

4783/7/3
ת"ק מס

משרד החוץ

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

שיחות רואים

נאוי 1971 - אוקטובר 1971

מדינת ישראל
ארכיון המדינה



שם ותיק: שיחות רוג'רס

מס' תיק: חצ-4783/7

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25/12/2018

תאריך הדפסה

חץ

משרד החוץ

מחלקה
זשבה הפי והמנהל

תיק מס'

4783/7/3



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס: 130.2
מיכל מס': 4783/30
תאריך התעודה: _____
שם מחבר התעודה: _____
שם הנמוק: _____
תיק מס': 7
סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים)

4/8/70
6/5/71

- מכתב ☐
מורק ☐
תזכיר או מיזכר ☒
דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון ☐
פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה ☐

הטופס ימלא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

נספח א'

מסיבת העיתונאים של מזכיר המדינה רוג'רס 16.3

השאלות והתשובות בנושא המזה"ת

ארה"ב תומכת בשליחות יארינג ותפעל להפשרת הקפאון מאחורי הקלעים

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you assess for us where you think the United States and Israel and Egypt and the Soviet Union, the whole complex of powers involved in the Middle East peace search, stand at this point, and particularly what contribution international guarantees, involving the United States and the Soviet Union, might make to a peace settlement.

A. Well, the United States is supporting the Jarring mission because we think that the best prospect for peace is to have the parties negotiate under procedures established by Ambassador Jarring.

At the moment, as you know, because you have read the answers that were given by Israel and Egypt to Ambassador Jarring, there is what seems to be an impasse. We are convinced that that impasse can be overcome. We are going to do what we can to see that it is overcome, and we strongly support the continuation of Ambassador Jarring's mission.

Now, we are going to work behind the scenes. We are going to have discussions with all concerned about what we can do to not only get around this particular impasse but to make substantial progress in the talks.

סודי ביותר לנמען בלבד

2 - א

ארה"ב מוכנה להשתתף בכוח בינלאומי כתמיכה להסכם

As far as international guarantees are concerned, we have said that we are willing, as a nation, to play a responsible and appropriate role in a peace-keeping force. Now, we have not attempted to dictate or lay down any particular ways that that might be done. Obviously a peace-keeping force would have to be supportive of an agreement, and that agreement has to be reached among the parties. On the other hand, the type of peace-keeping force that might be formulated would play an important part in the attitude of the parties when they look toward the final agreement. So, to that extent the two are parallel, and we would continue under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, and at the same time in the Four Power talks we will talk about the possibilities of guarantees.

האפשרויות להרכב הכוח הבינלאומי

Now, an international peace-keeping force would not necessarily be limited to the Four Powers. It could include forces from other countries, and that is another matter that we are considering at the present time. I am looking forward very much to the meeting that I will have with Foreign Minister Eban on Friday. We will have further opportunities at that time to talk about these negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could talk a little bit in more detail about these international guarantees that you have talked about and specifically reports that the United States is interested in participating in a peace-keeping force with

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

גא - 3

the Soviet Union and other Big Four Powers.

דרכי פעולת הכוח הבינלאומי תלויות ברצון הצדדים, כוח בינלאומי
הוא הבטחון הטוב ביותר לצדדים

A. Well, as I have said, we are not fixed in our views about how a peace-keeping force would operate. That would have to depend to a large degree on what the parties wanted. But if an agreement is reached, and we hope one can be reached, then we think an international peace-keeping force, properly established -- with provision that it would be of a continuing nature, that it could not be removed by any unilateral decision, and that it would be located in areas that were critical -- would provide, we believe, possibly the greatest possible security for the parties.

גיאוגרפיה אינה ערובה לבטחון

There is a thought that geography is the sole consideration when you are thinking about security. Now, we do not think that geography is solely responsible for security, or even to a large extent responsible for security. Certainly in modern day world situations, geography is ordinarily not important; what is important is the political arrangement that is made : the agreement itself, whether they have made an agreement that is understood by the international community, and whether the powers of the world are willing to take part in guaranteeing that the agreement will be kept. And therefore we think that although geographical considerations are important, and certainly Israel is fully justified in considering them, we think an equally important consideration is the political consideration -- what is the political climate.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

נא - 4

ההבדלים בין 1957 והיום: כיום מדובר על הסכם חוזי

Q. Mr. Secretary, what political arrangements is this Government prepared to make with Israel to assure it that it will not find itself in the same situation it did after 1957 when it also had letters from President Eisenhower to Ben Gurion, and assurances from John Foster Dulles to Abba Eban.

A. Well, I think it is very incorrect to make an analogy between 1957 and the suggestions that we make today.

In 1957, as you recall, it was a continuation of the armistice. The parties still were in a state of belligerency. The UN force that was established was a very fragile force that could be removed unilaterally.

Now, we are not talking about anything of that kind. We are talking about a contractual agreement entered into by the parties with reciprocally binding commitments, signed, sealed and delivered, with full agreement of all concerned, that belligerency will cease, that they will live in peace with each other, that they will not interfere with each other's internal affairs, with provisions made for security, and with an international force consisting of those nations that are willing to participate and who may participate because the parties are prepared to accept it, with an understanding that that will continue for a definite period of time, probably with options to renew, so that it cannot be removed unilaterally, which would mean, if the United States participated, that the United States would not move its forces

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

בא - 5

except by the agreement.

So, as far as our government is concerned, we think that that is the most adequate possible guarantee that you can conceive of in modern life. What else can you do.

אין עכשיו מחשבות על ערבויות בילטרליות מארה"ב לישראל. הסיוע האמריקני
ימשך

Q. I had asked also what bilateral guarantees.

A. Well, we are not thinking of bilateral guarantees at the moment. Of course, we would continue to give support to Israel in terms of economic assistance and other assistance. In other words, that of course, would be a very important factor in Israel's attitude towards it's security. And we would be prepared to continue to play a supportive role to Israel. But what we are saying is this : that the climate has never been better for a settlement in the Middle East, and if we do not make a settlement now, we are going to plant seeds that will lead to future war.

Now, everyone, it seems to me, is prepared for peace. The difficulties now involve, on the one hand, the question of acquisition of territory, which Egypt says is unacceptable, and which the Security Council resolution says is unacceptable, and security as far as Israel is concerned. And anything that does not provide security to Israel is unacceptable, and unacceptable to us, and unacceptable as far as the Security Council resolution is concerned.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

6 - נא

אספקטים של בטחון אינם מחייבים רכישת שטחים

Now, we think there is a middle ground. We think those two positions can be negotiated if the parties want to. In other words, the security aspects of it do not necessarily require acquisition of territory. On the other hand, we recognize that Israel has to be satisfied that its security is guaranteed. And the United States is perfectly prepared to play a leading role in the guarantee.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can assurances by our Government of safeguards to the Israelis be convincing to the Israelis when the majority leader of our Senate doubts the wisdom of American troops to be stationed in the Middle East, and our Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman says that his proposal for an American-Israeli security treaty is actually—his intent was to limit and codify American support for Israel.

A. Well, first, I am not sure that when you quote Senator Fulbright that you are accurately quoting him.

Let me say I did not detect, in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, any opposition to the idea of a peace-keeping force as a matter of principle.

Now, as far as Senator Mansfield is concerned, I am not sure that he is

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

7 - נא

inflexible. I noticed what he said the other day. I have not had an opportunity to talk to him. But I am quite satisfied in my own mind that if we worked out an agreement that would be acceptable to the parties concerned, that our Senate and our House of Representatives would support it.

אין הוכחות לפינוי חיילים טוב יוסיס ממצרים

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you interpret the redeployment of Russian troops in the Sinai as a response to the President's plea for restraint on both sides?

A. I think it is too early to judge that. I do not think you could come to that conclusion based on the fact that they have redeployed some of their Russian armed forces that were manning the SAM-3 sites near the Suez as necessarily a response to that. As Mr. Bray said yesterday the deployment or redeployment is just that. We have no evidence that they have removed the troops from Egypt. So I think it is too early to judge.

אין להטיק מסקנות מהפרת הסכם הקפאון הצבאי באוגוסט 1970

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder, if I could follow up Marilyn's question. One does not have to go back to 1957 to understand the Israeli doubts, one can just go back to August, when the Soviets either countenanced, if not took part, in violation of the standstill. On the basis of that -- what we thought was a good understanding -- how can we be assured that their participation is not going to be an opening for eventual sabotage of a peace-keeping arrangement.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

8 - נא

A. Well, if there is any sabotaging, they can sabotage right now. They have got troops there, and we do not have troops there. Secondly, I think the fact that the missile controversy arose does not necessarily mean that some other agreement would not work. As you know, that was an oral agreement, and we were concerned about what happened. But certainly that does not foreclose the possibility of an agreement that might be satisfactory. What I want to emphasize is that we think that an agreement can be worked out that will be satisfactory. We recognize that it is not going to be easy. We recognize that there are types of agreements that can be worked out that would be very unsatisfactory. But if the parties are prepared to negotiate, I think it can be done.

המדובר בהסכם כתוב שייחתם ע"י מצרים ירדן וישראל

Q. I am not quite sure what you mean when you talk about international agreement. Are you talking essentially about a Middle East security treaty in which the Big Powers would participate. Are you talking about something as formal as a treaty ?

A. Well, I do not think it necessarily makes a great deal of difference, the form. We are talking about a written agreement, which would be signed and agreed to by all concerned. And all concerned, in this case, includes Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Now, we would anticipate that if this worked it would provide all the arrangements among the parties. And it would probably either in that agreement or by reference, refer to a UN peace-keeping force would have been considered and worked out, and worked out in agreement among those taking part in the peace-keeping force and those signing

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

נא - 9

the agreement. So the peace-keeping effort would be supportive of the agreement.

התבונה שוב הרבנה בין ארה"ב לבריה"מ בענין קובה

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can switch to another part of the world. Is there within the Government any concern now about any new and suspicious Soviet military activity in or around Cuba ?

A. Well, the understanding that we have with the Soviet Union has recently been clarified. We, I think, understand each other. We are watching what the developments may be. And that is where it stands at the moment.

לאופי הגבולות בין ישראל למצרים: עזה ושרם אש-שירה

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few moments ago you said that the security aspects in the Middle East do not necessarily require the acquisition of territory.

A. That is right.

Q. Do you mean that you feel that Israel could be secure if it returned to the pre-1967 borders ?

A. Well, let me make it clear, because when you discuss a subject of this kind and this complex, sometimes things can be taken out of context. Our position is very carefully set forth both in the President's state of the world message and in more detail in my December 9, 1969 statement.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

10 - א

We have never said that Israel had to withdraw from all territory. Our position has been that it should not acquire territory, except insubstantial amounts for security purposes.

Now, insofar as the present situation, which primarily deals with Egypt and Israel, we have said that our policy is that the 1967 boundary should be the boundary between Israel and Egypt. Now, that excludes the Gaza strip. So we are not talking about the Gaza strip. We also say that that 1967 boundary should be the boundary provided that adequate satisfactory arrangements are made for demilitarization of the Sinai -- and we say that is a matter that should be negotiated between the parties -- and that satisfactory arrangements are made concerning Sharm el Sheikh. And we say that should be negotiated between the parties.

Now, what I was saying earlier is that it is not necessary to acquire territory to make adequate provisions for security. Acquiring territory is one thing. Use of territory is something else again. And one of the uses that might be made of the territory that we are talking about, Sharm el Sheikh, might be the introduction of a peace-keeping force, which would include the permanent members of the Security Council, and other nations. And we are not inflexible about it. We just say we think that is a very useful instrumentality for maintaining the peace. And when the United Nations was formed, that was one of the hopes that was then expressed for mankind, that something of this kind might be developed. And we think for that reason that it is a very good prospect if the parties are willing to accept it.

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

נא - 11

הצבת כוחות אמריקניים (במסגרת כוח בינלאומי) תמנע מלחמה

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Mansfield's objections the other day were specifically to the idea of introducing American troops in one of the world's flash points, on the line where they could get into a deeper commitment. Would you comment on that?

A. Well, you know, that is a matter of judgement. There have been three wars there in the last 23 years, and we think this would prevent war, not cause war. We think that if a peaceful settlement is not worked out in the foreseeable future that there is a very dangerous situation that will develop and possibly lead to World War III. So we do not think it would be an added factor. We think it would be a factor leading to peace.

As far as the Russians are concerned, they are there now. People say "Why would you agree to a peace-keeping force in which the Russians participate?" Well, they are there in large number now in the area.

במסגרת כוח או"ם ייתכן ש"פ בין יחידות אמריקניות וסובייטיות

A. Mr. Secretary, is it practical to think in terms of American and Soviet troops cooperating in a situation -- in a shooting situation, for example? Would you expect Soviet troops to fire on Egyptian forces if that became necessary?

A. Well, I think this would prevent a shooting situation from occurring. We are

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

12 - נא

not of course talking about a Soviet-United States peace-keeping force. We are talking about a UN peace-keeping force, including United States forces and British forces and French and Soviet and others. And our answer is, yes, we think it is possible that under those circumstances a UN peace-keeping force might cooperate.

הרוסים העבירו חלק מסוללות סאם - 3 לידי המצרים

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Russians having pulled SAM-3's back from Suez.

A. No. I said the Russians who were operating the SAM-3 sites, not the SAM-3 sites themselves.

Q. Are they being operated by Egyptians now?

A. Yes, the ones that I referred to are now being operated by Egyptians.

Q. Would you regard this as a sign of Russian restraint in the situation?

A. Well, as I said, I think it is a little early to judge. It was not a very substantial number. But it gives reason for some encouragement.

הזזת שיחות יארינג תדון בשיחות עם שה"ח אבן

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you get these talks through Ambassador Jarring going again? Would you support the Secretary General's report that Israel should answer and make a commitment on withdrawal?

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

נא - 13

A. Well, I do not want to go into the details about how we hope to do that. We are going to have discussions about that with Mr. Eban and others. We are going to talk to Ambassador Jarring. We think this is the best hope for a solution.

הבהרה נוספת לאופי ההסדר בין ישראל ומצרים

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israeli answer to Mr. Jarring's proposal said, if I am not mistaken, that they were willing to withdraw from occupied territory but not to the 1967 line. And as far as I understand our position, we believe that it should be the 1967 line, but that that should be negotiated. With this in view, wherein lies the impasse exactly?

A. Well, I am not sure that the differences are as great as they seem. But keep in mind, because each time I see this reported in the press -- I should not say each time, but several times I have seen it reported in the press -- it is not accurately stated. We support the 1967 boundary between Egypt and Israel -- I am not talking about the Jordan problem or anything else. I am talking about that boundary -- provided that demilitarization can be worked out satisfactorily to the parties, and provided that a satisfactory arrangement is worked out between the parties on Sharm el Sheikh, to provide security for Israel.

תושג הטכמה של הקונגרס להתחייבויות אמריקניות

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the Middle East, you appear to be talking about an American commitment over a considerable period of time and much

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

14 - נא

firmer than anything the United States has ever given in this area before. You say 1957 is not a case in point. Given the national commitments resolution passed by Congress and the history of congressional-executive argument over commitments, are you not required at a minimum to secure a joint resolution of Congress or perhaps, as some Senators say, a treaty?

A. Well, it would not be a treaty. But we would certainly get the consent of the Congress in one form or another. And as I said of my testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, although it obviously had to be a tentative proposal, there seemed to be a general disposition to favor it.

We cannot be sure what Congress would do. But I think it would be favorably disposed.

I mean we could establish, if the agreement were satisfactory -- you always have to have the premise that the agreement is satisfactory -- if it is a satisfactory agreement, then I do not believe we would have difficulty in getting Congress to authorize a peace-keeping force.

Until this administration took office, we had 64,000 men in South Korea, in a UN peace-keeping force.

Q. Well, are you prepared to say at this point not simply that you want concurrence of, say, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, but that you want a

סודי ביותר
לנמען בלבד

15 - נא

vote of Congress in some form, in a positive way, to approve an American participation more or less indefinitely in a military sense in the Middle East?

A. Well, I do not want to answer that question, because I am not sure it would be more or less indefinitely, and I am not sure what form it would take. But I can say, Mr. Roberts, that I would think -- and I feel sure that this is the position of our Government -- that in an undertaking of this magnitude, in which we took part with other nations, we would expect congressional approval.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could give us your assessment about the development of U. S. - Arab relations, especially your assessment on the possibility of a resumption of diplomatic relations.

שפור קל ביחסים עם מדינות ערב. חידוש היחסים עם מצרים אינו מעשי כרגע

A. Well, obviously our relations with the Arab nations are affected by the Middle East problem. And they are suspicious of the United States. They at least to some degree blame us for what they think is Israel's intransigence. They are not sure that we are doing all we can to help solve the problem. On the other hand, I think there has been some awareness that we are making an honest, genuine attempt to work out a peaceful settlement. I think our relations have improved slightly. On the question of diplomatic relations with Egypt, we would certainly be willing to have diplomatic relations with Egypt. We do not think at the moment it is practical. But we would hope that if some arrangements are worked out, that we could have diplomatic relations with Egypt. We have historically been very friendly to the Arab world.



משרד החוץ

ירושלים, ח' בחשון תשל"ב

27 אוקטובר 1971

טודי ביוחד

361

א ל : שר החוץ

מאח : מ. גזית, סמנכ"ל

הנדון : הסדר התעלה - טבלה משווה

מצ"ב טבלה העורכת השוואה בין מסמכנו מ-19 אפריל 1971 ל"השקפות" האמריקניות
כפי שבאו לידי בטוי ב- ORAL MINUTES שהכין סיסקו בעת ביקורו בישראל ובשש
הנקודות של רוג'רט בנאמו בעצרת.

ב ב ר כ ה,

512 334
מרדכי גזית

העתיקים : המנכ"ל

השגריר י. רבין

מר ש. דיניץ

מר מ. אליצור

SECRET

SPECIAL AGREEMENT ON SUEZ CANAL

COMPARISON BETWEEN ISRAEL DOCUMENT OF 19 APRIL 1971, SISCO's ORAL MINUTES OF 2 AUGUST 1971 AND SEC. ROGERS' SPEECH 4 OCTOBER 1971

(Six Points)

ISRAELI PAPER OF 19 APRIL 1971	SISCO's ORAL MINUTES OF 2 AUGUST 1971	ROGERS' SPEECH 4 OCTOBER 1971
<p><u>Opening of the Canal and Passage</u></p> <p>The UAR will clear, open and operate the Suez Canal for the use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel, within six months of the effective date of the Agreement.</p> <p>(Point 1)</p> <p>(The implementation of Israel's part of the Agreement shall be concerted with the actual opening of the Suez Canal for navigation and not only with its clearing) (Point 12)</p>	<p>The UAR agrees to clear open and operate the Suez Canal for use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel, within six months of the effective date of this agreement (alternative 1 - except that Israeli warships shall not transit the Canal until there is a final peace agreement). (alternative 2 - Israel agrees not to exercise its right of free passage pending agreement on an overall settlement in accordance with SC Resolution 242) (alternative 3 - except that Israeli ships and cargoes will pass through the Canal only when a final peace agreement has been reached in accordance with SC Resolution 242).</p>	<p>The United States has long held that the Canal should be open to passage for all nations without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council Resolution of November 1967. What is presently at issue is the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe that an accommodation on this point is quite possible.</p> <p>(Point 6)</p>
<p><u>CEASEFIRE</u></p> <p>Israel and the UAR will observe the ceasefire <u>without limitation of time</u>. (The precise language concerning the non-resumption of fighting will be formulated in the Agreement between Israel and the UAR).</p> <p>(Point 2)</p>	<p><u>CEASEFIRE</u></p> <p>Israel and the UAR will continue to refrain from firing or other hostile acts by either the regular or irregular forces of either side, and will prevent the use of territory under their control for such firing or hostile acts, against the forces and civilian population of the other. At the same time they will continue their efforts to achieve under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring a peaceful and accepted settlement based on full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.</p> <p><u>Review</u></p> <p>In the event a final settlement between them has not been achieved by that time, the UAR and Israel agree to review this agreement in its entirety <u>eighteen months</u> from its effective date. Both sides reserve the right to restore the status quo existing on the date this agreement becomes effective if either side fails to carry out its undertakings thereunder.</p>	<p><u>CEASEFIRE</u></p> <p>Its maintenance is in the interest of all concerned. <u>The ultimate objective</u> of course, is a permanent end to belligerency as part of a binding peace agreement. <u>But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a ceasefire of a short duration be realistic.</u> With goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.</p> <p>(Point 2)</p>

IDF Stationing - Zone of Withdrawal

The IDF will be stationed east of the Canal at some distance to be specified in the Agreement. Israeli civilian maintenance teams only will remain in the Israel defence structures along the Canal.
(Point 3)

Egyptian Civilian Crossing

Egyptian civilian technicians necessary for the clearing, reopening and operation of the Canal will cross to the east of the Canal to perform their functions.
(Point 4)

No Bridges to be Built

No bridges shall be built across the Canal
(Point 7)

Egyptian Military Crossing

No UAR or any other military and/or irregular military personnel or forces shall cross the Canal or be introduced into the area east of the Canal from which Israel forces are withdrawn.
(Point 5)

Withdrawal, Supervision and UAR Presence East of Canal

Upon the effective date of this agreement and for the period during which work is being carried out to clear and ready the Canal for operation, Israel will withdraw its forces to a line 10 kilometers east of the Canal.

Egyptian civilian personnel necessary for the clearing, reopening and operation of the Canal will cross into areas up to a distance of 5 kilometers east of the Canal to perform their functions. Egypt will also restore normal civilian administration in those areas, including police functions

During the period the Canal is being cleared and readied for operation, the fortifications and other installations built by the Israeli forces in the area from which they withdraw shall not be destroyed, dismantled, or otherwise interfered with and no bridges shall be built across the Canal

Once the Canal is in operation for international navigation, Israeli forces will withdraw to the following line : (In the vicinity of the Passes).

Egypt may establish a military presence in the area extending to a line ten kilometers east of the Canal. The area between the lines will be free of military forces of either side and will be supervised in accordance with the provisions below. The above lines will be delineated on agreed maps which shall be an integral part of this agreement.

Once the Canal is in operation for international navigation, Egypt may establish and maintain a military presence in the area defined above as follows :

- (a) the total number of military personnel east of the Canal at any one time will not exceed 750.
 - (b) Their equipment shall be limited to : individual rifles, carbines or pistols; communications equipment; and command vehicles.
- No arms, vehicles or other equipment exceeding these limitations shall be brought across the Canal or be introduced into the area east of Canal.

IDF Stationing - Zone of Withdrawal

There are important strategic considerations involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides ... in the long run the most significant aspect ... might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an overall settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.
(Point 3)

The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the Canal. It is understandable, too that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible.
(Point 5)

No mention

Egyptian Military Crossing

The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here too, based on our discussions, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

different version - "we believe that there possibilities for compromise."
(Point 5)

Anchoring
Anchoring of military vessels in the Canal and Lakes shall be prohibited.

(Point 8)

Supervision
Agreed measures for supervision will be worked out.

(Point 9)

(c) No installations of a military nature, except those required for the housing and support for the Egyptian personnel permitted across the Canal, shall be constructed in the area east of the Canal from which Israel has withdrawn.

(d) Anchoring of military naval vessels in the Canal and in Lake Timsah, the Great Bitter Lake and Little Bitter Lake shall be prohibited.

Overall responsibility for the supervision of this interim agreement (except the provision regarding prisoners of war) will be vested in an Interim Commission under the command of the UNTSO. The UAR and Israel shall appoint liaison representatives to the Interim Commission. The UAR and Israeli liaison officers shall be authorized to travel for the purpose of inspection to any sector of the area between the lines. the UNTSO Commission shall establish posts in whatever number and whatever locations it considers necessary, and create whatever other supervisory machinery it considers appropriate, including aerial observation, for adequate supervision of this agreement. Both sides will have the right to station liaison officers in equal numbers at those posts located between the lines and to assign representatives to participate in UNTSO aerial observation missions.

The line to which Israeli forces withdraw under this interim agreement shall not be the final line of Israeli withdrawal under the peace agreement to be concluded between them.

Ways reassuring to both Egypt and Israel can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms which have existed in the area for the past two decades. (Point 4)

No mention

Thinning-out of Egyptian forces

The UAR will thin out its forces west of the Canal as specified in the agreement.

(Point 6)

No mention

No mention

Final Boundaries

The line which the IDF will hold in accordance with the Special Agreement is not considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of the peace settlement, the IDF will withdraw to it.
(Point 10)

The redeployment of Israel forces resultant from the Agreement shall not be construed as a stage towards further Israel withdrawal in the absence of a peace agreement.

The USG will oppose attempts to obtain such Israel withdrawal. (Part B, Point 3)

The USG will not consider the Agreement as implying an Israel commitment to future withdrawal to the international frontier or any other line not agreed to in the course of the negotiation. (Part B, Point 4)

Release of POW

Within 15 days of the effective date of the Agreement the UAR and Israel will release all POWs each holds of the other, as verified by the ICRC.
(Point 11)

Final Boundaries

It must be noted that this brief observation in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an overall settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.
(Point 3)

Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report earlier this year and in my statement of December 9, 1969.
(Introduction)

Prisoners of War

Within fifteen days of the effective date of this agreement, the UAR and Israel will release all prisoners of war each holds of the other, as verified by the ICRC.

No mention

Connection Between Special and Final Agreements

The Special Agreement shall not affect in any way the agreement of the parties to pursue negotiations between them under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the advancement of a just and lasting peace.

(Point 13)

Relationship of Interim to Final Settlement

The UAR and Israel undertake to pursue, under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, negotiations in an effective and expeditious manner looking toward the final peace agreement envisaged in Security Council Resolution 242. With a view to facilitating the attainment of a just and lasting peace between them based on full and complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts, Israel and the UAR have agreed to the interim measures set forth in this agreement.

Connection Between Special and Final Agreements

That A Suez Canal Agreement is merely a step toward complete and full implementation of resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself -- that has to be clearly established in any agreement; also that neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim settlement complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an overall settlement -- if it could there would be no necessity for an interim settlement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement was reached active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed. *Editor's note*

(This phrase missing in USIS version)

(Point 1)

ה ס ד ר ל פ ת י ח ת ח ע ל ת ס ו א ן

העמדה העקרונית האמריקנית בדצמבר 1970

11 דצמבר - בעת ביקור דיין :

שר ההגנה לאירד : "בבנין הזה מעוניינים בחעלה סגורה אך יש גם דיעות אחרות בעיר הזאת. האירופאים מעוניינים בפתוחה החעלה."

אדמירל מורר (יו"ר המטות המשולבים בשיחה הנ"ל) : "אני מעוניין בחעלה סגורה."

מזכיר המדינה : The opening of the Canal would be to the advantage of the Russians and disadvantage of the free world. Nevertheless, there is no reason not to talk on different possibilities but not on a piece-meal agreement.

שהב"ט בשיחה עם הנשיא : כי ישראל תחזיק בקו חעלה סואץ עד השגת פתרון מדיני המוסכם ומקובל על ישראל. מתוך ההקשר הכללי של חגובת הנשיא ברור שהוא לא ערער כלל על קביעה זו.

פניה מצרית ראשונה לפתיחת החעלה

14 ינואר 1971

פנייה בלהי פורמלית של שליו סאדאת לנציג ארה"ב בקהיר : פניה ראשונה נערכה ב-10 או 11 ינואר. לפי התחרשמות סאדאת ידע על הפנייה. ציין שההצעה שהוא מביא תועבר אה"כ בצנורות פורמליים. ההצעה - מקור ושראתה בהצעה שר הבטחון דיין. ישראל תעשה הצעד הראשון ותיסוג 40 ק"מ עד למעבר המיתלה. זה ישאיר את רוב סיני בידי ישראל ויתן לישראל קו הגנה טבעי. קע"ם תדלל כוחות היבשה למרחק 40 ק"מ. היא תשאיר את מערכת ההגנה האווירית ואת המתקנים בשלמותם. יחכן ואפשר יהיה לבצע חילופי שבויים ולהסיר את הגבלת הזמן על הפסקת האש. לאחר מכן ינהלו הצדדים מו"מ באמצעות יארינג (על הפתרון הכולל?). המו"מ יימשך ששה חדשים או שנה או כמה זמן שיהיה צורך. ללא לחצים ואיומים. השליח הנ"ל חזר לשיחה שניה עם נציג ארה"ב ב-14 ינואר.

ממקורות המוסד : אשרו הפרטים הנ"ל והוסיפו כי יוסכם על מיסות פיקוח וכי על הדילול המצרי לא יפורסם ברבים.

18 ינואר 1971

רבין נתבקש לברר עם קרדינל עמדה ארה"ב וגישתה לנושא, זהות בעל ההצעה ורצינות המקור.

20 ינואר 1971

חשובת רבין : כל עוד לא קבעה ישראל עמדה עקרונית אין מקום לשיחה כזו. שיחת בירור יזומה הנה בעלת משמעות.

21 ינואר 1971

חשובה לרבין : החשובות הנ"ל נחוצות לנו לגיבוש עמדה.

24 ינואר 1971

הוראות רוה"ם לקראת השיחה עם קרדינל - א) להשיג מידע (זהות מקור, סיבו); ב) לברר כוונות המצרים; ג) גישת ארה"ב להצעה. על רבין להבהיר שהחשובות נחוצות לנו לפני שנקבע עמדתנו. אין לנו התנגדות שימשיכו במגע עם הגורם המצרי אך לא בשמנו ומבלי לחייב אותנו.

27 ינואר 1971

בשיחה עם סיסקו נטאל רבין מהי עמדה ישראל להצעה המצרית. רבין השיב . שאין בידו חשבה כלשהי.

27 ינואר 1971

קרדינל אמר שהוא מניח שלא ינפורמציה מקהיר הפעם אמינות גבוהה יותר מאחר שלא באה דרך נציגם בקהיר. השליח של כאדאט אמנם מקורב לנשיא. באשר לעמדת ארה"ב הרי כשעוררנו הנושא בשעתו (רוה"ם באוקטובר 1970 ושהב"ט בדצמבר 1970) סבור היה שזה נושא המאפשר להרויח זמן בדיון שבינינו לממשל. עמדה ארה"ב : אין ארה"ב מתפעלת מפתחת התעלה. לשאלה חוזרת "מהי עמדתכם?" אמר שידבר עם פלינט בצורה בלתי פורמלית ויודיענו. שאל האם אנו רוצים שהם ישגרו איש מיוחד להספק הטיפול כתנאי לשליחת האיש תעשה על בסיס פניה שלנו אליהם תוך הנחה שאנו מגלים ענין בנושא.

1 פברואר 1971

רוה"ם מבקשת שרביץ יודיע לקרדינל שאם החשבה מפלינט איננה שוללת זאת אנו מוכנים לתת חשבה למצרים באמצעות האמריקנים, שאנו מסכימים להכנס עם המצרים לבירור הצעתם למרות שאין אנו יודעים מה בדיוק ההצעה וכוונתה ולמרות שאין אנו תולים בה תקווה.

4 פברואר 1971

הודעה פומבית של סאדאת בנאום בפני מועצת האומה המצרית.

5 פברואר 1971

סיסקו שואל ארגוב לתגובות ממישראל לרעיון שהעלה בינחיים סאדאת פומבית בענין התעלה. ארגוב שאל האם הם קבלו בינחיים מידע נוסף. סיסקו אמר שהערכתו האישית היא שאם ישראל סבורה שיש דרכים בהן יכולה ארה"ב להיות לעוזר כ-middleman היא השקול זאת באהדה.

8 פברואר 1971

קרדינל דיבר עם פלינט. בגלל עיסוקיהם אינם יכולים לגבש חשבה מפורטת, לפיכך פלינט היה מעדיף לו השארנו הצעת סאדאת במצב פתוח לכל אפשרות. רביץ הדגיש שרוה"ם מעוניינת לדעת עמדת פלינט כדי שתוכל להתחשב בה באופן מלא בעת קבלת החלטה. קרדינל חזר ואמר שפלינט היה מעדיף להשאיר ההצעה ללא מענה ברור אלא אם כן סבורה ישראל שההצעה איננה באה בחשבון.

פנייה מצרית שניה

8 פברואר 1971

מסיסקו, סאדאת העביר שדר דרך ברגוס לממארה"ב. מעביר השדר מקור מהימן לגמרי. המקור מודאג מהעדר תגובה אמריקנית להצעתו בדבר נסיגה חלקית ופתיחת התעלה. הוא מאמין כי דיון מופשט בדבר הסדר לא יוליך לשום מקום ועל כן מאמין הוא שהצעתו חסירה הסכנה מן המצב הנוכחי. הוא כבטיח לממארה"ב שההצעה אינה תרגיל של המלחמה הקרה. אין לחץ סובייטי עליו להגיש ההצעה. מבקש ממארה"ב להפעיל לחץ על ישראל כדי שזו תדון בחשומת לב בהצעתו. הוא מוכן לדון בהצעה עם הישראלים דרך ממארה"ב. ברגוס שאל אם סאדאת יתנגד להעלאת הנושא דרך יארינג. האיש ענה שזה מתקבל על הדעת אך אין הם רואים בכך הדרך הטובה ביותר. סיסקו העיר שזו הצעה שניה, בנוסף לזו עליה לא השיבה ישראל. הוא העיר שבעוד שנאום סאדאת מדבר על נסיגה בלבד ההצעה הקודמת מדברת על נסיגה תמורת דילול כוחות. אין ממארה"ב במצב להעריך ההצעה. הוא ממליץ כי ממישראל תגיב בצורה חיובית ולא פולמוסית להצעת סאדאת הפומבית.

9 פברואר 1971

הודעת רוה"ם בכנסת.

[illegible]

OL GELNL 1261

"...the matter, of course, rests with the parties, and we want it to remain there. We think the proposals are certainly worth consideration, and we were encouraged by the Prime Minister's statement yesterday that she was interested in pursuing the discussions on the subject. Our position is that anything that brings the parties closer together or any conversations they can have directly - or, particularly, indirectly - we doubt very much there will be any direct conversations - any conversations of this kind which will lead to reduction of tensions and an ultimate solution to the problem we certainly support. And when I say "solution", I'm talking about a contractual arrangement. Certainly, this is a proposal that deserves serious consideration."

1971 JUL 10

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6 GELIN 1461

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6 JUL 1971

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המחלקה הכלכלית והמסחרית של משרד המסחר והתעשייה
 הממונה על המסחר עם זרים
 הממונה על המסחר עם זרים : 1971

1971 1761

המחלקה הכלכלית והמסחרית של משרד המסחר והתעשייה
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 הממונה על המסחר עם זרים : 1971

1971 1761

בחצי השני של פברואר ביקר רבין בישראל והספול בנושא התעלה הופסק. הדגש עבר למגעי יארינג (חשובת מצרים מ-15 פברואר, חשובת ישראל מ-26 פברואר).

הטיוטה האמריקנית

6 מרץ 1971

סיסקו מגיש לרבין (בשיחה רשמית) נוסח הכולל רעיונות ראשוניים (preliminary ideas) להסדר התעלה. עקרי הדברים :

שתי הממשלות יקבלו על עצמן בצו 242 על כל חלקיה ועל מנת לקדם שליחות יארינג מסכימות כצעד זמני כדלקמן :

- (1) ישראל תחזיר כוחותיה לעמדות כ-40 ק"מ מזרחה לתעלה. שום כוחות צבאיים או טרם-צבאיים מאיזה סוג שהוא לא יוכנסו לאזור המפונה. תפקידים אזרחיים באותו אזור, כולל אלה הנחוצים לקיום חוק וסדר וספול בתעלה, יבוצעו עד לעומק 10 ק"מ ע"י אזרחי קע"ס.
- (2) קע"ס מסכימה לפתוח התעלה לשייט לכל האומות כולל ישראל חוץ ששה חדשים מתאריך כניסת ההסכם לחוקף.
- (3) שני הצדדים ישמרו על הפסקת האש בקפדנות. הם שומרים על זכותם -
(א) להחזיר הסטטוס קוו הקיים אם אחד הצדדים אינו מקיים התחייבויותיו;
(ב) לדון מחדש בחוס השנה בהתחייבויות, לשמור על הפסקת האש לאור ההתקצנות שהושג עד אז בביצוע החלטת 242 על כל חלקיה.
- (4) החלפת שבויים.
- (5) האחריות הכללית לפיקוח ההסכם תהיה בידי ועדה זמנית (interim) בפיקוד ראש המטה של האו"ם ויכלול נציגי קע"ס וישראל.
- (6) שני הצדדים יגבירו מאמציהם להשיג באמצעות יארינג הסדר של שלום מוסכם.

סיסקו סיפר שסאדאת אמר לברגוס שהצעת פתיחת התעלה עודנה בתוקף. סאדאת אמר זאת גם לסיטו. על הרעיונות דלעיל טרם דברה ארה"ב עם מצרים. סיסקו שואל האם יש מקום להגישם כהצעה ישראלית או כהצעה מטעם ארה"ב.

8 מרץ 1971

מברק לרבין חגובתנו היא שההצעה של סיסקו איננה יכולה לשמש בסיס. איננו יכולים להסכים שההצעה חוגש למצרים מטעם ארה"ב.

9 מרץ 1971

קרדינל אמר שלרעיון התעלה היתרון של רווח זמן. אין הוא רואה הרבה חסרונות מבחינתה של ישראל. עלינו להיות תקיפים במו"ט עם סיסקו. יש לחתור במקביל להגיע להצעה יותר נוחה עמו. עד שבסופו של דבר יתערב פלינט ויציע הצעת פשרה. אסור להידרדר במדרון של סיסקו.

19 מרץ 1971

שה"ח אבן בשיחתו עם רוב'רס : חוך עשרה ימים נבוא לארה"ב הצעה מפורטת.

גיבוש ופירוט העמדה הישראלית

23 מרץ 1971

ועדה השרים לענייני בטחון מקבלת שורה של החלטות בקשר להסדר התעלה. החלטות אלה בנוסח מתוקן מתקבלות בממשלה ב-28 מרץ.

9 אפריל 1971

הנוסח של העמדה הישראלית מוברק לרבין לשם שיחה עם קרדינל וגובתו.

12 אפריל 1971

קרדינל הגיב חמורות (כנראה יותר לעצם המחשבה שיהיה עליו ליטול חלק אקטיבי בהמשך המו"מ מאשר לגופם של הניסוחים).

העברת העמדה הישראלית לארה"ב

12 אפריל 1971

שיחה רבין עם סיסקו. רבין אומר כי מקווה בימים הקרובים להגיש לו נייר בעניין הסדר התעלה. סיסקו אומר כי כינתיים ההדלפות בעתונות חטלו כנראה אפשרות ההדברות האינסימית המוקדמת ישראל-ארה"ב.

16 אפריל 1971

שיחה עם קרדינל לקבלת תגובה מפורטת יותר על מסמכנו. קרדינל העיר שנייר זה הוא טוב (היתה זו הערה המוהה שכן הנייר שהוגש לו היה הנייר הישן) הוא אמר "זהו סדרה הביונית של הצעות". עם זאת הבהיר שהנייר המוצע אין לו סכוי להתקבל ע"י ארה"ב או מצרים, אך ישמש אמצעי להרוויה זמן לעריכת ביקור רוב'רס באזור.

19 אפריל 1971

רוה"ם ושה"ח מעבירים ההצעות לברבור.

19 אפריל 1971

רבין מעביר ההצעות לסיסקו.

20 אפריל 1971

אלון בשיחתו עם רוב'רס מפרט עקרונות העמדה הישראלית.

22 אפריל 1971

זורהלן מוטר לגזית תגובות ארה"ב למסמך הישראלי.

23 אפריל 1971

גזית מודיע לזורהלן שארה"ב מתבקשת שלא להעביר עד להודעה נוספת מסמכנו למצרים.
הוא רמז כמו כן שהחשבה האמריקנית מאכזבת.

6-7 מאי 1971

רוג'רס וסיסקו בביקורת בישראל :

מסרו לנו כי אין סאדאט חושב על הסדר ביניים בחור שכזה. הוא מעוניין בהסדר שיפילם
הדרך לתנופה לקראת הסדר כולל. הוא מוכן להפסקת אש עם הגבלת זמן. טווח ההתרחקות
איננו הדבר החשוב ביותר אם כי ברור שכל שיגדל המרחק כך יגדלו הסכויים לניסוח
שביע רצון בנושא הפסקת האש. בקשר לביצורים, רמז סאדאט שהוא מוכן לדון בערכות שלא
יושמדו המתקנים, אולי ע"י הסדר עם האו"ם. הצויות כוחות מצריים היא חיונית. סאדאט
לא נקב בגודל הכוח שייחצה. שיטת הפיקוח ע"י האו"ם. רוג'רס הביע שביעות רצון כללית
מן העמדת הישראלית כפי שבאו לידי בסווי בשיחות עם שהב"ט ועם רוג'רס (שיחת הסכום)
וסיסקו נשלח לקהיר לביקור נוסף.

12 מאי 1971

דווח על שיחות סיסקו בקהיר

אי חציה - סאדאט הבהיר בהדגשה מדוע הכרחי כי כוחות קטנים מצריים יחצו החעלה.
פיקוח - סאדאט הדגיש הצורך בפיקוח או"ם כחיץ. סיסקו התרשם שסתוף ישראלי-מצרי
אולי בא בחשבון תחת מטרה של האו"ם אלא לשאלה זאת קשורה בשאלת הצויות
הכוחות המצריים.

סיסקו התרשם שסאדאט טרם השמיע המלה האחרונה ויש אצלו גמישות מסוימת. סאדאט
דיבר על כך שהסדר כזה הוא מבחן לשלום. לא השמיע איומים בדבר מועדים לביטול
הפסקת האש. הדגיש שתי גדוה החעלה הן מצריות. סאדאט הבטחה לתת חשובה חוך שבועיים
אחרי שילמד כל הצדדות. אמר שזו הפעם הראשונה שניתן לו משהו שמאפשר לו לעיין בו
בצורה מסתית. יחכן ויעביר חשבתו באמצעות שליח רם מעלה.

המשך המגעים והארועים במצרים

13 מאי 1971

סיהורי סאדאט בקהיר. בעקבות טהורים אלה דווח רבין כי התחזקה ההרגשה בואשינגטון
שאפשר להחליש מעמד בריה"ם במצרים ע"י ויתורים על חשבון ישראל.

16 (?) מאי 1971

קרינאל אמר שחבל שלא העברנו את הנייר שלנו למצרים, עתה חושש הוא שנצטרך לנהל
מו"מ על בסיס נייר מצרי.

27 מאי 1971

נחתם חוזה בריה"ם-מצרים.

6 יוני 1971

סיסקו לרביץ. הם קבלו שדר נוסף מסאדאת, בסוף השבוע הקודם. היו להם כ-6 שעות כולל שיחות עם סאדאת ריאד והייכל. סאדאת אישר שהוא מעוניין שארה"ב תמשיך לפעול למען הסדר ביניים, שהחוזה עם בריה"ם לא ישפיע על הקו-שיח המצרי עם ארה"ב. בריה"ם גלתה עניין להשתלב במאמצים למען ההסדר. קע"ס לא דרבנה זאת.

6 יוני 1971

סיסקו לרביץ. ברגוס ראה סאדאת ב-4 יוני. חוזר לארה"ב. הערכותיו של ברגוס הוליוו לא מעט שולל את רוג'רס ומחמ"ד. קרנו בירידה בגלל הערכתו המוטעית לאן פני סאדאת. עם זאת ממשיכים האישים המצריים לומר כי הם מעוניינים בהמשך המו"מ בעניין הסדר חלקי וזאת באמצעות ארה"ב.

העמדה המצרית על סמך שיחות הסכום של ברגוס לפני ביקורו בארה"ב

9 יוני 1971

סיסקו לרביץ : המזכיר כועס על ההדלפות בעהונות. זה מכביר על שתוף ישראל במידע על המגעים. ברגוס נפגש פעמיים עם סאדאת וכן עם הייכל ריאד ואחרים. הדו-שיח עם ארה"ב נמשך כשהמצרים חובעים אי משלוח נשק לישראל. סאדאת אמר שכל מה שהשמיע באזני המזכיר עודנו עומד בכל הנוגע לרצונו לשפר היחסים עם ארה"ב. הערכת סיסקו היא שהסדר הוא אפשרי בתנאי שהן מצרים והן ישראל יעשו ויתורים נוספים. יש תחומי הסכמה וכן תחומי אי הסכמה. מושם דגש ניכר ע"י המצרים על הקטר והדו"ק בין ההסדר החלקי לא רק להסדר הכולל אלא גם לדרישת התחייבויות נוספות לפיהן מה שיוסכם בהסדר החלקי יוביל לנסיגה ישראלית טוטאלית. יש גמישות בכל הנוגע לטווח ההתחקות. לא נמתחו קווים במפורש. הם מדברים על אזור בקרבת שלושת המעברים. כן חושבים הם על אזור היץ רחב בו יבוצע הפקוח ע"י האו"ם. הם מדברים על הצית כוחות מצריים בצורה מוגבלת, באשר להפסקת האש הדגש על ששה חדשים אך האמריקנים הבחינו גמישות בנקודה זאת. בקשר לעתוי השימוש בחפלה ע"י ישראל, עמדת מצרים פחות ברורה.

10 יוני 1971

הנחיות רוה"ם לרביץ למסור לסיסקו שההגובה המצרית מאכזבת ואיננה משנה הבסיס כפי שהיה מוכר בהיות רוג'רס כאן. יש זהות בין ההצהרות המצריות הפומביות לבין מה שאומרים לאמריקנים בשיחות. צויין שאנו רואים בחומרה החמקנות מחמ"ד מלרווח לנו בצורה מליאה על שיחות קהיר.

11 יוני 1971

סיסקו לרביץ. מודה שהמצרים לא בקשו מפורשות שלא להעביר לנו בצורה מליאה ואף במסמכים את עמדותיהם אך ממארה"ב החליטה לא למסור לנו הניירות ולהסתפק במסירת עטת מצרים. סיסקו אמר שיש אנשים במחמ"ד המעוניינים להגיש נייר אמריקני לשני הצדדים.

12 יוני 1971

קרדינל אמר שבהתאם למהלכים הנוכחיים מובטח שנגיע במוקדם או במאוחר למול אולטימטום אמריקני אלא אם כן נצליח להוציא הנושא מהמסגרת הנוכחית.

15 יוני 1971

מסבת העונאים של דוג'רס בו דיבר על נקודות הסכמה בין הצדדים. דובר מצרי הגיב על ההודעה באומרו שאין היא נותנת תמונה אמיתית שכן לא היה מה שניתן לכנותו הסכמה בנושא כלשהו.

21 יוני 1971

גזית מוסר לזורהלן הערות ישראל בשולי מסבת העתונאים של דוג'רס.

פרשת ברגוס

26 יוני 1971

אחרטון מתקשר עם רביב בעניין נייר ברגוס וזאת לאור כתבת קראפט הראשונה.

27 יוני 1971

זורהלן לגזית : מחמ"ד הודיעה למצרים (משנודע לה על קיום נייר ברגוס בראשית יוני) כי ארה"ב לא נקטה בשום עמדה סובסטאנטיבית על היסודות של הסדר התעלה. הפקיד ארה"ב לקרב (עמדות) הצדדים.

29 יוני 1971

אבן עם ברבור על פרשת ברגוס.

29 יוני 1971

שיחת רבין-רוג'רס. רוג'רס מביע צער בענין התקלה בקטר למסמך ברגוס אך טען שתגובת ישראל מופרזת. הרי סיסקו כבר התנצל ולמרות זה קראנו לברבור. אילו מסר ברגוס הדברים בע"פ למצרים לא היתה בעיה. כמדינה ריבונית לארה"ב הזכות לפעול כפי שהיא פועלת. רוג'רס מתנגד לניירות. לגופו של ענין ההסדר : מה שמקובל על מצרים אינו מקובל על ישראל ולהיפך, יש תחומים של אי הסכמה מועטת יש אחרים בהם המשותף אינו גדול ויש תחומים של אי הסכמה גדולה. אף אחד מהצדדים טרם נקט עמדה בקשר לאזור החיץ או בקשר לפקוח. כשישראל דברה על אי חציית ע"י הצבא המצרי נראה היה שרצתה לסכל כל מאמץ להסדר. הוא מתרשם שעמדת ישראל היא שלא למהר, ולהרוויח זמן. העמדה הישראלית כפי שהעברה למצרים איננה מקובלת עליה כשם שעמדת מצרים איננה מקובלת על ישראל. על כן היה זה טוב אילו היה לאמריקנים עם מי בישראל לעבד הפרטים ואת האופציות הקיימות. לחפש את השינויים בעמדתה שישראל מוכנה להם כדי להקל על המצרים מבלי שזה לזיק לישראל עצמה. למשל, מדוע לא תאמר ישראל שההסדר החלקי איננו מטרה בפני עצמה וצאין לראות בו פירוש 242 אלא צעד לקראת בצוע 242?

30 יוני 1971

קרדינל מוסר שהוא ופלינט לא ידעו על נייר ברגוס וצאין הוא יודע על רעיון רוג'רס בדבר הגברת הדו-שיח עם ישראל באמצעות שליח.

1 יולי 1971

סיסקו מציע לבקר בישראל בשבוע המהחיל ב-11 יולי.

6.7.71

SECRET

ISRAEL POSITION APRIL 1971

EGYPTIAN POSITION JUNE 1971

AMERICAN REFLECTIONS

A. RELATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TO THE OVERALL SETTLEMENT

"The Special Agreement shall not affect in any way the agreement of the parties to pursue negotiations between them under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the advancement of a just and lasting peace" (Article 13)

"The line which the IDF will hold in accordance with the Special Agreement is not considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of a peace settlement the IDF will withdraw to it." (Article 10).

"Egypt and Israel should undertake to pursue negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring - looking forward to a final peace agreement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 and the Jarring memorandum submitted to the parties on February 8, 1971. According to the above mentioned papers, Israel should undertake to complete the withdrawal to the international frontier between Egypt and Palestine."

"The partial withdrawal will be a stage in Ambassador Jarring mission, leading towards an agreement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council Resolution 242."

"Sadat cannot achieve this commitment, a total withdrawal in the context of an interim agreement, ... and I would also say to you that we intend to do everything that we can to get him to drop that provision."

"What do we think is required from the point of view of the other side? ... Some kind of language that relates to interim settlement with ongoing discussions under Jarring's auspices, which relates it to the Security Council Resolution 242, but in a way which obviously does not prejudice either to your interpretation and our interpretation, our common interpretation of the Resolution."

TOP SECRET

Israel Position 19.4.1971

Egyptian Position June 1971

American Reflections

3. THE USE OF THE CANAL

"The UAR will clear, open and operate the Suez Canal for the use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel, within six months of the effective date of the Agreement."

"As for the Suez Canal, Egypt will undertake to open it in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention for the ships of all nations. Egypt would not accept the passage of Israeli ships and cargoes through the Canal until the Israel withdrawal is completed and a final agreement is reached. The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority will administer the use of the Canal and Israel should not interfere in any way in the secure use of the Canal for international shipping, and she should undertake to avoid hostile activities in the Suez Canal area."

Three possibilities:

- (a) "Egypt acknowledges Israel's right of passage but Israel accepting a self-denying ordinance, voluntarily saying we won't exercise the right in the circumstances of an interim agreement."
- (b) "To get Sadat to put the language of the June 4 Paper in positive terms... that Israel would have the right to use the Canal in the final settlement."
- (c) "To distinguish between merchant vessels and peaceful cargo and the warships ... Your merchant peaceful cargoes will be permitted use in the context of the interim settlement, but any warship will await the overall settlement."

Israel Position 19.4.1971

C. CEASE-FIRE

"Israel and the UAR will observe the cease-fire without limitation of time (the precise language concerning the non-resumption of fighting will be formulated in the Agreement between Israel and the UAR)."

Egyptian Position June 1971

"The Israeli Egyptian interim withdrawal arrangement will provide for six month cease-fire between the parties. Dr. Jarring will use this period for drawing a time-table for the implementation of all the parts and provisions of Resolution 242 and the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied areas."

American Reflections

"We think that there may be a way to have the cease-fire expressed in a way in which it is indefinite - not permanent. In the broadest legal sense, indefinite, open-ended ... And where certain practical review procedure in the Agreement given opportunity for both sides, not one side unilaterally, but both sides, to take a look at where things have come ... in time limit. And somewhere else in the Agreement ... It can be linked certainly to ongoing efforts with Jarring, but as a separate provision in the Agreement itself, you will provide for a joint review, not unilateral, a joint review by both of you, of the entire Agreement. That means Jarring, cease-fire and everything else, rather than just the cease-fire. In other words ... the cease-fire stated in an unlimited way, related to ongoing discussions, but not permitting that the Egyptians if two months after any discussions under Jarring have taken place, the discussions are not making progress, they say they are not making progress, end of the cease-fire. No, the review in terms of the entire Agreement would be a review that you would both make after a given period. My suggestion would be that we start out with a period of 18 months."

D. ZONE OF WITHDRAWAL

"The IDF will be stationed east of the Canal at some distance to be specified in the Agreement. Israeli civilian maintenance teams only will remain in the Israel defence structures along the Canal."

"As first stage in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242, the UAR is prepared to accept a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces to a line running from A to B. This arrangement should be carried out under the auspices of Ambassador Jarling."

"As Israeli forces withdraw, the Egyptians intend to restore their administration in the Sinai Peninsula up to the line running from X to Y, east of the three Passes. The area between the lines, namely the area between A-B and X-Y will be patrolled by U.N. observers."

"One possibility has occurred to us is to proceed in stages. First, Israel is to pull back, say 10 kms with perhaps the UNTSO assuring the Bar-Lev line is maintained intact. This withdrawal will start at a time that the interim agreement goes into effect and begin to clear the Canal, and for the period of time that the Canal is cleared and it is ready to be opened. Let us just say, hypothetically, six months for the purpose of discussions. Secondly for you in that period - you will have six months to test the situation. The only presence that will be allowed in this 10 km zone from the other side would be only those Egyptians needed on the Canal, some civilians, the kind of thing, and you would have six months to really try this out. Then to consider how much more you could withdraw in the vicinity of the Passes. If that were possible ... The Passes would be positioned by these people, your own, the Egyptian and the UNTSO. It would not be in Egyptian hands. It would not be in Israeli hands. You would be right there at the line... I would like you to look at this strategically to tell what really would be involved if you were to move from this position, behind this, east of the Passes, in order to reoccupy."

Israeli Position 19.4.1971

F. CROSSING

"Egyptian civilian technicians necessary for the clearing, re-opening and operation of the Canal will cross to the east of the Canal to perform their function."

"No UAR, or any other military and/or irregular military personnel or forces shall cross the Canal or be introduced into the area east of the Canal from which Israeli forces are withdrawn."

Egyptian Position June 1971

"As the Israeli forces withdraw, the Egyptians intend to restore their administration in the Sinai Peninsula up to the line running from X to Y east of the three Passes. The area between the lines, namely, the area between A-B and X-Y will be patrolled by U.N. Observers."

"The arrangement concerning the number of troops and armament, each side will maintain in the zone running from the Canal to the line X-Y and from the line A-B to the international frontier between the two countries will be supervised by U.N. Observers. Israel and the UAR may agree to restriction and limitation to numbers of troops and types of armaments."

American Reflections

In the first stage "the only presence that would be allowed in this 10-km zone from the other side would be only those Egyptian needed on the Canal, some civilians, that kind of think and you would have six months to really try this out."

"Our judgement is that if you were in a position to agree to allow a very limited Egyptian military presence in that second stage, limited to this 10-km zone only, limited, say, 750 men, carrying rifles, where the Agreement would have an explicit bar, no tanks, no artillery, no missiles, nothing - you know - of that sort that it meets your criteria and our criteria that Israel is not put in any strategic disadvantage. And also you are in no disadvantage in the event of violation."

"It seems to us that even in the context of an overall settlement that as a minimum need, the Egyptians are going to need some kind of a symbol in a very limited area to demonstrate the symbolism of sovereignty in the immediate Canal area. I mean, these can be conceded, for example, as strict defence personnel in terms of the Canal; itself, where you don't question the Egyptian sovereignty any more than we do. So that, what I am saying is ... that it is likely if we are to get an agreement that there but some limited presence in the 10-km zone, that it could be limited in number and depth and in armament ... this kind of precedence of limitation may really actually set, help set, a useful limit and precedent for the final settlement."

F. SUPERVISION

"Israeli civilian maintenance teams only will remain in the Israel defence structure along the Canal."

"Agreed measures for supervision will be worked out."

"The ~~area~~ between the lines namely the area between A-B and X-Y, will be patrolled by U.N. Observers. The arrangement concerning the number of troops and armament each side will maintain in the zone running from the Canal to the line x-Y and between line A-B to the international frontier between the two countries will be supervised by U.N. military observers. Israel and the UAR may agree to ~~and the~~ restrictions and limitations of numbers of troops and types of armaments."

"The Passes would be positioned by these people, your own, the Egyptians and UNTSO."

"Our notion is that we would advocate an augmented UNTSO with Egyptian and Israel representatives and I told you at the last meeting that Sadat said to me personally, I don't preclude Egyptian-Israeli participation, provided it is under the U.N. ~~idea~~ umbrella. I am basing it on that statement. So I would have thought that in this ~~have~~ circumstance, as I talked to our military people, you would need in addition UNTSO aerial reconnaissance, with Israel and Egyptian representatives right in those planes... not only is it a question of aerial reconnaissance, but your people under this arrangement should have, in our judgment, freedom to move right up to at least the 10-km line. The Egyptian representative would probably want to move to that other line, any other line east of the Passes as well."

Israel Position
(as formulated in 19 April, 1971 paper)

UAR Position
(derived from all sources)

US Comments

A. 1. Canal to be opened within six months of effective date of agreement. Use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel.

UAR will undertake to clear open and operate the Canal for the ships of all nations in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Israeli ships and cargoes will not pass through the Canal until final peace agreement and withdrawal completed.
(Precise timing of opening not stated)

Agreement that Canal should be opened within specified period. Suggestion made that Israel should postpone exercising its right to send Israeli ships.

2. Cease-fire without limitation of time.

A six-months cease-fire, as part of the withdrawal arrangement, to enable Jarring to fix a timetable for implementation of all parts of 242 and the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories.

Israel and UAR will continue to refrain from firing etc. across the cease-fire line while pursuing negotiations under Jarring's auspices.

3. (a) IDF to be stationed at some distance to be specified.
(b) Israeli civilian maintenance teams to remain in Bar-Lev line.

Egyptian administration and control will be restored up to a line east of the three passes beyond that line there will be an area to be patrolled by UN observers. Israel forces will withdraw to a line east of that zone. In Egyptian spokesman statement of June 15, 1971 the line specifically mentioned is from El Arish to Ras Muhammed.

(a) No clear US statement on withdrawal distance since Sisco's "preliminary ideas" of March 6, 1971 when 40 km was specified.
(b) Not a feasible proposition. Sadat did indicate willingness to consider a UN guarantee not to destroy the structures.

4. Egyptian civilian technicians will cross to the east of the Canal

Egyptian administration and control will be restored in evacuated area

Israel Position	UAR Position	US Comments
5. No UAR or any other military personnel shall cross or be introduced into evacuated area	Israel and UAR may agree to restrictions and limitations on number of troops and types of armament in zone from Suez Canal to the international frontier	Military token crossing of Canal essential.
6. UAR thin-out west of the Canal	See no. 5	
7.8. No bridges, no anchoring	-----	7. Okay; 8. Okay
9. Measures for supervision to be worked out.	Area between the lines will be patrolled by UN observers. Implementation of agreement to be supervised by UN observers	Augmentation of UNTSO, elaboration of mandate
10. New line is not considered final. When agreement on final boundaries reached in framework of the settlement IDF will withdraw to it.	Israel undertakes to complete the withdrawal from Egyptian territory to the international frontier	10. Okay
11. Exchange of POWs.	-----	

Page 1 of 1

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress.

2. The second part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

3. The third part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

4. The fourth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

5. The fifth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

6. The sixth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

7. The seventh part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

8. The eighth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

9. The ninth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

10. The tenth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

11. The eleventh part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

12. The twelfth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

13. The thirteenth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

14. The fourteenth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

15. The fifteenth part of the document is a report on the state of the Union.

Israel Position
(as formulated in 19 April 1971 paper)

UAR Position
(derived from all sources)

US Comments

12. Timetable will be so arranged that actual opening of the Canal is assured.

Israel to refrain from hostile acts in the general area of the Suez Canal and not to interfere in the free and secure use of the Canal by international shipping

Agreed that this point had to be cleared up.

13. Agreement will not affect Jarring talks

Undertakings to pursue Jarring negotiations expeditiously looking towards final Peace Agreement envisaged in 242 and Jarring's memo of February 8, 1971.


The Agreement should not be considered an interpretation of 242 but as a step towards its implementation. It is not an end in itself (Rogers to Rabin 29 June 1971. Cable no. 265).

B. GOI requests for USG support -
re : (a) GOI's position on terms of agreement
re : (b) ways and means to deter Soviet moves in and across the Canal.

Agreement is first stage in implementation of 242. Agreement is to be concluded under Jarring's auspices. Partial withdrawal to be arranged under Jarring's auspices as a step in his mission

B. (a) difficult to formulate. However US is going to be involved. Not clear how US could state it. There could be language in the Agreement to disavow claims that Interim Agreement carried implications suggesting what the final Agreement was... Interim Agreement stands on its own two feet... interpretation has to be based on the language of 242 and would not be affected by the Interim Agreement.

(b) Against a Soviet presence on the other side of the Canal, any attempt to do that would make this thing impossible... difficult to say what US might do in the event of things happening but it would take it as a matter of very grave concern The Soviet Union knows that... if there was a thinning-out by the Russians during this period would you change your attitude about moving further back.



~~SECRET~~

Israel Position
(as formulated in 19 April, 1971 paper)

UAR Position
(derived from all sources)

US Comments
(see also attached U.S. paper)

A. 1. Canal to be opened within six months of effective date of agreement. Use by ships and cargoes of all nations, including Israel.

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re : (b) ways and means to deter Soviet moves in and across the Canal.

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(b) Against a Soviet presence on the other side of the Canal, any attempt to do that would make this thing impossible... difficult to say what US might do in the event of things happening but it would take it as a matter of very grave concern. The Soviet Union knows that... if there was a thinning-out by the Russians during this period would you change your attitude about moving further back.

U.S. Paper of 22 April 1971

SECRET

(1) We believe the document contains elements which obviously will require further clarification and adjustment during subsequent negotiations. The U.S. Government is prepared to pass the points contained in paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1-13, of the Israeli document to the U.A.R. Government, to recommend that they be given serious consideration and to tell the U.A.R. Government we are prepared to convey its response to the Government of Israel. We are certain the Government of Israel will appreciate that, if we are to play a role of constructive diplomacy as both sides have asked us to do, we cannot be the advocate for the entirety of the positions of either side. Of the positions set forth in the Israeli document, some are obviously fundamental, others less so. We will, however, emphasize to the U.A.R. Government that we believe the Israeli proposal offers a positive basis for further discussions and exploration and will urge them to reply in a positive spirit.

✓ (2) The U. S. Government position remains as it was stated in the communications cited (President Nixon's letters to Prime Minister Meir of July 23 and December 3, 1970, and the clarifications conveyed by Assistant Secretary Sisco to Ambassador Rabin July 27, 1970).

(3) The U.S. position remains as previously stated: "No Israeli soldiers should be withdrawn from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to Israel has been achieved." We understand fully that Israel's willingness to pull back its forces in accordance with an interim agreement does not create an added obligation to make a further withdrawal in the absence of a peace agreement, and we agree that no added commitment would be involved on the part of Israel. If such an agreement is achieved, it would of course provide a basis for progress in the Jarring talks.

(4) It follows from 3 above that we understand clearly that a pull-back by Israel in accordance with the interim agreement does not

imply Israeli willingness to future withdrawal to the international border or any other line not agreed to in the course of the negotiations. Our view regarding borders remains that Resolution 242 neither endorses or excludes the pre-June 5, 1967 lines, in all or in part, as the lines to which Israel will withdraw in accordance with the final agreement to be reached under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

(5) We are not altogether clear just what Israel is aiming at in paragraph 5. We would be prepared to make clear to the Soviet Union the seriousness of any violation under the terms of any agreement reached on the Canal question, including any Soviet participation in or support of such violations. Other ways and means to deter such moves by the Soviets would depend on the actual circumstances of the situation at the time.

(6) As we have said, the U.S. Government is prepared to play a constructive diplomatic role in assisting the U.A.R. and Israel in reaching agreement on the Canal question so long as both parties wish us to do so. As previously indicated, we have no plans to involve Jarring or the Four in the negotiations.

22 April 1971

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי-ביותר

מס' 205
בשלה 201715 / 5/71

אל : המסרד
מאת: רוטינגטון

ט ט ט ט ט

סודי ביותר

שהח. העתק גזית ראש אמן .

זה עתה התקשר סיסקו טלפוניית ומסר שנתקיימה היום בקהיר פגישה בין ריאד לברגוס. בשלב זה הגיע מבדק ראשוני מברגוס וטרם הגיע הדיווח המפורט וזמלא על השיחה. סיסקו בקש להביא לידיעתנו הנקודות הבאות:

(1) תשובת ריאד לברגוס לא היתה בנויה כתשובה מפורטת סעיף אחר סעיף לדברי סיסקו שנמסרו כהתחשמותו מעמדת ישראל בעת בקורו השני בקהיר. היתה בשיחה זו העברת השקפה מצרית כללית לידיעת ארזב שלא על מנת להעבירה כתשובה לישראל.

(2) ריאד בדבריו לברגוס למעשה חזר על העמדה הקשוחה שבאה לידיע בשני בנאומו הפומבי של סאדאת. הדגש היה על שתי נקודות עקרוניות: (א) ההסדר החלקי הוא במסגרת תביעה לנסיגה ישראלית כוללת. (ב) הדגשת זכותה של מצרים לחצית התעלה ע"י כוחותיה הצבאיים במסגרת הסדר חלקי.

(3) סיסקו ציין שבדברי ריאד אינן נמצאים את אורית הגמישות והנכונות להתקדם לקראת הסדר שחשו בעת בקורים בקהיר. סיסקו חזר ואמר שטרם הגיעו למסקנה סופית מה מטרת הדברים שהושמעו בשיחה בין ריאד לברגוס האם זהו מהלך טקטי קטן שמבוצע ע"י ריאד שהנו ממילא מייצג הגישה הקשוחה לפתרון החלקי, כדי להביא לריכוך עמדת ארזב או באמת חל שנוי בגישת סאדאת לבעיה זו כפי שהם התחשמו ממנה בעת בקורם בקהיר.

(4) ארזב שוקלת תוכנ השיחה וכיצד תמשיכ לטפל בנושא במגמה לעמוד על כוונתו האמיתית של סאדאת. מאחר ואינן תשובת מצרים מופנית לישראל אלא לארזב, מבקש סיסקו לדווח לנו על התפתחות זו.

רב"ט-11111111

הח. דווחם טבל אלון דיין גזית דם אמן (בנפרד).

למחר

גזית העתק ראש אמנ (דרכ ימ)

סודי ביותר

לאחר שמיעת נאומו של סאדאת התקשרתי טלפוניית לסיסקו ושאלתי: האם הוא רואה בעמדת סאדאת כפי שכאח ליידי כיטוי בנאומו היום את תשובת מצרים לארהב.

ב. מאחר ונאמר כי תשובת מצרים תמסר היום עי ריאד לכרגוס - האם אכן נמסרה תשובה מצרית מפורטת לארהב. כמוכח האם אינ בשנוי דרכ מסירתה בחשואה למה שנאמר עי סאדאת לסיסקו (דרכ ביקור פאוזי) משום משמעות מהותית ניכרת. סיסקו השיב שהוא טרם קרא את הטקסט המלא של נאום סאדאת וניסה במקום לענות לשאלתי לאחל לדעת. השיבות שאפ אני טרם קראתי את נאומו והייתי מעדיף בתגובתי להמתינ לקריאת הטקסט המלא, אך עוד יותר הייתי מעדיף לשמוע מסיסקו מה מסרו המצרים בצניור הדיפלומטי. סיסקו השיב שטרם קיבל כל הודעה מכרגוס על פגישה מיועדת בקהיר. סיסקו הוסיף שאינ לו כל מברק על^כאו אינפורמציה ממקורותיו בקהיר. סיסקו לא העלים ממני אכזבתו אמ אכן התשובה תמסר דרכ ריאד לכרגוס. סיסקו הוסיף שבאם יהיה שנוי בדרכ המשכ הכרוך בנושא המחרון התלקי, הרי אי אפשר יהיה להתעלם מן המשמעות של השנוי הנוחלי גם לגבי נושאים שאינם נוהליים. סיסקו אמר שבמידה ויקבל משהו מקהיר על מגעים הוא יתקשר עמי היום או מחר.

במשכ לשיתחנו שאלתי למה התכוונ אחרטונ כאשר טלפנ לרכיב לאחר שיתחנו האחרונה. אחרטונ אמר לרכיב שהמפתח לבעית ירושלים הוא בידי ישראל וביקש להקפיא פעולותינו. שאלתי את סיסקו למה נתכוונ. סיסקו התפתל ואמר שידועה לנו עמדת ארהב בענינ ירושלים ותשאלה איננה רק מה עושים, אלא גם כיצד עושים את אשר אנו עושים בירושלים. כוונתו היא לגבי בעיות פרסום וכיובי

השיבות לסיסקו שמדיניות ישראל לגבי ירושלים חייבת להיות ברורה לארהב. אינ בדעתנו לסטות ממנה כמלוא הננימה, ומוטב שירגיעו הירדנים ולא יצרו בקרבם כל אשליה שישראל תשנה במשהו מפעולותיה בירושלים. סיסקו התחמק מכל וכוח בנושא ואמר רק שרצה להפנות תשומת לבנו לדגישות הנושא וכו'

תאחתי אותו ללא כל ספק שאינ לנו כל כוונה לשנות עמדתנו ופעולנו בענינ ירושלים.

רבינ.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי-ביותר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

אל : המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מס' 200

בשלה 201530 / 5/71

פ י י י י

גזית.

סודי ביותר

י י א ר י א ל י י

מצדדים עם אתרסון.

טרם הגיעו להערכות כלשהן ביחס לנאום סאדאת ומשמעותו. מחכים לדוח מברגוס שהתריעם הבוקר על דבר הזמנתו לריאד לצורכ קבלת תגובה מצרית בנושא התעלה. לשאלתי השיב שלא ברור אם דבר מסירת התשובה היום ע"י ריאד מעיד על שינוי בתכנית שגורו של פאוזי לכאן. יתכן שהיום יקבלו רק תשובה ראשונית ושדברים נוספים יובהרו יותר מאוחר בזמן בקור פאוזי אם אכן יתקיים. אמר שבעצם מבכרים ומ לשמוע מתמצרים את הדברים באופן מודרג ולא דווקא החלטי וסופי שכן מאפשר הדבר גמישות ומקח וממכר. כמו כן העיר (כפי שניתן היה כמובן לצפות) שמן הראוי להתכונן עכשיו לדברים פומביים בוטים מפי סאדאת בהתחשב בצרכיו הפנימיים שבעקבות הצעדים הדרסטיים שנקט לאחרונה. לשון אחרת שסאדאת עשוי לראות צורך לאזן כמה מהם בסגול תדמית תקיפה יותר כלפי ישראל. במקרה זה מה שיקבע יהיה כמובן מה שיאמר במישור הדיפלומטי. סכמנו לחכות ולראות מה יספר ברגוס.

בין השאר ספר כיצד לו אישית אינן כל אשליות או אי הבנות ביחס לעקדי עמדתנו ומובן לו בראש וראשונה שההסדר החלקי חייב להאריך ימים ולא להיות מוקצב בזמן או אחרת. השמע מדבריו בנושא שהוא אישית אכן מבינ העניין ומשלים אתו אבל שלא הוא הדין לגבי אחרים. מאידכ טענ שברור לו שסאדאת לא יכול לוותר על הזכות למעבר אנשי צבא לגדה המזרחית ולו גם בצורה סמלית. שאל בעצם מדוע לא? השיבותי תמציתית שבאשר להסדר החלקי הדבר לא בא בחשבון משום שהוא מובטח לפתוח תיבת פנדורה שכולם עתידים לבכות עליה ולבטח לא מעוניינת ארהב למצוא אצמה מתווכחת עם ישראל יום בהיר אם אכן הופרה או לא סמליות הכח במידה ומזכה אותנו ברשות TO SHOOT BACK. אמר שזה הדבר האחרון שהיו רוצים למצוא עצמם עושים.

מאשר להסדר כללי הדבר פסול מאחר ומפר הוא כבר מראשית הדרכ עקרון מרכזי שפעם היה מקובל גם על ממארהב עד שויתרה על חלקו לפחות במוימ עם

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

2/0008

הסובייטים והוא הצורכ להבטיח פירוזו המלא/סיני.
בהקשר לחילופי הדברים בנושא זה העיר בין השאר אתרשונ שהוא אישית מברכ
על אפשרות ההסדר החלקי במדה רבה משום שהוציא את העוקץ זמנית לפחות

ממשבר היחסים שהיה קיים בינינו בעקבות דחייתנו יזמת יארינג. אמר
שמרגיש חובה אישית לומר לי שאם הנ"ל שלנו מ-19 באפריל מהווה תמלה
האחרונה בנושא ודי שאנו נמצאים על COLLISION COURSE ואין
זו אלא שאלה של זמן לפני שאנו מתנגשים. אמרתי לו שבמקרה כזה לא
יהיה בכך משום חידוש.

שוחחנו כללית על התרשמויות המזכיר ובמיוחד מהבקור בארצ. מכל ומעט
שאמר בנדון התרשמתי שיצא פחות או יותר כפי שנכנס.
כל הנל איננו ליחוס.

ארגוב==

שהח רוהם מכל אלון דיין גזית רם אמן

לב/אר

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ממישראל וואשינגטון

סודי ביוגר

המשרד

רביץ

שיחת שה"ח-ברבור 22 דנא. נכח זורהלן.

שה"ח אמר שלפני נסיעת רוח"ס סוכס איחה שיואמרו לשגריר כמה דברים במקביל לשיחות הסתקיימות בוואשינגטון.

נשק: שה"ח ציין כי סיסקו הודיע לנו על קיום *REVIEW*. אך מצב זה קיים זה זמן מרובה ואנו שואלים רשמית מתי יסוכס ה- *REVIEW*, ומתי נדע על תוצאותיו. שה"ח שאל אם נכונות הנחות אלו - אחת שהנשיא קבע עקרון של שמירת המאזן במגמת קבע ועצמאית ללא קשר לסוגיות אחרות. שתיים שיש מדיניות של יחסי רכש רצופים. שלוש שסוכס כי אין לפעול דרך פתיחות וסיכומים רועשים כי אם על ידי ביצוע רצוף ושקט שהרי על התיאוריה של הנושא יש כבר סיכומים מחייבים. ברבור אישר את כל הנ"ל ושם דגש מיוחד על כך שאין חובה לפרסם מספרים ותאריכים וכך סוכס ב- 1970. שה"ח אמר כי אפשר לשתוק על אספקה אך אי אפשר לשתוק על חוסר אספקה והתקרבות סיום הסכמים קודמים מחייבת טיפול. אין אנו מגיבים על פירסומים בדבר עיכוב אך עובדה היא שככל שיהיה עיכוב יקשה למנוע פירסומים ושאלות.

הסדר מיוחד: שה"ח אמר שלאור שיחות בוואשינגטון רצונו להבהיר כי ישראל נשארת דבקה לנאמר במיסמך 19 באפריל ובשיחות שהחנהלו בארץ וכן שהיא רוצה בהסכם 2/...

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סודי ביוחר

זה בתנאי שיהלום את צרכיה הבטחוניים החיוניים כפי שהוסברו במיסמך ובשיחות.
 לאחר שרוב"רס סיסקו תיאר את עמדתנו כקונסטרוקטיבית מסר לנו סיסקו את
 התרשמויותיו מקהיר. עכשיו שמענו נאום סאדאת. ברבור וזורהלן התערבו
 ברגישות מסוימת והדגישו כי אמנם סאדאת התבטא בקהיר כפי שמסר לנו סיסקו.
 עכשיו יש לברר אם סאדאת שינה מעמו או שמא אפשר להפריד בין הרטוריקה לבין
 התגובה הדיפלומטית. ברבור סבור כי זה עדיין אפשרי ואחרי בירורים תהיה לארה"ב
 התרשמות יותר מוסמכת. לברבור לא היו ידיעות על שיחת ריאד-ברגוס. ברבור אמר
 כי מכל מקום זה *helpful* ששה"ח אישר מחדש כי ישראל מעוניינת בהסדר לפי
 המיסמך והשיחות.

לשכת השר

ד"ר חוקר את המסמך
 לקים לשלוח מחזורים
 בלשכה

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TO THE HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN SENATE AND HOUSE HEARINGS
ON THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
OF THE SENATE
AND
THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON THE
JULY 1, 1954

WITNESSES

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

210
מילר

רביץ.

שלך 207 ויה/287.

מ"מ רוח"ם ושה"ח מבקשים שתנהג בפגישותיך עם שמשון וקרדינל מלהלן :

א. על יסוד דיווחי שמשון היוני להבהיר עמדותינו. הדגיש שעמדתנו נשארה כפי שבאה לידי ביטוי במסמך 19 אפריל והשיחות בארץ. עשה זאת לפי שלנו 255 כמחוקן בשלנו 264. מטרת המהלך הן להקן אטא התרשמויות מוטעות to put the record straight ולחזק עמדת הסיקור שלנו. דבר זה הוא היוני גם בשל הדאגה הסובעת בשלך יח/287 סעיף 3. דברי אתרסון על collision course טריזשים הצורך לחזק חודעת יציבות עמדתנו שנשארה בהחלט למסמכנו. סבורנו שבכך אנו נענים גם לעצתו של קרדינל.

ב. בענין המסקת האש ואי-החציה חשוב שהדגיש במיוחד עמדתנו בהחלט לשלנו 255 (סעיפים ג' ו-ד')

ג. שותפים להרגשתך שמשון לא פטר לך כל הנאמר בשדר הטערי. תבע נא טענו שיהיונו במלוא הוכנו. שאל אותו אם יברי טאדאט בנאומי על ולמק דברי רוג'רט כאילו לארה"ב אין הבעות טעורים אמנם טבוטסיים על מה שנאמר על ידי רוג'רט לסאדאט. להלן מתוך נאום סאדאט : "כאשר הגיע לכאן רוג'רט, ואני סיפרתי לכם במועצת האומה, הדבר הראשון שהוא אמר, היה : "אני מוא, ואינני מבקש טעורים דבר, מצרים עשה כל המוטל עליה." אני אומר זאת והעולם כולו, לרבות רוג'רט, שומע את דברי. הוא אמר : "לא אבקש טעורים דבר. מצרים עשה את המוטל עליה. הבה נדבר על היוזמה..." "הגיע אלי רוג'רט. אני כבר מסרתי לכם באן פרטים על מה שהתנהל. כפי שאמרתי לכם, החל הוא בשיחתו באומרו : "אין לי דבר לבקשו טעורים, שכן מצרים עשה את כל המוטל עליה."

- ד. הצג נא נושא האספקה בצורה הרחבה והמודגשת ביותר. בהתייחס מירבית העמידם על -
- (1) חביעתנו ל- ongoing supplies.
 - (2) הטיחתנו מתי יסחיים ה- review שלהם.
 - (3) טחנתחונים הנוספים שהם מעוניינים כי נסמך להם כדי לקצר תהליך ה- review.

אם יאן הרוג'רט יאני בריק בהוליוו.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

סודי ביותר

זמס' 170

נשלח: 181730 מאי 71

אל : המשרד

מאת: וושינגטון

מ י ד י

סודי ביותר.

רוחם, שהח, גזית. העתק ראמן (הועבר כמס. 42)

סודי ביותר

שיחה עם סיסקו בנוכחות אתרסון, טסקהאוז, ארגוב ורכיב.
א. רכש.

אמרתי כי בסופ החודש יגיעו ארצה אחרוני הפנטומים. שר הבטחון
העלה את הנושא בתקווה שנקבל תשובה חיובית. יש לי הנחיות להעלות

הנושא מחדש. סיסקו ענה :
AND I AM UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL
YOU THAT THE MATTER IS UNDER REVIEW.

ב. ההסדר החלקי.

סיסקו שאל אם זו באמת דעתנו שהמאורעות במצרים יביאו לדחיה בסוגיית
ההסדר המיוחד. הואיל ולארהב אין אינדיקציה שכל יהיה. הוא רוצה
לדעת אם זאת היא דעתה הרשמית של ממשלת ישראל.
אמרתי כי יש אנשים שחושבים כי עלולה להיות דחיה עקב ההתפתחויות במצרים,
אחרים חושבים שלא. תוכ עשרה ימים לבטח נדע.

סאדאת עבר עימות רציני עם מתנגדיו וקשה לדעת באיזו מידה יוכל להיות
צמוד ללוח הזמנים שקבע, לא למדיניות אלא ללוח הזמנים. אני מקווה
שארהב לא תרצה להשפיע על לוח הזמנים עי שתפגין נכונות לויתורים.
ישנם כאלה החוששים שכעת סאדאת יגיד כי הוא קיבל על עצמו סיכונים
ועכשו ארהב צריכה לעזור לו בהשגת ויתורים ושעמדה כזו תזכה להבנה
מסוימת בארהב.

סיסקו שאל אם ישראל מעונינת שסאדאת יוכל לחזק מעמדו
(CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION).

מחלקת המודיעין

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אמרתי כי שאלה דומה הוצגה לנו לא פעם בקשר לחוסיינ ואנחנו בעד
חזוק חוסיינ וסאדאת אולם לא על תשובתנו. ישנם אינטרסים שישאל
איננה יכולה להקריב כדי לחזק שליט ערבי זה או אחר. אנו חייבים לשקול
דברים לגופם אך כמובן אי אפשר להתעלם מהשאלה מיהו הגורם הנמצא
בשליטון ואם יוכח שיכוא צמצום בהשפעה הרוסים במצרים הרי טוב.
סיסקו אמר כי הוא מסכים לגישה זהירה זו. הוא לא שאל את שאלתו
בהנחה שזה צריך להיעשות על תשובת ישראל. לישראל יש אינטרסים חיוניים
וקיימים דברים שהערבים מחסימים להם תשיבות רבה. ארזב לא תזרז את
סאדאת אלא תחכה לתשובתו. אחד הדברים הכי חשובים שסאדאת אמר הוא שלא
צריך להיחפז ויש לעבד כל דבר בזהירות ובקפדנות בכדי שלא תהיינה
אי הכנות. כאן הוסיף סיסקו :

הוא רוצה להגיד לנו בדיוק מה שהוא אמר היום בוועדת החוץ של הבית לאמור :
סאדאת אמנם הבהיר לרוג'ס ולו שהוא רוצה הסדר חלקי אך מה שקרה
בצכיה ודקטרינת ברזנייב מלמדים אתנו שיותר קל להכניס את הרוסים
מאשר להוציאם. הרוסים נמצאים במצרים משני טעמים :

א. כדי לחזק את מצרים נגד ישראל.

ב. לשם נוכחות בימ התיכון ובמפרץ הפרסי.

פרט לעזרה הצבאית שהם מושיטים למצרים הם מסייעים לכל הכלכלה
המצרית. אם נוכל ליצור תנאי שלום במקום מתיחות יתכן ואפשר יהיה
לצמצם השפעתם. אך זאת רק לטווח רחוק. סיסקו חזר על כך הכדור בידי
מצרים אולם רק בשאלת ההסדר מיוחד.

אמרתי כי בישראל לגמרי לא מאושרים שהוא אמר לסאדאת בשיחתו עמו על
ההסדר החלקי כי אין זו המילה האחרונה של ישראל. סיסקו אמר כי הוא
חש שכך יהיה והוא רוצה להסביר לנו את הקונטקסט. סאדאת ניסה לתת לו
את הרושם שאין זו המילה האחרונה מצד מצרים הוא מצידו אמר שהוא מתרשם
שהדבר כך בשני הצדדים. סיסקו הוסיף:

WE HAVE NOT WRITTEN A WORD AND WE MAY NEVER REACH THE WRITING
STAGE. IT IS VERY WISE THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING ON AN ORAL BASIS.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

3

מברק נכנס-מסווג

אתרשונ העיר בהמשך השיחה כי כשאנחנו באים לשקול את האינטרסים החיוניים
חשוב לשקול איזה אינטרס יש לנו שבקהיר ישלוט הממשל הנכונ.

ג. יארינג.

סיסקו אמר כי הם אמרו ליארינג שישנה קצת התקדמות. שהם העבירו למצרים
רעיונות קונסטרוקטיביים שלנו. הם תיארו כאזני יארינג רעיונות אלה
בצורה יותר חיובית מאשר מגיע להם. באשר לחשובתנו ליארינג אמרו כי אין
שינוי בעמדת ישראל כפי שהוגשה ב-26 לפברואר ואין להם רושם שיארינג
ימשיך בהקשר הזה כרגע. גם דעתו של יארינג בנידון לא השתנתה.
בעניין ירדן הם הדגישו שאין זה רצוי שיארינג יגיש ניירות. יארינג אמר
להם שאי פעם יעשה זאת מבלי לאמר מתי. התרשמו שאין לו כוונה להגיש
נייר על ירדן בעתיד הנראה לעין. דיברו עם יארינג על אפשרות שיטפל
בנושא ירדן בעל פה הואיל ומצאו חוסר מנותח בירדן. המלך מפחד שהוא
נשאר בצד. אהב השפיעה על ירדן לדחות כינוס מועביט. היום קיבלו
הודעה מהירדנים שהם רוצים לדבר עם אהב נוספות בנידון. טוקאן נפגש
עם יארינג ובודאי אמר לו את הדברים ישירות. שאלתי מתי יארינג יחזור
למוסקבה. סיסקו אמר שהוא התרשם שיארינג יבדוק אם יש מקום לדיאלוג
בעפ על ירדן. הרושם הוא שהוא יחזור בעוד כמה ימים. סיסקו אמר :

TELL ME THAT THERE IS ANYTHING YOU CAN DO ON JORDAN.

WE WOULD LIKE TO AVOID A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM
WHICH IS GOING TO BE EMBARRASSING TO US, AND MIGHT AFFECT WHAT
WE ARE TRYING TO DO ON AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

אמרתי כי אנחנו מאמינים שהפתח להסדר הוא באמצעות מצרים. אם ברצונ
יארינג להמשיך בהנחה ששני הנירות שהוא קיבל מהצדדים מהווים עמדות
ולא תנאים הוא יכול להמשיך.
בהקשר להסדר החלקי המאמצים צריכים להיות מכוונים לבדיקת אפשרות זו.
אמרנו כי אנחנו מוכנים לדבר על הסדר חלקי או ישירות עם מצרים
או באמצעות אהב. להעביר נושא זה לגורם אחד פירושו יהיה :

THE GAME IS OVER.

בעית ירושלים היא בעיה אמוציונלית. אם יארינג יטפל בנושא זה אפילו כעפ יהפך הדבר למכשול חדש. אם קיימת תקווה כל שחיה להגיע להסדר חלקי הרי זה ידק אם נשים את יתר הדברים במקרה. אני מאמין שיש לארח מספיק השפעה כדי לעצור את ירדן אלא אם כן רוצים להכשיל כל סיכוי להסדר חלקי. את הנושא הירדני יעלה כעת באמצעות יארינג או מועביט לא יושג דבר ורק יתווסף מכשול חדש. סיסקו אמר כי אין לו הרושם שכונת ירדן להכשיל את ההסדר החלקי. הקושי של ירדן הוא, וזאת הוא אומר מבלי להזדהות איתו, שבנוסף לעובדה שהם נמצאים בצד המ מודאגים מהנושא שצדדים זה פאקטו ננקטים בו כל הזמן : THAT ARE PREJUDICIAL TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

שאלתי מה ירוויחו מהעלאת הנושא במועביט. סיסקו ענה שאבסולוטית קשה להצביע על מה ירוויחו. אולם יפגינו לעולם הערבי את האינטרס שלהם בשאלת ירושלים וינסו להשיג ושהיית ייחמאציימי בירושלים. אמרתי כי זאת הם לא ישיגו אף פעם באמצעות מועביט. סיסקו אמר כי בענין ירושלים הם אמרו שכאן יש בעיה עם ומלכ. כשרוגרס ביקור ברומא מצאו: THE POPE HIGHLY CRITICAL AND CONCERNED WITH ISRAEL'S POLICY OVER JERUSALEM.

אמרתי כי אם ענין ירושלים יעלה באמצעות יארינג או במועביט הדבר יצמצם בחצי את הסיכויים להשגת הסדר חלקי. זהו הרושם האישי שלי. סיסקו אמר כי הוא אינו לוחץ הוא רק מסביר לנו המצב. ארחב רוצי להמנע מכינוס מועביט ומהצורך לנקוט עמדה פומבית בנידון. דיון במועביט רק יקשיח את העמדות ולא יהיה מוגבל ירושלים בלבד, כן לא יעזור הדבר להסדר חלקי. הוא מקווה שנשקול בכובד ראש מה שנשמע מיארינג מבחינה טקטית ושלא נסגור דלתות.

אחרי שחזרנו לשגרירות התקשר אתרטון עם רביב ואמר לו כי סיסקו מבקש להוסיף שהמפתח בשאלת ירושלים הוא ביד ישראל במידה והוא תסכים להקפיד פעילותו.

האמנם השתמע מדברי סיסקו בשיחה אולם הוא נתבקש להבהיר זאת מחדש. ה הביע פליאה על ההדגשה החוזרת של נושא ירושלים ושאל ממה כל

זה נובע. אתרסון אמר כי זה בעקבות המסג' שקיבלו היום. רביב שאל אם בכל זאת לא מתקבל על הדעת כי חוסיין שהתנגד כל הזמן להסדר החלקי רוצה להכשיר ההסדר החלקי הוא רק שואף להגן על האינטרסים שלו.

ד. נפט.

סיסקו סיפר שהגיעה אליהם תביעה של דינשטיין מה- TAPLINE לשלם דמי מעבר והוא מקווה כי לא נלחצ בנדידון. לא היו לנו פרטים על הפניה.

סיכום.

הנושא המרכזי בשיחה זו שהעסיק את ארהב הוא לחצ רציני עליהם בעניין ירושלים והצורך במידה מסוימת להעסיק את יארינג. לדעתו על ישראל לומר ברור לארהב שאין מקום עתה להרחבת הטיפול בנושאים נוספים מעל ומעבר לטיפול בבעיית ההסדר החלקי. לדעתו על תקוע בפגישתו עם יארינג לשמוע מיארינג ולא לנקוט כל יוזמה מצדנו. אם יארינג יציע טיפול בנושא הירדני, לדעתו על תקוע להשיב במצב רגיש זה של ההתפתחות במצרים מוטב להמתין ולראות מה יקרה וכיצד תתקדם מצרים לקראת הפתרון החלקי. אחרי הכל דומני שהנושא שיש לנו עניין פחות מכל נושא אחד שיטופל עי' יארינג הוא נושא ישראל-ירדן. הנני מציע שבשלב זה נעמוד בתקיפות ולא נכנס לכל יוזמה של דיאלוג עם יארינג בעניין ירדן. אם ירדן תעלה עניין ירושלים במועביט הרי כולנו יודעים שמועביט איננה מסוגלת להחליט כל החלטה ממשית. עדיף שיתקיים דיון במועביט מאשר תחת איום של דיון במועביט נכנס עתה לדיאלוג עם יארינג ונחיה את שליחותו.

באשר לתביעתכם להעלות נושא הרכש קיבלתי תשובה קצרה בדיוק כפי שצפיתי וכל נסיוני לחזור ולהעלות הנושא עלה בתוהו. בשלב זה נראה לי שכל אשר ניתן להעשות הוא להמתין ולראות מה יקרה במצרים. להמתין עד שארהב תקבל תשובת מצרים לגבי הפתרון החלקי. הקפאת כל נסיון להעלות במסגרת שליחות יארינג הנושא הירדני. אם ירדן תיזום העלאת עניין ירושלים במועביט-להפגין זלזול מוחלט בעניין (הייתי שולח לדיון דרג 10 במשלחתנו באום) ובוועוד שכוע- שבועיים להתחיל בפעולה בין ידידינו בסינאט בעניין הרכש אינני מציע להתחיל בכך עתה משום שעלינו לאפשר לחלופ לגל ההתפתחויות הכללי של הציבור האמריקאי והסינאט מהישגי ביקור רוגרס במזהה ומלכו של סאדאת. עתה אין כל סכוי להצליח לעורר הנושא (זאת לאחר שיהיה עם ידיד בסינאט).

רבינ.

Departure statement

Mr. Rogers made this statement on departing:

Ladies and gentlemen, as we leave Israel I want to say how much I've enjoyed our short stay here. We've had a very busy two days indeed. I think the visit has been worth while. As you know, we discussed principally the question of how we could achieve a peace agreement with Egypt and Jordan, a peace agreement that would be lasting and bring permanent peace to this part of the world. We also talked about a possible interim agreement on very specific and concrete terms.


Those talks have resulted in further clarification of the view of the Israeli Government. While we were in Cairo, we had very specific discussions with the Government of Egypt and we think that there has been some narrowing of the gap.

I should say that there are considerable areas of disagreement on differences that remain, but in view of the discussions we've had here, I've asked Mr. Sisco to return to Cairo to provide the Egyptian officials with certain clarifications that we were able to find here.

I would hasten to add that I would hope that the media do not attach any undue significance to Mr. Sisco's visit. It is consistent with the discussion that I had with President Sadat that if we were in a position to further clarify some of the ideas that we discussed with him as a result of our visit here in Israel, that we would continue to discuss those matters with him. And that is why I have asked Mr. Sisco to return to Cairo for that purpose. I think he will fly with us to Rome, and then if arrangements can be made, he will go from Rome to Cairo.

Again, let me say to the people of this grand country how much Mrs. Rogers and I appreciate the hospitality that has been shown to us everywhere we've been here, and how impressed we are with the visible results of the dedication, the creativity and the patriotism of this country and the people in this country.

I leave with the fondest recollections. I hope that I'll have an opportunity to return to Israel many times in the years ahead.



ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Although this is my first visit to your country, in many ways I feel I already know it well. The bonds of friendship which bind the United States and Israel are as old as your state and are such that no American can feel a stranger in Israel.


The constancy of America's support for the well-being and security of Israel is an axiom of our relationship, on which I need not elaborate today. In a letter which I will deliver to the Prime Minister, President Nixon states his conviction that Israel's security in the long run can only come from a final binding peace settlement with its Arab neighbors. He also states that American interests are deeply involved in the issue of war and peace in the Middle East and in the diplomatic efforts to achieve that peace.

This search for peace will be the central theme of the talks that we will have, and I am looking forward to our talks, the talks with your Prime Minister, your Foreign Minister, other of your government leaders, as well as with members of the Knesset, and friendly, as they always are between us.

We believe more can and must be done to impart new momentum to the negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. My talks in Arab capitals will only reinforced my conviction that there has never been — and may not be again for a long time to come — a better opportunity than exists today to move toward the just and lasting peace pursuant to the Security Council's people.

While the possibilities of renewing progress toward an overall settlement will be the principal focus of interest of our discussions, I expect also to explore and exchange specific and concrete ideas on the question of the interim Suez Canal agreement. We believe that if Israel and Egypt could reach such an interim agreement, it would not only contribute to the climate for a continuation of the cease-fire, which we believe is so important and which is approaching its 10th month, but would also facilitate the negotiations being conducted under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

This is an unusual time in our history. The nations in this area have the opportunity to take wise and decisive action. There are risks in agreeing to peace — there are greater risks in failing to do so. Israel has experienced and met the challenge and agony of warring war. I am confident that Israel will equally meet the challenge and indeed the agony of making peace. I am confident that, if we work together, his- tory will judge us well. This is the message I want to be able to convey to your Prime Minister from President Nixon when I talk with her. And the message that he has asked me to convey toward the just and lasting peace to your government and to your people.



SECRET

A. U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE - F.Y. 1972

I. The basic economic issue facing Israel is its balance of payments problem. This will continue to be the cardinal economic problem, irrespective whether or not a political settlement is attained. The maintenance of the military balance is dependent on Israel's economic strength.

(a) Notwithstanding the constant and considerable increase in exports, the current deficit continues to grow. In 1970 the deficit amounted to \$ 1.25 billion, and in 1971 it is estimated to total \$ 1.46 billion.

(b) In recent years, the high defense expenditure has been the main cause for the increased deficit. The military imports constitute 80% of the aggregate increase in the deficit, during the period 1966-1970. Total defense imports for 1966 were \$ 166 million and for 1971 they are estimated to reach the figure of \$ 855 million.

The total defense expenditure (direct and indirect) has increased at an unprecedented rate and its share in the GNP will be in 1971 as high as 30%. No significant decrease in this high percentage is foreseen for the next few years.

(c) In order to sustain the high defense burden and at the same time, increase exports, fast development must be continued. Therefore, capital goods will continue to constitute a substantial part of imports. Imports for the purpose of investments (direct and indirect) totalled \$ 475 million in 1970.

(d) Capital imports to Israel from established sources are financing the bulk of the deficit in its current account. But due to the heavy defense imports, regular capital inflow does not suffice to finance the entire deficit. The \$ 500 million loan extended by the U.S. Government in F.Y. 1971 helped to bridge this gap. This timely assistance is greatly appreciated.

II. In January 1971, Israel submitted the "Orange Memorandum" to U.S.G. This memorandum specified the need for special aid of \$ 500 million in F.Y. 1972. On his recent visit to Washington, the Minister of Finance discussed the subject with U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of AID, Assistant Secretary Sisco and other U.S. officials.

III. Last month, Ambassador Y. Rabin submitted to the U.S.G. two notes. The first note, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, was a request for a loan to finance military purchases amounting to \$ 300 million, on concessional terms. The terms envisaged are: a 25 year credit, 5 years grace, and 3% interest rate. Such favorable terms are of greatest importance, in light of the very great external indebtedness (\$ 2.8 billion at the end of 1971). The second note addressed to the Administrator of AID was a request for \$ 200 million Supporting Assistance grant, within the framework of the Foreign Aid Legislation. Supporting Assistance is vital to Israel, since:

- (a) It is not necessarily tied to military procurements, and
- (b) It will reduce the heavy pressure of the servicing of our external debt.

These payments on account of capital and interest will this year amount to approximately 500 million dollars.

Under U.S. Foreign Aid Legislation, Israel meets the criteria and is eligible to receive such grant.

It is assumed that with regard to credits for military purchases, the Administration has included the requested \$ 300 million item in its budget proposal for FY 1972. However, regarding the request for Supporting Assistance, no U.S.G. determination has yet been made.

A sympathetic and favorable consideration of this request by the U.S.G. would be greatly appreciated.

B. PLAN FOR A BINATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION

- I. The subject was first raised by Mr. Sapir with Dr. Shultz on February 10, 1971.
- II. On February 12, 1971, a memorandum on the subject was submitted to Dr. Schlesinger, Deputy to Dr. Shultz, to Mr. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, and to the U.S. Treasury. Simultaneously, it was submitted to Ambassador Barbour in Tel-Aviv.
- III. The idea is to establish a binational foundation. The Israel Government debt in Israeli pounds to the U.S. Government is about IL. 600 million (as of June 30, 1973). This amount is scheduled to be repaid until the year 2001. Under the proposal the IL. 600 million will be prepaid by the Government of Israel and transferred to the Foundation. The income from the foundation would be used for research, scientific translations, and educational purposes. The Trustees of the Foundation will be Americans and Israelis on a basis of parity. The Government of Israel is prepared either to match the U.S. grant of IL. 600 million, or alternatively to match the income of the Foundation from the said counterpart funds which will have been converted into a grant.
- IV. The U.S. Officials showed sympathetic interest in this program, which is now being reviewed. It was felt that it may prove mutually beneficial to both Israel and the U.S. and that it might serve as an example for other countries.

7 May 1971

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1971

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I know how pleased Secretary Rogers is to have the opportunity to make his first visit to Israel and to see, as I have during my own visits, what an exciting, beautiful, and dynamic country it is.

Through Secretary Rogers I want to convey to you and your people my greetings and best wishes. I am particularly pleased that he will have this opportunity to discuss with you directly our mutual concerns and our hopes for peace in the Middle East.

There is, of course, no need for me to reiterate here our continuing and strong support for Israel's security and for a final binding peace settlement with your neighbors, which alone can bring security over the long run. Our actions over the past two years speak more forcefully in this regard than any words.

American interests are deeply and vitally involved in the issue of war and peace in the Middle East and the diplomatic efforts to achieve a binding peace agreement. We cannot but be engaged, along with Israel, in the struggle for peace and in maintaining that peace. I know

you will give Secretary Rogers the most sympathetic hearing as our two countries seek to work together, as we must, to find the road to peace and security for you and your neighbors.

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Her Excellency
Golda Meir
Prime Minister of Israel

5000' n'l n'l
M E E T I N G

May 7, 1971
4:45 p.m.
Tel-Aviv

Participating: Prime Minister Golda Meir
Deputy Prime Minister Y. Allon
Foreign Minister A. Eban
Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan
Minister of Finance P. Sapid
Ambassador Rabin
Dr. Herzog
Mr. A. Lourie
Mr. S. Dinitz
Mr. M. Gazit
Mr. Elitzur
Mr. Avidar

U.S. Secretary of State Rogers
Ambassador W. Barbour
Asst. Sec. State Joseph Sisco
Mr. Atherton
Mr. McCloskey

(MR. ROGERS gives Prime Minister Meir a letter from the President).

MRS. MEIR: The floor is yours.

MR. ROGERS: You stole my line. (laughter). On the overall settlement of the Yarring mission, I don't think it would be productive to talk of it any length today. We would hope very much that there would be some way to get those negotiations going again so that there can be an active exchange. I realize that you have answered the questions, but maybe there is some way that you could provide supplementary information or he could ask another question or something to get it going. I think it would be unfortunate if it appears his mission is ended. Because we all agreed that that is the objective, a peace mission pursuant to that resolution and if his mission aborts and he leaves or is totally inactive, then that part of the negotiation will come to an end and there will be again sort of despair. No doubt about it, in our country and throughout many parts of the world, there is hope now. We have got to somehow keep that hope alive. But I think that is all I'd care to say about that today.

I know Mr. Sisco and General Dayan had some discussions this morning about the possibilities of an interim settlement. I thought maybe it would be worthwhile if you agree, to take the paper that we have, that you have provided us with and consider the points one by one.

MRS. MEIR: If you don't mind, the Minister of Finance has something to say, not on these questions, and then the Minister of Defense on the specific problem, and then we can go on.

MINISTER OF FINANCE SAPIR (reads prepared statement).

MR. ROGERS: I have no questions, thank you. We will obviously give this very serious consideration. You have made a copy of this available.

MR. DAYAN: I would just like to sum up the main points in this paper, on what we call the order of battle. I think these figures were agreed on by your people, and I am sure of course about our figures. Now, we believe in Egypt there will be 575, in Syria, 265 and then in Iraq, Jordan and Libya together 290 aircraft. All the Arab countries in this list will have 1,130. We will have this year 283. I think that it would be right at least to add together the Egyptian and the Syrian and that would make 840 vis-a-vis our 283. This is in April of this year, one month ago. In addition to the above figure, we have to take into account the Soviet planes in Egypt which are not here. Now next year, in 1972, we assume there will be ^{in Egypt} 625, in Syria 290, in Jordan, Iraq and Libya 335. That is to say, the total Arab air force will be 1,250. And if we get all our requirements fulfilled, and I hope so, then we would have 405 by the end of next year, December 1972.

I think that we have to take into consideration the surface to air missiles which have increased and now there are about more than a hundred, we think something between 100 and 117 operational SAM 2 and 3, and of them we believe there are about 40 operational batteries along the Suez Canal.


Now about our requirements. The Prime Minister requested your President in September of last year for 54 aircraft, F-4, of which we got 12, that is to say, we are still waiting for 42. If we could get about 18 aircraft during this year and 24 during the next year, then we could consider our requirements met. About the Skyhawks, the A-4, we requested 120 and 20 have been approved and 18 we were allowed to have a contract on. And on 82 we are still awaiting a positive reply. Now, this would cover the 1971-72. We would like to submit an order to the manufacturer for 1973, and if we could now place an order for 36 F-4, then they would be delivered during 1973 and '74 and if we could place an order for 25 A-4, then again they will be delivered during 1973-74. All this and probably a little more in detail is in the paper, and I am sure that you know all this.

The only thing that I may add is what whatever the political development will be, I believe that unless we can maintain our basic forces and strength, and the critical part of this is our air force, unless we can maintain that, I don't believe really that any political arrangement will hold good. Because the basic thing is to have the power and the strength for our own protection and then we can have different kinds of arrangements. And I am afraid that unless we can get something like that during the years 1971, 72, 73 and 74, then we shall get to be so weak that we won't have the minimum strength of our air force.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you.

MR. SISCO: Madame Prime Minister, we thought it would be helpful both of us if we took a little time to talk concretely about the points that are contained in the piece of paper that you gave us a couple of weeks ago. You will recall that in the discussion between the Secretary and Minister there were some general comments and we said to you we thought there were positive elements in the proposal as well as others that might prove difficult and subsequently we also said to you that we didn't want to prejudge the matter and that we were prepared to put forward the piece of paper that you passed to us if this was your desire, to the UAR. And to be candid, the reason we decided on that and to say that to you, Madame Prime Minister, is that we were particularly sensitive to the fact that we didn't want you and your government to feel you had to go through a long and prolonged negotiation on the principal elements that you had put forward to us. If these were our views, if we had indicated at that time we were prepared on the assumption that we thought some of the things were positive and some difficult from the point of view of the other side, we were nevertheless prepared to go ahead. And I think as it turned out, as you know, we went right ahead and we did not put forward any proposition but rather we had a rather specific exploration of the various elements that might go into an interim settlement while we were in Cairo.

In the discussion that Minister Dayan and I had this morning, I think that at the outset the fundamental question was asked by both sides; I think it is fair and understandable and entirely reasonable that you should ask what is your impression? Is the UAR ready for a Canal agreement? Are



serious about wanting an agreement? Do they seem to want to go ahead and try this out? A second question which we discussed was, will the Egyptians or do the Egyptians want to operate the Canal as well as open the Canal? What is your impression on that? And third, we also discussed the question of the cease fire. And I in turn asked the same question on our behalf. We wanted to be very, very sure that this was your desire as well, that you really want to go ahead and try to work out an interim settlement.

I gave the following as my impression, and Mr. Secretary, I haven't had a chance to fill you in on what I said here, but I am sure if you have views to the contrary, you will add or subtract. Certainly my impression is that Cairo is serious about wanting to go ahead and try to work out an interim agreement. They, as you know, relate it pretty directly to an overall settlement. They see it as a stage towards that overall settlement. They certainly do not want any interim settlement to become an end in itself, as the Secretary pointed out yesterday. But certainly our impression is that the door is completely open to further exploration on interim settlement. So I would answer that first question in the affirmative.

Does the UAR want to operate the Canal as well as open it? Well, my impression here is that they see the Canal as theirs, they operated it, that they are prepared to undertake obligations as they relate to clearing and opening and operating the Canal.

MR. ROGERS: Sadat said he wants to.

MR. SISCO: So again, I think our answer is an affirmative one.

Third, what about the question of his willingness to stop the fighting.

the cease fire, whichever way we want to express this. I want to really repeat what I said this morning, namely, we believe that the UAR is prepared for a cease fire, but obviously the emphasis that we found in Cairo is a cease fire based on a limited period rather than the more- open-ended specified period. I mentioned parenthetically this morning, Mr. Secretary, that as we discussed this question of an interim settlement, Sadat used the very same language which our Israeli friends used, namely that he saw the interim settlement as a test of peace. He used that particular phrase. From our point of view, we favor, Madame Prime Minister, the longest possible extension of the cease fire that would prove feasible in any negotiation with Cairo. We understand your desire, in this sort of a situation, not to be confronted with a threat that the shooting will open tomorrow, and we understand this view. And as far as we are concerned, if we could achieve an indefinite cease fire it would be all the better. But bear in mind the description which the Secretary gave yesterday and I added this morning, this great emphasis that we found in Cairo that the interim agreement must not be an end in itself. And our own feeling is that some formula would be found. I think both you and I feel that some formula could be found that gives as a practical matter an indefinite character to the cease fire, which I personally think would meet the practical needs of the situation.

MR. ROGERS: I just want to add that I think it is unrealistic to think they will say we will have a permanent cease fire. I think that would totally undermine the possibility of this interim settlement. On the other

hand, when I made the argument to Sadat that it is to his advantage not to have a limited duration, I thought it made some impression on him. I said to him: it looks silly to have it for a limited duration and now it is finished and nothing happens. I think it is possible to have an agreement that appears to have neither a limited nor a non-limited duration. I think that could be worked out. In any event, I don't think it is feasible to think he would even consider saying: if we enter into this interim agreement and after a short period look forward to a final settlement, that means I will completely give up my right forever to start hostilities again. Furthermore, it would be meaningless if he did. So I would hope that we could proceed on the theory that maybe we could work out some language that would satisfy both sides.

MR. SISCO: But you agree with me, Mr. Secretary, that as a practical matter we could press for the longest possible period that would be involved?

MR. ROGERS: To me, the present situation is ideal. There is no cease fire. So he doesn't have a cease fire that extends to February or the end of the year or next year. There just isn't any fighting going on. So he is not under pressure to do anything. So everyone takes it for granted now. Why isn't that a pretty good situation, particularly if you have something going on? I mean, work being done on the Canal, and Yarring meeting with people. So there isn't going to be any big demands or anything.

MR. ALLON: The Egyptian press says that Sadat made clear to you - I am not sure whether they are right - that he won't extend the practical cease fire after September this year.

MR. ROGERS: No, no. He did say that during the interim agreement he wanted a cease fire of limited duration, but as I say, we had this discussion and at the end he didn't say, you know.

MR. SISCO: I think I can explain the September date. What we have found all over the Arab world is discussion in the context of the Federation. And the three have agreed that they have got to look at where the Federation stands in September. And from time to time, at lower levels Mr. Secretary, we have heard words like, well, you know, in September Sadat has to take some rather critical decisions in relation to the Federation.

MR. ROGERS: I had a private talk with Sadat after our meeting with him and he raised the subject of the Federation. But he didn't talk about the September date at all in connection with the cease fire, even in that private talk. I don't think he wants to go under the gun on a cease fire, because every time he does, everyone says now the cease fire is going to end. He doesn't want to start anything. He knows he is in a vulnerable position. So he looks weak and silly. So I think from his point of view the present situation is the best. I said: Why would you want to change that, you are in a better position? I like it much better than a formal cease fire and when you get to the end of the period everyone gets the jitters.

MR. EBAN: an indefinite cease fire, and then spoke of a longest possible duration. Isn't there an inconsistency there?

MR. SISCO: I don't mean it to be. As we have stated, we want one as long as possible, if indefinite as possible, fine. But there is a distinction

two between the removal of the legal option to belligerency as against a practical extension that doesn't specify that three months from now or six months from now the thing will end unless something else happens. I have a feeling that it is possible to find some formula which really meets the practical requirement. Shall I call it an indefinite cease fire?

MR. ROGERS: Just say it is neither limited or unlimited.

MR. RABIN: But no commitment on their side for non-limitation?

MR. ROGERS: No commitment on either side for limited or unlimited.

MRS. MEIR: As the situation is now, the last announcement of the end of the cease fire, he made an announcement that there is no cease fire anymore. I will shoot when I will think it is necessary or convenient or I am prepared - that is, he left this option entirely open for his decision to make. He didn't say when, it maybe tonight, it may be six months from now, it may never be. But at any rate this was his announcement. The legal formula, whatever you wish to call the position of Egypt today vis-a-vis the world and Israel is no more dates, that is ended, and now it depends upon his readiness, when he thinks it is necessary, when he thinks it is worthwhile, when he thinks it is justified from the Egyptian point of view, he will shoot. He made that statement.

MR. ROGERS: Well, of course, every sovereign nation has that right. That is part of sovereignty.

MRS. MEIR: Except one thing. In 1967 he committed himself to cease fire that had no timetable with it. But that Nasser broke in his life and then Sadat went on for an agreement when you proposed your peace initiative, you said at least 90 days, and he accepted that, and then the Assembly said 90 days more, and

it was 90 days more and he said one month more, and when that month was ended, he said no more cease fire; now it depends on me whether we shoot and when we shoot.

MR. SISCO: Yes, but you remember the Secretary General had that little different language about maintaining quiet and so on.

MR. ROGERS: Let's go to the next point. When you talk about a cease fire it has no legal effect. As De Gaulle said, it is like young ladies and roses, while they last. That is what 197 proved. As far as everyone in the world is concerned they are satisfied that he isn't going to start the fighting now. Everyone says that de facto there is cease fire. Why isn't that good?

MRS. MEIR: It is just that. What is your estimation of what Sadat may or may not do. Supposing there is an agreement on the Canal and we pull back X kilometers - and there will be many Xs - and the Yarring talks are resumed and we don't come to an agreement very soon, it may take months. And Sadat one fine morning says: this is it. Since you say and as the Secretary said yesterday, he envisages this on the Canal as part of the final agreement on the borders, etc., and we are still there on the line, we are still discussing with Yarring, but we are still on the line, and he issues an ultimatum and says: Now this is enough, either you move on or I shoot. I mean, do you envisage that there is a possibility for him to say something like that?

MR. ROGERS: Yes, I suppose so.

MRS. MEIR: And to do it?

MR. ROGERS: I think he is more apt to say it than to do it. You asked me. That is my view. I think it is quite unlikely that he is going to do it. I don't think he is prepared or thinks he is prepared.

MR. ALLON: When we met in Washington, I think all of you expressed your worry that unless negotiations get some progress there will certainly be fire. Joe even wanted to frighten us that we should come and ask for American aid.

MR. SISCO: I don't think I said that.

MR. ALLON: Then in three weeks you should come and ask for aid.

MR. SISCO: We were speaking quite generally and certainly not in context of this.

MR. ALLON: I had a feeling that you thought unless there is some progress, war is bound to take place.

MR. SISCO: No, no, although we were concerned.

MR. ROGERS: My view is that if we don't now make progress, and by making progress I mean something tangible, now, and then after a while, X number of months or a year, then it seems to me there has to be an additional hope that negotiations still could succeed - unless that happens - I will put it the other way, if the Yarring talks break down, he leaves, quits, can't get any response, he says things are unsatisfactory, that the whole thing ends, then I think we have sown the seeds of war. I don't know when. It could be a while. Further, I think at that point, the attitude of the international community will surface, and your position will deteriorate further. I have no doubt about that. My own prediction would be that the war won't start for a while. That is always conditional though on what is going on in his government. He may have some young military men that see the opportunity to become a second Nasser and they start something over his objections. And that is possible, and you never know.

You asked does he want an interim settlement. I can't say, but my impression is that he really wants an interim settlement. He needs it. I think as far as we are concerned, as I said yesterday, let's go ahead and see. Maybe he is fooling us. Okay, let's try it. We don't lose anything by trying. Let's make an honest attempt to work something out. And take a few risks, because I think you are in a good position to take risks now. You are much stronger than they are.

MR. ALLON: I agree with you that he knows what defeat means and he knows he will be defeated. I don't think he can afford a defeat. Only Nasser grew from defeat to defeat. But he is not Nasser and he can't achieve the same thing as Nasser. And I am sure that you are right when you say there is no danger of immediate war or in the near future. But if it reaches a point where he feels that he can't get his way in the comprehensive or final arrangement, then he may go back to hostility as a means.

MR. ROGERS: There is always a possibility.

MR. ALLON: That is an option in his hands.

MR. SISCO: But on the other hand, he also knows that if you have agreed to withdraw X number of kilometers, if he knows that as a result of that hopefully there is a little improvement of the climate and a test of peace, and you get on with the discussions towards a fundamental settlement, he also knows that the answer in terms of further steps on your part is to get on with the discussions rather than to think in terms of 'I reserve my right and begin shooting again.'

MR. ROGERS: Let me add something. I think in the back of his mind, maybe in the front of his mind, and certainly we did all we could to put in in the front of his mind, he is saying to himself: 'if I can accomplish this I will have accomplished a political coup. Now, there is a great deal of doubt about the wisdom of the action I have taken; Kadafi is calling me a traitor and I have to fight with my own military.' He told us about the squabbles with his military people; they were distressed at first and now they think maybe he is right. But if in addition to getting the applause he has throughout the world, if in addition he could open the Suez which would be tremendous in terms of international attention, and then get a withdrawal which he could say was favorable to him, so he could get out from under the humiliation they talk about all the time, if there is no additional risk or very little additional military risk at the present time, I think it would put him in a frame of mind that he wouldn't want to start a war. He would have so much credit politically he would resist a war which would ruin him.

MR. SISCO: In effect, what comes through when the man talks is that an interim agreement he feels will strengthen his political hand. This is a slight overstatement and take it as such.

MRS. MEIR: And we ^{are} willing that he should feel it.

MR. ROGERS: Mr. Sisco went through a very elaborate presentation of public relations. You can see the headlines now: "Sadat gets the Suez open."

MRS. MEIR: What will they say about us? Can you picture that?

MR. SISCO: Very, very good. And I would be glad to paint that headline for you too.

MR. EBAN: The present situation is one in which there is no mutually accepted contractual obligation to have a cease fire at all. When you say we could work out a formula, I take it the interim agreement would not be silent on the cease fire entirely.

MR. ROGERS: No, but I am not sure how we would state it.

MR. SISCO: Our preference would be that it won't be silent. I know what you have in mind and I know what you have in mind (to Sec. Rogers). If you could just leave that to us.

MR. DAYAN: Just one word. I may be wrong, but I think that the fact that there is cease fire now in great part is due to the fact that we are sitting on the Suez Canal. From what I know about their internal discussions, I know that some of their officers estimate that if they try to cross the canal they would have about 80 percent losses now. So with all the good will of President Sadat when he discusses a plan of crossing the Canal and if some of his senior officers say: You can do it but you will leave behind 80 percent of the people, this is probably the main argument to maintain the cease fire. And if we will go back X number of miles and this argument will not exist, I am afraid that you can not just compare it with the present situation. Why won't it go on like it is now? Because we shall not be sitting on the Suez Canal. It is not just because they like the cease fire but they don't like the idea of losing 80 percent of their operational force.

MR. ROGERS: I think really it is more than that. I think they feel totally inadequate. They say so at least.

MRS. MEIR: The question is will they feel as inadequate when we have moved from the Canal.

MR. ROGERS: Probably not as, but still pretty inadequate. They are not thinking in terms of men but in terms of planes. They talk about Phantoms and not much else, about the damage you have done and how much better your pilots are and we provided the equipment and they show where the bombs hit. I never heard them mention men. They talk about Phantoms and pilots.

MR. ALLON: We know they had a plan to cross the Canal and this is the percentage which Dayan referred to. It is not an imaginary one.

MR. SISCO: It is not surprising. Any army would have a plan to cross the Canal. We have plans for every conceivable type of thing, except the invasion of Israel (laughter).

I want to ask the next one. "The IDF will be situated east of the Canal at same distance to be specified in the agreement." I think we'd like to hear any elaboration you'd like to make on that point.

MRS. MEIR: May I say what I should have said at the beginning. I think I made it clear in my talk with the Ambassador. We haven't the advantage of the type of government that there is in Egypt. We are democratic form of government and we have a Parliament and the only way a government is constituted is when it gets the vote of confidence of Parliament. In order to get that vote of confidence, it isn't enough when the designated prime minister goes to Parliament and shows what nice young men he has in his government. Parliament wants to know also what is the program of the government, what it is committed to. This is our form of government. When Mr. Eshkol died it was the same government, but

had to present it again to the Parliament, and get a vote of confidence. It was the same government except that to my sorrow, I had to take Eshkol's place, but it meant as though it was a new government and had to be presented to Parliament and get the vote of confidence. When we had elections in 1967 and after what we certainly had to go through the same procedure. One of the things that remained in all these instances, not the only one, but one of the things, was that the Israeli army will not move from anywhere from the cease fire lines, unless there is a peace agreement. Therefore, government sees itself bound by that and in order to move even 2 kms. we have to go to Parliament and get a vote of confidence on that or get a majority vote on that. Now, government therefore has not taken the decision to move to any distance. And all these negotiations, as I said to the Foreign Affairs Committee - you saw them today, a couple of weeks ago when we reported on this, we keep our Foreign Affairs Committee very well informed whether we like it or not, we have to, I said this is what we are doing but government decided these are exploratory talks mainly with the United States government, and only when the government is satisfied that the basis has been created and we say that on this basis, we the government are prepared to move X miles, then we will go to Parliament and put this proposition to them and then they will have to vote. So naturally, government did not take a decision on how many kilometers. But my colleagues are here, and I think I am reporting accurately on the mood, not a decision, but the mood is not a very long distance.

MR. ROGERS: As you mentioned, I did meet with your Foreign Affairs Committee - that is why I was a little late - and I was interested in the fact

that they sort of talked favorably about the interim settlement. They were not--

MRS. MEIR: They were influenced by government.

MR. ROGERS: Yes, that's what I mean. On your remark about young men in the government, I don't know whether Sadat has young men in the government or not. Yesterday I was talking about--

MR. ALLON: The youngest man is still the Prime Minister.

MR. ROGERS: I have a feeling that he still has quite a few older people about. They didn't look too young. But I thought the Committee did seem to be favorably disposed towards an interim settlement. Naturally, everybody would like to move as little as possible.

MR. SISCO: I don't know whether the Secretary would agree with this. My own view is that all these elements are interrelated obviously, but I have a feeling that the extent of the zone whatever X miles happens to be, could have an important effect on the formulation of the cease fire itself. In other words, from their point of view, I would have thought, and this is a surmise on my part, no more than that, I don't know whether the Secretary has the same feeling or not, but I would have thought if we come to that point and it is a reasonable zone, and I don't know what that is, it seems to me that the broader the zone or the more relevant the zone of evacuation is, I would think the better the possibility of getting a satisfactory formulation on the cease fire from your point of view.

MR. ROGERS: I think probably I'd agree with that. I think also it would have effect on what he'd want to try to move across the Canal. It seems

to me if he insists on moving a lot of troops across the Canal, that that casts serious doubts on his intentions. If he is looking for political benefit, it would seem to me he'd get more out of it if there were more kilometers involved, than if he insists on saying: I have an unlimited right of moving troops. That immediately raises doubts about his intentions. If he says: I will agree to only moving a sufficient number for symbolism's sake to prove it's my own land - in other words, from ^{practical} ~~a~~ matter, that seems to be much more important not to have the forces there than to announce in advance the duration of the cease fire.

MR. SISCO: Would you agree that the broader the zone from his point of view maybe that could resolve in a little less emphasis in terms of military presence?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: Well, military personnel as far as we are concerned, cannot be considered at all.

MR. ROGERS: Really it doesn't make all that difference if it is a small number of military personnel and you supervise. If you accept the principle of withdrawal and he has the right of sovereignty and he has fifty military personnel -- he could sneak them over as civilians anyway. If it is just a symbol that is one thing. If it is more than that, that casts doubts on his intentions. Well, let's get ahead.

MR. SISCO: "The UAR will thin out its forces West of the Canal as specified in the Agreement." Well, I think that this is quite difficult from the point of Egypt. I would just say that. It depends again on what the other elements of the entire arrangement are. But as a proposition, as we

began to run through these positive and less positive, rather I'll say positive and points that are going to be particularly difficult, I would think this would be very difficult from the point of view of the other side depending on what the arrangement is.

MRS. MEIR: You don't envisage any change on the other side of the Canal? Whether manpower or equipment or missiles?

MR. ROGERS: No⁰ by agreement. I wouldn't think so. I think it is a non-starter.

MR. GAZIT: What about non-augmentation?

MR. SISCO: That is one possibility, a commitment from them on non-augmentation. When I discussed this with Yitzhak I said we wanted your views.

MR. RABIN: My answer was that it is not satisfactory. That was my answer.

MR. SISCO: "No bridges shall be built across the Canal." That is fine. "And cargo of military...(reads)... shall be prohibited." That is entirely understandable and reasonable.

MR. ALLON: Would the Russians listen to that?

MR. SISCO: I think the Russians ought to be tied down to this agreement, whatever such an agreement is developed.

MR. ROGERS: I think in all of these things you have to say to yourself maybe it won't work but maybe we should try it. I would say the proposition is a perfectly reasonable one and we ought to try to pursue and try to have it included and enforceable. We can't guarantee it, but-

MR. SISCO: "The agreed measures for supervision...." We agree there must be agreed measures. In our original ideas that we presented to Yitzhak,

we quite frankly believe that the most feasible thing - although on this we weren't very specific with them because we didn't think it was wise - but I would have thought myself an augmentation of the UNSO is the answer in these circumstances. I personally don't feel the idea of maintaining an Israeli civilian maintenance team in your defense structures is a feasible proposition. I really don't.

MR. ROGERS: On the force, I didn't ask Sadat about it. He said any kind was satisfactory to him. I said, well we would not even think about the possibility of Russians. He said: that is all right with us. We could take other nations. Dutch and some others he mentioned. But whatever. He seemed to be flexible on that.

MR. ALLON: What will be their duty?

MR. ROGERS: To do what is necessary to see that the agreement is carried out.

MR. ALLON: And reporting to the UN, the Secretary-General.

MR. EBAN: And report if anything happened to the fortifications, for example.

MR. ROGERS: I think we'd have to try to do things like that, to provide them with more supervisory powers.

MR. SISCO: Then point 10: "The line which the IDF...(reads) is not considered final.... I think that is a very good statement. I think there may be a way to even present it in a more attractive way. But that is a very positive idea as far as we are concerned.

MRS. MEIR: They can't have any objections to that.

MR. SISCO: Number 11 we like, of course. We couldn't possibly say anything else since every word is our own. I was very glad to see that one paragraph of our ideas survived.

Number 12. I think here, I know you did offer a further explanation to our Ambassador, I think we need to hear from you on this. But everyone that read it in our government didn't understand it, and I think it is quite subject to a misinterpretation.

MRS. MEIR: Immediately after the war, there was quite a bit of anxiety among various nations, especially Great Britain thought they'd collapse now that the Canal was closed. We said they could have it open but we wanted our shipping. I had a discussion with George Brown when we met in London at a Socialist conference, and he said we ought to begin nibbling away at certain points, and when I said what, he said: the Canal. I said: have it open. All we want is our ships going through. He said: Your ships first? We said: No, we know our place, Britain first and we after. And he gave up after that. But at this conference different countries reported and the Norwegian representative said since the closing of the Suez Canal we are having prosperity in our country, we are building tankers and so on. That to the British was quite a shock. But now I think more or less the world has become accustomed to it and nothing serious has happened but there is no doubt that if the Canal is cleared, people will want to use it, and if they are told at that moment: yes, the Canal is cleared but we won't let ships go through until the Israelis move some more, then we will really have everyone come down on us with tons of bricks: 'You are not allowing shipping; it is because of you.'

And we must find some connection between our moving and the actual opening of the Canal for shipping, because otherwise we are really going to be in trouble.

MR. ROGERS: Well, I think that can be cleared up. We just didn't understand the language.

MRS. MEIR: For instance, when we say a test for peace. What do we mean? Two things: no shooting, then you can discuss and discuss without tension. And second, if the Canal is really opened and there is international shipping and maybe the cities are beginning to be re-built, then we think this is probably a deterrent to him to want to shoot. But if the Canal is merely cleared, you can shoot across a cleared canal. The fact that there are no ships sunk there doesn't prevent him from shooting. So that we should not find ourselves in the position that we have moved away and the Canal is cleared - and it will take about six months to a year they say - and then we are not there and he will say: now I have done mine - by the way, he speaks only of clearing the Canal.

MR. EBAN: The language is always to prepare it, to clear it.

MR. ROGERS: That is something we have to clear up.

MR. SISCO: I think we ought to make sure of it.

MRS. MEIR: What we meant by these words that nobody understands is that there must be a close connection between our moving and the shipping.

MR. SISCO: You also expressed another positive idea in the context of what you just said. If you want to say explicitly that obviously in ^{what} ever zone has been evacuated, if they want to go on with the job of building houses, you will find that from a political point of view, making something like that explicit in an interim settlement will be very helpful to the main on the other side. I know it is your position, but-

MRS. MEIR: He said it is none of our business.

MR. SISCO: The last point we think is also a positive statement. Again, we think it might be said from a presentational point of view in a different sort of way but the substance is very positive.

MR. ALLON: So why was your initial reaction so cool to this paper?

MR. SISCO: No, we said it had positive elements and it had some that could cause difficulties and we were prepared to go ahead with it. If we thought it was out of the ball park, we would not have said to your government we were ready to present this piece of paper without a change. Because you know the moment we present this piece of paper even though we say we are just presenting it, the assumption in Cairo is that the U.S. agrees with this piece of paper a hundred percent. What surprised us was that you felt you didn't want us to go ahead.

MR. ROGERS: There are some things I felt would have upset the apple cart. When you said a joint Egyptian-Israeli force might be a possibility, that seems to me would undercut it.

MR. SISCO: I want the record to show. Here is what we conveyed to you: "The U.S. Government believes that the Israeli proposal provides a basis for negotiating a canal agreement and is prepared to convey it to the UAR government. In our private view, it contains some constructive elements and some points which the UAR will not be able to accept. We have no intention, however, of pre-judging the UAR reaction, and we are ready to communicate the Israeli document unchanged to the UAR promptly."

MRS. MEIR: I just want to know if I understood. You don't believe that it is possible to get an unlimited cease fire.

MR. ROGERS: No, I don't, not stated in those terms.

MRS. MEIR: We don't care what terms. We didn't call it the end of belligerency. How it will be phrased doesn't matter, but not resumption of shooting.

MR. ROGERS: Yes, I don't think that is possible.

MRS. MEIR: You think that is impossible. Then, you think that it is likely that they will demand a crossing of some military power, symbolic, but some military forces will have to cross.

MR. ROGERS: I wouldn't say it is an impossibility not to, but I think that would be a tough one to overcome. But from my standpoint, I think I can understand why you'd say it has to be a very symbolic force and nothing more. In other words, if he insisted on a large military presence, I think it would make it almost impossible from your standpoint.

MRS. MEIR: And then you say that it is also impossible or almost impossible that there be any talk of thinking out of formations they have on the other side, that that must remain - not from your point of view.

MR. ROGERS: From his standpoint. I don't think he'd include it in an agreement.

MRS. MEIR: And that the force that would guarantee or be on the lookout would be UNSO.

MR. ROGERS: Not necessarily, but it would be a combined force of other nations. I think that would be quite easy to negotiate with him.

MRS. MEIR: And no maintenance personnel, Israeli maintenance personnel to see that our Bar Lev line is not destroyed.

MR. ROGERS: No, but he did indicate a willingness to consider a guarantee that he wouldn't destroy the structures. I don't think it would be feasible to ask for Israeli personnel there, it would be very difficult. Maybe it would be possible to work out some other agreement with the UN² representations.

MRS. MEIR: We had UNSO for 19 years, and what I am saying should not be interpreted as anything negative about the men that were there. Their duty was to report. 'Syria violated the cease fire at 2 o'clock in the afternoon; Israel violated the cease fire at one minute past 2', because when there was firing from Syria the Israelis shot back and therefore both violated the cease fire. But at any rate reporting, and then there were Mixed Armistice Commissions that sat and judged who really violated, and usually it was a plague on both your houses, you both did. But this was the duty of UNSO. They had no strength. They were given no power. They were not equipped to stop anything. Even when they saw people crossing the line and they knew they were infiltrating--

MR. ROGERS: We certainly are not advocating that we make the same mistake again.

MR. SISCO: It is a question of mandate, isn't it?

MRS. MEIR: Whatever you call it, when they see Egyptians trying to cross the Canal, what are they going to do? Shoot?

MR. ROGERS: Let's assume that because the last one failed it doesn't necessarily mean the next effort will fail. Let's try to work it out.

MRS. MEIR: I am only asking what your thoughts on this matter are.

MR. SISCO: No UN observer force is going to prevent that. Each side is going to want to reserve its right to take any action necessary in case of violations.

MRS. MEIR: You see, that is where distance comes in. Not from my military experience, but I heard from a military expert, that if we move to point A, we still can see what is happening on the Canal, and if a group of Egyptians begin to cross the Canal, I will give away a secret, we are going to wait for UNSO or anybody else, we will just do something to stop them. But if we move to point B, then we don't know.

MR. EBAN: And we are too far to move effectively if we did know.

MRS. MEIR: We can move maybe but it will take time. There is one more consideration. If we are in A, because we are so close and can act immediately it has an effect on what our strength has to be. If we are in B, then our strength has to be much larger. There are all kinds of military considerations, some I understand and some I don't, but I take the words of our experts. So it makes a lot of difference. But I couldn't say to anyone: there is nothing to worry about, UNSO is going to be there, because UNSO is a joke in the country for every child. Again, not because of the men, some even got hurt. They did their duty perfectly but this was their duty, not to do anything. and he keeps saying all the time: six

MR. ROGERS: What are your thoughts?

MRS. MEIR: We have discussed it at two or three meetings. We wanted to get your thinking on our proposition. You remember, we sent you two

papers, A and B. A is what we would expect - what you have just read - in an agreement between us and the Egyptians on the arrangement of the Canal. B is what we would ask the U.S. government. For instance, when we say we would like the U.S. Government to support our demands, some you do and some you don't know, I haven't heard from you that you absolutely don't accept it, you don't accept it because you think the Egyptians won't accept it and you won't be able to press them for it. Which articles are they mainly? On the question of the cease fire, which as far as the government is concerned, was the first condition. And then no connection with the 242 resolution and no consideration that this is the beginning of withdrawal, that this is the first stage of total withdrawal, timetable.

MR. ROGERS: There is no problem I think there. I don't see why you'd object to relating it to the Security Council resolution. You beg the question. We all agree it would be helpful in helping achieve the objectives of the Security Council 242.

MRS. MEIR: Maybe I don't make myself clear. That means no implications. We said we will withdraw to secured and agreed borders. We accepted the principle of withdrawal. We have said it. The only difference we had with Yarring when we first started was that we said we will withdraw to what - to secure and agreed borders. This is our position to this day. What we don't want is Sadat's interpretation and he keeps saying all the time: six months for the clearing of the Canal and this will be time enough for Yarring to work out a timetable in accordance with his interpretation of what 242 means to all June 4th borders.

MR. ROGERS: I think we can overcome that. He wants I think to be able to say this is not an end in itself, that this is a step to implementing the 242 resolution. You don't want any implications to follow from this agreement that would have any carry-over effects in the negotiations. These two are not irreconcilable.

MRS. MEIR: We asked the U.S. government on the question of the President's letter and Mr. Sisco's discussions whether this holds for his line, whatever the line may be and on this we got an affirmative answer. And then we said: ".....(reads) shall not be construed in the absence of a peace agreement....^{attempts} to obtain such Israeli withdrawal." What we had in mind was that at a certain point they will go to the Security Council and try to get a resolution that we must continue our withdrawal, and we ask that the U.S. should oppose it at that time.

MR. ROGERS: The first part we agree with. The second part--

MRS. MEIR: Maybe we didn't understand. The answer was that: "We understand fully that Israel's willingness to pull back...does not create an added obligation to make a further withdrawal in the absence of a peace agreement and we are agreed that no added..... If such an agreement is achieved, it would of course provide a basis for progress.." What was not clear is does this mean that you understand what we want, and what we want in addition to your understanding of what we want is that you support us on that. You say in several parts that you understand what Israel wants, and that's fine. But the question is what is the position of the U.S. government on that?

MR. ROGERS: The U.S. government's position is that if the claim was made that the interim agreement carried implications suggesting what the final agreement was, and that claim was made anywhere, in the UN or anywhere else, we'd say no. In fact, we'd have language in the agreement to disavow it. As far as that, we'd support you. All we don't want to do is have an open-ended commitment in the event that some effort is made to implement the 242 on its own merits unrelated to the interim agreement.

MRS. MEIR: (reads) You see, it follows from 3 above that I just read. (reads)....our view regarding borders..." Again, you say that you understand. Clearly you say that a pull back does not imply Israeli willingness to future withdrawal. What you have said now maybe covers this point, that if anybody will claim that this was the beginning of the withdrawal and from it stems or must stem Israel's keeping up the momentum to keep on going, that that you will oppose.

MR. ROGERS: That is right. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding. Any attempt to relate the interim agreement to the final agreement in the sense that it would be useful to interpret your intentions, that because of the interim agreement we interpret the Security Council resolution to mean withdrawal from all territories - we'd say absolutely no. The interim agreement carries no implications. It stands on its own two feet. And anything in the way of interpretation has to be interpreted on the language of the 242 and would not be affected by the interim agreement and we would solidly support you.

MRS. MEIR: Then we say on the stipulation of military forces crossing the Canal, (reads) to deter such moves." On that your reply was (reads). What we wanted to say was maybe two things. One, that the Soviets should be told in so many words by the U.S. that the U.S. won't have it, and in case the Soviets do it in spite of this agreement, what will the United States do?

MR. ROGERS: Of course, that is a tough question to answer. As far as the first question, we have already told Sadat we would not consider a Soviet presence on the other side of the Canal and any attempt to do that would make this whole thing an impossibility, and we obviously agree with the position you took earlier about the Soviet ships and we will talk to the Soviet Union about it. I don't think it is possible to give an answer about what we might do in the event of things happening, but we would take it as a matter of very grave concern. The Soviet Union knows that. I don't see them playing that game.

MRS. MEIR: As far as they are concerned, there is no limit to what we think they may or may not do.

MR. ROGERS: We have a lot of experience with them in a lot of places, and I don't think they have that in mind. If they do we will have to face it, but I don't think they have that in mind.

MRS. MEIR: Then I take it for granted that among three things you didn't respond to at all, were cease fire without limitations, the operation of the Suez Canal for the use by ships and cargoes of all nations including Israel. I can't imagine that there can be any doubt raised that when the

Canal is cleared and operated that Israeli shipping will go through the Suez Canal.

MR. SISCO: I think that is very explicit in your statement in paragraph 1, and I think we'd have to button that down.

MRS. MEIR: Right, but you didn't comment on it. Because although we haven't had shipping there, but this time it would mean that we don't have shipping and we consent to it, which is something that is--

MR. ROGERS: Would you in fact have ships that you'd want to send through there?

MRS. MEIR: Why not?

MR. ALLON: In addition to its importance as a matter of principle, as far as public opinion in this country is concerned, it's very important even among the most moderate. This is one of the symbols of--

MRS. MEIR: So at any rate, you know our position about the cease fire. We can't envisage the crossing of any military personnel. The government thought if we move certainly something must happen on the other side. With all the missiles, all the artillery, everything they have there, all that remains, and Mr. Sisco says maybe we can get no augmentation. I don't think they need augmentation.

MR. DAYAN: I am more optimistic on behalf of the Egyptians. I don't think it is so unreasonable. Supposing the formula is that there is limitation of forces on both sides, our new line wherever it is and the Egyptian line. And we say now, when we are really planning to resume the cease fire

or to have a long cease fire, and supposing I were an Egyptian. I really want sincerely now to have a period of cease fire, so I'd say, all right, let's both keep our tanks to a certain distance behind. So I think it would be for both parties and under limitation of forces on both lines. I can't see why the Egyptians will be offended by such a suggestion. Otherwise, of course, if they really want to deceive us, and say they want to concentrate their forces and to use an opportunity when we don't see and cross the Canal, then they won't accept it. But if sincerely for some time, from their point of view, they want a real cease fire, I can't see why they will not agree to limitation of forces on both sides and that will be discussed, what forces.

MR. ROGERS: Let me tell you what I think they'd say, based on the conversation we had with them. And here again, when we start to present the other fellow's point of view, the listener thinks we have adopted it. At one point, Sadat asked me what is your point of view and I told him, and immediately he was mad and took after me. I said: Come on, you asked me what their point of view was, and if you don't want me to tell you, don't ask me. So he said, okay. But I think that their point of view is, you know, he is a strong nationalist and gets very emotional about nationalism: my land, I don't want the Russians on my land, I need them now because I am weak, but this is our land and I am the leader and so forth. He says on anything to do with these decisions: 'this is my land, and to ask me not to do something even on this side of the Canal is unacceptable. I am trying to get my land back and that is the whole point of this. Why should you restrict me and my right of sovereignty? ' I don't want to argue with you. I am just telling you what his point of view is.

MR. DAYAN: During the first cease fire they practically took out their guns and left them just for training. But if it is emotional, then I can't--

MR. ROGERS: If you were talking about logic, that's one thing.

MR. SISCO: I want to be sure that we are all talking about the same thing, and that I understood you. We are talking in the first instance about a withdrawal from the Canal to a certain line and you are talking in addition about some thinning out possibly on the West side of the Canal and some comparable thinning out East of the line to which you will have withdrawn.

MR. DAYAN: I am talking about limitation of forces. That is, both parties wherever they are will agree not to have certain kinds of weapons and above certain numbers.

MR. SISCO: Where?

MR. DAYAN: On their line. I don't think it has to be done in two stages. But what I was talking about will apply to both parties, limitation of forces. Perhaps we will have to add some forces to our line to meet their number. But it will be agreed by the two parties that as we are not facing the assumption of renewal of fighting, on the line there will be a limited number of guns and tanks.

MR. ROGERS: I think that is possible. I don't think asking him to thin out his forces on his side will work, and I don't think it has much significance. He could put it back in a couple of hours. I just think that is the type of thing that would cause a lot of trouble and you don't

set such out of it. On the other things, on non-agumentation and limitation of number, maybe that is a possibility.

MR. SISCO: We did have a little discussion this morning in terms of trying to look at this picture strategically and try to get the Israeli appreciation of what is important strategically. The Mitla Pass and there are two or three key passes as to what their importance and significance are. I wonder if you could say something on this.

MR. DAYAN: This paper is based on something like ten kilometers, to my knowledge. The way I feel now, I wouldn't say what Mr. Sisco hoped this morning, but the way I feel now if the Egyptians will not undertake not to resume the shooting then we have to be very, very close to the line. And if the assumption is that fighting will be resumed then all kinds of arrangements have to be taken by us in order that we can go back to the line, a matter of distance and who is going to maintain the fortifications, and it will be so clumsy that I don't think it will work anyway. If they want to keep the option to open fire and we want to keep the option to go back to the line, so let's start negotiating right now about the final arrangements. But if they agree about no resumption of shooting, then we can go off the line. I'll put the same thing but the other way round - then we can allow ourselves to be further from the line. Mr. Sisco suggested this morning that the UN forces will keep the passes, to which I did not agree. This is out of the question. I wouldn't rely on them to keep even the fortifications and certainly not to be behind the passes which is more than 35 km. and that they will keep it.

But I do think if the Egyptians really agree that this is the end of the shooting, then the distance will be affected. As the Prime Minister said, this has not been decided and I told Mr. Sisco this morning this paper is based on ten kilometers, but I do agree that it has to do with their undertaking not to resume fighting - the distance that we can allow ourselves from the line.

MR. ROGERS: Where are the passes, about 35 km.? What would you envisage as a barrier in between where your people were and the Egyptian forces? Would you consider some other peace-keeping force?

MR. DAYAN: I wouldn't advise our people to go off the line at all. If the Egyptians do not undertake--

MR. ROGERS: Put that aside for the moment. Assuming you could be satisfied on that, what would you then envisage as a barrier in between or a peace keeping force?

MRS. MEIR: First, I'd like Dayan to say something about the possibility of any Egyptian forces crossing the Canal.

MR. DAYAN: As a matter of fact, it didn't come up this morning because I understood Mr. Sisco to be strongly against it; he asked me about some policemen. I said if they are really policemen then I wouldn't mind some policemen. That is how it was presented this morning.

MR. ROGERS: Let's assume there are no military forces that cross, just for the purpose of discussion, and you move back 35 km. and you are satisfied about the cease fire, then you wouldn't need any force in between.

MR. DAYAN: The 35 km. is where the passes are. That is how this figure came. We did not discuss where our line would be except, as I said, for this paper being based on something like ten km. But I did say there

is a relationship between the assurance that they will not cross and will not resume the fighting and all the measures that we have to take, including the distance that we can move.

MR. SISCO: One possibility that we didn't discuss this morning, and it is just me thinking out loud. It is altogether possible that what might be tried would be a ten km. withdrawal while the Canal was being cleared, and once the Canal is cleared, a withdrawal to the passes simultaneous with the actual beginning of the passage through the Canal. That is another possibility.

MR. ALLON: There is a major problem involved. Here is a model which can be worked of how the demilitarized area can be supervised. So I am asking you what sort of supervision will take place there. We can't agree to the sort of supervision which is there now. This is a good example of how this will be applied to other evacuated areas. This can be worked out as a model, a pilot plant, for the rest.

MR. ROGERS: If you start out with no military forces crossing, or merely a symbolic force, and you are fairly close, you don't need anything else.

MR. ALLON: They can violate the agreement.

MRS. MEIR: If they cross at night and we are further than 10 kms, we won't know until the morning. And I don't say it is impossible, but then it is war. And we are not going through this just to have war again.

MR. ALLON: And God forbid, if a token Soviet force crosses together with them.

MR. EBAN: I'd like to get your continued opposition to any idea of a military crossing, symbolic or non-symbolic. The suspicion will be that they are Soviets. I think it is much easier to stand on the principle. I think if the United States were to abandon that principle, it would be very, very bad. I understand you made a strong argument in Cairo, and I think it would be better to stick to the principle of no military forces and then have discussions on what to do on the civilian forces.

MR. SISCO: But then they would expect a much broader zone. I think, for example, this is my own judgement, I think a withdrawal to somewhere in the vicinity of these passes, 25 km., that is fairly--

MR. ALLON: If they don't intend to attack, what does it matter?

MR. ROGERS: It is emotional.

MR. SISCO: And political.

MR. ROGERS: Put it differently. If they can move that many at night, what difference does it make if they have a few there to begin with?

MRS. MEIR: There is a question also of our fortifications. We will be the hapgiest people in the world when the day comes when we can knock them down ourselves because there is peace. But until then, we have put so much into that, not just a question of money, a question of self-confidence when our boys are there, that until there is peace, I am afraid that the Government and the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Knesset will demand that Israel sees to it that something is being done that these fortifications are being kept intact, because we are moving away from the line; and having Egyptians coming over and blowing up these fortifications -that is something we can not possibly have.

MR. ROGERS: Going back to the General, someone suggested this kind of language, and this I am sure would not be acceptable in the final analysis but it does suggest a way of carrying out the thought that the cease fire is of pretty long duration and still not saying so: "Israel and the UAR will continue to refrain from firing or other hostile acts across the cease fire line while pursuing negotiations under the auspices of Yarring." And then you could say that while the negotiations are being conducted and everyone would keep saying the negotiations were being conducted, and you could keep the idea of permanency there without forcing them to say so.

MR. SISCO: And there is no deadline.

MR. ROGERS: I think there are ways to do it. I don't think it is possible to have him say: I will forever forego my right of sovereignty to start any military action to regain my territory.

MR. SISCO: As a practical matter, both sides will want to reserve their position in this regard. I can understand why both Israel and Egypt would want to reserve their position. We were ready to write it in explicitly.

MRS. MEIR: If they break the cease fire naturally.

MR. ROGERS: As a practical matter, if they have a provision that they will permanently agree to a cease fire, any night they want to violate it, they could say you started it. You could always figure out a reason.

MRS. MEIR: They say we are the aggressors in this war.

MR. ALLON: Therefore, it is important to know what sort of supervision

would take place in the evacuated area. I attach great importance to that.

MR. ROGERS: I don't agree with that.

MR. ALLON: But it is part of Sinai. It is a good chance to see what you have in mind, and how demilitarization would be kept in the future.

MR. SISCO: You mean in the overall settlement.

MR. ROGERS: Let's try to get this settlement first.

MR. SISCO: I was approaching it from the point of view of what is most practical. You have got a group of people you know and have been working with on the ground, and it seems to me that what is important to you is whether we were able to achieve a commitment that this man would withhold moving any military forces into the evacuated areas or at the most something symbolic. Then you have in effect demilitarization, and you'd want a commitment, I'd understand, that there would be no destruction of the Bar Lev line, and if you had UNSO personnel and whatever they'd need to police these and maintain them as well as any other points, it seems to me that doesn't prejudice what you would decide in terms of the overall no more than the present UNSO personnel on the Canal prejudice the whole situation as it relates to an interim settlement.

MR. ALLON: Even if I were to believe Sadat, as you know in this sort of regime you don't know who may rule Egypt next week.

MR. SISCO: But you know that is a problem throughout.

MR. ALLON: If I am to accept your own argument which you used in your discussion with Rabin and then with me, that we are entitled to shoot

our own way back in case of violation, then this means certain strategic consequences. In order to shoot our own way back means a certain distance and this is far nearer than the passes are, not question about it. And we know what our most responsible generals think about it.

MR. ROGERS: Obviously there is nothing you can do by way of agreement that doesn't run some risks, and you can't guard against every possibility. But the present situation, although you may not think so at the moment, runs a great deal of risks. We have got to figure out ways, as I said in the Knesset today, from our standpoint, to keep the momentum going. We can't continue our support the way we have if we don't. We are going to lose our position in a hell of a lot of the world to the Russians and we don't want that to happen. So we ask you to take some slight risks, because we don't think they are very great and we will do whatever is necessary to try to bolster you and to help overcome the risks you are taking. But we have just got to. Because otherwise you can conjure up all sorts of possibilities and then that would mean you won't do anything. The feeling is throughout the world that because you think of so many things that could happen, that you are not going to do anything.

MR. ALLON: I hope that is not your feeling.

MR. ROGERS: No, it is not, but I must say I noticed today in the Knesset, the whole attitude is negative. And at the conclusion of the meeting, the Chairman said: when the time comes to negotiate, we will

certainly be reasonable. And I said: the time is now. You have all agreed to negotiate. Don't keep saying when the time comes to negotiate. The psychology is: sometimes we will do it. Now we have to do it! As far as the United States is concerned, we can't wait any longer, believe me.

MRS. MEIR: Are we negotiating?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: In negotiations, can Israel say these are her positions?

MR. ROGERS: Please don't argue, of course--

MRS. MEIR: So we say we are prepared to move from the Canal, we are prepared to do that. We want to move from the Canal without hurting ourselves. We don't hurt them when we move from the Canal. We don't want to hurt ourselves. We believe it is possible that they have all the advantages that they want, and we are glad that they should have, from our moving away from the Canal, and we don't want any more shooting. And we don't want military personnel to cross the Canal, just because we have moved away from the Canal. Now, we say the Canal can operate even if we sit on the Canal, not technical reason why it can't. We understand that is a question of prestige for the Egyptians, fine. We are prepared to go along with them and to move our line from the Canal, which is not as good as the Canal line. But we don't want them to come right across. I don't know what negotiations are. If negotiations are that we have to accept what is said to us, then these are not negotiations. There is another word for that. If negotiations are if we say when Sadat said he'd like us to move from the Canal, fine. He wants to clear the

Canal, fine. He should have shipping from the Canal. We will move to a certain distance. We don't want any more firing. We don't want military personnel on this side of the Canal. Sadat said he will move his army across the Canal. He agrees there should be some power between us and them. If we have to face the Egyptian army, we'd rather face them across the Canal.

MR. ROGERS: I really do know the arguments. I promise you I do.

MRS. MEIR: We have heard before too that we don't want to negotiate. There are not many new things we can say to each other.

MR. ROGERS: I wasn't commenting on you but on what the Chairman of the Committee said. I was reporting on what he said, and I have a feeling that it is a frame of mind that is developing. When we talked today, I said: are there any questions? Nobody had any questions. I said: let's just talk, won't you try to clarify our position, the way you have done here today which I think has been very useful. I wasn't criticizing you but I do think there is an attitude that is so easy to develop that it is so difficult to do anything, that you end up doing nothing. I think this meeting today has been useful and I would hope we can continue in this spirit, and I think if we can convey the thoughts generally to the Egyptians, get their reactions, then analyze again, without committing you, whether there is some way of reconciling the points of view. We think desperately an interim agreement must be worked out.

As far as you and we are concerned, and our two governments, we don't have to negotiate. We should together find out what we can do and how you feel about it. We don't want to argue. As far as we are concerned, we

would like, if everything else could be worked, to have everyone say its fine. But it isn't possible for us.

MR. ALLON: You can see we are trying to be helpful. I would like to put forward a question. Would the Egyptians agree to American personnel being present along the Bar Lev line?

MR. ROGERS: I don't think it would be feasible from our standpoint. On this kind of thing. I think the Soviets might..... I think it would not be wise. I think if you had a final peace agreement and you felt it was helpful then we would consider it and in whatever form you thought was most helpful, and I think we'd get support for it.

MR. ALLON: But if this can help to achieve a final peace, why not?

MR. ROGERS: Because it is of interim nature, because there are so many uncertainties about it, and we can use other nations, that I don't think at the moment we could do it.

MR. SISCO: I think we could justify it at home in the context of an overall peace agreement. I don't myself - and Dayan will tell you I expressed a similar reservation this morning - think we could justify it in the context of something interim.

MR. RABIN: Don't you have a certain number of personnel in the UNSO?

MR. SISCO: Yes, and we could send more if the UN wanted. The Deputy Commander, or what he is called, was an American. In any event, if the UN was agreeable, we certainly could always add in terms of the UNSO business.

MR. ROGERS: And I think we don't need Congressional approval for that, so we could probably do that. But, as I say, on a final peace agreement I think the U.S. would be prepared to do anything you thought might help. In fact, I posed the question when I appeared before the Senate and there were no hostile reactions. I said 'I have a feeling and I am interested in your reactions, that if Israel and Egypt could agree finally on a peace agreement and they felt it would be helpful to have a peace keeping force in which the U.S. played a substantial role, I have a feeling you'd support it. Is there any question?' And there was no--well, they do it for political reasons, saying this could cause trouble with the Russians. But I don't--

Actually on the final peace agreement we would have to have a provision of long duration, if there was to be a peace keeping force. That would be a commitment of our nation which wouldn't be subject to change. But then we are not going to urge it. If it would be helpful, we'd consider it.

MR. SISCO: Whenever we have ever talked about peace keeping - I think it is worthwhile repeating this because the man in the street that reads the newspapers gets the idea that we are suggesting some kind of peace-keeping in lieu of Israeli strength. We have always assumed in context of a peace agreement that both parties would want to rely primarily on their means. We have always assumed if you are talking about UNSO or whatever, that this is an additive, supportive, complementary, but the primary reliance in the Israeli-Egyptian context, nothing that we have ever said or had in mind has been based on the assumption Israel must rely primarily on its strength. I would go further. I thought there were several of your people on the

Committee who were terribly naive today. I don't happen to think that Israel can protect its own security exclusively with its own strength in view of the fundamental change in this area. The Soviet Union is there. One person said: leave us alone. Well, there was a day, and your people don't seem to have caught on to this thing, when in the Israeli-Egyptian context all that was required, and it was a sensible policy, was you give us the wherewithal and leave us alone. That is no longer a protection for Israel's security. I have said this now 250 times this last year to Rabin. I believe this.

If I were in your shoes, Madame Prime Minister, with the Vietnam climate in the U.S., I know that the last thing in the world that Israel would ever want to do is ask the U.S. to intervene in this situation. But you know, it could develop exactly that way. And there is no way, no way, in which Israel can protect its own security exclusively with the Soviet Union involvement. I am sorry I had to repeat this, because this is the fundamental peg of our policy. And I know the fundamental pegs of your policy. But there has been a fundamental change that has occurred in this area. It means for all of your good intentions: 'we don't want you to be involved, we don't want your manpower, give us your materiel' - that is your best intention, but if it should ever evolve that Israeli security is jeopardized, you have no alternative but to call on the United States, and the President has to make the decision whether my brother will come to the defense of Israel.

MR. ROGERS: Even if you didn't call on us, we'd have a major problem. Whether you called or didn't call, if it looked as if Russia was going to move in in a big way to take countries in this area.

MR. ALLON: What will the Egyptians do in order to liberate themselves from the Soviets?

MR. ROGERS: One of the things, if we could get closer to them, renew diplomatic relations, try to improve our position. It might not be possible. On the other hand, it might be. We have done pretty well in other countries where things change.

MR. ALLON: Will there be a thinning out of the Soviet personnel in Egypt?

MR. ROGERS: Would that make your problem easier if that happened?

MR. ALLON: The less Russians, the better.

MR. ROGERS: Would you feel that you are in a better frame of mind in terms of taking some risks? Would that change your attitude toward an interim settlement? Would you be willing then to move further back?

MRS. MEIR: I don't understand.

MR. ALLON: I understand that the Egyptians are very anxious to see that the Russians will leave. I asked what are the means and how do they hope to get the Russians to leave?

MR. ROGERS: Here again, I want to be careful so that you will understand what I am saying. We have no idea of course of whether the Russians will leave or not and we all have the scepticism that you have. But if there was a thinning out by the Russians during this period, would you change your attitude about your willingness to move further back? Would

you then be prepared to take some additional risks on how this interim agreement might be formulated?

MRS. MEIR: The coming in of the Russians and the going out of the Russians, if the U.S. government says it can influence it, far be it from us to say whether it can or not. I am convinced that our action or inaction or the extent of our action will have no influence on the Russians being in Egypt or being out of Egypt. The Russians came in 1955. So I don't understand what relation. That we would be happier if the Russians weren't there, that it spells a great danger for us, of course it does.

MR. ROGERS: As far as we are concerned, this discussion has to be based on the fact that they exist and there is no point in spending a lot of time on speculations. So let's go ahead.

MR. RABIN: May I ask one question? I know that next week I will have to meet Joseph Sisco in Washington. May I ask a practical question, and I am sure that Joe always has something in mind. What do you have to suggest at the end of this meeting?

MR. ROGERS: I was going to ask the Prime Minister that question. Do you have any thoughts about how you would like us to proceed? Is there anything we can do that would be helpful to your government? One thought we had is the possibility, now that we have had this kind of talk with you, was to have Mr. Sisco go back and talk to Riad or somebody and explain in a little more detail. We are in a position now to give some more indication of your general approach.

MR. SISCO: Without commitment, I might add. We wouldn't commit you.

MR. ROGERS: It might be useful to show that the hope isn't dead, that there is still some prospect to proceeding to try and work out an interim agreement. We'd have to see that the papers didn't give it too much significance. We'd have to say that the point was we had clarifications of several points as a result of the talks we had with Sadat and with you and now it might be useful to have further talks, and it would be wrong to interpret this as an indication that there would be immediate breakthrough in the discussions, and so on.

MR. SISCO: And that these have been constructive talks. I realize we have expressed ourselves strongly, but--

MR. ROGERS: I don't think so. This is the first time we have had a good talk on specifics. We have had a good many talks about principles, but this is a serious talk on specifics and you have indicated the things you might be willing to do in the event certain other things have been done, and I think it has been very useful. I still think there is a possibility of working out an interim agreement. It is tough to tell how adamant he is on some of his points, but I think he is anxious for an agreement.

MR. SISCO: Well, we are in a better position to determine that now.

MR. ROGERS: If we can wrap it up so that it looks as if he has been reasonably successful in the agreement, then he might do it.

MRS. MEIR: I can only repeat the instructions we have from the government on the principles, and again I must emphasize that we have no authority to speak about the withdrawal of one mile. The government hasn't

decided and won't until it sees the principles are accepted, and that there is some arrangement, I don't care how you call it, that we are assured there is no more shooting, no crossing of Egyptian military across the Canal. That we have some mechanism, I don't care what group it is, engineers or someone there, a small civilian group that will see to it that the Bar Lev line is not destroyed. And if we have your assurance, and you have said so, that you will support us that this does not commit us to anything else, I don't know what my colleagues say or the government says, I don't care what Sadat says, but Sadat must know that you accept our position that this carries with it no commitment whatsoever.

MR. ROGERS: He knows that already.

MRS. MEIR: And when we have that from you - I don't care what he says but he must hear from you, and you say you have told him, that this is our stand supported by the U.S. government - I think these are the main points. Of course, Israeli shipping when shipping goes on. And that we are not talking about the clearing of the Canal but the opening of the Canal for shipping, and when it is open for shipping that Israeli ships go through the same as all other ships. And that this will not have a negative effect on our demands for the provision of the military supplies we need. I hope we won't find ourselves in the position that now that there is no shooting and everything looks rosy, you say therefore you don't need any more planes.

MR. ROGERS: On the contrary. I think it would be the other way round. I think it is easier for us if there is an agreement and it appears

that you are progressing on the road to peace. It is much easier to do it. I think the problem we have and it will develop more and more is that when the impasse is reached and it looks as if nothing is going to happen, then I think we do have a problem, particularly on the Phantoms. We just lose all of the world. Everyone comes in and our friends say: we hate to see U.S. prestige going. Mr. Eben says maybe we are confusing popularity with influence. I think one follows after a while. I think that it is influence as well as popularity. Governments come in and say the U.S. is losing its hold on some of these countries in terms of popularity. People don't like you. It is true. We have obviously lost some standing because of Vietnam in some parts of the world, and we don't want to deteriorate further. So if we turn the tables, if we could make some progress and public posture by two governments was received a little favorably it would be something we'd very much want.

MRS. MEIR: You said, and we are glad to hear that despite the fact that it is four years now after the war and the Arabs know the U.S. government has supported us in planes and economic aid and otherwise, yet they are now looking towards the U.S. government. To us it is a very good sign and I am sure it is to you too.

MR. ROGERS: I don't accept that. I think they feel this because of the initiative we took. They have a feeling that we are making an earnest effort to achieve a settlement and they think that we have had difficulty with your government, and that improves our position. No doubt about it. All I am saying is that the positions we have taken that led to the cease

fire which obviously you didn't want us to do and opposed, has led to a change of attitude of some of the Arab governments. You don't have to accept it but I think it is a fact.

MRS. MEIR: I think what the Arabs want and what they are asking you as a sign of friendship to the Arabs is not to give arms to Israel. I am sure the U.S. won't accept that attitude as far as the Arabs are concerned. The attitude that they can get all they want from the Russians and Israel must be left at their mercy is something I am sure no American will really accept. But that is beside the point. I don't think we have any objection that no paper of ours is presented, that the government has not taken a position on withdrawal, but there are certain principles. And if they are met we are prepared in the government to deal with it in the light of the principles and if they are acceptable to us, then you know that we are prepared to make some withdrawal. And I still believe it won't be something very, very dramatic, but at any rate that we are prepared to withdraw from the Suez Canal. I think we should give some thought to who will be there to see that things go well.

MR. ROGERS: Do you have any thoughts on that?

MRS. MEIR: I don't know what should be. I know what can't be, UNSO. I mean it can't be UNSO as it was. If all they can do is what they have done, then it is nothing.

MR. SISCO: But this would be an elaboration of their mandate.

MRS. MEIR: The Armistice Agreement spelled out exactly what is permissible and what is not. But look why argue about that? If you can come up with some thought. I think what Allon said in Washington is a fantastic idea, but I understand you didn't think it is a good idea.

MR. SISCO: There are times when wonderful ideas aren't feasible.

MRS. MEIR: If you want to go to Cairo and say these are the principles and argue for them. There is one more thing I'd like to ask you to help, and that is to get the Yarring talks resumed. Both sides should come with their positions and again number 1,2,3,4, etc.

MR. ROGERS: I think it is important that we understand each other on the question of our role. We don't want to undertake anything if it appears that you are sort of saying: go ahead, do what you want to do. We are in it together. And I am asking: really is this a helpful idea?

MRS. MEIR: I just said--

MR. ROGERS: It seemed to me--

MRS. MEIR: Mr. Secretary, I say exactly what I think. It may be a fault but I plead guilty to that fault. I don't say one thing and mean something else. So we said we don't want you give a paper or to say that Israel has decided to withdraw. These are the principles. If we, the Americans, can get positive answers from you, the Egyptians, on these principles we will report that to the Israelis and they say if these are accepted, they will deal with it positively, or whatever you wish to call it.

MR. ROGERS: Really, what I am asking is, do you think it's a good idea? Because we can get out of it. It is a suggestion that I think

might serve both our interests and I had hoped it would be something you'd want us to do as distinguished from something that you have some reluctance about.

MRS. MEIR: If we didn't want you to, we'd have told you at the beginning, we are not interested, we don't want it. This we think is a good service of the U.S. government, if they will do it.

MR. ROGERS: That is fine. I appreciate that.

MR. ALLON: I think the problem of on-going military supplies must not be connected with the progress of the political arrangement. It happened that we reached this very crucial political crossroads more or less when the agreement on military supplies reached its end. This is being interpreted as a sort of pressure. And you know things are more or less being known in the public, and that would have a bad effect. Don't connect it.

MR. ROGERS: We haven't. We didn't even raise it.

MR. ALLON: I had a feeling you said if we would have progress it would be easier.

MR. SISCO: But it would, let's face it.

MR. ROGERS: We didn't raise the question at all. And I just stated a fact. If we would get an interim agreement, it would be easier for us. When we ship you Phantoms, we have lot of trouble in a lot of areas. I just stated it as a fact.

MRS. MEIR: But to us the fact is that the last Phantoms are coming at the end of May, and then that's it. And this is a big worry to us.

Mr. Sisco said, and I am sure you'd agree, that you want Israel to be strong and to be able to defend itself. It will be a very, very dark day in my life, I am sure in the life of us all, when we reach a point where we say we can't defend ourselves and need help. And the day, God forbid, when one American boy loses his life on this soil will be the greatest tragedy for us. That is my conception. So the most essential thing for us is to be able to defend ourselves. And I don't know what will happen in the future but the idea that the end of May is the end of the delivery of the planes coming to us, in the light of all that has come to Egypt, is something which is of tremendous concern to us. I am sure that any possibility to negotiate with the Egyptians, whether on interim agreements or final agreement, it makes a lot of difference if they know that Israel can defend itself.

MR. DAYAN: I want to say something very general about the nature of this agreement if it will be reached. I told Mr. Sisco this morning that the way I see it, there are two principal ways. One is to add more and more mechanisms in order to shoot yourself back. I don't think it is a good idea. The other one is to take a risk and to rely on the agreement. And in this case, both parties will have to take some risks but the agreement has to be more liberal or more far-fetched, something like that.

I am for the second way. I am afraid if we shall look for all kinds of ways how to maintain fortifications and how to be in a position to go back, so the best thing is to stay there. The alternative way is to really believe that the two parties are heading for a final peace and that

is a partial step toward that, and that they will not cross the Canal and not resume the fire and we don't really have to take all the considerations and the measures and the techniques to rush back. So if when you discuss it in Cairo, you can bring them to this point of view, and find the formula for that, that you can say they agreed to and we can say we have an agreement by which we understand the fighting will not be resumed, then all the other things will be much easier to solve.

The last thing is about you and us. There are many questions that nobody can answer about supervision and who is going to take care of this and that, but the question is whether you are ready to play any role in this agreement by assuming responsibility, not specifying now what you are going to do but when we talk about the Russians, I think you are the only ones that can get them to make commitments not to cross the Canal. We cannot do it. Or if we reach an agreement and you say that you are not only supporting it or happy that we reached it, but you assume some responsibility that the agreement will be carried out, without even specifying how you will do it, but you are powerful and in some cases the only one that can take care of it. If we will have just your good offices, that can be for the negotiations, but because it is so vague who is going to supervise and keep the demilitarized or buffer zone, if you can find some way of assuming upon yourself responsibility to the agreement when it is reached, I don't want to use the word guarantee, but some promise, I think it would be

very helpful.

MR. ROGERS: In answer to the first part, I think we can do that. And we certainly will try. I am speaking about the discussions with the Russians. How that would develop, I can't predict at the moment. But I think that is a reasonable request and I think it is one we can comply with, and we can tell you as we go down the road what our judgement is on this.

I liked your second point, the attitude that you should adopt in this interim agreement. I think that is the one we would hope that you would adopt. That we will take certain risks and with the thought that this is going to be the beginning of the end of the belligerency, and I think it is quite possible that it could be. And the third point - I think it is difficult to formulate it but obviously if we should succeed in this, we are going to be involved certainly in terms of the eyes of the world because we put a lot of effort into it and we will be in a very tough and difficult position as far as our nation was concerned if it was unsuccessful. To that extent, we would support it. How we could state it, I am not too sure.

MR. SISCO: I reacted the same way when Minister Dayan described that second conception. In fact, it is not only a good conception as a practical matter, it is a highly effective conception of argumentation, in my opinion, in presenting an interim agreement.

MR. EDAN: Could we discuss what we say or don't say.

MRS. MEIR: The less the better.

MR. ROGERS: Let me think for a second. It seems to me I could say when I was leaving tomorrow that I had asked Mr. Sisco to return to Cairo

and talk to the officials, that our discussions have have been very useful and certain specifics have been clarified and he was going back at my request, and not with any specific piece of paper but for purposes of further clarification because we thought these talks had been so constructive and useful that we are now in a better position to talk with the Egyptians. Is that all right?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: That would be done tomorrow?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

(It is pointed out that there was a report from Cairo that Mr. Sisco will be going back, and Mrs. Meir reads the report in the Ma'ariv newspaper).

MR. SISCO: We have to send a telegram and find out whether it is all right.

MR. ROGERS: I have no idea whether they want him back or not. But in answer to the question about doing it tonight, I think it would be wrong because it would look as though it was decided at this meeting.

MRS. MEIR: May I suggest that the only thing that be said tonight is that there were further discussions and some things still remain to be clarified. And the Secretary will say tomorrow that he asked Mr. Sisco to go back.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: There have been two days of intensive talks and there is a very large international press corps here, and I don't think we can go out with only a sentence on this.

(It is decided that a statement will be prepared for the press and the meeting is closed at 7:40 p.m.).

Talks between

7/10/50 n.r.c.

THE PRIME MINISTER, MRS. GOLDA MEIR
and
SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. WILLIAM ROGERS
May 6, 1971
Jerusalem
5:15 p.m.

Present:

For Israel:

Mrs. Golda Meir
Mr. Y. Allon
Mr. M. Dayan
Mr. A. Eban
Dr. Y. Herzog
Mr. A. Lourie
Mr. Y. Rabin
Mr. M. Gazit

For the United States:

Mr. William Rogers
Mr. A. Atherton
Mr. Barbour
Mr. McCloskey
Mr. Pedersen
Mr. Sisco
Mr. Korn
Mr. Zurhellen

MRS. MEIR: I don't have to say that we are very happy to have you here. The only complaint that we have is that it is too short a visit but I hope that you will have a few moments at least to enjoy your stay in Israel, and we appreciate very much the opportunity to have not the first discussion but one more discussion on matters which we all believe are vital to both our countries, and we are anxious to listen.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Prime Minister. I am not sure I am anxious to talk. (Laughter) After visiting your Memorial, it is really the most impressive, and I recall that when I was a young lawyer for the Senate Committee that one of the assignments I had was to investigate the reduction of sentence of ? who was a member of the , whose sentence had been reduced,

and it had obviously been a serious blunder and we had an investigation, including witnesses who had been in ? , and as a result of that I got to know at that time many of your leading Jewish leaders from Washington. We made a recommendation which resulted in her re-trial. You remember she was retried and finally got life imprisonment and died in jail. It brought back the experiences that I had at that time in looking at things and in talking to witnesses, and seeing this Memorial brought it all back to mind. I must say I think the conception is magnificent, because it really makes it difficult for people to forget. It is so easy to forget...

Well, where would you like me to start? I really didn't come to talk. I came to have conversations. I hope we will have some time to have more active discussions. It's been a long day for us. It might be helpful to talk a bit about the impressions that we received as a result of the visits. Incidentally, I might say that in Turkey I was quite impressed with the new Prime Minister. Is he President or Prime Minister?

MR. SISCO: Prime Minister. Dr.

MR. ROGERS: He is new but he is quite impressive and he gives every indication of being strong enough to deal with the problems which his predecessor couldn't quite handle and is still not unaware of the risks that he might face if he launches into a program which results in the type of government they have in Greece. He is a professor of constitutional law, quite an impressive man, and he seems to be a man of considerable ^{competence} confidence, and if it should work that he is successful - He has many programs in mind. He got the largest

vote of parliament when he considered the martial law that he ever had there. He has got the military and the other people behind him at the moment.

MRS. MEIR: I guess Turkey needs it.

MR. ROGERS: They need it. We went to Saudi Arabia first, and there the impression that we got that was favorable was one of youth in the ministries. With minor exceptions the ministers are all surprisingly young; seem to be intelligent men. For instance, Fa'ad is certainly articulate and seems to be a capable man and probably will succeed. Obviously impressions on a short trip are superficial, but they did seem, particularly the younger ones, to be aware of the problem of the youth in the country, which is a serious problem. His concern in the Middle East, as you know, is principally Jerusalem. He is also, of course, interested in the Paletine problem, but he expresses great concern with Jerusalem and the fact that he thinks the character of Jerusalem is changing in a way it can't be re-established. As I said to , I didn't raise questions specifically what he meant. I told him we would talk to you about it, and get your views on it, whether that was occurring or not. We had no incidents of any kind that you might expect. We were in Riyadh. He is not, I think, primarily interested in the overall settlement. He is interested in Palestinians; for the most part interested in the problem of the Palestinians.

In Jordan the King seems to be in control. The city seems to be secure. He's got an awful lot of military people in the city. Every block has a military man or two, and in a lot of dangerous areas where

tanks and the fighting took place he has personnel carriers, but he travels around the city quite freely himself. In fact, after the dinner he gave us, he asked if we would like to travel around and he got into his car and drove us around. He drove all through the city and the areas where the fighting took place, and through some areas where two months ago apparently you couldn't get through at all.

He too has a fairly young group around him. His top military man is a very impressive man. You know him? You probably don't know him. He is very impressive. He is a cousin, I think, of the King, Ben Shaker, a Beduin, a strong looking man.

Now, he was obviously concerned with the Palestinian problem, the refugees. We flew in his helicopter from the Dead Sea along the Jordan up to the ? Mountains, stopped then, looked at the Colan Heights, from that side, and they took us over the place where there were tank battles also with the Jordanians. In some areas along the Jordan where the canal ? is still operative, farmers were coming back, beginning to cultivate the land. South of that, where the canal is not operative it is very barren and everything is deserted; there is no life at all, and the Valley itself, as I say, has obviously deteriorated very fast.

We didn't visit a refugee camp. My wife did. We flew over several. You know, it is very depressing to see 60,000 people in a very small area, and there just isn't any plan to speak of for the future; sort of living from day to day. He is getting money, supplying money and trying to get money from other place.

His general attitude in discussing the possibility of peace is

that he says, well, I realize I have to make some adjustment, and he doesn't talk about getting back every inch of land. He talks about his desire for peace and hopes that something will be worked out and he feels a little bit left out because he hasn't been involved actively in discussions until we got there. So he welcomed the trip. He gave us a warm reception. It is interesting: when we drove in from the airport to the place we stayed, we went right through what is the stronghold of Palestinians and we had a couple of ways planned so none of them knew which way we'd come. So the reception was surprisingly good. I didn't see any hostility at all. Young people and old people and everybody else waved. I didn't see any adverse signs.

He desperately hopes that something will work out. He relies on the United States to a considerable extent. He doesn't want any Russian presence and they had a lot of offers and he has resisted. We are helping him, as you know, and we are going to continue to help him because I think it is essential that he stay in control. For the moment he is, I think, with one minor exception, which we flew over, where there is no trouble now; there is no active trouble there but there is a concentration.

But he, as I say, I think he feels that unless a peace agreement is worked out, that he is on the ropes; he can last for a while. He doesn't talk about his own position very much, but it is clear that he feels that over a long period of time something has to be done. The Government can't continue - something has to be made for the refugees. How many are there now?

MR. SISCO: They had, I would say, what, 300,000 that moved from the West Bank to the East Bank. Is that a pretty good figure?

MR. GAZIT: 250,000.

MR. DAYAN: I wouldn't say farmers, or people that lived on the land here, more than 100,000, that really left the country and became refugees.

MR. ROGERS: I didn't want to get into that. There are certainly a lot of people in desperate straights.

MR. DAYAN: You are right about one thing, which I believe you noticed. Many of them left their villages in Transjordan, in the Valley of Jordan, because of El Fatah and went to live in the refugee camps and now they are coming back. They didn't live here on this side of the Jordan, but they did become kind of refugees on their side when the war started after the war, when the Fatah committed their operations from the border. They left their villages and the entire Jordan Valley was deserted and they went up to the camps but I think by now they are coming back. They are perhaps included in the number.

MR. ROGERS: In any event, without attempting in any way to talk about how they got there and the reason, it is a sad sight, just from a human tragedy point of view. There is no way to avoid that conclusion. You just have to see it.

In Lebanon, as you know, the government feels very insecure. They have a lot of radicals there, who cause a good deal of trouble. I think the word got out not to have any violence during my stay there, and I think the word circulated pretty well. They had a huge demonstration the day before, 15,000, but the word had gotten out not to have

any trouble. We were scheduled to fly by helicopter but they found a concentration in the hillside, where the plane normally flies, and they picked them up that morning. So we went in by car. I stopped in the street at one time, because there was a lot of discussion about whether you could do it or not, so I thought I'd stop and I got a shoeshine and there were a lot of people who gathered around, a lot of young people and as I was telling Mr. Eban, the response was encouraging, not discouraging. Got a big ovation when I left, most young people, a lot of Palestinians.

But the government itself is quite shakey. The president is a rather impressive appearing man, but he is fearful that his country is going to be attacked and he is fearful of - he says he doesn't think he has a chance of defending his country. He doesn't have any military force to speak of at all. He is just trying to protect the city and there when you travel, you have tanks. I had two tanks and four-five personnel carriers, and when you go by certain parts of the area, you are surrounded by tanks. You feel that you are in a military zone. I tried to see if I could get rid of them, but they insisted on it. So they have had a lot of bad incidence there. I said, you probably saw, on my arrival statement that we thought the present border should be the border and they received that warmly.

MRS. MEIR: The Lebanese border?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

MRS. MEIR: Even without minor rectifications!

MR. ROGERS: But there is a genuine fear, I think genuine fear; people talk to you, take you aside and say to you, you really

feel quite sure that Israel isn't going to attack us? You feel that they don't intend to take over our land? This country means a lot to us. Can you give us an assurance that Israel isn't going to try to conquer us? And I said I wasn't in a position to give assurances for another country, but I thought it was absolutely out of the question that they had any intentions and that we'd do everything ahead of time to make our position clear and if any such thing happened, we would feel it is a very serious matter, and I'm sure you wouldn't object to anything I said.

MRS. MEIR: I think if they want to do something about worrying, they have something to worry about right within their own borders, to take care of the Fatah in their own borders.

MR. ROGERS: They are in a position really, I think, that is unique, and I might as well say what it is. This is my clear impression. They aren't sure that they can handle it. They don't have any strength to speak of, and they will tell you that. They don't have any army to speak of, very small, and their equipment is no good, and obviously they have a strange kind of a government which is all divided up by religious groups and, as you know, they have a Christian president and a Moslem Prime Minister. The foreign minister is - anyway, each ministry, they have so much of this and so much of this and this is a constitutional requirement, not a written constitution, but by practice. So that the government, I just don't think that they feel they have ability to handle the Fedayun.

MR. ALLON: In some cases they did very well in suppressing the terrorists. When they felt they were ought of hand they took some

firm measures and managed to control them.

MR. ROGERS: :You think we should do more to give them the equipment to do it?

MRS. MEIR: I know there was a time when exactly the same was said about Hussein. Very often people came to us when the shelling was continuous from the Jordanian soil over to our villages and we said, we can't take it any more and we have to do something about it, and they said, but you know that Hussein can't control, El Fatah; something will happen. Who will take over? He just can't handle it, and then, all of a sudden, he did a pretty good job. Maybe he could give some technical assistance in Lebanon. I know the situation in Lebanon is different because it is Christian and Moslem and that it's not exactly the same thing, but you people thought that too, that Hussein couldn't handle it.

MR. ROGERS: That's wrong; quite the contrary. I don't think that's true.

MR. SISCO: There were two or three occasions when I can remember the exchange that Yizhak (Rabin) and I had, that we felt that he should confront the situation and that he was sufficiently strong to confront the situation.

MR. ROGERS: Not only that, I had some stiff conversations with his ambassador to that effect.

MRS. MEIR: There is no doubt that you said to him that he should. But we were told more than once that we must understand the situation in Jordan and, as a matter of fact, we did. We reacted when things became so bad we couldn't take it any more.

MR. ROGERS: I just think - in the first place, the King has the Beduins who are pretty good fighters and pretty solidly behind him, whereas in Lebanon the president really has a divided community too. He doesn't have an strong military people; at least they weren't apparent. You couldn't see them. And he says frankly; he told us how much is the size of his army. It is very small. What I am really interested in - we are thinking of trying to strengthen his hand, because he says he will move if he has the strength to. He just hasn't any military equipment to speak of. What would your attitude be on that?

MRS. MEIR: The question - there is a Lebanese government. We didn't choose it. We have nothing to do with it. That's their fate. They have to live with it. And the Lebanese border is no problem from the territorial point of view. During the War of Liberation in 1948, in the fight, we had - I don't now how many villages - by the end of the war we had occupied 40 Lebanese villages. That's no problem. We can give them right back, and the border until the Six Day War was an ideal border. Once in a while, because people live on both sides, so close to the border, and farmers would cultivate, the Lebanese farmers would cultivate their land right up to the border and so would our people. They would leave in the morning and cross the border. It didn't mean much and every once in a while cows went astray one way or the other. I remember, to the credit of the Lebanese, I remember especially one case where a truck with girl soldiers, ours, the driver evidently got mixed up, crossed the border with the girls and with their Sten guns. They were returned. They didn't take that as

an attack. It was an ideal border, and in the Six Day War, I think they declared war against us but never lifted a finger. And then this Lebanese border, I mean that area, became a concentration of the Fatah. We were so sure of our relationship with the Lebanese that if you would go up to our side of the border you would see that in some of the kibbutzim, for instance, the baby homes are built right on the border. We were so safe in our feeling as to the Lebanese. And there is shelling and there is shooting and there are mines. The bus with the children a year or so ago. This all comes from the Lebanese border. There is one section especially where the Lebanese themselves say, they are not present there. There is no Lebanese presence. That place was named Fatahland. What should we do, whether it is from Fatahland or any other land that is Lebanese territory from which there is shelling? Then at one time we found that there was an agreement between the Lebanese government and the Fatah that there must not be shelling from the Lebanese territory, because if there is then the Israelis will come across. But that it is perfectly all right for them to cross the border ^{into} Israel. There they are free to do anything they want and come back again. Well maybe it is satisfactory to the Lebanese but it is not quite satisfactory to Israel. So this is a problem. It is their land. It is their territory, and I think an elementary lesson that we all know is that a government is responsible for its territory, and what is done in that territory and from that territory.

But this was the problem with Jordan until this last year, and this is the problem with Lebanon. To us it was a surprise and a shock

and it is the same pattern; if you don't stop it at the very beginning and do something about it, naturally it grows and then at one point it is out of hand. But all our sympathy to the Lebanese government. They are the last people we would like to quarrel with. We never have. At any rate since 1948. We had good relations before 1948 and very good relations after 1948. There was no peace agreement. There were no formal relations but it was considered a friendly government, within our neighborhood at any rate, what friendliness in our neighborhood means. But after this it really became impossible.

MR. ROGERS: I think we will give serious consideration to helping them. I think they need help. I think they should be strengthened. We ought to do it, I think, in a way that it will be for internal security. They just are weak, that's all. It is one thing to employ them to do something; it is another when they don't have anything to do it with.

MRS. MEIR: If they get something to do it with, if I may suggest, at least that should be a condition, that they are responsible for what is happening.

MR. ROGERS: They say they are.

MRS. MEIR: At their borders, whether the shells come from two kilometers within their borders or whether they are allowed - and very often Fatah groups, gangs, pass^{ed} into Israel territory when it was impossible for them to pass without being seen by a Lebanese army post. They were allowed to go into Israel. They were allowed to come back after they have accomplished their good deed.

MR. EBAN: In January we sent a statement of policy through

Jarring which covered the point about the boundary which we recognize by . The main problem is the need to prevent infiltrations and attack.

MRS. MEIR: That should be a condition, because otherwise -

MR. ROGERS: They will say that. They say, we will do more as soon as we are strong enough, but I don't think you could talk to them without being convinced that they don't think they are strong enough. Maybe they are. There the president is frank to say - he took me aside and said, look, I realize the seriousness of the problem. The fact is that the whole problem, they wish would disappear. The presence of the Fedayun is very embarrassing. They talk about in any peaceful settlement, what can we do to guarantee to get the Fedayun out of their country. They look to us. We don't want them. So you have a feeling of helplessness on their part. It doesn't do any good to lecture whether it is right that they don't feel they have the strength. At least they think they don't, and they are terribly worried about the problem. They are obsessed with the problem. In fact, that's about the only thing they talk about, and when you go by these camps, as I say, the minute you get near the camp or the hospital where the Fedayun are in, that they have used for attacks and kidnapping, they have tanks right along side, fully manned. There is no fooling. They aren't doing it to kid you. In fact, they were very upset when I didn't take it very seriously. But they are very fearful. I don't think that is a charade, a pretense at all. I think that there is more pessimism in Lebanon about the future

than in other countries. They are so pessimistic about the whole thing. They don't think there is a chance for a peace agreement. It is depressing. In the other countries, at least there is some hope. They talk about the possibility, maybe, but in Lebanon, most of the leaders - one had the feeling that they should see a psychiatrist - were so gloomy.

Then we went to Egypt and we saw their top people. The impression that you get in Egypt that would surprise you some is that Sadat seems to be totally confident of his own position. He doesn't seem to have any doubt about it, nor do the people around him. He took the action against Ali Sabry just before we got there. A lot of the so called specialists thought he wouldn't. He speaks English very well. He is physically an attractive man with a lot of force, a good sense of humor, and you know, if you were making a prediction you'd have to say - from a short visit of this kind - that he is going to take Nasser's place. He is it. We had serious doubts about it when he came in office. We thought that he wouldn't amount of much. We had reports that he wouldn't be very effective and so forth. And certainly he is an intense man and quite intelligent, gives the appearance of being very thoughtful and willing to exchange ideas. He does have a typical Arab characteristic of being very emotional at times and very, very forceful at times and then being vacillating between that and being thoughtful. And when he is strongly emotional, then he uses some of the words that you may expect and then at other times he goes right back and is perfectly willing to exchange ideas and to do so on a reasonable basis.

He talks of practical things. He talks a good deal of his own problems, the need to improve the lot of the Egyptians. He is not going to use UAR. He is going to call it Egypt.

MR. ALLON: The Arab Republic of Egypt.

MRS. MEIR: We always called it Egypt!

MR. ROGERS: You don't have any feeling that they are going to attempt to perpetuate Nasser. There is no ? that you see. The pictures are down. Sometimes you see a picture of Nasser half way torn down. I went to the tomb, on the way in, and stopped and signed the book and there weren't many people around. We drove there on the way in and there ^{seemed to be a few} people there but it wasn't crowded. And there was very little said about President Nasser. So you had a feeling that there is a new man, and he gave you the feeling that that is what he intended, with no if's, and's or but's, and he said, I am the president; I am making decisions. I have made some decisions. One decision I made is, I want a peace agreement. I have said so. A lot of my advisers thought I shouldn't. A lot of the other Arab nations criticized me for it. Kadaffi thought I was a traitor, but I am prepared to make a peace agreement. You see, I got the words from Mr. Eban. Those are the words he used and I picked those words out and I accepted them and I am prepared -

MR. SISCO: He was very proud of that.

MR. ROGERS: He said, I didn't use the words that the Americans use. I took Mr. Eban's words, peace agreement. I noticed he used the words "peace agreement". Those are his words -

MRS. MEIR: He should read a little more.

MR. EKAN: About secure boundaries.

MR. ROGERS: So he does everything he can to convince you that he is prepared to sign a peace agreement. He says that is what Egypt wants. He thought that is what the U.S. wanted and he thinks that any kind of guarantees that anybody wants to make is satisfactory to him. If we want to undertake to guarantee a peace agreement, he is prepared to let us do it, and he'd like to have a guarantee from us that there would be no violations, but he doesn't need it necessarily. He feels that the time is right to make a peace agreement. He thinks it is the only solution to the problems in the Middle East and he is prepared to do it, and he said, I am a practical man, I am reasonable. The only thing I can't do is give up my territory. Anything else, I will consider. I will consider any kind of guarantees, any kind of force in the area, anything else, but that I can't do. And he said, this is the time to do it, and this is what we thought the United States wanted. This is what he thought, he said, the international community always said should be done. This is what the Arabs have been asked to do and this is what you said the Arabs wouldn't do. But I have done it and I am prepared to face the risks, and I want your answer, what is your position. So I said, I am going to talk to Mrs. Meir.

MRS. MEIR: I want a peace agreement even without guarantees; one better.

MR. ROGERS: I think the problem, and I don't think really - this probably isn't a good time to go into the whole thing. We will

have more time tomorrow. He is not thinking of an interim agreement as such. He wants a peace agreement. He is prepared to sign it. He says it is the only solution. He knows that the King is not talking about retaining, or going back to the old borders. He knows there is flexibility there as far as territory is concerned. He says he thinks that Syria is changing its policy, that they are waiting for him. His relations with Syria have improved; that they are prepared to go along if he does, and he thinks that that would ^{be} not an insurmountable problem, to be worked out between Egypt and Israel. He talks a little about Gaza, but not very much. He doesn't talk about Jerusalem. I don't think he mentioned it at all. I don't think so. But what he says is, as far as my territory is concerned, the Sinai, I have to have it back. I will make a peace agreement. I will do anything else that is reasonable, consider any practical arrangement you have in mind, but I have got to have my territory back. That's what I thought everybody wanted.

MR. ALLON: The little he said about Gaza, what was it?

MR. ROGERS: He said in effect - Mr. Sisco can add anything he wants to this. He said, in effect, that he thought it should be under Arab control, that he thought that it should be on a temporary basis back as it was before the '67 war, that he thought then a decision should be made by the people in Gaza, whether they wanted to be part of Jordan or separate, and at that point he didn't have any interest, Egypt didn't have any interest, as such in it. Beyond that, he thought that people in Gaza should have some freedom of choice, but he made it clear that this was not a very important part of his

thinking. He talked about the problems he had with his military leaders to get them to think about the Suez, the opening of the Suez. He said - his foreign minister was in the room - the foreign minister suggesting the was not in favor of/opening of the Suez, but I did it anyway, because this is how I feel. Because I think if we could do that, work it out so the Suez is opened, and there was a withdrawal and we could come to terms on the peace agreement, that that would keep the momentum going and we'd have a chance to work out the other arrangements on the Sinai and I think, he said, I think we could work out a peace agreement. I don't know of any other way to do it. I will do anything that is reasonable and practical except I can't agree to give my land away.

He asked what Israel's attitude was. I said we plan to be in Israel, of course, to visit Israel; that we had no information beyond the answers that you had given to Ambassador Jarring. We said that we thought that your position would have to be clarified. We weren't sure what it was; that we had been urging you and, as I said, as I have said publicly, that you had indicated that once Egypt agreed to a peace agreement that you would lay your cards on the table, say what you were prepared to give up in return for the peace agreement and that we thought that the time was now. He did not talk about - he made no threats; he didn't talk about saying I have got to have it in this month or next month. He didn't say anything of that nature. He did say that time is passing and time is an important factor, and nothing can happen if time passes except the deterioration. I will have problems if momentum isn't maintained. Hussein

will have an additional problem if this momentum doesn't continue. And I think that now is the time to get to it, and try to work it out.

He talked very frankly. He said, to begin with, one of the things you are concerned about is the presence of the Soviet Union. I will tell you about the presence of the Soviet Union. We didn't want them here. He said, we got them here because, first, we got them here because of the Aswan Dam which you refused to finance. We are building it and it is built. Then we had problems with our defence. I needed military equipment. I couldn't get it anywhere else. I went to Moscow; Nasser went to Moscow, and got it. We couldn't operate; we don't have the ability, didn't have the ability to operate the equipment, the SAM sites. It requires a special kind of training, and I said, come in and operate them for us and then train us how to do it. They did. We have them here. There is no secret of it. We don't want them. We want to defend ourselves. He said, they are teaching our pilots how to fly. We need that. That's the only way they can learn to fly. But he said, I am non-aligned. I want to remain non-aligned. I haven't made any commitment. To illustrate what I say, everything I purchased, I paid for. All the Russians who are here are being paid for by me, getting salaries and expenses from me in Sterling. He said, that's a drain on me. I don't like it. But I am not beholden to anybody. I don't intend to be. I am an Egyptian and I plan to be responsible for all the security but I can't do it until we have had the proper training and we are going to get it. We have got so many people; look around. We can learn, and we are going to.

But he said, we want American presence. We want, if we could work out something, we want to have better relations with you. We want you here.

MR. ALLEN: Did I hear 'right when you said "American presence"?

MR. ROGERS: He is talking about diplomatic presence. No, he didn't - he meant if we had diplomatic relations then we'd have Americans, you know, there in much greater numbers. He said, the last thing we want is a confrontation of the major powers. He said, I have got enough troubles myself on my own hands without having a ? between the major powers. And that was about it. He said, I want to continue to improve our relations with the United States. We did do two or three little things. We added one man to our infra-[?]section and one man to their intra-section in Washington. We will provide some debt rescheduling - we didn't decide what - so that they can get some wheat from the World Bank, and we want to continue to have active discussion with him about the Middle East problem. Riad was there. They were very temperate in what they said. They were very temperate in what they said about Israel. There wasn't any vitrolitic language at all. As I said, there was a deep feeling of emotion at times, but there were no long distribes about Israel or anything of that kind.

When they talked about the Suez Canal, contrary to what I thought from the traffic, he wasn't talking about it as a sort of an interim settlement and then somewhere along the line we will talk again. He was talking about it as a way of continuing the momentum but having (1) a pretty clear understanding about the peace agreement. In other

words, I thought maybe he was thinking about sort of a half-way settlement, and then some other time having another half-way settlement. He really isn't. He is talking about trying to arrive at the general framework of a peace agreement and this would be a method of making it possible to achieve. On the - we didn't - well, let me tell you what we did say. We said we think there are four areas of agreement based on discussions we have had with Israel. This doesn't commit Israel, because we are not sure we are stating Israel's position exactly correctly. But this is our impression, take it as such.

We think there is willingness on the part of Israel to have the Suez Canal opened. That is a point that seems to be a point of agreement and as far as the United States is concerned, although there are some in the United States feel that it would be to our disadvantage and it might have some strategic disadvantage, on balance, our government felt that it would be about a stand-off[?]. This is a point that maybe I didn't make clear when you and I (referring to Mr. Dayan) had discussions, that there was some lack of clarity on that. But on balance, our government's position is, it would favor neither the Soviet Union or the United States, but particularly because we think it would provide a mechanism for keeping the momentum going. So there seems to be an agreement that the opening of the Suez Canal would be acceptable.

Two. There seems to be an agreement that given proper conditions that a withdrawal of some kind under proper conditions would be possible.

Three. There seems to be agreement that it has to be coupled with a cease fire of some duration, but obviously during the period the Suez was being opened and for X period thereafter there would have to be a cease fire and it would have to be clear in some form or other, whether you call it a cease fire or extend the conditions as now exist or whatever, but whatever it is, there would be no fighting during this period of this understanding.

And fourth, that it would not be an end in itself. That whatever was done would be done with the thought in mind that a peace agreement is the end of the road which we all saw.

He took note of those four points. He talked about moving his forces across the Canal; that would be essential. It would have no meaning; otherwise it would be - he would have no way of proving that the withdrawal was acceptance of his sovereignty of this area.

We asked what he had in mind about military strength across. He never was specific about that. We argued the position that we didn't see why it was necessary. Why do you need it? Why can't you have civilians? Why do you need military? He said, as far as the Russians are concerned, he wouldn't want them there. As far as his own people are concerned, he wants to have sufficient military personnel to make it clear that he was controlling the Suez Canal. We didn't get down to specifics about it. What we were arguing that we didn't see why it was necessary to have military personnel; why can't you have civilian personnel? Why is it necessary? We argued your case. Why should Israel accept that? Then we also made the argument, if you require withdrawal of any distance and you make a major

move of forces across, then you are defeating your own purpose; then it would look as though you accepted a more permanent arrangement because otherwise, if it is a temporary arrangement, why are you insisting on such a big withdrawal; why would you want that number of troops there? If it is symbolism and you want it to appear to be a temporary measure leading to a final peace agreement, why make it look as if it has a permanency? Why not make it look temporary? We argued the fact that the opening of the Suez and the withdrawal, even a withdrawal of a short distance, would be a major success for him; in the first instance, he proposed the idea and therefore he'd get credit for it. Secondly, it would be, it is true, an acceptance of the principle of withdrawal by Israel, not necessarily a withdrawal as they wanted it, as they interpreted the Security Council resolution, but at least it was a physical recognition of the principle of withdrawal. As we have said, all that has happened until now is that we have had a lot of discussion about withdrawal. We never had any withdrawal. So any withdrawal would be significant. It would signify that there was a possibility that a peace agreement could be achieved and that Israel was prepared to take a step, modest though it is in that direction, and then it would give Jarring a chance to continue his discussions and maybe we could finally get active discussions underway and so forth.

The last part of our discussion was all of this type. We made the argument at some length. I can't tell. He listened, particularly intently to the last part. He didn't respond. We said that we would talk to you further. We said we had no proposal. We weren't going

to submit any specific proposal and that we were not going to submit any piece of paper. I can't think of a more - I guess I had better be careful - senseless procedure than everybody putting things on pieces of paper and having one side say it's for and the other side rejects and everybody in the world knows that there's something that's been rejected and that makes everybody mad. And I said what we want to do is actively exchange ideas. If you want us to play a part, we will do it. If Israel wants us to play a part, we will do it. We will convey ideas to you. We hope that you will convey ideas to us. We'd like to see if something can be worked out. We are not going, at this stage in the game, to reduce things to writing. Let's see if we can agree on things.. Then if it looks as if we can agree, then we can reduce it to writing. Let's try to get a letter of intention of that concept; we agree that that is how it is going to look, and then to put it in fine print. Not to try to bring the final contract before you know if you can agree or not.

He said he accepted that concept. He thought it was useful. He thought we would be in close touch. He thought that you would be willing to convey your thoughts and we would convey it to him and he would be very happy to do that with us. He didn't want any other involvement, and so forth.

So we are in a position where if your government is prepared to propose things or discuss them with us, we'd like to - As far as we are concerned, as a government - I have told your ambassador, and I am sure it's been conveyed to you - we find ourselves in a difficult

position, because we have represented to every other government that we have talked to that we firmly believe that if the Arabs, and particularly the Egyptians, took the position, clear position, that they are prepared to make a peace agreement with you, and to say that they recognize your sovereignty, they were prepared to live with you in peace, that they would do everything they can to prevent their territory from being used by others to attack you and harass you, if they would agree not to attempt to become involved in your internal affairs, all the other things, freedom of navigation and so forth, that we thought that a peace agreement might be possible, and in any event, we said that we felt sure if that happened that you'd clearly state what you'd be willing to do in return. And we can't honestly - and when we talk to other governments. I have just been to a Cento meeting. Every government comes up and says, what is Israel prepared to do? We say, we are not sure. And I am sure you know, and I don't mean to keep saying it because I know it is a difficult position for you: your government has lost support in the international world, even a government like Turkey that's very fond of you. Well, comparatively, they have - this man particularly has strong pro-Israeli feelings at present and he has expressed them many times in the past and he expressed deep concern. The international support that you have had on this issue is deteriorating. You have tremendous respect but on this issue - and we are in the same boat. Our public policy is so well known and it is there for everybody to see.

I would hope very much that - and you don't have to do it now, or while we are here; we didn't undertake this trip with the idea of

coming back with anything in hand. But I would hope that you would be able in the near future to take a position that is at least better understood and hopefully a position from which we could work toward a peace agreement. The position of our government: we will do anything we can to help you. What can we do? I mean, now is the time. We are prepared to help, to work out a peace agreement and we will do whatever we can to assist. What would you like us to do? And if you have doubts as you go down the road and you are satisfied that they are not sincere, then turn it off; decide that you don't. You don't have to sign the agreement until you sign the agreement. But it seems to me that you would want to keep the momentum going, keep it alive and work towards a peace agreement, because, as I say, we are prepared to assist. I am not talking necessarily about the Four Powers. We don't really care how it is done. What would you like us to do? We will consider any reasonable proposal.

Well, go ahead.

MR. SISCO: I might say a word or two just to give the Secretary a rest.

I think we have made one point. Why is it that the United States feels that there is an opportunity today? Why do we think the time is ripe? Why do we think there is a chance and that the chance may be lost? Well, let's look at the conditions in the area from your point of view. First of all, I think you would agree with us in our assessment that Jordan from the point of view of being a partner in a future peace is as secure as one would hope in the present circumstances. It could change, as you all realize. I think you are as satisfied as

we are that the King is in control, that the King would like to make some kind of a settlement. You can recall in the days of the September crisis, I think you, Madam Prime Minister, and a number of your ministers, made very sensible, very effective argument, and that is, that if there wasn't a king to run that show, with whom would you make peace? There was no one to make peace on the Jordan side. So you have got Jordan there in a position, in a reasonable position - nothing is immutable - to make peace with you, with a reasonable chance that that peace will stick.

Now, what about Cairo? I would put it this way which is really essentially saying the same thing as the Secretary said. And who can be sure because these are only impressions. Certainly I think we come away with the impression that this is a man who would like to try to do business with you on this question of peace, and feels able to do something about that at the present time but is certainly not very sure in circumstances of a continued impasse.

So the question we ask ourselves, both in relationship to Jordan and Egypt, from your point of view, what is it that you expect or what condition do you want to see develop in these two countries, or could you conceive of developing in these two countries which is more favorable in terms of trying to grasp with this problem of a peace settlement?

On the question of an overall settlement or an interim settlement, I think we found a very, very deep concern, both in Jordan and in Lebanon, Madam Prime Minister, that an interim settlement would lift the pressure in so far as pursuing efforts for a fundamental

settlement and if you were to ask the King what his attitude is on the interim settlement, he would say it really doesn't touch the fundamental problem that confronts me. I need an overall settlement in these circumstances.

MR. ROGERS: He doesn't really favor it.

MR. SISCO: I think that's putting it - and in Lebanon, given their explosive situation of the Fedayun, their concern is, they put it this way - it means the same but their language is different - it doesn't touch the fundamental Palestinian problem.

Now, if you have a different assessment as to Jordan and Egypt in terms of whether these positive indicators in so far as a willingness on their part to come to grips with this; if you can conceive of a situation where six months from now or twelve months from now or eighteen months from now the situation will develop in a more favorable way from your point of view, then frankly we would like to hear it, because our impression is otherwise. Our impression is that the longer the impasse continues in this situation, the more difficult it will become for the King and the more difficult that it becomes for the present leadership in Egypt. And so I think that if you at some point, Madam Prime Minister, could really elucidate this point and tell us what it is in terms of developments in these two countries that you are looking for, which in your judgment would represent a more favorable condition than that which exists today, we would frankly appreciate having your views and having your judgment on this regard. If you feel that we are wrong in this assessment of these favorable indicators I think it is important that we have your views.

MR. ROGERS: I would like to bring the meeting - not necessarily

this meeting, but while we are here - not to really argue different points. We could cover all ground and make predictions about the future. What I would hope is: what are you prepared to do? Just that simple. The time is ripe, I am convinced. You don't have to tell us now. We don't have to know even when we leave -

MRS. MEIR: You know it by heart.

MR. ROGERS: I don't know -

MRS. MEIR: No. We know it by heart.

MR. ROGERS: But maybe tonight is not the night; it's getting late and we have all day tomorrow.

MRS. MEIR: We can stop any moment that you say, Mr. Secretary. On one thing we are in perfect agreement: I don't know how you did it. You did in a few days, covering so much territory and talking so much, that I understand perfectly if you say we knock off at any moment when you say it is all right and we can go on at any time that you say.

MR. ROGERS: We can continue.

MRS. MEIR: I am going to say something that I am afraid you won't like, but you see it depends upon where you begin. If all of a sudden for some reason there was no peace with Egypt and now we have to sit down and say, here Sadat wants to make peace with you, what is it that prevents Israel from meeting his sincere desire for peace? But we can't forget, and I think not only my colleagues on the Cabinet are in accord with that; I think any person on the street that you meet, and this is a democratic country. You can talk to anybody. There is a history to this. I will never forget that last year when

I was in the United States I had dinner at Ambassador Tekoah's house. Ambassador Jarring was there and Dr. Bunch was there. Dr. Bunch at one point said, if I were really honest, I would return the Nobel Prize that was given to me. He said, when we signed the Armistice Agreement, I as everybody else, including the Arabs at that time - at least that's the impression he got - were convinced this is something very temporary and at most within a year there would be permanent peace agreements, and he said, here we are and there is no peace and there have been wars after that. I don't think I deserve the Nobel Prize. I didn't bring peace into the Middle East. He remembers. If he remembers, we certainly have a right to -

MR. ROGERS: Everybody does. Everybody we talked to recalls everything that's happened. As I said, everybody has his own recollection of history, his own emotional reaction to history, and, as I say, I know that you feel very strongly about this, but what we hope we can talk about is the future.

MRS. MEIR: We will come to the future. But Mr. Sadat evidently makes an impression that he wants peace. All he wants is his land back. This is exactly where he was in '67. I don't know whether he was asked the question or not, but we have to ask the question: what happened exactly four years ago, almost to the day; what happened just four years ago when all of a sudden preparation for war was made in Egypt. Was there anything provocative on the part of Israel that warranted everything that happened between the first week of May and the 4th of June?

I asked for my famous speech of March 1st, 1957. What happened?

How much of what was promised and assumed and hoped for took place? After we left Sharm-el-Sheikh and after we left Gaza, right back where we came from? Why was there war again in 1967? I only mention this because I think we are duty-bound to learn from our experience. We are again in Sharm-el-Sheikh. We were perfectly happy when the U.N. force was there so long as there was shipping. So now there is Sadat and that what happened in 1967 was the work of Nasser, but many people came back from talks with Nasser and said that Nasser wants peace. There was a special messenger who went to Nasser and went to Ben Gurion and came back with the story that Nasser wants peace -

MR. ROGERS: He never said it this way. You see, you said if anything happens to Nasser, we can make peace. You speak about Sadat in the same derogatory terms.

MRS. MEIR: I am not speaking in derogatory terms. I never spoke to Nasser and I haven't had the privilege of speaking with Sadat. But let's take Sadat. We must listen to what he says. Anybody else can discount everything he says in public, but I have a collection of things that he said after he said he is prepared, after he quoted Eban, and agrees with him, after that. A collection of how he pictures the final settlement of our problem and the final settlement is no Jewish State. Heikal, who is not just one more newspaper man in Egypt. He writes a series of articles, arguing with those in opposition to Sadat. They must not get the priorities mixed up. There are priorities. Priority number one is to get the Israelis out of the land that they conquered and occupied in 1967. Priority two is to get them out of the territory of 1947. Palestinians back - a state where

Jews and Moslems and Christians will live together and then there is no Zionist state. These things have not been said in secret to anybody. This is on the radio; this is at the conference of the so called Socialist Union. This is at the conference that was held of Patah in Cairo, by the same Sadat. Now, I won't say anything derogatory about Sadat. I don't know the gentleman. I only want to know: when is he Sadat? When is he saying to the world and to his people - I remember that Nasser very often said to people that went to see him, of course, I want peace, but if I make peace with Israel I will be assassinated. My people won't let me and then turned right around and made another fiery speech to his people.

MR. ROGERS: He never said he wanted to make a peace agreement with you. In fact, when we first - you said no Egyptian will say, I will make a peace agreement. When you spoke to our Ambassador, you said, repeatedly, no Egyptian will ever say, we will make peace with Israel.

MRS MEIR: I don't believe I ever said what Egyptians will say.

MR. ROGERS: Unless I am mistaken, you said as soon as ^{an} Egyptian, as soon as Sadat, says he will make a peace agreement, sign a peace agreement, we will lay our cards on the table.

MRS. MEIR: I said, as soon as any Arab leader says peace, when it comes to the discussion of the territorial question, - this is an exact quote - we will lay our cards on the table and I repeat it now.

MR. HERZOG: "You said, face up to all questions.

MRS. MEIR: Exactly. We are prepared to do it now. When you say what Israel wants - Israel wanted peace for 23 years. Israel

immediately after the Six Day War said, let us negotiate peace; let us negotiate for secure and agreed borders. And the answer we got immediately after the war was Khartoum. And from then on we kept on repeating like parrots: we want negotiations for agreed and recognized borders and a peace agreement. We didn't change.

Now, what is it that Israel wants? Exactly that. What is there a stalemate with the negotiations under Dr. Jarring's aegis? What happened? It happened that Dr. Jarring handed us a paper and handed the Egyptians a paper and asked for our commitment. That we won't give, and Sadat said he is prepared to make a peace agreement with Israel on condition that Israel commits itself to pull back to the pre-5th of June lines. That we won't accept, but I think three times at least, twice through our Ambassador, once through our Foreign Minister, we asked you to convey to Egypt, and I am sure you did, we are prepared to go on with these negotiations without any pre-commitment. We didn't ask anybody for any pre-commitment and nobody should ask us for a pre-commitment.

Now, as far as Egypt is concerned, I don't think it is correct to say that nobody knows what we want. We have said it in public. We have said it to you. I remember I sat in your office in Washington. We had a long and thorough discussion and we talked then not only of Egypt but also of Jordan and what we want in the Jordanian border. I said we don't draw lines but in principle, that we won't come a step down from the Golan Heights. At that time it was almost ? to speak about the Syrians because it was still the old regime. Now it is a new regime, and to the extent that it is a better regime and

more reasonable regime, we congratulate them on that. When Mr. Sisco, you asked, what do we want in Jordan, in all modesty, I think maybe Israel helped a little bit to keep the King on his throne.

MR. SISCO: Sure.

MRS. MEIR: I don't say much, but a little bit I think we did. And when Nasser was there, we didn't do anything to put Nasser out of the picture. Nasser died. Sadat came in and if it is a more reasonable regime, we congratulate Sadat. We congratulated Sadat in the first speech that he made when he said he wanted to concentrate on the welfare of his people. Just like Ben Gurion went to the Knesset when Naguib took over and said, these are people who have said that their program is the welfare of their people and we think with these people, on this program, it is surely possible to make peace. It went the other way.

Now, as far as Egypt is concerned, it isn't a secret that we said that we must continue in the control of Sharm el-Sheikh. It isn't a secret that we said that there must be a land connection between Sharm el-Sheikh and the State of Israel. These are no secrets, but I understand perfectly, not happily, that you don't accept this, but it isn't that we haven't said what we wanted. The United States policy, to our sorrow, is international borders. But it isn't because you don't know what the Israel policy is. I'm sorry -

MR. ROGERS: Except you only mention Sharm el-Sheikh. What about Sinai, what about the rest? of Sinai?

MRS. MEIR: I said to your Ambassador only two weeks or so ago it is not all of Sinai; it is not even half of Sinai. How wide

the strip that will connect Sharm el-Sheikh to Israel across the international border, that's a question of negotiation. That line we haven't drawn. But nobody can say that Israel or suspect that Israel wants all of Sinai. And I said distinctly to the Ambassador, not all of Sinai, not even half of Sinai, but that we want Sharm el-Sheikh, that we want to be in control of Sharm el-Sheikh, that after this (referring to speech of 1957), when all good things were said in here. I quote not what I said, but my quotations of good things that others have said, and then came 1967. So we said we must be in control of Sharm el-Sheikh. I remember in my talk to you last fall, you said, well, is it proper, maybe you want 99 years? I didn't say yes or not. If you said, I can give you a lease for 99 years, I'd say, Mr. Secretary, I will take this to the Government and the Government will decide. But control of Sharm el-Sheikh - by all means. Not an international force, not Russians, not Yugoslavs, not Indians. Israel. Then we know there will be free shipping for everybody, and Israel has never attacked Egypt. Not in 1948, not in 1967. We didn't attack Jordan. We didn't attack any of our neighbors.

So it is well known what Israel wants. And when I say, I am sorry - it is a great understatement - that there is a disagreement, not only between us and Egypt but that there is a disagreement between the United States Government and Israel on this policy, but we disagree on something that we have heard from each other, not that because we don't know what we want, not because we don't know what your policy is, not that you don't know what our policy is. It is for us almost a tragic disagreement, and not because we don't like Sadat in Egypt,

and not because we don't like the King in Jordan. We are, I won't say more sensitive you must give us credit that we have some sensitivity sensibility what is happening right across the border, whether the King is there or the King is not there. So there was a time when the King said, I can't make peace with you because of Egypt. I can't do it alone. All right. So we wait. And nothing happens so long as our villages can have a day, or a night, without shells. Here you spoke about the Lebanese border. What demands have we of Lebanon? What demands have they of us? No territorial questions, no border question whatsoever. Then what do we do if we have our people and our children on this side of the border; if we a city of Kiryat Shmona where over and over again there is shelling, over and over again people are killed? What do we do? What does any country do in a case of that kind? We carry responsibility to our people? So we decided that there is nothing that is more unjust than the accusation that is heard in various quarters, Israel wants the acquisition of territory. That isn't true. That isn't true. But we want borders that are more defensible than our other borders were and borders that should be a deterrent in themselves. I know, Mr. Secretary, you were perfectly right when you said over and over again, it's nonsense, there is no such thing as secure borders -

MR. ROGERS: Certainly isn't. Japan found that out.

MRS. MEIR: But when the Syrians are on the Golan Heights and we are down or when we are on the Golan Heights, I don't know whether it makes sense, but we feel more secure.

MR. ROGERS: We really never raised a question about that really ever.

MRS. MEIR: Then there is the question of Transjordan. When there is 12 miles between Natanya and the Jordanian border, less than 12 miles, there's a difference. Geography or no geography, but there is a difference. When Tel Aviv is shelled from across the border, but that didn't do too much harm, but it was in 1967, but Natanya? You know what it means to this country with having it cut in the center? So that's all we want. We want that these borders, that out of the blue were attacked. Mr. Secretary, it is a fact. A government that I wasn't it, sat here, a room upstairs I suppose, on the 5th of June and through General Bull sent a message to King Hussein. Jerusalem now is a point that causes a lot of anxiety. But Jerusalem was divided on the 5th of June in 1967, and the Israel government, not because it was losing the war - the Egyptian air force was non-existent practically - sent a message to King Hussein through General Bull and the message was delivered and King Hussein wrote about it even that it was delivered, saying that if you don't come in, nothing will happen to you, and he came in because Nasser told him that he is bombing Tel Aviv. So all I can do is sympathize with Hussein, but I don't know ^{where} why we are to blame. I don't think it is right to say even that we are to blame because there is a diplomatic stalemate. We are prepared to go on with our discussions.

Well, Mr. Secretary, we were called intransigent/^{because}for three years we said we want direct negotiations. Then we accepted your peace initiative, that we should go to Dr. Jarring. So we went. But, honestly, are these negotiations? When Sadat brings his paper to Dr. Jarring and Dr. Jarring sits and makes it more palatable -

MR. ROGERS: I know -

MRS. MEIR: Are these negotiations? But we won't go back on our word. We are prepared to negotiate under the aegis of Dr. Jarring, but if the condition is that in order for negotiations to go on we must accept a pre-commitment that Sadat places upon us, we won't do it. But we make no pre-commitment. We state our position, and after he said that he wants a pre-commitment, we didn't say well if that's what you want, we don't talk any more. We didn't say that. We stated our position. And he doesn't like the fact that we said, we won't go back to the 4th of June borders. We didn't ask him to accept it. We said after that, okay, now you know what we think; we know now what you think. Now let us proceed from here. Let us go point by point and when we come to the territorial question, we will tell exactly what we want and if Sadat - and we said that too - that there can be no peace without a solution of the Palestinian question, and by the way, when you said, if I heard correctly, that there is no plan for the refugees, we have a plan.

MR. ROGERS: Who said that?

MRS. MEIR: You said when you looked at the camps.

MR. ROGERS: What I mean, nothing in the offing. They don't see any hope and they're there all the time and nobody -

MRS. MEIR: Mr. Secretary, we are prepared to put on the table a quite detailed plan for the solution of the refugee problem, for the welfare of the refugees, certainly also for the welfare of Jordan, and are prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent, but when it is said here that there is no peace unless the Palestinians go back to the land that was taken from them, we know exactly what this means. Now,

I don't know how sincere these statements are. I can't judge except by reading. There is no reason why I shouldn't believe them. If one is to believe Mr. Sadat, I see no reason why we don't, then I believe him when he says he wants peace, but then I must also believe him when he spells out what peace in his book means and it means no Israel. And I think these are the problems. It is not a question, I don't think; I hope that you have no doubts whether Israel wants peace.

MR. ROGERS: It is really getting late and I will just make a few comments and maybe we should adjourn. When you say, we know what you want; we know the arguments that you make. We heard the arguments before. We heard the argument you just made, how we want Sharm el-Sheikh and access -

MRS. MEIR: That's no argument. I tell you we want Sharm el-Sheikh -

MR. ROGERS: Let me finish. Then you argue. It doesn't make our position - this is the argument. Now we have told you, you must understand, it doesn't make it clear to me. We have never been told by you, if you get a satisfactory arrangement on Sharm el-Sheikh and access that you will withdraw to the '67 boundary. Where would you withdraw to? Tell us now.

MRS. MEIR: Mr. Secretary -

MR. ROGERS: You say, we don't want it all, we don't want three-quarters. But we have never known, and when the President asked me, what is your position, what are you willing to give up in case you are able to get what you want, I have to answer, I say, I think

Madam Prime Minister wants what I read about in the London Times, in the conversation you had with our Ambassador. I gathered that the conclusion he came to that if there was a satisfactory arrangement on the demilitarization and on Sharm el-Sheikh and access, that probably you would be willing to go back to the '67 boundaries, but not necessarily. I wasn't sure. I am not sure tonight.

MRS. MEIR: In my conversations with the Ambassador, I said definitely not the '67 borders. You announced - the United States Government announced the American policy, international borders - period.

MR. ROGERS: No, that's not our position. You haven't read our statement. I said that we thought that if a satisfactory security arrangement could be made on Sharm el-Sheikh, and by satisfactory I meant by agreement between Israel and Egypt and a satisfactory arrangement could be made on demilitarization, and I didn't say what demilitarization would consist of, it would have to be satisfactory to the parties in the negotiations, then -

MR. SISCO: And Gaza.

MR. ROGERS: And Gaza. Then we thought the '67 boundary should be the boundary. That's what I said. That's what the President said. That's what he believes. We have said it and said it over again. I said it in my statements this year. This is our position. This is the U.S. position. But we have not known, and certainly Ambassador Jarring doesn't know. He didn't lay down conditions. You say he kept laying down conditions. He asked some questions. He didn't lay conditions.

MRS. MEIR: Who didn't?

MR. ROGERS: Jarring. He said if so and so happens, would you be willing to do this? He just asked questions, and so at the moment he doesn't really know and, frankly, we don't know and, as I said, I don't think we ought to get into it tonight but I would hope, and we don't have to do it while we are here. Maybe it is not appropriate. Maybe it is not timely. Maybe you don't want to. Maybe you have some other reason. We would hope that somewhere along the line before too long we would want to know what it is. After all, we are your principal supporter. We have a right to know what you are thinking. Not sort of what you want, but what you are thinking of. Secondly, we think the time is ripe to work on a peace agreement. We don't want you to take Sadat at his word or anybody else at his word. We would be foolish to suggest it. We want the negotiations to be conducted under Ambassador Jarring, hopefully that progress is made and maybe we can find a more active way to do it so that exchanges of ideas are quicker. But we hope that a serious and earnest and active effort can be made to see if agreement or interim agreement is possible. Because we will never have a better time. U.S. policy is very adversely affected throughout the world now by this impasse, and we are prepared, as I said earlier, to play any kind of a role that you would think would be helpful. You say what you don't want us to do. You don't want troops there. You don't want to ?

That's very well. We are not urging you to. But we do think that the willingness on the part of the United States to play a role to be helpful should be appreciated. Maybe it should be rejected.

Maybe we should get out all together. Is that what you want? Don't you want us to work together? Don't you want us to give you full support? I would think that you would appreciate our offer, that we are prepared to consider any kind of a guarantee, any kind of arrangement that you think might guarantee peace in the future, because as a practical matter it is clear that if hostility occurred we would want to help somehow. We fully support you and we have and we will continue to, so we are in the boat together, and we are having problems in our own foreign policy. It is seriously damaging to us. We are prepared now - I think, as I said at the airport, that this is a time to take risks for peace. We recognize there are some risks. We think there are greater risks in doing nothing. I realize it is an easier thing to do nothing, to argue against any proposal and to figure out all the villains that cause the problems but I would hope that we could get beyond that point. If it is possible. If there is no chance now, well, say so. We will say there isn't any chance for peace. We will forget the whole idea. But I would hope that we can at least together project an image of wanting to. The fact is that the rest of the nations in the world don't think that you want to make peace. I'm sure that grieves you.

MRS. MEIR: This does grieve us. This is unjust. But there have been many unjust accusations against us. We can't help that. The question is if we to ourselves can say honestly that we want peace, and we do. We refuse peace on dictated terms. Now, the question of Suez came up. On the 4th of February, Sadat made a statement. On the 9th of February I answered that statement. Then we followed

exactly the principle that you are proposing now. We thought it would be a good idea to come to agreement, to try to reach an agreement with the U.S. government, and we presented our paper.

MR. ROGERS: No - I am shaking my head - we never thought of our role of reaching an agreement with Israel. We said from the beginning that we were prepared to try to play a useful role if you wanted us to. The agreement should be between you and Egypt.

MRS. MEIR: Naturally. But we thought that we would present to the United States what our idea of the opening of the Canal is. I don't know whether you are in favor of that or not. But Sadat says this should be the first move to be followed by further withdrawals. We don't accept that, because the minute that we decide to go back to the international border -

MR. ROGERS: We don't accept that either.

MRS. MEIR: -We will pack up and go back. There is no use to do it in stages. We will just pack up and go back. We thought; we accepted that suggestion that it may take a long time to reach a peace agreement. If there is a possibility of putting a stop to shooting and we always quote you, "to stop shooting and begin talking" and we thought, if there is a possibility, there is a willingness on the part of Egypt to say, this is the end of shooting, and we were not asked but we said the line to which the Israeli army will withdraw is not considered by us as a final line. We suggest that talks under Mr. Jarring should go on and Israel will withdraw to agreed and secure borders in a peace agreement. All this we have said. Sadat - I have nothing against him, if he says what he wants. But that's not what

we are prepared to accept and he evidently is not prepared - He argues with us in public statements and says this is unacceptable. Israel's presence even in an international force in Sharm el-Sheikh is not acceptable. So there is a disagreement between us and Egypt on very specific problems, but it isn't that we just heard Sadat make a suggestion of the opening of the Canal and we just paid no attention to it. That certainly cannot be said. Maybe he won't accept & we don't know what the United States thinks about these various proposals. You have the right to say that you don't want to enter into discussion on this proposal, but that's exactly what we tried to do.

MR. ROGERS: Do you actually favor the opening of the Suez? In other words, is it something that you - really appeals? When we got the response from you, it sounded as if you were doing it as a favor to us.

MRS. MEIR: Not as a favor.

MR. ROGERS: We are not pressing. We are just hopeful that we can find some ways -

MRS. MEIR: That's exactly -

MR. EBAN: We said we wouldn't do it if it's against your strategic interest.

MR. SISCO: We said we were ready to transmit your views on this, as you wrote them.

MR. ALLON: The Secretary said we are in one boat and he thought America deserves to know what we think. So we are now trying to tell you, to discuss with you the possibility[?] of agreement between us about the terms. You say, no, we are not a party for agreement because

we can only offer our good offices. So what is exactly the position between America and Israel on this matter?

MRS. MEIR: May I answer this question? As far as we are concerned, if it were not in the context of maybe the beginning, that eventually there will be peace, and we said the opening of the Canal and by all means the people coming back to the cities on the other side of the Canal and I wasn't even hurt that Sadat said, it's none of her business what I do with my cities on the Canal. Because we thought if civilians live in those cities, if there is shipping in the Canal, maybe this is a beginning. As far as Israel is concerned, we have lived without shipping through the Suez Canal for quite a few years. That isn't the greatest tragedy that happened to Israel. We can go on.

MR. ROGERS: We don't need it either.

MRS. MEIR: But it almost seems as though Sadat doesn't need it and he is doing us a favor.

MR. ROGERS: I don't want to argue his case. We are not carrying goals for him. What we are doing is trying to express what he told us. Now, actually - on the question, if you could reach agreement, the description of the agreement we don't think is insurmountable. We can argue for days. What you want to avoid, if I understand, the implications that the interim agreement has any carry-over effect as to the final agreement. That's a fairly simple matter to take care of. That is a matter of drafting. They want to be sure that this isn't an end in itself. Now we can argue about it, but the simple thing is to try to work it out.

MRS. MEIR: Is he prepared to say that this is the end of all shooting, not for three months, not for six months?

MR. ROGERS: No, of course not and we wouldn't expect. It's against the nature. He would not say, never again, under any circumstances would I take any action and when you raise that question, he would say, then forget it, then obviously I am not going to say this is the end of everything. This is the beginning of a search for peace agreement.

MR. EBAN: We said two things: we said the line the IDF will hold in accordance with a special agreement is not considered final...
....(reading)

MR. ROGERS: What I am saying is, I don't believe, as I say, I am reluctant to get too involved in specific pieces of paper. I don't believe that's a . The question of how he describes. What it means after you are making it. That is a fairly simple proposition.

MRS. MEIR: The question is: stopping of shooting and not stopping of shooting.

MR. ROGERS: But -

MRS. MEIR: Just patience for one moment, please. We are on this line, and every once in a while Sadat says, now, if something doesn't happen, I must begin shooting. If shooting begins, this is the best line that Israel can hope for. Israel says we are prepared to move from this line X kilometers. If the future holds for us that at some certain point, and he makes it very clear; he makes his plan very clear in the 1st of May speech, exactly how it should go on. If

at a certain point, after three months or after six months, after half a month, I don't know, he again will say, now, look, if you don't move, we begin shooting. Now, I am glad to hear that you argued with him about military personnel crossing the Canal. But even not crossing the Canal. Certainly that's ridiculous that we should agree that we should have the Egyptian army not on the other side of the Canal but on this side of the Canal right in front of us, or, as he suggests, an international force keeping us, the two armies, apart. The Canal is better than an international force, if war still goes on. Now, the Israel army should consent, the Israel government should consent - the army will do anything that the government decides - the government should consent that the army should move from their best line to a line which is not as good and at some point again be threatened with shooting? This is the position. And we say, no shooting, because if there is a danger of shooting for any reason, any reason which Sadat will think a good reason, and a good reason will be because he says, this is not something in itself. This must be the beginning of the moving of Israel to the international border. We say, no; whereto we move that's for negotiation and agreement.

MR. ROGERS: We agree.

MRS. MEIR: But if we are going to be threatened with shooting, and suppose the Israel army thinks that, never mind, at any time, if Egypt threatens shooting, we will shoot our way right back again. Why? If we are in the best line that we have, if there is a danger of shooting? So we say, no more shooting. Shooting is out of the question. It isn't peace yet. It's not peace. But no more shooting. And from

here we go on with negotiations.

MR. EBAN: What is his position on the cease fire in the context of an interim agreement?

MR. ROGERS: What he wants is to have a specific time period with a cease fire stated. We took the position; when I say we took the position, we said, we argued, presented the point of view, that he might be wider not to do that, rather than having a deadline and then not extending the cease fire and then not doing anything about it, which makes him look pretty silly. He has a cease fire and says I'm not extending the cease fire another day and just does nothing, why isn't it better to leave the present situation? Not describe it one way or the other. Just don't have any deadline. Don't say one way or the other. Actually, we all know, I think, a statement on a piece of paper is not enforceable. What you try to do, you assess the political consequences of a move, as a realistic matter, and decide what the risks are, but it would seem to us that it would be an advantage to the present situation. The advantage to the present situation is that it doesn't present any deadlines, not faced every couple of months with everybody in the world getting excited; what is going to happen on the 30th of June? We don't have a 30th of June. So what we were presenting to him was to say, the important thing is to have the Suez opened and a withdrawal. The distance of the withdrawal is not all that important. The significance would be to the world and certainly to the parties and the people in the area; the significance would be maybe it is possible to work out a peace agreement. At least you have gotten to a stage where you have been able to

agree on something. Up to this time all it's been is argument. Everybody states his own argument and nobody has done anything. There hasn't been any movement. The only thing that's happened that's been successful is the cease fire itself. Of course, if you say you have to promise that you won't shoot, until we find a final peace agreement, he won't say that; that's the end of the whole project. Because he won't do that. If this doesn't appeal to you and it is an argument you want to make to destroy the idea, this is a good one. It is a perfectly plausible argument, but as any general knows, he can't say, forever we will agree that we will never have war even though we have no peace agreement.

MR. DAYAN: I wanted to ask about Sadat's position, if he made it clear about the final peace agreement; did he mention that he would be ready to do it without us coming to agreement with the other Arab countries and without a settlement over the Palestine question, because in public whenever he mentioned the peace agreement with us, he ties it with complete or total withdrawal from all Arab countries, including Jerusalem and the solution of what you call the Palestinian - ^{he} he doesn't call them refugees any longer - but the Palestinian rights for self-determination.

MR. ROGERS: I can answer you. He did not raise that. But it could well have been an oversight. We didn't raise it either. We have always said, as you know, that a peace agreement should deal with all the problems. It may be - he finds that there was no point to raise it. I will say though that he didn't really talk about the Palestinians at all. He was really talking about Egypt's problems

and Egypt's future and nothing else. Now, as I said, I don't necessarily draw the implication that he is totally not interested, but in this conversation he sounded as if his own focus was inward and not outward. Didn't you feel that way?

MR. SISCO: This is the point, Mr. Minister Dayan, it really struck. It may be accidentally, as the Secretary pointed out. It was just so Egyptian oriented. I never quite heard anything so exclusively Egyptian oriented in terms of details as they relate to an overall settlement and any concrete points that we discussed in relationship to the interim settlement.

MR. RABIN: Do you believe that he will leave the other problems unsolved? I am asking your estimate?

MR. SISCO: My estimate is that he is keeping his options open, that he would face up to that question if he ever got there. The pre-occupation -

MR. RABIN: Do you really believe it?

MR. SISCO: I am trying to give you an impression, but I am now trying to give you the emotional man, which may be in some ways a little more indicative than otherwise. The pre-occupation, emotional and intellectually as such, that it is almost an exclusive concentration on the Egyptian problems. I don't know the answer.

MR. ROGERS: Let me say about that. To me it is a useless exercise to try to decide whether you believe somebody under these conditions. You meet them for a day. How can you possibly decide if you believe them or not? You have got to decide as you go along what to do to protect your own interests. Whether you believe or don't believe it is beside the point. If you think it is all a joke and doesn't mean anything, you might break up and say, let's go home. We

didn't have that feeling. I don't know whether he would take on the responsibility to fight the many other Arab countries who have been critical of him, to say that he's sign a peace agreement. You know, in our first discussion (referring to Mr. Eban), you made a very eloquent speech about how important it would be if Egypt ever said, we are prepared to make a peace agreement with Israel.

MRS. MEIR: It is.

MR. EBAN: The same speech said if he agreed, that he should negotiate the boundary problem.

MR. ROGERS: Yes, but you put a lot more emphasis on that at that time because you didn't think he was going to say it.

MRS. MEIR: The idea that people joke about, that Israel feels it is a tragedy that happened that Sadat is prepared to make peace really has nothing to stand on. This is almost an insult to us. He said he wants to make peace. What do people do, two people that have to make peace? They sit down and argue and discuss and there are crises and there are stalemates and they go on and they discuss until they finally come to a peace agreement. Sadat said he wants to make peace. Good. That's a very important thing. On his conditions. Right or not? On his conditions. We pull right back as though nothing happened. Then he will make peace. I don't care - we can live another 100 years without an Egyptian Ambassador. But he says, diplomatic relations, no Palestinian - this is the Foreign Secretary speaking - we are 100 percent in favor of the rights of the Palestinians. We defend their rights all the time and we will continue to do so in the

future. We think that the latest propositions made by the Palestinians to live with peace in Israel in one country are the most logical, most practical, the most just up to now. We hope that the Israelis will finally come to reason and accept to live in peace with the Palestinians who are the owners of the country. There is no contradiction between us and the Palestinian movement. We give the Palestinian movement our total support. What the Palestinian Movement asks is the end of the Zionist movement. That's all. He wants peace. Because the Zionist Movement is based on the creation of a Jewish State and not on a state where there would be Jews, Moslems and Christians. If the Israelis accept the ideas put forward by the Palestinian Movement that would mean that they renounce the Zionist ideology. He talks about peace.

MR. SISCO: The other Arabs, Jordan and Lebanon, particularly, Madam Prime Minister, are much more worried - and they are genuinely worried - that Egypt is ready to sacrifice the rest of the Arabs and get on with a peace of their own.

MR.S MEIR: Mr.Sisco, I have no other way of knowing what they say except when I read what they say, when we listen to their radio several times a day.

MR. SISCO: I don't wish to argue about this, but there are public statements made on both sides.

MRS. MEIR: Not on both sides.

MR. SISCO: On both sides. If we took these public statements, Lord, there's no chance for working it out. I think what you have to

go on and I think what we have to go on - we don't know whether Sadat means it or doesn't mean it; whether you feel it is better than Nasser or worse. The only thing we have to go on is what is their latest position. Their latest position was written in their response to Jarring.

MR. ROGERS: Let me say this: you keep talking about Sadat as if he did something awful. Jarring asked him questions. First everybody agreed that we'd abide by the procedures that Jarring established. This was part of our initiative, because if you ever try to work out procedures between Egypt and Israel and Israel and Jordan, they'd never get beyond the procedural point. We said, will you agree to abide by the procedures that Jarring decides upon, and you said, yes. Now, the procedure that Jarring decided upon was to ask questions. Why did he ask the questions? He asked the questions hopefully to clarify the positions of the two sides, Egypt and Israel. He asked questions which he hoped would elicit answers about - we will do these things, if these conditions are met. That's how he posed the questions. What Sadat did was answer the questions, yes, we will do; yes, we will do; yes, we will do this, on the condition that these things are met and these conditions. In your case, you didn't =

MRS. MEIR: Sadat said that if Israel commits itself -

MR. ROGERS: Let me finish. Sadat said in response to questions by Jarring - he didn't do it except that way - and nobody, certainly I never heard anybody say it was a tragedy for you or as far as Israel is concerned. And we all said, and you must agree that it came as a surprise, certainly it came as a surprise to the United States and it

came as a surprise to you, in view of the conversation that you had with Ambassador Barbour. You said it wouldn't happen. And we are in a position where he has done the very things that we thought he wouldn't do. And somehow - maybe we can't; if we can't, we are prepared to take that as an answer. But we would hope very much that as a result of our visit here that we can think of some things to do that will get us off dead center, to have some people in the world support our position. We literally have no other nation that we know of that supports your position. Now, maybe there is somebody that does, but we haven't found any nation. Every nation has come in to say and is very upset and says it is going to be very harmful to us and to you, the United States, and isn't there something that you can do to persuade Israel to answer in a more positive way? As I say, you don't have to do it. We are prepared to leave without an answer and maybe we can't figure it out. Maybe when we leave it would be better to talk about it some other time, but if there was some way to do, we would very much appreciate and we think it is in your national interest. I know that you say, well, you are closer to it and God knows you are, and we don't understand it, but sometimes an objective viewpoint is helpful and I have a feeling that it is helpful. It would be helpful to Israel to say something, to take a position that is more positive, to get the negotiations active. Not just to say that we are prepared to negotiate. But actually do something that signifies that and we will try to get Jarring back in the ballgame. He is going to quit pretty soon. That's all right. Maybe the whole thing is hopeless.

MRS. MEIR: Maybe Jarring should start something different. Maybe he should get, with him, get the two sides together.

MR. ROGERS: We can't go back - as far as the United States, we can't go back to the face to face argument. We went through that for so many months. If you want to, we can't prevent you. We would hope that you would not fall back on the face to face argument now.

MR. ALLON: We understood that at a certain phase we should -

MR. ROGERS: You agreed with us, I thought, you would make a concession; you'd agree to start out this way and that at a time that Ambassador Jarring thought an approach and agreement possible, then he would decide that face to face negotiations would be desirable. That to us is a sensible position. We still believe it -

MR. SISCO: And we'd help you get it.

MR. EBAN: It's not only Sadat who answered these questions. We answered. We said eight things which we would do and then we ended by saying that now that the parties have stated the position they should pursue their negotiations in detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions to cover all the points in their respective documents, whereupon the Egyptians packed up and went home. I would call attention to what we said. We didn't refuse to answer these questions. We put our position on matter on which they put their position. The normal thing would be to negotiate the detailed and concrete agreement on that basis.

MR. SISCO: I hope, Madam Prime Minister, that you don't go away feeling that in our trying to give you what are obviously superficial,

one-day impression - we were trying to reflect to you the mood that we found and I hope that you don't read this reflection of the mood that we found as synonymous with what the U.S. judgment or position is. I feel really that we owe this to you. You know, you don't go there. You haven't been to Egypt. You haven't been to Jordan or Lebanon and, Lord, you are much closer to it. But you have to two visitors, firemen, who have been there for five or six days. All we have tried to do is just kind of reflect the mood that we found. It doesn't mean that we necessarily agree with the judgment or this is the American view. But it is advantageous for you to know at least how two people, the kind of mood that we found there.

MR. ROGERS: I think the more friends the United States has in the Arab world the better, and we have made a lot of friends. We are able to talk and able to go there and be in active and direct communication with them. I think that's helpful. We have a lot of support in our country for what we are trying to do, a lot of support for our efforts.

(The meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m.)

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