

141.

תמך להיוון

סטודיה (סוגי ביומט)

3 המבנה למיילד. זה נ'3'2'1' א-; ח'לוק' אלכלה בון פ'לה  
ל'ש' א'ע'ס: ס'ב'ו'י' א'מ'ל'ת' פ'ל'ש' ל'ג' (ה'מ'ל'ת' פ'ל'ש' ל'ה'ת'  
זה ע'ה' ל'ב'ל'ס)

נפתח: 1981 12.7 - 11.4

נסגר: ~~1981~~

מס' / ח'מ'א



שם תיק: משנה למנכ"ל ח. בר-און - טאבה

מזוזה פניי: חצ-10/7068

מזוזה כריט: 000b8qu

מזוזה כריט: 3-312-3-5-5

תאריך הדפסה: 5/12/2018



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

### טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות\*

חטיבה מס': 130.2  
 תיק מס': 10  
 מיכל מס': 7068/3  
 תאריך התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
 שם מחבר התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
 שם הנמען: \_\_\_\_\_  
 סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

12/4/82  
 22/4/82  
 29/4/82

- מכתב
- מברק
- תזכיר או מיזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

א"י: האגף א"א  
מאג' אגף השר



לשכת שר הבטחון

הקריה,

טז אייר תשמ"ב  
9 מאי 1982

004541 /ק

י. ח. בן-אהרן, ראש לשכת שר החוץ  
אלוף טמיר, יועץ שר הבטחון לבטחון לאומי  
תא"ל שיאון, יו"ר הועדה הצבאית המשותפת  
סא"ל יואל זינגר, רע"ן הדין הבינלאומי

הנדון: נציגי משרד הבטחון במו"מ על טאבה  
שלך: מיום 6 מאי 1982

1. נציג משרד הבטחון בוועדה הבין-משרדית בראשות מנכ"ל משרד החוץ יהיה תא"ל שיאון.
2. ראש ועדת המשנה לקביעת תנאי החיים באזור טאבה עד להכרעת מעמדו יהיה תא"ל שיאון.
3. נציג משרד הבטחון בוועדת המשנה לניהול המו"מ ליישוב חילוקי הדעות (פישור, בוררות וכו') יהיה סא"ל יואל זינגר רע"ן הדין הבינלאומי.

*עודד שמיר*  
עודד שמיר - רס"ן  
שליש שר הבטחון

עב/

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9589

\*\* יצא

טודי

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אל: קהיר, נר: 158, מ: המשרד  
דח: ב, סג: ס, תא: 120782, רח: 1015  
נד: מחאה מצרית

מזכיר

טודי/בהול

הטגריר

מחאה מצרית בעניין ההסדר הימני בטאבה  
שלכם 431 ו-435 מה-24.6, ו-402 מה-20.6.

1. בעקבות המחאה שהגיש לך שאפטי עבדול חמיד קיימנו דיון בהשתתפות נציגי הועדה המשותפת, המשטרה ומשהח, וגיבשנו תשובות שמוצע כי תמסרן בעפי לשאפטי בהודמנות של פגישה קרובה. נעיר רק כרקע - ביסוד המחלוקת עומדת כמובן המחלוקת על צורת החיים בטאבה עד להכרעה הסופית בדבר גודל השטח. כידוע הנושא תלוי ועומד ובטומ' שנערך במהלך חודש מאי לא הוכרעו הדברים ולכן לא נכנס הכוח הרב לאומי לשטח כמוסכם. חלק מן התלונות המצריות נסבו על דברים שאידעו שבעקבות פעילויות שלהם שהיו מכוונות למנוע 'הכרה' במצב הקיים מצדנו בשטח.

2. במתן תשובתך תוכל לציין כי לגבי חלק מן התלונות שהשמיע בפנייתו היו לפני כן פניות ישירות באמצעות הועדה המשותפת, וניתנו על ידה תשובות נהמדובר בטענות שבסעיפים 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 - חילופי המברקים נשלחו אליכם בדיפי'.

3. רוב הטענות מתמקדות בשתי נקודות: ישראל מגבילה את הכניסה מכיוונה של מצרים, וכי היא מקיימת נוכחות משטרתית מסוג כזה או אחר באיזור טאבה.  
לדעתנו מוטב להשיב בצורה כללית, תוך התייחסות לשתי הנקודות

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הללו, ובאשר לנקודות הספציפיות להוסיף דק השלמות לפי הצורך לתשובות שכבר נתנה הועדה המשותפת.

### 4. להלן תשובות לשתי הנקודות:

א. למענה בדבר הגבלת הכניסה מהשטח המצרי נהגה ליד ביטוי בסעיפים 8,7,4,3 לנר 435) - יש להבהיר שישראל פועלת לפי ההסכם מה-25.4, הקובע המשך הפעילויות שהיו קיימות בשטח. תירות מהצד המצרי לא היתה חלק מפעילות זו. יחד עם זאת, ישראל תאפשר כמובן כניסה למאה מהצד המצרי בדרך המקובלת דהיינו:

ב. למענות לגבי נוכחות משטרתית באיזור, והצבת שומר ליד החוף המצרי (סעיפים 8,7,6,5 לנר 435) - יש להבהיר כי המשך הפעילות האזרחית באיזור כרוך מטבעו בהמשך השמירה על החוק והסדר, שהוא כוח המציאות. דבר זה נעשה באמצעות משטרת ישראל ושומרים אזרחיים. יש להוסיף כי כל עוד לא נכנס הכמד' לאיזור בגלל העדר הסכם על סמכויותיו, קיים ייחלל ריקי' מסוים מבחינה בטחונית, ועל משטרת ישראל החובה למנוע חדירות של אלמנטים חתרניים לאיזור. כדי להמחיש את הבעיות, ניתן להוסיף כי דק בימים אלו (20.6) נתפס באיזור אילת מחבל שהסתנן מירדן.

### 5. להלן השלמות שניתן לתת למענות הספציפיות שאוזכרו במחאה:

א. למענה מס' 1 ונר 435 (העמדת שומרים) ניתן להבהיר כי הועדה המשותפת המצרית הבריקה בענין לועדה הישראלית (מברקס 34 מה-8.6), זו השיבה (מברק מס' 4374 מה-10.6) שהמדובר היה בהסדר זמני - שבינתיים הופסק - שהיה נחוץ בגלל העדר נוכחות הכמד', ובשל האפשרות שה- 'GAP' ינוצל ע"י גורמים חתרניים בתקופה דגישה זו.

ב. בחליפת מברקים (נוספת מצרי 35 מה-20.6, ישראלי 4418 מה-10.6) חזרה הועדה הישראלית על עמדתנו שהמשך הפעילות האזרחית באיזור (כפי שנקבע בהסכם מה-25.4) כרוך בהמשך השמירה על החוק והסדר.

ג. למענה מס' 2 ונר 435 (חדירת יחידות צי) ניתן להבהיר שהועדה המשותפת המצרית הבריקה על כך לועדה הישראלית (מברקס 34 מה-8.6) אשר השיבה (מברק 4374 מה-10.6) שהמדובר היה בהתקנת מצופים במים לאורך הקו המצרי, כדי למנוע ממחרתצים לטעות ולעבור לצד המצרי כפי שאירע ב-28.5.

ד. למענה מס' 3 ונר 435 (מכונית דיפלומטית אמריקנית) אין אנו מציעים שתשיב מעבר לאמור בסעיף 4 (נא) לעיל נהגבלות הכניסה הכלליות). אולם אם תילחץ, ניתן לציין שהדיפלומטיים יכלו לבקר

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

באירוד ע"י מעבר בדרך המקובלת נדהיינו המסוף הישראלי אן  
העדיפו שלא לעשות זאת מסיבות שלהם.

הערה:מדיווחו של מזאל נר 482 אנו מבינים שהיו להם דרכונים  
בניגוד לטענה שהשמיעו.

ד.גם לטענה מס' 4 בנר 435 (25 אנשי משרד התיירות המצרי) אין  
אנו מציעים שתשיב מעבר לאמור בסעיף 4 (א) לעיל. אולם בשעת  
הדחק תוכל להוסיף, כי הועדה המצרית הבריקה על כך לישראלית  
מברקם 36 מה-20.6) אשר השיבה נמברק 4417 מה-21.6) שלא היתה  
שום כוונה לפעול בניגוד להסכם, ושקצין קישור נשלח לטאבה מהמטה  
כדי לברר את המצב. בינתיים המצב הובהר והוחלפו דברים בנושא  
עם קצין הקישור המצרי במקום.

ה. לטענה מס' 5 בנר 435 (ישראלי ליד השער המצרי) ניתן להוסיף  
לאמור בסעיף 34) לעיל, כי השומר נחוץ, בין היתר, כדי למנוע  
מאנשים מן הצד הישראלי לחצות את החיץ. לא שעברו את ביקורת  
הגבולות במסוף הישראלי. אם תישאל בדבר הקמת בקתת שמידה  
(בותרקה), יש להשיב שכיום אין מקימים ביתן כזה, ויש במקום רק  
סוכה קטנה. אולם גם אם היו מקימים ביקתה, אין לייחס לכך  
משמעות כי המדובר במתקן זמני המיועד לתת מחסה בתנאי האקלים  
הקשים במקום.

6. שאר הטענות כוסו ע"י תשובות הועדה כאמור.

7. א. כתוספת אגבית בתשובתך ניתן להוסיף, כי ישראל מתחוקת את  
החוף למימון וביצוע, וכי רק דשות אחת יכולה לעשות כן מטבע  
הדברים, מה גם שלפי ההסכם מה-25.4 כמובן ישראל היא הממשיכה  
בפעילות הקודמת.

ב. ניתן גם לרמוז לכך שהמסוף המצרי נהנה ממים וחשמל מהצד  
הישראלי (נאמנם בתשלום) וזאת לפי הסכם עם הקונסול המצרי  
באילת.

8. לידעתך - ביקשנו מן הועדה המשותפת כי יהיו הוראות קבע  
לקצין הקישור בצדנו אשר יקבעו את נוסחי תשובותיו למקרה  
שיתעוררו בעיות מן הסוג שתואר בתלונות. נבעבר קצין הקישור  
הישראלי היה איש מילואים המתחלף מדי פעם לעומת המצרי שהוא  
סדיר. נמסר לנו ע"י הועדה שבקרוב יוצב קצין קישור ישראלי  
סדיר, ויש לקוות שדבר זה ימנע אי-הבנות שנבעו מהחלפת קציני  
מילואים.

9. האמור על דעת מח' מצרים והועדה המשותפת.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דובינסטיין

תפ: טהח, טסהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, דם, אמן,  
ממת, דובינסטיין, משפט, דיבון, מצרים, ומיר  
תח: הועדה המשותפת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9227 2 דף 1 2 חתוך 11 עותק 32 חתוך 2 סודי ביותר

לדוק

מל: המשרד, נד: 210, מ: קהיר  
דח: א, סג: א, תא: 120782, ות: 2215  
נד: טאבה

סודי ביותר/מיד

מל: דובינסקיין

דע: האנכל, דיבון, לשכת שהח, קידר.  
מאת: השגריר

טאבה, השיחה עם שאפיטי עבדול חמיד

1. הגיש לי אנרת בערבית שלאחר אשפט הפתיחה הרגיל נאמר בה  
שלאמור: 'תוך התייחסות להסכם שנחתם בין שתי המדינות ב-25  
באפריל 1982 בדבר,, הצעד העקרוני לפתרון בעיות הגבול'  
מתכונתה שהח' להגיש הזמנה ואפגש בין שני הצדדים, המצרי  
והישראלי, ביום 27 ביולי דנא ברפובליקת מצרים הערבית לדיון  
בצעדים הנוגעים לביצוע ההסכם הנ"ל. משהח' המצרי מביע אהונתו  
שהצעה זו בדבר המפגש ביום 27 ביולי 1982 תקבל בחיוב על ידי  
הצד הישראלי, עד כאן בתוספת מלוח הנימוס המקובלות.  
2. שאפיטי הוסיף בעל פה שהוא מבקש שבחן המשלחת הישראלית  
ישתתף גם נציגו הבכיר לשיחות בדבר המשטר הזמני לאזור ח  
אלוף דוב שיאון.  
3. אמרתי לו שאינני מבין משמעות ההגדרה הכוללת בדבר נושא  
השיחות וכן ההכללה לגבי מקום המפגש במצרים.  
4. באשר למקום קיום השיחות אמר שהם יתקיימו או בקהיר או  
באלכסנדריה אם חוג האויר יהיה חם מאד בקאהיר.  
5. לגבי תוכן השיחות המטרה היא לנסח כתב ה- COMPROMIS  
שליפיו יתנהלו הפישור והבוררות. הם מקווים ומצפים להענות  
מהירה.  
6. כאן פתחתי בויכוח שנמשך ביני לבינו למעלה מחצי שעה. ספרתי  
לכו ההסתגרות של האנשים בדבר הליכי הפתרון. (הצאתי שאיננו בקיא  
בדקויות). הנקודה המרכזית שעליה עמדתי היתה שאנו נאמנים כחובן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2 דף 2 2 חתוך 11 עותק 32 חתוך 2 סודי ביותר

להתחייבויותינו בהתאם לסעיף 7 (2). הצידנו חשבנו בזמנו שלא  
הוצו כל האפשרויות הטמונות באותו לפי (2) אולם רזהמי הסכים  
במחווה לעמדה המצרית והבענו נכונות לגשת לפישור ואמנם כך בתב  
שהח' לבמאל חסן עלי. איננו מתכננים או מתעלמים האפשרות בוררות  
אולם אנו מאמינים שנגיע להסכם במסגרת הפישור ועל כן איננו  
מזכירים בנשיאה אחת פישור ובוררות, ואמנם נענה עלי בעל פה  
למכתבו של שהח' שאיר והסכים לגשת לפישור אם כי סייג זאת  
ברצונו לפנות לנשיא, מאז לא שמענו דבר והם הגורם  
לדחיה. במלים אחרות סיכמתי מוטב שההזמנה תהיה לדיון ב-  
COMPROMIS לפישור נקודה זאת לאו.  
7. דחה ברוננו הטענה שהם האשמים באי הפעילות עד עתה, אך עם זאת  
ג'מס אשה על המצב בלבנון אך חזר ואמר שאנו המושבים  
במכתב. אתר שלי הפדוטוקול נכדק מלפונית עם איבראשי שהיה  
בשיחה שקיימתי עם עלי ושה ישב גם דובק) הסיכום של עלי היה  
שהם מוכנים להתחיל בפישור ולהאשיך אחבי בגרודות אם יכשל  
הפישור. הוסיף למעוננו שה- COMPROMIS שייפתח יהיה כוחו יפה  
גם לצדכי פישור וגם לצדכי בוררות. הערתי שאינני משפטן ואינני  
יודע אם כתב COMPROMIS לצדכי פישור זהה לזה הדרוש לצדכי  
בוררות אולם עמדתנו היא אופטימית אנו אסובנעים שנגיע להסכם  
במסגרת הפישור ואיננו רוצים מראש להתפס לפסימיות ולהתייחס  
לאפשרות בוררות במרם. התחלנו אפילו בפישור אם כי שוב ושוב  
איננו שוללים אפשרות כזו כפי שהדבר אופיע בהסכם ולפי אותו  
הסדר.  
8. אמרתי שאני מוכן להקל עליו. עצתי היא שלא יחסור לי אנרת  
ההזמנה עתה אלא יתייעץ אישית עם עלי, ואז ישוב אלי, משלא קיבל  
עצתי נקשתיו לנסח בדיוק את אמרת המפגש בשאני רושם ואז  
אתר: המפגש נועד לניסוח COMPROMIS לצדכי הפישור AS WELL  
AS לצדכי הבוררות לאקרה והפישור ייכשל. עד כאן. הוא הוסיף  
שלאמור,, שלגופו ברור שאנו נתחיל בפישור כבקשתכם ונעבור  
לבוררות אם ניכשל. ביקש מאז שנענה להצעתם לגבי מועד המפגש וכי  
אביא לו תשובתנו בכל ההקדם. ===

תפ: שהח, סשה, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, אנכל, האנכל, ר/מרבו, רם, מאן,  
דיבון, מצרים, דובינסקיין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2750

יציא

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אלי: ווט, נר: 909, מ: המשרד  
רח: ר, סג: ס, תא: 230682, רח: 2000  
נד: טאבה

2750

טודילרגיל

סבל

דט: השגריר, הציר

טאבה

1. קואק היועמיש למחמי'ד/מרי'ת שאל (22.6) למצב העניין בנושא זה. אמרתי כי אנו ממתינים לתשובת מצרים על הצעתנו לפישור כפי שהועברה באיגרת שה'יח לעלי ממאי נכתובה לעלי שהציע בוררות. הזכרתי כי בעי'פי אמר עלי לשגרירנו בקהיר שאם זו מטלתנו כנראה יש לקבלה, אך עליו לקבל אישור מובארבי. מאז לא שמענו נפרט לכך שמובארבי באיגרתו לרה'מ' איזכר נושא זה בלי להיכנס לצורת ההליכה. כן סיפר בקר על המו'י'מי שנוהל לגבי החיים בשטח המחלוקת בטאבה ושלא הסתיים.

2. בהודמנות זו התייחסתי לניירות שמסרו האמריקנים, זאת ברוח שלי 482 מ' 11.6. הודיתי על החבילה הראשונה של המסמכים ועל מאמצינו, אך שאלתי בעדינות מה הניעם לכתוב את הנייר הכולל 'נקודות לשיחה' שנמסר לך נושהתק ממנו וכן מהתוכן שליווה את חבילת המסמכים הראשונה מסר לנו קואק שוב אתמול. אמר נבמקצת טובה כי לא היתה פניה פורמלית מצרית, אך האמריקנים הרגישו צורך למסור נייר כזה המנסה לשכך את חששות המצרים שהביע מובארבי בשעתו, שפישור הוא כביכול בוררות בלי 'שורה תחתונה'. לכן בא הנייר להראות שמהגוון רחב יותר. כן התייחס קואק לכך שבמהלך המו'י'מי הבינו הם והמצרים כי נסכים לבוררות לאחר הפישור.  
3. במענה הדגשתי שאנו מתייחסים לתהליך הפישור במלוא הרצינות, ולא היינו רוצים שיווצר מצב שאין בו כל אינצנטיבה למצרים להתייחסות כזאת, כיוון שיידעו שתהיה בוררות אחי'כי. אנו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מתכוונים כרגע להצעת הפישור ואיננו מדברים על בוררות. כאשר אנו חושבים שבריא ליחסים בינינו שההליכים יהיו באו'רה רגועה ולא ש'יהוג הנשוי הצעיר יבלה את ימיו הראשונים במחיצתו המתפדת של שופט מבי'יד לענייני משפחה.  
4. רמותי בעדינות שלפניך לא כדאי שיגישו האמריקנים ניירות בשלבים אלה, כל עוד לא נתבקשו. אמרתי כי המצרים מעוניינים לקדם את הנושא ומביעים באו'ניהם אי נוחות שהדבר לא יז, ואם לא יזוו משהו בזמן הקרוב, ודאי יבקשו להצטרף אמרתי כי המצב הפורמלי הוא שלא קיבלנו תשובה מלאה על הצעתנו לפישור, אך בלי קשר לכך ומירמנו שלנו אנו שוקלים להיענות ולהציע טיפול בעניין.

5. כהירהור אישי לחלוטין אמרתי, שהגם שיש לנו כל הפיעונים המשפטיים והעובדתיים ומכלי קשר אליהם, הרי בגלל הרצון שהיחסים בין המדינות יתנהלו בצורה טובה בלי פצע פתוח לאורך רסן, יתכן שהיה בריא אילו צד ג' היה מציע הצעת קו שתקבל על שני הצדדים. בהקשר זה הזכרתי בדרך אגב, כי חלק מטיעוניהם עלול י'לסחוב'י אופנו לכיוון השגות על הגבול של 1906 שקבע לראשונה חוקת המצרים בסיני, על כל המשתמע. אמרתי כי המצרים בוטחו דיברו איתם לא פנדמלית על אפשרות, כי אם תוכר ריבונותם תהיה אפשרות לישראל לשימוש במלון, למשל לפתיחת קוינו ולהקלות מיוחדות. אמרתי כי לנו יש טיעונים לכל השטח והצעות שיבואו יכולות לבוא רק לקו גבול מתאים בתוכו. אמר שאת טיעוני מצרים דאו האמריקנים (והמצרים שלנו) את עלי עם כל חבילת הטיעונים לז'שינג'סון בשעתו. אך לא את שלנו. הדגשתי כי האמור הוא הרהור אישי שאין מקום להעבירו הלאה. עמדתנו היא הפישור ובו יציג את כל טיעוניהם לגבי השטח.

6. חזר ואמר שהאמריקנים אינם מתלהכים להיות מעורבים, אך מכל מקום הם מבינים את רצוננו בפישור אבל המצרים מעוניינים בכך שיהיה ברור שהעניין לא י'סחב' ללא קץ. הדגשתי כי במפורש אין זו כוונתנו, ואנו מעוניינים בהליך נינוח כפי שהצענו אך בלי כל כוונת סחבת. חזר והציע שנתייש הסיפור.

דובינשטיין==

STATE OF TEXAS



10/10/10

STATE OF TEXAS



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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חצ"א

710

מל: 110, נר: 482, ח: 110  
דח: 7, ס: 10, ח: 110682, זח: 1630  
11: 110682-110

*חצ"א*

110682-110

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1. דעתנו אינה נוחה ביותר לתוצאות של הארצות בנשוא זה לפי הסכם 25.4 עליהם להחליט לפי הצדדים אנו לא בקטנו המומד ההסכמי שחברנו נמסר בעקבות מאמיה לא פורחלית שלנו, אך בנייד הנוכחי יש חשש כי יעשה דעות ועמדות נהגם שיש להודות שהם מתגלים כנסח בצורה זהירה.

2. אנו הודה לקודמנו על הניירות שנשלחו בחניכה הראשונה ועל האמץ אך בהתייחסות לנייר הדש אל נא מגיב ואם יעלה דאח הצידו בקש נא תתנו בעדינות שלא לעסק בנך בשלבו זה

3. חסביהם כאובן להטות בסעיף 2 בקטל לבזורה לידעתי - אנו מתגלים מלכת קו שלא תהיה בו הסכמה לבזורה מאחר הפיזור נכון שהצדדים והאמריקאים חזקי התחמו בשלב מסוים שההליה הטבה, אך שיער שמה עלי ח-5.9 הצענו פישור והנחיו את העגרות בקרה לא לדבר על בזורה.  
4. מתחנה היא כי הנושא יתה"ם בפישור שאכיו על כל הצדדים להסכים בצדדים הרוחיה לכך ונחוננו שלא יניעו הדברים לירי פוזר.

110682-110



ט ר פ ס מ ב ר ק

ד פ . . . . . מתוך . . . . . דפים

ס ר ו ג ב ט ח ו נ י . . . . .

ד ח י פ ד ת . . . . .

ת א ר י כ ז ז " ח : 081630 ג י ו נ י 82

מ ס ' מ ב ר ק . . . . .

81021

רובינשטיין, בנצור,  ז"ל זכ"ל

ט באה - פ י ש ו ר .

1. קוזק, היוהמ"ש של מחמ"ד/מז"ח מסר לי העתק נייר לשיחה שהכינו בלשכתו. לדבריו, הנייר נמסר גם למצרים. הנייר מצ"ב. בקט הגובתי.
2. הערתי שאעביר כמובן הנוסח ארצה, אך לדעתי הפסקה השישית מזיקה. לפי פסקה זו יש לחחוס על הסכם הבוררות באותו זמן שמסכימים על צורת הפישור. הסברתי שלדעתי שילוב זה ישלול מהמצרים כל מניע לסיים תהליך הפישור בהצלחה. הם יוכלו להכשיל הפישור ביודעם שסדורי הבוררות כבר "בכיסם".
3. הגיב שהם אמנם הבינו עמדת ישראל לפיה אנו נסכים לחחוס על הסכם הבוררות באותו עת שנכנס לתהליך הפישור.
4. העיר שהמצרים מוכנים לנצל תהליך הפישור לדיון בסדורים בשטח לגבי המלון וכדומה, אך לא לגבי קביעת הגבול. בנושא הגבול אינם מוכנים להיות במצב בו "הסכימו מרצונם לוותר על חלק מאדמותיהם."
5. סיפר שלהערכת האמריקאים יהיה קל יותר להתקדם במו"מ המעשי על ניהול המלון אם המצרים ידעו שאין הם דנים על סדור קבוע ותהליך הפישור על המעמד הסופי כבר החל.

C.O.V

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CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

-- Our research indicates that conciliation need not be structured as a form of non-binding arbitration. Rather, it can be a very flexible and useful procedure for seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of a dispute.

-- The parties may wish to consider the possible utility of naming a conciliator or conciliators who would be charged with conducting further exploration of the possibilities for a mutually acceptable solution.

-- The possibility of inconsistent judgments on the merits (or prejudice to the position of one or both parties) can be avoided through express limitations on the content of any report as well as express restrictions on its use in subsequent proceedings.

-- Concerning the termination of the conciliation phase if full agreement is not achieved, several possibilities exist. They range from a fixed time limit for the conciliation phase to a unilateral declaration of termination by either party. The latter would not seem appropriate in this context. We would suggest that the parties give particular attention to the models which leave it to the conciliator or conciliators to decide when termination of the conciliation proceedings would be warranted.

-- With respect to integration of the conciliation/arbitration process, we see two basic options.

-- The first would be sequential reference to distinct conciliation and arbitration processes. The parties would specify in the agreement they are about to negotiate (a) the procedure for conciliation, and (b) a separate and distinct arbitration procedure to which the remaining issues would be submitted in the event conciliation is not completely successful. This could either be accomplished by spelling out an ad hoc arbitration procedure, or by incorporating existing model arbitration rules in whole or in part (we will be prepared to provide the parties with information concerning several such sets of model rules if they desire).

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2.

-- The second option would be to seek to integrate conciliation and arbitration into a single process. For example, the World War II peace treaties described in our paper provide for the transformation of a two person conciliation ~~arrangement~~ which ~~will not~~ ~~only~~ ~~be~~ ~~perceived~~ as fair and impartial by both sides, but which can begin to work immediately.

-- We would urge the parties to give careful consideration to those models which provide the conciliator(s)/ arbitrator(s) maximum flexibility in adopting rules of procedure and leave to their discretion other issues on which the parties may not be able to reach prompt agreement.

-- We remain willing to assist in any way we can.



5/29/82

Handwritten notes in Hebrew script, likely a summary or commentary on the typed text above.



י' בסיוון התשמ"ב  
1 ביוני 1982

צקני  
ל.א.ק.ו.  
מ.א.ק.ו.  
ז

ש מ ר ר

אל : מנהל מחלקת מצרים

מאת : יוסף למדן

הנדון : טאבה : סידורי ביניים וכניסת הכמ"ר

1. כידוע לך, התנהל בימי ד' וה' בשבוע שחלף (ה-26 וה-27 במאי) סיבוב נוסף של השיחות עם המצרים בנושא הנ"ל - (ראה נא דיווחו של תא"ל ד.שיאון במברק הועדה המשותפת נר 21 מה-27 במאי).
  2. לא הושגה כל התקדמות. בפגישה עם מפקד הכמ"ר (שנערך ב-26.5 בבוקר בבסיס אל-גורה-איתם) הציגו שני הצדדים את עמדותיהם על כל הניגודים שיש בהם, בעוד שמפקד הכח רשם לפניו את ההבדלים הניכרים בתפיסותיהם של הצדדים. המפקד ציין שהוא זקוק להזמנה מוסכמת משותפת והנחיות ברורות אשר לתפקידי הכח באיזור טאבה. הוסיף שבמידה שתפקידי אלה יחרגו מאלה המתוארים בפרוטוקול הכמ"ר יצטרך לקבל אישורו של מנכ"ל הכח ואף של המדינה (המדינות) שיחידותיה (7) תתבקשנה לבצע תפקידי אלה.
  3. בישיבה הפורמלית שהתקיימה ב-25.5 אחה"צ בבאר-שבע התברר שלא היו בידי היו"ר המצרי, אדמירל חמדי, הוראות חדשות. אי לכך, חזרו הצדדים ודשו שוב בחילוקי הדיעות הידועים ביניהם, ובראשם נושא המשטרה ותפקידה באיזור.
  4. בישיבה הבלתי-פורמלית שקויימה ב-26.5 בבוקר במלון "הילטון" ת"א, סיכם חמדי את המצב בדיונים כלהלן :
    - א. שני הצדדים מסכימים כי :
      1. יש להזמין את הכמ"ר להכנס לאיזור ;
      2. ההסדר יהיה זמני ;
      3. חלק הארי של תפקידי הכמ"ר באיזור מוסכם (הקמת תצפית, פטרולים וכו').
    - ב. יש חילוקי דיעות בין הצדדים על :
      1. תפקידי ישראל באיזור ;
      2. תפקיד מצרים באיזור.
- הטעים שלמעשה מצרים מכירה בכך שישראל (בעיקר עיריית אילת) תספק את כל השירותים העירוניים והאזרחיים באיזור והבעייה שנשארת היא נושא המשטרה. מבחינתנו בעייה זו מצטמצמת להמצאת נוסחה שתהיה קבילה אצל שלטונות מצרים. שיש להמנע מהשימוש במילים כגון "משטרה" ולסמכות, והציע שנכתוב בהזמנה לכמ"ר כי הכמ"ר יסייע (WILL ASSIST) בשמירת החוק והסדר, בתיאום (IN COORDINATION) עם הצדדים.



ש מ ר

לצורך התיאום, חזר לרעיון הקמת "קבוצת שדה" או משהו בדומה לזה בין נציגי יושבי ראש מנגנון הקישור ומפקד הכמ"ר בשטח.

5. לדעתי, הגיע הזמן שניתן את הדעת לטקטיקה המצרית במו"מ זה ולהשלכותיה מבחינתנו. האם מטרת המצרים לעסוק ב-"STONE WALLING" מפני שנוח להם לא להגיע להסדר שיאפשר כניסת הכמ"ר על יסוד התנאים שלנו, או האם הם רוצים להגיע למצב שיאפשר להם לטעון שישראל מערימה מכשולים, ולכן יש להזמין את ארה"ב להשתתף בשיחות. להערכתי האפשרות השנייה היא הנכונה.

6. כך או כך ברור שבמדה שאין שינוי בעמדת המצרים תימשכנה השיחות זמן ארוך יחסית מבלי מוצא מהסבך בו נתקלו. בנסיבות אלה עלינו לבחון מחדש את האינטרס שלנו. האם מצב זה נוח לנו, והאם יש לנו עניין ביצירת פתח שיצדיק פנייה לאמריקאים? לעניות דעתי אין לנו עניין בהשאת הנושא בלי פתרון סביר היות והוא עלול להפריע במרוצת הזמן למכלול יחסינו עם מצרים, ואולי לפגוע קשות ביחסים חשובים אלה. כ"כ אני מניח שאין לנו כל עניין בכניסת האמריקאים לתמונה בשלב טרומי זה.

7. אם כן, מתבקש מאמץ מחשבתי לאתר "FALL-BACK POSITIONS" שאולי יהיו קבילים על המצרים. הניתן למשל להסכים כי:

א. לא תהיה כל נוכחות משטרתית קבועה באיזור, ובשעת הצורך יזמין הכמ"ר את "המשטרה" להכנס בכדי לטפל בבעיות שוטפות - והיות ואין למצרים כל חלק בהמשך החיים באיזור, פירוש הדבר, הלכה למעשה, הזמנה רק למשטרת ישראל. (בשיחות האחרונות רמז חמדי כי ייתכן שיוכל להסכים לסדר כזה).

ב. לחליפין (רעיון מצרי לפיו): הכמ"ר ימסור מתפרעים לצד שלהם - ושוב, היות ומספר המצרים המבקרים באיזור או התיירים ממדינות שלישיות הנכנסים מאיזור "C" יהיה מזערי, פירוש המעשי של הדבר מסירת המתפרעים ומפירי הסדר לטיפול של משטרת ישראל.

ג. עם או בלי קשר - למעמד המשטרה באיזור, שמא תוקם מעין קבוצת שדה, בבקשת המצרים.

8. מובן שלכל אחת מההצעות הנ"ל יש קשיים רציניים, עקרוניים ואחרים, מבחינתנו, אך ברצוני להעלותם לשיקולכם ואולי לדיון לפני המשך השיחות עם המצרים (שמועדו טרם נקבע).

ב ב ר כ ח  
יוסף למדן

העתק : המנכ"ל  
מר ח. בר-און  
מר ש. דיבון  
מר א. רובינשטיין  
מר א. בקר  
- המשנה למנכ"ל  
- סמנכ"ל  
- היועץ המשפטי  
- מחלקת משפט

ה' בסיון תשמ"ב  
30 במאי 1982

אל : המנכ"ל

סאה : היועץ המשפטי

הנדון : סאה

לקראת כינוס ועדה ההיגוי, ראה נא תרומת מהדיון  
סקייטנו בנושא זה בלשכתנו ב-21.5.82 והכוללת את הדברים  
שהצגתי בע"פ לפני המשתתפים כשאלות המחייבות סיחול,  
לפי מצע שהכינוחי מראש ושיסודותיו עשויים לשמש אותך  
בהכנה לדיון אצלך.

ב ב ר כ ה ,  
ב/ו צ א ג א  
א. רובינשטיין

העקב: המנכ"ל

מ. ש. רייבין, סמנכ"ל  
מח' מצויים

NO. 1000

DATE: 10/10/1910

CITY: NEW YORK

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE  
AMERICAN RED CROSS SOCIETY  
HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE  
THE RECEIPT OF A CHECK FOR  
THE SUM OF \$100.00 FROM  
THE AMERICAN RED CROSS SOCIETY  
FOR THE YEAR 1910.

AMERICAN RED CROSS SOCIETY  
NEW YORK, N. Y.

10/10/1910  
J. Edgar Hoover  
Director

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: ה' בסיון תשמ"ב  
30 במאי 1982

סודי

מספר:

עוזק 2 מחון 7 עוזקים  
דף 1 מחון 9 דפים

דיון בנושא המחלוקת בענין סימון הגבול בטאבה 21.5.82  
משרד היועץ המשפטי למשרד החוץ

נוכחים : א.רובינשטיין  
א.בקר  
דוד גולדמן  
דוד קורנבלוט  
צבי קידר  
י.למדן  
י.אלסטר (רשם)

משה"ח

צה"ל {  
חא"ל ד.שיאון  
אל"מ י.פורח  
אל"מ א.מלמד  
סא"ל י.דינגר  
רס"ן ח.שרברו

נדב ענר - משרד רוה"מ  
רון אדלר  
יוסף ברנשטיין  
אגף המדידות

## א.רובינשטיין

פוחח בהתאם למצע לדיון דלהלן ומבקש לקיים דיון בקשר לחומר שבידינו ולשמוע לעות לגופו של הענין לפני שנעסוק בסכניקות הפישור והבוררות.

## מצע לדיון

1. כידוע הושג עם הפינוי הסכם פרוצדורלי שלפיו ינוהל המו"מ בענין המחלוקת ביננו ראשים: האחד יעסוק במחלוקת עצמה, והאחר יעסוק בסדרי החיים בתקופת הביניים. מונתה ועדת על בראשות מנכ"ל משה"ח למכלול הנושא. ועדת המשנה העוסקת בסדרי החיים בתקופת הביניים בראשות תא"ל שיאון נפגשה עם המצרים פעמיים וממשיכה לעסוק בכך. ועדת המשנה בראשות הח"מ אמורה לעסוק בהכנת ההליך.

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מספר:

2. כידוע מעוניינים המצרים בבוררות. אנו הצענו פישור (תוך שאמרנו כי לדעתנו ניתן היה להמשיך במו"מ לפי 7(1) לחוזה השלום אך אם סבורים המצרים שמוצה המו"מ נלך לפישור, המופיע ראשונה צבסעיף 7(2) והמאפשר אוירה רגועה. העמדות בוטאו בחלופי אגרות בין שה"ח שמיר לשה"ח המצרי עלי. אם ישיבו המצרים חיובית על ההצעה לפישור (היתה אינדיקציה מסוימת לאפשרות כזאת) יהיה צורך לנהל מו"מ על "הסכם הפישור" והפרוצדורה, לרבות מינוי מפשרים וכו' (אפשרות משלימה היא כי המצרים יעמדו על כך שאם ייכשל הפישור תבוא כוררות במקומו). אנו מכינים חומר בנושא האפשרויות הפרוצדורליות, שהן מגוונות לפי התקדימים, וכן נקבל חומר אמריקני.

3. בנפרד מן הצד הפרוצדורלי, עלינו לעסוק בהכנת החומר לגופו - היינו, טיעוניה ועמדותיה של מדינת ישראל בהליכים שיתנהלו. לנושא זה אנו מבקשים להקדיש את עיקר הדיון היום.

4. שאלה ראשונה היא חומר עובדתי ומשפטי: כידינו נמצא חומר מסוים שקיבלנו מתא"ל שיאון על הדיונים עם המצרים והטיעונים כפי שהוצגו להם בעת המו"מ על סימון הגבול. כן קיבלנו חומר מסוים מן הפרקליטות הצבאית, אך עלינו לקבל חומר נוסף לפי רשימה שבידינו. בנפרד קיבלנו באמצעות השגרירות בלונדון והשגרירות הבריטית כאן חומר על מה שקדם לסימון הגבול ב-1906. נדמה שהחוליה החלשה בחומר היא תקופת המנדט והמצב ששרר בה. אנו מבקשים מכל הגורמים הנוכחים: א. להתייחס בדבריהם לאמור; ב. להמציא לנו חומר שברשותם. נמנה צוות שירכז חומר זה כאן. (בין השאר יש להתייחס לשאלה אם יש חומר שלא טופל עד כה; אם יש מקום להזמין חומר מארכיונים זרים (תורכיים ובריטיים) אם יש בידינו כל המפות ותצלומי האויר הנחוצים; וכן אם יש מקום לדוקומנטציה של המצב בתקופת המנדט בעדויות בני התקופה).

5. השאלה הבאה היא קו הטיעון הישראלי. אנו מבקשים להעלות מחשבות ראשוניות בנושא זה ולקיים דיון מקדמי עליהן. דיון מפורט ייעשה לאחר קבלת החומר וגיבושו. מטרתנו תהיה להכין בשלב ראשון תזכיר מפורט שיסביר את החומר ואת הבעיות ויציג אופציות לפעולה. יתכן שועדת העל בראשות מנכ"ל משרדנו תרצה לכוון צוות של יועצים (משפטנים וגיאוגרפים) שיוכלו להעיר על תזכיר זה.

6. באשר לקו הטיעון: א. הגבול שנקבע בחוזה השלום הוא הגבול שבין א"י המנדטורית למצרים. השאלה היא זיהוי גבול זה. (מה מצב המפות של חוזה השלום?); ב. אנו מכינים

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- שהגישה חיה כי גבול זה הוא הגבול של 1906. השאלה היא האם זהו הרצוי לנו, או  
היש טעם לראיות כי בתקופת המנדט היה הגבול שונה (ספציפית - כיצד נהגו). מה  
מצב המפות, התיאורים וסימני השטח מתקופת המנדט. זאת כמובן אם יש בכל אלה כדי  
לסייע לנו. אם לאו, מן הסתם יש ללכת לגבול 1906.
- ג. אם הגבול הוא גבול 1906 - מהם הטיעונים בקשר לזיהוי גבול זה. ספציפית - התיחסות  
למפות; תיאורים מילוליים; מה היחס<sup>?</sup> לאבני גבול (כולל זו שבמס' 91) האם התיאורים  
המילוליים יכולים לסייע לנו (למשל הספור על ה"גבעה הקטנה" של נאום שוקיר). האם  
יש סיכוי לסתור את אבן הגבול מס' 91. האם ניתן לטעון להבדלים בין הקו המבוסס על  
הסכם 1906 לבין הסימונים שבשטח; האם ניתן לטעון ולעורר ספקות בקשר לכך?
- ד. הועלו מחשבות, בעיקר בזמן האחרון, בקשר לאפשרות לתקוף את כל קביעת הגבול ב-1906  
בטענות של כפיה ו/או מרמה מצד הבריטים כלפי התורכים. נאסף חומר ארכיוני רב  
(שטרם עובד כולו). שאלה היא האם, ראשית, יש אפשרות לתקוף זאת מבחינה עובדתית  
ומשפטית; ושנית, היש רצון פוליטי לעשות זאת על רקע ההשפעה השלילית העלולה  
להיות לכך על מכלול היחסים עם מצרים. אולי כמובן ניתן לעשות זאת ע"י רמזים וצד ג'  
ולא באורח ישיר. ואולם, האם איננו מנועים לעשות זאת לאחר שהכרנו בקו המנדטורי  
בחוזה השלום?
- ה. בנוסף לכך - יש להתיחס להתנהגותנו שלנו (מדינת ישראל) בעבר והאם אין היא יוצרת  
בעיות של מניעות כלפינו: הן בשנות המדינה לפני 1967 (אם כי הרי זה קו שביתת  
נשק, ולא גבול מוכר) והן לאחר 1967 ובמהלך המו"מ לסימון הגבול (אגב - המצרים  
ואנו מתיחסים לכל העניין כאל סכסוך טכני של demarcation. אנו יוצאים  
מהנחה שהגישה מקובלת על הכל).
- ו. אנו מבקשים התיחסות לכל אלה. כמו כן לשאלה אם הדגש בטיעוננו הוא טכני או משפטי.  
— נודה על התיחסות במלוא גילוי הלב.
- ז. הצד הפרוצדורלי בקצרה: יהיה צורך במו"מ עם המצרים, ראשית על פישור או בוררות, כאמור.  
אם יסכימו לפישור, יתכן שיתכעו - כאמור - הסכמה לבוררות מראש אם ייכשל הפישור יהיה  
צורך בניסוח הסכם באשר להליך: מי יהיו המפשרים (למקרה פישור) (התקדימים גמישים;  
מבחינתנו נראה כסביר ישראלי, מצרי ואמריקני); נתנגד לקביעת לו"ז; האם המפשרים כפופים  
למערכת ראיות או יוכלו לפעול גם לפי "הישר והטוב"; צורת הטיעון לפנייהם וכיוצא באלה.

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

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מספר:

## דב שיאון

1. סובר כי עיקר המאמץ שלנו צריך להיות מופנה לבדיקת הליכים אשר יתקיימו ; תהליך המו"מ, הפישור והבוררות. העניינים הפרוצדורליים צריכים להיות הצד החזק שלנו והוא אשר צריך לחזק את הנושאים המהותיים. עד כה טרם בדקנו את כל החומר הרלבנטי אך נראה שכל שמרבים אנו בקריאתו-עמדתנו הולכת ונחלשת - וגם מטעם זה יש להתרכז בנושאים הדיוניים.
2. לגופו של ענין, הסעון שלנו במו"מ לסימון הגבול החבסס על כך שהמפות אינן מדוייקות וגם אם יש מפות זהות, קשה לסמן מהן בשטח. בהסכם השלום נאמר "הגבול המנדטורי" ואם אין אפשרות להסתמך על המפות המנדטוריות יש לחזור לגבול המקורי של 1906.  
→ <sup>00</sup> לענין הגבול של 1906 אלמנטים שאפשר היה לבדוק הם  
א. תאור מילולי של הגבול.  
ב. השלמת התיאור המילולי על ידי תיאור של סימון הגבול.  
ג. המפה המצורפת.  
הסיעון מבוסס בעיקר על קיומו של אי-דיוק במפות תוך קריאה סטויימח של התיאור המילולי.  
התיאור המילולי קבע שהקטע האחרון עובר על ה- eastern ridge overlooking ומשם לנקודה על החוף (הדקלים) ממסומנת על המפה כ- A1.
3. בידי המצרים מצויות רשת הקואורדינטות של הגבול ומספר מפות והם יכולים בקלות רבה למצוא את הנקודה האחרונה. ה- eastern ridge מצוי לטענתם לא בואדי, לא במפרץ אלא מעל הוואדי.  
כמו כן החבססו על דברי נועייר שוקייר שהיה מזכיר הועדה המצרית אשר תאר את תהליך הסימון הקבוע בסוף 1906. מופיע אצלו תרשים של בסיס פירמידה ליד הדקלים ויש גם תיאור של טאבה שיכול לסייע לנו.  
לעומת זאת, טוען שוקייר גם שהוואדי בשטח מצרים, אין הוא קובע מהו הוואדי, והאם הגבעה של נלסון היא בואדי או מזרחית צפונית לו. השאלה היא מהי ה"גבעה הקטנה" הנזכרת אצלו.  
בסימון הגבול ב-1906 היו שלשה שלבים :  
א. סיור וסימון נקודות אסטרונומיות.  
ב. סימון ארעי.  
ג. סימון קבע על ידי פירמידות

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משרד החוץ

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מספר:

מכיוון שהחל מהשלב השני הפעולה נעשתה בידי סכנאים, ייחכן כי כבר בסימון הארעי, נמלו טעויות. כך למשל אין קו ראייה בין נק' 89 ל-91 וגם התיאור של הסימון אינו השרידים (ראה הטיעון של ס.אלבק בנושא זה).

#### 4. מהו החומר הרלבנטי המצוי בידי הצדדים

א. התיאורים מ-1906 של Owen ו-Wade.

ב. רשת הקואורדינטות מ-1939 (תומכה במצרים).

ג. החלק מהדו"ח של Owen אשר מתאר כי עמדת הבריטים היחה שלתורכים שבעקבה לא תהיה שליטה על טאבה.

ד. בידינו מצוי הדו"ח המלא של Owen - התורכים ביקשו את עקבה, מצודה <sup>למח</sup> וראס אל נקב כך שלבריטים לא תהיה שליטה על עקבה, אך על טאבה היו מוכנים לוותר.

ה. מפה שבדק אוריאל הד ולפיו הקו עבר ליד רגלי הגבעה.

#### 5. עמדת המצרים כיום

עפ"י לביב מהמודיעין המצרי נראה שהמצרים אינם מוכנים לשקול עמדה שייחכן ושני הקוים (זה שלנו וזה שלהם) אינם נכונים במאת האחוזים. המצרים סבורים היום כי יוכלו להוכיח הקו שלהם.

#### 6. עמדתנו

איננו יכולים להחזיק ולחמוך בקו הדקלים, אך ניתן לטעון שהקו המצרי בודאי אינו נכון - קרי נק' 91 הקיימת אינה סבירה.

#### 7. מאמץ איסופי

אנקרה - יחכן שהתורכים רומו או נאנסו אך לפי ספרו של רושדי פאשה, ספק אם זה יסייע.

יש לבדוק גם עדויות Bromley.

#### 8. קו לפעולה

א. המפוח עם שגיאות מסויימות. לא לערער בכלל על המפות.

ב. ערעור על 1906.

9. מה היה המצב בזמן המנדט, אינו ברור. ב-1979 היחה שהות קצרה בטאבה, אך מאז לא שהינו שם ולא טענו בענין זה בועש"ן.

#### י. למדן

גם בידי המצרים הדו"ח המלא של Owen.

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

תאריך:

- 6 -

מספר:

דב שיאון (לשאלה רובינשטיין)  
בנקודה 91 נמצאו שרידים של אבן ועמוד זאוק ליד זה. כנראה היתה שם נקודה  
וכך גם מסומן ברשת הקואורדינטות.

צבי קידר

א. אין עדיין הסכמה מצרית על מישור, הנושא אצל מובארכ.  
ב. האם ניוון לשכנע המצרים לדון על פי קו 1906.

שיאון

המצרים מסכימים כיום לדון על פי קו 1906.

א. מלמד

ישנו תקדים בשטח (נק" 52) שהמצרים מערערים על מיקום הפירמידה בגלל קו ראייה  
המסקנה : א) לא בכל מקום יש אבן - המיקום נכון.  
ב) כיוון שאין קו ראייה, אבן 91 לא במקום. אין באיזור הנ"ל חולות  
נוודים.

רון אדלר

יכול להיות שהסימון נעשה גם בלי קו ראייה מכיוון שהיה מזורז.

א. מלמד

מה שמעוה "גבול מנדטורי מוכר"  
המצרים אינם מדברים על אבני הגבול כ"גבול מוכר" וגם לפני 67' הגבול לא היה  
בהכרח בהחאם לאבני הגבול אלא עבר לעיחים בנקודות אחרות.

א. רובינשטיין

האם קיים חומר מנדטורי המפרש המושג "גבול מנדטורי מוכר".

י. זינגר

לפי הארכיון הבריטי (מכתבים 1939) - "מוכר" משמעוהו 1906.

י. פורת

המצרים יכולים לטעון כי בסימון הגבול הם לא פעלו באופן עיוור על פי הפירמידות

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך:

- 7 -

מספר:

אלא חמיד עבדו לפי מסופ (1912 ו-1916), ומצאו כל נקודה.  
אנחנו לא השתמשנו במסופ לשם הסימון.  
נקודה 91 לסענתם היא הן על פי המספה והן לפי מיקום האבן ועל כן לפי עקביותם  
זו הנק' הנכונה.

ר. אדלר

1. לגבי נק' 91

א. נק' 91 אינה על שפה היס, דבר המחליש את הסעון המצרי כי צריכה להיות  
לכאורה נקודה נוספת על החוף.

ב. כיצד למשוך הקו מ-91? המשך ישיר, שבר גיאולוגי.

2. מידות אסטרונומיות

לא ברור היכן נערכו מדידות אלה, אם על הגבול עצמו או בנקודות עזר. אין  
כמעט ספק שנק' 91 על הגבעה לא נערכה מדידה כזו אלא בוודי.  
סובר שנק' עיקרית בדקלים ונק' משנייה על ה"גרניט נוב" (הגבעה שמעל רפי  
נלסון).

3. כיצד מסמנים גבול

א. הנחיה כתובה או מסה.

ב. מסכימים בשטח על נקודה, מודדים ומעלים על רשת בלתי תלויה.

ג. לפי הרשת הבלתי תלויה מעלים על מסה.

ב-1906 פעלו כך, ולכן המספה רק מתארת המצב בשטח והמספה נתונה לעומת השטח.

4. קשה לטעון שכל המספות מוטעות אך ניתן לומר שיש חוסר דיוק יחסי בגלל:

א. טיב מדידה.

ב. בעיות קנה מידה.

ג. פער בין רשתות ישראל ומצרים.

א. רובינשטיין

יש להכין דו"ח על המו"מ לסימון הגבול עם המצרים בשנה האחרונה, כי אז הושמעו  
הסיעונים השונים לגבי כל נקודות המחלוקת.

י. זינגר

1. "גבול מוכר" משמעותו 1906.

2. הקואורדינטות מופיעות לראשונה במכתב מ-1939, השאלה היא מתי נמדדו.

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך:

- 8 -

מספר:

3. חשוב לדעת מה היה המצב בסוף המנדט. ראה פסה"ד בענין קמבודיה - תאילנד 1962.

4. האם לתקוף 1906

א. אי דיוק - ניחן לטעון.

ב. לטעון נגד הגבול עצמו - אי אפשר.

## א. רובינשטיין

החוליה החסרה היא באופן בולט המצב בחקופת המנדט, אם יש בכך כדי להועיל. הדגשנו כי לפרקטיקה שנהגה נודעת חשיבות.

## ד. שיאון

המצב מ-1906 והלאה נהיה גרוע יותר מבחינתנו ועל-כן חזרנו ל-1906 כדי שנערער על ענין טאבה.

## י. זינגר

אם המפות בחקופת המנדט אינן תומכות בעמדתנו, יש מקום למשיכת הדיון בלבד.

## ח. סרברו

1. יש לתקוף התמיסה המצרית הפסיכולוגית שטאבה היחה במשך מאות בשנים מצרית.
2. הקו של 1906 סומן בנקודות העיקריות שבו לפי הטעון המצרי.
3. "מוכר" - משמעותו סימנים בשח, מפות או נחוני מדידה. ושלשם חומכים בעמדה המצרית.
4. קו הדלקים לא נחמך בהגדרה המילולית אך ניחן להגן על הגרניט נוב.

## ד. שיאון

קו הדקלים זו הנחיה מדינית וניסינו לבנות קיים גם לכך.

## ח. סרברו

## הטקטיקה

יש לתקוף המדידות על פי מסמך שמראה כי המדידות לא היו טובות וכל המפות לאחר מכן היו מבוססות על כך.

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך:

- 9 -

מספר:

## י. פורח

כדאי להחחיל אולי בתהליך הפישור עם 14 הנקודות האחרות כדי לצנן הרוחות.

## ת. טרברו

מציע לפתוח את כל הסימון מחדש.

## א. רובינשטיין

איני דוחה הצעה פורח, אך סמק אם יש מקום לפתוח כל הסימון מחדש, מטעמים מדיניים ברורים. לשם הכנת ההליכים נהיה זקוקים לכל החומר המצוי כיום בידי הנוכחים על מנת לרכזו.

1. מבקש על כן מכל הנוכחים שיעבירו העתקים של החומר המצוי בידיהם.
2. מבקש כי יוכן סיכום של כל מה שהיה עד כה כולל טעונים ואסמכתאות.
3. מבקש למנות צוות בינמשרדי שיכין יחד את סיכום החומר החדש וכיצד יש לחקן הטיעונים בהתאם.
4. נותן תדרוך על מהות הפישור ועל הגישות האפשריות לצד הפרוצדורלי (נראית כסבירה ועדה של שלושה, אמריקני, ישראלי ומצרי דבר שיאפשר חשומה ישראלית מחאימה).

## ד. שיאון


אינו מבין מדוע יש להעביר הסכומים האמורים מכיוון שקיימות סטנוגרמות.

## א. רובינשטיין

יעלה זאת שוב.

## ר. אדלר

מבקש כי חועלה הבעיה של מיפוי בחקופת הביניים.

רשם  
  
יחזקאל אלסטר

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

12/0

תאריך: ד' בסיוון תשמ"ב  
26 במאי 1982

מספר:

אדוקה V

אל : המנכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

## הנדון: טאבה - חומר

1. ב-21.5.82 כינסתי במשרדי דיון ממושך עם הנוגעים בדבר במשרדי הממשלה (לרבות תא"ל שיאון, ד"ר אדלר מאגף המדידות, מר קידר, סא"ל זינגר, ואנשי משה"ח). בנפרד אדווח על כך.
2. בין השאר ביקשתי מתא"ל שיאון כי תוכן על-ידיו בשיתוף גורמי המקצוע (אגף המדידות) תמצית סכירה של הדיונים שקויימו עם המצרים במהלך השנה האחרונה בעניין סימון קו הגבול. הדבר נחוץ הן כדי שאנו, העוסקים בכך, נתחיל מנקודת מוצא אחידה וברורה לגבי כל מה שאירע, והן כי לעמדות שהוצגו במהלך השיחות יש חשיבות גם בתהליך הפישור עצמו.
3. תא"ל שיאון התנגד (חרף מאמצי שכנוע רבים) ואמר כי יש להסתפק בפרטיכלי הדיונים שהיו ובהסכריו בע"פ ואינו מוכן למאמץ של תמצית כזאת שתדרוש זמן רב (הערכתו שונה). הוא ביקש להתרכז בטיעונים עתידיים, אך ברור לי - והדבר היה ברור למרבית המשתתפים - כי לשם העתיד יש צורך לדעת את שאירע בעבר.
4. הודעתי לתא"ל שיאון כי אבקש הנחיה ברוח זו מועדת ההיגוי שבראשותך, ואני מבקש בכל לשון כי היא תינתן.

ב כ ר כ ה,

א רובינשטיין

העתק: ממנכ"ל

מר ש. דיבון, סמנכ"ל  
מנהל מח' מצרים

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

12/10

תאריך: ד' בסיוון תשמ"ב  
26 במאי 1982

מספר:

אל : המנכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

א. רובינשטיין

## הנדון: טאבה - ראובן אלוני

במזכרים קודמים הפניתי תשומת הלב כי לדעתי יש צורך לשנות את הסטטוס הקיים לפיו מטפל מר אלוני בטאבה כ"מינהל לפיתוח מרחב שלמה". הודעתי זאת בשעתו בע"פ גם לתא"ל שיאון שהבטיח לטפל.

ב-21.5.82 שוחח אתי תא"ל שיאון בנושא שבנדון ואמר, כי "בעזרת השם" ניתן לפתור חלק אחד מן הבעיה, היינו, שלא ייקרא מרחב שלמה אלא בשם אחר, למשל "המינהל לפיתוח" (כפי שמופיע באחת מהחלטות הממשלה שעסקה בנושא) - אם כי גם שם זה קצת מנוגד לכך שאין אנו עוסקים כביכול בבניה חדשה באיזור. אולם, אמר תא"ל שיאון, יש בעיה חמורה יותר - היינו, שכביכול פקע קיומו של מר אלוני עם הנסיגה כי אין מושל סיני, ולכן לא ברורה הקונסטרוקציה שלו, ופירוש הדבר - אין מי שיתן את השירותים והתקציבים באיזור (אשפה, טלפון וכו'). אמרתי כי לדעתי יתנום משרדי הממשלה ועיריית אילת כמו בכל מקום אחר. תא"ל שיאון אמר כי הדבר סבוך ובלתי אפשרי מינהלית. ביקש שמש"ח יאשר בצורה כלשהי שמר אלוני ימשיך לטפל בטאבה, וזאת כיוון ששר החקלאות הממונה הישיר על מר אלוני אינו מגלה עניין וכו'. אמרתי כי לא אמליץ, וזאת ברוח האמור, אך אעביר לממונים.

א.ר.

שיאון נתן לי את העתקי שג'ועדת השרים לבטחון המצ"ב מאפריל 1981.

היום (26.5) התקשר מר אלוני באותו עניין. פתח בכך שהוא מסכים עם גישתי העקרונית אך צריך לפתור את המצב המעשי. רצה לבקש שמש"ח יביא לממשלה. אמרתי לו את אשר אמרתי לשיאון, והוספתי כי השר שהביא את הנושא בשעתו לוועדת השרים צריך מן הסתם להביאו גם עתה. אמר כי היה זה השר שרון כשר החקלאות. אמרתי כי בין אם שר החקלאות ובין אם שר הבטחון יביאו, אין זה לכאורה עניין למשרדנו, אך אעביר לממונים.

ב כ ר כ ה,

א. רובינשטיין

2:04

העתק: לש"ש ה"ח  
ממנכ"ל

מר ש. דיבון, סמנכ"ל  
מנהל מח' מצרים

מכתב  
משרד  
הבריאות



מזכירות הממשלה

107

מזכיר הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ג בניסן התשמ"א  
27 באפריל 1981

סודי ביותר

עותק מס. 3 מתוך 7 עותקים.

אלישי

אל : ראש-הממשלה ושר הבטחון  
שר הפנים

רבותי,

הנני מתכבד להביא לתשומת-לבכם חיקון לסעיף ג' בהחלטה  
מס. 90/ב של ועדה השרים לעניני בטחון, מישיבתה ביום י' בניסן  
התשמ"א (14.4.81) -:

הגבול הכינלאומי - אזור טבה 90/ב"

ג. המינהל לפיתוח מרחב שלמה בתאום עם מינהל  
התיירות יכול להמשיך בפעולות הפיתוח באזור  
טבה בלי פרסום."


ב ב ר כ ה

אריה נאור

אריה נאור

העתק: שר החקלאות  
לשכת שר הבטחון

27  
21/5/82



מזכירות הממשלה

מזכיר הממשלה

ירושלים, י"ג בניסן התשמ"א  
17 באפריל 1981

סודי ביותר

עותק מס. 3 מחור 7 עותקים.

א. אילון

אל : ראש-הממשלה ושר הכטחון  
שר הפנים

רכותי,

הנני מתכבד להביא לתשומת-לבכם החלטה מס. ב/90 של  
ועדת השרים לעניני בטחון, מישיבה ביום י' בניסן התשמ"א  
-(14.4.81):

הגבול הבינלאומי - אזור טבה "ב/90

מחליטים :

- א. משרד הפנים לא יפרסם הכרזה בענין הגבול הבינלאומי במחוז הדרום, עד לאחר גמר הטיפול בענין טבה במסגרת הועדה המשותפת.
- ב. משרד הפנים יודא כי לא תהיה הכרזה על חיקון שטח השיפוט של אילת עד גמר הטיפול בענין טבה במסגרת הועדה המשותפת.
- ג. מינהל הפיתוח יכול להמשיך בפעולות הפיתוח באזור טבה בלי פרסום.

בברכה,  
א. אילון  
אריה נאור

העתק: שר החקלאות  
לטכח שר הכטחון

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: כ"ז באייר תשמ"ב  
20 במאי 1982

מספר:

26

שמור-דחוף

אל : מר י. בן-אהרון, מנהל לשכת שה"ח

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: טאבה

בהמשך לשיחתנו:

1. נוצר לכאורה בציבור רושם כי בענין טאבה תובעת ישראל "פשרה", דהיינו, אולי אין לה זכות משפטית אמיתית ולכן היא תובעת פשרה בעוד המצרים עומדים על "ייקוב הדין את ההר". היו בעניין זה גם התבטאויות בדרג בכיר (שר התיירות ברדיו בשבוע החולף דיבר על "פשרה" וכו' ו"אלאהראס" כבר מסר תגובת דובר משה"ח המצרי לפי נוסח איגרת עלי לשה"ח; אם כי הוא מזכיר שחוזת השלום מדבר על בוררות או פישור).

2. חלק מהרושם אולי נובע מהמושג "פישור" (conciliation) שאינו מוכר בציבור וגם לא בממשלה, שכן הוא שאוב מהמילון הבינלאומי ואין לו אח ורע במשפט הפנימי, המכיר - לעומת זאת - את מושג הבוררות. פישור "פישור" שבו שני הצדדים נשבעים ליישור.

3. מבלי להיכנס לשאלה לגופה, של מצבנו בהליך שיתנהל, נדמה לי שמבחינה ציבורית טוב שהתבטאויות ישראליות בנושא זה יהיו בקו שונה, ויסבירו את עיקרי גישתנו כפי שראוי לה לכאורה שתוצג בפומבי.

אני מציע לשיקול כי שה"ח בהתבטאותו בפורום לשכת עוה"ד מחר יכלול פסקה כלהלן:

- א. בציבור ישנה - דומה - אי בהירות בקשר למחלוקת עם מצרים בענין טאבה.
- ב. המחלוקת - והיא איננה על טאבה בלבד, אלא על ארבע עשרה נקודות נוספות בקטעים שונים של הגבול הבינלאומי - נוגעת לזיהוי המדויק וסימונו של הגבול בין ארץ-ישראל המנדטורית לבין מצרים, שהוא הגבול שנקבע בחוזה השלום.
- ג. אין ישראל תובעת ממצרים שטח מצרי, ואינה מבקשת "טובה" או ויתור מצד מצרים על שטח שנקבע בחוזה השלום כי הוא מצרי. תביעתה של ישראל היא לשטח שלפי עמדתה, בהתאם לחוות דעת מומחי המיפוי שלה, הוא מעברו הישראלי של קו הגבול. למצרים טיעונים משלהם בכיוון ההפוך.
- ד. ערב הפינוי הושג הסכם פרוצדורלי, שלפיו עד ליישוב הסכסוך תסיג ישראל את כוחותיה לקו שאליה טוענים המצרים והמצרים יגיעו לקו שאליה טוענת ישראל; ובאשר לטאבה - שהיא היחידה מכל נקודות המחלוקת שבה שוקקים חיים וישנה פעילות - תימשך הפעילות כפי שהיתה עד כה. הבטחון יובטח ע"י הכוח הרב-לאומי. כרגע מתנהל מ"מ עם המצרים בקשר לפרטי סדרי החיים שם עד ליישוב הסכסוך. לצרכי המשפט הפנימי - מבלי לפגוע בהליך ליישוב הסכסוך - מתיחסת ישראל לטאבה כאל כל תחום אחר שחל עליו משפט ישראל.
- ה. באשר לסכסוך עצמו, חוזה השלום קובע כי סכסוכים ייושבו במו"מ, ואם אין ניתן ליישבם במו"מ - בפישור (conciliation) או בבוררות. אנו סברנו כי יש מקום להמשיך במו"מ, אך אם טוענים המצרים שהמו"מ מוצה, הצעתנו היא

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

תאריך:

מספר:

- 2 -

פישור.

1. פישור, שהוא אחת מדרכי יישוב סכסוכים המוכרות במשפט הבינלאומי ומשמשות בו בהסכמים שונים, אך אינן ידועות בציבור הרחב, היא מסירת סכסוך לטיפול ע"י ועדת מפשרים, הבודקת את העובדות והראיות, שומעת את הצדדים ומציעה להם פתרון, אם כי אין הם חייבים לקבל את הצעותיה (שלא בבוררות, שהיא מחייבת). אנו מציעים פישור, המופיע ראשונה בין האופציות שבהסכם השלום, גם כיוון שאנו סבורים כי ביחסים בין שתי מדינות ידידותיות עדיף לבחור בדרך המאפשרת אוירה נינוחה ורגועה של יישוב המחלוקת.

2. אני מבקש לחזור ולהדגיש, כי המדובר אינו בדרישה כי מצרים תוותר על שטח מצרי, אלא בקביעה נכונה של קו הגבול כשלכל צד טיעונים משלו, ובאור זה יש לראות את הסכסוך. עמדתנו שלנו, כאמור, היא כי טיעונינו הם הנכונים".

ב ב ר כ ה,

א. רובינשטיין

העתק: מנכ"ל  
ממנכ"ל

מר ש. דיבון, סמנכ"ל  
מנהל מח' מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1807

נבו

שטר

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טלוגי

אל: המשרד, נר: 329, מ: קהיר  
דח: מ, סג: ש, חא: 190582, וח: 1215  
נד: מאבה

סודי/מיד

אל רובינשטיין

דט מח' מצרים, טרנ/1

מאת דובק

1. לשלך נר 231.

2. הידיעה ב"אל גומהודי"י נכונה-הוקמה ועדה מיעצת לעניני  
הבוררות (או הפישור) הטורכנה ממוטחים בכירים למטפס  
בינלאומי, שלא מטובדי משרד החוץ, כדלקמן:  
דד' ווחיד ראפת (יורי), דד' חאמד טולטאן, דד' אבראהים שחאטה  
ודד' מופיד שהאב.

3. הועדה הנל תפעל כגוף מיעץ ליד משרד החוץ ואף תיצג מצרים  
בבוררות.

4. דד' ווחיד ראפת נחשב לסומחה ממדדגה ראשונה בכל הקשור  
לנושאי בוררות ופישור. הוא שיפל בוטנו בבוררות בענין בוריימי.  
הוא בן 20, שמש בשנות החטישים כיועץ מיוחד למשרד החוץ המצרי  
בנושאים משפטיים ולא כטובד המשרד) בכל הסוגיות שנבטו  
מהלמות בתקופת נאצר.

5. וכבוד לך בוודאי שבשיחות הועדה העליונה בקאהיר, הוכיר במאלי  
חסן עלי אח שמו של הנל כסומחה עמו הוא מחיעץ בכל הקשור  
למאבה.

פ: שה, ששה, מנכל, טטנכל, דיבון, מצרים, רובינשטיין,  
דלמרכי, מטח, דט, אטן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

חח: ועדה מטופפת

אגודת ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד ירושלים

סוד

354

ס פ ס ס ב ר ק

דף...!...מתוך...!...דפים

סוג בטחוני... ס ו ד י

דהיפות.....

האריך וז"ח 181330 במאי 82

מס' מברק... 354

רובינשטיין, מצפ"א .

פישור, שלך ח/460.

דברתי שוב עם קוזאק כבשלך.

סיפר כי ינסה לעכב מסירת הסקירה אך הוא מסופק אם ניתן. לדבריו, תחילת הפרשה בפנייה מצרית להשתתפות פעילה אמריקאית בתהליך הפישור. האמריקאים ניסו להתחמק ואז הוצע (לא היה ברור לו מי העלה ראשון ההצעה הם או המצרים) כי ארה"ב תספק חומר רקע על מהות הפישור. לדבריו, כל זה ארע בעת שהות סטטל באזור.

שוב הדגיש כי מדובר בסקירה היסטורית על מהות המושג ולא בחוות דעת.

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: כ"ד באייר תשמ"ב  
17 במאי 1982

מספר:

*טאבה*

אל : המנכ"ל  
תא"ל ד. שיאון

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

## הנדון: טאבה ורפי נלסון

א. הבוקר, בעקבות השידורים ברדיו על נלסון ו"מכונות המזל" שלו בטאבה (נר 296 של מח' מצרים) שוחחתי עם עו"ד גדעון רוזנבלום המייצג את נלסון. אמרתי כי אנו תמהים על הפרשה, על הצבת מכונות ההימורים כ- test case ועל השבת תשומת לב ציבורית מיותרת שכוודאי תיקלט בצד השני. רוזנבלום אמר כי לאחר שקיבל תשובה של תא"ל שיאון אליו מ-9.5 למכתבו מ-2.5 (אגב, במקביל היתה פניה מתא"ל שיאון אלי להשיב על אותו מכתב); בו הודיעו כי משפט ישראל חל, הסיר נלסון בעצתו את המכונות מכלל פעולה. המלצתי לעו"ד רוזנבלום ש"יירדו" מן התקשורת כי הדבר לא יועיל לעניין כולו.

ב. כעבור זמן-מה ראיתי את "מעריב" מהיום ובו ידיעה כי הועדה המשותפת החליטה על תחולת משפט ישראל. התקשרתי שוב לעו"ד רוזנבלום ואמרתי כי דבר זה אינו נכון (אמר כי דיבר עם העתונאי אך מסר לו רק על הודעת שיאון ולא על "החלטה" של הועדה) ואין טעם להזמין תגובות נגד מצריות.

ג. לגופו של דבר הדגשתי בפניו כי גישתנו היא שמשפט ישראל חל, ואנו מתייחסים למשפט מדינת ישראל ולא להסדר המשפטי הקודם שלפיו חל לכאורה משפט סיני.

ד. בינתיים מסרה לי תנ"צ חנה הירש היועצת המשפטית למטרה כי בעוד שמבחינה משטרתית היה איזור טאבה באחריות משטרת אילת, הרי מבחינת רשיונות תכנון ובניה ורישוי עסקים לא קיבלו רפי נלסון (רישוי) והמלון (תכנון ובניה) רשיונות מעיריית אילת אלא ממר אלוני מנהל המינהל לפיתוח מרש"ל. בהמשך למזכרי מאתמול אני מציע כי מר אלוני יעבוד ב"כובע" של גוף ממשלתי או עירוני מתאים.

ב ב ר כ ה,

א. רובינשטיין

העתק: לש' שה"ח  
ממנכ"ל

מר ש. דיבון, סמנכ"ל  
מנהל מצרים

אלי: המשרד, וד: 288, ג: קהיר  
 דח: ד, טג: ט, טא: 170582, זח: 1800  
 נד: טאבה

טאבה

אלי: מחלקת מצרים, משפטיה.

דט: מרכז.

טאת: שארירות.

טמוד/רגיל.

טאבה.

י' אוקטובר י' 16 במאי צפוי כי משלחת מצרים לבוררות נראשונה דדי  
 וחיד ראפת תכלול את, דדי' חאמד סלמאן, דדי' אברהים שחאחה ודדי  
 מפיד שהאב.

י' מאיו י' 17 במאי - וחיד ראפת, בכיר יועציה המשפטיים של  
 מצרים, י' עתף פעולה עם אנשי המחלקה המשפטית של המשרד כדי להכין  
 הבוררות.

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תפ: שהח, טשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, דיבון, מצרים, רובי נשטיין, משפט,  
 ד/מרכז, טמת  
 תח: ועדה משותפת

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טאק

מל: קהיר, נר: 163, מ: המשרד  
דח: מ, סג: ט, תא: 100502, וח: 1600  
נד: מאבה

חודי/מידי

השגריר

מאבה,

1. בנצוד מועברת בדיפי איגרת שהח בתשובה לאיגרתו של עלי שנמסרה לך כשבוע החולף.
2. תשובת שהח ממעימה את עמדתנו שנמסרה למצרים במהלך השיחות הקדחתניות ערב פינוי טיני כי בשלעצמנו איננו סבורים שהמומ' נ טעיף לנו לחורה השלום ( מוצה, אך אם דעתם שונה אנו מוכנים להתקדם לשלב הבא נ טעיף 27) אולם עמדתנו היא כי השלב הבא יהיה פישור.
3. ה' התניה' המרומזת של גיבוש הנורמליזציה כהסדר מאבה שבאיגרת עלי לא נשאה חן בעינינו ולכן הפסקה האחרונה באיגרת התשובה של שהח.
4. אלא מסוד את האיגרת לעלי בלויית הסברים כלהלן :  
א. אנו רוצים בפישור כיוון שזהו הליך נינוח ורגוע שאין בו אותה אגידה שישנה בבוררות והעלולה להיות השפעה לא נעימה על היחסים.
- ב. זו היתה עמדתנו מאז המומ' על חוזה השלום ואין בה כל הידוש אופציה ונ באמור באיגרת שהח) מופיעה ראשונה בסעיף 27.
- ג. אט יזכר עלי על פישור ושם ייכשל תהיה בוררות - אנו מציעים כי תחמוק לפי שעה מהתחייבות לכך נ הדבר עלה בכוזר כהצעה ונדון במומ' לפני הפינוי אך לא סובס'.
- ד. הרושם שתחזיר לעלי צריך להיות שאנו מוכנים להתקדם ואיננו יוצרים עיכובים אך עמדתנו פישור.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אגב, עמדה זו מוצקת מכחינה משפטית לא פחות ואולי קצת יותר מהתביעה המצרית לבוררות.

רובינשטיין .

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהנט, מנבל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רם, אמח, ממח, רובינשטיין, משפס, דיבון, מצרים

יג' באייר התשמ"ב  
6 במאי 1982

232

- סודי -

אל : השגריר, רוסינגטון  
מאת: לשכת המסנה למנכ"ל

רצ"ב העתק מברק הנשיא מובארק לרה"מ מ-27.4 וחשובת  
רה"מ מ-30.4.

ב ב ר כ ה,

נתן מרון

העתק: מר א. רובינסטיין  
מר ח. קוברסקי

11/07/82  
7/8/82  
Jerusalem, April 30, 1982

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your warm and moving words. During the last few months, I have repeatedly declared, privately and publicly, that we intend to fulfil our commitment under the Peace Treaty "<sup>do</sup> the dot and the date," and we did. We both know that it was not easy. And I appreciate the fact that, in the letter of April 20, 1982 which you were kind enough to address to me, you contributed to the removal of the difficulties which then faced our two countries.

I do hope, Mr. President, that the reciprocity in the carrying out of all the provisions and commitments under the Peace Treaty will be permanent.

Now it is our duty to concern ourselves with the future, and as the Peace Treaty between our two nations is consummated, it only awaits scrupulous implementation.

I therefore respectfully suggest to you that we renew our negotiations on full autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Of course, these important negotiations - which, in my opinion, should concentrate on the stipulations concerning the democratic election, inauguration and establishment of the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) - should take place in the capitals of the three nations involved.

Let us therefore decide soon about the resumption of the autonomy talks, at all accepted levels.

My wife joins me in sending our best wishes to your wife and to you, Mr. President.

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin

His Excellency  
Mr. Mohammed Hosny Mubarak  
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Cairo

משרד ראש הממשלה  
27 IV. 1982  
820 (3-1) '82

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5RAP34 PRESIDE CY OF REPUBLIC ABDINCAIRO 202/210 25 2222WLS

ETATT

DEAR PRIM E MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN  
TEL AVIV

IN THESE HISTHIC MOMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND THE ISRAELI PEOPLE ON THE STEPS YOU TOOK ON THE ROAD TO PEACE. THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WILL OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF OUR RLAEER RELATIONS AND PAVE THE WAY FOR INCREASED INEEEE INTERACTION AND INTENSIFIED COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

WHEN WE MET HERE IN CAIRO, WE PLEDGED TO WORK VIGOROUSLY AND TIREEEEE TIRELESSLY TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE FOREVER, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BUILD BRIDGES OF CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHN THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS TO COME. TOGETHER, WE SHALL PROCEED TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF PEACE AND FULFILL OUR COMMITMENT TO A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, WE VIEW THE FUTURE WITH HOPE AND OPTIMISM.

I AM CERTAIN THAT THROUGH YOUR WISDOM AND VISION, WE WILL EEEE WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME ALL OBSTACLES AND CREATE A SHINING MODEL FOR ALL NATIONS OF THE REGION. THIS IS OUR HISTORIC MISSION WHICH WE WILL FULFILL WITH DETERMINATION AND FAITH. YOUR PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED BY OUR PEOPLE.

WITH MY BEST WISHES AND FLCEEEE FELICITATIONS.  
-- MOHAMED HOSNY MUBARAK.

COL OK CKD

TELEGRAMME

TELEGRAMME

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

ש.מ.ר

תאריך: י"ג באייר תשמ"ב  
6 במאי 1982

מספר:

אל : המנכ"ל  
המשנה למנכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: טאבה  
לשלך מ-5.5

א. מן הדברים שאמר לך לואיס בע"פ בשתי שיחותיכם כי האמריקנים יעצו למצרים שלא יזיקו להשתתפותם בשירות בדבר הסודי הביניים; עולה כי האמריקנים - הגם שהבטיחו למצרים במכתב אתרסון כי אם יבקשו ישתתפו גם בכך - אינם מתלהבים מהשתתפות זו. בינהיים אכן מתנהל המו"מ שם בלעדיהם.

ב. אני מבקש להעיר לסיפא של מכתב אתרסון, המהוה אישור כי "ארה"ב תמשיך למלא תפקידה כשותף מלא בתהליך השלום": יש כאן אי ריוק שראוי לשים אליו לב. ארה"ב היא "שותף מלא" ככל שהמדובר במו"מ האוטונומיה; אין היא שותף מלא במו"מ בעניינים הביטורניים עם מצרים (ואכן לא השתתפה במו"מ הנורמליזציה למיניהם). השתתפותה איפוא במו"מ בעניין טאבה היא sui Generis ואין לראותה באותה מתכונת של "שותף מלא" כבאוטונומיה. בעניין זה הערנו לאמריקנים עוד כשכלי ניסוח ההטכם הפרוצדורלי, והם מחקו שימוש במונח זה. כזכור היתה גם רגישות ממשלתית אצלנו ככל נושא השתתפותם. פסקת הסיפא במכתב אתרסון אמנם מדברת על תהליך השלום, אך הכנסתה למכתב שעניינו סכסוך הגבול אינה נוחה לנו.

לחשומת לב ולכל שתמצאו לנכון.

ב ב ר כ ה,

א. רוכינשטיין

העתק: השגריר וושינגטון  
השגריר קהיר  
מר ש. דיבון, סמנכ"ל  
מנהל לש' שה"ח  
מנהל מצרים  
מנהל מצפ"א  
תא"ל ד. שיאון

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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*מאזק*

אל: המטכ"ד, נד: 62, מ: קה"ד  
דח: מ, סג: ס, חא: 050582, רח: 1200  
נד: אגרת לשהח

סודי/מיד

לשכת הסד

דח: לשכת המנכ"ל, מחלקת מצרים

מדובר

1. להלן תוכן אגרת לשהח' שנמסרה הבוקר על ידי כנאול חסן עלי  
לשגריר טוון:

CAIRO . MAY 5TH, 1982.

DEAR MINISTER SHAMIR,

ACCORDING TO THE RECENT AGREEMENT SIGNED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ON APRIL 25, 1982 ON "THE INITIAL PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING BOUNDARY QUESTIONS", EGYPT AND ISRAEL REACHED AGREEMENT PROVIDING THAT THE REMAINING TECHNICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARY DEMARCATION QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AN AGREED PROCEDURE" WHICH WILL ACHIEVE A FINAL AND COMPLETE RESOLUTION IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE VII OF THE PEACE TREATY".

THE SAID ARTICLE STIPULATES THAT ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES RESULTING FROM THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY, NOT RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE SETTLED BY CONCILIATION OR ARBITRATION.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

GIVEN THE INHERENT NATURE OF THE PRESENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THE DEMARCATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN MANDATED PALESTINE AND EGYPT, AS STIPULATED IN ARTICLE I PARA II AND ARTICLE II OF THE PEACE TREATY, OR MORE PRECISELY OVER SOME PARTS OF THE SAID BOUNDARY LINE, PARTICULARLY AT THE TABA AREA ON THE GULF OF AQABA, IT IS ONCE MORE THE VIEW OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT THAT, SINCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, THE MOST APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE TO SETTLE SUCH DIFFERENCE, IS AGREED ARBITRATION, FOR REASONS ADVOCATED IN OUR PREVIOUS TALKS.

SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AS WE BELIEVE, SHARE THIS VIEW IT WILL BE TO BEGIN TALKS LEADING TO THE DRAFTING OF A "COMPROMISE OF ARBITRATION" ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS. INDEED THE SOONER SUCH DIFFERENCES ARE RESOLVED THE BETTER FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACEFUL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS.

AWAITING AN EARLY REPLY WHICH WILL ACCELERATE THE SOLUTION OF AFOREMENTIONED QUESTIONS IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE VII OF THE PEACE TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT ON "INITIAL PROCEDURE" I REHEW TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

2 . בנפרד דיווח על השיחה .

3 . האגרות תשלח בדי"פ' הקדוונ . =====

98 : שפה, סטאה, דרהמ, סרהמ, שהובט, מנכנל, ממנכנל, סמנכנל, אמח, דם,  
אמן

6/2

ירושלים, י"ב באייר התשמ"ב  
5 בואי 1982

ש מ ר

אל : המנכ"ל  
היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: טאבה  
בהמשך למזכרי מה-3.5

ר"ב העתק מכתבו של אתרסון לבוטרוס גאלי שאודותיו דיבר לואיס לפני  
ימים מספר.

לואיס מסר לי אתמול שהחברר לו שהאמריקאים סכמו עם הוצרים שהעתק  
המכתב יובא לידיעתנו. בגלל תקלה לא קבל לואיס את ההנחיה, אלא אחר שהוא  
שאל על כך בווישינגטון.

לואיס ציין בנוסף לנייל פעם נוספת את אשר הוא אמר כבר קודם לכן, דהיינו  
שהאמריקאים יעצו למצרים בעל פה, שמוטב שלא יזדקקו להשתתפות אמריקאית בעבודת  
הת-הועדה שתטפל בהסדרים המעשיים בשטח ושמוטב להשאיר הטפול בסוגיה זו למגעים  
בילאטרליים בין מצרים וישראל.

ב ב ר כ ה,  
חנן בר-און

העתק: השגריר קהיר  
מנהל לשכת שח"ח  
מנהל מתי מצרים  
מנהל מצפ"א

Dolan

RECEIVED, THE SECRETARY OF THE  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20530

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS REVIEWED THE MATTER AND HAS

ADVISED THAT THE MATTER IS BEING HANDLED BY THE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND THAT NO FURTHER ACTION IS

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20530

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20530



**EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**  
Tel Aviv

May 4, 1982


Mr. Hanan Bar-On  
Deputy Director General  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Jerusalem

Dear Hanan:

Further to our conversation yesterday, I am enclosing a copy of Roy Atherton's letter to Boutros Ghali of April 25 on the Taba agreement.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

  
Samuel W. Lewis  
Ambassador



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO THE HONORABLE  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEAR SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, in relation to the matter mentioned therein.

I am sorry to hear that you are unable to visit the United States at this time. I am sure that you will find the information furnished to you by the Bureau of Consular Affairs to be of interest.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,  
Yours truly,  
[Signature]

C O P Y

C O P Y

C O P Y

Cairo, Egypt  
April 25, 1982

Excellency,

I am writing to confirm the two points I made to you in our meeting earlier today with reference to U.S. participation in connection with reaching agreement on the "initial procedure for resolving boundary questions."

First, in our conversations with the Israelis, we have received confirmation that, should Egypt request United States participation as provided for in the document referred to above, Israel will not object to such participation.

Second, the United States interprets the language concerning our participation as relating to the negotiations for an agreed procedure which will achieve the final and complete resolution in conformity with Article VII of the Treaty of Peace, including meetings which will be held to establish the arrangements which will apply in the areas in question, pending the final determination of the boundary demarcation questions. The United States has informed Israel that we are conveying this interpretation to you and they have not objected to this interpretation.

Finally, as Ambassador Stoessel reiterated to President Mubarak during their recent meetings, I also wish to confirm that the United States intends to continue to play its role as a full partner in the peace process.

Sincerely,

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.  
American Ambassador

His Excellency

Boutros Ghali

Minister of State  
for Foreign Affairs

SECRET

1. The purpose of this document is to provide information regarding the activities of the organization in the area of [redacted] and [redacted].

2. The organization has been active in the area of [redacted] and [redacted] since [redacted].

3. The organization has been active in the area of [redacted] and [redacted] since [redacted].

4. The organization has been active in the area of [redacted] and [redacted] since [redacted].

SECRET

SECRET

3  
Israel-Egypt Agreements to be implemented in conjunction with the establishment of the international boundary.

A. Tourism

1. Arrangements for exchange of currency by Israeli tourists visiting Sinai "under study" by Egyptian authorities; reply awaited. (Agreed Minutes, 5 April 1982). Without finalization of appropriate arrangements, Israel tourism in Sinai will be severely hampered, and may possibly not begin.
2. Tour operators to be informed by 25 April 1982 of arrangements for charter flights to Ras al-Naqb after final withdrawal (Agreed Minutes, 17 December 1981).
3. Arrangements for access to Pharaon Island (Coral Island) - High Committee (no Agreed Minutes), 16 March 1982.
4. Correction of all tourist maps distributed officially (Agreed Minutes, 27 October 1981).
5. Ferry-boat service, Ashdod/Haifa - Port Said (details to be worked out in Transportation Committee) (Agreed Minutes, 17 December 1981).
6. Opening of Egyptian Consulate in Eilat "as soon as convenient" (Agreed Minutes, 21 October 1981).
7. Opening of Israeli Consulate in Sharm El-Sheikh.
8. Special permits (e.g. transit visas, transit passes or cards) for time limited visits to Sinai to be issued promptly at the Taba check-point and at airports of Ras el-Naqb, Ras Nasrani and Santa Catherina (High Committee, Agreed Minutes, 27 October 1981).

B. Communications

1. Operation of 4 border check-points (Agreed Minutes of High Committee, 27 October 1981).
2. Operation of a regular bus-line between Tel Aviv - Cairo and Eilat - Sharm El-Sheikh and Eilat - Ras el-Naqb by 25 April and 2 May 1982 respectively. (Add. to Memorandum of Understanding, 17 March 1982).
3. Passage of trucks by 15 April 1982 (Memorandum of Understanding, 18 September 1981).

4. Special entry arrangements from Israel to Southern Sinai  
(Agreed Minutes of High Committee, 27 October 1981)

5. Sharm El-Sheikh as point of entry for people arriving by sea  
(Agreed Minutes of High Committee, 19 January 1982)

6. Opening of central route in Sinai, Ismailia-Nizana  
(Agreed Minutes of High Committee 27/10/81 and 19/1/82) to all vehicles  
including trucks.

C. Civil Aviation

1. Flights between Eilat-Ras Nasrani (Sharm El-Sheikh) and Santa  
Catherina ( Memorandum of Understanding, 5 January 1982).

2. Permission for third countries' charter flights carrying  
Eilat-bound passengers to land at Ras-el-Naqb (Add. to Memorandum  
of Understading, 22 December 1981).

3. Appropriate air traffic services to be rendered to Israeli  
flights en route to East Africa.

4. Coordination between Eilat and Ras el Naqb air fields  
(Memorandum of Understanding, 18 September, 1981 and annex to  
Memorandum of Understading 5 November, 1981)

5 Direct telephone line between Eilat and Ras el-Naqb airfields  
(Add. to Memorandum of Understading, 22 December, 1981)

D. Telecommunications

1. Direct terrestrial telecommunication system between the two  
countries. ( Agreed Minutes , 26 October, 1981 , and Memorandum of  
Arrangements , 3 December 1981). A delay in implementation was already  
reported by Egypt and it was agreed to operate a channel through the  
El-Arish terminal before 25 April (Agreed Minutes, 11 March 1982)

2. Surface mail and parcels by 1 April 1982 ( Agreed Minutes of High Committee 19 January 1982 , and Agreed Minutes 24 March 1982)

3. Telex - 4 additional telex channels, commencing 1 May 1982).

E. Border regime

Appropriate arrangements to be worked out concerning relations in the border area ( High Committee, Agreed Minutes, 27 October, 1981) - still not finalized.

Matters connected with Trade and Commerce ( outstanding since the interim withdrawal and still unresolved)

1. Access to the public sector in Egypt

In violation of the Peace Treaty, and despite agreements signed subsequently, the public sector in Egypt ( about 80 % of the market) remains closed to Israeli trade.

2. Banking

All financial transactions with Egypt are channeled through one bank, the Suez Canal Bank, and this represents a severe impediment on the development of normal trade relations.

In talks between the two Foreign Ministers in Cairo in February 1982 it was agreed that the Governors of the Central Banks of both countries would meet during March to discuss banking problems. The Egyptians have not honoured this agreement, despite reminders from the Israeli side at the Ministerial level.

3. Shipping

The Egyptian Shipping Company, Martrans, has so far not recognized the Israel Zim lines as an authorized carrier, contrary to the understanding reached at the abovementioned meeting of the two Foreign Ministers.

ישיבה ב-24 באפריל בשעה 21.05 במשרדו של בוטרוס גאלי בנוכחות: שטסל, אתרטון, דרייפר מהצד האמריקאי, המנכ"ל והח"מ מהצד הישראלי.

בוטרוס פתח את הישיבה בתאור של פעולותיו אחרי שהושג הסכם "אד רפרנדום" ביום ו' ה-23 דנא (נייר 7 הנקודות ר"ב). בוטרוס אמר שביום ו' הוא דווח משך שלוש שעות לממלא חסן עלי ולאחר מכן לאוסמה אל באז על תוצאות הדיונים ביום ו'. הוא נתקל בבעיות ושאלות רבות במיוחד לגבי סעיף 4 (המשך החיים הנורמליים באזור כולל המלון) של המסמך, לא פרוט הסעיפים הספציפיים של חוזה השלום ואי-הזכרת מקום המסופים. באותו זמן לדברי בוטרוס בילה שאפי שעות רבות עם היועץ המשפטי שהעלה 32 השגות למסמך והציע מסמך חדש לגמרי:

בוטרוס המשיך ואמר שבשבת ה-24 דנא הוא בילה מ-09.00 עד 13.00 בישיבות עם הנשיא מובראק עם רה"מ מצרים, אבו גהצלי, כמל חסן עלי ויושבי ראש האסיפה הלאומית כולל יו"ר ועדת החוץ וועדת החוקה. שיחה זו הייתה לא פשוטה ולקחה זמן רב.

בטיעונים שהוא ועלי הציגו בפני הנוכחים בישיבה הוא טען שהמסמך שהושג ביום ד' הינו מסמך שקול, שהוא תוצאה של "עיסקת חבילה". בישיבה זו הוא לא הציג את התיקונים הישראליים המוצעים.

בשעה 13.00 בערך צלצל לו אתרטון ומסר לו את הנוסח של התיקונים לסעיפי 5 ו-6. עד כמה והוא מבין את התיקונים המוצעים יש להם רק פרוש אחד שישראל איננה רוצה מעורבות אמריקאית כלשהי ב-2 המישורים של המו"מ, דהיינו לא במו"מ להכנת הפשור והבוררות ולא במו"מ לקביעת ההסדרים המעשיים לחיים בטאבה. בוטרוס המשיך ואמר שבתנאים אלה מצרים לא יכולה לקבל את ההצעות.

המנכ"ל בפתיחת דבריו הביע הערכה למאמצים שהושקעו ע"י כולם במו"מ זה. הוא הביע צער על כך שגם ברגע האחרון ישנן עוד בעיות. הוא הדגיש שהמסמך של 7 הנקודות שסוכם ביום ו' סוכם "אד רפרנדום" וזה נעשה על מנת לאפשר לצדדים להציע תיקונים אחרת הרי יכולנו לסיים את המו"מ.

המנכ"ל הדגיש את הערכתנו למאמצי ארה"ב.

לאחר מכן הדגיש המנכ"ל שמצרים וישראל הקימו כבר למעשה את הועדה המשותפת מאחר ושני הצדדים מינו את נציגיהם לוועדה זו, תא"ל דב שיאון מחד ואדמירל חמדי מאידך. פרוש הדבר שועדה זו למעשה כבר קיימת ויכולה להתחיל בעבודתה מיד.

אנו מצידנו ראינו את הועדה הזאת כועדה טכנית בדומה לוועדה צבאית המשותפת שפעלה עד כה. אנו מעולם לא רצינו להקנות לוועדה זו אופי בינלאומי ע"י צרוף גורמים נוספים. אנו חוששים שזה היה מקנה לוועדה אופי שאינו דווקא טכני כפי שהבנו שגם המצרים היו רוצים להקנות לה.

לגבי המו"מ הפרוצדורלי לקראת פשור ובוררות ראוי לציין שרה"מ מצדד מאוד (meticulous) לגבי כל בעיה הקשורה בבעיות משפטיות.

אנו רצינו ורוצים להיות צמודים לסעיף 7 של חוזה השלום וסעיף זה הוא ביסוד בילטרלי. ברור שאין לנו התנגדות לעיצה אמריקאית לפתרון בעיות על בסיס אד הוק.

אך ישנה מאן בעיה של עקרון משפטי, ויש להסתכל על המסמך כ"חבילה" אך ברצוננו להציע שה"חבילה" תהיה גמישה עד כמה שניתן. לגבי הניסוח יש לזכור שישנן כמה דברים שאין ביכולתנו להיות גמישים אודותם.

המנכ"ל הציג לאחר מכן את התיקונים שאנו מציעים הוא אמר שברצוננו שבסעיף 2 יכתב:

These procedures will be agreed on expeditiously and in good faith.

המנכ"ל הדגיש שמשפט זה משקף את דברי רה"מ לשטסל.

These procedures will be conducted on a regular basis and in good faith.

The purpose of this document is to provide information regarding the procedures to be followed in the event of a security breach.

The information contained herein is classified as SECRET and is intended for the eyes of authorized personnel only.

In the event of a security breach, the following procedures should be followed immediately:

1. Notify the appropriate authorities immediately.

2. Isolate the affected system or area.

3. Preserve all evidence and logs.

4. Investigate the cause of the breach.

5. Implement corrective actions to prevent future breaches.

It is the responsibility of all personnel to report any suspicious activity or security breach immediately.

These procedures are subject to change without notice.

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The information contained herein is classified as SECRET and is intended for the eyes of authorized personnel only.

In the event of a security breach, the following procedures should be followed immediately:

יתכן ונוכל להסכים בע"פ על הדברים שהמנכ"ל אמר קודם לכן בענין העצה שכל צד יכול להוועץ באמריקאים על בסיס אד הוק. אם זה אינו מקובל יתכן ונוכל לחפש ניסוחים אחרים. המנכ"ל הדגיש שהוא אינו מוסמך ללכת מעבר לכך. בוטרס הזכיר בתגובתו את מכתבו של הנשיא קרטור מה-26 למרץ 1979 לרה"מ ולטאדאט והקריא את סעיף 2:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on request of one or both the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

בוטרס אמר שמצרים הפעילה את המכתב כפי שישראל הפעילה את המכתב לפני זמן מה. בוטרס המשיך ואמר שביום ו' ה-23 דנא הוסכם על חבילה. מצרים מצידה וויתרה הן בקשר לסוגית "הפשרה" בענין הגבלת הזמן לתהליך הפשור והבוררות והן בענין המלון, והנה הצד הישראלי משנה את החבילה מצידה. לכך אין אפשרות להשיג הסכמה מצרית. שטסל מצידו אמר כי המשלחת האמריקאית הסכימה לנייר 7 הנקודות שסוכם ביום ו' מאחר וחשב אותו כהגון. ארה"ב רואה את תפקידה כשתוף מלא ורוצה להיות לעזר. ברור שהם יהיו מוכנים לשקול כל הצעה אחרת המקובלת על הצדדים. מכל מקום סיים שטסל דבריו ארה"ב רוצה לסייע. בוטרס הגיב באומרו שברור לגמרי מהתיקונים שישראל הגישה, שישראל אינה רוצה מעורבות אמריקאית דבר שמצרים לא יכולה להסכים לו וממשלת מצרים תגיד זאת בפה מלא. המנכ"ל ובר-און הציגו בנקודה זו את התיקונים המציעים על ידינו. בוטרס שמע את התיקונים והם נרשמו אך הגיב שהוא בטוח שאנשיו אינם יכולים לקבל זאת. הוא אמר שהתיקונים הישראליים משנים משהו יסודי מאוד בקשילשתי מערכות המו"מ הוצאתה של ארה"ב מהתהליך אינו מקובל על מצרים בשום פנים ואופן. בפנותו לשטסל אמר בוטרס כי בסיס השיקולים המצריים היו הדברים שנאמרו להם ע"י האמריקאים וזה כלל את המעורבות האמריקאית במקרה הצורך. לאור שינוי העמדה הישראלית אין אפשרות להתקדם. המנכ"ל חזר והסביר עמדתנו והוסיף שנראה לו שיתכן וישנה כאן אי הבנה. רה"מ לא הבין שדובר על השתתפות אמריקאית במו"מ הטכני. בוטרס הגיב ואמר שדווקא את זה הוא הבין מדברי שטסל. המנכ"ל ובר-און חזרו והסבירו את מצב הרוח בארץ ויָאָרו עוד פעם את הטראומה לאור הנעשה בימית שטסל מצידו חזק דברים אלה ע"י תאורו הוא מהאווירה ששררה בישיבת עם רה"מ ביום ו'. האחרון. שטסל כיכ ניסה פעם נוספת להוביל את השיחה לדיון על הנוסחאות השונות. בוטרס הגיב על כך באומרו שלמעשה אין על מה לדבר, למשלחת הישראלית אין מנדאט ואף על פי כן רוצה להכתיב שינויים בסיסיים בגישה כללית. בוטרס עזב את השיחה כדי להתייעץ עם הממונים עליו (הנשיא מובראק וכמל חסן עלי). בשובו לחדר כעבור זמן ניכר למדי הוא הודיע שאין באפשרותו לבוא לקראתנו. יחד עם זאת אמר בהתייחסו להערה של המנכ"ל אשר תהה שמא כדאי שבבוטרס יגיע עוד באותו הלילה ארצה שאם יתברר למחרת בבוקר שאמנם קיימת גמישות בצד הישראלי הוא יהיה מוכן מיד לצאת ארצה לשיחות נוספות. השיחה הסתיימה בחצות.

... in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

... and that the United States will, in the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

20/06

ירושלים, י' באייר התשמ"ב  
3 במאי 1982

ס ו ד י

א ל : המנכ"ל

הנדון: טאבה  
למברקו של השגריר קשהיר נר 471

כזכור, הבריק השגריר ב-27 באפריל שקיימת כניכול חליפת מכתבים בין מצרים לאר"ב בקשר להסכם הזמני על יאבה שנחתם ב-25 באפריל.

שוחחתי היום עם לואיס ושאלתי אוודות ידיעה זו. לואיס אמר שידוע לו שקיים מכתב של אתרסון לבוטרוס שבו פירט אתרסון את הפרוש האמריקאי לגבי שחי שאלות בהסכם כדלקמן:

1. אר"ב מאשרת בפני המצרים שהם מבינים שאם מצרים תבקש מעורבות אמריקאית במו"מ הרי ישראל לא תתנגד לחביעה זו.

2. הסעיף השני מתייחס לסוגיית סעיף 7, דהיינו שמדובר על מו"מ להגיע לפרוצדורה מוסכמת.

הפרוש האמריקאי התבטט על החברות שהמנכ"ל מקר לשטסל בעל פה ב-24 באפריל, למרות שמדבר זה איננו מובן מוזכר במכתבו של אתרסון.

בקשתי מלואיס להעביר לנו העתק מהמכתב - לואיס הבטיח להודיענו אם אפשר עוד היום אם אכן יוכל להעבירנו העתק.

לואיס מסר שהמכתב נכתב ע"י אתרסון בלחצו של בוטרוס שאמר שהוא זקוק למכתב על מנת לשכנע את הנשיא מובארק להסכים לחתימת ההסכם.

לואיס הוסיף שהאמריקאים יעצו למצרים בעל פה לא לעמוד על מעורבות אמריקאית במיוחד בכל הנוגע לתת הועדה המטפלת בעניינים המעשיים.

ב ב ר כ ה,

חנן בר-און

העתק: היועץ המשפטי  
השגריר קהיר  
השגריר וושינגטון  
מנהל לטכסו שה"ח  
מנהל מח' מצרים

RECEIVED, BY CHECK NUMBER  
2 MAY 1951

1951

1951

RECEIVED  
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RECEIVED, BY CHECK NUMBER  
2 MAY 1951

RECEIVED  
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מסודי החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מחוך

דף 1

סודי ביותר

מחוך 12

עומק 1

\*\*אלי: המסוד, נר: 471, מ: קהיר  
\*\*דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 270482, רח: 1000

\*\*סודי ביותר/בהול

\*\*המנכל- לנמטן בלבד. אישי

\*\*מהשגריר

\*\*לעיני המנכל בלבד ללא תפוצה ללא הנחיותיו.  
\*\*אתמול אחר החתימה ניגש אלי טיסמת רידא וסיפר שהוחלט-לפי  
\*\*בקשתנו - שלא לפרסם את המסמך משום שאז היה צורך גם לפרסם  
\*\*חליפה מכתבים נאחד מכל צד) סודיים בין ארהב למצרים שבפרסומם  
\*\*אנו לא דצינו. לא טניתי כמובן דבר. לידעתך. ==

\*\*פ: שהח, טשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, ריבון, מצרים, רובינשטיין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מתוך

דף 1

סודי ביותר

מתוך 2

עוהק 2

אל: המשרד, נר: 507, מ: קהיר

דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 290482, רח: 1200

סודי ביותר/מיד

מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל

מהשגריר

איש בהחלט לנמטן בלבד ללא כל תפוצה.

למנכ"ל המנכ"ל 506. האם אמנם בקשנו אנו שהנוסח לא יפורסם והאם

יש חליפה מכתובים כנאמר במנכ"ל 471. ===

ח: מנכ"ל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* דף 1 מחוך 1 \*\*

\*\* עוזק 6 מחוך 12 סודי ביותר \*\*

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\*\*אל: המשרד, נד: 527, מ: קהיר

\*\*דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 290482, זח: 1600

\*\*נד: מצריים-ארהב

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\*\*סודי ביותר/מיד

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\*\*ממי בראון, המנכ"ל

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\*\*מהשגריר

\*\*

\*\*לנמטן בלבד.

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\*\*1. שלך 516 הצטלבו עם שלי 507.

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\*\*2. כל מה שידוע לי הוא אותו מטפס יחיד שאמר לי עיסמת רידא

\*\*בשלי 471.

\*\*3. אם תצטרך להשתמש במטפס שאמר לי רידא אנא אל תצטט אותו אלא

\*\*תשתדל לטדפל המקור בך שלא יחשדו שהדבר נודע לנו בקהיר. ===

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\*\*פ: שהח, סשהח, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, דיבון, רוזבינשטיין, מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

550

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NY 1

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Handwritten signature/initials

אכ: קהיר, נר: 549, ה: המשרד  
דח: מ, סג: ס, מא: 300482, וח: 1500  
נר: מנרקי רהמ ומובראק

1001/מיד

הסגיר

להלן מוכן מברק מהנשיא מובארק לרהמ' שנטלח בה'שרין בדואר  
הרגיל וכן תשובת רהמ' לנשיא.

אנא העבר התשובה לתעודתה:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN

TEL AVIV

IN THESE HISTORIC MOMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND THE ISRAELI PEOPLE ON THE STEPS YOU TOOK ON THE ROAD TO PEACE. THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WILL OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF OUR RELATIONS AND PAVE THE WAY FOR INCREASED INTERACTION AND INTENSIFIED COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES IN VARIOUS FIELDS.

WHEN WE MET HERE IN CAIRO, WE PLEDGED TO WORK VIGOROUSLY AND TIRELESSLY TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE FOREVER. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BUILD BRIDGES OF CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHEN THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS TO COME. TOGETHER, WE SHALL PROCEED TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF PEACE AND FULFILL OUR COMMITMENT TO A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. WE VIEW THE FUTURE WITH HOPE AND OPTIMISM.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

I AM CERTAIN THAT THROUGH YOUR WISDOM AND VISION, WE WILL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME ALL OBSTACLES AND CREATE A SHINING MODEL FOR ALL NATIONS OF THE REGION. THIS IS OUR HISTORIC MISSION WHICH WE WILL FULFILL WITH DETERMINATION AND FAITH. YOUR PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED BY OUR PEOPLE.  
WITH MY BEST WISHES AND FELICITATIONS.  
MOHAMED HOSNY HUBARAK.

JERUSALEM, APRIL 30, 1982

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. MOHAMMED HOSNY HUBARAK

PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
CAIRO

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR WARM AND MOVING WORDS. DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS, I HAVE REPEATEDLY DECLARED, PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, THAT WE INTEND TO FULFIL OUR COMMITMENT UNDER THE PEACE TREATY 'TO THE DOT AND THE DATE', AND WE DID. WE BOTH KNOW THAT IT WAS NOT EASY. AND I APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT, IN THE LETTER OF APRIL 20, 1982 WHICH YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO ADDRESS TO ME, YOU CONTRIBUTED TO THE REMOVAL OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THEN FACED OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I DO HOPE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE RECIPROCITY IN THE CARRYING OUT OF ALL THE PROVISIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER THE PEACE TREATY WILL BE PERMANENT.

NOW IT IS OUR DUTY TO CONCERN OURSELVES WITH THE FUTURE, AND AS THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS IS CONSUMMATED, IT ONLY AWAITS SCRUPULOUS IMPLEMENTATION.

I THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WE RENEW OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON FULL AUTONOMY FOR THE PALESTINIAN ARABS, INHABITANTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT. OF COURSE, THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS-WHICH, IN

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

MY OPINION, SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE STIPULATIONS CONCERNING THE DEMOCRATIC ELECTION, INAUGURATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY (ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL) - SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CAPITALS OF THE THREE NATIONS INVOLVED.

LET US THEREFORE DECIDE SOON ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS, AT ALL ACCEPTED LEVELS.

MY WIFE JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR BEST WISHES TO YOUR WIFE AND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MENACHEM BEGIN

בן אהרון

מפ: טהח, טטהח, דהמ, סרהמ, טהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, דס, אמחן,  
ממ, דיבון, מצריס, רובינסטיין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מל: ווט, קהיר, נר: חזום 361, מ: המשך  
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 300482, וח: 1530

1071/מידי

השגריר

INITIAL PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING - M. להלן הערות ל-  
BOUNDARY QUESTIONS

שנתמה ביום 25.4.82 בין ישראל למצרים בטעות ארה"ב.  
נ. למסמך קדם מומי ממושך שטיקרו תביעת מצרים כי הסכסוך הקיים  
בקשר לחמש עשרה נקודות הגבול (ובמיוחד זו של טאבה) ייחסר  
לנדרות לפי סעיף 2) לחוזה השלום סיפא, כי לסיום הליכי  
הנדרות ייקצב מועד מראש, וכי על לסיומה יוקפאו החיים בשטח  
המחלוקת בטאבה, ועמדת ישראל היתה כי ניתן להמשיך במומ' (סעיף  
2) אך אם זה מס, הצעתנו היא ללכת לפישור (CONCILIATION)  
(סעיף 2) רישא. אין מקום לקבוע מועד מראש לסיום ההליך,  
ואם לא יעלה יפה נ ואין חובה לקבל את תוצאתו) ניתן יהיה  
לשקול בנדרות. בינתיים על החיים בטאבה להימשך במסלולם הקיים  
כהחוף, כפר הנופש, המלונות.  
2. בסיומו של המומ' נחתם (ברגע האחרון) המסמך המציב, ולהלן  
הערות לחוכנו:-

א. ההסכם אינו נוגע, כאמור, לטאבה בלבד אלא לכל חמש עשרה  
הנקודות השנויות במחלוקת ושפרטיהן בידי הועדה המשותפת נמערבת  
הקיסור) הצבאית.  
ב. הסכסוך הוגדר - על ידי דוברים משני הצדדים - בייטכניי  
הואיל והגבול הבינלאומי ביסודו כשלעצמו אינו שנוי במחלוקת  
אלא נקבע בסעיפי חוזה השלום 2) ו-1, ולכן השאלה היא של  
סימונו בלבד: המצרים רצו לאווכר את הסעיפים הללו במפורש, אך  
בעקבות התנגדותנו להוכיר דווקא סעיפים אלה הוסכם על הנוסח של  
ALL THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS המופיע בהסכם.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE THROUGH  
NEGOTIATIONS

שנמשפט השני עניינו בדלקמן: המצרים טענו מזה זמן כי המומ',  
שהוא השלב הראשון ליישוב סכסוכים לפי סעיף 7 לחוזה השלום,  
2) - כבר מוצה, ויש לעבור לשלב הבא 2), שהוא פישור או  
בנדרות.

אנו סברנו כי לכאורה טרם מוצה המומ', אך רהמי אמר שסם סבורים  
המצרים כי מוצה, לא נתנגד לעבור לשלב הבא, אך דרישתנו כי יהא  
זה פישור.

הניסוח שהושג (HAVE BEEN UNABLE) מאפשר לכאורה עדיין גם  
להמשיך מומ', לפיכך גם לא הסכמנו, במשפט הבא, לקבוע כי העניין  
ייפטר - כתביעת המצרים - לפי סעיף 2) ועמדנו על כך (והדבר  
גם הושג) שבהסכם ייוכר סעיף 7 בלי לציין סעיף המשנה הרלבנטי  
2)2).

אין פרוש הדבר, ככל הנראה, שיתקיים בהמשך מומ' נוסף לפי  
2)2), שכן בשיחות נאמר כאמור למצרים מפי גורמינו הבכירים, כי  
אם סבורים הם שהמומ' מוצה - ניתן לעבור לשלב הבא, שלשיטתנו  
הוא פישור. מן הצד האחר, ברור - מטבעו של הליך פישור -  
ששניים בהחלט להיות בו מאמצי תיווך של המפשרים שיהיה בהם  
אמנאם ניכר של מומ'.  
הוסכם כי הסכסוך ייחסר איפוא לפרוצדורה מוסכמת לפי סעיף  
7, ומן הטעם יהא זה 2)2).

ד. עד להסכם הסופי, הוסכם - בשיחות המדיניות בדרגים הבכירים  
- כי עד ליישוב המחלוקת תיסוג ישראל עד לקו שאליה טוענת  
מצרים (הקו הצפוני) ואילו המשטרה המצרית המצויה באזור ג' א  
בטיני תגיע עד לקו שאליה טוענת ישראל (הדרומי). הכוח  
הרב-לאומי התבקש לקיים את הבטחון באזור. משמעות המונח  
ייבטחוני (SECURITY) טרם נדונה והוגדרה, וניתן  
לראותה הן כמשמיעה 'בטחון חוצי' והן כמשמיעה 'סדר  
ציבורי'. הובהר עם המצרים בשיחות עם גאלי במהלך המומ'  
2)2) כי אין זה חלק מאיזור א או ס אלא הכמיר נמצא  
עם מכוח הסכם מיוחד. גאלי עצמו אמר ואת מפורשות, להמשמעות  
המוויקת והפרטים אמורים להיקבע במומ' שבו יוסדרו פרטיהם של  
החיים בתקופת הביניים - ראה להלן.  
מומ' זה יקבע גם את הצדדים המשפטיים הקשורים בכניסה למקום,  
בשמירה על הסדר, בחוק הנוהג, במיסוי וכיוצא באלה שאלות  
פרקטיות בעלות חשיבות רבה.

ה. ואולם, בינתיים הושגה - חרף העמדה המצרית השלילית - הסכמה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ACTIVITIES כי ב- ייתקופת הביניים יימשכו פעילויות שנערכו (THAT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED)  
בשטחים אלה

הפעילויות שבהן מדובר הן באיזור טאבה נ לא בשאר נקודות  
המחלוקת, ומספרן שלוש: כפר הנופש של נלסון, החוף והמלון  
הנבנה.

ברור כי ההסכם מאפשר המשך בניית המלון. עם השלמתו תתעורר  
שאלת הפתיחה. עמדתנו תהיה, כי הפעילות שהיתה עד כה כללה  
בניית מלון לא כדי שיעמוד על תלו סגור, שהרי איש אינו בונה  
מלון כדי שלא ייפתח, ומאילא ההסכם לפי פירושונו כולל פתיחת  
המלון.

יחד עם זאת הוסכם ככתוב, כי לא יהיו פרויקטים חדשים של בניה  
כלשהיא בשטח נמנה לחשש המצרי ל'בניה זוחלת', כביכול.

ו. נקבע כאמור הסדר לדיונים בין מצרים לישראל בקשר להסדרי  
תקופת הביניים, אם כי הובן שהאמריקאים יוכלו להשתתף גם באלה  
עם יתבקשו.

בהסדר זה ייקבעו העניינים הפרקטיים השונים - משפט, סדר  
ציבורי, מיסוי ועוד.

ז. בכל המכלול הפרוצדורלי של המשך התהליך יהיה מומ' עם  
המצרים בהשתתפות האמריקאים (אם יתבקשו על ידי הצדדים), לשם  
סימון סופי של הגבול לפי חוזה השלום. דומה שבכוונת  
האמריקאים, ככל הנראה, לבוא בהצעות פרוצדורליות, אך טרם  
קבלנו מידע ממשי על כך.

עמדה ישראל, המנוססת על סעיף 2), היא - כאמור - כי השלב  
הבא יהיה פישור (המופיע גם ראשון בסדר הדברים בסעיף 2)2).  
5. הסיפא של ההסכם היא 'שמירת זכויות' של הצדדים, שלפיה  
ההסדרים של תקופת הביניים לא ישנו את מעמדם בסכסוך. בשולי  
הסיפא יש להעיר, כי אין בכך מבחינתנו לכאורה כדי להנוע אותנו  
מלפטון בהליכים טיעונים בקשר למקופה שקדמה להסדר זה.

6. בכוא העת נוריעכם מחשבותינו לגבי ההליך.

רונינטטיין.

מ: שח, טשה, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן,  
מח, מצפא, ריבון, מצרים, רונינטטיין, משפט, ומיר  
חח: תאל שיאון ועדה משותפת

~'3 ~

Talking Paper:

1. The problems and preoccupations which we are faced with are what might occur after April 25th. The situation which might arise is that Egypt, in spite of present intentions, will find itself under increasing pressures, externally and internally, to change course and look for alternative political solutions.

2. One of the most important barriers against any such development and the sudden appearance of alternative schemes, such as the Fahd plan and/or some combination of it with the Venice Declaration, is a clear understanding between the US and ourselves of some of the more fundamental positions which underlie our relations.

3. We believe that it would be timely to reiterate the following points which constitute the understandings and assumptions common to both of our Governments.

- a) The US Government sees itself committed to continue its active support and participation in the peace process as laid down in the Camp David framework also after April 1982. US participation and support of the process means that the US Government will not lend its support to alternative plans except after thorough consultations and coordination with the Government of Israel.

We would therefore suggest that the Governments of the US and Israel consider the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, signed at Camp David to be the sole agreed upon and therefore viable means of achieving a final settlement of the Middle East conflict and will accordingly refrain from consideration of, and oppose any initiative aimed at altering or replacing it, or otherwise detrimental to it.

The Governments of the United States and Israel stress the importance of the continued negotiations, without preconditions and interruptions, on the implementation of the above-mentioned Framework.

The Government of the United States will consult in advance and will make every effort to concert with Israel, on an ongoing basis with respect to any ideas which it may wish to explore with other States concerning the peace process and its progress.

The Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt constitutes a major contribution to the achievement of peace and stability in the region and to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Government of the United States re-affirms its undertaking to promote full observance and to prevent violation of that Treaty of Peace, and to ensure the maintenance of an acceptable multi-national force and observers as an alternative to the United Nations Forces and Observers.

The Government of the United States will oppose, and if necessary vote against any action or resolution in the United Nations which in its judgement adversely affects the Treaty of Peace.

The Governments of the United States and Israel reiterate the commitments in the Memorandum of Agreement between them signed on March 26, 1979. In addition, the two Governments will view with particular gravity any action directed to weakening the nature of the diplomatic and other relations between Egypt and Israel in implementation of the Treaty of Peace between them.

- b) It goes without saying that the basis for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is embodied in the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
- c) It is in our opinion imperative that also in the future the US Government will continue to oppose the strengthening of the rejectionist front and therefore it will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy on this issue with the Government of Israel prior to and during the course of any negotiations or discussion in any international or bilateral forum.

Without prejudice to the above, the Government of the United States takes note of Israel's position that it will not negotiate with the organization known as the PLO.

- d) The issue of freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran remains a crucial point on which we would seek to consult fully and where we believe that the position of the US Government plays a vital role. In this connection, we believe that the question of the islands of Tiran and Sanapin is of particular importance. We will give some of the legal aspects

separately, but it might be worthwhile to point out that there exists also a possibility to use this issue in order to achieve some tie between Saudi Arabia and the peace process. We believe that there might be a possibility to obtain Saudi (and eventually Jordanian) recognition of the principles relating to freedom of passage through the Straits embodied in the relevant articles of the Treaty of Peace (Article V and Article VI of the Military Annex).

Such recognition might eventually lead to the establishment of an "area of peace" in the Gulf of Eilat.

- e) I believe that the US will also in the future, take note of the position of the Government of Israel according to which that Government will oppose any action towards the establishment of an Arab States west of the Jordan River.

4. We believe that it might be useful to incorporate these and other points in a more formal document summarizing the positions of our two Governments. Such a document should also incorporate some economic and security aspects connected with the withdrawal and the situation which we envision to occur.

הצעה בענין הטיפול במחלוקות הגבול טאבה ושאר הנקודות

ועדה בין-משרדית בראשות משה"ח ובהשתתפות משה"ט תפקח על המו"מ וההליכים.  
~~משרדים נוספים ישתתפו בנושאים ספציפיים לפי הצורך (פנים ומשפטים למשל - ראה לפרט)~~  
ועדה ~~בין-משרדית~~ זו תמנה שתי ועדות משנה? -

בראש ועדת המשנה לניהול המו"מ עם המצרים (בהשתתפות ארה"ב ככל הנראה) על ההליך ליישוב הסכסוך יעמוד היועץ המשפטי של משה"ח וישתתף בה ~~המשרד~~ <sup>המשרד</sup> ~~אך~~ <sup>אם</sup> (מאחר והסכמנו לראות את שלב המו"מ כשלב שמוצה ההנחיה לוועדה תהיה כי בהליך הבא נסכים רק כי השלב הבא יהיה פיזור, ובוררות אנו עשויים לשקול רק אם תוצאת הפיזור תידחה ע"י אחד הצדדים). השלב הראשון בעבודה יהא איפוא קביעת הפרוצדורה, ולאחר מכן ניסוח המחלוקות וקביעת חברי ועדת הפיזור (השאלה כיצד ייערך הטיעון הישראלי תידון לקראת ההליך).  
במסגרת זו תפקח ~~הועדה~~ <sup>גם</sup> על איסוף החומר הישראלי, ותקבל מן הרשויות הצבאיות את החומר שנאסף עד כה, וכן תשקול איסוף חומר מארכיונים שונים.

ועדת משנה של הועדה בראשות נציג מערכת הבטחון תעסוק במו"מ על החיים באיזור המחלוקת עד להכרעה הסופית.

לצורך כל נושא יהיה מקום לשקול אילו משרדי ~~ממשלה~~ <sup>ממשלה</sup> נוספים ישתתפו.



הצעה בענין הטיפול במחלוקות הגבול טאבה ושאר הנקודות

- א. ועדה בין-משרדית בראשות משה"ח ובהשתתפות משהב"ט תפקח על המו"מ וההליכ"ם. משרדים נוספים ישתתפו בנושאים ספציפיים לפי הצורך (פנים ומשפטים למשל - ראה להלן).
- ב. הועדה תנהל את המו"מ עם המצרים (בהשתתפות ארה"ב ככל הנראה) על ההליך ליישוב הסכסוך. (ההנחיה לועדה תהיה כי בהליך הבא - אם ההנחה היא כי אם שלב המו"מ מוצה - נסכים רק כי השלב הבא יהיה פישור ובוררות אנו עשויים לשקול רק אם תוצאת הפישור תידחה ע"י אחד הצדדים). השלב הראשון בעבודה יהא איפוא קביעת הפרוצדורה, ולאחר מכן ניסוח המחלוקות וקביעת חברי ועדת הפישור (השאלה כיצד ייערך הטיעון הישראלי תידון לקראת ההליך).
- ג. במסגרת זו תפקח הועדה גם על איסוף החומר הישראלי, ותקבל מן הרשויות הצבאיות את החומר שנאסף עד כה, וכן תשקול איסוף חומר מארכיונים שונים.
- ד. ועדת משנה של הועדה בראשות נציג מערכת הבטחון תעסוק במו"מ על החיים באיזור המחלוקת עד להכרעה הסופית.
- ה. לצורך כל נושא יהיה מקום לשקול אילו משרדי ממשלה נוספים ישתתפו.



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Handwritten notes:*  
10/28/82 / WJ  
10/28/82 / WJ

*Handwritten:*  
10/28/82

April 28, 1982

Dear David:

I deeply appreciated your untiring efforts to bring about a solution to the problems we faced. Without your skillful and courageous efforts in Egypt and Jerusalem there would have been no resolution possible.

You, Hanan and Eli gained the unreserved respect and admiration of your Egyptian and American colleagues. Despite the remaining gaps, I believe we together helped protect the broader interests of the peace process and, in particular, the harmony of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

It was good to work with you and your colleagues. The course ahead will not be easy but I am confident that strengthening the peace between Israel and Egypt deserves our best efforts.

Please convey my thanks and warm good wishes to both Hanan and Eli.

Sincerely,

*Handwritten signature:*  
Walter

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Mr. David Kimche,  
Director General of the Foreign Ministry,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: המשרד, נד: 469, מ: קה"ד  
רת: ב, סג: ס, חא: 260482, זח: 2000

*Handwritten signature*

אל: המנכ"ל, רובינשטיין

מאת: השגריר

סודי ביותר/בהול לצפול

1. נוכחתי במסגרת החתימה בשנת 1930 על ידי שאפיט, טבדול חטי"ד וכן שטסל בער.
2. שטסל מסר לי המקוד שלנו אמבירו בדיפ.
3. אחר החתימה הוזמן שטסל על ידי בוטרנס לשיחה קצרה בארבע ע"ניים.
4. אחר שיחה זו הוזמנתי גם לבוטרוס לשיחה קצרה בארבע ע"ניים.
5. לפני כן מסרו לי הנצרים מסוכס טאכס שהמסמך עצמו יאמר סודי וכי הם יוציאו הודעה קצרה לעתונות הכוללת עיקרי הנקודות.
6. מסר יעץ שגם הוא וגם אני נאמר לעתונאים שאנו שמחים שהגענו להסכם מבלי להכנס לפרטים, אני מניח שכך הוא עשהנהוא יצא לעתונאים לבדו מיד אחר צאתו מבוטרנס ומכל מקום כך נהגתי אני בהשאיירי לכנס להחליט מה ואם לפרסם.
7. עסקת ריזא שאל אותי האם התייצבנו בנד על הקו החדש במוסבס, עניתי שאינני יודע, ביקש מכל מקום שאבד"ק בהולות על כך שהם חתמו.
8. על השיחה הקצרה עם בוטרנס לחוד. ===

תפ: שהה, סשה, רהמ, סרהה, שהבט, מנבל, טמנבל, ר/מרכו, רס, אטן,  
די בון, מצרים, רובינשטיין

משרד החוץ-מוזלכת הקשר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* ייצוא

שמו

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אל: קהיר, וויט, תלש, נר: חוום 80, מ: המשרד  
דח: ב, סג: ש, תא: 260482, וח: 1000  
נד: הסכם הגבול

6-10

שמו/בהול טפל.

שון - בהול/טפל.

דע- ארנס/וויט/נגטון.

תאיל שיאון.

הסכם מחלוקת הגבול.

ג-130 ס נחתם ההסכם, מחילה בראשי תיבות נעיי בר-און ומורמד  
בעזות דרייפר) ואחר-כך בחתימה מלאה על ידי המנכ"ל בעדות  
סטטל.

חתימה מלאה מצריח תיווסף על ידי שאפעי עבד אל-חמיד היום.  
(סטטל יצא זה עתה מצרימה).

נדאי שתייה נוכח, אם תוכל, בעת חתימת עבד אל-חמיד. סוכם כי  
תקבל לידך את המקור החתום שבידי האמריקאים לאחר שייחתם על  
ידי.  
הנוסח והה למה שהבריך בר-און אתמול.  
רובינסטיין.

פ: שה, סשה, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכ, מאנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן.  
מח, דיבון, רובינסטיין, מצרים, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* 8638

\*\* \*\* מצא

סודי ביותר

מתוך 2 עמק 6  
מתוך 14 עמק 6

Handwritten notes in a circle: 266, 3-2

מל: קהיר, נוש, נר: חוום 62, מ: המשרד  
דח: ב, סג: מ, מא: 250482, זח: 1630  
נד: טאבה

סודי ביותר/בהול

השגריר

טאבה

ולהלך טיוטת ההסכם עם מצרים שאושרה היום ע"י הממשלה והוגשה למצרים לאשור סופי.

\*\* INITIAL PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING BOUNDARY QUESTIONS \*\*  
\*\* EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR \*\*  
\*\*RESOLVING THE REMAINING TECHNICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE \*\*  
\*\*INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, IN CONFORMITY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT \*\*  
\*\*PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE, WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN \*\*  
\*\*UNABLE TO RESOLVE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. EGYPT AND ISRAEL \*\*  
\*\*AGREE THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AN AGREED \*\*  
\*\*PROCEDURE WHICH WILL ACHIEVE A FINAL AND COMPLETE \*\*  
\*\*RESOLUTION, IN CONFORMITY WITH ARTICLE VII OF THE TREATY OF \*\*  
\*\*PEACE. PENDING CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY \*\*  
\*\*AGREES TO MOVE BEHIND THE LINES INDICATED BY THE OTHER. THE \*\*  
\*\*PARTIES AGREE TO REQUEST THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND \*\*  
\*\*OBSERVERS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THESE AREAS. IN THE \*\*  
\*\*INTERIM PERIOD, ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN \*\*  
\*\*THESE AREAS SHALL CONTINUE. NO NEW CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS \*\*  
\*\*WILL BE INITIATED IN THESE AREAS. MEETINGS WILL BE HELD \*\*  
\*\*BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO ESTABLISH THE ARRANGEMENTS \*\*  
\*\*WHICH WILL APPLY IN THE AREAS IN QUESTION, PENDING A FINAL \*\*  
\*\*DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARY DEMARCATION \*\*  
\*\*QUESTIONS. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT \*\*

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

מתוך 2 עמק 6  
מתוך 14 עמק 6

בראון

מפ: שהח, טשהח, מנככ, מהנככ, רהמ, טהבט, רובי נשטיין, דיבון

TOP SECRET

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AND UNDER-SECRETARY STOESEL,  
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, JERUSALEM, APRIL 22, 1982, at 9.00 A.M.

PRESENT: Draper, Lewis, Brown, Ned Walker, Ben-Matt, <sup>Kimche</sup> Rubinstein, Dan Merridor, Bar-On,  
Avner, Porth.

Stoessel: I come mainly to talk about Taba. We met with the Defence Minister yesterday afternoon. He told us about the air strike yesterday. We were reassured to hear that they were limited to PLO targets only, and that there is no intention to widen the conflict. Washington has tried to be very careful in its reaction, urging restraint and focusing on the importance of maintaining the cessation of hostilities. We have been in touch with all our embassies in the whole area urging the same thing. All the parties with whom we have been in touch indicate that they do not want escalation. Syria, too, seems not to want to escalate unless Israel does.

PM: I would like to comment on what happened yesterday and on what may and may not happen in the future. Several weeks ago there were rumours around the world that Israel was going "invade" Southern Lebanon. I told Ambassador Lewis: "No decision was taken by the Cabinet to enter Lebanon." and I added: "But take note and inform the Secretary and the President that we will not allow the shedding of Jewish blood and permit those responsible to enjoy impunity." We exercised what I believe was over-restraint. There was the Sergeant killed in Gaza, A PLO spokesman in Beirut claimed responsibility and then denied. There was the Druse Policeman who was stabbed in the back and died. There was a diplomat in Paris who was killed. There was a member of our Security Services who lost a leg. Explosives have been planted in many <sup>spots</sup> but they were discovered and dismantled. There were two terrorists whom we caught as they crossed the Jordan loaded with weapons and explosives. And yet, despite all this, we didn't do anything. But there is a limit. I am sure my words to Sam were faithfully reported by him. And <sup>then</sup> a young officer was killed. Allow <sup>me</sup> to say something subjective as a human being. There is always a difference when you hear of a man killed and you don't know him and when you hear of one killed whom you do know. The 21-year old officer who was killed is the grandchild of one of my most beloved friends. I know the whole family. I was at his Brith. What I say is a subjective feeling and is, of itself, no reason to make certain decisions. And then there was that other officer who was killed and wounded by a mine. Mr. Secretary, this week we commemorated our Holocaust Memorial Day. On Memorial eve I saw a film (Arthur Cohn's 'The Final Solution'), an hour-and-a-half documentary made of actual original German <sup>footage</sup>. The film showed people at the last moment fighting not for life but for human dignity. Thousands and thousands and thousands marching - men, women and children. I always see before me the picture of a little boy raising his hand, his mother looking on, as the German murderer aims his gun at him. One-and-a-half million of such little children. They had nothing to defend themselves. Nobody came to their rescue.

I spoke to Mrs. Thatcher and out of the blue she said to me: "Mr. Prime Minister, if I had been Prime Minister in those days and had to choose between winning the war and bombing Ashwitz I would have chosen winning the war." I answered that in 1944 the war was already lost. The allies were ~~xxxx~~ sending a thousand bombers over Germany a night. Germany had already lost the war. What difference would it have made to send forty-sixty bombers to destroy the railway lines to Aushwitz. Hundred of thousands of lives would have still been saved. I told her you could have delayed the massacre. And now, just three days ago, we ~~xxxx~~ had Holocaust Day. When I met Sam for the first time five years ago, I told him, it will never happen again. We will not allow the shedding of Jewish blood and grant the killers impunity. We don't want to hurt anybody. If we are left in peace there will be peace. If not we will look for them wherever they are. Our Chief of Staff said yesterday, if they is quiet and calm then there will be quiet and calm from our side. Otherwise, we shall hit back harder than yesterday. If they shell our civilian population we may decide to enter Lebanon. We want you, our best friends, to know exactly the line of our policy. The cessation of hostilities has been broken scores of times. We have exercised maximum restraint. But there is a limit. If they carry out attacks we shall counter-attack. If they again shell our Northern townships we will have no other option but to try and destroy their infrastructure. This would, of course, be a Cabinet decision. Let Habib - he has unique ways of operating - try and forewarn them. If there will be peace on their side, there will be peace on our side. We do not contemplate entering Lebanon as I told your Ambassador.

Lewis: We conveyed that message we received last night from Arik. Thus far, the PLO has given orders not to initiate action. Syria assured us that they do not want to widen the conflict and will exercise maximum restraint. Your reassurances are very helpful.

PM: Thank you. Let's hope for the best.

Stoessel: From all these concerns, to go back to Taba seems inappropriate.

PM: Yet life must go on.

Foreign Minister: In Taba (laughter).

Stoessel: About Taba I think it is important to solve at least the general ~~xxxx~~ outline if we can before April 25th so that everything can go smoothly on that day. I am impressed that a great deal has been done on the question and there is already general agreement on the basic outline. Your contribution to this has been great. The remaining kernel of the problem is Mubarak's desire for his own reason to have a time-frame for the settlement of conciliation and arbitration. Last night the Defence Minister made clear his own view. He is opposed to a time-frame. He wants to go forth on conciliation and arbitration but without time-frame. We have thought of some alternative ways and we would like to submit them to you this morning. Essentially, we have three possible ways of approaching conciliation and arbitration. The first is, the parties would agree to submit the dispute to conciliation/arbitration.



PM: We shall leave it to the sub-committee. The main points are accepted. Only the question of ~~people~~ people staying overnight, that should not be prohibited.

(PM receives telephone call from Sharon)

PM: That was Sharon on the phone. He was in Yamit. There is now a horrible tragedy taking place there. There is horrendous violence. Our soldiers are being attacked with stones, sticks and bottles. Our soldiers are unarmed and our girl soldiers are weeping, crying, Children are lying in ~~front~~ front of buses and they won't move even when they are sprayed with water. The commander had to remove Prof. <sup>Ne'eman</sup> from the area. He is a member of the Knesset and the commander says that he has been inciting. He said Gula Cohen has done much <sup>to</sup> calm the situation. We have 5000 soldiers to remove 1000 civilians. They are being attacked but our soldiers do not raise a hand. This has never happened in <sup>the</sup> history of any nation before. We were attacked, we won the wars, we are voluntarily withdrawing, Arik says nobody who is not in Yemát this morning would believe what is happening there. He was very outspoken. He asks me to ask you to try with the Egyptians to accept the proposal without a time-limit. Let the only proposal be conciliation/arbitration and urge to accept. The sub-commission will decide on normal life. Arik was very emotional and expresses strong opposition to a time limit. ~~Having~~ Having now heard Arik, I have to withdraw my previous remarks (on <sup>the</sup> second proposal). Let the original proposal stand. You yourself said it was forthcoming.

Stoessel: I will work on it as hard as I can.

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Meeting adjourned at 9.45 A.M.  
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U-6 23/1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3667

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שמוך

א.ב.ק

מל: המשרד, נד: 155, מ: לונדון  
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 220482, יח: 1630  
נד: מאבה

שטורקמידי

מצרים

שמוך

מאבה. דו"ח קופטן מוון 29.5.1906  
אחרנו ומטבירים בדיפ' שיצא אליכנס היום. להלן קטע מהדו"ח:

FROM WHAT WE SAW TO-DAY , I THINK WE CAN WITHOUT ANY LOSS TO OURSELVES GIVE THE TURKS THE NAKB-EL-AKABA , PROVIDED WE HOLD THE HEAD OF IT - IF WE HOLD THE HEAD WE COMMAND THE SITUATION . OUR FRONTIER LINE , I THINK , WILL THEN RUN ALONG THE RIDGE NORTH OF TABA IN A NOERHWELY DIRECTION TILL IT REACHES A PROMINENT HILL ( WHICH WE HAVE NAMED JEBEL IBRAHIM ) ABOUT 1,000 YARDS FROM THE HEAD OF THE NAKB-EL-AKABA , AND FROM THENCE TO THE HEAD OF THE PASS AND EDGE OF THE PLATEAU . FROM GEBEL IBRAHIM AND FROM THE EDGE OF THE PLATEAU AT THE HEAD OF THE PASS WE COULD BRING A CROSS FIRE ( IF EVER NECESSARY ) TO BEAR ON ANY FORCE THAT ATTEMPTED TO ADVANCE UP THE NAKB -EK -AKABA , AND MAKE ANY SUCH AN ADVANCE ALMOST AN IMPOSSIBILITY . THE LINE WILL PROBABLY THEN CONTINUE ALONG THE EDGE OF THE PLATEAU TOWARDS MASHASH -EL-KANTILLA , AND SO ON EAST OF KASSIMA . THIS LATTER PART IS ONLY A CONJECTURE , BUT I GATHER , FROM WHAT RASCHDI PASHA AND THE TURKISH COMMISSIONERS SAY , NAMELY , THAT AS LONG AS THEY HAVE THE NAKB-EL-AKABA , AKABA IS SECURE FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW , AND WHAT HAPPENS AS REGARDS THE REST OF THE ROAD THEY CARE LITTLE . . . . . WE , OF COURSE , KEEP TABA , RUNNING THE BOUNDARY LINE IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO POSITIOOTNNH


משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THAT NO POSITION CAN COMMAND THE WADI-EL-TABA, WHICH WILL BE OUR ROAD DOWN TO TABA AND SO TO THE GULF OF AKABA.

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מילוא

תפ: מצרים  
תח: תאל שיאון (בנפרד)





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*\* 6387

\*\* \*\* יוסי

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סודי ביותר

מחוך 6  
דף 1  
עותק 15 מתוך 34

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*Handwritten notes:*  
אגודת  
ישראל

\*\*מל: ווש, קהיר, נר: חוום 628, מ: המשרד  
\*\*דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 200482, וח: 0100  
\*\*נד: פגישת בגין-חסן עלי

\*\*מייד/סודי ביותר

\*\*השגריר וושינגטון, קהיר.

\*\*פגישת רהמי בגין- כמאל חסן עלי

\*\*להלן סיכום עקרי הדברים בשיחות בהן השתתפו שר הבטחון, שר  
\*\*החוץ, בוטרוס גאלי, סגן שהח', המנכ"ל ושגרירי מצרים וישראל,  
\*\*ואחרים.  
\*\*סטנוגרמה תישלח בנפרד בהקדם.

\*\*נתקיימו שתי פגישות: האחת לפני ארוחת הצהרים והשניה לאחריה.

1. שהח' עלי עמד על החשיבות שמייחס לשיחות לאחר הישגי שלוש  
\*\*השנים מאז החתימה על הסכם השלום, בחתימה על מערכת של  
\*\*הסכמים, לל כ-40 במספר, המכסים את שטחי שתפי בין שתי המדינות.  
\*\*ה-25.4 יחשב כהתחלת היישום המלא של ההסכם ותחילתה של  
\*\*הנורמליזציה המלאה, וכתחילתו של מאמץ איתן במומי לאוטונומיה.

\*\*שרון העלה, בעת ביקורו במצרים, בעיות: בינהן הפרות הפרוטוקול  
\*\*הצבאי.

\*\*מימצאי הס. פ. מ. מאשרים שהנספח הצבאי להסכם השלום מקויים  
\*\*במלואו. יתכן והיו אי הבנות אי פה אי שם, אך לא היתה כוונה  
\*\*להפרות. תיקוני ההפרות מבוצעים ברוח טובה, והכר"ים שיחל  
\*\*במילוי תפקידו החל ב-25.4 ימצא לפניו מפה נקייה.

2. לגבי הברחת נשק ושתי'פי פעלה מצרים ברצינות למניעת  
\*\*ההברחות ונעצרו אנשים עם נשק וחומרי חבלה.

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מתוך 6

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סודי ביותר

הביע שביעות רצונו להתחלה לחילופי מידע בתחום זה ודבר זה יימשך.

3. על נאום עבד אלמג'יד למד עלי שזה התפרש בצורה לא נכונה. יסוד לדון אותו גם מהאספקטים החיוביים שלו. לראשונה שלא היה ג'ינוי לק.ד. בתנועת הבלתי מזדהות, לראשונה שנושא הכר'ים הוסר מסדר היום. לראשונה שמצרים קראה להכרה הדדית במדינה ערבית. לאחר שדברי עבד אלמג'יד פורשו בצורה לא נכונה יצא הוא (עלי) למחדת בהצהרה שמצרים קשורה לק.ד., לשיחות האוטונומיה וכי אין שינוי במדיניותה.

התייחס לרגישות שמגלה ישראל בשלב זה והצהרות מצד שרים בישראל נגד הנסיגה, באומרו שעתה מחובתנו לטהר האווירה ולסלול הדרך לכיסים הידידותיים ויישום כל ההסכמים, ונראה לעולם שק.ד. חי ושיחות האוטונומיה נמשכות.

4. רוהמי בגין עמד על התופעה המדאיגה של הברחות הנשק. הסכם השלום משמעו גבולות פתוחים ושקטים ויהיה זה אבסורד אם לאחר חתימת הסכם השלום הגבול ביננו יטוף דם, יוברח נשק ואנשי אשפי' ישליכו רימונים על אנשינו. מכך עשויה להפתח מלחמת גרילה ואולי אף מלחמה גדולה. אם מדינה רוצה לסגור הגבול ולמנוע הברחת נשק הדבר ניתן בידיה. ירדן עשתה זאת. אנו מבקשים מכם שתעשו כמיטב יכלתכם בעניין זה. אנו רוצים לסמוך עליכם ועל הבטחות הנשיא מובארך שאכן הברחות הנשק יפסקו.

5. מכאן עבר רהמי להפרות הנספח הצבאי באזורי סיני השונים ונושאי הפרוץ.

הנשיא סאדאת הבין בומנו שאם יהיה שלום תקבל מצרים את סיני אך היא לא תקבלו אם סיני תהיה מלאה ברכווי צבא. כי סיני שמשו פעמיים בסיס לתקיפת ישראל. כן עלינו לשמור על כך כשאלה של עקרון ולא כשאלה המבדילה בין הפרות קטנות וגדולות.

6. עלי הסכים כי השאלה עקרונית ומען שעיפי' ממצאי ס.פ.י.מ' ההפרות תוקנו בהבטיחו שאלה לא יקרו בעתיד. לשם כך אף הציע הקמת קו שלפון ישיר (קו חמ) בין שר הבטחון שרון לשר ההגנה אבו גזאלה.

7. שר הבטחון שרון ציין שעדיין ישנן הפרות שיש לתקנן ואכן וובר על כך בישיבה שנתקיימה לאחר מכן ובה פרט האלוף שגיא הפרות אלה.

9. בהמשך, בתייחסו לנושא המדיני חוד רוהמי בגין לנאומו של עבד אלמג'יד בכונית, במנותו אחת לאחת את עשרה (11)

781

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* הנקודות שמסמעותן נפרט לנקודה חיונית אחת על הכרה הדדית בין

\*\* הערבים לישראל, אינה אלא תכנית לתחילת השמדתה של מדינת

\*\* ישראל. על מצרים להבין שלא תהיה ממשלה מטורפת עד כדי כך

\*\* בישראל שתסכים לחזור לגבולות המוצעים בתכנית זו.

\*\* 9. המצב בין שתי ארצותינו כיום רציני מאוד, אמר רהמ"י שטסל

\*\* דיווח לנו על שיחותיו במצרים, שכלל לא רציתם לדון במסמך שלנו

\*\* שטסל בנושא המדיני. הנשיא מובארך אף דחה נייד אמריקאי שטסל

\*\* ביקש להציע לאחר מכן.

\*\* אם לא ידעתם על דברי עבד אלמג'יד מדוע לא אמרתם זאת. אחרת

\*\* מהוים דבריו הצהרה רשמית.

\*\* במסמך שלנו הצענו הצעה רצינית לתיקון המצב ואפילו לא רציתם

\*\* לדון בכך. אם כך הדבר, כיצד ניתן לתקן המצב?

\*\* 10. במשך עשרת הימים האחרונים התנהל אצלנו ויכוח, אם אנו

\*\* יכולים לסגת לגבול הבינ"ל ואם לאו. יש ביננו הטוענים לאו,

\*\* כולל חברים באופוזיציה. היתה התפתחות מסוכנת במצרים שניתן

\*\* להגדירה כמסבר אמוך. הצהרת עבד אלמג'יד הינה סכנה אמיתית לנו.

\*\* המסבר הוא משום שאת כל ההצעות דחיתם ואל יאמר שאלה דברי

\*\* סחטנות. זו שאלה של דיבורים בגילוי לב. את הפרות הסכם השלום

\*\* יש לתקן אם לאו יהיה על הממשלה להחליט וזו עשויה להחליט על

\*\* נחית הנסיגה. אם הנכם סבורים שהאמריקאים יכולים לתת לנו

\*\* פקודות לסגת אינכם אלא טועים.

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\*\* 11. לשאלת בוטרוס גאלי אם אגרת הנשיא מובארך אינה מהווה

\*\* חיקון המצב השיב רהם בלאו מוחלט.

\*\* פה"ח עלי טען שבדבר פגישת מובארך שטסל ישנם הבדלי פרשנויות.

\*\* כאשר שטסל הציג הצעת מכתב האישור מחדש, העניין נדון, אלא

\*\* שמובארך היה סבור שכבר חתמנו על הסכם והסכמים נלווים וכי

\*\* נאום עבד אלמג'יד לא היה סטייה ממדיניותנו. כי הוא אפילו לא

\*\* קרא נאום זה אלא נתן הנחיות כלליות בלבד. מכתב האישור, סבור

\*\* מובארך, לא יוסיף דבר להסכמים הקיימים אלא ינסוך הרגשה של

\*\* השפלה במצרים.

\*\* 12. בנושא האוטונומיה אמרנו לשטסל, הוסיף עלי, שבכל עת

\*\* שתירצו לחדש השיחות אנו מוכנים לכך, על מנת להראות לעולם

\*\* ש"ק.ד. אינו ייסוס מת"י.

\*\* 13. שר הבטחון התייחס לעקרי שיחותיו בקהיר בשבוע שעבר. עמד

\*\* על הקשר הפוליטי של הבעיות הנוכחיות ביננו בציינו דברי

\*\* רהמ"י. הציג את נושא הפרות הצבאיות בסיני ושתה"פ עם ארגוני

\*\* הטרור, מבחינה אופרטיבית ובהעברת מידע לגבי המצב בלבנון

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מתוך 6

סודי ביותר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* בננוסח דומה. 23. השר שרון העלה את שאלת ההתחייבות האמריקאית הנחוצה אף

\*\* היא. לשם כך התקשר רהמי בו במקום עם השגריר לואיס וסובס

\*\* שבמהשך לחילופי המכתבים בין רהמי בגין למובארך יכתוב הנשיא

\*\* רייגן שני מכתבים והים, האחד למובארך והשני לרהמי בגין שבס

\*\* יאמר שהוא שמח לרשום את תכנם וכי הוא (הנשיא) חוזר ומאשר את

\*\* ההתחייבותו הוא לתהליך המומי לאוטונומיה.

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\*\* 24. גאלי טען שאינם יכולים להתחייב באשר למילים בהם ירצה

\*\* להשתמש מובארך וזאת אין להכתיב לו. על כך השיב רהמי שלא

\*\* נתנגד לשינוי במילים אך לא נסכים לשינוי בתוכן.

\*\*

\*\* שרון הדגיש שדבר אחד חייב להיות במכתב מובארך, שהתכנית

\*\* היחידה למומי לפתרון ש שאלת ערביי פלסטין תהיה האוטונומיה.

\*\* גאלי הציע שעל מנת למנוע אי הבנות הסיכום הנוכחי יהיה

\*\* מד-רפרנדום וכך הוסכם.

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\*\* 25. אגרת רהמי למובארך נמסרה בו במקום לידי עלי, והיא מוברקת.

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\*\* בנפרד.

\*\* מנהל מחלקת מצרימי

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\*\* ט/נס

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\*\* חפ: שה, סשה, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן,

\*\* לו בינשטיין, דיבון, מצפא, מצריים

\*\*

סודי ביותר

כ"ז 20  
בבטן התשמ"ב  
באפריל 1982

א ל: שר החוץ  
המנכ"ל

ד ע: היועץ המשפטי

בשיחה טלפונית היום בצהרים אמר לואיס שהוא מתרשם שיתכן וקיימת אפשרות  
להגיע להבנה עם המצרים לגבי טאבה, אם אנו נסכים מצדנו לפרק זמן קבוע  
והם מצדם יסכימו להמשיך בבית המלון.

לואיס אמר שזאת התרשמותו הוא, אך היתה לי הרגשה שהוא מבסס דבריו על  
המז או אמירה מצרית כלשהיא.

לואיס הדיגש שפרק הזמן שאודותיו הוא מדבר אינו יכול להיות ארוך מדי  
אלא חייב להיות סביר.

מצדי לא הגבתי אלא הסתפקתי במספר שאלות הבהרה.

כ ב ר כ ה ,

חנן כר-און



(1)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
JERUSALEM

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL

המשנה למנהל הכללי

סודי ביותר

כ"ז 20  
בניסן באפריל  
התשמ"ב 1982

106

א ל: שר החוץ  
המנכ"ל

ד ע: היועץ המשפטי


בשיחה טלפונית היום בצהריים אמר לואיס שהוא מתרשם שיתכן וקיימת אפשרות להגיע להבנה עם המצרים לגבי טאבה, אם אנו נסכים מצדנו לפרק זמן קבוע והם מצדם יסכימו להמשיך בבית המלון.

לואיס אמר שזאת התרשמותו הוא, אך היתה לי הרגשה שהוא מבסס דבריו על רמז או אמירה מצרית כלשהיא.

לואיס הדגיש שפרק הזמן שאודותיו הוא מדבר אינו יכול להיות ארוך מדי אלא חייב להיות סביר.

מצדי לא הגבתי אלא הסתפקתי במספר שאלות הבהרה.

כ ב ר כ ה ,

  
חנן בר-און



The President

April 20, 1982.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter of April 19 which I read with great interest. As I told you in my letters dated March 21 and April 16 and the oral messages I conveyed to you through Minister Sharon, the Arab Republic of Egypt is determined to fulfill all its obligation under the Camp David accords and the Peace Treaty in good faith. Likewise, we expect Israel to do the same. This is the only course that is compatible with our interest, and infact, with the interest of all peoples of the Middle East. When I repeated several times since I assumed office that peace to us is a strategic goal and not a tactical maneuver, I wanted to deepen the commitment of both peoples to the ideal of peace. You would also recall that I made it a point to state that the completion of final withdrawal from Sinai will cement the relations of peace and open new avenues for cooperation and interaction. This being our record, it is abundantly clear that we intend to keep our word and honor our commitment. It is inconceivable that we violate our undertakings for we believe that such a conduct could not generate any benefit to either party. Since we took the first step on the road to peace, we pledged ourselves to work for a comprehensive and durable peace. A fragile or shaky arrangement would undermine our purpose and set back our efforts.

In the " Framework For Peace in The Middle East ", we made a commitment to enter into " negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects ". In order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of

.../...



The President

- 2 -

authority, while taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, it was agreed that there would be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. A self-governing authority would be freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to provide them with full autonomy. The self-governing authority would replace the military government and its civilian administration which are to be withdrawn. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues would be negotiated, with the participation of representatives of the inhabitants, not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

On March 26, 1979 as we signed the historic Peace Treaty, we signed a letter containing a commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. The purpose of these negotiations was stated as follows: "to agree, prior to the elections, on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities and other related issues". We intend to continue negotiating with you, with the help of the United States as our full partner, until we reach agreement. It is vital that we set in motion the process of solving the Palestinian question, because we are determined to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with the provisions of the Camp David Framework which remains the only binding document between our two countries.

.. / ...

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\* \*\* יוצא  
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דף 1 מתוך 2  
עותק 11 מתוך 34  
סודי ביותר

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נכנס  
איתן

\*\*מל: ווש, קהיר, נר: חוזם 627, מ: המשרד  
\*\*דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 200482, זח: 0100  
\*\*נד: אגרת רהמ לחובארמק

\*\*סודי ביותר/מיד\*

\*\*פגישת רה"מ' בגין - כמאל חסן עלי.  
\*\*למברקנו בנדון (סעיף 25) להלן אגרת רה"מ' בגין לנשיא  
\*\*מובארמק.

JERUSALEM, APRIL

\*\*19, 1982  
\*\*DEAR PRESIDENT HOBARAK,

\*\* I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 16 WHICH I READ  
\*\*WITH GREAT ATTENTION.

\*\* I WILLINGLY ACCEPT YOUR ASSURANCE ABOUT RECTIFYING ANY  
\*\*POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SINAI  
\*\*AND THE EFFORTS WHICH WILL BE MADE BY THE EGYPTIAN  
\*\*AUTHORITIES TO FIGHT AND PREVENT SMUGGLING OF ARMS,  
\*\*EXPLOSIVES AND ALL OTHER WAR MATERIALS FROM EGYPTIAN  
\*\*TERRITORY INTO ISRAELI TERRITORY.

\*\* I DO HOPE, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, THAT WE SHALL AL  
\*\*FAITHFULLY ADHERE TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD AND TO THE  
\*\*PEACE TREATY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

\*\* THIS RAFFIRMATION INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING RECIPROCAL  
\*\*COMMITMENT:

\*\* UPON COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAEL'S ARME\*\*

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*FORCES AND CIVILIANS BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY  
 \*\*BETWEEN EGYPT AND MANDATED PALESTINE, THE ONLY PLAN TO  
 \*\*RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS, INHABITANTS  
 \*\*OF JUDAEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT, THE WEST BANK AND  
 \*\*THE GAZA STRIP, WHICH WILL BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE  
 \*\*PARTIES CONCERNED WILL BE THAT OF FULL AUTONOMY FOR THESE  
 \*\*INHABITANTS, AS STIPULATED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CAMP  
 \*\*DAVID ACCORD.

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\*\*WITH EVERY GOOD WISH.

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\*\*YOURS SINCERELY, MENACHEM BEGIN

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מנהל מחלקת הצרים =

\*\* חפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ד/מרכו, רם, אמחן,  
 \*\* מצפא, רו ב'נסטיין, דיבון, הצרים

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Meeting between

The Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin  
and  
Under-Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Walter Stoessel

Monday morning, April 19, 1982, 11:30 a.m.  
Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel

Mr. Y. Shamir  
Mr. A. Sharon  
Dr. Y. Ben-Meir  
Dr. D. Kimche  
Aluf A. Tamir  
Mr. Y. Avner  
Mr. D. Meridor  
Mr. U. Porat

For USA

Ambassador S. Lewis  
Mr. M. Draper  
Mr. B. Brown  
Mr. P. Hare  
Mr. E. Walker  
Mr. H. Teicher  
others

others

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H.E. MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, as I promised you, I thought throughout the day and night about a way to find a correction to what is wrong and to make it possible to carry out our commitment. We do not look for excuses to postpone our withdrawal, as I have told you time and again. But we cannot overlook the breaches of both the Peace Treaty and Camp David. If, for example, they promised to stop the smuggling of arms, we will be in a position to watch that this is indeed so in the future. On the violations in the demilitarized zone, the limitation of forces zone, they have already taken out

certain units. We have the possibility of observing the territory from the air through photographs and we will be able to see if, indeed, they keep to their commitment according to the military annex. For the protocol, I wish to say, that there is a commitment of the two countries not to permit the supply of arms to terrorists, nor violate the military annex.

But we have to face the fact that ultimately the problem is: where are we going? The word "Autonomy" doesn't even appear in Mubarak's letter to me. Its deletion was intentional. Privately, I wish to say that Mubarak is not the author of the letter. I know who the author is - El Baz and Ghali. Aly said to our Foreign Minister that he didn't even know about Meguid's speech in Kuwait. Mubarak does not mention Autonomy, but only a comprehensive peace with all our neighbors. I have to surmise that Meguid's speech is <sup>automatically</sup> actually El Baz' speech. If they, Mubarak and Aly say that they knew nothing about the speech beforehand, then let them say publicly it does not express the Egyptian viewpoint. I don't expect them to do so. If then it is an official statement of Egypt, it absolutely contradicts Camp David. What is going to happen? We are about to withdraw to the international boundary, leave the strategic points, plunge into an unknown future, whilst Egypt operates according to an actual plan, their 11-point plan.

I say again, as I have said before in the past, that plan means the destruction of Israel in stages.

I wish now to make a constructive proposal. Let me suggest the following draft which will be issued as a declaration by the

President of the United States with the approval of the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel:

"The President of the United States of America with the approval of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of the Prime Minister of Israel, declares:

"Upon the completion of the withdrawal of all Israel's armed forces and civilians behind the international boundary between Egypt and Mandated Palestine, the only plan to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy for these inhabitants, as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord."

This is what your government has been saying during the last few months, that the Autonomy plan is the only operative plan for negotiation. The President himself has said it. We see no reason why Egypt shouldn't be able to accept it. If they reject it, it means that they stand by their 11-point plan. If they reject the statement, the Cabinet may decide on the postponement of withdrawal until the 25th of May, at 14 hours Greenwich Meantime. This will be my recommendation to the Cabinet. This is the only way (referring to the above proposed text) to correct the breaches of the Treaty and to maintain the integrity of Camp David concerning Autonomy.

It was for this reason that this morning I consulted six of my colleagues (representing the coalition) and all the Ministers approve of this draft. You will now have to contact Washington to

find out whether the President will be prepared to make such a statement. At 12:30 today we shall be meeting with the Egyptians; we shall be talking to them about Taba and their behavior concerning the breaches and I shall also share this draft with them. You are here today; the Egyptians are here today, and we can perform a job today.

As you see, we have made an intellectual effort to resolve the problem.

AMBASSADOR LEWIS: Can I ask a couple of questions? Would you like this statement to be publicly declared by the President or in the form of a letter to you and to Mubarak?

MR. BEGIN: We would prefer three signatures attached to the statement, one of them America as witness. If that is difficult, let the President of the United States make it in the form of a public declaration, but obviously with the approval of the two other governments.

MR. SHARON: If you ask whether the paper should be kept secret, the answer is a definite no.

MR. LEWIS: That was not my question. It is primarily a question of form. The President is not usually accustomed to make such statements in public.

MR. STOESEL: He might make such a statement on the day of the withdrawal.

MR. BEGIN: Here you have a reiteration of our commitment to withdrawal - the first sentence. It will take place on April 25th. I used to say the 26th, but that was my mistake. I checked and found that the exchange of instruments of ratification took place on

the 25th.

MR. STOESEL: Mr. Prime Minister, you have certainly made a constructive effort. I shall have to be in touch with Washington and you will talk today to the Egyptians.

MR. BEGIN: Maybe you can go to Cairo and see President Mubarak. We have to make a decision on Wednesday. The matter is most urgent.

MR. STOESEL: As I understand it, if there is approval by the Egyptians and the U.S. of your proposal, the withdrawal will take place?

MR. BEGIN: Yes, Sir. I will then suggest to the Cabinet that we carry out the withdrawal on the 25th.

MR. SHARON: But we still have some other problems that are not yet solved.

MR. BEGIN: We shall talk to the Egyptians about them today.

MR. SHARON: I don't know why you (the Americans) are so worried about the withdrawal on April 25th. It is not a sacred date. I know our strength and I trust it but I am worried not about the date of the withdrawal but about the future. All the time you come back to us, again and again, so concerned about the date, the 25th of April. We don't owe a thing to anybody. The rest of the world owes to us. The problem is not the date but what will be after the date; will they continue their relations with the terrorists? Will they continue violations on the military annex? We are the ones who have cause to be worried, what to expect in the future. Why pressure us on withdrawal? I want you to know that I will recommend not to withdraw

if there is no resolution of those 15 border points and the other matters we have discussed. Why didn't you ask us yesterday evening about what is happening concerning the violations? You didn't ask because it doesn't really bother you.

MR. LEWIS: What bothers us is that the Peace Treaty will not be implemented.

MR. SHARON: The Peace Treaty is not withdrawal but the matter of intentions. Are we going to be pressured in the future by you on a Palestinian State? The question of terrorists and of Egypt's future intentions, that's what should worry you, as it does us. And yet all we hear over and over again from you is: are you going to withdraw on April 25th? The problem is how you, as full partners, are going to be on guard in the future to live up to your commitments and responsibilities to make sure that the intentions of the peace are kept in full.

MR. LEWIS: We will live up to our responsibility.

MR. SHARON: Are you going to live up to them forever?

MR. LEWIS: Let me ask you, Mr. Prime Minister, is there any possibility that if Cairo or Washington would want to make language adjustments, will you be prepared to consider them?

MR. BEGIN: We will consider any proposals. Of course, we will have to study them and we may have our objections, but we are ready to consider proposals that might be made. I think that what I have presented here today is a logical, condensed document of the two main political points - the Egyptian 11-point plan and the Autonomy - that is the question, that plus the supplying of arms to terrorists on the border.

What are we to expect, a blood-spilling boundary? Where is the peace? It will be destroyed if things continue as they have begun. Therefore, they must be stopped. We have the experience with Jordan. When the government decides to stop the smuggling of weapons, it can do so. It can seal its border. Jordan has proven this. After the Six-Day War we had incursions almost daily from Jordan. They continued until September 7th, 1970, when everything changed. Jordan decided to put a stop to it and the border was sealed, as it is to this day. For the purpose of smuggling arms, a government that keeps watch can prevent it and seal its border. If Egypt doesn't stop it, it means it doesn't want to stop.

MR. BEGIN: I am not even discussing whether the Egyptians continue or not. I am saying that objectively that a government, which have military police, intelligence service at its disposal, wants to stop it, it does, and if it goes on, and the PLO says openly, yes, we do smuggle arms from El Arish into the Gaza Strip, this is at least by tolerance of the Egyptians, if not by active cooperation. I don't have proof of that active cooperation; therefore, I don't accuse them of it, but at least by tolerance, passive. It is the same. They must stop it.

MR. STOESSEL: As I said, they assured me that they would do everything possible to stop it and that they have captured many weapons, many grenades. It is not always possible to catch every smuggler.

MR. BEGIN: This passage is also asserted in the letter of

President Mubarak. I said it yesterday. That issue of the Autonomy - may I say something among ourselves: Mubarak didn't write that letter. I know who wrote it. And, therefore, that question of Autonomy is evaded intentionally because the plan is not Autonomy now. They return to the original document presented to President Carter and to me by President Sadat. I know also the author of that document; the same people. And they try on the eve of our greatest plunge to tell us in advance: this is our plan, and if you withdraw, it is your responsibility. We told you in advance. That's our plan, the 11 points. Therefore, we must take those precautions in advance. This will be too late. We shall be on the other side.

MR. LEWIS: One final question about procedure still: assuming that this were accepted by Mubarak and Reagan and was to be issued, the wording would imply to me that it would be issued at the same time, the 25th or 26th, because it starts "upon the completion of the withdrawal..."

MR. BEGIN: Before. That is the condition.

MR. LEWIS: No, I am saying - it would have to be agreed before, but the actual issuing of it, to be consistent with the language.

MR. BEGIN: No, not at all; that should be done at the latest on Thursday.

MR. LEWIS: The issuance?

MR. BEGIN: Sure. Then we complete our withdrawal. We said, "upon the completion....the negotiation.."

MR. LEWIS: It must be the future tense in the sentence.

MR. BEGIN: It is a promise.

MR. LEWIS: I understand. You'd like this issue not later than Thursday or Wednesday?

MR. BEGIN: It is a recommitment. Official withdrawal. We want a commitment that the negotiations will center upon full autonomy, as it is written, stipulated, in the Camp David Agreement. Everything out of the existing text.

MR. STOESEL: We will be in touch with Washington.

MR. BEGIN: I will read to you again the passage in which the word Camp David is mentioned. Then you will understand our worry: "At Camp David our two countries took a daring and pioneering step on the road to peace. The signing of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East was not merely an addition to a certain document to history books. Rather it was, and always will remain a ? and revolutionary expression of the will of our peoples and the earnest desire to live together as good neighbors and friends. Being aware of our historic responsibility we took it upon ourselves to widen the scope of peace, so as to have it reign over every corner of our trouble area. We made a solemn commitment to work together tirelessly and vigorously for a comprehensive peace between Israel and all its neighbors . From the very beginning we knew that such an undertaking was not an easy task. However, we accepted the challenge with faith and hope. It was not a step that we unknown. . . . ."

Beautiful words. But only one expression? comprehensive peace. Where is Autonomy? That simple word. We agreed to conduct negotiations about Autonomy. It disappeared. A letter of six pages. The

word Autonomy doesn't appear even once, and as I know the author of the letter, the real author, it was done intentionally. Autonomy doesn't exist any more. The plan of the 11 points exists instead, or the Fahad plan at least. And we should close our eyes to such a fact? It will change all our lives and then our own people would come to me and say, why, you didn't even inform us about it. This is a democratic country. You know it very well, Sam.

MR. LEWIS: Very.

MR. BEGIN: Did you read today's Jerusalem Post? Two articles against me. Did you read Ha'aretz? Three articles. Read Davar, Hamishmar. You will come to ten articles.

MR. LEWIS: You have gotten to Ma'ariv and Yidiot yet! (Laughter)

MR. BEGIN: In the morning, already at least 10 articles.

MR. LEWIS: I didn't see any articles against you in the Post.

MR. BEGIN: But I did in the morning, believe me. Jerusalem Post only today praises me with one sentence, why I said that those accusations in the Security Council about the tragic incident on the Temple Mount is a blood libel against the Jewish people. So the Jerusalem Post says, the Prime Minister on this is right. That is an event in my life. (Laughter)

MR. STOESEL: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, we thank you for this suggestion and we will be in touch immediately with Washington.

MR. BEGIN: We shall talk to the Egyptians. After our talk, I would like to inform you how they went.

(Discussed where to contact.)

MR. STOESSEL: If required useful, then I can go back to Cairo.

MR. LEWIS: Also, I should say, Mr. Prime Minister, the Egyptians asked if they could have a session, a chat with Mr. Stoessel before they leave to go back to Cairo, so they will be seeing him later this afternoon, also. I just wanted you to know that.

MR. BEGIN: No problem. Pleasure.

MR. LEWIS: If at any point, it is useful to have the three of us sit together, it is possible. We are not suggesting that, but it is obviously a possibility. So if you and they decide it would be useful, the Secretary is available.

MR. BEGIN: After the talks with the Egyptians, we shall see if it can be useful. We will see after that.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 12:10 noon.)

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Jerusalem, April 19, 1982

Dear President Mobarak,

I thank you for your letter of April 16 which I read with great attention.

I willingly accept your assurance about rectifying any possible violations of the security arrangements in Sinai and the efforts which will be made by the Egyptian authorities to fight and prevent smuggling of arms, explosives and all other war materials from Egyptian territory into Israeli territory.

I do hope, dear Mr. President, that we shall all faithfully adhere to the Camp David Accord and to the peace treaty between our two countries.

This reaffirmation includes the following reciprocal commitment:


Upon completion of the withdrawal of all Israel's armed forces and civilians behind the international boundary between Egypt and Mandated Palestine, the only plan to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy for these inhabitants, as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord.

With every good wish.

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin


His Excellency  
President Mobarak  
Cairo.



Draft

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

I wish to reaffirm our reciprocal commitment to the effect:



Meeting between  
 The Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin  
 and  
 Under-Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Walter Stoessel

Tuesday night, April 20, 1982, 9:30 p.m.  
 Prime Minister's Residence  
 Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel

- Mr. Y. Shamir
- Mr. A. Sharon
- Dr. Y. Ben-Meir
- Dr. D. Kimche
- Mr. M. Sasson
- Mr. Shmuelwitz
- Aluf A. Tamir
- Aluf Ya'ari
- Dr. E. Rubinstein
- Mr. H. Bar-On
- Mr. Y. Avner
- Mr. D. Meridor
- Brig. D. Stou
- Mr. Divon
- Mr. U. Porat

others

For USA

- Ambassador S. Lewis
- Mr. M. Draper
- Mr. B. Brown
- Mr. P. Hare
- Mr. E. Walker
- Mr. H. Teicher

others

H.E. MR. BEGIN: .. I got a draft in reply to us -  
 H.E. MR. STOESEL: I should say, Mr. Prime Minister, this is  
 only part of an expected letter. We have not seen the full text.  
 There will be other parts that will reaffirm.  
 MR. BEGIN: Will I get the letter tomorrow before 9:30?  
 MR. LEWIS: If at all humanly possible.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 11:00 / 13:00  
 →

MR. BEGIN: I would like to have the possibility to read it out to the Cabinet. So I would like to analyze the text. The first two lines are identical. Then instead of our text come the words, "...the only plan to resolve the problem of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza remains that of full autonomy for these inhabitants for the transitional period of five years during which the final status of those territories will be negotiated among the parties concerned on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord."

As we can see here, negotiations apply only to the ultimate status, final status, of the West Bank, as it is called, and Gaza - Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District - and not on autonomy itself, whereas in our text it is written, "...which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy..." In other words, the plan of full autonomy will be negotiated; not only the final status.

Now, in the Camp David Accord, this is written in clear language, page 22 of our booklet. "The Parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority, to be exercised in the West Bank (Gaza District, Judea and Samaria)..." Autonomy is not self-executing, self-enacting. The meaning is understood. It doesn't come into force per se, automatically. The agreement of the basic issue of the powers and responsibilities of the Self-Governing Authority (Administra-

tive Council) should be negotiated. Here there are no negotiations. Only the status, the final status of the West Bank should be negotiated after three years add, of course, during the five years of the transitional period. That is ture. But 242 and 338 are not mentioned at all in the provisions of Camp David Agreement. This is page 23, "...applies to the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.." not to the final status, as I will read out. Now I will read the whole passage, "...When the Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin as soon as possible but not later than 3 years after the beginning of the transitional period negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a Peace Treaty with Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate and related committees will be convened; one committee consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relations with its neighbors, and the second committee consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan, to be joined by elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status." After full-stop , it comes, "...the negotiations

shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242.." What is clear, "on the principles and provisions of 242..." The negotiations are based on the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel, which is obvious, because 242 applies to countries, to secure borders. Therefore, these two changes in the text are unwarranted by the Camp David Accord.

Gentlemen, you made a mistake. You didn't look into the book. We have a famous Talmudic expression: "Let us take the Book and look into it." So I did look into it. The fact is that some of the Book I remember.

MR. STOESEEL: Our lawyers worked on this. Maybe you are a better lawyer, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: They made a mistake.

MR. STOESEL: Your concern here is the mention of 242 and 338.

MR. BEGIN: First of all, 338 - it doesn't matter; it is a repetition of 242, but it is not written. Why should we add?

MR. STOESEL: Those are attached, I think.

MR. BEGIN: The point is that 242 in this context applies to the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel; not to the final status. The final status should be negotiated during the five year transitional period between all those parties: Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, or rather its Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council), and then we cannot leave out the negotiations between the Autonomy itself, because the basic issues are the powers and the responsibilities of the Self-Governing Authority. So long as they are not agreed upon, the authority cannot

be elected. So it cannot be established. So it cannot be inaugurated. So the transitional period cannot start. Therefore, we wrote that the only plan to solve, etc. the famous problem, which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned, will be that of full autonomy, and then our final phrase, may I say, includes everything: "...as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord." You don't even have to add "the transitional period", because one of the provisions is the transitional period. You don't have to add "the final status" because one of the provisions is the final status. Therefore, I wrote "provisions of the Camp David Accord" in order to stress that each provision will be taken into consideration during the negotiations. Why add to it - and detract - both?

MR. STOESEL: Among the parties concerned, as stipulated by the provisions of Camp David Accord. I think we could do that.

(General discussion)

MR. BEGIN: We don't need transitional period. It is obvious. "As stipulated by the provisions.." There is a transitional period. We don't put in the force; no provisions. We say in accordance with the provisions as stipulated. "All measures to ensure the security of Israel during the transitional period and beyond."

MR. LEWIS: It is getting into a different area. The only problem is, if you don't have that reference, then it can be read that the problem of the inhabitants will be resolved, once and for all, in the autonomy negotiations.

MR. BEGIN: If you say by the provisions.

MR. LEWIS: Someone who doesn't have the Camp David Accord in

front of him, this surmises that it is the approach for the five years and then there is another negotiation.

MR. BEGIN: It's true.

MR. LEWIS: We see that balance as being an important addition.

MR. BEGIN: Sam, let us logically deal. Either we say a general expression; namely, "..as stipulated by the provisions.." where everything is included; nothing is excluded, or we quote the transitional period, then I want to say what is going to happen during the transitional period and beyond. . The key, to our security. "..All measures will be taken and provisions made to ensure the security of Israel and its neighbors ..and beyond.." One of the most important words that we asserted after days and nights of work. For days on end we negotiated that word "and beyond". Not only for the five years will we have a problem of security. Either we add a general sentence -

Our text is good. It is couched in general terms. Therefore, it is compact. Otherwise, you include and exclude.

(General Discussion)

MR. BEGIN: I can make a suggestion to make it easier. Take our text and then there will be, to answer your problem, Sam, "that of full autonomy for these inhabitants for a transitional period of five years as stipulated by the provisions..." I can agree to that. We shall write, "...which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy for these inhabitants for a transitional period of five years as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord."

(Private discussions by delegations.)

MR. BEGIN: I would add, "...with all the provisions of the Camp David Accord.." , "...in accordance with all provisions of the Camp David Accord.." so it includes final status, security measures, all the provisions. First we add the words "transitional period" and then we add "...in accordance with all the provisions of the Camp David Accord." We cover all the fields. There is no escape clause at all. We close it.

MR. WALKER: It is a limitation on our ability to negotiate. "Which will be negotiated between the parties concerned will be that of full autonomy". Doesn't that limit our ability to negotiate the final status, because that also relates to the problem of Palestinians.

MR. BEGIN: You forget the final words, "...full autonomy... for a transitional period of five years, as stipulated by all the provisions." Everything is included in this general phrase: "in accordance with all the provisions of the Camp David Accord."

MR. STOESSEL: We wanted to meet your point: that this is the only plan. We wanted to state that it is full autonomy. We have done that.

MR. BEGIN: Mubarak's letter; he didn't hesitate to write to me that the only document binding the two countries. In other words, that framework we talk about: the Camp David Accord, which remains the only binding document between our two countries. "This is our policy today and it will remain unchanged in the future." I must say, quite strong words. He didn't hesitate to say so. "The only binding document." No others. That includes really the 11 points - or excludes.

The Accord is composed of two parts. The first part is autonomy;

the second part is the Peace Treaty between the two countries.

MR. STOESEL: Could we leave it that we understand your point of view. We will faithfully transmit those to Washington and we will do the best we can to meet them and include that in the letter.

MR. BEGIN: Agreed. Thank you.

Do you have any idea, Mr. Secretary, what the President intends to write to us, or what he intends to include? My friends have got some suggestions.

MR. STOESEL: We have not seen the text. I understand that he wants to make some general reference to the relationship between the two countries, the importance of strengthening the bonds, all of the various aspects, going back over the years. It will be very strong, forthcoming language and going into this language about Camp David and the Autonomy.

MR. BEGIN: We can send our request over this evening?

MR. STOESEL: Certainly.

MR. BEGIN: As far as this letter is concerned, including the last passage about Taba, we shall consider it in the Cabinet. I have to consult my friends, and we shall consider the letter in general.

MR. STOESEL: And on the Taba question, we continue to be available, to be of assistance, through our legal adviser, through proposing a system of procedures, reconciliation of any dispute. We stand ready to be of assistance. We don't want to become involved in the substance of the dispute. That would be for conciliators or arbitrators.

MR. BEGIN: What is the latest hour tonight we can send over our letter?

MR. LEWIS: Any time. I would only urge that you shouldn't

give us too long a list, because in Washington we have very little time to work to get the letter back to you by tomorrow morning.

MR. BEGIN: A few points.

We shall consider all points tomorrow, starting at 9:30 for five hours. Tomorrow every Minister will take the floor.

MR. SHARON: Today, one of our young officers, at \_\_\_\_\_, lost his leg, from a mine. He will live, but he lost his leg. Last night a civilian truck was ambushed and handgrenades were thrown at it. There were no casualties, but that happened south of Gaza, on the main road.

MR. STOESEL: These are deplorable things - terrible.

MR. SHARON: I think that in the last ten days we had about 20 to 25 terrorist activities, and we don't have to emphasize that all these activities were initiated in Lebanon; instructions are coming from Lebanon. They are using the system - they are sending instructions through the normal broadcasting.

MR. STOESEL: Hidden messages?

MR. SHARON: Yes. Around Gaza they don't have the problem of handgrenades because they got so many of them from Sinai, but we have always to remember that though these events take place in Israel, the initiative, the orders and the planning, the briefing, the weapons and after the execution, the reports, all that comes from Lebanon and goes to Lebanon. And in the last ten days, or two weeks, we had one Sargeant Major killed in Gaza, the man who was killed in Paris, a border policeman who was \_\_\_\_\_ to death in the northern part of

Samaria - Jenin; the civilian who lost his leg; today the officer who lost his leg. Quite a number of explosions took place all round the country. It was a very severe thing that happened out of Ashkelon - I must say, things like that happened only in the '50s, where an Israel vehicle was ambushed on the main road about less than one mile south of Ashkelon, on the main road to Gaza, but still about 8 miles north from what used to be the green line, the northern boundary of the Gaza District, really in the heart of the country.

MR. LEWIS: What sort of ambush was it?

MR. SHARON: Shooting and handgrenades that were thrown. It is a citrus grove on both sides of the road and there is a road, when you go south to Gaza, it takes you left to a group of settlements, moshavim, and when the car turned to go down, to slow-down and turning to the left, at the road junction, he was attacked. Nothing really happened, except the event itself that took place. Suddenly people start to think; people don't understand. It didn't happen since the '50s. There were, of course, terrorist activities in the Gaza District and in Samaria and Judea, and there were all kinds of sabotage and other things inside the country, but an attack, a deliberate attack by- people who are waiting and ambushing on the main road not not been happening since the '50s. So all that happened in the last ten days.

(The meeting adjourned at 10:45 p.m.)

משרד ראש הממשלה  
מחלקת משא ומתן  
תאריך: 19.4.82  
שם: *מפגש*  
מיקום: *בני ברק*  
שם המפגש: *מפגש*  
שם המשתתפים: *מנחם בגין, קמל חסן עלי*  
שם המפגש: *מפגש*  
שם המפגש: *מפגש*

*מפגש*  
*מנחם בגין*  
*קמל חסן עלי*

*32*

Meeting between  
The Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin  
and  
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
General Kamal Hassan Aly

*19.4.82*  
*מפגש*

Monday, April 19, 1982, 12:30 noon  
Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel:

- Mr. Yitzhak Shamir
- Mr. Ariel Sharon
- Dr. David Kimche
- Ambassador Moshe Sasson
- Aluf Abrasha Tamir
- Brig. Dov Sion
- Mr. Divon
- Mr. Don Meridor
- Mr. Zvi Kedar
- Dr. Ben-Meir
- Mr. Yehuda Ayper
- others

For Egypt:

- Dr. Boutros Ghali
- Ambassador Sa'ad Mortada
- Admiral Hamdi
- others

H.E. MR. BEGIN: General Aly and Dr. Ghali, we welcome you and your colleagues as representatives of our respective countries to this meeting. We have hard work to do; therefore, without any introductions, except for extending our greetings to you, I will ask you, General Aly, to bring before us any proposal you wish to.

H.E. GENERAL ALY: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. I convey best regards from President Mubarak to your Excellency and we are glad to be here at the time of the Spring Festival, the very old Egyptian tradition, and we are glad to take this boost of fine weather

that you have here. And we consider this visit as important, because I think, after all, what we have accomplished during the past three years, after the ratification of the Treaty between Israel and Israel, and after ratifying three Agreements, nine Memos of Understanding, 40 Agreements covering all fields of cooperation between the two countries, covering all activities, we are glad that the 25th of April, which will be after four-five days, will be considered as a start of a full implementation of the Treaty. We consider this as a start of the full normalization between our two countries, and also we consider it as the start of strong effort for the negotiations of the Autonomy, which we have to work on in the next period very perseveringly and very strongly.

Fortunately, we had Minister Sharon in our country. There were raised some points in Israel and I think some of them were clarified by us to Minister Sharon; namely, maybe the deviations in the military proposal or the military annex to the Treaty, and I think through the report of the Sinai Field Mission, which I myself read it only this morning, clarifies that the military annex is implemented in full. Maybe there were some misunderstandings here or there, but, as usual, it was not intended to be, and as usual also the Sinai Field Mission took all measures to amend it, both sides, but it is in good faith. So hopefully that this point is quite clear now and that the Multinational Force, when starting on the 25th its verifications and its main mission, it will see the clean map for the military annex to be implemented in future.

As for the other issue which was raised by my friend, Arik,

concerning the smuggling of weapons and the cooperation - not the cooperation but just closing eyes concerning some smuggling or something like that, I think we have already proved, Mr. Prime Minister, that through the whole year, the last year, we were acting very seriously concerning smuggling weapons to Egypt as a whole, and believe me, we do not know if some arms to be smuggled, for instance from Lebanon, coming from El Arish, will they be directed to Cairo or to Israel: We don't know, and that's why we are preventing this to the utmost, and the list which I presented to my friend, Arik, showed that we have about 20 cases, maybe more, arresting people with weapons, with arms, with explosives. And again, there is even more than what was mentioned in the list because the last four cases were at the end of March and the beginning of April, including one case on the 1st of this month, the other on the 4th of this month, and still after that we have another case in Cairo for collecting weapons. We do not know whether it will be directed to our border with Israel or not, but we arrested this and I am glad that we have started exchanging some information about these activities and I am convinced that we have to implement what we agreed upon between the delegations of the Ministry of Interior and another process, which I may discuss afterwards, to take place, to avoid or to exchange information about smuggling weapons or any anti activity because it is for the benefit of our two nations and our two peoples and because we do not want any violation to the Treaty from one hand and from the other hand, that it is not to the mutual interest of both of us in security

matters. So we will never let this happen between our two countries. We will persevere in this and we are very serious and this list showed this very clearly.

I learned that the speech of Dr. Magid was interpreted maybe in a different way, but I give you the right to read it like that -

MR. BEGIN: Assuming that we are literate people.

MR. ALY: Yes. (Laughter) I quite agree with the Prime Minister, but we have to look at/positive <sup>the</sup> aspects of it. Now for the first time, and through this, let us call it "maneuver", for the first time and before the final withdrawal, we never got any condemnation of Camp David; not any attack against the Multinational Force which will take place, because there was in the agenda of the meeting -

MR. SHAMIR: There was a certain condemnation, but in a different language.

GENERAL ALY: For the first time there was no condemnation for the Camp David in the Non-Aligned Movement; for the first time that the MFO, the Multinational Force, was omitted from the agenda and this was very important for both of us; for the first time that Egypt calls for mutual recognition in an Arab country. I know, it was rejected by both Israel and the Palestinians, but, well, this is a real call for peace in an Arab country, for the first time.

So, actually, the positive aspects in this have to be looked after as a package deal, altogether, with the speech. And when it was interpreted in such a way, the next day I came up with a statement that we, Egypt, are tied to Camp David, are tied to the Autonomy

Talks. This has nothing to do with any change of policy from the side of Egypt, and this was quite well clarified that it is not a new policy, which is a real thing. It is not a new concept. It is not a new approach. We still believe in and we are faithful to Camp David and faithful also to the Treaty between Israel and Egypt and the Autonomy Talks in the future. This is our position, and this is our real position. And this also was stated by the President several times and all the time as well.

Now, for Taba, I think there are a few things to be discussed -

MR. BEGIN: Let's leave Taba now and consider the general issue and then we shall go over to Taba.

GENERAL ALY: So this is, in a nutshell, the whole position, and the whole area where we find that there is a certain sensitivity in Israel about it, and, of course, we are quite sincere in supporting the effort to remove any sensitivity, either in Israel or in Egypt, where you know, your Excellency, there were many statements in Israel, from Ministers, against the final withdrawal; that President Mubarak has to be in the Knesseth and make a speech and so on; you know, all these things created some sort of sensitivity on both sides.

Now, I feel it is our duty to support each other, to clarify the whole climate and to pave the way for the good forthcoming relations, the friendly relations, the implementation of the 40 Agreements which we have reached. We were working very hard during the past three years, Dr. Ghali and myself and all my colleagues here,

both sides, participated in this/<sup>in</sup>very good faith. So I feel that both sides will pave the way during these five days coming to clarify the whole climate and atmosphere and create the atmosphere for the forthcoming relations. I feel as well that we have to show the whole world that peace in full is a reality between Egypt and Israel, and to give the whole world also the feeling and the atmosphere that Camp David is alive and the Autonomy Talks are continuing and in the shortest time I hope that we can meet again.

So this is what we are aiming at; hopefully that after this visit that we can just declare this to the whole world. It will give a very good impression to both countries, to both peoples, who are now very sensitive - very sensitive - and I am sure that we believe in peace, both of us, and we will continue our process in the good spirit which is prevailing. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you, General Aly.

GENERAL ALY: Maybe, Dr. Ghali, you will add something?

DR. GHALI: No.

MR. BEGIN: He will get the floor any time he wishes, even in the middle of my speech.

General Aly, I want to thank you for certain positive assertions you made to us today. I accept them willingly. One assertion President Mubarak asserted in his letter of the 16th of April concerning the smuggling of arms into the Gaza District from El Arish, and I would like to stress that this is one of the most perturbing phenomena. First of all, we captured five hundred hand-grenades. You are a military man; you know how many people can be

hurt by one hand-grenade. Now we can make out what would be the number of people killed or wounded if those 500 hand-grenades would have been used if we didn't capture them. If we captured 500, we have to assume that a certain number was not discovered. This is most perturbing.

We signed a Peace Treaty. It is a revolutionary step. Therefore, the borders should be open and completely peaceful. We had such a peaceful border for 19 years with Lebanon and still there was a state of war between those two countries. Now, it is a blood-dripping border during the last six years because of events which took place in Lebanon itself, including the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and the arming by the Soviet Union of the PLO, being supplied by the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria with heavy weapons. But for 19 years it was a completely peaceful border. Let us imagine the absurd situation that/after signing a Peace Treaty with Egypt and Egypt with Israel, the border between us will be blood-dripping: arms will be smuggled into the Gaza District. There are people who belong to the PLO there. They will throw the hand-grenades at our jeeps or command cars or the civilian cars, passing the main street in Gaza, kill our people. The Israel army one day will retaliate. Then we actually will have a guerrilla war on our border, which one day may turn into a big war, as experience tell us. So then everybody will ask: what is the point of having made peace? What is the meaning of the Peace Treaty?

I am telling you all this, Mr. Minister, that all of us

should understand how serious this matter is to us. I would like to say that we have the experience that if a country wants to seal off a border and to prevent smuggling of weapons - more than of drugs - the border can be sealed. It was our experience with Jordan. 1967-8-9, we had almost daily incursions through the Jordan River. Hundreds of people got killed on both sides of the border; hundreds of people. Then in 1970, King Hussen actually liquidated the PLO in Jordan. How he did it is a different story. We know it. He killed thousands of people, men, women and children; artillery fire into the refugee camps. But that is a different story. We didn't rejoice in that. Not only we were sorry; we were deeply sorry that that happened. Some other people praised him for that, as I remember, the articles in those days in the press.

Now we are being put on the bench in the Security Council because a crazy man came to the Temple Mount and opened fired, having taken by surprise all the guards. So our nation is being accused. We apprehended him. He will face trial. If he is insane, well, the law says what to do with insane people. <sup>If</sup> He is judicially sane, he will be brought to book. What else can a country do against such an event, and yet Jordan and Syria - Syria just now killed over 6000 people in Hamat, men, women and children; whole families were wiped out. And they complain against us, and Jordan, with those events of September 1970, complains against us! That is the paradox of the situation. But, well, we know the hypocrisy in the Security Council.

I maintain that the border can be sealed off if you want

it, because the Jordanians sealed off their border. I will admit, sometimes there are incursions, but we know the Jordanians did their best and we don't accuse them, and as you could have seen, nothing happened to Jordan for all these years, although there were incursions - very few. We didn't accuse Jordan. We know that they do their best. What can they do else? Sometimes we can also overlook an incursion. It can happen to everybody. So there was no activity whatsoever on the other side of the river. We didn't retaliate. We didn't do anything. We understood they do their best.

Mr. Minister, I ask you that you should do your best. That's all. If the smuggling goes on, our conclusion must be that some officials perhaps look like this (indicating spread fingers) at the smuggling. There is no other explanation, because if they look, without binoculars, they must see on camels, hand-grenades, submachine guns, ammunition. It is a border. There are border police there. There are soldiers. You have to search some people.

But we want to rely on your promise. Of course, what is going to happen on the ground will be decisive and we shall see. I also rely on the promise given to me by President Nubarak in his letter. He said, we shall stop it. We shall not tolerate it. It is not in our interest to have it. You said so. All right. We accept it.

GENERAL ALY: Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: But we shall see what is going to happen in the next few weeks on the ground.

GENERAL ALY: Mr. Prime Minister, may I interrupt? Maybe

I can just respond to point by point, because really it would be very helpful to clarify everything. I think when we agreed together, Arik and myself, about putting the border line with barbed wire and all these arrangements, even through Rafah, I think this will help also, because there are certain passages in these fences which can be controlled very carefully. That's one point.

The other point is that we have agreed to exchange the information you get and we get also, and I think through this cooperation, and as I told your Excellency, I have personally some ideas for this exchange which will be very helpful, and maybe David or Hamdi are here. Hamdi has got some of the information, and we responded to you immediately and this will be the same.

MR. BEGIN: They are all secretive people. They didn't tell me anything. They keep secrets.

GENERAL ALY: Sometimes they act separately. So through these two elements of cooperation, I am quite sure that nothing will happen on the borders.

MR. BEGIN: Let us hope so.

GENERAL ALY: I can assure you.

MR. BEGIN: The second problem is the demilitarized zone and the limitation of forces zone. General Aly, as a military man, you understand what is to us the demilitarized, limitation of forces zone. It is also the soul of the peace. The first word I uttered in Jerusalem to Sadat, of blessed memory, was: how do you envisage our peace, and I immediately said to him, Mr. President, the Sinai Peninsula cannot again be filled up with soldiers. It must be an area

of peace on both sides. President Sadat understood. He surmised, by implication, that I mean when there is peace, you will get the Sinai Peninsula, but under no circumstances will it be filled up with armies, because three times the Sinai Peninsula was used as a base to attack Israel: in 1948, then in the '50s we had those incursions, almost daily; then again in 1967. In 1967, you remember how the armies concentrated, concentrated, then it happened what happened. Never again. And then we agreed a demilitarized zone for 150 kms and then a limitation of forces zone. We gave a certain zone of demilitarization. Of course, smaller because of the difference of the areas. We must keep it faithfully, Mr. Minister. If there are violations of those security arrangements; they may be small, a battalion here, a company there, which is not a threat to the Israel army. But it is a matter of principle. Today it may be a battalion; perhaps tomorrow it will be a brigade. Of course, demilitarization is realistic in a desert; not in a built-up area. In a built-up area you can keep in every garage tank or a gun. Everybody knows the trick and everybody has his own experience. But in a desert, it is possible to control it, to watch it. It is serious. There were violations. I understand that the President promised me also in his letter to correct them and also Marshall Ghazala promised to our Defence Minister. May I ask you, according to your information, were all those violations already corrected, because the promise was to do so until Saturday? Today is Monday.

GENERAL ALY: Your Excellency, I read the report of the Sinai Field Mission this morning. As usual, they kept it secret from me also; until this morning. And I reviewed all the points

which were presented by my friend, Arik, and I see that there is nothing. The area, the zones A, B and C are clear, and I quite agree, Mr. Prime Minister, that it is a principle. It is a matter of principle, and both of us we have to keep all the areas as in the Treaty. I know quite well that there were some deviations from what was written, but I assure you that this will never happen on both sides; I am sure. And here I would like to confirm something that even in Zone A the amount of forces in relation to what is mentioned in the Treaty is 60 percent of the forces mentioned in the Treaty. It is a fact.

MR. BEGIN: More interesting are Zones B and C.

GENERAL ALY: Yes.

MR. BEGIN: A is far away.

MR. SHARON: We always have emphasized that; that you are keeping 60 percent of the troops. The question was not the question of the size.

MR. BEGIN: Excuse me. Practically, I have to add, you can change it in no time. You have now tunnels. In a few hours, you can change it.

MR. ALY: Oh no, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: I don't object that you keep it 100 percent. That's not a gift to Israel. But mainly the problem is of Zone B and C, Mr. Minister, near to our border, the demilitarized zone, what is happening. El Arish.\* For example, why was a superfluous battalion kept for so many months?

GENERAL ALY: Maybe it was interpreted differently, Mr. Prime Minister. Now there is a battalion of the central police, which is still there, ready to get to the area of Yamit, after the evacuation, as we agreed together with Arik to just keep and control the area until the Israeli authorities come back and see what are the constructions and equipment to be transferred back to Israel. This is the battalion. Maybe there was another battalion of engineers in El Arish airport. This was agreed upon within the Military Joint Committee, and it is a battalion, unarmed, only for the construction of the runway of El Arish airport, and when Arik asked us to evacuate it, we immediately fulfilled, and even the equipment is still there and the civil authority will transfer it.

So I assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that the implementation of the Treaty concerning the military annex will be in spirit and deed. I assure you about that. Maybe when Arik wanted to show to the President this map, he said, it is a matter of principle: no violations whatsoever have to take place. And I have given the order, if any, will be rectified immediately. And this is the spirit and in this spirit we will continue.

In the past, when I was the Minister of Defence, I had a telephone direct to Ezer Weizmann. Can I propose that between Arik and Abu Ghazala that there will be this hot line immediately -

MR. BEGIN: We are for it.

GENERAL ALY: And as we agreed with Minister Shamir, that we will have regular meetings, every three months, that also we can

have a hot line between us too.

MR. BEGIN: You should rather have a cool line. (Laughter)

GENERAL ALY: I think on the 27th or at the end of this month that we will have a direct communication, not through Rome. It will be through El Arish.

MR. SASSON: There is a delay; in about two months.

GENERAL ALY: So it will be easier and not expensive.

MR. SHARON: There are still some things that should be moved from the area but that we will discuss during the lunchtime. I got also the report of the SFM and we will discuss it.

GENERAL ALY: All right.

MR. BEGIN: So let us now pass to the third problem; that is, may I say, the moral, political issue. The President writes to me about statements that were made. You mentioned just a half-hour ago. That's not the chronological order of things. I haven't yet written the President because we want to clarify the situation and then write to him, but I said to Dr. Ghali on Friday - he is now indulging in shuttle diplomacy.

DR. GHALI: I am a commuter.

MR. BEGIN: You have good predecessors: Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Haig.

DR. GHALI: God bless the distance between Tel Aviv and Cairo.

MR. BEGIN: The order of the thing is such. Dr. Magid, your official representative at the UN, made a speech at the Security

Council, because of the events in Judea and Samaria, or, as you call it, in the West Bank, and attacked Israel violently. I wrote a letter after that event to the President and complained to him and I used the sentence: Dr. Magid shouldn't have made the speech he delivered to the Security Council. Our Ambassador who sits here will bear me out. He reported to me that when the President reached that passage, he interrupted reading and said, the Prime Minister is right. I didn't know anything about the speech of Dr. Magid. He shouldn't have made that speech.

Several days later, the same Dr. Magid, your representative, your spokesman at the UN, gives an interview to a Kuwait newspaper and uses the following phrase: Upon the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai, the era of liberation of other occupied Arab territories will begin. Then I asked the Ambassador, to whom I had the opportunity to talk: what does it mean "the liberation of other territories"? Liberation is an active term. What does he promise me; to join other Arab countries in a war to liberate Arab occupied territories, in inverted commas, because it is a quotation. What does it mean?

And then Dr. Magid several days later appears at a conference of 80 non-aligned countries, a majority of members of the UN, delivers a speech which you call, using the word, maneuver, tactical, but in that speech he asserts the following plan. Now I read - it is in Hebrew but it will be a faithful translation, I can assure you. "In accordance with the Egyptian plan, Israel has to agree to the following points: 1. End of Israel occupation.

2. The right to return or to get compensation in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 - I suppose, if my memory doesn't fail me - of December 1948.

3. The right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty over its natural resources.

4. The right of self-determination without foreign intervention.

5. The right to an independent state in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on the basis of the borders - as he put it of 1967, meaning 4th of June 1967.

6. The right of sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem. Here I must remark that the American Ambassador tells me that they have a different translation from the Arabic and it means in Jerusalem and not over Jerusalem. But our man, the Head of Military Intelligence, General Sagi, whom you meet from time to time, contends that he has got three translations, all of them are as follows: the right of sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem and the rejection of any geographical or demographic change in the city and in its legal status.

7. The rejection of Israel policy which strives to bring in geographical, demographic and judicial changes in the areas which were occupied in 1967.

8. The right to security within the framework of secure borders on the basis of mutual recognition of the right with the neighbor states. The only positive point. I say, this is positive, whatever it means. It is subject to interpretation. But it is

written positively.

9. The right to liquidate, to cancel, all the steps which contradict the conventions of Geneva.

10. The right to liquidate the settlements which contradict the international law concerning occupied territories.

11. The right to bring into realization the Geneva conventions in full in occupied territories until a general arrangement and retreat or withdrawal of Israel from those territories takes place.

Now, General Aly, my dear friend, this is called the Egyptian plan.

DR. GHALI: There is a mistake. You have to check your translator. They are not in order. It is not a plan. Chota.

MR. BEGIN: What does that mean?

DR. GHALI: Which is "conduct". A basic difference.

MR. BEGIN: I will accept any translation.

DR. GHALI: It is not a plan. There is a word el-chot and chota, which means line or conduct. Plan is something completely different.

MR. BEGIN: I have the word in Hebrew "plan". I accept yours. Line of what, of conduct?

DR. GHALI: Which is completely different from a plan.

MR. BEGIN: All right, let it be conduct. I accept your interpretation of the Arabic because I don't know the language. It doesn't matter. There are the 11 points. I want to tell you, General Aly, I am a citizen of Israel. Those 11 points, what do they mean to

me. not as a Prime Minister, as a citizen of Israel? The beginning of the destruction of the State of Israel. And I would like you to know, because, Dr. Ghali will bear me out, I showed him that map. You can see from afar; you can see the mountainous part to the west of the Jordan River, which flows from the Kinneret Lake in the north to the Dead Sea in the south, or to the east from the Mediterranean. Up there is the part of the land which we call Samaria, the historic name, and down to the south is Judea. Now, the line which resisted in 1967 was the line in the valley, beneath all those mountains and hills. The distance between that so-called green line and the sea-shore is 8 miles at the widest point, 13 kms. Now, the PLO has already missiles with a range of 21.6 kms; Soviet guns with a range of 27 kms. Now I was told by our military intelligence men, the deputy military intelligence director, that already they have also 180 mm guns with a range of 42.8 kms. With all those weapons they can reach from those mountains every city, town, village and township in that valley of the Mediterranean in which two-thirds of our civilian population lives. If I say to you, as a military man, as a strategist, you will understand that there won't be any crazy cabinet in this country which will ever agree to return to that line and ever agree to have a Palestinian state built up on those mountains. It is a mortal danger to us. I said so to Lord Carrington; I said so to President Mitterrand; I say so to you and to Dr. Ghali. Britains, Frenchmen, Egyptians are not going to be killed by the Palestinian State. The Israelis are going to be killed by that Palestinian State -

en masse, in the thousands, as we were killed for 19 years, through incursions during those days. Those days when they didn't have those weapons. Now they have those weapons. We have to take into consideration the changes which took place in the meantime.

Now to proclaim to 80 countries that this is the line of conduct which Egypt suggests: we should return to that green line, a Palestinian State in Judea and Samaria - the West Bank - and in the Gaza District - and all the other points: this is the beginning of the end of our State. Are we going to acquiesce? Are we going to accept? Why on the eve of our decisive step to return to the international border should such a plan be proclaimed? As the Catholics say "Urbi et Orbi". Why? In Kuwait and to us. Urbi is in Kuwait and Orbi is to us.

DR. GHALI: I can give you a list of threats coming from your side, that you will re-occupy the Sinai in 24 hours.

MR. BEGIN: If you breach. What do you want?

DR. GHALI: This is a threat. Mr. Ezer Weizman said it.

MR. BEGIN: Let me speak.

DR. GHALI: You are the Prime Minister. I am just a minister.

MR. BEGIN: You are my guest. I want to hear; but hear me out. I didn't yet finish. I only want to say, when Ezer Weizman, whom you love so much, who is to you a symbol of the love of peace, said, one day, if the Egyptians should breach the Peace Treaty, in no time we shall be back to Sinai.

DR. GHALI: It is a threat.

MR. BEGIN: He said, if you breach. Didn't I tell you on

Friday, Dr. Ghali, compliance will bring compliance. Non-compliance will cause non-compliance. This is international law. Everybody knows. If you sign a peace treaty, there is reciprocity, in both directions, to keep the peace and to guard the peace treaty and execute these provisions. So the same should the other side do. If it is not so, the other side is absolutely entitled not to accept it. Absolutely. Without any qualification whatsoever.

Now, I got a letter from President Mubarak. We analyzed it with the American Friends. I want to tell you, General Aly and Dr. Ghali, that since we got the information from Deputy Secretary Stoessel, the situation which now prevails between our two countries is very serious. We speak always with candor, always. President Sadat used to open his heart to me. I used to open my heart to him. He told me at the time about the crack-down. Nobody heard it from me. He knew that I will keep the secret. I used to speak to him freely about everything, even about our tradition, about Jerusalem. So I talk to you with complete candor.

I would like you to know that after we heard Mr. Stoessel, the Deputy Secretary, yesterday about his talks in Cairo, there is a serious situation between our two countries. Why? Because he reported to us like this: he brought to you a certain document which had to correct the moral, political situation, but you didn't want to discuss it even. You said, we cannot even discuss it. The President said the same. Then Mr. Stoessel produced to you an American document, that the President of the United States will make

a certain statement. Both countries will say, we accept its contents. The President rejected it on the spot. As far as Dr. Magid's speech and those 11 points of conduct are concerned, you said you didn't know anything about it. The President said he didn't know anything about it. If you didn't know anything about it, so it is a personal statement by Dr. Magid. Why don't you say so? That it doesn't reflect the point of view of the Egyptian government? But you don't. If you don't, it means that this is the statement of policy by the Egyptian government, as proclaimed Urbi et Orbi, to 80 countries, and there is no correction of it.

In the letter to me by President Mubarak, the word "autonomy" is not mentioned at all. Yes, Sir. Read it. I can read it to you. Only comprehensive -

DR. GHALI: Framework for peace in the Middle East.

MR. BEGIN: Comprehensive peace. 11 points are the comprehensive peace, in your interpretation? That interpretation I heard the first evening from President Sadat at Camp David. I said, when President Carter asked me, what is your opinion? I said, Mr. President, totally unacceptable. I will go home tomorrow. A Palestinian state - self-determination means a state; withdrawal to line of June 1967; control of the Gaza Strip by Egypt and of the West Bank by Jordan, etc. etc. Add President Sadat had to withdraw his document. Now you come back to that document which was withdrawn. Otherwise, there wouldn't have been agreement in Camp David.

We decided on Autonomy, five years of a transitional period,

withdrawal of the military government, a withdrawal of our forces, the remaining forces into specified security locations. That is what we agreed. That is the soul of our agreement. This is not mentioned at all.

So there is no correction of the most severe breach of all. This is in complete contradiction to the Camp David Agreement. This is hostile propaganda of the worst sort; to say to us that in the wake of our withdrawal to the international border there will start a time in which our friend, Egypt, will ask us to go back to the green line, to form a Palestinian State on those mountains, to risk our very existence.

So, therefore, General Aly and Dr. Ghali, I would like to inform you that we made a suggestion to correct the situation, a sincere suggestion. You didn't want even to discuss it. I am not speaking about the affrontry of such an attitude. It is perhaps for the Americans to decide because we didn't produce the document to you. They, the Americans, produced to you their document. You didn't even want to discuss it. If you don't want to discuss it, how will you correct the situation?

Now, it is my duty to tell you, General Aly and Dr. Ghali, that for the last ten days we have a serious debate among our people, whether in the face of the breaches of both the Peace Treaty and the Camp David Agreement, we can withdraw to the international border or we cannot. Some of my friends already drew their conclusion and said, we cannot; we must not; it will endanger our very

existence in the future. We are being led astray. Some of our best friends. Today I am going to meet seven members of Parliament of my Party and they will demand it of me. There are also members of the Opposition who say so. There is in the last few weeks a development in Egypt which changed completely our relationship, or as really Mr. Veliotis said, a deep crisis of confidence arose between us. How can we rely on the future if Dr. Magid, an official representative, makes such statements? To say that this is a maneuver. What? On our account, maneuvers? On account of our future, of our existence? This is no maneuver to us. We cannot play with words. It is our life, not yours. Again, I repeat, no Egyptian will get killed if a Palestinian State is there on the mountains. But we shall be killed. Our blood will be shed. I said so also to Lord Carrington. He understood. I said so to the President of France. You must all understand what is the difference between us. You live in Egypt - God bless you. You don't have the PLO. Excuse me, you have offices of the PLO, even a base at El Arish. Why you allow a base of the PLO to sit on our border, I don't understand.. Why should you allow an implacable enemy of our country and people. They want to destroy us. They say so. Arafat just lately made several speeches. I heard him even. I know about better oratory. I wouldn't say that he is a certain Demosthenes, but still he is making speeches. Blood; only blood he wants. Shed their blood, he shouts all the time. What are we deaf or what? Why do you keep a base of PLO in El Arish? I don't understand. Why shouldn't you close it?

However, again I go into the main point. There is now a deep crisis of confidence between us because of that development which was not corrected. Any proposal made by us or the Americans to correct was rejected by you yesterday. So I have to tell you, and don't, please, Dr. Ghali, use the word "blackmail". I heard it twice, once from Dr. El-Baz, who is a very able man, as you know, as I know, a very able lawyer, and then from you, and it is not proper to use such a word. We don't insult you in our talks. What kind of blackmail? We don't black mail you. We speak to you in candor and in pain. We have deep respect for your people. We have a deep sentiment for the Egyptian people. I say to my friends, the Egyptian people is a good people, good-hearted people, and they want peace and they don't want another war with us. We don't want war. We want to live at peace. We gave you back Santa Katerian and El Arish weeks ahead of the time. We gave you back all that part of Sinai, with the oil, with the two airfields already transferred to you. Now we have this problem in Yamit. No nation ever faced such a problem. Some of the best of our people barricaded themselves and they are prepared to die, as they say. And we have to evacuate them. And Arik brought in their 4,000 of our soldiers, two brigades, to evacuate them. We are doing it today. Nobody should speak about blackmailing you. But candor. It is our duty to speak to you with candor. It is our duty you should know the situation. We must correct this breach of the Peace Treaty and the contradictions of the Camp David Agreement..

If it is not corrected, General Aly, on Wednesday we shall

hold a Cabinet session. I don't want to prejudice its decision. It is a democratic cabinet based on parliamentary rules. The majority will decide, but I have to tell you in advance, also the President, the Cabinet may decide to postpone our withdrawal until the 25th of May, 14 hours Greenwich meantime, in the hope that you will during those four intervening weeks correct the situation which was not corrected yet; to the contrary, it became even more severe because you rejected every proposal. You didn't even want to discuss that proposal. That is not the way to deal with us. And it is not a threat. There is a situation which we have to explain to you and the President should know in advance that that may happen. I don't say that it will. I don't know what the opinion of my colleagues will be. But there is such a possibility. I told so the Americans today.

I want to add a few words about the Americans. They are friends and allies. If you ever thought that the US of American can order us to withdraw, you are mistaken. They can't. I don't think they can give orders to you. Neither can they give orders to us. They can't. And if we decide, the decision will be carried out. So this is what I want to tell you in full sincerity. Now you know the situation. And let us discuss the possibility- of rectifying it because we want peace. We want to carry out our commitment. I said to Dr. Ghali, complaine will bear complaine; non-complaine will bear non-complaine. But we prefer the former. Complaine and complaine. Thank you for your attention.

GENERAL ALY: Thank you very much.

DR. GHALI: In other words, you don't consider the letter of President Mubarak as a rectification?

MR. BEGIN: Surely not. It is a rectification on the issue of smuggling of arms.; a certain rectification about the demilitarized zone. There is no rectification whatsoever about the Autonomy negotiations and about the 11 points which mean the beginning of the destruction of the Jewish State.

GENERAL ALY: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for clarifying all these feelings which you have. And I see my duty now to clarify many things which have maybe been misinterpreted in these very sensitive days. Maybe I will start with the meeting between Stoessel, the Deputy Minister, and President Mubarak yesterday. And I see that there is some difference in interpretation of this meeting. When Mr. Stoessel showed me the proposed declaration or letter - document - we discussed everything. But the essence that was in the meeting with President Mubarak was that we have already agreed or signed the Treaty ratified by the People's Assembly, the three main documents for normalization, 40 agreements, and President Mubarak didn't consider the speech of Dr. Magid as a divergence in our policy, because really, and very sincerely, he didn't read it. All the directives that Dr. El-Magid had is that our policy is clear and you have to clarify this in Kuwait. And be sure that no condemnation of Camp David; be sure that the MFO will not be condemned in this conference. That was the whole directive. And that's why President Mubarak saw that any additional written agreement will add nothing to the Treaty. It will add

nothing; only, I will not use the word "black mail" at all, but it will bear the feeling in Egypt of humiliation, and not blackmail. Humiliation.

MR. BEGIN: I didn't make the speech, General Aly. I read it.

GENERAL ALY: I quite agree. But, believe me, in this spirit that Mr. Mubarak said, in principle, you can find this humiliation in Egypt. I do not want to start the good relations with Israel after the withdrawal with such a document which will be considered a humiliation.

MR. BEGIN: Why? Where is the humiliation?

GENERAL ALY: This is the spirit. I said it very sincerely. And that is why, in principle, he said, it is not needed. We will respect our commitment. We will respect the 40 agreements signed by both of us, and he didn't at all look at this speech, because he didn't read it, believe me. He didn't see any change in our policy. Only he looked at the positive achievements in this conference, that for the first time we are asking the people for peace; that for the first time security between the Arab countries and Israel; for the first time no condemnation of Camp David; for the first time no condemnation and the omission of the MFO on the list of proposed subjects to discuss. He looks at this only. Maybe I started with this because it is very essential to know the spirit. I know that if you would have met with President Mubarak, that you will both solve everything.

MR. BEGIN: How can I meet him? He doesn't want to come to

Jerusalem. It is our capital, General Aly. Our Parliament, our President. I sit here. Where should I go to meet Mr. Mubarak, President Mubarak? To Tel Aviv?

GENERAL ALY: Maybe Mr. Stoessel has learned from President Mubarak his intentions; that he was aiming to maybe spend the night in Tel Aviv but come to visit you and come to visit the President. That's very normal.

MR. BEGIN: About the night, I already told you: it's not my business where a man spends his night (laughter). I never ask such a question.

GENERAL ALY: But as I mentioned to you, Mr. Prime Minister, the last time, there was an intention to have a working visit for the first time. This was the spirit. Maybe I misinterpreted this with Moshe (Sassoo). God forgive me.

DR. GHALI: You are sharing the responsibility. You are a Minister and he is only an Ambassador.

GENERAL ALY: So that's the spirit, Mr. Prime Minister, believe me. Then about this office in El Arish. It is not an office.

MR. BEGIN: It is a base.

GENERAL ALY: It is not a base. It is a building where they meet and yesterday they were arrested because we got information, the good information from your Intelligence.

MR. BEGIN: It was a base. You arrested them.

GENERAL ALY: Believe me, Mr. Prime Minister, they were

under our surveillance. They were surveyed and they were spotted and we were glad that we had gotten the information. We got information about four. We didn't find the names of two, but the other two were arrested. So this is the sincerity in the implementation of the agreement, and hopefully through the borders, which will be secured very well on both sides that nothing will be infiltrated on both sides also. So this is the sense, Mr. Prime Minister. Maybe Dr .Ghali can say something.

As for the Autonomy, we told our friends, the Americans yesterday, add President Mubarak said to Mr. Stoessel: any time you want the Autonomy talks to be resumed, we are ready. Any time. So it is our interest to show, as I mentioned before, <sup>to</sup> the whole world that Camp David is not a dead horse, as they say. It is alive. And it will continue. That's our will. And Mr. Prime Minister, we are aiming to build on Camp David. This is the real thing. If we have, and it is not a secret, we have an office of the PLO in Cairo. We do not deny this. When they were bombed and there was an explosion in Beirut, late President Sadat told them, we are ready to send medicines and doctors, and even they, the brother of Yasser Arafat asked for that and when were prepared everything, they gave a statement that we will not accept anything from Egypt. Thank you. We do not send anything. For only humanitarian reasons. But no cooperation whatsoever in any activity. Maybe we are trying to convince politically the PLO and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to live together, to learn to live together, to solve the problem peacefully by negotiations. And that's where we are aiming to come to achieve

the Autonomy Talks, to come to agreement on principle, which can encourage these people to come together on a peaceful solution with us, both of us. That's our endeavor.

(Dr. Ghali cited a joke told about Mr. Begin in Egypt; whereupon Mr. Begin mentioned the reference to him as "Shylock" in Egyptian press.)

GENERAL ALY: Mr. Prime Minister, many great leaders are attacked from here and there. This is a sign of leadership, and believe me, yesterday, for instance, President Mubarak told Mr. Stoessel: we have great confidence in Mr. Begin. We respect the man very deeply.

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Stoessel told me so. Even that the President spelled out the word "respect" - re-s-p-e-c-t.

GENERAL ALY: That's true. In capitals. (Laughter)

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Stoessel was very accurate in his report.

GENERAL ALY: So these are the feelings, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: I am a friend of Mr. Mubarak. He knows it very well, and we want peace with your people and with your country and to be friends with your government, General Aly. But you don't let us. There was a kind of a turn-about only two, three weeks ago. Arik, my friend, asked several times in the Cabinet session: why do the Egyptians do it? They at least should be silent. Our people are literate. They read. Now from Yamit comes a cable, from the barricade: Before we die we want to tell you, Egypt will never make peace with you. I got a cable. It is in all the press today. Why? We read the

statements of Egypt, of Egyptian leaders. How can you rely on that? These are the questions we are being asked. Defence Minister?

MR. SHARON: We have talked seriously four days ago when I was in Cairo. I came then and we had four major problems. One is the political problem and that was the subject the Prime Minister was discussing now. And, as I said, about this point, the Prime Minister will find a way how to present it to you. The Prime Minister did it through the American Deputy Secretary of State and then talking to Dr. Butros Ghali and, of course, today to both of you.

I brought up another subject that worried us maybe more than anything else when it comes to the military side of our future relations, and that is the cooperation with the terrorist organization, and I understood then that we knew that you had a PLO office. It is not that we like it, but there are offices in many other countries. Therefore, I do not refer to that so much as to the, I would say, operational cooperation with the terrorist organization, and I emphasized several fields of activity; one which was a completely new one which we never saw before and that is the decision by the Egyptian high-level authorities to transfer to terrorist organization information collected by the Egyptian Embassy, and we are talking very frankly. We know that embassies are usually collecting information. I think, I hope, that our Ambassador in Cairo is also active in that. Otherwise, we have to replace him.

MR. BEGIN: 'Arik wants to say that Ambassadors have developed intellectual curiosity. By the nature, they are curious people.

MR. SHARON: Some times they produce some other means for that. But it was a high-level decision to transfer this information to the terrorists and general information about Israel and specifically information about Israel's intentions in Lebanon. Our plans against terrorist organizations in Lebanon. That was one side. The other side was a certain logistics supply.

Then I emphasized about the smuggling of weapons, hand-grenades, explosives, arms into Gaza. And I came back in all our discussions that we were discussing of dangers of terrorism in both countries and looking at terrorism as a starting line for overall wars, and that is what developed after our War of Independence. I believe that without terrorist activity, that we would have avoided a circle of wars that last for 25 years. And I reminded that we discussed several times, the last time on the 16th of March, here in this room, when the Prime Minister asked you to make an effort to stop this smuggling of arms, and I mentioned the figure of about 500 hand-grenades and so on, and I discussed the Prime Minister's meeting with the late President Sadat in August 1981, and the promise of the late Sadat to cooperate. As a matter of fact, this cooperation started then, but after President Sadat was assassinated, it stopped. And I emphasized the dangers of this cooperation with terrorist organizations. That was, I would say, the second subject I raised.

Then I raised the subject of violating forces in Sinai, mostly in Zone B, and partially in Zone C, because the buffer zone is already Zone C, and there are two border guards, companies, in the

buffer zone. And I brought to you a map, with all our complaints, and I told the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that when I put it to you, you were, I would say, very kind to say that you are going to correct this deployment, and as far as we know you made an effort. As a matter of fact, this effort has not been accomplished yet. There are some things which should be changed. Again I explained what is the danger. I talked about the asymmetric situation, that for you it is much easier than for us, and I reminded that we were talking about this, sitting on the beach in Alexandria, in the summer of 1979, we were discussing already this question then; this asymmetric situation, where for you it is a logistic situation; for us, in order to exercise our right, it means to go to war. And that is a very hard decision, and mostly it is done gradually, step by step. Because today if you are allowed to keep 230 tanks and one day we will find 260, are we going to drag a nation to war for 30 tanks? Israel, with all its military? What if it will be 300 tanks? Therefore, I always said, and repeat it again, be careful; don't do it. And again, being in Cairo, I reminded of the conversation I had with the General then, Field Marshall today, Field Marshall Abu Ghazala. A conversation took place in January this year when I came with the list of violations. I had with me then General Tamir and Brig. Sion, both together with me, and General Abu Ghazala explained and said - this was after the assassination of the late President Sadat - and he explained that the

army is the most loyal element to the regime, to the peace and so on. And we have to be very careful and not to offend the army. I answered that I understood that. And I told him, People, you've got time, - it was January - but don't leave it to the last minute because we will not accept it. I am just now repeating all our talk on Thursday. Altogether, I am repeating things that we have been talking about for years, and I think I told President Mubarak that in the last meeting in the Parliament of the Security and Foreign Affairs, I counted more than 40 meetings where we were discussing or complaining about violating forces in Sinai and about the smuggling of arms.

I mentioned the letter of our Prime Minister, the visit of General Abu Hafex, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, who we knew from the war and whom we like. He was a guest. I think he enjoyed it very much. We were talking to him about that and then our Chief-of-Staff wrote a letter to him, with all the list. What I learned, sitting there in the last meeting, that the Chief-of-Staff not only gave a list of violations, but he also gave a map. Suddenly, I looked at the table and I saw a map there. You remember that we discussed the question of maps. I had been asking: how you managed to get the map in the Yom Kippur War. Suddenly, I see another map. So I thought I found the answer. (Laughter) You had the map and the list. And again, I asked my friend, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about two weeks ago, David Kimche, on his trip to Egypt - it was a private trip - Dave, talk to our friends; correct it immediately, because we are approaching the date of the 25th of

April. We will not be able to withdraw. That's what I told him, unless it will be changed. I must say that in the last three days, or since I came there, you made a great effort.

I asked General Sagi to join us at lunchtime in order to bring the rest of the cases that have not been done yet and that should be done. But I want to tell you that I think you must be very careful, because if you move troops to Zone A or west of the Canal, but they leave there equipment, they leave there weapons and do things like that, you know, you just create further suspicion here in this country.

You remember I told President Mubarak, that you were not reading correctly the map in Israel. It is not only that you have problems. We have problems. We have tremendous problems. You know, all the time you talk to us about your problems, and we are friends now four years. We meet each other. We know the families. So many things happened. But we feel that you don't read the map of the feelings in Israel at the present time. So that was the second problem.

I don't want to waste time here on details. The principle is important. Everything should be corrected. And please, control your troops to the lowest eschelon. Don't create a situation where we will suspect, because if we will suspect, we would like to know. What what will we do? We will try to fly. If we fly, it will be a violation. If it will be a violation, we will find ourselves in war. So, please, don't do it. That's the third point.

The fourth was the demarcation of the border. I brought the Prime Minister's plan, which I think was forthcoming, a genuine

one. I think one that you could have accepted immediately, though we are sure about the borders. As about that, we know where the border is. I remember what we talked about sitting in Etzion. I looked at your face. You were surprised that everything was ready to be handed to the Egyptians. When you came to the airport, to Etzion airport, I think you yourself were surprised. Everything was ready to be handed.

(A book by Martin Gilbert was handed to Mr. Sharon.)

I think that we were flying over the border and you saw our preparations, the road, the positions, the barbed wire fences of the security system that we built in Rafah, in all these places. You saw it yourself. You knew that we were going to do it. So we know the border. And being in Egypt, I told you that I was not a supporter of this idea, because I think that the Prime Minister went too far in order to help you find a solution. My position was much harder on that. You are talking about your land. It is not your land. Why is it your land? It is our land. That's how we see it. And we were sitting there and I brought Dr. Adler, the head of the            ? Department. I had never seen him before. He was talking about the 15 points on the border. He was very convincing. He was not less convincing than the people you brought. All the time you give us the feeling that we are taking your land. We are not taking your land. What the Prime Minister was trying to do is to find a solution that will enable us to come to the international boundary on the 25th of April, but you were keeping all the time pressuring in order to force us to do more. We cannot do more about that. Kamal, we cannot do

more about that. ? showing the famous map which shows the village of Taba is in Egypt. Did we ever claim the village of Taba? We are together there.

GENERAL ALY: Is it a village?

MR. SHARON: Used to be a village. The ruins. The well. That was the fourth question. I said that we came forward, I think. I couldn't find such a proposal which will go so far towards Egypt. So these were the problems. Look, I am a believer in the people, but people, you must make an effort. Don't try to pressure us to the corner. Don't push us.

GENERAL ALY: Can I respond?

MR. SHARON: I think that Mr. El Baz found this book. I would have suggested some better book.

MR. BEGIN: The author says the thesis is mistaken. It is not as it was interpreted.

GENERAL ALY: Mr. Prime Minister, I started by life as a Second Lieutenant working in patrols to the left of the Eighth Army in the western desert, for about three years, from 1942 to 1945. And then afterwards they thought that I might be helpful - I'm sorry to speak about myself but this is an introduction to something else. Then afterwards, I was assigned as an instructor for land navigation and topography for three years in the army corps school. And when actually I visited the borderline with Arik, I was quite convinced, as you were, that this is our land, because any technical person who can read the map and see that point 91 is on a ridge, on a height, which is about 296 feet over the sea. You will never find this in the valley of Taba - never. And then this was the map, the

description and the drawing on the map and at last on the ground there was the cone; there was the railway pillar and everything. So the ground, the map, the description. So I was quite convinced as Arik was that this is our land. He sees it as Israeli land. This is a technical dispute and a technical difference and now I see that we are very near to how to solve the problem. We are very near, thanks to your effort with the Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: I suggest, because we want to finish this problem - then I have another proposal to make to you and I still have meetings, and you have to meet the Americas, as they told me. I said to our American friends, I suggest as follows: after my talk with Dr. Ghali, that we agree that negotiations were exhausted on the Taba problem.

MR. BLY: Fine.

MR. BEGIN: In accordance with Article VII of the Peace Treaty, there is now a stage which is called conciliation. Maybe we shall not accept the judgment of, let's say, a commission of three, which by agreement we shall appoint. Maybe we shall not agree. If we agree the problem is solved. If we don't agree, we will pass immediately to agreed arbitration. We take upon ourselves a previous commitment to fulfill any judgment by the arbitrator or arbitrators. Time limit is not mentioned in the Peace Treaty. We cannot accept it. But what is the problem of time limit? You can always urge your representative, or the third man, do it quicker; do it in a week; do it in two - I don't know - in a month. We shall

not urge him to delay. Not at all. But how can we say two months or three months? Perhaps it will take 3-1/2 months. It is not in the Peace Treaty. Therefore, we don't accept time limits. We never accepted time limits. We were right. A target was suggested to us, after the Camp David. We didn't accept. We were right. We didn't stand by the year. It is already now 2-1/2 years and we didn't reach an agreement on the Autonomy. Why, to create artificial limits, which aren't fulfilled? You can urge them to do it as quickly as possible. We will not say a word to stop it, to do it slower. Not at all.

Then the question of what is the term "life goes on". So I suggested, as we are members of government, should we deal with such details? Let there be a commission of two and two, and they will decide. Then Dr. Ghali was quite, may I say, outspoken, if not obstinate, that the hotel must be paralyzed. Why should the hotel be paralyzed? I don't understand. As we already said to each other: there are beautiful girls. Why shouldn't they stay there in a good hotel. What is the problem? Life cannot be frozen. But even if details should be considered, let us pass it to a commission. This is the accepted pattern in all international conferences. Presidents pass to the prime minister; foreign ministers to their experts, etc. and usually there is a judgment. So it will take another time, but it will be solved. Arik says, our land; you said, your land. What's the result? Let them make a compromise. There is no other way. I don't suggest a compromise to divide the land. What I suggest is to find a way out of the debacle.

DR. GHALI: We have done a study and I will send it to you: the last 20 or 30 arbitrations or conciliations which have been agreed now in Western Europe and everywhere, all of them have a time limit.

MR. BEGIN: But in our Peace Treaty, there is no limit.

DR. GHALI: In our Peace Treaty, we are talking about conciliation and we are talking about arbitration. The practice in conciliation and arbitration is a time limit. This is my only argument, which I am giving to a lawyer, one lawyer to another lawyer.

MR. BEGIN: It is not a convincing argument. We speak about a specific document, our Peace Treaty. The practice in Europe, I don't know. Perhaps they wrote in the document about time limits. I don't know. I didn't study it, I will study your document. In our Peace Treaty, there is no time limit. Why should we impose a time limit? Urge them to do it quickly. I don't oppose it.

MR. SHAMIR: I wanted to raise one point only, because we don't have enough time. We know that there is a trend in certain Arab circles in a few Arab countries to start to accept the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, especially our withdrawal from Sinai - this part of the Treaty. But they don't accept and they are not ready to accept at any price the Autonomy. It is a fact. And we know that because Egypt is now striving to renew relations with Arab countries, there are many thoughts about this direction and this is the cause of our sensitivity to the fact that, for instance, in the last letter of President Mubarak, the Autonomy was not mentioned. You

have said in this conversation a few times that President Mubarak believes in the Autonomy, Camp David. Let him declare it. It is very important for us. It is very important. Let us remove all suspicions. Why not? And let us find the way for it.

MR. BEGIN: I produced this draft (indicating) to the  
and  
Americans, /Mr. Stoessel said it is a constructive contribution. I want to assure you, General Aly, we never wanted to humiliate you and we don't agree that you should humiliate us. You have your honor and we have our honor, and honor should be mutually respected. Now we want to try to find a way. Yesterday we got the report from Mr. Stoessel: you didn't want to discuss one document, another document. Now, I prepared another draft. My colleagues accepted it. I will read it out to you. The suggestion is that the President of the United States of America with the approval of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of the Prime Minister of Israel makes a certain statement to the effect or declares - the preamble is like this: "The President of the United States of America with the approval of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of the Prime Minister of Israel, declares", or states, whatever:

"Upon the completion of the withdrawal of all Israel's armed forces and civilians behind the international boundary between Egypt and Mandated Palestine ...."you will remember this is the wording of the Peace Treaty, word by word, and now you have here a reaffirmation of our commitment to withdraw behind that border or that boundary. The continuation is: "...the only plan to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and

the Gaza District..." In your language the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I put in both versions because we agreed to it at Camp David that everybody will use his language, which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned..." because I couldn't say "the three governments". Jordan is invited and we hope they will join and also Palestinians may participate in your delegation. I hope they will join. We will have to agree to their representation. But they were also invited. I use the general term "the Parties concerned", whatever they are. Now it is the United States, Egypt and Israel. Tomorrow it may be also Jordan, and certain Palestinians participating in your delegation. "...between the parties concerned will be that of full Autonomy for these inhabitants, as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord."

Everybody in my opinion can accept it. This is the exact wording of both the Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accord. Full autonomy. To resolve. This is written in the resolution.

Take this copy. Consider it during lunchtime. If you want to meet us again, please let us know. When the sun sets, we cannot continue our talks. It will be the Remembrance Day for our fallen brethren, six million of our people. If you want until sunset still to meet at my residence, at any time, I will be at your disposal. And the Americans asked that we agree that you should meet. Greatest of pleasure. Please meet the Americans. But I would like my colleagues to give you a proper lunch.

(The meeting adjourned at 2:15 p.m.)

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Meeting between

The Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin  
and

Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
General Kamal Hassan Aly

Monday, April 19, 1982, 5:00 p.m.  
Prime Minister's Residence  
Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel:

Mr. Ariel Sharon  
Dr. Yehuda Ben-Meir  
Mr. David Kimche  
Ambassador Moshe Sasson  
Aluf Abrasha Tamir  
Brig. Dov Sion  
Mr. Divon  
Mr. Yehuda Avner  
Mr. Don Meridor  
Mr. Zvi Kedar  
Mr. Eli Rubinstein

others

For Egypt:


Dr. Boutros Ghali  
Ambassador Sa'ad Mortada  
Admiral Hamdi  
Mr. Fawzi

others

H.E. MR. BEGIN: Mr. Shamir can't be here. He is attending  
a memorial meeting.

So, General Aly, yours is the floor.

GENERAL ALY: Mr. Prime Minister, I was really thinking  
just when we met or even before that I may give a statement before,  
in the airport, before leaving the country, concentrating on the  
issues which are of a concern in Israel, and this is as just giving  
the spirit in the two countries. This is one. Concentrating on the  
bilateral relations, the normalization, which will carry on after the  
25th as well, and on the Autonomy, which we are looking forward to



resume after the 25th as well. This is one way of clarifying our position, and the stability of our policy, which will never change.

Then I was thinking with my colleague, Dr. Boutros, about the possibility of another alternative with this statement of President Reagan. Of course, we will convey this to our President and thinking also of another alternative. You rightly said that the last letter of President Mubarak didn't include the Autonomy. It didn't include, but this was, in my opinion, and I am quite sure of that, it was not intended. What about if President Mubarak might - I will raise this with him - might send a follow-up letter, telling that we are committed to the negotiations for the full Autonomy?

MR. BEGIN: The form will be alright with me.

GENERAL ALY: All right.

MR. BEGIN: Only the contents. Because every word plays a role. If we could agree that what I write, or perhaps the whole contents of it, and this contents will be in the form of a follow-up letter; that following my letter of - the date - I would like to inform you that, etc. etc. I can even make it easier. I can today give you my reply to President Mubarak's letter and he will answer my letter.

GENERAL ALY: Very thankful.

MR. BEGIN: I owe you now a reply and he will then again reply.

GENERAL ALY: All right. That's excellent.

MR. BEGIN: It will be the proper procedure. I can do it. But my letter will be short in this case (Laughter), and then these words, you will repeat: thank you for your letter, etc.

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MR. DIVON: You agree to the text proposed by the Prime Minister?

DR. GHALI: We will find something which corresponds to what the Prime Minister has in mind.

MR. BEGIN: Did you tell the Americans that this may be a second way?

GENERAL ALY: Actually, we were thinking together, Boutros and myself loudly, and we said to them about that. They said, well whatever you agree upon, we are satisfied. So as you rightly mentioned, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. BEGIN: I will compose now a letter to the President and he will answer, including those words.

About Taba -


GENERAL ALY: This is the only remaining issue, Mr. Prime Minister. Now, about the fixed time again. We are not asking for a target date, because we are now complexed about a target date. Maybe if we just give a fixed date to the conciliation and arbitration, this would be very helpful, because we know that - and maybe Dr. Ghali knows more about the arbitration and conciliation, more than I do. I am not a lawyer. And maybe he could keep this case in his office, as he mentioned, about two or three years -

MR. BEGIN: You have the document, about the European precedent?

DR. GHALI: I have nothing. I will send it over.

MR. BEGIN: We shall have our Cabinet meeting on Wednesday.

(Mr. Sharon joined the meeting.)



MR. BEGIN: Clarification of the problem of the Autonomy (speaking to Mr. Sharon). Our friends consulted each other and they don't reject the idea of the President of the United States making this declaration. But they brought up a second possibility that the President of Egypt writes to me a letter, which will include that short statement I drafted, and then I make the following suggestion, that as President Mubarak wrote to me a letter, I will answer his letter and then he will send to me an answer to my letter, which is more natural than that he at his initiative writes to me a second letter without receiving a reply. That will be included in the letter of President Mubarak. I think it is reasonable. We can accept it. Both forms are good.

MR. SHARON: May I just ask: where is the American commitment. Sorry. You don't mind if we consult.

MR. BEGIN: It is a good remark. What we are going to say now: I will get in touch now with Mr. Stoessel that the American President can write two letters, one to President Mubarak and one to me, also with the same intent. It will come at the same time or have a difference of a few hours. It doesn't matter much. The American President can write to both of us saying that he is glad to note that such and such letters were exchanged between your President and myself.

GENERAL ALY: All right.

MR. BEGIN: He informs us that he is glad to note.

MR. SHARON: I don't worry about the Egyptian side. I worry about the American side. I don't see the American commitment  
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now.

MR. BEGIN: If the President writes me a letter that he is glad to note that President Mubarak wrote the following letter and if he writes to President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Israel received from you such and such a letter; that's a commitment.

MR. SHARON: How are both of us going to be secured from the American side? I would say, how Egypt and Israel; what guarantees both of us will have against the possibility that the Americans will come with another proposal?

MR. BEGIN: I am glad to note -

GENERAL ALY: Arik always said that we are free countries. We can manage without any interference from the Americans. So we can implement this.


MR. BEGIN: The President of the United States will write to us, expressing his satisfaction, glad to note that such and such.

DR. BEN-MEIR: This is an American commitment to remain committed.

MR. BEGIN: And the US is also committed to the very same; reaffirms its own commitment. The American President said several times, made such statement.

DR. GHALI: You have an exchange of letters, double letters, sent next day of the Treaty, that he offered the guarantee of the U.S. to the implementation of the treaty. You have a double letter which was signed on the 26th of March.

MR. BEGIN: We shall arrange it now with the Americans now on the phone.



So about Taba. Let us now talk. Do you accept conciliation, arbitration? What do you suggest?

GENERAL ALY: Only to have some fixed date. We know that the hotel will not be finished before August. I think we have plenty of time for conciliation and arbitration even during these three months, because the issue is a very slight and technical one and it can be finalized very easily. So just if we can put a fixed date, not a target date, a fixed date for the conciliation and the arbitration. I think it would be very helpful, Mr. Prime Minister.

MR. SHARON: I would not fix any time for that. Both sides will urge to conclude, but I don't see any reason why we - then we are going to be again under pressure. I would say that it should be agreed arbitration. We have to agree about the arbitrator. They may discuss the question of the arbitrator for 10 years -

GENERAL ALY: That's why.

MR. SHARON: You will propose your kadi; we will propose our rabbi.

DR. GHALI: This is exactly what we want to avoid.

MR. BEGIN: He gave only an example.

MR. SHARON: Nobody thought seriously about the rabbi. About the Kadi -

GENERAL ALY: Actually, we want to start the new era without any disputes, without any affects against the feelings here or there. That's our intention in fact, and as I see it, as I was telling your Excellency today, as a professional in topography, it is a very slight issue, which can be technically solved, very easily.

DR. GHALI: Again, Mr. Prime Minister, we don't want to do anything without your permission. We know it is a democratic country. We have no objection to get in contact with the owner of the hotel and discuss with him the possibility of cooperation with him after the event.

(Private discussion by respective delegations.)

MR. SHARON: Boutros, can I ask a question? When I see your achievements, I would like to have you as my legal adviser. What is going to be in President Mubarak's letter? The Prime Minister will send a letter; the Prime Minister writes beautiful letters. So what will be in President Mubarak's letter? What are we going to get back in this letter?

DR. GHALI: You said this morning that this letter mentioned nothing about the tripartite negotiations about Camp David. The President will mention in the new letter a reassurance which was not in this letter, reassurance that we respect Camp David, reassuring that we will continue the negotiations. It will be a kind of amendment to this letter.

MR. SHARON: I want to understand one thing: how this paper that was presented to you this morning, how it is going to come as part of President Mubarak's letter.

DR. GHALI: He will put in his letter the idea of this.

MR. SHARON: The idea? Not the language?

DR. GHALI: You can't impose words on the President.

MR. SHARON: That's why I am asking.

DR. GHALI: What was the main idea you have in mind? You want that we will continue Camp David.

MR. ALY: That Camp David is the only binding thing, that we will continue on the negotiations for the full autonomy as mentioned here to solve.

MR. SHARON: That is not the content of this paper.

(Short interval during which The Prime Minister spoke to the Americans on the phone, and a small drafting committee worked on the Prime Minister's letter to President Mubarak.)

MR. BEGIN: Let us do a complete job. So far as the Americans are concerned, they will accept gladly. The President of the US will write two letters, to President Mubarak and to me. Yehuda (Avner), would you please read my letter?

MR. AVNER: "Dear President Mubarak: I thank you for your letter of April 16th which I read with great attention. I willingly accept your assurance about rectifying any possible violations of the security arrangements in Sinai and the efforts which will be made by the Egyptian authorities to fight and prevent smuggling of arms, explosives and all other war materials from Egyptian territory into Israeli territory."

MR. BEGIN: This was asserted in his letter; two assertions.

MR. AVNER: "I do hope, Dear Mr. President, that we shall all faithfully adhere to the Camp David Accords and to the Peace Treaty between our two countries. This reaffirmation includes the following reciprocal commitment: Upon the completion of the withdrawal of all Israel's armed forces and civilians behind the

the international boundary between Egypt and Mandated Palestine, the only plan to resolve the problem of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (West Bank and Gaza District) which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy for these inhabitants, as stipulated by the provisions of the Camp David Accord. With every good wish."

MR. BEGIN: Now, the President will reply to me that he gladly reaffirms that reciprocal commitment to the effect - gladly reaffirms our reciprocal commitment, because what I wrote is in two parts. The first part is our commitment. The second part is to the autonomy.

DR. GHALI: Again, Mr. Prime Minister<sup>ister</sup> to avoid misunderstanding. This is just a project. We are not sure at all that we can do it. The basic idea is what is important, to have the contents which you have put in your letter. It could be different wording.

MR. BEGIN: That passage, starting from "Upon the completion.." should not be altered. Here every word counts.

DR. GHALI: I agree, if you can do it, according to your point of view, in another wording, you don't ask that this must be the wording. What is important is that it will correspond to -

MR. BEGIN: How do we deal with such problems? We usually exchange notes what is going to be included in the letter. Therefore, I suggest that the President answers me - of course, he has to agree; he is a sovereign president. It is up to him - that he reaffirms the commitment to the effect, the reciprocal commitment to the effect, and then repeats this. That's all. I think it is the best way. The President of the US will send two letters.

DR. GHALI: To avoid any kind of misunderstanding, this is ad referendum. I am sure of nothing. We can try to find the other formula.

MR. BEGIN: I want to tell you, Boutros, ad referendum to our Cabinet. We are only three ministers. We are 18 in the Cabinet. This is the way.

MR. SHARON: Mr. Prime Minister, I worry about one thing. We speak in the letter about smuggling of arms, and so on, but we don't say a word about penetration or raids by terrorists across the border. I think it is important.

GENERAL ALY: It is in the Treaty. We have not to repeat so many things. If we can just leave the whole problem -

MR. BEGIN: The protocol.

GENERAL ALY: The protocol stands.

MR. SHARON: I see no reason to object.

GENERAL ALY: It is not objecting.

MR. SHARON: It is a matter of one word.

MR. AVNER: Add one word "and incursions". "...to fight and prevent incursions and smuggling.."


DR. GHALI: Now you are losing your time and our time. You are adding complications. We have agreed with the Prime Minister that what is important that the letter he received from our President nothing was mentioned dealing with the tripartite negotiation and this was the main idea; the autonomy. If you just want to add other ideas, I am very honest with you, forget about it. And I am not

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responsible. What I am trying to do, and I say it with great honesty to the Prime Minister, is just to give an answer to what the Prime Minister said this morning. This morning he said, the letter of your President was a good letter, but you avoid to mention anything dealing with the full autonomy negotiations. My idea is a very simple one.- I am not sure to obtain this - is to send to the Prime Minister a letter from my President, saying, Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for your letter and we will continue the negotiations and we believe that Camp David is the only framework binding for negotiations. Stop. Now, if you just want to add that we want to say that smuggling should be prevented - everything exists in the Treaty.

MR. BEGIN: I answer his words. He asserted in his letter.

MR. SHARON: I will tell you what happened. During the day, I was reading again and again President Mubarak's letter, and I found there that besides the fact that there is no one word about autonomy, and I agree with the Prime Minister that it was very important to emphasize smuggling of arms and so on, but, you know, I thought about that again, and I found that it is not a matter of smuggling weapons, but last year we managed to catch 10 commandoes of the PLO that came to Sinai from Egypt and crossed the border and acted, committing assassinations, putting explosives, murdering. As a matter of fact most of their victims were Arabs that were suspected by them to cooperate with them, and that's including one Kadi in Gaza. So I saw that if the Prime Minister already mentions in his letter the question of arms, explosives, hand-grenades and so on, it will be very important to mention incursions. What is wrong with that? Later



people say, look, we are responsible only for hand-grenades, arms, explosives. What about terrorists coming across the border? Why not? What difference does it make? Why are you afraid? I can tell you, we are ready to sign any paper now that you will ask us. Any paper, in addition to Camp David, any other paper, exchange of letters that we had in the past, and take any commitment that terrorists will not come from our side of the border into Egypt. And I must tell you, I will be veru pleased to sign it, in order to show that we are going to make every effort that your security will be as strong as possible. So why are you angry when we ask something that may happen, that already happened?

DR. GHALI: Can I talk? We spent six months in signing this Treaty. Everything exists in this Treaty. Why do you want to repeat something which already exists?

MR. SHARON: I will tell you why. You could have said, why do we have to discuss it? We discussed for six months. We signed an agreement. Everything was in order. Why we started to worry? We started to worry because of several things. The activity - I don't like to use the word "cooperation" with the terrorists, and we decided not to use the term now, but the terrorist activity coming across the Egyptian border, that bothers us deeply. And then the question of, I would say, the violation of forces, and that's what really brought us to think agin that we must have something more.

DR. GHALI: Arik, I was under the impression that we agree. We have seen the people and this morning we said everything is solved.



MR. SHARON: What bothers you? That we want to include -

DR. BEN-MEIR: He is talking about the Prime Minister's answer to your President.

MR. BEGIN: Nothing wrong with the word "incursion". That is in reply. It is my comment. That's my kindness in answering a letter. I answer the President on two passages that he asserted.

DR. GHALI: Believe in us and please trust us. He will answer your letter which will correspond to what you have in mind. But that we must have each word or each thing in this letter, I'm not sure at all that I will obtain this.

MR. BEGIN: Dr. Ghali, let us be open-hearted with each other. If you say there may be different words, I won't object. I want only to say that perhaps that difference of the words may create a difference in content and then we shall not be able to accept. So why shouldn't we try?


DR. GHALI: I completely agree. Again I want to be honest.

MR. BEGIN: Not because we try to push you or put words. It is just Monday and Sunday is the day.

DR. GHALI: I know.

MR. BEGIN: Why shouldn't we try to work out the text? That is the usual procedure. There is nothing wrong with it.

GENERAL ALY: I would like to assure you of that, that the essence will be there; that I can assure you. About the word and letter, this is something else which might be different, but never be a different aspect or a different meaning.



MR. BEGIN: To avoid difficulties, don't change, because every word here was thought out, and we consulted each other, with the Americans and with you. I don't want now to go into all the possible details. If the words you may change will not change the contents -

DR. GHALI: Okay.

MR. BEGIN: If they will, we may say that is not satisfactory and we shall take a decision. In order to avoid difficulties, General Aly, I would advise you, wholeheartedly, I am going to have a visit of 12 members of the Knesseth, who will come to press upon me to take the decision - I don't want to repeat it now because I want good blood between us - that I told you about in the morning. 12 members. All members of our Party. Without ehri vote, we don't have a majority in Parliament. You understand, this is a democracy. We need a majority. I have to work for it. So let us not create difficulties. We worked it out. Now we found a proper way so that nobody should be hurt in his feelings. I write a letter. The President will answer my letter. The usual procedure, as he did. But we really formulated a good formulation. Why shouldn't we use it?

GENERAL ALY: Anyhow, Mr. Prime Minister, we are trying to overcome any difficulties and we will continue.

MR. SHARON: I want to say something. Boutros, of course, who can dictate to a president the words that he is going to use, but in this letter, there is one thing that must be there and the idea is, all the ideas behind this paper, that the only plan to resolve the

problem of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaz a District which will be negotiated between the Parties concerned will be that of full autonomy for these inhabitants...

MR. BEGIN: As stipulated.

MR. SHARON: So I would say, what bothers us? Let's come to the root of the question. What bothers us is the fact that we are afraid that after the withdrawal, some time will pass; there will be some other plans, brought maybe by you, maybe not.

DR. GHALI: Or maybe by you.

MR. SHARON: We will not. But maybe. We sign this paper. Maybe by us, maybe by you. Maybe by the Americans. Maybe by the Saudis, the Jordanians and so on. So we want to be sure that the autonomy is the only and sole solution or plan in order to solve...

GENERAL ALY: In this respect, maybe you have listened to the statement of President Mubarak, about ? plan. It is only a paper; unless the parties concerned agree about it, it will stay as it is, just a resolution.

MR. BEGIN: Let us not complicate matters. We exhausted them. If we continue, we will exhaust ourselves. To avoid any misunderstanding, if there are any changes, I would suggest that you instruct Mr. Mortada, your Ambassador, to let me know in advance before the Cabinet meeting, so that I can be prepared and not be taken by surprise, and I should get it by tomorrow evening. It is possible. You can send a courier, or we still may have the session of the Cabinet on Wednesday afternoon; then we can have it by Wednesday morning.

(Discussion on timing of reply.)

MR. SHARON: About the question you asked before, I don't think we can accept any, at this point - we cannot freeze life. Life is going on in Taba and in any other of these 15 points that we have; 14 others. I don't see any possibility/you <sup>unless</sup> want to cause upon us troubles in the future to restrict/any time <sup>by</sup> table. It is enough that we say that the parties will make their best to do it as early as possible, but not any time, any time-table.

DR. GHALI: Sorry. We completely disagree, so as to avoid any kind of misunderstanding.

MR. SHARON: We have a problem.

DR. GHALI: We will give a list to the Prime Minister of different arbitrations which have been agreed and conciliations where you have a fixed date. This is a general rule.

MR. BEGIN: We answered you in the morning.

DR. GHALI: We will give it to you. About the hotel, what I am proposing, is postponing the construction for the period, for the period until -

MR. BEGIN: Please explain to me rationally what is the rationale of such a postponement, of constructing the hotel, rationally, not emotionally.

DR. GHALI: I am not emotional. The rationale is that the best way to be sure that everything will finish quickly, that everybody is interested to avoid any complications. When you will have the opening of the hotel, when you will have the 700 tourists, with different nationalities -

MR. BEGIN: Look how wrong you can be, Doctor. If we decide upon conciliation or arbitration, then the whole problem is not in your, neither in my, hands at all. Let say, we decide on conciliation, a commission of three, one and one, and let us also use that procedure. By the way, it is also in our tradition, Zabla, and the two, let them appoint the third one, and we give it to them to decide. You can only urge every day, we want the verdict, the judgment as soon as possible; next week, next month, etc. It is not in our hands. What do you have in common with the hotel? They will do the job. You have to urge them to do it as quickly as possible. The hotel? They are independent people.

DR. GHALI: The rule is like this. All the conciliations have a limited date and all the arbitrations have a limited date.

MR. BEGIN: You say that the hotel, if it is not constructed, will influence everybody to finish the judgment?

DR. GHALI: And will avoid complications.

MR. BEGIN: Those people are on the olympus. They are like judges. They don't ask us questions efen.

DR. GHALI: To avoid complications.

MR. BEGIN: Don't add more difficulties. I suggest, again, really, I have to repeat it, General Aly, let us pass it to a sub-comission. We have 10 subcommissions. Why shouldn't two of our men and two of your men consider what does it mean "life goes on". How much can we deal with it? I must tell you, usually my brain is not so weak but I am feeling that it is weakening with this problem of a

hotel. What is it our problem to deal with, two governments, two generals, two privates? Everybody is dealing with the hotel! Let us have two men. We shall give you two good men. You shall give. Let them sit down for two days, have a conclave, and put out white smoke. What is the problem? Boutros, you make like difficult. It is not necessary. Boutros, I want to tell you, I don't think that we exhausted our negotiations, but I accepted your point of view, to make it easier for you. All right, finish with negotiations, let us pass now to arbitration. What is the problem? They are living people. Give us the judgment as soon as possible. What, will they procrastinate? The third man - it must be a man who is unbiased. It cannot be an Egyptians or an Israeli. We will find the man. We will find him. So he will be interested in procrastinating? What should he? Urge him to handle it quickly, and then, immediately, if we cannot accept; if you cannot accept, immediately pass to arbitration, and arbitration is a commitment on both sides to accept in advance anything the arbitrator says and again. let us do it, one and one and the two will chose a third man, also a man from abroad, by agreement. When you go back home, send us names of two men, and we will give you within 24 hours two good men, or perhaps we will use one of the committees, perhaps General Sion will be one man and the other gentleman on our side. Whom do you have in your commission? (Reference was made to Admiral Hamdi.)

So I think we had a good day today, all in all.

MR. SHARON: We have to remember one thing. Once we have not reached the consent about Taba/<sup>area</sup> and the other 14 points, so don't be

surprised that we are going to withdraw to the border of the line where we think the border is.

DR. GHALI: Don't be surprised that you will have complications later, and what we want to avoid is this kind of complications.


MR. BEGIN: Therefore, we accepted the idea of General Aly. Remember, it was his original idea. You advance to the line which we suggest. We do not cross the line suggested by you. It is a free area. We call it a free area. Sovereignty is not yet decided. It is an open question. It will be decided by conciliation and arbitration. In the meantime, life goes on. What is the meaning of "life goes on"? A commission will sit. One member will be General Sion. Whom would you suggest?

MR. SHARON: We will decide.

GENERAL ALY: So now I see that the only difference is the fixed time and the hotel.

MR. SHARON: We have a problem now. Of course, everything depends whether there is going to be a letter and if we are going to get the same meaning that the autonomy is the only and sole plan for solving the question of the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza District. But we have another problem; I mean, what will be the situation in Taba now. We agree that General Sion. I don't know if Admiral Hamdi - In any case, they are working together all the time.

We discussed at lunchtime - it was a nice lunch. General Sagi was there and he brought some points that should be corrected.



GENERAL ALY: Minor.

MR. SHARON: Everything is minor in comparison with what we have done already.

(General discussion.)

MR. SHARON: Then I have a third proposal. It is a compromise. It is a fair compromise. You will have your <sup>temporary</sup> terminal on the line where you believe the border is. We will have our temporary terminal on the line, 91, where we believe the border is. In between - I don't see any harm, if in between, what can be, there will be a free area. A real compromise. Here, the dome, tree, it will be your terminal, temporary. You know, this temporary can last for 30 years -

DR. GHALI: This we want to avoid.

MR. BEGIN: Nothing lasts so long.

MR. SHARON: That you will be yourself here. We don't want to bother you in your terminal. Now, here in 91, that will be our terminal, and though we'd like to have you as guests, why should you bother us there. In between life is going on.

GENERAL ALY: He is talking legally.

MR. SHARON: Boutros, why do you think we need a representative here? In any case, we are here.

MR. BEGIN: Boutros, perhaps it is a fair compromise.

(General discussion)

MR. BEGIN: We hope for a positive solution of the difficulties.

(The meeting adjourned at 7:20 p.m.)



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M E E T I N G

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, MR. MENAHEM BEGIN

and

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE USA, MR. WALTER STOESEL

Thursday, April 15, 1982  
9:10 a.m.

Also participating:

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister Y. Shamir  
Deputy Foreign Minister Y. Ben-Ze'ev  
Mr. D. Kimche  
Mr. E. Rubenstein  
Mr. H. Bar-on  
Gen. A. Tamir  
Gen. Yaari  
Mr. Meridor  
Mr. Uri Pevz  
Mr. Azriel Hevo

USA

Ambassador S. Lewis  
Mr. W. Brown  
Mr. Draper  
Mr. Teicher  
Mr. Matthews  
Mr. Peñito  
Mr. Hare  
Mr. Kozak

- - -

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, may I on behalf of the Government of Israel greet you and your colleagues to this country. We are grateful that you undertook this journey. Perhaps we have to apologize for causing you the trouble, but the situation is serious. I appealed to the Secretary to come over, but I understood that he personally couldn't do so, because now he is involved in a grave international problem, which we hope may be solved without the use of force, although the chances today, this morning do not seem so good. But the Secretary is really make an almost indescribable personal effort, taking into consideration that he also underwent a certain operation, to travel between Buenos Aires

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which  
and London back and forth is really an effort/should be admired by everyone. We do admire him and the effort he is making and we understand that he cannot come. You of course as his deputy I believe will do your best in order to try to straighten out and to find a positive solution for the problems which have arisen, particularly in the last ten days.

When we appeal to you as representatives of the Government of the U.S., we do so on the basis of the letter written by the President of the U.S. of America, Mr. Carter, on March 26, 1979, and addressed to me, which reads:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wish to confirm to you that subject to U.S. constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Egypt, the U.S. will, on request of one or both of the parties, consult with the parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty."

Now as one of the parties to the treaty, we declare to you that we have such a request, that there was a breach of the Treaty of Peace by the government and armed forces of Egypt and that should be redressed, and the U.S. should undertake, on the basis of their commitment, to bring about the compliance with the peace treaty. As the word 'compliance' is used, there are two

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possibilities, or in the proper language, one alternative, which of course includes two possibilities. One, compliance by Egypt which will be answered by Israel with compliance, fully, of all the provisions of the peace treaty. As we did in the past, so shall we do in the future. The other possibility is that there will be non-compliance by Egypt. Then we will be forced to answer with non-compliance.

What we prefer, and this I state at the beginning of our deliberations, is the former to the latter. We prefer reciprocal compliance with all the provisions of the peace treaty. And now I will explain what are our complaints, why we think the treaty was not complied with and that breaches were committed.

I will take Article 5 of Annex III, Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties. Article 5 in section 3 stipulates: "The parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other." For many months, we tolerated hostile propaganda by Egypt. We didn't acquiesce to it, but we didn't make an issue of it. I can explain why. We understood that there is a certain process in political life, especially in relations between two people. The Egyptian people were educated for nearly 40 years in absolute hatred of the State of Israel and also the Jewish people. And as the press is controlled there, so is the television and the radio, and there was permanent brain washing - Israel is the devil, Jews are cheaters, Shylocks. That name was applied to me personally for a long time after the visit of President Sadat

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to Jerusalem, etc. So we listened to it and we read it. We have the Egyptian press every day. We of course monitor Egyptian radio. And we didn't make an issue of it, because of that attitude. It's passing, time will be the great healer, we have to live together, we shall meet each other, etc. As our wounded men did in El Arish. One of the most moving human scenes which your Ambassador, my friend, Sam Lewis, and I witnessed ourselves, when invalids, Egyptians and Israelis, embraced each other and promised each other never to wage war against each other. Invalids for life, who were fighters. So we believed that this event will be a beginning of coming closer to each other.

I hold here a booklet about Jerusalem which was issued I suppose a year ago, perhaps a year and a half ago. When I read it yesterday I just couldn't believe my own eyes. This booklet, issued by the State Information Service, Cairo, states that actually Israel doesn't have anything in common with Jerusalem. It ended a long time ago. It says: "The Jewish presence in Jerusalem was finally terminated by the Babylonian invasion and the Jews were not able to recover their political entity until 167 B.C." That is almost childish. They came back to Jerusalem from the Babylonian exile; we rebuilt our Temple after the return from the Babylonian exile. An ignoramus wrote those words. And I could quote more, but it's not necessary. I can only say again - hostile propaganda.

But I am coming to recent days. There was a complaint by Syria first, and then Jordan, to the Security Council of the United Nations in connection with the events in Judea and Samaria

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about two weeks ago. The first complaint was by Syria but then Jordan took over. And the representative of Egypt, Dr. Magid, made a speech to the Security Council, one of the most violent attacks ever from the rostrum of the UN against Israel by any Arab country. So when I wrote on the 25th of March a letter to President Mubarak in reply to his note that he was kind enough to send me, I drew his attention to that speech by the official representative, Dr. Abdul Magid and I wrote to him: "Yesterday in the Security Council, Dr. Magid, whom I met in Ismailia (that was my first visit to Egypt at the invitation of President Sadat) launched a violent attack on Israel in the context of the events which occurred in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Why should this be so, Mr. President? Those who complained to the Security Council are Jordan and Syria. We both recall how King Hussein suppressed the PLO in Jordan when his army killed thousands of Palestinians by shelling with heavy artillery refugee camps. And but a few weeks ago the Syrian army perpetrated a horrible massacre of the civilian population in - (6,000 people were killed in Hamad by the Syrian army, men, women and children, whole families were wiped out, 3,000 are still missing) - Hamad. Do those two governments have the moral right to accuse Israel? Does any country tolerate riots in which soldiers are attacked with rocks, in which soldiers are stabbed in the back and killed by hand grenades? The answer is implied in the question. I respectfully submit to you, Mr. President, that your delegate in the UN should not have made the speech he delivered yesterday in the Security Council."

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Our Ambassador, Mr. Sasson, delivered this note to President Nubarak and the President read it in his presence. When he read that passage, he exclaimed twice: "The Prime Minister is right!" First - "I say to my colleagues or advisors privately, but please keep it confidential - how can Jordan and Syria complain? What did they do to the Palestinians or Syrians? He is right." Then, his second remark was: "Dr. Magid should not have made that speech in the Security Council. I didn't know anything about that speech. Tell the Prime Minister so."

And Sasson faithfully reported to me. Of course, I kept it in full confidence.

However, only four or five days passed since that encounter between the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Ambassador of Israel, and the very same Dr. Magid is interviewed by a Kuwaiti newspaper and there he makes a statement which I quote: "After Israel withdraws finally from Sinai, the era of liberation of other occupied Arab territories will begin." So I asked the Ambassador of the US, my dear friend, Sam Lewis, what did he mean by the word "liberation". It's an active concept. Is Egypt going to join other Arab countries in a war against Israel to liberate what he terms "other Arab occupied territories"?

However, the main negative phenomenon from this point of view appeared during the conference of non-aligned countries which also took place in Kuwait, and Dr. Magid made a speech there.

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May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, how can I assume that President Mubarak didn't know anything of the speech is official representative was going to make to probably 50 or 60 countries, so-called non-aligned countries of the Third World, when he, Dr. Magid, is the representative of Egypt? I don't know, perhaps Mr. Mubarak didn't hear about the speech in advance but it is very difficult for me to assume that, especially after the remark he made to our Ambassador. He should have been forewarned; at least he should have felt that he had to talk to Dr. Magid.

I remember during the lifetime of President Sadat when I drew his attention to certain behavior by Dr. Ghali, then Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs, he was very angry and I could have seen how he admonished Dr. Ghali. Whatever President Mubarak did, I will quote to you one sentence now. And I will just remind you of the so-called Egyptian plan of how to solve the Palestinian problem; I will not repeat all those points, because I know you read it while you were still in Washington. Dr. Magid is addressing the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Kuwait and he says: "How else since for the first time in modern history Israel is in the ebb and its forces are withdrawing while an Arab country, which is Egypt, is regaining sovereignty over its own national soil and restoring a beloved part of its land which had remained under foreign occupation for approximately 15 years."

"Israel is in the ebb" - instead of saying to the non-aligned countries - I am glad to inform you that Israel is fulfilling the provisions of the peace treaty and it's going to hand us over

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the last part of the Sinai Peninsula, he pictures Israel as being in the ebb because its forces are withdrawing, etc.

If our withdrawal should prove, Mr. Secretary, ~~that~~ Israel is in the ebb, then our non-withdrawal will prove Israel is not. That is a logical conclusion. I must tell you that present there are Arab countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, African countries, Yugoslavia, I suppose at least--

MR. SHAMIR: 80 countries.

MR. BEGIN: Two-thirds of the UN, 80 countries from all parts of the world, and here stands a representative of our friend with whom we have to live in peace and understanding and cooperation, normalize our relations. And he tells us now that actually Israel is at the ebb, down. It has to withdraw, it doesn't do it by its own decision and willingly and for the sake of peace, but it is losing; it is downgraded.

What is that if not hostile propaganda, forbidden unequivocally by Section 3 of Article 5 of Annex III?

Then I will only add again a mention of those 11 points. I'd only like to say I studied them again yesterday. And Mr. Secretary, if you studied those 11 points well, I am sure you will share my impression, if not accept my conviction, that this is a prescription to destroy the State of Israel, not immediately, but by stages. But that is now an old story. Even the PLO would like to see us destroyed by stages. First a state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but Mr. Arafat adds that we shall strive on of course; now we shall accept such a state. In other words, by stages, not

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necessarily in one stroke, but by stages, the destruction of Israel. What does it mean? We should withdraw to the lines of 1967 which is here - (pointing to map). The distance between this line and the sea is 8 miles, shorter than Broadway, Mr. Secretary. Now in Lebanon the PLO has already got a Katusha missile with a range of 21 km. and now it is threatening the Shi'ites in Lebanon whom they killed yesterday en masse with artillery, with 130 mm guns, supplied by the Soviet Union, with a range of 27 km. Now the Palestinian state should be on these mountains, Samaria on the north and Judea on the south, and as you can see from each hill you can reach every place in this valley by those missiles and those 130 mm guns. What would it be if not a threat to our existence?

Then of course one of the points is Arab sovereignty over or in Jerusalem. There is a difference in translations, so I leave it in the two versions. That is our capital. Then there should be either a return or compensation of Palestinian refugees starting from 1947 and 1948. Mr. Secretary, we never wanted the refugee problem to be created. In our time, almost all wars create problems of refugees. But in 1947 and '48, we were in this country only 620,000 people. And the attempt was made to destroy us. We lost then 5,000 of our best men, nearly one per cent of the population. Today it would be 33,000 men killed. It would have been a complete national disaster. We couldn't have come out of it any more. We lost 3,000 men during the Yom Kippur war; we still live under

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that trauma. It's a small nation; everyone knows everyone else. If you would proportionately make that account with regard to the American people, then everyone would understand the tragedy. It would have meant hundreds of thousands of Americans killed. And one of those 11 points would be either return or compensation, and the decision would be with the people themselves. We didn't want them to flee. They were ordered by their leaders to flee. They were then 300 or 350,000 and now with their progeny they are over a million. If hundreds of thousands should return, the State of Israel would cease to exist. We wouldn't agree to be a Rhodesia.

So in other words when you analyze it point by point, what was presented as an Egyptian plan to solve the Palestinian problem, it means by stages the annihilation of the State of Israel. And that we should hear from Kuwait presented to 80 countries and canvassing for their support. What is it if not the most hostile propaganda anyone can think of, when these statements of polemic are made by Egyptian representatives, two or three weeks before the 26th of April when we have to finalize the withdrawal to which we are committed? Indeed, my colleague, the Defense Minister, asked the question: What are they, fools? Why couldn't they be silent for another few weeks, and then after that, what could we have done? Not so. To quote Shakespeare: there is a method in their madness. Madness it is, as far as relations with Israel are concerned. Because we were not born yesterday, Mr. Secretary. But there is

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method to that madness. What was it? Our Egyptian friends assumed for the last few months that the U.S. will take care of Israeli withdrawal. If there should be some people - as you know, we live through a trauma, we had to uproot 1600 families, uproot them, take them out of their homes, give them new homes, a real trauma. So they assumed the U.S. will take care of it. ( Israel will withdraw, but we shall now make all those declarations. If after that, the Israelis will come to us with recrimination when we do something else, for instance if the Israelis don't agree to our proposals on autonomy, one day Gen. Ali will call in the Ambassador of Israel and tell him go back home, or will recall Ambassador Mortada. What can we do? I admit, nothing. Can we send the army into Sinai because the ambassadors are recalled? I say openly, no. That is a breach of the peace treaty because it says there must be an exchange of ambassadors even after the interim withdrawal. But what <sup>can</sup> we do? But then if we'd come to Mr. Mubarak or to Gen. Ali and say: what did you do, why did you breach the peace treaty? they will say: Didn't you know we stand by these 11 points? Why didn't you pay attention? We said it openly, you heard it and didn't draw our attention to it. You don't want now to have a Palestinian state, etc., etc., so we can't have your ambassador here and you can't have our ambassador in Hertzliya. That is the method to their madness, to place us before a fait accompli and then use it against us.

We made so many sacrifices for the peace with Egypt - oil, airfields, villages and towns. And just on the eve, when we

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have to embrace each other and say now this stage is finished, now formalization can be completed; now we can tell the African countries there is no reason for them not to have diplomatic relations with Israel. - they used to say Egypt is an African country and you keep under your rule part of Egypt, so we can't have diplomatic relations, it was an excuse but they said it. But now it won't be so, so we can renew diplomatic relations, we can have an exchange of commerce, education, culture, etc. This is the time to be real friends. And here we have the representative of Egypt going to Kuwait saying we are in the ebb and presenting a plan how to destroy the State of Israel.

What I want to sum up now concerning this paragraph - we don't have any doubt whatsoever that the Egyptians in the last few weeks committed the most serious breach of the peace treaty with regard to that section - "the parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding". Excuse me for the light observation, but probably they want to foster mutual misunderstanding - "and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda." And not only didn't they abstain, but they waged hostile propaganda against the State of Israel.

~~Secondly~~ Secondly, there is an organization which calls itself the PLO. Mr. Secretary, whoever listened as I did or read the speeches made lately by Mr. Arafat, in every word there is blood, only bloodshed, in every speech. It is too horrible to listen to or to read. Blood! He is a blood-thirsty two-legged animal, I

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wouldn't hesitate to say so, with all this paraphernalia, eith the beard, etc. So he has the PLO. Now, I one day said to President Sadat - then I think we already called each other by our first names - how can it be that some of your people cooperate with the PLO? We are making peace and your people cooperate with them. He said how do we cooperate? I said, well, the PLO smuggles arms from El Arish which we handed over to Egypt, ahead of time, several weeks ahead of time, at the/<sup>re</sup>quest of President Sadat. Later on he told me - that was a turning point in the history of the relations between our two countries and indeed of the position of Egypt in the Middle East. None of the Arab countries every believed that you will give us El Arish. They used to tell us: don't believe the Israelis; it's only atrick. And he said: now this is the symbol that you mean it and we are going to live in peace. We met in El Arish as good friends and we promised to cooperate. So after that I told him from El Arish come weapons to the Gaza Strip in which there is a PLO of course and they use those weapons to kill our men.

It will suffice if I tell you, Mr. Secretary, that we already captured 700 hand grenades smuggled from El Arish into the Gaza Strip. Let's imagine how many people would have been killed with those 700 grenades. We captured them, through our viligance and also sheer good luck. And it goes on and on. And I spoke about it to President Sadat and he immediately gave ins-ructions to stop it and they did stop it. It only proves

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it is a matter of decision by the bureaucracy. President Mubarak sits in Cairo, not in El Arish, but if orders are given and there is the resolve to stop it, it is stopped. If a government wants to stop that traffic of weapons or explosives, it does. If it goes on, it is a proof that the government in question doesn't want to stop it. I will not deny that sometimes even with all the efforts something may happen. But I am speaking about the permanent traffic of explosives or grenades, ammunition, etc. Permanent. So this must be a result of cooperation of certain underlings of President Mubarak with the PLO. And why should they keep a PLO base in El Arish? It is now on the border of Israel. Why should the other side be a PLO base, when everyone knows the PLO is bent on killing our people? That is its raison d'etre.

Now I will read Article III, Section 2:

"Each party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other party. Each party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice."



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If this traffic goes on, if there is cooperation between Egypt and the PLO, if there is a PLO base in El Arish on our doorstep, it is a complete violation of this article. A daily violation, permanent violation. Therefore we ask to redress this wrong.

The third point is about the demilitarized zone. Mr. Secretary we gave up this whole territory, 23,000 square miles, with the greatest strategic importance, if you look at Sharm-el-Sheikh from which we could reach even with our boats Bab-el-Mandeb which was blocked in 1973, and then towards Africa. We gave it up for the sake of peace. But we made arrangements for our security. First of all, a demilitarized zone, 150 km. to our international border. In a desert, demilitarization is a serious arrangement. In a populated area it is rather a hoax because you can keep a tank in every garage, and this is not theory. But in a desert, where you can take pictures from a satellite or a plane and can see any violations, this is a proper security arrangement. This demilitarized zone is violated. We have now a battalion of Egyptian troops in El Arish airfields. Again, on our doorstep. They shouldn't be there. They do not wear military uniforms. This is an old trick and we cannot be misled by it. You can either dress soldiers in police uniforms or you can dress them even in ties, but they are soldiers. And we have good information, Mr. Secretary. There is a full battalion of trained Egyptian soldiers at the El Arish airfield. They shouldn't be there and they mustn't be there. Egypt undertook not to have in this area, 150 km.

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from the international border into the Sinai peninsula, even one soldier of the regular army.

Then there is the forces limitation zone, zone B. and also there they keep more troops than they are allowed to. The demilitarized zone is the essence of the peace treaty, the soul of the security arrangement. If I may say so, at least some compensation for the territory we left, for the strategic depth we lost, is that suddenly we will not be taken by surprise as happened in 1973. We shall see them coming if they should - perhaps not under President Mubarak, I prefer to think so, but perhaps under someone else, who knows who will one day become the leader of Egypt. So at least we will not be taken by surprise. If this is violated, why are we going? It is not a question of the battalion. That Egyptian battalion doesn't threaten the army of Israel. It is question of principle. Today a battalion, tomorrow a brigade, the day after, a division. With tricks you can do much. People can come and be civilians and settle there, or tourists. We know also the trick of tourists from the time before the Second World War. All over Europe there were German tourists. I don't make comparisons, just to remind ourselves about the possibility of using tricks. We don't. We withdrew, we gave up territory. Should the other side be allowed to play tricks upon us? As far as our security is concerned, which means to us the lives of our people.

So these are the three points - the hostile propaganda, the full cooperation with the PLO and smuggling of arms, and the

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violations of the demilitarized and forces limitation zones. All these three wrongs should be redressed before we withdraw from the rest of Sinai, on the 26th or 25th of April as stipulated by the peace treaty, three years from the date when we exchanged the instruments of ratification, which took place on the 26th of April, 1979, and next week on Monday it will be three years.

(There is an exchange in Hebrew with Mr. Shamir).

My friend remarks that it might be the 25th. If I am mistaken, I will admit my mistake, but those 24 hours are not of such great importance, changing the course of world history. And we want to carry out this commitment. Yes, indeed, Pres. Reagan said so in the press conference yesterday, I gave him such a pledge. I want you, Mr. Secretary, to inform him of what I have said because I did give him such a pledge and I want to carry it out. However, if those wrongs are not redressed during the few following days, ahead of the 25th or 26th of April, if there is non-compliance by the Egyptians as we informed through your ambassador, we may consider the possibility of postponing our withdrawal until those wrongs are redressed. Not to abolish our commitment. This is our commitment, but until those wrongs are corrected we may postpone it. This is in absolute conformity with international law. If both sides comply with the commitments and provisions of a treaty, it's all right. If one side doesn't, the other side is perfectly entitled to do the same.

So again, I repeat, compliance will meet with compliance; non-compliance with non-compliance. We prefer the first arrangement,

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to have full compliance by the Egyptians and then there will be full compliance by Israel.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your attention.

MR. STOESEL: Thank you for your welcome to me, and I want to underline what a pleasure it is for me to be here in your country and to meet with you and your colleagues. As I mentioned earlier, and as you know in response to your request, President Reagan asked the Secretary to send me to discuss these matters with you, in view of the Secretary's preoccupation with the other crisis and you can understand the importance of his efforts in that regard.

But I am here to help Israel and Egypt towards the full implementation of the peace treaty and I do want to underline that we in the U.S., the President and all of the American people, understand the sacrifices which Israel is undergoing, as a result of the withdrawal from the Sinai. And I do want to say that we take our responsibility as a full partner in this process very seriously. We share with you the desire that there be a full implementation, that there be reciprocal compliance, as you very well stated, and that is certainly our view.

I have taken very careful note of what you have told me this morning, and you can be sure that we share these concerns. You have mentioned hostile propaganda, and I can say we are concerned equally about that, and that I will take this up as the first order of business when I meet with President Mubarak. Now, whether or not the statements which have been made by Egypt represent a change in basic position I think is open to question. To date we do not see them as a signal of Egypt's going back on the commitments

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made in the past by President Sadat and by President Mubarak. But certainly what has been said, particularly the speech by Ambassador Magid, has caused great concern, very justifiable concern, and we think that should be cleared up. And I would say we consider that this is not only a matter between Egypt and Israel but also that it concerns <sup>the</sup> relationship between Egypt and the United States.

On some of the other matters, Mr. Prime Minister, which you have mentioned, the PLO, the smuggling of arms, we would agree also that if there are violations here that they are very serious and must be addressed. I understand that Mr. Sharon will be discussing these matters today in Cairo and we hope he can resolve these issues to your satisfaction. If this is not the case, then if we find that indeed Egypt has been less than vigilant in fulfilling its obligations then I certainly am prepared to tell the Egyptians that they must live up to their obligations and that they must take action. The same goes for the activities in the demilitarized zone, of which you spoke. We hope that these will be cleared up also. We will be checking also through our own sources. I will be discussing them in Egypt and we do hope that these can be resolved, and it is necessary that they be resolved.

And I can give you complete assurance that I will report faithfully and accurately to President Reagan what you have told us this morning.

MR. BEGIN: Thank you very much. I would like Gen. Yaari now to present you with some details of these violations.

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His father is Meir Yaari. He and I are permanently political opponents, but we respect each other. Especially since when I was a child I was a member of the youth organization of which he is the leader to this very day. But then when I became bar mitzva and got some wisdom, I changed my direction. But Meir Yaari is now 85 years old and still writing articles every week. Last Friday I read his article, criticizing me, and I enjoyed it very much.

GEN. YAARI: The violations we are talking about, I will give to you according to the best of our information and the last date we know of. Maybe something has changed since then, but this is the list. First in Zone A, we have the deployment of elements of 3 battalions framework in addition to the 4 brigades allowed in the Annex of the Treaty, and we are talking of mid-March. About an infantry battalion, in the area of ... which is in the northern axis in Zone A.

Secondly, in the Hagilla area, mid-March, there is a ten company that we relate to a battalion company. Sometimes there is a change in that, but that is the last information. That is for division No. 13. And the first one was also from the same division.

Thirdly, also of mid-March, there was a battalion in the Wadi Sudar area, a battalion of the 119th infantry brigade. This is as far as excess units are concerned.

I just want to add, that we know that the Egyptians are aware of the problem. Sometimes they try to cover it, but they are aware of the problem, and the violation.

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In addition, we also saw logistic depots, what we regard and evaluate as army level, east of Ismailia. We know of some checks that were made in the area to the effect that this is a mine store area where they clear mine fields, etc. But according to our best evaluation, this depot is exactly similar to an army level depot that was situated in the Kabir area.

Now in Zone B, we have the following units in excess to the agreement, as of the end of February. An infantry company in the same 18th division, proper infantry, in the Hutamiya area. Another company belonging to another division, also proper infantry, in the area where only the border guards should be situated. In the El Arish area, as of mid-March, we know of the defense battalion that the Prime Minister spoke about, which was situated there around the airfield. We know about engineer units that were in the area. On some of them, at least one of them, there was an agreement that they will do some work in the area and would leave at the end of March. The Prime Minister spoke about an attempt to cover it by dressing them in civilian clothing.

We know, we have good information, on intelligence signal units in the El Arish area. We know of similar units that may have been taken out, in the Nahal area. In the Bir Gafgafa area, we know of some units of the brigade that are situated there, that has been situated in the airfield which is east of the A Zone. And we know of an engineer company in the northern axis, east of the A line, and that is from February.

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Now, we know that both El Arish and Bir Gafgafa airfields have not only the presence but actually the running of those airfields is done not by civilians but by members of the Egyptian air force.

As far as the ground is concerned, we talk about 11 positions that are protruding from the line A into the B area, three of them in the northern axis, 4 of them in the Bir Gafgafa area, 3 south of that in the Gidipass, and one in the Mitla pass. We talk about fences and anti-tank fortifications, two in the Bir Gafgafa area, one in the Gidi area, which crosses into the B zone. And there is one in the Mitla pass. And we talk about a sigint unit, actually an electronic warfare unit, in the Ras Muhammad area which crosses into the line between the lines. Now, in the buffer zone, apart from what I mentioned now, there are the units of the police of the border guards and military police instead of the police units that should be there. And we have knowledge about some of their activities, which is not according to the agreement. These are our basic grievances.

As I say, we know that the Egyptians are aware of them. It was even said that they will actually dismantle the fortifications. From air photography it seems the fortifications are still there. Perhaps nothing was added, but they are still there. And as far as the other violations, units in A and B zones, I dare say the Egyptians are aware and know very well where the violations are. I hope that all this will be rectified but these are the facts that we can present today and according to dates. Thank you.

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MR. BEGIB: I will now ask our Deputy Foreign Minister to present to you, Mr. Secretary, a draft document which we prepared. You got it from our ambassador and also through Sam Lewis, but we'd like to present it for your consideration. Of course, it is a draft and we don't stand by every word. There can be changes and corrections.

MR. BEN MEIR: The draft document relates to the various points the Prime Minister raised before and a few others. It is called a Statement of Reaffirmation and reads:

"A. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Treaty of Peace between the two countries and pledge complete and unconditional compliance with all its provisions, including those pertaining to:

- (1) Restrictions and arrangements which Egypt and Israel took upon themselves in Zones A,B,C,D - (D is an Israeli zone and we have agreed to limitations) - and their commitment not to carry out any breach of the restrictions and arrangements with respect to those Zones. Measures will be taken to ensure that by April 26, 1982, the status of, and in these Zones, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.
- (2) The functioning of the MFO and the performance of its responsibilities as agreed upon and stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, including its duty to prevent any violations of the Treaty in accordance with Annex I of the Treaty, and ensuring the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty.

- (3) The implementation of all the normalization arrangements as agreed upon between Egypt and Israel on the basis of Annex III to the Treaty, and the putting into effect by April 26, 1982, of all the agreements signed since the conclusion of the peace treaty."

And there are a number of specifics:

- "<sup>3</sup>(a) Keeping the borders permanently open for travel of persons and the exchange of goods.
- <sup>3</sup>(b) Continuing the maintenance of diplomatic relations at their existing ambassadorial level.
- (4) Refraining from hostile acts and the dissemination of hostile statements in domestic media, in foreign countries or in international bodies.
- (5) Preventing any activity and operation of terrorist organizations from the territory of one country against that of the other, including hostile propaganda, smuggling of arms and other war materials across their respective borders; Also, including the dismantling by April 26, 1982, of the existing infrastructures of those terrorist organizations.

B. Egypt and Israel reaffirm their adherence to the Camp David accords, including the commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith an agreement concerning full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), based upon democratic elections, the establishment and inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority (administrative

council) - (this is from the Camp David Accord) - and the transitional period of five years.

The Parties to the Camp David Accords undertake not to propose or entertain any plan relating to the peace process other than the Camp David Agreement."

MR. SHAMIR: I would like to add that in the last week we are witnessing a certain momentum in the deterioration of the Egyptian attitude towards their obligations under the peace treaty with us, as was expressed in this conference in Kuwait and in the relations with the PLO which are getting closer and closer. It is our impression that the reason for this momentum is the Egyptian assessment, after their last meeting in Washington by President Mubarak and their Minister of War, that the Israeli withdrawal will take place on the 25th or 26th of April. And this is sure. And their assessment that the American reaction to any Egyptian violation of their obligations will not be very harsh. It is the Egyptian assessment. And therefore it is very important for the U.S. to explain to the Egyptians that they are wrong, if they are wrong. Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: Can I ask a question, Mr. Foreign Minister, about that last comment? Is that an assessment of the Egyptian attitude or is it based on intelligence about Egyptian attitudes?

MR. SHAMIR: It is an assessment based on intelligence.

MR. BEGIN: IN other words, it is an intelligent assessment.

MR. STOSSEL: Perhaps I could comment first of all on the suggestion of the reaffirmation. Certainly I said when this was presented to me in Washington by your ambassador, Mr. Arens, that

this is a possible option which we should consider for dealing with the problems before us. It may not be the only option. There may be other ways which we will find to be useful, perhaps even more appropriate. We will have to see. Our objective of course is to bring the commitments which already exist to full life.

I think we have to be wary of trying to put down only certain points of the accords in a reaffirmation. This could cause some confusion if we try and extract only some points from what has already been agreed. But certainly we do see that there could well be value in reaffirming the Camp David commitments. And as far as the U.S. is concerned we would be thoroughly prepared to do that.

I do feel that before we commit ourselves now to a particular form we should explore the whole range of options which would be possible. I think we want to avoid an approach which does take attention away from the real concerns and real challenges which face us. And again, we have to be careful about an approach which might seem to challenge the integrity of either side which could call forth a very determined obdurate stand in favor of national honor. This could raise problems down the road. I would want to study this possible approach very seriously and consider how it can be presented to the Egyptians, and when I come back from my visit there, then I think we will have a better feel for how to approach this problem.

MR. BEGIN: Mr. Secretary, I would like to say now why we made this suggestion, why we prefer it to all other options, although

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I do understand there may be other options. We need a reassurance now, and only through a document of reaffirmation can we get that reassurance.

I would like to give certain concrete examples. We have established diplomatic relations in accordance with the peace treaty after the interim withdrawal to this line from which we are supposed to withdraw on the 25th or 26th of April. And there is an Ambassador in Cairo, representing the State of Israel, and an Ambassador in Israel representing Egypt. If one day after the 26th of April, when the whole of Sinai is in the hands of Egypt, and we conduct negotiations with Egypt on autonomy. They for instance suggest that Arabs living in Jerusalem should have the vote for the AC/SGA and we object to that. They have a right to make their suggestion, we have a right to make a different one. But let's assume that we do not reach an agreement, and a foreign minister or president of Egypt decides on that day to say to us: You don't agree to our suggestion to have the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem vote for the autonomy; if so, we can't tolerate your ambassador in Cairo. It makes it impossible to solve the Palestinian problem, which we see as the core of the conflict, etc., etc. And Mr. Sasson has to be, as President Sadat told me about the Soviet ambassador "ordered out." What can we do? I put it to you as a friend, a simple question. I can say that in my opinion we can't do anything. That is not a reason to send our army back into Sinai. I will say immediately that should one day the Egyptian army come into the demilitarized zone, the Israeli army will be in Sinai in a few hours' time, no doubt. This is a beginning of hostilities.

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But not because of the departure of the ambassadors. So we can protest. What else can we do? We wouldn't like to face such a possibility. Therefore, inter alia, we put in that reaffirmation that the diplomatic relations will continue to be on the ambassadorial level. One can ask: how do you know that undertaking will be carried out? It is also a piece of paper. But this is a reaffirmation. In the peace treaty it is written but now on the eve of withdrawal the Egyptians renew, promise, pledge, commit themselves that there should be ambassadors. If they breach it, it is a matter for both the U.S. and Israel. Then we shall look for an answer.

So therefore it is important for us that there should be a statement of reaffirmation. We couched it in terms which wouldn't be humiliating for anyone. It is all reciprocity. All the paragraphs apply to both Israel and Egypt. No one's integrity is being attacked.

The second example, even more important I might say, or as important, is the question of smuggling of arms that should be and must be stopped. Mr. Secretary, for the first time since our state was renewed, we made peace with a neighbor, we signed a peace treaty, abolished a state of war, all for the first time, and that boundary will be dripping with blood? It is absurd. We had a boundary with Lebanon for 19 years completely peaceful. The villagers on both sides used to talk to each other and return the cows that got lost. It was pastoral calm, green fields on both sides, with neighbors greeting each other in the morning. For 19 years, without a peace treaty, with a state of war going on. Now that we have a peace treaty with a neighbor and have abolished the state of war, will

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that border be bloody? That is absurd. And it must be if grenades are being smuggled and then used and our people get killed or maimed. What can we do but retaliate? So on the other side there must be casualties and casualties on our side. Then where is peace? Then the treaty of peace becomes just a mockery. So we have to have this reassurance not only on paper but in the field on the ground. That there won't be such a PLO base and no smuggling. If you put several good officers on that border line and some soldiers, they can stop any smuggling. They can if they want to, if they get the instructions, if they are called to book in case they do not fulfill those instructions. It may take time but it can be carried out. No one can say: we can't stop it. If it goes on it means that they are interested in keeping the border boiling, and that is impossible. So what is the treaty of peace for? The whole dream was that we shall have a period of peace. We would like it on all borders, but we can't then at least on one border, peaceful conditions, life, not death.

Again, we have to have this reaffirmation. And of course what happens in the zones as Gen. Yaari explained to you. Because this as I said is the heart of the peace treaty. If the demilitarized zone is going to be militarized it may remind us of the events in Vietnam, Sam. The most military zone in Vietnam was the one called the demilitarized. That is very bad. That is not to be tolerated.

Therefore, I would like you to consider very seriously, Mr. Secretary, a draft. I don't know whether this draft, but a draft for

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statement of reaffirmation. We need it, and it's good for Egypt as well. As far as I know the U.S. will be prepared to sign it as a witness as you did the peace treaty. We also have a memorandum of agreement and this letter of the President, etc. But this is not insulting anyone. It is a clear paper. Our minds are open and we are ready to listen to suggestions. But I have to add that time is of the essence. We may have to consider it and clarify it by the middle of next week. Around Tuesday or Wednesday I will have to call a special session of the Cabinet to take a decision. If you come back on Sunday, I will postpone the debate on this issue from the weekly cabinet meeting which takes place on Sunday, which will deal with other matters. After we meet with you and have information from what happened on the other side, then I will call a special session of the cabinet on Tuesday let's say. Until then we will have all the information and then we shall take a decision because it is six days from the date. For many months I used the phrase that we want to carry out our commitments to the dot and to the date. I still say it. We want to, provided that - as I wrote to President Mubarak - both sides are faithful to the peace treaty. He probably didn't pay attention to that proviso.

MR. STOESEL: Let me say that we certainly see that time is of the essence. It is very urgent to clear these things up. That will be my intention, to work as fast and as seriously as possible on this. And we will study the document and see what in our opinion would be the best way to proceed. It is conceivable

that some of the matters we have discussed could be handled in another way, others would be put in writing. But we will see. We will give you our best recommendation on this.

On the question of ambassadors, for example, I see a possible problem here, in that sending an ambassador is a sovereign prerogative of a state. To send an ambassador is in the treaty, but whether he is maintained or not--but perhaps it would be possible to put it as an intention to maintain, something like that.

MR. BEN MEIR: The treaty says to exchange ambassadors.

MR. LEWIS: That was done.

MR. BEGIN: But it can be undone, Sam. I fear that it can be undone. That is the problem. What will I do then? Can you give me, in good Shakespearean English, an "eitzza"? If after April 26th, our ambassador is "ordered out", what will I do? I will tell you, I will be forced to do nothing.

MR. STOESEL: You might be unhappy with an Egyptian ambassador for some reason and you might want him to go home.

MR. BEGIN: I won't order him out. We are faithful to every commitment. We proved it. For the last six weeks, we dismantled villages, industrial enterprises, wonderful production facilities, from which we used to send for the last four years vegetables and fruit to Europe during the winter. We dismantled it already completely. All the people left and wept. For God's sake, what more can we do to prove our good will and our faithfulness to our commitments? Every day on the radio and on the TV, these people cried. What else? And we are going ahead with it. During that dispute, today as well. But

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we want to be sure of this peace. It is not an ox, for God's sake. Talking to the Arabs, promising them that we are at the ebb!

Dave, would you like to say something?

MR. KIMCHE: I'd like to say one thing. We spent many, many very arduous weeks negotiating with the Egyptians and with your own people regarding the establishment of the multinational force in Sinai. One of the basic points that we said and the Egyptians agreed and your own people were very firm about that, was that the table has to be clean by the time of the withdrawal, by the 26th or 25th of April. The table has to be completely clean. In other words when the MFO does start its operation, it has to be completely clear that there are no violations and this is one of the basic points we made in these negotiations for the establishment of the MFO. And the MFO will then be responsible for preventing violations, not just reporting on them. One of the articles in the protocol, which you may remember, Mr. Prime Minister, was that they have to redress any violation within 48 hours after notification of such violation. That is one of the points in the protocol which the Egyptians agreed to and of course your own people accepted. This was one of the basic points regarding the prevention of violations in the future. I think we haven't got such a situation at the moment, and I think it is extremely important that the MFO can start performing on the right foot. I'd like to make one other point.

I was now in Egypt and I had a long conversation with El Baz, with Boutros Ghali and with Gen. Ali. And I made the

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point very strongly regarding their actions with the PLO; the fact that they are helping the PLO. I must say that they did not deny it, they were not able to say: this is not true. So it is not a case where we are saying we have this and they are denying it. All they could say was we are trying to prevent this. Well, I think in a country like Egypt if one decides to prevent it, it's a very, very easy thing to do.

MR. STOESEL: Thank you very much for that. We certainly agree on both points and certainly the MFO should start with a clean slate, a tabula rasa, and then the commitment to follow up, to see that any violations are not only reported but are taken care of.

On Gen. Yaari's report, which we listened to with great attention and interest, we are glad to have these details. I gather that at least on some of them the reports from the Sinai Field Mission may not bear them out as being violations. And I would be interested in any comments you have on that. If there is a possible discrepancy between what the Field Mission is reporting and what your information shows, and is it conceivable that on some of these points there is a disagreement on the meaning of the provisions of the Annex?

GEN. YAARI: As far as the deployment of units is concerned, I can assure you that the Egyptians know where the violations are according to what I said. And they even have been taking steps now that the issue is so strong to abolish or move units.

MR. BROWN: Are they taking such steps?

GEN. YAARI: They may be.

As far as on the ground is concerned, fortifications, mine fields, positions, fences, what we have is air photography and interpretation of air photography. I can assure you that our analysts, whom I know well, once those fortifications, mine fields and fences will not be there, we shall be able to say that they are not there. And I understand that the SFM was checking them and they say the Egyptians are starting to dismantle them. I hope that will be done according to what they said.

MR. BROWN: What is your latest information on that?

GEN. YAARI: The latest is that we saw them in position, unless some changes have taken place. And I said that nothing was done to build more. But the moment they will be taken down we shall know it. It is very easy to see. And as for the other sensitive things I said, sigint units, etc. you can be assured I am right.

MR. LEWIS: Why the difference in interpretation on certain issues? There has been a long debate between the Israelis and Egyptians on the military commission, and our people have been present, and there is from our perception a general difference of view about certain aspects.

GEN. YAARI: As far as the excess units, we base our reports on your own photography and read-outs. We don't see the photographs, we see the read-out. Secondly, the SFM deals with major units.

MR. LEWIS: That is what the treaty calls for.

GEN. YAARI: Yes, main elements.

MR. LEWIS: But that is the definition of what is a violation. Minor elements are not a violation by the same token.


GEN. YAARI: What we are talking about are additional units that we see in the area according to the read-out that are regarded not as main elements. And we know very well that they are an addition in the area. They represent not full units but divisions which are west of the canal.

MR. LEWIS: This is one of the areas obviously where the SFM interpretation differs from yours. Where you have made these statements our people have checked and apparently have been assured that in fact these minor elements belong to other main elements in the Sinai. You disagree and I take it that on the basis of your intelligence the Egyptians are lying to the SFM. Is that the heart of the issue here?

MR. BEGIN: Excuse me, may I make one remark? If there is good will, there won't be any misunderstanding. If there is ill will, there will always be. One can say a main element is a division and a brigade is a minor element, but that is ill will and not good will. Main elements means more or less a serious unit starting from a company. A company is a serious unit in the military, it may be 150 men. A battalion may be near 1,000 men, 800 at least.

MR. LEWIS: But there was agreement among the military experts at the time the Annex was drawn up as to main elements, and I think the battalion was the unit.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew and Arabic at the top of the page. The Hebrew text includes "לשרת השר" and "ביום 16/4/82". The Arabic text includes "بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ".



April 16, 1982. *الرئيس*

*The President*

A handwritten signature or set of initials enclosed in a circle.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter of March 25, 1982. In that letter, you made it clear that you shared with me a firm commitment to strengthen the structure of peace for the good of our two peoples and, indeed, the good of all nations. Peace has become the paramount goal of the new generations of young men who are protesting the devastation and destruction of war. They are determined to stop the senseless killing of fellow men for advancing nationalistic aims. It is certainly a fortunate development that indicates the trend of the future.

At Camp David, our two countries took a daring and pioneering step on the road to peace. The signing of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" was not merely an addition of a certain document to history books. Rather, it was, and will always remain, a dynamic and revolutionary expression of the will of our peoples and their earnest desire to live together as good neighbors and friends. Being aware of our historic responsibility, we took it upon ourselves to widen the scope of peace so as to have it reign over every corner of our troubled area. We made a solemn commitment to work together tirelessly and vigorously for a comprehensive peace between Israel and all its neighbors. From the very beginning, we knew that such an undertaking was not an easy task. However, we accepted the challenge with faith and hope. It was not a step into the unknown as some believed, but a great leap on the road to a bright future for our sons and grandchildren.

.../...

*The President*

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We cemented this gigantic step when we signed the peace Treaty and accompanying documents on March 26, 1979. This act came as an added proof of the solidity and stability of the peace process. The implementation of the provisions of the Treaty proceeded smoothly and without any serious problems. We were able to settle all differences amiably and friendly. Our representatives cooperated to create an atmosphere of better understanding and smooth communication. They became more familiar with the difficulties and sensitivities of one another. They were learning more about the dynamics of peace and the aspirations and perhaps the fears of both nations with the passage of every day and each phase. Such turn of events reassured many Egyptians and Israelis alike and allayed the fears and suspicions of those who were skeptical or unwilling to believe in peace.

We have honored all our commitments under the Treaty in good faith. By the same token, we have stated repeatedly that you have done the same. Our purpose was not confined to making a legal point for the record. More importantly, we were focussing on the future. It is a must to build new bridges of confidence between our peoples everyday. It is with this in mind that I reiterated on several occasions that the completion of final withdrawal from Sinai will witness a great enhancement in the atmosphere of peace and friendship among our countrymen. The last barrier will be removed and more Egyptians would be pleased to visit Israel and establish contacts with their cousins and neighbors.

.../...



The President

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In the past few weeks, certain developments took place that could have generated sharp exchanges of polemics and criticism. However, we applied maximum restraint and remained composed. Again, we were focussing on the future in so doing. What counts is that peace should gain more converts steadily. As I mentioned to you in my letter of March 21, 1982, several statements made by high ranking Israeli officials did not seem to be geared to serve our common purpose. I reminded you, in that letter, of our firm pledge to work for peace forever between our nations. I am glad that your letter of March 25 carried a reaffirmation of that pledge. This being the case, officials on both sides should be more careful in their public pronouncement. Specifically, there should be no reference whatsoever, explicitly or implicitly, to the prospect of non-withdrawal on time. Believe me, such threats, be them overt or veiled, are extremely detrimental to our goal. They create the kind of ill-feeling we have been striving to eliminate. As I stated several times before, let us look beyond the twenty-fifth of April. Let us not be immobilized by such a date that will soon belong to the past.

Some reports alluded to alleged violations on our part of our commitments under the Military Annex. Here also, I believe that the media is not the proper channel for dealing with such matters. Therefore, I was pleased when the issue was raised by Minister Sharon as I received him today. He will certainly report to you that Field Marshal Abu-Gazala explained to him in detail that we are not violating our commitments. Nor do we intend to commit any violations in the future. That does not serve our interest as we are looking forward to a stable and lasting peace.



The President

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It is unthinkable that we attempt to achieve such insignificant advantages which would hurt the cause of peace. You know that once we give our word, we honor it at all cost. To us, this is a moral commitment as well as a legal obligation. If we affix our signature to any document, it acquires a sanctity that is reserved for our most revered papers. In short, we do not take our commitments lightly. Minister Sharon will tell you that it was agreed to maintain close contact between military authorities on both sides to deal with these matters promptly before they acquire undue dimensions. I am certain that this will enable us to avoid any misunderstanding of this sort.

On the other hand, you may rest assured that Egypt will not condone any smuggling of arms or explosives through its territory. We find such illicit acts injurious to our own interest and a threat to our security. There is no reason for us to tolerate such activities. An Egyptian police delegation visited Israel late last month and agreed with your authorities to cooperate closely on such matters as well as other areas related to security and justice.

Disagreement over the exact location of the boundary line near Toba should not turn into a source of friction or ill-feeling. It should be assumed that both Parties are disagreeing in good faith. The sooner this difference is settled, the better it is for our future relations. It was for that reason that we proposed to refer the question to arbitration without



The President

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delay. We do not want to allow the generation of any negative attitudes among our peoples. I am certain that the matter can be settled and removed from the way within a few weeks, for it is only a technical matter rather than a politically loaded issue. Thus, I urge you to cooperate with us in this connection as you did in the past with a view to reaching agreement in the coming few days on a formula for arbitration. Until the dispute is settled, the situation on the ground should be neutralized. No Party should be permitted to perform functions that are incompatible with the concept of arbitration. In other words, day-to-day activities should be suspended until a verdict is issued. A contested area is not suitable for establishing a model for coexistence and cooperation. On the contrary, any physical presence there is certain to create the hostility and friction which we want to avoid. Thus, we will be defeating our purpose if we insist on formulas that are likely to complicate matters for us in the future.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

We are looking forward to consolidating the historic achievement we made during the past few years for the benefit of all nations of the region. I am confident that this is your desire too. Therefore, I appeal to you and your sense of history to enable us to build solid bridges of confidence between our peoples who bore this awesome responsibility. Let us not be saddled with the suspicions and fears of the past. Let us refrain from any act or statement that might increase tension in the




The President

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region or revive old suspicions and fears. I have asked Dr. Botrous Ghali to deliver this message to you and convey to you and your colleagues my views in length.

With best wishes,

Sincerely  


Mohammed Hosny Mubarak



טאג  
17/4

טופס מברק צפון

40/1

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

דפים \_\_\_\_\_ מתוך \_\_\_\_\_ דף \_\_\_\_\_

צא השגריר

אל: קהיר - השגריר 272

סיווג בטחוני: 1310

דחיפות: 1311

תאריך וזיחה: 1617-

מס. מברק: 477/1

קשר  
מח'  
קשר

וויינגטון  
40/1

השגריר

להלן ניהול קצ שהוכנו ע"י היוזם המשפט  
אנליקים רובינשטיין בנושא טאבה והסכסוך  
בקשר לגבול ישראל - מצרים :

מה שמה מה סורתה שהבט גנא ג/אנא רובינשטיין  
ליצבא רובינשטיין חס אלן א"בין גנאים

שמה בק

אישור המנכ"ל:

אישור מנהל המחלקה:

תאריך: 16.4.82 השולח

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך כג' בניסן תשמ"ב  
16 באפריל 1982

מספר:

אל: שר החוץ  
המנכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: יישוב סכסוכים עם מצרים - סעיף 7 לחוזה השלום

א. מטרת נייר זה להעמיד על עיקרי תוכנו ותולדותיו של סעיף יישוב הסכסוכים (סעיף 7) לחוזה השלום מיום 26.3.79.

ב. לשון הסעיף היא כלהלן:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

(ובעברית: "1. חילוקי דעות הנובעים מהחלתו של חוזה זה, או מפירושו, ייושבו במשא-ומתן). 2. כל חילוקי דעות כאמור, שאי אפשר ליישבם במשא ומתן, ייושבו ע"י הליך של פישור או יוגשו לבוררות").

ג. השלב הראשון הוא איפוא שלב של מו"מ בין הצדדים. רק בהיעדר אפשרות לפתור במו"מ עוברים לשלב הבא שהוא פישור או בוררות.

ד. כאן יש להסביר בקיצור מהי בוררות ומהו פישור ואת ההבחנה ביניהם:

1. בוררות (arbitration) הוא הליך שבו מסכימים הצדדים למסור את הכרעת הסכסוך לבורר או בוררים, המתמנים על-ידיהם (אחת השיטות האפשריות היא זבל"א) לקיום הבוררות קודמים שלבים, שפרטיהם משתנים ממקרה למקרה ובהתאם להסכם, של קביעת הבורר ושל ניסוח הסכם (או טיוט) הבוררות (compromis), בו מתגבשת השאלה השרויה במחלוקת, והיכול לכלול הוראות שונות באשר למהות הבוררות ולפרוצדורה שתינקט בה. כתום הבוררות ניתן פסק בורר שהוא בדרך כלל פסיקה המחייבת את הצדדים. כל בוררות בהקשר המשפט הבינלאומי ביסודה היא בעלת אופי "בינלאומי" במובן זה שבדרך כלל, מלבד הבוררים שממנה כל צד, מתמנה בורר בוסף (umpire) (שלעמים הוא בורר יחיד) שבדרך כלל איננו בן אחד הלאומים המתדיינים. ואולם, בכך מתמצה ה"הבינלאומיות", ובהקשר שלנו הבוררות היא מוסכמת במובן זה שכל מרכיביה צריך שיוסכמו ע"י הצדדים ולא בוררות הניתנת לגוף בינלאומי (כמו ביה"ד בהאג או ארגון או"מי אחר כלשהו). זהו גם פירושו של סעיף בחוזה השלום. המכריע הוא רצון הצדדים, המתמנים את הבוררים, ומנסחים את המחלוקת.

2. פישור (conciliation) הוא מסירת סכסוך לטיפול ע"י פישור אדם יחיד או ועדה, הבודק(ת) את העובדות והראיות ושומעת את הצדדים ומציע פתרון לאדדים. כל צד חופשי לקבל או לזכות הצעות של מפשרים (כמובן יש להן משקל פוליטי לא מבוטל). מבחינה זו, השוני בין פישור לתיווך הוא ביכולת וזכות של המפשר להעלות פורמלית הצעות לעיון הצדדים; ההבדל בינו לבוררות הוא כי בדרך כלל אין הפסק מחייב. (ישנם תקדימים שבהם דובר על פישור מחייב (חוזה השלום עם איטליה ב-1947), אך בדוגמאות המורכבות ביותר, כמו באחד מנספחי אמנת האמנות של וינה מ-1969 נקבע כי "דו"ח הועדה, הכולל כל מסקנות שהן שייקבעו בה בקשר לעובדות או לשאלות משפטיות, לא יהיה מחייב את הצדדים

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# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: 3

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ולא יהיה לו אופי אלא של המלצות המוגשות לשיקול הצדדים כדי להקל על פתרון ידידותי לטכטון". הוא הדין לגבי פרוצדורת פישור המתוארת באחד מנספחי טיוטת אמנת הים החדשה, בה נקבע כי הדו"ח לא יהא מחייב. בשני המקרים האחרונים מדובר על דו"ח שיוגש תוך שנה מהקמת הועדה: נכון הוא כי בתקדימים קודמים יש תקופות קצרות יותר בפרוצדורת הפישור (וכן בכוררות) אך אין חובה כלשהי לדבוק דוקא באלה.

ה. תולדותיו של סעיף 7 במו"מ על חוזה השלום ב-1978 הן ביטודן כלהלן:

1. ההצעה האמריקנית הראשונה מ-11.10.78 כללה סעיף יישוב סכסוכים וקבעה כי אם אי אפשר להגיע לפתרון באמצעים דיפלומטיים יוגש הסכסוך לבוררות או לביה"ד בהאג לפי דרישת כל ממשלה (וכן נקבעו פרטים טכניים בנוגע לאפשרויות אלה, ונאמר כי פטה"ד או פסק הבוררות יהיה סופי ומחייב).  
(הערה: בטיוטות ישראליות קודמות לחוזה השלום דובר הן על אפשרות של בוררות והן על אפשרות של ועדת פישור).
2. בדיון בענין זה ב-13.10.78 עם האמריקנים הודיעה משלחת ישראל כי לא נסכים לביה"ד בהאג, מטעמים מובנים, וכי אנו מציעים נעדת פישור, שתורכב מחמישה חברים, שניים שיבחר כל צד והזמירי שייבחר על-ידי הארבעה. משלחת ארה"ב לא ראתה קושי בכך.
3. באותו יום שבו האמריקנים לאחר שטוחחו עם המצרים ואמרו כי הללו מתנגדים לפישור ומציעים להחליפו בבוררות.
4. בעקבות זאת הציעו האמריקנים ב-14.10.78 נוסח של ועדת בוררות בת חמישה חברים (שניים מכל צד והחמישי שייבחר על ידיהם). נוסח ברוח זו, בשינויים קטנים, הופיע בטיוטת אחדות של ההסכם עד 19.10 (טיוטה מס' 5).
5. במו"מ שנערך ב-19 באוקטובר 1978 עם הנשיא קרטנר הוסכם כי תהיה ועדת בוררות של 4 ואם יהיה קפאון, יבחרו חמישי. למחרת (21.10.78) העלו המצרים הסדר של שלושה שלבים: תחילה מו"מ, אח"כ ועדת פישור (conciliation) ובאין הסכם - בוררות, שבה יהיו שניים מכל צד וחמישי מוסכם. ישראל אמרה כי בגלל הקושי להפקיד גורלנו בידי צד ג' אנו רוצים כי לפני קביעת בוררות יש צורך להסכים על קיום deadlock. בסופו של דבר הושמטה ההתייחסות למספר הבוררים, ונקבעה הנוסחה שחלוקי דיעות שלא ניתן לפתור במו"מ יפתרו ע"י פישור או ימסרו לבוררות, לפי הנוסח הקיים כיום בהסכם השלום.
6. פרופ' ברק הסביר לממשלה (23.10.78) את הרקע לאי התלהבותנו לבוררות ואח"כ אמר כי הנוסחה שהתקבלה מכילה את "הרעיון... שיש פה אופציה של בחירה בין פיוס (פישור-א"ר) לבוררות, וכן שזה לא אקט צדדי אלא ששני הצדדים צריכים להסכים. אנו יכולים לאמר כי אנו לא מסכימים ללכת לפיוס (פישור) אלא לבוררות, והצד השני יכול לומר כי הוא לא מסכים ללכת לבוררות אלא לפיוס (פישור), ואם אין הסכמה, לא לוריאציה הראשונה ולא לוריאציה השניה, אז יש קונפליקט שלו אין פתרון משפטי, והפתרון גם לא היה פוליטי" (כך). פרופ' ברק - ככל הנראה - ראה קושי במצב זה וחשב שעוד ניתן יהא לתקן בנוסחה, אך הדבר לא נעשה.

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# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

תאריך:

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1. את המצב הקיים כיום ניתן לתאר איפוא כלהלן:

1. תחילה יש לנסות לפתור המחלוקת במו"מ.
2. כהנחה כי המו"מ לא עלה יפה, יש צורך להגיע להסכמה בין הצדדים כי אי אפשר לפתור את הסכסוך במו"מ.
3. א. הצעה הוא קביעת ההליך: סעיף 7(2) מדבר על "יישוב ע"י פישור" או "הגשה לבוררות", וממילא יש צורך לקבוע מהו ההליך בו בוחרים. גם על כך יש לנהל מו"מ.  
ב. קביעת עמדתה של ישראל בשאלת הבחירה בין פישור לבוררות תלויה לכאורה בהערכת המצב שלה לגבי סיכומה. אם מהערכת המצב יעלה, כי במאזן ההסתברויות נוטה הכף לטובתנו, ניתן להסכים לכאורה לבוררות, שהפסק בה מחייב. אם אין אנו אופטימיים לגבי התוצאות, ניתן להתאמץ למשוך לכיוון פישור, שבו אין חובה משפטית לקבל את הצעת המפשר. במקרה של ספק עדיף לכאורה פישור ומכחיבה משפטית, הואיל והוא מופיע ראשון בסעיף 7(2), דומה שיש משקל לטענה שיש לפתוח בו.

4. לאחר קביעת ההליך יש להגיע להסכם על מינוח המפשר/ית או הבורר/ים. מובן כי ניתן לקבוע יותר מבורר או מפשר אחד, בנוסח של זבל"א. יש להגיע גם לניסוח השאלות השנויות במחלוקת, דבר זה ייתכן שיעשה במסגרת המכונה - כאמור - במקרה של בוררות בשם *compromis d'arbitrage*.

5. למותר לציין כי הליכים אלה עשויים להימשך זמן רב, וכל זאת עוד לפני הפישור או התיווך עצמם, שהם גם עשויים להימשך לא מעט. וכאמור - התקדימים מדברים על חודשים אחדים גם על שכנים.

ז. עד כאן המצב המשפטי בקשר להליך. לא למותר לציין לגוף הסכסוך, כי בהליכים הנוגעים לסכסוכי גבול, לפי תקדימים בינלאומיים, יש חשיבות למסמכים המוכיחים טענות כל-צד, אך גם לפרקטיקה שהיתה קיימת בתקופות רלבנטיות באיזור המחלוקת.

~~ב. ר. פ. ה.  
א. רובלבושטיין~~

~~העתק: מנהל לשכת ראש הממשלה  
מנהל לשכת שר החוץ  
קיועץ המשפטי לממשלה  
ממג"ל  
מר ש. זילברן, ס/מנכ"ל  
מנהל מח' מצריים~~

מדינת ישראל

10/21

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: כג' בניסן תשמ"ב  
16 באפריל 1982

מספר:

7 (תג'ר) הפענוח. ניצ' פלג'י אל  
להלן (ני"א) ~~מסמכים~~ יקצ' יקצ' יקצ'  
מ"א (הכנסת) בק"מ (ת"א)

אל: שר החוץ  
המכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: המסמכים המצריים (non-papers) בנושא טאבה שנמסרו ל"הב"ט ב-15.4.82

להלן ניתוח ראשוני של המסמכים והערות להם:

1. לשהב"ט נמסרו שני מסמכים על בידר שה"ח המצרי (שאינם נושאים כותרת עניינית). המסמך הראשון עוסק בבוררות; השני עוסק בתקופת הביניים.
2. א. המסמך העוסק בבוררות יוצא מן ההנחה כי הוסכם שהסכסוך ייושב ע"י בוררות מוסכמת, לפי סעיף 7 לחוזה השלום. הוא בנוי בצורת "הסכום" בין ישראל למצרים בו מתוארים שלבי תהליך הבוררות, לרבות לוח-זמנים.  
ב. לכך יש להעיר, כי סעיף 7 לחוזה השלום (שתולדותיו ותוכנו נסקרים בנייר המצ"ב, ראשיתו מו"מ - ולדעתי אין חובה או הכרח לומר כי כבר סיימנו תהליך המו"מ. דומה שרצוי שגישתנו תהא כי עדיין ניתן לנהל מו"מ (היכול גם להסתייע במתווך אמריקני, למשל). מבחינה טובטנטטיבית יכולים הצדדים עדיין לגסות לפתור את הדברים בסי"פ ביניהם אולם, אם נסכים כי לכאורה תם שלב המו"מ (דבר שאינו הכרח כל עיקר מבחינתנו) - יש לעבור לשלב הבא.
- ג. באשר לשלב הבא: המסמך המצרי מדבר על בוררות ועוסק בשלושה שלבים: הראשון: השלב הנוכחי - ההסכמה העקרונית למסירת הסכסוך בטאבה לבוררות מוסכמת (אין התחייבות לשאר הנקודות השנויות במחלוקת מיהוים הגבול). השני: שלב שטר הבוררים (הקומפרומיס) שהם קוראים לו גם "הסכם מיוחד", לכך יצבו משום מה שלושה חודשים ממועד ההסכמה הנוכחית (העקרונית). לשם כך תוקם ועדה מיוחדת משותפת כאורח מילדי, שתסכם "שטר בוררין" ובו שמות הבוררים של כל צד וה-umpire וכן פרוצדורת קביעת ה-umpire (יש כאילו סתירה בנייר - אם ה-umpire מוסכם אין צורך אחר כך לכאורה בפרוצדורה נוספת); קביעה כי הבוררות תסתיים תוך 3 חודשים מאז סיכום ניסוח שטר הבוררים, וכי פסק הבוררים יהא מחייב. כלומר ניתנים לכל התהליך ששה חודשים בלבד. השלישי: מיד (תוך 10 ימים) אחר פסק הבוררים תיפגש ועדה טכנית משותפת לסימון הגבול לפי הפסק.
- ד. מבחינתנו העמדות האפשריות הן אלה:  
ראשית, הייתי ממליץ כי השלב הראשון לאחר מו"מ יהיה פישור (conciliation) בהתאם לרישא של סעיף 7(2) לחוזה השלום, ולא בוררות. לדעתי יתקשו המצרים למצוא עילה משפטית להתנגד לכך. פישור לא יהלך עלינו את אימי החרב המתהפכת של פסק בוררות בלתי נוח. יתאפשרו גם מאמצי תיווך רגועים יחסית של המפשר. במקרה כזה יש למנות איפוא ועדה למינוי המפשר/ים ולניסוח נקודות המחלוקת. לוי"ז (אם בכלל) צריך להיות ממושך יותר (למשל, עד חצי שנה לקביעת הבוררים וניסוח שטר הבוררים ושנה לניהול בוררות).  
שנית, ממילא כשהמו"מ בפישור אין בשלב זה צורך לדבר על פסק מחייב; יתכן שהדברים יסתכמו בהסכמה.
- ה. אין זה סותר כמובן את האפשרות כי אם לא יניב הפישור פירות, ניתן יהיה ללכת לבוררות, ואז יחולו כללי הבוררות. במקרה כזה החסרון העיקרי בהצעה המצרית (אם תעמוד אז על הפרק) הוא לוח הזמנים הקצר.

2/...

משרד החוץ

ירושלים

כתאריך:

מספר:

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3. המסמך השני עוסק בחיים בתקופת הביניים. לפי הצעת רה"מ (למעשה), מדובר על ועדה שתדון במצב בתקופת הביניים. ואולם, המצרים אימצו לכאורה הצעת רה"מ בחלקה הפרוצדורלי אך לא בחלקה המהותי. בחלק המהותי מבקשים המצרים:
  - א. הקפאה של כל הפעילויות בשטח. על כך דיברו גם בעבר, אך גם נשמעו (למנכ"ל מפי גאלי) בוטחאות של הקפאת המלון והשארית החיים בחוף ובכפר נלסון. מכל מקום הקפאה אינה מקובלת עלינו (ראה להלן).
  - ב. מיקום אלמנטים מהכוח הרב-לאומי מקובל עלינו, אך לא בניסוח של "למניעת נוכחות צבאית כלשהי או להקמת מבנים חדשים כלשהם באיזור", באשר לנוכחות צבאית, לכך אבו מסכימים (ומשתמע לכאורה אולי שהמצרים שויים להסכים לנוכחות משטרה אזרחית - ראה להלן), אך טעון בדיקה עדיין אם ירצה הכמ"ר לעסוק במניעת הקמת מבנים חדשים.
  - ג. מיקום טרמינל זמני (עד לקביעת הגבול הקבוע) בכל צד, עם נוכחות נציגים חדיית. שהב"ט הצביע על כך שמיקום הטרמינל-שהציעו המצרים הוא מעבר לשטח שעליו מתבססת עמדתנו. *אין להניח שהמצרים יסכימו*
  - ד. הסעיף האחרון חמור, בלתי קביל ובלתי מעשי כאחד - כניסה לשטח ברשיונות טמערכת הקישור (המשותפת) ונוציא שיפה כוחם ליום אחד בלבד. (מובן כי הדבר משמיע דרישה להקפאה מוחלטת, אחרת אין להעלות על הדעת כניסה חד-יומית).
4. באשר לעמדתנו שלנו: אכן תת הועדה לתקופת הביניים צריכה לפעול מיד ורצוי שכולל, מלבד אנשי צבא, משרד החוץ ומשפטנים, גם אנשים הבקיאים בבעיות המקום (נציגות משרד הפנים, משטרה ואפילו עיריית אילת) לפחות כיועצים, כדי שלא תתקבלנה החלטות פרקטיות שלא על דעת גורמים שונים בשטח.
5. בהנחה כי מוסכם שהכמ"ר יהיה בשטח טאבה, השאלה היא:
  - א. צורת החיים בפועל.
  - ב. המשפט שיחול.
  - ג. באשר לצורת החיים, עמדתנו הבסיסית היא כמובן כי החיים צריך שיימשכו כרגיל באדמיניסטרציה שלנו (אז כי לצד כניסה הופשית בלי אשרות לישראלים אולי כדאי למצוא סידור מקביל למצרים ולאזרחים של מדינות שלישיות); המלון יפתח; הכמ"ר יהיה, אך משטרת ישראל תפעל גם היא (אין כאן דמיון למקרי קונמיניום-או איזור ביטרלי במקומות אחרים - סעודיה/כוית - שבהם פעלו המשטרות של שתי המדינות, כי שם המדובר בשטח נרחב וכאן באיזור קטנטן). כעמדת נטיגה ניתן לקבוע שאזרחים מצרים שיעברו עבירות יועברו מיד לשלטונות מצרים במעבר הגבול (כדי לנסות להימנע מכך שרק כמ"ר יהיה בשטח בתפקידי שיטור).
  - ד. ניתן אולי להסכים כי מצרים תבנה מלון או מתקן נופש בחלק הדרומי של השטח כפי שאנו עשינו בצפונה וזאת without prejudice לתוצאות הליכי יישוב הסכסוך.

3/...

# מדינת ישראל

משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

תאריך: 3

מספר:

- 3 -

ה. סמכות שפיטה: אנו מציעים כי סמכות השפיטה תהא שלנו לגבי ישראלים ותיירים זרים, פרט למצרים שידמטרו לשלטונותיהם.

ו. מיסוי - ניתן לפתור ממיסוי, בכפוף לתשלום בעד שירותים מובילציפליים שניתן לאילת לא כמס אלא כתשלום בעד שירותים שהעירייה נותנת (מטבע הדברים אכן יינתנו שירותים אלה מאלת).

עושה הברית מצרי

~~ב מ ר כ ה ,~~

~~א רובלנשטיין~~

~~העתק: לשכת רה"מ  
לשכת שהב"ט  
היועץ המשפטי לממשלה  
ממוכ"ל  
מר ש. זיבון, ס/ממכ"ל  
מנהל מחלקת מצרים~~

~~לוטת: הצעת מצרים~~



MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. The Parties agree to submit the dispute concerning the demarcation of the international boundary in Taba to agreed arbitration, pursuant to Article 7 of the peace treaty.
2. They undertake to conclude the Special Agreement (compromis) of arbitration no later than 3 months from the final signature of the present Agreement. To this end a special joint Committee will be established immediately to conclude the compromis on the following principles:
  - a. The Special Agreement shall include the names of the arbitrator designated by each Party, as well as the Umpire agreed upon by them as well as the procedure of designation of the Umpire.
  - b. It shall include a provision directing the arbitral tribunal to give its award no later than 3 months from the final signature of the Special Agreement of arbitration.
  - c. The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be final and legally binding on the Parties.
3. A Joint Technical Boundary Commission shall meet no later than 10 days after the formal communication of the award of the arbitral tribunal to the Parties, in order to effect forthwith the demarcation of the international boundary in Taba in accordance with the award.

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ש"ס/א"ח

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

3991

\*\* יוצא \*\*  
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שמו

אל: ווא, נר: 247, מ: המשרד  
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 110482, זח: 1400  
נר: תכניה 11 הסטיפים

שמו/מיד

חוכניה 11 הסטיפים המצרים

- בהמשך למברקנו הגלוי בנדון להלן תוספת-  
1. נציג אשפי לועידה, דחה פורמליה בכתב את ההצעה המצרית.  
בעקבותיו דחו החוכניה גם סוריה, אלג'יריה ודנמר. טבל מקום  
החוכניה המצרית לא וכתה לכל מטעד בוועידה שאימצה כמקובל  
בוידות אלה, החליטה מרחיקת לכת עוד יותר בהשראת אשפי.
- המאמץ המצרי היה מכוון לאו דווקא לאימוץ החוכניה המצרית  
במור שבואת כי אם גם למניעת גינוי חד משמעי לחוזה השלום  
המצרי-ישראלי כנהוג באומי ובנדאי בוידות הבלטיות. לפי מידע  
שבדינו אין אמנם גינוי חד משמעי לחוזה השלום אך יש הסתייגות  
מי'המיתוח על עתיד העם הפלסטיני במסגרת קמפי דיודיי  
ומי'הסכמים נפרדימי.

הטרוח

3. חוכן ההצעה המצרית, מהווה חזרה על המשנה שלהם שבאה לידי  
ביטוי בצהרות דשמיות וככלי התקשורת, בהודטנויות שונות.  
החידוש הוא מלאשונה נעשה נסיון מצרי לקבץ ולגבש משנה זו  
במדוכו המוגשת במסמך לפורום בינלי.
4. בסטיפים שהועלו עיי מצרים אין אוכוד של אשפי ולא בכדי  
הטינוי בו משתמשת ההצעה הוא העם הפלסטיני. נראה שמצרים  
רוצה לעקוף מכשול הייצוג הפלסטיני, עיי שימוש במינוח כללי  
ולחשאיך בכך פתח לפידושים נוחים במידת הצורך מצרים נהגה כך  
לעמים קדובות עיי משמוש האכחנה בין המונח פלסטינים לבין  
המונח אשפי.

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

5. מתוך עיון ראשוני בסטיפי ההצעה המצרית, מתקבל רושם שקיים  
דמיון רב בין חוכן ההצעה לבין המרכיבים העיקריים של חוכניה  
שמונה הנקודות של הנסיך פהד. הבדל ברור בין שתי החוכניות הוא  
קריאתה של מצרים להכרה הדדית בין ישראל והפלסטינים שאינה  
קיימת בחוכניה הסטודית במפורש או כי הודגשה בפדטנויות כגון  
10 של שהתי טעוד אל פייסלי.
6. החוכניה המצרית שוב מאשרת את ההערבה שמגמת מצרים של מוכארך  
והיה להתיישר בהדרגה עם הקו של המחנה המרכזי של מדינות טרב  
הכולל את סעודיה, ירדן, נסיכויות המפרץ ומדוקו, תוך קיום  
המסגרת הפורמלית של חוזה השלום. אף כי החוכניה לא אומצה הרי  
בהצגתה המחיימה מצרים למחנה זה שיש לו ולה תפיסה מוחתפת לגבי  
ההסדר המדיני הסופי של הבטיה הפלסטינית והשמחים. לא טן הנמנע  
שזו הייתה מטרתה העיקרית של מצרים.

7. יצויין כי הגורמים שהתייצבו בנגד החוכניה המצרית בוועידת  
הבלמרי הם למעשה אותם גורמים שדחו גם את חוכניה פהד והביאו  
לפירוד הפסקה הטרבית בפאס.
8. ניתן לומר כי הצגה חד צדדית של חוכניה המצרית המתייחסת  
לפתרון הבטיה הפלסטינית ולסמטוס הסופי של יושי ועזה, אינה  
עולה בקנה אחד עם התחייבויותיה של מצרים במסגרת קמפי דיודי,  
בהן מדובר על תהליך מומי להקמת אוטונומיה ולא על הסדרים  
סופיים לפני תום תקופת המעבר.

המרכיב/ערב 1

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכיל, ממנכיל, סמנכיל, טמת, דמ,  
אמן, מצפא, הסברה

מוצרי נר ירושלים בעמ" 11.00 2069

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

3982

יוצא

בלטיס

אל: ווא, קהיר, נר: חוץ 182, מ: המשרד  
דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 110482, זח: 1400  
נד: חוכנית 11 הסעיפים

בלטס/מ"ד

חוכנית 11 הסעיפים המצריים

1. להלן חוכנית 11 הסעיפים שהציג עבד אלמג'יד בוועידת הבלטיס  
שעל ישראל לקבלם במסגרת ההכרה ההדדית עם הפלסי נר' טונטה  
קרלו 7.4:  
א. טיום הבינוש.

ב. זכות לשונו או לקבל פיצויים בהתאם להחלטת האו"ם 194.  
ג. זכותו של העם הפלסטיני לריבונות על אוצרותיו.  
ד. זכות ההגדרה העצמית ללא התערבות חיצונית.  
ה. זכות למדינה עצמאית בגדמי'ע וטזה על בסיס גבולות 1967.  
ו. זכות הריבונות של העיר ירושלים (הכוונה למזרח העיר)  
ודחיית כל שנוי גאוגרפי או דמוגרפי בעיר וכל שנוי בטעמה  
החוקי.  
ז. דחיית כל מדיניות ישראלית החותרת להכניס שנויים  
גאוגרפיים, דמוגרפיים וחוקיים בשטחים שנכבשו ב-1967.

ח. זכות לבטחון במסגרת גבולות בשוחים על בסיס ההכרה ההדדית  
בזכות זו עם המדינות השכנות.

ט. זכות לבטל את כל הצטרדים הסותרים את אמנת ג'נבה.  
י. זכות לחסל את הישובים הסותרים את החוק הבינ"ל בנוגע  
לבינוש שטחים.  
יא. זכות ליישם את אמנת ג'נבה במלואה בשטחים הכבושים עד  
להסדר בולל ולנסיגת ישראל מהם.

2. הסוכנות הכונית (ס"י"כ) 7.4 ציטטה את עבד אלמג'יד שאמר  
בנאומו:  
א. זכות ההגדרה העצמית היא של העם הפלסטיני כפי שזו הזכות של  
אחרים.  
ב. הזכות להקים מדינה פלסטינית היא זכותו של העם הפלסטיני  
באותה מידה כפי שהוקמה מדינת ישראל על אדמת פלסטין.

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ג. תמורת ההכרה הישראלית בזכויות הפלסטינים זכותה היא לחיות  
בגבולות בינ"ל מוכרים.

ד. הנסיבות המדיניות הבינ"ל הנוכחיות מחייבות הכרה בזכות  
הקיום של ישראל בתוך גבולותיה המוכרים ובבטחון הדדי.

3. ברשותכם הכתבה בנדון של הוואל סטריט ג'ורנאל מה-8.4.  
4. עבד אלמג'יד לעתונאים בכונית נרדיו צות אלטרב 8.4:  
א. למצרים אין מונופולין על השלום ולא תנסה לכפות פתרון על  
אף אחד.  
ב. הפרוש המצרי לפתרון הצודק והכולל לבעייה הפלסטינית מתמקד  
בזכות ההגדרה העצמית לעם הפלסטיני ובזכותו להקמת מדינתו  
העצמאית על אדמתו.  
5. בדאיון לכתב סימויית בכונית (9.4) אמר עבד אלמג'יד:  
א. מטפן רב של מדינות באפריקה אסיה ואמלי'מ מקבלות השקפת  
מצרים כפי שהוצגה בוועידת הבלטיס ועובדה זו משתקפת בהודעת  
הסיכום המתונה והריאליסטית.

ב. יש מדינות טרבייות השותפות לדעותינו אולם הן אינן מכריזות  
על עמדתן בגלוי בגלל הלחצים המופטלים עליהן בזירה הטרביית.

ג. הצעה מצרים להכרה הדדית בו זמנית אינה עמדה חדשה זוהי  
עמדה שמצרים הודיעה עליה באו"ם אשתקד.

ד. קרא לישראל ולפלסטינים לפתוח במוי"מ ולהציט פתרונות  
מעשיים במקום לדחוח את ההצעה המצרית שהוטלה בוועידת הבלטיס.  
אנו שואלים מה התחליף שמבקש הצד הפלסטיני או הישראלי להצעה  
המצרית?  
המדכו/טרב 1=

פ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, אובל, עטנכל, סמנכל, טמת, רמ,  
אמן, מצפא, טעת, הסברה, פורת

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

671

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שמו

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מל: המשרד, נר: 141, מ: קהיר  
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 110482, וח: 1000  
נד: נאום עבדול מגיד

*Handwritten signature and scribbles*

מל: המרכז.

מאת: השגריר.

שמו/מיד

1.. מאחר שאין לי במחון שיש בידכם הנוסח הרשמי המלא של דברי עבדול מגיד בנווית הנני מבריקו להלן במלואו לפי טכסט באנגלית שקבלתי משגי'ארהב כאן.

2.. אין בידינו לטא בידי שגי'ארהב כאנ( הנוסח המלא והמדויק של החלטות הכלמויות בנווית, אם הנוסח המלא בידכם אודה אם חבריקו בהווד בהול.

3.. להלן נוסח נאום עבדול מגיד לאמור:

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL  
AND THE COMPASSIONATE

MR. CHAIRMAN.

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME FIRST OF ALL TO CONVEY TO OUR BROTHER IN KUWAIT THE MOST SINCERE GREETINGS FROM THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, AND GOOD WISHES FOR CONTINUOUS ADVANCEMENT AND PROGRESS. KUWAIT FEATURES AS A MOST BELOVED PART OF OUR GREAT ARAB NATION AND AN IMPORTANT STEP ON THE PATH TOWARDS THE OVER ALL PROGRESS OF THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE, FURTHER ON BEHALF OF THE

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EGYPTIAN DELEGATION AND ON MY BEHALF, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY THANKS AND APPRECIATION FOR ALL THE HOSPITALITY AND KINDNESS WE HAVE RECEIVED SINCE OUR ARRIVAL IN KUWAIT WHICH ARE TRULY BECOMING OF THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY AND CORDIALITY SO WELL KNOWN OF THIS COUNTRY.

IT IS INDEED AN ADDED PLEASURE FOR ME TO WITNESS AMONG US A NUMBER OF BELOVED BROTHERS, WHO HAVE FOUGHT AT OUR SIDE AND WE ON THEIRS FROM THE SAME TRENCH. SIMILARLY, WE HAVE FOUGHT AND I SAY SIDE BY SIDE- IN DIFFERENT BATTLES AND I SHOUTE THAT NON OF US HAS EVER DIVERTED FROM THE HOLY COURSE SET BEFORE US, NAMELY THE REST NATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, THESE THE NATIONAL INALIENABLE LEGITIMATE AND BASIC RIGHTS.

MR. CHAIRMAN

THIS EXTRAORDINARY MEETING IS BEING HELD IN HIGHLY CRITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, SOME OF THIS CIRCUMSTANCES INSPIRE OPTIMISM AND HOPE, WHILE OTHER OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FILL ONE WITH SORROW AND ANXIETY, AS A WHOLE HOWEVER, THE CIRCUMSTANCES CALL FOR CAUTION, A DEEP MEDITATION, WELL THOUGHT OUT MEASURES, SOUND POLICIES AND APPROPRIATE ACTIONS.

ON THE ONE HAND , IN A FEW DAYS FROM NOW, THE ISRAELI FORCES WILL PULL OUT FROM THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY THAT HAS BEEN OCCUPIED

SINCE 1967 . THIS IN ITSELF IS A DEVELOPMENT, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH, I DO NOT ENVISAGE THAT ANYONE IS UNAWARE OF. FURTHER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS FACT AVE A LEGAL, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL IMPACT WHICH NO DOUBT WILL CREATE A DRIVING FORCE WHICH WILL BOOST PROGRESSES TOWARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, FOR HOW ELSE SINCE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MODERN HISTORY ISRAEL IS IN THE EBB AND ITS FORCES ARE WITHDRAWING WHILE AN ARAB COUNTRY WHICH IS EGYPT IS REGAINING SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN NATIONAL SOIL AND RESTORING A BELOVED PART OF ITS LAND WHICH HAVE REMAINED UNDER FOREIGN OCCUPATION FOR APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. ON THE OTHER HAND , HOWEVER WE CANNOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE PALESTINE QUESTION IS THE CORE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, AND THAT UNLESS A

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

JUST AND COMPREHNSIVE SOLUTION BE ATTAINED FOR THIS QUESTION, WE CANNOT EXPECT A JUST AND COMPREGENSIVE PEACE TO REIGN IN THE AREA.

I RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION A FEW PASSAGES CONTAINED IN THE ADDRESS OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR. MOSNI MUBARAK IN THE OCCASSION COMMEMARATING SOLIDARITY WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE . HE SAID: " AS A RESULT OF THE DENIAL OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO DISASTERS AND DEVASTATING WARS WHICH LASTED FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS CLAIMING TENS O THOUSANDS OF LIVES AND DRAINING ENORMOUS RESOURCES WHICH IF THEY GAVE NOT BEEN DEPLETED BY THE CONSECUTIVE WARS, COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN THE REALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL THE NATIONS OF THEAREA, THESE RESOURCES COULD HAVE HELPED THESE NATIONS TO MEET THE GROWING PRESSURES OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. IN VIEW OF THEIR BEING DEVELOPING NATIONS, THEY HAVE TO BE ADE? QUATELY PREPARED TO FACE THESE PRESSURES AND TO STRUGGLE TO RESIST AND OVERCOME THEM OR ELSE THEY WILL BE CRUSHED. FURTHER IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PALESTINE QUESTION CONSTITUTES THE CORE OF THIS PROBLEM WHICH DETERMINES THE FATE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND BINDS IT WITHE THE SHACKLES OFHCONFLICT AND DISPUTES. ADDED TO THIS ARE THE ETERNAL BONDS WHICH TIE THE PALESTINIANS TO THE EGYPTIANS , THE PALESTINE QUESTION HAS REMAINED TO OCCUPY A FOCAL ISSUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF EGYPT AND EGYPT HAS CONSEQUENTLY LED THESTRUGGLE FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINEAN PEOPLS AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE U.N. RESOLUTION AS A BASIS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND FOR OPENING BEFORE ALL PEOPLES NEW WISHES OF SECURITY, PEACE AND FREEDOM' "

WE CANNOT ALSO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE NATIONAL LEGITIMATE RIGYTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IMPLY THEIR RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE FREELY, WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT SATATE ON THE LAND OF PALESTINE, THIS IS A LAWFUL AND LEGITIMATE FRANEWORX WHETHER ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE U.NJM CHARTER OR TO THE GENERAL ASSEMOLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO THE PALEETINIAN ISSUE.

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T THE SAME TIME THE CONDITION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES IN THE WEST BANK, OCCUPIED JERUSALEM AND GAZA STRIP HAVE BECOME EXTREMELY SERIOUS AND MUST BE DEALT WITH FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THEIR SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECT ON THE FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

ALL THIS MR. CHAIRMAN, PLAYS A ROLE IN MAKING THE STARTING POINT ON WHICH, TO OUR MIND, THIS MEETING MUST CONCENTRATE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEING CRITICAL, THEY NEED SERIOUSNESS, THE SITUATION BEING GRAVE, IT REQUIRES IT NECESSARY TO LEAVE ASIDE ANY METHOD WHICH MAY WASTE OUR TIME IN POLEMICS AND ACCUSATIONS WHILE OUR PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SUFFER MORE AND MORE AND THE PALESTINE ISSUE ITSELF IS CONFRONTED WITH AN INCREASING FLAGRANT CHALLENGE.

WE ARE NOW AHEAD OF ANY POLEMICS, CONDEMNATION OR THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION AFTER RESOLUTION, ALL THAT IS NOW REQUIRED IS TO LAUNCH A NEW STAGE BASED ON A SLOW-MEDITATION RATIONAL AND MATURE STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SUCH A STUDY SHOULD AIM FIRST AT RELIEVING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP FROM THEIR SUFFERINGS AND DEALING IN A SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL MANNER WITH THE CRITICAL MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE PALESTINE ISSUE WHERE THE USE OF BOMBASTIC LANGUAGE IS OUT OF PLACE. AND-LET ME SAY- NO STRONG RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY ANY FORUM OR INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL EVER SUFFICES.

THE PALESTINE ISSUE, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS UNDERGOING A DANGEROUS STAGE IMPERILLING IT UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITY; WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT ALL OF US- THE PLO WHICH REPRESENTS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AS WELL AS ANY OF THE MEMBER STATES OF NON-ALIGNMENT-ARE AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

STARTING WITH THIS POINT, IN ANTICIPATION FOR A DEFINITE FUTURE OUTLOOK, EGYPTIAN DIPLOMACY DECIDED TO CARRY THE BURDEN WHICH MIGHT OUTWEIGH ANY OTHER PARTIES, IT DECIDE TO ENDURE THE BURDEN THAT EGYPT ALONE COULD ENDURE, THAT IS TO MANAGE TO MOVE TOWARDS THE INITIATION OF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WHICH WOULD DEFUSE THE TENSIVE

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SITUATION OR CURB IT PREVENT ISRAEL FROM ANNEXING THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES OR CLAIMING ITS SOVEREIGNTY OF THEM, IN SO DOING , ISRAEL SHOULD CONCEDE TO THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATING WITH IS REPRESENTATIVES, TETE A TETE , IN ORDER TO REACH AT THE END, A JUST AND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FROM ALL THE CONCERNED PARTIES.

EGYPT DID NOT MEAN TO SEIZE A RIGHT WHICH SHE DID NOT POSSESS, IN TALKING IN THE NAME OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, THIS IS BECAUSE EGYPT IS AWARE OF THE REALISTIC CONDITIONS PREVAILING ON THE PALESTINIAN STAGE, EGYPT CONTRIBUTED FURTHER TO THE RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE ADOPTED RELEVANT TO THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PLO, AND IS COMMITTED TO THE OVERALL ARAB OBJECTIVE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

WHAT EGYPT AIMED AT WAS TO TRY TO MOVE THE DEADLOCK WHICH SHE ANTICIPATED TO OVERSHADOW THE WHOLE ISSUE, AS WELL AS THE DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THEMSELVES, TO SET FORTH TO THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION A LOGICAL MEANS OF WHICH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ABOVE ALL MAY AVAIL HIMSELF, EGYPT ALSO INTENDED TO POSE AN ALTERNATIVE BEFORE ISRAEL ITSELF, WHO INSISTS ON MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

MR, CHAIRMAN, LET ME SAY- WITHOUT ENTERING INTO DETAILS AND EVEN WITHOUT THE NEED TO DO SO AS YOU ARE AWARE OF EVERY LITTLE BIT OF THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION- THAT EGYPT TRIED ITS BEST TO STOP THE DETERIORATION OF SITUATIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HONESTLY AND HONOURABLY, EGYPT TRIED TO DO SO TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE UNDER THE YOKE OF OCCUPATION AND TO OPEN THE DOOR OF HOPE BEFORE THAT PEOPLE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD OR GATHERED IN THE REFUGEES' CAMPS. EGYPT TRIED SO TO STOP AN OVERDUE TIDE AND TO HELP ESTABLISHING PEACE WHERE THE PEOPLES OF OUR ARAB NATION CAN MOVE FORWARD ONWARDS A BETTER FUTURE UNDER MORE ACCEPTABLE AND LESS CHALLENGING RELATIONS. I DO NOT

SAY THAT WE FAILED BUT I RATHER SAY THAT WE HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED.

WHILE DEDUCTING THIS I ONLY HOPE FOR THE ABIDANCE BY ONE COMMITMENT THAT TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH PRIMARILY TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE RESTORATION OF THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE RESPECT OF ALL OTHER RIGHTS WHICH ARE CONCRETELY PROVEN AND RESPECTED IF COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATION CHARTER AND RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FRAME OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY STAGE.  
MR. CHAIRMAN,

EGYPT IS NOT ONLY A PART OF THE ARAB NATION BUT IT IS A MAIN ORGAN IN THE ARAB BODY WHICH CAN BY ALL MEANS BE SEPARATED, EGYPT WHICH CONTRIBUTED LARGELY TO SERVING THE ARAB NATION IN ALL ITS PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HAS BECOME INEVITABLE DUE TO ITS POSITION. WITH THIS IN MIND AND OTHER UNANIMOUS AUTHORIZATION BY WHICH THE NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT CALLED UPON ITS MEMBERS TO EXERT EFFORTS AND TAKE ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, EGYPT WILL FURTHER PURSUE ITS SINCERE AND HONEST ACTION IN SUPPORT TO THESE RIGHTS NOT BY EMPHASIZING THEM THEORETICALLY BUT ENDEAVOURING TO RESTORE THEM PRACTICALLY.

ON THIS BASIS, WE CALL UPON THIS DISTINGUISHED MOVEMENT TO CONSIDER AN INITIATIVE BASED ON COINCIDENT AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION, IN OTHER WORDS, THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF EACH PARTY TOWARDS THE OTHER WITHIN A FRAME OF FULL EQUALITY AND RIGHTNESS.)

IN THIS RESPECT WE SAY THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS OTHERS WERE WITH THE SAME CRITICISM THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO ESTABLISH A STATE OF THEIR OWN IN PALESTINE AS ISRAEL DID.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

LET THIS BE AN APPROACH TO SUPPORT ALL OTHER ENDEAVOURS TO PENETRATE THE DEADLOCK WHICH ALMOST RE-ENVELOPED THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE COINCIDENT AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION WE OF COURSE CALL UPON ISRAEL TO FULLY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO RE-EMPHASIZE AS FOLLOWS:

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I.. THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO END THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THEIR TERRITORIES.

II.. THE RIGHT TO RETURN ON COMPENSATION IN THE PURSUANCE OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194.

I.I.I.. THE RIGHT TO DOMINATE THEIR WEALTH AND RESOURCES.

IV.. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

V.. THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE WEST BANK GOZA STRIP ON THE BASIS OF 1967 BORDERS.

VI.. THE RESPECT OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT IN JERUSALEM AND REJECTION OF ANY CHANGE IN ITS GEOGRAPHIC, DEMOGRAPHIC OR LEGAL STATUS.

VII.. THE RESPECT OF THEIR RIGHT TO THEIR TERRITORIES AND CONSEQUENTLY THE REJECTION OF ANY ISRAELI POLICY OR MEASURES ADOPTED BY ISRAELI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES AIMING AT CHANGING THE GEOGRAPHIC, DEMOGRAPHIC OR LEGAL STATUS IN THE TERRITORIES PARTIALLY OR TOTALLY OCCUPIED IN 1967.

V.I.I.I.. THE RIGHT TO SECURITY AND TO LIVE IN SECURE BORDERS ON A MUTUAL BASIS WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

IX.. THE RIGHT TO ABOLISH ALL ISRAELI MEASURES ADOPTED IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES CONTRADICTING THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

X.. THE RIGHT TO REMOVE THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS BUILT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE CONDITIONS OF OCCUPATION.

XI.. THE RIGHT TO FULLY APPLY THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES UNTIL, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THESE TERRITORIES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, VERY HONESTLY AND SINCERELY THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION MAKES IT INEVITABLE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAELI RIGHT TO EXISTENCE INSIDE SECURE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS ON A MUTUAL BASIS AS THE OTHER RIGHTS OUT LINED IN THE RELATIVE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONCERNED U.N. AGENCIES.

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MR. CHAIRMAN,

SUCH IS THE ROAD AS PERCEIVED BY EGYPT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE MOVEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE THIS MOVEMENT OF WHICH EGYPT WAS AMONG THE INITIAL FOUNDERS HAS CONSISTENTLY CALLED FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TAKING ALL CONSIDERATION ALL PREVALENT FACTORS AND CONDITIONS.

I SPOKE FRANKLY AND SINCERELY AND PRESENTED THE QUESTION IN CONSISTENCY WITH OUR CONSCIENCE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SO EASY TO CONDEMN ONE OR THE OTHER. ON BEHALF OF EGYPT I URGE YOU TO MOVE TO PRACTICAL AND CONCRET ACTION.

WE REALIZE THAT THE PREDOMINANT TREND OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACHIEVE PEACE. THESE HEROIC PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN AND ENJOY PEACE, LET US MOVE TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS GOAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OR TIME WOULD LAPSE AND THE OPPORTUNITY BE LOST RENDERING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST PEACE AN IMPOSSIBLE PROCESS

HISTORY WILL JUDGE FOR OR AGAINST US DEPENDING ON OUR SUCCESS OR FAILURE TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL BY PROPERLY AND CORRECTLY SAVING THE WAY TOWARDS IT.

MAY GOD HELP US IN OUR EFFORTS.

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חפ: שרה, טשהח, דהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנבל, ממנבל, ד/מרכו, רס, אמחן,  
מח, דיבון, מצרים, רובינשטיין, יגד, הסברה

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The first part of the report is devoted to a description of the  
 general situation in the country. It is found that the economy  
 is in a state of stagnation and that the government is unable  
 to meet its obligations. The main cause of this is the  
 excessive expenditure on the military and the neglect of  
 the civilian sector. It is recommended that the government  
 should reduce its military spending and concentrate on  
 the development of the economy.

The second part of the report deals with the social situation.  
 It is found that the population is suffering from a  
 general decline in living standards. The main cause of this  
 is the lack of investment in social services. It is  
 recommended that the government should increase its  
 spending on education, health and social welfare.

The third part of the report discusses the political situation.  
 It is found that the government is weak and that there is  
 a need for a more stable and democratic system. It is  
 recommended that the government should reform its  
 constitution and hold free and fair elections.

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