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כבד אב' 1

בנימין

## התכתבות למבין'ית

**נפתח:**

**נספג:**



שם תיק: בריטניה -התכתבות מדינית

מזכה פניני חצ-7289/4

מזהה פריט 000max

כתובת : 2-120-1-9-1

תאריך הדפסה 17/12/2018



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
2 PALACE GREEN,  
LONDON, W8 4QB  
TEL: 01-937 8091

שגרירות ישראל  
לונדון

סודי  
אישי

27 ביוני 1975

אל : מר י. ענוג, מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת: השגריר, לונדון

הנדון: אספקת צנטוריונים

ישעיהו היקר,

אינני יודע אם אתם מקבלים דווח שוטף בנושא זה ממשהב"ט. היות ובהנחיות שה"ח בשלכם 266 נגעתם בנושא זה ברצוני לעדכן אותך, ובאמצעותך את שה"ח, על מצב העניינים.

כידוע לך בקשנו בתחילה 200 שלדות. עד עכשיו קבלנו 38 שהגיעו ארצה בסוף השנה שעברה. נגמרה העסקה עם אוסטריה בסך של 80, אמנם בלי צריחים, והסנקים עומדים להגיע ארצה בזמן הקרוב. כמו כן קבלנו 6 משוחררים מהצבא הבריטי ועוד 5 עם ציוד מיוחד. כלומר עד כה קבלנו 124 ו-5 מיוחדים, דהיינו 129.

לפני יומיים מסרו לנספח צהל שישחררו בקרוב עוד 7 מהמשוחררים מהצבא. בסה"כ נגיע עד גמר חודש זה ל-136.

לפי ידיעות נספח צהל פנויים למכירה בין 25-35 שכבר הוצאו משימוש הצבא הבריטי. אנו מניחים שגם את אלה נשיג.

בבקורי בארץ בנובמבר סכמתי עם שר הבטחון שנתרכז על השגת 150 שלדות והברקתי בנדון לשה"ח. אם כן, אנו מתקרבים ליעד זה.

ב ה ה כ ה, (כא)  
גדעון רפאל

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ס ו ד י ב י ו ת ר  
אישי

שגרירות ישראל  
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27 ביוני 1975

אל : מר י. ענוג, מנהל אירופה ב'

מאת: השגריר, לונדון

ישעיהו היקר,

הנדון: השיחה עם וילסון ב-24.6

להלן שתי תוספות בשולי הדווח בשלנו 214.

1. שאלתי את וילסון מה גורל התשובה על רשימת השמות של אסירי ציון שקלהאן הגיש לגרומיקו בזמן בקורו האחרון של רה"מ במוסקבה. וילסון אמר שלא רק קלהאן טיפל בנושא זה אלא גם הוא שוחח עם קוסיגין בנדון. הסובייטים שחררו 2 בריטים אך עדיין לא שמעו מאומה על האסירים היהודיים שלמענם פנו. אמרתי - שמא הגיע הזמן לתזכורת. וילסון אמר שהוא ידבר אישית בנושא זה ובמצב יהודי בריה"מ עם ברו' נייב בפגישתם בפסגה בהלסינקי.
2. וילסון טען שהובהר להם שמחלתו של ברו' נייב היא סרטן הלסת. אם זו השערה או ידיעה אינני יודע אך הוא דיבר על ברו' נייב כאדם חולה וכינה אותו " an old man in a hurry " .

ב כ ר כ ה,  
(נא)  
גדעון דפאל



UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1917

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

1917

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

1. The Secretary of the Army is directed to...

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SECRET

1917

## משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה. כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה  
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),  
תשי"ז - 1957.

## סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד

מאת: לונדון

מס: 214

נשלח: 251300 יוני 75

מ י י י

שח. העתק ענוג.

סודי ביותר - אישי

שיחה עם וילסון, השתתפה מרשייה.  
וילסון טוח באמרו שרוצה לעדכן אותנו במסי נושאים.  
1. קיבל דו"ח על שיחות שהייתה הסורי בוש. הן הנהלו באיירה נינוחה.  
סורי לא הביע התנגדות לנטיית המחוזש להשיג הסכם ביניים עם מצרים אך  
מצפה שבנקבות הוטם ותמוכ אהיים בהחל מויים עם סוריה.  
דו"ח הסורי רצה במיוחד לדעת את תכ. השיחות עם רבין. האמריקאים  
תארו את עמדת רה"מ באור חיובי והדגישו את כוונותיו לסייע למניעת  
קפאון בהקדמות לשלום.  
באמר מוטגר אמר וילסון - הדיווח שהם ואירופאים אחרים קבלו מהאמריקאים  
על נכונותו של רבין לבוא לקראתם היה יותר מיוזג.  
2. בעקבות פגישותיו עם פורד במאי ובמיוחד שיחתו ב 30/5 במדיסל הסיק  
וילסון שאהיים מתכוונת להטיל פתרון כפוי לכך והעביר לנו את דאגתו  
באמצעותי ובשיחתו עם רה"מ כאשר ביקשו להתעכב בדרכו לווש.  
שיו וילסון מתרשם שאהיים נמלכה בזעתה ומרכזת את כל מאמציה להשיג  
כלי תאחיות הסכם ביניים בין ישראל ומצרים. הבעתי את ההשערה שמא  
בכוונה רצו האמריקאים ליצור אצלו את הרושם שהם הותרים לפתרון כפוי  
לפני הגיעו של רה"מ לווש. כדי להשפיע על עמדתו בענין הסכם הביניים.  
וילסון שלל הנחה זו באמרו שהדיפלומטיה האמריקאית חובבנית ואין  
פורד פועל בדרכ זו.  
3. מאידך הוא סבור שבפמגת ראשי מדינות הקהילה האירופאית שתתקיים  
ב 17/7 - 17 יעמדו נושא המזימת והנפט במרכז הדיונים שיתנהלו  
במישרין בין ראשי הממשלות וללא השתתפות. הפקידים. אמנם בסדר היום של  
הפסגה רשומים נושאים של השוק המשותף, יחליפו העות על פסגת ומשא  
והלחצ של זיסקאר דסטן בענין ועידת האנרגיה, אך יש לאפות לפעילות  
חשובה בנושאים שלנו. הוא שולל גיבוש עמדה אירופאית ומוכח לפעול

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## משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה  
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),  
תש"ז - 1957.

## סודי ביותר

-2-

נגדה אכ חושש מיוזמה ארפתית -גרמנית. ידע על שירת גנשד-קיס"נגר אכ  
טענ שהאמריקאים שפכו צוננים וגם חסידיים הביעו במלגות אחרת ותנגדותם  
לנקיטת יוזמה בשלב הנוכחי העדיף.

וילסון הביע דעות שליליות מאד על הגישה האוטונומית של תלמוט שמידט  
המלוי אוהדת לישראל. טענ ששמידט נתפס באובססיה בעניינים מוניטריים  
ודאגה מאינפלציה ורואה ביחסי הבנה בין אירופה ומדינות ערב ערובה  
למציאת חידודות כלכלית שוטכ השטרים הדמוקרטיים באירופה.  
וילסון אמר שהוא זקוק לתדריך מפורט ולעדכון לפני הפסגה עיימ שיוכל  
לנהל את המערכה בתצלחה. הוא סבור שיכול ללכד טביבות 4-5 מהאירופאים  
נגד היוזמה המתוכננת והמזיקה לישראל.

כמו כן הוא עומד לחוועד עם בדיינייב בסופ יולי בפסגה בתלס"נקי  
וואה ביקש לשוחח אנו שוב על המזון. בהזמנות זו הוא רוצה גם לנהל  
עם בדיינייב שיחה יותר יסודית בענייני יהודי בדיה"מ.

בגלל חשיבות המעמדים האלה הוא מבקש להפגש אתך לערב ממושכ בציקס  
לפני ה 16/7 לשיחה ללא השתתפות הפוראופ וכדמדין

הציע שסיבת בקורכ בלונדון תהיה או השתתפות

ALLON ALPNE

בארוע או בקור משפחתי. אם לא תוכל להשתתף מבקש שאגביר לו את  
התדריך בעוד מועד לפני צאתו לפסגת הקהיליה.

4. נטר על שיחתו עם ציאושסקו שנתעכב בדרכו לארה"ב. הלה היה מעוניין  
במיוחד לחשיג את תמיכת דיטניה בנושאים של ובשא הנוגעים למשחון  
ולעצמאות רומניה, ובמיוחד הודעה מראש על תמריצים ועריכתם במחזק  
ניכר מהגבול.

כמו כן שוב רצה לדחום את וילסון לפעילות משותפת בעניין ועידת גנבה שלנו.  
הוא פרש את 242 במתכונת חכנית החלוקה של 47. וילסון דבר הפעם  
במשול מה על ציאושסקו.

5. בקהיליה מתנהלת מערכה עם איטליה ליישום הסכם עם ישראל ונגד  
הביעורויה המופרזות של איטליה המעכבת את כריחת ההסכמים עם מדינות  
תיגר. קלחאן קיבל על עצמו בדיון בלוסמבורג שוחקיים אתמול לחתייצב  
נגד מדיניות הושהיה איטלקית.



כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

## סודי ביותר

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6. מעניין הפעולה המשותפת של מדינות המערב נגד הפורענות של מפיקות הנפט מהווה גייסקאר דיטטנ המכשול העיקרי לנדרות הדיונים שתקיימו אנו הוא ממשיך לשתף פעולה עם האלגיריים ומנסה לחבל בפשרה שהושגה לטפל במטגרת אחת אך בצורה נפרדת משאלות הנפט, הומרי הגלם, הצמחת המחירים למוצרים תעשייתיים ולהענקת מעמד יותר נכבד ורחבת השפעתם של מדינות המפיקות נפט ב

חובציו מעניין וויסווי התפקה ומחירי חומרי הגלם שוילסון הגיש לוועידה גמייקה זכתה לחמיכה ניכרת אך הוא תמים דעים עם האמריקאים שאין לערב אותה עם בעית הנפט.

7. נקרוב לודאי שועידת הליטניקי התקיימה בין 28/7 ו 2 באוג. הוא רצה שישאירו כמה נושאים לדיון בוועידה עצמה אך ביזנייב לחצ וזכה לזכמו האמריקאים לגמור את כל הדיונים בגנבה ולחשתק בוועידה רק בחתימה על כ-15 הסכמים. העיקר בוועידה תהיינה השיחות בין ראשי המדינות שיתנהלו משוליה.

8. וילסון הביע את דאגתו על ההתפתחויות בחלקה הדרומי של אירופה מפורטוגל עד תורכיה. דיבר באפן שלילי במיוחד על רהימ פורטוגל והשתמש בפרזיולוגיה מרכסיסטית ללא השכלה סוציאליסטית. הוא מודאג במיוחד מההתפתחויות באיטליה. הסכים אתי שאנו עדים לתהליך

של COLLAPSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNDERCARRIAGE  
ולמעשה לס' אורכ הימ והיכוני נשאר רק גלגל אחד תקין - ישראל. 4  
שאלוני מה החגיון האירופאי לתקוע בו תקע. וילסון אמר שמסכים לגמרי שיש לשמור על כוחה של ישראל, הדמוקרטיה היחידה המובטחת לאורכ קו ממוטט זה. זה נתן לי הזמנות לחשמיע את הורעומת מעניין נאום קלהא ומכירת נשק ביטי לארצות ערב בחזמא לסעיפים ב' - ג' בחלמ 266.  
וילסון אציר שגמ הוא הופתע מנאום קלהא והוא חושב שקלהא לא הבינ את נשמעונו. הנאום הוכח כנראה עי טומ מקנאלי שאותו וילסון תאר כפרו - ערבי. הוא שמע על הנאום רק באמצעות המסדק שהגיע מלדוויגי מעקבות שיחות. ביקשתי בשמכ שימצא הזמנות קרובה לחקן את המעוות בחזמא לנחיה במסדקס. וילסון אמר שתחילה שהוא איננו עומד



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## סודי ביותר

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לנאום בנושאים ביניים בקרוב. מרשייה הציע שיענה על חאלה של עתונאי  
אכ בסופ וילסון אמר שהוא מוכן להשיב על שאלותא בפרלמנט ברוח  
רצויה לנו.  
בענין מכירת הנשק ניסתה וילסון להדגיע. שוב הסתמך על שליחות מרכוס זיו.  
אמר שעד להגשמת חוכםיוון להקמת תעשיות נשק במצרים תעבורנה שנים  
רבות וזה גם לא יהיו מסוגלים אפילו עם יבוא של טכנאים וטכנולוגיה  
לוקים ותעשייה ראויה לשמה. מוורתיו מכל וכל הנחה זו ואמרוי שמצרים  
מוכוננת ליצור לעצמה עמדת מפתח במזית כסדרה לתעשייה צבאית  
מוימונ של פטרודולרים.  
וילסון אמר שאמריקה מעונינת למשוך את מצרים לתוכ המהנה  
האמריקאי ולתתיר אווה מתוביטים. אמרתי שמצרים ממשיכה לקבל ציוד  
סובייטי וצוהדת נוסף לו נשק וידע אירופאי. זאת גם עיקר ענינה  
בדו שיח האירו ערכי.  
וילסון אמר שהמצב הכלכלי של מצרים קטסטרופלי וחדיון האחרון בקהיר  
של הדו שיח היה מחוסר תכנ. אמרתי - המפגש הכליט את המגמה המדינית  
שעד כה אנגליה תונגדה לה. ציינתי שתמאצ הצררי להפכ למרכז של תעשייה  
צבאית עומד בטוירה לתנחות כאילו פניה לשלום ולשיקום כלכלי פנימי.  
הוספתי שלא קיבלנו כל אבטחה ממשיית מביטניה שלא תפר את מאזן החימוש  
לרעת ישראל ועדיין אנו מחכים להבטחות מחייבות. הוספתי ששני הנושאים  
נאום קלחאז מלווה בהודעות על עסקות נשק ענקיות גרמו להאגה רבה  
בישראל ומעיבים על היחסים. וילסון היה במבוכה ניסתה בפרט בנושא  
הנשק אכ לא נתנ תשובה מטפקת. ענינ הצנטוריונים כלל לא עלה.  
9. על שיחות רחיים בווש. לא שאל. כנראה היה מעודכ עי האמריקאים.  
10. בסופ סיפר לי על הצדוקה שנגרמה לרמ עיי הפורענות של אידי אמינ  
וטיקוליו להפעיל הכוח הצבאי המיוחד שמאומנ במהכונת הישראלית  
לתחמ נגד חטיפות מטוטים, אכ לא מצאו אפשרות איכ להגיע בסז זה  
לאוגדה ובצע מבצע מוצלח. הוא מודאג לא רק מגורלו של הילס אלא  
של 700 בריטים ותשמישים בני ערובה בידי אמינ.  
אמר שרוב האפריקאים פנו לאידי אמינ זולת קאונדה ונירדה אשר מטרבים  
לניים כל מגע אלו. ===

רפאל. =====



## משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה  
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).  
תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר מס' 266

בשכח ב- 242000 יוני 76

בהול

אל : לונדון

מאת: המשרד

אל : השגריר, לונדון.

שלכ 200.

פגישתך עם ווילסון. להלן הנחיות השר:-

א. הואיל וזוהי הזמנת ווילסון, יש לשמוע מה בפיו, לשם מה הזמין. גם יש ענינים במזי צפויים או מסובכים תאמר, כי עליך לדווח עליהם לשר. מצידיך תעלה-נא שוב ובכל מקרה את נאומו של קלאהאן בארוחה עם פאנמי בדוח שדר ושר לקלאהאן. הוספ נא כי הנ השמעת 242 והתסכמה הבריטית המפורשת והבלתי מעורעת לייצגיות המצריות בענין הטריטוריאלי ובנושא הפלשתינאים הדחימו אותנו, שכן שום שר חוצ מערבי לא החזיק כל כך לסת. זה מחיר כבד מדי, מחזינתנו, ששילמה בדיטנה עבור החסד הערבי. תשובתו של קלאהאן לא השביעה רצוננו ואנחנו מצפים לכך כי הוא, ווילסון, ימצא הזדמנות קרובה כדי לחזור על האנטרפרטציה שלו לגבי הנושא הנ"ל. תיקון זה טוב מאד ליחסינו. הוא לא יזיק ליחסיהם עם הערבים.

ג. אינן אתה מתבקש חוזר אינן אתה מתבקש להעלות ביוזמתך אתה את ענין הטריטוריאלי שכן לראות בה את הפיצוי האות לעסקתם האדירה עם הערבים פירושו השלמה עם אותה העסקה במחיר זול מדי. מבלי להעלות על כן ביוזמתך את ענין הטריטוריאלי, אתה מתבקש לתאר את מוח הדיוח שבה קיבלנו את הידיעות על העסקה עם הערבים שדבר התגבשותה והיקפה לא הוכחו כלל על ידי שדר קלאהאן. מימדיה אדירים ודברי ההדגעה הבריטיים על אי הפרזת המאזן באיזור מתקבלות אצלנו ביוסר אימון ובדאגה. המאזן מופר כבר עתה שכן משלוחי הנשק הסובייטיים נמשכים ולנו יש קשיים עם האמריקנים להפריד בין המעיה הפוליטית לבין הבטחת האספקה הצפויה של ודש.

ד. משלב זה יעלה ווילסון את הטריטוריאלי, תזכיר לו, כי הוא חייב תשובה לאלון על הצעה כי תצבא הבריטי ישתחרר מן הטריטוריאלי, יספק לנו ויצטייד במימון ערבי בציפטיים.

ה. אינן אתה יודע דבר על סיכויי הסדר הביניים מעבר למה ששמע קלאהאן מפי

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## משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה  
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).  
תשי"ז - 1957.

### סוד - ביטחון

רבי"נ. אנחנו השארנו הצעותינו בידי האמריקנים, הכדור הועבר על ידם  
למגרש המצרי ואנו ממתינים.

ענוג.

שבת אצל סק סניף ירושלים 2  
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1. The purpose of this document is to provide information regarding the activities of the [redacted] and the [redacted] in the [redacted] area.

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2. The [redacted] and the [redacted] are [redacted] in the [redacted] area.

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
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יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים).  
תשיז - 1957.

## משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

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מאת: המשרד

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אם תחייבה הכחיות עוד נבריקך הערב.

מס' 264

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ענוד

שהח מנבל שק אירופה ב

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו  
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך  
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון  
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה  
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).  
תשי"ז - 1957.

## משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-משווג

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עבוג.

הוזמנתי זה עתה לפגישה עם וילסון הערב ב-2230 שעונכו.  
אנא ברר אם שתח רוצה שאעלה נושא מסוים.  
מניח שוילסון רוצה להעיר על דברי קלחאן למאמץ ומכירות הנשק.  
אגיד בחתאם לנאמר עי שתח ורה"מ.  
ברצוני גם לעמוד על השלמת עסקת הצנטוריונים וחמום לגישור הפער.  
אנא תשובתכם בחוזר

השגריר

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5.50 p.m.

MR. AIREY NEAVE (Abingdon): Whatever view one takes about the right solution to the problems in the Middle East, I think that the House will generally agree that the h M for Plymouth, Sutton (Dr. David Owen) has given us an interesting analysis of what is happening at present. I am sure that my r h F would have been concerned to hear what the h M said about demilitarisation of Sinai. I found it most constructive. I am not in a position to follow the h G, except about his fear regarding the dangers of a kind of bilateral arrangement between two super powers. I have this fear, too. I believe that this country and Europe have a great opportunity to exert the kind of influence leading to reconciliation <sup>to</sup> which my r h F referred.

My r h F is to be congratulated on the improved standing of British foreign policy, but he was right to be cautious in saying that the reconciliation for which we all hope is no bigger than a man's hand at this time.

I should like to refer particularly to the need to have regard for human rights in all our policies and to begin with the question of refugees. I mention this matter shortly, because I hope that some time in the autumn there will be an opportunity for a debate on refugee policy and that some h M will choose it as the subject for a Private Member's Motion. I mention this matter because Prince Sad<sup>Aga</sup>rudin Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, should receive the support of the House and the Govt to a greater extent than at the moment. I am a member of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and that is another reason why I mention this matter.

We have often debated major emergencies involving refugees and made large financial contributions to situations such as Bangladesh. It is perhaps a contrast, a lack of balance, that I refer in passing to the fact that in the day to day <sup>by the United Nations</sup> administration/of refugee problems all over the world we contribute relatively little. I thank the Govt for the increase in contribution to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees from £180,000 to £210,000, but that is a very small figure compared with the large amounts that we have contributed when there has been a great emergency. I hope that there will be a debate in another place on this question.

My r h F the Minr for Overseas Development has done his best to help the United Nations over the Sudan. I hope that the Govt will continue to give all possible aid to the Sudan Govt with their vast refugee problem in Southern Sudan. So far the Govt have given £500,000 - half of that before Christmas - and £50,000 to the voluntary agencies which are working in Southern Sudan.

Like many h Ms, I visited Southern Sudan recently and saw for myself many of the terrific problems which are occurring there. About 700,000 or more refugees are coming in from various neighbouring African States.

In this connection it is necessary that the Govt should find some money to help the United Nations and the Sudan Govt with the problem of the bridge over the Nile at Juba. This affects the whole of the transport problem of Southern Sudan which at the moment is conducted in a most primitive fashion. There is great difficulty in getting hospital and education supplies into this area for the large number of returning refugees. Denmark and Holland are contributing, but the United Nations must find a considerable sum, as my r h F the Minr for Overseas Development is fully aware.

None the less, I welcome the Govt's policy towards the Sudan generally and the award of £15.7 million in technical assistance at the time of President <sup>Nemery's</sup> ~~Numeri's~~ visit to this country. I congratulate the Govt on what they have done in the last year for the Sudan.

Whatever our relations with other countries may be, we must always make a stand for human rights and principles. These must never be sacrificed. I am an officer of the <sup>International</sup> Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in the Soviet Union. Whatever our policy may be towards the Soviet Union or the strategic importance of Greece, we should still be in a position to make a stand for individuals and never turn a blind eye to the fate of political prisoners. I was an official at the Nuremberg Tribunal. We condemned many practices, which are being continued today, at the Nuremberg trials of the major Nazi war criminals.

This brings me to the Brezhnev doctrine. What does he mean by the "end of the cold war"? This week's Economist provides some quotations from Pravda. I welcome a period of reconciliation, but we should be realistic, as has been on both sides certainly have been. Pravda says,

"Only naive people can expect that recognition of the principles of co-existence by capitalists can weaken the main contradiction of our times between capitalism and socialism or that the ideological struggle will be weakened."

It also states,

"Co-existence does not mean a discontinuation of the class struggle but only the renunciation of military methods."

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6.8 p.m.

MR. DENNIS WALTERS (Westbury): It is always said of foreign affairs debates that they range too widely. It is perhaps inevitable that they should.

The hon Member for Inverness (Mr. Russell Johnston), speaking from the Liberal bench, has understandably presented a tour d'horizon of foreign affairs, and he has done so very well. Perhaps I, speaking from the Government back benches, should confine myself to one, more limited, area.

It has been generally agreed by speakers from both Front Benches and from the back benches that an effective reactivation of the Jarring mission would be extremely desirable. I agree. I agree that Resolution 242 is correct and ultimately might provide the best hope for a solution but, depressingly, I cannot see that taking place in the near future.

My right hon Friend the Minister of State rightly took credit for a number of important initiatives which have taken place in the Middle East in the past two years and the greatly improved relations between Britain and a number of Arab countries.

X follows

(Mr. Walters spkg)

The Government should be congratulated on what they have done. However, I should like to see an even more robust approach to a policy which has been firmly set in the right direction. First, I should like to see a more robust approach to the sale of British military equipment to those Arab countries which have expressed an interest in making such purchases from Britain. The argument that selling strike equipment to the Arab countries would seriously affect the balance of military power in the area, and thereby make a peaceful settlement more difficult, is frequently made but it is specious and the facts do not substantiate it.

There is no military balance but an imbalance which is decisively and sharply tilted in favour of Israel. The United States has continuously supplied, and in vast quantities, all the military equipment, both defensive and offensive, which Israel has at any time demanded. On the very day that the Nixon-Brezhnev talks opened in Washington, the open secret of the United States decision to supply Israel with a further 48 Phantoms and 36 Skyhawk bombers to add to the 120 Phantoms which have been already supplied was announced. The timing of the announcement was the only surprise about the transaction. It is one of an endless catalogue.

It should be remembered in this context that even at the highest point of Russian-Egyptian co-operation - that is, for the period leading up to July 1972 - in wishful anticipation of a positive Western response President Sadat terminated the Soviet military presence in Egypt. The Soviet Union had consistently refused to supply Egypt with effective strike weapons. In this respect the Soviet Union showed greater prudence than the United States.

The military balance argument is fundamentally bogus and generally recognised as such by any person wishing to acquaint himself with the real facts. Of course I accept that there are many who would like to perpetuate the present imbalance, but that is rather a different argument and not the one which is usually produced. Moreover, I do not believe that the perpetuation of the military imbalance in Israel's favour is necessarily conducive to achieving peace on mutually acceptable terms. The past six years have demonstrated fairly conclusively that it is not.

There is a strong case to be made for exactly the opposite proposition - namely, that if the Arab countries possessed comparable military equipment to that of Israel and a strike capacity of their own, peace negotiations would be more likely to start and to be successful because Israel would be presented with a new and powerful incentive to negotiate.

MR. CLINTON DAVIS: Is not the hon Gentleman turning the truth on its head? Has not every possibility of negotiation been offered by Israel? Was not the immediate response to President Bourghiba's offer to negotiate one of "Yes, any place, anywhere and with anybody"? How does the hon Gentleman reconcile those facts with what he has just been saying?

MR. WALTERS: I do not believe that what the hon Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis) has just said is correct. If he goes back to the Egyptian acceptance of Resolution 242 and the Egyptians' positive response to the Jarring questionnaire of February 1971, he will see that all the concessions which Israel used to demand from Arab countries have been made.

There would be a new incentive for Israel to negotiate, an incentive which would be recognised not only by Mr. Sapir and by the moderates, but also by \_\_\_\_\_

General Dayan and the Hawks. The more attractive incentives have failed, as I have just mentioned in my reply to the hon Member for Hackney, Central. There was the incentive provided by Resolution 242, the response to the Jarring questionnaire, in which Egypt declared publicly its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to give commitments concerning the termination of all claims of belligerency and acknowledgment of the right of each of the two parties to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries, and the incentive of King Hussain's repeated public and private declarations of his desire to reach a peaceful settlement. Anybody who has spoken to him would not doubt that he meant it. All these incentives have proved inadequate.

At the same time, in the international arena there has been failure. The United States pressure on Israel did not materialise. When powerful action was called for, the United States administration meekly succumbed to internal political pressure.

Britain and France have so far been unable to stimulate a sufficiently strong and united European policy to take the place and to fill the vacuum left by the United States. It is in this context of the urgent need for British and European influence to be felt that British timidity about arms and even more about participation - conceivably in order to keep in step with the Americans - is unfortunate.

Only a few weeks ago the United States made it clear that it was prepared to reverse its policies and to take an initiative which it would have earlier criticised if taken by others. It announced that it would be willing to supply Phantom aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It would indeed be mortifying after all the anxiety and hesitancy about what we should do with the Jaguar if the United States sold Phantoms to those countries. Kuwait, which has been particularly wise and statesmanlike in all its

dealings will, I feel sure, ponder carefully before entrusting its long-term defence to the United States.

When I spoke in the foreign affairs debate in December I talked at length about the energy crisis and referred to the prediction made by the Director of the State Department's Energy Division that by 1980 at least one-third of the United States fuel needs would have to be met by Arab countries. I shall not repeat myself on this except to say that I remain convinced that eventually a change in the direction of United States policy might come about quite suddenly when self-interest became so glaringly apparent that internal political pressures would have to be squashed.

In the meantime Britain and France must not be left behind. They should pursue their policies based upon European interests and provide the guidance and leadership in the Middle East which the United States has so signally failed to produce.

(Y follows)

(Mr. Walters speaking)

\* I turn to two other aspects of the Middle East situation where some action is called for. It has become a cliché to say that there cannot be a solution of the Middle East conflict without finding a solution to the problem of the Palestinians, a solution which, if it is not perfectly fair and satisfactory to all the Palestinians, is at least not intolerably unfair and would be acceptable to moderate Palestinian opinion. If there is no solution to the Arab-Israel conflict there will be a constant threat of war with a serious danger of escalation, the economic development of the area will be distorted by expensive and excessive preoccupation with arms and defence build-ups, and the economic interests of Britain and Europe will be constantly threatened by oil disruption.

It follows logically therefore that, pending a settlement, the Palestinian problem should not be allowed to deteriorate to a point where compromise is permanently excluded. There is disturbing information from the occupied territories that the Israelis are developing a policy of economic pressure, designed to reduce the inhabitants to a state of absolute economic dependence on Israel, at which stage a new mass exodus of Palestinians from their own land could be stimulated by economic pressure and in order to prevent this happening.

I believe that an international presence should be established, if at all possible, in the occupied areas and that a programme of economic development should be undertaken for the

benefit of people living under occupation, under the aegis of the United Nations and with financial support from a consortium of European and Arab Governments - possibly the EEC and the Arab members of OPEC. Finally, I believe that there should be renewed international pressure for the return of the 1967 displaced persons. Our representative at the United Nations has already made powerful appeals on this matter in very effective speeches.

Actions of this kind would also be helpful to Israeli moderates, because anyone interested in the problem knows that there is a considerable division of opinion within Israel and that the moderates do not wish to see the final destruction of the Palestinian people, because they also share the belief that a settlement would in that event never be attained.

Finally there is the problem of Jerusalem. After their victory over the Arabs in 1967, the Israelis proclaimed the annexation of Arab Jerusalem. The General Assembly of the United Nations declared this to be illegal but over the last five years Israel has remained in control and enormous new building programmes have gone ahead.

In 1970, delegates at a building programme conference described the threat to Jerusalem as enormous and said that the city might be turned into a second Los Angeles if the process went on. The Archbishop of Canterbury made a statement in 1971 in which he urged that something should be done about Jerusalem. He said:

"The old city of Jerusalem is sacred to Jews, to Christians and to Moslems ... It is a city which belongs to all three ... The building programme of the present authorities is disfiguring the city and its surroundings in ways which wound the feelings of those who care for its historic beauty and suggest an insensitive attempt to proclaim as an Israeli city one which can never be

other than the city of three great religions and their peoples."

Calling a halt to the building programme is an urgent step, but recent reports in The Times and the Sunday Times indicate that this is not being done and the vandalism goes on. I implore my rt hon Friend when he visits Israel to press very strongly the question of Jerusalem on the Israeli Government, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government will give the other points I have raised careful consideration.

6.25 p.m.

MR. MICHAEL STEWART (Fulham): My hon Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) argued that there was a danger that Israel would over-play her hand, would rely too much on her present military advantage and would not look far enough ahead to what the future may bring. I think that there is great weight in that argument but if ever the Israelis are to be persuaded to believe in it it will be essential for the leaders of the Arab countries to make it clear by deed and word that if ever agreement can be reached they will thereafter abandon any idea of destroying the State of Israel and will treat Israel if not as a friend then at any rate as a neighbour and as one member of the United Nations should treat another. Until that happens it is useless to counsel prudence to the Israelis.

There is one thing above all that the leaders of the Arab countries could do to make this more credible - that is, to say, "We are ready here and now to meet the Israelis at the conference table in order to put the necessary flesh and blood on the essential but still rather bare and bony structure of United Nations Resolution No. 242." It would be enormously difficult for the Arab leaders to say that, but what alternative faces them? If they did it, I believe that they would be surprised at how far the Israeli Government would go to meet them on all the other points in dispute.

Secondly, I turn to the problem of Rhodesia. I think that we were reassured to hear yesterday what the Foreign Secretary had to say about his adherence to the Six Principles. I think we understood the explanation that was given about the sending of the diplomats and officials but I want to put a point to the hon Gentleman. There may be some danger in doing this kind of

6.37 p.m.

MR. A. E. COOPER (Ilford, South): We have heard from the rt hon Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) and his right hon Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) protestations of their belief in democratic Socialism. The hon and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Taverne) must be taking converts by the dozen. I want to refer first to the speech of the hon Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew). Since 1955 I have made six visits to Israel, four of them on parliamentary delegations. That does not give me any special expertise, but at least it gives me first-hand knowledge of what is going on there.

The hon Member dismissed the claims and protestations of the Israelis with a wave of his hand and said they would not give up Sharm el Sheikh and the other half of Jerusalem. We have to understand why they will not do this and why Sharm el Sheikh is so important. It is the entrance to the Red Sea, which controls the Gulf of <sup>Aqaba</sup> and which lies in the heart of the State of Israel. It is there that the new refineries are being built and the pipelines are going to the seaport of Ashdod, into the Mediterranean and into Western Europe.

At the end of the six-day war the United Nations - what I regard as a moribund organisation - had its people at Sharm el Sheikh. All that Nasser had to say was "Get out" and away they went. The Israelis, however, were able to control the situation fairly well. The hon Member spoke of the Israeli policy of reprisal and assassination. Has he no memory of Munich or Lodd or the other things which the Arab guerillas have done to Israelis over the years? Do not the Israelis have a right to defend themselves against this

sort of atrocity perpetrated against them year after year? Of course they have, in just the same way as the British people would defend themselves, given the same problems.

My hon Friend the Member for Westbury (Mr. Walters) made a remarkable speech. As I listened to him, I had to say to myself, "You have to be joking", because I could not imagine anyone quoting such unrealistic and so-called facts about a situation as those which he put forward. He solemnly tells the House that the Russians have not put any missiles or offensive arms on the west bank of the Suez Canal. He must be joking. The SAM /missiles have been there for a long time.

LORD BALNIEL: They are defensive.

MR. COOPER: So is a revolver. But if a bullet fired from a revolver kills by shooting someone through the heart it is an offensive weapon. The truth is that during this period both the Americans and the Russians have been delivering arms to both sides. This has brought about a serious situation.

AA FOLLOWS

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(MR COOPER SPKG)

I do not know whether I am rather exceptional in this connection but I spent some time going ~~through~~ through the Gaza Strip and along the West Bank, now occupied by the Israelis, once Jordan territory. I wonder if anybody in this House, when they talk about the Palestinian problem, really knows what the Israeli Government are doing for the <sup>Palestinians</sup> ~~the~~ in the Gaza Strip. For example, ~~the~~ the Arabs, ~~themselves~~ under Israeli supervision, are building three-roomed houses or cottages - I suppose we would call them chalets - with running water, something which the Palestinian Arabs have never known in ~~their~~ their history; and this is going on year after year.

Does anybody know or realise that <sup>about</sup> ~~some~~ 100,000 Arabs move out of the Gaza Strip into Israel every day to earn their living and ~~at the same rates as are paid to Israeli people within the State of Israel itself?~~ ~~at the same rates as are paid to Israeli people within the State of Israel itself?~~ Does anybody realise that within the Gaza Strip the Israeli Government are building up cottage industries to enable Arab women to earn their <sup>v</sup> living, again at high rates of pay, something which they have never known before in the whole of their lives? If we are to take sides in this, for <sup>goodness</sup> ~~the~~ sake let us give both sides of the story.

My hon Friend talks of what is going <sup>on</sup> ~~in~~ in Jerusalem and the high buildings that are going up there. Does he know what the old City of Jerusalem was like before Israel took over after the Six Day War? The old Arab City of Jerusalem was full of filthy, rat-ridden slums, ~~the~~ the Israelis have now converted



of their territory. It is a question of whether we in this country, and the United Nations, accept United Nations Resolution No. 242 <sup>to the effect</sup> that we do not accept that one nation should capture another nation's territory. The Prime Minister of Israel has <sup>herself put a barrier by</sup> saying, ~~that the rt hon Member~~ <sup>that the rt hon Member</sup> and I hope ~~that the rt hon Member~~ for Fulham (Mr Michael Stuart) will not forget it, for he also misled the House in this sense, that she would not give up one inch of captured soil.

MR COOPER: I never see any force ~~in~~ that in ~~any~~ argument for the simple reason that half of Western Europe today has been captured by the Soviet Union as a result of conquest and nobody suggests that anything should be done to push the Soviet Union out of any of these territories. Nobody suggests that the Soviet Union should be pushed out of the Baltic States. We are very hypocritical about this.

Let us take our own empire which we built up over many hundreds of years, most of it by conquest. Suddenly, somebody has decided in the United Nations that whatever one gets by conquest is illegal and immoral and ~~you~~ <sup>one</sup> cannot have it any more.

MR CLINTON DAVIS: ~~Secretary, Canterbury~~ In order to put the record right following the intervention of Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) the hon ~~Member for Canterbury~~ is not it right that what was being said by the Israeli Government was that they would not cede territory that had been occupied before meaningful negotiations had taken place?

MR COOPER: The hon Gentleman is quite right.

In discussions we had with high ranking Members of the Israeli Government they put two very pertinent points to us. ~~Take Sinai~~, For example, They asked, "Why on earth should we want Sinai? Nobody lives there. It is all sand and we have all the sand we need. We do not need any more. The only reason we need Sinai is ~~because~~ <sup>that</sup> it is a defensive barrier against Egypt on the other side of the Canal."

Then they ask, "Why should we want another quarter of a million Arabs? Again, we have all the Arabs we need. We would like to get ~~him~~ rid of them." Of course they want to get rid of them.

In my judgment, the Israeli case is very powerful. What we must have and I am sure the Foreign Secretary is aware of this is something of which ~~we~~ we have heard a lot this afternoon, a detente between the four great Powers to establish the boundaries of the State of Israel; and those boundaries having been established, the big four must guarantee that that shall be so. ~~In my judgment~~, In that way and in that way alone can we get hope to get a peaceful settlement in that part of the world.

6.49 p.m.

MR FRANK ALLAUN (Salford, East): Several hon Members have referred today to the 70th birthday of the Foreign Secretary. I, too, wish to send many happy returns to the Foreign Secretary but not as Foreign Secretary. He is a <sup>- a nice man</sup> nice man with nasty ideas. I hope he will not take that as a personal insult. On the contrary, it is his ideas I am getting at. I shall say a word about the Middle East to which the hon Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Cooper) ~~and~~ and a previous Conservative speaker, the <sup>Member</sup> ~~Member~~ <sup>The latter</sup> hon Member for Westbury (Mr Walters) referred. ~~He~~ made an astonishing proposal. He said that we are sending Phantoms and other arms to Israel and therefore we should supply arms to the Arab countries. ~~Instead~~ I believe it would be far more sensible, instead of arming both sides as we are doing to our shame, that we should be arming ~~neither~~ neither. If the Big Four - the United States, Russia, France and Great Britain, were to say, "Not another weapon to either Israel or Egypt" the war would shortly end. Basically, that is what I should like to see and perhaps this kind of idea could be applied in other parts of the world, too.

BB FOLLOWS

Ms. May

5.15 p.m.

MR. CHRISTOPHER MAYHEW (Woolwich, East): The Minister of State has created a record. He spoke for longer about the Middle East, while creating fewer emotional reactions, than any previous speaker in the debate. A lot of what he said was welcomed by all shades of opinion on this subject - for example, the undoubted increase in goodwill between this country and the arab world. Granted this increase of interest, business and goodwill, has not the time come to upgrade some of our posts in the Middle East? Admittedly, we have a Grade 1 post in Cairo. But why are there no Grade 2 posts anywhere in the Arab world? This matter appears to have been forgotten and should be looked into.

I was particularly glad that the Minister mentioned the successful progress of the Gulf. Many hon Members on this side of the House remember the forecasts of dire disaster that would take place in the Gulf as soon as the British left. The Foreign Secretary made a speech in which he said that he was very much afraid that when we left the Gulf the Egyptians would walk in. Indeed, I recall recounting to the Foreign Secretary some years ago a special personal message from President Nasser who said, "Tell, Sir Alec when you get back that there will be no Egyptian soldiers in the Gulf." I am glad that, looking at the Gulf in the light of what the Minister has said, President Nasser was right on that occasion and the Foreign Secretary was wrong. It is a fact that the development of the Gulf has been going well and that Britain's prestige and influence there is greater today than when we had a military presence there.

I was also glad when the Minister said that it was the Government's policy to try to reactivate the Jarring method of negotiating a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. I was sorry to hear my hon and learned Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) intervening in the opposite sense and putting the Israeli view for face-to-face talks.

MR. RICHARD: My hon Friend is quite wrong. I quoted a sentence from the Israeli Ambassador's speech and asked in view of that what chance there was of getting a Jarring type mission going and whether it was the best way out of the situation. I was not expressing any view. My hon Friend is wrong.

MR. MAYHEW: I am glad to have that interpretation by my hon and learned friend, because he quoted the Israeli ambassador as making a number of points against the possibility of a Jarring type mission succeeding. He asked the Minister whether in the light of the Israeli ambassador's remarks it was worth proceeding in the way that was being suggested.

MR. RICHARD: My hon Friend must not do this. He is a much older parliamentary hand than I and knows what he is doing. I quoted from a speech at the United Nations. I expressed no view on the rightness or wrongness of what was said. I merely asked for the Government's view. There is nothing wrong in that.

MR. MAYHEW: Since my hon and learned Friend has given me some advice, perhaps I may give him some. It is better to make these points in one's own language than to be misunderstood by quoting at length the views of the Israeli Ambassador on the subject.

Having cleared that aside, I come back to agree - it seems

that my hon and learned Friend also agrees - that the best way to proceed is through a Jarring mission. There is no question that, without any assurances from the Israelis about their acceptance of Resolution 242, the idea of simply envisaging direct face-to-face talks is not the best way. We should proceed on the Jarring basis.

The difficulties of getting a face-to-face negotiation are sometimes underrated. We must recognise that in practice the Israelis lay down two important preconditions: first, that Jerusalem shall not be discussed and, secondly, that the Palestinians should not be represented. These are grave stumbling blocks to this alternative method of negotiation.

We must see the Arab view here. It is a fact that the Israelis are <sup>the</sup> party in possession. They have the loot. Perhaps I may bring this out with a homely analogy in order to restore relations with my hon and learned Friend the Member for Barons Court. Those who advocate face-to-face talks are sincere and honourable and the last people who would run away with one's wallet. But if one of them were caught red-handed with one's wallet it would not be enough for him to say, "Let us sit round a table and discuss this controversy between us."

S FOLLOWS

"what I want is to be left alone in peace."

When one says, "I will certainly sit around the table with you on condition that you return my wallet", they reply, "No pre conditions before face to face talks."

This may sound exaggerated, but it is a point of view held in the Arab world. The Israelis occupy tens of thousands of square miles of Arab territory and the Arabs say, "Before we can agree to face to face talks, we ask you to say in advance that you will withdraw from territories that you have conquered."

That is what Mr. Jarring asked the Israelis to say and it was because they would not say it that the Jarring talks broke down, and we have never got negotiations going on Resolution No. 242.

DR. MAURICE MILLER: Would it not be more accurate to say that what the Israelis are in effect saying to the Arabs is, "If you agree to negotiate with us, we will not permit you to put a sword back at our throat again"?

MR. MAYHEW: I leave the House to judge. I think that the analogy is that the Arabs are asking for an understanding, not that the Israelis should withdraw before the negotiations - certainly not - but that they will agree to withdraw under Resolution 242 as part of a settlement. That is what the Israelis have not given. They have spelled out the territories that they wish to maintain - Jerusalem, Sharm el Sheikh and so on. These are the realities. To ask for face-to-face talks is making no positive contribution. The Jarring procedure is much better.

The whole House agrees, I think, judging from speeches both today and yesterday, that the prospects of a peaceful settlement in the immediate future are nil. They have receded year by year for some time now. Our task has become how to create the conditions in which, on some future occasion, a

peaceful settlement can become practicable or, even less than that, how to prevent the conditions arising in the Middle East which will prevent a peaceful settlement ever coming.

From the Israeli point of view, on the surface, there seems a lot to be said for the status quo. After all, they now control the whole of Palestine, they dominate the area militarily and they have severely crippled the Palestinian liberation forces with their policy of reprisals and assassination. Yet they are further away than ever from the absolutely vital aim that they must have, which is to be accepted in the Middle East by the Arab world. This is a literally indispensable thing for them. Whereas, today, although they represent only two per cent. of the population and two per cent. of the territory of the Middle East, so vast is their lead technologically, in the power of their weapons and their capacity to use them, their general competence and their greater efficiency of government, that the two per cent. can dominate the 98 per cent. But the question is, how long can the two per cent. dominate the 98 per cent?

When we look behind the chaos of Arab politics and calmly consider the marked and steady growth of educational standards, population, wealth and technology, plus the growth of the power of the oil producing countries, it is plain not only that two per cent. of the Middle East cannot indefinitely dominate 98 per cent. but that within 15 or 20 years at the outside, Arab power will be dominant in the Middle East.

The next question is, in that event and assuming no settlement has been reached, can the State of Israel survive?

I have no hesitation in answering, "No." To the extent that the creation of facts by Israel in Jerusalem and on the West bank eradicates the old 1948 boundaries to the extent that Israel succeeds in consolidating and incorporating its conquests and squeezing out more Palestinians from Palestine, as it is doing by economic pressures, so the 1948 frontiers become meaningless and the whole concept of the resolution No. 242 of a compromise settlement based on withdrawal to the 1948 frontiers becomes meaningless, too.

In practice, whether they want it or not, the Israelis will have opted for all or nothing at that time and the Arabs in their turn, when they are strong enough, will demand all or nothing. The State of Israel will in practice then be dismantled and Palestine will again become predominantly Arab. This is long distance thinking but it is as certain as any historical prediction can be.

What can we do to avoid this happening? The Israelis have put their short-term military domination in front of their long-term political acceptance and this is a disastrous strategy. I am afraid that it could provide a terrible disaster for them. None of us wants this. I have always maintained that within her proper frontiers, Israel has a right to exist. I have always been willing to urge any forms of defence arrangement for Israel within her proper frontiers. I would willingly see arms sold to Israel as part of a settlement to defend her within her proper frontiers.

We have to ask how to avoid this almost certain long-term disaster. It is, therefore, in everyone's interests, especially those of the Israelis, to try to get a peaceful settlement. The only possible way of doing so, both sides will agree, is along the lines of Resolution No. 242. Unfortunately, if we are realistic, we know that, at present, there is no chance of that happening.

S 4

General Assembly

The most recent restatement of resolution No. 242 is Resolution No. 2949 of December last year. Of its six recommendations, the Arabs accept all and indeed voted for the resolution. The Israelis do not at present accept three of the recommendations, and voted against. The first of these recommendations was

"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;"

The second was the Assembly's invitation to Israel

"to publicly declare its adherence to the principle of non-an<sup>n</sup>exation of territories through the use of force;"

The third was the statement that the Assembly

"Recognises that the respect of the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

These are not at present acceptable to Israel, who voted against the resolution, as I explained in my intervention.

We must recognise also that the United States is not prepared to pressurise Israel into acceptance. The resolution was passed by 86 votes to 7, the 7 being Israel and half a dozen of the smaller Latin American states. I was deeply disturbed to hear my right hon Friend say that the British Labour Party lines itself up with the six banana republics in opposing Resolution 2949.

I cannot conceive how this has come about.

My right hon Friend gave no explanation. If my hon and learned Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr Ivor Richard) wishes to do his party good service, he will at least spell out tonight the precise reasons - which clauses in this

resolution, backed by an overwhelming majority of world opinion - practically the whole of Europe, the whole third world, practically the whole Communist world - have led the Labour Party to oppose it. We are entitled to know all these facts and we have never had them spelled out.

Although, at the moment, bearing in mind the American attitude, the essential recommendations regarding a settlement are not practicable,<sup>but</sup> there are two recommendations which are practicable. They call upon us not to recognise the creation of facts by Israel, the eradication of her 1948 frontiers, on which a future settlement is bound to depend. I would urge that everything that we do, on both sides of the House, should carefully follow this resolution in refusing to acquiesce in the creation of facts, which is the enemy of a settlement.

Again, I was very sorry - I am sad to have to say these things - to see that, whereas the Foreign Secretary when he visited Jerusalem was careful not to do so under Israeli auspices - no doubt the Minister of State will take the same care when he visits Jerusalem - and therefore to accept the annexation of Arab Jerusalem by the Israelis.

T FOLLOWS

Mr. Mayhew speaking

when my right hon Friend the Leader of the Opposition visited Jerusalem he acquiesced in the creation of facts by visiting Jerusalem under Israeli auspices, especially as he found occasion to praise the new building in Jerusalem when there. Of all Israel's creation of facts, the worst is the erection by Israeli property developers of monstrous flats and offices in conquered Jerusalem.

Not for the first time in history the Holy City has been desecrated by Barbarians.

On a more constructive note, however, may I say that the whole future must rest, if we are to have any hope, with the United Nations. In his peroration, my rt hon Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) very inconsistently, <sup>the</sup> assured House that the next Labour Government would operate their foreign policy through the United Nations. That was his main message. Yet that is what we are asking for in this case, and it is my rt hon Friend himself who opposes the main resolution passed by the General Assembly. I am afraid that the Opposition may be accused, if we are not careful, of double standards in some of these things, of separating ourselves from the Third World in particular. We heard much about Africa yesterday. We on these benches have a fine policy towards Africa. However, I point out to the Opposition Front Bench that the OAU recently went far beyond the United Nations' resolutions in criticising Israel and called for unconditional withdrawal of Israel from her conquered territories, which include a great part of Africa. Sinai is the biggest part of Africa under military occupation. These colleagues of ours in Africa, with whom we are fighting against colonialism and

racialism, see in that fight South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia and Israel grouped together.

MR. CLINTON DAVIS (Hackney, Central): Rubbish.

MR. MAYHEW: My hon Friend has only to follow their diplomatic activities and speeches to see that that is true. That may be right or wrong. Let us avoid controversy and leave that in doubt. I am simply saying that we shall find our whole position in Southern Africa very much undermined and our relations with our allies in the fight against colonialism and racialism very much undermined if we appear to be adopting double standards and attacking racialism and colonialism everywhere except where practised by Israel.

Finally, I seem to have criticised my Party leaders rather more than usual. Let me hastily say that all parties have things of which to be ashamed in their records in the Middle East. The Tory Party is the party of Suez. That puts it beyond the pale to begin with. The Liberal Party attacks colonialism and racialism in every part of the world, except where it is practised by Israel. I hope that the Labour Party will carefully consider the possible double standards in its approach to this colonial question. - [Interruption.]

I am sorry to have aroused my hon Friend the Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis). I hope that he will have an opportunity to speak later. He will no doubt say quite different things on this subject with equal sincerity.

The way home for all my rt hon and hon Friends on the Opposition Front Bench is to study carefully the latest Resolution, No. 2949, of the General Assembly. It is the best hope, it is

supported by world opinion, and I do not understand why they are so strongly against it. If we cannot immediately go forward to a peaceful settlement under Resolution 242 let us at least do those things which are set out in Resolution 2949 which will help to keep the conditions so that we can eventually reach a peaceful settlement which would be in the interests of everyone in the world, including in the long run the State of Israel.

to France that we do not think that there should be any more tests in the atmosphere. Therefore, our position is that we do not think that these tests should be carried out, but the French are capable of making their decisions for themselves. They will no doubt decide in the light of all the approaches which have been made to them whether to go ahead.

Therefore, as I look at the broad sweep of policy in relation to the emergence of China, in relation to the security conference to be held with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, in relation to the formation of the Community and its progress, I think that we can report progress.

As always in the conduct of foreign affairs there are some areas that justify optimism. There are other areas still faced with stubborn problems but where it should be possible to see a way through. The Indian subcontinent is certainly one where rigid positions must give way to neighbourliness. The price of separation and non-co-operation is too high on that continent. There are signs that this is recognised by all three countries - India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

But there are other areas where we seem to be stuck as regards reconciliation and where the future is depressing. The Middle East is the most outstanding. Two profoundly emotional human needs are there in conflict - security and sovereignty. It was these needs which were taken into account in Resolution 242, which has been accepted by both Israel and Egypt. Implementation of this resolution, with all its ambiguity, remains the best hope for peace.

In so far as we can help - unfortunately, the wish is not necessarily the father to the deed - we will do so. But I cannot report to the house that I am optimistic. Everyone in terms of reconciliation for years past has been looking for an answer. None has found it.

Sooner or later negotiations must take place. We will use all our influence wherever we can to bring that about.

I said at the beginning of my speech that I would include a section on Rhodesia.

MR. CLINTON DAVIS (Hackney, Central): Before the Secretary of State turns to the question of Rhodesia will he enlarge a little on the current policy of the Government with regard to Resolution 242? Does he say that his interpretation of that resolution is consistent with the previous Government's interpretation; or does he support an amendment to it?

SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME: I think that our interpretation is exactly the same - [Interruption] - I hope that it is. I do not think that we want to amend Resolution 242, because I do not think that we should get any consent in the United Nations to another ~~and~~ resolution. We had better stick to it as it is.

I turn to the question of Rhodesia. Since the Pearce Commission reported last May, we have been endeavouring to maintain contact as best we can with all shades of opinion in Rhodesia, including the Rhodesian authorities.

(N FOLLS)

MR. REED rose -

MR. ROBERTS: May I answer the hon Gentleman's question.

One could commend that attitude to a World Court decision to another country, namely, France, the dispute in her case being with another country and of a different character. However, the principle remains.

MR. REED: I support the rt hon Gentleman's view. I am saying that it is inconsistent for Britain to enforce the judgment of the Court in relation to Iceland and to remain silent about the decision of the Court in relation to the tests in the Pacific. If the justification is that only those who are party to a dispute before the Court are to be responsible for enforcing action, it can mean only international anarchy which the Court is designed to prevent.

MR. ROBERTS: I take the hon Gentleman's point, but I shall not be drawn into an argument about whether we are enforcing that decision. I do not think that the presence of our ships in the area is an enforcement of that decision. However, this is a very fine point.

I agree that until the International Court is backed by a system of enforcement, which must in turn be agreed, it has less validity than we would wish it to have. I do not agree that even the present system, which is authority without enforcement, would lead to anarchy.

I have time only briefly to refer to another area in which I have been extremely interested, the Middle East. There is a new initiative under Doctor Jarring. I was glad to hear the assurance of the Foreign Secretary, I think on the prompting of my rt hon Friend the Leader of the Opposition that any initiative including the present initiative,

will rest on the terms and objects of United Nations' resolution-242. I am sure that both sides of the House are right in believing that we should rest on the resolution. It is the only possible basis for an agreement which is just and durable between the two main sides in the dispute.

What I am slightly concerned about is this. The Foreign Secretary rightly described what has been happening in Washington as a detentive development which we warmly welcome and hope will lead to practical results. One of the emanations of what has been said in Washington is that the two super powers will be looking at the Middle East with a view, as Mr. Brezhnev put it in his broadcast in the United States, to assisting a settlement in the Middle East. Meantime, we have the Jarring ~~exercise~~, once more. The Tunisian Prime Minister has been engaged in certain talks. Then there are the results of the detente talks, as I call them, in Washington. It must surely be a major purpose of our foreign policy in the next few weeks to ensure that those three efforts to assist in the Middle East situation do not diverge but are, if possible, brought together.

There are other aspects of the detentive development in Washington which others apart from ourselves will wish to ensure do not diverge from existing efforts to create understanding. We thoroughly agree with the Foreign Secretary about the way in which the Helsinki talks should develop, namely that there should be commissioned two practical committees with the duty of reporting back to the major body practical means of moving ahead in security and co-operation and of selecting priorities such as in matters of exchange - one could almost say exchange of persons and papers.

to get out of Keflavik, they might well decide not to buy any of Iceland's fish, which could well finish Iceland's economy, which, as I have said, is already dicky.

I hope that the Icelandic Government will realise the complexities of the situation and that we have some sympathy for them in the position in which they find themselves. I hope, too, that they will return to the negotiating table which could only be to the <sup>advantage</sup> of Iceland, Britain and the international community as a whole.

*P. Wall  
Halkenrue* I shall devote the rest of my speech to the question of the southern flank, particularly the <sup>subject</sup> of oil. The energy gap is the most important question facing the world for the next generation or, possibly, two generations.

That brings to mind immediately two issues - first, that Europe draws 57 per cent. of its oil from the Middle East and <sup>the</sup> that oil comes round the Cape; <sup>that</sup> secondly, America in the next decade will draw 60 per cent. of its oil from the Middle East, also round the Cape.

We have also the problem of the immense increase in wealth which is going to the nations supplying the oil - the nations of the Arab world - and the effect that this could have on international monetary policy. Obviously we shall have to consider this problem carefully in the future.

I believe that the dependence of the West on its long-range oil supply round the Cape is crucial. The question has been asked: why should the Soviet Union bother about this; if it wanted to be aggressive, would it <sup>not be</sup> so much easier and quicker to invade the Middle East? Any such action would be the cause of World war three, as the Soviet Union knows as well as we do.

Z 3

The alternative is to take action against this long and tenuous line of oil communications either directly or through a third party. This could happen. Such action has been taken in the past - in the Neen conflict, the Spanish Civil War, the Malaysian and Indonesian confrontation, and other such conflicts.

Only last week at the meeting of Western European Union General Goodpastor, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, emphasised the dependence of the West on its oil route and said how worried he was about it. We must have a policy of flexible response, not only in central Europe, but also as regards our oil supplies. I do not believe that we can have such a policy without the help of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese provinces in Africa. This is the burden of my speech.

It has become fashionable in recent months in the Press and elsewhere to say that the British Government have a choice between black Africa and southern Africa, and to try to force them to make this choice the pressure being clearly in favour of black Africa. I do not believe that we have to make this choice. We want to trade and be friends with both sides and use our influence on both sides to try to persuade them to come together for the common good of the continent.

I want to put some important figures on the record. First, not more than 10 per cent. of our oil supplies come from Nigeria. As I have already said, about 60 per cent. of our supplies and those of America will come round the Cape during the next decade.

On the question of investments, the relative figures for black Africa, excluding the Arabs, and for southern Africa - not South Africa alone - are as follows. The book value of investments, less oil, in Southern Africa is £740 million. In other African Commonwealth countries it is £280 million plus £72 million in other independent African states, a total of £352 million. Thus the value of our investments in Southern Africa is twice the value of our investments in the rest of Africa.

Our investment in oil in Nigeria is worth from £150 million to £200 million, but that still leaves a large balance in favour of ~~XXXX~~ the south. Adding to that the value of our holding of South African securities of about £1,000 million it is clear that the balance of investments is very much in favour of the south rather than of black Africa.

In 1972 the figures of United Kingdom imports and exports were - <sup>imports from</sup> the south, £352 million, and <sup>--from</sup> ~~XX~~ black Africa, inclusive of Nigerian oil, £457 million; exports to the south £342 million and to black Africa £405 million. That gives a slight bias in favour of the north - if you like, black Africa.

Weighed in the balance must be the growing tendency in African, Commonwealth and independent states towards the nationalisation or expropriation of British firms, which does not happen in the south.

My object is to try to put the balance sheet to the House. I do not want this country to be forced to make a

choice between the two areas. That would be wrong for this country and I do not think any hon Member would want that to happen. However, if we have to make a choice - if a decision is forced on us - it seems clear where the balance of British advantage lies in both economic and strategic terms.

I return to the vital question of the oil route, 66 ships a day pass Capetown. One thousand ships a month call at South African ports. Yet this Govt have not yet implemented the undertakings they gave when in opposition. The House will recall that in 1967 it debated the question of the supply of maritime arms for the defence of the Cape route. My rt hon Friend, who was then the Leader of the Opposition, said this:

"The Government have taken the wrong decision."

That was then they decided to suspend the delivery of arms to South Africa.

"They have failed to justify it to the House.

It is damaging to our national interest in finance, in trade and in defence, and a

Conservative Administration will reverse it."

[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th December 1967; Vol. 756, c.1152.]

That pledge has not yet been fulfilled. True, we have provided the South African navy with eight small anti-submarine helicopters, but that was after a good deal of flap and bother including a White Paper. The Labour Government provided 16 Buccaneers, which were built in my constituency and four of which have since been written off in accidents. Are replacements to be supplied?

I remind my rt hon Friend the Secretary of State that when as leader of the Opposition he came to my constituency and was asked at a meeting whether a Conservative Government would supply Buccaneers to South Africa he said, "Yes." They have not been supplied.

When I table questions I get the stock Foreign Office answer to the effect that no orders have yet been placed. Every hon Member and every civilservant knows that orders from South Africa are not placed until an assurance has been given that export licences will be granted. The Simonstown Agreement must be fulfilled in the spirit as well as in the law if our oil routes are to be adequately defended.

AA folls.

7.41 p.m.

MR. CLINTON DAVIS (Hackney, Central): I shall not follow the speech of the hon Member for Clapham (Mr. William Shelton), save to say that the message that he seemed to be conveying was that if one detests a regime one must not declare that detestation if it happens to be one with which one is aligned. That is not a doctrine to which many hon Members on the Opposition side of the House, at least, would be prepared to subscribe.

I want to address my remarks to the situation in the Middle East. During the last few weeks I have had the advantage of visiting both the Lebanon - albeit too briefly, and Israel. I do not claim to be a great expert on either of those countries, but in those visits I was able to obtain a flavour of both of them and to sense the atmosphere which is prevailing in both.

Against that background I shall make certain observations the role of the United Kingdom and about the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday and of the Minister of State today.

Concerning the Lebanon, until the events of the last few weeks, at least - I went there before the incidents arose in Beirut - it was quite clear to any visitor that the Lebanese themselves view the presence of the Palestinians, many of whom had descended upon them after the conflict in Jordan, with a mixture of fear, suspicion and anxiety.

It was with great reluctance that we were accompanied on visits to two villages, Shatyla and Sabra, which lie within about five minutes' drive from the centre of Beirut. It was quite clear that even the police force there was not prepared to enter these territories because they appeared to be under the sovereignty of the ~~xxxx~~ terrorists. It was no <sup>small</sup> wonder that eventually a development had to arise where the Lebanese authorities found themselves on a collision

course with the Palestinians living in those and other villages. There is no doubt that the conditions in which those people lived are squalid, miserable and unacceptable. As I have said, they are within five minutes by car of lush Beirut. Very little indeed, nothing, is done, apart from the help that is given by the United Nations, to assist those people in their misery. They have been used for 25 years or more as miserable pawns in a game of power politics.

It is noteworthy that the only sensible plan that has been forthcoming has come from the Israelis themselves, with the Peres plan to rehabilitate these people, first in the Gaza Strip. But the Arab world looked upon that as totally unacceptable because it was interfering with the status quo. Israel, Egypt and the rest of the Arab world find themselves spending thousands of millions dollars in order to build up their arsenal of weapons. If only a tenth or a twentieth of that money could have been utilised over the past years in bringing some help to these miserable people, those conditions could have been resolved. There is no doubt about that. The Lebanese could have resolved as far as their own refugee population is concerned, the position themselves. The Egyptians could have done it, but they have lifted not a finger.

Instead, they have preferred to allow these miserable people to fester. They have taught them to detest Israel. They have nurtured that hatred. Now they say, "let all the Arab refugees return to Israel." In those conditions it is totally impossible for Israel to accept in entirety the people who are bent on Israel's eradication and destruction.

My hon Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller) and I were together in the Lebanon and we met Palestinians.

The one theme common to everything that they said was that they could not accept Israel and that it had to be eradicated. They said, "we shall live together in a multi-confessional state with the Jews." But what faith can the Israelis have in a multi-confessional state? after the disasters of Lod Munich, Khartoum, Bangkok and ~~Nicosia~~ Nicosia when they have seen how Arab behaves towards Arab in Jordan, when Arab terrorists fled to Israel in order to obtain sanctuary. What faith can the Israelis have when they see how the Egyptians behaved towards the Yemenis, with the use of poison gas? It does not offer <sup>a</sup>very satisfactory token of good faith.

There are many Lebanese whom we met who desperately yearn for peace. They are Phoenicians. <sup>Peace would give the opportunity for trade.</sup> They want to trade with Israel. At present they are living in an impossible situation. Whether <sup>by the terrorists</sup> the effects of thralldom which existed at the time of our visit, and the terrorists will persist, we know not. I hope that that will not be the situation.

The situation we found in Israel was not of over-whelming confidence or complacency. Everywhere we went, as a principle of discussion at political meetings, there was <sup>raised</sup> the question of peace. Israel does not have to be told by my hon Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) that peace is essential. The Israelis recognise that. Israel is a tiny nation surrounded by hostile forces, but despite everything that they have had to expend they have achieved an enormous rate of economic expansion and have achieved full employment. They have built up the welfare state, and, at the same time, they have brought very large scale aid to the ~~damaged~~ depressed areas of the world, including Latin America, and many parts of Africa, and that is a remarkable contribution from a small nation. It is a living testimony

of their democratic Socialist idealism.

At the same time, Israel has absorbed 800,000 refugees from Arab persecution. It is a quiet, undemonstrative settlement of people. These people were left quite destitute. They were never offered any compensation.

HH follows

HH.1

(MR CLINTON DAVIS SPEAKING)

Anxieties were expressed to us, however, by the Foreign Minister of Israel, above all about Resolution <sup>No</sup> 242. I was glad to hear from the Foreign Secretary yesterday that he accepts the previous Government's interpretation of Resolution <sup>No</sup> 242, that it did not refer to the relinquishment by Israel of all the territories. That seems to be common ground between the two sides. But I cannot help feeling that <sup>the r. l. y's</sup> speech at Harrogate was to a large extent inconsistent with that, since he then spoke about Israel returning to the 1967 frontiers "with minor revisions". I do not know what he meant by minor revisions, and the <sup>Foreign Secretary</sup> has never explained it. I hope that the instructions which he gives to our Representative at the Security Council is not to engage in map drawing.

I rather think that that is what he had in mind when he referred recently to the

("secure and recognised boundary" between Israel and Egypt as coinciding with the old Palestine border. That is not particularly helpful. Resolution 242 does not need further interpretation of that kind. What it needs, and what the parties at the United Nations ought to be encouraging, is that the parties to the dispute should be drawn together in direct negotiation on the basis of Resolution 242 - that is what was contemplated - and for the United Nations to provide such help as may be appropriate in implementing the resolution.

HH.2

I was astonished to hear from <sup>the hon.</sup> Member for Westbury (Mr Walters) the suggestion that the British Government should now provide arms for the Arabs to force Israel to the negotiating table. Israel does not need much forcing. Israel has its <sup>hawks</sup> - of whom I disapprove - and it happens to have its doves, but what it does not have are clay pigeons, and it is certainly not prepared to accept a situation in which withdrawal must come before any settlement.

The Israelis have made their position clear over the years. In 1968 there was the Jarring offer for the delegations to meet in Cyprus. Israel accepted. Egypt did not. Every suggestion for a meeting has been refused. In August 1970 Israel expressed her support for permanent peace with Egypt and <sup>JORDAN</sup> accepting the consideration of withdrawing her armed forces from territories occupied since 1967 and, as a result of that, secure and agreed borders to be laid down in peace agreements. Egypt was not interested. Israel <sup>has</sup> always agreed to talks without pre conditions, but Egypt has not been interested.

When my h Friend the Member for Woolwich East refers to the Jarring question<sup>a</sup>aire, one fact which he does not mention is that Egypt has insisted throughout that Israel's armed forces be withdrawn to the pre-June 1967 frontiers, and that has been a condition precedent to any discussion<sup>s</sup>. The Israelis, of course, will not accept it, because they are not mad.

When President Bourguiba suggested that there should be direct negotiations, that was immediately accepted by Mr Eban. On the part of Egypt <sup>chronicle</sup> there has been a total of rejection.

As regards the occupied territories, there has been massive distortion from one or two h Members on both sides. It is nonsense to suggest, for example, that economic pressure is being applied

by the Israelis on the occupied territories to reduce their economic strength. We have just been there, We have seen them. The Israelis are trying to build up the trade union movement. They have made great efforts and they have succeeded in eliminating <sup>Economic</sup> unemployment. /conditions which have never existed before<sup>and</sup> in these territories now exist. Arab students go to Amman, ~~to~~ to Cairo, they are educated there, and they come back to the occupied territories. There is the open bridges policy; 200,000 people pass to and fro between Israel and Jordan each year.

MR MOLLOY: The probability is that if the Nazis had over-run this country and ruled us for about twenty years, some British students would ~~would have~~ have gone to a German university, and some of us would still have been operating in the underground.

MR CLINTON DAVIS: The mind begins to boggle if my h Friend suggests that there is any likeness or the slightest comparison between what is happening in the occupied territories today and what happened in Nazi Europe. We have just been there. He has not. I have seen it. He has not.

MR MOLLOY: I have been there.

MR CLINTON DAVIS: If the situation is so ghastly why did so many Arabs decide to take their holidays in Israel, Arabs not only from Jordan but from Samaria and Judea taking what was once described by an Arab writer as "a vacation in the Zionist hell?"

I believe that the difficulties, which undoubtedly exist, can be resolved only by the parties coming together. That is the way in which peaceful settlements have been achieved everywhere, <sup>and</sup> in India, <sup>and</sup> Pakistan, <sup>and</sup> in Germany at the end of the war, The parties had to get together.

Only by direct negotiation, and only by the Government encouraging direct negotiation will the situation ultimately be resolved and

HH.4

the great technological progress which Israel and the Arab State together can offer to the deprived peoples of the Middle East be allowed develop.

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HH.5

7.56 p.m.      MR. PETER TAPSELL (Horncastle):      In common with the majority of hon Members who have spoken today, I shall direct my remarks to the Middle East, but, lest I get caught in the deadly cross-fire between the hon Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Clinton Davis) and his hon Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Holloy), I shall confine myself to the economic aspects of the problem there, and keep well clear of the political.

I see that some Arab leaders have recently been complaining that in the joint communique issued by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon only 86 words were devoted to the Middle East. Communiques are often designed to conceal rather than to expose the essential nature of talks, and, in so far as that communique is frank, the shortness of its Middle East section is, I suspect, more likely to be a reflection of the intractable nature of the area's problems than of its unimportance to the super-powers. Indeed, Mr. Brezhnev has recently told us that the Middle East is now the world's most dangerous area. I believe that to be true.

In this context, I shall say a few words about the economic problems of the Middle East, which are based upon oil. In thinking about oil and the attitude of the great Middle Eastern oil producing countries, it is of the first importance to try to understand how the people of those countries see the problem themselves. I have known the area fairly well all my life, and I recently returned from a visit to seven of the major oil producing countries of the Middle East. They feel that only recently have they begun to receive anything approaching a fair commercial price for their oil. They point out that the vastly higher living standards of the West and of Japan have, in their view, been made possible by the cheap oil which the Middle East has been providing over the past 20 years or more.

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They say also that oil is still a cheap raw material. The fact, as I pointed out to the Prime Minister at Question Time today, that the Reuters commodity index shows that the price of the 17 leading international commodities has risen by 80 per cent. in the last 12 months seems to indicate that the price rises in oil, which have received so much publicity, have by no means kept pace with the general increase in raw material prices.

JJ FOLLOWS

Mr. Tapsell spkg

The oil producing countries also point out that it is the heavy taxes which most countries impose on oil products at retail level which makes petrol appear so expensive. They feel bitter that the Governments of many of the consuming countries obtain as much, if not more revenue from the oil in the form of taxes as do the producing countries, many of which have standards of living much lower than we have. The oil-exporting countries also claim that the cost of their imports from the industrial world have gone up <sup>by</sup> probably more than the rise in the price they are paid for the oil they sell. They also say that they are paid for <sup>their</sup> the oil in paper currencies which are constantly depreciating in value while their oil reserves are by no means inexhaustible.

The point about depreciation is a valid one because they are paid mostly in U.S. dollars and <sup>since August</sup> 1971 the value of the U.S. dollar has depreciated against <sup>both</sup> the German <sup>deutschmark</sup> and the Swiss franc by about 40 per cent. When the oil producing countries take normally prudent investment measures to seek to protect themselves from this enormous depreciation they are immediately accused of unsettling the international monetary system, although they have been the chief financial losers in each financial international crisis since 1967 and they have the strongest vested interest of all in monetary stability. They are now being frequently warned that as their financial reserves build up to massive proportions the countries of Western Europe and North America, not to mention Japan will almost certainly introduce limitations on the proportion of equity they can hold in public companies for investment purposes.

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While they well understand the political reasons which prompt each country to wish to exercise effective ownership of its own major industries, this poses a serious question for them. What, they ask, are they supposed to do with this depreciating paper that they receive for their oil, bearing in mind they have only limited supplies of this extractive raw material and that in most cases it is their only ~~an~~ national asset? Most of them have already established advanced welfare states at home, and development funds have also been established, with huge resources from the oil producing states to help the poorer Arab states. They will be dispensing large sums for development projects in the next decade. What, the oil countries ask, are they supposed to do now? They cannot put all the money that they will get into gold and property, <sup>and</sup> they must do something for them with it. One alternative course of action is <sup>h</sup>drastically to curtail oil production, to keep the oil in the ground, thus preserving their capital in an inflationary era, extending the life of their one precious resource and pushing up the world price of oil.

From their point of view, as their reserves build up, this makes absolute sense, and I am sure it is a policy which many of them will tend increasingly to pursue. The effect of this for us in the West and for Japan will be to precipitate the energy crisis even more quickly than has been suggested. The whole situation poses a major problem for the Western world, Japan and the Soviet Union. Although it is impossible to get figures from the Soviet Union, leaders in the <sup>Western</sup> oil industry think that by 1980 the Soviet Union <sup>may</sup> ~~will~~ be needing to import about 10 per cent. of its total energy requirements.

The important point to grasp is that the energy crisis is far more acute and more immediately present than is even now generally realised. The rt hon Member for Cardiff, *(Mr. Gallagher)*, South-East, in his amusing knockabout opening speech talked rather jocularly of the possibility of our cities being jammed with cars without petrol. But that is a real prospect. The dangers of economic, financial and political confrontations developing between the oil producing countries and the oil consuming countries whose very existence, way of life and standard of living depend on this source of energy are all too real. I would suggest to my rt hon Friends that it should be an urgent task of statesmanship to avert these potential dangers and it might be possible to do so before they reach flashpoint, although I do not believe that we have a great deal of time ahead of us.

The more thoughtful Arab leaders are ~~more~~ conscious of the dangers of overplaying their economic hand in this international situation. They recognise that the super-powers, ~~particularly~~ Russia and America, will not permit their domestic economies to be brought to a standstill, <sup>in any circumstances</sup> ~~for instance~~ by the oil producing countries of the Middle East, and the Arab leaders have no desire to see the Sykes-Picquot Agreement of yesteryear updated in a modern form by a secret Brezhnev - Nixon agreement which in effect divides the oil fields between the super-powers of today. The Arabs need to sell their oil even if increasingly their need to sell is not quite as urgent as the consumers' need to buy. Above all, the Arabs treasure their independence. <sup>(therefore</sup> They <sub>have</sub> as much interest in solving these problems as anyone else.

We need to establish a permanent international machinery separate from anything that exists now, to seek to work out agreed plans for regulating the flow of oil from the exporters to the importers in the best interests of both and to agree on an international plan, or series of bilateral agreements, by which the vast surplus revenues to be derived from oil can be constructively employed for the benefit of the investing countries and the countries where the investment is to be made. The economic problems involved in this are too vast, too political and too closely related to <sup>the</sup> national survival of so many great nations for them to be left in the hands of the oil companies. Only Governments and a permanent international body staffed by respected nationals of both the main producing and the main consuming countries can hope to measure up to the scale of the problems involved.

I hope, therefore, that my rt hon Friend will take an early initiative in establishing machinery of this kind divorced from the negotiations about the price of oil which recur at regular intervals. Of course, Britain is exceptionally well placed in the current critical energy situation compared with the United States, Germany, or Japan. As a result of the North Sea discoveries <sup>(soon)</sup> we shall be nearer to being self-sufficient in energy terms than we have been for half a century. Nevertheless, it is urgently necessary for Britain to embark upon a major programme to reduce its dependence upon oil in every possible way. Such a programme would be as much in the interests of the oil exporting countries as it would be in the interests of the major oil importing countries because, ultimately, it is in everyone's interest that as much of the oil as possible should be kept in the ground for as long as possible.

There are many directions in which oil saving programmes could be launched in Britain and a senior Minister should be put in charge of this policy at once. I want to mention just a few steps which should be taken. I list them in rising order of importance and I make no apology for doing this in a foreign affairs debate, because all of these suggestions are relevant to future good relations with the Middle East.

It should be made compulsory for all public and commercial buildings to have double-glazed windows and for building insulation standards to be made much more stringent. Local authorities should be required to revert to the use of trolley buses. Public transport should be encouraged instead of private transport in all cities and emergency plans should be drawn up for the limited curtailment of private motoring in case this should suddenly be necessary because of acute petrol shortage. The rundown of the coal industry should be halted and reversed. A date should be set by which electricity generation by nuclear power should be in sufficient supply to make it compulsory for all central heating to be powered by electricity rather than oil. A far more intensive study should be

carried out into the harnessing of solar and tidal energy. For instance, the Severn Barrage scheme, which has been under study since 1849, <sup>in politics</sup> which even the Leader of the Opposition will agree is a long time, should be implemented.

KK follows

MR. TAPSELL speaking:

Hon Members more knowledgeable than I about power matters will, I am sure, be able to think of <sup>many</sup> other actions which could be taken in these important spheres.

When Mr. Brezhnev recently reminded us that the Middle East is the world's most dangerous area, I am sure that he had oil as well as Israel in mind, because the indications are that Russia is facing the prospect of an energy crisis herself.

There are some problems in the Middle East which can perhaps best be solved only by the passage of time. However, oil is a problem which will grow steadily more serious with the passage of time. It is not a situation which particularly calls for quiet diplomacy. What is needed is fairly <sup>problems</sup> dramatic and public action now to grapple with the before they become even more difficult than they already appear to be.

(Dr. Miller speaking)

The apparent <sup>British</sup> support of such a brutal regime, which came to power as a result of the overflow <sup>the</sup> of a freely elected democratic government marks a shameful period in our history. There are those on this side as well as in the Conservative Party who feel that we should-be doing more in opposing a regime of this kind.

I should like to deal now with the situation in British Honduras and British policy towards that country. I have visited the country twice and both times, travelling around, I got the decided impression that the apparently overwhelming support for the present Prime Minister is not quite as unanimous as would appear from his position in parliament. When independence is granted to British Honduras - it cannot now be long delayed - will the British Government give that people a guarantee that their sovereignty will be protected from any attempt to infringe it by neighbouring Guatemala.

I receive regular correspondence and newspapers from British Honduras and I know that there is a growing feeling among a fairly widespread grouping of several parties that there will be an attempt by Guatemala - which the Guatemalans have never denied - to claim sovereignty over British Honduras. Will we give any guarantee on independence?

*M. Miller*  
The third area about which I wish to speak is the Middle East. When all the foliage is cut through and when one has disregarded the verbiage, the root of the problem can be seen as the non-acceptance by the Arab states of the existence of the state of Israel. I know that there are differences of opinion in relation to other problems that have developed and are still <sup>present</sup> / but this is the root of the argument.

The Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, said in a recent speech that the Arab refugee problem was the result, not the cause, of the 1948 war and <sup>went</sup> on:

"It is absurd to contend that the present territorial configuration is the cause of the Middle East tension. The heart of the problem is what caused the six-day war, not the territories administered by Israel after the war. Simply put, the root issue is the Arab attitude to Israel's very existence and security, and once the Arab countries accept the legitimacy of Israel, as we have always accepted theirs, there is no reason for their intransigence against negotiating the differences between us. In this connection, let me state as firmly as I can that Israel's insistence on negotiations, direct or indirect, is not a manoeuvre devised to bait our Arab enemies. The vehement refusal of Arab leaders to discuss with us the terms of a possible settlement must raise the question as to whether they are really prepared to live in peace with us. This is the crux of the conflict."

When Resolution No. 242 is still in the forefront of the minds of the people of this country, the United States and France, it is incumbent on the Government to ensure that it continues to be the basis for a settlement. It is a resolution which has been stated over and over again, which requires to be discussed and about which negotiations should take place to secure its implementation.

I agree with my hon Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Dr. David Owen) who, in a very percipient speech, talked about the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the evacuation and demilitarisation of Sinai being an excellent starting point for negotiations towards the implementation of Resolution No. 242. When <sup>one</sup> ~~one~~ considers all the difficulties which seemed at one time completely insoluble and which attempts have been made to solve, when one sees the success of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, with a dialogue between East and West Germany which no one would have thought possible a few years ago, when there is a treaty of agreement discussed and signed between North Vietnam and America, bringing in South Vietnam, which also could not have been envisaged a few years ago, and when in the face of all the difficulties, some discussions are going on about Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, one sees that there are no areas in which negotiation has not taken place and in which some progress has not been made as a result.

MM FOLLOWS

## DR. MILLAR SPEAKING

It seems to me, and to many others, that there is no reason why this very delicate area of the Middle East should not fall into the same category as those other areas.

Every now and then, at indeterminate intervals, we undergo the ritual of a debate on foreign affairs. What emerges, and what has emerged in this debate, to some extent, is that we react to an immediate situation but when that immediacy recedes we relapse into our previous somnolent state.

I enjoyed the speech of my hon Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr.Judd). He made a practical suggestion about what we should be doing in debates of this kind. My hon Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr.Maclennan) also made an excellent suggestion, which I commend, if I may be so bold, to the Foreign Secretary and the Government. My hon Friend said that the only manner by which we, as the British House of Commons, can have any influence and knowledge of all the intricacies of what is taking place in other parts of the world is to have a specialist committee on foreign affairs. I commend that idea to the Government as worthy of very serious consideration.

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(MRS. HART SPEAKING)

We were saying what a splendid colonial record we had and asking what, therefore, was wrong with colonialism. We were saying what wonderful administrations we had in Africa and asking why, therefore, should people like Kenyatta, Hastings Banda and other liberation leaders in our own colonies seek to liberate them. It is an extraordinary throwback and a total failure to understand the principles of liberation, and what colonial freedom is about, quite apart from what colonialism is about.

SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME: I dislike intensely the Soviet Union's policy towards Jews, yet I feel on balance because of the international requirements of peace and co-existence, that we have to have contacts with the Soviet Union and that we have to try to create constructive co-existence with the Soviet Union. I do not like the Greek Government. Although I will tell the Greek Government that I do not like their policies, here is a flank of NATO exposed. I am not prepared to expose the security of Western Europe in the south-east corner of the Mediterranean or the NATO Seaboard of Portugal. They are essential to the physical security of Western Europe. Therefore, we have to judge these matters carefully. Of course there is a moral content in foreign policy. Nevertheless, we have to take account of the physical security of a continent under threat. Therefore, this is a nice consideration of balance. Moral content comes into it,

but so does the physical security of Western Europe.

MRS. HART: I take the r h G's point. .

My first comment is that we are not in a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Of course we work for co-existence with the Soviet Union, but we have no military alliance. Secondly, when the rt hon Gentleman says that we must protect the physical security of Western Europe, we know how important are the Cap Verdi Islands to NATO defences and, therefore, why it is that so many of the countries of Western Europe are anxious that the battle for liberation in Guinea is not won, as seems likely it may be in the next two or three years.

What is the security element if included in it are people who themselves are a threat to democracy and freedom. I am glad that the rt hon Gentleman has clarified the situation. But the opposition beg to differ, and we hold our position strongly.

I turn to the EEC and to aid and trade. Here we are concerned with the inter-relationship of four elements - the associables and the non-associables and the aid and trade position of both.

Three major policy issues arise and will be with us over the next few months. It is very difficult because the Government, in entering into negotiations, can tell us very little. All that they can do is to listen to us, and we can only hope that what we say will be taken seriously.

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מזכיר נכנס

מחלקת הקשר

*[Handwritten signature and initials]*

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אל: המשרד

מאת: ניר יורק

מיידי

לשכת מנכ"ל

נאום הבריטי במועביט:

SIR DONALD MAITLAND:

MY DELEGATION AGREES WITH THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT BEFORE US AS REGARDS THE IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES. FIRST, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CEASE FIRE SHOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED. SECONDLY, THERE IS A CLEAR NEED FOR ADDITIONAL UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS IN WHATEVER NUMBERS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO CONSIDER NECESSARY. I SUGGESTED IN THE COURSE OF OUR DEBATE LAST TUESDAY THAT THE DISPATCH OF ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS MIGHT WELL PROVE AN ESSENTIAL FOLLOW-UP TO OUR RESOLUTION 339(1973). MY DELEGATION HOPES THAT THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE OBSERVERS IN THE FIELD CAN TAKE PLACE WITHOUT DELAY.

THIRDLY, WE ENTIRELY AGREE THAT A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE SHOULD NOW BE SET UP AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO THIS END. WE ASSUME OF COURSE THAT ON THE BASIS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF HIS PLANS AND WILL CONSULT THE COUNCIL AS NECESSARY ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS AS THE MANDATE OF THE FORCES.

I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SPECIFIC EXCLUSION OF FORCES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS FROM THE PRESENT EMERGENCY FORCE IS IN THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO GUARANTEE A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242 (1967). THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EMERGENCY FORCE AT PRESENT BEING SET UP TO ASSIST IN ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND THE LATER PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. AS REGARDS THE LATTER, THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL KNOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS INTIMATED THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A UNITED NATION PEACE-DEEPIING FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT REAINS OUR POSITION.

I WISH TO ADD ONE FURTHER POINT ABOUT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3. MY DELEGATION INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "UNDER ITS AUTHORITY" IN THIS PARAGRAPH AS REFERRING TO THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COUNCIL FOR POLICY AND NOT AS ASSIGNING TO IT THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FORCE. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE AN IMPRACTICABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR IT TO ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

TODAY WE ARE DEALING WITH AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. IN OUR UNDERSTANDABLE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE CEASE FIRE, THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE TRUCE OBSERVERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

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RESOLUTION 339 (1973). MY DELEGATION HOPES THAT THE REINFORCEMENT  
OF THE OBSERVERS IN THE FIELD CAN TAKE PLACE WITHOUT DELAY.

THIRDLY, WE ENTIRELY AGREE THAT A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY  
FORCE SHOULD NOW BE SET UP AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO THIS END. WE ASSUME OF COURSE  
THAT ON THE BASIS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL WILL KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED OF HIS PLANS AND WILL  
CONSULT THE COUNCIL AS NECESSARY ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS AS  
THE MANDATE OF THE FORCES.

I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SPECIFIC EXCLUSION  
OF FORCES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS FROM THE PRESENT EMERGENCY  
FORCE IS IN THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO  
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED  
TO GUARANTEE A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
RESOLUTION 242 (1967). THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE  
EMERGENCY FORCE AT PRESENT BEING SET UP TO ASSIST IN ENSURING  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND THE LATER PEACE-KEEPING  
FORCE TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. AS REGARDS THE LATTER, THE  
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL KNOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS  
INTIMATED THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A  
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT BEING  
OUR POSITION.

I WISH TO ADD ONE FURTHER POINT ABOUT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3. MY  
DELEGATION INTERPRETS THE PHRASE "UNDER ITS AUTHORITY" IN  
THIS PARAGRAPH AS REFERRING TO THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY  
OF THE COUNCIL FOR POLICY AND NOT AS ASSIGNING TO IT THE  
DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FORCE. IT WOULD CLEARLY  
BE AN IMPRACTICABLE ARRANGEMENT FOR IT TO ATTEMPT TO  
EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

TODAY WE ARE DEALING WITH AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. IN OUR  
UNDERSTANDABLE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE CEASE FIRE, THE  
REINFORCEMENT OF THE TRUCE OBSERVERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

-2-

OF AN EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE AREA, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR PRIME OBJECTIVE- THIS IS TO OPEN THE WAY FOR THE URGENT PURSUIT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. SECURING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE FIRE IS NOT MORE THAN THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 (1967). IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AN IMMEDIATE START BE MADE WITH THIS TASK, AND I SHOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THAT MY DELEGATION ATTACHES THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 338(1973) IN WHICH THIS TASK IS DEFINED. I WELCOME THE REQUEST IN THE PRESENT DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT ALL MEMBER STATES EXTEND THEIR FULL CO-OPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION 338(1973). THIS REQUEST MY DELEGATION FULLY ENDORSES. IT WILL BE A REFLECTION ON THE CAPACITY OF THIS COUNCIL TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IF WE ALLOW THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS PEACE TO SLACKEN.

- AD KAN

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OF AN EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE AREA. WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT  
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**BARONESS BIRK:** My Lords, in view of the reply regarding the training of Egyptian pilots, and of the fact that, as I understand it, the Government have confirmed that these pilots are being trained and will continue to be trained, may I ask whether, between to-day and making the Statement in the House to-morrow, this subject will be reconsidered? Because is it not breaking the Government's neutrality? They say that they will not give help to either side. To continue the training of pilots is really a breach, and makes nonsense of the statement that no help is being given to either side in a military sense.

**BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE:** My Lords, perhaps I did not make it clear that these pilots are already trained pilots who are on a conversion course. Were we to stop their courses right away they would return instantly as trained pilots, and that would not help the situation.

**BARONESS BIRK:** My Lords, would the Government then keep them here for ten years?

**LORD BARNBY:** My Lords, may I ask the Minister for a simple affirmative or negative reply? Has ammunition ordered in this country by Israel before the commencement of the current Arab aggressive operation been denied export?

**BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE:** My Lords, arms which are not already on their way are in fact subject to the embargo.

**LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD:** My Lords, is my noble friend aware that she has support from all Benches in the line the Government are taking to use their utmost influence to try to achieve a cease-fire? Is she aware that the only prospect of succeeding with that is if we are absolutely neutral as between both sides? I am sure that there is great sympathy, including my own, with the Israelis in this matter; nevertheless, is my noble friend aware that she has very great support for the line she has taken?

**BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE:** My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend very much for his words. I would only repeat to the House that the main objective of my right honourable friend and Her Majesty's

Government, as I said in the first Answer, is to bring this terrible fighting to an end and simultaneously to create conditions in which progress can be made towards carrying out the Security Council Resolution.

**LORD JANNER:** My Lords, would the noble Baroness please say whether she thinks it is morally right either from a pre-purpose or any other purpose to refuse to supply the necessary supplies to Israel which is being attacked from all sides and against whom an enormous flow of arms has been used? Is it proper that we should refuse to do anything in respect of the tanks that have been supplied and which will be useless without these parts?

**BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE:** My Lords, Her Majesty's Government consider that we are in a stronger position to ask our allies and anybody else who would listen to come together to try to seek an end to the fighting and to create the conditions for a settlement, if we do not at the same time supply arms either to one side or the other.

**LORD BROCKWAY:** My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that many of us welcomed the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, that we should refrain from questions to-day until we have heard the Statement from the Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to-morrow? Is she aware that we were a little surprised that he proceeded to put questions himself and that this has led to the unfortunate exchange of questions to-day, and that many of us will reserve our questions until we have heard the Statement?

**LORD WINDLESHAM:** My Lords, I think many noble Lords in all parts of the House would agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has said. I was asked earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, whether there would be an opportunity for a fuller debate later in the week, and I can confirm that there will be an opportunity on Thursday. In addition we have the Statement, which has been forecast, by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which will be released to your Lordships' House.

continue. We do not think that it would help matters particularly to send these ten pilots back.

LORD JANNER: My Lords, while I appreciate that we shall be debating or discussing this matter to-morrow, there are one or two matters of considerable urgency on which I should like to ask a question. The first is with regard to the removal of the embargo on Israel relating to the supply of arms. How dare we, and how can we, refuse to supply Israel with parts necessary to use the tanks that we ourselves sold to them, particularly after a contract has been entered into and that contract has already gone to the extent of the arms being delivered in this country to Israel? In view of the tremendous amount of armaments being flown in and supplied by Russia in particular to Arab countries, is it not a shocking thing that we should stand aside and leave these people who are defending Israel against an aggression, and a violation which everybody realises is a violation, to be slaughtered by guns and weapons far above the numbers that they themselves possess, and in spite of the fact that the aggression was taken on one of the most sacred days which was being celebrated in Israel by Israeli troops? Cannot we possibly do the right thing and remove that embargo straight away? Time is very important in this matter.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, while I personally understand the noble Lord's deep personal concern, I would ask him to recall that in recent years Her Majesty's Government's policy has been to consider requests for arms from both sides provided that they did not seem likely to impede the search for a settlement or to encourage the resort to hostilities. This is why we have now imposed an embargo. On the last point, I do not think that it is right to apportion blame for this round of fighting. The British concern is not to take sides, but somehow to ensure a lasting solution to the problems of the area.

LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that nobody expects this country to take sides, but it is obvious from some statements that have been made—even by her right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary

—that we appear to be adopting an attitude that is far from neutral. Can the noble Baroness justify the refusal of the British Government to provide spare parts and other material for which Israel has already paid? Can she also state whether King Hussein, who has suddenly decided to enter into hostilities in a limited fashion, is being provided with arms from this country as for the past few years? May we have some information about that?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, as I said earlier, we think that an embargo should not be one sided. It applies to both the main combatants in the area. So far as Jordan is concerned, it applies also to her.

LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, the noble Baroness cannot get away with that. There are many other things that the Government are getting away with. I want to ask quite plainly whether it is true that Israel has paid for spare parts for tanks and other equipment and that this material has not been delivered? If so, why not?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I thought that I made it perfectly clear, and I hoped that it was acceptable to the House, that in this very severe conflict it would not do to have an embargo which was one sided. The only way in which we had a justification for working for a cease-fire, and connecting that with a settlement that is fair to all concerned, is to have embargoes to the battlefield.

LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, if it is not to be one sided, would the noble Baroness inform your Lordships' House whether Egypt has purchased material from this country, paid for it and been refused delivery? Indeed, is it true that Egypt is not concerned at all about getting arms from this country because she has been adequately supplied by Russia, who, as we know, is no friend of this country?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am happy to say that I have a precedent from the previous Government of the noble Lord who, together with ourselves, always refused to discuss in detail specific arms agreements, and I do not propose to do so now.

[Lord Avebury.]

regulations in force in that part of the United Kingdom conformed to those in the rest of the British Isles?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, I think that is rather wide of the Question. As the noble Lord will know, the building regulations to which I have referred apply to England and Wales, but do not apply to the Isle of Man.

# MIDDLE EAST: THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

2.48 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question of which I have given Her Majesty's Government Private Notice, namely:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement on the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs will to-morrow make a full Statement on the Middle East which I will, by leave of this House, repeat. Noble Lords will, however, be aware that Her Majesty's Government's main objective is to bring the fighting to an end and simultaneously to create conditions in which urgent progress can be made towards carrying out Security Council Resolution 242 in full. In the meantime, we have stopped sending arms to the battlefield.

LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Baroness for the answer she has just given. I hope she will understand that we are in some difficulties because this is the first day of resumption after the Recess. We are all deeply conscious of and share the anxiety and disquiet of the people of this country about hostilities in the Middle East. No doubt there are many noble Lords who would like to put particular points to the noble Baroness, but in the circumstances I can understand that the Foreign Secretary would himself wish to make a very full Statement to-morrow. I think the House ought, therefore, to be content with what the noble Baroness has said. However, I presume that the statement that arms have ceased to be supplied, presumably to both sides, means that the

Scorpion tanks not yet sent to one of the Arab States will now not be sent, and, secondly, that the Government will look at the question of training Egyptian pilots at the question of training Egyptian pilots in the present circumstances. Perhaps this matter could be part of the Statement the Foreign Secretary will make to-morrow? In the light of that, if I may advise to my noble friends in the House, I think we ought to wait for the full Statement to-morrow. But the noble Baroness and the Government Chief Whip will be aware that it must be expected that we may wish to debate the Middle East situation on Thursday in the light of the Statement being made to-morrow. I hope we can have an assurance, either from the Leader of the House or from the Chief Whip, that, if it is the desire of Members, time will be provided for such a debate.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I would thank the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for his most admirable restraint, with which I very much concur, because I think it would be more acceptable to the House if they based their questions on the full Statement to-morrow. As I understand it there is a possibility, in fact a probability, that there will be a debate on Thursday. On the specific question put to me by the noble Lord about the Scorpions for Dubai, as he is well aware, Dubai is not a battlefield country and that is why these are continuing.

LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, would the noble Baroness be a little more forthcoming? There has been deep disquiet about aircraft supplied to Libya and deep suspicion that these aircraft have found their way to the battlefield. Would the noble Baroness look at this matter, because there is great disquiet among Members of this House about all arms to these States in the light of the present situation?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I will certainly draw this question to the attention of my right honourable friend. I omitted to reply to another point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, about training Egyptian pilots in this country. These are 12 trained Egyptian pilots who are on a conversion course in this country. We feel that this should

Her Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to make representations explaining the very strong feeling in this country over the death of President Allende and others, and over the many people who had been arrested. The Government of Chile offered its assurances that it would deal in a humane manner and in accordance with due process of law with all those in detention and with those in political opposition.

#### HOUSING: USE OF NON-FLAMMABLE MATERIALS

2.44 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what action they are taking to encourage or compel the use of non-flammable material in house building.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (BARONESS YOUNG): My Lords, the Building Regulations 1972 made under the Public Health Acts 1936 and 1961 already restrict the use of inflammable materials in the construction of houses where this is thought necessary in the interests of safety.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, will the noble Baroness agree that in the course of this year something like £200 million-worth of damage has been done to houses for personal and public use and an unknown amount by wet or damp rot? In those circumstances, is not some further encouragement, or possibly compulsion, necessary, to use material which is both non-flammable and which prevents wet or dry rot setting in?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, the building regulations are under continuous review, and I can assure my noble friend Lord Selkirk that there has been a complete amendment of that part which deals with structural fire precautions; it came into effect at the end of August. The kind of points which my noble friend has made are taken into account.

LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, can the noble

Baroness tell the House if the Government have considered whether this might be a field in which the National House Builders Registration Council have a constructive contribution to make?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, I understand that when the building regulations are under review at least 160 different organisations are consulted. If the Council is not among them, I will certainly see that their name is added to the list. It is, of course, open to any organisation which wishes to make representation on this matter to do so any time.

LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that the Fire Brigades Union have suggested that all new building materials should be compulsorily tested, and that the results should be transmitted to all local authorities and all Chief Fire Officers? What will the Government do about that?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, if the noble Lord has plastics in mind when he refers to new materials. I would say that these are already subject to building regulations.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, am I to understand from what the noble Baroness has said that builders have been instructed not to use the material which was used in the Isle of Man concert hall, where something like 200 people were killed?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to comment on the terrible tragedy at Summerland, which I understand is now the subject of a public inquiry.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: But am I to understand that the material, which everybody agrees was inflammable, has now been prohibited for use in public buildings?

BARONESS YOUNG: My Lords, I cannot comment on anything which is connected with that disaster. I said in my previous answer that plastic materials are the subject of building regulations.

LORD AVEBURY: My Lords, while not wishing to comment on the particular case to which the noble Baroness has referred, does the Minister not consider that it would be in the interests of the people of the Isle of Man if the building

me repeat that all necessary security emergency and monitoring services are being fully maintained so that there is no risk.

It would be inappropriate for me to comment on the incident itself. I would refer the right hon. Gentleman to a reply I gave to the hon. Member for Shoreditch and Finsbury (Mr. Ronald Brown). There will be a report in due course from the nuclear inspectorate which will be considered when it is received. But it would not be appropriate to comment upon the incident while the investigation is proceeding.

#### MIDDLE EAST

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home):** With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the Middle East.

The House will know that the Security Council passed a resolution last night calling for an immediate end to the fighting in the Middle East; for the immediate implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts; and for immediate and concurrent negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the area. Hon. Members on all sides of the House will, I am sure, welcome the news without reserve.

As I told the House last week, all our diplomatic efforts have been directed towards achieving a cease-fire and a full settlement. I have been in close touch with the parties to the conflict, with the Americans and the Russians, and with our European allies during these anxious days. I cannot be absolutely sure of the position, as I speak now, but the indications at present are that the Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian Governments will accept the terms of the Security Council resolution, which calls for a cease-fire by 6 p.m. today London time; and I have just heard before I came into the Chamber that President Sadat has given orders for the cease-fire to be observed at the time fixed. The Israeli Government has issued a similar statement. Each party's acceptance is of course contingent on the acceptance by the others. The attitude of Syria is still

obscure. Hon. Members will I am sure join with me in appealing to the parties scrupulously to observe the Security Council's call for an end to the fighting.

As the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations said in the Security Council last night, we realise that the road to a settlement will not be easy. This time the momentum towards peace must not be allowed to slacken. As I assured the House last week, we remain ready in this country to contribute in any way we can both to making the peace and to keeping it. I believe that the international community should and will have a part to play in providing guarantees. We will help in this if required to do so to the extent of providing a part of a peace-keeping force.

Dr. Kissinger's present intention is to stop briefly in London on his way back to America from Moscow and Tel Aviv. Obviously his programme is liable to change, but if he is able to stick to his plan I shall see him later tonight and will be able to discuss this and other matters with him.

We are at the beginning of a long and complicated process but the opportunity for a real peace does now exist. I shall continue to keep the House informed.

**Mr. Callaghan:** We join the Foreign Secretary in welcoming what seems to be the end of hostilities for the time being and we express, too, the fervent hope that this will be the beginning of a genuine peace. The

"immediate implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts"

is as ambiguous a phrase as could be adduced at present. I recognise that it is probably the Americans and the Russians who have played the major part in getting the resolution together, but do the words

"immediate and concurrent negotiations between the parties concerned"

mean in the Foreign Secretary's understanding that there will be direct discussions between Israel and Egypt, which has always seemed to be an essential part of the negotiations?

Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman raise with Dr. Kissinger when he comes to London this evening whether Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev have discussed the future of the Palestinians, because I noticed that the resolution was

[MR. CALLAGHAN.]

silent about that and I have heard nothing about that particular matter.

Thirdly, it is my preliminary estimation that there would be no difficulty in any part of the House in accepting the right hon. Gentleman's view that Britain should help to provide part of a peace-keeping force if conducted under United Nations' auspices and there is general agreement to it. If this were one of the ways of achieving a peaceful settlement, we would want to play our part.

Can the Foreign Secretary, either now or later, report to the House after his conversation with Dr. Kissinger what he understands to be the future of our oil supplies?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** The implications for the United Kingdom of the decision by the Arab producers to reduce oil production are not clear. As I told the House last week, there is no indication that the restrictions which are being talked about are specifically directed against this country. Nevertheless, we could be affected, and the Government are naturally reviewing the contingency arrangements to deal with any situation in which our supplies might be significantly reduced.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry will keep the House informed on this matter and on the situation as it develops. But it is not at the moment clear. In the meantime, it makes good sense for all consumers to see what they can do to economise by cutting non-essential use of fuel. I shall discuss this with Dr. Kissinger to see whether he knows more.

It is true that interpretation of Resolution 242 has been the centre of difficulty all the time. I should not like to anticipate now the discussions, but I am sure that demilitarised zones, to provide a buffer of security for all the countries, must be part of the settlement.

Will these be direct discussions between the parties? That, as the right hon. Gentleman truly says, has been the difficulty up till now. I hope there will be direct discussions, but I am sure they will have to have help.

The Palestinian problem must be part of a final settlement—otherwise, of course, the settlement would not stick.

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**Sir D. Dodds-Parker:** Can the Foreign Secretary say whether any progress has been made in the Council of Ministers towards a European underwriting of any final settlement?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** The Middle East experts of the European countries of the Nine are meeting today to discuss the matter. There has been a pretty good unanimity in the Council that the European countries would help in peace-keeping if that proved to be necessary.

**Mr. Thorpe:** The Foreign Secretary will be aware that there will be worldwide relief that the fighting is likely to stop. Since the cease-fire is conditional upon general acceptance by all concerned, and since Syria and Iraq have not yet expressed their view—and, indeed, Syria has never accepted Resolution 242—will the Foreign Secretary bear in mind, and put to Dr. Kissinger, that, in the event of there not being acceptance from that quarter, there might none the less be a cease-fire on the Egyptian and the Israeli front in Sinai, even in default of the other?

Since it is generally accepted that Resolution 242 was accepted because it meant different things to different people, should there be ambiguity whether talks and withdrawal are to be immediately concurrent, would the right hon. Gentleman consider what sort of machinery ought to exist, possibly under the Secretary-General's chairmanship, to try to remove ambiguities which could cause the cease-fire to be ended with one or either side claiming that it had not been honoured?

Finally, although this move for a cease-fire was clearly on the initiative of the super-Powers, would the right hon. Gentleman confirm that if anyone had any doubts of the necessity for a world forum such as United Nations, the events of the last 24 hours have proved it?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** Any settlement must be under the broad umbrella of the United Nations and the Secretary-General will, I think, have to take a part, and would want to do so. On the right hon. Gentleman's first question whether, if Iraq stood out alone, let us say, she could be in a position to stop the process of the cease-fire and negotiations, one has to remember that Iraq

never did, since 1948, accept any cease-fire. In the documents, although I hope to know more about this tonight, the word "reciprocity" is used about relations between the Israelis and Egyptians, for example, and the Israelis and the Jordanians, and so it is possible that we might have a cease-fire on one or two fronts even if Iraq stood out.

**Mr. Biggs-Davison:** Would it be true to say that this conflict may have brought nearer the achievement of a common foreign policy between the nine members of the EEC?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** I hope that that would be so. They are completely agreed now on the arms policy which they are pursuing and which will have to be reviewed, just as we review ours. We are completely united on that. I think they are united, too, that, when it appears how Europe could help in the Middle East, it would be willing to do so.

**Mr. Mayhew:** The Foreign Secretary will recall that the needs of the Palestinians form part of Resolution 242. Will he assure us that he recognises that in the weeks ahead, if a settlement is to be lasting, some generous restitution needs to be made to the Palestinians, not only by the Israelis but with the help of other countries, including Britain?

May I suggest also that recent events present a considerable justification of the policy which the right hon. Gentleman laid down in Harrogate and the decisions that he has taken since?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** One can only hope that in this situation any contribution one makes is helpful to somebody. It is not an easy job to find the right policy in this kind of situation. I hope that Harrogate was one contribution that may be useful.

The question of the Palestinians must clearly form part of a complete and long-term settlement. I hope that we shall not become too euphoric at this moment because there are many difficulties in the way. One step at a time is perhaps enough.

**Mr. Finsberg:** At the end of his statement, my right hon. Friend said that Britain would be prepared, if necessary, to contribute to any international peace force. Would he make it clear to the

House that, if we are prepared to contribute to such a force, that force may not be withdrawn at the whim of one side or the other?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** After the performance of the last Secretary-General of the United Nations, that would have to be a condition.

**Mr. Frank Allaun:** In reaching a settlement, will the British Government take the initiative among the Big Four to stop all future arms supplies to both sides? Secondly, would the Foreign Secretary agree that, although a few days ago it looked as if this were going to be a fatal blow to the détente, if a cease-fire takes place it may well be that we are much nearer a détente and world peace than we were before the whole business started?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** I echo profoundly the hope expressed by the hon. Gentleman in the last part of his question. As to stopping all arms to the area, if there is to be peace arms will have to be strictly rationed or stopped. This is a matter about which I shall be talking to Dr. Kissinger. I do not know as yet how far the Russians and the Americans have taken this question of limitation of arms into the area.

**Mr. Crouch:** The whole House will want to congratulate my right hon. Friend on having kept his cool in the last few days, whether or not there has been agreement with the decision that he made and recommended to the Government. However, it is one thing for the super-Powers to take decisions to help to bring about a cease-fire, but will he see that the recent decision that the Government made to apply an arms embargo is equally used to influence an effective peace settlement?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** If we are realistic, this had to start with the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The process of peace-making has just begun, and no more than that. I must underline that. As I have said, arms limitations or an embargo will have to be part of a permanent settlement.

**Mr. Timm:** Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the interests of the Palestinian Arabs cannot be adequately protected without their participation in

[MR. TINN.] any discussions leading to a peace settlement? Would it not be the height of hypocrisy for the world, which has often condemned the actions of the Palestinian Arabs in seeking to draw attention to their grievances, if the negotiations were allowed to take place over their heads?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Yes, Sir. I take note of what the hon. Gentleman said and recognise the importance of this question. I think we ought not to try to define too closely today how much will be settled and how soon.

Mrs. Sally Oppenheim: While accepting that an international arms embargo is obviously an important and contributory factor to world peace, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend can say in what respect the influence of the United States and of Russia in the peace negotiations has been diminished by the fact that they have supplied arms, and what key rôle do we expect to play as a result?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: In response to my hon. Friend, I would say that the Russians and the Americans have been the main suppliers in the area, but the situation gradually built up into a war. The situation which we want to create is one in which arms will play a smaller and smaller part, and in which we can move towards peace. This limitation or embargo may help, and we certainly hope that it will do so.

Dr. Dickson-Mahon: If the Foreign Secretary agrees that the peacemakers in Moscow have done a great job, will he make sure that Dr. Kissinger is tonight congratulated on his award of the Nobel Peace Prize? There is a report—I hope a scurrilous report and quite unfounded—that the British Government have so far failed to congratulate him.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have already congratulated him, but I have no objection to congratulating him twice.

Mr. Fidler: Will my right hon. Friend accept the great feeling of relief on all sides of the House, and throughout the country, at the prospect of a cease-fire at 6 p.m. this evening with no further loss of life, and the prospect of both sides—Israel and her Arab neighbours—coming into direct negotiation? In addition, may

I ask my right hon. Friend, in line with his non-intervention policy announced last week, which *inter alia* denied spare parts and arms to Israel, the victims of aggression, what steps he proposes to take, either in conjunction with his own friends or with his European partners, to ensure that no special loans are raised in the City of London directly to assist Egypt and Syria in the purchase of arms, as might be indicated by the proposed loan through Morgan Grenfell for Abu Dhabi, which is supplying such money to them?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: As I understand it, commercial transactions by banks or companies of any kind are carried out within the rules laid down by the Bank of England or by the Economic Departments or the Treasury, and are not the concern of the Foreign Office.

Mr. Harold Wilson: While joining in the warm welcome which my right hon. Friend and other right hon. Members have given—above all, because of the terrible casualties between Arab and Jew until the cease-fire could be achieved—may I put these questions to the right hon. Gentleman? First, on my right hon. Friend's point about negotiations, will the right hon. Gentleman share our pleasure that while, as all of us agreed last week, Resolution No. 242 was capable of different interpretations, there are now to be negotiations, which I hope, speaking for myself, will be direct negotiations at the appropriate time? Will he confirm that the Israel Government have for years pressed for direct negotiations which, indeed, I called for at the end of my speech last week? Secondly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on the question of the Palestinians, we on this side of the House—and I think it is true of the right hon. Gentleman—have always emphasised that no settlement, whether a comprehensive settlement or even just a local and limited one, as was proposed by the Americans for the Suez Canal, is possible or lasting without a generous provision for the Palestinians, which I myself have reason to believe was available if direct negotiations could have occurred before this tragic fight?

Thirdly, since one of the requirements of Resolution No. 242 is secure and defensible frontiers, and since these can be assisted by internationally effective

guarantees, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in what he said last week and again today he will have our full support for international forces, with indeed the participation of British forces, if this is considered necessary and helpful, provided, as my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman said, and as I said last week, that they cannot be withdrawn at the moment of danger on the initiative of any of the parties? Finally, will he confirm that if peace has been secured and this ghastly murderous duel has been ended, it has been ended, as we forecast last week, by the wisdom of the duellists' seconds and by nobody else?

**Sir Alec Douglas-Home:** The duellists' seconds, as the right hon. Gentleman put it in that way, have been supplying each side with arms and the situation was gradually aggravated to a point where there was a war. I hope, with him, that we are indeed approaching the organisation of a lasting peace.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about direct negotiations. I cannot, of course, reply on behalf of Israel or the Arab nations. Direct negotiations after the war are best, but if they cannot come to direct negotiations, then others must put themselves in a position to help. I am quite sure that the question of the Palestinians must be part of a final settlement and that, as I said just now, such a settlement will not stick unless it is. On secure and defensible frontiers, I am pretty certain, as I said just now, that there will have to be buffer zones, demilitarised zones. How they will be policed is a matter for discussion. What is quite certain is that if there is an international force involved it must not be withdrawn by one side or the other.

#### CLERK OF THE HOUSE (RESIGNATION)

**Mr. Speaker:** I have two statements to make to the House. I have to inform the House that I have received a letter from the Clerk of the House in the following terms:

"I write in accordance with custom to let you know that I wish to resign my position as Clerk of the House at the end of this year. On 31st December I shall have completed exactly forty-three years in the service of the Commons including twelve years as the Clerk, when I had the honour of presiding in the House on five occasions during the election of the Speaker.

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Throughout these years my work has been made lighter by the help of many colleagues and especially by the kindly tolerance of the Chair and of Members of all parties. For that help and kindness I shall always be deeply grateful."

**The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. James Prior):** I am sure that the whole House will wish to pay tribute to the distinguished service that the Clerk has given, but there will be an opportunity to express our thanks on a motion at a later date. I suggest, therefore, that this afternoon we follow precedent and reserve our remarks for that occasion.

**Mr. Harold Wilson:** I, too, am assuming that there will be another opportunity of paying tribute to one who has served this House faithfully in many capacities—most of all as Clerk of the House—and to express the hope that the views of the House, not only of Front Benchers but of hon. Members in all parts of the House, will be sought before a successor is appointed.

**Mr. Speaker:** With regard to that, I think it is important that I should deal with that point—and the reason will become apparent from the second statement that I shall make. Although I gather that it is not in accordance with precedent for it to be announced in the House, I think that this is a matter of which the House should be informed. I am glad to say that the Queen has approved the Prime Minister's recommendation, made after consultation with me, that Mr. D. W. S. Lidderdale should succeed Sir Barnett Cocks as Clerk of the House of Commons.

#### HOUSE OF COMMONS (ADMINISTRATION)

**Mr. Speaker:** If I may now make my second statement, the arrangements for organising and staffing the administration of the House of Commons have grown up over a very long period. It has become increasingly clear in recent years that they are in some ways ill-fitted for providing the House with a thoroughly efficient and effective service. The features of those arrangements which are currently causing concern include:

A feeling which appears to be fairly widespread among Members that there

# תקן להחלטות ב - תלם

① Sra Donald Matland (25.10.73) חתמה

② House of Lords חתמה House of Lords חתמה  
 ③ Commons חתמה Commons חתמה

④ (24.10) חתמה (24.10) חתמה

← קבוצת אירואה ק

אסמבר

ה'ק ז'ט'ני' B

ממשרד לונדון

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המשרד

קומיי.

1 1

פגישת ש"ח-שגבריסטניה לבקשה השגריר.

לדוידג' פתח בבקשה להתייחס לביקורת החמורה על האסמברגו. תירץ אותו כהחלטה פוליטית העולה בקנה אחד עם קריאתם להפסקת המלחמה. סר אלק היה משוכנע כי תהיה לאסמברגו השפעה fairly equal על כל הצדדים. גם מצרים טוענת <sup>ל</sup>שאי אפשר לסמוך על הבריטים כמספקים אמינים. בריטניה ציפתה למהלומה מהירה של ישראל ולא העלתה על דעתה ואף לא אמרו לה כי עצם קיומה היה בסכנה. בריטניה מקווה כי ישראל לא תחשוב אותה לעוינת. בריטניה מוסיפה לומר ש ירידות, אך יש אינטרסים שונים. היא רוצה <sup>ל</sup>לדגש בגבולות ברי-הגנה. לדוידג' ביקש גם לשמוע על ההפתחיות ביסמה האחרונה ואיך אנו מתארים לעצמנו המכניזם שנוצר עם קבלת החלטה מועבי"ט 338.

בן-מלך

ש"ח הגיב בציינו כי בריטניה מסלה עצמה מלשחק תפקיד משמעותי בסוביה שלפנינו שכן נקטה במדיניות לאוטית על חשבון הפקידה הבינ"ל. אם הנפס היה בראש הדאגות, הרי שהתחמלה כל אפשרות של קיום equidistance בין הצדדים. השמעה בריטניה על ישראל נמצאת בשפל, ועובדה זו אינה קשורה כלל לשיקול אם הייתה לאסמברגו משמעות צבאית זו או אחרת. כאשר לא קבלנו את אשר הזמנו ברגע שבו זה היה נחוץ יותר מאי פעם הרי שאבד האמון. ~~לא הייתה שום בחירה על פי חל האסמברגו ועל מי לא ואין שום ספק כי הערכים לא זו כלבו שלא נפגעו~~ <sup>ל</sup>שכן אספקתם הרבה לא באה מבריטניה אלא מהאסמברגו לא חל על הפריפריה הערבית שממנה יכלו בדרך זו מצרים וסוריה לקבל כל טוב. להתנהגות זו הייתה תוצאה

Характер

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

- 2 -

הרסנית (devastating) על יחסינו. לדבר היחה משמעות החורגת אף מהיחסים  
 הביטחוניים שכן מעמד באירופה משפיע גם על אחרים. השר רושם לפניו הסברי  
 השגריר אולם אין בידהם כדי לשנות במאומה את משקל ה-  
 distrust and pain שהותירו כאן. השר ביקר קשות את ההצהרות הבריטיות שלאחר ה-6 באוקטובר.  
 ההתחמקות מזיהוי החוקפן עומדת בסתירה אף למה שאמר השר, בתגובה ראש האופוזיציה  
 ב-24.5.1967 כאשר קבע כי ההסגר הימי המצרי דאז היווה אקט חוקפני. הפעם נעדרה  
 כל סולידיות מערבית מהצהרות דוברי בריטניה, אשר יצרו לעצמם עמדת ביניים בין  
 ארצות חברית וברה"מ, עמדה שעוררה indignant views אף בארה"ב שבאו  
 להפגין. שה"ח שוחח על כך עם קיסטנבר וחתיר לו להמחיש לסר אלק את רגשות  
 ישראל בסוגיה זו ובמילים שלו.  
 הנישוח הבריטיות גם אינן מציאותיות וזאת בנוסף על חוסר קבילותן על ידינו.  
 הנה התנבא סר אלק ב-16.10 כי

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are going to be in  
 a position to take a peace initiative.

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- 4 -

המכת בין צדדים אל לו לנזק חכניות. לחכניה מיוחסת לו ע"י לואט הרן אין  
 כל שחר. הוא מקרה שישראל ומצרים יגישו נגירות בבוא הזמן. ברור שלטעמים  
 2 ו-3 שני מחברים נכדאי לציין שהרוסים אשר בעסקה המוסקבאית מכאן כי בטלו אח  
 242 בגלל אי-בהירות המאפשרת לישראל לקרוא כפי שהיא רוצה, המכירה עכשו  
 להפלה המושג על מרושמים וללא איזכור מפורש של הנסיכה ויזניה. מאידך סעיף  
 3 חנו נאחז אמריקני-ישראלי ואין טעם לרונן עתה בכעיות עיתורי דקדויות כפן  
 2-3-2

לשאלת השגריר אם המונה "בחסות נאותה" מרושו ארה"ב גרוסיה ענה השר כי סביר  
 הוא שזהו המרושמן מכל מקום עם כבוד אין קביעת מספרים. אין להניח שהכורונה  
 לאו"ם ולפרוצדורה שהכשילה אח יארינג. לשאלת השגריר על הבאות הסעים השר שאם  
 הנסח המסמך האש למשך שבועות אפשר יהיה גלוי לגשת ללוב המסמך מגעים והוא  
 משער כי הנסמך עתיד להיעשות בנובמבר, אולי בנוי-יורק אם כי אין מסמך  
 מיוחד לבעיות הכאן.

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24.10.73

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שגרירות ישראל  
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ט"ז באב תשל"ג,  
14 באוגוסט 1973.

מח/א/ב

אל: אירופה ב',  
מאת: ע. זאב סופות.

הנדון: הצבעת בריטניה במועבי"ט -  
הפגישה עם מזכיר המדינה לוויילס.

בהמשך למכתבנו בנדון מיום 13.8.73, אני מצרף  
כאן הודעה לעתונות של ועד שליחי הקהילות ובה  
ההודעה הרשמית של מזכיר המדינה לוויילס על המדיניות  
הבריטית.

בברכה,

מ.א.

העתק: השגריר,  
הציר.

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The  
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PRESS RELEASE

Date 12th August 1973

On Thursday 9th August 1973, The Rt. Hon. Peter Thomas, Q.C., M.P., (who is the Secretary of State for Wales, met at the home of Cllr. Rosa Freedman certain prominent members of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, who are his constituents.

They wished to discuss the deep anxiety felt by the local Jewish community about apparent changes in the British Government's policy concerning the Middle East situation in general, and in particular the re-interpretation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.

The deputation, in addition to Cllr. Rosa Freedman, who is herself a Deputy, consisted of:

- Dr. J. Braude - President Adath Yeshurun Synagogue; Member of the Board of Deputies Executive Committee
- Mr Alfred A. Dunitz J.P. - Board of Management, Hendon Synagogue
- Harold S. Langdon - Vice-President, Reform Synagogues of Gt. Britain
- S.S. Levin - Vice-President, United Synagogue
- Sidney L. Shipton - General Secretary of the Zionist Federation  
Vice-Chairman, British Section, World Jewish Congress.

As a result of the discussion, Mr. Peter Thomas issued the following Statement on the next day:-

" There has been no change of any kind in the Government's policy on the Arab/Israel dispute. We stated this categorically when we cast our vote on 26 July 1973.

" Our policy remains firmly based on the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. This resolution does not call for Israel's  
/ withdrawal

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
12th August 1973

Press Release cont./

... withdrawal from every inch of the territories she occupied in 1967 and there is no suggestion in our minds that Israel should withdraw in advance of an overall settlement.

" We believe that if a settlement is to be reached there must at some point be negotiations between the parties and it must obviously provide for Israel's security. "

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The deputation was well satisfied with the constructive character of the discussion.



MATTERS OF JEWISH INTEREST: CONFRONTATION WITH PETER THOMAS

LONDON, August 13th. (JTA)

A confrontation took place between Peter Thomas, QC, MP, Conservative Member of Parliament for South Hendon and Secretary of State for Wales and a group of his constituents, including leading members of the Board of Deputies. The meeting took place at the initiative of the constituents who wished to discuss the apparent changes in the attitude of the British Government to the Middle East situation, which had caused deep anxiety to British Jews. Among those present were Councillor Rosa Freedman, in whose home the meeting took place, Dr. Jacob Braude, Alfred A. Dunitz, Harold S. Langdon, S.S. Levin, and Sidney L. Shipton.

As a result of the discussion the Minister issued the following statement next day:

"There has been no change of any kind in the Government's policy on the Arab-Israel dispute. We stated this categorically when we cast our vote on the 26th July, 1973. Our policy remains firmly based on the Security Council resolution 242. This resolution does not call for Israel's withdrawal from every inch of the territories she occupied in 1967, and there is no suggestion in our minds that Israel should withdraw in advance of an overall settlement. We believe that if a settlement is to be reached there must be at some point negotiations between the parties and it must obviously provide for Israel's security."

A spokesman for the group that had met Mr. Thomas told the JTA: "We are well satisfied with the constructive character of the discussion with Mr. Thomas."

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
2 PALACE GREEN,  
LONDON, W8, 4QB.  
TEL: 01-937 8091



ש מ ו ר

שגרירות ישראל  
לונדון

ט"ו באב תשל"ג,  
13 באוגוסט 1973.

אל: אירופה ב',  
מאת: ע. זאב סופות.

הנדון: ההצבעה הבריתית במוע"ביט -  
פניות לחברי ביה"ן בעלי השם

בהמשך למכתבנו בנדון מיום 8.8.73, נתקיימה הפגישה עם מר פטר  
הומס, מזכיר המדינה לוויילס. מר תומס קבל הדרכה בפוראוף ובא לפגישה  
מצוייד בתיק עבה ובסכום המדיניות הבריטית שהוכן בשבילו בפוראוף.  
מתוכו הקריא קטעים לאנשי שיחו. לפי קטעים אלה דבקה ממבריתניה ל-242,  
לא תתמוך ומעולם לא תמכה בקריאה לישראל לפנות את כל השטחים ואינה  
תומכת ולא תתמוך בקריאה לישראל לפנות שטחים לפני הסדר שלום. דברים  
אלה הוא מוכן לפרסם בהודעה לבוחריו באיזור בחירתו, אך ביקש קודם  
להתייעץ בפוראוף על כך.

חוששני שלא ידעו אנשי שיחו לעמוד על הסתירה שבין הרוגייט, קטעים מסויימים בנאומו קראו ותמיכתם בהצעת ההחלטה הנ"ל במועביט לבין מו"מ חפשי בין הצדדים וללא תנאים קודמים או תכתיבים, ולא ידעו לעמוד בתוקף על הסטיות מ-242 שבהצעת ההחלטה במוע"ביט. ברור כי נקודות אלו הובהרו להם קודם השכם והערב, ובידיהם היה הנייר המצורף שהוכן ע"י השגריר. אך התרשמותי מהדו"ח ששמעתי מפיהם על השיחה היא כי התמוגגו מרוב נחת מדברי אהדתו של תומס, הזכרת תמיכתו הנלהבת בישראל ב-1956 וב-1967, ומתכן סכום הפוראוף שהקריא להם.

עוד תחיימנה שיחות דומות, בין היתר עם ג'ון גורסט ומרגרט תצ'ר.  
הדגשתי את הנקודות העיקריות שיש לעמוד עליהן בשיחות אלו, ומכנסים  
את הפעילים לפגישה מיוחדת ביום 14.8.73 כדי להבהיר להם את נקודות  
הסיוע. הצעתי לרכז את המאמצים בחברי ביה"ן בעלי השפעה או מהלכים  
במשלה או בשמרנים באיזורי בחירה שוליים.

בברכה,

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THE SECRETARY OF THE  
TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
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ה'תש"ח  
ב' כסלו

ה'תש"ח  
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242  
ד' באב תשל"ב  
5 באוגוסט 1973

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טורי

אל : עודד ערן, לונדון

מאח זי. ענוג

הנדון: שיחה עם שגב ריטניה על מועבי"ט

השגריר בא בלוויית היועץ ומצוייד, באותו נייר שעל הכנתו דיווחת. דיברתי בקצרה על נקודות המחלוקת הרבה, שכן הן הובאו לידיעתם מעמים אין ספור ובצורה המציתת ובהירה על ידי מזכר קומי (שהעתקו הועבר על ידי מר לוריא למחלקה זו).

האובותיו היו חסרות ענין ובתכנון, והרצאתן היתה חסרת ברק ואולי אף שנוע עצמי. יציבותה של עמדת בריטניה מ-1967, מ-242 ועד להרובייט, מהרובייט העיירה, ועד למועבי"ט - אינה נישנת להוכחה, קלה להתקפה, אך קשה לקבל סיפוק רשמי מאיש שיחה אנגלי רשמי בנידון. בין הדברים, שהשגריר הבריטי חוזר עליהם בצורה מרביזה (מבלי לחוש בזה) שאבקש להזכיר מן השיחה האחרונה, הופיע שוב ההיתר הבריטי לישראל להתקיים. אמרתי לו, כי זה כבר לא אקטואלי, אבל השתמשתי בסוף מחון ככל האפשר, כי היחסים המאפשרים דו-שיחה אינם צריכים לסבול.

בהסתמכי על מאמר סטיוונס ב"אובסרבר" שבו ראינו כאן השפעת דוברי הפוראום - נבעתי בקלות ביחסי ארה"ב בריטניה. הוא טען נמרצות שהוכח לו שאין כאן הדלפה רשמית, שהעמדה כתב את אשר כתב על דעתו. ניהא. כאשר דיבר על החזית של 13 המדינות, גרסתי שבכל זאת חסרה בריטניה המרשימה אותה מדינה האחת, שבידיה הכלים לעשות משתו למען המצב - בעוד שכומר זה איננו אצל האחרים. לא הרחקתי לכת בפרובוקציה. איש שיחה אפאטי וחסר מידע איננו נוח לפולמוס. השיחה ארכה שעה וחצי ומיטב כשרוני הצנוע הוקדש להמחשת הקרירות שעשויה להשתרר לחון יחסינו ולפגוע באחד הנכסים העיקריים שלהם: האפשרות להיות גלויי לב, הדדית. אינני חושב שהוא מתעלם מן האספקט אחד. הייתי אפילו אומר שכל העסק לא נוח לו; הוסיף, אישית, שהוא מצטער על מה שקרה בניו יורק, לדיווחיו כנראה טובים, אולם נתקלים במגמתיות פרו ערבית, צינית למדי, חסרת אחריות בינלאומית - אך משתלמת לפחות זמנית, למדיניות החדשה של המוריין אופיס.

הסבריו - שהם עשו הכל למען הקונסנזוס, שהדבר הוכשל (רמז) על ידי האמריקנים - אינם משכנעים. אולם הוא אמר, כי הבריטים קבלו בהתחלה התהליך עצמנו לא לקפוץ לראש החור אלא שהאמריקנים איתרו מועד ההידברות והמצב חייבם לפעולה.

השיחה היתה נהוצה, דו"ח מפורט עליה ודאי כבר נתקבל שם, שכן היועץ רשם; היא לא תעזור הרבה, שכן המצב סבור למדי, אך בודאי לא חזיק.

ב ב ר כ ה

י. ענוג

העתק: מר א. לוריא

OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., APRIL 4, 1968.

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF THE REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, DATED APRIL 10, 1968, AND TO STATE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE RESULTS OF THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., APRIL 4, 1968.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., APRIL 4, 1968, WAS THE RESULT OF A CONSPIRACY WHICH INVOLVED THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING THE LATE DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THAT THE CONSPIRACY WAS THE RESULT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, A GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS A SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

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Confidential

22 July 1973.

(Dear Tony)

Since we spoke on the telephone yesterday about the current Security Council debate on the Middle East, I have received the draft resolution drawn up by non-aligned Council members. We reject the text as a whole, and it cannot serve as a basis for discussion with us. Among our specific objections are the following:

- (a) The resolution introduces the concept of "the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people" which is not contained in Resolution 242. Moreover, in the Arab mind this expression denotes the demand of the Palestinian organisations for the liquidation of the State of Israel and its replacement by a Palestinian Arab State.
- (b) The fourth preambular paragraph falsifies the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Security Council resolutions taken under Chapter VI, like 242, are recommendations; only resolutions under Chapter VII are mandatory.
- (c) Operative paragraph 2 is a completely false statement. Israel occupation of territories does not contravene the Charter, nor any Security Council resolution. On the contrary, the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 established cease-fire lines without calling for withdrawal, while Resolution 242 makes withdrawal from "occupied territories" one of the elements of a peace settlement.
- (d) Operative paragraph 3 could be regarded as implying that under Resolution 242 Israel was obliged to withdraw to the old international border, which would then become the "secure and recognised boundary" between Israel and Egypt. We reject any such interpretation, and maintain that the territorial aspect of an Israel-Egyptian peace settlement is a matter for negotiation and agreement between the parties. As I told you yesterday, if the Security Council were to give approval to the old international border, either directly or through endorsing the Garring Memorandum of February 1971, the Israel Government would be obliged to declare that Security Council Resolution 242 had ceased to be an agreed basis, since it had been made subject to an interpretation that had not been agreed. I would repeat that we would regard this result as regrettable, for in spite of the lack of progress in the past, we have always considered that when the conditions were

22 July 1973.

suitable for negotiations, there would be value in having a textual consensus agreed upon in advance.

Another serious aspect of this draft resolution is that its adoption would frustrate the proposal that the Secretary-General should visit the area. Even if it failed to be adopted (either because it lacked a majority or because it was vetoed), the debate on so controversial and partisan a proposal would create an atmosphere unsuitable for the proposed visit.

We would urge your Government to reject this draft, and <sup>T</sup>persevere in the efforts to obtain a consensus that would not go beyond reaffirming Resolution 242 and taking favourable note of the Secretary-General's intention to visit the area. He would then be free to come out under his own independent authority and not under a Security Council mandate or under a duty to report back to the Council.

(Yours sincerely,

Michael *Quinn*

Mr. A.D. Parsons,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
Downing Street West,  
London, S.W. 1.

Verbal message telephoned by Amb. Comay  
To A. Parsons of F.O. on 21:7:73

In view of disturbing indications concerning the kind of draft resolution that might be submitted to the Security Council in the current Middle East debate, and the attitude the United Kingdom delegation may take towards it, I have been instructed to clarify the position of my Government.

If a resolution is adopted which gives any approval to the old Egyptian-Palestine international border or to the Garring Memorandum of February 1971, this would necessitate an Israel statement that Security Council Resolution 242 has ceased to be an agreed basis for an agreement between Israel and neighbouring States, since there have been added to it interpretations that have not been agreed upon. This result would be regrettable, for in spite of the lack of progress in the past, we have always considered that when the conditions were suitable for negotiations, there would be value in having a textual consensus agreed upon in advance. It may be that the vote of the United States would obviate the above situation arising. But the British Government should be aware of the possible results if the attitude expressed by Mr. Gore-Booth to Mr. Eran of our Embassy should be pursued, and we have, therefore, felt obliged to make the position clear.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
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LONDON, W8, 4QB.  
TEL: 01-937 8091

מ"ר צניל  
סגרירות ישראל  
לונדון

כה' בתמוז תשלג'  
25 ביולי 1973

אל : מר א. לוריא, יועץ לשה"ח  
מר מ. קדרון, סמנכ"ל

מאח: השגריר לונדון

מצ"ב לידיעתכם:

א. הדברים שמסרתי טלפונית לפארסונס  
מהפוראופ בשבת בבקר 21.7.73.

ב. העתק מכחבי לפארסונס ביום א' 22.7.73.

בברכה,  
מ. קומיי

העתק: מר י. חקוע



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- - - - -

Confidential

22 July 1973.

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(b) The fourth preambular paragraph falsifies the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Security Council resolutions taken under Chapter VI, like 242, are recommendations; only resolutions under Chapter VII are mandatory.

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22 July 1973.

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We would urge your Government to reject this draft, and <sup>to</sup> persevere in the efforts to obtain a consensus that would not go beyond reaffirming Resolution 242 and taking favourable note of the Secretary-General's intention to visit the area. He would then be free to come out under his own independent authority and not under a Security Council mandate or under a duty to report back to the Council.

(Yours sincerely,

Michael *Lowery*

Mr. A.D. Parsons,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
Downing Street West,  
London, S.W. 1.



Subhead A (3) of the Civil Accommodation Services etc. United Kingdom Vote 1973-74 Class VI. 7.

**Hyde Road and Wenlock Way,  
Manchester**

Mr. Kaufman asked the Secretary of State for the Environment (1) whether, in view of the special hazards on this heavily used main road, he will authorise the siting of a pelican crossing on Hyde Road, Manchester, where it is adjacent to Stowell Street;

(2) whether, in view of the special danger from fast through traffic to children on their way to school, he will authorise the siting of a pelican crossing on Wenlock Way, Manchester, where it is adjacent to Galloway Road.

Mr. Speed: I will consider any proposals that might be put forward by the local highway authority.

**Road Safety (Children's Training)**

Mr. Terry Davis asked the Secretary of State for the Environment what material is made available by his Department to schools and local education authorities to assist in training children in road safety.

Mr. Peyton: I will furnish this information as soon as possible.

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
AFFAIRS**

**Nigerian Diplomatic**

Mr. Greville Janner asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he had discussions with the Nigerian Head of State during his recent visit to London concerning traffic violations by Nigerian diplomats in Great Britain; and, if so, then what was the outcome thereof.

Mr. Anthony Royle: My right hon. Friend did not discuss this matter with General Gowon.

**Middle East (UN Resolution 242)**

Mr. Clinton Davis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) if he will make a statement concerning the adjourned debate at the Security Council of the UN on the Government's attitude concerning the interpretation of Resolution 242 of 22nd

November 1967 and, in particular, as to how this differs from the interpretation placed upon the resolution by the previous Government;

(2) if the Government maintain their previously declared policy concerning Israel and the Arab States that withdrawal from territories by the Israeli Government must be preceded by negotiations, direct or indirect, between the parties to the dispute;

(3) if he will undertake that the United Kingdom delegate to the United Nations Security Council will not propose or support any proposal for the establishment of any new machinery in the peace making process as described in Resolution 242 and which is not agreed upon between the parties directly concerned;

(4) if he will give an instruction to the United Kingdom delegate at the Security Council concerning the adjourned debate on the Middle East to propose that the parties to the dispute affecting Resolution 242 should proceed to negotiations in order to seek agreement on the basis of that resolution and for the Secretary-General and his special representative to provide the parties with such assistance as may be appropriate;

(5) what is the policy of the Government concerning the proposal made initially by President Sadat of Egypt, accepted by the Israeli Government and now blocked by the Government of Egypt, that there should be an interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement whereby the Suez Canal would be reopened and Israeli forces would withdraw a certain distance from it.

Mr. Anthony Royle: The policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East remains to do whatever they can to help towards a peaceful settlement on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. This policy governs our approach towards the present Security Council debate, which we hope will bring progress towards such a settlement. Our views on how Resolution 242 might be implemented and on other aspects of the Middle East problem remain as set out in my right hon. Friend's speech at Harrogate on 31st October 1970. We should be glad to see an interim arrangement on the Suez Canal provided that it were clearly linked to an overall settlement and acceptable to the parties.