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שיחה קמ 101

910'

מדעי/מ תצלומים
ת"א 101

25/10 ? יום שישי ? [illegible]

[illegible]

29/10 יום – [illegible]

[illegible]

30/10 יום [illegible]

11/ יג – [illegible]

3/11 אול – [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

מ ט ר ד ה ח ו ץ

סיווג..... תאריך .....

אל: .....

מאת: מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל

Abbreviated Transcript

ISRAELI – EGYPTIAN MILITARY DELEGATIONS MEETING

(KM. 105 – CAIRO–SUEZ ROAD; 28 Oct. 73 – 0145 hrs to 0350 hrs)

PRESENT

FOR EGYPT	FOR ISRAEL
MAJ. GEN. ABD-EL-GHANI JIMSI	MAJ. GEN. A. YARIV
COLONEL HONAIDY	COLONEL D. SION
Mr. ISMAMY	LTC. A. SHALEV
Mr. OMAR SERY	LTC. Y. PORAT
FOR UNEF	LTC. A. TRAUB
LTC. AULIS KEMPPAINEN – FINLAND	OBSERVERS: MAJ. GEN. MAGEN
CPT. JOSEF FALLON – IRELAND	LTC. Y. BEN ARI
	LTC. D. GEDALIAH

NOTE : MAJ. GEN. YARIV'S OPENING REMARKS WERE NOT TAKEN IN ENGLISH (BY MISTAKE) AND SHOULD BE TRANSCRIBED FROM HIS TAPE-RECORD AND THE HEBREW PROTOCOL. THIS TRANSCRIPTION STARTS WITH GEN. ABDEL GHANI'S REPLY.

GHANI – We would like to reciprocate the things said by GEN. YARIV. We hope these negotiations will lead to an effective cease-fire. Before continuing – we wish to state that the cease fire has finally taken effect on 1300 hrs. today (GEN. YARIV agrees). We recognize the fact of the existence of a peace keeping UN force – between EGYPT and ISRAEL.

The cease fire, as understood by us – gives us complete freedom of supply of our forces including those east of the CANAL – food, water and medical supplies. This matter can be discussed in further details. The city of SUEZ is also to receive supplies.

I would like to speak about the general lines of the UNSC resolution 338 and 339. We have fought with valour till 22 Oct. 1852 hrs., as it ordered.

But during 23 and 24 Oct. there occured changes in positions and there was fighting after the resolution came into effect. We would like therefore to discuss the lines of a return to the ceasefire lines of 22 Oct.

.../2

The rest of the points referred to by GEN. YARIV (such as POWs lists and exchange, the return of IDF bodies, the BAB EL MANDAB blockade etc.) can be discussed, but the first step must be the implantation of UNSC resolution 338 and points evolving from it. If it is agreed - it can be discussed at any given time table - to withdraw the Israeli forces to the 22 Oct. cease fire line - than the rest of the points raised by GEN. YARIV can be discussed.

YARIV - I have no authority to discuss 22 Oct. cease fire lines. Whatever happened after 22 Oct. - was a direct result of firing by 3rd Army forces on the east bank of the CANAL. I repeat - I have no authority to discuss this.

I suggest to pass to the question of supplies. Our authorities, our P.M. - have agreed to the convoy which is now here. But I have no authorization for discussion of further convoys.

GHANI - In order to ensure a positive and constructive arrangement- ..... the supply arrangement should not be temporary. As we see it - we would like similar convoys to continue on a daily basis. Especially as the convoys carrying rations, water and medical supplies - will be under the auspices of the UNEF.

YARIV - (Agrees to discuss present convoy)

GHANI - This convoy consists of about 100 trucks with rations mainly, plus water and possibly some medical supplies. The drivers will be UN personnel.

YARIV - (Agrees - including check of contents and Israeli escort) How will the supplies get to the east bank of the CANAL, as we hold all of the west bank?

GHANI - (The approach - by 2 main roads, to SHALUFA area) Supplies to be unloaded on west bank and collected by Egyptian troops from east bank crossing by their own means (such as ferries and amphibious vehicles).

YARIV - How will this operation be supervised?

GHANI - By the UNEF.

[illegible] - If this will be agreed - supervision will be possible.

.../3

YARIV - This will mean UNEF personnel on both banks of the CANAL. Is all this well understood? It's very important that there is understanding - though there might be disagreement.

GHANI - (Suggests supplies to be brought along SUEZ road to SHALUFA airfield area and unloaded there and also at a point farther North - and shows points on his map).

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss further convoys; this will depend on other points of discussion.

GHANI - For this convoy only - it will not be satisfactory. We need daily convoys - there is no point to discuss this further .....

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss permanent arrangements. I can answer only about today's convoy. We shall have to meet again for further arrangements.

GHANI - (Hopes to receive date for meeting for a permanent arrangement).

HOSNIDY - The Egyptian delegation is fully authorised to discuss all points (Suggests Israeli delegation to have similar power - for constructive discussion).

YARIV - I have no authorization to discuss cease fire lines of 22 Oct. and permanent arrangement of supply (Hopes to be able to answer at next meeting).

(Suggests to start checking the convoy, to be brought forward to the check-post - while he consults IDF authorities).

GHANI - The convoy is at present the concernoof the UNEF, which is to supply drivers who are not yet available.

BREAK: GMN. YARIV CONSULTS WITH IDF AUTHORITIES BY TELEPHONE.

YARIV - I hope to be able to give you the timing for a meeting for discussion of further points - by noon. As for the convoy - we suggest to start it's unloading in the KUSAI area, when the UN drivers arrive.

GHANI - (Agrees; reminds again that withdrawal to 22 Oct. cease fire lines is main point for discussion).

.../4

YARIV - (Suggests to discuss meanwhile th points of POW lists and exchange; Freedom of movement in GULF of SUEZ and RED SEA; the "stand still"; local commanders arrangements).

GHANI - The withdrawal point - will open all the rest to negotiation.

YARIV - (Stresses POW's lists - as most important).

GHANI - (Suggests a schedule of negotiations should be worked out - to include discussion of POW's lists etc).

YARIV - I don't think the point of POW's lists is contigent to other points.

GHANI - (Suggests that first withdrawal to 22 Oct. cease fire lines should be discussed - and then lists of POW's).

YARIV - Would you suggest the withdrawal lines to juxtoposed to POW's lists?!

GHANI-HOMAIDY - No, no !

YARIV - Can I assume that POW's lists will be provided at next meeting?

GHANI - I hope to have them for our next meeting.

(SOME TEXT MISSING)

YARIV - What about public anouncement about the meeting?

GHANI - (Suggests - no official anouncement; to be anounced approximately: UN asked for meeting, both sided agreed, meeting took place) - YARIV AGREES.

YARIV - to KEMPPAINEN - How do you see arrangements for the convoy? UNEF personnel should be on both banks of CANAL. - KEMPPAINEN AGREES.

GHANI - The convoy is to arrive at check point exchange drivers for UNEF drivers. Supplies then to be unloaded on the western bank and collected by the Egyptian forces from the eastern bank by their own means.

HOMAIDY - The trucks are 3 tonners. There isn't much chance for the UN drivers to arrive before 6 a.m.

YARIV - Documents of UN drivers will have to be checked; (to KEMPPAINEN) - What kind of documents do they have?

KEMPPAINEN - Cyprus ID cards (YARIV AGREES)

YARIV - (Suggests convoy to be broken up into parties of 20 trucks at check point, the check to continue while checked party goes to CANAL).

.../5

BREAK; GEN. YARIV CONSULTS IDF AUTHORITIES BY PHONE

YARIV - Our authorities prefer SHALUFA as delivery point. GHANI AGREES.

KEMPPAINEN - Some of the UN drivers might not have ID cards, will you accept a UNEF officer's guarantee? YARIV AGREES.

POINT CHECKED ON MAP, AREA MARKED BY GEN. YARIV ON EGYPTIAN MAP.

YARIV - I suggest KILO 138,5 (GHANI AGREES)

UNEF officer will have to be on the opposite (east) bank, and only one boat or amphibious vehicle will be permitted to cross at one time.(AGREED).

GHANI - Local commanders should be present on the spot from both sides(AGREED).

YARIV - An additional check will be carried out by us after unloading at CANAL bank. The unloading will be done by Egyptian soldiers coming from east to west bank.

GHANI or HOWAIDY - There may be difficulties between the soldiers. We suggest the check to be made at the check point here of both unloading and checking be done by Israeli soldiers on CANAL bank.

YARIV - I suggest the unloading and checking be done of one or two trucks at a time, with separation of the soldiers. The check will be made by Israeli personnel, with UN officer present. GHANI AGREES.

YARIV - The Chief of Staff just told me about an agreement to evacuate wounded Egyptian 3rd Army personnel. We request lists of our POW's and permission for visits to them by RED CROSS representatives.

GHANI - (Hopes it can be arranged).

YARIV - (Requests search and return of bodies of Israeli soldiers; we are prepared to reciprocate).

GHANI - (Asks where bodies might be found; ANSWER - All along the CANAL and in damaged tanks and vehicles; AGREES to check, suggest to wait until UN posts established).

YARIV - (Suggests again idea of "double withdrawal" - to solve problems of cease fire lines.)

GHANI - (As withdrawal to cease fire lines of 22 Oct., according to UNSC resolution 338 is a principle - YARIV's proposal will be difficult to accept. But -

.../6

- will check it. Asks for timing for next meeting).

YARIV - We will give you an answer as early as poddible.

GERY - As for publication of the meeting - following text is proposed : "The UN suggested a meeting between Egyptian and Israeli military representatives, under the auspices of the UN. Both sides agreed, and a meeting took place".

(SOME TEXT MISSING)

KEMPPAINEN - The UN drivers will take trucks in "shifts", Egyptian soldiers for unloading will cross unarmed (GHANI AGREES). The convoys will be escorted by UN vehicles. How many Egyptian soldiers will be allowed to cross for unloading?

YARIV - One truck to be unloaded at a time, 10 soldiers will be allowed to cross (GHANI AGREES).

KEMPPAINEN - The checking will be done under supervision of UN. Israeli checking personnel to be unarmed.

YARIV - 10 soldiers from each side - both unarmed (AGREED).

GHANI - (Thanks for the meeting) The main problem - are the cease fire lines, keeping of which is the main thing for the UNEF.

YARIV - As we understand - the UNEF is to supervise the cease fire - and not to fix or keep it's lines. The problem of the cease fire lines - might be a very tough one.

GHANI - (Asks about wounded Egyptians evacuation; can they be collected by the UN or by Red Cross helicopters?)

YARIV - (Promises to check the possibility of evacuation by UN convoys).

GHANI - (Red Cross prepared to evacuate wounded by cars or helicopters - possibility to cross of overfly Israeli held territory ?!) .

YARIV - What about evacuation of our wounded POW's?

GHANI - (Explains the difference in status - being POW's).

YARIV - We are prepared to reciprocate - release wounded Egyptian POW's.

GHANI THANKS FOR MEETING AND WELCOME

First of all I would like to say I'd like to put your jackets on first.

Major General Yariv: We take the cease-fire very seriously as well as we do ascribe great importance to para 3 of U.N security council resolution 338 and we have all interest to enter as early as possible into negotiations for the what we believe for the and just peace for all the sides concerned. We feel it is very important - in order to have sound cease-fire - that we all agree to do our best to maintain the cease-fire; secondly - we think it very important to have a release of prisoners - of P O W's as early as possible. I would like to remark that we have up to now not yet received any lists of our P O W's and to the best of my knowledge we have transmitted through the Red-Cross the list of the prisoners we have from the Egyptian - armed - forces. So the first point concerning a cease-fire agreement was maintaining the cease-fire itself; The second point - as early as possible mutual release of P.O.W's and to do our best to for both sides to look and search for (miss) dead soldiers on the battle-field - to make arrangements for them; The third point - which to our mind is important - in order to have a cease-fire is the possibility to permit free navigation in the Suez - Gulf and the Red - Sea to the Bad-el - Mandeb Straights on which you are now maintaining a blokade. In addition to that, we would think it very advisable - recommended - to have arrangements made for contact between local commanders so that any possible trouble

could be avoided. Of course we see the present and of course we must find a way to determine clearly, and I think this is already on the way; the lines of the cease-fire as they are now. I would like to remark that of of course we see the present lines of cease-fire something temporary and from which we shall move as readily toward the final lines of peace to be negotiated as to para 3 of the U.N. resolution. In this

In this context we think it is very important to get as early as possible to a situation where there is a seperation between the military forces, and such a seperation will enable: A: To avoid unnecessary military clashes and will enable a mild atmosphere which is imperative and necessary for our negotiations, and secondly we understand that under the present situation in this area it is very important to let civilian life to return to take it's normal course as early as possible; whether from the agricultural point of view - you have very fertile areas in this region; whether from the point of view of the urban population in the cities along the canal - and therefore we think we propose for your consideration the following possibility - that we withdraw -- [this is a very important point so I'd let the tea and coffee arrangements take their course and then we'll return to it - with your permission General ---- I'm sorry we don't have Irish coffee I think we can continue]

So we - from the points of view I've mentioned there - necessity for the seperation of forces as early as possible, and in order to permit normal civilian activities to their course as early as possible

we want to propose to you an arrangement where by we shall withdraw our forces to the east bank of the canal and you shall withdraw your forces to the west bank of the canal, that a zone shall be established 10 kms from each side of the canal where U.N emergency force or any other U.N observer force or any other arrangement that you would prefer should prevail. And I have been ordered to propose this plan to you in all seriousness and in all earnestness for your early consideration. Now of course we ascribe great importance to everything that is concerned with the maintenance of the cease-fire, I think I have forgotten one point; I mentioned the maintenance of the cease-fire itself - a clear deffinition of what it means, I mentioned the early exchange of P.O.W's and arrangements for looking for dead bodies in both combat zones. I mentioned a free passage to the Gulf of Suez and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, I mentioned the local arrangements for contacts between commanders to avoid possible trouble; And there is another point which I have (not) forgotten to mention and this is the question of stand still. Arrangements to assure a standstill - of course under the stipulation that this whole period is a transitionary period from which we shall move as early as possible to negotiations as they are mentioned in para 3 of Security Council Resolution 338. Then we have of course the practical point of the convoy that we have agreed to pass to Suez for the town of Suez and the formations of the Third Army east of the canal; and I would be glad if you could give us details concerning the convoy

I'm very sorry that it did not take place earlier - this there was some misunderstanding - I was in this place ~~earlier~~ between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and 6 o'clock but understand that information didn't get you early enough and that you were waiting for us on km 72

- Right

- But the ~~mess~~ message we got - I think it important to put on record - the message we got through the good office of the U.S. Government was addressed by Mr, actually, General Hafez Ismail said they would meet it is understood that each would be accompanied the Egyptian Government is prepared to despatch a representative of the Egyptian Armed Forces rank of Major General to come in contact with an Israeli military representative of the same rank. It is understood that each would be ~~also~~ accompanied by an adequate number of assistants, here present, they would meet by 1500 hrs Cairo local time at km 110 so we came here, I'm sorry for all the delays but I stayed, we were waiting on the other side of the canal ~~to~~ until all the arrangements were being made and I hope that you understand that here it was purely a technical misunderstanding. So I think I have made all the points I wanted to make. I would like again to stress that we would like to utilize all the possible machinery - whether the U.N Emergency Force, whether the U.N observers in order to maitain a solid cease-fire and at the same time to move as early as possible toward practicde negotiations that could lead us on

...5

to peace. As far as the proposal is concerned that I mentioned of withdrawal - mutual withdrawal of course we understand and we want to emphasize that these lines will not be the last lines to which we withdraw, the last lines of our withdrawal are of course to be established and agreed upon in the negotiations in order to reach a just and durable peace.

We hope that the war which we have had - which was a tough war - a tough battle - which both sides have done their best and fought will enable us to move through negotiations towards peace so that we might be able to establish normal relationship between our countries and between our peoples.

Thank you very much.

תרגום

I'm sorry I'll talk in Arabic, you have here who can translate it exactly as I say it.

- אתה רוצה תרגום תרגום?

- כמובן

- תתן לזה את הנאום ...

תרגום

הצעה שהיא עניינית:

הלוא זהו אלגנץ:

היינו רוצים שהשיחה תתנהל בדרך חופשית וקונטרוקטיבית, ורצוי
שהקהל המקומי ברוחות הבמה המקדים את הצגת הסרט
המוזיקה ולא Temperament, למשל, בכתיבה שהשירה
ההרגיל לא תהיה באוטונה אלא בשיטה תלויה, האם הקהל
מסכים לכך או לא?

המקרים של תעלה - אני רוצה שהוא תמשיך כך יום יום עד
שנהיה אחד הדברים המרכזיים בעיר. כלומר לא יום אחד אלא
הדברה מתמשכת. הייתי מחבון שהשירה הקלאסי-עתיק תהיה
ואחרים ואחרים כמאות מלבד בסיס ההסכם בין שתי המערכות
ומחבון שהוא תהיה תחת הגלוי הגלוי. האם הקהל מסכים
לדברים אלה? הדבר יעמוד בפני עצמו.

על פי סעיף 44, אני תמיד כי הדרך הראשון הוא שלפנינו
על אופן הביצוע של הפעולה מול הנתמן מס' 338 ומכאן ואילך
נפיץ על הנקודות האחרות המפלגות מעניין. אם השקל מסכים
עתיד פיון הנקודה, לפי אינה יכולה עניינים ני-
דבר את נציגי הועדות הציבוריות אל אולמי יום 22, ואחר-
כך יהיה לפנינו פיון ולפני כן חייב הנקודות הללו
אחת הסופה הסופרת הינינו.

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ק: _____

זמן הקבלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

[illegible] الجانب الشرقي [illegible] نص الشعب الطيب الذي

[illegible] ستوه [illegible] الاعتداءات [illegible]

[illegible] الى ايقاف اطلاق النيران بطريقة فعالة وتحت

الى النتائج التي ترمي اليها الاجتماع بناءا على

ساتذة المجلس الجانب الاسرائيلي لتطبيق قرار مجلس الامن ٢٤٢

و ٣٣٨ بناءً على [illegible] تحت اشراف الامم المتحدة. فمن المقرر البدء بالبحث

عن ايجاد تسوية سريعة وفق الطريق الثاني. ايضا من الضروري

مع الاسف [illegible] ثانيا: ان هذا تأليف يتمثل قوات

الرقابة الدولية ووزارات الخارجية الدولية لتتخذ مركزها من القوات

المشتركة وادراكها واستمرار عملها. من المفروض ان هذا تأليف فيه كفاح

الكل جانب بالرغم قواته او ايضا سمحة قواتنا تحتل الشرقي طبقا

لمقتضاه الثاني. الى ذكرة الجدال بالتفصيلات والمياه والمواد

الغذائية. وهناقش هذه المقترحات بالتفصيل زيادة على الجدال المقدم

وكذلك المواد بخصوص السويس بالتفصيلات والمواد الغذائية وأشياء

الاساسية. المقترح الذي اشار اليه الجدال فيما يتعلق بالمقترح

يكون يتفق على الخطوط الرئيسية لتطبيق قرار مجلس الامن

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ס: _____

זמן הקפלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

لا نفهم انه القتال داخل سينا يشرف حتى يوم ٢٥ سنة ١٨٥٠

عندما وقف القتال في ذلك الوقت ، وعندنا يوم ٢٢ و ٢٣

تغيرت بعض المناطق نتيجة للقتال في الوقت الذي طلب فيه اتجاهات

اطلاعه البرلمان قد حدد بقرار من مجلس الامن رقم ٢٢٨ وعلى

ذلك نرجو ان نتفق على الخطوط التي يجب ان تعود اليها القوات

الاسرائيلية في ما كانت عليه يوم ٢٥ وبالتالي نحل كثير من المشاكل

المتعلقة التي اثارها الجزائر . النقط الاخرى التي اثارها الجزائر

كنا لا نمانع فيها اطلاقا انه نحن نتحرك مثل موضوع

الاسرى او القتلى او باب المنذب وغيره . وعلى هذا

الاساس اعتقد بشكل ان الخطوة الاولى هو ان نتفق على

اسلوب تنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن ٢٢٨ وبالتالي على النقط

الاخرى المتفرعة منه . اذا كان نتفق الجزائر بدأ بمناقشة

هذه النقط وفي اي توقيت يمكن تنفيذ انسحاب

القوات الاسرائيلية الى مناطق يوم ٢٥ وبعد ذلك يمكن

كل هذه النقط ممكن تحت وتحل بالروح الطيبة التي تسود

بيننا .

מקור הידיעה: _____ מספר הדו"ח: _____

מבוע הידיעה: _____ תאריך עבוד: _____

קובץ: _____ ת/ס: _____

זמן הקבלה: _____ תפוצה: _____

תאריך _____

[illegible]

الاداء عبد الغني - يتمنى من نسبة الاصابات عارضة ايجابية وبناءة

انه يكون ترتيب العاشة قبل الجيش على الاقل فترة الشرفة للقناة

استديو يعني ليس Temporary مؤقتة يعني انه القول الذي ما

يتحول انزياده ... وضوع حديثنا ليس حد انزياكي بل حسقو

سيكون فيتم هل هذا يأخذوه عليه الجزال ام لا

How do you see it generally?

ال Convey القوة التي ما يجب انه عارضة ويتحول تحت شرف

الاسم المتحدة الاصلية الشرقية التنا زعم انه ليتم سوريا

من ستراتيجية الاصابات التي تدور حاليا يعني ليس يوريا

واحدا وكله الصفة مستمرة خاصوصا وانه هذا القول

سيحمل تعيينات وبناء ومواد طبية مقحمة حسب الاتفاقية

بين الكلوتين وما شكوين تحت اشارات الاسم المذكورة

وبيل هذا الكلام يؤخذ عليه الجزال انه هذا يعتبر ارض

بالنسبة لنا

[illegible]

פנימי

לשכת ה־רמטכ"ל

תאריך 30 נוב 73

מס' תיק

לשכת שה"מ/מר שיבטיאל

הנדון: סגנון פעולה של הצדדים

אלופי סגני הפעולה של
הצדדים מה- 29 נוב 73

בברכה

שגיא פולק-מרן

לשכת ה־רמטכ"ל

29 לנובמבר 73

<u>שיחות הפסקת-האש עם מצרים</u>
מפגש מס. 17.

<u>כללי</u>

1. המפגש התקיים ביום ה', 29 נוב' משעה 1130 עד 1230, לאחר שדחינו ביום את המפגש שנקבע בשיחה קודמת.

2. נוכחו מטעם המצרים גנרל גמאסי, קול הוויידי ופאחמי ומר אימבראשי. מהצד הישראלי - אלוף יריב, אלוף אייל, אלמים שיאון וגירא.

3. הדיון הוקדש ברובו להפרדת הכוחות ולשמירה על הפסקת האש אולם הסתיים בקפאון בענין הפרדת הכוחות וכתוצאה לא נקבע מפגש נוסף.

<u>הפסקת-האש</u>

4. הצד הישראלי פתח הדיון בסעיף א' של ההסכם - חובת הצדדים לשמור על הפסקת-האש. הצד המצרי הפר הפסקת-האש בצורה קבועה בימים האחרונים ובעיקר ב-28.11, צלפו והרגו חיילים שלנו באיזור הפריקה של התעלה, ב-ק"מ 143-139, בגזרת איסמעליה ודרומית למחסום ב-ק"מ 101 כביש קהיר-סואץ. סמוך לתחילת המפגש ארעו תילופי יריות בין הכוחות והמצרים אף ירו על צוות משותף של או"מ, קולונל מצרי וקצין שלנו.

5. גמאסי השיב כי התערב וחקר תקריות אחמול והורה להפסיק אותן. אלוף יריב קבע כי רק בהתערבות אלוף פיקוד הדרום ובהתערבותו לא הופסקה הפריקה של האספקה לארמיה 3.

6. אלוף יריב הסתמך על נאום הנשיא סאדאת בשלושה נושאים:-

א. כאילו ישראל נוקטת שיטה של התחמקויות. בשיחות היינו גלויי לב ולא הסתרנו ולא התחמקנו משום נושא.

ב. שאין טעם ללכת לועידת-שלום אם לא שומרים על הפסקת-האש - והרי ממה שקורה בשטח המצרים המפרים את הפסקת-האש.

ג. שהנוכחות המצרית על החוף המזרחי של התעלה עובדה קיימת שאין חזרה ממנה. אי לכך אין אפשרות להגיע להפרדת כוחות.

<u>הפרדת הכוחות</u>

7. גנרל גמאסי השיב כי אין להתבסס על דברי הנשיא בועידת אלג'יר במשא ומתן. אילו הם היו מסתמכים על מה שאומרים מדינאים בישראל היינו כבר במצב לוחמה.

8. לשאלה הריטורית של גמאסי האם השיחות בדבר הפרדת הכוחות הגיעו לקפאון השיב כי במקרה זה יש לחזור ולדון בחזרה לקוי ה-22 באוקטובר. ואם גם בזה אין ישראל מוכנה לדון המצב ברור להם.

9. הצד הישראלי ציין כי אם גם הגענו לקפאון בנושא זה כאן יתכן שנוכל להתקדם בו בשיחות ג'נבה. אך פרט לנושא זה קיימות בעיות חיוניות שיש לפתור אותן - כגון: קיום הפסקת-האש, אספקה לכבריח, מצרכים נוספים הדרושים לסואץ ודלק - ואילו לנו שתי בעיות שיש לפתור אותן:- שחרורם של מזרחי ולווי והחזרת החללים. ניתן למצוא פתרון לבעיות אלה ולהגיע להסכמה בדבר הביצוע.

10. איננו יכולים לדון בקו ה-22 באוקטובר אלא במסגרת הפרדת הכוחות ובזה הגענו לקפאון. יתכן שנוכל למצוא דרך לצמצם את התקריות באמצעות תוכנית שעדין אין עליה אישור.

11. גמאסי השיב כי אין בפתרון הבעיות היומיומיות הקטנות כדי לפצות על הקפאון בנושאים העיקריים:-

א. האספקות תמשכנה בהתאם להסכם בחסות ה-או"ם ועליהם הדאגה לכך. התושבים והחיילים המכותרים יתקיימו איכשהו.

ב. החזרת החללים תמשך ללא תמורה, אין הם מחנים ענין זה בשום עיסקה ותמורה.

ג. המצרכים הנוספים הדרושים לעיר סואץ - כגפרורים, ריבה וגבינה שישראל עיכבה וכן שאר הבעיות הקטנות יכולות למצוא פתרונן באמצעות ה-או"ם.

ד. העיקר הוא שאנו בקפאון בנושא בעל חשיבות - כהפרדת הכוחות ועל או"ם לפעול כדי שיקויים הסעיף בהסכם.

ה. החזרת מזרחי אושרה עקרונית אולם אין הוא מוסמך לומר כיצד יוסדר הענין עכשיו.

ו. הוא מודה לנו על נכונותנו לפתור אספקת הכוח המכותר בכבריח אולם אין הוא רוצה לדון בנושאים משניים ולהזניח את העיקר. אין זה משנה כיצד תועבור האספקה ביבשה או בים, דרך ארמיה 3 או ישירות באמצעות או"ם פעם בשבוע.

12. גנרל סילאסוו הביע אכזבתו שהצדדים הגיעו לקפאון. סעיף ב' שבהסכם הוא חלק חשוב מהפסקת-האש. לא נאמר בהסכם כי הפרדת הכוחות תידון ותועבר לוועידת השלום בג'נבה.

13. גנרל גמאסי הוסיף כי סעיף ב' משפיע על סעיף א' בהסכם."למרות שננקוט בכל אמצעי הזהירות יתכן שמעקדים מקומיים ימצאו במצב רע בגלל טיבה כלשהיא, כמחסור באספקה, או הפסקתה" - מדבריו של גמאסי משתמע חשש שהפסקת-האש תופר כתוצאה מאיום שלנו לגבי האספקה הסדירה לארמיה או לסואץ. האלוף יריב הניח דעתו כי איננו נוקטים לשון איומים כעקרון. גמאסי הביע תקוה כי הקפאון בסעיף ב' לא ישפיע על קיומם של הסעיפים האחרים.

14. אלוף יריב ציין כי כל מה שהוסכם עליו יקויים אולם מדובר כעת בדרישות נוספות שאינן מפורשות בהסכם - אספקה לכבריה, דלק ואספקה שונה לסואן. אנו לא גרמנו קשיים לגבי פינויי פצועים נוספים מסואן מחוץ להסכם, ולא לגבי אספקות למרות הרגשתנו כי הועבר גם ציוד צבאי. אנו מודים לו, מאידך, על הבטחתו שהחזרת חללים תמשך.

<u>סיכום</u>

15. הצדדים סיכמו עם גנרל סילאסוו על הודעה לעתונות בזו הלשון:- נמשכו דיונים בסעיף ב' של ההסכם. לא הושגו תוצאות מעשיות. לא נקבע מועד מדויק למפגשים נוספים. (גמאסי ציין כי אין לו הוראה רשמית בנושא).

23 שלון אלוף

29.11.73

TOP SECRET

29.10.73

Ept.: We think that it is good that we dicuss this matter and we think it is a goo idea ~~that~~ the disengagement between the troops by taking your troops one ste back, it will be a good step forward. What I mean is this: according to the Security Council decision you go back to the 22 Oct. line, if your troops move back for a line which will be determined by both of us and it won't be difficult to determine that line as one step, most of this problem will be solved. I mean all the steps which will be taken by us, it will be gradually for the last discussion which will be done as negotiation or whatever you like between the two governments (on the political) for the whole political situation. The very step of that from our military point of view to make one step forward to the 22nd line, it means, if we define this line, your troops will move to that line, we will make disengagement between the troops. That is one step, and then the other step - we will see how it will go. If we say (that) our troops on the East Bank of the Canal will go to the West Bank, again further on we are looking forward that they will go again to the western bank when the negotiations start between the two governments and settle the whole problem, as far as I know. So, if you agree with that it will be a very good step from you to solve so many problems for us both.

Isl.: May I first ask a question - I understood your proposal which says that the idea of disengagement of forces looks positive and in order to carry it out you suggest that we withdraw first of all to the line of 22 Oct. This is clear. I understand. Then you said that later on there might be as you consider, I have not understood it clearly, a more general switch of forces, or did I misunderstand you.

Ept.: On this point - here is the Canal, here is Ismaeliya, here is Suez. We have our troops here, and here is Deversoir. You have your troops somewhere here till Adabiya, or will we put it on the map if you like. Red line, that is our troops, a different line - that is your troops.

Isl.: ..... that is something to debate.

Ept.: Yes, according to our opinion the Israeli troops were here on the 22nd at 18.52 hours. We may be wrong.

Isl.: But

Ept.: That is right, and then here the 23rd and here the 24th. It does not make any difference between the lines if it is one Km, 10 Km or 5 Km. All right - if we make this disengagement and that talking from the political point of view and from the military point of view and both of them. If your troops have pushed forward to that area, the whole problems here will be solved and then that is the first step. Still, you have your troops on our side and we still have our troops on the other side. In the period the negotiation will be done between the two governments, and I'm sure of that it is very active now between the two governments through the UN or whatever they are doing. I don't know how they are, and then, the second step will be how it will go after that step. Your troops, as I understand from the political point of view, will go to any line in Sinai, as one step. Another line in Sinai, how it will go, that is the political personel will define that. So, the first step will solve so many problems between us, between the convoys, the 3rd Army, the P.O.W.'s the dead personnal, all our military, any clashes between both sides never will be. Our authorized local commanders from here to your local commanders to solve that problem. So, every thing will be easy for both sides, as we understand.

Isl.: I understand from your proposal that, and I don't propose to go into discussion about the lines, but my instructions are that we still want to discuss the proposal I brought forward the last meeting, and if this is not acceptable at our level between two generals, my government has asked for a discussion at the political end of this proposal. The proposal I meant was a mutual switch of 10 Km.

Egt.: On both sides?

Isl.: Yes, where the main point, of course, is not whether it is 10 Km or 5 Km, in between the UNEF or the UN observers or somebody else or something else, but the main point is the general switch all along the Canal on both sides. I understand the answer to that proposal is that you accept the point of disengagement of forces, but.... which means that only us who disengage, and your troops stay in their present position. So there is no mutualanything. If we two cannot discuss this point any further, I cannot understand you, but then I have been instructed to ask you for a discussion of the proposal at the political end.

Egt.: I have given your proposal to my government and they discussed it. I didn't take a definite answer for that until now because it is still under

discussion by the political personnel. So, there is no definite answer yet about that. But, as far as I understand, and I am authorized with the political men, working with them, and I hope that you will remain also in order not to change the personalities.

Isl.: I know.

Egt.: We don't like to change it also.

Isl.: Here we are only military men.

Egt.: We are only military men, I don't know how it will go.

Isl.: Excuse me General, there is only one difference between the two of us. You are a military man still in service and I am a military man recalled to active service.

Egt.: It does not make any difference. So, as far as I understand from our politic men, why do we get our troops back to the west while we are trying to solve the whole problem by the withdrawal of the Israeli troops through Sinai as a result to negotiation between the two governments. Until the negotiation has been done, we can settle the matter here on the west, so we make that disengagement. They took it your proposal as a disengagement between the troops first of all. So, we stop any clashes between each other, and it will be very good for the political personnel to start their way on a firm base, that is their point.

Isl.: I understand the answer now, but still I would ask you to transmit the government my government's proposal, for meeting at a political level concerning the idea. I, of course, transmit the answer.

Egt.: Just to make it clear, that in an important point. Let us discuss it more throughly, just to facilitate ~~thim~~ their work of the political men - you mean both armies or just only parts of our troops.

Isl.: I mean both armies, but if you have any counter proposal.

Egt.: At any rate in future you may withdraw your troops to any line in Sinai. Maybe here, maybe there, at any line. So, at all cost our troops will be on the eastern bank, so there is no need to take them back and then send them here as far as they are concerned, and we are keen to put it in effect as soon as possible.

Isl.: General, I will be very frank with you, you know we understand very well as a General at the General Staff in you position and experience, that you enter political negotiations your military position is of utmost importance, so, of course, our interest in maintaining a good military position is also of great importance even though at a further stage we might go back across the Canal, but when we start a negotiation you want to be in a good position. I understand your point of view as well.

Egt.: And I understand your point very well. O.K. just one point. As military men we want to make disengagement between the troops to stop any clashes, right? The cease-fire is in effect now and it is very good, this situation. In case we stay here for longer time and we didn't solve the military sides, what will happen? These troops will be in a bad situation and you know that you are stoping our planes going there, you are stoping any trial (to do) to give them rations through the water or through the gulf. Even our wounded personnel we could not take them, so the result we will be in a corner to start a fight again for the benefit of these troops or to stop it. We are going on way for peace, thus our political personal as I understand. The military situation is effecting the political situation now. The negotiation will take time and you know them. They will take time. The UN here and there may take weeks. Will you take over the supply of the 3rd Army until the negotiation stop? Do you have any recommendation to disengagement of our troops, keep them away, how? So I am afraid that in the coming time period there must be clashes here some where for any small reason, so our proposal from our military point of view to make them away and to make them away to clear a way to Suez and the 3rd Army.

Isl.: One, two, three roads.

Egt.: This road?

Isl.: Adabiya, and the Cairo-Suez

Egt.: We may discuss

Isl.: General

Egt.: Maybe one way may be one road may be two roads, the aim is to make the disengagement to the troops on the western bank to keep the troops away of each other to help the political men to start their talks, how they will talk how they will solve it is up to them.

I. General, I have very well understood very clearly understood your proposal.

E. Very well.

I. But, I have also got instructions and the instructions are on the matter of 22nd and supplies etc. We, my political authorities, still stand by the proposal that you told me you don't accept at this stage.

And they would like to discuss this at a political level.

E. All right, that's clear.

I. So I think we pass to other points now.

E. All right.

I. If there is any question because as I said I wan't to do my best that even we can't solve this disagreement there will be no misunderstandings, so I think we are clear?

E. Yes.

I. Although we don't agree, on the contrary. We disagree very much on the point. There is no misunderstanding.

E. All right.

I. Something has come up which is very difficult to us, I don't (know) whether you heard announcement of our Government that we have to discontinue the evacuation of wounded people from Suez and the 3rd Army.

E. Yes.

I. And I think it is very important that I explain to you the position we have taken (on) medical supplies to the area and we have agreed that the number of wounded people, the number that was settled in the ..... be evacuated - correct?

E. (I) think so.

I. ~~XXX(I)XXXXXX~~ And I understand that the intention was to evacuate the whole 2,000 wounded, meanwhile we have asked for the following things: We have asked the Red Cross since the outbreak of war until today. We asked to have a list of our P.O.W.s in Egypt. We have asked the Red Cross to visit our wounded prisoners and prisoners and the Red Cross had come up until today, until I left with a negative answer on all these points.

I. Now General, we can't accept this. We have given you a list of prisoners. We have permitted a visited of the Red Cross to the P.O.W.'s. We have agreed. We have taken plasma to the wounded people in the Suez and 3rd Army. We agreed to evacuate wounded people. So we must. There is a Geneva Convention and I think you know the Geneva Convention as well as I do and there is no need to ..... but we can't proceed with the evacuation of the wounded people unless the following things are taken care of.

a. We must get a list of the P.O.W.s you have.

b. We want a visit and an immediate (visit) of the Red Cross of all our wounded prisoners.

c. We wan't to have our wounded prisoners released as soon as possible, then we can continue the evacuations of the wounded people that was talked about and everything, of course, we asked for will be under ..... and the last point is that we have to set up as soon as possible a time-table for the total release of the P.O.W.'s on both sides. We are now holding 7,000 Egyptian P.O.W.'s, excuse me, over 6,000.

E. . . .

I. I am not sure of the numbers, I think included but I might be wrong.

E. Civilians?

I. I am not sure 100%. So this is a very difficult point, General, with us it is a major point of principle. We must, I think I am stressing it, because I think we must settle this as soon as possible.

E. Alright, as I promised you last time, we are keen to solve all the military problems. First of all, the names of your wounded P.O.W.'s is with me now, it can be given to you and it will be given to . . . to the Red Cross today. They will be visited by the Red Cross authorities, and their names will be given to you through the Red Cross.

I. Only the wounded?

E. The wounded and the P.O.W.s will give the names also.

I. When General?

E. During the coming 3 days the names will be given to the Red Cross. But giving you back the P.O.W.s and taking our P.O.W.s although it is very important for both sides, I can't give a word, now for the time (being) to do it.

I. How about the wounded P.O.W.s?

E. The wounded are under our medical supervisor and under the Red Cross and they are treated very very nice in all aspects and we are responsible for that in front of all authorities. We can do anything for them. We are giving them medical support in the best of our hospitals and so on. You will hear from them how they are treated from the medical point of view or from any other point of view.

I. But please General, let us for a moment leave the question of total exchange of P.O.W.s aside. Let us talk about the wounded prisoners. Now what you have said General is first of all you have with you a list of the wounded.

E. Yes.

I. ..... you will permit a visit by the Red Cross to the wounded prisoners today, I understand.

E. From tomorrow everybody will be visited by the Red Cross.

I. From tomorrow every wounded prisoners or so every prisoner?

E. Every wounded prisoner.

I. I see. There are a number of points belonging to the Geneva Convention except the exchange of prisoners.

E. Yes.

I. There is. The Red Cross has to have a list of all the P.O.W.s and we have already given this list perhaps it's not full as yet, but we have given most of the names, perhaps by now it is ...

E. The majority of them.

I. But ..... there is a visit. There should be a visit of the Red Cross to the place where the P.O.W.s are kept. And we have permitted that the Third, a visit of the Red Cross to the wounded P.O.W.'s to see how they are treated. Now No. 4 - the Geneva Convention stipulates (that) with the cessation of active hostilities it stipulates a release of all P.O.W.'s. But we are now

I. talking first of all of an exchange of the wounded prisoners. This has been done in '67. This has been done in '56 and other wars we have had. It is hard for me to understand, General, why you are holding back on the list of all the P.O.W.'s, you told me within 3 days.

E. Yes.

I. And why you are holding back on a visit to the P.O.W.'s, not only the wounded and why you are holding back on the evacuation of the wounded P.O.W.s. There are P.O.W.'s that cannot go back to their units. They are wounded people. We are ready to send back to youxx wounded P.O.W.'s immediately, as well. And it has been done in the past. It is not the question of a precedent. It has been done between us in the past. This is a very important point.

E. Our wounded persons, which you have some of them, are here in the Suez area, and some of them may be in your hospitals, but those who are here on the easternbank of the Canal are not P.O.W.'s.

I. That's right. But they are wounded, surrounded, wounded soldiers, excuse me, I'll let you finish.

E. So, changing the P.O.W.'s in your hospitals and in our hospitals - they are still P.O.W.s.

I. Excuse me, would you like some more coffee?

E. No thank you, that's enough for me.

I. Anybody for coffee?

(In Ivrit: Can we have coffee ... Coffee was served.)

E. So the prisoners, the wounded P.o.W. we call it, the wounded P.o.W. with or with you, will keep them, to be treated as P.o.W. Right ? those sounded personal here, in the eastern bank of the Canal, we don't consider them P.o.W. maybe surrounded yes, but they will be treated as their brother military men there on the eastern bank so we don't want to make any exchange between the P.o.W., and the wounded P.o.W. now, until they'll be treated there or until the problem of P.o.W. will be settled as one .....

I. I understand general, I understand what you say but it is very difficult for me to agree with you and to see your point of view. I will tell you why. You do not agree with us for an exchange of wounded P.o.W. but you want us to permit the evacuation of wounded soldiers. I have all sympathy for wounded people, this is of course dear, but there is something that I think is inconsistent, that an exchange of wounded P.o.W. that are in a status of P.o.W. you say no, but on the other hand you insist on our agreeing with the evacuation of people who are wounded people, such people I understand but are still in the status of fighting soldiers, there's something that doesn't click.

E. Can we make that proposal, you want to evacuate your wounded P.o.W. on the other side, You give us our wounded P.o.W. in Israel and on the eastern bank of the Canal. Right ?

I. This is a proposal I think that we can work on, as I don't have a definite yes on it, I'll let you know as soon as possible, I think it will be all right.

E. And I will also let you know as possible.

I. All right.

E. Please, and that means the plasma and the blood which is needed for civilians in Suez to be given to the civilians in Suez under the supervision of the U.N. because the civilians need it badly.

I. General, when do you think you can have an answer on that ?

E. If you want it tomorrow.

I. Perhaps today.

E. Perhaps today, as soon as I go back , we make communication through the U.N.

I. Yes.

E. And then we'll start working on it.

I. Good, I want to be loyal to my principle of avoiding any misunderstanding. Can I assume the following:

A. That in case we have an exchange of wounded prisoners, and that can be done immediately, within 1, 2, days, I hope. In case we have an exchange of the wounded prisoners we shall agree to the evacuation of wounded civilians and soldiers from the 3rd army area on the East bank, yes ?

E. Yes.

I. And we shall agree to medical supplies for the civilians in Suez.

E. Yes.

I. Now in addition to this, can I assume that we will have, if possible today, if not tomorrow, a list of all our prisoners, and can I assume that the R.C. will be able to visit all our prisoners in the camps where they are.

E. Yes.

I. And visit our wounded P.o.W. before they are evacuated.

E. Before their evacuation ?

I. If they are evacuated immediately, , then it's all right, no problem, but if, let us say, the evacuation takes 2 days with all the preparations we would like, because we want the R.C. if possible even today, to visit them, so I want to summarize the parts. If we agree, in case we agree to an exchange of wounded P.o.W. and B. to the evacuation of your wounded from the 3rd army area and from Suez and if we agree to give you medical supplies for the civilians in Suez you undertake :

1) to give ~~as~~ us without delay a list of all our P.o.W

2) a visit by the R.C. to all aou P.o.W.

3) a visit of the R.C. to our wounded P.o.W. and

4) the evacuation of our wounded P.o.W. Yes ?

E. Yes.

I. All right

E. Very clear.

I. Now I promise you an answer, today. I will do my very very best to give you an answer today through the U.N.. I hope it won't take time, I hope it won't have any difficulties of communication from Tel Aviv to Cairo through U.N. (to go to).

E. It will go.

I. Because I had difficulties last night, great difficulties last night in setting up communication with the U.N. before the convoy, I assume you will want to discuss the convoy.

E. Discuss this ?

I. The convoy ? All right, if this point is clear we can go further.

E. It is clear now, and I will do my best to make it so this problem will be solved.

I. I will be glad, we will be very glad, this will facilitate a lot of matters.

E. Yes, We want to facilitate all our military matters.

I. Anything else, General ?
Yes, and then there's a last point, that is, we would like to have a time table on the general exchange of prisoners.

E. It's very hard to discuss it now that's a very difficult problem.

I. Why is it so difficult ?

E. Let's solve one thing and then go to the other.

I. You are going to gain much more by it than we.

E. Maybe so.

I. Many many more soldiers.

E. We want to keep these P.o.W. for, not to keep them, I mean when we settle the other matters we will settle that on other firm bases.

I. I'll tell you General, you see that I was less urgent on the general exchange of P.o.W. than on the other points concerning the P.o.W. and I only asked for a timetable, but here again, according to the Geneva Convention, to any accepted procedure a general exchange of P.o.W. is something that one wants the active hostilities ceased,

it is an accepted principle and we are not dealing in hundreds of thousand of people, we are dealing in relatively small numbers and for us it is very important point therefore d'urge you to consider it seriously as possible and as soon as possible,

E. All right, we'll consider it, but I want to tell you General.

I. Yes.

Allthough there is a cease of fire but still there are so many complications from the military point of view that as you feel in this area especially in this area we still have some of our troops. Here, we have difficulties for their supplies, we didn't do anything against your plains coming for supplies here or for evacuation your plains are crossing the area for supply arms and for evacuatinn here if we start, any trial done by us ~~ak~~ is opposed by you for help for the 3rd army by land by air until the last night, yes the helicopters and so on, and the helicopters are not for supplies, as you know, [redacted] may for serious medical evacuation, because 5 or 3 or 4 helicopters doesn't make a good help for the troops there so the prisoners of war as, we feel ~~xitik~~ still one part of the whole thing going on in this area, so we make a schedule if we come back to the main point which we started how we disangage the troops away from each other by any means to any distance as military men, most of these problems will be solved, and I promised you I will explain it back to my government until they make their negotiations on the Political level. So just postpone it please for a while until everything goes better on that.

I. I understand General what you said, but still I want to urge you to explain our point of view to your Government and I will explain your point of view which I understood very clearly to my authorities. Now I hope that if the matter of the P.o.W's that we have discussed that you will talk today to your authorities and I to my authorities and let you have an answer by today, then the question of evacuation of the wounded people here will be solved.

E. Alright. In this case the evacuation from Israel to our Egypt or from Egypt to Israel or from here to there it will be arranged by R.C.

I. Yes, as we start all means are possible.

E. About the convoy.

I. Yes please. On the convoy I want to make a general remark and this is that I hope or I want to make it clear that once we undertook we agreed that we let pass this convoy, we didn't talk about other convbys, we took it seriously. I want you to believe me when I say that there was no back thoughts in our minds, and that we didn't fool around with it. I want to ask you Generals that in this case we played straight forward and I can assure you that in anything we will have to do together. If I shall disagree I shall tell you so, if I say this we will do, I shall do my utmost to assure that we will do it properly.

E. Now we have 100 lorrys to be sent to the other side as you accepted, up till now 30 lorrys went to the Western bank, 20 yestefday and 10 today.

I. I want to ask the General do you know what is the situation now.

E. Now I saw the convoy there with your soldiers on one side, our ~~&~~soldiers on other side. 10 lorrys were taken to theCanal zone the bank of the Canal.

I. Today.

Now this is the point that I told you I have difficulties in communications, because you wanted already to do it last night. What the General says is : the U. N. only has 25 drivers this takes along time. Now what we have proposed, to take the 25 drivers, take 25 trucks up to ....., not 38, we will take it up to here. We will have drivers ready. The minute that 25 drivers have brought the lorrys here our drivers will take them immediately there, the 25 U. N. people will go back across, and so on this will lessen very much the lorrys to reach Km 138.5. This is already been done.

E. Alright.

I. We shall not post detain because it took the only 25 drivers until they get back ~~I~~ it takes a long time so by this proceedure you will be able to ferry your lorrys across with the U. N. drivers very quickly. I mislead you. The check point is here.

—. Yes.

I. Our drivers will take the lorrys from the check point until here. We can take enough drivers to take all your lorrys at one time until here. So you will stand here and then the U.N. drivers will take them the short way. One minute, then the 25 can come back, and they won't have to go back to here. That is alright with you ?

E. That is alright.
When do we expect to finish that convoy, the General knows?

I. From what I understand, this is only part of the problem. The big problem is the unloading and the ferrying across.

E. Yes.

I. So, how do you see this problem, because I understand that you have only one amphibious vehicle engaged for the operation.

E. But we agreed one at a time.

I. But this dosn't mean perhaps it is my fault, if you can employ more, we will agree to more.

E. Please, if we can make it more than one point, we will use more than one car.

I. But if you can have it. Would you like another point or at the same point?

E. If it is

I. At same point if you can use 3, 4 alright.

E. At the same point may be easier for the U.N.

I. Yes, how many more can you engage ?

E. We have so many there, I don't know exactly

I. 5 ?

E. If can make it up to ten it won't make any difference, because one going there and one going here.

I. Up to ten

E. Up to ten.

I. But how many people do you want to cross for the unloading?
Would you, I think, here again, that it was because I have the details I determined so one we say you will engage ten in the operation.

E. Yes.

I. But you have only ten men to unload the trucks.

E. We want 100. Ten in this case. Ten for every lorry you unload and to use and every car to use ten persons to unload. For unloading unarmed as we said. So it will be easier.

I. I want to check and will give you an answer in a minute.

E. Alright, and the local commander if it is, if 100 alright. We can make it seven for every lorry, but not less that that.

I. Not less than seven

E. Yes

E. I am going to phone

E. Alright

I. Please, we will have something to eat, otherwise we will starve.

I. Do you eat something please.

E. No I don't eat too much, that is why I am very thin

I. So you endure longer.

E. I drink coffee and smoke cigarettes that is very bad I know.

I. How about you

(In Ivrit:) - After the meal break.

D. 50 people? We shall bring the 25 lorries or the 30 if you want. As close as possible, to the area which I understand is 3 km. from the Canal because -

I. (In Ivrit: somebody else) The junction = (Ivrit: right), the junction to Adria.

I. Not the junction to the left. He knows, you take on. The staging area and any given time, 5 lorries are being unloaded. So you will have 10 men per lorry to unload.

E. O.K.

I. Now I have an answer on the deal with the prisoners. What my authority says is the following:

a. We are ready to give you the plasma for Suez as you asked. We are ready to exchange, of course, the wounded prisoners, to give you all your wounded prisoners. Now the evacuation of wounded here, the difference between what I told you and what I have been authorized now. As far as the evacuation of the 3rd Army and of Suez are concerned, we are ready to let you evacuate all the seriously wounded. Not all the wounded, but the seriously wounded. I was told that the Red Cross told us you have in the Suez area about 70 or 75 seriously wounded people. If there are more, please tell us. Now as to our propositions - I have to add one other point. You remember all my propositions?

E. Yes.

I. And the point is that among the wounded persons we also want Cpt. (sic Lt. !) (R.G.) Avidan.

E. Cpt. (sic Lt. !) Avidan.

I. Yes.

E. That is the first P.O.W. for a long time.

I. Yes.

E. I know,.

I. Is his health bad? health. And we would like to include him in the group of the wounded.prisoners.

E. Cpt. (sic Lt. !) Dan Avidan.

I. Yes, so I already have given you an answer. I have to go back to Tel Aviv now. I understand that you have to check it.

E. Again please, about the coming convoys,

I. Yes.

E. Please give me one minute. While tyring to solve the problems I want to give a period for continuing the convoys until we settle this matter very urgently, and very quickly we will settle all the matters, very quickly, if we stop the convoys, the coming convoys, that again will come back to the last situation. So please, we wanted to continue until the negotiation or the discussions on the political level starts or finishes, to go to a one turning point if they agree evrything will be finished alright.

I. But I understand, excuse me. (In Ivrit: This person was called to speak with the Ramatkal)

E. (Somebody else): Is he seriously ill?

I. " " Yes, for a long time.

E. " " He was alright, but he is seriously ill now.

I. I think we better arrange for a private meeting between the two Generals. Can we?

E. I'll do my best. What are the times for our tape?

I. Excuse me! We were on the point of the convoy. I have checked again and as I told you before, General, this is (the) thing to the meeting of the political level, I think. And this is my private observation. I think that if we can progress on the question of the P.O.W.'s I think this might help but I'm not giving you a promise, not only that he is late. This helicopter is pestering us.

E. You mean this problem is linked to the problem of P.O.W.s?

(E was written) I. To the exchange of P.O.W.'s. I would put it like that, the position now is that first of all we have to have this meeting on the political level.

E. Yes.

I. I this my person estimate is if we advance on the question of P.O.W.'s it might help. I don't wan't to promise you anything.

E. Alright.

I. I said 3 times I don't want to promise.

E. The exchange of P.O.W.'s.

E. Concerning the wounded people.

I. No.

E. But we did decide.

I. My observation was in answer to the General's question about the continuation of the convoys.

E. This is linked with the exchange of P.O.W.'s but not with the wounded P.O.W.'s

I. This is my personal observation and I might be wrong, because as I told you - the answer that we have talked on the political levels about the general plans, which then can perhaps be away with the convoy and the question of the lines.

E. From our point of view as military men, we are now making it difficult for the political authorities to start. But if we solve this problem, it will be easier for them. This (is) from my point of view.

I. I understand, General, what you say. But the instructions that I have (are) very very clear. Now another question: Is it possible, General, I have given you the answer of my authorities on the question of the wounded, etc.

E. Yes.

I. If it (is) possible for, I am gladly wait here. Is it possible for you to go back and contact and then come back?

E. I am sure that everything will be facilitated.

I. The question is when can we have an answer?

E. Today you will have an answer.

I. Today at night?

E. At night.

I. Alright.

E. I can go there and get ~~sinx~~ contact with them. I know the situntion from both sides.

I. I am sure that if you wouldn't have known you wouldn't be here. (laughter)

E. I wanted to facilitate my job because still I feel I will be here for a long time, and even the political matters, I think I will participate in it also. I would like to go back with good results about the continuation of the convoy so we can facilitate the matters. I don't know if we can start the negotiations tomorrow on the political level or what the day after tomorrow, they may say after 5 or 6 days and so on. Thank you very much.

I. General, I understand, but unfortunately I can't help you.

E. Alright. I would like to comment (that) we are taking this kind of meeting very seriously. A lot of things depend on the result we can get out of it, and I believe that from this point everything could proceed. Minor things and facilitated would develop a kind of atmosphere we look forward to reach to make a real political advance.

I. I fully understand and therefore I wan't to make everything possible so that the present convoy is on it's way as speedily as possible. As far as the continuation of convoys is concerned I understand clearly what the General said, but here I have clear instructions.

E. I am just saying that we have to make progress on the military side concerning the 3rd Army in particular, to facilitate any political negotiation. We can't advance on the 3rd Army's expense in political aspects.

I. I understand you very clearly. So as on the continuation of the convoys we a[illegible] at the point of necessity for a meeting at a political level. To this I am adding my personal observation. Perhaps I am wrong, but I think so. I feel that to get further, or if we can advance on the question of the ag general exchange of prisoners, I feel that it will have a good influence on the questions of convoys.

I

A: A Political assistant to Egyptian war minister. Ghamsi

B: Yarin

C: Israeli

D: Egyptian E: Egyptian

A: I have been appointed to be assistant to war minister for political aspects. That's my new position. It was going to be announced to be sent to you officially to write it officially and then send it officially. Here's the representative of foreign affairs and here is the representative of the armed forces. thats a military man - and I am a political military man. So we say a political. So I have the authori now to start talking about the political aspects of the problem.

B: Okay with your permission now General, may I propose that we start first where do we stand - because I have already given an answer yesterday on the question of the prisonners.

A: ~~Yes, please. on~~

A: About the prisonners of war - We'll start it as 1, 2, 3, as we said yesterday. About changing the wounded prisonners of wars - we accepted - and we sent their names to the Red-Cross; They will take all measures to send them over to you, but meanwhile we would like to have our wounded prisonners in your hospital because we don't have their names.

B: You don't have their names?!

A: No, no, not yet wounded P.O.W's

...1

B: We have not submitted the list?

A: I Think That we submitted the list to the Red Cross as wounded

B: I will check it.

A: We didn't receive them.

C: I think that we submitted the list to the Red - Cross

A: as prisonners of war ?

B: Of the wounded?

C: Yes - as wounded

A: as wounded?

B: - Yes - But I will check it.

A: O.K

B: We will check it whilst we are here

(נאום)

A: According to that problem will inform the Red - Cross to go to the Third Army and to make a list of those who will be evacuated from the Third Army and Suez.

B: Excuse me General - I didn't get the point very well.

A: The wounded P.O.W's that you have.

B: We will exchange - you need their names

and then take measures to exchange them. I will do the same thing, but meanwhile we will send to the Red-Cross to take measures to go to the third army and Suez to see our wounded people to make their evacuation under their supervision.

B: I see s but on this point we talked about the seriously wounded.

A: Yes

B: And last time the Red-Cross gave us the figure about 75 wounded

A: I asked about these 75, I couldn't find them there but I checked that these were about 70 seriously wounded. and also about the seriously wounded - I gave you the 45 names; 27 of them are seriously wounded and the rest are not seriously wounded

Bx.

B: Yes, I see

A: If any doctor from the Red-Cross will say that he is seriously wounded - he will be evacuated

B: and if he is not seriously wounded! I understood we had an exchange of all the wounded.

A: Prisonners; all your wounded prisonners and all our wounded prisonners

A: But you said ~~all~~ seriously wounded

B: No, no, no, I mean —

A: Ah -

B: There are two problems here; 1 problem is the wounded Egyptians prisonners and the wounded Israeli & P.O.W's. We suggest an exchange. In addition you have talked about the people in the Third army and Suez area .. On this, only on this only we said the seriously wounded, In addition to the exchange.

A: alright

B: In addition to the exchange So can I accept, can I understand that you are ready to exchange the wounded P.O.W's?

A: Yes

(the list of the names) (רשימת השמות)

B: And what do you see as the time-table?

A: We didn't put any time-table, the Red Cross will put it. The sooner the better - we are ready, at any time / We gave orders for that yesterday and they are run.

B: Good, good. And we will know from the Red Cross how many seriously wounded there are in the Third army and the Suez area.

A: About the list of names of the P.O.W's we'll hand today a list of them to the Red-Cross. about Dan Avidan - he is ready, to be changed at once. when we finish.

we brought him with us because we thought you are feeling something for Dan Avidan as he was kept for a long time maybe or for any other reason so we brought him when we finish our meeting one of our gentlemen can come with us to the check point the Colonel or one our officers will hand him over.

B: We appreciate it. Thank you very much

A: About the dead bodies? They are arranging to get the dead bodies here. They will be sent here to be handed here or any other place if you want but they suggested that yesterday

B: That's alright

A. The other dead bodies all over the area - we didn't have any list for them now but through the Red Cross we are ready, we will give the information today to start wherever they want to search.

B. I have a proposal on that but I'll let you finish first, General.

A: That's about the P.O.W's which that we send yesterday

B: Alright, so we owe you, because I thought that you already had a list of your wounded P.O.W's. not?

A: No?

B. I'll see to it that you get it through the Red-Cross as soon as possible and have you asked, & and we'll also ask - I suggest you also ask the Red-Cross how many seriously wounded you have in the Third Army and Suez area. So that it will not take too much time

אתמול נפקד את זמנך ב. א: תשתדל את ש' (סה
אין מודיעין תלונה, שלא כל המודיעים יגידו (סה אותה כוונה
שם יהתבו הדא (סה - סה ובויאו אלו אלו מכוון (סה) - את
כ(סה) דסה אדון. לאפשרך את הרשימה לאו סה הפצוי זה-
את זו לאו אלמלא ובויאו
- סה

B: I understand that the list of the P.O.W.'s will be handed by you to the Red-Cross today. Could you tell me how many you have?

A. That's one * list, not all the lists Just to be clear. (That's one of the lists) We have different lists in different places. One of the lists will be handed today

B. (Only) One of the lists or the total lists?

A: Not the total

B: It will take about two three days as the general promised yesterday to finish the lists. We want to be concrete on the names and numbers of the people everywhere

C: How many names are there in the first list?

A: In the list I think about 64, 67 something like that

B: I see, I see. And then as far as the exchange of the prisoners is concerned we'll make this through the Red Cross.

A: About the wounded?

C: And they are ready and it's just a question of —

B: Now how about the visit of the Red Cross to the prisoners?

A: The minute we will give them the names, they are allowed to visit them.

B: From this point, if I understood you correctly, so what we discussed yesterday is in order and now it remains for both sides to carry out the agreement of yesterday.

A: Right. That's about the POW's. But I was surprised last night about the information that we had, recall, that the Israelis cut the water away from Suez city. That means our citizens and the city will die.

B: I must check this.

A: It was given to us through the UN and by our liaison officer

[illegible]

C: You mean the water which is running to Suez City?

A: Running, coming very close to the Canal from up here up to — and so the water was stopped yesterday.

B: What is true general is that on the 20, 21st we blew up the pipe jamps of the sweet water.

C: It was somewhere North to Faid airfield

A: Do you mean the pipe line gang on the other side?

C: Not the pipe line, the sweet canal, the East bank of the sweet canal it was blown up so the water

(—רעש ברקע מטוסים)

C. But according to my best knowledge there are still water in the sweet Canal.

A: No it was reported to us officially yesterday through the UN Colonel Hogan.

B: This is I didn't understand because

A: Anyway you can check. We consider it a setback we want a promise that the water will not be cut from the city or it will be very serious.

B: Of course

ד"א —— אבל אנחנו לא מבינים, מדוע, מפני ש

A: It was cut in the area, I can give the HR 03019/33 שלו

C: Now referring to smaller; place in the area could you tell us where is it?

C: Very small ——.

C. What is the name of the place? See m. Crossing

I don't remember the name

Could you show me on the map please.
Even the approximate area will do.
Could you translate your MRs to this map please?

(—שכן מתחת ל)

A: Just North of Suez I can't get exactly—

B: Approximately—we have the MR's. We'll check it

C Tell me, what happened at this point.

A: The report came that it was the Suez Canal was stopped, was blocked

B- but we'll check it and let you have an answer as soon as possible

D And we can give details as soon as —
We just got a message before leaving

B I suppose that the water will be given to the citizens

B- yes.

E If you please, do you mean that this is a promise that the water will be supplied today?

B- I'll check it now and give you a full answer before we finish the meeting.

D Thank you very much. About Suez itself, our citizens there need food and also medical

support. The medical support was given to them but some doctors should go there. Although we'll evacuate the wounded persons from there but still they need current supply, the civilians, if you agree, under UN supervision to give them just food because the storage there may be very little to them.

B If I can ask you several, so that I can check the problem, how many doctors, you say you need food, how many lorries, how many quantity?

A I'm talking about the principle today, if you want tonight I'll give you the list maybe how many lorries, how many doctors, how many this, how many that.

B: I suggest that if you possess a detailed cable in the question of a) doctors b) medical supply c) food supply for sure, please send me a cable and we'll try to have an answer.

E So you mean you want this cable today?

B: It was nice — you can send it from morrow. We'll try to answer as soon as possible, whether by cable or the next meeting.

(משהו בעברית)

A Let's please start our work

משהו בעברית — משהו בעברית

Don't think my Arabic is not good enough. I hope that in the future I'll have the opportunity

improve it with your help.

A We'll do our best. (פנים)
To start the procedure of our work we'd like the names of the Egyptians delegation we'd like to have also from your side the names and positions of the delegation so it can be efficient.

B: I'm what capacity you mean. So general I must tell you, when we talked about the political level as I told you yesterday, we were talking about ministerial level. Ministrial level. and then we get the message last night about midnight we understood that as you told me you changed your bet. (לפנים) So although this is not what we meant, we meant the ministrial level I'm permitted to discuss the matter with you

A All right

B I don't have the authority to conclude anything but I have the authority to discuss it

A All right (מיושן)
O.K. we'll consider the delegation are the 3 of you

B Yes, I myself my psition is an assistant to the chief of staff, the colonel is at the armed forces' general staff, the lieutenant-colonel Lev-ran, I pramoted him (פנים) colonel Lev-ran, and colonel Sion, also from the general staff.

A. First of all we would like to discuss the steps that will be taken by both sides to disengage the troops as a step for forward discussion by higher level, political levels, for complete settlement between us according to the security council decision 242.
Now our meeting, if you accept that, I want to make it as opening phase for other periods, the opening phase from our point of view means cease of fire and that's all right the positions of the U.N. troops between both sides and then withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the lines of 22nd of October. These are the 3 main points, if they are settled during our opening phase it will fascilitate for further talks between higher political levels
If you agree with that we can start talking, if you don't, that's up to you, we'll discuss it.

B. All right. Excuse me general, I only want to check the problem of the water for Suez

C -

B

(C ?):

B. So if I can give an answer by the end of the meeting o.k., if not I will cable you.

A. All right.

FM 13

B. Now going back to the political question: I know that & what I'll say will not surprise you because I tried my best to put our position as clear as possible so as not to deceive you or lead you along the path. As we see it, a serious disengagement, I would say a serious step forward from the present position which can solve a lot of problems and create a base for further negotiations and further developments to our mind cannot be a unilateral withdrawal on our part to what you call the line of the 22nd of October. This will not lead to an ~~arbitrary~~ action of serious disengagement, the way we see it we see 2 problems, 2 principle points, In order to create a serious change in the present situation 1) a really serious disengagement ~~&~~ an agreement of the disengagement I will go into detail about it or ~~letterally~~ literally 2) and (~~letterally~~ literally) ~~signed~~ agreed arrangement for a buffer zone which will be occupied by the UN forces or any other factor which will be agreed upon by both sides parties. Now, and here again I know I am not saying anything new, I have told the general and you Colonel, but I want to go over it again. Why what we suggest is a switch where we leave the West Bank of the Canal and you withdraw for a certain phase until further negotiations and further step and further phases, you withdraw to the West Bank of the Canal. Because if withdrawal under the present circumstances, we withdraw to the East Bank of the Canal and your troops withdraw ——

If you remember we are both today from Israeli interests, — we are in a situation where the disengagement of forces is not a serious one and still on the seats — for possible renewal of the conflict. Well I don't need to draw the picture. You know the picture well enough. Therefore, we think that in order to answer practically the problem of disengagement, we think it has to be a total disengagement from West Bank to East Bank and from East Bank to West Bank. As

No 2. We think it is very important to have a Buffer Zone in addition to that where the BZ will be between the banks of the Canal and the forces on each side. If this is the case we think of a BZ that will extend from the East Bank to the West Bank in between the emergency force, UN observers, or any other factor that will be agreed upon by both sides. We think that as far as the details of this BZ are concerned, the with width of it, whether they are different at different parts. Then is the Great Bitter Lake, whether there is a necessity for the BZ at the Great Bitter Lake or not, the width of the Northern Sector, the position of Suez, the town of Suez. On these details we can discuss and find ways to come to an agreement. But we are very firm on (a) the principle of Section (b) on a mutually agreed BZ the details of which can be discussed between us and on which we can be flexible. Here we are locked.

A - yes

pm B. No, we're not locked. Do you mean from East to West and not to East all over the Canal?

B- All over

B-A; the second and the third army.

As I said before that's one step for further negotiations.

A: Yes.

A: Our troops were on the West Bank of the Canal before we started this conflict and when you have your troops here West Bank we have our troops East in some areas. Why don't we keep it for the benefit of both sides, for one phase of one period. When have some of your troops on the West and some of our troops on the East, just one step for further actions. I'd say that some of your troops will be concentrated on a certain area on the East.

B: As you told me.

A - As I told you. That's our point of view. We will solve so many problems as you know. And then we'll make a complete disengagement between the two armies. Maybe carried out in one week 2 or 3 days or maybe a month, could come between it. If we do it, it will be very easy for both sides to make either steps.

B: As you see two plans. One phase when there are still troops of equal rate on both side, of the Canal and then a second plan which will be neglected. It is difficult for me to see, and it is not difficult, I understand it, I am talking frankly general.

A: We are talking frankly.

B- big I understand the reasons, but then I think we cannot agree to change the status-quo that exists. I see stick to the basics of part of both sides, big military elements of your army which are West and East, of our army West and

East and West, until we make some further step forward, if this remain for the time being, we think it will must remain as status quo. Because the question of the 22nd of October on this line it can be discussed, we can have great and long discussions on it, I have heard on the radio and seen on the press that the representative of the UN emergency force has said that the UNEF cannot put the leaders line of the 22nd of October, they don't know how to do it. They have difficulty in fixing the present line, as I told you yesterday, so far as they are concerned, I think I until the time yesterday I think it will be impossible to move from the present situation to a new situation, if it is confirmed by our move from the present line to the supposed line, which you call the 22nd line." I have checked it again with my authorities, perhaps I am wrong, and I also believe it is our case, but I checked it again, and then will not be.

A: But again —

B: May I ask you general. I understand very well the difficulty you see in the present situation. Why not, we, we understand the difficulties, we understand as military men, we understand your difficulty as a politically man understood. Why not get through with this difficulties by a major move which creates a new situation, which you know that we'll not stay on the East Bank of the Canal. That our government has already said in 71, that the interim

agreement has assumed that if and when we withdraw from the Canal to a certain distance eastwards, the withdrawal will not be the final line of withdrawal.

D - Right.

I the final line of withdrawal will be determined in negotiations between you and us.

D - Right.

B - Therefore why not remove the difficulties about it in the present situation by a paper more in the nature of the one we have suggested. I understand the difficulties, the practical difficulties, the difficulties of psychology etc. I understand. But if you could combat these difficulties by the fact that you knew that there is not a permanent position that we shall occupy, but that if you have a suspension of agreement during our part, then will be a Buffer Zone in which there will be a neutral factor, UN factor or somebody else which will prevent this. In relation to face of the B2 as concerned I am authorized to tell you that on the 30 we have the various modalities. I do think by showing the modalities of the B2 there were part of our difficulties concerning the situation.

D - Right. Why don't you make it the basis. I feel now that it is very difficult to

say now where's the line of the Dead and very difficult for you to move your troops that's obvious. From the present situation they don't we make it a buffer more, one step to the East, and make a buffer State between both troops. I mean there is Jerusalem, there is Suez, he agrees that your troops come somewhere here, which you don't approve, the bridge head in Ramleh. You don't accept that. Why don't we meet, and you have that according to the Security Council 242, steps will be taken by you for withdrawal in Sinai, according to any negotiation it will be done. Why don't we make it one step here.

A: For example?

B: I'll just come a line. Just one step.

B: And a BZ here.

A: Q BZ here for the UN.

B: Well, on the I have no authority to speak

A: It means one of our troops will be here

A: Ah! I see

A: and then your troops will be here and the Buffer State will be here; and then everything will be -

B: Well I understood. May I ask you some questions. If you say some of your troops will be here, to what do you have in mind?

A: We can discuss it, I don't know

B: I mean on each of points 1, 2 Hebron, Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus

A: We can discuss it in details;

you think that it will not be advisable
the Arabs to be there, the commissioners of
Israel will not be there, the commissioners of
you want infantry only, unchanged in quality,
we can abandon it, or the we can
address the technical note.

I see

If minute you go from here, there are no
hot interests from both sides. - Specially the
troops will be away. The IDF will be in the
after area, everything will be cleared. I am
authorized to tell you if we can stop that
step and that's, - I can going to say it on the
phone and then 3rd phase can be on. If we go
to that line, higher political authorities will
be up.

Political negotiations.

Yes, sir

Maybe not.

If that include a meeting with highest
political authorities. Will that be possible?

Right

Indicated.

I'll tell you general, this is your proposition
cannot say whether
Just quote it to your officer, and he
will discuss it upon.
suggest general you have brought
very serious proposal. Because I have no
authority I cannot enter into a discussion on
because it is very, that we have

[illegible] to me Request I could very well
[illegible] personal objection, but it will not be
[illegible] I have no authority, and there is no
[illegible] to begin discussing it and I will
[illegible] of the my authorities as soon as possible.
(b) I think myself, if you remember I told you,
that my principle to which I want to stick,
[illegible] Delagoa Delagoa but no misunderstanding

[illegible]

I don't want you to have the impression that we
have no objections whatever, or that we already
agreed with, because but I will report it and
I'll do my best to see that you get an
answer as soon as possible. Now, this is a
very serious proposal.

Yes I know.

It has something to do with what we
proposed in the Interim Agreement, but it
might take more than one or two days
before you can answer to it. I might
be able to always give you an answer
but I certainly want to recapitulate, with
your permission general, because it is very
important to understand it. As I say take your
time, misunderstandings to hear.

Right, that is very good.

[illegible] (Pause). Now, you say we
[illegible] to the [illegible] — the [illegible]
[illegible] we could claim.

Alright yes.

[illegible] ? [illegible]

[illegible] you have certain [illegible] on the [illegible]

[illegible], the nature and character of [illegible] specific [illegible]
with [illegible] the Eastern Bank.
[illegible] a B.L with UN [illegible]
or any other, the [illegible] of which can be
changed.
[illegible] the UN will be better.
[illegible] of course.
[illegible] a market [illegible] the project

Yes, I think I have understood.
[illegible] the [illegible] of shipowners I
assume first, to make that ship [illegible]
[illegible] for the bridge head. [illegible]
the Bridge [illegible] the better [illegible]
have our bridge head on the [illegible]
of the political people can [illegible]
[illegible]. Then [illegible] for them for the rate,
[illegible]

[illegible] you said formerly, you [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] I could [illegible]
[illegible] from my own [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] that I can get ——
[illegible] the bearing
[illegible] [illegible].
[illegible] I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Tuesday a.m. October.

[illegible] whether that I can not [illegible] about it [illegible] about it [illegible] always as it [illegible] thought, so as I have already understood, I expect it today here, and I may become a witness. Meanwhile, I want to tell you about you by telling you that tomorrow [illegible] will be able to do so, it might take [illegible] days. Today is what? Today is Tuesday I think that we'll be able to give you an answer before Saturday or Sunday [illegible] point.

Thought. That means that I can expect to a conclusion that the Security Council elsewhere [illegible] the Israel is referred by you.

Yes, at this stage definitely.

At this stage [illegible]

It is difficult to define

We can define it better by [illegible] the line [illegible]

It is always possible, but we think it better to have a major more than [illegible] The intermediate phase that you have proposed.

I took the legal major more, and [illegible] that evaluation we can say. This is [illegible] maybe, what do you think about the [illegible] here, there

I would want to give you an idea [illegible] have to discuss it very seriously [illegible]

[illegible] very serious matter, and I [illegible] afraid to say a word, because I [illegible]

[illegible] you.

I [illegible] that this new proposal will [illegible] a long time to discuss between the two governments, and as you said until Saturday [illegible] meeting.

[illegible] not before Monday.

I see that's fair, but the situation here is getting more and more complicated. As you know our enemy that takes lots of space the Red army will stay there and it will stay there, until the end, and some [illegible] and small Albanian army become serious here. Can't you give us any recommendation, proposal to [illegible] the situation of the Albanian troops.

supply?

the military troops in Albania in left

the Red army.

the Red army here.

Ismail, you are speaking about supply. [illegible] thing.

[illegible]?

[illegible] supply

Please from [illegible] will discuss this [illegible] big step, and until they get to a decision upon this, it may not [illegible] a [illegible] decision for our troops.

I'll tell you, on the [illegible], but I have to look, and I think he'll be able to [illegible] you, since they gave me an answer to [illegible] problem, I think he will be able to give you [illegible] problem of the problem which concerns the withdrawal of the Red army.

the extension of the present [illegible]
ges
Construction of Supply Sparing [illegible]
pressed, or your government [illegible]
to make [illegible] and army [illegible]
and army do be annihilated. That is the
exact truth, I read it.
Annihilated
from two expressions.
We have no intention of the kind [illegible]
wage [illegible] and we want to make peace.
Paul to Tex.
Paul I don't think that an annihilation of the
[illegible] army will help us to make peace
right.
But this is a general statement you
intended in concrete fact. So identify to
satisfy your interest in concrete fact,
that I can tell you. I can present you
the account on the concrete problem
concerning the situation of the 2nd army
together with an answer to the. Can you
thank you very much.
Perhaps one before that I don't want to
promise. On Monday we have the [illegible]
latest Monday we'll have an answer with
the reduction, perhaps before. But at the
latest Monday noon.
Thought Paul from the military point of
view [illegible] the whole thing proposal
from them.
I [illegible] that [illegible] will be very [illegible]
[illegible] will [illegible]
It will go down in history as your plan
I think it will solve all the problems [illegible]

B. Any pressure?

A. Yes.

B. Maybe from the psychological point of view of the nation, maybe one point. Feeling that not a single soldier in Sinai. It will be very difficult for us. Its military cost as well.

A. I understand.

B. That's all. But we can put here 3 Divisions of Brigade, 2 Brigades, one tanks, artillery, artillery — that's up to the division. The minute you approve that you troops will go to Israel and then will be time to bring it will be alright.

A. I understand.

B. I mean 3 Divisions of the artillery, the problem, even we cannot — But with the FREG you have more than 3 Divisions, with the Air Force you have all the air cover, more and more ——— general, excuse me please, concerning the ——— resolution, UN Security Council resolution concerning the Sinai? I have discussion. If you can be quite short. I prefer that the summit will be a success not only to create solutions other problems. Because you declared in your reception [illegible] the resolution [illegible] and the [illegible] of the [illegible]

Exhibit

A: Yes, Sir

B: At this point I think yes. What else then? I think we have covered all points I want to summarize so to be clear.

(1) We are agreed on the exchange of prisoners of war, as we have already received a list of our wounded prisoner of war from the general.

the whole list?

A: It is the whole list.

B: As we have already received the whole list of our wounded P.O.W.'s I will make sure that as soon as possible, a list of your wounded P.O.W.'s will be handed through the Red Cross. Gen. Sela, I understand will arrange through the Red Cross the exchange of our release of the wounded P.O.W.'s.

(2) I understand that Gen. Sela is handing the first list of the P.O.W.'s in Egypt to be followed by other lists so that it will be the complete list in another two days?

A: As soon as possible

B: I would to stress that from our point of view, general, that this will not take too much time. Yesterday we talked about 3 days. So please, it will remove a lot of ill feeling. And of course we continue to supply you with lists of you

סודי ביותר
(לאחר מלוי)

טופס 2247

prisoners through the Red Cross. Another point

(3) Another point we agreed upon is to
be immediately as possible, a visit by the
Red Cross to the P.O.W's camps and
to see which are being handled in and
to our wounded P.O.W's before they
are evacuated, and of course, we have
permitted the visits already.

(4) Then we shall ask the Red Cross
mutually to ascertain the number of
seriously wounded people Suez and
3rd Army. After we know the figure, we
shall permit their evacuation. The
the wounded P.O.W's and the other P.O.W's
and of course we appreciate the gesture
made (by bringing Captain Dreiden back
A- Thank you very much.

Now on the problem, we formed between
us in the last three days a number
more, and we are trying to solve
and important problem, We should try
our best to give you an answer by
Sunday, I hope not later than Monday
Coupled with the, I have you an idea
on the question of how we shall
solve the problem of the continuing supply
of the 3rd army should hostilities
D - And the Suez city.

A - I have you an answer tonight at the

I'm not sure tomorrow morning about water supply
1 The city of Suez.
D Water supply the food and medical supply

B - (1) I ever you can answer about the current water supply which you say is cut today.
(2) yes, we will send you a message later giving the details of doctors, number of doctors, the amount of medical and food supplies, and I shall then try to give you an answer as to as possible How many inhabitants are there in Suez?
B. Exactly I don't know exactly, but Well it is thousands. Some of them were evacuated before war and some of them are there.
C - Could you give us an approximate figure?
D - Not less than 10,000 maybe 15,000 as much as I know. If we can solve the problem about our citizens we will be very glad, if we don't we will have ill feeling.
B - I understand.
D - If they are military we can accept, but if they are civilians it is very hard for us.

Recently we've had another information that you have in KHABRID, EAID, is there several civilians put in camps. Maybe right hoppe wrong. Is it true,

B: We camps! This I can answer you with full responsibility!

A: I reported that there are in civilian in camps.

B: Yes. On my responsibility.

A: Alright. Thank you very much.

B: If you have a specific report on a certain spot, let us know and we will immediately check it. I don't think it's right. Now you asked us to check in the AGFHQ here, a bunker where you think soldiers and officers are perhaps buried or alive. We have looked, there are so many bunkers we haven't found anything. If you can specify, we will do it. If you can give us a specific spot we'll go and check again.

A: Honestly it don't have anything about that point.

B: So if in the meantime you should on closer survey, you added this certain, it will make the search quicker.

A: Alright.

B: Before I forget about Suez,

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it's up to you what you will agree to the R.C. people to your side to search positions and in the tanks where there dead bodies and they will take the dead across. In the past this has been done. that you have already done something on it, propose this not because we want people to across to look for information about your positions. this is not the point. if this is acceptable to you in principle I suggest that they sit down and work out the areas where you will permit them to move and work with the R.C. to take out the bodies, and I will ask for a similar arrangement of course we will ..... it

A. I mean mainly on the eastern bank of the canal

B. Yes

A. As principle, I don't think there will be no objection but we'll see with the R.C. how it will go

B. So perhaps when you think you could answer this problem we will give you an answer on this about the same time

(medical supplies)

The chaplains will be civilians

That is not the point

2 - Concerning the list you gave us yesterday - we'd like you to check about 3 names which we couldn't identify. The 1st one is private [illegible] No. 2167... (consultations between Egyptians)

E. It was no. 33 in the list.

? No. I have no number, give me the name

? - O.K. private [illegible]

[illegible]

E. oh, it's something else

He's a tankist and I haven't his number

? You haven't got the number

No,

It's important you check again (repeats) (arabic)

Can you check again.

I will.

? Could you see his no here.

It's 2137299 - [illegible]

(5 minute break)

E. No 2167543 // It was No 33 in the list yesterday and we couldn't identify

He's a pvt, he's a tankist company and he has only some buns in hand. left

a bullet in the left foot. Hamo

Pse check again the number and the name

I will, I will

The other one is number #0 on your list without personnal number, he is also put, his name is [illegible] Gay. That's the name you gave us.

No, it is - [illegible] Feld from the nahal

Do you have his personnel no.

No,

[illegible] N[illegible] (That is the (burn) trouble with the left leg..)

Now the third no. is - [illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible] what he is civil engineer

What's his family name

[illegible] Debleta

What's his personnel No?

his no here as I see it 2131710

Pse check again because we couldn't identify him

- Now we have these corpses ~~[illegible]~~ you mentioned yesterday. We identified the pilot but we couldn't identify 4 of the 5 dead.
The first one was [illegible]

- Now please do me a favour and [illegible] these 4 [illegible]

Are these dead soldiers from the last strongpoint which surrendered

- No
Where are they from?
I'll check
But you're sure - they're not from the jetty of Suez, from Port Tufiq, the last people who surrendered, you know

I know, I can't just answer on the spot But I believe the coffins will be here tomorrow, we buried them you know, we did bury them on a chapel but we got them out and put them in boxes and we ~~called~~ told the [illegible] that they are ready for evacuation whenever they want.

I prefer leaving the people here and make an immediate handing of them

- Could it be arranged tomorrow
- Why not any time.
- Any time you want.

- I've got [illegible] here in the checkpoint and he's just ready to come any time.

[illegible] Perhaps we will bring him ask to bring him, if possible by helicopter.

- Can he walk? He's not a stretcher case is he? He can walk, can't he?

Yes, why not?

We want one thing concerning [illegible] we don't want a declaration about handing him on this condition we could get him out.

It wasn't mentioned before

I mean we don't want the press to declare it until we start exchanging the wounded people, that's very important.

It will be very difficult

I can imagine it

Isr - Because he will be handed over to his family and the whole country will know about it

3N - They can know, but not for publication

Isr - I can't believe we can censore it

3N - That's very important, that's the promise we gave anyway to our authorities because we felt just as they .... Well I believe that the exchange of wounded P.O.W. will be in effect any time, even from now as soon as we have the lists and the R.C. ...:

Isr - You mean you don't want to publicize this until - this exchange of wounded will be executed

3N - Until it will start which means 24 or 48 hours

There is a correction in this matter, for 20 hours not 24 hours, just just at all

Isr - [illegible]

3N - This will mean that he is among the wounded

Isr - one of the wounded we are exchanging.

(D)N - We appreciate very much his return and think that it will create, well what I believe is the main thing now is even

side must offer the maximum facilities to create the atmosphere, it's not only what we can reach, it's the atmosphere which allows everybody to accept what we would reach, that's the very main thing and that includes all the minor things between troops, civilians, press, commands, we've got to start creating - the conditions which would allow anything we can reach or anything our politicians can reach to take effect without trouble that's a very very important thing

- To prepare the public opinion on one side on the other side

- - - - - -

- You can't just transfer from being an enemy to a peace by signing any kind of document, there must be a period of relaxation and things like them

- tell me one thing colonel, how is it that there is no a wounded pilot among these 45

- The first 13 are pilots

I give names & ranks

B. About the Suez, the water, we know you have a water disinfection plant in a water cleaning plant in Suez, and we instructed, before the cease-fire, we instructed our airforce and our artillery troops not to touch it, what we have done because you must see how we can tackle the problem, as I told you on the 21st of October we have blown up, we have made a gap in the sweet water canal, I think in the Faid area, This is the only thing we have made, now, perhaps only today the water level is probably going down and perhaps only today the problem has been created for Suez, or is there any other problem? because we checked and we don't know any other thing we have blown up

Maybe that's the reason

All right, we'll chek it

In this case we want to make something to fascilitate getting the water

We understand it, I will check it when we get back, if you can give us any additional details about it by cable it will help

All right, we'll do

A. About Capt. Dan Avidan.

B. You asked not to be published

A. Please, because he is just one man, and then it will be very difficult, not to announce it until we start changing the wounded P.O.W tet's say he will be among them.

How do we do this?

How do we do this? There is no [illegible] no telephone no fax

(There is internal argument in Hebrew.)

B. We'll do our best not to publish it, we have censorship so our radio, our T.V., our newspapers, with we can close the censorship, I only hope that foreign correspondent will know about it. If he goes abroad and publishes there we'll have difficulties but inside the country well. close it

A. All right. And in case it is abroad, we'll say that he was seriously wounded.

Argument in Hebrew how to [illegible] Avidan

End of conversation

Meeting with Egyptians on 1 November 1973

A. Aluf Tal

B. Jamsy

C. Colonel Amedi (or Auedi!)

D. Israeli

E. Aluf Eyal, Liaison Officer with the Red Cross

A. Here I have a list of subjects. Shall I tell you? a) The change of wounded prisoners-of-war; b) the list of prisoners-of-war; c) the first list; c) an arrangement for finding out casualties; d) the problem of the civilians in Suez; e) the corridor for the 3rd Army; f) disengagement of forces, which was your remark or proposal; g) I was told that you complained about the west bank civilians, that something happened to them.

B. You put them in camps.

A. I inquired (about) the problem and I'll tell you what happened.

A. Would you like (the) General to discuss one subject in this order?

B. Alright. First of all about the wounded P.O.W.'s. We accepted all we had discussed with General Yariv and we are going to carry it out as soon as possible. From today the Red Cross went to Suez and to the 3rd Amy to make a list of the seriously wounded personnel and to be evacuated. And then there is a helicopter, as far as I know, from the UN, coming from Israel today to give the list of our wounded prisoners-of-war in Israel.

A. May I call General Eyal, a retired General, he is a Liaison with the Red Cross in Israel? If you do not mind we'll bring him along here with the list and the details.

B. Alright. There is no problem about the wounded P.O.W.'s.

A. May I present General Eyal.

C. Colonel Auedi.

A. We have a copy of wounded P.O.W.'s and we submitted to the Red Cross, but we brought along a copy, and this is exactly the list that the Red Cross got.

B. As we said before and we agreed with General Yariv, this goes as follows: The seriously (wounded) persons or soldiers on the eastern bank with the 3rd Army troops, and the wounded P.OW.'s in Israel, the list here, and the seriously wounded in Suez, as a city, will be evacuated through the Red Cross to Egypt at the time we are sending you the wounded P.O.W.'s.

A. Simultaneously you mean.

B. Yes. According to the schedule to be done by the Red Cross. Whatever they like. So it is up to the Red Cross.

A. Excuse me, one minute please.

(In Ivrit: (Have) we already received the list of our wounded in Egypt?)

D. Yes. 45 wounded Israeli P.O.W.'s in Egypt and the will take place simultaneously.

A. Right.

B. Now today, as far as I have been informed from the U.N. (Mr. Selazar ?)[redacted], the Red Cross representative in Cairo went to the 3rd Army troops at 9 o'clock in the morning to make a list of the seriously wounded persons to be evacuated and also he will go to Suez City to see the seriously wounded and meanwhile there is a helicopter coming from Israel today, very close to (in Ivrit: Ayin Mussa) at 0300 today with one of your representatives to give the list and make confirmation with Salazar to arrange the exchange of these wounded P.O.W.'s.

A. It is right. May I make a remark? The lists of both parties of prisoners in Egypt and Israel of wounded prisoners is already submitted and known to the Red Cross and both parties. You've got our list, we've got your list and everything is ready for exchange. There is no list yet of your wounded in the 3rd Army, and in the town of Suez.

B. Right.

A. So why not separate the problem? Then we'll get your list of the 3rd Army and the town of Suez. Then we'll be able to evacuate them. Why should we wait until these arrangements take place?

B. It will not take long time. Today Mr. Salazar promised that he will get give the list of the seriously wounded people in Suez.

A. What is your estimation about the scale of the list?

B. How many? I don't know exactly. Maybe 200, maybe 10, I don't know.

A. I see. So your proposal is to make the whole exchange simultaneously. You will send our wounded, we'll send your wounded from Israel, the 3rd Army and Suez. We discussed that with General Yariv.

D. As far as I remember, the summing-up about the wounded prisoners was like this - that we are going to do first of all the list that has been done. Meanwhile, the Red Cross will ascertain how many are seriously wounded in the 3rd Army area because at the beginning it was talked about 2,000 wounded in the 3rd Army area and we summed it up to about 75 seriously wounded and the exchange will be done by the Red Cross's good offices, by steps that first the P.OW.'s who are in hospitals already in Egypt and in Israel, and a second phase - the soldiers wounded and not prisoners in the 3rd Army area and Suez - this is going to be a second step.

B. We didn't say - one step or two steps about that. It was one bulk! (sharply)

A. General -

B. And these 2,000 - it was a rumour and - 70, and maybe less than that and I am sure it will be less than that. (hurt tone)

A. Although I got a report as he said (D), I am not going to insist on that, provided that it will take place simultaneously, and we will have our wounded at the same time and provided the Red Cross is in a position and is able to carry it out.

B. Mr. Salazar promised that he will get the names today, if he will have one more day, maximum, we'll make it in the worst case 2 days, if he can't do it today, and I am sure he can do it in one day, so the list of names will be with us both sides and then -

A. I would suggest that tomorrow morning the whole operation will take place.

B. Alright, the Red Cross can do whatever it likes.

A. Can the Red Cross do it General Eyal?

General Eyal: I do hope yes.

A. Tomorrow? Do they have enough facilities to ~~carry~~ transfer people simultaneously?

Eyal: As you know there are two problem: 1) the evacuation from Israel - this might be by air.

A. Well (is) 45 people one airplane or 2?

D. No. 37 is in one airplane - so 2 airplanes from Israel and

C. And from Egypt as well. We have 45.

A. I suggest to compromise. As I have agreed to make it simultaneously from the 3rd Army as well and Suez, I would like you not to divide our group in Egypt into small parties, but tomorrow morning to send all of them to Israel. You have a lot of people in Israel, about 400 - it will take more time, and the Red Cross will do it non-stop, of course, but I will appreciate it very much if you will agree today that tomorrow morning, you will send our people and we will start to send your people. Because I know what happens later. We understand each other here and we come to an agreement, and then there is a matter of communication always, and then the Red Cross comes and presents a very complicated programme, you see, and by that communication breaks down. So, I would suggest that both of us, you and I, will come into an agreement on the practical steps that should be taken tomorrow morning and that's all.

B. Im afraid we can't do it in one or two days. It's easy to take the 45 Israeli wounded prisoners-of-war by two planes and that's all. On the other side it will take a long time for the Red Cross to evacuate the 400 and those who are here.

A. So you mean that you won't send all of our people before you get your last man?

B. Just to make them parallel with each other. And the Red Cross will do it - I don't know how.

A. I will accept any solution that you will offer, provided that it is balanced in some way. So if you wan't to make a balance in quantities, one time-table, then we have to separate the problem of the 3rd Army and the problem of Suez. Let's discuss - I want to come into an agreement about the 3rd Army as well. But let's start tomorrow to exchange the wounded from Israel and from Egypt and when the operation will come to an end, we'll start to evacuate from the 3rd Army and Suez.

B. Sorry to say, that it's difficult to make it like that. Here's the Suez City, 10 kms. from here, and we can evacuate our wounded personnel as quickly as possible. It won't take any time, and the 3rd Army maximum (is) 70, and I'm afraid to say maybe less. If it is 70 and here 100 or 200, we can take them in one day or two days.

A. But I'm sure that to evacuate 400 people from Israel and the wounded people of the 3rd Army, it will take a few days and we will have to wait a few days until we have our people. It makes no sense, because there is a very small group in Egypt.

B. I'm afraid that the Red Cross would take 2 and 3 and 4 days to arrange for the two planes to come to evacuate your wounded because they have so many complicated procedures.

A. Then it means the whole operation will begin in 2 or 3 days and it's a pity. You see we wanted it to be done simultaneously, so we cannot start by evacuating Egyptian wounded soldiers from Israel before such a step is carried out as far as our wounded are concerned. It should be simultaneously as we've just agreed. Now you say it will take about 2 days.

B. I assume.

A. You assume before of the Red Cross?

B. If we agree after 2 days, we'' start the operation, just to give the Red Cross time, that's all. If ~~thx~~ Mr. Salazar will be ready to do it tomorrow, we'll be ready to do it tomorrow, but I'm sure with their complications through Geneva and transportation and the and paint it white and helicopters and planes should be like this and call signs and so one, if they can do it, we'll start it. At the same time, we give you your wounded prisoners-of-war, you will send us ours, but ours will take longer, that (is) for sure, because they are 400 and you have 40. At the same time, we evacuate our wounded people by road. Convoys are ready, the doctors are ready, it can be done in one or two days.

A. Let me find out something. Can you contact the Red Cross through the telephone?

C. They are in the area.

A. (Ivrit: I want actual witness - otherwise there won't be an end to this flirt).

A. The Red Cross, they intended to have at their disposal tomorrow, under their protection and patronage, all the people in Israel. So as from tomorrow, if we come to an agreement, all these people will be under supervision of the Red Cross~~nx~~ not of us, and they will be trusted. Now I don't know how long it will take (till) they are ready to start the transfer tomorrow.

B. That's right.

A. They are ready to start to transfer your people from Israel tomorrow, so I suggest that tomorrow you will transfer to us our wounded as well.

B. If the Red Cross says "I'm ready to evacuate the Israeli soldiers from Egypt, from tomorrow", we'll have no objection.

A. But I want to clarify this. If they manage to transfer tomorrow a 100 of your people, I don't know what is their capacity, but I suppose they won't manage to transfer tomorrow all the 400. Will you transfer to us all our 45 people or (do) you want to wait until your last man comes?

B. I think we'll wait until all of them will will be changed simultaneously. Just to be clear with each other.

A. So let's speak in terms of numbers. How (do) you say?

B. I'll tell you how to go - Say here in Israel 400 - that's ours. We'll say (the) estimation in the 3rd Army (is) 60 or 50 just to make a round figure. Maybe in Suez 100, so that the total number will be 550. This 550 will be exchanged by your 45. The 550, 400 of them will be by plane, from Israel to Egypt, the rest of them will be by cars, ambulances, from here. The last man from your soldiers will be the last man from our soldiers, and (the) schedule done by the Red Cross, whatever it likes - starts tomorrow; the day after tomorrow.

A. Let's say tomorrow it starts - how many people will we get tomorrow out of the 45?

B. That means 10 opposite 1.

D. That means that the Red Cross plane is going to go to Cairo, and instead of 37 is going to being only --

B. We are ready to give transportation and help for the Red Cross to make it as quickly as possible.

A. Let's say - I want you to know one thing General. I am discussing with you that, not because I don't trust you, but because of practical reasons. According to this proportion, suppose the Red Cross will manage to send 100 people, Egyptian soldiers tomorrow, according to your formula, you'll have to send 10 people of ours. So it means maybe the Red Cross will have to transfer 4 or 5 groups from Egypt. I don't see how it can be done 10 times to do the same operation. May I ask you frankly - Why are you insisting on it? Don't you trust us? Are you afraid that if we have our 45 people we'll not let you have the rest of yours?

A. They are ready to start to bring our people from Israel tomorrow, so I suppose that tomorrow [illegible] to us our bonuses as well.

B. If the Red Cross says they're ready to evacuate Israeli soldiers from Egypt, then tomorrow we'll have no objection.

A. But I want to clarify this. [illegible] to transfer [illegible] to our people. I don't know what is their capacity, but I suppose they won't manage to transfer tomorrow all the [illegible]. Will you transfer to us all our [illegible] you must [illegible] your last war [illegible]?

B. I think we'll wait until all of them will [illegible] to be clear with each other.

A. So let's speak in terms of numbers. How [illegible] you say?

B. I'll tell you this: Say [illegible] - let's [illegible] (or) additional to the [illegible] (15) 10 or 20 [illegible] [illegible] your [illegible]. The [illegible] will be by cars, [illegible] [illegible] will be the last [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

B. I'm feeling that you are keen on this problem, and it's very important for you as we understand it very very well, and you wan't to make it as quickly as possible, and we - so we wan't to do it. We can't say that all the Israeli soldiers P.O.W.'s are handed to Israel and all our soldiers are still in Suez, in there and in here. The reaction inside here will be the same reaction as in your country as far as the problem is concerned.

A. I understand your problem. Thank you for telling me. So may I forward a proposal. If this is the problem, let's divide our people into 2 groups not 10 to 1 because it means 10 times the same operation. Let's divide it into 2 groups - let's have one group when we begin the mutual operation, and the 2nd group when your last group will be sent.

B. Alright. So the first group - the first Israeli group will be from now 27 seriously wounded soldiers, as it is defined by the Red Cross. They made a definition for your people that 27 of them are seriously wounded and the rest not seriously wounded. So we start with these 27, and then the last group will be with our last group. The rest of the 27. So the first group will be 27, the 2nd group will be 18.

A. I wan't according to our knowledge, the Red Cross will be ready from tomorrow morning to begin this operation, and I hope it will begin tomorrow morning.

B. I hope so too.

A. I hope we'll get today the list of your wounded soldiers from the 3rd Army. Because as you said, the helicopter is there and the people are there, so I hope the list will be ready.

B. I hope so.

A. Now we raise the problem of our wounded people, P.O.W.'s and dead and killed in the town of Suez. We asked you to find out for us - what happened and how many they are.

B. It was very difficult to get the numbers of those who are in Suez because the communication with the Government is very bade and takes a very long time and couldn't get accurate information about that, but as a principle, we said - the P.O.W.'s will be handed over as P.O.W.'s, the dead bodies, as dead bodies.

A. According to your principle we have a list of 45 wounded, but there are more wounded in the Suez Canal which both of us don't (know) how many. So I would like this group of Suez Wounded to be associated with this arrangement.

B. If we have any wounded soldiers in Suez itself, they will be treated certainly as this.

A. So when can we expect your answer about how many wounded there are?

B. Maybe tomorrow. Because we asked the Government and we couldn't get any wire from them.

A. So in addition to our 45 wounded people, we'll get our wounded out of the town of Suez, is that true? And I hope tomorrow you will be in a position to tell us how many men we have there.

B. Alright.

A. Thank you. So we are talking now about our 45 people which are in the list plus x people that we don't know yet how many out of the town of Suez. Thank you very much indeed, and you say that those who are P.O.W.'s, they -

B. Will be treated as P.O.W.'s.

A. As the rest of our P.O.W.'s, and the dead as dead and wounded as wounded.

B. And I hope that their names will be included in the list. I will appreciate it very much if you will make the remark that these people are our of the town of Suez. So that we will know by that that they are included. Is that alright?

B. Alright. In order not to make N any confusion about these wounded P.O.W.'s a liaison officer can come with Monsieur Boisar and see the General here, or in Suez or any area to settle all the matters. We agreed about the principles. About the procedure, "if there are two soldiers here, we can do that, we need transportation". They can do it, the three of them.

A. I think it is a very good idea, but I wanted to make another proposal. Maybe we can get hold of them now and bring them along here. If we can establish contact with them, maybe we can bring them now - the Red Cross.

B. Alright.

D. Mr. Boisar.

A. Go and try. If you manage, alright, if not, we'll arrange a meeting for tomorrow.

B. For both of them. He's supposed, at 1300, to meet your helicopter (at) El-Shat.

A. Try to establish contact, if it is possible maybe we can conclude it on the spot today, it will be the best thing. We'll let's wait for him and in the meantime -

B. The list of the P.O.W.'s. This list as I promised before, will be handed today to the Red Cross. But not the complete list.

A. Do you have any idea how many people are there?

B. No, I don't know exactly.

A. And the rest of the -

B. We didn't make a schedule for that, for giving the full list of names - some of them may be in Suez, some of them maybe in the 3rd Army.

A. (They offered cigarettes)

B. No, thank you. So we'll give them gradually.

A. I wan't to tell you frankly, General, my intension is to eliminate factors of friction. We wan't to make as many arrangements as possible that both parties will be satisfied, and I think it is in the interest of both parties to eliminate friction and tension, and as you mentioned before about public opinion, in your country, in our country, about wounded soldiers. It also applies to P.O.W.'s.

B. Right.

A. And I don't think it makes any gain if information is handed over from us to you or from you to us. And I know you have quite a good administration.

B. (Gives a smile of satisfaction)

A. So I think it's about time to know exactly our names, and how many Israeli soldiers are P.O.W.'s in Egypt. We will appreciate very much if you'll be able to submit to us the rest of the names in due time, you see. Because it solves a lot of tension and it raises public opinion's temper. It is not in the benefit, I think of our mutual interests, not only of ours.

B. Right. First we didn't receive the whole list of our prisoners of Egypt - all the P.O.W.'s are not known to us although you announced that you have about 6,000, but we didn't receive the names of these 6,000.

A. Let me find out. (In Ivrit: What happened?)

B. We didn't receive the names of the 6,000 people who were announced that they are P.O.W.'s.

A. Let me try to find out, to clarify it.

(In Ivrit: What happens? We did not accept to give them the P.O.W.'s)

D. (In Ivrit: We gave, Sir. 6796 names were given to the Red Cross)

A. (In Ivrit: Dead?)

D. (In Ivrit: Yes, up till today at 10 o'clock.)

A. Up to today we passed to the Red Cross the names of 6796 Egyptian soldiers exactly. It was submitted to the Red Cross up to 10.00 o'clock today. Names, ranks, personal number, etc. Exactly as this list. So we handed to the Red Cross their names. Now you just told me that the first list will be handed over to us tomorrow.

B. Today. This one will be handed to you today, to the Red Cross. And then gradually we'll give the other lists.

A. Gradually? I don't think that the position, the military position or political position of Israel or Egypt will be affected by how we treat our P.O.W.'s. It only raises tension without any advantage to any party.

B. As far as their treatment, they are treated very very well as P.O.W.'s. The problem is of names, and this problem as you know is a complicated one, and it is taking a political side on that. So according to (the) Geneva Convention, we should admit the names - right? We will give you the names, but the whole names are not available now. So we'll give the list, the time we'll have the second list we'll give it, the third list we'll give it, and so on. But very difficult for me to put dates on that. I promised General Yariv that we'll give the list of the first names in three days and that's the third day.

A. It's quite alright. Do you know why we need this list as early as possible? We need it to know - we have also missing soldiers, by having their names, their parents will know whether their boys are alive or dead or whether they are in Egypt as P.O.W.'s. So it has nothing to do with politics, it has nothing to do with the State of Israel or with the State of Egypt. It has only to do with 2 parents, with individual people and I don't see what kind of benefit or advantage you can get out of it if you hold the list. I understand if we need to have a hard discussion or conversation about matters of interest. I understand, I do understand. I don't understand why shouldn't we make efforts to help parents to know whether their boys are alive or dead. I really don't understand.

B. We will do our best. We will do our best. According to the P.O.W.'s, I had a message now from the Minister, the minute I came here, that 4 officers were captured yesterday by your troops somewhere here, yesterday. I don't know where because he didn't put it in the message - their names are with me - Colonel Manduch Halim Gerges; Colonel Ahmed Elmi Salim Taber; Lt. Colonel Said Moisur Mohammed Abas; Captain Hamdi Zen El-Adin Pharag. They were captured yesterday somewhere here, I don't know exactly.

A. I will find out and let you know.

B. Please. We don't wan't to consider them P.O.W.'s, because after (the) cease-fire we may have some of our soldiers or officers about here. They will be captured as P.O.W.'s, so we can send some of our civilians, maybe capture one of these soldiers and make another -

A. I don't know why we should argue now before I know the information, but suppose I myself and one of my officers will go now and will penetrate into the 3rd Army area and will be captured there. Are you going to hand him over to me back? And say "Excuse me, there is a cease-fire"?

B. (Quiet laugh)

A. You will tell me, I'll tell you what you will tell me "He will be treated like a P.O.W." So let me find out what happened and we will tell you.

B. This information came to us through the U.N.

A. I see. Do you know where?

B. Maybe somewhere near the UN post or something like that? I don;t know. We received a message from the UN, so he sent it to me to discuss today.

A. So I will find out, and will let you know. If they are with us, I will tell you. And then we'll have to argue what their status (is) - whether P.O.W.'s or kidnapped. That will be later - let me find out first.

B. About the 3rd point - that's the wounded and the dead bodies.

A. What about the P.O.W.'s? I understand your position, but I'll appreciate it very much, General, if you will tell me at least what do you have (in) mind until we'll have the rest of the list?

B. I can't say a definite time for that. I am sorry to say that I can't give a date, a definite date to give the 2nd list or the 3rd list or the 4th list. So I think this problem will be solved very soon. As far as I understand or feel, this problem will be solved very soon, how and when --

A. I think that you got my point and am waiting for your reaction. I know that you are not the President of your State and I am not the Prime Minister of my State. But both of us know what the honour of the soldier is, and it has nothing to do with their parents. I am waiting for your response.

B. And I think you heard what the President said about this yesterday.

A. Yes, I heard, but I hope you heard our Prime Minister too. I'll tell you. Let's finish first the formal discussion and then I'll appreciate very much if we'll have a private discussion.

B. About the dead bodies. We had 6 dead bodies in our country. They are completely respected, buried by your religious procedure and they are ready to be handed. They were supposed to be handed (over) today or last day, I'm not sure.

A. Through the Red Cross?

B. The Red Cross had been informed (about) putting the boxes, and they are ready -

A. Yesterday we got 6. Do you refer to the same 6?

B. Yes.

A. There are no other dead bodies?

B. No, in our country we don't have no more. That's these 6. But the rest of them are in the field, the Canal zone maybe west, maybe east.

A. So what about arrangements that our people will be able to go and look for them?

B. We sent orders to the local commanders, as I said before, to see where are the dead bodies, and then we'll permit the Red Cross to come and see the dead bodies to separate them, you take your and we take ours.

A. Please look into destroyed tanks.

B. That's the main point which we emphasized, the destroyed tanks in -

A. When will you ~~us~~ have decent information?

B. Maybe three or four days. We may make it the 5th.

A. Yes, quite alright. You mean the Red Cross will be in a position to -

B. I think so at any rate.

A. Very good.

(Consultation in Ivrit)

A. We have a problem. First of all I wan't to thank you for this arrangement. The problem is that within abandoned tanks or detsroyed tanks, if the Red Cross or you will take out the bodies, we won't be able to recognize them anymore. So we would like to recognize the tank itself. By that we can recognize the crew, you see? And because of this and other reasons of religion, we would like that our Rabbi will be with the Red Cross so as to identify on the spot.

B. I propose to make another meeting especially for that, to make the details of these arrangements. The Representative of the Red Cross and one of your representatives and one of our representatives to have a meeting somewhere here or at any place so that they can make a schedule to go to Devesoir area one day to search all this during 2 or 3 days and finish it.

A. Is it alright with you to decide upon this meeting for tomorrow?

B. There is no -

C. We can agree now and confirm it later this evening.

A. So principally we agree that tomorrow such a meeting will take place, and you will confirm it.

B. Alright, we will confirm it.

B. This confirmation will be with the Red Cross.

(Break of consultations. Informal conversation)

B. I want to convey the problems of the Red Cross to the Red Cross, or what? We will send the problems of the Red Cross which we are discussing now to the Red Cross or we will report it?

D. I think it will be better.

B. To report it by us.

D. And we will also inform our people, so that there isn't any misunderstanding. Two people will know the problem.

A. The Red Cross people will be brought along by helicopter.

B. So let's go on to the 4th point - Suez City.

A. Suez City - yes.

B. Now as a principle, we have our people. There - they should be fed, they should have water, they should have medical support.

A. I know the problem, let me put it this way: as far as medical treatment - and I refer to doctors, to medicine, etc, it is quite alright with us. I'll tell you what is our problem. This is not a problem. It is guaranteed - as far as medical assistance is concerned. The problem is with food and water. I don't say "no", but I just wan't to put forward the problem. The problem is that there is no separation between the 3rd Army and the town. So, by allowing ... (end of tape) I will appreciate it if you can suggest a solution to this dilemma, because there is a dilemna. I can tell you theoretically what kind of solution - One solution can be supervision of UN personnel with liaison officers of ours between the town of Suez and the Third Army. This can be one solution and by that there will be two different issues. One issue the town of Suez and the second issue the 3rd Army. If we could separate and inspect whether food, water, etc. is not transferred from the citizens to the 3rd Army. This is one theoretic possibility. I don't know whether you will like it or not. Another theoretical possibility is that more to avoid trouble for the civilian population, we are ready to let them free exit if you want.

B. Free exit?

A. If you wan't to evacuate them, we have nothing against it. There are two theoretical solutions to the problem. But I don't say these are the only alternatives. I will appreciate very much if you have a 3rd alternative which will meet our problem. The problem is how to separate the support of the civilian population of the town of Suez from the armies.

B. Well, you agreed to supply the 3rd Army with supplies and medical support.

A. It was a temporary arrangement, as far as I know.

B. Yes. We'll talk about that in the coming point. But now, there is an agreement between both countries and both Governments to supply the 3rd Army with water supply and medical support and it is running now, and I hope it will continue. The same thing will be done or it is proposed to be done to the civilians. More

important for us than the 3rd Army. To make a separation between them all. The things which will be given to the civilians in Suez will be also the same things, supplies, water and medical support only. These items will be checked by the UN. They will be under your control because you check them here, so don't be afraid we'll give them supplies to be given to the 3rd Army because we are giving already the 3rd Army supplies and medical support. Now we are making troubles for the civilians only. We want to let them feel that they can live, but evacuation of the city, we don't wan't, and we have no idea about evacuation.

A. I could imagine. I am not pressing you. So I would suggest, that you will ... to us a list of figures how much food, how much water you need for the civilian population, and what are the guarantees that this will be for the civilian population only. So I'm waiting for -

B. General Yariv told me the same question. And I have an answer now to settle that problem because it is one of the most important problems of today. He asked me what kind of items to be given to the civilians. Then in the last conference. Well, we need lorries everyday for the city. One lorry (of) wheat-flour - that's for bread, one lorry - rice, one lorry - petrol.

A. Why should they have petrol?

B. That is for the cars, the civilian cars.

A. Is business as usual in the town of Suez?

B. Not as usual, but if it is as usual they need 30 (?) But we are giving only one for the Government, the policemen, ambulances. One lorry for medical support. One small car for blood and plasma.

A. Everyday.

B. Two lorries for different items of rations. I mean these ones. So there are 7 lorries to be given to the city everyday. They will be checked by UN under their supervision, no military items - here you can check them or your check-point - for 1,2,3,4 hours and then to be release to go to the city. There are so many things for the city, but we are taking the main items only. These rations and water only - but there are so many other items - we don't wan't to -

A. I understand, but you didn't tell me what are the guarantees that this will not go to the 3rd Army.

B. Because you are giving already the 3rd Army supplies.

A. Well, it is subject to further discussion for the future. These were ad hoc arrangements. I don't (know) what are the arrangements for the future. So I would prefer to separate these two problems. Let me put all my questions about it, because this is a very complicated issue - how many people there are?

B. Maybe 30,000.

A. 30,000? I've been told 6,000, 4,000.

B. I've been asked about that, I don't know about that.

D. You mentioned the other time 3,000, 4,000 inhabitants.

B. I said that because I couldn't get the number. Some of them were evacuated before the war and some of them are there. I don't know how many people are there, but this estimation came to me from our administration for public health, and also the Minister of Supply.

A. I understand about the population. Nobody knows exactly. But what about the guarantees that it won't be transferred to the 3rd Army.

B. How we can make any guarantee. I don't have any- do you wan't to put the UN force between this and the Canal or what?

A. I don't know. I'm expecting you -

B. I'm expecting to have confidence with each other because the most important thing is confidence. I feel that the population there will need that for themselves, and the Army will take its supplies. We will not give the Army food and leave the civilians. The Army should give the civilians, but not the civilians give the Army.

A. It's true, and I am sure that these things are very proper within yourselves, but the problem here is that we are two parties here, you see. I am sure that you make the best arrangements according to your norms and means, and I will have to ask my authorities, but if I may make a suggestion, in order to promote the request of yours, my authorities won't discuss it, because I just now got a telephone about the problem that we discussed a few minutes ago about our wounded, soldiers in the town of Suez, the prisoners and the dead. I just got a telephone now - because my authorities would like to refer to them as to a separate group. All three groups -

the bodies, the wounded and the P.O.W.'s. They would like to have them as one group, and to separate this issue from the general issue of the wounded, the P.O.W.'s and the dead bodies. But you said just before that you referred to the wounded soldiers in Suez as to the wounded P.O.W.'s, to the bodies as to the rest of the bodies and to the P.O.W.'s as to the rest of the P.O.W.'s, so with such a position, I mean my authorities wouldn't refer to it as to a good will of your authorities - of your side, you see. And I don't think it will promote discourse. We must find a formula, both of us are soldiers, General. I don't know exactly your influence upon your civilian authorities, but I know exactly my influence as far as military subjects are concerned, of course. I have a lot to say being the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, but I have not enough power to influence my civilian authorities and I think, I'm telling you exactly, I think they will have a lot of reservations because the problem of the 3rd Army - your position as far as our wounded soldiers there and P.O.W.'s and bodies are concerned and I denied I objected because they wanted to enforce me to take a position upon a point that we have discussed already and agreed upon and I objected. I managed to deny it, to repel it that means. I could do things easier, I could tell you alright I'll pass the message to my authorities and you will get an answer. I could tell you this but by this I will mislead you. I'm sure my authorities won't accept it as it is. We must find another formula.

B. Now I feel that the final goal of all what's going on here in this area is to let the 3rd Army and civilians in Suez suffer as much as you can. Am I right or wrong?

A. You mean our goal?

B. Yes.

A. I think you are wrong.

B. I hope I am wrong. Now, you are doing everything to x separate the city and the army. Not to give the Army as much food as it wants, we're supposed to submit to the 3rd Army 12 lorries - that's a day. Now during the 5 days, you submitted only 60 - that means 12 lorries every day. That means these rations and water may be only enough for a battalion. The rest has no rations and no water and we didn't discuss that although it is very little, because we took 5 days to submit 60 lorries to the 3rd Army, although we feel that we didn't say a word. Now we are coming to the civilians and another complication will be -

A. I admit that there is a problem.

B. I know.

A. I'm just looking forward fothe better formula, how to solve it, that is all.

B. If you are submitting already the rations and water to the Third Army, with your acceptance, so the same thing with the civilians. The civilians should have priority.

A. You know what, General, I'll do my best and let you know and if I say I'll do my best, I'll do my best. But I am not authorized to commit my authorities now. I'll let you know.

B. If this problem will not be solved, everything will be stuck, or will go to the dead ....., as we say. Now, again everything will be postponed and then we'll come to the next point about the water for the civilians and then I'm afraid everything will be also the same. They don't have water. If you permit them to have water alright, if not, we'd see how can they live.

A. They don't have water?

B. They don't have water. The water now in Suez is as follows - The Canal comes from Ismaelia to Suez, and it was blown out (up) by the Israeli troops on the 21st of October. That is one source of water to Suez. Another source of x water is a water-line coming from Cairo through Zitia (Atia?) and into Suez. Both channels are under your control now.

A. Does the water flow?

B. But we are keeping it. We are locking it from Cairo.

A. Why?

B. In order not to give water here.

A. To us?

B. Yes.

A. You wan't us to give you water and you don't wan't to give us water?

B. I'm telling the truth. Now for the Suez. To amend the Canal from the distance may be half way between Ismailia and Suez, and this is the main source. We need so many men, 100 technical men to work there.

A. Excuse me. You mentioned two sources of water.

B. Yes, the Canal and the pipe line.

A. What about the reservoirs of the town itself?

B. They have reserves for a couple of days - 5 days, 10 days, 15 or 30. They should keep it all the time.

A. I see -

B. So if we wan't to facilitate the matter of water from Suez Canal, we have two variants - the first one to mend the Canal here, to mend it (by) specialists, about 100 to go there with their grebers, bulldozers, to mend what happened on the 21st. It will take a long long time.

A. What other alternative do you have?

B. The alternative - the pipe line in Zitif (?), you have your troops there and our technicians can go there - about 50 persons, 5 cars, 2 pumps, 2 grebers, - to stay there and work the pumps to make it work day and night. They should stay there in this area. That's where your troops are located now. That is the quickest way - pipline.

A. Are these the only two alternatives?

B. Yes.

A. No other alternative?

B. No other. So if you wan't to give them water, we should do the two channels or two means simultaneously. The quickest way to do it now through the pipeline, so they can take water, and then meanwhile we are working on the Canal zone. The sweet water; we need it not only for the population here in the city, but for the whole people in the area, Cabrit, Janiffa, Fayid, all this area. There are thousands there living, so they need water for themselves, for their animals, about the plants.

A. About these poor people we know everything, and we take care of them. I can tell you that you raised the problem of some of them who were taken to camps.

B. No, no, that's what we heard, but the General Yariv said no.

A. No, no. I am sorry to admit that he wasn't right. I checked it. You were right and I cancelled it, and they are back.

B. Back home.

A. Yes. They returned to their places. I'm very sorry, and General Yariv just didn't know.

B. That's alright.

A. But I checked it. You were right and I cancelled it, and we've sent them back to their places.

B. They need water for themselves, for their animals, for their plants. We can't give them water unless we mend the sweet Canal.

A. Now they are under (our) responsibility and we are taking care of them. I think the real problem is the problem of the town of Suez, of course. We are taking of your people here along the lake and if you wan't to draw attention to some experts, I will treat it, if you will tell me that you are not satisfied, or that you would like something else to be done. I will look into it.

B. All we need is to solve the problem of the supplies of the city and the water for the city, and it's fair enough for the civilians.

A. Well, I understand the problem and I will raise it with my authorities and I can promise you personally that I will do my best to solve it.

B. About the convoy, let's finish with the Suez - about the convoy for the 3rd Army. We feel now is getting better than before, but still we need more and more, do you think we can, when you finish this convoy, we'll have another permanent supply for the 3rd Army or still a temporary one - one convoy only and that is enough? I asked General Yariv the same question, and he told me he would give me an answer on the 4th or the 5th.

A. He was right. Because as you mentioned before, it's a political question and a strategical (one) too and as you know our Prime Minister is in the States now. We cannot take a decision when she is absent. So, we are waiting for our Prime Minister.

B. Can you speed it up by any other means, because it's very very slow and it's making so many troubles to the local commanders here, to the UN, giving troubles to us.

A. I don't think we are the reason for and delay. I think the procedure takes time but not because of us. What is the [illegible] situation?

D. The officer responsible has been here before.

A. Which officer? Ours? (In Ivrit: An officer of the Red Cross) and he said that now it has been speeded up tremendously and they are loaded - 86 lorries - and there are 40 more, and it's going very qickly now, and the people who are unloading and loading are doing their best but this is the maximum they can do. ~~The~~

B. The maximum because we asked for 100 soldiers to pass from the east to the west for unloading and then you asked to make it 5. We started with one amphibian cars and then we made it 5.

A. At that time they called on me and I told them to make it 5 not 1. So I am familiar with the problem. What can be done now more to -

B. If the principle is to supply the 3rd Army, let's put another crossing means -

A. You mean more crossing means?

B. More crossing means, and if we put more crossing means, we can facilitate the problem for your drivers and UN drivers and for our people and they will speed it up, finish the first convoy and start the second convoy.

A. Today there (were) about 5 amphibious wagons. How many would you suggest?

Red Cross man: There are 50 carriers, 50 people carrying, unload and load.

A. But the General says the problem is not people but amphibious facilities for crossing means.

Red Cross man: But there is also a problem on the spot. I mean that there are so many vehicles that can come to the unloading-jetty.

B. Yes, because they are using 1 gap only. Is there any objection to put a bridge over there? - to facilitate this problem? Under their supervision?

A. I think this whole war was around these bridges. It's a very delicate subject.

B. Just only for one day or 2 days instead of making all these complications for your UN driver for this and that. Under their supervision, and then it will not be erected the whole time - for 3 or 4 hours and then cancel it again, and then put it away this side - or on the other side or whatever you like. It doesn't make any difference to us.

A. (Yes, just a moment, what did you say? in Ivrit)

B: I think they are using 22 1 ferry now. You know, you've never been there?

A: I can tell you one thing on the spot. If it is only a matter of more amphibious facilities and, even some more people - It is guaranteed; I want to check it technically

B: Alright.

A: about a the bridge - etc. it makes it complicated even psychologically. So let me check it technically and I will let you tomorrow.

B: Alright. And let's forget this bridge or ferry as I meant. "We'll use the amphibious crafts - more than 5 - that will make it easier

(...)

A approx - I'm not talking about names, just total ... - Do you know the total number of Egyptians P.O.W's as I just now gave you the total number of Egyptians ... - There is a lot of tension here everywhere especially here across the lines. We you were asking information about whom you have have and they're feeling very sensitive - and what we are working on - how to just — you know —

B Well, I'm not talking about name's, just total numbers. Well, just now I gave you your the total number of your p.o.w's. It was exactly up to the last one. I gave you all details 400 wounded soldiers. I checked it personally; they got it today before 10 o'clock. But a day - 24 hours - before that they got another number - around 5700.

So this morning they got - as I told you - 6700 and something. No, no your ambassador in Geneva can receive the whole list ~~so~~ ~~want~~ ~~what~~ ~~ראש לוק~~ - we will check it as soon as .

D - So what I'm asking you is the total number; I'm not asking you and ~~even~~ ~~not~~ if I'm not wrong the R.C. said that today we would get the total number in ~~Gkd~~ where Broisard will meet Mr. Convers. So if he gave him the total number of P.O.W's for Egypt - why don't you give us here? the total number, because he gave them. And as you know - maybe they will come here in a short time so I think it might would be very nice if you just told us the total number.

B - ~~You~~ Even ~~mean~~ the approximate number, it ~~shd~~ shouldn't be the exact number ...

A your military spokesman said there ~~were~~ a few hundred, he announced it on the radio and it was in the newspapers. But how many - hundreds no-one knows. Maybe Mr. Broisard will bring it with him now?

C - Maybe

A - ...

(...)

B - Did you say the R.C. is ready to tranfer wounded soldiers from tomorrow?

E - (... ?) - Yes, even we were ready to start today. ~~Gs~~ And as they have one of their aircraft going from Geneve to Beirut

and to Cairo so it's no problem at all - just to start - if tomorrow morning, for example, they will start with 37 Egyptians wounded to Cairo we are ready - We are ready even for all 400, tomorrow. But the problem is how many aircrafts they will have. Now, as the General mentioned here, the R.C it's the best if he will take responsibility on the whole number of the 400 wounded soldiers. He will start from the first bunch, second, the more he can transfer - we will be happy - so why waste time? We can do it from tomorrow morning. Ma they will earn 1 more or 2 more aircraft so they will be able to transfere in 1 day 100 maybe 200. There is possibility to do it, but quickly.

B - I don't know if the R.C. goes from Cyprus Israel to Cyprus or Geneva

E - no, why not? they can go direct.

A - I suggest - I just used the telephone - and I suggest that as far as the town of Suez is concerned - lets wait a bit little bit, I'm expecting a telephone call again, and you'll come later on again. About the convoy, I am ready - as I told you before - I am ready to any arrangement so what would you prefere? I would suggest to have another gap. Now we are using one gap

- 25 -

אלמנו אחדיפוח זהרחות אל הפרקה הקיומה - מעקה יפלה
אחר (וסף:

A - I understand. Now we have 1 gap. There is is even a better suggestion - to have this gap widened. Let's widen it so that 2 tranferes will take time simultaneously

B - We have so many gaps along the canal, we can use 1 already made.

- You know what - let's agree upon it principally, and technically let's leave it to the people in the place. I am ready for another gap or to widen this gap. Alright?

B - Alright In this case we may use more than 5 vehicles

A - Yes, for each gap - the same effort

B - 5.

A - I told you before - that I would answer tomorrow. but I am answering now

B - That means that we will make another gap or widen the gap. Use 5 more vehicles with ~~more~~ 50 more soldiers.

A - So I will tell my forces there, you will tell your liaison officer there, and then solve it on the spot. Alright?

B - Alright. That's very important for you to know now - That we will widen the gap which we are using now or make another gap - Use another gap very close to it in the same area using 5 vehicles here and 5 vehicles here, to make transportation. 50 soldiers here and 50 soldiers here.

E - The man on the spot should find out which is the better place.

A - What I mean is our people with their liaison officer - they will discuss it on the spot with you - you may be present - and will do all technical arrangement because I don't think we can decide exactly upon details here in these .. excuse me one minute.

A - I'm still waiting for another telephone. I told you I will do my best and try. So we have agreed upon enlarging the gap there or to have another in order to facilitate. And about the town of Suez - let's wait a little bit. I told you about the town of Suez that our medicine etc. is guaranteed already. But as far as food and water

is concerned I just asked you to wait a few minutes. You are in a better position You have to deal only with me. I have to deal with you and with my authorities at the same time, in order to promote our mutual case. But alright let's wait and see

B - Let's go ahead with other points

A - I already gave you an answer about the seventh point which was - I'm leaving the disengagement toward the end. The seventh point was the answer about your people - the camps. And I told you already that General Yariv was mistaken and you were right and we settled the problem.

B - alright. Thank you very much. Settled the problem with their life, freedom to go and where and to their fields.

A - We brought them back to their places. If you have any complaint about it maybe we will get some information - just let me know.

B - alright - if we hear any more complaints

A - We have no intentions whatsoever to cause

them any harm so if you will know anythi just let me know that's all.

I would like to tell you one thing to make ---- There is infiltration of your people, soldiers, civilians, from the east-bank to the wes bank from time to time. I think it causes a lot of troubles and it causes incidents. I w would appreciate very much if you would look into it in order to prevent such uncontroled activities. I don't think it contributes to les the friction and tension.

B: I have the same thing here; some infiltratio from the troops here to forward positions where they were not here, even on the 25th. In different places on the Suez road area - north of Suez; in attaka...

A: I know. We got a complaint yesterday about attaka through the U.N. I'm sorry to say tha maybe you didn't observe it before, but we wer there long ago. About the rest of the places you are mentioning - I will check, I don't know but about attaka I know.

B: But you were there on the 25th by the helicopters. We had our troop there But we didn't make any problem with them because our people were there but they didn't shoot

or didn't make any ...

A: I think, if I may suggest, General, we sent you an answer last night. I don't know whether you got it or not.

B: No, I didn't receive it before last night.

A: Yes, we sent a message because we got your complaint and we just said that you were mistaken and that we were there before that. But I would suggest not to deal with it as with a seperate issue; I would suggest we have arguments about the 22 etc etc about the whole area - but I don't see any reason why to refere to attaks as to a different issue. It is not the only complaint that you have. So why should it be treated differently? I thought yesterday, when we got the message, that you just didn't observe when actually we came there. We came there long before the day that you are mentioning in your message.

B: What about some our points if you find ~~here~~ tomorrow that we have here some troops?

A: I think we will complain to you and will say that you - - - - - -
If it will happen tomorrow. But [illegible]

happened a long ~~time~~ ago . Not today, nor yesterday and not tomorrow . Long ago .

B: We may have some troops somewhere here in your area , maybe in Attaka or any other place, but you didn't observe them. Would you reccomend to tell the U.N. that we have some troops here and there and here and there and make another complaint or what ?

A: If your troops will be here - ~~not~~ within our area it means that they are within our area and it is either an enemy's pocket of P.O.W's . But Ярков бой is not within the area which is kept by you ;

B: Ярков бой is with us ; You have a part of it - yes . But still you have some troops there

A: Yes , but it is not ... If you would find our troops among your troops then you will be right . But on Ярков бой it is a different position which is not among your troops and if everything as applies to - every spot here is the same as Ярков бой so I thought that you ~~were~~ was mistaken about the date - when we occupied the place

B: Maybe -

A: And I would suggest not to make our of it a different issue. I think it belongs to the whole complex, the whole conflict..

B: at any rate we had many reports about some positions which were not occupied by you and then were occupied after the 25th. Putting one post here, a company there, a group of persons here

A: I think you are right, but it belongs to the whole argument about the 22nd of October. It belongs to the major issue; I don't think it can be dealt with seperately.

B: at least you can stop more...

A: We are not carrying out any such kind of activities, in the moment if youll have a complaint about it

B. .... every movement seperately as the whole question under discussion

E How about we keep things ... at least to avoid any kind of clash, minor incidents witnessed(!) will cause many, many, harm

A: I see your point and I can assure you

Vam

that we are not carrying out deliberately such kind of activities, the people, The remarks that I made about these infiltrations. I refere not to organised activities. I refered to popular people and soldiers, individual soldiers, individu peoples, small groups that are moving from one side of the canal to another side, etc, and it causes trouble, it causes friction, it causes tension and also it endangers the life of people. So I drew your attention to such kind of activities which I don't think is deliberately carried out by your government.

B: No, We never been reported about this infiltration

A: I know, thats why I'm telling you.

B: But maybe individual move, from one soldiers, or a soldiers ~~tells~~ made something like that I'm not sure I never been told about that. If there is a specific case we can discuss it, but as a principal, we are keeping our troops in their positions, as we said but no infiltration, and we have no intention to move to make these infiltration.

A: Now as far as, I'm waiting for the telephone about the town of Suez

B: ~~alright~~ alright

A: Maybe, I told you I'll give you an answer tomorrow, but maybe we can make some progress by this telephone I dont know, so until this tele-

phone will come, may I have a private conversation with you

B: Alright Alright

A: Did you covered all the subjects you wanted to raise?

B: Yes, I think there are some details about the Red Cross, how they will get our wounded personel from here that's up to Monsieur ...

A: So why don't they discuss it in the mean time

B: ... الجرحى , الجرحى بتاع الجيش الثالث ... العربيان , نسيناها
عاوزين عربيات اللي جت بتاعتنا ما تاخدوش U.N.
عربيات الأسعاف اللي داخلة مدينة السويس مافيش U.N. تخلي
الأسرائيلين ينزلوا والناس بتاع الـ U.N. اللي واقفين واقفين
لسانهم مدينة السويس دي مافيش حاجة ويرجعوا. نفس
الحكاية اللي جات هنا, اللوري بتاعنا بيروح وجاي الناس
لسانهم --- نقل بترول الـ BOAT اللي هناك معرقلة بعيد.

A: But I can tell you one thing, my instructions will be to our representatives to come into conclusion with your people and the Red-Cross. and not coming again with open problems, thats all. If you guarantee it to me then alright. If not we'll discuss it now. So I hope you will take the same position towards your representative

B: alright

A: I will tell my representatives not to come back to Israel if they won't fulfil their mission tomorrow you'll tell them not to come back to Egypt, to your representatives, then they will have to sign (?) ...

B: we will have to exchange the representatives

laugh ...

A. Now about the town of Suez ... I suggest that until it will be solved permanently, we have one problem for the time being, and by that we will gain time to discuss it with my authorities with your authorities until we'll reach a permanent arrangement. But, I mean one convoy of these seven cars that you mentioned.

B: yes, seven ....

A. yes, but I would like you to do a gesture towards us, I'm refering to the list of the prisoners of war ...

B: Yes

A: I'll tell you why. The civilians of the town of Suez is a matter of a humanitarian question. The same applies to the list of prisoners. It is a humanitarian question. So lets put this to issues, together.

B: This convoy and the prisoners of war in Suez you mean? or what?

A: No, no I mean we will allow you, I will allow you, we will allow you to, to, this convoy to the town of Suez, but we would like very much to have the list of prisoners, not of Suez.

B: Ah, ha

A: In general

B: hold it

A: Until permanent arrangements will take place

B: Over the water!

A: Water will be discussed again, when we'll discuss permanent arrangements, but in the mea

time, we will allow you to have a convoy of water tanks

B: of what?

A: Water tanks. Let me make it to clarify it. This is a major issue, and it should, it will take a time, in Israel, to discuss it and to find a formula of our problem, which I explained to you in this morning. In the mean time we ~~would~~ would like that people to suffer there. So only as a temporary scheme I ~~suggest~~ suggest that in order not to lose time, we will enable you to have such a convoy and also water, with water tanks. In the mean time we will discuss it in Israel and we will discuss it together, how to solve the problem, not temporarily but permanently, and the problem of water will be included will be included in the permanent arrangement. But temporarily it should be carried with water tanks, with the same convoy

B ... And also they have the right from the international point of view, the international law gives them that right to fight even they are civilians but we are not talking about these things; so they have the right to do whatever they like; they can take the measures whatever they like; Theg governer is there the civilians is theirs but we are sorry we don't accept any temporary measures for Suez itself as you see it. so we'll tell yor

A - So we'll tell you what. If you don't want to accept these temporary - then I'm not denying you your demand about Suez city. I want this to be on record - I'm not denying you your request about the town of Suez, I just can't give you an answer on the spot. So tomorrow I will give you an answer as for the water and the food. I gave you a positive answer about medical support etc. This is to a final answer and it can be in effect as from now - valid as from now.

B - about medical support for Suez?

A Yes. You raised today 3 problems: food, medical support and water.
So as far as medical support - all aspects of medical support - is guaranteed.
About food and water - as you are insisting of discussing a permanent and not a temporary arrangement - I want you to let me have 24 hours to discuss it in my country and to find out a good formula which will guarantee our interests too. But I want to assure you that we recognize the right of these people to get food and water, we are not denying it. So give me a chance to tell you tomorrow our position

B - We will wait. All right. If there is any reply it can sent by a message.

A We'll send a message

D - הכוונה הוא כאן מקבל או התגובה הצדדית?

A - הכוונה אולפן כאן, וזו לא שאלה מקרונית, אלא אם הכוונה להגיע תשובה על ידי מכתב, ולכך.

A - אז אולי אולפנו נוכל להשתמש אלא ב - message מתי?

D - באמצעות הכוונה

A - alright. If it will be a simple answer then it can be done by a message. If it is a complicated one - we will have to meet to discuss it.

B - alright.

A - Now about your officers you mentioned.

כמה קצינים — נתן קצה?

D - אלפה

A - There were 4 officers. I suggest that you try to get their names and whether if you have any P.O.W's of ours in the town of Suez or not. The easiest way it will be to exchange these 2 groups ~~ditto~~ in a different issue so lets discuss it also tomorrow. You will find our what happens —

B - In case we don't have prisonners of war in Suez what will be the situation?

A - I will try and find our and answer. We were not prepared for it. I was taken by surprise by you now.

B - and also I was taken by surprise by the minister when he sent a message and said please solve it today. Just to have the feeling that I'm going one step forward ~~I am going~~ to — because we feel that they are not prisonners of war

A - They are not prisonners of war?!

B I don't know where they were captured. ↺ Honestly, when - I don't know. It was just mentioned that they were arrested or —

A You know - I didn't even know about it until you told me. But now I found out that it is true. I heard the first time today when you told me. I personnaly

D - אני לא בטוח שאלה בטוח אלה הנתונים

A I am not sure these are the same names but I checked already but it is true that we had 4 officers. So I assumed these are the same

D(?) We didn't check the names we just know about the group.

A - So I think these are the same people. But I was taken completely by surprise I personnally didn't know about it, when I came this morning. I will tell you something - if you keep our people in the town of Suez as prisonners-of-war it will be the easiest thing to exchange these 2 groups as special groups which has nothing to do with, let's say, the whole complex of prisonners. If you don't ~~help~~ have, maybe you have something else in return to offer us

I don't know, because both of us we have to convince other people in our countries; we have no free hands - you don't have free hands and I don't have free hands to decide upon everything here on the spot. So I think I am telling you offer? If you have anything to offer in return I think it will soften the way towards exchanges. The best thing to do is to find whether you have our P.O.W's of ours in the ... In such case I think it can be done on basis of an equal exchange of lets say special groups that are not exactly captured during the fighting. This will be the easiest thing from that point of view to all of .... Because you are asking me again and again why you don't have P.O.W's. I try to suspect that maybe you know that there is no chances that there are such P.O.W's

B I don't know if there P.O.W's in Suez or not and I think if the governer has P.O.W's he would have mentioned it immediately. He never mentioned it.

לשאלה: האם קיבלתם הודעה מהקונסולטו - אין לי
A - גם אני לא יודע אם יש שם שבויים
במצרים אין לי הודעה מהקונסולטו שיש שבויים

A The Red Cross people - they are asking for my helicopter to come along here. It will take about ½ an hour.

B I don't think there will be any changes if the R.C. comes now because tomorrow they will arrange another place where, we don't have any different ideas about that. He will get to us the names only - how many names here and how many names there.

A - But they will don't know the situation in the town and in the ~~eighth~~ (8th army) - the 3rd army. Besides we can know on the spot - ~~the~~ both of us through the R.C. whether they are ready tomorrow to start - are you in a hurry, can you stay another ½ hour?

B - Thats alright, I feel today General that we came to a conclusion that we are discussing the wounded P.O.W's and that is all.

A - Why?

B - That's all we did today. We have only accomplished that 1 mission.

A - No, we have agreed upon another (gate?) for the convoy. We agreed upon a lot of things.

B - We just agreed only about the exchange of the ...

A - No, no, you are disappointed ...

B - yes we have accepted that before ...

A - You are disappointed about the town of Suez although I didn't give you a negative answer I just told that I would give you tomorrow an answer. And I am disappointed about the list of prisonners of war. So both of us are disappointed about the major issues which are of great interest to us. But I promised you an answer tomorrow; you didn't promise me an answer about the list you just told me to do your best in order to promote the -

B - Well we didn't solve any problems today; it's up to the authorities to decide what to do.

A - we have agreed upon the wounded

B - The wounded P.O.W we had discussions with General Yariv

A- Yes but we agreed today about the matter and what shape it will take, we agreed about the convoy of supplies, we agreed upon a bigger gap or another gap, I gave you an answer that you complain about the people that were taken to camps that you were right and you brought them back, I think we had a very interesting discussion.

B- Yes, that is the most important thing, that we had a good interesting discussion and we knew each other.

A- Yes, and also I think that you made quite a big step toward the solution of the problem of the town of Suez

B- No, we didn't come to any solution about the Suez, we made an approach

A- General, maybe you are not realizing but we owe you an answer tommorow and I told you that I do recognize the right of these people to get their food, water and medical help

So I told you that I do recognize their right, I told you that tommorow I will give you an answer, I think these are good prospects for the future and I said also that I am ready tomorrow that you will bring one convoy to the people of Suez — you denied it As a temporary solution, you denied it but still I promised you an answer tomorrow about a permanent solution.

B - But any way it was a good chance to General Tal today but from my point of view we didn't accomplish our mission today, except discussing what we discussed before about the wounded P.O.W's. We put the system of the work, that's all.

A - This is not all. Tomorrow you will get an answer about the town of Suez and this is a major issue, and beside - you have an open option if you like - to prepare a convoy today and to bring it tomorrow with food and water and everything until you will get our answer as far as a permanent solution. So I think you made quite a progress -

we are the party that didn't because as far as the list of the P.O.W's is concerned you said that you would do your best and that is all. ~~well that~~

B - Well, that's your point of view and I still say ~~:~~ we didn't make any progress today about all these items. Just only put the procedure of how to evacuate the wounded P.O.W's

A - You know what General - let's decide now on the spot about another meeting tomorrow. You know exactly what is important to us. I know exactly what is important to you. Let's come here tomorrow, but in order not to disappoint each other - Is that all right?

B - I think when I go back everybody will be disappointed today. I'm afraid of that. First thing I ~~need~~ will meet. The minister will say "where are the 4 officers?" I will tell him they will discuss it. "what did you do to Suez?" - They will discuss it. "~~wh~~ they

A - THEY WERE ready to allow us b

B - temporary

A - Until tomorrow

B - and then the water

A - Until tomorrow

B - I will tell him our civilian people should starve. That's all.

D - May I just, General, put ~~in a letter~~.

B - Honestly, ~~the~~ when we go back, the Colonel told me, when I go back, everybody is talking as I am Israeli. What did you do with that? I say they said so and so and will do so and so. Maybe the same thing with you.

A - Why not to put it in a positive way? Why don't you say, 'well the Israeli's agreed that tomorrow morning we will have a convoy with ~~soppy~~ supplies to the town of Suez and tomorrow afternoon they will discuss with us permanent arrangements. I think that is fair enough

C(?) - Because we were expecting, General,

a message from you with all these details that you gave us on the spot -

A - No, no, no, this is true, technically ~~informa~~ and formally it is true but I do admit that this is not a technical problem but an essence. So I say - We are not denying the right of these people to get their food and water etc. and medical aid. We had today the first time the exact requirements and my answer was not immediate, not on the spot, I hade to make a lot of telephones, and my answer was that tomorrow you may send one convoy of the size you ask for. Tomorrow morning. and tomorrow afternoon we are ready to discuss permanent arrangements.

B - allright

A - So why you don't call it an achievement?
(משקיע מלמעלה)

A - If you don't want tomorrow morning - It can take place tomorrow afternoon; Take your time. I don't suggest that you don't accept it. I think that it is a progress toward a solution of the problem. I don't

think that you have not to accept. ~~you~~ We promised to discuss also permanent ~~solutions~~ arrangements.

B - Alright - we'll make the meeting the day after tomorrow - if it is possible.

A - Alrignt the day after tomorrow. What time General?

B - At 12 o'clock?

A - Alright at 12 o'clock Saturday. ☺

B - If you don't mind we arranged for another place for ~~the~~ our meeting. That's at KM 99 (~~or 100~~)

A - You don't like this place?

B - No it is very good. We came here 3 times and we are ready to come more and more. The facilities are well.

(ההמשך לא נמצא בקלטת)

A - We checked it - on the map - it is on your side place. It will be a real disadvantage for me - I'll tell you frankly - Here I have my telephone and arrangements, so I am in position to call my authorities to let you know. Otherwise, then,

I will have to tell you tomorrow, I will tell you tomorrow.

B - Just to please, we are here under the U.N. flag and there will be under the U.N. flag, anyway we can stay.

A - I'll tell you what - let's do it

אוקיי הלאה הכי קדונוי שלנו ? , פה? אוקיי התחום שלנו פה.

ק"מ 4 - 3 -

Near or lets have it near our check-post there. Our of the check-post, and let's have the U.N. flag.

B - That is a 3-km difference between our place and the suggested place.

A The ~~dif~~ distance makes no difference, but I'm telling you frankly, I would like to have my facilities there - the telephone, etc.

(סדרני) (דוונוי מאוחרי ובלבדי בדונוי) קשה לאדם הלפלוי

B He needs more time today to do the work in the 3rd army and the Suez - It takes more time

A - Let's leave it tomorrow we have a meeting.

B - We can make the whole meeting the day after tomorrow at 12 o'clock. Not tomorrow. To settle all the matters. To give the R.C. a chance to organise

everything and facilitate all the matters and transportation and this & and that and then I will get our the representative, our representative in the R.C. to solve all the problems, or do it alone - whatever you like.

A- I don't think we should postpone it. we have decided even upon tomorrow,

B - If the R.C. is ready tomorrow —

A - The R.C. is ready tomorrow so I think the best thing to do is tomorrow according to the matters ~~according to it~~ and arrangements we have done

B - alright

A - alright

B - When do we do it tomorrow. The time - the meeting with the R.C. and the 2 representatives

A - So let's say tomorrow at 12 o'clock or even earlier. Let's do it 12 o'clock. Here.

B - and our meeting will be 12 o'clock Saturday.

A - But the place - you ~~said~~ raised quite a problem, General,

B - There is no problem. We didn't make problems about the place before.

A - yes, but I want ~~to~~ have my communications. Maybe, let's have the next meeting here Saturday and this will be the last meeting

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים

מקור הידיעה :
מבוע הידיעה :
קובץ :
זמן קבלה :

מספר הדוגית :
תאריך עבוד :
ת/ק :
מפוצה :

תאריך _____

last meeting here and Saturday we'll discuss and arrange a new place for it. is that alright with you

B - alright

A - So Saturday we'll meet here 12 O'clock and we'll decide upon a place for the next meeting. Thank you very much

B Thank you v. much.

סודי ביותר
(לאחר מלוי)

טופס 2247/1

(1/200) 12-64

חוברת ראשונה

הנדון: פגישה עם נציגי הצבא המצרי
דו"ח פגישה מס' 3 מ-30.1300 אוק' 73

1. נוכחים:

א. המשלחת המצרית:- גנרל גמסי, קול' הווידי, מר אבראשי (מה"ח).

ב. המשלחת הישראלית:- אלוף א. יריב, אל"מ א. לברן, אל"מ ד. מיוז, רל"ש הרמטכ"ל.

ג. לבקשתם הוצגו היום המשלחות בצורה רשמית.

2. עיקרי דברים

א. החלפת שבויים פצועים

(1) המצרים מסכימים להחלפת השבויים הפצועים. העבירו כבר הרשימה ל-צל"א (בנוסף למה שמסרו לנו).

(2) מבקשים רשימה השבויים הפצועים שלהם אצלנו בארץ.

(3) המצרים יפנו ל-צל"א שיקבע רשימה הפצועים קשה בסואץ ובארמיה 3.

(4) החלפת השבויים תחבצע בהקדם האפשרי מבחינתם. יאפשרו לצל"א לבקר אצל פצועינו לפני החזרתם.

(5) מסרו לנו כג'סטה את סרן רן אבידן. ביקשו לא לפרסם מסירתו לידינו עד שכל החלפת השבויים הפצועים התבצע.

ב. שבויים:

(1) היום מעבירים המצרים רשימת שבויים שלנו ראשונה ל-צל"א. תכלול כ-64 שמות.

(2) יתר רשימות השבויים יועברו ל-צל"א תוך 2-3 ימים.

(3) הצל"א יוכל לבקר השבויים שלנו במצרים ברגע שיקבל את רשימה לידיו.

(4) אנו נמשיך במסירת שבוייהם אצלנו לצל"א ואיפשור בקוריהם.

2...

(5) הצד המצרי הסכים שקשה לדבר על קו' ה-22/10 ושקשה לצה"ל לזוז מנקומותיו אך הוא מעלה האפשרות שנראית לו שישראל תיסוג לפחות 30 ק"מ ממזרח לתעלה (טווח ארטילריה) ושכוחות מצרים יעבו בצד המזרחי של התעלה. באשר לסוג הכוחות וכמותם וכן אמצעי הלחימה שיהיו שם ניתן להגיע להסכם. מסר כי סמכותו למסור כי אם הצעה זו תתקבל יהיה אפשר לעבור למו"מ בדרג פוליטי והכי גבוה.

(6) הצד הישראלי מסר כי ימסור הצעה זו לשלמונותיו וכי מניח שאפשר יהיה להשיב ביום ראשון ולכל המאוחר ביום שני.

(7) הצד המצרי העלה השאלה מה יהיה עד מתן התשובה מבחינת אסקה לארמיה 3. נענה כי גם בקשר לזה יקבל תשובה יחד עם נושא ה- Major move ואולי אף קודם לכן.

(8) להבהרה הוסיף הצד המצרי כי לא יוכלו שלא להעביר חיילים לצד המזרחי של התעלה מבחינה פסיכולוגית, באשר לכמות וסוג הכוחות והאמל"ח, יוכלו להיות צמצומים.

ה. ש ו נ ו ת

(1) חללים

(אא) יסדירו בהקדם העברת גויות 6 חיילינו שאת שרותיהם מסרו לנו וזאת בציר סואץ-קהיר.

(בב) ביקשנו כי יאפשרו לנו כמו בעבר סיור של רבנים צבאיים בכיתות עם הצל"א באזורי הלחימה ממזרח לתעלה כדי לזהותם ולקברם. המצרים הטיבו כי עקרונית אינם מתנגדים ויבדקו זאת עם הצל"א. יתנו ההשובה לכך כשיעבירו לנו התשובה ביחס למה שדרוש להם בסואץ (רופאים תרופות ומזון).

(גג) ביקשנו מספרים ושמות של החללים, השבויים והנעדרים שלנו בציר סואץ. אמרו יבררו דרך מושל סואץ ויודיעונו.

(2) הבונקר בעגרוד - העלינו נושא זה שהועבר אלינו מטעמם ע"י הצל"א, אך הם לא ידעו עליו דבר.

(3) מסרו כי שמעו שחושבים של אאאא החיץ החקלאי מצפון לסואץ הובנסו למחנות. הכחשנו.

ג. סואץ (מים, רפואות ומזון):-

(1) הופתעו אנשי להיוודע כי המים לסואץ בתמ"מ הופסקו. רוזיה בזה Set back , ויש חשש שהאנשים עם ימותו.

(2) מסר נ.צ. של מקום הפיצוץ.

(3) הובטח מצידנו כי נבדוק בעניין ונשיבם הלילה או מחר בבוקר.

(4) כמרו כי בסואץ הם זקוקים לרופאים, תרופות ומזון בצורה טופחה. מבקשים להסדיר העברה דרך האו"ם. ביקשנו כי יעבירו לנו מברק מיפרט מספר הרופאים וכמות התרופות והמזון הדרושה להם ואז נשתדל להשיב להם במברק או בפגישה הקרובה.

(5) מסרו מספר בלתי מחייב של 5000-4000 תושבים בסואץ (נראה כי הגזימו- הח"מ).

ד. שאלת החיץ בין הצבאות, אספקה לארמיה 3 וכו':

(1) בשלב ראשון הציעו המצרים את 3 הצעדים הבאים לקראת התקדמות בסו"מ וניהול שיחות בדרג יותר גבוה:-

(א) הפסקת אש.
(ב) הצבת כוחות או"ם בין שני הצדדים. } קיים טוב לשני הצדדים
(ג) נסיגת צה"ל לקו 22/10.

(2) הצד הישראלי אמר כי לא היתכן נסיגה חד-צדדית לקוי 22/10 ומצדנו אנו תקפים בדעתנו כי צריך להיות disengagement רציני ובנוסף אזור חיץ בין שני הצדדים שיכול להחפס ע"י האו"ם היינו מכל צד יחזור למקומו שלפני פרוץ המלחמה.

(3) הצד המצרי נימה להעלות מחדש האפשרות לצמצם ראש הגשר שלנו במערב התעלה כדי שלפחות כאן יהיה Disengagement.

(4) הצד הישראלי יזכן שאי אפשר להסכים לענייני הסטטוס-קוו. אפילו מעמד האו"ם נמסר כי אי אפשר לקבוע המצב של ה-22/10. אם לזוז ולסגת מהמצב הקיים כדי לא להיכנס לקשיים, אזי למשהו רציני, היינו יש לעשות Major move משהו הדומה ל- Interim settlement שדובר בו בעבר. גם במקרה זה אפשר ליצור אזור חיץ כדי להסיר השטות.

3..

סגן ה-רמטכ"ל

הנדון: מפגש הפסקת האש עם מצרים
מפגש מס' 4

כללי

1. המפגש התקיים ב-1 נוב' שעה 1200.

השתתפו:-

א. מטעם המצרים - גנרל גמאסי, קולונל הווידי.

ב. מטעם ישראל - אלוף טל, אלוף אייל, אל"מ שיאון, אל"מ לב-רן.

החלפת פצועים

2. השבויים - פצועים יוחלפו בו זמנית משלשה מקומות - מישראל למצרים וממצרים לישראל במסוסי הצלב האדום ומארמיה 3 ומהעיר סואץ ברכב ביבשה.

3. הקבוצה הראשונה שלנו תכלול 27 פצועים קשים ותצא יחד עם הקבוצה הראשונה של המצרים מן הארץ, מארמיה 3 ומסואץ.

4. הקבוצה האחרונה שלנו, שתכלול 18 פצועים תצא ממצרים במסוס כשהקבוצות האחרונות מיכראל, מארמיה 3 ומסואץ תעזובנה.

5. אם יימצאו פצועים שלנו בסואץ הם יפונו במסגרת ההסדר לגבי פינוי הפצועים שלהם בסואץ. הובטח שיודיעו ב-2.11.73 אם אמנם ישנם פצועים, ומספרם.

חללים

6. הובטח להרשות לאנשי הצלב האדום להכנס לשטחים המוחזקים על-ידם ממזרח לתעלה ובסואץ החל ב-5.11.73 כדי לאתר, לזהות ולפנות את הגופות.

7. הובטח כי אם ישנם חללים שלנו בסואץ יחול עליהם ההסדר לגבי כלל החללים.

8. הבטיחו לבדוק אפשרות לצרף רבנים לאנשי הצלב האדום, כדי שיעסקו בפינוי חללים.

שבויים

9. הודיעו כי היום 1.11.73 נמסרה לצלב האדום רשימה ראשונה של שבויים ישראליים הכוללת כ-שבעים שמות. שאר הרשימות תועברנה תוך תקופה קצרה מבלי להתחייב על מועד.

10. המצרים סרבו למסור המספר הכולל של שבויינו אצלם והודו כי הסיבה לכך הינה פוליטית. הודגש להם שסרובם למסור הרשימה הכוללת, למרות שאנו מסרנו רשימה מלאה של 6,796 שמות של שבויים שלהם, מהווה הפרה של העקרונות ההומאניים ואמנת ג'נבה.

החלפת פצועים וחללים

11. הוסכם לקיים מחר, 2 נוב', שעה 1200 ב-ק"מ ה-101 כביש קהיר-סואץ, פגישת נציגי מצרים וישראל עם אנשי הצלב האדום לקביעת הסידורים המפורטים לביצוע החלפת הפצועים ואיסוף החללים.

12. המצרים הציעו כי פינוי הפצועים מסואץ ומארמיה 3 יבוצע באמצעות אמבולנסים ורכב לפינוי פצועים, במכוניות מצריות נהוגות ע"י אנשי או"מ ו/או צלב אדום **לא** ימצאו כאלה מבקשים שנסכים לנהגים מצריים אזרחים ואליהם יחלוו נציגי צלב אדום או או"מ ואנשי צה"ל.

אספקה לעיר סואץ

13. השיבונו לפנייתם בקשר לאספקה לאזרחים בסואץ כי בעיקרון אנו מקבלים שיש להרשות אספקה סדירה, אולם הבעיה היא כיצד לוודא פיקוח שהיא לא תועבר ליחידות הצבא. האפשרויות הן חיץ בין העיר לבין ארמיה 3 באמצעות משקיפי או"מ ונציגינו, או פינוי התושבים.

14. הנציג המצרי דחה בכל תוקף אפשרויות אלה בטענות:-

א. הוסכם לספק מים, מזון ותרופות לארמיה 3, לא כל שכן שהאזרחים **המכוסרים** בסואץ זכאים לאספקה סדירה.

ב. האספקה לעיר תמסר בפיקוח או"מ, אין כל חשש שהאזרחים יעבירו לחיילים, אלא להיפך, אם יחסר להם הצבא ימנע מעצמו ויעביר לתושבים.

ג. אין להם כל כוונה להעתר להצעה בדבר פינוי איזשהם אזרחים מאדמתם.

15. לדרישה לקבל נתונים שהובטחו על התושבים והצרכים שלהם מסרו כי יש בידם הפרטים שקיבלו ממשרד הבריאות והאספקה שלהם:-

א. אינם בטוחים במספר התושבים, אולי 30 אלף אך אינם בטוחים בכך, לאחר שהוזכר כי במפגש קודם נקבו בכמה אלפים.

ב. דרישתם לאספקת העיר מסתכמת בשיירה יומית של 7 משאיות:

1 משאית קמח

1 משאית אורז

1 משאית דלק לרכב המושל ואמבולנס

1 משאית תרופות

1 מכונית קטנה - דם ופלסמה

2 מכוניות פריטי אספקה שונים

16. דרישתם לגבי אספקת מים לעיר סואץ כללה שתי אלטרנטיבות:-

א. חיקון תעלת המים המתוקים שפוצצה ב-21.10.73. הדבר יצריך עובדים רבים וכלי הנדסה ומשך זמן ניכר, אולם בדרך זו פיתרון גם לצרכי התקלאות לאיכרים בשטח שבשליטה ישראלית.

ב. תיקון המשאבות בזייתיה שסיפקו מים בצינור קהיר-סואץ, יצריך כ-50 טכנאים, 8 מכוניות, 2 משאבות. הצוות יצטרך להשאר קבע במקום ולהפעיל את המשאבות. בדרך זו ניתן לפתור בעיית המים במהירות. הצוות יהיה בפיקוח ישראלי.

ג. לדעתם רצוי לפעול בשתי דרכים כדי לפתור את הבעייה המיידית ולהתחיל בתיקון תעלת המים המתוקים שיצריך זמן רב.

17. תשובתינו היתה ששירת האספקה תכלול משאיות ג'ריקנים או מכליות מים. המצרים דחו ההצעה כאינה עונה לצרכי אוכלוסיה אזרחית. אנו דחינו דאגתם לאוכלוסיה בשטח שבשליטה שלנו שהיא באחריותנו. הובטח להעביר דרישותיהם לגבי סואץ לשלטונות שלנו ולמסור תשובה במפגש הבא.

18. לאחר קבלת הוראות טלפוניות, הצענו להם שירה חד-פעמית מיידית של אספקה לעיר כמחווה הומאני תמורת מחווה מצידם - העברת רשימה מלאה של השבויים שלנו שבידיהם. הנציג המצרי דחה את ההצעה בטענה כי הוא לא מוכן לקבל הסדר זמני לגבי נושא אזרחי הומאניטרי. נציגנו הדגיש כי אין הסתייגות לגבי אספקת תרופות ורופאים מיד וכי אין אנו מסרבים להכיר בזכות האזרחים לאספקה ולמים.

שבויים לאחר הפסקת האש

19. הנציג המצרי העלה כנושא דחוף דרישה להחזרת 4 קצינים מצריים אשר נשבו אתמול. הם לא רואים בהם שבויי-מלחמה. השבנו כי דרישתם איננה תואמת את ההגיון והנוהלים המקובלים - כל מי שנמצא בשטח שבשליטת הצד השני ובידיו נחשב כשבוי.

20. שמות הקצינים השבויים הם:-

א. קולונל ממדוח חליס גרגס.

ב. קולונל אחמד חלמי סאלם טאהב.

ג. לט/קול אסעיד מייסור מוחמד עבאס.

ד. קפטן חמדי זיין אל עבידין פרג.

21. בשלב מאוחר יותר הוצע להחליף את ארבעת השבויים ה-נ"ל תמורת אנשינו בסואץ, שהם מאותה קטיגוריה. המצרים לא השיבו במישרין להצעה זו ולשאלה ישירה ענה הנציג כי אינו בטוח שישנם שבויים ישראליים בעיר, אחרת המושל היה מדווח עליהם. אם ימצאו פצועים או חללים ינהגו בהם במסגרת מה שסוכם לגבי החלפת פצועים והעברת חללים.

אספקה לארמיה 3

22. הנציג המצרי הצהיר כי לארמיה הוקל עכשיו, אולם היא זקוקה לאספקה קבועה והזכיר כי האלוף יריב הבטיח כי תשובה תינתן ב-5 נובמבר. אולם בינתיים ביקש להחיש פריקת השיירה הראשונה - אם על-ידי הקמת גשר ארעי או תוספת כלים אמפיביים, מקומות פריקה וסבלים.

23. אושר להרחיב את מקום הפריקה הנוכחי או להוסיף מקום פריקה שני סמוך, להגדיל את מספר הכלים האמפיביים ל-10 ואת הסבלים ל-100. הסידורים המעשיים יעשו ע"י הנציגים במקום.

חדירות

24. העלינו בעיית החדירות שלהם לשטחינו, שגורמות להקריות אש ולהפרות הפסקת האש ותבענו שיודו את הכוחות שלהם להמנע מכך. תגובתם היתה כי יש להם טענות דומות לגבינו - לחדירה שלנו ל-ג'בל עתקה אחרי ה-25.10.73, היו להם כוחות שם אבל הם נמנעו מלירות. השבנו כי ענינו לשדר שלהם בקשר ל-ג'בל עתקה, שבטעות יסודו כי כוחותינו היו שם לפני הפסקת האש, אולם לא כדאי להפריד בעייה זו מן הכוללת של קוי הפסקת האש ב-22.10.73. החפתח ויכוח על מהו כיס - מובלעת עצמאית ובשליטה וענה כיס בשבי או כוחות זה לצד זה. הוצטח כי החדירות הן יוזמה מקומית של קבוצות קטנות או בודדים ולא מדיניות.

המפגש הבא

25. סוכם כי המפגש הבא יתקיים בשבת, 3 נוב', שעה 1200 במקום הקבוע. לדרישת המצרי הוסכם כי במפגש זה יקבע מקום המפגשים הבאים. הם הציעו מקום כ-2-3 ק"מ בשטח שלהם.

26. נציגי הצלב האדום ושני הצדדים יפגשו מחר, 2 נוב', שעה 1200 במקום המפגש הקבוע כדי לקבוע פרטי הסידורים להחלפת הפצועים.

1925 ca.

(1) - 3.11.73 -

A - Ghamsi

B - [illegible]

C - [illegible]

I know that it is very important to you the prisonners of war . their names and the and this and that , But still there is a diversion now about our way that we are talking about the details of so many things that we want to concentrate on the main object of this delegation . As far as we are concerned we think that this delegation should deal with 2 main problems; cease- fire arrangements ~~and discussion~~ - number 1 ; number 2 - discussion on the lines to which Israeli troops can withdraw on the western bank of the canal according to security - council resolution 338 and 339 .

Under the first item - that's number 1 - cease - fire arrangement - we feel that there are so many incidents or cases , I'll give some examples which makes us feel that a cease fire is not effective or it will not be effective

2

very soon. First of all, just examples - that's all -. First one - air reconnaissance in the northern area starts the day before yesterday. Our air defence means shot at these planes because it was on our troops and then again your planes started shooting our air-defence battalions. Just one case. I don't want to make any comments, just an example.

B - You mean dispersing ... the second army

A - Yes, we didn't make any complaints to the U.N but I just listing. That's number 1. Number 2: in Kabrit area you know that we have a strong isolated point. On the eastern side of the lake. It is isolated, yes. But still it is considered that it is part of the base bridge-head of the third army on the eastern bank. Yesterday some of your tanks starts going towards them to surround them although they already near the lake ...

B - When was it?

A - Yesterday morning. One of your tanks was stuck in a minefield there, it was damaged, and then back again came some infantry with their

machine-guns near our strong point there to cut it by the object (?), to cut it. That point from the bridge-head - there is about 5 kms. This point is away from the bridge-head for about 5 kms. In the distance between this point and the bridge-head they put the machine-gun and 5 or 6 soldiers there. For one purpose - to cut the point and for another purpose in the near future to surround them or take the P.O.W's or something like that.

This morning from 6 o'clock to 8 o'clock in the morning the Israeli troops on the Eastern side bank of the canal start shooting sub-machine-guns against our troops. in Gidi direction. I gave three incidents, only an example, we didn't make any complaints. we made a complaint about yesterday because they did it when I was here or I was out through the U.N but the rest we didn't. So that's the first point. we should agree that we must control our troops to make cease-fire effective. And, we are doing so severely.

The second point on the cease-fire arrangements thus continuation of supply to the third-army. Today or tomorrow we consider that the first convoy will be finished. We hope - it was 120 lorries, there are still 47-40 in the bridge-head there to be unloaded

and still 7 on the way going there. Are we going to be permitted

B - Do things being improved last days ?

A B - Yes , after making 5 cars better than 1 and 18 cars better than 5 the 2 gaps better than 1 . But still very slow because we started this work for 1 week now

B - How many cars are being loaded per day ? Since we met last ?

A B - a difference between one day and another . But still , as far as I know , they told me 17 , about 17 cars a day . So now we still have 7 here waiting and 40 there , maybe unloaded - finished unloading , or still loading 5 They are going alright now . So I asked before if we will have the permission to continue the supply of the third army or not ? And I put it under cease-fire arrangements as B because the situation may be affected - the cease fire will be affected sooner or later by that situation .

B - Will you please elaborate on that when you say the cease-fire will be affected .

A I mean we started 7 days now for 1 convoy and as you know 7 or 8 days for 1 convoy

it means nothing. It means something yes, but it won't help. many many complications are put in front of this convoy. So during the 7 days we were supposed to push forward more and more, but now this convoy won't help in the situation. What will happen if we don't continue that work we'll come back again to the 22nd situation. No supply - then you know the rest how it can go.

See under the s cease-fire arrangements permanent supply of Suez city by food, water, medical support and ---- I promise to give you the answer today.

And then item number 2 - I finished with the cease-fire arrangements - Item number 2 discussion the lines on which the Israeli troops can go, and I am afraid it will be very difficult to discuss that question today unless the political situation will be cleared in the near future - in the coming few days, but I am raising that point if you have something to say about that, we can start as it is our mission. According to the P.O.W's and the list, as I said, we accepted all or agreed on the main items and the principals and today they are carrying out the schedule and the procedure will be done. If they finished all these

works - that's alright. If there is any complications - we can solve them. So that's my opinion about the meeting of today. If we can discuss it one by eachother through our point of view it will be alright.

B - Good, then let's go one by one, it will be easier. First thing you mentioned - cease-fire problem clashes in the area. And ..... something there. Now I think this is the easiest point. I think we can come to a situation in which we don't have clashes. This is the easiest point but you mentioned that the list of the P.O.W's is a minor thing to compare with the other major issues. It's not a minor thing to us. And you mentioned the other time 1 important phrase and you were quite right. When you go back to your people you are pro-Israelis and when we go back to our people we are pro-Egyptians. That's quite true, really, and we are on the pressure. I believe you are on the pressure and we were as well. And let's be frank as we have been till now. We have to solve this problem otherwise we can't go an inch further, really, because you said that this issue of the P.O.W's list has been principally concluded -.

A - Yes.

B - But we don't see any progress. You promised, you promised, General, I must tell you and stress it, really I must stress it. You said - I that we would have a list of all people, and this was a few days ago. And you said that we will depatch (?) ~~another~~ the other list in 2 days and we are not progressing. So we are blocked and we have to break through this block.

A - I promised that we would give you the list and as I said the last time we will give them list after list a until all the matters will be settled on that. We will not keep them forever. We know that. Geneva convention is clear to us as it is clear to you; and be sure that you will have the list of their names in the right time.

Mr. [redacted] - You said the right time.

B You realise, General, that this is

A I know that this is important and complicated and how it is pressing you

B No, just a moment please. I am not saying that it is complicated and pressing. This is known. But what I want to say is

that this is entirely different to what you said the other two times before. That's the point.

A I said that we will give you a list and we gave you one list. And I think you had before 2 lists.

B What we have been fetched (!) is only 1 list of 45 wounded P.O.W's which Colonel Ouabi gave me personally. Is that right Colonel Ouabi?

A The wounded people we didn't discuss. There is no objection about that. I said about 60 or something like that

B 64. You mentioned the number of 64. and this will be handed over on the same day.

A It was handed but not their whole names. Instead of -

B C we got yesterday, only yesterday, only 29 names without their military numbers and we can't identify the names even - because we don't have any military numbers and ~~there~~ all together were 29.

A That's a mistake. I'll see Colonel Sherif,

Brigadier Sherif because I am not working on the names and the list. That's a mistake. I'm sorry for that If they didn't put the numbers or...

C no, no serious here is the list. You can see how they put it. This is the Red Cross list. That's it. No more.

(מראה לו את הכתב-יד)

B This is my handwriting which...

C This is the first...

B 45 wounded which you gave me personally. You remember? And this is what we have been handed over by the R-C. Yesterday.

C Through the R.C. in Tel-Aviv and now also Mr. Broisard told us that this is the only list they got. They have no more.

A General Sherif is here; I will check with him.

C He is here and he told me that is what they have no more.

B General Sherif - can he be summoned?

A Yes! sure! He is outside waiting.

B We will make a break and ask him.

A No. He will not do anything. And he will not do anything more than that.

C We want him to be about neat.

A B He is carrying out as orders said. We told him to give you these names, that's one list, but, he did it the wrong way - that's all. He is not responsible for not giving you the 64.

B But you realise, General, that you are stuck. Really, you are stuck. Because someone is making errors and instead of progressing we are retarding.

A This list will be changed today, putting the numbers and all the different, their ranks and ....

C But what about the 64 you mentioned.

A? What 64?

C No, no the General said that 64 would be transfered days ago. Only yesterday we got 29. But we are asking the whole list.

A There will be another list handed to you.

the second and third and forth list.

B General, allow me. Do you recall that you promised us that the full list of our P.O.W's would be handed over not later than 3 days from a couple of days before, and we are on the fifth day from since then. Am I right or am I wrong? Let's clarify this point please

(מרעש – דברי הקריאה).

A We consider that although I said that I'll give you the list of the names and this and that; but still the P.O.W's and their names and handing – that's a political question which I can't --

B ~~Although~~ Although you promised?

A Yes. I promised for 6 - 40 names. You have already 23 right? - 29. The rest of the 64 will be handed to you.

B Let's please clarify ---

A So I said 64 names will be handed to you. That's 1 list - 29. The rest of these 64 will be handed to you at another session But the rest ...

C But you have already just now said - you promised ... the whole list.

B If I am wrong - ~~xxx~~ please say it. But that's what we we went away with the impression with.

A As I said now - it is a political question now and it is linked with so many things ; so many other things. And now I again, back again, all the time the 4 meetings we are talking about the P.O.W's and wounded soldiers and this and ~~that~~ dead bodies and not the main mission of this delegation - we didn't start anything about that. Although I know it is very important to you.

B I am ready to say a word about the other topics. General Yariv said that you will be given an answer not before Sunday or Monday. Do you remember that?

A - Yes

B - The major issues. I mean the borders of the 22nd of october, and all the major problems And what we should do is to execute this thing of the P.O.W lists of ~~evacuated~~ exchange of P wounded

P.O.W's, Suez matter and all that. So please let's stay with the schedule. So the major thing of the 22nd of oct. boundries, yes, we'll leave it.

A - That's a complicated thing. Let's ~~leave~~ link all the other things with each other to see how it will go.

B O.K.

A ~~is~~ the continuation of the supply of the third army will be continued or not?

B Now I must remind you that this is a major issue that General Yariv said - the answer will be given on Sunday or Monday. Do you remember that please General?

A Alright. The second thing. There will be any reply today about the Suez city or not? Supply of Suez city.

B No. we were authorized not to go into details about this issue until we are given a list, the full list of the P.O.W's

C and the permission to the R.C. to visit them.

A Of course

B Now I will say all the minor things that are linked with it like visits of the R. C. people

A Right. So you are...

B Because you realise that the issue of the people in the third army and the Suez city - as you mentioned once before - they are not prisonners of war - it's a special issue, a special problem. So we have to deal with this apart from the exchange of wounded and the other things. Yes. I interrupted you; you wanted to say something. Please.

A No. As far as I understand now you are linking now the permanent supply of the third army and permanent supply of Suez city with the names of the P.O.W's. Am I right or wrong?

B No, not the permanent supply of the third army I believe.

A - The third army is connected with the 22 question is it.?

C Yes General Tal said this is human thing. Why make these poor families more poor than they should be. And he doesn't understand why you are doing what you are doing, I mean by

delaying these lists, from, denying these lists from us. And of course we have to link these ~~lists~~ things with the issue of the town of Suez.

A Issue of Suez City

C Suez City

A Suez City. How About the continuation of supply of the 3rd army.

C This is a major issue and this will be answered....

[illegible]

A So back again, you are linking this with that and this with that, all of them, So better leave the meeting today and make another meeting, that's a proposal, with a decision of your General Headquarters and my G.H.Q. on all these items once and for all, if you don't have any reply also for Suez City as I understand, I understand there is no reply for a sapply of. Suez City

B. Yes you are quite right, once we haven't solved the 1st problem of the lists of our P.O.W. being kept by you we unfortunately can't make any progress, really and we came to know each other these meetings and I'm really sorry about it and I hope you share the same feeling and it's a pity

[illegible] - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

B- These appear 2 problems to be solved as against what ?

A- The list of names of the P.O.W. That's as for as I understand from you. you have linked ... this with that, am I wrong or right ?

B - Now could I clarify a couple of things: We discussed the other time the Suez city problems - citizens and wounded and all that . Have you any answers - How many citizens are there, How many wounded are there .

A The wounded, The R.C. told me now, there are 1400 in Suez city. Soldiers and citizens .

B How many people are living except the wounded?

A I don't know exactly how many people are there. because it's very difficult to get into in contact with the government there . Very , very difficult

B - Now to speak frankly . Do you think that this is a deal (I mean, is it) , a fair deal to have just lists because according to the Geneva convention

you are obliged to give us the names, the ranks and the personnal numbers of our P.O.W's being kept by you. This is an international law. So we have to separate things. We have to see first a good faith, a good will from your side, and it's not a far-fetched thing. It's only a thing that should be done according to international law. So what really happens! Let's get down to the facts. There are forces of your army that are on the eastern bank. Right? They lack food, they lack water. You know that. We made a special and exclusive move. We were willing to let a convoy of about 100 trucks move to the third army and unload it there. We started by 100 trucks, then there were added 20 to 30 vehicles. How many are there all together?

S - 127

B A - we started with 120

B - alright. As far as I know we started with 100 but this is really a minor thing. And we did it as a special favour.

Just to show good will. Why won't you show us good-will by having these lists of P.O.W.s which you are obliged by international law to give us !! We are not talking now about exchange of P.O.W's which is special issue.

A I know. We started our talks with good faith and we tried to show you our good faith and be sincere with these talks to be succesful. And even a when we felt - as an example - that Cpt. Dan Avidan is important for you - we handed him on the second day just to let you feel that we are sincere on that.

B We appreciate it very much

A Thank you very much. It was just a symbol and that's alright, in order to go ahead, step by step forward. Now, according to the international law, our citizens in Suez should live and they have their right to have their supplies and their water. and we didn't hear in any war up to now of any army captured a city and cut the water from it, that's very sensitive for us, so if the international law gives you the right to have the list of names and Geneva

convention - we admit that and also on the other side - the civilians have their rights according to the international law. We wanted not to link all these problems with each-other but we are feeling now that you are linking this with that and this with that until we come to a conclusion that we will not do anything and all our meetings will come to vain. I'm sorry to say that. Only one thing - that is the convoy to the third army, and we appreciate that very much and it is a good thing to do; and we suppose, or we hope that this will be continued. If you want to stop it - it's up to you. If you want to link it also with the names.

B No, we didn't say that the continuation of supply to the third army is linked. This is a special thing and General Yariv promised you that on Sunday or on Monday you would get an answer about it and I said it again today. I hope that we started .. ~~and depends~~ of progress two issues one is the handing over of the lists of the P.O.W.s which you promised. It's not only an obligation to an international law but you personnally - you promised and ~~that~~ our people back-home are very disappointed about not having these lists. at least the first one of 64

you mentioned wasn't given to us ; so you can really imagine how my people back-home are disappointed.
So how can we go any further and make some progress when things that are being concluded here are not being executed actually?

A You are stressing these points so many times now. I promised to give you the list of about 64 and we gave you the list of 29 - that's 1 list. And I promise now that I will give you the list that will make it 64 or 63 or 65 as it goes just to have the list of names. But it is not - the whole list of names. As ar I said before we'll send that ...

B Could you tell us please how many P.O.W's, at least the total number of our people that are with you?

A I have been asked that question so many times and I couldn't answer it
This P.O.W - to be frank - it is raised by all the political levels. Up to your president, prime-minister and up to our president. And even in N.Y. everybody is talking about that. And I think both parties are linking this with that. I am not talking about the list I'm talking about exchange of the prisonners of war -

how it is important ; and it is a political situation. If I am authorised to give the list - I won't have any objection to do it as fast as I can do it for the benefit of our meetings everytime to fulfil any mission or to facilitate our work , but also that everybody has his own limits and that's my own limits up to now .

B Now you mentioned that you were ready to give us the rest of the names ; I mean from 29 to 64. When will it be done ?

A We left our work just working on the P.O.W s ?

B The impression we got with the first meeting and we recollected that we are going through all the problems simultanously and will reach a real agreement which would back each- other in each aspect , I mean we got the impression that there would be no problem of continuation of supplying the third army and the Suez city . Maybe we were wrong , but that's the impression we got - that we are stending on a good firm base of mutual interest to reach an agreement on all these aspects just to create the atmosphere we hoped to do for peace and political talks . But I believe that after that we were stuck

in the ~~meeting~~ out the minor things of just we got to give deliver or offer the lists and to go and exchange and the question of the third army and the city still has no answer. While we had this impression .. everything is minor except the P.O.W's It's not one thing. I wonder if we can just put it plain like that. These problems got to be solved if there is something we have to offer each-other, not only for the present, but for the future. I mean concerning the P.O.W's, the wounded people the, third army, the Suez city. These things got to be avoided as obstacles and we've got to get through simultaneously and by one word, and we will not have any problem,

B O.K. Just now with Brig. Sherif. We, I do believe, solved all technical problems, and there is one big plan - how to start accept the new subject he raised today with the 1400 wounded.

A This is a technical problem.

B But we never heard it before. We knew about a wounded ... third army, around 75, but never we heard about this. O.K. We prepare everything it is clear. From technical point of view we have the

answers. But for us the problem of ~~the~~ our list - the full list of prisonners of war is more than essential.

A - Why don't we discuss the situation of the thousands of people starving in the Suez city. But the P.O.W are in our hands, under complete supervision, medical aid for them, they are eating, they have a good time there in their places.

B It is not what the convention says. The convention says that they have to be released. Must be given to the R.C. and that the R.C. can protect it.

A We were going to concentrate only on one point and leave the other points..

B No, we'll not leave the other points. If we get for example the whole list and we know that the R.C. representative can come and see them - we immediately start to solve the all rised problems. Everything.

A Just make a deal from your point of view and we'll have that proposal. Do so and so and so; we'll do so and so and so. And this will solve all these problems.

B We gave you a full list of all the P.O.W as from the 11th of October till yesterday; everyday you get a list, a full list of the P.O.W's. And we feel that this shouldn't be a major issue. The major issue is the exchange of the P.O.W's. But we have a right to this grace according to the convention the same way you had a right to this grace according to the convention. And we supplied you with a list every day, you have an example here of a list, it's almost a book, of 7000 today, it's almost 7000 P.O.W and we can't even get the total figure of our prisonners. I think this is unfair. This is against the convention and it's very difficult to start any other problems - to solve them when such a basic issue - we are not talking about the exchange - the exchange will be another problem - but we have now a problem A - of proceeding from the first basic right that both sides have - to know how many and who are the P.O.W's in the other camp. And that the R.C. should be authorised to visit them according to the convention. You claim that there is a problem of the civilians. We agree to that and we admit that there is a humanitarian problem of Suez, and we are ready to solve it today and to go into all

details - provided that the first issue of the list is solved. I mean - this is basic. We have many more problems to solve. But this is such an obsticle that we have been waiting for 5 days, for 6 days to be solved. We see that we can't progress. Of the names you make a political issue. I mean the political issue could be whether you are going to exchange or not exchange. But the sheer names - I mean how many we have and who they are is not a political issue - this is a basic right of both sides and that is why it is in the convention; and both sides have agreed. And we agree that the city of Suez is not going to starve and will have enough water provided that we get satisfaction for this basic principle, I mean for this basic demand - right. This is a right by the convention.

C I would like to add something; That General Tal, the other time, wasn't authorised to allow a first convoy to the Suez city you mentioned and he did it. Because we wanted to make even the tiniest progress. Really, and I admit it, so you should take it into consideration that we are really going further than sometimes we are

allowed. And this was a ~~thin~~ thing that you, I don't know why, because maybe of your own reasons you rejected it.

A No, I can see or I understand that there is a proposal to solve the problem of Suez city. On the other hand we will give you the list of the P.O.W's. Right?

B Right. the whole list

A The whole ~~link~~ list.

B Including a link with a visit of the R.C. people.

A The minute we hand the names - they go automatically.

CB yes, so it's very clear.

B Just to show you a small thing you know - I told you about ~~the~~ - also I told you the least. we got of the 29. But this is the least. We transfered to the R.C. every day, you see the numbers, the names, the rank, everything They get it very clear. Every day they get. we can't even, you see, identify ---

A That's a technical mistake from General Sherif. We'll correct it soon, really quickly.

B O.K.

(illegible)

B we will allow Now, a daily convoy of 7 vehicles. The contents of which you mentioned last time and we can remind the contents. This will be allowed daily - a convoy of 7 vehicles to the city of Suez. This will be executed when we receive the full list of our P.O.W I mean that when we have the last name this can be done daily. Is it a fair deal, General?

A Yes, I want to clarify something about this That includes supply and water. Now

B Now, I was talking only about supply mean food and medical supply. This was mentioned by the contents of the 7 vehicles by day. Now once you mentioned the problem of water. We would like to make it like this. We will be given the number of inhabitants, the city citizens who live in the Suez city by the waters. Unfortunately, you don't know. You mentioned different numbers. We will leave it for the R.C to ~~find out~~ decide how many

inhabitants are living in the Suez city and we will be ready to allow them also a daily supply of water coming by water tank-cars.

A Tank? coming from Cairo?

B Yes.

A That's more than the 7 vehicles which will be allowed for supplies!

B In addition to the 7 vehicles you mentioned. But it will be decided according to the number of the citizens living in the Suez city. Being determined by the R.C. people. I think it's quite a fair deal.
Now to be frank and honest and clear - this can be executed only after we have the full lists of all our prisonners in Egypt. Everywhere. I think this is clear..

A - Very clear.

C ~~and~~ It's a big step forward

B and I think it's quite a step forward.
At least we know where we live.

A Alright I'll see my authorities - how it will work on that. And I promise I will give you the decision

through the U.N. when they will agree to that I will send a cable to inform you about that decision. Throw

B Through the observers? Very good. the best.

A About the continuation of the third army. As far as know there is some talks, some agreements, maybe on higher levels, that there is another convoy consisting of 50 lorries. That's what they said. So when we finish with this convoy we'll start with another 50 lorries.

B This is a total surprise for us. We learned about it when I over there to the check-point and we learned .... (אבוקי נורית)

A I asked my people here if the military commanders here know that. They say that they don't know anything about that, so I am raising that question just to ask the political authorities in Israel if they will admit that or submit that - it will be alright. If not we have our lorries - they can go back easily. But as far as I know - before I come here that there is acceptence to push forward 50 more lorries with supply, the same thing. In this case, if you would accept I would like to have in these lorries

rations, water and winter ~~uniform~~ clothes. And that's non-military equipment. I mean undershirts, heavy clothes but not —

B So, as I told you, we were totally surprised to learn it ~~hear~~ here, so we will have to fetch it - forward it to our authorities and we can give you an answer in about it through the U.N or in the next meeting.

A Alright - if you can send it through the U.N or in the second meeting - alright. We still have 40 lorries here are still waiting so we still have 1 or 2 days to work.

B It is not us to be blamed. The people who are reloading

A No. I am just giving you information because if it is true it is up to the political levels. I want to raise 1 question: Suppose that we have some of our military personnel in one of the areas under your control. We want to make sure of their situation before we start on their problem. I mean - we will call the U.N to tell them we have 5 soldiers here. or 100 soldiers here or 5 soldiers here. Maybe 5, maybe 10, maybe 100. Just an order, not to make them P.O.W. we would

like to have your acceptance to ~~accept~~ show the U.N people where they are so they can return them back to us. Can it be accepted or not? They are not working against you. They are not from our ranges. They are not. Just living in one area under your control.

B You mean that there are still Egyptian soldiers spread all over the area here. and groups of ..

A Just only one group

B Are you talking about a specific group?

A Yes.

B Where?

A If I have the answer I will say where. and you will take them today.

B What do you think is their status?

A Just living there.

B Talking frankly. Don't you think they should be considered P.O.W when they are found? really. Let's take the ~~1967~~. Our strong point, in the ~~1967~~ They were surrounded and they surrendered there. Remember?

A - Yes. Port Tawfik. 37 people.

B and we didn't say a word. It was according to the law. Now the option is either they have food - let them eat or they don't have food. After all they are here in our territory. If we had people in your territory, I don't think we could bear it in mind - .. (...) To

C To make you assured that if they will need for example medical treatment they will get it - excellent and they will be in the best hands...

B If you ask my advice, if you'll allow me to advise you - Please let them know # and advise them to surrender and everything will be O.K. We at least, you can say a lot of things about Israelis, but one thing is ~~true~~ proved - we treat P.O.W the best ... that the whole people in the world have ever heard. # we are famous and known for that.

A Alright. Very good. Just another question. I heard from the General that in Suez there is 1400

B 300 of them - a rounded figure - are seriously wounded. That means that 300 seriously wounded will be evacuated only - or there will be permission for 1400

B As I mentioned - it is the first time I learned of this fact. I would like to check it and give you the answer.

A That means that we will not start the exchange of the wounded P.O.W.s until we finish that.

K If we (for example) agree and we get the whole list of our P.O.W - immediately to start with the evacuation of the wounded. So there is no ~~prep~~ problems with the 14 or 3 how many you have in the 3rd army. I will give you the answer today about the 300.

A Now again you are linking the P.O.W.s with the seriously wounded P.O.W

K Well this you raised juster this morning and even you don't know who they are - soldiers or civilians

A I don't know even if they or soldiers or civilians, it doesn't ~~matter~~ make any difference - we made a deal

B Well, still General, we are waiting for you to answer us. You promised that an answer would ger yesterday about our wounded soldiers or captured soldiers ~~in~~ or killed soldiers in Suez. Still we are waiting for this answer.

A We couldn't get contact with the Governer, honestly. And I told General Sherif, with the R.C. the R.C. can go there and see the Governer and ask him if he has P.O.W's he is a civiliam man - he will not keep them; if he has wounded he will not deny that from the R.C. If he has dead bodies - he doesn't care for keeping them. Up to the R.C. If you permit one of our officers to go with the R.C. that Sherif was responsible for that. & he can go to Suez and settle the matter there; so this point I couldn't get any answer to it really.

(הפרעה בתרגום)

all right I'll do another thing. That's up to the R.C. The R.C. can go there and see them and inquire. If they are P.O.W's they will be kept as P.O.W's and you will know their names and status and everything through the R.C. Wounded - the same thing. Dead - the same thing. Up to the R.C. You can start it from now. Because we couldn't get in touch with the Governer to have the names of any of them, information about any of them.

(הפרעה בתרגום)

B The question of the 300 seriously wounded in Suez city -

is a new issue because I would like to remind you that we were concluding something like this: We have the 45 wounded with you and we have now in Israel 400 wounded, the list of which we dispatched you yesterday. And we agreed upon 70-75 being seriously wounded in taking out from the 3rd army and the Suez city. Right?

A No. Sorry to say that. We said ... or 30 or 1 or 1000 in the 3rd army. We put it clearly. I think you can hear it back again. 45 wounded, against 400 you have. We didn't know that there were 400 in your hospitals in Israel

B But you got the lists?

A yes, Again the number of wounded in your hospitals, the seriously wounded in the 3rd army, the seriously wounded in Suez city. We didn't make any numbers because we didn't know and up to that minute we knew that number from the R.C. only. So seriously wounded, or wounded from both sides - we agreed to exchange them. So if there is any change - we can start back again on that problem.

(...)

B according to the R.C. there are 300 seriously

wounded in the Suez city.

A That's what I said

C What are they - soldiers? citizens?

A Some of them are soldiers, some of them are civilians. As the General said - I heard it from the R.C. for the first time now. It doesn't make any difference if they are soldiers or civilians. Because seriously wounded as a human-being - that's all.

B O.K.

(הפסקה קצרה)

B Now when do you think you will have an answer to the lists of our P.O.W.s?

A I don't know. That's up to the authorities which will decide when we can start back.

B So I think - please clarify and check how many seriously wounded there are of the army and how many are civilians in Suez city.

A It has to be done by a representative of the R.C.

B All right. the R.C. will go. We'd like to know how many seriously wounded there are among the

seriously wounded in Suez city and how many are of the armed forces.

A would it make any difference?

B I don't know. Really I don't know. After all we are soldiers and we have to check it with our authorities. But at least

A we will not ask that question because it is very difficult for us to get into contact with the government So please let the R.C. give that answer, and we'll believe the R.C. and Let the R.C. go there and ask how many soldiers! How many civilians?. How many seriously wounded in the city. Up to the R.C. what he says - we accept it. In order not to wait a word from us.

B In order to be frank and not to confuse things - to my best knowledge - this issue of 300 seriously wounded is for me and for you, I think

C for. all of us

B I agree with your correction. Once you raised it you had a point. But still this is a new item and we'll have to check it with our purpose. Do you understand?

A Yes, just check what General Yariv. I think because he started the talk about the wounded, as far as I can remember, or General Tal.
You will see that we mentioned it more than once, without any numbers. We said that we would exchange the seriously wounded or the wounded P.O.W's that is the # 45 from our hospitals and then we will have 1-2-3 - Fhast' 1 - That's number of people in Israel, which we didnt know. Second - that in the 3rd army. But somebody here said about 70. I don't know from where this number.

B It had been determined by the R.C. You remember?

A Yes. Those seriously wounded in the Suez city, we didn't say a word who is soldier who is civilian, how many, we didnt know

B Anyhow, maybe we missed this point, I don't think, but still there's a chance that we missed this point. We have one sign(?) we think it's a new item, we have to check it . . . I believe this thing will be smoothed

A I hope so. So we can come to a conclusion of the meeting of today as follows

C yan.

B Please, and lets make it very very clarifying, make it a real progress, not waste

C שגרונים, תלוין עם המלים שאנו שהיה . . .

B

C . . . ס|

אומרים או: כולם בתנועה מוחלטת . . .

B כן, תהא המילה שתבוא המילום . . . מה נעשה עם הבעה המילום

C . . . ושאנו מסוימת

B הוא הסכים שנעשה המילום שהיה אתה, תשלח

. . . נפצעו, נלקח שבויים, אנשים ותגישה בתביעה. כימ-חמץ

אומרים, גם יש מלים שאנו מסוגלים

C או שמיים שאנו אז תפסים שאנו, בדיוק את הסך הכל

B שמיים, הוא אומר, ישמשו כשמיים. מלים ואז אחר כך

C בסדר, כך או שהוא הציבור

A Sirs, please. That proposal is, that proposal and it is not a decision, proposal. That Egypt will hand over the list of all prisoners of war in our country

B Yes!

A On the other hand, we'll permit

B In one bulk

A In one bulk (חוזר על הצעה קודמת)

B Names and military numbers and all details

A Names, military numbers, ranks and every-

thing, yes...

B According to law

C yes!

A According to law. And on the other side 4 lorries will be admitted to the- every day to Suez city: carrying different supplies and medical supplies

B Now if you let me

A just a moment please

B yes!

C yes!

A About the water for the Suez city, according to the Red-Cross decision, about the quantity of water, needed to Suez, this quantity will permitted to go to Suez by Egyptian lorries

B Water tank cars yes

A Water tanks, is it water tankers or just only lorries with Jericans and so on. That is the first item. And this up to their authorities, to give the decision on that proposal. I mean it is not a decision it is a proposal

B yes

A From our division, from both divisions

the second one

B Now, before let's detail somethings, when we are talking about 4 carries, what will be the contents, let's specify again

A yes

B just to be clear...

A yes!

B .... One flour one rice

A One flour one rice.

C One medicines

A one medicines

B One blood and plasmas

A one petrol

B Petrol

A One...

B Smaller one...

A With blood and plasma

B And then two

A Two different

B Different

A Different, what do you mean by different

B Cheese, beans

A I mean all kinds of things, ... food

B You mean different kinds of food

A ya.

B About the water, you said that it would be, the quantity of the water would be up to the decision of the Red-Cross. What I was saying is that

A To see how many people there is, and then

B And then they will make the census of the peoples?

A Yes

B The people in of Suez?

A Yes

B And we will both decide upon the quantity needed, quantity of water needed for a person a day and this will be the amount of water per being allowed that they will be moved to Suez city

A No, Please we don't want to postpone that

B Yes!

A For further discussion just leave it to the Red-Cross because water is needed for the inhabitants, water maybe needed for hospitals water maybe needed for any other thing I don't know, especially hospitals. So I hear the Red-Cross

A Be framed, I just want varify, just to make plain We as general Tal mentioned

before, we don't water that being supplied to Suez city will be transfered to the 3rd army

A: No

C: For the time being, maybe tomorrow every thing will be changed

A: yes!

C You understand? for the time being this is the point

A Yes

B So, we will have, the Red-Cross will have to decide first thing how many citizens are in the Suez city. They will decide together with us the amount, the quantity of water needed per day per person, the total quantity will be allowed to be pushed to Suez city in water tank cars

A I'm telling you we don't want to postpone it again and make another meeting for that. I leave it with the Red-Cross and you.

B O.K

A Both of you. How many gallon do you give per person per day.

B If you ask my personal opinion I think it's about 5 liters per person per day don't you think so?

A I don't want to . . .

B I just . . .

A 'Cos the quantity of water given to the citizen, it will be the minimum needed for them I'm sure of that

B . . . . . [illegible]

A So there is no . . . .

B It's agreed . . .

A let's understand, the last, if water needed to the hospitals, needed for anyother medical thing or, that is up to the Red-Cross.

. . . [illegible]

A to make administrative work for so many troubles there the Red-Cross will do it.

(laughter) [illegible]

B ~~that's~~ it's included, when I say 5 liters per person per day it's included with the it's included.

A ya!

B Now, the last ~~issue~~ issue I would like to clarify is about the answer

you will be giving us the answer through the U.N. or either to the U.N or in our next meeting.

A right!

B are we going to fix the next meeting?

A yes we will have to fix it when we finish our this one.
about the exchange of the wounded prisoners of war, as we said before. The 45 wounded prisoners of war will be handed from Egypt to Israel through the Red-Cross in two groups. The first group as you said before - 27 seriously wounded, the second group - 18. on the opposite hand to evacuate to Egypt our wounded prisoners of war in Israel with out giving any number.

B why? you can mention the number 400.

A

A as you said 400,

B yes!

A Our seriously wounded plus our

seriously wounded in the 3rd army according to the Red-Cross.

B The amount of the ...

A yes! according to the Red-Cross visit and the seriously wounded in the Suez city as the Red-Cross dicide. it is up to the Red-Cross to dicide. How many from here and how many from there, I mean from in Suez city. Civilians or military perssonel, the same. There is no diffrence between this 300 maybe what ~~you~~ He said - maybe 300, ~~all civilians~~ Maybe all soldiers, all civilians, one here, one there, it doesn't make any differance with us "

B Well, they said approximately there are around 60% or 40% of soldiers among

A But ...

B ... 30 %.

A Let's discuss the second item, it is a decision or just only a proposal from both sides until a decision is taken by our authorities.

B We can make decision if we are talking about the two first groups. The 3rd army wounded and the .... We can make a decision concerning the first despatch of the seriously wounded I mean the 27 against a certain number of the 400 wounded, egyptian wounded in Israel. We can make a decision about that. The other thing we have to check with our authorities ~~about our two ways~~ because you raised, you raised a new item as I said before. The seriously wounded in Suez consisting a swell of soldiers and citizens, you understand?

A Yes, no ...

B If you ask me, if you ask me, we can decide upon the first

C ... ?מה לגבי הראשונים

B No, but...

C ... 45 ... ~~for the second month~~

A As we considered that with General Tal as you remember, when General Tal was here, on the last meeting, we made a formula, the 3 Items against the 45. And

we made 10 opposite to the, and then there is one question, the one we cant bring him with one airplane every time. So we made them two groups, and two groups from so many groups from our side, so the last group from our side will be opposite the last group from your side. And I was very clear with the 3 items. Those in Israel that are 400, those in the army which I didnt know, those in Suez. If it is not clear or you want to go back to your authorities well go back to our authorities and then will settle that matter ~~issue~~ next on the coming meeting also, just to have it cleared up

B O.K

A O.K. So the two points will be up to the authorities

B yes

A The higher authorities on the coming meeting

C [illegible]

B We raised the other time the question your unfortunately couldnt give us the answer was whether there are wounded people of ours in Suez city and except, I mean

the 45 in your country and . . .

C . . . עוד את מה שיש

B And the number of the prisoners of war in Suez

C . . . ואת מה שיש

A Alright, just to clear the 3rd point

B yes

A As far as the prisoners of war, as far, as the prisoners of war, wounded prisoners of war, dead bodies,

B Yes!

A From the Israel army, in Suez, we will leave that to the red cross to decide if we have some of them in the city or not

B Or maybe there are

A Because . . .

B Maybe they are in the 3rd army . . .

A We dont know!

B Maybe there are in the 3rd army

A Still we have to clarify this point

C If there are wounded people of ours in the Suez, in the 3rd army, they should be added to the 45 in your country

A I agree, as against . . . .

B Included in the exchange

C That's right

C שישה, שישה, תגיד לו שאנחנו לפחות שנדע, לא, ש
אלוהי אמיתי כי יש שם.

B yes!

C

B No, no, no, I think we have to emphasize it according to what we know there are in your hands, in Suez, Israelies prisoners of war

A yes!

B This is what we know

A If the Red-Cross would go there, he will see, take their names

C We raise this because we know that there are

A Alright, provided that you except one of our people to accompany the Red-Cross

B in order

A To communicate; in order to allow the government ~~[illegible]~~ to give the information, to get it back, because I believe he may have some difficulties, the Red-Cross, from, if he goes, and just asks, O.K

B Why not, why not, pass a message

A We can't

B By General Gamasi himself, to
C To the commander!
D To the commander of Suez, or to the government, he has a radio and he hears it through transmitters and everything that his is meetings are being held, and he knows who is General Gamasi, so a message can be passed
A Sure
B To him -
A I tried, but I couldn't get complete reply about that
B I mean a message being passed to the governor
C
B Through the Red-Cross people, right?
A alright, we want only to facilitate the job of the Red-Cross men. We have no intention exploiting this visit by any means
C I know that there is a link between the commander of the U.N. force in Suez and the commander of the Egyptian army in Suez, so you may use the communication of the U.N
A Maybe it's a good idea!

A To fascilitate the job of the Red Cross.

B So to clarify this thing wounded people in Suez city and 3rd army will be considered as in the plus to the 45 wounded. The full list of the P.O.W's will include the prisoners of war in Suez city and the 3rd army. Everything is clear.

A Everything is clear.

B Now, we have to fix the next meeting

A I think it should be on the 6th, will be reasonable thats what was you have .... read back until general Yariv comes back. So we have the political situation and then with the military situation and then I know everything will be solved.

C yes!

B six is tuesday?

A six is monday?
We are on the 3rd today

B Mrs. Meir will give a speach is the Knesset on Monday

B Tomorrow is Sunday 4th Monday is the 5th so she should be back ...

A 6th is tuesday

B yes!

A yes!

B If she comes Monday - one more day

A One more day.

B you must have your reasons

A Ha, Ha, Ha that's only for that reason - clear.
when she comes back she will give the decision.

C Maybe you want Mrs Meir here in these meetings:
she could go through it better than us.

A Everything starts from the political situation, Everything and I'm sure that the political situation is allright all these problems will be solved.

B If you bring your president here we will bring Mrs. Meir here and everything will be solved. I can asure you.
We fixed the 6th 12 oc'. now, if there is something to be clarified or to be decided we will pass it through U.N. chanells is it O.K?

A If any of my authorities will approve to hand the list of all prisoners in one bulk including those in Suez city and the 3rd army. We can send you a message saying that we except doing so in one bulk and so in .... and so we'll start in Suez city on the second day

B that's right

A Handing over the names and lists we'll send Addy sherif

and I will not come on that meeting

B I see!

A Or colonel Huaidy may come

B Good

A So one of our representatives will come to hand the names and to start ...

B And maybe even we can start ~~to~~ with the transfer of the wounded
the exchange of wounded.
Any message you send to us in few hours you get back an answer. So there is no problem if you don't want to come to a meeting, if you send any message of this kind. out of it you want an answer to the U.N you get back an answer in a few ~~minutes~~ hours. I'll fix the date, we can fix the place, we can fix the amount of cars, we can fix

everything, No problem.

A So I owe you a message and you owe me a message. The coming message from you will say that we accept the exchange of wounded prisoners of war on the opposite hand we'll give the .HOO here and Suez and the numbers of everything.

B what are the chances General what do you think about your authorities?

A On that hand:

B on that hand!
He is waiting until Mrs. Meir comes back

A When I come back, when I go back I'll see what ... from N.Y.

B close

לשכת הרמטכ"ל

ש מ ו ר

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם המצרים בתאריך 3 נוב' 73 -
ב-ק"מ ה-105

1. נוכחים: מצידם - גנרל ג'מסי +קול' הורידי.
מצידנו - אלוף ש. אייל, אל"מ ד.שיאון ו-אל"מ א' לברן. כן השתתף תא"ל א.אבנון. ייצג את הצד הישראלי אל"מ א' לברן.

2. כללי:-

א. בהתאם להנחיות המוקדמת של שרהב"ט, הפקד עיקרה של הפגישה להבהיר למצרים, כי כל עוד אינם עומדים בדיבוריהם בענין מסירת רשימות שבויינו יקשה עלינו לבוא לקראתם במיוחד בנושא האספקה לעיר סואץ.

ב. בסוף הפגישה גובשו 2 הצעות ברורות שיש לתת עליהן תשובות ברורות אם דרך ה-או"מ ואם בפגישה הבאה:-

1) הגשת רשימת כל שבויינו תמורת אספקה לעיר סואץ.

2) החלפת שבויים פצועים.

3. פירוט ההצעה בענין קבלת רשימת שבויינו תמורת האספקה לעיר סואץ:-

א. מצרים תמסור לנו ברשימה אחת את שמות כל שבויינו שבמצרים (כולל דרגות ומספרים אישיים), לרבות אלה שבסואץ וארמיה 3. [illegible]

ב. תמורת זאת: (ראשית, שהסדיר הישפין ויתבע):-

1) נרשה אספקת מזון ותרופות לעיר סראן ע"י שיירות יומיות של 7 מכוניות (שתכלולנה 1 מכונית קמח, 1 מכונית אורז, 1 מכונית תרופות, 1 מכונית דלק, 1 מכונית קטנה לדם ופלסמה, 2 מכוניות לשונות כשמדובר בדברי מזון שונים).

2) נרשה בנוסף ל-7 המכוניות אספקת מים יומית לעיר סראן במכוניות מצרות, בהתאם למספר התושבים שבסראן (המספר יקבע ע"י "הצלב האדום" והכמות הנדרשת תיקבע על ידינו ו"הצלב האדום").

4. פירוט ההצעה בענין חילופי שבויים פצועים:-

א. חזרו על ההצעה הקודמת להחליף 45 פצועינו שבמצרים בפצועים שלהם בישראל ובארמיה 3 (לפי החלטת ה-צל"א המספר שהוזכר עד כ-75 איש).

ב. הוסיפו דרישה שבמסגרת זו יפונו כל הפצועים קשה שבסראן לפי החלטת ה-צל"א (למדנו בנפרד מה-צל"א, כי מדובר בכ-300 איש) כשהמספר כולל חיילים ואזרחים.

ג. הבהרנו וקיבלנו, כי פצועים קשה שלנו הנמצאים בסראן או בארמיה 3 נכללים במסגרת החלפת הפצועים, היינו, בנוסף ל-45 שבמצרים.

ד. מאחר והעלו הנקודה הנכללת בסעיף ב' לעיל אמרנו, כי אנו צריכים להתייעץ בשלטונותינו ונימן להם השובה אם באמצעות ה-או"מ או בפגישה הקרובה, כמוך לתשובתם בדבר שאירת הפצועים.

5. פירוט והוספות:-

א. כשנאמר להם, כי לא עמדו בדיבורם בקשר למסירת רשימת השבויים שלנו הראשונה ובקשר למסירת כל רשימות השבויים תוך 3 ימים הודו בכך ואמרו, כי זה הפך להיות ענין פוליטי. עם זאת מסר, כי ישתדל לעמוד בדיבורו וישלים בהקדם מסירת הרשימה הראשונה שצריכה לכלול 64 שמות (נמסר לו, כי הם מסרו רק אתמול ורק 29 שמות וגם אותה בצורה משובשת).

ב. כמשקל-נגד לדרישתנו לקבל רשימת כל שבויינו במצרים אמר, כי הדבר הוא פחות-ערך ושלמעשה נושאי הפגישות שלנו צריכים להיות הפסקת האש וחזרה לקווי 22 אוק'.

ג. בהקשר לקווי 22 אוק' הזכרנו, כי אלוף יריב אמר שימסור תשובה בנדון ביום ראשון או שני.

ד. בקשר לבעיות הפסקת האש מסר על התקריות הבאות:-

1) ביצוע סיורי אויר שלנו מעל ארמיה 2 שבעקבותיהם ירתה ההגנה האווירית שלהם ואנו ערוכים על כך.

2) תנועות של טנקים ו-חי"ר שלנו אתמול ליד מאחז המבודד ב"בוצר".

3) ירי כוחותינו הבוקר באיזור הג'ידי על כוחותינו.

ה. העלה טוב בקשתם להמשך האספקה לארמיה 3 לאחר שהשיירה הראשונה תסתיים. נענה שהובטחה לו תשובה ע"י האלוף יריב ביום ראשון או שני. בהקשר זה מסר, כי כ-50 מכוניות שלהם מחכות כבר ליד המחסום (ב-ק"מ ה-101) ע"פ אישור הדרג הגבוה". מכוניות אלה כוללות מנות מזון, מים, ובגדי חורף לארמיה 3. נענו שלא ידוע לנו על שום אישור של דרג גבוה לשיירה זו.

ו. ביקשו, כי נרשה לחיילים שלהם לעבור לשטחנו ולהוציא לשונם חיילים לכודים שלהם. נענה, כי החיילים הלכודים (שכמובן לא רצה לפרט טיבם ומקומם) צריכים להיחשב עלינו כשבויי מלחמה ושאנו ניתן להם הטיפול הטוב ביותר האפשרי.

ז. הוסכם כי ה-צל"א יבדוק בסוראץ, ימיין וימסור לנו כמה חיילים פצועים וכמה אזרחים פצועים יש להם שם.

6. <u>פגישה נוספת</u>:-

א. פגישה נוספת נקבעה ל-6 נוב' שעה 1200.

ב. הסבירו התאריך בכך שמניחים כי אז יחזרו רוה"מ וירים מ-ארה"ב ואפשר יהיה למסור להם תשובות ברוב הנושאים.

אהרון לכרן - אל"מ

ס ו ד י

אגף מודיעין/ מחקר
מ/0411/7306/581.12
יג' חשון תשל"ד
8 נוב' 1973
עותק מס' 2
מסמך זה כולל 3 עמ'

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם גנרל ג'מסי ב-ק"מ ה-105 מ-8 נוב' 73

נוכחים: מצד המצרים - גנרל ג'מסי רקול' הורידי.
מצד ישראל - אלוף א' יריב, אל"מ ד' שיאון ב-אל"מ א' לברן.

פירוט דו"ח הפגישה:-

א. כללי - הפגישה הוקדשה לבירור הפרטים כפי שרואים אותם המצרים בהנחה שיהיה הסכם ברוח ההצעה שהביא סיסקו ממצרים.

ב. החלפת פצועים:-

1) בארמיה 3 יש רק 6-10 פצועים שיש לפנותם.

2) בסראן דובר בעבר על 300 פצועים קשה אך לדברי ה-צל"א ישנם סה"כ 1200 פצועים שיש לפנותם כולל חיילים.

3) כל אלה צריכים להיות מוחלפים בנוסף ל-400 הפצועים המצריים שבישראל.

4) אין שום בעייה מצד המצרים להתחיל בהחלפת פצועים; היינו - 44 שלנו מול כ-1610 שלהם (1200 מסראן ועוד 400 בישראל ועוד כ-10 בארמיה 3). עם זאת נאמר גם כי הדבר כפוף לביצוע כל ההצעה (שהועברה אלינו ע"י סיסקו) כ"חבילה אחת".

5) בירור ומסרו כי אין פצועים (וכן אין שבויים) שלנו בעיר סראץ. ישנם בעיר כ-25 חללים שלנו.

ג. <u>הספקה לעיר סראץ</u>:-

1) בירור ומצאו כי בעיר סראץ יש כ-20,000 איש. מספר זה לדידם הוא גם על דעת ה-צל"א.

2) אי לכך, רוצים הספקה יומית לסראץ של 17 מכוניות כדלהלן:-

א) 2 מכוניות - כ"א 30 טון - לחיטה.

ב) 5 מכוניות - כ"א 20 טון - למצרכים שונים, למזון, לבגדים וכו'.

ג) 1 מכונית - של 1 טון - לתרופות ודם.

ד) 9 מכוניות למים (2 של 6 טון+2 של 8 טון+5 של 7 טון).

3) סה"כ ליום - 17 מכוניות הכוללות 160 טון מזון ועוד 63 טון מים ועוד 1 מכונית לתרופות (לא חייבת להיות כל יום אלא לפי הצורך)

4) גנרל ג'מסי מסר כי הרוחה ע"י סאדאת עצמו להגיע למצב בו סראץ תחיה ותהיה ככל עיר במצרים; היינו - תהיה עיר חופשית ובמידה שיהיו לאנשי העיר תנועה וקשר חופשיים לחוץ. האספקה לעיר תהיה אמנם תחת פיקוח או"מ, אך פרט לזה לא יהיו כל הגבלות. מדגישים כי לא תהיה העברת מצרכים מסראץ לארמיה 3.

5) נענה כי אין אנו רואים הדברים כך וכי סראץ היא לדעתנו עיר מנותקת ובכלל בעבר דיברו רק על הספקת מזון, תרופות ומים לעיר וכאן מועלה לראשונה נושא חדש ומפתיע. הודגש לצד המצרי, כי נקודה זו גם לא הועלתה בהצעה שהועברה אלינו ע"י מר סיסקו.

ד. הספקה לארמיה 3:-

1) מדובר בהספקה של מצרכים לא צבאיים. תכולתם לא ברורה עדיין לצד המצרי והם יבדקו זאת ויבריקו לנו.

2) המכוניות יועברו באחריות ובפיקוח או"מ וייבדקו בנקודת הפריקה ע"י קציני ישראלים ומצריים.

ה. שיטת ההספקה לסראן ולארמיה 3:-

1) הודגש מצידנו כי מדובר בנהגי או"מ שיעבירו המכוניות להעודתן הצד המצרי רוצה בנהגים מצריים.

2) הציר לסראן ולארמיה 3 יהיה בחסות או"מ ולא יהיו עליו נקודות ביקורת ישראליות ושום פעילות צבאית ישראלית.

3) הצד המצרי מסכים לביקורת בנקודת הפריקה לארמיה 3 אך לא תהיה שום ביקורת באשר לאספקה לעיר סראן.

ו. הפרדת הכוחות: הוסכם כי הנושא חשוב, וצריך להידון, אך לא בפגישה זו שכן טרם סוכם הדיון בישראל בהצעה הכוללת שהובאה ע"י סיסקו.

ז. העברת החללים שלנו - מצידם זה בסדר והם מוכנים להשאיר הפרטים ל-צל"א.

ח. סיכום:-

1) רואים כל ההצעה לסיכום בחבילה אחת.

2) פגישה נוספת נקבעה ליום שבת 10 נוב' שעה 1400.

א' לבנן, אל"מ

Meeting Between Yariv - Jamsi
8th of November 1973 15.00

A - Jamsi B - yariv

[illegible]

So General How do we feel? things are going difficult!

We feel allright, I think everything is going allright.

You think so?

I think so.

Seriously? Well there is no secret you know that our disco- and his general have come last night to Israel [illegible] Cyprus and I had the* nice honour meeting him

You what?

I had the honour of meeting him the airport but they had not the discussions yet when I left. We perhaps if we would have known that the discussions would take a bit more we would have not troubled you for the meeting But as we cabled you before we knew We didn't want to cancel meeting because you would have thought why do they cancel the meeting so we kept the in- on. I was thinking and p- is allright with you

because we have very seriousa matters to discuss offcourse and but as the discussion are not yet concluded, I hope it will be allright, I hope it will be allright but until there is finished we can not go into details I suggest that perhaps we say so for today because Ive read through the minuets of the two last meetings and I've seen that a lot of work has been done between you and General Tal and between you and General Eyal on the problem of the wounded and on Suez So if you are agreed I suggest that we say under the condition that an agreement is reached through the talks that the president with Dr. Kissinger and the talks we had with Dr. Kissinger & Sissco provided that an agreement is reached how shall we arrange, I'll take only one item, How are we going to arrange exchange on the wounded? Because then it is all the wounded
- right as we discussed ...
- If you agree to it provided that an agreement is reached
- right
- Because this means until an agreement is reached we can't do anything
- right! About the wounded as we discussed it before with General Tal and General Eyal ...

A - As we said you will have your wounded prisoners of war and we will have ours in your hospitals and then the wounded personel in the 3rd army they were only 6 or ten persons as far as we knew from the Red-Cross and then we came here to the Suez City we thought that there were 300 seriously wounded, thats what the Red-Cross reported early to put these people against these 44 and to exchange them as soon as possible, So General Eyal has said, I thought that there were about 60 or 70 something like that so I will go back to my authorotics. So we stoped the whole thing. As far as the Red-Cross is concerned there was a meeting and they asked me to come there or they reported to me through Sheriff that there was 1000 ...

- General Adlie Sheriff

- General Adlie Sheriff that there were 1200 I think, cevilians and Military in Suez city and their Doctors ... 1,200!

- And they said from our paint of view as Doctors and as Red-Cross we think that all these people should be evacuated because the water, the medicine and this and that is not sufficient there so they should be

evacuated So if you agree to that proposal we can start the work and they made the ~~schedule~~ schedule and transportation and everything we don't have any problem on that provided you will agree to take our wounded people in Suez city, that's allright. Have you checked if we have any wounded soldiers in Suez area.

yes.

בעצם אין שבויים מצרים ...

You don't have any prisoners of war in Suez, you don't have wounded prisoners of war in Suez but there are dead bodies there. Maybe about 25 something like that And I say the civilians there to be evacuated for their own benefit as human beings especially on the proposal given to us through General Kissinger exactly as it is given to you on the same day, those civilian in Suez who are sick or wounded should be evacuated through the Red Cross and there is no objection on that With your permission General I only want to ask

ורשה אלוף מצרים: אני רוצה ... כול הכבוד סוכלנים ...

אלוף מצרים ...

בכלי כלי, אני מבין מה אתה

אלי מצרים ... מה הכוונה?

(שקט כך בכלי)

Now, and where do we stand on the list of the prisoners?

the list of prisoners is writen

the proposal of Mr. Kissinger. so. it will be disaussed with the whole problem.

3 - I understand, what you mean to say General is that, it's like that - If we condition the exchange of the wounded including the 1200 wounded civilians in the Suez then you are ready to do it., if we condition that with the list of the p.o.w's then you want to wait for the whole agreement to be taped up, correctly?

- Yes, the list of the prisoners of war will be with the whole.....

- I understand, Now if we don't bring the list of the p.o.w.s in, then you are ready to have an exchange without the list.

- pardon?

- I'll ask you this question - the last time we said that we want to link the exchange of the prisoner to the list.

- The list of prisoners of war was linked with the supply,

- with the supply - allright so we have to wait...

- and we link that with...

- with the wounded

- no...

- no, with the 22nd.

- right

- no, no I agree...

C - בסדר, הבנתי שזו בעיה בינתיים, יכול
להיות שאנחנו נצטרך עוד כמה, כמה ימים...
B - בכל אופן, אני מבין, אני מבין שעשיתם את כל המאמץ (אדיום)
אבל אפשר, אפשר לעזור אולי בזה שאני
לא, אולי בסדר
B - Now, I understand the position perfectly
I think, now, may I ask a question -
suppose we want to say to you - let
us make until because I think until
the thing will be rapped(?) up with
president Saadat, Dr. Kissinger, Sissco,
Mrs. Meir. and so forth it may take
till Saturday, today is Thursday. Let
us suppose that we say o.k. We
don't want to wait till Saturday
and we are ready to exchange the
wounded only, is that possible?
A - The wounded?
B - Ya!
A - That's as we said now.
B - Is that possible?
A - Yes, that is possible
B - Because בגלל זה (אולי) בקשר =
בסדר, I understand ...
אני אולי בשבילו זה טלפון בלבד?
אולי הוא יכול לטלפון רגע אחד ...
So I'm just asking I know that...
A - Just, If he can go to the telephone
to ask please, this wounded, again to
make sure, you have 44 not 45
B - One man died
A - right! 44
B - can we have the body, this body?

- yes sure, yes sure The 400 in your hospitals, 6 or 10 or what ever it was
- 14 I remember 14.
- I don't remember that's what they told me, maybe 14
- I read the papers they said ...
- and 1200 from Suez
- Yes
- right:
- 14 the civilians ...
- and military
- But I don't want to mislead you General because if we ask I will be told that everything has to wait till saturday:
- allright
- Because I've asked you - you said O.K. so I don't want to mislead you Now I know that you are waiting for important answers - we are waiting for important answers and here we are tied to the big powers. So what I wanted to ask was another question yes, may I ask another thing:
- yes
- Again, suppose there is an agreement, if there is no agreement then we are in trouble, But Because both sides want peace, we both don't want talk, So, I suppose there will be an agreement, Now suppose there will be an agreement there will be certain details which we will have to discuss

A - yes

B - So Jill take an example and I understand this is not obligation from your point of view beause we haven't finished it yet and not an obligation from my point of view but to understand your thing - If we are talking about continue supplys to the East bank that was I think the term...

- One of them

- yes' the east bank was used, Suez and the east bank correct? City of Suez and east bank right?

- right.

- what do you have in mind as far as amount of supplys is concerned?

- amount?

- amount, the quantity.

- yes.

- of supplys concerned what do you have in mind? I want if you say Saturday when we meet again that you have a diffrent quantity I know I won't be angry with you because I know that we are talking on the supposition there is an agreement.

- No, I was very close to these talks and I have...

- General, I didn't think otherwise

- No...

- I was sure you were close to the talks...

- No, I mean I have the reply the

for Suez city we need 17 lorries per day
- 17 or 7
- 17 not 7, 17
- the other time you mentioned only 7
- We thought... The population is 20,000, the Red-Cross saw by it self with the Governer and we amounted their needs specially the winter is coming 17 lorries as follows - 2 lorries that each lorrie 30 tons - flour-, wheat, 5 lorries each lorrie 20 ton that's civilian lorries
- 5 lorries in total 20 tons
- No No each one 20 ton
- Big trailer each one 20 ton, Hundred ton
- Hundred ton!
- Daily!
- Daily supplies, מספקה, we don't have any slightest idea to give these to the 3rd army through the town because it is listed that the 3rd army will have its own supply. Because they need diffent things - supplies, vegetables, clothes, winter clothes and so on.
1 truck 1 ton - medical support + blood somedays we don't need that because we don't need that everyday.

[illegible]

A - 9 lorries of water

B - you were with 2 lorries, we had - 2, 5
1 and 2

- No, I just made it the whole water
9 lorries for water
that is 2 6 tons lorries
2 - 8 ton lorries
5 - 7 ton lorries that is the kind of
lorries which the governer can get from
the civilian authorities thats 9 lorries.
Thats 63 tons of water per day.

- The whole there are 17 lorries
different weights.

17 ,15 ,10

If you want to make them tonage
thats 160 tons

That's 160 tons supplies 1 for medical
support, and 63 tons for water as
far as I understood from our president
today according to Suez city He told
me clear enough that this city should
be treated as any other city in the
country so there is no restrictions
on the city. To live as anyother people
in the country. We are giving that
these supplies daily and all other
things should run as in other

I mean if they want newspaper, they should have, telephones they should call those relatives in Cairo if some doctors should relief other doctors they should go, some of them want to go to Cairo and they should go and all other things.

Well, this means that, I'm not only asking now not discussing, this means actually free movement.

Free movement yes for the city it was clear by him on that item

Free movement in the city?

yes

You mean anybody can come and go on the road without...

Thats what he told me

I can't see how it will work.

It's just normalization of a life of these civil man we don't want them to suffer by any kind

No, I understand what your intent is but I can't see how this...

Well, I'll listen to the end.

yes

This is about Suez and the third army? And how about supplies to the 3rd army?

The third army will be supplied with non military items to be checked under the U.N. supervision and to be checked some Israel officers and some Egyptian officers on the Western

bank of the canal to make it one point under the supervision of the U.N to check the supplies to be sure that there is...

- on the west bank? ya! ya!

The loading area, to be there, as we are going now, I mean if we need to give them 50 lorries a day we will send them 50 if it's 100 a day we will give them 100, if it's 15 we will give...

- But how will we...

- can be unloaded?

- no but how will we work out the quantity we must have some understandings how much it is, how do you seize it?

- I don't have the detail(s) everyday, I don't have the detail which will be supplied everyday...

- yes

- But I can get it in details, I mean in details, what details, the distriction How many lorries a day and we have, for example like we did now, the supply was food, water and medical supply and you wanted some clothing I think, so in order to have an understanding I hope it wont go on for a year... I hope we'll have long before that an disengagement, so the problem will not exist.

- right

- But until this disengagement We have to

have an understanding of how many lorries a day a week, every two days etc. you have in mind.
- honstly I came here...
- No, if you have, I'm not pressing you if you don't have I understand.
- I don't have that, but I can give it to you by lorries tonight if you want but the point which I want to stress is - we are steping forward for peace so we don't want to make restrictions on those who are on the eastern bank. For example - they asked for raisors, shaving cream, do you list that in the list: We consider that all items except armament emmunition, mines what ever you want to list as military items, the rest should go to them.
- If I understand you correctly everything that is non military.
- yes
- chocolates
- what do you care too much for...
- ciggarets, בול, wheat, בורגול, anything else
- I understant - excuse me

- אתה יכול לנסוע הביתה?
- לא לפני הפגישה הבאה עם קשלה.
- אתה יכול לנסוע בבוקר
- שלושים בלוקים ביום שלושים בלוקים ערבים אלא אלא
- לקשלה אלי ביום
- כי ביום הבא יש הפגישה
- יש הפגישה יש מחלפה

- כלים אלה מצוין כמה מכוניות אלה ולמה (אוכלוסיה) כמה &
כלה שמשתמשים.
- עכשיו כמובן.
- לא כלה שמדובר גם על לפנים (אוכלוסיה)
- עכשיו בעצם שמעתי ראיתי מספרים בערך על כמה
אלפי כמה בתוך שבועות מעולה כ"א בתוך שעות אלה
כמובנים.
- כמובן, כמובן.

- So as I said how many lorries etc you only have to check that I understand.
- yes I do please just to be sure.
- now perhaps for a moment if I can come back to Suez city
- yes
- Here I think we had a diffrent idea but I want to understand you very well. What you mean generally is that actually you mean for a free city
- under the supervision of the U.N.
- yes but what are the restrictions: if there is supervision are there any
- actually there are no restrictions from our point of view. lets say those people who are staying in Suez they are stucked to Suez they will stay there in Suez but according to the procedure of work we have doctors there to stay 3 months and then they should have relief withother doctors In that kase should we come back again from and make a meeting

for replaceing 19 doctors with 19 doctors and 18 mudses with 18 nurses and to risk by that? No if some teachers are there in Suez they want to communicate the Ministry of Education for their work how can it work? They should have the permission to come here to come there and then it can be organized by any other way just not to let you feel a minuet that we are useing Suez city as a link to the third army, Because we are giving the third army supplies so we don't need anything from Suez city. Suez city may need something from the third army and not the opposite. If you have any other idea please tell me so we can have...

- As far as I understand what was discussed was only the supplig of food, medical supply and water as far as I know we did not discuss the things you raised there actually free movement, first to permite what you said a normal life, I want to check it maybe I missunderstood it on my part so I have to go back and check it ~~not~~ but I think this was not discussed.
- This was actually never mentioned.
- It is written here in the paper supplies medical support and food, water yes the three iteams. yes

it is written here but as we feel - we will have some more complications again on that problem - we don't want - The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food water and medicine all wounded civilians in the town will be evacuated, I know that is supplies of food + water. How we can come tomorrow and say they need some clothes' and then you say no what will happen to the people there? So there are so many problems we are making it clear from now in order not to make any complications

- yes so but, you agree with me in the paper of the propocal so - in the paper it only says what you have read out.
- right!
- now you bring up some aditional aspects
- right!
- One aditional aspect is other supplies not only food, water and medical supplies but let's say clothes or newspapers or books or anything. This is one question you bring up in addition to what is recomendet and the second question you bring up is the question of movement.
- yes.
- acctually you speak of free movement and these are two important items movement + comunication Now only to understand you - If you speak

comunication this is communication by telephone by radio you don't need us you have the radio.

- yes - by telephone by telegraph the want to ... you want us to let you repair the line this is the point I miss - right?

- yes, if there is another mean we can do it

I'm sorry to interupt but I believe what general Jamsi is talking about is not the meanwhile situation only, I believe we are waiting on a bigger or wider side which will include by steps and solve all these problems so when we are discussing a meanwhile supply it's looked at from the point of view of the whole solution of the situation we are in especially that military steps we got to discuss so that would bridge the gap between our thinking and yours became we look at it in this - see what I mean?

- I see what you mean but as I see it as I understood it there is a present situation A) we want to get out of the present situation into this engagement different all together you have your plan of this engagement and we have our plan of this engagement I think that after everything is signed we sit down and discuss it, so until this engagement plan is carried out it will take at least a couple of days.

1 - That is a temporary solution which you are talking about Now

3 - Now, I thought that during the time the arrangement during the time are covered by the proposals which speak about the check point and the system of inspection for the third army and the proposals ~~for the third army~~ ~~And second point the c~~ for the second ~~food supplies and medical supplies~~ point in the city of Suez and the proposal ~~and at the second point~~ says food supplies, medical supplies and

Now you have a different set all together which is not mentioned in the proposal, which gives a different aspect of the whole situation. I reported back but I am not discussing now whether pro or con. but I am only trying to say that this is a different view of the matter which is not contained in the proposal. Just with political leaders are talking on high level when they say we want this - just only one line and then —

I know (Mr) when they say, we want this, it's just only one line. (Mr) Jurkman and then it's impossible to make it in details.

I know. Yes, this problem always worries me because in the details you can hit a lot of trouble.

Right.

This is a difficult problem I see it so on this this would be a surprise to my authorities because they have not thought over this at all.

The question of communication of movement and communication. This is a new aspect all together. I understand your p. of view. But then we have to talk about this. I am glad I asked you because what will happen otherwise, I would have come after the agreement and you be now the procedure with the agreement, UN. and all that, I'll come back and then we start everything from the beggining. So now I'll go back with a better idea what you have in mind.

Now we are talking about some items of the proposal but the whole proposal should be linked to each other, all the points should be linked in our agreement.

B. A package deal

A. Yes, a package deal, we are talking now about the temporary for Serg. Temporary for the case fire like temporary for that, temporary for that. If we finish the whole deal, and you accept the proposal. All this things would be

B) I understand, I understand.

A. Solved. So we are talking about temporary solutions only.

B. I know, but what is, you remember General, I was very... I said you must be very loyal to one principle disagreement it is not good, but it's ok but not misunderstanding.

A. Right

B Because if there is misunderstanding then we'll have only trouble.

A. Right

B We can have different opinions this is legitimate like each one has his opinion this is legitimate, but not misunderstanding. Therefore, I am glad that I ask you this question because I can come back with a clearer picture.

But what will be the result if you

2a

say we don't accept that proposal for the Suez City. It is considered a city and they will stay there and they will suffer as they are suffering now. But what do you think, General, it is a bad situation.

Yes. It is a very bad situation. So we are giving them the better conditions to live, from our point of view.

I understand what you said, but it is just temporary until we settle this out.

Yes.

If you oppose, or you think this is not fair to give them any of these items which I mentioned, what can we do?

I am not, General, I am not discussing the question from the human point of view, whether it is fair or not, because I don't want to do the thing because I can say that it is not fair that you have not given us the list of P.O.W.'S up. Let us leave that side this.

Because if we enter into discussion about the fairness, then you know, each one takes out his notebook, opens his notebook A, B, C, D and so forth. But it is important for me to understand, it is better that now I go back, and tell them when please we must know. General, Jamil has brought up this and this point. So next time when I come I come with more answers and a full understandment of your humane points of view. I only tell you, I have to tell you to be fair, that when you discussed the proposal that you will not at all discuss this points concerning

the city of Suez. It is fair, I must tell you. So I'll have to go back and tell them as you said. strategy and we have to the details and to convince a lot of minds.

Right

So I am glad we did not cancel the meeting because that can save us time before everything is. Now before I forget I have a clear idea of what you mean by the daily supply to the city of A Suez. yes, exactly. yes. I have a clear idea of what you mean, what else you want for the city of Suez. by the supply of East-Bank of the third Army - you said you don't have the exact number now.

Yes. to say how many letters to go every day.

You think you could realize that by table. Because if you meet on Saturday only it is better that we think and prepare other issue and there will come a Saturday and I'll say oh, General excuse me I have to go back and ask again and we don't get anywhere. A: In the original content?

B: of course.

Food supplies as including the clothes, the winter clothes -

This point I understood. the 50 lorries (~~50~~ 130)

So this is clear. What else can we discuss? There is a point that we want to make clear. The Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by Egyptian check points. At the Suez end of the road

an Israeli officer or officers can
with the UN to supervise the more
nature of the cargo. I would like to
find out your understanding about that
I can tell you, our understanding was
that on the reloading we will continue
the present arrangement.

Under the supervision of the UN?
As we have done today. As it is
done now. Like the last convoy.
Now did we do it on the last convoy?
I will understand. (B) UN officer or officers
were there, together with our officers and
they inspected the unloaded supplies
out here and there checked some.
But the UN as no more drivers as it
happened today. They don't have enough
drivers, we would like to have the loaders
with our drivers so that we can find
make it more faster. Up to the
unloading there and then start working
there.

And this I think we will not be able to
do it. agree to general
It don't make any difference, just only
drivers, driving with loaders to make
make it easy to facilitate the supply that is
ordered. We are using the UN more than
enough now on that problem. At least
at least 25 UN drivers
Today they didn't push any driver because
they don't have any. They didn't push
any driver today.

I asked in the check points. they

don't have any drivers. אין לנו נהגים
But now (come they are unloading now)
they have 30 loaders unloading now
(— ... — 30 —)
... 50 ... 30 ... 100 ...
B: General Says there are 30 loaders unloading
and the UN
(— ... — 30 —)
B: So first of all I want to tell
you I am glad you are bringing out
this question now because this will
enable me to clear them up now and
not later.
A: Right.
B: But I think that what we have in mind
and as far as I know, that we talked
about with Mr. Seasco we didn't mention
the question of drivers and we assure you
that these are UN drivers.
A: yes, thats from our prime ~~view~~ view this all
one to fusility the thing, we didn't discuss, there
was any political leader with that subject it was
very minor details we can say.
B: for example
A: This problem to present to that
B: No, No I understand. lets speak from our level
A: yes, thats all.
B: yes, but at our level I must tell you so far
this is been with us a point of PRINCIPLE to the
U N. ~~drivers~~ drivers. Now if I may ask on this matter
question.
A: yes
B: in the proposal it says two checks points in
addition to the unloading area, and I didn't understand

why there is an arrest of two. Two in addition to the unloading area.

I - It didn't say two or one.

2 - perhaps they didn't understand, the Americans didn't understand.

1 - yes, it was an oral discution, But not on paper

B - Because I said, I know that there is inspection in the begining, and there is an inspection in the unloading.

A - yes

B - And then he, said, the americans said, that there was some mention of ~~kilo~~ KM 102 and ~~kilo~~ the 109 KM

A - ~~if~~ why?

B - So I think - 102 perhaps the No. 1 inspection,

A - Right.

B - 109 - I thought perhaps if this is where we gather 20 lories together, and from there send them ~~of~~ on and I right ?? was this there point ? well know, please.

A - yes, I was going to ask the question of that. On the level of our political leaders, they don't know exactly how it workes, exactly. so they know that there is a check pinl at 102 and another check point at 109. they meant that there will be as a continuation there will be two check points from the Israeli army on the Suez road up to Suez city. That is the understanding they thought there are two check points to Suez city. so that's a free city. so the road will be free without any check points from Israeli army so the check points will be from the U.N - only. as far as we understand it.

B - so there we have a big mis understanding

A - again that is our understanding, for that I think it was.

B - But why do you need two check points?

A - we don't need any check points, but it was remained that the Israeli troops have two check points on the road. but actualy it's not ...

... רק לא

but only the check points on the Suez road by the Israeli army will be replaced by U.N. But realy there was a discution on what check points, how many check points, and this and that.

B - yes, I understand.

A - But they listen the check points, and they feel or we know or we feel as I understand that Suez road will be free that will be now check points from the Israeli army. That check points will be from the U.N. as the proposals says.

B - up to the loading point

B - up to the Suez road and up to the unloading point

... רק לא

A - There is Suez road Somewhere here ...

B - Somewhere here.

A - Thats one or two ... Thats your check point.

B - One or two. 101.

A - exactly. 101. now.

B - 105.

A - 102 everybody going from here to Cairo saying check point 102. So it was 102. from the military and civiliens also as they say. There is another check point here, or here I think one of these I think. The U.N. is here.

Yes going to the city, and to Suez and to Adabia. There two check points will be replaced by the U.N and not Israeli check points up to Suez.

Now ... A - we understood it like this

I understand what you mean. I don't say I agree but I understand what you ... Now, your supplies going to the city Suez will be checked only to the city of Suez

as you understand there is know check by these two U.N. points, or if they you want to change them up to them, anyway they want to check the supplies to the city up to the U.N. we don't have any I understand A- relations with in that.

I understand, but then, why do you need the second point this is what I don't understand.

A- We don't need B- Ah, you don't need the second

A- But one point, I want to make it very clear we understand there will be no from check points from the Israeli army on the road to Suez. The check points will be from the U.N. only.

B- yes, I understand what you mean.

A- and the supplies will be checked by the U.N. only.

B- I understand what you meant, but that means that the check point will be there when Lozy stands there to the city - not permanently. what interests you, is the inspection of the vierals; what interests us is also the inspection of the vierals A- right B- not that it is a permanent point on the road - day and night very nice but when we agree A- why B- because the question of supply we see it must be under assistant that you work out jointly, and between the assistant we have already had the president of how this works, so what I understand is that (this is how we understood it) that you want to say that the check on the Suez-Cairo road will be done by the U.N and it does not mean that the U.N mens will be for 24 hours. for example we have vierals moving on this road that the U.N will check these vierals Lozy. Do you understand me Jani?-

If it was like this there is no need to say I'm only trying to clarify not - I hope now otherwise anyway to ...

I believe were just discusing, what we can do or to

meanwhile situation B - yes
and this case, and all this complication, but I believe when we sit next time and discuss it down to the minority of subject, when we finish, the question of the disengagement will be some jumping steps on each subject. ✓ from 0 to something which makes all this question.
Now, what it is very important that I understand you fully and do you understand me fully so that next time we meet there will be little misunderstanding as possible I think I understood what you meant, but as far as one or two points are concern this is not what is not what is important whether it is one point or two points.
But the important thing that there will be no checkpoints from the Israeli party, Ashdod, and this road will be clear.
B what do you mean by clear?
A That there will be no military activities on that road
B There we have a misunderstanding
A That's one point from the second point of the proposal B. On this we don't agree.
A. We do it temporarily. That's, it can be done temporarily, yes. The UN will have one or two check points to check the supplies for the city. But, again as I said, the whole thing will be linked with each other.
B. Yes, I understand that.
A All the proposals
B It can take two weeks. Let us say we have an agreement about somehow reaching the forces. Let us say.

Until you can count the forces, until you can move everything. Until you arrange everything. That can take a lot of time, a lot of people to move. So meanwhile we must have some arrangments. Correct?

Right.

It is important to know the area of our two forces and tanks and everything on both sides. It is very easy to have fight on both sides, we don't want that anymore. That's why it's very important to be very specific about the details even though it takes two weeks or ten days. Therefore I am asking all these questions, not in order to agitate you gentlemen.

No. Temporarily the UN will check the troops supplies for the city.

But the proposal didn't mention anything about movement of our troops anywhere. But it was understood that we will be able to move our troops. I didn't say that we will be able to stop the supplies, but our troops will be able to move there. They won't interfere with the inspection. You understand? Now I see it. They will move freely.

Ye. 3. Allright.

A. and also I said, as I said, that's a free city so there will be another from our side.

B. I understood your point General, but this also will be a mistake like that. The State of the city of Gaza, is that of a city that is cut off. So we have

a difference here. Anything that concerns the city of Suez and the East Bank there is a difference between the two. On the unloading, we say the present conditions will continues on the East Bank. All right now. On the unloading this will be as we said about Suez. This will be.

C. [illegible]

3. How do you see the checking? Only by UN you said?

Yes, as I say it.

3. I understand. So I want just to go back to the city of Suez. I understand your opinion and your position and we see a number of important differences of opinions. We sit still as the city was cut off we see fuel movements of our forces on the road. There is a question of inspection by the UN, this we understand. So there are differences of opinion between the Egyptian side and the Israeli side on the Suez and the East Bank and the 3rd Army. I think there I understand and I know the amount and the nature of the supplies you want. And the question of communication and movement I understand - here there is a difference of opinion but I understand what you have said. And the 3rd Army we don't have the amount, the quantity but if you can tell us it will help to understand what you have in mind. And the nature of supplies - you say

everything non-military. You say inspection here by UN and the unloading as we did today. We have beside officers inspecting together with UN and as we did today, you have your men on the side to see what they do. The

B. This is clear to me.

A. What else?

B. I think I understand.

A. All this is a temporary arrangement in order to move from the present phase to the phase of disengagement.

B. Right.

A. We have some difficult problems here.

B. Right and the second point of the proposal is the most important one. A yes, we should solve all these problems.

A. Yes.

B. The second one.

A. Yes.

B. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22nd positions in that same way of agreement on the disengagement and the seperation of forces under the supervision of the UN. That is the main point which we should discuss with each other and when we settle that, even if it is in one phase or two phases or three phases or whatever it goes then we finish the whole complications there in this whole area. That is the main point.

A. I agree with that. I suggest we don't start to discuss it today because

I promised that we don't go into these discussions before it is all on paper But it is very important ~~that~~ I am very glad that I did not ~~cancel~~ correspond the meeting today because I ~~see~~ already see a lot of problems here

A: Right

B So it is important for us to clarify it. I understand the big differences of opinion are on the city of Suez You see it as a free city with a UN road, we see it as a city cut off where we still hold the road and there is a UN inspection on what is coming in I am not talking about the quantities on ~~and~~ the supply of the East Bank it will help us if you let us know the quantities so we as far as concerned I think I don't see any difficulties in that

A - right B - But perhaps you have diffinulties in ~~this~~ on the quantities so this is - I think I understand, because in the proposals as you said it is a very general terms it doesn't mention these problems and then ofcourse the question of ~~this~~ disengagment is very important and this I think we have to have a special discussion to work it out

A - right.

B - ~~to work it out~~ now we ~~not to~~ have some other questions let us say we come to everything is agreement and that is the rapt up, then I think it also says when the check point is established

A - correct B - then we can make the deal with the ~~d~~ prisinors A - right. B - How this is going to be, the lists and all that is going

to be a complicated matter.

- you know it won't take any time
- at all A - at all
- well it takes sometimes, I think that with the wounded it's that P.O.W
the red cross I understand that there is
(?מישהו בקשר אתם כמה חודש מישהו, אתמול יש לנו בקשה מיוחדת)
so that I see, then when we get the list
and we will exchange them to set up the check
point. and will fixed between us the day and time etc A. Right
any other points you would like to ask?

A - Back again, just one word before I leave.
B - yes please.
A - The whole proposals is linkt with each other.
to be done as one thing teams not to seperate
one point from another.
B - may I have a word with you?
A - yes.
B - It is almost a pleasure for me to talk
A - Oh, thank you. I have the same pleasure

ג. אספקת לחץ מים

המגדיר ופילטרציה בדיקה כי כמויות המזון ופירוט הסוגים נתונים לפיקוח אל"מ ומרש לאספקה ובזיוי בבתיים מהתיים כל המיסים המזהרים. זכות לשמוע ולשות להיות נוכחת ולבקה בדמן הפרקה.

בתיר לבתים הדיק פילטרציה כי אל"מ יפעיל נחגים מבתים אזרחים המזהרים בפיקוח אל"מ לפיקוח לפרקה בדמן דאלי בפיקוח המל"מ. הנה כללנו כבל וכל העסקה נחגים מבתים. הנפעל המבוי ג'כ"ב בדיק שיתה אזעית על האספקה לפזון ולאחסנה כלים והמבחנו לכך בחנאי שקבל את רשיכת ומבויים. הזה דוזה את החנאי ויתר על הבקעה ובדיק להרשות מקרי לבמנה והמהיות האזרונות מכיתת ה-50. ניתן אישור לכך העקום.

לדוגמה, במידות קדמות בדיקה המבים שיתה זמנית של 7 בכוניות לפזון ותוספת מכילות עים. לאחסנה כלים הם בדיקה שיתה זמנית של 50 בכוניות (150 טון מזון מבל הסוגים כולל מים).

בסיחה כדאית המיב יהיב לג'מס הקלות לגבי סוגי אספקה לפזון (עתונים, דואר, בסיעות חוקתי כל"ת) וכן תיקון מבוי [illegible] ים התורת הסדר בדיקה במעון המבויות ע"י בריקתי. חדגשתו כי אוכלוסית פזון אינו [illegible] בלבד כי בתחילתן כל הסיחות בקנו כמספר התוכבים הזה כחבשת אלפים ואל"מ הגיעו לבמים אלף. הן המבים והן הבל"ת הודו שהמספר ברובו מורכב מאנשי בטחון. לבבל, מבין 1200 המבוקים במיח"ם בעיר 60-70 אחוז הם חיילים. הדגשנו כי אספקה לקיר כזאת אינה אספקה לאזרחים בלבד ובכאן הסדון לחביעתנו לפיקוח בל המעבים לפזון. בן אמרנו כי באשר לכמויות ולסוגים הן לבמון והן לאחסנה בלוש כחובתם לקבל האסכתנו.

בסיום העלו המבים בפת הבעות בתוקף סעיף הסכימה על אחסקת האש (סעיף A) :

א) האבלות שני האדיים בסיודי אזיר עד מרחק 30 ק"מ מקודי האד האני וכן במקרן כזהן בגדמ"ש והיבודנו כאשבין אינבנו בר ביצוע בקודים האמתלים הקייבים.

ב) להקציר כוחות אל"מ בין עמדות שני האדיים בבל מקום האיקר בדרום.

ג) להזמין סיודי אל"מ בגדמ"ש של התלת טיפקתי ויאבחנו את בלום האזרחים המבויים וללוותם בבוהוהיבו המבלים בחם במקום לבוהג הביבלאומי.

- - -

בטיום הפגש הנדיק סילאסדוז במפתיע כי בונתם לממשיכת שביתתנו לו נוזו מקים
בכל תוך זמך קצר טצי מוטרתי אוים במקום המחסומים הישראלים , והזוי בק"מ ו-101
ומשני בכניסה לעיר פוזן מזרח. השיירות כתוקפנות על המניט התייצנו כלונו ע"י
כוחות אוים. יכולנו הנחל למצוק השיירה לאורמיה שלנו במקום תבריקה. למקומו, מוקם
המחסום הישראלי בכניסה , כמה מטרים ממקומו למחסום שלנו, נסוג מיד עם פיזוזנו ולאחר
מכן נוזיק לכך שמוקם בחסום נוסף כמה עכרים מזרחית למחסומנו. בקשר למחסום כאוים
הקים ליד העיר פוזן כותה הנדת עם מיפלגה וחשומרה מלק.

לאחרונה כי במפגש של ראשי המטה הנדיק סילאסדוז עמד בכוונה לפנית הקמת מחסום נוסף
עם קבלת רשימת הטבוזים ומי להטמנת טני הנדים לפרסי כוזי מעיפי החסם.

המפגש הבא נקבע ליום ד' 14 דצמ ב-1200. בלשכתי מעץ כהוא עסוק במג'לים מחר.

12.11.73

A- Gamasy
B- Yariv
C- General Hlasuan
D- Silk o'k
E- Silk o'k

C- ooo But I promise that I will do also that talk.

B- No, I want to make an Egyptian talk. I have come for a meeting with my Egyptian talk, and the is under UN auspice.

C- But I have an independent separate function to perform here too.

B- I am very sorry but I have come for the Egyptian general and I want to talk to him. Very simple. We've agreed to come into agreement. We held the meeting, the two parties held the meeting under the auspices of the United States.

C- First of all — but this is correct mainly. But ooo —

B- the meeting is between the Egyptian government and the Israeli government, and here I see, general, it is turned into a procedure whereby the UN is talking to the Egyptian government, the UN is talking to the Israeli government. This is not what we intended.

C- Well, you see ...

B- Specially, excuse me general specially as we have already, the precedent has already been established. We'll never get to peace if talks continue through an intermediary. No reflection on

your personality general nor whatsoever, I'm only marking out the procedure

C - I finish This. You see it was my intention to ...

B - I'm sure you didn't do it in order to torpedo the ...

C - No, not at all. On the contrary.

B - I'm sure your intentions are positive. But still we cannot go on like this

C - No, I only wanted to know ...

B - Because if we go on like this, General, it means I can sit in Tel-Aviv, General Carmasi can sit in Cairo and you will fly between us.

C - No, we'll wait 5 minutes more and talk business. But before that I only wanted to know I put some questions on my role to you. Let's not talk at all about what the parties should do now. I had as I said, I had according to that agreement an independent role also to establish check-points, to see that this traffic to the third army and to Suez runs smoothly and that ... ya, these are the main points.

B - [illegible] for to make what it says. It says, the agreement talks about establishment of the check-points but it doesn't say anything about traffic, we can discuss it of course but it doesn't say anything about traffic

C Why then have check-points if we don't control them check-points?

B - The c.p. have to do with the question of checking the kind of traffic that comes in.

D- You know, this paragraph before that, it talks about an impeded traffic. And the Secretary informed you that he has an independent responsibility which you must execute.

B- This we can discuss, the details of the c.p.*

D- He doesn't really know to discuss the establishment of the check-points because...

B - The agreement with due respect, the agreement is between the two sides.

E- But we have responsibility and if we fail we as UN will not be good.

B- We have no intention or wish to cause failure to UN.

D - General Yarin

B- I want to come back to what we started that I want to have discussion with an Egyptian General. When you bring on the point of the c.p., the question of the c.p, the answer is as we talked yesterday the establishment of the c.p. is closely linked with the question, in our eyes, with the procedure of the whole exchange of prisoners of war.

C - Yes, I wanted to have this talk presumably that this is executed.

D - May I make also a point that first of all - we saw that we had bona fide not political things, intermediary between you and Egyptians, this is not. Yesterday, I promise I had no idea we would start in informal (informative) talks, later we saw that things didn't move at all after a

* c.p - check-points

few minutes. That happened to be my idea to start to begin ~~to~~ informal (informally) talks, you don't want to continue them, due of the same time I want to say that we in our opinion progress has been achieved through that technique yesterday. Now maybe today it will not be necessary to have it, but I would like you to know that we had gonna talk and certain things have happened while talking to you and to them. Now we would have liked to know more before starting the formal meeting in order to avoid positions being taken. The parties are reluctant to come down. If you would be able to tell us a few things in a nut-shell and then start the formal meeting. If you don't want we can't force you, then we'll start right away, but I think it's a shame because we are gonna fail, completely, completely.

B - This is not the question. The question is the nature of the procedure. I am have been meeting with the General and we get along quite well. We had disagreement but we settled between. B And I see no reason why we shouldn't continue to do so. Even if there is disagreement, so we can discuss it. But if it starts

Like E Let's proceed then with the meeting.

B - Yes.

Like E Good. And I have ample reason to say that you will be pleased.

B - I hope so. I hope you'll be pleased for my part as well. I'm going to thank

you for that ...
to settle

B- To settle today the establishment of the c.p. coupled with the following questions:
(a) the reception of the list of our P.O.W's, for which we've been waiting
(b) the exchange of prisoners, wounded and not wounded prisoners. We are ready to proceed at the maximum speed possible. For example we are ready to hand all your prisoners tommorrow, and all your non wounded prisoners tommorrow, bring them here in one convoy. And we're ready to evacuate all your wounded as fast as the Red Cross can do it. We can bring all your wounded by plane to Cyprus. So I propose to discuss this in detail. Then there is the question, what is the question that I present upon the question of supplies - Third army or the city of Suez. As far as the 3rd army is concerned, I think there is an established procedure in the question which we have to discuss the question of quantities, the nature of supplies. As far as the city of Suez is concerned, the agreement sets out the nature of supplies and we have to discuss two problems.
(1) The question of quantities
(2) the " of the inspection of the kind of supplies that goes to Suez, ~~what~~ what kind of inspection will be carried out inorder to assure the point which is from our side, our point of view, very important point, for after all in Suez you have military elements, and

Suez city has contact with the third army and before we continue to the general plan of disengagement, to what is called, paragraph (B), we have the problem of assuring that what goes to Suez does not go to the 3rd army. I think from our point of view a legitimate interest. By this is our position and we are ready to discuss the details of what I have just said here now.

A - First of all let's speak about the town of Suez. As it is mentioned here in the agreement the town of Suez will be supplied by food, medicine and water. The three things. We would like to say that the quantity or quality is not restricted so we don't want to make complications about that matter we are ready to send to the city their needs only. And after the UN to discuss and to how to fulfil the need of the population there with the government. So we leave that to the UN, and whatever it says we accept it. That is about the two items - food and medicine. When we say food and medicine, we think that the people there need some more. I don't want to mention any specific things such as clothes. We leave it also to the UN to discuss it and take decision upon that. Or these problems, or other problems except the

three food medicine and water. About the water, you know that we have a pipe line here, and we discussed before we should carry the water from Cairo to Suez; to facilitate the thing we would like to mend the pipe line here in Isis, very close to Suez where your troops are, and it is easy to be done, it will save a lot of time and effort, minimize the traffic on the road, and then the only thing that we need is some civilians to work on the pumps there. About Suez also there may be some movements for the people there and I don't think there will be any complication on that as far as it is controlled by the UN. That's about the city. Also about the — before leaving the Suez Canal going from Bitter Lake to Suez, we need the water in that canal for the benefit of the civilians, thousands of people there, near the water for themselves and for the plantation for irrigation. It will solve all the problems of Suez city. In this case, we'll send our engineers and our people to mend it and —. About the quantity and quality to the city, again as I mentioned before clear, this is up to the UN to discuss and to take a decision on that. If they feel that these things are not needed for the population they can stop it. If they think it is needed for the population they can let it. That's about the town

of Suez.

Another point - the Third army. As it is mentioned here "there shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East-Bank. And our understanding that is that everything can go to the East Bank except military cargoes. such as armaments, ammunition. mines, barbed wires etc. The rest of that is free, no limitation on that. As far as quantity or quality is concerned. What's about the two items you discussed.

I did discuss the P.O.W.'s, the list the wounded etc, it will be solved.

B- How?

C- Could you please now explain your idea.

A- Yes. We are ready to hand over the list of the names of the P.O.W.'s. One question was raised yesterday that there are about 1000 persons considered to be P.O.W.'s in Israel but we didn't receive their names, 60 officers out of them and I have their names made speeches in your broadcast, their families heard them and still we didn't receive their names.

B - this I'm sure we can clear out.

A - If this point is cleared out, we are ready to give you the list and to let you feel satisfied and we are not making any obstacle for implementation of this, we can give you the list,

just give us a word when you will give us an answer for this.

B - I think there is misunderstanding because we supply through the Red Cross a daily list of all P.O.W's. So what I think, may be you haven't got the last 3 or 4 days because the whole list was transfered well, I think everyday, the last one was yesterday. As I mentioned the total number of your P.O.W's is around 8000.

B - 7990

K - It was yesterday. But because everyday few more come, so maybe there are now 8000. Yesterday there were 7990. So everyday we supply the up to date information through the Red Cross. I gave you an exemple. I have here the list for exemple. This list up to date Nov. 4th. I have the whole list so if you have questions so please tell us whom you want to know I will tell you exactly.

A - Brigadier Sheriff will come and I have the list of the 61 officers here, that's on your broadcast said, the number 7852. We have received the names of 5085. So we still need 2067, 61 of them made a speech through the broadcast and I have their names.

B - Happily I see no problem on this because.

K - I see no problem because now I understand. There is a delay between the Red Cross in Geneva, maybe between

The Red Cross in Israel, Geneva and Cairo.
A - Right
ICRC - That's the one reason
A - Let's make it like this easy. Brigadier Sheriff, our Liason Officer will come here and you are here
B - now?
A - Mr. Salazar will be here as the general told us now. So settle the matter and just say between each other, in front of the Red Cross that "I don't have any more names or Egyptian prisoners," and our officer will do the same thing. It will be clear, right?
ICRC - No problem.
A - They can do it today? tomorrow?
B - No, today. If they can do it today, we prefer to do it today.
ICRC - But for the certain date. The general has got for the 4th of November. Now we ask already the 12th so there maybe some additional that are not on the list.
A - They can discuss to have additional names tomorrow and to hand it over and we'll put here even the last pilot which we have on the 9th.
ICRC - Yesterday, even today the Red Cross in Tel-Aviv will get a list up to date.
A - Alright
(ICRC) - We have a copy here you know.
B - We can bring you a copy, no problem.
A - Mr. Shalazar will be here the Red Cross representative, and you can get your R/C representative, the 4 of them will be here and —

B - Ok

אלוף אלי - Could you please explain the question of wounded and —

A - About the exchange of wounded, we'll start it tommorrow. I called the Red Cross yesterday night, our liason officer to call the R/C. If they are ready we'll start it tommorrow. I said tommorrow, because we have the meeting today. Tommorrow at 10 o'clock we start. The first plane with your wounded P.O.W's will leave Cairo to Cyprus and there from Cyprus to Israel. The first plane opposite from Israel to Cyprus to us. And then, that is the first group, and then we'll start our people coming by planes. The last group will be with the last group as we discussed it before and there is no objection for that

B - אתה יודע כמה יש לנו

A - You have 400

B - And we have 44.

A - We have the pilots, but he is not wounded

A - Nasla

אלי - One you say is not wounded, what about the second?

A - He died.

B - In hospital?

A - Yes. So, you have 44 and we have 400 right? You'll have the first group there who are seriously wounded as we said. They are 26 I think or 27. The first plane will take the 26 tommorrow or 27. We'll have the 1st group, maybe 100, I don't

know up to the R/C and they will start evacuating our people there. The last group coming from Israel, we'll give you the last group, that is the rest of them.

B- 18.

A- In the meantime, tommorrow we'll start at 10 o'clock, that means tommorrow 10 o'clock we'll start evacuating our civilians from Suez, by buses, ambulances. It's up to the R/C to say 10 ambulances, they will take 200, multiplied by 6 days that's 1200, that means in 6 days we'll finish the wounded people to be evacuated from both sides, that is including the 14 cases in the 3rd army. And we said 6 or 7 days to give one more day reserve. As I heard yesterday they will give us 30 persons everyday. You have 400, so it will take 5 days. Here 10 buses, 200 everyday. It will take 6 days. So during 6 days we'll finish the wounded. And then we'll start after that the P.O.W's.

B-

T/K - We are ready general, if it is possible to evacuate the whole 400 tommorrow back to Cairo.

A - With what transportation?

T/K - Maybe the R/C or maybe the UN can arrange it.

A - Up to the R/C whatever it likes to do we accept it.

B - We can bring them to Cyprus. We can't unfortunately bring them to Cairo. We would like to bring them to Cairo. (Sq pg 3) This is not possible

7- It's up to the R/C to decide it. They can come here and see how they can arrange it, the facility they have. We agreed on the principle. It doesn't make any difference, 3 days 4 days 1 day the principle we agreed on.

- [illegible]

But, I see a number of problems.

(1) Why should we wait with the P.O.W's (שבויים) If it's a question of interrogation we have a bigger problem than you have. There are 9000 prisoners. So, we are ready to have all. I am not exaggerating, all your prisoners tommorow or even tonight, oh no, tonight, it's too late, tommorrow morning all 9000 prisoners here.

- 8000

- How will you bring them?

- By buses.

- With buses.

- They are not wounded. They are healthy people. After breakfast, give them light lunch and bring them here with buses. Why should we wait? No, General I understand it is a problem, I understand it is a problem 8000 people. If not tommorrow morning the day after tommorrow. If you want it 4000 then 4000. Because we don't see the point.

- Wait.

- Excuse me. I'll only finish with your permission general. We don't see any point of principle why, any special logic

or method why we should wait for bringing in the non wounded prisoners until we finish the wounded. They are going by air. These are coming on land.

A- We'll see how it works through the RLC.

B- You mean the wounded. I'm speaking about the non-wounded. You would like this to be discussed through General Sheriff?

A - They can discuss it with general Sheriff, but we don't want to make it ...

B- Firm!

A- eh...

B- You have still to clear it back?

A- No, no, I mean it's very difficult to have the 9000.

B- OK 4000

A - 8000 [illegible]

B- Let us say 4 and 4. What we don't want is, we don't want to say: as from tomorrow, tommorrow is Tuesday, right? From Tuesday or from 13 you say 15 20 only wounded

A - Right, and then from 21 onwards

B- I understand, I understood, we see no reason why we should wait with the non-wounded prisoners until the 21st. We do not see the logic, there is no conviction

A- No, we want to make some facilities for our P.O.W's, when they are coming back, we don't want them to come by buses here and then we'll take them through that line to Cairo through our troops and the same thing, so ah ah —

B - [illegible]

A - moral ... it doesn't make any difference if it's in 5 days or 10 days.

B - General, this does not accord with my instructions. So, this is a point I have to check. Perhaps you can think about 2 groups, 3 groups.

- We could do it during the night

B - If I know the general he has all the necessary knowledge and talent how to find a way. I don't have to tell the general how to do and what to do.

A - Well, we'll see how it goes; don't you!

B - Please

A - It's just a matter of days, that's all. Why?

B - I'll tell you why. Because we are asking ourselves what ... we can understand with the wounded, well there's a problem, the R/C has only so many planes. It's a problem and unfortunately under the circumstances you can't, or perhaps you would like your planes to come and fetch them? I'm talking seriously.

A - From Israel?

B - Yes. I'm talking seriously. If we give you a corridor, you can land. I haven't checked, but it just occured to my mind.

A - We have the thinking that we'll take them by planes.

B - The R/C.

A - That is the only ... murder not to take them by buses through our troops and I say

that's all.

B- This I understand, but what I wanted to say general, is I understand that on the wounded you have a problem. The problem is the R/C planes. Unfortunately therefore I suggested you come and take them seriously, unfortunately as the nature of relationships is today, I hope it will change, but as the nature of relationship between us is today, it is difficult for you to come and fetch the wounded prisoners from Israel. So I understand on this problem you have the question of UN transport. But on the problem of not wounded prisoners there is no question of transport.

A - I the same —

B- Why should we not start?

A- We'll take them by planes through the R/C so the facilities of the R/C

B- You want the 800 by plane?

A - Yes.

B- [nb] It is a bigger airlift than you got from the Russians and we got from the Americans. [illegible] It is not a question of principle with us, anyway you decided to evacuate your prisoners it's OK with us, but it will take a hell of a lot of time. 800! The R/C takes 16 days to evacuate 400 wounded. The RC will take 400 by 20, it will take them 120 days to evacuate your —

A- At least we can see you for a longer time.

B - 2013 This is the only thing I agree for Ali

Tk - Maybe another solution. If you have your problems, you want to get them, let's say in a week time let's say instead of 1 day or 2 days, the R/C will take responsibility for all P.O.W's under the flap of the R.C.

P - Right

Tk - But in this case, let us get our P.O.W's, don't keep them. This is the problem

A - I have only 1 point to say. The last group from our P.O.W's will be with the last group of your P.O.W's exactly as we did with the wounded. That's only one thing which I said to General Sheriff. Up to you with him you'll come with Monsieur Bocsard Sidegar and you'll do it whatever you like.

B - I suggest that we wait until the general — I'm worried about the problem because it will take a long time for the exchange

A - We'll facilitate everything for you.

B - Of the not wounded prisoners but I suggest that as they'll talk today, when do you think General Sheriff be here?

A - They'll be held before 1 o'clock they said they'll be here at 1 o'clock.

Br - Let's discuss other points until.

B - Just please with your permission (— 11360) Now this is as far as the prisoners are concerned and the prisoners are linked with the check-posts. I suggest that we wait until General Sheriff and Mr.

Bossard are here. Let them work out the problem with the list and the names of the officers you mentioned etc etc If everything is ok, then we can first of all exchange lists. And we can then see where we stand with the prisoners. If we have a discussion, we can then go back to discussion about the prisoners.

A- Why don't we start the discussion about the other points?

B- Ya. I'm coming.

A- Ah!

B- I said "Then we'll come back" now. I don't suggest to wait until then. I only wanted to sum up this point. You ~~know~~ remember the principle I always say - disagreement ok, but no misunderstanding.

A - Alright.

B - Now, as to Suez and 3rd army, here and you know General I've always been frank with you, I see a number of big problems. (a) the question of the quantities and nature of supplies. It is true that the agreement does not spell out quantities. It doesn't say. In the agreement it says "daily" that means per diem, per day of "water, food and medical supplies." You told us the last time we met, you told us there are 20,000 people in Suez. Before that ~~before~~ when I was away, when I went to the same place Mr. (Sary) went, the problem of Suez came up, and we asked the RC and they agreed, ~~and~~ if you agree, to see

how many people there are in Suez. Because last time you mentioned a large figure 20,000, before that a figure of 3 to 4000. So there is a question there of the size of the population. Because we know there is a difficulty - there are civilians there are military elements there, it's a complicated problem. So, there's a question of the size of population. Then, as to the nature, according to the agreement. This is very clear. The nature of the supplies. It says "food, water and medical supplies." As to the quantities, I remember you gave us figures, you gave us figures. Once, we checked the figure. For 20,000 people, I'm speaking only about the kind of food you mentioned, on the water we have no new figures, I'll tell you frankly, we consider them a little bit low. But on food we thought the figures, accepted figures rather high. What I want to suggest (a) that we discuss here the quantities on the supply (b) that we discuss here also the question of the nature of supplies. Perhaps we can come to an agreement. But the easier part of the discussion. I think the difficult part, which is important also is the question of the inspection. As long as we are in the position we are in general, that is to say, as you know the situation where we are, where the 3rd army elements are, where Suez is, the 2nd army — the present configuration of cease-fire lines,

we have a problem. The problem is that on one hand we accept, we definitely accept the principle that the military people have to live and that the people of Suez has to live, has to have the necessary food and water and medical supplies to live. Now, but there's also the problem that we must make sure there are no military supplies reach these areas. Right.

So we have a procedure of injection established, agreed upon by both parties on whatever goes to the 3rd army. But we don't have any procedure of inspection for what is going, for what is going to be, because we didn't have any precedent except for the medical supplies to Suez. We don't have any established, agreed procedure between us to what is going to be going into Suez. What is very important to us is that (a) the vehicles that come from the outside should not go into Suez city, the same vehicle that comes from the outside should not go into Suez city because it is very difficult to control an inspected vehicle. I say open.

A

B- Let us say you bring supplies from Cairo, 10 lorries, 10 ton lorries for example. If they come from Cairo and go to Suez and there is let us say only the check-point at the entrance to

Suez. There is an inspection, - what kind of inspection let us leave that for a moment - then, even there is an inspection, if these lorries continue then we can never be sure that there is nothing on the lorries somewhere not of the nature of non-military supplies. It is legitimate for one to

A - You are too suspicious.

B - No,

A - You are too suspicious

B - No. We, You have experience and we have experience.

A - not with that kind of —

B - Yes, yes. But eh. I want to explain. Now - This is one problem and we think we should find the technique whereby the same vehicles that comes from outside will not go to Suez, not go into Suez. Because in Suez you have direct contact with the military you have free passage. The second thing is the act of inspection. We have an established procedure on the 3rd army and we want a similar procedure on the entrance to Suez. Over.

A - Well

B - We are ready. It is not a question of thinking that the other side is not honest or something. This is not the question - for a military body that is in such a position, it's legitimate to try.

A - I got the wrong impression then. Anyway

B - I'll tell you honestly, I think it's legitimate to try

A- About the agreement General,

B- Yes please

A- It doesn't mention anything about checking anything going to Suez City. No (E) it says "the Israeli c.p. on the Cairo Suez road will be replaced by the UN [illegible] Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the banks of the Canal. At the banks of the Canal, that means only for the 3rd army and not for the city itself. The city itself - everything going to the city will be checked by the UN c.p. only. Quantity and quality up to the UN only. Any restrictions on the city are not acceptable from our side.

B - General. I'm afraid that here we are in what is called in English at loggerheads, we are in a conflict. It is true that the language of (E) is a little bit ambiguous and it says "At the Suez end of the road," and you general know the maps as well as I do, as well? You know it much better, and you know the Suez end of the Cairo-Suez road is in Suez. It is not at Km. 88.5. It is - I know you have an answer and I have an answer, and we'll go back and forth like that, but I admit the language is not clear. "At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate," I know it says later "with the UN to

supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal"

A - Right

B- True, but there is here none, not mystification but lack of clarity, because there is definitely a contrast, contradiction between "Suez end of the road," and "bank of the Canal." So this is a question that for us is very important, but I'll ask you because I'm looking for ways to come to an understanding. I mean General, you think we want to squeeze the city.

- Yes

- And we want to squeeze Brel army We don't want to squeeze. We don't want to squeeze.

Boisard.

- Here they have come! We don't want to squeeze it. We want to make sure that under the circumstances before we move to the big plan, whatever it be, of disengagement. First stage - we first talked about it - that the military situation on the ground will not change. But we don't want to squeeze. But inorder to, as a gentleman says, to get movement, what kind of inspection do you have in mind?

- On the Suez road to Suez city?

- yes yes. No inspection at all except by the UN.

- How?

— be sure that non military cargo will be sent to the city.

ב- ...ולפני ...ולפני ...של ...תגרום

א- I feel from the discussion that you are trying as you said to squeeze the city. That's not fair for the civilian — (water) till now. But at any rate all what I can say that the cargo which will be sent to the city will be checked by the UN at the c.p.

ב- How will they check it?

א- Up to them. They can do whatever they like.

ב- What kind of procedure, General, do you have in mind?

א- It's the responsibility of the UN.

ב- But I explained to you General the reasons why we are so interested in this problem. Therefore, it is very important for us to know the technical details of the inspection. For example I mentioned the problem of the vehicles. Colonel [illegible] thought I am suspicious about his integrity. It has nothing to do with integrity and honesty. I think every military man wants to improve his military position, there's nothing wrong with that. That's a military game.

א- Well, I think we can do —— (cross) Among the supplies to Suez city, I think we have to work in close co-operation with the ICRC to decide the necessary amount for the civilian population, and according to that either decide the number of vehicles and the cargo and we would then check each vehicle.

Concerning the supplies to the 3rd army I should decide which amounts should be delivered daily, and as the general says Israeli officers can participate in checking the cargo at the Bank of the Canal. Here are

B: Here & there are a number of points General

(a) We would like, as far as the quantities, we would like that to be discussed with you and also our Egyptian friends here. Then as to the procedure of inspection at the Suez end there is a technical difference between the Suez end and the bank of the Canal. At the bank of the Canal the vehicles don't go on because they don't cross in the Canal amphibious [illegible] of the 3rd army after a checking take over. The authorities of Suez the vehicles can go on. How are you going to solve this problem. It will go to the town, General, I am sorry there is no connection between both of them. They will go to the civilians inside the city, under the supervision of the UN.

I understand General, but we know that there is direct communication between 3rd army in Suez.

There is no communication between both of them. There's a canal there bridges so - therefore I explained the reason before, we can't let the same lorries that bring the food stuff into the city. If I understood you General correctly, you said that you are going to use on the entrance to Suez, the same procedure that you use on the bank

of the Canal.

C - (This does not form part of the agreement)

B - Alright let us for a moment assume that the same procedure is being used, then anyway you undertake unloading the trucks.

C - There will be an unloading area.

B - Alright if there is an unloading area, then trucks coming ~~from~~ from Suez, your trucks coming from Suez can then take, instead of loading, let's say 40 trucks. Have come, 40 trucks sent to an unloading area at the Suez - Cairo road wherever the General decides. There they are being unloaded they are being inspected, I am not talking about who is inspecting now after being inspected, instead of being loaded on to the lorries that come from Cairo, they can be loaded on to the lorries that come from Suez city.

A - There may be no lorries in Suez city to carry the cargo.

B - If you have a problem with lorries - I think the UN can give you the lorries, I think perhaps we might find a solution for you.

A - The UN may make the C.P. check the lorries, maybe 20 kms away from here why not? Anyway Any place they want to be an unloading area. At any place to make sure that there are no military cargo and then it can go up to Suez, in Suez itself, unload it and then come back.

B - But the same lorries are then going into Suez.

A - The same lorries will enter Suez.

However, today I understand the situation, General Nasser and General Gamasi is as follows now we have differences of opinion on the question of the three tasks of the exchange of P.O.W.'s. We have a difference of opinion on the method of inspection of supplies to Suez city and we have not yet talked all the three of us about the nature of supplies and the quantity as far as Suez city and the third army is concerned. I suggested to the General that back of us check with the authorities and that we have another meeting tomorrow, but I — understand the General can't come tomorrow, so the day after tomorrow the General Nasser brought up the question - what are we going to do meanwhile. Until the day after tomorrow there are people in the 3rd army, there are people in the city of Suez, and General told me there are 60 lorries for the 3rd army and 150 tons of supplies for the city of Suez. Correct General? Now I checked with my authorities and I have clearance to let you send the 60 lorries to the 3rd army and the 150 tons to Suez city until we sit down on Wednesday and that everything goes through the unloading area to the 3rd army. But I've been instructed that is to be done on condition that you exchange the lists. I explained to my authorities that your General Gamasi didn't feel so happy about that question of the lists,

2R:

A- We'll cancel our agreement about the convoy going to Sudz for tomorrow and thank you very much for that.
The 40 lorries going to the 3rd army we cancel it also, but still the last convoy, the 50 lorries convoy, you remember that? We had 2 convoys

B- Yes, yes, yes

A- The first convoy finished, the second convoy 50 lorries, the rest of these 50 convoy are still here, they will be parked as before.

B- General I'm sorry. This is possible, but if we don't get the list, my orders say I can't agree.

A- The 50 lorries which the Israeli government accepted before, we put up. out or up on of — these are still 8 here

B- Ah, this, this I must ask.

A- I was talking about 40 more than those 8 so we can have 48 lorries.

B- I see you are talking about 8 lorries,

A- I am talking now about the 8 lorries rest.

B- So, we have to go and ask.

A- That's our normal thing. There is no change

B- But I must check. I know General, but I must check.

A- I made it clear only that the rest of the 50 lorries, I think there are 8 here, They will be parked as usual. That is, the remainder of the 50 lorries. I was talking about 40 more.

B- I understand.

A- So I am cancelling the 10 more. If you want to keep the 8 lorries remaining from the 50 lorries which the Israeli government accepted before, that is up to you.

B- I want to check.

A- Check what?

B- I don't want to mislead you. Never mislead you. I understood what you said but we don't want to fire: we don't want to fire, we don't want to stop with force.

A- I don't want to let you go back again

B- no, I'll ask the colonel

A- Nothing new on what I said now.

B- No, this we have to discuss when I get home.

A- About the 8 lorries?

B- No, about the 8 lorries, I'll give you an answer immediately. Perhaps

I-

A- Just forget the 10 more lorries and we didn't say a word about it?

B- Alright. I understand but I have misinformed the minister so I have to tell him, because I didn't understand that there were remnants of the 50 vehicles. I understand. General, perhaps while we are waiting for the answer, when we met the last time before yesterday's meeting, you gave the quantities for Suez and you said you might check the quantities for the 3rd army. Perhaps if you have

the figures, before we meet again, we can think about it.

A- We need 50 lorries everyday for the 3rd army

B- What kind?

A- Supplies, all different of supplies...

B- 50 lorries, 3 ton, 4 ton 12 ton? This is a question - for how many people? Approximately we know what the division is, approximately we think we know your order of battle of the 3rd army elements so we have more or less an idea how many people, let's say we had 25% to be sure, perhaps our intelligence has made a mistake, so we have more or less than an idea. Therefore, I ask if you say 50 per day. If it's 3 ton 10 ton 15 ton.

A- 50 lorries of 3 tons, if they are more than 3 tons we can change them into tonnage. If there are 7 or 8 ton lorries we can make it in tonnage.

B- Alright, so what is the weight?

A- 15.

B- Daily

A- Different things.

B- Alright.

A- Sometime clothes, sometimes supply, clothes this

B- I understand. (מבין את הנקודה שמדובר בציוד ולא בנפשות)

So with the 8 lorries it's alright. I don't have communication, but I take it, at least a general can take a

clause upon his responsibility ah? So the 8 Corps is alright because we promised you so?

A- Right

B- And you don't want any arrangement until we meet again for Suez or the 3rd army.

A- Yes.

B- You come with a bad adviser. Jo13 At least with a tough adviser. Ce Eright. So we meet again on —

A- Why don't we start the first point of the agreement and discuss it about the ceaze-fire. I think there is a problem there somewhere as we heard now.

B- Where?

A- (It reminds me) with the first point of the ceaze-fire, respecting the ceaze-fire.

B- Yes ah!

A- The General pink, if not we postpone it.

B- I'm ready. Because your general are already respecting us wanting to straggle this city. If I say we don't want to speak about ceaze-fire now what is left?

A- About the ceaze-fire, we would like to emphasize that we should stop air-reconnaissance 30 kms. from the front lines of both sides in the East of the Canal in order not to make any clashes between both sides. That's ... (to B10)

That's our proposal, there may be more than that. (B) We would like to have the

UN forces be put between both sides. Especially in the southern area and we leave to General Siilasvuo, the Commander of these forces - to do it by dispensation, that is our recommendation.
- Only the southern sector General?
- Only what?
- You said only in the southern sector.
- No, Especially.
- Ah, especially.
- There are so many clashes in the southern sector.
- The southern sector is very complicated.
- Let it be alone in the 2 sides, east and west we don't mind. The third thing - we would like to have UN forces to be allowed with patrols in the West Bank of the Canal, to ensure.
- Excuse me General. You talked about sweet water canal for the agriculture have you noted it down because I want to help you very much in this respect.
- I hope so.
- Ok.
- I would like to have the UN forces to be allowed to make patrols in the West Bank of the Canal and the Bitter Lake specially to ensure that our civilians there are living or are being treated well.
- Yes. Treated well in their homes, not in camps, that they go to the fields etc.
- That's our point of view about ceeze fire first to minimize clashes between both sides.

Eh. the last thing sorry awfully sorry —
Please, please.
When I mentioned the West of the Canal, I
mean the West of the Canal between the Bitter
Lake and Suez itself here.
I understood
Because this area, the back of the troops
stationed on the east and some snipers
are trying to do some shooting our
troops from the Western Bank of the Canal
and happen we'll have some casu.
Unfortunately it is natural General. Unfortunately
but side will do our best to minimize
these things, but if we put some UN
forces in these sensitive areas, it may help
both of us. Thats all I wanted to say
May I, about the air ~~force~~ I have to check,
I have to check, Yes I say 30 kms. That is
very, I am very curious to ask the chief
of Intelligence how he gets his air photo
coverage but it is not the subject of the
discussion
The plane, don't come near the 30 kms.
I understood. But I only want to
remind that unfortunately we don't have
a stand still agreement, we don't have
a stand still agreement, and this means
that under the agreement we have
troops can be moved from one
place to another, Enforcement can
come in and the question of photo
coverage is of course very important
because otherwise, we don't have
any coverage, and therefore I say because
you can answer that this is for both sides

30 kms. Now 30 kms, if you say 30 kms as far the canal is concerned. Where do you start to count the 30 kms? From the forward lines.
Our forward lines...
Of both sides.
Forward lines of both sides. That means, if we take our forward line, here, if you take 30 kms to the west, that means about 60 kms from the canal. I may make a jam for you understand! I'm not disputing now, because when I report it I want to be sure that I understand it properly.
On the Eastern Bank of the canal there is no problem.
On the Eastern Bank of the canal, you have 2nd army, and you say 30 kms from 2nd army. Right?
Right.
OK.
The same thing with your troops. So what you mean 30 kms from the forward lines of the 2nd army, that's why shall not pass. Ok. And the same thing you say here, for the 3rd army - 30 kms we shall not come. Now about you? And we shall not come also.
But we have troops here. Now where do you start to count the 30 kms? From the forward...
Which is from here.
Here I made that proposal just to prevent getting your planes here, your reconnaissance planes come here and

then we shoot against them as it happend, and then you start shooting our air defence means and then we start with our ground forces and then and so on, the same thing there and the same thing here. If we say 30 kms here, that is our troops here, and we have.

These are our troops

- And we have our here... just to be away from our air-defence means, to minimize shooting against each other.
- So where will you fly?
- we'll not come 30 kms here.
- Alright, I understand
- You have your troops are in close contact with our troops. there 30 kms will not make any reconnaissance in this area. just to minimize but not stand still.

B- no stand still, I know there is no stand still. Because there is no stand still we have a problem.

A - I'm just giving you a proposal from our point of view to make the cease-fire more firm, but still there'll be some shooting between the troops here and there, but I'm just giving our proposal to minimize.

B - I understand General, I understood. Now, because the lines are so difficult, and you're right last paragraph (b) is important, because of mine we want get out of this complicated situation, I agree with you. But for the time being - I don't know how long it will be - let's

hope it won't be too long we'll have the problem of the complicated line of fire. It is difficult for me to see, now, before will the UNF, especially the southern sector, how will the UNEF go between the sides there. You have on the Eastern Bank 3rd army elements and our elements, more to the East of 3rd army elements. So UNEF between these two. Then, you have 3rd army elements, canal, our elements, UNEF between there. Then it remain our elements. West of the Canal and your western elements of the 3rd army, and in between UNEF B. 1, 2, 3 at least, not to mention the 2nd army etc. So, but I'm not going that in answer general I'm just pointing out that this is very complicated thing and then here is the question of UNEF patrols. Usually the patrols, in the past at least, if I am wrong please correct me general, in the past at least, UNEF patrols or UNTSO patrols was between the lines, not within the lines. Sometime there was a checking or a peace problems, yes, if there was an incident or something that had to be checked especially, our permanent routine work, was there by UN factors only in between the lines. What you are asking here is a patrol within the lines that are now being held by us. I mean it's Egyptian territory

— fighting, you have civilians there alright we have a responsibility towards civilians, I agree. So I'm not trying to give an answer now because I'm not authorized, but I'm only trying to point out the difficulties before I go back and get an answer.

P - I read three points for UN which is responsible for that. If UN ~~peace~~ force can do it, it will be alright for the benefit of cease-fire. If it could do it, it's up to them.

B - But another point for the record, General. It is not written in the agreement. It is not covered by the agreement. It says "cease-fire." It means that both sides have to cease fire. This I agree. And we have to do our best to ensure that our soldiers don't open fire just because they like to open fire. Of course if there is effective fire from your side (your — your say) and you will have an answer.

A - Alright.

D - The one thing that remains we have to fix a time for the next meeting. Wednesday?

A - I am busy tomorrow.

B - Wednesday at which time is convenient

P - At whatever time you like

B - 12 o'clock?

P - 12 o'clock.

C - Before you finish I would like to... As I already said yesterday, pure (E) I have an independent force which is not linked with any other

provision in the agreement. This is to establish c.p. on the road. I read the paragraph: "the Israeli c.p. on the Cairo - Suez road will be replaced by UN c.p. At the Suez end of the road Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise. The non-military nature of the cargo "at back of the convoy." So it is my intention to establish these c.p. today, before dark, let's say at 6 o'clock.

B - General, I think we are going to have a strong argument about that. We are not going to have our c.p.

C - You will be very ill-advised not to let me now establish this according to the agreement

B - I know, General, I don't have the authority

C - I have the authority.

B - But I don't have the authority to remove.

C - You have signed this agreement

B - Yes, we also signed an agreement "as soon as P.O.W.'s etc" and on this we are stuck, and therefore we cannot proceed without having solved these problems. Please, I don't have the authority general

C - Very well I'll check because I am going to open this check-post today.

B - I'll report it; but we are not going to move

C - Then, to just to make more points clear before we meet next time, the convoys on the road between Cairo and

Suez will be escorted by UN. They are UN convoys. Israel may or can check the contents of the cargo.

B- " At the bank of the canal?

C- There is no provision for checking the food or medicine to Suez. That will be under our auspices completely. And convoy I would see now as a practical compromise to the news which have been expressed here. We supervise the unloading of the trucks in the city of Suez, and we take care of the return of these same trucks.

B- Please, I didn't understand you so very well, general, please.

C- So my intention is, or my idea is, convoys to Suez city that they also would be starting from here escorted by UN, reach the city of Suez, be unloaded by UN supervision, the cargoes checked and then we would ensure that the same trucks would return to Cairo.

B- —— ?

D- The trucks remain under UN supervision all the time in Suez city, never out of our eye.

B- How is it going to be done? After the unloading ...

C- We have to have an unloading area in Suez city itself which is supervised by our troops. And —

B- And from that unloading area where do the cargoes go?

C- That is, of course, not my business, because the cargoes are meant for the city of Suez.

B- I want to understand. I'm not yet arguing, perhaps we'll argue, but I'm not yet arguing... May I draw a picture please? Let us say, the road, you come to the city of Suez; you cross the line, you come to an area, let us say this is the area.

C - We — the cargo there and supervise.

B- unloading area.

C- Inspect contents

B- and the lorries

C- will return as a convoy back to Cairo

B- I understand.

D - Right away under our supervision

B- I understand.

D- So if something is hidden, then it will remain hidden out. That's the idea. Always we'll be there.

B- I understand the point, I must report this back. But this is not in according to my instructions, so I must report it back, but I would say the language of the agreement is unfortunately not so clear, because as I pointed out before the phrase "end of Suez road" and "bank of canal" are in contradiction. I understand that this is your interpretation so I want to say I understood it, I have to report it back and so I'll give you my authority's answer on Wednesday. And I hope that - somebody else will also interprete that —

C - And I hope that somebody else will also interprete that —

(more)

B- I don't know, I don't know
How does general Gowany say?
Okay? OK. I'm sorry that we didn't
get very far. We have so many
problems left. I hope that tomorrow
we can move forward. We'll sit
down with my authorities because
I want to say again. I have told
the General, I am saying this again
in your presence General Silaven,
and your partners from the UN.
We want peace. The General say to
me that Egypt wants peace and I
believe him, perhaps the General don't
believe me, but we believe him.
The point is that for 26 years we
have been at war, so naturally
there are a lot of difficulties,
political, psychological, military
difficulties to get ready. Things moving.
And it will take a lot of patience.
I know the general's impatient.
The general has been speaking to me
about the way we try to strangle the
city of Suez by many civilians etc.
But I think the General has to
agree with me that in the city of Suez
there are many many military people.
There are many many military
elements. We cannot forget. If we are
trying to find a way, but we cannot
say to ourselves, that the information
we had, let us forget. The information
we had and let us speak only about
the civilians. So we have a problem.

I. Think that even colonel Hilt, as I said your tough answer, will have to admit that there are military elements and quite a lot of military elements in the city of Saigon. Because we know very well that only very few civilians are left in the city. And the figure of 20,000 is something that can be definitely discussed, it is open to discussion now. I am only trying to point out that we have several problems we must take into consideration before we can move on to the big problem of disengagement. I agree with you, this is a big problem.

C - Well, I have talked already today - we could have had the Reds moving the convoys moving tomorrow morning.

D - As you don't mind the press are here.

? - If you don't mind the press are here.

B - Let I'll tell you. General Cowing and General Stanton my only consideration of today - I made a correct estimate of the situation. This is my only consolation. I was afraid it would turn out like that. But this is no solution. I do hope that each of us talks to his authorities at home and tries to explain the situation as well as he can in order to move forward....

C - Please check.

B - I think the situation is negative but I'll check again. There is nothing in the agreement

C - There is nothing in the agreement with us. But as I will be responsible for the convoy now, I must also see the practical

questions.

B- I see that there are a lot of prem people here. I see that there All prem people are equal and some of them smoke. Am I right Mr. Gabe —

- Like? (pl n3)

- You want them to take a photograph now.

- no

- Good-bye.

M E E T I N G

November 29, 1973

GEN. YARIV: May I congratulate Gen. Gamasy for the high distinction he got from the Minister of War.

GEN. GAMASY: That's General Abdul Ramid Gamasy, not General Hamer Abdul Gamasy.

(Laughter).

GEN. YARIV: I suppose he is at least a close relative of yours.

ISRAELI MEMBER: A twin brother.

GEN. YARIV: Toexplain, I have the Hebrew translation - this was a very high compliment paid to the General by the Minister of War onthe occasion of a conference on the lessons of the last war.

GEN. GAMASY: It would be a good compliment for me if we would succeed in these meetings. (laughter) Then I could quit the army after that, I mean if everything did go right with separation and disengagement.

GEN. YARIV: Well, to settle everything in one meeting would be difficult, you know. But perhaps we can make some progress.

GEN. GAMASY: I hope.

GEN. YARIV: Well, General, you are always very cautious towards me and you let me start. But I am ready. Could we- we are waiting for a couple of answers from Brig. Sharif, I believe.

GEN. GAMASY: Brig. Sharif is here, if we can leave that now until we finish our work and we will-

GEN. YARIV: That's all right. Because you remember there are a couple of important questions on which we were waiting for answers. But this can wait.

We'd like to start with the problem, that we had a little concert just now - the question of the problem of cease fire. It is true that we have not yet reached an agreement on disengagement, we are battling on disengagement, but I think in your mind, as well as in ours, the first paragraph of the agreement is a very important one, because otherwise we can't get anywhere, if we cannot maintain the cease fire. And I think that whatever difficulties we are having in discussing various matters, and we might have here or in Geneva later, I think the maintenance of the cease fire is very important. Because otherwise we can slide into a real conflagration, which no one has an interest in. And when we speak about the cease fire, we are speaking about the cease fire in the air, on land and at sea. And when I say at sea, I don't want to be too general, and what we speak about is the movement of our ships through Babl Mandeb, through the straits of Babl Mandeb, which is also part of the cease fire. But I would like to be more specific about the cease fire in this area, in this area along the cease fire lines. Unfortunately, I have to emphasize that there have been very serious breaks in the cease fire and especially yesterday, and they have been along the Canal at the following points: at Kilo 139, Kilo 141, Kilo 142, Kilo 143.5, at Kilo 144 and the Ismayiliya area. Eppecially I want to stress the case of a soldier that was killed by sniper fire, not far away from the unloading area, and it was only because of the intervention of Gen. Tal, and my personal intervention, that unloading was not stopped. The unloading was not stopped only

because of our intervention, when I said that I am meeting you today and we can discuss it, and I am sure that Gen. Gamasy will take all the necessary steps to prevent it. And then another special area is this area 101. We have had trouble several times, this morning again. I can't under any circumstances accept that the fact of our forces mining positions is a reason for opening fire. It cannot be a reason for opening fire. The agreement doesn't say anything about mining or fortifications. If someone tries to move forward the line, this is something different. This is a breach of the cease fire itself; then there is a reason for opening fire. But the circumstances as we have checked them, and I am not bringing up the whole list, did not warrant any breach of the ceasefire. I think we should do everything in our power to try to stop this. If this necessitates more intensive contacts or between the local commanders, we are all for it, in any formthat will be suitable. If you think a meeting between Gen. Tal and the parallel commanders from your side is necessary, we'll be ready for it. This is the first point I wanted to take up at this meeting.

GEN. GAMASY: May I answer? We are very interested in the cease fire. I mentioned that before, in article'a of the six-point agreement. I also learned yesterday that there were clashes very close to the unloading area close to the UN flag, and especially in this area which we are interested in for the Third Army. I admit myself I was surprised yesterday when I received that message. I called the commander here and the local commander, both of them, by

telephone, yesterday. Made the investigation. They said we didn't have any clashes at all in 138 or in 141 it was in 141, yes, at 10 o'clock, and then one o-clock and then three o'clock, and we gave strict orders to stop all this nonsense. That's from local commanders. I assured and told Gen. Siilasvuo that we have no intention at all to make these small things, for what reason I don't know. And also, about this area here. Now, I called the commander, the army area commander, and then the brigade commander, and then the division commander. We said we don't have any firing , although I hear it myself. But our post here is doing that, and then he called our post. They said there are 3 M-113 coming towards me and shooting against me so I am shooting. That's a small thing adn we will see how our liaison officer will come back. If he is mistaken we will punish him. There is no need for that. And we are giving strict orders, I am sure, especially from the minute you said Gen. Tal interefered by himself to call at the area to see what is going on. And I did it, and still we have two majors there that were killed,

GEN. YARIV: Where?

GEN. GAMASY: At the base. Itold you, two officers.

GEN. YARIV: When? Then?

GEN. GAMASY: Yes, then. With all that that we gave strict orders especially in this area.

GEN. YARIV: I am glad.

GEN. GAMASY: For the two armies, if there are some clashes we should investigate each case by itself-

GEN. YARIV: Same here.

GEN. GAMASY: So we can stop it. So I want to make it sure to

you both that we have no intentions at all of that. The army commanders have strict orders. The division commanders have from the local commanders. Although there are some good things from local commanders. They've got contacts with one another.

GEN. Y: Yes, they have?

GEN. SIILASVUO: I was yesterday south of Abu Suwei with the Austrian area, and it seems that at least there, although there was also yesterday some firing on rather nonsensical reasons, the local commanders Meet. And I think the UN is also doing - I got a very favorable impression of the Austrian company commander there. He really tries to stop unnecessary firing.

GEN. Y: I think I met the company commander once.

GEN. S: Maybe.

GEN. Y: All right, if there is a common understanding I am sure we can see how we can restrict it. And we are all for letting-- we have not restricted under any circumstances our local commanders within the general framework of their orders of the area to do whatever they can, on the spot to contact your local commanders in order to limit it.

GEN. G: That's a very good idea. To do that through the United Nations if there is any fire to stop it.

GEN. Y: All right.

GEN. G: And we will give orders like that.

GEN. Y: Now, if I am not mistaken, I am sure that the problem of disengagement, you would like to bring it up of course and to discuss it. Now, we have problems, General, we have problems. And the problems are, we have listened to the announcement of the President in Algiers, ina ddition to all that we have discussed.

Amongst other things, I am very sorry - the President is a President of course and I can't complain about it or discuss anything with the President. But among other things, he said that what is the use of going to a peace conference if there is daily firing. I hope that as far as the daily firing is concerned, this will not be an obstacle to going to the peace conference. I hope so. Another thing the President said is as far as Israel is concerned, and he mentioned, he referred especially to Km. 101, as far as Israel is concerned, Israel is still utilizing the method of evasion and of deception. I am not for one moment saying that we don't have disagreements and differences of opinion, for one moment I am not saying that. I think I have never tried to give you the impression that we agreed to something and then denied it. I think I was very clear in saying that we cannot accept your position on the size of your forces/ East of the Canal that we cannot accept your position on the distance of our forces from the Canal, and that we cannot accept the timetable you have presented here for everything, this in connection with the first line of disengagement. So, and I think I have never tried to create a wrong impression, whether it was on the problems of supplies, whether it was talking of the prisoners of war, whether it was on the problems of cease fire.

The third point the President made in Algiers yesterday, the President said that, and I think in this he confirmedyour position, he made it very clear, the crossing of your forces of the Suez

Canal is a fait accompli - this is of course true - but that there is no return, and that you will not be ready to discuss it. We were not speaking about a return of the forces to the West Side. We were speaking, yes, in our proposal, but we were also ready to discuss the question of the size of your forces. Now on the question of return, our proposal contains a return of your forces, this is true, or part of your forces. If you remember our proposal, for which we got your clear negative answer, the proposal of each side evacuating the ground taken during the war and permitting UNEF to take over the ground taken during the war, this includes a certain return of your forces to the other side, it's true. The President clearly states that you will not accept it under any circumstances.

I would like to point out theproblem we have in this connection. And this is that we are speaking about the line of disengagement, which has to dowith cease fire. It has not to do directly with the question of our withdrawal. We do not deny it. That is to say, I have stated with full authority from my government that this is a first line of disengagement and there will be further lines. Line or lines, that dempends on nagotiations about withdrawal. NOw, within the context of withdrawal you can I think rightfully maintain that there is no question of mutuality in territory. There might be a question of mutuality in other things, territory versus other things, but not in territory. But when we speak about the disengagement in connection with the cease fire, in connection with separation

of forces, it is the position of my government that the question of mutuality has a bearing on the problem, has a bearing on the problem. And here I see a great difficulty. And I have to tell you that I have no new proposal. I have no new proposals on disengagement. That is to say, in order to be clear, the official proposal is the proposal I just mentioned, of each side giving up the conquered ground taken during the war-

GEN. G: Each side?

GEN. Y: Each side evacuates the area taken during the war and UNEF takes overthe area. On this, I got your clear negative answer which I reported to the government. We still have an unofficial proposal which the government ~~unofficially~~ authorities did not agree to make official, which was a 10 km. line, which you have clearly turned down. Now, if I may with your permission, I would like to have a five-minute break because all ~~the~~ today over Israel people are going to the cemetery to honor our fallen and our missing soldiers. And we have a little ceremony with our soldiers here. And with your permission, I would ask five minutes, and we'll be back.

(B R E A K)

GEN. SIILASVUO: As I understood when we parted last Monday, Israel rejected the Egyptian proposal of 35 km. from the Canal.

GEN. Y: Yes.

GEN. S: Egypt has then rejected the idea of , the Israeli idea of 10 km. from the Canal. And as I understood, you thought you could find out from your authorities some other line or lines

and then we could discuss the question of the reduction of the Egyptian troops on the Eastern side of the Canal. Nothing came out of this?

GEN. Y: No.

GEN. S: I must say that I feel rather disappointed, personally.

GEN. Y: I understand your point of view, General.

GEN. G: Just about the comments about the speech in Algeria, I don't see taking this speech as the basis of the discussion here, because if we hear all that has been said during the few days, by both the Egyptians and the Israelis, we would have started to be at war. So let us better leave these speeches for the political leaders to discuss it-

GEN. Y: In Geneva.

GEN. G: In Geneva, through their channels and so on. But it won't be an excuse for stopping our discussions today. As far as I understand you want to stop it, and there is only one official positon, that the United Nations will take over the positions of our troops. That means we came to a deadlock on the disengagement and separation of troops. If this is so, we would like to go back to the 22nd of October line. I think it is the responsibility of the United Nations to take over on that problem, according to the spirit of their resolutions and according to the six-point agreement. If also, you don't want to discuss these lines, so then everything is clear

GEN. Y: Well, I would say so. May I for one minute leave I'll say like this no,/on the disengagement, unfortunately, I see it is difficult for us to progress. As you said, General, we have a deadlock on disengagement. And I agree with you that things should be clear, always clear. And I have always tried my best to be clear. And that means, as you mentioned in one of our last meetings, that perhaps we ssill have to

discuss things in Geneva.

GEN. G: Which things?

GEN. Y: Disengagement.

GEN. G: I said so?

GEN. Y: I think in one of our meetings you mentioned it but it doesn't matter. I think this is what will have to happen.

GEN. G. first temporary line so that we can separate our troops, so that we can have a fair cease fire, and that will be the concept of the six-point agreement. And all other things - like prisoners or war and supplies and so on will in putting the cease fire into effect.

GEN. Y: Yes, but on this we have come to a deadlock. I hope that the problem, if it can't be solved here, andif neither of our authorities changes its opinion, then it will have to be solved at a later stage. But this is above my head already.

Before we talk about the 22nd of October line, I would like to bring up a couple of pmoints with your permission, General. Because until further discussion on disengagement is reached, or we get to that stage, life has to continue here. And we want to see that despite the difficulties we have that life does continue in such a way that we can minimize problems and that we can find ways to continue the maintenance of the cease fire. In spite of the differences that we have and the deadlock. So I would say there are a couple of outstanding problems for the continuation of life under the present conditions from your side and from our side. From your side, there is the problem of kabrit, correct?

And the problem ofthe list of things that you want us to let through to the city of Suez, which has been handled by Gen. Siilasvuo, and the details you gave us about the supply of fuel, correct? These are the two major outstanding items for the continuation of daily life.

On our side, we have two problems. One is one that the General always said is a problem between us but we have come to that-

GEN. G: What?

GEN. Y. Mr. Mizrachi and Levy . And the second problem where we are stuck in the problem of the evacuation of dead bodies and the answers to inquiries about missing soldiers. Now, although we are stuck on disengagement - and I won't forget that I owe the General an answer onthe 22nd, I'll come back to that - although we are stuck on disengagement, we think that we can discuss these problems, and if we can find a solution, both to Tobruk and both to the items to be included inthe daily supplies to the city of Suez. But this is also contingent upon the solution of the two outstanding problems from our side, which I mentioned. One, Mizrachi and Levy. Levy is, I don't know how to call him, an unfortunate, innocent person. And the second thing has to do with the question of the missing and the dead bodies. If we can come today to an understanding of principle on these matters, I will be ready as early as possible to give a full detailed answer

about kabrit and about the supplies to Suez.

Now, about the 22nd of October. I have the authority only to say that, you know our position, that the line of the 22nd of October has to be discussed within the framework of disengagement. Now, on disengagement we are locked. But - and now I am saying something for which I don't have authority, I do not have authority - but I am ready to go back to the authorities and to propose to them to check thoroughly and to see whether we could find some way of minimizing the danger of incidents and of friction in the present lines with the help of the UN and . But I want to say right away that I can't commit myself on it, because perhpas my ideas will not be accepted, and I don't want you, General, to have a misunderstanding that here I am giving you an idea, and the next day I am saying, no, I am going back on it. There are many question marks and I didn't have the time to check it thoroughly. I only threw out very briefly that perhaps I will bring it up. I didn't get an okay on it, but I said I would bring it up. And as I was in a hurry, there was no time to get okay or no, so I am in a position to do this.

So if we can talk about what I called the question of the continuation of daily life, in principle, then I'll try my best to give you a detailed answer as soon as possible. What do you say about it, in principle?

GEN. G: I say that on daily life items, it will go according to the six-point agreement which was signed by both of us. If there

are any obstacles to that, then theUnited Nations should interfere. So, I want to leave it now, this daily life. We may live or we may not live. Thosepeople there in the city of Suez, theymay live or theymay not live. But the main problem is the disengagement and the 22nd of October line. Finish with the diesngagement line now. So I want to hear a specific thing about the 22nd of October line. As I understood, it is difficult to define this line. And then you will see with the United Nations how life will work or how these lines can be done, or how to ease the situation here. Am I right or wrong on that?

GEN. Y: I will try, yes. I have no authority.

GEN. G: Yes.

GEN. Y: General, I don't want to promise anything. Otherwise, I'll be accused again.

GEN. G: I want to clear myself only that the Egyptian delegation understands that we are in a deadlock also onthe 22nd line.

GEN. Y: At this time and this point, yes.

GEN. G: So then it's up to Gen. Siilasvuo to make any comments if he'd like.

GEN. Y: I understand you don't want to discuss anything about the city of Suez, because I want to point out, General, as-

GEN. G: I think these small things can be solved automatically when we solve the main problem. We are now solving the small, minor details, the small things, and then leaving the main problem. The main progblem of the six-point agreement as we understood it is

especially the separation of troops and to make the cease fire fair. And all these small things, the supply of the troops, and this, and prisioners of war and wounded helped in making the cease fire fair. Now we finished with all these items and we are stuck with the main problem. We should have started with that and then started with the small things. But it helped and it was of big benefit to both sides, that we finished the four points of the six-point agreement.

GEN. Y: Five.

GEN. G: Four. We still have two, A and B.

GEN. Y: Ah, A, yes.

GEN. G: So we can't say anything. That's up to you. Because we fulfilled all that was needed from us according to the agreement. These two points are up to you. If you want to fulfill them, all right. If not, we can leave them to other authorities, higher authorities.

GEN. Y: But, General, I can't add very much more to what I have said on these problems of disengagement and the 22nd of October at this point. If the question of the supply of Suez does not interest you, that is up to you General. As I understand, the people on the East Bankand the people in Suez are really quite well, and there is no urgent problem apparently, from your point of view. So perhaps there is no need to go into the problem of supplies to Suez.

GEN. G: There are many, many problems. But I don't want to start talking about matches, blankets - that's what happened yesterdy-

jam was away.

GEN. Y: Jam?

GEN. G: Jam.

GEN. Y: That's not fair. That's part of food.

GEN. G: Cheese, white cheese in cans, 3 lorries? were kept yesterday. I really don't want to-

GEN. Y: Where in Suez or Ferdown?

GEN. G: Feirdown. And in Suez some of these itemswere also kept back. I don't know why, but I left all these minor details in order not to interfere with the main problems we are discussing. But even so, we are not linking the bodies with anything. The minute we find the bodies we will send them, even if we cut the discussions today.

GEN.Y: I appreciate that very much.

GEN. G: That's our responsibility from all aspects. Everything we promised, we fulfilled it.And we will do it. There is no need to keep the dead bodies in our hands. Why? We have there chaplains, we have your church, and they will be respected at any time, at all times, and we will send them back. There is no need to discuss that. So many items here - I listed, seven or eight items for the daily life of people in Suez and also in the theater.

GEN. Y: Right.

GEN. G: But also I don't want to discuss all these details because still it is not the main object of our discussions. So what- they can stay without jam, they can stay without blankets-

GEN. Y: That is up to you, General.

GEN. G: Any initiative is yours now, as I told you before, not any the initiatie isyours now, because there is nothing needed from you.

GEN. Y: Including Cabrit?

GEN. G: I will be very glad, General, if you solve any item fromthese items. I will be glad. You can say no. I will be very, very glad personally glad, as a delegation very glad, as Egypt will be very glad, to solve the Cabrit problem, to solve any of these problems. They will be very glad of it, I am sure. They will appreciate itpersonally and they will appreciate it as a delegation and as a country.

GEN. Y: We know each other for some time now, General.

GN. G: I think so.

GEN. Y: And I understood perfectly well what you said. So, as you say, I have - we, not I personally - what small measure I can contribute I try - we have the initiative on what you call the small items, as in a similar measure you have the initiative on what you call the problem between us, onthe line. Because the last positbn was that there is a decision in principle, and this is it.

GEN. G: It's still the principle.

GEN. Y: So on this you have the initiative.

GEN. G: On the problem of the line, we could have solved this before we started the six-point agreement.

GEN. Y: How? General, if you prefer not to discuss it in a full forum-

GEN. G: No. We started talking with each on the 28th-

GEN. Y: One o'clock at night.

GEN. G: On the 28th of October, and we solved some problems.

GEN. Y: But we did not succeed in solving that problem.

GEN. G: Because itis very recently.

GEN. Y: (laughs) Let us not discuss - then we raised it, but ma'alesh.

Before I move further, only how dp you want to understand this? Because, , on the problem of Mizrachi, because I have to report that. If I tell the Prime Minister that Gen. Gamasy told me thatthe question of Mizrachi could have been solved long ago, she willsay: well, then why didn't you solve it? What do I answer? It's not only the question of the PRIME Minister, but it's his wife. I went to see her.

GEN. G: On the principle we agree.

GEN. Y: This we know, but the wife is not happy with the principle. Enough is enough, she wants her man back.

GEN. G: But when how, it will be carried out, I am not authorized to discuss.

GEN. Y: This complicates matters. I am telling you very frankly, General, this complicates matters. But perhaps I will have a word with you later on that, with your permission of course. But on Cabri, how doyou envisage the supply of Cabrit? Because we haven't worked it out yet. Before we work it out, I would be glad to hear your idea, how you want to work that out.

GEN. G: We made two proposals that the Third Army should give Cabrit supplies by land or by sea, or through the United Nations.

GEN. S: I think the most practical proposal, Gen. Gamasy, was this supply separately from the unloading area.

GEN. Y: I haven't checked it, I didn't go into details, but I think that we would prefer not by way of water.

GEN G: If it is by land /Well, it is very easy. The distance is small. They can carry the food, once a week, even under the United Nations flag once again, although it is only 5 or 6 km. So it won't make any problems for us or problems for you. Just inform the local commander and we'll give them supplies. And it will be supplied from the bridgehead.

GEN. Y: All right, now how about my having a word with the General?

GEN. S: As I understand that the discussion on para. b of the agreement has at this stage endéd in a stalemate. I would like, however, to say that the agreement, para. b, stipulates that the discussions between the parties should begin immediately to settle this questio n. There is no stipulation that the matter should be left to the peace conference, and that is my item as the representative of the United Nations at this conference.

GEN. Y: I will duly report it.

GEN. G: I would like to say for the record also that para. b affects para a. Although we will take all the precautions, but still maybe some local commanders willbe in a bad situation for any

reason. Because I am feeling from Gen. Yariv's talking about some items linked with other things he is interested in, maybe for taking other steps, maybe against the supply of the Third Army, or the supply of Suez and so on, which is charly stated in the six-point agreement. I hope not. I don't want to be wrong on that.

GEN. Y: I think you are.

GEN. G: I have the impression now that it is a threat that if you don't do that, we will do that. This is what I understood. I want to make it clear that this will not affect any other item in the agreement which we signed. That's all.

GEN. Y: Gen. Gamasy, I appreciate that verymuch. But, first of all in principle I am against threats. Threats will be of no use to anybody. And I did not intend to, I did not phrase it as a threat. Not only did I not phraseit as a threat, I did not mean it to be a threat.

GEN. G: That is good to hear.

GEN. Y: Because first of all, daily supply to Suez is going on. Secondly, the daily supply to the Third Army is going on. Anyway. And this goes on as long as we have maintenance of the cease fire. What I meant is that there are outstanding, additional problems. We are not sticklers to the word. The word says food, medical supplies and water to the Suez. What we are discussing now are additional items to the very words. Because as far as food, medical supplies and water are concerned, no problem, so far, General. An occasional

wounded, no problem. Wehave not made any difficulties on that, and we won't make any difficulties. On the Third Army supplies, okay, so we have a discussion here and a discussion there. Of course, we will make sure, General, we will make sure that no military supplies go to either of these places. Thise does create some problems for us and I think it is only legitimate for us to take all the necessary measures to see that military supplies will not enter. I am not so sure that up to now no military supplies have entered, but let us leave this point. I don't say that howitzers have entered or that tanks have entered, but - so there is no threat about it. What we are discussing is a change in the situation; an increase inthe situation. Cabrit up to now was in a certain position. We are discussing, we have made the proposal. This proposal has not been accepted by you. So far we are in a status quo. Now we are speaking about a change in the status quo of Cabrit. And speaking of a change inthe status quo of the list of supplies to Suez. In this connection, I brought up a point about the missing dead bodies - I'm very, very appreciative of what you said, Gemral, very appreciative. I see it as a very fine gesture and a very honorable position on your part, and I am really very appreciative of what you said. There is still an outstanding problem, so I suggest we have two or three words, with your permission, and perhaps we can then-- because I want to go back and try to move these things, which you would not like to discuss at this moment. And I also would like to give you - not to draw out in time the question of Cabrit, but to try to finish it as soon as possible, so that at least Gen. Gamasy can come back and say that in principle Cabrit is solved. So may I have a few words? (Gen. G. and Gen. Y. leave the meeting).

GEN. S: I suggest that we say, because it will leak out anyway in a few hours, so it is better to say something, like the discussions on para b have not led to an understanding and that - what should we say?

UN MEMBER: First of all, have you reached an understanding to meet again on Sunday or would you like to discuss that? You have not reached that.

GEN. G: But we promise if we have the authority to meet each other again, we will,do it, on the problems we discussed. That's on Mizrachi, and on Cabrit and on the supplies for Suez.

GEN. Y: And if we have any other ideas, we'll let you know.

GEN. G: That's a special-

GEN. Y: Open-

GEN. G: meeting. If it will be under the UN auspices, I think so.

GEN. S: You can meet always under my auspices anyway, I am not against it. What shall we say to the press?

GEN. Y: I will accept whatever the General proposes.

UN MEMBER: I think in view of the importance attached to b, which is between the parties under the auspcies of the United Nations that the world press, it would be better and to come from the General at this point. I would prefer if that be avoided. I know it will leak to the press, I realize that.

GEN. S: I am ready to face this failure.

UN MEMBER: But then it's very difficult. You may have some people .. .. .. Could we say that both sides will consult and a meeting will be arranged at a later date?

GEN. G: I don't accept that.

UN MEMBER: How would you put it then?

GEN. G: Just that we came to a deadlock. Let's face facts because it will be leaked to the press by any means, or formulated by-

GEN. Y: Don't despair, don't despair. It's a long road.

GEN. G: Up to this point, that's true.

GEN. S: That no concrete results have been reached. Can we say that?

GEN. S: Yes.

GEN. Y: On that question.

GEN. S: Yes. Discussion on para b of the agreement have been held and no concrete results have been reached. I think we could still say that-I am still hopeful - everything is possible in the world, you know. We can say at this stage, no concrete results have been reached.

GEN. Y: At this stage, no agreement has been reached. Or any other phrase that leaves it open, but I don't want to put the General into any reaction that is not acceptable to him.

GEN. S: No firm date for a next meeting has been-

GEN. G: Better to say meetings. To saymeeting gives the ide that we will meet again. But I have a feeling that it will take a long time until the politicalleaders will-

GEN. Y: Not necessarily, General.

GEN S: Let's say no firm date for a next meeting has yet been fixed.

GEN. Y: I'm not saying goodbye, General, I am just saying au revoir.

GEN. S: Discussion of para b of the agreement continued today. No concrete results have been reached. No firm date for a next meeting has yet been fixed.

UN MEMBER: Is that agreeable to both generals?

GEN. G? I want to say something. The announcement of Gen. Siilasvuo is stated inthe name of the United Nations here, right? So you can formulate it as you like. But that is not my opinion, I didn't participate-

GEN. S: The Secretary-General told me the other day that the parties decide what to say. (laughter). But at least I have your agreement that this is all right.

I will thank the press, however, fortheir patienae and their endurance. Thier life here at 101 has benn much more monotonous than ours. Right?

A - Camara

B - Yariv

C - Silasvon

14/11/73

D - UN Delegate

C - Now both parties could resume negotiat...

B - alright I would like to say that w... considered the proposals. I understand ... due to my fault, I understand that ... there was a package deal on the way, that it seems I have torpedoed, but I am sorry about that If I have torpedoed the package deal it was not intentional. Anyway, peasant. If there is a package deal, I'll be happy and we'll know about it today. I would like to start with the P.O.W.s, of course we know your interest in the question of supplies to the 3rd army and Suez. ... we have considered the whole problem in great detail, so that we have a position for every aspect of the problem so that we can then pass after hopefully we conclude the negotiations today successfully we'll be able to pass to the important, to the ph... that is important to both sides, to the phase of disengagement. Now we would like on the P.O.W.s, we would like to have a simultaneous

exchange and as rapid as possible exchange of the p.o.w's. and then we'll go with the replacement of the check-points. And of course simultaneously begin the supply to the 2nd army and the city of Suez as will be agreed upon. Now as to the p.o.w's. the situation is a little bit strange here. I'm not speaking about the list, because this goes without saying that we want to have the list. ~~and~~ But as to the exchange, we are able to do it in one day, the whole pack of them, in one day, including the wounded, including the healthy p.o.w's - we can bring all 8000 people lined up in a convoy. Now I understand that you, as far as the wounded prisoners are concerned, the ~~cattle~~ controlling factor in your plan is the available Red Cross air lift. Therefore you have proposed that we start with the simultaneous exchange of one group, that you then go on i.e. 2, 3, 4 or 5, I don't remember, groups of Egyptian wounded P.O.W.s from Israel to Egypt and then the last group simultaneously your last groups and your and last half, second part. Now we are ready to consider the proposal, although

as I said. we can do the whole thing in one go — that whilst the exchange of wounded P.O.W.S is going on, which would take 5 or 6 days I think.

C - 5 days.

B - That this time span, be the framework for the whole exchange of P.O.W.'S. Any system you want - we prefer to bring your P.O.W.'s by 6 buses from Israel to here. If you prefer any other system that is ok. with us. And during this framework of 5 or 6 days that we exchange the wounded prisoners, we bring out all the your wounded people from Suez and the exchange of all the non-wounded prisoners. So that the point you made about the problem, the difficulties of having all 8000 prisoners in one go, this is no more a difficulty and of course simultaneously with that, we start the question of the supplies to Suez and to the 3rd army, and of course we are ready to discuss with you all the details concerning these supplies right now. But I will be very glad to hear General Gonen's remarks about these proposals

A- I want to hear the rest about the 3rd army and Suez city, so that we can finish all in one package deal.

B- We are not holding back any particulars. There is a number of details that we have to discuss about the prisoners, the evacuation of the people who are not prisoners in Suez. But let us not go into it right away because then we won't be able to start.

A - The PoW's and the wounded P.O.W's will not be a problem at all.

B - [illegible]

Now we come to the question of supply. In the question of supply there are the following problems if I remember correctly. There is the problem of quantity, of nature of supply, and the problem of inspection.

A - To the city?

B - Yes. Quantity, nature and the question of inspection. Now, as far as the quantities are concerned, the quantities - General Gomez mentioned for both the city of Suez and the 3rd army amount ~~accordant~~ to 310 tons per day.

A- I want to hear the rest about the 3rd army and Suez city, so that we can finish all in one package deal.

B- We are not holding back any particulars. There is a number of details that we have to discuss about the prisoners, the evacuation of the people who are not prisoners in Suez. But let us not go into it right away because then we won't be able to start.

A - The P.O.W's and the wounded P.O.W's will not be a problem at all.

B - [illegible]

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A - To the city?

B - Yes. Quantity, nature and the question of inspection. Now, as far as the quantities are concerned, the quantities - General Gomaa mentioned for both the city of Suez and the 3rd army ~~amount~~ amount to 310 tons per day.

Correct?

A- Right.

B- Now, I know and we can have a discussion with you about the city of Suez because you said there are 20,000 people in Suez. So we can talk about 20,000 people there you said 600 tons correct? whether it is 20, we can discuss between us because you say 20,000. As far as the 3rd army is concerned, you just say 600 tons. We don't know how many people. Of course we say this is a military information how many people you have, we can make a calculation according to our estimate of what the 3rd army consists, the 3rd army element east of the Canal consists of. So we can't, because where we see the difficulty? and General I am speaking frankly as we used to do in the previous meetings. If you say there are 20,000 people in Suez and we've talked about the fact that there are very considerable military elements in Suez, and we don't know how many part of the 20,000 people in Suez are civilians and how many are military. Once a figure was mentioned, I'm not saying that you swore to it and it was a public statement, a figure of 3½ was mentioned. According to our information there are no more than 3-4000 civilian

Correct?

A - Right.

B - Now, I know and we can have a discussion with you about the city of Suez because you said there are 20,000 people in Suez. So we can talk whether 20,000 people that you said is too few correct? whether it is 20, we can discuss between us because you say 20,000. So far as the 3rd army is concerned, you just say it's too few. We don't know how many people. Of course we say this is a military information how many people you have, we can make a calculation according to our estimate of what the 3rd army consists, the 3rd army element to cross the Canal consists of. So we can't because where we see the difficulty? and Gen'l I am speaking frankly as we used to do in the previous meetings. If you say there are 20,000 people in Suez and we've talked about the fact that there are very considerable military elements in Suez, and we don't know how many part of the 20,000 people in Suez are civilians and how many are military. Once figure was mentioned, I'm not saying that you swore to it and it was a public statement, a figure of 3½ was mentioned. According to our information there are no more than 3-4000 civilian

in Suez. The rest of the 20,000 if that are 20,000 people in Suez are military people. Now if add to this X number of 3rd army people then we don't know how the whole figure works out if let us say you say 160 tons for the people in Suez, and you say 150 tons for the 3rd army that means that you have about, if I make a rough calculation, that you have about 16,000 military men in the 3rd army, you have in Suez, according to my calculation about 3 to 4, 5000 civilians, 6,000 civilians, and you have between 14-16,000 military men. Therefore, as we come to the quantities we have to figure it out in some kind of tons. We have tons in some kind of tons - I'll tell you the bare general - the figure we have come up with - you figure 310 tons yes?

A - Let's make Suez town please separate than the 3rd army -

B - Yes. You separate it general, but in reality there isn't separation. in

A - In reality there is separation

B - theoretically.

A - There is a physical separation between,

B - It can by good military people take you, be easily overcome. Now about Suez city, you

mentioned for water 68 tons per day. Now we reckon food per person, if you take 20,000 and they are all civilian, we reckon for a civilian person 1.6 kgs per day food which is the ration for pilot in all — this is what a pilot gets 1.6 kgs per day. this a fresh food 32 tons +, if we calculate 600 grms. of bread per person, it is 8 tons, so it makes all together 140 tons. You asked for a 140 tons Right let's say we can discuss it, and we promised you on the nature of supplies. The paragraph says "food, water medical supplies" we promised you newspapers and we promised you free movement of Red-Cross doctors back and forth from Suez. Because you asked me to deal only with the city of Suez.

A- You agree about a 140 tons to the ship.

B- Including water. About the water I promised you that we agree, I think I also told you general (to Silavan) after the talk with the general, I informed you about the gist of the talk. I had with the general, I informed you about Suez city and that we agreed to the newspapers and the water pipe etc.

C - No I haven't heard about it. I don't know about that.

B - I'm not sure I won't swear about it

Because I remember that after I had a talk with the general that I talked with you. What did I tell you?

C - But you didn't tell the rest of the
B - What did I tell you then?
C - You said that the was over or something like that. That complete meaning to me
B - I was sure but I won't mean it.
C - I mentioned it also to my friend here
B - I won't mean to it.
D - What did you agree?
B - We agreed that newspaper we agreed to mend the water pipe
C - This I have not heard.
B - I am not meaning
C - The newspaper I'm not so sure, but I don't remember
B - We agreed to mend the water pipe at 2 A.S and let you have enough water during the day that is equal to the amount of water that you asked for.
A - Just to see
B - to see
A - right
B - And we are ready to repair it. And if we need any information to make the repair quickly we'll ask you for it.

B- Now, so far that is easy on the city of Suez, Now I say easy- from our point of view everything is easy, but I know that upon whole on the we had a tough disagreement- We come to the question of inspection. Almost before the conclusion of the last meeting, before let us say the stormy conclusion of the last meeting General Wilson brought up a proposal. The proposal said that there'll be an unloading area inside the Egyptian lines of the city of Suez, the ~~trucks~~ trucks will remain under the supervision of the UN. The UN will inspect, once the supplies are unloaded, the UN will inspect the supplies and they will then be taken from the unloading area by the Egyptian side to wherever they are intended

C- Yes, but still under UN supervision

B- Under UN supervision, yes. Now I want to make a proposal on this, - That the base were outside of the city of Suez, I have seen, I was at the camp, near the camp you know, or there is another possibility near the place we had a misunderstanding with the Captain the morning - There are warehouses

C- Colonel

B- I beg your pardon. We record the time during this mistake. It's my fault.

B- This is a sign that promotion is due to you (o/n 3)

I'm sorry that I can't promote you, but otherwise I'll have to make up for my—

D - You can you may (illegible) (o/n 2) I must say that after the 2 or 3 days it may be possible (o/n 3) I will write it down.

B - Does anybody smoke cigar? Nobody. A. I'm the only one Nobody So to come back to the point. To have the unloading area outside the city of Suez whether near the UN camp or the other proposal, any other piece the general would agree upon and the same principle the general has put forward, but we've the presence of two liaison officers from our side who will observe the inspection by the UN. Now would you like to go with the 3rd army?

A - Yes please. The other package deal so we can finish it in 5 minutes.

B - I'll tell you I'm now a specialist in supplies. Now we come to the army. As yes we have another point— the question of drivers. We agree to, we cannot accept the Egyptian drivers, we

agree to UN drivers. If the UN doesn't have enough drivers, we'll supply drivers.
Now, about the army. (unsworn)
Now there is another point that I thought to mention in conjunction with the evacuation of deceased, perhaps I can mention it now. Why should we not use the railway the train, for the supplies for the city of Suez. We are ready to repair the railway. It's within our lines. He says it's OK. I don't know I'm not a railway ~~engineer~~ engineer, but if it's necessary to repair it, we'll repair it.
This is a point that could be considered. I am not insistent. Now we could go to the 3rd army. Perhaps we'll start with inspection because the inspection process is not like in the city of Suez. I suppose that we agree that the inspection and the procedure of unloading the supplies at the bank of Suez be continued as has been up till now.
Now about the quantities. You mentioned 150 tons general. Really we took one figure. I don't know how you made the calculation for a 150 tons. We took a figure, an estimate of the element of the Red Cross Bank not within Suez city, no

within Suez city. And we figured that food, combat rations, 25 tons, and water 75 tons which makes 100 tons. Now, General I want you to see, you always told me that we are proving you very hard.

A - Yes you are still proving us

B - Today I want us to be in a good spirit so.

A - I'm coming with the same spirit today

B - Ok, now I want to tell you what we did. Because we said how did we come to 25 tons food combat rations? Because we reckoned that per 25,000 persons.

A - 1 kg?

B - Yes. combat rations. This is a combat ration without water per person. We took 25,000. Now when we reckoned Suez city food we took 25,000.

A - 1 kg two grms.

B - I'm ready to put my whole salary it isn't much that there are not that many people 45,000 people from them 25,000 civilians in the one on the East Bank of Suez city but city so we took 25,000 people on the East Bank there [illegible]

which is a point you mentioned yesterday, last time, you said "non-military supplies." It says in the agreement. Give us a detailed list of what you have in mind so that we won't have on the basis of the equal an argument- "is this non military, is this military?" I think that I have covered all points. Except the C.P. but this we have further discuss it is anyway expedient. As I said drivers either UN or if there aren't enough UN drivers we can supply them. So, I think I have covered all points.

A- Alright. I want to say that the negotiating delegation from the first minute we've signed the agreement, we would like to implement it correctly. We are aware what's at stake. So although we have stuck in the last meeting that we'll try to do our best in the meeting to solve our problems in a practical deal as we said. According to the wounded and the P.O.W.'s.

B- Excuse me general, I forgot one point I don't want a misunderstanding later, about the evacuation of the wounded from Suez, you have 1200 about 300 severely wounded. Now about the exchange. You remember our point about not having the

that comes from your lines going into your lines. And we want a break in the transport So, here is why we proposed the truce. If you stop in the truce, we can transport the wounded easily and you can take out your wounded in two times in two days. Or perhaps in 3 days. If this is impossible, then I understand you have to bus ambulances.

A - Right.

B - That will take a much longer time. Then we would like you to bring out the wounded people, then the cars will wait at some point, esp., or wherever necessary and then you'll transport your wounded people. ~~or~~ You can also by transport to the ambulances.

A - except the seriously wounded

B - Get that from the start

A - So, the first point is the wounded P.O.W.'S and the wounded P.O.W.'S We accept the principle of having your own the list of all P.O.W.'s. We want that and we have the list here. No objection on that. We'll what if exchange from the two of -

B - agree

A - We can start it tomorrow morning And as I said before it is the responsibility of the Red Cross to make the facilities for evacuation of wounded

P.O.W's and the P.O.W's. We don't have any objection on that. According to the facilities they have as I understood from liaison officer. Where here they have two airplanes with a Red Cross marking. If they can work 24 hours, might let them work 24 hours. If they can work 1 trip, let them work 1 trip. Whatever procedure they want to do.

B – 50 days.

A – The wounded personnel were estimated to be evacuated from both sides in 6 days and 1 day reserve. And then once it start parallel to it. We don't care with the P.O.W's. They work 13 days exactly + 2 it makes 20 days to fulfil the exchange.

B Excuse me for interrupting you, Mr. General. How do you want 13 days, 20 days?

USSR – Yes sir we have the DC 6 and the DC 9, we have calculated yesterday mathematically, with Mr Boisset of the Red Cross who would be here within half an hour. The capacity of the DC 6 and DC 9 from the point of view of sitting and 4 trips day

B - You're speaking about the wounded P.O.W's? Wounded ob.

A - The other P.O.W's.

B - Non wounded

A - the non-wounded P.O.W's

B - We need B days - 2 airplanes. This has been calculated yesterday

K - That's, for the 8000 you say?

N - Yes sir. for the 8000.

A - — since we come from the last meeting they came to that conclusion, with the possibilities they have. The transportation already they have, they can do more than one trip a day; and so on, so they will finish in 13 days. they can do it and — satisfied with us.

B - with two Jumbos and you can do it in two days; no problem at all

A - Airplanes

B - Jumbo jets

A - These two airplanes are supposed to be from the Red-Cross

B - yes I understood the point

A - It doesn't make any difference it's just a few days, that they can do it quickly let them do it. So the problem set now clearly, and you are very happy now right? and we are very

B - Jim very honoured,

A - angry?

B - unhappy

A - why?

B - with you Jim never angry, Jim never angry but Jim unhappy.

A - unhappy from what? for what I said now? that is one of your problems and we will solve it and I need your help for other problems to be solved

B - we have not solved the problems

A - why?

B - If I may explain, last time when we came here we said - we can finish the pows business in one day the whole lot so you brought up the question of the wounded prisoners 5 to 6 days o.k. but we wanted the non wounded prisoners in one day in two days, in three days I come back now say o.k. you have difficulties some ~~technical~~ technical difficulties with the non wounded prisoners of war we understand so not in one day, not in two days not in three days but in six days where is the difficulty I know where the difficulty is I'll tell you frankly at the end but the difficulty you are presenting General is that the only way that non wounded prisoners can be transported is by the two Red-Cross planes why? I understand

that the wounded ones should be transport by the planes but a man who's health the trip the threat is not so difficult. O.K. so we say not one day we change the proposal we say that during the time of the six days you are getting all your wounded prisoners you are evacuating all the people in the Sinai and we don't see any reason, technical reason why the pows can not be exchanged within a matter of four days because what you are proposing is 20 days. I think General that you feel that we are very sensible about the prisoners of war and that you have you have to say donots of our intentions and therefore if you are holding the prisoners of war, dealing with the p/o.ws of for 20 days you have a pressure on us for 20 days. Now this is not a problem I want to tell you General - I really, about the spirit in which we have been dealing - So far we got the list of the 45 wounded, and this is good. We are very grateful to you for your fine gesture with Captain Avidan and we recieved 6 bodies from you but up to now we have not recieved a list of prisoners

from ~~N~~ if it is correct the list was allready in your pocket.

A - ya!

B - But it is not in my pocket so what can I do? What have we given you, what have we given you until now? a daily list of all your wounded We passed all the visits...

A - Sorry, I know everything about these P.O.W's

B - allright I leave the p.o.w.s

A - I want to be sure first that you are not unhappy with my words you are unhappy with the procedure of the ~~wrong~~ work.

B - yes

A - right?

B - yes

A - just to be sure of that, not to misunderstand each other.

B - Nothing personall!

A - Second - honestly we are trying to ~~forget~~ hire some planes from other countries to lift our people P.O.W's from Israel if we can succeed we will do it in less than 13 days. If we can do it we will be able to do it in less than that that is up to the country Switzerland so we are doing our best to try to hire

We don't want you to feel that we are pressing you with the p.o.w.s because we have allready our p.o.w.s more than you have and we need them as you need them. They are important for us as they are important for you. especially after one week or two weeks or three weeks 'maybe maximum for 20 days, right?, Then we don't have any doubt, in your intentions and I hope they are allright.

B - But if I may - General. I will only want to finish the list because somebody can ask, the General can ask what General Gamasy has been doing with General Yariv until I came into the picture so I want to tell you we arrange a ~~daily~~ list for the Red Cross of the wounded

Shaw of all the prisoners?

B - of all the prisoners. Then we transmitted the list of all the prisoners to the Red-Cross. I know there is a time delay but we gave it to the Red-Cross without any delay and ~~unfortunately~~ fortunately the time delay between Geneva and Tel-Aviv and Geneva Cairo which you can make in one day with

is ten days! But this is not our fault we-Hgiven all the lists of all the prisoners and everything. We have let through supplies to the 3rd army we have let through all together 177 lorries of supplies without the agreement there have been passed supplies, medical supplies to the city of Suez, we have made no difficulties for the visits of the Red-Cross and supply of to the third army and visit of the Red Cross to third army and we were for the exchange, a total of all the wounded prisoners including the evacuation of wounded people in Suez down the wrong thing on but I don't think this is for so to spoil settle there fore I want to come to the point of the proposals, for as we have often the last meeting proposals the six days have come down from for one day or two days cannot extend it to 10 days under no circumstances. Th if we want to proceed and

we want to proceed we want all to para B then I think General p find a way in which it is a ~~technicality~~ If its only a technicality I'm that the U.A.R excuse me the Republic of Egypt the Arab republic of excuse me is strong enough organised enough to find a Solution salvation that can evacuate prisoners from Israel to Egypt, takes one hour flight, one and hour flight within six days, on this I am afraid we can't down I don't want to do that.

A- If we succeed in keeping plane from Sinai we'll be able to do the whole thing in 13 days Mr Bernard and the company staff and the factor

B- that I know.

C- May I say something at this point? Does allow me to outline how that can be done the exchange of all can be arranged in 6-8 days. Original. Any facilities, we'll be happy to have it.

C- You agree?

B- I agree. If you make it 6, I will make it easier for me.

C - I say 6-8. So we'll make it 7.

[illegible] - Compromise (yes)

B - alright

A - Lets go to the second point.

B - By the way General, I listened on the radio, or I'm not sure, I think it was mentioned by the B.B.C. I'm not sure in some English newspaper, I'm not sure it is correct, that the royal air force says the British government has decided, is prepared to put the royal force airplanes at the disposal of the Red-Cross."

D - I never heard about that

B - I heard it on radio, I'm not sure

C - then of course will be part of consultation with the I.C.R.C. All possibilities, I don't think that it be a question of only [illegible] world is full of planes.

B - I am astonished as well especially in this area there is many tourism now. (yes)

B - I want to remind that I proposed that your planes come and first leave Antonov 12 and I.L. 14 through Aeroport planes but I [illegible] this problem. I.C.I. may take a little minute, excuse me.

C - We now consider this issue of P.O.

closed.

B- No, no we can talk further, but we can't implement before we have an answer.

C- of course. I mean the parties now completely agree on the question.

B- If everything, and the system of evacuation of the wounded is acceptable to you from Suez.

A- The system of facilities by planes from Ismail to Cairo

B No, I mean the evacuation of wounded from Cairo & Suez.

A I'm afraid I don't know exactly the steps of the train; if we can take them with the train it will be alright here and then we'll discuss the first part if by ambulance, then I propose then technique of it's acceptable for I am very happy.

A- It will be very difficult for us - we have all these ambulances in Suez - of the problem

[illegible] why you will refer?

B- But you are taking everyday

C- 200

A they need 10 buses. Each of not have these buses

B- But perhaps they have 6 ambulances that can ferry back and forth. It is only

A- I want to talk about this point not to be so — to carry ammunition and armament in such ambulances. We can put one UN observer.

B- General, you know such a lot of armies on the other side and such a city. They need many supplies.

A- A lot of supplies are needed after them (wins)

B- Yes, I forgot one point, excuse me General. That the submission of the list includes ~~them~~ immediate visit of the Red Cross to all prisoners.

A- That's automatic. The minute we get list, we let them visit.

B- There is another point, if it is acceptable to you. If we bring the prisoners (Sk ok) on the Lebanese border non-wounded prisoners, you can fetch them from Beirut.

A- By ships?

B- By ships or planes, whatever you like very short

A- We tried to do it by sea also, but they couldn't get ships available the near future.

Sk - It is very complicated with the Sea

A- We thought to get them also through Beirut.

B- I think the planes are the best

A - The quickest and best way

[illegible] - Probably the buses

B - in 10 hours.

A - We will solve that problem

(הפסקה - שיחה על פורים)

(חזרה לנושא)

B - General, I think it'll be alright with the planes. I want final, final answer.

A - alright

B - thank you very much.

A - that's about these taxes. there are 3 points quantity, nature and inspection.

B - Before I forget, if I may, because then we have a misunderstanding when we speak about the P.O.W's we include all the P.O.W's in Israel you have about 56 from 1969, 70, and we have 9 that we want also to include מוסא הרר and you have one man who is in Egypt since 1959.

[illegible] - 1953

B - Yes, who's mentally disordered. Poor guy he's [illegible]. Ran away from the mental hospital.

A - we are talking about P.O.W's, we [illegible] P.O.W's. Everybody who is considered P.O.W will have it since we started

not This war, I mean 1967 - got everybody we have. If [illegible] is considered a P.O.W. you'll have him, if he's not considered so that is another [illegible] case.

B - Then, I propose that you make [illegible] to consider him a P.O.W.

A - Sure (?) (?)

B - What can't understand, Ok?

A - Ok. We have no problem about the exchange of P.O.W's.

B - No I mean about [illegible] will it be alright?

A - [illegible] is not a P.O.W.

B - I understand General I understand, your English is very good and [illegible] But I have to give an answer [illegible] home

A - Ok. That? We have one or two persons in ~~Suez~~ Cairo as you have.

B - Give me the names

A - I'll give you the one or two names I have already in mind and then [illegible] these, and you'll take the two

B - Alright [illegible]

A - Solved all problems

B - [illegible] Because general Rivers

A - I want to be your guest in Cairo

B - I hope so

A - And you must in Israel. Of course everybody is invited. (?) [illegible]

excuse me, a very important point about the dead bodies. We would like to have 3 teams with the Red Cross we'll have with each team 3 or 4 chaplains with the Red Cross also to go over the 2nd army 3rd army, Suez.

A- Any arrangements for the dead bodies accept.

B- I am not happy about the dead but I am happy that you agree. The bodies we'll fix with the Red Cross

A- Up to them if you do it, no approach from us, nothing at all. They can do whatever they want.

B- Then there is the last point about city of Suez, we have rumours there are still a couple of wounded. I ask you personally, make a special effort.

A- I'll do by myself although ~~I~~ Bernard went to Suez and asked government - they said they have orders but they don't have POWs or wounded POWs But I'll check by myself to be sure that there are none

B- I'll tell you frankly general. There is 20 metres between your forces and our forces, and all the time they have fought to each other and they know where a couple, we don't know the

perhaps 3 or 4 or 5, we don't know exactly wounded prisoners still alive in Sweg. Please I ask you personally.

P - Personally I am responsible for her. If we have any P.O.W.s we are not interested to keep 5 or 4 or 2 and cancel all this.

R - Would you be able at the next meeting to tell me All right. Thank you. Can you give me one minute on the phone I'll hold.

(2nd) (2nd-3rd Interp)

A - (Subst) On the subject of inspection to Sweg I (Oper) think that an important point

— never take upon to the end, [illegible]
come to a conclusion we do not
— can [illegible] body to join [illegible]
L.N to do it as we see it is possible
— may I have a little word with the commandant
A - I didn't want one or two [illegible]
Then, I don't want our people
we are responsible for inspection
can be attention to [illegible] the doctor opinion
the attention — whatever you like you
have in another way.

Int - Ok.

(2nd-3rd 36 Interp and)

- Hla 3/c

B- — the water will be in the pipe

A- yes what is the conclusion now?

B- the conclusion need is that supplies in carriers or trains anyway you bring it is 30 ton + the newspapers. When we consider food 16 kg per person, we took our highest ration, which is the best ration, fresh food 1.6, 20,000 people is 32 tons + 8 ton bread, this gives us 40 tons, except the water, and the water if we take the pipe of WWS and we work it for 2 hours a day, you have water supply for 20,000 people on the norm of 5 litres per person.

A- which makes 100 tons a day. Altogether 140.

B- the is how it came to the 140. If you take 3 litres a day it is not 5?

A- We consider the civilians should be civilians.

B- I mean why we took 5 litres.

A- Civilians they should have 3 litres, and the water. I don't want to the details of that. I'm feeling you you are treating the civilians in the city strictly as they are troops.

The second point you need to know the minimum so they can buy everyday from us to send them

lorry and half a lorry and tomorrow another cor, one this tomorrow, is it can't go this way for the airbases, very difficult for them, and very difficult f

"

B- just a moment (-1430)

[illegible] - 32 tons of food and 8 of bread make altogether 40.

[illegible] If we take the two figure you mentioned the one for water 63, you remember general? and now we calculate food it makes together 40 tons, it will come to 103 only. But general you are to make it 100 tons for water, makes altogether 140. So the difference not a big one. You mentioned 16 Please tell us your calculation, we haven't heard a word; we just heard total number of 160 tons without details, without breaking the figure all or maybe it's ok. with us.

(-1720)

We made some remarks, but we haven't heard a word from you

a-m (-1730)

At least at the beginning a very cumbersome and delicate organizational task. But I have a plan which I propose now to present to the parties. That I am told a Lieutenant Colonel who is in charge of the whole area starting from here ending at the canal Bank and at city of Suez. He then will have people at the jobs. Secondly, let's not try the first two days to get the full capes, because we must see how it works. If we are with tens of trucks, it will be a bad start for the whole operation, we can make the missing formage at let's say (two days, you know) first day I propose to send half of the agreed amount and the first days experience already will enable us the next day to have full amount and then the amount can be taken the fourth day.

B - no problem. I interrupted you when you started to me about the quantity, correct?

A - Yes.

B - Would you like to come back to the

A - The quantities needed for the city to be considered as they may be

as we are giving them. We want to give them more than you said. We can't say that every man in the city should have 1.6 as a pilot, or 2 lbs as any other military man. So we put it as 5 lbs for every person to make it 160 tons, only food + 60 tons for water, make it 160. Although we said before 160 ton for supply and now is misinterpreted between the supply. When you said supply you said them ration, flour and water, exactly as pioneers.

B - And bread

A - And bread as pioneers exactly.

B - Fresh food

A - But we put here food, clothes, they need some clothes, they need some different things. That's why we don't want to say we give them 60 ton, for food but others will be needed they should have more than you said, so we propose that we still discuss the same amount that we said before and that is the minimum that we can send them. I am sorry to discuss all these matters.

B - But it's better that we discuss them.

A - I feel sorry for myself to attend such a meeting to discuss such matters. About mending the water pipe

and then I'll leave it to the UN to
it. If they don't want to give the
food or water, we accept it.
About the inspection, I don't
accept any inspection at all and I
will leave it to the UN it's their
responsibility. the agreement didn't say
a word about that, and the Iraq
is responsible for making, for any
the supplies to the civilians like by
our means and let you feel happy
we are not sending them arms
military items. - up to the UN also. They
can do whatever they like, by
means they like, they can do it
their own right. As I heard
drivers should be also from the
and they would come back to
of the 3rd army. We had experience
thousands of people on the border
we are giving them the minimum
are supposed to give them 50 kg
and we give them the 50 kg
10 days - That is 5 lorries a day
the | that it was done. The
How it was was done? Because
so many double-necks on the way
one of them is the UN drivers; the other
is the checking point. The third is
is our troops and so on. The 5 lorries

do the third army I think we can, [illegible]
can realize it is enough for only a [illegible]
battalion. So I want to make a proposal
for the drivers to be from our side
in order to facilitate the problem for
the UN. and to facilitate the problem
for ourselves and to push it, speed it
and they will not be spies because they
are going along the road itself and
there is nothing to hear them do spy
on the road. If you can accept
it will facilitate many things. I
afraid the UN will come tomorrow
and will say I don't have 100 drivers
54 for Suez town and 54 to the army
and then we'll start again giving
them 10 by 10, 20 by 20. Or another
proposal: We give the UN civilian
drivers. Send them to the UN, we pay
for them, give them their
cards and put them at the UN
we leave them with the UN
this situation is clear. It is
just to speed it up. I am afraid
stay the coming 10 days without
putting food or water. If it is
good proposal, it will be welcome
by us. So let us finish with the Suez
before I start with the 3rd army

B- How about the train?

A - I called for the train now a they said they were ready to go our wounded people. It will be alright

C - Canal if also be used for the convo

B - Yes it will be excellent. That mean that if the train is used, then it means more drivers for the trolley and there will be no problem. In point of view we'll make sure that everything that comes in, there shall be no bottle-necks and the daily supplies would go across on the same day

A - We try to use the train because it's easy for us.

C - And the same case we were talking about

A - Yes it will be easy for us. Maybe the problem of unloading. Those people coming from Suez come unload it, check it by your all means. I'm afraid that the part of the train from here to Suez is unserviceable, I'm not sure of it.

Asst - We also are in coming to this meeting

B - We'll have the engineers check it to make sure

that means if we start tomorrow, you consider it safe for the train to go to the city? We have to check it. But we can start tomorrow with the convoy for the first time.
We'll use the road with the minimum numbers we need for both, the city and the 3rd army, until we have it clear saying that it is alright we'll start eh
Okay I say again now, General Cosmas mentioned many bottle-necks on this convoy to the 3rd army. I must say, on the reports I've not been myself on that spot, but the reports I had are that the worst bottle-neck is the carrying the cargo to the other side. The two things - the unloading of the trucks on the bank, and the carrying of the cargo to the eastern side.
We have agreed to 100 people unloading - what about the ferrying
We've agreed to 10 vehicles.
10 amphibians vehicles
For the 3rd army, it will be good for us if you make it 2 points instead of 1 point, unloading points, 2 unloading points instead of 1 point.

B - Yes I must check. I am not saying "No" but I must check. Where do you want the 2nd point, General?

A - Km 154, 153, 151, on the Canal zone.

B - Alright, I'll check it and I'll give you an answer.

Chm - It is an effective proposal to facilitate also our task.

A - 154 or 151 km.

B - Now - how many vehicles do you want there?

A - The same arrangement.

B - 10 vehicles and 100 men to amphibious vehicles and 100 men, that is, 10 per vehicle.

A - I thought the men only for unloading because it is very difficult for us because we don't have mechanical equipment.

B - I'll give you an answer on that.

A - If they have a ferry, they will use it as they are using now in the.

B - At 138.5 km.?

A - They are using 1 ferry and 5 vehicles. They can do the same thing on the other point. Another point there will be 2 points - one for us and easy for the UN.

B - Is it possible to find a point closer to 138.5? It will be easier for us.

A- No, it will be very crowded on the
B- I'll check it and give you an answer.

Op. kilo

A- I knew the op bilo — it must be a bad place

B- I haven't been there myself but it is possible. I'll check it and give you an answer. On drivers - I've not forgotten the quantities, we'll come back to the quantities to be clear on the 3rd army. We want to insist on all drivers, if it is necessary we can supply drivers, but if you have the trains there will be no problem. Volens

A - To the third army?

B - No, to the town of Sucy. Then there are enough drivers for the 3rd army supply

A- We can do the same thing - the trains get all the supply to Sucy and then to be loaded on Sucy to the 3rd army, that's another variable. We'll use the trains

B - This is possible. Does that make it easier for you

A - But now we'll work on our system mode, not to complicate anything for

B - Yes exactly

A - We'll work with the lorries until we settle the trains. They'll give us on the H plan. If not we'll continue with the lorries.

B - On the inspection, the unloading area ... the city of Suez has been agreed upo... Please show it to me. General, ... is ...

G - That's opposite the railway station.

C - The area between the lines, near the Israeli positions here and Egyptian pos... in this side. I don't care who is contro... the area.

A - That means it's in the Israeli side, rig... I agree. I don't want it in our sid... that's all.

C - As the Colonel said it's rather difficu... to organize on your side.

A - That's very good.

B - I understand that you will have a co... there with the UN.

A - They are in the area already.

B - I understood it before. On the contrary, ... wanted to make clear to the General so th... there shall be no misunderstanding.

A - On this subject I have no comments ... all. That's up to the UN to do what ... they want.

B - Now the question of supplies, ... quantities. We need 100 tons, diffe... supplies, not food. They need cl... we may send to manufacture clo... for them. They need blankets, ... mean supplies like different sup...

when we say supply for troops are give them only food - supplies of different things - they need matches, they called me yesterday to send matches.

B - Generally matches don't shoot general.
A - (and clothes don't shoot.
B - I want to ask how many clothes, everyday, what kind of supplies
SK - It is a one time load.
B - You know General I'm not trying to be - - : we were tough and hard on one thing, the inspection of bottle water all that, but about the supplies I want to be helpful (please amplify)
A - As any other persons in the world, how they like I will leave it to the UN.
B - General what I wanted to say, if I am a stickler I'll street out the agreement. It says "food, water, medical supplies," in the agreement. Now we don't want to be like that what other things you have in mind I am asking you.
A - Civilians have so many different things. How can I make a list for people to live. I live with coca-cola, another person live with water. I live with 1.5 kgs a day, I myself live with 1 kg a day.

B - I also

A - He wants chocolate, the other person wants bread only bread so on so on all what they need, they have got and that's why it was stated agreed that supplies for them it says supplies. That they civil supplies and not food only. They have contact what do you mean by that.

B - Washington

Hanan - He's in Tokyo now Kissinger

Hare - Daily supply food

B - Now general you know the diferents between man and Diplomatic people. But seriously the of Suez will recieve daily supply of food, water medicin For example it doesn't say anything about clothing it doesn't say anything about furniture know anything but if you are talking about vehicles of food and in a certain tonage, if I want only understand, then is this what you have in mind for example does it say anything about clothing

A - But they didn't say anything about cigarets. The cigarets do you send them or not?

B - this is what I wanted to understand, I think but I want to understand because I want to go to the telephone that a clear O.K. that we don't a misunderstanding. next day any troubles.

A - just make it like this the non military supply up to the U.N. to decide if they find that the military nature they can send it back to Cairo.

B - only military is the Prunen chorlete let me please check it now, I understand

your point, now the quntities, what is your po
on the quantety.

A- 100 Tons supplies, 60 Tons water and when w
say supplies, will be 30 Tons of them grocery
of them maybe one day all of them flour, third
maybe different items will be. green vegetables, that
they live. It's very difficult to make it everyday the
prosidger with the same quantety with the same lev

C- can we say here, when you contact with the pol
of cause your inda inspertion is not just you know so
thing not yet it also has must have certen
and d can say that the U.N when the cat
is concerend will be responsible of the non militery nature
the supplies.

B- But for example that will includ that we prefer
it will be big

pit ex. I know this from Cypres. from the expirience.
There will be problems of somebody may think that
kind of item can't be used, we have the diferency in
Cypres the problem of tiers and bricks you know. They
militery of course became they have been
It was not used by refrences by cars but on they
them for militery positions but d think that this should
left to an inparcail.

B- I understand you. General Gansi, to understa
d'm not arguing, you are arking for 100 tons of
excluding water

A- excluding water

B and our calculaiton was 40 Tons so you are
ex actally 2.5 times as much

A- there is another point please you conceded the city as a military nature they need fuel for t electricity stations, for the cars and so on.

B- what amount? give me a quantity then able to

A- They didn't say any quantity for any

B- But in the agreement it didn't mention fuel I'm not saying no, I'm saying there is a di you must give me what do you have in mind

A- I don't know we should get contact with the government to say, we can leave it to the U N decide to the goverment what ever by the to see there needs, they need 1 long they can't not. when I say fuel it doesn't make any oz, they are so many different fuels they need. tommorow they'll need greese or maybe oil as any in the world.

B- The big problem is

A- I know it is a big problem

B I'll tell you the big problem. The big problem that in Sweg you have only a small number of civilians and have a large number of military

A- can we General do it for instance decide it time can we decide it as we at said to convoied at the begining the most nessary the go food, water and medicine etc. and other th have mentioned before that, the seven topics you speaking of in the begining to start like this, a then we may insure about the clothes there is not b be any problem, we agreed the clothes to the

army, its only logical that they should have
and then with time they could

A- you are all these questions because
be raise in future but in fact we will never send
clothes while they need food, we will never se
them News papers while they need food they will ne
Send them anything when they that's all
sure they will be complications in fact there small
complications will

B- not about matches, not about cigarets not about
needs the only problem that one can is about
wether it's not tank feul or all these sorts of thi

C- dont mix things.

C- everybody in with in 6-8 days and don't make
escals.

A- That is a very small point we have
casualties in Kabrik area they should be taken b
helicopters on your side you want them to be taken to
I am making a proposal. The helicopters from your si
take them, bring them here, will take them from here

B- Thats O.K. where do you want us to push them

A- From Kabrik area. Thats is

B- near the lines, with the red cross.

A- By helicopters.

B- Now it is agreed that the whole prisoner bus
is in 6 days.

C- Thats been agreed.

B- Now I'll have an answer 15 minutes.

C- I think that it will be closer to 6 than to 8 d

B- O.K. I trust you on that. asum from a moment

that you will work out the supply busines, assu
a moment that you work it out, how do you propose
start the ball rolling.

A- From Tommorow morning at 8 o'clock it is recomended to
start that.

C- Colonel Bidasani please come now to listen.

B- yes please General.

A- To start at 8 o'clock in the morning tommorow,
one is from Cairo to Israel, and one from Israel to Cairo
that's we call them prisoners of war, order not to
mistake. That is the first thing if it is
it is upo the air port. The second thing is the U N
check points will be as I understand will be establish
at that time the minimum to the Suez ca
will be tommorow. if you can do it 20-25 it's u
to you. but we feel:

B- 25 Tons?

A- Now 25 lorries we feel that it is acceptable for us
importance, if you want less you can do it tommorow
or duy after tommorow 2 or 3 days order to organize
it.

B- what kind of lorries?

A- 3 Tons lorry. if there are more than 3 tons lorry but
we'll try to make them 3 Tons lorry

B- and the list

A- we will send in there lorries the needed things
only, I mean food, supplies different kinds of food
1 medicine and that's all.

C- when will we start?

A- I recomend if it starts here at 8 o'clock upo to
you. if it is not convinient we make it

A- But there will be admiral need of drivers to

A- another at 10 o'clock or at the same t either we in order not to make it difficult we m make one at 8 o'clock and the other one may b 9 o'clock.

B- let's say a little later

A- well make them 25 lorries at the same po with the supplies as usual.

B- and when do we have the list?

A- now.

B- O.K. so first the good, so the only thing is n last telephone.

A- I think that's the last telephone will be good

B- I hope so too.

A- I want to express my feelings about, we want feel that our people in the town are not confined prisoners. they are treated as human-beings but we alright with the 3rd army if it suffers it's goo us, we don't care too much with the 3rd army, care with the civilians in the Suez City. so plea don't make any complications for the people there, them feel that they are civilians in there self all.

B- General, I've got your point.

A- and in case the answer will be no, either y leave it the U.N. or to fix it and if he goes government, however, I don't know what population exactly, that's what he said and what he gave to Mr. Waizer if the General goes to the gover there and says there are only 10 thousand

don't care. let them make it 50 thousand
5000 we are not speaking here about sending
3rd army ... three the tons.

B - No, I to the 3rd army, to the people in the
Suez not to the soldiers.

A - exactly as the 3rd army

B - we are all the three of us military men

(15.05.67)

B - I understand it will be less because
if there will be any special problem you will warn
before later we will discuss it.

A - we are not wasting any time now

(15.05.67)

A - It's a master piece of ambiguity

B - this is his craft.

(15.05.67)

B - I think the

C - just on the east bank of the lake or
the lake itself

A - They were stoped yesterday by 2 Israeli
we still want to apply them as we apply
the forces on the eastern bank. The
is for the consoles there, on the eastern bank
will have a to send there food, we
want to get stoped by your forces, orderly
and the same thing.

B - Or this I don't know anything, I have
unfortunately now authority to discuss this

A - consider the part of the bridge,
there are stations there under there control

they have two means of supplying

B - I understand that, but I have now authority to discuss it perhaps you appreciate that I have no authority to discuss it I am

A - and they the result of that.

B - we have a problem.

A - That's up to you to solve it.

B - does can solve it now.

A - I can't solve it by fair.

B - That will be a party general.

A - That's what I'm talking, we are station for a long time, you know that there is no to give them the supply.

B - But unfortunally I can't, I have no author discuss it.

A - what can we do now?

B - I myself that will discuss it again, I'll again general, I can't promise you any can promise you one thing that I'll have the when I'll get back.

A - There is now

B - I really don't know the answer.

A - if they don't have food, we should send food.

B - I understand very clearly what you say I can't give you an answer. I have now

So How do we finish the supplies together 250 altogether including water as the ge said.

A - yes to the city

B- anything else?

C- could "I" make some type now? I

agreement was reached today on following point

(1) Egypt will hand the list of all Israel prisoners of war today now taking place

(2) Exchange of all prisoners of war will begin tommorow at 8.00 am exchange to be completed within 6-8 days

I have Mr. Borsard assure that this will be done. this will include evacuation of all wound in Suez city and 10 wounded in Kabrid;

(3) convoy to Suez city will be U.N. responsible and a U.N unloading are will be established the railway station. lorry convoy will be used entirely but lorry convoy will be used until rail way maybe used later. Some special arrangements will be worked out with Israel delegation to meet there wishes.

B- I understand you mean the two

C- yes, I don't want to mention any details.

(4) 3rd army will be supplied, there will 250 Tons for Suez and 3rd army

B- including water.

C- including water after this package deal has been agreed upon I expect Israel to redraw the check points under Garo - Suez U.N. will remain at there check points which were established yesterday and probably I almost its wise to establish a 3rd one to control the movement in the railway station

and I also would expect that there would be
forces will not inspect movement of
military supplies to the east bank, nor to the city
Suez. I think that I now can congratulate both
the parties for a very sincere effort which in a
short time has ended in an agreement on 4 point
of the agreement and this of course, I'm sure will
very much facilitate further discussions on the most
difficult point - peace. That is all I can say
today - thanks you very much our next meeting

A - Sorry were we going to start tommorow at 8 o'clock

C - Yes.

A - That the first convoy and the second convoy
at 10 o'clock. P.M. and the figures you gave to us
now correct? 20-25 trucks for each

A - That's for tommorow and the day after tommorow

A - what about press now?

B - The general has any remarks

A - I don't have any remarks except
reaching these good results, and compliments
convinced that the Israeli delegation will clear
any to be done in future

B - Before I say more remarks for
conference may I only very quickly five points
make sure on the question of Bir Gafgafa Mizraki
you will give us one or two names so that we
conclude this, do I understand correctly ge

A - The inspection thing dont

B - and we will arrange between us. if you

have the names the sooner the better, or
dead bodies, we can provide them the wed
and it will be very grateful to you if you will
something on the any wounded prisoners
in the Suez, and I want to tell you general th
you have difficulties with the seriously wounded
in the city of Suez and the train doesn't work
for the seriously wounded we are ready to a
an with ambulances only on one condi
that together with the U.N. we check the am
this is for the seriously wounded, because
there are 300 seriously wounded, and for the
wounded either they go by train or we have
with the convoy but for the seriously wound
if you want to have the ambulances in
city for you and put them so they don
have to been moved twice o.k. with us
A- O.K. Thank you very much. That's up to th
seriously wounded in Suez general you w
that for the seriously wounded to take our a
inside the city to evacuate them
B- Because otherwise there is double han
for the lighter wounded it is not so imp
but we are ready we only want to make s
with your promition to check the ambulanc
they go into the city
A- So then they will be driven by the U.N.
ones
B- By the U.N.
A- The red Cross
B- The red Cross drivers

15.11.73

A - Gamasi
B - Yariv
C - Silaswo
D - (Colonel Audi)

15/11/73

C. Well, I open this informal meeting, and I wonder if we could start with the problems of the paragraph B, and please get some framework for the next sign post.

B. Before that we have a few questions about the list of the prisoners. We had a little bit of troubles translating, but that can happen, and we haven't finished yet, general Eyal didn't come with me because they are sitting on the list. So there might be a question about numbers or names, but we have a question for example: There are some omissions - you remember we talked about the Fantom pilot? Last week, November 4th, a Fantom was shot down.

A. His name was listed in the last list by Ind and all the rest of the names were by type writer.

B. Yes?

A. Yes, the last name -

B. Perhaps it is on the list so, not on the booklet.

A. No, because the booklet was mine, but the official list was given to general Eyal, and the last name by Ind written on the 4th November.

B. Another thing is a pilot who was on television and his name is not in the list, but I don't know his name, I'll get to phone call I'll tell you, and there is another

$1 per N.

one or two or three cases, I'll get them on phone soon from airforce chief and I'll tell you. another question I wanted to ask you is about the low Mizraki and the people you want-

A. We'll talk along on that subject.

B- alright now we can talk about

A - I'll list, some very small points but we'll not discuss them until I have a reply, in order to start our work. First Number 1 I asked to make another unloading point

B - yes, I have not forgotten, I'll have an answer by tommorow

A - The second thing, we need three lorries, three Tons, that's about 9 or 10 Tons a day, fuel for the city for the trucks which will come from the city to collect the supply back again

B - just a moment, how many, yes

A - 3 lorries is 9 Tons

B - 9 Tons?

A - They said 10 Tons will make 3 lorries that's 9 Tons

B - 9 tons, of what is it ~~dooooogs~~ gasalin?

A - gasalin gas, we call it fuel

B - Benzin

A - Benzin, greese, gas

B - everyday 9 Tons?

A - yes

B - For the lorries that come to take the

A - For the lorries and the machines there and the situation the ~~bomps~~ pumps they are using, electricity stations and so on. That's what they asked for, and then to make it clear we'll leave it to the U.N. or to the Red Cross, what ever you like, to see if what exactly they need and they ~~lift~~ list it and then

B - On the fuel?

A - On the fuel, needed for the cars taking their

supply and for the electricity pumps, and so on.

C- This is a question now the the fuel for the lorries which will pick up the supplies for.

B- This is not a big problem, not a big amount.

A- yes not a big amount.

C- and new generators

A- There are all different refs of the city, we made mean here fuel, means gasalin, gas, Butan gas, grease

C- maybe you'll first get an answer in principle then we can talk about modalities.

A- Good, and then if you see it is an excess you can reduce it, just to get contact with the governer or any authority there

B- I'll have an answer either today, by cable to you or tommorow I'll let you know as soon as possible.

C- By the way, I'll be in Jerusalem tonight

B- So we can contact you

C- In Goverment House and leave only tommorow afternoon.

B- yes, you told me on Friday your in

C- yes, so I can be contacted in the Goverment House I go to see Dr. Bowyer

B- Is he coming already?

C- He is there

B- O.K.

A- The 3rd point is also fuel for the convoy going to the 3rd army. We had that acceptance before and we used to push some of this fuel for the amphibious cars.

B- We agreed to fuel for the amphibious vehicles

A- Yes.

B- we agreed on that in the past.

A- But they didn't allow them during the last 6 or 7 days. Just as principle you accept that, and they keep the fuel on our side, on the western side here, to be sure that it will not go to the third army, just to be sure so there is no objection for that.

B- No, there is no objection on principle, what is the technical arrangement we only, what is the technical we have to find out.

C- They come, fill up and then they go. it's not safety but it's

A- fuel for the city and the second point fuel for the city. third point fuel for the amphibious cars.

B- amphibious cars is o.k. we'll only assure that it works.

A- alright thank you very much. Number 4, mending the pipe line - when you are ready just let us report before.

B- yes, we'll be able to tell you tommorow what the time-table is. we told already yesterday the Chief of Staff already gave directions to the command to start working on it. we'll give you more clear better answer tommorow.

C- I'm not sure about whether the working is going to be by Egyptain personal or by.

B- On the time being we have taking it on ourselves.

A- I will list all the points and then will leave them till tommorow, all of them, and then mending sweet canal. for the benefit of the inhabitants.

B- yes, on this we can give you an answer general. I have talked to the Chief of Staff and the minister about it. the minister suggested that first of all suggested

we have a Red Cross visit to the people there and then we see what to do after it.

A- alright we agree

B- because you have talked to me about it the day before yesterday, I have not forgotten.

Col G- The Red Cross was ready notified they can go and visit

A- at least till Mr. Boisard can go and visit the inhabitants in this area from Suez till Ismaelia area to the west to be sure they have there water there, medical care, especially we are interested in the sweet canal, and they accepted ~~excepted~~ that.

D- Yaniv, is it that you wait for the ICRC report before you

B- yes, we want first of all a visit

A- The other point, please be sure that the list of all on prisoners of war to be handed during the coming ~~few~~ days, because still we have

B- these are still in the Red Cross, so will hand it

A- Some of their are still in Geneve, so let's have

B- [illegible]

A- well, hand it directly, yes you are right

A- we are intending to use the railway for evacuation of our wounded from as we used as you said yesterday and also for supply to make it more easy for us and for the U.N. and for you.

B- O.K.

A- I think he told me yesterday that it is good or one ..... just to make sure of that

B- yes, but we are not engineers. we have efficient officers - so I asked the Chief of staff yesterday. He has already given orders to check the line, or one mile

to be sure whether it is workable or not, and today when I'll get back I'll check all this and tomorrow I'll be able to tell you where it stands with the other questi

A- alright, if we don't have any meeting tomorrow for any reason, I don't know, please, just send us a cable so we can use the Railway for the evacuation of the wounded

B- O.K.

D- general I understood that case there is

B- yes

A- and the last point, Kabrid ont again

B- difficult problems, general

A- yes, I know but we'll have to solve it we have so many difficult problems

B- let us think about it we are going to meet tomorrow Let us think about it some more

A- I want to say that it is still a part of the Eastern bank, a part of bridge there, so it should be supplied as the other troops although it is seperated in this area.

B- isolated

A- isolated, but we can give it food through the lake, but you stopped the boats.

B- It's time I asked yesterday it's time we stopped them.

A- yes and also by land. Because there are some positions there. They can fire on each other. If the supply will go, our troops will fire to collect it, so there will be clashes on a small point. We don't want to make any clashes from such a case. Just think it over please. Because it is insistent for us.

B- I will explain it to them.

A. O.K.

B. With your permission general, you have anything on the wounded people we have according to information in the city of Suez?

A. No, not yet. But I called to the governor, but he didn't send me an answer.

B. I will be very grateful to you if -

A. I will make sure of that.

C. I have a practical problem. This area here where the convoys assemble should be better organized and I think we need some bulldozers there and I wonder if for instance the Egyptians could provide one bulldozer or two. I have to talk with my contingent commander, how he wants to arrange this area, its not good that they wait on the road you know, it stops across the traffic. Then I would like to put on record that the U.N. check point here stops any other traffic than the U.N and the convoys. Agreed?

B Agreed.

A. Agreed.

C. But I wanted to put it on record.

A. You said so. But as far as we are concerned we'd like to make it 3.

C. Maybe one day. Until some arrangements will be made.

A. It will be most sensible to for both people, like newspaper men and this and that.

B. Would you like to start or would you like us to start?

A. I want you to start.

B. Alright, you are always general.

A. You are senior to me.

B. I am a reserve officer!

B. So as you say, general, would you like to put forward any point before we start?

C. No, I have not.

B. Alright, we thought that at this meeting we should put forward general principles, round which we could start a discussion because I'm afraid, I think that if we start right away with ~~principles~~ lines on the map we get stuck.

C. I only thought when I drove here that we could first forget about lines.

B. That will take some time. This is one of the points. That's a difficult problem, so I'll take a cigarette with your permission. You don't smoke any of these?

A. No, thank you.

B. What brand do you smoke general?

A - Cleopatra

Hol' - Is it Virginia brand or oriental brand?

B - It's like Kent

D - General, can I ask you for a personal favour?

B - yes please

D - Can we have a copy for the record of our meeting

B - Yes All the meetings

D - Because I have a very bad memory

Hol' - All the records, you know it's like this

B - No problem

Hol' -

B - She colonel said it's not well printed I said what do have we'll give you

C - May I say one thing, we keep also record and we send it to the secretary general

Hol' - I'll tell you the only problem is I read the copies that they gave me photo-copies and it was very difficult to read them because it was written in hand writing

Hol' - Almost like the tapes of Watergate

Hol' -

Bro

Hol' - I just want to warn you they have been trying to make me say that the Israelis stopped them from me going through I denied it, you'll never find / I just want to warn you

McN - They say all kinds of things anyway.
Nek - they wanted to try to make that implication several times. I said No, no, no, no.
B - alright.
Hol - If they can arrange for us to go to Cairo then
Clear this problem about the tape.
Hol - You mean a copy of the tape?
D - transcript, anything.
Hol - Not this is the problem. The cassettes, you know have been erased. We use the same, but the secretary is doing the transcript.
B - We wants a written record Ok?
D - If it is available
B - I think yes. Now we thought about a number of principles Before we start mutual discussion, and perhaps I'll touch on each principle, as a preliminary talk to what we are going to discuss later. First of all I think that you understand that we have no interest in delaying the discussion about the disengagement. We have no interest to delay, because we understand, I think it's a mutual understanding that if we want to move to peace, we have to solve as quickly as possible the present situation, which is full of friction points.
A - Right.
B - Now we think, that for each side the disengagement should be such that both sides, after the disengagement be in a position that cannot be considered as defeated. You understand what I mean?

A- Yes

B- And that the lines of disengagement should actually portray the reality as it is now, translated into lines of disengagement and that there should be a balance of the picture, the picture should be balanced, the lines of disengagement should portray a balanced picture so that each side will not have misgivings about entering into negotiation. Because the disengagement is only first step to the negotiations and because if there is a balance, if there is an imbalance if there is no balance in the position of both sides, then there is no stimulus, nothing to motivate the readiness to enter negotiations. Because we start then from a position that each side is thinking "ah, I have by negotiation to gain something, or I have something to lose from negotiations, therefore, I'll do everything to manoeuvre things so that I don't go into negotiations and I'll do things to obstruct negotiations." A

Another point I think I mentioned it once but it perhaps it was lost in minor details to discuss that perhaps I didn't get it clearly enough. We are two sides here, that have been in conflict for over 25 years. A hard conflict, very tough and bitter conflict. Now it is very difficult to pass from a situation of such

a conflict quickly immediately to an atmosphere of complete, total mutual confidence and trust. It takes time. You have doubts and suspicions about us. We have doubts and suspicions about you. Very natural. We are only human beings. Once we had a ~~promise~~ proverb from Mr. Eshkol, he used to say "a man is only a human being and sometimes not even that." So, we are only human beings. Therefore, we think that it is difficult to advance rapidly from the situation we are in to a total idyllic situation. It is natural, therefore, for each side to look for physical guarantees on the ground that will compensate and neutralize the mutual doubts and suspicions.

Point 4 is that we see the situation of disengagement as a temporary situation and not as something that this is it. Something from which we shall pass over to the final settlement as it will be agreed upon at the end of the peace negotiations. And, therefore, we think because it is a temporary situation, in the configuration of the lines of disengagement we should take care that for both sides there is no lure, no incentive, not date that can encourage one of the sides or both sides to take military initiative to gain an advantage.

A - to start another war or another conflict.

B - Now point 5: We think that an effort should be made, again always by both sides, to look for ways and methods in determining the lines of disengagement that will encourage along the lines and between the lines, will encourage a return to normal civilian life and will encourage the taking up of fruitful economic activity, so that this will serve as a ~~prod~~ step in the progress towards peace on the one side, and will discourage military activity on the other side.

Point 6: In determining the lines, the lines of disengagement — we are only talking about the first step now. In determining the lines of disengagement we think it is important to take into account the existing military installations. Because, if this is not taken into consideration this will mean that new military installations will have to be established, which will then constitute a new vested military interest that will make further withdrawal and disengagement more difficult.

A - We want to understand one point.

B - Please.

A - What do you mean by military installations?

B - Camps, headquarters, roads, things

like that.

A- That means that if you move to any line you want to put that into consideration, and a other part under the control of the Egyptian troops, or the UN means?

B- No, no. For example, what I means is, let us say we have a discussion, and I am sure we'll have a discussion about the lines. You have told me 30 kms, and we'll have a very tough discussion, but this is not the matter for the moment. Let us say that today there is an installation here, installation here and here, so we think it is good to take this into account instead of saying "no you move here, where there are no installations, let us say we'll have to put up new installations.

A- I got the idea now.

B- I am frank. What is the meaning of it? It can mean that in the first stage the withdrawal might be less. But then it could be more on the second stage. Whereas if we determine another line and we make new installations, then we perhaps in the first phase go to more, but then we say in the second phase we say "wait a minute we put up money to put new installations." This is the thing.

A- I got it now.

B- Now there is a question of, how should I put it, of demonstrative

military presence. We think that for the disengagement it is good that the demonstrative portrayed military presence be low profile and not pronounced in order to prevent another outbreak of hostilities and in order to avoid the continuation of the mutual distrust, mutual suspicions, as far as each side's intentions to the other side are concerned. And we think, on the other hand, that there should be made an effort to give pronounced expression to the political and civilian sovereignty of the sides on the ground. Did you get my point?

A- Not yet. You are using a very Oxford English.

B- Thank you for the complement, but I'll say it this way. We think it is better not from the point of view of immediate gain - this is not the problem, because it is a temporary situation anyway. It is better for the disengagement not to put the emphasis on military presence, but to compensate for lack of emphasis on military presence by giving expression to political sovereignty of the ground concerned, on which we think there should not be pronounced military presence. Is that clear?

C- Maybe you should give an example.

B- I'll give you an example.

The drawing you made, you remember, the two bridge-heads. So, for example if instead of having two divisions there in the bridge heads, three divisions, 44 tanks and everything, an army, there are no forces or only symbolic forces, but on the other hand, there is your administration there and you are around this area. That is to say the political sovereignty of Egypt is demonstrated on the ground. This compensates on one hand for the lack of military demonstration, but on the other hand,

May I with your permission, General Eyal is on the phone, so I'll also tell him about the list.

P- And I want to tell you one thing - none is missing from our lists. none

A- He is telling me no. That there are some parts in the railway line, that are not in order. Between Lod to Suez. The information coming from the Finland battalion commander.

Rabin - Alright. Is it a major obstacle, or is it a small one?

A- It is a small one, but it's a big one for the train to go, so we'll start using the railway until

Rabin - I know that last people there were given orders to our railway people to come down and check the line. I don't know whether they are already on the ground, but they discussed the problem last night

A - As we said, at any rate we'll wait until you have confirmation.

[illegible] - If you check up here, we'll get the information from the Finnish commander. We'll see what can be done, if it's a major obstacle.

[illegible] - I think that the best thing to say is that the interests of the international press are covered by their colleagues from the Israeli side.

[illegible] - Well, I get the idea. You can say what I can say.

[illegible] - Now, as we agreed that we don't give them announcements, that they are not approaching us, so I am asking your good offices — I'd like you to say it the way I phrase it. That the Israeli delegation said that the interests of the international press

[illegible] - I'll get it (repeats) "the interests of the international press is covered in the Israeli part by their colleagues stationed in Israel." I will say only this.

B - The two sides should look for means of direct co-operation in the supervision, mutual co-operation in the supervision of the various arrangements and in the maintenance of the cease-fire. [illegible] This is no reflection on the UN or anybody else who will be. If we continue to rely in our contacts only on the Buffer

factor will maintain the situation. This means that we continue the situation of no direct contact - we thereby reinforce the mutual suspicions and the mutual distrust instead of doing with it away gradually. Therefore, we think we should look for some such techniques that will enable us at the same time to have the Buffer, but at the same time to do things co-operately, mutually. For example, permanent meetings, for example, contact, according to a certain method, mutually agreed upon between local commanders. Because General Carmay and myself meet together with General Silesvan, but the captain - can, you know, fire and until this comes back, we have to wait for the next meeting.

After mutual agreement on the system, if it is on the front level, if it is on the Army level, if it is at the divisional level or brigade level. This can be also decided upon gradually - you can start on a higher level and after some time, if it works well, go lower down.

Like - In fact this is one of the functions of UNEF to bring the two sides together on local problems - this has happened in many cases.

B - You had it in Gaza like in 1950. Like - We have done it now and then bringing the two sides

B- We are not against it. Don't misunderstand me, doctor, we are not against UNEF. We say in addition to it. For example - direct line. I don't know if in ... we had direct line, but in Jerusalem, we had direct line with the Jordanians and it stopped a lot of trouble. So, mutual, combined patrols.

Bleck - Combined patrols?

B. B- Yes.

Bleck - I want this point clarified. First of all I said Unef manning means that the commander of the Unef contiger or whatever it is can bring the two sides together for a meeting to clarify matters. For this joined patrol how do you see in UN patrol?

B - It can be together with the UN. In principle there is no question of ... technically it is definitely possible. So, I brought up only the principle. I didn't go into details and we thought that for this first informal talk that the three of us have together it will be better if we take out some post. Because each of these principles leaves in application in reality you can find 5, 6 sometimes 10 different ways to apply the principle. And we have not yet discussed the whole matter at home fully. We started it of course, but we did not discuss it yet fully. So we thought that

if at this time ask each other questions to clarify today - not to start discussion
If you want to start discussion OK, but I thought to clarify, so each of us can go back home, think again and come back better prepared tomorrow to continue the discussion.

Elk - Are you running 8 principles or 6 principle? 8?

Shavit - 10 (plus)

Elkana - I want to get to "military presence should be low profile" that's 7.

B - "should not be pronounced inorder to prevent, on one hand to prevent outbreak of hostilities, on the other hand, inorder to minimize mutual distrust, as far as intentions are concerned. On the other hand ~~the expression~~ should be given to political sovereignty by civilian activities, which will also promote understanding towards a final settlement.

Elkana - The last one joined patrols.

B - As an example.

Shavit - This is an example, not a principle the principle was that the UN, I mean the Buffer forces, we don't say UN, should avoid clashes between the parties but should not serve as an obstacle to mutual contact. And the mutual patrols was only an example.

although

C - It's a good idea, yes. We don't want to be an obstacle.

Hadi - So there are the principle of peace-making. 10 principles.

A - I am the only obstacle now, at the lack of my understanding.

B - Ok. Take each principle, alright.

Hadi - We are having are having a mutual seminar.

B - Please.

A - About the quick disengagement of the disengagement — i must be eh so quick. Because there are suspicions between both of us, — that's number 4, or something like that.

B - I'll explain it. I know which point you mean. What we say is, the point was not that the disengagement should not be quick. After 25 years, it is difficult to pass from a 25 year conflict, tough conflict, tough fighting, tough war, to pass immediately to complete understanding immediate total settlement. But the question is not the settlement. The question is that because of the protracted, the long conflict there are mutual suspicions and doubts. And it will take a long time for the doubts and suspicions to disappear. For example: if I say something, no, let us say differently — if the general says something, I think "what does he mean?" If I say something, the general and the colonel I am sure think "what does he mean?" So this is perfectly understandable. It takes a long time to disappear. Therefore, it is legitimate, we think for each side,

I'm only talking now about disengagement & when the disengagement system is setup, to look for such guarantees that will compensate for his doubts and mistrusts. This does not say that the disengagement is long. This is only a psychological problem. Not the physical problem on the ground. Therefore, we think that each side in the apresion of disengagement on the ground, each side should have enough physical guarantees on the ground that will make up for his doubts. For example

A - I got it now

[illegible] - Confidence building measures.

A - Exactly, very good definition (יפה) Fig. Flo

(B - I don't know which was the better seminar. [illegible] -1973)

A - I wanted to clarify some questions. From our point of view, disengagement means the return of the Israeli troops to a line in Sinai.

B - Yes.

A - Which means separation of troops by the UN. Is there any difference on that?

B - We will have a discussion, tough discussion, which line.

A - I meen disengagement like this eh.

B - What you meant to say, if I may, General - If we speak about disengagement, we don't speak about disengagement here.

A- I wanted to be sure of that
B- You can be sure of it. We will have a very strong argument about which line, where you are, where you are
A- I am sure of that. We had 8 meeting to solve — problems (1973) we would like to enlist — I agree on most principles which you mentioned. I want to put another one that the Buffer state,
B- The Buffer force
A- The Buffer Zone with the UN force operate, should be wide enough to ensure that no clashes can take place between both sides
B- Alright. I have seen during the last war what the importance of even 3-4 kms along the Suez canal is when I said your bridges.
A- We would like also to put it on principle as our opening phase all the disengagement, to reach disengagement states, Israeli troops should return to 22nd October positions according to Security council resolution 339. We consider it very important for both sides to give a good sign for both sides that we are stepping forward to peace specially when we start the conference, the coming conference, there will be no conflict between each other anyway; so we can start the negotiation in a better step.

B- The point I don't [illegible] we agree, it is fully understood.
[illegible] I have table agreed upon by both sides should be put for implementation of separation and disengagement of troops.
[illegible] about that
[illegible] all. If you want to discuss anything
Fuad: If it is agreeable to you, what that we take a look at question of the principles noted your principles [illegible] our principles. [illegible] that we have the points understand the points you made. And we'll take [illegible] at home and [illegible] tomorrow. How
If I may [illegible] the question we have [illegible] there is a private meeting [illegible] two tommorrow.
Where do you want to [illegible]
[illegible]
I propose that we keep [illegible] here concerning the [illegible] Call 911 of 11, a phantom [illegible] down and a pilot, [illegible] his name is [illegible], Captain [illegible] How [illegible] was a [illegible] 204700. He [illegible] that one died [illegible] he is healthy but he died yesterday in the air.

He was added to the list.
He is booked in ink.
Now there was an helicopt. Ball,
shot down on the 2 October in
the [illegible] of the 3rd army, and
[illegible] was there [illegible]
pilot and another pilot [illegible]
injured
in plane with the terrified [illegible]
started at 8 o'clock.
Think I have given it
the pilot, there is no information
about him. There's no information about
pilot. Now there was another
one lieutenant [illegible]
missing, on a
[illegible]
missing?
Yes. We've heard got only
Now
but I mean
[illegible]
they are not here.
shot down a helicopter with two
people were present [illegible]. No
information only about one
and [illegible] a doctor
[illegible]
and a mechanic and a pilot
these people we don't have any
about
Maybe you can find something
them from your troops!

[illegible] you say?
[illegible] Still with you. [illegible] mechanical, flight [illegible] engineer [illegible] sergeant, [illegible] 63-73. [illegible] all [illegible] reports [illegible] depended only on [illegible].
[illegible] Rucs of none any [illegible] [illegible] who is not on the list. [illegible] [illegible] we have misunderstanding [illegible] names of a physically [illegible] persons. I understand you very well. - [illegible] about these people. If somebody is missing, if we know that he is killed [illegible] easier [illegible] to know that he is killed than [illegible] to know that he is missing and we don't know what happened [illegible]. If you can help us.
[illegible] get to [illegible] single day [illegible] happened to them, [illegible] people. - Coming [illegible] of the 5th, you know the [illegible] missing pilot.
[illegible] understand you give [illegible] The rest of the names is here. [illegible] any clue, like [illegible] can will give us.
[illegible] understood. We will give you [illegible] name what might be helpful [illegible]
[illegible] will give you the list in a few [illegible] explain it to you.

A. [illegible] both agreed a good agreement [illegible]
it was very complicated.
P. [illegible] can trust him.
A. Dr. Kissinger (spoke) [illegible] I say
that he negotiated [illegible] and very
Ry. [illegible] understand what he has to
[illegible]
must admit that if [illegible]
[illegible] more of a [illegible]
[illegible] would be no [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] to say [illegible]
[illegible] recommend on the [illegible]
[illegible] before we [illegible]
[illegible] will be easy for [illegible]
[illegible] a leader [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[

ER.

16. 11. 73.

A - Ofmasi
B - Yariv
C -
D - (Colonel Israeli)
E - Israeli officer

A - I heard good news about you general Yariv.
B - What good news.
A - Just good news.
B - I don't know. I'm not sure. The legal adviser said that I have to leave the ar
that I have to leave the service becau
I a political man. I don't know
to happen.
good news about you that's all I
But then I have good news
myself also.
I heard congratulations
are been appointed Commander in Chief
the forces I understand according to
newspapers.
the only source that said that
is correct.
a small question before we
another loading point for the Third army,
it up to the chief of staff and unfortunate
to get in ok of the minister and the
came back very late in the evening
couldn't get the answer before becaus
I didn't have a jet in the morning; I
with a slow plane. I had to leave
2 o'clock I don't have the answer
I hope I'll have it; next meetin
I'll have it before our meeting, I
you.

A - So please, we unloaded yesterday only 8 lorries

B - I want to go to Kilo today. I want to see it with my own eyes.

A - Please, do that because we don't know where the complication is —

B - You don't know where the bottle-neck is.

Gen E - I was there and we had the impression that the bottle-neck is like general Bilasson said with the unloading and loading on the other side.

A - The facilities is the bott'-neck. Maybe our soldiers is the bottle-neck.

B - I went to Suez yesterday, and I think there is no problem there.

(left flank) — transportation — with the maximum effort, and now the transfers — all these setbacks.

B - Even if you have more men.

A - We got to have.

Gen E - There a plenty of men there.

A - They have 100 men there

Gen E - There were 7 amphibious cars when I was there. 4 of them were doing nothing

A - We want to make another point. North of Suez so they can speed up

B - South of the present point. You said 151?

A - 154 or 151. In one of them. That's a larger space. And the second point: supply to Kabrid position.

B - Yes. This is a difficult problem. Because also we consider the Third army — what about the idea to replace it with UN. You don't have to give me an answer now. I am throwing it out. I have no de.

I have no authority, but if you say OK. I'll

A- Alright I'll discuss it with our authorities and if I have approval of our minister we'll send you a cable. But here during the coming few days, we have a boat there, we can give them supply. But your forces are stopping them. There is no cease-fire in this area. Why? Because of some soldiers there, (2 soldiers)

B- General, I'll tell you because the instructions I have on Kabrid are very specific. We consider it an isolated point and therefore under the present circumstances I have no authority to agree with you on the point of supplies.

A- It is not an isolated point because it can get supplies. Some of your soldiers are very close to it a few metres from both sides. They will fire against each other, but they will have their supply. ~~They~~ We can do it. And they can do it, but we stopped them doing so, because that is the problem. We can discuss the matter, if you can carry there, it will be alright.

B- Unfortunately, ~~if~~ this is an isolated point. The authority I have is to give you an idea that ~~thought~~ thought about it and thought out the idea about UN, but I have not the authority to agree with you now. Meanwhile, until I give you an answer

for Suez and 3rd army.

Now as far as that concerned, if you

you know the question of food supply and water. First of all – the principle – 3rd army that fuel for the lorries would come in the supplies. Please tell me how much you want. And for the rest, please let me have a detailed list what do you want for what. How you calculate it. Do you understand me?

A- Yes, for the 3rd army, it's ok.

B- No, I am speaking about the city of Suez. I say ① – we agree already now to one thing that the fuel, the gasoline.

A- For the lorries and amphibious cars, they take it already, as they do now. There is no problem on that.

B- Not for the 3rd army. City of Suez

A- no, I mean the fuel for the lorries and amphibious cars as it is now. No problem. For the city, I say, if we can leave it to the Int.

B- We prefer to do it between ourselves.

A- Alright. Let me call me I'll call the governor to send me the quantity and how he calculated it.

B- Tell me, if you can now, how much you want for the lorries.

A- Honestly, They told me, as I told you yesterday

B- tons!! But this is 1515

A- 1515

B- But I can already give you ok. for the benzine you need for the lorries to take the supplies. Tomorrow you can already have it.

(3/Nick [illegible]) D - And they can already refuel for the tanks in the unloading area?

B - Yes.

3/Nick D - We agree on that.

3/Nick E - You send a tanker that will send in the compound UN compound, and fill up the tanks.

A - This is agreed. Until we need some more for their work inside

B - You'll have the list.

3/Nick [illegible] D - Concerning the army, General, you agreed D just for refilling the amphibious vehicles, but for the restitution of destribution of supply in the army area, they need on the Eastern Bank, some amount of fuel.

B - We don't have any reserve.

- Well they use a lot of it.

B - Well, give me a list, how much it is

D - They are for the army as well.

B - I don't promise. But if you give me a list, we'll discuss it. Because you know what? I don't promise things, I don't have in my packet. Because I promise you, I go back home, they say "so and so, this is too much this is so, this is so, I haven't seen the list," and then you'll say, you'll rightly say "yaniva is a liar." No, I mean, not a liar but an operator.

3/Nick E - The problem is quite simple. Although we would like them to have, for instance, fuel, to cook their meals, we wouldn't like them to have more fuel than they have there now to fire the tanks. This is

the simple question.

A- But the tanks use another gasoline.

Abel- yes.

B- Enough to carry ammunition from one battalion to another.

D- You are a good adviser (yes?)

B- I have to match you, We have to match you! Stuck with these problems.

A- Mending the pipe line, you thought on it again?

B- yes. I checked it last night with the director of operation. I sat with him about midnight, and they said "yes, we will start checking but you need a concrete answer. I'll write it down. If I can cable you before we have the next meeting, I'll do my best to cable you: "the situation is so and so, the order is up fix it."

A- Alright. thank you very much. And the Suez Canal?

B- On the sweet canal, I gave you an answer yesterday, general. We said that we want to have a Red Cross visit, correct?

A- In this case you'll mend it.

B- I don't promise. First we want to have a visit of the Red Cross and see what the Red Cross says, and then the Minister will consider the question.

D- Happily, general, you mentioned the visit of the Red Cross — To check the civilian facilities.

B- to check the situation of the civilians.

D- But concerning the Sweet Canal itself, it doesn't need the Red Cross visit.

B - The situation in the Sweet Canal - to see whether the civilians can irrigate their fields, whether they cannot irrigate their fields. All these problems. And the Minister promised that after the —— consider the question, he didn't want to give you a concrete answer.

[illegible] E - There is water in the Sweet water canal and the fields are irrigated.

B - yesterday, after the meeting, I flew over the water

A - There is water there, in the Sweet Canal?

[illegible] E - yes. And the irrigation is alright.

B - But, in the canal the level of the water is not high. I looked to see whether in the side of the Canal — some not, some yes.

[illegible] E - Most of them yes. And it is green and all the vegetables are blooming.

D - Do you mean they don't need the sweet water of Canal?

[illegible] E - No, they have no water.

B - Colonel, I don't know. We flew all over the Canal. They'll check for you. We didn't check. Only got a general impression.

A - [illegible]

7

B - The situation in the Sweet Canal - to see whether the civilians can irrigate their fields, whether they cannot irrigate their fields. All these problems. And

B- ok. Thank you general. Now we have a very very serious problem with the prisoners in the list. Very serious problem. And I want to tell you where it is.

A- There will be no problems at all.

B- I'll be very happy. But there are some very difficult problems I'll explain it to you. Before that - Yesterday there was some misunderstanding. We only got wounded, no healthy people. The 9 people who should have come, did not come.

A - Who?

B - Yesterday, according to the first information the Red Cross gave, said 26 wounded and 9 prisoners from 1969. We sent all the 56 from 69 back, and they did not arrive yesterday. According to information they should arrive today. So, I don't know what happened. So, the start was not so good.

A - No. It was very good from both sides. I feel that it was very good. General Sheriff told me that everything goes exactly through the Red Cross.

B - Here I give you the example - the 9 -

A - We didn't say about the 9 or 7. That's the first time I hear that.

B - The Red Cross informed us yesterday that there will be 26 and 9. And only the 26 came and the 9, we informed the families -

A - It doesn't make any difference to us if they take the 9 prisoners with the wounded.

B - General, I am sure that you didn't give

an order not to send them. I'm sure.

A- And no authority in our country is interested in that.

8/2/21 - The fact is that no healthy P.O.W's did arrive yesterday.

D - It got to be arranged and decked

B - So, at 12 o'clock today They are here, yes. At 12 o'clock, I think General Sheriff and The Red Cross and some of our people will be here to discuss the Logics. They can then check what has happened.

A - Anything about the P.O.W'S, they can do whatever they like. We gave the orders to exchange them, by their schedule, by their convenience.

B - Today there was another problem, it's not a great problem, but it's a technical difficulty that makes problems to us. Perhaps there is some shortcut between your authorities and the Red Cross the Red Cross informed us that the group of 9 ~~people~~ prisoners will arrive today 13⁰⁰ - So we made all the preparation. Then we got information that they will arrive at 9³⁰ - it is better. But we had to change everything, you know it's a big do when the prisoners come. Is that in the hands of Brigadier Sheriff?

A - Yes. He is responsible

8/2/21 So the problem is this. We announced yesterday that there will be P.O.W's, healthy coming. We know that you are not responsible for all the details, but this was part of the agreement and people

in the country are trying to explain it as obstruction to the agreement.

B- Ya. Some people came out "You see? You are not watching out for our interest."

Herut- "You can't trust them." So the details are very important. I

A- Why these 9?

E- They are there for 4 years or 3 years. Their families were already waiting for them in the hospital and suddenly they don't arrive.

B- I must give you the whole story. The explanation was that in the evening they had some party and in the morning they had too much luggage and they couldn't take the luggage.

E- This was the explanation.

A- If they can do it at any time, they can do it. When general Sheriff comes with your opposite number, they can arrange it. We don't know.

B- This is the easier point. Now we come to the question of the names. And it has to do with about 17 air crew members. For example- a captain jirve ez he abandoned his jet plane about 10 kms. W. from Ismaelia area. His accompan accompanying plane did see him when he reached the ground. We had air to ground communication. Now, we found his plane without the ejection seat, so he has ejected, and we have nothing about him. The second example

A- He died on the day because do you think we will keep him?

B- No. But it is strange because we have nothing. After he fell to the ground during one hour There was communication.

A- It is difficult for us to make sure for every soldier who died, who was wounded or killed. It is very difficult for us.

D- According to the last I had from the general yesterday, and the clues he gave me concerning the pilots and air crew you consider the arrival of a pilot to the ground alive, that he must be alive and a P.O.W.

B -no. B- The arrival is not enough. It might not be enough. But the fact that we had communication with him when he was on the ground.

A — he had been killed during a battle while he was giving air support to

B- This is very strange. I'll give you another example. Another lieutenant. We have the Map Reference where he was shot down and we have the evidence of one of the officers, no, we found in the room of one of the officers in the area in the West Bank, we found half of his identity disc - you know our identity disc. So we found the identity disc and the doctor, Egyptian doctor amongst our prisoners mentioned his name and said that he treated him as he had a broken arm. And he is not in the list.

D- not in the list?!

B- No 3, for example, he was, his plane was

hit South East of Port Said and the pilot reported that his plane was hit, then - we saw that his picture appeared in a Turkish newspaper and from your prisoners we got information that about the date and the place of this incident, the plane was there and the pilot ejected. I'll give you another example: North of Suez, on the Eastern side of the Canal, a plane was hit, the second plane said that he saw him ejecting. And radio Cairo transmitted a greeting from him to his family on the 21st of October. And I'll tell you which hour - 0015 21st of October. We asked about him in Suez. We asked in the interrogation of P.O.W's from Suez city. They said they remembered this and that the pilot was safe and sound and was taken as a prisoner. And the prisoner also said that he remembers the plane and he remembered the pilot ejecting. He even remembered the date. And when the date was checked with what he said, it was the date we knew from the report.

Then there is a case with a pilot, we have the M/R in the area of Port Fuad. The prisoners said they saw the plane falling and we have informati- that you sent some people to look fo- him. We can give you the date or perhaps you can find out —.

A- It is very difficult for us to discuss all these cases, but I would like

to assure you that we are not keeping a single P.O.W. by any means, under any circumstances. We are not interested at all in keeping 1 or 2 or 10. Just, please trust us on that point. If you want to have a certificate from us that all the prisoners of war, and we can take the same certificate from you, but it shows that we don't trust each other. Now, we are not interested at all in keeping a single man.

D - He killed by any soldier in the spot. Maybe drowned in the water... Who knows?

B - This is not the problem. As we have such a large number of air crew men unaccounted for, and for example, we take the officer, the pilot who sent a greeting on radio Cairo.

A - That's one important point. This one.

D - It looks very very strange for me. And we've got to investigate it and we'll give you a constructive answer on it.

B - I will even try to check if we can bring you the tape and the recording!

A - If they put him on the radio to make a greeting for his family —

B - Because you see for us there's a difference. I believe you when you say that you keep nobody from the list, and that you have nobody else. But there is also a question when we know, when we have information that looks good to us that says that no there's a pilot who was seen under

such and such circumstances, and he is not there anymore, then we ask about the circumstances - what happened? what happened? and there are so many?! What happened?

Or for example, in the area of [illegible], on October 11th, a phantom was shot down and they both ejected, the two pilots. One of your pilots, who took part in the battle that day, ~~he~~ it was an air-battle day, he said that he saw them ejecting and coming down with their parachutes.

A - There's a lake, a big lake there in [illegible].

B - Or another point, if I take the question of the Bell helicopter. You have the navigator, he is lightly wounded. He is on the list, but there is nothing about all the other people who were with him!

D - I am suggesting to let that to General Sheriff and General Eyal to go thoroughly to all the details ~~to~~ and I'm sure that from our side General Sheriff will get all the support to investigate to get an answer

B - This is very important. ~~This is very~~ important. By the way, the helicopter was on T.V., on Cairo T.V. So there must be some information what happened to the other people. All these cases. There some cases of which you are sure. - I only wanted to explain the problem as we see it and why we see it so seriously.

Another point is that there are 160 ~~men~~ names of soldiers whose names were mentioned by the radio, and of course I have all the dates and how and everything. Even giving details, just an example - a man was interviewed by the voice of Cairo radio in Arabic on 5th of November in the evening, and he said that he is 21 years old, that he is an armour soldier, that he was born in Israel, that his parents are from — that he is a bachelor, and that he became a prisoner on Saturday, and so on and so forth.

A - We'll leave that till General Sheriff will come. He is responsible to answer any questions about ~~Engage of these cases.~~

B - Engage anyone of these cases, that's for sure.

B - General, that is ok. for the technical aspect of how to deal with it. But I want to impress you with the seriousness of how we view it. We take it very very seriously.

A - And it serious too if we are keeping them.

B - I'm not saying you are keeping them.

A - If Brigadier general Sheriff cannot answer any questions on that, that is his executive responsibility, because he is working in Cairo and those people working in the field, we can't check prisoners from them, unless they give us these prisoners from Sheriff.

B - I know

A - Or Sheriff doesn't know exactly what happened until he receives the P.O.W's. He may be drowned this fellow in Nile.

B - What I want to say, I reported very faithfully your statement. That was yesterday,

that there are no live prisoners with you except for what there is on the list. I reported it. But as we have there questions, big question marks, I think you should do everything possible to remove these question marks. Otherwise, everybody will say perhaps there is something fishy here.

D- I got the idea, but I want again to assure you, there maybe mistake in the names, there maybe anything - but never - someboody is caring after — the P.O.W's. It is impossible, it is impossible. Well, I can imagine something in the field, somewhere, any kind of clash. Even any kind of aggressiveness, but never such.

B- I believe you, I believe you Colonel, but therefore I want to impress you with the importance of checking it, only to remove the question marks.

A- We will do that.

E- Even if we can get information that he was killed, that we can get his body this would be even a great relief to the family.

B- Yes yes.

A- I hope we can get it because you should contact with the units to see what happened, to remember what happened to that pilot, or to that soldier and so on and you will find them in the deads' bodies

E- Most of these cases, the 47 pilots, after all, there are not so many pilots and the people in the units will remember where he

was shot and where his grave was.

A - Right

B - Alright. I only want to see if there is anything else. But this is, please, I hope you understand what we mean.

A - Alright. We'll start now?

B - Ya.

A -

A - Most of the principles general, we had with you, it is acceptable in general. And with the other principle which I mentioned yesterday, can make a firm base for both sides to start our work today. I want to stress on the following facts: ① First of all that the land we are talking about is our land. And since 1967 our people in Egypt are suffering too much morally and physically. While Israel is not suffering and not threatened at all to Israel up till now.

② Our chance now for reaching peace, between Egypt and Israel is a very good chance and didn't happen since the 25 years, during the last 25 years. We should not miss that chance for the benefit of both sides.

③ The military situation in Canal Zone, specially in the southern part, if it will not change very soon, will lead both sides to a very bad situation. So there should be, as we believe, a movement on the ground in that sector to ease the military situation.

(4) The time factor is important for both sides. And so we should case the military situation on the ground before we go to the peace conference, to give a better chance for the conference to succeed, specially if you'll go there in your ex head of the delegation

B - I don't know. This is speculation

A - And also the military situation cannot stay as it is; until the conference comes to an end. We don't know when it will come to an end. Proceeding from there facts, we would like to start our discussion today with the following priorities, with your permission - First of all to to define the lines to where the Israeli ~~Gen~~ troops move on the Western Bank. And then discussion on the disengagement on the East. Both of these two items are connected with each other and linked with each other, I know this. This maybe one step, and this another step. So, I believe that if we work on that basis it will be alright.

B - I would like to start with your points, the points you mentioned General. You mentioned the first principle of land. This land was under your rule since the beginning of the 20th century. And I don't want to go into discussion about that. I'm not arguing about it. I would like to go on to the second one, because the second point is talking about a good opportunity for peace and I understand that if it is

a good opportunity now, I think it's a good opportunity. It will take some time to reach the gap —— But I would like to ask you how do you understand the word peace? For example to start off the conversation about peace. How would you translate the Jewish word peace in this case? How would you translate the word peace into Arabic Y Salam?

A- Salam

B- Here for example we have a problem. I am not talking to you now with instructions from the Government. Because, I've always tried to be as frank with you as I only can, the instruction I have for our intimate discussion today is to explore not to define from our side definite alternatives except the one I presented, but to explore all the various aspects because the government did not have enough time to really discuss it, but to explore everything so that the Government will have enough time to discuss it. — Nobody asked me to do it —
We have followed the problem very closely, and personally I had the opportunity to follow it very closely. And I know, you know from your point of view we have a difference of principle. I remember the late President Mr Nasser had a conference in Sudan, Hartum. That means that actually when you say peace, you mean a situation under of non belligerence, certain arrangements, that are connected with our withdrawal,

after the withdrawal to a line that will be agreed upon, there is a general statement of recognition, there is a statement saying that the state of war is over or of belligerent activity, but there are no, but the nature of the relationship between us doesn't change, no contact; I don't say immediate diplomatic recognition, that you will send your ambassador to Israel and we send our ambassador to Egypt, but there is no economic movement, no movement of tourists etc. etc. So that we break relations. The contact that has existed between the Egyptian people and the people of Israel —— absent.

Now, I agree with you that this has nothing or that this does not have necessarily to do with disengagement. We could make a disengagement without talking about peace. It is possible. But as you have touched upon the problem, and made it a point that it is a good chance for peace, I ask you the the Thing not inorder to irritate you, but inorder to bring out something that is very very important to us first of all to understand, first of all to understand. I am not discussing it now or arguing about it. But it is of the utmost importance to understand whether what you have in mind — after let us say what is called "the peace conference" and after all the arguing and fighting and discussing, negotiations and manoeuvres with

Kissinger without Kissinger, and Bregnev on here, Bregnev on there and God knows what else, where do we stand after all? Do we have Salam? It is not a formality. It is a question of the nature of the relationship between our people, not only between our governments.

A- Do you want my personal answer for that? I am not authorized.

B- As I am not pushing you. no. I have also not been authorized to ask you.

A- But I believe that in future, if the steps are taken correctly, through our discussions and then in the peace conference — and then the last situation should be cleared out by the political leaders.

B- We are talking personally, because as I said, we have no authority. Nobody knows at home I'll put the point here on the place, when we came over here.

A- That's a very good question for the political leaders to discuss.

B- What I want to impress you with. I am not asking you to undertake a signature. As I said, we can discuss disengagement without it.

A- Right.

B- But as you mentioned that this is a good chance for peace I tried to bring out this question. It is not only a question of political agreement, it is also a question of the people. The people in Israel can definitely think differently

about the position that would be taken in the government in what can (if) eventually be reached is نه or salam. You understand my point of view? The public. I don't know of whether you have a good understanding or feeling on the question of public opinion. This point of نه or salam can make a very very big difference in the question of what the people are prepared to agree to or not to agree to. Because if we talk about نه, then the question of doubts of about intentions is a different question. Because many people would say "wait a minute. We've had 25, 26 years of wars and of conflicts; if we get only salam, it means another war might come. If it means another war might come, we must take maximum precautions. Especially after the last war this is a big problem. So I wanted to impart to you, the understanding of this point, how important it is. Because people want peace. They don't want war. Naturally, they don't want war. But they also want to feel secure. So, I thought it would be very important for me, and I am glad you brought it up, the question of a good chance for peace - first to explain this point to you in detail - I'll tell you that it was my feeling that you would say salam.

A - I said peace.

B- That you will say Salom. When I asked you about peace you will say salom. You would not say "No" I was sure this would be your answer. We only have one word in Hebrew; we don't have the difference between Salam and Sulh. Only SHALOM. But as I understand in your concept of knowing political thinking, I understand the difference you make between "No" and Salam, because it is very important for me, personally, I am not talking for the government now at this point. ~~I am talking only personally.~~ It was very important for me personally, at this point to understand, when you say peace what do you have in mind. I thought this is a good opportunity to explain to you why the difference between the two is something that is very essential. I myself gave hundreds of lectures to explain this point, because it is a very important element in the political thinking of the Arab states, the Arab people, relations to Israel and the solution of the conflict.

Now if we talk about your proposal. We think that your proposal has a number of important disadvantages from our point of view. We think that your proposal does not reflect the results of the war at it entered the cease-fire, and the situation on the ground.

You have important forces at the East Bank. 2nd army in the East Bank. You have important elements of the 3rd army in the East Bank - not the whole 3rd army, but you've got elements of the 3rd army. And we have very important elements of our force on the West Bank. But your proposal, and I am talking about disengagement now. I'm not talking about a final settlement. I am talking about disengagement. That is to say - the starting point, the starting line for peace negotiations. The starting line we propose does not neglect the actual situation on the ground. Now, and I have said that before, very openly - that it is best for each side, when it does enter negotiations to also its best to proceed from a position of strength. So, I don't think that we for example, should look for a position of strength that is not reflected by the position on the ground as it is now. This is not warranted. ~~It then~~ This would then raise a whole set of problems that we have yesterday put down in the principle that we have presented to you. But I think, on the other hand, that your proposal will put us into a position that is not strong enough in relation to what the situation is on the ground now to start negotiations.

Second point is that your proposal ~~is advanced~~ is against one of the principles that we also presented yesterday. It is not a balanced

proposal. That is to say. ~~if~~ In this proposal, you will have a ponderant military strength against us. Because under the situation you have a big obstacle - The canal which is an obstacle, ~~which~~ It can be bridged, The General knows how to do it. Perhaps I should use this occasion to say - well done. (9/73) This was a beautiful project. But this means that we start in a position where you have very strong military power and we have weaker military power. And, therefore, we must then take a very tough stand in order to assure our position: And there is this inbalance in the beginning for which we have to find ways and means to have guarantees until the peace-talks are ended. When the situation is not balanced, it might be used by you. It is legitimate. Because we will have a very strong political discussion: And it is only naturally conceivable that military pressure by the one side and the other side will be used to overcome a political difficulty.

Now, the line ~~you~~ have proposed, amongst other things, will mean for us amongst other things that we have to give up. Important part of our military installations which we have in the Sinai, (and I am speaking about the lines of disengagement & not about final lines) and therefore, we will have to set up new installations, which will make it for us more

difficult then to proceed to further lines. And of course, these things can be used by you as pressure on us. I say this is only legitimate. This is a struggle without shooting. Ok. But it's a struggle of the table, not of the battle-field. And each side will probably use every device it has inorder to further this or other political point. ~~And~~ ~~as~~

Another point is - We have proposed in 1971, a partial solution, or interim agreement - withdrawal from Suez, the opening of the Canal, and we said the line we will withdraw to will not be the final line, and we can talk about the Buffer. Whether there will be a Buffer Zone etc this was not then stated in detail. But we proposed this without war. Now we have fought a tough war, very tough war. I think the toughest War we had, ~~No~~ and a lot of blood has been spilled on both sides. Now you propose us a similar proposal but under more difficult conditions after we have paid such a price. We think this is very difficult.

A - I didn't ~~get~~ give any proposals yet.
B - Ah
A - What proposal I gave?
B - The one we talked about. Let us say - Do you know French?
A - No.
B In French there is a phrase. called "avant projeè." It means the first edition of the project.

Perhaps you gave us avant projée.
A - Where?
B - In 104 km.
A - We were discussing ideas. That's all. But we didn't make any proposal.
B - But perhaps I'm firing in the air
A - You gave me the proposal switching the troops, and I said "why don't you do so," and you gave your proposal. So, we were exchanging thoughts / ideas only.
B - General, I am not trying to catch you at your word / but I remember the so called political meeting and you had a political appointment with . Then you said "the German plan" Let us take it as something in the air - Ok. You said withdrawing - the canal.
A - You even asked me a question on that
B - yes.
A - It was a wrong answer for me
D - Not less than! / Not less than!
B - Ok that makes it even more difficult. But I even remember one of us said this will get no good price for peace, because you are the author of the plan. So, these are the points in connection with these Thoughts.
A - I understand now that you don't want to move your troops on the West, because it give you a bad military situation, or less powerful military situation. Right?
B - There you have misunderstood me. We are ready to move our forces. Yes. I told you yesterday, that in principle we don't want to stay here. We understand that you cannot accept a continued, prolonged situation where we are sitting here

From our point of view, there is nothing that is pressing us to move quickly, but we understand your point of view. And therefore, when we say disengagement, we are ready to disengage to the East Bank.

- Alright
- But <u>But</u>, under certain conditions.
- Right. I want to make this clear. You want to make the disengagement in <u>one</u> step, but not in two steps - withdrawing to a certain line in the West and then for disengagement.
- On this I can't give you a definite answer now. Because we have not cleared the plan yet. It is possible that as a technical phase, it is possible that we have an intermediary line for a short time, I would say an administrative, technical (line), but in principle we can do it in one jump. Technically, in order to be able to do it properly, in order to have one step back, second step back, perhaps yes.
- We can do, for instance, a step by the UN. For instance, that the UN takes in an intermediary phase - from the half situation to the full situation. The UN comes in, they take over of what is going to be left by both sides.
- I think from the talk we had yesterday, and from what I just heard from you, you have the apprehension that we would like to stay here as long as possible. We have nothing pressing from our side that

we have to more fast, but we understand your point of view, and, therefore when we speak about disengagenent (יוסי תרגם)

A- Alright. What is your proposal on the disengagenent?

B I can talk now, I have authority and want to talk on one thing. Because you said this is something we've just picked up and discussed. I can tell you the authority that I have to talk about now is something FIRM. We can throw out ideas afterwards.)

(You know this is a present that was given to me by Brigadier Avnon when we signed the agreement.

E- It must be put in the museum)

B- 10 kms, 10 kms.

(GOLAN)

A - On both sides?

B- On both sides

A- And then our troops to go to Cairo

B- From the canal to Cairo is 110 or 120.

A- It would be more convenient for our troops to go to Cairo (יוסי). I understad your proposal and we discussed it. It is very difficult for us to accept that proposal. Very very difficult. In many ways. politically or militarily.

B- I didn't expect to you, when I presented it to you to say "OK." This or nothing else

A- There are so many variants we can discuss. That is the first variant. It is not convenient for you and for us. Not convenient for both

sides. And not acceptable for both sides.
(5:50 p.m.)

- The measures you mentioned are really constructive. But from the trust point of view, it gives more trust to you than it gives to us. And there is a continuous threat of the presence of your troops on our land. This may physically give the satisfaction, or the assurance, security. But what gives is, not only — which would create the condition of an atmosphere, but the lines on the ground, although it will be only until the final stage on our ground; which means that the presence of the Israeli troops would create a continuous threat. So the trust on our point of view, as I personally understand, must be the lines. And then all that with real constructive measures.

B - I have understood Colonel Aweli's point. Now, am I wrong that in your thinking the Israelies want to stay in that line till doomsday

E - Forever.

- But this I have said, and this I have the authority, full authority to state to you in the most formal way, not only in an intimate talk between us. The line of disengagement is definitely not our last line of withdrawal. The last line of withdrawal, we shall discuss. I know that in your thinking, it's 67. Right? I understand. It was formally stated by the Rais. We will argue about —. Or perhaps I am wrong, perhaps you want us to go back

to UN partition, I don't know. But let us assume at least (I think it's a reasonable assumption) that you would like us to go to at least 67. So in this formal statement that has been stated in 71 already I am stating now, and we stated in a formal obligation, and the government is ready to sign this statement. You have a guarantee that we are not going to stay there. This is one point.

The second point is - you think that these, what we call, confidence building measures, they are not a gimic and in no way can they tie your hands vis à vis further withdrawal on our side from this line. And I am sure that this will not be an obstacle. We can agree on disengagement which would say - no patrols, this is alright. But I was throwing out this idea to you because I count all this in my thinking. I've been in the intelligence since 61 and I watched this problem. My belief is that if we want to live in this area, we must live in peace with our Arab neighbours. Ok. we have planes, we have weapons - yes, because we want to survive. But this is not instead of peace. We must and we want to reach peace with our Arab neighbours, so we are looking for ways and means gradually. I understand, it cannot be tommorrow morning. It is impossible because it is not a political problem. This is a psychological problem, an emotional problem. This we

understand. So, when I mentioned these measures, they have to do with psychological emotions. They are not a condition for disengagement. But I make a lot of talk about these measures, because not that they are physically important. They will not prevent a war between us, but they are very important psychologically.

- I agree. When we come to the lines or to the disengagement agreement, then we'll talk about these measures. It's too early to is too early to talk about these measures now. Thank you very much for these measures. They are very constructive as Colonel Bueti said.

- Perhaps the general has seen a list. (yes)

Excuse me, may I ask a technical question. For Colonel, I don't know how it is in the Egyptian Army Forces, in our army from Captain to Major before the war it was 4 years before you could became a major. You have this system minimum time?

- minimum time for every rank.

- For every rank?

- for every rank.

- In the army it's only up to and including Lieutenant Colonel. From Lieutenant Colonel and above, no minimum time

- No, we have minimum time for every rank including general. I mean Brigadier general should not be promoted before-

- We had another system, but this was later, when I got the rank appointment for the head of intelligence, which is the rank

of major general, I was a Brigadier general, I had to wait a year. But later it was —

- Now, the second variant. UN here, UN there. I think that you would agree with me that it is very difficult for us to accept the variant. Because what did we do? Nothing at all. The conflict will be raised at any time; no chance at all to build our cities in the Canal Zone,
- Why?
- That's only 10 kms here, and your troops will be here, as I understand. That means, that with not machine gun, but with any other gun, but not artillery, can reach the Canal, and can reach Ismaelia, Suez and Port Said etc. So it is very difficult for us.
- Let us assume without artillery.
- We can agree for certain ways of forces.
- What I mentioned - defensive zone, no armament
- where?
- On our side and on your side.
- Only light forces
- In order to alley to avoid your fears about, not only the civilians, but especially the civilians
- we started this war, because the situation —
- I understood the difference (yes) We are after the war now.
- This variant does not give us any compensation for anything. We do not accept that variant. We have an idea that our soldiers here on the Eastern Bank, on our land, they should stay on the Eastern Bank, because it is not acceptable for them to to from our military point of view or from political point of view

and from psychological point of view. We don't want any UN here. We want our forces here on the Eastern Bank of the Canal. So, inorder to make it easy, this variant is not convenient for us and is not acceptable to us. So let's have another variant. A third variant from you.

B- I gave you 2 variants

C- We can give you till tommorrow variants.

B- How about another variant from your side.

A- We have some principle: (1) first of all our troops should be on the Eastern Bank of the canal.

B- From the Egyptian Armed forces, you mean.

A- From the Egyptian Armed forces.

B- Right.

A- (2) There should be a Buffer Zone between both of us. This Buffer Zone should be wide enough, as I said yesterday, to assure that there will be no clashes at all between both of us. In the the Buffer Zone the UN will work. We should have the opportunity for our people in the Canal Zone to live in the canal.

B- On this we have no misunderstanding.

A- The line where to go, we can discuss it on this basis. If we have our troops on the Eastern bank of the canal, you have your troops here on the West, yes. So we want our troops to be on the Eastern Bank of the canal. The Buffer Zone should be maximum. The wider the BZ the better for both sides because there will be no clashes at all.

So, on this basis, if you have a variant, we can discuss it.

- We are talking about disengagement now, not about the final line?

- No. That is a temporary line, for the benefit of the coming —

- you say - after this war has been fought, the Egyptian side has forces on the East Bank, important forces, true; the Israeli have — force on this side. We want the Israelis for disengagement not for final settlement, to go back — to have the Egyptian forces on both side of the canal all along. And then we start the discussion. If there is some difficulty, the UN is not an obstacle. UN is not an obstacle, you know & we know. 1967 - no obstacle. UN are no obstacle. Then the I would say, the Canal is a better obstacle than the UN. the (We can accept it that the canal should not be an obstacle, perhaps.) But, for the negotiations we are in an inferior position. At the same time, I admit we will go back. You can tell me general "What are you talking about, anyway you yourself have said that you will go back, so what difference does it make?" The difference it makes is for the period of the negotiations. For the period of negotiations under this variant variant, we are in a bad position.

- Why?

- Because you have great forces here and it will be easier for you to exert military pressure for us than it will be for us to resist it.

- So, we can have some measures to secure your

troops, if you feel that these troops will threaten you

- Excuse me, may I offer you fresh military supply and fresh ice-cream. This is yogurt.
- Yogurt I don't care for it.
- This is good for the evening after
- for good digestion

If you come to our party tonight, it will be —

- you have a party tonight?
- Yes. And Farid is waiting your permission to come to us, in international territory.
- I would ~~can~~ have come tonight, but I haven't seen my family this week.
- We have guitars, we have jazz.
- But I promise you, general another time, when you can come, I will come, with great pleasure.
- They will take our pictures.)

Here, if you choose any line in Sinai, that's a temporary line as I said. We want to make the disengagement clear for both sides. Any line you choose, we can discuss it, and then we can make a security zone for both sides and ~~no~~ another zone for the UN to work. So, we can have security for both sides. For our side and for your side. Please remember that our troops here 10-15 kms. there is a water obstacle here, behind of their backs, they are in a very difficult situation.

E- Then why not withdraw to the other side?

A - And then,
B - Did you see the roads in the marsh?
A - Which you made very close to Port Said?
B - no, kilo 10, 12.
A - Ah, here. There is here Port Fuad, That's Captina and in the marshes, yes.
B - It's a good road.
E - So, you'll get back an improved Sinai.
B - But please, before I forget. Your last proposal is not so clear to me. Could you again?
A - We have here our troops. (crosses) Here is the canal. Let's say in Sinai somewhere, there will be a line where the Egyptian troops can stay and the Israeli troops would stay, and there will be the UN forces here. This area should be wide enough to keep the troops away from each other, and also to make it easy for both of us., we can make here a security zone, where we can put very light forces here, and very light forces here, and then we put your main forces and our main forces. And then we discuss all the other measures convenient to both of us to be sure that no one will start another war.
B - Which means that our security line will be at least 40 kms East of the Canal.
A - The security zone?
B - The security line. (I like your coffee. May I have your coffee?)
A - Have a bottle of Coca-Cola. The Coca-Cola director in Israel is a friend of mine and I said to him that we have no Coca-Cola, so he said it is impossible.)

- This is the Israeli line, yes? And this is the Canal, so This will be at least 40 kms.
- No, more than that. More and more. For disengagement that won't work. At all
- Look, general, if we have our cities here, and our troops here. We don't want to make any clashes between them. And that's a temporary line as I said.

I agree

Here we should have a very wide space here between both sides. A very wide space - for the UN, in order not to give any chance to our local commanders and to your local commanders to make any conflict between both of them. If we agree that we need more than 30 or 40 kms here, and then security Zone for both sides and UN Zone. So it should be far away from the Canal. In this case, we don't care too much for putting all our troops here. I mean, such forces as we are keeping now. Also we don't have to put big forces in Sinai. Both of us. So, we will relax both of us and then it will be convenient for both sides.

- This won't work general. We cannot accept it as a line of disengagement - a line that far to the East. It is a line of disengagement. We are not talking about withdrawal.

with Dr. Kissinger today, discussion with K.

Ah, with K.

- I don't know what he wrote today.
- I heard a little bit on the radio.

B- This is a line of disengagement, we cannot accept.

A- What do you mean by disengagement? - to keep away the troops from each other.

B- yes.

A- If you put your troops here what are you going to do? There will be no disengagement. There will be engagement.

B- He said he is not a politician.

A- I am a straightforeward man.

B- I know, but the general can be a very good politician. Not only a politician, but a political leader and conductor of political activities.

But what I wanted to say. You remember Gaza? In Gaza we had Egyptian forces and - on both sides of the line, no intermediary zone. - Until the end of ~~67~~ May 67 no trouble between the military forces.

D- This is a very single case, a very special case, and couldn't be a rule.

B- Yes, I agree with you. But it was no different situation than here. What I am now arguing about., Why this wide zone, wide distance of disengagement 30-40 kms, as a line from which we start the withdrawal which will lead to final settlement. This we consider much too much.

- If we don't do it like this, there would be clashes.

- Why should there be general?

- First of all we should ~~agree~~ accept that our troops should be at least 30 kms from each other.

B- Why?

A- Because of the artillery you have and the

and the artillery we have.

B- But we can always use planes, you can use planes. We can use long range artillery

A- We are leaving these arms because they are controlled - the air-force etc. For long range artillery if we pay 35 kms from both sides, it will be alright. There will be no chance at all for the troops to engage.

B- The disengagement, in my thinking, is not conditioned by the distance between the forces ~~always~~ a local commander with too much initiative may do all kinds of things. Therefore, I think that the avoidance of local bitter clashes which make tension which lead to war, is conditioned not by the distance of the forces, but by the interposition of a 3rd factor, in this case we are talking about UN. But if you prefer a Soviet US force - by the way what do you think about a Soviet US force?

A - You mean to come here?

B - As a Buffer force.

A - no, we prefer the UN force. they are from different countries.

B - I'm not saying that we prefer ~~to have them Soviet~~ here.

A - But if the political leaders accept both of them Americans and soviets, that's up to them, but I feel.

B - So, what I mean to say is that by having UN between your forces and our forces, you prevent local clashes. Because if we make trouble, we challenge the UN

A - How wide do you think this area should be?

B - It should be wide enough to present a kind of barrier that you cannot just walk

through. I'll give you an example. Along the Gaza strip the UNEF was there, there was a line of 400 yards between each force. This is ~~nodeb~~ nothing. No depth. There must be some depth, a couple of kilometres, so that if we want to make trouble, we have to walk through, drive through with tanks or ~~artill~~ our infantry or whatever we have. But it is not necessary to take the criterion of artillery range.

D - The UN which you described is not a problem for

E - a major war but not for local clashes.

D - and in an area where we are expecting to put the civilians back home. And what we can do, I don't know - to start another war, or to complain to the UN, while the civilians are under fire. Concerning the ~~with~~ width, you consider the by the presence of a neutral force while a neutral force you described as an helpless kind of force.

E - the war, in a complete war.

D - What are we risking? We are not risking our troops, we are risking the civilians & the normal life of the population.

B - I understand, but this is what I wanted to say —

A - How wide do you consider this area?

B - In my mind, if it's 5 km, it's also good 8, 9, 10. General, you have a whole army in 10 kms. True?

A - True. But if it is wider than that, it will be better for both sides. So, we consider that

10 kms is not enough.

B- I want to make a break for a few minutes to check on the Red Cross business.

What you say is that you remain with your presence on each side. We go back 40 kms. This we think does not represent the final result of the fighting. I agree that you can say "But you are on Egyptian soil." It is true but the argument of your soil, is not relevant to the temporary line, it is relevant, very relevant to the final line, but it is not relevant to a temporary line, on which both of us have to start the political discussions. I don't want to use the word "fight" because I hope it will be a discussion and not a fight. So, therefore, we cannot accept it. We have to accept the two things, your military presence here, and a withdrawal of 40 kms.

A- I didn't say 40 kms.

B- 30 kms! No I don't joke.

A- If this distance is wide enough, it will give security to both sides, on the canal zone, for the canal citizens, for the local commanders, for everyone. We will not keep all these troops, frankly, from the military point of view, on the other side. But if we come to any line close, if the cities here are not secure or safe, we will not accept it. For the benefit of the civilians and how they will live. Because the minute we start making new buildings here and there, and we appointed a minister specially for that, Osman.

B- Isn't he a general? General Osman of armour

A- I don't have a general Osman. But if we have security here, in the meantime, it will give a new security. The minute we have here thousands of people on this end, it is a very big security for you.

B- I told Colonel Aiesi. We were for a return in the interim solution of 1971, the opening of the canal and the return of the civilians because in that we see security for ourselves.

A - That's Ok.

B - So we have an interest not to arm the cities of the civilian population.

A - And the minute you go from here, we'll start working on that, to give you the spirit, or feeling that we are keen on that.

And there is another point. If the canal, they will start mending the canal, hundreds and hundreds, maybe thousands of people working here (civilians), that mean that there will be no positions here from the military and operational point of view. Millions of trucks of sand and cement and this and that. So, actually, we will not have here positions, for the benefit of the people.

So we have one variant. We show move forward to give them space so they can stay, leave this or work with them as employees. That's why this stage should not be small.

The position here for — army, the army commander will refuse anybody to jump here. So that is another problem for us to give you security. The quantity of troops here as I told you, we are obliged to reorganize it from our military point of view. And the minute we start here, demobilization in our army will start, The thousands and thousands and thousands we called and I think you'll do the same thing. Because there is no interest to keep all these big forces. So the line here, please, before you leave this meeting, I want to know your idea about that line to which you would like to go and then we tackle all the other problems on the basis of that line. Just to have an idea

B- I was thinking, I have not yet crystalized it, I was thinking about the possibility of a line of 10 kms.

A- From where?

B- From the Canal?

A- That means, inside our troops?

B- Our first line - 10 kms from the canal.

A- And these 10 kms will be occupied by what?

B- By UN and civilians

A- We were talking also of a variant. I want to check the variants. How many variants?

B- Two variants

A- Sir we cancelled this proposal, and we cancelled this proposal

B- This is a unilateral cancellation, general.

([illegible])

B- What I suggest, General: I think that we know your point of view although we disagree. You know our point of view.

A - But your point of view

B - is not acceptable

A - and cannot be physically

E - implemented

B - I know why you say it - because if you maintain that you have military presence, then it is difficult. Because, from your point of view (I don't see the difficulty, we don't accept it, we say no military presence on the East Bank, so we don't see the difficulty), but if we say 10 kms here -

A - Sorry, the 10 kms will be like this (over). That's our troops and your troops nose to nose.

B - But, general, you have today, if I take the 2nd army, I think that only in a few places the line is more than 4 kms. correct?

A - no.

B - Only in a few places.

A - no. Just only in a small place is —

B - from Ismaelia to Kantara, if I remember correctly, the line is 4-6 kms.

A - From 10 - 12.

B - In the 3rd army. In the South

A - There's only a small gap here is — area.

B - I think we must check it again. For your last argument I want — but to this I answered that, if I remember

the line correctly, in the majority of the Suez Canal, you have much less than 10 kms.

E - 5-7 kms; maximum is 7 kms.

B - Let us leave it now. I'll check it again and you'll check it again.

A - I am sure that there will be no distance at all between your troops and our troops, if it is 10 kms.

B - But this is assuming we accept your presence on the Eastern Bank of the Canal. There we have a difference of opinion. If we accept it, then there is a problem of 10 kms., but if there is no military presence, then this problem doesn't exist and your civilians can there is no one to stop them.

There are two possibilities: either the possibility about the line that I am right and you are wrong. Perhaps I'm wrong. I'm not swearing. I must check by the maps again but this is very easy to check where the maps are today. If I am right, then there is no problem. We have some distance. The second problem is that if you have civilians rebuilding Suez, how do you call the farm, the big farm, we call it "the Chinese farm." How do you call it? on the Eastern Bank? Here you have a big farm with irrigation and all that. It doesn't matter. So the people are working here. If there is no military presence on this road and we are back 10 kms, then no problem for the people to work.

We have a difficulty with our documen

because you continue from the point that you have military presence. I continue from the point where you don't have military presence. So it is only for the discussion.

A - Right

B - Green

A - That means anybody here, 10 kms from Ismaelia cannot shoot Ismaelia

B - Let us say we have no presence here.

A - no artillery?

B - Let us say we have no artillery here.

E - Just walking forces

A - Here to the left of —

E - 15 kms

A - And then 25 kms. is it safe for our people to work?

B - Let us say that we have a situation where we won't be able to fire artillery on this area, and you won't be able to fire artillery on a similar area. Then, the people can work freely. Alright, this was only for the sake of discussion

A - I can't understand now what's your proposal. Up till now I didn't get your proposal.

B - I'll resume it and try to make it very clear. I'll put it like that coord

A - 40 kms? I didn't say anything about the distance, but here to a distance or to a line, which we'll discuss. We have our troops here and then a security Zone and then the UN, and then a

security zone and then your troops.
B- I'll do it again and you correct me, please. Open — security zone.
A- Another security zone
B- Another security zone
A- And then the main forces.
B- If I understand correctly, security zone means light forces
A- Right
D- Anything like that
A- The same thing here
B- I know, I know ... Right?
A- Right. The distance
B- This is what I wanted to ask.
A- The distance here goes without saying more deep less troops, closer, we should keep more troops. We are obliged to do it.

~~A- We didn't say anything about the distance now 5 kms, 10 kms & [illegible],~~
~~B- Secure against what? Artillery?~~
~~D- Any kind of ground force activity.~~

B- (nods) " Distance is in proportion to the amount of forces, of Egyptian troops on the East Bank", correct?
A- In all cases, the canal zone, as civilians are concerned, should be secured enough. We didn't say a word about the distance now 5 kms, 10 kms 100 -s
B- "Secured" (nods) against what, against artillery?
D- Any kind of ground force activity.

B- " Secured against any kind of ground force activity " (rest)
A- So They can live safe.
B- ok. I understand.
A- That's my thinking but that's not
B- It's not an official proposal
A- Give me your proposal then.
E- May I just add something
B- yes.
E- The same argument can be turned over, saying, the smaller the Egyptian forces are here, the greater the distance we are ready to go.
A- Right
B- This is his opinion, I don't know, his personal opinion
A- That's all informal
B- yes now
A- Now, your proposal then, so I can take it with me.
B- yes. it's a problem, it's a problem. Because you have probably discussed it much better than we have, because your Prime Minister has already presented the whole plan.
A- I haven't seen him for a long time
B- If I know your general, you've probably prepared everything before the Prime Minister —.
A- That's just a military thinking, that's all from our military point of view
B- Where we have a problem is in your presence. You want both presence and UN.

You say the Egyptian forces, then you say UN forces, and you say this is at least 10 kms. Then you say this is, I don't know how much, another 10 kms. yes.

A - we can discuss it

B - Because what we had in mind is something different altogether. What we have in mind is - the canal, UN security line

A - The UN?

B - yes

A - UN Zone.

B - I haven't thought about how deep. This we can discuss, and then main forces now, if you say - I have no authority

A - I have the authority either

B - how deep This, we can discuss, main forces here can be discussed. Keeping in mind problems - "No Egyptian forces on East Bank." I know your provision: "Civilian activity on both sides of canal, depth of security zone, and (pull)

A - approximately

B - I'll tell you I am thinking about the factor I'm looking now at problems for which I don't have the answer but which I will recommend to take into consideration "canal out of Israeli artillery range" yes I understood the point you made? You said our main forces should be in a position that they could not fire with artillery or light weapons on the canal Zone and in particular civilian activity

A - Yes, that's one point.

B Now. what I have to say is - the official position that I have the authority to present is the one you have told me is unacceptable. Where are all your papers?

A - Here. 10 lines and 10 lines and UN, UN, UN!

B - no, this is not official. The official proposition, I'll write it down on paper ok? This is the official position that I have been authorized to convey. Now, your official position is this. Unofficial is this. And I'll also put, with your permission, unofficial, personal.

A - It's clear enough. Just to discuss it for a while before I leave. Can you explain how the people here will work?

B - I'll tell you first of all there is the principle of sovereignty and mutual presence. That is to say, it is possible, perfectly possible in my mind, that in a certain area say x there no military forces but there only sovereignty.

A - Do they have any security?

B - Could be also Egyptian police, or Egyptian gendarmerie.

A - About this space

B - Let us say, for example, you can have Egyptian civilian administration + Egyptian gendarmerie + UN.

A - And you think that they can live.

B - ~~I think so~~ Because you are not going to war! And this is only a temporary line. If we are talking about a permanent line, on this there is no argument, and

This I can state formally, this is only a temporary line

A - Right.

E - We can have also only light forces on the 10 kms and Observation Posts.

B - I'll tell you something, general we have a difficult job. very difficult job. Now I'm not telling you any story. This we have not discussed with the authority. And the authority is the military echelon, the political echelon and the government, the Cabinet. So, all these things, we have written down. I think I can tell the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, "I understand what the Egyptian position, as presented by General Gamasy very well."

A - Unofficial.

B - You gave me the official also

A - Not to be published in the newspapers.

B - This I promise you.

A - Or I'll be court marshalled.

B - I'll go back home (S.S. to not report) and the authorities and the General Staff and the Cabinet, the Prime Minister with the political advisers, they'll have to go through it You will probably want to to present what we discussed and I have given you also what I call personal view, yes? And I suggest that we then come back, like this today alone, or do you want the UN?

A - no?

B- I think that if we want to have progress — at home I know we have to have serious discussion. It is a serious matter. It is very easy to say "no." This is easy to say no. But if we want to find a way to say "yes, but..." we have to discuss it very thoroughly. So, today is Friday. Tuesday, Wednesday OK? We can have a meeting between us to discuss any practical problem. I'm not trying to run away from the practical problems. But on this I would recommend - I asked her yesterday, I told her again "I'm going to see General Comay... we'll discuss the matter with him, and I know General Comay will want to get down and as quickly as possible on concrete business. And I know that you she did not yet have time" - She was in Washington, she came back, she went to London, She came back and she had to appear in Parliament, and there was a — of "no confidence" by the opposition and all this, she was really occupied, so I told her "I'll tell General Comay Tuesday or Wednesday, I'll come back with something more concrete to discuss again. If that is OK. with you I suggest so. There are also practical problems. I don't know today or something will arise perhaps tomorrow, the question of kilo of the additional unloading area, perhaps there will be a problem with the prisoners, perhaps you will have a problem with fuel

How about meeting then on Sunday or Monday? We leave disengagement to Tuesday or Wednesday and we have a meeting on the practical problems - Sunday or Monday. I can cable you today or ~~tomo~~ tomorrow whether we prefer Sunday or Monday. And then when we meet, we can fit the meeting on the disengagement whether Tuesday or Wednesday.

A - And then the coming meeting will be for this.

2 - On Tuesday and Wednesday this to give time to my authorities to work it out properly. Perhaps Tuesday, but I don't want to say Tuesday and then tell you Wednesday. This is on disengagement. There might be practical problems, I suggest that on the practical problem, if you want, we can meet Sunday or Monday and I'll cable you by tomorrow whether Sunday or Monday.

A - So other matter except this. In case we don't meet on Tuesday or Wednesday because you may not have anything to talk, in this case I will hear from you if you want me on Sunday or Monday.

B - yes. I'll cable you tomorrow about Sunday or Monday

A - On practical problems

B - now it is possible that we won't have any practical problems. Do you see anything that is pressing from your point of view

for Sunday or Monday.

A- That's only the unloading point which you accepted. So, cable us and we will put it forward.

B- Alright. If we have no meeting on Sunday or Monday, then I'll let you know whether it is Tuesday or Wednesday.

A- What about the situation on the West now? I think that we'll start arguing on this subject, as I felt today, until we go to the peace conference?

B- How many times can we repeat the argument? one two three times or?

A- I feel that we started from A (that's ~~A) and then we'll have to keep this to~~ Go to Z.

B- Perhaps you can finish it at C.

A- I hope so. So, I think we'll have a very long time until we come to an agreement or disengagement. That's my [illegible]. Because we started on A, although we discussed it before. Then on B, and then on C and then on D. We discussed all that, and even th with the political leaders - they discussed all these matters. And they came to conclusion on these matters from the principle point of view. Right? of their political ideas.

So in case we start talking until the coming month and then we go to Geneve (or you go to Geneve but not me,

B I've got to run for elections

A- And then till the end of the year and then they'll start again on January and so on. Political people they don't care —

B- How about the situation here? Do you have any idea to move your troops to any other line from the situation now in order to facilitate the whole problem?

B- Ya. you mean if we move ~~it will~~ you get rid ~~Solve the~~ of the problem of supply. We have not discussed the problem to the general but I think you have thrown out the idea of replacement by UN.

E- Temporarily, as an intermediary stage. Lets say the 3rd army withdraws to the West Bank, and we withdraw to the East Bank We have one line from South of Ismailia to Suez and you have a continuous line on the Western side till Ismailia, and then from Ismailia you have on the East side, on the Northern sector, the 2nd army

A- According to the agreement we are talking about because we are military men and not politicians. According to the agreement, item (B) which we are ~~death~~ discussing. Do you have any idea that you will move your troops to any other lines on the West until we come to an agreement on the disengagement?

B- I understand the question. On principle, we prefer to move in one more. ~~If~~ — We First of all you know that we have not been notified by anybody officially, not USA department, not UN. except

Except what we read in the newspapers, we had no notification from anybody about the cease-fire. But let us suppose that we ——— ! We have a problem. We must have elections. The elections were due October 30th. The parliament decided to suspend it. Now if we go to disengagement, the Parliament must have a mandate from the people. Our government's mandate is run out in October prolonged to 31st of December. So we got to make elections. On what shall we make elections? Shall we make elections on labour, or cost of living. The subject of election will be the kind of solution we are going to have. Santoga And when the Parliament decided on the 31st of December, it was 2 or 3 days after the cease-fire. We didn't know about Geneve. We didn't think about geneve or disengagement - nothing. This is not used as a pretext, but I present the problem to you. This does not say that under no circumstances the peace conference should not start. It can be started preliminarily. In such a conference there are a lot of problems - for example - who will take part. There's a problem. For example - Syria. Syria ~~we have~~ With Syria the situation is altogether different. No actual agreement only a decision about cease-fire

We have big ~~problem~~ trouble with the P.O.W's, big trouble, big trouble. We wanted to start an agreement with them through the US which starts with a return to the villages (there are big villages) of the civilians, and in addition we want to settle the question of the P.O.W's. The Syrians are only talking about this, —— So there's us a problem. I don't know, could you help to talk to them?

A- I don't know if we can or not.

B- I'm only asking, I'm not pressing you.

A- No, if we can help, we have no objection at all to do it.

B- If we ask it formally could you do it, yes?

A- We can start talking with them. Their foreign minister is in Cairo today, and he will stay with us two or three more days. Why not?

B- If you can, we will be grateful —— because we have a difficult problem with Syria now.

But I come back to the point, because you started about disengagement. So we have this problem. But we would like to do it in one move and we don't have to wait for the peace conference. We see the disengagement as something between you and us, not only in contact with the peace-conference. That is to say, as you said general, of the

peace conference starts only 9th of December, so we try to finish the disengagement by 5th. If not it means that we can't start the peace conference. One possibility.

Second possibility - the Israelis because of elections don't want a peace conference until January. - therefore — disengagement.

No. This in our conception has nothing to do with the peace conference. But something that has to do with the peace conference is <u>which line we should get to</u>. This has to do with the peace conference because we have negotiations in mind. But the actual disengagement as an act, we do not tie at all with the peace conference. So to come back to the question, we would like to do it in one jump. If this is what you like, I'll come back again on Tuesday or Wednesday. We will also discuss at home the point of possibility of intermediate step. For example, we see the possibility, as an intermediate step, for example, we exchange our forces for the 3rd army.

DOWN

E - A switch of forces.
B - This is a possibility.
A - A possibility of what?
B - That we exchange. No Israeli forces on the West Bank. Israeli force here on this side.

instead of 3rd army which is gone back to this side.

A- That's no C

B- No, no, this is not a disengagement. This is intermediate step, not disengagement Intermediate stage - that is to say, not the line of disengagement.

E- Half a step.

B- But again we have not discussed it - because the question you asked me "what about between the line of disengagement and today?"

D- What? The question was what measure would be taken in the ~~East~~ West on the ground to meet our agreement.

A- For example?

D- Any kind of separation of troops; movement towards a line 22nd

E- 22nd is no separation, because if let's say on 22nd we were 5 kms from here and the 3rd army comes in here, there is no separation.

D- We didn't say that. The question was - "what measures?" As general mentioned, it's urgent to be done -

A- ye., but how? How will it look on the ground? I understood the idea, but how will it look?

A- As we feel on the Western Bank is the most complicated situation for the 3rd army and for your troops here, both of them.

B - We can live with it.

A - If some of your troops withdrawn to any line we discuss, here it will ease the military situation in this area, which will blow out at any time. It can be sooner or later. And I'm afraid we will start discussing the disengagement line for a long long long time. I feel that it will take a long time to come to the plan. I agree with you a hundred percent that if you can do it one step, it will be good for you and good for us and we'll finish about this 24 and line or any other line. We want to ease the situation here.

B - I understand

A - From a military point of view, as a step for the coming point. Both are parallel — meanwhile we are talking. Exactly as the agreement - 6 points.

B - A disengagement in order to discuss the line of disengagement. A separation of forces in order to discuss the line of disengagement

A In the 6 point agreement, we discussed it and we left 2. While these 6 points should be simultaneously with each other.

B - A parcel.

A - So we are skipping 2 of them.

B - General we once talked about it, but I won't to come back to it. Whilst we

are discussing the disengagement, (we don't have the disengagement yet, we don't have the peace conference yet) there will be a situation in the 2nd army then you are in a very bad situation!

A - It is not necessary to do it like this. Why don't I if you move to that area. Here is the Suez road and here is another road and here is a 3rd. road and so on. We can make a very wide Buffer Zone for the UN to work according to our principles to make it as wide as we can so we prevent any clashes from both sides. And this will ease the situation here, and 100% will ease the situation here, because they are connected. The people here in the 3rd army. The minute your troops will move, from the military point of view, there is no need to keep all these forces here - why? We are stepping to peace

B - I'll tell you why, because we have not agreed upon the line of disengagement and it is important for us as well as for you to gain good military position!

A - I said before that I am afraid that the situation here gets more and more complicated from day to day so we should have immediate steps to ease the situation here.

B - I'll tell you General.

A - without any recommendation to ease the

situation is the 2nd army, you can do it.

B - "intermediary phase." / unofficial?

A - Official or unofficial whatever you like, and back again I'm responsible for that.

B - Ok. I owe you an answer on that.

A - That's one step to show the people that there is confidence between both of us. And please read what the other countries are talking about us now. If we don't have a solution on that problem, I don't think we'll move too much because again I think we'll have a long long time discussing on that line.

B I understand.

A - And the UN, you can make it as wide as you want. But here we don't care too much for the troops here - Sinai area, from here to Suez — we have so many troops here and again, again again from the military point of view, there is no need to keep all these troops here on the Eastern side.

B - I understand.

A - Alright. And this is officially and unofficially both of them.

E - Are you ready, for instance, to withdraw from the Eastern side a division or one of the divisions. Or how much?

A - I'm ready to minimize the troops here from the military point of view! We can cross again if there is a threat, but this will give the 3rd army and the 2nd army and the whole people will feel that something is happening. Our problem now is that everybody is not trusting us, us as military men.

B - Ya.

A - Inside our armed forces, they are ~~blaming~~ blaming us for the situation that we have made

B - Yes. I know.

A - And also the civilians are speaking half their time on that, just because they want their people back home. They will be happy for that. And from the military point of view, we don't want to start, we don't have the idea to start another war. If we can put here or minimize it, and in this case we will give you the security and you will give us the security. Both sides will have the security feel will ease, and we'll have plenty of time to discuss it here.

B - I understand your point. I don't say that I agree, but I understand your point

A - Make it official

B - That's ok. Anyway I put it down in Hebrew.

A - As from the operation point of view ——
B - I put down "From Egyptian point of view OK. also official."
A - And the AL-AHRAM and the newspapers now are starting shouting saying that the Israelians are not respecting the agreement and they are starting talking about disengagement and forget everything about the 22nd of October.
B - You don't want this - a souvenir
A - A souvenir, just to remember
D - This is a very very sensitive: urgent thing to give a response
A - If you are ready to discuss this tomorrow, I'm ready to discuss it
B - no, then I can tell you, not because we don't want to discuss, because then is no point in telling you "NO" this we can do tomorrow. But then is no point therefore to discuss all the we need time because the government —— does not start until (Christmas)
D - I'm sorry general.
B - Please, please
D - We signed an agreement mentioning the 22nd line — We go back home, and the hell of a time we have
B - Colonel, I understand what you are saying, but if we take the language of the agreement, it says "within the framework of disengagement"
A - Mr. Kissinger's formulation!

D - "Within the framework" means that it is connected to it and an immediate thing to be done.

B - I can tell you this - we have no interest of staying here long. We can, ~~but to~~ physically we can, but we have no intention. We'll have a tough discussion on the disengagement, but the toughness of the discussion is not designed to make us stay longer here. The toughness of the discussion on the disengagement originates from our wish not to be in a position, when we go to the line of disengagement, and this represents the expression of the end of the fighting, that we are in a situation where what has been gained, or not gained, is not expressed by the line. This is all. Not the intention to stay here

D - With the intention of moving towards peace, and General I'm sure 10 years later will remind me that we stayed here discussing about tonnage

B - True.

D - It is a shame. We can get a very good start fulfilling what we have agreed upon.

A - Here are our troops GOLAN. The main problems between both sides are here and here and here in the East

B - Demilitarization, and the question of the final line.

A- Well, here [illegible]. A line from [illegible] to — and then we have an area for the UN. and here is our area Security Zone and we'll have Security Zone and main forces etc. And then keep the situation at this until we finish the peace conference. So it will be the best solution for disengagement. You still have from our land from 60 to 100 kms.

B- This is inside Israel

6 kms.

A- And here a hundred kms

B- If I understand, this is for Salam.

A - Yes. Disengagement line

B- Right away?

A- Right away. This is unofficial I was with the spirit to handle it over step by step and make it easy for both sides, but I feel that it may be very difficult for us. It may be difficult for both of us to come to a conclusion on the disengagement line. It will take a long time.

That is our official one — to come to that line - [illegible], shorem a Sheik is here, so that is the UN area, Security Zone and so & so. So we'll all the problems and then we can send all our army home, and you send your army home

B- For the record, General,

A- Official

B- General, for the record I will take it with me, but because I want to maintain a friendship with you, I suggest we don't discuss it now. (5/1x3)

A - This informal thing I gave, you can start working on it. That's one step forward.

B - We'll take it very seriously. May I in the end only ask you that you give the necesary instructions to check the question (of the list) as thoroughly as possible. It is urgent.

A - Alright. I will see Sheriff and what he did now. If we start on Kabrid position — . Sorry for discussing all these small things — .

B - Life is difficult.

A - About your proposal you said if we take the point away, you put UN forces instead.

B - Ya.

E - no change in the line, no change in weapons, evacuation

B - yes everything you have

A - Is there any possibility to supply them where they are? No other possibility? If we say cease-fire and we have a boat here, that is 6 tons or 7 tons, what hurts you to feed these people? As a part of the bridge head where you are giving them 150 tons, and here they will have only 10 tons a day. What's

the difficulty? Is it because it is very important for us?

B- I ill tell you general. I would gladly discuss it with you, but on this I have very specific instructions —

A- — It gives me the impression that these small things reflect how we are treated — that's all. 150 tons going to thousands of people here and 100 soldiers here are not feeded.

B- General, I'll report it back, — you refered to at the end to how we behave to you

A- yes.

B- I'll take the city of Suez. We all know that in the city of Suez there are about 4000 civilians, 50000 civilians, the rest are all military men, 3rd army elements. We did not make any conditions that we would not supply the 3rd army. We supply the city of Suez, calculated 20,000 men.

A- It was good

B- Ok? Why do I say it? I'm not giving it as an answer back on Rabid. I'm saying it inorder to —

A- Alright

B- I am not saying it because I want to say "the final argument Yariv gave." This is not the problem, because the question of attitude is important. We talked about the confidence building measures - it is important.

E - We had, for instance, the problem with the lists. Nobody in our goverment could understand why although we gave you the lists daily, and we couldn't get the lists.

A That's very bad

E They couldn't understand it why you were so resistant on the list.

D With the same spirit you got to look at Kabrid.

B So Colonel, this is why I said to the general I'll report it.

A Alright. It will not make any offerenc to us if we take these people to the bridge head. Because for future military activities, if there will be any this won't do anything. You have your troops here, and we have our troops here.

B You have a firm base anyway on the Southern part of the East Bank.

A So, honestly, who talks with me on that subject? The 3rd army commander

B General Wasi

A General Wasi, yes.

B Is he in good health now?

A yes.

B ₪1311

A And he was not sick at all

B No, but sometimes he used to have trouble with his stomach. Perhaps I mit him up with somebody else...

A- He says "you are giving us supplies for thousands of people here
B - and you can't ~~give~~ get a supply
A - for them?" Alright what can I do? Can I fight for these people too? No, the answer no. What can I do? "Is that a cease-fire?" "yes, it is a cease-fire." Just give us time, give us time give us time." and, honestly, I told him yesterday, and in the conference here he called me & said "don't forget Kabrial." "Hell with Kabrial position there. You have thousands here." He asked me if I will not be able, I should have them by any means— I told him "keep them there until we see and they can fast for 2 or 3 days."

E Ramadan, the secret of Ramadan.

B I will report it faithfully to the government.

A Honestly, I don't know how long they can stay there and the quantity of rations they have. Honestly, alright, thank you very much

So I can come to a conclusion. The 22nd point or any line to be discussed on the West will be taken into consideration ~~by you~~ and we will have another reply on that

B - yes.

A - We agree 100%, that if we can do the disengagement line on the East one step,

for the benefit of both sides, alright with us. We don't care too much for that. We can come to a conclusion then. We don't want want to link the disengagement line with the conference of peace. ~~We~~ And then the official proposal EL ARISH to RAS MUHAMAD. The unofficial proposal that is my personal proposal, but I can back it for a long time for the military purposes, and disengage the clashes, or minimize the clashes. When you think ——

Please remember that the minute we have a good line for disengagement, will ease the military situation and thousands of civilians will be in the area, and Mr. Osman will start his work. This is quite a security for you. We don't want to keep all our forces on the Eastern Bank. That's for sure, because there's no need for that, provided that we have some steps to show the people and the other military personnel to be convinced that we are going towards peace. How peace and how ~~so~~ so I'll leave it to Mrs. Meir and President Sadat.

B - I understood.

A - Thank you very much.

19.1.1.73

A- GAMASY
B. Yariv
D. Colonel Hadi
E. EYAL

B- We'll continue the serious talk about disengagement on Wednesday. Is that Ok?
A Wednesday is not suitable for me. Tommorrow or Saturday
B- Tommorrow, we haven't finished the discussion yet. Tommorrow we have a meeting with the Prime Minister. So Thursday is Ok. If it is Friday, then I can't come,
D - What are you?
B - He is a mayor. He is going to run for mayor.
E - I'd like to be able to invite you to have good wine — what about beer?
A- Is it that on Friday you will not continue?
B- I won't be able to continue
A- There will be another
B- Major general. Well, it may be general Tal. He is one of the candidates, but they have not decided yet. It's a question not of wanting this one or the other one. It's a question of the law. I want to go into politics. If I were a field commander, then it is something different, I would have given up everything, but I'm not a field commander, I am a staff officer
D - That means that for war you are willing to give up your ~~candidatship~~ candidacy but for peace, you don't.

- No, not for war.
E - That's why he decided to go to politics.
A - — The general authority when you left the Golani Brigade.
B - the question is that when you are a commander of men, then if you leave them you —
E - You can't leave them. You have a responsibility towards them.
- you're a traitor to them if you leave them, but I am only a staff officer. the Chief of Staff can get along very well without me.
- Peace is much more important today, so that's why it would the best on the political side.
B - If it is Thursday, I'm here. Tommorow is impossible because we'll have to sit with the Prime Minister and it will take the Whole day.
A - Alright. So we settle an official meeting for Thursday 11 o'clock.

B - Now the point I would like again to take up, and I want to say, it is very very serious from our point of view, very very serious, very serious is the question of the names that are not on the list, and I will give you 3 examples:
A lieutenant by the name of Cohen ARAN no —
- Why don't we leave it until Sheriff comes? We'll discuss everything in front of him.
- I'll tell you general, I'm not taking the whole list. I want to give you 2 or 3 example

why we are taking it so seriously.

A- We take it seriously too.

B- Because, for example, this man he has been seized, in Cairo sent to prison on the 16th of October, when the Minister of War visited the prisons and he is not on the list. He was seen by 4 of our P.O.W.'s who are now here.

A- Be sure that you will have him. There must be some mistake, because the Minister of War went to see all the prisoners, so there was no cheating about that.

B- He is not on list! Another captain

A- On that item, if we have the desire to hide him for any reason, we shall never hide him.

B- So, why he is not on the list?

A- He was inside the party, and infront of the Minister, and the whole group saw him.

B- And the second man was not on the visit of the Minister of war, but he has been seen in the hospital by 3 people.

A- — registered in the hospital and this is the reason ...

B- and in the prison, and in the prison.

E- and in the prison.

B- And a private, we saw him on the Jordanian television on the 16th of October. He is not in the list. Another private was on the ~~south~~ voice of Cair on the 6th of November 930 in the morning. We heard his voice and he is not on the list.

A- I'm responsible for all that. These are very clear cases, very clear cases.

B- I only took 5'51, there are other cases. But I want, general, to emphasize as strongly as I possibly can how seriously we regard this problem.

A- I want to tell you, General, I reported the cases you told me to our minister, and he took it very seriously, and all of us took it very seriously. Especially with the responsible people for guarding in hospitals, and especially registration which may be the main problem for us - faults while making the lists. But we had no idea at all, or no intention at all to keep anyone for any reason.

B- I also suggest that you check with the interrogation people.

A- No, for the interrogation, they put them in prison or in hospital, so all the prisoners should be registered.

B- So I suggest that as soon as possible the two gentlemen sit down.

Now, another additional point, you still have 3 seriously wounded people who have not been evacuated with the seriously wounded people. One major [illegible], captain [illegible], lieutenant [illegible] and private [illegible]. We agreed that the seriously wounded will be evacuated

E- 2 legs broken, you know.

A- But understood that you want the P.O.W's and the wounded P.O.W's both of them ~~simultaneously~~ simultaneously.

B- Yes, but amongst the wounded, we agreed to get the seriously wounded first.

E- We have sent you all the wounded except one. There is one whom the doctor wants to stay a few days more because he is very serious. Well, we can let him go but this would be very

A- doctor?

E- The doctor from the Red Cross. He advised us to

~~to~~ keep him for a few more days, so that he would be able to be healthier. Otherwise all the wounded were sent.

B- Now, it is hard for us to understand why there are so many changes in the ~~notification~~ daily notification concerning the numbers of exchange of prisoners, and the time.

A- Only once.

B- No, why? On the 1st day we had the 9 people who didn't come, on the second day

E- the second group.

B- for the second group, the first number you have given us was different from the second. It is not a question of the number. It is a question that when we get the number we notify people.

E- And the families

B- Last night at 1 o'clock in the morning! Half past one!

A- Concerning the ~~timing~~ timing?

E- It was planned that the second bunch would come around 6 o'clock, 6:15; everything was agreed with the Red Cross, because everyday a representative from Tel-Aviv comes with one of the air-crafts to Cairo, sits with your people there, arranges the whole plan. And we would ask very much, if we could get the second group, say 6 or 7 but not after midnight. You see ~~3~~ 1:30 is ...

A- Ya. [illegible]

B- Now, about the bodies. I understand from general Eyal that we agreed to start with the bodies on Sunday.

E- Or monday.

B- And it's not Sunday, not Monday, it's

tommorrow.

A- It will start tommorrow. We will have the meeting here and.

B- I understood, when I talked with you, general, that we would have a chaplain accompanying the Red Cross people to look for the bodies, and this is not being agreed upon.

A- Why ——

B- Ah! What about your lines? We don't need the information. We have the air-force and this is not a problem to look for a force or a tank. It is not important.

A- I know that you want these people for the identification of the bodies. So, we are able to do it with the Red Cross. It will be alright

B- You will see an old man with a grey beard. I understand it is legitimate not to have someone looking around.

A- [illegible]

B- Explain it in English, so they can understand. This is it — through the Red cross if they collect all the dead bodies.

D — put them on UN — across the canal to Sinai.

B- And how about identification?

A- Identification should be done. You have the files.

D- They will take all the details ——

E- — if they take the tank number or the location

A- The tank number. or anything —

B- And what is also very important is to know the exact location where the is. That can help us sometimes in identification.

A- [illegible] You want. then to say what body, where, the number of the tank.

I am talking about the bodies within our — to put all the details, so that they can identify any other of them.

E- Even to name the place — for example if it was Rabrid or Port Taufic, if we know where it will make it easier to identify them.

B- Then, there is the question of the 25 bodies from Suez. I am told the Red Cross people are there, but if they are there, we would like to have the bodies as soon as posible. —

A- According to your plan, according to the exchange of bodies, we start from Suez — Port Said, it doesn't make any difference, with them or with us —

E- Yes, you see but in Suez I would like, if we can just to this problem from the rest, because we understood from the General, that I think it was a week ago, that there are around 25 bodies there. So if it is posible and they are ready the bodies to be transferred as soon as possible.

B- It can be done in a day

A- General Eyal will stay with Mr. Boisard and Sheriff and we are ready to hand them over.

E- Very good. So

A- So what arrangement they take, we are ready to do, we have no objection at all.

B- You handed over to us the two bodies of the UN officers. With them was an Israeli liesan officer.

A- — got two bodies today

B- It's wounded prisoners that died.

A- You didn't get the body of the liason officer?
B- No.
E- We got only the two bodies of the UN officers.
D- but not the third one.
A- Alright, no problem.
B- General, we would like to have all the dead bodies, you already have, from the wounded prisoners etc, as soon as possible
A- and ours
B- Yes, of course on a mutual basis, of course. How about Levi? You have him since 1953. For 20 years.
A- He is not a P.O.W, and he will be treated separately.
B- alright
A- As the other case
B- Separately? Where do we stand on the separately.
A- No, I mean when we finish all these P.O.W's we can talk about these two cases, [illegible] and [illegible]
B- Why do you condition it on the question of the P.O.W's? as a separate special problem?, when we ~~finish~~ finish talking about the P.O.W's! Why can't we talk about it?
A- Because that's another problem.
B- I know, but still
A- When we finish all our problems and different things here, we can pay it special attention
B- alright. How about the water pipe, it will be ready next Sunday. By next Sunday, all the preparations will be made
A- alright
B- Just at the end of this point, I would like to emphasize again, General, how seriously we take the question of the names who are not on the li

We are very worried about it, very worried about it.

D - I have a preliminary answer. The gentleman who was shown on the Jordanian television is not one of the 9 we have shown on our T.V. Now I suggest that the Red Cross pass it to the Jordanian authorities.

Second, about the helicopter crew, there is a very high probability, that they are amongst the 25 bodies in Shes. There's a high probability. I can't be sure, but when we find the bodies, we can finally see.

E - Yes, but the Captain called after that he was seen by our P.O.W's in the main prison.

B - I told you general.

A - The co-pilot

B - No, the co-pilot is wounded and you gave his name on the list.

A - There are people who can say what happened to the rest of the crew?

B - Yes.

A - They were seen by others? I have great experience with this. In 67 when we had our P.O.W's and I was with them personally I had a lot of names given to me by our P.O.W's of people they say they saw in captivity and they were not on the list and never came back here. But we were skeptical about it, because I trusted the Red Cross and I trusted the information given to the Red Cross. But hearsay about prisoners from people that came from prison saying that they have seen so & so I can give you a list of hundreds of names who have been seen by our people. You will hear fathers & mothers telling you they have heard.

B- Fallen and V this is possible. But here independently you get 3 or 4 P.O.W's, they can tell you the exact date and the exact place, I only gave you general 2 examples.

A- P.O.W's who were with them?

B- yes. I gave you general only 2 examples. One who was present when the Minister of war visited the central prison in Cairo, general אחמד סלים. the second example, this a captain, a helicopter pilot who was seen by 3 of our P.O.W's at the hospital and the prison.

A - (בדיבורית) תגיד אם אחמד אלגזי אומר שיש עוד אנשים שלנו שנמצאים בכלא אצלכם, כי הוא (הפלה), כי הוא מעניין אותי אישית. יש דברים שהם לא יודעים עליהם ושיהיה לנו. אני רוצה שאתה תגיד להם.

A- Before I leave I would like to hear from you what remarks you have, so that I can start personally to investigating this matter. Because we don't want to make any problems about that. It never happened. It happened with us and it will never happen with Egypt. If we want to keep them, then we'll keep them. But keeping them without announcing, that's not fair at all. As I said before we should have a certificate when we finish this exchange that every side hasn't got a single prisoner of war, wounded or not wounded, in the lines, in the prisons, in the cities - to be sure that there is no P.O.W in our hands, as will our troops and also in your troops - and all the precautions you want. When we finish this exchange

we can take 2 or 3 ~~weeks~~ days reserve and make another meeting, especially for that in case 100%, no doubt about any one we should hold, and both of us should be satisfied on that point problem.

B - I suggest that - general Eyal has the whole list, they'll both sit down today

E - yes. I have all the names, we'll check it again today

A [illegible]

We'll finish about the P.O.W.'s until they discuss it. Now what about ~~another~~ the second unloading point for the 3rd army?

B - Now here we have difficulties. We think that from the security point of view, it is better to have one unloading point. I don't know whether you know that we lost, 2 people were killed, one on Saturday and one 2 days before Saturday, I think it was Thursday, 2 people were killed at Kilo at the unloading area, and if we have another unloading area, we will have trouble again. So we to have only one unloading area.

A - this is a sad thing to hear

B - I ~~didn't~~ know. When I came back on Saturday we met Friday, when I come back, they told me about it. I wanted to ____ but the Minister said. "no. this is a serious matter, ____. we will discuss it with General Eyal."

A - the problem is now that we are sending them 25 lorries a day or 20 lorries. They can't take more than 11. In one day they took 22 and in another 15.

B- I think that if the work is properly organized, they can take 25 lorries a day. If you need some more people, I don't think if you can have some more people. If you need another 2 or 3 amphibious vehicles [illegible]. We prefer to have more intensive work on one point than to divide it between 2 two points.

A- It doesn't make any difference to you to make 2 unloading points?

B- The difference is that it makes more security problems — Rabbani last night you said we have problems with Kilo, two guys —

A- Killed?

B- That's right. If you want, we can give you the exact time and the exact date That means it was refused, [illegible]

A- / RABBI! You accept supplying Kabrit with the same procedure as the third, or still at your last proposal.

B- no. the last proposal.

A- there is no other way.

B —

A- In case we agree on that, we'll get into contact with the UN, direct.

B- But as I say - disagreement, no misunderstanding we are ready to evacuate the people, but not the tanks

A- Ah! That's another thing. That's another thing.

B- I don't say we take. We'll leave it to the UN.

A- That's another thing.

B- How about some of that, do you haven't got any of that good Egyptian coffee? If so may,

... / - . . . . — . . . .

A - yes
B - I & I may, much better than the coffee I get from the troops.
A - the third point about the fuel needed for the town of Suez.
B - Now, here we have a difficulty —
A - Did you receive my menage?
B - no.
A - I sent it at 2300 yesterday.
B - no.
A - Through the UN, and Brigadier Sheriff surely sent it.
B - no.
A - I told you when you sent me the menage I told you that I investigated the problem of P.O.W's.
E - there may be one misunderstanding that general AVNon should have come with us and he didn't appear. May be he did get a menage last night because my secretary told me that he was trying to reach me on the phone last night.
A - At any rate, I sent you a cable saying that you had 63 P.O.W's instead of the numbers we meant the day before. Because I felt that you were not
B - happy
A - So I gave you the number which should be given including some more members instead of ~~4~~. Brigadier Sheriff
B - I'll tell you what we'll do, we'll get him on the phone and ask him whether he got the menage, and why he didn't notify us. Perhaps he called me at night because I pulled out the phone; I was very tired and I went to bed at 9:30.

E- He was supposed to be with us today
B- The journalists were calling because the press said I was going to leave, so everybody was calling. So I pulled out the phone and went to bed. Perhaps he called me, but this morning he could have called me. I was in the office till 9 o'clock.
A- I sent a message saying that the meeting is ok about the time, and you will have 68 prisoners yesterday instead of the 40 which we said
E- Ah, that's the first time I hear it
A- to keep the number at the same level we discussed before, after we discussed it with all the authorities concerning these POWs.
B- Thank you very much, general.
A- And you received already the same numbers I sent in the message.
E- Yes, you did, at 1 o'clock at night.
B- I appreciate it.
A- And also I sent you a message about the fuel needed for Tues.
B- the message is there, I'll have to give the answer.
A- That's another message.
B- I'll have to give you answer on Thursday, or I'll send you before on cable.
A- — trouble you all the time. For the town we need 2 lorries 3 tons daily, and 1 lorry with 6 tar gas that is for the hospital and once a week. I wrote it to you in detail in the cable. So be sure you receive it.
B- I have no authority to give you an answer now. I have to discuss it with the

Minister

A- I think it's not a big problem there 2 lorries which have to go to the civilians there!

B- I'll

A- And also the quantities need for different things

B- It's all in the cable?

A- In, general in the cable, but I want to tell you the details.

B- בסדר גמור. אני רוצה קודם כל שנשתה קפה

A- We would like to drink our coffee then (בדיחה)

B- בקשר לזה שהוא - תספרי לו
תגידי לו שיש אחד שנקרא [illegible]
בוודאי. [illegible] מי? [illegible]

B- He is the most famous sergeant major in Israel.

A- I think we should have him for a troop in Cairo.

B- I'll get him permission, no problem.

A- תגידי לו שיש לנו כמויות קטנות - [illegible]

B- [illegible]

A- [illegible]

B- He is very famous.

A- We have very small quantities of different things, so you will feel that they will not go to the 3rd army for war or for troops in Suez for war. Now 10000 litres ~~Kg~~. Kerosine. That's for elimination and Are you writing it?

B- I am making a good deal, I think

A- Are you writing the

B- yes, yes.

A- 10000 litres ___ That's for electricity pumps 10000 litres diesel that's for hospitals and

kitchens - that's daily. 100 litres petrol for cars inside the town - the police, the ambulances, 100 kgs lubricant oil, motor oil - that's daily. Weekly - 50 litres butos gas — gas, —, that's for the hospitals and what they are using in the houses. 100 kgs grease, 30 litres oil for car brake. So that's 3 item weekly and 5 items daily. That's all. If you consider the quantities, you will find them lesser than needed.

B - General, I am very sorry because I am not playing a game in order to give me. I didn't take the cable. I got notification from General Gasit yesterday when I sat with the minister on the old question of UN and Red Cross, that there is a confirmation of the meeting. And we'll check now where the cable is and, of course, I'll check with the minister. I'll tell you where the problem is — The problem is not quantity. The problem is the question of agreement. Where it says about them "water, food, medical supplies", but we'll discuss it.

D - — very minor details — it's just the kind of what we expect — for the population, just to facilitate them - that is all. The quantity is the minimum. The machine of the civilian city must go on.

B - I understand, but as there are some instructions which I must follow, so I have to check with the minister. If the cable would have been there, if I had known about the cable, I would have come with an answer now.

D- Does it mean that you are the only one interested in peace?

B- no,

D- to facilitate?

B- This means that at one point I have a certain autonomy very limited, to decide on the spot, and other point I have to discuss.

E- We have agreed on patrol

D- to the convoy

B- And I have not asked the Minister. He looked at me and said Ok.

A- There's no other way.

D- These lorries need lubricative oil.

B- For these lorries there is no problem. For these lorries, Colonel, gasoline, lubricative oil, everything, they are ready, no problem.

D- —

E- You must admit that on all the items, for example, food, we were quite liberal and there was no objection to the various items that were there, and the first and the other convoys,

A- yes, we don't have any trouble on that.

B- General, you must understand also that we have been super liberal on this way. Why? I'm coming back to that point always, I am sorry I don't like to rub it in but I have to say it now that we are on that point. You have at the most, I'll be liberal, 5000 civilians in Suez - I am liberal now. And the rest of the 20,000 who are mentioned are military men.

D- Even so you have not denied the 3rd army food.

B- Yes. We are giving food to the third army and again more. So you are getting for the third army through two channels.
D- Even so, you can't consider these people more than civilians.
B- Why?
D- Because they have not any organized kind of uniform.
B- Well, but they are still military people with weapons.
D- Are they?
B- Yes. For example, the light wounded people. They look very well, physically young.
D- They are a bit thirsty.
B- But honest to come back, I'm not evading the answer. To come back to the question, you'll have an answer on the fuel question to the city of Suez as soon as possible.
D- But as a personal request from you, that you support it as much as you can because it is a very very minor thing — and — able to get through with this minor thing — by all means to frustrate them.
B- I'll give you an honest answer - I'll do my best.
D- Then it is not certain.
B- No don't be sure of that. I don't promise, if I make a promise, then it is 100%. But I say I'll do my best.
D- If you support them, then it is certain.
B- Sometimes, yes. I am only a general, not a minister. I don't know whether I'll be a minister.
D- It's something possible.
B- Thank you.

A- The last point - Yesterday there were 4 or 6 cases where your troops shot at our troops

B- When was that?

A- And also ~~During~~ air reconnaissance

B- You had your planes?

A - Yours

B - Our planes!

A - One of them we didn't shoot and one of them

B - Was shot, down?

A - no. not shot down yet shot against it.

B - From you?

A - From us. Because they went West of the canal 20 kms. in the Northern part.

B - Where about? Port Said,

A - In area. The first coming from South of ms 1/2 or South of D'325, north of ms and came up to here. That's 2 cases. And then 2 clashes in Ismaelia area, south of Ismaelia

B - Can you give me? in the Ismaelia area... on the canal, or on the ...?

A - One on the West, and one on the east

B - Aha! one on the west, on the canal on the west, or the (kerosine) canal, and one on the ~~Ea~~ east, on the Suez canal: ~~Ca~~ Can you give me the ~~A~~ ?

A - We sent the line and everything to the UN. And just making an indication. 3 of our soldiers were taking a hut, south of ms 1/2 or ms 1/2 or D'325, they were 3 of them civilians and 3 of them military, doing yet just like there soldiers working there, and some of your soldiers shot at them and we had casualties

Some of them killed.

B- Where was that?

A- South of ADAbiya. I am giving them because cease fire is the first item in the agreement. We didn't come to any conclusion on that and we are still just talking about that. We would like you to give any instructions to your troops

B- to observe the order of cease-fire. On this I can promise you that I'll do my very very best to ensure you.

A- And we are doing the same thing - giving strict orders in order to ensure that there are no clashes between one officer from here and another officer from there. Yesterday one of your officers came to one of our officers, local commander, I won't say where

B- Why?! it's alright! I am very glad!

A- Saying "don't do that. I'll give my word it is alright" That happened yesterday, and so they settled the matter

B- Very good! I'm very glad we have such officers!

A- Some officers are quite aggressive and some officers are in good relation with each other.

D- It is very important, general.

B- Very important

D- Equal and this symbol of equal understanding and co-operation of the forces ought to be

B- general.

D- general, because firing is something very dangerous.

B- I agree with you.

B- On this we have no misunderstanding and no disagreement.

E - The case near Kilo, the soldiers ... This is already the 3rd case, but only 2 of them were killed, and they felt very badly about it, and it happened in the vicinity of the unloading area, and the unit there was outraged because they claimed "not only do we let the Egyptian soldiers take their rations, but the return is that they snipe at us. This was regarded at headquarters as a very serious case

A It was reported to us that your snipers shot against our forces, and they shot towards them. We don't want to say that, but it happens. We had 3 killed yesterday. We didn't report that to the UN in order to keep it —

B - You have met General Tal. He is in command. I know General Tal, personally on the phone not to the division commander, to the Brigade commander — the battalion commander — and I'll

A Honestly, we are doing the same thing.

B I'll speak to the Chief of Staff, I'll speak to the Minister, and I'll see General Tal when we get back, he's waiting for me wants to see me anyway, so I'll tell General Tal himself about the incidents situation.

A That's yesterday - 3 cases. But we didn't announce that in order to keep it smooth.

B I am very sorry about that.

E And by the way, general, last night, about midnight, I was with the assistant chief of the military hospital ~~in Beer~~ at Sheba, and

and he was at the phone at my house and he got a phone call saying that 6 wounded were brought to the hospital from the area.

A - From Suez?

B - From the whole area.

A - Alright. In case we can't collect the lorries or send the lorries to the 3rd army, as it happens now, and you refuse to make another unloading area, what can we do then? I mean yesterday we sent them 25 lorries, still they have 11 ___.

B I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll get back home - but I'll ask you before that, for there is no point if I'll ask the authorities for something that doesn't give you anything, and from which you derive no benefit - if you have more men unloading, if you have more vehicles does that help?

A It will be better

B Ok. so I'll check if we can get more of your men across to help unloading; and how many more vehicles would you like to have?

A Double

B 20. I don't promise, but I promise you to check and an answer we'll calculate.

A We have one ferry working there

D 2 ferries

A 2 ferries? We can make them 3.

B 3 ferries ok already, about more vehicle, I'll give you answer by wire because we are only meeting on Thursday and today is Monday; that's a lot of time. I'll wire you an answer about more men and more vehicles.

sure you would
D - I'm consider widening the area which is very crowded by vehicles and people.
E It is wide enough on this side, on the Western side, the problem is on the other side.
B I have not been to the point, every time I want to go to the point, the helicopters are not allowed to go there, and I have no time to go by car. I have not been up till now to see it.
E I saw it. The bridge in the fortification road on your side is very narrow. You must have seen it.
B On the eastern side
E And ~~Her~~ This is the problem that there it is narrow and only one or two amphibious cars can
B And on the Western side?
E It's quite wide
B Wide enough?
E Yes.
D - I saw it yesterday - there is one disadvantage left - There is at kilo and that is this jetting from the wall — at least 3 or 4 cars to run up simultaneously and it's wide enough for me to move around But on the far side there is this column coming down — we haven't got this jetting
B - with amphibious with the PBI you can go up, no? with a ferry not, but with the PBI you can go up.
A - I'm not sure about the ferry...
B - For this I'll give you an answer as soon as possible so that you don't have to wait for the next meeting.

A - Double the means and double the soldiers.
E The best thing would be to appoint at your side a commander when I was there I saw that the work did not progress - and he'll watch because when they come on our side all that they do is sit and drink water or eat something
A well they are hungry
B This is alright
E not that we grudge them.
A Thanks. In case we have complications on that. Is there any objection to send some of these lorries
B - to Suez?
A - to Suez city?
B. -
A - Thank you very much.
B - So on the 3rd ferry it's already Ok, upon my conscience and if you want to divert some of the lorries from 3rd army unloading point to Suez, Ok...
A I'll leave it here to the local commander to do it here with your local commander in case, but we are concentrating for the 3rd army priority. Alright. Ok We finished our meeting for today?
B We have finished our meeting for today, unless - I want to ask you that you are generally, general?
A Why don't we discuss the other problem?
B I'll tell you, general.
A We have an important meeting also on Wednesday. I can report something.
B I'll tell you, it is not because I want to gain time. We want to get ahead with disengagement. But the whole problem is, I told you, you are in a better position.

You have an advantage over us because I know that you have a plan already Mr. Fahamy has presented a plan. We have not yet presented a plan.

A On the disengagement?

B Yes! on disengagement too. He said - the first line to which you have to withdraw is a line east of the passage.

A He sent it who?

B Dr. Kissinger

A That means that Dr. Kissinger sent it to you?

B Yes When I was with the Prime Minister — He has a plan which says - first withdrawal to any line east of the passage, and then so and so on until the end.

A I never heard about that. That's the first time.

B Please ask him.

A When he was in Washington during the first meetings

B That was when I wasn't here, you remember

E May be it's his personal plan.

A Yes, I think so

B So, this is why I said, that you have a disadvantage over us. We have to prepare, the general staff has to meet, and they have to present it to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister to the Cabinet, and this is the only reason we asked for Wednesday, the only reason.

A How about the 2Q nd line?

B We prefer, we prefer to go (and this is still the position and I suppose it will not change) to 2nd line, I gave a suggestion but you said "no" letting

the UN in, but you said "No". If we take 6th of October as a starting point (Gen.) that we hand over each other's places to the UN, but you said - No.

A- Right. I said "no."

B- So we prefer instead of going back to 2nd line unless this will be then replaced by UN — possibility. We didn't say that this (is what is going to happen) this is a possibility, and then disengagement - a pan possibility, ~~and then~~ This is one possibility. The second possibility the UN coming in and then we want to go back to —

A- The problem is general, I want to make it clear for you and clear to the authorities especially when General Tal takes over. The problem is - time is pressing, and we want to make any solution for this area, as I said. According to point (b) of the agreement, there should be something about the 2nd line, to ease the situation in this area. It will have a long time, a long talk on the disengagement lines. Why don't we start. On the Western Bank for moving some of your troops, to a line, not the 2nd, we'll call it 2nd and then we'll have big different opinions about that.

B. On this point I have been very frank, and, therefore, I say general, we are going to have long discussions about a settlement, long discussions, and I have not said peace but a settlement. We have talked about it with the Prime Minister and it is a big problem — Now when we go to negotiate you want to be in a good position, we want

to be in a good position. Therefor, the positions from which we will enter discussions will be the line of disengagement.

5 to 9 10

You have very good cards here, strong here. Our card is this. Your card is this. If we start giving out this card, we are already in a bad position. So, therefore, we prefer to make the disengagement as soo. as possible. We don't want this peace of ground. We are not looking for ground. The importance of our presence here is only in the fact that it helps us in discussing with you the line of disengagement. The importance of us here is not to discuss a final settlement.

A - Right

B - But if we start going back here, I am speaking openly, then we give up a strong card in our discussion with you for the line of disengagement.

A - Back again, we are not making implementation for para (5) of this agreement.

B - Here you see Dr. Kissinger, we have already seen the definition, the difficulty we have with the interpretation of the definition in the agreement. If you say 22 nd of October from your point of view legitimate. We say from our point of view - within the framework of disengagement, it is legitimate from our point of view.

A - So, we may discuss it for one month.

B - No. we want to finish it quickly, if we can.

A- If we come on Thursday, we would like to continue, forever, until we come to an additional war, to settle it up.

B- No, no, no! We have no ~~interest in dead~~ lock interest in a dead lock.

A- And we have no interest also.

B- I know you have certain demands, we have certain demands. We want to finish it. If we can finish it on Thursday, then on Thursday. If each of us has got to go back once, we can finish it on Friday, Saturday or Sunday. I think we can finish it in 3, 4 days.

A- Alright, if we start on Thursday.

B- There can be two possibilities: either we come to an agreement, on Thursday, on Friday, on Sunday, or we come to a dead lock on Sunday, on Friday or Saturday. I hope no dead-lock. We don't want a dead lock because what is a dead-lock? another fight. Dead-lock is another fight. We don't need another fight. We don't need another fight. We want another fight. Therefore, I am answering your point that it can go on and on and on and —. I am saying something, perhaps brutal, I am saying we'll come to an agreement perhaps not on Thursday, you will have to go back to Cairo, I'll have to go back to Tel-Aviv and then we come again on either on Friday or Saturday, and then we can finish it. Either we come to an agreement, and we shall be happy both of us, or we are at dead lock, which is not good, but it won't go on forever.

Technically, we can stay here for a long time. But politically or strategically, we have no interest.

A - Right.

E - For us The quickest solution is to give up, to let the UN take over.

[illegible]

B - [illegible]

[illegible]

B - He has a great deal of sniping but -

E - One on the 14th of November at 138.5 kms, a tractor driver was killed by a sniper, and then at 142.3 kms. on the 17th of November, that was the day before yesterday, at 15.28 a soldier was killed by a sniper.

A - If we start talking about Thursday, you know our opinion about the proposals you gave, and we know your opinion about the official proposals.

B - Perhaps I'll have a variant. If each side comes with the official proposals, then it's a deadlock.

A - Yes. That means we skip these two proposals, the official.

B - But perhaps I'll have a variant,

A - That's what I mean. We'll start with another variant.

B - [illegible]

A - What about the last variant we discussed before and we didn't come on any conclusion about that.

B - You know, why do we have the meeting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and all this? To check if I can come with a variant.

This is the reason why we postponed the meeting, the only reason, not to play around.

A - Alright

B - Not to play around.

A - I hope we'll have just one step forward.

B - I understand your position. I don't say I agree, but I understand your position very clearly.

A - Why don't you agree, by the way? (yes?)

B - I can repeat the arguments. I'll repeat what you have said. I don't have your drawing. Your drawing is in my files. It's a document. No, I did the drawing and I wrote on top - "unofficial, personal via. Now, what you said I'll repeat.

E - Maybe you'll put the kilometres now

B - Yes, I'll put in the kilometres. 10 and 2nd army, 3rd army - main forces, so to speak, security zone, correct?

A - You are talking about my proposal now?

B - Yes.

E - I have another version of this.

A - I'll be court marshalled.

B - I have repeated it and you can be sure that I will repeat it to the authorities

A - Alright

B - Because I think it should be fair. Security zone, UN - wide enough to ensure no artillery fire etc. resettlement of the cities, civilians, Mr. Osman, civilian activities right?

A - [illegible]

B- You see, I take it seriously. UN, security zone, light forces, at first, security zone Israeli, correct?

A- And then main forces.

B- Now all this should be at least 40 kms.

A- I didn't say that.

B- 30-40.

A- I didn't say that.

B- Alright. Out of artillery range.

A- I said these people should be secure enough, the wider this area the better, and the less troops here, the less distance, and the more troops here.

B- I'll write it down again.

A- No, I know that you'll remember it, because it is the most important point in the program - the distance and the troops.

B- I know, I know

D- So, let us say that the distance is negotiatable, the principle is security zone.

B- Your tough point of principle, not negotiable, you said, is your military presence here, correct?

A- True.

B- And the distance, we can negotiate, not 2 kms but ... I understand. Another question is, which is a point of principle with you, that this area, also here must not be within artillery range, correct? This is exactly what I have explained to all the authorities.

A- And then all the precautions to be taken by both sides.

B - All the measure we will discuss.

E - Another variant - if this is the Canal, I understood for instance last time that your version was this - a sketch of about 10 kms, let's forget about the 2nd and the 3rd army.

B - One second, I have asked for a map, and I'll bring the map next meeting. I didn't have time to look at it closely. As we have marked up in the map, your present line on the Eastern side and our present line on the Eastern side, some places 10 kms, some places 5, some 6 some 7; one or two places, you have 12. So it is not all that simple.

E - So about 10 kms a strip of Egyptian light forces for the security of the cities of the area. Let us say 20-25 kms. of UN buffer-zone, then a strip of 10 kms. of Israeli light forces, and then further up, out of the artillery range of the Canal, the main understanding.

D - There is a misunderstanding.

A - Is that an interpretation of my proposal?

E - Yes. I think so.

A - No. Here the Canal, here the troops first.

B - yes, the 10 kms! Ah! This is your main force.

A - I didn't say any kilometres here because it will need another discussion.

B - But artillery range.

A - The minimum.

B - So it is 30 kms, 32 actually

B- I'll take 175 minimum.
D- Well, actually that's not the point, general.
A- When we say 30 kms. it's for the sake of these people
E- What about another version? That this may be there is some justification on the ground. What about the 3rd army? Just the Northern part and about the second army East, also reduced forces, not 2 or 3 divisions or 5 may be. What about a proposal like that?
D- Then, what the final picture will be?
B- No This is his idea, not my idea.
A- What about the situation of the 3rd army?
E- the 3rd army on this side of the canal.
A- And who will be here?
E- The Egyptian light forces. This is not my proposal, it's just a variation, not my proposal. I have no proposal.
A- Alright. But when we start on Thursday, we would not like to stop until we finish.
B- From my point of view, possible.
A- And as general Tal will be busy, I am also busy.
B- The only problem is whether we can agree?!
A- If we don't agree on Thursday, we'll come again on Friday and Saturday and Sunday until Elections
B- No, before.
A- the election is pressing you also.
B- Me personally?

A - no.

(Somebody comes in handing the transcriptions of the meetings)

B - Ah!!! as we promised you.
E - This is not the last yet.
B - By the way, if I may captain, please ask general Eisenhower if we can have copies of the meetings he had with the UN. The general would probably also like to have them. There were 3 meetings, correct? 11th, 13th 14th of November.
D - I wonder how they spelt my name!
A - Can you read it?
D - How can you mistake my name like that?!
A - "Gainsy!" - that's why the voice of America ~~and~~ announces "Gainsy, Gainsy" all the time.
E - The typist is typing it from the, you see, so she doesn't see me, I can't see her.
D - I've got to say something back to her.
B - You are right. We shall. Who is the typist?
E - I don't know her.

—

TOP SECRET 22.11.1973

A -Gamazy
B -Yariv
C -Siilasvuo
D -Uedi
E -Sion

B - You talked to me last time about fuel to Suez and I was not ready with an answer and you said that it was in the cable and I checked, and we received the cable which says: "following message passed for Yariv from Gamazy - meeting confirmed, 68 Israeli p.O.W.s shall be repatriated, tomorrow 18th November in 2 separate groups". I want to make sure that the General does not think that we have played for time. I really did not. But I think that towards the end, later, we can discuss it. You have given us the details, we have noted it down, and I think we have an answer.

A - Right.

B - We are fully conscious of the importance of this meeting. Unfortunately, the press has given wide publication to the meeting and to its urgency etc., but, from our point of view, we are looking at the contents and I see it as an important meeting because it is the first formal meeting we have in discussing para. 2 (B) of the agreement. And, therefore, I want to say that I hope we'll have a thorough, might be difficult, but thorough discussion on the problem of para B. I shall be happy if we shall be able to reach an agreement, but I don't know whether we shall be able to do so today, but I hope that even if we don't reach an agreement today, we shall be at such a situation at the end of the meeting, that will permit us to continue a further meeting if necessary tomorrow. But we shall see that as we go along.
Now, if I may with your permission, before I present para B., there are a few points. I'll touch only a few subjects before we go, because today is day No. 8, and we are finishing successfully the operation of the P.O.W.s. I would take the opportunity to thank the Red Cross, which is represented here, and I want to thank you, General Siilasvuo, for suggesting your help in arranging the transport by plane - it helped all of us to move along with this operation. But I have to bring it up at this meeting, that we had difficulties, I don't know the reason, but we've had difficulties in the exchange. We made every effort to be punctual in the plane loads, timetable and not to have any misunderstanding, but unfortunately, also after we talked, General, last time, planes were late, the groups were not according to what the Red Cross told, but this is now behind us, because the last group I understand from General Eyal... ./...

E - In 10 minutes, they will arrive in Tel-Aviv.

B - So, I hope this is alright. There is still one point we shall discuss, I understand, the first break and I hope everything will be alright. Incha'allah.

A - Everything will be alright.

B - I am glad.

Now, there is still the serious problem of the missing persons. You remember I've given you all the details, so I hope, Brigadier Sheriff will be here today.

A - He is here now. They came just to settle these names and missing persons.

B - About the evacuation of the dead bodies. There has been a postponement in the timetable 3 times. We don't know why.

A - That point I'll ask.

B - If I may come back to the point, I understand that you have apprehension or doubts about the possibility of having in addition to the Red Cross, people from our side looking for dead bodies in your area. I can understand it. But on the other hand, I cannot expect Egyptian officers, soldiers, to look for dead bodies with all their efforts. I can understand it. He is only a human being. And, therefore, I want to propose again, and ask again, that you reconsider your decision about the participation, if possible. If you have any limitations on the age of the person, on the profession of the person, if you want to blindfold him, we will gladly accept these things. It is really not a question of having more information about your troops. This is only to expedite the question of the bodies, and as we have so many problems with the missing people, one of the possibilities of answering these difficulties is by looking and finding the bodies on the ground. I don't know if you know, General, and you, General Siilasvuo, there is a very great religious difficulty we have. As long as a body is not found, according to the Jewish Law, the man is not dead. For example, his wife cannot remarry and this is a great tragedy.

A - We know that.

B - This is why I am so pressing on this point. I would also like to remind you General, of the question of the dead bodies from Suez. We talked about it and we understood from General Sheriff that this would be done.

E - Two days ago, yesterday also.

B - Before passing to para. B., I owe you an answer, General, about supply Third Army. After the last meeting, I had enough time, thank God, and I went directly from here to Kilo. Now, what I found was that you had only 80 men instead of 100 men. Perhaps it is our fault, I am not sure. I gave orders and I am sure that the Chief of Staff gave another order to have 100 men. You only work with 5 vehicles instead of 10. There a major there, and

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I called the major, and explained to him and told him please to tell his commander that he can bring next day 100 men and to use 10 vehicles. Another point was - you know the jetty here, there is a jetty. At the jetty, you can simultaneously use 3 vehicles, and only 2 were used. You load 2 instead of 3 and it takes more time.

Now, the last point is that at the same place today, because of the place they have there, they are loading, and the captain will check if I'm right, only 3 vehicles simultaneously, correct? Now we are preparing and they have started work today, or even yesterday, with engineers. There is a little house, and this is done today on the right side of the house to clear place on the left side of the house at least for another 3 lorries. So at the same time, you can unload 6 lorries. So 100 men, 10 vehicles, and the broadening of the unloading point.

And another thing - I think you want to open a wider opening on your side, and we have agreed on that. All this would solve the problem for the Third Army.

An additional point, when we were there, was that for the last couple of days they didn't get any water, only supplies, no water, because according to the agreement, you can take a lot of water. When I was there, on Monday, they said that for the last 3 days on transport, there was no water. So, I finished all the points prior to our main subject. There are some other points which we can discuss at the end. I don't want you to think that we want to gain time.

A - We'd better leave this for the coming break or finish with this... Let's start with para. B.

B - Good. Only one thing before I forget. Newspapers to Suez. There was a misunderstanding, they did not let the newspapers through. I gave orders yesterday to let the newspapers through also from the previous day, because I promised you.

A - Thank you.

B - So, now we come to, as the French say, "le vif du sujet".

General, we have already put forward an official proposal, but as you asked me to..., with your permission, I want to recapitulate, as this is a formal session. I want to recapitulate our original official proposal. Because I think that officially we have not had a reaction yet, officially.

As this is a formal meeting, I would like to start, formally and officially. The original proposal as you know, as I presented it and as it was published in the newspapers, was the proposal of each side returning to respectively East and West Bank of the Canal, with the withdrawal of 10 km. from the Canal and the UN replacing, entering into the area of 10 km. East and 10 km. West of the Canal.

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Although I have no difficulty in guessing your reaction, if I may, with your permission, General, just go back and explain several of the points that were incorporated in the concept of this proposal. First of all, we begin a withdrawal, and our withdrawal is one of your principal thoughts. I think the principal point in your concept. It is only the initial withdrawal. I know we might have differences of opinion; probably we shall have differences of opinion about the line of withdrawal, but we are beginning our withdrawal.

Secondly, this plan does answer the question of separation of forces and disengagement. There is a wide zone in between the forces. And I think it can permit the UN effectively to inspect and ensure the maintenance of the cease-fire. It also permits the opening of the Suez Canal for international traffic.

And I think it does give an equal starting point to both sides for the peace negotiations, and, I think, it is also a fair representation of the situation on the ground as it was at the end of the fighting.

A - We discussed that before, and we came to a conclusion on the basis of the explanation I gave that it is difficult for the Egyptian side.

B - Clear.

A - And you promised to start from your proposal.

B - I keep my promise.

A - I don't want to say the reasons...

B - I am sure you will have reasons on the second proposal too. (laughs).

A - You will repeat the second proposal?

B - Ya.

A - We accepted the other time to start from D, because we finished the three, and now you are starting from a,b,c,/

B - But it didn't take a long time. Now, I am not joking, because you could have asked me why do you need all these exercises. I said at the beginning that this is a formal meeting and this was not on the record. So, I think we have to have this for the record.

By the way, I don't know, what is your official proposal, General?

A - I gave you. It is Ras-Muhammad - El Arish.

B - So I must give you an official answer, that this is not acceptable.

A - Alright.

B - Now, I want to stress, General, that we have had long discussions...

C - I have been kept informed.

B - Good, and we have had a very long talk on Friday, I think about 4 hours, and I think we have quite a good idea about what each other's ideas and lines of thinking are. If I now come with a proposal that the General might reject very easily, it is not as an exercise in formality, but we exchange thinking. I explained to General Gamazy in our talk why the next

meeting after Friday, we won't be able to have it before Tuesday, or Wednesday. I explained the process we have to go through with the Prime Minister and her advisers and then the Cabinet and the leaders of opposition and the security and the foreign affairs committee of the Parliament. This takes a long time. Now did partake, that was on Tuesday, in the Cabinet meeting, perhaps you have seen it in the newspapers, for 5 hours. I am saying this in order to point out that what I am presenting is not something - there was a very serious discussion. I don't say that this is it and finish, but there was a very serious discussion. This is why I am proposing now our proposal inspite of the fact that I think that I can more or less understand your thinking. And, therefore, please, let us discuss this proposal even if you have a negative idea about it. What we suggest is, after our Government and the Cabinet has seriously discussed the problem, I tried my best to explain them your thinking and how you see it, and after considering all our interests and problems, the following thing: we propose to transfer all ground that has been taken by one of the sides during the last war to the UN. And go back to exposition prior to October 6th. And to this we add another thing, that this agreement should include free navigation through Bab El Mandab. If course, this else includes the return of normal civilian life to the Suez Canal Zone and the opening of the Suez Canal to international traffic as Egypt does see it fit.

Why do we bring up this proposal? First of all, we think it has all the advantages of the first proposal. Secondly, I would like to point out, because, General Gamazy has mentioned it several times, he has mentioned it as a point of principle that the soil is Egyptian soil; we don't dispute the fact. But, as I said before, as we are talking about separation of forces and disengagement, which means a withdrawal of Israeli forces to a <u>temporary</u> line, and we don't know how long - this is one of the points we have to discuss. The question of the sovereignty of the soil belonging to Egypt, I don't say it's not important - to each nation there is nothing more important, but it is not relevant directly to this problem, because there will be further withdrawal. So it does not infringe upon the principle that this soil is Egyptian soil.I know you mentioned it and I want you to understand how we see, and on this question, there is no discussion between us, and no difference of opinion. I am emphasizing it that we understand how important this point is for you.

Now, I think that under this proposal, first of all, we give up a very very important strategic advantage. I know that you might (and this is legitimate) that the only thing we have in our mind is to ensure a

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superior military position. This is not the case - a sound military position yes, but it is not our supreme interest to ensure a superior military position. Our supreme interest is eventually to reach peace. We will have a tough fight with you. I hope a verbal fight - not with fire, we will have long discussions, long negotiations, and each side will use every means it has in its political arsenal to try to win an advantage, this is clear; but this does not stand in any contradiction that our supreme interest is eventually to reach peace, and not eventually to have military superiority. To maintain a good military position that will a) help us and permit us to wage a good political discussion and to wage this political struggle, this is something which is natural, but we don't want, under any normal circumstances, to maintain a superior military position. By withdrawing from the West Bank, we are giving up a considerable strategic advantage. Very considerable strategic advantage. After all, we are in a position astride 3 important roads, roads that are very important to you. We are sitting where we are 101 km., it is not so far from vital centres of Egypt. We understand the sensibility from your point of view. I am not trying to point out how strong we are, etc. This is not the point at all. I am only trying to point out that we are giving up a very strategic advantage in the immediate context, in the context of the final solution, this is not important. But in the immediate context of separation of forces, of disengagement, this is a very important point. At the same time, we are lifting the encirclement of an important military element, of what you have here of the Third Army. In addition, by our withdrawing when I analyse the military situation, what will it look like when we withdraw, from your point of view, our withdrawal, not only to give up already what we mentioned - the giving up of an important strategic advantage, but by our withdrawal, under this proposal, permits you immediately after withdrawal, to unify 4 of your military components which are now not unified: Second Army, Third Army in two parts, the forces you have along the Kassassin - Ismailia road, these are 4 different elements; by our withdrawal these elements are unified and from the military point of view, this is a great advantage to you, no doubt. We understand this, but it is alright with us because we see it not in the context of the next round of fighting, but in the context of advancement towards peace. I am always coming back to this point, because I am afraid and we are afraid and we are apprehensive that you think that we are only looking at everything from the context of how to be in a good position for the next round. This is not our line of thinking. In addition to that, if I may now try to be as a military

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analyst, I know that you don't need my military analysis, the general doesn't need my military advice, or my military analysis, but as a matter of fact, 5 infantry divisions, your famous 5 infantry divisions, they are now in an operational situation where they have great limitations for operation. The moment we do the withdrawal, your 5 divisions are free to operate fully. They can operate today as well, of course, but there are limitations. Under this scheme of withdrawal, they have free full operational ability. In addition, you have separation of forces, UN is in a position, under this proposal, to do its inspection. By the way, if you want a disengagement from the West Bank, under any circumstances, this is a tricky military operation. This scheme, where the UN comes is and we go over, this facilitates this tricky military operation, of taking out big size of a military force, transplanting it to the Eastern Bank.

Now, we come to another very important point, which we mentioned in our presentation of the principles. There is always the question of sovereignty and military presence. Under this scheme, it is true on the East Bank there is no military presence, but full expression of Egyptian sovereignty except for military presence, over the area evacuated by us. Egyptian administration over all civilian activities, including the return of inhabitants to the cities along the Suez Canal. General mentioned Minister Osman and his activities, Egyptian flag, the opening of the Suez Canal, all this can be done under Egyptian sovereignty and administration, including police forces.

C - But with UN presence.

B - Of course, with UN presence. But I don't see any contradiction we've had this in our area, there have been precedents of this all over the area. Now, we have also worked one of the possible time plans. If you want later to go into details, we can present 8 possible time plans which can be changed, which can be compressed only to show you that we have also thought how this can be brought about.

A - I think this proposal was discussed last time also, and we think that in this case, we will be in an inferior military position. There will be no security for the people in the Canal Zone; there will be no security for opening the Canal for international traffic; actually, there is no separation of forces, because the space is very small, so from this military and political point of view, we came to a conclusion and we discussed that with our authorities and we, it is impossible for us to accept that as I said the last time;

I don't want to say anything about the sovereignty of Sinai, that's our land and no doubt that we have sovereignty over it, and we have the right

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to be there and so our troops there, so I don't want to discuss that subject or that item. So from the military and political point of view, it is very difficult to accept for the reasons I mentioned now. It won't give any help for both of us, and there is no separation of forces here. There is no disengagement here, nothing at all, nothing at all. All the troops will be away from each other 10 km., as I understand from the proposal as we discussed it before. With a machinegun we can do it or you can do it.

B - You must have a very high charge for the machinegun.

A - I don't want to say "artillery" because we know all the arms and their characteristics. So, I would like to have another proposal, practical one, so we can think about it.

B - "Tefadal". It is up to you now. I presented 2 proposals. You didn't present anything because we discussed these two.
But it was unofficial. It was an unofficial discussion.

A - We started talking about the problems unofficially only in order to have the thinking of each other, but still it is a proposal and was discussed by our side.

B - What is your proposal?

A - And the third proposal you said: a,b,c,: the UN should work 10 km. on the East and that is the disengagement. That's another informal proposal.

B - I didn't understand you.

A - That's another one of your proposals - it will be the coming one (laughs).

B - But what is your proposal? Seriously now, because we talked informally. I am not playing around. Really! Because we are in a formal meeting, what is your official proposal?
One official proposal you gave - East of Al-Arish, Ras Muhamad, UN 60 km. North 100 km. South. This is your proposal. On this my government's answer is negative. I proposed one official proposal, your answer is negative, second official proposal, your answer is negative. Am I to understand that you are still standing on the line of disengagement as the line of Al-Arish, Ras Muhamad?

A - ...

B - I understand, but on this our answer is negative. So I must ask you if you have another proposal.

- May I ask one question now, because I do not completely understand this proposal. How far would the Israeli troops then retreat?

- Now, that would mean,

- Because you said this doesn't give security.

- This is a little bit complicated, because for example, we shall evacuate here 1670 square kilometers on the West Bank. Then what will be evacuated

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on the East Bank by the Egyptian armed forces 880 square kilometers, which is only a temporary evacuation anyway, because we continue to withdraw. But this brings up another point because you can say "wait a minute, do you mean that all this would be with UN troops?" We can discuss this, maybe not all this but up to a certain line. b) Under the present lines, we still have forces between south of Ismailia to the Great Bitter Lake; between Kabrial and south of Ismailia we have forces, let us say that this can be discussed. Because otherwise you have Egyptian forces on the North of the East Bank because you have been there the whole time, 10km. Then, you have UN until South of Ismailia, then between south of Ismailia and Kabrial you have Israeli forces, then UN again. Let us say that this can be discussed also. In order to answer your question, let us assume that this means that there are no Israeli forces closer than the line that is today held by the Egyptian forces on the East Bank, which is in some places at the most, I think, 13 km. in some places 7 km. Or, we can agree on another line let us say from 10 to 12 km. Let us say the maximum point of your line of contact and let's make this the line. Does that answer your question?

Then, of course, for the security of the Canal and civilian activity, let us say we agree that the UN will be all along, this side with the Egyptian presence where it was before October 6th, and here most of the Canal will be with the Egyptian forces. Let us say that our forces, I don't have authority yet, but let us say that our forces will be here, yes?

A - That is the UN zone?

B - This is Egyptian, this is UN instead of Second Army, and this is Israeli. But let us say we discuss that and we leave that, and will all be UN. And if we are here then another point that we can agree on is that there will be nothing heavier than machineguns, light machineguns. And a limitation of forces here, let us say that we will ask for something mutual on the East Bank, in order to eliminate the danger to the Suez Canal activity and civilians. Of course, the best assurance is when there is traffic. General, we are interested in your having civilian activity as soon as possible, because we see it also as a guarantee for us. Not an objective to fire against, but a guarantee for us. The movement in the Canal is more than an assurance to us.

A - I answer with the same answer.

B - I did not believe that after bringing up a good argument, you will change the answer.

C - I wanted only to know this question of the Israeli presence because I also have to give of course my opinion.

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B - General, what I want to say, the proposal means meanwhile presency, but this is a point that can be discussed. Then the Israeli presence can be in such and such a distance. And under such mutual limitations of weapons and size of forces that the Egyptian side a - will not have any doubts about our capability to do any offensive operations, b - that we won't be able to do anything harmful against civilian targets here, and mutually we shall not be afraid that the Egyptian side has on the first line such concentration of forces that the next morning they can cross the Canal. I understand that to sum up this stage of the discussion, the General has presented an official proposal, which was given to us in the informal talks and we have not accepted. I have presented two official proposals which the General has not accepted. I don't yet whether except for the Sharm-el-Sheikh Ras Muhamad line the General wants to present another proposal. But may I propose to have a break. If the General wants to...

A - Alright.

I presented Al-Arish area to Ras Muhamad we have the map of that. East of Al-Arish. We have another proposal to keep Al-Arish east and west to the UN, as it is the capital of Sinai.

B - Ya. This is how I understood.

A - That's a new proposal. And then your troops will be east and our troops will be west. Other details can be discussed, to what lines, what forces, security zone on both sides, type of forces to be in the area, and all other guarantees for both sides. I am looking forward for the coming Conference. This proposal will give you the chance to discuss on the political level all other problems in the security council resolution 242. There is no problem from the military point of view at all. And that is our second proposal: instead of East of Al-Arish and keeping about 40 km. in your hands, now about 60 km, 80km., may be 100 km. to be in your hands, and keeping the area Al-Arish down to the UN. In all cases, Sharm-el-Sheikh area should be in any solution in the hands of the UN, as it is the main problem for both sides in the Resolution 242.

B - I understand that the whole area between Al-Arish and the Canal will have your main forces.

A - I didn't say the main forces - we can discuss it. We can have our main forces, and security zone and light forces and frontier troops, and then we can discuss where to put the frontier troops, where to put the light troops, where to put the main forces.

C - How would then this question of the amount of troops be supervised?

B - May I suggest that we leave it, because I wanted to raise it, with your permission.

C - Because it is my interest.

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B - Of course, I am not disputing that.

A - The guarantees and the precautions will be done by the UN.

C - I would now like quickly to get an idea. There would be a kind of semi-demilitarized area which should then be somehow...

B - I want to understand, General, you propose that we withdraw from here to Al-Arish directly.

A - In some phases, we'll fix it.

B - If I understand, you say, for disengagement and separation of forces, you propose that we actually move (all the phases will be technical phases), but what you actually propose is that we move directly from a line here directly to Al-Arish.

B - Then, I must ask you, General. I remember one bright morning, km. 104, you presented to us what you then called the El Gamazy plan (laughs). And we even talked about the possibility that in addition to General Siilasvuo you might get the Nobel Prize for it. You remember?

A - .... you may have the Nobel Prize.

B - I think that we can both agree that the General will get it. I agree.

A - I agree.

B - So in that plan, the concept was different. Altogether different con - cept. Because you talked of a line of at least 30 km. between your forward lines on the east shore, on the Eastern Bank, and our forward lines in the Sinai, and you explained that was a question of artillery range. But nowhere in that plan was there anything similar to our forward line being in Al-Arish - Ras Muhamad.

A - We didn't discuss the plan at all.

B - But you said 30 km. It was not 30 km, from Bir Gafgafa. It is 30 km. from your forward line as it is now. The Colonel understood me.

A - No he was not with me. We were alone.

B. - Alright. When we talked then, you mentioned your bridge heads, 2nd Army and 3rd Army. The bridge heads are, let us say, the eastern most point 12 km. from the Canal (I have brought with me the map with the exact line). If you add 30 km., we do not get to Al-Arish and Ras-Muhamad.

A - Yes, right...

B - I don't want to beat about the bush. What I am asking is whether we can discuss something in between the proposal I have presented and the line you have presented, the line Al-Arish - Ras Muhamad?

A - We came here to discuss all the proposals.

B - Good.

A - And I think you have the authority through the Cabinet and the Knesset and all this, and I think I have the authority too.
I gave my proposal, that is the Gamazy proposal you mentioned. We were alone both of us.

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B - No witnesses, only you and me.

A - I don't deny I said it.

B - I didn't for one minute think that you will deny it.

A - And also General Tal discussed the thing with me alone to see my thinking as one of the members who is responsible for this discussion. Our military leaders, we have also military leaders.

B - You met yesterday with the President.

A - And yesterday, we had a big meeting also, before I came. So, if I give my proposal, I can back it, but I am not authorized to say it now. I am giving the official proposal now, and you are giving the official proposal.

B - I understand. What you say now is very important, because I understand that we have ground for discussion.

A - Sure, sure.

B - This is very important.

C - Of course, in this hide plan for eventual withdrawal, I would see as one stage may be your second proposal.

E - General, it has to be like this through the UN.

B - We can buy it for you.

C - If Israel agrees with your proposal, there must be a timetable then and a plan how to withdraw the troops.

A - Right.

C - And I thought that there may be as one of the first stages, may be start in the North maybe oontinue in the South. That our stage could be the second proposal of Israel, would be part of that withdrawal.

A - Alright. The plan for withdrawal is very easy to be put by both sides, that can be carried out easily.

B - I think the General would like, first of all, to agree on a plan, and to discuss the phases of withdrawal.

C - For instance, thinning out the Second Army, under UN supervision.

B - Yes. What I wanted to propose, General, I still have a long list of points, to discuss, to elucidate, to clarify, in order to see what the ground between us is where we can advance, and I think I am not sure whether the General can, but I think if we would enter a discussion about the advantages I could convince you, that you have a good case. But I understand we cannot discuss it. But what I propose is to enter a break now, and after the break come back and enter a discussion, about the various things that can perhaps bring solution.

A - I hope so.

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A - Let's continue.

B - So, I hope we can finish it tomorrow. We'll meet tomorrow. I know that with your authority of importance, you can.

A - You are a brilliant political man. (laughs).

B - This means a bad General.

A - You will be a political man from tomorrow.

B - No, I have another few days time. So, I'll be here.

A - Alright.

B - Now, before we continue, if I may a) fuel for Suez (I promised you an answer). So in principle - OK, but we'll have a discussion about the quantities. I know Colonel Uedi is already looking at me. We have a difference of opinion about the quantities of fuel.

A - We don't want to discuss these things now.

B - In the end? OK. Now, I wanted only to tell you that I have not forgotten. I have in principle a positive answer; about the quantities we will make a discussion in the end.

E - We should move the negotiations into Hilton Cairo and Hilton Tel-Aviv.

A - You have Hilton in Tel-Aviv?

B - Yes. You have Hilton Nile and we have Hilton Tel-Aviv. I think our nicest hotel.

C - You can make a compromise to have the meeting in Sheraton (laughs).

B - In summer, I go for my health to Sheraton.

I want to clear up a point of principle. When we are talking about disengagement, I am coming to think that perhaps there is a misunderstanding about what you call disengagement and what we call disengagement. Why do I say this after I looked at your map? When you showed me the map, and you said disengagement, I understood that you are meaning something that is of great change, great change in the situation, as it was from June 1967. And a great change from the situation as it is today if we withdraw right back to the line you have proposed. Now, what we had in mind when we spoke about disengagement, is a withdrawal that puts an emphasis on separation of forces, and on a temporary round that will permit us to start the peace negotiations. The peace negotiations I don't know when they will start, because until today we have not yet had an invitation. But let us assume, sometime in December or January. Why do I say December or January, because we have the elections December 31st, and the main subject for elections will be the political problem. Now, for our government, to discuss the peace negotiations without a mandate from the people is impossible. So the peace negotiations won't start until after our elections. It is not a question of

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tactics from our point of view, or some intentions. It is impossible for the government to go to peace negotiations without a mandate. Impossible. I think I now understand what you mean by line of disengagement and I think there is a difference in the way we see the disengagement in principle, I am not speaking about lines, and as you see it. We were thinking about something we withdraw to for a certain period which we can discuss. We can discuss the length of the period during which we stay in the line of disengagement, on which we shall agree. But we did not have in mind something like this line. Perhaps you think that in this line we'll stay during the peace negotiations. And if the peace negotiations take 8 months, 10 months, perhaps a year, we did not think about a line to which we will withdraw and on this line we will stay for 10 or 12 months! We can discuss it. Therefore, we did not think about something that far. I would like to clear up because it is a point of principle. I think there is a difference of opinion.

A - No, since 1967, we think that there was no disengagement at all. Both of our troops are opposite each other.

B - Correct.

A - As a step for the final settlement, the line should be somewhere in Sinai, very far from the Canal. And our troops both sides should be very far from each side. And a new element, the UN troops, to separate the troops for a long time. This situation will be a real disengagement for a long, long time. But not, as you say, 10 or 5 km. from both sides as you think. The line we proposed now will give both sides...

B - General, this is a delegate of President Kadafi, he is from Tripoli.

A - Who?

B - That soldier. We won't keep him here (laughs).

? אתה ילד קטן

His Atabic is not good, he came as a very small boy.

B - Excuse me, the Prime Minister has asked me to ask you if we can have, she wants me to have the names, your names tonight. So that I can come tomorrow with your people, and that you can bring Mizrachi and.....

A - I can't promise on that, because we'll go back at 5 or 6 o'clock, we'll start discussing the question until midnight, and then until these people will get the names, and then they will have the approval on the names, and then as you know, he has been 25 years in prison. So through our tribunal, it will take time. So the prison can't give the orders to send him for one day.

B - May I ask you a personal favour, General. If you would let Cairo know of our Prime Minister's request. Would you do it perhaps now?

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A - I assure you I am backing Mizrachi to come back to your camp.

B - I know, I know.

A - We don't need to keep him.

B - I know, General, but perhaps you can let them know now, so that we can gain time.

A - Alright.

B - Thank you.

(end of tape)

A - The negotiations may take 1 month, 2 months, 10 months. We will be safe and you will be safe and everything will be clear for both sides. And you still have so many cards with that line from the political point of view to discuss all the matters you need to carry out Resolution 242.

B - I understand now. I have no authority now to discuss a final line of disengagement. But I have the authority to have your ideas and views on the first or second line of disengagement. Let us discuss the question of the first line of disengagement. Before we make a line on the map, I would like to ask a number of questions, because this will help you when I get back, to get authority to discuss it "yaani". What I would like to ask you first is the question of your forces on the East Bank. Today on the East Bank, you have the Second Army, a strong force, a strong force. Now, in the initial phases of disengagement, the presence of a strong force from your side on the East Bank presents a military problem. We are talking about progressing towards a peace settlement. When we are in the initial lines of settlement and you have a strong military force which has strong , infantry troops with all light, medium and heavy infantry weapons with tanks, protected by a strong umbrella, strong and efficient umbrella of air to ground missiles. This presents a difficult problem for us. When we are in the initial stages of disengagement, when everything is very sensitive and very fragile. If you have such a force in mind, and in your mind - as I understood you are speaking not only about Second Army concentration like that, you are also speaking about the Third Army concentration like that. This presents a serious problem.

A - OK?

B - OK.

A - As I said before clearly, why are we keeping these strong forces on the East? Because we didn't come to any settlement. And we didn't come to any engagement line. Or we didn't come to settle any separation of the troops. So, we have the Canal - a very serious water barrier, and we have your forces in front of us. So we should keep good forces and

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strong forces to the East. As I said before, the farther away we get the disengagement line to the east, the less troops we will keep on the Eastern Bank. But if this line is very close to our line, say 10, 20, 30 km., we are obliged to keep big forces on the Eastern Bank. That is the problem. So we should make compromise in both.

B - Distance and size. You told me this the last time.

A - And I still insist on that. That is very important from the military point of view, not political. And another problem I want to raise: when we start opening the Canal, the minute you withdraw, we will start working for opening the Canal, and put our civilians in there. When we open the Canal we shall have thousands of civilians working on the Eastern Bank of the Canal with their tractors. They need at least 5 - 10 km. to work. Say 5, 2, 3 km., so our defensive positions on the Eastern Bank will be nil. There will be no defensive positions. So we should move forward, or you should move backward, make it like that to make it easier.

B - Alright.

A - Because we will not have defensive positions or good defensive positions in this area. So we should have a space for that. In this case, the farther distance you go,

B - The smaller the size of the force.

A - And this will be discussed. And of course from the strategical, tactical point of view, we can choose the lines very easily. I'm afraid we are talking here political and military. I know that's our work.

B - Alas!

A - But it gives weight for the military side. That's all.

B - Alright. I am taking each point very carefully. Let us assume for the moment that we have an agreement on the distance, what do you have in mind once we speak about symbolic forces? It is a division, tanks, anti-missile system?

A - If you go to that line...

B - General, this is a very important point and I'll do my best to explain to you how we see it. I understand what you have said. Let us say there's a first phase of withdrawal, and we'll agree 3, 6, 4, months, we can agree, because I understand that you don't want a line of disengagement that looks too near to you. In such a condition, if you have big military forces on the East side, and we have very light military forces, we are in a difficult situation for that period. The question is whether we cannot consider a system which is limited in time, which will permit the following things to happen: which will permit you to start civilian activities, whatever you decide, which will permit us to prepare for peace negotiations and to start (not to enter the peace

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negotiations fully)., to start the peace negotiations; b) which will have mutual guarantees, that we won't be able to do anything military against you, and that you won't be able to do anything military against us. Then, look for a system which will ensure us. For example, if you have only limited forces on the Eastern side and the main forces on the Western side. If there is a UN zone on the East Bank of the Canal. If then there is a security zone for us which will ensure you that we have nothing heavier than light machineguns, and that all our main forces and all our artillery is out of artillery range from the Suez Canal, and all this for limited time period, and it is understood that this is the first line of disengagement - Is this possible, do you think this is a possibility? Because I have to go back home and show them, because at the Cabinet this was not discussed. So, I must come home and have your ideas in order to present them, in order to explain them and have the Cabinet's decision on this. You remember what I told you the last talk. You asked me "General Yariv, how long will these talks about disengagement take, another month?" I said "No, we'll meet Thursday, if we cannot come to an agreement, you'll go back, I'll go back, we can sit Friday, we can sit Saturday, and I hope we'll work it out". I said "if there's an agreement "hamdulla'allah", if God forbid there is a dead lock, it is bad". If there is war each side will do what it can. But we don't want war. We want an agreement. And it is not easy, I know. You have problems, we have problems. We must work it out. So I am trying now to clarify all these points. Was I clear enough?

A - Yes. If we come to a conclusion for starting civilian activities preparing for peace, as you said, mutual guarantees and so on, I agree, but just apply it and put it on the map, and give me the lines to see how it can go. Theoretically, yes, but practically, we want to see how it will go.

B - Yes, I understand. General, I understand that you cannot tell me "OK, fine". You have to see because tomorrow morning, I can come to you with a map which will be out.

A - Why don't you want to put it now?

B - Honestly, it is not in my pocket. I have the authority to restate proposal No. 1, to present proposal No. 2, and I did it not just like that, because we had a long discussion about that, and I have the authority to clarify these problems. We discussed various lines, it is true. You remember you gave me a drawing, personal view? I gave you a drawing unofficial personal view. But I don't have an official map. And I don't know, I don't have the authority to present a map today. But I have full authority to discuss all these factors with you.

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We have discussed them on Friday, but I have authority to discuss it again. And I'll take again each point, we have time.
Now, I understand what you said about final line of disengagement, not final line of settlement - El-Arish - final line of disengagement; b) I understand that this does not rule out temporary line of disengagement. We must discuss where it is, and its modalities and its details.

A - And its lines.

B - You can accept the principle, but you cannot accept the line until you see it on the map.

A - Right.

B - OK. So this we have cleared up. Very important. Now, you told me that as far as the size of the forces is concerned, this has to do with the distance of the line of disengagement, let us say the temporary, the first line of disengagement. Its distance from the Canal zone will influence the size of the forces you want to have on the East Bank. Point No. 3: When we say we go to the first line of disengagement, east of the Canal, we have agreed on the distance and it answers your problems. What is the time frame you have in mind for such a line? 4, 5, 6 months? less 1, 2 months?

A - The sooner, the better.

B - For example, if we say 3-4 months.

A - To go to the first line of disengagement -

B - No, to go tomorrow - "bukra".

A - And stay there.

B - Yes, to go tomorrow. Because, as I told you, we have no interest to stay in this piece of ground. This is your piece of ground. If it is necessary, we can stay here as long as it is necessary, but we have no interest. If we can come to an agreement, we leave. So, the time frame I am talking about is not <u>until</u> we withdraw, but <u>after</u> we withdraw. How long to your mind we stay there?

A - What's your opinion?

B - Let's say 3-4 months.

A - On the first line. To what distance?

B - You gave me an indication. We would like to speak about a distance of 10-12 km. of first line East of the Canal, light forces, security zone. In other words, in order to be clear: for this time frame what we are thinking (again I don't have the authority, but to give you an idea), the westernmost line of security zone, we are thinking about 10-12 km., from the Canal. But nothing heavier than light forces.

A - That's a security zone for your troops?

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B - That means our troops here, say 10 km., and then you have security zone 10 km?

C - Then it would be 20 km. from the Canal.

B - If I may draw here. This is, let us say, between 10 to 15. Then, security zone, then main forces.

A - That is the Egyptian 10 km. and then 10 km. security zone. Clear. Here the Canal, Egyptian forces 10 km. and UN.

B - I want to discuss with you the size of the forces. There we have a security zone.

C - With UN?

B - No, without UN. We would agree if here there would be only UN, but the General insists on having Egyptian presence on the Eastern side.

C - Who guarantees that there are only light forces?

B - I'll come back to the question of inspection. We have a number of proposals to it. Now, I would say that the Easternmost line of security zone should be so that our main forces are out of artillery range from here, because you brought out the point that you cannot have any civilian activities here. We are willing to do it. Everything we have here will not be able to fire on the zone here, on the Canal here.
The problem is what size of force you will have here? If you are speaking about the size of force you have now in the Second Army, this is against us. This is why I asked you what do you have in mind by symbolic forces, in addition to administration. Please, General, I am telling you the truth frankly and honestly, I don't have any signature. I am now trying to clarify a position so that I can go back and discuss it.

A - We don't understand how the UN will work here 10-15 km. If we say 10, it is impossible for any UN forces to work.

B - Why not? The question is what size of force you'll have. This is what I want to clarify if you say "symbolic presence", it is not a brigade, it is not a division, it is a smaller force, it is a small force. Then, I don't see any difficulty. But, then, perhaps, I am wrong.

A - Where is our security zone? Just to put reconnaissance patrols, frontiers...

B - I'll tell you what we can have, first of all there is the UN.

A - There is no UN.

B - Why not, you can have the UN.

A - But the area for the UN 5 km., I don't accept 5 km.

B - Only now for the sake of argument. First of all, we can have combined patrols.

A - On what?

B - On this line. UN-Egyptian-Israeli patrols. Another point - we are ready

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to accept your observation posts here on our line. And we'll have observation posts to see what is going on and you will have observation posts to see what is going on. We propose mutual air-photo coverage. We can agree by national means or by international means or by other means.

A - Why do we complicate it like that? We have 300 km. to go in Sinai. Why are we pressing ourselves here in these 15km.? Give them the area to work, and give us the area to work.

B - I'll tell you why. Because we are entering peace negotiations and we'll have a long fight with differences of opinion, and it is a very fragile situation. We cannot pass from one situation very quickly to another. We talked about it and I was very frank. And we have now the problem of what you mean by peace and what we mean by peace. What I suggested here is a transitory phase, that will give us the feeling, you as well as us, that we enter the peace negotiations when we are still in a position that militarily we are more or less balanced, more or less balanced, so that we enter the political struggle when neither we have a military superiority over you, nor you have a military superiority over us. We may have a military superiority generally. This is a different thing. But on the ground, on this immediate problem on the ground, this is another thing. Nothing behind it more than that.

E - There is another point that I would like to clarify. The civilian administration gives you the whole bridging system over the Canal, which is an assurance to you that in case hostilities break out, you have the possibility of crossing the Canal, not as a military operation, but as a civilian operation. The fact that the bridge heads are there is an indication of hostile intentions. The moment you have reduced the bridge heads and we have reduced the bridge heads on the Western Bank, this is a symbolic sign that both sides don't have any aggressive intentions. Now, from a purely military point of view, you are in a very strong position because in case hostilities break out, inspite of all the assurances etc., you have the bridges over the Canal, and the Canal is in Egyptian sovereign hands to bridge the Canal and let your forces in.

A - I don't agree, because this situation will put us in a very bad military situation. In a very bad military situation. Secondly, will give us indication that there is doubt between both of us. Because you are very very close to the Canal. We don't have any inch to move. So if you say we can cross the Canal and so on, that's only theoretical, but not practical.

E - You had a practical possibility with us sitting on the Canal. ./..

A - And you have also practical experience (laughs).

B - Technically, you can move 500, 600 tanks in one night, and we can't do anything about it.

A - And you can do the same thing from Sinai.

C - I must say here one thing. Please have confidence in UNEF now. UNEF 2 is different from UNEF 1, as everybody knows. It has been established by the Security Council. It has the backing of the permanent members, and in fact of the whole world. The world is fed up with the war. Anything which we are guaranteeing will create very very strong reactions. And, although we have no tanks, no airplanes, no guns, I think we have more than hope to be the guarantors now. And if it depends on me personally, we shall guarantee.

B - I fully accept your words.

A - Let's first of all agree on principle. Let's start with the UN forces. We think that the UN forces should operate in a wide distance, we should give them as wide a distance as we can to be sure to separate the troops. This distance may be between 20 to 30 km. If we come to that conclusion, or accept that, then we'll see how it works. Do you think it is good as a buffer zone between both troops?

B - I'll tell you. I think, with your permission, General, I think the problem for UNEF is not to have room to manoeuvre the troops.

A - The presence of UNEF in a wider area gives us guarantee to keep away from each other.

B - I want to separate several aspects. For UNEF it is important to have enough room that represents a barrier for each side. I think in the talk we had on Friday, we mentioned that, and I agree with General Siilasvuo that there is a big difference in principle between UNEF 1 and UNEF 2, not only of size and importance, because of backing etc. As I understand it, the commander of UNEF 1 won't be able to say by himself -

C - Only by the instructions of the Security Council.

B - This is a big difference. The Secretary General won't have the authority; once in the Gaza district there was a line, line 1 man deep. If we speak about a zone, even if it is 5 km, 7,8,9,10, the question for General Siilasvuo is not to make movement with the armour troops. The problem for General Siilasvuo is to say to each side "Gentlemen, we are here the guarantors of cease-fire or armistice or anything else, and if you attack us, or if you try to move, you are acting against the world organization". Therefore, whether it is 5, 20 or 10 km. is not important. Now, what is important is the question you raised of artillery range, this I accept. Because if we hold the line, within an artillery range of the Canal Zone, we won't touch the General, but

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our walk so to speak over your . There you have a case, I agree. We don't have civilian targets, you have the civilian targets, therefore is on us. We should not be in a position where we can fire with whatever weapons we have, if we have M6 at this point, and artillery at this point, that we should not be able to fire on your civilian targets. But the width of the UNEF force in between whether it is 10 or 20 km., this is not so important. Because in 10 km, even in 5 km. depth UNEF can fulfil its mission. If there are no administrative problems.

C - You are speaking of no practical...

B - Yes, yes, this I understand, there should be a road etc. The infrastructure inside the zone should permit the life of such a force.

C - Yes. We cannot leave our troops in the middle of the desert without roads. That is of course, one point.

B - Clear and accepted. For example, if you look at the map, I'll tell you General the map is my prestige, because when I was the Director of Intelligence, the intelligence was responsible for the production of maps, so I want to show you my map. These are the lines today. You explain your idea.

E - Let's say that this road is in the hands of the UN, the lateral road going from to . And here are about 8 East West roads. We figured UN check-posts on each of these...

C - Are you talking about 8 battalions, one on each road?

E - Either 8 companies or 8 battalions.

C - Small battalions.

E - On each road. These will also be meeting points. The 101 meetings we'll make them here or here. And here the meetings of the local commanders and the joined patrols. We figured something, I mean privately, it wasn't presented to the Government, of some sort of assistance, where UN at the same time separates between the forces and at the same time is able to exercise some sort of cooperation between the forces by enforcing the cease-fire.

C - And where will the security zone of Israel be?

E - Somewhere to the East, and the Egyptian light forces to the West.

A - Where is our security zone?

B - I must tell you I don't know his plan.

A - Why are you giving your troops a security zone without giving us a security zone, what is the sense of it from the military point of view?

E - This is a sort of a middle line. There is one road here along the Canal. This is the second road here. So the Egyptian administration has got the road along the Canal. And the possibility of doing all the construction

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work needed to clear the Canal and bring life back to the Canal zone. The UN has the second line. About the security zone of light forces or police forces, or whatever you call it, Egyptian forces come up to this road.

A - That is the main forces here.

B - This is a line of contact. This is not a road.

E - We would like to start from a new conception. If we go back to the previous conception, the same thing we can say, we have a line here, the same way that you have the line here.

A - But why don't we start from the concept of peace? According to the concept of peace, you will leave Sinai. And then leave the political leaders to discuss about when and Sharm-el-Sheikh.

B - General, I have a suggestion. If we start from the concept of peace, we'll need 6 months to discuss what peace means.

A - We'll leave it to the foreign ministers.

E - Let us call it "separation of forces". According to the separation of forces, we propose the idea that both sides . We have here 1600 square kilometers, you have 800, we put in Siilasvuo's bank (laughs). For the time being, we'll say - he is the banker. Let's start with what we can agree upon, I mean, what is the idea of the separation of forces.

C - Yes. (they open maps).

B - Each square is 1 km.

E - We figured it like this: 520 square kilometers 2nd army.

B - You say 175mm. gun has 32-33 range? Out of artillery range.

A - You gave me now one more kilometer (laughs).

B - General, I know I have to think about the things you have said, the people in the Cabinet they have to think. They are not as far advanced as we in the talks. We understand each other.

C - That's about 10 km.

B - About.

E - For instance, even if we forget the West Bank, we are still here on this side.

B - We will go back to here. I know you are looking at me, Colonel, I am speaking seriously.

D - We agreed on one thing - that we need disengagement to separate the troops. Allow us to work, allow us to return the civilian activities. Any kind of security for civilian activities.

B - Yes, you have, why not?

D - That's an endless theoretical discussion , you allow this civilian interest to be risked like that.

B - How far do you have between the Canal and all your forces? 100 km. the whole Egyptian Armed Forces! Between the Canal -

C - And Cairo

B - You have all your forces. And we are "be'id, be'id" so you have a good guarantee.

D - Have we?

B - Yes, I think so. What can we do? I am thinking what can we do?

D - You have all your axis free eastwards -

B - And you have all your axes free. I am asking you, why do you think we have an interest to offend the Canal?

D - Well, I don't see any interest for you even to be present here. The farther you go, the better guarantee you give us and you get out of us.

E - The difference between the two forces is this that you have the concentration of all your army, standing army, permanent army, at a 100 km. zone at constant readiness. We have an army which is a mobilized army a civilian army, and we have to have a)the army in Israel, about 300km. from here, b) we have the time lag of mobilizing the army.

B - And moving. You know it well from October 6th.

E - This is the difference. You have a guarantee here and we have to have the minimum 2 days to mobilize and we have 250 km. to cross to come to the front line, and this is a great advantage on your side.

C - There is one more thing I would like to add here: we all think that this is the first phase. Can there already be discussed the second phase before the final disengagement of the settlement line -

B - General, it will be very theoretical because I don't yet even have authority to discuss this line.

C - I am only putting forward an idea. If this should be agreed as the first phase, there should also be agreed a second phase.

A - I am ready to discuss it.

B - I see your point, but we haven't discussed it yet. Really, we haven't discussed it yet.

A - The second line?

B - Yes, really we haven't discussed it yet. But I am ready to go back home and say that you would like to discuss the second line. This is a possibility. I think that we would prefer at this stage to discuss the first line of disengagement, even if we put a time limit on it.

A - How long do you think you'll stay here?

B - I think we could settle it to 3-4 months.

A - 3-4 months?

B - Because it will take about this time to get into serious peace discussions.

A - Are you linking the time with the time expected for the peace conference?

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B - No, no. For part of the peace conference, we have the problem I explained to you, the problem of the elections. Now, let us say we start straight after the elections. Until the time of the elections, it is about 6 weeks, and after all the formalities and all this, it will take about 2 to 3 months until we get really into the details of the -

A - Right.

E - From 4 to 6 months I figure it the minimum. The advantage on this line is this - that in case we go to a line here (theoretically), this line will take more time to move into than this line. You know perfectly well that we have an infra structure on this line.

A - Right.

E - You can't just lift it in one day or a week and move back, and you have to have enough , on your ground in order not to be exposed. So the advantage of a minimal line, or let us call it an optimal line, like this here, is that it can be done quickly. I mean that the first step to it can be done quickly. If we go deeper into Sinai, this will take longer to put into action. Because the withdrawal will have to be spaced out.

A - The farther you go the better for you from the defensive point of view.

B - This might be right. But...

A - ..best chance for the ground, best chance for the directions.

B - But we have a problem - all our installations...

A - You can put your installations temporarily.

B - If you compare this with the situation today, which situation is better?

A - This situation is better.

B - Why, please? Now, seriously, I am not provoking.

A - Seriously, this situation is better for us. Now we feel that you are still in war, keeping all our forces, keeping the country mobilized, everything is ready. And even if these forces are big enough, alright, it doesn't "yaani"...

B - It doesn't worry you too much.

A - Although it is very close to Cairo, as it appears. From the military point of view, we'll stay. But the minute you go here, we should demobilize thousands and thousands of people. And everything will be changed in the military situation.

B - We will also demobilize.

E - We will demobilize the whole army.

B - Not the whole, but a large part.

A - But we'll do more than you do, that's for sure. How can we defend this line? with minimum troops, how? very difficult, very very difficult to defend it.

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UN - But this has not been discussed for some time. Could you again explain what should happen under your plan, 1st phase, to the Third and Second Armies - structure, what do your expect? thinning out - how?

B - On the East Bank?

UN - security zone?

B - This is what we have in mind.

E - Supposing we start from the South, we lift the blockade on Adabiya road.

B - This is his private plan.

A - General Yariv, we are not recording it...

B - He has talked to me about that, but we haven't talked yet to anybody else.

A - And we'll not take it as official.

B - Alright.

E - We lift this place Adabiya and we hand it over to the UN, our forces somewhere here on the Suez-Cairo road. The southern division of the Third Army is moving out from this area and heading south through the Adabiya axis. The UN is taking over this part of the southern division, up to the Mitla road.

A - The Mitla road or the Mitla strait?

E - Mitla road.

B - Not the pass.

E - Second phase: our troops move, lift from the North of the Suez-Cairo road and move up to the North of the Sheluha Cairo road. The second division and the main forces of the Third Army move out from here and go to the 101 check-point. The UN takes over all this before that, and takes over the whole parameter of the Third Army.

C - What would remain of the Third Army here?

E - For the moment of disengagement, nothing. Now, our troops move to the Genifa area...

B - I don't like his plan, too long, too long.

E - To the UN forces with civilian Egyptian administration. Now, the Southern division of the Second Army moves up to the main axis Ismailia-Bir Gafgafa road up to the North somewhere here, UN takes over. We move out from here, all the Second echelon troops of the divisions and exit.

B - You are violating one of the principles of war - simplicity, but that's alright.

E - This is very simple.

A - Very simple. Just go on.

E - When we remove our forces from the Genifa area either through the UN here, or through our bridge head here, and you remove your second division, the central division, from the Kantara area to the eastern side. Now, we

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take out the remnants of our forces here, the last forces, and Northern division back to the other side, and you stay from Port Said to km.10 you had before. Nice?

A - That's very simple and very good.
That is the procedure for evacuating the troops for switching.

E - For the moment, we do the handing over to the UN bank, all the gains are in UN hands.

B - He comes back to the second proposal.

E - Which can be modified.

A - Just more steps.

B - General, on this I am in your opinion.

C - But this has 4 phases, that the Egyptians come back here -

E - This is what mother said to the child that she will tell him later, tomorrow and the day after.

B - Now, to come back, General, because if we want to progress, I'll have to come back after our meeting to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and tell them what I clarified with you. Some basic questions, one is the question of the size of your forces. If I understood you correctly, you say that under all circumstances, you want to have a strong force on the East Bank. Also, when we are speaking about a first line of disengagement, which will be limited in time. That you want a big force, this is what I understand, I don't know. If you give me a rough idea , I don't want to pin you down on 2 or 3 battalions .

A - The further the line you can go, the less troops we'll keep, and it will be better for us and better for you and better for the peace negotiations. The closer you come here, the more forces we'll keep on the Eastern Bank and that's logical from the military side.

B - I'll ask you a question.

A - Yes.

B - Because I see the Colonel looks at me suspiciously. For the sake of clarification, you say you want us out of artillery range 30-35 km. Let us assume for a moment that we are on a line 35 km.

A - From the forward lines. Just for the sake of discussion.

B - Between the Canal and our Western most line, let us say there are 33-35 km. In between we have the UN, a certain depth. What size of forces would you like to have on this side?

A - First of all, we don't mean the Canal, what about the troops? Disengagement first of all should be with the troops. When we talk about the distance, we should talk <u>from the forward lines</u>.

B - Yes.

A - 35km. from the forward lines, not from the Canal.

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B - General, what you are saying is that we shall be 45 or 50 km. from the Canal.

A - - We are separating the troops, and we are not separating the Canal. Because any shot from your troops or any guns from our troops will start the war again. Right? So we start from that line.

B - What you say is "Please, gentlemen, move from this line 40 km. East. Correct? As a first line of disengagement.

A - Yes.

B - As separation of forces. Now you say we must be in a situation where we cannot put any fire. (end of tape).... for a limited time, we are not talking about 10 months. We can discuss the time. You say from here 40 km. and then you will want a security zone and then main forces. So I want to understand what additional guarantee you need? if we are with our security forces, our Westernmost line is out of artillery rangeof your forces, of the Canal. What can we do? Yes, General, offensive, but that we can do from also about 50 km. This doesn't change between 50 and 40 km., if you are speaking about a general offensive, not that we have it in mind. But if you say that we can make a general offensive on your troops and the Canal zone, then the difference between 40 and 50 km. is immaterial. The question is whether we can interfere without making a move forward, without making an armour offensive, whether we can interfere without crossing the line. For this the distance of 32 km. is enough.

D - What advantage this line you proposed gives you militarily.

B - Militarily, I'll tell you what advantages it gives us. It gives us an added guarantee that during the very sensitive period of the beginning of peace negotiations. More difficult for each side, for us as well as for you to start anything militarily if we get bogged down politically.

D - By this line you are keeping military pressure on us and we are that pressed in the line we are in - just we are under military pressure...

B - No, no. I see it differently. That permits us not to be under military pressure if politically we have difficulties at the beginning. Because it is balanced. You have forces on this side, we have forces on the other side. You have all you need in near distance to prevent any advance from our side. At the same time, we have enough of guarantee that permits us to discuss politically without feeling any immediate

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military danger. You can say "Ah, you will stay here the whole time, and then how will we advance politically?" I say - "No, on this first line, limited in time".

C - Irrespective of progress of peace negotiations?

B - Irrespective of progress of peace negotiations.

UN - What are the conditions? In other words, the point is that in the provisional line, you could agree let's say on 2 or 3 months irrespective of the progress made at the peace conference. Let's say around the 15th of February, if the Peace Conference doesn't go well, inspite that would you agree for the Israeli forces to go to the second phase line?

A - Do you accept that concept?

B - I'm personally for it and I am ready to recommend it to my government.

UN - So it will be a commitment to you in the presence of UN, if things are slow...

B - Excuse me, I can't say 3 or 4 months I'll have to discuss that, but a limited time.

E - At least 6 months.

B - I don't want to sign.

E - No, at least 6 months.

B - Let us take an example General. On the prisoners, we said 6 to 8 days, so we have to say 3-6 months.

UN - So, in the first phase you would like to stay in the passes, is that so?

B - Light troops forward.

UN - But you would hold the pass.

B - Yes.

A - If we come to a conclusion on that line, it will be very very good for the coming peace conference.

B - I understand.

A - And the maximum we are far away from each other, the better for the peace conference.

Although you are still keeping most of the defiles in your hands, and that is a very good strategic line.

B - The distance you are asking for, we are way back.

A - No. You are in the direction of Mitla, just to penetrate the...

B - If you say these last 40 km. where does it put us?

E - On the sands.

A - Here in the direction of Mitla, the 3 main defiles will be in your hands.

B - How?

A - You will be in the Eastern part of the defile.

E - But we have a good jumping point.

./...

A - So it is very difficult for us to jump there and there is no jumping point.

E - No, no, for us, for us.

A - Yes, and that's a very good area for you, and you are using it. And here also - you are keeping most of your main forces, concentration areas.

B - We will be here.

D - Could you for a moment, General, forget about installations. They should not be an obstacle.

UN - How much time, General Gamazy, could you give to the Israeli counterparts to dismantle their main line of defence. The idea was - going back to first phase next week. At least what you say is that you cannot dismantle in one week. So how do you try to help them - They want to dismantle it. They say they need time between the first and second phase to dismantle it and build something in the back.

E - One of the principles we mentioned that both parties should agree that it is better for them to base themselves on existing installations than to force the other party, to build up new installations; because what happens later is that once you build new installations, you stick to them. So if the final solution is that we should clear out from most of Sinai, let's say, there is no sense for us to build new installations and then having to stick to them in order to get back the amortization of the installations.

C - May I suggest that one way of bridging the gap - could you discuss again the temporary nature I mean, the period - 3 months have been mentioned for a phase, you don't like too much. In order words, the Egyptian side would possibly agree on a phase one, let's say provided that it is not too long and they are sure you will go to phase 2.

E - Provided both sides may like it in the end and want to stay permanently there. (laughs).

C - Well!

E - But this is not serious.

B - General, we shall be somewhere in the line you are talking about . You will have major forces here, you'll have all your missiles.

C - West.

B - Not West, East, if I understand.

C - Ah, what the General wants!

B - Yes, here you have your major forces on the East Bank, you have all your missiles, everything will be here, and there we are going to discussions! General, you could have come to us on October 6th, and you could have said: "Look here, instead of having a war, we want to discuss with you what we are discussing now."We would have had the same discussion without having spilt blood on your side and on our side.

./...

A lot of blood was spilt on both sides. And after that, we are back at the same point. I'll have to come back to my government and say, and the government is responsible to the public. We've had about 2000 killed. You've had many killed. It was a tough war, everybody fought bravely but it was a tough war and a lot of people were killed on this. So we have to come to the public and say "After so many people were killed, back 40, 50 km., in the beginning." We are not discussing the principle of withdrawal. We accept the principle of withdrawal. The discussion will be about the final line. We know your opinion. We haven't yet made up our opinion, because we have elections. I am not bringing up now the point of peace because I don't want you to think I am being obnoxious. Let us leave it aside what kind of peace we are talking about (remember we talked about it). I think you must understand the problem we have. Therefore, I am looking for ways now to reach common ground in order to enable our political leadership to reach decision - for the first line of disengagement.

D - How about a final line of disengagement, and this may ease the phases.

(consultations in Arabic).

A - Sorry, I don't understand his question. Do you have a final line of disengagement and then we'll start talking about the intermediate lines?

B - No, we have not yet, because we have not discussed it yet. Also in our informal talks, we have not discussed it, therefore, I have not brought it up. Today I understood what you meant by the final line of disengagement: we shall reach this line sometime between today and X, we shall stay on that line from X until a final settlement, a final agreement, is reached. I haven't thought about it personally; we haven't discussed it with the government. But if I may suggest practically: I promised General Gamazy that we will not draw these discussions here until I don't know how long. Correct? I can propose practically - I can come back to the Cabinet and say "Wait a minute. Give me a mandate what to say to General Gamazy about the final line of disengagement", and I will show what you have meant. This will then take some time, the government will have a long discussion and in addition to that the government will have to discuss the first line of disengagement. It will take a long time. I propose to discuss the first line of disengagement first, and when we come to the Peace Conference, or before that, if you want,

E - After the elections.

B - After the elections to discuss the final line of disengagement.

C - To make these 3 or 4 months meaningful -

B - If you want my recommendation, General, my recommendation is, my personal opinion, perhaps tomorrow I'll come with a different answer from the

./...

Cabinet, my personal opinion is that if we want to advance, and this is our main object, if we want to advance, and start with a final line of disengagement, it will then take us a long time, and we are in a delicate situation now, I know. I've read your newspapers. We have not talked about war, but I read your newspapers - El Aharam, and what has been said by Mr. Hanis and all the other people. This is a delicate situation from which we want to move forward. I recommend that we start with the first line of disengagement and we will then have time enough to discuss the second.

C - With the understanding that there will be other lines.

B - Yes.

E - That's right.

B - The fact of having a limited time plan already gives you a guarantee for the disengagement.

C - Would it be possible after the first phase to have another intermediary line?

A - I agree.

C - -

B - I hardly have a mandate to discuss the first line, please believe me.

A - Alright, we'll come to a line, General Yariv, a temporary line, with a mind to an intermediary line.

B - Alright.

A - This line you said the distance. You were arguing about 30 km, 40 km. What is the maximum and the minimum you want for that line.

B - The maximum we want to the East and to the West is between 10-15 km. Only light forces. Main forces out of artillery range. Or I'll say more - nothing, no weapons within firing distance from the Canal zone.

A - That means this proposal?

B & E - More or less.

A - Why don't you give us a security zone?

B - Would you like to draw it? Please draw it.

A - We need at least a security zone exactly as - and also we are just arguing until I go back to our people there. (He draws) This is the line as it is now. Here we think that there should be a security zone, and then the UN and the security zone, and then the main forces. UN security zone and then main forces. Right?
If we make this 20 km.

C - This will not leave any road for us.

A - Alright, if it is our hand, or in their hand, you will have the right to move on that road.

./..

B - You know what that means, General? That our main forces will be at least 70 km. East of the Canal.

A - 60 km. from our troops.

B - All you mean is that we shall have light forces 50 km. from the Canal, and here you will have 5 infantry divisions.

A - I'll tell you that's good. That will solve many problems. We need at least 35 km, that's for the artillery.

B - But from where?

A - From the forward defence lines. Instead of 35, I made this 40.

B - There will be no artillery here, correct?

A - Here the reconnaissance parties...

B - No artillery here.

A - We want to make precautions for the main forces. And the artillery can move and come here.

B - General, I have a proposal - let us make an agreement about the main forces. For limitation of the main forces.

A - If you accept this line, we can start talking about the forces. But before accepting the line...

B - For the first line of disengagement... I think I won't be able to convince you, I won't be able to convince you.

A - Alright. What is your proposal about the distance in this case?

E - Why not start talking about limitation of forces?

B - We haven't started talking about what forces we will have.

A - We were just talking about the distance.

B - You say you have forces here, then you say this is 10-12 km. Well, this you say you cannot accept. The difference is very great.

C - ---

B - Why for example can't you say, you have together with the forces at the security zone (I am not sure that what I am saying will be accepted), which will mean 20 km. Now, UN goes down... we have to check it on the maps now, this is 25, and this is 10, then, you are out of artillery range.

UN - Then you main forces are 35 km.

B - From the Canal, not from your troops.

A - Back again, as a military man, it doesn't make any difference, 5 km. or 10 km. I said we'll start working here and here. The civilians will be everywhere. Our troops will be out of their positions, so we start from the forward defensive lines. In this case, we have 10 km. here, so 25 km. from your first troops to our first troops. This is the problem.

B - These first troops have nothing with which to reach you. They have no

tanks, they have no 81mm. mortars, they are light troops. What you are meaning to say that from this line with the security zone, it's 10 km. You want from these 10 km. to take another 32 km. I consider it too much.

C - Between troops.

B - I understand what you say.
That means 10 km. your security zone, 5 km. UN, 10 km. our security zone, that is 25. You want another 10 km. for our main forces.

ANAL	2nd Army 3rd Army	10 km. Egyptian Security zone	5 km. U.N.	10 km. Israeli security zone	10 km. Israeli light forces	Israeli main forces

35 km.

B - Then you have from here to here 10 km., 15, 10 = 35.

C - From main troops to main troops. 35 km.

ANAL	2nd and 3rd armies	10 km. Egyptian Security zone		15 km. UN	10 km. Israeli Security zone	Israeli main forces

B - This is what you mean?

A - Yes.

D - I have a personal impression that this road means something from installation point of view.

B - It is a good line.

D - All this talk about distance is just because I sense that may be there are installations there, which I suggest that you neglect for the moment, and then, we can see how we can compromise on the question of the military installations.

D - A time table, or any kind of solution we can reach.

B - It is not a question of military installations. Military installations are also important, but this is not the dominant factor. The dominant

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factors are different and I tried to explain them to you in all our talks. The dominant factor, amongst other things - the first line of disengagement (I am not talking about the second and the final settlement), must have some bearing on what the outcome of the last war was. There must be some connection. What you are suggesting, General and Colonel, has no relation to the situation on the ground as it is now. There must be some relation. It is only a first line of disengagement. I'll ask you another question. I drew these lines, and as I know I will have great difficulties, no, I think the Cabinet will not accept it. I can't say I am sure they will not accept it, because then we will not discuss the line. Perhaps they will accept it, but my estimate is that they will not. Have you any remarks on this?

D - By what factors are calculating the distance?

B - I told you the factor, and I think it is a fair factor, legitimate, fair and relevant. That we should be out, we should be where we have forces, whether on the westernmost security line or the westernmost main force line, we should not be able to bring fire upon your civilian targets. Here we have a difference: you say we should not be able to bring fire on your troops, but we say "we should not be able to bring fire on civilian targets". If we are able to bring fire on your troops, it will be mutual. You'll be able to bring fire on our troops. So here it is equal, it is not something that is unequal.

A - No, but we are talking about disengagement.

B - But I don't see any reason. If we limit it in time, the UNEF is there. If we are going to a Peace Conference, why should there be friction? If we want to do something serious, or you want to do something serious each side brings in its armour and divisions and avante. But this is not the problem.

C - --- one should not , cannot--- in terms of 5 km., I think.

B - But there we have a problem. We have a problem here on the first line of disengagement. We cannot go from the situation on the ground as it is now to the lines of disengagement which you propose. You propose that the first line of disengagement would be close to 50 km.

UN - If you are going to consult your authorities, why don't you also discuss (I think it is important) how long the first line of disengagement is going to last? I know that you have not yet discussed it, General Yariv and General Gamazy, but I think these questions will be asked.

A - True.

UN - What do you have in mind?

B - I said the framework of time 3-6 months. This we can discuss. ./...

A - 3-6 months on that line?!

B - Yes, but we can discuss whether it is 3 or 5 or 4.

A - On this line?

B - No, General, this is what you propose.

A - That's what we discussed.

B - I think this is too far back. But let us say (I know that you don't agree) to have our first line closer. If I make the line here or here, you don't agree. Right?

A - That's 25 km.

B - You don't agree, I understand. So, we have a difference of opinion. So I say the line on which we two shall agree (perhaps tomorrow we shall have a big discussion and we shall agree) on the Westernmost line of our position, we propose to stay 3-6 months.

UN - And that you say irrespective of progress at the peace conference.

B - I am already adding that this is not the final line of complete with - drawal and not even of disengagement.

A - Temporary line.

E - I don't know whether your additional remark ---

UN - No, but we discussed that with the General and General Yariv said, if it's 3 months, it is not linked with the peace conference. Because General Yariv many times repeated "disagreement yes, but misunderstanding, no". That could be one.

E - But if you say without any respect to whether there is a peace conference or not -

UN - No progress.

B - I'm not saying peace conference because I told you we don't have any invitation yet.

UN - Yes, that's true, and I think this is an important point.

A - 3 to 6 months on the whole of that line.

B - On the line wherever it will be agreed between us.

A - Not yet.

B - Where it <u>will be</u> agreed between us.

A - The minimum and the maximum line.

B - I don't know because the government didn't tell me.

A - Until the government gives you the line (open maps), 10-20 km. from the forward troops or from the Canal?

B - From the Canal.

E - From the Canal.

A - That means nose to nose troops. Well, we have the troops already 10km. from one another!

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B - This we can discuss.

A - We are entering disengagement, that means the troops should be away.

B - Then we have a second problem which you haven't understood. What kind of troops will you have?

E - It will influence very much - the strength and which kind of weapons.

B - They will ask, for example - will all the missiles, all the SAMS be here?

A - Are you complacent with that to make separation for the troops, to put your forces 10km. east of ---

B - You know, the Jews have a characteristic, they answer questions by questions (laughs). This is well known. So my question is if you can put down what is the maximum line which you agree for us to be in the West. I know perhaps you don't have the government's signature for me. I don't have the government's signature for that too.

E - We mean the nearest line.

B - The nearest line to you, so that I can tell them what we can expect. I can understand if it is difficult for you to say now. Perhaps you want to check and come back tomorrow? Because I have a problem. You know with me I have the government's decision and I am already beyond it.

A - And also I am already beyond my proposal.

B - I'll tell you what, General, at least I have a consolation. We'll suffer together.

E - I have to watch him, you know, so that he doesn't step on lines.

b r e a k

B - No, for officers in their duty who are members on the list for elections. I told them that I have decided, if the government wants me to continue to represent the Israeli side at the negotiations, that I am ready to continue irrespective of whether there will or will not be a change in the law. So this is what I told them. Now, I want to explain to you why I did it here. If I do it in Tel-Aviv, they'll say "Ah! Yariv is a bastard" Why? (they stopped the tape)

A - 10 km. East of the Canal. We'd better discuss just to come closer to each other.

B - If I understood you, General, you want to maintain your troops on the Eastern Bank of the Canal.

A - Right.

B - How strong? Whole 2nd army, whole 3rd army?

A - In this case, we should keep them, but we don't want to keep them.

B - In this case ---

./...

A - Yes.

B - If I understand on this proposal, 35 km. from your forward positions, or 45 km. from the Canal. Under these circumstances, you would like to keep here 2 or 3 divisions? 300-400 tanks etc.

A - So we may reorganize it. These positions can be - your forces here and our forces here, that means 35.

C - 35 between main and main.

B - You want to have heavy forces here.
I will report it but I must give you my honest opinion of what I think the government's position will be. As the French say "très très très difficile".

A - What's your idea about the troops here? on this basis, on this distance.

B - There is a differenoe you see, General. Where is the difference? (I know you have a tough adviser) We shall have main forces here, you will have important forces here and very important forces here.

A - There is no other place for us, or to go to Libya!!

B - Oh!!! (laughs) Anything but not to Libya.

E - Well, about the petrol it's not too bad.

B - Of course, you have no other place to go. This is clear but what is difficult for us to accept is the big forces here. This is the problem. There will be a very big problem with my government about the distance, about this line which is 35 km. from the Canal, very big. They will not accept it, I am sure, and in addition you are putting another big obstacle, which is the size of the forces. And all this within a limited time frame.

A - The time frame 3 to 6 months.

B - I said on purpose 3 to 6 months, so that we can discuss. We are giving a limited time frame because we say that this is not our final line of disengagement. Never mind, it's not the final line of settlement. You are putting for me and for my cabinet two very great problems - one is the distance, and the second, the size of the forces. I must tell you this because I know the climate at home.

D - As a temporary line, it is not finally important. So, as soon as we speak about another line, as second step, we simultaneously cancel all these problems.

B - Yes, but you have to keep in mind two important points. We have been at war, we have thanks to the help of General Siilasvuo, we have the cease-fire but it is still not -

A - Firm.

B - We have to pass to a more stable situation. It is a line of disengagement

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for a temporary time where each side can begin to feel that it can discuss politically and seriously. During this time, you are putting us militarily at a great disadvantage. You really must try to understand. I know your president has a public. He is in charge of his people. He has to answer to his people. We understand. The same on our side. The difference is you have one president, we have a whole government (laughs). You have one president. He is the boss - rais. We have a Prime Minister with a cabinet and we have three different parties in the coalition. This is a political problem. Now our government has to come to the people and say "we had the war, the lines are as they are. Now, immediately from this, we have to go back 35 km. from the Canal". I must be honest with you, because I'll mislead you. I must be honest with you. It won't work that way.

D - Will the public be more relaxed if it is 15?

B - Yes.

A - But the troops won't be relaxed.

B - But for this we can take mutual guarantee measures. I understand that if we are close you also have a problem. OK, let us take several guarantee measures which will put all kinds of difficulties for us to take military initiative - size of the forces, nature of the forces, inspection, everything.

D - General, what will the public say if we start talking about 242 which means complete withdrawal. If just a temporary withdrawal...

B - I'll tell you exactly what the public will say. It will say "first of all we have peace negotiations". This is what we are going to talk about, I don't know where it will be - Geneva or wherever it will be. On this, the public will go. This is what the elections will be about, or about the principle of the settlement. You have a certain interpretation of 242. We have a different interpretation. Now what will the public vote about? The public will vote what kind of interpretation we give to 242. The public won't vote for a map. But it will vote for certain principles. And there will be one party that will put forward such principle, another party that will put forward other principles, and the third party will put forward other principles. And there will be a public vote and then the government can go to the negotiations according to the principles which have been voted upon by the public. Therefore, the line of disengagement, is irrelevant to the final settlement. It has to do with the psychological mood and the feeling with which we can go to the elections. I understand that it is mutual. Therefore, I say first of all we clear out of here. We clear out of here. Everything west of the Canal is clear of Israelis. If you have big forces on

the other side at the same time, we are very far from the Canal. We are only at the beginning and there are such great differences of opinion between us. We feel that we start from a bad position, which is not warranted by the results of the war. This we could have discussed without a war.

E - I think it is essential to know more about the size and number of your troops, East of the Canal, because this may be very very important.

A - I think it is very hard for us today to come to a conclusion today on that problem.

B - I agree.

A - Until tomorrow we'll think--- What I can say now, from the principles that the distance where the Israelis , Israeli troops will be, according to that distance, our forces will be on the Eastern Bank. And we didn't come to a conclusion on that, now. For the distance we didn't come to a conclusion and also about the forces we didn't come to a conclusion. We didn't come to the forces because we didn't come to the distance. That is the problem.

UN - I am sorry, General, but since we are summarizing now the conclusions of the meeting, I wonder if you can advance without commitments since you have no authority. What you have now in mind, I mean, improvement from your point of view.

B - I at this stage cannot say more than I have said, that we would like to have the forward line 10 to 15 km. from the Canal.

UN - That's the light one, and then the main forces?

B - The main forces out of artillery range from the Canal.

UN - In other words, the difference between you now is that you would like to have troops beyond artillery range whereas the Israeli proposal is to have the civilian population on the Canal beyond artillery range.

B - Yes.

A - There is no security zone now for us. I mean these troops will be opposite to our troops on the east, as I understand,

E - Not necessarily.

UN - 10-15 km. with security zone with light weapons which cannot reach the Canal?

B - Exactly.

E - And there will be a UN force.

A - 35 km. what you said now.

UN - It's important that you make it clearer so we understand it.

B - I would say that here under this proposal, our security zone is 25 km. from the forces, 35 km. from the Canal. That is to say even if we have here artillery, it can't reach the Canal, it can reach the forces.

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What we have in mind is our security line here between 10-12 km.

UN - Where do you put UNEF around here?

B - Now, here we come to the problem of size of Egyptian forces . With the size General has in mind there is no room for UNEF. But if you speak about a restricted size, symbolic presence, then (end of tape).



B - Because I understand this is your minimum proposal.

A - That means we are concluding our discussion today. That you have your troops 10-12 km. from the Canal.

B - And your proposal is, if I understand correctly, forces here, forces here, then --- of 10 km, then security zone of 10 km. , then the UN 15 km., then our security zone of 10 km., then our main forces.

A - That's my proposal, the unofficial one, I gave it to you. But we stay 3 hours discussing in order to eliminate the differences between each other. All we came to is somewhat like this - unofficial from your side, and unofficial from our side. Now back again to that line we started at 11 o'clock.

B - Alright. I know what you mean. The official proposal is as it was.

A - "Halas".

B - An unofficial possibility.

A - Aywa! Unofficial possibility.

B - Is what I have drawn here.

UN - 10-15 km. to a forward line, and 35 km. to the main forces which is artillery range from the Canal.

A - Right, that is possible.

B - Unofficial possibility.

A - Absolutely right. Unofficial, unofficial, but I'll take this---

B - I have a tough job, General, believe me.

A - Believe me I have too.

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B - כאן הנקודה שלנו : מה קו"מ כלפנו, מה קו"מ
security zone , 15 אולי , מה zone security
שלנו ואו"מ כלפיים שלנו . אולי הנקודה
של הפעתה הפתרונית .

The principle of the General is that out of artillery range is not for the Canal, but for the forces.

A - Because we are disengaging the forces. Not disengagement between the Canal and your forces.

B - General, this I must admit is a good argument.

A - Although it is very important for us for the sake of the civilians.

E - But we can come to an agreement.

A - We'll work on that unofficial possibility.

B - But I'm saying to you honestly, it is difficult.

A - As a temporary phase for other phases.

B - Temporary phase and limited time frame, 3 to 6 months. We can discuss it. When I speak about 10-12km., this we say is temporary 3 to 6 months.

A - On this proposal, or the other one. Both of them.

B - Yes, both of them. My version and your version - OK. 10 to 12, this is what the line is now.

A - 10 to 12 km., that's the official one.

B - No, this is unofficial. Like you.

A - 10 to 12 km. you'll stay 3 to 6 months also, that's the official one?... Sorry.

B - 35, 45 is your unofficial proposal -

C - Or unofficial possibility.

A - Unofficial possibility.

B - My counter unofficial possibility is our first line 10 to 12 km. from the Canal.

A - And the official?

B - The official I'll tell you tomorrow, when I'll tell them what you say, I'll bring you the official. I have the authority only for proposing - remember the proposals, General? This is what I have the authority. I don't have the authority to say this is official. I say unofficial possibility 10 to 12 km. I understand what you are saying. I now go back and report, I'll do my best to have an official proposal tomorrow.

A - I'll make myself very clear now. The official proposal is what I handed today EL-ARISH , RAS-MUHAMAD and keeping the zone EL ARISH - RAS MUHAMAD area - that's for the UN. That's the official. All the other things we discussed today was to know our both thinking and I was giving my views

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about these 10 to 12 km. or about this one. That it cannot be accepted. This 10 to 12 km. on the Eastern Bank or the UN take over our positions for the reasons which I said - superior military position, no security for people, no security for opening the Canal, no security for separation, no nothing. That is what I mentioned at 11.30 in the morning. So, this discussion was just talking.

B - We are exactly the same from our position. That is to say - the official proposal is about the UN replacing the territories that have been taken during the war by each of the sides. This is the official proposal. All the other drawings I have presented were under the exchange of ideas. It is absolutely clear to me what the official proposal presented by the General is. It is clear to me that the drawings the General has made, that his observations are not the official Egyptian proposal. Right?

A - Right.

B - And I hope the General knows that all the drawings and observations I made are not the official Israeli position. So I can say "what have I gained today?" I have gained the possibility to go back to my government and say "Here I have a) very clearly the Egyptian official position; b) I have unofficial, unauthorized thinking which I have heard, this is all. But the official position is the line EL ARISH - RAS MUHAMAD.

A - You may come back tomorrow and we may start back again from the...

B - General, I answered all your questions. I would like to make one remark. Please remember that we are speaking (this is important for the record) about the first line of disengagement within a limited time frame of 3 to 6 months. Second item I would like to stress is that you have not given me any indication, except for a very general principle, of the size of the forces you want to have on the East Bank. You have only told me the principle that there is a direct link between the distance from the Canal or from your forces to our first line, and the size of the forces. But you have not given me any more indications about it. Correct?

A - Correct.

B - So how do we say? Disagreement yes, misunderstanding no. At least that. No, we have gained something else. I can go back and say what the unofficial, personal possibilities that were discussed are. This is the gain of today (It is a difficult life, better to be a soldier).

D - We wish you your continuation on this plane.

B & E - Thank you.

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B - I can't say our sandwitches are from Hotel Hilton but -

D - They are very good.

B - Good, alright. I'll have a sardine sandwitch.

General, are there any current problems?

A - Brigadier Sheriff and General Eyal still have some more problems to solve. I don't want to speak any word about this, any word about that. I am fed up with that.

Sheriff - General Eyal and myself talked about these problems and General Eyal - discussed these matters of exchange of letters between the people of Suez and those outside Suez. The means to evacuate a 100 wounded from Suez hospital. The means to change the teams in Suez hospital - they have been there for a long time, and the means to supply Suez hospital with more medical equipment.

B to A - General, are you going to give a statement to the press about your political career? Yes, excuse me, Brigadier Sheriff.

Sheriff - So -- the Red Cross and he asked them whether these people would be permitted to leave, and the answer of the Red Cross was affirmative. So the Red Cross from Egypt Mr. Boisard will go to this place -- so that they can carry on.

B - I'll tell you what? As I was not up to date when I came here on the Red Cross problem. On this, I promise you an answer tomorrow.

Sheriff - Very good. Second point is Sir the exchange of private letters.

B - You had more points before that. One was the evacuation of Abu-Sultan in Geneva.

Sheriff - The second is the means of exchange of private letters between people of Suez and outside Suez.

B - This I must check.

Sheriff - Thank you. From Suez and into Suez.

B - Alright.

How will you ensure that it is not military correspondence?

Sheriff - I don't know who looks upon the letters.

B - It's a problem.

Sheriff - We need the evacuation of over 100 wounded rom Suez.

B - I'll give you an answer on that tomorrow.

S - We need to change the medical teams of Sue. hospital.

/...

B - How many people are there?

S - Well, we can get the number.

B - You speak about the principle.

S - Yes, and then go on with the practical application. The medical team - that is, doctors and nurses. And lastly, the need to supply Suez hospital with more medical convenience.

B - For example -

S - Medicaments, cotton-wool, medical equipment, not only basic.

B - Good, I'll give you an answer on all these problems tomorrow.

A - I'm glad you discussed it and gave a decision on that at least.

B - I didn't give a decision, I said I'll give an answer tomorrow.

B - Ah! If I would have known that you have much good sandwitches, I wouldn't have given you our sandwitches.

E - Very good supply - thank you very much.

B - It is hard to talk and eat.

D - Take your time, take your time.

E - Are these Israeli oranges?

Sheriff - No.

B - I can see a different kind. How do you call this kind.

A - Bourdean.

B - You know from where the word Bourdaen comes? Portugal.

B - [illegible]

E - [illegible]

B - [illegible]

E - [illegible]

(tape is interrupted).

E - Today, we finished, and we thank you and the Red Cross for the exchange of the P.O.W.s, except the problem of Mizrachi; but all the rest, starting with our P.O.W.s whom we think have been captured and we still are waiting for your answer about them. We gave very good 3 examples: Lieutenant Cohen El Ran, Captain Marom Max, private Tam Yosef. Well, in this case, we did not yet receive your answer.

Sheriff - I'll have to go back to Cairo to answer you.

A. - Did you check that?

S - I checked it and I am going on with the checking, because it is a long list.

B - Excuse me, please, General; After all we have been talking, about this problem already last week! And there is no movement on it.

S - Yes, we'll check this.

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B - Can you give us, Brigadier Sheriff, how long it is going to take - a week, a month?

S - It won't take a week or a month, but I am checking it, really. I have a list and I am meeting people.

B - Please, please, Brigadier Sheriff, tell us is it a question of 2 or 3 days or more?

A - "yaani", how long, and take one day reserve - 3 days is alright with you? On the 25th?

- 26th.

E - Monday morning. OK.

B - Excuse me, I must tell you a story. You say another day. Every time an engineer gives us an estimate, we say "add another month".

E - As you remember, yesterday, we transferred to you the 10 bodies, and I know you got them, but we are still waiting for our soldiers' bodies from Suez. Well, and I would like to mention that except these 25 bodies, there is a body of our liaison officer with UN observers, lieutenant לוי . He was on the list handed to us by the Red Cross as a P.O.W. We noted his family that he is a POW and alive. All our P.O.W.s come back home and, at least, if he is dead, we would like to have his body as soon as possible.
So, if I'm not wrong, Brigadier Sheriff, told me that during the night we will get through the Red Cross an answer - so that we'll be able tomorrow...

S - I'll ask when I go back to Cairo.

E - But here again, I would like, General Yariv, that we will have our dead back.

B - On that you don't need my permission.

A - Only that specific one?

E - That specific case as well as around 25 bodies from Suez. We have been talking the whole week about it.

A - Tomorrow, this body will be handed at 2 o'clock.

S - The day after tomorrow at 10 o'clock here.

B - And the bodies from Suez?
(consultations in Arabic).

E - You told me this morning for the first time that there are. I should check and see if there are. Yesterday, you collected all the bodies West.

S - Only 4.

E - We gave you all the possibilities. Only this morning, you told me that there are. I'll check it, and I'll give you an answer. Yes, but this is not an answer about the 25 bodies.

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A - Why not make it, in case there is any complication, the day after tomorrow?

S - Both sides give simultaneously.

A - Exchange, there are just 9. These people will go there, or the Red Cross take all the corpses, and you take the corpses from our...

E - About these bodies, I just heard this morning, but about the bodies in Suez, we are talking about for days.

A - I agree that we talked about 10 times about that.

B - Today is the 22nd. Let's agree that on the 25th.

E - You said that you want to have the dead bodies of --- With us, it's tomorrow. Let me check it. It can't be on Saturday. The 25th, Sunday.

S - We'll deliver the lieutenant at 101, and at the same time, at 10 o'clock you receive at Suez your dead bodies and we receive at Kantara the bodies east of your frontier.

E - Just this morning, you told me about this. It's the first time that I heard.

B - If the bodies are there, you will get them.

A - I'll tell you the truth. It was reported to the Minister that we have some bodies, east of Port Said, east of the strong point there, and that's for sure that there are some bodies there. Their families asked for them, and it was a bad situation. They --- "Why do you carry on the -- with the Israelis and don't ask for these bodies?"So there is trouble for these bodies.

S - Very much indeed.

E - We got a message that there are bodies east of our strong point. This was the cable we got. So, we went together. It was the day before yesterday.

S - Not east, west, west of your strong point.

E - This morning, was the first time you told us about east of our strong point.

S - Exactly, I was reported yesterday by your authorities. Here there should be bodies. Your commander told us.

B - You will get them. As many bodies as there are.

E - We are not going to shoot new bodies so that you have more bodies.

A - On the 25th of November.

E - Even before. If there are, may be even before. The whole subject of searching after the bodies, well, I understand , understood this morning that you changed your ideas about it.

S - Not exactly. We discovered mines in the area, that means practical difficulty to have people killed in searching f the dead bodies. ./...

A - I'll tell you General. He told me about these mines which they found in ----- and in Kantara,---- if there are any dead bodies, they can be collected by the Red Cross, and they can do something for the mines.

B - The Red Cross has no pioneers to clear the mines.

A - How can we do it? You have your mines and we have our mines. What can we do?

E - We agreed with the Brigadier and the Red Cross to have combined teams with the Red Cross, going between the lines and trying to find and collect these dead bodies. So this was agreed. And for sure, we'll clear the area from mines before.

S - ---------to collect the bodies and removing mines from defensive positions is something which I cannot...

B - May I propose, if I remember my military school correctly, every mine field should be marked on the map. After you make a mine field, it has to be marked on the map. We can check our maps and know exactly where in the no-man's land we put mines or did not put mines. We know exactly. And if I know the Egyptian army, things are always well marked on papers and maps etc. I am sure, your commanders know where your troops put mines in the no-man's land. So, when we come from our side with the Red Cross, when you come from your side with the Red Cross, there's no need to step on mines. Each side comes with a map, a neutral map, with no other information, only where the mines in the area are, and nobody will step on the mines.

S - My war minister told me very clearly that in our mine fields only Egyptian teams are to search for bodies.

C - Brigadier Sheriff, there was an agreement on this point on joint teams.

B - Yes.

C - So what is this talk about?

S - The agreement about joint teams was before we had the information about mines.

C - There is no such thing as changing your mind after you have made an agreement.

S - They were not speaking about mines. There was no speaking about mines. They were speaking about searching the bodies.

C - At-------we know that there are mines.

A - Well, I'll check it and see how we can do.

B - Shall we speak about it tomorrow?

A - Yes.

B - ٢٣/٤ ok

S - On the 25th, we'll get our bodies east of your strong point.

B - This is standing order.

./...

A - There is only one point now left - dead bodies in no man's land.

S - ----------

A - How about the fuel for the city?

B - Yes. I promised an answer. Agreed in principle. But we'll have a discussion about quantities. I know the Colonel always looks at me, he says about "the spirit" of agreement, but we have to make some calculations. So we made the calculation and we worked on the assumption -

E - We figured that a town of about 5,000 inhabitants is entitled to 5 ambulances, 5 fire brigades cars, and about 10 various trucks and cars for daily needs of distribution of food etc. That brings us to about 45 cars that are constantly running, except the 30 vehicles that are employed in drawing supplies from the UN point to the city. Now, we figured that in a town like this, the maximum is about 40 kms. per day, per car. And the consumption of petrol is about 10 litre per day, and the consumption of oil is about 2.5 kg. for 100 litres of petrol, and the change of oils and grease are after 3,000 km. (This is a rough estimate), gives you about 5 km. of oil and 2 km. of grease. The consumption of oil for breaks is almost next to nil.

A - That daily or weekly or what?

E - Daily.

B - We have to make some calculation.

D - -------no temptation that we-------you change your mind. ------250tons of supplies, we still have...

UN - What's the total?

A - We'll leave it to the UN to do it.

UN - What's the total?

E - I didn't say this was the answer. I said these were the calculations.

B - There should be some logic to it. We checked the logic.

UN - Can you give the total? there would be better feelings.

B - I want to say about the ill feelings. What should I say when I go to report to the Cabinet and I have to tell them that my Egyptian friends have agreed that in Suez there are 20,000 most of them military men, not civilians. And they say "you agreed to this and this and this". So, this I cannot forget. You must agree that this isa fact. No, Colonel, please comment.

D - -------we calculated to take the minimum quantity -

E - We are far apart on unimportant matters. We just wanted to show you that we made calculations about the oil and the grease, etc., and we figure, I don't know who wants maybe someone is just asking you for too many items, for supplies that are not even needed. You have

figured that about 100 kg. of oil for engines is needed. Our estimation is that about 10 kg. would be ample enough for the 35 cars, and for the 30 vehicles. But no objection for instance on the 1,000 l. of solar for the hospital, and for cooking and for other things, not even about the 1,000 litres of kerosene for light and for cooking. And the same goes about the 1,000 litres of mazut, so the difference is really negligible.

C - Gasoline for cars do you have it?

E - Gasoline for gas is... about the cooking butan gas you can get about 50 gas containers but I don't know whether you figure it big or small. We have two sizes - one of 12 kg. and the other of 48 kg. We don't know which one you have, and we would suggest to have 100 butan gas containers but small ones, a smaller size like this, and also that for security reasons and not for consumption reasons.

B - If I may remark, you always, General and Colonel, always look at me very doubtingly and disdainfully when we come to the quantities. Then you say about the spirit. I want to remind you that we didn't get a list of the prisoners, a list of the prisoners, which is a piece of paper, nothing more, we didn't get a list of the prisoners, until after we sat down and worked out all the arrangements and after you had the full list of the prisoners. And I am not bringing it up. I am not saying that you made business when we talked about people. You were talking about quantities of material matters.

A - At any rate anything discussed about the town or the quantities, we have no coins at all -----and the UN can take it.----

B - Alright.

A - There is another small point before we leave. You know that for the 3rd army, we have only one unloading point. We talked about making another unloading point, and for security measures, you refused. During this unloading point, there is a gap on the eastern bank, there is a gap on the western bank, there is another gap on the eastern bank, and we want to make another gap on the western bank, just to cross 30 metres in the same area.

B - General, perhaps I have explained it to you this morning. I went there after the last meeting, and I looked at it closely. Western bank, unloading point you have a jetty, you have a building here, you can put at the same time 3 vehicles, and I watched and there were only 2. I told the major who was in charge. He had only 80 people, I said he could take 100. I told our commander 100 - I have agreed. I told him he could employ 10 vehicles.

(tape interrup ed). ./...

B - First of all, I checked about Adabiya (It was also on Television) because by chance the television was there. What happened was that a vehicle by mistake I think, there were some civilians, some soldiers, went past your check-point, past our check-point.

A - Past your check-point?

B & E - Yes.

B - This was that. If you ask the UN, they came to take the wounded people afterwards, they didn't know what happened. This is what happened, the vehicle drove past your check-point, past our check-point (he was mistaken probably) and then they opened fire. And there was a wounded or two wounded and the UN came in and took them out. So, you can check with the UN where the wounded people were picked up. I am very sorry for it, very sorry because it was unnecessary. But the soldiers didn't know what was happening. We are very sorry for it personally, and also the Minister asked me to tell you that we are very sorry, but they passed the two check-points and they didn't know what happened.
Now, we have given strict orders again not to open fire unless there is a crossing of the lines. There are several instances where your troops cut a crossing the cease-fire lines and started advancing towards the fortifications. And orders are very very strict and I know, General Tal went down yesterday himself, personally, again to ensure that people won't open fire like that and I don't think it happens. But we have a whole list of cases in which your troops either advanced on the ground, or opened fire and I don't think it's necessary for us to give you the whole list - a,b,c, etc., but I only want to tell you that we are conscious of the problem, and we are doing everything to see that no fire is unnecessarily opened.

A - Alright.

B - I didn't know about Adabiya. I went personally to check it and to see what can be done. There was a minor point which we raised at our meeting last time - whether we could have a copy of the meetings we had with you, General, of the records.

C - We have no records, you know.

UN - We are not equipped for that. We took it for us frankly.

C - Then we would have to have a secretary taking of the machine.

B - But on the first meeting you had a stenographer.

UN - She was here in case you would not have the agreement. She was ready to retype it.

E - You know, you could have changed the agreement?

B - But let us assume, that tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, Sunday or Monday, we reach an agreement about disengagement. What form will it get?

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The form of record is a problem.

UN - We can have a secretary which will type , write it.

B - I'll tell you I am not worried about the record, I'm worried about the agreement. For the record we'll find a so ution.

A - I have a proposal - when we come to the main tems of that agreement, and we'll go back all of us and have it writt n...

B - In a clear form...

A - By all legal procedures, and then we'll exchange it - to be sure from both sides.

B - A signature.

A - And then we'll sign it. And I will sign it in another formal meeting as the last one.

B - Incha'allah.

A - We'll go back today and prepare it (laughs).

B - I'll bring the Jerusalem Post tomorrow, I'll be grateful if you can bring the El Ahram.

A - That's a promise and I'll bring of today and yesterday.

E - Specially Heikal's article on his talk with Kissinger.

B - I have it, I have it.

E - You have it already?

B - Yes. There are two very interesting. One is the talk with Kissinger, the other is the interview with the Minister of War. Very interesting.

A - (smiled).

B - (laughingly) I am straightforward General, I am straightforward.

A - I didn't say a word.

E - Smiling is much better than saying.

A - May I have a word with you General, before we go.

E - These are UN cigarettes.

TOP SECRET

23.11.1973

A - GAMAZY
B - YARIV
C - SIILASVUO
D - UEDI
E - EYAL
S - SHERIFF
F - UN OFFICER MR. GORGE

C - Good morning, gentlemen, we start today ...
A - With your permission, if we can discuss the problem of the Red Cross.
S - The questions we asked yesterday you promised to answer today.
B - Yes. I understand that on the question of the civilian population, the Red Cross representative in Tel-Aviv has already had an answer. You asked for soldiers to be taken and the answer was negative. When I got back I was told by the newspapers the answer has been negative.
S - We got an answer--- concerning the population who wish to leave the area.
B - So, I am probably mistaken. On leaving it's alright, but the answer was negative on the request to take a census. I understand the Red Cross, as I promised you, General, has been on a visit, had no complaints.
S - Well, the point is that people who want to leave-----the Red Cross ------- to Cairo----the area------and find a way of taking them out---- buses going and coming.
B - I understand the answer is that the Red Cross delegate from Jerusalem will come it is OK with us.
S - Not from Cairo?
B - No, we prefer from Jerusalem. I want to be clear what we are talking about because I don't want to have a misunderstanding. I understand your request is to let people who want to leave, leave. That's alright. Then there is another point: you would like the Red Cross representative to go and check who wants to leave, who wants to stay, on this our answer was negative. Whoever wants to leave it is OK. If the Red Cross representative from Jerusalem wants to go and see how things are down there in the area,'tfadal'.
S - Now, are people allowed to leave, whoever wants to leave, whoever wants to enter again, to go in a kind of agreement and understanding to let them come back again.
B - As far as I understand what was agreed upon, if the people want to leave, it's OK. But we can't permit a movement back and forth.
S - Those who were outside to go back to their town.

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B - Ah, that's a different point. This I'll have to check. You are talking about people from the outside coming in.

S - About people who were previously inhabitants before the war.

B - This is a new point. This I have to check. If we get into an agreement with General Gamazy, then you won't have any problem at all. I am talking seriously, not cynically.

S - So, you promised me to answer about more than a 100 wounded to be evacuated from Suez.

B - Yes, in principle it's alright.

S - They can go out -----

B - Just a moment. Because with you we always like to be clear, so we have no misunderstanding. So, once the question of the bodies from Suez is in order.

S - No problem.

B - As the General says, I hate the word exchange - I really do.

S - They'll start on Monday.

B - Sunday.

S - 25th.

B - I remember , but you check if I am right. Then, there is the question of correspondence. On this I am sorry, the answer is negative.

S - Even for cards?

B - Yes.

S - Cards are non-military information.

B - But the non-military nature of the information is for the Third Army. Now, there was another point, about medical supplies - OK. The relief of medical teams. General, I am sorry, the answer is negative. Of course, I remind you that we have agreed to free movement of the Red Cross medical supplies. I think this covers all points you mentioned.

S - General Yariv, just a little point concerning the exchange of bodies in no man's land. My authorities told me that we should search in our mine fields and you will search in your mine fields.

B - OK.

S - Each side knows his mine fields - we have to put on the maps where our troops are -- we can fix a timing when the teams start working, so that there will be no firing.

B - So what you mean is division of the no man's land (and for the purpose of looking for bodies), yes?

S - We have our mine fields and we know where they are, and we are ready to look for the bodies of both sides in our mine fields, without joint committees. We are ready to take the responsibility because we

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know where the mine fields are, and with our engineers, it might not be necessary to remove the mines.

B - OK. We'll look where the mines are, and where they can go. But how do we prevent any accident in fire?

S - -----at such a moment when you start searching, the Red Cross will put a flag on the edge of the forward defensive lines and udder the Red Cross flag -- and exact timing coordinated with the UN, we'll start the operation.

E - We agreed that your team will look after the killed soldiers west of our strong point at the North. They were there and they looked after the bodies. Will this work on the same basis?

S - It worked very well, I think.

E - Yes, but if we will come from our side, and start searching for bodies will our team be allowed to advance until your lines?

S - -----500 metres from our forward defensive lines. This-----on the map, because on the ground, you can never see it. It needs some small level teams, may be----with the local commanders.

E - אנחנו נתנו לכם להתקדם עד 200 מ', וגם אנו רוצה שנוכל להתקדם עד לקו שלכם.

E - As we allowed you to advance to 200 m. from our strong point there, we would like to have the same!

A - That's from Port Said?

B - Exactly.

A - It doesn't make any difference between 200 and 500. The Red Cross will be there.

(B - General Gamazy has given a very good statement to the press, I was very glad to read it).

E - We would prefer to allow these teams to search and find the dead bodies.

A - General, both of you will be there and the teams will be there. If there is a dead body, at a distance of 250, it doesn't make any difference, 320, it doesn't make any difference. If you see a dead body from the Chinese army, you will take it away.

E - Well, I am sorry to say that until today, we are talking about this around 8 days, we were not allowed to start. So I would like ------ on the 25th, fine!

S - We need maps and we have to put things on maps.

E - Well, today is the 23rd, it's a long time.

S - We have to put our positions, your positions on the map together.

E - Well, we can do it now.

S - So, you've got a map to give us?

B - A map for what, for mines?

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S - For the positions.

B - For the positions, yes. I even have a map here.

E - I prefer to decide on the 25th and to allow the local commanders on the spot - they will find a solution there. We just start with it.

A - The local commander?

E - The local commander.

A - OK. - 'Halas'. On the 25th, you will get the bodies from Suez.

E - And you will get the bodies east of the strong point.

S - One last point. We started looking for our bodies in no man's land east of the strong point that you occupy. Yesterday, it seems they found nobody and they have to go back. The Red Cross gentleman yesterday, had a very strong diarrhoea, and he went back to Cairo to be cured. Would you mind, Sir, if we continue tomorrow?

E - They can continue tomorrow.

B - What happened to your seriously wounded people from the Third Army. We waited 3 times for the evacuation.

A - No, it's finished. In Karamit strong point, those who were wounded, we found them dead, died of their wounds.

B - Why, General, when you asked me I gave you on the spot an answer.

A - We had 3 or 4 dead after that until the Red Cross---we reported to the UN and the Red Cross and they are buried there.

B - I am very sorry, General.

A - One of them is buried there and the others ---

B - I am very sorry because we were ready the same day to do it.

E - Two weeks ago I agreed on the spot to solve the problem with the Red Cross.

A - So much work with the Red Cross. It takes a long time, on our side, on the other side.

B - I am very sorry, General.

E - Still, there is one very important subject. Well, I waited the whole night to have the names, so we'll be able to exchange Mizrachi.

A - Mizrachi has nothing to do with it, not at all. I'll be responsible for Mizrachi indirect, because it is the responsibility of another

B - Factor.

A - With General Yariv, we'll discuss it.

B - Alright.

S - So, tomorrow, they can start searching the bodies-----inform the local commander

E - Of our strong point. You promised we'll wait until the 26th about the pilots on the investigation.

S - Yes, Sir.

E - Alright

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B - Amid Sheriff? Amid is correct.

A - Correct.

B - I must check my Arabic the whole time.

A - I personally have the impression you will need it.

B - I'll tell you. I studied Arabic once and I got to the Stage where I could read a newspaper fluently. That was in 46, 47. Then, I stopped - I didn't have time and I tried again after I left the army, but it was very difficult, I couldn't keep the time table with my teacher so I asked him to forgive me. You want to talk business General, I am sure, so do we,'tfadal'.

A - 'Tfadal' you.

B - General, I have good witnesses that I have always taken up your challenge and invitation.

A - Because you have the initiative.

B - Yes, this is true. Because we are the ones who make the withdrawal. Israel is making a withdrawal. This is our initiative. We have agreed on a withdrawal.

D - ------

B - I'll be very frank with you, General, and Colonel, as I always try - to be as frank as possible. We are in a difficult situation. I haven't told anything to the press, but we are in a very difficult situation, as the official positions have been mutually rejected as unacceptable. This is a privilege of each side of course - and we have talked about unofficial possibilities, and I have shown the Prime Minister yesterday the drawing. I said - this is General Gamazy's - and, I think, that Colonel Uedi wasn't happy. He thought that you had given up too much. No? (I didn't tell her that) (laughs).

But so far the unofficial possibilities you have mentioned are - there's a wide gap. And so far, I have no bridge no PMP no ----, no bridge to bridge the gap, no unifloat, nothing. So, this is a difficult position. But I have a couple of questions, and the major question, General, on which yesterday you didn't give me an answer. You gave me an answer of principle, but you didn't give me an answer that I could translate to our authorities and to say "this is what our Egyptian friends have in mind". And this is the question of the size of the forces on the East Bank. You gave me the principle:

a) you insist on military presence on the East Bank, as a principle

b) the size of your forces on the East Bank will be in proportion to the withdrawal of our forces. But when I asked you how much, you stuck to the principle. Now, you have a clear idea of distances. Two good examples: one is your unofficial possibility, one is our unofficial

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possibility. So my question is, General, whether on these two possibilities you could give me an idea about the size of your forces on the East Bank.

A - You mean the size on the possibility of 45 km. from the Canal -

B - Add on the basis of our unofficial possibility which you have not accepted as I have not accepted yours. I have not brought it to the government yet, but I have not accepted it and the Prime Minister said it is true that is unacceptable for us. Our unofficial possibility of 10-12 km. from the Canal, which you do not accept.

F - Main line 35.

B - Main line 45 his unofficial.

F - But you had unofficial 35 from the Canal, main line.

B - General, I want to explain. It is not that I am looking down for something to upset the whole matter. I am asking the question, because it is of weighty question, and it is a question of the size, nature and armament of the force. That is to say size and characteristics.

A - It is very difficult to say the size. We have civilians here and we say we'll keep a smaller part of the division, say half of the division.

B - I'll tell you why I think this question is legitimate. If we would have been dealing only in generalities, then it is a general point, but we have been dealing with very clear lines. So many inhabitants ---, therefore this is a crucial factor. I can understand, General, that perhaps you can't give me an answer today, alright, I won't press you, I'll come back tomorrow.

Because, I think, General, that the matters we are discussing are so important that we shouldn't put a pressure on you like that. We don't want to draw it out but...

A - Right. Before I can give the size and the different factors of arms to be kept here, we should start from what size you will keep on the other side?

B - What size?

A - What size of troops you will keep on the other side?

B - Our main forces, you mean?

A - That's factor number one. And the factor number two is the distance

B - Distance(We have two examples.

A - If I can say, if you put here 2 divisions, we shall have here 2 divisions.

B - Plus <u>all</u> the divisions you have in the Egyptian armed forces you have on the Western side of the Bank.

A - On the west side of the bank, we don't consider it in the field.

B - General, you always say I am a politician, but I have also had some military schooling (laughs). We all know it is true there is a Canal in the middle which has been bridged before. You don't have to make a ./...

bridging operation, you don't have a sand wall everything is ready and you'll have, let us say (I don't know, perhaps you'll have----- or perhaps you'll have 10 divisions), but you have X divisions - 2,1 divisions. You'll say - if we have 1 division on the passage, for example, you will want 2 divisions on the bridge heads (for example). Then you say in addition --- what you have behind, this doesn't count. Let us say you have 2 infantry divisions with tanks with------ with all that goes with infantry divisions, which will be fully perfected by your whole missile system, because you have your missiles either some of them on the East Bank, because you say you want us out of artillery range not from the Canal, but out of artillery range from the military posts.

A - - For the benefit of the two sides.

B - Of course, I understand, but you will have your missiles there, all your missiles in addition to these two divisions which will be perfected by tanks and by missiles and by everything else. You will have the rest of your armed forces somewhere between the West Bank and let us say--- Kassassin, etc.

A - Between you and Cairo and Shallom and Libya and this area.

B - General, we both know that your main forces are not in Sallom, that your forces are not even in Amariya, that your main forces are between Cairo and the Canal. So what you are supposing is that in addition to a strong presence, very strong presence, on the Eastern Bank, you'll have all the forces on the West Bank which means if you are looking for checks and balances (you know the principle of checks and balances, I am sure Mr. Brashi knows the principle of checks and balances), if you are looking for a military balance, you are eliminating the fact that you have all your forces on the West Bank The Canal is no obstacle for them any longer. So where does that lead us? If we weigh the factors in this manner, we will never get to an understanding. And the General knows much much better than I do and so does the Colonel, the movement table of all the divisions, how long it takes to cross, administratively, to cross. How many vehicles it takes to pass at 20 or 30 km. over the bridge and the rest is easy.

A - If I give you the size, and I will give it, the size of our troops and tanks on the eastern side of the Canal in the 2nd army sectors, there should be another limitation on your troops in Sinai.

B - I don't say that we can't discuss it. We can discuss it. ./...

A - Because there will be the two opposing sides on the Eastern Bank of the Canal. Right?

B - No!

A - (smiling)

B - No, I'll tell you why I am saying no. Now, I am speaking purely militarily, purely militarily.

A - Purely militarily.

B - We are not trying to dispute the fact that this is Egyptian soil. This is not a question that we dispute your sovereignty or your right to do what you see fit on your side. This is not the question. But if we speak in purely military terms, we cannot, from the purely military point, we cannot only compare the forces we have in the Western part of Sinai with what you have on the Eastern Bank of the Canal.
We have also to take into consideration I don't say that we have to have as many divisions but we have to take into consideration the amount of force at your disposition on the Western Bank. For example, let us say that all your armoured divisions and your mechanized divisions, whether they are at Huckstep and Ashor, or whether they are at Kassassin and Ridam el Hamar or Tel Subin.

A - You know everything except the coordination. You can give us the orders. (in good spirit).

B - It is no great wisdom. After the war and after I have been---

A - Head of Intelligence.

B - For 8 years, not great trick. You know all our divisions, as well. So, we cannot forget it. I think it is a legitimate military point. Because I think, General, that we should not try to have what the French call "Dialogue de sourds" - 'Atash'. But by the time we finish, our negotiations, I'll be able to conduct an interview in Arabic, incha'allah. Anyway, seriously, you must understand, General, you had the element of surprise on your side on October 6th. Now, it is true both sides want to move towards a peaceful settlement. I believe you, I have full confidence when you say it, full confidence. I hope ~~you say it~~ you believe us, and the President believes us in this respect. But until we move from the present situation to a peaceful settlement, there are difficult political stages inevitably.
There will be difficult political stages and phases and it is legitimate for each of the sides to use military pressure, not necessarily war, but military pressure. This is what happens in every conference. It is a classical strategic theory - the combination of military political moves. Therefore, we want to assure ourselves against military surprise move on your part. If you have strong military presence

./...

on the East Bank, and I have given you a few exa ples what it means when we speak about a couple of divisions, every ing your divisions have with the cover of the missiles, which cove not only the planes in the sky but it will cover our ground troops as well in range. And in addition to that you will have a big military force, as big as you intend to, near the West Bank of the Canal, so that we cannot reckon the size of our forces in Sinai only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. We must take into consideration also what you will have on the West Bank. The point of principle according to you, General, is that we should calculate our forces only in relation to what you have on the East Bank. I think that this is militarily speaking... If I go to my Chief of Staff and I say"I met General Gamazy today and I accepted his principle", he throws me out of his office, and he'll say "you are an assistant Chief of Staff? Perhaps for the political authorities, you are good, but not as a military man"".

E - What we have to do is make another Canal, so that it would be symmetric.

A - The Canal is our problem.

E - No, in the Sinai to make another Canal-

B - So that it would be balanced.

A - That's a good idea - (laughs).

B - By the way, a digression. Has the Bitter Lake always existed? before the Canal?

E - Yes.

B - But where did the water come from?

D - Like the Dead Sea.

B - But the Jordan always flew into the Dead Sea. But this is only a curiosity.

A - Do you want to know the size by divisions, by units , by arms?

B - We would very much like to know the size of the force by battalion, brigade, division, the kind of armament like - artillery, tanks, air to ground missiles... These are straightforward questions.

- ... But General, I don't want to push you,seriously. If you want time to consider this problem it's OK. I won't...

A - I don't have the reply now. I'll have to think it over, because I came here under the impression that still we'll be engaged on the lines and this and that.

B - We'll have a debate on the lines.

A - But we finished on the lines now. On the basis of that line.

B - This is true, the question was on the basis of the line, but I also said, because it is very important that we have no misunderstanding, that the line, the distances, the lines you have presented in your

./...

unofficial possibility are unacceptable to us. And I know that the distance I have presented are unacceptable to you. This is clear to me. If you would like to discuss it...

A - And then we would - the size of the troops on no basis.

B - You have two hypotheses.

E - Two possibilities.

A - Unofficial possibilities.

F - 35 & 45 for main forces, is that what you mean?

A & B- Yes.

F - On each basis discussion on the size of the forces.

B - Mr. Gorgé. This is only the main forces line. But there is also question of security line. So, I am saying this to make sure that we have no misunderstanding... General, for example, I'll say them again - whether or not you'll have artillery on this side, what kind of artillery whether (well - laughing - I won't tell you what kind of artillery you have). Question of tanks, question of anti-tank guns - whether caliber of all kinds or limited caliber; question of infantry weapons - you have the whole range of infantry weapons from Ak to Sager to etc...

A - To Saga?

B - Saga is mabutka. I can give you a military secre , General, the maker of --- you know him (laughs), Swppper and Segev ou knew them. And then the question of tanks, amphibious tanks - and we mentioned artillery, tanks and air to ground missiles - alright, I understand that on this we'll have to wait because you want to clarify the problem.

A - If the General would agree to have a break

B - "Tafadal".

A - I want to ask you a personal question. Did you agree on the final line of disengagement.

B - No, not that we didn't agree. We haven't discussed it at all. We have not yet discussed it at all. Ah, yes, I have to explain it to you. It takes you one hour to get to Cairo. I have to fly to --- change the plane. Yesterday, there was a very strong wind ooaa! And I came like that. And I saw the Minister and the Prime Minister it was about 9 o'clock and she had a big political meeting, so there was no time even to discuss it. There was time to report, but no time to discuss.

A - The same thing happened to me.

B - - I believe you.

A - 9.30 we start.

./...

B - I don't know how President Sadat is, but my Prime Minister likes to work at night. She can stay when all the young people are half dead, she can stay still going strong till 3 o'clock in the morning. But last night, she was busy with political problems. She didn't have time to discuss it.

C - May I ask one question now.

B - Yes.

C - I understand that on the Israeli side there has been no discussion nor agreement on the line you presented.

B - True.

C - But is there an understanding that there will be successive lines, that is, which we have now discussed, is the first line of withdrawal.

B - I even wrote, the General even wrote with his own handwriting - time frame 3 to 6 months.

A - But under discussion, I underlined that in the report to the President -

C - Historic documents.

B - Now, this is clear, no misunderstanding. This is what I proposed, not what you accepted. Now, in answer to your question, General, this what I presented is an unofficial possibility of our first line of disengagement, which means that further lines or a further line of disengagement is envisaged. I cannot say whether line or lines, but but at least line.

E - But instead of what Mr. Gorgé proposed that irrespective of progress in peace conference, 3-6 months, I didn't like it. It should be that the next line should be agreed upon in the peace conference.

B - This is my view, 3 to 6 months. I haven't checked the official view. General, I think we can agree on a meeting tomorrow.

A - 10 + 10 and then 15 for the UN.---- and then you will have the defiles in your hands, which will leave us in a very bad military position. Although we can talk about it tomorrow, morning, as it is a temporary line. In this case, we should have another line here so you can move to the second line ---

B - I'll give you an answer tomorrow, but I think, we would like to discuss the second line at the conference, but I must check.

A - Alright, if it is for the conference, let the foreign ministers do it.

B - No, I'll give you an answer perhaps.

A - Alright, --- I'll let our foreign minister know that you will give me a reply.

B - But for the Peace Conference, we don't have any invitation.

A - I think Mr. Eban declared yesterday -

E - Yes, in Washington. Foreign Ministers for the 16th of December. ./...

A - They mean to have 3 or 4 days conference and then postpone it for after the elections. It is also Christmas time, and this and that so... I would like to have the minimum time for that line. We would like to have the minimum time for that line on the 16th of January.

B - Bes...

A - Also we will not start building our cities here until this line will be withdrawn from here. If my hostilities start, there will be thousands of our civilians here.

B - This means you are taking off something that w see as a security measure.

E - [illegible]

A - When I was in Ismailia 3 or 4 times started shooting at Ismailia and you can't know what happened. Thousands of people were living in Ismailia. They were in a very bad position from 1967 till... two years here. So that is why we were insisting to have your troops back away here so that they can work and be safe here. The problem is 35 km.

X - 45.

A - 45 km. for safety for our people here. Specially for people coming to work in the Canal and so on, very difficult for them to work in such a situation , although we need it badly to start work here. It gives you security, and it gives us security, and we want our people go.

B - This is unfortunate because we see in the beginning of work in this scene a security for us. I understand your position. I only want to be clear so that when we meet again tomorrow, we don't start again from the same position.

A - Yes, please. We want General to be clear so that we can come to a conclusion.

B - As the situation is now I am permitted to say, that we cannot accept the size of the forces you are talking about, we cannot accept the distances you are talking about, and that we cannot accept the timeframe.

A - The three main points. That means we didn't do anything, General.

B - I'll tell you what we did: I didn't have any idea about the size of the forces, I didn't know until this monning.

A - But, honestly, we didn't discuss it and I just gave it, just like that.

B - I know it is on your responsibility, but your shoulders have already borne heavier responsibility. So this is clear to me, and I'll present it to the authorities, and I'll come back tomorrow, and see whether we can --- I don't promise.

A - Inorder not to get that indication that we are not clear enough on that point --- our civilians here because we want them to go back. ./...

And the minute you start here, the minute we start working here...

B - I understood that.

A - - If we can give them more safety, 10km. for the UN, not ourselves, it will be better for them.

B - I'll ask you a question in order to be clear. That's not a question of time pressure on this. At which distance, when we are at distance X, you are ready to start on the Canal with civilian activities. What is X.

A - What X from our point of view? 60km.

F - 60 from the Canal, main forces?

A - Main forces.

B - That means 50 for the security zone. Until then, no civilian activities.

A - No, that's a political point, I don't want to say it now. Now I felt that there will be danger for these people to start working there. If you can give the UN 10 more km., it will be alright for these civilians here.

F - Instead of 15 for us, you have given us 25, and then the civilians would start.

B - That means we have to go back 55 for the main forces.

B - That means we've got to go back to 10 more km. here. That means 45km. from the westernmost line.

F - And 55 for your main force.

A - From the military point, there is no difficulty for that at all. Because the defile is still in your hands, right?

B - You say main forces 55 km.?

A - All the defiles are in your hands.

B - How come, General? You know, each one has his o n map.

E - This sounds like the joke about the American t rist coming to Cairo and the guy telling them that the pyramids are 20km. from here, but for you, ladies, only 15.

B - הגנרל, איפה היא איננו? שיקחו הנה. כמה קילו? אולי הוא איננו. כדאי.

F - What would you say to the press now?

B - If the General agrees, we can say that the discussion today were devoted to clarity sake from the distance point of view and that we shall continue tomorrow.

(end of tape)

A - .... because I have no time at all.

B - Same problem here, so if I come tomorrow with the same ideas, don't be angry general.

./...

He, the Colonel (Eyal) doesn't believe me. He thinks I have not told you about the tanks. He is more difficult than you are General.

E - I'd like to have tanks, water tanks for instance.

B - The easternmost point of Mitlé is 30 km. from the Canal.

E - 30-34km. The Mitlé pass is about 20km. wide.

(press takes pictures).

	10-15	10km.	25km.	10km.	
CANAL	2nd Army	Egyptian Security zone		Israeli security zone	Main Israeli forces.

29/X

28/X

30/X

31/XI

$$\frac{x}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{x} = 1$$

$$\frac{x}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{x}$$

$$\frac{x}{2}$$

לשכת ראש הממה הכללי

ב' כסלו תשל"ד
26 נוב' 73

310

שיחות הפסקת האש עם המצרים
ממגש מספר 16

כללי

1. הממגש התקיים ביום ב', 26 נוב' משעה 1100 עד 1315, בק"מ ה-101 בכביש קהיר סואץ, לאחר שהמצרים ביקשו דחיית הממגש ביום.

2. נוכחו מטעם המצרים: גנרל גמסי, קולונלים הוזידי ופאהמי ומר איבראשי.
מצד ישראל: אלוף ידיב, אלוף אייל, תא"ל אורלי, אל"מים שיאון וגיידא וסא"ל גדליה. מן האו"ם - גנרל סילאסטו ומר גורגיה.

3. בדיון חזרו הצדדים על עמדותיהם לגבי קוי ההפרדה. לא הועלו הצעות חדשות, אולם ההצעה המצרית הבלתי רשמית הוגדרה כרשמית.

קוי ההפרדה

4. גנרל סילאסטו פתח בציינו כי עבר חודש מקבלת ההחלטה באו"ם וכי הוא מקווה שבדיון זה תמצא פשרה בין עמדות הצדדים ושיקבעו קוי הפרדה בין הכוחות אשר יאפשרו לכוח האו"ם למלא את יעודו. גנרל גמאסי הוסיף תקוותו שנגיע לתוצאות או לפחות שנתקרב לחצעת פשרה כלשהיא. אי לכך הוא מציע שנשמיע מכאן ואילך הצעות רשמיות מחייבות בלבד.

5. ההצעה הרשמית המצרית הנה:-

א. מזרחית לתעלה, ברצעה של כ-10 ק"מ, 3 דיביזיות חי"ר מצריות הכוללות חסיבות טנקים אורגניות/כ-450 טנקים.

ב. מזרחית לרצועה זו, בפס ברוחב 10 ק"מ, כוחות מצריים מונבלים, תצפיות, חי"ר יחידות סיור, נשק קל.

ג. מזרחה - ברוחב של 15 ק"מ איזור חיץ של כוחות או"מ.

ד. מזרחה לאיזור החיץ - רצועה ברוחב 10 ק"מ כוחות ישראל מונבלים, תצפיות יחידות חי"ר, נשק קל.

6. הצד הישראלי חשיב כי דחה הצעה זו בדיון קודם משום שאינה עונה לדרישה הבסיסית שההפרדה תהא הדדית, אין ב משום תרומה מצרית לחנתקות, ההורם היחיד הוא הצד הישראלי. ההצעה אינה מתקב ת לא מבחינת גודל הכוחות המצריים, ולא בשל מרחק הנסיגה שלנו ולא מבחינת משך הזמן (קו אמור להשאר בתוקף עד ה-18.1.74).

2/..

7. חצד הישראלי חבע מן המצרים שיתרמו לענין הפרדת הכוח (הסכים) הן בהסגת כוחות והן בפינוי שטח בפי שהם דורשים מאתנו. איננו מוכנים לנוכחות צבאית מצרית, בצד המזרחי של התעלה, בהכנית של הפרדת הכוחות. יתכן כי השלטונות יחיו מוכנים לברוק אפשרות של כח סמלי, כפי שהציע גנרל גבאסי בשיחות המוקדמות. הגנרל הכחיש שאי פעם הסכים לנוכחות סמלית בלבד.

8. התצעה הישראלית הרשמית נשארת כפי שהיתה ללא שינוי. המצרים ביקשו שנביא למפגש הבא הצעותינו לגבי-

א. הכוח המכסימלי המצרי שאנו מסכימים לו בגדה המזרחית של התעלה.

ב. המרחק המכסימלי שאנו מוכנים לסגת מן התעלה.

ג. גודל הכוח הישראלי באיזור הקרוב, תחום הכוחות הקלים.

ד. ריחוק הכוחות העיקריים הישראליים.

ה. הגבלות או דרישות לגבי הכוחות המצריים בגדה המערבית, אם ישנן.

ו. שיטות פיקוח על קיום ההגבלות.

9. גנרל גבאסי סיכם כי לדעתו הדיונים בדבר הפרדת הכוחות יתמשכו ללא תוצאות עד לועידת השלום וזו תאלץ לדון בקוי הפרדה ובהפסקת האש במקום בהכניות השלום. אי לכך הוא מציע שנחזור לדון בנסיגה לקוי ה-22 באוק'. חזרנו על עמדתנו כי אין לדון בקוי ה-22 באוק' אלא במסגרת קוי ההפרדה וההתנתקות. כ הגובה הציע גבאסי הכנית מוגבלת יותר: נסיגת צה"ל למרחק של קילומטר או חצי קילומטר סביב המובלעת כדי לאפשר לכוחות או"ם ליצור חיץ בין הצדדים. הקשינו לגבי מעשיות הכנית מעין זו אולם הצד המצרי לא התעקש כדי לתגן על סבירותה.

עניינים שוטפים

10. הצד הישראלי העלה את הנושאים הבאים:-

א. העברנו ב-25.11 ליד קנטרה 28 גופות חיילים מצריים וקבלנו 12 חללים שלנו אולם טרם קבלנו את החללים מסוראן. הסכמנו כי נציגים, מבריגדיר שריף, יסע לסוראן כדי להסדיר את העברת הגופות.

ב. הצד המצרי מסרב לסייע בפינוי מוקשים בשטח החפקר כדי לאפשר תוצאת גופות. הגנרל הבטיח לפעול בענין ולשכנע את המפקדים המקומיים.

ג. תוצאות חקירתם בדבר שבויים - נערכים להשיבתו למפגש הקרוב.

ד. הודענו כי תיקון משאבות צנור המים לסוראן יושלם עד יום ד', 28.11.

ה. התלוננו שסירבנו לאשר העברת שבועונים, נפרורים. שאלו לגבי האישורים להעברת דלק ומצרכים שונים לסוראן. נשיב להם במפגש הבא.

ו. ציינו כי חם מעיינים בתשובתנו לגבי בוצר.

או"ם

11. גנרל סילאסטר ומר גורג'ה ניסו משך הדיון ולפניו לשכנע את הצדדים כי קיימת אפשרות למשרת ע"י ויתורים הדדיים בנושאים משניים! הציעו שהמצרים יסירו את תביעתם שהתכנית תוגבל בזמן ושאני הצדדים יתפשרו לגבי גודל הכוחות והמרחק.

המפגש הבא

12. נקבע ליום ד': 28 נוב' שעה 1100.

נרשם ע"י דב שיאון

A - GARBASZ

B - YARIV

C - אלוף אלון

D - Silas Cousins

ד. הדגדגים משותפת בינינו פיכן לאחר, הנוכחי לוודא
וכיוצא לאפיע כפי הפרוטוקול לאחר מכן לחולל את הפגישה.

D - We doublechecked the texts. We would suggest that you both start signing and then we pass it and so on.

C - there will also be a copy of it for you.

D - ya. Wait a second.

D - I'll read my statement for the record. Are you ready?

C - Wait a second.

D - May I say a few words at the opening of the meeting. As you know the text of Dr. Kissinger's letter to the Secretary General which was released Friday evening was also officially communicated to me by the Secretary. You all know its terms, so I am not going to read it to you. But the ultimate paragraph refers specifically to UNEF's role. I will read this relevant passage: "It has also been agreed by the two parties that they will hold the meeting under the auspices of the UN commander at the usual place - Km 101 on the Suez - Cairo road to sign this agreement and to provide for its implementation. I would be most grateful if you would take the appropriate

steps to ensure that the meeting is held on Saturday Nov. 10 1973 or at such other time as may be mutually convenient for representatives of the parties to take the appropriate steps. With these few remarks, I'll declare the meeting open and I propose suppose that as the first items on the agenda would be the signature as agreed."

B - [illegible]

D - We will have the two names typed on a machine.

C - I propose a 15 minutes break then resume the meeting after 15 meeting.

D - Would you in the meantime have picture taken? Do you agree that the press come in?

E - Yes Yes groups. You can provide a false paper to sign here. We will have to do it 5 or 6 times.

[illegible]

B - I say General the only incident we'll have here will be between the press

[illegible]

C - From now on it's the truce.

B - I hope so.

[illegible]

B - [illegible]

D - The question point E ° the Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be

replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non military nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal". and I would like the parties to reach an understanding and arrangements to facilitate my immediate implementation of this paragraph E. I decided to establish UN checkpoints as soon as possible. In this connection, it will be advisable to free road from all military movements except that of UNEF. I am anxious that UN check-points be established and will expedite the implementation of point F, which says "as soon as the UN check-points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all P.O.W.S including wounded."

B- Well, I think we have to clear this point very carefully. We cannot treat point E. without F. Secondly, if you would like to repeat what you mentioned about military movement on the road?

D- "It will be advisable to free road from all military movement except that of UNEF.

B- I'm afraid, General that this we cannot accept. Nothing is said in the agreement, as I read it, whatsoever, as to the point you mentioned.

D- What is your proposal?

B - My proposal is to proceed according to the agreement which says the exchange of checkpoints, movement on the road, can go on, as far as it is necessary for UNEF personnel or for UNEF to move, these moves can be granted co-ordinated without any great difficulty by liaison officers. But we cannot accept the stopping of any military movement on that road. And there is nothing in the agreement we have just signed all the three of us to this effect.

A - As far as I understand, the Cairo - Suez road is to be completely cleared out from any Israeli forces from Km. 101 to Suez. Any check-points on the road in this area to be established by the UN.

B - With all my efforts, in English I made I can't see it written. It doesn't say it in any of these paragraphs that this is the case.

A - The spirit of the paragraphs written in this agreement is like this.

B - General, for example it says that there shall be no impediment etc, in this case we can speak about spirit, but - I don't want to sound cynical, I'm not cynical, on the contrary very serious, because in our previous meetings both of us have said, and I believe you totally General, that it is our

intention to maintain the ceaze-fire and to reach agreement, but I really can't see anything that even evokes slightest impression of anything that has to do anything with the spirit of agreement that says no military movement. Any effort I could make intellectually physically, I cannot see it.

A- What do you mean by "the Israeli check-points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN check-points" Why does it mention so? - if you will not be cleared out from the road?

B- Because this means as it says states that inspection of supplies will be done in these check-points by UN officers, the with Israeli officers to observe it. This does not preclude, General, this does not preclude military movement on the road. Our forces General are not coming from Cairo. Our forces are inside the area.

A- Does that mean you're going to put some check-points on the road?

B - We have check-point on the road!

A - That means you and I like this: United Nation will put check points and you'll put check points also?

B - This is for example a point that can be

discussed, because General what you mentioned first of all was the... military movement, on this I think I was very clear that we cannot accept what General Salasnev has said and what you maintain on the check ~~points~~ check posts let us discuss the problem.

D - All the Israeli check-points will be replaced by UN check-points and the supervising of the non-military nature of the cargo will be done by Israeli officers and the UN and at the bank of the Canal.

B - All this (a) does not preclude military movement (b). It has to do with the movement (c) of supplies, not with the movement of our personnel along the road. Because in fact, what you are saying, General, and what my colleague general Carmary is meaning that the Suez-Cairo road will in fact, formally and literally become a UN road. This has not been agreed upon. On the contrary.

D - Well, of course, if the parties agree that there will be military movement on the road I — it would have only facilitated our passage —

A - Would you like to explain the Israeli military movement from the Israeli point of view? As far as we understand it, this road will be free, the supply

will go to Suez city free, your check-points accept the UN checkpoints, so it is free. It is free and will be put under the supervision of the UN as (F)

B- Ya. On this we have a misunderstanding. Because what we understand is that the UN check-points are going to supervise, to inspect the nature of the cargo that will be supplied including the nature of supply to Suez-city because it say "the town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine." Now we understand that this will be inspected by the UN with us observing

and we (2) have to discuss all the technicalities General, on how the supplies will be checked by the UN and also by us.

A- On the Eastern bank of the Canal.

B- No 1 to Suez no 2.

A- To Suez, it will be checked by the UN only.

B- But General, before we move to this point, before we speak about the supplies to Suez, we have many difficult problems. You have your position of certain points, we have our position of certain points, and this we will have to discuss and argue over it and see how we can proceed. But before we proceed to the

question of supplies, what we have to say about check-points I have said, but I think we should discuss point (F) before we discuss point (C).

D - "the town of Suez will receive daily -"

B - No. I think we should discuss paragraph (F) before we discuss para (C).

D - Ya, ya.

B - Because the question of the exchange of P.O.W's and we are willing to add to this the question of the exchange of P.O.W's wounded and not wounded, we are ready to add to this complex of problems, and it is a complicated problem, we are ready to add to this the question of the evacuation of your wounded in Suez. If I remember correctly General, in our last meeting, you mentioned a number that has been mentioned by the Red Cross 1200 wounded from Suez, the City of Suez, including if I am not mistaken about 300 seriously wounded people from Suez.

D - We are back in (C). Is that what you mean?

B - Yes. But I mean the question of wounded people.

D - All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.

B - Yes. Now why do I come back to para (F).

Because F says " as soon as the UN check-points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange " etc. That is to say that the exchange of P.O.W's including wounded is linked to the establishment of the check-points. Therefore I suggest that we discuss the question of establishment of check-points together with the complex question of exchange of P.O.W's, wounded P.O.W's and not-wounded P.O.W's and including this, because we accepted on principle evacuation and it says also in agreement in the course of the question of evacuation also the evacuation of the wonded people of Suez and only then we discuss the question of supplies.

A - But if we are starting now from (F), we'd better start from (C). Is there an objection? By agreement which says "all wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated,"

B - Excuse me General, what we have to discuss are the modalities of evacuation, the system, the method, the technique, the timing.

A - That will be done by the Red Cross easily. All the wounded, all the P.O.W's, all wounded civilians all this will be discussed separately by the Red Cross and in full details and I think both sides agree

on that except the P.O.W's - we didn't discuss that item only. Why we linked that with the check-points we want to see first how the check-points will work, how the UN will implement its job here so other problems will be solved automatically.

B- But the establishment of the check-points (it is linked to)

A - Actually the 6 points are linked with each other except (a) and (b). (c) (d) (e) (f). the four of them are linked with each other

B - Well, what do you suggest to discuss first?

A - I suggest that the UN first of all start its work and in the meantime, at the same time, we have a time-table for the whole work of these 4 points. At the same time, we can evacuate the wounded ~~on~~ from both sides, the P.O.W's from both sides, all the other - will be clear and will be attended.

B - My General, we cannot agree to establishment of UN check-points before we are clearly and fully agreed on the question of the exchange of the P.O.W's and on the receipt of the list of our P.O.W's which we have not received up till now. Although although you've got all the lists of your P.O.W's.

A - We'll give you the list of the names of P.O.W's.

B - Br - Br. That's for sure. We signed this agreement today with a good spirit to carry it out exactly. So let's start with the main problems, I don't mean that the P.O.W's is not a main problem, but automatically it will be done.

B - How?

A - We'll come back to the P.O.W's. We discussed that matter for a long time, but on principle we have no objection, but the details. Still we -

B - But what are the details?

A - Let's see "how the UN first will start, and the Red Cross is a part of that. Now we're talking about the check-pnts and the Suez road which an important thing not for feeding the troops or the civilians in the Suez road, that is important of course - but it will facilatate all the other matters.

B - What like for example?

A - The UN doesn't start its work how "We'll work out this agreement.

B - But with this must be ~~it~~ linked. It says here " As soon as the UN cp* are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of prisoners."

* cp - check-points

סוג כטחוני

מידת דחיפות

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

12

הנדון:

D- May I say a word here in between. As I read this agreement, I have an independent obligation to establish the UN c.p. in the place of all Israeli c.p. as soon as the agreement has been signed. So, in my opinion the establishment of the c.p. cannot be linked with anything

B- On this General, I'm sorry, but until we have a clear agreement on all the details: details - concerning our P.O.W's exchange, mutual exchange, wounded and not wounded I cannot establish the " procedure, timing technicalities of the replacement of our c.p. by the UN c.p.

D- Well, I disagree, I think that I should now as the agreement has been signed and not waiting for any detailed discussions on any other point, these c.p. should be established.

B- So this is a point I have to clear out with my friends.

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 13

D- Would you like to clarify it now, or?

B- No, I don't think we can clarify it over the communications, it's a little bit too difficult and complicated to be alone by phone

D: I propose now a 10 mts break and I'll have discussion with both parties

C- 10 mts break and informal talks. Would you like to go in your respective tents?

D- ooo

D- ooo and I told them as soon as the UN c.p. are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all war prisoners including wounded. I said that at the formal meeting now, they will have to say how this is done, and I said that these lists should come in that first step. They were thinking of first having the wounded exchanged, then the prisoners, but for this we Them also I explained to them how I see

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 14

This question of the wounded, and I said that as I see there will be no There will be no movement of single vehicles, there will be convoys. We start at the beginning with few convoys with few cars, we increase the number of the cars up to the means of the supplies both to Suez and the Third army and when a convoy under UN escort with Egyptian drivers in the trucks is moving on the road, There should be no Israeli obstacle by Israeli traffic at that time. the lanes of the convoys will be cleared or agreed upon daily with you, without impediment either to Suez or to the Bank of the Canal, there should be no Israeli checking on the road except on the Bank of the Canal. there should be no checking on the convoys to Suez.

C The wording of the agreement That.

E - Is it possible in that time. If you are told between 3 and 5 then will

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 15

be a convoy going to the East Bank is it possible for you to avoid any kind of friction

- If you have a tank on the road or
E- To stop moving at that time. Just for the time in advance and agree to.
C) What I meant General Yaniv by rolling is that a convoy should roll like it rolls if I may use an example we know best of the rolls, and it rolls and rolls non-stop and then somebody has to telephone, because this would not be neither according to the letter nor the spirit of the agreement the way we read it. It must roll, and then you have your men at the bank of the Canal and then you participate in the checking. You can do it and I assume it will be there. So about rolling convoys you are told in advance and let it roll, and it is

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 16

escorted and once it is escorted, it can have in our considered opinion Egyptian drivers. It is escorted, nobody can escape. It will be escorted by UNEF, not just by one man. It will be an escort.

B - Are these the points, General?

D - Yes.

B - Well, this raises a host of problems.

1) According to the instructions I had - it is very important that we have a very detailed and clear understanding on the arrangement of c.p., list and exchange, as a first step, of wounded prisoners. How do you see this? How does General El-Gamasy see it?

D - eh -.

C - We have made it very clear and that is why we will need once more formal

that he has meant to explain it to you that it has to be implemented by

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

them, and that you are entitled to know today how they are going to do it. this we agree with you. Because it says "As soon as the c.p, this will happen." and you ought, your experience, as you say, he must tell you now, he should show you what he showed us. He has long pages, it seems that he has done his homework, on the lists and prisoners, so let him explain it to you now. You will see.

B - He has done his homework on the lists already two weeks ago

C - Well, he has it there. Well, where is general S'K. You are the specialist, you will see how it looks to you.

(S'K) - Have you got the list?

C - No I don't mean lists, the time table.

(S'K) - No, I understand it. I just asked if he has got the lists.

C - He is going to explain to you how (F) should be executed. Now

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 18

we told him that if he's done the way we say, he is under straight obligation to fulfil F and there is no out for them, and he understands that, and I said it with the same voice and the general said it with the same voice and my colleague here. He has to do it and he'd better know that he has to do it. To help you We should explain exactly what they want to do. And you General S/K, you know whether it can be done the way you explained with the ICRC and so on.

S/K - I would think that, for instance, I would propose, we announce when we have established the check-points and from that moment so and so many hours, the first convoy of wounded prisoners arrives to this c.p. here. I don't know how this has been worked out

S/K - It has been worked out.

- Are they coming by plane or?

S/K By air

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

20

הנדון: _____

want our prisoners.

S - all ours

B - here. That is to say, we would prefer first of all to have the lists.

Not prefer ~~We want~~ first of all to have the lists.

C - Immediately on the c.p.?

B - No, even before the c.p. We would like to have the lists first of all. Then, a X hours later, whatever you prefer, 6, 12, 24, the following things are done simultaneously:

(a) the c.p. are being replaced.

(b) The Red Cross flies the first contingent of wounded prisoners from Israel to Egypt and from Egypt to Israel. All our prisoners are lined up here, all their prisoners are lined up here, if they want to cut it up that is OK.

D - I was thinking of ... that we start manning the c.p. jointly - to be

(1/100) 3/70

2262/1 טופס

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

21

הנדון: _____

ready to take over, can it be done?

B - I can check

D - And as soon as you have the lists, you want the lists first, then when the B.C.P. is established

B - And how many hours later do we have the —

D - Well, if we make it tomorrow morning, would it be tomorrow morning already?

B - The Wounded?

D - No. I mean the —

B - כמה זמן אחרי זה נוכל להתחיל?

D - If we decide now, tomorrow morning, we can start.

B - What?

D - the exchange of wounded P.O.W.'s

B - מה זה אומר חילופים?

D - The R/C, they have their aircraft standing by in Cyprus. So they can start from Cairo and land at the same time

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג כטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 22

D - We would have our people at your c.p. at 8 o'clock?

B - Tonight?

D - No. Tommorow morning. Then, for instance 6 hours later the first flights taking off. Would it be possible? 4 or 6?

B - אני לא כשיר?

We would prefer to advance, if I get clearance, if I get clearance from home, we would prefer to advance the time of the joint. The beginning of the time of the joint morning at the c.p, so that we get the lists. We would like them to have, if I get clearance, this we can do immediately. Thus we can do within short time. Then, tommorow morning, the time we'll fix, we can start the wounded, and we'd also like to have, if they can't do the whole switch we can bring all prisoners. Good. We

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת החיפוי _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

23 הנדון: _____

don't know how many they have. If they do it in one ~~stage~~ go.

A - 7990 until yesterday.

B - But if they don't want to do it in one go, we would prefer tomorrow to have at least the first ~~be~~ batch of prisoners

D - Of prisoners, not wounded.

(שיחות בשדה התעופה בדרך לטס. עמדת הנקודה בגבול הירדן ואחר כך)

B - So if I may, in the talks with General Gamasy, we had a lot of disagreement, so arguments, so I said the principle I want to observe is disagreement is OK but no misunderstanding. So, subject to authority for me to agree to joint manning - first stage - let us say I got it. - Then I propose that in return of the joint manning of the c.p. here, you mean this c.p.?

D - Yes. There are in fact no c.p. here. There is a little one in the entrance to Suez.

B - We talk now about this one.

C - But you won't have any other c.p. on

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: (1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

(2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

(3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

(4) _____ נר: _____

(5) _____ נר: _____

(6) _____ נר: _____

דע: (1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 24

The road.

B- ר"ת ע"כ I'll come to that. We still have a number of problems.

ק"כ"ק- Well, I think that we could have symbolic presence at all c.p.

B: I have to check it. So, as we get the lists of prisoners, we'll agree, of course of all the prisoners, then we agree to joint manning of the two c.p here. Then and this can be done right away or within two or three hours. Then, if I get authority for this, tomorrow morning we expect the Red Cross to make the exchange of the wounded, and the minute we get word from the Red Cross that our prisoners are on the air, we leave these two c.p. We would like at the same time, if possible to have all our prisoners exchanged. We are ready to bring all the 9000.

ק"כ"ק - 7900

B- If they are ready to do it in two batches, OK. So half and half- they'll bring their half

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 25

We'll bring their half. And as we get the wood and see if the two convoys on both sides of the c.p. we shall then leave the c.p. So far so good. Then we also want to make clear, that in the exchange of the P.O.W's, this we must clear before we start the replacement, the list should include all our P.O.W's, also those of 69. And also a man by the name of נדין אשרת

א - אשרת נדין

B - Yes who is now in Egypt, and of course we return all Egyptian prisoners we have, about 56 from before

C - Everybody. But what was this אשרת, I don't understand.

ראש - אשרת was an intellyence man.

C - Yes. Since when has he been there?

ראש - 10 months

ראש - A year ago.

C - Oh.

B - This is our last problem, but we have

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 26

a number of problems which are very difficult. I have to refer to them: I understand the question of military movement on the road is agreed that we can move military people on the road.

D - Yes.

C - Not during convoy.

B - I'm coming to this. Now what we suggest, while the convoys the size of which etc we have to discuss, that we have a Liason officer with you officers the convoy to ensure that there will be no trouble on the road. Because we have people all over the road. Somebody might fire a rifle or something. This is one point. Of course on that point of having no other movement on the road whilst you are moving I think I can clarify it, I have to get authority, like the joint manning. Then, there is another question - on the amount of vehicles and the applic

סווג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

27

הנדון: _____

We have to discuss it. Now on the drivers, we want UN drivers, not Egyptian drivers. As it has been done in the 150 vehicles that have already passed.

מלא"ל - But this is not in the agreement.

C(A) - On basis, General Yariv, can you say that the Egyptians cannot drive on the the escorted convoy.

B - Because this is not a UN road. It does nowhere say it's a UN road. It nowhere says, gentlemen that it has to be driven (מתרגם 86 עמ' 13)

It doesn't say anywhere that the supplies have to be carried in vehicles have to driven by Egyptian drivers.

מלא"ל - But it doesn't say they should not be driven by Egyptian drivers.

B - So this is open to discussion.

מלא"ל - Generally as it stands in the law, if you want them, for example, to be Egyptian

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 28

You have to put it in the agreement.

C - _____ you said also the quantity of supplies, the number. Where does the agreement give you this right? We are talking informally here to prescribe a number or to discuss a number of vehicles going to the third army or to Suez city.

B - They discussed it with us. They came with a proposal.

C - No, but now the agreement is signed.

B - But the agreement has not covered all the details. If the agreement would have been explicit on all issues, it a different matter; the agreement is not explicit on all issues and not by chance. Therefore it is open to discussion. And as a matter of fact (it's a tape recorder).

C - Explain to us how the concept of implementation we are going to go two steps backwards. So we were thinking of whether it is possible

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סווג מבחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____

4) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 29

for you to speak to the General of your concept of implementation. He has then to give us the same thing. We'll meet tomorrow, if it's possible and convenient to you? to then move from there

B- I didn't understand you very well, I'm sorry. Perhaps I didn't follow.

אלוף - I said that we really got a movement forward because the agreement

(Vis P/a)

B- with less press.

D- As General Gamasy said we should make tomorrow a package deal which solves three things a) The manning of the O.P.'s by UN (b) The question of the P.O.W's (c) The fate of the city of Suez, and in that connection of course the convoys to the third army. I don't think it could be helped very much to say much more. I propose that our next meeting would take place

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: 30

Tomorrow in the same place at 12 o'clock.
Agreed?

B - Agreed.

D - Thank you very much for today. Let's hope that tommorrow will spring something new.

B - To you and your assistants for your help in this meeting. I know we got along very well before, I hope we'll get along well in the future, ~~I say~~ in meetings we had with the General I always said "Disagreement we've had and we will probably have disagreement, but no misunderstanding. I hope we'll find a mutual language, we'll find it, and I hope, I fervently hope, that we are on the road, long road, a difficult road to peace. But you know the Chinese proverb "Even a journey of 1000 mile, starts with a small step." אין סוף

A - Thank you very much General. General

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1

סוג בטחוני _____

מידת דחיפות _____

אל: 1) _____ נר: _____ מאת: _____

2) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ק.: _____

3) _____ נר: _____ ת.ז.ח.: _____

4) _____ נר: _____

5) _____ נר: _____

6) _____ נר: _____

דע: 1) _____ נר: _____

הנדון: B1

Yarive!

B- I was going to say hello to you.

(1/100) 3/70

טופס 2262/1