

אָרױב

תּוֹנן בּרֵאשׁוֹן

תּוֹקִי קוֹנָנִים

אַרְהֵב

ד-ט

3' עגם, אַאוּמִים, מַלְאָגֶה ח'י"ם לַבֵּי

נפּתח: ~~1471~~ 10.75

נסגד: ~~1979~~ 2.79



שם תיק: משנה לטכניל ח. בר-און - ארה"ב - קונגרט-
חומר על סטאטורים - אותיות י - יל

חצ-7077/6

טווח פיוז

טווח פריט: 000bdvc

נוזבת: 3-312-3-5-7

5/12/2018

תאריך הדפסה

111/אָרױב



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 130.2
 מיכל מס': 7077 / 30
 תאריך התעודה: _____
 שם מחבר התעודה: _____
 שם הנמען: _____
 תיק מס': 6
 סוג התעודה (סמך ✓ במקום המתאים):

2/2/77

4/11/77

מכתב

מברק

תזכיר או מיוזר

דיון וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון

פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

REPRESENTATIVE SIDNEY R. YATES (D-ILL.)

DC"

Term began: 1948 (was out of Congress 1962-64, then re-elected)

Hometown: Chicago

Committees: Appropriations

A member of the Appropriations Committee's important Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

Yates is the "Dean" of the Jewish Congressmen. Often times, leaders of the Appropriations Committee turned to Yates for advice on Israel-related issues. He is well-respected by his colleagues and periodically he calls together all Jewish Representatives to plan strategy on legislation important to Israel. His efforts were particularly important in getting cosponsors for the O'Neill Phantom Jet resolution during the Yom Kippur War and the resolution condemning the terrorist attack at Ma'alot. Yates initiated on October 6 a letter to President Carter criticizing the October 1 U.S.-Soviet joint communique on Middle East. Letter was cosigned by 136 Representatives. He led a House delegation to meet with Carter on the same day to discuss U.S. Middle East policy.



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
PHONE (312) 646-4140

ג' בטבת תשל"ח
13 בדצמבר 1977
104

קונסוליה כללית
של ישראל

מ
ד"ר (000)

א ל : צבי רפיה, דושינגטון

מאת : הקונסוליה הכללית, שיקגו

הנדון: מכתב דרוח של חבר הקונגרס ייטס

מצ"ב מכתבו של חבר הקונגרס סיד ייטס לבוחריו ובו
תיאור ביקורו בישראל כעת ביקור סאדאט.

ב כ כ ה,

דן כירם

העתק: הקונסול"ל, כאן
מצפ"א

דכ/גו

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
CHAIRMAN, INTERIOR
FOREIGN OPERATIONS

NEWSLETTER NO. 95-9

November 23, 1977

Dear Friend:

I am writing this letter to you on the plane flying home from Israel. I was there last week as a member of a congressional delegation when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt made his historic, unexpected, world-shaking visit to Jerusalem.

During the first few days of our visit, we had no inkling that the President of Egypt was coming. In briefings with Israel's top ministers, the possibility of the visit was mentioned but was dismissed as being much too remote. Rather, the ministers emphasized how important the conquered lands were for Israel's security. They used numbers of maps and charts to illustrate the nearness of the pre-1967 West Bank border to the Mediterranean Sea, only eight and a half miles at one point, so narrow in fact that an enemy armored column would be able to reach the sea in twenty minutes, thereby cutting Israel in half. Sixty percent of Israel's three million people live in that narrow corridor, an area that could easily be shelled by cannons located within the West Bank.

That is why all the ministers were opposed to the creation of a new Palestinian state on the West Bank territory, because of fear of possible attacks being launched from there upon Israel. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin, who is one of the world's renowned archeologists, told us that was why the Israeli settlements on the West Bank were so necessary. He likened the settlements to those established in Roman times when the Roman soldiers, encamped along the Mediterranean, received orders from Rome to farm and cultivate the areas they occupied. Their arms were to be used only in the event of war. He thought it was entirely logical for such Israeli settlements to continue even within a Palestinian Arab entity which might be created later.

We were flown by helicopter to the Golan Heights from which Syria had shelled Israeli farms and fishermen in the Lake Tiberius region nearby. Such shelling no longer takes place since the capture of the Heights by Israeli forces. From the Golan, our party moved to the Lebanon-Israel border where we were shown "the Good Fence" through which Lebanese-Christian Arabs pass to and from Israel to work and to receive medical aid.

On Thursday afternoon when we entered Prime Minister Begin's office for our appointment with him, we knew something was afoot because of the huge group of

reporters and television crews. When he entered, the Prime Minister quickly walked into the blinding glare of television lights and said: "Ladies and gentlemen, I want to announce to you that President Sadat of Egypt has accepted my invitation to come to Israel and will arrive on Saturday night." There was an outburst of excited exclamations, followed by prolonged applause. Begin smiled. He, too, was excited by the prospect of Sadat's visit, and we were pleased because Begin had used the occasion of our visit to let the world know of the impending historic meeting. But the meeting was to take place only two nights later. Could they possibly be ready on time?

They were already started on security arrangements when we returned to the King David Hotel where we were staying and where President Sadat and his party would be staying, too. In order to insure maximum security for the Egyptian president, the Israeli government had directed that the entire hotel be evacuated, an order that was already being carried out. The lobby was teeming with guests who were leaving, porters who were carrying their luggage, and with the first contingent of security personnel. Amazingly, there were few complaints. Everyone seemed to feel that they were participating in a great moment in history. The word on everyone's lips was "incredible". They asked each other, "Could this be the first step to peace?"

As we filed into our rooms to pack our bags to move out, we received word from the Prime Minister's office that our delegation would be allowed to remain in the hotel but that we would be moved to the first floor. The upper floors were to be assigned to the Egyptian president for greater security. Our delegation met to decide whether we ought to stay. Certainly, we did not want our presence to add to the problems the Israeli government now faced in providing massive protection for its distinguished visitor. While we were meeting, another call came from the Prime Minister's office. Mr. Begin was calling to request that we remain in Israel to attend the meeting of the Knesset which President Sadat was to address on Sunday.

Some in our delegation still wanted to leave because they questioned whether an official American congressional delegation should be present at a meeting of Israel and Egypt's top leaders. Majority Leader Wright of Texas, who headed the delegation decided to ask U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis for advice. Lewis, who in my opinion is one of our most able ambassadors, told Wright that he believed we ought to remain for the Sunday meeting, pointing out that he and American Ambassador Eilts, who represents the United States in Egypt, had been used as the channel to deliver the formal invitation from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat (Lewis jokingly referred to himself as the "happy postman"). It was entirely appropriate, he said, for our delegation to be present. We decided to stay.

On Thursday night, service was excellent in the hotel's huge dining room . . . we and the initial Israeli security forces were the only people eating. On Friday and Saturday, the hotel was converted into a veritable fortress as hundreds of additional police with side arms, troops with automatic rifles and machine guns, and special security forces moved in. Police roadblocks had closed off all streets leading to the hotel. We were given special badges to let us leave and return.

All Israel was alive with excitement. In our hotel, Israeli and Egyptian journalists ate and drank together, swapping stories, while outside, in several of the principal thoroughfares, young people danced Israel's national dance, the Hora. Instead of clearing them from the streets, policemen joined the dancing.

On Sunday, on arriving at the Knesset, I was ushered to a seat in the second row in the distinguished visitors' section, immediately behind Mrs. Aliza Begin, the Prime Minister's wife. Members of the Knesset slowly took their seats. Prime Minister Begin hurried in and sat down in the first row facing the podium. Other ministers soon joined him, including Defense Minister Weizmann, who had broken his ankle in an automobile accident the previous day. He hobbled into the chamber leaning on a cane, saying he wouldn't miss the occasion for anything. Seated behind Begin was Shimon Peres, the leader of the opposition party. Beside him sat Yigal Allon, the former Foreign Minister, with whom Peres conferred occasionally on the speech Peres was to give following those of Sadat and Begin.

As four o'clock approached, a profound hush fell upon the chamber. Everybody waited expectantly for the historic moment. Promptly at four, to the sound of ruffles and flourishes, President Sadat walked into the chamber to take his place at the speaker's podium. As he looked around the audience, a resounding wave of applause broke the emotional atmosphere. Ambassador Lewis who was sitting on my left said, "That is the first time I have ever heard of an ovation in the Knesset. It is never done."

Sadat's speech in Arabic and the speeches of Begin and Peres in Hebrew were translated into English simultaneously as they were delivered. While I found the speeches impressive, the one moment I will remember forever occurred at the conclusion of Begin's speech when he turned to Sadat and extended his hand. Sadat rose with a smile to take it. I still see in my mind's eye that firm hand clasp of the two leaders, their forms silhouetted against the rough-hewn stone wall of the Knesset, a handshake that brought tears to my eyes. It marked the end of the hostile isolation by the Arabs of Israel and Israel's representatives over the thirty-year life of Israel. I had witnessed rebuffs by Arab delegates of the Israeli delegates at United Nations' diplomatic functions when I worked with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson at the United Nations. When the Israeli

Delegates entered the room, the Arabs would turn their backs or leave the room. Sadat's warming presence was the first breach in this psychological warfare.

There came to my mind the story of the time during the Civil War when a delegation from the North came to visit President Abraham Lincoln at the White House. During their conversation, Lincoln happened to make a laudatory remark about General Robert E. Lee. Immediately, one of the women visitors cried out in anger. "Mr. President," she exclaimed, "how can you speak well of our enemies? Should we not, rather, destroy them?" Lincoln hesitated only a few seconds. "Madam," he then said gently, "do we not destroy our enemies when we make them our friends?"


The Chinese have a saying that the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. That step was taken by Sadat. Now all eyes are on Israel to continue the momentum toward reaching an understanding which might bring peace. Decisions will be difficult because the memory of four wars with the Arab nations is not easily erased and the countries are still technically at war. Moreover, a recalcitrant group of Arab states led by Syria still maintains its hatreds, its hostilities, its opposition to Sadat's move, a fact which still requires Israel to weigh her security needs very carefully. Sadat's courageous gesture nevertheless calls for a courageous response.

One final thought: Sadat had said that he believed the Palestinian issue to be the crux of the problem. In his speech he acknowledged Israel's right to live in security and safety. He is aware of the unanimous Israeli opposition to the creation of a Palestinian Arab state on the West Bank because of the vulnerability in which it places the adjoining narrow coast of Israel. Perhaps that is why he acknowledged to our visiting congressional delegation the possibility that the Palestinians might be satisfied with "a confederation or a federation," rather than a totally sovereign state. When we later conveyed Sadat's thought to Yigal Allon, he said that although he would be opposed to a confederation, he thought a federation presented an interesting idea.

An economic federation, for example, between a demilitarized West Bank entity, Israel, and Jordan would offer an exciting economic potential. In response to a question I asked as to what Jordan would gain from peace with Israel, Prime Minister Begin said he envisioned the possibility of an economic arrangement could be worked out whereby Jordan could use Israel's seaports. This, of course, is pure speculation. But if Sadat can come to Israel to speak while the two nations are still in a state of war, almost anything is possible.

As former Prime Minister Ben Gurion once said, "In Israel, the impossible we do today, the miraculous takes a little longer."

Sincerely yours,


SIDNEY H. YATES
Member of Congress

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

כז' חסוד חשל"ז
13 יולי 77

316

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

גם קולנוע (קולנוען יוסף)

רצ"ב לעיונכם איגרת שהפיץ המורשה ייסס המתייחסת
לישראל ולמגישה ייסס עם הנשיא שנחקימה לאחרונה.

בברכה,

צ. רפיח

העחק: לשכה המנכ"ל
המרכז
הציר כאן

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

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מ. ר. ס. נ.

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JUL 13 1977

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE
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SUBCOMMITTEES:
CHAIRMAN, INTERIOR

NEWSLETTER NO. 95-6

July 5, 1977

Dear Friend:

President Harry Truman, never a person to mince words, once said: "It's amazing how often I give an order to do something -- and it isn't done." One of the instances he must have had in mind was his fight against the State Department in 1947 when it tried in every way to stop him from granting diplomatic recognition to the new nation of Israel.

When I read the latest statement on Israel made last week by the State Department, I wondered whether President Carter, too, was not beginning to encounter the same frustration with that Department as Mr. Truman did. President Carter had made his position clear in March of this year at a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts, when he said:

"I think one of the finest acts of the world's nations that ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel. So, the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, of Israel's right to exist, to exist permanently, to exist in peace."

He concluded that the peace in the Middle East should provide open borders, between Israel and her Arab neighbors, to tourism, to travel, to commerce, to cultural exchange.

I would have expected the State Department to follow the beacon the President had lighted, but such was not the case. In effect, the State Department was warning Israel that all the territory she had won at such cost in lives and money in the wars with the Arab nations were subject to being returned with only minor border adjustments. This was necessary, according to the statement, in order to achieve "normalization of relations between the parties".

Why such a harsh statement? Did it signal a retreat from the President's concept for peace? Did it reflect a change in our policy toward Israel because of its new government? I decided to go directly to President Carter for the answers, and I called the White House for an appointment. I was given one for last Friday. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's foreign affairs advisor, attended the meeting.

I told the President I hoped his excellent statement at the Clinton town meeting still represented our policy for peace in the Middle East, rather than the one expressed by the State Department. Surely, I said, Israel could not be expected to place the lives of her people in jeopardy by giving up the territorial

advantages she now possessed without the kind of genuine peace the President had outlined. "Normalization of relations between the parties" to which the State Department had alluded, could only be considered an armed truce susceptible to being broken at any time. The President himself, I pointed out, had called for "defensible borders" for Israel. The President affirmed the position he had spelled out at Clinton. He nodded when I told him I did not think the State Department should be outlining in advance of Israel's negotiations with the Arab nations any territorial concessions Israel should be required to make. Let the parties themselves negotiate whatever concessions need be made when they meet.

I sensed the President's dissatisfaction with the bluntness of the State Department's statement. That was why, I thought, he had ordered that there be no further statements on the mideast until Israel's Prime Minister Begin arrives in the United States later this month. Apparently, the President had been concerned by Mr. Begin's post-election remarks and by predictions in the press that Israel's new government would be less likely to make any concessions. If true, this would nullify in great measure the President's efforts to bring the parties to the peace table. Whatever fears he may have had in this respect seemed to have disappeared for he told me he welcomed and appreciated Begin's friendly words earlier that week. He said he looked forward to meeting Mr. Begin, that Begin would be given a most cordial and friendly reception.

I asked the President whether his drive for a Middle East peace this year was not unduly optimistic. The President said that even though it was not likely that peace could be attained quickly, he wanted to bring the parties to the bargaining table in Geneva this year to start negotiations. The important thing was for negotiations to begin so that the parties would be moving toward recognition of Israel and peace.

As I left the President, I felt reassured about his friendship for Israel. I still had concerns about the State Department. Obviously, a President needs men of wisdom to advise him, but even wise men are given to mistakes occasionally. There comes to mind the classic case of ancient Greek King Pyrrhus who, being harrassed by the Romans, speculated on whether to make war against them. He placed the matter before the Oracle of Delphos and received the Oracle's reply, abstruse as usual: "You, Pyrrhus, the Romans will conquer." Pyrrhus' advisors told him the Oracle's statement foretold his victory, whereupon Pyrrhus attacked the Romans, only to be defeated. The Oracle was right. The advisors were wrong.

Sincerely yours,

Sidney R. Yates

SIDNEY R. YATES
Member of Congress

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
 או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
 לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
 דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
 יחסי-חוק וסודות דשמיים),
 תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

סידי

משרד החוץ	
דברק נכנס - מסווג	
מ"ה דו הקו	זת ים נוכחית
התעקף אושרה ע"י	
תאריך החתימה	
זאת זה מקבל מסמך	רישום ביומן
דף	שורה

אל: המשרד
 מאת: וושינגטון

מסי 160
 נשלח: 061030: יולי 77

Handwritten notes and signatures in the center of the page, including the name "משה דיין" and other illegible scribbles.

מכל

סידי ייטס נפגש למקשתו, עם הנשיא ב-1 דגא בבית הלב שפיתח בת
 עשרים דקות. השתתפו גם בזינגסקי ופרנק Moore איש הקשר
 של הבית הלב עם הקונגרס. להלן דווח שקיבלתי אמש מייטס:
 ייטס שיבח את הנשיא על הגדרת מהות השלום כפי שהגדירה בנאומו
 בקלינטון והוסיף: מצעדי כינון שלום כזה יהא זה UFAIR
 לצפות מישראל שתוותר על הבטחון שהגבולות הנוכחיים מעניקים להם ותסתפק
 באיזורי בטחון וסיפוחי בטחון בלבד.
 הנשיא נד בראשו להסכמה.

ייטס בירכ את הנשיא על שהודיע במסיבת העיתונאים האחרונה כי תיפסקנה
 הודעות הפומביות על לבוא ראש ממשלת ישראל לווינגטון. ייטס אמר כי
 היה זה צעד טוב והזמין הקורה שאב שאר הודגים בממשל ילכו בעקבות
 הנשיא.

הנשיא אמר כי אכן הוא מצפה שכך יהא. עם זאת חייב ואמר-הרי יש לנו מסמך
 גדול מאד.

ייטס אמר כי דברי דובר מחמד (ב-27 כינוי) לא היו במקומם. לאחר שהנשיא
 קובע את מהות שלום אינו עוזרו צריכים לתת לכך פירוש אחד כפי שעשה
 דובר מחמד. ההגדרה שהגדיר דובר מחמד את השלום איננה כהגדרת הנשיא.
 הנשיא לא הגיב.

הנשיא אמר כי הוא מריכ מאד ומברכ על הודעתו המתונה של ראש ממשלה בגין
 הודעה זו של בגין. היה אחת הסיבות לכך שהנשיא זיכר את אשר אמר במסיבת
 העיתונאים האחרונה שלו.

UTMOST cordiality

הנשיא אמר כי ראש הממשלה יתקבל ב
 וכי הוא צופה בפניו יב לשיחותיו עמו.
 ייטס שאל מדוע רק ישראל מחזקשת בפומבי למשות אעדימ שונים ואילו הערבים
 לא התבקשו לעשות מאומה.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

- 2 -

בזינסקי אמר-אנו דוחפים את הערבים לקיום יחסים קרובים יותר עם ישראל. תנשיא אמר-הערבים רוצים ללכת לגבנה, והוא תנשיא, מצפה לכך. תנשיא אמר כי שאל את סאדאת כמה זמן דרוש כדי לכוונן שלום וכי. סאדאת השיב לו- חמש שנים.

ייטס אמר כי טעות טועה תנשיא באומר חזור ואמור כי הוא רוצה בכינון שלום בשנה זו, ובלחצו על הצדדים לקראת משרה זו.

תנשיא אמר-אנו רוצים להביא הצדדים לגבנה בשנה זו.

ייטס אמר-אבל הרי לא תוכל להביא לכינון שלום בשנה זו.

תנשיא אמר-בשנה הבאה אפשר לטפל בתחומים אחרים של מדיניות חוץ.

תנשיא אמר עוד-קשה מאד להביא הצדדים יחד.

ייטס אמר-אני מתעניין במהי מחמד והצהרות דובריה כי יחס מחמד לישראל הוא כיתס ואל לבנו. אנו אומרים לישראל מה עליה לעשות, משל כאילו היה תנשיא

אומר לבנו. חוץ עליו לעשות. זו טעות. ישראל הינה

מדינה ריבונית. *And you cannot talk down to her.*

ייטס אמר-אחיה יודע, טענות רבים שלי רצו לבוא עמי ולשוחח איתך בענין ישראל, לו הסכמת-עשויים או שלושים היו באים לבטח. אמרתי להם לבל יבואו

כדי ששיחתנו תהא גלוייה וכנה.

ייטס אמר-יש חשיבות מרובה לשימוש במונח *DEFENSIBLE BORDERS*

ויש להמשיך בכך כנסיים לכל התיחסות לזיתור על שטחים.

תנשיא נד בראש מבלי להגיב.

במהלך השיחה חזר תנשיא וציין יחסו החם והמי וחד לישראל.

סגנסטייה השיחה לזוה בזינסקי את ייטס אל השער. בהזדמנות זו אמר

בזינסקי לייטס כי הוא מעוניין שהמום יתחיל בשנה זו אך אינו הוא טבור

כי השתא יושג שלום מלא. חשוב להחזיק לאגוד בדרך לשלום, דרכ זו ודע

מעלות ומורדות רבים. אמר בזינסקי כי הסיפורים המתהלכים עליו כאילו

הוא הינו ה *BAF GUY* אינם נכונים והשתדל מאד

לרשים את ייטס באמצעות דבריו אלו.

ייטס מציין כי בשורה המג'יד תנשיא יודעות רמה לישראל, לזהם בגין, וכן.

לייטס ענינו לו קרא תנשיא *טוב*

עד כאן דברי ייטס.

רפ"ח.==

שהח דרום מפכל סגנסטייה מנסה לרצו דרוזן אביזר מנפא מאוס אב הפוזות מתיים חקר לים א

חז/כש

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסייחון וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

אל: המשרד

מאת: רוסינגטון

מס 60

בשלה: 031415 נוב 76

ש פ ו ר

מ י י ד י

Handwritten notes in Hebrew: "אין כה" (No such), "בקר במאיים" (Check in threats), "ד"ר" (Dr.), and "א" (A).

מצמא אירופה.

פירוש יוסט, הנושא כידוע בתואר הנלתי רשמי של זקן חברי הקונגרס היהודיים, ישנה באירופה עם רעייתו בין ה-6 ל-22 דגא, במסגרת הוועדה הקונגרסיונלית - ציבורית לפיקוח על ביצוע הסכמי הלטובקי, שבאישור המדינה מאסל, יבקר במאיים, בויסל האגף לונדון וינה זברך. יוסט עשוי להתקשר עם הסגירים בכירות אלה כבקשה פגישה, למותו לונדי שאנו ממליצים להענות לכל פניה שלו. אנא הודיעו לכירות.

רפיה

מנהל מ/מנכ"ל שק מצמא איר א ב

מב

1948

1948

1948

1948

1948

1948

1948

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
319

י"ד חמוז תשל"ו
12 יולי 1976

א. א. (י"ס)
א. א. א. א.

אל: מצפ"א
המרכז, משה"ח
מאח: צבי רפיח, וושינגטון

הנדון: ועידה כלכלית באוניברסיטה מיינ

מצ"ב חליפה מכתבים שקיים סידני ייסס עם מזכיר המסחר ומזכיר
המדינה בנוגע לשיחופה של ישראל בוועידה כלכלית באוניברסיטה מיינ
באוגוסט ש.ז.

הנושא נמצא בטיפולו של הציר הכלכלי.

לידיעחכם.

ב בר כ ה ,
צ. רפיח

העתיק: איהן רף, כאן
הציר הכלכלי, ניו-יורק

משרד החוץ
תל אביב



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.
17th Street NW
Washington DC 20521

Handwritten notes:
N
The
(120)
[Signature]

מס': 2000
תאריך: 2000
שם: ד"ר משה, משה

הודעה על פטור ממס

הודעה על פטור ממס
הודעה על פטור ממס
הודעה על פטור ממס

הודעה על פטור ממס

הודעה.

ד"ר משה
[Signature]
מ. משה

מס': 2000
תאריך: 2000
שם: ד"ר משה, משה

ENOCH SILVERSTEIN
3810 N. CICERO AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60641
283 5300

JUL 7 1976

RECEIVED

JUL 8 1976

SIDNEY P. YATES, M.C.

June 1, 1976

Congressman Sidney Yates
House Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Yates:

Sometime back (through information received by this office) you corresponded with the Commerce Department, regarding: a similar conference which intentionally excluded Israel from their view of the Mid-East.

As you can see by the enclosed, (and please note the statement by Secretary Kissinger) this exclusionary policy is still continuing by the United States Government.

Thank you and stay well.

Enoch



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

LEGISLATION
LEGISLATIVE

CHICAGO OFFICE:
210 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-4596

June 10, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 "C" Street
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing a copy of my letter of June 10 to Secretary of Commerce Elliott L. Richardson, respecting a Joint Middle East-American Business Conference at the University of Maine which is to be held under the joint sponsorship of the Department of State and the Department of Commerce.

The questions I have addressed to Secretary Richardson are equally appropriate for you.

I would appreciate your response to the questions which I have asked him.

Very truly yours,
Sidney R. Yates
SIDNEY R. YATES
Member of Congress

United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

June 10, 1976

The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
Secretary of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20436

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On December 2, 1975, I wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce enclosing a copy of the publication of the Department of Commerce on the subject of "Developing Opportunities in the Middle East: A Growing Market for Investment and Consumer Goods". I stated at that time that Israel was a part of the Middle East and asked the Secretary why it was not included in the seminar.

I received an acknowledgement by letter on January 5, expressing the Department of Commerce's apologies and saying that its failure to include Israel was an oversight and it would not happen again.


I am enclosing an announcement of a Joint Middle East-American Business Conference scheduled for August 2-6, 1976, to be held at the University of Maine with the cooperation of the United States Department of State and the Department of Commerce. Again, Israel has been read out of the Middle East -- and apparently any person or firm who does business with Israel has been read out of the conference. How else is one to interpret the line attributed to Secretary Kissinger, "for face-to-face discussions with pre-selected American businessmen regarding specific products for sale and manufacture"? What is a pre-selected American businessman?

I ask you the question specifically -- will businessmen attending the conference and who seek to do business with the ministers of the Arab countries you outline be required to observe the boycott of the Arab League? Will representatives of Israel be allowed to be present in order to present business opportunities in Israel for American businessmen?

I would appreciate your reply as promptly as possible.

Very truly yours,

Sidney R. Yates
SIDNEY R. YATES
Member of Congress



JOINT
MIDEAST-AMERICAN
BUSINESS
CONFERENCE

For the first time, buyers, distributors and sales representatives from nearly every nation will be in the United States to talk with you and your company on how to penetrate and sell the fabulously rich MIDEAST MARKET.

You will meet, work with, and live among the men who are directly involved in the purchase of billions of dollars worth of products and services needed and used by the respective countries. Your contact will be personal—face to face. You can discuss your products with the men who are doing the buying. A solid sale could be initiated then and there.

YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH AND FORMALIZE CONTACTS THAT WOULD TAKE YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH BY "SHUTTLE SELLING."

and the U.S. Department of Industry, Commerce and every other country in the Middle East and Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are all expected to have representatives at this landmark event.

THIS WILL NOT BE A GENERALIZED CONFERENCE: IT WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC AND INDIVIDUALIZED INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST.

The Conference will be complete, intensive and personalized. In addition to general sessions, the Conference will break into small groups to discuss sales and investment potential in each country for every category of industry, product and service area.

You will come away knowing exactly what the market is for your products and services, where it is, and how to sell to it. You will learn the business etiquette and procedures to be used in these countries. You will learn all these matters directly from Middle Eastern authorities who are pleased to impart the knowledge to you.

"THIS MAY BE THE FIRST LARGE-SCALE CONFERENCE HELD IN THE UNITED STATES WHERE ARAB AND IRANIAN BUSINESSMEN WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRE-SELECTED AMERICAN BUSINESS MEN REGARDING SPECIFIC PRODUCTS FOR SALE AND MANUFACTURE."

Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

The Arab States and Iran have ambitious programs to industrialize their countries in the very near future. They definitely need the technical skills and experience of the industrialized nations to achieve their goals quickly. The Conference will enable Middle Eastern entrepreneurs who desire to set up manufacturing operations to talk with American businessmen interested in participating in this industrialization. This participation can take several forms including Joint Ventures (with or without capitalization); turn-key proposals; license agreements; and other technical assistance opportunities.

This part of the Conference is arranged so that Arabs and Iranians interested in establishing a manufacturing operation will know exactly what products the American industrialists present at the Conference can manufacture, and they can begin immediate face-to-face discussions. Speakers will discuss in detail the procedures, practices, and problems commonly encountered by parties wishing to enter into such agreements.

Morning sessions will include seminars and discussions, led by authorities, on the new products and will be highly informative for the future — with excellent information on the product. The market potential for virtually every conceivable type of commercial product will be thoroughly explored and explained.

Interviews arranged between Mideast entrepreneurs and American manufacturers for on-the-spot discussions about joint ventures, license agreements, investment opportunities and financing.

Information Centers, staffed and operated by Arab nationals for each of the Arab states in attendance. Here you can obtain explicit answers to specific questions; invitations to bid, tax information, sources of Arab investment capital, import permit forms, lists of projects seeking U.S. corporate participation, warehousing facilities, etc. At these Centers Arab nationals will be available — agents, distributors and sales representatives — approved by their governments and with the right contacts to help you sell your product in their country or licensed area.

The *U.S. Department of Commerce* will also be represented to provide you with all the information forms, etc., that you will require to conduct export business to the Mideast.



Also included in the registration is a "get acquainted" cocktail party, a clam bake, lobster dinner, and flexibility of individual symposia selection that will permit time for some golf, tennis, boating, swimming or sightseeing.

Bring your wife if you wish and combine a Maine vacation with your business trip. Wives will enjoy complete freedom of the beautiful 1100-acre campus — with an Olympic-size swimming pool, 23 all-weather tennis courts, 3 nearby golf courses.

She will enjoy the seminar on "The Executive's Wife Abroad," side trips to Bar Harbor, summer theater, available tours to Mooshead Lake, Sugarloaf/Carabasset Valley, Penobscot Bay, Down East, antiques, escorted shopping expeditions. Come a week early or stay a week after the conference.

Lodging for registrants with spouses is available at the nearby Airport Hilton Hotel (transportation to and from campus provided) for a modest additional cost.

relatively few people to attend. The quality of the registrants and the reputations of the speakers and contacts made will generally be high level and many of those covered (see list) might be lost on representatives of the lower corporate management. The following, then, are suggested:

- Chief Executive Officers
- Marketing Vice Presidents
- Chief Financial Officers
- Legal and Contract Officers
- International Marketing
- Product Marketing Specialists

TOPICS

The following list of topics the "faculty" will be asked to cover will give you an idea of the level and scope of the conference. Please indicate those of interest to you with a checkmark.

- Step-by-Step Approach of the Negotiations Process
- Identifying Markets and Opportunities
- Financial Strategies for Transactions in the Middle East
- Influencing Purchase Requests
- Locating Decision Makers
- Utilizing Middlemen
- How to Promote Your Product or Service
- Dealing with Sub-Contractors
- Preparation of the Bid
- How to Complete a Successful Delivery
- How to Use a Contract to Generate New Business
- What to Avoid in Dealing with Arab Customers
- Who Should be Involved in Your Company
- Tax Breaks to Look Into
- The Best Way to Take Payment
- Sources of Reliable Information and Assistance
- The Nature and Extent of Competition From Other Countries
- What You Have to Know About Local Customs and Culture
- Prohibited Activities
- General Restrictions on Foreign Business Activity
- Income Taxes and Customs Duties
- Protection of Industrial Property Rights
- Joint Ventures and Closed Shareholding
- Direct Investments by Middle East Governments
- Capital Markets of the Middle East
- Opportunities for Obtaining Equity and/or Debt Capital from Middle East Governments
- Formation of Joint Stock Companies
- Free Zones
- Tax Free Income, Personal and Corporate
- Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Each OAPEC State

Ladies registration (not including Conference participation): \$50.

Write or phone:

John R. Brown, Jr.
Coburn Hall
University of Maine at Orono
Orono, Maine 04473

Tel. 207 - 581 - 2581
or

Austin Cragg
34 West Putnam Avenue
Greenwich, Connecticut
06830

Tel. 203 - 661 - 6101

August 2 through 6, 1976, University of Maine at Orono
Mail this registration to:

JOINT MIDEAST - AMERICAN BUSINESS CONFERENCE
Coburn Hall
University of Maine
Orono, Maine 04473

Please register me for the Joint Mideast-American Business Conference,
August 2-6 at the University of Maine at Orono.

Enclosed is check in the amount of \$_____ to cover _____ registrations.

Please bill my company.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Company: _____

Street address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Phone No. _____

Bill from my company:

Name: _____ Title: _____

Name: _____ Title: _____

Name: _____ Title: _____

I (we) desire on-campus complimentary room accommodations.

I (we) desire lodging at the Hilton Hotel. Please make reservations for
_____ persons in _____ double rooms.

Check payable to: Mideast-American Business Conference (MABCO)
Registration fee: \$1,000. THIS IS A 100% TAX-DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE
(see Treasury Reg. 1-162-5 Coughlin vs Commissions, 203F 2d307) which in-
cludes registration fees, travel, meals and lodging.

Ladies registration: \$50.

Check-in will begin at 1:00 PM, August 1, and will end at 9:00 AM,
August 2.

\$0. per person when more than one registrant from the same company.

Cut on dotted line





RECEIVED
JUN 11 1976
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, M.C.

June 11, 1976

Honorable Sidney R. Yates
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Yates:

Secretary Richardson has asked me to acknowledge your letter dated June 10 regarding a Joint Middle East-American Business Conference scheduled for August 2-6, 1976, to be held at the University of Maine with the cooperation of the United States Department of State and the Department of Commerce.

You may be assured that this matter will receive our closest consideration and that a further response will be forthcoming as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Mansfield D. Sprague
Counsellor to the Secretary
for Congressional Affairs

377 5485



JUN 10 1976

RECEIVED

Honorable Sidney R. Yates
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

JUN 10 1976

SIDNEY R. YATES, M.C.

Dear Mr. Yates:

Thank you for your letter of June 10 to Secretary Richardson in which you raise several questions regarding the University of Maine's on-campus "Joint Mideast-American Business Conference," to be held August 2-6, 1976.

This is a privately sponsored conference with the announced aim of "aiding in the recycling of petrodollars in an effort to reestablish the international monetary equilibrium." We understand that the sponsors invited foreign participation from the petroleum exporting countries of the Near East and from other countries in the area which are expanding their economies with the aid of petrodollar loans and grants from the oil exporting countries. However, we are advised by the Conference Director, Mr. John R. Brown, Jr., that there are no objections whatever to the presentation by government or business representatives of the State of Israel of business opportunities in that country.

Mr. Brown further advises us that the sole basis for "pre-selecting" U.S. firms to be invited was an effort by the Conference organizers to match U.S. business firms with the specific commodity interests expressed by the foreign business and official participants. No consideration of excluding firms doing business with Israel was involved in the selection process.


Neither the Department of Commerce nor the Department of State is acting as a co-sponsor of the Conference. The only Commerce Department participation now scheduled is the presence of two officers of our Field Service who will distribute literature, answer questions about the Department's services to businessmen seeking export opportunities abroad, and inform participants about the Export Administration Regulations. Further, the

sponsors assure us that businessmen attending the conference and seeking to do business with the participating Arab countries will be formally apprised of the U.S. policy regarding the Arab boycott.

Should you wish to contact Mr. Brown for further details about the Conference, he maintains an office at Colburn Hall, University of Maine at Orono, Orono, Maine 04473 (Phone: 297-581-2581).

Please feel free to contact me if there is anything more we can do to be of assistance.

Sincerely,


Charles W. Hostler
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Commerce

Enclosure

Important Notice

Most member countries of the League of Arab States employ a secondary boycott against foreign firms which undertake certain specific types of business relationships with the State of Israel. The Commerce Department will not disseminate or make available for inspection any tenders or trade opportunity documents which contain conditions intended to support such boycotts, or which are based on documents known to contain such provisions. Trade or investment opportunities published herein are not presently known to be subject to such conditions. However, it is possible that U.S. firms responding to opportunities from Arab countries may be asked at some stage of a transaction to participate in an Arab boycott-related restrictive trade practice as defined in the Department's Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR, Part 369 et. seq.).

Firms are reminded that pursuant to Section 3(5) of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, it is the policy of the United States (a) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States, and (b) to encourage and request U.S. concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information to refuse to take any action, including the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting such restrictive trade practices or boycotts. Accordingly, U.S. concerns receiving such requests to participate in a restrictive trade practice or boycott are encouraged and requested to refuse to comply with them.

Firms are further reminded that U.S. concerns receiving requests to participate in a restrictive trade practice or boycott must report such receipt to the Department of Commerce in accordance with Section 369.4 of the above-cited regulations.

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסייתוין וסודות רשמיים), חשי"ז - 1957.

א/ס
ק"מ

ג'ן ק'לניס

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ס ו ד י

אל ז המשרד

מאת: רוטינגטון

ס י י י ס

211 סס

בשלה 081100 דצט 75

עברונ.

בארוחת ערב עם חבר ביוזם היהודי ס'יט' י'יטט בהשתתפות הזכ יר'כ והתם הכי'ע י'טט את דאגתו מככ שהחולטנות האדוונות באומ (עצרת ומועבי'ט) הפעולה בלבנון והדיון במע'ב'יש בעקבותיה הג'ברו מאד את הערנות לנ'ושא הפלשת'נא' בקרב חבר' הקונגרס והכי'ע הערכתו כ' בקונגרס מצפ'ים לשמוע מה יש לנו לומר באורה פוז'י'טיבי לגבי נושא זה. י'טט אשר שמע מאתנו על פג'שתו הצפוי'ה של שר הבטחונ עם חבר' קונגרס בבקורו הקרוב כא, אמר כ' חשוב שמפגש זה ינוצל כדי להבהיר עמדתנו בנושא זה וכ' לא יוקדש רק לנושא' רכש וצרכ' הבטחונ. י'טט הכי'ע תקוותו כ' לשר הבטחונ י'יהיה מה לחדשי' בנושא זה. אט נפגש השגר'ד בארוחת ערב עם י'טט. י'טט חזר בפניו על הדישא של תמ'ק. השגר'ד חכה'ד לו עמדתנו בעני' הפלשת'נא' והתבדל המחות' בי' הצורכ למצוא פתרון לבעיה במסגרת מוט עם י'דד ובין התדי'נות עם ארגונ' החבלה שאי'ננה באה בתשכונ בשום פ'י. י'טט הכי'נ העני'נ. אי'נגו סבור ש'שראל יכולה או צר'כה לשנות עמדה לגבי אשפ אכ סבור שהיה מועיל אם נצא בחכ'ית פוז'י'טיב'ית לגבי אמטרות פתרון הכעיה הפלשת'נא'ית בכל מסגרת שהיא.

רפ"ח

שהח דוחם מנכל שרהבם ממנכל ארגוב י. רביב ס. קדרון רוזן אכידד מצפא
חקר מזהים רס אמן
אב/ס

4826

י'צ"א

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמ"ס

אל: בון , ני , ווש , נר: חוים 947 , מ : המשרד
דח: מ , סג: ב , תא: 080279 , יח: 1730
נד: דברי יאנג

אני

בלמ"ס/מיד

עתונות בון .

דט: נאום , שג .

ראיון השגריר יאנג לשפיגל .

לפי עתון דבר מה- 7 דנא, אמר יאנג: 'י שהתמיכה החד צדדית של
ארצות ב' ישראל הוציאה לנו שם רע אבל שינינו את המצב הזה. אמנם
אנחנו עדיין תושבים בישראל בתוקף, אבל הצלחנו לנוון יחסים
מקיפים עם מדינות ערב. נציגי אשפי הדיפלומטים המצליחים
ביותר באום'
עד כאן .

אנא הנריקו הנוסח לנו , לנאום ולווש'נגטון .
ארבל 2 - מצפא . =

תפ: שהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנככ, סמנכ, ססת, רם, אמן, אירא, מעת,
הסברה, ארבל, סותים, מצפא



Handwritten: Favorable

Handwritten: WIN

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309

PHONE 575-7851

865 PEACHTREE ST., N. E.
SUITE 434

אטלנטה, 1 בדצמ. 1976
ס"ב בסלו תשל"ז

215.10.7.3(542)

Handwritten signature

אל: מר שמחה דיניץ, השגריר, וושינגטון

מאה: הקונסול הכללי, אטלנטה

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס יאנג

לאור נבחוננו של קרטל עלחה חשיבותו של הנ"ל. נפגשתי עמו מספר פעמים. הפעם
התקיימה השיחה במשרדו ע"מ לברכו לבחירתו מחדש.

מר יאנג יצא ללוסוס שבאפריקה כדי להשתתף בסמינריון בו ישתתפו חברי קונגרס
נוספים ומספר סנטורים מצד האפריקאים יהיו מיוצגים כ-25 מדינות.
לפני צאתו לדרך נפגש הנ"ל פעמיים עם קרטל כדי לשוחח עמו על המינויים
משורות הכושים בהם יש לו יד וגם כדי לשוחח עם הנשיא החדש על המדינות
האפריקניות של קרטל.

נפגש גם עם אנטוני לייק, הקשר בין קבוצת קרטל ומחלקת המדינה.
לשאלתו באם הוא מתכוון להצטרף לאדמיניסטרציה החדשה, ענה שהיה מעדיף להשאר
ציר הקונגרס, אך אינו בטוח מה יהיו הלחצים.
ביקש הסבר על הנעשה אצלנו, בעיות הגבול הלבנוני, כ"כ שוחחנו על האינטלגנציה
הכושית הנמצאת באזור הדרום ושחלקו לא אוהדת אותנו. דעתו היא שלישראל
אין מה לחשוש מהכושים אשר יצטרפו לשלטון החדש.
שוחחנו גם על ביקורו בארץ והביע את רצונו לבקר בארץ על אף שאינו יכול
להחייב בשלב זה.

בברכה,

נחום אסתר
קונסול כללי

Handwritten signature

העתק:
מר צ. רפיה, וושינגטון
מר ח. בר-און, וושינגטון
מצפ"א

Q781



א ל : טצפ"א

בברכת
שגרירות ישראל
בושינגטון

Handwritten signature in Hebrew script, likely reading 'צביה' (Tzvia).

JAVITS 750

Senator Jacob K. Javits

New York

SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE BY
SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS
AUGUST 2, 1978

DETERIORATION OF THE MIDEAST PEACE DIALOGUE

President Sadat's stated refusal last Sunday, July 30 to resume face-to-face peace talks with Israel and his characterization of Israel's latest suggestions as "negative and backward" is the latest and perhaps the most serious of recent developments which show the deterioration in the Mideast peace prospects.

I believe that we have reached yet another crisis and turning point in the negotiating process. Even the viability of the continued U.S. mediating role has been called into question. President Sadat's latest remarks appear to culminate a progressive hardening of his position over recent months, underscore the harsh rhetorical tone he now seems to favor and makes the U.S. mediating role unnecessarily difficult and perhaps impossible for the time being.

President Sadat is reported in the press as urging the United States to abandon its mediating role and to assume the status of a "full partner in the negotiations".

It seems clear to me that President Sadat's stratagem is to force the United States to offer its own terms for a peace settlement, in the belief that a U.S. plan would be tilted to the Sadat position; and that the United States would then be obliged to pressure Israel into adopting those terms.

In my judgment, this would be a grave mistake for the United States. An agreement "forced" upon the parties - even if possible - would be of questionable viability and would invite disruption and undermining by the Soviet Union, by the PLO and by Libya, Iraq and others with a ready capacity for mischief in the area. Moreover, I do not believe that the American people would support any effort by the United States to try to force Israel - by the undoubted leverage which U.S. economic, military and diplomatic support for Israel gives it - to accept an agreement which

the government and people of Israel believe to be a mortal danger to the security and integrity of the State of Israel.

I hope that President Carter will, instead, publicly and privately urge Egypt and Israel to cool it, to eschew preconditions and to return to the bargaining table for earnest, patient negotiations which alone can achieve an objective so essential to all.

For this reason I felt that Secretary Vance's trip to the Middle East should have been cancelled and that negotiator Atherton should have been recalled. I believe that this would have been more compatible with the mediating role of the United States, which is that of a mediator and not a salesman. Now that the decision has been taken for Secretary Vance to go to Israel and Egypt - which must now be accepted as the policy of the United States -- I hope that President Sadat will recognize that if Egypt wants a continuation of United States mediation, President Sadat cannot create conditions in which that becomes impossible, otherwise, the United States would be best advised to cease mediating until conditions making U.S. mediation possible have been again restored.

In my judgment, it is now incumbent upon Egypt and Israel to bear in mind that they are negotiating not only between themselves but also that they are negotiating in public under close observation by the American people whose goodwill is so important to Israel and Egypt alike. The people of the United States have a right to expect decorum, dignity and goodwill in the statements and actions of the two parties not public sarcasm and name calling. If this is lost, President Carter could lose also the broad mandate he now enjoys for the United States mediating role which is so essential to both sides and to hopes for some peace agreement for which the United States has invested so much of its diplomatic energies and prestige.

President Sadat's statement demanding Israel's acceptance of his preconditions and his exclusion of any compromise on the issues of "Arab land" sovereignty seem to transform "negotiations" into "capitulation" for Israel. This is true for two reasons:

First, President Sadat equates the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with "Arab land" in the sense of the Sinai and the Golan Heights. However, neither Gaza nor the West Bank is Egyptian, Jordanian or territory of any other Arab country as recognized by international law. Both were parts of the British mandate over Palestine and of the area approved for partition by the United Nations on November 30, 1947. The population is preponderantly Arab, but, for that matter, so at one time was the population of what is now Israel. Under such reasoning President Sadat could still claim that pre-1967 Israel is also "Arab land." If so, he would simply be presenting the mirror-image of the "Judea and Samaria" theory of Prime Minister Begin as to the West Bank.

Second, it is well known that for security reasons some ultimate territorial adjustment is required on Israel's eastern border, and that Israel could not accept a hostile, irridentist salient in the Gaza Strip. Even Secretary of State Rogers' plan of 1969 included territorial adjustments for security reasons, and, most importantly, United Nations Resolution 242 balances "withdrawal" with "secure and recognized boundaries". When he was in the United States earlier this year, President Sadat reaffirmed his understanding of Israel's security needs. His present assertion appears to be a sharp departure from that position which seemed at the time to open real negotiating possibilities.

President Sadat is quoted as saying that he doesn't want to embarrass President Carter and that "Cy Vance is a friend and is always welcome." Nonetheless, the facts speak more loudly than these words. The facts are that Sadat's refusal to resume face-to-face negotiations with Israel, and his insistence on preconditions - which prejudices the very issues which are at the heart of the dispute - as a price for further negotiations can only be a severe embarrassment for President Carter and a challenge to the very basis of the United States mediating role.

President Sadat's hardline position is particularly unfortunate in coming as a reaction to significant new indications of flexibility in Israel's position. Since the last Egyptian-Israeli meeting at Leeds Castle, Israel has taken a more flexible stand on three important elements of its previous proposals:

First, Israel has stated its willingness to negotiate the issue of sovereignty of the West Bank and Gaza at the end of the five year interim period. Previously, in response to questions from the United States, Israel had said only that it would be willing to negotiate the "status" of those areas after the five year interim period.

Second, Israel has relaxed its demand that the negotiations must culminate in a full treaty of peace and has indicated that it would be prepared to negotiate for peaceful relations if the search for a final peace treaty proved unachievable at this time.

Third, Israel has now stated its willingness to negotiate the issue of a territorial compromise. This, in my judgment is a major, positive evolution of the Israeli position which previously emphasized Prime Minister Begin's election campaign promise to assert Israeli sovereignty over all of "Judea, Samaria and Gaza District".

My discussions with responsible United States officials lead me to believe that our State Department in fact sees the terms of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement gradually taking shape. In these circumstances, it is vital that the "moderate" Arab governments, which have so conspicuously stood silently on the sidelines to date, to declare themselves in support of the negotiating process and on the side of compromise. I believe that the United States has fully earned the right to put it up to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other "moderate" Arab states which should now come forward on behalf of peace and the peace process. Failure on their part to do so - with the negotiating process now at such a low ebb - will range them on the side opposed to a negotiated solution and the American people will have to draw the appropriate conclusions.

#

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

Handwritten notes and signatures in blue ink, including the name 'אל:חמסור' and 'מאת: ירוש'.

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נשלח 031600 ארוב 78

התקבל 052521

מידע

מצפא.רע:דיניץ.

יעבץ נשא אתחול במליאת חסינת את הנאום שלהלן:

PRESIDENT SADAT'S STATED REFUSAL LAST SUNDAY, JULY 30 TO RESUME FACE TO FACE PEACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL AND HIS CHARACTERIZATION OF ISRAEL'S LATEST SUGGESTIONS AS "NEGATIVE AND BACKWARD" IS THE LATEST AND PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SHOW THE DETERIORATION IN THE MIDEAST PEACE PROSPECTS.

I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE REACHED YET ANOTHER CRISIS AND TURNING POINT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. EVEN THE VIABILITY OF THE CONTINUED U.S. MEDIATING ROLE HAS BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION. PRESIDENT SADAT'S LATEST REMARKS APPEAR TO CULMINATE A PROGRESSIVE HARDENING OF HIS POSITION OVER RECENT MONTHS, UNDERSCORE THE HARSH RHETORICAL TONE HE NOW SEEMS TO FAVOR AND MAKES THE U.S. MEDIATING ROLE UNNECESSARILY DIFFICULT AND PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TIME BEING.

PRESIDENT SADAT IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS AS URGING THE UNITED STATES TO ABANDON ITS MEDIATING ROLE AND TO ASSUME THE STATUS OF A "FULL PARTNER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS".

IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT PRESIDENT SADAT'S STRATAGEM IS TO FORCE THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER ITS OWN TERMS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT, IN THE BELIEF THAT A U.S. PLAN WOULD BE TILTED TO THE SADAT POSITION, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO PRESSURE ISRAEL INTO ADOPTING THOSE TERMS.

IN MY JUDGMENT, IT IS NOW INCUMBENT UPON EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THEY ARE NEGOTIATING NOT ONLY BETWEEN THEMSELVES, BUT ALSO THAT THEY ARE NEGOTIATING IN PUBLIC UNDER CLOSE OBSERVATION BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHOSE GOODWILL IS SO IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT ALIKE. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT DECORUM, DIGNITY, AND GOODWILL IN THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES NOT PUBLIC SARCASM AND NAME CALLING. IF THIS IS LOST, PRESIDENT CARTER COULD LOSE ALSO THE BROAD MANDATE HE NOW ENJOYS FOR THE U.S. MEDIATING ROLE WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO BOTH SIDES AND TO HOPES FOR SOME PEACE AGREEMENT FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS INVESTED SO MUCH OF ITS DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES AND PRESTIGE.

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PRESIDENT SADAT'S STATEMENT DEMANDING ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PRECONDITIONS AND HIS EXCLUSION OF ANY COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUES OF "ARAB LAND" SOVEREIGNTY SEEM TO TRANSFORM "NEGOTIATIONS" INTO "CAPITULATION" FOR ISRAEL. THIS IS TRUE FOR TWO REASONS:

FIRST, IT SEEMS TO ME, PRESIDENT SADAT EQUATES THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP WITH "ARAB LAND" IN THE SENSE OF THE SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. HOWEVER, NEITHER GAZA NOR THE WEST BANK IS EGYPTIAN, JORDANIAN, OR TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER ARAB COUNTRY AS RECOGNIZED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW. BOTH WERE PARTS OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER PALESTINE AND OF THE AREA APPROVED FOR PARTITION BY THE UNITED NATIONS ON NOVEMBER 30, 1947. THE POPULATION IS PREPONDERANTLY ARAB, BUT, FOR THAT MATTER, SO AT ONE TIME WAS THE POPULATION OF WHAT IS NOW ISRAEL. UNDER SUCH REASONING PRESIDENT SADAT COULD STILL CLAIM THAT PRE-1967 ISRAEL IS ALSO "ARAB LAND". IF SO, HE WOULD SIMPLY BE PRESENTING THE MIRROR-IMAGE OF THE "JUDÉA AND SAMARIA" THEORY OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AS TO THE WEST BANK.

SECOND, IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT FOR SECURITY REASONS SOME ULTIMATE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT IS REQUIRED ON ISRAEL'S EASTERN BORDER, AND THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT A HOSTILE, IRRIDENTIST SALIENT IN THE GAZA STRIP. EVEN SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' PLAN OF 1969 INCLUDED TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR SECURITY REASONS AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 242 BALANCES "WITHDRAWAL" WITH "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES". WHEN HE WAS IN THE UNITED STATES EARLIER THIS YEAR, PRESIDENT SADAT REAFFIRMED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. HIS PRESENT ASSERTION APPEARS TO BE A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM THAT POSITION WHICH SEEMED AT THE TIME TO OPEN REAL NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES.

IN MY JUDGMENT, MR. PRESIDENT, IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER A PEACE PLAN OF ITS OWN. AN AGREEMENT "FORCED" UPON THE PARTIES - EVEN IF POSSIBLE - WOULD BE OF QUESTIONABLE VIABILITY AND WOULD INVITE DISRUPTION AND UNDERMINING BY THE SOVIET UNION, BY THE PLO AND BY LIBYA, IRAQ, AND OTHERS WITH A READY CAPACITY FOR MISCHIEF IN THE AREA. MOREOVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT ANY EFFORT BY THE UNITED STATES TO TRY TO FORCE ISRAEL - BY THE UNDOUBTED LEVERAGE WHICH U.S. ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL GIVES IT - TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL BELIEVE TO BE A MORTAL DANGER TO THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

I HOPE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL, INSTEAD, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY URGE EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO "COOL" IT, TO ESCHEW

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PRECONDITIONS AND TO RETURN TO THE BARGAINING TABLE FOR EARNEST, PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ALONE CAN ACHIEVE AN OBJECTIVE SO ESSENTIAL TO ALL. PRESIDENT SADAT CANNOT CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THAT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE. OTHERWISE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE BEST ADVISED TO CEASE MEDIATING UNTIL CONDITIONS MAKING U.S. MEDIATION POSSIBLE HAVE BEEN AGAIN RESTORED.

FOR THIS REASON I FELT THAT SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD HAVE BEEN CANCELLED AND THAT NEGOTIATOR ATHERTON SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECALLED. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE MEDIATING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS THAT OF A MEDIATOR AND NOT A SALESMAN. NOW THAT THE DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR SECRETARY VANCE TO GO TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT - WHICH MUST NOW BE ACCEPTED AS THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHICH I DO ACCEPT - I HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WILL RECOGNIZE THAT IF EGYPT WANTS A CONTINUATION OF U.S. MEDIATION, PRESIDENT SADAT HAS TO DO SOME VERY CONSTRUCTIVE THINGS ABOUT IT.

PRESIDENT SADAT IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS PRESIDENT CARTER AND THAT "CY VANCE IS A FRIEND AND IS ALWAYS WELCOME". NONE-THELESS, THE FACTS SPEAK MORE LOUDLY THAN THESE WORDS. THE FACTS ARE THAT SADAT'S REFUSAL TO RESUME FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND HIS INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS - WHICH PREJUDGES THE VERY ISSUES WHICH ARE AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE - AS A PRICE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY BE A SEVERE EMBARRASSMENT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER AND A CHALLENGE TO THE VERY BASIS OF THE U.S. MEDIATING ROLE.

PRESIDENT SADAT'S HARDLINE POSITION IS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IN COMING AS A REACTION TO SIGNIFICANT NEW INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY IN ISRAEL'S POSITION. SINCE THE LAST EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MEETING AT LEEDS CASTLE, ISRAEL HAS TAKEN A MORE FLEXIBLE STAND ON THREE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF ITS PREVIOUS PROPOSALS:

FIRST, ISRAEL HAS STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AT THE END OF THE 5-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD. PREVIOUSLY, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE "STATUS" OF THOSE AREAS AFTER THE 5-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD.

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SECOND, ISRAEL HAS RELAXED ITS DEMAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST CULMINATE IN A FULL TREATY OF PEACE AND HAS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE FOR PEACEFUL RELATIONS IF THE SEARCH FOR A FINAL PEACE TREATY PROVED UNACHIEVABLE AT THIS TIME.

THIRD, ISRAEL HAS NOW STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE ISSUE OF A TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. THIS, IN MY JUDGEMENT IS A MAJOR, POSITIVE EVOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION WHICH PREVIOUSLY EMPHASIZED PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROMISE TO ASSERT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF "JUDEA SAMARIA, AND GAZA DISTRICT".

MY DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPONSIBLE U.S. OFFICIALS LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT OUR STATE DEPARTMENT IN FACT SEES THE TERMS OF AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT GRADUALLY TAKING SHAPE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS VITAL THAT THE "MODERATE" ARAB GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAVE SO CONSPICUOUSLY STOOD SILENTLY ON THE DISLINES TO DATE, TO DECLARE THEMSELVES IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ON THE SIDE OF SOMPROMISE. I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FULLY EARNED THE RIGHT TO PUT IT UP TO SAUDI ARABA, JORDAN AND OTHER "MODERATE" ARAB STATES WHICH SHOULD NOW COME FORWARD ON BEHALF OF PEACE AND THE PEACE PROCESS. FAILURE ON THEIR PART TO DO SO -WITH THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS NOW AT SUCH A LOW EBE - WILL RANGE THEM ON THE SIDE OPPOSED TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

I THANK THE CHAIR AND I THANK MY COLLEAGUE FROM CALIFORNIA FOR HIS COURTESY.

THE ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, THE SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA.

Handwritten note: כלל ענין

Handwritten note (mirrored text): זהו דבר חשוב ויש לו חשיבות רבה. יש להקפיד על כך שכל המידע יגיע בצורה מדויקת. (אנא לא להפזר)

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מידי

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

נשלח 061900 יולי 78

קונסיס
מסוי יולי

אל מנכ"ל מצא"י העוזק לשכת מנכ"ל.

לזלג הודעה שפורסמה היום על ידי סנטור יעקב יעבצ:-

JAVITS SAYS EGYPT'S PEACE PROPOSAL DISAPPOINTING
BUT WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF TALKS.

THE EGYPTIAN PEACE PROPOSAL MADE PUBLIC YESTERDAY IS DISAPPOINTING. SUBSTANTIVELY IT IS ONLY A REITERATION OF THE CLASSIC ARAB POSITION, AND AS SUCH IT IS EVEN A RETROGRESSION FROM THE SITUATION AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH VISIT TO JERUSALEM LAST NOVEMBER. IN SUBSTANTIVE TERMS THE NEW EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL LACKS THE IMAGINATION AND GENEROSITY OF SPIRIT WHICH SO DISTINGUISHED PRESIDENT SADAT'S EARLIER INITIATIVE AND DOES NOT ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THE BEST THAT CAN BE SAID FOR THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL IS THAT IT MINIMALLY FULFILLS THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT FOR BRINGING ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF THE DIRECT EGYPTIAN ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF BY SADAT LAST FEBRUARY. IN THAT SENSE, THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FILLS A NEED.

NOW, AT LEAST THERE ARE TWO PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE-- THE ONE OFFERED LAST DECEMBER BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND THE DELAYED NEW EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL. THE SUBSTANTIVE GAP BETWEEN THOSE TWO PROPOSALS IS VERY WIDE. THE TASK OF THE UNITED STATES, AS THE MEDIATOR, WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE STATED RESOLVE OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO PURSUE ITS MEDIATING ROLE WITH VIGOR AND PROMPTNESS. THE STALEMATE IN THE MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE BROKEN IF ALL SIDES NOW COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH A REAL DETERMINATION TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE QUEST FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND WITHOUT BARRING ANY RELEVANT SUBJECT. THE ALTERNATIVES ARE UNTHINKABLE.

BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT ARE TO BE COMPLIMENTED NOT WITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RESUME THE TALKS UNDER SECRETARY VANCE'S MEDIATING AUSPICES IN LONDON THIS MONTH. THE OPPORTUNITY IS ALSO PRESENTED, THEREBY, FOR ARAB STATES WISHING TO BE IDENTIFIED AS "MODERATE" TO USE THEIR

SECRET

SECRET

18 OCT 1978

78 OCT 18 081800 FTUL

TO: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM: AMEMB, TEL AVIV (100-100000)

JAVITS SAYS EGYPT'S PEACE PROPOSAL DISAPPOINTING BUT WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF TALKS

THE EGYPTIAN PEACE PROPOSAL MADE PUBLIC YESTERDAY IS DISAPPOINTING, SUBSTANTIAL, BUT ONLY A RETROGRESSION FROM THE SITUATION AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH VISIT TO JERUSALEM LAST NOVEMBER. IN SUBSTANTIAL TERMS THE NEW EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL LACKS THE IMAGINATION AND GENUINENESS OF SPIRIT WHICH SO DISTINGUISHED PRESIDENT SADAT'S EARLIER INITIATIVE AND DOES NOT ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THE BEST THAT CAN BE SAID FOR THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL IS THAT IT MINIMALLY FULFILLS THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT FOR BRINGING ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF THE DIRECT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF BY SADAT LAST FEBRUARY. IN THAT SENSE, THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FILL A NEED.

NOW, AT LEAST THERE ARE TWO PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE-- THE ONE OFFERED LAST DECEMBER BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND THE OTHER BY EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL. THE SUBSTANTIVE GAP BETWEEN THOSE TWO PROPOSALS IS VERY WIDE. THE TASK OF THE UNITED STATES THE MEDIATOR WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION TO PURSUE THE MEDIAL OF PEACE WITH VIGOR AND PROMPTNESS. THE STALEMATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE BROKEN IF ALL SIDES NOW COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH A REAL DETERMINATION TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE QUEST FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND WITHOUT BARRING ANY RELEVANT SUBJECT, THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNTHINKABLE.

BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT ARE TO BE CONGRATULATED FOR UNDERSTANDING THE FORGOING ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RESUME TALKS UNDER SECRETARY HANCOCK'S MEDIATING AUSPICES IN NOVEMBER. THE OPPORTUNITY IS AND I RECOMMEND FREEDLY FOR STATES WISHING TO BE INTERFERED AS "MODERATE" TO USE IT.

SECRET

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INFLUENCE TO BRING THE PARTIES MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER. THE RESUMED TALKS SHOULD SHOW WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR TERM BETWEEN A THIRD SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF A REAL PEACE. THE PARTIES SHARE AN AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS REGARD, AND IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL PEACE LOVING NATIONS AND PEOPLE TO HELP AND COOPERATE.

ADKAN

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INFLUENCE TO BRING THE PARTIES MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER. THE
RESUMED TALKS SHOULD SHOW WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR TERM
BETWEEN A THIRD SINAL DISengagement AND THE BEGINNING OF A REAL
PEACE. THE PARTIES SHARE AN AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS
REGARD, AND IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL PEACE LOVING NATIONS AND
PEOPLE TO HELP AND COOPERATE.

ADAM

STONUT.

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מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת השגר

ס ו ד י

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כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לחיסון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יהסי' חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

אל : המשרד

מאת, רושילבנסון

מס' 60

בשלה: 061830 יולי 78

התקבל: 070040

מ י ר י

רוזבילבנסון.

המשך לשיחותי אחר פרסם הערב סנטור יעבץ הודעה לעיתונות בתגובה להצעה המצרית.

בתודעתו קודא יעבץ להצעה המצרית

DISAPPOINTING ורואח בה אף נסיגה מחמצב סנוצר

לאחר ביקורו של אדאח בירושלים. יעבץ אומר שההצעה המצרית

DOES NOT ADVANCE THE CAUSE
OF PEACE.

הנוסח המלא של הודעתו מוברק בגלוי.

דיניץ

הודעה זו/הצעה שהבט מנכל ממנכל מומא מזחים הקד רמ אמך

מסך

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה)
יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים.
חשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

ס"ס 474
נשלח: 261800 יוני 78
נהקבל: 270038

סודי
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אל: המשרד
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רובינשטיין
הוא
הוא
(1/10/78)
הוא

רובינשטיין

סלכ 455 - 456

דברתי הבוקר עם יעבץ שחזר רק היום העירה. הקראתי לו את הקטע ומנאום
סאלח שהעברתם והוספתי כי התפלאתי על הבקורת שהיא יושבת על שלא
רצינו כביכול לצעוד לעבר המצרים בו בזמן שמצרים שמיטה עמדות לפי
שבאו לידי ביטוי במאום סאלח, עמדה שהיא חזרה להכנית הישגה של
נסיגה כוללת החייבת להקדים לכל מומ"י.

כך הסבתי תשובת לבו שהדברים שהשמיע סאלח פרושם לא רק התנגדות
תנאים מוקדמים אלא גם הגבלת המומ"י לקביעת סדורי במו"ג בלבד.

יעבץ אמר שאת נאומר הוא נשא תחת האימפקט המיידית של התכונות הממשלה.
יחד עם זאת הוא הבין מהממשל שארצה עומדת לתבוע מצדדים שינוי
מעמדה והוא מבין שאכן ירחיב נהגה ככ.

ס"א און

מה היה טענה שיש לה ממשלה להגיד להם להגיד לנו מה

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לחיסול דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). חשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
החלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

אל: המשרד

מאת: וואשינגטון

ש מ ר מ ס. 413

נשלח : 221400 יוני 78

מ י ד י התקבל: 222320 יוני 78

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מצפא

תצהיר יעבצ

נאומו של יעבצ בסנט גו, בינ השאר, מוחזק בקורח על ישראל מכה הדים החכים מאמצעי התקשורת. הידיעה הופיעה בעמודים הראשונים של העיתון הגדולים. ישודרת זה כבר כמה שעות בראש מהדורות החדשות של הרשתות. אפ שהנאום מוקד בעיקרו למתיחת בקורת גמ על מצרים כמעט לא מוזכרת עובדה זו והשדרת יח שזים את הדגש על הבקורת המוטחח בפי יעבצ נגד תשובות ממשלת ישראל. דברי הפרשנות המלווים את הדיווחים על דברי יעבצ מציינים שיעבצ ידוע סאחד התומכים העיקריים של ישראל מאחב ושלהתבטאותו נגד תשובות תימשלה תהיה השפעה רבה הנ בקונגרס והנ בקרב הציבוריות היהודית.

נוסף לנאומו בסנט התראיינ יעבצ גם ברשתות הטלביזיה, ובין השאר הביע תמיכה בנוסחת אסואנ של הנשיא קרטר. בתאיונות אלה הדגיש שלדעתו ממשלת ישראל עלתה על דרכ מסוכנת ושהסימה הדוחפת אותו להתבטאותו היא ידידותו למדינה ומחוייבותו לעתידה של ישראל.

---, זנד

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מיו
דאמירי

כב' בסיון תשל"ח

27 ביוני 1978

ש כ ו ר
328

א ל: הציר, רוסינגטון

מאת: מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: פריזן יעבז

ראת נא הערתו - שאלתו הרצ"ב של המנכ"ל
בנידון.

בברכה,

נחמן (נ"א)
נשה רביב

העקו

המנכ"ל

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מ. רובין
א. רובין

~~א. רובין~~

14 ביוני 1978

סודי

אל : השגריר רוסינגטון.
העק: מנכ"ל. ✓
מאת : השגריר נאו"ם.

הנדון : פעילות מצרית בקרב היהודים.

ספר לי חבר כי מריון יעבץ, אשתו של הסנטור, החקירה עם כמה יהודים ושאלה אם מוכנים לקבל הזמנה לצהריים אצל אדם עבד אל-מגיד, שגריר מצרים ליד האו"ם. הקבוצה כוללת:

- השופט ריפקינד
- פרופ' רוסובסקי מהרוורד
- טילבר - עורך "ניו-יורק רביו אוף בוקט"
- הרב הרצברג
- בוב ברנשטיין - יו"ר "רנדום-האוז".

לידיעתך.

ב ב ר כ ה,



ח. הרצוג.

1951

1951

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REPORT OF SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM THE SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible Signature]

יצחק / קונטרס

איגרת ה'ה'ר

382

מברק נלוי

זמן חיבור:

אל: טפ"א

מאח: טווסיונגסון

ז'חיפוח: מייד

להלן הנאום שנסטור יעבץ ישא מחר בבליאת הטינס. הנוסח
הובא כבר ע"י משרדו של יעבץ לידיעת העתונות.

רפיח

ז'אני
1730

Richard M. Gold

New York

ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT ON THE WEST BANK SENDS THE WRONG SIGNAL

SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE
THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1978

At this critical juncture in Middle Eastern affairs, the world--and especially we in the United States--have been waiting for a significant signal from both Egyptian President Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin, that each was ready to resume, in the name of his government, the stalled peace negotiations. We have heard, so far, nothing but public rhetoric - indeed some theory - from President Sadat. But now we do have in hand the Israel government's statement of its position and it is for me a disappointment as the Israeli government's response is the wrong signal, at the wrong time and argues with the wrong party.

I hope that this is not Israel's last word on the questions posed to it by the United States:-- The questions referring to the West Bank and the Gaza District are: (1) Could Israel say that at the end of five years the question of the final status of these territories would be resolved? (2) What could Israel say about the mechanism by which this question would be resolved?

As the mediator seeking to promote a resumption of the negotiations I believe that the United States was correct in its expectation of a more positive reply from Israel. The Israeli statement leaves up in the

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air the crucial question of Egypt-Israel or Arab-Israel negotiations concerning the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza District. Negotiations on this issue, which goes to the heart of the Arab-Israel dispute, cannot be left this way.

I have noted the statement issued by the Department of State on June 18, 1978 which refers to "a number of useful discussions with the Egyptians" concerning the U.S. request to Egypt for its "specific views on how the issues relating to the Palestinians, the West Bank and Gaza could be dealt with in the negotiations".

As much as I feel Israel must accommodate to new opportunities, I feel as strongly that Egyptian Prime Minister Sadat has been unavailing and occasionally threatening since his historic original peace gesture last December. I am aware also that neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia, the latter a beneficiary of recent U.S. arms support, has lent any public support or commitment to the moderate course of President Sadat's original initiative.

The Arab world bears a heavy burden of responsibility for its past history of unreliability and its present intransigence in these negotiations.

So far, Egypt has not answered the prime questions necessary to be asked of it: (1) Does President Sadat still adhere to the two pre-conditions for even negotiating with Israel? (i.e., that Israel must agree to complete withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza District, and self-determination by the Palestine Arabs there which could include a P.L.O. state). (2) Do we even know finally whether Egypt will come to an agreement with Israel on the West Bank and Gaza District so that the negotiations on Sinai may go forward without Jordan being present as a negotiating party?

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The absence of a formal Egyptian counter proposal to the peace proposals tabled by Prime Minister Begin at Ismailia last December also has been a vital factor contributing to the loss of momentum in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations following President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. The formulation and presentation to Israel of Egypt's "specific views" on the question of negotiations respecting the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza District, and the role to be played by the Palestinians in such negotiations could set the stage for a rethinking by Israel of the position contained in the Israeli Cabinet statement of June 18.

The situation requires a positive stance by Israel to assist the United States in its role as mediator of the Arab-Israeli

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ISRAELI CABINET STATEMENT ON THE
WEST BANK SENDS THE WRONG SIGNAL

negotiations. The possibility of achieving a real peace in the Mideast, after thirty years of war, is sufficiently compelling to justify extraordinary efforts by all parties including the United States as mediator, to surmount procedural obstacles and secure the resumption of face-to-face Egypt-Israel negotiations on the substance of the dispute.

In line with its acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242 as the basis of negotiations respecting the West Bank and Gaza District, I believe that Israel faces a real danger now if it fails to come forward with a more precise statement of its views as to the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza. The danger is that the United States may well come forward with its own peace plan. As a substitute of United States thinking for Israeli thinking on an issue so vital to Israel this would be a negative development in terms of Israel's constant and proper insistence on achieving peace through face-to-face Arab-Israel negotiations. And, being confronted with an American peace plan would raise the whole issue of a dictated U.S. Middle East peace plan.

Time is only on the side of those who seek anarchy or war in the Mideast, not peace, and the parties involved are the hope of the world for peace and this needs to be forwarded therefore most actively.

What is essential to the security of Israel must of course be determined by its government which is responsible to Israel's people. I speak here today only of what I see to be necessary for the United States to pursue its mediating role, which can be decisive if equipped with the necessary cooperation on the part of Israel and on the part of Egypt.

According to press reports both the Israeli Cabinet and the Israeli Knesset were themselves sharply divided on the substance of the Israeli Cabinet's June 18 statement which was preceded by a full month of vigorous debate. It seems clear to me now that it is therefore logical to expect that there will be divisions as to what is contributing properly to the mediation role of the United States among those who support the best in U.S.-Israel relations in the United States.

I consider it the high duty of all friends of Middle East peace in the United States now to come forward with their suggestions, ideas and views as to what will be the most conducive to peace. And, it is my judgment that this requires a fundamental acceptance, not for ritualistic purposes but as the firm basis for negotiations, of the applicability of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. The only way to negotiate at this rather late stage is to come forward with measures to implement these basic declarations of policy to which the parties have pledged their formal acceptance.

845
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר
110

אילנה (ויז) 11

מל: 111, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120
דח: מ, ס, ט, י, יא, יב, יג, יד, טו, טז, טז, 1400
נד: נאום סודאט

100/מדי

דיניץ

כנה נא ליטובץ והפנה תשומת לבו לקטע מנאום סודאט בו דובר על
כך שבתקופת חמש השנים יהיה 'ו' י'ס בידי 'רדן ודצועת עזה בידי
מצרים (הקטע מוברך בגלוי). הוסף נא לו כי התפלאנו לראות
שהוא מוקד את עמדתנו על כך שבכ"כ לא רצינו ללכת לקראת
המצרים בה בטעה שטעדתם היא כפי שמתבאר בנאום סודאט.

דובינסקיין ==

תפ: שהח, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, סנכל, סמנכל, ססנכל, ממח, רס, אמן,
מצפא, מותים

משרד החוץ, תל אביב, 1951

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לחיקוק דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). חשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

מס' 384
נשלח 211900 יוני 78

סודי
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איל: תמ"ד
מאת: רושינגטון

ה'שנ"ח
(10/10/78)

מנכ"ס

תפרד מבדיקים בלוי נוסח נאום שעומד סנטור יעבצ לשאת בסנטור וחר

הנאום הועבר אלי הערב על ידי הסנטור בצדף ה- PRESS RELEASE
הקדוחי לסנטור ושאלתיי אם כוונתו לקבל הערותי או שהנאום כבר גמור ומופץ. יעבצ אמר שהנאום כבר הושלם וחופץ.
אמתי שאם ככ הרי אינ טעם שאמסור לו הערות.
יעבצ אמר שבכל זאת רוצה לשמוע דעתי. אמתי שאני יכול רק להגיד לו שהנאום הזיק ומעוות ואינו נוחג והמנונה האמיתית של המצב.
ה- PRESS RELEASE מציינ רק את נקודות הביקורת על ישראל והתגלם מהביקורת שבנאום על מצרימ. יעבצ אמר שלא דאה
ה- PRESS RELEASE וכי יעצור זאת מיד. ואילו לגבי הנאום שצנר לדעתו הוא מכיל ביקורת יותר חריפה על מצרימ והערבים מאשר על ישראל. טענתי מחריפה נגד הדברים שמופיעים בנאום ועבצ סיכמ השיחה באומרו שינסה לאזנ אותו עוד יותר מחר בסנט.

דין יצ

שנוו דחמ סרהמ שהבט מנכל ממנכל ממנכל מנפא מזחיה חקר דמ אמנ
מא-רע

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



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שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

13 ביוני 1978

Handwritten note:
הח' / ז'לג' (אמ"ת)

א ל: מצפ"א
מרכז

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: נאום יעבץ על המזה"ת

מצ"ב נוסח נאום של סנטור יעבץ ב-8 דנא בטקס
סיום שנה הלימודים בברוקלין קולג'.

הנאום מוקדש לסיכויי השלום באזורנו ולעסקת המטוסים.

בברכה

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צבי רפיה

Senator Jacob K. Javits

New York

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
BROOKLYN COLLEGE, JUNE 8, 1978

MIDEAST PEACE PROSPECTS AND THE JET FIGHTER SALES

On May 15, after months of discussion and an impassioned floor debate, the Senate voted 54 to 44 to sustain President Carter's decision to sell sixty F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia as part of a "package" sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

I strongly opposed the Administration's decision to condition the sale of planes to Israel - which had been promised in connection with Israel's agreement to the Sinai II accord - on the approval by the Congress of parallel sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and I fought for the resolution of disapproval.

From that perspective, I wish to make clear today how I see the prospects for Mideast peace now.

The war planes sales question has been resolved by the Senate and those of us who opposed the "package" must now work within the parameters of that decision. Above all, the war planes sales controversy must be viewed as an "incident" rather than as an event in the special relationship between Israel and the U.S. Speaking before the American Jewish Committee in New York on May 18, just after the Senate vote Vice President Mondale, expressing the Administration's perspective, made much the same point with respect to the jet fighter sales controversy when he cautioned the world not to "mistake a temporal disagreement

over a discrete question with a fundamental disagreement over a common goal".

The common goal is the search for a just and lasting peace in the Mideast, in which the integrity and security of Israel is assured.

As to Israel's security, Vice President Mondale has assured us in his May 18 speech that:

"military assistance to Israel will continue regardless of any negotiating differences. It will continue not as a lever to force accomodation, but as a fundamental commitment to the strength and survival of a free democracy. It will never be used as a form of pressure against Israel. And it will always reflect a special relationship - which will always remain special."

Therefore, the focus of attention must now revert to the peace process itself, and here the issue of Israel's reaction to the Senate's approval of the jet fighter "package" becomes central to the issue.

The reaction of Israel is likely to follow one of two patterns. It could feel itself backed into a corner and endangered because of the possibility that the "packaging" of the jet fighter sales indicates a material weakening of the special relationship between Israel and the United States, especially respecting military assistance. Conversely, Israel could treat the jet fighter package deal as an "incident" and not a major event, taking the Carter Administration at its word, even if Israel continues to disagree that the packaging decision was a wise one that will in the long run butress the security and integrity of Israel.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the next signal should come from Israel. It has the important decision to make, and how it makes that decision may well determine the course of events in the

Middle East, respecting U.S. mediation efforts for peace.

Will Israel give the signal that it has lost confidence in the U.S. special relationship? Or, will it give the signal that, notwithstanding a disagreement over the jet fighter sales package, it maintains confidence in the U.S.-Israel special relationship? To give that latter signal, would I believe be very much in the highest national interest of the United States as well as the best course for Israel's integrity and security.

It is Israel that must decide the applicability of U.N. Resolution 242 and 338 to the West Bank of the Jordan and what is meant by Prime Minister Begin's assertions regarding the "rights" of Israel in Judea and Samaria.

Some would advise Israel that it must say to the Administration now "show us that the jet fighter package sale will, in fact, promote the peace process." This, I think, does not assure Israel of getting the answer which I believe would express most truly the feelings of the United States toward Israel. To assure that the right answer and the one which is truly representative of the United States comes forward I believe that a positive signal must come from Israel.

If Israel takes the initiative in giving the right signal to the United States, it will get an excellent reception, and an excellent response.

I base this conclusion very heavily upon the fact that throughout the debate over the jet fighter sales package, the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and many Senators who voted against Israel's declared policy in this respect sought to make

clear the constancy of the United States commitment to Israel's security and national integrity. I believe now is the time to count on that as the surest road toward peace.

This question of the signal from Israel is very specific because the question at hand is Israel's response to questions which have been posed to it by the United States in the aftermath of Prime Minister Begin's visit to the United States in late March.

Following the suggestion of Foreign Minister Dayan, the United States in its mediating role has laid aside for the moment the effort to achieve agreement on the formulation of a broad "Declaration of Principles" to guide negotiations respecting the ultimate disposition of the West Bank and Gaza.

Instead, the United States, in accordance with Dayan's suggestion, has asked for clarification of two points in Israel's proposal for a self-rule arrangement in the West Bank and Gaza, put forward in Ismailia last December by Prime Minister Begin. More specifically, the United States has asked Israel to state its views respecting: 1) the steps to be taken during the interim five year period of self-rule toward the determination of the future government there after the interim five years and how Israel envisions that future; and 2) Israel's views with respect to the role which the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District are to play in determining the ultimate disposition and government of those areas.

In connection with its request for a clarification of Israel's position on these two points, the United States has stated its own

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view to Israel. In a speech dated May 10, 1978 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., the United States Ambassador at Large for Middle East Peace Negotiations, stated the United States view as follows:

"We believe that there need be interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza agreed between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian representatives. During this interim period an ultimate solution can be worked out combining security for Israel and its neighbors and a territorial solution which will not leave a residue of irredentism to ferment and threaten the peace in the future. Our own view is that an independent Palestinian State in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution, and that its future should lie in a close link with Jordan."

The significance of Secretary Atherton's statement of the U.S. position is derived from a subsequent passage in his speech of May 10, which states as follows:

"We hope nevertheless that our ideas will commend themselves to Israel, because we believe they offer the possibility -- perhaps the only possibility -- for renewing the momentum of the Egyptian-Israeli talks and ultimately the overall Arab-Israeli negotiating process."

It would be a grave error, in my judgment, to dismiss the significance of Secretary Atherton's statement respecting the importance of Israel's response to the questions which have been posed to it.

In a philosophical sense it may seem unjust that the burden of moving peace forward should once again fall upon Israel. For, the questions asked go to the heart of the most sensitive and difficult issues in the Middle East and they come at a time when Israel has just seen an important vote in Congress go against it for the first time since its establishment. But, Israel has many times surmounted grave challenges in diplomacy and in war and I am confident that Israel will respond to this challenge positively. A failure to meet the challenge could open Israel to the accusation - however, unjust that accusation might be -

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that it failed to do its part in restoring momentum to the negotiations for peace in the Mideast.

We can see that a very heavy burden has been placed upon Israel at a psychologically difficult moment. I believe that an equally serious burden has been assumed by the Carter Administration, in gaining Congressional acceptance of its strategy.

In his May 18 speech, Vice President Mondale stated the Administration's rationale for its position on the jet fighter package:

"We believe it is necessary to work with moderate forces in the Arab world if a peaceful and stable Middle East is to evolve. We believe that our support for Egypt and Saudi Arabia will help promote that objective without threatening the security of Israel. And we believe that these actions are taken in the best interests of peace."

In taking the Administration at its word, Israel would have the right to hold it to its word. The United States must insure that the "signal" which has been sent to Egypt and Saudi Arabia be given the same meaning by them as that which has been given to Israel by the President speaking through the Vice President.

At this point I would like to say a word about Egypt first and then Saudi Arabia.

President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem was a great act of statesmanship. It was brilliant in its timing, its symbolism and its spirit. But, having initiated a break through of such significance, it is disappointing to have witnessed his break-off of the negotiations in the Political Committee in January last. Having set such a high standard of statesmanship for himself in his visit to Jerusalem, in November, 1977 his puzzling negotiating tactics just two months thereafter raise questions about the prospect for achieving tangible peace agreements.

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I hope very much that President Sadat will again soon be seized of the passion for peace which motivated his historic initiative. And, I hope that this time his passion for peace will carry with it an attention to detail and a determination to stay the course of the prolonged and specific negotiations which must ensue. Because, in the Mideast, peace will be a very tangible and detailed set of understandings and agreements and it can only be achieved on the basis of very painful compromises on both sides. Moderation in this context means fairmindedness and persistence with respect to an accumulation of issues which may not each be cosmic in themselves individually but which in the aggregate could constitute a peace agreement that would transform the whole Mideast.

With respect to Saudi Arabia, it must be said that its "moderation" in world affairs has been least manifested with respect to the question of Mideast peace negotiations. I believe that a good case has been made that Saudi Arabia has pursued a constructive and moderate course on the issues of oil production and pricing within OPEC and that it has been moderate in its management of its vast holdings dollars and other western currencies. These policies have been helpful to the United States and the other states concerned and are appreciated.

But, when it comes to the issue of Mideast peace negotiations the record of Saudi Arabia appears much less to be considered "moderate". We are told that Riyadh has been "constructive" behind the scenes with respect to Sadat's peace initiative. But it has failed to register any public endorsement of the initiative, despite Sadat's almost desperate need for the overt support of even a single Arab government. Moreover,

throughout the whole negotiating process, Saudi Arabia has continued to provide a subsidy of some reportedly forty million dollars per annum to the Palestine Liberation Organization, despite the P.L.O.'s continuing denunciation of the peace negotiations and its continuing record of terrorist atrocities.

I would hope, therefore, that the United States will make it clear that the sale of sixty F-15's - the world's most advanced jet fighter - is not to be viewed as a reward for its past "moderation" in the peace negotiation process but rather as an invitation to Saudi Arabia to play a more active and open role in those negotiations in the future.

There could be a crunch coming in U.S.-Israel relations relative to the peace negotiations, and I believe that Americans deeply interested in Israel should be prepared for the very exacting role they may be called upon to play should this happen.

I believe that it is the unique responsibility of the Jews and others in the United States who are knowledgeable on the subject, to inform our fellow Americans as to the excruciating dilemma which the Carter Administration's policies may be forcing upon Israel. Israel needs the United States. It is dependent upon the United States for military and economic assistance and diplomatically the United States is Israel's only friend at the United Nations.

The friendship of the United States is not merely desired by Israel. It is a matter of deepest necessity. Yet, there are circumstances as yet only hypothetical, which could compel Israel to stand against a Mideast peace policy of President Carter on the grounds of Israel's overriding national security interest and survival as Israel sees it.

The Jewish community of the United States is a community of patriotism, dedication and talent. Resourcefulness and capacity even in times of adversity have been a hallmark of this community. Jews are dedicated to the United States, devotedly and passionately, and have also an ancient, ordained privilege to support the survival and national integrity of Israel as a homeland for homeless Jews.

I have painted the canvas thus far in somber colors - and properly so because I believe that there may be a crunch ahead which will test the character profoundly of the American Jewish Community.

But now I wish to tell you that I am, however, a cautious optimist.

I believe that a period of interim administration of at least five years will be needed in the West Bank and Gaza. And during this period all sides, including Israel and Jordan must be free to assert their rights and their claims to allegiance of the indigenous people. Undoubtedly individual Arabs who also may be P.L.O. sympathizers having a valid claim to residence in the area would claim the right to compete politically. But, the P.L.O. as a para-military organization dedicated to violence and terrorism must be excluded. Such exclusion is required by Israel on national security grounds (and perhaps by Jordan, too, on these same grounds). In addition, the P.L.O. as a para-military terrorist organization must be excluded from the West Bank and Gaza in order to give the people there a true and meaningful opportunity for political self-determination - which would be impossible in the face of P.L.O. coercion.

I have travelled extensively in Israel and the Arab lands, and I have talked at length with the major leaders involved. I am convinced

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that Mideast peace is really "do-able", if everyone keeps his shirt on and his powder dry.

I believe that the establishment of trade relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors pursuant to a peace agreement would prove to be the biggest inducement to normalization and the "enforcer" of peace. The fact is that there are enormous opportunities for regional economic development and trade in the Mideast. Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria can provide the markets. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have more than adequate capital. And, Israel has the technology and the skills which are in such short supply in the Mideast. There is truly a possibility that by the end of the century the deserts of the Mideast could be made to bloom, literally, as a result of Arab-Israel economic partnership - as they have already bloomed in Israel.

I know that many in the U.S. were traumatized by the loss that was suffered when the Senate approved the "package deal" linking the sale of jet fighters to Israel with sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yet, I respectfully suggest that it would be inimical to all the interests involved to permit this defeat to begin a "state of war" between Israel's friends in the U.S. and those who may have disagreed on this issue.

It would be counterproductive to treat this one vote as any demonstration that our Federal legislators no longer fully appreciate the significance of Israel and its security needs to the defense of freedom and the security of the Middle East. It should be clear to anyone familiar with the Mideast, that no matter how many planes our government may sell to Arab countries, the reality remains that the ally the United States can genuinely depend upon in that entire region in defense of the values and institutions we hold most dear is the State of Israel.

What is crucial at this time is for all the friends of the best in U.S.-Israel relations, to work unremittingly to see that the U.S. "special relationship" to Israel should indeed be "forever".

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כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בחון המדינה יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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נשלח 171030 מאי 78

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אל: המשרד

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מ ירי

מכל

המשרד הכולל עם סגור יעבץ כדי להודיע לו על עמדתו. יעבץ היה כירוצ מראשי הומוסקסואל במערכת במסג ופאת מספר פעמים בצורה נמרצת, אמירת הומוסקסואל למען ענייניו ועבד אמר, וביקשני להעביר ארצה, שרצה הברורה הוא שלפחות 20-25 סנסורים שתבין יד העיסוק הם למעשה הומוסקס וידידים בתחום של ישראל אך עשו זאת באמנות שאין זם פוגעים בישראל, הוא שוחח אישית עם כ-30 סנסורים ומסקנתו היא שאין ארצות בעמות זכר וכדי הסנסורים אלה יתייצבו עם ישראל ככלתובת מעשי. התיי לו על דבריו ועודתו.

ירוצ

שהח... י"מ רחם שחבט ממכל ממכל מצטא מזחום חקר רח אמר
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Handwritten notes and signatures in Hebrew, including the name "מירד" (Meretz) and other illegible scribbles.

תמצא - דע לשכת דתם

להלן באדם שנשא היום סנטור יעכץ במליאה הסנאט :

SPEECH BY SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS, DELIVERED ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1978 10:00 AM

THE STATUS OF MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

DURING THE EASTER RECESS, I VISITED ISRAEL FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING MYSELF UP TO DATE ON THE POSITION AND THINKING OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE THINKING OF THE OPPOSITION.

BASED ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADING FIGURES OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER MY VISIT TO ISRAEL, AND UPON MY REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS BASIC DOCUMENTS WHICH I HAVE SEEN, I SHOULD LIKE TO REPORT TO THE SENATE MY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS RESPECTING THE CURRENT STATUS OF MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

FOUR WEEKS HAVE ELAPSED NOW SINCE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. ALSO I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO ISRAEL WHERE I WENT AND CONFERRED WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND THE LEADING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPPOSITION. HENCE, IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. FIRST, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL DESPITE SOME OF THE MORE DIRE IMPLICATIONS.

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THAT WERE DRAWN FROM THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO REACH A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES. THE DARK CLOUD WHICH SEEMED TO HAVE DESCENDED ON THE SCENE WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER REPORTED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHAT HE FELT TO BE THE "SIX NO'S" HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS BEEN PENETRATED BY NEW RAYS OF LIGHT AND HOPE.

IN SAYING THIS I DO NOT WISH TO IMPLY ANY SENSE OF COMPLACENCY OR EUPHORIA. THAT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY MISPLACED. FOR SERIOUS DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PARTIES ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REMAIN. BUT, THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IS CONTINUING. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTINUED DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND ALL PARTIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO REEXAMINE THEIR OWN POSITIONS AS WELL AS THE POSITIONS OF THE OTHERS.

POTENTIALLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN THE VISIT OF ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN TO CAIRO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND GENERAL GAMASSY. A RETURN VISIT BY DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN TO CAIRO IS EXPECTED SOON. THUS FAR, THE VISIT OF MR. WEIZMAN HAS NOT LED TO RESUMPTION OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES, AS REQUESTED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN BUT PRESS REPORTS HAVE STATED THAT SOME SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON A NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES RESPECTING THE SINAI AS WELL AS THE WEST BANK AND GAZA PROBLEMS.

THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATING ATMOSPHERE IN ANOTHER RESPECT. THE OVERRIDING SENSE OF IMMEDIACY AND IMPENDING DOOM WHICH SURROUNDED THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT SADAT TO WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY - WHICH CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY TO THE ADVERSE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE BEGIN VISIT IN MARCH - HAS RECEDED APPRECIABLY. NOW, NO ONE IS CONTENDING THAT PRESIDENT SADAT'S POLITICAL POSITION IS IN AN IMMEDIATE DANGER AND THE SENSE THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS IN A CLOSE AND FRANTIC RACE TO MEET A DEADLINE HAS BEEN DISSIPATED. THIS HAS RELIEVED MUCH OF THE TENSION IN THE HIGHLY OVERCHARGED ATMOSPHERE WHICH ENGULFED THE BEGIN VISIT.

IN LOOKING BACK AT THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE BEGIN VISIT, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS NOW TRANSPIRED IN THE FOUR WEEKS SINCE THAT VISIT, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE POSITION OF ISRAEL AND THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, DID NOT RECEIVE THE "FAIR BASIS" OBJECTIVE

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CONSIDERATION WHICH THEY DESERVED. INSTEAD, AN EXAGGERATED AND AT LEAST PARTIALLY INACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISRAELI'S POSITION - AS BEING INTRANSIGENT AND NARROW - WAS CONVEYED AS THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREAT HOPE CREATED BY PRESIDENT SADAT'S HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH VISIT TO JERUSALEM AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S RECEPTION OF HIM AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF NEAR DESPAIR CREATED BY HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON COMBINED - PERHAPS UNAVOIDABLY - TO PRODUCE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS OF EGYPT SEEMED TO BE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT AND MUCH MORE SOLICITUDE THAN THE POSITIVE PEACE PLAN BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

ON THE OTHER HAND, A VERY DIFFERENT SET OF SPECTACLES WAS USED TO EXAMINE THE POSITION AND PROPOSALS OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, WHICH WERE SUBJECTED TO CRITICAL AND SOMETIMES UNSYMPATHETIC SCRUTINY.

IN THE MORE DISPASSIONATE ATMOSPHERE WHICH I HOPE WILL NOW PREVAIL, I BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION WILL BE SEEN AS BEING CONSIDERABLY MORE FLEXIBLE AND MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF IT AS BEING "BEGIN'S SIX NO'S". LEAD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO BELIEVE, ACCORDINGLY, THE TIME HAS COME TO RESTORE A GREATER DEGREE OF SYMMETRY TO THE STANDARDS WHICH ARE APPLIED IN RESPECT TO THE POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AS THEY WERE EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE END OF THE BEGIN VISIT, IN MY JUDGMENT, REVOLVE AROUND A SINGLE POINT - THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THE DIFFERENCES RESPECTING THE APPLICATION OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242, AND THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, ALL CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THIS ONE POINT.

AND THE FACT IS THAT THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IS UNSETTLED AND A SUBJECT OF HISTORIC DISPUTE.

FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADOPTED A SIMPLISTIC VIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - A POSITION WHICH IS IN DOUBTFUL HARMONY WITH PREVIOUS POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

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IT MAY BE THAT THE POSITION ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE CURRENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, RESPECTING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, IS JUSTIFIABLE ON THE GROUNDS OF WHAT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE SITUATION. BUT, SINCE ISRAEL'S POSITION HAS BEEN CRITICISED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON LEGAL GROUNDS, A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SITUATION FROM AN INTERNATIONAL LAW POINT OF VIEW IS CALLED FOR.

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AFTER WORLD WAR I RESULTED IN A BRITISH MANDATE OVER PALESTINE. IN 1922, BRITAIN UNILATERALLY CARVED THE KINGDOM OF TRANSJORDAN OUT OF THE ORIGINAL MANDATE AND AWARDED IT TO THE HASHEMITE LEADER WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN DEFEATED BY THE SAUDIS IN A DYNASTIC STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF WHAT IS NOW SAUDI ARABIA.

PURSUANT TO THE BALFOUR DECLARATION WHICH PROMISED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH HOMELAND IN PALESTINE, THE PREFIGURATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL THROUGH IMMIGRATION TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II. THIS PROCESS WAS GIVEN GREAT IMPETUS AND GREAT URGENCY BY THE LIBERATION OF THE JEWISH REMNANT WHICH SURVIVED THE NAZI HOLOCAUST IN EUROPE.

THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE ACQUIRED THE LEGAL SANCTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. WHEN THE LEAGUE WAS DISBANDED AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IT IS NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT THE UNITED NATIONS GAVE ITS EXPLICIT LEGAL SANCTION TO THE BRITISH MANDATE. IN ANY EVENT, ON APRIL 2, 1947 BRITAIN INFORMED THE UNITED NATIONS OF ITS INTENT TO DIVEST ITSELF OF THE MANDATE AND REQUESTED THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO MAKE PROVISIONS FOR THE "FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN PALESTINE." ON NOVEMBER 29, 1947, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTED ITS APPROVAL OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE TO PARTITION PALESTINE INTO A JEWISH AND ARAB STATE WITH SOME DEGREE OF ECONOMIC UNION, AND AN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP FOR JERUSALEM. THE PLAN WAS ACCEPTED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY BUT REJECTED BY THE ARAB STATES. AN OUTBREAK OF DISORDER AND TERRORISM ENSUED AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL REFUSED TO TAKE ACTION TO IMPLEMENT THE PARTITION PLAN.

AT MIDNIGHT ON MAY 14, 1948 THE PALESTINE MANDATE WAS TERMINATED.

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THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IMMEDIATELY PROCLAIMED THE STATE OF ISRAEL WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF THE PARTITION PLAN AND ISRAEL WAS RECOGNIZED BY A NUMBER OF STATES INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR.

EGYPT, SYRIA, TRANSJORDAN, LEBANON AND OTHER ARAB STATES RESPONDED BY ATTACKING ISRAEL, TO DENY IT ITS STATEHOOD. A CEASEFIRE BEGAN ON JULY 18, 1948 AND IN FEBRUARY, MARCH, APRIL AND JULY OF 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, LEBANON, JORDAN AND SYRIA RESPECTIVELY WERE NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES AND WENT INTO FORCE. FOR JORDAN THESE CEASEFIRE LINES INCLUDED THE WEST BANK, FOR EGYPT THEY INCLUDED THE GAZA STRIP.

IN 1950, JORDAN PURPORTED TO ANNEX THE AREAS OF THE WEST BANK WHICH IT HAD OCCUPIED IN THE 1948 FIGHTING. THIS ANNEXATION HAS NEVER BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED STATES. INDEED, ONLY TWO GOVERNMENTS EVER RECOGNIZED THAT ANNEXATION - PAKISTAN AND BRITAIN. EGYPT NEVER PURPORTED TO ANNEX THE GAZA STRIP, WHICH IT HAD OCCUPIED AND WHICH IT CONTINUED TO ADMINISTER UNTIL IT WAS CAPTURED BY ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967. AT THE SAME TIME THAT ISRAEL ALSO TOOK THE WEST BANK TERRITORY FROM JORDAN.

I HAVE INCLUDED THIS BRIEF REVIEW OF THE POLITICO-LEGAL HISTORY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BECAUSE IT IS HIGHLY PERTINENT TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.

THE ESSENCE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS THAT THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS DIFFERENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE POSITION OF THE SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE ANY SUCH DIFFERENCE AND, THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO THE MEANING OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242 AND THE STATUS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK WHICH HAVE BEEN BRANDED AS ILLEGAL.

THE POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MAINTAINS THAT ISRAEL BY RIGHT OF CONQUEST HAS A CLAIM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE CLAIM OF JORDAN WHICH IS SIMILARLY BASED ON THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST. AT A MINIMUM, ISRAEL CONTENDS THAT THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE UNSETTLED

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QUESTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEREBY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY RESPECTING THE SINAI AND GOLAN WHICH ADMITTEDLY ARE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA.

ADMITTEDLY, THE ISRAELI POSITION IS COMPLICATED BY MR. BEGIN'S LONGSTANDING CONTENTION THAT ISRAEL HAS A BIBLICALLY-BASED CLAIM TO JUDEA, SAMARIA (WEST BANK) AND GAZA DISTRICT.

HOWEVER, MY PURPOSE IS NOT TO SEEK TO VINDICATE THE CLAIMS PUT FORWARD BY ISRAEL ON THE MERITS. RATHER, MY PURPOSE IS TO SHOW THAT ISRAEL HAS A RESPECTABLE LEGAL BASIS FOR ITS CONTENTION THAT THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS UNSETTLED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THAT IT HAS NOT ACTED IN A WAY WHICH CAN BE CATEGORICALLY BRANDED ILLEGAL THAT ITS POSITION IS NOT ARBITRARY OR INTRANSIGENT AND - MOST IMPRTANTLY - THAT IT HAS A BASIS FOR PUTTING FORWARD THE PROPOSALS WHICH IT HAS TABLED.

TO ARGUE THAT THOSE PROPOSALS ARE ENTITLED TO BE CONSIDERED AND DISCUSSED AND TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS, IS ONLY TO ARGUE FOR EQUALITY AND FAIR PLAY, IN MY JUDGMENT.

A MAJOR DIFFERENCE HAS ARISEN BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. DESIRE THAT ISRAEL AGREE TO THE FORMULATION THAT U.N. RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES "ON ALL FRONTS". THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BELIEVES PASSIONATELY THAT THIS FORMULATION COMMITTS IT TO EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF A PALESTINIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, BECAUSE IT PLACES THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ON EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE STATUS OF THE SINAI AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WHERE THERE ARE JURIDICALLY ESTABLISHED EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY. ISRAEL FEELS THAT IT IS NOT LEGALLY OBLIGED TO DO SO. ALSO, ISRAEL SEES AGITATION AND IRREDENTISM UNDER SUCH AN INTERPRETATION STARTING AT ONCE FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE (LIKELY TO BE PLO DOMINATED) IN ANTICIPATION OF THE REFERENDUM AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE WEST BANK TO BE MADE AT THE END OF FIVE YEARS UNDER ITS PEACE PROPOSALS.

IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT THE LEGAL POSITION OF ISRAEL'S GOVERNMENT BECOME INTERRELATED WITH ITS OVERRIDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

WITHIN ISRAEL I ENCOUNTERED A SPECTRUM OF VIEWS ON THE LEGAL ISSUES RESPECTING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, EVEN WITHIN THE BEGIN

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GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NEAR UNANIMITY WITHIN ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO ITS SECURITY CLAIMS ON THE WEST BANK, AND, ON SECURITY GROUNDS, PRESIDENT CARTER IS SAID TO HAVE STATED, AS UNITED STATES ASSUMPTIONS, THAT TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE NOT REQUIRED UNDER U.N. RESOLUTION 242 - WHICH BALANCES WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES". IT HAS EVEN BEEN IMPLIED THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS AGREEABLE TO SECURITY ADJUSTMENTS RESPECTING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

IN VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SUGGESTED VARIOUS ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING AN ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. MOREOVER, THE PREVIOUS ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INFORMALLY SUGGESTED THE ALLON PLAN AND OPPOSITION LEADER PERES HAS ELABORATED ON THAT PLAN IN NUMEROUS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS.

THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS PUT FORWARD A DIFFERENT APPROACH WHICH IT FEELS WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME RESULTS. INSTEAD OF DIVIDING THE LAND OF THE WEST BANK, THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS PROPOSED A DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS ON THE WEST BANK. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD RESERVE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO ISRAEL AND TURN OVER "SELF-RULE" CIVIL FUNCTIONS TO THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK.

THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PUT FORWARD ITS PROPOSALS ON A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS". IT HAS SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT ITS PROPOSALS ARE WORTHY TO BE THE BASIS OF COUNTER PROPOSALS. THIS IS NOT "INTRANSIGENCE" AS THAT WORD IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD.

THE OVERRIDING IMPRESSION WHICH I RECEIVED IN ISRAEL WAS ONE OF A DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH WAS EMBODIED IN PRESIDENT SADAT'S HISTORIC PEACE INITIATIVE AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S RECEPTION OF IT AND AN UNABATED DETERMINATION TO WORK TO ACHIEVE TANGIBLE PEACE AGREEMENTS BASED ON THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES OPENED UP BY THAT INITIATIVE - AND IN THE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION AS THEY WERE THEN UNDERTAKEN BY PRESIDENT CARTER.

JUST ABOUT ALL ISRAELIS, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING MR. BEGIN'S BITTEREST POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF THE LAST THIRTY YEARS, FEEL THAT MR. BEGIN HAS MADE HONEST AND FAR REACHING PROPOSALS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S INITIATIVE. THEY SHARE MR. BEGIN'S FEELING THAT HIS PROPOSALS HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN THE CONSIDERATION WHICH THEY DESERVE, AND THEY SHARE THE FEELING THAT A MORE CRITICAL AND UNSYMPATHETIC STANDARD HAS BEEN APPLIED TO ISRAEL THAN TO EGYPT AND PRESIDENT SADAT.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I SEE NO RATIONAL GROUNDS FOR THE

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CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL - THIS RELATIONSHIP MUST REMAIN IN TACT IN OUR OWN AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INTEREST.

I BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY THAT A SYMPATHETIC AND CREATIVE APPROACH BY THE UNITED STATES CAN LEAD TO A REFORMULATION OF THE ISSUES WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THE "SIX NO'S" WHICH WERE ELICITED FROM MR. BEGIN. THE OBJECT OF U.S. DIPLOMACY, SURELY, IS TO PRODUCE FORMULATIONS WHICH WILL PRODUCE AGREEMENT, NOT DISAGREEMENT, AND, ALL OF THE FLEXIBILITY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO COME FROM ONE SIDE.

NOW THAT THE PERVASIVE ATMOSPHERE OF IMMEDIACY AND IMPENDING DOOM MAY HAVE BEEN LIFTED FROM THE MIDEAST PEACE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT WHAT HAD SEEMED TO BE A SERIOUS IMPASSE BUT WHICH UPON CLOSER EXAMINATION REVEALS MANY AREAS OF AGREEMENT. ENORMOUS MOVEMENT FORWARD FROM THE STARTING POSITIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, AND IMPORTANT AREAS FOR THE REDUCTION OF REMAINING DIFFERENCES.

I BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION CAN BE MADE AT THIS TIME BY THE UNITED STATES IN PLACING A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON THE ENORMOUS BENEFITS THAT WOULD BE OPENED TO ALL PARTIES BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS. FOR, THE FACT OF AGREEMENT WILL TRANSFORM THE SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST. THE WAY COULD BE OPENED FOR DRAMATIC COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - NOT ONLY THROUGH THE LIFTING OF THE CRUSHING ECONOMIC BURDEN OF ARMAMENT BUT ALSO THROUGH OPPORTUNITIES TO ENLIST ISRAELI TECHNOLOGICAL AND MANAGERIAL CAPACITIES AND THOSE OF EGYPT IN SUPPORT OF THE ENORMOUS CAPITAL RESOURCES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER OIL PRODUCERS IN A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE CANNOT MEAN A RESTORATION OF THE PRE-1967 STATUS QUO OF BITTER ANIMOSITY. AND, IN A TRANSFORMED MIDEAST THE PRESENT FEARS AND SECURITY PREOCCUPATIONS COULD BE SEEN IN A LESS COMPELLING AND THREATENING LIGHT, MAKING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS EASIER TO ACHIEVE AND EASIER TO IMPLEMENT.

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO FACE UP TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION "IN ALL ITS ASPECTS". ADMITTEDLY THIS HAD IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL, BUT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, IT IS THE ARAB STATES, MORE THAN ISRAEL, WHICH HAVE FAILED REALLY TO FACE UP TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. ON THIS POINT, THE UNITED STATES, HAVING PRESSED ISRAEL VERY HARD, OUGHT NOW TO TURN ITS ATTENTION TO PRESSING THE ARABS TO FACE UP - AND STAND UP - TO THE P.L.O. WHICH REMAINS AS THE SINGLE GREATEST OBSTACLE

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-9-

BY FAR TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST, IT IS NOT ENOUGH IN MY JUDGEMENT, MERELY TO OBTAIN ACQUIESCENCE IN THE BYPASSING OF THE P.L.O. IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS NOT ENOUGH, IN MY JUDGMENT, TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE BY HOLDING OPEN THE PROSPECT OF A REFERENDUM IN FIVE YEARS IN WHICH THE P.L.O. COULD COME IN AND ACHIEVE A P.L.O. STATE ON THE WEST BANK.

THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE ARABS - THOSE ARABS WHO BELIEVE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND WHO DESIRE PEACE - TO FACE DOWN THE P.L.O. AND DEMAND OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE A LEADERSHIP PREPARED TO ACCEPT ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL - OR FORFEIT THE CLAIM OF A VOICE IN THE SETTLEMENT RESPECTING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

FOR DESPITE THE HOPEFUL PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, THE P.L.O. CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN LEBANON ITS BLOODY PLAYTHING. ISRAEL'S EXASPERATED INCURSION INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON CANNOT, BY ITSELF, SOLVE THE P.L.O. PROBLEM THERE. ISRAEL HAS ANNOUNCED A PLAN FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES AND I BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL MUST COMPLY IN THE PROXIMATE FUTURE WITH THE CALL OF U.N. RESOLUTION 425 FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON. TO FAIL TO DO SO COULD EMBROIL ISRAEL IN AN UNNECESSARY DISPUTE WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER THE USE OF U.S. SUPPLIED WEAPONS THERE AND GIVE AN OPENING TO THE "REJECTIONIST" FORCES IN THE P.L.O. AND SOME ARAB STATES TO SUPPLANT THE ARAB-ISRAEL SEARCH FOR PEACE WITH A CONFRONTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE ONLY TOO READY TO UNDERCUT THE U.S. PEACE EFFORT AND SEEK TO BLACKEN ISRAEL'S NAME AND TO DISCREDIT SADAT AND OTHER PEACE INCLINED ARAB LEADERS.

עו 100

רמיה

שחח רחמי אורחם שחבה מוכל ממכלל ממכלל מצאם מאום אב מעת הסכרה מזהם חקר רם אמך

תעורר אסגבני הסטוריה פתול רעיה חרב

מכ/ממ

Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) used the Easter recess to make a visit to Israel and, according to reliable informants, he delivered a tough message.

The New York senator, who has long been one of Israel's strongest supporters in Congress, warned Prime Minister Menachem Begin that his policies were too inflexible, and that many senators who had stood with Israeli governments in the past could no longer be counted on to do so. Javits told the Israeli leader that only a few more than half the 100 senators could be counted on now—an estimate that may have been more diplomatic than precise. Javits reportedly carried the same message to other Israeli politicians.

Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), another longtime supporter of Israel, holds views similar to Javits'. He gave an interview to The Wall Street Journal recently that revealed some of his discomfort at Begin's current policies. Ribicoff aides said the reaction from the American Jewish community was generally supportive.

◊◊◊

House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Tex.), who won his No. 2 leadership post by a one-vote margin over Rep. Phillip Burton (D-Calif.), is trying hard to prevent Burton from getting so close again. After Burton spoke like a candidate again at a Florida convention of labor leaders last winter, Wright's supporters started trying to lock up the next election and leaked word that 193 Democrats who hope to return next year promised to support Wright. That's two-thirds of the House Democrats.

It would be most unusual for a sitting leader to be knocked off. But it also wouldn't be very politic to say no when a sitting leader who can grant favors asks your support. It could be different when the decision is made by secret ballot at a caucus of House Democrats in December.

◊◊◊

The campaign financing controversy in the House is far from over. Democratic leaders plan to retract their offer to Republicans to restore 100 percent of the party contribution limits when they bring the once-defeated bill back to the House floor in the next couple of weeks. They are considering restoring only a portion, perhaps as little as half, of the \$50,000-per-

The Capitol



candidate limit parties now may make. Since Republican Party organizations have raised nearly four times as much as Democrats, they are expected to fight the issue bitterly again.

Democratic leaders also do not intend to allow a vote on public financing of House races which they blame for defeat of the bill before. Liberals are organizing to fight the leadership on that issue and may try to defeat the rule permitting consideration of the bill if it does not provide for a public financing amendment. The public affairs lobby Common Cause fired the first salvo, warning leaders in a letter that Tongsun Park placed a "Congress for Sale label" on the House and that the House must give up reliance on private contributions.

Korean Tongsun Park's large cash gifts to congressmen may not have been the best choice of arguments to make with Speaker O'Neill, who is extremely sensitive to charges that he accepted Park's largess, at least to the extent of two birthday parties.

◊◊◊

In two weeks it will be a year since President Carter sent Congress his energy bill calling the issue "the moral equivalent of war." Congress hasn't passed a bill yet. It bogged down last fall in House-Senate disputes over whether to continue price controls on natural gas and whether to tax up the price of domestic crude oil to reduce consumption. House-Senate gas conferees have agreed to gradual deregulation but are still fussing over the details of how finally to end price controls and incremental pricing—whether low priority industrial users should be forced to bear the price increase until it reaches a certain level when it would spill over on home heaters.

Several self-imposed deadlines have now gone by. There is increasing talk again that if the gas issue

isn't settled in a couple of weeks it will be dropped and remain the divisive issue it has been for 24 years.

Meanwhile, the crude oil tax continues to evoke passion, with liberals calling it a regressive rip-off of the poor and the oil industry insisting that it be given part of the tax receipts to look for more oil.

When Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger and House energy leaders, Reps. Lud Ashley (D-Ohio) and Al Ullman (D-Ore.), met with oil people last week, Rep. Toby Moffett (D-Conn.) said Schlesinger and the others had promised the oilmen \$35 billion and other goodies if they helped pass the tax.

But House energy staffers said Moffett had it backward. What happened, they said, was that Schlesinger and the House people reminded the oil people of the tax credits and intangible drilling cost exemptions in the bill which they won't get if it dies. Schlesinger also made it clear that the administration would not use its power to raise oil prices if the oil tax is rejected.

◊◊◊

A group of young House Democrats including Reps. Andrew Maguire (N.J.) and Peter Kostmayer (Pa.) went to Speaker Tip O'Neill recently asking that he pressure the party caucus to strip Rep. Charles Diggs (D-Mich.) of his chairmanship of the District of Columbia Committee and the International Relations African subcommittee because of his indictment on charges of payroll kickbacks.

O'Neill reacted negatively, saying Diggs should be presumed innocent until proven guilty and added, after checking with black leaders, that the Congressional Black Caucus would make it a black-white issue should Democrats try to strip the senior black congressman of his chairmanships at this stage.

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In Congress next week:

The Senate will continue debating the Panama Canal accord after taking up the farm conference report on Monday.

The House will vote on the farm bill, the bill setting ceilings on the White House staff which failed under a quickie procedure to make it by two-thirds vote last week but now can get by on a majority, and rules of ethics for all government employees.

—Richard L. Lyons

מברק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

אב: המשרד
תא: 1010

סמור
מיד"י

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ק"א
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מס" 284
נשלח: 1319000 אמר 78
נתקבל: 140235

ואל נאמריא, והטקס לשכנת רחמי.

אנ רצוני לתפגרת ושומת לבכם לנאום שנשא היום יעבצ במליאת
גם נש הנאום והנה רבה לעמדת ישראל בכלל ולעמדת ראש הממשלה ומאמציו
הן הם הנאום לשלום מפרט.

ועבצ שולח עותקי נאומי זה-עם מכתבי לואי גפרוים-לנשיא, מזכיר
עושיית, מדינת ישראל, אררטון וסוגדית.

א. גוזקתתי עם עוזרו של יעבצ ובדכותיו על הנאום. כמוכ"י חפניתי תשומת לבו
לפרק והערות של הנאום המתייחס ליציאת צה"ל מלבנון ואינו מתייחס
לעמדת התיים כמו המשתת א"י כניסת מחבלים, גורל הנוצרים, האיטיות
שמכניסה והתפרטות כוח אומ"י לאזור וכ"י.

יעזרו גורר שהספור ע"ד ומוזע לכב.

דפיה.

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ק"א
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4. מדינת ישראל
2. מדינת ישראל

ארוחת צהריים סנטור יעבץ - שר החקלאות מר אריאל שרון

שר החקלאות הדגיש בפני האורח ועוזרו מר מיטר לאקלנד כי הכניית השלום של רה"מ הינה בסיס הוגן למו"מ והיא למעשה הכניית השלום היחידה שהוצגה, אם כי טרם נדונה לפרטיה.

על עמדת ארה"ב אמר השר כי לאחר ששמעה את דעותיו של הנשיא סאדה בעת ביקורו בארה"ב סנו למחרון הקל והוא לחץ על ישראל ולא לשכנוע ארצות ערב.

בעת דיון על פרטי החכנית הישראלית ישראל יכולה להגמיש עמדותיה בסיני אולם אין כל אפשרות לגמישות ביהודה ושומרון.

ברמת הגולן יכולה לסגת מעט מהגבולות הנוכחיים אך לא יותר מהקוויים קלים עקב השיבות העומק האסטרטגי שהיא מעניקה.

בנושא יהודה ושומרון פרט השר, הוך הסתייעות בספה, אה הכנייתו האיטית של יישוב אלפי יהודים לאורך בקעת הירדן ובמידה מעטה יותר יישוב יהודים בין רכוזי האוכלוסיה בשארית שפלת גב ההר (ביו"ש) ובין יישובי ערביי ישראל - שלאורך הקו הירוק. תוך שמירה מספר מסדרונות מקשרים האחד באזור ירושלים רבחי (שלדעת השר חמנה כמיליון אזרחים) השני בין רמאלה לשכם והשלישי בין שכם לג'נין.

לדעת השר אין לישוב יהודים באזורי ריכוז האוכלוסיה הערבית בגב ההר: ג'נין, שכם, רמאלה וחברון (פרט לקרית ארבע). השר חזר והדגיש לאורך כל השיחה כי אין ביטחונו זו נוכעת משיקולים דתיים והיסטוריים אלא רק משיקולי בטחון.

השר אמר כי מספר האוכלוסיה היהודית בשנת 2000 יהיה 4,7 מליון ואם ינחננו ליהודי העולם אתגרים כישוב הארץ וכו' יהיו 5,4 מליון אשר הם יהיו המתיישבים בכל האזורים הללו.

הסנטור שאל על הנגב והשר השיב כי גם שם חהיה תנופת פיהוח. אולם ציין כי הבעיה המרכזית במיהוח הוא המים והמחיש את השיבוחה בתקריות המים בגבול הסורי מ-1964 בהם ראה חלק מהסיבות המרכזיות לפרוץ מלחמת ששת הימים. כמו כן הוסיף כי בנוסף לסקודות הירדן שבסוריה ובלבנון מצויים מקורות המים שלנו בגדה"ע וזו סיבה נוספת לצורך בהגנתם.

הסנטור שאל אם כן כיצד נהגו ב-19 השנים לפני מלחמת ששת הימים והשר השיב כי המצב אז יצר מצבי מחו ובעיות בטחון רבות.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The history of the United States is a story of growth and change. It begins with the first settlers who came to the shores of North America. These early explorers and settlers found a land of vast natural resources and a people with a rich and diverse culture. Over the years, the United States has grown from a small colony to a powerful nation. It has faced many challenges, but it has always emerged stronger and more united. The story of the United States is a story of hope and progress. It is a story of a people who have built a nation that is a beacon of freedom and democracy for the world.

The United States has a long and proud history. It is a nation that has made many contributions to the world. It has led the way in many areas, including science, technology, and the arts. The United States has also been a leader in the fight for human rights and social justice. It has shown the world that it is possible to build a better society. The history of the United States is a story of a people who have never given up on their dreams. They have always believed in a better future, and they have worked hard to make it a reality.

The United States is a nation of many cultures and backgrounds. It is a place where people from all over the world have come to live and work. This diversity is one of the strengths of the United States. It has allowed the country to be a leader in many areas. The United States has a rich and varied history. It is a story of a people who have built a nation that is a source of pride and inspiration for all.

הסנטור שאל לגבי הפרוש להחלטה 242 ותחולתה על הגדמ"ע. השד השיב כי הוא אישית אינו צריך להשיב על כך שהרי לפי הפיסחו הבטחונית אין כל אפשרות לגבישות בגדמ"ע ולנסיגה מסמ.

לדעתו ישנו רוב בישראל בנושא אי הנסיגה מהגדמ"ע, רוב אשר מורכב מאנשים מספלגות שונות ולא דוקא מספלגות הקואליציה. לגבי פתרון בעיית האוכלוסין הערבים שבגדמ"ע הרי שישנן אפשרויות שונות ותכנית האוטונומיה של רח"מ בהחלם נראית לו למרות הסכנות הכרוכות בה עבור ישראל.

על עיסקה הזבילה אמר השד שרון כי יש להחלם בעקרון הכריכה של המכירות לישראל, סעודיה ומצרים ואפילו במחיר דחיית העיסקה כולה כולל ישראל, והוסיף כי בעזרת ידידנו בקונגרס ניתן לרחות העיסקה.

הסנטור השיב כי אמנם הקונגרס הינו מוקד ידידותי לישראל וכידיד אמת רוצה לומר שהאסדה נמצאה בירידה ומספר ירדתי ישראל מחילים לחשוש האם אין בהתנהגותה של ישראל מכשול לתהליך השלום ואולי אפילו מנוגד לאינטסים לאומיים של ארה"ב. קו מחשבה זה יכול להקל על המימשל ללהוץ על ישראל וביחוד בתחם הסיוע שאינו פופולרי.

השד שרון גרס כי ניתן ללהוץ על ישראל רק עד שלב מסוים כי בנקודה מסוימת יתעורר "הישראלי המשובע" שיקרא ליציאה למלחמה לאחר כדי לזכות בנצחון שיחכן פעקב מניעת הסיוע יכול להלות בסכנה בעמיד.

מלחמה כזו הסתיים ללא ספק בנצחון ישראל למרות האבדות הרבות אולם הערבים יפסידו את כל השגיהם הטרינייים וארה"ב הפסיד את מעמדה שם כי ישונו חזרה לברה"מ.

בנושא לבנון הדגיש השד את זמניות שהיית ישראל שם ואת הסכנה צפריסה הסורית הן במיקומה הנוכחי בלבנון והן בסכנת פלישה דרומה שהגרם לאפשרות פגישה ארטילרית בריכוז האוכלוסיה והתעשים של חיפה.

שלמה גורביץ

מצמ"א

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כס. 48

אל: המסדר

נשלח: 041830 אפר 78

מאת: וואשינגטון

הזקבל: 050344 אפר 78

מ י י י

מנהל מצפא.

וועדת החוץ של הסנט-דיווח סנטור יעבצ מביקורו בישראל.

לקראת סיום ישיבת הוועדה היום, שדנה בהצעות הסנטורים קייס, אבורזק ודקונטיני-ראה שלנו - נתבקש סנטור יעבצ על ידי סנטור פרטי לסטור לחברי הוועדה רשמי מביקורו בישראל.

לובן פרטינו שרשמתי:-

יעבצ :- בביקורי בישראל מצאתי מידת הכמסה לגבי שתי שאלות:-
ככלית זה נכון ששתי הצלגות הראשיות-מפלגת העבודה ותל"כוד-מסכימות שהגדה המערבית מהווה בעיה בטחונית לישראל. קיימת אחדות דעות לגבי האיום שההוות הגדה לבטחונ ישראל. נקודה זאת מאד חשובה מאחר ומצביעה על אי גמישות, אפילו תקופת חמש שנים ומשאל עם לא מקנים לזה בטחונ. כל מה שלא יימשה יביא להקמת מדינה פלשתינאית, מטטר עצמי, אוטונומיה כל זה

Euphemism

סאדאת מציע ערבות של נייר שלא תעמוד במבחן. אינ מרווח לתנועה. אינ אני בא לשלול מסאדאת השגיו. אבל, תנאיו המוקדמים נוגדים מדיניותה המסורתית של ארצנו. ארצנו מתנגדת למדינה עצמאית. בטחונ ישראל חייב להבטיח בחשבונ ונהלכל בכל הסעי. קיימ משקע עשוק של אי אמונ. חייבים לתת זמן ובטחונות גדולים יותר שהגדה לא תשמש סדרב בלב ישראל. חייבים לתת למוחות הראציונליים תקווה.

קייס:- כולנו מעריכים מאד דבריך. הנאמר על ידך תואם דבריו של הנשיא שנאמרו לנו לפני כ-10 ימים. הנשיא אמר שאלה הן עמדות ארצנו. האי סאדאת הטכיים לנקודות אלה-הנשיא אמר כי לא כדאי To Press This Point.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including a signature and some illegible scribbles.

אין זה זרוש שנטייל לחצ על צד כל שהוא, הצדדים חייביני לשאת ולתת.

פרסי: -מתג והגובות ששמעת לגבי החלטה 242 והתנתלויות.

יעבצ: -קיימים תלוקיני דעות לגבי 242.

לחלטה שני קצוות זהים, היא דורשת נסיגה וגבולות בטוחים, לגבי
התנתלויות קיימת מתלוסת, נאחונ בגין בחירות בא החלקו סנוצאה מעמדתו
בנושא זה, הוא נסחר עקב מצע מפלגתו בחירות, הרוב בצ'כור תומכ בדומי
בגין בנושא 242 והתנתלויות, במיוחד, קיימת תמיכה בהתנתלויות בסיני.

פרסי: -נעקבות ביקור בגין כאן -גמחה ביקורת רבה באמצעי התקשורת.

פגשת בו לאחר ביקורו כאן, ואני רחמי בגין X Modified His position
or stuck to it

יעבצ: -אני נמנע בדרכ כלל מלדווח על דעות יום של ראשי מסללות
ועובאות לידיעתי בעקבות שיחותי עמו, השגריר שלנו נסח

בעת שיחותי עם רחמי בגין, בוודאי הוא דווח על כך לממשלתנו, סלית-

אני רשאי לומר כי רחמי בגין ממשיכ לציין הנקודה שישאל הגישה תוכנית

טובות, גשיא ארזכ הביעה תמיסנו בהן, סאדאת רשאי להגיש תוכנית משלו, בגין
לא קיבל אוחנ עד סה.

פרסי: -אני רוצה ומעוניין לראות את סאדאת מציע הצעות משלו.

אני רוצה שתחיינה שתי הצעות, אז ידונו בהן, אני רחמי בגין אמר שהכל

ניתן לטומי-אנו צריכיני לתקדם.

אני מקווה שכך יהיה.

נדסאן

ג.חמיד.

שמה חתם סוכנות סהבת גנאל אלה סהבת גנאל אלה סהבת גנאל אלה סהבת גנאל אלה
למנהל קר - רחמי אהן יחי

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

ג'ס
דאגס (יורק)

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס. 81

נסלח 291000 מרץ 78

התקבל 291419

זול: המשורד

חאה: אתונה

לשבת ומנכ"ל דע ושיינגטון (הועבר).
להיך לפי סוכנות הידיעות היווניות דברי הסנטור יעבץ בהגיעו לאתונה מישראל.

REFERRING TO HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL , SENATOR JAVITS SAID THERE WAS
REAL ISSUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER
WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS " THE TERMS UPON WHICH PEACE MAY BE
OBTAINED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT" .

" BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS A DISCUSSION ON DIFFERENCES OF
OPINION AS BETWEEN NATIONS OF GREST TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP ,
AND I AM CONFIDENT IT WILL BE RESOLVED, " HE SAID .

THE U.S. , HE SAID , IS COMMITTED TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY
OF ISRAEL , A COMMITMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTED IN CONGRESS .

ג'ס

נציבות

הזמן רחם שרחה שהבט מנכ"ל ממנכ"ל מעת הסברה מצפא מדחים חקר תעוד הסמורית

ולא יאמר ר. חוב

סא/נא

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

24 מרץ 1978

למחביר

בגלל ויל עמין - לעיתים (ולמחביר)

אל : סאפ"א
מרכז

מאת: צ. רפיה, וושינגטון

יזק

הנדון: הגובות סנטורים על המזה"ח

בצאתם מפגישה עם הנשיא בכיה הלבן ב-23/3, שוחחו
כמה סנטורים עם עתונאים שהמתינו להם.

להלן רישום מהוך הקלטה שנערכה.

בברכה

צבי רפיה

העחק:
הקונב"ל, שיקבו

(JAVITS) continuation

role fully and completely, in the utmost good faith. I think there is a lot to be said for those three positions. We knew this was a tough one, the president knew it was a tough one. And yet it is human nature that when you find you are actually finding it tough to be disturbed and to feel that it is very difficult, maybe impossible and therefore, to be somewhat discouraged. Personally, I do not feel that it should result in that. I urged the president to persevere. I believe the president will persevere realizing what is at stake in terms of peace in the middle east and peace in the world, and I would do my utmost to forward the process.

Q: Does the president feel the Sadat initiative is dead.

A: I never quote the president. But it is my belief that the president does not believe that it is dead. It is discouraging, it is disturbing, it is highly difficult, it looks very frustrating right now, but I do not believe the president feels it is dead. I hope and pray in the interest of peace for our world that he does not believe it is dead and I don't think he does.

Q: Would the arms package make things worse?

A: No, I don't really think the arms package is really all that significant. We will get a complete appraisal of the arms balance which will result from such an arms package. I have always believed that we will find a pragmatic way to keep our promise to Israel made in 1975 respecting these highly sophisticated aircraft and I think that we will work out some pragmatic arrangement with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia and I still think so and the president will give us plenty of turn-around time which is a very essential fact.

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס. 369
נשלח 21:00 21 פבר 78
התקבל 22:00 21

דואר (900)

אל: המשרד
מאת: רוסי

מצפא.

להלן הודעה לעיתונות שפרסם משרדו של סנטור יעבץ ובה עיקרי נאומו בואלאס טקסס ב-20 דנא.

DALLAS, TEXAS— CHARGES THAT ISRAEL IS HEAVILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STALEMATE IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS DISREGARD ISRAEL'S ESSENTIAL SECURITY NEEDS AND THE BASIS FOR BRINGING ISRAEL AND EGYPT BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, SEN. JACOB JAVITS SAID MONDAY NIGHT.

IN REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY AT THIS CITY'S TEMPLE SHEARITH ISRAEL THE NEW YORK REPUBLICAN DECLARED:

"SUDDENTLY, ISRAEL FOUND ITSELF PLACED IN THE DOCK ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE, AND MANY IN THE US MEDIA. IT IS BEING CHARGED IN THESE CIRCLES WITH PURSUING POLICIES AND TACTICS WHICH ARE ALLEGED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STALEMATE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS."

JAVITS SAID THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT NOW MUST BE FACED IS TO ANALYZE WHY AND HOW THE EUPHORIA WHICH SURROUNDED PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM LAST NOVEMBER "HAS GIVEN WAY IN JUST THREE SHORT MONTHS TO THE DIFFERENCES OF THE MOMENT."

"A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE PRESENT CONFUSED ATMOSHERE" HE SAID, "IS AN IMPLICATION PLAYED ON HEAVILY IN THE MEDIA, AND INCREASINGLY ENCOURAGED BY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT PRESIDENT SADAT MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION TO ISRAEL BY GOING TO JERUSALEM AND THAT ISRAEL 'OWES' SADAT A MAJOR CONCESSION IN RETURN."

"WE MUST BEAR IN MIND" HE SAID "THAT IT WAS NOT ISRAEL WHICH REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE OR DEAL WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS FOR 30 YEARS, THAT SUCCESSIVE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTERS FOR 30 YEARS OFFERED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES FOR PEACE AND THEREFORE AN OFFER TO VISIT SADAT IN CAIRO TO OFFER PEACE WAS NOT AN OPTION OPEN TO ISRAEL."

NEW YORK'S SENIOR SENATOR SAID "I DONT BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT EVERY ACTION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO TAKE EXCEPTION TO THIS SUDDEN TURNING OF THE TABLES ON ISRAEL IN OFFICIAL UNITED STATES OPINION RESPECTING THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE EGYPT ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS,

WHICH I

-2-

IMPASSE IN THE EGYPT ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS CONFUSED BY SOME UNNUENDO AND BAD FEELING".

HE PROPOSED STEPS TO RESTORE MOMENTUM AND TRUST TO THE MIDEAST PEACE MAKING PROCESS, INCLUDING CONVINCING JORDAN TO JOIN PRESIDENT SADAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ADDITIONALLY HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD WORK TO BRING THE CONCEPT OF "PHASING" TO THE FOREFRONT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO BRING SAUDI ARABIA INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

"IN MY JUDGMENT, MISTAKES HAVE BEEN MADE BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN— MISTAKES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE PRESENT IMPASSE." JAVITS SAID, BUT HE ADDED "THESE MISTAKES AND THE FAULTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED SO FREELY TO ISRAEL CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO OBSCURE THE BASIC TRUTHS THAT THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL REMAINS A FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF US FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES A STRONG ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST".

BUT HE CONTINUED "EVERYONE IS FOR PEACE AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAS CERTAINLY RUN GREAT RISKS FOR IT. BUT WHAT COUNTS MOST FOR ISRAEL, AFTER FOUR WARS OF SELF DEFENSE AND 30 YEARS OF TOTAL ARAB HOSTILITY, IS THE SHAPE OF THE PEACE WHICH ISRAEL IS TOLD IT IS BEING OFFERED. AND ON THIS QUESTION— WHICH IS THE BOTTOM LINE FOR ISRAEL — NOBODY SEEMS TO BE LISTENING SERIOUSLY TO WHAT ISRAEL IS TRYING TO SAY ... IS ISRAEL BEING CONDEMNED FOR MAKING COUNTER PROPOSALS? INDEED, WHY IS THIS PROCESS OF ISRAELI COUNTER PROPOSALS BEING CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSAULT ON THE GOOD FAITH AND POLITICAL HONOR OF PRESIDENT SADAT?."

JAVITS SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER ACCEPTS THE SINCERITY OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S BELIEF THAT PEACE WILL BE SECURED ONCE AND FOR ALL IF ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE TERMS HE HAS OFFERED AND ADDED THAT "I AM NOT CALLING INTO QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S BELIEF IN THAT REGARD".

BUT HE SAID "I DO OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE LACK OF SYMMETRY IN US POLICY WHICH SEEMS UNPREPARED TO ACCEPT EQUALLY THE SINCERITY AND

/...3

-3-

GOOD FAITH OF ISRAEL'S BELIEF THAT THE TERMS OFFERED BY PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD EXPOSE ISRAEL TO SECURITY DANGERS WHICH THREATEN ITS SURVIVAL AND WHICH IT CANNOT ACCEPT".

HE SAID THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S "ROLE AS MEDIATOR HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY ALLOWING FALSE EXPECTATIONS OF SUPPORT TO DEVELOP ON BOTH SIDES, FORCING IT INTO THE UNPRODUCTIVE ROLE OF PUBLIC REFEREE. THIS HAS ENCOURAGED BOTH SIDES TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REFEREE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT, INSTEAD OF NEGOTIATING WITH EACH OTHER".

JAVITS SAID THAT THREE ELEMENTS WERE NEEDED FOR THE PEACE PROCESS TO RESUME.

---"FIRST, WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO RETRIEVE PRESIDENT SADAT FROM THE POSITION FAR OUT ON THE LIMB, IN WHICH HE FINDS HIMSELF... ONLY BY BRINGING JORDAN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING THE WEST BANK CAN PRESIDENT SADAT EXTRICATE HIMSELF FROM THE POSITION OF BEING SELF APPOINTED NEGOTIATOR FOR THE ARABS".

---"SECOND, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ITS DIPLOMATIC ENERGIES ON BRINGING THE CONCEPT OF 'PHASING' TO THE FOREFRONT IN THE ACHIEVEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO ACHIEVE SOME INTERMEDIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL KEEP THE NEGOTIATING MOMENTUM GOING AND CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION IN AN ORDERLY MANNER OF THE MANY VEXATIOUS ISSUES WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED. SECESS WILL BREED SUCCESS AND TRUST WILL BREED TRUST".

--- FINALLY, "I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO INTRODUCE AN ECONOMIC PLAN FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ECONOMIC EQUATION IN MY JUDGMENT, OFFERS THE BEST MEANS FOR DRAWING SAUDI ARABIA INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEREBY OPENING THE WAY FOR BRINGING TO BEAR THE FULL WEIGHT OF SAUDI ARABIA WITHIN ARAB COUNCILS ON BEHALF OF THE PEACE PROCESS".

"THE CHALLENGE FOR ISRAEL, JAVITS CONCLUDED "IS TO PROJECT IN A VOCABULARY WHICH IS FULLY COMPREHENSIBLE TO US AND WORLD OPINION, A VIEW OF A NEW AND FORWARD' LOOKING SITUATION IN WHICH ITS SECURITY AND ITS ASPIRATIONS ARE ACHIEVED IN A SITUATION OF PEACE AND REGIONAL PROSPERITY".

AD KAN.

נ"ח

פחה רותם ס/רותם מנכל שהבט המנכל שמנכל מעה הסברה מצאא מזחיים חקר רים אגב

הסטוריה וח'ב

מב/חא

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר 6/10

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כבר קלע *מאמרים*

מאמרים

סודי
מאמרים (9/10)

אל: המשרד

מאת: זושובנסון

מס. 460

בשלה: 031900 אופק 77

בתקבל: 030204

מכל . דע: לשכת שהח ב"י .

הארוחה בוקר שסעד היזם הנשיא בבית הלבוך עם קבוצת סנטורים רפובליקנים העלה יעבץ
את . ענין המחויבות האמריקנית בענין אסף בתחום להסכם ארז"ב - ישראל שבלוחה
להסכם סיני - 2 .

יעבץ העלה זאת בצורה תקיפה וברורה ותבע מהנשיא קיום המחויבות הצ"ל . הנשיא אמר
בארוח חי משמעי כי יכבד המחויבות אלו . הדברים הצ"ל סיפר יעבץ לעוזרו לאחר
הפגישה .

רפ"ח

המחלקה מכל שהח ממכל ממכל מצפא חקר רח און
לכ/ח

מבקר נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

כל הסוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה
יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים),
חסיין - 1957.

אליאס (900)

מס' 568
נשלח 1100
נתקבל 77

סודי
סודי

אלה המשרד
מאת: ניו יורק

קדישאי בשביל רוחם
דע לשכת שהח.מככ
מאת רובינשטיין

להלן עיקרי דבריהם משיחת שהח היום עם סנטור יעקב (ב.וכחות
רפיה. רובינשטיין).

הסנטור הביע צער על שלא נכח בסעודת שהח עם חברי ועדת החוץ של הסנט
בוושינגטון. הוא ציין קטיווד כי סנטור קייס הוא ידיד גדול של ישראל.
אחייכ התעניין בשאלותיו של סנטור ריביקוף בארוחה שנראה ששמע כי היו
תוקפניות. שהח אמר לו כי הציג את עמדתו וכי שאלות ריביקוף לא היו
לעזר. יעבצ ציין כי ריביקוף ידיד ישראל.

בענין לבנון שאל יעבצ לעמדתו ושהח אמר לו כי הקושי הוא בכך שאיננו
יכולים להפקיר את הנואלימ וכך בחישארות המזבלימ ליד גבולנו.
בענין גנבה ציין יעבצ את נחישות החלטתו של הנשיא קארטר לפתוח את הים
ושאל לעמדתו כלפי הסובייטיים וחלקם בוועידה. שהח חזר על עמדתו והוסיף
בענין זה.

יעבצ ציין שאם כי יש לנו רוב של שני שלישי החומכ בנו בסנט ורוב מוצא
גם בבית הנבחרים ישנו סחפ מסויים בעמדתו בדעת הקהל ובקונגרס.
הסחפ בקונגרס נובע לדעתו מלחצ של ציבורי הבורחים על חברי הקונגרס
התוחים על עמדתו בין השאר בענין התנהלויות.

שהח ציין כי הממשלה הנוכחית טרם העלתה התנהלויות אלא כל הממשלתו
הקודמות וכי לא התנהלויות יהיו המכשול לשלום.

יעבצ ציין כי קארטר עלול להעמיד את יהדות ארהב בפני הבריחה הקשה בין
מה שהוא עשוי להגזירו כהגטרס לאומי של ארהב ובין

הלניאליות לישראל וביקש כי ממשלת ישראל WILL BEAR IN MIND
אפשרות זו, אם כי חזר על חמיכה המסורחית של יהדות ארהב ובידכ על
כונת שהח לערוכ מסע תמיכה בקהילות יהודיות אחדות.

שהח ציין כי אנו רואים בהחמזה רבה מתג נשק עי ארהב למדינות ערב ו
ספציפי את שיפוצ המיגים עי ארהב. וכי אנו מתגדים לככ(חרפ זאת סודי)

Handwritten mark

מחצית המאה
השנייה לפנה"ס

ס' פ' ת' פ'

מחצית המאה
השנייה לפנה"ס

מבריק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת השגר

כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (כסותון המדינה יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

= 2 =

רוצים כי ארוב תפוט מקום בריחמ במדינת ערב).
יעבצ עמד על הקשר בין סעודיה לארוב וסיפר על שיחותיו שלו בסעודיה שהיו ידידותיות. שהח אמר כי הקשר ידוע לנו וכי אנו מניחים שניתן לזגיע לאזור בקשר לירושלים (החשובה לסעודים) שיניח זעת המוסלמים באשר נקטומות הקדושים.

שהח נפגש הערב (בנוכחות רפיה) עם סנטור טטון. רוח הדברים היחה דונג (הוספת ראיון טטון הוברקה בפרד).

חג שמח

רובינשטיין

שהח רוח מנכל שתכט ממנכל אבריאל ששון מצפא חקר רח אמן

מב/ח

(א) (אם תהיה רוצה להעביר את המטרה הזו לטובת אחרים, תוכלי לעשות זאת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.)
התשובה היא שכן, כי המטרה הזו היא לטובת הכלל, ולכן היא יכולה להיות מיושמת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.
המטרה הזו היא לטובת הכלל, ולכן היא יכולה להיות מיושמת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.

המטרה הזו היא לטובת הכלל, ולכן היא יכולה להיות מיושמת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.
(אם תהיה רוצה להעביר את המטרה הזו לטובת אחרים, תוכלי לעשות זאת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.)

המטרה הזו היא לטובת הכלל, ולכן היא יכולה להיות מיושמת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.
(אם תהיה רוצה להעביר את המטרה הזו לטובת אחרים, תוכלי לעשות זאת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.)

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(אם תהיה רוצה להעביר את המטרה הזו לטובת אחרים, תוכלי לעשות זאת באמצעות תרומה או מתנה.)

שה"ח, רוח"מ, שתכ"ס, מנכ"ל, מצפ"א, ר/אמ"ן, רס.

ל
רוח"מ
4/7

רושינגטון

סודי ביותר

סיידו

ה מ ש ר ד

בראון, רפית.

שיחת רוח"מ-יעבץ ב-4/7.

נכחו לואיס, לוקלנד, דיניץ, אבנר, פתיר והח"מ.

רוח"מ אמר כי הוא מצפה לפגישתו עם קרטנר ושוחח איתו בגילוי לב גמור וישתדל להגיע
אתו להסכמה. יעבץ אמר כי "ההסכמה" נקודה חשובה מאוד. עמדת הנשיא היא ידידותית
הוא נאמין שתמצא שפה משותפת טובה בין שני האישים אם כי זה עדיין לא מכטיח . DEAL
יעבץ הדגיש את החשיבות של דעת הקהל בארה"ב והעיתוי של ביקור רוח"מ. לפי הפתגם
הידוע כי לפעמים לא חשוב מה הן העובדות האמיתיות אלא מה שהשומע חושב שהן. התמיכה
בישראל בקונגרס עדיין לא התערערה אולם הוא היה מתקשה לגייס כיום 76 סנטורים
למכתב תמיכה בישראל. לדעתו עדיין אפשר לגייס שני שלישי מהסנט לנשימה כזאת. הוא לא
רואה נטיה בקונגרס לקצץ בסיוע הכלכלי בישראל אולם חברי קונגרס רבים אומרים
"הבה נעצור לרגע ונראה מה ישראל מתכוננת לעשות".

בהתייחסו לדברי יעבץ על שני שלישי אמר רוח"מ כי פירושו שכ-67 סנטורים יתמכו בנו
גם כעת וזה מספר לא מבוטל.

יעבץ אמר כי כאשר לעיתוי הביקור הזה יהיה . DECISIVE AND DEFINITIVE
הנשיא רוצה לקדם את תהליך השלום כמז"ת. והוא לא יכול להגזים כלל בתיאור החשיבות
של ביקור רוח"מ. אם ייווצר קפאון בשיחות עם הנשיא אל לו לרוח"מ לעזוב את רושינגטון
עד שלא תמצא גישה אחרת. כן הוא לא מיעץ שרוח"מ יחזור הביתה כדי "להרהר" בנושאים.

מר בגין ענה כי הוא מקבל דבריו אלה של יעבץ.

DATE, TIME, LOCATION, WEATHER, WIND, etc.

PROCEED

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OFFICE

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AND LOCATION

DATE, TIME, LOCATION, WEATHER, WIND, etc.

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סודי ביותר

מיידו

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יעבץ המשיך שהקהילה היהודית אינה מנחלת את ארצ"ב. על אף החשפעה והיוקרה שיש ליהודי ארצ"ב אי אפשר להניח מראש ששאר הנקוט עמדות המנוגדות למדיניות הנשיא. כל עוד שיש ליהודי אמריקני דולר אחד ייתן אותו לישראל אבל אין להגזים בהערכת החשפעה הפוליטית של יהודות ארצ"ב.

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN YOU ALLOW YOUR STRUGGLE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ARABS TO THE US.

⊙ and

רוח"מ הודה ליעבץ על הערכותיו. אמר כי הוא יוצא לארצ"ב עם תקווה גדולה בלבד. ציין במיוחד את המשפט האישי בברכת קרטז אליו. רוח"מ אמר כי הוא לא אתב את הודעת מחמ"ד על המז"ת אולם מדבר רע צמחה סוכה. הנשיא אשר הודעות נוספות ומחכה לביקורו.

רוח"מ הסביר בהרחבה את האחריות ההיסטורית המיוחדת המוטלת על הדור שלנו - דור השואה והתקומה. זה דור תנ"כי שכל הישג הוא תוצאה של סבל וקרבת. כל מטרתו להגיע למצב בו ילד יהודי יוכל לחיות כאדם חופשי ולא תחת איום של הרג. אם סאדאת יעמוד על נסיגה לגבולות 67 ומדינה פלשתינאית תשעים ושבע אחוז מאישיש יתנגדו לתביעה זו. תביעה זו אינה בסיס לשלום כי שלום כזה יהיה חסר כל תוכן.

אנו רוצים במו"מ שיוביל לחתימה חוזי שלום. בחוזי שלום יש כל מהות שלום הם כוללים סיום מצב המלחמה, קביעת גבולות, סעיפים דיפלומטיים, סעיפים פוליטיים וסעיפים כלכליים אנחנו לא רוצים יותר מאחרים, אך גם לא פחות. חוזה שלום הוא הדבר המקובל ביחסים

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סודי ביותר

מייד

- 3 -

בינלאומיים. רוח"מ ציין כי הוא שמח שגם דובר מחמ"ד השתתף במונח "חזרה שלום".

אנו מוכנים ללכת לג'נבה אחרי החגים, כ-10 באוקטובר ^{לפני} מו"מ ללא תנאים מוקדמים. אין אנו מעוניינים בסתבת או ברווח זמן אנו רוצים בשלום.

יעבץ אמר כי הנשיא ישאל את רוח"מ למה ישראל זקוקה לבטחונה בגדה המערבית.

רוח"מ אמר כי שג' ארה"ב מסר לשה"ח שהנשיא מצפה לשמוע דברים ספציפיים לגבי כל שלוש הגזרות. יש לו רעיונות והוא יביא אותם לממשלה לפני נסיעתו אולם הסנטור בודאי יסכים שהנשיא צריך להיות הראשון שישמע רעיונות אלה מפיו. עד כאן השיחה.

טעונים דומים אם כי בקצרה העלה יעבץ גם בשיחותיו עם שה"ח ושתב"ס. פיסר ליקלנד אמר לי אחרי השיחות כי הבעיה המקרית שלנו היא שקרטר על סף המסקנה שישראל היא המכשול העיקרי לשלום. אם אכן יגיע הנשיא למסקנה כזו מצבנו יהיה קשה.

מ. רביב

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ALEXNDRIA, EGYPT, JULY 10, REUTER -- PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT HAD LUNCH AND TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS HERE TODAY WITH U.S. SENATOR JACOB JAVITS, THE OFFICIAL MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) REPORTED.

THE REPUBLICAN SENATOR FROM NEW YORK, A PROMINENT JEWISH SPOKESMAN, IS ON A MIDDLE EAST TOUR. BEFORE COMQNG HERE HE HAD TALKS WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN.

SENATOR JAVITS, WHO ARRIVED HERE ON FRIDAY, ALSOLMET MR. SAYED MAREI, SPEAKER OF THE EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENT, MENA SAID.

REUTER MM/KR

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day for (02/1/77) [Signature]

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ALEXANDRIA-JAVITS 2
 JAVITS, WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD VISITED ISRAEL, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND A UNANIMOUS VIEW THAT +THIS IS THE TIME TO TRY FOR PEACE.+
 OF THE ARAB LEADERS, JAVITS SAID +SUCH IMPLICATIONS DRAWN FROM THE (U.S.) PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS THAT THEY WOULD GET EVERYTHING THEY WANT WITHOUT COMPROMISE HAS NOW BEEN DISPELLED.+
 +NATURALLY, WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAYS CANNOT BE ERASED,+ THE SENATOR COMMENTED. +BUT NO ONE IS STAMPING HIS FOOT AND SAYING THAT, UNLESS YOU WITHDRAW, WE'RE NOT GOING TO GENEVA OR UNLESS YOU AGREE TO GIVE UP EVERYTHING WE'RE NOT GOING.+
 INTERESTINGLY, HE REMARKED, NONE OF THE ARAB LEADERS WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN REFUSED TO GO TO GENEVA WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS ASSERTED ISRAEL'S HISTORIC RIGHT TO THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER.
 BEGIN'S ELECTION WAS +BEING ACCEPTED AS THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE

OF ISRAEL, AND THAT'S THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS TO BE DEALT WITH.+
 JAVITS FEELS ISRAEL HAS A +LEGITIMATE AND REAL CONCERN+ ABOUT THE CREATION OF A PALESTINE STATE IN ITS BORDERS THAT WOULD BE DOMINATED BY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), WHICH HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF THE JEWISH STATE. ISRAEL, IN TURN, HAS REFUSED TO DEAL WITH THE PLO.
 (MORE)

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ALEXANDRIA-JAVITS 3

+THERE IS A REALLY DEEP CONVICTION IN ISRAEL THAT IT SIMPLY CANNOT ALLOW A PLO STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND HOPE TO SURVIVE.+ SAID THE SENATOR, WHO IS ONE OF ISRAEL'S STAUCHEST SUPPORTERS IN CONGRESS.

BUT, HE ADDED, +I WOULD NOT RULE OUT ANYTHING FOR THE WEST BANK WITH THE CONTEXT OF ALL THE GIVE AND TAKE POSSIBLE.+

WHILE PRESIDENT SADAT HAS MAINTAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES HOLDS 99 PER CENT OF THE CARDS AT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TABLE BECAUSE OF ITS STRONG TIES WITH ISRAEL, JAVITS HOLDS:

+THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DIRECT OR MAKE ANYONE DO ANYTHING. BUT THE UNITED STATES CAN BE A VERY IMPORTANT INTERMEDIARY AND

MEET ATTR BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEN THE MANY, MANY ITEMS OF GIVE AND TAKE THEY HAVE BEGUN TO BE DISCUSSED, AND I BELIEVE THERE IS A

VERY RECEPTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD GETTING AT IT.+

JAVITS IS HOPEFUL THAT STAFF PREPARATIONS FOR GENOVA CAN NOW BEG~~IN~~ AND +CLEAR A LOT OF UNDERBRUSH AND SOLVE MANY ISSUES AT A STAFF LEVEL AND LEAVE AS FEW AS POSSIBLE FOR THE TOP NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS BY ANYONE.+

(END) 7DCOLLING

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

דף מספר 1 מתוך 3 דפים
עותק מספר 9 מתוך 5 לעותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

אל: רוזשינגטון
מאת: המשרד

מס 105
נשלח 062030 יולי 77

מ י ד י

על
דו"מ
(ס/מ) 1/10
יח"ק

בראונ, רפ"ח.

חת דהם - יעבצ ב-4/7.

נכחו לואיס, ליקלנד, דיניצ, אבנר, פת"ר והח"י.

דומ אמר כי הוא מאפה לפגישתו עם קארטר, ישוחח איתו בגילוי לב גמור וישתדל להגיע אחר להסכמה. יעבצ אמר כי ** ההסכמה ** נקודה חשובה מאוד. עובדת הנשיא היא ידידותית.

הוא מאמין שתמצא שפה משותפת טובה בין שני האישים אם כי זה עדיין לא מבטיח DEAL. יעבצ הדגיש את החשיבות של דעת הקהל בארצות הברית של ביקור הח"י. לפי הפתגם הידוע כי לפעמים לא חשוב מה הם העובדות האמיתיות אלא מה שהשופט חושב שהן. התמיכה בישראל בקונגרס עדיין לא התערערה אולם היא נתקשה לגייס כיוזם 76 סנטורים למכתב תמיכה בישראל. לדעתו עדין אפשר לגייס שני שליש מהסנאט למשימה כזאת. הוא לא רואה נטייה בקונגרס לקצב בטיוע הכלכלי בישראל. * חברי קונגרס רבים אומרים ** הכו נעמוד לרגע ונראה מה ישראל מתכוננת לעשות **.

כהתייחסו לדברי יעבצ על שני שליש אמר רה"י כי פירושו שכ-87 סנטורים יתמכו בנו גם כעת וזה מספר לא מבוטל.

יעבצ אמר כי באשר לעיתוי, הביקור הזה יהיה DECISIVE AND DEFINITIVE.

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר 2 מתוך 3 דפים
עותק מספר 9 מתוך 35 עותקים

סודי ביותר

הנשיא רוצה לקדם את תהליך השלום במזרח. זהו לא יכול להגזים כלל בתיאור החשיבות של ביקור רחמי. אם יוצא קפאונג בשיחות עם הנשיא אל לו לרהם לעזוב את רושינגטון עד שלא תמצא גישה אחרת. כן הוא לא מיינע שיהם יחזור הביתה כדי יי'להודי'י בנושא'מ. מ' בגי'נ ענה כי הוא מקבל דמיון אלה של יעבצ. יעבצ המטי'כ שהק'ילה היה'יית אינה מנהלת את ארה'בי. על אפ' ההשפעה וה'וקדה שיש ליהודי ארה'בי אי אפשר להניח מראש ש'הק'ילה היהודית תנקוט עמדות המנוגדות לנאי'יות הנשיא. כל עוד שיש ליהודי אמריקני דולר אחד ייתג' אותו ליש'חל אבל אינ' להגזים בהערכת ההשפעה הפוליטית של יהדות ארה'בי.

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN YOU ALLOW YOUR STRUGGLE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE ARABS TO THE US.

XXX

אמר

רוחם הודה ליעבצ על הערכותיו. אמר כי הוא יוצא לארה'בי עם תקווה גדולה בלב. צי'נ במיוחד את הנאנט האישי במסכת קארטר אליו. רחמי אמר כי הוא לא אהב את הודעת מחמדי על המזתי אולם מדבר רע צמחה טובה. הנשיא אמר הודעות נוספות ומחכה לביקורו. רחמי הסביר בהרחבה את האחריות הוויסטורית המיוחדת המוטלת על הדור שלנו- דור השואה והתקונה. זה דור הנכיי שכל הישג הוא תוצאה של טבל וק'בנות. כל נפיתו להגיע למצב בו ילד יהודי יוכל לחיות כאדם הונשי ולא תחת איום של הרג. אמ סאדאת יעמוד על נסיוה לגבולות '6 ומדינה פלשתינאית תשעי'מ תבע אחוז במדינה יתנגדו לתביעה זו. תביעה זו אינה בסיס לשלום כי שלום כזה יהיה חזר כל תוכנ. אנו רוצים כסומי שיובי'ל לחתימת חוזה שלום. בחוזה שלום יש כל מהות השלום. הם כוללים סיום מצב המלחמה, קביעת גבולות, סעיפים דיפלומטיים, סעיפים פוליטיים וסעיפים כלכליים. אנחנו לא רוצים יותר מאהדים, אכ'גמ לא פחות. חרזה שלום הוא הדבר המקובל ביחסי'מ בינלאומיים. רחמי צי'נ כי הוא שמח שגמ דובר מחמדי השתמש

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

-3-

במונחי חוזה שלומיים.

אנו מוכנים ללכת לגנבה אחרי החגים, ב-10 באוקטובר ולנהל מוטי כלא תנאים מוקדמים, איננו מעוניינים במחבת או בדיווח זמן אנו רוצים בשלום.

יעבצו אמר כי הנשיא ישאל את רחמי למה ישראל זקוקה לבטחונה בגדה המערבית.

רחמי אמר כי שגי ארהב מסר לרחמי שהנשיא מצפה לשמוע דוברים ספציפיים לגבי כל שלוש הגזרות. יש לנו רעיונות והוא יביא אותם לממשלה לפני נטיעתו אולם הסנטור בודאי יזכיר שהנשיא צריך להיות הראשון שישמע רעיונות אלו מפיו. עד כאן הענינה.

טעונים דומים, אם כי בקצרה, העלה יעבצו גם בשיחותיו עם שהחי ושהבטי פיטר ליקלנד אמר כי אחרי השיחות כי הנכעיה העיקרית שלנו היא שקצאמר על סף המסקנה ש'ישראל היא זמכשול העיקרי לשלום, אם אכן יגיע הנשיא למסקנה כזו מצבנו יהיה קשה.

מ.ו.כ.כ.

שהח רחמי שהבטי נבכל נצפא-רנ"כ דיניצ ר/אמנ רם
ח/יכ

מברק יוצא-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לחיזוק דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

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
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משרד יעבב.

ב-1 ביולי פגש יעבב את שר האוצר וסגנו פלוסינג. שר האוצר הסביר בהרחבה את הפעילות והמרכזיות בהן ימלא ותנן צימצום הגרעון במאמצים השלומיים, רישיון האינפלציה ועידוד הנתיחה הכלכלית של המשק. בהקשר זה צמד על השיבות וסידוע שאנו מקבלים מארה"כ הוכיח ובעת הערכה על הסיוע מעבר וחלקו של יעבב בו. שר האוצר הדגיש את חשיבות המשק של הייצור תושות ובמיוחד ייצור ה-16. יעבב אמר כי היחס בקונגרס היה שאנחנו מעוניינים בייצור נשות בעיקר לשם ייצוא, הוא צופה לכך שאם הקונגרס יתמך שייצור תשות בועד בעיקרו לעודד המשק הכלכלי סבולוגי של התעשייה של הקשיים יפתח במקרה. (על זאת אמר לי היילנר אח"כ שאל נזלזל בקושי המצוט העומד לפנינו בכל סוגיות הייצור תשות).

מ. רביכ

שהי"ח דה"מ מנכ"ל שדבי"ט מ/מנכ"ל אלון וד"ס מצפ"א אלרון/כלכלית חקר
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שבדירות ישראל

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אל: מצפ"א

מאת: צבי רמיה

מצ"ב לעיונכם נוטח הדיון שנערך

במליאת הסנט ב-27 דנא בעקבות נאומו

של הסנטור יעבץ על מדיניות החוץ של הנשיא

קרטר. מרשומות הקונגרס ב-27 דנא.

ב ב ר כ ה,

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התקן:

המרכז

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY

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PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSAL

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I asked for this time this morning to speak about the President's peace proposals respecting the Middle East. Before I make my remarks in chief, I wish to make a short statement respecting my discussion with the President in the company of Senator Case, the Vice President, and Mr. Brzezinski, the President's adviser on national security affairs.

On Friday morning last, Senator Case and I met with President Carter, the Vice President and Mr. Brzezinski to discuss with the President the Mideast, Arab-Israeli issues and the perspective set out in the body of my speech being delivered in the Senate today.

The meeting was friendly and constructive. I share with the President the same objectives respecting the Mideast and our meeting was a discussion and not a confrontation. The President listened attentively to what I had to say and I was most interested in his comments. We did not seek to reach an agreement at this time on how U.S. Mideast policy is to be articulated and how differences which remain may be adjusted. But I am satisfied that we share the objective of a just and lasting peace in the Mideast and I feel that the President can greatly forward the prospects for success.

In this spirit, I felt encouraged by the President to place my position on the public record so as to invite informed debate on the crucial issues that are involved. This is the spirit in which I speak today.

It is my hope to work with the President and the President's advisers, with the Vice President, and the Secretary of State, and to do all I can to help to achieve the Mideast peace objective of the President and of the American people. I believe in time we have a good chance to accomplish it.

Also, I have advised the President of my intention to go to the Mideast as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the July 4 recess and the President has most generously invited me to continue our discussion further before I leave.

My purpose this morning is to open the dialog on a vital element of U.S. foreign policy from this time forward. We cannot erase, nor does anyone seek to erase what the President has said—that is history. Therefore, I would not ask any President to do that, certainly not President Carter, deeply as he has this issue in his heart.

Speaking in San Francisco on June 17, Vice President Mondale presented an official statement of President Carter's Mideast peace proposals. In my judgment, President Carter's intentions respecting peace in the Mideast are entirely creditable. Serious questions remain, however, as to whether the specifics of the Carter proposals, as spelled

out by Vice President Mondale, will accomplish the results which are sought by the President. Indeed, there are reasons to conclude that the Carter proposals will not succeed in their objective because they are unrealistic and fail to take account of certain of the key factors in the situation. By asking so much of Israel, and thereby requiring Israel as a matter of its very survival, to ask so much from the Arabs in return—things which may exceed Arab willingness to concede—the Carter proposals may in themselves undercut the possibility of a successful U.S. role as mediator.

My purpose is to open the dialog on this vital element of U.S. foreign policy from this time forward so that it may crystallize in the most constructive U.S. position and the most likely to forward Mideast peace.

The idea of trading territory for peace, which is the essence of the Carter proposals, is not a new one. Several years ago Israel's policy was described by Prime Minister Rabin as being one of trading a "piece of territory for a piece of peace" on a step-by-step basis. Now, President Carter is proposing a well nigh total trade of all the Arab territory administered by Israel for "total peace." In addition to Israel's return "to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967," President Carter has also proposed the establishment of "a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan" in the territory Israel withdraws from.

The persistent public advocacy by the President of the United States of Israeli withdrawal to approximately the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian "homeland or entity"—before the convening of the Geneva Conference, before there has been any meeting without preconditions between Israeli and Arab negotiators, even before Israel's new government took office—can only continue to feed Arab illusions that President Carter will deliver to them what they have been unable to deliver to themselves by any other means including the recurrent recourse to war.

Moreover, the President's advocacy of Israel's return to its precarious 1967 borders, side by side with a Palestinian homeland or entity is having the effect of putting the Israelis in fear of their survival and thus hardening the terms they feel they must insist upon. This in turn will make it harder for the Arabs to agree. As a result, the chances for Mideast peace may be lessened and the danger of war enhanced by a breakdown in the peace seeking process through overreaching.

This clash of frustrated Arab illusions and burgeoning Israeli fears when compressed into the pressure cooker of a short-term, "wrap it up" Geneva Conference can only produce more not less tensions and danger of yet another Middle East war. What had been hoped for as a move forward—and understandably different from Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy—was a call upon all the parties to Geneva and all issues to be on the table for negotiation without preconditions and with the United States in a mediating role between the parties. Even

Prime Minister Begin accepts this approach.

But, to be as specific as Vice President Mondale's blueprint of the administration's position, in advance of Geneva, has raised both Arab expectations and Israeli fears, thereby inviting failure.

It is not enough to state this conclusion. It is necessary to go further and to analyze why the proposals of the administration as confirmed by Vice President Mondale are becoming unrealistic.

As President Carter himself has emphasized, the United States is morally committed to the survival and integrity of Israel. And, notwithstanding the magnitude of the American contribution, the burden of assuring Israel's survival and integrity rests squarely upon the Israelis themselves—and rightly so.

Thus, the quality of the decision which Israel makes over the coming year with respect to the life and death issues that will be posed for it at the Geneva conference is of the highest importance to the United States as well as to Israel.

I am convinced that the highest quality of decision can only be made by an Israel which does not feel pressed to the wall. Nations under the threat of coercion from friends—or enemies—seldom make the most clear-sighted decisions. And, wrong decisions by Israel—either conceding too much or not conceding enough—carry the eventual risk of renewed war.

The three tangible Carter-Mondale suggestions are for:

First, Israel's return to 1967 borders with minor modifications, with security zones forward of these borders to be phased out as relations between Israel's neighbors—that is, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria—and Israel are normalized;

Second, A "homeland" for the Palestinians, "preferably" in some association with Jordan; and

Third, Diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Arab States and a phased achievement of real peace: with trade, open borders, et cetera.

Why are these positions unrealistic?

First, To establish forward security borders for Israel means some reasonable zone—say 20 to 25 kilometers—and in that zone it will be impossible to administer affairs for long—what with the PLO riflemen in the wings, the irredentism and pressure to get Israel out will be enormous—no organized administrative continuity is possible, propaganda and disorder will be the order of the day.

Second, The use of the term "Homeland" establishes at once a parallelism with the Jewish National Home in Israel and exactly contradicts an association with Jordan. Indeed, the basis for this association has not been properly laid on the Arab side. In addition, such an association neither assures control of policy nor even its own continuity. As a precedent there is Syria's abrupt denunciation of its union with Egypt in the United Arab Republic.

Third, The administration's proposals respecting a Palestinian entity is qualified by the phrase "preferably in association with Jordan." This phrase is loaded with ambiguity and uncertainty. Yet, the status of the proposed Palestin-

ian entity is one of the most crucial and disputed issues of the entire controversy. Whose "preference" is to govern? The Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO, continues to be recognized by the Arab governments as the "sole" representative of the Palestinian people. At the meeting of its governing national council in March of this year—the PLO conspicuously refused to moderate its demand for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state. Moreover, the political declaration issued at the close of that meeting gives no indication of PLO interest or willingness to federate a Palestine entity with the Kingdom of Jordan, as was formally proposed a few years ago by King Hussein and despite reported heavy pressure on the PLO to do so by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Fourth. The administration proposals are silent on three of the issues most crucial to the achievement of a lasting peace—Jerusalem, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. Does the return of Israel to approximately the 1967 borders mean that Jerusalem is again to be a divided city—a Middle East Berlin—with Israeli access again as difficult as in the year before 1967? What is envisaged under the Carter proposals for the Golan Heights and for Lebanon? Is Lebanon to remain territorially intact and under Syrian hegemony; and is the PLO to continue to have the right to exist as a "state within a state" there? These questions are crucial in themselves and related inextricably to the Golan Heights issue and the 1967 borders issue.

Fifth. The administration proposals suffer from the multiple deficiency of being too detailed in some respects, silent in other crucial respects, and—worst of all—open-ended in the final analysis. Hitherto, international efforts to achieve Mideast peace have rested upon U.N. Resolution 242 as reinforced by resolution 338. But now, according to Vice President MONDALK's speech:

Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace. Our concept was to use this framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

The implications of the above-quoted sentences are far-reaching indeed and may open a Pandora's box of new difficulties. How does one define "the parties concerned" as used above? Is the new "overall framework for enduring peace" intended to be merely additive to the existing language of resolution 242—which makes no mention of a "Palestinian homeland or entity"—or are its basic concepts to be opened up to redefinition or renegotiation? Is the Soviet Union to be a party to the definition of the new "overall framework for enduring peace"? Is the Security Council of the United Nations, which now includes the Peoples Republic of China, to pass upon or give it sanction to the new overall framework? By calling into question the status of resolution 242 and 338, the administration proposals raise new uncertainties. I believe that the central position of U.N. Resolution 242 should not be undermined directly or by implication. Its ac-

ceptance has been reiterated by the new Government of Israel and by all the other parties other than the PLO and it should be the basis for negotiations at Geneva.

The major criticism of the administration's proposals, in terms of the reaction of many of Israel's supporters in this country, derives from what appears to be an imbalance in what the Israelis and the Arabs are being called on to do.

Israel is being asked to agree in advance to retreat to its 1967 borders in return for a peace which will be phased in over a number of years. The territorial concessions which Israel is asked to make are of dual significance to the very essence of its national security. First, the territories which it has administered since 1967 constitute virtually the totality of Israel's bargaining power with its Arab neighbors. Second, Israel is convinced that its 1967 borders are virtually indefensible under modern battle conditions and as such would be a constant invitation to attack rather than a reinforcing element of a lasting peace.

On the other side, the Arabs are being asked to promise to accept Israel in peace at the conclusion of "phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace." This seems like being asked to pay heavily now in return for only the promise of a reciprocal benefit which is to be delivered at some indefinite time in the future.

The Israelis will clearly feel impelled to make high reciprocal demands on the Arabs in return for what President Carter is asking of them—demands which the administration proposals do not now seem to encompass.

If the Arab States come to believe that the Arafat "nonnegotiable demands" approach to relations with Israel can succeed, the temptation could be strong for them to try the Arafat approach to relations with the West in general respecting the OPEC oil cartel and North-South issues in particular. The United States has a very real and direct interest in seeing that the Arab States come to recognize that their relations with Israel must be based on a genuine acceptance of Israel's national integrity and vital national interests, too. On the grounds of national interest and security alone our interest in a secure Israel must be put among our priorities.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield to Senator BROOKE.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I first want to commend the distinguished senior Senator from New York, our most able colleague, for having made this statement. I know how strongly he feels about the Middle East. I know he has been concerned, as have many of us, about recent administration statements on the subject of peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Mr. President, purposeful ambiguity has its role in the arcane world of diplomacy so long as it makes a positive contribution to the achievement of desired ends. Recognizing this, many of us have been willing until now to forego extensive comment on the administration's ambiguous statements regarding the Middle East.

But ambiguity can also be of great detriment if it creates misperceptions as to actual intent. And it is becoming increasingly apparent that this is the danger that besets the current administration's approach to the Middle East.

It had been my hope that by now the administration would have clearly reiterated, by its actions and statements, a U.S. refusal to coerce Israel into accepting a dictated settlement. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. And I fear that the administration is drifting dangerously toward acceptance of the view that an imposed settlement might be justified. Such an approach would have a high probability of setting the stage for escalating tensions and greater disasters in the Middle East.

One of the serious consequences of the administration's ambiguous statements on the Middle East may be the creation of the perception in the minds of many in the Arab world that direct negotiations with Israel will be unnecessary because the United States will deliver Israel to Geneva to sign a prearranged dictat. Such an Arab expectation will never be fulfilled. Its creation, either by design or ineptness on the part of some U.S. officials could, however, stimulate an understandable hardening of Israeli positions in response to Arab intransigence stemming from such an expectation. Thus, ill-conceived statements on the part of the administration could threaten the very cause of peace which they are intended to promote.

This period of uncertainty requires constant affirmation of fundamental principles providing the anchor for U.S. Middle East policy. Three such principles come to mind.

First, Israel as an independent democratic state is a vital interest of the United States. Its assured existence is intimately linked to the survival of the values upon which our own freedom and form of government are based.

Our unqualified commitment to Israel's survival does not exclude a U.S. desire and need for amicable relations with the Arab States. There is no question that continued improvement of relations with various Arab States is also of crucial importance to our country. But, and this is fundamental, lasting improvement in relations with the Arab States cannot be obtained through a lessening of resolve to assure a viable Israel. Should that resolve weaken, the United States would sacrifice its claim to be a country of principle and honor. Friend and foe alike would have little confidence in our policies or intentions.

Second, it is peace, meaning not only the cessation of a state of belligerency but also normal intercourse between Israel and her neighbors, that is the goal. We must reject the temptation to impose "quick fixes" that do little more than provide interludes between periods of armed conflict.

Finally, the proper role for the United States in the Middle East must be as a mediator and not as a dictator of agreements. Those who would be tempted to impose a settlement on Israel are wrong. It is the Israelis, not ourselves, who must endure the immediate consequences of

any agreements. And it would be totally unacceptable for the United States to condition its relations with Israel on Tel Aviv's willingness to accept risks that we ourselves would find intolerable if confronted with similar circumstances.

Much has been said recently about a "peace offensive" by the Arab States. We all naturally welcome indications of moderation and restraint on the part of the opponents of Israel. But we also recognize that the term "peace" does not have a universal meaning for Israeli and Arab alike.

To many radicals in the Arab world, "peace" could only be achieved if Israel ceased to exist. Their "peace" would be that of the sword. Without question, these perpetrators of violence and hatred must be rejected.

Others in the Arab world believe "peace" means only a cessation of conflict with Israel by overt military action. To them it does not mean unqualified acceptance of Israel's sovereign status. "Peace" in this view, is merely the continuation of the struggle against Israel by means other than military force. To Israel and the United States, this restricted definition of "peace" is unacceptable. While it may promise a brief or even moderately extended respite from open warfare, it also will sow the seeds for future violence.

I am convinced that peace in the Middle East, to be worthy of the name, must include the following:

First. Recognized borders that provide adequate military and political security for the Middle East States.

Second. An end to the preaching of hatred and animosity toward one's neighbors.

Third. Free exchange of peoples and ideas between the various societies.

Fourth. Open trading relationships between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Fifth. An end to "political warfare" against Israel in various international forums.

But I also am convinced that it is the fundamental right of the conflicting parties to make the decisions regarding the risks to be taken in seeking peace. And only in direct negotiations will the opportunity present itself for the parties to hammer out agreements that will be effective in promoting peace in the area.

The United States can legitimately encourage the accommodation process in several ways.

First, it can indicate to all parties that its commitment to the continued existence of Israel is a principled one that will not be sacrificed to expediency or weakened by acceptance of nebulous formulas for peace. The best means of doing so continues to be a U.S. willingness to provide clearly needed economic and military assistance to Israel. Indeed, as many realize, unless the United States is true to its moral and security-related commitments to Israel, it could never be trusted as a reliable friend of Arab countries.

Second, it can demonstrate that support of Israel and good relations with Arab countries are not mutually exclusive goals. The extensive amounts of U.S. aid provided Egypt, Syria, and Jor-

dan in recent years and the close relations we have with Saudi Arabia are ample proof that this is not the case.

Finally, the United States can continue to offer its "good offices" as a mediator in the search for peace. While doing so it must clearly indicate that it will not seek to dictate the terms of a settlement, either by itself or in conjunction with other outside powers.

True peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through covenants freely agreed to by the involved parties in direct negotiations. Solutions imposed from without will be too fragile to accommodate the tensions that will continue to be characteristic of the Middle East for years to come. Israel and her Arab neighbors must be fully committed to the terms of an agreement if peace is to exist. Such commitment would be impossible under an imposed settlement.

There should be no doubt that pressures will increase for the United States and Israel to accept simple formulas for peace. Indeed, voices are being raised in this country insisting that Arab expressions of a desire for peace are sufficient justification for extensive concessions by Israel. These "simple formulas" remind one of H. L. Mencken's statement:

For every difficult and complex problem, there is an obvious solution that is simple, easy and wrong.

There are no simple, easy solutions in the Middle East. And neither Israel nor the United States can afford to be wrong in the choices that are made. Too much is at stake.

It is time for the present administration, the Congress and the American people to understand that the process of peace will be very protracted in time if it is to bring to pass the desired results. Our commitment must be for the long haul. And we must accept the financial and psychological burdens that such will entail.

Mr. President, the United States cannot afford to be an "uncertain trumpet" as it seeks to encourage the negotiating process in the Middle East. It is important that we do not mislead others into thinking that we will attempt to coerce Israel into accepting a settlement. To do so would be to risk miscalculations on the part of Israeli and Arab alike, the end result of which would likely be a disaster of unmitigated proportions. Therefore, it is important that the administration clearly indicate, in its statements and actions, that the United States rejects a coercive approach in its relations with Israel even while it undertakes to do everything that it can to encourage direct negotiations without prior conditions between Israel and the Arab States.

In closing, I would like to ask the Senator from New York one question. Is it a crucial point, and one that the Israelis have persistently and consistently argued, that they must negotiate directly with the Arab States?

Mr. JAVITS. That is correct.

Mr. BROOKE. But the Arabs have consistently said they will not negotiate directly with Israel; is that correct?

Mr. JAVITS. Exactly.

Mr. BROOKE. It is a question of direct negotiation between Israel and the Arab

States if we are going to get on with peace in the Middle East.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is exactly correct.

Mr. BROOKE. That is the point the Senator has tried to make.

Mr. JAVITS. That is exactly right.

Mr. BROOKE. I appreciate having that clarification, not that I had any serious question about it, but I think it ought to be made time and time again. The administration must be made more sensitive to the need for direct negotiations without preconditions between Israel and the Arab States if peace is to be given a chance. A dictated "Carthaginian" peace is unacceptable.

Mr. JAVITS. That is correct.

Mr. BROOKE. I thank my distinguished colleague.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Yes, I yield.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Following up the statement of the Senator from Massachusetts, can the Senator envision any kind of peace in the Middle East that is imposed on either side being acceptable to either?

Mr. JAVITS. I cannot.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Unless the United States is prepared, if we want to force a settlement, and have a modern day pax romana, to police it perpetually, not only would it be adverse to Israel and the Arab interests, but certainly to our interests, to try to impose something that they do not want.

Mr. JAVITS. And to Western European interests, which are so involved in the area.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Exactly. That is what I have had for years misgivings about. We can offer our good offices, if we can encourage the parties to meet in Geneva, to meet in Tanzania, anywhere where they can negotiate a settlement either face to face or, as the Senator has indicated, through the intermediary of some other parties that both can accept, that is fine.

But in the last analysis, an area that has lived together, sometimes in war but often in peace, for 3,000, 4,000, or more years, is going to have to settle its disputes among themselves. For our country, well-intentioned as we may be—and I emphasize well-intentioned, because we were doing wrong at the start, but we tried to impose in Vietnam our idea of a settlement, our idea of how that government should operate, and it did not work. We had neither the omniscience nor the omnipotence to impose our ideas of correctness.

To enforce our ideas of correctness in the Middle East, I just hope we do not make the same mistake there.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague for his contribution.

I yield to Senator SCHWEIKER.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. I thank the distinguished Senator, my friend from New York, for yielding. I would like to associate myself with the important speech of the distinguished Senator from New York. I think he was most articulate and most eloquent in his usual ability in expressing the concerns that many of us feel.

I think particularly the two points, as I see them, are, first of all, that we cannot, no matter what intentions or whatever our misguided idealism might be, expect that we are going to effectively thrust down someone's throat or impose a settlement on the parties that they are not in full accord with and are not of a mind as being a fair and equitable way to handle the situation.

Second, I believe if we get away from the principles of secure and defensible borders we are only kidding ourselves, and we have kidded ourselves before, because of the very turbulent nature of the Middle East, and we have got to have some long-lasting settlement that recognizes defensible and secure borders.

I again commend the distinguished Senator.

Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the important speech of the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS). I fully support his goal of stimulating the dialog on U.S. policy toward the Mideast. Peace in this divided region remains an important—if not the most important—element of our foreign policy, and we must proceed carefully and confidently. The distinguished Senator from New York has eloquently raised very important questions regarding administration proposals in this area, and I believe several of his key points are worthy of reaffirmation.

First, I feel the United States cannot and must not impose a peace settlement on the nations of the Middle East. Statements that merely imply this possibility, as the Senator from New York has pointed out, can only create fear and uncertainty in Israel, and renewed intransigence on the part of Arab nations. Second, Israel must be guaranteed secure and defensible borders if any forthcoming settlement is to be permanent. Surely we have learned this important point repeatedly during the history of the State of Israel.

Peace in the Mideast will not come about tomorrow—and may not come about at all if we do not respect the hopes and fears of the parties involved, as well as the political realities of the area. I would like to reiterate my feeling that, by raising these important concerns, the Senator from New York has performed a great service—not only to those of us in the United States, but to the citizens of all the nations of the Middle East.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I want to thank the Senator from New York for his great and enlightening speech about the administration's plan regarding the Middle East.

I would like to ask a question basically to repair my ignorance of recent history.

On page 5 of his statement the Senator says:

The use of the term "homeland" establishes at once a parallelism with the Jewish National Home in Israel and exactly contradicts an association with Jordan.

I believe the use of the word "homeland" is applicable in one case and is

not applicable in the other, and I agree on that certainly very profoundly. But I would like enough historical background—if the Senator please—to explain in what way this exactly contradicts an association with Jordan. Will the Senator comment on my lack of knowledge of the history of that?

Mr. JAVITS. Yes. The reason is that the virtue of the Jewish homeland was precisely in its sovereignty and autonomy. And the fact, the central theme, of the Jewish homeland was that persecuted Jews from everywhere, after the loss of 6 million in the Hitler holocaust, could gain admission simply by coming there to a place of Jewish sovereignty—a refuge. In this sense there is no analogy to a Palestinian "homeland." The Palestinians are Arabs and can, and have, found a "home" in many Arab nations. They are probably the largest group of all in Kuwait. Since, independence, sovereignty, autonomy was a prime requirement for a Jewish homeland, then the "homeland" analogy is particularly inappropriate for a Palestinian entity which "preferably" is to be federated with the Kingdom of Jordan and thus not sovereign and autonomous in the realm of foreign policy and defense.

Palestinian Arab refugees are already settled in many of the Arab countries, there is certainly no analogy to the lonely, persecuted dangerous position of the Jewish minority in the displaced persons camps of Europe who came into Israel when it was established as a state.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I thank the distinguished Senator from New York. That explains it very, very well.

I would like to ask further, then, in what existing nations is the Palestinian population spread at the present time?

Mr. JAVITS. To give the Senator the best—I think our time is up. May I ask the majority leader whether we are going to have a morning hour?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, by way of answer, is the Senator's time up?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MURPHY). The Senator's time has expired.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a brief period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to extend beyond 15 minutes with statements limited therein to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDWEST PEACE PROGRAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I do not intend to use this time to speak, I will just use it in answering the questions. I yield.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I simply wanted to ask that question.

Mr. JAVITS. Yes, where the populations are.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. The entities.
Mr. JAVITS. Well, the populations are concentrated, and I am drawing on my

memory, as follows: There are roughly 350,000 in the Gaza Strip, about 50,000 of those work every day in Israel.

There are roughly a half million or more in the West Bank. There are smaller numbers in Lebanon. My recollection is there are maybe 200,000, something like that, in Lebanon which includes a lot of the armed PLO.

In Syria there are smaller numbers. But the bulk of the population is concentrated in the West Bank and in Gaza and on the East Bank in Jordan.

In Jordan, itself, a majority of the population is said to be Palestinian. But the refugees in the camps are concentrated in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon. Those are the major concentrations of the Palestinian refugees who are professional "refugees" getting U.N. assistance.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. If the fondest dreams of the Palestinians were recognized and they were assigned a place for a homeland, does that mean there would be a movement of Palestinians from other parts of the world into that homeland the way in which the Jews went to Israel?

Mr. JAVITS. The only contemplation of that migration that I see is the concept of the incursion of a lot of PLO riflemen into the West Bank. The West Bank has 500,000 people now and it is not a very big place, so there is probably not too much accommodation just to move in, as it were, to vacant territory. No doubt there would be pressure to encroach on Israeli territory.

Those are, as the Senator has developed, a number of the reasons that motivated what I said about that issue.

I do not wish to let it go without saying that for years I have worked and fought for the support of the Palestine-Arab refugees in their resettlement, intelligent normalization of their conditions, and for the rights of the Arabs in Israel as full 100-per citizens of that country.

I have no truck with any discrimination of any kind or character against them anywhere, including in Israel.

But that is a very different concept from the threat which the Israelis feel pointed at their heart in a PLO West Bank state in the present rather crude state or relations between them and the Arab confrontation states.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I am grateful to the distinguished Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague.

Mr. President, Senator Case could not be here this morning. He accompanied me when we together went to see the President on Friday, and he has asked me to have printed in the Record a brief statement by him together with the text of a statement which he issued following his talk with the President.

I ask unanimous consent that these statements be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I would like to comment briefly on the meeting Senator JAVITS and I held with President Carter on Friday. It was a most useful

meeting, in my view, and such discussions help underline the continuing efforts to work out foreign policy matters on a bipartisan basis.

Because of the strong interest in the issue we discussed Friday—the Middle East—I thought it might be helpful to comment for the record on my views of some points which must be kept in mind in trying to work out a lasting Middle East settlement. We discussed these points at the hour-long meeting, which also was attended by Vice President MONDALE and the President's national security adviser.

The attachment is as follows:

COMMENTS BY SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE ON HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST

Speaking for myself, I raised the following issues with the President. I underscored the importance for the United States to keep Israel strong and to help Israel's economy as far as possible. I raised a number of specific coproduction requests made by Israel which have not yet cleared through the State Department and the Defense Department, despite the President's commitment to do his best in this respect. I emphasized that ambiguous statements by top administration officials encourage those in the bureaucracy who oppose coproduction to drag their feet. I agreed to, and I will, make available to the President a detailed memorandum outlining the specific cases and indicating where they are stuck in the system.

I also pointed out to the President that there were a number of reported violations of the Sinai agreements by Egypt, some of which are confirmed by the United Nations Emergency Force in the area. At the President's request I am preparing a brief on the matter.

I also emphasized my concern that some administration statements on the "homelands" question may cause unrest among the Arabs in the West Bank and possibly stimulate a power struggle among the local inhabitants and the PLO. It seems to me this would harm the effort to work toward peace in the Middle East.

Finally, I discussed with the President the effect of administration statements and "code words" used in those statements in respect of progress toward a Geneva conference. It seems to me essential the U.S. carry on its discussions with the confrontational states in the Middle East with a view toward acting as honest brokers as those states move toward Geneva. One real danger now is that American statements will raise unrealistic Arab expectations and Israeli fears in the area which will lead to further, and serious, instability, undermining our effectiveness.

In my view, which I made clear to the President, the bed rock of American policy must be to keep Israel strong and able to provide its own defense.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, as I conclude may I say two things?

First, this issue has always been a very strongly bipartisan issue. I hope it will continue so.

Mr. President, second, may I say that I have a deep and profound respect for the President, the Vice President, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski, for their good faith and good will in this matter. I hope that they will take what I have said as an honest expression of another view, which must be tested in the public domain just as the policy outlined by Vice President MONDALE must be. As we

know from recent history, American foreign policy must have public and congressional understanding and support.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President, the Senator from Florida states that as chairman of the Near East Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee our subcommittee welcomes the dialog and discussion of the steps that are now being taken and proposals now being made in order to bring peace to the Middle East.

Unless all of the views, those of the administration, and of those who raise questions, are aired we could in the process of trying to make peace stumble to everyone's great detriment and particularly now that the climate seems possible to have a meaningful dialog for peace.

The Senator from Florida assures the Senator from New York that his remarks, thought, and discussion with the administration are welcomed by all.

Mr. JAVITS. I am grateful to my colleague. He has helped me to put the matter exactly in the right context.

I yield to my chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator SPARKMAN.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I compliment and commend the distinguished Senator from New York for presenting a very clear and explicit viewpoint that no one could misunderstand.

He has always acted in that way. I have never found it difficult to agree with the Senator in his presentation.

After all, one objective toward which we all look and pray is the permanent peace in that troubled part of the world. I believe that all of this is aimed at that purpose.

I commend the Senator for presenting his views so clearly this morning.

Mr. JAVITS. I deeply appreciate that, Senator SPARKMAN, especially from so revered a Member as yourself. I pledge to you, as I pledged to Senator STONE and everyone on both sides of the aisle, that my full efforts will be expended in this spirit, on behalf of a just and lasting peace in Mideast.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, it is with pleasure I have the opportunity to join in this important dialog with my distinguished colleague from New York, Mr. JAVITS.

Like him, I believe it is time to formulate a constructive Mideast policy. Certainly our primary responsibility lies with bringing the Israeli and Arab States together. Our policy must not heighten already existing pressures, but instead, must offer temperate suggestions which may pave the way to a negotiated settlement.

I do not believe we need to reiterate the reasons why Israel must be acknowledged as a sovereign State. We all know she is. She has a right to expect that our overall objectives will be the preservation of her sovereignty. I do not believe it serves any nation's advantage to prescribe preconditions to resolution of the

conflict. We should not feel compelled to set the standards for settlement. We should, however, impose with the most urgency, the necessity for reconciliation of the opposing factors.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 242, adopted in 1967, together with SCR 338, have been accepted in principle as guidelines for future negotiations. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg recently said:

Despite the passage of time since the adoption of Resolution 242—and, perhaps, because of it—I adhere to the view that the Resolution does provide the basis to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement between the parties, provided they will come to share the will and courage to achieve a just and lasting peace, which is the goal of the Resolution.

As the Ambassador, I, too, believe we have a set of principles within which we may work. I see no reason to try to alter, or reexamine, or try to improve upon them at this point in time. We can be flexible, but this flexibility must come when all parties are gathered around the negotiating table.

In conclusion, I agree with my distinguished colleague when he said that the "United States is morally committed to the survival and integrity of Israel." Moreover, his statement that "Nations under the threat of coercion from friends—or enemies—seldom make the most clear-sighted decision," is absolutely correct.

I, therefore, urge the administration to implement its most persuasive diplomacy in drawing the Arab and Israeli States together. But, I do hope the President will refrain from setting arbitrary standards for settlement before the parties concerned can mediate their differences in the proper negotiating atmosphere.

We all have an important stake in the outcome of this settlement. Let us have the time to reach a settlement before it is too late.

Thank you.

Israel file

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS

by Senator Jacob K. Javits

PREFACE

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This morning I met with President Carter, in the company of Senator Case, to discuss with the President the issues and the perspective set out in the body of my speech which will be delivered in the Senate on Monday morning. My meeting with Mr. President was friendly and constructive. We share the same objectives respecting the Mideast and our meeting was a discussion and not a confrontation. The President listened attentively to what I had to say and I was most interested in his comments. We did not seek to reach an agreement on how U.S. Mideast policy is to be articulated and differences remain on how to achieve the objective of a just and lasting peace which we share. In this spirit, the President encouraged me to place my position on the public record so as to invite informed debate on the crucial issues which are involved.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS

(To be delivered on the Senate Floor
Monday, June 27, 1977
Embargoed for Sunday, 6:30 p.m.
June 26, 1977)

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS

Speaking in San Francisco on June 17, Vice President Mondale presented an official statement of President Carter's Mideast peace proposals. In my judgement, President Carter's intentions respecting peace in the Mideast are entirely creditable. Serious questions remain, however, as to whether the specifics of the Carter proposals, as spelled out by Vice President Mondale, will accomplish the results which are sought by the President. Indeed, there are reasons to conclude that the Carter proposals will not succeed in their objective because they are unrealistic and fail to take account of certain of the key factors in the situation. By asking so much of Israel, and thereby requiring Israel as a matter of its very survival, to ask so much from the Arabs in return - things which may exceed Arab willingness to concede - the Carter proposals may in themselves undercut the possibility of a successful U. S. role as mediator.

My purpose is to open the dialogue on this vital element of U. S. foreign policy from this time forward so that it may crystallize in the most constructive U. S. position and the most likely to forward Mideast peace.

The idea of trading territory for peace, which is the essence of the Carter proposals, is not a new one. Several years ago Israel's policy was described by Prime Minister Rabin as being

one of trading a "piece of territory for a piece of peace" on a step-by-step basis. Now, President Carter is proposing a well nigh total trade of all the Arab territory administered by Israel for "total peace". In addition to Israel's return "to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967", President Carter has also proposed the establishment of "a Palestinian homeland or entity -- preferably in association with Jordan" in the territory Israel withdraws from.

The persistent public advocacy by the President of the United States of Israeli withdrawal to "approximately" the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian "homeland or entity" -- before the convening of the Geneva conference, before there has been any meeting without preconditions between Israeli and Arab negotiators, even before Israel's new government took office -- can only continue to feed Arab illusions that President Carter will deliver to them what they have been unable to deliver to themselves by any other means including the recurrent recourse to war.

Moreover, the President's advocacy of Israel's return to its precarious 1967 borders, side-by-side with a Palestinian "homeland or entity" is having the effect of putting the Israelis in fear of their survival and thus hardening the terms they feel they must insist upon. This in turn will make it harder for the Arabs to agree. As a result, the chances for Mideast peace may be lessened and the danger of war enhanced by a breakdown in the peace seeking process through over-reaching.

This clash of frustrated Arab illusions and burgeoning Israeli fears when compressed into the pressure cooker of a short-term, "wrap it up" Geneva conference can only produce more not less tensions and danger of yet another Middle East war. What had been hoped for as a move forward - and understandably different from Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy - was a call upon all the parties to Geneva and all issues to be on the table for negotiation without preconditions and with the U. S. in a mediating role between the parties. Even Prime Minister Begin accepts this approach.

But, to be as specific as Vice President Mondale's blueprint of the Administration's position, in advance of Geneva, has raised both Arab expectations and Israeli fears, thereby inviting failure.

It is not enough to state this conclusion. It is necessary to go further and to analyze why the proposals of the Administration as confirmed by Vice President Mondale are becoming unrealistic.

As President Carter himself has emphasized, the United States is morally committed to the survival and integrity of Israel. And, notwithstanding the magnitude of the American contribution, the burden of

assuring Israel's survival and integrity rests squarely upon the Israelis themselves - and rightly so.

Thus, the quality of the decisions which Israel makes over the coming year with respect to the life and death issues that will be posed for it at the Geneva conference is of the highest importance to the United States as well as to Israel.

I am convinced that the highest quality of decision can only be made by an Israel which does not feel pressed to the wall. Nations under the threat of coercion from friends - or enemies - seldom make the most clear-sighted decisions. And, wrong decisions by Israel - either conceding too much or not conceding enough - carry the eventual risk of renewed war.

The three tangible Carter-Mondale suggestions are for:

1. Israel's return to 1967 borders with minor modifications, with security zones forward of these borders to be phased out as relations between Israel's neighbors (i.e. Jordan, Egypt and Syria) and Israel are normalized;

2. A "Homeland" for the Palestinians, "preferably" in some association with Jordan; and

3. Diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Arab states and a phased achievement of real peace: with trade, open borders, etc.

Why are these positions unrealistic?

1. To establish forward security borders for Israel means some reasonable zone - say 20 to 25 kilometers - and in that zone it will be impossible to administer affairs for long - what with the PLO riflemen in the wings, the irredentism and pressure to get Israel out will be enormous - no organized administrative continuity is possible, propaganda and disorder will be the order of the day.

2. The use of the term "Homeland" establishes at once a parallelism with the Jewish National Home in Israel and exactly contradicts an association with Jordan. Indeed, the basis for this association has not been properly laid on the Arab side. In addition, such an association neither assures control of policy nor even its own continuity. As a precedent there is Syria's abrupt denunciation of its union with Egypt in the United Arab Republic.

3. The Administration's proposals respecting a Palestinian entity is qualified by the phrase "preferably in association with Jordan". This phrase is loaded with ambiguity and uncertainty. Yet, the status of the proposed Palestinian entity is one of the most crucial and disputed issues of the entire controversy. Whose "preference" is to govern? The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continues to be recognized by the Arab governments as the "sole" representative of the Palestinian people. At the meeting of its governing National Council in March of this year- the PLO conspicuously refused to moderate its demand for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state. Moreover, the Political Declaration issued at the close of that meeting gives no indication of PLO interest or willingness to federate a Palestinian entity with the Kingdom of Jordan, as was formally proposed a few years ago by King Hussein and despite reported heavy pressure on the PLO to do so by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

4. The Administration proposals are silent on three of the issues most crucial to the achievement of a lasting peace -- Jerusalem, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. Does the return of Israel to "approximately" the 1967 borders mean that Jerusalem is again to be a divided city - a Middle East Berlin -with Israeli access again as difficult as in the year before 1967? What

is envisaged under the Carter proposals for the Golan Heights and for Lebanon? Is Lebanon to remain territorially intact and under Syrian hegemony; and is the PLO to continue to have the right to exist as a 'state within a state' there? These questions are crucial in themselves and related inextricably to the Golan Heights issue and the 1967 borders issue.

5. The Administration proposals suffer from the multiple deficiency of being too detailed in some respects, silent in other crucial respects, and - worst of all - open-ended in the final analysis. Hitherto, international efforts to achieve Mideast peace have rested upon U.N. Resolution 242 as reinforced by Resolution 338. But now, according to Vice President Mondale's speech:

"Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace. Our concept was to use this framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace."

The implications of the above-quoted sentences are far-reaching indeed and may open a Pandora's box of new difficulties. How does one define "the parties concerned" as used above? Is the new "overall framework for enduring peace" intended to be merely additive to the existing language of Resolution 242 (which makes no mention of a "Palestinian homeland or entity"), or are its basic concepts to be opened up to redefinition or renegotiation? Is the Soviet Union to be a party to the definition of the new "overall framework for enduring peace"? Is the Security Council of the United Nations, which now includes the Peoples Republic of China, to pass upon or give its sanction to the new overall framework? By calling into question the status of Resolution 242 and

338, the Administration proposals raise new uncertainties. I believe that the central position of U.N. Resolution 242 should not be undermined directly or by implication. Its acceptance has been reiterated by the new government of Israel and by all the other parties other than the PLO and it should be the basis for negotiations at Geneva.

The major criticism of the Administration's proposals, in terms of the reaction of many of Israel's supporters in this country, derives from what appears to be an imbalance in what the Israelis and the Arabs are being called on to do.

Israel is being asked to agree in advance to retreat to its 1967 borders in return for a peace which will be phased in over a number of years. The territorial concessions which Israel is asked to make are of dual significance to the very essence of its national security. First, the territories which it has administered since 1967 constitute virtually the totality of Israel's bargaining power with its Arab neighbors. Second, Israel is convinced that its 1967 borders are virtually indefensible under modern battle conditions and as such would be a constant invitation to attack rather than a reinforcing element of a lasting peace.

On the other side, the Arabs are being asked to promise to accept Israel in peace at the conclusion of "phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace." This seems like being asked to pay heavily now in return for only the promise of a reciprocal benefit which is to be delivered at some indefinite time in the future.

The Israelis will clearly feel impelled to make high reciprocal demands on the Arabs in return for what President Carter is asking of them - demands which the Administration proposals do not now seem to encompass.

If the Arab states come to believe that the Arafat "non-negotiable demands" approach to relations with Israel can succeed, the temptation could be strong for them to try the Arafat approach to relations with the West in general respecting the OPEC oil cartel and North-South issues in particular. The United States has a very real and direct interest in seeing that the Arab states come to recognize that their relations with Israel must be based on a genuine acceptance of Israel's national integrity and vital national interests, too. On the grounds of national interest and security alone our interest in a secure Israel must be put high among our priorities.

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כל המסר חוכן מספר זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך — עובר על החוק לחיקוק
דיני העונשין (בסחון המדינה
יחסית) ופירות רשמיים.
תשי"ז—1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס — מסווג

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מצפא.

להלן נוסח הנאום אותו עומד לשאת הסנטור יעבץ במליאת הסנט ביום ב' ה-27 דנא.
הנאום אינו מותר לפרסום לפני יום א' ה-26 דנא שעה 6.30 עון ורוטינגטון.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS,
BY SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS,
PREFACE.

THIS MORNING I MET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, IN THE COMPANY OF SENATOR FASE, TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT THE ISSUES AND THE PERSPECTIVE SET OUT IN THE BODY OF MY SPEECH WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED IN THE SENATE ON MONDAY MORNING. MY MEETING WITH MR. PRESIDENT WAS FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE. WE SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES RESPECTING THE MIDEAST AND OUR MEETING WAS A DISCUSSION AND NOT A CONFRONTATION. THE PRESIDENT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO WHAT I HAD TO SAY AND I WAS MOST INTERESTED IN HIS COMMENTS. WE DID NOT SEEK TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON HOW U.S. MIDEAST POLICY IS TO BE ARTICULATED AND DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON HOW TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE WHICH WE SHARE. IN THIS SPIRIT, THE PRESIDENT ENCOURAGED ME TO PLACE MY POSITION ON THE PUBLIC RECORD SO AS TO INVITE INFORMED DEBATE ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE WHICH ARE INVOLVED.

(TO BE DELIVERED ON THE SENATE FLOOR MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1977
EMBARGOED FOR SUNDAY 6:30 P.M. JUNE 26, 1977).

PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS.
SPEAKING IN SAN FRANCISCO ON JUNE 17, VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE PRESENTED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S MIDEAST PEACE PROPOSALS. IN MY JUDGEMENT, PRESIDENT CARTER'S INTENTIONS RESPECTING PEACE IN THE MIDEAST ARE ENTIRELY CREDITABLE. SERIOUS QUESTIONS REMAIN, HOWEVER, AS TO WHETHER THE SPECIFICS OF THE CARTER PROPOSALS, AS SPELLED OUT BY VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, WILL ACCOMPLISH THE RESULTS WHICH ARE SOUGHT BY THE PRESIDENT. INDEED, THERE ARE REASONS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE CARTER PROPOSALS WILL NOT SUCCEED IN THEIR OBJECTIVE BECAUSE THEY ARE UNREALISTIC AND FAIL TO TAKE

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כל המוסר תוכן מספר זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך — עובר על החוק לחיסון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסית) וסודות רשמיים.
תשי"ז—1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס — מסווג

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ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN OF THE KEY FACTORS IN THE SITUATION, BY ASKING SO MUCH OF ISRAEL, AND THEREBY REQUIRING ISRAEL AS A MATTER OF ITS VERY SURVIVAL, TO ASK SO MUCH FROM THE ARABS IN RETURN — THINGS WHICH MAY EXCEED ARAB WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE — THE CARTER PROPOSALS MAY IN THEMSELVES UNDERCUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL U.S. ROLE AS MEDIATOR.

MY PURPOSE IS TO OPEN THE DIALOGUE ON THIS VITAL ELEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM THIS TIME FORWARD SO THAT IT MAY CRYSTALLIZE IN THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. POSITION AND THE MOST LIKELY TO FORWARD MIDEAST PEACE.

THE IDEA OF TRADING TERRITORY FOR PEACE, WHICH IS THE ESSENCE OF THE CARTER PROPOSALS, IS NOT A NEW ONE. SEVERAL YEARS AGO ISRAEL'S POLICY WAS DESCRIBED BY PRIME MINISTER RABIN AS BEING ONE OF TRADING A "PIECE OF TERRITORY FOR A PIECE OF PEACE" ON A STEP-BY-STEP BASIS. NOW, PRESIDENT CARTER IS PROPOSING A WELL NIGH TOTAL TRADE OF ALL THE ARAB TERRITORY ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL FOR "TOTAL PEACE". IN ADDITION TO ISRAEL'S RETURN "TO APPROXIMATELY THE BORDERS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE WAR OF 1967", PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ALSO PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND OR ENTITY — PREFERABLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN" IN THE TERRITORY ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM.

THE PERSISTENT PUBLIC ADVOCACY BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO "APPROXIMATELY" THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN "HOMELAND OR ENTITY" — BEFORE THE CONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, BEFORE THERE HAS BEEN ANY MEETING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND ARAB NEGOTIATORS, EVEN BEFORE ISRAEL'S NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE — CAN ONLY CONTINUE TO FEED ARAB ILLUSIONS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL DELIVER TO THEM WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DELIVER TO THEMSELVES BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING THE RECURRENT RECOURSE TO WAR.

MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT'S ADVOCACY OF ISRAEL'S RETURN TO ITS PRECARIOUS 1967 BORDERS, SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH A PALESTINIAN "HOMELAND OR ENTITY" IS HAVING THE EFFECT OF PUTTING THE ISRAELIS IN FEAR OF THEIR SURVIVAL AND THUS HARDENING THE TERMS THEY FEEL THEY MUST INSIST UPON. THIS IN TURN WILL MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE ARABS TO AGREE. AS A RESULT, THE CHANCES FOR MIDEAST PEACE MAY BE LESSEned AND THE DANGER OF WAR ENHANCED BY A BREAKDOWN IN THE PEACE SEEKING PROCESS THROUGH OVER-REACHING. THIS CLASH OF FRUSTRATED ARAB ILLUSIONS AND BURGEONING ISRAELI

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כל המוסר חוכן מסמך זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (במסגרת המדינה
יחסי חוק ומסורת רשמיים).
תש"ז-1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסוג

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FEARS WHEN COMPRESSED INTO THE PRESSURE COOKER OF A SHORT-TERM "WRAP IT UP" GENEVA CONFERENCE CAN ONLY PRODUCE MORE NOT LESS TENSIONS AND DANGER OF YET ANOTHER MIDDLE EAST WAR. WHAT HAD BEEN HOPED FOR AS A MOVE FORWARD - AND UNDERSTANDABLY DIFFERENT FROM HENRY KISSINGER'S STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY - WAS A CALL UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO GENEVA AND ALL ISSUES TO BE ON THE TABLE FOR NEGOTIATION WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS AND WITH THE U.S. IN A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. EVEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH.

BUT, TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S HAS RAISED BOTH ARAB EXPECTATIONS AND ISRAELI FEARS, THEREBY INVITING FAILURE. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO STATE THIS CONCLUSION. IT IS NECESSARY TO GO FURTHER AND TO ANALYZE WHY THE PROPOSALS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AS CONFIRMED BY VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE ARE BECOMING UNREALISTIC. AS PRESIDENT CARTER HIMSELF HAS EMPHASIZED, THE UNITED STATES IS MORALLY COMMITTED TO THE SURVIVAL AND INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL, AND, NOT WITHSTANDING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION, THE BURDEN OF ASSURING ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL AND INTEGRITY RESTS SQUARELY UPON THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES - AND RIGHTLY SO.

THUS, THE QUALITY OF THE DECISIONS WHICH ISRAEL MAKES OVER THE COMING YEAR WITH RESPECT TO THE LIFE AND DEATH ISSUES THAT WILL BE POSED FOR IT AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THE HIGHEST QUALITY OF DECISION CAN ONLY BE MADE BY AN ISRAEL WHICH DOES NOT FEEL PRESSED TO THE WALL. NATIONS UNDER THE THREAT OF COERCION FROM FRIENDS - OR ENEMIES - SELDOM MAKE THE MOST CLEAR-SIGHTED DECISIONS. AND, WRONG DECISIONS BY ISRAEL - EITHER CONCEDED TOO MUCH OR NOT CONCEDED ENOUGH - CARRY THE EVENTUAL RISK OF RENewed WAR.

THE THREE TANGIBLE CARTER-MONDALE SUGGESTIONS ARE FOR:

1. ISRAEL'S RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS, WITH SECURITY ZONES FORWARD OF THESE BORDERS TO BE PHASED OUT AS RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS (I.E. JORDAN, EGYPT AND SYRIA) AND ISRAEL ARE NORMALIZED.

2. A "HOMELAND" FOR THE PALESTINIANS, "PREFERABLY" IN SOME ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN, AND

3. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE ARAB STATES AND A PHASED ACHIEVEMENT OF REAL PEACE; WITH TRADE, OPEN BORDERS, ETC.

WHY ARE THESE POSITIONS UNREALISTIC?

1. TO ESTABLISH FORWARD SECURITY BORDERS FOR ISRAEL MEANS SOME REASONABLE ZONE - SAY 20 TO 25 KILOMETERS - AND IN THAT ZONE IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ADMINISTER AFFAIRS FOR LONG - WHAT WITH THE PLO RIFLEMEN IN THE WINGS, THE IRREDENTISM AND PRESSURE TO GET ISRAEL OUT WILL BE ENORMOUS - NO ORGANIZED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINUITY IS POSSIBLE, PROPAGANDA AND DISORDER WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY.

2. THE USE OF THE TERM "HOMELAND" ESTABLISHES AT ONCE

כל המסמך תוכן מסמך זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לבד - עובר על החוק לחיסון
דיני העונשין (במסגרת המדינה
יחסינות המדינה השמים).
תש"ז-1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

4

A PARALLELISM WITH THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN ISRAEL AND EXACTLY CONTRADICTS AN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN. INDEED, THE BASIS FOR THIS ASSOCIATION HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY LAID ON THE ARAB SIDE. IN ADDITION, SUCH AN ASSOCIATION NEITHER ASSURES CONTROL OF POLICY NOR EVEN ITS OWN CONTINUITY. AS A PRECEDENT THERE IS SYRIA'S ABRUPT DENUNCIATION OF ITS UNION WITH EGYPT IN THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS RESPECTING A PALESTINIAN ENTITY IS QUALIFIED BY THE PHRASE "PREFERABLY IN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN". THIS PHRASE IS LOADED WITH AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY. YET, THE STATUS OF THE PROPOSED PALESTINIAN ENTITY IS ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL AND DISPUTED ISSUES OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY. WHOSE "PREFERENCE" IS TO GOVERN? THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) CONTINUES TO BE RECOGNIZED BY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AS THE "SOLE" REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. AT THE MEETING OF ITS GOVERNING NATIONAL COUNCIL IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR - THE PLO CONSPICUOUSLY REFUSED TO MODERATE ITS DEMAND FOR THE DESTRUCTION ISSUED AT THE CLOSE OF THAT MEETING GIVES NO INDICATION OF PLO INTEREST OR WILLINGNESS TO FEDERATE A PALESTINIAN ENTITY WITH THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, AS WAS FORMALLY PROPOSED A FEW YEARS AGO BY KING HUSSEIN AND DESPITE REPORTED HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE PLO TO DO SO BY EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS ARE SILENT ON THREE OF THE ISSUES MOST CRUCIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A LASTING PEACE -- JERUSALEM, LEBANON, AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. DOES THE RETURN OF ISRAEL TO "APPROXIMATELY" THE 1967 BORDERS MEAN THAT JERUSALEM IS AGAIN TO BE A DIVIDED CITY - A MIDDLE EAST BERLIN - WITH ISRAELI ACCESS AGAIN AS DIFFICULT AS IN THE YEAR BEFORE 1967? WHAT IS ENVISAGED UNDER THE CARTER PROPOSALS FOR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND FOR LEBANON? IS LEBANON TO REMAIN TERRITORIALY INTACT AND UNDER SYRIAN HEGEMONY, AND IS THE PLO TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXIST AS A "STATE WITHIN A STATE" THERE? THESE QUESTIONS ARE CRUCIAL IN THEMSELVES AND RELATED INEXTRICABLY TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ISSUE AND THE 1967 BORDERS ISSUE.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS SUFFER FROM THE MULTIPLE DEFICIENCY OF BEING TOO DETAILED IN SOME RESPECTS, SILENT IN OTHER CRUCIAL RESPECTS, AND - WORST OF ALL - OPEN-ENDED IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS. HITHERTO, INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MIDEAST PEACE HAVE RESTED UPON U.N. RESOLUTION 242 AS REINFORCED BY RESOLUTION 338. BUT NOW, ACCORDING TO VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S SPEECH: "RESOLUTION 242 DOES NOT BY ITSELF PROVIDE TO WORK WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO OUTLINE THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ENDURING PEACE. OUR CONCEPT WAS TO USE THIS FRAMEWORK AS THE BASIS FOR A PHASED NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARD PEACE".

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך — עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני הצונטין (מסמך המדינה
יהסיחוץ ומודות רשמיים).
תש"ז—1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת השגר

מברק נכנס — מסווג

-5-

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABOVE-QUOTED SENTENCES ARE FAR-REACHING INDEED AND MAY OPEN A PANDORA'S BOX OF NEW DIFFICULTIES. HOW DOES ONE DEFINE "THE PARTIES CONCERNED" AS USED ABOVE? IS THE NEW "OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR ENDURING PEACE" INTENDED TO BE MERELY ADDITIVE TO THE EXISTING LANGUAGE OF RESOLUTION 242 (WHICH MAKES NO MENTION OF A "PALESTINIAN HOMELAND OR ENTITY"), OR ARE ITS BASIC CONCEPTS TO BE OPENED UP TO REDEFINITION OR RENEGOTIATION? IS THE SOVIET UNION TO BE A PARTY TO THE DEFINITION OF THE NEW "OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR ENDURING PEACE"? IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH NOW INCLUDES THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TO PASS UPON OR GIVE ITS SANCTION TO THE NEW OVERALL FRAMEWORK? BY CALLING INTO QUESTION THE STATUS OF RESOLUTION 242 AND 338, THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS RAISE NEW UNCERTAINTIES. I BELIEVE THAT THE CENTRAL POSITION OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242 SHOULD NOT BE UNDERMINED DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION. ITS ACCEPTANCE HAS BEEN REITERATED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND BY ALL THE OTHER PARTIES OTHER THAN THE PLO AND IT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA.

THE MAJOR CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS, IN TERMS OF THE REACTION OF MANY OF ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS IN THIS COUNTRY, DERIVES FROM WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN IMBALANCE IN WHAT THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS ARE BEING CALLED ON TO DO.

ISRAEL IS BEING ASKED TO AGREE IN ADVANCE TO RETREAT TO ITS 1967 BORDERS IN RETURN FOR A PEACE WHICH WILL BE PHASED IN OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS WHICH ISRAEL IS ASKED TO MAKE ARE OF DUAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE VERY ESSENCE OF ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. FIRST, THE TERRITORIES WHICH IT HAS ADMINISTERED SINCE 1967 CONSTITUTE VIRTUALLY THE TOTALITY OF ISRAEL'S BARGAINING POWER WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. SECOND, ISRAEL IS CONVINCED THAT ITS 1967 BORDERS ARE VIRTUALLY INDEFENSIBLE UNDER MODERN BATTLE CONDITIONS AND AS SUCH WOULD BE A CONSTANT INVITATION TO ATTACK RATHER THAN A REINFORCING ELEMENT OF A LASTING PEACE.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE ARABS ARE BEING ASKED TO PROMISE TO ACCEPT ISRAEL IN PEACE AT THE CONCLUSION OF "PHASED NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARD PEACE". THIS SEEMS LIKE BEING ASKED TO PAY HEAVILY NOW IN RETURN FOR ONLY THE PROMISE OF A RECIPROCAL BENEFIT WHICH IS TO BE DELIVERED AT SOME INDEFINITE

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כל המסמך תוכנו מסמך זה כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על חוקי לתיקון
דוני העונשין (מספרון המדינה
יחסית: יסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז-1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

=6=

TIME IN THE FUTURE.

THE ISRAELIS WILL CLEARLY FEEL IMPELLED TO MAKE HIGH RECIPROCAL DEMANDS ON THE ARABS IN RETURN FOR WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS ASKING OF THEM - DEMANDS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS DO NOT NOW SEEM TO ENCOMPASS.

IF THE ARAB STATES COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE ARAFAT "NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMANDS" APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL CAN SUCCEED, THE TEMPTATION COULD BE STRONG FOR THEM TO TRY THE ARAFAT APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IN GENERAL RESPECTING THE OPEC OIL CARTER AND NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES IN PARTICULAR. THE UNITED STATES HAS A VERY REAL AND DIRECT INTEREST IN SEEING THAT THE ARAB STATES COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL MUST BE BASED ON A GENUINE ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS, TOO. ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND SECURITY ALONE OUR INTEREST IN A SECURE ISRAEL MUST BE PUT HIGH AMONG OUR PRIORITIES.

AD KAN

RAFIACH==

שהח רהמ מנכל שהבס ממנכל ממנכל מאוס אב מצפא המוצות מדמיס הקר מעת המברה רמ אמס

חז/מה

205h

חברת נכנס - מסוג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

כל המסמך תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לחיפון דיני העונשין (בסחף המדינה יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

J.S.

ה'תש"ז (1957)

אלנהמשרד
מאת: וושינגטון
אל: עברון

מס' 399
נשלח: 271900: יוני 1957

ס ו ד י
מ"ד

לאחר שיעבצ שיגר ביום שישי את נוסח נאומו לנשיא, למונדייל, לברזזינסקי ולואנס התקשרו עמו באותו יום, בפרד, מונדייל וואנס וניסו להציג את מלשאת את הנאום או לפחות להכניס בו שינויים. יעבצ דחה פנייתיהם. (הערה: ממי לא הנוסח כבר היה מצוי אותה שעה בידי העתונאים). יעבצ נשא הבוקר כמתוכנן את נאומו במליאת הסינאט. (לאחר תום דבריו נאמו גם סנטורים אחרים: פקווד, שוויכר - BROOKE (כולם רפובליקנים) מחו ביקורת על מדיניות הממשל במזהת. סנטור HA/ALAWA (הרפובליקני מקרליפורט) אמר אפ הוא דברי ביקורת וביקש מיעבצ הסברים הסטוריים. סנטור קייס נעזר נהדי ונ או הודעה משעמו התואמת את ההודעה שמסר ביום שישי בעקבות פגישתו עם הנשיא הוכללה בפרטי כל הדיון. סנטור ספרקס. (יור ועדת החוץ הגוהג בדח כלל לפי קו הממשל) שיבח את דרי יעבצ. סנטור סטון כיור חת הועדה למזהת אמר דברים בלתי מחייבים. נאום יעבצ קיבל פרסום בולט בשלביזיה ברדיו בניו יורק טיימס (היום, בעמוד ראשון) וכך בבולטימור סאן. ב. משבוע שעבר נפגשו הסנטורים רוברט בירד (מנהיג הרוב הדמוקרטי) קרנטון (סגנו) נלסון ומצבנאום (היהודי) עם מונדייל. לפי מקור אחד מונדייל הציע כי הסנטורים יכתבו מכתב תמיכה בנאום שנשיא נאם פרנציסקו. קרנטון קבל הרעיון בברכה ואפ החל לעבוד על יטוטא. גם מצבנאום נטה לדאות לדאות הדבר בחיוב. לאחר פניות של ידידים נראה שהתכנית הוקפאה.

רפ"ח

שח רוחם מנכל ממנכל שמנכל שהבני מצטא חקר ו/ ס אמן
/א אר

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



ר' צבי
צבי

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

א' בכסלו תשל"ז
23 נוב' 76

633

צבי
רפ"ח

אל: למצפ"א
סאת: צבי רפ"ח, וושינגטון

הנדון: "הצהרת הקונסנסוס" - פנייה יעבץ לקיסטנג'ר
למברק פזנר 312 מ-17 דנא

מצ"ב נוסח פנייה סנסור יעבץ למזכיר המדינה, בבקשה
הבהרה של מדיניות ממארה"ב במזה"ח לאור הצטרפותה ל"הצהרת
הקונסנסוס" במועבי"ט.

בברכה,
צ. רפ"ח

העחק: מר א. עברון, משנה למנכ"ל.

JACOB K. JAVITS
NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
FOREIGN RELATIONS
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOINT ECONOMIC
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 15, 1976

REGIONAL OFFICES:
ROOM 511
110 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

ROOM 222
FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING
111 WEST HURON STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14202

ROOM 420
LEO W. O'BRIEN FEDERAL BUILDING
CLINTON SQUARE
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12207

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I note with concern that the United States departed from its previous practice in respect to voting on one-sided resolutions condemning Israel as to actions on the West Bank of the Jordan, in the resolution passed last week in the United Nations Security Council.

This has raised questions which I feel should be answered as to United States policy in the Middle East. First, does this vote signal any change in the United States policy respecting Israel, its security, and its relation to its neighbors and to the United States? Second, what was the United States reason for voting aye on the resolution passed in the Security Council on Thursday, November 11, 1976?

I would appreciate your earliest reply.

With warmest regards, believe me,

Sincerely,

Jacob K. Javits

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
The Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520



ירושלים, כ"ט בחמוז תשל"ו
27 ביולי 1976

1310 ב.א.ג.
למחלקת ה-3

סורי ביוחזר
לנמען בלבד

א.א.א. (א.א.א.)

אל: מנהל המרכז

מאח: המח' הבינ"ל

הנדון: שיחות סנטור יעבץ עם נציגים רשמיים בכירים ערביים



כללי

1. לרעתו כל הצדדים, כולל ישראל, מבינים את חומרת הקפאון במצב אך הוא משוכנע שאין להם יכולת כלשהי להלחם.
2. אינו סבור שתצליח תזוזה כעת או במשך 1976 לפחות.
3. יש שאיפה אמיתית לשלום בכל הארצות, קיים מצב חדש יחסית שהוך 10-15 שנים יבוא השלום בהדרגה לאחר נסיון לרו-קיום בין הצדדים.

מצרים

4. התפעל מסאראת הרוצה בשלום. מצרים משקפת את התעלה ועושה לפיתוח הארץ ומוכיחה שאינה רוצה במלחמה.

סוריה

5. טוב היה אם גם סוריה הייתה מיישבת בקונייסרה, כביטוי לשלום. החרטט מאד מאסאד (שקבלו סיד) והדגיש שסוריה לא תסכים להשארות אף שעל אדמה ערבית כבושה. ארה"ב חייבת לסייע לבניה קונייסרה (כמו בסואץ) כחרומה לשלום ונורמליזציה כדי ליצור מצב של אמון בין ישראל לשכנותיה. אם יתקדמו "עיר אחר עיר", ישמשו חנאי החיים בשטח כ"ערובות לשלום" לשני הצדדים (כמו בסיני וסואץ). במסיבת העתונאים קודם, אמר שפגש בראש הקהילה היהודית ברמסק בהחלט לטובה מחיי הקהילה אבל מנקודת השקפה הסטורית אפשר להבין את חששות כל קהילה יהודית לגבי העתיד. סיים בכך ש"יכול לומר שמצבה של הקהילה היהודית כסוריה תקין". בנושא זה הודה לו השגריר הסורי על שפטר את האמת על מצב היהודים שם וציין כי במשך מאות שנים היה מצב היהודים טוב וזה ימשיך עוד מאות בשנים.

ירדן

6. בירדן שמע על דבוקתם בהחלטות רבאט.

אס"ף

7. מטכ"ם ומגן על עמדת ישראל וארה"ב שלא להסכים להשתתפות אס"ף במו"מ לפני שיכילת-כמו היתר-בהחלטות 242, 338. ערפאת אמר בשיחות פרטיות דברים היוצרים רושם של נכונות לקבל שתי החלטות



- 2 -

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

אלו ואת קיום ישראל, אבל בפומבי הוא מכריז על עמדה קיצונית יותר הדוחה קיום ישראל.
אש"ף איננו כנראה הסתרון, תוסף בעמדת ארה"ב שערפאת אינו שותף מתאים למו"מ.

בדמ"ע

8. בבחירות בגדמ"ע זכו אנשים שרואים משימתם העיקרית בשרוחים מוניציפליים. ההתנחלויות בשטחים
לא ישנו מדיניות ארה"ב באשר להסדר סופי באזור. לישראל קשה ומסוכן להסכים לריכוז 3 מיליון
פלסטינים בגדמ"ע ובעזה. בחטובה לשאלת הסודי (על עליות מליונים מיהדות רוסיה) הוא אמר שיחכן
והוא צודק אבל אין לשכוח רדיפות ונגיפות של יהודים.

ג'נבה

9. אינו רואה תקווה לועידת ג'נבה כעת ואינו סבור שאש"ף ראוי שישתתף בה.

לבנון

10. העלה על נס הפקיד סוריה בהפסקת הטבח בלבנון וכולם שם הסכימו על הסכנה בחלוקת לבנון.
קיימת הסכמה כללית נגד חלוקת לבנון.

ישראל

11. מפגישותיו עם המנהיגות גילה שאין רצון למלחמה. יש לממשלה קשיים ולדעתו לא תושג התקדמות
כלשהי לפני סתיו 1977. הממשלה חלשה מכדי לעמוד בהחלטות חמורות כל כך כנדרש. המחוננים יזכו
ברוב קטן מאד בבחירות.

מברק יוצא-מסווג

אל: דיריב סוין
מסד: המסד

דיניק,
סלך 290, סכך.

בקשתו של להכיר ביר בנישא שיועבר זליך סך שבפעים.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת המסד

Handwritten signature/initials

כל המוסר הוכן מסמך זה, בולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לחיסון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
הסעיף 177 וסודות רשמיים).

תשי"ז - 1957

מסלח: 221700 סכך 76

ארי

החל רישום בכל מסמכל שק רביב איר אב מנשא חקר רט

ג/ג

תאריך 9/2

אל :

מאת :

הנדון _____

מ
(ד"ר) ~~ד"ר~~
ד"ר

סוג

אל : ~~אלה ד"ר~~

מאת : לשכת המנכ"ל

_____ :11

שגם של מבקש

אכן יש משהו
למסדה למעלה.

22 (2)

מ: אלו

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

ל אב תשל"ו
26 אוגוסט 76

1
2
3
4
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6
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8
9
10
11
12

375

אל: מצפ"א

מאח: צבי רפיה וושינגטון

הנדון: דברי סנטור יעבץ בוועידת המפלגה הרפובליקנית

מצ"ב נוסח דברי סנטור יעבץ בוועידת הרפובליקנית. שימו נא
לב שהרישא של דבריו מתייחסת לרצח הל רוזנטל.

הוועידה לא הקשיבה לדברי יעבץ. חשומה הלב שלה הייתה נחונה
לריגון ויעבץ לא הצליח לסיים השמעה דבריו.

ב ב ר כ ה

צ. רפיה

Handwritten signature and initials

משרד החוץ
ירושלים



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

213

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: AMBASSADOR

Handwritten signature and date

Subject: ...
Reference: ...

RE: ...

... in the ...

... the ...

... ..

... ..

FOR RELEASE: 3 p.m.
Wednesday, 18 August 1976

CONTACT: Peter Teeley
202: 224-8352

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY -- "TO WIN WE MUST DESERVE TO WIN"

An Address by Senator Jacob K. Javits before the Republican Nominating Convention, August 18, 1976, Kansas City, Missouri

I am very pleased at the opportunity to speak at this particular moment before the Nominating Convention of our Party.

But before I begin, I have a personal message to the Convention. I thank you for adopting the strong anti-terrorism plank which you did in the Party's Platform.

Last week a young man died in a senseless killing at the airport in Istanbul, Turkey. Hal Rosenthal was a member of my staff who was on his way to a Conference on the problems of the Middle East when he lost his life in a terrorist attack on innocent and helpless people. He was 29 years old.

That blow, that extinction of a young life puts into sharp and agonizing focus a single fact that we all too frequently forget. Politics is about people, about individuals with individual problems, individual hopes and aspirations, and about individual agonies. And politicians must be dedicated to people. It is our duty, our reason for offering ourselves for office, our reason for offering our Party as a way -- we think the best way -- to govern our country; and I speak as a fellow Republican who has been successful, running as a Republican with progressive views in New York, the second largest State of our Nation with a 2-1 Democratic registration and, including the City of New York, long a Democratic Party bastion.

Our challenge is to broaden our base of support among the people and to give the people the reasons why they should vote Republican in November. And although in 1976 the dominant Republican voice may be conservative in impulse and tone, we are about to face a national election in which we must bespeak the aspirations and the will of millions of Americans who are Democrats and independents if we are to keep a Republican Administration in the White House. This will not be done with rhetoric - but it can be done with reason.

Men and women in public life nowadays have every reason to be uneasy about surveys which show widespread disenchantment with the United States political process. And we Republicans, in particular, must be concerned with other surveys which indicate that our Party is the declared Party of only one fifth to one quarter of the American people. We need to -- and we can -- forge a Republican majority of the American people as we give them reason to understand that our Party is their Party...that we are a people's party. And, this is not only for ourselves, but for the two party system which is so essential to our freedom. For our two party system can hardly be sustained if the party division gets too lopsided.

We have always prided ourselves on being the Party of equal opportunity for the individual and the Party that is dedicated to the right of the individual as much as possible to live his or her own life. But we Republicans, while having many achievements at home and abroad have not yet cracked the way to deal with human vicissitudes and catastrophes with the aid of government but based upon Republican principles.

Cancer, stroke and heart disease always are expected to strike other people, not someone you or I know.

It's always someone else who is expected to be unemployed.

It's always someone else who needs a daycare center to care for her child so that she can hold a job.

Or someone else whose parents need housing or long term medical care.

It's always someone else, or it's a number of someone else, or a class, or a headline!

Well, the headlines don't cry the tears of the individual hurt and the individual need. When the television cameras leave the supermarket, the prices are still too high for elderly people on fixed incomes who are deprived -- or bewildered. And they need their Social Security and they need their Medicare. And, when there is a recession and millions are laid off, the unemployed still suffer.

And that, my fellow Republicans, is what politics is all about.

It's about helping those who can't help themselves; and it's about making sure that every citizen has an opportunity to help himself or herself. It's about easing the burden of people -- real people with real problems. It's about enabling them to make decisions about the kind of people they wish to be -- the the kind of country they wish to live in -- and the kind of world they wish to shape.

The principles we Republicans expound, and the measures we take must ring true. They must be and they must appear to be responsive to the will and the needs of our fellow citizens.

Political programs must give practical answers to the problems and aspiration of people -- they are not ends in themselves. Politicians worry about the jobless; about how to carry the welfare burden; they decry the crime rate; are alarmed by inadequate productivity; and feel the dangers of decay and bankruptcy in our great older cities. But behind every discussion of the jobless is an individual suffering the pain and the shame of being unable to provide for himself or his family. Behind the rising crime rate are individuals -- people who have been hurt, maimed, robbed, or murdered -- and whole families destroyed by a member who is an addict or a juvenile felon. Behind every food stamp and school lunch program is a life-giving potential for undernourished and hungry children.

Behind inadequate productivity is inadequate capital investment and lowered worker morale.

There are remedies and they can be Republican remedies. They can range from a strengthened private pension system which we are now beginning to get under the new Federal Pension Reform law, to stock ownership by workers, and cooperative programs with business for interim employment and manpower training and education of the recession type unemployed. Republican remedies can range from enhanced Federal welfare payments as an option in lieu of revenue sharing to government business projects for the rehabilitation of felons and addicts. They can include housing, health and education. The point is that we must accept our role, that we must find Republican solutions; solutions which are practicable and can be superior to the simplistic application of government money and bureaucratic administration of the Democrats. The Depression-bred nostrums of the 30's have either long since served their purpose, or are completely out of date.

And that, my fellow Republicans is also what politics is all about. It's about ideas about making a better life for the people who give us their trust.

And that's why the Republican Party is committed to private enterprise in the public interest. For the American economic system is the mechanism by which more people have been able to do more to help themselves to a better life than anywhere else on earth, ever, and that's why our duty as Republicans is to try to serve the many millions of Americans who intend to keep it that way.

The Republican Party must take advantage of that intention. If we are to win we must forge a coalition of common interests.... among the many millions of Americans who operate the levers of production in firms small and large, as workers and managers and professionals, and those who service their efforts. The shop steward and the shop foreman, the second-rank executive, as well as the working men and women whose personal vision of the future is linked to the success of the private enterprise system to which they are committed. These are all part of the American public to which the Republican Party must appeal.

We have every right to make that appeal on the basis of our principles, of our record of what we are capable of accomplishing for the people. We have a President who has restored a sense of integrity to the nation's highest office; we have an economy recovering its vitality; people on jobs are at their highest and inflation is being abated. Our foreign policy has been featured by remarkable major successes -- and we are at peace.

The United States economic system makes and the Government takes; but the Government can be the essential guarantor of the dominance of the public interest in our economic system. It is the Republican Party that best can implement that concept. Ours is the Party to make the system work. Ours is the Party to make the country work.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Republican Convention, there is no reason for us to be behind in this election. If we are the underdog, it's because we have not yet sent the American people the message that they want to hear. The Republican Party is the newest Party. It wants to conserve the best of the past, and it is committed to pursuing the best for the future. And, its founding principles are most compatible with the inner feelings of the American people.

As we are on the threshold of balloting for the most powerful and influential office on earth -- notwithstanding the turbulence of the Convention floor -- let us seek a moment of inner contemplation and reflection on our duty -- for as we here act so may very well go the peace, the prosperity and the health of the American people.

I close with the Biblical injunction which applies so precisely to our condition.

"Behold you have been given a good doctrine. Do not forsake it."

✻ ✻ ✻ ✻ ✻

Senator Jacob K. Javits

103A
5/11/76
New York

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Thursday, 17 June 1976

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ADDRESS BY U.S. SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS
AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
WASHINGTON, D.C., 17 JUNE 1976

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDEAST

At a time when the United States is increasingly preoccupied with its Presidential election, the situation in the Mideast has once again assumed crisis proportions. Lebanon has become the focus of a bloody struggle of diverse dimensions, and has replaced Israeli settlements on the West Bank and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as major issues in respect of peace in the area. Indeed, the outcome of the struggle in Lebanon is likely to have far reaching consequences for war or peace in the Mideast as a whole. The initiative which the United States seized so boldly and imaginatively following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, having done its part, is momentarily eclipsed. Today, the United States and its western allies have been reduced to the role almost of bystanders, observing events in Lebanon from the sidelines.

The shift of focus in the Mideast from the disturbances on the West Bank which followed the first democratic elections ever successfully conducted in the Mideast, to the gruesome bloodshed in Lebanon has had at least one salutary effect. It has broadened the perspective of some who had focused their attention too narrowly on but one aspect of the Mideast problem -- the ultimate disposition of the post-1967 Arab territories. The religious overtones of the Lebanese civil war, with Moslem pitted against Christian, has exposed the hollowness of the PLO proposal to create a unified "secular" state in all of the territory of the British-mandated

Palestine.

In view of the current line-up of forces respecting Lebanon and the Mideast, I would like to take this opportunity to do the following:

1. Restate the importance and mutuality of self-interest underlying the special relationship between the United States and Israel;
2. State the present opportunities for movement toward peace in the area as I see them; and
3. Suggest policies which the United States should pursue to enhance these opportunities.

The special relationship between the United States and Israel -- existing since the creation of Israel in 1948 -- is sometimes taken for granted these days and thus, like do many old and familiar events, its historic importance tends to be overlooked.

The United States and Israel are bound together essentially for the same reasons that the United States is bound inextricably to its allies in Western Europe. Indeed, Israel today is to the United States and the Atlantic Alliance what West Berlin was to NATO in the decades of greatest intensity of the Cold War. The credibility of the United States rests in just such a real sense upon the national integrity of Israel, as it did -- and does -- upon the survival and integrity of West Berlin during the years when the Soviet Union was pursuing every method short of open war to erase that outpost of freedom and democracy from Central Europe.

The Soviet Union has made the Mideast a prime target for expansion and control. It has expanded its naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean many fold and has sought and obtained its first foreign naval bases in Arab ports on the Mediterranean and along the Red Sea littoral. The radical socialist forces which have seized control of a number of Arab states have closely aligned themselves internationally with the Soviet Union; and, the Soviet Union - in the most irresponsible way - has placed billions upon billions of rubles worth of sophisticated military equipment in the hands of Arab governments whose avowed aim has been to drive Israel into the sea.

Fortunately, Israel is a nation of very great determination and self-reliance, and of legendary valor and skill on the battlefield. There is no doubt that the military capability of Israel and the will to use that capability in defense of its national existence is a signif-

icant politico-military and strategic asset of the free world in the Mideast today. Certainly the capability of Israel to intervene has been a major restraining factor on Syria and the other Arab nations, as well as the Soviet Union.

So long as Israel's and the United States interests are linked, the lines of oil supply to Western Europe and to ourselves cannot be closed if we choose to keep them open. It is for this reason, I believe, that serious consideration should be given to including Israel within the NATO umbrella. For Western Europe, too, has a vital interest in the existence of Israel as a viable political community.

Ironically, Israel even acts as a guarantor of the integrity of the hierarchical Arab regimes against outside attack or subversion by their aggressive radical Arab neighbors.

But, transcending the military significance of Israel to the West is the bond of shared freedom, shared culture, shared history and shared destiny.

Peace in the Middle East is a vital objective despite the many times its promise has been broken, and certainly the place is strewn with broken promises. Let us inventory some of these, going back to the withdrawal of Israel from Sinai in 1956.

Despite promises that Israeli cargo would be permitted to sail through the Suez Canal on third party ships, a Danish ship carrying Israeli cargo was detained for 262 days. A Greek ship was seized and detained for 4 months. From 1959 until the Canal was closed in 1967, Israeli cargo was excluded from passage. And, as recently as the aftermath of the Sinai One agreement, Israel was confronted again with unkept agreements. Assurances given to Secretary Kissinger in January 1974 that Israeli cargo would be permitted through the Canal on third party ships were once again not honored. The Canal opened in June 1975, but further Israeli concessions were extracted in the Sinai Two agreement before Israeli cargo was permitted access to the Canal.

The Sinai Two agreements provide for a cessation of hostile propaganda but the PLO's voice on a Palestinian radio station was reopened in Cairo and the Zionist-racist resolution was endorsed in the United Nations by the Egyptian government in 1975. The return of the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in action was a condition of the first

disengagement agreement, yet it was not until March 29, 1975 -- fourteen months after the agreement was signed -- that Egypt announced that it would return the bodies of Israel's soldiers.

The broken promises and the increasing suspicions that accompany them go back as far as 1949, when it was agreed under the terms of the general armistice that "no warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from the territory of one of the parties to this agreement against the other party." Little wonder after almost 28 years of terrorist raids from across its borders that Israelis are reluctant to risk their future on the promises of their adversaries.

Yet, there seems to be little reluctance in the United Nations to make moral judgments as to Israel's obligation to bring an end to the hostility of her Arab neighbors; there is ready willingness in the United Nations majority to accept the premise that efforts for peace-making in the Middle East must be made by Israel unilaterally, and Israel alone.

Unrelenting pressure has been brought to bear on Israel to concede territory gained in wars of self-defense that cost the blood of thousands of the best of her youth, without the promise of peace. There is no corresponding pressure on the Arabs to negotiate with Israel face to face; to make those commitments which imply readiness to live and to let live...to restore a semblance of normality to an area too long racked by the pain of war. Any peace arrangement and any final border must reinforce security and provide an inducement to peace, and not be an inducement to renewal of war.

Memory has failed those who have witnessed the aftermath of four wars in which Israel has engaged. On every occasion -- in 1948, in 1956, in 1967, in 1973 -- Israel responded to acts of aggression, to attempts to extinguish her national life. Each time at harrowing cost, she survived. In each case, and each time from strengthened positions won in a war, Israel offered to negotiate face to face with her Arab opponents. Each time Israel has sought to exchange a "piece of territory for a piece of peace." Yet, each time the offer was rejected and communication was limited to discussion via third parties and to military disengagement on the battlefield. That is, each time until the second disengagement with Egypt, to which I will hereafter refer.

Only last March, when Prime Minister Rabin visited the United States, he asked our Government to transmit a series of proposals to Egypt's government which would encourage the peacemaking process to continue and to accelerate and to avoid a renewal of war on an increasingly tragic scale. As far as I know, the United States has yet to receive an answer from Egypt on Israel's proposals. I don't know whether those particular proposals are acceptable to Egypt or not. But I do know that they are on the table and that we have reached a point where it is vital to get an answer.

The war in Lebanon exemplifies the problem that the world faces. Today the PLO and the Syrian Army are shedding each other's blood. Tomorrow morning there may be a deal. But recent events tell us that even during -- let alone after -- every truce there is an escalation. There is an escalation in war and participation in the conflict that has widened instead of narrowed. An increasing number of Arab states has come onto the scene in varying combinations. Alliances shift almost as rapidly as the shell fire increases; shedding the blood of innocents, and all the while the government of Israel must look on its northern border with apprehension as to what tomorrow will bring. An internal Arab conflict may bring temporary surcease for Israel. But ultimately silent guns offer the only hope for an end to the turmoil for both Israel and her neighbors.

Lebanon, in addition, teaches that the Arab-Israel struggle is by no means the only key to stability and peace in the Middle East for the latter has nothing to do with the leftist Moslem and rightist Christian controversy in Lebanon. But Lebanon does show the shuddering instability of the area which stems also from the attitude of radical Moslems to the hierarchical governments of the area and emphasizes further the stabilizing element of Israel's presence there.

The enormous tragedy that has engulfed Lebanon stands as a symbol of the anguishing frustration of efforts to bring stability to that part of the world. For a generation, Lebanon was a model of the comity, the beauty, and the prosperity to which all of the Middle East could look as a splendid evocation of the possibilities of tomorrow.

And now there are 20,000 dead, refugees scattered across the international landscape and heightened hostility along the borders of

her bleeding statehood. Why hasn't the United Nations focused its attention on bringing respite to Lebanon's people? Why instead are we confronted in the United Nations with a series of almost weekly resolutions that focus on Israel's alleged iniquities -- mainly phony -- and the minutiae of Israel-Arab relationships - rather than the sustained attempt to stanch the bloodshed in Lebanon? Why hasn't the international community attempted actively to work for a settlement that could bring an end to the devastation and a restoration of hope for some settlement? Why have even United States efforts seemed tenuous?

I think that the answer to all those questions lies in the fact that there is a feeling of hopelessness about the anarchy in Lebanon and the discord in the Arab world; and that we live in a world in which our allies the great industrial organizations continue to be fearful of the use of the Arab oil weapon and, therefore, reluctant to articulate any cause and any view that may give offense to those who wield that weapon.

I sometimes feel that we suffer a moral blindness that stems from a paralysis of will. We are a long way from the days of 1958, when a direct intervention of U.S. troops prevented just such bloodshed in Lebanon as we witness today. Such intervention is both impossible and undesirable in 1976. But the world is none the less obliged to bring the influence of the nations to bear in helping to solve the Lebanon problem.

One other factor which I consider to be of primary importance in the area is that the accepted nature of the second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement was not in the course of the hot pursuit of war, but was deliberately arrived at after the forces were separated and, indeed, separated by United Nations forces. This resulted in definitive civilian type arrangements like the cession of the Abu Rudeis oil fields to Egypt, the rebuilding and resettlement of Ismalia and Suez, and the installation of the United States Truce Observers to supplement the United Nations forces in Sinai. This, therefore, is truly the first step toward peace and hence, the importance with which it was considered in the Senate and the Congress and by the President.

In view of all of these factors, I believe the time has come to declare that no elections in the United States, or elsewhere, should be permitted to stand in the way of the effort to resolve the Middle East

* peace dilemma and that we must survey it in ongoing terms and take a new look at the possibilities for solutions.

I cannot conceive of any President of the United States feeling any differently considering the critical dangers the world faces in the Mideast. All nations have an obligation to contribute to the easing of tensions there in whatever way they can without reference to national elections. For these reasons, I make the following proposals:

1. the United Nations pay increasing attention to encouraging a solution;
2. an international consortium make available financial assistance to restore what has been destroyed by war once it is over in Lebanon;
3. the United States do all possible to bring about a response by the government of Egypt to Israel's peace proposals made in March of 1976;
4. the Geneva Conference process be reconvened on a two stage basis; the first stage to consider an agenda and the parties to be invited to attend;
5. immediate steps be taken by the parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to ease tensions on the ground as follows:
 - a. face to face negotiations;
 - b. enhancing Egyptian economic reconstruction and development;
 - c. negotiations to bring about reconstruction and resettlement of Kuneitra along the model of the Suez Canal cities;
 - d. a widening of economic contracts between Jordan and Israel and on a time phased basis with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon;
6. exclusion of the PLO as a political force unless and until it accepts the responsibility of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.

Item 6 perhaps offers the greatest possibility of all, for a solution to the Palestinian problem is inherent in a resolution of the 1967 border conflict.

It is my view that peace in the sense of a thriving political, cultural and economic relationship among the parties to the conflict is a number of years away -- ten or more -- but that a beginning can be made now by establishing a pattern of relationships and behavior that will make later more productive developments more likely.

As an example, the question of Israeli settlements on the West Bank may well be susceptible to a mutually satisfactory solution when both parties are ready to negotiate face to face. Israel itself

has stated that everything can be negotiated fact to face. Nothing can be settled until the parties themselves sit down to settle. It should be noted that Israel has been steadfastly committed to such negotiations. President Sadat himself has indirectly acknowledged this in an interview with the London Times in which he was quoted as follows: "We could have achieved something this year, but unfortunately it is the Arab position which is hindering this, not one of the two superpowers." The Egyptian President has expressed a willingness to examine those elements within the conflict that may lead to settlement. I believe that the factors which underline a real peace must be phased in gradually and persistently and, if possible, on a timetable which, hopefully, can be developed as a result of the second stage of a Geneva Conference.

Almost as many possible West Bank solutions have been offered as there are leaders in each of the countries involved -- whether it be the Allon Plan, the Goldman Plan, whether it be Federation or Condominium or any one of a dozen variations. The search must continue.

The road to peace in the Middle East is more dangerous than ever but the stakes are higher; and we in the United States must do our best to assure Arabs and Israelis alike, by our words and by our actions, that we are committed to their mutual security, to their survival as thriving national, social and cultural entities; and to the belief that out of the present pain and anguish can come growth, stability and peace.

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חמוצה קבץ

הנדון: פגישה שנערכה יעבץ עם נכבדים באי"ש

1. להלן עיקרי דבריו שעלו בעת פגישה של הנספור יעקב יעבץ עם מקומיים בסיוור ביום 23 אפר' 76:-
2. אנטון מדוסיאן (ארמני, מנהל בי"ח בראמאללה)
 - א. עסקתו הפוליטית הארמנית היא פרו-האסמה. אינו חוזה פתרון ספציפי, אלא היה מעדיף לאחר סיום הכיבוש הקמתה של פדרציה כדוגמת הצעתו של המלך חסיין.
 - ב. הציבור, ברובו, הוא פרו-אס"פ. אינו יודע מיחס מנהיגי אס"פ בגדמ"ע, כי גם אם יש כאלה הם ודאי במחנה.
 - ג. הרצון להגיע למליטה אס"פ הוא ערמילאי; אין אס"פ מבטיח מדינה טובה יותר או תנאי חיים נוחים יותר, אלא רק מדינה בטלסון פלמטינאי. ברור, כי יהיו קשיים כלכליים, אך גם החילת דרכה של מדינת ישראל הייתה רצופה מחסור ובעיות בתחום הכלכלי.
 - ד. בתחום הכלכלי הוא טבע-רצון לחלוטין מן המצב. הציג בגאווה את התפתחות בית המרוח שלו ואת הרחבת הייצור בטנים האחרונות. מחצית סחורו מסווקה בגדמ"ע וברצועת עזה והמחצית האחרת בגדמ"ז. הקטיט סנגרסו בחקופת האחרונה (הגבלות יצוא-א.כ.נ.) בגדמ"ז לא היו בעלי אופי פוליטי, אלא נבעו מתחרות מסחרית גרידא.
 - ה. הפועלים במפעלו ברובם הסכריע אינם מאורגנים באיגודן מקצועי ואינם מכייעט דעות פוליטיות בכיוון זה או אחר. הם מסתפקים בעבודתם ומידת המעורבות שלהם בנוסאי אס"פ וכיו"ב היא אפסית.
 - ו. אינו חושט כלל לבטחוננו הארמני או לבטחון מפעלו כל עוד הישראלים מקיימים את הסדר כדרכם עד כה. לא היו כל התנכלויות למפעלי העסיה בעירו או במקומות אחרים.
3. אברהם אל-טויל (ראש העיר החדש והמיועד של אל-בירה, לאוסני, רוקח במקצועו)
 - א. בחירתו לעיריה וכניסתו העתידה להפקיד ראש עיר הם הקופה חדטה בחייו. עד כה נסע מלעסוק בענייני ציבור ואילו מעתה יצטרך לחנות את עיסוקו הפרטי ולעסוק ראשו ורובו בניהול העיר.

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ב. על ידאל להמטיך טגגנון-חייט- טאוהפוט עם העיריות החדשות כבעבר, לא להחוק אותן לנקיטת יהדות לאומניות-הצהרתיות כיוותרות, להימנע מצעדי התגרות כגון צעדת "גוש אמונים" ולגלות אורך-רוח כלפי העיריות החדשות כמסך, נאמר, הזנה הראשונה לסירותן .

ג. ראשי הערים בגדמ"ע נהגים שמידה רבה מאד כל חוסר וסמכויותיהם עולות על אלה שבידי עמיתיהם בעולט הערבי כולו, כולל ירדן. אולם על ידאל לגלות יתר הבנה למצבם, למשל: כרצות ראש עיר לתקן את החיקת המיסוי העירוני כדי להגדיל הכנסותיו דרוש ממנו המיטטל הצבאי לבקש זאת בטפורט. טובן, כי זוהי דרישה שקשה לעמוד בה בפני האוכלוסיה המקומית. במקום זאת על המיטטל הצבאי לכפות שינוי החיקת כנ"ל על החוסכים המקומיים.

ד. ביקש מהאורה לפעול בארה"ב כדי להשיג כסף לפיתוחה של בית-להם בפרט והגדמ"ע בכלל, בין אם בדרכים ישירות ובין אם באמצעות ממסלת ירדן. הציע כדוגמא את הצורך בהקמת סיכונים כעירו, כדי שיוסמך אופיה הנוצרי-המסורתי ותקסן הגירתם של בני הדור הצעיר.

ה. ציין לחיוב את העזרה שבגיש לו המיטטל לפיתוחה של עירו, אך הדגיש את הצורך בעזרה רבה יותר, במיוחד נוכח העדר המיכת העולט הנוצרי בו כדוגמא התמיכה האפשרית של מדינות המפרץ בראשי-ערים מלמיט.

סיכום

6. יעבץ גילה התעניינות מרובה בכל הנעשה והנסמע. הביע צערו על שלא יכול להוסיף ולססוע וירצה בעתיד לדעת יותר בנוסא זה.

7. לדעתו דאווה המלאכה סנעטית בטטחים ליכה, ובמיוחד הדגיש את ההגינות הרבה סבה נוהלו הכחירות. לדבריו סמע ממנהיגי ערב דעה דומה לגבי מידת הצדק ואי-ססוא-סנים שנרגנו בבחירות האחרונות.

8. עיקר התעניינותו במעמד אס"מ בעולט הערבי ובגדמ"ע, ובקשר לכך הביע את ההערות דלהלן:-

א. הדבקות הרבה באס"מ בין החוסכים היא חלק מן הרצון להביא לסיום הכיבוט היטראלי, אך אינה מעוגנת בכל מוטג ברור של דמות המדינה העתידה, אופיה או מידת הריאליות סבה.

ב. סהמעט טראה וסמע אינו מתרסט כי יט מקום לחסס יטראלי מפני רדיקליזציה של ראשי אעיריות החדשות, אט כי בעלייתו של דור צעיר יותר סמון גט סיכווי רב מכחינה יטראלית.

ג. סצטרף לדעתו של פריג", כי על יטראל לנהל דו-סיה קונסטרוקטיבי גט עם הקיצוניים יותר סבין ראשי הערים החדשים כדי לא ליצור להט דימוי רדיקלי ופרו-אס"מי שלא לצורך.

ב. על ישראל להמשיך במגננת-חייט-סוחפית עם העיריות החדשות כבעבר, לא לדחוק אותן לנקיטת יחידה לאומניות-הצהרתיות מיוחדת, להימנע מצעדי התגרות כגון צערת "גוש אמונים" ולגלות אורך-רוח כלפי העיריות החדשות כמסך, נאמר, הונה הראשונה לסירוחן.

ג. ראשי הערים בגדמ"ע נהניו ממידה רבה מאד של חופש ומטכויותיהם עולות על אלה שבידו עמיתיהם בעולם הקרבו כולו, כולל ירדן. אולם על ישראל לגלות יתר הבנה למצבם, למשל: ברצות ראש עיר להקן את חתימת המיטוי העירוני כדי להגדיל הכנסותיו דורש ממנו המימסל הצבאי לבקש זאת בספורט. מובן, כי זוהי דרישה ספקה לעמוד בה בפני האוכלוסייה המקומית. במקום זאת על המימסל הצבאי לכפות שינוי חתימת כנ"ל על החוסבים המקומיים.

ד. ביקש מהאורה לפעול באורה"ב כדי להשיג כסף לפיתוחה של בית-לחם בפרט והגדמ"ע בכלל, בין אם בדרכים ישירות ובין אם באמצעות סממלה ירדן. הציע כדוגמא את הצורך בהקמת סיכונים בעירו, כדי שייסגר אומיה הנוצרי-המסורתי ותוקטן הגירחם של בני הדור הצעיר.

ה. ציין לחיוב את העזרה ספגית לו המימסל לפיתוחה של עירו, אך הדגיש את הצורך בעזרה רבה יותר, במיוחד נוכח העדר המיכת העולם הנוצרי בו כדוגמת המיכת האסורית של מדינות המפרץ בראשי-ערים סלמים.

סיכום

6. יעבץ גילה התעניינות מרובה בכל הנעשה והנסמע. הביע צערו על שלא יכול להוסיף ולסמוע וירצה בעתיד לדעת יותר בנושא זה.
7. לרעתו ראויה המלאכה שנעשת בסכחים למבח, ובמיוחד הדגיש את ההבינות הרבה שבה נוהלו הבחירות. לדבריו סמע ממנהיגי ערב דעה דומה לגבי מידת הצדק ואי-סדוא-פניו שנדגלו בבחירות האחרונות.
8. עיקר התעניינותו בסעמד אס"ם בעולם הערבי ובגדמ"ע, ובקשר לכך הביע את התערה דלהלן:-
 - א. הרבקות הרבה באס"ם בין החוסבים היא חלק מן הרצון להביא לסיום הכיבוש היסראלי, אך אינה מעוגנת בכל מוטג ברור של דמות המדינה העתידה, אופיה או מידת הריאליות שבה.
 - ב. הסמעט טראה וסמע אינו מטרטט כי יש מקום לחסס יסראלי מפני רדיקליזציה של ראשי העיריות החדשות, אם כי בעלייהו של דור צעיר יותר כסוף גם סיכוי רב מבחינה יסראלית.
 - ג. מצטרף לדעתו של פריג", כי על ישראל לנהל דו-טיה קונסטרוקטיבי גם עם הקיצוניים יותר שבין ראשי הערים החדשים כדי לא ליצור להם דימוי רדיקלי ופרו-אס"מי שלא לצורך.

8. בחתום הראב יוחזר על ישראל לרכז את מדיניותה בהסדרים על הגבולות (קרי: עם מדינות ערב, כולל ירדן) ולצמצם ככל האפשר את הדיון בסאלת מידה ייצוגיותו של א"מ, ככלות-הכול הנקודה האחרונה היא רק בחינה אחת של הבעיה, אשר הודגשה מעבר לפורמאליות המתאימות ועל ישראל לעשות לצמצום הסיבות.

9. גילה התעניינות רבה במידה מעורבותה של ירדן בגרמ"ע והסינויים בה בסנים האחרונות.

10. התלהב מאד ממגמות הפיתוח הכלכלי המסתמנות בירדן לאחרונה ואף נתבקש ע"י המלך ואחיו חסן לנסות ולהשיג בארה"ב הסיכום פיננסי לתכניות בחתום זה.

11. בחתום הפוליטי הוא רואה בגרמ"ע את "עקב אכילס" של סיכויי ההסדר עם מדינות ערב.

12. יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב על ישראל לעזור בנחיד כדי להשיג הסיכום של חוגים לא-יהודיים, שהיה חיונית עבורה במניס הקרובות. אינו רואה הסדר-סלום קרוב, אולם יתכן ואנו בחילתו של החליף טייטלבוך 10-15 שנים, ואשר בסופו הסדר יסימנע פלחמות נוספות. בהסגמו של זה יהיה לארה"ב, כמובן, חלק מכריע. באופן בסיסי, אמנם, לא נסתמחה החסימה האמריקנית במדינת ישראל אולם הנכונות להסתיך ולתמוך בה באופן מטיבי תהיה תלויה במידה, שבה הסתכנע ארה"ב, כי ישראל עושה כל אפשר כדי להגיע להסדר במזה"ה וכי אין היא מצפה מכל האחרים לנהוג לפי דרישותיה-סלה בלבד.



ד"ר אמנון כהן, אל"ם
יועץ לעניני ערבים

אכ/יד

PAO ADVISORY.

JAVITS LINKS MID EAST TENSIONS TO WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

(2300)

WASHINGTON--U. S. SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS, R-N. Y., SAID WEDNESDAY THAT THE MOST SERIOUS TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST EXIST IN THE WEST BANK AREA AND OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHERE THE ISRAELIS HAVE PERMITTED JEWISH SETTLEMENT.

"I BELIEVE IT IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT TO POINT OUT TO ISRAEL THAT SETTLEMENT, NEW SETTLEMENT OF THESE AREAS CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE WHAT ULTIMATELY MAY BE THEIR DISPOSITION, JAVITS TOLD A MEETING OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE HERE. "IN THESE NEW SETTLEMENTS THE ISRAELIS ARE STRICTLY ON THEIR OWN," JAVITS SAID.

THE SENIOR SENATOR FROM NEW YORK, WHO JUST RETURNED FROM A MID EAST TOUR OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE "WILL NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE" IN U. S. POLICY.

JAVITS TOLD THE AUDIENCE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MID EAST HAVE BRIGHTENED CONSIDERABLY DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. HE SAID THERE IS A "NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR

BRINGING ABOUT SOME FORM OF RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY THERE, OR PERHAPS NON-BELLIGERANCE OR -- IN THE ULTIMATE -- OF PEACE." THE SENATOR ESTIMATED THAT A REAL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA WILL TAKE 10 TO 15 YEARS TO ACHIEVE, AND LISTED NUMEROUS STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY THE U. S., ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES DURING THE INTERIM.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SENATOR JAVITS' ADDRESS:

(BEGIN TEXT:)

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE ARRIVED AT A WATERSHED IN THE LONG AND AGONIZING CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE BORDERING ARAB STATES. THIS IS, AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, A DARK HOUR AND AN HOUR OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL AS THEY OBSERVE THE 28TH ANNIVERSARY OF A STATE THAT HAS BEEN BELEAGUERED SINCE THE HOUR OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT. INDEED, SINCE ZIONISM FIRST BECAME IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY AN IDEA OF HOPE FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE, IT HAS COME UNDER ATTACK AND HAS BEEN USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR BRUTALITY AND TYRANNY. I THINK IT APPROPRIATE, SO SOON AFTER MY OWN JOURNEY THROUGH THE MID EAST FOR ME TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT ISRAEL'S PERIO AND ISRAEL'S OPPORTUNITY.

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LET'S NOT FOOL OURSELVES. THE DANGERS ARE MANY AND SERIOUS. THEY HAVE GROWN IN NUMBER AND COMPLEXITY. ONLY YESTERDAY A NEW YORK TIMES LEAD STORY DEALT WITH PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS SYMPTOM OF THE CURRENT TENSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE BORDERING ARAB STATES, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND EVEN ISRAEL AND SOME OF HER CLOSE FRIENDS IN THE UNITED STATES -- NEW ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND OTHER ADMINISTERED AREAS.

I BELIEVE IT IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT TO POINT OUT TO ISRAEL THAT SETTLEMENT , NEW SETTLEMENT OF THESE AREAS CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE WHAT ULTIMATELY MAY BE THEIR DISPOSITION. IN THESE NEW SETTLEMENT S THE ISRAELIS ARE STRICTLY ON THEIR OWN. WE ARE VERY SYMPATHETIC. I THINK WE OUGHT TO BE VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR CONCERN ABOUT WHOSE HANDS THE WEST BANK IS IN ULTIMATELY, BUT WE OUGHT TO ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR, WITHOUT NECESSARILY USING THE ^{STRINGENT} STRINGENT LANGUAGE OF AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, THAT THE FACT OF SETTLEMENT WILL NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN OUR POLICY RESPECTING THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THOSE AREAS.

I WAS PLEASED TO READ SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ASSERTION IN BALTIMORE THE OTHER NIGHT WHEN HE NOTED THAT:

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"THE UNITED STATES CAN NEVER IGNORE ITS MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF NATIONS WHICH RELY UPON US AS THE ULTIMATE DEFENDER OF THEIR SURVIVAL AND FREEDOM. WE ARE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE FUTURE OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND WE SHALL NEVER FORGET THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY HAS A SPECIAL CLAIM ON THE CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND."

I BELIEVE THAT DR. KISSINGER WILL BE VALUED BY HISTORY AS ONE OF THIS COUNTRY'S REALLY GREAT SECRETARIES OF STATE. HIS ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE SEARCH FOR A STABLE WORLD ORDER AND FOR PEACE ARE TRULY IMPRESSIVE. BUT IN VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS I HOPE DR. KISSINGER'S WORDS SIGNAL THE END OF AN UNHAPPY ERA. FOR SOME OF THESE ACTIONS HAVE SEEMED TO REFLECT A LESSENING OF COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST'S ONLY TRULY DEMOCRATIC STATE. THEY HAVE, I BELIEVE, CONTRIBUTED TO A CLIMATE IN WHICH ISRAEL HAS SEEN HERSELF FORCED TO RESPOND AS THOUGH SHE WERE ALONE AND FRIENDLESS IN THE WORLD, EVEN IF THIS IS NOT TRUE.

I REGRET TO SAY THAT I BELIEVE THAT THIS CLIMATE HAS HELPED TO CREATE A "GARRISON" STATE MENTALITY AMONG MANY

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ISRAELIS. IT IS MY VIEW THAT THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY CAN AND MUST PLAY A FORCEFUL ROLE IN ASSISTING THE ISRAELIS TO EMULATE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE THE BOLD RISKS THAT THEY HAVE SO SUCCESSFULLY ASSUMED IN WAR. FOR IT IS TIME TO OFFER NEW ALTERNATIVES, NEW PERSPECTIVES AND NEW POSSIBILITIES. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEMS FACED BY ISRAEL, BUT I BELIEVE THAT OPEN DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES TO ETERNAL HOSTILITIES NEEDS TO BEGIN.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE 1973 WAR HAS RESULTED IN A VASTLY DIFFERENT SELF-PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES. WHATEVER THE ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE FIGHTING, THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN HAVE A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN THEIR OWN PROWESS THAT DIDN'T EXIST BEFORE. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO NEGOTIATION THAT IMPEDED PAST ATTEMPTS TO FIND A SOLUTION HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

MY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS: ONE, THAT IT IS A RELATIVELY NEW SITUATION. TWO, THAT EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS THAT GIVE US A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR BRINGING ABOUT SOME FORM OF RENUNCIATION OF

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WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY THERE, OR PERHAPS NON-BELLIGERENCE, OR IN THE ULTIMATE, OF PEACE; THOUGH I THINK THAT IS LIKELY TO TAKE MORE THAN IMMEDIATE TIME.

I WOULD ESTIMATE THAT IN THE COURSE OF A DECADE THE PEACE SITUATION CAN BE PHASED IN THE COURSE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LIVING TOGETHER ON THE GROUND WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THAT AREA. THIS PROCESS IS EPITOMIZED BY THE SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF LIVING BY THAT AGREEMENT BEING THE WILLINGNESS OF ISRAEL TO GIVE UP THE PASSES AND THE ABU RUDEIS OIL FIELDS, THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL AREA, AND THE REBUILDING OF THE EGYPTIAN CITIES OF ISMAILIA AND SUEZ. INDEED, PRESIDENT SADAT ADVISED ME IN CAIRO THAT IN EXCESS OF 600,000 EGYPTIANS WERE BEING RESETTLED ALREADY IN THE AREA.

I FOUND SIMILAR EVIDENCE IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AND WITH THE KING, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CROWN PRINCE OF JORDAN.

IN JORDAN THERE IS AN APPRECIATION OF AND AN ANXIETY TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. INASMUCH AS THERE IS A NEW LINK BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA, ONE HAS A RIGHT TO SPECULATE THAT SUCH AN ATTITUDE MAY ALSO

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BE FINDING SUPPORT IN SYRIA ITSELF.

IN ISRAEL, A COUNTRY WHERE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE HAS BEEN ITS PRINCIPAL GOAL SINCE THE DAY OF ITS CREATION, THERE IS ALSO A NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE. SADLY, THAT CLIMATE IS A FUNCTION OF A GROWING SENSE OF POLITICAL ISOLATION AND A STAGGERING ECONOMIC BURDEN THAT GROWS DIRECTLY FROM ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMS AND MILITARY SECURITY. THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION THAT THIS ECONOMIC BURDEN CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A VIABLE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

ISRAEL, AS A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC NATION, IS NOW CAUGHT IN THE TRAUMA OF MAKING DIFFICULT DECISIONS THAT SIMPLY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED HAPPILY BY ALL SEGMENTS OF HER POPULATION. ISRAEL MUST SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF A NEW APPROACH TO THE PEACE TABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A GOVERNMENT ABLE TO PERSUADE ITS PEOPLE THAT PEACE WILL COME OF SACRIFICE; THAT SOME NEW STEPS MUST BE TAKEN IN THE NATION'S LARGER INTERESTS. I MIGHT SAY THAT ONE OF THE ISRAELIS THAT I TALKED WITH PHRASED THE SITUATION, IN MY JUDGMENT, VERY WELL AS FOLLOWS: ONE, YOU START WITH A RELUCTANCE TO USE WAR AS AN OPTION THROUGHOUT THE AREA -- BY ARAB AND ISRAELI

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ALIKE. THEN YOU PROCEED WITH A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THAT'S WHAT I MEAN WHEN I SAY THE REBUILDING OF CITIES, THE MAINTAINING OPEN THAT WHICH IS OPEN, OF THE ALLENBY-HUSSEIN BRIDGE BECAUSE I WALKED ACROSS IT MYSELF BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. AND FINALLY, PEACE. IT IS GOING TO TAKE, IN MY JUDGMENT, BETWEEN TEN AND FIFTEEN YEARS TO GET TO THE LAST STAGE. YOU MAY PHASE IT IN BY WHAT IS CALLED NON-BELLIGERENCY, RENUNCIATION OF RECOURSE TO WAR AND SO ON. AT LEAST IF AN OBJECTIVE IS SET NOW WHILE THIS OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, AND BY NOW I MEAN WITHIN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS, THEN THE AREA IS POINTING TOWARD A GIVEN CONSTRUCTIVE OBJECTIVE. I BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VITAL PART TO PLAY IN THAT PROCESS.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES, AND LET US REMEMBER, I JUST SPEAK NOW OF POSSIBILITIES. I SUGGEST THAT ISRAEL OFFER YET AGAIN TO SIT DIRECTLY ACROSS THE TABLE FROM HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IN RETURN FOR THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES EXPLICITLY ACCEPTING ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MUTUAL OBJECTIVE OF ARRIVING AT A GENUINE PEACE AFTER A SPECIFIC SERIES OF PHASES HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED AND SUCCESSFULLY

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IMPLEMENTED. THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

THE IMPULSE FOR COOPERATION IS THERE. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE IT BY OUR OWN ATTITUDES AND OWN SUGGESTIONS. YESTERDAY'S SLOGANS MUST NOT DOMINATE TODAY'S REALITY.

THERE IS A PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS -- INCLUDING THOSE ON THE WEST BANK -- EXPRESS IT. THE JEWISH PEOPLE ABOVE ALL MUST SYMPATHIZE WITH SUCH A THIRST FOR A NATIONAL HOMELAND. WHILE WE MUST NEVER PERMIT THE ARM OF TERRORISM TO STRIKE AT THE HEART OF ISRAEL FROM A PUPPET STATE, WE MUST SEARCH FOR WAYS WHEREBY THE PALESTINIANS CAN ASSERT THEMSELVES AS AN ENTITY DESPITE THE CHAOTIC, COMPLEX AND QUICKLY MOVING POLITICAL FLUX OF THE MID EASTERN ARENA.

THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT JORDAN STILL OFFERS HOPE FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. JORDANIAN CONFEDERATION WITH THE WEST BANK IS NOT A DREAM BUT A REAL POTENTIAL. PERHAPS IT IS TIME FOR OFFERS MADE AND REJECTED IN THE PAST TO BE RENEWED WITH NEW ELEMENTS IN A NEW TIME.

EVEN SYRIA, WHERE THE BITTERNESS OF THE STRUGGLE AND THE

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CONFLICT REMAINS AT ITS FIERCEST, OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT AT LEAST A BEGINNING CAN BE MADE.

THE UNITED STATES ITSELF HAS MUCH TO OFFER IN CREATING AN AMBIENCE FOR THESE NEW MOVES ALONG THE ROAD TO PEACE. THERE ARE SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUGGEST. I MIGHT MENTION JUST TWO AREAS THAT ARE WORTHY OF EXPLORATION.

DURING MY RECENT TRIP TO THE MID EAST, I DISCUSSED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH SOME OF THE NEWLY ELECTED OFFICIALS ON THE WEST BANK. THERE IS A GENERAL IMPULSE TO CREATE NEW HOUSING, MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA. THE UNITED STATES MAY WELL CONSIDER A PROGRAM WHEREBY IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE FUNDS TO SUCH WEST BANK DEVELOPMENT, PERHAPS IN CONCERT WITH SOME OF THE ARAB OIL STATES.

I THINK, TOO, THAT SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF A SIMILAR NATURE MIGHT ASSIST IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KUNEITRA AS A SYMBOL OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACEFUL CO-OPERATION. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, REQUIRE AS A COROLLARY SUCH NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE RENEWAL OF THE UN BUFFER FORCE THAT WOULD

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MAKE SUCH A PROJECT FEASIBLE.

I THINK I SHOULD SAY HERE THAT ALL OF THESE POSSIBILITIES MAY HELP TO BRING ABOUT INCREASING POLITICAL STABILITY BUT THAT THEY REQUIRE A POLITICAL WILL FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. I SAID EARLIER THAT I REGARD JORDANIAN CONFEDERATION WITH THE WEST BANK AS A REAL AND DESIRABLE POSSIBILITY. JORDAN IS A PALESTINIAN STATE IN MANY WAYS AND HER LEADERSHIP ACCEPTS THE UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 238. SUCH RECOGNITION OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS IS A PREREQUISITE FOR RECOGNITION AS A RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL ENTITY.

NOW, I WISH TO SAY THAT I CAME BACK MUCH LESS CONVINCED. EVEN ASIDE FROM THE EMBROILMENT IN LEBANON; AND THE TERRIBLE CONFLICT THERE INDICATES WHAT COULD HAPPEN WHEN THE PLO IS INVOLVED IN A NATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION -- AND THIS IS QUITE ASIDE ALSO FROM ITS INHUMAN TERRORISM. FOR, THERE IS AN UNWILLINGNESS OF THE PLO TO COME TO ANY POSITION WHERE IT CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AS A NEGOTIATOR. THE FACT IS THAT WHILE DR. ARAFAT APPARENTLY TELLS CERTAIN ARAB LEADERS THAT HE IS MODERATE, HE IS PUBLICLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF WHICH RECOGNIZES ISRAEL AS A STATE. SO LONG

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AS HE FAILS TO DO THAT, I BELIEVE THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT, THAT THE PLO CANNOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WITH AS A PARTY TO A MIDDLE EAST AGREEMENT.

BUT WHATEVER THE CONTOURS OF THE ROAD TO PEACE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST CONSIDER ALSO THE REALITY OF THE SUSPICION AND MUTUAL DISTRUST THAT HAS DOMINATED THE AREA FOR SO LONG. A MORE FORMAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL OR A SERIES OF UN AND GREAT POWER GUARANTEES TO ALL OF THE PARTIES ARE ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES TO BE CONSIDERED. THE POINT IS THAT EVERYTHING MUST BE CONSIDERED TO GAIN MOMENTUM AND TO KEEP IT GOING.

THE SUGGESTIONS THAT I HAVE RAISED HERE ARE SIMPLY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ESSENCE OF MY BELIEF THAT MOVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL IF STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. WE DO OURSELVES A DISSERVICE IF WE SHUT OUR EYES TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT TOMORROW CAN BE DIFFERENT AND BETTER THAN YESTERDAY. THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL IN ARMS HAVE BEEN A NECESSITY; BUT THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL EXPRESSING THEIR GENEROSITY, THEIR HOPE AND THEIR VISION OF JUSTICE, IS THE

ULTIMATE EXPRESSION OF THE JEWISH SPIRIT. YOU AND I, AND MILLIONS OF OTHERS, HOLD ISRAEL AND HER PEOPLE AS A CENTRAL PART OF OUR OWN INDIVIDUAL BEINGS. WE ARE HER CLOSEST FRIENDS AND WE KNOW THAT THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL HAVE UNDERGONE A NATIONAL TRAUMA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR -- A WAR THEY WON. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ESCAPE THE EMOTIONAL HAVOC WREAKED BY THAT WAR. WE CAN DO OUR PART BY CONTINUING TO OFFER MATERIAL SUSTENANCE AND TO HOLD THE BANNER HIGH IN THE FACE OF ANY THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL; AND WE WILL DO SO. WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME ENCOURAGE HER TO TAKE THE RISKS FOR THE PEACE FOR WHICH SHE HAS SEARCHED SO LONG.

TO SUMMARIZE THE COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS I SEE IT NOW IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. RECOGNITION THAT ANY OPPORTUNITY LOOKING TOWARD PEACE MUST NOT BE PASSED BY FOR THERE IS NO APPETITE FOR WAR AND THERE IS A CLIMATE FOR PEACE.
2. PEACE WILL BE FORGED BY CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND - MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL WHICH NEED TO BE PHASED IN OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS.
3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOP PEACE ON THE GROUND MAY

BE MADE NOW AS FOLLOWS:

- A) EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT;
 - B) AN END TO THE STRIFE IN LEBANON, BUT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BASED ON THE PARTITION OF LEBANON;
 - C) EXTENSION OF THE UNDOF MANDATE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS;
 - D) NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING ABOUT RECONSTRUCTION AND RESETTLEMENT OF KUNETRA ALONG THE MODEL OF THE SUEZ CANAL CITIES;
 - E) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK; SOME RESOURCES FOR ESSENTIAL MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION;
 - F) A POSITION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS THAT NEW SETTLEMENTS WILL NOT COUNT IN THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE WEST BANK;
 - G) CONTINUING TO KEEP OPEN THE ALLENBY-HUSSEIN BRIDGE.
4. EXCLUSION OF THE PLO AS A POLITICAL FORCE UNTIL IT ACCEPTS 242 AND 338.
5. CONVENING, IF IT IS POSSIBLE, OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE ACCORDING TO THE UNITED STATES TWO STAGES PLAN.
6. CONTINUED UNREMITTING ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF ISRAEL (INCLUDING OPPOSITION TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT AND DISCRIMINATION) ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ISRAEL'S FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO ISRAEL'S FEELING OF SECURITY.

ITEM

NESA-79

FORD DENIES 'SNUB,' PRAISES TEST BAN TREATY (400)

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים
עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

סודי ביותר

אלו המשרד
מאת: ווטינגטון

מס' 469

נשלח: 282000 אמר 76

Handwritten notes: 2/261

אלו המנכ"ל
במסגרת היום עם יעבז במשרדו בקפאול, השתתפו עוזרו לייקלנד גרפית יעבז יזם המגישה כדי לדוות לי על סיורו במזחה והדשמויותיו.
א. משה בענק. חוק סיוע החוצ, אמר שהוא ועמיתיו מסיגט איגמ מתכוונים לוודא לנשיא בענק סעיפי החוק שהנשיא רוצה בביטולם וכי האיום בוטו א יזיזם מעולם זו. הוא מבקש מהיגו לחיבן זאת, אמרתי בו במקום כי אינ לנו כל כוונה להתערב בכל או אפ לפציע להם לנהוג אדחת יעבז אמר כי אם ישל הנשיא הנשיא וטו אזי קיימות שתי אפשריות לקבל את הסיוע: האחת להעביר החלטה המטכ שתצוטח באופן שתכלול את כל הסכום שהנשיא ביקש ל-76 בלי רביע הביניים ואת רביע הביניים לטרפ לחוק 77. השניה להעביר החלטה המטכ עם רביע הביניים. אמרתי לו שאם מדובר בהחלטה ביניים מוטב להכליל בה את פורת הרביע שכן הדבר יחייב הנשיא לחוסים להקציב 77.8 מיליון 10 אחוז מ-77.5 מיליון אשראי בלבד ולא תהא בעיה של תקיחה תקציבית. בעוד שהוטפת ב1971 עשויה לארור תיקון בתקרת ההקציב שקבע הקונגרס. יעבז אמר שיש בכך הגיגג וחוא ותסריו ידאגו שישראל לא הפמי'ספית גם אם ישל הנשיא וטו על החוק.
ב. יעבז סיפר על הדש'מיותיו מביקוריו בלצות ערב כפי שווחמ לנו. י'מר- שהוא יארח לצהדיים בגיו יורק את שגרירי שלוש מדינות ערב הנ ביקר. הוסיף הוא משתמש מעיוג של יישוב קוני'טרה על גדי הסורים המורת הזוזה קטנה של ישראל באזור הגבעות שליד קוני'טרה.
אמרתי לו שאינ לנו התנגדות ליישוב קוני'טרה אכ הסבתי לו בהרחבה מדוע אינ אפשרות להסכים קטנים בגולג. אלא להסכם על סיומ מצב לווחת. עוד אמר כי תחזיר בשיחותיו בירצ שיש לשמור על אופייה האובייקטיבי של יחדות ארצ ולהימנע מכ שתוצא כעושה דמיה של מדינת

2/00000

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר _____ מתוך _____ דפים

עותק מספר _____ מתוך _____ עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

== 2 ==

ישראל. הבהירתי לו את עמדת ישראל כלפי המנהיגות היהודית. בסיוע השיחה סיפר כי הוא נוסע עם ריביקוף לועז'ית אונקטד בניירובי ויראה את קיסינג'ר ביום ראשון. באותה הזדמנות ידווח לו על הדשמויותיו.

בקשתי ממנו להזכיר למזכיר את בקשותי ממנו שרם צאתו לדבר עם האמריקנים על יחסי ישראל אמריקה ועל המנעות מדינות אמריקה מלתקת חלק במסע נגד ישראל באומ ובמוסדות בינל. הבטיח לעשה זאת דיניצ

שחח רוחם מנכל שחבט (בנפרד) ממנכל ארגוב אבידר פנוג י. רביב משה רביב / מצפא (רס) בנפרד
ו. / אמן (בנפרד)
ר/ אר

הענין הזה הוא שכל המעשה הזה
הוא מעשה של אהבה ושל חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
ועל כן הוא מעשה של צדקה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של נאמנות
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמונה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אהבה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
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ועל כן הוא מעשה של נאמנות
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמונה

ועל כן הוא מעשה של אהבה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
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ועל כן הוא מעשה של אהבה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
ועל כן הוא מעשה של צדקה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של נאמנות
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמונה

ועל כן

ועל כן הוא מעשה של אהבה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
ועל כן הוא מעשה של צדקה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של נאמנות
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמונה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אהבה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של חסד
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמת
ועל כן הוא מעשה של צדקה
ועל כן הוא מעשה של נאמנות
ועל כן הוא מעשה של אמונה

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסייחוי וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ו די
Handwritten signature/initials

מס' 403
משלה: 181700 יוני 76

אל: המשרד
מאת: רוסינגטון

אל: מנכל
דע: עברון

למקשתכ אני מפנה תשומת לבך לנאום יעבצ אתמול במועדון העתונות
הלאומי בווישינגטון. קטעים ממנו הברקתי בשלי 380.
בנאומו ניסרטים שנויים עמדה שהינם ללא ספק תוצאה של התגובות
השליכיות הרבות שקיבלו הוא ועוזריו, להופעתו האודוניה בת ועדת החוצ
של הסינט וכן של שיחתך ושיחת השגריר עמו לאודוניה.
יעבצ קובע שמוקד ההתענינות במזהת עבר מהגדמייע ללכנון. בניגוד
להצרותיו הקודמות כי בנושא ההתנחלויות נמצאת ישראל לבדה,
אומר עתה יעבצ כי הבעיה ניתנת לפתרון הדדי משביע רצון, כאשר שני
הצדדים יהיו מוכנים למזמ פנים אל פנים וכי דבר לא יוסדר
עד אשר הצדדים עצמם ישבו לעשות זאת.
בנאומו יוצא יעבצ מגדרו כדי לשבח את ישראל ומאמציה לשלום כולל
יוזמת רוהמ בביקורו האודוניה כאנ(אם כי הוא מגבילה משום מה למצרים
בלבד) מציינ את המחוייבות האמריקאית לישראל המבוססת על הסטוריה ועל
אינטרסים משותפים, קודא להכללת ישראל בנאשו- מונה את חטאי מצרים
כלפי ישראל וקובע כי אל מול הלחצ על ישראל- אין לחצ מקביל על הערבים
לנהל מזמ פנים אל פנים עם ישראל.
לעומת זאת מסתפק יעבצ בתביעה מאשפ לקבל האודיות הנובעת מ-242 338
ואה בככ את ייאמארו ת הגדולה מכלי לפתרון הבעיה הפלשתינאית.
(על נקודה זו נעיר לו).
יעבצ גם מאשט דברי סאדאת בלונדון טימס שעמדת הערבים היא שמנעה
השגת התקדמות בשנה זו אליהם הפנית כזכור, תשומת לבו בשיחתכמ
האודוניה.
לפני נאומו התקשר אל השגריר וביקש פרטים על נאום רוהמ בכנסת דברים
שהכליל בנאומו.
רפ"ח-

שהח רוהמ מנכל שהכס ממנכל ארגוב יוני י. וכיב שק מצמא מזתים חקר רס אמר
רע/ אר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (כטחון) המדינה יחסייחון וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

מס. 238

נשלח 111300 יוני 76

סודי

סודי

Handwritten initials/signature

אל; המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

אל: עבדון

לבקשת סנטור יעבצ נפגש עמו המנכל ב-10 דנא בקפיטול.
השתפו שני עוזרי הסנטור והחיים, יעבצ ביקש ושמע הערכת המנכל
להתפתחויות האחרונות בלבנון. בדבריו התעכב המנכל גם על נושא
ההתנחלויות ודברי הביקורת הפומביים של יעבצ, המנכל אמר כי הובא
לידיעתו שיעבצ עומד לשאת נאום מדיני על המזהה במיעדיו העתונות
בושינגטון בשבוע הבא. המנכל ציין כי נושא ההתנחלויות והשטחים
איננו מעסיק עתה את הממשל ואת דעת הקהל וזו היתה הדרשמותו גם
משיחותיו במחמד, יעבצ הסכים עמו.
המנכל אמר כי דברי יעבצ הפומביים גרמו לנו צער ביחוד משום שבאו
מפי סנטור שכמותו. המנכל הדגיש במיוחד את החלטת הממשלה מהפ
במאי ונתח את המשמעות הבטחונית של ההתנחלויות הקיימות בשטחים
מה שני. יעבצ אמר כי בהודעתו המוכנה מראש לעתונות לא יכלול כל התייחסות
להתנחלויות ואולם הוא ודאי ישאל על כך בפרק השאלות והתשובות
והוא יודע מה להשיב.
רפ"ח-

שהח רחם שתבט מנכל ממנכל ארגוב רוזן י. רכיב ממפא חקר רט אמן
מא/אמ

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לחיסון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

ד' אגוס (1957) ירד י

אליהמשרד

מאת: ד"ר סיגנטון

סס 409

בשלה: 211300 מאי 76

פ רכיב.

דברי יעבץ בישיבה הפומבית של תת ועדת החוץ בסיבט בנושא ההתבחליות ולא פהום
סכך עצם הופעתו המשותפת עם אוברזק(כעיקר) וכן סטיבנסון והאקסל והפירסום שגיתן
לכך גרסו לנו נזק רב ביותר.

הופעתו השלילית של יעבץ בלטה שבעתיים לנוכח מסיכותו האימבה והדברים החיוביים
ביותר שהשמיץ סנסוד קייס, המרשפות רבים מהנוכחים באותה ישיבה מהופעתו הימה קשה
ביותר. אין ספק שהדבר יהווה אור ירוק לאחרים בבחינת מה שסופר ליעבץ סומר גם
לבו ויש להביח כי עוד בחזור ונשפע על כך.

רפיה

שהח דוהם סנכל סנכל אביוד אדגוב רוזן י רביב סנפא חקר רם ? אייא/

תע/רד

מסמך
מס' 1000000000

מס' 1000000000
מס' 1000000000

א. פירו.

המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך
המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך
המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך

המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך
המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך
המסמך מפרט את כל הפרטים הרלוונטיים לתיקון המסמך

מסמך מס' 1000000000
מסמך מס' 1000000000

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוק ועודות דשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

Handwritten notes: $\frac{25}{(122)}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{2}$

סודי

אלו ווסינגטון
מאת: המשרד

מס. 472

בשלה 231400 מאי 76

בידי

רשיח. לשלך 409.

מטכילים אתך שהופעתו האומללה של יעבץ בת ועדת החוץ של הסנס מזיקה ומזאיקה במסגרת (יחד עם אבורזק) ובתוכן. כן ישנו לב שבדבריו בפני הועד היפודי-אמריקני ב-12.5 דיבר יעבץ על אי שיתוף אשיף "עד לקבלתו את 242 ו-338" ולא הזכיר הצורך בהתחייבות מצדם להכיר בישראל.

משוב שיעבץ יקבל תגובות הן מהצבול בניו יורק והן מראשי היתדות המאורגנת. מ. רביב

שהח רהח מנכל ממנכל אבידד ארגוב רוזן י. רביב מצפא חקר רט ד. אייאל
רע/או

מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

187
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סודי

אלזהמשרד
מאת: רושינגטון

מס 409

בשלה: 211300 מאי 76

ס רכיב.

דברי יעבץ בישיבה הפומבית של מה ועדת החוץ בסיגם בנושא ההתחלרות ולא פחות
סך עצם הופעתו המשותפת עם אוברזק(בעיקר) וכן סטינגטון והאקל והפירסום שגיתן
לכך גרסו לבו בזק רב ביותר.

הופעתו השלילית של יעבץ בלטה שנפתיים לנוכח מפיכתו האיתנה והדברים החיוביים
ביותר שהסמיע סנטור קייס, המרשפות רבים מהנוכחים באותה ישיבה שהופעתו הימה קשה
ביותר, אין ספק שהדבר יהווה אור ירוק לאחרים בבחינת מה שמועד ליעבץ מותר גם
לבו ויש להניח כי עוד בחזור ובשפע על כך.

דפיח

שהח דוהם סנכל סנכל אביזר אדגוב רוזן י רביב מפפא הקר רם

דע/רד

o r r e

מחשבות
מחשבות

מס 904
מס 904

א פתח.

הנה אנו מודים לך על כל המאמצים שהבנת להעלות את המצב הכלכלי של המדינה ואת המצב הכלכלי של העם. אנחנו מודים לך על כל המאמצים שהבנת להעלות את המצב הכלכלי של המדינה ואת המצב הכלכלי של העם.

אנחנו מודים לך על כל המאמצים שהבנת להעלות את המצב הכלכלי של המדינה ואת המצב הכלכלי של העם. אנחנו מודים לך על כל המאמצים שהבנת להעלות את המצב הכלכלי של המדינה ואת המצב הכלכלי של העם.

מחשבות

מחשבות

מחשבות

משרד החוץ
תל אביב



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew:
משרד החוץ
תל אביב

Handwritten initials:
R.D.

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SENATOR JAVITS' PRESS CONFERENCE
REGARDING HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST
26 April 1976

I have just returned from a fact-finding mission, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the West Bank, which the Israelis call an "administered area" and the Arabs call an "occupied area". I'd like to summarize for you my impressions and give some idea of the possibilities which may be available to us in that area of the world, looking toward a more stable situation. I do not intend as yet to make recommendations to the government or to the Congress until I have more carefully studied my notes, the reports of our ambassadors on my discussions there, etc., but I will advance certain possibilities.

My assessment of the situation there is as follows: one, that it is a relatively new situation. Events have occurred in the last six months that give us a new opportunity for bringing about some form of renunciation of war as an instrument of settling affairs there, of perhaps non-belligerence, or even peace in the ultimate, but I think that is likely to take more than immediate time. I would estimate it at ten to fifteen years, the peace situation being phased in after an experience of living together, which is essential to that area, and which is epitomized by the second disengagement agreement with Egypt, the most important aspect of which, in my judgement, is the demilitarization of the Suez Canal area, and the rebuilding of the Egyptian cities in that area, and the fact that President Sadat informed me that in excess of 600,000 Egyptians were being resettled in the area.

The big new development is that I see a reluctance to engage in war on the part of all countries there, and a real appetite for peace. I've already described a manifestation of that on the part of President Sadat. I also found the same situation in Syria, an appetite for peace and a reluctance to go to war; that's certainly the case in Israel and in Jordan.

Another new aspect of the situation of course is the strains on the Arab world which have been imposed by the Lebanon. Again I found a unanimity of opinion that under no circumstances should the Lebanon be partitioned, as between the Christians and the Moslems. I found that everywhere. The new elections on the West Bank are another very important development in that they are admittedly clean and democratic. I heard no word challenging the honesty of those elections. I personally consider it a great tribute to the Israelis that they practiced what they preached, even though they must have known that the elections could have caused more trouble, as indeed they have, on the West Bank, to wit the demonstrations and the countermarches of thousands and thousands of Israelis, but nonetheless they knew that was the right thing to do and I thoroughly agree that it was. It will take probably as much as a year, certainly the rest of this year, for the newly elected officials to sort themselves out. I interviewed a number of them. Right now they consider their job to be strictly municipal, though many of them are very sympathetic to the PLO. But that does not necessarily mean that they want the PLO on the West Bank, because at the same time they are sympathetic to the Palestinian

nationalistic feeling evidenced by the PLO, they are very concerned about the fact that thousands of PLO armed men coming into the West Bank may nullify the result of these elections and put them all out of business notwithstanding that they were elected. Also there is great fear that the West Bank will be made the base for an expansion of the Palestinian national homeland, which is what Arafat is contending. So, I do not see any important change in that area for a while.

Now, I wish to say that I come back much less convinced, indeed very very unconvinced, that the PLO is any solution, because I find that aside from the embroilment in the Lebanon, and the terrible conflict there which indicates what happens when the PLO messes into the situation on a national basis - and this is quite aside from its inhuman terrorism - also an unwillingness of "Dr. Arafat" to come to any position where he can be taken seriously as a negotiator, in view of the fact that while he apparently tells Arab leaders that he is moderate, in fact he is still breathing fire and brimstone and is unwilling to accept the resolutions of the United Nations itself which recognize Israel as a state. So long as he fails to do that, I believe the position of our country is absolutely correct, that he cannot be taken seriously and he cannot be negotiated with. I did not see him.

Another situation there which deserves the attention of Americans is all this controversy about the settlements in the West Bank on the part of Israelis and, though the Golan Heights are not now involved in any new action of that kind, they are included in that debate. The debate is raging in Israel itself. One must realize that the West Bank, if it's in the wrong hands, is a dagger pointed at the heart of Israel. Americans should realize that if the West Bank were in unfriendly hands, there is only a twelve mile band between the borders of such a state and the sea, as far as Israel is concerned. Israel would be tremendously vulnerable to being split in half. We're dealing with a question of survival there. So the anxieties of the Israelis respecting that matter seem to me to be very clear, and I cannot see anything very definitive happening there for a while. I should say at least a year, while these new municipal officials get accustomed to their jobs and work themselves in. They may ultimately be capable of being dealt with as a total administration for the whole West Bank. Right now they are very scrupulous about confining their activities to their own particular municipal jobs. I believe however that it is absolutely correct to point out to Israel that settlement, new settlement of these areas cannot be permitted to change what ultimately may be their disposition. In these new settlements the Israelis are strictly on their own. We are very sympathetic. I think we ought to be very sympathetic to their concern about whose hands the West Bank is in, but we ought to also make it clear, without necessarily using the stringent language of Ambassador Scranton, that the fact of settlement will not make a difference in our policy respecting the ultimate disposition of those areas. That I think is a perfectly correct position. I don't think we can say that we are opposed or in favor, simply that it will not be permitted to give the Israelis an advantage. Obviously marches such as the one that recently took place, which tend to produce a reaction in terms of disorder in the area, are not very good for Israel. But, as I say, we cannot twist their arm and say "we'll deny you aid if you do it", but we certainly can express our views as to the results, and that's what I advise.

Finally, it is very essential that a way be found to extend the United Nations force, UNDOF, between Syria and Israel. That expires on May 31, and it should be extended for a year but it probably won't be extended for more than six months. But I have confidence that it will be extended and that a way will be found to do that. I think that could be very helpful in fortifying this appetite for peace that I found in the

area.

Also I would suggest, respecting the Syria - Israel border -- again as a possibility, not as yet as a recommendation -- that the United States see if it's possible to duplicate on that border what to me is the most important contribution to peace on the Israeli Egyptian border, which is the rebuilding of the Suez Canal cities and the encouragement to tens of thousands of Egyptians to return there. That might be done also with respect to Kueneitra on the Syrian-Israeli border which remains a destroyed city as kind of a monument to the intractability of that dispute. If that city too might be rebuilt and its inhabitants returned, again that could be a very important contribution to ultimate normalization of the area. I say that for the following reason. I do not believe that it is possible under existing conditions to establish new confidence between Israel and its neighbors in terms of psychology, so that they trust each other. The heritage is altogether too bitter for that. But I do believe that it is possible to make progress, country by country, toward the living conditions on the ground, so that over a period of time they will have mutual hostages to the maintenance of peace, like the Suez Canal cities and the situation in the Sinai desert as between Israel and Egypt, and so I look for some comparable initiative respecting the relations between Syria and Israel.

I see no hope right now for a Geneva Conference because I do not believe that it is right to admit the PLO to a negotiating position in that conference for the reasons I have described. I believe this possibility that I have raised, of better living conditions on the ground, to be the only suitable course for the interposition of our diplomacy, that is U.S. diplomacy, and mediation efforts. I might point out in the same connection that I see it as very hopeful that there is a tremendous interest in, and activity in economic development in Egypt. In my judgement, President Assad of Syria is getting a new interest in economic development. And Jordan, under King Hussein and his brother Prince Hassan, is the leading exponent of economic development in the whole area. These are, I think, very hopeful signs, and I hope that we in the United States encourage their continuance and expansion. Indeed I would like to see if we could conceivably contrive some way of helping the municipalities in the West Bank. For the most elementary things like repairing a sewer system or a water system they need a little help. The whole estimate in the aggregate in the area was \$10 million. To find some way of accomplishing that would be extremely useful. How it can be done, as I say this West Bank area which the Israelis call administered and the Arabs call occupied, I cannot say yet. But, it is well worth looking into.

Finally, when I came in I was shown a dispatch, to save you asking me the question, respecting the fact that our President and President Hassan may meet. I hope they will and I would consider it desirable that they should. That is all I can say about that. I will answer any questions.

QUESTION (1): You are quoted as saying that they might meet before May 31st, is that possible?

SENATOR: I have no idea. All I can say is that I hope that they do meet sometime soon. I can't say before May 31st or not. And I don't believe that the extension of the UNDOF force should depend upon their meeting.

-MORE-

QUESTION (2): Did President Hassan give you any sort of message to President Ford about meeting?

SENATOR: Any conversations I had with any head of state I consider to be private and not for quotation by me.

QUESTION (3): When do you plan to meet with President Ford?

SENATOR: As soon as he can see me. I have already put in a bid to see him.

QUESTION (4): Were there any messages, without divulging what they were?

SENATOR: Whatever is encompassed and is dubbed a message I will deliver to the President. I will neither confirm or deny that there were messages.

QUESTION (5): Senator, you were away how long?

SENATOR: I was away for ten days and my foreign policy assistant, Peter Lakeland, and my administrative assistant, Don Kellermann, traveled with me.

QUESTION (6): Did Hassan put in a pitch for West Bank aid?

SENATOR: No. This is my idea based upon my observation of the situation on the ground because I don't see material progress except in this, as I say, bilateral way at this time. Although I believe that the opening of a more normal situation is greater than it has been for a long time, not withstanding the terrible tragedy of the Lebanon. I might say that one of the Israelis that I talked with phrased the situation in my judgement very well as followed: One, you start with a reluctance to use war as an option throughout the area -- Arab and Israeli. Then you proceed with a normalization of relations. That's what I mean when I say the rebuilding of cities, of the maintaining open that which is open, of the Allenby Bridge because I walked across it myself between Israel and Jordan. And finally peace. It is going to take in my judgement between ten and fifteen years to get to that last stage. You may phase it in by what is called non-belligerency, renunciation of recourse to war and so on. At least if an objective is set now while this opportunity presents itself, and by now I mean within the next twelve months, then everybody is pointing toward a given constructive objective.

QUESTION (7): Do you have any dollar figure on rebuilding the city of (inaudible)?

SENATOR: The question is one of what it costs. As you all know, we are giving economic aid of Egypt of \$700 million in this fiscal year. Of course, that is a very much bigger operation than Kueneitra. I don't know what would be the cost of such an activity or how much would be contributed to by the oil rich Arab states and other parties. I might tell you parenthetically that I hope that in many of these things we can bring in western European participation. I think it is urgently in the interests of NATO that there should not be an outbreak of war in the Middle East and that Lebanon should not be partitioned. They should join with us in the efforts to bring about a more stable situation in that area in an affirmative way. I hope very much that our diplomacy will direct itself to that end.

QUESTION (8): Congress has just agreed to send military weapons to Egypt. Do you think weapon sales to Israel should be increased?

SENATOR: I do not believe that the military aid that is being extended to Israel is competitive. I believe that what we are trying to do is assess what Israel really needs for its security and to give it what it needs. That is the basis for the difference between the President and the government of Israel on this fifth quarter. I believe that that issue should be compromised and the reason is that I am convinced that the cash flow needs of the Israelis for essential arms is more than the figure which is available, to wit one billion eight, outside the fifth quarter. I believe that situation should be compromised and should not be allowed to be a disturbing cloud between the U.S. and Israel, because it is deserved on the cash flow basis to enough extent to be the basis for a fair compromise.

QUESTION (9): What kind of compromise, split it right down the middle?

SENATOR: Well, I can't say that. But I think it's a fair compromise emphasizing the arms quotient which is what Israel is in serious problems about. I do not believe that we are or should handle the arms issue on a competitive basis. In short, Israel should have what she needs, rather than measuring what China or some other country may be doing for Egypt.

QUESTION (10): Does Israel have what she needs?

SENATOR: I think if we give her the billion eight, and a fair compromise on the fifth quarter, she will have what she needs.

QUESTION (11): Does the Egyptian aid that is being received from China necessitate an increase?

SENATOR: I said no. But that includes a settlement on the fifth quarter.

QUESTION (12): Senator, you say in your opening remarks that you went to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the West Bank, and not to the Lebanon. Why not?

SENATOR: I have not been into the Lebanon because I was not interested in seeing Dr. or Mr. Arafat, and that would be the only reason. Other than that it's just an observation on the ground which our ambassador there can make better than I because he was there longer than I. Because I cannot take Mr. Arafat as a serious negotiating party, I did not wish to go to see him.

QUESTION (13): Senator, did any Arab leader with whom you talked on this trip say to you that the government of his country would recognize Israel as a sovereign Jewish state under certain circumstances?

SENATOR: The answer to that is no, but I think it is very important that every Arab leader affirmed his support of United Nations resolution 242 and 338 which, in my judgement, accept Israel as a sovereign state. So, the effect of that policy is: yes; whereas I did not actually get such a commitment from any Arab leader.

QUESTION (14): Senator, you said that you didn't want to see Mr. Arafat. Did he give any indication that he... (inaudible)

SENATOR: I would not wish to answer that.

QUESTION (15): When you said that you would not divulge conversations with the head of government, now you are refusing to divulge this area, and Arafat is certainly not a head.

SENATOR: I believe it is in the highest interests of our country and of peace not to divulge it.

QUESTION (16): Senator, the fact that you were received by Assad and various other Arab leaders, is that in some way a precedent? Have there been any other Jewish senators who have been so received?

SENATOR: I cannot tell you whether it is a precedent shattering event or not. I can only tell you that for some years the ambassadors of the various Arab countries, in New York and in Washington, have urged me to come to their countries to see and hear on the ground in their own countries their point of view. At last I did that, and I'm very pleased that I did. What the implications are, or the significance, I must leave each of you to judge.

QUESTION (17): Inasmuch as you were seeking points of view, why did you deem it unnecessary to search out Mr. Arafat?

SENATOR: First let me thank you for your word "unnecessary". That's a better word than I used. Second, let me say that there are implications in my seeing Mr. Arafat, which I did not wish to bring into being.

QUESTION (18): What are those implications?

SENATOR: Well, the implications are some form of consideration as a negotiating party, which I didn't feel he was entitled to.

QUESTION (19): Does the fact that you went over there and talked to these leaders imply that American Jews will be able to travel to these lands?

SENATOR: Oh no. I can't say that in any way. Americans, as I understand it have gone into all of these countries, including the Lebanon, time and time again. I draw no deductions either way from the fact that these heads of government have talked to me.

QUESTION (20): Are you saying that we should be thinking in terms of putting some money into the rebuilding of the Suez cities and Kueneitra, or that we should be having talks...?

SENATOR: I think the latter. But also, as we are already helping Sadat -- that's one of the reasons for the \$700 million -- in the rebuilding of the Suez Canal cities, I believe we should also consider as an element of those talks our own willingness to participate in the economic reconstruction of Kueneitra.

QUESTION (21): Did you get any Syrian feeling that that's what they wanted?

SENATOR: No, this is strictly my own idea, based on my observations. It has no basis from President Assad. He is perfectly free to reject it thunderously, and I won't be a bit insulted.

QUESTION (22): Senator, when did you last visit Egypt?

SENATOR: I last visited Egypt thirty years ago. It may interest you -- this is not news but strictly a personal reaction -- when I got off the plane at Cairo, one of the television men asked me whether it was my first visit. I said no, it was my second visit, that I had been there in December of 1946 when I was first elected as a Congressman, but at that time I took the al-Misr, an Egyptian airline, a little Dakota, from Cairo to Tel Aviv, and I hoped to live long enough to do it again. The President commented on that and was apparently quite interested.

QUESTION (23):....Syria?

SENATOR: No, I'd never been to Syria. I'd stopped in the Lebanon on planes, but I'd never visited in the Lebanon. And I was in Jordan once before, when I went through the Mandelbaum Gate years ago and almost caused a governmental crisis.

QUESTION (24): When you were in Syria, did you get any information on the treatment of Syrian Jews?

SENATOR: Yes, I went to see the Jewish Quarter, and I talked to the head man of the Jewish Quarter. My observation is that the Jewish community in Syria is living there as an integral part of the Syrian economy and the Syrian society, but, in view of the history, I can understand perfectly how deceptive that appearance can be in terms of the psychology and outlook and feeling in the heart of any member of the Jewish community there as to how certain that situation is and how long it will last. But as far as I could see, currently, the position is a correct one. I hasten to add, that doesn't give any particular assurance because of the obviously very touchy situation there based on history.

QUESTION (25): Is Assad willing to preserve the ethnic purity of the community?

QUESTION (26): Senator, President Ford has been thinking of going to the Middle East for some time, probably next month. Do you think he should?

SENATOR: Yes, I hope he can. He's got a little business on his hands right now that's pretty important, and I want to see him nominated. But, quite apart from his election campaign which I would urge him not to neglect, even at the risk of not going to the Middle East, I think it would be very desirable because I think the presence of a President would symbolize the fact that the area has no appetite for war. That is a good thing. It's the single most important thing I met in the Middle East is that there is no appetite for war.

Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 21, 1975

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JAVITS RIPS U.N. RESOLUTION CLASSIFYING ZIONISM AS "RACISM"
CALLS ACTION "ECHOES OF THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE OF GOEBBELS"

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) today strongly criticized the United Nations General Assembly's Third Committee for adopting a resolution classifying Zionism as a form of "racism".

In a speech on the Senate floor Javits said "it is time to speak out and call a halt to this vicious brand of name-calling, which brings back echoes of the propaganda of Goebbels and his Nazi party colleagues in the 1930's."

Javits called the United Nations action "offensive nonsense" and asked: "Is this what the American people are being asked to give their tax dollars to support?"

The Senior Senator from New York warned that "the cynical effrontery of the latest resolution...can only serve further to undermine the credibility of the United Nations itself."

The full text of the Senator's speech follows:

ANTI-SEMITISM AT THE UNITED NATIONS

On October 17th, the United Nations General Assembly's Third Committee, at the instigation of a number of Arab countries, adopted a resolution which purports to classify Zionism as a form of "racism". Earlier this year, at the World Conference of International Women's Year, held at Mexico City, a similar resolution was rammed through by a militant coalition of Arab and radical states.

In my judgment, such resolutions should succeed only in holding up to ridicule their sponsors in the eyes of the world's people. Certainly the cynical effrontery of the latest resolution, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee, can only serve further to undermine the credibility of the United Nations itself.

In this connection, I would like to quote from the statement of the United States Representative during the debate on this resolution:

"Under the guise of a program to eliminate racism, the United Nations is at the point of officially endorsing anti-semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history. This resolution explicitly encourages the racism known as anti-semitism even as it would have us believe that its words will lead to the elimination of racism."

As one who has been a diligent supporter of the United Nations since its founding, I am continually more hard put to continue my support for the United Nations in the face of criticism by my colleagues in the Congress, when such offensive nonsense as this latest PLO resolution is given the solemnity of a document of the United Nations itself, and when a tyranny of the majority in votes, without reference to productivity or population or sincerity, rams it through the General Assembly. Is this what the American people are being asked to give their tax dollars to support?

Mr. President, it is a time to speak out and call a halt to this vicious brand of name-calling, which brings back echoes of the propaganda machine of Goebbels and his Nazi party colleagues in the 1930's.

I believe that all Americans also share the moral loathing of this hypocritical resolution which prompted the U.S. Representative to characterize it as "obscene". I hope that serious people at the General Assembly will mark carefully some additional words spoken by the U.S. Representative:

"The United States protests this act. But protest alone is not enough. In fairness to ourselves we must also issue a warning. This resolution places the work of the United Nations in jeopardy."

In closing, I wish to make a few observations about Zionism, which has been so cruelly perverted by the sponsors of the U.N. resolution. As is so often the case when dealing with vicious propaganda, here we find that truth has been stood on its head. Zionism is a defensive doctrine of a people who have been the victims of the most unremitting racial discrimination in history, culminating in the World War II holocaust murder of six million Jews. The aspiration of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust for a relatively safe haven has found expression in the State of Israel in the ancient Jewish homeland. The idealism, humanity and sacrifice which have gone into the founding and preservation of Israel form the best refutation to the charges which have so mindlessly and unjustly been levied against Zionism.

I am pleased to join in a resolution, introduced today by Senators Humphrey, Brock and other Senators, condemning the U.N. action on Zionism.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר 1 מתוך 2 דפים
עותק מספר 16 מתוך 20 עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

התקשרות

סודי ביותר

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בשלה: 221000 יבו 76

מידי

אל 2 המשרד
מאגז ורשינגטון

מנכ"ל עברון

לבקשת סנטור יעבז נפגשתי עמו אתמול בקפיטול לשיוח ארוכה. השתתפו עוזרו לייקלנד ורפ"ח.

לבקשת יעבז סקרתי בהיחזק המצב במועביט ובלבנוג וכן ההתפתחויות המדיניות יעבז אמר שהמאורעות בלבנוג מבליטיים הצורכ בחיזוקה ובחימושה של ישראל ובגבחה קצב משלוח הצירוד הצבאי לישראל. אמר כי בדעתו לחקדיט לככ מעשה יותר חשובת לב ופעילות.

במהלכ השיחה אמר יעבז כי המזכיר טעה בדרכ השיפול בענינ אנגולח. את תלקח השני של השיחה הקדיט יעבז ביוזמתו לפרשת חוזה העבודה של אשתו מריוג עם גתיבי האויר האיראניים ולחדיט המצבוריים שיש לככ. (אינ לי ספק שזו היה הסיבה לככ שביקש לחפגש עמי).

יעבז אמר שהוא חרד למעמד המנהיגות שלו בקרב היהודים. הארגונים היהודיים קמת מציקים לו בענינ אשתו, אך הוא מודאג לגבי תגובת ה-

Constituency היהודי האמריקאי בכללותו. (הערה: ידוע לנו שהוא

קכל מסתבי ביקורת מיהודים על רקע הצבעת איראג נגד הציונות). יעבז הוסיפ כי בקרוב יטיק את מסקנותיו מהפרשת. אמר, כי כידוע, הינו אחד התומכים הגדולים של ישראל. הוא מבקש שאומר לו אם חלח ארוזיה במנהיגותו.

אמחתי לו שתמיכתו בישראל ופעילותו רבת השנים למענה - אינה זקוקה כלל לעדות והוכחה נוספת. לא התחנתי בטימני ארוזיה במנהיגותו. אמחתי שלגבי

הבעיה האישית של העסקת אשתו אינ אני מחווח דעה כי זה ענינו האישי כיצד לפתור הבעיה. חדיגשתי שאינ איראג אוייבחה של ישראל. אנחנו

אמג מתדעמים קשות על הצבעטה בענינ הציונות. הוספתי שיש לזקופ לחכות איראג שהיא מוכחה דלק לישראל ומקיימת עמנו יחסים מועילים

מחומים שונים וזאת למרות הצבעת איראג נגד הציונות. לעומת זאת

ציינתי העמדה השלילית של שגריר איראג כאג, זאהדי, כלפי ישראל והגזק

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

דף מספר 2 מתוך 2 דפים
עותק מספר 16 מתוך 20 עותקים

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים), תשי"ז - 1957.

סודי ביותר

שזוהי גלויה גם ליחסי ארצו עם אחזב (רפ"ח סיפר ליעבצ על דבריו החלטיים על השאה לסנטורים מקאינטייר ומורגן כי ימכור דלק לישראל בכל נסיבות שהנ).

ז"כר היה שיעבצ מד לבוכ ונרגש מהפרסומת שקיבלה אשתו בג"נ החקשרותה עם הו"רזאנים.

ביום השיחה הזכרתי הסכנה האסמורה בכיוונות הרווחות בקרב כמה מחברי ועדת חוץ בביתנו בלונדון בסיוע 6% ז-77 יח"ו, יעבצ אמר שהוא מתנגד לכך וכי הסינט לא ייאשר זאת.

לשפוט לפי דברי יעבצ הרי פרשת אשתו הביאה אותו ליתר רגישות והתחשבות בצבור היהודי מחד ולגכונות ליתר פעילות למען ישראל מאידך.

ד"ג צ"ג

יהיה רחם מנכל שהכס ממנכל איגרב י. דכיב ורד/מזמים בן דב/מלפא רס
בנ/דל

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סגרירות ישראל
דוסינגסטון

11.10.1976

ר"ח
ר"מ
ר"ג
ר"ד
ר"ה

אל: מצפ"א

מאה: צבי רמיה

מצ"כ לעיונכם - ובני המוכשרים לישראל בזכות -
סיוע לישראל ופעילות נמר השיתוכים עובדים לאומיים,
כפי שפורסמו בכשומנה הקונגרס ב-1976 -

ב ב ר כ ה ,

צ . רמיה

החקק:

המרכז"ל, בני-יורק

11

and the other side of the mountain
the water is very pure and clear
it is full of fish and other
wild life.

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8.16.76

13.11.76

USE

H 11809

June 27 of this year, and took that plane, its passengers and crew to Entebbe Airport near Kampala, Uganda, where they were met by additional terrorists in apparently prearranged sanctuary.

The nation of Israel reacted to this incident by taking a dramatic and courageous step of rescuing the hostages. It was an act that has thrilled the entire free world for its daring and bravery. I commend the courage, skill and execution of the rescue mission, the saving of lives and the creation of deterrents arising from this act.

What happened in Uganda is no isolated affair. Over 800 persons have been killed and 1,700 injured in international terrorist incidents since 1968. These innocent victims include not only United States and foreign diplomats but also private citizens, businessmen, and tourists.

One thing is clear; the situation calls for action, and I am taking it in the Congress of the United States to help in every way possible to end the terrorism which is plaguing the world.

Last week, the House passed H.R. 1552, a bill to implement the U.N. and OAS conventions on terrorism. This bill, passed with my support, will enable the United States to become a party to both conventions, and to maintain a position of leadership in the efforts of the international community to combat terrorism.

Further action in the House took place on the foreign aid bill, which passed the House with my vote in favor of it. The bill has been sent to the Senate for action. Under that bill Israel will get \$1 billion in foreign military credit sales, and half the credits will be forgiven. Israel will also get \$735 million in security supporting assistance.

More importantly, however, the bill contains language which will cut off foreign aid to any nation which harbors or gives sanctuary to terrorists. This kind of dramatic action on the part of our Nation will bring to the attention of the world the need to deal with this problem severely.

In addition to these positive votes which I cast, I have sponsored original congressional resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 712, on August 10 of this year. This resolution has been referred to the Committee on International Relations and states that it is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations to take such actions as may be necessary to prompt the United Nations to establish an international policy imposing on the government of a country a duty to make every reasonable effort to free at the earliest possible moment any hostages held by international terrorists seeking sanctuary in such country and to return the hostages to their homeland. It seems clear that such an international policy is necessary and should be established without delay.

Although the United Nations apparently will not act in a meaningful way to stop terrorist activities, I believe that even the United Nations would agree to a policy of protecting innocent hostages

and place that responsibility on any country to which they have been taken.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I have taken action in recent days sending a letter to the President of Argentina expressing my deep concern about recent reports of anti-Semitic violence in that nation. I pointed out in the letter that there have been reports of a number of shootings and bombings of Jewish institutions and businesses in Argentina, as well as the kidnaping of several prominent Jews. In addition, I pointed out that the distribution of Nazi literature within Argentina was increasing sharply in recent months. The letter deplored these incidents of violent anti-Semitism, and said they were repugnant to Americans and people of good will everywhere.

I called on President Videla of Argentina to make every effort to end anti-Semitic terrorism in his country.

Mr. Speaker, terrorism must be stopped wherever it takes place in the world. I can only repeat the stirring words of the Israeli Foreign Minister Chaim Herzog in speaking before the Security Council concerning the Entebbe raid. Although the Council met to consider a complaint brought against the Government of Israel, Mr. Herzog turned the tables on his accusers. He stated:

I stand here as an accuser of the countries that, because of evil design or lack of moral backbone, have collaborated with these bloodthirsty terrorists.

I stand here as an accuser of this world organization, the United Nations, which has been unable, because of the machinations of the Arab delegates and their supporters, to coordinate effective measures against the evil of world terrorism.

Yes sir, before us stands the really accused—this rotten, corrupt, brutal, cynical bloodthirsty monster of international terrorism and all those who support it, whether by commission or omission.

This organization is in the accused stand today. Mankind will judge it by its behavior on this occasion because never has the issue been clearer, never has the issue been so clear-cut.

There will be no excuse in history for this body or for the constituent members of this body if it fails to condemn terrorism.

These words were challenges not only to the United Nations, but to our own Nation as well and to all the world. It is a challenge we must accept. I pledge my full efforts to see that all actions I can take as a Member of the U.S. Congress on behalf of the people of the fabulous Fifth Congressional District and the Nation will be taken and that mankind will be cured from the curse of international terrorism.

WE MUST END INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Mr. WYDLER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)


Mr. WYDLER. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow at the Hewlett High School in the fabulous Fifth Congressional District in New York, there is being held an antiterrorist rally. This conference has been called to condemn international terrorism which threatens the lives of innocent men, women, and children and is a direct threat to world peace. It was called by the American-Israel Friendship League, of which I am a charter member and of which the former Congressman and my good friend, Herbert Tenzer, is president. I understand that at this conference the Antidefamation League of B'nai B'rith will introduce a resolution calling on the United States to withhold aid from foreign countries who harbor terrorists. This is a resolution I fully endorse as the Representative of the area of the U.S. Congress, and I congratulate them and those who have brought about this meeting tonight.

I wish to set forth in this Congressional Record my beliefs and actions in this area so that everyone may know exactly where their Congressman stands on this most important issue.

Acts of international terrorism such as assassinations, bombings, skyjackings, kidnappings, and seizures of conference buildings persist, causing death and serious injury to citizens of many nations, and endangering the safety, welfare, and rights of citizens of all nations.

Most recently a group of terrorists hijacked a plane in our own Nation which was on board American passengers and flew it to France. This act indicates that we are not immune from the international terrorists, and that our Nation must take action to end international terrorism.

The most dramatic incident was that in which terrorists acting in the name of the Palestinian Liberation Organization hijacked an Air France Airliner on



משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. בולן
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בסיון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

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אלהמסדר

מאת וש

אלזמכל

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נפגשתי היום לשיחה בקפיטל עם מר"ס יודאל יור ועדת הפ"מ
הארגון של בית הנבחרים. השתתפ רפ"ח.
החלק הראשון של השיחה הוקדש להודעות במזאת, סקרת' בפ"ו
התפתחויות האחרות. יודאל הביע שביעות רצון רבה ממחלכי סאדאת-
בג"נ. אמר שמלכתחילה לא האמין בשיטת הצעד אחר צעד. ופי"ד ת"כ בעמדת
ישראל שיש רק אחד טחל מום- הוא מום ישיר. ענה הוכח כי גם
סאדאת מקבל זאת ויש לעודד וחליכ זה. הוא מצידו ישמח לסייע
בכל שנבקשו.

הודיתי לו על חבריו וכפ על הידידות הרבה אשר גילה כלפי ישראל
שכ שנות שרותו הרבות בביה"נ. ציינתי החשיבות שבמסג עידוד
למגעי ישראל-מצרים. יודאל הבטיח את המשכ ופי"כחו.

ד"נ יצ-

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משרד החוץ-גזירות הקשר

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יציא

סמור

סמור כהן

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אלי: 110, נר: 46, מ: המשרד
דח: ר, סג: ש, מא: 020275, רח: 1600
נד: סמור כהן

סמור/רגיל

רפ"ח. סמור כהן. סלך 466.

בבקשתך נפגשתי אתמול עם אנדרסון. הבטחתי שבתאום אתך נעשה הבלי
להצלחת ביקורו של הסמור באוגוסט. אמרתי כי בנפרד מהפעמליה
הגדולה נשמר לסדר לסמור פגישה עם שרים, תדרוכים מדינניים
וצבאיים וביקור באחד מבסיסי חיל האויר בסיוני. אנדרסון ביקש
למסור שיתקשר אתך ביום שני.
== מפא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, סרהמ, סוככ, מצפא, ארד, אורחים

משרד החוץ - תל אביב - 10000

מברק נכנס-מסווג

כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי חוק וסודות רשמיים).
חשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת המערב
38

א. א
1. אין פרוצדורה
2. מסמך - תימן קולוני
אלו המסמך
מאת: ורטינגטון

מט 466
נשלח 1600 31 ינו 79
בהקבל 132 0101 סג' 79

מצפא.

באגמתי היום עם סנטור ביל כהן, רפובליקני מתיין (בן לאב יהודי ואם נוצרית) שנבחר
בהחירות האחרונות, והתחמו המיר ועוזרו של הסנטור. לאחר שברכתיו לאיבחרו (אנו פיוורטים מאוד
עוד מהיותו קונגרסמן) שקרתי והתפתחויות האחרונות במופ'. הגובתו תיחה
YOU ARE PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED הגובה אופיינית ליחסו פנידיופי מאוד
אליכו גם בעבר. כהן מכון כחבר ועדת השרותים העוזיינים. ביקר לאחרונה בסין כחבר משלוח
חברי ועדה זו.

נפיה

לחם רחם שרומ מנכל מצפא
הד"ר פל

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2 בינואר 1979

ל: מנכ"ל
מאת: צ. רפיה, ושינגטון

הנדון: סנטור ביל כהן

החקש אלי ידידי Joel Abramson , מה"מנהיגים הצעירים" של הקהילה היהודית במדינת מיין וסיפר כי קיבל הסכמתו של סנטור ביל כהן ממיין לצאת לביקור בישראל עם רעייתו ועם קבוצת נכבדים ממדינה זו. הביקר מחוכנן לאוגוסט ש.ז. ואברמסון מרכז הטיפול בכך.

אברמסון מסר לי כי יגיע ארצה לביקור בסוף ינואר תחילת פברואר ומעוניין לפגוש אנשינו במשרד החוץ לשיחה בעניין.

מסרתי לו שמוהיהם של גד רנון ואורי בר-נר והצעתי שיחקש עם בבואו.

אברמסון הוא בחור "רציני", היה יו"ר המנהיגות הצעירה של ה-U.J.A , פעיל מבחינה פוליטית בקשרים עם נציגי מיין בקונגרס ומוכן תמיד לסייע. אנה הסבירו לו פנים.

אני מניח שהקונכ"ל בבוסטון יבוא עמו במגע לגבי הרכב הקבוצה ושאר הסידורים המקומיים.

בברכה
צבי רפיה

העחק:
קונכ"ל בוסטון

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Cannon

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12 April 1977

The Honorable
Howard W. Cannon
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Cannon:

Thank you for your letter of March 30th
regarding the Diaspora Institute on Mount Zion.


I have written to the appropriate authorities
in Israel to inform them of your impressions and
your concern with regard to the status of the
Institute.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

Unseen copies to: Mr. Zvi Rafiah
Mitzpah ✓
Tfutzut



HOWARD W. CANNON
NEVADA

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
COMMERCE
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE
SCIENCES
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

30 March 1977

His Excellency
The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Embassy of Israel
1621 22d Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to express my concern in regard to the Diaspora Institute's status on Mount Zion. My wife and I had the pleasure of visiting this school, and other holy places on the Mount, and were inspired by its spirituality.

Mrs. Cannon and I were impressed by the fine work which was being undertaken and the excellent non-sectarian instruction being offered at the institution. It was one of the highlights of our visit and I thought that it would be useful to inform you of our favorable impression.

Sincerely,

Howard W. Cannon
HOWARD W. CANNON

HWC:CBS:de

1/11/18

5

החברה

ה"ר קולנס-זמאן

א' בחשון תשל"ח
1 בנובמבר, 1978.

אל : מר צ. רפיה, הסגרירות - ווסינגטון
מאת: הציר, לונדון

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס להמן - ביקורו בלונדון

לוטה העתק מכתב התודה ששלח ליועץ הכלכלי
ולח"ם בעקבות פגישתנו עמו כאן בו הוא מספר על
כוונותיו להמליץ על פעולה אמריקנית לשיחוף
מדינות אירופה במדיניות נגד החרת הערבי.

במרכה,

י. ק. ז.
יואב בירן

העתק: מצט"א
אנרגיה

WILLIAM LEHMAN
12th District, Florida

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
EDUCATION AND LABOR
(ON LEAVE)
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
CENSUS AND POPULATION
CHAIRMAN
(202) 225-6741

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE
235 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4211

DISTRICT OFFICE:
2020 NE. 1630 STREET
NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA 33162
(305) 945-7518

REPLY TO:

October 25, 1978

Minister Yoav Biran
Economic Counselor Kushnir
Embassy of Israel
26 Palace Green
London, W.8 4QB
Great Britain

Dear Messrs. Biran and Kushnir:


I want to thank you for the most informative meeting in London last month and for the opportunity to discuss anti-boycott policy and other matters with you.

You will be interested to know that the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, chaired by my colleague, the Honorable Jonathan Bingham, will hold hearings in the next Congress to review the effectiveness of the U.S. anti-boycott law and to examine possibilities of increasing international support for our anti-boycott law. I plan to testify before the Subcommittee to stress the need for greater cooperation from the major industrial nations with respect to U.S. anti-boycott policies.

For your information, I have enclosed a newsletter report which was sent to 10,000 of our constituents in Miami to inform them of the Arab boycott issue.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,



WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

WL/ahl
Enclosure

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ו' בתשרי תשל"ט

12 באוק' 1978



שגרירות ישראל

ושינגטון

א ל : יואב בירן, לונדון
מאח : צ. רפיח, וושינגטון

קולקום-למא

הנדון: סונגרסטון ביל להמן

מצ"ב חלום מכתבו המדבר בעד עצמו.

אני מצרף גם תודותי על עזרתכם ומחזיר לכם ד"ט חמה.

בברכה
[Signature]
צבי רפיח

העחק : מנחל מח' אנרביה, משה"ח
מצפ"א ✓

Original

Handwritten notes

THE STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JULY 1967

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: AMBASSADOR, ISRAELI EMBASSY

RE: ISRAELI EMBASSY

Reference is made to the report of the...
...of the... of the...

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure

Gilbert
Mr. [Name]

WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
EDUCATION AND LABOR
(ON LEAVE)
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
CENSUS AND POPULATION
CHAIRMAN
(202) 225-8741

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4211

DISTRICT OFFICE: ☐
2020 NE. 163D STREET
NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA 33162
(305) 945-7518

REPLY TO:

October 6, 1978

OCT 12 1978

Mr. Zvi Rafiah
Minister Counselor
Embassy of Israel
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Zvi:

I want to thank you for putting me in touch with Counselors Biran and Kushnir when I was in London last month.

We had a very informative meeting about issues of concern in Britain. I learned more about the Arab boycott situation there and in the rest of Europe. I understand, also, that the Embassy is quite pleased with the active role the British community has taken in regard to Soviet Jewry.

Counselors Biran and Kushnir asked that I convey to you their kind regards.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,



WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

/ahl

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

25 באוקטובר 1978

כ"ד בתשרי תשל"ט

אל : מר נ. לורך, מזכיר הכנסת, י-ם

מאק: נ. חסיר, וושינגטון

U.P.1 - הנדון: - חבר ביה"נ להסן -

מר לורך יקר,

בוודאי המצא ענין בפרסומים הלוטים.

ידידנו להסן בקטנו להעבירם לידיעתך עם ברכה לבבית.

שלד, וצ"ה
נ. חסיר

העמק: טצפ"א

WILLIAM LEHMAN
18TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

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NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA 33162
(305) 943-7518

October 18, 1978


Dear Friends,

Earlier this month, I wrote to you that in September I attended the annual meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Bonn. The Middle East is always the subject of controversy at IPU sessions, but this year the Middle East was the most intensely debated question.

The United States delegation was determined that inflammatory statements at the IPU be kept to a minimum during the sensitive discussions then taking place at Camp David. This strategy was decisive in constructing a final Middle East document and in convincing the other 75 nations of the need for a calm atmosphere.

As the author of the Middle East resolution introduced by the U.S. delegation, I was assured a place on the ten-member committee to draft the final document. Retaining reference to Camp David in the final resolution was very important to us, and we were able to work closely with the Israelis and the Dutch, and as best we could with the French and Italians, toward this objective.

Opposition on the committee came from two groups. The first was made up of Syria, Lebanon (which was dominated by Syria), and Tunisia. The second faction, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, took every opportunity to denounce our resolution as merely a Camp David statement having nothing to do with the Middle East or with the IPU. The U.S. position, in supporting Camp David, was a source of frustration for the communist countries because they were left out of the negotiations, and a threat to the Arab bloc because any mention of Camp David would imply division in the Arab world.



With Abraham Melamed, Israeli delegate and Member of the Knesset

Another essential goal for us was to prevent the IPU from once again singling out Israel for criticism. With the agreement of the Israeli delegation and the assistance of our Dutch friends, we were able to make a deal with the Egyptians and Syrians. In exchange for our reluctant withdrawal of the specific reference to Camp David, they agreed to remove any direct criticism of Israel from the resolution.

It appeared that this agreement would be acceptable to all the parties, and the arrangement did hold. At the last minute, however, the other side acted in bad faith by permitting their friends from Senegal to add new language supporting "self-determination of the Palestinian people," which is always used to mean a Palestinian state. I spoke out to the full political committee, which consisted of representatives from each country's delegation, to protest the violation of the Arab commitment and to state that the United States delegation was now compelled to vote against the final resolution.

This note passed to me by Israeli delegate Nathaniel Lorch following a particularly tense moment of the debate aptly illustrates the nature of the Mideast bargaining sessions

(We thank you all the same for a generous gesture, knowing how much Camp David means to you -- and to other delegations.)

We thank you all the same for a generous gesture, knowing how much Camp David means to you -- and to other delegations.

Although the United States could not support the final product of this heated debate, the resolution was much more moderate than we had expected or hoped. The United States delegation can take credit for shaping the debate and arriving at a resolution more satisfactory to us and to Israel than in any recent year.

At the conclusion of the conference, the words in a letter to me from Avraham Katz, leader of the Israeli IPU delegation, convinced me that our efforts were very worthwhile--"Even if the outcome leaves a great deal to be desired, I am convinced that you have no reason to regret your efforts. They were expended in a good cause."

* * *

In recent years, an enormous amount of Arab oil money has been flowing into the British economy. Hundreds of billions of "petrodollars" have been spent in gambling casinos and extravagant shopping sprees, as well as in buying up property. While in Europe, I wanted to see whether this financial activity has had any impact on the reactions of British Jewry or the British government to Arab boycott demands.

The Arab trade boycott prohibits companies doing business in Arab countries from also doing business with Israel. One of the biggest problems resulting from the boycott is the "voluntary" boycott by companies enforcing the boycott on third-party companies without any additional pressure to do so from their Arab clients. Anti-boycott laws enacted by Congress last year make such actions illegal in the United States, but these laws have so far been extremely difficult to enforce.

I found out that, while British Jews are interested in and are certainly disadvantaged by the Arab trade boycott, they devote more time and energy to the issue of Soviet Jewry than to any other single Jewish issue. Large segments of British society outside the Jewish community are actively involved as well. Church groups and trade unions take an active part in the struggle for freer emigration of Soviet Jews. Interestingly, the makeup of the Jewish community in Britain is somewhat different from that of American Jewry. There are fewer Jews in all of Britain than there are in Dade and Broward Counties, yet there are more Jews in Parliament than there are Jewish Members of Congress.

In London, I met with Mr. Lewis Goodman, Chairman of the Anglo-Israel Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Justin Kornberg, Chairman of the Anti-Boycott Committee of Britain, and Mr. Terence Prittie, author of The Economic War Against the Jews. I also visited with the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Dr. Immanuel Jakobovits, to discuss the boycott and other matters.

A major concern which, in the words of the Chief Rabbi, carried "ominous overtones," was the recent House of Lords Select Committee Report on their Foreign Boycott bill. Some British leaders apparently fear that a strong solitary stand by Britain against the boycott would only result in a loss of jobs for British workers and a worsening of the economy. Yet, looking at the other side of this, lucrative business and jobs are now being lost by refusing to deal with Israel and firms not complying with the boycott.



At the home of Dr. Immanuel Jakobovits, the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain

Although the United States and Canada have enacted anti-boycott legislation, the House of Lords Report recommended that Britain not create anti-boycott legislation at this time. This is regrettable, and I am amazed that the British public has not reacted with greater alarm against the boycott. I would have thought that there would be more public outrage in a society with a tradition of free trade.

Since Britain will chair the Common Market for the next six years, the demand for anti-boycott laws would be more effective coming from within the Common Market membership. The issue has been tabled in Britain until there is some indication that the Common Market as a whole can be pressed into action.

The British anti-boycott leaders, Goodman, Kornberg, and Prittie, urged me to impress upon my colleagues in Congress and other influential U.S. citizens the need to raise the boycott issue at every opportunity in our dealings with Common Market countries. They also believe it is imperative that an organization be established in Brussels, the Common Market headquarters, to more effectively lobby member nations on behalf of an anti-boycott policy.

I plan to explore the possibility of Congressional action in the next Congress urging our government to present the need for a unified anti-boycott policy to our Common Market allies.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

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October 6, 1978



Addressing the Opening Plenary Session of the 65th Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in the West German Bundestag

Dear Friends,

In August, "Tip" O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, named me co-chairman of the delegation which would represent the U.S. House of Representatives at the 65th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference in Bonn, West Germany.

The IPU, which was founded in 1889, is an organization of legislators from 76 nations who meet to consider the important public policy issues which affect all nations and peoples. There is no comparable international gathering where the actual lawmakers can meet and come to better understand one another and the problems of their respective countries.

In 1977, I attended the IPU meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, but returned dissatisfied with the resolutions passed by the delegates and, even more, with the positions taken by the American delegation on the Middle East. This year, as a leader of the United States delegation, I was determined to prevent a similar outcome and set forth a U.S. position which reflects more accurately the Congress and the American people.

To establish the U.S. position at the outset, I arranged to become an opening speaker at the first session of the conference. Much of what I said focused on nuclear arms control and expressed both my deeply-held ideas and the position of the United States delegation that we must do all we can to halt the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. I strongly urged my fellow delegates to return to their own nations to work for the strongest possible stand against the arms race.

Speaking directly to the Soviet delegation and their communist bloc allies, I pointed out that a major stumbling block to nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union is the continued Soviet human rights violations. I wanted communist delegates to clearly understand that U.S. public opinion will affect the Senate's willingness to ratify a new SALT agreement.

In subsequent conversations, the delegates and staff from the Eastern European nations expressed great concern to our group about what they termed "human rights linkage" to the SALT package.

I felt it essential that my statement emphasize our search for peace in the Middle East and outlined the resolution introduced by the U.S. delegation calling for calmness and moderation in these IPU meetings while the sensitive talks were beginning at Camp David. Our Mideast resolution, with the help of seven co-sponsoring nations like the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, made the Mideast political sessions much less inflammatory than in recent years.

Other resolutions were introduced and, as expected, the final Mideast document did not contain all we wanted, but it was much more favorable than the 1977 resolution which had specifically condemned Israel for human rights violations. With delegates from Europe, the Soviet Union, Israel and even the Arab representatives, we tried very hard to construct the best possible resolution. Although the Soviet and Arab votes eliminated any mention of Camp David, we were able to muster enough support to prevent the resolution from singling out Israel for criticism on the establishment of settlements in occupied territories.

* * *

Our delegation also held informal meetings with the IPU delegation from Cyprus regarding the recent vote to lift the arms embargo on Turkey.

Meeting with
Senator Stafford,
Norville Jones
of the Senate
Foreign Relations
Committee, and
Members of the
Cyprus House of
Representatives



The Cypriot delegation seemed willing to accept lifting the arms embargo and expressed the hope that the negotiations can be arranged under the auspices of the United Nations to achieve the reunification of the people of Cyprus. Their major priorities are the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, the return of refugees to their homes, and the guarantee of human rights to all the people of Cyprus. I told them of President Carter's special and personal promise to me that these goals will be accomplished.

Conferring with
West German
Official Herr
Siegele at the
Anti-Terrorism
Headquarters



Because the Federal Republic of Germany coordinates its anti-terrorism efforts with both the United States and Israel, we arranged a meeting at the West German Anti-Terrorism Headquarters. At our meeting, the Germans revealed that they had the cooperation of a friendly government while carrying out their anti-terrorist actions such as the recent incursion into Somalia to seize a hijacked Lufthansa jet. Israel, on the other hand, has had the more difficult task of not only countering terrorists but, as in the case of Entebbe, a hostile government as well.

Our discussion also focused on the need for international agreements so that there can be no place where terrorists may live without fear of prosecution. In his welcoming address to the IPU conference, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt urged the parliamentarians to support the international anti-hijacking agreement signed at the Bonn Summit in July.

* * *

As Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Census, I took time while in Europe to seek ways in which we could improve our own 1980 census.

In meetings with British and West German census officials, we learned that they collect their census data more quickly and cheaply than we do. Instead of using the mails and depending on various expensive follow-up techniques, the British and West Germans use door-to-door "enumerators" who drop off, pick up, and provide personal assistance in filling out the census forms.

Both Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany will have a 1981 census. Using their methods, they will spend less than half the amount we will spend to collect comparable information. Before the end of this year, our Subcommittee plans to hold hearings to question U.S. census officials about developing a census collection system that will result in saving money for the American taxpayer.

* * *

My experience at the IPU conference convinced me that Members of our Congress need to take an even more active part in Inter-Parliamentary Union meetings. Other countries tend to measure U.S. leadership by the strength of our participation in these international forums.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

P.S. If you would like to have a copy of my introductory speech, please call our North Miami Beach office at 945-7518 or write to me at 236 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

In order to keep our mailing lists accurate and up-to-date, we would appreciate knowing if your name or any other name should be added, changed, or deleted. Please call our North Miami Beach office at the above number and give the details to our staff there, or make corrections below and send the information to me at 236 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

NAME _____

STREET ADDRESS _____

BUILDING & APARTMENT # _____

CITY & ZIP CODE _____

מברק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

שמו

ת"א
101600
LEHMAN

אל: המשרד

מאת: רושינגטון

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לחיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסינות וסודות רשמיים).
תש"ז - 1957.

מס' 150

בשלה: 101600 אוגוסט 78

התקבל: 102252

ממישראל לונדון (העבר) דע איילון

קונגרסמן ביל LEHMAN (דימוקראט, יהודי מפלורידה) ישנה בלונדון ב-7-6 לספטמבר.

מעובדין ללמוד על הסקעות סעודיות בגויטניה והשפעתן על עממי הקהילה היהודית שם.

איפא'יק הפנה אותו לגורג GARRAI מנכל הפד'ציה הציונית בלונדון.

חיש לכם המלצות עם מי כדאי שיפגשו אם כן, חבריקונא וכן אל מי עליו להתקשר בלונדון.

רפיה

מנכל אלוך כלכלית מצמא

כש/אק

DATE

NO. 021

NAME: [illegible]

ADDRESS: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

RE: [illegible]

[illegible body text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]



28 ביוני 1978

~~א.א.~~
א.א.
קונאנס (למחן)

~~א.א.~~

אל : מצפ"א
מרכז

מאת: צ. קפיה, וושינגטון

הנדון: קשרי ה- PFLP עם טרוריסטים
מארצות חו"ל

מצ"ב קטע מהניו-יורק טיימס מה-26 דנא.

בעקבות הפרסום קיבלתי, לבקשתי, מקונגרסטן להמך העתק
מכתבו, המצ"ב, של ראש מחלקה המחקר במודיעין הנגדי של חיל-
האוויר האמריקני.

בברכה

בצבי רפיה
יפה אמין.

העתק:

מחלקה הבטחון, משה"ח
טר ז. אלון, כאן
הקב"ט, כאן

Palestine Group Linked to Terrorists of 14 Nations

By DAVID BENDES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25—United States intelligence agencies, drawing largely on information from foreign intelligence sources, have linked terrorists from 14 countries with international operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

The largest number of foreign terrorists who have cooperated with the Palestinians over the last nine years came from West Germany, according to a presentation by the United States Air Force intelligence officials to a member of Congress.

"Germans comprised the largest single foreign group," said Charles A. Russell, chief of the acquisitions and analysis di-

vision in the Air Force's Directorate of Counterintelligence, in a letter sent last week to Representative William Lehman, Democrat of Florida.

Mr. Russell added that in the international operations of the Palestinian organization, "probably more Germans have been involved than Palestinians." His compilation showed, however, that over the last decade, the Popular Front, headed by Dr. George Habash, had also received assistance from one or more terrorists from the Netherlands, Brazil, France, Venezuela, Britain, Colombia, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and Italy.

The compilation lists 12 West Germans who received training either from Dr. Ha-

bash's group or from Al Fatah, the major Palestinian group.

The first group of West Germans to receive training from Palestinians were members of the so-called Baader-Meinhof gang, named for Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. Along with others, they were given weapons training in 1970 and 1971 at Fatah camps in Bualbek, Lebanon, and in Syria. Later gang members who called themselves the Red Army Faction participated in terrorist actions in Europe. Almost all the original members of the group are dead, including Mr. Baader and Miss Meinhof.

The second group of West Germans, constituting offshoots of the Red Army Faction, was trained almost entirely by Popular Front specialists based in South-

ern Yemen, according to the intelligence compilation.

The group included two West Germans, Gabriele Krocher-Tiedemann and Hans Klein, who were part of the six-member Popular Front team that attacked a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna in December 1975. At least six other West Germans are listed in the compilation as having received Popular Front training in Southern Yemen before committing acts of terrorism.

The listing, which was requested by Representative Lehman as an amplification of a briefing on terrorism for the Congressional Research Service, described cooperative ventures in which the West Germans helped procure vehicles for Palestinian terrorists in Paris, joined in an attempted rocket attack on an Israeli aircraft in Kenya in January 1976, and participated in an airliner hijacking

in June 1976 that ended in Entebbe, Uganda, with hostages being freed by Israeli commandos.

1977 Hijacking Cited

The submission by Mr. Russell also asserts that "close ties between the P.F.L.P. and German terrorists also were evident" in the October 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner en route from Palma, Mallorca, to Frankfurt, which was diverted to Somalia.

Mr. Russell added: "It would appear that in addition to listed personnel there are probably at least a dozen more which are available to the P.F.L.P. for international operations."

Among the other West Germans with Popular Front training not listed in the Air Force intelligence compilation are Peter Jürgen Boock, 26 years old, and Sieglinde Gudrun Hofmann, 33. They were among four West German terrorist suspects arrested early this month in Za-

greb by Yugoslav police at the request of authorities in Bonn. The two are believed to have participated in the shooting last July of Jürgen Probst, chairman of the huge Dresdner Bank, at his home near Frankfurt.

The pro-Palestinian stance of the West German terrorists dates back a full decade, according to their published statements and manifestos. It was the counterpart of intensive anti-Zionist agitation that developed among West German leftists after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

June 14, 1978

Honorable William Lehman
House of Representatives
236 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Lehman

Colonel Singhoff has asked me to reply to your letter of 25 April 1978. With regard to my comments made in my 19 April 1978 presentation to the Congressional Research Service conference on terrorism, all remarks concerning foreign involvement with Palestinian terrorist groups were confined to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), not the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). My remarks were made in conjunction with a slide (see Attachment) listing the various nationalities which have been identified as involved in international operations of the PFLP (i.e., operations outside Israel proper since 1968).

Specifically, I indicated that among the various nationalities involved in PFLP operations, Germans comprised the largest single foreign group. I also stated that in international operations of the PFLP probably more Germans have been involved than Palestinians. As you are aware, the term Palestinian refers only to those individuals born in Palestine (essentially the modern national state of Israel) and not to Arab-world participants in PFLP activity.

In response to your specific inquiry, set forth below is a listing of those German nationals who have participated in international operations of the PFLP or those who are known to have been trained by that group. Based upon the relatively significant number of Germans who have undergone PFLP training, it would appear that in addition to listed personnel there are probably at least a dozen more which are available to the PFLP for international operations.

1974 - Ulrich Schmuecker. Member of the Berlin-based terrorist group, Movement Two June. Served as liaison with PFLP in Germany.

13 January 1975 - Johannes Weinrich. Involved in procuring the vehicles used in the PFLP operation against an El Al Boeing 707 at Orly Airport, Paris, France.

June 1975 - Wilfred Boese in contact with PFLP team chief Michael Moukarbel in Paris, France.

December 1975 - Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann and Hans Klein constitute part of a six-member PFLP team involved in the attack on the OPEC Oil Ministers' Conference in Vienna, Austria.

January 1976 - Brigitte Schulz and Thomas Reuter arrested with two or three Arabs in a PFLP operation designed to shoot down an El Al aircraft using an SA-7 heat-seeking missile of Soviet manufacture. The operation was attempted in Nairobi, Kenya. The two Germans currently are on trial in Israel.

May 1976 - Bernard Hausman, traveling on a false Dutch passport, was killed by the premature detonation of a suitcase bomb he was carrying at Ben Gurion Airport, Israel.

June 1976 - Wilfred Boese and Brigitte Kuhlmann led a four-person PFLP unit in hijacking an Air France airbus en route from Athens, Greece, to Tel Aviv, Israel. The aircraft was diverted to Entebbe, Uganda, where these two Germans and at least five other terrorists were killed in the Israeli raid.

June 1976 - Rolf-Ludwig Pohle arrested in Athens, Greece, in conjunction with the above Air France hijacking. Served as a weapons courier and link between German terrorists and the PFLP. Trained by the PFLP during 1975 in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The close ties existing between the PFLP and German terrorists also were evident in the October 1977 hijacking, by the PFLP, of a Lufthansa Boeing 737 airliner en route from Palma de Mallorca, Spain, to Frankfurt, Germany. The aircraft was diverted to Mogadiscio, Somalia. This hijack was the first ever conducted by the PFLP wherein that group demanded the release of primarily non-Arab terrorists, in this case the remaining members of the German Baader-Meinhof Group located in Stammheim Prison. In this context, estimates indicate at least half of the 16-20 German terrorists now sought for involvement in the 5 September 1977 kidnap and execution of German industrialist Dr. Hanns-Martin Schleyer and related cases were trained by the PFLP in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

In addition to the above indicated 16-20 persons, the following Germans are known to have been trained in terror tactics by the PFLP in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Ingrid Siepmann - whereabouts unknown. Freed from prison in West Berlin during early March 1975 in exchange for the life of kidnapped West Berlin Mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz who was abducted by German terrorists on 27 February 1975. Siepmann was flown to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) along with the following four companions.

Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedemann - arrested entering Switzerland from France, December 1977. Following training in the PDRY, returned to Vienna, Austria, in late 1975 to participate in the PFLP takeover of the OPEC Oil Ministers' Conference, December 1975.

Rolf-Ludwig Pohle - in prison, West Germany. After training in the PDRY, arrested in Athens, Greece, June 1976, for possible involvement in the Air France airbus hijacking to Entebbe, Uganda, and as a fugitive.

Verena Becker - in prison, West Germany. After training in the PDRY, where she used the code name "Soho," returned to Germany in early 1977 and participated in the 7 April 1977 assassination of German Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback in Karlsruhe.

Rolf Heissler - whereabouts unknown

In addition to the PFLP training of the above named individuals, German terrorists also were provided instruction by Fatah during 1970-71. This instruction was given at camps in Baalbek, Lebanon, and in Syria. Germans trained in these locations included the following:

Andreas Baader, co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof Group, the first effective German terrorist group. Committed suicide in prison, 18 October 1977.

Gudrun Ensslin, ideologue of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Committed suicide in prison, 18 October 1977.

Jan Carl Raspe, an original member of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Committed suicide in prison, 18 October 1977.

Ulrike Meinhof, co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Committed suicide in prison, 9 May 1976.

Horst Mahler, early member of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Currently in prison in West Berlin.

Ingrid Siepmann, traveled first to the Middle East in 1969 to arrange for Fatah training of other Baader-Meinhof Group members. Current whereabouts unknown.

Dieter Kunzelmann, currently active in communist political activity in West Berlin.

Sincerely

Charles A. Russell
CHARLES A. RUSSELL

Chief, Acquisitions & Analysis
Directorate of Counterintelligence

PFLP

Dutch
German
Brazilian
French
Venezuelan
British
Colombian
Turkish
Algerian
Egyptian
Libyan
Jordanian
Lebanese
Italian

This slide indicates those foreign nationalities known to have been involved in international operations of the PFLP since 1968. In some cases, only a single national of the given nations was involved.



הרמטכ"ל
תל אביב
8.12.57

בברכת
שגרירות ישראל
בושינגטון

ב. ז. רמט

WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEES:
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



After Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin completed talks with President Carter, we met at a reception at the Israeli Embassy on March 22. I asked the Prime Minister, "What do you think?" "Very difficult," he replied, "but still hopeful."

April 6, 1978

Dear Friends,

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman visited Washington last month to discuss Mideast issues with the Administration and with Congress.

Prime Minister Begin informed a March 21 meeting of the House International Relations Committee and other interested Congressmen, including myself, about Israel's far-reaching peace proposals. I agree with Begin that the Israeli peace plan is fair and just, and certainly constitutes a generous answer to Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

In response to Sadat's symbolic, but limited, recognition of Israel, Begin has offered to return nearly all of the Sinai to the same man who, only five years ago, launched a surprise attack against Israel. Begin has been bitterly criticized by some in Israel for the extent of his peace proposals. "Maybe I went too far," he said. "I took great risks, but I took these risks for the sake of peace."

Unfortunately, Sadat's response has been to break off the direct talks with Israel and to call for U.S. pressure on Israel to agree to withdraw from the West Bank.

Arab hostility toward Israel, while somewhat diminished in Egypt, remains strong in most of the rest of the Arab world. In the face of this continuing hostility, Israel must retain control of the West Bank for her security. Otherwise, the bulk of Israel's population would be within range of Arab artillery.

"In our small country," Begin said, "most of our civilian population lives in a narrow coastal strip 9 to 15 miles along the seashore. Dominating that coastal plain are the mountains of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Can we allow an enemy to sit up on those mountain-tops and threaten the lives of every woman and every child in Israel?"

"Who controls that range of hills may be a matter of political policy to everyone else," Begin continued. "To us it is a matter of life itself."

This is difficult for the Administration to see because they are just not close enough to it. The President must understand that Prime Minister Begin is not going to bargain away the security of his people.

Israel has offered the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza a greater measure of freedom and autonomy than they had ever enjoyed under the rule of Jordan or Egypt. The military government there would be replaced by an administrative council elected by the residents of the areas themselves in a democratic, secret ballot.

As for the settlements, legally, historically and traditionally, the Jews have as much right as anyone to live in the West Bank, the Biblical areas of Judea and Samaria, which Jordan occupied by force from 1948 to 1967. The local Arab population of the area has not been significantly displaced by new Jewish settlements and, indeed, they have prospered greatly as a result of 11 years of economic cooperation with Israel.

The minimum of Israeli settlements in the Sinai desert allow Israel to control the flow of arms from Egypt into Gaza, an Arab area only 45 miles from Tel Aviv, which served as a terrorist base against Israeli civilians for 19 years, until the 1967 war. The truth is Israel has built no new settlements in the Sinai since the start of direct talks with Egypt.

Regarding the Israeli action in Lebanon, Begin asked our group of Congressmen, "Is there a country in the world that can tolerate an armed terrorist group operating from a neighboring country where they are given immunity?"

"Only a man of military action can hate war as I do," he continued. "Sometimes it is necessary to fight, but in all my fighting, I've never fought civilians. I've always fought against armed men. The great difference between the civilian casualties in Lebanon and the civilian casualties in Israel is that the Palestinians deliberately attacked civilians."

I was also present when Israeli Defense Minister Weizman met with the House Armed Services Committee on March 9. Weizman told us about the many discussions he's had with the Egyptian Minister of War, General Jamasi, who once admitted that former Egyptian President Nasser had made a great mistake in initiating actions which caused the 1967 war. Weizman then recalled for us Israel's warning to Jordan to stay out in 1967, but Jordan's King Hussein also made a mistake and began shelling Jerusalem. "Israel needs protection against future mistakes by unpredictable Arab leaders," Weizman concluded.

In discussing the U.S. proposal to sell advanced American F-15 warplanes to Saudi Arabia, Weizman noted that "one F-15 is equal to any three other planes that the Saudis could buy," including the French F-1. In addition, "there is no way the U.S. can safeguard the use of F-15's given to Saudi Arabia." In a wartime emergency, the Saudis could be expected to do practically anything to prevent an Arab defeat, including deploying the powerful F-15's from their new forward base at Tabuk, only 10 minutes from Eilat. Weizman further warned against underestimating the ability of the Saudis to learn to maintain the F-15's without American help.

Despite some press reports, I have seen no real erosion in Congressional support for Israel. The Congress wants peace, and they want Israel to survive.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress

כל המוסר חובן מסמך זה, בולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחוץ זסודות רשמיים),
חסי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ
מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי

אל: המשרד
מת: וושינגטון

מס. 86
נשלח: 041130 ג'וב 77
נתקבל: 041958 ג'וב 77

ידעו (מזל)

אל: רוזן, רבי"ב
שלכם 56.

דיברתי הנוקר עם קונגרסם לחצ בזהמ למציקם.
סוצאה מכח החליט לכתוב לברזינסקי ולבקש הברותיו.

רפ"ח

שהח רהם מנכל מנכל סודתם שהבט רוזן מצפא שסוג רמ
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Handwritten signature and date: 12/11/77

Jerusalem, 19 Heshvan 5738
31 October 1977

My dear Mr. Lehman,

Upon my return to Israel, after additional visits to the European Commission in Brussels and the European Parliament in Luxembourg, may I reiterate the pleasure I had meeting you in Sofia, and the gratitude of our entire delegation for your sympathy and understanding in the course of the IPU Conference.

One cannot help feeling sad and somewhat outraged at the fact that, 30 years after the termination of the Second World War and the Holocaust of our people, Israel, the only Jewish State, a small state built by and for the remnants of the Holocaust, should be the one country which is being criticized by the IPU, condemned and threatened - and that in a matter of human rights, in which our record, even if it is not perfect, can certainly be favorably compared with that of many, if not most of the members of the Union. Unfortunately, such have become the ground rules of the international game in many forms, and one often feels that what has happened to Jews as individuals and as a group in many national states, is now happening to Israel in the international arena.

Against such a background, the courageous stand adopted by you and other members of the U.S. delegation, as well as quite a few members of other delegations, who were not afraid to remain in a minority, is a ray of light and a source of hope.

For this - our gratitude.

My wife joins me in sending you and Mrs. Lehman our best wishes. We hope to be able to meet you soon here in Israel.

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature in Hebrew: נטנל לורח

Handwritten signature of Netanel Lorich
Netanel Lorich

The Hon. William Lehman
Member of Congress
236 Cannon Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
U. S. A.



7.10.77

383

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: נתי תמיר, וושינגטון

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זוהי תשובה לכתב הידיעה
המורשה להמין - 2
המורשה להמין - 2

הנדון: I. P. U. - המורשה להמין

I. P. U. המורשה להמין השתתף כחבר משלחת הקונגרס לכנס ה- שנערך בחודש ספטמבר ש"ז בסופיה - בולגריה.

א. להלן דברים שמטר טר להמין באמצעות עוזרו:

א. 1 - המשלחת האמריקאית בראשות סנטור סטאפורד, הגישה הצעת החלטה - הפוגעת בישראל - בפני ועדה הנוסח של הכנס.

א. 2 - טרם הגשת הצעת החלטה - הצביעו חברי משלחת ארה"ב על הנוסח המוצע. למרות דרישת סטאפורד להצבעה פה-אחד - חל פיצול בהצבעה. המורשה להמין ו-9 חברי משלחת אחרים הצביעו - נגד. סנטור סטאפורד ו-11 חברי משלחת נוספים הצביעו-בעד.

ב. עם שובו מן הכנס לוושינגטון נפגש המורשה להמין עם יו"ר ביה"נ - אוניל. בפגישה זאת הסביר להמין לאוניל מדוע הצביע נגד הצעת החלטה. משלחת ארה"ב להמין טען כי הרכב המשלחת - שברובו היה רפובליקאני - לא מסקף נאמנה יחסי הכוחות בקונגרס ארה"ב. כתוצאה מסיחה זאת חתם אוניל על הודעה קובעת, בין השאר, כי: דרך הצבעת משלחת הקונגרס לא מבטא עמדת הקונגרס האוחדת את ישראל וכי להבא ינקוט בצעדים לשם איזון יתר בהרכב משלחת מטעם הקונגרס לכנסים בי"ל.

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(ראה המסמך הנלווה)



188

17.01.77

№: 000000

Секрет: для полковника, старшего лейтенанта

Имя: И.И.И. - фамилия: Иванов

Ваше имя и фамилия являются секретными. Не сообщайте их третьим лицам. - 17.01.77

1. Для вас действует следующее правило:

а. 1 - все сведения, содержащиеся в документах, относящихся к вашему делу, являются секретными. Не сообщайте их третьим лицам.

а. 2 - все сведения, содержащиеся в документах, относящихся к вашему делу, являются секретными. Не сообщайте их третьим лицам. Не сообщайте их по телефону, телеграфу, радио, почте и другим способом. Не сообщайте их в печати, в беседах, в разговорах и в других случаях. Не сообщайте их в общественных местах, в транспорте, в местах скопления людей. Не сообщайте их в местах, где вы работаете, учитесь, отдыхаете и т.д.

б. Если вы увидите, что кто-то пытается узнать секретные сведения, сообщите об этом немедленно начальнику вашего подразделения. Не сообщайте секретные сведения никому из родственников, друзей, знакомых, соседей, коллег по работе, учебе, отдыха и т.д. Не сообщайте секретные сведения в местах, где вы работаете, учитесь, отдыхаете и т.д. Не сообщайте секретные сведения в местах, где вы работаете, учитесь, отдыхаете и т.д.



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ג. לדברי מר להמן - מר לורך עמו נפגש בכנס, ציין בפניו כי בעקבות פעילותו לפיצול ההצבעה בקרב חברי משלחת ארה"ב - פיצלו משלחת מדינות אירופאיות שונות הצבעתן.

ד. עוזרו של להמן ציין כי המורסה היא מעוניין לקבל מכתב מר לורך שבו תודגש פעילותו הטובה למען ישראל בכנס סופיה. במכתב זה יעשה שמוש במחוז בחירתו.

ה. יש לנו ספקות אם צריך להענות לבקשה להסן, לפני שיוחלט מה לעשות - אנו מבקשים לקבל ממשלחתנו פרטים טפה שארע בכנס בסופיה וכן הערכה לגבי משלחת קונגרס ארה"ב.

בחודה מראש ובברכה,

נ. חמיר

העמק: מר נ. לורך מזכיר הכנסת. הכנסת י - 8.



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Very truly yours,

A. B. C.

cc - Mr. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q. R. S. T. U. V. W. X. Y. Z.

STATEMENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKER

THOMAS P. O'NEILL Oct. 5, 1977

"The recent vote by the U.S. delegation to the IPU in favor of a resolution condemning Israel certainly does not reflect the attitude of the leadership or the majority of the members of the House of Representatives on this matter.

"I will work to assure that future Congressional delegations to such international conferences as the IPU better represent the broad consensus of the House of Representatives in support of Israel."

שגרירות ישראל
וויטינגטון

Handwritten notes and a diagram with lines and numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) and the word "אל:".

19.9.1977

מכתב

מאת: צבי רפיח

מז"ב לעיונכם המכתב

Mr. Lehman המכתב

אנא עזבוני

מכתב

בברכה,

צ. רפיח

צ. רפיח

REPORT ON THE
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WORK DURING THE YEAR 1900

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They further announced that a government pathologist would perform an autopsy on Biko's body in the presence of a pathologist nominated by the parents of Mr. Biko. This is cold comfort to Steve Biko's loved ones and all throughout South Africa and the world at large who are greatly saddened by his tragic and untimely death and sickened by the inhuman system that created the circumstances for his loss of life. In light of past "mysterious" deaths of political prisoners, the South African Government's credibility in the case of Steve Biko must be seriously questioned.

Of course the question to be answered is why Steve Biko, and other Black opponents of apartheid, are in detention in the first place. South Africa routinely insults the intelligence of the international community with its hypocritically stated observance of the rule of law and of so-called "civilized" Western democratic values while turning itself into a virtual prison camp in order to maintain its supreme value—White Supremacy. Meanwhile, in total disregard for the international community's concern for human rights, the Vorster Government has had only one decisive answer to mounting Black unrest—detention and persecution. This is the South African way of life that Pretoria is willing to defend to the last Black person.

In the death of Steve Biko, South Africa has lost a potential leader who would have been instrumental in any credible dialogue across the color line aimed at bringing into being a humane and just political and economic system to South Africa. Instead, the South African government has embarked on a campaign of genocide against the leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement such as Biko and the late Abraham Tiro. Despite what South African authorities may say of Biko's death, there is urgent need for an internationally sanctioned independent investigation into the death of Steve Biko and other detainees, and into the general treatment of South African political prisoners. Biko's death along with so many others that have occurred in South Africa is a serious loss. One only wonders when Vorster and his National Party colleagues will wake up to the routine inhumanity that has become the South African way of life.

EXPLANATION OF KOCH AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. KOCH) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, next week the House will consider H.R. 3, "The medicare-medicaid anti-fraud and abuse amendments." H.R. 3 contains a provision called the Crane amendment, which deals with the issue of medical records privacy.

The Crane amendment is totally ill-advised and in addition fails to cover fully the problem of medical record privacy. Representative SARTRELLS also has an amendment that is inadequate to deal with the complexities of the issue.

The best amendment is the so-called Rogers substitute. This provision provides for good privacy controls on PSRO's and for HFW to provide legislation based on the Privacy Protection Study Commission's recommendation on medical record privacy by October 13, 1977.

I fully support the Rogers substitute.

The Koch and Preyer amendment will be offered only if the Rogers substitute fails, as a more fully reasoned approach

to medical record privacy than the Crane or Satterfield amendments.

I have been intimately involved with the issue of medical record privacy, first as the coauthor of the Privacy Act of 1974, then as a Commissioner of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, and finally in the drafting of the legislation Representative GOLDWATER, Jr., and I introduced this July to implement the Commission's recommendations.

This is a very complex area. Although the Commission did hold extensive hearings, we believe that Congress should have adequate time and hearings to evaluate the Commission's recommendations and to receive full review by the public and the affected agencies.

The Koch and Preyer amendment is a revision of H.R. 8283, which was introduced by Representative GOLDWATER and I in July of this year to implement the medical privacy recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. More time is needed both to provide a perfected bill and to provide adequate consideration by Congress and the public of the major policy issues involved.

DISAPPROVE \$250 MILLION ARMS SALE TO EGYPT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. LEHMAN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I testified today before the House Committee on International Relations in opposition to the proposed \$250 million arms sale to Egypt.

I am strongly opposed to this sale and would like to share the reasons for my opposition with my colleagues:

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM LEHMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman: I have introduced H. Con. Res. 343, disapproving the proposed sales to Egypt of 14 C-130 aircraft and 12 "Firebee" remotely piloted vehicles.

Seventeen months ago, I appeared before this Committee to oppose the sale to Egypt of an initial six C-130 transport planes. I did not, and still do not, believe that it is in the interests of the United States to establish a military supply relationship with Egypt.

While I have many reasons for opposing this sale, some of my strongest opposition comes from the memory of the incredible poverty I saw when I visited Egypt less than a year ago. To allocate \$250 million of badly needed U.S. assistance for the purchase of military equipment is a sad misordering of priorities. From what I saw with my own eyes, the Egyptian people need food and housing and sanitation far more than they need military aircraft.

There is no state bordering Egypt which poses a serious military threat to the security of that nation. The Egyptians have enough military muscle already to trounce neighboring Libya, as they did recently, and, we should remember, Israel has no offensive intentions toward Egypt. From a military standpoint, therefore, this weapons sale is not justified.

According to newspaper reports, State Department officials cite Egypt's "moderate stance" on Mideast issues in justifying additional sales of American arms. But, in fact, if Egyptian President Sadat were indeed "moderate" enough to agree to live in peace

with Israel, he would have no need at all for an additional \$250 million worth of modern weapons of war.

I also reject the proposal that the U.S. must be responsible for becoming Egypt's main arms supplier because Egypt kicked out the Russians. We all know that peace is not coming easily to the Middle East and that there may be another war. I hope that day will never come, but if it should, none of us want to be responsible for a situation where American weapons would be used against our ally, Israel.

As a member of the National Security Task Force of the House Budget Committee, I am learning that American weapons technology is very advanced and very deadly. Because of what I know of American weapons technology, I am here today to oppose this second step in what, if allowed to continue, will become a major military supply relationship between the U.S. and Egypt.

If we do not stop this sale today, I fear the day will come when modern American weapons, in the hands of Egyptian soldiers, will be used to kill the soldiers of Israel.

H. Con. Res. 343

Concurrent resolution disapproving the proposed sales to Egypt of 14 C-130 aircraft and 12 "Firebee" remotely piloted vehicles

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress objects to the proposed sale to Egypt of 14 C-130 aircraft and related defense articles and defense services, such proposed sale being described in the certification submitted by the President, pursuant to section 36(b) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on September 1, 1977 (Transmittal No. 77-89).

Sec. 2. The Congress objects to the proposed sales to Egypt of 12 "Firebee" remotely piloted vehicles and related defense articles and defense services, such proposed sale being described in the certification submitted by the President, pursuant to section 36(b) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on September 7, 1977 (Transmittal No. 77-93).

NATIONAL HISPANIC HERITAGE WEEK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Puerto Rico (Mr. CORRADA) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. CORRADA. Mr. Speaker, this week we are celebrating National Hispanic Heritage Week pursuant to a joint resolution approved by Congress on September 17, 1968, and a proclamation signed by President Jimmy Carter on August 29, 1977. In this connection, I insert into the Record my remarks:

The great historian Theodore Mommsen, so well known for his famous work on the Roman Empire, summarized in a few precise words what Rome was all about. He said: "the story of Rome is just one great process of incorporation." He meant, of course, incorporation by conquest.

The Roman legions roamed over the face of the earth, subdued the peoples of Hispania, Greece, Egypt, and so many other countries; spread the tentacles of Roman government—supported by military might; and gave the world a false impression of unity. However, along the years one defection after the other weakened its power, until nothing was left but a small, debilitated nucleus. That is why Mommsen so appropri-

WILLIAM LEHMAN
13TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

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EDUCATION AND LABOR
(ON LEAVE)
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEE:
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House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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(305) 945-7518



Inspecting the Kfir jet fighter -- (l. to r.) Israel Roth, Executive Vice President of Israel Aircraft Industries, Congressman Bill Lehman, and Asef Ben Nun, veteran test pilot.

July 5, 1977

Dear Friends,

Because I understood that the Israelis were concerned about the U.S. attitude toward sales of their new Kfir jet fighter to other nations, arrangements were made for me to meet with Al Schwimmer, President of Israel Aircraft Industries. We were able to get together at Le Bourget, the day before the Paris Air Show was opened to the public.

Schwimmer and his group outlined the problem -- Israel needs to maintain its Kfir fighter production line in order to support the development of its independent aerospace industry.

My comprehension of Israel's effort to create an aviation industry was strengthened after inspecting her civilian aircraft at the show. The Westwind executive jet and the Arava transport plane are excellent aircraft, but it is difficult for an aircraft industry to survive without military production. In order to build up a civilian aerospace industry, it is essential to produce military planes and to sell them overseas, since local needs are not great enough to maintain the production lines.

In the long run, Israel's aerospace industry will continue to develop not only for military needs, but for civilian needs as well, so that when real peace comes to the Middle East, there will be a substantial aerospace industry in place in the area.

The Israeli group also explained to me that it was difficult for them to understand possible U.S. objections since Israeli export of the Kfir helps the U.S. economy. Forty percent of the Kfir's components, including its General Electric engine, are American-made. In addition, by increasing its exports, Israel reduces its need for American military and economic assistance. In the final analysis, if Israel is not able to sell its planes to the free world, these sales will be made anyway by the French or Swedes, whose planes contain few U.S. components and provide little benefit to the U.S. economy.

I learned much about the good qualities of the Kfir. Current estimates indicate that it costs only \$5½ million compared to \$10 million for the U.S. F-16. It can turn more sharply than any plane in operation today, is safer than the F-16 because its fuel tanks are not adjacent to the engine, and has the most effective ejection seat ever invented to protect its pilot.

The capability of the plane was underlined when Time Magazine's military aviation correspondent visited our meeting and observed, "The Kfir is the toughest, most compact and competitive fighter aircraft in this show and, dollar-for-dollar, has the best striking power of any aircraft now being produced."

After the meeting, I thought the best way to deal with Israel's concerns would be to arrange an appointment with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's Assistant for National Security Affairs and a man with whom I'd had a good working relationship even before he went to the White House.

Dr. Brzezinski outlined the U.S. policy for me -- the U.S. opposes weapons sales to any country to which America, itself, would not sell. He further pointed out that possible Israeli sales to such nations as South Africa might weaken the important image Israel maintains in the free world as a defender of human rights, although the U.S. would not formally object to sales to these countries.

Dr. Brzezinski did understand Israel's concern, however, and agreed to work actively to firmly reassure our friends in the free world that Israel is a safe and secure source of supply. In addition, he expressed to me his great interest in maintaining an ongoing dialogue with Israel's friends in Congress.

I came away from the meeting with the feeling that the Administration is continuing its strong commitment to Israel while at the same time is showing a new concern for the morality of uncontrolled arms sales abroad.

This has been another legislative report on events regarding the Middle East. Please be assured that I will continue working to further improve cooperation between the United States and Israel.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Bill

WILLIAM LEHMAN
Member of Congress