on that proposal. I mean it is not a decision it is a proposal

B yes

A From our division, from both divisions

the second one

B Now, before let's detail somethings, when we are talking about 4 carries, what will be the contents, let's specify again

A Yes

B Just to be clear...

A Yes!

B .... One flour one rice

A One flour one rice.

C One medicines

A one medicines

B One blood and plasmas

A One petrol

B Petrol

A One ...

B Smaller one ...

A With blood and plasma

B And then two

A Two different

B Different

A Different, what do you mean by different

B Cheese, beans

A I mean all kinds of things, ... food

B You mean different kinds of food

A ya.

B About the water, you said that it would be, the quantity of the water would be up to the decision of the Red-Cross. What I was saying is that

A To see how many people there is, and then

B And then they will make the census of the peoples?

A Yes

B The people in Suez?

A Yes

B And we will both decide upon the quantity needed, quantity of water needed for a person a day and this will be the amount of water per being allowed that they will be moved to Suez city

A No, please we don't want to postpone that

B Yes!

A For further discussion just leave it to the Red-Cross because water is needed for the inhabitants, water maybe needed for hospitals water maybe needed for any other thing I don't know, especially hospitals. So I hear the Red-Cross

A Be framed, I just want verify, just to make plain We as general Tal mentioned

before, we don't ensure that being supplied to Suez city will be transfered to the 3rd army

A: No

C: For the time being, maybe tomorrow every thing will be changed

A: yes!

C: you understand? for the time being this is the point

A: Yes

B: So, we will have, the Red-Cross will have to decide first thing how many citizens are in the Suez city. They will decide. together with us the amount, the quantity of water needed per day per person, the total quantity will be allowed to be pushed to Suez city in water tank cars

A: I'm telling you we don't want to postpone it again and make another meeting for that. I leave it with the Red-Cross and you.

B: O.K

A: Both of you. How many gallons do you give per person per day.

B If you ask my perssonal opinion I think it's about 5 liters per person per day don't you think so?

A I don't want to . . .

B I just . . .

A 'Cos the quantity of water given to the citizen, it will be the minimum needed for them I'm sure of that

B . . . . . [illegible]

A so there is no . . .

B It's agreed . . .

A let's understand, the last, if water needed to the hospitals, needed for anyother medical thing or, that is up to the Red-Cross.

. . . [illegible]

A to make administrative work for so many troubles there the Red-Cross will do it.

(laughter) [illegible]

B ~~that's~~ it's included, when I say 5 liters per person per day it's included with the- it's included.

A ya!

B Now, the last ~~issue~~ issue I would like to clarify is about the answer

you will be giving us the answer through the U.N. or either to the U.N or in our next meeting.

A right!

B are we going to fix the next meeting?

A yes we will have to fix it when we finish our this one.
about the exchange of the wounded prisoners of war, as we said before. The 45 : wounded prisoners of War will be handed from Egypt to Israel through the Red-Cross in two groups. The first group as you said before - 27 seriously wounded, the second group - 18. on the opposite hand to evacuate to Egypt our wounded prisoners of war in Israel with out giving any number.

B why? you can mention the number 400.

A

A as you said 400,

B yes!

A Our seriously wounded plus our

seriously wounded in the 3rd army according to the Red-Cross.

B The amount of the ...

A yes! according to the Red-Cross visit and the seriously wounded in the Suez city as the Red-Cross diside. it is up to the Red-Cross to dicide. How many from here and how many from there, I mean from in Suez city. Civilians or military perssonel, the same. There is no diffrence between this 300 maybe what ~~you~~ He said - maybe 300, ~~all civilians~~ Maybe all soldiers, all civilians, one here, one there, it doseut make any differance with us

B Well, they said approximately there are around 60% or 40% of soldiers among

A But ...

B ... 70 %.

A Let's discuss the second item, it is a discussion on just ending a perspective from both sides until a decision is taken by our authorities.

B We can make decision if we are talking about the two first groups. The 3rd army wounded and the .... We can make a decision concerning the first despatch of the seriously wounded I mean the 27 against a certain number of ~~the~~ the 400 wounded, egyptian wounded in Israel. We can make a decision about that. The other thing we have to check with our authorities ~~about our two ways~~ because you raised, you raised a new item as I said before. The seriously wounded in Suez consisting a swell of soldiers and citizens, you understand?

A Yes, no ...

B If you ask me, if you ask me, we can decide upon the first

C .... 60 אבל לא יותר

B No, but...

C .... 45 ... ~~Egyptian wounded~~

A As we considered that with General Tal as you remember, when General Tal was here, on the last meeting, we made a formula, the 3 Items against the 45. And

we made 10 opposite to the, and then there is one question, the one we cant bring him with one airplane every time. So we made them two groups, and two groups from so many groups from our side, so the last group from our side will be opposite the last group from your side. And I was very clear with the 3 items. Those in Israel that are 400, those in the army which I didnt know, those in Suez. If it is not clear or you want to go back to your authorities well go back to our authorities and then we'll settle that matter ~~in~~ next on the coming meeting also, just to have it cleared up

B O.K

A O.K. So the two points will be up to the authorities

B yes

A The higher authorities on the coming meeting

C

B We raised the other time the question your unfortunately couldnt give us the answer was whether there are wounded people of ours in Suez city and except, I mean

the 45 in your country and . . .

C
B
C
A
B
A

. . . עקה לו סם אה עב

And the number of the prisoners of war in Suez

. לכל אה סם לו עקה

Alright, just to clear the 3rd point

yes

As far as the prisoners of war, as far, as the prisoners of war, wounded prisoners of war, dead bodies,

B
A

Yes!

From the Israel army, in Suez, we will leave that to the red cross to decide if we have some of them in the city or not

B
A
B
A
B
A
C

Or maybe there are

Because . . .

Maybe they are in the 3rd army . . .

We dont know!

Maybe there are in the 3rd army

Still we have to clarify this point

If there are wounded people of ours in the Suez, in the 3rd army, they should be added to the 45 in your country

A

I agree, as against . . . .

B Included in the exchange

C That's right

C שישה, שישה, חיים או שאינו יודע, וה, ש
אנחנו מדגישים כי יש שם.

B yes!

C

B No, no, no, I think we have to emphasize it
according to what we know there are in
your hands, in Suez, Israelies prisoners of war

A yes!

B This is what we know

A If the Red-Cross would go there, he will
see, take their names

C We raise this because we know that
there are

A Alright, provided that you except one of
our people to accompany the Red-Cross

B in order) אדום, כדי שיוכל

A To communicate, in order to allow the
government ~~[illegible]~~ to give the information, to get
it back, because I believe he may have
some difficulties, the Red-Cross, from, if he
goes, and just asks, O.K

B Why not, why not, pass a message

A We can't

B By General Gamasi himself, to
C To the commander!
B To the commander of Suez, or to the goverment, he has a radio and he hears it through transmitters and everything that his is meetings are being held, and he knows who is General Gamasi, so a message can be passed
A Sure
B To him
A I tried, but I couldn't get complete reply about that
B I mean a message being passed to the governor
C
B Through the Red-Cross people, right?
A alright, we want only to facilitate the job of the Red-Cross men. We have no intention exploiting this visit by any means
C I know that there is a link between the commander of the U.N. force in Suez and the commander of the Egyptian army in Suez, so you may use the communication of the U.N
A Maybe it's a good idea!

A To facilitate the job of the Red Cross.
B So to clarify this thing wounded people in Suez city and 3rd army will be considered as in the plus to the 45 wounded. The full list of the P.O.W's will include the prisoners of war in Suez city and the 3rd army. Everything is clear.
A Everything is clear.
B Now, we have to fix the next meeting
A I think it should be on the 6th, will be reasonable thats what was you have ... read back until general Yariv comes back. So we have the political situation and then with the military situation and then I know everything will be solved.
C Yes!
B six is tuesday?
A six is monday?
We are on the 3rd today
Mrs. Meir will give a speach is the Knesset on Monday

B Tomorrow is Sunday 4th Monday is the 5th. so she should be back ...

A 6th is tuesday

B yes!

A yes!

B If she comes Monday - one more day

A One more day.

B you must have your reasons

A Ha, Ha, Ha that's only for that reason clear.
when she comes back she will give the decision.

C Maybe you want Mrs Meir here in these meetings:
she could go through it better than us.

A Everything starts from the political situation, Everything and I'm sure that the political situation is albright. all these problems will be solved.

B If you bring your president here we will bring Mrs. Meir here and everything will be solved. I can asure you.
We fixed the 6th 12 oc'. now, if there is something to be clarified or to be decided we will pass it through U.N. chanells is it O.K.?

A If any of my authorities will approve to hand the list of all prisoners in one bulk including those in Suez city and the 3rd army. We can send you a message saying that we except doing so in one bulk and so in .... and so we'll start in Suez city on the second day

B that's right

A Handing over the names and lists we'll send Addy sherif

and I will not come on that meeting

B I see!

A Or colonel Huaidy may come

B Good

A So one of our representatives will come to hand the names and to start ...

B And maybe even we can start ~~to~~ with the transfer of the wounded

the exchange of wounded.

Any message you send to us in few hours you get back an answer. So there is no problem - if you don't want to come to a meeting, if you send any message of this kind. out of it you want an answer to the U.N. you get back an answer in a few ~~minutes~~ hours. I'll fix the date, we can fix the place, we can fix the amount of cars, we can fix

everything, No problem.

A So I owe you a message and you owe me a message. The coming message from you will say: that we accept the exchange of wounded prisoners of war on the opposite hand we'll give the .HOO here and Suez and the numbers of everything.

B what are the chances General what do you think about your authorities?

A On that hand:

B on that hand!
He is waiting until Mrs. Meir comes back

A When I come back, when I go back I'll see what ... from N.Y.

B close

73 לילה 1-7 הקלטה מס' [illegible]

-1-

A - [illegible]

B - [illegible]

C - Colonel Aweed

D - [illegible]

E - [illegible]

A - Here I have a list of subjects. Shall I tell you? a) The charge of wounded prisoners of war. b) the list of prisoners of war, c) the first list c) . An arrangement of finding out casualties. d) The problem of the civilians in Suez e) The corridor for the 3rd army f) Disengagement of forces, which was your remark or proposal. g) I was told that you complained about the West Bank civilians, that something happened to them.

B - You put them in camps.

A - I inquired the problem and I'll tell you what happened.

A - Would you like General to discuss our subject in this order?

B - alright. First of all about the wounded p.o.w's We accepted all we had discussed with General Yariv,

and we are going to carry it out as soon as possible. From today. The Red Cross went to Suez and to the 3rd army to make a list of the seriously wounded personnel to be evacuated. And there is a helicopter, as far as I know, from the UN coming from Israel today to give the list of our wounded prisoners of war in Israel.

A- May I call General Tuk, a retired general, he is a Liaison with the Red Cross in Israel. If you do not mind will bring him along here with the list and the details.

B- Alright. I think there is no problem about the wounded p.o.w's.

A- May I present Generals Tuk.

C- Colonel Arieli

A- We have a copy of wounded POW's and we submitted it to the Red Cross, but we brought along a copy, and this is exactly the list that the Red Cross got.

B- As we said before and we agreed with General Yariv, this goes as follows: The seriously persons or soldiers in the Eastern Bank

with the 3rd Army troops, and the wounded POW's in Israel, the last here, and the seriously wounded in Suez, as a city, will be evacuated through the Red Cross to Egypt at the time we are revealing you the wounded. P.O.W.S.

A- Simultaneously you mean?

B- Yes. According to the schedule to be done by the Red Cross, whatever they like. So it's up to the Red Cross.

A- Excuse me one minute please

[illegible]

D- 45 wounded Israeli P.O.W's in Egypt and the will take place simultaneously.

A- right

B- Now today, as far as I have been informed from the U.N. (Mr. Salazar), the R.C. representative in Cairo, he went to the 3rd army troops at 9 o'clock in the morning to make a list of the seriously wounded persons to be evacuated and also he will go to Suez city to see the seriously wounded

and meanwhile there is a helicopter coming from Israel today very close to Kolt 1to at 0300 today with one of your representatives to give the list and make confirmation with Salazar to arrange the exchange of these wounded P.O.W.'s.

A: It is right. May I make a remark? The lists of both parties of prisoners in Egypt and Israel of wounded prisoners is already submitted and known to the Red cross and both parties, you've got our list, we've got your list and everything is ready for exchange. There is no list yet of your wounded in the 3rd army, and in the town of Suez.

B- Right

A- So why not separate the problem? Then we'll get your list of the 3rd army and the town of Suez, then we'll be able to evacuate them. Why should we wait until these arrangements take place?

B: It will not take long time. Today Mr. Salazar promised that he will ~~give~~ get

give the list of the seriously wounded people in Suez

A- What is your estimation about the scale of the list.

B- How many? I don't know exactly. Maybe 200 maybe 10, no I don't know.

A- I see. So your proposal is to make the whole exchange simultaneously. You will send our wounded, we'll send your wounded from Israel, the 3rd army and Suez. Be assumed that with General Yariv

D- As far as I remember, the summing up about the wounded prisoners was like this - that we are going to do first of all the list that has been done. Meanwhile, the Red Cross will ascertain how many are seriously wounded in the 3rd army area because at the beginning it was talked about 2000 wounded in the 3rd army area and we summed it up to about 75 seriously wounded

and the exchange will be done by the Red Cross
great offices by steps that first the POW's
who are in hospitals already in Egypt and
in Israel, and a second step-phase, the
soldiers wounded and not prisoners in the
3rd army area and Suez - this is going to be
a second step.

B- We didn't say - one step or two steps
about that. It was one bulk! (שונות)

A- General —

B- And these 2000, it was a moment
and — 70, and maybe less than
that and I am sure it will be
less than that (לפי הכלל)

A- (Although I got a report as he said (D), I
am not going to insist on that, provided
that it will take place simultaneously, and
we will have our wounded at the same
time and provided the Red Cross is in a
position and is able to carry it out.

B- Mr. Salzger promised that he will get the
names today, if he will have one more day
maximum, we'll make it in the worst case

2 days, if he can't do it today, and I am sure he can do it in one day, so the list of names will be with us both sides and then —

A- I would suggest that tommorrow morning the whole operation will take place.

B- Of right the Red Cross can do it whatever it likes

A- Can the Red Cross do it General Sk ?

General Sk - I do hope yes.

A - Tommorrow? Do they have enough facilities to ~~carry out~~ transfer people simultaneously ?

Sk - As you know, there are two problems

(1) The evacuation from Israel - this might be by air

A- Well 45 people in one airplane or 2 ?

D- No, 37 in in one aeiplane, so 9 airplanes from Israel and

C- And from Egypt as well. We have 45. two airports

A- I suggest to compromise. As I have agreed to make it simultaneously from the Israel army as well and Suez, I would like you not

to divide our group in Egypt into small parties but tommorrow morning to send all of them to Israel. You have a lot of people in Israel, about 400 - it will take more time, and the Red Cross will do it non stop, of course, but I will appreciate it very much, if you will agree today that tommorrow morning, you will send our people and we will start to send your people. Because I know what happens later — We understand each other here and we come to an agreement, and then there is a matter of communication always, and then the Red Cross comes and presents a very complicated problem program, you see, and by that communication breaks down. So, I would suggest that both of us, you and I will come into an agreement on the practical steps that should be taken tommorrow morning and that's all.

B- I'm afraid we can't do it in one or two days. It's easy to take the 45 Israeli wounded prisoners of war by two planes and that's all. On the other side

it will take a long time for the Red Cross to evacuate the 400 and those who are here.

A- So you mean that you won't send all of our people before you get your last man?

B- Just to make them parallel with each other. And the Red Cross will do it - ~~but~~ I don't know how.

A- I will accept any solution that you will offer provided that it is balanced in some way. So if you want to make a balance in quantities, on time table, then we'll have to separate the problem of the 3rd army and the problem of Suez. Let's discuss — I want to come into an agreement about the 3rd army as well. But let's start tomorrow to exchange the wounded from Israel and from Egypt and when the operation will come to an end, we'll start to evacuate from the 3rd army and Suez.

B- Sorry to say, that it's difficult to say that it can make it like that. Here's the Suez city, to run from here, and we can evacuate our wounded personal as quickly

as possible, it won't take any time, and the 3rd army maximum 70, and I'm afraid to say maybe less. If it is 70 and here 100 or 200 we can take them in one day or two days.

A- But I'm sure that to evacuate 100 people from Israel & + the wounded people of the 3rd army, it will take a few days and we will have to wait a few days until we have our people. It makes no sense, because there is a very small group in Egypt.

B- I'm afraid that the Red Cross would take 2 and 3 and 4 days to arrange for the two planes to come to evacuate your wounded because they have so many complicated procedures

A- Then it means the whole operation will begin in two 2 or 3 days and it's a pity. You see we wanted it to be done simultaneously, so we cannot start by evacuating Egyptian wounded soldiers from Israel before such a step is carried out as far as our wounded are concerned. It should be simultaneously as we've just agreed.

Now you say it will take about 2 days.

B- I ~~took~~ assume.

A- You assume before of the Red Cross. Is.

B- If we agree after 2 days we'll start the operation, just to give the Red Cross time, that's all. If Mr. Salazar will be ready to do it tommorrow, we'll be ready to do it tommorrow but I'm sure with their complications through Geneva and transportation and this and paint it white and helicopters and plane should be like this and call signs and so on, if they can do it we'll start it. At the same time, we give you your wounded prisoners of war, you will send us ours, but ours will take longer, that for sure, because they are too and you have to. At the same time we evacuate our wounded people by road. Convoys are ready, the doctors are ready, it can be done in one or two days.

A- Let me find out something. Can you contact the Red Cross through telephone.

C- They are in the area.

A- [illegible]

A- The Red Cross they intended to have at their disposal tommorrow, under their protection and patronage all the — people in Israel. So as from tommorrow, if we come to an agreement, all these people will be under supervision of the R.C., not of us, and they will be trusted. Now I don't know how long it will take. They are ready to start the transfer tommorrow

B- that's right.

A- They are ready to start to transfer your people from Israel tommorrow, so I suggest that tommorrow you will transfer to us our wounded as well.

B- If the R.C. says "I'm ready to evacuate the Israeli soldiers from Egypt from tommorrow, we'll have no objection

A- But I want to clarify this. If they manage to transfer tommorrow a 100 of your people, I don't know what is their capacity, but suppose they won't manage to transfer tommorrow all the 400. Will you transfer to us all our 45 people or you want to wait until your last man comes?

B- I think we'll wait until all of them will

wait until all of them will be changed simultaneously. Just to be clear with each other

A- So let's speak in terms of numbers. How you say?

B- I'll tell you how to go - Say here in Israel 400 - That's ours. We will say estimation in the 3rd army 60 or 50 just to make a round figure. Maybe in Suez 100 So that the total number will be 550. This 550 will be exchanged by your 45. The 550, 400 of them will be by plane from Israel to Egypt, the rest of them will be by cars, ambulances from here. The last man from your soldiers will be the last man from our soldier, and schedule done by the Red Cross, whatever it likes - starts tommorrow, the day after tommorrow —

A - Let's say tommorrow it starts - how many people we will get tommorrow out of the 45

B - That means 10 opposite 1.

A - That means that the R.C. plane is going to go to Cairo, and instead of 37 is going to bring only —

B- We are ready to give transportation and help for the R.C to make it as quickly as possible.

A- Let's say - I want you to know one thing general. I am discussing with you that not because I don't trust you but because of practical reasons. According for this proportion, suppose the R.C will manage to send 100 people, Egyptian soldiers tommorrow, according to your formula, you'll have to send 10 people of ours. So it means maybe the R.C. will have to transfer 4 or 5 groups from Egypt. I don't see how it can be done so fasies to do the same operation. May I ask you frankly, why are you ~~us~~ insisting on it? Don't you trust us? Are you afraid that if we have our 15 people we'll not let you have the rest yours?

B- I'm feeling that you are keen on this problem, and it's very important for you as we understand it very very well, and you want to make it as quickly as possible, and we so we want to do it. We can't say that all the Israeli soldiers P.O.W's are handed to Israel and all our soldiers

are still out. In Suez, in there and in here. The reaction inside here will be the same reaction as in your country as far as the problem is concerned.

A - I understand your problem. Thank you for telling me. So may I put forward a proposal. If this is the problem, let's divide our people into 2 groups not 10 to 1 because it means 10 times the same operation. Let's divide it into 2 groups - let's have one group when we begin the mutual operation, and the 2nd group when your last group will be sent.

B - Alright. So the first group - the first Israeli group will be from now 27 seriously wounded soldiers, as it is defined by the R.C.. they made a definition for your people that 27 of them are seriously wounded and the rest not seriously wounded. So we start with these 27, and then the last group will be with our last group - the rest of the 27. So the first group will be 27, the 2nd group will be 18.

A - I want according to our knowledge, the R.C. will be ready from tommorrow morning to begin this operation, and I ~~want~~ hope it will begin tommorrow morning

B - I hope so too.

A - I hope we'll get today to the list of your wounded soldiers from the 3rd army. Because as you said the helicopter is there and the people are there, so I hope the list will be ready.

B - I hope so.

A - Now we raise the problem of our wounded people, ~~pris~~ P.O.W's and dead and killed in the town of Suez. We asked you to find out for us - what happened and how many they are.

B - It was very diffficult to get the numbers of those who are in Suez because the communication with the government is very bad and takes a very long time and couldn't get accurate information about that, but as a principle, we said - the P.O.W.s will be handed over as P.O.W. the dead bodies, as dead bodies

A - According to your principle we have a list of 45 wounded, but there are more wounded in the Suez Canal which both of us don't have

many. So I would like the Grop of Suez wounded to be associated with this arrangement. -

B- If we have any wounded soldiers in Suez itself, they will be treated ~~a~~ certainly as this.

A- So when can we expect your answer about how many wounded there are.

B- Maybe tommorrow. Because we asked the government and we couldn't get any wire from them.

A- So in addition to our 45 wounded people, we'll get our wounded out of the town of Suez is that true. And you I hope tommorrow you will ~~be~~ know a position to tell us how many men we have there.

B- Alright

A- thank you. So we are talking now about our 45 people ~~B~~ S which are in the list + X people that we don't know yet know yet how many out of the town of Suez. Thank you very much indeed, and you say that those who are P.O.W's They

B- Will be treated as P.O.W's

A- As the rest of our P.O.W's, and the dead as dead and wounded as wounded.

B- And I hope that their names will be included

in the list. I will appreciate it very much if you will make the remark that these people are out of the town of Suez. So that we will know by that that they are included. Is that alright?

B- Alright. In order not to make any confusion about these wounded P.O.W's A Liason officer can come with Monsieur Bossar and see the General here, or in Suez or any area to settle ~~the~~ all the matters. We agreed about the principles. About the procedure, "if there are two soldiers here, we can do that, we need transportation, they can do it the three of them.

A- I think it is a very good idea, but I wanted to make another proposal. Maybe we can get hold of them now and bring them along here. If we can establish contact with them, maybe we can bring them now, the R.C.

B- Alright

D- Mr. Bossar

A- Go and try. If you manage, alright, if not we'll arrange a meeting for tommorrow

B- for both of them. He's supposed at 1300 to meet your helicopter at Sk

A- Try to establish contact, if it is ponible maybe we can conclude it on the spot today, it will be the best thing. Well let's wait for them and in the meantime —

B- — The list of the P.O.W's. This list as I

promised before, will be handed today to the Red Cross. But not the complete list.

A- Do you have any idea how many people are there?

B- No, I don't know exactly.

A- And then the rest of the ——

B- We didn't make a schedule for that, for giving the full list of names- some of them may be in Suez, some of them maybe in the 3rd army

A- [illegible]

B- No, thank you. So we'll give them gradually.

A- I want to tell you frankly, General, my intension is to eliminate factors of friction. We want to make as many arrangements as possible that both parties will be satisfied, and I think it is in the interest of both parties to eliminate friction and tension, and as you mentioned before about public opinion, in your country, in our country about wounded ~~P.O.W's~~ soldiers, it applies also to P.O.W's,

B- Right

A- And I don't think, it makes any gain if information is handed over from us to you or from you to us. And I know you have quite a good administration

B- (I think) [illegible]

A- So it's about time to know exactly our names, and how many Israeli soldiers are P.O.W's in Egypt.

We will appreciate very much if you'll be able to submit to us the rest of the names in due time you see. because it ~~makes~~ a lot of tension and it raises public opinion's temper. It is not in the benefit, I think of our mutual interests, not only of ours.

B- Right. First we didn't receive the whole list of our prisoners of Egypt. all the P.O.W's are not known to as although you announced that you have about 6000, but we didn't receive the names of these 6000.

A- let me find out.

B- We didn't receive the names of the 6000 people who were announced that they are P.O.W's.

A- Let me try to find out, to clarify it

D- .

A-

D-

A- Up to today we passed to the Red Cross the names of 6796 Egyptian soldiers exactly. It was submitted to the R.C. up to 1000 o'clock today. Names, rank, personal number etc. Exactly as the list. So we handed to the R.C. these names. Now you just told me that the 1st list will be handed over

to us tommorrow.

B- today. This one will be handed to you today by the R.C And then gradually we'll give the other lists.

A- Gradually? I don't think that the position, the military position or political position of Israel or Egypt will be affected by how we treat our P.O.W's. It only raises tension without any advantage to any party.

B- As for as their treatment, they are treated very very well as P.O.W's. The problem is of names, and this problem as you know is a complicated one, and it's taking a political side on that. So ~~we~~ according to Geneva convention, we should admit the names - right. We will give you the names, but the whole names are not available now. So we'll give the list, the time we'll have the second list we'll give it, the third list ~~and~~ we'll give it and so on. But very difficult for me to put dates on that. I promised General Yariv that we'll give the list of the first names in three days and that's the third day.

A - It's quite alright. Do you know why we need this list as early as possible? We need it to know - we have also missing soldiers, by having their names, their parents will know whether their boys are alive or dead or whether they are in Egypt as P.O.W's. So it has

nothing to do with politics, it has nothing to do with the state of Israel or with the state of Egypt. It has only to do with 2 parents, with individual people and I don't see what kind of benefit or advantage you can get out of it if you hold the list. I understand if we ~~ha~~ need to have a hard discussion or conversation about matters of interest. I understand, I do understand. I don't understand why should we make efforts to help parents to know whether their boys are alive or dead. I really don't understand.

B- We will do our best. We will do our best. According to the P.O.W's, I had a message now from the minister, the minute I came here, that 4 officers were captured yesterday by your troops somewhere here, yesterday. I don't know where because he didn't put it in the message - their names are with me - Colonel Mandouh Halim ~~Georges~~

Colonel ~~Ahmed~~ Mohmed Elmi Salim ~~Taher~~.

Lieut-Colonel Said Moisur Mohammed Abas

Captain Hamdi Zen EL-Abin Pharag

They were captured yesterday ~~here~~ somewhere here I don't know exactly.

A - I will find out and let you know.

B - Please. We don't want to consider them P.O.W's, because after ceasefire we may have some of our soldiers

or officers about here, They will be captured as P.O.W's so we can send some of our civilians maybe capture one of these soldiers and make another —

A- I don't know why we should argue now before I know the information, but ~~if~~ ~~say~~ Suppose I myself and one of my officers will go now and will penetrate into the 3rd army area and will be captured there. Are you going to hand him over to me back? and say "Excuse me there is a ceeze-fire"?

B- [illegible]

A- You will tell me, I'll tell you what you will tell me "he will be treated like a P.O.W" So let me find out what happened and we will tell you.

B- This information came to us through the UN.

A- I see. Do you know where?

B- Maybe somewhere near the UN post or something like that? I don't know. We received a message from the UN so he sent it to me to discuss today.

A- So I will find out, and will let you know. If they are with us I will tell you. And then we'll have to argue what their status - whether P.O.W's or kidnapped. That will be later - let me find out first.

B. About the 3rd point - that is the wounded and the dead bodies.

A - What about the P.O.W's? I understand your position, but I'll appreciate it very much, general, if you will tell me at least what do you have mind until we'll have the rest of the list?

B - I can't say a definite time for that. I am sorry to say that I can't give a date, a definite date to give the 2nd list or the 3rd list or the 4th list. So I think this problem will be solved very soon. As far as I understand or feel, this problem will be solved very soon, how and when —

A - I think that you got my point and am waiting for your reaction. I know that you are not the president of your state and I am not the prime minister of my state, by both of us know what the honour of the soldier is, and it has nothing to do with their parents. I am waiting for your response.

B - And I think you heard what the President said about this yesterday.

A - Yes, I heard, but I hope you heard our prime Minister too. I'll tell you. Let's finish first the formal discussion and then I'll appreciate very much if we'll have a private discussion.

B - About the dead bodies. We had 6 dead bodies

in our country. They are completely reported buried by your religious procedure and they are ready to be handed. they were supposed to be handed today or last day I'm not sure

A - Through the R.C.)

B - the R.C had been informed putting the boxes and they are ready —

A - Yesterday we got 6. Do you refer to the same 6?

B Yes

A - there are no other dead bodies?

B - No, in our countries we don't have no more. That is these 6. But the rest of them are in the field, the Canal Zone maybe West maybe East

A - So what about arrangements that our people will be able to go and look for them

B - We sent orders ~~through~~ to the local commanders, as I said before to see where are the dead bodies, and then we'll permit the R.C. to come and see the dead bodies to separate them, you take yours and we take ours

A - Please look into destroyed tanks.

B - That's the main point which we emphasized the destroyed tanks in —

A - When will you have decent information?

B - Maybe three or four days. We may make it the 5th

A - Yes quite alright. You mean the R.C will be in a position to ——

B - I think so at any rate.

A - Very good.

A - We have a problem. First of all I want to thank you for this arrangement. The problem is that within abandoned tanks or destroyed tanks, if the R.C. or you will take out the bodies, we won't be able to recognize them anymore. So we would like to recognize the tank itself. By that we can recognize the crew, you see? And because of this and other reasons of religion, we would like that our Rabbi will be with the R.C so as to identify on the spot.

B - I propose to make another meeting especially for that, to make the details of these arrangements. The representative of the R.C and one of your representatives and one of our representatives to have a meeting somewhere here or at any place so that they can make a schedule to go to Dawson area one day to search all this during 2 or 3 days and finish it.

A - Is it alright with you to decide upon this meeting for tommorrow?

B - There is no ——

C - We can agree now and confirm it later this evening

A - So principally we agree that tommorrow such a meeting will take place, and you will confirm it

B - Alright, we will confirm it.

B - This conformation will be with the R.C.

B - I want to convey the problems of the R.C to the R.C. or what? We will send the problems of the R.C which we are discussing now to the R.C or we will report it?

D - I think it will be better
B - to report it by us
D And we will also inform our people, so that there isn't any misunderstanding. Two people will know the problem.
A - The R.C people will be brought along by helicopte.
B - So let's go on to the 4th point - Suez city
A - Suez City - yes.
B - Now as a principle, we have our people there - they should be fed, they should have water, they should have medical support
A - I know the problem, let me put it this way - as far as medical treatment - and I refer to doctors to medicine etc, it is quite alright with us. I'll tell you what is our problem. This is not a problem. It is guaranteed - as far as medical assistance is concerned. The problem is with food and water. I don't say "no," but I just want to put forward the problem. The problem is that there is no separation between the 3rd army and the town. So, by allowing (To us) I will appreciate if you can suggest a solution

to this dilemma because there is a dilemma. I can tell you theoretically what kind of solution ~~is~~ One solution can be supervision of UN personnel with liason officers of ours between the town of Suez and third army. This can be one solution and say that there will be two different issues. One issue the town of Suez and the second issue the 3rd army. If we could separate and to inspect whether food water etc is not transfered from the citizens to the 3rd army. This is one theoretic possibility. I don't know whether you will like it or not. Another theoretical possibility is that in order to avoid trouble for the civilian population, we are ready to let them free exit if you want.

B- Free exit?

A- If you want to evacuate them, we have nothing against it. These are two theoretical solutions to the problem. But I don't say these are the only alternatives, I will appreciate very much if you have a 3rd alternative which will meet our problem. The problem is how to separate the support of the civilian population of the town of Suez from the armies

B- Well, you agreed to supply the 3rd army with supplies and medical support.

A- It was a temporary arrangement, as far as I know.

B- Yes. We'll talk about that in the coming point. But now, there is an agreement between both countries and both governments to supply the 3rd

army with water supply and medical support and it is running now, and I hope it will continue or it will is proposed to be done The same Thing will be done to the civilians More important for us than the 3rd army to make a separation between them - all the things ~~that~~ which will be given to the civilians in Suez will be also the same things, supplies, water and medical support only. These items will be checked by the UN. They will be under your control because you check them here, so don't be afraid we'll give them supplies to be given to the 3rd army because we are giving already the 3rd army supplies and medical support. Now we are making troubles for the civilians only. We want to let them feel that they can live, but evacuation of the city, we don't want, and we have no idea about it evacuation

A - I could imagine, I am not pressing that you. will So I would suggest that you will submit to us a list of figures how much food, how much water you need for the civilian population, and what are the guarants that this will be for the civilian population only. So I'm waiting for--

B - General Yarive told me the same question, And I have an answer now to settle that problem because it is one of the most important problems of today. He asked me what kind of items to be given to the civilians Then in the last conference. Well, we need 7 lorries everyday for the city. One lorry wheat - flour,

that's for bread, one lorry - rice, one lorry - petrol, o

A - Why should they have petrol?

B - That is for the cars the civilian cars. Am

A - Is business as usual in the town of Suez?

B - Not as usual, but if it is as usual They need 30. But we are giving only one for the goverment, the policmen, ambulances. ~~etc~~ fo One lorry for medical support. One small car for blood and plasma.

A - Everyday.

B - ~~2~~ two lorries ~~for~~ different ~~to~~ items of rations I mean these ones. So there are 7 lorries to be given to the city everyday. They will be checked by UN under their supervision, no military items - here you can check them at your check point - for 1, 2, 3, 4 hours and then to be released to go to the city. There are so many things for the city, but we are taking the main items only. These rations and water only - but there are so many other items ~~things~~ we don't want to ——

A - I understand, but you didn't tell me what are the guarantees that this will not go to the 3rd army.

B - Because you are giving already the 3rd army supplies.

A - Well, it is subject to further discussion for the future - These were ad hoc arrangements. I don't what are the arrangements for the future.

So I would prefer to separate these two problems, let me put all my questions about it, because this is a very complicated issue — how many people there are?

B - Maybe 30,000

A - 30,000? I've been told 6,000, 4000

B - I've been asked about that, I don't know about That.

D - You mentioned the other last time 3,000, 4,000 inhabitants

B - I said that because I couldn't get the number. Some of them were evacuated before war and some of them are there. I don't know how many people are there, but the estimation came to me from our administration for public health, and also the minister of supply.

A - I understand about the population nobody knows exactly. But what about the guarantees that it won't be transferred to the 3rd army.

B - How we can make any guarantee I don't know any — do you want to put the UN force between this and the Canal or what?

A - I don't know I'm expecting you —

B - I'm expecting to have confidence with each other because the most important thing is confidence. I feel that the population there will need that for themselves, and the army will take its supplies. We will not give the army food and leave the civilians. The army should give the civilians but not the

civilians give the army. Therewith not

A - It is true, and I am sure that these things are very proper within yourselves, but the problem here is that we are two parties here, you see; I am sure that you make the best arrangements according to your norms and means, and I will have to ask my authorities, but if I may make a suggestion, in order to promote the request of yours, my authorities won't dismiss it, because I just now got a telephone about the problem that we discussed a few minutes ago about the our wounded, soldiers in the town Suez, the prisoners and the dead. I just got a telephone now - because my authorities would like to refer to them ~~separate~~ as to a separate group. All three groups, the bodies, the wounded and the P.O.W.s, they would like to have them as one group, and to separate this issue from the general issue of the wounded, the P.O.W.s and the dead bodies; but you said just before that you referred to the wounded soldiers in Suez as to the wounded P.O.W.s to the bodies as to the rest of the bodies and to the P.O.W.s as to the rest of the P.O.W.s, so with such a position, I mean my authorities wouldn't refer to it as to a good will of your authorities, of your side, you see, and I don't think it will promote discourse; we must find a formula, both of us are soldiers, general, I don't know exactly your influence upon your civilian authorities but I know exactly my influence

as far as military objects are concerned. Of course I have a lot to say being the deputy chief of staff, but I have not enough power to ~~enforce~~ influence my civilian authorities and I think, I'm telling you exactly, I think they will have a lot of reservations because the problem of the 3rd army, — your position as far as our wounded soldiers, Allied and P.O.W.'s and Arabs are concerned and I denied I objected because they wanted to enforce me to take a position upon a point that we have discussed already and agreed upon and I objected. I managed to deny it, to repell it that means I could do things easier, I could tell you "okay I'll pass the message to my authorities and you will get an answer," I could tell you this but by this I will misled you. I'm sure my authorities won't accept it as it is. We must find another formula

B- Now I feel that the final goal of all what's going on here in this area is to let the 3rd army and civilians in Suez suffer as much as they can. Am I right or wrong?

A - You mean our goal?

B - Yes.

A - I think you are wrong.

B - I hope I am wrong. Now, you are doing everything to separate the city and the army. Not to give the army as much food as it wants, we're supposed to submit to the 3rd army. No worries that is a duty. Now during the

5 days, you submitted only 60. That means 12 lorries everyday. That means, these rations and water may be only enough for a battalion. The rest has no rations and no water and we didn't discuss that although it's very little, because we took 5 days to submit 60 lorries to the 3rd army although we feel that, we didn't say a word: Now we are coming to the civilians, and another complication will be

A - I admit that there is a problem

B - I know.

A - I'm just looking forward for the better formula how to solve it, that's all.

B - If you are submitting already the rations and water to the third army, with your ~~adaptation~~ acceptation so the same thing with the civilians, the civilians should have priority.

A - You know what, general, I'll do my best and let you know out if I say I'll do my best, I'll do my best, but I'm not authorized to commit my authorities now. I'll let you know.

B - If this problem will not be solved, everything will be stuck, or will go to the dead ____, as we say. Now, again everything will be postponed and then we'll come to the next point about the water for the civilians and then I'm afraid everything will be also the same. They don't have water. If you permit then

to have water alright, if not, we'd see how they can live.

17- They don't have water?

B- They don't have water. The water now in Suez as follows - The Canal ~~is~~ come from Ismaelia to Suez, and it was blown out ~~and~~ by the Israeli troops on the 24st of October. That's one soura of water to Suez. Another source of water is a water line coming from Cairo through pipes and into Suez. Both channels are under your control now.

A- Does the water flow?

B- But ~~you~~ we are keeping it, ~~you~~ we are getting it from Cairo.

A - (Why?) ~~Inorder not to give water here.~~

B - Inorder not to give water here.

A - To us?

B - Yes.

A - You want us to give you water and you don't want to give us water?

B - I'm telling the truth. Now for the Suez, to ammend the canal from distance may be half way ~~from~~ between Ismaelia and Suez, and this is the main source, we need so many men, ~~so~~ new technical to work there.

A - Excuse me. You mentioned two sources of water

B - Yes, the Canal and the pipe line. ~~the~~

A - What about the reservoirs of the town itself?

B - They have reserves for a couple of days, -

5 days, 10 days 15 or 30. They should keep it all time.

A - I see

B - So if we want to facilitate the matter of water from Suez Canal, we have two variants ~~→~~ The first one to mend the Canal here - to mend it specialist about 100 to go there with their grabers, bendozers to mend. What happened on the 21st. It will take a long long time.

A - What other alternative do you have?

B - The alternative - the Pipe line is 215, you have your troops there and our technicians can go there about 50 persons, 8 cars, 2 pumps, 2 grabers, ~~A~~ to stay there and work the pumps, to make it work okay and right, they should stay there in this area. That's where your troops are located now. That is the quickest way pipline.

A - Are there the only two alternative?

B - Yes.

A - No other alternative?

B - No other. So if you want to give them water, we should do the two channels or two means simultaneously. The quickest way to do it now through the pipe line, so they can take water, and then meanwhile we are working on the Canal zone. The sweet water; we need it not only for the population here in the city, but for the State people in the area.

3 km
26, מיל', 6'27, all this area. There are thousands that living, so they need water, for themselves, for their animals, about the plants.

A - About these poor people we know everything and we take care of them. I can tell you that you raised the problem of some of them who were taken to camps.

B - No, no, that's what we heard but the General Yariv said no.

A - No, no. I am sorry to admit that he wasn't right. I checked it. You were right and I cancelled it, and they are back.

B - Back home.

A - Yes, they returned to their places. I'm very sorry, and General Yariv just didn't know.

B - That's alright.

A - But I checked it. You were right and I cancelled it, and we've sent them back to their places.

B - They need water for themselves, for their animals, for the plants. We can't give them water unless we need the Suez Canal

A - Now they are under responsibility and we are taking care of them. I think the real problem is the problem of the town of Suez, of course. We are taking of your people here along the lake and if you want to

draw attention to some aspects I will treat it, if you will tell me that you are not satisfied, or that you would like something else to be done. I will look into it.

B- All we need is to solve the problem of the supplies of the city and the water for the city, and it's fair enough for the civilians.

A - Well I understand the problem and I will review it with my authorities, and I can promise you personally that I will do, do solve my best it.

B- When we will have the reply on that?

A - Tommorrow.

B- About the convoy, let's finish with the Suez, about the convoy for the 3rd army, as we feel now is getting better than before, but still we need more and more, do you think, we can, when you finish this convoy, we'll have another permanent supply for the 3rd army or still a temporary one - one convoy only and that is enough? I asked General Yanis the same question, and he told me he would give me an answer on the 4th or the 5th

A - He was right, because as you mentioned before, it's a political question and a strategical too and as you know our Prime Minister is in the States, now. We cannot take a decision when she is absent. So, we are waiting for our Prime Minister. That!

B - Can you speed it up by any other means? Because it is very very slow and it's making a many troubles to the local commander here, to the UN giving troubles to us.

A - I don't think we are the reason for any delay. I think the procedure takes time but not because of us. What is the situation.

D - The officer responsible has been here before.

A - Which officer? ours!

And he said that now it has been speeded up tremendously and they are loaded 86 lorries and there are 110 more. And it's going very quickly now, and the people who are unloading and loading are doing their best but this is the maximum they can do

B - The maximum because we asked for 100 soldiers to pass from the E to W — for unloading and then you asked to make it 5. We started with one amphibic car and then we made it 5.

A - At that time they called on me and I told them to make it 5 not 4. So I am familiar with the problem. What can be done now in order to —

B - I.E. the principle is to supply the 3rd army, let's put another crossing means.

A - You mean more crossing means?

B - More crossing means, and if we put more crossing means we can facilitate the problem for your drivers and UN drivers and

for our people and they will speed it up, finish the first convoy and start the second convoy.

A- Today there about 5 amphibic wagons. How many would you suggest?

[illegible]: there are 50 carriers, 50 people carrying unload and load.

A: But the general says the problem is not people but amphibic facilities for crossing means.

[illegible]: But/then it also a problem on the spot. I mean that there are so many vehicles that can come to the unloading jetty.

B- Yes, because they are using 1 gap only. Is there any objection to put a bridge over there? to facilitate this problem. Under their supervision.

A: I think this whole war was around these bridges. It's a very delicate subject.

B: Just only for one day are 2 days instead of making all these complications for your a U.N driver for this and that. Under their supervision. And then it will not be erected the whole time - for 3 or 4 hours and then cancel it again and then put it away this side - or on the other side or whatever you like; It doesn't make any difference with us

A: [illegible]

B: I think they are using 1 ferry now. You know, you've never been there?

A: I can tell you one thing on the spot. If it is only a matter of more amphibious facilities and, even some more people - It is guaranteed; I want to check it technically

B: Alright.

A: about a the bridge - etc. it makes it complicated even psychologically. So let me check it technically and I will let you tomorrow.


B: Alright. And let's forget this bridge or ferry as I meant. We'll use the amphibious crafts - more than 5 - will make it easier

(...)

A approx - I'm not talking about names

- Do you know the total number of Egyptians P.O.W's as I just now gave you the total number of Egyptians - There is a lot of tension here everywhere especially here across the lines. We you were asking information about whom you have have and they're feeling very sensitive and what we are working on - how to just — you know —

B Well, I'm not talking about names, just total numbers. Well, just now I gave you your the total number of your p.o.w's. It was exactly up to the last one. I gave you all details #00 wounded soldiers. I checked it personally; they got it today before 10 o'clock. But a day - 24 hours - before that they got another number - around 5700.



So this morning they got - as I told you - 6700 and something. no, no your ambassador in Geneva can receive the whole list ~~so~~ ~~want~~ ~~what~~ [illegible] - We will check it as soon as

D - So what I'm asking you is the total number; I'm not asking you and ~~even~~ ~~not~~ if I'm not wrong the R.C. said that today we would get the total number in ~~Geneva~~ where Broisard will meet Mr. Convers. So if he gave him the total number of P.O.W's for Egypt - why don't you give us here? the total number, because he gave them. and as you know - maybe they will come here in a short time so I think it ~~would~~ might be very nice if you just told us the total number.

A - ~~You~~ Even ~~mean~~ the approximate number, it ~~shall~~ shouldn't be the exact number ...

A your military spokesman said there ~~were~~ a few hundred, he announced it on the radio and it was in the newspapers. But how many - hundreds no-one knows. Maybe Mr. Broisard will bring it with him now?

C - Maybe

A - [illegible] ...

([illegible])

B - Did you say the R.C. is ready to tranfer wounded soldiers from tomorrow?

E - [illegible] - Yes, even we were ready to start today. ~~As~~ and as they have one of their aircraft going from Geneve to Beirut

and to Cairo so it's no problem at all - just to start - If tomorrow morning, for example, they will start with 37 Egyptians wounded to Cairo we are ready - We are ready even for all 400, tomorrow. But the problem is how many aircrafts they will have. Now, as the General mentioned here, the R.C It's the best if he will take responsibility on the whole number of the 400 wounded soldiers. He will start from the first bunch, second, the more he can tranfere - we will be happy - so why waste time? We can do it from tomorrow morning ma[y] they will earn 1 more or 2 more aircraft so they will be able to tranfere in 1 day 100 maybe 200. There is possibility to do it, but quickly.

B - I don't know if the R.C. goes from Cyprus Israel to Cyprus or Geneva

E - no, why not? they can go direct.

A - I suggest - I just used the telephone - and I suggest that as far as the town of Suez is concerned - lets wait a little bit, I'm expecting a telephone call again, and you'll come later on again. About the convoy, I am ready - as I told you before - I am ready to any arrangement so what would you prefere? I would suggest to have another gap. Now we are using one gap

אלחנן אלדיוסוי אהרוני את הנערה הקיוה בוקר טוב
אמר לוסף.

A - I understand. Now we have 1 gap. There is is even a better suggestion - to have this gap widened. Let's widen it so that 2 tranferes will take time simultanously ~~we~~

B - We have so many gaps along the canal, we can use 1 already made.

A - You know what - let's agree upon it principally, and technically let's leave it to the people in the place. I am ready for another gap or to widen this gap. Alright?

B - Alright In this case we may use more than 5 vehicles

A - Yes, for each gap the same effort

B - 5.

A - I told you before that I would answer tomorrow but I am answering now

B - That means that we will make another gap or widen the gap; use 5 more vehicles with ~~more~~ 50 more soldiers.

A - So I will tell my forces there, you will tell your liaison officer there and then solve it on the spot. Alright?

B - Alright. That's important for you to know now - That we will widen the gap which we are using now or make another gap - use another gap very close to it in the same area. using 5 vehicles here and 5 vehicles here, to make transportation. 50 soldiers here and 50 soldiers here.

E - The man on the spot should find out which is the better place.

A - what I mean is our people with their liaison officer - they will discuss it on the spot with you - you may be present - and will do all technical arrangement because I don't think we can decide exactly upon details here in these .. excuse me one minute

(שיחת טלפון לא ברורה)

A - I'm still waiting for another telephone. I told you I will do my best and try. So we have agreed upon enlarging the gap there or to have another in order to facilitate And about the town of Suez - let's wait a little bit. I told you about the town of Suez that medecine etc. is guaranteed already. But as far as food and water

is concerned I just asked you to wait a few minutes. You are in a better position You have to deal only with me. I have to deal with you and with my authorities at the same time, in order to promote our mutual case. But alright let's wait and see

B - Let's go ahead with other points

A - I already gave you an answer about the seventh point which was - I'm leaving the disengagement toward the end. The seventh point was the answer about your people - the camps. And I told you already that General Yariv was mistaken and you were right and we settled the problem.

B - alright. Thank you very much. Settled the problem with their life, freedom to go and where and to their fields

A - We brought them back to their places If you have any complaint about it maybe we will get some information - ~~other~~ just let me know.

B - alright - if we hear any more complaints

A - We have no intentions whatsoever to cause

them any harm so if you will know anything just let me know that's all.

I would like to tell you one thing to make ---- There is infiltration of your people, soldiers, civilians, from the east-bank to the west-bank from time to time. I think it causes a lot of troubles and it causes incidents. I would appreciate very much if you would look into it in order to prevent such uncontroled activities. I don't think it contributes to lessen the friction and tension.

B: I have the same thing here; some infiltration from the troops here to forward positions where they were not here, even on the 25th. In different places on the Suez road area -- north of Suez; in attaka.

A: I know. We got a complaint yesterday about attaka through the U.N. I'm sorry to say that maybe you didn't observe it before, but we were there long ago. About the rest of the places you are mentioning - I will check, I don't know, but about attaka I know.

B: But you were there on the 25th by the helicopters. We had our troop there But we didn't make any problem with them because our people were there but they didn't shoot

or didn't make any ...

A: I think, if I may suggest, General, we sent you an answer last night. I don't know whether you got it or not.

B: No, I didn't receive it before last night.

A: Yes, we sent a message because we got your complaint and we just said that you were mistaken and that we were there before that But I would suggest not to deal with it as with a seperate issue; I would suggest we have arguments about the 22 etc etc about the whole area - but I don't see any reason why to refere to attacks as to a different issue. It is not the only complaint that you have. So why should it be treated differently? I thought yesterday, when we got the message, that you just didn't observe when actually we came there. We came there long before the day that you are mentioning in your message.

B: What about some our points if you find ~~here~~ tomorrow that we have here some troops?

A: I think we will complain to you and will say that you - - - - - -
If it will happen tomorrow. But [illegible]

happened a long ~~time~~ ago . Not today, nor yesterday and not tomorrow . Long ago .

B: We may have some troops somewhere here in your area , maybe in attaka or any other place, but you didn't observe them. would you reccomend to tell the U.N. that we have some troops here and there and here and there and make another complaint or what?

A: If your troops will be here - ~~not~~ within our area it means that they are within our area and it is either an enemy's pocket of P.O.W's . But אפקוד לוֹד is not within the area which is kept by you ;

B: אפקוד לוֹד is with us ; You have a part of it - yes . But still you have some troops there

A: Yes , but it is not ... If you would find our troops among your troops then you will be right . But on אפקוד לוֹד it is a different position which is not among your troops and it everything as applies to - every spot here is the same as אפקוד לוֹד so I thought that you ~~were~~ was mistaken about the date - when we occupied the place.

B: Maybe -

A: And I would suggest not to make our of it a different issue. I think it belongs to the whole complex, the whole conflict.

B: at any rate we had many reports about some positions which were not occupied by you and then were occupied after the 25th. Putting one post here, a company there, a group of persons here

A: I think you are right, but it belongs to the whole argument about the 22nd of October. It belongs to the major issue; I don't think it can be dealt with seperately.

B: (?) at least you can stop more...

A: We are not carrying out any such kind of activities, in the moment if youll have a complaint about it

B. .... every movement seperately as the whole question under discussion

E How about we keep things ... at least to avoid any kind of clash, minor incidents witnessed(!) will cause many, many, harm

A: I see your point and I can assure you

that we are not carrying out deliberately such kind of activities people, the The remarks that I made about these infiltrations. I refere not to organised activities. I refered to popular people and soldiers, individual soldiers, individual peoples, small groups that are moving from one side of the canal to another side, etc, and it causes trouble, it causes friction, it causes tension and also it endangers the life of people. So I drew your attention to such kind of activities which I don't think is deliberately carried out by your government.

B: No, We never been reported about this infiltration

A: I know, thats why I'm telling you.

B: But maybe individual move, from one soldiers, or a soldiers ~~from~~ ~~that~~ something like that I'm not sure. I never been told about that. If there is a specific case we can discuss it, but as a principal, we are keeping our troops in their positions, as we signed but no infiltration, and we have no intention to move to make these infiltration.

A: Now as far as, I'm waiting for the telephone about the town of Suez

B: ~~alright~~ alright

A: Maybe, I told you I'll give you an answer tomorrow, but maybe we can make some progress by this telephone I dont know, so until this tele-

phone will come, may I have a private conversation with you

B: ~~Alright~~ Alright

A: Did you covered all the subjects you wanted to raise?

B: Yes, I think there are some details about the Red-Cross, how they will get our wounded personel from here that's up to Monsieur ...

A: So why don't they discuss it in the mean time

B: ... الجرحى , الجرحى بتاع الجيش الثالث ~~التوصيات~~ العربيات , نسيت احنا عاوزين عربيات اللي من هنا بين بناعتنا ما تاخدوش U.N. عربيات الاسعاف اللي داخلة مدينة السويس مافيش U.N. تخلي اسرائيليين نفسهم والناس بتاع الـ U.N. اللي واياهم ويروحوا لغاية مدينة السويس دي مافيش حاجة ويرجعوا. نفس الحكاية اللي جات هنا, اللوري بتاعنا بتروح وصاحب الناس لغاية --- نشوف بقى الـ BOAT اللي هنا معجوقة بينا.

A: But I can tell you one thing, my instructions will be to our representatives to come into conclusion with your people and the Red-Cross and not coming again with open problems, thats all. If you guarantee it to me then alright. If not ~~them~~ we'll discuss it now. So I hope you will take the same position towards your repesentative

B: alright

A: I will tell my representatives not to come back to Israel if they won't fulfil their mission tomorrow you'll tell them not to come back to Egypt, to your representatives, then they will have to sign (?) ...

B: we will have to exchange the representatives

laugh ...

A. Now about the town of Suez ... I suggest that until it will be solved permanently, we have one problem for the time being, and by that we will gain time to discuss it with my authorities with your authorities until we'll reach a permanent arrangement. But, I mean one convoy of these seven cars that you mentioned.

B: yes, seven ....

A: Yes, but I would like you to do a gesture towards us, I'm refering to the list of the prisoners of war ...

B: Yes

A: I'll tell you why. The civilians of the town of Suez is a matter of a humanitarian question. The same applies to the list of prisoners. It is a humanitarian question. So lets put this to issues, together.

B: This convoy and the prisoners of war in Suez you mean? or what?

A: No, no I mean we will allow you, I will allow you, we will allow you to, to, this convoy to the town of Suez, but we would like very much to have the list of prisoners, not of Suez.

B: Ah, ha

A: In general

B: hold it

A: Until permanent arrangements will take place

B: Over the water!

A: Water will be discussed again, when we'll discuss permanent arrangements, but in the mean

time, we will allow you to have a convoy of water tanks

B: of what?

A: Water tanks. Let me make it to clarify it. This is a major issue, and it should, it will take us time, in Israel, to discuss it and to find a formula of our problem, which I explained to you in this morning. In the mean time we ~~would~~ would not like that people to suffer there. So only as a temporary scheme I ~~suggest~~ suggest that in order not to lose time, we will enable you to have such a convoy and also water, with water tanks. In the mean time we will discuss it in Israel and we will discuss it together, how to solve the problem, not temporarily but permanently, and the problem of water will be included with, will be included in the permanent arrangement. But temporarily it should be carried with water tanks, with the same convoy

①

B ... And also they have the right from the international point of view, the international law gives them that right to fight even they are civilians but we are not talking about these things; so they have the right to do whatever they like; they can take the measures whatever they like; Theg governer is there the civilians is theirs but we are sorry we don't accept any temporary measures for Suez itself as you see it. ~~so we'll tell you~~

A - So we'll tell you what. If you don't want to accept these temporary - then I'm not denying you your demand about Suez city. I want this to be on record - I'm not denying you your request about the town of Suez, I just can't give you an answer on the spot. So tomorrow I will give you an answer as for the water and the food. I gave you a positive answer about medical support etc. This is to a final answer and it can be in effect as from now - valid as from now.

B - about medical support for Suez?

A Yes. You raised today 3 problems: food, medical support and water.
So as far as medical support - all aspects of medical support - is guaranteed.
About food and water - as you are insisting of discussing a permanent and not a temporary arrangement - I want you to let me have 24 hours to discuss it in my country and to find out a good formula which will guarantee our interests too. But I want to assure you that we recognize the right of these people to get food and water; we are not denying it. So give me a chance to tell you tomorrow our position

B - We will wait. All right. If there is any reply it can send by a message.

A We'll send a message

D - האם הוא יכול לקבל את התשובה היום?

A - השאלה אולפן זה, יש לו מאחורי קרקעות, אני לא יכול להגיד לך עכשיו, נקווה.

A - אנו נשלח לכם הודעה שתגיד את ה- message מתי?

D - באמצעות הטלפון

A - Alright. If it will be a simple answer then it can be done by a message. If it is a complicated one - we will have to meet to discuss it.

③

B - alright.

A - Now about your officers you mentioned . .

כמה קצינים — נתן קצה ?

D - אחד

A - There were 4 officers. I suggest that you try to get their names and whether if you have any P.O.W's of ours in the town of Suez or not. The easiest way it will be to exchange these 2 groups ~~in~~ ditto in a different issue so lets discuss it also tomorrow. You will find our what happens —

B - In case we don't have prisonners of war in Suez what will be the situation?

A - I will try and find our and answer. We were not prepared for it. I was taken by surprise by you now.

B - and also I was taken by surprise by the ~~minister~~ minister when he sent a message and said please solve it today. Just to have the feeling that I'm going one step forward ~~I am going~~ to because we feel — that ~~they~~ are not prisonners of war

A - They are not prisonners of war?!

©

B I don't know where they were captured. ©
Honestly when - I don't know. It was just
mentioned that they were arrested or —

A You know - I didn't even know about
it until you told me. But now I found out
that it is true. I heard the first time
today when you told me. I personnaly

D - אני לא בטוח שאלה בטוח אלה הזדהויות

A I am not sure these are the same names but
I checked already but it is true that we had
4 officers. So I assumed these are the same

D(?) We didn't check the names we just know
about the group.

A - So I think these are the same people.
But I was taken completely by surprise I
personnally didn't know about it, when I came
this morning. I will tell you something -
If you keep our people in the town of Suez
as prisonners-of-war it will be the easiest
thing to exchange these 2 groups as special
groups which has nothing to do with, let's say,
the whole complex of prisonners. If you don't
~~help~~ have, maybe you have something else in return to offer us

⑤

I don't know, because both of us we have to convince other people in our countries; we have no free hands - you don't have free hands and I don't have free hands to decide upon everything here on the spot. So I think I am telling you offer? If you have anything to offer in return I think it will soften the way towards exchanges. The best thing to do is to find whether you have our P.O.W's of ours in the ... In such case I think it can be done on basis of an equal exchange of lets say special groups that are not exactly captured during the fighting. This will be the easiest thing from that point of view to all of ... Because you are asking me again and again why you don't have P.O.W's. I try to suspect that maybe you know that there is no chances that there are such P.O.W's

B I don't know if there P.O.W is in Suez or not and I think if the governer has P.O.W's he would have mentioned it immediately. He never mentioned it.

לשונו: המפקד - הם לשלוח הקונסולטציה - מחברה שלנו - במטכ"ל אין להם הקונסולטציה בהביאו את החברה של הבלה- הישראלים A - אבל אין אומרים להם לפני שלה.

⑥

A The Red Cross people - they are asking for my helicopter to come along here. It will take about 1/2 an hour.

B I don't think there will be any changes if the R.C. comes now because tomorrow they will arrange another place where, we don't have any different ideas about that. He will get to us the names only - how many names here and how many names there.

A - But they ~~don't~~ will know the situation in the town and in the ~~eighth~~ (8th army) - the 3rd army. Besides we can know on the spot - ~~the~~ both of us through the R.C. whether they are ready tomorrow to start - are you in a hurry, can you stay another 1/2 hour?

B - Thats alright, I feel today General that we came to a conclusion that we are discussing the wounded P.O.W's and that is all.

A - Why?

B - That's all we did today. We have only accomplished that 1 mission.

(4)

A - No, we have agreed upon another (gate) for the convoy. We agreed upon a lot of things.

B - We just agreed only about the exchange of the

A - No, no, you are disappointed ...

B - yes we have accepted that before ...

A - You are disappointed about the town of Suez although I didn't give you a negative answer I just told that I would give you tomorrow an answer. And I am disappointed about the list of prisonners of war. So both of us are disappointed about the major issues which are of great interest to us. But I promised you an answer tomorrow; you didn't promise me an answer about the list you just told me to do your best in order to promote the -

B - Well we didn't solve any problems today; It's up to the authorities to decide what to do.

A - we have agreed upon the wounded

B - The wounded P.O.W we had discussions with General Yariv

A- Yes but we agreed today about the matter and what shape it will take, we agreed about the convoy of supplies, we agreed upon a bigger gap or another gap, I gave you an answer that you complain about the people that were taken to camps that you were right and you brought them back, I think we had a very interesting discussion.

B- Yes, that is the most important thing, that we had a good interesting discussion and we knew each other.

A- Yes, and also I think that you made quite a big step toward the solution of the problem of the town of Suez.

B- No, we didn't come to any solution about the Suez, we made an appraach

A- General, maybe you are not realizing but we owe you an answer tommorow and I told you that I do recognize the right of these people to get their food, water and medical help

so I told you that I do recognize their right, I told you that tommorow I will give you an answer, I think these are good prospects for the future and I said also that I am ready tomorrow that you will bring one convoy to the people of Suez — you denied it As a temporary solution, you denied it but still I promised you an answer tomorrow about a permanent solution

B - But any way it was a good chance to General Tal today but from ~~am~~ my point of view we didn't accomplish our mission today, except discussing what we discussed before about the wounded P.O.W's. We put the system of the work, that's all.

A - This is not all. Tomorrow you will get an answer about the town of Suez and this is a major issue, and beside - you have an open option if you like - to prepare a convoy today and to bring it tomorrow with food and water and everything until you will get our answer as far as a permanent solution. So I think you made quite a progress -

we are the party that didn't because as far as the list of the P.O.W's is concerned you said that you would do your best and that is all. ~~well that~~

B - Well, that's your point of view and I still say ~~g~~ we didn't make any progress today about all these items. Just only put the procedure of how to evacuate the wounded P.O.W's

A - You know what General - let's decide now on the spot about another meeting tomorrow. You know exactly what is important to us. I know exactly what is important to you. Let's come here tomorrow, but in order not to disappoint each other - Is that all right?

B - I think when I go back everybody will be disappointed today. I'm afraid of that. First thing I ~~need~~ will meet. The minister will say "where are the 4 officers?" I will tell him they will discuss it. "What did you do to Suez?" - They will discuss it. "~~with~~ ~~they~~

A - THEY WERE ready to allow us b

B - temporary

A - Until tomorrow

B - and then the water

A - Until tomorrow

B - I will tell him our civilian people should starve. That's all.

D - May I just, General, put ~~in a letter~~.

B - Honestly, ~~the~~ when we go back, the Colonel told me, when I go back, everybody is talking as I am Israeli. What did you do with that? I say they said so and so and will do so and so. Maybe the same thing with you.

A - Why not to put it in a positive way? Why don't you say, 'well the Israeli's agreed that tomorrow morning we will have a convoy with ~~soppy~~ supplies to the town of Suez and tomorrow afternoon they will discuss with us permanent arrangements. I think that is fair enough

C(?) - Because we were expecting, General,

a message from you with all these details that you gave us on the spot -

A - No, no, no, this is true, technically ~~informa~~ and formally it is true but I do admit that this is not a technical problem but an essence. So I say - we are not denying the right of these people to get their food and water etc. and medical aid. We had today the first time the exact requirements and my answer was not immediate, not on the spot, I hade to make a lot of telephones, and my answer was that tomorrow you may send one convoy of the size you ask for. Tomorrow morning. and tomorrow afternoon we are ready to discuss permanent arrangements.

B - alright

A - So why you don't call it an achievement?
(מדוע אינך קורא זאת הישג)

A - If you don't want tomorrow morning - It ~~then~~ can take place tomorrow afternoon; Take your time. I don't suggest that you don't accept it. I think that it is a ~~s~~ progress toward a solution of the problem. ~~this solution~~ I don't

think that you have not to accept. ~~you~~ We promised to discuss also permanent ~~sanctions~~ arrangements.

B - Alright - we'll make the meeting the day after tomorrow - if it is possible.

A - Alright the day after tomorrow. What time General?

B - At 12 o'clock?

A - Alright at 12 o'clock Saturday. ☺

B - If you don't mind we arranged for another place for ~~the~~ our meeting. That's at KM 99 (~~or 100~~)

A - You don't like this place?

B - No it is very good. We came here 3 times and we are ready to come more and more. The facilities are well.

(מראה לו את המפה ומצביע...)

A - We checked it on the map - it is on ~~mine~~ your place. It will be a real disadvantage for me - I'll tell you frankly - Here I have my telephone and arrangements, so I am in position to call my ~~people~~ authorities to let you know. Otherwise, then,

I will have to tell you tomorrow, I will tell you tomorrow.

B - Just ~~to~~ please, we are here under the U.N. flag and there will be under the U.N. flag, anyway we can stay.

A - I'll tell you what - let's do it

אולפה הלאה ככו קודונו שלנו ? , פה? אולפה האחרונה שלנו פה.

- 3 - 4 קמ

~~Near~~ or lets have it near our check-post there. our of the check-post, and let's have ~~a~~ the U.N. flag.

B - That is a 3-km difference between our place and the suggested place.

A The ~~dif~~ distance makes no difference, but I'm telling you frankly, I would like to have my facilities there - the telephone, etc.

(פדרו-) (דיוונו מאוחרו ובפרוו בינוים) אצלה הגדוד הפרקלי

B He needs more time today to do the work in the 3rd army and the Suez - It takes ~~more~~ more time

A - Let's leave it tomorrow we have a meeting.

B - We can make the whole meeting the day after tomorrow at 12 o'clock. Not tomorrow. To settle all the matters. To give the R.C. a chance to organise

everything and facilitate all the matters and transportation and this & and that and ~~then~~ I will get our the representative, our representative in the R.C. to solve all the problems, or do it alone - whatever you like.

A - I don't think we should postpone it we have decided even upon tomorrow,

B - If the R.C. is ready tomorrow —

A - The R.C. is ready tomorrow so I think the best thing to do is tomorrow according to the matters ~~according to it~~ and arrangements we have done

B - alright

A - alright

B - When do we do it tomorrow? The time - the meeting with the R.C. and the 2 representatives

A - So let's say tomorrow at 12 o'clock or even earlier. Let's do it 12 o'clock. Here.

B - and our meeting will be 12 o'clock Saturday.

A - But the place - you ~~said~~ raised quite a problem, General,

B - There is no problem. We didn't make problems about the place before.

A - yes, but I want ~~to~~ have my communications. Maybe, let's have the next meeting here Saturday and this will be the last meeting

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים

מקור הידיעה : _____
מבוע הידיעה : _____
קובץ : _____
זמן קבלה : _____

מספר הדוח : _____
תאריך עבוד : _____
ת/ק _____
מפוצה _____

תאריך _____

last meeting here and Saturday we'll discuss and arrange a new place for it. is that alright with you

B - alright

A - So Saturday we'll meet here 12 O'clock and we'll decide upon a place for the next meeting.
Thank you very much

B Thank you v. much.

סודי ביותר
(לאחר מלוי)

טופס 2247/1

(1/250) 12/64

SECRET

Abbreviated Transcript

ISRAELI - EGYPTIAN MILITARY DELEGATIONS MEETING

(KM. 105 - CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD; 28 Oct. 73 - 0145 hrs to 0350 hrs)

PRESENT

FOR EGYPT		FOR ISRAEL	
MAJ. GEN.	ABD-EL-GHANI GAMSI	MAJ. GEN.	A. YARIV
COLONEL	HOWAIDY	COLONEL	D. SION
Mr.	IBRAHIM	LTC.	A. SHALEV
Mr.	OMAR SERY	LTC.	Y. DORAT
FOR UNEF		LTC.	A. TRAUB
LTC.	AULIS KEMPPAINEN - FINLAND	OBSERVERS:	MAJ. GEN. MAGEN
CPT.	JOSEF FALLON - IRELAND		LTC. Y. BEN ARI
			LTC. D. GEDALIAH

NOTE : MAJ. GEN. YARIV'S OPENING REMARKS WERE NOT TAKEN IN ENGLISH (BY MISTAKE) AND SHOULD BE TRANSCRIBED FROM THE TAPE-RECORD AND THE HEBREW PROTOCOL. THIS TRANSCRIPTION STARTS WITH GEN. ABDEL GHANI'S REPLY.

GHANI - We would like to reciprocate the things said by GEN. YARIV. We hope these negotiations will lead to an effective cease-fire. Before continuing - we wish to state that the cease fire has finally taken effect on 1300 hrs. today (GEN. YARIV agrees). We recognize the fact of the existance of a peace keeping UN force - between EGYPT and ISRAEL.

The cease fire, as understood by us - gives us complete freedom of supply of our forces including those east of the CANAL - food, water and medical supplies. This matter can be discussed in further details. The city of SUEZ is also to receive supplies.

I would like to speak about the general lines of the UNSC resolution 338 and 339. We have fought with valour till 22 Oct. 1852 hrs., as it ordered.

But during 23 and 24 Oct. there occured changes in positions and there was fighting after the resolution came into effect. We would like therefore to discuss the lines of a return to the ceasefire lines of 22 Oct.

.../2

The rest of the points referred to by GEN. YARIV (such as POWs lists and exchange, the return of IDF bodies, the BAB EL MANDAB blockade etc.) can be discussed, but the first step must be the implantation of UNSC resolution 338 and points evolving from it. If it is agreed - it can be discussed at any given time table - to withdraw the Israeli forces to the 22 Oct. cease fire line - than the rest of the points raised by GEN. YARIV can be discussed.

YARIV - I have no authority to discuss 22 Oct. cease fire lines. Whatever happened after 22 Oct. - was a direct result of firing by 3rd Army forces on the east bank of the CANAL. I repeat - I have no authority to discuss this.

I suggest to pass to the question of supplies. Our authorities, our P.M. - have agreed to the convoy which is now here. But I have no authorization for discussion of further convoys.

GHANI - In order to ensure a positive and constructive arrangement- ..... the supply arrangement should not be temporary. As we see it - we would like similar convoys to continue on a daily basis. Especially as the convoys carrying rations, water and medical supplies - will be under the auspices of the UNEF.

YARIV - (Agrees to discuss present convoy)

GHANI - This convoy consists of about 100 trucks with rations mainly, plus water and possibly some medical supplies. The drivers will be UN personnel.

YARIV - (Agrees - including check of contents and Israeli escort) How will the supplies get to the east bank of the CANAL, as we hold all of the west bank?

GHANI - (The approach - by 2 main roads, to SHALUFA area) Supplies to be unloaded on west bank and collected by Egyptian troops from east bank crossing by their own means (such as ferries and amphibious vehicles).

YARIV - How will this operation be supervised?

GHANI - By the UNEF.

[illegible] - If this will be agreed - supervision will be possible.

.../3

YARIV - This will mean UNEF personnel on both vanks of the CANAL. Is all this well understood? It's very important that there is understanding - though there might be disagreement.

GHANI - (Suggests supplies to be brought along SUEZ road to SHALUFA airfiels area and unloaded there and also at a point farther North - and shows points on his map).

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss further convoys; this will depend on other points of discussion.

GHANI - For this convoy only - it will not be satisfactory. We need daily convoys - there is no point to discuss this further .....

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss permanent arrangements. I can answer only about today's convoy. We shall have to meet again for further arrangements.

GHANI - (Hopes to receive date for meeting for a permanent arrangement).

HOMAIDY - The Egyptian delegation is fully authorized to discuss all points (Suggests Israeli delegation to have similar power - for constructive discussion).

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss cease fire lines of 22 Oct. and permanent arrangement of supply (Hopes to be able to answer at next meeting).

(Suggests to start checking the convoy, to be brought forward to the check-post - while he consults IDF authorities).

GHANI - The convoy is at present the concern of the UNEF, which is to supply drivers who are not yet available.

BREAK; GEN. YARIV CONSULTS WITH IDF AUTHORITIES BY TELEPHONE.

YARIV - I hope to be able to give you the timing for a meeting for discussion of further points - by noon. As for the convoy - we suggest to start it's unloading in the KUBRI area, when the UN drivers arrive.

GHANI - (Agrees; reminds again that withdrawal to 22 Oct. cease fire lines is main point for discussion).

.../4

YARIV - (Suggests to discuss meanwhile th points of POW lists and exchange; Freedom of movement in GULF of SUEZ and RED SEA; the "stand still"; local commanders arrangements).

GHANI - The withdrawal point - will open all the rest to negotiation.

YARIV - (Stresses POW's lists - as most important).

GHANI - (Suggests a schedule of negotiations should be worked out - to include discussion of POW's lists etc).

YARIV - I don't think the point of POW's lists is contigent to other points.

GHANI - (Suggests that first withdrawal to 22 Oct. cease fire lines should be discussed - and then lists of POW's).

YARIV - Would you suggest the withdrawal lines to juxtoposed to POW's lists?!

GHANI-HOWAIDY - No, no !

YARIV - Can I assume that POW's lists will be provided at next meeting?

GHANI - I hope to have them for our next meeting.

(SOME TEXT MISSING)

YARIV - What about public anouncement about the meeting?

GHANI - (Suggests - no official anouncement; to be anounced approximately: UN asked for meeting, both sided agreed, meeting took place) - YARIV AGREES.

YARIV - to KEMPPAINEN - How do you see arrangements for the convoy? UNEF personnel should be on both banks of CANAL. - KEMPPAINEN AGREES.

GHANI - The convoy is to arrive at check point exchange drivers for UNEF drivers. Supplies then to be unloaded on the western bank and collected by the Egyptian forces from the eastern bank by their own means.

HOWAIDY - The trucks are 3 tonners. There isn't much chance for the UN drivers to arrive before 6 a.m.

YARIV - Documents of UN drivers will have to be checked; (to KEMPPAINEN) - What kind of documents do they have?

KEMPPAINEN - Cyprus ID cards (YARIV AGREES)

YARIV - (Suggests convoy to be broken up into parties of 20 trucks at check point, the check to continue while checked party goes to CANAL).

.../5

BREAK; GEN. YARIV CONSULTS IDF AUTHORITIES BY PHONE

YARIV - Our authorities prefer SHALUFA as delivery point. GHANI AGREES.

KEMPPAINEN - Some of the UN drivers might not have ID cards, will you accept a UNEF officers guarantee? YARIV AGREES.

POINT CHECKED ON MAP, AREA MARKED BY GEN. YARIV ON EGYPTIAN MAP.

YARIV - I suggest KILO 138,5 (GHANI AGREES)

UNEF officer will have to be on the opposite (east) bank, and only one boat or amphibious vehicle will be permitted to cross at one time.(AGREED).

GHANI - Local commanders should be present on the spot from both sides(AGREED).

YARIV - An additional check will be carried out by us after unloading at CANAL bank. The unloading will be done by Egyptian soldiers coming from east to west bank.

GHANI or HOWAIDY - There may be difficulties between the soldiers. We suggest the check to be made at the check point here of both unloading and checking be done by Israeli soldiers on CANAL bank.

YARIV - I suggest the unloading and checking be done of one or two trucks at a time, with separation of the soldiers. The check will be made by Israeli personnel, with UN officer present. GHANI AGREES.

YARIV - The Chief of Staff just told me about an agreement to evacuate wounded Egyptian 3rd Army personnel. We request lists of our POW's and permission for visits to them by RED CROSS representatives.

GHANI - (Hopes it can be arranged).

YARIV - (Requests search and return of bodies of Israeli soldiers; we are prepared to reciprocate).

GHANI - (Asks where bodies might be found; ANSWER - All along the CANAL and in damaged tanks and vehicles; AGREES to check, suggest to wait until UN posts established).

YARIV - (Suggests again idea of "double withdrawal" - to solve problems of cease fire lines.)

GHANI - (As withdrawal to cease fire lines of 22 Oct., according to UNSC resolution 338 is a principle - YARIV's proposal will be difficult to accept. But -

.../6

- will check it. Asks for timing for next meeting).

YARIV - We will give you an answer as early as poddible.

SERY - As for publication of the meeting - following text is proposed : "The UN suggested a meeting between Egyptian and Israeli military representatives, under the auspices of the UN. Both sides agreed, and a meeting took place".

(SOME TEXT MISSING)

KEMPPAINEN - The UN drivers will take trucks in "shifts", Egyptian soldiers for unloading will cross unarmed (GHANI AGREES). The convoys will be escorted by UN vehicles. How many Egyptian soldiers will be allowed to cross for unloading?

YARIV - One truck to be unloaded at a time, 10 soldiers will be allowed to cross (GHANI AGREES).

KEMPPAINEN - The checking will be done under supervision of UN.Israeli checking personnel to be unarmed.

YARIV - 10 soldiers from each side - both unarmed (AGREED).

GHANI - (Thanks for the meeting) The main problem - are the cease fire lines, keeping of which is the main thing for the UNEF.

YARIV - As we understand - the UNEF is to supervise the cease fire - and not to fix or keep it's lines. The problem of the cease fire lines - might be a very tough one.

GHANI - (Asks about wounded Egyptians evacuation; can they be collected by the UN or by Red Cross helicopters?)

YARIV - (Promises to check the possibility of evacuation by UN convoys).

GHANI - (Red Cross prepared to evacuate wounded by cars of helicopters - possibility to cross of overfly Israeli held territory ?!)

YARIV - What about evacuation of our wounded POW's?

GHANI - (Explains the difference in status - being POW's).

YARIV - We are prepared to reciprocate - release wounded Egyptian POW's.

GHANI THANKS FOR MEETING AND WELCOME

22.10.73

First of all I would like to say ~~agreed~~ I'd like to put your jackets on first.

Major General Yariv: We take the cease-fire very seriously as well as ~~we do~~ ascribe great importance to para 3 of U.N security council resolution 338 and we have all interest to enter as early as possible into negotiations for ~~the what~~ we believe for the and just peace for all ~~the~~ sides concerned. We feel it is very important - in order to have sound cease-fire - that we all agree to do our best to maintain the cease-fire; secondly we think it very important to have a release of prisoners - of P.O.W's as early as possible. I would like to remark that we have up to now not yet received any lists of our P.O.W's and to the best of my knowledge we have transmitted through the Red-Cross the list of the prisoners we have from the Egyptian - armed - forces. So the first point concerning a cease-fire agreement was maintaining the cease-fire itself; The second point - as early as possible mutual release of P.O.W's and to do our best ~~to~~ for both sides to look and search for (miss) dead soldiers on the battle-field - to make arrangements for them; The third point - which to our mind is important - in order to have a cease-fire is the possibility to permit free navigation in the Suez - Gulf and the Red - Sea to the Bad-el-Mandeb Straights on which you are now maintaining a blokade. In addition to that, we would think it very advisable - ~~recc~~ recommended - to have arrangements made for contact ~~local~~ between local commanders so that any possible trouble

could be avoided. Of course we see the present and of course we must find a way to determine clearly, and I think this is already on the way, the lines of the cease-fire as they are now. I would like to remark that of of course we see the present lines of cease-fire something temporary and from which we shall move as readily toward the final lines of peace to be negotiated as to para 3 of the U.N. resolution. In this

In this context we think it is very important to get as early as possible to a situation where there is a seperation between the military forces, and such a seperation will enable : A : To avoid unnecessary military clashes and will enable a mild atmosphere which is imperative and necessary for our negotiations, and secondly we understand that under the present situation in this area it is very important to let civilian life to return to take it's normal course as early as possible ; whether from the agricultural point of view - you have very fertile areas in this region; whether from the point of view of the urban population in the cities along the canal - and therefore we think we propose for your consideration the following possibility - that we withdraw -- [this is a very important point so I'd let the tea and coffee arrangements take their course and then we'll return to it - with your permission General ---- I'm sorry we don't have Irish coffee. I think we can continue]

So we :- from the points of view I've mentioned there - necessity for the seperation of forces as early as possible, and in order to permit normal civilian activities to their course as early as possible ...

we want to propose to you an arrangement where by we shall withdraw our forces to the east bank of the canal and you shall withdraw your forces to the west bank of the canal, that a zone shall be established 10 kms from each side of the canal where U.N emergency force or any other U.N observer force or any other arrangement that you would prefer should prevail. And I have been ordered to propose this plan to you in all seriousness and in all earnestness for your early consideration. Now of course we ascribe great importance to everything that is concerned with the maintenance of the cease-fire, I think I have forgotten one point; I mentioned the maintenance of the cease-fire itself - a clear definition of what it means, I mentioned the early exchange of P.O.W's and arrangements for looking for dead bodies in both combat zones. I mentioned a free passage to the Gulf of Suez and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, I mentioned the local arrangements for contacts between commanders to avoid possible trouble; And there is another point which I have (not) forgotten to mention and this is the question of stand still. Arrangements to assure a standstill - of course under the stipulation that this whole period is a transitionary period from which we shall move as early as possible to negotiations as they are mentioned in para 3 of Security Council Resolution 338. Then we have of course the practical point of the convoy that we have agreed to pass to Suez for the town of Suez and the formations of the Third Army east of the canal; and I would be glad if you could give us details concerning the convoy

I'm very sorry that it did not take place earlier - this there was some misunderstanding - I was in this place ~~earlier~~ between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and 6 o'clock but understand that information didn't get you early enough and that you were waiting for us on km 72

- Right

But the ~~mess~~ message we got - I think it important to put on record - the message we got through the good office of the U.S. Government was addressed by Mr, actually, General Hafez Ismail said they would meet it is understood that each would be accompanied the Egyptian Government is prepared to despatch a representative of the Egyptian Armed & Forces rank of Major General to come in contact with an Israeli military representative of the same rank. It is understood that each would be ~~a~~ accompanied by an adequate number of assistants, here present, they would meet by 1500 hrs Cairo local time at km 110 so we came here, I'm sorry for all the delays but I stayed, we were waiting on the other side of the Canal ~~th~~ until all the arrangements were being made and I hope that you understand that here it was purely a technical misunderstanding. So I think I have made all the points I wanted to make. I would like again to stress that we would like to utilize all the possible machinery - whether the U.N Emergency Force, whether the U.N observers in order to maitain a solid cease-fire and at the same time to move as early as possible toward practicde negotiations that could lead us on

...5

to peace. As far as the proposal is concerned that I mentioned of withdrawal - mutual. withdrawa of course we understand and we want to emphasize that these _ lines will not be the last lines to which we withdraw, the last lines of our withdrawal are of course to be established and agreed upon in the negotiations. in order to reach a just and durable peace.

We hope that the war which we have had - which was a tough war - a tough battle - which both sides have done their best and fought will enable us to move through negotiations towards peace so that we might be able to establish normal relationship between our countries and between our peoples.

Thank you very much.

תרגום

I'm sorry I'll talk in arabic, you have here who can translate it exactly as I say it

- אלוה רוצה תרגום מדויק ?

- מסדר

- תתן לזה את הכבוד ...

תרגום

הלווא שהם אלגני:

בלב המבוי חג הלפידים אותם רקשור טלויות אותם ההלך
ומוא מפיל את המשלה בי הסוחרי והיוונים המתנצחים ביניהן
יפרשמו ההפסקה את הדברים האקסיומטיים ושתיהן על פרוץ אור
שתי הדברים ידועים בהן. מטרת המיתולוגיה היא לתן
מאטפיזיות הבאות על ביטוי בסיפורי מעשיות. ההלוי עוקב ההטחין 339 !
מאורין סו/בב/22 בסילוה: האוס. שלפני שתפיל הסחה היין
ידוע לחברים כי המשל הנפוץ ביותר באסף סופי
משלה 1380 הוא שניי: קיימת ואמורה לעבי הבחי
הפילוסופיות והבחי החוש הפילוסופיות שיתפחו את עצמותן
בין העולות המדבריים והפילוסופיות. [illegible]
[illegible] כי ישנם רשות לכל בעל לעסוק את בחותו, ואני נעסוק
את בחותי בלב שלם, בהיותי בטוח שהבחים הלא אותו
ביבלי, בעוד מיליון שנים, ואני נדון בנקודה
על הפרוטוקול כפי שאמר הלוי, ובמו כן הרשות לעסוק את
הלוי הואלף במעלה מיליון שנים והחמרים הפואטים והבחיים הפחותים לא.
לפחות שתי בחותיו של הלוי אינן נקיות מלא הלוי אחת
מהן היא שהמשה עליו השלום הוא בעל הברית הישן
מיתולוגיה בחיבורה שתיהן הן תלויות בבר הפחות אחת
מהן. כפי שאני מהיוני בינתי הבחה הבחה ליום 22 בשעה
1251, שעה בה מתה הסופר. במשך היומים 23, 24 הגיעו בשה
מיתולוגיות בחיבורה שתיהן הן תלויות בבר הפחות אחת
מהן. כפי שאני מהיוני בינתי הבחה הבחה ליום 22 בשעה
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מיתולוגיות בחיבורה שתיהן הן תלויות בבר הפחות אחת

II

הטוא זהה אלגיני :

המינו נולדים משאחר מתקדמים הדרך היולדי וקונטרוקטיביי , ודי
אהפקה המינו לבולחי הבאה המקרה של העלה תפיה
משמיני ולא Temperate , למשל , בריטניה שבה הוא ושלוה
להניו לא תמה האחסונה אלא בשיה תמידי , האם המינו
מסכים לכך או לא ?

ה Convey , השירה מתבצע היום ושרונך תחי פקוח האוי
המינרלי של העלה – אני רוצה שהוא תמשך בכך יום יום. זה
שנחים אחי הבונים המתקדמים בעי . כלומר לא יום אחד אלא
הדורה ומשחי היתוך מכונן שהשירה הצאי נעלה מינו
ומיים והמרוחים האחרים בלבד עפ"י ההסכם בין שחי המשלחי
לדברים אלה ? הדבר תלוי בהבנה ובאוי . האם המינו מסכים
עמי ? הדבר תלוי בשיחה בין שאי.

על שם כאלף נאמר, אני חפיתי כי הדבר הראשון הוא שלחנות
על אופן הסיבוב של המטה מוליך המטה מס' 338 ומכאן ואילך
נשיא ועל הנקודות האחרות המסומנות מעגל. אם הפנל מסובב
נתון מבון הנקודה ב, שלפי אינה צמודה ביחס
[illegible] בקצה של נפיחת הבלונים על אילנו יום 22, ואחר
ניתן יהיה לשפוך ולפרוץ חס כי הנקודות האלו
אחת הטובה השורה הינינו.

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ק: _____

זמן הקבלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ס: _____

זמן הקפלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

لا يفهم انه القتال داخل سينما يشرف حتى يوم ٢٠ سنت ١٨٥٠

عندما وقف القتال في ذلك الوقت ، وهذا يوم ٢٢ ، و؟؟

تغييرات بعض المناطق نتيجة للاشتباك في الوقت الذي قامت فيه اتجاهات

اطلاقه النيران قد تحدد بقرار من مجلس الامن رقم ٢٢٨ وعلى

ذلك ترى انه ينبغي على المنطقة التي يجب ان تعود اليها القوات

الاسرائيلية الى ما كانت عليه يوم ٢٠ وبالتالي تحل كثير من المشاكل

المتعلقة الى اثارها الجدال . النقطة الاخرى التي اثارها الجنرال

كنه لا يمانع في فكرة اطلاقا انه كنه يشترط مثل موضوع

الاسرى او القتلى او باب المندب وخلافه . وعلى هذا

الاساس اننا نشعر ان الخطوة الاولى هو ان ينفذ على

اساس تنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن ٢٢٨ وبالتالي يصل الى النقط

الاخرى المتفرعة منه . اذا واذا تقوم الجنرال بندا بمناقشة

هذه النقطة وفي اي توقيت يمكن تنفيذ انسحاب

القوات الاسرائيلية الى مناطق يوم ٢٠ وبعد ذلك يمكن

كل هذه النقط تحت وتحل بالروح الطيبة التي تسود

بيننا .

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ס: _____

זמן הקבלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

[illegible]

الاداء عبد الغني - يتمنى من نسيم اسماعيل عاريقه اجابية وعادة

انه يكون ترتيب اعاشة قدات الحبس على اساس انه الشخص

استدعيه دليس temporary مؤقته يعني انه اقول الي ما

يتحمل انزاره. وموضوع حديثنا اس عن انزاكي ل حبس

سيكون فيتو عن هذا سيأخذه عليه الجنرال ام لا.

How do you see it generally?

ال convoy القوة التي ما يجب انظاره ويتحمل تحت تهديد

الاسم المذكور الصفة الشرقية التي زعم انه يتهم سوريا

من ستراوس ان الاعتقالات التي تدور حاليا يعني ليس بريئا

واحدا وكله لصفة مستمرة خصوصا وانه هذا القول

سيحمل تعيينات وماء ومواد طبية مقبل مس الاشخاص

بين الكلوتين وما شابه تحت اشارات الاسم المذكور

وبعد هذا الكلام يأخذه عليه الجنرال انه هذا يعتبر انه

بالنسبة لنا

[illegible]

TOP SECRET 22.11.1973

A -Gamazy

B -Yariv

C -Siilasvuo

D -Uedi

E -Sion

B - You talked to me last time about fuel to Suez and I was not ready with an answer and you said that it was in the cable and I checked, and we received the cable which says: "following message passed for Yariv from Gamazy - meeting confirmed, 68 Israeli p.O.W.s shall be repatriated, tomorrow 18th November in 2 separate groups". I want to make sure that the General does not think that we have played for time. I really did not. But I think that towards the end, later, we can discuss it. You have given us the details, we have noted it down, and I think we have an answer.

A - Right.

B - We are fully conscious of the importance of this meeting. Unfortunately, the press has given wide publication to the meeting and to its urgency etc., but, from our point of view, we are looking at the contents and I see it as an important meeting because it is the first formal meeting we have in discussing para. 2 (B) of the agreement. And, therefore, I want to say that I hope we'll have a thorough, might be difficult, but thorough discussion on the problem of para B. I shall be happy if we shall be able to reach an agreement, but I don't know whether we shall be able to do so today, but I hope that even if we don't reach an agreement today, we shall be at such a situation at the end of the meeting, that will permit us to continue a further meeting if necessary tomorrow. But we shall see that as we go along.
Now, if I may with your permission, before I present para B., there are a few points. I'll touch only a few subjects before we go, because today is day No. 8, and we are finishing successfully the operation of the P.O.W.s. I would take the opportunity to thank the Red Cross, which is represented here, and I want to thank you, General Siilasvuo, for suggesting your help in arranging the transport by plane - it helped all of us to move along with this operation. But I have to bring it up at this meeting, that we had difficulties, I don't know the reason, but we've had difficulties in the exchange. We made every effort to be punctual in the plane loads, timetable and not to have any misunderstanding, but unfortunately, also after we talked, General, last time, planes were late, the groups were not according to what the Red Cross told, but this is now behind us, because the last group I understand from General Eyal... ./...

E - In 10 minutes, they will arrive in Tel-Aviv.

B - So, I hope this is alright. There is still one point we shall discuss, I understand, the first break and I hope everything will be alright. Incha'allah.

A - Everything will be alright.

B - I am glad.

Now, there is still the serious problem of the missing persons. You remember I've given you all the details, so I hope, Brigadier Sheriff will be here today.

A - He is here now. They came just to settle these names and missing persons.

B - About the evacuation of the dead bodies. There has been a postponement in the timetable 3 times. We don't know why.

A - That point I'll ask.

B - If I may come back to the point, I understand that you have apprehension or doubts about the possibility of having in addition to the Red Cross, people from our side looking for dead bodies in your area. I can understand it. But on the other hand, I cannot expect Egyptian officers, soldiers, to look for dead bodies with all their efforts. I can understand it. He is only a human being. And, therefore, I want to propose again, and ask again, that you reconsider your decision about the participation, if possible. If you have any limitations on the age of the person, on the profession of the person, if you want to blindfold him, we will gladly accept these things. It is really not a question of having more information about your troops. This is only to expedite the question of the bodies, and as we have so many problems with the missing people, one of the possibilities of answering these difficulties is by looking and finding the bodies on the ground. I don't know if you know, General, and you, General Siilasvuo, there is a very great religious difficulty we have. As long as a body is not found, according to the Jewish Law, the man is not dead. For example, his wife cannot remarry and this is a great tragedy.

A - We know that.

B - This is why I am so pressing on this point. I would also like to remind you General, of the question of the dead bodies from Suez. We talked about it and we understood from General Sheriff that this would be done.

E - Two days ago, yesterday also.

B - Before passing to para. B., I owe you an answer, General, about supply Third Army. After the last meeting, I had enough time, thank God, and I went directly from here to Kilo. Now, what I found was that you had only 80 men instead of 100 men. Perhaps it is our fault, I am not sure. I gave orders and I am sure that the Chief of Staff gave another order to have 100 men. You only work with 5 vehicles instead of 10. There a major there, and

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I called the major, and explained to him and told him please to tell his commander that he can bring next day 100 men and to use 10 vehicles. Another point was - you know the jetty here, there is a jetty. At the jetty, you can simultaneously use 3 vehicles, and only 2 were used. You load 2 instead of 3 and it takes more time.

Now, the last point is that at the same place today, because of the place they have there, they are loading, and the captain will check if I'm right, only 3 vehicles simultaneously, correct? Now we are preparing and they have started work today, or even yesterday, with engineers. There is a little house, and this is done today on the right side of the house to clear place on the left side of the house at least for another 3 lorries. So at the same time, you can unload 6 lorries. So 100 men, 10 vehicles, and the broadening of the unloading point.

And another thing - I think you want to open a wider opening on your side, and we have agreed on that. All this would solve the problem for the Third Army.

An additional point, when we were there, was that for the last couple of days they didn't get any water, only supplies, no water, because according to the agreement, you can take a lot of water. When I was there, on Monday, they said that for the last 3 days on transport, there was no water. So, I finished all the points prior to our main subject. There are some other points which we can discuss at the end. I don't want you to think that we want to gain time.

A - We'd better leave this for the coming break or finish with this... Let's start with para. B.

B - Good. Only one thing before I forget. Newspapers to Suez. There was a misunderstanding, they did not let the newspapers through. I gave orders yesterday to let the newspapers through also from the previous day, because I promised you.

A - Thank you.

B - So, now we come to, as the French say, "le vif du sujet".

General, we have already put forward an official proposal, but as you asked me to..., with your permission, I want to recapitulate, as this is a formal session. I want to recapitulate our original official proposal. Because I think that officially we have not had a reaction yet, <u>officially</u>.

As this is a formal meeting, I would like to start, formally and officially. The original proposal as you know, as I presented it and as it was published in the newspapers, was the proposal of each side returning to respectively East and West Bank of the Canal, with the withdrawal of 10 km. from the Canal and the UN replacing, entering into the area of 10 km. East and 10 km. West of the Canal.

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Although I have no difficulty in guessing your reaction, if I may, with your permission, General, just go back and explain several of the points that were incorporated in the concept of this proposal. First of all, we begin a withdrawal, and our withdrawal is one of your principal thoughts. I think the principal point in your concept. It is only the initial withdrawal. I know we might have differences of opinion; probably we shall have differences of opinion about the line of withdrawal, but we are beginning our withdrawal.

Secondly, this plan does answer the question of separation of forces and disengagement. There is a wide zone in between the forces. And I think it can permit the UN effectively to inspect and ensure the maintenance of the cease-fire. It also permits the opening of the Suez Canal for international traffic.

And I think it does give an equal starting point to both sides for the peace negotiations, and, I think, it is also a fair representation of the situation on the ground as it was at the end of the fighting.

A - We discussed that before, and we came to a conclusion on the basis of the explanation I gave that it is difficult for the Egyptian side.

B - Clear.

A - And you promised to start from your proposal.

B - I keep my promise.

A - I don't want to say the reasons...

B - I am sure you will have reasons on the second proposal too. (laughs).

A - You will repeat the second proposal?

B - Ya.

A - We accepted the other time to start from D, because we finished the three, and now you are starting from a,b,c,/

B - But it didn't take a long time. Now, I am not joking, because you could have asked me why do you need all these exercises. I said at the beginning that this is a formal meeting and this was not on the record. So, I think we have to have this for the record.

By the way, I don't know, what is your official proposal, General?

A - I gave you. It is Ras-Muhammad - El Arish.

B - So I must give you an official answer, that this is not acceptable.

A - Alright.

B - Now, I want to stress, General, that we have had long discussions...

C - I have been kept informed.

B - Good, and we have had a very long talk on Friday, I think about 4 hours, and I think we have quite a good idea about what each other's ideas and lines of thinking are. If I now come with a proposal that the General might reject very easily, it is not as an exercise in formality, but we exchange thinking. I explained to General Gamazy in our talk why the next

meeting after Friday, we won't be able to have it before Tuesday, or Wednesday. I explained the process we have to go through with the Prime Minister and her advisers and then the Cabinet and the leaders of opposition and the security and the foreign affairs committee of the Parliament. This takes a long time. Now did partake, that was on Tuesday, in the Cabinet meeting, perhaps you have seen it in the newspapers, for 5 hours. I am saying this in order to point out that what I am presenting is not something - there was a very serious discussion. I don't say that this is it and finish, but there was a very serious discussion. This is why I am proposing now our proposal inspite of the fact that I think that I can more or less understand your thinking. And, therefore, please, let us discuss this proposal even if you have a negative idea about it. What we suggest is, after our Government and the Cabinet has seriously discussed the problem, I tried my best to explain them your thinking and how you see it, and after considering all our interests and problems, the following thing: we propose to transfer all ground that has been taken by one of the sides during the last war to the UN. And go back to exposition prior to October 6th. And to this we add another thing, that this agreement should include free navigation through Bab El Mandab. If course, this else includes the return of normal civilian life to the Suez Canal Zone and the opening of the Suez Canal to international traffic as Egypt does see it fit.

Why do we bring up this proposal? First of all, we think it has all the advantages of the first proposal. Secondly, I would like to point out, because, General Gamazy has mentioned it several times, he has mentioned it as a point of principle that the soil is Egyptian soil; we don't dispute the fact. But, as I said before, as we are talking about separation of forces and disengagement, which means a withdrawal of Israeli forces to a <u>temporary</u> line, and we don't know how long - this is one of the points we have to discuss. The question of the sovereignty of the soil belonging to Egypt, I don't say it's not important - to each nation there is nothing more important, but it is not relevant directly to this problem, because there will be further withdrawal. So it does not infringe upon the principle that this soil is Egyptian soil.I know you mentioned it and I want you to understand how we see, and on this question, there is no discussion between us, and no difference of opinion. I am emphasizing it that we understand how important this point is for you.

Now, I think that under this proposal, first of all, we give up a very very important strategic advantage. I know that you might (and this is legitimate) that the only thing we have in our mind is to ensure a

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superior military position. This is not the case - a sound military position yes, but it is not our supreme interest to ensure a superior military position. Our supreme interest is eventually to reach peace. We will have a tough fight with you. I hope a verbal fight - not with fire, we will have long discussions, long negotiations, and each side will use every means it has in its political arsenal to try to win an advantage, this is clear; but this does not stand in any contradiction that our supreme interest is eventually to reach peace, and not eventually to have military superiority. To maintain a good military position that will a) help us and permit us to wage a good political discussion and to wage this political struggle, this is something which is natural, but we don't want, under any normal circumstances, to maintain a superior military position. By withdrawing from the West Bank, we are giving up a considerable strategic advantage. Very considerable strategic advantage. After all, we are in a position astride 3 important roads, roads that are very important to you. We are sitting where we are 101 km., it is not so far from vital centres of Egypt. We understand the sensibility from your point of view. I am not trying to point out how strong we are, etc. This is not the point at all. I am only trying to point out that we are giving up a very strategic advantage in the immediate context, in the context of the final solution, this is not important. But in the immediate context of separation of forces, of disengagement, this is a very important point. At the same time, we are lifting the encirclement of an important military element, of what you have here of the Third Army. In addition, by our withdrawing when I analyse the military situation, what will it look like when we withdraw, from your point of view, our withdrawal, not only to give up already what we mentioned - the giving up of an important strategic advantage, but by our withdrawal, under this proposal, permits you immediately after withdrawal, to unify 4 of your military components which are now not unified: Second Army, Third Army in two parts, the forces you have along the Kassassin - Ismailia road, these are 4 different elements; by our withdrawal these elements are unified and from the military point of view, this is a great advantage to you, no doubt. We understand this, but it is alright with us because we see it not in the context of the next round of fighting, but in the context of advancement towards peace. I am always coming back to this point, because I am afraid and we are afraid and we are apprehensive that you think that we are only looking at everything from the context of how to be in a good position for the next round. This is not our line of thinking. In addition to that, if I may now try to be as a military

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analyst, I know that you don't need my military analysis, the general doesn't need my military advice, or my military analysis, but as a matter of fact, 5 infantry divisions, your famous 5 infantry divisions, they are now in an operational situation where they have great limitations for operation. The moment we do the withdrawal, your 5 divisions are free to operate fully. They can operate today as well, of course, but there are limitations. Under this scheme of withdrawal, they have free full operational ability. In addition, you have separation of forces, UN is in a position, under this proposal, to do its inspection. By the way, if you want a disengagement from the West Bank, under any circumstances, this is a tricky military operation. This scheme, where the UN comes is and we go over, this facilitates this tricky military operation, of taking out big size of a military force, transplanting it to the Eastern Bank.

Now, we come to another very important point, which we mentioned in our presentation of the principles. There is always the question of sovereignty and military presence. Under this scheme, it is true on the East Bank there is no military presence, but full expression of Egyptian sovereignty except for military presence, over the area evacuated by us. Egyptian administration over all civilian activities, including the return of inhabitants to the cities along the Suez Canal. General mentioned Minister Osman and his activities, Egyptian flag, the opening of the Suez Canal, all this can be done under Egyptian sovereignty and administration, including police forces.

C - But with UN presence.

B - Of course, with UN presence. But I don't see any contradiction we've had this in our area, there have been precedents of this all over the area. Now, we have also worked one of the possible time plans. If you want later to go into details, we can present 8 possible time plans which can be changed, which can be compressed only to show you that we have also thought how this can be brought about.

A - I think this proposal was discussed last time also, and we think that in this case, we will be in an inferior military position. There will be no security for the people in the Canal Zone; there will be no security for opening the Canal for international traffic; actually, there is no separation of forces, because the space is very small, so from this military and political point of view, we came to a conclusion and we discussed that with our authorities and we, it is impossible for us to accept that as I said the last time;

I don't want to say anything about the sovereignty of Sinai, that's our land and no doubt that we have sovereignty over it, and we have the right

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to be there and so our troops there, so I don't want to discuss that subject or that item. So from the military and political point of view, it is very difficult to accept for the reasons I mentioned now. It won't give any help for both of us, and there is no separation of forces here. There is no disengagement here, nothing at all, nothing at all. All the troops will be away from each other 10 km., as I understand from the proposal as we discussed it before. With a machinegun we can do it or you can do it.

B - You must have a very high charge for the machinegun.

A - I don't want to say "artillery" because we know all the arms and their characteristics. So, I would like to have another proposal, practical one, so we can think about it.

B - "Tefadal". It is up to you now. I presented 2 proposals. You didn't present anything because we discussed these two.
But it was unofficial. It was an unofficial discussion.

A - We started talking about the problems unofficially only in order to have the thinking of each other, but still it is a proposal and was discussed by our side.

B - What is your proposal?

A - And the third proposal you said: a,b,c,: the UN should work 10 km. on the East and that is the disengagement. That's another informal proposal.

B - I didn't understand you.

A - That's another one of your proposals - it will be the coming one (laughs).

B - But what is your proposal? Seriously now, because we talked informally. I am not playing around. Really! Because we are in a formal meeting, what is your official proposal?
One official proposal you gave - East of Al-Arish, Ras Muhamad, UN 60 km. North 100 km. South. This is your proposal. On this my government's answer is negative. I proposed one official proposal, your answer is negative, second official proposal, your answer is negative. Am I to understand that you are still standing on the line of disengagement as the line of Al-Arish, Ras Muhamad?

A - ...

B - I understand, but on this our answer is negative. So I must ask you if you have another proposal.

C - May I ask one question now, because I do not completely understand this proposal. How far would the Israeli troops then retreat?

B - Now, that would mean,

C - Because you said this doesn't give security.

B - This is a little bit complicated, because for example, we shall evacuate here 1670 square kilometers on the West Bank. Then what will be evacuated

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on the East Bank by the Egyptian armed forces 880 square kilometers, which is only a temporary evacuation anyway, because we continue to withdraw. But this brings up another point because you can say "wait a minute, do you mean that all this would be with UN troops?" We can discuss this, maybe not all this but up to a certain line. b) Under the present lines, we still have forces between south of Ismailia to the Great Bitter Lake; between Kabrial and south of Ismailia we have forces, let us say that this can be discussed. Because otherwise you have Egyptian forces on the North of the East Bank because you have been there the whole time, 10km. Then, you have UN until South of Ismailia, then between south of Ismailia and Kabrial you have Israeli forces, then UN again. Let us say that this can be discussed also. In order to answer your question, let us assume that this means that there are no Israeli forces closer than the line that is today held by the Egyptian forces on the East Bank, which is in some places at the most, I think, 13 km. in some places 7 km. Or, we can agree on another line let us say from 10 to 12 km. Let us say the maximum point of your line of contact and let's make this the line. Does that answer your question?

Then, of course, for the security of the Canal and civilian activity, let us say we agree that the UN will be all along, this side with the Egyptian presence where it was before October 6th, and here most of the Canal will be with the Egyptian forces. Let us say that our forces, I don't have authority yet, but let us say that our forces will be here, yes?

A - That is the UN zone?

B - This is Egyptian, this is UN instead of Second Army, and this is Israeli. But let us say we discuss that and we leave that, and will all be UN. And if we are here then another point that we can agree on is that there will be nothing heavier than machineguns, light machineguns. And a limitation of forces here, let us say that we will ask for something mutual on the East Bank, in order to eliminate the danger to the Suez Canal activity and civilians. Of course, the best assurance is when there is traffic. General, we are interested in your having civilian activity as soon as possible, because we see it also as a guarantee for us. Not an objective to fire against, but a guarantee for us. The movement in the Canal is more than an assurance to us.

A - I answer with the same answer.

B - I did not believe that after bringing up a good argument, you will change the answer.

C - I wanted only to know this question of the Israeli presence because I also have to give of course my opinion.

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B - General, what I want to say, the proposal means meanwhile presency, but this is a point that can be discussed. Then the Israeli presence can be in such and such a distance. And under such mutual limitations of weapons and size of forces that the Egyptian side a - will not have any doubts about our capability to do any offensive operations, b - that we won't be able to do anything harmful against civilian targets here, and mutually we shall not be afraid that the Egyptian side has on the first line such concentration of forces that the next morning they can cross the Canal. I understand that to sum up this stage of the discussion, the General has presented an official proposal, which was given to us in the informal talks and we have not accepted. I have presented two official proposals which the General has not accepted. I don't yet whether except for the Sharm-el-Sheikh Ras Muhamad line the General wants to present another proposal. But may I propose to have a break. If the General wants to...

A - Alright.
I presented Al-Arish area to Ras Muhamad we have the map of that. East of Al-Arish. We have another proposal to keep Al-Arish east and west to the UN, as it is the capital of Sinai.

B - Ya. This is how I understood.

A - That's a new proposal. And then your troops will be east and our troops will be west. Other details can be discussed, to what lines, what forces, security zone on both sides, type of forces to be in the area, and all other guarantees for both sides. I am looking forward for the coming Conference. This proposal will give you the chance to discuss on the political level all other problems in the security council resolution 242. There is no problem from the military point of view at all. And that is our second proposal: instead of East of Al-Arish and keeping about 40 km. in your hands, now about 60 km, 80km., may be 100 km. to be in your hands, and keeping the area Al-Arish down to the UN. In all cases, Sharm-el-Sheikh area should be in any solution in the hands of the UN, as it is the main problem for both sides in the Resolution 242.

B - I understand that the whole area between Al-Arish and the Canal will have your main forces.

A - I didn't say the main forces - we can discuss it. We can have our main forces, and security zone and light forces and frontier troops, and then we can discuss where to put the frontier troops, where to put the light troops, where to put the main forces.

C - How would then this question of the amount of troops be supervised?

B - May I suggest that we leave it, because I wanted to raise it, with your permission.

C - Because it is my interest.

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B - Of course, I am not disputing that.

A - The guarantees and the precautions will be done by the UN.

C - I would now like quickly to get an idea. There would be a kind of semi-demilitarized area which should then be somehow...

B - I want to understand, General, you propose that we withdraw from here to Al-Arish directly.

A - In some phases, we'll fix it.

B - If I understand, you say, for disengagement and separation of forces, you propose that we actually move (all the phases will be technical phases), but what you actually propose is that we move directly from a line here directly to Al-Arish.

B - Then, I must ask you, General. I remember one bright morning, km. 104, you presented to us what you then called the El Gamazy plan (laughs). And we even talked about the possibility that in addition to General Siilasvuo you might get the Nobel Prize for it. You remember?

A - .... you may have the Nobel Prize.

B - I think that we can both agree that the General will get it. I agree.

A - I agree.

B - So in that plan, the concept was different. Altogether different con - cept. Because you talked of a line of at least 30 km. between your forward lines on the east shore, on the Eastern Bank, and our forward lines in the Sinai, and you explained that was a question of artillery range. But nowhere in that plan was there anything similar to our forward line being in Al-Arish - Ras Muhamad.

A - We didn't discuss the plan at all.

B - But you said 30 km. It was not 30 km, from Bir Gafgafa. It is 30 km. from your forward line as it is now. The Colonel understood me.

A - No he was not with me. We were alone.

B. - Alright. When we talked then, you mentioned your bridge heads, 2nd Army and 3rd Army. The bridge heads are, let us say, the eastern most point 12 km. from the Canal (I have brought with me the map with the exact line). If you add 30 km., we do not get to Al-Arish and Ras-Muhamad.

A - Yes, right...

B - I don't want to beat about the bush. What I am asking is whether we can discuss something in between the proposal I have presented and the line you have presented, the line Al-Arish - Ras Muhamad?

A - We came here to discuss all the proposals.

B - Good.

A - And I think you have the authority through the Cabinet and the Knesset and all this, and I think I have the authority too.
I gave my proposal, that is the Gamazy proposal you mentioned. We were alone both of us.

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B - No witnesses, only you and me.

A - I don't deny I said it.

B - I didn't for one minute think that you will deny it.

A - And also General Tal discussed the thing with me alone to see my thinking as one of the members who is responsible for this discussion. Our military leaders, we have also military leaders.

B - You met yesterday with the President.

A - And yesterday, we had a big meeting also, before I came. So, if I give my proposal, I can back it, but I am not authorized to say it now. I am giving the official proposal now, and you are giving the official proposal.

B - I understand. What you say now is very important, because I understand that we have ground for discussion.

A - Sure, sure.

B - This is very important.

C - Of course, in this hide plan for eventual withdrawal, I would see as one stage may be your second proposal.

E - General, it has to be like this through the UN.

B - We can buy it for you.

C - If Israel agrees with your proposal, there must be a timetable then and a plan how to withdraw the troops.

A - Right.

C - And I thought that there may be as one of the first stages, may be start in the North maybe oontinue in the South. That our stage could be the second proposal of Israel, would be part of that withdrawal.

A - Alright. The plan for withdrawal is very easy to be put by both sides, that can be carried out easily.

B - I think the General would like, first of all, to agree on a plan, and to discuss the phases of withdrawal.

C - For instance, thinning out the Second Army, under UN supervision.

B - Yes. What I wanted to propose, General, I still have a long list of points, to discuss, to elucidate, to clarify, in order to see what the ground between us is where we can advance, and I think I am not sure whether the General can, but I think if we would enter a discussion about the advantages I could convince you, that you have a good case. But I understand we cannot discuss it. But what I propose is to enter a break now, and after the break come back and enter a discussion, about the various things that can perhaps bring solution.

A - I hope so.

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A - Let's continue.

B - So, I hope we can finish it tomorrow. We'll meet tomorrow. I know that with your authority of importance, you can.

A - You are a brilliant political man. (laughs).

B - This means a bad General.

A - You will be a political man from tomorrow.

B - No, I have another few days time. So, I'll be here.

A - Alright.

B - Now, before we continue, if I may a) fuel for Suez (I promised you an answer). So in principle - OK, but we'll have a discussion about the quantities. I know Colonel Uedi is already looking at me. We have a difference of opinion about the quantities of fuel.

A - We don't want to discuss these things now.

B - In the end? OK. Now,I wanted only to tell you that I have not forgotten. I have in principle a positive answer; about the quantities we will make a discussion in the end.

E - We should move the negotiations into Hilton Cairo and Hilton Tel-Aviv.

A - You have Hilton in Tel-Aviv?

B - Yes. You have Hilton Nile and we have Hilton Tel-Aviv. I think our nicest hotel.

C - You can make a compromise to have the meeting in Sheraton (laughs).

B - In summer, I go for my health to Sheraton.

I want to clear up a point of principle. When we are talking about disengagement, I am coming to think that perhaps there is a misunderstanding about what you call disengagement and what we call disengagement. Why do I say this after I looked at your map? When you showed me the map, and you said disengagement, I understood that you are meaning something that is of great change, great change in the situation, as it was from June 1967. And a great change from the situation as it is today if we withdraw right back to the line you have proposed. Now, what we had in mind when we spoke about disengagement, is a withdrawal that puts an emphasis on separation of forces, and on a temporary round that will permit us to start the peace negotiations. The peace negotiations I don't know when they will start, because until today we have not yet had an invitation. But let us assume, sometime in December or January. Why do I say December or January, because we have the elections December 31st, and the main subject for elections will be the political problem. Now, for our government, to discuss the peace negotiations without a mandate from the people is impossible. So the peace negotiations won't start until after our elections. It is not a question of

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tactics from our point of view, or some intentions. It is impossible for the government to go to peace negotiations without a mandate. Impossible. I think I now understand what you mean by line of disengagement and I think there is a difference in the way we see the disengagement in principle, I am not speaking about lines, and as you see it. We were thinking about something we withdraw to for a certain period which we can discuss. We can discuss the length of the period during which we stay in the line of disengagement, on which we shall agree. But we did not have in mind something like this line. Perhaps you think that in this line we'll stay during the peace negotiations. And if the peace negotiations take 8 months, 10 months, perhaps a year, we did not think about a line to which we will withdraw and on this line we will stay for 10 or 12 months! We can discuss it. Therefore, we did not think about something that far. I would like to clear up because it is a point of principle. I think there is a difference of opinion.

A - No, since 1967, we think that there was no disengagement at all. Both of our troops are opposite each other.

B - Correct.

A - As a step for the final settlement, the line should be somewhere in Sinai, very far from the Canal. And our troops both sides should be very far from each side. And a new element, the UN troops, to separate the troops for a long time. This situation will be a real disengagement for a long, long time. But not, as you say, 10 or 5 km. from both sides as you think. The line we proposed now will give both sides...

B - General, this is a delegate of President Kadafi, he is from Tripoli.

A - Who?

B - That soldier. We won't keep him here (laughs).

? איפה למד ערבית

His Atabic is not good, he came as a very small boy.

מזרחי

B - Excuse me, the Prime Minister has asked me to ask you if we can have, she wants me to have the names, your names tonight. So that I can come tomorrow with your people, and that you can bring Mizrachi and.....

A - I can't promise on that, because we'll go back at 5 or 6 o'clock, we'll start discussing the question until midnight, and then until these people will get the names, and then they will have the approval on the names, and then as you know, he has been 25 years in prison. So through our tribunal, it will take time. So the prison can't give the orders to send him for one day.

B - May I ask you a personal favour, General. If you would let Cairo know of our Prime Minister's request. Would you do it perhaps now?

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A - I assure you I am backing Mizrachi to come back to your camp.

B - I know, I know.

A - We don't need to keep him.

B - I know, General, but perhaps you can let them know now, so that we can gain time.

A - Alright.

B - Thank you.

(end of tape)

A - The negotiations may take 1 month, 2 months, 10 months. We will be safe and you will be safe and everything will be clear for both sides. And you still have so many cards with that line from the political point of view to discuss all the matters you need to carry out Resolution 242.

B - I understand now. I have no authority now to discuss a final line of disengagement. But I have the authority to have your ideas and views on the first or second line of disengagement. Let us discuss the question of the first line of disengagement. Before we make a line on the map, I would like to ask a number of questions, because this will help you when I get back, to get authority to discuss it "yaani". What I would like to ask you first is the question of your forces on the East Bank. Today on the East Bank, you have the Second Army, a strong force, a strong force. Now, in the initial phases of disengagement, the presence of a strong force from your side on the East Bank presents a military problem. We are talking about progressing towards a peace settlement. When we are in the initial lines of settlement and you have a strong military force which has strong , infantry troops with all light, medium and heavy infantry weapons with tanks, protected by a strong umbrella, strong and efficient umbrella of air to ground missiles. This presents a difficult problem for us. When we are in the initial stages of disengagement, when everything is very sensitive and very fragile. If you have such a force in mind, and in your mind - as I understood you are speaking not only about Second Army concentration like that, you are also speaking about the Third Army concentration like that. This presents a serious problem.

A - OK?

B - OK.

A - As I said before clearly, why are we keeping these strong forces on the East? Because we didn't come to any settlement. And we didn't come to any engagement line. Or we didn't come to settle any separation of the troops. So, we have the Canal - a very serious water barrier, and we have your forces in front of us. So we should keep good forces and

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strong forces to the East. As I said before, the farther away we get the disengagement line to the east, the less troops we will keep on the Eastern Bank. But if this line is very close to our line, say 10, 20, 30 km., we are obliged to keep big forces on the Eastern Bank. That is the problem. So we should make compromise in both.

B - Distance and size. You told me this the last time.

A - And I still insist on that. That is very important from the military point of view, not political. And another problem I want to raise: when we start opening the Canal, the minute you withdraw, we will start working for opening the Canal, and put our civilians in there. When we open the Canal we shall have thousands of civilians working on the Eastern Bank of the Canal with their tractors. They need at least 5 - 10 km. to work. Say 5, 2, 3 km., so our defensive positions on the Eastern Bank will be nil. There will be no defensive positions. So we should move forward, or you should move backward, make it like that to make it easier.

B - Alright.

A - Because we will not have defensive positions or good defensive positions in this area. So we should have a space for that. In this case, the farther distance you go,

B - The smaller the size of the force.

A - And this will be discussed. And of course from the strategical, tactical point of view, we can choose the lines very easily. I'm afraid we are talking here political and military. I know that's our work.

B - Alas!

A - But it gives weight for the military side. That's all.

B - Alright. I am taking each point very carefully. Let us assume for the moment that we have an agreement on the distance, what do you have in mind once we speak about symbolic forces? It is a division, tanks, anti-missile system?

A - If you go to that line...

B - General, this is a very important point and I'll do my best to explain to you how we see it. I understand what you have said. Let us say there's a first phase of withdrawal, and we'll agree 3, 6, 4, months, we can agree, because I understand that you don't want a line of disengagement that looks too near to you. In such a condition, if you have big military forces on the East side, and we have very light military forces, we are in a difficult situation for that period. The question is whether we cannot consider a system which is limited in time, which will permit the following things to happen: which will permit you to start civilian activities, whatever you decide, which will permit us to prepare for peace negotiations and to start (not to enter the peace

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negotiations fully)., to start the peace negotiations; b) which will have mutual guarantees, that we won't be able to do anything military against you, and that you won't be able to do anything military against us. Then, look for a system which will ensure us. For example, if you have only limited forces on the Eastern side and the main forces on the Western side. If there is a UN zone on the East Bank of the Canal. If then there is a security zone for us which will ensure you that we have nothing heavier than light machineguns, and that all our main forces and all our artillery is out of artillery range from the Suez Canal, and all this for limited time period, and it is understood that this is the first line of disengagement - Is this possible, do you think this is a possibility? Because I have to go back home and show them, because at the Cabinet this was not discussed. So, I must come home and have your ideas in order to present them, in order to explain them and have the Cabinet's decision on this. You remember what I told you the last talk. You asked me "General Yariv, how long will these talks about disengagement take, another month?" I said "No, we'll meet Thursday, if we cannot come to an agreement, you'll go back, I'll go back, we can sit Friday, we can sit Saturday, and I hope we'll work it out". I said "if there's an agreement "hamdulla'allah", if God forbid there is a dead lock, it is bad". If there is war each side will do what it can. But we don't want war. We want an agreement. And it is not easy, I know. You have problems, we have problems. We must work it out. So I am trying now to clarify all these points. Was I clear enough?

A - Yes. If we come to a conclusion for starting civilian activities preparing for peace, as you said, mutual guarantees and so on, I agree, but just apply it and put it on the map, and give me the lines to see how it can go. Theoretically, yes, but practically, we want to see how it will go.

B - Yes, I understand. General, I understand that you cannot tell me "OK, fine". You have to see because tomorrow morning, I can come to you with a map which will be out.

A - Why don't you want to put it now?

B - Honestly, it is not in my pocket. I have the authority to restate proposal No. 1, to present proposal No. 2, and I did it not just like that, because we had a long discussion about that, and I have the authority to clarify these problems. We discussed various lines, it is true. You remember you gave me a drawing, personal view? I gave you a drawing unofficial personal view. But I don't have an official map. And I don't know, I don't have the authority to present a map today. But I have full authority to discuss all these factors with you.

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We have discussed them on Friday, but I have authority to discuss it again. And I'll take again each point, we have time.

Now, I understand what you said about final line of disengagement, not final line of settlement - El-Arish - final line of disengagement; b) I understand that this does not rule out temporary line of disengagement. We must discuss where it is, and its modalities and its details.

A - And its lines.

B - You can accept the principle, but you cannot accept the line until you see it on the map.

A - Right.

B - OK. So this we have cleared up. Very important. Now, you told me that as far as the size of the forces is concerned, this has to do with the distance of the line of disengagement, let us say the temporary, the first line of disengagement. Its distance from the Canal zone will influence the size of the forces you want to have on the East Bank. Point No. 3: When we say we go to the first line of disengagement, east of the Canal, we have agreed on the distance and it answers your problems. What is the time frame you have in mind for such a line? 4, 5, 6 months? less 1, 2 months?

A - The sooner, the better.

B - For example, if we say 3-4 months.

A - To go to the first line of disengagement -

B - No, to go tomorrow - "bukra".

A - And stay there.

B - Yes, to go tomorrow. Because, as I told you, we have no interest to stay in this piece of ground. This is your piece of ground. If it is necessary, we can stay here as long as it is necessary, but we have no interest. If we can come to an agreement, we leave. So, the time frame I am talking about is not <u>until</u> we withdraw, but <u>after</u> we withdraw. How long to your mind we stay there?

A - What's your opinion?

B - Let's say 3-4 months.

A - On the first line. To what distance?

B - You gave me an indication. We would like to speak about a distance of 10-12 km. of first line East of the Canal, light forces, security zone. In other words, in order to be clear: for this time frame what we are thinking (again I don't have the authority, but to give you an idea), the westernmost line of security zone, we are thinking about 10-12 km., from the Canal. But nothing heavier than light forces.

A - That's a security zone for your troops?

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B - That means our troops here, say 10 km., and then you have security zone 10 km?

C - Then it would be 20 km. from the Canal.

B - If I may draw here. This is, let us say, between 10 to 15. Then, security zone, then main forces.

A - That is the Egyptian 10 km. and then 10 km. security zone. Clear. Here the Canal, Egyptian forces 10 km. and UN.

B - I want to discuss with you the size of the forces. There we have a security zone.

C - With UN?

B - No, without UN. We would agree if here there would be only UN, but the General insists on having Egyptian presence on the Eastern side.

C - Who guarantees that there are only light forces?

B - I'll come back to the question of inspection. We have a number of proposals to it. Now, I would say that the Easternmost line of security zone should be so that our main forces are out of artillery range from here, because you brought out the point that you cannot have any civilian activities here. We are willing to do it. Everything we have here will not be able to fire on the zone here, on the Canal here.
The problem is what size of force you will have here? If you are speaking about the size of force you have now in the Second Army, this is against us. This is why I asked you what do you have in mind by symbolic forces, in addition to administration. Please, General, I am telling you the truth frankly and honestly, I don't have any signature. I am now trying to clarify a position so that I can go back and discuss it.

A - We don't understand how the UN will work here 10-15 km. If we say 10, it is impossible for any UN forces to work.

B - Why not? The question is what size of force you'll have. This is what I want to clarify if you say "symbolic presence", it is not a brigade, it is not a division, it is a smaller force, it is a small force. Then, I don't see any difficulty. But, then, perhaps, I am wrong.

A - Where is our security zone? Just to put reconnaissance patrols, frontiers...

B - I'll tell you what we can have, first of all there is the UN.

A - There is no UN.

B - Why not, you can have the UN.

A - But the area for the UN 5 km., I don't accept 5 km.

B - Only now for the sake of argument. First of all, we can have combined patrols.

A - On what?

B - On this line. UN-Egyptian-Israeli patrols. Another point - we are ready

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to accept your observation posts here on our line. And we'll have observation posts to see what is going on and you will have observation posts to see what is going on. We propose mutual air-photo coverage. We can agree by national means or by international means or by other means.

A - Why do we complicate it like that? We have 300 km. to go in Sinai. Why are we pressing ourselves here in these 15km.? Give them the area to work, and give us the area to work.

B - I'll tell you why. Because we are entering peace negotiations and we'll have a long fight with differences of opinion, and it is a very fragile situation. We cannot pass from one situation very quickly to another. We talked about it and I was very frank. And we have now the problem of what you mean by peace and what we mean by peace. What I suggested here is a transitory phase, that will give us the feeling, you as well as us, that we enter the peace negotiations when we are still in a position that militarily we are more or less balanced, more or less balanced, so that we enter the political struggle when neither we have a military superiority over you, nor you have a military superiority over us. We may have a military superiority generally. This is a different thing. But on the ground, on this immediate problem on the ground, this is another thing. Nothing behind it more than that.

E - There is another point that I would like to clarify. The civilian administration gives you the whole bridging system over the Canal, which is an assurance to you that in case hostilities break out, you have the possibility of crossing the Canal, not as a military operation, but as a civilian operation. The fact that the bridge heads are there is an indication of hostile intentions. The moment you have reduced the bridge heads and we have reduced the bridge heads on the Western Bank, this is a symbolic sign that both sides don't have any aggressive intentions. Now, from a purely military point of view, you are in a very strong position because in case hostilities break out, inspite of all the assurances etc., you have the bridges over the Canal, and the Canal is in Egyptian sovereign hands to bridge the Canal and let your forces in.

A - I don't agree, because this situation will put us in a very bad military situation. In a very bad military situation. Secondly, will give us indication that there is doubt between both of us. Because you are very very close to the Canal. We don't have any inch to move. So if you say we can cross the Canal and so on, that's only theoretical, but not practical.

E - You had a practical possibility with us sitting on the Canal. ./...

A - And you have also practical experience (laughs).

B - Technically, you can move 500, 600 tanks in one night, and we can't do anything about it.

A - And you can do the same thing from Sinai.

C - I must say here one thing. Please have confidence in UNEF now. UNEF 2 is different from UNEF 1, as everybody knows. It has been established by the Security Council. It has the backing of the permanent members, and in fact of the whole world. The world is fed up with the war. Anything which we are guaranteeing will create very very strong reactions. And, although we have no tanks, no airplanes, no guns, I think we have more than hope to be the guarantors now. And if it depends on me personally, we shall guarantee.

B - I fully accept your words.

A - Let's first of all agree on principle. Let's start with the UN forces. We think that the UN forces should operate in a wide distance, we should give them as wide a distance as we can to be sure to separate the troops. This distance may be between 20 to 30 km. If we come to that conclusion, or accept that, then we'll see how it works. Do you think it is good as a buffer zone between both troops?

B - I'll tell you. I think, with your permission, General, I think the problem for UNEF is not to have room to manoeuvre the troops.

A - The presence of UNEF in a wider area gives us guarantee to keep away from each other.

B - I want to separate several aspects. For UNEF it is important to have enough room that represents a barrier for each side. I think in the talk we had on Friday, we mentioned that, and I agree with General Siilasvuo that there is a big difference in principle between UNEF 1 and UNEF 2, not only of size and importance, because of backing etc. As I understand it, the commander of UNEF 1 won't be able to say by himself -

C - Only by the instructions of the Security Council.

B - This is a big difference. The Secretary General won't have the authority; once in the Gaza district there was a line, line 1 man deep. If we speak about a zone, even if it is 5 km, 7,8,9,10, the question for General Siilasvuo is not to make movement with the armour troops. The problem for General Siilasvuo is to say to each side "Gentlemen, we are here the guarantors of cease-fire or armistice or anything else, and if you attack us, or if you try to move, you are acting against the world organization". Therefore, whether it is 5, 20 or 10 km. is not important. Now, what is important is the question you raised of artillery range, this I accept. Because if we hold the line, within an artillery range of the Canal Zone, we won't touch the General, but

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our walk so to speak over your . There you have a case, I agree. We don't have civilian targets, you have the civilian targets, therefore is on us. We should not be in a position where we can fire with whatever weapons we have, if we have M6 at this point, and artillery at this point, that we should not be able to fire on your civilian targets. But the width of the UNEF force in between whether it is 10 or 20 km., this is not so important. Because in 10 km, even in 5 km. depth UNEF can fulfil its mission. If there are no administrative problems.

C - You are speaking of no practical...

B - Yes, yes, this I understand, there should be a road etc. The infrastructure inside the zone should permit the life of such a force.

C - Yes. We cannot leave our troops in the middle of the desert without roads. That is of course, one point.

B - Clear and accepted. For example, if you look at the map, I'll tell you General the map is my prestige, because when I was the Director of Intelligence, the intelligence was responsible for the production of maps, so I want to show you my map. These are the lines today. You explain your idea.

E - Let's say that this road is in the hands of the UN, the lateral road going from to . And here are about 8 East West roads. We figured UN check-posts on each of these...

C - Are you talking about 8 battalions, one on each road?

E - Either 8 companies or 8 battalions.

C - Small battalions.

E - On each road. These will also be meeting points. The 101 meetings we'll make them here or here. And here the meetings of the local commanders and the joined patrols. We figured something, I mean privately, it wasn't presented to the Government, of some sort of assistance, where UN at the same time separates between the forces and at the same time is able to exercise some sort of cooperation between the forces by enforcing the cease-fire.

C - And where will the security zone of Israel be?

E - Somewhere to the East, and the Egyptian light forces to the West.

A - Where is our security zone?

B - I must tell you I don't know his plan.

A - Why are you giving your troops a security zone without giving us a security zone, what is the sense of it from the military point of view?

E - This is a sort of a middle line. There is one road here along the Canal. This is the second road here. So the Egyptian administration has got the road along the Canal. And the possibility of doing all the construction

work needed to clear the Canal and bring life back to the Canal zone. The UN has the second line. About the security zone of light forces or police forces, or whatever you call it, Egyptian forces come up to this road.

A - That is the main forces here.

B - This is a line of contact. This is not a road.

E - We would like to start from a new conception. If we go back to the previous conception, the same thing we can say, we have a line here, the same way that you have the line here.

A - But why don't we start from the concept of peace? According to the concept of peace, you will leave Sinai. And then leave the political leaders to discuss about when and Sharm-el-Sheikh.

B - General, I have a suggestion. If we start from the concept of peace, we'll need 6 months to discuss what peace means.

A - We'll leave it to the foreign ministers.

E - Let us call it "separation of forces". According to the separation of forces, we propose the idea that both sides . We have here 1600 square kilometers, you have 800, we put in Siilasvuo's bank (laughs). For the time being, we'll say - he is the banker. Let's start with what we can agree upon, I mean, what is the idea of the separation of forces.

C - Yes. (they open maps).

B - Each square is 1 km.

E - We figured it like this: 520 square kilometers 2nd army.

B - You say 175mm. gun has 32-33 range? Out of artillery range.

A - You gave me now one more kilometer (laughs).

B - General, I know I have to think about the things you have said, the people in the Cabinet they have to think. They are not as far advanced as we in the talks. We understand each other.

C - That's about 10 km.

B - About.

E - For instance, even if we forget the West Bank, we are still here on this side.

B - We will go back to here. I know you are looking at me, Colonel, I am speaking seriously.

D - We agreed on one thing - that we need disengagement to separate the troops. Allow us to work, allow us to return the civilian activities. Any kind of security for civilian activities.

B - Yes, you have, why not?

D - That's an endless theoretical discussion , you allow this civilian interest to be risked like that.

B - How far do you have between the Canal and all your forces? 100 km. the whole Egyptian Armed Forces! Between the Canal -

C - And Cairo

B - You have all your forces. And we are "be'id, be'id" so you have a good guarantee.

D - Have we?

B - Yes, I think so. What can we do? I am thinking what can we do?

D - You have all your axis free eastwards -

B - And you have all your axes free. I am asking you, why do you think we have an interest to offend the Canal?

D - Well, I don't see any interest for you even to be present here. The farther you go, the better guarantee you give us and you get out of us.

E - The difference between the two forces is this that you have the concentration of all your army, standing army, permanent army, at a 100 km. zone at constant readiness. We have an army which is a mobilized army a civilian army, and we have to have a)the army in Israel, about 300km. from here, b) we have the time lag of mobilizing the army.

B - And moving. You know it well from October 6th.

E - This is the difference. You have a guarantee here and we have to have the minimum 2 days to mobilize and we have 250 km. to cross to come to the front line, and this is a great advantage on your side.

C - There is one more thing I would like to add here: we all think that this is the first phase. Can there already be discussed the second phase before the final disengagement line of the settlement -

B - General, it will be very theoretical because I don't yet even have authority to discuss this line.

C - I am only putting forward an idea. If this should be agreed as the first phase, there should also be agreed a second phase.

A - I am ready to discuss it.

B - I see your point, but we haven't discussed it yet. Really, we haven't discussed it yet.

A - The second line?

B - Yes, really we haven't discussed it yet. But I am ready to go back home and say that you would like to discuss the second line. This is a possibility. I think that we would prefer at this stage to discuss the first line of disengagement, even if we put a time limit on it.

A - How long do you think you'll stay here?

B - I think we could settle it to 3-4 months.

A - 3-4 months?

B - Because it will take about this time to get into serious peace discussions.

A - Are you linking the time with the time expected for the peace conference?

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B - No, no. For part of the peace conference, we have the problem I explained to you, the problem of the elections. Now, let us say we start straight after the elections. Until the time of the elections, it is about 6 weeks, and after all the formalities and all this, it will take about 2 to 3 months until we get really into the details of the -

A - Right.

E - From 4 to 6 months I figure it the minimum. The advantage on this line is this - that in case we go to a line here (theoretically), this line will take more time to move into than this line. You know perfectly well that we have an infra structure on this line.

A - Right.

E - You can't just lift it in one day or a week and move back, and you have to have enough on your ground in order not to be exposed. So the advantage of a minimal line, or let us call it an optimal line, like this here, is that it can be done quickly. I mean that the first step to it can be done quickly. If we go deeper into Sinai, this will take longer to put into action. Because the withdrawal will have to be spaced out.

A - The farther you go the better for you from the defensive point of view.

B - This might be right. But...

A - ..best chance for the ground, best chance for the directions.

B - But we have a problem - all our installations...

A - You can put your installations temporarily.

B - If you compare this with the situation today, which situation is better?

A - This situation is better.

B - Why, please? Now, seriously, I am not provoking.

A - Seriously, this situation is better for us. Now we feel that you are still in war, keeping all our forces, keeping the country mobilized, everything is ready. And even if these forces are big enough, alright, it doesn't "yaani"...

B - It doesn't worry you too much.

A - Although it is very close to Cairo, as it appears. From the military point of view, we'll stay. But the minute you go here, we should demobilize thousands and thousands of people. And everything will be changed in the military situation.

B - We will also demobilize.

E - We will demobilize the whole army.

B - Not the whole, but a large part.

A - But we'll do more than you do, that's for sure. How can we defend this line? with minimum troops, how? very difficult, very very difficult to defend it.

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UN - But this has not been discussed for some time. Could you again explain what should happen under your plan, 1st phase, to the Third and Second Armies - structure, what do your expect? thinning out - how?

B - On the East Bank?

UN - security zone?

B - This is what we have in mind.

E - Supposing we start from the South, we lift the blockade on Adabiya road.

B - This is his private plan.

A - General Yariv, we are not recording it...

B - He has talked to me about that, but we haven't talked yet to anybody else.

A - And we'll not take it as official.

B - Alright.

E - We lift this place Adabiya and we hand it over to the UN, our forces somewhere here on the Suez-Cairo road. The southern division of the Third Army is moving out from this area and heading south through the Adabiya axis. The UN is taking over this part of the southern division, up to the Mitla road.

A - The Mitla road or the Mitla strait?

E - Mitla road.

B - Not the pass.

E - Second phase: our troops move, lift from the North of the Suez-Cairo road and move up to the North of the Sheluha Cairo road. The second division and the main forces of the Third Army move out from here and go to the 101 check-point. The UN takes over all this before that, and takes over the whole parameter of the Third Army.

C - What would remain of the Third Army here?

E - For the moment of disengagement, nothing. Now, our troops move to the Genifa area...

B - I don't like his plan, too long, too long.

E - To the UN forces with civilian Egyptian administration. Now, the Southern division of the Second Army moves up to the main axis Ismailia-Bir Gafgafa road up to the North somewhere here, UN takes over. We move out from here, all the Second echelon troops of the divisions and exit.

B - You are violating one of the principles of war - simplicity, but that's alright.

E - This is very simple.

A - Very simple. Just go on.

E - When we remove our forces from the Genifa area either through the UN here, or through our bridge head here, and you remove your second division, the central division, from the Kantara area to the eastern side. Now, we

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take out the remnants of our forces here, the last forces, and Northern division back to the other side, and you stay from Port Said to km.10 you had before. Nice?

A - That's very simple and very good.
That is the procedure for evacuating the troops for switching.

E - For the moment, we do the handing over to the UN bank, all the gains are in UN hands.

B - He comes back to the second proposal.

E - Which can be modified.

A - Just more steps.

B - General, on this I am in your opinion.

C - But this has 4 phases, that the Egyptians come back here -

E - This is what mother said to the child that she will tell him later, tomorrow and the day after.

B - Now, to come back, General, because if we want to progress, I'll have to come back after our meeting to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and tell them what I clarified with you. Some basic questions, one is the question of the size of your forces. If I understood you correctly, you say that under all circumstances, you want to have a strong force on the East Bank. Also, when we are speaking about a first line of disengagement, which will be limited in time. That you want a big force, this is what I understand, I don't know. If you give me a rough idea , I don't want to pin you down on 2 or 3 battalions .

A - The further the line you can go, the less troops we'll keep, and it will be better for us and better for you and better for the peace negotiations. The closer you come here, the more forces we'll keep on the Eastern Bank and that's logical from the military side.

B - I'll ask you a question.

A - Yes.

B - Because I see the Colonel looks at me suspiciously. For the sake of clarification, you say you want us out of artillery range 30-35 km. Let us assume for a moment that we are on a line 35 km.

A - From the forward lines. Just for the sake of discussion.

B - Between the Canal and our Western most line, let us say there are 33-35 km. In between we have the UN, a certain depth. What size of forces would you like to have on this side?

A - First of all, we don't mean the Canal, what about the troops? Disengagement first of all should be with the troops. When we talk about the distance, we should talk <u>from the forward lines</u>.

B - Yes.

A - 35km. from the forward lines, not from the Canal.

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B - General, what you are saying is that we shall be 45 or 50 km. from the Canal.

A - - We are separating the troops, and we are not separating the Canal. Because any shot from your troops or any guns from our troops will start the war again. Right? So we start from that line.

B - What you say is "Please, gentlemen, move from this line 40 km. East. Correct? As a first line of disengagement.

A - Yes.

B - As separation of forces. Now you say we must be in a situation where we cannot put any fire. (end of tape).... for a limited time, we are not talking about 10 months. We can discuss the time. You say from here 40 km. and then you will want a security zone and then main forces. So I want to understand what additional guarantee you need? if we are with our security forces, our Westernmost line is out of artillery rangeof your forces, of the Canal. What can we do? Yes, General, offensive, but that we can do from also about 50 km. This doesn't change between 50 and 40 km., if you are speaking about a general offensive, not that we have it in mind. But if you say that we can make a general offensive on your troops and the Canal zone, then the difference between 40 and 50 km. is immaterial. The question is whether we can interfere without making a move forward, without making an armour offensive, whether we can interfere without crossing the line. For this the distance of 32 km. is enough.

D - What advantage this line you proposed gives you militarily.

B - Militarily, I'll tell you what advantages it gives us. It gives us an added guarantee that during the very sensitive period of the beginning of peace negotiations. More difficult for each side, for us as well as for you to start anything militarily if we get bogged down politically.

D - By this line you are keeping military pressure on us and we are that pressed in the line we are in - just we are under military pressure...

B - No, no. I see it differently. That permits us not to be under military pressure if politically we have difficulties at the beginning. Because it is balanced. You have forces on this side, we have forces on the other side. You have all you need in near distance to prevent any advance from our side. At the same time, we have enough of guarantee that permits us to discuss politically without feeling any immediate

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military danger. You can say "Ah, you will stay here the whole time, and then how will we advance politically?" I say - "No, on this first line, limited in time".

C - Irrespective of progress of peace negotiations?

B - Irrespective of progress of peace negotiations.

UN _ What are the conditions? In other words, the point is that in the provisional line, you could agree let's say on 2 or 3 months irrespective of the progress made at the peace conference. Let's say around the 15th of February, if the Peace Conference doesn't go well, inspite that would you agree for the Israeli forces to go to the second phase line?

A - Do you accept that concept?

B - I'm personally for it and I am ready to recommend it to my government.

UN - So it will be a commitment to you in the presence of UN, if things are slow...

B - Excuse me, I can't say 3 or 4 months I'll have to discuss that, but a limited time.

E - At least 6 months.

B - I don't want to sign.

E - No, at least 6 months.

B - Let us take an example General. On the prisoners, we said 6 to 8 days, so we have to say 3-6 months.

UN - So, in the first phase you would like to stay in the passes, is that so?

B - Light troops forward.

UN - But you would hold the pass.

B - Yes.

A - If we come to a conclusion on that line, it will be very very good for the coming peace conference.

B - I understand.

A - And the maximum we are far away from each other, the better for the peace conference.

Although you are still keeping most of the defiles in your hands, and that is a very good strategic line.

B - The distance you are asking for, we are way back.

A - No. You are in the direction of Mitla, just to penetrate the...

B - If you say these last 40 km. where does it put us?

E - On the sands.

A - Here in the direction of Mitla, the 3 main defiles will be in your hands.

B - How?

A - You will be in the Eastern part of the defile.

E - But we have a good jumping point.

./...

A - So it is very difficult for us to jump there and there is no jumping point.

E - No, no, for us, for us.

A - Yes, and that's a very good area for you, and you are using it. And here also - you are keeping most of your main forces, concentration areas.

B - We will be here.

D - Could you for a moment, General, forget about installations. They should not be an obstacle.

UN - How much time, General Gamazy, could you give to the Israeli counterparts to dismantle their main line of defence. The idea was - going back to first phase next week. At least what you say is that you cannot dismantle in one week. So how do you try to help them - They want to dismantle it. They say they need time between the first and second phase to dismantle it and build something in the back.

E - One of the principles we mentioned that both parties should agree that it is better for them to base themselves on existing installations than to force the other party, to build up new installations; because what happens later is that once you build new installations, you stick to them. So if the final solution is that we should clear out from most of Sinai, let's say, there is no sense for us to build new installations and then having to stick to them in order to get back the amortization of the installations.

C - May I suggest that one way of bridging the gap - could you discuss again the temporary nature I mean, the period - 3 months have been mentioned for a phase, you don't like too much. In order words, the Egyptian side would possibly agree on a phase one, let's say provided that it is not too long and they are sure you will go to phase 2.

E - Provided both sides may like it in the end and want to stay permanently there. (laughs).

C - Well!

E - But this is not serious.

B - General, we shall be somewhere in the line you are talking about . You will have major forces here, you'll have all your missiles.

C - West.

B - Not West, East, if I understand.

C - Ah, what the General wants!

B - Yes, here you have your major forces on the East Bank, you have all your missiles, everything will be here, and there we are going to discussions! General, you could have come to us on October 6th, and you could have said: "Look here, instead of having a war, we want to discuss with you what we are discussing now."We would have had the same discussion without having spilt blood on your side and on our side.

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A lot of blood was spilt on both sides. And after that, we are back at the same point. I'll have to come back to my government and say, and the government is responsible to the public. We've had about 2000 killed. You've had many killed. It was a tough war, everybody fought bravely but it was a tough war and a lot of people were killed on this. So we have to come to the public and say "After so many people were killed, back 40, 50 km., in the beginning." We are not discussing the principle of withdrawal. We accept the principle of withdrawal. The discussion will be about the final line. We know your opinion. We haven't yet made up our opinion, because we have elections. I am not bringing up now the point of peace because I don't want you to think I am being obnoxious. Let us leave it aside what kind of peace we are talking about (remember we talked about it). I think you must understand the problem we have. Therefore, I am looking for ways now to reach common ground in order to enable our political leadership to reach decision - for the first line of disengagement.

D - How about a final line of disengagement, and this may ease the phases.

(consultations in Arabic).

A - Sorry, I don't understand his question. Do you have a final line of disengagement and then we'll start talking about the intermediate lines?

B - No, we have not yet, because we have not discussed it yet. Also in our informal talks, we have not discussed it, therefore, I have not brought it up. Today I understood what you meant by the final line of disengagement: we shall reach this line sometime between today and X, we shall stay on that line from X until a final settlement, a final agreement, is reached. I haven't thought about it personally; we haven't discussed it with the government. But if I may suggest practically: I promised General Gamazy that we will not draw these discussions here until I don't know how long. Correct? I can propose practically - I can come back to the Cabinet and say "Wait a minute. Give me a mandate what to say to General Gamazy about the final line of disengagement", and I will show what you have meant. This will then take some time, the government will have a long discussion and in addition to that the government will have to discuss the first line of disengagement. It will take a long time. I propose to discuss the first line of disengagement first, and when we come to the Peace Conference, or before that, if you want,

E - After the elections.

B - After the elections to discuss the final line of disengagement.

C - To make these 3 or 4 months meaningful -

B - If you want my recommendation, General, my recommendation is, my personal opinion, perhaps tomorrow I'll come with a different answer from the

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Cabinet, my personal opinion is that if we want to advance, and this is our main object, if we want to advance, and start with a final line of disengagement, it will then take us a long time, and we are in a delicate situation now, I know. I've read your newspapers. We have not talked about war, but I read your newspapers - El Aharam, and what has been said by Mr. Hanis and all the other people. This is a delicate situation from which we want to move forward. I recommend that we start with the first line of disengagement and we will then have time enough to discuss the second.

C - With the understanding that there will be other lines.

B - Yes.

E - That's right.

B - The fact of having a limited time plan already gives you a guarantee for the disengagement.

C - Would it be possible after the first phase to have another intermediary line?

A - I agree.

C - -

B - I hardly have a mandate to discuss the first line, please believe me.

A - Alright, we'll come to a line, General Yariv, a temporary line, with a mind to an intermediary line.

B - Alright.

A - This line you said the distance. You were arguing about 30 km, 40 km. What is the maximum and the minimum you want for that line.

B - The maximum we want to the East and to the West is between 10-15 km. Only light forces. Main forces out of artillery range. Or I'll say more - nothing, no weapons within firing distance from the Canal zone.

A - That means this proposal?

B & E - More or less.

A - Why don't you give us a security zone?

B - Would you like to draw it? Please draw it.

A - We need at least a security zone exactly as - and also we are just arguing until I go back to our people there. (He draws) This is the line as it is now. Here we think that there should be a security zone, and then the UN and the security zone, and then the main forces. UN security zone and then main forces. Right?
If we make this 20 km.

C - This will not leave any road for us.

A - Alright, if it is our hand, or in their hand, you will have the right to move on that road.

./...

B - You know what that means, General? That our main forces will be at least 70 km. East of the Canal.

A - 60 km. from our troops.

B - All you mean is that we shall have light forces 50 km. from the Canal, and here you will have 5 infantry divisions.

A - I'll tell you that's good. That will solve many problems. We need at least 35 km, that's for the artillery.

B - But from where?

A - From the forward defence lines. Instead of 35, I made this 40.

B - There will be no artillery here, correct?

A - Here the reconnaissance parties...

B - No artillery here.

A - We want to make precautions for the main forces. And the artillery can move and come here.

B - General, I have a proposal - let us make an agreement about the main forces. For limitation of the main forces.

A - If you accept this line, we can start talking about the forces. But before accepting the line...

B - For the first line of disengagement... I think I won't be able to convince you, I won't be able to convince you.

A - Alright. What is your proposal about the distance in this case?

E - Why not start talking about limitation of forces?

B - We haven't started talking about what forces we will have.

A - We were just talking about the distance.

B - You say you have forces here, then you say this is 10-12 km. Well, this you say you cannot accept. The difference is very great.

C - ---

B - Why for example can't you say, you have together with the forces at the security zone (I am not sure that what I am saying will be accepted), which will mean 20 km. Now, UN goes down... we have to check it on the maps now, this is 25, and this is 10, then, you are out of artillery range.

UN - Then you main forces are 35 km.

B - From the Canal, not from your troops.

A - Back again, as a military man, it doesn't make any difference, 5 km. or 10 km. I said we'll start working here and here. The civilians will be everywhere. Our troops will be out of their positions, so we start from the forward defensive lines. In this case, we have 10 km. here, so 25 km. from your first troops to our first troops. This is the problem.

B - These first troops have nothing with which to reach you. They have no

tanks, they have no 81mm. mortars, they are light troops. What you are meaning to say that from this line with the security zone, it's 10 km. You want from these 10 km. to take another 32 km. I consider it too much.

C - Between troops.

B - I understand what you say.
That means 10 km. your security zone, 5 km. UN, 10 km. our security zone, that is 25. You want another 10 km. for our main forces.

CANAL	2nd Army 3rd Army	10 km. Egyptian Security zone	5 km. U.N.	10 km. Israeli security zone	10 km. Israeli light forces	Israeli main forces

35 km.

B - Then you have from here to here 10 km., 15, 10 = 35.

C - From main troops to main troops.

35 km.

CANAL	2nd and 3rd armies	10 km. Egyptian Security zone		15 km. UN	10 km. Israeli Security zone	Israeli main forces

B - This is what you mean?

A - Yes.

D - I have a personal impression that this road means something from installation point of view.

B - It is a good line.

D - All this talk about distance is just because I sense that may be there are installations there, which I suggest that you neglect for the moment, and then, we can see how we can compromise on the question of the military installations.

D - A time table,or any kind of solution we can reach.

B - It is not a question of military installations. Military installations are also important, but this is not the dominant factor. The dominant

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factors are different and I tried to explain them to you in all our talks. The dominant factor, amongst other things - the first line of disengagement (I am not talking about the second and the final settlement), must have some bearing on what the outcome of the last war was. There must be some connection. What you are suggesting, General and Colonel, has no relation to the situation on the ground as it is now. There must be some relation. It is only a first line of disengagement. I'll ask you another question. I drew these lines, and as I know I will have great difficulties, no, I think the Cabinet will not accept it. I can't say I am sure they will not accept it, because then we will not discuss the line. Perhaps they will accept it, but my estimate is that they will not. Have you any remarks on this?

D - By what factors are calculating the distance?

B - I told you the factor, and I think it is a fair factor, legitimate, fair and relevant. That we should be out, we should be where we have forces, whether on the westernmost security line or the westernmost main force line, we should not be able to bring fire upon your civilian targets. Here we have a difference: you say we should not be able to bring fire on your troops, but we say "we should not be able to bring fire on civilian targets". If we are able to bring fire on your troops, it will be mutual. You'll be able to bring fire on our troops. So here it is equal, it is not something that is unequal.

A - No, but we are talking about disengagement.

B - But I don't see any reason. If we limit it in time, the UNEF is there. If we are going to a Peace Conference, why should there be friction? If we want to do something serious, or you want to do something serious each side brings in its armour and divisions and avante. But this is not the problem.

C - --- one should not , cannot--- in terms of 5 km., I think.

B - But there we have a problem. We have a problem here on the first line of disengagement. We cannot go from the situation on the ground as it is now to the lines of disengagement which you propose. You propose that the first line of disengagement would be close to 50 km.

UN - If you are going to consult your authorities, why don't you also discuss (I think it is important) how long the first line of disengagement is going to last? I know that you have not yet discussed it, General Yariv and General Gamazy, but I think these questions will be asked.

A - True.

UN - What do you have in mind?

B - I said the framework of time 3-6 months. This we can discuss. ./...

A - 3-6 months on that line?!

B - Yes, but we can discuss whether it is 3 or 5 or 4.

A - On this line?

B - No, General, this is what you propose.

A - That's what we discussed.

B - I think this is too far back. But let us say (I know that you don't agree) to have our first line closer. If I make the line here or here, you don't agree. Right?

A - That's 25 km.

B - You don't agree, I understand. So, we have a difference of opinion. So I say the line on which we two shall agree (perhaps tomorrow we shall have a big discussion and we shall agree) on the Westernmost line of our position, we propose to stay 3-6 months.

UN - And that you say irrespective of progress at the peace conference.

B - I am already adding that this is not the final line of complete with - drawal and not even of disengagement.

A - Temporary line.

E - I don't know whether your additional remark ---

UN - No, but we discussed that with the General and General Yariv said, if it's 3 months, it is not linked with the peace conference. Because General Yariv many times repeated "disagreement yes, but misunderstanding, no". That could be one.

E - But if you say without any respect to whether there is a peace conference or not -

UN - No progress.

B - I'm not saying peace conference because I told you we don't have any invitation yet.

UN - Yes, that's true, and I think this is an important point.

A - 3 to 6 months on the whole of that line.

B - On the line wherever it will be agreed between us.

A - Not yet.

B - Where it <u>will be</u> agreed between us.

A - The minimum and the maximum line.

B - I don't know because the government didn't tell me.

A - Until the government gives you the line (open maps), 10-20 km. from the forward troops or from the Canal?

B - From the Canal.

E - From the Canal.

A - That means nose to nose troops. Well, we have the troops already 10km. from one another!

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B - This we can discuss.

A - We are entering disengagement, that means the troops should be away.

B - Then we have a second problem which you haven't understood. What kind of troops will you have?

E - It will influence very much - the strength and which kind of weapons.

B - They will ask, for example - will all the missiles, all the SAMS be here?

A - Are you complacent with that to make separation for the troops, to put your forces 10km. east of ---

B - You know, the Jews have a characteristic, they answer questions by questions (laughs). This is well known. So my question is if you can put down what is the maximum line which you agree for us to be in the West. I know perhaps you don't have the government's signature for me. I don't have the government's signature for that too.

E - We mean the nearest line.

B - The nearest line to you, so that I can tell them what we can expect. I can understand if it is difficult for you to say now. Perhaps you want to check and come back tomorrow? Because I have a problem. You know with me I have the government's decision and I am already beyond it.

A - And also I am already beyond my proposal.

B - I'll tell you what, General, at least I have a consolation. We'll suffer together.

E - I have to watch him, you know, so that he doesn't step on lines.

b r e a k

B - No, for officers in their duty who are members on the list for elections. I told them that I have decided, if the government wants me to continue to represent the Israeli side at the negotiations, that I am ready to continue irrespective of whether there will or will not be a change in the law. So this is what I told them. Now, I want to explain to you why I did it here. If I do it in Tel-Aviv, they'll say "Ah! Yariv is a bastard" Why? (they stopped the tape)

A - 10 km. East of the Canal. We'd better discuss just to come closer to each other.

B - If I understood you, General, you want to maintain your troops on the Eastern Bank of the Canal.

A - Right.

B - How strong? Whole 2nd army, whole 3rd army?

A - In this case, we should keep them, but we don't want to keep them.

B - In this case --- ./...

A - Yes.

B - If I understand on this proposal, 35 km. from your forward positions, or 45 km. from the Canal. Under these circumstances, you would like to keep here 2 or 3 divisions? 300-400 tanks etc.

A - So we may reorganize it. These positions can be - your forces here and our forces here, that means 35.

C - 35 between main and main.

B - You want to have heavy forces here.
I will report it but I must give you my honest opinion of what I think the government's position will be. As the French say "très très très difficile".

A - What's your idea about the troops here? on this basis, on this distance.

B - There is a difference you see, General. Where is the difference? (I know you have a tough adviser) We shall have main forces here, you will have important forces here and very important forces here.

A - There is no other place for us, or to go to Libya!!

B - Oh!!! (laughs) Anything but not to Libya.

E - Well, about the petrol it's not too bad.

B - Of course, you have no other place to go. This is clear but what is difficult for us to accept is the big forces here. This is the problem. There will be a very big problem with my government about the distance, about this line which is 35 km. from the Canal, very big. They will not accept it, I am sure, and in addition you are putting another big obstacle, which is the size of the forces. And all this within a limited time frame.

A - The time frame 3 to 6 months.

B - I said on purpose 3 to 6 months, so that we can discuss. We are giving a limited time frame because we say that this is not our final line of disengagement. Never mind, it's not the final line of settlement. You are putting for me and for my cabinet two very great problems - one is the distance, and the second, the size of the forces. I must tell you this because I know the climate at home.

D - As a temporary line, it is not finally important. So, as soon as we speak about another line, as second step, we simultaneously cancel all these problems.

B - Yes, but you have to keep in mind two important points. We have been at war, we have thanks to the help of General Siilasvuo, we have the cease-fire but it is still not -

A - Firm.

B - We have to pass to a more stable situation. It is a line of disengagement

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for a temporary time where each side can begin to feel that it can discuss politically and seriously. During this time, you are putting us militarily at a great disadvantage. You really must try to understand. I know your president has a public. He is in charge of his people. He has to answer to his people. We understand. The same on our side. The difference is you have one president, we have a whole government (laughs). You have one president. He is the boss - rais. We have a Prime Minister with a cabinet and we have three different parties in the coalition. This is a political problem. Now our government has to come to the people and say "we had the war, the lines are as they are. Now, immediately from this, we have to go back 35 km. from the Canal". I must be honest with you, because I'll mislead you. I must be honest with you. It won't work that way.

D - Will the public be more relaxed if it is 15?

B - Yes.

A - But the troops won't be relaxed.

B - But for this we can take mutual guarantee measures. I understand that if we are close you also have a problem. OK, let us take several guarantee measures which will put all kinds of difficulties for us to take military initiative - size of the forces, nature of the forces, inspection, everything.

D - General, what will the public say if we start talking about 242 which means complete withdrawal. If just a temporary withdrawal...

B - I'll tell you exactly what the public will say. It will say "first of all we have peace negotiations". This is what we are going to talk about, I don't know where it will be - Geneva or wherever it will be. On this, the public will go. This is what the elections will be about, or about the principle of the settlement. You have a certain interpretation of 242. We have a different interpretation. Now what will the public vote about? The public will vote what kind of interpretation we give to 242. The public won't vote for a map. But it will vote for certain principles. And there will be one party that will put forward such principle, another party that will put forward other principles, and the third party will put forward other principles. And there will be a public vote and then the government can go to the negotiations according to the principles which have been voted upon by the public. Therefore, the line of disengagement, is irrelevant to the final settlement. It has to do with the psychological mood and the feeling with which we can go to the elections. I understand that it is mutual. Therefore, I say first of all we clear out of here. We clear out of here. Everything west of the Canal is clear of Israelis. If you have big forces on

the other side at the same time, we are very far from the Canal. We are only at the beginning and there are such great differences of opinion between us. We feel that we start from a bad position, which is not warranted by the results of the war. This we could have discussed without a war.

E - I think it is essential to know more about the size and number of your troops, East of the Canal, because this may be very very important.

A - I think it is very hard for us today to come to a conclusion today on that problem.

B - I agree.

A - Until tomorrow we'll think--- What I can say now, from the principles that the distance where the Israelis , Israeli troops will be, according to that distance, our forces will be on the Eastern Bank. And we didn't come to a conclusion on that, now. For the distance we didn't come to a conclusion and also about the forces we didn't come to a conclusion. We didn't come to the forces because we didn't come to the distance. That is the problem.

UN - I am sorry, General, but since we are summarizing now the conclusions of the meeting, I wonder if you can advance without commitments since you have no authority. What you have now in mind, I mean, improvement from your point of view.

B - I at this stage cannot say more than I have said, that we would like to have the forward line 10 to 15 km. from the Canal.

UN - That's the light one, and then the main forces?

B - The main forces out of artillery range from the Canal.

UN - In other words, the difference between you now is that you would like to have troops beyond artillery range whereas the Israeli proposal is to have the civilian population on the Canal beyond artillery range.

B - Yes.

A - There is no security zone now for us. I mean these troops will be opposite to our troops on the east, as I understand,

E - Not necessarily.

UN - 10-15 km. with security zone with light weapons which cannot reach the Canal?

B - Exactly.

E - And there will be a UN force.

A - 35 km. what you said now.

UN - It's important that you make it clearer so we understand it.


B - I would say that here under this proposal, our security zone is 25 km. from the forces, 35 km. from the Canal. That is to say even if we have here artillery, it can't reach the Canal, it can reach the forces.

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What we have in mind is our security line here between 10-12 km.

UN - Where do you put UNEF around here?

B - Now, here we come to the problem of size of Egyptian forces . With the size General has in mind there is no room for UNEF. But if you speak about a restricted size, symbolic presence, then (end of tape).



B - Because I understand this is your minimum proposal.

A - That means we are concluding our discussion today. That you have your troops 10-12 km. from the Canal.

B - And your proposal is, if I understand correctly, forces here, forces here, then --- of 10 km, then security zone of 10 km. , then the UN 15 km., then our security zone of 10 km., then our main forces.

A - That's my proposal, the unofficial one, I gave it to you. But we stay 3 hours discussing in order to eliminate the differences between each other. All we came to is somewhat like this - unofficial from your side, and unofficial from our side. Now back again to that line we started at 11 o'clock.

B - Alright. I know what you mean. The official proposal is as it was.

A - "Halas".

B - An unofficial possibility.

A - Aywa! Unofficial possibility.

B - Is what I have drawn here.

UN - 10-15 km. to a forward line, and 35 km. to the main forces which is artillery range from the Canal.

A - Right, that is possible.

B - Unofficial possibility.

A - Absolutely right. Unofficial, unofficial, but I'll take this---

B - I have a tough job, General, believe me.

A - Believe me I have too.

./...

B - צאו הכללה שזו : 10 ק"מ כלומר, 10 ק"מ
Security zone, 15 אולי, 10 zone
שלנו ואתם כלומר לקריית שלנו. אולי הכללה
של השטח האחרונה.

The principle of the General is that out of attillery range is not for the Canal, but for the forces.

A - Because we are disengaging the forces. Not disengagement between the Canal and your forces.

B - General, this I must admit is a good argument.

A - Although it is very important for us for the sake of the civilians.

E - But we can come to an agreement.

A - We'll work on that unofficial possibility.

B - But I'm saying to you honestly, it is difficult.

A - As a temporary phase for other phases.

B - Temporary phase and limited time frame, 3 to 6 months. We can discuss it. When I speak about 10-12km., this we say is temporary 3 to 6 months.

A - On this proposal, or the other one. Both of them.

B - Yes, both of them. My version and your version - OK. 10 to 12, this is what the line is now.

A - 10 to 12 km., that's the official one.

B - No, this is unofficial. Like you.

A - 10 to 12 km. you'll stay 3 to 6 months also, that's the official one?... Sorry.

B - 35, 45 is your unofficial proposal -

C - Or unofficial possibility.

A - Unofficial possibility.

B - My counter unofficial possibility is our first line 10 to 12 km. from the Canal.

A - And the official?

B - The official I'll tell you tomorrow, when I'll tell them what you say, I'll bring you the official. I have the authority only for proposing - remember the proposals, General? This is what I have the authority. I don't have the authority to say this is official. I say unofficial possibility 10 to 12 km. I understand what you are saying. I now go back and report, I'll do my best to have an official proposal tomorrow.

A - I'll make myself very clear now. The official proposal is what I handed today EL-ARISH , RAS-MUHAMAD and keeping the zone EL ARISH - RAS MUHAMAD area - that's for the UN. That's the official. All the other things we discussed, today was to know our both thinking and I was giving my views

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about these 10 to 12 km. or about this one. That it cannot be accepted. This 10 to 12 km. on the Eastern Bank or the UN take over our positions for the reasons which I said - superior military position, no security for people, no security for opening the Canal, no security for separation, no nothing. That is what I mentioned at 11.30 in the morning. So, this discussion was just talking.

B - We are exactly the same from our position. That is to say - the official proposal is about the UN replacing the territories that have been taken during the war by each of the sides. This is the official proposal. All the other drawings I have presented were under the exchange of ideas. It is absolutely clear to me what the official proposal presented by the General is. It is clear to me that the drawings the General has made, that his observations are not the official Egyptian proposal. Right?

A - Right.

B - And I hope the General knows that all the drawings and observations I made are not the official Israeli position. So Ican say "what have I gained today?" I have gained the possibility to go back to my government and say "Here I have a) very clearly the Egyptian official position; b) I have unofficial, unauthorized thinking which I have heard, this is all. But the official position is the line EL ARISH - RAS MUHAMAD.

A - You may come back tomorrow and we may start back again from the...

B - General, I answered all your questions. I would like to make one remark. Please remember that we are speaking (this is important for the record) about the first line of disengagement within a limited time frame of 3 to 6 months. Second item I would like to stress is that you have not given me any indication, except for a very general principle, of the size of the forces you want to have on the East Bank. You have only told me the principle that there is a direct link between the distance from the Canal or from your forces to our first line, and the size of the forces. But you have not given me any more indications about it. Correct?

A - Correct.

B - So how do we say? Disagreement yes, misunderstanding no. At least that. No, we have gained something else. I can go back and say what the unofficial, personal possibilities that were discussed are. This is the gain of today (It is a difficult life, better to be a soldier).

D - We wish you your continuation on this plane.

B & E - Thank you.

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B - I can't say our sandwitches are from Hotel Hilton but -

D - They are very good.

B - Good, alright. I'll have a sardine sandwitch.

General, are there any current problems?

A - Brigadier Sheriff and General Eyal still have some more problems to solve. I don't want to speak any word about this, any word about that. I am fed up with that.

Sheriff - General Eyal and myself talked about these problems and General Eyal - discussed these matters of exchange of letters between the people of Suez and those outside Suez. The means to evacuate a 100 wounded from Suez hospital. The means to change the teams in Suez hospital - they have been there for a long time, and the means to supply Suez hospital with more medical equipment.

B to A - General, are you going to give a statement to the press about your political career? Yes, excuse me, Brigadier Sheriff.

Sheriff - So -- the Red Cross and he asked them whether these people would be permitted to leave, and the answer of the Red Cross was affirmative. So the Red Cross from Egypt Mr. Boisard will go to this place -- so that they can carry on.

B - I'll tell you what? As I was not up to date when I came here on the Red Cross problem. On this, I promise you an answer tomorrow.

Sheriff - Very good. Second point is Sir the exchange of private letters.

B - You had more points before that. One was the evacuation of Abu-Sultan in Geneva.

Sheriff - The second is the means of exchange of private letters between people of Suez and outside Suez.

B - This I must check.

Sheriff - Thank you. From Suez and into Suez.

B - Alright.

How will you ensure that it is not military correspondence?

Sheriff - I don't know who looks upon the letters.

B - It's a problem.

Sheriff - We need the evacuation of over 100 wounded from Suez.

B - I'll give you an answer on that tomorrow.

S - We need to change the medical teams of Suez hospital.

/...

B - How many people are there?

S - Well, we can get the number.

B - You speak about the principle.

S - Yes, and then go on with the practical application. The medical team - that is, doctors and nurses. And lastly, the need to supply Suez hospital with more medical convenience.

B - For example -

S - Medicaments, cotton-wool, medical equipment, not only basic.

B - Good, I'll give you an answer on all these problems tomorrow.

A - I'm glad you discussed it and gave a decision on that at least.

B - I didn't give a decision, I said I'll give an answer tomorrow.

B - Ah! If I would have known that you have much good sandwitches, I wouldn't have given you our sandwitches.

E - Very good supply - thank you very much.

B - It is hard to talk and eat.

D - Take your time, take your time.

E - Are these Israeli oranges?

Sheriff - No.

B - I can see a different kind. How do you call this kind.

A - Bourdean.

B - You know from where the word Bourdaen comes? Portugal.

B - [illegible]

E - [illegible]

B - [illegible]

E - [illegible]

(tape is interrupted).

E - Today, we finished, and we thank you and the Red Cross for the exchange of the P.O.W.s, except the problem of Mizrachi; but all the rest, starting with our P.O.W.s whom we think have been captured and we still are waiting for your answer about them. We gave very good 3 examples: Lieutenant Cohen El Ran, Captain Marom Max, private Tam Yosef. Well, in this case, we did not yet receive your answer.

Sheriff - I'll have to go back to Cairo to answer you.

A - Did you check that?

S - I checked it and I am going on with the checking, because it is a long list.

B - Excuse me, please, General; After all we have been talking, about this problem already last week! And there is no movement on it.

S - Yes, we'll check this.

./...

B - Can you give us, Brigadier Sheriff, how long it is going to take - a week, a month?

S - It won't take a week or a month, but I am checking it, really. I have a list and I am meeting people.

B - Please, please, Brigadier Sheriff, tell us is it a question of 2 or 3 days or more?

A - "yaani", how long, and take one day reserve - 3 days is alright with you? On the 25th?

- 26th.

E - Monday morning. OK.

B - Excuse me, I must tell you a story. You say another day. Every time an engineer gives us an estimate, we say "add another month".

E - As you remember, yesterday, we transferred to you the 10 bodies, and I know you got them, but we are still waiting for our soldiers' bodies from Suez. Well, and I would like to mention that except these 25 bodies, there is a body of our liaison officer with UN observers, lieutenant [illegible]. He was on the list handed to us by the Red Cross as a P.O.W. We noted his family that he is a POW and alive. All our P.O.W.s come back home and, at least, if he is dead, we would like to have his body as soon as possible.
So, if I'm not wrong, Brigadier Sheriff, told me that during the night we will get through the Red Cross an answer - so that we'll be able tomorrow...

S - I'll ask when I go back to Cairo.

E - But here again, I would like, General Yariv, that we will have our dead back.

B - On that you don't need my permission.

A - Only that specific one?

E - That specific case as well as around 25 bodies from Suez. We have been talking the whole week about it.

A - Tomorrow, this body will be handed at 2 o'clock.

S - The day after tomorrow at 10 o'clock here.

B - And the bodies from Suez?
(consultations in Arabic).

E - You told me this morning for the first time that there are. I should check and see if there are. Yesterday, you collected all the bodies West.

S - Only 4.

E - We gave you all the possibilities. Only this morning, you told me that there are. I'll check it, and I'll give you an answer. Yes, but this is not an answer about the 25 bodies.

./...

A - Why not make it, in case there is any complication, the day after tomorrow?

S - Both sides give simultaneously.

A - Exchange, there are just 9. These people will go there, or the Red Cross take all the corpses, and you take the corpses from our...

E - About these bodies, I just heard this morning, but about the bodies in Suez, we are talking about for days.

A - I agree that we talked about 10 times about that.

S - Today is the 22nd. Let's agree that on the 25th.

E - You said that you want to have the dead bodies of --- With us, it's tomorrow. Let me check it. It can't be on Saturday. The 25th, Sunday.

S - We'll deliver the lieutenant at 101, and at the same time, at 10 o'clock you receive at Suez your dead bodies and we receive at Kantara the bodies east of your frontier.

E - Just this morning, you told me about this. It's the first time that I heard.

B - If the bodies are there, you will get them.

A - I'll tell you the truth. It was reported to the Minister that we have some bodies, east of Port Said, east of the strong point there, and that's for sure that there are some bodies there. Their families asked for them, and it was a bad situation. They --- "Why do you carry on the -- with the Israelis and don't ask for these bodies?"So there is trouble for these bodies.

S - Very much indeed.

E - We got a message that there are bodies east of our strong point. This was the cable we got. So, we went together. It was the day before yesterday.

S - Not east, west, west of your strong point.

E - This morning, was the first time you told us about east of our strong point.

S - Exactly, I was reported yesterday by your authorities. Here there should be bodies. Your commander told us.

B - You will get them. As many bodies as there are.

E - We are not going to shoot new bodies so that you have more bodies.

A - On the 25th of November.

E - Even before. If there are, may be even before. The whole subject of searching after the bodies, well, I understand , understood this morning that you changed your ideas about it.

S - Not exactly. We discovered mines in the area, that means practical difficulty to have people killed in searching for the dead bodies. ./...

A - I'll tell you General. He told me about these mines which they found in ----- and in Kantara,---- if there are any dead bodies, they can be collected by the Red Cross, and they can do something for the mines.

B - The Red Cross has no pioneers to clear the mines.

A - How can we do it? You have your mines and we have our mines. What can we do?

E - We agreed with the Brigadier and the Red Cross to have combined teams with the Red Cross, going between the lines and trying to find and collect these dead bodies. So this was agreed. And for sure, we'll clear the area from mines before.

S - ---------to collect the bodies and removing mines from defensive positions is something which I cannot...

B - May I propose, if I remember my military school correctly, every mine field should be marked on the map. After you make a mine field, it has to be marked on the map. We can check our maps and know exactly where in the no-man's land we put mines or did not put mines. We know exactly. And if I know the Egyptian army, things are always well marked on papers and maps etc. I am sure, your commanders know where your troops put mines in the no-man's land. So, when we come from our side with the Red Cross, when you come from your side with the Red Cross, there's no need to step on mines. Each side comes with a map, a neutral map, with no other information, only where the mines in the area are, and nobody will step on the mines.

S - My war minister told me very clearly that in our mine fields only Egyptian teams are to search for bodies.

C - Brigadier Sheriff, there was an agreement on this point on joint teams.

B - Yes.

C - So what is this talk about?

S - The agreement about joint teams was before we had the information about mines.

C - There is no such thing as changing your mind after you have made an agreement.

S - They were not speaking about mines. There was no speaking about mines. They were speaking about searching the bodies.

C - At-------we know that there are mines.

A - Well, I'll check it and see how we can do.

B - Shall we speak about it tomorrow?

A - Yes.

B - [illegible]

S - On the 25th, we'll get our bodies east of your strong point.

B - This is standing order.

./...

A - There is only one point now left - dead bodies in no man's land.

S - ----------

A - How about the fuel for the city?

B - Yes. I promised an answer. Agreed in principle. But we'll have a discussion about quantities. I know the Colonel always looks at me, he says about "the spirit" of agreement, but we have to make some calculations. So we made the calculation and we worked on the assumption -

E - We figured that a town of about 5,000 inhabitants is entitled to 5 ambulances, 5 fire brigades cars, and about 10 various trucks and cars for daily needs of distribution of food etc. That brings us to about 45 cars that are constantly running, except the 30 vehicles that are employed in drawing supplies from the UN point to the city. Now, we figured that in a town like this, the maximum is about 40 kms. per day, per car. And the consumption of petrol is about 10 litre per day, and the consumption of oil is about 2.5 kg. for 100 litres of petrol, and the change of oils and grease are after 3,000 km. (This is a rough estimate), gives you about 5 km. of oil and 2 km. of grease. The consumption of oil for breaks is almost next to nil.

A - That daily or weekly or what?

E - Daily.

B - We have to make some calculation.

D - -------no temptation that we-------you change your mind. ------250tons of supplies, we still have...

UN - What's the total?

A - We'll leave it to the UN to do it.

UN - What's the total?

E - I didn't say this was the answer. I said these were the calculations.

B - There should be some logic to it. We checked the logic.

UN - Can you give the total? there would be better feelings.

B - I want to say about the ill feelings. What should I say when I go to report to the Cabinet and I have to tell them that my Egyptian friends have agreed that in Suez there are 20,000 most of them military men, not civilians. And they say "you agreed to this and this and this". So, this I cannot forget. You must agree that this isa fact. No, Colonel, please comment.

D - -------we calculated to take the minimum quantity -

E - We are far apart on unimportant matters. We just wanted to show you that we made calculations about the oil and the grease, etc., and we figure, I don't know who wants maybe someone is just asking you for too many items, for supplies that are not even needed. You have

./...

figured that about 100 kg. of oil for engines is needed. Our estimation is that about 10 kg. would be ample enough for the 35 cars, and for the 30 vehicles. But no objection for instance on the 1,000 l. of solar for the hospital, and for cooking and for other things, not even about the 1,000 litres of kerosene for light and for cooking. And the same goes about the 1,000 litres of mazut, so the difference is really negligible.

C - Gasoline for cars do you have it?

E - Gasoline for gas is... about the cooking butan gas you can get about 50 gas containers but I don't know whether you figure it big or small. We have two sizes - one of 12 kg. and the other of 48 kg. We don't know which one you have, and we would suggest to have 100 butan gas containers but small ones, a smaller size like this, and also that for security reasons and not for consumption reasons.

B - If I may remark, you always, General and Colonel, always look at me very doubtingly and disdainfully when we come to the quantities. Then you say about the spirit. I want to remind you that we didn't get a list of the prisoners, a list of the prisoners, which is a piece of paper, nothing more, we didn't get a list of the prisoners, until after we sat down and worked out all the arrangements and after you had the full list of the prisoners. And I am not bringing it up. I am not saying that you made business when we talked about people. You were talking about quantities of material matters.

A - At any rate anything discussed about the town or the quantities, we have no coins at all -----and the UN can take it.----

B - Alright.

A - There is another small point before we leave. You know that for the 3rd army, we have only one unloading point. We talked about making another unloading point, and for security measures, you refused. During this unloading point, there is a gap on the eastern bank, there is a gap on the western bank, there is another gap on the eastern bank, and we want to make another gap on the western bank, just to cross 30 metres in the same area.

B - General, perhaps I have explained it to you this morning. I went there after the last meeting, and I looked at it closely. Western bank, unloading point you have a jetty, you have a building here, you can put at the same time 3 vehicles, and I watched and there were only 2. I told the major who was in charge. He had only 80 people, I said he could take 100. I told our commander 100 - I have agreed. I told him he could employ 10 vehicles.

(tape interrupted). ./...

B - First of all, I checked about Adabiya (It was also on Television) because by chance the television was there. What happened was that a vehicle by mistake I think, there were some civilians, some soldiers, went past your check-point, past our check-point.

A - Past your check-point?

B & E - Yes.

B - This was that. If you ask the UN, they came to take the wounded people afterwards, they didn't know what happened. This is what happened, the vehicle drove past your check-point, past our check-point (he was mistaken probably) and then they opened fire. And there was a wounded or two wounded and the UN came in and took them out. So, you can check with the UN where the wounded people were picked up. I am very sorry for it, very sorry because it was unnecessary. But the soldiers didn't know what was happening. We are very sorry for it personally, and also the Minister asked me to tell you that we are very sorry, but they passed the two check-points and they didn't know what happened.
Now, we have given strict orders again not to open fire unless there is a crossing of the lines. There are several instances where your troops cut a crossing the cease-fire lines and started advancing towards the fortifications. And orders are very very strict and I know, General Tal went down yesterday himself, personally, again to ensure that people won't open fire like that and I don't think it happens. But we have a whole list of cases in which your troops either advanced on the ground, or opened fire and I don't think it's necessary for us to give you the whole list - a,b,c, etc., but I only want to tell you that we are conscious of the problem, and we are doing everything to see that no fire is unnecessarily opened.

A - Alright.

B - I didn't know about Adabiya. I went personally to check it and to see what can be done. There was a minor point which we raised at our meeting last time - whether we could have a copy of the meetings we had with you, General, of the records.

C - We have no records, you know.

UN - We are not equipped for that. We took it for us frankly.

C - Then we would have to have a secretary taking of the machine.

B - But on the first meeting you had a stenographer.

UN - She was here in case you would not have the agreement. She was ready to retype it.

E - You know, you could have changed the agreement?

B - But let us assume, that tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, Sunday or Monday, we reach an agreement about disengagement. What form will it get?

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The form of record is a problem.

UN - We can have a secretary which will type , write it.

B - I'll tell you I am not worried about the record, I'm worried about the agreement. For the record we'll find a solution.

A - I have a proposal - when we come to the main items of that agreement, and we'll go back all of us and have it written...

B - In a clear form...

A - By all legal procedures, and then we'll exchange it - to be sure from both sides.

B - A signature.

A - And then we'll sign it. And I will sign it in another formal meeting as the last one.

B - Incha'allah.

A - We'll go back today and prepare it (laughs).

B - I'll bring the Jerusalem Post tomorrow, I'll be grateful if you can bring the El Ahram.

A - That's a promise and I'll bring of today and yesterday.

E - Specially Heikal's article on his talk with Kissinger.

B - I have it, I have it.

E - You have it already?

B - Yes. There are two very interesting. One is the talk with Kissinger, the other is the interview with the Minister of War. Very interesting.

A - (smiled).

B - (laughingly) I am straightforward General, I am straightforward.

A - I didn't say a word.

E - Smiling is much better than saying.

A - May I have a word with you General, before we go.

E - These are UN cigarettes.

TOP SECRET

23.11.1973

A - GAMAZY
B - YARIV
C - SIILASVUO
D - UEDI
E - EYAL
S - SHERIFF
F - UN OFFICER MR. GORGE

C - Good morning, gentlemen, we start today ...
A - With your permission, if we can discuss the problem of the Red Cross.
S - The questions we asked yesterday you promised to answer today.
B - Yes. I understand that on the question of the civilian population, the Red Cross representative in Tel-Aviv has already had an answer. You asked for soldiers to be taken and the answer was negative. When I got back I was told by the newspapers the answer has been negative.
S - We got an answer--- concerning the population who wish to leave the area.
B - So, I am probably mistaken. On leaving it's alright, but the answer was negative on the request to take a census. I understand the Red Cross, as I promised you, General, has been on a visit, had no complaints.
S - Well, the point is that people who want to leave-----the Red Cross ------- to Cairo----the area------and find a way of taking them out---- buses going and coming.
B - I understand the answer is that the Red Cross delegate from Jerusalem will come it is OK with us.
S - Not from Cairo?
B - No, we prefer from Jerusalem. I want to be clear what we are talking about because I don't want to have a misunderstanding. I understand your request is to let people who want to leave, leave. That's alright. Then there is another point: you would like the Red Cross representative to go and check who wants to leave, who wants to stay, on this our answer was negative. Whoever wants to leave it is OK. If the Red Cross representative from Jerusalem wants to go and see how things are down there in the area,'tfadal'.
S - Now, are people allowed to leave, whoever wants to leave, whoever wants to enter again, to go in a kind of agreement and understanding to let them come back again.
B - As far as I understand what was agreed upon, if the people want to leave, it's OK. But we can't permit a movement back and forth. Those who were outside to go back to their town.

./...

B - Ah, that's a different point. This I'll have to check. You are talking about people from the outside coming in.

S - About people who were previously inhabitants before the war.

B - This is a new point. This I have to check. If we get into an agreement with General Gamazy, then you won't have any problem at all. I am talking seriously, not cynically.

S - So, you promised me to answer about more than a 100 wounded to be evacuated from Suez.

B - Yes, in principle it's alright.

S - They can go out -----

B - Just a moment. Because with you we always like to be clear, so we have no misunderstanding. So, once the question of the bodies from Suez is in order.

S - No problem.

B - As the General says, I hate the word exchange - I really do.

S - They'll start on Monday.

B - Sunday.

S - 25th.

B - I remember , but you check if I am right. Then, there is the question of correspondence. On this I am sorry, the answer is negative.

S - Even for cards?

B - Yes.

S - Cards are non-military information.

B - But the non-military nature of the information is for the Third Army. Now, there was another point, about medical supplies - OK.
The relief of medical teams. General, I am sorry, the answer is negative. Of course, I remind you that we have agreed to free movement of the Red Cross medical supplies. I think this covers all points you mentioned.

S - General Yariv, just a little point concerning the exchange of bodies in no man's land. My authorities told me that we should search in our mine fields and you will search in your mine fields.

B - OK.

S - Each side knows his mine fields - we have to put on the maps where our troops are -- we can fix a timing when the teams start working, so that there will be no firing.

B - So what you mean is division of the no man's land (and for the purpose of looking for bodies), yes?

S - We have our mine fields and we know where they are, and we are ready to look for the bodies of both sides in our mine fields, without joint committees. We are ready to take the responsibility because we

know where the mine fields are, and with our engineers, it might not be necessary to remove the mines.

B - OK. We'll look where the mines are, and where they can go. But how do we prevent any accident in fire?

S - -----at such a moment when you start searching, the Red Cross will put a flag on the edge of the forward defensive lines and under the Red Cross flag -- and exact timing coordinated with the UN, we'll start the operation.

E - We agreed that your team will look after the killed soldiers west of our strong point at the North. They were there and they looked after the bodies. Will this work on the same basis?

S - It worked very well, I think.

E - Yes, but if we will come from our side, and start searching for bodies will our team be allowed to advance until your lines?

S - -----500 metres from our forward defensive lines. This-----on the map, because on the ground, you can never see it. It needs some small level teams, may be----with the local commanders.

E - [illegible]

E - As we allowed you to advance to 200 m. from our strong point there, we would like to have the same!

A - That's from Port Said?

B - Exactly.

A - It doesn't make any difference between 200 and 500. The Red Cross will be there.

(B - General Gamazy has given a very good statement to the press,I was very glad to read it).

E - We would prefer to allow these teams to search and find the dead bodies.

A - General, both of you will be there and the teams will be there. If there is a dead body, at a distance of 250, it doesn't make any difference, 320, it doesn't make any difference. If you see a dead body from the Chinese army, you will take it away.

E - Well, I am sorry to say that until today, we are talking about this around 8 days, we were not allowed to start. So I would like ------ on the 25th, fine!

S - We need maps and we have to put things on maps.

E - Well, today is the 23rd, it's a long time.

S - We have to put our positions, your positions on the map together.

E - Well, we can do it now.

S - So, you've got a map to give us?

A map for what, for mines?

./...

S - For the positions.

B - For the positions, yes. I even have a map here.

E - I prefer to decide on the 25th and to allow the local commanders on the spot - they will find a solution there. We just start with it.

A - The local commander?

E - The local commander.

A - OK. - 'Halas'. On the 25th, you will get the bodies from Suez.

E - And you will get the bodies east of the strong point.

S - One last point. We started looking for our bodies in no man's land east of the strong point that you occupy. Yesterday, it seems they found nobody and they have to go back. The Red Cross gentleman yesterday, had a very strong diarrhoea, and he went back to Cairo to be cured. Would you mind, Sir, if we continue tomorrow?

E - They can continue tomorrow.

B - What happened to your seriously wounded people from the Third Army. We waited 3 times for the evacuation.

A - No, it's finished. In Karamit strong point, those who were wounded, we found them dead, died of their wounds.

B - Why, General, when you asked me I gave you on the spot an answer.

A - We had 3 or 4 dead after that until the Red Cross---we reported to the UN and the Red Cross and they are buried there.

B - I am very sorry, General.

A - One of them is buried there and the others ---

B - I am very sorry because we were ready the same day to do it.

E - Two weeks ago I agreed on the spot to solve the problem with the Red Cross.

A - So much work with the Red Cross. It takes a long time, on our side, on the other side.

B - I am very sorry, General.

E - Still, there is one very important subject. Well, I waited the whole night to have the names, so we'll be able to exchange Mizrachi.

A - Mizrachi has nothing to do with it, not at all. I'll be responsible for Mizrachi indirect, because it is the responsibility of another

B - Factor.

A - With General Yariv, we'll discuss it.

B - Alright.

S - So, tomorrow, they can start searching the bodies-----inform the local commander

E - Of our strong point. You promised we'll wait until the 26th about the pilots on the investigation.

S - Yes, Sir.

- Alright

./...

B - Amid Sheriff? Amid is correct.

A - Correct.

B - I must check my Arabic the whole time.

A - I personally have the impression you will need it.

B - I'll tell you. I studied Arabic once and I got to the Stage where I could read a newspaper fluently. That was in 46, 47. Then, I stopped - I didn't have time and I tried again after I left the army, but it was very difficult, I couldn't keep the time table with my teacher so I asked him to forgive me. You want to talk business General, I am sure, so do we,'tfadal'.

A - 'Tfadal' you.

B - General, I have good witnesses that I have always taken up your challenge and invitation.

A - Because you have the initiative.

B - Yes, this is true. Because we are the ones who make the withdrawal. @srael is making a withdrawal. This is our initiative. We have agreed on a withdrawal.

D - -------

B - I'll be very frank with you, General, and Colonel, as I always try - to be as frank as possible. We are in a difficult situation. I haven't told anything to the press, but we are in a very difficult situation, as the official positions have been mutually rejected as unacceptable. This is a privilege of each side of course - and we have talked about unofficial possibilities, and I have shown the Prime Minister yesterday the drawing. I said - this is General Gamazy's - and, I think, that Colonel Uedi wasn't happy. He thought that you had given up too much. No? (I didn't tell her that) (laughs).
But so far the unofficial possibilities you have mentioned are - there's a wide gap. And so far, I have no bridge no PMP no ----, no bridge to bridge the gap, no unifloat, nothing. So, this is a difficult position. But I have a couple of questions, and the major question, General, on which yesterday you didn't give me an answer. You gave me an answer of principle, but you didn't give me an answer that I could translate to our authorities and to say "this is what our Egyptian friends have in mind". And this is the question of the size of the forces on the East Bank. You gave me the principle:
a) you insist on military presence on the East Bank, as a principle
b) the size of your forces on the East Bank will be in proportion to the withdrawal of our forces. But when I asked you how much, you stuck to the principle. Now, you have a clear idea of distances. Two good examples: one is your unofficial possibility, one is our unofficial

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possibility. So my question is, General, whether on these two possibilities you could give me an idea about the size of your forces on the East Bank.

A - You mean the size on the possibility of 45 km. from the Canal -

B - Add on the basis of our unofficial possibility which you have not accepted as I have not accepted yours. I have not brought it to the government yet, but I have not accepted it and the Prime Minister said it is true that is unacceptable for us. Our unofficial possibility of 10-12 km. from the Canal, which you do not accept.

F - Main line 35.

B - Main line 45 his unofficial.

F - But you had unofficial 35 from the Canal, main line.

B - General, I want to explain. It is not that I am looking down for something to upset the whole matter. I am asking the question, because it is of weighty question, and it is a question of the size, nature and armament of the force. That is to say size and characteristics.

A - It is very difficult to say the size. We have civilians here and we say we'll keep a smaller part of the division, say half of the division.

B - I'll tell you why I think this question is legitimate. If we would have been dealing only in generalities, then it is a general point, but we have been dealing with very clear lines. So many inhabitants ---, therefore this is a crucial factor. I can understand, General, that perhaps you can't give me an answer today, alright, I won't press you, I'll come back tomorrow.

Because, I think, General, that the matters we are discussing are so important that we shouldn't put a pressure on you like that. We don't want to draw it out but...

A - Right. Before I can give the size and the different factors of arms to be kept here, we should start from what size you will keep on the other side?

B - What size?

A - What size of troops you will keep on the other side?

B - Our main forces, you mean?

A - That's factor number one. And the factor number two is the distance

B - Distance? We have two examples.

A - If I can say, if you put here 2 divisions, we shall have here 2 divisions.

B - Plus <u>all</u> the divisions you have in the Egyptian armed forces you have on the Western side of the Bank.

A - On the west side of the bank, we don't consider it in the field.

B - General, you always say I am a politician, but I have also had some military schooling (laughs). We all know it is true there is a Canal in the middle which has been bridged before. You don't have to make a ./...

bridging operation, you don't have a sand wall everything is ready and you'll have, let us say (I don't know, perhaps you'll have----- or perhaps you'll have 10 divisions), but you have X divisions - 2,1 divisions. You'll say - if we have 1 division on the passage, for example, you will want 2 divisions on the bridge heads (for example). Then you say in addition --- what you have behind, this doesn't count. Let us say you have 2 infantry divisions with tanks with------- with all that goes with infantry divisions, which will be fully perfected by your whole missile system, because you have your missiles either some of them on the East Bank, because you say you want us out of artillery range not from the Canal, but out of artillery range from the military posts.

A - - For the benefit of the two sides.

B - Of course, I understand, but you will have your missiles there, all your missiles in addition to these two divisions which will be perfected by tanks and by missiles and by everything else. You will have the rest of your armed forces somewhere between the West Bank and let us say--- Kassassin, etc.

A - Between you and Cairo and Shallom and Libya and this area.

B - General, we both know that your main forces are not in Sallom, that your forces are not even in Amariya, that your main forces are between Cairo and the Canal. So what you are supposing is that in addition to a strong presence, very strong presence, on the Eastern Bank, you'll have all the forces on the West Bank which means if you are looking for checks and balances (you know the principle of checks and balances, I am sure Mr. Brashi knows the principle of checks and balances), if you are looking for a military balance, you are eliminating the fact that you have all your forces on the West Bank. The Canal is no obstacle for them any longer. So where does that lead us? If we weigh the factors in this manner, we will never get to an understanding. And the General knows much much better than I do and so does the Colonel, the movement table of all the divisions, how long it takes to cross, administratively, to cross. How many vehicles it takes to pass at 20 or 30 km. over the bridge and the rest is easy.

A - If I give you the size, and I will give it, the size of our troops and tanks on the eastern side of the Canal in the 2nd army sectors, there should be another limitation on your troops in Sinai.

B - I don't say that we can't discuss it. We can discuss it. ./...

A - Because there will be the two opposing sides on the Eastern Bank of the Canal. Right?

B - No!

A - (smiling)

B - No, I'll tell you why I am saying no. Now, I am speaking purely militarily, purely militarily.

A - Purely militarily.

B - We are not trying to dispute the fact that this is Egyptian soil. This is not a question that we dispute your sovereignty or your right to do what you see fit on your side. This is not the question. But if we speak in purely military terms, we cannot, from the purely military point, we cannot only compare the forces we have in the Western part of Sinai with what you have on the Eastern Bank of the Canal.
We have also to take into consideration I don't say that we have to have as many divisions but we have to take into consideration the amount of force at your disposition on the Western Bank. For example, let us say that all your armoured divisions and your mechanized divisions, whether they are at Huckstep and Ashor, or whether they are at Kassassin and Ridam el Hamar or Tel Subin.

A - You know everything except the coordination. You can give us the orders. (in good spirit).

B - It is no great wisdom. After the war and after I have been---

A - Head of Intelligence.

B - For 8 years, not great trick. You know all our divisions, as well. So, we cannot forget it. I think it is a legitimate military point. Because I think, General, that we should not try to have what the French call "Dialogue de sourds" - 'Atash'. But by the time we finish, our negotiations, I'll be able to conduct an interview in Arabic, incha'allah. Anyway, seriously, you must understand, General, you had the element of surprise on your side on October 6th. Now, it is true both sides want to move towards a peaceful settlement. I believe you, I have full confidence when you say it, full confidence. I hope you believe us, and the President believes us in this respect. But until we move from the present situation to a peaceful settlement, there are difficult political stages inevitably.
There will be difficult political stages and phases and it is legitimate for each of the sides to use military pressure, not necessarily war, but military pressure. This is what happens in every conference. It is a classical strategic theory - the combination of military political moves. Therefore, we want to assure ourselves against military surprise move on your part. If you have strong military presence

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A - Because the C will be the one opposing all on the Western front of the Canal. Right?

B - Not ...

(Laughing)

A - No, I'll tell you why I'm saying no. Now, I'm speaking purely politically, purely politically.

A - Purely politically.

B - We were crying so much for long that Italy is Egyptian until that N expedition that we thought you somehow or other failed to ... what you are in your duties. It is not the question. But if we speak in purely military terms, we cannot stop the enemy, with my point, what you have on the Western bank of the Canal.

My only duty is this: considering I don't say that we have to take many divisions but we have to take into consideration the amount of troops as your disposition on the Western bank. For example, let us say that your proposed divisions and your mechanical divisions, whether they are at Mersa Matruh and Alex, or whether they are at Marsa el Hamra and Kilab el Ma'en or Tel Kebir.

A - You know, everything except the evacuation. You can give me the orders.

(In good humour).

B - It is an exact opinion. If you are and after I have been ...

A - Head of Intelligence.

B - For 5 years, not great cycle, you study all the division, as well, and we cannot forget it. I think it is a legitimate military point.

Because I think, General, that we should be sure to have what French call Division de Choc, that is the one we finish, our reserves, I'll be able to muster strategic in Upper Egypt, especially against Italian Army. Now, if you have only one division or two divisions of marines on your side as Commando, you, if we were both sides want to move towards a powerful land force. I believe that conditions when you say it, this question between us. I hope you have no belief us, and the Prime Minister believe us in this respect, for until we move from the Western bottleneck, where are difficult political strains inevitably.

There will be difficult political choices and there is going to be some few feet of the plans to the military reserve, for geographically, but military reserve. This is what happens in every conference. It is a classical scientific theory - the combination of military political means. Therefore, we have to assure ourselves military support above on your part. If we have other military presence

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on the East Bank, and I have given you a few examples what it means when we speak about a couple of divisions, everything your divisions have with the cover of the missiles, which cover not only the planes in the sky but it will cover our ground troops as well in range. And in addition to that you will have a big military force, as big as you intend to, near the West Bank of the Canal, so that we cannot reckon the size of our forces in Sinai only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. We must take into consideration also what you will have on the West Bank. The point of principle according to you, General, is that we should calculate our forces only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. I think that this is militarily speaking... If I go to my Chief of Staff and I say"I met General Gamazy today and I accepted his principle", he throws me out of his office, and he'll say "you are an assistant Chief of Staff? Perhaps for the political authorities, you are good, but not as a military man"".

E - What we have to do is make another Canal, so that it would be symmetric.

A - The Canal is our problem.

E - No, in the Sinai to make another Canal-

B - So that it would be balanced.

A - That's a good idea - (laughs).

B - By the way, a digression. Has the Bitter Lake always existed? before the Canal?

E - Yes.

B - But where did the water come from?

D - Like the Dead Sea.

B - But the Jordan always flew into the Dead Sea. But this is only a curiosity.

A - Do you want to know the size by divisions, by units , by arms?

B - We would very much like to know the size of the force by battalion, brigade, division, the kind of armament like - artillery, tanks, air to ground missiles... These are straightforward questions.

- ... But General, I don't want to push you,seriously. If you want time to consider this problem it's OK. I won't...

A - I don't have the reply now. I'll have to think it over, because I came here under the impression that still we'll be engaged on the lines and this and that.

B - We'll have a debate on the lines.

A - But we finished on the lines now. On the basis of that line.

B - This is true, the question was on the basis of the line, but I also said, because it is very important that we have no misunderstanding, that the line, the distances, the lines you have presented in your

unofficial possibility are unacceptable to us. And I know that the distance I have presented are unacceptable to you. This is clear to me. If you would like to discuss it...

A - And then we would - the size of the troops on no basis.

B - You have two hypotheses.

E - Two possibilities.

A - Unofficial possibilities.

F - 35 & 45 for main forces, is that what you mean?

A & B- Yes.

F - On each basis discussion on the size of the forces.

B - Mr. Gorgé. This is only the main forces line. But there is also question of security line. So, I am saying this to make sure that we have no misunderstanding... General, for example, I'll say them again - whether or not you'll have artillery on this side, what kind of artillery whether (well - laughing - I won't tell you what kind of artillery you have). Question of tanks, question of anti-tank guns - whether caliber of all kinds or limited caliber; question of infantry weapons - you have the whole range of infantry weapons from Ak to Sager to etc...

A - To Saga?

B - Saga is mabutka. I can give you a military secret, General, the maker of --- you know him (laughs), Swppper and Segev you know them. And then the question of tanks, amphibious tanks - and we mentioned artillery, tanks and air to ground missiles - alright, I understand that on this we'll have to wait because you want to clarify the problem.

A - If the General would agree to have a break

B - "Tafadal".

A - I want to ask you a personal question. Did you agree on the final line of disengagement.

B - No, not that we didn't agree. We haven't discussed it at all. We have not yet discussed it at all. Ah, yes, I have to explain it to you. It takes you one hour to get to Cairo. I have to fly to --- change the plane. Yesterday, there was a very strong wind ooaa! And I came like that. And I saw the Minister and the Prime Minister it was about 9 o'clock and she had a big political meeting, so there was no time even to discuss it. There was time to report, but no time to discuss.

A - The same thing happened to me.

B - - I believe you.

A - 9.30 we start.

./...

B - I don't know how President Sadat is, but my Prime Minister likes to work at night. She can stay when all the young people are half dead, she can stay still going strong till 3 o'clock in the morning. But last night, she was busy with political problems. She didn't have time to discuss it.

C - May I ask one question now.

B - Yes.

C - I understand that on the Israeli side there has been no discussion nor agreement on the line you presented.

B - True.

C - But is there an understanding that there will be successive lines, that is, which we have now discussed, is the first line of withdrawal.

B - I even wrote, the General even wrote with his own handwriting - time frame 3 to 6 months.

A - But under discussion, I underlined that in the report to the President -

C - Historic documents.

B - Now, this is clear, no misunderstanding. This is what I proposed, not what you accepted. Now, in answer to your question, General,this what I presented is an unofficial possibility of our first line of disengagement, which means that further lines or a further line of disengagement is envisaged. I cannot say whether line or lines, but but at least line.

E - But instead of what Mr. Gorgé proposed that irrespective of progress in peace conference, 3-6 months, I didn't like it. It should be that the next line should be agreed upon in the peace conference.

B - This is my view, 3 to 6 months. I haven't checked the official view. General, I think we can agree on a meeting tomorrow.

A - 10 + 10 and then 15 for the UN.--- and then you will have the defiles in your hands, which will leave us in a very bad military position. Although we can talk about it tomorrow, morning, as it is a temporary line. In this case, we should have another line here so you can move to the second line ---

B - I'll give you an answer tomorrow, but I think, we would like to discuss the second line at the conference, but I must check.

A - Alright, if it is for the conference, let the foreign ministers do it.

B - No, I'll give you an answer perhaps.

A - Alright, --- I'll let our foreign minister know that you will give me a reply.

B - But for the Peace Conference, we don't have any invitation.

A - I think Mr. Eban declared yesterday -

E - Yes, in Washington. Foreign Ministers for the 16th of December. ./...

A - They mean to have 3 or 4 days conference and then postpone it for after the elections. It is also Christmas time, and this and that so... I would like to have the minimum time for that line. We would like to have the minimum time for that line on the 16th of January.

B - Bes...

A - Also we will not start building our cities here until this line will be withdrawn from here. If any hostilities start, there will be thousands of our civilians here.

B - This means you are taking off something that we see as a security measure.

E - [illegible]

A - When I was in Ismailia 3 or 4 times started shooting at Ismailia and you can't know what happened. Thousands of people were living in Ismailia. They were in a very bad position from 1967 till... two years here. So that is why we were insisting to have your troops back away here so that they can work and be safe here. The problem is 35 km.

X - 45.

A - 45 km. for safety for our people here. Specially for people coming to work in the Canal and so on, very difficult for them to work in such a situation , although we need it badly to start work here. It gives you security, and it gives us security, and we want our people go.

B - This is unfortunate because we see in the beginning of work in this scene a security for us. I understand your position. I only want to be clear so that when we meet again tomorrow, we don't start again from the same position.

A - Yes, please. We want General to be clear so that we can come to a conclusion.

B - As the situation is now I am permitted to say, that we cannot accept the size of the forces you are talking about, we cannot accept the distances you are talking about, and that we cannot accept the timeframe.

A - The three main points. That means we didn't do anything, General.

B - I'll tell you what we did: I didn't have any idea about the size of the forces, I didn't know until this morning.

A - But, honestly, we didn't discuss it and I just gave it, just like that.

B - I know it is on your responsibility, but your shoulders have already borne heavier responsibility. So this is clear to me, and I'll present it to the authorities, and I'll come back tomorrow, and see whether we can --- I don't promise.

A - Inorder not to get that indication that we are not clear enough on that point --- our civilians here because we want them to go back. ./...

And the minute you start here, the minute we start working here...

B - I understood that.

A - - If we can give them more safety, 10km. for the UN, not ourselves, it will be better for them.

B - I'll ask you a question in order to be clear. That's not a question of time pressure on this. At which distance, when we are at distance X, you are ready to start on the Canal with civilian activities. What is X.

A - What X from our point of view? 60km.

F - 60 from the Canal, main forces?

A - Main forces.

B - That means 50 for the security zone. Until then, no civilian activities.

A - No, that's a political point, I don't want to say it now. Now I felt that there will be danger for these people to start working there. If you can give the UN 10 more km., it will be alright for these civilians here.

F - Instead of 15 for us, you have given us 25, and then the civilians would start.

B - That means we have to go back 55 for the main forces.

B - That means we've got to go back to 10 more km. here. That means 45km. from the westernmost line.

F - And 55 for your main force.

A - From the military point, there is no difficulty for that at all. Because the defile is still in your hands, right?

B - You say main forces 55 km.?

A - All the defiles are in your hands.

B - How come, General? You know, each one has his own map.

E - This sounds like the joke about the American tourist coming to Cairo and the guy telling them that the pyramids are 20km. from here, but for you, ladies, only 15.

B - [illegible]

F - What would you say to the press now?

B - If the General agrees, we can say that the discussion today were devoted to clarity sake from the distance point of view and that we shall continue tomorrow.

(end of tape)

A - .... because I have no time at all.

B - Same problem here, so if I come tomorrow with the same ideas, don't be angry general.

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and the miners two extra hours, the mining we start working here...

S - I understood that.

A - If we can give them eight, 10%, for the US, not negative, it will be better for them.

S - Will ask you a question to be clear. There's not a question of them getting on this. As with Ukraine, when we are at Glasgow. I, you are ready to meet on the level with civilian authorities. Does it?

A - What I form our point of view.

S - Oh from the Chair, safe person.

A - Safe person.

S - They seems to (or the security zone. Until then, be jointly activities.

A - No, that's political point. I don't want to say it now. How I felt that above will be timber for three points to start working there. If you can give her 7% (2 units in), it will be alright for those civilians here.

S - Instead of 15 for us. You have given de 25, and then the civilians would start.

A - That means we have to cash 5% for the mole forever.

S - That means we've got to go back to 10 more bn, here. That means also from the watermark line.

A - Yes, 5% for your main force.

S - Does the military point there is no difficulty (or else at all, because the (Gulf) is still in your hands, right?

A - Yes any main force is in.

S - All the defects are in your hands.

A - For sure, Granted? Yes sure, with our law this country.

S - This seems like the Jolo where the Mindanao border ended to Sitno and the new valley that they're pursuing are 20km from here, but for you, Indian, only 15.

S - What would you say to the Syria now?

A - If the Central agrees, we can try the discussion today were focused to clarity make (for) the Ukraine point of view (at that we still continue).

(end of item)

A - ... because I have to (one as) all.

S - The problem here, as if I come (returns with the main issue, don't be sure (secret).

He, the Colonel (Eyal) doesn't believe me. He thinks I have not told you about the tanks. He is more difficult than you are General.

E - I'd like to have tanks, water tanks for instance.

B - The easternmost point of Mitlé is 30 km. from the Canal.

E - 30-34km. The Mitlé pass is about 20km. wide.

(press takes pictures).

	10-15	10km.	25km.	10km.	
CANAL	2nd Army	Egyptian Security zone		Israeli security zone	Main Israeli forces.

TOP SECRET

23.11.1973

A - GAMAZY
B - YARIV
C - SIILASVUO
D - UEDI
E - EYAL
S - SHERIFF
F - UN OFFICER MR. GORGE

C - Good morning, gentlemen, we start today ...
A - With your permission, if we can discuss the problem of the Red Cross.
S - The questions we asked yesterday you promised to answer today.
B - Yes. I understand that on the question of the civilian population, the Red Cross representative in Tel-Aviv has already had an answer. You asked for soldiers to be taken and the answer was negative. When I got back I was told by the newspapers the answer has been negative.
S - We got an answer--- concerning the population who wish to leave the area.
B - So, I am probably mistaken. On leaving it's alright, but the answer was negative on the request to take a census. I understand the Red Cross, as I promised you, General, has been on a visit, had no complaints.
S - Well, the point is that people who want to leave-----the Red Cross ------- to Cairo----the area------and find a way of taking them out---- buses going and coming.
B - I understand the answer is that the Red Cross delegate from Jerusalem will come it is OK with us.
S - Not from Cairo?
B - No, we prefer from Jerusalem. I want to be clear what we are talking about because I don't want to have a misunderstanding. I understand your request is to let people who want to leave, leave. That's alright. Then there is another point: you would like the Red Cross representative to go and check who wants to leave, who wants to stay, on this our answer was negative. Whoever wants to leave it is OK. If the Red Cross representative from Jerusalem wants to go and see how things are down there in the area,'tfadal'.
S - Now, are people allowed to leave, whoever wants to leave, whoever wants to enter again, to go in a kind of agreement and understanding to let them come back again.
B - As far as I understand what was agreed upon, if the people want to leave, it's OK. But we can't permit a movement back and forth.
S - Those who were outside to go back to their town.

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THE DEPOT

29.11.1913

A - CLERGY

B - LARRY

C - CLEARING

D - DICK

E - KYAK

F - MURPHY

G - MR. GRIFFEN, MR. CLARK

G - Good morning, gentlemen, we meet today...

A - In your quarantine, if we've missed the symbols of the Red Cross.

A - The questions we have yesterday now remained to answer Larry.

B - Yes, I understand that on the question of the utilities quarantine, the Red Cross representative is [illegible] and in answer, You asked for opinions to be taken and the answer was negative. When I got back I was told by the newspapers the answer has been negative.

B - We got no answer -- concerning the population who will be there six days, I am probably wrong, by leaving this district, but the answer was necessary to the reasons to take a chance. I understand the Red Cross, as I previous you, General, has been on a visit, had no complaints. Well, the point is that people who work to [illegible] the Red Cross [illegible] to Calgary [illegible] I find a way of taking them out---- buses going and coming.

A - I understand the reason is that the Red Cross [illegible] from Vancouver, will come to be with us.

B - Not into Calgary?

G - Oh, we prefer from Vancouver... have to be almost two to one letting about because I don't want to have a misunderstanding. I understand your letter [illegible] the word to Larry, Larry, that's alright. When there is another order, you would like the Red Cross representative to go and check the route by Larry, who seems to stay on this [illegible] negative. We ever want to leave it is OK. If the Red Cross representatives from Vancouver, when do go and see [illegible] there is six or [illegible].

B - Now, are people allowed to leave, anyone there to leave, because needs to open again, to go in a [illegible] and [illegible] to [illegible] there.

B - As far as I understand what was agreed upon, is to permit what to leave, it's OK, but we don't permit a quarantine and [illegible].

G - Those who want outside to go west to their [illegible].

B - Ah, that's a different point. This I'll have to check. You are talking about people from the outside coming in.

S - About people who were previously inhabitants before the war.

B - This is a new point. This I have to check. If we get into an agreement with General Gamazy, then you won't have any problem at all. I am talking seriously, not cynically.

S - So, you promised me to answer about more than a 100 wounded to be evacuated from Suez.

B - Yes, in principle it's alright.

S - They can go out -----

B - Just a moment. Because with you we always like to be clear, so we have no misunderstanding. So, once the question of the bodies from Suez is in order.

S - No problem.

B - As the General says, I hate the word exchange - I really do.

S - They'll start on Monday.

B - Sunday.

S - 25th.

B - I remember , but you check if I am right. Then, there is the question of correspondence. On this I am sorry, the answer is negative.

S - Even for cards?

B - Yes.

S - Cards are non-military information.

B - But the non-military nature of the information is for the Third Army. Now, there was another point, about medical supplies - OK.
The relief of medical teams. General, I am sorry, the answer is negative. Of course, I remind you that we have agreed to free movement of the Red Cross medical supplies. I think this covers all points you mentioned.

S - General Yariv, just a little point concerning the exchange of bodies in no man's land. My authorities told me that we should search in our mine fields and you will search in your mine fields.

B - OK.

S - Each side knows his mine fields - we have to put on the maps where our troops are -- we can fix a timing when the teams start working, so that there will be no firing.

B - So what you mean is division of the no man's land (and for the purpose of looking for bodies), yes?

S - We have our mine fields and we know where they are, and we are ready to look for the bodies of both sides in our mine fields, without joint committees. We are ready to take the responsibility because we

know where the mine fields are, and with our engineers, it might not be necessary to remove the mines.

E - OK. We'll look where the mines are, and where they can go. But how do we prevent any accident in fire?

S - -----at such a moment when you start searching, the Red Cross will put a flag on the edge of the forward defensive lines and under the Red Cross flag -- and exact timing coordinated with the UN, we'll start the operation.

E - We agreed that your team will look after the killed soldiers west of our strong point at the North. They were there and they looked after the bodies. Will this work on the same basis?

S - It worked very well, I think.

E - Yes, but if we will come from our side, and start searching for bodies will our team be allowed to advance until your lines?

S - -----500 metres from our forward defensive lines. This-----on the map, because on the ground, you can never see it. It needs some small level teams, may be----with the local commanders.

E - אנחנו נתנו לכם להתקדם עד 200 מ', וגם אנו רוצה שגם אתם נתקדם עד לקו שלהם.

E - As we allowed you to advance to 200 m. from our strong point there, we would like to have the same!

A - That's from Port Said?

B - Exactly.

A - It doesn't make any difference between 200 and 500. The Red Cross will be there.

(B - General Gamazy has given a very good statement to the press, I was very glad to read it).

E - We would prefer to allow these teams to search and find the dead bodies.

A - General, both of you will be there and the teams will be there. If there is a dead body, at a distance of 250, it doesn't make any difference, 320, it doesn't make any difference. If you see a dead body from the Chinese army, you will take it away.

E - Well, I am sorry to say that until today, we are talking about this around 8 days, we were not allowed to start. So I would like ------ on the 25th, fine!

S - We need maps and we have to put things on maps.

E - Well, today is the 23rd, it's a long time.

S - We have to put our positions, your positions on the map together.

E - Well, we can do it now.

S - So, you've got a map to give us?

B - A map for what, for mines?

./...

have cleared the mine fields for, and with our explosives, it might not be safe any to remove the mines?

A - Oh, we'll look where they're going and where they can go. But how do we prevent any accident in-fact?

B - ---- it would a moment when you start exploding, the Americans will put a fuse on the edge of the forward defensive lines and behind the 2nd Cross line -- and cannot similar movements from all the 3A. We'll start the operation.

B - We agreed that some rens will look after the injured soldiers west of our strong point at the Narib. They were flown out they looked after the bodies, with this work on the same basis?

A - It worked very well I think.

C - Yes, but if we will open fire our side, and start searching for bodies will our tanks be allowed to advance until your lines?

B - ------ 800 metres from our forward defensive lines. Then---- the men, because on the ground, you can adapt and fix, it could some small level tones, why be---- enter the local commander.

B - As we allowed you to advance to 800 m. from our strong point there, we would like to have the ground.

A - That's fine, fine then.

B - Thank you.

A - It doesn't matter difference between 700 and 800, the 800 cross will be there.

C - General Dimsey has given a very good statement to the press, I was very glad to read it.

A - We would prefer to stay a bit terse to avoid the dead bodies.

A - Thankful, both of you will be there and the ground will be there. If there is a dead body at a distance of 750, it doesn't make any difference, 750, 800, it doesn't make any difference. If you see a dead body from the distance away, you will take it away.

B - Well, I am sorry to say that until today, no any fighting about still around 5 days, we were not allowed to start. So I would like ---- on the 25th, fine!

S - I'm most glad and we have to get there on time.

B - Well, today is the 21st. Only a long time.

C - We have to put our positions, your positions on the map together.

A - Well, we can do it now.

B - So, you've got a map to show?

A - A map for you, for mine?

S - For the positions.

B - For the positions, yes. I even have a map here.

E - I prefer to decide on the 25th and to allow the local commanders on the spot - they will find a solution there. We just start with it.

A - The local commander?

E - The local commander.

A - OK. - 'Halas'. On the 25th, you will get the bodies from Suez.

E - And you will get the bodies east of the strong point.

S - One last point. We started looking for our bodies in no man's land east of the strong point that you occupy. Yesterday, it seems they found nobody and they have to go back. The Red Cross gentleman yesterday, had a very strong diarrhoea, and he went back to Cairo to be cured. Would you mind, Sir, if we continue tomorrow?

E - They can continue tomorrow.

B - What happened to your seriously wounded people from the Third Army. We waited 3 times for the evacuation.

A - No, it's finished. In Karamit strong point, those who were wounded, we found them dead, died of their wounds.

B - Why, General, when you asked me I gave you on the spot an answer.

A - We had 3 or 4 dead after that until the Red Cross---we reported to the UN and the Red Cross and they are buried there.

B - I am very sorry, General.

A - One of them is buried there and the others ---

B - I am very sorry because we were ready the same day to do it.

E - Two weeks ago I agreed on the spot to solve the problem with the Red Cross.

A - So much work with the Red Cross. It takes a long time, on our side, on the other side.

B - I am very sorry, General.

E - Still, there is one very important subject. Well, I waited the whole night to have the names, so we'll be able to exchange Mizrachi.

A - Mizrachi has nothing to do with it, not at all. I'll be responsible for Mizrachi indirect, because it is the responsibility of another

B - Factor.

A - With General Yariv, we'll discuss it.

B - Alright.

S - So, tomorrow, they can start searching the bodies-----inform the local commander

E - Of our strong point. You promised we'll wait until the 26th about the pilots on the investigation.

S - Yes, Sir.

E - Alright

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B - Amid Sheriff? Amid is correct.

A - Correct.

B - I must check my Arabic the whole time.

A - I personally have the impression you will need it.

B - I'll tell you. I studied Arabic once and I got to the Stage where I could read a newspaper fluently. That was in 46, 47. Then, I stopped - I didn't have time and I tried again after I left the army, but it was very difficult, I couldn't keep the time table with my teacher so I asked him to forgive me. You want to talk business General, I am sure, so do we,'tfadal'.

A - 'Tfadal' you.

B - General, I have good witnesses that I have always taken up your challenge and invitation.

A - Because you have the initiative.

B - Yes, this is true. Because we are the ones who make the withdrawal. Israel is making a withdrawal. This is our initiative. We have agreed on a withdrawal.

D - ------

B - I'll be very frank with you, General, and Colonel, as I always try - to be as frank as possible. We are in a difficult situation. I haven't told anything to the press, but we are in a very difficult situation, as the official positions have been mutually rejected as unacceptable. This is a privilege of each side of course - and we have talked about unofficial possibilities, and I have shown the Prime Minister yesterday the drawing. I said - this is General Gamazy's - and, I think, that Colonel Uedi wasn't happy. He thought that you had given up too much. No? (I didn't tell her that) (laughs).

But so far the unofficial possibilities you have mentioned are - there's a wide gap. And so far, I have no bridge no PMP no ----, no bridge to bridge the gap, no unifloat, nothing. So, this is a difficult position. But I have a couple of questions, and the major question, General, on which yesterday you didn't give me an answer. You gave me an answer of principle, but you didn't give me an answer that I could translate to our authorities and to say "this is what our Egyptian friends have in mind". And this is the question of the size of the forces on the East Bank. You gave me the principle:

a) you insist on military presence on the East Bank, as a principle

b) the size of your forces on the East Bank will be in proportion to the withdrawal of our forces. But when I asked you how much, you stuck to the principle. Now, you have a clear idea of distances. Two good examples: one is your unofficial possibility, one is our unofficial

possibility. So my question is, General, whether on these two possibilities you could give me an idea about the size of your forces on the East Bank.

A - You mean the size on the possibility of 45 km. from the Canal -

B - Add on the basis of our unofficial possibility which you have not accepted as I have not accepted yours. I have not brought it to the government yet, but I have not accepted it and the Prime Minister said it is true that is unacceptable for us. Our unofficial possibility of 10-12 km. from the Canal, which you do not accept.

F - Main line 35.

B - Main line 45 his unofficial.

F - But you had unofficial 35 from the Canal, main line.

B - General, I want to explain. It is not that I am looking down for something to upset the whole matter. I am asking the question, because it is of weighty question, and it is a question of the size, nature and armament of the force. That is to say size and characteristics.

A - It is very difficult to say the size. We have civilians here and we say we'll keep a smaller part of the division, say half of the division.

B - I'll tell you why I think this question is legitimate. If we would have been dealing only in generalities, then it is a general point, but we have been dealing with very clear lines. So many inhabitants ---, therefore this is a crucial factor. I can understand, General, that perhaps you can't give me an answer today, alright, I won't press you, I'll come back tomorrow.

Because, I think, General, that the matters we are discussing are so important that we shouldn't put a pressure on you like that. We don't want to draw it out but...

A - Right. Before I can give the size and the different factors of arms to be kept here, we should start from what size you will keep on the other side?

B - What size?

A - What size of troops you will keep on the other side?

B - Our main forces, you mean?

A - That's factor number one. And the factor number two is the distance

B - Distance(We have two examples.

A - If I can say, if you put here 2 divisions, we shall have here 2 divisions.

B - Plus <u>all</u> the divisions you have in the Egyptian armed forces you have on the Western side of the Bank.

A - On the west side of the bank, we don't consider it in the field.

B - General, you always say I am a politician, but I have also had some military schooling (laughs). We all know it is true there is a Canal in the middle which has been bridged before. You don't have to make a ./...

bridging operation, you don't have a sand wall everything is ready and you'll have, let us say (I don't know, perhaps you'll have----- or perhaps you'll have 10 divisions), but you have X divisions - 2,1 divisions. You'll say - if we have 1 division on the passage, for example, you will want 2 divisions on the bridge heads (for example). Then you say in addition --- what you have behind, this doesn't count. Let us say you have 2 infantry divisions with tanks with------- with all that goes with infantry divisions, which will be fully perfected by your whole missile system, because you have your missiles either some of them on the East Bank, because you say you want us out of artillery range not from the Canal, but out of artillery range from the military posts.

A - - For the benefit of the two sides.

B - Of course, I understand, but you will have your missiles there, all your missiles in addition to these two divisions which will be perfected by tanks and by missiles and by everything else. You will have the rest of your armed forces somewhere between the West Bank and let us say--- Kassassin, etc.

A - Between you and Cairo and Shallom and Libya and this area.

B - General, we both know that your main forces are not in Sallom, that your forces are not even in Amariya, that your main forces are between Cairo and the Canal. So what you are supposing is that in addition to a strong presence, very strong presence, on the Eastern Bank, you'll have all the forces on the West Bank which means if you are looking for checks and balances (you know the principle of checks and balances, I am sure Mr. Brashi knows the principle of checks and balances), if you are looking for a military balance, you are eliminating the fact that you have all your forces on the West Bank. The Canal is no obstacle for them any longer. So where does that lead us? If we weigh the factors in this manner, we will never get to an understanding. And the General knows much much better than I do and so does the Colonel, the movement table of all the divisions, how long it takes to cross, administratively, to cross. How many vehicles it takes to pass at 20 or 30 km. over the bridge and the rest is easy.

A - If I give you the size, and I will give it, the size of our troops and tanks on the eastern side of the Canal in the 2nd army sectors, there should be another limitation on your troops in Sinai.

B - I don't say that we can't discuss it. We can discuss it. ./...

A - Because there will be the two opposing sides on the Eastern Bank of the Canal. Right?

B - No!

A - (smiling)

B - No, I'll tell you why I am saying no. Now, I am speaking purely militarily, purely militarily.

A - Purely militarily.

B - We are not trying to dispute the fact that this is Egyptian soil. This is not a question that we dispute your sovereignty or your right to do what you see fit on your side. This is not the question. But if we speak in purely military terms, we cannot, from the purely military point, we cannot only compare the forces we have in the Western part of Sinai with what you have on the Eastern Bank of the Canal.
We have also to take into consideration I don't say that we have to have as many divisions but we have to take into consideration the amount of force at your disposition on the Western Bank. For example, let us say that all your armoured divisions and your mechanized divisions, whether they are at Huckstep and Ashor, or whether they are at Kassassin and Ridam el Hamar or Tel Subin.

A - You know everything except the coordination. You can give us the orders. (in good spirit).

B - It is no great wisdom. After the war and after I have been---

A - Head of Intelligence.

B - For 8 years, not great trick. You know all our divisions, as well. So, we cannot forget it. I think it is a legitimate military point. Because I think, General, that we should not try to have what the French call "Dialogue de sourds" - 'Atash'. But by the time we finish, ou our negotiations, I'll be able to conduct an interview in Arabic, incha'allah. Anyway, seriously, you must understand, General, you had the element of surprise on your side on October 6th. Now, it is true both sides want to move towards a peaceful settlement. I believe you, I have full confidence when you say it, full confidence. I hope ~~you say it~~ you believe us, and the President believes us in this respect. But until we move from the present situation to a peaceful settlement, there are difficult political stages inevitably.
There will be difficult political stages and phases and it is legitimate for each of the sides to use military pressure, not necessarily war, but military pressure. This is what happens in every conference. It is a classical strategic theory - the combination of military political moves. Therefore, we want to assure ourselves against military surprise move on your part. If you have strong military presence

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on the East Bank, and I have given you a few examples what it means when we speak about a couple of divisions, everything your divisions have with the cover of the missiles, which cover not only the planes in the sky but it will cover our ground troops as well in range. And in addition to that you will have a big military force, as big as you intend to, near the West Bank of the Canal, so that we cannot reckon the size of our forces in Sinai only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. We must take into consideration also what you will have on the West Bank. The point of principle according to you, General, is that we should calculate our forces only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. I think that this is militarily speaking... If I go to my Chief of Staff and I say"I met General Gamazy today and I accepted his principle", he throws me out of his office, and he'll say "you are an assistant Chief of Staff? Perhaps for the political authorities, you are good, but not as a military man"".

E - What we have to do is make another Canal, so that it would be symmetric.

A - The Canal is our problem.

E - No, in the Sinai to make another Canal-

B - So that it would be balanced.

A - That's a good idea - (laughs).

B - By the way, a digression. Has the Bitter Lake always existed? before the Canal?

E - Yes.

B - But where did the water come from?

D - Like the Dead Sea.

B - But the Jordan always flew into the Dead Sea. But this is only a curiosity.

A - Do you want to know the size by divisions, by units , by arms?

B - We would very much like to know the size of the force by battalion, brigade, division, the kind of armament like - artillery, tanks, air to ground missiles... These are straightforward questions.

- ... But General, I don't want to push you,seriously. If you want time to consider this problem it's OK. I won't...

A - I don't have the reply now. I'll have to think it over, because I came here under the impression that still we'll be engaged on the lines and this and that.

B - We'll have a debate on the lines.

A - But we finished on the lines now. On the basis of that line.

B - This is true, the question was on the basis of the line, but I also said, because it is very important that we have no misunderstanding, that the line, the distances, the lines you have presented in your

unofficial possibility are unacceptable to us. And I know that the distance I have presented are unacceptable to you. This is clear to me. If you would like to discuss it...

A - And then we would - the size of the troops on no basis.

B - You have two hypotheses.

E - Two possibilities.

A - Unofficial possibilities.

F - 35 & 45 for main forces, is that what you mean?

A & B- Yes.

F - On each basis discussion on the size of the forces.

B - Mr. Gorgé. This is only the main forces line. But there is also question of security line. So, I am saying this to make sure that we have no misunderstanding... General, for example, I'll say them again - whether or not you'll have artillery on this side, what kind of artillery whether (well - laughing - I won't tell you what kind of artillery you have). Question of tanks, question of anti-tank guns - whether caliber of all kinds or limited caliber; question of infantry weapons - you have the whole range of infantry weapons from Ak to Sager to etc...

A - To Saga?

B - Saga is mabutka. I can give you a military secret, General, the maker of --- you know him (laughs), Swppper and Segev you know them. And then the question of tanks, amphibious tanks - and we mentioned artillery, tanks and air to ground missiles - alright, I understand that on this we'll have to wait because you want to clarify the problem.

A - If the General would agree to have a break

B - "Tafadal".

A - I want to ask you a personal question. Did you agree on the final line of disengagement.

B - No, not that we didn't agree. We haven't discussed it at all. We have not yet discussed it at all. Ah, yes, I have to explain it to you. It takes you one hour to get to Cairo. I have to fly to --- change the plane. Yesterday, there was a very strong wind ooaa! And I came like that. And I saw the Minister and the Prime Minister it was about 9 o'clock and she had a big political meeting, so there was no time even to discuss it. There was time to report, but no time to discuss.

A - The same thing happened to me.

B - - I believe you.

A - 9.30 we start.

./...

B - I don't know how President Sadat is, but my Prime Minister likes to work at night. She can stay when all the young people are half dead, she can stay still going strong till 3 o'clock in the morning. But last night, she was busy with political problems. She didn't have time to discuss it.

C - May I ask one question now.

B - Yes.

C - I understand that on the Israeli side there has been no discussion nor agreement on the line you presented.

B - True.

C - But is there an understanding that there will be successive lines, that is, which we have now discussed, is the first line of withdrawal.

B - I even wrote, the General even wrote with his own handwriting - time frame 3 to 6 months.

A - But under discussion, I underlined that in the report to the President -

C - Historic documents.

B - Now, this is clear, no misunderstanding. This is what I proposed, not what you accepted. Now, in answer to your question, General,this what I presented is an unofficial possibility of our first line of disengagement, which means that further lines or a further line of disengagement is envisaged. I cannot say whether line or lines, but but at least line.

E - But instead of what Mr. Gorgé proposed that irrespective of progress in peace conference, 3-6 months, I didn't like it. It should be that the next line should be agreed upon in the peace conference.

B - This is my view, 3 to 6 months. I haven't checked the official view. General, I think we can agree on a meeting tomorrow.

A - 10 + 10 and then 15 for the UN.---- and then you will have the defiles in your hands, which will leave us in a very bad military position. Although we can talk about it tomorrow, morning, as it is a temporary line. In this case, we should have another line here so you can move to the second line ---

B - I'll give you an answer tomorrow, but I think, we would like to discuss the second line at the conference, but I must check.

A - Alright, if it is for the conference, let the foreign ministers do it.

B - No, I'll give you an answer perhaps.

A - Alright, --- I'll let our foreign minister know that you will give me a reply.

B - But for the Peace Conference, we don't have any invitation.

A - I think Mr. Eban declared yesterday -

E - Yes, in Washington. Foreign Ministers for the 16th of December. ./...

A - They mean to have 3 or 4 days conference and then postpone it for after the elections. It is also Christmas time, and this and that so... I would like to have the minimum time for that line. We would like to have the minimum time for that line on the 16th of January.

B - Bes...

A - Also we will not start building our cities here until this line will be withdrawn from here. If any hostilities start, there will be thousands of our civilians here.

B - This means you are taking off something that we see as a security measure.

E - [illegible]

A - When I was in Ismailia 3 or 4 times started shooting at Ismailia and you can't know what happened. Thousands of people were living in Ismailia. They were in a very bad position from 1967 till... two years here. So that is why we were insisting to have your troops back away here so that they can work and be safe here. The problem is 35 km.

X - 45.

A - 45 km. for safety for our people here. Specially for people coming to work in the Canal and so on, very difficult for them to work in such a situation , although we need it badly to start work here. It gives you security, and it gives us security, and we want our people go.

B - This is unfortunate because we see in the beginning of work in this scene a security for us. I understand your position. I only want to be clear so that when we meet again tomorrow, we don't start again from the same position.

A - Yes, please. We want General to be clear so that we can come to a conclusion.

B - As the situation is now I am permitted to say, that we cannot accept the size of the forces you are talking about, we cannot accept the distances you are talking about, and that we cannot accept the timeframe.

A - The three main points. That means we didn't do anything, General.

B - I'll tell you what we did: I didn't have any idea about the size of the forces, I didn't know until this monning.

A - But, honestly, we didn't discuss it and I just gave it, just like that.

B - I know it is on your responsibility, but your shoulders have already borne heavier responsibility. So this is clear to me, and I'll present it to the authorities, and I'll come back tomorrow, and see whether we can --- I don't promise.

A - In order not to get that indication that we are not clear enough on that point --- our civilians here because we want them to go back. ./...

And the minute you start here, the minute we start working here...

B - I understood that.

A - - If we can give them more safety, 10km. for the UN, not ourselves, it will be better for them.

B - I'll ask you a question in order to be clear. That's not a question of time pressure on this. At which distance, when we are at distance X, you are ready to start on the Canal with civilian activities. What is X.

A - What X from our point of view? 60km.

F - 60 from the Canal, main forces?

A - Main forces.

B - That means 50 for the security zone. Until then, no civilian activities.

A - No, that's a political point, I don't want to say it now. Now I felt that there will be danger for these people to start working there. If you can give the UN 10 more km., it will be alright for these civilians here.

F - Instead of 15 for us, you have given us 25, and then the civilians would start.

B - That means we have to go back 55 for the main forces.

B - That means we've got to go back to 10 more km. here. That means 45km. from the westernmost line.

F - And 55 for your main force.

A - From the military point, there is no difficulty for that at all. Because the defile is still in your hands, right?

B - You say main forces 55 km.?

A - All the defiles are in your hands.

B - How come, General? You know, each one has his own map.

E - This sounds like the joke about the American tourist coming to Cairo and the guy telling them that the pyramids are 20km. from here, but for you, ladies, only 15.

B - הגנרל, איפה השאר מונח? שימוש הנה. כמה? אלוהי הוא מונח. כמובן.

F - What would you say to the press now?

B - If the General agrees, we can say that the discussion today were devoted to clarity sake from the distance point of view and that we shall continue tomorrow.

(end of tape)

A - .... because I have no time at all.

B - Same problem here, so if I come tomorrow with the same ideas, don't be angry general.

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
He, the Colonel (Eyal) doesn't believe me. He thinks I have not told you about the tanks. He is more difficult than you are General.

E - I'd like to have tanks, water tanks for instance.

B - The easternmost point of Mitlé is 30 km. from the Canal.

E - 30-34km. The Mitlé pass is about 20km. wide.

(press takes pictures).



ס ו ד י

כ"ד בחשון תשל"ד
19 בנובמבר 1973

109.1/מ

אל: המנכ"ל
1. מר מ.ר. קדרון, יועץ 2. מנהל מאו"ם ב'
1. מר ש. דיבון, יועץ 2. מנהל המחקר
השגריר י. מקוע, נאו"ם, ניו יורק
לשכת השר

מאת: מ/מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל

הנדון: פגישות עם נציגי הצבא המצרי

רצ"ב פרוטוקולים מהפגישות ב-14 ו- 15 בנובמבר.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

י. בירן