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מדינת ישראל  
משרד החוץ

4293/11

~~22~~

קולנוע

1968, 9/11

נאמנים בלתי נאמנים

נאמנים נאמנים

AD

שם תיק: קומ"י - שונות, החבלנים בשדה התעופה  
 באתונה, השטחים המוחזקים באתונה

מזהה פנימי: חצ-4293/11

מזהה פריט 000mcha

תאריך הדפסה: 08/02/2018

כתובת 2-120-3-19-9

4293/11

מחברות מ  
בילדו נתחבב

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באמרי

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1968

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא-מסווג

ש מ ר

מס' 81

בשלה 26.12.68

אל: ממישראל אתונה

ממנו: המשרד ירושלים

ב ה ר ל

כרוז

למי רדיטר יואשמו מתקיטי הטטוט ב-  
WILFUL MANSLAUGHTER  
האם זה מדוייק? הבהר בא כיצד מוגדרת בדיני יוון העבירה בה יואשמו  
ולמה הכוונה.

הלל מירון

תפוצה: שם ה3 ריהמ3 מנכל3 סמכל מזתים חקר קבם משפט מאום ב מצר רמ2

מב/דר

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

שטר

מס' 59

חומר: 271230. דצמ' 68

הודפס: 271515.

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

פיקוד

קבט, מזמים .

בחצות בתקבלה בנציגותנו הודעה טלפונית מאלמובי שדיבר יוונית , והנה

תרגומה לעברית :

אנו מצלצלים מטעם האחד האומי הסוציאלי היווני כדי להודיעכם

שמשרדי אל-על ברחוב OTHONOS יעלו באוויר. אתם היהודים איבכם

יודעים שעליכם להסתלק מיוון . עד כאן .

הודעה על כך במטרה מיד למשטרה , שלדבריה נקמה באמצעים הדרושים

לאנטחת המשרדים . מנהל אל-על כאן מסר לנו כי בשעות הבוקר המוקדמות

נערך חפוש פ"י המשטרה במשרדיהם ולא נמצא דבר. קיימת שמירה ליד המשרדים

24 שעות ביממה.

הת' 3' ג' 1

תפוצה: שהח 3 ורוהמ 3 מנכל 3 סמנכל מזמים קבט חקר מצר / מוסד דמ

דכ / סא

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

שמור

מס' 60

חומר: 271330. דצמ' 68

הודפס: 271500.

אלי: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: ממישראל אתונה

בהול

מסתיים, לוריא, הלל, קבט.  
ממקור פתובאי:

א. התובע הכללי האשים הבוקר את שני המתנקשים בארבע אשמות:

1. החזקה בלתי חוקית של נשק.
2. שמוש בלתי חוקי בנשק.
3. רצח בכורונה תחילה.
4. גרימת נזק לרכוש זר.

ב. בשל עובת החגים פתוחים מוסדות הממשלה רק חצי יום ולכן הוחזרו העצורים לידי המשטרה. מחר בשעה 1100 בבוקר יובאו המתנקשים בפני שופט TROISIEME CHAMBRE D'ACCUSATION כנראה לשם הוצאת פקודת מעצר.

כרוד.

(במסד לגב' ורד 271445)

תפוצה: שהחזר ורוהמז סנכלז סמנכל מזתים מאום ג' חקר מצר/המוסד קבט רמס  
דכ/סא

1977-1978

ARTICLE

Les dispositions de l'article 1er sont applicables à compter du 1er janvier 1978.

ARTICLE 2

Le montant de l'indemnité est fixé à 200 000 francs.

ARTICLE 3

Le montant de l'indemnité est fixé à 200 000 francs.

Il est révisé annuellement en fonction de l'évolution de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

1. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

2. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

3. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

4. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

5. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

6. L'indemnité est calculée sur la base de l'indice des prix à la consommation.

TROISIEME CHAMBRE D'ACCUSATION

Le montant de l'indemnité est fixé à 200 000 francs.

ARTICLE

(S'agit de l'article 1er)

Les dispositions de l'article 1er sont applicables à compter du 1er janvier 1978.

ARTICLE

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ט ט ו ר

מס. 70

חובר: 281215 דצמ 68

הודפס: 281315

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

פ י ד י

סירון, הלל.

שלך 89.

אפשר להגיש תביעה אזרחית עד עשרה ימים לפני פתיחת המשפט.  
אי אפשר כמובן, להגות מהיתרונות שמעניקה תביעה כזאת כל עוד היא לא תוגש.

ב. בשיקוליכם קחו גא בחשבון הנקודות הבאות:

1. לפי חוקי יוון אין צורך דין זר יכול להופיע בבית משפט יווני.
2. במקרים חמורים מורכב בית המשפט משלושה שופטים וחמישה מושבעים.  
כך יהיה כמובן במקרה דנן.
3. יש צורך במינימום של חמשה-עשר יום בין הודעה על קיום משפט ובין התחלתו.

כ ר ו ז

תפוצה: שהחצ 3 רהמ3 מבכל3 סמנכל מזתים טשפט קבט מאום ב' חקר מצר/מוסד

2מ2

דכ/מב

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TO: SAC, [illegible]  
FROM: SAC, [illegible]

RE: [illegible] and [illegible]  
[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס מ ר

מס' 72

חבר: 281530 דצמ' 68

הודפס: 281700

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

מייד

הלל, מירון, מזתים, קבט.

א. קריאניס ספר כי בפגש הבוקר עם התובע פאפנסטס'ו PAPANASTASIOU המטפל במתן אשום, אשר הסביר לו כי לפי החוק, אפילו למשרד החוץ היווני אין הוא יכול למסור העתק התיק. לעומת זה יוכל למסור העתקים מכל המסמכים הקיימים כנד ויהיו בעתיד לעורך דין של צו מעורבו בדבר כגון אל על. ב. שאלתי היועץ המשפטי שלנו אם אפשר לעשות הדבר מבלי שאל-על תכריז על עצמה כצד אזרחי. מתברר שאי אפשר, אולם צד אזרחי יכול להודיע לפני התחלת המשפט כי הוא מבטל השתתפותו בו. ג. אם תחליטו בחיוב נוכל ביום שני בבקר להפעיל אל על כאן אחרי שהיא תקבל הוראה מתאימה מהנהלתה.

כרוז

תפוצה: שהח 3 רוהם 3 טבכל 3 סמבכל מזת משפט קבט מאם ב חקר מצר/מוסד 200

גל/יג



משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר  
ש.ס.ד.

מברק נכנס-מסווג

מס' 71

חובר: 281530 דצמ' 68

הודפס: 281700

אל: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: ממישראל אתונה

מייד

הלל, מזתים, לוריא, קבט.

- א. שאלתי קריאביס אם אין בדעתם לגנות רשמית את ההתקפה על המטוס. בחשובה שאל האם לא קראתי את הצהרת פטאקוס. הערתי כי זו לא היתה אלא תשובה לשאלה ואין היא כוללת גנאי. נבוך ואמר שימסור הענין הלאה.
- ב. קריאביס שאל אם אין בדעתנו לבקש אמצעי במחון נוספים למטוסי אל על. עניתי כי טרם קבלתי הנחיות בענין זה.

כרוז

תפוצה: שחח 3 ררהם 3 מנכל 3 סמנכל מזתים קבט מאוס ג חקר מצר דם 2  
גל/יג



**משרד החוץ**

מחלקת הקשר

**מברק יוצא - מסווג**

מס' 90  
בשלה: 28.12.68

ש מ ר

מיד

אלו ממישראל אתונה  
מיום: המשד ירושלים

כרוז.

- א. גרסיים להסכים להצעה שמטפחת ההרוג, אך רק היא בלבד, תגיש תביעה.
- ב. נראה לנו כי רצוי להמנע מהגשת תביעה בשם אל על, כדי למנוע אפשרות שיטענו שזו חברה לאומית, המשתתפת במאמץ המלחמתי. וכו'.
- ג. תביעה בשם המשפחה תתן לנו את היתרון שהצבעתם עליו ותמנע את הסיכוכים המוזכרים בסעיף ב'.
- ד. נסכם בענין זה לאחר התייעצות סופית מחר, ואז נודיעכם סיכומנו הסופי.
- ה. בינתיים, אם יש לכם הערות לגבי הפרשה, הבריקובא.

הלל - מירון

הפנציה: שהח 3 רוהם 3 טנכל 3 טנכל מזתים משפם קבם מאים ב חקר מצר רם 2  
בל/יג

# משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

## טקסט

מס' 61

חובר: 271515. דצמ' 68  
הודפס: 271700.

אל: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: ממישראל אתונה

## בחול

מזמים, לוריא, קנט .  
שלי 60.

א. לפי מקור עתונאי אחר בקבעו שמונה סעיפי אישום.

ארבע הנוספים הם:

1. בסיון לרצוח.

2. החזקת חומר גפץ.

3. הצתה מסכנת הסדר הציבורי וחי אדם.

4. השבתת תחבורה אוירית.

ב. אחרי ברור עם אנשי חוק מתברר : החמורים ביותר בין שמונת הסעיפים הם רצח בכוונה תחילה והצתה מסכנת הסדר הציבורי וחי אדם. העונש על שניהם הוא מוות או מאסר עולם.

אשר לרצח בכוונה תחילה במקרה של הוכחת מניע רגשי, העונש הוא 20 שנות מאסר. אין אפשרות של שחרור בערבות כאשר העונש הצפוי הוא 20 שנה.

ג. דברתי עם קונדוריוטיס וקריאניס. הובטחו לי למחר בבוקר סעיפי האשום, וכן תוצאות החקירה המשטרית.

בראה סחר בבוקר.

כרוז.

( במסר לגב' ורד 271645 )

תפוצה: שהח3 ריהמ3 מנכל3 סמכל מזמים שאום ב' קנט חקר מצר/המוסד רמ2  
דכ/ סא

מסמך מס' 100

מטרה

המטרה של המסמך היא להגדיר את התהליך...

מטרה

המטרה של המסמך היא להגדיר את התהליך...

תחומי אחריות

התחומים שבהם יחול המסמך הם:

- 1. תחום אחריות.
- 2. תחום אחריות.
- 3. תחום אחריות.
- 4. תחום אחריות.

המטרה של המסמך היא להגדיר את התהליך...

משרד החוץ

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מחלקת הקשר

מס' 147

חומר: 270850 דצמ 68

הודפס: 271130

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

ב ה ו ל

קול ישראל חדשות ירושלים:  
בכרוזים שפורזו על ידי שני המתנקשים פיד לאחר בצוע ההתנקשות בשדה  
התעופה מטעם החזית העממית לשחרור פלשתיין באמר בין היתר:

Q. ARE YOU ANTI SEMITES OR TNAI JEWISH . A. ARABS ARE SEMITES THEMSELVES, SO THEY CANNOT BE ANTI SEMITES. ANTI SEMITISM IS A TERM THAT WAS COINED IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST , PARTICULARLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE JEWS WERE PERSECUTED, TORTUREDE, AND KILLED. THE ARABS ( INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS) HAVE A WHITE CLEAN RECORD IN THIS RESPECT. WE NEVER PERSECUTED JEWS. WE SHALL NEVER INDULGE IN SUCH AN INHUMAN CRIME . Q. WHY DONT THE PALESTINIAN ARABS LIVE WITHIN THE STATE OF ISRAEL. A. IN SIMPLE TERMS: ISRAEL IS ANOTHER REODESIA OR SOUTH AFRICA. IT IS A ,, JEWISH STATE'' THAT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST ALL NON JES, THE SAME WAY THAT RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AR ,, WHITE STATES'' THAT DISCRIMINTE AGAINST ,, NON WHITS. PALESTINIAN ARABS WILL NOT ACCEPT TO BE SLAVES IN AN ANTI ARAB '' . JEWISH STATE'' . Q. WAY DONT YOU '' NEGOTIATE '' WITH ISRAEL . A. FOR THE SAME REASON THAT AL EUROPEAN NATIONS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH HITLER NEGOTIATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OCCUPATION MEANS COLLABORA - TION WE WANT FREEDOM . Q. WILL YOU AS PALESTINIAN ARABS ACCEPT THE IMPLIMENTATION OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION OF NOV 1947 , A. THE U.N. IGNORED COMPLETELY THE BASIC FACTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WHEN IT VOTED TO GIVE THE ZIONISTS A,, SOVEREIGN STATE IN A PART OF PALESTINE . THE U.N. HAS NO SUCH POWER THAT ENABLES IT TO GIVE PEOPLES SOME LANDS TO OTHERS. THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ARE A,, STEPPING STONE '' FOR THE ZIONIST MOVEMMENT ITS AGGRESSIVE TIMS AND GOALS GO FAR BEYOND THE U.N. RESOLUTION FOR 1947 . Q. WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF THE JEWS NOW LIVING IN PALESTINE IF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ACHIEVES VICTORY . A. THE PRESENT ETHINC COMPOSITION OF PALESTINE )I.E. ISRAEL) WHICH COMPRISES OF A MAJORITY OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IS DUE TO A HUGE INFLUX OF JEWS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD . THIS CHANGE OF IDENTITY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE PRICE OF DENYING THE ARABS THEIR OWN NATIONAL RIGHTS. THUS WE FIND THAT SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC BI - NATIONAL STATE. BEFORE SUCH A STATE CAN BE CONSTRUCTED

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מספר תעודת זהות: 12345678  
שם: אברהם יצחק

מספר תעודת זהות: 89 01234567  
שם: שמואל יוסף

1 2 3

התאחדות הציונית הישראלית  
מטה המרכז הלאומי לתעודת זהות  
רחוב בן צור 10, תל אביב

BI - NATIONAL STATE, BEFORE SUCH A STATE CAN BE CONSTRUCTED  
SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC  
DENYING THE ARABS THEIR OWN NATIONAL RIGHTS. THUS WE FIND THAT  
THIS CHANGE OF IDENTITY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE PRICE OF  
DUE TO A HUGE INFUX OF JEWS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD  
WHICH COMPRISES OF A MAJORITY OF JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IS  
A. THE PRESENT ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF PALESTINE (I.E. ISRAEL)  
IF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ACHIEVES VICTORY  
O. WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF THE JEWS NOW LIVING IN PALESTINE  
TIMS AND GOALS GO FAR BEYOND THE U.N. RESOLUTION FOR 1947  
A. "STEPPING STONE" FOR THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT ITS AGGRESSIVE  
TO GIVE PEOPLES SOME LANDS TO OTHERS. THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ARE  
A PART OF PALESTINE. THE U.N. HAS NO SUCH POWER THAT ENABLES IT  
WHEN IT VOTED TO GIVE THE ZIONISTS A "SOVEREIGN STATE IN  
IGNORED COMPLETELY THE BASIC FACTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION OF NOV 1947, A. THE U.N.  
TION WE WANT FREEDOM, O. WILL YOU AS PALESTINIAN ARABS ACCEPT  
NEGOTIATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OCCUPATION MEANS COLLABORA  
REASON THAT ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH HITLER NEGOT  
O. WAY DON'T YOU "NEGOTIATE" WITH ISRAEL. A. FOR THE SAME  
NOT ACCEPT TO BE SLAVES IN AN ANTI ARAB "JEWISH STATE"  
THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST "NON WHITS. PALESTINIAN ARABS WILL  
THE SAME WAY THAT RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA ARE "WHITE STATES"  
IT IS A "JEWISH STATE" THAT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST ALL NON JES  
A. IN SIMPLE TERMS: ISRAEL IS ANOTHER RHODESIA OR SOUTH AFRICA.  
DON'T THE PALESTINIAN ARABS LIVE WITHIN THE STATE OF ISRAEL.  
JEWS WE SHALL NEVER INDULGE IN SUCH AN INHUMAN CRIME. O. WHY  
HAVE A WHITE CLEAN RECORD IN THIS RESPECT. WE NEVER PERSECUTED  
TORTURED, AND KILLED. THE ARABS (INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS)  
PARTICULARY IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE JEWS WERE PERSECUTED  
TERM THAT WAS COINED IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST  
THEMSELVES, SO THEY CANNOT BE ANTI SEMITES. ANTI SEMITISM IS A  
O. ARE YOU ANTI SEMITES OR THAI JEWISH. A. ARABS ARE SEMITES

SEVERAL PRELEMINARY STEPS OUGHT TO BE MADE :

1. THE JEWS WHO DESIRE LIVING IN A BI-NATIONAL STATE IN PALESTINE MUST DETACH THEMSELVES COMPLETELY FROM THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT . WE ARE AGAINST ZIONISM ... NOT AGAINST JEWS.
2. THE SO CALLED ,, STATE OF ISRAEL IS SELF DEFINED AS AZIONIST JEWISH STATE . IT SHOULD BE DISMANTLED .
3. JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE MUST BE STOPPED COMPLETELY . SUCH IMMIGRATION WHEN CONTINUING WILL AND MUST LEAD TO AN ,, OVER FLOW'' OF POPULATION IN PALESTINE . THIS MEANS EXPANSION AT THE EXPENCE OF NEIGHBOURING ARAB STATES.
4. THE RIGHT OF EVERY SINGLE PALESTINIAN ARAB TO ,, GO BACK HOME'' CANNOT BE DEBATED. IT IS A BASIC RIGHT THAT HAS TO BE RESPECTED AND IMPLEMENTED.
5. ISRAEL IS A TOOL OF IMPERIALISM. IF AND WHEN A BI - NATIONAL PALESTINIAN STATE IS BORN IT MUST BE DEMOCRATIC IN NUTURE AND THUS MUST BE IN THE RANKS OF AFRO ASIAN STATES FIGHTING FOR FREEDON AND AGAINST IMPERIALISM.
6. THE PROGRAM FOR A BI NATIONAL PALESTINIAN STAE IS A WHOLE THAT IS INDIVISIBLE. NO PART OF IT CAN BE TAKEN FOR THE WHOLE.

38/10  
אליאזק רמ

תפוצה: חדשות קול ישראל

טב/77

SEVERAL PRELIMINARY STEPS OUGHT TO BE MADE :

1. THE JEWS WHO DESIRE LIVING IN A BI-NATIONAL STATE IN PALESTINE MUST DETACH THEMSELVES COMPLETELY FROM THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT. WE ARE AGAINST ZIONISM. NOT AGAINST JEWS.

2. THE SO CALLED " STATE OF ISRAEL IS SELF DEFINED AS AZIONIST JEWISH STATE. IT SHOULD BE DISMANTLED.

3. JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE MUST BE STOPPED COMPLETELY. SUCH IMMIGRATION WHEN CONTINUING WILL AND MUST LEAD TO AN " OVER FLOW" OF POPULATION IN PALESTINE. THIS MEANS EXPANSION AT THE EXPENSE OF NEIGHBOURING ARAB STATES.

4. THE RIGHT OF EVERY SINGLE PALESTINIAN ARAB TO " GO BACK HOME" CANNOT BE DEBATED. IT IS A BASIC RIGHT THAT HAS TO BE RESPECTED AND IMPLEMENTED.

5. ISRAEL IS A TOOL OF IMPERIALISM. IF AND WHEN A BI - NATIONAL PALESTINIAN STATE IS BORN IT MUST BE DEMOCRATIC IN NATURE AND THERE MUST BE IN THE RANKS OF ARAB AND ASIAN STATES FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM AND AGAINST IMPERIALISM.

6. THE PROGRAM FOR A BI NATIONAL PALESTINIAN STATE IS A WHOLE THAT IS INDIVISIBLE. NO PART OF IT CAN BE TAKEN FOR THE

WHOLE.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 1951  
 1951

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1951

אל ז שר החוץ

מאת: שלמה הלל, סמנכ"ל

הנדון: הגשת תביעה אזרחית נגד החבלנים באתונה

אנשינו באתונה, בהתייעצות עם היועץ המשפטי של הנציגות ועורכי דין מקומיים, הציעו כי בנוסף על ההליכים הפליליים שיביש החובע הכללי של יוון נגד שני החבלנים, תוגש נגדם גם תביעה אזרחית מטעם חברה אל-על, משפחת ההרוב הדיילת המצועה.

להערכת אנשינו, להגשת תביעה אזרחית יהיו מספר יתרונות עבורנו בעת ניהול המשפט:

- א. צד אזרחי ככל צד אחר במשפט יכול לעיין ולהעתיק כל מסמך הקשור המשפט;
- ב. צד אזרחי משתתף בשלב החקירה של השופט החוקר ויכול להציג שאלות, להעלות הצעות ואף לערער על מסקנות השופט;
- ג. עם סיום חקירתו מביש השופט החוקר את פרי עבודתו למועצה משפטית והיא אשר קובעת סעיפי האישום. על קביעה זו של המועצה המשפטית יכול הצד האזרחי לערער במני המועצה המשפטית בארג גבוה יותר.

בהתייעצות שקיים מר חדי מירון עם שר המשפטים, המליץ שר המשפטים על-כך כי אמנם תוגש תביעה אזרחית, אך יש לצמצמה למשפחת ההרוב בלבד (אולי גם הדיילת), אך לא בשם חברה אל-על, וזאת כדי למנוע התיינות על אופיה ומהותה של אל-על (כטענת הערבים - חב' המשתתפת במאמץ המלחמתי).

הצעתו של היועץ המשפטי שלנו והצמתי היא, מטעם המוזכר לעיל, כי מוטב להסתפק בתביעתה של משפחת ההרוב, כי תביעתה של הדיילת עלולה להביאנו לאותה התיינות בענין אל-על שברצוננו למנוע.

נראה לנו כי רצוי להבטיח השתתפות שלנו במשפט, מחשש כי החובע היווני יעדיף להתעלם מטענות פוליטיות שיטמיעו הנאשמים, הסמכות על ישראל, סירור ישראלי החל מדיר יאסין ועד היום וכו'. אם יופיע מטעם משפחת הנרצה עוד יווני בעל שער קומה (רצוי לא יהודי), הרי שהוא יוכל לנצל את זכותו כדי לסתור דברים כאלה ולתעמיד את דמותו של הסרור הערבי על דמותו האמיתית.



מאידך, נדמה לי כי היה מקום לקחת בחשבון שתי הנקודות הבאות:

(1) זו תהיה הפעם הראשונה, לפי מיטב ידיעתי, שאנו מבישים תביעה אזורית נגד איש טרוור ערבי. יש אמנם להביא בחשבון, שעד כה התנהלו משפטים כאלה רק בארץ, ואין זה סך הנמנע שבמירה שיתנהלו משפטים כאלה בחו"ל נהיה צריכים להגיש גם תביעות אזוריות כדי להבטיח יכולתנו להסתפק במשפט.

(2) יש לחשוש שהופעת גורם ישראלי במשמטן בכ"ז תגביר את מידת הפוליטיזציה ואח אלמנט ההתנצחות הישראלי-ערבי במשפט (מאידך, הששני שללא השתתפותנו המיידית תהיה כמה חופשית לגמרי לערבים לפתח מחקפה עלינו).

עכבנו סתן חשובתנו הסופית לאחונה, אולם חיונית חשובתנו הרחופה בענין זה.

לאחר קבלת החלטתך החיובית, נצטרך כמובן לדאוג גם להסכמת האלמנה. ברור שמשלחנו צטרך לשאת בכל הוצאות המשפט.

כל הנ"ל גם בחיאום ועל דעת היועץ המשפטי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

שלמה הלל

העתיק: המנכ"ל  
המשנה למנכ"ל  
מר ס. קומיי  
מר א. שלוש, ממנכ"ל  
מר ג. אכנר, ממנכ"ל  
מר ח. מירון, היועץ המשפטי  
מנהלת פז"ח

... ..

1) ... ..

2) ... ..

3) ... ..

4) ... ..

5) ... ..

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... ..

ירושלים, ו' בטבת השכ"ט  
27 בדצמבר 1968

אל : מר א. לוריא  
לשכה המד  
מר א. שלוש  
מר ט. קומי  
מר א. בן-חורין  
מר ה. מירון  
מר ג. אבנר

מאת: שלמה הלל, טפנכ"ל

1. בשיחה טלפונית עם כרוז באחונה, ציין שרק מחר יוגשו סעימי האישום.  
כפי הנראה יוגשו בגדם ארבעה סעימי אישום:

- (א) נשיאת נשק בלתי חוקי;
- (ב) שמוש בנשק בלתי חוקי;
- (ג) רצח בכוונה תחילה;
- (ד) גרימת נזק לרכוש זר.

השטט יתקיים בפני בית דין אזרחי.

2. הגשת כתב האישום מהעכבה הן בשל החקירה שעדיין נמשכה והן בשל התרופצות  
טניסיק בין היוונים, בשל לחציט שמפעילים עליהם הערבים. לדברי כרוז מורגש  
בהחלט הלחץ הערבי על טפאלה ירוון.

3. כרוז הניע, לאחר התייעצות עם היועץ הטפטי של הנציגות ועו"ד מקומי, כי  
בנוסף לחביעה של השלטונות היווניים, מוגש נגד השניים גם תביעה אזרחית (פצויים?)  
בשם חברת אל-על, טפאלה החרוג והדיילה הטצועה.

בקשתי מכרוז כי ישלח לנו הבהרה טפטיה להצעה זו על רקע החוק היווני. בהתקבל  
המירוט והחטברים - נשקול ונסכם העניין.

ב ב ר כ ה,

שלמה הלל

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY

1. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
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17. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

מס' 56

סודי

הרב: 271130. דצמ' 68

הודפס: 271330.

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

בהול

מזתים. לוריא. הלל. קבט.

המסוט.

א. ממיוון לא פרסמה כל הודעה רשמית.

ב. בעתונת הבקר לא הופיעה שום פרשנות אך שניים פרסמו הודעה

שלבן המגזינה המתקשים כפושעים פליליים. לפי ידיעה אחת, קבלו

העתונים הוראה ממשרד החוץ לא לעסוק בפרשנות, אלא למסור עובדות

בלבד. לפי אותה ידיעה הושמה אתמול אה"צ שמירה חמורה, לפי בקשת

פיפיבליס עצמו, על מסוט לבנוני של חברת MEA שחבה באתונה.

ג. אצל הדיילת הפצועה ביקר אתמול פטאקוס והבוקר ראש עיריית אתונה.

ד. עד כמה שידוע, עוד לא הוצאה פקודת מעצר בגד המתקשים, לפי

שהתביעה עדיין לא סיימה את חקירתה. לא אתפלא אם על סעיפי האישום

יוחלט בדרג ממשלתי גבוה.

ה. בקשתי פגישה עם פטאקוס.

הנציגות.

תפוצה: שהח3 רוחס3 סבכל3 סמכל מזתים הקר מצר/המוסד מאום ב' קבט רט2

דכ/ סא

ՄԱՐԿԱԿՈՒՄ

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי

מס' 57

חברת: 27 1130

הודפס: 271330

אל: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: מטישראל אתרבה

בהול

שלמה הלל .  
לשיחתנו הטלפובית .  
כידוע לך במצא כאן סאמי ועל אף הסחבת מקורים שישתתף בחקירה כאשר  
זו תועבר לשרותים .  
בשלב זה לא בראית תכלית מעשית לבוא הקצין מהמסמרה .  
החלטה על שחרור בערבות או כבון אלו תתקבל ללא ספק כדרג מדיבי  
ולא משטרתי או טשפטי .  
הואיל והשמיעה בטלפון היתה לקויה יתכן שלא הבינותי השקוליים  
שלכם . מכל מקום , אין פעם בבואו באורח רשמי .  
אם תחליטו לשגר , בודיע על בואו - במקרה הצורך - אחר הגיעו .

כרוז .

תפוצה: שהח3 רוהמ3 מנכל3 סמבכל מזתים חקר קבט מצר רמ3

טב / סא



# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ו ד י

מ.ס. 69  
חובר: 272200 דצמ 68  
הודפס: 281130

אל: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: מפישראל אתונה

ב ה ו ל

הלל. מזתים. לוריא. קבט.

נקודות עקריות מדברי פטאקוס בשיחה הערב:

- א. סיפר על בקורו בשדה התעופה מיד אחרי ההתקפה. כינה את המתנקשים גנגסטרים. הוא עצמו דבר אתם ושאלם מדוע אין הם מתקיפים את הישראלים בישראל ומדוע הם מתנפלים על אנשים חסרי נשק. תשובתם היתה: אנו גהרוג ישראלים בכל מקום שבמצאם.
- ב. לדבריו, הגיעו הכבאים והמטטרה מיד עם פתיחת ההתקפה. המתנקשים החלו בורחים ובתפסו על ידי המטטרה. לידיעתכם: זו הפעם הראשונה שאנו שומעים גירסה זו.
- ג. המתנקשים נמצאים בידי המערכת המשפטית וייעבשו בכל חומר הדין, כראות לגנגסטרים.
- ד. הואיל והחקירה עברה לשלב משפטי אין ברצע זה באפשרותם למסור לנו העתק התיק, אולם אין בו יותר ממה שהוא סיפר וממה שהופיע בעתונות.
- ה. בשדה נקטו אמצעי בטחון מוגברים.
- ו. להערתך כי דעת הקהל בישראל ובעולם מצפה לגבוי הפושעים פי יוון הציע לי שאקרא דבריו במסיבת העתונאים היום (ראה שלנו 67 מהיום).
- ז. חזר משך השיחה להערתך בענין יומרות אנדרים פפנדריאו לזכות בהכרת גורמים זרים כדלהלן: טענות המתנקשים כי הם רוצים לרצוח ציונים ולא יהודים דומות לטענות אנדריאס פפנדריאו אשר מכריז על התנגדותו ל"פסקוסיים" בלבד אך הורג יוונים.
- ח. פטקוס היה אפולוגטי מאד וביכר שלא נוח לו כי תקרית כזאת קרתה בתחום אחריותו.

כ ר ו ז

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET

02.00

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA  
FROM: SAC, [illegible]

REF: 005575 ZXA 88  
081182

SECRET

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SECRET

SECRET - EYES ONLY

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא-מסווג

ס ר ד י

מס<sup>4</sup> 83

בשלה: 27.12.68

אל : ממישראל אתונה

מאת: המשרד ירושלים

מידי

מסוס אל-על.

א. שקול גא, תוך התייעצות עם אנשי המוסד אפשרות בקורך אצל פמאקוס כדי לפתח גם צבור זה.  
אם תחליטו בחיוב, מציעים כי תביע שביעות רצונך על שמטפלים בענין בדרך משפט פלילי וכי כך ימשיכו. בהמשך למברק חקר 85 תוכל להזכיר בעדיבות כי גם ארגונו של אגד<sup>4</sup> ראס פפגדריאו מבקש הכרה ביבלאומית ואף פנה אלינו בנידון.

ב. לידיעתך, מבסטים להשיג הצהרות ארבוים מקצועיים כאגוד המייסדים, פועלי במלי מעופה וכו' על חומרת המעשה מבחינה ביבלאומית כללית ועל הצורך להספל כפושעים ביד חזקה.

הלל - מזתי"ם

שהג' ורדהטס מבכל 2 סמבכל מזתים חקר קבט מאום ב' מצר רמס

טב/בש

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא-מסווג

ש מ ר ר

מס<sup>4</sup> 85

בשלח 27.12.68

אל: ממישראל אתונה  
מאת: המשרד ירושלים

ג ה ו ל

כרוז

בקשר להצעתך כי תוגש תביעה גם בשם החברה משפחת ההרוג והפצועה  
הברק בא חרות דעת משפטית מנומקת בהסתמך על המשפט היווני להבהרת  
היתרבות והמגבלות שבהגשת תביעה כזו.  
הברק בא גם השלכות צבוריות ופוליטיות שיכולות להיות לענין.  
מירון הלל

תפוצה: שהח3 דרהמ3 מבכל3 סמבל מזתים משפט מאום ב חקר קבמ מצר

המוסד רמ2

דכ/דר

# משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא-מסווג

פ ו ג י

מס" 84

בשליח: 27.12.68

אל: ממישראל אתונה  
מאת: המשרד ירושלים

ב ה ר ל

עלתה הצעה ששה"ח ישלח אגרת לפיפיבליס שבה תובע שביעות רצוננו ממהלך החקירה  
ומהטיפול היעיל של יוון בפרשן זו כבענין פלילי. הכרונה לחייב את ממיורן  
להמשך קו זה של סיפול במרץ, ללא ספיות פוליסיות מהענין.  
מאידך, בשל אופיו של פיפיבליס ומשרדו, קיים פה הסרט לגבי ההצעה מחשש שתוך  
כדי טמון תשובה לאגרתנו, יוכל פיפיבליס לקבוע עמדות בלתי נוחות מבחינתנו.  
אבא חרות דעתך בחוזר.

הלל - מזתי"ם

-----  
שהח3 רוהמ3 מבכל3 סמבכל מזתיים חקרי מאום ב קבט מצר/המורס דמ3

דכ/הז 27.12

31.12.68

מפישראל אחונה

מידע

המשרד ירושלים

כרז.

חוחלט נגד תבשה תביעה אזרחית כלשהי.

ה ל ל

31.12.68

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי

מס' 49

חובר: 262215 דצמ' 68

מספס: 262330

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

בהול

מזתים, הלל, לוריא, לשכת השר.

א. כפי שהודעתי בשלי 48, הבטיח קונדוריוטיס כי הספול במתנקשים יהיה כפרשעים פליליים רגילים. יש להביח כי יתחיל לחץ ערבי לראות במתנקשים גבורי מחתרת ואת פעולתם כמעשה מדיני. מאחר שאין בטחון בעמידת איתנה מצד יוון בענין זה אני מציע להפעיל לחץ עליה מכל הכוונים האפשריים ולנהל הסברתנו בהתאם.

ב. אפשר גם לטעון שלאור יחסה של יוון לישראל יתכן שהמתנקשים הביחו שכאן קרקע בוחה לבצוע מעשים מסוג זה.

כרוז

נפוצה: שהו 3 רוחם 3 דייך מבכל 3 סמנכל מזתים מאום ב קבט חקר

מצר/מוסד רם 2

דכ/יג



משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ו ד י

מס' 48

חומר: 262130 דצמ' 68

הודפס: 262330

אל : המשרד ירושלים

מאת : מפישראל אחובה

ב ה ו ל

לוריא, הלל, מזתים, לשכת הסר, קבט.

שלך 80.

א. בהעדר פיפובליס ראיתי את המנכל קונדוריוסס ומסרתי לו בהתאם להבחיותיכם. הביע הזדעזעותם מהפסע המתועב והבטיח שהחקירה תעשה בכל הקפידה האפשרית, כנהוג כלפי פושעים פליליים רבילים. כן הבטיח למסור לנו תוצאות חקירתם. אשר לשתופנו בחקירה, אמר כי עליהם לבדוק הנהוג בעגין כזה. לידיעתכם: לא עמדתי על שתופנו כי למעשה הדבר מוטכם ויתבצע מטחר בצנורות המוסד.

ב. מסרתי לו שאנו מצפים שינקטו בכל האמצעים כדי לפגוע כל פגיעה בוספת בישראלים או במוסדותיהם. הבטיח לעשות הדרוש.

כרוז

שהח 3 רוחם 3 דיין מנכל 3 סמנכל מזתים מאום ב' קבט חקר מצר/מוסד רמ 2

דכ/לג



משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ש פ ט ר

מס' 65

חובר: 271900 דצמ' 68

הדפס: 272100

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל אתונה

ג ה ר ל

מירון, הלל.

שלכם 85.

1. בדעת היועץ המשפטי שלבו יש בעקר יתרונות להצעה ואלה הם:
  - א. צד אזרחי ככל צד אחר במשפט יכול לעיין ולהעתיק ~~כל~~ מסמך הקשור במשפט.
  - ב. צד אזרחי משתתף בשלב החקירה של השופט החוקר ויכול להציג שאלות, להעלות הצעות ואף לערער על מסקנות השופט.
  - ג. עם סיום חקירתו מגיש השופט החוקר את פרי עבודתו למועצה משפטית והיא אשר קובעת סעיפי האישום. על קביעה זו של המועצה המשפטית יכול הצד האזרחי לערער בפני המועצה המשפטית בדרג גבוה יותר.

2. המגבלה היחידה. הצד האזרחי משתתף ככל צד אחר במשפט אך בנגוד לבאשם-אינו יכול לערער על פסק הדין.

3. אשר להשלכות צבוריות ומדיניות, השתתפותו בדרך זו במשפט תאפשר אזור למאמצי הנאשמים ושולחיהם להפוך את המשפט לבמת תעמולה לטובתם. יכול כמובן להיות גם שקול, שלא כדאי לבו להסתכן בהתבצחות כזאת.

ת ר ז

שהח 3 רוחמ 3 מבכל 3 סמכל מזת משפט מאום ב קבט חקר מצר רט

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משרד החוץ

ירושלים, ח' בטבת תשכ"ט  
29 בדצמבר 1968

טודי

פרטיכל ישיבת הנהלה בראשות מ"מ המנכ"ל  
מיום 27.12.68

נכחו: ה"ה א. לוריא, ג. אבנר, מ. ביתן,  
א. בן-חורין, ש. הלל, א. קדרון,  
א. שלום, ת. מרון, ד. ריבלין,  
ע. שמעוני, א. בן-יוחנן, י. ברנע.

המטוס באחונה

ה"ה א. לוריא: גילוי הציג סנסלח פקיד בכיר של מטה"ח ליון, וזאת לפחות מתוך סיקולים של דעת קהל פנימית.

ה"ה א. בן-יוחנן: בנוגע להצעת המנכ"ל לסקל כינוס מועבי"ט, דעת הטר שלילית.

ה"ה מ. ביתן: מציע לדבר עם כתב ניוזויק שיכין כתבה על חנועת הטרור הערבית מנקודה ראותנו, כמסקל נגדי לכתבה שהופיעה בטיים.

ה"ה ש. הלל: ביחס למה שארע קיימים שני מישורים: (1) דמות הפת"ח בעולם והמערכה ההסברתית הכללית. (2) הפעולה הקונקרטיה ביון. מציע סנסלח מיטהו לאחונה המתמצא בבעיות המטפטיות.


ה"ה מ. קומיי: יש היסג רציני לפת"ח בעולם והם נהפכו למוטג בעל קנה מידה בינלאומי. אנחנו צריכים לתח את מחטבתנו לבעיה זו. העובדה שהם מגיעים לאחונה ורומא תהפרט בעולם כהפגנת כוח ולא כחולשה.

ה"ה ד. ריבלין: לא נצליח בהסברתנו הנגדית אם נרצה להציג את הפת"ח כסתם רוצחים. ההבלטה צריכה להיות על הנקודות המתקבלות כשליליות בעולם, כגון כוונתם להסמיד את ישראל.

ה"ה ש. הלל: יש היום הרגשה בעולם: אחת רציתם לכבוש ששחים, תסכלו פת"ח. לא הצלחנו להבהיר שגם לפני המלחמה היה טרור ולא הכיבוש יצר אותו.

באשר למקרה באחונה יש חשט שהערבים ילחצו על היונים ולא ברור עוד איך אלה ינהגו.

ה"ה מ. קומיי: כדאי להציע ליונים להתעלם מהרקע הפוליטי ו- to play c wn אטפקט זה.



מסרד התחבורה טולח מברק ל אי.ק.א.או.

ה' א. טלוט:

(1) יט לברר אצל היונים מה פירוט wilful manslaughter.

ה' א. לוריא:

(2) ה' מרון יתיעץ עם טמגר ביחס לטיגור טשפטן.

(3) ה' טלוט יבדק ענין טיגור מברקים ליאטא, וכו'.

(4) מחמ"כ תכין חומר על אפטרות של לחץ נגדי על יון.  
(תיירות, ארה"ב וכו')

(5) לטיפול כוסף בנוטא יוקם מטה בהרכב ה"ה הלל,  
בן-חורין וטלוט.

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כה' במכתב תשכ"ט  
15 בינואר 1969

משרד החינוך  
7.1.1969  
נר 717 נכנס

אל : מחלקת החקר

מאת : י.ח. בן-אחרן

הנדון: הצי הסובייטי בים התיכון

למכתב מר נ. הדס מ-8 בינואר 1969.

עקיבה מתמדת אחר הנועות הצי הסובייטי אפשר לדעת  
להשיג בצנורות הצבאיים בעיקר.

סקירות והערכות בנושא זה מתפרסמות בארה"ב, הן בצורה  
של עדויות בפני הקונגרס והן ע"י ראיונות עם קצינים בכירים  
בצי האמריקני. כתב-העת הידוע U.S. News & World Report  
פרסם השבוע מאמר וראיון על הצי הסובייטי, ההרחבות ומשמעותה  
המדינית והצבאית של הגברה פעילותו. רצ"ב העתק המאמרים  
לידיעתכם.

ב ב ר כ ה,


י.ח. בן אחרן

העתק: מר מ.ביחן, סמנכ"ל  
מר ש. הלל, סמנכ"ל  
מצפ"א

1954  
1954  
1954

From the Baltic to the South China Sea there isn't a corner of the globe where traditional U. S. supremacy at sea is not being contested by Russia.

A fresh assessment explains the reasons for concern among U. S. planners. Also, on page 51, a top naval authority gives his size-up of the dangers.



Challenge in the Mediterranean—Soviet cruiser at Port Said.

## GROWING THREAT OF SOVIET SEA POWER

Soviet sea forces, after years of steady build-up, are moving now to challenge U. S. supremacy in one after another of the world's oceans.

These aggressive moves by a fast-expanding Russian fleet are starting to cause serious concern among Allied naval planners.

Among their reasons for concern—

- Russia's "token" force in the Mediterranean—a fleet of 35-plus warships—is approaching the size of the U. S. Sixth Fleet there. Moscow has made it clear that despite occasional temporary withdrawals, its fleet is in the "Med" to stay.

- Soviet naval vessels also have begun to operate regularly in the Indian Ocean. Two task forces are engaged in "showing the flag" at several ports at a time when the British fleet is about to withdraw from that area and plans for U. S. naval bases there are lagging.

- In recent Allied joint naval exercises in the North Atlantic, Russian warships got in the way so often that one U. S. admiral remarked: "We didn't need to assign a 'blue force' as the theoretical enemy; the real one was right there all the time."

- In the North Sea, Soviet warships patrol regularly just offshore from the U. S. nuclear-submarine base in Scotland, and have begun tracking all Allied warships operating in the area.

- The Baltic Sea recently has become a recognized "Russian lake," with 800 Communist vessels reported to be cruising there regularly, compared with only 100 vessels of the Western Allies.

- Russian naval craft have begun to operate aggressively in the Sea of Japan—where one collided with a U. S. warship in naval exercises in 1967—as well

as the South China Sea near Vietnam, the Philippine Sea and the Bering Sea. On all major sea routes in the Western Pacific, Soviet ships are a common sight.

- New forms of naval deception by Russian ships have been reported lately. Soviet warships, for example, are found to be altering their identification numbers when passing through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean. This is termed by one Allied officer "hardly indicative of a country with peaceful intentions."

"Aggressive and varied." No sea in the world appears to be free from Russia's rising naval challenge. Says Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the U. S. Chief of Naval Operations:

"The Soviets' ocean operations are becoming unmistakably more aggressive, more varied, and are being conducted at ever-increasing distances from their home bases."

The wider range of Russian opera-

Russian sailors in Alexandria. Moscow says its fleet is in the "Med" to stay.  
—Pix Photos



tions at sea is attributable, in part, to new Soviet techniques for resupply en route.

At one instance, three Soviet submarines, operating with two support ships, just returned to Russia from a cruise of five months at sea, covering an area 6,000 miles from the nearest Soviet base.

Wherever U. S. or other Allied warships are engaged in naval maneuvers, a Soviet vessel is usually cruising nearby. Indications are that major U. S. ships, such as cruisers and carriers, are followed almost constantly, their courses charted on a 24-hour basis.

**Real challenge?** How much of a challenge to U. S. supremacy at sea is the growing Soviet Navy at this stage? The latest reported strength figures show this:

Biggest current Soviet threat is a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines now numbering about 50, and backed by another 300 conventional subs.

Of these modern underwater craft, roughly 100 are believed to be armed with either ballistic or short-range missiles, capable of reaching targets at least 350 miles away. The rest carry torpedoes, able to damage if not destroy any Allied lifeline of shipping across Atlantic or Pacific waters in wartime.

Russia's surface fleet has become second only to that of the U. S. in size. It includes some 25 missile ships, including cruisers, almost 100 destroyers, 300 minesweepers, 230 landing ships and 750 patrol craft. Latest additions are two helicopter carriers, one now based in the Mediterranean.

This Soviet fleet is the world's newest and fastest-growing. Virtually all of it has been built in the past 20 years.

(continued on next page)

## RISING THREAT OF RUSSIAN SEA POWER


[continued from preceding page]

Fewer than one third of American naval vessels currently in use are as modern.

Almost as dangerous strategically as these warships are Russia's intelligence ships, scattered worldwide. These are responsible for pinpointing the location of all American and Allied warships in case of war.

Hundreds of Russian fishing and research ships—the world's largest fleets of each—help perform this function with elaborate electronic gear on board. These craft sometimes dot the horizon in the North Atlantic and Pacific. Some are nearly always stationed offshore from a few specified Allied ports, particularly U. S. nuclear-submarine bases.

But it is in the Mediterranean that Soviet sea power is making its biggest challenge to U. S. naval supremacy.



—Sovfoto

Soviet nuclear submarine heads for sea. Its missiles have a range of 350 miles.

There, Russian officials state openly that the expanding Soviet fleet is aimed at usurping the American fleet's position.

The Moscow newspaper "Izvestia" recently demanded that the U. S. call its ships home and let the Russian Navy "keep peace" in the Mediterranean.

To meet this growing incursion by Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, Allied headquarters at Naples has created a new air unit, called the Maritime Air Forces. This is reported by U. S. officers to be a "cautionary" move. The unit is composed of American, British and Italian land-based air squadrons, with Greek and Turkish forces expected to participate later.

Russian warships in the Mediterranean call regularly, at this time, at ports in Egypt and Algeria. Port Said and Alex-

andria have become "rest and recreation" stops for Soviet ships on station in the Mediterranean. And Russian supply and repair ships anchor at other North African ports.

But U. S. observers on the scene say that the new Soviet fleet in these waters is trying to avoid dependence upon land bases. The Russians appear to have adopted the American techniques for provisioning at sea, so that they can be self-supporting without a crucial need for Mediterranean bases.

Allied naval officials, faced with this rapid Soviet build-up, are not about to let the "Med" turn into a Russian lake, as the Baltic has, without a major challenge. But they concede that the Soviets are going ahead in that part of the world faster than had been expected.

"Brand-new phase." Russia's naval challenge around the world is described by one of these officials as "a brand-new phase of the cold war," one that is "obviously aimed at controlling the use of the world's seaways, and obviously coordinated in Moscow."

An elaborate, computerized headquarters is known to be operating in Moscow now, with detailed control over all Soviet shipping—naval, merchant, fishing and scientific. The effectiveness of this control, observers say, was shown during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when, at a signal from Moscow, 20 Russian merchantmen bound for Cuba turned around.


No other nation on earth has this kind of tight control over its merchantmen, according to British Vice Admiral Peter Compston, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Admiral Compston calls the emergence now of Russia as a major sea power, for the first time in history, "one of the most dramatic changes of the last 20 years."

Senior U. S. officers, faced with the new Soviet challenge at a time when the Vietnam war has held up needed replacement of aging American warships, warn that this country is falling behind in a real, undeclared "war" at sea.


**Many-faceted war.** Says Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., Commander of U. S. Forces in the Pacific: "It is a war of design and construction, of manpower and national resources, of money, planning and organization—and the signs are that we are losing it."

The admirals are pinning their hopes for change on a single speech made during the 1968 presidential campaign by President-elect Nixon. Mr. Nixon warned that Russia was making a "very impressive bid" to becoming the world's No. 1 sea power; then he promised to change directions for U. S. and "restore the goal of a Navy second to none."




—Wide World Photo

At Curaçao. Gigantic domes house electronic gear on this Soviet tracking ship.




—UPI Photo

Off Hawaii. Russian spy vessels keep tabs on U. S. operations around world.



—North American Rockwell Photo

Near Guam. This "oceanographic" trawler checks movements of Polaris subs.



—Wide World Photo

Off New England. Red fishing fleets are often cover for intelligence activities.

# SOVIET SEA POWER: "MODERN, STRONG, SECOND ONLY TO U.S."

Interview With  
Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr.,  
U. S. Navy (Ret.),  
Former Chief of Naval Operations

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How far-reaching are Soviet designs on the Mediterranean? Exactly what is the Russian fleet up to there, in the Indian Ocean, elsewhere?

What should the U. S. be doing about it?

To provide timely answers to these and other questions, Admiral Anderson came to the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report" for this exclusive interview with the magazine's editors.

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**Q** Admiral Anderson, what is the real meaning of the Soviet thrust into the Mediterranean?

**A** Russia has decided, and is determined, to extend its power into that area of the world—politically, militarily and psychologically.

The Mediterranean is one of the most strategic areas in the world—the means of communication between all the different peoples and nations on the littorals to the north and the south. It is a bridge between Europe and Asia and Africa. The Mediterranean is the Soviets' physical and political highway to Africa and, through the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean.

From the standpoint of resources, the oil of the Middle East and now of North Africa is of tremendous economic significance.

We must also remember that around the Mediterranean are ancient rivalries and current trouble spots which are sources of instability and danger to the peace of the whole area.

**Q** What is Russia's long-range strategy, as you see it?

**A** I think there is a general recognition that the Soviet objective is world domination. Does that mean putting troops in New York, or Washington, or any other specific place around the world? I don't think so! Does it mean the destruction of our cities with atomic weapons? No, because they know they would get severe, immediate and certain retaliation on their own.

What it does mean is Russia's having the principal nations of the world either accommodate or be subservient to the Soviet Union in matters that they consider of importance to them.

**Q** How are they going about it?

**A** First, by providing a very stout defense in the areas that they consider vital to them. That's the reason they



—USN&WR Photo

Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr. (Ret.), has top credentials as an expert on Soviet strategy. He commanded the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean before becoming Chief of Naval Operations in 1961, later served as Ambassador to Portugal.

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could not tolerate the true independence of Czechoslovakia, and will not withdraw their Army and Air Force from East Germany and Poland.

Second, the Soviets want to avoid getting involved with their own military forces, unless it is absolutely necessary. In other words, they want to operate by proxy. They like to either create or exploit situations to their own advantage which pose to us only courses of action characterized by disadvantages, risks and expense. This is their typical strategy. That is what they did in the Berlin situation; they did it in Korea, and in Cuba. They have done it again in South Vietnam.

Coming specifically to the Mediterranean, the Soviet purpose is threefold: politically, to influence the nations on the northern littoral, the members of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and on the southern littoral, the Arab states; militarily, to pose a threat to NATO in the event of war; psychologically, they are trying to achieve a terrific impact on all of these countries, north and south.


**Q** Does this pose a practical danger to the U. S.?

**A** Do you remember in 1958, when we were invited to send troops into Lebanon? I happened to be in command of the Navy's carriers at that time. We took precautions in the event that the Russians intervened, but we really did not think that they were going to come in.

If you envisage a similar situation today, with the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, certainly we would have to think: "Is there a danger of a direct confrontation with the Russians? Is it worth it? What is the American public opinion going to be of American marines going ashore?"

Conversely, one of the great prizes in the Mediterranean area now is Libya with all its oil. Libya has been quite friendly to the United States. Suppose the situation changes

*(continued on next page)*



—U.S. Navy Photo

Soviet helicopter ship Moskva in Mideast waters.

## INTERVIEW WITH NAVAL AUTHORITY

[continued from preceding page]

in a year or so and the Egyptians decide, with or without Russian pressure, that they want that Libyan oil. Or suppose the Libyans "invite" the Russians in. How are we going to react? It is certainly going to pose grave difficulties for us.

**Q** Do you think the Russians are likely to expand into the Red Sea and then the Indian Ocean from their new base in the Mediterranean?

**A** Yes. As a matter of fact, they already are! Ever since Great Britain announced its intentions to reduce its naval activities in those areas, the Soviet Union has been on the move. Twice in 1968 the Soviets sent naval task units into the Indian Ocean from their Vladivostok bases. These were extended cruises, which included visits to numerous ports along the southern rim of Asia.

The Soviet presence in Egypt, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia grows stronger each day. Given the availability of the military bases in these countries, plus a modest Soviet naval force in the Red Sea, one has—in effect—a Russian lake.

**Q** What could the consequences be for us if they move in even more actively?

**A** The Suez Canal could be denied to us and our allies, either directly or indirectly, by the U.S.S.R. The Soviets would be in an excellent position vis-à-vis oil shipments from the Middle East, and commercial, seaborne cargoes between Europe and Asia.

Already the Soviets have a solid base from which to foment trouble for Saudi Arabia and all of North and East-Central Africa. Sudan's armed forces are outfitted with Soviet tanks and aircraft. Russian technicians are building Somalia naval bases on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Yemen is being armed by the Soviets.

Whether all of this is part of a master strategy as such is difficult to say. It certainly could be.

**Q** What should—or could—the U. S. be doing in the Indian Ocean area?

**A** I think that we should, at times of our own choosing, rotate forces into the Indian Ocean to show our own flag, definitely to establish a good rapport with the countries around the Indian Ocean littoral and to maintain evidence of the power and interest of the United States.

**Q** The Persian Gulf included?

**A** The Persian Gulf included, yes. For many years, we have had a very small naval force operating in the Persian Gulf. It is really three ships, and they're augmented from time to time with a small task force for naval exercises. But what is needed is more ships out there more frequently, to show the flag, to make contact with the people—show a definite presence, power and interest on the part of the U. S.

**Q** Should the U. S. try to replace the British when they pull out of that area completely?

**A** To try to have naval forces based in the area on a

continuing basis, such as the British did, would probably be very impractical for us. We have got too many commitments in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, and in places closer to home.

But definitely our ships should go out there. We should try to have an excellent rapport with the navies of those countries. This is difficult, of course, because of the rivalries between countries such as India and Pakistan, but we should try.

**Q** A lot of people want to know whether it really matters if we are dominant or not in places such as the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf—

**A** There is a vacuum there, and the Russians definitely want "dominance"—if that is the word—over the Arab countries in the area, primarily because of their oil and, secondarily, because of their strategic positions.

If you look at the situation from the long-range point of view, the tremendously large populations of the countries around the Indian Ocean—especially India—are important. To have them come under Communist domination should be a matter of serious concern to the United States.

**Q** Would a permanent Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean have any immediate effect on which way India goes?

**A** It would have an increment of influence, especially if the Indians felt that the Russians were paying far more attention to them than was the Western world, and particularly the United States. The same goes for Iran, Pakistan, and others in the region east of Suez.

**Q** But didn't you say a moment ago it would not be practical for us to keep a navy out there?

**A** There have been some studies made, as you know, of possible U. S. operating bases east of Suez. I am sure we have surveyed the entire area and have selected places where we can go in with our mobile forces quickly, especially so if our task forces are nuclear-powered.

Regarding the establishment of major bases out there, we already have heavy demands on our resources. Looking toward the future, it will be increasingly important for us to have some facility in the area in the years ahead. I do not think we would give major construction a high degree of priority at this time. Rights to have such bases if required and access to the facilities provided by friendly countries are another matter. These we should have as a *quid pro quo* for our assistance.

## ON POLICING THE WORLD—

**Q** Do you tend to side with the view that the U. S. cannot continue to be the policeman for all the world?

**A** The United States must recognize that it cannot do everything itself in all parts of the world. We cannot maintain large ground forces in different parts of Asia and in Europe.

In assessing our position, we should come back to a more realistic appraisal: (a) of limiting the commitments which we are willing to undertake, (b) of having the forces which we must have in our own self-interest, (c) of complementing the forces which our allies can provide. This, in my opinion, means a greater emphasis on naval and air power, and getting our reliable allies to do what they can in providing ground forces—local forces on the scene—to relieve the United States of those commitments.

**Q** Does it bother you that West Europe seems not very much concerned about the Soviet intrusion in the Mediterranean?

**A** It bothers me, and it bothers all the military people I know who are associated with NATO collectively. We should all get more out of NATO than we have in most recent years—to have them recognize, going back to the term of General

Eisenhower, in their "own enlightened self-interest"—to provide more of the forces on the scene to provide stability.

They must recognize that the United States is indeed providing the real deterrent forces, the mobile forces, the hard-hitting forces which they are not capable of providing, and they in turn must do more of which they are capable.

**Q** Are there signs that General de Gaulle is becoming a little more apprehensive about the Russians in the Mediterranean?

**A** I think he is, I think he should be.

**Q** Is Russian emergence as a Mediterranean threat based solely on sea power—or do you foresee their moving in with ground forces as well?

**A** No, I think they will avoid using land forces. They are going to depend on their growing sea power.

This has become an increasingly important part of their national strategy. It started at the end of the Stalin era, and was manifested throughout the Khrushchev period, despite the setback during the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

I think after the Cuban missile crisis the Soviet Navy made very clear demands for a greater role as part of the total power of Russia—that they had to have a greater, more aggressive shipbuilding program and a larger, more modern Navy. And we have seen that ever since.

The Mediterranean is, however, an excellent area in which to maintain ready amphibious forces. I think that the Russians recognize this. Therefore, we can expect to see Soviet marines—or "naval infantry," as they call them—embarked in amphibious-type ships and helicopter carriers in the Mediterranean with increasing frequency.

## 10 NEW SUBMARINES A YEAR—

**Q** Is Russia what you would call a first-class sea power?

**A** Very definitely, yes. She is second only to the United States at the present time. She has a Navy which is extremely modern and powerful, primarily in the strength of its submarine force—more than 350 submarines. To put this in context, Hitler had 55 submarines at the start of World War II.

The Russians for a long time were far behind the United States in numbers of submarines. They were later getting nuclear propulsion for submarines. When they first developed missiles for submarines, they were not nearly as successful as the United States was. But the Russians, particularly in the last few years, have been making major steps forward in the quality as well as the number of their ships.

Admittedly the Russian Navy does not have the powerful striking forces that our Navy has in two categories: our carrier striking force, which includes 15 attack carriers, and our amphibious striking forces. The Russians do not have anything comparable to those, although as I mentioned earlier they are developing an amphibious capability.

However, it is very, very important to us that the Russians are turning out about 10 new submarines each year. That is in addition to the increase of their missile-carrying destroyers, corvettes and escorts.

**Q** Is it likely that Russia can catch up in numbers of Polaris-type missile submarines?

**A** I instinctively want to answer this with a blunt reference to what Soviet technology has done in space and aviation. It is not only likely that the Soviets can match or surpass our numbers of Polaris-type strategic-missile platforms, it is highly probable.

The U. S. has 41 Polaris submarines, and has announced no plans to construct additional numbers. Russia has already started building strategic-missile submarines similar to our Polaris type.

There is no question of the technical knowledge and industrial capacity to support an ambitious construction

program. Soviet planners surely recognize the advantage of mobility, concealment and positive striking power afforded by the submarine as a strategic-missile launcher.

**Q** Are Soviet submarines operating off our coasts?

**A** They have been operating in the Atlantic and Pacific. Whether Moscow has sent any missile-carrying submarines close to our coasts, I cannot say. But they have been operating submarines in the South Atlantic, they have been going around the Cape of Good Hope, they have had them in the Indian Ocean, they have them in the Pacific. They move them around in regular patrols and exercises.

**Q** How good are the missiles that they carry?

**A** They are excellent missiles. The Russians, after all, have shown great capability in their space program. The missiles that we have seen in surface-to-air defense in North Vietnam have been good. And we know that the Soviet missile in Egyptian hands, that sank the Israeli destroyer, was effective.

**Q** What is the range of the Russian submarine missiles?

**A** We used to estimate 350 miles. I would strongly suspect that the newer missiles—ballistic-type missiles—are much greater in range. They could lie off our coasts and reach cities in the United States far inland.

**Q** How do you defend against that?

**A** There is no absolute defense against missiles. Our anti-submarine defenses have improved, but I do not think that anybody could guarantee that, as effective as we are in anti-submarine warfare, we could prevent some missiles from being launched by enemy submarines.

**Q** There was testimony before the last session of Congress that the U. S. ought to be building faster attack submarines, quieter ones, to go after Soviet missile submarines. Do you agree?

**A** The attack submarine is one of the most effective anti-submarine weapon systems that we have. And I certainly believe that the United States needs to increase its submarine-building program. This does not mean, of course, that we have to match the Russians submarine for submarine. I would say we need to build 50 or 60 more, but the Navy Department is in the best position to state the exact magnitude of the program.

There is something to remember about these American submarines: It takes five years from the time you give a go-ahead and have the funds—a minimum of five years—before you can get them out to sea. With this lead time, we had best be absolutely certain that we have set our sights high enough.

I think the Russian submarine fleet is a very serious threat. It can be directed against the lines of communication among the NATO countries, between the United States and such allies as we have in the Western Pacific. The Russian submarines—and Russian missiles from submarines and surface craft—can be directed against our fleets and amphibious forces in the event of war. So this is a factor of major military significance in the total world equation between the East and the West.


We do not have in being sufficient modern antisubmarine forces to insure against very, very serious losses at sea in the event of an emergency or war. We have to get on with a building program.

## WORRY OVER MERCHANT FLEET—

**Q** Are you at all concerned about the Russian development of their commercial fleet—their merchant marine?

**A** Very concerned. The sea power of a nation is not just merely its naval forces; it is its maritime forces, its merchant marine, its research and development in oceanography and

*(continued on next page)*



—Sovfoto

Russian submarine base in the Northern Pacific.

## INTERVIEW WITH NAVAL AUTHORITY

[continued from preceding page]

other areas. Sea power also includes fishing fleets and the shipbuilding industry. It is many things.

Where there has been developing a very great deficiency in United States total sea power is in the deterioration of our merchant marine. This is taking place at a time when the Russians are rapidly building up a very strong, modern merchant marine which, while not yet as large as that of the United States, probably will be larger and much more modern in three to five years. This is a matter of very serious concern.

We have had to resupply our forces in Vietnam, and we have accomplished this under the greatest of difficulties by sea, because of the lack of suitable American-flag merchant ships. Remember that we have done this without any submarine opposition. We are running to the bottom of the barrel of American-flag ships to meet American requirements. I believe that the United States has got to recognize that it must build up its merchant marine. This is a big job, because it has been neglected for a long time.

We have spent in the last five years less than 50 million dollars on research and development for sealift and sea transport. But for airlift and air transport we have spent over a billion dollars in research and development. We have got to get ships which we can operate with reduced crews, more automation, greater efficiency. I think that Government subsidy is necessary, but I think Government subsidy has to be wisely applied.

**Q** Yet the argument is heard that the U. S. military can do very well by using foreign-flag ships, and save money at it. What is the answer to that?

**A** The answer is that "flags of convenience" are not adequate for United States requirements at all. There are two categories of foreign-flag ships: (1) those American-owned flags of convenience "under effective control" and registered in Panama, Liberia or Honduras, and (2) other foreign-flag ships available on the open market.

There are only about 60 general dry-cargo ships of use to the Department of Defense for carrying military cargoes under flags of convenience. All but three of these ships are Liberty ships [built during World War II], which are being scrapped at a substantial rate. Accordingly, the capability of flags of convenience to carry military cargoes is quite limited. Certainly it is not a future capability.

There are a large number of dry-bulk ships and tankers under flags of convenience. However, most of these ships are already engaged in carrying essential raw materials, principally iron ore, bauxite and oil, to support the United States industrial base, and thus would keep on doing in the event of an emergency just what they're doing now—so they are not available to meet this requirement.

## U. S. News & World Report

Also there's a certain risk in planning to use foreign-flag vessels. They just may not be available when the chips are down.

So the flag of convenience simply does not replace the U. S.-flag merchant ship.

Just think back to the time of the Cuban missile crisis. We had 10 battalions of marines afloat, and if we had gotten involved in Cuba, we would have had to muster very quickly a major logistic, seaborne support effort down there. We might have had a very serious problem.

**Q** Is there any military significance in the Russians' oceanographic programs around the world?

**A** Everything the Russians do has either a political or military significance, and frequently they are intertwined. For example, within the Russian fishing fleets, which operate worldwide, are ships equipped with electronic recording devices and listening devices. They carry on both oceanographic research and intelligence work.

## U. S. NAVY UNDER NIXON—

**Q** Admiral Anderson, a final question: Could you sum up your recommendations to a new Administration on our naval needs?

**A** That is a big order. I will try.

First of all, a new Administration will certainly want very carefully to reassess U. S. objectives, U. S. commitments, U. S. capabilities and limitations—and evolve the best overall defense strategy. Only from the position of the White House can this be done, with the advice of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Second, in my opinion, powerful naval forces are absolutely essential to a nation which is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, so dependent upon the sea.

Third, our strategic position, tied up as it is with allies, means controlling the seas—using them for our purposes, denying them to an enemy in the event of war. This in turn means a modern Navy.

To have a modern Navy, we must have a consistent long-range shipbuilding program. This is going to be expensive, but everything is expensive these days. We have got to replace this large quantity of naval ships which are over 20 years old. This is long overdue!

Along with this, we've got to have an aggressive program to provide and maintain a modern American merchant marine. This, too, is going to be difficult, and is going to be expensive, and it is going to take time. But I believe that by capitalizing on American ingenuity and longer-range shipbuilding programs we can in fact build up the American merchant marine. In fact, we have got to do it.

In research and development, we have got to see to it that our ships, our weapons and our naval aircraft are able to provide not only the requirements of today, but tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. That means many years into the future.

We have had a long period of time when we have not adequately capitalized on the development of suitable replacement aircraft for the Navy, and particularly in getting on with high-speed and quiet submarines. Some corrective steps have been taken recently, and hopefully they'll be funded to a greater degree in the next Congress and the ones to come.

Of course, I am just a little bit biased on the subject. But I actually believe that, if we allow our Navy and other seagoing assets to fall into disrepair, we are allowing our nation to become second or third-rate. I think we have to remember that the decline and fall of almost every great nation was heralded by a decline of their sea power.

I think that sizes it up.

[ ]

משרד החוץ

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סיווג


מזכר

אל :	מר א. קדרון, סמנכ"ל	אל :
מאת :	משה ששון, סמנכ"ל	מאת :

הנדון: עבודת מחקר

ראיתי תשובתך ע"ג מזכרו של מר ג. גבריאלי הרצ"ב וברצוני להעלות מספר נימוקים שיהכנן ועשויים לגרום לשינוי החלטתך.

- (1) אין צל של ספק באשר למהימנותו של האיש, יוסף נבו, העומד לכתוב את עבודת המחקר הנידונה. הוא שרת במשך תקופה ארוכה כעוזר בענף ירון שבאמ"ן וגם חפקידו הנוכחי במכון שילוח מחייב קלירינג בטחוני קפדני.
  - (2) נבו מתחייב שאה העבודה יראו הוא והבודק בלבד - במקרה זה פרופ' ג. בר שבודאי מוכר לך.
  - (3) מחוך ידיעה כללית של הנושא, אני משוכנע שאין כל טעם לגשת לעבודה זו מבלי שתהיה אפשרות לטפל בחומר חסוי. יהיה זה מגוהך לבסס עבודה זו על חומר גלוי בלבד.
  - (4) נבו הינו כאמור עובד מכון שילוח שבתקציבו אנו משהתפיים ובוועדה המחקר שלו אני יושב כנציג המשרד. לדעתי, אי-הגשת סיוע לאיש המכון יש בו משום כך טעם לפגם.
- אנא שקול העניין מחדש.


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העחק: מר ג. גבריאלי, מנהל בטחון

לשמוש בתוך המשרד בלבד

17.1.51

SECRET



סיווג

# משרד החוץ

## מזכר

אל: מר א. קדרון סמנכ"ל  
 מאת: ג גבריאלי

אל: מר א. קדרון סמנכ"ל  
 מאת: ג גבריאלי

הנה המכתב השני על אוחו  
 נושא של חומר מתקופת  
 התחלת המדינה.  
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
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UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



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משרד החוק

מזכר

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	אל:	מנהל האגף
	מאת:	מנהל חקרי

לכבוד משרד החוק  
ועל ידי שירות המבחן

מל שירות המבחן, אק יימלא העוד  
סימנים לעבודה, הכי ישר  
מסמך מפורטים:

- במידה וישנה תיקון
- היותם קרובים, הכי הם קרובים
- נחמ אינו מופיע למסן
- ולפי

ל. ג. ניו לאס שומר  
זכו פתרון "משנה"  
עבדלה לאר הסיוס"א"  
שנראה על המדר בלתי  
1950

- הוועדה אינו זוכה אלא  
שניה <sup>לפני</sup> בעתק הקניית  
שליפה במשך בזמן ימים  
בזמן אלו

במה התק. ישנה כרטיסיה  
ג- 1952-1953, היותם של  
הי שבו, אך אין צד שום לא אלקטו

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מספר תעודת זהות

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מנהל חקר

אל :

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מנהל בסחון


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 חתום

ראה נא הפנייה המצורפת.  
 האם ניתן בכלל להפריד חומר  
 בלמ"ס מהחומר המסווג בנושא  
 הנדרש? מתן אישור לעיון  
 בחומר בלתי מסווג - לא יהיה  
 בעייה. אך חומר מסווג לא  
 נוכל לתת. האם זה סכניח  
 אפשרי? האם יש לך כח אדם  
 כדי להוסיב מישהו להוציא חומר  
 בלמ"ס כנדרש?

ג גבריאלי

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חתימה


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מסמך מס' 100

תאריך: 10/10/2010



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המסמך מס' 100, המכיל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים, נמצא באתר האינטרנט של משרד המשפטים, תחת הכותרת "מסמכים". המסמך מס' 100, המכיל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים, נמצא באתר האינטרנט של משרד המשפטים, תחת הכותרת "מסמכים". המסמך מס' 100, המכיל את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים, נמצא באתר האינטרנט של משרד המשפטים, תחת הכותרת "מסמכים".

אשראי

10/10/2010

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26.12.69

משרד החוץ

סיווג

מוזכר

אל :	מר א. קדרון, סמנכ"ל
מאת :	י. מילבידסקי, לשכת ששון

הנידון: עבודת מחקר

רצ"ב מכתבו של מר יוסף נבו המכין עבודת מחקר שיש לנו ענין רב בה.

החומר שהוא נזקק לו לצורך עבודה זו נוגע רובו ככולו למכלול היחסים הבין-ערביים (ירדן פלסטינאיים) ואיננו מתייחס לנקודה הישראלית (השיחות עם עבדאללה).

לאור הנ"ל מבקש מר ששון אשורן לאפשר למר נבו גישה לחיכי מחלקת החקר ומגנזה שנלר הנוגעים בנושא.

בברכה,  
י. מילבידסקי  
יהודה מילבידסקי

לשמוש בתוך המשרד בלבד



TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY

The Reuven Shiloah Research Center  
Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies  
RAMAT-AVIV, TEL-AVIV



Tel 416111

אוניברסיטת תל-אביב

מכון שילוח  
לחקר המזרח - התיכון ואפריקה  
רמת-אביב, תל-אביב

תל אביב,  
21.12.1969

לכבוד  
מר יהודה מלוויצקי  
משרד החוץ  
ירושלים.

א.נ.

בהמשך לשיחתנו הטלפונית מיום 21.12.69; רצוף בזה פרוט החומר שאני מעוניין בו לצורך עבודת הגמר, מ.א. בנושא "קונגרס יריחו, עבדאללה והפלסטינאים 1948".

כל חומר העוסק בהתארגנות פוליטית פלסטינאית בא"י, ב-1948 (לאורך כל השנה!) התקשרויות עם עבדאללה, בין אם היזמה באה מצידו או מצד גורמים פלסטינאים כל שהם. פעילות (בעיקר סמויה) של עבדאללה ונציגיו בא"י - אחרי מאי 1948 - ע"י סוכנים, שליחים, קציני הלגיון, אנשי האדמיניסטרציה של הממשל הצבאי העבר-ירדני, נכבדים מקומיים, או באמצעות כל גורם אחר.  
חומר על הכינוס הפלסטינאי בעמאן (1.10.48), הכינוס ביריחו (1.12.48), ממשלת כל פלסטין בעזה והכינוס הפלסטינאי שם וכן כל חומר על המנהיגות ~~אצל~~ הפלסטינאית בכלל, ב-1948.

מהות החומר, כפי שאני מניח, הוא בעיקרו דוחו"ת שלנו על המצב בגדה המערבית (חזור הכיבוש העבר ירדני והעיראקי), עתונות ערבית מהתקופה או לקטים מתוך עתונות ~~אצל~~ ושידורי רדיו, תיקים אישיים, רשימות שמיות של אמשחתפי הכינוסים (אם ישנן) או כל חומר אחר.

למותר לציין כי לא אפרסם חומר זה או טובאות ממנו ללא קבלת היתר מכם.

בברכה ובחודה מראש

יוסף נבו.

ר"ב פרטים אישיים:

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Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies  
The Hebrew Bible Research Center  
Tel Aviv, Israel

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1985

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1. The first part of the book deals with the historical background of the text. It discusses the political and social conditions in the land of Israel during the period of the monarchy and the exile.

The second part of the book deals with the literary analysis of the text. It discusses the structure and style of the text, and the use of literary devices such as parallelism and metaphor.

The third part of the book deals with the theological interpretation of the text. It discusses the role of the text in the development of the Jewish religion and the Christian church.

The fourth part of the book deals with the archaeological evidence for the text. It discusses the discovery of ancient inscriptions and other archaeological remains that relate to the text.

The fifth part of the book deals with the modern interpretation of the text. It discusses the role of the text in modern Jewish and Christian thought.

1985

1985

The sixth part of the book deals with the future of the text. It discusses the role of the text in the future of the Jewish and Christian religions.



TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19122

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FEDERALISM

1. אלסו ליל  
2. זניג גאמג בוקים אשיר קלאר הולמר .

ח.ל.

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December 5, 1969

לשכת השד  
משדד החוק  
12.1.1970  
דואר זכנס

The Honorable Abba Eban  
Foreign Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem, Israel

Sir:

During my recent year as a visiting professor at the Hebrew University, I was able to focus some attention on the problem of normalizing relations with the administered territories, based on the assumption that Israel will have to remain within them so long that some permanent political arrangements are now necessary. I am taking the liberty of sending you the enclosed position paper summarizing the options I see available for whatever value it may have. Of course, I will be delighted to be of any further service on this matter if you should so desire.

With very best wishes for Israel's every success, I am

Very truly yours,

Daniel J. Elazar  
Director

DJE/drg  
Encl.

## ISRAEL AND THE "TERRITORIES": TOWARD A WORKABLE FEDERAL SOLUTION

Daniel J. Elazar  
Temple University

"We must recognize the fact that we have two peoples living in the same land, each desirous of preserving its own national and cultural integrity." This could be a quotation taken from the remarks of almost any of Israel's leaders in their discussion of the situation in the Land of Israel that has come to the forefront again since the Six-Day War. Nor would many thoughtful people disagree with such a statement. In essence, this is the problem whose solution is the key to peace in the area. How can both peoples create a life together in such physical proximity that will enable them to preserve their respective national and cultural integrities, particularly since one is unconditionally unwilling to formally recognize the rights of the other or to enter into political relationships with it?

The Israelis' clear rejection of the idea of simple annexation of the settled territories of Palestine intentionally or unintentionally reveals that, in its essence, this is a problem of federalism; of the linking of diverse entities by a lasting yet limited covenant in such a way as to preserve their integreties while enabling them to achieve common ends or protect common rights. Federal solutions have indeed been put forward in various quarters, usually in a very casual manner without examining their implications or understanding what is needed to give them a practical chance of succeeding should they be tried. This does not mean, however, that a federal solution is not feasible and appropriate, provided that it is constructed to fit the needs of the particular situation and is not confined to the use of orthodox federal instruments, namely to the federation of governments serving entirely discreet territories or functioning in entirely

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David J. Elazar  
Tel Aviv University

We must recognize the fact that we have two peoples living in the same land, each nation of preserving its own national and cultural identity. This could be a situation taken from the remarks of a... of Israel's leaders in their discussion of the situation in the land of Israel that has come to the forefront since the Six-Day War. Not many thoughtful people disagreed with such a statement. In essence, this is the problem whose solution is the key to peace in the area. How can both peoples create a life together in such physical proximity that will enable them to preserve their respective national and cultural identities, particularly since one is predominantly Jewish and the other predominantly Arab? The Israeli's clear rejection of the idea of a binational or bi-cultural state is a political reality with which we must deal. In its essence, this is a problem of federalism. The linking of diverse entities by a lasting yet limited covenant in such a way as to preserve their individuality while enabling them to achieve common ends or protect common rights. Federal solutions have indeed been put forward in various quarters, usually in a very casual manner without analyzing their implications or understanding what is needed to give them a practical chance of succeeding should they be tried. This does not mean, however, that a federal solution is not feasible and appropriate, provided that it is constructed to fit the needs of the particular situation and is not confined to the use of ordinary federal instruments, namely to the delegation of governmental powers to sub-national units or to the creation of a central authority.

discreet areas. The federal idea is, at least potentially, far more flexible than that. Perhaps some less orthodox applications of federal principles can be of use in this situation.

Quite clearly, any suggestions for structural reorganization to accommodate the divergent elements now present within the territories under Israel; administration must be predicted upon the resolution of certain larger political and, indeed, social psychological problems beyond the scope of this modest paper. Hence, the following proposals are based on assumption that the following preconditions will be fulfilled.

1. The security situation will require that Israel retain military control over most, if not all, of the territories occupied as a result of the Six-Day War for the indefinite future.
2. Continuing hostility on the part of the neighboring states will ultimately require Israel to make some decisions that will normalize political life in the territories.
3. Within the context of a "no-peace" situation, it will become possible for Israel to exercise ever-widening options for the political normalization of the territories, increasing in conjunction with elements of the local population.

#### Bi-National Federation

The most common federal solution to the problem of the conflicting rights of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs proposed since the Six-Day War is also the most orthodox one. It proposes the creation of a "Palestine" entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which would then be federated with Israel to create a bi-state federation. This solution sees a conventional federal arrangement, a partnership between peoples on the order of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia but with the democracy characteristic of the United States or Switzerland.



Even ignoring Israel's desire to maintain its special character as a Jewish state, this suggestion is practically unworkable at the present time. The history of federalism shows that it takes two to federate. That is to say, both parties must be willing to accept the bargain creating a federal union in the proper federal spirit and have a strong desire to live up to its provisions if the federation is to have any chance of success. This does not seem a realistic possibility as long as there is no common sense of "Palestinianism" among the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which there is not, and as long as Palestinians feel (quite legitimately, from their perspective) that they must have the approval of the rest of the Arab world before seeking any status as a separate entity, much less a unit in a federation with the "Zionists".

All the available evidence points to the fact that, for most of the so-called Palestinian Arabs, their strongest sense of political (or pre-political) attachment is reserved for their locality and they have no sense of being related to "Palestine" as a whole. Thus they would have to create a sense of Palestinian nationality before they could be expected to maintain an Arab state in a larger federation. To date, the only force capable of stimulating feelings of Palestinianism is hatred of Israel, clearly a contradiction to the idea and spirit of the proposed federation in every way. Moreover, federation on such a basis would clearly bring the Palestinian Arabs into direct and sharp confrontation with their Arab brethren, thus creating a schizophrenic situation that would not only work at cross purposes with the avowed purpose of the federation to help the Arabs preserve their identity but would create unbearable psychological pressures on the potential leaders of the Arab state.



A two-state federation has its drawbacks for Israel as well. In the first place, it entails the recognition of a "Palestinian" entity that does not as yet exist and which does Israel no particular good to create. A two-state union, which must inevitably be based on full equality of the states to succeed, also works against Israel's desire to maintain its own Jewish identity. It does nothing to deal with the "demographic problem" produced by differential reproduction rates that is one of the most important aspects of Israel's concern about any partnership with the Arabs. It will either remain a threat or generate future conflicts if any kind of real or supposed population imbalance should result. Finally, such a federation would require rather drastic changes in Israel's present political system and perhaps in its relations to the Jewish diaspora as well.

Moreover, whatever the expectations of equality of the two states, a two-sided federation with these particular entities would be clearly unequal (Table One). Such an arrangement cannot work to the advantage of either if the experience of other efforts at federation are any guide. In every case, such efforts have proved failures. Inequality in federations can be tolerated when the inequalities are more or less balanced or dispersed among a number of federated units (as is the case in the United States or Canada) but a federation of one strong and one weak unit can only lead to frustration and repression or rebellion and war, particularly when ethnic differences are involved.

#### Milletization of the "Territories"

A very different approach to the problem has emerged in hazy outline in certain quarters in Israel, evolving hesitantly from a status quo which protects the local autonomy of the Arab communities in the territories. Organized systematically, one sees that it, too,



is based on federal principles and elements, though not consciously so. This approach envisages the administered territories of the West Bank and Gaza kept within Israel's security orbit while leaving the local affairs and keeping the entire area in limbo insofar as territorial sovereignty is concerned.

Accepting these preconditions, it is possible to shape a radically new kind of federal solution around them. What is necessary is an arrangement whereby those who live in the territories-- and it is expected that they will come to include an increasing number of Jews-- will be able to choose as individuals between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship in some meaningful way while also being able to maintain or establish self-governing local communities attached to their respective states of citizenship. Such an arrangement has the advantage of avoiding the problems of a full bi-national federation or of incorporating a million reluctant Arabs into an equally reluctant Israel as full citizens. It would allow the Arabs the full right to preserve their national identity and pan-Arab connections and not jeopardize the Jewish identity or security of Israel. However the practical question of how to effectuate such an arrangement is a very difficult one.

What is implied in this arrangement is a combination of a modern version of the millet system utilized in the Ottoman Empire, whereby everyone is organized within their religious or ethnic communities which are, in turn, granted substantial internal self-government, with the principle of national identity and citizenship expressed to a degree territorially. The following four goals must be achieved by any workable plan based on this approach.

1. Absolute Israeli military control over the territories for security reasons.

2. Substantially free movement of Jews and Arabs into and out of the territories.
3. Right of all residents of the territories to freely choose their citizenship among the options offered, i.e. Israeli or Jordanian, and to live within a communal framework that gives that citizenship meaningful expression.
4. Substantial economic integration of Israel, the territories, and Jordan.

The first problem is to design the municipal political arrangements necessary to effectuate the rights of choice of citizenship and self-government. Somehow the powers of police, taxation, and local policy-making in general; the provision of social services; and the rights of participation and representation in the national government of the respective countries of citizenship must be provided for.

One way to do this would be by establishing a condominium over the territories placing them as a whole under joint Israeli-Jordanian administration and then dividing local administrative functions along municipal boundaries. Under this arrangement, the inhabitants of each town and village would choose the state under which they chose to be governed, which state would then exercise governmental powers over them in the appropriate manner. Territory not included within (or otherwise separated from) the boundaries of existing towns or villages would be administered directly by the condominium authority and open to settlement by either Jews or Arabs. The creation of new towns and villages based on differences in national citizenship will be handled by Israeli and Jordanian authorities through a set of regular procedures to be established by joint agreement.

Thus at the present time, all the pre-existing Arab cities and townships would remain Jordanian municipalities with substantial internal autonomy. The Etzion Bloc and the various Nahal settlements would form the basis for two or three regional councils under Israeli jurisdiction and Jewish Hebron would become an independent city (Hebron Ilit) under Israeli law and control.

This plan has many advantages and, using a little imagination, is workable. Its major drawback is that it requires the cooperation, not only of the Palestinian Arabs but of Jordan as well. The willingness of Jordan to cooperate in such an arrangement is problematical, to say the least, while the involvement of the Palestinian Arabs is necessarily contingent upon Jordanian participation. Moreover, even with a change of heart on the Jordanian side, the difference in the character of the regimes in question would complicate matters somewhat. At the same time, the involvement of Jordan in a permanent arrangement of this sort would have the additional advantage of restoring the ties between the east and west banks of the Jordan, the traditional area of the Land of Israel.

Implementation of this plan would require virtually no changes in existing Israeli political institutions and arrangements since the Jews and Jewish settlements in the territories would be able to participate in the existing political system without any serious adjustments. Moreover, partial implementation of the plan could begin immediately through unilateral Israeli action establishing the goal, taking jurisdiction over vacant (and vacated) lands, organizing the Jewish settlements in the territories as Israeli governmental units, and proceeding with the establishment of new Jewish settlements where deemed appropriate.



A Multiple-Unit Federation

There is one other possibility for creating a territorially based state on federal lines to solve the problem that could perhaps be implemented and sustained. It would involve the creation of more than two subunits in such a way as to obviate the necessity for an immediately positive response by all the Arabs of all the "territories" or the creation of a Palestinian entity. Perhaps the best possible arrangement would be the division of the country into a number of regions -- no less than nine or more than twelve including the federal district of Jerusalem. These regions would be given substantial local autonomy, particularly in the educational, cultural, religious and social spheres under a clear constitutional arrangement, which could range from a fully federal one (as in Switzerland where the cantons are the basic units of domestic government) to a substantially decentralized system based on federal principles but still unitary in the locus of final authority (as in the Netherlands where the provinces are still subject to substantial national government control).

The two most advantageous arrangements would be either one of nine regions or one of twelve. Under a nine region arrangement, Judea Samaria, and the Gaza Strip would form three separate units with pre-war Israel forming the other six (with the Golan Heights annexed to the Northern region and some boundary adjustments for the others). Two possible regional arrangements are shown in Tables Two and Three. They have the advantage of being based, in general, on existing sub-district or district boundaries. Other arrangements are possible if the entire boundary question were to be opened anew (perhaps taking into consideration the natural districts outlined by the Israel Office of Statistics). In the first, one of the six Jewish districts would

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The two most advantageous arrangements would be either one of three regions or one of twelve. Under a three region arrangement, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip would form three separate units with great local autonomy, the other six (with the Golan Heights annexed to the Northern region and some boundary adjustments for the others). The possible regional arrangements are shown in Tables Two and Three. They have the advantage of being based, in general, on existing administrative or district boundaries. Other arrangements are possible if the entire boundary question were to be opened then perhaps leading to consideration of the natural districts outlined by the Israeli Office of Statistics. In the first, one of the six Jewish districts would

be liable to a change of majority with demographic changes. This possibility is eliminated in the second. Under a twelve region arrangement, the three Arab units could be immediately joined by a fourth composed primarily of Israeli Arabs while either regions would have a virtually unalterable Jewish majority. Tables Four and Five delineate one such possibility, again utilizing present boundaries.

Even with free movement of population among regions and the difference in Jewish and Arab rates of reproduction, it is unlikely that this situation would be altered in more than one region under either system. Thus the Jewish character of the greater part of the federation would be assured while the Arab character of all areas with heavy concentrations of Arabs would be equally protected.

It may be argued that Israel is too small for a federal or even quasi-federal division of such complexity. In fact, the present cease fire lines give Israel an area well over twice the size of Switzerland or the Netherlands and even excluding the uninhabitable area of Sinai, the federation would just about equal either in area. Moreover, the total population of the federation would be approximately 3.7 million, which, considering its potential growth, is not significantly less than Switzerland's static 5.9 million and is, in fact, larger than the total population of the United States at the time it adopted its federal constitution.

Even more important, the size and population of the several regions works out well. It can be assumed that any region of over 300,000 is politically and administratively viable. Under the twelve region system, five clearly meet this test and two others will probably reach that figure in the very near future. The remaining five are large enough in area to reach the desired population level within a

reasonable time through the continuation of normal efforts at population dispersion. (In fact, one of the secondary benefits of the plan to Israel would be the added incentive for population dispersal, already a keystone of the State's policy). Under the nine region system, six meet the test and all but one of the others are likely to shortly. Moreover, under either of the systems there is sufficient balance in area, population, and resources among the regions, both Jewish and Arab, to prevent any single region from dominating the federation or to lead to the development of one or two weak regions that would inevitably be dominated by their larger sisters.

Precise details as to the form of government to be used in such a political system need to be worked out at a later stage in the consideration of the plan. A few general principles must be accepted as the basis for more specific delineation. The governmental system of the entity herein proposed would involve a constitutional allocation of a minimum of powers exclusively to each level of government (e.g. foreign affairs and defense to the general government, religion to the regional governments) and the sharing of most powers concurrently by both. The institutions of the general government should be designed to protect both the national rights of the majority people and the integrity of the minority people, as well as the civil rights of all individuals. A bicameral legislature would probably be most appropriate with the regional governments represented equally in one house and according to population in the other. (One possible arrangement is suggested in the Appendix). Where the general government exercises powers under its rights of concurrent jurisdiction, every consideration should be given to decentralizing the administration of the resultant programs, relying on the regional governments to carry them out.

The regional governments would have legislative and administrative organs of their own to enable them to carry out their responsibilities and properly represent their people. Within the limits of the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government for each region, the regions should have considerable flexibility in creating and adopting their governmental institutions including those of local government, in light of local circumstances.

The judicial system should combine general and regional concerns with local judges appointed from among local residents. The supreme court should have the power to decide questions arising from the distribution of powers among the several jurisdictions.

Provisions could be made for interregional cooperation in achieving common objectives that would allow the several Jewish and Arab regions to institutionalize collaboration among themselves where policy would dictate its advisability. Thus, for example, the national aspects of educational policy and administration could be transferred by the regions to separate interregional authorities for Jews and Arabs.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of this approach lies in its potential for implementation. It is possible to start with the consent of a relatively few Arabs rather than necessarily waiting for all of them. The dual national aspects of the plan could even be implemented in the beginning by giving the Israeli Arabs their regional government under the twelve region system while encouraging the Arabs of the territories to move in the same direction. Moreover, the plan can be implemented without recourse to states outside of the area of Israeli control, whether Jordan, Egypt or Syria. Israel can act with a minimum of outside interference to resettle the Arab refugees, give the Arabs meaningful citizenship with real self-government, and nip

the arguments of the pro-Palestine group in the bud, all the while protecting its own security.

The plan even has substantial internal advantages for Israel. It can provide for needed decentralization within the Jewish sector and could form the basis for an electoral system that represents local districts as well as national interests. While this would mean significant changes in the existing political system, none of the changes would move in radically new directions but would, rather, serve to implement proposals already under discussion, albeit in a more definite manner than hitherto suggested. It could, indeed, eliminate the nagging problem of Arab minority rights while safeguarding the Jewish character of the state to the greatest possible extent.

#### Conclusion

None of the foregoing plans is without its positive features and none is without its drawbacks. Perhaps still other plans will be suggested in the future. Yet one thing is clear, any solution worthy of the name must necessarily be a federal one, whether in the sense of the orthodox application of the federal idea to create a federal system or in the unorthodox use of federal principles to create a new kind of political system. The Jewish people, who were among those most responsible for the introduction of the federal idea in practical as well as theoretical ways in the days of their emergence as a nation (the very term federal is consciously derived from the covenant idea as first expressed in the Bible), should be able to contribute to the further expression of that great principle of political self-government in solving the pressing problems confronting them today.

Two of the plans presented above offer a potentially decent and honorable way out of Israel's difficult impasse in regard to the settled territories of Palestine. In that respect, they represent something to aim at, at the very least. At best, they offer Israel a chance to seize the initiative in dealing with an unfriendly population having legitimate claims to the territory on which they are settled and which must remain within Israel's immediate sphere of control for both historical and security reasons.

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Appendix

The Legislative Structure of the Multi-Unit Federation: One Possible Arrangement

The government of the federation would be vested in a bicameral legislature, a president and an executive council. One house of the legislature (called here the senate) would represent the regions equally with each region (and the federal district) electing three representatives, giving that house a total membership of 36 (or 27 or 30). The other house of the legislature (called the Assembly) would be elected from the regions on a population basis with no region having less than two representatives. For example, with one representative for every 30,000 people, that house would have a total membership of 126 and no region would have less than three representatives. With one for every 50,000, the total membership would be 74 and no region would have less than two. Table Six calculated the representation of each region on the basis of these two possible apportionments for the twelve regional plan. Legislation could be initiated in either house and would have to be approved by both.

The president and the executive council would be chosen by both houses sitting in joint session, the former for a fixed term and the latter either for a fixed term for so long as it has the confidence of both houses. It would function as the federal cabinet and its members could be drawn from either house.



Table One

The Bi-State Federation: A Profile

	<u>Area (sq. km.)</u>	<u>Population (1967)</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Non-Jews</u>
Jewish State	21,970 <sup>a</sup>	2,773.9	2,383.6	396.7 <sup>a</sup>
Arab State	7,700 <sup>b</sup>	988.6 <sup>b</sup>	.3 <sup>c</sup>	988.3
Sinai Territory	59,000	d	---	d

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<sup>a</sup>Including Golan Heights and East Jerusalem

<sup>b</sup>Including 1500 Square kilometers of northern Sinai

<sup>c</sup>Scattered, in Hebron, Kfar Etzion, and the Nachal settlements

<sup>d</sup>Beduin

The Bi-State Federation: A Profile

	Area (sq. km.)	Population (1967)	1968 Law Non-Law
Lebanon State	21,070 <sup>a</sup>	2,773,8	2,383.6, 386.7 <sup>b</sup>
Arab State	7,700 <sup>b</sup>	982.4 <sup>b</sup>	39 988.3
Sinai Territory	59,000	5	5

<sup>a</sup>Including Golan Heights and East Jerusalem  
<sup>b</sup>Including 1500 square kilometers of northern Sinai  
<sup>c</sup>Excluded, in Lebanon, West Bank, and the Golan Heights  
<sup>d</sup>Arabia

Table Two

The Nine Unit Federation: Area and Population (Plan A: Using Present Districts)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area (sq.km.)</u>	<u>Population</u> <sup>000s</sup>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Non-Jews</u>	<u>Major(#)</u> <u>Cities</u>	<u>Capitol</u>
Tzafon <sup>a</sup>	4,475	432.0	238.4*	195.6	8	Tzefat
Haifa	854	442.5	378.2*	64.3	3	Haifa
Mercaz	1,242	495.4	459.5*	35.9	6	Petah Tiqw
Tel Aviv	170	821.6	814.0*	7.6	6	Tel Aviv
Jerusalem	627	296.4	225.7*	70.7	2	Jerusalem
Darom	14,107	292.7	267.6*	25.1	7	Beer Sheva
Judaea	c.2,400	196.6	c	196.6*	3	Hebron
Samaria	c.3,500	402.0	c	402.0*	4	Shechem
Gaza	c.1,800	389.7	c	389.7*	4	Gaza
Sinai Territory	c.59,000					

a. Including Golan Heights

b. Including East Jerusalem

c. Trace, in various settlements

\* Majority



Table Three

The Nine Unit Federation: Area and Population (Plan B: Regions Based on Combinations of Present Subdistricts)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Population(000s)</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Non-Jews</u>	<u>Major Cities</u>	<u>Capitol</u>	<u>Subdistricts</u>
Tzafon <sup>a</sup>	3,539	262.9	173.8*	89.1	6	Tzefat	Golan Tzefat Kinneret Yizrael
Asher	1,219	497.5	369.5*	128.0	3	Haifa	Acco Haifa
Dan	170	821.6	814.0*	7.6	6	Tel Aviv	Tel Aviv
Manasheh	1,203	407.0	337.4*	69.6	5	Netanya	Hadera Sharon Petaḥ Tiqwa
Darom	2,399	360.4	323.5*	36.9	7	Rehovot	Ramla Rehovot Ashkelon Jerusalem(part)
Negev	12,835	164.5	139.8*	24.7	4	Beer Sheva	Beer Sheva
Judaea	c.2,400	196.6	b	196.6*	3	Hebron	Hebron Bethlehem Jordan
Samaria	c.3,500	402.0	b	402.0*	4	Shechem	Ramallah Nablus Tulkarm Jenin
Gaza	c.1,800	389.7	b	389.7*	4	Gaza	Gaza Khan Yunis El Arish

(continued on next page)

Table Three cont.

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Population</u> <sup>000s</sup>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Non-Jews</u>	<u>Major</u> <u>Cities</u>	<u>Capitol</u>	<u>Subdistricts</u>
Federal District	c.110	266.3	195.5*	70.8	1	Jerusalem	Jerusalem(part)

---

a. Including Golan Heights

b. Trace, invarious settlements

c. Including East Jerusalem

\* Majority

Table Three cont.

Region	Area	Population	Area	Non-Jews	Area	Capital	Substitutes
Eastern District	115	282.3	122.24	70.8	1	Jerusalem (part)	

- a. Including Golan Heights
- b. Trade, investment
- c. Including East Jerusalem
- d. Majority

Table Four

The Twelve-Unit Federation: Area and Population

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area(sq.km.)</u>	<u>Population ('000s)</u>	<u>Major Cities(#)</u>	<u>Capitol</u>	<u>Present Status</u>
"Naftali"	2,340 (4)*	109.0 (12)	3	Tzefat	Tzefat and Kinneret subdistricts, Golan Heights
"Yissachar"	1,197+(7)*	153.9 (11)	3	Afula	Yizrael Subdistrict
"Asher"	936 (8)*	168.8 (9)	2	Akko	Akko Subdivision
"Zevulun"	854 (10)*	442.5 (2)	3	Haifa	Haifa District
"Menasheh"	944+(8)*	371.5 (5)	4	Petah Tiqwa	Sharon, Petah Tiqwa, and Ramle subdistrict
"Dan"	170 (11)*	821.6 (1)	6	Tel Aviv	Tel Aviv District
"Binyamin"	2,087+(5)*	282.2 (6)	5	Rehovot	Rehovot and Ashkelon subdistricts and Jerusalem outside Jerusalem
"Shimon"	12,835 (1)*	164.5 (10)	4	Beer Sheva	Beer Sheva Subdist.
"Ephraim"	c3,500-(2)*	402.0 (3)	4	Shechem	Ramallah, Nablus, Tukam and Jenin Subdist.
Aza	c1,800 (6)*	389.7 (4)	4	Aza	Aza, Khan Yunis and El Arish Subdistricts

Continued on next page

Table Four

The Twelve-Unit Federation: Area and Population

Region	Area (km.)	Population ('000s)	Area (Square Miles)	Population (Millions)
Central	2,300 (890)	100.0 (12)	890	100.0
Western	1,100 (425)	122.8 (15)	425	122.8
Eastern	838 (323)	122.8 (15)	323	122.8
Central	838 (323)	122.8 (15)	323	122.8
Western	844 (326)	122.8 (15)	326	122.8
Eastern	170 (65)	122.8 (15)	65	122.8
Central	2,087 (806)	122.8 (15)	806	122.8
Western	12,558 (485)	122.8 (15)	485	122.8
Eastern	28,500 (110)	122.8 (15)	110	122.8
Central	11,800 (456)	122.8 (15)	456	122.8

Continued on next page

Table Four (Continued)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area(sq.km.)</u>	<u>Population('000s)</u>	<u>Major Cities(#)</u>	<u>Capitol</u>	<u>Present Status</u>
Federal District	110(12)*	266.3(7)	1	Jerusalem	Jerusalem
Sinai Territory	c59,500				

\*Rank order

Table 10 (Continued)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Area (sq. km.)</u>	<u>Population (1950)</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Present Status</u>
Federal District 1101121*	286,207	1	Urusskaya	
State Territory 229,800				

\* Same as 1946

Table Five

The Twelve-Unit Federation: Distribution of Population

<u>Region</u>	<u>Jewish Population ('000s)</u>	<u>Non-Jewish Population</u> (000s)
"Naftali"	88.6*	20.4
"Yissachar"	85.2*	68.7
"Asher"	64.8	104.0*
"Zevulun"	378.2*	64.3
"Menasheh"	336.0*	35.5
"Dan"	814.0*	7.6
"Binyamin"	265.2*	17.0
"Shimon"	139.8*	24.7
"Ephraim"	a	402.0*
"Yehudah"	a	196.6*
"Aza"	a	389.7*
Federal District	195.5*	70.8

---

a. Trace, in various settlements

\* Majority



Table Six  
Two Possible Apportionments

<u>Region</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Assembly</u> <u>30,000 per seat</u>	<u>50,000 per seat</u>
"Naftali"	3	4	2
"Yissachar"	3	5	3
"Asher"	3	6	3
"Zevulun"	3	15	9
"Menasheh"	3	12	7
"Dan"	3	28	16
"Binyamin"	3	9	6
"Shimon"	3	5	3
"Ephraim"	3	13	8
"Yehudah"	3	7	4
"Gaza"	3	13	8
Federal District	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	36	126	74
Jewish Regions	24	87	51
Arab Regions	12	39	23

Table Six  
Two Possible Apportionments

Region	'Senate'	Assembly	50,000 per seat
"Watah"	3	4	2
"Yindah"	3	2	3
"Aber"	3	4	3
"Zevulur"	3	16	3
"Lansanah"	3	12	7
"Dan"	3	23	10
"Binyamin"	3	3	6
"Shimon"	3	2	3
"Ephraim"	3	13	4
"Yehudah"	3	7	4
"Gass"	3	13	3
Levitical Levites	3	2	2
TOTAL	36	128	74
Levish Regions	24	87	51
Arab Regions	12	39	23

25, Eaton Mansions,  
Sloane Square,  
London, S.W.1.

November 20th, 1968.

His Excellency Mr. Abdel Latif El Bighdadi,  
Vice President of U.A.R.

Dear Sir,

May I convey to your excellency my highest regards and beg permission to introduce my friend Mr. L. Edgar Detwiler, president of Liberia International American Corporation and of Liberia Iron and Steel Corporation.

Mr. Detwiler, about whom I have written you before, is the head of an international group of financiers who are interested in helping Egypt build a super, new Suez Canal and industrial zone. I would not have taken the liberty of introducing to your excellency Mr. Detwiler had I not been deeply convinced that what he is proposing is for Egypt a highly economical, beneficial project. As for our Egyptian side I am also thoroughly convinced that it is a patriotic act to help execute such a project, which would no doubt bring to Egypt untold prosperity and help solve quite a number of its present and future political and social problems.

You may find that after discussions with Mr. Detwiler and after having read the memorandum I have already sent you with my brother Aziz, that there could be some objections about the form in which the project is submitted, but do not let that deter you for a minute from taking an active part in carrying it through. Mr. Detwiler is a very understanding, intelligent, resourceful and amenable international financier with lots of experience behind him and an enormous amount of good faith. Hence he would not object at all, within reason, to any amendments to the present form of the project or even a new form provided that the project in its essence is carried through.

Mr. Detwiler has also asked me to introduce him to His Excellency Vice President Hassan Ibrahim, as I have explained to you in my previous letter. May I beg your excellency to see to it that, if the necessity arises, Mr. Detwiler is introduced to His Excellency Hassan Ibrahim under the right light.

Mr. Detwiler will tell you, if allowed, in person more details about the subject and about what he wants to do with it and who he wants to meet.

I know your excellency, that I may be asking you for too much, but I hope that your faith in my esteem for you and in my good judgment will bear me out.

May I, your excellency, thank you for your forbearance, and please rest assured, dear Sir, that I am always

faithfully yours,

Mohamed Omar

3 ת 9 !

סיווג

# משרד החוץ

## מזכר

אל:	מר ש. הלל, סמנכ"ל
מאת:	לשכת המנכ"ל

הנדון: הגשת תביעה אזרחית בענין המטוס ביון  
 מזכרך מיום 30 בדצמבר 1968

המנכ"ל איננו רואה ערך הסברתי או מדיני רב בהגשת תביעה אזרחית ומכל מקום הוא מתנגד לכך שהתקציב למטרה זו יבוא ממשרדנו, או שאנחנו נספג בהגשתו.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י. ברנע

העתק: שה"ח

מר א. קדרון, סמנכ"ל

היועץ המשפטי

מר א. בן-חורין

מנהלת מזת"ים

31.12.68

חתימה


תאריך

חתימה

תאריך

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



NO. 100

TO: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director

RE:

FROM: [Illegible]

DATE:

RE: [Illegible]

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מדינת ישראל  
משרד ראש הממשלה

לשכת המנהל הכללי

חי ה' 111 ה' 111

גב' היילין זקל

אביצור אף אף

היא אורי זל

זרני

א. אורי

LEONARD RAE  
at present  
1 Buckhurst Ave.  
Point Piper N.S.W.2027  
Australia.

25th November, 1968.

Dr. Jaacov Herzog  
Director  
Prime Ministers Office  
JERUSALEM.

Dear Dr. Herzog,

since my arrival in Israel has been postponed for a few weeks I would like to keep you informed on the status of Mr. Detwiler's Suez Canal Project by enclosing herewith excerpts from a recent letter from Mr. Detwiler to me which is self explanatory.


I also enclose copy of a letter from Mr. Mohamed Omar to Mr. Abdel Latif El Bighdadi.

Needless to say that both Mr. Haims and my own efforts for the obtaining of a 50 million Dollar Credit have been unsuccessful (maybe we didn't try hard enough).

I am looking forward to meeting with you again and will communicate with you as soon as I know my arrival date in Israel.

I am keeping Mr. Shlomo Hillel at the foreign office informed and remain with best regards

yours sincerely

  
.....  
Leonard Rae

encl.

LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CORP.

60 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

TEL 269-6711

CABLE ADDRESS: LIBINTAM NEWYORK

From:  
48 Grosvenor Square  
LONDON S.W.1.

London,  
20th November 1968

Mr. Leonard Rae  
1 Buckhurst Avenue  
POINT PIPER N.S.W  
Australia.

Dear Leonard,

I am enclosing copy of a letter dated November 20th to Mr Jaray, which is self-explanatory. I am also enclosing copy of a letter of introduction to Mr. Bighdadi, Vice President of the U.A.R., signed by Mohamed Omar who is an Egyptian lawyer living in London who previously held a number of important positions with the Egyptian Government in Cairo. His brother is now an official of the Egyptian Foreign Service and his sister is having dates with Nasser's eldest son.

I also have been having meetings with Lord Wigg and have kept him informed about what is happening.

Mr. Omar's brother is leaving tomorrow for Cairo, Egypt to have confidential meetings with a number of important people there, especially Mr. Bighdadi. We understand that this is the man who, in the event that something happens to Nasser, in all probability will become the next president of Egypt. He is also highly respected by President Nasser.

I am making plans to leave for Cairo, Egypt around December 6 or 7, and in the meantime various meetings will be held and arrangements made for me to meet various important people on my arrival.

We have been informed that it is advisable to work through the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority and that if he is sold on the project this will make it much easier to obtain Nasser's co-operation. I am enclosing copy of a completely revised plan and a letter addressed to President Nasser, for your information.

/continued...

Mr. Leonard Rae.

(2)  
20th November 1968

Another very important thing has developed. The Egyptian Government is looking for enough money - approximately \$50 million - to purchase 1 Boeing 707 with spare parts and 4 Boeing 727 with spare parts. This will involve a loan of about \$50 million. It will be guaranteed by the Egyptian Government and the planes are to be used by United Arab Airlines which is owned entirely by the Government. President Nasser is most anxious to obtain this loan and buy these five planes, and if we can arrange this loan it would put me immediately in direct contact with President Nasser and the welcome mat would then be out for us to have the Canal Project approved, as well as a great many other things could then be accomplished by the actual performance on our part of producing \$50 million for Egypt, when they are being turned down from practically every source for financing ventures - with the exception of the Russians. It would even pay a group of Jewish bankers to make this loan available, and if it could be camouflaged or handled through St. Phalle, or even through LIAC, it would put us in such a powerful position in Egypt that we could accomplish almost anything. I have already phoned Jack about this today and told him to get busy with Walter and Thibaut, St. Phalle and Abelson, and even if necessary see Charlie Allen, as it is most important that we work out this loan. You might also have some ideas as to how it can be accomplished. They are willing to pay as high as  $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ , and if possible attain a 6-year loan, and are also willing to pay a substantial discount. I will also try to contact Martin Haims about this matter.

LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CORP.

60 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

L 269-6711

CABLE ADDRESS: LIBINTAM NEWYORK

19th November 1968

His Excellency  
Gamal Abdel Nasser  
President of the United Arab Republic  
CAIRO  
Egypt.

Dear Mr. President,

We respectfully suggest the following proposals for your important consideration as President of the United Arab Republic and as the recognized leader and outstanding statesman of all the Arab countries.

As you know, the vital Suez Canal greatly and seriously affects the economics of many countries and hundreds of millions of people throughout the World. The closing of the Canal has brought about great hardships, serious difficulties and increased costs for many products and people to the equivalent of over six billion Dollars U.S. per year.

This situation and demand create the necessity of building a new economical, high speed, two-way-passage type of canal in the Sinai Peninsula not far from the location of the Suez Canal and of such size to meet future world requirements.

It is proposed to build, with your assistance and in co-operation with your Suez Canal Authority, the World's most essential, largest, widest and deepest canal as a most desirable substitute for the Suez Canal, and also a special type of Industrial Freeport Zone located on each side of the entire length of the canal which would have great economic inducements and thus attract various industries from all over the World.

The present Suez Canal is 103 miles long, about 35 feet deep and 195 feet wide. The proposed new canal would be parallel and adjacent to the Suez Canal, running from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez. It would be

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

about 83 miles long, 80 feet deep and 1200 feet wide, and accommodate vessels in size up to 500,000 tons. It would be about the same depth and width as the proposed new Panama Canal.

Although the canal itself would be 1200 feet wide, the land width to be operated as industrial free-port zone would extend to a depth of five miles on each side of the canal and be 83 miles long. This land area would be leased for various industrial purposes to companies throughout the World. In back of each industrial area on both sides of the canal would be space to provide for building workers' homes, schools, hospitals, markets, or a number of complete modern towns for the people who would live and work in the canal and industrial zone.

The canal and industrial zone would be available to all nations and people throughout the World. It would be operated as a tax-free and free-port zone, thus attracting many industries. Vessels passing through the canal would pay tolls depending upon their size.

The large amount of low cost oil and natural gas that is being produced from adjacent countries, which could be made easily available by pipeline to the canal and industrial zone and its industries, would make it possible to have low cost power for the production of thousands of commodities at a lower cost than is possible elsewhere, as well as one of the most economical and largest potential petro-chemical industrial developments that could be built anywhere in the World.

Also the important strategic location of the canal, that would affect world commerce and shipping and more millions of people than any other canal in the World, the fact that it would be 80 feet deep and 1200 feet wide - sufficient to accommodate the World's largest vessels, and the low cost oil and gas that could be obtained, would make it an ideal location for various companies and industries to be located on either side of its 83 miles length.

The various companies who could capitalize this unique canal and industrial no-tax zone and what it would offer would have advantages that could not be duplicated anywhere in the World.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

This project would create tremendous economic benefits for your country and considerable diversified employment for many hundreds of thousands of people from Egypt and bring about hundreds of millions of dollars of new industrial investment.

Attached is a copy of the proposed canal location - marked Exhibit A, and a copy of the proposed location of the Canal and Industrial Zone - marked Exhibit B.

It would become the World's most important canal and industrial zone, the only project of its kind.

It would bring to Egypt, and to you personally, greater prestige, and inspire goodwill, appreciation and credit from practically every country in the World, and would also produce very substantial financial benefits for Egypt.

Your favourable approval of this project would be recorded in history as you being responsible for one of the most important projects ever done in the World.

Your approval would also make it possible to force Israel to withdraw its military forces from Egyptian territory and obtain the peace terms which you desire. You would greatly succeed in this vital matter by having the goodwill, support and force of the most powerful nations and the other nations in the World as your allies. Israel could not afford to antagonize the nations of the World by holding up such an important project in Sinai that would so seriously affect world economy. You would be able to obtain a great victory over Israel, without having another war or firing a single shot or losing one Egyptian soldier's life.

This programme would make it possible to capitalize more favourably on the vast oil and gas deposits in the Arab countries adjacent to Egypt.

Your acceptance of our proposal would produce many substantial benefits not only for Egypt and other Arab countries but also for many other countries throughout the World.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

While the Suez Canal remains closed it is slowly filling with sand. Even dredging and clearing the Canal before it could be used effectively again would take considerable time and great expense which would almost certainly bring about higher tolls. Increased tolls would make the Suez Canal an even less attractive proposition because they would probably make the Suez Canal too costly a short cut for most dry cargo ships as well as tankers.

Unfortunately, the history of the Canal during the last ten years - in which it has been closed twice and tolls increased three times - is such that the World will no longer rely on the control, use and continuous operation of this Canal unless having assured Egyptian guarantees of safe passage at all times.

It takes nearly twice as much tanker and cargo tonnage to move the same amount of oil and products to and from Europe by way of the Cape of Good Hope around Africa as it did through the Suez Canal. It is a matter of longer distance, greater time, thus causing increased costs.

Therefore, an enormous shipbuilding programme costing hundreds of millions of equivalent U.S. Dollars has started throughout the World to build large size vessels that will no longer have to depend upon the use of the Suez Canal. Over 49 million deadweight tons of tankers alone are now being built, from 150,000-ton-and-over class up to 500,000 tonnage. By the time all the ships now on order are delivered the world tankers fleet will have increased by approximately 50 per cent. Practically none of the new large size tankers and other vessels now being built would be able to use the present Suez Canal because of its small size.

Even when the Suez Canal is reopened the large size of the new vessels being built makes it obsolete. Even if the Egyptian Government would agree to make the Canal longer, wider and deeper, the various nations throughout the World would never again want to be in a position to depend upon the Canal or have to use the Canal, when at any time the Egyptian Government may specify conditions of use that would be unacceptable to them.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

However, we believe it would be possible for the Egyptian Government to work out an agreement in co-operation with the United Nations whereby the various nations and shipowners of the World would have assured safe passage through the proposed new canal at all times.

Many people have asked why it is not practical to widen and deepen the present Suez Canal to meet future world requirements. It is not practical for many reasons, two of which are that it would be too expensive and take too long a time to make the present Suez Canal the same large size as the proposed new canal and have the industrial zone adjacent to it such as we contemplate. The new canal would be first excavated as a dry cut about 95 feet deep and 1200 feet wide, through desert land; each side of the canal would be continuously lined with reinforced permanent concrete piles. After this main canal area was dug dry, each end of the canal would then be opened to let the water pass through.

We hope that the Egyptian Government will make an effort to open up the present Canal to release the various vessels therein as soon as possible, and also allow it to be used by those vessels which can use the old Canal until such time that the new, larger canal would be available.

Nor would it be economic to build a large pipeline to transport oil and gas from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea, as has been suggested to the Egyptian Government. To have a large tanker unload its oil at the Gulf of Suez port, then ship the oil through a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea where it would have to be loaded on to another tanker, is not an economic operation. We have one of the largest owners of tankers in the World interested in our new canal project and he, as well as other tanker owners, would not consider this kind of combined Tanker unloading-pipeline-reloading operation. Also there will be many other products, as well as people, to be transported, for which a pipeline cannot be used.

It has taken thousands of years to reach the present world population of almost four billion people and to supply them with their requirements. Now it is estimated that in 33 years the world population will double itself

/continued....

and the per capita consumption of all products based upon a higher standard of living will be much greater in the future than ever before. So will the amount of products and people that must be transported and for many sound economic reasons vessels will be made much larger and the proposed new canal would meet these requirements.

The estimated cost of the proposed new Canal and Industrial Zone, including construction, equipment, materials, engineering, financial and legal expenses and other facilities, would be around \$2,410,000,000 (U.S) and it would take about three years to complete. It is estimated that the canal would produce an annual gross income of \$500,000,000 from the first complete year of operation and each year thereafter the gross income should become much larger.

The Suez Canal produced a gross income of \$266,000,000 for a period of 12 months prior to its closing in June 1967. Approximately 75% of this amount was from tolls paid by tankers. The larger estimated \$500,000,000 gross income of the new canal and industrial zone operation is based upon a much larger volume of business which could not be handled by the Suez Canal - whose only income was received from ship tolls whereas the new canal and industrial zone would receive income from ship tolls, land rentals, power sales and other facilities from various industries.

If you accept our general proposal about building a new canal and industrial zone, the Liberian International American Corp. of 60 Wall Street, New York, of which I am President, would arrange to execute an agreement covering all matters involved, in co-operation with your Government and your Suez Canal Authority. We would then form, in co-operation with the Suez Canal Authority, an Egyptian company which we suggest might be called the Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company which would arrange to finance, build and develop this canal and industrial project.

Once the canal has been built and is in operation, and after the first 12 month period, it is proposed to pay the Suez Canal Authority a minimum guaranteed income of \$10,000,000 per year plus 50% of the annual net profits of the new company.

/continued....

It would also be agreed that the new Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company would assume what financial obligations still remain that the Egyptian Government must pay to the former owners and operators of the Suez Canal.

It would also agree to employ most of the officials and employees now being used by the Suez Canal Authority.

By your co-operation and acceptance of this programme you would have the great honour and privilege of solving a vital canal problem that has the World greatly concerned. As stated before, you would receive the World's appreciation and gratitude, for consummating a magnificent and vital task that would greatly benefit humanity, and the prayers and praises of the World would be yours.

The proposed canal is of great world importance and a way should be found to have it built as quickly as possible. We would therefore greatly appreciate having the honour and privilege of discussing with you in greater detail the matters involved. Two of my associates, Mr. Thibaut de St. Phalle, President, Director - Dean Witter Overseas Finance Corp. of New York, and Mr. Walter Saunders, Chairman of the Board - Transoceanic Marine Inc. of New York and myself would be most grateful in having a meeting with you or, if you prefer, with the Chairman of your Suez Canal Authority, at your earliest convenience.

Attached hereto is a list of our officers and directors of Liberian International American Corp., also our legal, engineering and banking associates and references for your information.

Mr. Thibaut de St. Phalle, one of our directors, is now representing the Panamanian Government on the proposed new Panama Canal which is to be built in co-operation with the Government of Panama and the United States Government.

According to the opinion of many economic and financial experts they do not know of any other economic programme that could be created for the Egyptian Government that would produce as much goodwill, favourable world-wide

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

(8)  
19th November 1968



public relations and so many other substantial benefits as this proposed new canal and industrial zone would produce for the Egyptian people.

We feel sure that, after you have been thoroughly informed about the complete details of this canal project and the tremendous benefits it would produce for Egypt and the World, you will find a way in which we can co-operate and have it built.

Respectfully submitted,

Yours faithfully,

L. E. Detwiler - President  
Liberian International American Corp.  
Liberian Iron and Steel Corp., etc.



**EXISTING CANAL**  
 103 MILES LONG  
 195 FEET WIDE  
 38 FEET DEEP

**PROPOSED CANAL**  
 83 MILES LONG  
 1200 FEET WIDE  
 80 FEET DEEP

LOCATION OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED CANALS

MIDDLE EAST CANAL PROJECT

PROPOSED NEW SUEZ CANAL IN A 10 MILES WIDTH TAX FREE INDUSTRIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONE

- LOWEST COST OIL AND GAS FUEL AVAILABLE IN THE WORLD
- NO TAXES OF ANY KIND
- LAND CAN BE LEASED FOR 99 YEARS BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD




EXHIBIT B.

MEARRO PROJECT  
 LE DETWILER  
 EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

19th November 1968

ESTIMATED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, GROSS & NET INCOME AND  
OPERATING EXPENSES AND OTHER FINANCIAL DETAILS OF THE  
PROPOSED NEW NASSER CANAL & INDUSTRIAL ZONE CO. OPERATION

The estimated cost of the proposed new Nasser Canal and Industrial Zone, including construction, equipment, materials, engineering, financial and legal expenses and other facilities, would be around \$2,410,000,000 (U.S) and it would take about three years to complete. It is estimated that the canal would produce an annual gross income of \$500,000,000 from the first complete year of operation and each year thereafter the gross income should become much larger.

The Suez Canal produced a gross income of \$266,000,000 for a period of 12 months prior to its closing in June 1967. Approximately 75% of this amount was from tolls paid by tankers. The larger estimated \$500,000,000 gross income of the new canal and industrial zone operation is based upon a much larger volume of business which could not be handled by the Suez Canal - whose only income was received from ship tolls whereas the new canal and industrial zone would receive income from ship tolls, land rentals, power sales and other facilities from various industries.

Once the canal has been built and is in operation, and after the first 12 month period, it is proposed to pay the Suez Canal Authority a minimum guarantee of \$10,000,000 per year plus 50% of the annual net profits of the new company. This amount of net profits would be derived after deducting all yearly operating expenses, including guarantee payment and interest payments on all loans or bond issues but not the principal repayments and also before the payments of any dividends to shareholders.

The estimated annual gross income to be received from ship tolls and land rentals from various industries, power sales and other facilities is estimated at not less than \$500,000,000 per year with a gradual increase of 4% additional per year in gross income thereafter.

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<u>Estimated Annual Gross Income</u>		\$500,000,000
Operating expenses	\$ 30,000,000	
Reserve Contingencies Fund	6,000,000	
Bond interest before making annual sinking fund payments	<u>140,000,000</u>	
Total operating expenses	\$176,000,000	<u>\$176,000,000</u>
Annual Net Profit		\$324,000,000
50% of the net amount would be paid to the Suez Canal Authority		<u>\$162,000,000</u>
Balance available for Bond Sinking Fund payments and dividends for A & B shares		\$162,000,000
Bond repayments of \$100,000,000 per year to be made after five year period of operation		\$100,000,000
This amount available for dividends to A & B shares		\$ 62,000,000

The proposed capital and financing programme of the Nasser Canal and Industrial Zone Co. would be as follows:

20,000,000 shares of A stock par value \$20.00	\$400,000,000
10,000,000 shares of B stock par value \$1.00	10,000,000
First Mortgage Bonds issue \$2,000,000,000 - 25 years-7% Sinking Fund issue	<u>\$2,000,000,000</u>
Total amount of Capital	\$2,410,000,000

The bonds would not be retired for sinking fund repayments during the first five years of operation. Thereafter a sinking fund of \$100,000,000 per year would be paid for a period of 20 years.

The Bonds would be sold by an international banking group to the public at the price of \$1,000 per Bond.

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With each \$1,000 bond sold to the public the buyer would have the right to purchase 2 shares of A stock at the price of \$20.00 per share.

The founders of the new canal project and banking group would have the right to purchase 10,000,000 B shares at the price of \$1.00 per share.

The A shares would have the right to receive the first \$2.00 in annual dividends and any balance of additional annual dividends payable would be equally divided between the A and B shares.

The Board of Directors of the Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company would consist of 19 members. The A shareholders would have the right to elect five directors and the B shareholders would have the right to elect five directors. The Suez Canal Authority would have the right to appoint nine directors. The new Company would operate in co-operation with the Suez Canal Authority.

The larger and diversified income that the new canal and industrial zone would produce and the time saving advantages that the canal would make available, plus a much greater volume of business because of its larger size than was ever available to the present one-way narrow, shallow passage type of Suez Canal, and with the increased amount of products that must be transported in the future, would make the estimated gross income of \$500,000,000 per year a figure that could well be supported by the time the canal would be completed.

It is estimated that in 33 years the world population will double and the volume of transport business by sea will more than quadruple during this period.

The fact that after the first five year period the First Mortgage Bond issue of \$2,000,000,000 would be repaid at the rate of \$100,000,000 per year, and a saving of interest of \$7,000,000 per year, would make the 50% of the net amount of earnings that the Suez Canal Authority would receive much larger every year thereafter. The same would be true of the amount available for bond interest and sinking fund payments, and the payment of dividends to the A and B shares.

Therefore the bonds and shares would be a most attractive investment and one which would greatly increase in market value for many years.

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The above potential earnings plus the fact that the new canal would represent a world necessity and be the only one of its kind should appeal to all types of investors.

Once the Egyptian Government accepts this proposal it would also be agreed that a reasonable amount of the bonds and A shares to be sold would be made available for purchase by the Egyptian Government, the Suez Canal Authority and Egyptian citizens.

L. E. Detwiler - President  
Liberian International American Corp.

25, Eaton Mansions,  
Sloane Square,  
London, S.W.1.

November 20th, 1968.

His Excellency Mr. Abdel Latif El Bighdadi,  
Vice President of U.A.R.

Dear Sir,

May I convey to your excellency my highest regards and beg permission to introduce my friend Mr. L. Edgar Detwiler, president of Liberia International American Corporation and of Liberia Iron and Steel Corporation.

Mr. Detwiler, about whom I have written you before, is the head of an international group of financiers who are interested in helping Egypt build a super, new Suez Canal and industrial zone. I would not have taken the liberty of introducing to your excellency Mr. Detwiler had I not been deeply convinced that what he is proposing is for Egypt a highly economical, beneficial project. As for our Egyptian side I am also thoroughly convinced that it is a patriotic act to help execute such a project, which would no doubt bring to Egypt untold prosperity and help solve quite a number of its present and future political and social problems.

You may find that after discussions with Mr. Detwiler and after having read the memorandum I have already sent you with my brother Aziz, that there could be some objections about the form in which the project is submitted, but do not let that deter you for a minute from taking an active part in carrying it through. Mr. Detwiler is a very understanding, intelligent, resourceful and amenable international financier with lots of experience behind him and an enormous amount of good faith. Hence he would not object at all, within reason, to any amendments to the present form of the project or even a new form provided that the project in its essence is carried through.

Mr. Detwiler has also asked me to introduce him to His Excellency Vice President Hassan Ibrahim, as I have explained to you in my previous letter. May I beg your excellency to see to it that, if the necessity arises, Mr. Detwiler is introduced to His Excellency Hassan Ibrahim under the right light.

Mr. Detwiler will tell you, if allowed, in person more details about the subject and about what he wants to do with it and who he wants to meet.

I know your excellency, that I may be asking you for too much, but I hope that your faith in my esteem for you and in my good judgment will bear me out.

May I, your excellency, thank you for your forbearance, and please rest assured, dear Sir, that I am always

faithfully yours,

Mohamed Omar

7.8.68

ס' יפה

העתק

חיל הים של בריה"מ  
(מאת האדמירל גורשקוב, מפקד חיל הים אגרוסי, יולי 1962)

משימות חשובות ביותר עומדות בפני הצנא וחיל הים הסובייטי, תפקידם להגן יחד עם כוחותיהן המזויינים של המדינות הסובציאליסטיות האחרות על האינטרסים של כל מדינות המחנה הסובציאליסטי בפני סכנה אימפר' כלשהי.

צבאנו וחיל הים שלו הינם מגן בטוח לכל העמים הנאבקים למען החרות השלום והסובציאליזם בפני <sup>212</sup> האימפריאליסטי. תכונתם זו בתגלית בבירור בימים הקריטיים של המשבר בים הקריבי, חיל הים שלנו כמו גם שאר החילות המזויינים הובאו לידי כוננות קרבית מלאה. המשבר הקריבי הביא את מלחי חיל הים להעמקת ההכרה בחשיבות דרישותיה של המפלגה הקומוניסטית הממשלה הסובייטית, בדבר שמירת כוננות קרבית, אשר תאפשר להנחית מהלומת נגד על התוקפן האימפר' תוך זמן קצר.

בהתכוננם לתקוף את בריה"מ ומדינות סובציאליסטיות אחרות סומכים, כידוע, האימפר' על שמוש פתע בנשק של השסדה המובנית. יחד עם זאת, מטילים הם את תפקיד אחד הנושאים העיקריים של נשק זה על כוחות המרוץ של צייהם, ובפרט על הצוללות האטומיות המצויידות בטילים. נשיא ארה"ב מבטיח להגדיל ב-50% עד סוף 1969 את מספר הצוללות האטומיות המצויידות בטילים. בתרגילים ובתמרוכים מעבד הפיקוד של הכוחות המזויינים של נאט"ו תוכניות לרכז נושאות מטוסים ונושאות טילים תת-מימיות באזורים הקרובים ביותר לחופי בריה"מ ומדינות סובציאליסטיות אחרות.

כל הנ"ל מאלץ את העם הסובייטי ואת כוחותיו המזויינים להיות דרוכים ולא להרשות כל גלויי ארגעה עצמית תמימה וגילויי שלווה. הועידה ה-22 של המפלגה הקומוניסטית הסובייטית הדגישה ביתר שאת את ההכרח לחזק בכל האמצעים את כוחותיה המזויינים של בריה"מ לרבות את חלקם האינטגרלי של חיל-הים "כל עוד קיימים התוקפים האימפר' - נאטר בהחלטת הועידה ה-22 - צריך לעמוד על המשמר ולהחזיק את אבק השרפה יבש: לשכלל את ההגנה של המדינות הסובציאליסטיות ואת כוחותיהן המזויינים.

המפלגה הקומוניסטית, הממשלה הסובייטית גילו ראייה חדה בהערכת המצב הבינלאומי הנוכחי. הגנת מדינתנו עומדת על רמת ההסגים החדישים ביותר של המדע והטכניקה בשנים האחרונות, כתוצאה מהכנסתו בקנה מדה נרחב של נשק טילים-גרעיניים. השתכללו כל סוגי כוחותינו המזויינים, בהתאם להחלטת הועד המרכזי של המפלגה והממשלה הסובייטית, חלו שבויים נכבדים גם בחיל הים, אשר ציודו וארגונו הולטים אתה חשיבות תפקידו בהגנת המדינה. חשיבות מוכרעת בודעת להוראותיו ולהצעותיו של חרושצ'וב אשר ביקר בשנים האחרונות יחד עם חברים אחרים של הועד המרכזי של המפלגה בכל יחידות חיל הים.

בעבר פעלו כל אבותנו והאוויריה הימית שלנו לרוב באזורים הסמוכים לחופים, תפקידם הצטמצם בעיקר לש"פ אופרטיבי טאקטי עם הכוחות היבשתיים, עתה, בהביאנו בחשבון את כוונת התוקפנים ואת המקום שהועד לחילות הים שלהם בהתקפה על המדינות הסובציאליסטיות, חייבים אנו להיות מוכנים להנחית מהלומות מיחדות(?) על האובייקטים הימיים והיבשתיים של האימפריאליזם בכל בקודה ובקודה באוקינוס העולמי ושל הסטחים הסמוכים לו צאצא במבצעי התקפה נרחבים.

השנויים שחלו בחימושו ובארגונו של חיל הים הגדילו את עצמתו הקרבית ואת אפשרויותיו האופרטיביות, כוח המחץ של הנשק הטילי-גרעיני; רדיוס הפעילות הבלתי-מוגבל; המהירות הגבוהה מתחת לפני המים, האוטונומיות הגדולה ופסק הצלילה; ההסתגלות לפעולות סתגרניות (יכולת פעולה עצמית - הערת העורך) נוספות של הצוללות האטומיות - הרחיבו את האפשרויות האופרטיביות והקרביות של הצי התת-מימי.

מתפתחים גם הכוחות האחרים של חיל הים: האויריה הימית-טילית; האוביות (שעל פני המים) המצוידות בנשק טילי. תפקיד חשוב בהגנת החופים בפני התקפה מן הים ממלאות עתה יחידות של החוף, ראוי לציון, כי עתה בקבעת עצמתו של חיל הים לא ע"י הכוחות או ע"י התכונות הקרביות של האוביות והמטוסים, אלא ע"י ציודם בטכניקה חדישה ביותר ובנשק, עומד לרשותינו צי מודרני אדיר במלוא טובן המלה.

עם הקמת חיל הים המודרני שלנו המושגת על ידינו, על טכניקה טילית ועל רדיו-אלקטרוניקה - הושם קץ לשלטונם של חילות הים של המעצמות האימפריאליסטיות במרחבי הימים והאוקיינוסים.

תקוותם של האסטרטגים מעבר לאוקיינוס כי החופים ודרכי התחבורה הימית שלהם לא יהיו ברי-פגיעה כתוצאה ממהלומותינו במקרה של מלחמה - צללו לתהום הנשיה. עתה לא קיימים אובייקטים ברי-פגיעה לא על היבשה אצא ולא בימים ובאוקיינוסים.

המלחים מודים למפלגה הקומוניסטית ולממשלה הסובייטית על דאגתם לחיל הים וכמו כן לבוני האוביות, למהנדסים ולמדענים אשר מחשבתם הנועזת ועבודתם האמיצה מתגלים בטכניקה האדירה ובנשק האימתני, כל זה מחייב את מלחי חיל הים לקנות שליטה מלאה בטכניקה של האוביות ולהבטיר ללא לאות את הכובות הקרבית.

הבגרות הקרבית של הסגל נוצרת בעבודה היומ-יומית המאומצת. עתה יהפכו המסעות הארוכים בימים ובאוקיינוסים לענין שגרתו. מבצע בהצלחה ע"י טילים המיועדים למטרות שונות, עובדו שיגורי טילים מתחת לפני המים ומן האויר. היחידות של האוביות התת-מימיות גדול מספר המומחים להתקפות טילים ולהתקפות טורפדו. יותר ויותר צוותות מביסים בקליעות מדויקות את ה"אויב" בתנאים המסובכים של הפלגה, מסעמקים גדולים ומרחקי שיא, ראויים לשבח הספנים, הם למדו לנהל מאבק פקטיבי בגד צוללות מודרניות. הם פועלים תמיד בתוארם ובדיוק, הם פותרים במומחיות בעיות מסובכות, אסווי הקרב של הטייסים הימיים מצטיינים בהשגים חשובים: רוב מהם הפכו למומחים לטיסת ארוכות ולפגיעות טילים מדויקות.

המפלגה, הממשלה וכל העם הסובייטי מטילים על חיל הים אחריות כבדה להגנת המולדת, "היו ערניים" - כתב חרושצ'וב בספר האורחים של הסיירת "אדמירל זאקוב", בבקרו ביחידות הצי הצפוני. מלחי חיל הים חייבים לזכור תמיד דרישה זו, הרי כל אחד מהם יודע סודות מדיניים, וצבאיים. ידיעות אלה מעניבות את הביון של המדינות האימפריאליסטיות.

רוב מלחי חיל הים מתנהגים כהאוי ואינם מגלים את הסודות: מזהירים אחרים מפני מעשים בלתי-מחושבים. אך למרבה הצער יש פספסנים, אנשים המפריים את כללי השיחות בטלפון, ברדיו ובאמצעי תקשורת אחרים; המגלים סודות במכתבים המפריים את כללי שמירת המסמכים.

השגי מדינתנו מעוררים זעם בלתי-מרוסן בקרב האימפריאליסטים, בשאיפתם לגרום לנו בזקים - בזקטים הם כל האמצעים האפשריים, ריגול, חבלה אדולוגית הועלו לדרגה של מדיניותה הממלכתית של ארה"ב וגרורותיה, השמות של המרגלים פינקובסקי ופאן הראו זאת הלכה למעשה, לכן הערבות המתמדת היא תפקידו החשוב ביותר של כל חייל סובייטי.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

בלתי מסווג

פס' 118

חומר: 301745 דצמ 68

הדפס: 302130

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: תל אביב

ב ה ד ל

אל: תקופע/ביר ירוק

דע: בספחי צה"ל בוטיצנטרון, לונדון, פריז, דוטא, ר' אמז (הועבר לכולם), קמ"ט קטור לאו"מ, מטהח/מארם 2. סמוך המחבר: ה/161.

בהמשך למברקים: ה/152, ה-153, ה/154, ה/155 מ-28 דצמ' להלן

חומר ברוטף:

1. בסוף אפריל 68 נפגש ראש ממשלת לבנון אל-יאפי עם קבוצת חבלנים שעמדו לצאת לאיסורים ונתן להם את ברכתו. הצהרות אישים בכירים לתפיכה בחבלנות, מהם קיצוניים כגון: מערוף ס ע ד - ציר פרלמנט מצידון - הגבירו את הגיוס לחבלנות בלבנון.
2. מתגייסים רבים התאסרו בלבנון במחנות הפליטים באיזור ס ר י פ ו ל י ובאיזורי צ ו ר ו צ י ד ו נ, בהם הקימו הארבוזים גם סצוררי נשק וחומרי חבלה. ברחובות צ ו ר בראים פידאיים לבושים בגדים מזרמים.
3. הגיוס לחבלנות מתנהל בגלוי בלשכות גידס. גם התרמת הכספים בלוחה ובעזרת ע"י מודעות בעתונות. בחינים לבנוניים, המתגייסים בלבנון בטלחים גם לאימון בארצות ערב השכנות.
4. ב י ר ו ת משמשת מקום מושב המפקדה הצבאית והפוליטית של "החזית העממית לשחרור פלסטין" האחראית ל-2 תקיפות מטוסי אלפל, מב י ר ו ת מפרסמים גם א ל - פ ת ח וארבוזים אחרים הודעות ומצטרפים על פעולות החבלה ונציגיהם נפגשים עם עם אנשי העתונות.
5. בחודשים האחרונים גדלו ריכוזי החבלנים בלבנון בקרבת הגבול עם י ס ר א ל ומספר החבלות עלה ללא תקדים (בין ארג' - דצמ' 22 מקרים). לאחרונה ידוע על רכוז חדש של מאות חבלנים שבאו בעיקר מס ו ר י ה. שלטונות לבנון יודעים על כך היטב ויש גם קציני קטור ביניהם.

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לחבלנים אלה יש חופש תנועה בלתי מוגבל והם מתארגנים עתה באזור  
וְצִדִים כמדינות גדולות של נשק וחומרי חבלה. חלקם מתגוררים גם  
בכפרים ובקרבת מוצבי צבא.

6. "אל אנוואר" הבירותי מ-23.12.68: "הוקמה אגודה לתמיכה בפלסטיין  
ובפעולה הפיזיאלית. מטרתהים בה בניית מפלגות ואגודים שונים. כנס  
הפתיחה בערך באולם ההרצאות של משרד החינוך בב י ר ת .

7. "אל יום" הלבנוני מ-30.10.68: דברי חבר הפולמנט באזור ב י ר ת ,  
ש פ י ק א ל ו ז א ו : "איך גבולות המסובלים לעצור את הפעולה  
הפיזיאלית ולעולם לא נתרשל בתמיכתנו בפעולה זו רבביסוסה בכל השטחים".

8. "אל אנוואר" מ-12.11.68: הועלתה הצעה בפולמנט הל ב ב ו י  
שחברי הפולמנט יתרמו מינימום 100 לירות לבנוניות מטכרם החדשי לפעולה  
הפיזיאלית. כמה צירים וביניהם צירי "החזית הדמוקרטית" ו"חזית המאבק  
הלאומי" כבר תרמו. מקורות פרלמנטריים ציינו כי קיימת נטייה לארגון את  
ההתרמה בצורה שהאחראי על המשכורות בפולמנט יבכה מן השכר, ובשיארת  
הפולמנט תעביר את הסכום הכולל למקורות המספלים בבעיה הפיזיאלית.  
9. "צות אל ערובה" - 25.7.68: ועדת כספים עליונה לתמיכה בפ ת ח  
פונה בקריאה לאזרחים לתרום. הכתובת: ת.ד. 6718 ב י ר ת . טלפון:  
237915 ב י ר ת .

10. "אל אנוואר" מ-30.11.68: הורכבה בב י ר ת הועדה הלאומית הכספית  
לסיוע לפת "ח. יו"ר ד"ר א ס א ה פ א ח' ו י . סגנו והמזכיר  
ג' ב ר א ו ע כ א ד י (ושמות 4 חברים נוספים).

11. "מערב" מ-21.11.68: במכתב טארה"ב הזמין ארגון השחרור הפלסטיני  
אצל פכוז היצוא הישראלי מספר ספרים ובקש לשלחם ישירות אל המרכז  
למחקר של הארגון, רח' טאדאת 606, בניין צאלח אבו חסן, ב י ר ת .

12. "אל חואדת" הלבנוני מ-7.4.67: צעירי א ש " פ ערכו שורת  
סימפוזיונים במרכזי הארגון במחנות ד ב י , א ל ב צ , ו א ל ב ו ד ג'  
א ל ט י מ א ל י שבל ב ב ו י .



1917

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1917

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been  
 appointed to the various positions in the office of the  
 Secretary of the Board of Education for the year 1917.  
 The names are listed in alphabetical order of the last name.  
 The positions are listed in the order in which they were  
 filled. The names of the persons who have been appointed  
 to the positions of Secretary and Treasurer are listed  
 first. The names of the persons who have been appointed  
 to the positions of Chairman and Members are listed  
 next. The names of the persons who have been appointed  
 to the positions of Secretary and Treasurer are listed  
 last.

.. 4 ..

הפקיה של אחונה הוא התגברות סופלמה על הפנסוליה הפוליסיים,  
והדיסלומסטיים ועל הסיבוכים האזרויים שו ר א ל בצלה אז  
(הכרונה לאלב'יר).  
זאת פדות ברורה לכשלוץ ישראל לפכב את ההתנגדות הפירמאנית  
ע"י פתווכים.

דובר צה"ל

-----  
תפרצה א + לויצוון

בל/מר

ՄԱՐԷՏ ԲՈՒՎ

ՀԱՅԿԱՆ ԳՐԱԴԱՐԱՆ

•• † ••

ԿՈՒՐԿ ԵՎ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ ԿՐԻ ՄԱՐԷՐԵՆ ԾՐԱԿԱՆ ԵՎ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆՆԵՐԸ,  
 ԲԱՐՈՒՆԵՐՈՒՄ ԵՎ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ: ԿԱՐԿԱՆ ԵՎ ԿՐ Կ Բ ԼՆԻՆ ԿՐ  
 (ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ):  
 ԿՐԿ ԵՐԵՎԱՆ ԿՐԿԱՆ ԿՈՒՐԿԱՆ ԿՐԿԱՆ ԿՐԿԱՆ ԿՐԿԱՆ  
 ԿՐԿ ԿՐԿԱՆ.

ԿՐԿԱՆ ԿՐԿ

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 ԿՐԿԱՆ Կ + ԿՐԿԱՆ  
 ԿՐԿԱՆ

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס' 22 (שרונת)

חונר: 28.12.68

הדסט: 290500

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: יאסא מונטריאול

ד ח ר ף

FOR: MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FROM: IATA MTL MONTREAL QUEBEC 28 DECEMBER 1968.

DGM738 EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION HAVE CAUSED THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES GREAT CONCERN STP IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT ACTIVITIES BASED ON REGIONAL DIFFERENCES HOWEVER SERIOUS AND WHICH INCLUDE CONDONING ENCOURAGING AND/OR PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY/POLITICAL ACTION AND COUNTER-ACTION SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH SAFE AND REGULAR AIR TRANSPORT STP SUCH ACTION AS HAS BEEN WITNESSED IN THE LAST DAYS NOT ONLY ENDANGERS THE LIFE AND HEALTH OF NUMEROUS INNOCENT CIVILIAN TRAVELLERS AND EMPLOYEES BUT IS ALSO DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONFIDENCE OF WORLD TRAVELLERS AND CAN HAVE GRAVE LONG TERM ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE NATIONS INVOLVED STP IN THE INTEREST OF THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY I URGE THE HEADS OF THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO PERSONALLY PREVENT FURTHER ESCALATION OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND ENSURE THAT CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR SAFE REGULAR AIR TRANSPORT ARE RESTORED IMMEDIATELY IN THIS AREA STP

FURTHER I ASK ALL PARTIES NOT TO ALLOW THIS VITAL INTERNATIONAL AND UNPOLITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE TO BE AFFECTED BY LOCAL FACTORS IN THE FUTURE STP THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL AIR TRANSPORT IN THIS REGION IS A RESPONSIBILITY SHARED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY BY ALL GOVERNMENTS BUT AMONG GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE REGION IT SHOULD ESPECIALLY CONCERN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN KEEPING WITH THEIR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE STP THIS SAME MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ISRAEL LEBANON SYRIA JORDAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS STP  
 KNUT HAMMARSKJOLD DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

גמילה 16 של המבוא

(Page 2)

12.12.68

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FOR: MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FROM: LATA MTL MONTRREAL QUEBEC 28 DECEMBER 1968.

THESE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION HAVE CAUSED THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE GREAT CONCERN. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT ACTIVITIES BASED ON REGIONAL DIFFERENCES HOWEVER PERIODS AND WHICH INCLUDE ENCOURAGING AND/OR PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY/POLITICAL ACTION AND COUNTER-ACTION SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH SAFE AND REGULAR AIR TRANSPORT. SUCH ACTION AS HAS BEEN WITNESSED IN THE LAST DAYS NOT ONLY ENDANGERS THE LIFE AND HEALTH OF NUMEROUS INNOCENT CIVILIAN TRAVELLERS AND EMPLOYEES BUT IT ALSO RESTRICTIVE TO THE CONFIDENCE OF WORLD TRAVELLERS AND CAN HAVE LONG TERM ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE NATIONS INVOLVED. IN THE INTEREST OF THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY I URGE THE HEADS OF THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO PERSONALLY PREVENT FURTHER ESCALATION OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND ENSURE THAT CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR SAFE REGULAR AIR TRANSPORT ARE RESTORED IMMEDIATELY IN THIS AREA.

FURTHER I ASK ALL PARTIES NOT TO ALLOW THIS VITAL INTERNATIONAL AND AIRPOLITICAL PUBLIC SERVICE TO BE AFFECTED BY LOCAL FACTORS. IN THE FUTURE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL AIR TRANSPORT IN THIS REGION IS A RESPONSIBILITY SHARED DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY BY ALL GOVERNMENTS BUT AMONG GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE REGION IT SHOULD ESPECIALLY CONCERN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN KEEPING WITH THEIR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLICS AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. BUT HAMMARSKJOLD DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION.

SECRET

LEONARD RAE  
at present  
1 Buckhurst Ave.  
Point Piper N.S.W.2027  
Australia

25th November, 1968.

Mr. Shlomo Hillel  
Director  
Ministry for foreign affairs  
JERUSALEM.

Dear Mr. Hillel,

enclosed please find copy of my letter to Dr. Herzog  
and attachments which are self explanatory.

I am looking forward to meeting with you when next  
in Israel and remain with best regards

yours sincerely

  
.....  
Leonard Rae

encl.

LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CORP.

60 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

TEL 269-6711

CABLE ADDRESS: LIBINTAM NEWYORK

From:  
48 Grosvenor Square  
LONDON S.W.1.

London,  
20th November 1968

Mr. Leonard Rae  
1 Buckhurst Avenue  
POINT PIPER N.S.W  
Australia.

Dear Leonard,

I am enclosing copy of a letter dated November 20th to Mr Jaray, which is self-explanatory. I am also enclosing copy of a letter of introduction to Mr. Bighdadi, Vice President of the U.A.R., signed by Mohamed Omar who is an Egyptian lawyer living in London who previously held a number of important positions with the Egyptian Government in Cairo. His brother is now an official of the Egyptian Foreign Service and his sister is having dates with Nasser's eldest son.

I also have been having meetings with Lord Wigg and have kept him informed about what is happening.

Mr. Omar's brother is leaving tomorrow for Cairo, Egypt to have confidential meetings with a number of important people there, especially Mr. Bighdadi. We understand that this is the man who, in the event that something happens to Nasser, in all probability will become the next president of Egypt. He is also highly respected by President Nasser.

I am making plans to leave for Cairo, Egypt around December 6 or 7, and in the meantime various meetings will be held and arrangements made for me to meet various important people on my arrival.

We have been informed that it is advisable to work through the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority and that if he is sold on the project this will make it much easier to obtain Nasser's co-operation. I am enclosing copy of a completely revised plan and a letter addressed to President Nasser, for your information.

/continued...

Mr. Leonard Rae.

20th November 1968

Another very important thing has developed. The Egyptian Government is looking for enough money - approximately \$50 million - to purchase 1 Boeing 707 with spare parts and 4 Boeing 727 with spare parts. This will involve a loan of about \$50 million. It will be guaranteed by the Egyptian Government and the planes are to be used by United Arab Airlines which is owned entirely by the Government. President Nasser is most anxious to obtain this loan and buy these five planes, and if we can arrange this loan it would put me immediately in direct contact with President Nasser and the welcome mat would then be out for us to have the Canal Project approved, as well as a great many other things could then be accomplished by the actual performance on our part of producing \$50 million for Egypt, when they are being turned down from practically every source for financing ventures - with the exception of the Russians. It would even pay a group of Jewish bankers to make this loan available, and if it could be camouflaged or handled through St. Phalle, or even through LIAC, it would put us in such a powerful position in Egypt that we could accomplish almost anything. I have already phoned Jack about this today and told him to get busy with Walter and Thibaut, St. Phalle and Abelson, and even if necessary see Charlie Allen, as it is most important that we work out this loan. You might also have some ideas as to how it can be accomplished. They are willing to pay as high as  $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ , and if possible attain a 6-year loan, and are also willing to pay a substantial discount. I will also try to contact Martin Haims about this matter.

LIBERIAN INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN CORP.

60 WALL STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

269-6711

CABLE ADDRESS: LIBINTAM NEWYORK

19th November 1968

His Excellency  
Gamal Abdel Nasser  
President of the United Arab Republic  
CAIRO  
Egypt.

Dear Mr. President,

We respectfully suggest the following proposals for your important consideration as President of the United Arab Republic and as the recognized leader and outstanding statesman of all the Arab countries.

As you know, the vital Suez Canal greatly and seriously affects the economics of many countries and hundreds of millions of people throughout the World. The closing of the Canal has brought about great hardships, serious difficulties and increased costs for many products and people to the equivalent of over six billion Dollars U.S. per year.

This situation and demand create the necessity of building a new economical, high speed, two-way-passage type of canal in the Sinai Peninsula not far from the location of the Suez Canal and of such size to meet future world requirements.

It is proposed to build, with your assistance and in co-operation with your Suez Canal Authority, the World's most essential, largest, widest and deepest canal as a most desirable substitute for the Suez Canal, and also a special type of Industrial Freeport Zone located on each side of the entire length of the canal which would have great economic inducements and thus attract various industries from all over the World.

The present Suez Canal is 103 miles long, about 35 feet deep and 195 feet wide. The proposed new canal would be parallel and adjacent to the Suez Canal, running from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez. It would be

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

about 83 miles long, 80 feet deep and 1200 feet wide, and accommodate vessels in size up to 500,000 tons. It would be about the same depth and width as the proposed new Panama Canal.

Although the canal itself would be 1200 feet wide, the land width to be operated as industrial free-port zone would extend to a depth of five miles on each side of the canal and be 83 miles long. This land area would be leased for various industrial purposes to companies throughout the World. In back of each industrial area on both sides of the canal would be space to provide for building workers' homes, schools, hospitals, markets, or a number of complete modern towns for the people who would live and work in the canal and industrial zone.

The canal and industrial zone would be available to all nations and people throughout the World. It would be operated as a tax-free and free-port zone, thus attracting many industries. Vessels passing through the canal would pay tolls depending upon their size.

The large amount of low cost oil and natural gas that is being produced from adjacent countries, which could be made easily available by pipeline to the canal and industrial zone and its industries, would make it possible to have low cost power for the production of thousands of commodities at a lower cost than is possible elsewhere, as well as one of the most economical and largest potential petro-chemical industrial developments that could be built anywhere in the World.

Also the important strategic location of the canal, that would affect world commerce and shipping and more millions of people than any other canal in the World, the fact that it would be 80 feet deep and 1200 feet wide - sufficient to accommodate the World's largest vessels, and the low cost oil and gas that could be obtained, would make it an ideal location for various companies and industries to be located on either side of its 83 miles length.

The various companies who could capitalize this unique canal and industrial no-tax zone and what it would offer would have advantages that could not be duplicated anywhere in the World.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

This project would create tremendous economic benefits for your country and considerable diversified employment for many hundreds of thousands of people from Egypt and bring about hundreds of millions of dollars of new industrial investment.

Attached is a copy of the proposed canal location - marked Exhibit A, and a copy of the proposed location of the Canal and Industrial Zone - marked Exhibit B.

It would become the World's most important canal and industrial zone, the only project of its kind.

It would bring to Egypt, and to you personally, greater prestige, and inspire goodwill, appreciation and credit from practically every country in the World, and would also produce very substantial financial benefits for Egypt.

Your favourable approval of this project would be recorded in history as you being responsible for one of the most important projects ever done in the World.

Your approval would also make it possible to force Israel to withdraw its military forces from Egyptian territory and obtain the peace terms which you desire. You would greatly succeed in this vital matter by having the goodwill, support and force of the most powerful nations and the other nations in the World as your allies. Israel could not afford to antagonize the nations of the World by holding up such an important project in Sinai that would so seriously affect world economy. You would be able to obtain a great victory over Israel, without having another war or firing a single shot or losing one Egyptian soldier's life.

This programme would make it possible to capitalize more favourably on the vast oil and gas deposits in the Arab countries adjacent to Egypt.

Your acceptance of our proposal would produce many substantial benefits not only for Egypt and other Arab countries but also for many other countries throughout the World.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

While the Suez Canal remains closed it is slowly filling with sand. Even dredging and clearing the Canal before it could be used effectively again would take considerable time and great expense which would almost certainly bring about higher tolls. Increased tolls would make the Suez Canal an even less attractive proposition because they would probably make the Suez Canal too costly a short cut for most dry cargo ships as well as tankers.

Unfortunately, the history of the Canal during the last ten years - in which it has been closed twice and tolls increased three times - is such that the World will no longer rely on the control, use and continuous operation of this Canal unless having assured Egyptian guarantees of safe passage at all times.

It takes nearly twice as much tanker and cargo tonnage to move the same amount of oil and products to and from Europe by way of the Cape of Good Hope around Africa as it did through the Suez Canal. It is a matter of longer distance, greater time, thus causing increased costs.

Therefore, an enormous shipbuilding programme costing hundreds of millions of equivalent U.S. Dollars has started throughout the World to build large size vessels that will no longer have to depend upon the use of the Suez Canal. Over 49 million deadweight tons of tankers alone are now being built, from 150,000-ton-and-over class up to 500,000 tonnage. By the time all the ships now on order are delivered the world tankers fleet will have increased by approximately 50 per cent. Practically none of the new large size tankers and other vessels now being built would be able to use the present Suez Canal because of its small size.

Even when the Suez Canal is reopened the large size of the new vessels being built makes it obsolete. Even if the Egyptian Government would agree to make the Canal longer, wider and deeper, the various nations throughout the World would never again want to be in a position to depend upon the Canal or have to use the Canal, when at any time the Egyptian Government may specify conditions of use that would be unacceptable to them.

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

19th November 1968

However, we believe it would be possible for the Egyptian Government to work out an agreement in co-operation with the United Nations whereby the various nations and shipowners of the World would have assured safe passage through the proposed new canal at all times.

Many people have asked why it is not practical to widen and deepen the present Suez Canal to meet future world requirements. It is not practical for many reasons, two of which are that it would be too expensive and take too long a time to make the present Suez Canal the same large size as the proposed new canal and have the industrial zone adjacent to it such as we contemplate. The new canal would be first excavated as a dry cut about 95 feet deep and 1200 feet wide, through desert land; each side of the canal would be continuously lined with reinforced permanent concrete piles. After this main canal area was dug dry, each end of the canal would then be opened to let the water pass through.

We hope that the Egyptian Government will make an effort to open up the present Canal to release the various vessels therein as soon as possible, and also allow it to be used by those vessels which can use the old Canal until such time that the new, larger canal would be available.

Nor would it be economic to build a large pipeline to transport oil and gas from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean Sea, as has been suggested to the Egyptian Government. To have a large tanker unload its oil at the Gulf of Suez port, then ship the oil through a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea where it would have to be loaded on to another tanker, is not an economic operation. We have one of the largest owners of tankers in the World interested in our new canal project and he, as well as other tanker owners, would not consider this kind of combined Tanker unloading-pipeline-reloading operation. Also there will be many other products, as well as people, to be transported, for which a pipeline cannot be used.

It has taken thousands of years to reach the present world population of almost four billion people and to supply them with their requirements. Now it is estimated that in 33 years the world population will double itself

/continued....

and the per capita consumption of all products based upon a higher standard of living will be much greater in the future than ever before. So will the amount of products and people that must be transported and for many sound economic reasons vessels will be made much larger and the proposed new canal would meet these requirements.

The estimated cost of the proposed new Canal and Industrial Zone, including construction, equipment, materials, engineering, financial and legal expenses and other facilities, would be around \$2,410,000,000 (U.S) and it would take about three years to complete. It is estimated that the canal would produce an annual gross income of \$500,000,000 from the first complete year of operation and each year thereafter the gross income should become much larger.

The Suez Canal produced a gross income of \$266,000,000 for a period of 12 months prior to its closing in June 1967. Approximately 75% of this amount was from tolls paid by tankers. The larger estimated \$500,000,000 gross income of the new canal and industrial zone operation is based upon a much larger volume of business which could not be handled by the Suez Canal - whose only income was received from ship tolls whereas the new canal and industrial zone would receive income from ship tolls, land rentals, power sales and other facilities from various industries.

If you accept our general proposal about building a new canal and industrial zone, the Liberian International American Corp. of 60 Wall Street, New York, of which I am President, would arrange to execute an agreement covering all matters involved, in co-operation with your Government and your Suez Canal Authority. We would then form, in co-operation with the Suez Canal Authority, an Egyptian company which we suggest might be called the Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company which would arrange to finance, build and develop this canal and industrial project.

Once the canal has been built and is in operation, and after the first 12 month period, it is proposed to pay the Suez Canal Authority a minimum guaranteed income of \$10,000,000 per year plus 50% of the annual net profits of the new company.

/continued....

It would also be agreed that the new Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company would assume what financial obligations still remain that the Egyptian Government must pay to the former owners and operators of the Suez Canal.

It would also agree to employ most of the officials and employees now being used by the Suez Canal Authority.

By your co-operation and acceptance of this programme you would have the great honour and privilege of solving a vital canal problem that has the World greatly concerned. As stated before, you would receive the World's appreciation and gratitude, for consummating a magnificent and vital task that would greatly benefit humanity, and the prayers and praises of the World would be yours.

The proposed canal is of great world importance and a way should be found to have it built as quickly as possible. We would therefore greatly appreciate having the honour and privilege of discussing with you in greater detail the matters involved. Two of my associates, Mr. Thibaut de St. Phalle, President, Director - Dean Witter Overseas Finance Corp. of New York, and Mr. Walter Saunders, Chairman of the Board - Transoceanic Marine Inc. of New York and myself would be most grateful in having a meeting with you or, if you prefer, with the Chairman of your Suez Canal Authority, at your earliest convenience.

Attached hereto is a list of our officers and directors of Liberian International American Corp., also our legal, engineering and banking associates and references for your information.

Mr. Thibaut de St. Phalle, one of our directors, is now representing the Panamanian Government on the proposed new Panama Canal which is to be built in co-operation with the Government of Panama and the United States Government.

According to the opinion of many economic and financial experts they do not know of any other economic programme that could be created for the Egyptian Government that would produce as much goodwill, favourable world-wide

/continued....

His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser.

(8)  
19th November 1968



public relations and so many other substantial benefits as this proposed new canal and industrial zone would produce for the Egyptian people.

We feel sure that, after you have been thoroughly informed about the complete details of this canal project and the tremendous benefits it would produce for Egypt and the World, you will find a way in which we can co-operate and have it built.

Respectfully submitted,

Yours faithfully,

L. E. Detwiler - President  
Liberian International American Corp.  
Liberian Iron and Steel Corp., etc.



MEDITERRANEAN SEA

EXISTING CANAL  
 103 MILES LONG  
 195 FEET WIDE  
 38 FEET DEEP

PROPOSED CANAL  
 83 MILES LONG  
 1200 FEET WIDE  
 60 FEET DEEP



LOCATION OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED CANALS

MIDDLE EAST  
 CANAL PROJECT

PROPOSED NEW SUEZ CANAL IN A 10 MILES WIDTH TAX FREE INDUSTRIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONE

- LOWEST COST OIL AND GAS FUEL AVAILABLE IN THE WORLD
- NO TAXES OF ANY KIND
- LAND CAN BE LEASED FOR 99 YEARS BY VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD




EXHIBIT B.

MEARRO PROJECT  
 LE. DETWILER  
 EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

19th November 1968

ESTIMATED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, GROSS & NET INCOME AND  
OPERATING EXPENSES AND OTHER FINANCIAL DETAILS OF THE  
PROPOSED NEW NASSER CANAL & INDUSTRIAL ZONE CO. OPERATION

The estimated cost of the proposed new Nasser Canal and Industrial Zone, including construction, equipment, materials, engineering, financial and legal expenses and other facilities, would be around \$2,410,000,000 (U.S) and it would take about three years to complete. It is estimated that the canal would produce an annual gross income of \$500,000,000 from the first complete year of operation and each year thereafter the gross income should become much larger.

The Suez Canal produced a gross income of \$266,000,000 for a period of 12 months prior to its closing in June 1967. Approximately 75% of this amount was from tolls paid by tankers. The larger estimated \$500,000,000 gross income of the new canal and industrial zone operation is based upon a much larger volume of business which could not be handled by the Suez Canal - whose only income was received from ship tolls whereas the new canal and industrial zone would receive income from ship tolls, land rentals, power sales and other facilities from various industries.

Once the canal has been built and is in operation, and after the first 12 month period, it is proposed to pay the Suez Canal Authority a minimum guarantee of \$10,000,000 per year plus 50% of the annual net profits of the new company. This amount of net profits would be derived after deducting all yearly operating expenses, including guarantee payment and interest payments on all loans or bond issues but not the principal repayments and also before the payments of any dividends to shareholders.

The estimated annual gross income to be received from ship tolls and land rentals from various industries, power sales and other facilities is estimated at not less than \$500,000,000 per year with a gradual increase of 4% additional per year in gross income thereafter.

/continued....

<u>Estimated Annual Gross Income</u>		\$500,000,000
Operating expenses	\$ 30,000,000	
Reserve Contingencies Fund	6,000,000	
Bond interest before making annual sinking fund payments	<u>140,000,000</u>	
Total operating expenses	\$176,000,000	<u>\$176,000,000</u>
Annual Net Profit		\$324,000,000
50% of the net amount would be paid to the Suez Canal Authority		<u>\$162,000,000</u>
Balance available for Bond Sinking Fund payments and dividends for A & B shares		\$162,000,000
Bond repayments of \$100,000,000 per year to be made after five year period of operation		\$100,000,000
This amount available for dividends to A & B shares		\$ 62,000,000

The proposed capital and financing programme of the Nasser Canal and Industrial Zone Co. would be as follows:

20,000,000 shares of A stock par value \$20.00	\$400,000,000
10,000,000 shares of B stock par value \$1.00	10,000,000
First Mortgage Bonds issue \$2,000,000,000 - 25 years-7% Sinking Fund issue	<u>\$2,000,000,000</u>
Total amount of Capital	\$2,410,000,000

The bonds would not be retired for sinking fund repayments during the first five years of operation. Thereafter a sinking fund of \$100,000,000 per year would be paid for a period of 20 years.

The Bonds would be sold by an international banking group to the public at the price of \$1,000 per Bond.

/continued....

With each \$1,000 bond sold to the public the buyer would have the right to purchase 2 shares of A stock at the price of \$20.00 per share.

The founders of the new canal project and banking group would have the right to purchase 10,000,000 B shares at the price of \$1.00 per share.

The A shares would have the right to receive the first \$2.00 in annual dividends and any balance of additional annual dividends payable would be equally divided between the A and B shares.

The Board of Directors of the Nasser Canal & Industrial Zone Company would consist of 19 members. The A shareholders would have the right to elect five directors and the B shareholders would have the right to elect five directors. The Suez Canal Authority would have the right to appoint nine directors. The new Company would operate in co-operation with the Suez Canal Authority.

The larger and diversified income that the new canal and industrial zone would produce and the time saving advantages that the canal would make available, plus a much greater volume of business because of its larger size than was ever available to the present one-way narrow, shallow passage type of Suez Canal, and with the increased amount of products that must be transported in the future, would make the estimated gross income of \$500,000,000 per year a figure that could well be supported by the time the canal would be completed.

It is estimated that in 33 years the world population will double and the volume of transport business by sea will more than quadruple during this period.

The fact that after the first five year period the First Mortgage Bond issue of \$2,000,000,000 would be repaid at the rate of \$100,000,000 per year, and a saving of interest of \$7,000,000 per year, would make the 50% of the net amount of earnings that the Suez Canal Authority would receive much larger every year thereafter. The same would be true of the amount available for bond interest and sinking fund payments, and the payment of dividends to the A and B shares.

Therefore the bonds and shares would be a most attractive investment and one which would greatly increase in market value for many years.

/continued....

The above potential earnings plus the fact that the new canal would represent a world necessity and be the only one of its kind should appeal to all types of investors.

Once the Egyptian Government accepts this proposal it would also be agreed that a reasonable amount of the bonds and A shares to be sold would be made available for purchase by the Egyptian Government, the Suez Canal Authority and Egyptian citizens.

L. E. Detwiler - President  
Liberian International American Corp.


30.12.66

לשכת המנכ"ל  
מחלקת החקר

הנדון: חברת התעופה "מידל איסט איירליינס" הלבנונית  
ס לבקשתכם הטלפונית מ-30.12

1. ברורנו העלה שהמניות בחברה "בתיבי האויר הסזרה מיכוניים"  
מצויות ברשות הגופים הבאים:
  - א. לחברת "אייר פראנס" - 30% מהמניות.
  - ב. לבנק אינטרה בהרכבו החדש - 65% מהמניות.
  - ג. לגורמים אחרים - 5% מהמניות.
2. 15% מהמניות בבנק אינטרה בהרכבו החדש מצויות בידי אמריקאים.

ב ב ר כ ה,



אילן שרייבר

העתק: מר ש. הלל, מנכ"ל  
גב' י. ורד, מנהלת מזמי"ם

10.10.2  
10.10.2

DECLARATION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
10.10.2 - 10.10.2

1. The Board of Directors of the Company is composed of the following members:
2. The Board of Directors is authorized to exercise all the powers and authorities conferred upon it by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company.
3. The Board of Directors is authorized to exercise all the powers and authorities conferred upon it by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company.
4. The Board of Directors is authorized to exercise all the powers and authorities conferred upon it by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company.
5. The Board of Directors is authorized to exercise all the powers and authorities conferred upon it by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Company.

10.10.2



10.10.2

10.10.2  
10.10.2

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס' 104

חומר : 071930 אקטובר 68

הודפס : 080900

אל : המפטרר ירושלים

מאת : מפישראל ביר יורק

ס י ד י

קופי, פאום 2.

להלן סכתב הפיכל אלי מ-7 באוקטובר.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR,

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1968 REPLYING TO MY LETTER OF 28 SEPTEMBER ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1966.

PERMIT ME TO POINT OUT THAT YOUR LETTER MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THIS RESOLUTION ALTHOUGH IT WAS, IN FACT, THE REASON FOR MY LETTER, WHICH, INDEED, QUOTED THE THREE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE RESOLUTION.

I HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE REPLY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO MY REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF RESOLUTION 259 IT WILL RECEIVE, CO-OPERATE WITH AND FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. YOUR LETTER, HOWEVER, EXPRESSES ONLY YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS " TO RECEIVE AND CO-OPERATE WITH SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SAME BASIS AS THAT LAID DOWN FOR THE FACT FINDING MISSION OF MR. GUSSING LAST YEAR, NAMELY, THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 237 AS INTERPRETED IN PARAGRAPH 212 OF YOUR REPORT A/6797 OF 15 SEPTEMBER 1967 ". THIS RESPONSE, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS CONDITIONAL AND THUS WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT IS CALLED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259. NOR DOES IT GIVE TO ME THE ASSURANCE REQUIRED FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THAT RESOLUTION

BY DISPATCHING THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

THE UNAVOIDABLE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM YOUR LETTER, AS I INTERPRET IT, IS THAT MY APPROACH HAS BEEN MET WITH ONLY A CONDITIONAL AND THEREFORE INADEQUATE RESPONSE. IN THIS REGARD, MAY I REPEAT THAT MY LETTER OF 28 SEPTEMBER WAS WRITTEN IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259. YOU WILL NOTE PARTICULARLY THAT OPERATIVE

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0722 2222 2222

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DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR,

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER 1952 REPLYING TO MY LETTER OF 28 SEPTEMBER ON THE SUBJECT OF REPRESENTATION IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 277 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1952.

PERMIT ME TO POINT OUT THAT YOUR LETTER TAKES NO REFERENCE TO THIS RESOLUTION ALTHOUGH IT WAS, IN FACT, THE REASON FOR MY LETTER, WHICH, INDEED, QUOTED THE THREE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF RESOLUTION 277.

I HAVE TAKEN GARDEROU NOTE OF THE REPLY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO MY REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2 OF RESOLUTION 277 I WILL RECEIVE CO-OPERATIVE WITH AND FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. HOWEVER, EXPRESSION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE AND CO-OPERATE WITH SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SAME BASIS AS Laid DOWN FOR THE ACCESSION MISSION OF MR. GUSING LAST YEAR, NAMELY, THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 277 AS INTERPRETED IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF YOUR REPORT OF 15 SEPTEMBER 1952, THIS BEING THE POINT IT SEEMS TO ME IS CONDITIONAL AND THUS WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT IS CALLED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 277. NOR DOES IT GIVE TO ME THE ASSURANCE REQUESTED FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THAT RESOLUTION BY DISPATCHING THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

THE USA, IN DRAFTING CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM YOUR LETTER, HAS INTERPRETED MY APPROACH AS HAVING BEEN MET WITH ONLY A CONFIDENTIAL AND THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE RESPONSE. IN THIS REGARD, YOUR REPLY TO MY LETTER OF 28 SEPTEMBER WAS WRITTEN IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 277. YOU WILL NOTE PARTICULARLY THAT OPERATIVE

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בלתי מסווג

מחלקת הקשר

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PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE RESOLUTION MAKES A REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WHICH ENVISAGES IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT CONDITIONS. FURTHER, PLEASE NOTE THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION REFERS EXCLUSIVELY TO "THE ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL". IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD, I AM SURE, THAT IT IS NOT WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MODIFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OR TO CONCUR IN A COURSE OF ACTION LESS THAN OR DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CALLED FOR IN THAT RESOLUTION.

TO MY REGRET, I AM OBLIGED TO CONCLUDE THAT YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER DOES NOT AFFORD ME A BASIS ON WHICH TO DISPATCH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CLEAR INTENTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259. IT FOLLOWS THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ADVISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THIS EFFECT IN A REPORT, AS CALLED FOR IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE RESOLUTION, WHICH IT IS MY INTENTION TO SUBMIT SHORTLY.

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PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE RESOLUTION MAKES A REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WHICH INVOLVES IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT CONDITIONS. PLEASE NOTE THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE RESOLUTION REFERS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL. IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE REQUEST IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OR TO TAKE ACTION OF ACTION LESS THAN OR DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION.

TO MY REGRET, I AM OBLIGED TO CONCLUDE THAT YOUR LETTER OF 4 OCTOBER DOES NOT AFFORD ME A BASIS ON WHICH TO BRING THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CLEAR INTENTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ADVISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THIS EFFECT IN A REPORT, AS CALLED FOR IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE RESOLUTION, WHICH IT IS MY INTENTION TO SUBMIT SHORTLY.

YOURS SINCERELY,

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 17 OCT 1957 12 30

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מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס 87

חומר: 041300 ד צמ 68

הדפס: 042200

אל: המשרד ירושלים

מאת: ממישראל צו יורק

מאום 2, העתק ורשיבגטון.

להלן אגרת שהגשנו היום לבשיא סרעביס:

EXCELLENCY,

ON INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER TO MY LETTERS OF 2 DECEMBER 1968 (SX8912) AND 3 DECEMBER 1968 (3/8917), I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING:

THIS MORNING AT APPROXIMATELY 0430 HOURS LOCAL TIME AND AGAIN AT 0530 HOURS MORTAR FIRE WAS OPENED FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY ON ISRAELI WORKERS AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE CENTRAL JORDAN VALLEY.

IT HAS NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE WANTON AND PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT ON THE NIGHT OF 2-3 DECEMBER AGAINST ISRAELI VILLAGES IN THE BEIT SHEAN AND JORDAN VALLEYS WAS INITIATED BY THE IRAQI FORCES STATIONED IN JORDAN. THE 122 MM. GUNS, OF SOVIET MANUFACTURE, FROM WHICH THE ISRAELI VILLAGES WERE SHELLED ARE PART OF THE IRAQI

ARMY'S EQUIPMENT BUT ARE NOT IN USE BY THE JORDANIAN FORCES. THE ISRAELI VILLAGES SHELLED BY THE IRAQI ARMY WERE TEL-KATZIR, HAMADIYA, BEIT YOSEF, NEVE EITAN, MAOZ HAIM, KFAR RUPPIN, MASSADA, DEGANIA ALEF, DEGANIA BETH, ASHDOT YAAKOV AND KINNERET.

THIS WAS THE EIGHTH AND LARGEST IRAQI ARTILLERY ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELI INHABITED LOCALITIES SINCE 17 OCTOBER 1968.

THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN HAVE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE TERROR WARFARE PURSUED AGAINST ISRAEL FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY. THEY HAVE SUPPLIED THE TERROR ORGANIZATIONS WITH FUNDS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, EXPLOSIVES, TRANSPORTATION AND HAVE ASSISTED THEM WITH TRAINING AND INTELLIG

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EXCELLENCY

ON INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER TO MY LETTERS OF 2 DECEMBER 1953 (2001) AND 3 DECEMBER 1953 (2002), I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING:

THIS MORNING AT APPROXIMATELY 0630 HOURS, 0000 AM AND AGAIN AT 0730 HOURS, MORTAR FIRE WAS OPENED FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY ON ISRAELI WORKERS AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE CENTRAL JORDAN VALLEY.

IT HAS NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE MORTAR AND PREMEDITATED AGGRESSORS ON GARDED OUT ON THE NIGHT OF 2-3 DECEMBER AGAINST ISRAELI VILLAGES IN THE BEAN SHEAN AND JORDAN VALLEYS WAS INITIATED BY THE ISRAELI FORCES STATIONED IN JORDAN. THE 152 MM GUNS OF SOVIET MANUFACTURE FROM WHICH THE ISRAELI VILLAGES WERE SHELLED ARE PART OF THE ISRAELI ARMY'S EQUIPMENT.

BUT ARE NOT IN USE BY THE JORDANIAN FORCES. THE ISRAELI VILLAGES SHELLED BY THE ISRAELI ARMY WERE TEL-KATZIR, HAMADIA, BEIT YOSEF, NEVE ESHAN, MAAS HAIM, Kfar Ruphin, MASSADA, DEGAN ALEF, DEGAN A BETH, ASHDOT YAACOV AND KINNERET.

THIS WAS THE EIGHTH AND LAST ISRAELI ARTILLERY ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELI SETTLED LOCALITIES SINCE 17 OCTOBER 1953.

THE ISRAELI FORCES IN JORDAN HAVE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE TERROR VARIOUS BUREAUS AND INSTANCES FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY. THEY HAVE SUPPLIED THE TERROR ORGANIZATIONS WITH FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT, EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS, TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HAVE ASSIGNED THEM WITH

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- 2 -

ENCE INFORMATION. MEN AND OFFICERS  
OF BATTALION 421 OF THE IRAQI ARMY HAVE JOINED TERROR  
COMMANDOS IN SABOTAGE RAIDS AGAINST ISRAEL, AND SEVERAL  
OF THEM HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER BY ISRAELI FORCES.

IN VIEW OF THE PERSISTENT AND MOUNTING AGGRESSION BY THE  
IRAQI FORCES, ISRAEL AIRCRAFT ACTED TODAY IN SELF-DEFENSE  
AGAINST IRAQI MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE IRBID AREA IN ORDER  
TO SILENCE THE BATTERIES EMPLOYED IN THE SHELLING OF  
ISRAELI VILLAGES. ONE ISRAELI PLANE WAS ABANDONED OVER  
JORDANIAN TERRITORY BUT ITS PILOT WAS RESCUED AND RETURNED  
TO ISRAEL.

IT WILL BE RECALLED, EXCELENCY, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ  
HAS SO FAR FAILED TO ANNOUNCE ITS UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE  
OF THE CEASE-FIRE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
I HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THIS FACT IN LETTERS TO THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE MOST RECENT NONE  
(CORRECTION LAST WORD SHOULD READ -ONE) DATED  
5 NOVEMBER 1968 (S/3386).

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE  
CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT. PLEASE ACCEPT, ETC.

AD KAN  
NAUM

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ENCE INFORMATION MEN AND OFFICERS  
OF BATTALION 451 OF THE TRAO ARMY HAVE JOINED TERROR  
COMMANDOS IN SABOTAGE RAIDS AGAINST ISRAEL AND SEVERAL  
OF THEM HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER BY ISRAELI FORCES.

IN VIEW OF THE PERILS WHICH WOULD BE MOUNTED BY THE  
TRAO FORCES IN ISRAELI TERRITORY TODAY, THE  
AGAINST TRAO MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE TRAO AREA IN ORDER  
TO SILENCE THE PARTIES EMPLOYED IN THE AREA  
ISRAELI VILLAGES ONE ISRAELI PLANE WAS ABANDONED OVER  
JORDANIAN TERRITORY BUT ITS PILOT WAS RESCUED AND RETURNED  
TO ISRAEL.

IT WILL BE RECALLED EXCELLENCY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL  
HAS SO FAR FAILED TO ANNOUNCE ITS UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE  
OF THE CEASE-FIRE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
I HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THIS FACT IN LETTERS TO THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE MOST RECENT ONE  
(CORRECTION LAST WORD SHOULD READ - ONE) DATED  
2 NOVEMBER 1968 (S/2088).

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE  
CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT. PLEASE ACCEPT, ETC.

AD KAW  
NAUM

0000 0120

ירושלים, ג' בחשוון תשכ"ט  
25 באוקטובר 1968

אל נאו"ם, ניו-יורק

מאח מ"ם מנהל מאו"ם 2

הנדון: סיכום המצב היהודי ושומרון

ב-22.10.68 הרצה תת-אלוף ורדי באולם שרת במטה"ח  
בפני מספר אנשי המשרד על הנושא הנ"ל. מצ"ל עיקרי דבריו  
על פי רשימות שרשמתי בשעת ההרצאה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אורי גורדון

101

SECRET

SECRET, 2nd Edition, 1964  
25th Anniversary Edition

SECRET, 2nd Edition, 1964

SECRET, 2nd Edition, 1964

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סיכום המצב ביהודה ושומרון

הרצאה חת-אלוף ורדי ספקר אזור יהודה ושומרון  
במש"ח ביום 22.10.68

מטות הפח"ע לא הושבו

א. לא הצליחו לשכס את אורה היינו

ב. לא הצליחו לקבל שווק אקטיבי מצד האוכלוסיה המקומית.

אין זאת אומרת שאין אהדה לפח"ע. ולא שיש חשש מלשחף אתו פעולה. ראש עירייה שכס למשל סבור שמכנינה מדיניה מביא הטרור הועלת באשר הוא מקיים את הבעיה הפלסטינאית כבעיה ערה, הוא אינו רוצה שמעילות הטרור תחייט בעירו אלא בסקומות אחרים. בחברון סבורים שישראל מחכה להזדמנות לחטל את השבון 1929 וחוששים מפני גירוש המוני לירדן ולכן מעונינים המנהיגים לשמור על השקט בעיר. בטענותיהם בירדן מסבירים הם כי הישארותם בפלסטין חשובה יותר מאשר פעולות טרור בעיר, ומציבים את הסכנה של הגירוש ההמוני ע"י אלמונות ישראל כנימוק נגד פעולות טרור בחברון. ראשי הכפר עוג'ה תחת, ליד יריחו שזרכו עברו כמה חוליות מחבלים ושהוטל עליו עוצר מספר פעמים, טענו בירדן כי אם יסוככו בעמיד בפעילות החבלנים לא יוכלו יותר להחזיק מעמד במקומם ויעברו כולט לירדן ועל השלטונות שם יהיה לדאוג להם. גוסף לאי הרצון להסתבך בפעולות הטרור יש לאוכלוסיה גם ענין משלה בהמשך וקין של החיים ולא היתה הצלחה לכל הנסיונות לבצע אפילו פעם אחת שביחה כללית בכל הגדה. זה להבדיל כמוכן משביחות מקומיות שהצליחו.

כדוגמא יכולה לשמש העונדה שראש עירייה שכס ומועצה העירייה נכשלו בנסיונם לחשביח את העיר שכס בהגובה למיצוך בית של אחד מנכבדי העיר וזאת על אף השליחים שנשלחו ע"י ראש העיר כדי לארגן שביחה זו. נענו לקריאה לשכות רק כ-6 עסקים שאף הם שייכים בחלקם לחברי מועצה העירייה שיומו השביחה. מצב דומה קיים ביחס להשבתת בתי"ס כאשר פעילות רבה מביאה להשבתת ב"ס זה או אחר בעוד שבבתי ספר אחרים ממשיכים בלימודים.

קיימים גורמים הפועלים באופן קבוע כדי להחטיט את קוצרים הצלחות חלקיות בלבד ובמיוחד בקשר למאורי ממויטים כגון כשפמיזם ידיעה שהרמנו מסגד או שהתנהגנו בצורה פוגעת במקום קדוש. כך המצב עד כה ואין לצפות להצלחות בקנה מדה הרבה יותר גדול.

הגורמים הפחטיטיים הם בעיקר הקומוניסטים הגורטים שיש להחזיר המצב לקדמותו. קיים תיאום אופרטיבי מסוים בין הקומוניסטים ובין אל קומיון אלערב ותבעת. ההיענות לחסיסה באה כד"כ מכיוון אחד בלבד והוא בתי הספר. בראש עומדים טורי והלמידי בתי הספר המשתייכים לתנועות הנ"ל אך יש חוג של מורים המתנגדים להם ומונעים פעולות מסוג זה. בימים האחרונים היו מקרים כשטורים סגרו את תלמידיהם בבתי הספר כדי למנוע השתתפותם בהתנגדות.

הרקע לחסיסה הנ"ל הוא התיסכול הרב בקרב המנהיגות, האינטליגנציה והנוער. העמיד לא ברור כלל. ניזונים משמועות ותעמולה. מאז תחילת הכיבוש הומצו שמועות כי הנה עומדים על סף הסדר וכי האריך מינוי קרוב כבר נקבע. כשעבר האריך הנקוב הועלו שמועות על הסדר חדש ועל האריך חדש וכך היו מתאריך מינוי אחד לשני. היום נמוצות שמועות כי האריך המינוי הוא חג המולד.

מצד אחד קיים רצון חזק שנפנה אך מאידך אין שום סימן שאנו עומדים לצאת אלא רואים בתהליך התערות והט מרגישים שחט עצמם משתתפים בתערות זו. מול גלגל הפעילות להוצאתנו מהשטחים קיים גלגל חיי יום-יום חמדהק את ההשתלבות. הם מרגישים כי הם מסתבכים אתנו הן בתחום הכלכלי והן החברתי (כגון פגישת המשוררת הלאומנית מדה טוקאן משכס עם שר הבטחון).

ראש עירייה שכס שהחט על פטיציה חריפה לפיה ישראל מבצעת רצה המוני חסביר בע"פ "... אצאקנמשיך לשתף אחכט פעולה אך מאידך נגיש אגרות חריפות ... המלים הן הנשק של החלשים".

STATE OF NEW YORK

IN SENATE,  
January 10, 1911.

REPORT

1. On the Report of the
2. Commissioners of the

The first report of the Commission on the subject of the proposed amendments to the Constitution of this State, was presented to the Senate on the 10th day of January, 1911. The Commission was organized on the 15th day of December, 1909, and since that time has been engaged in a study of the subject. The Commission has held numerous public hearings and has received many suggestions from the people of this State. The Commission has also held many private hearings and has received many suggestions from the members of the Senate and the Assembly. The Commission has also held many private hearings and has received many suggestions from the members of the Senate and the Assembly. The Commission has also held many private hearings and has received many suggestions from the members of the Senate and the Assembly.

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REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE

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סגירת גבול הירדן בפני חירות תרומת תרומה גדולה לאי הצלחת הפח"ע. מספר ההדירות המוצלחות קטן ביותר ומי שחוזר מוצאים אותו והורגים או שובים אותו. מאידך קיימות התארגנויות מקומיות, ברב הסקרים ביזמת אנשים הבאים מירדן אולם ביזמת מקומית ספונסנית, האלטנט המועד ביותר לכך הוא תלמידים. יש לקחת בחשבון שההייגה התארגנויות מקומיות בעתיד אך מספר המעורבים הן בהתארגנויות ספונסניות והן באלה הנעשות מביב מנהיגות מבחוץ יהיה מוגבל בלבד.

המגע הקרוב בינם לכינינו גרם בין השאר לכך שהם למדו מה הם הגבולות במסגרתם יכולים הם לפעול בלי שיינקטו אמצעים נמרצים נגדם. הם מכירים את בעיותינו בפנימיות וכן את מידת חופש הביטוי הקיים אצלנו ומנצלים אותו. ספרסטים ראיונות והצהרות שיוכלו לשמש להם אליבי כלפי מדינות ערב והלאוטנטי. היום כבר מעיזים להניף כרזות "כולנו פת"ח" וכרזות חמיכה בנאצר והוסיין בהפגנות.

את התסיסה מהזקות מדינות ערב בשירותיהן ובמעילות אחרת המיועדת להציג את המצב בשטחים כאי השלמה אקטיבית עם הכיבוש. קיים גם חשש של הפלסטטינאים מן יושב הסדר מבלי לשתף אותם. מענין שההפגנות בימים האחרונים החלו לפי כמה מקורות כדי להוכיח שבלי הפלסטטינאים לא יהיה הסדר. אולם שליטה המנהיגות המקומית על ההפגנות אבדה כנראה והועלו כרזות בעד חוסיין ובעד נאצר.

מול תהליך ההתססה קיים תהליך של השלמה עם הכיבוש. מרבית האספקה כיום נקנית בישראל למרות העובדה שמוחר לייבא מירדן, אחרי תשלום סכס כמובן. חיבוא מירדן השנה יסתכם ב-20 מליון ל"י בערך ואילו חיבוא מישראל יסתכם כנראה בין 80-140 מליון ל"י. הקשרים הכלכליים עם ישראל מחמתחיים במישורין רבים ומגוונים, כולל במגעים ויוזמות של יהודים וכלל אין לנו מושג על מלוא היקפם.

נשאלת השאלה אם כל הקשרים הכלכליים והחברתיים והכרת ישראל מקרוב כמו שהיא אם יש בהם כדי להביא לשינוי ביחס לישראל ולנכונות להיות אתנו. וכאן הטוב שלא תהיה אשליה שההשלמה עם מציאות מסוימת יוצרת תהליך נפשי חיובי מקביל. יתכן אפילו שנוצרים רגשות חדשים של סינה לשלטון נדיב ומעניף. נשאלת השאלה באיזו מידה יתחילו להכיר בריאליות של דברים לעומת הדמיון בו היו שרויים. יש לציין שער היום יש כפיה מסוימת של הדמיון על המציאות. הרושם הוא שבין המנהיגים יש כאלה הנחפסים ליתר ריאליזם המביא אותם למסקנה שיש להגיע לאיזה שהוא הסדר מאחר שאם תפרוץ מלחמה היא תנחל על אדמתם ובעריהם. אולם כשמתחילים לדבר על פתרונות ריאליים מתברר שהם מעלים את חכנית ברנדוט, את תכנית החלוקה של 1947 עם היקונים מסוימים וכד'. כלומר אפילו אצל הריאליסטים כביכול לא השתנה הרבה.

בחושה לשאלה אם האוכלוסייה יודעת על כשלונות פת"ח על אף השידורים פארצות ערב המספרים על נצחונות ציין תת-אלוף ורדי כי אחד הזעזועים שעבר על האוכלוסייה בשטחים הוא הכרת כזב התעמולה הערבית. בשעה שצה"ל כבש את עריהם טענו חחנות הרדיו הערביות כי צבאות ערב מנצחים וכי ת"א עומדת להיכבש. יש נשים לקבל את שקרי התעמולה הערבית כי רוצים לשמוע אותם ולהאמין בהם אך חיי היום-יוון באים ומפריכים טוב ושוב את הכזבים. חושבי יריחו באו לראות את בית המגדל שפוצץ לפי השידורים הערביים, אולם ראו את הבנין עומד על הילו ואח המושל, שנחרג כאילו - מסתובב כריא ושלם, וברכו אותו על כך. ידיעות על הריסת בנין המושל הצבאי בשכם או הריסת מלון אמבטדור והריגת חיילים רבים שם החגלו ככזב לאנשים שבאו לראות הדברים בעיניהם. אולם לשקרים יש ערך אפילו אם הם מופרכים אח"כ כי כמשך אותן השעות בהן מאמינים לשקר גיחן להסיה ולעורר הפגנות בעקבות ידיעות שחופצו כאילו נהרגו ונמצעו תלמידות בהפגנה בעיר אחרת וכו'. בסיכום יש ההפכוות מסוימת לעומת המצב לפני מלחמת 6 הימים.

לגבי השאלה אם קיים הבדל בהתנהגותם של האוכלוסין מקבועים בגדה וכין התנהגות הפליטים בגדה השיב כי במובן המצומצם של מליט אין פליטים בגדה שלא כמרוצות עזה. הפליטים לשעבר הנמצאים בגדה נקלטו וטרגיטים עצמם כחושבי המקום. אין הבדל בין "הפליטים" לבין חושבי המקום הן מבחינת השחטות בהפגנות והן מבחינת ההצטרפות לחבלנים.

THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF THE  
LIFE OF THE GREAT KING CHARLES THE FIRST  
BY JOHN BURNET  
IN TWO VOLUMES  
THE SECOND PART OF THE HISTORY OF THE

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THE SECOND PART OF THE HISTORY OF THE

מ. ש. הלל

מר מ. קומי  
מזתי"ם

הנדון : יהודי ערב

בהתאם לבקשתנו עומים להתכנס סדר ראשי התאחדויות פולי  
סדינות ערב בישראל, כדי לשלוח מברק למזכ"ל או"ם בענין  
יהודי ערב.

חברנו רצ"ב מיוסח מברק עבור ראשי התאחדויות.

נודה לך אם תאשר את נוסח המברק, כדי שנוכל להביאו בפני  
ראשי התאחדויות.

בברכה,



צבי גבאי

הצחק : מר מ. הלל, סמוכ"ל  
מנהל פאו"ם 2



## הצעת מברק למזכ"ל או"ם

אנו ראשי התאחדויות עולי מצרים, עיראק, סוריה ולבנון בישראל;  
מביעים את מודעתנו העמוקה לגורלם של אחינו הנמקים בבתי הכלא במדינות  
ערב, על לא עוול בכפם, מאז מלחמת ששת הימים. מצבם של אחינו במדינות  
ערב הוחמר בצורה קשה מאוד בעקבות מלחמת ששת הימים. השלטונות במדינות  
ערב מתכלים להם, מונעים מהם פרנסה, מחרימים את רכושם, מיצרים את  
צדיהם, נקלטים בהם ומחזיקים בהם כבני ערוכה פוליטיים בניגוד לכל  
מוסר בין-לאומי.

מדינות ערב טרבו ועודן מסרבות להרשות לגורמים בין-לאומיים  
לבדוק את מצבם של היהודים וכן מסרבות להתיר להם לעזוב את המדינות.

שארי הפליטה של הקהילות היהודיות שבוחרו במדינות ערב משמשים  
כסעיר לעזאזאל בידי שליטי מדינות אלו, בהם משסים את החמונים בעת זעם  
ומחרימים את רכושם בעת מחסור.

בשם של אחינו המדוכאים באכזריות שלא כודעה אנו זועקים אל מצפון  
העולם ודורשים מהמזכיר הכללי של האו"ם לבדוק את מצבם, להקל עליהם את  
גורלם ולאפשר להם לצאת ממדינות ערב שבזלו מהם את זכויות האדם.

בל יחזור קשר השתיקה שהיה בעת השמדת אחינו באירופה עתה כאשר  
רדיפות חמורות מתנהלות נגד היהודים במזרח התיכון.

ОТЪЗВАНЕ НА СЪДЕБА

Във връзка с извършените проверки по отношение на изпълнението на задълженията по отношение на данъците, които са дължими от лицата, които са обект на данъчни проверки, се установява, че в някои случаи лицата не са изпълнили задълженията си по отношение на данъците, които са дължими от тях.

Във връзка с извършените проверки по отношение на изпълнението на задълженията по отношение на данъците, които са дължими от лицата, които са обект на данъчни проверки, се установява, че в някои случаи лицата не са изпълнили задълженията си по отношение на данъците, които са дължими от тях.

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*Handwritten signatures and notes at the top of the page.*

1.10.68

מר מ.ש. קוממי  
סגן מנהל מאו"ם 2

הנדון: פעולות יהודיות בקשר לשליח המזכ"ל היהודי ערב  
טבוט ביניים של פעולות בהו"ל ליום 1/10 לאור  
דיווחים מנציגויות שנחקשו לפעול

- 1) ניו יורק 27 - הועד וגני ברית בעלי פגעים עם המסלחות הדיפלומטיות להו"ם המעילום לצורך זה.
- 2) המועדון וזולמו לוחצים על הממשל ושלוחותיו.
- 3) פועלים לחטגה התבטאויות בעתונות היהודית וחלא יהודית. המועדון יוצא בהודעה והועד יעשה אף הוא.
- 4) מפעילים כתי הכנסת וארגונים של יוצאי ערב.
- 5) מקיימים מגע הדוק עם מאו"ם.

לפי דווח ממריט ב-27 מעכב הועד היהודי האמריקני עד אמצע שבוע זה (1/10) טרטוט נרחב בענין גלוי הנציב העליון לפליטים כי שלטונות מצרים אינם מרשים לאף יהודי לעזוב מצרים. מניו יורק ב-26 כי הועד אמנם יפרסם הידיעה. (מטעמי יהודית איסלקיה שהביקה לאחונה ב-27 הוסיפה כי הוצא חוק חדש למיז אמור ליהודים לצאת מקבולות המדינה ~~על א-היו בעלי אזרחות זרה לפני יוני~~ 1967)

מלונדון 26/9 - ועד הצירים ממגר מכתב למוראוף וארגון החילים המשותפים פונה באמצעות סניפיו לחברי המרלמנט.

1) - 27/9 מרומא אגודה איסלקיה של מגורשים ופליטים יהודים ולא יהודים ממצרים הבריקה למזכ"ל ולנשיא מועבי"ס דרשה שיגור וקדה מיוחדת למצרים והתערבות או"ם לשימור המצב.

2) מקוים למצרים ראשיים ב-30/9.

3) נשיא איחוד הקהילות הבריק זכתב לנו טאנט ונשיא מועבי"ס בדרישה לבדוק מצב יהודי ערב ובקשר מצרים סוריה ועירק ביקש פגישה עם שח"ה מדיצי לתאר בענין המצב ולבקש התערבות ממאמיליה.

4) הנושא הועלה בדרישה הרבנים בראש השנה.

מחוג 30 - מועצת הקהילות הבריקה למזכ"ל מהאח על מצב יהודי ארצות ערב. הדבר פורסם כרדיו ונמסר ל- JTA .

1) הרב דבר בדרישתו בראש השנה - חלמינקי 26

2) הקהילות היהודיות העברנה מזכיר ליו"ר המרלמנט וודכו לראשי הסיעות העיקריות.

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- קנברה 29 - טגן נשיא בית הצירים ונשיא ארגון הספרדים יבריקו למזכ"ל האו"ם.  
הסגיר ימגש עם אנשי מועצת היהדות האוסטרלית כדי להכניח שיגור מברק למזכ"ל.  
מאפרים ראשיים, דרישה ביום כיפור ופניה לממאוסטרלית.
- פגמה 28 - קהילות יוצאות מז"ח השגרנה מברק למזכ"ל והעמק לועדה זכויות הארץ
- גואטמלה 28 - קהילות גואטמלה וטלברוד הבריקו למזכ"ל. משחילים לארגן מאפרים בעתונות.
- קיסו 27 - הסגיר דבר במשרד החוץ אצא עם יו"ר ועדה החוץ בסרלמנט וביקש ועד הקהילה  
לפגוח ליו"ר הסרלמנט ולשה"ח.
- בומביי 27 - (1) הועד המרכזי של יהודי הודו וארגון בתי הכנסת של יוצאי עירק הבריקו למזכ"ל  
ובקשו לשלוח נציג שיבדוק מצב יהודי ערב וכמיוווד מצרים סוריה ועירק. כן  
שיגרו הנ"ל מברק למשה"ח ההודי המבקש שמשוודו הציע למזכ"ל למנות למטרות  
הנ"ל ושתצביע באו"ם בהתאם.
- (2) דרישה בבית הכנסת המרכזי בבומביי כראש השנה.
- (3) משחילים לארגן מאפרים.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אורי גורדון

העמק לשכת הנכ"ל  
סר ש. הלל, ממזכ"ל  
מזחי"ם  
באו"ם ניו-יורק



בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר מס' 197

מברק נכנס

חובר: 111800 אוק 68

אל: המשרד ירושלים

הודפס: 121100

מאת: סמישראל בני יורק

ס י י ד י

קומיני סארם ב הפחק וושינגטון.

להלן נוסח האגרת שהגשנו היום למזכל

EXCELLENCY,

I AM INSTRUCTED TO REFER TO THE TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU ON 1 OCTOBER 1968 BY THE ASSOCIATIONS OF JEWS FROM EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA NOW IN ISRAEL, A COPY OF WHICH IS ENCLOSED, AND HAVE THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WISHES TO ENDORSE THIS APPEAL, IN WHICH IT FINDS CONFIRMATION FOR ITS OWN VIEWS ON THE MATTER, AS EXPRESSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE GRAVE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM TO WHICH THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE CALLED ATTENTION, AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE URGENT DEMAND FOR APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL

ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF THE VICTIMS, APPEARS IN REPORTS PUBLISHED BY OTHER PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

A REPORT RELEASED IN PARIS ON 5 OCTOBER 1968 BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AND BASED ON RELIABLE SOURCES WITHIN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, ESTABLISHES THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

A) THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAS RECENTLY DECIDED TO BAN THE DEPARTURE FROM EGYPT OF ALL JEWS, THUS APPARENTLY HOLDING THEM AS HOSTAGES. THIS DECISION APPLIES TO JEWS OF EGYPTIAN CITIZENSHIP, TO JEWS NOMINALLY STATELESS, AND EVEN TO JEWS HOLDING FOREIGN NATIONALITY IF THAT NATIONALITY WAS ACQUIRED AFTER THE SIX-DAY WAR. IN THE PAST JEWS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE EGYPT AFTER HAVING BEEN FORCIBLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR EGYPTIAN NATIONALITY BY THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES.

B) ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE REMAINING ESTIMATED THOUSAND JEWS OF EGYPT STILL ARE IN PRISON. THEY HAVE BEEN KEPT IN DETENTION SINCE THE JUNE 1967 WAR, THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN NEITHER CHARGED NOR FOUND GUILTY OF ANY OFFENCE. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT EVEN MADE ANY PRETENCE THAT THESE

SECRET

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SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: AMEMB, CAIRO

DATE: 10/25/56

REF: 10/25/56

SECRET

URGENT 10/25/56  
FROM AMEMB, CAIRO

EXCELLENCY,  
I AM INSTRUCTED TO REFER TO THE TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU ON 1 OCTOBER 1956 BY THE ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA NOW IN ISRAEL, A COPY OF WHICH IS ENCLOSED, AND HAVE THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WISHES TO ENDORSE THIS APPEAL, IN WHICH IT FINDS CONFIRMATION FOR ITS OWN VIEWS ON THE MATTER, AS EXPRESSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE GRAVE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM TO WHICH THE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE CALLED ATTENTION, AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE URGENT DEMAND FOR APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF THE VICTIMS, APPEARS IN REPORTS PUBLISHED BY OTHER PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

A REPORT RELEASED IN PARIS ON 2 OCTOBER 1956 BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AND BASED ON RELIABLE SOURCES WITHIN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, ESTABLISHES THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

(A) THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC HAS RECENTLY DECIDED TO BAN THE DEPARTURE FROM EGYPT OF ALL JEWS, THIS APPARENTLY HOLDING THEM AS HOSTAGES. THIS DECISION APPLIES TO JEWS OF EGYPTIAN CITIZENSHIP, TO JEWS NOMINALLY STATELESS, AND EVEN TO JEWS HOLDING FOREIGN NATIONALITY IF THAT NATIONALITY WAS ACQUIRED AFTER THE SIX-DAY WAR. IN THE PAST JEWS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE EGYPT AFTER HAVING BEEN FORCIBLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR EGYPTIAN NATIONALITY BY THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES.

(B) ABOUT A QUARTER OF THE REMAINING ESTIMATED THOUSAND JEWS OF EGYPT STILL ARE IN PRISON. THEY HAVE BEEN KEPT IN DETENTION SINCE THE JUNE 1957 WAR, THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN NEITHER CHARGED NOR FOUND GUILTY OF ANY OFFENSE. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT EVEN MADE ANY PRETEXT THAT THE

- 2 -

DETAINED JEWS WERE GUILTY OF ANY OFFENCE. 'THEY ARE BEING HELD PRISONERS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE JEWS.', THE REPORT STATES. THE JEWISH PRISONERS, WHOSE NUMBER IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 225 AND 230 PERSONS, HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE TOURAH PRISON NEAR CAIRO AFTER INITIAL DETENTION AT THE ABU ZAABAL JAIL, WHERE THEY WERE THE OBJECT OF ODIUS AND INHUMANE TREATMENT, INCLUDING TORTURE.

C) IN IRAQ, 26 JEWS OUT OF THE 2500 SOULS REMAINING OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF THAT COUNTRY ARE ALSO BEING HELD IN PRISON WITHOUT CHARGES HAVING BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST THEM. AFTER THE JUNE 1967 WAR MORE THAN 100 HEADS OF JEWISH FAMILIES WERE THROWN INTO JAIL, BUT MOST OF THEM HAVE SINCE BEEN RELEASED. SINCE JUNE 1967, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED A HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCH OF ALL JEWISH HOMES AND HAS DRAWN UP A REGISTER OF ALL OCCUPANTS. JEWS HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL FROM THEIR AREAS OF RESIDENCE, AND REMAIN UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE. IRAQI JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO EMIGRATE AND CANNOT SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.

D) IN SYRIA, JEWS ARE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS IN THEIR OWN HOMES, BEING FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL MORE THAN A MILE AND A HALF FROM THEIR RESIDENCES WITHOUT SPECIAL PERMITS. THEY MUST CARRY SPECIAL IDENTITY CARDS AND MAY NOT SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF THEIR PROPERTY. PALESTINIAN ARAB REFUGEES HAVE BEEN RESETTLED IN HOMES IN THE FORMER JEWISH QUARTERS, POSING A CONTINUAL THREAT TO JEWS IN DAMASCUS AND ALEPPO, WHERE INCIDENTS HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED.

THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT AND SUPPORTED BY MANY OTHER SOURCES, HAS CREATED DEEP CONCERN IN ISRAEL AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE CONTINUED PERSECUTION OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES CONSTITUTES NOT ONLY A GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT ALSO ADDS TO THE ALREADY GRAVE TENSIONS EXISTING IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST M.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSURE BE CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL .

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

YOSEF TEKOAH

TELEGRAM SENT BY THE ASSOCIATIONS OF JEWS FROM EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA, ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 1 OCTOBER 1968

DETAINED JEWS WERE GUILTY OF ANY OFFENCE. THEY ARE BEING HELD PRISONERS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE JEWS. THE REPORT STATES THE JEWISH PRISONERS, WHOSE NUMBER IS ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 250 AND 300 PERSONS, HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE TOURAH PRISON NEAR CAIRO AFTER INITIAL DETENTION AT THE ABU ZABAL JAIL, WHERE THEY WERE THE OBJECT OF ODIOUS AND INHUMAN TREATMENT, INCLUDING TORTURE.

c) IN IRAQ, 25 JEWS OUT OF THE 2500 SOULS REMAINING OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF THAT COUNTRY ARE ALSO BEING HELD IN PRISON WITHOUT CHARGES HAVING BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST THEM. AFTER THE JUNE 1967 WAR MORE THAN 100 HEADS OF JEWISH FAMILIES WERE THROWN INTO JAIL, BUT MOST OF THEM HAVE SINCE BEEN RELEASED. SINCE JUNE 1967, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED A HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCH OF ALL JEWISH HOMES AND HAS DRAWN UP A REGISTER OF ALL OCCUPANTS. JEWS HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL FROM THEIR AREAS OF RESIDENCE, AND REMAIN UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE. IRAQI JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO EMIGRATE AND CANNOT SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.

d) IN SYRIA, JEWS ARE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS IN THEIR OWN HOMES, BEING FORBIDDEN TO TRAVEL MORE THAN A MILE AND A HALF FROM THEIR RESIDENCES WITHOUT SPECIAL PERMITS. THEY MUST CARRY SPECIAL IDENTITY CARDS AND MAY NOT SELL OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF THEIR PROPERTY. PALESTINIAN ARAB REFUGEES HAVE BEEN RESETTLED IN HOMES IN THE FORMER JEWISH QUARTERS, POSING A CONTINUAL THREAT TO JEWS IN DAMASCUS AND ALLEPO, WHERE INCIDENTS HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED.

THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT AND SUPPORTED BY MANY OTHER SOURCES, HAS GREATLY DEEPENED CONCERN IN ISRAEL AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE CONTINUED PERSECUTION OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES CONSTITUTES NOT ONLY A GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT ALSO ADDS TO THE ALREADY GRAVE TENSIONS EXISTING IN THE AREA OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER AND ITS ENCLOSURE BE CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

YOSIEF TEKOH

TELEGRAM SENT BY THE ASSOCIATIONS OF JEWS FROM EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA, ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 1 OCTOBER 1968

- 3 -

WE THE LEADERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF JEWS IN ISRAEL ORIGINATING FROM EGYPT, IRAQ AND SYRIA MEETING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ISRAELI SECTION OF WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, EXPRESS OUR DEEP ANXIETY AT THE FATE OF OUR INNOCENT BROTHERS LANGUISHING IN PRISONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES. THE CONDITION GENERALLY OF OUR BROTHER IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAS GREATLY WORSENE FOLLOWING SIX DAY WAR. THE AUTHORITIES IN THE ARAB STATES PERSECUTE THEM, PREVENT THEM FROM EARNING A LIVELIHOOD SEIZE THEIR PROPERTY, RESTRICT THEIR MOVEMENTS, WREAK VENGEANCE ON THEM AND HOLD THEM AS POLITICAL HOSTAGES IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL MORALITY.

THE ARAB STATES HAVE REFUSED AND STILL REFUSE TO PERMIT INTERNATIONAL ORGANS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TO INSPECT THE CONDITION OF THE JEWS. THEY ALSO REFUSE TO PERMIT THE JEWS TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRIES. THEY REMNANTS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE ARAB STATES SERVE AS SCAPEGOATS FOR THE ARAB RULERS WHO USE THEM TO DEFLECT THE ATTENTION OF THE MASSES DURING DIFFICULT PERIODS.

IN THE NAME OF OUR OPPRESSED BROTHERS CRUELLY PERSECUTED WE CRY OUT TO THE WORLD'S CONSCIENCE AND CALL UPON THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO EXAMINE THEIR SITUATION, EASE THEIR LOT, AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO LEAVE THE ARAB STATES WHICH HAVE DENIED THEM HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE SEVERE OPPRESSION IS WAGED AGAINST THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, LET THERE BE NO REPETITION OF THAT CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE WHICH PREVAILED WHEN OUR BROTHERS IN EUROPE WERE DESTROYED.

CHAIM GOSHEN, CHAIRMAN-ASSOCIATION OF JEWSS FROM EGYPT  
 SHIMON BEN YAACOB, SECRETARY-ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM IRAQ  
 YAACOB ROFFE, CHAIRMAN-ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM SYRIA

AD KAN

NAUM

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תפוצה: א נאמן

דכ/דו

WE THE LEADERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF JEWS IN ISRAEL ORIGINATING FROM EGYPT, SYRIA AND SYRIA MEETING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ISRAELI SECTION OF WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, EXPRESS OUR DEEP ANXIETY AT THE FATE OF OUR INNOCENT BROTHERS LAUGHING IN PRISONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES. THE CONDITION GENERALLY OF OUR BROTHER IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES HAS GREATLY WORSENEED FOLLOWING SIX DAY WAR. THE AUTHORITIES IN THE ARAB STATES PERSECUTE THEM, PREVENT THEM FROM EARNING A LIVELIHOOD SEIZE THEIR PROPERTY, RESTRICT THEIR MOVEMENTS, BREAK VENGEANCE ON THEM AND HOLD THEM AS POLITICAL HOSTAGES IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL MORALITY.

THE ARAB STATES HAVE REFUSED AND STILL REFUSE TO PERMIT INTERNATIONAL ORGANS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TO INSPECT THE CONDITION OF THE JEWS. THEY ALSO REFUSE TO PERMIT THE JEWS TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRIES. THEY REMOVED THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE ARAB STATES SERVE AS SCAPEGOATS FOR THE ARAB RULERS WHO USE THEM TO DEFLECT THE ATTENTION OF THE MASSES DURING DIFFICULT PERIODS.

IN THE NAME OF OUR OPPRESSED BROTHERS CRUELLY PERSECUTED WE CRY OUT TO THE WORLD'S CONSCIENCE AND CALL UPON THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO EXAMINE THEIR SITUATION, EASE THEIR LOT, AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO LEAVE THE ARAB STATES WHICH HAVE DENIED THEM HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE SEVERE OPPRESSION IS WAGED AGAINST THE JEWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, LET THERE BE NO REPETITION OF THAT CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE WHICH PREVAILLED WHEN OUR BROTHERS IN EUROPE WERE DESTROYED.

CHAIM GOSHEN, CHAIRMAN-ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM EGYPT  
 SHIMON BEN YAACOB, SECRETARY-ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM SYRIA  
 YAACOB ROFFE, CHAIRMAN-ASSOCIATION OF JEWS FROM SYRIA

AD KAN

NAUM-1111

SECRET

SECRET

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ  
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

פס' 247

חובר : 151000 אוקטובר 68  
הודפס : 160900

אל : המשרד ירוסלים  
סאת: סמישראל ורסינגסון

קומי פאום ב, ורסינגסון (הועבר).

היום פורסם דו"ח או תאנט בענין השליח. בדו"ח סכתב אליבו מ-9.27  
ו-10.7 להלן ברסח פתיחת דוחו. סכתבו לערבים ותשובות הירדני.  
הסברי והסורי.  
כן תשובת תקוע מ-4.10.

1. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259 (1968) OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1968, WHICH REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL "URGENTLY TO DISPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ARAB TERRITORIES UNDER MILITARY OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE HOSTILITIES OF 5 JUNE 1967, AND TO REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 237 (1967)".

2. ON 28 SEPTEMBER, THE DAY FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 259(1968) BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I ADDRESSED LETTERS TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL, JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

IDENTICAL LETTERS WERE SENT TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, READING AS FOLLOWS:

"UDEAR MR. AMBASSADOR,

"I REFER TO THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1968 ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 (U 1967).

"IT IS MY INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT THIS RESOLUTION AS FULLY AND AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR ME TO BE ENABLED TO ASSURE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO IS TO UNDERTAKE THE SECOND HUMANITARIAN MISSION THAT HE MAY COUNT UPON THE SAME CO-OPERATION AND SUPPORT FROM THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE FIRST SUCH MISSION ENJOYED. A PROMPT WORD FROM YOU TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE APPRECIATED.

0 101 1100

UNITED STATES  
- OFFICE -

1968 09 27

247 00

TO : DIRECTOR, CIA  
FROM : AMEMB, WASHINGTON

DATE: 10:00 AM  
CLASS: SECRET

1. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF  
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 259 (1968) OF 27 SEPTEMBER  
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IDENTICAL LETTERS WERE SENT TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE  
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"I REFER TO THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
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SUPPORT FROM THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT  
WHICH THE FIRST SUCH MISSION ENJOYED. A PROMPT WORD FROM  
YOU TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE APPRECIATED.

"YOU WILL RECALL THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION I INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT I HAVE BEEN READY FOR SOME TIME TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE THE SECOND HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND THAT HE WOULD PROCEED TO THE AREA IMMEDIATELY ONCE THERE IS ASSURANCE THAT HE WILL HAVE THE ACCESS AND CO-OPERATION INDISPENSABLE TO THE FULFILMENT OF HIS MISSION".

(SIGNED) U THANT"

U3. REPLIES TO THESE LETTERS WER ADDRESSED TO ME AS INDICATEV BELOW. THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN, DATED 30 SEPTEMBER, READS:

"KDEAR MR.. SECRETARY-GENERAL,

"THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28C SEPTEMBER 1968, CONCERNING THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237, WHICH CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE FLED THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION ON RESOLUTION 259 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT.

" I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-OPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS.

(SIGNED ) MUHAMMAD H. EL-FARRA"

THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, ALSO DATED 30U SEPTEMBER, IS AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL:

"THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER 1968, CONCERNING THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237, WHICH CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE FLED THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION OF RESOLUTION 259 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT.

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"YOU WILL RECALL THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION I INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT I HAVE BEEN READY FOR SOME TIME TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE THE SECOND HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND THAT HE WOULD PROCEED TO THE AREA IMMEDIATELY ONCE THERE IS ASSURANCE THAT HE WILL HAVE THE ACCESS AND CO-OPERATION INDISPENSABLE TO THE FULFILLMENT OF HIS MISSION."

(SIGNED) U THANT

"REPLIES TO THESE LETTERS WERE ADDRESSED TO ME AS INDICATED BELOW. THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN, DATED 30 SEPTEMBER, READS:

"DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,

"THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1968 CONCERNING THE DEPARTURE OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 WHICH CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION ON RESOLUTION 237 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT."

"I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCE THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-OPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS."

(SIGNED) MUHAMMAD H. EL-FARRAJ

"THE LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, ALSO DATED 30 SEPTEMBER, IS AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,

"THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER 1968 CONCERNING THE DEPARTURE OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 WHICH CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION ON RESOLUTION 237 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT."

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

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' I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-OPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS.

(SIGNED) MOHAMED AWAD EL KONY'

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REPLY FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SYRIA, DATED 3 OCTOBER:

' UDEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENENRAL:

' THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER 1968, CONCERNING THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2377, WHICH CALLS ON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE FLED THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION ON RESOLUTION 259 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT.

' WHILE THE UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVERNMENT, COMMENSURATE WITH BOTH RESOLUTIONS 237U AND 259 OF THE SECURITYU COUNCIL, REMAINS THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS NO MANDATE OVER SYRIAN CITIZENS OF JEWISH FAITH, I AM AUTHROIZED TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-UOPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTION.

(SIGNED) GEORGE J.U TOMEH'

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I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-OPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS

(SIGNED) MOHAMED AWAD EL KONYI

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REPLY FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SYRIA, DATED 3 OCTOBER:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL:

THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DATED 28TH SEPTEMBER 1968, CONCERNING THE DESPATCH OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2377, WHICH CALLS ON ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE BEEN THE AREA SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. YOUR PROMPT ACTION ON RESOLUTION 239 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BY MY GOVERNMENT.

WHILE THE UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVERNMENT, COMMENSURATE WITH BOTH RESOLUTIONS 2370 AND 239 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, REMAINS THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS NO MANDATE OVER SYRIAN CITIZENS OF JEWISH FAITH, I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE AFFORDED ALL CO-OPERATION IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTION.

(SIGNED) GEORGE J. U. TOMENI

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משרד החוץ

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חובר: 091750 אוק 68  
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אל: המשרד ירושלים  
מאת: מסישראל ציר יורק

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קומי סאום ב העתק ווסינגטן (הרפבר).  
להלן איקרתבו בתשובה לעיראקים:

ON THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTER ADDRESSED TO YOU 30 SEPTEMBER 1968 BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ (S/8837), TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 31 JULY 1968 (S/8699) BEGAN ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1968 AND WAS CONCLUDED ON 27 SEPTEMBER. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ UNDOUBTEDLY FOLLOWED THE COURSE OF THE DE-TE IN THE COUNCIL AN IF HE CONSIERE THAT THE INTERESTS OF HIS COUNTRY WERE SPECIALLY AFFECTE, HE COULD HAVE EASILY AVAILED HIMSELF OF THE FACILITIES FOR WHICH THE CHARTER AND THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE PROVIDE, AND HAVE ADVANCED HIS ARGUMENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THAT DEBATE. INSTEAD, HE CHOSE TO WAIT FOR TEN DAYS AFTER THE DEBATE WAS OVER BEFORE HE SENT HIS COMMUNICATIONS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE WAS UNWILLING FOR HIS VIEWS TO BE PUT TO THE CHALLENGE AND REFUTED IN THE CONTEXT WHERE THEY PURPORTEDLY BELONG.

THE IRAQI LETTER DOES NOT COME, X HOWEVER, AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE. IRAQ IS WELL KNOWN TO BE ANXIOUS TO SHARE IN THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE IN WHICH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE TRYING TO ENVELOP THE PERSECUTION OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES SINCE JUNE 1957. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS GOOD REASONS NOT TO SPARE ANY EFFORT TO BAR INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF ITS VIOLATION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS XF JEWS IN ITS COUNTRY. THE REPORT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO DISPUTABLE LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OR TO PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN AUTHORITATIVELY REJECTED IN THE COUNCIL. CANNOT OBSCURE THE TRAGIC HUMAN ISSUE INVOLVED NOR DISTRACT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY OF EXAMINING IT DIRECTLY.

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ON THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTER ADDRESSED TO YOU 30 SEPTEMBER 1968 BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ (S/BRX/1) TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 21 JULY 1968 (S/6899) BEGAN ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1968 AND WAS CONCLUDED ON 27 SEPTEMBER. THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ UNDOUBTEDLY FOLLOWED THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL AND HE CONSIDERS THAT THE INTERESTS OF HIS COUNTRY WERE SPECIALLY AFFECTED. HE COULD HAVE EASILY AVailed HIMSELF OF THE FACILITIES FOR WHICH THE CHARTER AND THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE PROVIDE, AND HAVE ADVANCED HIS ARGUMENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THAT DEBATE. INSTEAD, HE CHOSE TO WAIT FOR TEN DAYS AFTER THE DEBATE WAS OVER BEFORE HE SENT HIS COMMUNICATIONS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE WAS UNWILLING FOR HIS VIEWS TO BE PUT TO THE CHALLENGE AND REFUTED IN THE CONTEXT WHERE THEY PURPORTEDLY BELONG.

THE IRAQI LETTER DOES NOT COME, HOWEVER, AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE. IRAQ IS WELL KNOWN TO BE ANXIOUS TO SHARE IN THE CONSPIRACY OF STRIFE IN WHICH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE TRYING TO ENVELOPE THE PERSECUTION OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES SINCE 1948. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS GOOD REASONS NOT TO SHARE ANY EFFORT TO BAR INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF ITS VIOLATION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS OF JEWS IN ITS COUNTRY. THE REPORT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO DISPUTABLE LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OR TO PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN AUTHORITATIVELY REJECTED IN THE COUNCIL, CANNOT OBTUSE THE TRAGIC HUMAN ISSUE INVOLVED NOR DISTRACT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY OF EXAMINING IT DIRECTLY.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

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בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

IT IS A FACT THAT IRAQ, MXF ITS OWN CHOICE, ENTERED THE ARAB WAR WITH ISRAEL OF MAY-JUNE 1967 AND HAS SINCE REMAINED AN ACTIVE PARTY IN THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA. IN JUNE 1967 IRAQI AIRCRAFT CARRIED THE WAR INTO ISRAEL AND ITS LAND FORCES MARCHED TO ATTACK IT. IN CONSEQUENCE, ITS TERRITORY WAS AFFECTED BY ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELI AIRFORCE. FURTHERMORE, LARGE IRAQI CONTINGENTS ARE STILL STATIONED IN JORDAN AND ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES IN WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL. AS AN INSEPARABLE ASPECT OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR, IRAQ GIVES EXPRESSION OF ITS HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL ALSO AT HOME. IT WREAKS VENGEANCE ON THE DEFENCELESS IRAQI JEWS WHOM IT TREATS AS SCAPEGOATS FOR PUBLIC DISCONTENT OVER THE RESULTS OF THE WAR. IN SPITE OF PERSISTENT EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION ABOUT THIS TRAGIC HUMAN ASPECT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA, THESE FACTS ARE ALREADY WELL ESTABLISHED AND WORLD OPINION RECOGNIZES THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR THEM. GXXXXXX THEIR DENIAL BY THE ORXANENT REPRESENTATIVE OR IRAQ REFLECTS HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENT TO PURSUE ITS POLICY ON THIS MATTER, AND NOT TO BE DEFLECTED BY THE REACTION OF OUTRAGED PUBLIC OPINION.

THIS IRAQI ATTITUDE EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO FULFIL ITS DUTY REGARDING THESE INNOCENT AND DEFENCELESS VICTIMS OF CONFLICT, THROUGH A FACT-FINDING MISSION BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS PROVIDED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 (1967).

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE CIRCULATED AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

XXXXXX PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

AD KAN

TEKOAH.

תפוצה: א

17/27

IT IS A FACT THAT IRAQ, BY ITS OWN CHOICE, ENTERED THE ARAB WAR WITH ISRAEL IN MAY-JUNE 1967 AND HAS SINCE REMAINED AN ACTIVE PARTY IN THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA. IN JUNE 1967 IRAQI AIRCRAFT CARRIED THE WAR INTO ISRAEL AND ITS LAND FORCES MARCHED TO ATTACK IT. IN CONSEQUENCE, ITS TERRITORY WAS AFFECTED BY ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE. FURTHERMORE, LARGE IRAQI CONTINGENTS ARE STILL STATIONED IN JORDAN AND ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES IN WARFARE AGAINST ISRAEL AS AN INSEPARABLE ASPECT OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR. IRAQ GIVES EXPRESSION OF ITS HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL ALSO AT HOME. IT BREAKS VENUE ON THE DEFENCELESS ISRAELI JEWS WHOM IT TREATS AS SCAPEDS FOR PUBLIC DISCONTENT OVER THE RESULTS OF THE WAR. IN SPITE OF FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO SUPPRESS INFORMATION ABOUT THIS TRAGIC HUMAN ASPECT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA, THESE FACTS ARE ALREADY WELL ESTABLISHED AND WORLD OPINION RECOGNIZES THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR THEM. GXXXXXX THEIR DENIAL BY THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OR IRAQ REFLECTS HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENT TO PURSUE ITS POLICY ON THIS MATTER, AND NOT TO BE DEFEATED BY THE REACTION OF OUTRAGED PUBLIC OPINION.

THIS IRAQI ATTITUDE EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO FULFIL ITS DUTY REGARDING THE SEVERE AND DEFENCELESS VICTIMS OF CONFLICT. THROUGH A FACT-FINDING MISSION BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS PROVIDED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 237 (1967).

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XXXXXXXXX PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCE, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

AD KAN

TEKOH