

מבצע

תמך בנשואן

מיקי קונזיס
ג-ג

3' אולם, מולדת מים, לאו"ם, יומי הנחמה (נאל)
פוליס שירותי ק"א א"צמק עם נשאר סטילום פקטור (מאז)

נפתח: ~~1970~~ 10.75
נסגר: ~~1971~~ 2.79

מאז 2018

שם תיק: משנה למנכ"ל ח. בר-און - ארה"ב - קונגרס -
 חומר על סנאטורים - אותיות ב - יג'
 ממוזה פיוז
חצ-3/7077
 ממוזה כריט 000bdv8
 ממוזבת: 3-312-3-5-7
 תאריך הדפסה: 15/12/2018

מברק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 402

נשלח 251300 ינו 77

שמו

מידי

אל:תמשרד

מאת:וושיןגסטון

מאום א'.

אונסקו.

א. חמורשה כינגהם מבקש לדעת המצב עתה ועמיתנו לגבי:
1. החפירות בירושלים. 2. שיגור המשלוח לשטחים.

ב. כינגהם הינו כידוע אבי התיקון קייט כינגהם למניעת הסיוע מאונסקו.
למוטר לצייך ידידותו ותמיכתו בנו.

רפיה

שח מנכל ממנכל קדריון ארגוב מאום אב הסכרה תרבות מצפא גונן ארלי
רע/סו

ד"ר אבי (אויאוי)

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שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

d

14. 7. 1976

אל: מצפ"א ✓

מאה: צבי רפיח

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי המורשה בינגהם על תשלום
החוב האמריקאי לאונסק"ו, כפי שפורסמו
ברשומות הקונגרס מ-2 דנא.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העחק:

מאו"ם א

פריס

THE UNITED STATES AND UNESCO—
H.R. 14239

SPEECH OF
HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, June 30, 1976

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report on H.R. 14239, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1977. Included in this report is a provision for payment of \$3.5 million to the UNESCO general fund, which completes the U.S. assessed contribution for 1974.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report explained its support of this provision on the grounds that the payment of this amount would avoid the loss of U.S. voting rights in the organization through 1976. At present the United States, which is 2 years in arrears in its payments, would under the rules lose its vote in the General Conference meeting this fall.

The House conferees decided to go along with the Senate in this respect, and I am prepared to support the conference report, but I do not wish my vote to be misunderstood.

In 1974 the Congress, and I believe, most of the American people, were shocked and saddened by the baldly political actions of the UNESCO General Conference in imposing sanctions on Israel. Certain states, anxious to use their bloc voting power to damage Israel, found and used flimsy pretexts to condemn Israel for its valuable archeological excavations in Jerusalem and for its educational policy regarding Arabs in the occupied territories. Further, they combined to deny permission for Israel to join the European regional group. These were wrongful and foolish actions, politicizing an organization whose goals are stated to be, and should be, universalist and above the battle of conflicting ideologies and nations.

Faced with this situation, the U.S. Congress adopted an amendment to the

State Department authorization bill, offered by Senator CASE in the Senate and myself in the House, cutting off all further funding for UNESCO, until these political actions were reversed.

During the past year, it has been apparent that the Secretary General, and to some extent the UNESCO Executive Committee, have been looking for ways to restore the organization to its proper role vis-a-vis Israel. In particular, the groundwork was laid for Israel to be invited to join a regional grouping—which every other member is free to do—that of Europe.

In my view, these limited moves in the right direction deserve a limited response by the United States. The payment of \$3,500,000 is indeed a limited response, since the total amount due UNESCO by the United States is now \$40 million.

This payment of \$3.5 million must not be thought of as an abandonment of the principle represented by the Case-Bingham amendment, but as an indication of continued U.S. interest in, and good will toward, UNESCO, and of a hope that the UNESCO membership and Secretariat will react in a similar spirit. The continued politicization of UNESCO can only damage the organization and its lofty and important mission in the world. The United States desires to participate fully, but it cannot and will not do so until UNESCO resumes its proper role in the family of international organizations.

מברק יוצא - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות דשמיים),
תש"ז - 1957.

מסוד

אל : ציר יורק ורשינגטון

מאת: המשרד

מס' ח/564

בשלה: 151600 אוק 75

אובסקו.

בשיחה עם GORDON KERR עוזרו של המורסה ביגהאם הסברנו השתלשלות
העניינים האחרונים במסגרת אובסקו כולל תגובתנו להחלטה האחרונה של הוועד
הפועל.

קאר הסביר שהוא התרשם ש"הצעד" שבהחלטה אינו כזה שיצדיק שינוי העמדה על הקפאת החקצי
מוסר שמחמד מערביבז להשיג עד סוף השנה שחרור חלק מהסכום המוקפא, לתשלום החוב
במלפני 1975, כשלושה וחצי מיליון דולר. קאר אינו ברטה להיענות לבקשה זו שלדעתו
לא מוצדקת כתירוטה "לצעד הצברוע" של הוועד הפועל, מה גם שהוא רואה סכנה בפתיחת
הברז שיוביל לרדישות נוספות.

מאום א

מאום: ממ מנכל ממנכל מ. קורדון אריגוב י. רבוב מאום א ב מצפא הסבריה קשתום מקצב

אב/ל

יד' חשון תשל"ו
19 אוק' 1975

א ל: מר צבי רמיה, הסגרירות וושינגטון
מאת: מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

הנדון: גורדון קר- עוזרו של המורה ג'ונתן ב. בינגהם
מברק 610 מיום 30.9.75
מכתב 1242 מיום 1.10.75

1. מבטחי ע" הנ"ל לצהרים ב- 15.10.75, ונכחתי במיחהו עם המנכ"ל.

2. במיחה עם המנכ"ל הועלה, בין היתר, נושא אונסק"ו. קר חתה כיצד ראוי לנהוג
עמה לאור החלטת האחרונה של הועד הפועל של אונסק"ו. התייחסוה לסוגיה זו- במברק
מא"ס א" מס. ח/564 מיום 15.10.75. ראה גם מברק הריגוב מס. 547 מיום 15.10.75.

3. שוחחנו רבות על המלכיס בקונגרס, הן אלה שהיו כרוכים בדיונים על הטכנאים (שהחיימו
ב- 9.10.75) והן אלה הצפויים בתקשר הסיוע חוץ. להלן כמה מן הנקודות שלגביהן החלפנו
דעות.

4. סיוע חוץ

* יש להניח שהגשת הצעה תקציב סיוע החוץ התעכב שוב. יתכן שהיא חוגש רק לאחר בקורו
של סאדאט, היינו, בחצי הראשון של נובמבר 1975 (בינתיים הנני למד שהנחה זו אינה
מבוססת כנראה).

הדיונים לא יהיו קצרים. יש לצפות למספר רב של הקונים. (במסגרת) קשה להנח
שהדיון בחוק החדשה יסתיים לפני פגרת חג הפולח. כן קשה להניח שהדיונים בחוק התקצבות
יסתיימו לפני פגרת חג הפסחא כפי שארע לגבי שהא 1975. יש בכ"ז לזכור שלגבי חלק זה
של הסיוע המוצע, חל אחר, בהשוואה לשנה שעברה, של יותר מחצי שנה.

* אחד הנעלמים המקשים כדרך כהסלכות התקרה התקציבית הכוללת והשפעתה על מיסדיו האפשריים
של תקציב הסיוע (אגב למדתי כמה שהיא הורדה לסך של 395 בליון דולר).

* קושי אחר כללי נובע מן העובדה שחלה משנה הפודה בין הסיוע הכלכלי לארצות שונות
בסך 2.87 בליון שכבר אושר בבית ב- 10.9.75 (קוראיה הדרומית, מקיסטאן וכול") לבין
הסיוע הצבאי. במיוחד בולטת העובדה שהיבלת המזה"ת תהא כנראה צמודה לפרק הסיוע הצבאי.

5. סיוע צבאי למצרים

* הסכומים המבוקשים למצרים יהיו כידוע גדולים מאשקד. חיתכן סקטיקה של הצמדתם לסעיף
הישראלי כדי למנוע שחיקה.

* בינגהם וכמה חברים אחרים בבית שטעו מסימקו ברורות שהמטשל יהייתם ברצינות ובחיוב
לבקשות מצרים לנשק.

* בינגהם וידידים אחרים מודאגים מאוד מהוועק סאדאט בפני שני בתי הקונגרס. הם משוכנעים
שיהיו לה הדים מרחיקי לכת ויחצצם עוד יותר הדמוי החיובי של מצרים כשות זכויות
לישראל (שחל להסחמן כבר אשקד, אפילו הוך נסיון להוועק סכומי ענק סיוע לשתי
המדינות).

6. טילי פרשינג

בינגהם וחבריו מאוד מודאגים בנושא זה. הבינוחי שהם היו מאושרים אם הבקשה לטילים אלה הייתה מוסרת מסדר היום. נדמה להם שהיא עלולה ליצור קשיים וסבוכים לגבי סעיפים אחרים. כבר ממילא הם עומדים בפני מאבק נגד הסעון המזיק שארה"ב שלמה לישראל מיצויים או שוחד תמורת האדמות שמהן הסוג. סנסור ג'יימס ב. אלן (ד- אלבמה) כבר הפיץ הסיסמה: 90 דולר בעד כל אינטש מרובע או משהו דומה לה.

אין בטחון שסעונינו בענין טילי הפרשינג ירשימו.

הערה: בענין הסעון החפצלהי הנ"ל הסכחי שימח לב לדברי קידינג'ר בהוכנית " פגוש העחונות" ב- 12.10.75

" it is not the agreement that creates the need for assistance to the parties, but the long term interests of the U.S... the assistance to the parties antedates the agreement".

7. מצב הרוח בקונגרס

כלליה אין קר מאמין בדכורים על סחף רציני או סחף בכלל. הוא סבור שגישה האזון באשר לישראל ומצרים אמנם התחזקה: יש לשמור על הזיקה לישראל אך יש לקדם בד בבד את העסקת ההשפעה האמריקנית במצרים וגם בעולם הערבי. נראה שגישה דו-מגמתית זו אמנם נשחרשה עתה בחודעה חברי הקונגרס.

ב ב ר כ ה

דוד בן-דב

העתיק:

מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל

מר איתן בנצור, וושינגטון

מר דוד הורגמן וושינגטון

IV. THE STATE

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V. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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12/10/75

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אל: לשכת המנכ"ל

מאת: מנהל מאו"ר

Gordon KERR

הנדון: בקור
עוזר ראשי
למורשת ב' רגמו בינגהאם (ד-ג.י.)

מר קר (בן 30) הינו אחד מ"עמודי התווך" שלנו בין עוזרי הסנטורים והמודעים היוזומיים, עיקר המלאכה בכל פעולותיו של המורשת בינגהאם למעבדו - בעטפה ותעסה על ידו. מביטת הסיפוע לאונקקו, המעבד השבתי לקליטת יהודי ברה"ט וההתנגדות למכירת סילי הוק לידון - כל זאת יום לזקוף במידב רבה לזכותו של מר קר, אשר זהו בקורו הראשון בישראל: 13.10.75-19.10.

... ל"ב טיזת חכבית הבקור.

עורך התכבית הינו מר אריה אמיר והמלווה מר יצחק ליאור.

ו-ג-ד-ה יודו

בדערו יודו

העקו: מר א. עברון, מטנה למנכ"ל

מר י. גור-אריה, ס/מנכ"ל

מר ט. ארצוב, ס/מנכ"ל

מנהל מצט"א בפועל ✓

מנהל התבוריה, קב"ט

1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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1-11-42

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ארה"ב

Gordon Kerr

מר

עוזר ראשי למודעה ג' רנתן בינגהאם (ד - נ.י.)
13.10.75 - 19.10.75

יום ג' - 13.10.75

09.20	-	בחינה בנתב"ג, טיסה אל-על 002 (מבין יורק)
	-	יציאה לתל-אביב
	-	חופשי

לינה - מלון פלזה, תל-אביב

יום ג' - 14.10.75 (דובר צה"ל)

	-	סיור בטייג-טיטה מלוד (במסגרת הסימפוזיון הבינ"ל על ההיבטים הצבאיים של הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי)
	-	חזרה לתל-אביב
21.00	-	א"ע עם בחמיה לבנון במסעדת 'לה-קודרון'

לינה - מלון פלזה, תל-אביב

יום ד' - 15.10.75

07.30	-	יציאה לירושלים
09.00	-	בקרד ביד ושם
10.00	-	סיור בעיר העתיקה (+ הפירות הכתל)
12.30	-	פגישה עם המבכ"ל
13.30	-	א"צ עם מר דוד בן-דב, מטכנות טאבנים
15.15	-	פגישה עם אלון (טיל.) אריאל שרון, יועץ לרוח"מ
	-	חופשי
18.30	-	שאוויסטיות (Prints) עם יושבד בן-יעקב, בביתו
20.30	-	א"ע עם הגב' אן-מארי לאמברט פינקלד, מסעדת האטרון ירושלים

לינה - מלון מוריס, ירושלים

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

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UNITED STATES

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יום ה' - 16.10.75

סיור בגולן - טיסה מעמדות (במסגרת הסימפוזיון הבינ"ל, ראח לעיל)	-	
חזרה לירושלים	-	
הצגה בתיאטרון החאן	-	21.00
<u>לינת - מלון מוריה, ירושלים</u>		

יום ו' - 17.10.75

פגישה עם פר אפרים דברת; יופץ לשר האוצר	-	09.00
יציאה לים המלח	-	10.00
בקר במצדה	-	11.30
א"צ במלון מוריה, סדום	-	13.00
חזרה לירושלים	-	
קפה עם ה"כ אולפנט, בביתו ?	-	21.30
<u>לינת - מלון מוריה, ירושלים</u>		

יום שבת - 18.10.75

בקר בבית לחם	-	09.00
חיכל הספר, מוזיאון ישראל	-	10.00
פגישה עם עולים מברה"מ, בביתם	-	10.30
בטיחה לקבוץ מעלה-החמשה	-	12.00
א"צ וסיווד במשק	-	12.30
המשך לחל-אביב	-	
א"צ עם ה"כ בן-פורת, במסעדה האן הדקל	-	20.30
<u>לינת - מלון פלזה, חל-אביב</u>		

יום א' - 19.10.75

יציאה לבת"ג	-	06.45
המראה טיסת אל-על 001 (לביור יודק)	-	08.00

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of various factors on the performance of a system. The study is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 discusses the conclusions.

2. Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is based on a series of experiments. The first experiment was designed to determine the effect of factor A on the system's performance. The second experiment was designed to determine the effect of factor B. The third experiment was designed to determine the effect of factor C. The results of these experiments are presented in Section 3.

3. Results

The results of the experiments are presented in this section. The first experiment showed that factor A has a significant effect on the system's performance. The second experiment showed that factor B has a significant effect. The third experiment showed that factor C has a significant effect. The results of these experiments are summarized in Table 1.

4. Conclusions

The conclusions of this study are that factor A, factor B, and factor C all have significant effects on the system's performance. The results of this study are consistent with previous research in this area.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כ"ח בחשוון תשל"ו
29 אוקטובר 75

1235

אל: מצפ"א
מאח: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: הופעת סאדאת בקונגרס - נאום בינגהם

מצ"ב לעיונכם נוסח הנאום שנשא בינגהם במליאת ביה"נ ב-23 דנא
בו הביע החנגדות להופעת סאדאת בקונגרס.

בדבריו מזכיר בינגהם גם הופעת רה"מ בפני הקונגרס.

בברכה,
צ. רפיה

התעק: המשנה למנכ"ל
לשכת רה"מ

גל קלעו

RECEIVED
1958



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1958
15 JANUARY 58

1958
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SADAT SPEECH .

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 23, 1975

Mr. BINGHAM. -Mr. Speaker, I strongly object to the decision by the

House and Senate leadership to invite Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to address a joint session of the Congress on November 5, 1975. This rarely extended privilege is an inappropriate action for the United States at this time. It is said to have had its origins in a specific request from President Sadat to address the Congress, a request which was endorsed by the administration. Sadat is understandably eager to advance his view of recent events in the Middle East and make a case for large new amounts of American aid to his country. Confronted with what amounted to a fait accompli, the leadership in both House and Senate decided to demonstrate U.S. good will and evenhandedness by agreeing to the appearance, and by arranging a similar appearance by the Prime Minister of Israel in the near future.

While heads of state are occasionally invited to address a joint session, I cannot agree that President Sadat deserves such an invitation at this juncture. His reputation as a peacemaker is of very recent vintage and it is impossible to know yet if it will mature into real and long-lasting peace.

He has taken a few risky steps toward establishing a less belligerent relationship with the nation of Israel and people around the world hold deep hopes that more steps will follow. But Egypt's moves toward peace in the Middle East have only just begun and pale in comparison with 28 years of off-and-on war with the objective of destroying the state of Israel.

It is important to note that during that same 28 years no invitation of this kind was extended to the Government of Israel. Why is it that this valiant democracy only offered this opportunity in the wake of an announcement that the leader of the principal Arab confrontation state will appear before the Congress on November 5?

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

שמור

תאריך: יד' חשון תשל"ו
19 אוק' 1975

מספר:

א ל: מר צבי רפיה, השגרירות וושינגטון
מאת: מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

הנדון: גורדון קר - עוזרו של המורה ג'ונתן ב. בינגהם
מברק 610 מיום 30.9.75
מכתב 1242 מיום 1.10.75

1. נפגשתי עם הנ"ל לצהרים ב- 15.10.75, ונכחתי בשיחתו עם המנכ"ל.

2. בשיחה עם המנכ"ל הועלה, בין היתר, נושא אונסק"ו. קר תהה כיצד ראוי לנהוג עתה לאור החלטת האחרונה של הוועד הפועל של אונסק"ו. התייחסוה לסוגיה זו - במברק מאו"ם א' מס. 564/ח מיום 15.10.75. ראה גם מברק הרצוג מס. 547 מיום 15.10.75.

3. שוחחנו רבות על המהלכים בקונגרס, הן אלה שהיו כרוכים בדיונים על הטכנאים (שהסתיימו ב- 9.10.75) והן אלה הצפויים בהקשר הסיוע חוץ. להלן כמה מן הנקודות שלגביהן החלפנו דעות.

4. סיוע חוץ

* יש להניח שהגשת הצעת תקציב סיוע החוץ תעכב שוב. יתכן שהיא תוגש רק לאחר בקורו של סאדאת, היינו, בחצי הראשון של נובמבר 1975 (בינתיים הנני למד שהנחה זו אינה מבוססת כנראה).

הדיונים לא יהיו קצרים. יש לצפות למספר רב של תקונים. (במסגרת *JARIC-UP*). קשה להניח שהדיון בחוק ההרשאה יסתיים לפני פגרת חג המולד. כן קשה להניח שהדיונים בחוק ההקצבות יסתיימו לפני פגרת חג הפסחא כפי שארע לגבי שחא 1975. יש בכ"ז לזכור שלגבי חלק זה של הסיוע המוצע, חל אחר, בהשוואה לשנה שעברה, של יותר מהצי שנה.

* אחד הנעלמים המקשים כרוך בהטלכות החקרה החקציבית הכוללת והשפעתה על מימדיו האפשריים של תקציב הסיוע (אגב למדתי מכס שהיא הורדה לסך של 395 בליון דולר).

* קושי אחר כללי נובע מן העובדה שחלה השנה הפרדה בין הסיוע הכלכלי לארצות שונות בסך 2.87 בליון שכבר אושר במית ב- 10.9.75 (קוראיה הדרומית, פקיסטאן וכול') לבין הסיוע הצבאי. במיוחד בולטת העובדה שקבלת המזה"ח תהא כנראה צמודה לפרק הסיוע הצבאי.

5. סיוע צבאי למצרים

* הסכומים המבוקשים למצרים יהיו כידוע גדולים מאשקד. תיחכן טקטיקה של הצמדתם למעוף הישראלי כדי למנוע שחיקתם.

* בינגהם וכמה חברים אחרים בבית שמעו מסיפקו ברורות שהמטרה יתייחס ברצינות ובחיוב לבקשות מצרים לנשק.

* בינגהם וידידים אחרים מודאגים מאוד מהופעת סאדאת בפני שני בתי היונגרס. הם משוכנעים שיהיו לה הדים מרחיקי לכת ויתעצם עוד יותר הדמיו החיובי של מצרים כשוות זכויות לישראל (שהחל להסתמן כבר אשקד, אפילו תוך נסיון להוות סכומי סיוע לטחי המדינ:).

2/...

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

- 2 -

תאריך:

מספר:

6. טילי פרשינג

בינגהם וחבריו מאוד מודאגים בנושא זה. הבינוחי שהם היו מאושרים אם הבקשה לטילים אלה הייתה מוסרת מסדר היום. נדמה להם שהיא עלולה ליצור קשיים וטבוכים לגבי סעיפים אחרים. כבר ממילא הם עומדים בפני מאבק נגד הסעון המזיק שארה"ב שלמה לישראל פיצויים או שוחד המורה האדמות שמהן הסוג. סנסור ג'יימס ב. אלן (ד- אלבמה) כבר הפיץ הסיסמה: 90 דולר בעד כל אינטש מרובע או משהו דומה לה.

אין בטחון שטעוניהם בענין טילי הפרשינג ירשימו.

הערה: בענין הסעון החשפולתי הנ"ל הסבחי שימת לב לדברי קיסינג'ר בחוכנית "פגוש העחונות" ב- 12.10.75:

" it is not the agreement that creates the need for assistance to the parties, but the long term interests of the U.S... the assistance to the parties antedates the agreement".

7. מצב הרוח בקונגרס

כלליה אין קר מאטין בדכורים על סחף רציני או סחף בכלל. הוא סבור שגיטח האזון באשר לישראל ומצרים אמנם החחזקה: יש לסמור על הזיקה לישראל אך יש לקדם בד בבד את העמקת ההשפעה האמריקניה במצרים וגם בעולם הערבי. נראה שגיטח דו-מגמתית זו אמנם נשחרטה עתה בחודעת חברי הקונגרס.

ב ב ר כה,

דוד בן-דב

העתק: מנהל לשכה המנכ"ל

מר איתן בנצור, וושינגטון

מר דוד תורגמן וושינגטון

מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

תאריך: י"ח חשוון תשל"ו
15 אוק' 1975

מ. 3. 25. 75 : ד. ע

מספר:

15710

א ל: המנכ"ל ✓

מאח: מנהל מצפ"א בפועל

הנדון: גורדון קר - עוזרו הראשי של המורשה ג' ונחן ב. בלנגהם
(ד-ניו-יורק)

לקראת פגישתך היום עם האגודה הנ"ל ובמענה לבקשתך,
הנני מצ"ב נייר קצר על כמה ממאבקי הנ"ל בנושאים שהועלו
בקונגרס ושהיתה להם חשיבות מיוחדת מבחינתנו.

ב ב ר כ ה, 3
דוד בן-דב

SECRET

1. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham

2. Gordon Kerr- chief Admin. & Legis Aide to Rep. Bingham

כמה הערות

1. כאמור במכתב רפ"ח 1242 מיום 1.10.75 סייע לנו גורדון קר בכמה מן הפעולות החשובות מבחינתנו בקונגרס והדבר התבטא כמובן ביוזמות ברובות של בינגהם בחוץ עם כמה חברי קונגרס אחרים. יוזמות אלו התבטאו, בין היתר, בנושאים הבאים:-

- * הסיוע האמריקני לסוריה בשת"א 1975.
- * מניעת הסיוע לאונסקו
- * המענק השנתי לקליטת יהודי בריה"מ
- * ההתנגדות למכירת טילי " הוק" לירדן.

2. הסיוע לסוריה

כזכור נכלל בפרק המז"חי של הצעת חוק סיוע החוץ לשת"א 1975 שהוגש ע"י הנשיא ניקסון לקונגרס ב- 24.4.75 סעיף בדבר " קרן חרום מיוחדת" בסך 100 מליון דולר. היה ידוע שהכוונה להעניק מירב הסכום הזה לסוריה. במהלך השלב הראשון של דיוני הבית על הצעת חוק סיוע זה הגיש המורשה בינגהם הצעת חקון ב- 30.7.74 שקבעה:

It is the sense of the Congress^s that none of the funds authorized in the foreign aid bill should be provided to any nation which denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate.

בינגהם עצמו הסביר שכונתו לסוריה וכך גם הובנה יוזמתו. חקונו קבע גם שהנשיא חייב לדווח לקונגרס מראש כיצד בכוונתו להשתמש בכספי קרן חרום מיוחדת זו (שנועדה לסוריה) ושכל אחד משני הבחיים יהא ראשי, חוץ שלושים יום מפרסום הצעת הנשיא, להטיל וטו.

החקון אושר ונכלל בחוק סיוע החוץ (הרשאה) שאושר סופית בקונגרס ב- 30.12.74. כתוצאה מתקון זה הוקצבו הסכומים מתוך קרן זו במהלך שת"א 1975 לשעורים ובהקצבות מבוקרות.

3. אונסק"ו

לאור החלטות אונסקו נגד ישראל ב- 21.11.74 הגיש בינגהם בראשית דצמבר 1974 הצעת חקון שתבעה עכוב תרומות ארה"ב לאונסקו עד לבטול החלטותיו האנטי-ישראליות.

החקון היה מקביל לזה שהוגש בסנט ע"י סנטור קליפורד קייס (ר- ניו-ג'רסי) והנוסח המשוהף נתקבל ב- 17-18.12.74. כתוצאה מיוזמה זו נמנע מאונסקו לקבל את ההקצבה השנתית מארה"ב בסך 22.5 מליון דולר (חלק ניכר בתקציבו).

4. חקון נלסון- בינגהם לחוק סיוע החוץ מ 1961

שמו של בינגהם קשור גם בחקון שנתכוון להטיל טגבלות על סמכויות הממשל למכירת נשק למדינות זרות הן במזומנים והן באמצעות חוק הסיוע^{המזון} שנתקבל ב- 30.12.74 קבע בעיקרו שעל הממשל להגיש לעיון הקונגרס כל הוכנית למכירת נשק בסכום העולה על 2.5 מליון דולר. לפי החקון, מוסמכים שני בחי הקונגרס תוך 20 יום קלגדרים מיום הגשת הצעת הממשל, להטיל עליה וטו. לאחר שהגיש הנשיא לקונגרס ב- 10.7.75 את מכתב ההצעה למכירת נשק אנטי אוירי לירדן לרבות 14 סוללות טילי " הוק", הביע הבית את התנגדותו במדה רבה כתוצאה מלחימתו ומנהיגותו של בינגהם. ועדת החוץ של הבית דחתה את הצעת הממשל הראשונה ב- 24.7.75 ולאחר מכן נאלץ הנשיא לבטל את פנייתו ולחפש נוסחה פשרה בנושא זה.

5. סיוע לקליטת יהודי בריה"מ

בשליבים האחרונים של אשור תקציב סיוע החוץ לשנת 1976 התפתחה יוזמה בוועדה ההקצבות של הסנט לקצץ הסכום של 40 מ" דולר שכבר אושר ולהורידו ל- 25 מ" דולר. יזמה זו הוכשלה ובקרב חברי הבית היה בינגהם בין הפעילים לאשור הסכום המקורי.

Section 1: Introduction

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records. It highlights the need for consistency and the potential consequences of errors. The text emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the organization's success and compliance with regulations.

The second part of the document outlines the specific procedures for data collection and analysis. It details the steps involved in gathering information, ensuring its reliability, and then processing it to extract meaningful insights. This section serves as a practical guide for staff members.

The third part of the document addresses the challenges associated with data management. It discusses issues such as data security, privacy concerns, and the integration of different data sources. The text offers strategies to overcome these challenges and ensure the integrity of the information.

The fourth part of the document focuses on the role of technology in modern data management. It explores various tools and software solutions that can streamline processes and improve efficiency. The text also touches upon the importance of staying updated with the latest technological advancements.

The fifth part of the document discusses the importance of training and development for staff members. It emphasizes that having a skilled workforce is crucial for effectively managing data. The text provides recommendations for creating a learning environment and investing in employee growth.

The sixth part of the document concludes by summarizing the key points discussed throughout the document. It reiterates the importance of a proactive approach to data management and the commitment to continuous improvement. The text ends with a call to action for all stakeholders to work together towards the organization's goals.

The final part of the document provides contact information for further inquiries. It lists the names and titles of the relevant personnel, along with their phone numbers and email addresses. This section is intended to facilitate communication and provide support to the readers.

The document is signed off by the author, who expresses their hope that the information provided is helpful and informative. They also mention that they are available for any questions or feedback. The text concludes with a professional closing and the author's name.

א"ת ק"א/א"י



עיריית ירושלים
بلدية اورشليم - القدس
MUNICIPALITY OF JERUSALEM

לשכת ראש העיר
ديوان رئيس البلدية
Mayor's Office

ש מ ר

ירושלים י"א' בחשוון השל"ו
16 באוקטובר 75

אל : מצפ"א

מאח: היועץ המיוחד לראש העיר

הנדון: Mr. Gordon Kerr
Principal Administrative Assistant
to Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D.- N.Y.)

הנ"ל נפגש קצרות עם ראש העיר שמכיר את המורשה יונחן בניגהאם אישיה. בשיחתם עלתה שאלת החפירות דרומה לחומה. בנושא החפירות וההחלטות האנטי-ישראליות של אונסק"ו שנחקלו על ריקען, היתה בשעתו פעילות רבה מצד מר בינגהאם, שהוקיע בביה-הנבחרים האמריקאי את ההחלטות ויצא בדברים נלהבים בזכות העמדה הישראלית. מר קולק העיר, כי עקב הכניית החפירות דרומה לחומה למעשה הושלם. "אם כך", העיר מר קר, "מדוע לא ננסה על סמך עובדה זו, להשיג שנוי בהחלטות אונסק"ו, אף אם חכנית החפירות ליד הכוחל המערבי, שמגמתן לחשוף נדבכים נוספים של הכוחל, בעינה עומדת? חכנית זו עשויה להגיע לשלב ביצוע במועד מאוחר יותר.

בשיחה ארוכה יותר שהתקיימה בביהי, סקרתי בפני מר קר את הבעיות הבסיסיות הקשורות עם דו-קיום יהודי-ערבי בירושלים. היו לו מספר "שאלות לעניין". את גרסתו, כי בקונטקסט של הסדר-כולל ומכלי לוותר על מעמדה של ירושלים המאוחדת כבירת ישראל, יש סיכוי להגיע לפחרון הבעיות המדיניות של ירושלים - אין הוא מוכן לקבל בגישה אופטימיסטית.

מר קר התעניין גם-כן בהגובת הצבור הישראלי, להתבטאויותיו הפומביות של השגריר האמריקאי.

האיש מרשים בחדות-תפיסתו, הבל שמחוסר-זמן נאלצנו לסיים השיחה בטרם מוצו כל הנקודות.

בברכה,
יששכר בן-יעקב

העחק: המשנה למנכ"ל
מנהל מאו"ם א'

מר צבי רפיה, השגירות, וושינגטון

Edward G. Brestler
(A-Pa)

כ"ה בטבת תשל"ו
29 בדצמבר 1975

1388
שמור

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②
③

אל: מר עמנואל שמעוני, הקונסול הכללי, פילדלפיה
מאה: צבי רפיח, השגרירות, וושינגטון

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס אדוארד ביסטר
מכתבך מה-10.12.75

תודה על מכתבך.

ביסטר ~~ק~~הינו, כידוע לך, חבר ועדת החוץ של ביה"נ.

לפני כמה שבועות ביקר אצלו ח"כ א. יריב במסגרת מסע ההסברה
שערכנו בקונגרס להבהרת דרכינו ברכש צבאי. ביסטר היה חביב מאד
והביע הבנה ואהדה לצרכינו.

חשוב עד מאד שביסטר יבקר בארץ, ובהקדם. אני מציע שנכבדי
הקהילה באיזור בחירתו, המקורבים אליו, ידרבנו אותו לכך.

באשר לתקציב - תקנון הקונגרס. אוסר על חברי קונגרס לקבל הוצאות
טיסה ואירוח ממשלות וגופים זרים. לכל נוסעים חברי הקונגרס ע"ח
תקציב הועדות בהן הם חברים. אינני מניח שלביסטר יהא קושי בכך.
אם סידור זה אינו אפשרי לגבי ביסטר אני מציע שהקהילה תקבל על עצמה
הוצאות הדרך ואילו אנו (כלומר, משרד בארץ) נקבל על עצמנו הוצאות
השהות בישראל. במקרה זה נצטרך למצוא לכך "כיסוי" מתאים. אבל, כאמור,
אם ביסטר אכן ירצה לנסוע, אין לי ספק שיוכל לנסוע ע"ח הוועדה.
מרבית עמיתיו בוועדה עשו זאת.

בכל מקרה, כדאי מאד לעודד נסיעתו לארץ. על הדרך המעשית
נדון כשיהא מוכן לכך.

ב ב כ ה ,
צבי רפיח

העתק: מצפ"א, משה"ח
אורי בר נר, כאן

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כא' בסיוון תשל"ח
26 ביוני 1978

ג'ס
קונאים (גורק) רה"ד
צ"ן - לכונסיה גמעה מל"ש

אל : מנהל מצפ"א
מאח : צ. רפיח

הנדון : שיחה עם קונגרסמן אדוארד BEARD

בירד הינו דמוקרט, בן 38, מרוד-איילנד. מכהן בביה"נ
מ-1975, חבר ועדת החינוך של ביה"נ. בדרך כלל היה ידידותי
לישראל ומקיים קשרים טובים עם הקהילה היהודית ברוד-איילנד.
לאחר שכמה מידידיו היהודים התרשמו לאחרונה -
וסיפרו לי על כך - כי חלה תפנית שלילית ביחסו לישראל
נפגשתי עמו בשבוע החולף לשיחה ממושכת.

משפתחתי בהבהרת משמעות אישור עסקת המטוסים לגבי
המו"מ המדיני והמאזן הצבאי באיזור, הפסקני הנ"ל ונתן לי
הרצאה ארוכה - לעתים אף נרגשת מאד-על דעתו והרגשותיו. מאופן
דיבורו נראה היה לי כי חיכה להזדמנות זו "לשפוך" את אשר
על ליבו. להלן עיקר דבריו:-

"נמאס לנו מהמזרח התיכון ומהמלחמה והסכסוך הבלתי פוסקים
שבו. נמאס לנו מהדרישה שנראה את האנטרסים הישראליים או
הערבים קודמים לאנטרסים שלנו. עלינו לדאג בראש ובראשונה
לאמריקה. לא יתכן שבכל פעם שישראל רואה סכנה כל שהיא לבטחונה
(התכוון לעסקת המטוסים) צריכה ארה"ב לעשות מה שישראל רוצה.
הסעודים נותנים לנו נפט. אני מרוד-איילנד, אין לנו

נפט ויש לנו תמיד בעיות קשות במדינתנו. ומה אתם נותנים לנו?

יש לכם נפט? אני נותנים לכם סיוע כספי... 2/138. אמה אתם נותנים לנו?

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אפס! כאן עשה סימן אפס עגול באצבעותיו כדי להמחיש זאת
עוד יותר ...
אתם שגיתם ביחס לכוהו של הלובי היהודי וכו' וכו'.
אני בהחלט בעד קיום ישראל ובטחונה אבל לא "בלי גבול".
אנחנו צריכים להחליט בעצמנו מה טוב לארה"ב ולא להיות
חתת לחץ, לא לחץ יהודי ולא לחץ ערבי!
משנרגע קמעה השתדלתי להסביר לו שישראל חזקה הינה
אנטרס אמריקני ולא (נאט"ו) אנטרס מנוגד לאנטרס אמריקני. סיפרתי
לו כיצד הצילה ישראל את ירדן ב-1970, לבקשת ארה"ב, על
המידע החשוב שסיפקנו לארה"ב ביחס לנשק הקונבציונלי
הסובייטי אותו לא קיבלו מכל מקור אחר, על כך שדוקא ישראל -
יותר מכל מדינה אחרת באזור - מסוגלת לסייע לסעודיה וכו'.
בסיום השיחה נראה היה לי שנרגע לחלוטין. נפרדנו
בחיוכים, בלחיצת יד חמה ובהבטחה מצדו כי יתקשר עמי בכל
פעם שיהיו לו שאלות ובעיות.
הרגשתי היא כי הדברים שאמר משקפים לא רק את מחשבותיו
הוא, אלא גם מחשבותיהם של אחרים מעמיתיו.

ב ב ר ב ה,

צבי רפיח

העמק:

המנכ"ל
המרכז
השגריר, כאן
הציר, כאן
הקונכ"ל, בוסטון

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

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בלמס

רגיל

מאת: חצב

הנר: 22.2.79/837/2181

המקור: טאסיס

תזייק: 2000 21.2.79

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הנדון: ארהייב- מצריים // מצריים בתורת יישוטר' במזהיית .

/=====

פרשנ טאסיס, אלכסנדר בוחונקיו, כותב:

כפי שדווח בעיתונ יושינגטון פוסט יי, הרי הנשיא סאדאת יי המודאג
 מן המהומות באיראן הציע ליטול תפקיד צבאי- פרוי מערבי עיקרי במזהייר
 כשבתמורה, תצייד ארהייב את כוחותיו- המזויינים בנשק חדשני יי, לדברי
 העיתונ, הציע זאת סאדאת לבראונ בעת ביקורו בקהיר, במהלכו הציג נשיא
 מצריים בפני השליח האמרי רשימת רכש צבאית גדולה שמחירה ביליוני עייג
 ביליונים של דולרים, סאדאת, אמר יושינגטון פוסט יי, הציע לארהייב
 להשתמש במצריים בתורת תחליף לאיראן. אפילו בקנה מידה גדול מזה ששימשה
 בו איראן בתקופת השאה.

במילים אחרות: בש הסכימה לשתחק תפקיד של שוטר במזהיית, מוכנה קהיר
 להקריב את האינטרסים הלאומים של העמ המצרי לטובת התוכנית האסטרטגית
 אימפי של ארהייב באזור זה. כזהו המחיר שמוכנ לשלם סאדאת עבור הנשק
 האמריקני. נראה כי המאורעות האיראנים היו צריכים להראות
 לכל העולם בבירור כי לא התחברות צבאית לארהייב ולא כלי הנשק האמרי
 החדשניים ואלפי היועצים האמרי יכולים להבטיח ייצובות יי באיזשהו
 איזור, המאורעות האיראנים הינמ לקח- טוב לכל המוכנ לשרת אינטרסים
 זרים אולם, אמ לשפוט עפייי הכל, לקח זה סמנו מוכנ לאנשים מסויימים

בלמס
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כח" בשבט תשל"ט

25 בפברואר 1979

ת"ן
אנשים (גיון)

א י ש י
ש מ ר

א ל: מר צבי רמיה, וושינגטון

מאח: ס/מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: סנטור רוברט בירד
למכתבך מה-10.1

צבי היקר

סנטור בירד לא ביקר ברמת הגולן טכיון שגוררות ארה"ב בת"א עשה הכל כדי שהוא לא יבקר ברמה. במשך ימים רבים נאבקנו עמם בנושא. הם מצאו תרופים רבים כדי שנוותר על הרעיון. לבסוף סוכם שהסנטור יבקר ברמה ואף קבענו לכך כשעתיים כולל מדריכים אולם בדרך צפונה התעכב הסנטור בנצרת שעה ארוכה ביותר וכאשר הגיע לגליל הצפוני לא היה כבר זמן לבקר בגולן כי על הסנטור היה להגיע לפנוח ערב לירושלים. נושא המסוס לא עלה כלל וכאסור לא זאח היתה הסיבה של אי ביקורו.

סצנריו דומה עברנו בקשר להיכנון הביקור בירושלים המזרחית.

ברגע שהחברר לשגרירות ארה"ב שטדי קולק לא יהיה בארץ הם קפצו על המציאה וסרבו לאשר סיור בעיר בהדרכתו של אלעד בלד.

כך קרה סנטור בירד ביקר בירושלים המזרחית בליווי הקונכ"ל האמריקאי. בכזרה ירושלים (במשך השבת) שנועדה למנוחה) וביום שישי בערב הוא נפגש בחסות הקונסול האמריקאי עם נכבדים בכדה.

בברכה,

אורי בר-נר

העתק סמוי:

מר גד רנון, מנהל מצפ"א

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בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

נר 101

גשלה 041530 נר 77

נתקבל 050243

קונאנס (גורג)



אל; המשרד
מאת; רושינגטון

להלן הודיעה שמשר אתמול מנהיג הדמוקרטים בסנט ROBERT BYRD במליאת הסינאט,
אשר במסרה לפרסום בכתובות

MR. PRESIDENT, BRINGING THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN THE MIDEAST TOGETHER IS AN EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX UNDERTAKING. YET THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS PRESERVING IN ITS ENDEAVORS TO BRING ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE TROUBLED REGION.

THIS IS A MATTER WHERE THE INTENSITY OF FEELINGS IS SUCH THAT EACH WORD MUST BE MEASURED. MUTUAL SUSPICIONS RUN HIGH. YET DESPITE THOSE DIFFICULTIES AND THE FACT THAT CRITICAL QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN UNRESOLVED IMPORTANT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. WE MAY FIND OURSELVES IN DISAGREEMENT WITH CERTAIN PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATION. BUT THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS MAKING A GENUINE AND VITAL EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE.

I BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY, AS REITERATED IN HIS POSITIVE AND FORCEFUL ADDRESS TO THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS WEDNESDAY NIGHT, IS DESERVING OF SUPPORT.

AS THE PRESIDENT STATED, THIS MAY BE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR A PERMANENT MIDEAST PEACE SETTLEMENT IN OUR LIFETIME. WE MUST NOT LET IT SLIP AWAY. PARTISANSHIP SHOULD NOT PREVAIL. WE NEED CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION AND DISCUSSIONS.

THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT SERIOUS FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT REAL PEACE ARE WITHIN REACH. RECENTLY, ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY VERY MUCH WANTS TO TO TO GENEVA. DAYAN SAID "I MYSELF THINK THAT WE NEVER HAD A BETTER TIME TO GET PEACE".

OF COURSE ANY CONSIDERATION OF OUR MIDEAST POLICY BEGINS WITH RECOGNITION OF OUR STEADFAST COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. EARLIER THIS YEAR VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE REFERRED TO OUR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AS A "MORAL IMPERATIVE". LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT CARTER SPOKE OF OUR "UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP" WITH ISRAEL.

THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF THIS COMMITMENT, WHICH IS WITHOUT PARALLEL. ISRAEL REMAINS THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND HAS RECEIVED 10 BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FROM THE US SINCE 1973. MOSTLY IN THE FORM OF DIRECT GRANTS OR CONCESSIONAL LOANS. THE PRESIDENT HAS PLEDGED THAT USUCH AID WILL CONTINUE AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT AS TO THE UNWAVERING S

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SUPPORT IN THE SENATE FOR THE ASSISTANCE NECESSARY FOR ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY SECURITY. WHAT WE SHOULD HOPE TO ACHIEVE AND WHAT THE PRESIDENT IS STRIVING FOR IS REAL SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. THE CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON MILITARY SECURITY IN ISRAEL - AS WELL AS IN OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS - INEVITABLE DIVERTS ATTENTION AND RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS. HIGH INFLATION AND HIGH TAXES AND LABOR DISTURPTIONS ARE MAONG THE MORE OBVIOUS RESULTS. WE ALL LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL CAN LIVE IN PEACE AND CAN MORE FULLY APPLY THEIR GREAT TALENTS AND ENERGIES TOWARD FURTHER DEVELOPING A NATION THAT ALREADY STANDS AS A MODEL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL LIBERTY.

A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT AND ONE THAT HAS BEEN STRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER, IS AGREEMENT ON RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BORDERS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 OF 1976, WHICH SHOULD SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THAT RESOLUTION PROVIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS.

THE CONTINUING REFUSAL OF THE PLO TO ACCEPT UN RESOLUTION 242 AND ISRAEL'S REIGHT TOT EXIST CONSTITUTES AN OBVIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE.

IN HIS SPEECH TO THE WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PRESIDENT CARTER POINTED OUT SOME OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH REMAIN, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT BY ISRAEL OF CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT IN TERRITORIES CURRENTLU UNDER OCCUPATION.

CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS A RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULT AND TRAGIC PALESTINIAN QUESTION. I WOULD AGREE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION THAT THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS AS WELL AS OTHER IMPORTANT SUBSTATIVE ISSUES MUST BE DECIDED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

THE ACCEPTANCE BY ISRAEL OF A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION INCLUDING PALESTINIANS AT GENEVA IS AN IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT. LIKEWISE, ISRAEL HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND WITH ALL ISSUES NEGOTIABLE. SUCH AN APPROACH ON THE PART OF ALL PARTIES IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL TALKS.

MR PRESIDENT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE WITH ITS EFFORTS TO CONVENE A GENEVA CONFERENCE, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE FORUM FOR THE MIDAST NATIONS TO WORK OUT A SWTTLEMENT IN FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATIONS. I SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS CONTINUING EFFORT TO PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

AD KAN

RAFIACH----

מברק נכנס
 משרד החוץ
 מחלקת הקשר
 21/10/76
 10:00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
 DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
 DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 95th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 123

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1977

No. 186

Senate

(Legislative day of Tuesday, November 1, 1977)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Honorable ROBERT C. BYRD, a Senator from the State of West Virginia.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Almighty God, ruler of men and nations, we thank Thee for every promise of peace on Earth, for the increase of good will which promotes peace, for every token of understanding and every act of cordiality, for the improved climate of trust essential to peacemaking, and for the untold thousands who pray for peace.

We beseech Thee, O Lord, to make us part of the solution and not part of the problem as here we strive for a better nation in a better world.

Grant to us pure hearts that we may fitly observe our National Day of Thanksgiving.

Through Him who gave His life for all mankind. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., November 22, 1977.

To the Senate:

Under the provisions of rule I, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable SPAEK M. MATSUNAGA, a Senator from the State of Hawaii, to perform the duties of the Chair.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
President pro tempore.

Mr. MATSUNAGA thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RECOGNITION OF THE LEADERSHIP

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the Proceedings of Tuesday, November 15, 1977, and Friday, November 18, 1977, be approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECOGNITION OF THE LEADERSHIP

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from West Virginia.

PROSPECTS FOR A NEW GENESIS FOR PEACE IN ANCIENT LANDS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, together with millions of people around the world, and in hope and cautious optimism, I watched by television the almost unimaginable encounters that took place in Jerusalem this past weekend. For three decades, Israel has lived in a state of war with her neighbors; throughout the course of her life as a modern nation, she has known no real security and only glimmering moments of fitful peace. Against such a background, the outpouring of admiration and gratitude shown by the Israeli people toward President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt during his brief visit to Israel was understandable and, indeed, contagious.

The diplomatic initiative and action taken by President Sadat required enormous courage, and he deserves the esteem of men of good will in every nation. Passions in the Middle East are deep and unpredictable. A number of political figures have paid the extreme price in the past quarter-century in that region because they valued statesmanship over irrationality.

But President Sadat evidenced in his bravery that he realizes the truth articulated by Albert Einstein, who said, "Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding."

Prime Minister Begin is likewise to be commended for recognizing the opportunity that President Sadat made possible, and grasping the hand of peace that was extended to him. He has displayed an enviable degree of wisdom and diplomatic vision that should bode well

for the future of Israel and the whole Middle East.

Several observers have remarked that little of substance was achieved by the speeches before the Knesset and the private conversations in Jerusalem. Perhaps these commentators missed the truth underlined by Plato when he said "The beginning is the most important part of the work." Egypt and Israel have broken through the psychological barrier of suspicion and hostility. Their leaders and vast numbers of their people have demonstrated that a will for peace has displaced a will for war in two previously hostile nations in that volatile region of the world. That fact in itself is an auspicious occasion after a generation of bloodshed and conflict.

Prior to the tentative link that was forged last weekend between Egypt and Israel, the only real common denominator that existed between those two nations was their friendship with the United States. For many years, the leadership of this Nation has sought to end the tortured stalemate that has prevailed between the Arabs and Israelis. I commend the present administration and previous administrations for pursuing avenues of mutual understanding with Egypt, while continuing to honor the sincere and profound commitment that America has held toward Israel since its inception. The exercise of this balanced policy in recent years may have helped Egypt to avoid the debilitating and limiting encumbrances that she might have been forced to follow had her only recourse been toward reliance on Soviet aid and diplomatic resources. If the seed of genuine peace was planted in Jerusalem this past weekend, we can take some pride and satisfaction in the fact that that seed was sown in soil long cultivated and tended by American diplomacy.

Experience reminds us that we cannot allow our anxiety and strong desire for a resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict to render us oblivious to the hard requirements that a lasting peace will exact. But a positive step has been taken, and we can all share the joy of the Israelis and the pride of the Egyptians at this moment in history. The late John Foster Dulles once remarked that one has to take chances to obtain peace.

and that is what President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin appear willing to do.

I hope that this important initial step will be supported by all other nations in the Arab world.

CAREER EDUCATION—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on behalf of Mr. HATHAWAY, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 7 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 7) to authorize a career education program for elementary and secondary schools, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by all of the conferees.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the Record.)

Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. President, the conference report on the Career Education Incentive Act represents a significant and much-needed reform to our Nation's educational system, and I strongly urge my colleagues to support it.

This measure as it emerged from conference very closely resembles the provisions of S. 1328 as reported out of the Committee on Human Resources, and subsequently approved unanimously by the Senate on October 20 of this year.

The provisions of this legislation will insure that at every level education will be more closely related to the world of work and to the career preferences of individuals. It will help provide students with the awareness, exploration, and decisionmaking skills they so urgently need regarding career opportunities and requirements. In this way, the legislation intends to promote equal opportunity among all students, with particular attention to the elimination of bias and stereotyping on account of race, sex, age, economic circumstance, or handicap.

The bill calls for a short-term Federal commitment to elementary and secondary career education implementation which will peak and then decline over its 5-year life. At the end of this time frame, all Federal involvement will cease and career education programs will be conducted solely with State and local resources. It authorizes for K-12 implementation, up to \$50 million in fiscal year 1979, \$100 million in 1980 and 1981, \$50 million in 1982, and \$25 million in 1983. These funds are to be allocated among the States on the basis of their population aged 5 to 18, except that each State shall receive a minimum of \$125,000. Over this 5-year time period, re-

quired State matching payments gradually increase.

Further, from these authorizations, 5 percent is reserved to the Commissioner of Education for the purpose of administering the programs at the Federal level and for making model grants. One percent is reserved for career education information activities, and one-half of 1 percent is reserved over the 5 years for a one time national evaluation. Also, 1 percent is reserved for allocations to outlying territories.

The bill requires each State education agency to utilize not more than 10 percent of the Federal funds it receives each year for State leadership activities. In fiscal year 1979 it may utilize not more than 10 percent of the Federal funds for State level staff, and in the following years, not more than 5 percent. All of the remaining Federal funds received must be passed through to the local educational agencies. All States, except the minimum allotment States are required to employ a full-time career education coordinator, an expert in anti-stereotyping activities, and a guidance and counseling expert, at least on a part-time basis.

Permissible State-level uses include the conduct of inservice training institutes for teachers, the dissemination of career education materials, the conduct of State-level evaluation, the collaboration with various elements of State and local communities, and the modification of teacher-training curriculum.

Uses by the local education agencies include instilling career education concepts into the classroom, implementing comprehensive career guidance and counseling programs, fostering collaborative relationships with various elements of the local community, implementing work experience programs, employing local coordinators, providing inservice training, conducting institutes for parents, members of school boards and community leaders, purchasing materials, operating career education resource centers, and conducting evaluations.

Each State applying for funds is required to submit an initial application and by July 1, 1979, a one-time State plan, and subsequent amendments to the plan as necessary. The State educational agency is the administering agency.

The bill also provides an annual authorization of \$15 million for post-secondary education demonstration projects, through grants, contracts, or other arrangements to postsecondary institutions, public agencies, or private non-profit entities. Such projects must have national significance or unusual promise in promoting career education at the postsecondary level.

The bill requires a comprehensive evaluation by the Commissioner of Education to determine those methods of career education that best fulfill the broad purposes of the act, that best promote career skills, that eliminate stereotyping, and which do so on the most cost-effective basis.

The Office of Career Education in the U.S. Office of Education is the adminis-

tering unit at the Federal level. The National Institute of Education and the National Advisory Council on Career Education are encouraged to continue their prior efforts in career education.

Mr. President, I am pleased to report to my colleagues that the conferees agreed to the higher funding levels in the Senate bill, to a greater emphasis on the elimination of stereotyping on the basis of race, sex, handicap, age, or economic status, and to a specific evaluation component, all of which were included in the Senate version.

Additionally, authority for model grants to exemplary career education projects, and for dissemination of career education information, as included in S. 1328, were incorporated into the final version of the legislation.

But most important in my view was retention by the conferees from S. 1328 of the \$15 million annual authorization for post-secondary career education demonstration projects.

Many students and their families are devoting considerable resources and time to the pursuit of post-secondary education, and then discovering that inadequate or nonexistent job opportunities result. Their education of course has a priceless inherent value in terms of fostering self-awareness, and awareness of the world around them. But these students often feel embittered about participating in a process which pretended to promise them significant and financially rewarding career opportunities, and failed to deliver to the level of that expectation. With an increased focus on available career opportunities and requirements, and increased attention to career skills, this situation could be greatly improved.

NEED FOR CAREER EDUCATION

As our schools are subjected to increased criticism, and as the youth of our Nation are victims of intolerable levels of unemployment, it is clear that we must move as forcefully and expeditiously as possible to make career education a reality for every American.

A number of criticisms have been leveled at our educational system from a variety of sources. A large number of them center around the failure of education to relate more satisfactorily to the world of work and to career needs. The National Advisory Council on Career Education, established by section 406 of the Special Projects Act, has summarized these criticisms as follows:

First. Too many persons leaving our educational system are deficient in the basic academic skills required for adaptability in today's rapidly changing society.

Second. Too many students fail to see meaningful relationships between what they are being asked to learn in school and what they will do when they leave the educational system. This is true of both those who remain to graduate and those who drop out of the educational system.

Third. American education, as currently structured, best meets the educational needs of that minority of persons who will someday become college grad-

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מדי

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי) מס' 87 בסדרת רשמיים, תשי"ז-1957.

נשלח: 061700 יוני 77

ה'תש"ל
1/16/57
(3)

אל: המסדר

מתגוש ✓

אל: מבבל, עדרון.

סגן רודט בירד, נמנהג היוב בסינט, ביקש לדאוג כדי לשמוע על התפתחויות האדרונות במזרח וב'ישראל. נפגשתי עמו היום במשרדו בקפיטול לשוחח שארכה שעה וחצתה רפ"ח.

סגתי בפניו התפתחויות הפוליטיות ב'ישראל והדגשתי כי חזקה על כל ממשלה ב'ישראל שנוקדת לשלום ובכלל זה כל ממשלה העתידה לקום. כשמניימ קונצנזוס לחתימה לשלום ולמניימ כנ קיימ קונצנזוס לגבי ההתנגדות לחזרה לגבולות 48' ולחקמת מדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית.

התייחסתי למערכות האמריקניות האדרונות והכרתי השפעה השליטית שלהן עיקר לגבי השלכת עמדות מדינות ערב ואפשרות המניימ.

בירד הודח על המערכות ואמר שדברי עזרו לו רבות להביינ המצב ב'ישראל וגינתנו למודון האכסוכ. אמר כי חייבימ לשמור על המונמטימ לשלום. בוגרבה חזרתי והכרתי כי 'ישראל תמטיכ במאמציה לקראת הסדר במזרח שיהיה מכוסס על בטחונ.

חזרתי והזמנתי לכך ב'ישראל. אמר שיעשה זאת בדצונ. דיניצ

סוף רחם ונכל שהבט, ממנכל ממנכל מצאא חקר רח אמן

אל יכ

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ז' שבט תשל"ז
26 ינו' 77

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מכתב
ל
בנטון

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

הנדון: הצעת חוק נגד טרור

ב-12 דנא הגיש הסנטור בנטון מסכסס הצעה חוק הכופה על הנשיא להפסיק סיוע כלכלי, סיוע צבאי, מכירה נשק ממסלהית ואזרחית, הלוואות של הבנק לייצוא וייבוא וכו' לכל מדינה המסייעת מרצון למעסי טרור.

רצ"ב דברי ההסבר כפי שנפרסמו ברשומות הקונגרס ב-12 דנא וכן רצ"ב נוסח הצעת החוק. ממשרדו של הסנטור בנטון נמסר לנו כי בכוונתם לפרק את החוק למספר חלקים ולהצמיד כל חלק כתיקון לחוק אחר. למשל, החלק העוסק בהלוואות הבנק לייבוא וייצוא יוצמד לחקיקה הנוגעת לבנק הייבוא והייצוא כשזו תועלה בההליך התקצוב.

ב ב ר כ ה,

Handwritten signature in blue ink:
שי פלדמן

העמק: לשכת היועץ המשפטי.

OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES

DATE: 11/20/77
TIME: 10:30 AM

Handwritten notes:
11/20/77
10:30 AM
11/20/77

RE: [Illegible]

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By Mr. BENTSEN:

S. 205. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, relating to criminal offenses committed by terrorists; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 206. A bill requiring the President to suspend economic assistance, military assistance, Government and commercial sales of arms, Export-Import Bank loans, and the generalized system of preferences to any country that willfully aids or abets terrorism.

PUNISHMENT FOR TERRORIST CRIMES

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill to create strict mandatory sentences for those found guilty of terrorist crimes.

In recent years, such crimes have killed and maimed hundreds of people. According to the FBI, since 1970 there have been almost 1,000 such incidents. There have been bombings and shootings; arsons and snipings. Almost 400 people have been killed or wounded as a result. Property damage has totaled almost \$6 million.

Mr. President, the crimes of destroying innocent lives in the pursuit of political objectives is reprehensible, undemocratic, and alien to the traditions of a free and civilized society. There is no excuse, no justification, no reasoning that will suffice to make these acts anything else. Our laws of crime and punishment must reflect the severity of these offenses.

It is in response to the growing incidence of mindless violence that I introduce this bill. This measure would create strict and certain punishment for violent terrorist crimes. It would create a mandatory minimum sentence of from 2 to 10 years. And Mr. President, this would be in addition to the indeterminate sentence for the violent crime covered by present law.

This measure also provides for the death penalty in the most heinous cases of terrorism, those involving the death of a victim. The measure does provide procedural safeguards, such as a hearing to determine the existence of mitigating circumstances that would render the death sentence inappropriate. But it also recognizes that terrorist crimes are wanton and cold-blooded acts of violence that cannot and will not be tolerated, and that those who choose to commit the ultimate crime must know that they may be punished by the most severe penalty, death. This measure states in decisive terms that in our society, there can be no appeal over the ballot to the bullet, and that those who make such an appeal will pay the cost.

Mr. President, to convict under this proposal, all elements of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The violent crime itself must be proven. The fact that it was committed pursuant to the encouragement of a group that

employs violence as a political instrument, must also be proven.

In those cases where the death penalty is an option, a sentencing hearing will be held to determine whether the facts of the case warrant the most severe penalty. If the victim dies and the death penalty is found inappropriate, a mandatory prison sentence of increased severity would be given. This could be no less than 4 years; no more than 20. If the facts brought out determine that the crime was vicious and wanton in the extreme, the death penalty could be given.

Mr. President, there is no place for random violence in a free society. There is no place for air piracy, letter bombs, or machine guns in our streets. If the criminal believes that he may destroy the lives of innocent people to seek publicity for his political views, let him know that the law will respond in kind. There can be little mercy for the wanton and reckless killer. He has declared war on free society itself; he has destroyed the right of those immediately affected and endangered the rights of all; he has proclaimed himself above the law; and he should be aware that in the eyes of the law and the decent opinion of mankind, murder is murder, violence is violence; and no cause or higher belief can justify such action.

Mr. President, my bill would see to it that the punishment would fit the crime. In the increasingly dangerous world we live in, we face the fact that new forms of violence and terror will be available to the deranged and the fanatic. They can strike at cities; or powerplants; military installations; Government buildings; or private homes. They can employ bombs or germ warfare.

Mr. President, we must make sure that those who do so know that their conduct will be met by the outrage and severity it deserves. This bill will increase the punishment for such crimes in a fair and responsible manner. It will state in clear and decisive terms that wanton violence—in the name of any cause—will not be tolerated, and will be met with the full force the law allows.

My second bill, Mr. President, relates to international terrorism. It requires the President to suspend economic and military assistance, Government and commercial sales of arms and Export-Import Bank loans and loan guarantees. I am pleased that last year the Congress approved and the President signed into law legislation I introduced to deny eligibility for the generalized system of preferences to any country which willfully aids and abets international terrorism.

In spite of increased efforts in recent years by certain nations to crack down on terrorist organizations, terrorism has widened in scope and there is growing evidence of cooperation among international terrorist groups. Examples of terrorism are becoming an unfortunate feature of our daily news. Since 1968 alone approximately 800 people have been killed and 1,700 injured in international terrorist incidents; 114 U.S. citizens have been involved and 24 of them killed.

In spite of the fact that international terrorism has continued to grow, how-

January 12, 1977

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

ever, no legal solutions are in sight. Many nations, particularly those in the Third World, are unwilling to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism which, they say, can be justified under certain circumstances. Therefore, sources report that almost half of those terrorists captured in the last 5 years have been released. These nations' unwillingness to bring the full force of the law to bear against these international outlaws threatens the safety and peace of all nations.

It has for some time been U.S. Government policy to support adoption of an international convention to mandate sanctions against States which fail to prosecute or extradite international terrorists. However, the convention has made little headway and the prospects for enactment are remote.

I believe U.S. policy of no-negotiation with terrorists is a correct one. But I believe we must go one step beyond this in an effort to meet the problem of foreign governments' harboring of terrorists. My legislation is designed to serve notice to all nations that the United States will not countenance acquiescence to terrorism and that we are willing to take serious action to deal with this problem. I urge the Senate's support for this bill. The civilized world must respond with tough, effective measures against those international outlaws who would seek to

destroy the very foundations of the democratic system.

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 206

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 12 (legislative day, JANUARY 10), 1977

Mr. BENTSEN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

Requiring the President to suspend economic assistance, military assistance, Government and commercial sales of arms, Export-Import Bank loans, and the generalized system of preferences to any country that willfully aids or abets terrorism.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 That (a) the President shall suspend, for such period as he
4 deems appropriate—

5 (1) economic assistance;

6 (2) military assistance;

7 (3) Government and commercial sales of defense
8 articles and services;

1 (4) extensions of credits and guarantees under the
2 Foreign Military Sales Act; and

3 (5) loans and loan guarantees made by the Ex-
4 port-Import Bank with respect to any country which
5 willfully aids or abets international terrorism.

6 (b) If the President finds that national security justifies
7 the continuation of assistance to any government described
8 in section (a), he shall report such finding to the Speaker
9 of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on
10 Foreign Relations of the Senate. Assistance may be fur-
11 nished to such government unless the Congress, within thirty
12 calendar days of receiving such report, adopts a concurrent
13 resolution stating that it does not find that the national secu-
14 rity justifies assistance to such government.

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 206

A BILL

Requiring the President to suspend economic assistance, military assistance, Government and commercial sales of arms, Export-Import Bank loans, and the generalized system of preferences to any country that willfully aids or abets terrorism.

By Mr. BENTSEN

JANUARY 12 (legislative day, JANUARY 10), 1977
Read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations

October 18, 1976

SENATOR DALE BUMPERS (Democrat - Arkansas)

Biographical Information:

Born in Charleston, August 12, 1925; attended the public schools of Arkansas, University of Arkansas, Northwestern University, LL. B. degree, 1951; admitted to Arkansas Bar, 1952; served in U.S. Marine Corps, 1943-46, staff sergeant; president, Charleston Chamber of Commerce; president: Charleston School Board, Franklin County Board of Education; Governor of Arkansas, 1970-74; married former Betty Flanagan, 1949; three children; elected to the U.S. Senate, November 5, 1974, for the term ending January 3, 1981; Methodist.

Political Information:

Bumpers replaced Senator Fulbright for the Arkansas Senate seat and has been considered as a possible Vice-Presidential candidate. Bumpers defeated Fulbright in the 1974 primary.

Committees:

Aeronautical & Space Sciences
Interior & Insular Affairs

Voting Record:

Bumpers' position on Israel is diametrically opposed to his predecessor. During the primary race in May 1974, Bumpers went out of his way on national T.V. to say that his position on the Middle East is different than Fulbright's.

Bumpers has voted for all foreign aid bills since his term began. He supported the Sinai resolution because, he said, since visiting the Mideast (Israel, Egypt in August 1975) he was convinced that it "will greatly enhance the possibility of peace in the Sinai."

Bumpers indicated he had reservations about the recent proposed Administration arms sales to 11 countries (including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Singapore, Phillipines, Korea & Pakistan). He said, unlike Sen. Nelson, that he did not oppose the sale of arms to all the countries, but wanted to know reasoning and justification from Administration.

In a long letter in October 1974, Bumpers said: "A settlement imposed by the major powers will not endure." Also: "I am frankly unwilling, however, to say flatly that I would never favor aid or trade concessions to the Soviet Union unless the internal policy of that country is changed."

Regarding nuclear technology, Bumpers has said: "New nuclear technology should be furnished by this country to any foreign nation only upon the strictest safeguards and guarantees that it will be used only for peaceful purposes."

Bumpers cosponsored the resolution deploring the terrorist attacks at Istanbul Airport.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס ו ד י

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

מס' 128

בשלה: 06175א דצמ 76

מאיר רוזן דע אפרתי (כאן)

שלך 85.

א. בכונתי לסטור האטור במכרש לסטור במפרט.

ב. האין הסתייגויות של מדינות ערביות אחרות שאישרו את ה-N.P.T.

ר פ י ח

שהח רהם מנכל ממנכל רוזן מצפא טרי/ו.א.א.

ח/רע

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שלך 85.
א. בכונתי לסטור האטור במכרש לסטור במפרט.
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מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

יורי
ג'ני
ג'ר

סודי (מאוס)
מסי 67
נשלה: 0217/צמ 76

אל: המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון
עברון, רביב

עוד משיחת היום עם סנטור במפרט:-

א. שנת 1977 חייבת להיות שנת תזוזה. הסנטורים הודישמו שסאדאת זקוק **DESPERATELY** לשלום. במפרט יודע שגם אנו רוצים בשלום, הוא עד ומכיר בחשדותינו לגבי כוונות הערבים לאחד הנסיון המר שלנו עם משכ שנים סה רבות ואינו מקל ראש בכך, עם זאת אינ מנוס לדעתו מכינוס ועידת גנבה ומהתקדמות לקראת שלום כבר בשנה הבאה. הפניתי תשומת לבו לדברי רהם באנטרנציונל הסוציאליסטי כגנבה ולדברי שהח בוועדת העורכים וודגשתי נכוונותנו אנו לתזוזה לקראת השלום. הביע שמחתו על הדברים הנל.

הוא מסכים עמנו בהחלט שכל עוד אשפ לא ינער חוצנו מהטרור ויגנהו ולא יכיר בישראל אינ לשתפו בדיוני גנבה, מכיר בהחלט בהבדל בין אשפ כארגון טרור בלתי נבדל, שספג מזה קשה בלבנוג לבינ הפלשת'נאים בגדמע, בעזה ובירדן. ושאל אם לא מוטב לנו להידבר עם מנהיגים בגדמע שאינם אנשי אשפ בהסרה. ג'שתו הבסיסית לישראל היובית וידידותית כתמיד. עם זאת רצה להדגיש שאיכ להתקדם לשלום.

ב. ציין שהשאה דיבר באורה חיובי מאד לגבי ישראל, הביא(השאה) הערכה רבה להישגיה וציין הסתייעותו בישראל בתחומים שונים.

רפ"ח.---

שהי היה שורה (מסמך) לנכנס ולחזור אקס רחן י, רכב נק אלקו ולחזור חזר וא' (מסמך) אקו (מסמך)

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס ו די

ל
קואליציה
(ס/6/6) בלגיה

מס 93:

נשלח 071500 ינומ77

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

אל עברונ, מ. רביב

א. נפגשתי היום לשיחה בת שעה עם סנטור בלמונ במשרדו בקפיטול. בלמונ הינו, כידוע, רפובליקני שמרני מאוקלהומה, הרפובליקני הבכיר בוועדת התקציב, חבר ועדת ההקצבות ונמנה על משלחת ריביקופ. בהיותנו בארץ ביקש שאבוא לשמוע רשמיו מס'וריו במזהה.

ב. החדשם מאד מסאדאת ומרצונו לעשות שלום עם ישראל. סאדאת הבהיר להם שדבריו על שלום בדור הבאי לא הובנו כהלכה. הוא מוכן עכשיו לשלום פורמלי, אבל קשה לצפות לכך שיחסי ידידות ורעות יכוננו מייד ולכן יש להמתין.

מצבו הכלכלי של סאדאת חמור והוא זקוק מאד לסיוע כלכלי מארהב. סאדאת אמר להם שהוא נמנע מלבקש נשק וחלפימ מהסובייטים. אבל אמר האמריקנים לא יסייעו לו לא יהא לו מנוס מלפנות שוב לסובייטים.

ג. כחקלאי ציין שמצרימ איננה יודעת לנצל את מי הנילוס ומערכת ההשקיה שלה הינה כשלונ. לעומת זאת החדשם מאד לטובה ממפעל ההשקיה הירדני בעמק הירדן.

ד. גם ירדן רוצה בשלום אמ כי להערכתו המלכ חוסיין הינו (ביקש שלא אצטטו בהערכתו זו) ובלמונ איננו מעריכו כגורמ רציני.

ה. בלמונ אמר ששנת 77 חייבת להיות שנת התקדמות לשלום שרדי כל הצדדים רוצים בכך. אמר כי ארהב מייבאת 45 אחוז מהנפט שלה מחול וכל משבר במזהה יביא למשבר אנרגיה שיביא לאסון כלכלי ולכן חשוב לנוע לשלום. הוא בדעה שעלינו לנקוט יוזמות בחזום הטריטוריאלי.

ו. תוכ הצגת עמדתנו הדגשתי רצוננו ונכונותנו למומ ב-1977, וחזרתי בהרחבה על ההכרזות השונות של רהם ושהח בדבר נכונותנו למומ ולשלום. כמו כן, הבהרתי עמדתנו לגבי אשפ והשאלה הפלשתינאית. בלמונ לא חלק על דעתנו שעדיף לפתור הבעיה במסגרת ירדן וודאי שאינ הוא רוצה לראות סובייטים במדינה פלשתינאית בגדמיע. כשלעצמו הוא רואה בירושלים את

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

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הבעיה העיקרית.

ז. בלמונ אמר שאם כי הינו רפובליקני הוא סבור שמינויי ואנס, לאנס ובלומנטל הינם מינויים טובים. באפנ מיוחד, אמר, הוא מבכר על מינויו של שלזינגר. כנ אמר שהבעיה של קארטר היא שהוא עורר בעמ ציפיות רבות מכדי שיוכל להגשימן.

ח. למרות שלא התעניין עד סה במיוחד בעניני חוץ הוא מעוניין מעתה להמשיך ולהתעדכן, וביקש שאבוא לבקר מפעם לפעם כדי למסור לו הערכותינו. מדבריו הבינותי שהוא מקיים קשרים עם שגרירות מצרים וכנראה גם שגרירות ערביות אחרות.

ר פ י ח

שחח רחמ שחכט מנכל ממנכל אבידר ארגוב רוזן י. רביב שק מצפא מזתיט וקר רט אמן
רע/אק

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס ו ד י

מס 94

נשלח 071500 77 ינו 77

ה
ד/מאוס (סג' 1/16) (אג' 6)
1957
10.11

אלו המשרד

מאתו וושינגטון

עברונ. רביכ.

סנטור בלמון סיפר לי כי הוזמן עי סנטור מתאיאס לפגישה עם ראש ממשלת
ירדן העושה עתה בווינגטון. בפגישה שהתקיימה אתמול השתתפו כמה סנטורים
נוספים. הירדני אמר בין השאר:
א. עתה הזמן לשלום. אם תוכ זמן סביר לא תושג התקדמות, יתהווה לחצ
כבד על סאדאת.

ב. מעמד אשפ נמצא בירידה והוא מאבד מיוקרתו.

ג. את בעיית הפלשתינאים יש לפתור במקומות בהם הם יושבים עתה.

לאילו מהם המעוניינים בכך יש להציע פיצויים תמורת הרכוש שאיבדו.

ד. ירדן זקוקה מאד לסיוע כלכלי. שאל אם הקונגרס יסייע לה והסנטורים
השיבו בחיוב.

ה. אדהב מסרה אמנם לירדן טילי הוק אבל מייד לאחר מכן נתנה לישראל
אמצעים המנטרלים את ההוקים.

רפיח-

שנת רחם שתבט מנכל ממנכל אביכר ארגוב ריזן י. רביכ שק מצפא מזתיס חקר רם אמר
רע/אק

מסמך מס' 1000
תאריך: 10/10/2023
מס' 1000

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מסמך מס' 1000
תאריך: 10/10/2023

מסמך מס' 1000
תאריך: 10/10/2023

מסמך מס' 1000

המסמך נועד לפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים למסמך מס' 1000, תאריך: 10/10/2023.

המסמך כולל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים למסמך מס' 1000, תאריך: 10/10/2023.

המסמך כולל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים למסמך מס' 1000, תאריך: 10/10/2023.

המסמך כולל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים למסמך מס' 1000, תאריך: 10/10/2023.

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המסמך כולל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים למסמך מס' 1000, תאריך: 10/10/2023.

מסמך מס' 1000

מסמך מס' 1000
תאריך: 10/10/2023

October 18, 1976

1070 / 1457
SENATOR HENRY L. BELLMON (Republican - Oklahoma)

Biographical Information:

Born in Tonkawa, Okla., September 3, 1921; educated in Noble County public schools; graduate of Billings High School; B.S. in agriculture, 1942, Oklahoma State University; served 40 months in U.S. Marine Corps, 1942-46; engaged in soil conservation contracting and farming; State Republican chairman, 1960-62; served 1 term in Oklahoma House of Representatives, 1946-48; elected Oklahoma's first Republican Governor in 1962, served 4 years; former chairman, Interstate Oil Compact Commission; former member, executive committee, National Governors Conference; former national chairman, Nixon-for-President Committee; married Shirley Osborn, January 1947; three daughters; Presbyterian elected to the U.S. Senate, November 5, 1968; reelected November 5, 1974.

Political Information:

Bellmon narrowly defeated his opponent in 1974 for his second term and began his service in Washington as one of the most fervent supporters of the Nixon administration. He served as Nixon's national campaign chairman in 1968 before making his first race for Senate. He has also received a great deal of support from the oil interests in Oklahoma.

Committees:

Budget (Minority Ranking Member)
Appropriations
Agriculture and Forestry
Post Office & Civil Service

Voting Record:

Bellmon's record up until this year was one of the worst in the Senate. He had never joined as a cosponsor of any major declarations or resolutions favorable to Israel. This year he voted for the Sinai technician resolution and for the Fiscal Year 1976 and 1977 appropriations bills. He also voted for the original Fiscal Year 1976 authorization bill which was ultimately vetoed by President Ford.

Bellmon has very strong oil interests in Oklahoma and it is reflected in all of his legislative as well as Middle East positions.

Bellmon has been an advocate of oil depletion allowances (a tax break for oil producers) and in 1971, denounced the U.S. role in negotiations between OPEC and western European nations over oil prices. He declared that by siding with the importing nations, the United States has taken a "neocolonialist" attitude towards the developing countries in the Middle East. He noted that if the OPEC states would receive higher prices for their oil, it would be possible to cut back on foreign "handouts" to these same countries.

In June 1970, he pointed to the impending danger of big power confrontation in the Middle East and advocated a settlement along the lines of 242. His outline for peace included withdrawal of all troops and military equipment to armistice lines that existed prior to the Six-Day War. He went on to say that Israel must overcome her illusion that superior military power will overwhelm the Arab nations and bring peace. He expressed dismay "at the negative reaction of the Israelis toward the attempt by Nahum Goldman to visit Israel." He also cited recent Soviet

SENATOR HENRY L. BELLMONVoting Record (Continued)

participation in the SALT talks as indicating their intention to negotiate an international settlement with the United States (Bellmon was a cosponsor of the Jackson Freedom of Emigration Amendment in 1972, but did not join as a cosponsor in 1973). Later in 1970, Bellmon commended Nixon for the evenhanded policy pursued in the Middle East and for the "persistent refusal to yield to public pressure for increased deliveries of Phantom jets to Israel." He maintained that any sale of jets to Israel would have been "politically disruptive and detrimental to the long-range interests of peace."

In November 1971, he told his colleagues that he had recently talked with Sadat who had agreed to virtually every requirement of 242 and is being "very cooperative." He said Russia is not sending more arms to Egypt and that giving Phantoms to Israel will push the United States into an anti-Arab posture. Sadat, he said, "wants a peaceful solution" and Israel should be magnanimous.

Bellmon did not sign the letter of 76 Senators last year to President Ford on the Administration's "reassessment" of its Middle East policy. In a private letter he said "I do not feel the letter was helpful to a peaceful resolution of the Mideast conflict."

Comments:

Bellmon's position on the Budget committee is important. This new committee sets ceilings for total Congressional spending and thus, among other things, establishes the maximum levels of funding for the foreign aid bills. Within Oklahoma reside two important defense contractors: Rockwell International-General Aviation Corp. & McDonnell Douglas in Tulsa.

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שגרירות ישראל
וויטינגטון

ה' תשל"ז
ה' תשל"ז
ה' תשל"ז

29.6.1977

ל

אל: מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיה

מצ"ב לעיוונכם נוסח הדברים שנושא הסנטור

ברוק מעל בימה הסנט ב-27 דנא.

ב ב ר כ ה,

צ. רפיה

העתיק:

המרכז, משה"ח

LETTER FROM
THE
SECRETARY
OF THE

1911

RE: _____
DATE: _____

TO: _____
FROM: _____

Israel Embassy

STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD W. BROOKE REGARDING UNITED STATES
MIDDLE EAST POLICY

June 27, 1977

Mr. President, purposeful ambiguity has its role in the realm of diplomacy so long as it makes a positive contribution to the achievement of desired ends. Recognizing this, many of us have been willing until now to forego extensive comment on the Administration's ambiguous statements regarding the Middle East. But ambiguity can also be of great detriment if it creates misperceptions as to actual intent. And it is becoming increasingly apparent that this is the danger that besets the current Administration's approach to the Middle East.

It had been my hope that by now the Administration would have clearly reiterated, by its actions and statements, a U.S. refusal to coerce Israel into accepting a dictated settlement. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. And I fear that the Administration is drifting dangerously toward acceptance of the view that an imposed settlement might be justified. Such an approach would have a high probability of setting the stage for greater disasters in the Middle East.

One of the serious consequences of the Administration's ambiguous statements on the Middle East may be the creation of the perception in the minds of many in the Arab world that direct negotiations with Israel will be unnecessary because the United States will deliver Israel to Geneva to sign a prearranged diktat. Such an Arab expectation will never be fulfilled.

Indeed, it would likely stimulate a hardening of Israeli positions in response to Arab intransigence stemming from such an expectation.

This period of uncertainty requires constant affirmation of fundamental principles which provide the anchor for U.S. Middle East policy. Three such principles come to mind.

First, Israel as an independent democratic state is a vital interest of the United States. Its assured existence is intimately linked to the survival of the values upon which our own freedom and form of government are based.

Our unqualified commitment to Israel's survival does not exclude a U.S. desire and need for amicable relations with the Arab states. There is no question that continued improvement of relations with various Arab states cannot be obtained through a lessening of resolve to assure a viable Israel. Should that resolve weaken, the United States would sacrifice its claim to be a country of principle and honor. Friend and foe alike would have little confidence in our policies or intentions.

Secondly, it is peace, meaning not only the cessation of a state of belligerency but also normal intercourse between Israel and her neighbors, that is the goal. We must reject the temptation to impose "quick fixes" that do little more than provide interludes between periods of armed conflict. Intermediate measures worked out and agreed to by the Middle East states would still be useful so long as they clearly contributed to the goal of true peace.

And then of course the proper role for the United States in the Middle East must be as a mediator and not as a dictator of agreements. Those who would be tempted to impose a settlement on Israel are wrong. It is the Israelis, not ourselves, who must endure the immediate consequences of any agreements. . And it would be totally unacceptable for the United States to condition its relations with Israel on Tel Aviv's willingness to accept risks that we ourselves would find intolerable if confronted with similar circumstances.

Much has been said recently about a "peace offensive" by the Arab states. We all naturally welcome indications of moderation and restraint on the part of the opponents of Israel. But we also recognize that the term "peace" does not have a universal meaning for Israeli and Arab alike.

To many radicals in the Arab world, "peace" could only be achieved if Israel ceased to exist. Their "peace" would be that of the sword. Without question, these perpetrators of violence and hatred must be rejected.

Others in the Arab world believe "peace" means only a cessation of conflict with Israel by overt military action. To them it does not mean unqualified acceptance of Israel's sovereign status. "Peace" in this view is merely the continuation of the struggle against Israel by means other than military force. To Israel and the United States, this restricted definition of "peace" must be unacceptable. While it may promise a

brief or even moderately extended respite from open warfare, it also will sow the seeds for future violence.

I am convinced that peace in the Middle East, to be worthy of the name, must include the following:

(1) Recognized borders that provide adequate military and political security for the Middle East states.

(2) An end to the preaching of hatred and animosity toward one's neighbors.

(3) Free exchange of peoples and ideas between the various societies.

(4) Open trading relationships between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

(5) An end to "political warfare" against Israel in various international forums.

But I also am convinced that it is the exclusive right of the conflicting parties to make the decisions regarding the risks to be taken in seeking peace. And only in direct negotiations will the opportunity present itself for the parties to hammer out agreements that will be effective in promoting peace in the area.

The United States can legitimately encourage the accomodation process in several ways.

First, it can indicate to all parties that its commitment to the continued existence of Israel is a principled one that will not be sacrificed to expediency or weakened by acceptance of nebulous formulas for peace. The best means of

doing so continues to be a U.S. willingness to provide clearly needed economic and military assistance to Israel. Indeed, as many realize, unless the United States is true to its moral and security-related commitments to Israel, it could never be trusted as a reliable friend of Arab countries.

Second, it can demonstrate that support of Israel and good relations with Arab countries are not mutually exclusive goals. The extensive amounts of U.S. aid provided Egypt, Syria and Jordan in recent years and the close relations we have with Saudi Arabia are ample proof that this is not the case.

Finally, the United States can continue to offer its "good offices" as a mediator in the search for peace. While doing so it must clearly indicate that it will not seek to dictate the terms of a settlement, either by itself or in conjunction with other outside powers.

True peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through covenants freely agreed to by the involved parties in direct negotiations. Solutions imposed from without will be too fragile to accomodate the tensions that will continue to be characteristic of the Middle East for years to come. Israel and her Arab neighbors must be fully committed to the terms of an agreement if peace is to exist. Such commitment would be impossible under an imposed settlement.

There should be no doubt that pressures will increase for the United States and Israel to accept simple formulas for peace. Indeed, voices are being raised in this country insisting

that Arab expressions of a desire for peace are sufficient justification for extensive concessions by Israel. These "simple formulas" remind us of H.L. Mencken's statement:

For every difficult and complex problem, there is an obvious solution that is simple, easy and wrong.

There are no simple, easy solutions in the Middle East. And neither Israel nor the United States can afford to be wrong in the choices that are made. Too much is at stake.

It is time for the present Administration, the Congress and the American people to understand that the process of peace will be very protracted in time if it is to bring to pass the desired results. Our commitment must be for the long haul. And we must accept the financial and psychological burdens that such will entail.

Mr. President, the United States cannot afford to be an "uncertain triumph" as it seeks to encourage the negotiating process in the Middle East. It is important that we do not mislead others into thinking that we will attempt to coerce Israel into accepting a settlement. To do so would be to risk miscalculations on the part of Israeli and Arab alike, the end result of which would likely be a disaster of unmitigated proportions. Therefore, it is important that the Administration clearly indicate, in its statements and actions, that the United States rejects a coercive approach in its relations with Israel

and will undertake to do everything that it can to encourage direct negotiations without prior conditions between Israel and the recognized Arab states.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ו' ניסן תשל"ה

6 אפריל 1976

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
לג
אולגין

Smother Brooke

אל : מר משה רביב, מנהל מצפ"א

מאח: איתן בנצור, שגרירות וושינגטון

הרצ"ב אנא לידיעתך.

בברכה

איתן בנצור

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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1976 March 6
1976 March 6

Handwritten notes and signatures
1/11/76
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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
STANDARDS AND CONDUCT

OFFICES:
2003-F KENNEDY FEDERAL BLDG.
BOSTON, 02203
617-223-7240
421 OLD SENATE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
202-224-2742

March 15, 1976

Mr. Albert Schlossberg, President
The Jewish Community Council
72 Franklin Street
Boston, MA 02110

Dear Mr. Schlossberg:

Thank you for your letter concerning the efforts of some Americans to cancel pre-paid trips to countries that voted in favor of the recent UN resolution equating Zionism to racism.


I took the liberty of contacting the State Department about this matter. They maintain that the position of the United States government on the UN resolution has been clear from the beginning. The action is deplored as anti-Zionist in character. After its adoption by the Plenary of the General Assembly on November 10, President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Moynihan all spoke out forcefully against it.

There had indeed been a news report that the Department of State urged the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to reject requests for cancellations of trips involving previously-paid vacations in countries that voted for the anti-Zionist resolution. The Department states that they did not urge the CAB to reject requests to cancel, without penalty, such trips which involve charter flights. When the CAB was asked to give the necessary waivers in such cases, it asked the Department if, in addition to its own official protests and statements, it had adopted a policy of encouraging private US citizens to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the votes of countries that favored the anti-Zionism resolution. The Department replied that it had not. The CAB then made its decision, using the criteria it normally applies in such cases.

I hope that this information will be of use to you.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,


Edward W. Brooke

EWB/ds

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



ת"ק חנוכה
קדיה, שמחה

הילינסון

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

מאח

30 ביוני 1978

אל : מצפ"א
כלכלית

מאח : צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: אל-על - לוס-אנג'לס

בהמשך לשיחתי עמו מצ"ב סכתב ששיגר חבר ביה"נ
מלוס-אנג'לס, אנתוני בילינסון, לנשיא.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העתק:

הציר, כאן
איתן רף, כאן
הקונכ"ל לוס-אנג'לס

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1978 11 22 00

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM :

URGENT 11/22/78

ISRAELI AIR FORCE - 11/22/78

ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAS REPORTED THAT IT HAS
DOWNED A SUICIDE BOMBING PLANE WHICH WAS
ENROUTE TO TEL AVIV.

INFO

ISRAELI AIR FORCE
TEL AVIV
11/22/78
11/22/78 11:22 AM

END

Return to JF

June 22, 1978

Honorable Jimmy Carter
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that negotiations will begin on Monday, June 26, between the U.S. delegation and Israeli officials regarding expanded air services and additional gateways for El-Al Airlines.

As a House member from the Los Angeles area, I am very interested in the liberalization of air services for the Israeli airline, especially the possible designation of Los Angeles as an additional gateway. As you may know, the Los Angeles area includes the second largest concentration of Jewish population in the United States and would clearly provide a large market for travel to Israel.

I understand that under the terms of the current Air Transport Agreement between the U.S. and Israel, which was signed in 1950, Israel is restricted to operation only to New York, while U.S. carriers may operate between any point in the U.S. and Israel.

I am sure the U.S. delegation will take this matter into consideration during the upcoming negotiations.

Sincerely,

ANTHONY C. BEILENSON
Member of Congress

ACB/cel

bcc: Mr. Michael Styles, Director
Office of Aviation

מסמך מס' 1000

1000
1000

1000

Senator Howard Baker, September 18, 1978

"It was a great victory for President Carter, and if future negotiations produce a permanent peace, it will be a great victory for the world.

"Much was accomplished at Camp David, and I congratulate President Carter for it."

December 22, 1977

REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD (Republican-Michigan)

Term Began: 1957

Committees: International Relations--Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs; Small Business

Ranking Republican on House International Relations Committee. Consistently supports foreign aid. Has voted in Committee for amendments to increase aid to Israel. Saw Sinai Agreement as "most significant breakthrough in Arab-Israel relations in a generation." Says Jackson-Vanik freedom-of-emigration amendment "well-intentioned but misguided." Opposes PLO participation in negotiations with Israel. Says military sales to Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait must be evaluated on case-by-case basis. Says such sales "should not upset the balance of power...nor should they jeopardize the security of Israel." Broomfield says it is "important to avoid situations in which the Soviet Union becomes the sole source of military supply for Arab states, such as Syria."

01/10/75 2/10/75
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD (Republican-Michigan)

Term Began: 1957 7/1/6

Committees Important to Israel: International Relations (Ranking Member)

Biographical Data: Presbyterian; received B. A. from Michigan State University; served in Michigan House of Representatives 1949-1955; served in Michigan Senate, 1955-1957; member of U. S. delegation to the UN in 1967; married, three daughters.

Home Town: Birmingham, Michigan

Special Comments: Broomfield is the key Republican and the acknowledged Administration spokesman on the Committee. Broomfield's district is composed of suburbs of Detroit, and there is a heavy Jewish constituency in the Birmingham area. He is an intelligent, low-key individual.

Strong pro-Administration position. He supports all aid bills, and he worked hard for a compromise on the Hawk missile issue so that the Administration might not suffer a defeat in committee. Broomfield voted for amendments to increase aid to Israel in committee last year, and because of his pro-Administration position, he has indicated support for this year's request.

Broomfield saw the Sinai Agreement as the "most significant breakthrough in Arab-Israel relations in a generation." Initially, he favored a two-year renewable clause on the commitment of U. S. personnel, but he backed down when the Department of State indicated that a time limit would require renegotiation of the agreement.

Broomfield is one of the most outspoken supporters of South Korea in the Congress.

Handwritten notes:
Title
Date

1952
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR QUESTION ON THE MATTER OF MY VETO LAST WEEK
OF THE MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE BILL. I AM SURE THAT YOU
KNOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN INCORRECT REPORTS THAT I USED THE
BILL TO OBTAIN TOO MUCH MONEY FOR ISRAEL. NOTHING
COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH.
IT IS THE BILL BECAUSE IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE
PRESIDENTS AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE DECISIVE FOREIGN POLICY THAT
ISRAEL ALONG WITH OUR OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES BELIEVES
THE BILL WOULD HAVE IMPOSED

UNWISDOM AND
ABILITY TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICY IN TODAY'S WORLD AS DURING THE
YOUR KIPUR WAR OF 1973 HE CAN HAVE ONLY ONE FOREIGN POLICY - THAT

OF THE PRESIDENT.
OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES WILL NOT BE PURSUED IN MY
ADMINISTRATION AS THE FAILURE OF OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
ISRAEL. INDEED, I BELIEVE THAT MY VETO HAS DELAYED THE FUNDS THAT
THE ISRAELI NEEDS AT PRESENT. AS SOON AS THE CONGRESS SENDS ME
A BILL OF UNACCEPTABLE RESTRICTIONS I WILL IMMEDIATELY SIGN
IT SO THE ISRAELI MAY RECEIVE THESE VITAL FUNDS.

1952

1952

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-משווג

ש מ ו ר

מס 254

נשלח 151700 יוני 78

החקבל 150157 יוני 8

אל: המשד

מאת: וושינגטון

מ י ד י

מצפא. סמינר מכון דיוויס.

שוחחתי עם ברזאמס. חכנית החקיקה הרחוסה בביהנ' איננה מאפשרת לו לבוא.
הוא עומד בקשר עם זמירה גורדמן לגבי' מציאת מחליף מתאים.

רפיח

שהח מנכל ממנכל מ צפא

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות דשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משדד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי

ה'אלה (27.3.57) מ'די

מס 499
נשלח 251348 מרצ 77

אל: המשדד
מאת: רושינגטון

מ'די

מנכ"ל, עברונ.

נפגשתי היום עם ג'ון ברזמאס, מצליף הסיעה הדמוקרטית בבית הנבחרים
במוסדו בקפיטול.

ביקשתי את הפגישה כדי לסקור בפניו את ההתפתחויות האחרונות ועמדתנו
בנושאים המזאתים השונים. תאחזי בהזדמנות את מדיניותנו בקשר למצומ, גבולות
בני הגנה וחבועיה הפלשתינאית.

ברזמאס אמר כי כמעבר כנ בעתיד יש לו אהיה רבה לישראל וינסו לחמוכ
בנו ובעמך ותינו. הזכיר כי סובר ומנהיגות הדמוקרטית של הקונגרס הוא
נפגש את לשבועיים לארוחת בוקר של מנהיגות זו עם הנשיא. בין השאר
סיפר כי בפגישה ומנהיגות עם הנשיא למחוז ארוחת הערב לכבוד רזמ בבית
הלב. אמר אונל כי עשה טעות בשאלה ששאל את רבינ לגבי אשפ.

ברזמאס הדגיש את חשיבות יום העיוני שערכ הנשיא ועמו סגנו, שריו
יועציו ובכירי למנהיגות הקונגרס לפני השבעתו לנשיא. דיון זה מסמל
את רצונו של הנשיא בשיתוף פעולה בין הנשיא לקונגרס ולמיוחד את

הסתנו בעובדה שהקונגרס חייב להיות שותף פעיל בהתווית מדיניות
החוצ בניגוד בולט לגישתם של ממשלים קודמים ובמיוחד לגישת קיסטינגר
שלא רצה כל התערבות של הקונגרס בענייני חוצ. ברזמאס אמר כי אכן הקונגרס
מתכוון להיות פעיל מאוד. כ. אמר כי לנוכח ריבוי בהצטרות ופרושים חשוב
לו לשמוע עמדתנו וביקש שאנשיכ לחזי קו במונה. חזר והבטיח
תמיסתו תמיסתו בכל עמדתנו היסודיות.

על דבריו בענין תורכיה, יוון וקפריסין ראו מברק נפרד.

דין י.א.

שחח רחמ מנכל מנכל י. רביכ מצפא הקר רם

מב/אק

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

203/8
20622

שמור

גל
דו"מ
(קופים)

מס 202

נסלח: 091830 דצמ

אל: המשרד

מאת: ועינגסון

מצמא.

גון בראדמאט נחמנה ~~המורה~~ אהמול למצליף הטיעה הדימוקרטיה בבית הנבחרים.
כיתן עד כה כסגן המצליף, עומד בראש הגוש המרו יווני בבית"נ ידיד ותומך
עקבי בישראל ומוכר לי אישית היטב.

רפיה

שהח רותם מנכל ממנכל מצמא

צג/קא

1955

№: 1000
ОПИСЬ РАБОТ
1955.

№ 505
ОПИСЬ РАБОТ

АКТИВ РАБОТЫ ЗА 1955 ГОД. ВВЕДЕНИЕ. РАБОТЫ ПО ВОПРОСАМ
ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО ПРАВА, ЗАКОНЫ И ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВО СССР. РАБОТЫ
ПО ВОПРОСАМ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА.

1955

ОПИСЬ РАБОТ
1955



ה' שבט תשל"ז
24 ינו' 77

37

המ"מ
28/1

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: אבו-דאוד

ב-18 דנא הגיש הסנטור BELIMON בשם הסנטור BARTLETT
(המחלים מניחוח גידול סרטני באחת מריאותיו), הצעת החלטה הקוראת
לנשיא לפתוח במו"מ על הסכם לפעולה נגד טרוריסטים ונגד מדינות
המסייעות למעשי טרור. בלמון הכניס ברשומה הקונגרס הצהרה של
סנטור ברטלט בגנות שחרור אבו-דאוד ע"י ביהמ"ש הצרפתי.

רצ"ב נוסח הצעת ההחלטה והצהרת ברטלט כפי שהופיעו ברשומות
הקונגרס ב-18 דנא.

ברטלט, רפובליקני מאוקלהומה, איננו נמנה על ידידינו.

ב צ ר כ ה,

צבי רפיה

העתק: הקונסול הכללי, יוסטון, טכסס

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO

FROM
DATE

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

[Handwritten signature]

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SENATE RESOLUTION 42—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. BELLMON (for Mr. BARTLETT) submitted the following resolution:

S. Res. 42

Resolved, That the Senate requests that the President engage in the negotiation of agreements with other nations to help prevent acts of terrorism by, among other means, denying assistance or asylum to persons who perpetrate acts of terrorism, and by invoking sanctions against any nation which gives assistance or grants asylum to such persons.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, on behalf of Mr. BARTLETT, I submit a resolution and I ask unanimous consent that a statement by Senator BARTLETT be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARTLETT

A decision last week by a Federal Court in France resulted in the release of Palestinian Abu Daoud, undermining the efforts of both Israel and West Germany, who had requested extradition of the alleged terrorist. Daoud was sought for prosecution in the murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich.

While the decision by France was bitterly disappointing to Israel and West Germany in particular, the action has grave implications for every civilized nation of the world.

It underscores once again the tragic and inexcusable absence of international cooperation to combat international terrorism.

Today I introduce legislation which does not address itself to this incident specifically, but to the general issue of international terrorism and the need for some framework within which the civilized nations of the world can work together to prevent terrorist acts. Terrorism, regardless of the ideal or goal involved, is a world-wide plague. Its prevention will require world-wide cooperation.

The resolution I propose requests that the President of the United States engage in negotiations with other nations to halt international terrorist activities. These negotiations would hopefully lead to agreements to help prevent acts of terrorism by, among other means, denying assistance or asylum to persons who perpetrate acts of terrorism, and by invoking sanctions against any nation which gives assistance or grants asylum to such persons.

Rep. Edgar 1/19/77 Comments on Daoud release, urges cosponsorship of Tsongas-Edgar resolution which now has 85 cosponsors. Responds to questions from Rep. Carr (D-Mich) regarding evidential basis that France's release was premature. Inserts resolution, and 1/24/77 Time Magazine article, "Terrorists--L'Affaire Daoud: Too Hot to Handle." Supports resolution strongly, says it is totally warranted. H 428-31

Rep. Carr 1/19/77 Questions Rep. Edgar (D-Pa) as to "what evidential basis he has established or developed for the conclusion that the release of Abu Daoud by the French Government was premature and unjustified." Notes not a cosponsor of Tsongas-Edgar resolution regarding Daoud release, planner of 1972 Munich massacre. Says "I am terribly interested, if I can be permitted to be your conscience for a moment, that we not rush headlong with language that would seem to circumvent those ideals." (equal rights, civil liberties, due process.) Says "Perhaps if we can have solid evidence that the French government in fact took some shortcuts with their own procedures, we might find a better foundation for the condemnation of the French Government. However, I have to caution us so that we are not about to recommend to the French Government that they not follow due process only because there is a suspected Arab terrorist involved. H 428-9

Rep. Tucker 1/19/77 Compliments Rep. Weiss (D-NY) for calling attention to French release of terrorist Abu Daoud, planner of 1972 Munich massacre. Also compliments "particularly for pointing out the distinction involved between the actual extradition of Abu Daoud from one nation to another, and the holding of that individual until such time...as legal documents might be presented to the French Government to allow it to make its final decision." H 431

Rep. Daniel (Dan) 1/19/77 Regarding France's release of Palestinian terrorist Abu Daoud, planner of 1972 Munich massacre, says "it is unbelievable that a nation which has played so significant a part in the history of our civilization should permit itself to be used, and used badly, by contemporary barbarians...." Charges "So long as international hoodlums can attack at random, can find sanctuary with those who share their politics...none of us...can be free. We are all hostages...." H 431-2

Rep. Biaggi 1/19/77 Says "world terrorist movement has a newfound friend in France." Says "It is time for sanctions to be imposed against nations who in any way, contribute to the cause of international terrorism. All nations opposed to the menace of international terrorism must unite at once, before the movement is allowed to proliferate any further. We cannot abandon our fight against world terrorism until it is won." H 432, 437

Rep. Maguire 1/19/77 Discusses preliminary findings by Congressional Research Service regarding international agreements and their applicability to French release of Abu Daoud, planner of 1972 Munich massacre. Calls statements by citizens or elected representatives on subject "not only acceptable, but essential...." Notes cosponsorship of Tsongas-Edgar resol. condemning all terrorist activities, calling for justice of all perpetrators of such acts, and terming France's release "premature and unjustified." Inserts 1/19/77 WPost editorial, "Giscard's Complaint." Says "This is not simply an Israeli-Arab or a Palestinian issue. It is an issue. as to whether or not we are going to have law and whether or not we are going to observe that law...." H 432-5

Rep. Annunzio 1/19/77 Calls French release of Abu Daoud, planner of 1972 Munich massacre "an outrageously cynical gesture of appeasement." Cosponsors Rep. Wolff (D-NY) resol. urging international convention to arrange multilateral treaty." Inserts resol. H 435

Rep. Baucus 1/19/77 Calls French action "unthinkable." Notes French announcement of sale of 200 Mirage jets to Egypt "thus providing the French with increased access to that much sought after Arab commodity of oil. That a national would let its beliefs be compromised and turn its back on the legitimate extradition request of a neighbor and ally because of its energy needs, only serves to point out the deplorable lack of a meaningful energy policy among those nations who have become so dependent upon Arab oil." Cosponsors Tsongas-Edgar resol. condemning all terrorist activities, terming French release "premature and unjustified." H 435

Sen. Byrd 1/19/77 Says 1973 Arab oil embargo "underlined the energy vulnerability" of US. Realizes "need to develop and explore every possible source of energy that might be practical and possible for our use." Calls for allocation of "all funding and manpower necessary" to reap undeveloped source of shale. Urges budget increase. S 1047-8

Sen. DeConcini 1/19/77 Calls discrimination by European Economic Community (EEC) against US citrus a violation of GATT Agreement. Notes 40-percent preference given to Israel in 1970, to Egypt in 1973 as part of most-favored-nation status agreement. S 1114-5

Sen. Pearson 1/19/77 Calls for deregulating interstate sales of new natural gas and providing incentives for development of new natural gas supplies. (Reintroduces Pearson-Bentsen bill.) S1117-8

Rep. Gilman 1/19/77 Expresses "indignation and personal sense of injustice" at French release of Abu Daoud, terrorist and planner of 1972 Munich massacre. Says release was "direct result of the French Government succumbing to the pressures of Arab governments and the threats of the terrorist organizations. This can only mean a step backward in the fight against international terrorism." Says French action has "further deteriorated the limited control that civilized nations now exercised over terrorism." Notes letter sent to French Pres. Giscard D'Estaing expressing opinion that France has shown "regrettable disregard for her own moral obligation as a world leader." Says French action has "brought one free nation to her knees at the hands of terrorism." Calls upon US to take lead in impressing upon other nations the "collective threat" posed by terrorism. Calls for coordinated multinational effort to apprehend and punish terrorists. In letter to UN Ambassador Scranton, called for UN public rebuking of France. Letter said "Through its silence, the United Nations has given its encouragement and tacit approval" for such future action. Reintroduces resol. urging Pres. to accelerate negotiation efforts with other nations to prevent terrorism. Also urges Pres. to take certain measures against countries supporting intl. terrorism and persons engaged in terrorist acts and to seek to strengthen sanctions against these persons and nations. Maintains "Any acquiescence to terrorism and its threats is an invitation for terrorists to strike at any nation for any reason at any time. The French Government's actions in releasing Abu Daoud has made us all victims." H 426

Rep. Holtzman 1/19/77 Calls French release of terrorist Abu Daoud, planner of 1972 Munich massacre "an affront to decency and endangers the lives of innocent people throughout the world." Says France made "the considered and cowardly decision to yield to Arab pressure and protect Daoud from persecution...." H 426

Rep. Tsongas ^{1/19/77} Comments on Daoud release, urges support of his resolution. H 426-7

Rep. Ottinger 1/19/77 Calls French release of terrorist Abu Douad, planner of 1972 Munich massacre a "grave flouting of international justice." Notes cosponsorship of Tsongas-Edgar resol. Writes letter to French Ambass. to US and asks for cosingers. Letter says "we are outraged that France chose to flout the basic tenets of the 1976 Council of Europe anti-terrorism treaty.... The precipitous release of Abu Daoud has jolted the moral conscience of the entire free world," calls French explanation of release "specious rationalization." Text maintains "For all those who seek to have international diplomacy replace terrorism as a means of solving global problems, France's release of Daoud is an agonizing blow." H 427 (Also PRESS RELEASE)

Rep. Krebs 1/19/77 Says French policy since 1956 has been "a gradual and ever-increasing appeasement of the Arab countries in the Middle East. This has been done under the guise of an even-handed policy, which of course, meanst nothing more than a one-sided policy which has become more and more so in recent years." Says France's release takes away its right to participate in any future guarantees it may have had in Israel's borders." Says greatest contribution France could make for Mideast peace would be "a drastic change in its one-sided policy." H 427-8

Miss Eglin
192

2

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

13 ביוני 1978

Handwritten notes and signatures: "אירנה" (Arieh) circled, "קונסים" (Konsim) written below, "מיר" (Mir) written to the left, and a signature "אליעזר" (Eliezer) at the top left.

אל : מר מ. גונן, מאמס הפעולה בשטחים
מאה: נ. המיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: פנייה חבר ביה"נ גליקמן -
פניסת קרקע

בלוטה - העחק פנייה חבר ביה"נ גליקמן לשגרירות
ומכתבו אליו של א. חבש - המדברים בעד עצמם.

נודה אם תסייע בידינו במחן חשובה לפונה.

בברכה

Handwritten signature

נ. המיר

העחק:
הסברה/רפרנטים
מצפ"א ✓

SECRET



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

Handwritten scribbles and markings, possibly initials or a signature.

TO: DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FROM: AMBASSADOR, ISRAELI EMBASSY

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible body text]

[Illegible body text]

[Illegible signature and stamp]

[Illegible footer text]

DAN GLICKMAN
FOURTH DISTRICT—KANSAS

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-6216

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MYRNE ROE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
BILL BEACHY
WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

JUN 9 1978
June 7, 1978

Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I have received the enclosed letter from a constituent who alleges that current Israeli law caused land that he owns in the West Bank to be confiscated. I would be most appreciative if you would look into this situation for me.

With best regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dan Glickman".
Dan Glickman

DG:CM
Enclosure

2216 Greenway Blvd
Wichita, KS 67213
May 28, 1978

Mr. Dan Glickman
Congressman
Kansas Fourth District
1128 Longworth Bldg
Washington, DC 20515

JUN 11 1978

Dear Sir

Enclosed is a copy of an article written by Anthony Lewis to the New York Times News Service, describing the newest trick that Israel is adopting to expropriate land on the West Bank.


I am one of those U.S citizens mentioned in the article who own property on the West Bank.

Israel had in 1948, expropriated all of my parents' property, thus condemning us to a miserable existence of need and deprivation. All my savings of all the past twenty-two working years, were invested in two one-acre plots around Ramallah, and now I am told that my land has been confiscated simply because I live outside that area. My parents were refugees without a country and did not know who

to turn to for justice. I, on the other hand, belong to a great country and ask you as my representative to our Government to do what you deem is necessary to have the Israeli Government repeal this illegal and unjust action perpetrated against me and all those other non-resident West Bank property owners, most of whom are U.S citizens.

Hoping to hear from you.

Sincerely yours

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Abraham Habash', followed by a long horizontal line.

Abraham Habash

fh

Israel Restricts Land Ownership

RAMALLAH, Israeli-Occupied Jordan

sensitive question on the West Bank under the occupation, and it appeared that Israel had adopted a new policy sharply restricting Arab property rights.

Aziz Shehade is a widely-known West Bank lawyer, a man of 65, respected, successful. He has friends in Israel, and he spent two months this winter as a visiting fellow at Harvard. He is a model of the moderate Palestinian with whom Israel ought to be able to get along.

A few weeks ago Shehade bought some property near Ramallah from a cousin who has lived in Canada for years and is now a Canadian citizen. He took the title documents to the Israeli military government to register the transfer in the routine way. But he was told that the sale could not go through: the land had been taken over by the custodian of "absentee property."

The refusal to register the sale outraged Shehade, and for more than personal reasons. Land is a highly

SINCE ISRAEL OCCUPIED the area in 1967, it has treated as absentee property real estate owned by persons in hostile — that is, Arab — countries. The same practice has been the law in Israel itself since 1948. The property vests in a custodian who may dispose of it as he wishes but keeps the proceeds in trust for distribution as part of any political settlement with the Arab states.

Now, suddenly, Shehade was told that a property owner living not in an Arab state but in Canada was an "absentee." And within days, others around the West Bank had similar experiences.

To treat all foreign-owned property in the West Bank as "absentee," subject to the custodian, would have a very large impact. Residents of non-Arab countries are estimated to own 100,000 acres of land on the West Bank, and 11,000 houses. Much of the property in Ramallah, for example, is owned in the United States, because 15,000 people from this area live in America — many, for some reason, around San Francisco. Most property in Bethlehem is owned by people in Latin America.

THE APPARENT new definition of "absentee property" has therefore caused alarm on the West Bank. The widespread suspicion is that Israel has come up with another device to acquire land for settlements.

IEL PEND

JUST WHAT ISRAEL intends on the West Bank is not so clear to me. The country is divided on the issue, its leaders evasive. What I do know is that the longer the occupation goes on, the worse it will be — for Israel. Occupations corrupt the occupiers. Arrogance becomes a habit. And today's security becomes tomorrow's danger.

©New York Times News Service

Prayer

Let religion be to us life and joy.
 Let it be a voice of renewing challenge to the best we have and may be; let it be a call to generous action.
 Let religion be for us a dissatisfaction with things that are, which bids us serve more eagerly the true and right.

lay and holiday mornings and Sunday and The Wichita Beacon by the ny, Inc., at 825 E. Douglas, Wichita.

Davis Merrill Jr.
Executive Editor
oll, Editorial Page Editor
Managing Editor
ix, Circulation Director

DG:CM
Enclosure

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

גם
קניאריס (אדין)
27 ביוני 1978

הוא ז"ל: קונגרס אדין
אליהו

א ל: מצפ"א
מאו"ר

מאת: נ. תמיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: בקור קונגרסמן גרין

לקראת בקורו בארץ והתכתבות בנדון -
שמה חמצאו ענין בלוטה.

בברכה

נ. תמיר

S. WILLIAM GREEN
18TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:
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URBAN AFFAIRS

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(202) 225-2436

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 20, 1978

JUN 21 1978

Mr. Zvi Rafiah
Embassy of Israel
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Zvi:

To follow up on our telephone conversation, I am enclosing a copy of Congressman Green's biography, along with some speeches he has made on the Middle East.

As you will note, he made his first speech on the House floor on the subject of his opposition to the package sale of fighter planes, and followed up on this with personal testimony before the House International Relations Committee.

On other issues, as a Member of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, he has concentrated his efforts on obtaining aid for New York City and on housing legislation. As you will note from the biography, he is a housing expert, having served as the Regional Administrator of HUD's New York office for seven years.

Congressman Green was elected to the House in a special election on February 14th of this year to fill the vacancy created when Ed Koch became Mayor of New York. He won the election by 1161 votes, less than 2%. He is the only Republican Congressman from New York City.

Mr. Green lives in Manhattan and is a member of Temple Emmanu-El. As the biography notes, he serves on the board of numerous civic and philanthropic organizations.

Thank you again for all of the assistance you have provided in setting up the Congressman's trip to Israel. I will be back in touch with you about a meeting with him prior to his departure.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Alice Tetelman
Administrative Assistant

AT:es

New York

Eighteenth District-

SEDGWICK WILLIAM GREEN, Republican, of Manhattan, N.Y.; born in New York City, October 16, 1929; B.A., Harvard College, magna cum laude, 1950; J.D., Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, 1953; admitted to the bar of D.C., 1953 and New York State, 1954; 1st Lt., U.S. Army, 1953-55; Law Secretary, Judge George T. Washington, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 1955-56; private practice of law in New York City, 1956-70; Chief Counsel, New York Joint Legislative Committee on Housing and Urban Development, 1961-64; elected to New York State Assembly, 1965, 1966-68; Regional Administrator (N.Y.), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1970-77; Chairman, Region II (N.Y., N.J., Puerto Rico, and V.I.) Federal Regional Council, 1971-77; Ex officio member, Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, 1970-77; Trustee, Jewish Association for Services for the Aged; Overseer, Center for N.Y.C. Affairs, New School for Social Research; Advisory Committee, NYU Graduate School of Public Administration; Trustee, Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center; Trustee, Albert Einstein College of Medicine; Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Treasurer 1976-78); married to the former Patricia Freiberg; two children: Catherine Ann and Louis Matthew; elected to the 95th Congress, February 14, 1978 (special election); member of Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee.



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 95th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 124

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1978

No. 67

House of Representatives

CONGRESSMAN GREEN TESTIFIES ON THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS SALE PACKAGE

HON. S. WILLIAM GREEN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1978

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I had the privilege to testify before the House Committee on International Relations concerning the administration's proposed arms sale to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

I have had a continuing concern over President Carter's plan to link our previous commitment to sell jet aircraft to Israel with the sale of planes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. I expressed my concern in this regard to the committee and I also asked the committee to look into Saudi Arabia's security on the advanced F-15 planes.

In view of the concern expressed to me by my constituents and the ongoing national controversy over these proposed sales, I would like to share my testimony with my colleagues:

TESTIMONY BY REPRESENTATIVE S. WILLIAM GREEN

Mr. Chairman, and members of the International Relations Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to express my views on the proposed arms sales to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Your Committee has a central role to play in shaping policy on these sales, and I welcome this opportunity.

Within the next 30 days, this Committee and perhaps the entire Congress will decide whether or not to approve the Administra-

tion's proposal to provide 15 F-15s and 75 F-16 fighter bombers to Israel, 50 F-5E fighters to Egypt, and 60 F-15 fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia. The debate over this matter has thus far been vehement on many sides, and the future promises to hold more of the same.

When the air is cleared of the current rhetoric of phrases such as "balanced arms sales," "protecting our oil supply," or "showing our commitment of friendship," I believe the issue comes down to one central point: is the United States going to maintain its long-standing policy of protecting Israel's security as our staunch democratic ally in one of the most volatile yet strategic areas of the world? While we in the Congress have 30 days to decide the outcome of this issue, Israel has lived through 30 years of conflict brought about because of her basic desire to continue to exist. The U.S. has viewed Israel's existence to be in our best interests, and we have tried to help achieve peace in this part of the world. In the past year of Israel's 30th anniversary, we have seen the first real sign of peace initiatives, and we all believe these must continue to be encouraged.

However, as the world takes note of three decades of democratic rule in Israel, we must ask ourselves if we are about to witness yet more decades of deep divisions in the Middle East if this tripartite sale goes through as current proposed. I believe that by proposing to tie approval of planes which Israel needs for her security to arms which the other two nations seek to acquire for their own ends, the Carter Administration is creating a new equation in an already imbalanced part of the world. Despite the withdrawal of the term "package," and the President's reported intention to "reserve

judgment' until Congress considers each sale separately, the substance of the President's plan still presents us with the specter of a unified sale or nothing at all. He may have taken the ribbon off the package, but it still is not unwrapped.

In my letter of April 27 to the Chairman of this Committee, which all members received, I stated my view that the President's attempts to link these sales violates the spirit of Section 36(b) of the Arm Export Control Act. Congress has the authority to consider each of these sales separately and certainly did not intend that the oversight authority under this Act would be affected by Presidential discretion. Our governmental system of checks and balances must be upheld.

Thus, as your Committee rightly exercises its authority to examine each of these sales independently, I urge you to keep several points in mind.

First and foremost is our country's long-standing commitment to Israel and the special relationship which has existed between our two nations over these past 30 years. U.S. policy has consistently been to supply Israel with military equipment in order to meet security requirements and to match the forces arrayed against this nation. Every President since Truman has supported this policy on the grounds that a safe and secure Israel is in the best interests of the United States, and that our shared principles of democracy and the friendship between our two peoples must be maintained.

Israel's requests were made on the basis of standing, written commitments. Inherently linking the sale of arms to Israel to the other states, when this sale was promised independently of other similar actions, is of great concern to me.

Against this background, the current Administration proposal to link Israel's request is inconsistent with previous U.S. policies. Further, this offer is much less than Israel has requested. Moreover, the U.S. made a commitment to supply advanced fighter-bombers as part of its inducement to Israel to withdraw from the Sinai passes and enter into the Sinai II agreement.

The part of the sale which most disturbs me, and the large number of my constituents who have contacted me about it, is the linkage of Israeli sales to requests by Saudi Arabia for 60 F-15's, our advanced fighter bombers. Since we have provided more than \$15 billion in total arms sales to that country since the Yom Kippur War, I cannot understand why the Administration is worried that the U.S. has not shown enough interest in Saudi Arabia's military needs.

Supplying these aircraft to the Saudis is potentially fueling the tension in an already volatile area of the world, not lessening it. It is in the U.S. interests to stop the spread of weapons into that area of the world which could be used to create conflict. And, al-

though some might argue that these advanced planes are needed only for defense, and do not include offensive capability such as sophisticated bomb racks, what will be the U.S. response 2 or 5 or 10 years from now if a request or demand for more hardware is made?

Why too, we must ask, do the Saudis feel the need for these fighters? How can the U.S. adequately guarantee that they would not be used in any future confrontation against Israel, either by the Saudis or their allies in neighboring confrontation states? Certainly we should know why Saudi Arabia feels the need for such a large number of F-15's before we consider supplying them, and what personnel resources they have or will need to acquire to adequately maintain them. Nor do we have any assurances that this is the only jet purchase that the Saudis will make.

While the U.S. has supplied Saudi Arabia with a great deal of military aid, we have not given them our most advanced hardware and closely held military secrets. Before we ever consider taking this step, the U.S. must be assured that our military position is not compromised.

One of the reasons I have appeared before this distinguished Committee today is to raise a question to which I do not have an answer: What is the Saudis ability to maintain security on these F-15's? My concerns stem from a short article which appeared in the March 27, 1978 issue of Newsweek; as follows:

RISKING THE F-15'S SECRETS

Jimmy Carter's proposed sale of F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia not only alarms Israelis but could give Russia access to the secrets of the highly advanced plane's design and equipment. So warns Tom Gervasi, a former Army counterintelligence officer, in "Arsenal of Democracy," a forthcoming book on U.S. weapons. As Gervasi sees it, security is loose in Saudi Arabia, and some of its airport technicians are Syrian, Iraqi and Palestinian aliens who could be Soviet sympathizers. According to an Air Force general quoted in Gervasi's book, the F-15's top-secret radar device is 'a decade ahead of anything else.' "

I urge this Committee to look into the issue of Saudi security of our military secrets before taking its final vote.

In closing, let me say that I do not believe U.S. foreign policy should be determined by threats of leaders of other nations or fear that we are going to suffer economically as a result of the actions we take. Nor should our foreign policy decisions be based on the unilateral actions of one branch of government which interjects itself into the prerogatives of another. Our decisions should be based upon what is in the best interests of our country and its role in the world as a promoter of peace.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 95th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 124

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1978

No. 31

House of Representatives

PROPOSED ARMS SALE TO EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ISRAEL

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to give my first speech in the House of Representatives to express my deep concern about the direction of America's diplomacy in the Middle East. This is a moment of great risk and great challenge. It demands innovative policymaking and principled behavior. By virtue of this Nation's actions in the coming months, peace may emerge in the region, or the chance for peace may slip away. Thus, the United States must recognize that expedience and lack of forethought are the chief enemies of progress toward a settlement.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that certain administration policies reflect an absence of circumspection, and a willful refusal to consider long-term effects. The primary example is the administration's proposed sale of 60 F-15 fighter-bombers to Saudi Arabia. If not blocked by the Congress, this sale can only erode regional security, increase tensions, enhance the chances for a wider Arab-Israel confrontation, encourage the Arabs to seek military solutions and ultimately undercut the very national interests we are seeking to promote.

In view of the President's past statements about arms sales, I am shocked that he would undertake such a destabilizing arms sale. It seems to be contrary to the entire philosophy about arms exports that he enunciated to the voters in 1976, not just as that philosophy applies to the Mideast, but as it applies to the whole world. The sale of 60 F-15's to the Saudis is clearly unjustified. The Saudis are secure in their defensive needs. They confront no immediate or probable threat from their neighbors. In the real world—not the realm of far-fetched scenarios—it is indeed possible that the F-15's might see their only combat use in a future Arab war against Israel. Our Nation has a stated aim of lowering tensions and of assuring the stability of the Saudi regime. Why then sell the one weapon system which by its very presence all but guarantees Saudi participation, willing or unwilling, in any future Arab-Israel war?

I believe that many of my colleagues are troubled, as am I, by the flimsy justifications for the sale offered so far by the administration. In point of fact, it appears that this sale is going forward not because of Saudi needs, but because of Saudi demands. It has been widely reported that the Saudi leadership sees the sale of America's most sophisticated fighter-bomber as an acid test of our friendship and intentions. It does not require much insight to appreciate that a sale made under such conditions will

do nothing to cement a friendship. Rather, it can only be interpreted as evidence of this Nation's willingness to compromise its larger goals to curry favor with a major oil producer. Since the F-15's require airborne radars, such as the F-2C or F-3A, will the United States resist the inevitable Saudi demands for these systems? Or for the newest air-to-air missiles used on the F-15's? Or will the Congress hear again the litany of Saudi oil moderation and political moderation, as ever greater numbers of superfluous weapons are added to the Saudi forces. The cycle will have to stop somewhere. I believe it must be stopped now.

Mr. Speaker, I am deeply disturbed at the fundamental contradictions in this proposed sale. The administration has tied Israel's supply of essential F-15 and F-16 fighters to the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia and the sale of F-5E fighter bombers to Egypt. In this "package" approach there is an implicit devaluation of America's commitment to Israel's security needs. The United States has a commitment to Israel's security which has been affirmed by every U.S. President since Truman. It is not accidental or contrived, but founded upon the shared principles of democracy and the friendship between two peoples. Our arms supply relationship with Israel in general, and the sale of F-15's and F-16's to Israel in particular, exist separately from the proposed sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Israel's requests are based on standing, written commitments entered into connection with the Sinai II agreement. This has been derived, in turn, from the continuing American belief that a strong and secure Israel is essential to achieve peace.

Since this is so, the administration's ill-conceived packaging of the three sales—and Secretary Vance's demand that the package be accepted in toto—can only be taken to mean that, in the pursuit of ephemeral "even-handedness," the United States would allow Israel's security to erode. This can only harm the peace process. It can only send the wrong signals, cause the wrong interpretations, spark the wrong actions, and ultimately elicit the harder Arab demands and expectations which spell trouble for our hopes for peace.

Mr. Speaker, the interests of the United States, foremost of which is the achievement of peace, suggest that the Congress now has a responsibility to act in a manner which reflects a concern for regional stability and greater reconciliation. For all these reasons, I would actively support a resolution of disapproval of the proposed sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

26.1.77

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: שי פלדמן, וושינגטון

רצ"ב לעיונכם ההבטאות של המורשה גליקמן

מקנסאס כפרשה אבו-דאוד. נצ"ו הוצאו לראות

ירוקים 2 - 24 33

ב ב ר כ ה,


שי פלדמן

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1977

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

John Jenrette, South Carolina.
 Robert Kastenmeier, Wisconsin.
 Martha Keys, Kansas.
 Edward Koch, New York.
 Peter Kostmayer, Pennsylvania.
 John Krebs, California.
 William Lehman, Florida.
 Norman Lent, New York.
 Jim Lloyd, California.
 Stanley Lundine, New York.
 Mike McCormack, Washington.
 Matthew McHugh, New York.
 Edward Madigan, Illinois.
 Andrew Maguire, New Jersey.
 Edward Markey, Massachusetts.
 James Martin, North Carolina.
 Romano Mazzoli, Kentucky.
 Lloyd Meeds, Washington.
 Ralph Metcalfe, Illinois.
 Helen Meyner, New Jersey.
 Barbara Mikulski, Maryland.
 Abner Mikva, Illinois.
 George Miller, California.
 Norman Mineta, California.
 Joe Moakley, Massachusetts.
 Anthony Moffett, Connecticut.
 Ronald Mottl, Ohio.
 Austin Murphy, Pennsylvania.
 Stephen Neal, North Carolina.
 Robert Nix, Pennsylvania.
 Richard Nolan, Minnesota.
 James Oberstar, Minnesota.
 Richard Ottinger, New York.
 Leon Panetta, California.
 Edward Pattison, New York.
 Donald Pease, Ohio.
 Joel Pritchard, Washington.
 Carl Pursell, Michigan.
 Albert Quie, Minnesota.
 Tom Rallsback, Illinois.
 Charles Rangel, New York.
 Henry Reuss, Wisconsin.
 Frederick Riechmond, New York.
 Matthew Rinaldo, New Jersey.
 Robert Roe, New Jersey.
 Benjamin Rosenthal, New York.
 Edward Roybal, California.
 Jim Santini, Nevada.
 James Scheuer, New York.
 John Seiberling, Ohio.
 Philip Sharp, Indiana.
 Paul Simon, Illinois.
 Gladys Spellman, Maryland.
 Fortney Stark, California.
 William Steiger, Wisconsin.
 Gerry Studds, Massachusetts.
 Charles Thone, Nebraska.
 Bob Traxler, Michigan.
 Paul Tribble, Virginia.
 Morris Udall, Arizona.
 Charles Vanik, Ohio.
 Harold Volkmer, Missouri.
 Robert Walker, Pennsylvania.
 Henry Waxman, California.
 James Weaver, Oregon.
 Theodore Weiss, New York.
 Charles Wilson, Texas.
 Larry Winn, Kansas.
 Timothy Wirth, Colorado.
 Lester Wolf, New York.
 Antonio Borja Won Pat, Guam.
 Clement Zablocki, Wisconsin.

In my mind, the issue at hand is far greater than the release of this one man. It relates to the preservation of international sanity in the face of terroristic actions which jeopardize the lives of innocent persons.

This world cannot countenance the actions of international criminals who commit atrocities to others, no matter what alleged ends are sought to be justified.

The cavalier release of terrorists only adds fuel to the fire of those who believe that international morality is nonexistent. This entire episode is dramatic evidence that an international treaty, with sufficient teeth to make terrorism a non-palatable activity and sufficient incentive to spur all nations to join, should be a top priority of the Carter administration.

EDITORIAL TRIBUTE TO JIMMY CARTER AND GERALD FORD APPEARING IN AUFBAU

HON. THEODORE S. WEISS

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 24, 1977

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues and our constituents a moving and eloquent editorial written in English by Mr. Hans Steinitz who is editor of *Aufbau*—a German-language newspaper which is published in New York City.

In this distinguished literary comment, Mr. Steinitz elucidates the nature of the transfer of office from President Ford to President-elect Carter—the sense of expectation and loss as a new leader takes office and another leader steps down.

I highly recommend this article to Members of Congress and their constituents:

[November 12, 1976]

GOODBYE, MR. FORD, AND GODSPEED!

(By Hans Steinitz)

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I want to pay my honest respects and express my candid admiration for what you did and what you stand for, and I believe the time to do so is now, as you are preparing to leave the White House and return home to Grand Rapids. I sincerely feel that you have been the right man at the right time in the right position; and I agree completely with what Vice President Nelson Rockefeller said about you just a few days ago: "As President, you took us out of a period of crisis, disillusionment and discouragement." That's right; when the man who held the highest office of the land before you, and who had sinned and disgraced it, had eventually to quit, this country needed desperately a man of honesty and integrity; a straightforward man without malice and falsehood. You were that man, you restored respect to the Oval Office, and I, for one, started to breathe easier.

Yet, Mr. President, I voted against you last week, and I am happy that my man won. I voted for him, in spite of some hesitation in the early days of the campaign, for quite a number of reasons. One, because the Democratic Party has a great tradition of being the haven for the immigrants from abroad, opening to them the gates to the mainstream of America and leading them into the great community of the American family, and I always try to be loyal to that party. Second, because whenever a Conservative and a Lib-

eral (or in this case I ought to say: a Populist) face each other, everything else being equal, my heart beats for the Liberal. Three: because your opponent had picked a much better man as his running mate than you had; his Number Two man is one of the brightest stars in the country and a man with a great future, while yours did nothing but out-agnew Spiro Agnew. For me, he did not measure up to my standards.

Still, my decision to vote for your opponent did not come easily. Because, you see, Mr. President, I like you as fellow-pipe-smoker and a fellow-skiing enthusiast, I like you as an exemplary family man and a man of integrity, and I was happy to see how, in Kansas City, you carried the day over that second-rate right-wing actor from Hollywood. I was also very happy when you stood up for Secretary Kissinger—at a time when it was fashionable to pour dirt on him. Pity you had to run on a Republican platform which contained an anti-Kissinger plank; but at least, you played that down and did not throw your Secretary of State to the howling wolves. All that deserved recognition, and I am not going to withhold that from you.

On the other hand, Mr. President, there were moments when you made it hard for me to go on liking you. That was when you pardoned your predecessor in office in an un-called-for hurry; or when you vetoed dozens of bills which I thought were useful measures of social commitment, or, again, when you picked your running mate. Also in the TV debates you proved to be a masterful guardian of the people's purse, always insisting on saving money and reducing taxes, with a wealth of figures and statistics you quoted out of your head; while your opponent insisted on human needs and human tragedies and human aspirations and human problems all over the country. You were full of facts and figures and tax receipts; he was full of warmth and compassion and heart. Thus, I made up my mind to vote for a warm heart, and against a computer.

But now, I like you again, more than ever. You showed genuine greatness when you conceded defeat and wished the winner well; when you offered him your assistance and support and when you expressed the hope that our wounds be healed and our country be firmly led forward. Your attitude in defeat showed greatness and statesmanship and dignity and decency and the rest of it, and I want to tell you, Mr. President, that I am profoundly grateful for that. You showed in defeat the impressive greatness of American democracy; you proved that there is a better system of government than the one that is built on fairness and respect. In defeat you confirmed once more to me (and others) how truly proud we may be to belong to this country, and what a blessing it is to have been granted American citizenship.

You assumed the reins of leadership in greatness, and you turn them over in equal greatness. In between I may often have had reason to shake my head; but now, Mr. President, in saying Goodbye, I wish you Goodspeed, and I mean it with all the sincerity at my command.

VOTING REPRESENTATION FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HON. STEWART B. MCKINNEY

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 24, 1977

Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, one of the fundamental principles on which our country was founded was the principle of "no taxation without representation." As

THE RELEASE OF ABU DAUD

SPEECH OF

HON. DAN GLICKMAN

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 19, 1977

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity for discussion provided by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss) regarding the release by French authorities of the accused terrorist, Abu Daoud.

Fourth: A very important consideration... COAST. Given the mandate to cut back, streamline and make Army operations more efficient, the plan to locate ARRADCOM and the two weapons systems at Picatinny involves the least movement of personnel, the most efficient application of the Army's budget, and the greatest short and long-term savings possible. The data clearly supports this conclusion. But there is one added note, gentlemen: The cost of re-tooling Picatinny, closing it down or dedicating it for some other use would be enormous.

Parts of the 10 square miles of Picatinny serve as a repository for ballistic "waste." To remove this so-called waste and make the location of the economic impact of any other functions involves a cost that would involve millions of dollars.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of the economic impact of any other decision but the one the Army has chosen to implement on the greater Picatinny community. During this nation's military involvement in Indochina, over 9,000 persons were employed at Picatinny. That figure now hovers around 5,000. Without ARRADCOM, attrition would drive the figure down further. With any other decision but the one the Army has taken, the impact on the greater Picatinny community would be devastating to the economy of northern New Jersey. In April, 1975, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry prepared a report outlining the consequences of the Army's decision and the importance of Picatinny to New Jersey's economy. I would like, at this point, to submit a copy of the report.

The evidence clearly supported the Army's decision in December 1975 to establish ARRADCOM at Picatinny. To do otherwise would have been a contradiction of the logic of three years of work and study.

And, when the Army announced its plans to seek approval for its reprogramming request, your companion subcommittee in the other body of Congress did indeed grant its approval. During consideration in the House, I submitted several items that I believe are worth the attention of this body. They are:

The New Jersey Congressional Delegation letter urging approval of the \$7.3 million reprogramming funding.

A response to allegations that other Arsenal personnel are unwilling to move to Picatinny.

A letter from Mr. J. Richard Hall of the National Federation of Federal Employees.

Gentleman, we are too far along the course of developments to turn back now. Already, an ARRADCOM advance team is on the scene at Picatinny. And, contrary to what you may hear elsewhere today, surveys at the other installations affected by the Army's decision have shown that many would enjoy, indeed prefer, relocating at Picatinny.

The Army's budget is geared to an operational ARRADCOM by the end of this month.

The Army needs your approval in order to comply with budget regulations. It needs your approval to proceed with a plan already four years in the making.

Let me add this one note: Those who seek to halt or delay this reprogramming funding are, ironically, adding to the waste and inefficiency that we all seek to avoid.

Rejection of this \$7.3 million request will not halt the development of ARRADCOM, nor will it ensure that other arsenals remain open.

The Army, with the approval of Congress and the Executive Branch has made its decision. Stopping or delaying reprogramming funds to Picatinny Arsenal in Dover would mean that the consolidation would still proceed, but with inadequate financial support. The resulting confusion and inefficiency would be bad for the American taxpayer, bad for national defense, and bad for the soldier in the field.

As I have said before, the Army made the decision over a year ago to locate the Armament Research and Development Command at Picatinny Arsenal. Rejection of these funds would result only in a sloppy reorganization. Those who make this demand may be misleading their constituencies to believe that somehow, someday, this action would help save their local arsenals. It will not.

Rather, to turn aside the Army's request would be to pull the linchpin from a carefully constructed proposal requiring smooth implementation and turn it into shambles.

And, finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, our national defense effort needs your approval of this request if our nation is indeed going to be successful in the attempt to reorganize the Army's Armament Development capability so it will function at a greater level of efficiency and a lesser cost to our defense budget. It is time to get on with the unfinished business of providing adequate funds for the ARRADCOM consolidation.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention, and I welcome the opportunity to be of further assistance in this matter, if I can. I would refer your questions of a technical nature to General Ben Lewis, Commander of the Armament Research and Development Command.

AMNESTY

HON. WILLIAM M. KETCHUM

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 24, 1977

Mr. KETCHUM. Mr. Speaker, I had promised myself that I would make every effort not to be critical of our new President regardless of the motivation until he had had the opportunity to fully warm the seat in the oval office. However, his very first official act after having assumed the Presidency is one I consider so appalling that I must break that resolution.

I cannot sit silently by, leaving my views unspoken on the issue of Mr. Carter's "full, complete, and unconditional" pardon of Vietnam-era draft evaders.

Two and one-half hours following his inauguration, our new President has fulfilled a promise which, to my way of thinking, establishes an ominous precedent. What is to occur in the years to come if, God forbid, we should find ourselves engaged in another conflict? Will not those young men who elect to ignore their Nation's mandate feel perfectly free to thumb their noses and refuse to serve? The prevailing attitude can only be one of "So what, I'll be pardoned."

I consider President Carter's action offensive to the memory of all those who gave their lives in Vietnam; to those who spent so many years as prisoners of war; to those who remain unaccounted for even today. As a veteran of two wars, as a man with three nephews and a son who served readily during the Vietnam era, and as an individual who has always been proud to call myself an American, I am insulted, embarrassed, offended, and outraged.

I repeat that I fought the impulse to criticize very strongly, but silence refused to prevail. I can only say that our

President's premier action rates a zero in my book, and I regret that I must now explain it to my constituency.

H.R. 1—THE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE ACT

HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 24, 1977

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, more than 120 Members have now cosponsored H.R. 1, the Financial Disclosure Act which Congressman TOM RAILSBACK and I introduced on the opening day of this new Congress. Public financial disclosure by high level Government officials is urgently needed, and I trust this legislation will be the subject of congressional consideration early in this session.

Mr. Speaker, the list of our colleagues who have cosponsored the Financial Disclosure Act follows:

Glenn Anderson, California.
John Anderson, Illinois.
Thomas Ashley, Ohio.
Les AuCoin, Oregon.
Herman Badillo, New York.
L. A. Bafalis, Florida.
Alvin Baldus, Wisconsin.
Max Baucus, Montana.
Jonathan Bingham, New York.
James Blanchard, Michigan.
Michael Biputin, Iowa.
Richard Bolling, Missouri.
David Bonior, Michigan.
Don Bonker, Washington.
David Bowen, Mississippi.
William Brodhead, Michigan.
Clair Burgener, California.
Yvonne Burke, California.
John Burton, California.
Phillip Burton, California.
Bob Carr, Michigan.
Shirley Chisholm, New York.
Thad Cochran, Mississippi.
William Cohen, Maine.
John Conyers, Michigan.
James Corman, California.
Robert Cornell, Wisconsin.
Ronald Dellums, California.
Charles Diggs, Michigan.
Christopher Dodd, Connecticut.
Thomas Downey, New York.
Robert Drinan, Massachusetts.
Robert Edgar, Pennsylvania.
Don Edwards, California.
Jack Edwards, Alabama.
David Emery, Maine.
John Erlenborn, Illinois.
David Evans, Indiana.
Dante Fascell, Florida.
Millicent Fenwick, New Jersey.
Paul Findley, Illinois.
Hamilton Fish, New York.
Harold Ford, Tennessee.
Donald Fraser, Minnesota.
Benjamin Gilman, New York.
Willis Gradson, Ohio.
John Hammerschmidt, Arkansas.
Mark Hannaford, California.
Tom Harkin, Iowa.
Michael Harrington, Massachusetts.
Cecil Heftel, Hawaii.
Jack Hightower, Texas.
Elwood Hillis, Indiana.
James Howard, New Jersey.
William Hughes, New Jersey.
James Jeffords, Vermont.

→ 1610

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ג'רוזלם פוסט

משרד החוק

עתונות

24.XII.1978

רד"ר

אל:

מבר

killed the president. "The commission said there was no scientific evidence of more than one gun-

tial limousine, was submitted to the committee this week.
Representative Harold Sawyer.

Carter sued over Taiwan

מקרא
משרד

WASHINGTON (AP). — Sen. Barry Goldwater filed suit on Friday to stop President Jimmy Carter from terminating the U.S. defence treaty with Taiwan on grounds that the action "will set a dangerous precedent enabling a president to end any defence treaty at will.

Carter announced a week ago that the U.S. would extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. He also said the 1954 treaty with Taiwan would be ended.

The action seeks to have the court declare the termination of the defence treaty unconstitutional and illegal and asks that Carter be blocked from taking any further action toward that goal.

"The president's action is one of the worst power grabs in American history," Goldwater said in a statement.

The White House had no immediate comment on the suit, in which Goldwater is joined by five other senators and eight representatives.

Goldwater said that "just as the president alone cannot repeal a law, he cannot repeal a treaty which itself is a law."

"If the president gets away with it," Goldwater said, "then each and every treaty the United States has with another country, such as NATO or our alliances with South Korea and Japan, will be put in doubt.

"And no country such as Israel, with whom we may conclude a future defence treaty, can be assured that it will last any longer than the whim of the single person who happens to sit in the Oval Office at any given moment in history," he added.

מקרא

משרד

11/10/18 2160

34



א' תמוז תשל"ו
29 ביוני 1976

ש מ ו ר

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

299

Handwritten notes:
5444
ד"ר ג'ורג' א. פרידמאן
ה

אל"מ מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: שיחה עם עוזרו של סנטור ג'ונסטון

סנטור בנט ג'ונסטון, דמוקרט מלואיזיאנה, היה הסנטור האחרון -
ה-76 - שהצטרף לחותמי המכתב לנשיא במאי אשתקד. הצטרפותו ברגע
האחרון לא היתה מקריה - היה זה ביטוי לניגודי האינטרסים שהוא חייב
להתחשב בהם: מחד, ידידותו לישראל ונאמנותו לקבוצה נבחרת של פעילים
ותומכים יהודים במדינתו ומאידך - אינטרס הנפט - גם הערבי - הפעילים
מאד בלואיזיאנה ואשר אין סנטור יכול להתעלם מהם. ג'ונסטון, כזכור,
הצטרף לאחרונה ליוזמת סנטור הסקל בניסוח מכתב לנשיא שנקטל בעודו
באיבו, גם כתוצאה מהתערבותנו. הוא השתתף גם בארוחה שערך אבו-רזק
בקפיטול לשפיק אלחות.

לפני כמה חודשים צירף הסנטור לצוות עוזריו, מומחה לענייני
חוץ ומזה"ח - פרופ' FREEDENBERG. הוא יהודי, היה מפעילי
APPME בלואיזיאנה, ובתור שכזה אף ביקר בארץ ב-1974. עד להחמתו
בוושינגטון כיהן כפרופסור ליחסים בי"ל באוניברסיטת TULANE
בניו-אורלינס ולפני-כן באוניברסיטת שיקגו.

נפגשתי לאהרונה עם פרידנברג לצהריים לשיחת תדרוך ארוכה
בעניינינו. להלן כמה מן הדברים שאמר הוא:

יש עייפות בארה"ב, המורגשת יותר ויותר גם בקפיטול, מן הסכסוך
במזה"ח. יש רצון לראות בהתקדמות לקראת פתרון. אם לא בתקופת
הבחירות - אזי לבטח אחר הבחירות, ואין זה משנה אם יהא פורד או
קארטר הנשיא.

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

299

מ ד ר

ת"ד תש"ו
29 ספט 1976

הע: אג"מ
המ: אג"מ, משרד החוץ

הע: המ"מ על שירותי המגורים

המ"מ על שירותי המגורים, תוקפה מוגבלת, והוא נשען על
מ-87 - המספר המוגדר במסמך המ"מ. המספרים אלו
מיועדו לשימוש בלבד - והם לא יישאו תוקף כלשהו
במקרה של שינוי במצב. המספרים יישאו תוקף עד
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המ"מ המוגדר במסמך המ"מ. המספרים, אולם,
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במקרה של שינוי במצב. המספרים יישאו תוקף עד
למספר המוגדר במסמך המ"מ - והוא מספר 1000 - המספר
המ"מ המוגדר במסמך המ"מ.



ש מ ר
- 2 -

סנטור ג'ונסטון נהוץ להשפעות שליליות בעניינינו מצד הממשל.
פרידנברג ציין במיוחד שנים מעובדי ה- *N.S.C* המקיימים קשר הדוק
עם הסנטור ואשר, לדבריו, אינם ידידותיים לישראל - בוב אקלי (אוחו
מכיר הסנטור מזה שנים, שניהם ילידי שרי-פורט בלואיזיאנה) וכך הוטון.
מהם מקבל הסנטור תדרוכים שוטפים בענייני המזה"ת.

ג'ונסטון שמע לאחרונה מהממשל - ככל הנראה מהשניים הנ"ל - את
ההערכה כי הסורים מכים והורגים באש"פ לא רק מפני שאין הם רוצים
להילחץ בין עיראק מזה ולבנון רדיקלית פרו-עיראקיה מזה, אלא גם כדי
שידיהם של הסורים תהיינה חופשיות במגיעיהם עם ישראל לקראת הסדר עמה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ. רפיח

העחק: המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
המרכז, משה"ח
ד. חורגמן, כאן



מ ד ר
- 2 -

בשנת 1957, הוציא משרד החוץ את המסמך "הצהרת ממשלת ישראל על
ההתחייבות שהיא מקיימת כלפי המדינות המוסלמיות, ובהן מצרים, להקמת
מדינה יהודית עצמאית, וזאת על-פי החלטת האו"ם (181) בדבר
הפצת ארץ ישראל למדינות יהודית ומוסלמית".

הצהרת ממשלת ישראל, שהיא מקיימת את ההתחייבות - כללית ופרטית -
היא ההתחייבות שהיא מקיימת כלפי המדינות המוסלמיות, ובהן מצרים, להקמת
מדינה יהודית עצמאית, וזאת על-פי החלטת האו"ם (181) בדבר
הפצת ארץ ישראל למדינות יהודית ומוסלמית.

מ ד ר

ז. רמ"ח

משרד החוץ
משרד החוץ
משרד החוץ, משרד החוץ
ת. משרד החוץ, משרד החוץ

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ל
ד/א

ש מ ר
(GIAIMO)

מס' 175

בשלה: 121800 ינו 76

אלו התמיד
מאת: וושינגטון

מצפא דע שר ניו יורק דף כוון

CAUCUS

רוביס GIAIMO חבר ועדת התקצבות מקונטיקט כבוד אתמול עי ה--

הדוקרטי ליוזר ועדת התקציב של ביה"ג במקום ברוק אדאמס שנמתמנה שר התחבורה

ג'ימו הינו ידיד וחומן עקבי בישראל כולל סיוע החוץ, אני מכירו אישית

מיטב ומיודד עמו, למותר לציין חשיבותה של ועדת התקציב בכל הקשור לסיוע חוץ.

רפיה

הח תנכל ממנכל אלון מצפא אלרון / כלכלית אוצר

א

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מברק נכנס

מחלקת הקשר

מס' 61

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון
עברון דע הרצוג. למברקם 430. לאלן הודעה המורשה הרפובליקני ברי גוללואטר, R.
הדכלזם פדרטמו. כרשומות הקונגרס ב-30 אוקטובר.

3 יולי
א.י.

MR. SPEAKER, STRANGE AND PECULIAR OCCURRENCES HAVE CHECKERED THE HISTORY OF THE UN BUT IN RECENT YEARS, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED THAT MIGHT BE MORE ACCURATELY TERMED OMINOUS. THE MOST RECENT, AND ONE OF THE MOST SHAMEFUL IS THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE TO EQUATE ZIONISM WITH RACISM.

I INTERPRET THIS MOVE AS RACISM IN REVERS. AN EVIL PSYCHOLOGICAL PLOY TO UNTIMATELY DESTROY THE STATE OF ISRAEL. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT SICK, WARPED MINDS CONCEIVED THIS NOTION, AND THAT THE SAME KIND OF MINDS ARE SUPPORTING IT. WHAT AN OUTRAGEOUS DOUBLE STANDARD ON THE PART OF THIS UN COMMITTEE. THESE ARE THE SAME PEOPLE WHO LOOK THE OTHER WAY WHEN NATIONS SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION AND UGANDA ACTIVELY PRACTICE RACISM AND PART AND PARCEL OF THEIR NATIONAL GOALS.

MR SPEAKER, WE HAVE TOLERATED THE USE OF "SELECTIVE MORALITY" BY THE UN FOR FAR TOO LONG.

IT MUST BE APPARENT TO EVERY THINKING PERSON THAT THE UN IS BEING DOMINATED BY NATIONS WHICH WOULD USE IT STRICTLY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AT THE EXPENSE OF WORLD PACE AND COOPERATION. IF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSES A RESOLUTION TO EQUATE ZIONISM WITH RACISM, I WOULD URGE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO REPORT OUT THE BILL PENDING BEFORE IT THAT WOULD CUT THE US CONTRIBUTION TO THE UN FROM 30 TO 5.6 PERCENT, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT OUR POPULATION. WITHOUT MASSIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE US I DOUBT THE UN COULD AFFORD THE TIME TO DREAM UP WAYS TO CRUSH LITTLE NATIONS OR THOSE VIEWED WITH DISFAVOR AT THE MOMENT BY LITTLE POWER HUNGRY MEN WHO HAVE DISCOVERED WHAT SAPS AMERICANS CAN BE.

I DO WANT TO NOTE AND COMMEND US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, FOR HIS EXCELLENT FORTHRIGHT ACTIONS DURING THIS LATEST OUTRAGE. I WOULD HOPE BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT WILL WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE AN EXPANDED CONTINUATION OF HIS EFFORTS.

AD KAN

RAFIACH===

שהח רהמ מנכל מ/מנכל מ. קדרון ארגוב י רכיב המברה מצפא תפוצות מאום א ב חקר

צג/כר

07/18/10

11

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה
יחסיחוק וסודות דשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

גם
אלהים (עין)

מברק נכנס-מסווג

סודי

מס. 207

נשלח: 181700 מאי 78
נתקבל: 261728 מאי 78

אלו המשרד

מאת: ויקינגטון

אלו ממכל רביב.

לאור התצפעה בטינט שורח ואנס עם גלנ. גלנ אנר לואנס כי אל לו לממשל
למש הצבעת חסינט כאישור לאעדי הממשל במזחת. על ארהב ללחוצ עתה גם על
מצרים וסעודיה לגלות רצונ טוב ווייתורים.
תגל מפי . . . עוזרו של גלנ.

הפיוח
(הורה: האציק וקח אפי: גלנ חיה א גלנ)

יחז דחם סודת שחמט מגכל ממכל סמנכל מצפא מזחתימ חקר דמ אמנ.

מס

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

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October 18, 1976

Biographical Information:

Born in Cambridge, Ohio, July 18, 1921; graduated New Concord (Ohio) High School, 1939; B.S., Muskingum College; military: U.S. Marine Corps, colonel (retired), 1942-65; combat World War II and Korean war (awards and decorations); NASA astronaut 1959-65, first American to orbit the Earth (Friendship 7, 1962); member, board of trustees, Muskingum College; business, vice president, Royal Crown, 1966-68; president, Royal Crown International 1967-69; board of directors, Questor Corporation, 1970-74; member numerous United States and international aviation aeronautic and scientific organizations; Presbyterian (elder); married to the former Anna Margaret Castor, 1942; two children; elected to the U.S. Senate, November 5, 1974, for the term ending January 3, 1981.

Political Information:

Glenn was considered as a Vice-Presidential running mate by Jimmy Carter. It was generally acknowledged that his mediocre keynote speech to the Democratic National Convention contributed to his not being chosen: Glenn first sought the Senate seat in 1970 but he was defeated in the primary by Cleveland businessman Howard Metzenbaum. In 1974 Glenn defeated Metzenbaum in a very bitter primary contest.

Committees:

Government Operations
Interior and Insular Affairs
District of Columbia

Voting Record:

Glenn has voted consistently for all foreign aid bills. He voted for the Sinai resolution. He cosponsored a resolution condemning the U.N. General Assembly vote linking Zionism with racism. Glenn has been one of the Senators most concerned and outspoken on the matter of nuclear product and technology exports. He has advocated the embargo on the export of nuclear fuel production facilities unless the country in question has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) agreement to put all nuclear activities under safeguards and to forswear nuclear explosions.

Glenn was very critical in 1975 of the Administration's reassessment (he signed the letter of 76) and said U.S. support for Israel "is not an issue" for reassessment.

Glenn also wrote the President urging him to use the full force of his office to intervene on behalf of Syrian Jews wishing to emigrate.

Comments:

Senator Glenn, as a former Marine Corps pilot and astronaut, has one of the heaviest military/science backgrounds in the Senate. His knowledge and expertise can be expected to be called upon more

Comments:

and more frequently in the future.

Among the major defense contractors in Ohio are:

Rockwell International - Missile System
Grumman American Aviation Corporation
General Electric - Aircraft Engine Group
Republic Steel
Teledyne CAE
Delco
Goodyear Aerospace
Firestone
Gould, Inc.
Cincinnati Electronics
Emerson Electric

It is rumored that Glenn may seek membership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next year. In private, Glenn has raised questions about discrimination in Israel of Oriental Jews.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



נ.נ.
101
101

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

יד' כסלו תשל"ז
6 דצמ' 76

458

118
118

אל: / מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנסור גלן

עוזרו של גלן (שלא הצטרף אליו בסיור במזה"ת) אשר שוחח עם הסנסור
בשובו מהמזה"ת סיפר לי כלהלן:

א. הסנסור איננו מייחס חשיבות רבה לאי-ביקורו בדימונה. הסנסור
שיער מראש כי לא נאפשר את הביקור וקיבל זאת בהבנה ומבלי לעורר
בעיות. כמובן שהיה שמח לה ניתן לו לבקר אך משלא ניתן - השלים
עם זאת.

ב. הסנסור - יותר מכל אחד אחר במשלחת - מתעניין בפרטי הנושא
הגרעיני ולכן ביקש לראות הכור בדימונה. גם בביקורו האחרון
בסין ביקש לראות הכור הגרעיני שלהם. ואולם הסינים לקחוהו בדיוק
לכוון ההפוך מהדרך המובילה לכור...

ב ב ר ס ח,
צ. רפיח

העתק: א. אפרתי, כאן
ד. פלג, ו.א.א. ח"א.

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

תש"ל

17th Nov 1969
10:30 AM

מ"מ
משרד החוץ, ירושלים

הודעה

הודעה זו היא להודיע על פתיחתה של תענית היום (יום שישי) וזאת בשל חג המולד.

א. תענית היום תחל בשעה 18:00. תענית זו היא תענית חובה על כל בני ישראל. אין להשתתף בתענית זו אלא באופן חריט. אין להשתתף בתענית זו אלא באופן חריט. אין להשתתף בתענית זו אלא באופן חריט.

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ד. ר. א. א.
מ. ר. א.

משרד החוץ, ירושלים
ת. א. א. א. א. א.

שגרירות ישראל
וושנינגטון

1.12.1976

אל: מצ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה

מצ"ב לעיונכם דברי סנטור גלן על ביקורו
במזה"ת, כחבר משלחת ריביקוף.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ . ר פ י ח

ה ע ח ק :

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OPENING STATEMENT OF U.S. SEN. JOHN GLENN
WASHINGTON, D.C. November 24, 1976

It's a pleasure to be able to report to you on the very informative and productive work-study mission to the Middle East which concluded this week.

There definitely are rays of hope for both a Middle East peace and progress toward making that section of the world a zone free from the threat of nuclear weaponry.

I'm realistic that such welcome events won't happen overnight. Tremendous hurdles remain. Nevertheless, the talks with leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Iran convinced me that the Middle East may be on the brink of a major breakthrough.

Middle East Peace

Certain Arab demands that for decades threatened Israel's very right to exist as a nation have been lifted. The Egyptians, for instance, have said that all of the interested parties are ready to go to Geneva to talk peace. Reverses suffered by the PLO in Lebanon have potentially accelerated the timetable for peace.

Our visit with Prime Minister Rabin, ^(President) Sadat, King Hussein, the Shah of Iran and others underscored the desire for peace. Rabin spoke repeatedly of a total peace with open borders and full diplomatic and trade relations among the countries in the area.

Sadat indicated that Egypt has no preconditions for the resumption of peace talks. Furthermore, Egypt and Israel are both being hit by serious inflationary pressures and the need for economic development. Egypt, we learned, expects a population of 75,000,000 by the year 2000. The government eagerly wants international investment and recently streamlined ^{the} structure to advance economic development.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

As you know, the danger of nuclear proliferation around the world has been a principal concern of mine since arriving in the U.S. Senate. As ad hoc chairman for nuclear matters of the Government Operations Committee, I chaired eight days of hearings during the 94th Congress and, with Senators Ribicoff and Percy, introduced legislation to tighten United States export controls of nuclear material.

This recently concluded mission to the Middle East had, as its major goal, to research the potential for instituting strong safeguards in this highly volatile section of the world. There really is no section of the world where the danger is more apparent than terrorists or government factions with non-peaceful goals in mind can unbalance the scales of world peace to fatal levels.

I would report to you at this time that the high level meetings the U.S. Senators had with Middle East leaders reflected an encouraging amount of agreement between the major nations there.

First, at every stop on our mission, including Israel, Egypt and Iran, our private meetings revealed more than token interest

in establishing the Middle East as a nuclear free zone. By this I mean a section of the world where every nation pledges not to enter into production of weapons from nuclear materials.


Secondly, in answer to a direct question from me, I was pleased to learn from the Shah that Iran would be willing to abandon its plans for fuel reprocessing plants of its own if it could be assured of adequate enriched uranium from U.S. or, preferably, multi-national sources. This was a highly important and welcome statement. Iran plans to greatly increase its reliance on nuclear power for its electric production by the turn of the century. These plans call for vast amounts of enriched fuel. Yet it is these uranium enrichment plants and plants for the reprocessing of spent fuel that, when misused and in the wrong hands, can lead to development of nuclear weapons.


The Shah's statement means that development of nuclear power for electricity in Iran--and hopefully other countries of the Middle East--can be consistent with America's desire to control adverse proliferation effects.

מצב

שרות פרשת חמ' זוש

שלנו נר 285 אנה העבירו ליציאת רפ"ח. ==





משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

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משלח 161300 נוב 76

מידי

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מ. רביב. העתק מזחים.

להלן כתבה שהופיעה היום בוושינגטון פוסט מאת : JUDITH MILLER

SENATOR TALK TO PLO AIDE IN CAIRO--

THREE MEMBERS OF A SENATE DELEGATION TOURING THE MIDEAST EAST MET HERE LAST NIGHT WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

SENATORS ROBERT GRIFFIN OF MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN SENATE WHIP; JOHN GLENN, AND PAUL LAXALT HAD A PRIVATE HOUR LONG DISCUSSION AT THE CAIRO HILTON WITH BASEL AQL A PLO REPRESENTATIVE BASED IN LONDON.

ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES THE MEETING COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS RELATING TO PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS AND THE PLO'S WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT. SOURCES SAID AQL HAD BEEN "FAR TOUGHER" IN HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH NEGOTIATIONS THAN EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT.

AT MEETINGS SATURDAY WITH THE SENATE DELEGATION AND SUNDAY WITH SENATOR JAMES ABUREZK ADAT SAID HE WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN COMPEENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE STATED SEVERAL PRECONDITIONS TO PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE DEMANDS COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED.

AQL REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN WOULD NOT ABANDON TERRORIST TACTICS PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS SAYING PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN THE VICTIMS OF ISRAELI TERRORISM. HE ADDED THAT PLO LADER YASSER

ATTEMPTING TO CONFINE SUCH ACTS TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

THE THREE SENATORS ARE PART OF A 12 MAN SENATE DELEGATION, LEAD BY SENATOR RIBICOFF AND HOWARD BAKER CONDUCTING A STUDY TOUR OF THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SPECIFICALLY THE APPROPRIATENESS AND ADVISABILITY OF THE PROPOSED US SALE OF NUCLEAR REACTORS TO ISRAEL EGYPT AND IRAN.

(REUTER NEWS SERVICE REPORTED THAT THE SENATORS ARRIVED IN IRAN THE FINAL STOP ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST TOUR.

REUTER ALSO REPORTED THAT FRENCH PRIME MINISTER RAYMOND BARRE FLEW BACK TO PARIS AFTER A FOUR DAY VISIT TO CAIRO WHERE HE MET WITH SADAT AND OTHER HIGH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS).

PAZNER--

שחח רתמ שחכט מנכל סננכל סננכל מעה הסכרה מצפא מזחים חקר רמ אמך תעוד אילטר

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Handwritten notes in the right margin, including a signature and some illegible scribbles.

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

TO THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

JUDITH MILLER

SENATOR TALK TO PLO AIDE IN CAIRO -
 THREE MEMBERS OF A SENATE DELEGATION TOURING THE MIDEAST EAST
 MET HERE LAST NIGHT WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINE
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 SADAT AND OTHER HIGH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS.

PASNER--

SECRET

SECRET

כ"ו סיון תשל"ו
24 יוני 1976



ש מ ר

292

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: שיחה עם עוזרו של סנטור גלן

נפגשתי לארוחה צהריית עם רוי WEINER עוזרו של סנטור ג'ון גלן (האסטרונאוט, דמוקרט מאוהיו) לענייני חוץ ובטחון. וורנר שירת ב-71-1970 עם פט מויניהאן במועצה לענייני פנים בביח הלבן, אך לא רווה כל נחת מהולצמן וחבר מרעיו. וורנר משמש כעוזרו של גלן החל מראשית כהונת גלן כסנטור בינואר 1975. ידוע כחריף ובקי ואוהד ישראל. להלן מתוך הדברים שאמר:

גלן הינו אחד משלושת המועמדים הרציניים ביותר לכהונת סגן-הנשיא. גלן וקארטר נפגשו מספר פעמים ושוחחו ביניהם ארוכות גם בטלפון. אם קארטר יהא מעוניין לחזק את המיכת הליברלים והאיגודים המקצועיים - (הם כבר חומכים עתה, אם-כי בדליית ברירה - לאחר כשלון מועמדיהם הם) הוא יבחר במונדייל כסגנו. אולם אם ירצה קארטר לבחור בסגן נשיא שימשוך אליו קולות נוספים של בלתי-חלויים ורפובליקנים, הוא יבחר בגלן.

יש בהחלט אפשרות שקארטר עשוי למנות את ג'קסון לשר ההגנה שלו. מינוי כזה יגרום עגמת נפש לפול ניצה, הנמנה עתה על יועצי קארטר (לענייני בטחון). ג'קסון הוא שהמליץ בפני הנשיא קנדי למנות את ניצה כשר ההגנה שלו, לאחר שג'קסון עצמו דחה הצעה זו (קנדי דחה ההמלצה, כידוע). לג'קסון, בעל העבר העשיר בקפיטול, נותרה עתה רק שאיפה אחת בסינט והיא להיות יו"ר ועדת השירותים המזויינים (לאחר פרישת סיימינגטון, ג'קסון יהא "מספר 2" הדמוקרטי בועדה), ואולם סטנים איננו מראה סימני פרישה. לפיכך יעדיף ג'קסון את תפקיד מזכיר ההגנה (או המדינה) כדי לסיים בקרשנדו את הקריירה הציבורית שלו.

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

282

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1976
24

מ"ד: מ"ד
מ"ד: מ"ד

הודעה על פיקוד המבחן

הודעה על פיקוד המבחן... (הודעה על פיקוד המבחן...)

הודעה על פיקוד המבחן... (הודעה על פיקוד המבחן...)

הודעה על פיקוד המבחן... (הודעה על פיקוד המבחן...)



ש מ ר
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איך יחיישב מינוי ג'קסון כשר הגנה עם מינוי אפשרי של ברז'ינסקי כראש המועצה לבטחון לאומי? ראשית - ברז'ינסקי (וורנר מכירו כחלמידו באוניברסיטת קולומביה) הינו יותר שמרן מכפי שהוא נשמע. שנית, הללו ינטרלו זה את זה וקארטר יהיה השולט בכיפה לבדו.

גלן איננו מרוצה מחברותו בועדה הפנים של הסינט. עם כניסתו לסינט הציע לו סטניס להיות חבר בועדת השירותים המזויינים. גלן סירב. הוא ממילא מקיים מגע הדוק ומקבל תדרוך שוטף מראשי הפנטגון. גלן קיים יחסים הדוקים עם שלזינגר ועהה עם רמספלד.

לעומת זאת מעוניין גלן להצטרף לועדה החוץ של הסינט במקומו של סיימינגטון, הפורש, כידוע, בסוף שנה זו מכהונתו. יו"ר הועדה ספרקמן מאד מחבבו ומעוניין בהצטרפותו. כמוהו גם המפרי ומק-גי. מתחרה על המקום המתפנה - סנטור סטון. ואולם סטון הינו שמרני מדי ומקובל פחות מגלן וקרוב לוחאי שגלן יזכה במקום. כל זאת במידה וגלן לא ימונה לסגן-נשיא.

גישתו של גלן כלפי ישראל ידידותית. אין הוא רואה באש"פ גורם רציני שיש לקחת אותו בחשבון. לפני כמה ימים קיבל גלן הזמנה מאבורזק (ההזמנה נשלחה לכל הסנטורים) לפגוש את נציג אש"פ באו"ם. גלן זרק את ההזמנה לסל. לעומת זאת היו לו השגות לגבי ההתנחלויות בשטחים. רוי וורנר, אשר השתתף בארוחת הצהריים שערכתי למנכ"ל, פרופ' אבינרי, עם עוזרי הסנטורים מסר לסנטור את הסבריו של המנכ"ל בנושא זה ולדבריו ההבהרות הועילו להסרת ספקותיו של גלן.

חומכיו היהודים של גלן באוהיו מפצירים בו לבקר בישראל. גלן מעוניין בכך, אולם עהה הוא עסוק בהכנת הנאום שישא בפתיחת ועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית בניו-יורק. אם לא ייבחר לסגן-נשיא, ייתכן ויגיע ארצה אחרי הבחירות בנובמבר.

ב ב ר כ ה ,
צ. רפיח

העחק: המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
המרכז, משה"ח



ד א ר ג
- 2 -

הנהגות אלו יבוצעו על ידי משרד החוץ ויחידות הממשלה
הרלוונטיות (למשל משרד הביטחון) ויש להבטיח שההחלטות
האלו יתבצעו תוך זמן קצר ובהתאם לתוכנית העבודה.

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משרד החוץ
משרד הביטחון
משרד ראשי, תל אביב

ד א ר ג

ד. ראש

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דבר

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משרד החו
עתונות
12-02-1979

אל: א. כ. א.
א. כ. א.

ג'קסון: אש"ף עלול לשתק את בארות הנפט הסעודיים

קריאה

במצב של פגיעות מוחלטת ובחלק לא-רציונלי זה של העולם עלינו להביא בחשבון אפשרות של התרחשות כזאת. "בראון מטפל" הסנאטור הביע בסתונו ששר ההגנה הרולד בראון, העושה עכ"שיו בסעודיה במסגרת סיור בי מזרח התיכון, מטפל בעיבוד הסדר בטחון טוב יותר למזרח התיכון, המסוגל לטפל בבעיה זו. אם נוכל למצוא הסדר בין סעודיה, ישראל ומצרים, יהיה הסדר זה חזק דיו כדי להתמודד עם כל יריב, פרט לברית"י.

בהזיכרו מסני התערבות אמריקאית ישירה, על ידי הנחתת חיילים ושיגור גרסאות מטוסים, אמר ג'קסון, כי עימות ישיר של מעצמות העל ישרת את האינטרסים של הסובייטים.

ריאד, (יופ"ע, וע"ר). - שר ההגנה האמריקאי הרולד בראון (1-משך בעמוד 2, טור 8)

אתמול במשרד השליחויות, מול פני האומה של רשת סי.בי.אס., אמר, כי הוא שותף לדעת השר גיימס שליונגר כי המצב באיראן מעמיד את ארה"ב בפני בעיה חמורה יותר מאמברגו הנפט של 73-74. הוא סבור, כי יש להנהיג מדיניות של "הקצאת" דלק ולהתייחס חיל בסגירת משאבות הדלק בימי א' בסוף השבוע.

"די בפדוגה מתוננת" מידת הפגיעה של מאורעות איראן בארה"ב - קבע ג'קסון - חלילה במידת השפעתם של מאורעות אלו על מדינות אזור הים התיכון ובמיוחד סעודיה. הוא אמר: אם אש"ף, שלו קשר מסוים עם ממשלת חוסייני, יפעל באחד משטחים אלה - דבר שי ביכולתו לעשות והדבר גלוי - כן, אני מתכוון לחבלה, יוכל לשלול 10 מיליון תביות נפט מי סעודיה באמצעות פלוגה מתוננת אחת, המונה 250 חייל. האזור נמצא

מאת מרדכי ברקאי, סופר, דבר"י בארה"ב

ואשינגטון, (מיוחד לי דבר"י). - קיימת סכנה שאש"ף, במתקפת חבלה, יש-תק את בארות הנפט הסעודיים וימנע הזרמת 10 מיליון תביות נפט ליום במשך שנה תמימה - הז-חיר סנאטור הנרי ג'קסון, הסנאטור הדמוקראטי אמר, כי התשובה לכך היא בהסדר בטחון הדדי ישראל-מצרים-סעודיה, כי סיוע נשק אמריקאי, הוא הווהיר מתערבות אמריקאית ישירה בי כוחות ימיים או בחיילים. ג'קסון, יושב ראש ועדת ה-אנגריה של הסנאט, אשר רואיין

העיתון

בראון הגיע... שבמהלכו יבוא צילום ירדן של, אש"ף ישראלי פרטי

ג'קסון

60 ו-100 נגמ"שים. צפנת'הימן תקבל 12 מטוסים מדגם אף-5. סודיה: סיור בראון נועד לכשדון דמ"ק, (ע"ר). - בטאון סמ" שלה סודיה. תשרי"ן כתב אתמול, כי סיורו של שר ההגנה האמריקאי הרולד בראון במזרח נועד לכשלו. מסע אמריקאי חדש זה ללא ספק יסתיים בכשלון וגורלו יהיה כגורל הצעדים הקודמים. כתב העתון.

(המשך בעמוד 1) נועד אתמול עם עמיתו הסעודי הנסיך שוהטן בן עבדול עזיז, ד לדברי פקידים אמריקאיים הדגיש את החשיבות שארה"ב מייחסת להסכם שלום בין מצרים לישראל, הסכם לו מתנגדת סעודיה. פקיד אמריקאי אמר, הם הגיבו כי הם מבינים את השקפותינו, די בכך רמז כי לא חל שינוי בעמדת סעודיה.

אתמול הודיע שר ההגנה האמריקאי, - כי ארה"ב תמכור מטוסים קרב סילוניים וטנקים לסודאן ול-צפון-תימן. כדי לשכך את החשש שזת שהתערורו נוכח המהפך בי איראן. סעודיה תשלם סכום של כ-600 מיליון דולר, מחיר הנשק שיסופק לסודן וצפון-תימן אם תר כר העיסוק על ידי הקונגרס. סודאן תקבל 12 מטוסים קרב מדגם אף-5, שני מטוסי תובלה מדגם "סי-130", 50 טנקים מדגם "אמ"

M E E T I N G

DEFENSE MINISTER, GEN. E. WEIZMAN and
DELEGATION OF U.S. SENATORS

Friday, November 24, 1973
12:40 p.m.

Participating: U.S. Senators Pell
Jackson
Hollings
Javits
Steven
Domenici
McClure

and Staff: A. Lakeland, J. Ritch, J. Christianson,
D. Fosdick, J. McCain, D. Bresnahan

Dept. Minister of Defense, Mr. Zipori
Col. Tehila

GEN. WEIZMAN: First of all, it's nice having ^{you} here. I have been debating with myself for the last few hours what to tell you. The easiest way is to tell you to ask me questions, but I don't always like the easiest way so I will say a few things first.

I have always believed since I met Sadat -- and I think I told you this, Senator Jackson when I met you I think it was in March -- that I believe that what was started in November last year is almost, I wouldn't say it is inevitable, but almost inevitable for it to go forward and succeed. What I am a bit concerned about is that what we have been talking about for the last year is the marriage certificate and the marriage conditions. And all of us are seasoned married gentlemen and ladies, and know that what happens at the actual wedding ceremony is not very important, but rather life after that. And to be quite honest, I am a bit concerned about what life will be after that, because of general things, and particularly because of certain

things that have happened in the last year, since November 1977.

I myself had the experience, the pleasure, the honor of being in Egypt five times in the last year, of meeting Sadat practically every two months'-- it is now probably the third month that I haven't seen him, so something is amiss already. I don't know when I will see him, if I will see him.

But one of the things I would like to dwell a bit on is the mood in our little country. And I don't want to blame anyone, or give marks to anyone, whether it's the U.S. or Egypt or ourselves, or this leader or that leader, or this president or another president. One day when I leave this job -- I don't know when that will be, it can be in a short time, it can be longer -- I will write a book. But I don't know that anyone has yet analyzed what it has meant to be surrounded for 30 years, being a small country of 3 million, surrounded by so many hostile people, whether it's 40 million Egyptians, so many Iraqis, so many Syrians, so many Libyans, so many Jordanians, and for 30 years to be threatened with complete annihilation. And I can go back to cliches that have been used -- the only country in the world that can't afford to lose a war; a country that can't afford to lose battles, etc. All of us sitting here have taken part in all the battles. My good deputy was a Brigadier of a tank corps in 1967; a senior staff officer in 1973. Every Israeli that you touch has been in a battle, has been bruised in a battle or lost someone in a battle.

And perhaps the whole preparation for the peace conditioning lacked a few things. And in the 30 years of being completely disconnected

from the environment -- and I often say that most Israelis were and still are closer to Paris, Rome, London and New York than to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus or Amman. And Cairo is only 40 minutes around the corner and New York is eleven flight hours. But the whole culture, the whole language problem -- and by the way, this wasn't so much the case before the creation of the State; there was quite a bit of bloodshed then but there was more intermingling between us and the Arabs in pre-1948. And when suddenly this thing bursts forth and a leader of the greatest country in the Middle East suddenly arrived here, with all the hand shaking, the first reaction was a fantastic feeling and super-hyper-euphoria. And after that most of the people started closing in to themselves, and unfortunately mistrust, mistbelief started erupting, and that I think was one of the causes of the ups and downs of the curve of the negotiations, and in the relationship that went on between November 1977 to November 1978, and we are still not at the end of the road. And as I was quoted, rightly in Newsweek, I don't deny that some Israelis look at it as the peace calamity. Well, I don't.

I think we are heading for a very interesting, very important, very different period which has lots of opportunities and lots of dangers too. And to most of us it is much easier to sit now and analyze how we are going to keep the Israeli army in readiness, so that if we are double-crossed we will do this, that and the other, then to sit down and analyze what are the great possibilities in having trade, tourism, mutual interests between the Egyptians and ourselves.

So I will begin like the average Israeli, not only because I am an average Israeli, but because I am responsible for the defense

of our little country. The two of us (the Deputy Minister and myself) ran the campaign for the election and at least we won that battle, and we are responsible now for the defense of our country. And I don't think most Americans realize what we gave up in the Sinai. And I must say no regrets, we are giving it up, we are giving it up for A,B,C, and D peace conditions. And I suppose by now most of you know what is the annex to the peace proposal -- that we will have an A zone, 55 km. east of the Suez Canal, with only one division -- let's see it on the map. I want to emphasize one thing, and I do hope that certain things will not appear in the papers; I won't give anything to the press, I can assure you. In my negotiations with the Egyptians in the last year, I have negotiated from a standpoint that behind me we have something like close to 4,000 tanks and close to 600 fighter aircraft. I negotiated with them from a feeling that we have the only F-15 squadron outside the U.S., 25 of them, except for Iran that has the F-14, and we are a country that operates a very effective and very efficient air force and a very effective army. There is a vast difference if you negotiate with an ex-enemy for a peace treaty with a feeling that you are negotiating from so many divisions, so many battalions, and so many squadrons, or if you negotiate from another situation.

(Indicating on map) This is the old border; this is the line where we stand now which is known as J line. This is where the oil is. This is E line, west of it are the Egyptian forces, and in between is the U.N. We are going to go back eventually to this line, which is

the old international border. In the Sinai, we have ^{not} only two airfields, one here and one here, but we actually are leaving six airfields. Not all of them are occupied all the time, not all of them are fully operational, but six of them. We are giving a few things from the military that I don't want to elaborate on. I don't think people realize what a great buffer the Sinai is between Israel and Egypt. In this area there will be only one Egyptian division, and in the area between here and the old border there is a division into two zones, B and C, where roughly in zone B there will be 4 regiments of border forces with light weapons and in zone C only police and a few U.N. There will be no fighter aircraft based in Sinai, no fighter aircraft can flyover B and C, but only over area A. There will be no radar or electronics in B and C, only in A. No anti-aircraft missiles at all in A, B or C. This is the crux of it.

We are going to withdraw our army in good time, in three years, to roughly this area. To shrink them from this whole big area and to redeploy them in this area. And one thing I must say -- and this is perhaps not a very nice thing to say on the eve of peace after 30 years -- We shall for quite a long time, and I sincerely hope not forever, keep the army here in readiness, quite high readiness. If we are double crossed, which has happened before -- we never had peace conditions before, we had armistices, demilitarized zones, disengagement agreements, etc. We haven't been double-crossed with this administration, this Egyptian administration I mean. We are going to keep a strong force in armor especially and a strong force of paratroopers and an air

forcer. And the way we have decided with the Egyptians, this is really going to be a demilitarized or very thin military area (pointing to Sinai). I hope they will think more than twice before anything goes wrong, like closing an embassy in Cairo, shutting the Suez Canal to our shipping, closing the straits again, pushing more than one division into here. Because if this happens we can be in the Sinai very fast with quite an appreciable force. I hope and pray we won't have to do that. I took part in doing that three times in the last 30 years.

Another thing I'd like to emphasize on this map is this peculiar funny line showing what is known as the West Bank. I don't want to go back again to the 13 km. and so many km. from that line to the sea, etc. And up here this of course is the Golan Heights, but let's leave that for the moment. One of the reasons -- I wouldn't say this is what we said -- but one of the reasons most of us agreed to go that far with the Egyptians, in other words all the way including the settlements, was with the understanding and with the decision that the solution of the Sinai is not applicable to the West Bank.

I saw President Carter for the first time in March this year when I had an hour's talk with him and Vice-President Mondale was present, and I told him now again, as I kept telling Sadat too -- there are four disputed areas: Sinai, West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan. There is no common denominator to them except that some of the world calls them occupied territories.

The Sinai is a very big area, twice the area of the whole Delta, with only 50,000 inhabitants here. It's desert, it's open, only two or three good roads running here. Gaza is very small, highly populated with 450,000 people, stuck right into the belly of Israel. The West Bank is hilly, highly populated, with Jerusalem in the center, breathing down our necks to the coast. The Golan Heights breathing down on Israel, again broken country, hardly any population there.

Now two very interesting things. This (Sinai) is considered to be a sovereign part of Egypt. The Golan was a sovereign part of Syria. Gaza was never a sovereign part of any country. The West Bank was never a sovereign part of Israel, but never recognized, except by England and Pakistan, as a part of Jordan.

Therefore, if we Israelis rightly decide that all this goes back to Egypt, with certain military conditions -- and as my good friend Boutros Ghali said, "etc., etc., etc." -- this (West Bank) is a different kettle of fish, and in due time (the Golan) this is also a different story. Therefore please do not apply the same medicine that has been applied by us here to any other part. That is why we looked for a solution, we proposed it, it's been an agreement solution that there will be autonomy here. That is the word, and the crux of it as far as we are concerned is that we share life on the West Bank and Gaza, not give it up, not carry on controlling it, but share life. How, that will be discussed. Settlements stay, military stay; how much military, where they will be redeployed, this is to be discussed.

Camp David says there will be withdrawal of the military administration -- by the way, the word is "withdrawal" -- and redeployment of Israeli forces and beyond the five years -- and I won't go through Camp David again; it's become almost a second Bible now.

I do hope that what we have agreed on, and I think it's a good agreement, that we go all the way back in three years, except for the El Arish - Ras Muhamed line which is in 9 months, we withdraw in stages; a month after that diplomatic embassies open in both countries, and then two years and three months later we withdraw to the international border leaving the settlements, leaving the air fields, pushing our army all the way back to the Negev. By the way, the two airfields we will build will be one here and one here (on map), but your good committee that was here looked into it and knows all about it by now. So in three years we will be back here, and I do hope that a peace treaty will be signed between Egypt and us and we shall seriously, honestly start discussing what happens in Gaza and the West Bank as soon as the peace signature is signed.

I believe the Egyptians want it. I believe there is far more sincerity on the Egyptian side than some people think. I think they need peace just as much as we do. Some of them I believe more, some I believe less. I suppose when they sit in Egypt they say the same about us. That is only human and only normal. And I am one who has recommended to my government and to my friends and to Israel to accept this peace treaty and implement it as soon as possible, and I do hope

and pray that we will have it very soon, without any more messing about.

With your permission, Senator Jackson, I will answer any questions.

SENATOR STEVENS: You are going to have two airfields. What does it mean in terms of any variations as far as your ground forces are concerned?

GEN. WEIZMAN: Well, I'll start this way. Obviously when we sit in the Sinai we have far more possibilities to operate, especially towards Egypt and also going down here, Bab'l Mandeb -- we get most of our oil from Iran -- and the routes to Elath from the East, Japan, etc. We have always had a great interest to have our shipping there and some of our air fields. Now range-wise if we go back it will be a little more difficult. But we assume we are at peace with the Egyptians and they open the Straits. If they close them, we will be back in Sharm-el-Sheikh. This is one thing that has to be understood, that if peace is broken, we are back to where we started from, but it will be worse. I do hope this will not happen.

First of all, we leave this place close to Elath, Etzion. We leave a possibility of having at times this one here where we usually keep a flight; we leave this air field where we usually keep interception flights. We leave this air field in El Arish that we use as a satellite field for training to our main training base here near Beersheba. So from an air force point of view, we shrink into little Israel. Before the Six Day War, I used to say we run out of Israel before we run out of fuel. So we will have the air force pressed into a training

area which is Israel including the West Bank. Right now we fly all over the place. Who knows perhaps in three years I will come to an agreement with my friend, Ali, that we can both fly here. But from an air force point of view, we are being really pressed into a smaller area.

From an army point of view, the only effect is from both an army and air force point of view, there will be less training areas because right now they are running all over the sand dunes, knocking out tanks and guns. We will have to be far more restricted and the coordination between the air force training and the army training will be very much more difficult. If war breaks out -- and again, I am sorry to keep mentioning that but it has happened before in this part of the world, and that is my responsibility -- we'd break again into the wilderness of the Sinai.

MR. STEVENS: You don't see any modification in your hardware for the ground forces from a total forces point of view?

GEN. WEIZMAN: I do to a certain extent. I don't think for the next three or four years there will be anything substantial. We might cut down forces a bit. For instance, we have here -- it's not a great secret -- two divisions, regular divisions. You know that most of our army is based on reserves. The bulk of the army has to be called up in 12, 18, 36 hours. But we have regular forces now which is probably going to be cut by a certain percentage. The Air Force will not be cut.

I didn't go into it, because I know you know all about it by now, but up here we have the Syrians with 2,000 tanks and so many airplanes, and the Iraqis who can arrive in 48 hours, and the friendly

Jordanians with 600 tanks and F-5s around the corner, and Hawk missiles and a King who I don't know whether he'll fire or not, but the time before last he did. So we have a northeastern front, which is quite a threat.

SENATOR PELL: I'd like to follow that up, if I could, from the viewpoint of cost. As you come here and contract into a smaller area, wouldn't the cost be less? Because the \$3.37 billion price tag is not one that you can assume will go sailing through in the Congress.

GEN. WEIZMAN: First of all, I'd like to tell you a story, which is not a story. I hope the President won't mind. When we were sitting in one of the talks with your good President in the White House, I said, which was correct, that in the first checks by a U.S. team, some of them thought we were underestimating the cost. So he said: Give me the names, who are they?

We have no installations here (in the Negev). We have no airfields south of here. I'll start this way. 12 years ago when we were forced into the Six Day War, and that is again a story we can start on, how we arrived in the Sinai, and on the Jordan. It isn't that one bright morning, on June 6th, the late Mr. Eshkol, then Prime Minister, and we in the military decided it's a good idea to sail into the Sinai, and maybe take the oil here. I, as Deputy Chief to Gen. Rabin - and you'll tell me I was a bad deputy chief - had no idea that there was oil here. One of my good pilots blew hell out of the oil fields because he thought it was army storage. But we didn't just decide to go into the Sinai one fine day. There were reasons for it -

the closing of the Straits, 750 tanks here, Nasser saying this, that and the other, Hussein joining in. I think we have had very bad public relations for the last 11 years regarding what happened and what is this occupied territory, and we are pictured as these terrible Israeli militarists that got up one bright morning, with Eshkol -- and anyone who knew the late Eshkol knew the last thing he thought about was war -- and sailed into the Sinai.

In the five or six years prior to the Six Day War, we had only one regular brigade of armor plus one battalion. Everything else was reserves. Total for the Six Day War we had 1100 tanks, out of which 300 were Shermans and close to 200 were AMX-13s. The Air Force was 200 planes. For this mighty air force, we had three air fields; we had started building one here, but it wasn't finished and we operated from three ex-RAF air fields. For this we had hardly any installations.

We now have three times as big an army, almost three times as big an Air Force, growing up over the last 12 years, primarily with your assistance, because of the growth in these neighboring countries. Quite a lot of this army and air force was put into the Sinai because nobody believed we will have peace with the Egyptians. That is why we need that many dollars to go back here, because it's an empty area, where this one (Sinai) is full.

And I think that for the peace and quiet of everyone, including the U.S. - and the last thing I like to talk about is money, but

unfortunately that is what I know how to spend quite well, and our budget in the defense forces is about \$3 billion a year now. I think what we are talking about now, with all due respects to my friend here, is not only peace between Egypt and Israel but peace in the Middle East for the good of everyone. We are giving up a lot, which is not accountable in money. And we knocked out more Russian equipment in this part of the world in the last 22 years than you ever knocked out in Vietnam.

SENATOR JACKSON: A couple of questions. I take it that number one, what you are saying is that there is not going to be any early peace dividend. I am talking about budgets now. That became a bit of usage after Vietnam in our country. I mean realistically looking at the map up here, it seems to me that in the Negev you are going to have less room to maneuver. The advantage of the Sinai is you have that vast area which gives you an element of hardness and protection, maneuverability, all the things you can do. You move all your forces in here, and even if you maintain the same forces, if you have a surprise development out of Egypt - I am referring first to Egypt - you don't have as much punch with the same forces over here that you would have deployed in the Sinai.

GEN. WEIZMAN: One hundred per cent.

MR. JACKSON: I understand you are taking a certain calculated risk.

GEN. WEIZMAN: We are taking one hell of a calculated risk. The risk is a bit buffered or softened by the fact that we do have three zones with certain elements to them. But we are shrunk back

to a very, very small area. We are not as close in order to do what we always liked to say, that the best defense is counter-attack if not attack first. From an air force point of view especially we are shrunk very much into a very limited area, and we don't have the advantage of the airfields being strung out as they are now. And we do that without having peace with this area here, and that's without talking about the 10,000 PLO here in Beirut whom one day we will probably have to do something about, as we did when we went up to the Litani. And have had peace and quiet on the northern border for the last 8 months, and it is not so much because the UNIFIL is there but because we went up to the Litani. And we still have Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, so it is quite right that we are taking one hell of a risk in going back.

But after 30 years, I as Defense Minister, recommended to my Government to take that risk, and knowing this will be a rather soft belly of the Egyptians here, and if they misbehave themselves, we shall be here like this (on map), and we hope we won't have to do that.

But we definitely take one hell of a risk, with what we have here and what we have here (Northern and Eastern borders) and with the regimes in Egypt, where one day there is a Gamassy and one day there isn't.

MR. JACKSON: This is my point. I would be interested in your assumptions that you are going to make, looking down the road, in connection with your military planning. If you assume that Sadat will be followed by more Sadats, then you are in a pretty strong position over here, but you know, it's a great game of speculation as to how

much you can really assume that the current attitude will extend on into the future in Egypt.

GEN. WEIZMAN: That is a risk we take, and that is why we must still have a big army. I am sorry to keep repeating things which I often say to American friends of mine -- you have peace with Russia, diplomatic relations. Why do you keep such big armies? You have the Sixth Fleet and the Seventh Fleet, and this new missile and that one, and over-kill and under-kill and B-70s and B-20s, and I don't know what. We have the same case.

MR. JACKSON: Well, I will never forget the talk I listened to by the late General George Marshall, when all the smart guys were saying: the armies are at an end, the navies are over with, ^{it's} all going to be atomic weapons. And Marshall hammered home the point that we are still going to need the man carrying the rifle and the bayonet. The ground forces. We'll need the naval forces. And the worst thing you can do is to assume that the big new devices take over. That is what led to Korea in our country. We didn't have an army. The navy went down the zilch.

But my only question that I wanted to nail down as we leave her, and some how this story I think is a very important one that needs to be told, it's very simple. The world thinks, and especially in our country that when the signatures are on the treaty, you are not going to have to worry about any more defense expenditures in this part of the world. We are entering into a sort of euphoria and we can see big cuts in defense. I only speak for myself, but I think the view of the average American, watching that tube, is going to be: what the hell

are they coming here for \$3 billion for airfields, etc., I thought that we had entered a new phase, peace. This is a problem we politicians have to think about.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I also happen to be a politician somewhere along the line. Perhaps because for us it is so obvious that we didn't elaborate on it so much. First of all, as I said before, we still have Syria, Iraq and Jordan. I hope everyone will sign peace and live happily every after. I don't know if you know the manpower of the Egyptian army today, including the air force and navy it's 750,000. Regular, getting up every morning and saluting the flag, not reserves. When I call up the entire Israeli army including reserves it is not 750,000.

MR. JACKSON: What are your regulars?

GEN. WEIZMAN: I am not supposed to tell you, but we usually have with reserves about 100,000. If I call all the troops in, Bruce will tell you it's probably between 400 and 500,000. This is with everything, artillery and tanks and air force and navy. The whole country is only 3 million, and there are 40 million Egyptians. So they have 750,000 troops. Gamassy told me and Ali told me they will cut down the military. I'd like to see that. Perhaps the process in the coming years will be that they will cut down to a lower number; instead of so many tanks they will have less, instead of an air force with MIG-23s, which is not in very good shape, they will have a smaller but better equipped air force, perhaps American, perhaps French, as part of it is now.

But for us, 3 million people, that are going to be shrunk back to a very small area, with 40 million Egyptians that can turn like that overnight - I hope not, I believe not, I believe that the Sadats that will come in the foreseeable future will be like the one we know and respect and appreciate. I have more Sadat hours than any other Israeli in my little log book. Adding this into the fray, remembering again if we lose a battle - it's not Vietnam, even the South Vietnamese don't suffer as much as God forbid can happen here, a complete annihilation of the population of Israel. We just can't sign on the dotted line, and say fine, let's go home and pack up the airplanes and tanks. And we can't depend, with all due respect and all the appreciation for the aid given to us by the U.S., and there is a lot of aid being given us by the U.S. in the last five years, we can only rely on ourselves. With all due respect to the Sixth Fleet, it cannot stop a major confrontation in this area.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: Don't worry about these questions because this is the Senatorial group that ran the war in Vietnam. I am not going to cut back military aid because you are one of the only crowd that is willing to fight and know how to fight, and I hope you won't depend on the volunteer army, incidentally.

Now my question is, since there will be some disputation relative to money, and it is much cheaper for peace, \$3.2 billion, than what was it, 4 billion in the Yom Kippur War. So we are getting a bargain for peace; it is not costing us much at all. But there will be those who say: let's measure the good faith effort being made, because as you folks are so smart and so good, I don't see that missing piece of the

puzzle. Who will be negotiating with the Palestinians. I hear talk: we are going to give you autonomy under the people you choose under autonomous elections, but no we are not going to negotiate with Arafat, or the PLO, or this other group. But we will give you autonomy. Sadat can't speak for them, no, Hussein can't speak for them. I don't know who will speak to you. And yet I am voting money and trying to measure a good faith effort on the part of Israel.

How do I do that, in your opinion? I mean good faith about trying to make progress -- not a time schedule, that is unrealistic -- but there ought to be some kind of progress being made. Suppose you are in the U.S. Senate and trying to give Israel aid, no argument about that, but you said let's have a report back in 6 months or so that a good faith effort is being made, so the average taxpayer -- I am trying to build up credibility for my vote. I know how I will vote but I am trying to build up political credibility with my own folks. How would you measure that good faith?

GEN. WEIZMAN: First of all, I'd like to have you in my party and not against me. A few things you mentioned were correct and a few were incorrect. The only thing we said was we do not want to negotiate with Arafat and the PLO because they believe in one thing -- in the complete annihilation of the State of Israel.

MR. HOLLINGS: What about PLO officials if they get elected?

GEN. WEIZMAN: What we said and we will stand by that was first of all, we'd like Jordan to come in, the local Palestinian Arabs to be elected by elections on the West Bank and Gaza--

MR. HOLLINGS: What if the West Bank and Gaza elect Arafat?

GEN. WEIZMAN: He is not a citizen.

MR. HOLLINGS: Suppose he moves there?

GEN. WEIZMAN: Supposing he moves there and stays alive once he moves in, and a few other things that happen.

MR. HOLLINGS: Well, I like a direct answer.

GEN. WEIZMAN: You are supposing so many things. I ^{can} suppose a few other things. I know that we are sometimes accused of not being sincere about certain things we do.

MR. HOLLINGS: I think you are.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Not you personally. I am talking about opinions, and opinions that are very important to us and I have heard very closely. I don't want to start bragging and calculating what is the word of this leader in the Middle East and the other leader in the Middle East, and going back to '67, which I think from time to time is important to go back to and see what happened there, and what the Egyptians did, and the Jordanians, and how the world stood by and said: It's been very nice knowing you. You just go to war and see what happens. If you stay around, fine; if not, you be historically mentioned. We are going to stand by what we said and what we signed.

We will call upon local Palestinian Arabs to elect their own leaders through certain modalities that will be discussed between their elected persons, Egypt, Jordan (and Israel[?]). I Jordan doesn't come along - it doesn't say so in Camp David but we have agreed that if Jordan doesn't come in, then Egypt is good enough for us. We decided

on that later. I discussed these things with Sadat in December and January when I was there. We shall have to decide what does autonomy mean. What happens to our settlements, what are the responsibilities of the local police. For instance, if Mr. Arafat or his men come to Nablus or Tul' Karem -- and Tul Karem is this little place here and this is where the border used to be -- and there will be PLO blowing up a bus as they did the other day, will it be only the responsibility of the local police or will there be a cooperation, such as Interpol or something like that in fighting terrorism. Or do we have to sit back behind what used to be the border and see things blown up and say: no, there's autonomy, the chief of police of Nablus will investigate. There are a hundred and one things that have to be looked into. Not all of them were decided in Camp David.

I told President Carter last week that I think one of the big problems between the U.S. and Israel, and sometimes I think it is more between the U.S. and Israel than between Israel and Egypt -- and Sam has heard me say this -- that you still stick to the "back to 1967 border with minor modifications"; I mean the U.S. administration. Egypt never said so. We definitely don't say so. As I quite often say, and I didn't say it to the President, but I said it to Mr. Vance, what happened in the last 18 months in the Middle East is a very interesting thing. Egypt changed its course completely. I come to Washington, dial the Egyptian embassy and ask to speak to the Ambassador. A year ago, I wouldn't have believed it is possible. As I said to Sadat, and I was quoted once in Time Magazine, "it's like flying to the

moon." We live in the same hotel; we walk down the steps from the 10th floor to the 9th floor to have a drink with Mubarak or a cup of coffee with Ali, and so forth. And I can carry on and on.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: What about the blooming Palestinians?

GEN. WEIZMAN: I will come to that in a minute. They cause so much trouble, and the Egyptians don't give as much a damn about them as your administration does.

So the Egyptians changed their course, and we changed ours - if you had asked me a year ago, if we would give the Sinai back to the Egyptians, I would have said no. The only ones who didn't change their policy were the U.S. Back to 1967 -- good old Brookings; I don't even know who the heck that is. We are not going back to '67 with minor modifications, and the sooner that is understood, the better it is.

We are going to try to give the Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza as much administration of their own life as possible. We shall not take our army out of there. We shall carry on living there with Jewish settlements. And again I will quote what I said to President Carter ten days ago. I said roughly what I am telling you and that is that there is probably room on the West Bank for another 20, 30 settlements, Let's assume there will be 20,000 more Israelis living there. There will be a total of 35, 40,000. There are 750,000 Arabs on the West Bank. If you think by having more settlements, we want to control the West Bank, from a numerical point of view. But if it is a question of principle, then it is a question of principle for us too.

Therefore we will sign a peace treaty with the Egyptians who are very keen on a treaty, and from the word 'go', when I talked to Sadat, he said" Give me something so I can be covered for the Arab world and they won't say I am betraying them. This is the autonomy. And anyone who thinks this is a Palestinian state, and the Israeli army will just walk out and I won't have my radar station here or my outposts along the Jordan, especially as long as Jordan, Syria and Iraq are a threat, just doesn't read the situation. And I think that Sadat understands it.

SENATOR JACKSON: What you are saying is that there is no way that you can move out of the West Bank area.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I will say it positively. It is not only from a military point of view. I will come to a bit of Zionism. I must.

SENATOR JACKSON: But you don't get back to the basic point that prior to '67 all of Israel was within artillery range except the Haifa area.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Yes, there is a danger, but this is not the only point. There is a physical danger, therefore we must keep an army. There is an air danger from here, therefore I need the radar station.

SEN. JACKSON: But you have the reinforced Syrian situation backed up with the Iraqis. If you don't have effective military control in Gaza and still have the autonomy, how will you--

GEN. WEIZMAN: We will sit on the Jordan; we will discuss how and what are the responsibilities and where is our training, and what is an Israeli soldier allowed or not allowed to do on the West Bank; the same thing in Gaza. Perhaps a day will come when they will live happily ever after and we will need two soldiers and five bayonets, but

at present we need radar stations, and look-outs, etc.

But there is a main thing, far more than defense. You are right from the defense point of view, one hundred per cent. With 400,000 Arabs in Gaza, we must have a look out on what they do, especially with the Egyptians down here. It won't be all milk and honey.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: You said Sadat asked for something to save his face with the other Arabs. Why does he come now with the timetable? Evidently he didn't get enough.

GEN. WEIZMAN: No. Again, I don't want to be critical, I can but I don't want to. I think the whole negotiation has dragged on too long. I think if we had done it faster - January, February, March, April. But now after Bagdad and after he is completely isolated and is the only one who stuck his neck out, and I think he is very brave, imaginative and clever. If the whole thing would have moved a bit faster perhaps what he wants now he wouldn't have needed six months ago.

SENATOR JACKSON: I ask just one thing on this point. What if two things happen here. One, we can get some kind of economic cooperation going between Egypt and Israel, with some support from us. We've got a tight budget situation, but to move in basically in agricultural areas, to move in on public health; their health situation is terrible. And what is that is followed - I am being a little imaginative - by a mutual defense arrangement. Sadat has cut himself off from the Arab world in a substantial way. He is threatened by the Russian move into Libya, which is only a beginning. Obviously the Russians must have Sadat as number one on their list in the Middle East to eliminate

one way or the other. From your standpoint, from the standpoint of building security and protecting your Western flank, the beginning followed by the economic help -- you know, my idea is that there is too much American talk, when we get into the oil problem, too much talk about American naval forces being available to move in if necessary if they grab the oil fields, now this is talk. The real basis of preventing this, and protecting the oil fields, it seems to me, realistically and politically, from being denied to Japan, Western Europe and North America, is to build within this community, the Middle East, a capability of defending those areas with the brains you have got in Israel, with the geopolitical advantage that you have in Egypt, Sudan--

GEN. WEIZMAN: And the manpower on the West Bank and Gaza.

GEN. JACKSON: Well, you have got the basic element of political power. You have got that huge geographical mass, you have got 40 million people roughly in Egypt, and how many in Sudan?

GEN. WEIZMAN: 20 million. You know how many in Libya?

GEN. JACKSON: About 4 million?

GEN. WEIZMAN: 2½. 2½ too many.

GEN. JACKSON: I understand. But bear in mind that was a very stable government, so our top intelligence people told me in the State Department, and I argued with them that the monarchy was weak and was an obvious target with all the oil.

GEN. WEIZMAN: How are your arguments now about Iran?

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, the truth is that no one has a recommendation to make about how to help the Shah. Everyone is saying: we have

to help the Shah. If you ask them how, they're off. But to get back to the main track here -- the Shah, Iran is critical but you do one thing at a time.

It seems to me there is an opportunity here to do several things at once, to start the process of building a closer tie-in with Israel and Egypt and at the same time the beginning of a means by which this part of the world can be defended. I even envision a capability here if something should happen in Saudi Arabia. They can't work their way out of a paper bag.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I didn't want to start on this; Sam and I have talked about it many a time. I look upon this treaty between Egypt and us first of all, of course, for the good of the two countries, but I look upon it exactly as you do, and in my office I have a map of the whole area, and I see of course the terrible word known as linkage today, a link between Morocco and Egypt, if Tunis would come in, fine, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and ourselves. Against Libya and Syria and Iraq and South Yemen and the Horn of Africa, etc. This is why I tell the U.S.: if you look upon it the same way I do, not only from the point of view of solving the Palestinian problem, which I don't minimize, but from a global point of view, don't shrink us too much because then we will not be a power to be a good linkage between Egypt and Sudan. And don't ask us to go back to a flimsy, peculiar, funny looking border. And understand that the problem is that we are part of a global solution, as you said. I can elaborate on it all the way.

SENATOR JAVITS: I'd like to ask a question, because this is very pertinent. It is one thing to vault over the existing time by ten or twenty years. It is another thing to deal with our problem which is the money and the necessary approvals that have to be built into this situation.

We asked the Foreign Minister last night, I asked him, this question, which is very pertinent: From your perception, if there is a real threat to South Afrabia, either internal or external, it could be either, what would be the attitude of Israel, once this agreement is signed, and has the perception changed? His answer was that you have a deep concern about what happens there and that you would do everything you could to avoid an internal or external disruption or upset, upheaval, Iran style, or an external aggression against them. This is a critical question for us.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I think we could have a whole symposium about the future of East and West, and China thrown in between. One of my great hopes is that an agreement with Egypt will bring us to the doors of China, because to me China is such a big question mark such an interesting world, I'd like to see what is happening there. I don't know what other people think.

MR. STEVENS: If you are going to take the first step for mankind at least you have got to go to the moon. Getting that peace agreement is like getting to the moon. I think you have got to get there first.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Mr. Senator, we are getting there.

MR. STEVENS: Yes, well, I agree with you.

GEN. WEIZMAN: And it's not that easy, and I know the world is impatient. The world was very patient when we stood facing the Arab world in 1967, and don't build up my mood a little bit too much on that. I have seen how the world behaved when we had our necks really strung up.

The thing is that I believe, as you said, that we must look for common enterprises in health, in commerce, in tourism, in shipping, in air lines. I think this could have been done much faster a year ago, but it will still come along. I think the U.S. should look at it, as you said, from a global point of view.

As to the question you asked the Foreign Minister about Saudi Arabia, a hell of a lot depends on you. And I don't want to start telling the U.S. what policy to carry out and about the way you have been behaving in the last 25 years. People don't trust the U.S. in the world to really stand behind an internal collapse. I am not talking about ourselves. We probably the country most faithful to the U.S. in this part of the world. Now Sadat got in this too, and I am very glad about it, otherwise we couldn't have been in Camp David. Saudi Arabia is a different thing. Because you need them as much as they need you, if not more. The question is what would you do when a thing happens like in Iran. Have you got the moral strength now to stand, with all due respects, and again I am very careful, but what is human rights? Are there human rights in Russia; are there human rights in the Congo or in Uganda? So I am all for talking about human rights, but I am for keeping the U.S. strong in the world.

So if Saudi Arabia -- which, by the way, is full of human rights. They all get up in the morning fully human and fully right -- if anything happens there, will you go and help them, or say: No, human rights, Nicaragua. Another example is Libya. I quite often jokingly, and not so jokingly, told the Egyptians: climb into Libya, I will send you four squadrons of Phantoms. Why go to Saudi Arabia? Libya is standing there with two and a half million people with all the oil.

(At this point, the Chief of Staff joins the meeting)

And Libya is pro-Soviet. They have got the newest MIG-25 aircraft, the only country in the Middle East with them.

MR. JACKSON: The only country outside the Soviet Union, anywhere.

GEN. WEIZMAN: They have got all sorts of Topolov 22s, and whatever you want, and tanks galore. And there is Egypt, a country that is pro-West, that hasn't any riches at all. Why shouldn't you help them make a little law and order in that part of the world? What happens in^a battle between Egypt and Libya? Will you help them? I am all for it. But, no, this is against the constitution, and this, that and the other, and Vietnam, and Cuba. Now you have MIG-23s breathing down your necks, in Havana. Once and for all the U.S. has to decide will it be a global power looking after its interests, including the Middle East, the Far East, or is it only fine words and giving arms and support. We are not complaining, we get a lot of support. But we are the ones that knocked the Russians out of the Middle East. We shot down over 1,000 MIGs, knocked out about a thousand Russian tanks, and pushed the Russians out of Egypt. Sadat did that, but a few little wars helped

to do that. Now the question is what is the global policy of the U.S., not what is our global policy.

SENATOR JAVITS: Could I get back to this basic point. We haven't got an answer yet as to what you would do, assuming we back you, which we are doing.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Oh, if you back us, the whole Middle East can be organized in a few years. But every time we walk into Lebanon to make a little order, Sam phones me and I have to find all kinds of excuses.

SENATOR JACKSON: Could we go back to the problem we are running into constantly, the encirclement of the oil fields. Our own "imperialist" interests, in the interest of the Western world. Looking at the problem, it is obvious, I mean with the Russians in Iraq, in Yemen, in Ethiopia and Libya, a sort of encirclement.

I want to divide the problem into two parts. One, let's just leave Iran aside, that is something to talk about in a separate vein, because it creates a special problem due to the historical relationship with the Soviet Union on that border, and with all of the problems going back two or three hundred years. Truman handled it very well in 1946. I was in his office and he told me the story. When the Russians refused to get out in 1946, he summoned Gromyko who was then Ambassador and told him they were violating their commitment. He said: "If you don't start moving within 48 hours, I will drop it on you."

GEN. WEIZMAN: That is when the Russians didn't have an atomic bomb.

SENATOR JACKSON: That's right. But that is a separate situation. Obviously, the Western world could not tolerate a cut-off of the oil to Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. Now, what I am going to put to you is this. Wouldn't it make more sense as an option to have in being in the Middle East, with Israel playing the crucial role here or organizing and putting together some arrangement, starting with Egypt and yourselves, of a mutual defense capability to deal with a move that might be made through Russian surrogates, either in a coup or an overt move; wouldn't it make more sense that that security responsibility be within the Middle East community, and isn't it a fact that you could handle that situation against all adversaries in the world, except the Soviet Union. I mean suppose, specifically, what I worry about is an attempt either by a coup, and most of them have all been by coups so far, by a coup in Saudi Arabia or by an overt move either coming from Iraq or from Yemen to take over the oil fields or knock them out. What if they knock them out for a year, then what happens? I'd like to have a comment on that. I mean with the obvious support and assurances not just of the U.S., but Western Europe, they all have a stake in this. Isn't that a logical thing? We get so much talk, big talk but nothing behind it -- we will send the fleet, the Marines, we will intervene.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I will tell you this. First of all, as my good friend, Senator Stevens, said, let's have peace--

SENATOR STEVENS: You misunderstood me, but that's all right.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I took a while for the penny to drop, but I understand now. The thing is that I think this is what Sadat believes

should be done Africa wise. He looks upon himself quite rightly as the power on the African continent. The use of Israeli or mixed troops to solve problems in Saudi Arabia is not a very easy thing to be done, although it is not impossible.

SENATOR JACKSON: You mean including the Egyptians.

GEN. WEIZMAN: It is not impossible. I would first really concentrate on establishing that country so coups cannot happen. Look at Egypt. They haven't had a coup for 26 years.

SENATOR JACKSON: How close did they come to it with Sabri?

GEN. WEIZMAN: My dear Senator, with all due respect, a president was assassinated in the U.S. Anything can happen.

SEN. JACKSON: That wasn't the ground work for a coup.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I don't know. Books have been written about it. So what could have happened, didn't happen. The fact is that after kicking out Farouk, rightly, in 1952, there was a normal reign of Nasser and of Sadat, and I do hope that after him someone good will take over from him, and I hope he will stay for many years. He will turn 60 in December, on Christmas Day.

I wouldn't like to indulge in the future. I think for us in Israel the most important thing is that we must have this change in the environment. We have been used to wars for 30 years and more. We must test and check and see whether this peace treaty we have been working on for over a year is a feasible, workable, thing. Because the actual signature is not enough. We definitely see this not only as a local problem between Egypt and Israel. We, at least I, do see it as part of a global problem, a regional problem, of a battle between

East and West, where oil comes in, where political influences come in, where the future of Africa might be one way or another, where the U.S. will have to decide in the next few years, what its actions, or inactions, to use the treaty word, will be.

Cubans are being used in Africa. What is the counter action of the U.S.? What you actually said is: make yourselves Cuban for a while, which I don't look at negatively but it is not an easy one to answer. If we look at it as a global problem, as the future of the world, of which oil is one of the aspects only, maybe in 25 years there will be something different; there are all sorts of minerals and things you need in Africa, and they are run by a bunch of, I don't know, I don't want to be nasty. I think if we start rolling on this and if the world is not too hard on us, because again I don't want to go back into history as to who was the aggressor, what is occupied, what is not occupied, what is legitimate, what is not legitimate, how Israel was created, why, what is the Palestinian problem, why did the Egyptians enter here in 1943. All this and heaven too.

If we come to a conclusion that we have had enough blah-blah for the last year, now we have a good treaty, we think it's good. There have been better, but one of the things that Israelis have had to learn is that they don't negotiate with themselves. I could have signed a beautiful treaty with him (indicating Mr. Zipori).

SENATOR PELL: What would happen on the West Bank here if you had control and territorial boundaries passed to you on the heights, couldn't you pretty well let this section develop on its own? This is the Allon Plan basically.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I have heard of it. I want to say one thing. Israel was built, created on a certain ideology. And the problem is the world has become very practical and non-ideological. We'd like to stay ideological as much as we can. The ideology was whether we have any sense, any right, to come back to this part of the world, yes or no. We claim yes. I am quite often told by certain friends of mine: you do beautiful things because you have no alternative. Incorrect. We all have an alternative, to go to the U.S. Some of our Russian friends do that.

SENATOR PELL: In essence then if you had the territorial control, would it be acceptable from a military point of view?

GEN. WEIZMAN: I'd like to share life with the Arabs on the West Bank. If they tell me they don't want to, I will tell them they are doing it in the Galilee. I would like to share life with them and interfere with their lives as little as possible. It is not only a defense problem but it is a principle, why we came here and not to California.

SENATOR PELL: I don't mean to press this too hard, but there are no Arabs in these high points.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I am not worried about having Arab neighbors, and I don't want to say some of my best friends are Arabs. I want to live with them. There are a million and a quarter in this part of the world; there are 40 million across the Canal, five or six million over there. I have to find a way to live with them.

SENATOR PELL: That could be an acceptable route though.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I am not saying it is impossible. I'd rather

have this than a war, but I would prefer to find a better way than this one.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: Why don't you come with us to Cairo? We are going there now.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Who will you see there?

SENATOR HOLLINGS: Sadat.

GEN. WEIZMAN: Give him my best regards. If you see the Prime Minister, give him especially my regards.

SENATOR JACKSON: What happened on the dismissal of his General, this top guy, all of a sudden?

GEN. WEIZMAN: If you ask Sadat, he will say: Oh, I need the young generation. I think I know the reason but before you go and see him, I don't want you to go and say Ezer said you kicked him out because of A, B, and C.

SENATOR STEVENS: I'd like to ask a question. I logged three hours listening to Sadat one day and I came out with the definite impression that he was going to want to get a lot of money to assist in building a great force to bring peace to Africa, that that was his role. He said if he sent out his F-5s and they took some MIGs but came back fewer than they went out, would he have us behind him replacing those planes if he was going to do that. Have you ever discussed this, if and when you get the peace treaty, where he is going?

GEN. WEIZMAN: We did discuss it. I said a moment ago that Sadat thought his presence in Africa--

SENATOR STEVENS: His presence, or his presence for somebody

else, for us, for you, for the world?

GEN. WEIZMAN: First of all, I think that Sadat will first try and solve certain problems at home. And he has a hell of a lot of problems. You have seen Cairo. I knew Cairo 32 years ago, and I got the shock of my life when I saw it last year; dilapidated, worn down and going to pieces. I think he has a policy of having more influence in Africa. I will be for it, definitely. I think one of the things he'd like very much to solve is the Libyan problem, because that to him is not only very close but it's a very important problem. Right now, he's got a relatively big army on the Libyan border. Bruce, how many do they have?

MR. WILLIAMS: They took a division.

SENATOR JACKSON: Are the Russians running reconnaissance?

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't have the answer, but I don't think so.

GEN. WEIZMAN: He has a whole armor division, taken from this are_a (indicating map) and thrown on the Western front, to the Libyan border, including some mobile SAM batteries. To answer your question, I think he would to a certain extent increase his influence in Africa, try and solve his problems with Libya, but primarily try and mend things at home, which is one hell of a problem.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: Now about his responsibility for building up his economics and his problems back home, and what you said earlier about: Don't shrink us too much. I hope you won't shrink yourselves too much. I talked about a Marshall plan in this whole situation over a year ago, but the idea has become adulterated. I think the

only way a real Marshall Plan could work is on the basis of agricultural aid directly from Israel to Egypt. We give aid everywhere so there is no use for us to get into that act. To really build up^a process of peace and make it genuine, going back to the question of how fast you can move with the Palestinian problem, is for you folks to come forward with your great expertise in agriculture. We see it going from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. And really move directly yourselves and then let us indirectly help you, but I think it should be between Israel and Egypt on an agricultural basis. You know what I mean, and you shrink yourselves there in that regard.

GEN. WEIZMAN: In all my talks with Sadat, we always start with the military but end up talking about El-Al flying to Cairo, about agricultural enterprises. Last time in Salzburg, he told me he will push a pipeline of water from the Nile to the Negev. His imagination sometimes can go very far, very far. I wouldn't say run wild but go very, very far, and imagination is the most creative thing in the world. I fully agree with you. I'd like to see in three years time or more a mutual tourist plan, and in agriculture, add health, as you said, and a million and one things, but--

SENATOR HOLLINGS: And let the leadership come from you.

SENATOR JACKSON: But we have to provide some back-up.

SENATOR HOLLINGS: Don't worry about back-up. We can pay the bill. I am trying to build up your role.

GEN. WEIZMAN: I fully agree with you. But one of the forces causing a lot of problems are the inhibitions and complexes of both

peoples. And I don't want now to analyze the Israeli mentality, that are very touchy and see in every corner someone trying to trap them. This is a mentality that developed over a thousand years and hasn't completely come out in Israel as a free state, and I could tell you stories about it. As I said before, I negotiated with the Egyptians with the Israeli Defense Forces behind me, mentally all the time. Some of my friends negotiate from the Warsaw Ghetto, and I am not being critical, because I, thank God, was never in the Warsaw Ghetto, but was born and bred in this little country.

On the other side of the river, they also have complexes. We have to be very, very clever not to tell them : we are the brains in the Middle East, you are the manpower. I am very, very careful about that.

I will tell you one story and will finish with that. Gamassy and I became very, very close to each other, as close as two characters like us, two defense ministers, blowing each other to smithereens over the years, can become. He has a very sick wife, some kidney trouble, whom I never met because she is mostly in Europe. In Salzburg, when he was in a bit of a bad mood, probably the beginning of the crisis, I quite innocently, as to a good friend, asked him: Where is your wife? He said: She is still very sick. I said: Why don't you bring your wife to Israel; we have such good doctors? He looked at me and said: We have good doctors too.

SENATOR JACKSON: What is your assessment of the security situation in Saudi Arabia? I mean we have got, roughly speaking,

about 200 billion barrels of oil in reserves. I only ask out of self interest. What is your assessment of the security, of their ability to defend and protect that crucial resource.

GEN. WEIZMAN: What happens from an internal point of view, whether there is a major in the Saudi royal guard with a little knife stuck behind him ready to stick it into the king, and how many wives in the aren are really faithful -- that I really couldn't tell you. I don't know. I would say that a country that is so much advanced in human rights is an explosive keg of powder.

SEN. JACKSON: What about external?

GEN. WEIZMAN: I don't think they have enough forces to defend themselves, for example, from Iraq. If the Iraqis would like to blow hell out of the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, there isn't anything that can stop them. The question is what will you do if they blow up the oil fields in Saudi Arabia. You will go down to Mexico and buy oil there.

SEN. JACKSON: My scheme calls on you to come to the rescue.

GEN. WEIZMAN: If you ask us nicely, we will do it.

(Meeting adjourned at 2 p.m.)

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JACKSON-MIDEAST
BY LAWRENCE L. KNUTSON
WASHINGTON (AP)

U.S. SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON CALLED SATURDAY
FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD AN AMERICAN

AID PROGRAM PATTERNED AFTER THE POST-WORLD WAR II MARSHALL PLAN FOR EUROPE.

THE FINANCIAL AID WOULD BE BASED ON A FULL PARTNERSHIP WITH ISRAEL

AND EGYPT, WHO WOULD THE UNITED STATES AND TOGETHER "DO MUCH TO REVERSE THE MISERY OF CENTURIES AND MAKE THE DESERTS BLOOM," JACKSON SAID.

BUT HE SAID THAT WHILE THE OFFER OF SUCH AID SHOULD BE HELD OUT AS

AN INDUCEMENT, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RETAIN THE OPTION OF WITHDRAWING IT IF SUPPORT FOR PEACE EFFORTS IS NOT FORTHCOMING.

"THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT CAN AND SHOULD LET ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST KNOW THAT THERE IS A PATH TO THE REALIZATION OF THEIR PEACEFUL DREAMS ALONG WHICH WE ARE WILLING TO ACCOMPANY THEM," JACKSON SAID.

"WE MUST MAKE IT PLAIN THAT THOSE WHO ARE UNWILLING TO JOIN WITH

US AND ISRAEL AND EGYPT WILL GOSE OUT ON THE ECONOMIC AND OTHER BENEFITS OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE."

THE SENATOR, A DEMOCRAT, SAID IN A PREPARED ADDRESS THAT HE BELIEVES PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL BECAME POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT "UNDERSTOOD THAT SOVIET AMBITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A STABLE PEACE AND WITH THE INDEPENDENCE OF EGYPT AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION."

JACKSON SAID THE LEADERS OF EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN AND IRAN ARE AWARE OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ENCIRCLE THE OIL PRODUCING AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST ON WHICH INDUSTRIALIZED WESTERN NATIONS DEPEND. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE INROADS IN LIBYA, ETHIOPIA, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND SYRIA.

END

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R219

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CARTER-MIDEAST
FOR RELEASE 1900GMT
BY BROOKS JACKSON
(ADVANCE) WASHINGTON (AP)

U.S. PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER SAYS HE
FEELS THE LEADERS OF JORDAN AND SYRIA ARE OUT OF STEP WITH THEIR OWN

PEOPLE IN OPPOSING THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT ACCORDS.

"I THINK THE PEOPLE THERE WANT PEACE," HE SAID, ADDING THAT
OTHER ARAB LEADERS WILL DISCOVER THIS "WHEN AND IF THEIR LEADERS
SHOW THE SAME COURAGE" EXHIBITED BY THE LEADERS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

CARTER MADE THE COMMENTS IN AN INTERVIEW FRIDAY WITH OUT-OF-TOWN
BROADCASTERS. THE TRANSCRIPT WAS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON
SATURDAY.

CARTER ALSO SAID THREATS OF STEPPED-UP TERRORIST ACTIVITY BY
OPPONENTS OF THE ACCORDS ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED.

HE SAID HE HAS SEEN THREATS THAT SAUDI ARABIAN OIL FIELDS OR U.S.

INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD MIGHT BE ATTACKED BECAUSE OF THE
ACCORDS, BUT ADDED THAT, "WE WILL BE VIGILANT ABOUT IT."

"I THINK MANY PEOPLE IN THE MIDEAST, EVEN IN OTHER CONFRONTATION
STATES, DON'T FEEL AS DEEPLY AGAINST THE MAJOR MOVE TOWARD PEACE AS
SOME OF THE LEADERS INDICATE," CARTER SAID. HE WAS REFERRING TO
JORDAN AND SYRIA, WHICH WITH EGYPT MAKE UP THE STATES IN
CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL DURING PAST ARAB-ISRAELI WARS.

CAT

ZRP MOST PEOPLE WERE AMAZED AT THE 'OVERWHELMING GADSIDE
RESPONSE' OF EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS WHEN EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR
SADAT OPENED A PEACE INITIATIVE BY GOING TO JERUSALEM LAST YEAR.

MORE

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R220
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(ADVANCE) WASHINGTON -- CARTER-MIDEAST 2
"THEY THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE SOME ANIMOSITY, BUT THERE WAS AN
OVERWHELMING SENSE OF APPRECIATION THAT YOU FINALLY BROUGHT PEACE TO
US," CARTER SAID.

"I THINK SOME OF THE OTHER NATIONS WOULD FIND THIS TO BE TRUE,
WHEN AND IF THEIR LEADERS SHOW THE SAME COURAGE THAT HAS BEEN
EXHIBITED BY (ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM) BEGAL AND SADAT.

"I THINK THE PEOPLE THERE WANT PEACE," HE SAID. "I THINK THE
THREAT OF TERRORISM IS PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, BUT IF IT SHOULD OCCUR,
ATTEMPTS, I THINK WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET IT."

THE UNITED STATES HAS TRIED TO DRAW
JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN INTO PEACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL, BUT SO FAR
HUSSEIN HAS REFUSED.

SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD, MEANWHILE HAS LINED UP WITH
"REJECTIONIST" ARAB LEADERS WHO ARE OPPOSED TO ANY DEAL WITH
ISRAEL.

SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH IS NOT TECHNICALLY A CONFRONTATION STATE, IS ALSO

BEING MOVED BY THE ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE OF ITS FINANCIAL AND
SPIRITUAL INFLUENCE ON OTHER ARAB NATIONS.

CARTER SAID HE BELIEVES THE PRESS HAS GIVEN HIM TOO MUCH CREDIT
FOR THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT RESULTS AND OF

ALL
MUSLIM VICTORIES,
OVERREACTING AFTER GIVING HIM TOO MUCH CREDIT EARLIER IN HIS
ADMINISTRATION.

"IN GENERAL, I THINK THE PRESS HAS BEEN VERY FAIR," HE SAID.
"THE ONLY THING THAT HAS CONCERNED ME ABOUT THE PRESS HAS BEEN
THAT ALL THE TIME WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO WORK ON VERY BROAD-RANGING
PROBLEMS, WE'VE HAD INSTANT
SUCCESS."

"NOW THAT I HAVE
HAD SOME SUCCESS ... THERE HAS PROBABLY BEEN TOO
MUCH CREDIT."

END ADVANCE

17216 31 OCT 77

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

18 באוקטובר 78

קטנים
102

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה

הנדון: ג' קסון - הכנית מרשל למזחה
למברקי. 203.

להלן דבריהם שנשא סנטור ג' קסון במליאת הסקט וכן נוסח ההצעה כפי שפורסמו
ע"י משרדו של ג' קסון.

22.10.78
צבי רפיה

העמק: כלכלית
מרכז

AMERICAN LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jerusalem, 10/10/57

Dear Sirs:
Reference is made to your letter of 10/10/57.

Subject: [Illegible]
[Illegible]

[Illegible text]

[Handwritten signature and stamp]

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SENATOR JACKSON

/ News

U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington

(202) 224-9378

For Immediate Release

Thursday, October 12, 1978

OCT 18 1978

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

On A New Marshall Plan For The Middle East

Senate Floor, Thursday, October 12, 1978

Mr. President, I wish to introduce on behalf of myself, Senator Church, Senator Javits, Senator Case and Senator Stone a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to developing a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East.

This resolution affirms the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States should take the lead in inviting Egypt and Israel to explore with our government and with the governments of other Western industrial nations the opportunity for a New Marshall Plan for the Middle East, leading to a full economic partnership with the Israeli and Egyptian people and all those in the Middle East who are willing to live in peace.

Mr. President, the representatives of Israel and Egypt today open their negotiations at Blair House to complete the historic Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty initiated at Camp David.

At this time, the Camp David Agreements remain a political framework -- a foundation -- for the construction of a new political relationship.

The Middle East, with the exception of Israel, and despite vast oil revenues, remains plagued by poverty and instability. While a four-fold increase in the price of oil has enriched a small minority in a few countries, the great mass in the Middle East continue to suffer the burdens of inadequate food and shelter, high unemployment and a dismal future. A major factor in the tensions that have produced a generation of political instability in the Middle East has been the desperation that afflicts all but a handful of rich and privileged individuals.

For example, the Egyptian people, some 38 million and growing over a million a year, live from hand to mouth. In Cairo, where six million people are crowded together, hundreds of thousands of urban poor live, without water, plumbing or electricity, inside the tombs of the ancient cemetery area. Ten percent of the infants born each year die in infancy. In the Upper Nile, and in farming areas generally, the parasitic disease schistosomiasis contributes to Egypt's male life expectancy of 54 years and condemns millions to internal bleeding, debilitation and suffering. Professionals and skilled workers emigrate in droves -- for there is no work for them in Egypt.

This can and must be changed. The potential resources are rich and plentiful. With peace they can be developed, and with peace one can foresee a fruitful partnership of unprecedented proportions between Israel, Egypt and the United States.

In helping to alleviate poverty in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, there is a great and historic role for the United States, a role we once before filled in the reconstruction of postwar Europe.

As was the case with the Marshall Plan, it is essential that any such program for the Middle East be based on a full partnership with the Israelis and Egyptians. They should work with us and with other Western industrial nations for the common development of their countries and, eventually, the region as a whole. Among them, the countries possess all the potential resources: capital, ingenuity, management skills, labor and, with Western nation involvement, technology and markets. Together we can do much to reverse the misery of centuries, to make the deserts bloom.

The resolution we introduce today is intended to encourage President Carter to take the lead by inviting Egypt and Israel to explore with us and with other governments of Western industrial nations the opportunities for a New Marshall Plan for the Middle East.

The American government can and should let all the countries of the Middle East know that there is a path to the realization of their peaceful dreams along which we are willing to accompany them. And at the same time we must make it plain that those who are unwilling to join with us and Israel and Egypt will lose out on the economic and other benefits of such cooperation and mutual assistance.

The Camp David Agreements are, we trust, a significant step on the road to a stable peace in the Middle East. But for the peace to last it must be more than a peace among armies and diplomats, more than an official peace. It must come to occupy a place in the daily lives of Arabs and Israelis alike. There must be movement across once fortified borders that can now become gateways to the development of social, economic, and political relations -- first among the Israeli and Egyptian people, and in time among all those in the Arab world who are willing to live in peace.

S. Res. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. JACKSON (for himself and Mr. Church, Mr. Javits, Mr. Case and
Mr. Stone) -----

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to developing a
New Marshall Plan for the Middle East.

Whereas the Camp David Agreements have established a political
framework for the construction of a new political relationship
between Israel and Egypt which can be a significant step on the
road to a stable peace in the Middle East;

Whereas a major factor in the tensions that have produced a generation
of political instability in the Middle East has been the poverty
and desperation that afflicts the great mass of people in the area;

Whereas the potential resources of Egypt and other countries in the
region are rich and plentiful and can be developed in peace and in
partnership through cooperation and mutual assistance;

Whereas in helping to alleviate poverty in Egypt and elsewhere in the
Middle East, there is a great and historic role for the United States,
a role we once before filled in the reconstruction of postwar Europe:

Now, therefore be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President
2 of the United States should take the lead in inviting Egypt and
3 Israel to explore with our government and with the governments of
4 other Western industrial nations the opportunity for a New Marshall
5 Plan for the Middle East, leading to a full economic partnership
6 with the Israeli and Egyptian people and all those in the Middle East
7 who are willing to live in peace.

8 Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of
9 this resolution to the President of the United States.

מספר סגור בקווי עולם

מקדק ס.ד.

דגמא מספר הסגור בקווי
סגור בקווי עולם

מקדק 563 30 דגמא

SENATOR JACKSON

01251P
News

U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington

(202) 224-9378

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Tuesday, July 11, 1978

STATEMENT ON ALEXANDER GINZBURG

Press Conference Sponsored by
the Alexander Ginzburg Defense Committee
Room 2200, Rayburn Building, Tuesday, July 11, 1978

It is a great honor to share with Mrs. Natalia Solzhenitsyn and other members of the Alexander Ginzburg Defense Committee this occasion to speak out for a good and brave man who yesterday went on trial in Kaluga for charity toward political prisoners and their families, and for speaking the truth about Soviet non-compliance with international accords on human rights to which the Soviet Union itself is a party.

The Ginzburg trial again raises the central question of Soviet trustworthiness -- as the Soviet government signs international agreements affirming the right to justice, to the free flow of information, and to the right to emigrate, and then wantonly denies those rights.

The trials that began yesterday are a direct challenge to the support for fundamental human rights that this Administration, and this nation, has elected to make a central theme of our foreign policy. There is no way that the President can reconcile inaction in the face of the Ginzburg and Shcharansky trials with any serious claim to leadership on behalf of human rights.

We are not without resources to give substance to the claim that we stand for international adherence to international agreements concerning human rights.

The President has it within his power to disapprove the transfer of vital American technology to the Soviet Union. He could have several pending Soviet requests on his desk within the hour. He could disapprove them.

Let me give two examples.

One: Dresser Industries proposes to build a multi-million dollar plant in the Soviet Union that would turn out tungsten carbide oil drilling bits essential to the further development of Soviet energy resources. Included also is an electron beam welding capability. Soviet industry, like our own, runs on oil. So do Soviet tanks and aircraft and navy vessels. This is no time for the Administration to approve an export to the Soviets of American technology that could assist them to fuel their industry, their army, navy and their air force.

Two: The Administration is currently considering whether to approve the sale to the TASS News Agency of a Sperry Univac computer system vastly larger than any comparable system previously sold to the Soviets and with capabilities greatly in excess of existing transfer guidelines. This comes at a time when the American correspondents of the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun in Moscow have had serious charges preferred against them by the Soviet government. TASS, I need hardly say, is the Soviet Union's official propaganda organ. Many of its so-called reporters are in fact agents of the Soviet secret police.

I call upon the President to disapprove these two license requests, and to do so this afternoon. If in response to the trials of Ginzburg and Shcharansky

the President approves high technological assistance to Soviet industry, the Soviet armed forces, and the Soviet propaganda and intelligence organ, he will make a mockery of our national policy to support fundamental internationally recognized human rights.

There are, of course, hundreds of pending requests for the transfer of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. All of these requests should be reviewed. Only the most compelling arguments for such transfers should be permitted to prevail over the urgent need to take action in response to these outrageous trials and to the pattern of the unremitting abuse of human rights that they symbolize.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

א"ס
ד"ר
(1072)



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

13 אפריל 1978

א ל: מבפ"א
מרכז
אירוסה ג'

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: נאום ג' קסון ב-10 דנא
למברקי 249

מב"ב הנוסח המלא של הנאום.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

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תאריך: 10/10/77
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news from:

senator henry m. jackson

FOR RELEASE: P.M.'s

Monday, April 10, 1978

THE JACKSON AMENDMENT
and
FREER EMIGRATION

Remarks by Senator Henry M. Jackson

National Leadership Assembly
of the National Conference of Soviet Jewry
Monday, April 10, 1978, 8:30 A.M.
The International Inn, Washington, D.C.

I am pleased to be with you for what has now become an annual event -- a chance to join with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry at its Washington Conference. This is far from the worst moment in the history of the struggle of the Soviet Jews to obtain their freedom; unhappily, it is also far from the best. The point is -- and it is my theme today -- that we are engaged in a great historic process, in a struggle of which each momentary skirmish or battle is but a small part, in a contest of will and resolve in which victory will turn on steadfastness and courage. I am confident that the Soviet Jews will prevail in the long run because they have the will to stay the course no matter how uneven the odds against them.

It took us two and a half years to get the Jackson Amendment adopted. But when the dust had cleared, the Congress of the United States had passed the first statute in this century linking economic policy with respect for international human rights.

In supporting the Jackson Amendment for freer emigration, we have

international law on our side. By adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the UN Human Rights Conventions, and by signing the Helsinki Final Act, signatories have made the right to emigrate a matter of legitimate international concern -- indeed of international responsibility.

Congressperson Pat Shroeder recently returned from Moscow where Professor Naum Meiman asked her to deliver to me a letter and a statement entitled "The Jackson-Vanik Amendment". In his letter Professor Meiman writes that, "Academician Sakharov has read this statement and expressed full agreement with it." I want to read Professor Meiman's statement to you because I believe the views that ought to carry the greatest weight are those of the men and women who are on the front lines in the Soviet Union. We are the support troops. We can help. We can encourage. We can speak and we can legislate. But it is they who bear the greatest burdens -- for themselves and for those who will come after them. Here is what Professor Meiman says in his statement dated March 8, 1978:

"The Jackson-Vanik amendment is a constant target of attack by the Soviet mass media. It aggravates American-Soviet relations and has not achieved its immediate goal of facilitating emigration from the USSR, particularly for Jews. This rouses doubt in a certain section of the American public as to the advisability of preserving the amendment. Notice should be taken of the systematic campaign against the amendment by a narrow, but active group of businessmen, such as the management of Pepsi-Cola, who are specially interested in Soviet trade. The clash of views and opinions compels me to present my stand on this question.

"I believe the Jackson-Vanik amendment is of far greater importance than transient politics. Perhaps it will be properly assessed with the passing of time. The amendment is more than an important Act of Congress. It is something altogether new, something unprecedented. For the first time in history the top legislature of a great country deemed it necessary to pass a law supporting one of the basic human rights, that of freedom of movement, on a global scale. This right was throughout

history the main criterion, the main test, distinguishing the freeman from the slave and the serf.

The Jackson-Vanik amendment created an entirely new situation, making it impossible once and for all to consider freedom of emigration as a domestic affair of the country from which one wishes to emigrate.

This is understood perfectly by the Soviet Government, which has to take it into actual account in spite of all the thunder in the Soviet press. The Soviet Government quite soberly sees the amendment as a political reality.

Over a long range the Jackson-Vanik amendment is one of the most effective ways to assist the emigration movement. I am convinced that it will still play an extremely substantial role in promoting freedom of emigration.

The amendment has gained special significance since the Belgrade Conference, where the USSR in fact refused to carry out its human rights commitments under the Helsinki agreements. The Belgrade Conference highlighted the need for permanent practical measures to make the USSR respect human rights.

Let me underscore that the Jackson-Vanik amendment is important not only for Jewish emigration, even not only for any kind of emigration. It is a stimulus in the general efforts for human rights.

Let me close by noting that the amendment has already produced telling, though not always apparent, results. There are grounds to maintain that it has restrained the Soviet authorities from committing further, stronger reprisals against participants in the emigration movement."

The Senate made the Jackson amendment the law of the land in the Trade Act of 1974 by a vote of 88-0. President Carter has pledged, in writing, the full implementation of the amendment. But we keep discovering Members of Congress moved by special economic interests, and bureaucrats who have not gotten the message, who want to nibble away at the Jackson amendment, or repeal it outright.

They want to reverse the course upon which we set when we tied trade benefits for the Soviets to a liberalization of their emigration practices.

Right now efforts are underway by some Senators to try to grant credits to the Soviet Union and other non-market countries, with no quid pro quo whatsoever in freer emigration.

We must resist these efforts -- we must persuade their proponents if possible, and defeat them on the Senate floor or in the contest of public opinion if personal persuasion doesn't work.

The underlying logic of the Jackson amendment is simple: we have proposed to the Soviets that they relax their restrictions on emigration and that we, in turn, relax our restrictions on access to our market and credits. They have so far refused our offer. So we must do the same. We must continue to withhold credits and most favored nation status. To do otherwise would be to throw in the towel, to run up the white flag -- to tell the Soviets that they can have the economic benefits they desire without giving anything in return.

I believe the proposition we have put to them is one that they will eventually recognize as reasonable and one that they will eventually come to accept.

The Soviet economic future is bleak in so many areas -- agriculture, high technology, energy and manpower. The Soviets stagger under a military budget that takes twice as much of their resources as our budget takes of ours.

As the Soviet economy deteriorates, the continued practice of repressive emigration becomes increasingly costly. We can afford to be patient until the Soviets recognize where their real interests lie. The Jackson amendment constitutes just the sort of leverage that we ought to be using on behalf of basic human liberties.

I urge you to make it clear to the executive bureaucrats and to the Members of Congress that you expect them to implement the Jackson amendment fully; there will be no MFN, there will be no credits until there is a flow of people.

As we talk about free trade, let us talk about free people.



18 באפריל 1978

אל : מאסו"ק
מאח : נ. חמיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: ביקור סנטור ג'קסון בטיין - דווח
בהמשך למברק צ. רפיה נר 461
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מניה כי תמצאו עניין בפרטום הלוטה שבו מטכם ג'קסון פרטי
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אנא חשומה לבכם לטיפא בעמוד 3 שבפרטום - המחייחסת
לאזורנו.

בברכה

נ. חמיר

העתקים

מצפ"א ✓

מרכז

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1973

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: AMBASSADOR, ISRAELI EMBASSY

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95th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

CHINA AND UNITED STATES POLICY

REPORT

OF

SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND NATURAL RESOURCES

UNITED STATES SENATE



MARCH 1978

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MEMORANDUM OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 10, 1978.

To: Members of the Committee on Armed Services, and Members of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

From: Senator Henry M. Jackson

At the invitation of the People's Republic of China, I visited China from February 12 through 20. I looked on my visit as a welcome opportunity to continue the straightforward exchanges of view with Chinese leaders begun during my visit there in July 1974, particularly in the areas of foreign policy and energy.

During my visit, I had frank and friendly conversations with many of China's top leaders in Peking. These conversations took place over a period of 4 days with Vice Premier and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Teng Hsiao-ping, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Hsiu-chuan, Vice Minister of Petroleum and Chemical Industries Sung Chen-ming (now Minister of Petroleum), Vice Minister of Petroleum and Chemical Industries Sun Ching-wen (now Minister of Chemical Industry), Ambassador Hao Teh-ching, and other high officials. We also had the opportunity to look at China's energy developments first-hand on a trip through Shantung Province to the Sheng-li oil field, to petrochemical complexes in Peking and Shantung Province, and to the Hung-shan coal mine (also in Shantung).

Accompanying me were Dr. Dorothy Fosdick of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee staff; Mr. Grenville Garside, Staff Director and Counsel of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; Dr. Daniel A. Dreyfus, Deputy Staff Director for Legislation of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; Dr. Dwight H. Perkins, Chairman of the Department of Economics and Professor of Modern China Studies and of Economics, Harvard University; Dr. Thomas Bernstein, Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, and at the East Asian Institute, Columbia University; and Dr. Haakon Ragde, Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Washington.

We were warmly received by all the Chinese with whom we met. I am especially grateful for the cordial hospitality of my host, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and its President, Hao Teh-ching. I also want to thank Ambassador Han Hsu and the People's Republic of China Liaison Office here in Washington, D.C., for their important contributions to the visit.

I have tried, in this brief report, to summarize basic impressions and conclusions following my visit to China.

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CHINA AND UNITED STATES POLICY

Report of Senator Henry M. Jackson

CHINA-AMERICAN RELATIONS

There is a new spirit in China today. In 1974 when I first visited China a debate over the basic direction of the country still prevailed among the leadership. Today the leaders of the People's Republic of China appear determined to turn an already great nation into one of the world's industrial giants by the year 2000. That same leadership is resolved to do what is in its power to insure the security and territorial integrity of China so that the modernization of the country can proceed without interruption. China is also playing a significant strategic role in international affairs, including the struggle for stability in key areas of tension throughout the world. Over the longer run a peaceful world is inconceivable without the active participation of this great and dynamic nation with over 20 percent of the world's population.

Despite this reality, and the fact that many of our interests run parallel to those of the Chinese, the United States has not been giving sufficient priority to our own relationship with the People's Republic of China. Our leadership has been preoccupied elsewhere. Only once during the past 2 years has there been any substantial high-level contact between the top leadership of China and of our own executive branch of Government. Our Liaison Office in Peking is too isolated from the Chinese leadership to be an adequate substitute for contact at these highest levels.

On my return from China, I recommended to the President and to the Secretary of State that we should immediately move toward increased and substantial consultation between the most senior officials of our Government and those of China. These consultations at the highest level should take place on a frequent and continuing basis.

Meanwhile, in line with the Shanghai Communiqué, we should proceed with the process of normalization of relations between our two countries.

Normalization is not the most important aspect of United States-China relations from either an American or a Chinese point of view. For China, the overriding consideration that governs the conduct of their foreign policy is their determination to assure the security of their own country. It was this motivation that led them to seek an improvement of relations with the United States in the first place and it remains today the bedrock upon which the relationship between our two countries rests. For our part, we have a significant stake in the continued existence of a strong, independent China. We share with China a common interest in key strategic issues. We must not let the lack of normalization impede possible progress in areas where our concerns run parallel.

The lack of normalized relations obviously makes working together on common concerns more difficult. I have recommended to the President and to the Secretary of State that a major effort be made to resolve the issues still outstanding that block the full normalization of relations. Normalization must mean the end of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but should be done in a way that will not jeopardize the peace and stability of the region.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

The Chinese do not see an immediate threat of war with the Soviet Union. They feel that 1 million Soviet troops are inadequate for an attack, which suggests that they appreciate the role played by NATO in tying down much of Soviet armed might. Nonetheless, since they share a border over 4,000 miles long with their principal adversary, the Chinese are very conscious of the northern threat. Peking, for example, lies only little over 300 miles from Soviet troops stationed in Outer Mongolia. Even if there were only a 10-percent chance of a Soviet attack on China, any prudent Chinese leadership would make major efforts to assure that it did not happen. To friends of a patient about to undergo surgery, a 90-percent likelihood of survival may seem encouraging. The patient's mind will be dominated by the other 10 percent.

If war with the Soviet Union does come, the Chinese see a conventional attack as more likely, but they think nuclear weapons may also be used. The Chinese are confident that they can defend themselves without outside help if war should be launched, but enormous destruction and at least a temporary loss of territory would result.

The Chinese talk about the inevitability of a war breaking out some day as a result of the competition between the two superpowers. They speak not of preventing such a war but of postponing it. The key to preventing (the Chinese would say "postponing") war is the overall international situation, and particularly the extent to which the military balance is maintained in Europe. Chinese leaders are deeply concerned that we and our European allies are helping the Soviet Union to overcome its many economic shortcomings through concessionary economic deals, subsidies and the like, while receiving nothing more than commercial profit in return.

Arms control negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which they once saw as a conspiracy of the two superpowers to limit Chinese nuclear development, they now see mainly as part of a Soviet effort to obtain military superiority over the United States. For the moment they see America and the Soviet Union as having a rough military parity with greater Soviet quantities of arms offset by superior American weapons quality. They are far less sanguine about the future, and are particularly concerned that some versions of SALT and MBFR agreements now under negotiation would lead to a dangerous weakening of the forces that will be available to sustain the peace.

Chinese diplomacy around the world is governed by these same considerations which is why their interests often parallel ours. The Middle East and the Horn of Africa, for example, are seen as intimately tied to the strength of Western Europe and a credible NATO which the Chinese support. Chinese views on what constitutes an appropriate formula for a settlement in the Middle East differ significantly from my own. China's strong support of President Sadat's

peace initiative, however, reflects a concern shared by the United States that the situation in that region not deteriorate to the benefit of Soviet expansion.

China has supported American efforts to improve relations with India for some time. Since the change in government in India, the Chinese themselves have taken steps to improve relations with the world's second most populous nation. Difficult border issues between the two countries remain, however, and China continues to express concern that the Indians are too dependent on the Russians.

We also have parallel interests in Southeast Asia, where China supports the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as does the United States. The Chinese describe their state-to-state relations with the nations of Southeast Asia as good despite continued Chinese connections with the various Communist Parties in the region. One exception is Vietnam where such issues as the war with Cambodia and possible Soviet use of Camranh Bay for the support of Soviet naval operations are causes for worry.

American bases in Japan and the Philippines present no problems for Peking as long as they are seen as desirable by the Japanese and Filipinos themselves. For China, good United States-Japan relations are an important priority.

In Korea, American and Chinese interests do not run parallel. The Chinese support North Korea and express opposition to the retention of any American military bases or personnel in the country. They state, however, that the ultimate goal of Korean reunification is to be achieved by peaceful means.

Despite such areas of differences as over Korea, the greater number of areas of parallel concern lead the Chinese to look to the United States to play a determined and active role in world affairs, both at the strategic level and in areas of local tension. Their present concern is that we are doing too little, rather than that we are doing too much. They are also concerned that at this time American leaders do not understand China's own contribution to the strategic balance.

Although maintenance of a strategic balance is central, there are many other areas of common American and Chinese concern as well.

In the course of our discussions on arms control issues, for example, I suggested that it would be in the long-term political interest of the Chinese to develop the technology to do all of their nuclear weapons testing underground. While the Chinese made clear that they do not want to be bound by any agreement that would prevent them from making aboveground tests, they are, apparently, working on the capability to rely on underground tests. I am hopeful that this capability can be achieved in the near future so that their tests aboveground can be ended. Such a step would be beneficial to the long-term health and safety of both our peoples and of all mankind.

I was glad to hear from the Chinese about the greater freedom of movement to and from the People's Republic for overseas Chinese. This policy, which I encouraged, can bring to China new technical expertise and financial resources, while serving the humanitarian and human rights aim of reunifying long-separated families.

THE ENERGY AREA

One of the most important areas where China and the United States share common interests is economic. An essential part of the new spirit in China is the intense commitment to the late Premier Chou En-lai's "four modernizations" of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

Significantly, two of the new Vice Premiers just appointed by the National People's Congress, Fang Yi and Kang Shih-en, simultaneously hold the posts of Minister in Charge of the State Science and Technology Commission and Minister in Charge of the State Economic Commission.

Although China's modernization strategy emphasizes self-reliance, their determination to also "learn from the advanced experience of other countries" is resulting in a new openness toward the outside world. It is in the interests of the United States that this modernization effort succeed. America has nothing to gain and much to lose from a China plagued by internal economic crises. While actions by the United States will not be the primary determinant of whether Chinese economic development is a success or failure, we should play a positive role where we can.

Nowhere is American-Chinese cooperation in our mutual interest more clearly possible than in the area of energy.

China's Energy Resources

China is endowed with abundant energy resources. Although Chinese efforts toward mechanization of agriculture, industry and the military establishment are only in the formative stages, China is already the fourth largest energy producing nation in the world. With primary energy production in 1976 which would be equivalent to 7.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, it is led by only the United States (34.9 million barrels equivalent), the U.S.S.R. (23.5 million barrels equivalent) and Saudi Arabia (8.9 million barrels equivalent). China exports little of its energy resources and numbers fourth in primary energy consumption behind only the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Japan.

At present, coal is by far the principal source of China's energy production. However, Chinese petroleum reserves are large, on a par with those of the United States. Oil shale and natural gas reserves are also believed to be large and will become increasingly significant in the future. Hydroelectric power resources are also extensive. With a current (1975) production figure of about 30 billion kilowatt hours, Chinese officials claim that only about 2 percent of the potential resource has been developed.

Chinese Petroleum Reserves and Production

China has several known onshore sedimentary basins now producing oil and a large offshore area with oil-bearing potential.

Little geological exploration was done prior to 1949, and the People's Republic has been reticent to release detailed data. Therefore, estimates of the Chinese oil-producing potential vary widely. The Chinese, however, appear to be in general agreement with estimates of their on-shore potential at about 40 billion barrels of ultimately recoverable reserves.

Very little actual exploration has been done regarding China's potential offshore petroleum resources and any estimate must be considered to be sheer speculation. Important sedimentary basins are known to exist, however, in the Po Hai Gulf and the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. China has over 11,000 miles of coastline fronting on such potential producing areas. Only a small amount of actual offshore development in the Po Hai has thus far been done. Estimates of the ultimately recoverable offshore reserves vary widely from 30 billion barrels or less to several hundred billion barrels.

These figures compare to U.S. *proved* petroleum reserves of 30 billion barrels in 1976 and an estimate of U.S. oil reserves *produced and identified* of about 168 billion barrels. The U.S. figures, of course, are based upon infinitely more definitive exploratory work and production experience than are those for China.

China also has an oil shale resource estimated to be about 150 billion barrels in reserves, and has been producing small amounts of oil from shale for many years. Current production may be about 20,000 to 30,000 barrels per day and, although the reserves are large, production of oil from shale is not being emphasized.

Chinese petroleum production in 1976 was in excess of 80 million metric tons and increased in 1977 (80 million metric tons equals about 580 million barrels per year, or 1.68 million barrels per day). United States petroleum production, by comparison, was 8.1 million barrels per day in 1976 and U.S. consumption was about 17.4 million barrels per day.

Chinese Oil Fields

By far the two largest producing oil fields in China are the Ta-ching field in Manchuria, which came into production in 1960 and accounted for about 50 percent of national production in 1976, and the Sheng-li field in Shantung Province, which was visited by our group. The Sheng-li field came into production in 1962 and accounted for over 20 percent of national production in 1976. There are about 30 other fields in production, all much smaller in size.

The 1976 output of the Sheng-li oil field was 17.8 million metric tons (about 130 million barrels per year, or about 360,000 barrels per day). Oil from Sheng-li is shipped by pipeline to refinery and petrochemical complexes in Shantung Province and to the port of Huang-tao from which it has been exported to the Philippines and Romania.

Sheng-li oil (like that from Ta-ching) has high residuum content (77.1 percent) and requires costly cracking facilities to increase the percentage of vehicle fuels and petrochemical feed-stocks which can be obtained from a barrel of crude oil in the refining process.

The Chinese emphasize their determination to construct the equivalent of 10 Ta-ching oil fields before the year 2000. If this slogan is interpreted as increasing production in existing fields and initiating new fields to the extent of 10 times the present annual Ta-ching output

of about 43 million metric tons, it would imply expanding current (1976) production of over 80 million tons by more than 400 million tons, or 500 percent. This would be an ambitious goal, but it is not inconsistent with current activity.

The recent Chinese trade agreement concluded with Japan contemplates annual exports which are to reach 15 million tons annually by 1982, which will absorb a portion of the increase over the next 5 years. There seems to be no doubt that the projected growth of the Chinese economy will absorb the remaining production easily.

Chinese leaders state their intention to continue also to increase coal production for the conventional uses. Production targets for existing coal mines contemplate stretching their capabilities to the utmost, and new coal mines are in the planning phase. Oil production for Chinese domestic consumption will probably be utilized, to the greatest practicable extent, to serve the increasing demands for gasoline and diesel fuels, and for a variety of petrochemical feedstocks.

A continued emphasis upon mechanization throughout the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector, the obviously burgeoning use of motor vehicles and mechanization of the military could absorb the increase in petroleum output contemplated. Agriculture will impose a further requirement for petrochemical feedstocks from petroleum for fertilizer and pesticide production.

Petrochemicals will also continue to be important for synthetics such as plastics, rubber and, particularly, fibers. Cotton goods continue to be rationed in China and the expanded use of synthetic fabrics for clothing would reduce pressure on the cotton supply. Cotton, of course, competes with grains for scarce cultivated lands and also affords a potential base for export. It seems probable that the production of synthetics from petroleum will be maximized, as it already appears to be in some refineries.

The Chinese managers and leaders continue to emphasize their objective of self-reliance while yet drawing upon the new technologies of other countries. The damaging experience with Russian assistance has not been forgotten; in which Chinese dependence upon foreign technical support resulted in a serious economic setback when such support was abruptly withdrawn by Russia in the 1960's.

Progress, primarily in conventional, relatively shallow onshore oil fields, can probably be achieved by the Chinese with minimal dependence upon foreign technical expertise or equipment. Quite probably, the established production goals can be met in this fashion.

Exploration of previously undeveloped areas could benefit most dramatically by greater reliance upon outside technical advice, imported equipment, or both. This would be particularly true in exploration of potential offshore deposits in the Po Hai Gulf and the Yellow, East China and South China Seas.

At present, however, the emphasis for development appears to be primarily in oil fields like Sheng-li, where transportation and infrastructure are already developed and prospects for increased production with conventional technologies are good.

If a major discovery should result from the rather tentative offshore exploration work now in progress, or if a significant change in policy occurred, major Chinese entry into the oil export market is feasible. Such a policy change, of course, might result from either the need for increased foreign exchange or from foreign policy motives.

China-United States Relations in Energy Matters

The extent of Chinese receptivity to foreign energy technologies and the degree to which China will enter world energy markets as an exporter of coal and petroleum are decisions which are still under consideration in China. The outcome of such decisions will have profound impacts upon the future world energy situation.

China, for example, has just consummated an important agreement with Japanese business interests which contemplates expanded coal and petroleum exports over the next 8 years. The energy exports are expected to balance Chinese imports of Japanese industrial installations.

While the Chinese spirit of self-reliance runs strong and deep, the Chinese appear to be convinced that American petroleum technology is superior to that available anywhere else in the world. Although the continued lack of normalized relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China and national security restrictions concerning the export of certain high-technology equipment may impede transactions somewhat, it appears certain that China will be interested in importing U.S. petroleum technology, service and equipment to a greater extent than heretofore.

I have stressed with Chinese leaders that the greater exploration of China's petroleum resources will be of importance not only to China but to the rest of the world as well. To the extent that China becomes an exporter of oil, the pressures on world oil supplies in the 1980's and beyond will be correspondingly reduced. I have pointed out that U.S. technologies, experience, and capabilities can greatly expedite the exploration of Chinese resources.


I have recommended to the President that an effort be made to establish an ongoing technical liaison arrangement in the energy area. I believe that it would be desirable for the Department of Energy to designate a technical liaison officer to be available to assist representatives of the People's Republic with energy matters.

Hopefully the Chinese Government will follow suit by establishing an energy contact in their Liaison Office in Washington, D.C., and I have suggested this approach to Chinese leaders.

I also recommend that the technical exchange visits between our two countries be continued and increased. I suggested to the Chinese, for example, that they send a delegation of hydroelectric experts to visit the hydroelectric production and long-range transmission facilities of the Pacific Northwest. Further development of China's vast hydroelectric potential could help free more oil for export in the future.

Particularly useful would be longer-term technical exchange visits so that more in-depth training, study and mutual exchange of experience and ideas would be possible. The Chinese might benefit significantly, for example, from our research work now underway on solar energy and synthetic fuels development.

Energy gives us an important opportunity to move toward a better relationship with China. A program of consultation and cooperation on China's energy development is in the national interest of both China and the United States.



משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

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אל: המשרד

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מצמא. אירופה - ג'

להלן קטע מנאום שנשא סנטור ג'קסון בפני כנס והקונפרנס למען יהודי בריחמ'

בוושינגטון ב-10 דנא:-

THE SENATE MADE THE JACKSON AMENDMENT THE LAW OF THE LAND IN THE TRADE ACT OF 1947 BY A VOTE OF 88-0. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PLEDGED, IN WRITING, THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENT. BUT WE KEEP DISCOVERING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MOVED BY SPECIAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND BUREAUCRATS WHO HAVE NOT GOTTEN THE MESSAGE, WHO WANT TO NIBBLE AWAY AT THE JACKSON AMENDMENT OR REPEAL IT OUTRIGHT. THEY WANT TO REVERSE THE COURSE WE SET WHEN WE TIED TRADE BENEFITS FOR THE SOVIET TO A LIBERALIZATION OF THEIR EMIGRATION PRACTICES.

RIGHT NOW EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY BY SOME SENATORS TO TRY TO GRANT CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NON MARKET COUNTRIES, WITH NO QUID PRO QUO WHATSOEVER IN FREE EMIGRATION.

WE MUST RESIST THESE EFFORTS - WE MUST PERSUADE THEIR PROPONENTS IF POSSIBLE, AND DEFEAT THEM ON THE SENATE FLOOR OR IN THE CONTEST OF PUBLIC OPINION IF PERSONAL PERSUASION DOESN'T WORK. THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF THE JACKSON AMENDMENT IS SIMPLE; WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY RELAX THEIR RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION AND THAT WE, IN TURN, RELAX OUR RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO OUR MARKET AND CREDITS. ~~THEY HAVE SO FAR REFUSED OUR OFFER, SO WE MUST DO THE SAME. WE MUST CONTINUE TO WITHHOLD CREDITS AND MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE TO THROW IN THE TOWEL, TO RUN UP THE WHITE FLAG TO TELL THE SOVIETS THAT THEY CAN HAVE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS THEY DESIRE WITHOUT GIVING ANYTHING IN RETURN.~~

I BELIEVE THE PROPOSITION WE HAVE PUT TO THEM IS ONE THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZE AS REASONABLE AND ONE THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY COME TO ACCEPT.

THE SOVIET ECONOMIC FUTURE IS BLEAK IN SO MANY AREAS - AGRICULTURE HIGH TECHNOLOGY, ENERGY AND MANPOWER. THE SOVIETS STAGGER UNDER A MILITARY BUDGET THAT TAKES TWICE AS MUCH OF THEIR RESOURCES AS OUR BUDGET TAKES OF OURS.

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AS THE SOVIET ECONOMY DETERIOURATES, THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF REPRESSIVE EMIGRATION BECOMES INCREASINGLY COSTLY. WE CAN AFFORD TO BE PATIENT UNTIL THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE WHERE THEIR REAL INTERESTS LIE, THE JACKSON AMENDMENT CONSTITUTES JUST THE SORT OF LEVERAGE THAT WE OUGHT TO BE USING ON BEHALF OF BASIC HUMAN LIBERTIES.

I URGE YOU TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE EXECUTIVE BUREAUCRATS AND TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT YOU EXPECT THEM TO IMPLEMENT THE JACKSON AMENDMENT FULLY. THERE WILL BE NO MFN, THERE WILL BE NO CREDITS UNTIL THERE IS A FLOW OF PEOPLE.

AS WE TALK ABOUT FREE TRADE, LET US TALK ABOUT FREE PEOPLE.

ע ר ס י ו

ר פ ל ה

שהח רתנו ס. ודומה מנכלל ממנכלל סטנכלל מצפא מדאר הפוצות מעז הסכרת רמ בר
מב/מה

מס: 196
נשלח: 111130 מרץ 78
התקבל: 112001 מרץ 78

אל: המשרד
מאח: וושינגטון

Handwritten notes: (11/10/78) and other illegible scribbles.

אל מצפא, אירופה ג.
להלן וושינגטון פוסט מה-11 למרץ 78.

SOVIETS WITHDRAW INVITATION TO SEN. JACKSON TO VISIT.
THE SOVIET UNION HAS WITHDRAWN AN INVITATION TO SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON (D-WASH.) TO VISIT THERE THIS SPRING AFTER JACKSON INFORMED THE SOVIETS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET SEVERAL DISSIDENTS WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW.

JACKSON, A LEADING SENATE SPOKESMAN FOR HARD-LINE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, HAD PLANNED TO VISIT RUSSIA DURING THE SENATE'S EASTER RECESS. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY, JACKSON SAID THE VISIT "HAS BEEN POSTPONED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP."

THIS FOLLOWED A DISCUSSION BETWEEN JACKSON AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY F. DOBRYNIN, WHICH JACKSON DESCRIBED IN HIS STATEMENT. "I INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT WHILE IN THE SOVIET UNION I INTENDED PRIVATELY TO CALL ON DR. ANDREI SAKHAROV (THE SYMBOLIC LEADER OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS) AND A SMALL GROUP OF THOSE SOVIET CITIZENS WHO HAVE APPLIED FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE."

THIS WARNING APPARENTLY CONVINCED THE SOVIETS TO CALL OFF THE VISIT.

IN THE PAST NUMEROUS AMERICAN SENATORS VISITING MOSCOW HAVE MET SAKHAROV AND JEWS HOPING TO EMIGRATE. AN AIDE TO JACKSON SAID YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS ONLY TRYING TO BE POLITE BY ADVISING THE RUSSIANS IN ADVANCE THAT HE PLANNED SUCH MEETINGS.

"I REGRET THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REGARDED TWO PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS AS AN OBSTACLE REQUIRING POSPONEMENT OF MY VISIT," JACKSON SAID YESTERDAY. "WHILE THERE ARE NO PLANS UNDER DISCUSSION TO RENSTATE THE INVITATION I RECEIVED, I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL COME TO REGARD A FRANK AND OPEN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AS HELPFUL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES."

AD KAM

ITONUT--

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס 117

גשלה: 071700 מארס 78

נתקבל: 080153

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

מצפא

להלן הרכיבים פאנוגרפים למדת מתוך ראיון הסנסור גסטון לתחנת הרדיו של פ.י.בי.אס. ששודר ביום א 5 מארס.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew: (סנסור גסטון) ואל המשרד

SENATOR JACKSON ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

(FIRST PART OF INTERVIEW CONCERNED WITH ENERGY AND THE SENATE-HOUSE ENERGY CONFERENCE.)

RICHARD ROTH: ... SENATOR JACKSON, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS EXPRESSED ITS INTENT, ITS HOPE OF SELLING THE SAUDI ARABIANS SIXTY F-15 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, PART OF A PACKAGE OF SALES OF LESSER PLANES TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN TO SELL THE SAUDIS THESE PLANES MAY JEOPARDIZE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT?

SENATOR HENRY JACKSON: I THINK THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN RIGHT NOW WOULD BE FOR A MORATORIUM ON ALL SALES FOR THE TIME BEING, SO THAT WE COULD REALLY CONCENTRATE ON NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE MOST SOPHISTICATED AMERICAN AIRCRAFT TO BE PLACED IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND THEY'VE BUILT A NEW AIRPORT NOW RIGHT ADJACENT TO ISRAEL. I THINK IT'S DESTABLIZING. I THINK IT COULD CAUSE A LOT OF TROUBLE. THE BEST THING AT THE MOMENT -- NEITHER COUNTRY IS THREATENING EITHER COUNTRY. IT WOULD BE A LOT BETTER TO MAYBE HAVE A MORATORIUM HERE WHILE WE GET SOME SENSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS GOING.

AND THERE'S NO REASON IN THE WORLD WHY, IF THE PARTIES WILL FOCUS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE CAN'T BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. IT REALLY GETS DOWN TO DEFENSIBLE BORDERS. YOU SOLVE THE SINAI PROBLEM. THE SETTLEMENTS' ISSUE IS CONFUSING EVERYTHING. THAT'S NOT THE REAL ISSUE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SINAI, WITH ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. THE WEST BANK PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED BY GIVING TO ISRAEL THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THAT AREA. LET THE PEOPLE -- THE BEGIN PLAN IS PRETTY MUCH ON TARGET. WITH SOME ADJUSTMENTS -- TO GOVERN THEMSELVES. BUT WITHOUT IT, YOU

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HAVE AN INDEFENSIBLE BORDER SITUATION. THE WIDTH OF ISRAEL IN THAT UPPER AREA IS ONLY EIGHT TO TEN MILES WIDE. AND PRIOR TO THE '67 WAR, THE REASON WHY THESE CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN OCCURRING IS THAT ALL OF ISRAEL WAS WITHIN ARTILLERY REACH, EXCEPT HAIFA.

NOW YOU CAN'T HAVE A SOVEREIGN, VIABLE COUNTRY IN THAT KIND OF A CONFIGURATION. AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT DONE THE JOB OF GETTING THE STORY OVER ABOUT THE WEST BANK, BECAUSE THE STORY OF THE WEST BANK— FORGET ABOUT THE EARLY BIBLICAL IMPLICATIONS THAT MR. BEGIN...

GEORGE HERMAN: LET ME TAKE YOU AWAY FROM THE BIBLE FOR A MINUTE AND JUST ASK YOU SOMETHING. YOU'RE ADVOCATING A POLICY HERE....

SENATOR JACKSON: I USED TO TEACH SUNDAY SCHOOL, BUT I'VE FORGOTTEN MY....

HERMAN: YOU'RE ADVOCATING A POLICY HERE WHICH IS NOT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY. YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT FREEZING ARMS SALES. THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT CONTINUING ARMS SALES.

YOU'RE A MEMBER OF THE SENATE....

SENATOR JACKSON: IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HERMAN: YES, SIR. YOU'RE A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. YOU'RE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL. DO YOU NOW DO SOMETHING ABOUT THAT? WILL YOU MAKE YOUR VIEWS KNOWN?

SENATOR JACKSON: AS SOON AS I GET OUT FROM UNDER THE ENERGY PROBLEM, GEORGE, I HAVE GOT THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM, THE CHINESE PROBLEM, AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE. BUT I'M GOING TO TRY TO INJECT A LITTLE COMMON SENSE. IT WOULDN'T HURT TO COOL THIS THING WHILE....

HERMAN: BUT WHERE DO YOU START? DO YOU START AT THE WHITE HOUSE? DO YOU START IN THE SENATE?

SENATOR JACKSON: I'M GOING TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT IT AND SEE IF WE CAN'T HAVE A MORATORIUM. NEITHER NATION — I MEAN THE EGYPTIANS ARE NOT THREATENING THE ISRAELIS. SADAT'S GIVEN HIS WORD. I HOPE THE MAN SURVIVES, BECAUSE HE'S DONE A GREAT THING BY RECOGNIZING ISRAEL AND COMING TO JERUSALEM. AND I WOULD JUST HOPE THAT FOR

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THE NEXT SIX MONTHS THAT WE WOULDN'T BE TALKING ABOUT ARMS SALES, THAT WE'D BE TALKING ABOUT PEACE AND BRINGING THESE PARTIES TOGETHER, BECAUSE EGYPT—THE KEY TO THE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE THE SAUDIS. THEY'RE THE BANKERS. THEY'VE GOT ALL THE MONEY. THE ISRAELIS WITH THE BRAINS AND THE KNOW-HOW, AND THE EGYPTIANS HAVE GOT THE RANGE AND THE POPULATION. THAT IS, THE GEOGRAPHY. AND YOU GET THE THREE TOGETHER IN A RESOLUTION OF SETTLEMENT, AND YOU'VE GOT NINETY PERCENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SOLVED.

HERMAN: BUT IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED THE ARMS SALE....

SENATOR JACKSON: I KNOW THAT. BUT THE PRESIDENT'S A REASONABLE PERSON, AND I THINK HE'LL LISTEN TO CONGRESS, AND I THINK IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE A FREEZE NOW AND, INSTEAD, CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORT NOT ON A DEBATE ON ARMS SALES, BUT LET'S REALLY DISCUSS WHAT ARE THE ISSUES THAT ARE REALLY DIVIDING A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. I DON'T THINK THAT THEY AMOUNT TO VERY MUCH, WHEN YOU GET RIGHT DOWN TO IT. AND ANYTHING I CAN DO TO HELP IN THAT REGARD, I WILL DO IT.

HERMAN: WELL, WHAT DOES THAT AMOUNT TO? DO YOU MEAN YOU'RE CONSIDERING HELPING THE ADMINISTRATION....

SENATOR JACKSON: YES, I'M GOING TO TALK TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE OTHERS, AND DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO ENCOURAGE THIS KIND OF AN APPROACH.

HERMAN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, SENATOR JACKSON, FOR BEING OUR GUEST TODAY ON "CAPITOL CLOAKROOM."

שהח' רחמ' שיהא שחבט מנכל מנכל מעט הסברה מצמא מזחלים וקור' למ' אמר

תעו' ד' הסטורליה וקרת' חוב'

רע/פמ

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

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סודי ביותר

מס 585
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אל המשדר
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מחלקת הקשר
מדינת ישראל

אל:מנכ"ל.

קבוצת פעילים של זמנה יגות האגודה של המגבית נפגשה אצלנו לבקשתה עם סנטור גסטון בקפייטול, לשיחה שנסבה בעיקר על ישראל והמזת.

גסטון אמר לנו כי פרשת היישובים מציגה את ישראל כעקשנית והחזר מקשה על גסטון להסביר את עמדת ישראל בקוגרס. אינן הוא מבינן מדוע ישראל עוסקת כל כך בנושא היישובים, הרושם המתקבל עתה הוא שישאר איננה רוצה שלום וכי היישובים הוא הנושא העיקרי בשבילנו.

גסטון אמר כי החתרם שישאר זנחה את העקרון המרכזי שלה והוא - גבולות בני הגנה. יש לישראל - CASE חזק בנושא זה ואינן הוא מבינן למה זנחה זאת ישראל. לדעתנו עליה לחזור לכך.

כאן פנה אלינו גסטון ואמר-עלינו לעזור לי:החבר הטוב ביותר שתוכלו לעשות הוא שתעבירו מסר זה לישראל. גסטון הוסיף: מי שחושב שבעיית הקות ומטוסים לא תהיה כרוכה בעינן היישובים-טועה. השניים קשורים זה בזה. הוודמית של ישראל היום בנושא זה היא גרועה ועל ישראל לבחון מחדש עמדה בנידון.

כשהוכחם השמיעו באזניו את הנמוקים והטענות בענין היישובים

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

שמעו קודם לכן. בנאום השגריר ובתחילתו אמר גקסון כי הבעיה היא לא מה הסיבות ותזמנה יעים אלא איך הדבר נראה כאן. מדינת ישראל לפי שהיא נראית כאן. קשה להגן עליה.

גקסון ציינ שגם הדיכ רבינ ופרס מבקרים את הממשלה העינ היישובים.

גקסון אמר שעל היישובים צריכ לנהל מומי וחוסים שאינ ספק כי ישראל צריכה לחזיק צבא בגדה המערבית.

המשתתפים בפגישה אמרו לי כי גקסון לא אמר שישראל צריכה לחזיר את היישובים אלא חדר יש שתפול שלנו בנושא הוא לוקה.

פ"ח=

סבי רחם סודי שהבט אנכא אלחנף אביאל בינן שסין רח לאלין אורב רבי

OLD WORLD ORDER

WORLD ORDER

THE NEW WORLD ORDER
IS BEING ESTABLISHED
BY THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER NATIONS
TO BRING ABOUT
A NEW WORLD ORDER

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

THE NEW WORLD ORDER
IS BEING ESTABLISHED
BY THE UNITED STATES
AND OTHER NATIONS
TO BRING ABOUT
A NEW WORLD ORDER

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JACKSON

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, ONE OF CONGRESS

MOST PERSISTENT CRITICS OF SOVIET POLICIES, HAS BEEN INVITED BY SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION.

JACKSON'S OFFICE SAID WEDNESDAY THAT THE SENATOR WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION AFTER HE RETURNS NEXT WEEK FROM PEKING.

JACKSON HAS NEVER VISITED THE SOVIET UNION. HE OFTEN HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS AND WAS THE PRIME MOVER BEHIND A 1974 LAW THAT TIED U.S. TRADE CONCESSIONS TO SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICIES.

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לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות דשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957

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משרד החוק

מחלקת השטר

ס ו ד י
מ ל י ד י

הש
קולט
(ג'קסון)

מברק נכנס-משווג

אל: המשרד

מאת: ניו-יורק

השגריר רוסי (הועבר)

דע: מנכ"ל.

התקשר מוריס אייכרמס.

מטר כי הסנטור ג'קסון שווה איתו היום ואמר לו כי הוא שוכנע מדבריו סאדאט, כי ניתן למצוא
דרך פשרה בנושא יו"ש. הסנטור מדגיש את הנזק הרב שניגזם עקב ההתחללות האחרונה, וה"זיכות
המכ"ער" סבילבגי אמר מה בנושא ההתחללות. לדבריו, ג'קסון אמר כי מורגש כירסום ניכר בתמיכה
בישראל.

הרצוג

שהח רחם ס/רחם מנכל שתבס ממנכל ששון דיבון מצפא הקר דם אמן

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2037 :MIDEAST-JACKSON:

1/11/11

1/11/11

NEW YORK, FEB 5, REUTER - SENATOR HENRY JACKSON, A STRONG DEFENDER OF ISRAEL, SAID TODAY THAT THE REAL PROBLEM IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TALKS WAS THE QUESTION OF DEFENSIBLE BORDERS FOR ISRAEL, NOT THE PRESENCE OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS ON OCCUPIED ARAB LAND.

+WITHOUT THE WEST BANK, ISRAEL IS NOT A VIABLE SOVEREIGN STATE,+ HE TOLD INTERVIEWERS ON CBS-TV'S +FACE THE NATION,+

+-)99(-5 503 .-3 90 8'4-3). IT COULD BE SEVERED IN THREE OR FOUR PLACES WHERE THE DISTANCE TO THE SEA IS NO MORE THAN EIGHT MILES (13 KM).+

THE WASHINGTON STATE DEMOCRAT DENIED THAT HE WAS ADVOCATING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD KEEP THE ARAB WEST BANK. BUT HE SAID IF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE WEST BANK,

+YOU HAVE CREAED A DAGGER IN THE HEART OF ISRAEL.+

ISRAELIS STRONGLY OPPOSED +THE CREATION OF A SOVEREIGN STATE WITHIN THE HEART OF THEIR COUNTRY,+ HE SAID.

MORE JE

NNNN

2043 :MIDEAST-JACKSON 2 NEW YORK:

THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION WAS A MATTER THAT COULD BE IRONED OUT IN NEGOTIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, HE SAID, BUT IT POSED AN INTERNAL PROBLEM FOR THE LIKUD PARTY.

HE PSCXMSD SETTING UP DEMILITARISED BUFFER ZONES IN THE SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS TO SAFEGUARD A MIDDLE EAST PEACE.

MR. JACKSON, WHO IS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, SAID THE UNITED STATES REMAINED VULNERABLE TO AN ARAB OIL EMBARGO BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BUILT UP THE RESERVE REQUIRED BY TWO-YEAR-OLD LEGISLATION.

BUT HE STRESSED THAT A GROWING IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT IN THE ARAB WORLD MADE AN OIL EMBARGO UNLIKELY.

+WE ARE VULNERABLE BECAUSE WE DO NOT HAVE A STRATEGIC (OIL) RESERVE AT THIS TIME. BUT I QUESTION WHETHER THE SAUDIS WOULD GO THAT ROUTE. THE SAUDIS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE A STAKE IN THE WESTERN WORLD FROM A FINANCIAL POINT OF VIEW. THEY HAVE A LOT INVESTED HERE,+ HE DECLARED.

EGYPT'S DECISION TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE ARAB SPLIT, THEREBY LESSENING THE CHANCE OF AN EMBARGO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID.

REUTER JE

כל המוטרי חוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז — 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס — מסווג

מס 407

בשלה 311600 ינואר 78

בתקבל 310317

שמור

הא
דאגה
(סניאן ג'קסן)

אל: המשרד

מאת: ווסינגטון

מצפא מאסוק מזאר.

- א. סנטור ג'קסון יוצא ב-10 לפברואר לביקור בסין כאורח ממסלת סין.
- ב. בתאריך מאוחר יותר אמור ג'קסון לבקר בבדיהם. יתלווה אליו ריצ'רד פרל.

רפיה

שהח רהח ט/רהח שהבט מנכל ממנכל סמנכל מצפא מאסוק מזאר חקר רט סאן

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CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

105 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 1000
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
981-2786

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

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י"ט חשוון תשל"ח
31 אוקטובר 1977
101.2

אל: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון.
מאה: הקונכ"ל, סן פרנציסקו.

הנדון: סנטור ג'קסון.

ראה נא ברצ"ב תשובתו של סנטור ג'קסון ליהודי ציוני ממודעינו
בסן פרנציסקו.

בברכה,

מרדכי ארזי

העתק: מר מ. ארד, סמנכ"ל.
מר ח. בראון, הציר, וושינגטון.
מר ב. נבון, ציר ההסברה, וושינגטון.
מנהל מצפ"א.
לשכת המנכ"ל.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 17, 1977

Alexander Seidman, M.D.
758 Myra Way
San Francisco, California 94127

Dear Dr. Seidman:


Thank you for your recent communication and for giving me your personal views on the Israeli situation.

I am deeply concerned at the drift in American policy on the Middle East, the most recent example of which is the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of October 1. This statement, in addition to bringing the Soviets back into the Middle East in a most unfortunate way, seems to be the latest move in the Administration's program of pressuring Israel to make one-sided concessions in the context of the Geneva conference. I believe this policy directed at our Israeli friends--the only genuine democracy in the Middle East--is wrong and shortsighted.

You can count on me to continue to speak out on these vital matters.

With good wishes.

Sincerely yours,


Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

HMJ:fd

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



Handwritten notes in blue ink, including the word "מזכה" and other illegible characters.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

31.10.77

407

Handwritten notes in blue ink: "קולטנו" and "(סניאן א' קיסין)".

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור ג'קסון על מדיניות ארה"ב במזה"ת

מצ"ב מכתבו של ג'קסון המדבר בעד עצמו.

נ ב ר ב ה,

צ. רפיה

העחק: לשכת המנכ"ל
השגריר, כאן

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

704

17.01.78

ל: מ"מ
ממ: שר החוץ, ירושלים

Handwritten notes:
17/1/78
10/1/78

מ"מ משרד החוץ ירושלים

מ"מ משרד החוץ ירושלים

ד. ר. ג.
Signature
ד. ר. ג.

מ"מ משרד החוץ
ירושלים

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 17, 1977

OCT 28 1977

Mr. Leon Kogan
626 "I" Street, Apt. 804
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Mr. Kogan:

Thank you for your recent communication and for giving me your personal views on the Israeli situation.

I am deeply concerned at the drift in American policy on the Middle East, the most recent example of which is the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of October 1. This statement, in addition to bringing the Soviets back into the Middle East in a most unfortunate way, seems to be the latest move in the Administration's program of pressuring Israel to make one-sided concessions in the context of the Geneva conference. I believe this policy directed at our Israeli friends--the only genuine democracy in the Middle East--is wrong and shortsighted.

You can count on me to continue to speak out on these vital matters.

With good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson
Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

HMJ:fd

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 19, 1977

RAVIR
fight for OIG

Mr. A. B. Polinsky
Chairman of The Board
Coca Cola Bottling Company
of San Diego
1348 47th Street
San Diego, California 92102

Dear Abe:

Many thanks for your frank communication regarding the current policies of the Administration toward Israel.

As you can guess, I am deeply concerned at the drift in American policy on the Middle East, the most recent example of which is the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of October 1. This statement, in addition to bringing the Soviets back into the Middle East in a most unfortunate way, seems to be the latest move in the Administration's program of pressuring Israel to make one-sided concessions in the context of the Geneva conference. I believe this policy directed at our Israeli friends -- the only genuine democracy in the Middle East -- is wrong and shortsighted.

All of us must continue to urge the Administration to do everything it can to protect the integrity of Israel in the current negotiations. Needless to say, I am doing what I can but it is essential for the President and Secretary Vance to hear directly from people like yourself.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Hoop

Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

נמ"ס 284
נשלח 181800 יולי 77

דחופ

אלו המודד
מאת: וושינגטון

Handwritten signature and initials in blue ink.

מצפא. אירי ג. ✓
יהודי בריהים.

לזכר חלק ממאמר ראשי ביי וושינגטון פוסטיי היום על הצעת
הסנטור דול האומר לעקוף תיקון ג'קסון :

IT IS NOT A GLORIOUS EPISODE, BUT SOME INSTRUCTIVE POINTS HAVE BEEN MADE. FIRST OF ALL THE RUSSIANS CAN SEE THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS WILLING TO TRY TO BRING TRADE BACK INTO THE SOVIET AMERICAN PICTURE. IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER EXPECTATIONS, THERE SEEM TO BE FEW ILLUSIONS LEFT IN WASHINGTON THAT TRADE CAN BE A MAGIC SOLVENT OF OTHER TENSIONS OR THAT IT CAN BECOME VERY SIGNIFICANT IN STRICTLY ECONOMIC TERMS. BUT IT IS SEEN RIGHTLY AS A USEFUL ASPECT OF A MATURE RELATIONSHIP.

SECOND THE RUSSIANS CAN NOW ALSO SEE AS CAN THE ADMINISTRATION - THAT THERE IS NOT ANY WAY AROUND THE JACKSON AMENDMENT. SUPPORT FOR THE PRO EMIGRATION PURPOSE. OF THIS MEASURE HAS BEEN IF ANYTHING, STRENGTHENED BY THE CARTER HUMAN RIGHTS DRIVE. THERE IS NO VALUE IN BEMOANING THIS ANY MORE. IT IS POLITICAL FACT.

THE AMENDMENT HOWEVER IS NOT THE RIGID INSTRUMENTS IT IS OFTEN THOUGHT TO BE. IT INCLUDES FOR INSTANCE A PROVISION THAT LETS THE PRSIDENT ASK CONGRESS TO WAIVE THE AMENDMENT FOR A YEAR IF HE THINKS SUCH A WAIVER WILL PROMOTE EMIGRATION. THE AMENDMENT ACTUALLY ALLOWS MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN DID THE KISSINGER-JACKSON KREMLIN EXTRALEGAL AGREEMENT THAT CONTROLLED EMIGRATION AND TRADE FOR THE BRIEF PERIOD BEFORE IT COLLAPSE- AS SUCH A GROTEQUE CONSTRUCTION HAD TO COLLAPSE- IN 1974. WERTHAT SENATOR JACKSON WOULD NOT ALLOW HIS PERSONAL SUSPICIOS OF THE RUSSIANS TO OBSTUCT A QUIET ADMINISTRATION EFFORT TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. MR JACKONS RELATIONS WITH JIMMY CARTER ARE AS CLOSE WE NOTE AS HIS RELATIONS WITH HENRY KISSINGER WERE STRAINED.

IN BRIEF THERE IS A CERTAIN CHASTENED MOOD IN WASHINGTON ON THE TRADE EMIGRATION QUESTION. THE VARIOUS PATIES ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO RESHUFFLE THE DECK. THAT THE JACKSON AMENDMENT HANDLED CAREFULLY CAN E SOMEHTING OTHER THAN A BARRIER TO EMIGRATION AND TO T

RADE AND TO BETTER RELATIONS IN GENERAL IS BEING DEMONSTRATED IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA. WE THINK IT WOULD BE WELL WORTH THE RUSSIANS'S WHILE LOOK AT THE QUESTION ANEW.

RAFIACH=

שחזר רחמי מנכל ממנכל מצפא מזאר תפוצות חקר מעת הסברה תעוד איסור
 רמ בר נתיב
 צג/רמ

מס' תשנ"ט

מברק נכנס

Handwritten notes and signatures:

משק רביב
 2/1500
 77 MF 108
 288 ז' חל' 213/ש

ש"ע/213
 נר 288 ז' חל' 213/ש
 נר 168 ז' נ"י
 מ"ידי 2/1500 מאי 77 MF 108
 טודי
 אל: בר, נתיב

לחגן רישום של רפיח על פגישת אברמוב היומעה ג'קסון וריצ'רד פול.

אברמוב אמר שהצקות והמסע האנטישמי בבריתם נמשכו ונראה שהגענו למבוי סתום עם הסובייטים. שאל את ג'קסון מה, לדעתו, ניתן לעשות. ג'קסון אמר: אין לאבד הסבלנות צריך להמשיך בקו הקיים
 KEEP UP THE FAITH

המצב הכלכלי של הסובייטים קשה, הם חייבים כסף רב למערב (45 מליארד דולר חייב כל הגוש המזרחי: למערב, במשך חמש שנים האחרונות. מזה 10 מליארד לארה"ב). גם האירופאים מתחילים עתה לקמצ באשראי לסובייטים. הסובייטים זקוקים מאד לאשראי. תיסוג סטיבנסון (הגבלת ואשראי ל-300 מליון) הוא שודיג'זם. זו הדרך היחידה להביא אותם לפתרון בעיית ההגירה. אברמוב הזכיר (בעקבות דברי ואניק ומבלי להזכירו) שיש ומדברים על יוזמה הכיח הלכך בתחום הכלכלי. ג'קסון דחה רעיון זה ואמר: אין לנקוט כל יוזמה. יש לשמור על המצב הקיים. זו הדרך היחידה להבהיר לסובייטים.

ג'קסון הוסיף שטען לאחדונה ארוחת ערב עם שגריר רומניה. ג'קסון אמר לרומני דברים ברורים ותקיפים בנושא חידוש ה- MFA לרומניה והצורך להתנהג כהלכה בנושא ההגירה. לסיימחזר ג'קסון ואמר: תמסור לאנשיכ-תתאזרו בסבלנות. אין להפזז ולשנות המצב.

לפני כן נפגש אברמוב עם פנוויק, שחזרה והביעה הזדהותה עם מאבק יהודי בריה"מ וכוונתה להמשיך בפעולה. כן נפגש עם זוריןסקי, הסנטור היהודי מנברסקה. עד כאן.

פדחצור

מברק נכנס

ש"ע/206
 גר 279 פר תל
 גר 181 פר נ
 מ"ידי 271300 DF ווש

סודי

אל: בר, נת"ב

דע: ה"י

אברמוב נפגש אתמול עם ואניק וטליסמנ. להלן רישום השיחה על ידי רפיח:
 ואניק אמר כי שנת 1977 היא השנה הקריטית להישנקיטת יוזמה כלשהיא
 מצד ארהב ביחס לברי"ת. כוונתו ליוזמה בתחום הכלכלי ומתן
 אשראי ולא לנושא סאלט. לדבריו יוזמה כזו עשויה להניע את הסובייטים
 לנהוג ביוחד ליברליות בנושא יהודי ברי"ת. יוזמה זו חייבת לדעתו
 לבוא מהבית ולבני ולא מן הקונגרס.
 ואניק בדעה שהקונגרס מקבל אופי שמרני וכולני יוחד ויוחד.
 הדבר הל גמ על חסרי קונגרס חדשים. לוערכתו אילו הצביעו היום בקונגרס
 על הדטנט היה נדחה. שנת 1978 היא כידוע שנת בחירות לקונגרס ואם
 לא ייעשה דבר בשנה זו אינ, לדעתו סיכוי שיעשה משהו בשנה הבאה.
 ואניק אמר שלוערכתו תמכוססת על מגעים שונים עם תממשל, בזזינסקי
 הוא הקובע עת ה יוחד מאחרימ בנושא ברי"ת ויהודי ברי"ת. ואולם
 למרות ששוחח עמו אישית אינ ואניק יודע איפה עומד ברזיזנסקי
 בענינ זה. לדבריו יש מגמה בממשל הנדחפת על ידי ברזיזנסקי לשפל
 את היחסים עם סינ. ואניק חושש והדבר יכעיס את הסובייטים ואינו
 סבור שצעד כזה הינו מחוכמ במישור יחסי ארהב-ברי"ת. הוא סבור
 שתשוב גם לישראל שהיחסים הכלכליים עם ברי"ת ישפורו. הוא מעונינ
 לדעת מה עמדת ישראל לגבי נקיטת יוזמה כלפי ברי"ת.
 ואניק אומר כי שרת ומסוד מסרה לו שלאחיימוב, סגן תשר הסובייטי
 לעניני סוד חוצ יבקר בווישינגטון בשבוע הבא וכי אלחיימוב מעונינ
 לראות את ואניק. השניים אכן יפגשו. ואניק שואל אם לא כדאי
 היה לנסות לגשש אצל אלחיימוב בכיוון הנל.
 באשר לרומניה ואניק מסר כי השגרירות הרומנית כאנ הודיעה לו
 שיש כ-60 יהודים ברומניה אשר קבלו רשות הגירה לישראל ואולם ישראל
 איננה מתירה לתם להכנס לשטחה. הרומנים המציאו לוואניק רשימת
 שמית של אנשים אלו ואניק הבטיח לתמציאה לנו בהקדם.

עד כאן.

פרהצור

3

מברק נכנס

Soli ג'קנין
33

ש"ע/213

נר 286 פד תלכ

נר 168 פד נ"י

מ"ידי 271500 מאי 77 פד 77

סודי

אל: בר, נתיב

דע: הי"מ

לחגג הישום של רפיח על פגישת אברמוב היזמעם ג'קסון וריצ'רד פול.

אברמוב נסר שהצקות ותמסע האנשימי בבדידת נמשכ ונראה שהגענו למבוי סתום עם הטובייטים. שאל את ג'קסון מה, לדעתו, ניתן לעשות.

ג'קסון אמר: אינן לאבד הסבלנות צריך להמשיך בקו הקיים

KEEP UP THE FAITH

המצב הכלכלי של הטובייטים קשה, הם חייבים

כסף רב למע"כ (45 מליארד דולר חייב כל הגוש המזרחי: למערב, במשכ

תש שנים האחרונות. מזה 10 מליארד לארה"ב). גם האירופאים מתחילים

עתה לקמצ באשראי לטובייטים. הטובייטים זקוקים מאד לאשראי.

תיקון סטיבנסון (הגבלת האשראי ל-300 מליון) הוא שודג'יזם. זו הדרכ

היחידה להביא אותם לפתרון בעיית ההגירה.

אברמוב הזכיר (בעקבות דברי ואניק ומבלי להזכירו) שיש תמורים על

יוזמה הכית הלכנ בתחום הכלכלי. ג'קסון דחה רעיון זה

ואמר: אינן לנקוט כל יוזמה. יש לשמור על המצב הקיים. זו הדרכ היחידה

להבהיר לטובייטים.

ג'קסון הוסיף שסעד לאחדונה ארוחת ערב עם שגריר רומניה.

ג'קסון אמר לרומני דברים ברורים ותקיפים בנושא חידוש ה- MFA

לרומניה והצורך להתנהג כהלכה בנושא ההגירה.

לסיומחזר ג'קסון ואמר: תמסור לאנשיכ-ותתאזרו בסבלנות.

אינן להתפז ולשנות המצב.

לפני כנ נפגש אברמוב עם פנוויק, שחזרה והביעה הזדהותה עם מאבק

יהודי בדיהיים וכוונתה להמשיך בפעולה.

כנ נפגש עם זוריןסקי, הסנטור היהודי מנברסקה.

עד כאן.

פדוצור

[Handwritten scribbles and marks]

1/1

שרות תח"ל

מברק נכנס

ש"ע/206

נר 279 פר תלכ

נר 161 פר ני

מ"ידי 271300 מ"פ ווש-

סודי

אל: בר, נתיב

דע: חיים

אברמוב נפגש אתמול עם ואניק וטליסמנ. לולג רישומ השיחה על ידי רפ"ז:
 ואניק אמר כי שנת 1977 היא השנה הקריטית להישנקיטת יוזמה כלשהיא
 מצד ארהב ביחס לברית. כן, תו ליוזמה בתחום הכלכלי ומתנ.
 אשראי ולא לנושא סאלט. לדבריו יוזמה כזו עשויה להניע את הסובייטים
 לנהוג ביותר ליברליות בנושא יהודי ברית. יוזמה זו חייבת לדעתו
 לבוא מתבית הלכנ ולא מן הקונגרס.
 ואניק בדעה שהקונגרס מקבל אופי שמרני וכולני יותר ויותר.
 הובר תל גם על חברי קונגרס חדשים. להערכתו אילו הצביעו היום בקונגרס
 על הדטנט היה נדחה. שנת 1978 היא כידוע שנת בחירות לקונגרס ואם
 לא ייעשה דבר בשנה זו אינ, לדעתו סיכוי שיעשה משהו בשנה הבאה.
 ואניק אמר שלהערכתו תמכוססת על מגעים שונים עם הממשל, בזזינסקי
 הוא הקובע עת ה יותר מאחדים בנושא ברית ויהודי ברית. ואולם
 למרות ששוחח עמו אישית אינ ואניק יודע איפה עומד ברזיזנסקי
 בענין זה. לדבריו יש מגמה בממשל הנרחפת על ידי ברזיזנסקי לטפל
 את היחסים עם סינ. ואניק חושש ההדבר יכעיס את הסובייטים ואינו
 סבור שצעד כזה הינו מחוכמ במישור יחסי ארהב-ברית. הוא סבור
 שתשוב גם לישראל שהיחסים הכלכליים עם ברית ישפורו. הוא מעונין
 לדעת מה עמדת ישראל לגבי נקיטת יוזמה כלפי ברית.
 ואניק אומר כי שרת ומסרד מסרה לו שלאחיימוב, סגן השר הסובייטי
 לעניני סוד חוצ יבקר בווישינגטון בשבוע הבא וכי אלאחיימוב מעונין
 לראות את ואניק. השניים אכן ייפגשו. ואניק שואל אם לא כדאי
 היה לנסות לגשש אצל אלאחיימוב בכיוון הנל.
 באשר לרומניה ואניק מסר כי השגרירות הדומנית כאן הודיעה לו
 שיש כ-80 יהודים ברומניה אשר קבלו רשות הגירה לישראל ואולם ישראל
 איננה מתירה להם להכנס לשטחה. הדומנים המציאו לוואניק רשימת
 שמית של אנשים אלו ואניק הבטיח להמציאה לנו בהקדם.

עד כאן.

פדהצור-

3

מברק נכנס

שיע/216

גר 270 פר תלע

גר 156 פר ני

מידי 261600 MF ווש=

טודי

אל:נתיב

דע:בר,חיים

1. נפגשתי היום עם אדמיטאז בעקבות ביקורו בכוקרשט. הוא אמר שהבחינ
 בראינות הדיפה בנושא זכויות האדם ודאגה לקראת בלגרד. בענין ההגירה
 ור.פ.ג. אמר לו גליגה, שיתכן שישכח העסק אינו כדאי מבחינתנו.י.
 שאכתי אל אדמיטאז אמר הוא מתייחס ברצינות לוחבטאות זאת הוא השיב בשלילה.
 הוא אמר שובהיר להם באורחו חד משמעי מה מצפה מתו תמשל. הם לא נתנו
 שום נימוקים להצעה ביציאה.

2. אדמיטאז אמר שהוא מודאג מיזמתו של קוצ יחד עם 55 חסידים אחרים
 בביה"נ שעלולה להביא לאי הארכת ה-מ.פ.ג. על רקע תמשל המיוחד
 שנהג תמשל לזכויות האדם. ייתיה דרושה לנו עזרתכיי אמר והוסיפ
 שותמטורן מבקש להביא לתשומת לבנו שקיימת סכנה שיהיזינוק ישכ
 עם דמימי וארצות וישראל יאבדו מנופ חשוב ללחצ על הדומנים. הוא אמר
 שעל אף העובדה שתמספריים נמוכים ותו בהחלט אינם מספקים את תמשל
 צריכ להביא בתשכונ מה היה קורה אלמלא ה-מ.פ.ג.
 אמרתי שמשמלה ישראל אינה מתערבת בתחלשות הקונגרס, וכי אם נישאל
 על מצב העלייה לא תויה לנו ברירה אלא לספק את הנתונים תמות שהם.
 עם זאת אמרתי שהנחנו מודעים למה שמוטל על כפות המאזניים וכדי
 לתת לרומנים מידורח זמן לשיפורי ומצב רצוי שהעדויות יתקיימו
 במועד מאוחר ככל האפשר. הוספתי שתמשל חייב גם להביא בתשכונ
 שרומנים אינ למעשה שום סיבה לפעול לשיפורי ומצב אמ הם משוכנעים
 כפי שום טוענים ששיחות בקונגרס שיהיה מה שיהיה בסופו של דבר
 יחייכ ה-מ.פ.ג.

אדמיטאז אמר, טיש לו תדגשה שהדומנים ייכסר נמאסויי בהטחותיהם
 לתחיים שונים בקונגרס ותתנהגותם עלולה לגרור סירוב להאריכ
 ה-מ.פ.ג. הוא אמר שיתכן שיהיו עדויות ראשונות ב-16 ביולי ותמשכנ
 יידחה כדי לקיים לתו יעיל על הדומנים. מכל מקום תמטיח שתמשל
 יוסיפ ללחוצ והוא תוזר ומכש לצייד אותו בנתונים שבקשתי בשעתו.
 אני תוזר על ובקשה.

בדוקצור=

27.5.77

טוּדִי

שיחה ג'קסון - ש.ז. אברמוב, 27.5.77 במשרד

הסנטור בקפיטול

השתתפו: ריצ'רד פרל וצבי רפיה.

אברמוב אמר כי ההצקות והמסע האנטישמי בבריה"מ נמשך ונראה כי הגענו למבוי סתום עם הסובייטים. שאל את ג'קסון מה, לדעתו, ניתן לעשות.

ג'קסון אמר - אין לאבד הסבלנות. צריך להמשיך בקו הקיים. KEEP UP THE FAITH. המצב הכלכלי של הסובייטים קשה, הם חייבים כסף רב למערב (45 מליארד דולר חייב כל הגוש המזרחי, למערב, במשך חמש שנים האחרונות. מזה 10 מליארד לארה"ב). גם האירופאים מתחילים עתה לקמץ באשראי לסובייטים. הסובייטים זקוקים מאד לאשראי. תיקון סטיבנסון (הגבלת האשראי ל-300 מליון) הוא שהרגיזם. זו הדרך היחידה להביא אותם לפתרון בעיית ההגירה.

אברמוב הזכיר (בעקבות דברי ואניק ומבלי להזכירו) כי יש המדברים על יוזמה של הבית-הלבן בתחום הכלכלי. ג'קסון דחה רעיון זה ואמר - אין לנקוט כל יוזמה. יש לשמור על המצב הקיים. זו הדרך היחידה להבהיר לסובייטים.

ג'קסון הוסיף כי סעד לאחרונה ארוחת ערב עם שגריר רומניה.

ג'קסון אמר לרומני דברים ברורים ותקיפים בנושא חידוש ה-MFN להחנהג / כהלכה בנושא ההגירה.

לסיום חזר ג'קסון ואמר - תמסור לאנשיך - תחאזרו בסבלנות.

אין להחפז ולשנות המצב.


צבי רפיה

26.5.77

סודי

א.ש.ז.
א.נ.ק.
170

שיחת ש.ז. אברמוב עם המורשה צ'רלס ואניק בקפיטול

ב-26.5.77

השתתפו: מרק סליסמן, לשעבר עוזרו הראשי של ואניק המוסיף לקיים עימו קשר הדוק ולהנחותו בכל הקשור לעניינים יהודיים ולישראל, וצבי רפיה.

ואניק אמר כי שנת 1977 היא השנה הקריטית לנקיטת יוזמה כלשהי מצד ארצות הברית ביחס לברית המועצות. כוונתו ליוזמה בתחום הכלכלי ומתן אשראי ולא לנושא סאל"ט. לדבריו יוזמה כזו עשויה להניע את הסובייטים לנהוג ביתר ליברליות בנושא יהודי בריה"מ. יוזמה זו חייבת לדעתו לבוא מהבית-הלבן ולא מן הקונגרס.

ואניק בדעה שהקונגרס מקבל אופי שמרני ובדלני יותר ויותר. הדבר חל גם על חברי קונגרס חדשים, להערכתו אילו הצביעו היום בקונגרס על הדטנט היה נדחה. שנת 1978 היא, כידוע, שנת בחירות לקונגרס ואם לא ייעשה דבר בשנה זו אין, לדעתו, סיכוי שייעשה משהו בשנה הבאה.

ואניק אמר כי להערכתו, המבוססת על מגעים שונים עם הממשל, ברז'ינסקי הוא הקובע עתה יותר מאחרים בנושא בריה"מ ויהודי בריה"מ. ואולם למרות שווח עימו אישית, אין, ואניק יודע איפה עומד ברז'ינסקי בענין זה.

ואניק אומר שיש מגמה בממשל, הנדחפת ע"י ברז'ינסקי, לטפח את היחסים עם סין. ואניק חושש שהדבר יכעיס את הסובייטים ואינו סבור שצעד כזה הינו מחוכם במישור יחסי ארה"ב-בריה"מ.

ואניק סבור כי חשוב גם לישראל שהיחסים הכלכליים עם בריה"מ ישופרו.

ואניק מעונין לדעת מה עמדת ישראל לגבי נקיטת יוזמה כלפי בריה"מ.

ואניק אומר, כי הואניטה קרפס מסרה לו כי אלהימוב, סגן השר הסובייטל לענייני סחר-חוץ, יבקר בוויטינגטון בשבוע הבא וכי אלהימוב מעונין לראות את וואניק. השניים אכן ייפגשו. ואניק שואל אם לא כדאי היה לנסות לגשש אצל אלהימוב, בכיוון הנזכר לעיל.

עוד סיפר כי לפני זמן מה ביקר ארבטוב בווינגטון. הלה
התקשר טלפונית עם ואניק אך לא ביקר אצלו.

באשר לרומניה, ואניק מסר כי השגרירות הרומנית כאן הודיעתהו
שיש כ-60 יהודים ברומניה אשר קיבלו רשות הגירה לישראל ואולם ישראל
איננה מתירה להם להכנס לשטחה. הרומנים המציאו לוואניק רשימה שמית
של אנשים אלו וואניק הבטיח להמציאה לי בהקדם.

עד כאן משיחת ואניק-אברמוב.


צבי רפיה



י' חשון תשל"ז
3 נוב' 76

שמור

630

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

Handwritten notes in blue ink:
הנדרון ג'קסון וקארטר
הנדרון ג'קסון וקארטר

הנדרון: ג'קסון וקארטר

ריצ'רד פרל סיפר לי כי היחסים בין ג'קסון וקארטר השתפרו
מאד. אחד הביטויים לכך הוא, כמובן, המכתב ששיגר, בשעתו, קרט
לג'קסון בעניין תיקון ג'קסון והחרם הערבי.

ג'קסון גם פעל במסגרת מסע הבחירות של קרט בקונטיקט,
פלורידה, ניו-יורק וקליפורניה.

ב ב ר כ ה,
צ. רפיח

העתק: לשכת השר
המשנה למנכ"ל

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

000

1957

1957
1957

מ: 1000
מ: 1000

הודעה

הודעה על פתיחת משרד החוץ
בירושלים, יום ראשון, 17 במרץ 1957.

הודעה על פתיחת משרד החוץ
בירושלים, יום ראשון, 17 במרץ 1957.

1957
1957

מ: 1000
מ: 1000



כ"ו שבט תשל"ז
14 פבר' 77

93

שמור
סניאן ג'קסן

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: שיחה עם ריצ'רד פרל

להלן דברים ששמעתי מפרל לפני כמה ימים:

ביום ששי ה-4 דנא נפגש ג'קסון עם הנשיא בבית הלבן "בארבע-
עיניים". (ריצ'רד שמח שהפגישה הייתה ביחידות, כדי שברז'ינסקי יחשוש
קצת...)

בשיחה לא הועלה נושא המזה"ת, ומרביתה הוקדשה לנושא סאל"ט.

ג'קסון טען כי יש להוציא את ה- BACKFIRE הסובייטי ואת

ה- CRUISE - MISSILE האמריקני מכלל ההסכם העתיד על צמצום

הנשק הגרעיני. הנשיא קיבל את עמדה ג'קסון שהיתה מעגדת לעמדת הגורמים

האחרים בממשל המיוצגים ב- S C C (SECURITY COORDINATION COMMITTEE)

כולל ואנס, ברז'ינסקי, מונדייל וראש המטות המשולבים. ואכן קארטר הכריז

על עמדתו זו במסיבת העיתונאים שקיים לאחר-מכן.

ג'קסון טבע-רצון גם מההודעה שפרסם הממשל בענין זכויות

האדם בבריה"מ (סחארוב וג'ינזבורג). עם זאת מציינ ריצ'רד שהתבטאותו

האחרונה של ואנס בענין יורי אורלוב הייתה מאד פושרת ולמעשה חסרת

משמעות. ואנס אמר למעשה רק שהוא יודע על המקרה.

ריצ'רד אומר כי עמדתו הבסיסית של קארטר היא שהוא נותן

אמון בברז'נייב עד שברז'נייב יוכיח ההיפך. ריצ'רד רואה בכך גישה

מסוכנת מאד. ריצ'רד מפנה השומת לבנו לאפשרות כי באיזה שהוא שלב של

המגעים בריה"מ-ארה"ב עשויים הסובייטים להציע ויתור בנושא אחד (סאלט)

המורה ויתור אמריקני בנושא אחר (המזה"ת).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DATE: 1/15/64
TIME: 10:00 AM

TO: DIRECTOR, STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM: [Name]

ISRAELI SECURITY MATTERS

Reference is made to the report of the Israeli Security Council dated 1/10/64, which states that the Council has decided to continue its work in the field of security cooperation with the United States.

The Israeli Security Council is a body established in 1952, which has the honor of being the first such body to be established in the Middle East. It is composed of representatives of the Israeli Government and the Israeli Security Council, and is responsible for the coordination of security matters between the two.

The Israeli Security Council has been active in the field of security cooperation with the United States, and has held several meetings with the United States Security Council. It is hoped that the Israeli Security Council will continue to work closely with the United States Security Council in the future.

The Israeli Security Council is a body established in 1952, which has the honor of being the first such body to be established in the Middle East. It is composed of representatives of the Israeli Government and the Israeli Security Council, and is responsible for the coordination of security matters between the two.



שמור

- 2 -

היחסים בין קרטר וג'קסון הינם טובים יחסית. הפגישה בביית
הלבן היתה ביטוי לכך. קרטר דקוק לג'קסון כדי להבטיח תמיכת הסינט
בעה שיגיש הנשיא (באפריל) את חכנית האנרגיה שלו. מתוך הריאורגניזציה
שאושרה לאחרונה בוועדה הסינט יצא ג'קסון הנשכר העיקרי: ועדת האנרגיה
ואוצרות הטבע שהוא עומד בראשה מרכזת עתה את הטיפול בכל נושאי
האנרגיה, וקיבלה תחת חסותה הטיפול בהיבטים שונים של נושא זה שהיו
מפוזרים עד כה בתחומי ועדות אחרות. אפשר לומר ש"צאר" האנרגיה בסינט
הוא מעתה ג'קסון. (ג'קסון ממשיך לכהן, בנוסף לכך, למשך השנתיים
הבאות, לפחות, גם כיו"ר תת-ועדת החקירות שליד הוועדה לפעולות הממשלה.
זוהי תת-הוועדה המשלמת את משכורתם של דורותי פוסקין /ריצ'רד פרל).

ואולם ג'קסון הודיע פומבית שהוא ימשיך לשמור על עמדתו העצמאית,
ואם יראה זאת לנכון - הוא עלול גם להתנגד לעמדת הנשיא. ג'קסון כבר
נתן ביטוי לכך בהתנגדותו למינוי פול וארנקי, מינוי שהנשיא תומך
בו במרץ רב.

בין ג'קסון לשלזינגר שוררים, כפי שניתן היה לצפות, יחסים
טובים והדוקים, בהתאם למסורת העבר ביניהם.

ב. ד. כ. ה.,
צבי רפיה

העתק: המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת חקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר 18 מתוך 25 עותקים

סודי ביותר

Handwritten signatures and notes in blue ink, including a large signature and the word 'מיידי' (Immediately).

גר: 193

נשלח: 131700 17 ינו 77

אל: המשרד

מא: רושינגטון

עברון.

נמגשתי ב-7 דנא עם סנטור ג'קסון במשרדו בקפיטול. השתתפ רפ"ח. בשיחה שארכה כשעה סקרתי ההתפתחויות במזת ועמדתינו לקראת מום ב-77. ג'קסון הקדיש חלק ניכר מדבריו להערכה לתפקיד החשוב שממלאת וחמלא סעודיה בנושא הסכסוכ המזתי.

ודברו על צוות הממשל החדש אמר כי אינ הוא נותן אמונ בבדז'ינסקי ובגישתו כלפי בריהמ. סיפר לדוגמא כי היה יחד עם בדז'ינסקי בכנס בליידנברג ב-1968. בדז'ינסקי טענ אז בתוקפ רב כי בריהמ לא תפלוש לציכיה שכנ יחסיה עם מערב אידופה חשובים לה יותר. זמנ קצר לאחד מכנ אידעה והפלישה הסובייטית לציכיה. ג'קסון אמר כי ממשל קרטר

עשה טעות גסה בככ שהודיע כי הוא מעונינ להתומ על סאלט 2 עד הקיצ הקרוב. בככ למעשה טרפ את קלפיו ונתנ עמדת מיקוח נוחה לסובייטים. ג'קסון דיבר בהרחבה על אליית משקלה של סעודיה והחשיבות שכיצירת מגע אחה. ג'קסון אישר באוזני(את אשר שמעתי קודמ לכנ מסנטור צירצ'י) כי ריכוז נושא האנרגיה בועדת הפנימ, בראשה הוא עומד, נותנ בידינו עמדה כוח חשובה. מהדכ התייחסותו והתבטאותו כלפי הממשל ניתנ היה להבינ שיחס יו עם קארטר אינמ כה קרובים. כמוכנ שהבטיח כתמיד לעזור ולסייע לנו בכל הנושאים.

ד י נ י צ

Handwritten note at the bottom: שנה מה שהנא יונא עליונא אציר אקוב רען יתביב רבכלאיתנו מה לאאין



26.4.1976

הנדון: יהדות ברה"מ

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: מזא"ר

הנדון: יהדות ברה"מ (הסכם הסחר ברה"מ-ארה"ב ותיקון ג' קסון)

אני מסבה את השומת לבך לקטעים מחוץ הדו"ח שהגיש Richard Gilmore, Professional Staff Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Senate, US Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations. יו"ר ה-

הדו"ח נכתב ב-1.4.76 בעקבות ביקור גילמור בברה"מ בסוף נובמבר 1975 בקשר להסכם התבואה בין ארה"ב לברה"מ.

אני מצטטת מחוץ הדו"ח, כפי שפרסם אותו המדפיס הממשלתי האמריקני. בעמוד 2 נאמר:

...It appears Soviet officials are mainly interested in maintaining an upward trend in trade relations with the US. They attach considerable political importance to an increase in trade, but they did not emphasize the necessity of heavy U.S. Government credits for this trend to continue.

ובעמוד 15 נאמר:

... An official at Gosplan said that the current grain shortage severely affected the Soviet Union's balance of payments and that it would have an impact on the rest of the USSR's foreign trade.

אני מניחה, כי הקונסטלציה בארה"ב כעת - אי-פופולריות של הדטנס ושנה הבחירות - אינה נוחה לפעילות מוגברת בנדון, ואולי אין, מבחינת מצפ"א, הידוש בציטוטים הנ"ל, אבל אני מביאה אותם לחשומת לבך שמא בכל זאת אפשר לנצלם.

קח-נא בחשבון כי מעמדו של ברז'נייב התחזק לאהרונה, אם כי יש גם להתחשב בכך שהאווירה נגד הדטנס בארה"ב עלולה להשפיע לרעה על מנהיגי ברה"מ ביהסיהם עם ארה"ב.

בברכה,

ג'ואל זילבר
גיטה זילבר

העתק: המשנה למנכ"ל
מנהל אירופה 3



1954.10.10

№ 1000

№ 1000

1954.10.10 (1954.10.10)

Richard Gilmore, Professional Staff, with a number of other persons, including the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, U.S. Committee on International Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The above-named persons visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on October 10, 1954.

They were accompanied by their respective interpreters.

... It appears Soviet officials are mainly interested in maintaining an upward trend in trade relations with the US. They attach considerable political importance to an increase in trade, but they did not emphasize the necessity of heavy U.S. Government credits for this trend to continue.

1954.10.10

... An official at Gosplan said that the current grain shortage severely affected the Soviet Union's balance of payments and that it would have an impact on the rest of the USSR's foreign trade.

The above-named persons also visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on October 10, 1954.

The above-named persons also visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on October 10, 1954.

SECRET

1954.10.10

№ 1000

הממשלה
(משרד ג'קסון)

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

4

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס' 522

גשלה: 301530 כפט 76

אל: המשרד

ממח: וושינגטון

נייד

מצפה יערי. הלברין אומר. שר. אמנימלך ניל (העבר). רף - כאן.
לחץ כוח המבחן שניגד קארטר לסנטור ג'קסון ב-29 דגא אחר נמטר לפדוסום על ידי משרדו של
ג'קסון :

THE HONORABLE HENRY JACKSON
UNITED STATES SENATE
137 OLD SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON DC 20510

DEAR SCOOP,

I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU ARE COMPAIGNING IN BEHALF OF THE CARTER MONDALE TICKET. IN TALKING WITH OUR FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY MY STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN TWO ISSUES OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF OUR COUNTRY.

RIGHT NOW THE CONGRESS HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENACT THE FIRST NEW LEGISLATION IN TEN YEARS DELAING WITH THE ARAB SPONSORED BOYCOTT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. WE OUGHT TO RESIST ALL ATTEMPTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO IMPOSE RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION ON AMERICAN CITIZENS AS THE PRICE OF DOING BUSINESS.

MOREOVER IN MY JUDGMENT LEGISLATION SHOULD BE PASSED TO MAKE COMPLIANCE WITH ANY SECONDARY BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL ILLEGAL. I REGRET THAT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO OPPOSE SUCH LEGISLATION WHICH SEEKS ONLY TO BRING AMERICA'S COMMERCIAL PRACTICES INTO HARMONY WITH AMERICAN'S HUMANE PRINCIPLES.

I SHARE YOUR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THROUGHT THE WORLD. THE LEGISLATION WHICH YOU CO AUTHORED WHICH IS NOW THE LAW OF THE LAND AND WHICH IS AIMED AT SECURING THOSE RIGHTS WILL BE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED BY A CARTER MONDALE ADMINISTRATION. AS THE PLATFORM OF OUR PARTY MAKES CLEAR "AMERICA MUST TAKE A FIRM STAND TO SUPPORT AND IMLEMENT EXISTING US LAW TO BRING ABOUT LIBERALIZATION OF EMIGRATION POLICY IN COUNTIRES WHICH LIMIT OR PROHIBIT FREE EMIGRATION".

THE 1976 ELECTION IS AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY. IT IS AN ELECTION WHERE THE PEOPLE WILL I AM CONFIDENT CHOOSE AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHARES THEIR BELIEF IN HUMAN DECENCY AND FAIR PLAY. I VALUE YOUR SUPPORT AND HELP.

VERY TRULY YOUR
JIMMY CARTER

AD KAN.
RAFIACH--

שנת דחה. מבטל שנתו משנה למבטל פנפבל מצאם כלכלית מדאר אצור מדתים חקר רם אמר העוד

אלפר
מ/מא

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
16

י"ב שבט תשל"ו
12 בינואר 76

אל: מצפ"א
מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור ג'קסון נגד סחר עם קובה

מצ"ב הודעה לעתונות שנחפרסמה ב-7 דנא מטעם מטה הבחירות של ג'קסון. בקריאתו לבטל את החלטה המאפשרת לחברות-בת אמריקניות בחו"ל לסחור עם קובה מסתמך ג'קסון על פעילות הקובנים באנגולה ובסוריה.

בברכה,

צ. רפיח

העהק: המרכז, משה"ח
אמרכ"ז, משה"ח



① שלם

② תפקידים

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1700 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

TO: [Name]
FROM: [Name]

DATE: 1977 10 10

Subject: [Name]
Reference: [Name]
[Name] is a [Name] of [Name] who is [Name] of [Name].
[Name] is a [Name] of [Name] who is [Name] of [Name].
[Name] is a [Name] of [Name] who is [Name] of [Name].

10/10/77
[Signature]

[Name]
[Name]

[Signature]
[Signature]

[Signature]

NEWS FROM JACKSON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE

511 SECOND STREET N.E. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 (202) 488-7600

#128
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
WEDNESDAY, January 7, 1976

CONTACT: Brian Corcoran
Barbara Kellec
202/488-7600

MIAMI --- Senator Henry M. Jackson proposed today (Wednesday) that the United States reconsider the decision which lifted the prohibition against overseas subsidiaries of American corporations trading with Cuba.

"It seems every time we do something to normalize relations with Castro, he spits in our eye," Jackson said.

At a news conference in Miami, Jackson declared:

"It is clear that the Administration's policy of wooing Havana has failed totally and completely.

"Not only are Cuban troops serving as stalking horses for the Russians in Angola, but they are training Syrian tank brigades to operate the most sophisticated new Soviet armor.

"It is clear that Castro is willing not only to serve Soviet interests, but that he places Soviet interests ahead of those of the Cuban people.

"The Ford-Kissinger decision of August 1975 to lift the prohibition against overseas subsidiaries of American corporations trading with Cuba has backfired.

"Rather than encouraging Castro to move towards peace, it has encouraged him to believe that he alone can set the terms for Cuban-American relations.

"At the same time that Castro is exporting Cuban military involvement into Africa and the Middle East, he continues his campaign to undermine democracies in the Western Hemisphere.

"Ford's lifting of trade restrictions against Cuba should therefore be thoroughly reviewed. Clearly, the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola and Syria indicates that a 'normal' relationship with the United States is the farthest thing from Castro's mind."

#

Walter T. Skallerup, Jr. Treasurer

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

Handwritten signature and initials

דף מספר מתוך דפים
עותק מספר 17 מתוך 15 עותקים

סודי ביותר

מ י י ד י מסי 374

נשלח: 171400 דצמ 75

אל: המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

עברון, דע לשכת שהבט.

פגישת שר הבטחון עם סנטור גקסון בקפיטול ב 17 דנא. השתתפו השגריר,

צ'נובר, ריצ'רד פיל והחיים.

שחבט צ'יין כי העריכ מאד את שלזינגר. אמר שפגש את המספד ומצאו מאוד **ATTENTIVE**

FAIR JOB

גקסון אמר כי המספד הינו מאד **COURTEOUS** עשה

מאד ואכ לשאוד את כל החזרה (של הפנטגון) בקורס מזורז אין זה

אפשרי.

שחבט אמר כי הוא מבחינ בשנינו י קל במצב הרוח בארצ. החריגה כלפי הדטנט

איננה כשהיתה. אנגולה מפתיעה תן בחוקפנות טוביטימ ותן במעורבות

הקוביטימ.

גקסון אמר זה קורה בדיוק כשקייטינגר רוצה לחדש היחסים עם קובה. כשהבחירות

יתקיימו עוד נשמע נאומים נגד דטנט. לעם האמריקני י, ללא ספק נמאס מהדטנט.

גקסון הביע בטחון כי יזכה בבחירות המוקדמות בניו יורק. הוא מתקדם יפה גם

במסצ'וסטס. בפלורידה - עם יחזרה עם ואלט, ינסה לזכות במספר רב ככל האפשר

של נציגים. הדגיש החשיבות המיוחדת של המוקדמות בניו יורק, מסצ'וסטס

ואיילינוי השולחות יחד כשליש מצירי הועייה החמוקרטית שרמ כשי שליש

מהדוב החדוש לניו י מועד המפלגה. הדגיש החשיבות הפסיכולוגית המיוחדת

של נצחון בניו יורק.

גקסון שאל מה המצב האמריקני של משלוחי נשק לישראל.

שחבט השיב כי הממשל שחדד כמה פריטימ, מתנהלים דיונים על טכנולוגיה

מתקדמת ולא ניתנו תשובות על פריטימ עיקריים לגבי חכמת הדכש ל-5-4

השנים הבאות.

השגריר צ'יין הקטיטים הנעשים בפנינו לגבי טכנולוגיה מתקדמת.

בזקשר לבקשתנו לאספקת ציוד הסתה הדגיש שחבט הבעיה שיש לנו עם אייית

מסמך מס' 100

תאריך: 15.05.2018

מס' 100

מסמך מס' 100

מס' 100

מסמך מס' 100

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

=2=

הביון הטובי יטיית. הוסיף כי לגבי טכנולוגיה מתקדמת לא חלה כל תזו זה ממשיית. לעומת זאת לא השיבו לגבי התלפת טנקים ונגמשים ישנם שברשותנו בחדשים. השיבו לגבי F-16 והבטיחו שנקבל F-16.

שהבט אמר כי שנת 76 היא שנה קשה. בדרם מנסה לחזור למה היא נעיית יותר מסוריה כי נפגעה במצרים. בדרם הינה כשלונ כלכלי וחברתי אך מצליחה בתחום הצבאי. יהודי בדרם ומגיעים אלינו מדווחים על תנאי חיים קשים מאד שם.

גקסון אמר איזה שוטים אנו. יכולנו לעשות BARGAIN מצוייני באמצעות התנה. מומחים אומרים כי שדושות לברדם לפחות שבע שנים כדי לחלץ מתושבר החקלאי. רמ שוחטים בקר (בגלל מחסור בגרעיני מ) ויהיה לרם מחסור בבשר. הקנדים התחייבו למכור החיטה שלהם לסין.

לפי הדין

גקסון אמר עצתי לרם היא - החיו DETERMINED ו FIRM אינם חייבים לקבל את הוראות מומד. זו תהא ענה שנת אי ההחלטה. השגריר שאל האם לדעת גקסון יוכל הממשל בשנה זו לבוא ביו אמות של ממש במזת?

גקסון אמר - היא זה סיכון גדול בשבילם לנקוט ביו אמה רצינית. כל יו אמה שלרם תהא LOW LEVEL. נסייעת הנשיא לסין הזיקה לו, במיוחד כשהסינים רוצו לו על הדשנט. משאלי דעת הקהל מראים ידייה לפורד. האבטלה במסצוסטס כפולה מאשתקד. האינפלציה באה והולכת ויש הרגשת אי בטחון. גקסון הוסיף - זהו זמן קשה לישראל. יש לפקוח עינינו על הקונגרס ואחם עושים זאת. הממשל אינו יכול לדבר בשון חזק בתקופת ביניים זו. עצתי לרם היא STAND BY לגבי הדברים שרם חיוניים לרם. DIG IN.

ר פ י ח

10/10/10 2/2/10

11



October 18, 1976

SENATOR ROBERT P. GRIFFIN (Republican - Michigan)Biographical Information:

Born in Detroit, Mich., November 6, 1923; educated in public schools of Garden City and Dearborn, Mich.; graduate of Central Michigan Law School with J. D. degree; served as enlisted man in 71st Infantry Division during World War II, 14 months overseas; practiced law in Traverse City, Mich., 1950-56; married to former Marjorie J. Anderson of Ludington; four children; elected November 6, 1956, a Representative from Michigan's 9th district to 85th Congress; reelected to 86th, 87th, 88th, and 89th Congresses; appointed May 11, 1966 to U. S. Senate to fill unexpired term of the late Senator Patrick McNamara; elected November 8, 1966 to the U. S. Senate for full 6-year term; reelected November 7, 1972; elected October 1, 1969, Minority Whip of the Senate and reelected unanimously on opening day of the 92nd, 93rd, and 94th Congresses; United Church of Christ (Protestant).

Political Information:

Griffin is now Minority Whip in the Senate and, with Senator Hugh Scott's retirement, is due to become the Minority Leader. Despite this position, his reelection to the Senate in 1978 is not in the cards. In fact, he probably would rather be appointed to the Supreme Court if Gerald Ford regains the Presidency and there is a vacancy.

Committees:Foreign Relations

Commerce

Rules and Administration

Joint Committee on the Library

Voting Record:

Griffin has, for the most part, always taken the Administration line on issues relating to Israel and the Middle East.

While Griffin has voted for foreign aid legislation -- except for this year when he opposed the Fiscal Year 1976 authorization for the same reason the President vetoed it, namely, the policy provisions, his record on cosponsorship of declarations and resolutions in support of Israel has not been commendable.

Recently, he voted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against the resolution of disapproval on the Maverick missile sale to Saudi Arabia.

Griffin was not among the 70 Senators cosponsoring the Humphrey-Jackson Phantom Jet Resolution during the Yom Kippur War; not among the 71 cosigners of the December 9, 1974 letter to President Ford urging support for Israel and the rejection of the PLO, and was not a cosigner of the letter of 76 on the "reassessment" of the Administration Middle East policy. In addition, Griffin opposed transition quarter aid for Israel.

On May 15, 1968, he introduced a resolution urging the United States to work for a non-proliferation treaty on conventional weapons for the Near East through the United Nations. He declared that such a treaty would prevent a secret U. S. - Soviet "sell-out" of Israel and other nations in the area.

He has consistently fought against cuts in and to NATO because "the U. S. has vital security interests in the Middle East. Our forces in Europe -- and let us not forget that these include the Sixth Fleet -- enable us to project our influence and power into the Mediterranean and Middle East. The importance of maintaining a balance of military power -- not only between Israel and the Arabs, but also between East and West -- cannot be overemphasized."

While he cosponsored the October 1972 Jackson amendment to deny most-favored-nation status to those countries (like the USSR) which deny free emigration (76 cosponsors) he did not cosponsor the identical Jackson amendment in 1973.

In February of 1976 Griffin expressed criticism of Congress for adopting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and called it "counterproductive."

Comments:

Griffin comes from a state which has the largest Arab population in the country (approximately 300,000 to 400,000) which has traditionally supported him. He also is perhaps the closest to President Ford of all his Senate colleagues. Among Michigan's major defense contractors are: Chrysler; Ford; General Motors; Bendix; XLO Aerospace; Engstrom Corp.; Williams Research; Howmet Corp.; National Water Lift; LTV Michigan Dir.; and Teledyne-Continental.

ROBERT P. GRIFFIN
MICHIGAN

Handwritten notes in top right corner, possibly including a date and initials.

United States Senate

OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT MINORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Handwritten in red ink: "11/20/76" and "25" above it.

December 6, 1976

Handwritten in blue ink: "1/22/76" and a signature.

His Excellency
Yigal Allon
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Deputy Prime Minister
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Minister:

As a member of the delegation of U.S. Senators who recently visited your country, I wish to thank you for the many courtesies extended to us.

It was a pleasure and an honor to be received by you, particularly at a time when your schedule was so full.

Both as a group and as individuals, we were favorably impressed by our discussion with you, and by our visit to your beautiful country.

With genuine appreciation and warm best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Robert P. Griffin.

Robert P. Griffin
U. S. Senator

RPG:tb

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ט' כסלו תשל"ז
1 דצמ' 76

453

מ.ל.ל.
ז.ל.ל.
ה.ל.ל.

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

דברי הסנטורים גריפין (ממישיגן) ובלמן (מאוקלהומה)
בחום מסעם למזה"ת, כחברי משלחה ריביקוף.

ב ב ר כ ה,
ק.ל.ל.
צבי רפיח

העתק: הקונכ"ל, שיקגו
הקונכ"ל, יוסטון

RECEIVED
1952



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Plainly Speaking

By Sen. Henry Bellmon



Oklahomans concerned about the danger of another Arab-Israeli war during 1977 and the thrust of an embargo of Middle East oil shipments to the U.S. would have been reassured by recent statements by both Arab and Israeli government leaders. The comments were made to a 12-member delegation of U.S. Senators who were concerned about whether the current peace will last.

While the pressures on the Israelis for the return of occupied Arab lands continue strong, the Arab leaders, including President Sadat of Egypt, appear to be primarily occupied with strengthening their economies and solving other problems. Also the actions of the last war, the recovery of some lands and the re-opening of the Suez Canal have provided needed "face saving" as well as restoring a major revenue source.

This is extremely good news for U.S. energy users for the short term. Over the long haul, however, many serious and complex problems must be dealt with. Unless some solutions are found, tensions are certain to rise again, bringing about replacement of present "moderate" leaders of government with radicals and a return to terrorism and war.

In addition, continuing economic progress is essential. With inflation running at rates of up to 30 per cent per year, some housing costing over five times what it

did three years ago, and per capita incomes still less than 10 per cent of the U.S. level, great internal political stresses are still present. These could flare up if months or years go by without programs. Here is where correct but delicate diplomatic and economic decisions must be made by the U.S.

Foreign aid has become a bad concept to many who feel the money could better be used here at home. However, it appears that foreign aid used wisely in projects such as irrigating the Jordan Valley, bringing electricity to rural villages in Egypt, and building needed power projects has been a major factor in producing the current condition of relative stability between Arabs and Israelis. The costs of these projects to U.S. taxpayers are a small per cent of the costs the country would pay if another oil embargo is imposed.

The current period of peace in the Middle East is giving the U.S. a breathing space which should be used to increase our own energy production and make the country less dependent upon oil imports. Up to now no such progress is being made. Decisions soon to be announced by President-elect Carter regarding his energy program and his selection of key officials will determine whether or not four more years of living expensively and dangerously on insecure energy supplies will be a reality.

Area termed 'ripe' for peace accord

Griffin is hopeful on Mideast

By ALLAN BLANCHARD
Chief of Our Middle East Bureau

WASHINGTON — Michigan Sen. Robert P. Griffin, a member of a 12-man Senate Foreign Relations Committee group which made a trip to the Middle East, has returned to Washington convinced all sides of the conflict there are now "ready and ripe" for a "comprehensive peace settlement."

The Michigan Republican, who is expected to be Senate minority leader when Congress resumes in January, said all 12 members of the group, headed by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., and Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., came to the same conclusion after meeting with the leaders of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Iran during the 13-day trip.

Griffin also said he supported Ribicoff's recommendation to President-elect Jimmy Carter that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose shuttle diplomacy in the Mideast succeeded in bringing a truce between Israel and Egypt and weakening Soviet influence in the area, should be kept on in the next administration as a "special envoy" to the region.

Griffin said Kissinger is respected by both sides "who are looking to the United States for leadership." The senator said his one concern was that Carter, as new presidents have done in the past, may push foreign affairs into the background temporarily as he concentrates on developing a domestic policy.

"I hope the new administration won't wait too

long," he said. "I have a strong feeling that an effort early in the year could go someplace."

Ribicoff sent the suggestion about Kissinger to Carter while the group was still abroad. The President-elect said he would consider the idea.

Also, Griffin said, the group's talks with the Shah of Iran found him firmly committed to proceeding with the December meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' ministers, despite "a pitch" by the visiting senators for a delay in raising oil prices until the new administration "gets in place."

The shah is seeking a price increase of "at least 10 percent," Griffin said. The senators did not meet with the Saudi Arabians who, in the past, have opposed large oil price increases.

10/12/20

10/10

10/37

אסון אסון

אסון

שם

נר: 90
השליח: 081500 דצמ 78

אל: המשרד
מח: זוש'נגטון

מפא, מאור קונגרסון
WILLYS GRADISON, רפובליקני, יהודי, מסינסינטי, אוהיו
ב-80, גרוש, מגיע ארצה עם ושל בנותיו (גילים 16-27) לביקור מרטי במסגרת
סיור מאורגן של TWA

מגיע ב-22 דנא 810-TWA ומסריא לוי יורק 31 דנא X 811-TWA
ב-22 עד 27 בבוקר ישה במלון פליה ירושלים, ב-27 בפליה טבריה, ב-28
מייילת השחר, ב-29 וב-30 ברמזה קונטיננטל תל אביב.

הזו הביקור הראשון שלו ושל בנותיו בארצ. הסיור המאורגן כולל גם סיורים
בחבי הארצ. בשלב זה יש לו בקשה אחת-לאפשר לו ולבנותיו לחצוץ יד
ולחצולמ עם ראש המשלה. הוא יראה לכך את גולת הכותרת של ביקורו.

סיכמתי עמו כי נציג המשרד יקושר עמו בבואו ויסכם עמו אפשרות ארועים
ופגישות בנוסף לחכניה הסיור המאורגן.

גדיסון חבר ועדת ה WAYS AND MEANS רבת ההשפעה, הקובעת
מב' ענייני כספים ומסיים, מקבילה לוועדת הכספים של הסנט.

גדיסון הינו ידידותי. כדאי לנצל וביקור גדי כדי לעדכן אותו בכל הקשור
ליחסי ישראל ערב ולמומי, וכנ לגבי הסיוע ומיוחד בעקבות חסכם השלום.
מו כנ כדאי להפגישו עם חברי כנסת מוועדות הכלכלה והכספים. על משאלות
אחרות תלמדו ממנו בפגישתכם עמו.

ג'ה

811-TWA
10/10

Handwritten notes in a box:
10/10 - 811-TWA
מח: זוש'נגטון
אל: המשרד
מפא, מאור קונגרסון

מה של לוי לוי ארצ ארצ

Handwritten notes:
מפא, מאור קונגרסון
אל: המשרד
מח: זוש'נגטון
10/10

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
חשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

Handwritten notes:
מ
ש
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מס/ 302
נשלח : 211400 דצמ 78
התקבל: 212301 דצמ 78

אל: המשרד
מאת: וואשינגטון

אל: מנהל מצפא.

קונגרסמן SILLIS GRADISON , יהודי מסינסנטי.

א. ידיד מסינסנטי מסר לנו כי ב-15 דנא הופיע מאמר בנושא המזתיי
בעתון CINCINATI POST בחתימת גראדיסון.

ב. במאמר מציין גראדיסון כי השתופ, בין ה-20-18 בנובמבר, בכנס
שנערך בלונדון בחסות ARIEL FOUNDATION ושבו הועלה גם
הנושא המזתיי.

לדבריו למד מן הדצון בנושא שבלי מולח לפלשתינאים לא ימצא פתרון
למניח המזתיי. למרות שעובדה זו הפתיעה אותו - יש בה הגיון.
כייכי הביא גראדיסון במאמר סימוכין לדעתו זלעיל בדברים שנמסרו
לכאורה לפינדלי בפגישתו עם ערפאת.

ג. לאור האמור - בוודאי תנצלו בקורו של גראדיסון בארצ לשמ
הנחה עמדותינו בנושא הפלשתינאי ובמיחד השכילו אותו לגבי
חומת קביעתו שפתרון הטכסוכ באזורנו הוא בהקמת מדינה פלשתינאית.
רצוי ביותר שיתרשמ בשטח ממשעותה הבטחוניתמשל מדינה כזו.

ד. את המאמר עצמו לא ראינו. מיד עם קבלונו נעבירו לידיעתכם.

תמ"ר =

שהייח רחמי שהבטי ס/רחמי מנכל ממנכל סמנכל מצפא הסברה מעת מזתימ
חקר אמנ רם.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס' 309

מיידי

אל: המשרד

נשלח 1800 21 דצמ. 78

מאת: רושינגטון

רנו.מצפא.

בהמשך לשלנו מהיום.

להלן קטעים מן המאמר שהופיע תחת הכותרת:--

EUROPEANS LINK CAMP DAVID WITH THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIANS.

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO IMPLEMENT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS MAY REDUCE CHANCES FOR PERMANENT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS THE AGREEMENT IS TIED TO THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

THIS SURPRISING POINT OF VIEW WAS BROUGHT FORCEFULLY TO MY ATTENTION WHEN I PARTICIPATED RECENTLY IN A THREE-DAY DIALOGUE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND OUR COUNTERPARTS FROM BRITAIN, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, HOLLAND, IRELAND, AND ITALY.

IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSIONS, BRITISH AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS STRESSED THE NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR PALESTINIAN SELF DETERMINATION, WHICH, THEY ARGUED, COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP.

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE ARIEL FOUNDATION MEETING POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL CANNOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) SO LONG AS THE PLO IS COMMITTED TO DISMANTLING THE STATE OF ISRAEL. WE ALSO EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE MAY AGGRAVATE PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN ADDITION, OUR DELEGATION NOTED THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES THEMSELVES CANNOT ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS AS TO WHETHER THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE WOULD BE DESIRABLE FROM THEIR OWN POINT OF VIEW. JORDAN, IN PARTICULAR, SEEMS DECIDEDLY COOL TO HAVING SUCH A NEW NATION ON ITS BORDER.

OUR BRITISH AND EUROPEAN ASSOCIATES RESPONDED THAT THE PLO ITSELF HAD CHANGED AND NOW WAS WILLING TO WORK TOWARDS A POLICY OF TWO PALESTINES, ISRAEL AND AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE PLO, THEY ARGUED, NOW ACCEPTS THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

REP. PAUL FINDLAY (R-ILL.) WHO ON NOVEMBER 25 MET WITH PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT IN DAMASCUS, HAS STATED THAT MR. ARAFAT

- 2 -

IS WILLING TO RENOUNCE VIOLENCE AND GRANT DE FACTO RECOGNITION TO ISRAEL IF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IS ESTABLISHED. ACCORDING TO FINDLAY, ARAFAT ALSO SAID THAT THE PLO WILL ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

THOUGH WE MAY HAVE DISAGREED ABOUT THE VIEWS OF THE PLO, ALL OF US WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE, INITIATED TO COUNTER THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE CONFERENCE APPEARED TO EMBRACE A RELATIVELY MODERATE POSITION IN ITS FINAL COMMUNIQUE AND SEEMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED, IF PASSIVELY, THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL.

I CONCLUDED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT HOLDING THE SESSIONS AT CAMP DAVID REALLY AMOUNTED TO A LAST-DITCH ATTEMPT BY THE UNITED STATES TO DEFUSE A DANGEROUS SITUATION. SO FAR, IT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A SUCCESS. EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE MOVING-THOUGH SLOWLY-TOWARDS PEACE.

IF THEY SUCCEED THE KEY QUESTION IS: WHAT WILL FOLLOW CAMP DAVID? WHILE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT WOULD BE A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT IN ITSELF, IT WOULD NOT REMOVE THE SOURCE OF TENSION PRESENTED BY THE CONTINUATION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

VIEWED IN THIS HISTORICAL LIGHT, THE ARGUMENT THAT CAMP DAVID'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MAY INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS REALLY NOT ALL THAT SURPRISING. THE CONTENTION IS BASED ON THEIR CONCERN THAT A SEPARATE PEACE WILL ALLOW ISRAEL TO IGNORE THE REFUGEE AND SETTLEMENT QUESTIONS.

THE REAL SURPRISE, ASSUMING THE EUROPEANS AND CONGRESSMAN FINDLAY ARE CORRECT, IS THE PERCEPTION THAT THE PLO HAS MELLOWED AND IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL IN EXCHANGE FOR PA ESTINIAN SELF DETERMINATION.

AD KAN

N. TAMIR.

לגבית מדינת ישראל
הסכמה ממשלתית עם ישראל



VISIT TO ISRAEL
OF
CONGRESSMAN WILLIS GARDISON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

26 December 1978

Tuesday, 26 December

- 07.45 - Breakfast at the Plaza Hotel with Mr. Gad Ranon, Director, North American Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 09.00 - Meeting with Mr. Yehezkel Flomin, Deputy Minister of Finance, at his office
- 10.00 - Meeting with Mr. Dan Halperin, Director Economic Warfare Authority and Deputy Director-General for International Relations, Ministry of Finance
- 11.00 - Meeting with Mr. Joseph Ciechanover, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 12.45 - Lunch at the Knesset, hosted by Mr. Gad Yaacobi, M.K., Chairman of the Economics Committee and Mr. Shlomo Lorincz, M.K., Chairman of the Finance Committee
- 14.00 - Meeting with Mr. Moshe Sasson, Director, Center for Research and Policy and Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 15.00 - Meeting with the Acting Speaker of the Knesset, Mr. Moshe L. Meron
- 15.30 - Tour of the Knesset
- 17.00 - Meeting with Prof. Yigael Yadin, Deputy Prime Minister (to be confirmed)
- 16.45 - Courtesy call on Prime Minister Menachem Begin (to be confirmed)

Overnight at the Plaza Hotel, Jerusalem

For further information please contact:

Mr. Izhak Hahamy
Division for Official Guests
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem

Tel: 235111

December 1977

REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN (Republican-New York)

Term Began: 1973

Committees: International Relations--Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and Subcommittee on International Development; Post Office and Civil Service

Jewish. Supports foreign aid and all pro-Israel resolutions and amendments. Outspoken on terrorism. Active on behalf of Soviet Jewry. Cosigned Oct. 6, 1977 letter to Carter expressing concern over joint US/USSR communique on Mideast. Most recently, Gilman, who visited Argentina in August, has privately intervened with the Argentinian officials on behalf of Jacob Timmerman. Gilman met with Timmerman and his family during visit. Is one of core group of pro-Israel Representatives on International Relations Committee.