312

מין ברוון

מין קונגרס
על הפ
שם הנשה ה.בראון, סינקלר

ג'ונאתן, נאומים נבחר

נפתח: 1970 6/78

נסגר: 1979 11/78

312/111

134

יוצא בלמ"ס

אל: ני , וש , פריס , לונדון , בון , האג , רומא ,
בריסל , נר: חורם 560, מ : המשרד
דח: ד, סג: ב, תא: 180279, ות: 1400
נד: תקשורת ערבית

בלמס/דחוף

מסיבת עתונאים של סאדאת ובראון (17.2).

1. מסרת השיחות במצרים,לדברי בראון,היתה להתוודע אל דעות סאדאת ביחס לנושא הבטחון באזור והצעדים הדרושים ליציבות ולבטחון מצרים והאזור כולו.

סאדאת,שהתחמק מרוב השאלות,הסכים להרחיב את הדיבור רק על בקשות הנשק.הוא תבע מארה"ב יחס של שיוויון באספקת נשק וציין שמטרתו להגן בנשק זה על יאחי הערבים ועל כל מי שנמצא באזור נגד כל התערבות זרה"(סימולת 17.2).

2. נושא בקשות הנשק והתפקיד האסטרטגי של מצרים הופיע בהרחבה בעתונות ובשידורים המצריים ב-17.2.

3. חיליל שמונה ב-17.2 גם לתפקיד שהיה ש"י סאדאת,יוועד עם רימי בריטניה ב-19.2 בלונדון בדרכו לארה"ב(סימולת 17.2).

איראן.

4. חיליל שיגר מברק ברכה לבוראגן עם התמנותו לתפקידו והביע תקוות מצרים להידוק יחסי הדוח והתרבות בין מצרים ואיראנ(ר)צות אל ערב (17.2).

5. ערפאת נועד בטהרן ב-17.2 עם חומייניסיים (17.2).

6. רדיו מוסקבה בערבית (17.2) מוסר בהסתמכו על עיתונים ערביים שסובני הסי.איי.אי. מנסים להסתנן לשורות הארגונים

השמאלנים באירגון ומציין שפעולות פרובקטיביות באלו מנהלים
גם סובני המודיעין הישראלי.
ועידת שהיח הערבים.

7. בין סעיפי סדר היום של הועידה האמורה להתקיים ב-21.3
במוגדישו, דיון בקשר לאפשרות בינון קשרים דיפלומטיים בין
ספרד וישראל והצעה לגרש את ישראל מהתאחדות הדואר העולמית.
סוריה.

8. עוזר שהיח הסורי מחה בפני שגריר ארהיב על סיור בראון בדמת
הגולן ורואה בו צעד בלתי ידידותי שאינו משרת את היחסים בין
שתי הארצות כר דמשק (17.2).

9. ב -17.2 הגיע לדמשק שר ההגנה ההונגרי לביקור שימשך
כמה ימים.
נפש.

10. מכיר אופיק אמר בוינה שלא צפוי בינוס ועידת חרום של
מדינות האירגון בקרוב.המצב אינו קריטי כי יש עתה מחסור של
2.3 אחוז בלבד,וערב הסעודית,עיראק,ניגריה ומדינות אופ"יק
אחרות הביעו נכונותם לספק כמויות נוספות(מאס"יס 17.2).

11."אלקבס" הכווית 16.2,כתב כי מדינות המפרץ נקט אמצעים
למנוע הסתננות נפש ערבי לישראל דרך אירופה,בינהם הפסקת
האספקה לכל מדינה שתשווק לישראל(סי"יק 16.2).

כללי.

12. במהלך השיחות בין נשיאי גרמ"יו וסוריה,הוסכם על חתימת
חוזה ידידות ושיתוף פעולה בעתיד הקרובא.ד.נ. (17.2).

13. המתיחות בין רדיית לתימן נמשכת כאשר עדן מאשימה את תימן
בפתיחת המדינה להתערבות זרה גלויה.
הערבי====+

תפ: שהח,רהמ,סרהמ,שהבמ,מנכל,סמנכל,ממת,רמ,אמן,ארבל2,
מצפא,אירא,אירב,מעת,הסברה,מיתים

6951

יוצא

דף 1 מתוך 4
עותק 6 מתוך 10 סודי ביותר

אל: וש, נר: 302, מ : המשרד
דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 150279, רח: 1430
נד: שיחת שהח-בראון

סודי ביותר/מיידי

השגריר.

להלן מתוך שיחת שהייח ושהבייט עם מוביר ההגנה בראון אתמול 14.2 במשרדנו. נכחו מצידנו המנבייל, אלוף שרוני, רובינשטיין, ביסלביא, תהילה. מצד ארהייב, לואיס, מקגיפרט, מורי, טוינאם, ועוד שניים.

1. א. בראון פתח ואמר כי ביקורו נועד לא רק לדיון בבעיות בילטרליות בנושאים צבאיים, אלא גם בשאלות הכלליות של בטחון האיזור-עמדות מדינותיו וארהייב בענין זה. ארהייב משוכנעת כי האיזור כולו, כולל קרן אפריקה, פקיסטאן ואפגניסטאן, נתון בלחצים סובייטים, לאו דווקא בגלל תכנית סובייטית אלא תוך ניצול בעיות הקיימות באיזור על ידי הסובייטים. הסובייטים מנצלים לצורך זה את היותם מעצמת על צבאית כ בראון רואה אותם כמעצמת על בתחום הצבאי בלבד, ולא הכלכלי ואף לא האידאולוגי. הסובייטים נוהרו אלא להשתמש ישירות בכוחם, אך עושים מאמצים על ידי שליחים, כמו הויאט-נאמים בדרום מזרח אסיה, או שליחים מסוג אחר כמו הקובאנים, ועשו רווחים אחדים, למשל באתיופיה, אפגניסטאן ודרום תימן. הם גם סבלו נסיגות. אירגון היא נסיגה גדולה למערב ולישראל, אך אינה הצלחה סובייטית.

מכל מקום האיזור כולו קריטי למערב, ודעת ארהייב היא שיש לנסות לחזקו, והיא נכונה לשיתוף פעולה נרחב יותר באיזור. הסעודים דואים במחשבות אלה תועלת, אך אינם חושבים על דבר קונקרטי המבוקש על ידיהם מארהייב, שכן נוכחות ארהייב, לדעתם, עשויה להפכם למטרה נוחה לפגיעות . ארהייב מוכנה לדברים שונים כמו נוכחות צבאית רבה יותר, סיוע צבאי וגם בלכלי כ הדוגמאות - סיוע לתורכיה, נשק לפקיסטאן אם ייפתר הענין

הגרעיני, שיתוף פעולה עם הסעודים בקשר לעורה לסודאן וצפון תימן).

ב. בראון ציין כי ארהייב אינה חשה אשמה באשר למה שאירע לשאה, שכן בשלונו של השאה היה בכך שלא פתח מתחתיו מעמד של מנהלים שיטלו עמו חלק באחריות, ואם הכל במדינתו היה בידיו, היו גם השגיאות שגיאותיו. היתה גם בעית השחיתות. המהפכה באיראן חדרה להמונים, ישנה לאומנות חוקה. יש לקוות כי האיראנים יבינו מה הגורמים המרכזיים באינטרס הלאומי שלהם וינהגו בהתאם.

ג. הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי הוא ענין בסיסי באיזור, ויש מקום להנעת תהליך השלום. הערבים מוטנים שענין זה חשוב ולכן על ישראל להתפשר, והישראלים אומרים להיפך, ושניהם צודקים. בראון סיפר כי לחץ של הערבים בענין קמפ-דיוויד, והסעודים, ואולי קצת פחות מזה חוסין, גילו לפחות נכונות להקשיב. ואולם, הסכמי קמפ-דיוויד לפי השקפתם של הערבים מסכנים את סאדאת ומבודדים אותו. השקפת ארהב ברורה, כי הסכמים אלה הם צעד ראשון לשלום בכלל ובר קיימא. בראון הדגיש זאת בערב הסעודית ובירדן.

ד. בראון חזר בדבריו על מחויבות ארהב לבטחון ישראל והוסיף, כי ארהב דואה את השלום בתנאי בסיסי לשיתוף פעולה אזורי ובדרך ליציבות אזורית. התקדמות במסגרת של קמפ-דיוויד היא מרכיב מרכזי באסטרטגית ארהב, לא רק בין ישראל לערבים, אלא גם באיזור רחב יותר. ארהב חפצה לקדם בטחון ופיתוח בלבלי ולהגיש סיוע לכל המדינות באיזור, ולנטות בלבום בוחות פנימיים של רדיקליים ערבי על ידי תנוזה לקראת הסדר השלום. לדעת בראון, יש אים אמיתי מבחוץ ומבוחות שבתוך האיזור, ולכן יש להמשיך בתהליך השלום.

2. א. לשאלת שהח האם מצא בראון שמאודעות איראן מעודדים את הסעודים וחוסיין לתמוך בסאדאת או להיפך, השיב בראון כי הסעודים מודאגים מהסוביטים, אך הם אמביוולנטיים. הם רגישים גם לחשש, שהרדיקליים שמילא תפקיד באיראן יהיה גם בערב הסעודית. היינו מעין לאומנות ערבית אנטי-מערבית. מקגיפרט ציין כי הסעודים לא השיבו על השאלה באורח ישיר. מכל מקום, הוסיף בראון, יש רגישות גדולה בסעודיה ליחסן של מדינות ערביות אחרות.

מתשובתו של בראון השתמע, כי הסעודים לא היו רוצים שמצרים תעשה שלום עם ישראל בלא שייכנסו מדינות ערביות אחרות, לא

מתוך הסליקה לחלוטין

השתמע שישנה בעמדתם תנועה לכיוון סאדאת. בראון ציין כי בסוף השיחות אמנם דובר יותר על שיתוף פעולה סעודי-אמריקני מאשר על נוקשות ישראל.

2. באשר לרגישותם של הסעודים כלפי כינוש נר ציין בראון, בתשובה לשאלה, כי הסעודים אינם מצפים לצנחנים סוביטים, אלא חוששים מדרום תימן ומהשפעה של מליון פועלים תימנים בערב הסעודית. אם יבואו ספינות סוביטיות לצפון תימן, היו הסעודים מרוצים מאוד מן המחשבה, שארהב תאמר שבסקרה בוה יהיה לסוביטים עימות אתה. האמריקנים אמרו לסעודים, שהמ- האמריקנים - ירתיעו את הסוביטים, אך על מדינות האיזור לטפל בעצמן בבעיות פנים. התחום האפור - הקובנים - הוא שאלה קשה (השתמע כי ארהב לא תילחם בקובנים). אם יהיה שלום, 5 דיביזיות המצדיות שיתפנו מהתעלה עשויות להשפיע על מה שיעשו אחרים בתימן, אתיופיה וסומאלי. יש צורך גם בבחינת אוריים, והמצרים יהיו באלה.

3. בנקודה זו עלתה שאלת השימוש בנשק אמריקני על ידי הסעודים ומדינות אחרות, שעליה הבריק המנכל בנר 295.

4. בהמשך עלתה שאלת הנוכחות הצבאית האמריקנית באיזור, ושהה צייר, כי לדעתו יהיה לנוכחות כזאת אפקט חיובי.

5. לקראת תום השיחה ביקש שהח להוסיף הערה בקשר לסומי להסכם השלום, המתיחסת להשקפתו לגבי יוש ושה, ואמר:
"יאנו רוצים למצוא דרך לחיות בצוותא עם הערבים. אני מודאג ממה שקורה עתה סביבנו ועם אמריקנים המסבירים את מדיניות ארהב, כמו סוברס, אנשים ממעט הקונסוליה האמריקנית בירושלים וכדומה. הם הגונים ומסבירים את מדיניותכם בכנות. אבל הדושם שהערבים באן מקבלים מדבריהם הוא, שבמאוחר ובמוקדם יעשו הם יותר עצמאיים, והפתרון הוא לא לחיות יחד, תוך פשרה עמנו, אלא בתפיסה אחרת. בצירוף למתרחש עתה בקשר לראומנות הערבית והלך הרוח האסלאמי ששפך שמן על דגשותיהם, עלול הדבר להגיע להפגנות ולאי שיתוף פעולה, וחוסיין פונה לראשי הערים או לחברי מועצת חברת החשמל בירושלים, ומבקש מהם להתפטר כדי שלא יישתפו עמנו פעולה, כך שעצם שיתוף הפעולה עמנו הוא חמאגאב, את חברת החשמל, אם לא ישתפו עמנו פעולה, נתפוס ונפעיל בעצמנו). אתם עוורים לרגשות מסוג זה בין הערבים.

ישנן שתי דרכים לפתרון הבעיה, האחת להפעיל את תקופת המעבר של 5 השנים ולמצוא דרך לחיות יחד. יכולה להיות תפיסה אחרת, שונה, המצטרפת לקולות הבאים מאיראן, ומירדן. מבחינתנו שאלת ריבונות מזרח ירושלים למשל אמורה לעלות רק לאחר 5 השנים

השקעות ונשאות אמריקאי בתנאי ושמ

דף 4 מתוך 4
עותק 8 מתוך 10 סודי ביותר

לדיון בהסדר הסופי, וכל זה צריך להיות לאחר ההסכם עם מצרים.
אם תעלה עכשו שאלת הסטטוס של מזרח ירושלים, עלול הדבר להיות
לתגובה מתפשטת.

ירושלים

לפיכך סבור אני שפתרון הסכסוך הוא הדרך הטובה ביותר לשלום
באיזור, אך מה שקורה עתה. ובמיוחד ביוש ועזה, וגישתם עם
הערבים מול גישתנו, עלול להביא לתוצאות הפוכות. אנו לא נחלק
מחדש את ירושלים, ואם אינם רוצים לשבת עמנו בחברת החשמל של
מזרח ירושלים - נקשור את האיזור לחשמל של ישראל בעצמנו''.

בראון אמר, כי הוא, לפחות, נוטה להתרבו בענין זה בתהליך,
כיוון שאין איש, בולל הערבים, יכול לדעת מה תהא התוצאה בעבור
5 שנים. אם ניתן יהיה להשיג הסכם על התהליך - יהיה משהו
להיאחז בו.
שהה חזר ואמר כי הוסכם, ששאלת הסטטוס הסופי תידון עם ירדן
בתום 5 השנים ולכן העלאת הנושא עתה באורח במעט יומיומי היא
לא רק מעשה בוסר אלא ענין נעדר תבלית.

בראון אמר כי למען הערבים המתונים יש צורך לומר שהדבר בלול
בתהליך, אך יש לדון בו לאו דווקא עתה.
===א.רובינשטיין===

תפ: שהה,מנבל,רוזן,ר/מרבו

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

ל' בחשון תש"מ

20 בנובמבר 1979

אל : המשנה למנכ"ל, מר חנן בראון

רצ"ב נאומו של סגן נשיא ארה"ב
בארוחת הערב של הבונדס לכבוד סאם רוטברג
ב-18 לנובמבר 1979.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יוסי בל

יוסי בל

העתק : מנהל מצפ"א
המרכז

VICE PRESIDENT WALTER F. MONDALE
ISRAEL BOND DINNER TRIBUTE TO SAM ROTHBERG
TRANSCRIPT
WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 18, 1979

It's a pleasure to join your President, Mike Arnon; the head of your women's division, Alice Peerce; and all the friends not only from throughout the United States, but I understand this evening that we have visitors literally from all over the world, who have come to honor Sam Rothberg.

I want to pay a special tribute to Menachem Meir because his mother was one of the most courageous, decent, brilliant, humanitarian, democratic leaders in the history of mankind (Applause). I was privileged to know her for many years. Every time she visited Washington, I'd get a free meal at the Israeli Embassy (Laughter). And whenever I visited Israel I had a chance to meet Golda Meir. When she was Prime Minister, I had a chance to speak with her about the concerns of government. But above all the last time I saw Golda was in my last visit to Israel -- to which reference has been made -- when I was accompanied by my wife and my daughter, who is with me tonight (Applause). And we spent two hours with Golda, the last time I ever saw her, in a marvelous conversation about her life, her concern and interest in democracy, about the future of Israel, and about the relationship between Israel and the United States.

In a real sense Golda epitomized the profound connection between Israel and the United States -- because she was really a part of both. She taught school here. She was always in the United States speaking. She stayed over at everyone's home. And she never forgot her love and her affection for our country. And she always kept that incredibly close human connection between those two great societies.

I'm honored tonight to be as well with Israel's great Ambassador Eppie Evron (Applause). There isn't a country in the world represented by an Ambassador to the United States with more ability, who's respected more, than Eppie Evron (Applause).

It is a privilege to be with Prime Minister Begin's special representative tonight, Dr. Yosef Burg. Israel has a truly fine head of delegation to the autonomy negotiations. In fact, Dr. Burg, just yesterday, Bob Strauss told me that the only man who's ever shown greater negotiating talent than Dr. Burg ... is Bob Strauss (Laughter). And you must be a great public leader. Can you imagine staying in office and in the cabinet without interuption since 1948? (Applause)

1948 was the year that I managed Hubert Humphrey's campaign when he was seeking the Senate for the first time. And I was managing Harry Truman's campaign in Minnesota for another term in the White House. And, the reason I was managing it was, no one else would take the job (Laughter). And you've been in office all that time, congratulations. I can't believe it, I want to talk to you later (Laughter). I think we could use some advice over there.

When I saw the invitation to tonight's dinner; when I saw the list of names on the tribute committee, I was struck not only by what that list represents. I was also reminded that the very fact of that list -- a clear and joyous affirmation of Jewishness and love of Israel -- is truly a symbol of all we hold dear in our beloved country.

Our nation was founded with a Declaration of Independence that Prime Minister Begin not long ago called "almost a new chapter in the Bible." We believe in freedom and we cherish our religious faiths.

And thank God that we do. Because there are countries even today where an affirmation of Jewishness, a commitment to the Jewish State of Israel, is less than welcome -- and even dangerous. Within living memory, as Sam pointed out, there was a time when that affirmation was punished by the most tragic devastation ever visited on humankind.

The world must never forget the nightmare of the holocaust. And never again must the flame of decency be extinguished (Applause).

At the end of World War II, an American from Peoria saw first-hand the ravages of the holocaust. He saw how the night had closed in on European Jewry. And from that moment forward he resolved to do everything within his power to restore, to remake, to rekindle, and to rebuild the future of the Jewish people.

That man -- the genius we honor tonight -- is of course Sam Rothberg. He is one of the key architects of Israel's economic miracle. He is the American father of Israel Bonds. And no one could be more deserving of the first annual Golda Meir Leadership Award than Sam Rothberg (Applause). Bringing these two names together -- Golda Meir and Sam Rothberg -- is a symbol of the ties between our two nations, and the human qualities that give us all hope and confidence in the future.

Ten years ago, Golda Meir traveled all across our nation on behalf of Israel Bonds. Most of you heard her -- in New York, in Los Angeles, or in her own Milwaukee -- as she said this in every address she made:

> It will be a great day when Arab farmers will cross our borders not with planes or tanks--but with tractors, and with their hands outstretched in friendship, as between farmer and farmer, as between human beings. A dream it may be, but I am sure that one day it will come true.

And today, that second Israeli miracle is being born. Today, with all the problems, and there are many, Golda Meir's dream is coming true.

Who could have imagined that the President of Egypt would stand before the Knesset and speak to the leaders of Israel of peace! Who could have dreamed of the snapshot of Moshe Dayan and his wife, posing like tourists in front of the pyramids? Who could have conceived of Egyptian sailors and Israeli soldiers singing Hebrew folk songs together in Haifa? Who would have believed the sight of the flag of Israel and the flag of Egypt flying together proudly in El Arish?

When Prime Minister Begin visited President Sadat in Egypt, he was the first head of the State of Israel to do so in 2500 years. The world applauded. The cameras recorded an epochal landmark.

But today, it is not much news when the Egyptian Minister of Defense goes to Tel Aviv. It's not news when Israeli engineers go to Cairo. It's not news when Israeli ships sail through the Suez. And it's not news when an Egyptian army band practices the Israeli national anthem. And that's the best news of all (Applause).

Slowly, steadily, persistently, tenaciously, we are working our way toward normalcy. Through thirty years and four wars, the story of Israel has mingled triumph and tragedy. For three long decades, hatreds and suspicions had been millstones around our hope. But tonight there is no reason to despair about the future of Israel. Israel is no longer tentative. The state of Israel is forever (Applause).

At the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, President Carter said this:

> Peace is active, not passive. Peace is doing, not waiting. Peace, like war, must be waged.

And when you buy Israel Bonds, you are waging peace.

At that signing ceremony, three political leaders -- a Christian, a Moslem, a Jew -- all quoted the ancient biblical appeal that swords be beaten into ploughshares, and spears into pruning-hooks. But I'm sure that if the prophets Micah and Isaiah were alive today, they would instead talk about computers and grain silos and derricks and factories. Because that's exactly what they meant: the stuff of peace, the essentials of economic growth and opportunity.

Golda Meir once said that "the State of Israel cannot survive on applause, or speeches, or declarations, or even tears of happiness. It needs resources."

Tonight -- as you invest in the new Economic Development for Peace Loan -- you honor her vision. For you are building electric power stations and industrial parks. Irrigating the desert.

Exploring for oil. Creating new highways and airports and railroads and harbors to expand Israel's trade. You are casting an economic vote of confidence in Israel's survival.

We have worked together for a strong and peaceful Israel -- and for enduring American-Israeli friendship -- for twenty-five years. At times, we have had hope, and at times we've had sorrow. But whatever the climate at the moment, one unalterable fact remains clear:

Israel is our friend, our partner, and our conscience (Applause). Its well-being is in our strategic interest. We will never, never shrink from that commitment. I stand before you tonight representing the President of the United States and I say to you this evening that we will stand by Israel always (Applause).

What does that mean?

It means we're committed to secure and recognized borders for Israel.

We are committed to an undivided Jerusalem with free access for all faiths to the holy places (Applause).

We are committed to reliable economic and military aid to Israel, and never once did we threaten that aid at any time during this Administration -- nor will we (Applause).

We are committed to peace between Israel and all of its neighbors.

We are committed to being full partners in negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

We do not favor an independent Palestinian state. It would not contribute to a stable peace (Applause).

We will not negotiate with the PLO and we will not recognize the PLO (Applause) unless it first recognizes the right of Israel to exist, and accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is past time for the PLO to recognize Israel. It is past time for a total end to terrorism against Israel. That is the basis for peace. And we must insist that everyone accept it (Applause).

In the months ahead, true to these principles, Israel, Egypt, and the United States will translate the Camp David accords into the reality of a lasting Middle East peace.

In Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt; in Dr. Burg; and in our brilliant and experienced negotiator, Sol Linowitz -- we have three superb diplomats who are committed to that peace.

Now there will be problems. There will be emotion-laden issues. There will be contention. There will be compromises. But never, never will the security of Israel be compromised in that process (Applause).

We will not play politics with the future of Israel's security.

The negotiations will often be slow and frustrating. But to do what one Presidential candidate has done -- to denounce what does not yield instant success as an utter failure -- is worse than demagoguery. It is dangerous -- dangerous to Israel, and dangerous to world peace.

To call for a head-first lunge at all the remaining issues at once; to opt for a quick fix; to impose upon the negotiating parties a cookie-cutter set of ready-made solutions: that would only shatter America's credibility as a full partner in the peace process. It would be irresponsible, and a threat to everything we have accomplished.

We will stand by our friends. We will assist them with military equipment, economic aid, and moral support. We are prepared to help them withstand threats from the outside. And let me add this as clearly as I can. We will never, never barter any element of a Middle East settlement for oil (Applause).

We will never trade assurances of petroleum supplies or prices for Israeli security. Peace in the Middle East is not for sale. And succumbing to blackmail is not the American way (Applause).

We will not succumb to blackmail over Israel, or over oil. Nor will we succumb to it in Iran (Applause).

All Americans stand together tonight in condemning the events in Teheran (Applause), where our fellow citizens -- courageous and decent servants of the American people -- are being held prisoners tonight.

Since the first word of that inexcusable action, President Carter has personally directed our government's efforts to do everything we possibly can to secure their safe release. At the same time, we have resisted unacceptable demands on our country.

No economic pressure can weaken our stand on basic issues of principle. And I know I'm speaking for every American when I say that tonight (Applause). The President has ordered that we discontinue purchasing any oil from Iran for delivery to the United States. We need our honor and our independence more than we need their oil (Applause). In response to an impending withdrawal of funds, he has legally frozen official Iranian assets in this country.

Fundamental decency is at stake. Lives are at stake. At issue, too, is the basic principle of international law among all civilized nations. We hold the Iranian government and its leaders fully responsible for the safety and the well-being of our representatives in Iran. We hold them accountable for that responsibility.

We welcome the announcement that some of the hostages may be released. Tonight, we pray for the safe return of all of these courageous Americans. For the last American hostage is as important as the first hostage (Applause).

It has been my privilege over the past 3 years to serve with my President for the pursuit of these goals, and in support of a foreign policy that I believe reflects the values of the American people.

Moshe Dayan, who was here recently, said:

> President Carter has involved himself in the Middle East not only as a mediator, but also by becoming a real partner. He has done more and gone farther to bring peace than any former President.

And I'm proud to work for the man who is pursuing these ends (Applause).

Tonight you wage peace, as you buy Israel Bonds. And you especially honor one of our greatest and most decent Americans, and statesmen, and friends, Sam Rothberg (Applause).

Thank you very much.

2097 נבנס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמ"ס

אל: המשרד, נר: 3, מ : 111
דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 010379, רח: 1300
נד: דברי ברז'ינסקי

בלמס/מ"יד'

מצפא

הין מאמר/בריזינסקי

להלן דברי ברז'ינסקי על המרת בתבנית חדשות הבוקר של ס'.ב'.אס.

BOB SHIEFFER: LATE YESTERDAY IN WASHINGTON,WE TALKED ABOUT ALKL OF
THAT WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER,ZBIGNIEW
BRZEZISNKI,WHOPARGUED THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT
ARE NOT LARGE.BRZEZINSKI JOINED ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN DENYING
REPORTS THAT THE US HAS GIVEN ISRAEL A DEADLINE TO REACH A PEACE
SETTLEMENT.BUT HE ALSOWARNED THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

HERE'S A PORTION OF THE INTERVIEW.

DR. BRZEZINSKI,ISRAELI RADIO IS QUOTING ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER
DAYAN AS TELLING A CABINET COMMITTEE THAT MR CARTER TOLD HIMTHAT
THEY HAD TEN DAYS TO WRAP UPPFTHE MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS,AND,
IF THEY DIDN'T DO IT,THAT THE US WOULD REASSESS ITS MIDDLE EAST
POLICY.

IS THAT TRUE ?

BRZEZISNKI: NO,THAT'S NOT AN ACCURATE REPORT.I WAS

PRESENT AT THE DISCUSSIONS.AND THE PRESIDENT HAD A

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN AND WITH
PPRIME MINISTER KHALIL.ONE OF THE POINTS WHICH ALL OF THEM
MADE WAS THAT TIME IS GRADUALLY RUNNING OUT,THAT UNLESS
THERE IS PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACE TREATYNDIFFICULTIES WILL
INCREASE.THERE'RE CLUDS ON THE HORIZON.AND ON THIS THERE WAS
AGREEMENT.

BUT THERE CERTRAINLY WAS NO DISCUSSION OF DEADLINES.AND THERE
WAS NO DISCUSSION OF REASSESSMENTS.

SCHIEFFER: WELL,THAT DOES RAISE A QUESTION,THJOUGH.IS THE US
GOING TO HAVE TO REASSESS ITS MIDEAST POLICY IF SOMETHING DOESN'T
COME TO PASS SOMETIME SOON ?

BRZEZINSKI: I DON'T WANT TO -- I DON'T WANT TO BE A PROPHET.
I WOULD RATHER SAY THIS.FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS THE PRESIDENT

HAS INVESTED AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF TIME AND PERSONAL EFFORTS
IN AN ENTERRRPISE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF
THIS COUNTRY,WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE WELL BEING OF THE REGION, AND WHICH IS ULTIMATELY ESSENTIAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL,
NAMELY,TO THE SHAPING OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS.I AM CONVINCED THAT PEACE CAN BE ATTAINED,
PROVIDED THERE'S GOOD WILL AND DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF
THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

SCHIEFFER: I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND WHY MR BEGION IS COMING HERE
HE SAYS HE DOES NOT WANT TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS.I THINK HE EVEN SAID
HE DID NOT WANT TO GO TO CAMPO DAVID,AS PRESIDENT CARTER
SUGGESTED MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA.AND HE SAYD THAT HE IS NOT YET READY
TO TALK TO PRESIDENT SADAT.WHAT THEN IS THERE FOR THESE TWO MEN TO
DISCUSS WHEN MR BEGIN COMES HERE ?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL,FIRST OF ALL,THEY BOTH AGREED IN THEIR CONVERSATION THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THEM TO MEET.WE'LL
DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL.

WE'LL DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES.IMPORTAANT EVENTS HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN THAT REGION.I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FORTO THE PRIME MINISTER TO SHARE WITH THE PRESIDENT HIS
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEMS AND FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SHARE HIS

PERSPECTIVE WITH TE PRIME MINISTER.

AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST,VERY MUCH IN THAT CONTXT,I THINK THERE
WILL BE A DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES THAT INVOLLVE THE NEGOTIATIONS
OF A PEACE TREATY,THE ISUE OF PEACE OR WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS
ARAB NEIGHBORS.THESE ARE THE LOGICAL ISUES FOR THEM TO DISCUSS.

SCHIEFER: WHAT DOES MR CARTER HOPE TO GET OUT OF THIS ?

BRZEZINSKI: WELL,IN A GENERAL SENSE,WHAT HE HOPES TO GET OUT
OF IT IS CONTINUED MOMENTUM TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS,AND IN
THE FIRST INSTANCE,THEREFORE,THE ATTAINMENT OF A OPEACE BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND ALSO THE GENERATION OF GENUINE PROGRESS
REGARDING THE WEST BANK ISSUE.

NOW HOW THIS GENERAL OBJECTIVE MAY BE EXPRESED BY WHAT FOLLOWS
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CARTER- BEGIN MEETING,IT IS PREMATURE
TO SAY.ONE MIGHT HAVE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS.ONE MIGHT HAVE

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE EGYPTIANS IN ADDITION TO

THE CONSULTATIONS THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE HAD WITH BEGIN.

ONE MIGHT ENVISAGE RENEWED DISCUSSIONS AT THIS OR THAT LEVEL,
INCLUDING PERHAPS THE SUMMIT.

SCHIEFFER: MR CARTER USES WORDS,
LIKE HE SAYS ''IT'S DIGUSTING HOW CLOSE THEY ARE '' TO REACHING
AGREEMENT.BUT MR BEGIN SAYS HE FLATLY DOES NOT AGREE WITH THAT,
THERE ARE VERY STRONG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

BRZEZINSKI: I THINK THAT'S INHERENBT,TO SPMEEXTENT,
IN THE DIFFERENT ROLES THAT ARE INVOLVED HERE.THE US S A
COUNSTRUCTIVE MEDIATOR.WE WOIULD LIKE THE TWO PARTIES
TO AGRE.WHATEVER THEY AGRE ON IS ACCEPTABLE TO US,BECAUSE THERE
IS NO AMERICAN SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT,AS SUCH.AND IF WE CAN
GET THEM TO AGREE IT'S ACCEPTABLE TO US.

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE THE DIFFERENCES THAT REMAIN ARE GENUINELY
NOT VERY LARGE.WE BELIEVE,AND I BELIEVE ACCURATELY,THAT WE HAVE
SIGNIFICANTLY NARROWED THE GAP THAT HITHERTO DIVIDFED THE ISRAELIS
AND THE EGYPTIANS.NATURALLY,FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ONE OF THE
PROTAGONISTS,WHAT REMAINS TO BE RESOLVED IS IMPORTANT.AND
THEREFORE,IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT MR BEGIN WOULD SAY THAT THESE
ISSUES ARE IMPORTANT.

SCHIEFFER: YOU SAID JUST A MOMENT AGO THAT WITH GHOOD WILL ON
ALL SIDES YOU FELT THERE COULD STILL BE A PEACE AGREEMENT.

ARE YOU CONVINCED THERE IS STILL GOOD WILL ON ALL SIDES ?
ARE YOU CONVINCED THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED -- AND YOU
DON'T HAVE TO NAME THEM,IF YOU DON'T WANT TO -- WANT A PEACE
TREATY RIGHT NOW ?

BRZEZINSKI: I WANT TO BELIEVE THAT,AND I BASICALLY DO BELIEVE
THAT.THE PROBLEM,OF COURSE, COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT
IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS,IT IS NOT ONLY GOOD INTENTIONS THAT COUNT.
YOU ARE DEALIUNG WIUTH A LEGACY,A HISTORICAL LEGACY OF FEAR
OF CONCERNS OF SUSPICIONS.AND THIS INHERENTLY COMPLICATES
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BETWEEN ANY PARTIES.FORGET THE NAMES,
FORGET THE COUNTRIES,CALL THEM A AND B.IF THERE HAVE BEEN WARS,
IF THERE HAVE BEEN PAST IDSAPPOINTMENTS,THIS CONDITIONS THEIR
ATTITUDE.AND THEREFORE,I BELIEVE THEY HAVE GOOD INTENTIONS.
BUT I ALSO AM AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THEY MAY NOT FEL QUITE
THE SDAME WAY ABOUYT EACH OTHER.

=====

תפ: שהח,רהמ,סרהמ,שהבמ,מנבל,סמנבל,ממת,רם,אמן,הסברה,
מעת,כנסיות,אנרגיה,מקצב,מעתמבקרים,אמינגר,פתיר,הלפרין,
וחוב,דוצ,הורוביץ,מצפא,מרתים,הסטוריה

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-משווג

נר : 153
נשלח: 091700 פבר 79
נתקבל: 100040 פבר 9

סודי

מיידי

אל : המשרד
מאת: וושינגטון

מצפא. מרכז

ביקור בראון במזת.

היום בבוקר נערך תדרוך רקע לכתבי הפנטגון על מטרות ביקורו של בראון במזת. מתוך התדרוך יוצא שהפנטגון רואה כמטרה עקרית להביא תמיכת ארהב באזני סעודיה לאחד המאורעות באיראן ואולי אף לדבר עם מדינה זו על אפשרויות להדק הקשרים הצבאיים בין ערב הסעודית וארהב. אחת האפשרויות המועלות על ידי חלק מהכתבים שהשתתפו בתדרוך היא שארהב תספק לערב הסעודית חלק מהזמנות הנשק שבוטלו על ידי איראן. לגבי הביקור במצרים וישראל צויין שבראון ידרבן שתי הארצות להגיע להסכם ביניהן ובמקום זהותו בארץ יבדוק את צרכי ישראל המתחייבים מפינוי סיני.

לגבי הביקור בירדן לא נאמר כמעט דבר ונוצרה הרגשה שאין מייחסים לו חשיבות מרובה.

פזנר

שהח"ה סרהם שהבט מנכל סמנכל מצפא מזתים חקר רם אמנ
רע/לג

official text

לעדכן בן-חור
מתוקן בפיו מאמריקה
משרד החוץ.

International Communication Agency of the United States of America
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, Tel: 54338 ext: 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, Tel: 222376

official text

FEBRUARY 27, 1979

BROWN ON MIDEAST TRIP

WASHINGTON, FEB. 26 -- FOLLOWING INTERVIEW ON "FACE THE NATION" OVER COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM FEATURES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN; QUESTIONED FEB. 25 BY CBS NEWS PENTAGON CORRESPONDENT, IKE PAPPAS; HENRY BRADSHER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS WRITER, WASHINGTON STAR AND CBS NEWS CORRESPONDENT GEORGE HERMAN.

(BEGIN MIDEAST REMARKS):

BRADSHER: YOU'VE JUST COME BACK FROM A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. DURING THAT VISIT THE EGYPTIANS SUGGESTED TO YOU THAT PERHAPS A GREATLY INCREASED AMERICAN SUPPLY OF ARMS TO EGYPT MIGHT ENABLE THEM TO TAKE OVER SOME OF THE ROLE OF POLICEMAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THE SHAH OF IRAN ONCE THOUGHT HE WOULD HANDLE. THERE'VE ALSO BEEN SUGGESTIONS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT WE SHOULD BECOME MORE HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON ISRAEL AS A SOLID ROCK OF FRIENDLY COUNTRY IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. IS THERE SOME SENSE OF COMPETITION AS TO WHO NOW WANTS TO BE SEEN AS A LEADING AMERICAN FRIEND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SHAH?

SEC. BROWN: WELL, THE FACT THAT THE CAMP DAVID DISCUSSIONS ARE AT CAMP DAVID IN THE UNITED STATES INDICATES THAT A NUMBER OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT REGION -- THE MODERATE COUNTRIES -- REGARD US AS THEIR FRIEND, AND THE MAJOR NATION THAT CAN BRING THE BEST INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN

(MORE) 01

THE REGION. YOU'LL NOTICE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT INVOLVED IN THOSE TALKS. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE NATIONS IN THAT REGION IN -- IN THEIR EFFORTS FOR INDEPENDENCE AND FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE U.S. SEES THAT THERE -- THERE IS A POSSIBLE THREAT FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION AND SO DO THEY, AND THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO COUNTER SUCH A THREAT FROM A MAJOR POWER WITH WHATEVER MEANS ARE NECESSARY. AGAIN, LET ME SAY, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DEFEND ITS VITAL INTERESTS WITH WHATEVER MEANS ARE APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE WHERE NECESSARY, WHETHER THAT'S IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR ELSEWHERE. BUT THAT'S NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE THREAT. THERE ARE OTHER THREATS. IN MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY WERE EQUALLY WORRIED -- THE MODERATE STATES AND ALL STATES THAT I VISITED ARE IN THAT CATEGORY -- FROM -- ABOUT THREATS FROM WITHIN THE REGION FROM MORE RADICAL STATES; THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT TERRORISM AND THEY ALL RECOGNIZE THAT INTERNAL FORCES -- THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES, BETWEEN POOR AND RICH STATES, BETWEEN THE POOR AND THE RICH IN A GIVEN COUNTRY -- ARE AN EQUAL THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY AND TO THEIR SECURITY. WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN THOSE AREAS TOO, WITH ECONOMIC HELP, WITH DEVELOPMENT HELP, BILATERALLY OR MULTILATERALLY, AND, IN THOSE WAYS, WE INTEND TO PRESERVE STABILITY IN THE REGION ALONG WITH THOSE COUNTRIES.

HERMAN: ONE OF THE COUNTRIES TO WHOM YOU OFFERED OR PROMISED ARMS, I THINK, WAS NORTH YEMEN, WHICH THE SAUDIS WERE GOING TO PAY FOR. TODAY THE SOUTH YEMENESE HAVE BEEN ATTACKING, APPARENTLY, THE NORTH YEMEN -- NORTH YEMEN GOVERNMENT. DO YOU MAKE THIS TO BE A SKIRMISH, OR IS THIS SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS?

(MORE) 01

SEC. BROWN: IT'S TOO EARLY TO TELL, IT'S HARD TO BE SURE OF SUCH MATTERS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT'S AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF THING THAT I MENTIONED -- CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, SOME OF THEM SUPPORTED BY OUTSIDE FORCES. IT'S WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA, BUT THEY CLEARLY ARE WILLING -- IN FACT, EAGER -- TO FISH IN MUDDY WATERS BY AIDING ONE COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER.

HERMAN: IN THIS CASE SOUTH YEMEN.

SEC. BROWN: WELL, THEY CLEARLY HAVE A STRONG INFLUENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN. THEY SUPPLY MOST OF THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN THE PAST THEY'VE ALSO SUPPLIED MOST OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF NORTH YEMEN.

PAPPAS: MR. SECRETARY, JUST TO CLARIFY ONE THING YOU SAID EARLIER, DO YOU CONSIDER THE PROTECTION OF SAUDI OIL FIELDS TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS AND WOULD THE UNITED STATES GO TO WAR TO PROTECT THOSE INTERESTS.

SEC. BROWN: PROTECTION OF THE OIL FLOW FROM THE MIDDLE EAST IS CLEARLY PART OF OUR VITAL INTEREST. I SAID, AND I REPEAT, THAT IN PROTECTION OF THOSE VITAL INTERESTS WE'LL TAKE ANY ACTION THAT'S APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BUT MILITARY FORCE IS NOT NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE IN EVERY INDIVIDUAL INSTANCE.

PAPPAS: THERE'S ANOTHER QUESTION I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR TRIP. IN EVERY COUNTRY YOU VISITED, YOU ELICITED SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA -- AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE -- RAISE OUR VISIBILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU WERE NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THAT PUBLICLY. CAN YOU TELL US NOW WHAT IDEAS YOU HAVE TO INCREASE U.S. PRESENCE, MILITARILY.

SEC. BROWN: I THINK IT'D BE A MISTAKE FOR ME TO ADVANCE

PUBLICLY INDIVIDUAL IDEAS. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING, AND HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, WITH THE COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WHAT SORT OF U.S. PRESENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE, AND UNTIL THEY'VE THOUGHT IT THROUGH, AND UNTIL WE AND THEY HAVE AGREED, I THINK IT'D BE A MISTAKE FOR ME TO SPECULATE ON WHAT IT MIGHT BE. THE ONLY THING I WOULD SAY IS THAT LESS INTRUSIVE AND LESS OBVIOUS FORMS OF U.S. PRESENCE OR POSSIBLE MILITARY INFLUENCE, SUCH AS SHIP VISITS AND SO ON, ARE CLEARLY THE RIGHT WAY TO BEGIN SUCH ACTIVITIES, AND I THINK THAT MAY BE AS FAR AS WE WANT TO GO. WE'RE NOT --WE HAVEN'T WORKED IT THROUGH WITH THEM; TILL WE DO, I DON'T WANT TO SAY MORE PUBLICLY.

PAPPAS: WHAT DO YOU THINK OF SENATOR JACKSON'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT SOMEDAY FORM A QUICK STRIKE FORCE TO PROTECT THE SAUDI ARABIAN OIL FIELDS, AND WOULD WE SUPPORT A FORCE LIKE THAT?

SEC. BROWN: WE'RE A LONG WAY FROM A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS WILL FORM A COMMON MILITARY FORCE. IN A POST-TREATY ATMOSPHERE -- THAT IS, AFTER A TREATY BASED ON A CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, I THINK THAT WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES COOPERATING WITH EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES MORE CLOSELY.

BRADSHER: WHY -- WHEN YOU WERE IN SAUDI ARABIA, THOUGH, A LOT OF THE DECISIONS ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY, WHICH IS CRITICAL TO THE OIL SUPPLY FOR THE WESTERN WORLD, WERE PUT OFF, I BELIEVE, UNTIL CROWN PRICE FAHD CAME HERE. NOW HIS VISIT HAS BEEN POSTPONED; THERE'S TALK OF AN INABILITY TO WORK OUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. DOES THIS MEAN THAT WE'RE NOT REALLY MOVING IN THE DIRECTION WE THINK WE NEED TO MOVE IN RELATIONS WITH THESE CRITICAL COUNTRIES?

SEC. BROWN: IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT AT ALL, MR. BRADSHER, BECAUSE SHORTLY AFTER MY VISIT, THERE WERE FURTHER MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND SAUDI GROUPS ON SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS, AND THERE WILL BE STILL MORE RATHER SOON, NEXT WEEK, IN FACT.

(MORE)

MOREOVER, I THINK EVEN AT A HIGHER LEVEL THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUING TALKS ON SECURITY AND OTHER COOPERATION -- IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE.

HERMAN: YOU HAVE TALKED IN INTERVIEWS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. YOU SAID, I BELIEVE, THAT IF THERE WERE A GOVERNMENT THERE UNFRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES, IT COULD BE A RATHER SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. WHAT IS YOUR EVALUATION OF THE KHOUMEINI GOVERNMENT? IS IT A GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES?

SEC. BROWN: WELL, IT CERTAINLY IS A NEW GOVERNMENT AND A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF BEING FORMED IN DETAIL, AND ITS OWN POLICIES ARE THEREFORE STILL BEING FORMED. THEY CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN TRYING TO PROTECT AMERICANS IN A DIFFICULT AND UNSTABLE, DANGEROUS SITUATION. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT EAGER FOR ALLIANCES WITH ANY MAJOR POWER, AND I THINK THAT THEY WILL WANT TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES IN THAT WAY. I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WORK OUT FRIENDLY RELATIONS. I THINK IT'S GOING TO BE A MATTER OF TIME.

HERMAN: IS IT ALSO CLEAR THAT THEY ARE THREATENED, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT AT LEAST, BY ELEMENTS FROM THE LEFT, OR FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNON?

SEC. BROWN: YES, THAT'S CLEAR TO ME.

HERMAN: IF THEY WERE IN DANGER FROM THESE ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE APPARENTLY SEIZED A GREAT DEAL OF WEAPONRY, WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE WILLNG TO SUPPLY THEM?

SEC. BROWN: WELL, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING TO VOLUNTEER TO DO THINGS WITHOUT BEING ASKED, AND I THINK THAT IT'S, THEREFORE, A DOUBLE SPECULATION ON YOUR PART.

PAPPAS: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU SHARE THE FEAR THAT SOME IN ISRAEL HAVE THAT IRAN MIGHT NOW JOIN A COALITION OF IRAQ, SYRIA AND PERHAPS LIBYA TO ATTACK ISRAEL AND UPSET THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- IS THAT A REAL FEAR?

SEC. BROWN: IRAN CLEARLY HAS SUFFICIENT INTERNAL PROBLEMS, SO THAT ITS ENERGIES ARE GOING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY OCCUPIED WITH THOSE PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME. THERE ALREADY

ARE EXISTING PROBLEMS, AS YOU SUGGEST, FROM SOME OF THE RADICAL STATES IN THE AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EVEN THOSE WHOM WE CHARACTERIZE AS RADICAL DON'T SEE THE SOVIET UNION AS THEIR LEADER AND PROTECTOR.

BRADSHER: MR. SECRETARY, YOU JUST MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT IS GOING TO MEET WITH THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATORS WHO HAVE BEEN UP AT CAMP DAVID -- DOES THIS MEAN -- DOES THIS MEAN THAT WE'VE NOW MOVED ON TO THE STAGE AT WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS READY TO INVITE THE LEADERS OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES TO COME FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING THAT IS SUPPOSED TO COMPLETE THE TREATY?

SEC. BROWN: I DON'T WANT -- I'M IN NO POSITION TO PREDICT THAT. I THINK THAT HE'LL HAVE TO MAKE UP HIS OWN MIND, AND HE'LL WANT TO ANNOUNCE IT HIMSELF WHEN HE DECIDES.

HERMAN: CONGRATULATE THEM OR GIVE THEM A PEP TALK? (LAUGHTER)

SEC. BROWN: THAT DEPENDS UPON WHERE THEY STAND. I THINK THAT THE DISCUSSIONS UNDOUBTEDLY CONTAIN SUCCESSES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

PAPPAS: ONE OF THE BIG HANGUPS, AS I GET IT, IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IS THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON LEAVING POCKETS OF TROOPS INDEFINITELY ON THE WEST BANK AND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. YOU FLEW TO THOSE TERRITORIES DURING YOUR TRIP, AND REPORTEDLY YOU CAME BACK VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THIS, AND AS I GET IT, PRESIDENT SADAT IS INSISTING THAT THERE BE A TIMETABLE SET UP. NOW, DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO SIDE WITH ISRAEL ON THIS MATTER?

SEC. BROWN: PRESIDENT SADAT'S POSITION IS THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A TIMETABLE FOR AUTONOMY IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK. WHAT I LOOKED AT WAS THE MILITARY SITUATION, AND I CONCLUDED THAT THERE ARE REASONS WHY THE ISRAELIS, FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY, NEED TO HAVE A WAY OF PROVIDING EARLY WARNING, AND BEING ABLE TO GET TO THOSE POINTS QUICKLY IF THEY ARE ATTACKED. I ALSO CONCLUDED THAT NOT MANY POINTS ARE INVOLVED -- PHYSICAL POINTS ARE INVOLVED, RELATIVELY LIMITED TERRITORY WOULD BE INVOLVED. (END MIDEAST REMARKS)

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

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אל: מצפא.

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סלנג דברי שר ההגנה האמריקאי, הרולד בראון, על המזח ועל המו"מי כפי שנאמרו בתוכנית ה-סי.בי.אס. "יומל פב" האומה".

HERMAN: I'M JUST TRYING TO PURSUE YOUR AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST AND I WOULD PRESUME THAT ONE OF THEM MIGHT BE THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOME FASHION OR OTHER. FIRST OF ALL, CAN YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID DEVELOPMENTS, THE END OF THIS PHASE OF THE TALKS AND WHAT IT MEANS?

SEC. BROWN: THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE BEEN MEETING. THEY WILL, BEFORE THEY GO BACK TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, BE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT--

HERMAN: WHERE? IS HE GOING TO CAMP DAVID, OR--

SEC. BROWN: THE WHITE HOUSE.

HERMAN: THEY'RE COMING TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

SEC. BROWN: IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

BRADSHER: THAT WOULD BE TODAY, SIR?

SEC. BROWN: YOU, AND I THINK THAT WE THEN--WE'LL JUST HAVE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS.

BRADSHER: YOU'VE JUST COME BACK FROM A VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. DURING THAT VISIT THE EGYPTIANS SUGGESTED TO YOU THAT PERHAPS A GREATLY INCREASED AMERICAN SUPPLY OF ARMS TO EGYPT MIGHT ENABLE THEM TO TAKE OVER SOME OF THE ROLE OF POLICEMAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THE SHAH OF IRAN ONCE THOUGHT HE WOULD HANDLE. THERE'VE ALSO BEEN SUGGESTIONS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT WE SHOULD BECOME MORE HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON ISRAEL AS A SOLID ROCK OF FRIENDLY COUNTRY IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. IS THERE SOME SNESE OF COMPETITION AS TO WHO NOW WANTS TO BE SEEN AS A LEADING AMERICAN FRIEND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SHAH?

SEC. BROWN: LET ME SAY, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DEFEND

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ITS VITAL INTERESTS WITH WHATEVER MEANS ARE APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING MILITARY FORCE WHERE NECESSARY, WHETHER THAT'S IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR ELSEWHERE.BUT THAT'S NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE THREAT. THERE ARE OTHER THREATS. IN MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT THEY WERE EQUALLY WORRIED-- THE MODERATE STATES AND ALL STATES THAT I VISITED ARE IN THAT CATEGORY-- FROM -- ABOUT THREATS FROM WITHIN THE REGION FROM MORE RADICAL STATES, THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT TERRORISM AND THEY ALL RECOGNIZE THAT INTERNAL FORCES--THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND TRADITIONAL VALUES, BETWEEN POOR AND RICH STATES, BETWEEN THE POOR AND THE RICH IN A GIVEN COUNTRY--ARE AN EQUAL THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY AND TO THEIR SECURITY.WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN THOSE AREAS TOO, WITH ECONOMIC HELP, WITH DEVELOPMENT HELP, BILATERALLY OR MULTILATERALLY, AND, IN THOSE WAYS, WE INTEND TO PRESERVE STABILITY IN THE REGION ALONG WITH THOSE COUNTRIES.

HERMAN: ISN'T THAT EASIER SAID THAN DONE. I MEAN--

SEC. BROWN: MUCH--

HERMAN: ONE OF THE COUNTRIES TO WHOM YOU OFFERED OR PROMISED ARMS, I THINK, WAS NORTH YEMEN, WHICH THE SAUDIS WERE GOING TO PAY FOR. TODAY THE SOUTH YEMENESE HAVE BEEN ATTACKING, APPARENTLY, THE NORTH YEMEN--NORTH YEMEN GOVERNMENT. WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF THAT? WHAT--WHAT'S THE DEVELOPMENT THERE?

SEC. BROWN: THAT'S ONE OF THE--THAT'S AN EXAMPLE, TO THE DEGREE THAT IT'S HAPPENING AND IT'S ALWAYS HARD TO CHECK ON THE DETAILS--

HERMAN: BUT DO YOU MAKE THIS TO BE A SKIRMISH, OR IS THIS SOMETHING MORE SERIOUS?

SEC. BROWN: IT'S TOO EARLY TO TELL.IT'S HARD TO BE SURE OF SUCH MATTERS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE--THAT IT'S AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF THING THAT I MENTIONED--CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, SOME OF THEM SUPPORTED BY OUTSIDE FORCES. IT'S WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE AREA, BUT THEY CLEARLY ARE WILLING TO--IN FACT, EAGER-- TO FISH IN MUDDY WATERS BY AIDING ONE COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER.

HERMAN: IN THIS CASE SOUTH YEMEN.

SEC. BROWN: WELL, THEY CLEARLY HAVE A STRONG INFLUENCE IN SOUTH YEMEN. THEY SUPPLY MOST OF THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN THE PAST THEY'VE ALSO SUPPLIED MOST OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF NORTH YEMEN.

PAPPAS: MR. SECRETARY, JUST TO CLARIFY ONE THINK YOU SAID EARLIER, DO YOU CONSIDER THE PROTECTION OF SAUDI OIL FIELDS TO OUR VITAL INTERSTS AND WOULD THE UNITED STATES GO TO WAR TO PROTECT THOSE INTERESTS?

SEC. BROWN: PROTECTION OF THE OIL FLOW FROM THE MIDDLE EAST IS CLEARLY PART OF OUR VITAL INTEREST. I SAID, AND I REPEAT, THAT IN PROTECTION OF THOSE VITAL INTERSTS WE'LL TAKE ANY ACTION THAT'S APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BUT MILITARY FORCE IS NOT NECESSARILY APPROPRIATE IN EVERY INDIVIDUAL INSTANCE.

PAPPAS: THERE'S ANOTHER QUESTION I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR TRIP. IN EVERY COUNTRY YOU VISITED, YOU ELICITED SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA--AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE--RAISE OUR VISIBILITY IN THE PRESIAN GULF IN THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU WERE NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THAT PUBLICLY. CAN YOU TELL US NOW WHAT IDEAS YOU HAVE TO INCREASE U.S. PRESENCE, MILITARILY.

SEC. BROWN: I THINK IT'D BE A MISTAKE FOR ME TO ADVANCE PUBLICLY INDIVIDUAL IDEAS. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING, AND HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, WITH THE COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WHAT SORT OF U.S. PRESENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE, AND UNTIL THEY'VE THOUGHT IT THROUGH, AND UNTIL WE AND THEY HAVE AGREED, I THINK IT'D BE A MISTAKE FOR ME TO SPECULATE ON WHAT IT MIGHT BE. THE ONLY THING I WOULD SAY IS THAT LESS INTRUSIVE AND LESS OBVIOUS FORMS OF U.S. PRESENCE OR POSSIBLE MILITARY INFLUENCE, SUCH AS SHIP VISITS AND SO ON, ARE CLEARLY THE RIGHT WAY TO BEGIN SUCH ACTIVITIES, AND I THINK THAT MAY BE AS FAR AS WE WANT TO GO. WE'RE NOT--WE HAVEN'T WORKED IT THROUGH WITH THEM, TILL WE DO, I DON'T WANT TO SAY MORE PUBLICLY.

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

official text

FEBRUARY 7, 1979

(TEXT) BROWN TESTIMONY ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

WASHINGTON -- FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT OF U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY HAROLD BROWN AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY FEBRUARY 5 TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE -- ENTITLED "IN SUPPORT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM":

(BEGIN TEXT)

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THE ADMINISTRATION'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980. SECRETARY VANCE HAS GIVEN YOU AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM AND THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION IT MAKES IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS. MY STATEMENT WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY OUR DEFENSE INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE PACIFIC. JUST AS SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN CARRYING OUT OUR OVER-ALL FOREIGN POLICY, SO ALSO IS IT A VITAL FACTOR IN PROVIDING FOR OUR DEFENSE.

(MORE) 01

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980 PROPOSES APPROPRIATIONS OF 2,795 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH TOTALS 4,236 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS BUDGET IS MODEST IN RELATION TO OUR MANY INTERESTS AROUND THE WORLD AND THEIR IMPACT ON OUR SECURITY, ECONOMY, AND GENERAL WELL-BEING. THREE ELEMENTS WITHIN THIS TOTAL RELATE MOST DIRECTLY TO OUR WORLD-WIDE DEFENSE POSTURE. THE BUDGET PROVIDES 145 MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDING -- "MAP" -- FOR GRANT MATERIAL AID TO FOUR COUNTRIES AND OVER-ALL MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. IT INCLUDES 33 MILLION DOLLARS IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING FUNDS -- "IMET" -- FOR GRANT TRAINING OF STUDENTS FROM 52 FOREIGN COUNTRIES. AN APPROPRIATION OF 656 MILLION DOLLARS IS PROPOSED TO EXTEND 2,063 MILLION DOLLARS IN CREDITS TO 25 COUNTRIES FOR THE FINANCING OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. I SHALL HIGHLIGHT THE SUPPORT WHICH THESE PROGRAMS WILL PROVIDE KEY ALLIES AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AS I REVIEW OUR DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD.

NATO --

LET ME BEGIN WITH WESTERN EUROPE, WHOSE SECURITY AND FREEDOM ARE VITAL TO THE UNITED STATES. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN INSURING THAT WE GAIN THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF INTER-ALLIED COOPERATION AND THAT THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALL THE NATO ALLIES CAN BE USED TO THE GREATEST EFFECT. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THESE ALLIES ON THE SOUTHERN TIER OF NATO WHO CURRENTLY LACK THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH TO MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES AND PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DEFENSE NEEDED IN THEIR STRATEGIC LOCATIONS.

FOR FY 1980 WE HAVE PROPOSED MAP FOR TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IN PORTUGAL THE GRANT MATERIAL IS CONTRIBUTING TO SELECTED MODERNIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES,

SPECIFICALLY EQUIPPING A PARTIALLY AIR TRANSPORTABLE BRIGADE THAT WILL ASSUME AN IMPORTANT NATO DEFENSE MISSION

AFTER ITS FIRST FREE ELECTIONS IN ... YEARS, PORTUGAL IS ON ITS WAY TO ACHIEVING AN INDEPENDENT, STRONG AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. THE REORIENTATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES FROM COLONIAL INVOLVEMENT TOWARD A GREATER EMPHASIS ON NATO GOALS IS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF ALLIANCE SECURITY POLICY. OUR EFFORTS RELATING TO PORTUGAL IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE CENTER UPON MAINTAINING THE NATO ORIENTATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, COMPLETING EQUIPPING OF THE BRIGADE, CONSUMMATING RENEWAL OF THE LAJES BASE AGREEMENT (WHICH GIVES THE U.S. BASE RIGHTS IN THE AZORES), AND CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES.

FACED WITH AN ANNUAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT OF OVER ONE BILLION (ONE THOUSAND MILLION) DOLLARS, PORTUGAL IS UNABLE ECONOMICALLY TO MEET ITS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITHOUT EXTERNAL AID. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDES FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS HELPED STRENGTHEN PORTUGAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST.

U.S. ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS AID FROM THE OTHER NATO ALLIES, HELPS INCREASE THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES, CONTRIBUTES TO PORTUGAL'S NATO-ORIENTED DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, AND SUPPORTS PORTUGAL'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM.

THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO RECEIVE GRANT MATERIAL IS SPAIN. THE 1976 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION PROVIDED CONTINUED U.S. ACCESS TO STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AIR AND NAVAL FACILITIES. THE FY 1980 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR SPAIN INCLUDES MAP, IMET, AND FMS CREDITS REQUIRED TO FULFILL U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER THAT TREATY.

ON THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLAYS A VITAL ROLE. THE PROPOSED FY 1980 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR TURKEY CONSISTS OF IMET, FMS CREDIT, AND SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE (SSA). TURKEY IS ALSO

EXPECTED TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES THROUGH FMS CASH AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURES.

TURKEY'S SECURITY TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE AN IMPORTANT PART OF ITS WESTERN ORIENTATION. THE 1975-1978 PARTIAL LIMITATIONS ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE CAUSED MANY TURKS TO QUESTION THE VALUE OF THEIR TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IMPAIRED TURKEY'S ABILITY TO MEET ITS NATO COMMITMENTS AND TO PURSUE ITS NATO-APPROVED FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. NOW THAT THOSE LIMITATIONS ARE ENDED, WE NEED TO STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, REBUILD THE SECURITY TIES, AND HELP RESTORE TURKISH DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED TO REPLENISH TURKISH STOCKS OF PARTS AND EQUIPMENT AND TO MAKE EVEN MODEST PROGRESS IN FORCE MODERNIZATION. THE CURRENT YEAR'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IS TO ENABLE US TO CONTRIBUTE, ALONG WITH OTHER NATO ALLIES, TO TURKEY'S MILITARY NEEDS, AS WELL AS TO JOIN WITH OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN SUPPORTING TURKEY'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION MEASURES.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE IS FOCUSED ON SUPPORTING THE CONTINUED GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SO THAT GREECE WILL REMAIN A VIABLE PARTNER FOR THE WEST, ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO THE PROTECTION OF NATO'S IMPORTANT SOUTHERN FLANK. THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THAT POLICY AND PROVIDES A CONTINUING INDICATION OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC GREECE; SUPPORTS GREECE'S EARLY RETURN TO FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE; HELPS TO MODERNIZE THE GREEK ARMED FORCES, THEREBY IMPROVING GREECE'S ABILITY TO MEET ITS NATO RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE ALSO MAINTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION; AND ENCOURAGES THE CONTINUATION OF A PRESENCE IN GREECE ON U.S. AND OTHER NATO FORCES, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TO THE UNITED STATES, GREECE, AND THE REST OF NATO.

(MORE) 01

THE PROPOSED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR GREECE IN FY 1980 CONSISTS OF IMET AND FMS CREDITS. IT IS ALSO EXPECTED THAT GREECE WILL REQUEST TO PURCHASE SOME DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES FOR CASH BOTH THROUGH FMS AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURES.

STABILITY IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA IS ESSENTIAL TO THE WELL-BEING OF THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE DEEP MORAL AND HISTORICAL COMMITMENTS TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL. THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE, AND JAPAN ALL DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE OIL THAT FLOWS FROM THE REGION. WE SEE THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN AREA THAT IS PLAYING AN INCREASING ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND IN ITS EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. IN THIS REGION SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS HELPING US IN ENCOURAGING THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO ENTER INTO OR SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS LEADING TO SETTLEMENT OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT. FURTHER, SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROVIDES A MEANS TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITIES OF REGIONAL STATES TO INSURE REGIONAL STABILITY. TIMELY AND SELECTIVE DELIVERY OF MATERIAL AND TRAINING HELPS TO GUARANTEE THE CONTINUED INDPENDENCE OF REGIONAL STATES BY PROVIDING THEM WITH THE MEANS TO RESIST LOCAL AGGRESSION.

THE PRINCIPAL FORM OF ASSISTANCE ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS FMS CREDITS, WITH ISRAEL THE MAJOR RECIPIENT. ONLY JORDAN IS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE MAP. WE ALSO ARE PROPOSING TO CONTINUE THE VERY IMPORTANT IMET PROGRAM FOR SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

PACIFIC --

IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AREA RECENT EVENTS HAVE SERVED TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE INVASION OF CAMBODIA BY VIETNAMESE FORCES PLACES INCREASED PRESSURE ON WESTERN-ORIENTED COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, TO ATTAIN A GREATER MILITARY CAPABILITY. INDONESIA IS FACED WITH THE

TASK OF REPLACING SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF NO LONGER SUPPORTABLE SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITH EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF FMS CREDITS AND IMET TO THOSE NATIONS PROVIDES TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING THEIR FREEDOM FROM COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

OUR FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES REMAIN IMPORTANT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. OUR RECENT AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH PROVIDES A BASIS FOR CONTINUED AND MORE CERTAIN USE OF THESE IMPORTANT MILITARY FACILITIES, SIGNALS OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE REGION. WE NEED THOSE FACILITIES IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN A CONTINUING AND EFFECTIVE PRESENCE IN THE AREA. A CONTINUING PROGRAM OF GRANT AID MATERIAL, GRANT AID TRAINING, AND FMS CREDITS IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES.

YOU ARE ALREADY WELL AWARE OF THE GRADUAL REDUCTION ON U.S. GROUND FORCES IN KOREA AND THE TRANSFER OF U.S. EQUIPMENT TO THE ROK FORCES. FROM OUR CONTINUING UPDATING OF OUR ESTIMATE OF NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A HIGHER LEVEL OF NORTH KOREAN FORCES MUST BE DEALT WITH THAN ESTIMATED EARLIER. WE WILL PERIODICALLY REVIEW THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE IN THE LIGHT OF THIS FACTOR, THE GROWTH OF ROK ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPABILITY, INCLUDING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND THE VARIOUS POLITICAL RELATIONS (PRC NORMALIZATION WITH THE U.S., SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY, NORTH KOREAN-ROK DIALOGUE). TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES REMAINS A SOUND POLICY, PROVIDED WE SUSTAIN A SUFFICIENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AS WE INDICATED WE WOULD AT THE TIME OF OUR WITHDRAWAL. THE NECESSITY OF SUCH ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED IN SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN SPECIFIC TERMS, WE MUST CONTINUE A SUBSTANTIAL LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT AND GRANT AID TRAINING SUPPORT, IN

ADDITION TO THE EQUIPMENT TRANSFER, TO ENABLE THE SOUT KOREANS TO ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEIR COUNTRY.

AFRICA/LATIN AMERICA --

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA IS MODEST, BEING LIMITED TO RELATIVELY SMALL PROGRAMS FOR FMS CREDITS AND IMET. BY THIS ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES HELPS TO MAINTAIN REGIONAL BALANCES AND A DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AMONG WESTERN ORIENTED NATIONS. IN AFRICA OUR PROGRAMS ALSO ARE INTENDED TO HELP MODERATE COUNTRIES OFFSET THE VERY LARGE SOVIET AND CUBAN SUPPLY OF ARMS AND PERSONNEL.

AT THIS POINT, LET ME DWELL FOR A MOMENT ON A VERY IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM -- TRAINING OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL. WE PROVIDE MILITARY TRAINING TO ELIGIBLE FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS GRANT AID THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING, OR IMET, PROGRAM AND ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS THROUGH FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. WE BELIEVE THIS TRAINING TO BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

SINCE 1950 WHEN THE PROGRAM BEGAN, WE HAVE TRAINED ALMOST 500,000 FOREIGN PERSONNEL. MANY OF THESE TRAINEES HAVE RISEN TO TOP LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THEIR COUNTRIES, AN ASPECT OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE DEVELOPING NATIONS, BUT ALSO OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO OUR DEALINGS WITH OUR MORE DEVELOPED FRIENDS AND ALLIES. FOREIGN TRAINEES RECEIVE THE SAME TRAINING AS U.S. STUDENTS AND ARE REQUIRED TO MEET THE SAME HIGH STANDARDS OF DILIGENCE, DEPORTMENT, AND PERFORMANCE. FOR THE MOST PART,

INSTRUCTION IS IN ENGLISH WITH FOREIGN TRAINEES ATTENDING THE SAME CLASSES AS OUR OWN PERSONNEL. DURING THEIR PERIODS OF STUDY FOREIGN STUDENTS LIVE IN AN ENVIRONMENT THAT REFLECTS A CROSS SECTION OFAMERICAN LIFE, AND THEY ARE INEVITABLY EXPOSED TO OUR INSTITUTIONS, IDEALS, AND ASPIRATIONS. PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL LINKAGES FORMED DURING THIS EXPERIENCE OFTEN LAST A LIFETIME. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD DO WHATEVER WE CAN WITHIN OUR CAPABILITIES TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE THIS TRAINING PROGRAM, WHICH MAKES AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO OUR MUTUAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND, AS A BY-PRODUCT, IS ONE MEANS OF FURTHERING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.

TODAY, OF COURSE, MOST TRAINING IS ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS UNDER FMS. BUT THE RELATIVELY SMALL GRANT AID, OR IMET, PROGRAM IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. THROUGH IT WE GIVE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING DIRECT U.S. INTEREST IN THE MILITARY FORCES OF FOREIGN NATIONS AND, BY INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF TRAINING AND TRAINEES, WE ARE ABLE TO REACH INDIVIDUALS OF OUR CHOICE AS WELL AS PROVIDE INSTRUCTION FOR WHICH THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS TO PAY. IN MY VIEW, THE BENEFITS TO U.S. INTERESTS OF GRANT AID TRAINING ARE FAR MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN CAN BE MEASURED SIMPLY IN TERMS OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES. FROM A BUDGETARY PERSPECTIVE IMET IS ESPECIALLY ATTRACTIVE BECAUSE OF ITS LOW COST. FOR THE PRICE OF A SINGLE MAJOR WEAPON MANY INDIVIDUALS CAN RECEIVE TRAINING UNDER IMET. IT IS ONE OF THE BEST INVESTMENTS WE CAN MAKE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

IN SUMMARY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONTINUES TO BE AN ESSENTIAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE, IN TURN, THE KEY TO OUR NATION'S SECURITY. THE PROGRAMS PROPOSED REPRESENT AN AUSTERE LEVEL OF SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR THESE PURPOSES.

(END TEXT)

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official text

FEBRUARY 7, 1979

(TEXT) VANCE ON FOREIGN AID

TELLS COMMITTEE PROGRAM REFLECTS U.S. VALUES AND INTERESTS

WASHINGTON -- SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE LED OFF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S DRIVE TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ITS FOREIGN AID PROPOSALS WITH AN APPEARANCE BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 5.

HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY AID PROGRAMS "REFLECT THE CONCERN AND STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE" AND ARE "IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST."

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT:

(BEGIN TEXT)

DURING THE 25 MONTHS THAT I HAVE BEEN SECRETARY OF STATE I HAVE REGULARLY APPEARED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS A WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY. I DO SO AGAIN TODAY AS I PRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980. FOR THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

PRESIDENT CARTER IS ASKING CONGRESS TO APPROVE AN AUTHORIZATION OF 8,900 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE SEVEN COMPONENTS OF OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS: 1,800 MILLION

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DOLLARS FOR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; NEARLY 2,000 MILLION DOLLARS FOR SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE. 656.3 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE A TOTAL FMS (FOREIGN MILITARY SALES) FINANCING PROGRAM OF 2,100 MILLION DOLLARS; 110 MILLION DOLLARS FOR GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE; 33 MILLION DOLLARS FOR GRANT MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING; 3,600 MILLION DOLLARS FOR ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS; AND 277 MILLION DOLLARS FOR OUR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

IN THIS TESTIMONY, I WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE PROGRAMS AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT, IN DOING SO, I DO NOT SUGGEST THAT OUR DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES NEED OR SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE FACT IS THAT WELL CONCEIVED AND WELL EXECUTED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS THAT SERVE DEVELOPMENT ALSO SUBSTANTIALLY BENEFIT OUR FOREIGN POLICY BY IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPING NATIONS.

LET ME BEGIN WITH A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TRENDS OF A NEW ERA: THE GROWING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STAKES FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

FIRST, THERE IS THE STRONG LINK BETWEEN A SOUND AMERICAN ECONOMY AND CONTINUED ECONOMIC VITALITY IN DEVELOPING NATIONS.

-- IN 1977, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BOUGHT 42,000 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF U.S. MERCHANDISE -- MORE THAN A THIRD OF ALL OUR EXPORTS. IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, THESE COUNTRIES BUY ABOUT HALF OF ALL OUR WHEAT EXPORTS, 60 PERCENT OF OUR COTTON EXPORTS AND 70 PERCENT OF OUR RICE EXPORTS.

-- DURING THE 1970'S SALES OF U.S. GOODS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GREW BY 22 PERCENT PER YEAR COMPARED TO 15 PERCENT FOR SALES TO INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS.

-- AND OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE PROVIDED MORE THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE RAW MATERIALS WE USE.

THE STATISTICS DEMONSTRATE A VERY BASIC FACT OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE LATE 1970'S AND BEYOND: WE CAN ENHANCE OUR OWN WELL-BEING BY ENCOURAGING AND ASSISTING RAPID AND EQUITABLE GROWTH IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR POLICIES TOWARD THE DEVELOPING WORLD AFFECT INDIVIDUAL LIVES AT HOME AS WELL AS ABROAD.

-- THE PRICE OF FOOD IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD SUPERMARKET WILL BE AFFECTED BY FOOD PRODUCTION PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

-- JOBS IN OUR FACTORIES WILL DEPEND ON GROWING EXPORT MARKETS AND ON CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS IMPORTED FROM THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

-- THE INCOMES OF MANY OF OUR FARMERS WILL DEPEND ON POOR COUNTRIES EARNING SUFFICIENT INCOME TO EXPAND FOOD IMPORTS.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE THIRD WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE MORE ADVANCED DEVELOPING NATIONS, WILL CLEARLY HAVE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE IMPACT ON GROWTH RATES IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD. THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT BOTH HOW WE LIVE OUR LIVES AND THE KIND OF WORLD IN WHICH OUR CHILDREN WILL LIVE.

WHILE THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS GROWS STEADILY, SO DOES THEIR POLITICAL ROLE. THEY NOW HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON KEY REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES.

THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN TROUBLED AREAS OF THE WORLD. CONFLICTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD POSE DANGER TO WORLD PEACE BECAUSE THEY CAN ESCALATE INTO GREAT POWER CONFRONTATIONS. DEVELOPING NATIONS PLAY IMPORTANT ROLES IN HELPING RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN THEIR REGIONS IN TWO WAYS. FIRST ARE THE CRUCIAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS OF THE NATIONS MOST IMMEDIATELY AFFECTED BY DISPUTES NEAR THEIR BORDERS. THE CENTRAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SO-

CALLED FRONT LINE STATES TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN NAMIBIA IS A CASE IN POINT. SECOND, AS THE U.N. (UNITED NATIONS) AND OTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE OAS (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES) AND THE OAU (ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY) ENHANCE THEIR PEACEKEEPING ROLES, DEVELOPING NATIONS BECOME ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT.

IN A NUMBER OF OTHER SIGNIFICANT AREAS OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO ATTAIN GOALS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

-- WE WILL MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS IN HALTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION UNLESS WE CAN CONVINCE THOSE DEVELOPING NATIONS WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE ACQUIRE DANGEROUS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY THAT THEY CAN MEET THEIR ENERGY AND SECURITY NEEDS WITHOUT IT.

-- ESTABLISHING A GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS -- BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC -- DEPENDS LARGELY ON A GROWING RECOGNITION AMONG DEVELOPING NATIONS THAT HEALTHY SOCIETIES MUST DEFEND AND NURTURE THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

-- WE CANNOT RESTRAIN THE DANGEROUS GROWTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS UNLESS DEVELOPING NATIONS BECOME CONVINCED THAT THIS TYPE OF ARMS CONTROL ENHANCES THEIR SECURITY.

-- AND THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION OF OUR OCEANS AND OUR ATMOSPHERE CANNOT BE WON UNLESS WE ENLIST THE DEVELOPING NATIONS IN THIS STRUGGLE.

PROGRESS TOWARDS EACH OF THESE GOALS DEPENDS ON THE PRACTICAL DECISIONS OF MANY DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THOSE DECISIONS REQUIRES MORE THAN EXHORTATION AND IMAGINATIVE DIPLOMACY. WHEN WE ASK A POORER NATION TO WORK WITH US FOR PEACE...OR TO FOREGO SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY...OR TO BUILD A SOCIETY THAT IS MORE EQUITABLE, OUR INFLUENCE WILL DEPEND IN PART ON OUR ABILITY TO OFFER TANGIBLE SUPPORT FOR ITS SECURITY...OR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT...OR ECONOMIC GROWTH.

WE WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN ASKING DEVELOPING NATIONS TO SHARE OUR GOALS FOR A BETTER AND SAFER WORLD IF WE ARE

WILLING TO HELP THEM ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS OF BETTER AND SAFER LIVES FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE. THIS BASIC RECIPROCITY LIES AT THE HEART OF THE RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD.

IN A BROAD CONTEXT, THE LEVELS OF OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ARE JUDGED AS A SIGNAL OF OUR SERIOUSNESS IN THE SO-CALLED NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

THIS DIALOGUE IS CONDUCTED IN A WIDE VARIETY OF SETTINGS WHERE INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS MEET TO SHARE IDEAS, EXCHANGE VIEWS AND NEGOTIATE. WE HAVE OFTEN SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR THIS DIALOGUE TO BE A POSITIVE ONE WHICH WOULD AVOID THE RHETORIC OF CONFRONTATION. BUT OUR POSITION IN THE MANY NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN 1979 AND 1980 CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED IF WE ARE WILLING TO BEAR OUR FAIR SHARE OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS AND WORK WITH OTHERS IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN A POSITIVE FASHION.

AT A MORE DIRECT LEVEL, OUR AID IS ONE OF THE STRONGEST AND MOST TANGIBLE LINKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD. TRADE AND INVESTMENT HAVE A CENTRAL AND SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIES. OUR ECONOMIC AID IS ALSO OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THROUGH ITS DIRECT IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF THE POOR. AND IT IS THE MOST VISIBLE EXPRESSION OF OUR INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF DEVELOPING NATIONS.

IT IS NOT OUR POLICY TO LET SHORT TERM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS GOVERN OUR DECISIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. BUT OUR DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND OUR DIPLOMACY IN GENERAL MUST BE CAREFULLY INTEGRATED, IN PART BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENTS OF NATIONS RECEIVING OUR AID OFTEN INTERPRET THIS AS EITHER A SIGNAL OF DETERIORATING INTEREST IN THEM, OR A SIGN OF AMERICAN WEAKNESS AND WITHDRAWAL.

OUR AID ALSO HELPS BUTTRESS THE STRONG SENSE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND IDENTITY AMONG THE DEVELOPING NATIONS WHICH IS THE SUREST BARRIER TO DOMINATION BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

THIS POINT IS IMPORTANT IN BOTH LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM CONTEXTS.

IN THE LONG RUN, WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WEST AND DEVELOPING NATIONS WILL REMAIN POSITIVE. THESE RELATIONS ARE BASED SOLIDLY ON OUR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ECONOMIC TIES; ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL DIVERSITY AND SUPPORT FOR HUMAN FREEDOM; AND THE CULTURAL AFFINITIES WHICH HAVE ENRICHED ALL OUR PEOPLES.

WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, DISREGARD THE SHORTER TERM, AND RELY ONLY ON OUR LONG TERM ADVANTAGES TO DEAL WITH SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD.

SOME HAVE ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO FORCE SOVIET RESTRAINT BY ABANDONING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS THAT ARE DEEPLY IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS -- FOR EXAMPLE, A SOUND SALT (STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS) AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH IS LIKELY TO BE INEFFECTIVE AND DAMAGING TO OUR INTERESTS.

A BETTER RESPONSE IS TO CONTINUE TO TAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE APPROACH OF ACTIVE AGREEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD ITSELF, TO CONCENTRATE ON OUR TIES WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR INHERENT IMPORTANCE. SUCH AN APPROACH REQUIRES OUR SEEING THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS IN THEIR OWN TERMS, RATHER THAN PRIMARILY THROUGH AN EAST-WEST PRISM. AND IT MUST BE BACKED UP BY SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY THE ECONOMIC AS WELL AS SECURITY CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

THIS STRATEGY OF AFFIRMATIVE INVOLVEMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND DIVERSITY OF DEVELOPING NATIONS SERVES US WELL. IT CAPITALIZES ON THE WEST'S INHERENT STRENGTHS. IT IMPROVES OUR TIES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A CONTEXT WHICH DOES NOT FORCE THEM TO MAKE AN EXPLICIT CHOICE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT REDUCES THE WIDER DANGERS OF CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD. AND THE FACT IS THAT IT IS WORKING. OUR TIES TO THE ASEAN (ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS)

NATIONS AND IN THE ASIAN SUBCONTINENT, IN AFRICA, AND WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ARE STRONG AND SOUND. THIS IS REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONS, BUT IN OUR ABILITY TO WORK MORE EASILY TOGETHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

LET ME CITE AN ARTICLE I RECENTLY READ IN NIGERIA'S DAILY TIMES, ENTITLED "THE SOVIET DILEMMA IN AFRICA." ITS AUTHOR STATES THAT:

"FIRST THE RUSSIANS MOVE INTO SOME AFRICAN NATION, USUALLY AT A TIME WHEN THAT NATION'S VERY SURVIVAL IS THREATENED. FOR A WHILE THERE IS A HALCYON PERIOD OF FRATERNAL COLLABORATION USUALLY CEMENTED BY MASSIVE INFUSION OF MILITARY AID. THE NATION FEELS A LITTLE MORE SECURE AMD BEGINS TO WORRY ABOUT SUCH MUNDANE THINGS AS FOOD AND HOSPITALS AND ROADS. IT TURNS TO THE RUSSIANS HOPING THEY WILL GIVE ECONOMIC AID AS READILY AS THEY GAVE MILITARY AID. THE RUSSIANS SAY THAT THEY DON'T HAVE THE MONEY. THE NATION TURNS TO THE WEST WHICH IS WAITING IN THE WINGS. A QUARREL ENSUES AND THE RUSSIANS ARE ASKED TO LEAVE...."

THE AUTHOR GOES ON TO CONCLUDE:

"THE SITUATION IN AFRICA AT THE PRESENT TIME IS SUCH THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS LOSING OUT TO THE AMERICANS, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE AFRICAN COUNTRIES DETEST SOCIALISM, AS BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION IS UNWILLING TO, OR INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING MORE ECONOMIC THAN MILITARY AID."

I BELIEVE WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD AS LONG AS WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ASSIST THEM WITH THE MEANS TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR SELF DEFENSE.

OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAVE SIX IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES WHICH GUIDE US IN DESIGNING SPECIFIC PROGRAMS TO HELP MEET THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF EACH RECIPIENT NATION.

FIRST, WE WORK TO OVERCOME THE WORST SPECTS OF POVERTY AND HELP NATIONS ACHIEVE SELF-SUSTAINING, EQUITABLE GROWTH

PRIMARILY THROUGH A STRATEGY OF MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS. WE PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE WORLD-WIDE WAR ON HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION BOTH THROUGH OUR PL-480 (PUBLIC LAW - 480) ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND THROUGH THE STRONG EMPHASIS IN OUR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON EFFORTS TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION, IMPROVE NUTRITION, ENHANCE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION, CONTROL POPULATION GROWTH AND FOSTER RURAL DEVELOPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- IN PERU'S EXTREMELY POOR CENTRAL REGION, THERE ARE TRAGICALLY HIGH INFANT AND MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES. WE PLAN TO ALLOCATE 7.5 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 80 (FISCAL YEAR 1980) TO INCREASE THE ACCESS OF TWO MILLION RURAL PEOPLE TO IMPROVED CURATIVE AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH CARE SERVICES.

-- IN INDONESIA WE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER FINANCING FOR A RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. AN ESTIMATED 230,000 LOWLAND FARMERS AND LABORERS WILL DIRECTLY BENEFIT FROM INCREASED CROP PRODUCTION AND INCOME FROM IRRIGATION WHILE DRAINAGE WILL IMPROVE SANITATION AND HEALTH.

-- IN AFRICA'S SAHEL WE HAVE BEEN A PARTNER WITH THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND MORE THAN A DOZEN OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP CONTROL RIVER BLINDNESS IN THE VOLTA RIVER BASIN. THIS DREADED DISEASE HAS LONG PREVENTED THE FULL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOME 700,000 KILOMETERS OF FERTILE LAND IN SEVEN VERY POOR WEST AFRICAN NATIONS.

OUR SECOND OBJECTIVE IS TO HELP DEVELOPING NATIONS STRENGTHEN THEIR SELF-RELIANCE BY SUPPORTING LIGHT INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND IMPROVEMENT OF BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE. IN EACH CASE, OUR OBJECT IS TO PROMOTE HUMAN WELFARE. FOR EXAMPLE:

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PROPOSED THE CREATION OF A NEW U.S. INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION. THE INSTITUTE WOULD MOBILIZE MORE EFFECTIVELY THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY OF OUR COUNTRY TO WORK WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS IN CREATING AND ADAPTING TECHNOLOGY TO

SOLVE THEIR CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND IN BUILDING THEIR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES. IN ITS WORK WITH THE INDUSTRIALIZED MIDDLE TIER NATIONS WHICH NO LONGER RECEIVE CONCESSIONAL AID, THE INSTITUTE WOULD OPERATE ON A COST SHARING BASIS.

-- IN BANGLADESH WE WILL FINANCE A 12 MILLION DOLLAR RURAL ROADS PROGRAM USING LABOR INTENSIVE METHODS, TO INCREASE LOCAL AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES.

-- IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN, THE SMALL AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION OF THE ISLANDS LIMITS THE MARKET FOR PRODUCTS GROWN BY SMALL FARMERS. WE PLAN TO WORK WITH THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TO CONSTRUCT A FARM SUPPLY AND MARKETING CENTER, A COLD STORAGE FACILITY AND IMPROVED INTER-ISLAND TRANSPORTATION, DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTION AND INCOME OF SMALL FARMERS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN.

OUR THIRD OBJECTIVE IS TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BY PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID TO NATIONS IN REGIONS BESET BY SERIOUS CONFLICT. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- OUR SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE VITAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS BECAUSE THEY SUPPORT THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF BOTH NATIONS.

NEARLY HALF OF EGYPT'S PEOPLE LIVE IN OVER-CROWDED CITIES. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT PROVIDE THEM WITH THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS. WE WILL PROVIDE EGYPT WITH 750 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 80 TO IMPORT THE INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, SPARE PARTS, AND OTHER GOODS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND TO SUPPORT PROJECTS VITAL TO EGYPT'S LONGER TERM DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO THE POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH IS CRITICAL TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S ABILITY TO LEAD EGYPT TOWARDS PEACE.

AS WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE IS A KEY FACTOR IN ITS

DECISIONS TOWARDS PEACE. OUR AID HAS HELPED ISRAEL TO TAKE THE AUSTERE MEASURES OF DEVALUATION AND IMPORT REDUCTION NEEDED FOR EFFORTS TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITY FOLLOWING THE 1973 WAR. ALTHOUGH ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IS NOW DOING MUCH BETTER, ITS PROSPECTS FOR STEADY GROWTH AND STABILITY DEPEND STRONGLY ON HELP FROM THE UNITED STATES. OUR SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL -- 785 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 80 -- WILL PROVIDE FUNDS TO KEEP ESSENTIAL IMPORTS FLOWING. WE ARE ALSO PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH 1,000 MILLION DOLLARS IN NEEDED FMS FINANCING.

-- OUR ASSISTANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IS CRUCIAL TO OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA. THE SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE WE PROVIDE THE NATIONS OF THE AREA HELPS THEM TO DEAL WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS CAUSED BY YEARS OF CONFLICT. BY PROMOTING ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE REGION OUR ASSISTANCE NOT ONLY LESSENS HUMAN SUFFERING, BUT ALSO ENCOURAGES THESE NATIONS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY.

A FOURTH OBJECTIVE OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IS TO HELP FRIENDLY NATIONS MAINTAIN ADEQUATE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR SELF-DEFENSE. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) FINANCING, GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MAP) AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND TRAINING (IMET) TOGETHER WITH FMS CASH SALES ARE THE MEANS BY WHICH WE ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH LONG-STANDING EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES, WE ARE CONTINUING THE SHIFT FROM GRANT MAP TO FMS FINANCING. WE ARE REQUESTING GRANT PROGRAM FUNDS FOR ONLY FOUR COUNTRIES IN FY 1980 -- JORDAN, PORTUGAL, PHILIPPINES AND SPAIN.

THE FMS FINANCING PROGRAM IS A LESS COSTLY MEANS THAN MAP FOR ASSISTING OTHER COUNTRIES IN FINANCING THEIR DEFENSE PROGRAMS. EXCEPT FOR A PROPOSED DIRECT LOAN OF 500 MILLION DOLLARS FOR ISRAEL ON WHICH REPAYMENT WOULD BE FORGIVEN, FMS

LOANS ARE EVENTUALLY REPAID AND REQUIRE THE APPROPRIATION OF ONLY ONE DOLLAR TO GUARANTEE EACH TEN DOLLARS IN LOANS MADE BY THE FEDERAL FINANCING BANK.

THE IMET PROGRAM CONTINUES TO PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT RETURN ON A MODEST INVESTMENT. IT NOT ONLY DEVELOPS THE TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL COMPETENCE OF FOREIGN PERSONNEL TO USE EFFECTIVELY U. S.-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT, BUT ALSO ENABLES OFFICERS WHO HAVE OR ARE LIKELY TO ATTAIN POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN THEIR COUNTRIES TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND ESTABLISH FRIENDSHIPS HERE. WE BELIEVE THAT DOLLAR FOR DOLLAR THIS IS ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT PROGRAMS.

A FEW EXAMPLES OF PROPOSED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN FY 1980 DEMONSTRATES THEIR IMPORTANCE:

-- WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO REBUILD OUR IMPORTANT REATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY. THE 200 MILLION DOLLAR FMS CREDIT AND TWO MILLION DOLLARS IN IMET WE WISH TO PROVIDE ARE DESIGNED TO ASSIST TURKEY IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A MODERN ARMED FORCE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS NATO (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION) ROLE. THE 98 MILLION DOLLARS IN SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE IS CRUCIAL TO TURKEY'S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE ITS VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION; THIS IS IMPORTANT BOTH TO TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MUTUAL SECURITY OF THE WEST AND ALSO TO ITS CAPACITY AS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT.

-- WE ARE ASKING CONGRESS TO APPROVE FOR GREECE A 158 MILLION DOLLAR PROGRAM OF FMS CREDITS AND 1.8 MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY TRAINING. THIS ASSISTANCE WILL PROMOTE THE REINTEGRATION OF GREEK FORCES INTO THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE; ENABLE THOSE FORCES TO MEET THEIR NATO RESPONSIBILITIES; AND HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESENT BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION IS PRESERVED.

-- ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT SECURITY PROGRAMS IS FOR KOREA. PEACE AND STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA IN GENERAL AND

ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN PARTICULAR ARE OF CONTINUING VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR COUNTRY. THIS YEAR WE ARE REQUESTING 225 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS FINANCING FOR SUPPRT OF KOREA'S FIVE-YEAR FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN, AND THIS WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED BY CASH SALES. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE 1.8 MILLION DOLLARS IN GRANT MILITARY TRAINING WHICH WILL FOCUS ON TRAINING IN THE USE OF NEWLY ACQUIRED EQUIPMENT.

A FIFTH OBJECTIVE IS TO HELP TO PROMOTE RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO ASSIST REFUGEES.

-- RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS ARE AWARE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCE THE DEGREE OF OUR RESPONSIVENESS IN TERMS OF BOTH LEVELS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE WE EXTEND. PRESIDENT CARTER REAFFIRMED LAST DECEMBER THAT " IN DISTRIBUTING THE SCARCE RESOURCES OF OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WE WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR DEEPEST AFFINITIES ARE WITH NATIONS WHICH COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A DEMOCRATIC PATH TO DEVELOPMENT."

-- THE CONTENT OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE MORE EQUITABLE PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY POORER PEOPLE IN THE DEVELOPMNT PROCESS. THIS LATTER GOAL IS ENHANCED BY PROGRAMS SUCH AS TITLE II (ROMAN NUMERAL TWO) UNDER PL-480, WHICH BENEFIT THE POOR THROUGH SELF HELP AS WELL AS RELIEF PROGRAMS CARRIED OUT BY PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS.

-- THE BUDGET WE ARE PRESENTING TODAY WAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED BY OUR INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR FINAL APPROVAL.

-- OUR REFUGEE EFFORT IS A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, HELPING VICTIMS OF WAR, CIVIL STRIFE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO FIND NEW HOMES AND BEGIN NEW LIVES, GIVEN THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL PLIGHT OF REFUGEES WORLD-WIDE, WE INTEND TO STRENGTHEN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH NEW LEGISLATION AND MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF PROGRAMS IN ALL AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT.

OUR SIXTH OBJECTIVE IS TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SHARING OF FINANCIAL BURDENS FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT BY CONTRIBUTING OUR FAIR SHARE TO MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

MILTILATERAL AID IS A PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE MECHANISM BECAUSE OF ITS LEVERAGE IN GENERATING CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER DONORS AND ITS MOBILIZATION OF PRIVATE CAPITAL. THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THIS IS THE USE OF CALLABLE CAPITAL WHICH PROVIDES FINANCIAL BACKING FOR THE BANKS ENABLING THEM TO RAISE THE BULK OF THEIR FUNDING IN THE PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS.

THE ADVANTAGES OF BURDEN SHARING AND LEVERAGE ARE MOST PRONOUNCED IN THE WORLD BANK WHERE ON A CUMULATIVE BASIS EACH DOLLAR WE SPEND HAS RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 50 DOLLARS OF LENDING. IN THE RECENT REPLENISHMENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB), WE OBTAINED BOTH INCREASED BURDEN SHARING BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND INCREASED RELIANCE ON CALLABLE CAPITAL -- WHICH, THOUGH APPROPRIATED, DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES.

WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CONTAINING AND IN SOME CASES REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF THE MULTILATERAL BANKS, AND CONTINUE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN INCREASING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THESE INSTITUTIONS IN ACTIVITIES THAT ALLEVIATE EXTREME POVERTY.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UN PROGRAMS TO DEVELOPMENT ALSO SERVE TO MEET HUMAN NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- IN THE SUDAN, UNDP (UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM) IS EQUIPPING TRAINING CENTERS TO TEACH PRACTICAL SKILLS TO OVER 60,000 UNDEREDUCATED AND UNDEREMPLOYED PEOPLE.

-- IN THE PHILIPPINES, UNICEF (UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND) SUPPORTS A UNIQUE TELEVISED NUTRITIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM THAT REACHES 15 MILLION STUDENTS EVERY SCHOOL DAY.

LET ME NOTE HERE A MATTER OF SPECIAL CONCERN. LAST YEAR THE CONGRESS PLACED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FY 1979 APPROPRIATION BILL A PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF U.S.

ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY THE U.N. AGENCIES. THIS PROHIBITION PRECLUDES ANY PAYMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS U.N. ASSESSMENTS, SINCE THE UN AGENCIES CANNOT ACCEPT ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS WITH CONDITIONS ATTACHED. IT PLACES THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF ITS LEGALLY BINDING FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE U.N. AGENCIES. IN TURN, U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE U.N. AGENCIES IS WEAKENED, JUST AT A TIME WHEN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEGUN TO REASSERT ITS TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP ROLE AND WHEN THE U.N. IS ENGAGED IN A NUMBER OF MATTERS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES. WE URGE THAT THIS PROHIBITORY LANGUAGE BE REMOVED PROMPTLY.

THESE ARE THE PURPOSE OF OUR AID. THEY ARE PURPOSES IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. AND THEY REFLECT THE CONCEN AND STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

YET THE WORTH OF OUR GOALS IS AN INSUFFICIENT MEASURE OF THE WORTH OF OUR PROGRAMS. WE MUST ADDRESS TWO FURTHER QUESTIONS. FIRST, ARE OUR AID PROGRAMS INCREASINGLY WELL MANAGED, AND THE FUNDS EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY USED? AND SECOND, EVEN IF THEY ARE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT, CAN OUR PROGRAMS MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO THIRD WORLD NATIONS, OR DO CONDITIONS THERE PREVENT PROGRESS?

WITH REGARD TO THE MANAGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, GOVERNOR GILLIGAN WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN GREATER DETAIL:

-- ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE TO LINK MORE EFFECTIVELY U.S. BILATERAL PROGRAMS WITH OUR EFFORTS IN THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS.

-- WHAT A.I.D. (AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT) IS DOING TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS OVER ITS OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET AND TO DECENTRALIZE DECISION-MAKING OVERSEAS.

-- WHAT NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PEACE CORPS AND A.I.D. TO FORMULATE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE ACTIVITIES IN SPECIFIC

COUNTRIES.

-- HOW A.I.D. HAS EMBARKED ON DEVELOPING LONG TERM STRATEGIES ON A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, REGION BY REGION BASIS.

-- HOW IT IS ENHANCING AND STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM BY WHICH IT EVALUATES ITS PROGRAMS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT IS NOW REVIEWING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FULFILLING THE MANDATE THAT YOU GAVE HIM LAST YEAR TO REORGANIZE, CONSOLIDATE, AND UPGRADE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE CONSULTED YOUR CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS CONCERNING THESE OPTIONS AND WILL SOON BE MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

WITH REGARD TO WHETHER OUR PROGRAMS CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE, THE ANSWER IS A CLEAR "YES."

IT IS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXACT DEGREE TO WHICH STRONG AND EFFECTIVE AID PROGRAMS CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROWTH OF DEVELOPING NATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, THEY DO SO IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. THEY HELP POOR PEOPLE BECOME MORE PRODUCTIVE MEMBERS OF THEIR SOCIETIES THROUGH PROGRAMS THAT IMPROVE THEIR HEALTH AND EDUCATION, PROVIDE JOBS FOR THEIR HANDS AND MINDS, OR SUPPLY FERTILIZER FOR THEIR FIELDS. AND THEY HELP NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ALSO THROUGH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

BUT MANY OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS ARE ALSO AT WORK IN DEVELOPMENT -- SUCH AS THE DEGREE OF LOCAL EFFORT, THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE NATION CONCERNED, OR EVEN THE WEATHER. THUS, WE AND OTHER AID DONORS NEITHER CAN NOR SHOULD CLAIM SOME SPECIFIC DEGREE OF CREDIT FOR THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN.

WHAT WE CAN SAY IS THAT PROGRESS IS TAKING PLACE.

-- OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS, PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GREW ON THE AVERAGE OF THREE PERCENT EACH YEAR. THIS IS ABOUT 50 PERCENT BETTER THAN THE HISTORICAL GROWTH RATES IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DURING THEIR PERIOD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION.

-- THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR MANY MILLIONS HAS BEEN

IMPROVED BY THIS GROWTH. THESE IMPROVEMENTS ARE REFLECTED IN SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY, ADULT LITERACY, ERADICATION OF SMALLPOX, AND BURGEONING SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

-- THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WEATHERED THE SHOCKS OF OIL PRICE INCREASE, CROP FAILURES AND RECESSION BETTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

WE CAN ALSO SAY THAT OUR AID MUST AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE FOCUSSED PRIMARILY ON THOSE NATIONS WHICH SHARE OUR GOAL OF EQUITABLE GROWTH.

WHILE MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE.

POVERTY AFFLICTS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS WHILE THE ECONOMIES OF MANY NATIONS IN AFRICA, THE ASIAN SUBCONTINENT AND THE CARIBBEAN ARE STAGNATING. POPULATION GROWTH CONTINUES TO OUTPACE FOOD PRODUCTION IN MANY NATIONS. IN THE TIME IT HAS TAKEN ME TO SHARE THESE THOUGHTS WITH YOU THIS AFTERNOON, WORLD POPULATION HAS INCREASED BY ABOUT 4,000 PEOPLE -- THREE EVERY SECOND.

THESE PROBLEMS ARE COMPOUNDED BY MASSIVE RURAL AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS WHICH TOO OFTEN CRIPPLE ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF DEVELOPMENT PRESENTS A TRAGIC PICTURE OF WASTED POTENTIAL AND WIDESPREAD HUMAN SUFFERING. IT REPRESENTS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH WE AND OTHER NATIONS REQUIRE IF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY ARE TO BE SUSTAINED. AND IT IS A MORAL CHALLENGE WE CANNOT EVADE.

THE FUNDS WE HAVE BUDGETED HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED. THE SAME STRICT CRITERIA WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS APPLIED TO OTHER FEDERAL SPENDING HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BUDGET.

WE HAD PLANNED TO INCREASE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEVELS IN THE AREA OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC AID MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE DO IN THIS BUDGET. THE PRESSING NEED FOR BUDGETARY RESTRAINT

CAUSED US TO SLOW THE EXPANSION OF THESE PROGRAMS. SUBSTANTIAL CUTS WERE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. INDEED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REQUESTS FOR 1980 WILL RESULT IN ONLY 160 MILLION DOLLARS IN OUTLAYS ABOVE THE 1979 APPROPRIATED LEVEL -- A REALLY NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON THE TOTAL FEDERAL BUDGET. NONETHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MAKE VERY MODEST PROGRESS TOWARD A GOAL OF SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AID IN THE COMING YEARS.

FOR LET ME EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT WE ARE SPEAKING NOT ONLY OF THE COMPELLING PLIGHT OF HUMAN BEINGS IN DESPERATE NEED. WE HAVE A COMPELLING NATIONAL INTEREST IN THEIR PROGRESS. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT HAVE A STRONG FOREIGN POLICY OF ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN THE WORLD'S AFFAIRS, IF WE ARE UNWILLING TO PUT OUR RESOURCES BEHIND OUR WORDS. (END TEXT)

* * * 02

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

תיק ממל / סוצקס

13 ביוני 1978

א ל : מר מ. רביב, מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: נ. תמיר, וושינגטון

הנדון: תת הוועדה לאירופה והמזה"ת -
סקירתו של סונדרס על מדיניות ארה"ב
במזרח-התיכון

בהמשך למברקינו 185 ו-186

בלוטה - סקירתו של סונדרס בנדון כפי שהוגשה
לחברי תת הוועדה.

בברכה

נ. תמיר

העתק:
לשכת מנכ"ל
המרכז

ANNUAL REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Statement by Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, June 12, 1978

INTRODUCTION

This Subcommittee's annual review of U.S. policy in the Middle East provides a significant forum for the Administration to analyze American interests and goals in the Middle East and to share with Members of Congress and the public our perception of the policies necessary to pursue them. I can think of few areas of the world where it is more important to understand what is at stake for our country and for our friends and how our interests relate to each other.

HOW PERCEPTIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE EVOLVED

It may help focus our understanding of what is at stake today in the Middle East to examine how our perceptions of this area have evolved over the last three decades.

After the second World War, our thoughts ran along two lines.

First, on the strategic front, we spoke in terms of physical geography, characterizing the Middle East as "the strategic crossroads" and a "land bridge" joining Europe,

Asia and Africa. This perception grew out of pre-war European political concepts and the experience of a generation that fought in the Middle East and North Africa and across the Mediterranean during the war. The later Soviet thrusts in Iran, Turkey and Greece to expand their postwar influence reinforced this view.

Then, in 1948 we committed ourselves to the existence and to the survival of Israel as a Jewish state, as a home for victims of the holocaust and others who wished to come, and as a functioning democracy.

By the early 1960's, the advent of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads and the fact that the USSR had achieved an active position in the Middle East caused us to shift from seeing national interest primarily in terms of the Middle East's geographic position to a perception of the Middle East in global strategic terms. We wanted to enhance our influence in the area partly because the Mediterranean remained an important lifeline to our NATO allies and our allies to the east but also because of the importance of oil to western Europe and the political orientation of key states. We did not at that time see a direct threat to American interests coming from this area. Direct U.S. economic interests, apart from our interest in the reliable availability of oil to our allies at reasonable prices, largely centered in oil-related activities.

The U.S. also continued its firm commitment to Israel's strength and well-being and, at the same time, expressed humanitarian concern for peace in the Middle East which would permit all the people of the area, including the displaced Palestinians, to build better lives.

TODAY'S PERCEPTIONS OF OUR INTERESTS

In the 1970's yet a further evolution in our view of the Middle East has taken place. It reflects new developments there with which we and our friends must deal creatively.

Today there are few areas in the world where so many compelling American interests intersect as is the case in the Middle East. The basic catalogue of interests remains unchanged and familiar to us all, but there are important new points to be made about them. Let me discuss each of them in turn.

A. We have long recognized that it is imperative that the United States seek to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint and that helping strengthen the independence of Middle Eastern countries will contribute to stability in the region and make war less likely.

Since the mid-1960's, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have demonstrated to us in the heat of crisis that the Middle East is an area where U.S.and Soviet forces could confront each other in the context of a local war. Now, with

estimates of the Soviet Union's own changing energy needs, a new dimension has been added to the traditional Soviet interest in a strong position in that area. These facts provide an important part of the backdrop against which we pursue our interests in the area.

B. Our irrevocable commitment to the security, strength, and well-being of Israel has been reaffirmed by every American Administration since the modern State of Israel was born thirty years ago. It is a permanent feature of American foreign policy. I might add that this has been a deep personal commitment of mine. Many Americans share this commitment to a people who have suffered beyond our ability to comprehend and who have yet contributed so much to our heritage and to our world.

In this decade this commitment has been broadened and strengthened by the passage of time and the steady development of relations between our two countries.

Today, however, Israel and the U.S. must face together new and more difficult circumstances.

It is increasingly obvious that Israel's security can best be guaranteed over the long term by a policy of continued military strength coupled with a peaceful relationship with its neighbors. Close American cooperation with key Arab states is essential to achieving and guaranteeing that peace.

In the past year, the opportunity for peace has increased dramatically. Before 1967, when no Arab state would talk of recognizing Israel and making peace with it, the basis for a final, peaceful settlement of this conflict did not exist. Following President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem and Israel's warm reception, Israel for the first time since its founding as a modern state is dealing with an Arab state which is prepared to accept and recognize a Jewish state in the Middle East and to make peace and establish normal relations with it. Opinion in the Arab world has shifted gradually since 1967, and the shift accelerated after the 1973 war. In going to Jerusalem, President Sadat dramatized that shift and broke out of the thirty-year cycle of war and truce to create a new psychological climate in which there can be progress toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors. The issue is no longer whether there can be peace, but whether there can be agreement on the terms of peace.

In that context, we have particularly come to recognize in new ways the importance of a just resolution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs for a peace settlement. This is no longer seen as simply a refugee problem; it is a problem of fulfilling the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in ways that enable them to participate in

the determination of their own future and to live in peace and security with Israel. The Palestinians for their part must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace with Israel.

Finally, Israel's development has reached a point where the advantages of peace for the further growth of the Israeli people are clearer than ever. Peace can release their extraordinary talents and energies to the benefit of Israel and of the world at large. In per capita terms, Israel possesses more scientists, engineers, physicians and other professionals and technicians trained in public service fields than most nations of the world. Already, despite thirty years of conflict and tension, Israel's contributions to human and material development in areas such as health, agriculture, the environment, alternative sources of energy and water conservation have been remarkable. Under conditions of peace which relieve Israel of the world's most crushing defense burden, its already disproportionate contribution to solutions to some of the most pressing global issues will be magnified.

C. We have long recognized the importance of the Arab world. The strength and moderation of the major Arab countries has been a bulwark against radical forces in the Middle East, and they have in turn looked increasingly to the United States for support in ensuring their security

and independence. The oil which some of them produce has long been vital to our allies.

Today, there is a new degree of interdependence between the U.S. and the key Arab nations that are prepared to work with us constructively. The achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is surely a central goal in this relationship. There are other benefits as well.

The rapid increase in investable surplus which the Arab Governments hold--now approximately $140 billion--has added a new dimension to our interests in this area. Some of their increased revenues come from the willingness of some oil-producing states to meet increasing demand in the rest of the world by producing more oil than their domestic revenue needs would require them to sell. How those revenues are used will affect the ups and downs of the world economy and of the dollar, and they can play a significant role in the development of poorer nations. At the same time, the U.S. economy is important to the Arab oil-producing nations in accommodating these enormous amounts of capital.

The oil which has long been vital to our allies has become increasingly so to us. Crude oil imports from the Middle East made up 22 % of our total petroleum consumption and nearly half of our imports in 1977 (vs. 7% and 29% respectively in 1973.)

Thus, the Middle East figures in our calculations on energy, as well as in our balance of payments position and efforts to maintain a stable dollar, in ways that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

In the last thirty years, the U.S. has simply become much more involved in the affairs of the Middle East. Important nations in the area have looked increasingly to the U.S. for modern technology. Our relationship to their modernization programs and the increased economic involvement with them have sharply widened the range of contacts between Middle Easterners and Americans. No other country offers the broad range and depth of technology that exists in the U.S. and none is so adaptable to the specific educational requirements of foreign students. There are over 100,000 students from the Middle East in the U.S. now and almost 90,000 Americans are living in the Middle East.

Trade between the U.S. and the Middle East has increased rapidly since 1973. The import side of this trade has been given wide publicity as the U.S. demand for foreign and increasingly Middle Eastern oil has risen. However, U.S. sales to the area have also grown substantially. U.S. exports to the region were $3.5 billion in 1973 and accounted for 5% of our total exports. By 1977 American sales to the Middle

East had jumped to a total of $12.3 billion. Our Middle East customers now purchase over 10% of our total exports. In addition, hundreds of millions of dollars of architectural, consulting, engineering and construction services which do not appear in the above trade figures, are being exported and reduce our trade deficit with the region. The link between this market and American employment levels and the importance of these exports to our balance of payments are obvious.

Finally, the key oil-producing nations of the Middle East are increasingly important to the world economy. The rise in oil prices in 1973 demonstrated clearly how oil pricing decisions and the related decisions on production levels can be a major cause of economic dislocation in most countries of the world, from the most industrialized to the least developed. They also play an increasingly positive role in development. By the end of 1977 cumulative OPEC bilateral aid commitments totalled about $26 billion. OPEC countries have also committed substantial amounts of capital--almost $11.5 billion by the end of 1976--to international organizations. Further, they have pledged almost half of the billion dollar capital of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, an organization that is in itself a result of their initiative. These emerging OPEC financial powers soon will enjoy greater voting strength as a result of increased quotas in the IMF.

D. America has long felt a moral and humane commitment to the people of the Middle East to help end a conflict that has caused a generation of suffering and to help remove other obstacles that have impaired social and economic progress.

In the past year in this Administration, we as a nation have redoubled our commitment to a fuller realization around the world of basic human rights. Leaders in the Middle East have repeated to us in many ways at many times that they want to achieve peace so that they can devote their energies and their resources to the well-being of their people. Many of them have a vision of an era of growth and development which could follow a peace agreement. Many of them have asked us to cooperate with them in making that vision a reality. We remain prepared and want very much to provide this cooperation.

PREMISES FOR U.S. POLICY

The preceding analysis of U.S. interests in the Middle East in the 1970's suggests four premises about U.S. policy toward that area in the late 1970's.

First: Because each of our interests in the Middle East is important, the only viable national policy is one which enables us to pursue all of those interests at the same time.

Defining our interests this broadly and recognizing how they are interrelated is the most effective way the U.S. can help strengthen all of its allies and friends. Reciprocally,

all of our friends share a common interest in our strength, in our success, and in a strong American role in fostering peace, independence, and growth in the Middle East. This interdependence of all our interests deserves the most serious consideration.

For the United States, the pursuit of all of these interests reflects a coherence of policy in which our moral commitments and our human concerns on the one hand and our strategic and pragmatic national interests on the other are mutually reinforcing.

Second: The experience of the past four years has shown that we are best able to pursue all of those interests simultaneously in circumstances where there is progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When there is no movement toward a settlement, tension between Israel and the Arab states rises and relations between the U.S. and Arab nations become strained. The pressure on Arab states to look elsewhere for assistance increases and there is a corresponding diminution in the U.S. ability to play a role in influencing events. Additionally, Israel becomes increasingly isolated and harmony between the U.S. and its allies is jeopardized. When the U.S. is actively engaged in the peace process and when progress is being made toward achieving agreements as has been the case in the past

four years, Israel has enjoyed greater security. When as a consequence, the U.S. can strengthen its ties with all of the important Middle Eastern countries, the momentum toward peace grows and our vital interests become self-reinforcing.

Peace, therefore, is not only the best assurance of a secure and prosperous Israel, but also would strengthen moderate governments in the region and enhance U.S. global interests. It is crucial to the understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East to recognize that our urgent national commitment to an Arab-Israeli settlement is based both on our enduring commitment to Israel's security and on the fact that peace is a necessity for the U.S. and its allies.

Before leaving this point, I want to address openly a question that deeply concerns many Americans today, as well as our friends in Israel. The question is often put obliquely this way: What kind of U.S. relationship with the Middle East can we see five or ten years from now? On many occasions the real underlying question is: Are we not reducing our support for Israel in favor of the Arab nations?

The answer to the latter question is unequivocally no.

So long as all of our friends in the Middle East share a common interest in peace, in a strong U.S. role in the Middle East and in checking the growth of radical influence,

close relations with one party do not mean diminished relations with others. None of our friends, nor we, will gain from a diminished U.S. relationship with any of the key states there. To the contrary, a closer relationship with each party enhances our ability to pursue objectives common to all.

It follows from this that, in pursuing all of our interests in the Middle East, including our historic and unchangeable commitment to a strong Israel, our diplomacy must work toward creating conditions and a framework of relationships that make pursuit of these interests complementary. To do otherwise would not be consistent with our moral, strategic or economic interests. We believe our friends have an interest in our success.

Third: There has been a significant shift toward the West in the relations between principal Middle Eastern nations and the major powers outside the Middle East over the last several years.

Compared with the mid-1950's when the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies appeared to be in the ascendant and the U.S. position was eroding to a point that most Arab countries broke diplomatic relations with us after the 1967 war, the present position of the U.S. is a significant change for the better. This is not to say that the Soviet Union does not have legitimate interests in the Middle East or

that it will not have an important role to play in the future of that area. Our present position does, however, testify to recognition in many of these nations that their economic progress and national independence require a significant relationship with the West.

Entirely apart from political ideology, many Middle Eastern nations have recognized that the West offers the technology and the managerial skills needed to develop their countries, and that U.S. diplomacy can make an essential contribution to a peace which will lift the burden of heavy defense expenditures from their shoulders and let them get on with the constructive work of economic and social development.

While the economic relationship may persist, radical forces could again take advantage of conditions that would follow failure of the peace negotiations. Thus, one thing at stake in the Arab-Israeli negotiations and in cooperation with key Arab countries is the future orientation of the important nations of the Middle East, both in terms of their relationships with the great powers and in the nature of their own political systems. Moderate Arab leaders have turned to the U.S. for cooperation in achieving both peace and development. Their success will limit the role of radical forces. Their degree of success will in turn in large part determine whether Israel faces the future surrounded by

radical and hostile states or by nations which are committed to peace and orderly progress.

The fourth premise is that without in any way detracting from our other commitments a definition of U.S. interests in the Middle East must take serious account of the new dimensions of U.S. economic relations with the area.

These economic factors explain why our strategy in the past four years has had two thrusts--not one. The more dramatic has been our high priority drive for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Less dramatic, but of great importance, has been the effort to encourage the broadest possible range of relationships between the economic and social sectors of the U.S. and of the Middle Eastern countries. We have recognized not only the nation's economic need for these relationships, but also the fact that the U.S. presence in the future of the Middle East will be a truly national presence--not just a governmental one.

THE PEACE PROCESS AT PRESENT

Let me turn to one final subject. I know that this Subcommittee has been following closely the progress of efforts to promote an Arab-Israel peace settlement. Because of its importance, I want to conclude this statement with a status report.

A year ago we reported that our objective was a comprehensive peace settlement and that we were concentrating

our efforts on reconvening the Geneva Conference for negotiation of such a settlement, a concept to which we are still committed. A comprehensive settlement, in fact, remains the objective of all the parties to the conflict. But President Sadat's visit to Israel opened a new approach and historic new opportunities for peace, and since November we have been working with Egypt and Israel to build on that initiative toward a comprehensive peace. We have done this in full recognition that there will be no peace for Israel or its neighbors until there is a peace that encompasses all of them, including the Palestinians.

President Sadat's initiative must be seen in two perspectives:

-- First: United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967, established the basic equation for peace which has guided negotiators and mediators since. That equation established the proposition that there would be Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict in return for peace and security. Now Egypt has offered peace, acceptance, and negotiations on Israel's security needs. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem made this offer concrete.

-- Second: A year ago when President Carter and Secretary Vance conducted their initial consultations with the leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, they identified three issues that would need to be dealt with in peace negotiations: the nature of peace, Israeli withdrawal and the security measures that would accompany withdrawal, and the role of the Palestinians. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem resolved on Egypt's behalf that the nature of peace is to include not only the end of war but the acceptance of Israel and normal relations with it.

The purposes of the negotiations now are to restore the momentum created by President Sadat's November initiative and Prime Minister Begin's responses to it and out of this to develop a framework within which the other Arab parties to the conflict can join the negotiating process and address the questions of peace and normal relations with Israel, Israel can address the issues of security and withdrawal, and the problem of the Palestinians can be resolved in a just, humane, and honorable way.

The focal point of our current consultations with Israel and Egypt is the question of the future of the

West Bank and Gaza--those parts of the former Palestine Mandate lying outside Israel's 1967 boundaries--and the role of the Palestinians in resolving this question. This is the key to progress at the present stage of the negotiations. Without some understanding on these issues it will be impossible to achieve the Declaration of Principles which both Egypt and Israel want to govern larger negotiations for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Our role is to help the parties find a middle ground. In practical terms, that means helping them find a formula whereby a practical solution for the future of the West Bank and Gaza can be negotiated on the basis of all the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in a way that will give the Palestinians a voice in the determination of their own future.

Our role in this process is not simply as postman between the two sides. At decisive points in the negotiations, where we see it helpful to move things forward, we have in the past given our own ideas, and we will continue to do so in consultation with the parties. That was the way the agenda for the Political Committee meeting in Jerusalem was resolved last January--our proposal broke the impasse. The current discussion of the Declaration of Principles proceeds from an American working draft

written at the request of the two parties. That might occur again, but it would occur with the purpose of helping the parties to define middle ground where they might negotiate agreement. That middle ground would be developed from the positions of the parties, not from an abstract American peace plan.

On the issues being discussed, we have important points of agreement with both sides and points on which we differ.

With Israel there is full agreement that the threats to Israel's security which could come from these areas must be dealt with satisfactorily--both the threat of invasion by conventional military forces and the threat of terrorist and guerrilla attack. We are also agreed that issues as complex as these will require time and careful negotiation, so we suggested a year ago that the first objective should be an interim arrangement, perhaps five years, for the West Bank and Gaza, to give time to work out solutions there. During this period, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians could work out practical security arrangements that would make it possible to separate the question of Israeli security from the question of sovereignty over the territory. During the same time, these parties would work out arrangements for the political future of the West Bank and Gaza, with provision for obtaining the consent of the

people affected to the terms of a final peace treaty.

We have disagreed with Israel in one important area. The current Israeli Government, unlike its predecessors, has not agreed that Resolution 242 involves a prior obligation in principle to withdraw from any West Bank and Gaza territory. Israel has, however, agreed to negotiate with all of its neighbors on the basis of Resolution 242, and we have been discussing with it whether and how those negotiations would deal with the question of withdrawal as it relates to the West Bank and Gaza. Our position is that the issues of security and sovereignty can be separated--as Israel has already agreed to do in its proposal to Egypt on the Sinai. We are not saying that this agreement in principle to withdraw from West Bank and Gaza territory determines the timing and circumstances of actual withdrawal or the final borders, all of which must be negotiated. That would take place only in the context of a final peace treaty embodying commitments to normal peaceful relations and agreed security arrangements, including possible agreed border changes.

It is difficult to see how the negotiations for all these security and political arrangements can go forward until Israel has indicated that the principle of withdrawal in Resolution 242 can be dealt with in the negotiations as applying to this occupied territory. We have been discussing

this matter with Israel and are awaiting their views. Until this is clear, neither Jordan nor other Arab representatives will join the negotiations. They, in turn, will have to make clear their willingness to live in peace alongside Israel if negotiations are to succeed.

We and the Arab governments who are key to the peace process agree that the common objective is a peace settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 which, among other things, recognizes Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. With Egypt, we have reached agreement that such a settlement should encompass the full range of normal relations that are customary between states at peace with one another. We and those Arab governments also agree that a settlement must include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. And we agree that all the principles of Resolution 242, including the principle of withdrawal, apply to all fronts where territory was occupied in 1967, including the West Bank and Gaza.

On the other hand, we have made it clear over the past months that we do not agree with some key elements of the position of some Arab states. For instance, we do not agree with their call for a prior commitment of Israel to total withdrawal from every bit of occupied territory. That is not part of Resolution 242. We have also made clear that in

our view the future of the West Bank and Gaza lies in close association with Jordan and that an independent Palestinian state harboring irredentist feeling in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution.

A CONCLUDING WORD

This is a period of dramatic new opportunities for the people of the Middle East and for the relationships between the United States and the Middle East. How we together handle these opportunities may well determine the character of the Middle East, the American role there, and many aspects of the economic health of the world for the remainder of the twentieth century. It is because the stakes are so high that I have taken so much of your time today to analyze them in detail and to present them for your study and discussion. We are also engaged in an intensive effort to discuss them with the American people because it is essential that we enter this period of opportunity with a national consensus on policy and a shared sense of direction.

26.2.79

אל: מנהל מבצע

מלכה

בברכת

שגרירות ישראל

בושינגטון

חנן גרינולן

הנדיר

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

February 22, 1979

Honorable Hanan Bar-on
Minister, Embassy of Israel
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Hanan:

Thank you so much for your two recent notes--the first on the tragic death of Ambassador Dubs and the second on the successful evacuation of your colleagues from Tehran.

I know that you and your colleagues have been through enough assassinations to know how it affects all of us when one of our friends and professional colleagues is struck down in this senseless way. I know your words of sympathy come from the heart and all of us here thank you for them.

As for the evacuation from Tehran, we are thankful that we were able to help your colleagues. We feel as deeply rewarded in the success of their evacuation as you feel relieved. We accept your thanks but hope you realize that we share in your sense of gratitude for their safe return to Israel.

Sincerely,

Hal

Harold H. Saunders

מברק נכנס-משווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

שמור
בהול

מס' 226
נשלח: 141230 פבר 79

אל: המשרד
נאח: רוש
משרד האנרג'יה

שר האנרג'יה, דע המנכל-משהח'

מש'חחכ הטלפונ'ח עם השגר'ר

ל'בר' מחמד אמר סאונדרס אחמול בעדוחו ש:-

א. ארהב נכונה למלא אחר' החח'יבוח'ה להספקח נפט ל'ישראל, אכ ש'ישראל
פרמ בקשה הפעלח הסכם.

ב. ארהב משחדלח להשחמש בשרוח'ה הטובים על מנח לשכנע 'ארנ' נפט
אחר'ם לספק נפט ל'ישראל.

סאונדרס הוס'ף לכך ש'חכנ חוזר 'חכנ שספקים אחר'ם הגד'לו אח הכמו'ח
שהם מספקים ב'נ כה וכה ל'ישראל.

אז הנוסח המדו'ק נוכל לקבל רק בעוד מספר 'מים.

מ' אונ.

שר האנרגיה, מנהל אגף הנ"ל
שיה מנהל בן חיים בעלי מלבה

לה ירשה סיבה: ווטס
" טרנדה יעדיע