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J.K., Israel

MARK SEGAL
Jerusalem Post Reporter

— One of Britain's most vocal unionists has stressed the importance of amity between British and Israeli labour. Mr. Hugh Scanlon, President of the 1.2 million-strong Amalgamated Engineering and Foundry Workers Union (A.E.F.) — known for his strongly independent and often leftist views, told *The Jerusalem Post* in an interview at the Basle Hotel here that "friendship between the two labour movements was not weakening; on the contrary, it is getting stronger."

The 55-year-old trade unionist visited Israel as guest of the Labour Party, and he spoke on his impressions of the progress in building, defence and industry, "although you can't see it," he said. "The 55 per cent of your Gross National Product goes to defence, which only highlights the need to be done if peace were to come."

He said that he came primarily to look at the social and economic aspects, and he was not drawn into the political and ideological positions. He said that at the end of his visit with Mrs. Scanlon (he met her this morning) was that he felt that Israel has to be recognized as a Jewish state where they will be will be a reality.

FOR THE WORKERS

Generally, the trade unionist said: "I feel that the common bond of Arab and Israel workers is stressed. Indeed, the nearest sentiment on this matter is the recent remarks of Premier Golda Meir: 'I am not pro-Arab, nor pro-British. I am pro-Israel.'"

He said he considered the Histadrut as a unique, and its functions as transposed to the Western labour movement, while giving credit to the Labour Government, and of government and remained neutral, and even oppose the Histadrut in such areas as prices and wages. They in Britain believed that the Histadrut should not engage in politics, appreciating that Israel needed for a different philosophy.

Mr. Scanlon called on Histadrut leaders Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and his wife Raham Meshel, as well as on Secretary-General Arye Eliaz. Ben-Aharon tendered a farewell to the Scanlons.

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BROWN'S

Israel's Quality Bookshops

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MEMBER 13 ISSUE

STORY: Fashion Cheats

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Some of the camp inhabitants moved from structures along the route will be housed in other buildings. It was pointed out that there are more vacant buildings in the camp than are needed for resettlement of the evacuated people.

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Brown 'just as optimistic'

Jerusalem Post Reporter

LYDDA AIRPORT. — Deputy British Labour Party leader George Brown left for home yesterday "no less optimistic than when I got here." His five-day stay in Israel was the final stage in a Middle East study tour.

Just before emplaning by El Al with Mrs. Brown, the former Foreign Secretary summed up his trip to reporters by saying: "I am definitely encouraged by what I heard in the talks I held here, and no less optimistic than when I got here." During his regional tour, he avoided making any political statements that might commit him, and he followed this pattern when meeting the many reporters at the airport.

He did say that on return to London he would thoroughly study the material and documents he had accumulated during his mission, and then discuss with his colleagues in the British Cabinet and the Labour Party regarding any new ideas concerning future policy on this region. He once more stressed that he had no official statement to deliver.

Asked about the proper formulation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November, 1967, which he fathered, and whether it was correct to say, as the B.B.C. world service always does, that it speaks of "withdrawal from the territories," instead of "withdrawal from territories," Mr. Brown said:

NO REWRITING

"I wish the B.B.C. and other people would stop rewriting the U.N. resolution. I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the U.N. Security Council. I don't want to say any more about this, except that we had better stick to the original wording of the resolution."

Queried on whether the U.N. had a role in the Middle East, considering the Four-Power talks, the former Foreign Secretary replied: "I was always of the opinion that the U.N. had an important role to play here. When I get back I will determine for myself who should carry out which function."

During his final meetings here with the Labour Party Youth Division and Histadrut leaders, Mr. Brown spoke of the need for Israel to present a plan of its own

own customers, inquiring whether the Dead Sea Works would be able to meet its export commitments following the attack, the management stated that production was continuing on schedule.

Development Minister Haim Landau came here yesterday to look into security problems at close range.



Mr. George Brown plants tree at Jerusalem's Peace Forest on Sunday in memory of his father-in-law as his wife Sophie looks on. (Photo by Barallay)

for solving the conflict, and also dwelt on the need for "Israel initiatives."

Mr. Brown made his views on the exact text of the Security Council resolution even clearer during his meeting in Jerusalem on Sunday with Arab leaders from Jerusalem, and the administered areas. He told them: "I formulated the Security Council resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied, and not from the territories,' which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories. All the leaders of the Arab countries agreed with this text."

At the meeting Mr. Brown also recalled that he was a secretary to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in 1947 and that at the time he was opposed to the establishment of the State of Israel. "But now Israel is an established fact and you should recognize it and think how to live with Israel instead of wanting to annihilate it."

Leaves Eban's dinner early

Jerusalem Post

Diplomatic Correspondent

Mr. George Brown, known for his temperamental outbursts, prematurely left a dinner at Foreign Minister Eban's residence in Jerusalem on Sunday night after becoming involved in a heated argument. The argument evidently culminated in an exchange with the British Ambassador, Mr. John Barnes, who was also among the score of guests.

Mr. Brown apparently arrived at the dinner in high spirits. After reorganizing the seating plan, he sat down next to Mr. Haim Herzog, the political commentator and reserves brigadier, and argued with him about peace and a "timetable" for an Israeli withdrawal. At one point, he

taken someone else would be smiling. Mr. Brown retorted that this was a "silly answer," to which Mr. Herzog responded that silly questions usually invited silly answers.

The British Ambassador intervened, apparently in the hope of restoring peace, and was told by the former British Foreign Secretary "You must support everything I say."

Mr. Brown asked Mr. and Mrs. Eban's permission to leave for his hotel, declaring that he was very tired. Mrs. Brown, who was upset by the incident, was left behind at the dinner. The Ambassador drove Mr. Brown to the King David Hotel, and then rejoined the dinner.

The dinner was Mr. Brown's last function during his visit.

"Mr. Brown was feeling very tired after his long trip and asked if he might leave immediately after the meal." The Foreign Ministry spokesman in Jerusalem declined to comment.

Asked about the reported incident when he arrived in London yesterday, Mr. Brown said, "I was very tired at the end of a three weeks' journey and I asked my hosts if I could go home to bed and I then went home."

"There was no heated argument; I had no argument with the Israel Foreign Minister. My wife and the British Ambassador stayed at the dinner when I left."

INA reports that the London evening papers carried huge banner headlines on their front

were yesterday evening. The tribunal here of sives at the Americas salem on August 21 be pronounced at a. The accused are Nijma, 50, Bader 19, and Azmi Musar of the Fatah. They ing placed explosive the Consulate in E the detonators expl window panes in the

100 Sift from Bee in Bee

Jerusalem Post

BEERSHEBA. — One from Rumania were to synagogues of various national origins in Struma Martyrs Synagogue, and Rumania Warhaftig, and Rumania Moshe Rosen were present.

The Minister of Education said that the scrolls have been destroyed or evacuated communities. Of these have been repaired and cost of IL1,000 each 200 of them to the

Rabbi Rosen revealed offered \$1m. for the Jews — but prefer Israel without paymen

Lake K drops t

TIBERIAS. — The this month 46 cm, below the minimum sea level — this is age of 73.6 million in the lake.

The lake's level is the salinity of the the lower it gets the salinity is likely to crops next summer.

At its peak level the neret was 208.3 meters

Veteran farmers said yesterday that when they ever banana plantations did this year.

RUMANIA AT BLOOMF

Jerusalem Post

The Israeli National meets the Rumanian exhibition match in Jaffa. Kick-off will game will not be br

In the first match Wednesday, Rumania

TOURISTS..

A

[MR. STEWART.]

That is the Middle East. As I have explained before, there is reference, in the vital United Nations Security Council resolution, both to withdrawal from territories and to secure and recognised boundaries. As I have told the House previously, we believe that these two things should be read concurrently and that the omission of the word "all" before the word "territories" is deliberate.

I have made this clear already. I do not think that the House would expect me to go further on that matter now. We have now, with the resumption of the Four-Power talks, to see whether the resolution can be turned into a workable package, calendar, or timetable, or list of parallel actions by all parties which would ensure that all the provisions of the resolution are carried out.

I should now like to take up the three subjects to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. The first is the recent meeting at The Hague of the countries of the European Economic Community. This is clearly a matter of the greatest importance to this country. We can say beyond doubt that, at that meeting, there was manifested the clear desire of all members of the Community that the Community should be enlarged and we can properly hope, in view of what was said at the end of that meeting, that negotiations will be opened, at the latest very shortly after 30th June next year, and possibly earlier.

In those negotiations, there are bound to be extremely difficult problems; the right hon. Gentleman referred to the financial arrangements for the agricultural policy of the Community, and how vital that was to Britain. I would put this matter as follows. We all know that the agricultural policy of the Community and the financial support for it presents a problem, a difficulty, if you like, a disadvantage to this country, which has to be weighed against the important and undoubted advantages which we should gain if we were a member of the Community and that vast market were open to our industries.

On the other hand, we must recognise that the agricultural policy presents to France a substantial advantage, and it would not be sensible for us to approach

the negotiations on the assumption that the French could be expected to forgo every advantage they have in order to facilitate our entry. To do that would not be to approach the matter in good faith. Similarly, it must be understood that, if agreement is to be reached on this matter, this has got to be a question of reason and proportion. The agricultural policy presents certain substantial advantages for France and some other members of the Community and it presents certain problems for us. I believe that, given good sense on both sides, an agreement can be reached which would be advantageous both to the six present members of the Community and to ourselves. That is the spirit in which this has to be approached.

Similarly, in the approach to the Community, we have quite properly to bear in mind our obligations to our fellow members of the Commonwealth. I do not believe, looking at the history of previous negotiations on this matter, that it will be impossible for us to secure, in the negotiations, reasonable arrangements for our fellow members in the Commonwealth. I do not believe that it is the experience of any of the previous negotiations that it was on this matter that they were likely to break down. If there is the real will—I think that the importance of the discussions at The Hague is that they showed that there is the will—to reach agreement, I do not believe that negotiations would break down on the question of a proper regard for our fellow members of the Commonwealth. Throughout the negotiations which will come, as in the negotiations which, unhappily, were not successful in the past, we would certainly have a proper regard for our duty to our fellow members of the Commonwealth.

My only other comment on this is to invite the whole House to remember that it still remains true, despite the many difficult problems to be solved in negotiation, that there are very great advantages to be secured, both for us and for the countries now members of the Community, if we can get the enlargement of the Community—economic advantages for our industry, political advantages for us and for all Europe. I believe that it is the general wish of the House that these negotiations will be attended with success.

The second m hon. Gentleman relations between Europe, with the East and West C matter in the Speech a short t then are the gu Government's p tion of reconcil West.

The right hon delicate balance here. With th is agreed. W despair of man the concept of tions between- to use—East and the non-C obliged also. vakia and c approach this with hope.

Quite recent emerging from They were to engage in a two matters- of the use of without reje this is a so have plenty sing I ha nev contacts wh tries of East of increasin forms in w

Renuncia something already, in I think tha particular forward fa the "Brezl to me to have diffe lously ren each other right for and partic measures force if necessary as a w a we assent. tries in E

U.K. Minister says '67 resolution could bring peace

Jerusalem Post Reporter

TEL AVIV. — Mr. Joseph Godber, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, suggested last night that peace in the Middle East could be achieved on the basis of the Security Council 1967 resolution, as it would give Israel secure and recognized boundaries and the right of maritime passage in the Straits — and to the Arabs an Israel withdrawal and "a just solution of the refugee problem."

Mr. Godber was addressing the annual Balfour Dinner held by the Israel and British Commonwealth Association of Tel Aviv at the Dan Hotel. Mr. Haim Herzog, President of the Association, was in the chair.

"Britain recognizes and salutes the State of Israel as a permanent State in this part of the world," Mr. Godber said. "We want to see you acknowledged by your neighbours and living at peace." The Security Council resolution of 1967, though moved by a previous British Government, is what the present Government adheres to. The week-end speech of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, "my chief," should be read in that light. "It was intended and delivered as a dispassionate contribution towards the discussion of the solution of your country's problems with the Arab world. It was neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel — it was pro-peace."

But recalling the 1940 period when Britain was hearing "plenty of advice"

while it had to carry the risks and the dangers of war alone, Mr. Godber admitted that Israel might be feeling likewise today.

It was "a tragic development" that charges and counter-charges about violations of the cease-fire should have brought the process of Dr. Jarring's consultations to a halt. "I believe that it is in all our interests to achieve some reconciliation — for the alternative is deadlock. If there is no progress towards peace, there is surely a grave danger that there will be progress towards war. You have lived through 20 years of conflicts — can you, or we either, contemplate 20 more such years?" Mr. Godber asked.

Whatever resolution the U.N. assembly adopted yesterday, he said, it followed an "ill-timed debate" and anyhow the Security Council resolution was more important.

PERES ON U.N.

Mr. Shimon Peres, Minister of Transport and Posts, told the dinner that the U.N. General Assembly's resolution could not contribute much towards peace. The issue at stake was not territorial but political, he said.

Referring to the British democratic tradition, which Israel had inherited, Mr. Peres said: "I prefer to argue with the British than to be friends with the Russians."

... are,
Danish Ambassador, Mr. Sigvald Kristensen and Mr. Charles Bensley,
Philip Zinman and Larry Schacht.
(Barnil photo)



Yugoslav pistoleer fined IL50; IL500 each for his detectors


LOD AIRPORT. — The eight Yugoslav seamen who were arrested here on Tuesday in possession of a pistol and ammunition were released yesterday morning and allowed to board an Alitalia jet for Rome.

After spending the night in jail with

vacation — plans to fly to Dubrovnik from Rome.

The men were arrested just as they were about to board an outgoing plane on Tuesday, after two cleaning workers saw them toss a couple of ammunition clips



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ITEM ONE: DOUGLAS -HOME.

LONDON, 22, (UPI): BRITAIN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE A UNILATERAL INITIATIVE IN ANY OPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS, FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME TOLD THE COMMONS TODAY.

ASKED WHETHER AN APPARENT DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES MIGHT LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME UNILATERAL BRITISH INITIATIVE, AND SUBSEQUENT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS, DOUGLAS-HOME SAID +YES, THIS WOULD BE OUR INTENTION.+

+IF THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST OPENING FOR AN INITIATIVE BY THE GOVERNMENT, WE WILL CERTAINLY TAKE IT. I THINK PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AT THIS PRESENT TIME IS A MISTAKE,+ HE SAID.

CONSERVATIVE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT NORMAN ST. JOHN STEVAS SAID ISRAEL'S LONG TERM SECURITY WOULD BE BETTER SERVED + BY RECOGNITION BY THE ARAB STATES AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES THAN BY CLINGING TO THEIR PRESENT WARTIME FRONTIERS.+

DOUGLAS-HOME SAID +I SHARE YOUR POINT OF VIEW. I THINK THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY OF WHICH ISRAEL WOULD DO WELL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF, BUT ONE UNDERSTANDS THE DESIRE OF ISRAEL FOR SECURE BOUNDARIES WITHIN WHICH SHE MAY LIVE.+

ASKED WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE BASED ON A U N SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID +IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, YES, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEES.+

DOUGLAS-HOME SAID THERE MUST FIRST BE GREATER DEFINITION GIVEN TO ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS ON THEIR FRONTIER.

+THEN, UNLESS THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, THERE IS NOTHING TO GUARANTEE,+ HE SAID. +WHAT WE WANT IS A GOOD DEAL OF INFORMATION BEFORE WE CAN BE CERTAIN OF THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTEES WE OFFER. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S MIND WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEES.+

END OF 0900 HOURS EDITION ITIM ME NEWS AND PRESS REPORT

TUESDAY 23 MARCH 1971

0900 HOURS

FIRST EDITION

CONTENTS: 1) DOUGLAS-HOME TELLS COMMONS:

BRITAIN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO TAKE UNILATERAL
INITIATIVE IN ANY OPENING IN MIDEAST PEACE TALKS -
(UPI)

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Mr. Kershaw : The Council of Foreign Bondholders is a rather technical council and it would be unsuitable for it to act internationally on behalf of other kinds of claimants. In the last resort the companies concerned ought to exhaust local municipal remedies. As to the contribution by Her Majesty's Government, that is by the Treasury and Questions about it should therefore be addressed to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Malta

The following Question stood upon the Order Paper :

7. **Mr. WALL :** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on United Kingdom relations with the Government of Malta.

Mr. Speaker : I understand that Question No. 7 is to be answered at the end of Questions.

Israel

8. **Mr. Mayhew** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on his official visit to Israel.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : At the invitation of the Israel Foreign Minister I visited Israel on 21st and 22nd March. I was very sorry that I had to curtail my visit in order to attend to business in London. This was the first visit by a British Foreign Secretary to Israel as a guest of that Government and I was able to have useful discussion with Mr. Eban and the Israel Prime Minister. Details of these discussions are of course confidential, but we naturally talked about the Middle East dispute as well as matters of bilateral interest.

Mr. Mayhew : Is the Secretary of State aware of the hardening of Israeli opinion against withdrawal from conquered territories and consequently against the kind of peaceful settlement supported by himself and the United Nations? Will he therefore give the assurance to the House that while the Israeli leaders continue resisting British and United Nations peace policies he will not sell them offensive weapons?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : The whole question of arms to the Middle East is

another matter. I certainly have impressed upon the Israeli Government, and indeed upon the Egyptian Government as well, that I can see no prospect of a settlement of this dispute unless a dialogue takes place—a much quicker dialogue at much closer quarters than there has been until now. That I will try to promote.

Mr. Luce : Is Dr. Jarring making any progress?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : Dr. Jarring is hoping to make progress.

Mr. Kaufman : Is the Secretary of State aware that when my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew), talks about a hardening of opinion in Israel insisting that the occupied territories be retained, he is in fact referring only to extremists in Israel who represent the generality of political opinion in Israel as little as does my hon. Friend in this country?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : It is not for me to enter into a dispute between the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East. Israel accepted Resolution 242 and is willing to operate within it.

Vatican (British Representative)

10. **Mr. St. John-Stevas** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will now raise the rank of the British representative to the Holy See to that of ambassador.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Anthony Royle) : Not yet. But I am keeping under review the status of our representative.

Mr. St. John-Stevas : I thank my hon. Friend for what I take to be a helpful reply. Would it not be an appropriate moment to remedy this anomaly when we enter the Community, because otherwise we should find ourselves in a position of having the Holy See represented at Community level and not at national level?

Mr. Royle : I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his remark and for his interest in this subject. Her Majesty's Minister has always been treated with courtesy and understanding, and I do not think at this stage that he needs additional

navigational aids, apart from the excellent advice which I am sure my hon. Friend will make freely available to him.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is not this matter frequently raised in the House and is not the answer given by successive Governments always "Not yet", "Not now", "Sometime", "Perhaps never" or something like that? As the matter is being kept under review will my hon. Friend, having done a bit more reviewing, make another report to the House at an early date?

Mr. Royle: I think my hon. Friend is correct in saying that the answers over the last few years have tended to be somewhat similar. The matter is kept under review. I do not wish to make any attempt to forecast at the moment but I will certainly bear in mind all the comments that my hon. Friends have made.

Chemical and Biological Weapons (Geneva Protocol)

11. **Mr. Hugh Jenkins** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will seek international agreement that the Geneva Protocol be held to prohibit the use in war of all chemical and biological weapons against persons, animals or plants, in view of the Canadian Government's initiative in this matter.

Mr. Anthony Royle: We seek international agreement on effective measures to supplement existing international constraints against the use of chemical and biological weapons. A convention on biological weapons will be signed shortly. In Geneva we are taking an active part in discussions to try to strengthen the Geneva Protocol in relation to chemical weapons.

Mr. Jenkins: Has there not been some withdrawal from the original interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, and is there not also a disagreement between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence on this matter? Is not the Foreign Office anxious to return to the original interpretation of the Geneva Protocol while the Ministry of Defence opposes this, largely because it thinks that it might interfere with the sales of British CS gas to the United States? Will the hon. Gentleman ask the Prime Minister to

intervene and come down on the side of the Canadians, who have taken a considerable initiative in the matter, and, incidentally, on the side of civilisation?

Mr. Royle: The hon. Gentleman will recall that I replied to an Adjournment debate raised by him last year on this matter which I covered in great detail, including the fact that there was no disagreement between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office. As regards CS gas, we are continuing to give this complex matter our most serious consideration.

Mr. Carter-Jones: Some of us deplore the developments which are taking place in certain places, but will the hon. Gentleman consider publishing freely, quickly and to all nations all information which is beneficial to mankind?

Mr. Royle: This Government always publish information which is beneficial to mankind.

Latin America

12. **Mr. John Hannam** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what future visits to Latin American countries by Ministers are planned after March, 1972.

Mr. Godber: My right hon. Friend the Minister for Trade will be visiting Brazil and Chile next month. I hope myself to make a visit to Brazil later this year. Other ministerial visits to Latin America are under active consideration.

Mr. Hannam: I thank my right hon. Friend for that encouraging reply; I am sure we are all pleased at the increased number of visits being made to South America. Will my right hon. Friend impress upon the Prime Minister the value of his paying a visit to South America, possibly in conjunction with, or to link up with, one of the major trade fairs to take place in several of the countries of South America during the coming few years?

Mr. Godber: I shall convey my hon. Friend's views to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He has very pressing engagements elsewhere and I could not commit him in advance.

Mr. Foley: Does the Minister of State intend to visit Guatemala in the near future? If not, will he make clear to the

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE, LONDON, 8.3.1972

When I was in New York in the autumn, I thought that Israel got nearer to the ultimate formula required when Mr. Eban said in his speech -- although it was hedged around with a number of words which rather took away from its importance -- thought they had moved a bit when they said that they had no intention to annex Arab territory. Mr. Eban said that, and the implication of that view -- that you have no ambition to annex another's territory -- the implication must be that you are going to get out of it. I thought that this was edging forward just a little bit -- as much as you would expect at that time. One is bound to add that they would only withdraw on conditions and these conditions they have not defined. You can only get them defined if Dr. Jarring or somebody is able to get the Israelis and Egyptians to talk to each other. This is a very small but very obstinate difficulty to get over. I don't see this happening very shortly.

Question : Can you give us your estimate of Russian policy in the Middle East?

Answer : The Russians would like a settlement here. I think it would suit them not only because the Canal would be opened. I think a settlement would suit them on the whole as they have got what they want. If there was a settlement, the air bases on Egyptian soil, which suits their own purposes very well, particularly in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean. From the Russian point of view they have got what they want. I would think the Russians are quite keen to see a settlement. Certainly they do not want to see fighting break out again.

FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY'S ADDRESS AT DINNER OF ANGLO-ISRAEL
ASSOCIATION, 30.11.1971

... peace ... cannot be imposed, and will not be imposed. It is for the parties to agree on the terms. Their friends can only help by offering honest advice ... Let me start by saying that we stand with Israel when she claims the right to security Rights, however, both for the individual in society and for nations internationally, must be protected, by the law or by some other effective mechanism, if they are to be enjoyed. How is Israel's right to security to be protected? In our view, there are three ways in which this should be done.

The first is through the conclusion of peace agreements - not just armistice agreements, or anything provisional of that nature - between Israel and each of her four neighbours. These peace agreements would be permanent, formal and binding. Those who entered into them would be engaging themselves and their reputations to carry them out and to defend them. But governments and statesmen, you may say, - and experience sadly bears it out - are not permanencies in office. Something more is needed - an incentive in self-interest to observe the obligations entered into. This leads me to the second point : the definition in these peace agreements of permanent frontiers, agreed between Israel and each of her four neighbours. This act of definition would create the "recognised boundaries" called for in the Security Council Resolution of November 1967. Would they also be secure? That would depend on two things : first on the attitudes which would develop as a result of the conclusion of peace agreements; and secondly on the sum of satisfaction of the parties in the boundaries, on their self-interest in observing the agreed frontiers. I say "sum" because the boundaries would not be secure if the total satisfaction of one party were to be balanced perhaps I should say neutralised - by the total dissatisfaction of one or more of the other.

The third way is through physical arrangements designed to reduce the risks of violation, to remove particular points of fear and to build up confidence. In particular there should be commitments and arrangements to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israeli ships through the waterways of the region. I do not want to speculate about the possible nature of these arrangements. But they would certainly have to be reliable in a way which the arrangements which existed before 1967 were not ...

... I believe that three conditions have to be fulfilled if peace agreements are to be concluded and if a state of peace is to come into being.

The first condition is, to quote a phrase I used in speaking to the General Assembly, that dialogue must supplant confrontation ...

... The second condition is that proposals must be made. No dispute, or conflict is ever settled if the parties wait for one another. If the parties to the conflict in the Middle East want a settlement, if they want peace - which I believe that they do - then proposals must be made. Offers must replace questions. The affirmative must replace the interrogative. Risk must be run if peace is to be won.

The third condition is that the existing framework for a settlement - the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 - must be respected and made use of.

The Resolution may not be perfect. But to discard the Resolution, to tamper with it, would, in my view, be a retrograde step.

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חמצית מחזכיר השגריר קומיי "בריטניה ומז"ת מאז יוני 1970"
(החזכיר והערות נוספות מצורפים)

מאז קיץ 1970, היוזמה האמריקנית, הפסקת האש וקפאון שליחית יארינג, הפך חפקיד בריטניה לפסיבי יחסית. ארועי ספטמבר 1970 בירדן יצרו גם הם בלונדון חגובה המבקשת למנוע התערבות. ממשלת הית מקדישה חשומת לבה לנושאים דחופים וקרובים לה.

2

האינטרס הבריטי

עם העלמותה הפיזית מהמצ"ת והמפרץ הפרסי, אף אם יש לבריטניה אינטרסים חשובים באיזור, התחושה בלונדון אינה של מעצמה המנסה למצוא דרכה לתוך האיזור אלא זמנויה גלגל האחרון של התנתקות ממנו ועליה לא חלה יותר אחריות לגורלו.

האינטרסים של נפט ומסחר יובטחו בטווח ארוך רק בתנאי שלום ויציבות, ועצירת החדירה הסובייטית והרדיקליזם הערבי. מכאן שהסדר ערבי-ישראלי נשאר עניין של בריטניה. באשר לנפט, כשלון הנסיון לאמברגו בעת מלחמת ששת הימים והיעדר החרדה בבריטניה אחרי הלאמת B.P. בלוב מדגימים כיוון חדש, עם מיקוח כלכלי בין החברות לבין הממשלות המפיקות כגורם מרכזי ולא דווקא עמדות פוליטיות בסכסוך ישראל-ערב. מדיניות הסחר הבריטית אינה סובלת ממעצורים פוליטיים במאמציה לעשות עסקים עם ישראל, וישראל נראית בלונדון כשוק טוב שבפיתוחו ופצצים. קשה להוכיח כי האינטרס הכלכלי של בריטניה בעולם הערבי מתיחס ישירות לעמדותיה הכלכליות בסכסוך המז"ת, אף אם קיימת הרגשה ששני הדברים משפיעים אחד על השני.

3

פתרון מדיני בעיני הבריטים

לונדון אינה חושבת במונחים של פתרון כפוי, אלא על מז"מ והסכם. אין גשלת הית מחשיבה את האו"ם כקודמתה, היא מסיפה לעצוב מדיניותה על פי האינטרסים שלה ונכונה להכיר בזכות מדינות אחרות לעקרון מנחה זה. מכאן שאין חלוקי דעות בין ישראל ובריטניה על הצורך בדיאלוג ו"מודוס וויונדי". הם מכירים בדרישה לחוזה שלום כולל, סופי ומוהלס ורואים ב-242 חבילה אחת. לכן הסתייגו בזמנו מההסדר החלקי. באשר לאופי ותכן השלום ישראל-ערב, ההבדל בינינו מצוי בעיקר בשאלה הטריטוריאלית. הבריטים סבורים שהערבים לא יוותרו מרצונם על טריטוריה ולכן לא יהיה שלום אלא אם תיסוג ישראל מרוב רובה של הטריטוריה הכבושה. בסחון ישראל ישען על הסכמי שלום חתומים, על נוכחות או"ם, על יכולת ההגנה של ישראל, אולם לא על גבולות ברי הגנה שלא יושגו בהסכם.

הקהילה האירופאית

ההתחזקות הנוכחית הסובייטית מחתה ל"בטן הרכה" של אירופה, הנפט, והספקות בדבר
מהימנות ההתחייבות של ארה"ב לאירופה יהוו דחף למציאת עמדות אירופאיות משותפות
לקראת הסדר. כאן תהפוך בריטניה למוקד חדש של השפעה, עם נטית חברות אחרות
בקהילה לקבל הדרכה מבריטניה יותר מאשר מצרפת. לכן חייב הדיאלוג בריטניה-ישראל
לקבל מעטה מימד אירופאי.



856
ה"ת ברטלניק ג'

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON, W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091

שגרירות ישראל

לונדון

76

כ"א אדר תשל"ב

7 מרץ 1972

אל: אירופה ב'

מאת: הציר, לונדון

בעקבות פרסום הכתבה של Chapman Pincher
בדיילי אקספרס מה-6.3 הופנו כמה שאלות אל
דובר הפוראוף במפגש העתונאי הימי. להלן
תגובת הדובר:

"As you know it is not our practice to comment
on reports of particular arms transactions.
There has been no change in our policy in the
supply of military equipment to the countries
of the Middle East. This policy is not one of
embargo but it remains our policy to consider all
applications from countries in the area of their
merits."

בבוכה,

א. רופין

To

2, 2nd 1st W
1971 100

2nd 1st W

1971 100

General Sherman is known to have
the name was also a 2nd 1st W
and, with certain words, 1971 100
1971 100

"As you know it is not our practice to comment
on reports of particular arms transactions.
There has been no change in our policy in the
supply of military equipment to the countries
of the Middle East. This policy is not one of
embargo but it remains our policy to consider all
applications from countries in the area of their
needs."

1971 100

1971 100

Subs deal with Israel

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

NEGOTIATIONS to build two new submarines for the Israeli Navy have been almost completed by the Government, it was disclosed last night.

The deal, likely to be announced before Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home leaves for Jerusalem later this month, means a lifting of the four-year ban on

arms sales to Israel and could lead to much bigger orders.

Vickers yard in Barrow-in-Furness is earmarked to build the submarines—one large, one small.

The order also provides extra work for sub-contractors and the manufacturers of sonar and other electronic equipment. Vickers have been secretly competing for the order against a German firm.

The deal is certain to cause an uproar in Parliament from pro-Arab M.P.s. There have

been no new arms sales to Israel since the Labour Government refused to supply Chittim tanks, for which the Israelis were prepared to pay £30 million in cash four years ago.

But the Government has firmly decided that with the U.S. supplying Israel with planes, tanks, and other weapons, Britain's arms firms should no longer be excluded from an important export market.

It is also in Britain's defence

interests to have two more anti-Russian submarines in the Mediterranean in view of the steady Soviet build-up there.

The Government may use the deal to test the political ice over the possibility of resuming naval arms sales to South Africa.

The decision to lift the arms sales ban will be of great assistance to Sir Alec in his talks in Jerusalem with Mrs. Gold Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, and Mr. Abba Eban, the Foreign Secretary.

D. Express

6.3.72

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אסלה תיכ
גזית ניה
שגרירות ישראל
לונדון


איוסף ב'

בברכות מאת

With the Compliments of

E. Ruppin

Minister Plenipotentiary



~~Foreign Secretary~~
to questions during press conference
Wednesday, 8th March 1972, at Foreign
Office

Submarines to Israel :

" We do not comment on individual arms sales to any country with the exception of South Africa. There is no embargo on arms sales from this country to any country except for the Communist Bloc. Any country is free to give an order for arms and we consider this. In the case of the Middle East, we consider the overall balance. The answer must be "no comment" on any individual item like this. But any country can come along and order small submarines or aircraft and we will give licences if we think this is consistent with the balance of strength in the world or in any particular area."

ER/

cc. Mr. Lourie, Europa B.

cc. Amb. Comay
Gen'l Eyal

[Lord Drumalbyn.]

Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the Gas Council has the necessary knowledge and expertise to handle their future price negotiations, and do not accept any need for an inquiry to establish what prices they should pay.

LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his repetition of an unresponsive reply which he gave on the last occasion on which I touched on this subject. May I ask now whether he thinks that 80 per cent. per annum is such a reasonable profit as he describes, and does he think that what God gave to us the Government ought to give to America?

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I can only assume that the noble Lord reaches this 80 per cent. profit by basing it upon the estimate of profits possibly to be made in the future on the original subscribed capital, entirely ignoring the fact that a great deal more capital has to be put forward in order to earn those particular profits.

LORD RHODES: My Lords, can the Minister say that if and when we join the Common Market we shall adopt the same policy towards private profit from North Sea gas as that which the other countries which about the North Sea now have?

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think that is rather a different question from the one that is on the Order Paper, but I should be happy to answer it if the noble Lord would put it down.

LORD RHODES: My Lords, there is not a chance to put any Question down on this Paper: so many people put their names down one week after another.

LORD HARVEY OF PRESTBURY: My Lords, will my noble friend confirm that had the companies which are carrying out the exploration not been allowed to retain a reasonable profit, future exploration would not take place? And we desperately need this oil.

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I entirely agree with what my noble friend has said; and I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Balogh, if I may, that "reasonable" is a highly subjective word. "Reasonable" in this context must mean reasonable in line with the purpose—that

is, to get as much gas for this country as possible.

LORD BALOGH: My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he thinks that the Americans were terribly handicapped when they fixed a maximum of 12 per cent., as against the 80 per cent. in this country? May I further ask the Minister whether the Communists were too capitalistic when they obtained the gas at about two-thirds of the price?

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am sorry, but I did not quite catch the second part of that supplementary question.

LORD BALOGH: Then I will repeat it, if the noble Lord wants me to. I asked whether the Communists were too capitalistic when they obtained their gas from the Persians at two-thirds our price.

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think the question of what price is reasonable has to be judged in a number of contexts. It is not just the question of the extraction of the gas itself, but also the question of the encouragement of exploration. On the first part of the supplementary question, experience showed that the Federal Power Commission in the U.S.A. had to increase its price in order to encourage exploration because exploration was not being carried out to the extent which was necessary to sustain the supply.

LORD BALOGH: My Lords, does the Minister not realise that the Americans increased the price because there was a little inflation, but that they are still at 12 per cent. of original investment?

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, obviously I cannot answer as to the particular figures that the noble Lord has given, but I think that what I have said is related to the conditions in this country, and that is what matters.

LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether the Gas Council think they ought to be getting their gas cheaper; and, if so, has he any views on what the difference in price to the consumer would be? Furthermore, is he aware that questions from my noble friend invariably raise issues which the Government, within the terms of the Question, feel unable to answer, and will he give very careful

LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, is the noble Baroness not aware that within the last week or two, in reply to the mission from the Organisation for African Unity, Israel has agreed to the proposal for indirect negotiations? Is the noble Baroness not also aware that both sides have accepted the unanimous resolution of the United Nations of 4 years ago? Could this not be made the basis for such a conference?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am of course aware that both sides have accepted Resolution 242 of the Security Council. But as regards General Dayan's recent remark, that Israel would accept something on the lines of a Geneva Conference, he also put in a *caveat* to the effect that he wanted to be sure that there would be no imposition of a settlement by the four major Powers.

LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, if instead of the United Nations passing resolutions, either in the Assembly or in the Security Council, which are never implemented—and we are familiar with these resolutions and with their non-implementation—the nations associated with the United Nations, and, in particular those in the Security Council, gave a firm pledge of guarantees for both Israel and the Arab States against any possibility of aggression, plus providing the necessary finance for an adequate permanent, or possibly temporary, peace-keeping force in the Middle East, would that not be more likely to lead to a solution of the problem than having stupid conferences and passing stupid, although unanimous, resolutions?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, the United Kingdom has always said that she would play her part in helping to guarantee any settlement, if necessary by contributing forces. But of course such a settlement must be based primarily on agreement between the two main countries involved. The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, will remember that this resolution—which was, after all, initiated by the British Government—was the means whereby Dr. Jarring was sent as a mediator to see what common ground existed.

LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is the Baroness not aware that there was a session some years ago when the

United Kingdom Government in association with the Governments of France and the United States, decided on a tripartite agreement providing what was called a guarantee, but that never was any attempt made to implement it? What is the use of the British Government indulging in that sort of thing? Why do they not understand that we want a unanimous guarantee from the United Nations and the Security Council in order to prevent aggression?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, as I said earlier, the British Government were very much in favour of Resolution 242, which, among other things, sought to guarantee any frontiers that were agreed; but first of all they must be agreed between the parties concerned.

NORTH SEA GAS PROFITS AND PRICES

2.51 p.m.

LORD BALOGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the recent disclosure of exceptionally high rates of profit on natural North Sea gas, these profits have to be mainly transferred to America over the exchanges and thus largely burden our balance of payments; whether they will institute an inquiry under a competent impartial chairman and fortified by expert accountants, before negotiations begin in 1972, about the prices of gas to be paid by the Gas Council; and whether they will ensure that profits are reduced to more reasonable levels.]

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, in judging profitability it is necessary to take into account all concessions, including those on which oil has not been found. Foreign investment is welcomed provided that the company holding the concession is registered in this country. The profits are thus subject to United Kingdom taxation, and the balance, after deduction of tax, may of course be remitted abroad to foreign investors, though in practice such balances are often retained in this country for re-investment.

HOUSE OF LORDS

Wednesday, 26th January, 1972

The House met at half past two of the clock (*Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Chester*) :

The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

LORD SALMON

The Right Honourable Sir Cyril Barnett Salmon, Knight, a Lord Justice of Appeal, having been appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and thereby created a Baron for life, by the style and title of Baron Salmon, of Sandwich in the County of Kent—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Cohen and the Lord Denning.

The Marquess of Anglesey—Took the Oath.

SEX EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

2.41 p.m.

BARONESS MASHAM OF ILTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have a policy on sex education in schools and whether they have given any directives or guidance to local education authorities on this subject.]

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD BELSTEAD): My Lords, responsibility for secular instruction in schools rests with local education authorities, the governing bodies of schools, and head teachers. While it is impossible to satisfy all sections of opinion, they have shown great responsibility in this matter. General advice on an approach to the subject is contained in the Chapter entitled "School and the Future Parent" in a *Handbook of Health Education* issued by the Department of Education and Science.

H.L. 10 B 2

BARONESS MASHAM OF ILTON: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for his reply, may I ask him whether he thinks that this education should be combined with moral and spiritual teaching, or should be just straightforward biological sex? Further does he think that parents should have the right to know what their children are being taught in this subject, and should have the option of withdrawing their children from the showing of a film if they so wish?

LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, the noble Baroness may agree that teaching in this field involves a good deal more than education about sex. As it is a facet of human relations, it surely involves biological teaching, which I think experience has taught is generally best done in the primary school; moral, social and religious aspects of human relationships, which it is best to try to impart as children get older; and then there are always the questions to be dealt with which come up at all times and at any time. In answer to the noble Baroness's second and third questions it is my right honourable friend's view, and, I know, the view of the local education authorities, that parents certainly should have a right to know what is being taught to children in schools. Also, it is my right honourable friend's view, and, so far as I know, it is the practice of local education authorities that parents should be consulted before films are shown to their children.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, as we have been told over the years that a greater degree of sex education would give our children a greater sense of responsibility, can the noble Lord explain why the illegitimate birth rate is going up, and the incidence of V.D. among our young people is higher than we have ever known it?

LORD BELSTEAD: Yes, my Lords. I, too, have the statistics for 1969-70 from the Department of Health and Social Security, and I am not aware that any conclusions have been drawn from them by that Department.

THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he omitted one very important point, which is the simple phrase "self-control". There was not a single reference to that in all of the long answer that he gave.

LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I was not asked about self-control. I therefore had to contain myself.

THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, since I cannot contain myself where verbiage is concerned, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that one cannot just laugh off this very serious matter, and make no reference to self-control and morals? Is the noble Lord aware that the Government's job is also to support civilisation, and therefore the family; and will he give this matter much deeper and more serious consideration than he gave it in his answer?

LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I take to heart what the noble Earl said in his second question. To prepare for the Question this afternoon, I made inquiries in the Department of Education and Science as to whether the *Handbook of Health Education* which the Department of Education and Science publishes, and to which I referred when I was answering the original Question of the noble Baroness, is in your Lordship's Library. My advice is that it is in the Library, and I would ask the noble earl to look at it. I think he may find that the views expressed, which are supposed to be imparted to those who are doing the teaching, run very much along the same lines as the noble Earl's views.

BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, may I ask what is wrong with teaching biology as biology?

LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I think I covered that point in my first Answer to the noble Baroness.

BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell us how we have suffered from learning only biology?

LORD BELSTEAD: My Lords, I am delighted to have my opinion asked on these various points. But the House is really interested only in the view of Her Majesty's Government, and perhaps your Lordships would now like to go on to the next Question.

ISRAELI/ARAB CONFLICT

LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will take the initiative in proposing to the United Nations Security Council the convocation of a conference at Geneva of representatives of Middle East Governments and involved Powers with a view to securing a settlement of the Israeli-Arab confrontation.]

THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOT-TISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, we remain ready to help in any way open to us to promote the search for a settlement. But we do not feel that it would be useful at this stage to propose a conference of the kind suggested by the noble Lord.

LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask whether she has seen the very impressive letter in *The Times* from the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, making this proposal? In view of the frightening way in which the danger of war is mounting, and the ineffectiveness of ordinary methods of pressure and negotiation, is it not desirable that the world now begins a new and much more decisive approach than it has adopted so far? Would not this proposal meet the Arab objection to direct negotiations? Has not Israel said that she would now be prepared for indirect negotiations, and does this not give the opportunity of making a breakthrough?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am aware of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, on this subject, and of course it is a very serious situation in the Middle East. But as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, will be aware, the objections so far to this kind of conference have been that Egypt has first asked for an assurance from the Israelis that they would withdraw their troops, and the Israeli Government has always felt that there should be a direct settlement between the two without any pre-conditions.

the withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf.

Mr. Edwards: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, at a recent Press conference, in the presence of French journalists, stated that he had signed a secret treaty with Her Majesty's Government to last for 30 years, regulating the maintenance of British military bases in that country? Is he aware that this has already been reported in the French Press? Is he further aware that there has been a civil war in that country for the last 16 years and that many hundreds of political prisoners are still detained without trial? Is it not time that we withdrew our support for this unrepresentative hereditary ruler and supported the people of Muscat and Oman, who want a democratic régime?

Mr. Godber: This is an independent government with whom Britain is in a treaty relationship, and I have explained what that relationship is. I know nothing of the Press conference to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but if he would like to send me details I would be happy to look into it.

Mr. Edwards: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek leave to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Tanzania

26. Mr. Evelyn King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has made to the Tanzanian Government in respect of that provision of the Exchange Control Ordinances which can compel British subjects working in Tanzania to sell assets in Great Britain in exchange for Tanzanian currency.

Mr. Godber: None, Sir. The existing law on this subject remains the same as it was before independence.

Mr. King: Does that not mean that if a British subject is in Tanzania for 300 days and thereafter he were to inherit, say, £1,000 in this country he could be compelled to convert that money to Tanzanian shillings, which would be uncashable in Great Britain and possibly irremovable from Tanzania? Is that not

an intolerable position, about which representations ought to be made?

Mr. Godber: The difficulty is that the present arrangements are those which were enforced before Tanzania became independent and therefore I do not see how we can make representations for changes in a law which we tolerated in those circumstances. The position about the 300-day rule is that this is a new provision suggested in a proposed law which has not yet been promulgated. I am told, however, that the Bank of Tanzania will still retain its existing discretion to define residential status in certain special circumstances and that might apply in the case the hon. Gentleman raised, although without further details I could not say definitely.

Middle East

27. Mr. David Watkins asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he made to the Israeli Foreign Minister during his recent talks with him, for Israel to reconsider its rejection of Ambassador Jarring's request made earlier this year, for a specific commitment of Israeli withdrawal from occupation of the territory of neighbouring countries in the light of four power talks on the Middle East.

49. Mr. Clinton Davis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement concerning his recent talks with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Abba Eban.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: My talks with Mr. Eban naturally centred on the situation in the Middle East, but we also discussed a number of other subjects of mutual interest. The details must remain confidential.

Mr. Watkins: Will the right hon. Gentleman continue to take every possible opportunity to impress upon the Government of Israel that its continuing occupation and colonisation of the territory of neighbouring countries is the major obstacle to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The most practical thing to do is to try to get discussions going between Egypt and Israel, in particular under Resolution 242. As

rise for Christmas, and will he say whether reports emanating from Salisbury, and which appeared in the *Sunday Telegraph* yesterday, saying that it is in his mind now to appoint 14 commissioners, are correct? Or is this a confusion between commissioners and assessors?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : I think there may be some confusion, because the whole lot are really known as commissioners. There will be five and I hope very soon to be able to announce the two additional names. On what is known as the Commission on the Test of Acceptability I think there will be 16 further members whom Lord Pearce would like to have.

Mr. Healey : May I ask the right hon. Gentleman in this connection whether he will arrange for hon. Members to be given copies of the English text of the document purporting to explain the meaning of the Commission in simple terms and which I understand the Government are preparing also in African languages for the Commission's use?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : Yes.

South Africa (Arrested British Subjects)

22. **Mr. Hugh Jenkins** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what protests he has made concerning the arrest of 71 British subjects by the South African Government during the last year; and if he will list the criminal charges on which 55 of these British subjects have been detained.

Mr. Godber : There are normally no grounds for protesting in regard to the arrest in a foreign country of a British subject who is charged with having committed an offence under the law of that country. We have as necessary reminded the South African Government that when a United Kingdom citizen is arrested we expect him to be charged and brought to trial or speedily released. I will with permission circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT the other details which the hon. Member has requested.

As he will see, they cover a very wide range of which theft and fraud amount to well over half of those involved.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins : Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether those seven arrested on political charges have been brought to trial and charged and, if not, what protests he has made in this connection?

Mr. Godber : Of the seven, three were charged and convicted and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment. After one month they were released and deported. One of the other four is the Dean of Johannesburg, and there is the question of an appeal at present. The other three who have not yet been charged are concerned with matters on which we have made representations, but these are more recent arrests.

Following is the information :

BREAKDOWN OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES ON WHICH 55 BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN CHARGED IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE LAST YEAR (FROM 1ST DECEMBER, 1970).

Theft	22
Illegal Immigration	7
Possession of dangerous weapons	2
Housebreaking and attempted theft	1
Causing a disturbance	1
Assault	1
Fraud	10
Attempted rape	1
Breach of Immorality Act	1
Contempt of Court	1
Rape/Incest	2
Debt	3
Manslaughter	1
Attempted Murder	1
Abducting a Minor	1
Total	55

Persian Gulf

24. **Mr. Robert Edwards** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about the arrangements made by Her Majesty's Government in the form of a Treaty with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, following British withdrawal from the Gulf.

Mr. Godber : No fresh treaty was called for.

A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was concluded between the United Kingdom and the Sultanate on 20th December, 1951, and remains in force. Its validity has not been affected by the recent termination of our special treaty relations with Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States, or by the plans for

long as the momentum of talks can be maintained under that Resolution, and possibly speeded up, that is the best hope of peace.

Mr. Clinton Davis : Is it not clear that Israel, perhaps like India, is not prepared to accept paper guarantees and has always welcomed the prospect of direct talks with her Arab neighbours?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : That is true and it is the Israeli case that negotiations ought to start, but we all know the limitations to the possibilities of those negotiations. I was quite convinced after having been to Cairo and seeing Mr. Eban that the momentum of these discussions must, in one way or another, be stepped up and under a third party. The best third party anyone has been able to think of so far is Dr. Jarring.

Mr. Heffer : Is it not clear that Israel is obviously deeply suspicious as a result of what happened on the previous occasion when the United Nations troops were withdrawn very quickly? Is it not also clear that Israel really does want peace and has made it absolutely clear that she must have peace with guaranteed frontiers to ensure her existence as a State?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : There have been a number of offers of international guarantees and I think that we could in any new international guarantees avoid the dangers of the past, for example by making a decision on withdrawal unanimous.

Mr. Mayhew : Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the Egyptians have now given all the undertakings requested of them by Ambassador Jarring and by the British and American Governments? Is it not plain that if war in the Middle East is to be avoided pressure must be brought to bear on Israel sooner or later to make her contribution?

Sir Alec Douglas-Home : I think it is true that Egypt and the Arab countries want to live at peace with Israel. I was satisfied of that. Nevertheless, the deadlock remains, and the practical thing is to try to find a way out of the deadlock by starting talks with a much greater momentum than they have had up to now.

Development Divisions

32. Mr. Pavitt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he has yet decided on the places at which he proposes to establish three new development divisions overseas and the total number of staff proposed; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Wood : I cannot yet say where the new divisions will be. I hope to be in a position to do so very soon and to give the other information for which the hon. Member asks.

Mr. Pavitt : The whole House will welcome the extension of the Department's work in this way. When the extra divisions are fully established, will the right hon. Gentleman consider how they may serve the high commissions and embassies in the area in order to encourage a great deal of activity from the other side of the right hon. Gentleman's Department?

Mr. Wood : I feel that the future development divisions will have to operate largely as the existing development divisions have done, namely, in close conjunction with embassies and high commissions in their areas, in order to maximise the effectiveness of their work.

India (Overseas Aid)

33. Mr. Pavitt asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about the recent visit to India of the Minister for Overseas Aid.

Mr. Wood : I returned to England on 1st December after spending two weeks in or near Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta, at the invitation of the Government of India.

I was able to see examples of the developments in agriculture, and I looked at both light and heavy industry, at some of the educational institutions which we are assisting, and at urban improvement work in Calcutta. I had useful talks with a number of Ministers about the continuing rôle of British aid, and I signed two loan agreements. I also discussed, both with Ministers and with business men, the opportunities for foreign private investment.

Finally, in West Bengal, I saw some of the refugee camps, and the work of

voluntary organisations from Britain within them. This has given me a clearer idea of some of the problems that will have to be solved when the fighting is over.

Mr. Pavitt: In planning his forward programmes, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the tremendous amount which India has given in order to deal with the refugee problem, which the right hon. Gentleman has seen? Although India still ranks high in the total amount of aid given, because of its large population and large area which has to be extended, will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that the amount is even larger to deal with the fresh problems which he has seen?

Mr. Wood: I shall have very much in mind in the next few months all the considerations which the hon. Gentleman mentioned. I appreciate the continuing need not only for development in India but for the relief of the refugees, whether they remain in West Bengal or in East Pakistan, in the next few months.

Mrs. Hart: In considering this matter, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that a new factor seems to have entered into the situation, and that is the extraordinary and regrettable decision of the United States Government to cease providing economic aid to India? In my view, this is an added reason for calling a meeting of the India Aid Consortium.

Mr. Wood: As I understand it, the United States Government have suspended that portion of their promised aid to India which has not been committed. My view is that we should continue to give India the aid which we have pledged. Therefore, I hope that the right hon. Lady and I are in full agreement.

Commonwealth Development Corporation

39. **Mr. Judd** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in which countries outside the Commonwealth the Commonwealth Development Corporation now has projects; what have been the principal financial problems encountered in taking on projects in non-Commonwealth countries; and whether he will make a statement.

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Mr. Wood: The Commonwealth Development Corporation has projects in Cameroon and in Indonesia and others are being considered in Ethiopia and Thailand. The two main financial difficulties encountered by the Corporation in non-Commonwealth countries concern its tax position and the high cost of commencing operations in new countries.

Mr. Judd: While thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask whether he would also agree that one of the difficulties about the Corporation's effectiveness outside the Commonwealth is the very high interest rates at which money is made available by the Treasury in this country? Is there any prospect of seeing favourable rates of interest charged on money to the corporation for projects outside the Commonwealth?

Mr. Wood: This is a matter which, as the hon. Gentleman knows, we have been considering. I shall certainly take note of what he said because I, too, am very anxious, as, I believe, is the hon. Member, that the C.D.C. should widen its operations in the developing world generally.

Mr. Edward Taylor: Before considering an extension of the corporation's activities in Indonesia, would my hon. Friend get a satisfactory settlement with the Government of Indonesia of outstanding claims to compensation for British assets seized?

Mr. Wood: This is another question and outside the proper field of my responsibility.

Persian Gulf

41. **Mr. Mather** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about the latest position in the Persian Gulf.

40. **Mr. Biggs-Davison** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a further statement about the situation in the Gulf.

Mr. Godber: I have nothing to add to the statement made to the House by my right hon. Friend on 6th December.—[Vol. 827, c. 944-6.]



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כ" בכסלו תשל"ב
8 בדצמבר 1971

שגרירות ישראל

לונדון

Handwritten notes and signatures:
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אל : מר א. לוריא, המשנה למנכ"ל
מר מ. גזיה, סמנכ"ל
מר י. ענוב, מנהל אירופה ב' ✓
חקר

מאת: ע. ערן

מב"ב עופק מדו"ח מחורגם מאנגליה שהוכן ע"י
השגריר עבור השר לקראת ביקורו בלונדון.

לידיעתכם.

בברכה,

ע. ערן

בריטניה והמוות-התיכון מאז יוני 1970

הבחירות בבריטניה ביוני 1970 נערכו באותה עת בה החלה יוזמתה של ארה"ב שפתחה פרק חדש במזה"ת. מאותה עת נשמרה הפסקת האש. שליחות יארינג הוקפאה מאז פברואר 1971 ואילו שיחות הארבע נחקעו במבוי סתום. ההתענינות הבינלאומית התמקדה מאותה עת על המאמץ האמריקני למצוא הסדר חלקי בענין התעלה.

בנסיבות אלו הפך תפקידה של בריטניה לפסיבי יחסית. עקרונית, ממשיכה הממשלה השמרנית את מדיניות קודמתה והיא נמנעת מיוזמות עצמאיות. ארועי ספטמבר 1970 בירדן, גם הם יצרו בלונדון תגובה המבקשת למנע התערבות.

נאומו של סיר אלק בהרוגיס באוקטובר 1970 לא סימן מפנה רדיקלי במדיניות והיה בו רק נסיון להעניק בטוי פאמבי מפורט לעמדות שלמעשה פותחו עוד בימי הממשלה הקודמת. המניע מאחורי הצהרה זו היה בודאי ניצול הרגעה בסכסוך במזה"ת כדי לשפר עמדות בעולם הערבי, ובמיוחד בכל הקשור למצרים שיחסי בריטניה עמה הושבתו מאז משבר סואץ. ההתירה ליעד זה של שיפור היחסים עם מצרים נמשכה בעת ביקורו של סיר אלק בקהיר בספטמבר שנה זו.

בלונדון ראו בעין יפה את הפגת המתח במזה"ת ואת העובדה שהיוזמה הדיפלומטית נותרה בידי האמריקנים. ממשלת הית יכולה ליהנות להקדיש את תשומת לבם לנושאים דחופים וקרובים יותר, הכלכלה המתדרדרת והאינפלציה האבטלה ובעית יחסי העבודה, ההכרעה בדבר ההצטרפות לשוק המשותף, הפצע הפתוח באולסטר, התמונה הפוליטית הכלכלית והאינטרסגית המתחלפת באירופה, המשבר המוניטרי הבינלאומי ועתה הסדר בעית רודזיה. במסך 18 החלשים האחרונים נותרו רק מעט זמן ותשומת לב לבעיות בינלאומיות אחרות מלבד אלו שגרמו להתעוררות ציבורית כמו שאלת אספקת הנשק לדרא"פ. הסרגדיה האנושית של בנגלה-דש והסכסוך המחרף בין הודו לפקיסטאן (שתיהן חברות בחבר העמים הבריטי) רק חרמו להשתתפות מעורבות בענייני חוץ.

עמדתה הנוכחית של בריטניה למהזה"ת חייבת להבחין בפרספקטיבה היסטורית. רק מעט יותר מדור חלף מאז שלטה בריטניה בלוב, מצרים, סודאן, פלשתיין עראק המפרץ הפרסי ועדן. מאז הלך והתפורר מעמדה כמעצמה ים-תיכונית. חוץ שבועות מספר יעלם הסריד האחרון לשלטונה היטיר באזור עם נסיגתה מהמפרץ הפרסי וגם יחתם הפרק בן 90 השנה של " שעתה של בריטניה במזה"ת". לבריטניה יש עדיין אינטרסים חשובים באזור והאפעה מוקטה אולם לא חלה עליה יותר אחריות לגורלו. התחושה בלונדון אינה של מעצמה המנסה למצוא דרכה לתוך האזור, אלא של מעצמה המצויה בסלב האחרון של ההתנתקות ממנו.

נסיגה אינה בהכרח אדישות משום שהאנטרסים ממשיכים להתקיים ובמיוחד נפט וסחר. מאידך, יש להדגיש שהמו"מ המיגע בין המדינות המפיקות נפט לבין החברות המערביות עשוי להוביל לכך שאספקת הנפט לבריטניה תהיה פחות חשובה לרצונם הטוב של הערבים. לטווח ארוך האינטרסים של בריטניה מובטחים רק בתנאי שלום ויציבות ועצירת ההדירה הסובייטית והרדיקליזם הערבי. מכאן שהסדר ערבי-ישראלי נשאר מענינה של בריטניה. תחושת הדחיפות במציאת הסדר כזה עלולה להחריף עתה עם הופעתה של סין העממית בזירה הבינלאומית שכן הסינים עשויים להיות גורם מטריד בזירה ובמוע"בט.

שלא כפריס, לונדון אינה חושבת במונחים של פתרון כפוי על-ידי המעצמות אלא על פתרון שיושג באמצעות מו"מ והסכם. גישה זו אינה מתיחסת למקרה של המזה"ת בלבד - זו היא גישה בסיסית המבקשת פשרה מציאותית המושגת במגע פנים אל-פנים. יתר על-כן, הממשלה הנוכחית אינה חדורה תחושת מוראל וחשיבות האו"ם כקודמתה. היא מטיפה לעצוב מדיניותה של בריטניה על פי האינטרסים שלה ונכונה להכיר בזכות מדינות אחרות לאמץ עקרון מנחה זה. מדינות, כולל ישראל. מכאן שאין חלוקי דעות בין בריטניה וישראל על הצורך בדיאלוג ו"מוהוס וויונדי".

הבריטים הכירו גם בדרישה לחוזה שלום כולל, סופי ומוחלט. הם רואים בהחלטת מוע"ב 242 כחבילה אחת שמרכיביה כרוכים זה בזה. היו להם הסתייגויות ברורות מיוזמת רוג'רס להסדר חלקי וראו בה סטייה מהמטרה העקרית. חששותיהם נראים עתה כמצדיקים עצמם. אולם, כל עוד מבקשת ארה"ב להמשיך לפעל בכח יוזמה זו, לא תפריע בריטניה לכך.

במובן מטויים מהווה התקווה הבריטית להסדר כולל חריג מאחר והבריטים רואים פתרונות פוליטיים כהתפתחות הדרגתית ואבולוציונית. יתכן והבריטים יתקשו לעכל כי דוקא ישראל כסתה מהתפיסה הרואה החלטה 242 כ"חבילה" אחת והרואה עתה את ההסדר התהליכי ממוסך הבנוי משלבים. זו היא שאלת יסוד החייבת להתבהר בשיחות הקרובות. ^{במסגרת} של אופי ותוכן השלום בין ישראל ומדינות ערב, ההבדל בינינו ובין הבריטים מצוי בעקר בשאלה הסטריטוראלית. הבריטים אינם מאמינים שניתן להביא את המעצרים הערבים לצותר מרצונם על טריטוריה שבעיניהם נראית כשייכת להם. לכן, לדעת הבריטים, לא יתכן שלום אלא אם תיסוג ישראל מטריטוריות כבושות, פרט להתאמות מזעריות. לדעת הבריטים אין להשיג בסחון לישראל באמצעות גבולות שאולי יהיו יותר ברי-הגנה אולם לא יושגו בהסכם. לדעתם על בסחון ישראל להיות נסען על הסכמי שלום חתומים, נוכחות או"ם בשטח ויכולת ההגנה של ישראל. לדעתם אנו מיחסים חשיבות מופרזה למיקום הגבולות ושאל לנו להחמיץ הזדמנות לשלום בשל כך. ואף על פי כן אין הם מנסים לכפות דעתם עלינו.

מעורבותה הקולקטיבית של אירופה במזה"ת, בה חטא מעתה בריטניה תפקיד מכריע, עשויה להחליש במידה מה את מעורבותה האימפריאלית בעבר באזור. התחזקות הצי הסובייטי בים התיכון והשאיפה הסובייטית להשיג בסיסים ומתקנים לאורך החוף הדרומי שלו, מזכירים בחריפות למערב כי עדין יש לו "בטן רכה" כשמוסיפים לכך את התלות הנמשכת של אירופה בנפט המזת"י וספקות בדבר מהימנות התחייבותה של ארה"ב לאירופה הרי שמסתבר שאזור הים-התיכון והמזרח-התיכון יהפך יותר ויותר עבור האירופאים לנושא להתענינות כלכלית ואסטרטגית.

הדחף למצוא עמדות אירופאיות משותפות יגדל ללא ספק. אי-אפשר לזלזל באפשרות זו ולראות בה רק הוצר לווי המשרת את מדיניותה של צרפת. מאידך, יש לזכור כי תפיסתו האירופאית של הית, כזו של פומפידו, היא קונפידרלית ולא כזו החוזה ארצות הברית של אירופה. זו היא תפיסה פלורליסטית יותר מאשר צנטרליסטית. הבריטים ינסו למצא הרמוניה בין מדיניות החוץ והאנטרסטים השונים של המדינות השונות במקום לשעבד את מדיניותם הם למדיניות חוץ אחידה המחייבת את כולם. בהקשר העמדות האירופאיות בשאלת המז"ת תהפך בריטניה למוקד חדש של השפעה. החברות הקטנות כקהיליה המורחבת, כמו הולנד, בלגיה נורבגיה, דנמרק ואירלנד ואולי גרמניה תבסס לקבל הדרכה מבריטניה יותר מאשר מצרפת (לאיטליה "זהות" מזת"ת משלה). דיאלוג בריטי-ישראלי חייב לבן לקבל מעתה מימד אירופאי.

מסיבות שהוזכרו בחלקו הראשון של חזכיר זה, התענינות הציבור הבריטי בסכסוך המז"ת, נמצאת עתה בשפל והיא עשויה לגאות רק עם פרוץ מעשי האיבה. למי הוכות, על מי מוטלת החזרה ושאלות שונות הכרוכות בעמדותיהם של שני היריבים הן עדיין שאלות המעסיקות את המומחים בלבד, בפורין אופיס בעתונות באוניברסיטאות בקהילה היהודית ובחוגים פרו ערביים ופרו-ישראליים.

א.נ.

אם פחתה האהדה לישראל מאז מלחמת ששת הימים, הרי שאף הערבים כולל המצרים זוכים באהדה או כבוד. ההערצה הרומנטית לפת"ח נמוגה ככל שהתגלו המציאות של חסר אונים ופיצול בארגון. יותר על כן, הפעילות הטרוריסטית בצפון אירלנד הביאה להוקעת השימוש בשיטות טרור. מאידך, מקובל כי אף פתרון שלא יקח בחשבון את שאיפת הערבים הפלסטינאים, לא יהיה בר-קיימא. דבר זה מבטא שינוי טחל מאז התקבלה החלטה 242 המתעלמת מהפלסטינאים להוציא הפליטים. אולם, הזוית הפלסטינאית של הבעיה שוב טוטטשה בשנה החולפת, שעה שחסיין ייצב מחדש את שלטונו. מידי פעם מופיע בעתונות זרם כתבות ומכתבים בלתי אוהדים בסוגיות מסוימות כגון ירושלים, בעיות פנים או עזה, אך הוא גווע במהירות. אך מעט נשאר היום מהתקפות הכוללת על ישראל על בסיס "הומניטרי" הערבים שנעקרו ב-1967, אמצעי דיכוי וענישה כביכול כשטחים המוחזקים, יחס אכזרי כביכול לעצורים וכיו"ב. אך עדיין קימת ההרגשה שישראל יכולה היתה להיות גמישה ופעילה יותר בחפוש אחר השלום.

מלבד לסכסוך ישראל-ערב יש ענין כללי וחיובי בישראל כמדינה מיוחדת בעלת מוסדות מדיניים וחברתיים, דפוסי תרבות ואורח חיים שיש להם מכנים משותפים רבים עם אלו שבדיטניה. ענין זה מטופח באמצעות מגעים וביקורים הדדיים.

מדיניותה של השגרירות היא להציג עמדותיה של ישראל, את התקדמותה ובעיותיה כפי שהן ולהמנע מלהגרר לוויכוחי סרק עם יריבינו.

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RECEIVED 26 NOV 1971



ANGLO - RHODESIAN
RELATIONS

PROPOSALS FOR
A SETTLEMENT

Presented to Parliament
by the Prime Minister
on 25th November, 1971

PREFACE

In November 1970 contacts between the British and Rhodesian Governments, which had been in suspense since 1969, were resumed with a view to finding a settlement of the constitutional dispute between them. These contacts were initiated and conducted through an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Mr. I. D. Smith.

As a result of the progress made through this correspondence it was agreed that sufficient understanding had been reached to justify the commencement of preliminary talks between teams of British and Rhodesian emissaries. The first series of talks was held in Salisbury between the 3rd and the 5th April, 1971. Further talks between these emissaries were held at various times throughout the year and, as a result, the way was paved for full-scale negotiations between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Smith. These commenced in Salisbury on the 15th November, 1971.

At the conclusion of the negotiations agreement was reached on proposals designed to bring to an end the constitutional dispute between the two countries. The document containing these proposals was signed by Mr. Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home on the 24th November, 1971.

The text of this document follows:

PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

I. THE TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY

The proposals set out below are conditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The British Government will therefore appoint a Commission to ascertain directly from all sections of the population of Rhodesia whether or not these proposals are acceptable and to report accordingly to the British Government. It will consist of a Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and a number of Commissioners. The report will be signed by the Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen. The members of the Commission will travel extensively throughout the country visiting in particular all centres of population, local councils and traditional meeting places in the Tribal Trust Lands.

In the period before and during the test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of the Commission, provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner. Radio and television time will be made available to political parties represented in the House of Assembly.

The Commission will carry out its inquiries in public or in private as it deems appropriate. There will be immunity for witnesses heard by the Commission in respect of their evidence and freedom for persons resident in Rhodesia, whatever their political views or affiliations, to enable them to appear before the Commission. All Rhodesian Government employees will be permitted to express their views to the Commission. Persons in detention or under restriction will be similarly permitted. Arrangements will be made in London and elsewhere as necessary for Rhodesians resident abroad to submit their views to the Commission.

The Rhodesian Government will provide the Commission with such assistance as may reasonably be required to enable them to carry out their functions.

II. THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of Rhodesia will be the Constitution adopted in Rhodesia in 1969 modified in the following respects. The Rhodesian Government will introduce legislation to make the necessary modifications in the Constitution and related electoral legislation with effect from the date on which independence is conferred by the British Parliament.

(1) *The House of Assembly*

- (a) The existing provisions governing the increase of African representation in the House will be repealed and replaced by provisions to give effect to the arrangements set out in the following subparagraphs.
- (b) A new roll of African voters (the African higher roll) will be created with the same qualifications as those for the roll of European voters. The relevant means and educational qualifications are set out in Appendix I.
- (c) Additional African seats will be created in accordance with the arrangements set out in the following subparagraphs, with effect from the dissolution of Parliament following the date on which it is established that any such seats are due. The seats will be filled at the general election consequent upon the dissolution of Parliament. However, the first four additional seats will be created and elections held to fill them as soon as it is established that they are due.
- (d) When the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equals 6 per cent. of the number of voters then registered on the European roll, two additional African seats will become due; when the number of voters registered on the African higher roll equals 12 per cent. of the number of voters then registered on the European roll, a further two additional African seats will become due; further additional African seats will become due, two at a time, for each such proportionate increase of 6 per cent. in the number of voters registered on the African higher roll, until 34 additional African seats have been created, thus resulting in parity in the numbers of African and European members in the House of Assembly. This arrangement will ensure that at parity there are approximately equal numbers of voters on the African higher and European rolls.
- (e) The first two additional African seats will be filled by direct election for single-member constituencies by the voters registered on the African higher roll and the next two will be filled by indirect election by electoral colleges on the same basis as the existing eight African seats filled by indirect election. This sequence will be repeated in relation to subsequent additional African seats.
- (f) For the purpose of giving effect to the above arrangement the Registrar-General of Voters will review the number of voters registered on the African higher roll and

the European roll at not more than six-monthly intervals, and whenever additional African seats have become due he will issue a certificate to that effect to the President and the President will then be required to make an order providing for the creation of those seats as described above.

- (g) The qualifications for the existing roll of African voters (the African lower roll) will be replaced by qualifications equivalent to those for the "B" roll under the 1961 Constitution, subject to the financial qualifications being increased twice by 10 per cent. The relevant means and educational qualifications are set out in Appendix II.
- (h) The Rhodesian Government have agreed to a simplified application form for enrolment on the African lower roll, and to an amendment to the Electoral Act to provide that an applicant for the African lower roll shall, if he so requests, receive assistance from the registering officer in completing the form.
- (i) A candidate for election to an African higher roll seat will have to be registered as a voter on that roll, and a candidate for election to an African lower roll seat will have to be registered as a voter on one of the two African rolls.
- (j) Within one year after the holding of the general election at which parity is attained a referendum will be held among all enrolled African voters to determine whether or not the seats filled by indirect election should be abolished and replaced by an equal number of seats filled by direct election.

The new seats will all be African higher roll seats unless the Legislature has before the referendum provided for up to one quarter of the new seats to be African lower roll seats. The Legislature may also provide that a specific number of the extra seats should be rural constituencies.

Laws providing for any of the matters mentioned in this subparagraph, including the procedural arrangements for the holding of the referendum, would not have to be passed in accordance with the requirements for amending the Constitution; the only special requirement would be that in the House of Assembly they must be approved by a majority of all the African members.

If the majority of voters at the referendum is in favour of the abolition of the indirectly elected seats, an election to give effect to the change will be held within one year thereafter. It will be possible for an election to be held for this purpose without the dissolution of Parliament. If this course is adopted, the indirectly elected African members and the African higher roll members and also, if the number of African lower roll seats is to be increased, the African lower roll members, will vacate their seats on the date appointed for the nomination of candidates in the election and Parliament will be prorogued from that date until the completion of the election.

- (k) Not later than six months after the holding of that election or, if the result of the referendum is that the seats filled by indirect election are retained, after the completion of the referendum, an independent commission will be appointed to ascertain whether the creation of common roll seats in accordance with the constitutional provisions described in subparagraph (l) below is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia and, if this is not so acceptable, whether any alternative arrangements would command general support. The commission will consist of a Chairman who holds or has held high judicial office, and equal numbers of European and African members appointed by the Government after consultation with all parties represented in the House of Assembly. The commission will be required to report to the Legislature within one year of its appointment. A law to give effect to any recommendation of the commission would have to be passed in accordance with the requirements for the amendment of the Constitution.
- (l) The Constitution will provide that, with effect from the dissolution of Parliament following the date by which the commission is required to report, ten common roll seats will be created. The common roll seats will be filled by direct election by the voters on a roll consisting of all the voters for the time being registered on the European roll and the African higher roll. Elections to these seats will be conducted on the basis that the whole of Rhodesia will form a single constituency returning all the common roll members, and that each voter will have ten votes which he may cast as he chooses amongst the candidates.

(2) *The Senate*

The Senate will continue to be constituted as at present. As a consequence of the establishment (see paragraph (3) below) of a new Declaration of Rights enforceable by the courts, the Senate Legal Committee will be abolished.

(3) *The Declaration of Rights*

The existing Declaration of Rights will be replaced by a new Declaration affording protection to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and conferring a right of access to the High Court for the purpose of obtaining redress on any person who alleges that its provisions have been contravened in relation to him. The text of the Declaration and the provisions for its enforcement are set out in Appendix III.

(4) *Renewal of Declarations of Emergency*

Section 61 of the Constitution will be amended so as to reduce the period within which a declaration of emergency requires renewal by resolution of the House of Assembly from twelve months to nine months.

(5) *Amendment of the Constitution*

- (a) The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance to the British Government that they will not introduce or support in the Rhodesian Parliament any amendment of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution relating to the composition of the House of Assembly or of the specially entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act until the first two African higher roll seats have been created and filled or until three years have elapsed since the constitutional changes provided for by these proposals have come into force, whichever is the sooner.
- (b) Until the date by which the commission referred to in subparagraph (1) (k) above is required to report, or the date on which it reports if that is earlier, a Bill to amend any of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will require, in addition to the existing requirements of the affirmative votes in each House of the Legislature of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the House, the affirmative votes in the House of Assembly of a majority of the total European membership and of a majority of the total African membership.

- (c) The existing provision to the effect that a Bill to increase the number of members of the House of Assembly without altering the proportion of African members to the total number of members shall not on that account be regarded as amending a specially entrenched provision will be repealed.
- (d) The specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will include—
 - (i) the new provisions to give effect to the proposals in paragraph II (1) above;
 - (ii) the new Declaration of Rights, including the provisions for its enforcement by the High Court; and
 - (iii) the amended Section 61 relating to declarations of emergency.
- (e) The following provisions of the Electoral Act will be subject to the same requirements as regards amendment as the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution—
 - (i) those prescribing the qualifications and disqualifications for registration of voters on the European roll and both African rolls;
 - (ii) those prescribing the qualifications and disqualifications for candidates for election to the House of Assembly;
 - (iii) the provision for variation of the means qualifications for voters in consequence of changes in prices; and
 - (iv) the provisions prescribing the composition of the Tribal Electoral Colleges.

Section 26 of the Electoral Act, which provides for the gradual increase of means and educational qualifications for the existing African roll so that, when parity is reached, they are the same as those for the European roll, will be repealed.

III. REVIEW OF EXISTING LEGISLATION

The Rhodesian Government have intimated to the British Government their firm intention, within the spirit of these proposals, to make progress towards ending racial discrimination. Accordingly an independent commission will be set up to examine the question of racial discrimination. It will be required to consider existing legislation and to make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards ending any

racial discrimination. There shall be included in the functions of the commission a special duty to scrutinise the provisions of the Land Tenure Act and to consider the possible creation of an independent and permanent Land Board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved. The terms of reference of the commission, which will consist of three members, one of whom will be an African, are set out in Appendix IV. Its membership will be agreed with the British Government. The commission will be established as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. Its findings will be published.

The Rhodesian Government recognize that the findings of the commission will carry special authority and have given an assurance that they will commend to Parliament such changes in existing legislation as are required to give effect to its recommendations, subject only to considerations that any government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character.

IV. REVIEW OF CASES OF DETAINEES AND RESTRICTEES

The Rhodesian Government stated that 23 detainees have been released since the end of March, 1971, leaving 93 detainees and two restrictees (excluding 34 detainees who have been released on conditions). It is the Rhodesian Government's intention to release a further 31 detainees as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

Since the settlement will have created a new situation there will be a new special review of the cases of all detainees and restrictees to see whether, in the light of changed circumstances, they can be released or the restrictions can be removed without prejudice to the maintenance of public safety and public order. This review will be carried out by the existing tribunal, of which the Chairman is a Judge of the Rhodesian High Court, as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. The recommendations of the tribunal will be binding on the detaining or restricting authority. For the purposes of this special review an observer appointed by the British Government in agreement with the Rhodesian Government will be entitled to be present.

V. LAND

In the African Area there is at present approximately 5 million acres of unoccupied land which is available for settlement by Africans, 3½ million in the Tribal Trust Land and 1½ million in the Purchase Area. Provision exists under which significant additional land can be made available and the Rhodesian Government intend to make it available as the need arises.

Both Governments agree that they will immediately devote a proportion of the aid referred to in paragraph VI of these proposals to the improvement of areas currently occupied or intended for occupation by Africans.

With the exception of certain forest and national park areas the development of which may involve the removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights, the only two cases in which the Rhodesian Government are considering the eviction of Africans from land in the European Area are Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance that they will not take steps to evict African tenants or other occupants from these two areas or from other areas in which they are living until such time as the Commission referred to in paragraph III above has reported and its recommendations have been fully considered.

VI. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The two Governments attach the greatest importance to the expansion of the economy of Rhodesia and, in particular, to stimulating economic growth in the Tribal Trust Lands. There will therefore be a development programme to increase significantly educational and job opportunities for Africans in order to enable them to play a growing part in the country's future development, and early discussions between the two Governments will be held to agree on this programme and the best means of implementing it.

The British Government will provide up to £5 million per year for a period of ten years in capital aid and technical assistance to be applied to purposes and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government to be matched appropriately by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for this development programme. This will be in addition to the annual expenditure currently planned by the Rhodesian Government for African education and housing and for development projects in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. Part of this development programme will be devoted to the establishment of new irrigation schemes, intensive cultivation projects, industrial projects and the improvement of communications in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. As regards education, the moneys will be used to improve and expand facilities for Africans in agriculture, technical and vocational training, teacher training and training in administration and for other educational purposes in the field of primary, secondary and higher education.

The parallel development of the two elements in this programme will thus help to ensure that new job opportunities for

Africans will become available as the economy expands and additional educational facilities are provided for them.

VII. OTHER MATTERS

(1) As vacancies occur in the Rhodesian Public Service they will be filled according to the criteria of merit and suitability, regardless of race. The Rhodesian Government have undertaken to take steps to enable an increasing number of Africans to fit themselves to compete on equal terms with candidates of other races so far as appointments or promotions are concerned.

(2) Rhodesian citizens who have left Rhodesia for any reason will be allowed to return freely and without being subjected to any restrictions by reason of their past activities, but without amnesty in respect of any criminal offence.

(3) The Rhodesian Government wish to revoke the state of emergency at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of unforeseen circumstances they will do so after sanctions against Rhodesia have been lifted.

VIII. IMPLEMENTATION

As soon as the British Government are satisfied that the legislation referred to in paragraph II above has been enacted and steps taken to give effect to the proposals in paragraphs III and IV above they will introduce legislation to confer independence on Rhodesia as a republic and will commend this legislation to the British Parliament. They will also terminate their economic and other sanctions when this legislation takes effect. Both Governments will take steps to settle outstanding financial and other issues and to regularize relations between the two countries and matters affecting the personal status of individuals.

Nothing in these proposals shall be regarded as implying any change in the current attitude of either side to the present status of Rhodesia or of the 1969 Constitution.

The above proposals are acceptable to the Rhodesian and British Governments.

I. Douglas Smith.

Alec Douglas-Home.

24th November, 1971.

APPENDIX I

EUROPEAN ROLL AND AFRICAN HIGHER ROLL QUALIFICATIONS

- (a) Income at the rate of not less than \$1 800 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$3 600.

OR

- (b) (i) Income at the rate of not less than \$1 200 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$2 400; *and*
(ii) four years secondary education of prescribed standard.

APPENDIX II

AFRICAN LOWER ROLL QUALIFICATIONS

- (a) Income at the rate of not less than \$600 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$1 100.

OR

- (b) (i) Income at the rate of not less than \$300 per annum during the two years preceding date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$600; *and*
(ii) two years' secondary education of prescribed standard.

OR

- (c) Persons over 30 years of age with—
 - (i) Income at the rate of not less than \$300 per annum during the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$600; *and*
 - (ii) completion of a course of primary education of a prescribed standard.

OR

- (d) Persons over 30 years of age with—
Income at the rate of not less than \$430 per annum during the two years preceding the date of claim for enrolment, *or* ownership of immovable property of value of not less than \$800.

OR

- (e) All kraal heads with a following of 20 or more heads of families.

APPENDIX III

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

(Sections to replace present section 84)

Declaration
of Rights.

84. WHEREAS it is desirable to ensure that every person in Rhodesia enjoys the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, tribe, political opinions, colour or creed, to life, liberty, security of the person, the protection of the privacy of his home, protection from deprivation of his property without payment of compensation, the protection of the law, and to freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association;

AND WHEREAS the exercise of these rights and freedoms should be subject to certain limitations that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest;

AND WHEREAS it is the duty of every person to respect and abide by the Constitution and the laws of Rhodesia;

AND WHEREAS loyalty to Rhodesia is a fundamental duty of every citizen;

The provisions of the Second Schedule, as read with section *eight-four A*, shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection of the aforesaid rights and freedoms, subject to the limitations of that protection contained in those provisions.

Enforcement
of
protective
provisions
of
Declaration
of Rights.

84A. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (8), if any person alleges that any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights has been or is being contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Appellate Division for redress.

(2) If in any proceedings in the General Division of the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court any question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the person presiding in that court may, and if so requested by any party to the proceedings shall, refer the question to the Appellate Division so, however, that he shall not be required to comply with any such request which, in his opinion, is merely frivolous or vexatious.

(3) Where in any proceedings such as are mentioned in subsection (2), any such question as is therein mentioned is not referred to the Appellate Division, then, without prejudice to the right to raise that question on any appeal from the determination of the court in those proceedings, no application for the determination of that question shall lie to the Appellate Division under subsection (1).

(4) The Appellate Division shall have original jurisdiction—

- (a) to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (1) or to determine without hearing any such application which, in its opinion, is merely frivolous or vexatious;
- (b) to determine any question arising in the case of any person which is referred to it in pursuance of the provisions of subsection (2);

and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights:

Provided that the Appellate Division shall not exercise its powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.

(5) If in any proceedings in any court it falls to be determined whether any law is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the Attorney-General shall be entitled to be heard by the court on that question and if in any such proceedings any law is determined by the court to be so inconsistent, then, whether or not he has exercised his right to be heard in those proceedings, the Attorney-General shall have the like right with respect to an appeal from that determination as if he had been a party to the proceedings.

(6) Where any provision of any law is held by a competent court to be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, any person detained in custody under that provision shall be entitled as of right to make an application to the Appellate Division for the purpose of questioning the validity of his further detention, notwithstanding that he may have previously appealed against his conviction or sentence or that any time prescribed for the filing of such an appeal may have expired.

(7) A law of the Legislature may confer upon the Appellate Division such powers, in addition to those conferred by this section, as may appear to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the Appellate Division more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section.

(8) A law of the Legislature may make provision with respect to the practice and procedure—

- (a) of the Appellate Division in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon it by or under this section;
- (b) of subordinate courts in relation to references to the Appellate Division under subsection (2);

including provision with respect to the time within which any application or reference shall or may be made or brought and, subject to any provisions so made, provision may be made with respect to the matters referred to above by rules of court made in terms of any Act governing the practice and procedure in the Appellate Division.

(9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this section, the court shall not declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made after the fixed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be inconsistent with any provision of the Declaration of Rights if the provision concerned has been in force for a period of at least ten years, whether as part of the Act or statutory instrument concerned or of any previous Act or statutory instrument repealed or amended and substituted by the Act or statutory instrument concerned.

(10) For the purposes of this section—

“Appellate Division” means the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia.

Validity
of
existing
laws.

84B. No court shall declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made before the fixed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be *ultra vires* on the grounds that that provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights set out in Chapter VI of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1961 or Chapter VII of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, as the case may be.

SECOND SCHEDULE (Section 84)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

1. (1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted. Protection of right to life.

(2) Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention of any other law with respect to the use of force in such cases as are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this paragraph if he dies as the result of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case—

- (a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;
- (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
- (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or of dispersing an unlawful gathering;
- (d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence;

or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.

(3) It shall be sufficient justification for the purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph in any case to which that subparagraph applies if it is shown that the force used did not exceed that which might lawfully have been used in the circumstances of that case under the law in force immediately before the fixed date.

2. (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty, save as may be authorized by law in any of the following cases, that is to say— Protection of right to personal liberty.

- (a) in consequence of his unfitness to plead to a criminal charge or in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere, in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted;
- (b) in execution of the order of a court punishing him for contempt of that court or of another court or tribunal or in execution of the order of the Senate or the House of Assembly punishing him for contempt of itself or of its members or for breach of privilege;
- (c) in execution of the order of a court made in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation imposed on him by law, including any African customary law;

- (d) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court or an officer of a court or before the Senate or the House of Assembly in execution of the order of the Senate or that House;
- (e) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence;
- (f) under the order of a court or with the consent of his parent or guardian, for the purpose of his education or welfare during a period beginning before he attains the age of twenty-one years and ending not later than the date when he attains the age of twenty-three years;
- (g) for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious disease;
- (h) if he is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose of his care, treatment, or rehabilitation or the protection of the community;
- (i) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of that person into Rhodesia, or for the purpose of effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal of that person from Rhodesia, or the taking of proceedings relating thereto;
- (j) to such extent as may be necessary for the execution of a lawful order requiring that person to remain within a specified area within Rhodesia or prohibiting him from being within such an area, or to such extent as may be reasonably justifiable—
 - (i) for the taking of proceedings against that person relating to the making of such an order; or
 - (ii) for restraining that person during any visit which he is permitted to make to any part of Rhodesia in which, in consequence of such an order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful;
- (k) subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (4), (5), (6) and (7), for the purposes of his preventive detention in the interests of defence, public safety or public order.

(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable in a language that he understands of the reasons for his arrest or detention and shall be permitted at his own expense to obtain and instruct without delay a legal adviser of his own choice, being a person entitled to practise

in Rhodesia as an advocate or attorney, and to hold communication with him.

(3) Any person who is arrested or detained—

- (a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court or an officer of a court; or
- (b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence;

and who is not released shall be brought without undue delay before a court, and if any person arrested or detained as mentioned in subparagraph (b) of this subparagraph is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings which may be brought against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings preliminary to trial.

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than—

- (a) fourteen days unless the Minister designated for the purpose has issued an order providing for the preventive detention of that person; or
- (b) forty-two days unless the case of that person has, before the expiration of the said period of forty-two days, been submitted to a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph, and if such tribunal reports that, in its opinion, there is not sufficient cause for such detention, that person shall forthwith be released.

(5) Where a person has been detained by virtue of the provisions of a law providing for preventive detention for a period of more than forty-two days, his case shall be submitted for review at intervals of not more than nine months by a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph, and if such tribunal—

- (a) orders, either because that person satisfies the tribunal that new circumstances have arisen or because the tribunal considers it to be desirable, that the case of that person should be submitted to the tribunal for review before the expiration of nine months from the previous review of his case, the case of that person shall be submitted for review when so ordered by the tribunal;

- (b) reports that, in its opinion, there is not sufficient cause for the continued detention of that person, he shall forthwith be released.

(6) A person who has been detained by virtue of the provisions of any law providing for preventive detention and who has been released from detention in consequence of a report of a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph that there is, in its opinion, insufficient cause for his detention shall not be again detained by virtue of such provisions within the period of six months from his release on the same grounds as those on which he was originally detained.

(7) A tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph shall be established by law and shall consist of—

- (a) a chairman who shall be a person who is or has been a judge of the High Court of Rhodesia or is qualified in terms of section *sixty-five* to be appointed as such; and
- (b) two other persons, one of whom—
 - (i) is or has been a judge of the High Court of Rhodesia or is qualified in terms of section *sixty-five* to be appointed as such; or
 - (ii) has been a magistrate in Rhodesia for not less than ten years; or
 - (iii) is, and has been for not less than ten years, qualified to practise as an attorney in Rhodesia.

(8) The references in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph to a period of forty-two days include references to any lesser periods that amount in the aggregate to forty-two days:

Provided that no two such lesser periods shall be aggregated for this purpose if the period between the expiration of the first and the commencement of the second is more than one month.

(9) For the purposes of subparagraph (6) of this paragraph, a person shall be deemed to have been detained on the same grounds as those on which he was originally detained unless a tribunal established for the purposes of this paragraph has reported that, in its opinion, there appear *prima facie* to be new and reasonable grounds for the detention, but the giving of any such report shall be without prejudice to the provisions of subparagraph (4) of this paragraph.

(10) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation therefor from that other person:

Provided that any judicial officer acting in his judicial capacity reasonably and in good faith and any other person acting reasonably and in good faith and without culpable ignorance or negligence may be protected by law from liability for such compensation.

3. (1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced labour.

Protection
from
slavery and
forced
labour.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the expression "forced labour" does not include—

- (a) any labour required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court;
- (b) labour required of any person while he is lawfully detained which though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court—
 - (i) is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance or management of the place at which he is detained; or
 - (ii) if he is detained for the purpose of his care, treatment, rehabilitation, education or welfare, is reasonably required for that purpose;
- (c) any labour required of a person who is a member of any naval, military or air force, or who is otherwise subject to any disciplinary law in pursuance of his duties as a member of that force or under that law, or any labour required of any person by virtue of a written law in lieu of service as a member of such a force;
- (d) any labour required by way of parental discipline;
- (e) any labour required by virtue of a written law during a period of public emergency or in the event of any other emergency or calamity which threatens the life or well-being of any section of the community;
- (f) any labour which forms part of normal communal or other civic obligations.

4. (1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.

Protection
from
inhuman
treatment.

(2) No treatment reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case to prevent the escape from custody of a person who has been lawfully detained shall be held to be in contravention of this paragraph on the ground that it is degrading.

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question authorizes the doing of anything by way of punishment or other treatment which might lawfully have been so done in Rhodesia immediately before the fixed date.

Protection
from
deprivation
of
property.

5. (1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, except by or under the authority of a written law and where provision applying to that acquisition or taking of possession is made by a written law—

- (a) requiring that reasonable notice of the intention to take possession of, or acquire the interest in or right over, the property is given to any person owning the property or having any other interest or right therein that would be affected by such taking of possession or acquisition; and
- (b) providing for the payment of proper compensation within a reasonable time.

(2) Every person having an interest in or right over property which is compulsorily taken possession of or whose interest in or right over any property is compulsorily acquired shall have a right of direct access to the High Court or another adjudicating authority provided for in the law referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for the determination of his interest or right, if any, the legality of the taking of possession or the acquisition of the property, interest or right and the amount of any compensation to which he is entitled and for the purpose of obtaining payment of that compensation within a reasonable time.

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or the acquisition of any interest in or right over property—

- (a) by way of imposition or enforcement of any tax, duty, rate or due;
- (b) by way of penalty for breach of any law, including any African customary law, whether under civil process or after conviction of an offence or forfeiture in consequence of a breach of the law;
- (c) upon the attempted removal of the property in question out of or into Rhodesia in contravention of any law;

- (d) as an incident of a contract, including a lease or mortgage, or of a title deed to land;
- (e) for the purpose of its administration, care or custody on behalf and for the benefit of the person entitled to the beneficial interest therein;
- (f) by way of the vesting or administration of any property belonging to or used by or on behalf of an enemy or an organization which is proscribed or declared by or in terms of a written law to be an unlawful organization;
- (g) by way of the administration of moneys payable or owing to a person outside Rhodesia or to the Government of a country other than Rhodesia where restrictions have been placed by law on the transfer of such moneys outside Rhodesia;
- (h) as an incident of—
 - (i) a composition in insolvency accepted or agreed to by a majority in number of creditors who have proved claims and by a number of creditors whose proved claims represent in value more than fifty *per centum* of the total value of proved claims;
or
 - (ii) a deed of assignment entered into by a debtor with his creditors;
- (i) in the execution of judgments or orders of courts;
- (j) by reason of the property in question being in a dangerous state or prejudicial to the health or safety of human, animal or vegetable life;
- (k) in consequence of any law with respect to the limitation of actions, acquisitive prescription or derelict land;
- (l) as a condition in connexion with the granting of permission for the utilization of that or other property in any particular manner;
- (m) by way of the taking of a sample for the purposes of a law;
- (n) by way of the acquisition of the shares, or a class of shares, in a body corporate on terms agreed to by the holders of not less than nine-tenths in value of those shares or that class thereof;
- (o) where the property consists of an animal, upon its being found trespassing or straying;
- (p) for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of any examination, investigation, trial or inquiry;

- (q) in the case of land, for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of the carrying out thereon—
 - (i) of work for the purpose of the conservation of natural resources of any description; or
 - (ii) of agricultural development or improvement which the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and has without reasonable or lawful excuse refused or failed, to carry out;
- (r) in consequence of any law requiring copies of any book or other publication published in Rhodesia to be lodged with the National Archives or a public library;
- (s) for the purpose of, or in connexion with, the prospecting for or exploitation of minerals, mineral oils, natural gases, precious metals or precious stones which are vested in the President on terms which provide for the respective interests of the persons affected;
- (t) for the purpose of, or in connexion with, the exploitation of underground water or public water which is vested in the President on terms which provide for the respective interests of the persons affected.
- (4) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as affecting the making or operation of any law—
 - (a) in so far as it provides for the orderly marketing, production, growth or extraction of any agricultural product or mineral or any article or thing prepared for market or manufactured therefor or for the reasonable restriction of the use of any property in the interests of safeguarding the interests of others or the protection of lessees or other persons having rights in or over such property; or
 - (b) in so far as it provides for the compulsory taking of possession in the public interest of any property, or the compulsory acquisition in the public interest of any interest in or right over property where that property, interest or right is held by a body corporate established directly by law for public purposes in which no moneys are invested other than moneys provided from public funds.

Protection
from
arbitrary
search or
entry.

6. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or to entry into or the search of his dwelling-house.

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of

this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

- (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning; or
- (b) without derogation from the generality of the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this subparagraph, for the enforcement of the law in circumstances where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the entry or search is necessary for the prevention, investigation or detection of a criminal offence or for the lawful arrest of a person; or
- (c) to enable any public authority or any body corporate established directly by law to enter the dwelling-house in question in order to carry out work connected with any property of that authority or body which is lawfully in that dwelling-house; or
- (d) for the purpose of the valuation of the dwelling-house in question in connexion with any tax, rate or due; or
- (e) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons; or
- (f) to authorize, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or order of a court in any civil proceedings, the search of any person by order of a court or the entry into any dwelling-house by such order.

(3) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

7. (1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.

Provisions
to secure
protection
of law.

- (2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence—
 - (a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty;

- (b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature of the offence charged;
- (c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
- (d) shall be permitted to defend himself in person or, save in proceedings before a tribal court or at a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, at his own expense by a legal representative of his own choice;
- (e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or, save in proceedings before a tribal court or at a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, by his legal representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before any court and to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf before that court on the same conditions as those applying to witnesses called by the prosecution;
- (f) shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the charge;

and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence.

(3) Save in the case of a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph, when a person is tried for any criminal offence the accused person or any person authorized by him in that behalf shall, if he so requires and subject to payment of such reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be given within a reasonable time after judgment a copy for the use of the accused person of any record of the proceedings made by or on behalf of the court.

(4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence which is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty which might have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed.

(5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence upon a good indictment,

summons or charge upon which a valid judgment could be entered, and either convicted or acquitted, shall again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal offence of which he could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, save—

- (a) where a conviction and sentence of the General Division of the High Court or of a court subordinate to the High Court are set aside on appeal or review on the ground that evidence was admitted which should not have been admitted or that evidence was rejected which should have been admitted or on the ground of any other irregularity or defect in the procedure; or
- (b) otherwise upon the order of the High Court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.

(6) No person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence.

(7) Any court or other adjudicating authority prescribed by law for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be independent and impartial, and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person before such a court or other adjudicating authority, the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.

(8) Except in the case of a trial such as is referred to in subparagraph (12) of this paragraph or with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all proceedings of every court and proceedings for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation before any other adjudicating authority, including the announcement of the decision of the court or other authority, shall be held in public.

(9) Nothing in subparagraph (8) of this paragraph shall prevent—

- (a) the court or other adjudicating authority from excluding from the proceedings, except the announcement of the decision of the court or other authority, persons other than the parties thereto and their legal representatives to such extent as the court or other authority—
 - (i) may by law be empowered so to do and may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice, or in interlocutory proceedings, or in the interests of public morality, the welfare of persons under the age of twenty-one years or the protec-

tion of the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings; or

- (ii) may by law be empowered or required so to do in the interests of defence, public safety, public order or the economic interests of the State;

or

- (b) the court from excluding from proceedings preliminary to trial in respect of a criminal offence persons other than the accused person and his legal representative when so required by law, unless the accused person otherwise requests.

(10) Notwithstanding anything contained in subparagraph (3), (8) or (9) of this paragraph, if in any proceedings before a court or other adjudicating authority such as is referred to in subparagraph (1) or (7) of this paragraph, including any proceedings by virtue of section *eighty-four A*, a certificate in writing is produced to the court or other authority signed by a Minister that it would not be in the public interest for any matter to be publicly disclosed, the court or other authority shall make arrangements for evidence relating to that matter to be heard *in camera* and shall take such other action as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the disclosure of that matter.

(11) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of—

- (a) subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular facts; or
- (b) subparagraph (e) of the said subparagraph (2) to the extent that the law in question imposes conditions which must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their expenses out of public funds; or
- (c) subparagraph (5) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question authorizes a court to try a member of a disciplined force for a criminal offence, notwithstanding any trial and conviction or acquittal of that member under the appropriate disciplinary law, so, however, that any court so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that disciplinary law.

(12) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention, the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence under the law regulating the discipline of persons held in such detention, save that the case of such person shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time, and the person or authority conducting the trial shall be regarded as a court for the purposes of this paragraph.

(13) For the purposes of this paragraph, a tribal court shall not be regarded as not being an independent and impartial court by reason of—

- (a) the fact that a member of the court has an interest in the proceedings because of his position in the tribal society; or
- (b) the traditional or customary tribal practices and procedures.

(14) In this paragraph, the expression "legal representative" means a person entitled to practise in Rhodesia as an advocate or, except in relation to proceedings before a court in which an attorney has no right of audience, as an attorney.

8. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, that is to say, freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, whether alone or in community with others, and whether in public or in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief through worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Protection
of freedom
of
conscience.

(2) Except with his own consent or, if he is a minor, the consent of his guardian, no person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from making provision for the giving, by persons lawfully in Rhodesia, of religious instruction to persons of that community or denomination in the course of any education provided by that community or denomination.

(4) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—

- (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
- (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons, including the right to observe and practise any religion or belief without the unsolicited intervention of persons professing any other religion or belief.

(5) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

Protection
of freedom
of
expression.

9. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference and freedom from interference with his correspondence.

(2) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision—

- (a) which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—
 - (i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or public health; or
 - (ii) for the purpose of—
 - A. protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings; or
 - B. preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence; or
 - C. maintaining the authority and independence of the courts, tribunals, the Senate or the House of Assembly; or
 - D. regulating the technical administration, technical operation or general efficiency of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcast-

ing or television or creating or regulating any monopoly in these fields;

or

- (iii) in the case of correspondence, for the purpose of preventing the unlawful dispatch therewith of other matter;

or

- (b) which imposes restrictions upon public officers which are reasonably justifiable in the public interest.

(3) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that—

- (a) the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party; or, as the case may be
- (b) the restrictions imposed by the law in question upon public officers are reasonably justifiable in the public interest;

without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

10. (1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.

Protection
of freedom
of assembly
and
association.

(2) Nothing contained in, and nothing done under the authority of, any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision—

- (a) which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society—
 - (i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
 - (ii) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons;

or

- (b) which imposes restrictions upon public officers which are reasonably justifiable in the public interest.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision in relation to companies, partnerships, societies or other associations of persons, other than trade unions, employers' organizations or political parties, for—

- (a) the registration thereof, the procedure for registration and the qualifications for registration and authorizing refusal of registration on the grounds that the prescribed qualifications are not fulfilled; and
- (b) prohibiting or restricting the performance of any function or the carrying on of any business by any such association which is not registered.

(4) If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph and the court decides as a result of hearing the parties that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that—

- (a) the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph as are relied upon by the other party; or, as the case may be
- (b) the restrictions imposed by the law in question on public officers are reasonably justifiable in the public interest;

without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule *nisi* calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

Protection
from dis-
crimination.

11. (1) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph—

- (a) no written law shall contain any provision that is discriminatory;
- (b) no person acting by virtue of any written law in the capacity of a public officer or officer of any public authority shall perform any executive or administrative act in a discriminatory manner.

(2) For the purposes of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, a provision of a written law shall be regarded as discriminatory

and an executive or administrative act shall be regarded as having been performed in a discriminatory manner only if by or as an inevitable consequence of that provision or that act, as the case may be, persons of a particular description by race, tribe, colour or creed are prejudiced—

- (a) by being subjected to a condition, restriction or disability to which persons of another such description are not made subject; or
- (b) by the according to persons of another such description of a privilege or advantage which is not accorded to persons of the first-mentioned description;

and the imposition of that condition, restriction or disability or the according of that privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to the description by race, tribe, colour or creed of the persons concerned.

(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with the provisions of subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question relates to any of the following matters, that is to say—

- (a) any matter such as is mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (i) of the definition of a Money Bill contained in subsection (1) of section *ninety-two*; or
- (b) adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law; or
- (c) the application in the case of Africans of a particular race or tribe indigenous to Rhodesia of their customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons; or
- (d) persons who are not citizens of Rhodesia; or
- (e) a naval, military or air force, including liability to undergo naval, military or air force training; or
- (f) qualifications, not being qualifications specifically relating to race, tribe, colour or creed, for service as a public officer otherwise than in a naval, military or air force or for service with any public authority or any body corporate established directly by a written law.

(4) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to any law to the extent that it makes provision whereby persons of a particular description are subjected to any condition, restriction or disability or are accorded any privilege or advantage which, having regard to such of the

following matters as are relevant to the circumstances of the case, that is to say—

- (a) the nature of the condition, restriction, disability, privilege or advantage, as the case may be;
- (b) any special circumstances appertaining to persons of that or any other description;
- (c) the stage of social or economic development for the time being reached by the various descriptions of persons affected;
- (d) the state for the time being of the economy of Rhodesia;

is reasonably justifiable either in the interests of Rhodesia as a whole or in order to secure the protection, in an equitable manner as between the various descriptions of persons affected, of their respective interests:

Provided that this subparagraph shall not apply to the extent that the law in question results in the laws with respect to the matter in question affording greater difference of treatment of different descriptions of persons than immediately before the date of the making of the law in question.

(5) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to—

- (a) anything that is expressly or by necessary implication authorized to be done by any provision of a law that is referred to in subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph; or
- (b) anything that is done under the authority of any other law in such circumstances that if the doing of that thing in those circumstances had been expressly or by necessary implication authorized by that law the provisions of subparagraph (4) of this paragraph would have applied thereto; or
- (c) the exercise of any discretion relating to the institution, conduct or discontinuance of civil or criminal proceedings in any court vested in any person by or under this Constitution or any other law.

(6) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may be subjected to any restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by paragraphs 6, 8, 9 and 10 of this Schedule, being such a restriction as

is authorized by subparagraph (2) of paragraph 6, subparagraph (4) of paragraph 8, subparagraph (2) of paragraph 9 or subparagraph (2) of paragraph 10, as the case may be, of this Schedule.

12. (1) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the following provisions of this Schedule, that is to say, paragraph 2, 5, 6, 7, other than subparagraph (4) thereof, 8, 9, 10 or 11 to the extent that the law in question makes provision with respect to the taking, during any period of public emergency, of action for the purpose of dealing with any situation arising during that period, and nothing done by any person under the authority of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the said provisions unless it is shown that the action taken exceeded anything which, having due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required for the purpose of dealing with the situation in question.

Savings for periods of public emergency.

(2) Where any person is lawfully detained by virtue of such a provision as is referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, his case shall be reviewed by a tribunal established in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (7) of paragraph 2 not later than three months after the commencement of the detention and thereafter at intervals of not more than nine months from the date on which his case was last reviewed by that tribunal.

(3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of the provisions of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph of the case of any person, the tribunal may make recommendations concerning the necessity or expedience of continuing the detention to the authority by whom it was ordered and that authority shall be obliged to act in accordance with any recommendation of that tribunal unless the President otherwise directs.

(4) Where the President has directed that the authority referred to in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph shall not act in accordance with any recommendation of the tribunal referred to in that subparagraph, that authority shall cause to be published in the *Gazette* a notice that the President has so directed.

13. (1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 11 of this Schedule to the extent that the law in question—

Other special savings.

- (a) is a law with respect to which the requirements of subsection (1) of section *seventy-eight* were applicable and were complied with; or

- (b) is a law (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as an existing law) that has had effect as part of the law of Rhodesia before the fixed date and has continued to have effect as part of the law of Rhodesia at all times since that date; or
 - (c) repeals and re-enacts an existing law without alteration; or
 - (d) alters an existing law and does not thereby render that law inconsistent with any provision of paragraphs 1 to 11 of this Schedule in a manner in which or to an extent to which it was not previously so inconsistent.
- (2) For the purposes of this paragraph the reference—
- (a) in subparagraph (d) of subparagraph (1) to altering an existing law includes references to repealing it and re-enacting it with modifications or making different provisions in lieu thereof, and to modifying it;
 - (b) in subparagraph (1) to a written law includes any instrument having the force of law;

and the reference to re-enacting an existing law shall be construed accordingly.

(3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force of Rhodesia, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule other than paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof.

(4) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force that is not a disciplined force of Rhodesia and who is present in Rhodesia in pursuance of arrangements made between the Government of Rhodesia and another Government or an international organization, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule.

(5) No measures taken in relation to a person who is a member of a disciplined force of a country with which Rhodesia is at war and no law, to the extent that it authorizes the taking of any such measures, shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Schedule.

Inter-
pretation
of
Declaration
of Rights.

14. In this Schedule, unless the context otherwise requires—

“African customary law” means the tribal law and custom of Africans, whether or not indigenous to Rhodesia;

"contravention", in relation to any requirement, includes a failure to comply with that requirement, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly;

"court" means any court of law in Rhodesia, including a tribal court but not including a court established under a disciplinary law;

"disciplinary law" means a law providing for the regulation of the discipline—

- (a) of any disciplined force; or
- (b) of persons in prison awaiting trial or serving prison sentences; or
- (c) of persons whose detention has been authorized in terms of a law;

"disciplined force" means—

- (a) a naval, military or air force; or
- (b) a police force; or
- (c) a prison service; or
- (d) any other body established for public purposes by a written law providing for the regulation of the discipline of that body and declared by that law to be a disciplined force for the purposes of this Schedule;

"fixed date" means the date of commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act, 1972;

"law" means—

- (a) any provision of an Act of the Legislature or of the former Federal Legislature and any statute included in the Revised Edition of the Statutes prepared under the authority of the Revised Edition of the Laws Act, 1962, which is in force in Rhodesia;
- (b) any provision of an instrument having the force of law made in terms of an Act or statute referred to in paragraph (a) of this definition;
- (c) any unwritten law in force in Rhodesia other than African customary law;

and "lawful" and "lawfully" shall be construed accordingly;

"member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who, under a written law relating to the discipline of that force, is subject to that discipline;

"Minister" means a Minister of the Government appointed in terms of section *fifty-five*;

"parental discipline" includes school or other quasi-parental discipline;

"period of public emergency" means—

- (a) any period during which Rhodesia is engaged in any war and the period immediately following thereon until such date as may be declared by the President by proclamation as the end of the period of public emergency caused by that war; or
- (b) any period during which there is in force a declaration under section *sixty-one* declaring that a state of public emergency exists;

"tribal court" means a tribal court or tribal appeal court constituted by or under a written law.

APPENDIX IV

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

1. The Commission will carry out an examination of all aspects of the question of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. The Commission will review all existing laws (including subsidiary legislation and the administrative practices thereunder) to determine which such provisions or practices are, in its opinion, discriminatory. The Commission may receive evidence from any relevant source and the Government of Rhodesia will ensure that its officials will co-operate fully with the Commission in this respect.

2. The Commission will make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards the ending of any racial discrimination and its Report will be published.

3. The Commission is required to give special attention to the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. The Commission shall consider *inter alia*—

- (a) the question of removing any restrictions on the entry into European Areas of Africans wishing to attend multi-racial places of education or to be admitted to multi-racial hospitals, and any other restrictions on occupation;
- (b) the question of removing any restrictions on the right of an African member of the professions to practise in an European area;
- (c) in the light of the national interest, the question of the equitable allocation of land in relation to the needs of the respective sections of the population; and
- (d) the possible creation of an independent and permanent multi-racial land board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved.

17 17/10/71
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON, W8. 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091



13/0
שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

SHORT NOTE OF TALK BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH
AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN - 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.1

1st. December, 1971

Present: Prime Minister Edward Heath
Foreign Minister Abba Eban
Ambassador Michael Comay
Ambassador Arthur Lourie
Private Secretary to P.M. Heath

The Sar began by giving a brief outline of the present situation as it related to Egypt. Regarding the possibility of renewed fighting and the ultimative statements of President Sadat, the Sar said that we did not think war was inevitable. There was nothing on the ground to support the belief of an immediate assault. At the same time there was a school in Egypt which believes that they could not get political movement unless there is an atmosphere of imminent military crisis. While we doubted if Sadat would in fact gain political momentum from opening fire, it was a possibility which we had to take into account. The Soviets were not, despite reports to the contrary, showing restraint in arms deliveries to Egypt and in the course of the October meeting in Moscow had committed themselves to large deliveries which would begin to materialise in the coming months.

The Sar also emphasised the need for initiating a negotiating process as a substantive and not a procedural matter.

Mr. Heath, who in general listened without himself entering into any detailed response to the points made by the Sar, remarked at one point that the world was becoming more and more mystified that there was no settlement. For his part he had always felt that time was not on our side. He asked what it was that stopped Israel from withdrawing to defensive boundaries. The Sar explained the considerations which impelled us to insist that the cease fire lines be maintained as the only legal and secure ~~boundary~~ ^{line} until an actual peace settlement. He added that Egyptian entry into the Sinai meant, in present circumstances, also Soviet entry into the Sinai. He could not imagine that that was in anybody's interest.

In a reference to American support for Israel, Mr. Heath asked what did the Americans get in return. The Sar said that the credibility of the U.S. role in the world balance of power was at stake here. That the American Congress felt that there was a supervening American interest was shown by the overwhelming support given to allocations totalling \$800 million for aid to Israel in the last two years. The affirmative vote of 78 Senators could not be explained by there being 78 New Yorkers represented in the Senate.

Before concluding the conversation, which lasted about half-an-hour, the Sar spoke about the economic impact on Israel of British entry into the Common Market. The United Kingdom's exports to Israel were running at a rate of £100 million per year. There was a mutual interest in assuring that Israel would not be prejudiced by British entry and there was need for U.K. understanding and help in this connection.

A. L.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

מס' 320

בשלה: 101900 דצמבר 71

אל: המשרד

מאת: ביר יורק

מאום ב. העתק לונדון.

להלן הנאום הנרימי במליאה 10.12.71

F

1. IN MY STATEMENT DURING THE DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST LAST YEAR, I SET OUT MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON ALL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT. SINCE THAT TIME, THE SITUATION IN THE AREA HAS NOT CHANGED. NOR HAVE THE VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ALL ITS PARTS AND PROVISIONS.
2. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE BELIEF THAT RESOLUTION 242 SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM IS SHARED BY VIRTUALLY ALL THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANISATION. CERTAINLY IT IS SHARED BY THE MAIN PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. EQUALLY CERTAINLY IT IS SHARED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS, A BODY WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WE STILL BELIEVE COULD MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE QUEST FOR A SETTLEMENT. WHAT THEN IS THE PRESENT DISAGREEMENT ABOUT?
3. THE PRESENT DISAGREEMENT IS, OF COURSE, ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS AGREED END. THAT IS TO SAY, IT IS ESSENTIALLY A PROBLEM OF MEANS RATHER THAN OF ENDS. I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO CONCENTRATE ON MEANS RATHER THAN ENDS IN WHAT I HAVE TO SAY TODAY.
4. OVER THE PAST YEAR, THERE HAVE BEEN THREE MAIN ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. FIRST, THE CONTINUED, AND CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR JARRING SECONDLY, THE INITIATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES, DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL; AND THIRDLY THE MISSION UNDERTAKEN RECENTLY BY THE OAU. ALL THESE EFFORTS HAVE HAD AS THEIR ULTIMATE END THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242. ALL, THEREFORE, HAVE HAD, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, THE WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT OF MY GOVERNMENT.
5. SINCE THE IMMEDIATE AIMS OF THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE ARE MORE LIMITED THAN THOSE OF THE OAU MISSION OR OF AMBASSADOR JARRING'S, IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER IT FIRST. AS MY GOVERNMENT HAS SEEN IT - AND THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964

TATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL DOUBTLESS CORRECT ME IF I AM WRONG - THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE WAS, AND IS, TO ACHIEVE, AS A STEP TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242, AGREEMENT ON AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND A MEASURE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE FOLLOWED THE PROGRESS OF THIS INITIATIVE WITH INTEREST. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT, INDEED COULD NOT, BE MORE THAN TEMPORARY OR INTERIM. NOR WOULD IT BE AN END IN ITSELF. BUT, IF SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BRING ABOUT A CERTAIN DECONFRONTATION WHICH, HOPEFULLY, WOULD TRANSFORM THE ATMOSPHERE AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. IF THOSE CONCERNED CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PERSIST IN THIS QUEST, WE SHALL NATURALLY CONTINUE TO HOPE FOR ITS SUCCESS.

6. WE HAVE ALSO FOLLOWED WITH CLOSE INTEREST THE MISSION OF THE FOUR AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE. AS THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF SENEGAL REMINDED US IN HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THIS ASSEMBLY A FEW DAYS AGO, THE MISSION WAS INTENDED SOLELY "TO GET THE JARRING MISSION OUT OF THE IMPASSE IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF" AND TO ACHIEVE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. THIS WAS CLEARLY AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE INITIATIVE. WE WELCOME THE MISSION'S REPORT AND VERY MUCH HOPE THAT A MEANS WILL BE FOUND TO PUT IT TO CONSTRUCTIVE USE.

7. AS FAR AS AMBASSADOR JARRING'S MISSION IS CONCERNED, THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST YEAR WAS UNDOUBTEDLY HIS INITIATIVE OF 8 FEBRUARY. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED AMBASSADOR JARRING IN HIS MISSION AND WE WELCOMED THE AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH HE ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UAR, NOW EGYPT, AND ISRAEL ON THAT DATE, SEEKING CERTAIN PARALLEL COMMITMENTS TO BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND RECIPROCALLY AND SUBJECT TO THE EVENTUAL SATISFACTORY DETERMINATION OF ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. ON THE ONE HAND, AMBASSADOR JARRING SOUGHT FROM ISRAEL A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM OCCUPIED EGYPTIAN TERRITORY TO THE FORMER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE BRITISH MANDATED TERRITORY OF PALESTINE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SOUGHT FROM EGYPT A COMMITMENT TO ENTER INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND TO MAKE EXPLICITLY TO ISRAEL, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, VARIOUS UNDERTAKINGS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM PARAGRAPH 1 (II) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

8. MY DELEGATION WELCOMED THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE RESPONSE WHICH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT MADE TO AMBASSADOR JARRING.

AIDE - MEMOIRE ON 15 FEBRUARY. IN THEIR REPLY, THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS REQUESTED OF THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER COMMITMENTS ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IF ISRAEL WOULD GIVE, FOR HER PART, COMMITMENTS COVERING HER OWN OBLIGATIONS UNDER RESOLUTION 242, INCLUDING COMMITMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER ARMED FORCES FROM SINAI AND THE GAZA STRIP AND FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

9. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAVE NOT YET REPLIED DIRECTLY TO AMBASSADOR JARRING'S AIDE MEMOIRE. WE STILL HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO SO. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE THEY ARE UNWILLING AT THIS STAGE TO GIVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THE BASIC QUESTION WHICH AMBASSADOR JARRING PUT TO THEM, THEIR CONCERN IS NOT WITH TERRITORY BUT WITH SECURITY. IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER THIS SESSION, MR. EBAN SAID THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE A POLICY FOR EXPANSION OR ANNEXATION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON BOUNDARIES AND WITHDRAWALS SHE WOULD SEEK ONLY THOSE MODIFICATIONS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE HER SECURITY AND TO PREVENT ANOTHER WAR.

10. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF MR. EBAN WERE ABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING TO SAY THAT ISRAEL HAS NO DESIRE TO INCORPORATE ANY EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGN TERRITORY INTO THE STATE OF ISRAEL THIS MIGHT CONSTITUTE THE RESPONSE WHICH AMBASSADOR JARRING NEEDS IN ORDER TO RESUME THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I NOTE THAT A SIMILAR IDEA WAS SUGGESTED EARLIER IN THIS DEBATE BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF SENEGAL.

11. WE BELIEVE THAT DIALOGUE MUST SUPPLANT CONFRONTATION. ONCE AMBASSADOR JARRING'S MISSION IS RESUMED AS MY FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THIS ASSEMBLY ON 29 SEPTEMBER, UNLESS A MECHANISM OF DIALOGUE CAN BE ESTABLISHED, SOONER OR LATER - AND MAY BE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THE FIGHTING WILL START AGAIN. AND AND, AS SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-JONE WENT ON TO SAY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TEMPO OF THIS DIALOGUE MUST BE QUICKER THAN IT HAS BEEN UNTIL NOW, AND THAT IT MUST BE AT CLOSER RANGE. WE WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT, AT AN EARLY STAGE AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF AMBASSADOR JARRING'S MISSION, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE SOME CLOSE FORM OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMBASSADOR

JARRING, TO AGREE ON THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT. A SIMILAR
PROCEDURE MIGHT THEN BE FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER
PARTIES CONCERNED.

I HAVE, AS I SAID I WOULD, CONCENTRATED ON MEANS RATHER
THAN ENDS IN WHAT I HAVE SAID. ENDS AND MEANS ARE, HOWEVER,
INTIMATELY RELATED AND IT IS MY BELIEF THAT, AS IS SO OFTEN

THE CASE, WE SHALL FIND THE KEY TO THE ENDS BY TACKLING FIRST
QUESTIONS OF MEANS. BUT IN ANY CASE LET ME MAKE CLEAR THAT
MY GOVERNMENT ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO SEE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
AND THAT WE ARE READY TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO HELP BRING
ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

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שהח דוהם סנכל אלון דיין סנכל אירופה ב סצפא סאום א+ ב סעת הסנרה מזתים
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TO AGREE ON THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT. A SIMILAR
PROCEDURE MIGHT THEN BE FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER
AS CONCERNED.

AS I SAID I WOULD, CONCENTRATED ON MEANS RATHER
ENDS IN WHAT I HAVE SAID. ENDS AND MEANS ARE, HOWEVER,
INSEPARABLY RELATED AND IT IS MY BELIEF THAT AS IS SO OFTEN

THE CASE, WE SHALL FIND THE KEY TO THE ENDS BY TACKLING FIRST
QUESTIONS OF MEANS. BUT IN ANY CASE LET ME MAKE CLEAR THAT
MY GOVERNMENT ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO SEE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
AND WE ARE READY TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO HELP BRING
ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

TO AGREE ON THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT. A SIMILAR
PROCEDURE MIGHT THEN BE FOLLOWED IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER
AS CONCERNED.

B/ M.C.S. WESTON (UNITED KINGDOM) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD VOTED ON THE RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/L.228/REV.1, DESPITE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/L.229.

HIS DELEGATION HAD ALSO VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/L.230, DESPITE SOME RESERVATIONS. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ABSTAINED ON THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/231, BECAUSE OF THE VAGUENESS AND IMPRECISION OF THE CONCEPTS INVOLVED.

CARLO CALENDIA (ITALY) SAID HIS DELEGATION BELIEVED THAT THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED ON THE BASIS OF HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE STATES CONCERNED, INCLUDING ISRAEL. HIS DELEGATION COULD NOT SUPPORT THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/L.231, BECAUSE IT ATTEMPTED TO BOIL THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM DOWN TO ONE OF "SELF-DETERMINATION".

HIS DELEGATION HAD NO EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT ACTIONS BY ISRAEL CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 49 AND 53 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AS ALLEGED IN THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/SPC/L. 230.

ישראל והשוק

נחקיימו שיחות נפרדות עם השר ריפון ועם קרשאו, שר מדינה במשחה 2 בנושא השוק. בשיחתו השניה עם סיר אלק העיר שה"ח שכבר כעת מן הראוי לדון בבעיות של ישראל לקראת כניסת בריטניה לשוק, מה עוד שכרוכים בהן מאה מיליון ליש"ט של יצוא בריטי לישראל מדי שנה. סיר אלק הסכים לקיום דיונים אלה.

הסכסוך המז"תי

א. הסדרים ומו"מ

סיר אלק: ברור כי לא יתכן פתרון כפוי. המצרים רוצים בשלום אך לא יוכלו לנהל מו"מ ישיר. אין הם מתנגדים ל"התקרבות" בשיחות בחסות צד שלישי. פאוזי, שהוא ללא ספק המתון ביותר בהשקפותיו, שואל עצמו אם ישראל תפסה ההבדל העקרוני בין משטר נאצר לבין המשטר הנוכחי הרוצה בשלום.

ב. גבולות

שה"ח בריטניה: שאל איזה סיכון אנו רואים בנוסחא שניסוג לגבול 1967 עם תיקונים עליהם יוטכס במו"מ. "ממילא במקרה של שלום מוחלט תיסוגו מ-98% של סיני, פרט לשארם א-שייך שלגביו צורך בהסדר מיוחד". נוסחא כזו תוכל להוידו הענינים. יתכן מצב בו יקימו הארבע כוח, או יוענקו ערבויות, או תהיה נוכחות סמלית ישראלית בשארם, מצב שלא ישונה אלא בהחלטה פה אחד של מועבי"ט. בקהיר הודגש בפניו כי הם מעונינים בהסדר חלקי אך מדאיגה אותם שאלת הקשר להסדר כולל.

שה"ח: אם נגדיר הגבול הסופי, הרי במילא לא תהיה צורך במו"מ על הסדר חלקי. השאלה העיקרית היא האם סאדאת לא טרף הדלת על מגעים נוספים. שני המכשולים להסדר חלקי הם דרישת מצרים לויתורים גדולים מדי מאתנו קודם מו"מ ושאלת חציית הכוחות. אפילו תימצא הנוסחה של הקשר בין הסדר החלקי והמלא לא קובעות המלים אלא העובדות בשטח. תמורת החלשה ניכרת זו של מעמדנו, חייב הפצוי להיות מניעת העברת כוחות מצריים והפסקת אש בלתי מותנית. המצרים קבלו בזמנו את רעיון פירוז סיני, ונטישת רעיון זה מצדם מוסיפה עתה להקשות עמדתנו על פנוי. שליטה רצופה של ישראל בשארם חיונית ונוכחותנו שם חשובה לנו יותר ממסמך שלום חסר חשיבות. החזרת כוחות מיתר חלקי סיני היא במידה רבה פונקציה של נכונות מצרים לפרזו. לא נוכל לקבל שיבת צבא מצרים או נוכחות צבאית סובייטית בסיני.

ג. יארינג

סיר אלק: שאל לדעתנו על מהלך שבו יזמין או-תאנט הצדדים להודיע שהם מוכנים לחזור לשיחות, למשל על בסיס חכניה רוג'רס מיוני 1970. הוסיף ושאל אם נוכל לענות למסמך ה-8.2 בצורה קונסטרוקטיבית יותר.

שה"ח: השיב כי אינו רואה כל רע בחשובתנו. יארינג עצמו אשם בקפאון. לשאלת סיר אלק אם על בסיס הדווח האפריקני נהיה מוכנים לחדוש שיחות יארינג, ענה שה"ח בחיוב חוץ ציון שאין פירושו של דבר כי אנו מקבלים הנוטחאות שבמסמך האפריקאי.

את בעיותיה של בריטניה בויכוח המז"ת באו"ם סיכם סר אלק בכך שיש לבריטים אינטרס רציני בעולם הערבי, ועליהם להיזהר בהצבעותיהם. לעיתים עדיפה בעיניהם הימנעות מול הצבעה נגדית, אך הם תמימי דעים שאין לשחק עם נוסחת 242.

הקהילה האירופאית

שה"ח : חברות הקהילה אינן צרפצות להכנס לפרטי ההסדר, ובמילא אין קונצנטוס בין שש חברות הקהילה. שומאן גורס הסדר כפוי, ושאר החברות דוגלות בצורך במו"מ. אנו מציעים לכם כי חברות הקהילה לא ידונו בפרטי ההסדר במז"ת, אשר הם חייבים להיות שמורים למגע בין הצדדים. קיימת דאגה בישראל פן עמדת צרפת תהפך לעמדת הקהילה לרבות בריטניה.

סר אלק : בודאי ~~לכך~~ השש בענין המסמך, ויש לצפות לכך שינהגו עתה בזהירות. אך בסיסית קיים רצון לחפש דרכים לעזור במציאת פתרון במז"ת. אין בריטניה מתכוונת לשנות מדיניותה בכוון של צרפת. אין איש צריך לחשוש פן הבריטים מחכוננים להצטרף לקנוניה נגדנו.

הועדה לבטחון אירופה ודילול כוחות מזוינים

סר אלק : מסר על צפייתם לחתימה קרובה על הסכם ברלין, שבעקבותיו יאושר הסכמי רפ"ג-בריה"מ ופולין. לאחר מכן תתחלנה ההכנות לעריכת הועידה לבטחון אירופה. הועידה צפויה להתקיים עוד ב-1972. אחת הנקודות שנזכרה לסדר היום היא חנוכה חפשיה של אנשים ורעיונות מעבר לגבול. לשאלה שה"ח אם המז"ת יידון, ענה סר אלק שהנחתו כי הועידה תעסוק בכל השאלות הנוגעות ישירות לאירופה. כאשר לדלול כוחות מזוינים, לאחרונה מנסים הסובייטים לשוות לעצמם הדמית של רודפי שלום, וכמעונינים בדיון על צמצום החמוש. אינם מסתירים את הקשיים שלהם עקב משאביהם הכלכליים המוגבלים.

יהודי ערב

שה"ח : סקר את מצב יהודי ערב. סר אלק ענה כי הסורים מראים ענין בחידוש היחסים עם בריטניה. אינו יושע אם חדוש היחסים יהיה בעל השפעה על הקלה מצוקתם של יהודי סוריה, אך עדיף מצב של יחסים על היעדרם.

השבויים במצרים

שה"ח : העלה ענין השבויים, מסר שאנו מוכנים לחלופים בכל עת ואפילו לשחרור מוקדם מצדנו בכדי להקל על המצרים. במיוחד מכאיבה בעייתו של רס"ן אייל.

סר אלק : פנה שוב למצרים, אחרי ביקורו בקהיר בו העלה את העניין. אולם אין משיבים לו. יפנה פעם נוספת ויכתוב לריאד.

תת-מזכיר מדינה בריטי העלה שאלה אשור האמנה למניעת הפליה גזעית ע"י ישראל, אשר תקל על דרישות ישראל לגבי מצב היהודים בארצות ערב ופעולותיה בפורומים בינלאומיים שונים.

שה"ח : ציין שלדעת ישראל אין האמנה די חקיפה.

יהודי בריה"מ

שה"ת : העלה עניין יהודי בריה"מ, וציין יעילוהו של לחץ בינלאומי.
בר אלק: הביע סיפוקו מהשיפורים אף אם אין מספיק בכך, והחעניין לדעת אם יש
רדיפה פיזית של יהודים בבריה"מ.

B

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ו ד י

אל : המשרד

מאת : לונדון

פס. 7

בפלה: 011800 דצמ. 71

מ י י ד י

מנכ"ל, אירופה ב. ביניץ וויטנשטיין (הולנד)
שיחות שהייח - סר אלק.
נכחו:

לוריא, קומיי, ששונ, רופין, בנצור, ערנ.
מצד: גרינהיל, בארנס, פארסונס, אבנס, לייבר, שיי, ליהי (מח חדשות).
סר אלק פתח באומרו שאינם מוותרים על התקנה לפחדון. ברור שלא יתכן
פתרון כפוי.

המציאות רוצה בשלום והם מצפים לשמוע מאתנו על עמדתנו.
בקדיר נאמר לו שלא יוכלו לנהל מו"מ ישיר אכ אינם מתנגדים
לשיחות בכתב. השיחות בחסות צד שלישי.
דבר שני שעלה בשיחות בקדיר הוא דאגת מצרים מהסדר החלקי
לפתרון הכולל.

שהייח הגדיר הנושאים שירצה להעלות:
המסקנה האש, מצב השיחות ביחס להסדר החלקי, הקשר לשיחות יארינג,
תמגעים עם הנשיאים האפריקאים, דיוני העצרת והבעיות הפוליטיות הכרוכות
בקהיליית האירופאית.

התבטאויותיו של סאדאט יכולות לעורר מצד אחד רושם כאילו מצרים נחושה
בהחלטה לחוש האש אכ מאידכ יש גם פירוש שזוהי בעיקר פעולה כדי
TO GALVANIZE את המעצמות לפעולה פוליטית ולחצים עלינו.
יש אולי לאחרונה נסיגת מה מדיבורי המלחמה.

הערכתו היא שהמלחמה אפשרית אכ אינה בלתי גמנעת.
באשר למדיניות הסובייטית איננו רואים כל דיסון באספקה הצבאית
למצרים. התוצאה העיקרית של שיחות מוסקבה היא הסכמ בדבר אספקה מסיבית
אשר תמלא ביטוי כנראה בחודשים הבאים ואספקת ה-
TU-16 הינו רק חלק מקדים שלה.

PLATE 11

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PLATE 11

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

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ביהמ אינה יכולה להפסיק האספקה שכן זהו בסיס לנוכחותה במצרים.
דור לנו כי הסובייטים מנסים למנוע המצרים ממלחמה כוללת אך ידיעותינו
אינן מלאות ומדויקות על עמדה בריחיים בדבר פעילות צבאית מוגבלת.
עמדתם בנדון נראית לנו כדו-משמעית.
אנו שומרים על קור רוחנו אולם בקהיר נשמעים קולות הקוראים לפעולה
צבאית ולו מוגבלת.
סר אלק אמר כי כשהיה בקהיר עמד סאדאת על זה ששנת 1971 היא אכן שנה
מכרעת אולם הוא התייחס לזה בהסתייגות.
מאידך הוא חושש שאם סאדאת לא יוכל לגלות התקדמות במויים הדי חוגים
קיצוניים יטלו תסן לידיהם. הרושם שלו שמוראל הצבא המצרי ירוד ומשום
כך אולי צפויה פעילות מצרים שתעמיד את סאדאת במצב קשה.
פארוזי שהוא ללא ספק המתון ביותר בהשקפותיו הדגיש הנקודות האלה והוסיף
כי הוא שואל את עצמו אם אנחנו תפשו והבדל העקרוני בין משטר נאצר
והמשטר הנוכחי הרוצה בכנות בשלום.
שוזיח ושיב כי מה שקרה מאז פברואר אינו מעודד לחשוב שאכן חל שינוי
מהותי. מצרים רוצה בשלום המבוסס על תנאיה היא והשלום עליו היא מדברת
אינו שלום הכולל יחסים דיפלומטיים וכלכליים ומעבר חופשי בין הגבולות.
סאדאת חושב על שלום בין שתי מדינות האטומות זו לזו. הערכתנו היא
שכוונתם להחזיקנו במצב שבו נהיה פגיעים מבלי לחסל הסכסוך.
איננו רואים שום רצון מצדם להכניס שינוי בהשקפתם לגבי תהליך המגע.
קודם המצרים רוצים להחזירנו למצב 1967 ולאחר מכן להפעיל לחץ נוסף
עלינו. רק על-ידי מויים אפשר יהיה להתגבר על חוסר האמון השורר
בין שני הצדדים.
סר אלק אמר שמסכים עמנו משאלת המויים וכי ציטוט חליפת המכתבים באמצעות
יארנג הינה מגוחכת.
בקהיר הדגישו בפניו כי הם מעוניינים בהסדר החלקי אך מדאיגה אותם
שאלת הקשר להסדר הכולל.
מבקש לדעת מה הסיכוי שאנו רואים בנוסחה שבה נאמר כי אנו ניסוג לגבול
ADJUSTMENTS שעליהם יוסכם במויים.
67 עמ
ממילא במקרה של שלום מוחלט תיסוג מ-98 אחוז
של סיני פרט לשארם-א-שייכ שלגביה יהיה צורך בהסדר מיוחד.
נוסחה כזו תוכל להזיז העניינים.
שתייח ענה כי אם נגדיר הגבול הסופי הדי ממילא לא יהיה צורך במויים
להסדר חלקי.

משרד החוץ

3 מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

העיון העיקרי במסדר החלקי הוא שתהיה נסיגה חלקית ופתיחת התעלה ללא
פגיעה בעמדות היסוד. כאשר גגיע להסכם על קו הגבול הסופי נסוג
אליו.
אנו ממשיכים בארצות שהמסדר החלקי הוא צעד לקראת מו"מ בחסות יארינג
לפי המנדט שלו בהחלטה 242.
מד אלק חזר ואמר שאם כי אין צורך לתחום הגבולות הרי עלינו לומר כי
נסיגה לגבול 67 נדון על שני ימים במסגרת המו"מ.
שהיה ענה שיש שתי בעיות עיקריות ולא רק אחת לגבי סיני:
א. שארם-א שייכ. הנסיון בעבר הופך אותנו לסקפטים מאד לגבי כוח
אויים שבמילא קשה להקימו בהיבט הנוכחי של מועכייט.
שליטה רצופה של ישראל בשארם היונית כדי להגן על השייט הישראלי החופשי
והיא חשובה לנו יותר מכל התחייבות משפטית ואחרת.
אנפיקת הנפט וצנור הנפט, יחסים עם אפריקה ואסיה ופיתוח הנגב תלויים
בשייט חופשי ואילו למצרים שארם מהווה רק עניין של פרסטיז'ה.
מדע שצה"ל עוזב את שארם יוצא מצב הטומן בחובו רביעי והפיתוי
לכך גדול מדי.
ב. נסיגתנו בשאר חלקי סיני היא במידה רבה פונקציה של נכונות מצרית
לפרזו. אין אנו רוצים ברוב סיני אולם לא נוכל לקבל שיבת צבא מצרים
ונוכחות צבאית סובייטית בסיני.
אילו תימצא הנוסחה של הקשר בין המסדר החלקי והמלא לא המלימ סובעות
אלא העובדות בשטח. מבחינה צבאית אנו נושעים קו הגנה מוצק ובנוסף אנו
מוותרים על עקרון מדיניותנו שקבלנו הכרה בו שאין נסיגה ללא
שלום.
תזורת החלשה ניכרת זו של מעמדנו הפצוי צריך להיות מניעת העברת כוחות
מצריים מעבר לתעלה והפסקת אש בלתי מוחנית.
מד אלק אמר כי בזמן בקורו בקהיר נאמר לו שאם הנוסחה תהיה מתאימה
המצרים לא יחצו בהכרח את התעלה.
פארסונס העיר כי דברי המצרים בנדון לא היו ברורים.
שהיה השיב כי בהיות כל שרי החוץ הנוגעים בדם בניו-יורק היה סכוי
לחסיפ בכמה מגעים.
ושאלה העיקריות היא האם סאדאת לא מרק הדלת ושאלה זו נוכל לבד
לדושינגטון. קיימים שני משגולים והם:
חדשת מצרים לויתורים גדולים מדי מאתנו קודם מו"מ ושאלת חציית

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

הכוחות שהיח ציינ שחצו מ קבלו קודם את רעיון פירוק סיבוי ונטישת
רעיון כעת על יח מוסיפה הקשחת עמדתו על פינוי

סד אלק חזר לענין שארם באשרו שיתכן מצב בו יקמו הארבע

כוח או שהאירופאים יעבירו ערכויות או שתהיה נוכחות סמלית שלהם
מצב שלא ישונה אולי בהחלטה זה אחד של מועבייט

שהיח ענה כי ספק אם מעצמה כלשהי תסכים להחזיק כוחות נגד רצון
מצרים ולהילחם על חופש תנועת של ישראל

הדגשה בישראל שאם הסדרה היא נוכחות משארם או הסכם שלום מוטב
שנישאר משארם עבודתו תשונה הנוכחות שמ יותר ממסמך שלום הסר

הנכחות שהיח הדגיש כי אפי רוצים בסדרים מנשיים והשארם שאלת
הבסיס היורדי לכך פתוחה

סד אלק שאל לדעתו על מהלך זה יזמין או - תאגט את הצדדים להודיע
שהם מוכנים לחזור לשיתוף יורנג למשל על בסיס תכנית רוגרס מיוני 70
שהיח השיב כי יארינג עצמו ישמ בקפאונ שנוצר בקדשו את הנייר מתשמיני
בפברואר במקום להחזיק בשיתוף שתגשרנה על פני הפער שבעמדות שני הצדדים
כפי שבאו לביטוי בתשובותיהם למסמכו

יארינג חייב היה לדאוג למסמך ה-8.2 רק אפילו זה חולפת

סד אלק שאל אם נוכל לענות למסמך ה-8.2 בצורה קונסטרוקטיבית ביותר
ושהיח ענה כי אינו רואה כל דע בתשובתנו

ואמת היא שגם המצרים לא קיבלו את מסמך יארינג כלשונו אלא הגישו הצעת
נגד כפי שעשינו אנו

שהיח ניתח התשובה המצרית והדגים לגבי סעיפיה השונים כיצד הצידע של
התשובות החיוביות הוכנסו לני כל סעיף והסתייגויות המצריות
הידועות כגון:

התייחסות לאמנת קונסטנטינופול בענין השיט בסואץ, התייחסות לגבי החוק

הבינלאומי בענין השיט בטיהאד ופירוז שווה משני צדי הגבול וקפלת

הגבול הבינלאומי למעט עזה ופירוזו חזרה ל-67

שהיח העלה פעולת הנשיאים האפריקאים ותאר את הדקע לביקורם בהוכיחו

את החלטות אחיא והחלטה שהביאה למינוי תת הועדה

סד אלק חזר לשאלת חידוש השיתוף עם מצרים

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שהח ענה בפרטו את תשובתנו למסמך האפריקאי והביע רשש כי מצרים בתשובתה למסמך זה תתעקש על הכללתו של מסמך יארינג מ-8.2 והחלטת אחי"א. שהי"ח מצפה כי הנשיאים האפריקאים ידווחו לאו-תאנט השבוע ויכללו בדיווח זה את התזכיר שהגישו לשני הצדדים ותשובותיהם.

סר אלק שאל אם על בסיס זה, של הדיווח האפריקאי, נהיה מוכנים לחידוש השיחות בחסות יארינג ושהי"ח ענה בחיוב אף כי צי"נ שאינ פירושו של דבר שאנו מקבלים הנוסחאות הכלולות במסמך האפריקאי.

שהי"ח הוסיף שכמוכ"נ אינו יכול להיות ערב לפעולת הנשיאים ואם אמנם יהיו דבקים במסמך. שהי"ח עוד לדיון בבעיית העצרת והדגיש הצורך למנוע קבלת החלטות קיצוניות שתזדקקנה על ידי סאדאת כמתן לגיטימציה לפעולה נגד ישראל. יש למנוע כל שינוי ב-242 וכן כל דרישה לסנקציות לא רק בגלל השליטה שבדבר אלא גם משום שיהרסו את אוירת המו"מ.

שהי"ח סבר שיש סיכוי טוב לגייס שליש חוסם נגד החלטות אלה הצביעו על תוצאות ההצבעה בעי"נ הזכויות הפלסטינאיות במיוחד אך צי"נ בצער שקולה של בריטניה לא נכלל בין המתנגדים.

גוש המתנגדים הינו מגוון וכולל ארז"ב, קנדה, מערב אירופאים וכן אוסטרליה, ניו זילנד וכמה מדינות דרום אמריקאיות ולכן אם תצטרף תימצא בריטניה בחברה טובה.

אלק ענה כי יש להם אינטרס רציני בעולם הערבי ועליהם להיזהר מהצבעותיהם. לעזי"מ עדיפה בעיניהם הימנעות מול הצבעה נגדית אך הם זמימי דעים שאינ ABOUT ACHTUNG עם החלטה 242.

בבוא העת יהיו מוכנים לשקול אם להימנע שוב או להצביע נגד.

סר אלק שוב חזר לשאלת הגבול הסופי ולנוסחה שתתקבל על ידי המצרים. שהי"ח אמר שהאמריקאים ימשיכו בשנה הבאה בחיפוש אחר פתרון חלקי. הם נשארים בדעה שאינ אפשרות לעבור מהמצב הנוכחי לפתרון כולל אלא שחייב להיות תהליך הדרגתי.

כמו כן פתרון חלקי מתרכז על החזית המצרית ומשאיר בצד את תסבוכות והסדרים עם סוריה ועם ירדן.

סר אלק אמר כי לדעתו יקפוצ המלכ על העגלה ברגע שיושג הסדר עם מצרים תוהח השיב שזו גם הרגשתנו שכן אינ לחוסי"נ המעצורים האידיאולוגיים כלמצרים.

אם כן עלינו לומר שיהיה צורך בשנתיים טריטוריאליים.

אם כן יהיה רוצה שתשנתיים יהיו על בסיס הדדי ובחשך זה נזכרת עזה.

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היה רגע בו חשש חוסיין שאנו הולכים לקדחת פלשתינאזיה של הבעיה אם
 איננו מדיניותנו ומדובר סגור על בחירות למספר ראשיות מקומיות.
 יחד עם כל האמור לעיל בדור שחוסיין אינו יכול ליטול היזמה להסדר שלום.
 סר אלק עבר לשאלת ירושלים ושהיה חייב כי אנו מוכנים לדון בהסדרים
 מיוחדים בשאלת המקומות הקדושים. ציין את התענינות הותיקאן מהדעיגו
 להעניק סטטוס דיפלומטי למקומות ואישים.
 השאלה היא כמובן הגדרת האפוסטרופות מבחינת הנצרות.
 אחר לאיסלם אם יוכרז על ירדן כאפוסטרופוס כי אז נקבל זאת.
 סר אלק העיר כי הבניה בירושלים מעוררת תסיסה בחוגים כנסייתיים
 באנגליה ושהיה חייב כי אינו לנו מדיניות הרוצה בשינוי אופיה ההטרוגני
 של העיר ובודאי שהעובדות אינן מצביעות על כך.
 סר אלק שאל אם ידועה לנו העמדה הסובייטית בענין ההסדר החלקי ושהיה חייב
 כי משלבים הראשונים תקפו הסובייטים ההסדר החלקי באמרם כי הוא
 מיועד לעקוף את שאלת הנסיגה המלאה מסיני ובהיותו יזמה אמריקאית
 בלעדית. לאחרונה מסר לנו רוג'רס כי גרומיקו שאל על ההסדר החלקי אם לא
 התייג מפעולת אהייב וכי בעתונות הסובייטית פסקו ההתקפות על הסדר
 זה. אנו מניחים כי הסובייטים תומכים בעמדת מצרים כשישראל
 הזמינה האמריקאים לפעול בענין זה אם איננו יודעים אם ודוסיים תומכים
 בהכרזות המצריות האחרונות.
 שהיה עבר לדון בשאלת הקהיליה האירופאית וציין כי יש שני אספקטים בה:
 א. כלכלי
 ב. פוליטי.
 שהיה ציין כי האירופאים התחילו ברגל שמאל בחברם את המיזכר על המזהיית
 בו נכנסו לפירוש מיוחד ומזיק.
 תאמכ חובר במישור הפקידותי וללא התייעצות עמנו ובינתיים ייתוקיי.
 חברות הקהיליה אינן צריכות להיכנס לפרטי ההסדר ובמילא אינן קונצנזוס בין
 שש חברות הקהיליה החלוקות ביניהן כששומאן הצרפתי גורס הסדר כפוי
 ואילו שאר החברות דוגלות בצורך במוינים בין הצדדים.
 אנו מציעים לכם שחברות הקהיליה תידונה בבעיות הקשורות לה עצמה ולא
 בפרטי ההסדר במזיית שהם חייבים להיות שמורים למגע בין הצדדים.
 סר אלק ענה כי בענין זה בודאי נכוון חשש באצבעותיהן ויש לצפות שינהגו
 עתה בחירות אם בסיסית קיים רצון לחפש דרכים ואמצעים לעזור ולסייע
 במציאת פתרון.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

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שהיה התייחס לכניסתה של סין לאו"ם ואמר שהתגובות להג זכינה מהם היו
בטוחות. סר אלק שאל אם שיחת דוהיים - נכסנו ודרכו בשאלת יחסי
דיהים אהייב ועל כך השיב שהיה בחיוב.
הוסיף כי תיכלל גם שאלת אספקת המטוסים.
ודגשתנו היא שאם במאי יתקיים דיון בנושא המזיית בין שתי המעצמות והן
שכבר עתה מתקיימים דיונים פנימיים מוקדמים ומן הדאוי שאהייב תשמע
מפורט ותוכ מגע אישי במישור גבוה על עמדותיה של ישראל.
סר אלק שאל אם ידועות לנו תכניותיה הצבאיות של דיהים ביהס
למצרים. ושהיה השיב כי צפויה אספקה גוברת בקרוב והצביע על אספקת
TU-16 ומציאותם של מטוסי מיג 23 על אדמת מצרים.
אין לנו כל סיבה להאמין שבריהים תקפץ אספקה זו.
אז היתה האטה של אספקה ביולי ספטמבר הרי זו רק הוכחה שהאספקה אינה
על בסיס חושי.
סר אלק שאל אם היה מגע קרבי באויר עם טייסים סובייטים ושהיה השיב
כי אכן היה מגע כזה לפני הפסקת האש באוגוסט 57 ונזכחנו לדעת כי
ביצועי הטייטים הסובייטים אינם עולים על אלו של המצרים והדבר גורע
בדאי מהעדר נסיון קרבי מאז מלחמת העולם השנייה ולדעתנו נטלו על עצמם
הסובייטים את כל ההגנה האוירית על שמי מצרים.
סר אלק חזר ושאל אם לדעתנו איננו מחמיצים הזדמנות לחשיג הסדר בתנאים
נוחים שכן זוהי הדגשתנו.
שהיה ענה כי הדרכ היחידה לסלק חששותינו שהמצרים אינם מציעים לנו סתם
וחזימה על RECEIPT אישור קבלת השטחים בלבד - היא לקיים מו"מ
עמנו.
סר אלק אמר שאכן הדגיש בפני סאדאת הצורך במו"מ, מוקדם ככל האפשר
ושאל אם הגיעונו שמועות על הסכם. בתחילת השנה הבאה, בין אהייב
ובדיהים על המזרח התיכון מעל ראשי הנוגעים בדבר.
שהיה ענה כי הדגשתנו היא שאכן יעלה הנושא בשיחות נכסנו במוסקבה.
בזמ השיחה חזר מר לוריא לבעית ירושלים וסיפר על שיחה עם פיו לאגי
בה הפריד האחרון בין בעית המקומות הקדושים לשלוש הדתות והיותה של
ירושלים עיר חילונית חיה ומתפתחת.
ציינ זאת כדי להדגים שאינ לערוב פרשיות של שמירת המקומות הקדושים
ואותו חלק העיר שבו מרוכזים אינטרסים אוניברסליים לבין החלק החילוני
שנמצא שצומח ומתפתח כיחידה אחת.
האגף הוסיף כי קיים מגעים בנושא זה עם הארכיבישוף מקנטרברי אשר

TO THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.
FROM THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a memorandum or official communication.]

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

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גילה הכנה לבעיה זו והביע דעה שאין לשוב למצב הקודם כשהעיר היתה תאיה.

סר אלק עודד המשכ מגעים אלו.

שיחה שניה שהיה - סר אלק.

שהיה ביקש להוסיף על דבריו אחמול בענין המזית ומסר כי נוסף על כך שהאפריקאים מתכוונים להגיש הדוח באו"ם יש סיכוי להתפתחות נוספת - היא היוזמה הדרום אמריקאית בה מדובר על חידוש שיחות יארינג ללא איזכור מזמכ יארינג מ-8/2.

זוהי הוכחה נוספת שמדינות רבות מעדיפות את המשכ השיחות על פני

אפיון חולפת של המסמך מ-8/2.

שהיה אמר שישיראל תגלה גמישות רק במו"ם.

איננו רוצים שום שנוי ב-242, מאידך היינו רוצים מו"ם קונקרטי שידיז העניינים.

שהיה עבר לנושא השוק וציין כי בבוקר נערכו שיחות בנושא זה ולכן

לא יחזור על הבעיות אכ מדגיש כי למרות שנותנה עוד שנה שלמה עד

לוצטרפות המעשית של בריטניה לקהיליה מנ הראוי לדון בבעיות אלו כבר

כעת מה עוד שכרוכים בה מאה מליון לשיט של יצוא בריטי לישראל משנה.

סר אלק ענה שמסכים לקיים דיונים אלה.

שהיה עבר לדון באפקט פוליטי וציין כי קיימת דאגה בישראל שעמדת צרפת תהפך לעמדת הקהיליה לזכות בריטניה.

במדיניותה המזתית של צרפת קיים חוסר איזון משוער ובעוד שלפני 67

היו היחסים הדוקים ונלהבים הרי שאחרי שנה זו התרחקה צרפת מישראל והחלה

מחזרת אחרי הערבים תוך חמיכה אפילו במדיניות בריהים.

עמדות מאוזנות יותר אימצו לעצמן מדינות השוק האחרות.

סר אלק ענה כי בריטניה אינה מתכוונת לשנות מדיניותה בכוון של צרפת.

ברור כי תידון יחד עם שותפיה בקהיליה בבעיות שונות הקשורות לאירופה.

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החוקר מציג את הממצאים של המחקר, אשר נעשה על ידי צוות המחקר, וכן את המסקנות של המחקר, אשר נגזרות מהממצאים.

המחקר נעשה על ידי צוות המחקר, אשר מורכב מ:

1. ד"ר אביב גולן, ראש צוות המחקר, אשר ממונה על ביצוע המחקר, וכן על כתיבת המסמך.
2. ד"ר יעל כהן, חברת צוות המחקר, אשר מסייעת בביצוע המחקר, וכן בכתיבת המסמך.
3. ד"ר יעל כהן, חברת צוות המחקר, אשר מסייעת בביצוע המחקר, וכן בכתיבת המסמך.

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3. ד"ר יעל כהן, חברת צוות המחקר, אשר מסייעת בביצוע המחקר, וכן בכתיבת המסמך.

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3. ד"ר יעל כהן, חברת צוות המחקר, אשר מסייעת בביצוע המחקר, וכן בכתיבת המסמך.

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ציינ כי נכח בכמה מפגשים במשך ששת החודשים האחרונים וחש במאמצ להשיג קונצנזוס אולם לא היה נסיון של גיבוש מדיניות אחידה. עמדת בריטניה קרובה יותר לעמדה הצרפתית בסוגיית צורת ההתאגדות של מדינות הקהיליה כי כמו הצרפתים הם דוגלים בתפיסה הקונפדרלית תשומרת על זהות לאומית בו בזמן שיתר החברות ק רומת יותר לתפיסה פדרלית יחד עם זה הוא מהסס להדביק תוויות כאלה על העמדות. שהיה הצביע על הסתירה בעמדה הצרפתית אשר עקרונית הינה קונפדרלית אך בסוגיית המזית שואפת להגיע למדיניות אחידה כשהקהיליה צריכה לדבר בקול אחד.

בסיכום אמר סר אלק שאיש אינו צריך לחשוש שגם GANG UP ON ANYBODY שהיה עבר לענין יהודי ערב בציינו כי בעי דאק מתאפשרת יציאת היהודים מעזרת הקנדים המוכנים להעניק ויזות ועיקר הבעיה הוא מצד בסוריה שח סובלים 4500 יהודים.

מצרים נפתרה הבעיה רוב רובה. סר אלק ענה כי הסורים מראים ענין בחידוש היחסים הדיפלומטיים ובריטניה מעיינת בכך.

אינו יודע אם חידוש היחסים יהיה בעל השפעה על הקלת מצוקתם של היהודים אך עדיף מצב של יחסים על היעדר יחסים.

שהיה ציינ כי במקרים מסוימים שבהם עמדה אפשרות חידוש יחסים בין מדינות ערב ומדינות אחרות על הפרק ניצלו זאת מדינות ערב כדי לסחוט הסדרות אנטי-ישראליות וציינ כדוגמא את התעקשותה של רפ"ג ועמידתה נגד לחצים אלו.

סר אלק ענה שאין כל סיכוי שהסורים יצליחו לסחוט הצהרה מעין זו מהם ופארסנס הוסיף כי בינתיים כל הענין רדום.

שהיה עבר לנושא יהודי בריהים באומרו שזוהי הוכחה ליעילותו של לחץ בינלאומי. אנו מצפים שעד סוף השנה יעלו כעשרת אלפים יהודים מבריהים עד כה לא הצלחנו לגלות את העקרון המנחה את שלטונות בריהים במדיניות והליה שלחם אך אנחנו מסיקים כי הלחץ הוא אחד הגורמים למדיניות זו. ציינ כי אנו מתנגדים להתבטאויות אלימות כגון הליגה להגנה יהודית ואנו חושבים שהם מזיקות לענין.

סר אלק הביע את סיפוקו משיפור מצבם של יהודי בריהים תוך ציון כי

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השיפור אינו מספיק.

מבא התעניין לדעת אם יש רדיפה פיזית של יהודים בבריהם.
שהיה העלה את ענין השבויים במצרים במוסרו כי אנו מוכנים לחילופים
בכל עת ואפילו מוכנים לחדור מוקדם מצדנו על מנת לחקל על המצרים.
מיוחד מכאיבה בעיתו של רב סרג אייל.
סר אלק ענה שאחרי הבקור בקהיר, בו העלה בעיה זו, פנה שוב למצרים
אבל אין כל תשובה מהם.
מבטיח כי יפנה פעם נוספת ויכתוב לדיאד.

פארסנס העלה שאלת אישור האמנה למניעת הפליה גזעית על ידי ישראל
שתקל על דרישות ישראל לגבי מצב היהודים בארצות ערב ופעולותיה בפורומים
בינלאומיים שונים.

שהיה ענה שילמד בעיה זו וציין כי לדעת ישראל האמנה אינה די תקיפה
אז כי אולי פרדוקסלי הוא שדורקא מדינת ישראל אינה צד לאמנה זו.
סר אלק מסר פרטים על ההתפתחויות האחרונות במפרץ הפרסי.
ציין כי הם מודאגים מסימנים של הדירה סובייטית וסינית לאזור.
ביום ה תוכרז הקמת הפרדציה וזמריטים ימסרו ליזה אתי צופי
עומאני על סגל קציניה הבריטים לרבות כמה פקיסטנים.
בריטניה עשתה ככל אשר בכוחה לסייע לנסיכויות. ההסכמים החדשים עם
הפרדציה מאפשרים לבריטניה להציב שם כוחות למעשה כרצונה, אך כרגע אין
הדבר מעשי כי לא עומדים לרשותם כוחות כאלה, במיוחד כל עוד נמשך המצב
מירלנד.

אשר לבעיית האימ ציין כי לגבי אבו-מוסה נמצא פתרון
עם השייכ לפיו הוצבו כוחות איראניים על האי ונראה שלא צפויים קשיים
לגביו.

לאחר שיוחה הוסיף פארסנס את הפרטים הבאים:
שני הצדדים לא ויתרו עקרונית לתביעתם על ריבונות על האי אך למעשה
בוצעה כעין חלוקה ככ שבחלק אחד הציבו האיראנים את דגלם לרבות חיל
מצב ובחלק השני התנוסס דגלו של השייכ משרגה.
השייכ גם נשאר אחראי למינהל האזרחי. הכנסות אפשריות צפויות מזכיונות
נפט תחולקנה שווה בשווה. כנ יהיה מעמד שווה לגבי זכויות דיג
אשר לשני האימ האחרים התמנהג השייכ של רס אל חימוה עד לרגע האחרון
על למעשה גם הוא הסכים להסדר מלא אלא שבביצוע היו תקלות והיתה

התנגשות בין כוחות איראנים לבין כוחות השייכ וכתוצאה מכך יש כמה הרוגים ופצועים.

הבריטים מקווים שהעניין יעבור בשלום על אף העובדה שהכווייטים כבר התחילו לעשות רעש.

העיראקים כבר קראו לכל השגרירים בבגדאד כדי להביע את זעמם. הבריטים מקווים שאמנם הכל יעבור בשלום ושפרט למעט רעש לא הכוייטים ולא העיראקים ינקטו **צעדים** כדי להחריף את התקרית. יחד עם זה אין לפסול לגמרי הליכת העיראקים למועבייט, צעד שכונה על ידי פארסנס כאפשרות הגרועה ביותר.

הבריטים בתאור זה נוספו לנו מפי פארנסס לאחר סיום השיחה בין שני תשרים.

סר אלק שאל על מצב הארגונים הפלשתינאים ושהיה ענה כי למעשה דעכה תנועה זו ואחד הלקחים מרצח רוהים ירדן הוא שארגונים אלה הגיעו לשיא תיסכולם משעה שהאוכלוסיה בשטחים מסרבת לשתף איתם פעולה. האוכלוסיה בלבנון נוקטת בעמדה דומה ואילו בירדן הם חוסלו כמעט סופית.

שהיה עמד על האפקטיביות של עמדתנו בעת המשבר בספטמבר 70 שמנעה התערבות חמורה יותר מצד סוריה ותרמה להצלחתו של המלך. סר אלק עבר

לדווח על ההתפתחות באירופה באומרו שהם מצפים שבקרוב ייחתם הסכם על בליין שבעקבותיו יאושררו הסכמי רפייג - בריהים ופולין, בעקבות זאת תתחלנה ההכנות לעריכת הועידה לבטחון אירופה.

לא ברור לו מי לפי העמדה הרוסית צריך להשתתף ומה יהיה סדר היום. אחת הנקודות שהוזכרה הינה תנועה חופשית של אנשים ורעיונות מעבר לגבול והוא שואל את עצמו אם הסובייטים יוכלו לעכל רעיון זה.

משאל סר אלק את גרינהיל על לוח הזמנים ענה האחרון כי הועידה צפויה להתקיים עוד כ-72.

שאלת שהיה אם המזית יידון ענה סר אלק כי הסובייטים לא הבהירו על מה רצונם לשוחח אך הנחתו שהועידה תעסוק בכל השאלות הנוגעות ישירות לאירופה. בעניין MBFR אמר סר אלק כי הם חושבים שהנושא לא יידון בוועידה עצמה אלא באיזה גופים משניים.

סר אלק ציין כי לאחרונה עושים הסובייטים מאמצים לשוות לעצמם תדמית של רודפי שלום וכמעוניינים בדיון על צמצום החימוש וגרינהיל הוסיף כי

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החוביטים אינם מסתירים את הקשיים בנושא זה הנוצרים עבורם עקב המשאבים הכלכליים המוגבלים שלהם. לאחד מכם דנו שני השרים משאלת בקורו של סר אלק בארצ והאחרון הביע שמחתו לבקר. סוכמ כי הבקור ייערך בערב המועד המדויק יהיה תלוי בדיון בפרלמנט על התקציב והשגריר וינתן תשפלה בפרטים ובמועדים והזופיים.

שג

שהח דוהט סבכל אלון דיין ססבכל איר כ' מאוח ב מותים הקר אלגום דט אמן
לב/

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בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס' 5

בשלה 011715 /12/71

אל : המשרד

מאת: לונדון

מ י ר י

אירופה ב' תקוע-בירורק (הועבר).

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE DINNER OF THE ANGLO ISRAEL ASSOCIATION ON 30 NOVEMBER 1971

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, MY LORDS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
THE SUBJECT IN OUR MINDS TONIGHT IS THE CAUSE OF ANGLO-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP, THE CAUSE TO WHICH YOUR ASSOCIATION IS DEDICATED. A CAUSE WHICH YOUR GUEST OF HONOUR EPITOMISES IN HIMSELF AND FOR WHICH HE WORKS SO HARD. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ANY BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE HOST TO A FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL. BUT MR EBAN IS NO STRANGER. HE HAS FAMILY TIES WITH THIS COUNTRY: HE HAS MANY FRIENDS HERE: HE HAD A MOST DISTINGUISHED CAREER AS AN UNDERGRADUATE AND RESEARCH FELLOW AT CAMBRIDGE: (OF COURSE THE WRONG UNIVERSITY) AND HE HAS OFTEN VISITED LONDON DURING HIS TRAVELS. WE ARE VERY HAPPY THAT THIS TIME HE HAS BROUGHT WITH HIM HIS CHARMING WIFE.

YOU, MINISTER, ARE VISITING US AT A TIME WHEN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES ARE THINKING VERY MUCH ABOUT PATTERNS OF LIFE FOR OUR COUNTRIES FOR THE FUTURE. WE IN BRITAIN ARE ABOUT TO EMBARK ON AN ENTIRELY NEW PHASE IN OUR NATIONAL HISTORY: A PHASE WHEN, AS A MEMBER OF THE EEC, WE SHALL BE IN AND OF EUROPE IN QUITE A NEW SENSE. YOU IN ISRAEL ARE LOOKING FOR THE AVENUE WHICH WILL LEAD TO YOUR GOALS OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS LATTER PROBLEM HAS OF COURSE BULKED LARGEST IN OUR TALKS TOGETHER AND I WILL RETURN TO IT IN A MINUTE. HAPPILY IN OUR BILATERAL

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RELATIONS THERE IS NOT A GREAT NEED FOR DISCUSSION, FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE GOOD. POLITICALLY, WE SEE EYE TO EYE ON MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH BESET THE WORLD. CULTURALLY THE BONDS WHICH LINK US ARE AS STRONG AS EVER. MANY THOUSANDS OF ISRAELIS VISIT THIS COUNTRY EVERY YEAR, AND AS MANY, IF NOT MORE PEOPLE FROM THIS COUNTRY VISIT ISRAEL. OUR TRADE FLOURISHES, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. ALTHOUGH OUR ENTRY INTO THE EEC MAY BRING CHANGES, THE MARKETS BOTH IN THIS COUNTRY, AND IN OTHER ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, ARE EXPANDING: AND I BELIEVE YOU WILL PROVE MORE THAN CAPABLE OF HOLDING YOUR OWN. IT IS VERY MUCH OUR WISH THAT YOU SHOULD DO SO. THIS WILL BE PROMINENT IN OUR MINDS WHEN WE DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.

SO TO THE SUBJECT WHICH, I AM CERTAIN, PREOCCUPIES US ALL THE MOST: PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

LET ME START BY REPEATING WHAT I SAID RECENTLY IN CAIRO: THAT WE WANT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE ARE MANY REASONS WHY WE DO SO. WE WANT PEACE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST BE PEACE IF ISRAEL AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION ARE TO WIN THE PROSPERITY AND SOCIAL COHESION WHICH THEY DESERVE AND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE THE POTENTIAL. WE WANT PEACE BECAUSE WE HATE THE WASTE — OF RESOURCES, BUT ABOVE ALL OF LIVES — WHICH WAR BRINGS. WE WANT PEACE BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT PEACE BRINGS TRADE: AND TRADE PROFITS US ALL. FINALLY, WE WANT PEACE BECAUSE THE QUESTION OF PEACE OR WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEARS ON THE SECURITY OF THE

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WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

BUT HOW IS PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED? IT CANNOT BE IMPOSED ^{and will not be imposed}
IT IS FOR THE PARTIES TO AGREE ON THE TERMS. THEIR FRIENDS CAN ONLY
HELP BY OFFERING HONEST ADVICE: AND IT IS THE PART OF A TRUE FRIEND
TO DO THIS.

LET ME START BY SAYING THAT WE STAND WITH ISRAEL WHEN SHE
CLAIMS THE RIGHT TO SECURITY. RIGHTS, HOWEVER, BOTH FOR THE INDIVID ^{WAL}
SOCIETY AND FOR NATIONS INTERNATIONALLY, MUST BE PROTECTED,
BY THE LAW OR BY SOME OTHER EFFECTIVE
MECHANISM, IF THEY ARE TO BE ENJOYED. HOW IS ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO
SECURITY TO BE PROTECTED? IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE THREE WAYS
IN WHICH THIS SHOULD BE DONE.

THE FIRST IS THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS
— NOT JUST ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, OR ANYTHING PROVISIONAL OF THAT
NATURE — BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF HER FOUR NEIGHBOURS. THESE
PEACE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE PERMANENT, FORMAL AND BINDING. THOSE
WHO ENTERED INTO THEM WOULD BE ENGAGING THEMSELVES AND THEIR
REPUTATIONS TO CARRY THEM OUT AND TO DEFEND THEM. BUT GOVERNMENTS
AND STATESMEN, YOU MAY SAY, — AND EXPERIENCE SADLY BEARS IT OUT —
ARE NOT PERMANENCIES IN OFFICE. SOMETHING MORE IS NEEDED
— AN INCENTIVE IN SELF-INTEREST TO OBSERVE THE OBLIGATIONS
ENTERED INTO. THIS LEADS ME TO THE SECOND POINT: THE DEFINITION
IN THESE PEACE AGREEMENTS OF PERMANENT FRONTIERS, AGREED BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND EACH OF HER FOUR NEIGHBOURS. THIS ACT OF DEFINITION

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WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

BUT HOW IS PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED? IT CANNOT BE IMPOSED.

1. 2. FOR THE PARTIES TO AGREE ON THE TERMS. THEIR FRIENDS

HELP BY OFFERING HONEST ADVICE. AND 3. IS THE PART OF A PRO

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THE LAW OR BY SOME OTHER EFFECT.

MECHANISM IF THEY ARE TO BE ENJOYED. FOR ISRAEL RIGHT

TO BE PROTECTED. THERE ARE THREE WAYS

WHICH THIS SHOULD BE DONE.

THE FIRST IS THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

BUT JUST ANTI-STATE AGREEMENT. OR ANYTHING PROVISIONAL OF THE

THREE - BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF THE FOUR NEIGHBOURS. THE

PEACE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE PERMANENT. FORMAL AND BINDING. AND

NO ENTERED INTO THEM WOULD BE ANY. THEMSELVES AND THE

COMMITMENTS TO CARRY THEM OUT AND NOT REPEL THEM. BUT COULD

AND STATESMEN. YOU MAY SAY, AND I HAVE BEEN SAYING IT OF

AND NOT PERMANENTLY IN OFFICE. AND NO MORE. I NEED

AND INCENTIVE IN THE. IT IS TO OBSERVE THE OR OUT

ENTERED INTO. THE. AND THE SECOND POINT. THE

THESE PEACE AGREEMENTS. A. FRONT FRONT. AND TO BE

AND EACH OF THE. AND THE

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WOULD CREATE THE "RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES" CALLED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967. WOULD THEY ALSO BE SECURE? THAT WOULD DEPEND ON TWO THINGS? FIRST ON THE ATTITUDES WHICH WOULD DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS; AND SECONDLY ON THE SUM OF SATISFACTION OF THE PARTIES IN THE BOUNDARIES, ON THEIR SELF-INTEREST IN OBSERVING THE AGREED FRONTIERS. I SAY "SUM" BECAUSE THE BOUNDARIES WOULD NOT BE SECURE IF THE TOTAL SATISFACTION OF ONE PARTY WERE TO BE BALANCED - PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY NEUTRALISED - BY THE TOTAL DISSATISFACTION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE OTHERS.

THE THIRD WAY IS THROUGH PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF VIOLATION, TO REMOVE PARTICULAR POINTS OF FEAR AND TO BUILD UP CONFIDENCE. IN PARTICULAR THERE SHOULD BE COMMITMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION FOR ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE WATERWAYS OF THE REGION. I DO NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE NATURE OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS. BUT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE RELIABLE IN A WAY WHICH THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH EXISTED BEFORE 1967 WERE NOT.

THOSE, THEN, ARE THE THREE PRINCIPAL WAYS IN WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY OUGHT TO BE ASSURED. MY LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE, BUT I HOPE THAT YOU WILL THINK IT COVERS THE ESSENTIALS. AND OUT OF THE CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED BY THESE POLITICAL ACTS AND ARRANGEMENTS CHANGED ATTITUDES COULD DEVELOP, SO THAT TRUE PEACE, ROOTED IN THE HEART, COULD GROW.

I NOW RETURN TO THE QUESTION I ASKED AT THE OUTSET. HOW IS THAT PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED? IT MAY HAVE TO BE ACHIEVED STEP BY STEP. INDEED THIS IS AN APPROACH WHICH HAS RECENTLY

WOULD CREATE THE RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES, CALLED FOR IN THE
 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967. WOULD THEY ALSO
 BE SECURE? THAT WOULD DEPEND ON TWO THINGS: FIRST ON THE
 ATTITUDES WHICH WOULD DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE
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THE THIRD WAY IS THROUGH PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO
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 FOR ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE WATERWAYS OF THE REGION. I DO NOT WANT
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 POLITICAL ACTS AND ARRANGEMENTS CHANGED ATTITUDES COULD DEVELOP,
 SO THAT TRUE PEACE, ROOTED IN THE HEART, COULD GROW.

I NOW RETURN TO THE QUESTION I ASKED AT THE OUTSET.
 HOW IS THAT PEACE TO BE ACHIEVED? IT MAY HAVE TO BE ACHIEVED
 STEP BY STEP.

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SEEMED TO OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT OF MAKING PROGRESS. BUT, WHATEVER THE APPROACH, I BELIEVE THAT THREE CONDITIONS HAVE TO BE FULFILLED IF PEACE AGREEMENTS ARE TO BE CONCLUDED AND IF A STATE OF PEACE IS TO COME INTO BEING.

THE FIRST CONDITION IS, TO QUOTE PHRASE I USED IN SPEAKING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THAT DIALOGUE MUST SUPPLANT CONFRONTATION. IN PRIVATE LIFE, PEOPLE CANNOT AGREE, LET ALONE RESOLVE DISPUTES, UNLESS THEY COMMUNICATE. AND LETTERS WRITTEN BY SOLICITORS ARE NOT ONLY EXPENSIVE BUT TEND TO LEAD TO CONFRONTATION IN COURT. THE SAME APPLIES TO STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THE SECOND CONDITION IS THAT PROPOSALS MUST BE MADE. NO DISPUTE, OR CONFLICT, IS EVER SETTLED IF THE PARTIES WAIT FOR ONE ANOTHER. IF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WANT A SETTLEMENT, IF THEY WANT PEACE-- WHICH I BELIEVE THAT THEY DO -- THEN PROPOSALS MUST BE MADE. OFFERS MUST REPLACE QUESTIONS. THE AFFIRMATIVE MUST REPLACE THE INTERROGATIVE. RISK MUST BE RUN IF PEACE IS TO BE WON.

THE THIRD CONDITION IS THAT THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT -- THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967 -- MUST BE RESPECTED AND MADE USE OF. THE RESOLUTION MAY NOT BE PERFECT. BUT TO DISCARD THE RESOLUTION, OR TO TAMPER WITH IT, WOULD, IN MY VIEW, BE A RETROGRADE STEP. WE SHOULD STICK TO THE RESOLUTION AND, IN STICKING TO IT, WE SHOULD SEEK THE PRACTICAL MEASURES TO APPLY IT. WE MAY NEVER GET ANOTHER RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD COMMAND SO MUCH SUPPORT AS

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק נכנס

—6—

THIS ONE.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TENSE. A DEBATE ON THIS SITUATION IS ABOUT TO BEGIN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE HOPE THAT THE DEBATE WILL HELP TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION AND TO IMPROVE THE CLIMATE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE. WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME. AND, LOOKING RATHER FURTHER AHEAD, MAY I ASSURE YOU THAT YOU WILL ALWAYS FIND US RANGED WITH THOSE WHO ARE WORKING FOR PEACE.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, ETC.,

I ASK YOU TO DRINK TO THE STATE AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.
END OF SPEECH.

CORRECTION: AT THE BEGINNING OF PARA FIVE INSERT AFTER THE THE WORDS "IT CANNOT BE IMPOSED" AND WILL NOT BE IMPOSED, .

שהח דרום מנכל אלו דין סמכל אירופה ב מען הסכרה מזתים חקר אלגום מאום ב

רם אמן תעוד .

לב/אר

17-11-71
SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE DINNER OF THE
ANGLO-ISRAEL ASSOCIATION ON 30 NOVEMBER 1971. -

Your Excellencies, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject in our minds tonight is the cause of Anglo-Israel friendship, the cause to which your Association is dedicated. A cause which your guest of honour epitomises in himself and for which he works so hard. This is the first time any British Government has been the host to a Foreign Minister of Israel. But Mr. Eban is no stranger. He has family ties with this country; he has many friends here; he had a most distinguished career as an undergraduate and Research Fellow at Cambridge: (of course the wrong University) and he has often visited London during his travels. We are very happy that this time he has brought with him his charming wife.

You, Minister, are visiting us at a time when both our countries are thinking very much about patterns of life for our countries for the future. We in Britain are about to embark on an entirely new phase in our national history: a phase when as a member of the EEC, we shall be in and of Europe in quite a new sense. You in Israel are looking for the avenue which will lead to your goals of peace and security. This latter problem has of course bulked largest in our talks together and I will return to it in a minute. Happily in our bilateral relations there is not a great need for discussion, for relations between our two countries are good. Politically, we see eye to eye on many of the problems which beset the world. Culturally, the bonds which link us are as strong as ever. Many thousands of Israelis visit this country every year, and as many, if not more people from this country visit Israel. Our trade flourishes, in both directions. Although our entry into the EEC may bring changes, the markets both in this country, and in other advanced industrial countries, are expanding; and I believe you will prove more than capable of holding your own. It is very much our wish that you should do so. This will be prominent in our minds when we discuss these matters within the Community.

So to the subject which, I am certain, preoccupies us all the most: peace in the Middle East.

Let me start by repeating what I said recently in Cairo: that we want peace in the Middle East. There are many reasons why we do so. We want peace because we believe that there must be peace if Israel and the other countries of the region are to win the prosperity and social cohesion which they deserve and for which they have the potential. We want peace because we hate the waste - of resources, but above all of lives - which war brings. We want peace because we know that peace brings trade; and trade profits us all. Finally, we want peace because the question of peace or war in the Middle East bears on the security of the whole international community.

But how is peace to be achieved? It cannot be imposed, and will not be imposed. It is for the parties to agree on the terms. Their friends can only help by offering honest advice; and it is the part of a true friend to do this.

/Let me

Let me start by saying that we stand with Israel when she claims the right to security. Rights, however, both for the individual in society and for nations internationally, must be protected, by the law or by some other effective mechanism, if they are to be enjoyed. How is Israel's right to security to be protected? In our view, there are three ways in which this should be done.

A The first is through the conclusion of peace agreements - not just armistice agreements, or anything provisional of that nature - between Israel and each of her four neighbours. These peace agreements would be permanent, formal and binding. Those who entered into them would be engaging themselves and their reputations to carry them out and to defend them. But governments and statesmen, you may say, - and experience sadly bears it out - are not permanencies in office. Something more is needed - an incentive in self-interest to observe the obligations entered into. This leads me to the second point: the definition in these peace agreements of permanent frontiers, agreed between Israel and each of her four neighbours. This act of definition would create the "recognised boundaries" called for in the Security Council Resolution of November 1967. Would they also be secure? That would depend on two things: first on the attitudes which would develop as a result of the conclusion of peace agreements; and secondly on the sum of satisfaction of the parties in the boundaries, on their self-interest in observing the agreed frontiers. I say "sum" because the boundaries would not be secure if the total satisfaction of one party were to be balanced - perhaps I should say neutralised - by the total dissatisfaction of one or more of the others.

The third way is through physical arrangements designed to reduce the risks of violation, to remove particular points of fear and to build up confidence. In particular there should be commitments and arrangements to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israeli ships through the waterways of the region. I do not want to speculate about the possible nature of these arrangements. But they would certainly have to be reliable in a way which the arrangements which existed before 1967 were not.

Those, then, are the three principal ways in which we believe that Israel's security ought to be assured. My list is not exhaustive, but I hope that you will think it covers the essentials. And out of the confidence established by these political acts and arrangements changed attitudes could develop, so that true peace, rooted in the heart, could grow.

I now return to the question I asked at the outset. How is that peace to be achieved? It may have to be achieved step by step. Indeed, this is an approach which has recently seemed to offer the best prospect of making progress. But, whatever the approach, I believe that three conditions have to be fulfilled if peace agreements are to be concluded and if a state of peace is to come into being.

5 /The first

The first condition is, to quote a phrase I used in speaking to the General Assembly, that dialogue must supplant confrontation.. ~~In private life, people cannot agree, let alone resolve disputes, unless they communicate.~~ And letters written by solicitors are not only expensive but tend to lead to confrontation in court. The same applies to states in international relations.

~ The second condition is that proposals must be made. No dispute, or conflict, is ever settled if the parties wait for one another. If the parties to the conflict in the Middle East want a settlement, if they want peace - which I believe that they do - then proposals must be made. Offers must replace questions. The affirmative must replace the interrogative. Risk must be run if peace is to be won.

The third condition is that the existing framework for a settlement - the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 - must be respected and made use of. The Resolution may not be perfect. But to discard the Resolution, or to tamper with it, would, in my view, be a retrograde step. We should stick to the Resolution and, in sticking to it, we should seek the practical measures to apply it. We may never get another resolution which would command so much support as this one.

The situation in the Middle East is tense. A debate on this situation is about to begin in the General Assembly. We hope that the debate will help to relieve the situation and to improve the climate for progress towards peace. We, for our part, will do all in our power to work for a positive and constructive outcome. And, looking rather further ahead, may I assure you that you will always find us ranged with those who are working for peace.

Your Excellencies, etc.,

I ask you to drink to the State and people of Israel.

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How now, Brown—cowed?

THE title of this volume of memoirs is, to quote Lord George Brown, "unashamedly cribbed" from a song made famous by one of the greatest entertainers of our time, Frank Sinatra. What could be more appropriate? For is not George Brown the greatest entertainer to emerge (perhaps explode would be a better description) from English politics since he first stepped onto the public stage some 30 years ago? I mean this in no derogatory sense. Quite the contrary, I intend these words as a definite compliment. Politics should, *inter alia*, be fun and refreshing and entertaining. And George Brown has done his best, some might say more than his best, to ensure that political life did not submerge forever beneath the dead weight of the by-products of the affluent society.

One should not be misled, however, by superficialities. Beneath the surface *bonhomie* which George Brown displays to such fascinating effect lurks a serious and applied politician. He learned his politics the hard way. He was not eased through to the top by way of the right public school and the old universities. Brown was born in a working class tenement in Lambeth, London, and remained forever true to his background. From his earliest days he recollects seeing "the light shining over Big Ben from the landing when I went out to wash;" it continued to be a regular landmark for him. He became active in trade-union affairs, rapidly working his way up to the position of a district organizer for the Transport and General Workers Union. In 1945, the T.G.W.U. "sponsored" his candidacy to the parliamentary seat at Belper, Derbyshire. And, as a result of the great Labour landslide of that year, he entered Parliament. He has remained there ever since, though there have been one or two minor re-adjustments. In 1970 he became a life-peer, Lord George Brown, and he has now taken his place beside those other dignitaries of the realm with strange-sounding and, to the uninitiated, inexplicable titles. From Lambeth slum to the House of Lords. The wheel has turned a full circle; or almost.

'Here comes George'

Brown belongs to that group of working-class leaders — Bevin and Morrison were others — whom the British Labour Party has, from time to time, allowed into its front rank. His career, his successes and ultimate failure were dictated by this inescapable fact. Throughout his book, particularly those chapters which deal with Brown in office, the atmosphere of permanent crisis, of confrontation, is all-pervading. For he possesses a powerful and original

IN MY WAY by Lord George Brown. London, Gollancz, 299 pp.

Reviewed by
N. A. Rose



LORD GEORGE BROWN

mind and he often clashed with the traditional postulates of the British political system. He could not have been an easy master to work under. He took nothing for granted. One can well imagine the permanent officials whispering to each other: "Look out, here comes George. Hold on to your bowler and umbrella!"

He held minor office, as Minister of Works, in Attlee's second administration in 1951. Labour then spent 13 years in the political wilderness. When the party was returned to office in 1964, Brown had already moved into the position of Deputy Prime Minister. His period out of office was almost as turbulent as the years he spent straining at the leash as a Minister of the Crown. It is peppered with *les affaires*, from the Khrushchev dinner-party incident to the leadership crisis with Harold Wilson after Hugh Gaitskill's sudden death in 1963. They all reveal Brown as headstrong and dynamic, energetic and emotional, supremely confident in his own ability but curiously unable to evaluate correctly repercussions of his own outbursts. Whoever said, "But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve," surely had George Brown in mind.

When he attained to office he continued along the same path. He set up a new department, the Department for Economic Affairs. The idea was to make Brown a kind of overlord of the economy, and, of more importance, to challenge the Treasury's hegemony in this field. Perhaps only those familiar with the idiosyncracies of the British political system will appreciate the revolutionary character of this concept. The Treasury was considered, rightly, as being *primus inter pares* among government offices (the Foreign Office is in a class of its own for many different reasons), and ever since the days of the "Great Betrayal" of 1931 had occupied a special place in the demonology of the Labour Party. Brown failed, bravely and with a great flourish. But the result was not wholly negative. His attempt to upturn the existing system has left its mark. Many of his ideas have since been revamped and exploited by others.

Inevitably, it is his period as Foreign Secretary and his attitude to Zionism and Israel which demands our greatest attention. On his

appointment there is one characteristic touch. Upon entering the Foreign Office for the first time he found himself faced "by a ridiculous portrait of that ineffective monarch, George III." He replaced it with a portrait of Lord Palmerston, that most English of ministers.

He had at first opposed "the establishment of a Zionist state in Israel" (*sic*). But, "The state of Israel having been established, it seemed to me crystal clear that the state would have to live." Nevertheless, his writing on this contentious topic is woolly in the extreme. He contends that Arab statesmen are fighting for "an arrangement in their homeland (emphasis mine — N.A.R.) which would give them all the kind of rights that any people would ask for themselves."

Or, he talks of the "moderately led" Palestine Liberation Organization and its equally moderate leader, Yasser Arafat, without mentioning Arafat's programme or discussing the term "moderate" in its Middle East context. He is most interesting about the notorious Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, of which he proudly claims authorship. Since so much has been written and mouthed about this vague and imprecise piece of verbal engineering, I quote the author himself.

"It does not call for Israeli withdrawal from 'the' territories recently occupied, nor does it use the word 'all.' It would have been impossible to get the resolution through if either of these words had been included, but it does set the lines on which negotiations for a settlement must take place. Each side must be prepared to give up something: the resolution doesn't attempt to say precisely what, because that is what negotiations for a peace treaty must be about."

I would suggest that this interpretation corresponds in its essential points to that argued by the Israel Government. A gratifying, if somewhat profitless, meeting of minds. Still, on the whole, apart from one or two inside stories (that famous dinner-party at Foreign Minister Abba Eban's, for example), this chapter is disappointing, and Brown reverts back to the usual platitudes of "grasping opportunities," etc., which most politicians indulge in when they have nothing further to say.

Resigned in huff

He resigned in a huff from the Foreign Office and the Government in 1969. It was not unexpected. One might say that his political career had been spent in preparation for this act. Nevertheless he resigned over an issue of overriding importance.

Brown was protesting against what many have called the Americanization of the British political system. But one must not forget that entangled in this constitutional debate were his bitter personal relations with Prime Minister Wilson.

I found this book interesting in parts, nearly always amusing, but hardly stimulating. Perhaps one should not ask too much from politicians' memoirs. Enough that Lord George Brown is not lost to politics. Anyone who has seen him in action, whether on television or on the hustings, will not forget that volcanic sight in a hurry. I wonder how the House of Lords will digest him; or him it.



YOGA CLASSES

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MiG that Ben-Gurion ordered.

picked out two of the MiGs and gave in a range of 300 yards. The Syrians the two planes which were hit by cannon- plateau of the Golan Heights astride The others fled. The thunder crack as gh the sound barrier and swept in to nagogue at the wedding of a Mirage Degania kibbutz. Jokingly, the groom made me miss the world's first Mirage no battle. The Syrians were so sur- en try to fight back.

its first bombing mission three months y opened fire from the Golan Heights as a small community was settling day. The village was severely damaged was a hurried conference between Pre- al Itzhak Rabin, Chief of the General ued to fall on the village. General Weiz- from his office in Tel Aviv when Rabin radio telephone. Weizman at once gave base nearest the Syrian border. Within planes was heading towards the Golan d Vautour bombers pounded the Syrian y bombs and high explosives. Then, res, the Mirages roared in at tree-top bombs.

ge-MiG dogfight

November 1964, marked the first sharp rage and its Soviet rival, the MiG-21 not yet operational in Vietnam. Four ong their favourite intrusion route over as two Mirages swung in to attack, the d headed back towards Damascus. To r combat one of the Mirage pilots jet- ontaining his reserve of fuel and fired plume of smoke spurted from a MiG's uction. The three other MiGs fled.

ive spell of duty before the Six Day of July and August 1966. On Bastille red the Armée de l'Air Mirages soaring the Israelis sent their own on a mission were to smash tractors and excavation e Syrians were digging canals to divert a and deprive Israel of its vital water G-21s intervened after the third wave

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Monday, 22nd November, 1971

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Western European Heads of Government (Meeting)

1. **Mr. Blaker** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about the preparations for a meeting of Heads of Government of 10 Western European countries.

Mr. Rippon : It was agreed at the meeting in Rome on 6th November of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten that the preparation and convening of a summit conference of the Ten during 1972 should be a matter for all ten countries. As yet, the time and location of the conference have not been settled. My right honourable Friend, the Prime Minister's support was clearly expressed in his Zurich speech in September.

Namibia

6. **Mr. William Hamilton** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will list the reasons for British opposition to the ruling of the International Court concerning the illegality of South African occupation of the former mandated territory of South-West Africa, now named Namibia.

Mr. Godber : I would refer the hon. Member to the statement made by my hon. Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Adjournment debate on 19th October.—[Vol. 823, c. 678-86.]

28. **Mr. Pavitt** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many of Her Majesty's diplomatic staff are stationed in Namibia.

Mr. Godber : None.

52. **Mr. Alexander W. Lyon** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about Her Majesty's Government's policy towards the recent Security Council resolution on Namibia.

Mr. Godber : I would refer the hon. Member to the statement made by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Adjournment debate on 19th October.—[Vol. 823, c. 678-86.]

Nuclear Tests

15. **Sir G. Nabarro** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has made to the Government of the United States of America on nuclear tests.

Mr. Godber : None.

Middle East

20. **Mr. Clinton Davis** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the current initiatives being taken by Her Majesty's Government in connection with the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. Godber : We are extremely concerned about the situation in the Middle East. Various moves have recently been made, including the O.A.U. Mission. My right hon. Friend, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, will be discussing the whole problem with Mr. Eban when he visits this country next week.

Mr. Peter Archer asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will initiate proposals at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Middle East.

Mr. Godber : We have already made clear on a number of occasions that Her Majesty's Government would be willing to participate in some form of guarantee arrangements with the necessary forces, if others were also willing so to participate and provided, of course, that this was acceptable to the parties concerned.

Zanzibar

21. **Mr. Judd** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what requests he has received for assistance with the installation of a television broadcasting system in Zanzibar; what the estimated cost of such assistance would be; what evaluation has been made of the social benefits of such a system; what replies have been sent; and whether he will make a statement.

previously were not taxable will now be taxable?

Mr. Higgins: Once again I ask the leave of the House to reply, though in view of the large number of hon. Members present I do so with some trepidation. I will comment on the hon. Gentleman's two points.

I take his point about the explanatory memorandum, and there is a tendency to treat these matters as something of a formality. This brings out the point that there is a good case for a Ministerial speech to spell out these orders in rather more detail, for the benefit of the commercial interests which may be significantly affected by the order before the House. It is right that one should give an adequate explanation of exactly what is happening.

On the aspect of children's parties, what essentially we were concerned with was a doubt which had arisen over vend-

ing machine cups. I suppose such articles could be used for children's parties, although I understand that normally they are bought only in very large quantities.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Purchase Tax (No. 6) Order 1971 (S.I. 1971, No. 1781), dated 3rd November, 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th November, be approved.

[Continued in Col. 1095]

ERRATUM

In OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th November, 1971, Written Answers, col. 150, in Mr. Anthony Grant's answer to Mr. Dell, under the heading *Females* "34,933" should read "38,933".

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THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

(HANSARD)

IN THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FORTY-FIFTH PARLIAMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
COMMENCING ON THE TWENTY-NINTH DAY OF JUNE IN THE
NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF

HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II

FIFTH SERIES

VOLUME CCCXXIV

FOURTEENTH VOLUME OF SESSION 1970-71

HOUSE OF LORDS

Wednesday, 22nd September, 1971

The House met at half past two of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, pursuant to Standing Order No. 16:

The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Wool-sack.

Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Guildford.

THE EARL OF ONSLOW—Took the Oath.

THE VISCOUNT GORMANSTON—Took the Oath.

ISRAEL: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT

LORD JANNER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government when the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs proposes to visit Israel.]

THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOT-TISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, as my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stated in another

place on March 22, he has in principle accepted an invitation from the Government of Israel to visit Israel, at a date to be agreed.

LORD JANNER: My Lords, will the noble Baroness see to it that the date is fixed fairly soon? Further, will she ask her right honourable friend whether he will pay an official visit to the Golan Heights, Sharim El Sheik, the West Bank and other places, to see for himself how essential it is for Israel to be in a position to protect herself, in the event of an attack being launched against her, without having to rely upon help from other sources, which was so miserably denied on the last occasion?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am sure that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary is well aware of the problems to which the noble Lord has drawn the attention of the House; but, so far as the details of the visit are concerned, I would ask him to await an announcement which my right honourable friend hopes to make when all the details are settled.

BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, would it not be true to say that all the Foreign Secretary has got from his one-sided visit to the Middle East—which is, after all, a very sensitive area of the world—is that he was taken for a ride by the Egyptians, albeit on a camel, and that all he appears to have got is the hump?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, may I say to the noble Baroness that in no way did

[Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.] my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary have a one-sided visit. As I said earlier, he is about to accept an invitation from the Israeli Government to visit them. So far as the camel is concerned, having ridden camels myself I can only conclude that the Foreign Secretary felt it was all in a good cause.

LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, is it not a fact that the Egyptians never ride camels?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I was under the impression that they rode dromedaries.

LORD JANNER: My Lords, this is an extremely important matter, and in view of the statements which have been made by the Foreign Secretary would the noble Baroness be good enough to point out to him that a matter of this description has to be settled by the two parties themselves coming together, and that before he gives any further opinions he should see to it that he knows exactly what the position is so far as security is concerned.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said nothing new in Cairo which he had not already said elsewhere, notably in a speech in Harrogate last year. While there are great difficulties on either side he still bases the solution upon the resolution which was unanimously adopted by all members of the Security Council at the time.

BARONESS STOCKS: My Lords, as the Foreign Secretary, in an earlier speech, has already committed himself to a policy of total withdrawals to the pre-war frontiers of Israel, what is, in his view and in the view of the Government, negotiable?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, in the speech which he gave recently in Egypt my right honourable friend also supported again the question which was made for an interim settlement whereby the opening of the Suez Canal could take place in return for a partial withdrawal by the Israeli forces from Sinai, which would of course be the first step towards the parties themselves agreeing to a final settlement.

LORD CAMOYS: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Baroness could assure the House that no agreement was reached with Egypt without the knowledge of this House and that no private or (shall we say?) secret arrangements were made?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, that assurance I can certainly give, because the speech was largely quoted in the Press, and I do not think anything new was said there over and above what was said a year ago.

LORD JANNER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness one further question? The question that has just been asked shows that the noble Lord has put his finger on a delicate spot. Will the Government see to it that the two nations, as has hitherto been the custom in matters of settlement between other nations, come together before deciding upon what kind of result they want?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, it is perfectly clear that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has always said that a lasting settlement must be based on an agreement between the two parties; but, on the other hand, my noble friend will recall the Security Council's resolution of 1967.

RECALL OF PARLIAMENT AND FUTURE BUSINESS

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELlicoe): My Lords, in welcoming those of your Lordships who are here to-day (and I am glad to see that so many of your Lordships are here for the very important two-day debate) I should like to apologise for the conditions in your Lordships' House which those who have seen the West Front Corridor and the Library may have observed. I think your Lordships will agree that the building work which has been in progress in your Lordships' House for the past weeks should not have been unnecessarily impeded by our recall. I can assure your Lordships that conditions will be a great deal better when you come back in October; I can also assure your Lordships that conditions would have been a great deal worse if you had come back yesterday. As one of my noble friends

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TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY TO THE
ISRAEL MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Thank you for the messages which you sent to me on the eve of my visit to Cairo. I raised the matter of the prisoners held by Egypt and particularly that of Major Eyal and I hope there will be a response. I also told them of your intentions to release three Egyptians, without conditions.

You asked me to enquire about the impact of the new "federation" Egyptian foreign policy. They do not like the labels "federation" or "confederation" but rather describe the association as a "union" of which present manifestations are the early gropings. They assure me that they have complete freedom of decision, and I think that this is likely to prove right.

Generally I am quite convinced that the present Government want to live at peace with Israel and to find the way to do it. The reason is quite simple. The threat of war and the mobilisation of a large army puts a great strain on the economy. They can bear it with Russian help but it makes the long haul to a reasonable standard of living for

/the Egyptian

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the Egyptian people much longer.

When I say that this Government wants above all things to find the way to peace I must add that I fear that it is more than possible that if they cannot show results, some alternative could emerge under which things could take a much more serious turn for the worse. Given that chance now, Sadat could clinch a peace arrangement with the support of his Government and the people. But I do not think that he has unlimited time.

I gave your message about not sticking on Phase One of withdrawal. I think this was helpful, as there is no doubt that this is a major preoccupation. Riad said time and again that he could not contemplate an interim arrangement which in effect became final, like the old Armistice Agreement, which had originally been intended to lead on to a peace settlement. It must point the way clearly to a permanent settlement which, so far as Egypt is concerned, must be based on the old international frontier.

In this context, I raised the question of less indirect contact. The Egyptian fear here is that if they were to agree to direct negotiation with you that third parties, i.e. Jarring, Four Powers, Russia, America and etc. would lose interest.

I believe, therefore, that if progress is to be made a

/Third Party

CONFIDENTIAL

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Third Party will be necessary at any rate until much more confidence is generated than there is now. Jarring seems the best bet at present.

I look forward to seeing you in New York.

15 September 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

B

TEXT OF SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME
IN CAIRO ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1971

Egypt has a long and famous history and we of the 20th century, with all its technology marvel at the skills and techniques of your peoples and the beauty of the records which have contributed so much to civilisation. These are the heritage of the past. The business of the contemporary statesmen is to build a nation in which an identity, a character and a sense of achievement, all of them a source of pride for its people, go hand in hand with prosperity and a rising standard of living. I felt this in the crowd when a year ago I was present at the funeral of President Nasser.

As you carry on the work of building the modern Egypt you have the goodwill and the good wishes of the British people in your ambition. Above all we have admired the steadiness of the leadership which has guided Egypt through a year of stress and danger. This year has also seen the forging of new links between Egypt and her Arab neighbours. Britain has only one reason to regret this new association. The change of name has moved you to the other end of our alphabet, and so we shall no longer have your delegation sitting beside us at meetings of the United Nations General Assembly.

For Britain the greatest significance of this last year for our relations with you is that we have been able to carry through our intention of putting those relations on a fresh footing. I believe that it has been your object also: it was in this spirit that I was happy to welcome you, Sir, last January on your visit to London. We welcome this development and the understanding which

your Government has shown to help co-operation grow and mature. I hope that Britain's interests and ambitions are widely understood among our Arab friends today. Our interest in the Middle East is not one of power politics. We seek no military bases, we have no wish to try and interfere in the management of any independent country's affairs. Our concern is in friendship with all as trading partners in a framework of political stability in which standards of living and economic prospects may be raised. The keynote of that friendship was picked out by a distinguished editor of yours four years ago in an article in the London Sunday Times. He wrote of, and I quote - 'the equality of a mature relationship. Britain and Egypt can never be indifferent to one another because so much has passed between us, but today our friendship is securely based on mutual interests.'

The Sumed pipeline project in particular is a sign of the times that has a double significance. We welcome it not only as an important opportunity to contribute to the building of Egypt, but also as a practical example of the new promise of European co-operation in the development field. This is a pattern which I am certain must be followed increasingly if the world's needs are to be met.

Our trade is increasing once again in both directions. We have at last dealt with the tiresome question of nationalised properties. Above all, the possibilities for technical co-operation are opening up. I was glad to be able to tell you, Sir, today that my Government is now able to offer what I hope will be a useful financial contribution to your development.

A shadow, however, still hangs over the future of Egypt.

That is the threat of war. It is not just a question of the destruction that threatens all that has been built up with so much toil. It is not just a question of the resources wasted on armaments rather than invested in the region's future. Those can be replaced, but what can never be replaced are the lives of those who fall and the wasted years which the survivors spend under arms. The most urgent need must be the peace which will return them to their families and to the task of building an Egypt with an economic base which is firm and stable enough to resist whatever winds may blow on it. We want peace with you. We in Britain want peace for you, not only as a trading nation, but because the question of peace or war in the Middle East now involves the security of the whole international community. That peace must be real, based on a comprehensive political settlement under Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967.

Last October I took the opportunity at Harrogate to set out the elements of such a settlement which, in our view, would be fair. The most important of these elements were that Israeli armed forces should withdraw from territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 in the certainty of the knowledge that all states and claims of belligerency between countries engaged in that conflict would be brought to an end. We see no substitute for an agreement which will embody these basic elements.

In your Government's response to Dr Jarring's Memorandum last February as I understand it, there was an unequivocal and specific commitment to sign a peace agreement with Israel if Israel were willing to give the commitment about withdrawal for which the Resolution had asked. We would have applauded such a commitment from Israel but she proved at that time unable to give it.

Dr Jarring then withdrew and the Americans took up the running basing their new approaches on President Sadat's initiative of 4 February when he called for an interim arrangement which would allow the reopening of the Suez Canal in return for a measure of withdrawal by Israeli forces from Sinai, as a step leading to a final settlement.

At Ankara in April I welcomed this proposal and the efforts being made to give it effect. I said that I thought such an agreement could help to reduce tension and go some way towards breaking the present deadlock.

We were glad to see your Government Spokesman's reaffirmation on 24 August that Egypt adheres to President Sadat's initiative. I hope that it will be fruitful and that an arrangement can be negotiated soon. Real benefits would flow to the people of the Suez area and it would serve to build confidence for what in our view must be the next step - a comprehensive settlement. To that Security Council Resolution No. 242 remains the key. There will be opportunities for bilateral discussions shortly in New York where most of the Foreign Ministers concerned will be present. Thereafter I shall be in a better position to judge whether any further initiative would be useful.

In searching for ways to go forward none of us should exclude any path that offers hope of progress, just because in the past we have thought it right to reject it. The experience of history is that apparently insoluble difficulties can be resolved by diplomatic initiative, started by the parties to a dispute, assisted by friends who have a joint interest in peace.

In Europe, where for years we have lived with the threat of conflict between East and West that finds its focus in Berlin, that pattern seemed immutable until the Federal Republic took the

initiative and the Four Powers recognised a common interest in lowering tension. The same Four Powers incidentally who in New York have been trying to find ways to help the parties to a peace agreement on the basis of Resolution 242. And now in Berlin we have a definite prospect of an agreement which will make life very much better for the people of Berlin and which will, I hope, serve to reduce tension in Europe generally.

In all these discussions, whether it be in Europe, in New York or in the Middle East, the security of the parties is the dominating factor. Security which by removing fear of aggression removes the causes of aggression.

In the context of guarantees Britain would consider participating in whatever way seemed appropriate in a United Nations peacekeeping operating to help to secure mutually agreed boundaries in the Middle East, and freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, determined in accordance with the principles of Resolution 242. In this context, I should make clear that as far as Egypt and Israel are concerned that frontier should in our view be the old international frontier subject to whatever arrangements may be agreed for Gaza.

All this amounts, perhaps, to saying one simple thing: that my Government has been, and remains, ready to do everything in its power to help bring about the political settlement, and the state of peace, which is so much in the interests of all concerned.

It is our hope that the re-establishment of trust and friendship between Britain and Egypt will enable us to join in making a constructive contribution towards that overriding purpose.

משור החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי ביותר

מס' 351

שלח 212100 ספט 71

אל: המשור

מאת: ביו יורק

מ י י י

קומי/לובדון (הועבר במס' 179).

דפ: מנכל, לוריא.

עליכ להסביר לסר אלק בשמי כי קבלתי את הודעותיו ואשמח לדון
זן בהרחבה אם חובת גלוי הלב מחייבת אותך למסור בשם ממשלתך
ובמידה בשם שהיח כי נוצרה אוריה המפחיתה במידה ניכרת את
יכולתה של ממבריתניה לתרום לקידום השלום.
להופעותיו של סר אלק בקהיר היו הדימ חזקים בישראל. הגורם
העקרי בתודעת שהיח וחבריו הוא האפתעה. אנחנו לא עשינו דבר
העלול להפריע לחיזוק קשרי בריטניה-מצרים. לקראת ביקורו של
אלק תימנו תיאור מדויק של עמדותינו ועודדנו אותו לכרז את
מהלכיה של מצרים ומגמותיה. היה לנו רושם כי סר אלק שותף לדעתנו
בדבר יתרונות הדיפלומטיה השקטה המבוססת על מסורת של
RETICIENCE. אילו נקט מהלך זה (כפי שעשו שאר שהחיים
של אירופה שביקרו לאחדונה במצרים ובישראל) היה מתווסף גורם
נוסף בעל כושר לעודד הדברות. במקום זה הופתענו עיי נאומים,
יילומים וראיונות שהפכו ביקור זה לפומבי ביותר וזאת על חשבון
האיזון הדיפלומטי. לא ציפינו לתופעות הבאות:-
א. גלויים מופרזים סמליים ומהותיים של הזדהות עם מצרים והערבים.
ב. הודעה בזכותה של הפדרציה שהכח המניע שלה הוא קדאפי
המתעלל באינטרסים של ישראל ובריטניה כאחת. שעה שהפדרציה מוסכרת
במצע היסוד שלה במונחים התוקפניים ביותר נגד ישראל ונגד ידידים
אחרים של בריטניה. הפדרציה היא קואליציה אנטי-ישראלית ואנטי-
אירופית וקשה לנו להבין לשם מה התלהב ממנה סר אלק בפרהסיא.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ג. הודעה על גבולות ונסיונה וכח אויב במונחים שאינם מקובלים על ישראל והרי מדובר על כטחון ישראל (שאינו בריטניה מסוגלת לסיע בחיזוקו). ישראל נמנעת בצורה SCRUPULOUS מלהתבטא בצורה שלילית על נושאים הנוגעים לאינטרסים של בריטניה והרי יש רכוש של מוקדי מתיחות שבריטניה נתונה בהם.

ד. התייחסות שלילית למדיניות ישראל כנאום הרשמי שנשא על אדמתה של מדינה שלישית. מדובר בהערה שישראל לעומת מצרים לא נתנה התחייבות שהציע יארינג. דבר זה מוכן מאליה כאשר יארינג אימצה במקרה זה את עמדת מצרים מתוך כניעה לסחטנות קהיר העניין הפסקת האש. אך שהיח מבצע פליאה על שביקורת על ישראל הושמעה דווקא בקהיר ובאזני מצרים. שרים אחדים שביקרו במצרים וב ישראל לא הוציאו מלה אנטי-ישראלית מפיהם בקהיר, כפי שלא בקשנו מהם להשמיע או לשמוע מלה פומבית נגד מדינה ערבית כהיחמ ב ישראל.

הדגש שלנו הוא שבריטניה העדיפה את טיפוח האינטרסים הביטורליים שלה על פני שמירת כושר תמרונה המאוזן בנושא השלום. זו זכותה אך עלינו לציין ולרשום לפנינו את המציאות. מכל מקום דמות בריטניה בעיני ישראל היא שונה ממה שהייתה לפני שבועיים והתפתחות כזו לא הייתה הכרחית ונבעה כאמור מגלויים פומביים בביקור ובמיוחד מנאומים וראיונות שנגעו לא ליחסי מצרים-בריטניה כי אם לאינטרסים חיוניים לישראל. עלינו לומר לאלק כי שהיח תמיד דבר עמו בגלוי לב ואימונ ועכשיו HE FEELS LET DOWN

רקע:-

המגמה היא ליצור בסדר אלק תודעה שמתבקש למעשה מאזן ממנו, אם הוא רוצה להיחשב כגורם בעל כושר לתרום לשלום. אם אפשר, יש לזמוז כי מה שקולקל בפרהסיא, חייב לבוא על תיקונו בפרהסיא, כלומר בהודעה או לפחות תידרוכ ובמיוחד תוכן ורוח נאומי בעצרת. הרי ישראל ב-1967 הייתה קרבן למה שסר אלק הגדיר בשעתו בפומבי כ- EGYPT'S PROVOCATIVE WAR והעמ הבריטי כולו נרעש מהסכנה הצפויה לנו. כיצד לא יהיו רישומים למציאות זו בהופעה הרשמית של בריטניה.

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שמואל - מייד
מס' 6.5.71/17

י
ז
י

אל : ביירנבי

מאת : המשרד

שלך 6.

א. ראה בא חוזם 392, 30/4.

ב. עוזים. ב-1955 מכר ה-FN הבלגי זכות הייצור לתעשיה דרום אפריקה.
בזמנו לא היתה לנו זכות וטו. דרום אפריקה מייצרת כמות קטנה של עוזים
שאינם בשמוש סדיר.

בינתיים תוקן החוזה עם FN וכל הענקת זכות ייצור זקוקה לאישורנו.

עיצור

W. J. CONROY

W. J. CONROY

W. J. CONROY

W. J. CONROY

W. J. CONROY

33 '00

71 בשלח: 051600 מאי

א ל: המסד

מאת: לורנדר

אפריל ב

בתגובה למאמר קרדון הבוקר בטיימס בו הוא מציע כינוס ועידת שלום בינלאומית אמר דובר הפוראופ היום את הדברים הבאים לייחוס.
זה כמה חודשים סברנו שהתנאים להתקדמות טובים כפי שעוד לא היו
אם מוציאים שכרע כל העדיפות מגיעה למאמצים רוגרס.
סבורים שיוזמת יארינג בפברואר היתה לונה ואינן לגרוס שיוזמה זו עבר
עליה הכלה. תשכנו שבמועד מסוים יהיה דרוש לכנס את הצדדים בסכסוך
בנוכחות אחרים אך איננו סבורים שהגענו לנקודה זו

לא לייחוס - לא ברור מן המאמר אם בועידה צריכים להשתתף ה-4 או כל חברי מועצת.

הפוראופ מניח שנוכחות ה - 4 חיוניות להשגת הסכמה מצדית להשתתף.
הדבר נראה גם רצוי בגלל הערוכות שה- 4 יצטרכו
לחת לכול הסדר. הפוראופ מניח שהמצרים שקלו רעיון כזה. שהח סרב להגיב
כשנשאל על ידי עתונאי על תגובתו לוועידה בינלאומית דוגמת זו
שנחקיימה ב- 1954 בגנבה בענייני הודו-סין.

סר אלק הנציר בנאום הרב י"ט ש"ש לקחת בחשבון את השאיפות המדיניות
של הפלשטינאים אך הדעי"ון שיוצגו השמ"ת בועידה כזאת מערימ קשי"מ רב"מ
הפלשטינאים לא הצליחו לגבש הנהגה ייצוגית וכל דובר שייכחד
הפוכ לשופרת של הקיצוני"ם ומתנגדי"ם ל-242
ולחסד בדרכי שלום.
נוסח אנגלי מלא בד"פ.

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משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסוג

ס ו ד י - ב י ר ת ר

חוזם : 312

נשלח: 25.4.71

אל : לונדון העתק פאריס

מאת : המשדד

מ י י ד י

קומי, העתק פאריס. אנא העבר תשובה שהח למכתבו של סיר אלק במכתובת העברת מכתבו
הוא אל שהח היינו בצרוף מכתב לואי שלך. להלן נוסח התשובה:

THANK YOU FOR INFORMING ME OF YOUR VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE ENSUE SINCE OUR DISCUSSION IN LONDON MARCH 15. AS YOU KNOW THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPECIAL AGREEMENT INVOLVING THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO NAVIGATION IS NOW BEING ACTIVELY EXPLORED. ISRAEL AND THE UAR HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT BUT THEY DIFFER WIDELY ON ITS TERMS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U S WITH THE CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT. WE HAVE GIVEN YOUR AMBASSDOR A CONFIDENTIAL OUTLINE OF THE MAIN CONDITIONS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER SUCH A PLAN. CLEARLY IF WE MAKE THE CONCESSION OF OPENING THE CANAL AND REMOVING OUR FORCES THE LEAST THAT CAN BE EXPECTED IS THAT OUR SECURITY WILL NOT BE PREJUDICED. THE ISRAEL APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION ILLUSTRATES OUR SERIOUS AND CONCRETE INTEREST IN AGREED MEASURES OF PREVENTING WAR AND CREATING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS. THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE WILL HAVE A DEEP EFFECT ON ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT UAR INTENTIONS ARE AND A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR IDEAS FOR A SUEZ CANAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE OUR SECURITY OR OUR POLITICAL NEGOTIATING POSITION WOULD DO MUCH TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. ON THE BROADER ISSUE EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS HAVE BECOME LESS PROMISING SINCE WE MET IN MARCH. SINCE THEN THE UAR HAS DECLINED OUR PROPOSAL FOR DETAILED NEGOTIATION ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTIONS. HAS JOINED WITH LIBYA AND SYRIA IN A DECLARATION WHICH IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH ANY SERIOUS INTEREST IN PEACE AND CO-EXISTENCE. AND CONTINUES TO THREATEN TO BRING THE CEASE FIRE TO AN END. AS YOU KNOW IT IS A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF OUR POSITION ON BOUNDARIES THAT THE SITUATION TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER A PEACE SETTLEMENT MUST BE NEGOTIATED. THIS VIEW IS BASED ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENT. ON THE FACT THAT ISRAEL'S BOUNDARIES WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS HAVE NEVER BEEN PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED. AND ON THE FACT THAT OUR AGREEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THE JARRING MISSION WAS OBTAINED ON THE SPECIFIC

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

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ASSURANCE THAT SUCH ACCEPTANCE DID NOT INVOLVE EVACUATION OF ALL THE TERRITORIES", AND THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE PRE JUNE 5 ARMISTICE LINES WAS DELIBERATE. ABOVE ALL THE PRE JUNE 5 SITUATION IS QUITE INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR SECURITY AND WITH THE NEED TO PREVENT A NEW WAR. IN YOUR LETTER YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT BY PROVIDING THE EGYPTIANS THROUGH JARRING, WITH A STATEMENT OF OUR POSITION ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES THE WAY MIGHT BE OPENED TO A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE. THE UAR ATTITUDE MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE ON WHAT SUCH A HOPE IS BASED. IF THERE IS NO TERRITORIAL NEGOTIATION TODAY IT IS BECAUSE THE UAR DENIES AND REJECTS THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATING THE BOUNDARY QUESTION AND INSISTS INSTEAD ON ISRAEL ACCEPTING THE UAR POSITION OF A PRIOR COMMITMENT. I AM CERTAIN THAT WE SHALL NEVER AGREE TO THIS. FOR ISRAEL TO UNDERTAKE TO PRESENT TO DR JARRING SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS WOULD INVOLVE MY GOVERNMENT IN DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED DECISION. WE SHALL NOT FLINCH FROM DOING THIS WHEN THERE IS A CONTEXT OF A GENUINE NEGOTIATION. BUT IT SEEMS PURPOSELESS TO DO SO AGAINST AN ULTIMATIVE EGYPTIAN AFFIRMATION THAT THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION IS NOT EVEN A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION. THE KEY LIES IN THE AGREEMENT BY THE UAR TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTION. SHORTLY AFTER OUR TALK IN LONDON IN MARCH, I REITERATED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED FOR A DETAILED AND CONCRETE NEGOTIATION ON ALL ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR LETTER. AMBASSADOR JARRING INFORMED US THAT THIS POSITION HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE UAR BUT NO RESPONSE FROM CAIRO HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO US. THE CEASE FIRE WHICH WAS INITIATED LAST AUGUST HAS NOW LASTED NEARLY NINE MONTHS. IT IS IMPORTANT BOTH THAT IT BE MAINTAINED AND THAT CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS BE SOUGHT. I BELIEVE THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF THE CEASE FIRE BY CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF STRONGER CRITICISM IN THE FACE OF EGYPTIAN THREATS TO BRING IT TO AN END. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE SOVIET POLICY OF ARMS ESCALATION. THIS MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO REMOVE ANY HOPE OR PROSPECT THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION WILL BECOME POSSIBLE THROUGH AN IMPAIRMENT IN THE BALANCE OF ISRAEL'S STRENGTH. THE CEASE FIRE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROLONGED IN THE PAST AND WILL NOT ENDURE IN THE FUTURE BUT FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY POSITION BY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. TO SUM UP I BELIEVE THAT THE DAYS LYING IMMEDIATELY AHEAD SHOULD BE USED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SPECIAL CANAL AGREEMENT. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE LINE WHICH THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES WILL HOLD IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS NOT CONSIDERED FINAL AND THAT WHEN AGREEMENT ON A FINAL BOUNDARY

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מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

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IS REACHED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ISRAEL
WOULD WITHDRAW TO IT. WE HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THE SPECIAL AGREEMENT WOULD NOT, IN ANY WAY AFFECT OUR
AGREEMENT TO PROCEED WITH CONVERSATIONS
UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
PERMANENT PEACE.

I AM THEREFORE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAEL POSITION
CONTAINS MANY ELEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH FURTHER MOVEMENT
IS POSSIBLE. WE ARE ACTIVELY EXPLORING A SUEZ CANAL ARRANGEMENT.
WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR READINESS FOR A FREE, CONCRETE AND
DETAILED NEGOTIATION ON ALL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THAT OF BOUNDARIES
AND WE ARE FIRM IN SUPPORT OF PERMANENTLY MAINTAINING THE CEASE FIRE
IF THESE THREE THINGS COULD BE SAID OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION
THE PROSPECTS WOULD BE BRIGHTER. ANYTHING THAT COULD BE DONE TO
INDUCE A POSITIVE UAR APPROACH ON ALL OF THEM
WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

ל י ר א

שרת דורה אלון דיין סגל לוריא גזית אבנר ענוג/אירופה ב הדס מאור ב רם ר/אסד

חא / אב



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16/4/71 15/15
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BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

14 April, 1971

My Dear Minister,

The Foreign Secretary has asked me to pass you the attached personal message.

If you would like to discuss it, I am of course at your disposal at any time.

Yours sincerely

John Barnes

(E.J.W. Barnes)

Mr. Abba Eban,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

When we met in London on March 15th, I told you of my belief that the present time was particularly favourable for progress in the exchanges between Israel, the U.A.R. and Jordan. I felt that I should write to you now to tell you of my continuing conviction that this is so, but that this favourable opportunity cannot be expected to last indefinitely. Already we have begun to see signs of an increasingly fatalistic attitude in the U.A.R. regarding the apparent impossibility of further progress towards a settlement. The development of such attitudes of mind, if allowed to continue, surely cannot serve the interests of anyone in the Middle East. Furthermore, minor breaches of the ceasefire on the canal are indications that the situation on the ground may again be beginning to deteriorate: so perhaps are the recent events in Jordan.

I naturally respect the view which you have put to me that Israel can afford to maintain her

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

present posture until in your judgement prospects for successful negotiations improve. But this does not seem to me to make it any the less desirable to exploit to the fullest possible extent the present disposition of the U.A.R. leaders to explore the possibility of a peace agreement with you. And in the background there remains the threat, whose reality we have once again seen in recent days, that the persistence of the conflict will bring in its train a deeper and more dangerous Soviet commitment in the U.A.R., which is something which both you and we would wish to avoid.

I therefore earnestly hope that you will weigh carefully the advantages about which I spoke to you of providing to the Egyptians through Jarring a statement of your position on territorial issues in a form which could provide a basis for another move forward in the negotiating process. I fully realise that our views on these issues differ. But I believe, as I told you on March 15th, that Israel's requirements in Sinai as you described them to me could be stated in terms of her need

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

for security, taking the pre-June 1967 lines as a point of departure, in such a way as to open the way to a meaningful dialogue. As you told me the idea of a more limited arrangement on the canal could have attractions for both sides. However, I am not sanguine that a basis for agreement on such a limited arrangement exists. In any case it would in my view be essential for any such arrangement to be a step towards achievement of a comprehensive settlement in accordance with Resolution 242, which could alone lead to peace. I therefore believe that the best hope lies in enabling Jarring to proceed on the basis of his efforts so far.

I look forward to hearing from you your own views on the present situation.

With best wishes.

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN.
LONDON. W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

יב' בניסן תשל"א
7 באפריל 1971

הגנרל
אנדרסן
אל
מאת: הציר לונדון

הח' בביטאון
ב

מצ"ב תמצית נאומו של סר אלק מ-4 באפריל כפי שפורסמה ע"י הפוראופ. בקטע המרכזי הוא חוזר על תפיסתו לגבי שיקומן האפשרי של ערביות חוץ בכל הסדר שיושג במז"ת. אין למעשה חידוש בדבריו.

בברכה,

א. רופין

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EMBARGO: Not for publication, broadcast or use on club tapes
before 12.00 hours BST, Sunday, 4 April 1971

Extracts from a speech to be delivered by the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs at the United Nations Association Annual
General Meeting, Loughborough University

There is today one challenge, in particular, which contains a tantalising opportunity for the United Nations both in peacemaking and peacekeeping. The United Nations has, from its foundation, been closely involved in the problem of the Arab/Israel conflict. It is not simply the interests of the countries of the region which are at stake. The international community as a whole, and, in particular, the major powers are closely concerned.

There is no doubt that after all the history of Middle-East conflict and the absence of trust between Israel and the Arabs, that the United Nations and its Charter provide the best available framework within which to seek a just and lasting settlement. The main achievement of the United Nations since the fighting in 1967, has been the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 242. This is still the only basis for a settlement which has been generally agreed by the parties themselves and by the vast majority of the membership. This was an example of the Security Council at its best.

Britain played a leading part in negotiating that resolution. Since its adoption we have fully supported the patient efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Dr Jarring, to promote agreement between the parties in accordance with its provisions. In the meetings of the four Permanent Members of the Security Council in New York, we have also been engaged in the search for means to reinforce Dr Jarring's efforts. In all this we have had very much in mind the contribution the United Nations could make towards under-pinning, in its initial period, any peace settlement reached between the parties.

./.

ENGLISH: Not for publication, broadcast or use on other tapes
before 12.00 hours EST, Sunday, 4 April 1971

Excerpts from a speech to be delivered by the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs at the United Nations General Assembly
General Meeting, Longwood University

There is today one challenge, in particular, which contains a
centralising opportunity for the United Nations both in
peacekeeping and peacekeeping. The United Nations has, from its
foundation, been closely involved in the problem of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It is not merely the interests of the countries
of the region which are at stake. The international community
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conflict and the progress of peace between Israel and the Arabs,
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Since its adoption we have fully supported the peace efforts
of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. U Thant,
to promote agreement between the parties in accordance with the
provisions. In the meetings of the four permanent members of the
Security Council in New York, we have also been engaged in the
search for means to reinforce Mr. U Thant's efforts. In all this
we have had very much in mind the contribution the United Nations
could make towards reaching a settlement. In the initial period, any
peace settlement reached between the parties.

It is fundamental that the parties must by one method or another agree between themselves on the issues in dispute. Only such an agreement can lay the foundations for true peace and stability in the region. For example without agreement between the parties on frontiers there is nothing tangible and stable for others to guarantee.

In the Middle East, given the mutual suspicion and hostility of the last 25 years, there are bound to be difficulties in the early years following a settlement. It is here that the international community has a part to play in helping to create the conditions of confidence which are essential to a peace which will hold.

We believe that a United Nations peacekeeping force, rightly constituted, could provide that essential sense of security for both sides. Such a force could have several rôles. It should almost certainly be responsible for protecting the regime of the demilitarised zones which would be established by the settlement, and observing any attempts to violate that régime. But a force could also provide a reliable deterrent to potential military action in specific areas which past experience has shown to be especially sensitive.

We should profit from the mistakes of the past. A future peacekeeping force in the Middle East must not be withdrawn, except through a positive resolution of the Security Council. That would mean that each of the Permanent Members would have to agree. Britain would be prepared to consider participating in a United Nations peacekeeping operation of this kind in the Middle East in whatever way seemed appropriate at the time. The United States and French Governments have also indicated their willingness to contribute to such an operation. It is for the Russians to say what they would do.

It is fundamental that the parties must by one method or another agree between themselves on the issues in dispute. Only such an agreement can lay the foundation for firmness and stability in the region. For example, without agreement between the parties on frontiers there is nothing tangible and stable for others to

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We believe that a United Nations peacekeeping force, rightly constituted, could provide that essential sense of security for both sides. Such a force could have several roles. It should almost certainly be responsible for protecting the regime of the Golan Heights and areas which would be separated by the settlement and observing its activities to ensure that it is not a threat to the peace. It would also provide a reliable deterrent to military action in areas where there is a risk of a return to hostilities.

We should guard against the mistake of the past. A future peacekeeping force in the Middle East must not be withdrawn except through a positive resolution of the Security Council. That would mean that each of the permanent members would have to agree. Britain would be prepared to consider participating in a United Nations peacekeeping operation of this kind in the Middle East in whatever way seemed appropriate at the time. The United States and French Governments have also indicated their willingness to contribute to such an operation. It is for the Russians to say what they would do.

The countries in the Middle East must, of course, themselves decide what kind of guarantees they would require and support. It may be that, with the agreements they will reach among themselves, the need for external guarantors will be reduced to a minimum. But a force composed of powerful countries, willing to contribute to the security of all the countries in the area, could give the confidence which is so often absent from bilateral settlements, at least in the early stages.

It is by its handling of issues such as this that the United Nations will be judged. It is our hope that a success in the Middle East would in some measure dispel the disillusion that has become so noticeable in New York, and that it could stimulate the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to tackle other dangerous situations in a manner that would fulfil the hopes of San Francisco and the aspirations of the Charter,

NEWS DEPARTMENT
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4 April 1971

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to contribute to the security of all the countries in the area,
could give the countries which have been denied these
settlements, at least in the early stages.

It is by its handling of issues such as this that the United
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United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to tackle
other dangerous situations in a manner that would fulfill the
hopes of Ben Yehuda and the restoration of the Jewish state.

NEW ORLEANS
Foreign and Consular Affairs

4 April 1954

ב
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON, W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091



שגרירות ישראל

לונדון

25.3.71

אל: מנחם אנדלסון ב'

בהחלטתו של מנחם אנדלסון
(נא) (המזכיר)

בברכות מאת

With the Compliments of

מנחם

מנחם
(המזכיר)
אל

Parliament; and whether he will take action to prevent this in the future.

Mr. Rippon: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has frequent routine contacts with the Press on a wide range of subjects. In the course of these, officials have responded to questions from the Press about my broadcast on 2nd March. I am not aware of anything which has occurred in these exchanges which in any way restricts the rights of hon. Members to ask and obtain answers to Questions.

Egypt and Israel (Visits)

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether, during his projected visit to Egypt this summer, he will seek an opportunity of visiting Israel.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I confirm that I have accepted an invitation from the Government of the United Arab Republic to visit Cairo later this year. I have also accepted in principle an invitation from the Israel Government to visit Israel, at a date to be agreed between our two Governments.

Middle East

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will seek an early opportunity to pay an official visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to discuss with the Soviet Government outstanding political and economic problems and the situation in the Middle East, so far as it affects the position of Israel and countries of the Arab bloc of nations.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Last October I discussed all these subjects with Mr. Gromyko, and our exchanges have continued at official level since then. I look forward to taking advantage at an appropriate time of an invitation to visit Moscow, which I have already accepted in principle, to resume discussion of these and other subjects with the Russians.

Official Dinners (Expenditure)

Mr. Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will give, for the most

convenient stated period of time, the amount expended on official dinners at his official residence.

Mr. Godber: Seventeen official dinners were held at No. 1 Carlton Gardens in 1970. The total cost was £3,223.59.

WALES

Large Projects Pool

100. Mr. George Thomas asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he will list the Welsh local authorities who have applied for help from the Large Projects Pool, the amount asked for in each case, and the actual amount granted.

Mr. Peter Thomas:

The information is as follows:

County Area or County Borough	Amount sought £	Amount granted £
Caernarvonshire ...	100,000	—
Cardiganshire ...	78,000	60,000
Carmarthenshire ...	446,500	115,000
Flintshire ...	300,000	—
Glamorgan ...	4,918,500	790,000
Merioneth ...	60,000	—
Monmouthshire ...	852,000	330,000
Montgomeryshire ...	82,000	55,000
Cardiff ...	2,000,000	375,000
Newport ...	1,107,000	475,000
Swansea ...	525,000	—

Hospital Waiting Lists

Mr. Nicholas Edwards asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he is aware that the waiting time for in-patient orthopaedic treatment in South-West Wales hospitals is 14 months, that for tonsils and adenoids in adults it is 13 to 14 months, that for gynaecology it is 10 months at Carmarthen and 17 months at Haverfordwest and that for general surgery it is eight months at Carmarthen and 14 months at Haverfordwest; and how these times compare with other areas in Wales and with the average waiting times in England and Wales.

Mr. Peter Thomas: Yes. The Welsh Hospital Board and South-West Wales Hospital Management Committee are considering how best to improve the position. Comparable figures for other areas in England and Wales are not readily available.



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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

י"ט אדר תשל"א
16 מרץ 1971

59

אל: אירופה ב'

מאת: הציר, לונדון

הנדון: בריטניה והמז"ח

בשבוע שעבר קיים סיר אלק מסיבת עיתונאים "לא לייחוס" עם הכתבים הדיפלומטיים. רצ"ב תמצאו תרשומת מדבריו במשובה לשאלות על בעיות המז"ח כפי שתרשמו על ידי שני כתבים שמסרו לנו את הסטנוגרמה שתרשמה בזמן המסיבה. כמו-כן, תמצאו רצ"ב תוכן שיחה שניהל אחד הכתבים עם פקיד גבוה ממשרד החוץ (לא רצה לגלות את זהותו). הכתב הוסיף שדברים דומים מושמעים ע"י הפקידות הגבוהה בהזדמנויות שונות, יותר בצורת הרהורים מאשר תזריך פורמלי. יחד עם זה ברור שהדברים משקפים נאמנה הלך מחשבה מסוים במישורים הגבוהים של הפוראוף.

הדברים הובאו לידיעת שה"ח לפני פגישתו עם סיר אלק.

בברכה,

א. דופין

העתק: מר א. לוריא, יועץ מדיני לשה"ח
מר מ. גזית, סמנכ"ל

PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY

March 10, 1971 - Not For Attribution

Question: Is there any initiative which Britain could take on the Middle East?

Answer: At the moment it is best to pursue our contacts through quiet diplomacy. Since Mr. Riad was here we have been in very close touch with the Egyptians all the time. Our talks with Israel are very regular. Mr. Eban comes here next week. In the Four Power talks we have begun to talk about guarantees. We have been quite keen on this ourselves for some time because we think not that guarantees could be a substitute for an agreement on frontiers. But they could be a very important element in enabling Israel to feel secure, both sides to feel secure, particularly Israel. In the Four Powers we are discussing what kind of guarantees might usefully be used. We have taken a prominent part in this discussion. I do not think there is any public initiative that would help at the moment. One watches to see if there is a chance of a British initiative which would help to break the log jam at present.

And the log jam at present is that it is quite plain that the Egyptians have come forward with a positive statement that they will be prepared for a negotiated settlement leading to peace with Israel, and they have spelled out an interpretation of what they mean by this. It is something the Egyptians have not done before. The Israelis are willing to negotiate about withdrawal, but so far they have said they are not willing to start the negotiation from the base line of 1967. And this is causing at the moment the hold up. I do not know the best way to break that hold up. I think it is primarily for Dr. Jarring. We will give him any help we can or he asks for. I shall have a chance to talk this over with Mr. Eban. I do not think I have any more to say about it at the moment.

Question: How far was the British text of Resolution 242 definitive on the territorial question?

Answer: It is quite clear that no settlement can be dictated. The only thing that anybody outside Israel, Egypt and Jordan can do - and Syria - is really to help to get the parties together. And the only way they will get together is through Dr. Jarring. So any proposals we have to make, if we felt there were any proposals in relation to frontiers or demilitarized zones or anything like that, the proper way to make these is through Dr. Jarring. If we should feel, that is, there is a real contribution to be made.

Question: Has Dr. Jarring got himself into difficulties because he did not conform with the text of Resolution 242 (on territorial adjustments and withdrawal)?

Answer: In so far as we have said anything about territorial adjustments, if you look up my Harrogate speech. This did assume rightly or wrongly that you have got to start from some basis before you know how adjustments are going to be made. The most convenient base to start from - in fact there is no other in relation to Egypt and Israel - is the 1967 frontier. If small adjustments are to be made, I think that is the most convenient base from which to start. Otherwise you have to start de novo and it becomes much more than an adjustment. Either that, or Israel will have to specify the frontier anew. And this definition will have to be conveyed to the Egyptians and then debate can begin. So I think everybody assumes, or I would have thought most people assume when the Israelis withdraw to what they call secure frontiers, that this was probably the point of departure, that the adjustments would be made from the 1967 frontier. If there is any other way that the Israelis can get the Egyptians to accept, well and good. I doubt that there is in fact such a way. I thought the most realistic way is 1967. However, I shall talk about that with Mr. Eban.

Question: About security guarantees and a peace keeping force. Do you think the Russians and Americans should take part in it. And do you think it should be on both sides of the new frontiers of Israel?

Answer: It is very difficult to visualise a peace settlement unless there are demilitarised zones. And in those demilitarised zones you would either have United Nations observers in certain places, and in certain places perhaps you would have to have United Nations troops. It is rather difficult to forecast what the parties to the agreement would want. They might want observers on one part of the frontier, and they might want a United Nations force on other parts. Therefore I think we ought to be prepared to give guarantees through the United Nations. The thing to do is to find out what they want first of all, and then to see if you can supply it.

As the Israelis pay a lot of attention to their American contact, and the Egyptians pay a lot of attention to the Russians, it is rather difficult to think of a guarantee force that does not contain both of those powers.

Question: On both sides?

Answer: Yes, I think that will be required, though Israel is a very small country with very little space. Yes, I think there would have to be an element on both sides.

FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Wednesday, March 10, 1971

not for attribution

OIL

Question: Whether Britain had contingency plans in case Libyan supplies were cut off.

Answer: Yes, but you had better address this question to Davies. The new Teheran agreement has put an extra £100 million on to the British balance of payments. This year the extra burden will amount to between £50-60 million - by 1975 it will rise to £100 million and more.

Question: Would this mean that, in the event of the U.K. entering the Common Market that would mean an extra contribution to Common Market Funds.

Answer: Yes. We have advised the Libyan Government that if they put up the price of oil too high, they would be cutting their own throat. Consumer countries would be compelled to look for alternative sources of supply and alternative sources of power. In addition such an action would impose an additional burden on to the economies of the developing countries. There are, of course, some valuable aspects in the agreement: the five year duration of the agreement will have a stabilizing effect and if this continues it will mean the oil companies can plan ahead with reasonable certainty. However, if the Lybians were to go wild and to make things harder for the producers it could have an infectious effect. It could produce difficulties for the Arab countries which participated in the Teheran agreement. They would find it hard to sustain their position if the Lybians were to insist upon and obtain a higher price. Alternatively if they were to cut off supplies, it would take strong nerves on the part of the other Arab countries to maintain supplies indefinitely.

FROM HIGH F.O. OFFICIALS - ON MIDDLE EAST

The present situation is fragile and dangerous. It is important that the Big Four should continue to be as active as possible. If the present deadlock continues, there is danger of the whole thing going back to the Security Council and a new resolution might undermine 242.

Also time is of the essence. If nothing happens until September, when the next General Assembly begins, it may be too late. The next General Assembly may well bring Chinese admission to the United Nations and the Security Council and they would then claim their place together with the other Four. They would take a strident pro-Palestinian guerrilla posture and this would complicate the whole situation and make progress extremely difficult. Even if this did not happen, by the end of 1971 we would be in the United States pre-election period and the administration would be severely handicapped in its freedom of manoeuvre. These considerations should impress both sides to make haste.

משדד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

סודי ביותר

מס' ח/135
נשלח 15.4.71

אל : לונדון, ביו יורק, וושינגטון
מאת: המשדד

מ י י ד י

קומי. העתק תקופ. רבין.

להלן נוסח השדר האישי משה לשה עליו סיפר קראו לתקופ (שלנו 155,93 מני)
במסד אתמול ע"י ברנס ללוריא. ברנס לא הציג הענין כדחוף. למעשה הוכן השדר
עוד לפני שבוע אך מסירתו עוכבה בגלל החג.
לאמור:

WHEN WE MET IN LONDON ON MARCH 15TH, I TOLD YOU OF MY BELIEF
THAT THE PRESENT TIME WAS PARTICULARLY FAVOURABLE FOR PROGRESS
IN THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN ISRAEL, THE U.A.R AND JORDAN.
I FELT THAT I SHOULD WRITE TO YOU NOW TO TELL YOU MY CONTINUING
CONVICTION THAT THIS IS SO, BUT THAT THIS FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY
CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO LAST INDEFINITELY.
ALREADY WE HAVE BEGUN TO SEE SIGNS OF AN INCREASINGLY FATALISTIC
ATTITUDE IN THE U.A.R. REGARDING THE APPARENT IMPOSSIBILITY
OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH ATTITUDES OF MIND, IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE
SURELY CANNOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ANYONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
FURTHERMORE, MINOR BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE ON THE CANAL ARE
INDICATIONS THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND MAY AGAIN BE
BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE: SO PERHAPS ARE THE RECENT EVENTS IN JORDAN

I NATURALLY RESPECT THE VIEW WHICH YOU HAVE PUT TO ME THAT
ISRAEL CAN AFFORD TO MAINTAIN HER PRESENT POSTURE UNTIL IN YOUR
JUDGMENT PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS IMPROVE.
BUT THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO MAKE IT ANY THE LESS DESIRABLE
TO EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF
THE U.A.R. LEADERS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACE AGREEMENT
WITH YOU.

1954-4-11

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BUT THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO MAKE IT ANY THE LESS DESIRABLE

TO EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT THE PRESENT DISPOSITION

THE U.S. LEADERS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACE AGREEMENT

WITH YOU

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

-2-

IN THE BACKGROUND THERE REMAINS THE THREAT, WHOSE REALITY WE HAVE ONCE AGAIN SEEN IN RECENT DAYS, THAT THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CONFLICT WILL BRING IN ITS TRAIN A DEEPER AND MORE DANGEROUS SOVIET COMMITMENT IN THE U.A.R., WHICH IS SOMETHING WHICH BOTH YOU AND WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID.

I THEREFORE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT YOU WILL WEIGH CAREFULLY THE ADVANTAGES ABOUT WHICH I SPOKE TO YOU OF PROVIDING TO THE EGYPTIANS THROUGH JARRING A STATEMENT OF YOUR POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES IN A FORM WHICH COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ANOTHER MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I FULLY REALISE THAT OUR VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES DIFFER.

BUT I BELIEVE, AS I TOLD YOU ON MARCH 15TH, THAT ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS IN SINAI AS YOU DESCRIBED THEM TO ME COULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF HER NEED FOR SECURITY, TAKING THE PRE-JUNE 1967 LINES AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OPEN THE WAY TO A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE. AS YOU TOLD ME THE IDEA OF A MORE LIMITED ARRANGEMENT ON THE CANAL COULD HAVE ATTRACTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, I AM NOT SANGUINE THAT A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT ON SUCH A LIMITED ARRANGEMENT EXISTS.

IN ANY CASE IT WOULD IN MY VIEW BE ESSENTIAL FOR ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT TO BE A STEP TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242, WHICH COULD ALONE LEAD TO PEACE.

I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST HOPE LIES IN ENABLING JARRING TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF HIS EFFORTS SO FAR.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU YOUR OWN VIEWS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION.

WITH BEST WISHES.

עד כאן.

אירופה ב

הח רוחם מנכל אלון דיין לוריא בזעב ששמן מרון ספא מאמב איר ב הר דס אמן

07

מוזכר

אל :	מר מ. גזית, סמנכ"ל
מאת :	אורי גורדון, סגן מנהל פא"ם ב'
אל :	
מאת :	

הנדון: הנוסחה from territories בהחלטה 242

להלן הנייר שהכנתי לפי בקשתך.

היפסתי הוכחות לגירסתנו בנושא הנידון על יסוד הדיונים באו"ם שקדמו לקבלת החלטה 242. מפורטים בזה נסיונות הערבים וידידיהם להעביר הצעות החלטה נגדנו. תחילה ניסו בטועבי"ט ביוני 1967. כשנכשל נסיונם שם פנו מייד לעצרת החרום ושם טוב נהלו מספר כשלונות בזה אחר זה. ושוב ניסו בטועבי"ט בנובמבר 1967. מאמציהם בנובמבר להעביר הצעות הקוראות לפינוי מלא של הטטחים לא עלו בידם. לבסוף ובלית ברירה, העדיפו את הנוסחה הבריטית על המשכת המצב של העדר כל החלטה.

הנוסחה שהתקבל לא כלל כל זכר לנושא להיכן על הכוחות הישראליים לסגת, וזה לא מפאת טכחה. היו כמה נסיונות של הערבים ותומכיהם לפרט זאת כגון: "אל מעבר לקווי שה"ן" או "לעמדותיהם שטלפני 5.6.67".

הנוסחה שהתקבל לא כלל הביטוי from all the territories אשר גם אותו ניסו הערבים ותומכיהם לעייל. הנוסחה לא כלל אפילו את הא הידיעה the territories וגם זאת לא מתוך שכהה.

פירוט נסיונותיהם של הערבים ותומכיהם להנחיל עמדותיהם לאו"ם וכשלון נסיונות אלה מראה כי העדר כל הניסוחים הללו מהחלטה 242 הוא בהחלט meaningful.

הנייר אינו מטפל בניהוח הקשר בין הנוסחה הנדונה ובין משפטים אחרים בהחלטה שיש להם השלכות על הנושא הטריטוריאלי, אלא מצטמצם ככל האפשר בהבהרה הרקע לנוסחה FROM TERRITORIES

1. נסיון בטועבי"ט - יוני 1967

ביום 13.6.67 הביא הנציג הסובייטי בפני מועבי"ט הצעת החלטה שבין השאר כללה סעיף ברור מאוד בענין הנסיגה. הסעיף אומר:

"The Security Council,

...

2. Demands that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those States (i.e. UAR, Jordan and Syria. - U.G.) and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreement."

(S/PV.1358, p. 25)

הצעת ההחלטה הסובייטית כולל הסעיף הנדון לא התקבלה על-ידי המועצה.

משרד החוץ

סיווג

מזכר

א ל :

מאת :

א ל :

מאת :

- 2 -

נסיונות בעצרת החירות יולי 1967

2.

בעצרת זו נדחו 4 הצעות החלטה שכללו קריאות לפינוי מכל השטחים. כולן נדחו בישיבה 4.7.67.

הערה: מוצע להסתייג בהזכרה העובדה הנ"ל כדוגמא לנסיונות שנכשלו בנקודה זו. אולם לא להרחיב הדבור בנושא זה כי: (1) בעוד ששלוש הצעות החלטה היו של חומכי הערבים הידועים הרי אחת היתה הצעה של 21 מדינות מאמל"ט ומוטב אולי לא להזכיר זאת טוב עתה. (2) דומה שלא רצוי להבליט הערך של החלטות עצרת שכן ב-4.11.70 קבלה העצרת החלטה שאיננו מקבלים אותה.

לידיעה בלבד להלן הטקסטים הרלוונטיים מ-4 הצעות ההחלטה שנדחו:

א. הצעה בריה"מ (A/L. 519)

2. Demands that Israel should immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces from the territory of those States (i.e. U.A.R., Syria and Jordan. - U.G.) to positions behind the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as stipulated in the General Armistice Agreements, and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the Armistice Agreements;

ב. הצעה של מספר מדינות מאסיה, מאפריקה ויוגוסלביה (A/L. 522/Rev. 3)

1. Calls upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967:

3/...

מזכר

אל :	אל :
מאת :	מאת :

- 3 -

ג. הצעה אלבניה (A/L.521)

3. Insistently demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories of the U.A.R., the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan.

ד. הצעה ההלטה של 21 מדינות באמל"ס (A/L.523/Rev.1)

1. Urgently requests:

(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict.

3. נסיונות בטועבי"ס - נובמבר 1967

הדיון שבסיומו התקבלה ההלטה מס. 242 כונס לפי בקשת מצרים שהוגשה בצורה אגרה ס-7.11.67 לנשיא מועבי"ס. באגרה נאמר:

"I have the honour, ... to request the convening of the Security Council in an urgent session to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied...

(S/8226)

כלומר במרכז הבקשה המצרית לדיון עמד רצון מצרים המנוקס בבהירות ובהגיגות שישראל תבצע נסיגה from all the territories. השוואת הבקשה המצרית עם ההלטה שלבסוף קבלה מועבי"ס מצביעה על כשלונה של מצרים. אולם לפני שנחלה כשלון זה מידי המועצה נעשו על-ידי מצרים וידידיה נסיונות עקשניים לעייל את עמדתם. כנאומם במועצה ב-9.11.67 אמר נציג מצרים כי חובה על המועצה להכריח את ישראל to return to the positions held before

5 June. (S/PV.1373, pp. 63-65)

ב-7.11.67 הגישו הודו, מאלי וניגריה הצעה ההלטה פרו-ערבית אשר בנושא הנסיגה אמרה - Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict.

(S/8227)

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א ל :

מאת :

- 4 -

בו כיום הגישו גם האמריקנים הצעת החלטה (S/8229) אשר בנושא הנדון דרשה
... withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories,

... והכרה וכיבוד הדדיים של זכות כל מדינה באזור ל . . .
secure and recognized boundaries.

במשך ימים מספר נמסכו דיונים במועצה ומאחרי הקלעים בלי שהגבש רוב להחלטה כלשהי.
המוצאה יכללה להיות שלא התקבל שום החלטה.

ב-16.11.67 הגיש הלורד קרדון נציג בריטניה את הצעת ההחלטה שלו שהפכה ב-22.11.67
להחלטה 242. על מה שהתרחש מאחורי הקלעים אחרי הישיבה בה הגיש קרדון את הצעתו, קוראים
אנו בספרו של Arthur Lall לטעבר שגריר הודו באו"ם:

V.V. Kuznetsov at once met with the Arab delegates, who told him that the
formulation on the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the first operative paragraph
of the British draft was not acceptable to them. They insisted that the wording
read either that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from "all the territories",
instead of "territories" occupied by Israel, or that Israel would "withdraw to the
positions of 4 June 1967". In Addition, the Arabs were unwilling to accept the
phrase "recognized boundaries" also occurring in the first operative paragraph.

...

The Arab states met on the morning of November 17 and took a dramatic decision...
The Arabs concluded that it was better to get a resolution backed by all fifteen votes
in the Council than to insist on a resolution which might not be adopted or which
might obtain the bare minimum of nine votes. Several of them discussed matters
with Caradon. Could he not use the formulation "all the territories" instead of
"territories" in relation to the clause requiring Israel's withdrawal? Caradon's
response was that his draft represented a delicate balance which would be upset by
any changes.

(The UN and The Middle East Crisis, 1967. Arthur Lall. Columbia
University Press, 1968, pp. 253-4)

א ל :	א ל :
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- 5 -

נראה שהערבים וידידיהם לא השלימו עם הנוסח הבריטי וב-20.11.67 ארבעה ימים אחרי שהוגשה ההצעה הבריטית הגישו הסובייטים הצעה משלהם. בנוסח הנסיגה אמרה הצעה חדשה - 17

"2. (a) The parties to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June 1967".

(S/8253)



הגשת ההצעה הסובייטית ובעיתוי זה מפגינה הפער בינה ובין ההצעה הבריטית ודאי לא נעלם מהסובייטים כי יש הבדל בין דרישת הנסיגה שלהם ובין דרישת הנסיגה from territories נראה למשל כיצד הבין קוזנצוב בעת דיוני המועצה שקדמו לקבלת ההלטה 242 את הביטוי secure and recognized boundaries שהופיע הן בהצעה ההלטה והן בזו הבריטית : "... phrases such as 'secure and recognized boundaries'. What does that mean? What boundaries are these? Secure, recognized -- by whom, for what? Who is going to judge how secure they are? Who must recognize them? ... there is certainly much leeway for different interpretations -- interpretations which retain for Israel the right to establish new boundaries and to withdraw its troops only as far as the lines which it judges convenient. "

(S/PV.1373, p. 112)

הערה: קוזנצוב אמר דברים אלה ביום 9.11.67 בהתייחס להצעה ההלטה האמריקנית. ההצעה הבריטית הוגשה רק כעבור שבוע ב-16.11.67. אולם נראה לי שניתן להשתמש בציטטה זו גם בקשר להצעה הבריטית.

ראוי לצטט כאן מתוך ניהוח השופט י.אולשן בג'רוסלם פוסט מ-17.7.1970 -
... the word "secure" is used and not the word "secured", implying that the boundaries by their very nature are secure boundaries.

6/...



סיווג

מזכר

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- 6 -

כיצד הבין את ההצעה הבריטית שומה נציג סוריה:

... while there is a mention of the withdrawal of Israel forces, this reference is almost nullified by the absence of any time limit or any modus operandi. No clearer proof could be given to illustrate the ambiguity of this withdrawal than its description by Israeli-Zionist sources...

... Even in the very mandate entrusted to the special representative-to-be, the call for withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces is not provided for.

He is merely asked to:

"... proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution."

(S/PV.1382, pp. 8-10)

ברגע האחרון לפני ההצבעה הסביר קרדון

... the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the draft resolution, the whole draft resolution and nothing but the draft resolution.

ידידי הערבים העדיפו את ההצעה הבריטית על העדר כל החלטה ובהצבעה החקבלה ההצעה הבריטית פה אחד. ההצעות האחרות בנושא זה לא הביעו להצבעה. (S/PV.1382, p. 31)

7/...

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- 7 -

"With regard to the formula of withdrawal which in Spanish reads:

we do not believe it entirely reflects a well-defined thought and thus, even though my delegation voted in favour of paragraph 1 (i), we believe a more clear text would have been preferable, and I would refer you to the text that the Latin American delegations submitted to the General Assembly which read:

(S/PV.1382, pp.78-80)

as a result of the ~~xxx~~ recent conflict. (S/PV.13)
 from all the territories/ ~~ההקבלה הנוסחה~~ המעדיף לו ארגונו נציג ארגונו
 territorios ~~אלא הם~~ los territorios הנוסחה שהקבלה אינה

הערה: (1) כך הביין את ההחלטה נציג ארגנטינה בסועצה.

(2) עמדה נציג ברזיל, שהוקעה אחרי ההצבעה, ב-22.11.67, בנקודה הטריטוריאלית הנה:

"I should like to restate, ... the general principle that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and that the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized. ... Its acceptance does not imply that borderlines cannot be rectified as a result of an agreement freely concluded among the interested States. We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighbouring States;

(S/PV.1382, p. 66)

מזכר

אל :	אל :
מאת :	מאת :

- 8 -

(3) בגירסה הספרדית של החלטה 242 שהופצה על-ידי המזכירות נאמר:

Retiro de las fuerzas armadas israelies de los territorios que ocuparon...

(4) לאור דברי שני הנציגים הלטיניים במועבי"ט דומה שההרגום הספרדי של המלים הנדונות היה נאמן למה שכנראה מחייב הסגנון הספרדי הטוב, יותר משהיה נאמן לסכסס האנגלי המקורי כפי שהובן על-ידי נציג לטיני אחד הארגנטיני וכנראה גם כפי שהובן על-ידי הנציג הלטיני השני, הברזילי.

הנ"ל לגבי ההרגום הספרדי.

כפי שהוסבר לי הרי ההרגום הרוסי זהה לנוסח האנגלי.

אשר להרגום הצרפתי ראה להלן.

שלא לצרכי סיעון אלא להשלמת החמונה ראוי להזכיר שלא כמעשה הנציג הארגנטיני, שציין בעניין הנסיגה כי הצביע בעד הנוסח הבריטי שלא כלל הא הידיעה בעוד שהיה מעדיף נוסח אחר הכולל הא הידיעה, הרי היו נציגים שסענו כי הנוסח שהתקבל מדבר על ה - טריטוריות.

נציג צרפת למשל אמר במועצה מייד אחרי ההצבעה:

... the question of the withdrawal of the forces of occupation -- the resolution which has been adopted, if we refer to the French text, which is identical with the English text, leaves no room for any ambiguity since it speaks of withdrawal "des territoires occupés", thus giving a precise interpretation to the expression "territories occupied". Therefore we heard with satisfaction the representative of the United Kingdom stress the link which exists between that paragraph of the resolution and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force.

(S/PV.1382, pp. 58-60)

נציג בריה"מ אמר במועצה אחר ההצבעה -

... we voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by the

אל :

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- 9 -

United Kingdom, and we interpret that draft resolution in the same way as the representative of India, whose views we fully share.

In the resolution adopted by the Security Council, "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" is presented as the first necessary principle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East. That provision which we have adopted we interpret as follows.

It is a matter of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all -- we stress that -- all territories of the Arab States conquered by them as a result of attacks against those States on 5 June 1967. That is confirmed by the fact that in the preamble to the United Kingdom text we find emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Consequently the provision contained in the same draft concerning the right of all the States of the Near East to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries cannot serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israeli forces on any part of the Arab territories conquered by them as a result of war.

דברי הנציג ההודי אליו מחייס הסובייטי, נאמרו עוד לפני ההצבעה. הדברים הם כדלקמן:



It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories -- I repeat, all the territories -- occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967.

(S/PV.1382, p.28)

מובן שהערבים כחומכיהם במועצה ומהוצה לה דבקו ודבקים בגירסה זו בענין סעיף הנסיגה שבהחלטה 242.

הנ"ל הוא הרקע לסיכום דלקמן של Eugene V. Rostow שהיה באותו זמן

US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.



סיווג

מוזכר

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מאת :	מאת :

- 10 -

"... paragraph 1 (i) of the resolution, calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces "from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and not "from the territories occupied in the recent conflict". Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word "the" failed in the Security Council. It is therefore not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the Cease-Fire Resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation Lines." (American Journal of International Law. Vol. 64, 1970, p. 69)

בדבריו במועצה ב-22.11.67 מייד לאחר ההצבעה החליטה שר החוץ לדברי הנציג ההודי ואמר:

The representative of India has now sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying.

(S/PV.1382, p. 51)

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אורי גורדון

העתק:

לשכת השר

לשכת המנכ"ל

מסנה למנכ"ל

מנהל מצפ"א

מנהל הסברה

נאו"ם, ניו-יורק

שגרירות וושינגטון

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

ס ר ד י

מס' 301

בשלח: 18.3.71

אל : המשרד

מאת: ניר יורק

בזית העתק רבין (הועבר).

ה-4.

השגתי פתח מהמשלחת הבריטית שלא לייחס את רישום התבטאויותיהם בישיבות ה-4 מאז 12.2 תקבלו פותקים בדיפ'. להלן קטעים מיוחדים שבסיומם המקורי מוסיף למה שבודע לנו קודם רק בעקיפין.
א. בישיבת 12.2 בקשר לאזורים מפורזים.

ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CREAS REQUIRING DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE WEST BANK. PARTS OF THIS MIGHT NEED TO BE TOTALLY DEMILITARIZED AND SUPERVISED BY U.N. OBSERVERS. OTHER PARTS MIGHT BE "QUALITATIVELY" DEMILITARIZED, IN THE SENSE THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RE - INTRODUCE POLICE AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES. THERE MIGHT NEED TO BE STIPULATIONS ABOUT THEIR EQUIPMENT. ONE OBJECT WOULD BE TO PERMIT THEM TO FULFIL THE COMMITMENTS THEY WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE TO DO THEIR BEST TO PREVENT ALL HOSTILE ACTS' FROM BEING COMMITTED FROM THEIR TERRITORY.

ב. בישיבת 18.2 הוסיף:

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE DEMILITARIZED ZONES ALONG ALL THE BOUNDARIES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANY DEMILITARIZED ZONES WILL BE NECESSARY ANYWHERE ON THE ISRAEL/LEBANON BOUNDARY. WHERE THERE ARE DEMILITARIZED ZONES WE AGREE THAT GARRISON FORCES SHOULD BE STATIONED IN CERTAIN SENSITIVE AREAS TO DENY ACCESS, IF NECESSARY BY FORCE OF ARMS TO THE TERRITORY UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO THE ARMED FORCES OF EITHER SIDE BUT THAT ELSEWHERE MOBILE PATROLS OR EVEN OBSERVERS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. IN DECIDING THE LOCATION OF THESE SENSITIVE AREAS MUCH WOULD OBVIOUSLY DEPEND ON THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES. WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE ZONES IN WHICH OVERFLIGHTS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE PROHIBITED. NOR THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING AREAS INTO WHICH THE ENTRY OF NAVAL FORCES OF THE PARTIES WAS PROHIBITED. AS FOR THE DEPTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES I BELIEVE AMBASSADOR KOSBIUSKO - MORIZET HAS FOUR KILOMETRES IN MIND. WE ARE RATHER DOUBTFUL WHETHER DEMILITARIZED ZONES OF THIS SIZE, EVEN ACCOMPANIED BY RESTRICTIONS ON THE INSTALLATION OF ARTILLERY WITHIN LARGER ZONES, WOULD ADEQUATELY TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PSYCHOL-

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

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ES. CAL. AS OPPOSED TO THE PURELY MILITARY. REQUIREMENTS OF THE
SITUATION. WE AGREE THAT THE SIZE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH GARRISON
FORCES WERE STATIONED WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN
EACH PARTICULAR CASE.

ג. בישיבות 25.2 בקשר למהות ההחלטה שתצטרך מועבים לקבל

כערובה להסכם בין הצדדים:

THE SORT OF RESOLUTIONS WE MIGHT LOOK AT TO PROVIDE SUITABLE
WORDING ARE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 255 (1968) ON THE
TREATY ON THE NON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 16 (1947) ON TRIESTE.

כהנא

שהח3 יוהמ4 מבכל3 אלון דיין לוריא בזית ששון פירון אירופה ב מאומ ב הדס חקר דס א

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Advance text of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's
Speech at the Anglo-Arab Association Dinner on
Tuesday 2 March. 1971

Embargo:

Not for transmission, taping or use in any form before 1600 hours B S T on Tuesday 2 March and then under the following publication embargo:

Not for publication, broadcast or use on club tapes before 2100 hours B S T on Tuesday 2 March.

I hope I have the right credentials to speak to this dinner. As a Scot, I belong to a nation who long ago went into a Union and found it profitable and rewarding - that is, looked at from the smaller country's point of view.

For centuries Britain and Arabia have been attracted to each other. The romantic and the material have each played their part. We have always held in respect the Arab's love of his country and the value which he places on the dignity conferred by independence. Our contacts have been characterised by respect and fair dealing.

The discovery of oil changed the face of Arabia. It opened the prospect of riches for those who owned it and the opportunity for those who consumed it to meet the greedy appetite of industry. If partnership is to be fruitful and profit mutual then the greatest care must be taken to understand each other's needs. Lately the partnership has been prone to crisis. This is apt to be the case where one single commodity dominates the market. In such a situation there is all the more need for political wisdom.

An increasing number of countries are becoming deeply concerned about inflation; Britain is one of them. We are relieved that in the recent negotiations in Tehran rupture was avoided. But the agreement raises wide economic implications for the future and the concern is shared with Western Europe by countries in Africa and Asia.

When the price is pushed up so high there is only one response. It is to explore for further areas of supply and to develop as many other forms of power. I hope that this clear lesson of Tehran has been learned by all.

Mention of oil evokes the area known as the Gulf, an area which exemplified in microcosm the relationship between Britain and the Arabs and Britain and the peoples of the Near East. It was Britain's trade and her trade routes to India and Iran which took our forefathers to the Gulf. It was the need to protect that trade and to provide conditions for peaceful development which led to the establishment there of the system of states under British protection. It was in large part British enterprise and British investment which first discovered and then developed the enormous resources of oil of the region and produced indirectly the great enrichment of the inhabitants.

The system that grew up worked because it was to the benefit of all. But times have changed and it is right that we should be looking at it afresh. I believe nevertheless, that it was wrong to decide three years ago that Britain should withdraw from the area without any provision being made for continuing ties. Not less than other areas of the world, the Gulf area still needs peace and stability; and I believe that Britain, because of our traditional links, has a part to play and a contribution to make in helping to that end.

The consultations we have had since we took office show that the Governments in the area acknowledge this and would welcome our continued practical support. Three years ago the Rulers of the Gulf met and agreed to set up a Union. We all know the difficulties - England and Scotland, Britain and Europe; the dream of Arab union - the path is long and hard. But in the modern world time does not stand still for us and opportunity must be seized.

Yesterday therefore in the House of Commons I listed the range of assistance which the British government could give to a union of Emirates within the framework of a treaty committing us to consult together in time of need.

If this is accepted it will have a symbolic importance for our relations with the whole Arab world. It will signify the arrival at maturity of a relationship that is deeply rooted in a vital period of Arab history. In the last 100 years Britain has been continually involved in the awakening of Arab consciousness. It has been a turbulent period; and the fight for national independence which brought most of the Arab states to being was only the beginning.

Britain's involvement with Arab aspirations left us with a deep sense of national commitment to the states concerned. On Britain's side, at least, friendship has survived the strains and shocks which revolutionary change has brought in Arab countries. It is for the Arab peoples to determine their own form of government. However different that form of government may be from our own Britain does not withdraw the hand of a friend.

In Britain's relationship with Egypt we have been through much travail. We have been able to break out of the restraints. The U.A.R. Ambassador has been single-minded in his pursuit of better relations. Following the visit of Mr Riad to London all of us look forward to a fruitful period ahead for Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Mr Riad left us in no doubt of the sincere desire of his Government for an honourable peace in the Middle East. Since his visit, Dr Jarring has taken a positive initiative to try and identify the essentials for a settlement between Egypt and Israel within the terms of the governing Resolution of the Security Council. These have been welcome developments. The U.A.R. Government has felt able to give clear, unequivocal

and specific commitments on the nature of the peace which the U.A.R. would undertake to keep. Mr Jarring now seeks from Israel a matching commitment on withdrawal within the terms of Resolution 242.

Everyone understands the need for physical security for the State of Israel. It is the task of statesmanship to find the answer which will give confidence. Egypt has risen to the occasion by a public and absolute commitment to live at peace following a negotiated settlement. Patience is difficult when the emotions of years of tension run high but it will be infinitely worth it to achieve peace which is real; and the British Government will continue to do all it can, notably through the Four Power discussions which are now taking place on the important subject of guarantees, to hasten the day of settlement.

Let us then toast Anglo-Arab relations, reconciliation and peace.

NEWS DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

2 March 1971

תאריך 4-3-71

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MARK SEGAL
Jerusalem Post Reporter

One of Britain's most vocal unionists has stressed the importance of amity between British and Israeli labour. Mr. Hugh Scanlon, President of the 1.2 million-strong Amalgamated Engineering and Foundry Workers Union (A.E.F.) — known for his strongly independent and often leftist views, told *The Jerusalem Post* in an interview at the Basle Hotel here that "friendship between the two labour movements was not weakening; on the contrary, it is getting stronger."

The 55-year-old trade unionist visited Israel as guest of the Labour Party, and he spoke on his impressions of the progress in building, defence and industry, "although you can't see 100 per cent of your Gross National Product, which only highlights the need for peace were to be done if peace were to be achieved."

He said he came primarily to discuss social and economic aspects, and himself drawn into discussion of political positions. He concluded, at the end of his visit with Mrs. Scanlon (the wife of this morning) was that Israel has to be recognized as a state that has to have secure borders where they will be a reality.

FOR THE WORKERS

Generally, the trade unionist said, "I feel that the common ground of Arab and Israel workers is stressed. Indeed, the nearest thing to a common ground on this matter is the recent remarks of Premier Begin. He declared: 'I am not pro-Arab, nor pro-British. I am pro-Israel.'"

He said he considered the Histadrut unique, and its functions transposed to the Western world. He declared that in Britain the Labour movement, while giving general support to the Labour Government, is not of government and remained independent, and even oppose the government in such areas as prices and wages. They in Britain believed that unions should not engage in politics, appreciating that Israel needed for a different philosophy.

Mr. Scanlon called on Histadrut leaders Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and his wife, as well as on Secretary-General Arye Eliazar. Ben-Aharon tendered a farewell to the Scanlons.

EXPEDITION

IL18.00

WITH MY AUNT

Greene IL13.50

SIMPLIFIED WORLD CATALOGUE, 1970

IL20.00

ADOR'S JOURNAL

IL37.50

YEAR 2000

Kahn IL28.50

BROWN'S

Israel's Quality Bookshops

35 Allenby Road and Nahlat Benjamin, Tel Aviv

man's own

EMBER 13 ISSUE

STORY: Fashion Cheats

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announced yesterday. The move follows terrorist acts there.

Some of the camp inhabitants moved from structures along the route will be housed in other buildings. It was pointed out that there are more vacant buildings in the camp than are needed for resettlement of the evacuated people.

Brown 'just as optimistic'

Jerusalem Post Reporter

LYDDA AIRPORT. — Deputy British Labour Party leader George Brown left for home yesterday "no less optimistic than when I got here." His five-day stay in Israel was the final stage in a Middle East study tour.

Just before emplaning by El Al with Mrs. Brown, the former Foreign Secretary summed up his trip to reporters by saying: "I am definitely encouraged by what I heard in the talks I held here, and no less optimistic than when I got here." During his regional tour, he avoided making any political statements that might commit him, and he followed this pattern when meeting the many reporters at the airport.

He did say that on return to London he would thoroughly study the material and documents he had accumulated during his mission, and then discuss with his colleagues in the British Cabinet and the Labour Party regarding any new ideas concerning future policy on this region. He once more stressed that he had no official statement to deliver.

Asked about the proper formulation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November, 1967, which he fathered, and whether it was correct to say, as the B.E.C. world service always does, that it speaks of "withdrawal from the territories," instead of "withdrawal from territories," Mr. Brown said:

NO REWRITING


"I wish the B.E.C. and other people would stop rewriting the U.N. resolution. I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the U.N. Security Council. I don't want to say any more about this, except that we had better stick to the original wording of the resolution."

Queried on whether the U.N. had a role in the Middle East, considering the Four-Power talks, the former Foreign Secretary replied: "I was always of the opinion that the U.N. had an important role to play here. When I get back I will determine for myself who should carry out which function."

During his final meetings here with the Labour Party Youth Division and Histadrut leaders, Mr. Brown spoke of the need for Israel to present a plan of its own

own, and to show that it was capable of solving the conflict, and also dwell on the need for "Israel initiatives."

Development Minister Haim Landau came here yesterday to look into security problems at close range.



Mr. George Brown plants tree at Jerusalem's Peace Forest on Sunday in memory of his father-in-law as his wife Sophie looks on. (Photo by Barzilay)

for solving the conflict, and also dwell on the need for "Israel initiatives."

Mr. Brown made his views on the exact text of the Security Council resolution even clearer during his meeting in Jerusalem on Sunday with Arab leaders from Jerusalem, and the administered areas. He told them: "I formulated the Security Council resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied, and not from the territories,' which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories. All the leaders of the Arab countries agreed with this text."

At the meeting Mr. Brown also recalled that he was a secretary to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in 1947 and that at the time he was opposed to the establishment of the State of Israel. "But now Israel is an established fact and you should recognize it and think how to live with Israel instead of wanting to annihilate it."

Leaves Eban's dinner early

Jerusalem Post

Diplomatic Correspondent

Mr. George Brown, known for his temperamental outbursts, prematurely left a dinner at Foreign Minister Eban's residence in Jerusalem on Sunday night after becoming involved in a heated argument. The argument evidently culminated in an exchange with the British Ambassador, Mr. John Barnes, who was also among the score of guests.

Mr. Brown apparently arrived at the dinner in high spirits. After reorganizing the seating plan, he sat down next to Mr. Haim Herzog, the political commentator and reserves brigadier, and argued with him about peace and a "timetable" for an Israeli withdrawal. At one point, he

taken someone else would be smiling. Mr. Brown retorted that this was a "silly answer," to which Mr. Herzog responded that silly questions usually invited silly answers.

The British Ambassador intervened, apparently in the hope of restoring peace, and was told by the former British Foreign Secretary "You must support everything I say."

Mr. Brown asked Mr. and Mrs. Eban's permission to leave for his hotel, declaring that he was very tired. Mrs. Brown, who was upset by the incident, was left behind at the dinner. The Ambassador drove Mr. Brown to the King David Hotel, and then rejoined the dinner.

The dinner was Mr. Brown's last function during his visit.

"Mr. Brown was feeling very tired after his long trip and asked if he might leave immediately after the meal." The Foreign Ministry spokesman in Jerusalem declined to comment.

Asked about the reported incident when he arrived in London yesterday, Mr. Brown said, "I was very tired at the end of a three weeks' journey and I asked my hosts if I could go home to bed and I then went home."

"There was no heated argument; I had no argument with the Israel Foreign Minister. My wife and the British Ambassador stayed at the dinner when I left."

INA reports that the London evening papers carried huge banner headlines on their front

were yesterday. The tribunal here of survivors at the Americas on August 21 be pronounced at a

The accused are Nijma, 50, Bader, 19, and Azmi Mussa of the Fatah. They are placed explosive the Consulate in E the detonators exploded window panes in the

100 Sift from Bee in Bee

Jerusalem Post

BEERSHEBA. — One from Rumania were to synagogues of various national origins in Struma Martyrs' Synagogue, and Rabbi Moshe Rosen were

The Minister of scrolls have been destroyed or evacuated communities. Of these been repaired and cost of IL1,000 each 200 of them to the

Rabbi Rosen revealed offered \$1m. for the Jews — but preferred Israel with a paym

Lake K drops t

TIBERIAS. — The this month 46 cm. below the minimum sea level — this is age of 73.6 million in the lake.

The lake's level is the salinity of the the lower it gets the salinity is likely to crops next summer.

At its peak level the meret was 208.3 meters

Veteran farmers said yesterday that when they ever banana plantations did this year.

RUMANIAN AT BLOME

Jerusalem Post

The Israel National meets the Rumanian exhibition match Jaffa. Kick-off will game will not be In the first match Wednesday, Rumanian

TOURISTS..

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בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

אל: המשרד

מאח: לונדון

מס' 36

נשלח: 031930 מרץ 71

עבוג, מזחים. להלן נוסח חוזר הנוסח המלא של דברי סיר אלק במסגרת אגודת
הידידות בריטניה-ערב לאחר דילוג על ההקדמה. הנוסח כולל ההקדמה, מועבר בדיפ :

AN INCREASING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE BECOMING DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT INFLATION, BRITAIN IS ONE OF THEM. WE ARE RELIEVED THAT IN THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN RUPTURE WAS AVOIDED. BUT THE AGREEMENT RAISES WIDE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND THE CONCERN IS SHARED WITH WESTERN EUROPE BY COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND ASIA.

WHEN THE PRICE IS PUSHED UP SO HIGH THERE IS ONLY ONE RESPONSE. IT IS TO EXPLORE FOR FURTHER AREAS OF SUPPLY AND TO DEVELOP APACE OTHER FORMS OF POWER. I HOPE THAT THIS CLEAR LESSON OF TEHRAN HAS BEEN LEARNED BY ALL.

MENTION OF OIL EVOKES THE AREA KNOWN AS THE GULF, AN AREA WHICH EXEMPLIFIED IN MICROCOSM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN

AND THE ARABS AND BRITAIN AND THE PEOPLES OF THE NEAR EAST. IT WAS BRITAINS TRADE AND HER TRADE ROUTES TO INDIA AND IRAN WHICH TOOK OUR FOREFATHERS TO THE GULF. IT WAS THE NEED TO PROTECT THAT TRADE AND TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS FOR PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT WHICH LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT THERE OF THE SYSTEM OF STATES UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION. IT WAS IN LARGE PART BRITISH ENTERPRISE AND BRITISH INVESTMENT WHICH FIRST DISCOVERED AND THEN DEVELOPED THE ENORMOUS RESOURCES OF OIL OF THE REGION AND PRODUCED INDIRECTLY THE GREAT ENRICHMENT OF THE IMHABITANTS.

THE SYSTEM THAT GREW UP WORKED BECAUSE IT WAS TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL. BUT TIMES HAVE CHANGED AND IT IS RIGHT THAT WE SHOULD BE LLOOKING AT IT AFRESH. I BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS, THAT IT WAS WRONG YO DECIDE THREE YEARS AGO THAT BRITAIN SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA WITHOUT ANY PROVISION BEING MADE FOR CONTINUING TIES. NOT LESS THAN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, THE GULF AREA STILL NEEDS PEACE AND STABILITY, AND I BELIEVE THAT BRITAIN, BECAUSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL LINKS, HAS A PART TO PLAY AND A CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IN HELPING TO THAT END.

THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE HAD SINCE WE TOOK OFFICE SHOW THAT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA ACKNOWLEDGE THIS AND WOULD

-2-

WELCOME OUR CONTINUED PRACTICAL SUPPORT. THREE YEARS AGO THE RULERS OF THE GULF MET AND AGREED TO SET UP A UNION. WE ALL KNOW OF THE DIFFICULTIES - ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, BRITAIN AND EUROPE. THE DREAM OF ARAB UNION - THE PATH IS LONG AND HARD. BUT IN THE MODERN WORLD TIME DOES NOT STAND STILL FOR US AND OPPORTUNITY MUST BE SEIZED.

YESTERDAY THEREFORE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS I LISTED THE RANGE OF ASSISTANCE WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE TO A UNION OF EMIRATES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A TREATY COMMITTING US TO CONSULT TOGETHER IN TIME OF NEED.

IF THIS IS ACCEPTED IT WILL HAVE A SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD. IT WILL SIGNIFY THE ARRIVAL AT MATURITY OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN A VITAL PERIOD OF ARAB HISTORY. IN THE LAST 100 YEARS BRITAIN HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY INVOLVED IN THE AWAKENING OF ARAB CONSCIOUSNESS. IT HAS BEEN A TURBULENT PERIOD, AND THE FIGHT FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE WHICH BROUGHT MOST OF THE ARAB STATES TO BEING WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING.

BRITAIN'S INVOLVEMENT WITH ARAB ASPIRATIONS LEFT US WITH A DEEP SENSE OF NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE STATES CONCERNED. ON BRITAIN'S SIDE, AT LEAST, FRIENDSHIP HAS SURVIVED THE STRAINS AND SHOCKS WHICH REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE HAS BROUGHT IN ARAB COUNTRIES. IT IS FOR THE ARAB PEOPLES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER DIFFERENT THAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT MAY BE FROM OUR OWN BRITAIN DOES NOT WITHDRAW THE HAND OF A FRIEND.

IN BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH MUCH TRAVAIL. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BREAK OUT OF THE RESTRAINTS. THE UAR AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN SINGLE MINDED IN HIS PURSUIT OF BETTER RELATIONS. FOLLOWING THE VISIT OF MR RIAD TO LONDON ALL OF US LOOK FORWARD TO A FRUITFUL PERIOD AHEAD FOR ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.

MR RIAD LEFT US IN NO DOUBT OF THE SINCERE DESIRE OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR AN HONOURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SINCE HIS VISIT DR JARRING HAS TAKEN A POSITIVE INITIATIVE TO TRY AND IDENTIFY THE ESSENTIALS FOR A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNING RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THESE HAVE BEEN WELCOME DEVELOPMENTS. THE UAR GOVERNMENT HAS FELT ABLE TO GIVE CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THE NATURE OF THE PEACE WHICH THE UAR WOULD UNDERTAKE TO KEEP. DR JARRING NOW SEEKS FROM ISRAEL A MATCHING COMMITMENT ON WITHDRAWAL WITHIN THE TERMS OF RESOLUTION 242.

EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

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DISCUSSIONS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE ON THE IMPORTANT
SUBJECT OF GUARANTEES, TO HASTEN THE DAY OF SETTLEMENT.

LET US THEN TOAST ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE.

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LET US THEN TOAST ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE.

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and have been used in connection with the Arab question
never as a basis for any policy
any

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

מס' 26

בשלה: 3/3/71

אל 4 : לונדון

מאת: המשרד

להלן תגובת " חוגים מדיניים " לדברי שר החוץ הבריטי :

WE MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR THE EFFECT OF THE PARTICULAR AUDIENCE WHICH SIR ALEC WAS ADDRESSING, BUT HIS DEFERENCE TO THE U A R POSITION RPT POSITION SEEMS EXCESSIVE.

ISRAEL CANNOT AND WILL NOT ACCEPT THE UNJUSTIFIED IMPLICATION THAT THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT IS MORE "POSITIVE" THAN THE ISRAELI ONE. EGYPT HAS DIFFERENT AND MORE EXTREME FORMULATIONS THAN DR. JARRING ON MOST MAJOR POINTS - FRONTIERS, REFUGEES, NAVIGATION. THIS IS ITS RIGHT. ISRAEL ALSO HAS THE RIGHT TO STATE ITS POSITIONS. BUT THE FACT IS THAT EVERY POSITION STATED BY ISRAEL IS MORE FLEXIBLE AND JURIDICALLY CORRECT THAN EVERY POSITION STATED BY EGYPT.

MOREOVER, THE ISRAELI POSITIONS ARE NOT STATED ULTIMATIVELY AS REQUIRING PRIOR EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE, WHEREAS THE EGYPTIAN POSITIONS ARE SO STATED.

THE ISRAEL STATEMENT PROPOSES AND OFFERS NEGOTIATION ON EACH OF THE SUBJECTS, INCLUDING BAUNDARIES. THE EGYPTIAN DOCUMENT IGNORES THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION.

THERE ARE NO SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS FOR MEASURING THESE THINGS, BUT THE ISRAELI DOCUMENT IS SEVERAL THOUSAND PER CENT MORE POSITIVE AND CONCILIATORY THAN THE EGYPTIC ONE. WE SHALL NOT CHANGE THIS VIEW, EVEN IF THE PARTICULAR INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENTS IMPELS THEM TO EXAGGERATE THE VIRTUES OF ONE DOCUMENT AND TO INVENT SHORTCOMINGS IN THE OTHER.

IF THERE ARE NO CONCRETE, DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS MOMENT ON ALL THE ISSUES, INCLUDING THE BOUNDARY, THIS IS NOT ISRAEL'S FAULT BUT THE FAULT OF THE U S S R AND THE U A R WHO ARE ARTIFICIALLY CREATING A FALSE IMPRESSION OF DEADLOCK. THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY'S STATEMENT DOES NOT DO ENOUGH TO COMBAT THIS SOVEIT MANOEUVRE.

מעת.

תפוצה : שהחזר רוחם 4 מנכל 3 אלון דיין סמנכל מצפא מעת הסברה אירופה ב

מאום א+ב מזמים הדס חקר רם אמן

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GAD RANON/KLM JM

ITEM FOUR: DOUGLAS-HOME.

LONDON, 2, (REUTER): REFERRING TO THE VISIT OF THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO LONDON SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME SAID YESTERDAY THAT MR RIAD HAD LEFT +US IN NO DOUBT OF THE SINCERE DESIRE OF HIS GOVERNMENT FOR AN HONOURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.+

SINCE THIS VISIT, THE UNITED NATIONS MIDEAST ENVOY, DR GUNNAR JARRING, HAD TAKEN A POSITIVE INITIATIVE TO TRY AND IDENTIFY THE ESSENTIALS FOR A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE GOVERNING 1967 RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

+THESE HAVE BEEN WELCOME DEVELOPMENTS+, SIR ALEC SAID. +THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT HAS FELT ABLE TO GIVE CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THE NATURE OF THE PEACE WHICH THE UAR WOULD UNDERTAKE TO KEEP. DR JARRING NOW SEEKS FROM ISRAEL A MATCHING COMMITMENT ON WITHDRAWAL WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION 242,+

SIR ALEC ADDED: +EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL. IT IS THE TASK OF STATESMANSHIP TO FIND THE ANSWER WHICH WILL GIVE CONFIDENCE. EGYPT HAS RISEN TO THE OCCASION BY A PUBLIC AND ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO LIVE AT PEACE FOLLOWING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

+PATIENCE IS DIFFICULT WHEN THE EMOTIONS OF YEARS OF TENSION RUN HIGH, BUT IT WILL BE INFINITELY WORTH IT TO ACHIEVE PEACE WHICH IS REAL. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL IT CAN, NOTABLY THROUGH THE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS WHICH ARE NOW TAKING PLACE ON THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF GUARANTEES, TO HASTEN THE DAY OF SETTLEMENT.+

- 2 -

HE REFERRED TO HIS PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT YESTERDAY OUTLINING THE ASSISTANCE WHICH BRITAIN COULD GIVE TO THE NINE GULF STATES UNION OF ARAB EMIRATES. +IF THIS IS ACCEPTED IT WILL HAVE A SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD. IT WILL SIGNIFY THE ARRIVAL AT MATURITY OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN A VITAL PERIOD OF ARAB HISTORY.+

SIR ALEC ALSO SAID IT WAS FOR THE ARAB PEOPLES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER DIFFERENT THAT FORM OF GOVERNMENT MAY BE FROM THAT IN THIS COUNTRY +BRITAIN DOES NOT WITHDRAW THE HAND OF A FRIEND.+

HE ADDED THAT FOLLOWING MR RIAD'S VISIT TO LONDON IN JANUARY LAST +ALL OF US LOOK FORWARD TO A FRUITFUL PERIOD AHEAD FOR ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.+

SEND TO IN ITONUT.

פאקט
יחידה

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Intro

25.12.70

א'ה'ל
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לויסר נ'ה'ל כחן מצליח אנגל
המסוגל אלסר "טראנסקורט" רימג
אדצט'ז וואסלשט'ג וואק'ל'ס מח'ץ היברג
טל ו'ג דא ש'בי מ'ה'ג

L
C

Heath

We need to have a constructive diplomatic effort here (i.e. in the M.E.). I think the moment is opportune. If we can get the talks going again, through the jamming, we need to be able to ~~offer~~^{put} options to the table, to see whether it is possible to get a symposium out of it which would then lead to a settlement. One of the problems is that Israel, understandably, wants to have secure frontiers in any settlement and I think the problem is what exactly is meant by secure frontiers after a withdrawal and how do you bring them about. Does it mean some sort of international zone or a mere keeping force or a guarantee of one kind or another. And what I was suggesting was that we need to give some thought to this as soon as possible, so that we are prepared with

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some proposals and would also know what it would involve for the four Powers in the event of a settlement being reached.

The indications we had from Mr. Eban were that he thought the talks would begin through Dr J. There was no precise date fixed but I hope it would be before the cease fire was due to expire.

The view that I am putting forward is that we ought to be thinking now about how we can best meet Israel's claim for secure frontiers at the same time that there is a withdrawal. and therefore the Powers should be thinking ahead

and saying the power of guarantee if that is
required ^{whether it is} as a state keeping free or whether
it's an international zone or whether it
may be.

B

2.7.2/71k

BALFOUR DINNER SPEECH, TEL-AVIV

4 November, 1970

The Right Honourable Joseph Godber M.P.

(Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I am here tonight at your invitation to reaffirm the bonds of friendship and understanding which link Britain and Israel and to mark with you the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. It is not my purpose tonight to reflect on the Declaration or to examine the consequences which have flowed from it. I should like rather to say something about the continuing relationship between your country and mine, and to comment on the wider problems of the Middle East as we in Britain see them.

This is my first visit to Israel. But as the Minister in the Foreign Office with responsibility for the affairs of the Middle East during part of the last Conservative Administration I have been very much concerned with the problems of the area. I am therefore delighted to have this opportunity of seeing for myself a country which has so often been in my thoughts.

May I say first how much I have been impressed by the vitality and resourcefulness of the people of Israel and by their spirit of self-sufficiency and self-confidence?

The whole world knows of your remarkable achievements in agriculture (a subject in which, as some of you may know, I also have a particular interest). My expectations about this have been more than fulfilled.

But I have been equally struck by the evidence I have seen of Israel's remarkable industrial progress. It is clear to me that Israel, like Britain, is going through a continuing industrial and technological revolution. In that sense, as in others, our countries are involved in a common process. The links to which I have already referred are rooted in a shared reality.

What is as encouraging to us as it must be to you is the growth of our mutual trade during the past few years. There is every prospect that British exports to Israel during 1970 will again reach the one hundred million pound sterling mark.

I am equally glad about the progress of your exports to Britain. I know you are concerned about the possibility of a decline in your sales of citrus fruits to Britain if we enter the Common Market. But I have no doubt that there will continue to be a good market after our entry. We are well aware of this problem.

You will also be aware of the success of the British Scientific and Engineering Exhibition in Tel-Aviv last December. This featured over a million pounds worth of highly sophisticated British engineering and scientific equipment. We hope to mount an Exhibition of British Agricultural and Food Processing Equipment here in November next year.

But Britain and Israel are not only commercial partners. The Anglo-Israel Cultural Convention, which was ratified earlier this year, now provides the framework for cultural contacts of every kind between our two countries. This is a development which we shall do all we can to sustain and to encourage.

Yet commerce and culture cannot make up the whole content of relations between our two countries. Our relationship is also a political relationship; and its character is determined principally by the attitudes which, in their different environments, our two countries have come to have towards the prevailing conflict in the Middle East.

For 22 years I have followed the course of events in the region; and for four of those years I have had some responsibility for the formation and execution of Government policy in and towards the region. Yet the subject is one on which one is uncomfortably aware that whatever one says is bound to displease one side, and more than likely will dissatisfy both; for one of the most striking features of the conflict is the depth of conviction of the people on both sides of the rightness of their cause, and its historical justification.

It is also very much in my mind that it is above all your security and the lives of your sons and daughters, Israelis and Arabs alike, which are at stake. It is natural enough, therefore, that the participants in this conflict should often be irritated and resentful of the advice or exhortations which are so often offered to them by other countries, even if the interests of those countries are also heavily engaged.

But, having said that I well understand your feelings, I believe that what you want to hear from me tonight is not vague expressions of sympathy or horror about the Middle East predicament but a statement of how Britain believes that progress can be made towards a solution of this conflict, in which so much is at stake, above all for all who live in the region itself, but also, and one must recognise this, for the rest of the international community.

There are two particular matters which have aroused interest and apparently some concern here. They are the speech by my chief, Sir Alec Douglas-Hume, at Harrogate last Saturday and, in a wider sphere, the Debate in the United Nations General Assembly which has just concluded.

So far as Sir Alec's speech is concerned, I am quite sure that if it is looked at objectively, as I am sure my audience here tonight would wish to look at it, it will be seen that it was intended and delivered as a dispassionate contribution towards the discussion of the solution of your contry's problems with the Arab world. So far as timing is concerned, it has to be seen specifically against the timing of the Debate in the General Assembly at the United Nations.

What his speech contained was largely a repitition of what the British G overnment has been saying both in the 4-Power Talks and elsewhere. It was a genuine assessment of how my Government feels that the problem of peace in the Middle East should be approached. It was neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli. It was intended to be pro-peace and, as Sir Alec has repeatedly made clear, any settlement must start from the acceptance of Israel as a sovereign independent state.

I want to see the solution of the Middle East conflict. I want to see it in your interests. I want to see it in the interests of the whole of the Middle East and of the world as a whole. But I recognise that if a solution is to be achieved, it must be achieved out of the willingness of your country and of the Arab States directly concerned to make concessions to each other's point of view. It is never easy to do this and, when outsiders do tender advice, it is so often the concessions which it is suggested that you should make which fill you with indignation, while the concessions suggsted to others are something that you may well think should be conceded forthwith. It is this difficulty which confronts me today. But Britain has, and must have, a point of view on these problems and I am here to explain to you what it is.

It is really embodied in Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council in 1967. That Resolution was put forward by Britain and was accepted by all parties. It was a different British Government which promoted it but the present British Government endorses it and wishes to see it fulfilled.

We believe that this Resolution caters for the legitimate aspirations of all concerned. We believe too, that it takes account of their vital interests. So far as Israel is concerned, we believe that these vital interests are especially catered for in the passage which reads as follows:

" Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

We believe that the interests of Israel are also reflected in other passages of the Resolution, notably those which deal with freedom of navigation and with the refugees. Freedom of navigation for Israel through the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal would give Israel security for her maritime communications with Asia, Australasia and Africa.

On the other side, we believe that the legitimate interests of the Arab States must be reflected and that they are reflected in the passages which deal with the withdrawal of forces from territories occupied in the war of 1967 and their interests, like yours, must also be concerned with the establishment of secure and recognised boundaries. The interests of both sides are also reflected in the provision for a just settlement of the refugee problem. This would be the end of the sense of frustration and alienation which lies at the root of the hostile attitudes whose removal is essential to the creation of a real state of peace.

To this end, too, we shall continue to participate in the 4-Power Talks in New York. It is often asked whether these Talks have any value. It is sometimes suggested that they are positively dangerous. Our view is that they do have value; and that there is no danger for Israel, or for any other country concerned, in the thorough examination of the issues in dispute which takes place in that forum. We are not seeking to impose a settlement. On the contrary, we believe that only by negotiation and the establishment of confidence can a just and lasting settlement be reached.

The other matter of crucial importance at this time is the cease-fire. Like you, we want no shooting on any front. We therefore very much hope that the cease-fire on the Suez Canal which was re-established with so much difficulty at the beginning of August will now be extended. We hope that there will be no renewed outbreak of fighting on that front or on any other front. A cease-fire is not peace; but its existence is the best framework in which to make peace. It is all the more regrettable that there should have been violations of the military standstill which accompanied it. It is a tragic development that the charges and counter-charges about violations should have brought to a halt the progress of Dr. Jarring's consultations. For if there is no progress towards peace, there is surely a grave danger that there will be progress towards another war. You have lived through twenty years of conflict. Can you, or we either, contemplate twenty more such years?

There is one thing further I want to say. The main theme of the Balfour Declaration, the Anniversary of which the Dinner celebrates, was the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Britain recognises and salutes the State of Israel as a permanent state in this part of the world. We recognise your rights and privileges as a state. We want to see you acknowledged by your neighbours and living at peace within recognised and secure national boundaries. That has always been our objective and I repeat it to you tonight.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס - מסווג

סודי ביותר

אלו המשרד

מאת: פריס

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פריס

אירופה ב'.

שיחת שהח - סיר אלק.

השתתפו המבכל, השגריר, ריבלין, דופין, מזכירו האישי של סיר אלק, מייקין וגב' בוקר ספוראנו. שהח סקר השקולים שהביאו אותנו להפסקת שיחות יארינג כתגובה להפסקת ה-^{ובן אלה האצבי כפ: שולבר} STANDSTILL, לאחר מכן מאז אוגוסט. בדו-שיח שלנו עם ארה"ב

לא ציפינו להגיע לאותה מידה של הזדהות בלתי נותנת הקיימת בין מצרים לבין

בריה"מ. עמדת ארה"ב היא שחייב לשרור באיזור מאזן כוחות שישראל לא תיטוג

מעמדותיה אלא במוגרת של שלום. חייבים להגיע לגבולות בטוחים ומוסכמים ושאנו

צריכים לקבל פתרון בשאלת הפליטים העלול לסכן במחוגנו ולפרות אופיה היחודי

של המדינה. כן מוסכם שבכל מום יהיה המוקד על הידיים שיטנו ליד השולחן ללא

התערבות מהחוץ. אנו שואלים את עצמך ^{למה} עמדות עלה לא מתקבלות על דעתן של כל

ארצות המערב. במערב אנו רואים חוסר ^{הנדרש} מול הטכנה הסובייטית. בנאומיו

התיחס סיר אלק לחדירה הסובייטית ואנך סבורים שבזמן הגיבוי סכנה זו מחייבת

תיאור מערבי. יש להניח כי לחיזוק ישראל ארה"ב אינה מאושרת לחשאר בבידודות

כשנעצו אין חשיבות להחלטות אום שנתקבלו אך חשונה מדיניותה של בריטניה.

מדיניות זו הוצדה כמושתת על אינטרסים בריטיים. אנו רואים במגיעת הפיכת

הצות לאזור הגמוביה סובייטי, אינטרס ישראלי, ולדעתנו אין זה עומד בבידוד לאינטרס

הבריטי. סיר אלק השיב שער לפבי שנתיים היה במקומנו בזהג בדיוק כפי שבהגנו אנו

אולם יאחרונה סבור שהרוסים מגבירים מעורבותם וסיועם הצבאי למצרים ונתיחת מום

צריכה להיות אינטרס ישראלי חיוני. ישראל לא תוכל יותר להשען רק על פועמפה

ועדיפותה הצבאית. שאל את עצמו עד כמה בדור לנו הצורך במום ובנסיגת

כי בלעדיהם אין להגיע להסדר. איש מוידע אינו יכול וצריך לקבוע בדיוק את

הגבולות וברור שזה נושא למום. שהח ^{הוא} שאנו קיבלנו עיקרון הנסיגה לגבולות

בטוחים מוסכמים אך גם הצביע על כמה ^{הוא} שחצרכה שיבוי בגבולות. העובדה שויתרנו

בזמנו על ממשלת האיווד הלאומי כשנדרש לנו סכוי קלוש למום תשמש הוכחה לכנות ואנו

במום. מאידך, אנו רוצים וצריכים להכנס למום כשאנו בהגים מעמדה חזקה ומטרת

שיחותינו עם ארה"ב ונמצאות בשלב מתקדם מכובדים למטרה זו. איבנו רוצים לנהל מום

תחת לחץ כשבמקרה של מבו סתום תרחף עלינו הסכנה שהערבים יצליחו לכתוב מחדש

החלטת מועבים בהתאם לפירושה המקובל עליהם.

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זה לדעתנו אינטרס בריטי וכלל מערבי וקשה להבין למה אי אפשר להשיג תמימות דעים ואחדות מעשית מערבית בנדון. המבכל העיר שההרגשה בחוגי האום היא שבריטניה שינתה את עמדתה כלפינו ובעיני וושינגטון נראים שינויים אלה כבסיסיים למדי. סיר אלק אמר שמדיניותם לשמור על החלטת מועביט ופירט השיקולים ההומניטריים שהגישו אותם להימנע בהחלטות העצרת האחרונות. מדיניותם בריטניה לא השתנתה אך הוא משוכנע שרק מום עשוי לתת לישראל הבטחון המצוי לה. המבכל הצביע על כוונותיהם האמיתיות של הערבים בניסוח החלטות העצרת שהן אינן מבוססות על שיקולים הומניטריים ומסרתם לחתור תחת זכות קיומה של ישראל. שהח הדגיש החשיבות לא לתת יד לבסיון לצפח חשיבותם של הארגונים הפלשתינאים. סיר אלק העלה התנגדותנו לשיחות הארבעה והניח שאיננו גורסים גם שיחות על המזת במסגרת אירופית, כן שאל דעתנו בענין מתן ערבויות בינלאומיות. שהח הסביר שהתנגדותנו לשיחות הארבעה מבוססת בעיקר על עמדתה החד צדדית והעוינת של בריהם. שום ערבות שבה שותפה בריהם אינה יכולה להתקבל על דעתנו. מכל מקום הוכח כי אין הארבעה ואסגלים להגיע לוחלטה משותפת. אנו חוששים מכל בסיון להגיע לאחדות אירופית מסביב לעמדה הצרפתית כי פריניותה של צרפת היא חד צדדית ואינה מתקבלת על דעת יתר חברי הקהילה וארצות אחרות במערב אירופה. שהח ציין כי הצבעות צרפון בעצרת לא היו זהות עם אלה של שאר מדינות אירופה. סיר אלק הזכיר את פנייה העשר בה לדעתו נדונו בעיות המזת באופן אובייקטיבי ולא נאמר בה דבר העלול לעורר התנגדותנו. סיר אלק אמר שקיים חשש מסוים שאיננו ששים להכנס למום ושים בסיה מסויימת TO SIT IT OUT לאחר שאנו מאמינים שמצבנו הצבאי משביע רצון. הוא סבור שזוהי שגיאה גדולה ואם אנו חושבים שיש שינוי בעמדה הבריטית הרי אלה הן הסיבות. שהח השיב שאין זה כך ושאלו לא ענין הזזת הטילים והפרת ה- STANDSTILL חייבו נמצאים כבר בתהליך של מום. שהח סבור שהפסקת השיחות היתה חיונית כדי להדגים תחונה לשמור על הסכמים חתומים שהרי במקרה ונגיע להסכם ברור שאנו נידרש ליותר על שטח ונקבל כתמורה התחייבות ולכן שאלת אמינותה של התחייבות כזאת מצד המצרים הינה בעלת חשיבות עליונה עבורנו. דרשנו החזרת הטילים אך אין אנו הופכים דרישה זו לתורה תיאולוגית. זה כמה שבועות שאנו משתדלים ליצור מצב שיאפשר לנו לחזור לשיחות. תהליך זה מגיע לקיצו וקרוב לדעתי שעל הממשלה יהיה להתלים בנדון בקרוב ורצוננו הכנה הוא להגיע למצב שיאפשר אמנם שיבה לשיחות תוך תקווה שיצליחו ולא ייכשלו מיד בגלל גסיבות של חוסר פתרון. סיר אלק סיים השיחה באומרו שאין שנוי במדיניות הבריטית, שכמו בעבר הם נשארים ערים לבעיות בסחון שלנו ושבנדון להם שאנו עומדים בפני החלטות קשות וגורליות שאיש מהחוץ אינו רשאי לכפות אותן עלינו. רוסין.

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Sir Alec Douglas-Home
Extracts from Press Conference at Brussels
4th December 1970

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In the Mediterranean we have become accustomed to ceaseless shadowing. What was surprising was not that the Ark Royal incident happened, but that it was the first incident that happened.

While it was obviously an accident, it was obviously also a calculated risk, the implications of which have been exploited by Russia. This was an important reason for the increase of NATO effort in the Mediterranean by Britain.

For the first time in Russian history they now have naval operations in the Mediterranean covered from air bases on Egyptian soil. This was something which was mentioned in quite a number of speeches today and caused considerable concern. This has opened up a new NATO flank and created a new NATO front.

Sir Alec was asked about the Rogers claim that the prospects for peace in the Middle East have never been better.

"I don't know that I would use those words myself. I think there are certain circumstances which make it a good moment to start off with Jarring. Egypt has now a government which is not a leader in the Arab World. Jordan has more stability. Israel may calculate both factors - to take advantage of the situation. I do not know whether they will seize the opportunity, but I think the prospects are better - and the moment ought to be seized".

Referring to Denis Healey's statement (begining of 1964) to the effect that NATO countries' naval forces could blow the Soviet Flotilla in the Mediterranean out of the water in the first ten minutes of the war, Sir Alec said that this is no longer so. Russia using Alexandra and Mersa Matruh can cover all operations from the air bases in Egypt. So we have to make more NATO power in the area

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available. We could by no means blow the Russians out of the water in one salvo.

On the prospects for re-opening of the Jarring talks, a settlement must be strongly in the Egyptian interest and one hopes they will take advantage of the situation when Jarring comes back to the area. The speculative thing in all this is whether Israel really thinks that she can get any comparable security having withdrawn her forces largely from the occupied areas. This is where the crux of the matter will come. This is the most difficult question of all. When you talk to Mrs. Meir or Mr. Dayan or other leading Israelis they say we have had a tripartite guarantee that fizzled out; we had a UN guarantee that was withdrawn at a critical moment. How do you expect us to rely on any international guarantee and have any faith at all?

This is a very difficult case to answer, particularly in places like the Golan Heights. You would have to have some international force and it would have to be guaranteed that it would not be attacked or bypassed. By whom would the guarantee be given and would Israel have faith in such a guarantee? This must be one of the most difficult questions.

The Arab operation will concentrate largely on the question of the resettlement of the refugees, which is technically and financially possible over a period of years. A good deal of work has been done on this already. The moment is propitious for a settlement. I hope all parties see this.

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תל אביב, כ"ג בחשוון תשל"א
22 בנובמבר 1970

ש מ ר

אל : מר משה ארד, השגרירות, לונדון
מאת : מע"ה, תל אביב

הנדון: "הודעות מחובים מדיניים"

שלחת לנו את ההודעה אשר העתקה מצורף בזה
לנוחיותך. לפי הכותרת מסתבר שהמדובר בהנחיה
של משרד החוץ הבריטי שנמסרה ל"רויטרס" ואולי
אף לגורמים אחרים. בדקתי את העניין עם ידידינו
ב"רויטרס" כאן ומסתבר שהודעה כזו אמנם נחקבלה,
כמובן ללא הכותרת.

אינני יודע כיצד הגיע הדבר לידיכם, אולם
מאחר ואנו מחלבטים כבר זמן רב בפרסום חומר מסוג
זה, הייתי מודה לך אילו הודעת לנו מהי הסכניקה
בה הם משתמשים.

בברכה,

גדעון שגיא

העתק: מע"ה
אירופה 2

W. C. Sullivan, Jr., Secretary

0274-6894/96 \$05.00

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FOREIGN OFFICE, not for attribution, STATEMENT
As from Reuters, 4 November 1970.

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Leaders of Britain and Israel to-day review Middle East peace prospects in one hour and 40 minutes of talks described by British sources as serious, friendly and useful. Both the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, and the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, agreed that the meeting led to a fuller understanding of each other's attitude, the sources said. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Minister, assured Mrs. Meir that his weekend speech (sharply criticized by the Israelis) entailed no new risk for Israel. He said it was entirely within the terms of the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 1967, which has been the basis of the British policy in the search for a negotiated settlement of the Middle East problem. Informed British sources said the talks covered three areas :

- (1) The Middle East debate in the United Nations Assembly. The British leaders told Mrs. Meir they had never been particularly keen on a debate at this time and regarded the Security Council resolution as the only valid basis for progress towards a settlement.
- (2) The present situation in the Middle East. Mrs. Meir explained Israel's thinking in detail and there was a discussion of the prospects for extending the 90-day Arab-Israel cease-fire (due to expire at midnight to-morrow) and for negotiations.
- (3) Sir Alec's controversial speech at the Conservative Party meeting last Saturday. This question was raised by Mrs. Meir.

Foreign Office, not for attribution, statement
as from Reuters, 4 Nov. 1970

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The sources said Sir Alec reaffirmed that his speech was entirely within the terms of the Security Council resolution and entailed no new risk for Israel. He said Britain had always insisted that Israel should never be asked to withdraw from occupied territories except under the condition specified in the resolution. Britain sees an Israeli withdrawal as part of a simultaneous, package settlement which would also entail secure and guaranteed frontiers.

Mrs. Meir, these sources added, expressed her gratitude for the opportunity of talks with the British leaders, while Mr. Heath was glad to have a first-hand account of Israeli thinking. However, it was unrealistic to think that the wide-ranging discussions had brought a negotiated settlement any nearer. The sources said that Mrs. Meir did not ask why Sir Alec had made his speech at this particular time and Sir Alec offered no explanation. But the sources explained the timing as a decision to make clear Britain's position on the occasion of the United Nations Middle East debate.

To-day's British-Israeli exchanges marked the end of the substantive phase of the talks during Mrs. Meir's visit. She will lunch with both Mr. Heath and Sir Alec to-morrow but this will be mainly a social occasion not a working lunch.



Verbatim Service

VERBATIM SERVICE 288/70

TUESDAY

3RD NOVEMBER 1970

BRITAIN AND MIDDLE EAST: SIR COLIN CROWE'S SPEECH AT U.N.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SPEECH BY SIR COLIN CROWE IN PLENARY SESSION OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST ON NOVEMBER TWO 1970:

A GREAT DEAL OF EMOTION AND MUCH PASSION HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THIS DEBATE, AS INDEED IS BOUND TO HAPPEN IN ANY DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HARD THINGS HAVE BEEN SAID. BUT WHAT IS SO INTERESTING AND ENCOURAGING IS THAT PRACTICALLY EVERYBODY AGREES ON WHAT WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO DO, BOTH IN THE SHORT TERM, AND IN THE LONG. THERE IS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY.

WE ALL AGREE ON THE SAME IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES: TO ENABLE DR. JARRING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN HIS MISSION AND TO EXTEND THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE MEANWHILE.

WE ALL AGREE TOO ON THE LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE: TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THAT RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

AFTER THE DINNER WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL GAVE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON OCTOBER TWENTYTHREE, HE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT. IT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO BEFORE IN THIS DEBATE, BUT I THINK IT IS WORTH READING OUT IN FULL.

QUOTE THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AMBASSADOR JARRING ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY AGREED TO EXERT THEIR UTMOST EFFORTS

- (I) TO ENABLE AMBASSADOR JARRING TO RESUME HIS MISSION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE
- (II) TO SEARCH FOR POSSIBILITIES THROUGH AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO EXTEND THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED
- (III) TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO.

QUOTE THE FOUR POWERS WILL CONTINUE THEIR CONSULTATIONS AND THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET AGAIN IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER TWENTYEIGHT. UNQUOTE.

DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

THE POINTS MADE IN THIS STATEMENT ARE COVERED IN THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WE HAVE BEFORE US. BOTH DRAFTS CALL FOR RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO TO BE CARRIED OUT IN ALL ITS PARTS. BOTH CALL FOR THE EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE PARTIES' DISCUSSIONS WITH DR. JARRING. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN A/L.SIXZEROTHREE CALLS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT A/L.SIXZEROTWO DOES NOT MENTION THE CEASE-FIRE, WE UNDERSTAND FROM CONSULTATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS THAT THE SPONSORS MAY BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE A PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR THE TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF THE CEASE-FIRE TO FACILITATE DR. JARRING'S MISSION.

WE ALL AGREE, BUT IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO STILL ELUDES US. WE SEEM UNABLE TO BREAK THROUGH THE MIASMA OF DISTRUST, OF CHARGE AND COUNTERCHARGE. FOR THREE AND A HALF YEARS WE HAVE BEEN TALKING WITHOUT SUCCESS - BUT WE MUST NOT, WE CANNOT, GIVE UP - WE MUST MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH, TO REACH SUCCESS.

IT MAY HELP US TO MOVE FORWARD IF I SET OUT THE ISSUES AS MY GOVERNMENT SEE THEM.

IN DOING THIS I AM NOT SAYING ANYTHING NEW. I AM MERELY BRINGING TO THIS WIDER FORUM SOME OF THE IDEAS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE RANGE OF THOSE WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN URGING OR SUPPORTING DURING MANY MONTHS OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR POWERS, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HERE IN NEW YORK.

PACKAGE DEAL

LET ME MAKE QUITE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT WE HAVE NEVER BELIEVED THAT A SETTLEMENT SHOULD OR COULD BE IMPOSED ON THE PARTIES. WE THINK IT RIGHT HOWEVER THAT THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD KNOW THE SORT OF IDEAS WHICH WE BELIEVE THE PARTIES AND DR. JARRING COULD WORK ON TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED.

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT THE SETTLEMENT WILL HAVE TO BE A QUOTE PACKAGE DEAL UNQUOTE AND THAT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE EMBODIED IN AN AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL BE BINDING ON ALL THE PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TWO MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE, AS IN RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO, ARE COMMITMENTS TO PEACE ON THE ONE HAND AND WITHDRAWAL AND BOUNDARIES ON THE OTHER. THESE ELEMENTS ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE AND ONE CANNOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT THE OTHER.

FIRST, LET ME CONSIDER COMMITMENTS TO PEACE.

THE ARAB STATES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND ISRAEL, ON THE OTHER, MUST AGREE TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE STATE OF PEACE BETWEEN THEM. IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THEM MERELY TO UNDERTAKE TO TERMINATE ALL STATES OR CLAIMS OF BELLIGERENCY WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THEM, THOUGH THEY MUST CERTAINLY DO THIS. THEY MUST ALSO UNDERTAKE TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH A STATE OF PEACE.

IN PARTICULAR, THEY MUST RESPECT AND RECOGNISE THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EACH OTHER WITHOUT RESORTING TO THREATS OR THE USE OF FORCE. THEY MUST ENSURE THAT NO ACT OF BELLIGERENCY OR HOSTILITY ORIGINATES WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES. THEY MUST SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN EACH OTHER'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS FOR ANY REASON.

THE OBJECTIVE

TURNING TO THE SECOND MAIN ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE, THE OBJECTIVE, AGAIN AS SET OUT IN RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO, MUST BE TO ESTABLISH SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES. IN DOING THIS, WE MUST BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR. THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN RE-STATE IN THE DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH WE ALL ADOPTED WITH ACCLAMATION HERE

A MERE TEN DAYS AGO. THUS THERE MUST BE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE WAR OF NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MINOR RECTIFICATIONS OF THE FRONTIERS, TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

IN THE CASE OF JORDAN, THE LINES WHICH EXISTED BEFORE JUNE, NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN WERE NOT BOUNDARIES AND HAD NEVER BEEN RECOGNISED AS INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS - THEY WERE ONLY ARMISTICE LINES. IN SOME AREAS THEY WERE IMPRACTICAL, DIVIDING VILLAGES FROM THEIR FIELDS AND EVEN HOUSES FROM THEIR GARDENS. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITIVE BOUNDARY.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE BASED ON THE LINES EXISTING BEFORE JUNE FIVE NINETEENSIXTYSEVEN BUT THAT THERE COULD BE MINOR RECTIFICATIONS TO THESE LINES. THE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING SUCH MINOR RECTIFICATIONS MIGHT BE THE SUPPRESSION OF ANOMALIES WHICH MAKE DIFFICULT THE MAINTENANCE OF LOCAL SECURITY OR IMPEDE INTERIOR SURFACE COMMUNICATIONS OR NORMAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BOUNDARY.

GAZA AREA

IN THE CASE OF THE U.A.R., WE CONSIDER THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY OF THE FORMER MANDATED TERRITORY OF PALESTINE SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE FRONTIER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.A.R., EXCEPT FOR THE GAZA AREA FOR WHICH SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE AND EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT.

THE FRONTIER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON SHOULD BE THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY OF THE FORMER MANDATED TERRITORY OF PALESTINE.

AS FOR THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE REMAINDER OF THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD ALSO GOVERN THE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, ONCE SYRIA HAS ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

THERE IS ONE SPECIAL PROBLEM WHICH IN SOME WAYS SYMBOLISES THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. I MEAN THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM. THE PROBLEM IS SO COMPLEX AND FEELINGS RUN SO DEEP THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT COMPROMISE COULD EMERGE. BUT SOME AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE CITY, SOME AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES AND FOR THEIR PROTECTION, WILL BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A SETTLEMENT.

I TURN NOW TO GUARANTEES.

THE BEST GUARANTEE OF THE SETTLEMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ITS ACCEPTABILITY TO ALL GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE AREA. HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY IS THAT MORE CONCRETE GUARANTEES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ENDORSE THE AGREEMENT.

AS AN INTERNAL GUARANTEE, WE FAVOUR A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE BOTH TO SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL AND REMAIN IN THE AREA THEREAFTER. ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT MIGHT BE THE FORMATION OF DEMILITARISED ZONES, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO. THESE MIGHT BE SUPERVISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ANY FORMS OF EXTERNAL GUARANTEE WHICH MIGHT BE SUGGESTED.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

ANOTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE IS FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE RESOLUTION SPEAKS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH TWO(A) OF THE NECESSITY FOR QUOTE GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE. WE RECOGNISE THIS NECESSITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION FOR THE SHIPS AND CARGOES OF ALL COUNTRIES THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAIT OF TIRAN.

THIS FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION SHOULD BE GUARANTEED, AS APPROPRIATE FOR EACH OF THESE WATERWAYS SINCE WE RECOGNISE THAT THEY DO NOT ALL HAVE THE SAME STATUS.

AND THEN THERE ARE THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS. ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH IS TO BE FAIR AND LASTING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THOSE WHO REJECT A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO AND WHO ARE DETERMINED TO SEEK THEIR OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE AND TERRORISM.

IT IS FOR THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR A SETTLEMENT. WE SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT WISH TO OPPOSE ANY NEW POLITICAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FREELY WORKED OUT BY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND THE PALESTINIANS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

THE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE PARTIES SHOULD AGREE TO CO-OPERATE IN WORKING OUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMBASSADOR JARRING, IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III) AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TWOTHREESEVEN (SIXTYSEVEN).

THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD REAFFIRM THAT THE NINETEENFORTYEIGHT REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DO SO AND SHOULD INCLUDE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS AND ANNUAL PROGRAMMES FOR REPATRIATION AND FOR THE RESETTLEMENT WITH COMPENSATION OF THOSE REFUGEES WHO CHOOSE NOT TO RETURN. THE PARTIES SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO CO-OPERATE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF MACHINERY FOR CONSULTING INTERESTED PERSONS AND GOVERNMENTS AND FOR GIVING EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

THE PARTIES SHOULD ACCEPT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT NEED NOT AWAIT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

AS I HAVE TRIED TO INDICATE, THE ESSENCE OF ANY SETTLEMENT IS THAT WE MUST CREATE TRUE PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH WILL ENSURE THE AREA AGAINST A RECURRENCE OF CONFLICT. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THAT THE PARTIES, AS THEY MOVE TOWARDS THAT SETTLEMENT, MUST FEEL SECURE AT

EACH AND EVERY STATE. THUS QUESTIONS OF TIMING AND OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SPECIFIC MUTUAL ENGAGEMENTS WILL HAVE CARDINAL IMPORTANCE AND WILL HAVE TO BE FULLY PROVIDED FOR.

REASONS UNDERSTOOD

WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHICH PROMPTED ARAB DELEGATIONS TO BRING THIS PROBLEM TO THE ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR. WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER IT IS PROPER FOR THE ASSEMBLY TO ATTEMPT IN ANY WAY TO ALTER A RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY WHICH SOUGHT TO AMPLIFY, MODIFY OR ALTER THE BALANCE OF RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO, OR WHICH SOUGHT TO DO MORE THAN SIMPLY REAFFIRM RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO AND APPEAL FOR EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS ITS IMPLEMENTATION.


BUT MORE IMPORTANT THAN OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE LEGAL POSITION IS THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT IT IS UNWISE FOR THE ASSEMBLY TO ATTEMPT TO ALTER RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO. AS THE AUTHORS OF THAT RESOLUTION, WE ARE NATURALLY PROUD OF IT. BUT EVEN ALLOWING FOR OUR PRIDE OF AUTHORSHIP, WE BELIEVE THAT IT DOES CONTAIN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA, BUT PERHAPS ITS GREATEST VIRTUE IS THE FACT THAT IT WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND THAT IT STILL COMMANDS THE SUPPORT OF THE VERY GREAT MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD THEREFORE HANG ON TO THIS RESOLUTION AND ATTEMPT TO BUILD ON IT.

THUS MY DELEGATION WOULD PREFER THAT IF ANY RESOLUTION WAS TO EMERGE FROM THIS DEBATE IT SHOULD BE QUITE SHORT AND SIMPLE - NOT MUCH MORE THAN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF TWENTYTHREE OCTOBER.

AS FOR THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEFORE US IN A/L.SIXZEROTWO AND SIXZEROTHREE MY COMMENTS HAVE ALREADY COVERED THAT IN L.SIXZEROTWO, THE DRAFT SPONSORED BY CERTAIN AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES. WE WOULD NOT DISSENT FROM THE DRAFT IN L.SIXZEROTHREE WHICH FOLLOWS THE LINES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT. IT HAS THE HEART OF THE MATTER, BUT ITS FORMULATION MAY NOT BE QUITE WHAT IS REQUIRED IF IT IS TO SECURE UNANIMITY.

IT IS NEARLY THREE YEARS SINCE RESOLUTION TWOFOUR TWO WAS ADOPTED - WE HAVE REASON TO BE DISAPPOINTED AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS. LET US HOPE THAT OUT OF THE CURRENT DEBATE THERE WILL COME A MOVE FORWARD. IF THERE IS NONE AND WE HAVE TO TAKE UP THE PROBLEM ONCE MORE, WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE ACCEPT THAT IF NO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE PROBLEM ONCE MORE.

END VS288/70. L.P.S.

B 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

10 November, 1970

John L. Barnett

Thank you for your letter BS/C/5 of 3 November, with which you enclosed copies of the resolutions adopted at the National Conference of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress on 1 November. I have read with interest the texts of the resolutions to which you drew my attention.

You asked whether I had any comments on the resolutions. Resolution number 2 on the security of Israel called upon the Government to reaffirm its support for Security Council Resolution 242. As I am sure you are aware, this was what ... I did in my speech at Harrogate (I enclose a copy of the relevant extracts from that speech for your reference). I particularly mentioned the need for a just and lasting peace in the area and for secure and recognised boundaries, to which your Conference's resolution drew attention. I also referred to the importance of providing for freedom of navigation in accordance with the Security Council Resolution.

The Conference resolution also mentioned the problem of Jerusalem. On this, I would like to draw your attention to

/the reference

J. Barnett, Esq.

the reference in my speech to the need for agreement on the problems of Jerusalem as part of a settlement.

I am also grateful to you for calling to my attention the views of the Sixteenth Biennial National Conference of your organisation on the situation of Soviet Jews. The Government have made plain the fact that they deplore violations of human rights and the denial of religious freedom wherever these occur. These views, which of course apply to the condition of Soviet Jews, have repeatedly been stated at the United Nations by our representatives, as well as to representatives of the Soviet Government.

Alec Douglas-Home
Alec Douglas-Home
(ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME)

An equilibrium is needed in the Middle East which both sides would be prepared to accept. The actual issues in dispute are of a kind which can be solved. The fabric of a settlement consistent with the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 which would be fair and should be workable can easily be produced. Agreed solutions in all the separate elements would have to be incorporated into a formal and binding agreement which would be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council; but like the Resolution of November 1967, any such settlement must be based on two fundamental principles; the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war; and the need for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area could live in security. This means, as the Security Council Resolution said, that Israeli armed forces must withdraw from territories occupied in the conflict; and that, on the other hand the state of belligerency which has existed in the Middle East must be ended and the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force, must be recognised.

I believe that a settlement should establish a definitive agreement on territorial questions. Such an agreement would be the answer both to Israel's fear for her existence and, at the same time, to Arab fear of Israeli expansionism. This is why the balance between the provisions for Israeli withdrawal and secure and recognised boundaries is so important. No outsider can prescribe exactly where these boundaries should be. If they are to be recognised, they must first and foremost be agreed by the countries concerned. Between Israel and Egypt, an international boundary has existed for a long time. I believe that this boundary should once again be recognised in a settlement, subject to whatever arrangements might be made to deal with the special problems of Gaza problems that derive from the immense concentration of refugees in the Gaza area, whose future would have to be resolved by a settlement.

Between Israel and Jordan, the problem is more difficult. There has never been a recognised boundary between the two countries. But I believe that the Resolution implies that secure and recognised boundaries should be based on the Armistice

Lines which existed before the war of 1967, subject to minor changes which might be agreed between the two countries.

Between Israel and Lebanon there is no problem; the present boundary, though troubled by fighting like so many other areas in this troubled region, has never been questioned and should remain.

Between Israel and Syria there is of course the very sensitive problem of the Golan Heights. Syria has not accepted the Security Council Resolution. It is therefore impossible yet to discuss how the dispute between Israel and Syria should be resolved. But I would expect that, once Syria accepted the Resolution, the general principles governing the location of the other boundaries would also govern the boundary between Israel and Syria.

There is one special problem, which in some ways symbolizes the Arab/Israel problem as a whole. I mean the problem of Jerusalem. The complexity of this problem and the depth of feeling about the City are so great as to make any compromise between the positions of the two sides hard to conceive. Some agreement on the status of the City, some agreement providing for freedom of access to the holy places and for their protection will be an essential part of a settlement. But this may have to be almost the last problem to be tackled.

-- The second main pillar of a settlement would be the binding commitments which the Arab countries and Israel would make to live at peace with one another. These should include the establishment of a formal state of peace. They should cover an obligation on all states to refrain from any act or threat of hostility and to do all in their power to prevent the planning or conduct of any such acts on their territory.

There are, of course, other problems. One, which I should like to emphasise, is that of the Arabs who were refugees from Palestine during and after the fighting of 1948. When I spoke earlier of the Arab/Israel dispute being a problem of people, it was above all of the refugees that I was thinking. For many

years the international community as a whole has agreed on how this problem should be settled. It is agreed that those refugees who wish to return to their homes and are prepared to live in peace with their neighbours should be allowed to do so; and that those who choose not to should be enabled to resettle elsewhere with compensation. The need for a just settlement of the refugee problem is pressing, although it is unrealistic to suppose that a settlement will be reached before the other issues of which I have spoken are resolved. And we must not ignore the political aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs and their desire to be given a means of self-expression. We cannot support any political programme which would involve the disappearance of the state of Israel; this is what the Palestinian resistance organisations & present demand. But we must work for a settlement which will attract the agreement of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians, and which takes account of their legitimate aspirations.

There is also the problem of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. Firm guarantees will be required for all three.

All these are matters which are capable of solution. They are matters on which practical action can be taken, action which would remove the distrust which has so far stultified progress. Now that for a time the shooting has stopped, now that the fighting has ceased in Jordan, now that the four major powers and all the parties agree that peace should be made, now is the opportunity; and it should be seized. There are many problems ahead. There is the problem of how a settlement would be achieved. There is a more important problem of the charges and the counter-charges of violations of the military standstill on the Suez Canal. These are all problems which must be resolved. I believe that a simultaneous effort by all concerned, a simultaneous decision to grasp the opportunity of making peace which I think exists, would allow progress to be made. Britain launched the Resolution on which Dr. Jarring's peace mission rests. If this opportunity ^{to relaunch him} is lost, we may face another 20 years of years of tension and strife - 20 years or more in which the peace which the region so desperately needs will be lacking - and with the risks of confrontation between the major powers increasing. This is a price which I believe none of us, neither Arab nor Jew, neither Russian nor American, certainly not we in Britain, should be prepared to pay.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

בלתי מסווג

מברק יוצא

מס' 655
בשלה: 27.10.70

אלג'ביר יורק
מאג'מהמדי

ב ה ו ל

שוח.

(1) סמיוארט ב-19.12.69

"... AS I HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, THERE IS REFERENCE, IN THE VITAL UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, BOTH TO WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES AND TO SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES. AS I HAVE TOLD THE HOUSE PREVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO THINGS SHOULD BE READ CONCURRENTLY AND THAT THE OMISSION OF THE WORD "ALL" BEFORE THE WORD "TERRITORIES" IS DELIBERATE".

2. מנבל משה בריטניה במכתב פ-28.11.67 לועד הקהילות
" THE TEXT MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS BALANCED BY " TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY TERRITORIAL INTERCITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE. FURTHERMORE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IS ALSO SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. THE RESOLUTION STATES THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED BUT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT CALL FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE OF ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BALANCING PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION SET OUT ABOVE".

לשכת השגר

המוצא: שוח' מנבל' לוריא מאום א-ב אירופה 1

תא/רז

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

שומר

מס' 24

בשלה: 6.10.70

אל לונדון

מאת: המשור

בהול

קומיי. להלן גרסה אנדרת לברייט שנהנך מתבקש למסור מיד. האגרת על דעת
שר המשפטים והיועץ המשפטי לממשלה. בדוקבא מאריכים ודיוק הדברים
המיוחסים לך ולרופין.

THE EMBASSY OF ISRAEL IN LONDON PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS
TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVERNMENT,
HAS THE HONOUR TO COMMUNICATE AS FOLLOWS:
ON THE 9 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE EMBASSY, ACTING PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 10 OF THE AGREEMENT ON EXTRADITION DATED 4 APRIL
1960, BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM, PRESENTED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE A REQUEST FOR THE
PROVISIONAL ARREST OF LEIJA KHALED, PENDING THE PRESENTATION
BY ISRAEL OF A REQUEST FOR THE EXTRADITION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS. ON THE SAME DAY, THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY SENT
A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE ISRAEL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ASKING THAT, WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE
HOSTAGES "ON A KNIFE EDGE", "THE REQUEST BE REGARDED AS SUSPENDED
FOR THE TIME BEING". ON THE SAME DAY, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS REPLIED TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT
THE G.O.I. WAS MAINTAINING THE LEGAL STEPS ALREADY TAKEN, I.E.
THE REQUEST FOR MISS KHALED'S PROVISIONAL ARREST, AND WAS
AGREEING SOLELY TO THE "NON EXPEDITING OF THE PROCEEDINGS",
PROVIDED THAT MISS KHALED CONTINUE TO BE UNDER DETENTION.
IN HIS REPLY OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY NOTED
THE CONTENTS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE.
ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1970, MR. RUPPIN OF THIS EMBASSY, REITERATED TO
MR. TRIPP OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT MISS KHALED'S RELEASE COULD
ONLY TAKE PLACE WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

- 2 -

ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1970, SIR DENIS GREENHILL ADVISED AMBASSADOR COMAY OF THE INTENTION OF H.M.G. TO RELEASE MISS KHALED. AMBASSADOR COMAY RAISED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO HER RELEASE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, HE POINTED OUT, AGREED TO THE NON - EXPEDITING OF THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE NEGOTIATIONS THEN TAKING PLACE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THAT WAS NO LONGER THE SITUATION, AND THE G.O.I. WAS FULLY ENTITLED TO INSIST ON THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXTRADITION AGREEMENT. THE UNILATERAL RELEASE OF MISS KHALED COULD NOT BE RECONCILED WITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE EXTRADITION AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR FURTHER POINTED OUT THAT THE RELEASE OF MISS KHALED WOULD AMOUNT TO AWARDED A PRIZE TO THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HIJACKINGS AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE REPETITION OF SUCH ACTS IN THE FUTURE. THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT MISS KHALED'S RELEASE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT REACHED FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AGREED ONLY NON-EXPEDITING OF THE LEGAL STEPS, PROVIDED MISS KHALED WOULD NOT BE RELEASED AND IT INSISTED THAT SHE COULD NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE G.O.I.'S AGREEMENT. THAT AGREEMENT WAS NOT GIVEN. INDEED, THE G.O.I. ACTIVELY OPPOSED THE RELEASE.

THE RELEASE OF MISS KHALED CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER ACTS OF PIRACY IN THE AIR, MURDER OF ISRAEL NATIONALS, AND THE HOLDING OF HOSTAGES FOR RANSOM. THE G.O.I. IS CONVINCED THAT THE RELEASE OF MISS KHALED WAS NOT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. AS THE PRINCIPAL VICTIM OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE G.O.I. REGARDS THE RELEASE OF MISS KHALED AS A FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO CRIMINAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF ISRAEL NATIONALS.

.../3

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

- 3 -

THE G.O.I. REGARDS THIS ACTION OF H.M.G. AS BEING CONTRADICTION WITH THE LATTER'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EXTRADITION AGREEMENT, AS HAVING BEEN TAKEN IN DISREGARD OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE G.O.I., AND AS UNWARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUBMIT A STRONG PROTEST AGAINST THE RELEASE BY H.M.G. OF MISS LEILA KHALED.

לוריא - סיורן

שהח' ריהם סנכל אלון דיין סטנכל אירופהב' סטפס כלכלית רס' א/אסן

בל/אש

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא

מס' 41

בשליח 062230 ארס. 70

אלג' להבדון

מאת: המשרד

ב ה ר ל

קומיי.

שליכת 19.

מבקש להחזיר המילה SOLELY לבגוף האגרות.

מירון

תפוצה: שהחצ' מבכלצ' רוהמץ סמכל משפט איר ב

מנ/לש

בלתי מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא

מס' 38

בעלה 061915 אוק. 70

אל: לונדון

מאת: המשרד

ב ה ול

קומיי.

אם עדיין לא הגשית האגרת, השמט בא המילה STRONG

לוריא - מירון

תפוצה: שהחזר רוחמץ מכלל סמבכל מפשט איד ב
מב/לש

B



200/111c ←

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

845 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

PRESS CONFERENCE

BY UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 58

The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P., gave a Press Conference at the United Nations at 10 a.m. on Friday 25 September, 1970. The following is a transcript.

Sir Alec:: Ladies and Gentlemen: During the week I have been here, everybody has been gravely concerned, first of all by the Civil War in Jordan, because the object of the Fedayeen of course was to disrupt the Jarring Mission and therefore to make peace talks between Israel and Egypt impossible. This in itself was a very serious situation even before there was the danger of foreign intervention, and particularly intervention from Syria.

Therefore this week has been taken up with intense diplomatic activity to try to limit the war to a Jordanian war without foreign intervention at all. And the situation was eased greatly the day before yesterday when the news came that the Syrians have, in fact, withdrawn from Jordanian territory. Now, I think the task must be for everybody to try as hard as they possibly can to get Dr. Jarring's Mission on the move again. Otherwise, we will be back in the old position of the escalation of armaments on both sides with always the ultimate danger that this could bring about a war of much greater dimension than that of the confrontation between Israel and with Egypt.

The situation now, as I see it, is eased in that the Syrian withdrawal has left Jordan to settle its own affairs in its own way. The King's army seems to be in control of Amman and probably most of the country, perhaps with the exception of a small area in the North. And so an opportunity may occur again if the breaches of the ceasefire can be got over for a resumption of Dr. Jarring's Mission. It is optimistic at the moment to say that this will be possible, but this I have no doubt whatever is the objective and aim to which all the countries concerned should be devoting their attention now.

Mr. William N. Oatis (Associated Press, President of UNCA): Mr. Secretary, as President of the U.N. Correspondents Association, I would like to say from the outset that I am much obliged to you for coming down here to talk to us and I would like to ask you what's being done to bring about some arrangement by which the Israelis can return to the talks.

/Sir Alec:

Sir Alec: I think it very largely rests with the two sides, with Israel and Egypt and perhaps particularly with Egypt. The accusations have been made by each side, that there have been breaches of the ceasefire and before talks can begin that minimum area of trust has to be reestablished. I notice that the Permanent Representative of the U.A.R. a few days ago made a statement on television. Now this could be the kind of opening which could be given, perhaps to reestablish what I call that minimum area of confidence, by healing the breaches that have been made in the ceasefire agreement. One can only hope, as I say, that everybody will try and find ways and means of reestablishing that confidence because otherwise the outlook is very bleak.

Mr. Michael J. Berlin (New York Post): Mr. Minister, do you think that just words can reestablish the confidence or will the Egyptians have to act as well, in a logistic sense, to move missiles from one place backward?

Sir Alec: Well I think it is very difficult to say that words could achieve the result - words alone. I would think that probably action has to be taken by both sides. But I think it is better really that this should be examined by the two sides, both of whom I think want a resumption of talks. Of course any help that could be given by any other country - I have no doubt that any other country would be very anxious to help the two sides back to negotiation. But I think this is very largely a matter for the Israelis and the Egyptians and I hope that they will try - each will try - to see what can be done to re-start the talks which are really essential if we are to have any real hope of peace in the future.

Miss Pauline Frederick (National Broadcasting Company): I believe the Egyptians have said that they might consider returning to the status quo ante if there were a guarantee against surprise attack by Israel. Would the United Kingdom be willing to join with others of the big powers in guaranteeing Egypt against a surprise attack from Israel?

Sir Alec: I think it is too early to forecast what other countries might be able to do to help in this case. But what you are referring to is substantially I think what the Permanent Representative of the U.A.R. did say. No doubt this will want further interpretation before the Israelis could be satisfied, but this is the kind of way perhaps in which the deadlock could be broken.

Mr. Robert H. Estabrook (Washington Post): Sir Alec, do you see any particular way in which a British or Big Four initiative could be helpful in starting the process rolling?

Sir Alec: Well I think we have got to give a good deal more thought to that. I think this cannot be done in a hurry. The confidence has been too badly broken for the moment. I think we want to proceed with great caution. I just did note this statement by the Permanent Representative of the U.A.R. as a possible beginning of a willingness or readiness perhaps to seek to try and get back to talking again with Dr. Jarring.

Mrs. Kay Rainey Gray (Greenwich Time): I would like to ask you how would you foresee that the refugee question will be handled? In the Big Four? Or with the help of perhaps other middle or smaller powers doing some fact finding? Just how do you see this thorny question being handled for a peace settlement?

/Sir Alec:

Sir Alec: I am quite sure that if there is to be a settlement of this Middle Eastern situation that the most elaborate plans for the resettlement of the refugees are an absolute necessity. This at some point has to be dovetailed in to the whole of the plan. And it of course needs a great deal of capital, a great deal of planning and it will need a great deal of arrangement as to what countries take the refugees and what numbers. A great deal of preliminary work I think has been done on this already and this operation is certainly a possible operation. But I have no doubt whatever that this has to be part of the comprehensive plan and I think that it is very important that it should be worked out. Possibly the Four Powers can help in this, because it is the Four Powers by and large that have the resources that are necessary for a complete plan of resettlement, which will take years of course to be worked out and to be put into operation.

Mr. Ivan Zverina (United Press International): Sir Alec, is your Government still reviewing the question of possible sale of arms to South Africa?

Sir Alec: I will tell you what the position is. We are discussing our Government's point of view with the leaders of the Commonwealth countries and that process of discussion will go on for some time. The Prime Minister and I for example when we come back in October will be talking to some of the Commonwealth leaders here. And so this process of discussion goes on. I have said in the House of Commons that, if any action is taken on this, I would make a statement in the House of Commons and that is where the position rests. I think you know quite well the past position of the Conservative Party. For ten years we did sell arms to South Africa in the context of the Simonstown Agreement which we have with them. It has been our attitude in opposition that if we were returned to office we would continue this practice, because we believe that if you are a partner in an agreement that this is the right way to carry out the partnership. It concerns, of course, the limited area of naval armament for maritime patrol. That has been our past attitude. We are, as I say, consulting about our future attitude with the Commonwealth leaders and if and when we want to take action I would report that to the House of Commons.

Mr. Chakravarti Raghavan (Press Trust of India): Mr. Foreign Secretary, you have stressed the need for a settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem as part of a solution to the situation in West Asia. But you have curiously used the word "resettlement". That would obviously mean that you are not contemplating the right of large numbers of Palestinians to be returned to Palestine. Do you think it is realistic for the Big Four or anybody to think that you can settle the problem without giving the option to return?

Sir Alec: You should not misunderstand the word "resettlement". No doubt a number which we cannot quantify of refugees would be resettled in Israel. Equally certainly, a number of refugees would have to be settled in other Arab countries. Don't interpret the word "resettlement" as meaning that no Arab refugees would be resettled in Israel. It would be a wrong interpretation.

Mrs. Anne Weill-Tuckerman (Agence France Presse): Sir Alec, my question was along the line of my colleague. Does that mean that you think that after the events of the last two weeks, of the hijacking and all these dramatic things, that the Resolution 242 corresponds still quite well to the needs and that the Palestinians ought to be considered as refugees and not in any other way? Is that a definite conclusion?

/Sir Alec

Sir Alec: I think that Resolution 242 provides the only basis that we have got so far for starting talks. How those talks would develop and if at any point they could include any representation of the Palestinians I think it is much too early to say. But I think the Resolution 242 is the Resolution on the basis of which practically all the countries concerned feel that talks can be started. It embraces the main elements of a settlement. And therefore I think that we had better stick to 242 and as Dr. Jarring makes his contacts he will have to decide and suggest how he thinks that Resolution can best be interpreted.

Miss Betty Pilkington (WBAI Radio): Mr. Minister, yesterday in your Assembly statement you made out a very good case for the need to bring the Chinese into the U.N. However, we are told that your Government's position on the two traditional Chinese resolutions remains exactly the same as last year. My question is this: how do you reconcile supporting the seating of the Chinese on the one hand and supporting on the other a Resolution which has the clear effect, if not the original design, of keeping the Chinese out a bit longer?

Sir Alec: Well we have never seen how we could deny that this was an important matter. It is an important matter. An important matter to a great many countries. I did not express anything new. Our Government feeling has been for a long time that it would be better if the Chinese were in. How much they would contribute to international harmony, as I said yesterday, is a matter open to debate, but nevertheless we think they ought to be in and that this ought to be put to the test. I do not know whether there will be any alteration in voting this year or not but that this is an important matter to a whole lot of countries we don't see how it is possible to deny.

Mr. Alan Riding (Reuters): Sir Alec, do you see any circumstances under which Palestine representatives could participate directly in Middle East peace talks?

Sir Alec: It would be rash really to forecast that or make any definite statement on this - at this time. I think you must get the principals into action first and this must be Dr. Jarring's objective later on. Circumstances may change and something of this sort could happen; but I think it would be unwise to suggest that it should happen.

Mr. Stephen Scott (Canadian Press): Can you give your assessment of the chances of China entering the U.N. in the near future? And in relation to that, can you comment on the importance or lack of importance of attempts by Canada and Italy to recognise Peking?

Sir Alec: No. That is their affair. We shall have to wait and see what the voting brings. On past form, the last few years, it doesn't look as though the voting will vary all that much, but I can't answer for Canada or Italy. We shall know before long.

Mr. Ted Morello (Pakistan Times): Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up on the China question, we have been told that such Governments as yours which do recognise the Peking regime have been told recently that Peking is now interested in joining the U.N. This as you know has been one of the arguments for those who want to keep it out. We have also been told by the Secretary-General that China's involvement in the U.N. would not come before November or December 1972. Are you implying that it might come at that time? Do you consider this a new element and if this is the case that China is now interested? What do you consider the major stumbling block to the admission of China?

/Sir Alec

Sir Alec: Well I suppose I think that the Chinese probably are increasingly interested, although the Chinese never think or act in the same time scale as we do and so they will probably be quite patient about this. The main stumbling block must be of course the unwillingness of a good many countries to vote for their entry. And until that obstacle can be overcome then China will not become a member. But I think that the answer to your question is that there are indications that China is becoming more interested than she has been in the past in membership of the United Nations.

Mr. John Osman (BBC): Sir Alec, we have heard this morning that West German and British hijack hostages have been released. May I ask you, will Leila Khaled continue to be held by the British until the American hostages are released?

Sir Alec: The hostages as I think you know were released by the Jordanian army and therefore presumably they will return to their various home countries as soon as possible. Therefore the sort of old basis on which we were operating clearly doesn't hold any more. But inside the Berne group we have always been looking for a global solution to the problem of the hostages. I think that the Berne group will obviously look at the situation anew in the light of the fact that a certain number of hostages have been released. But it is still immensely important to get all the hostages out. I can't give any definite answer to a question about Miss Khaled's future.

Mr. Alexander Gabriel (Transradio News Agency): Sir Alec, how do you estimate how far this Assembly can go in making some progress in the disarmament sector. Do you feel that the agreement with regard to the seabed is possible? Do you feel that especially the chemical and biological draft treaty can receive approval in this session? Beyond that, perhaps, what are your expectations?

Sir Alec: I would have thought these two particular fields of disarmament which you mention could be matters on which the nations could agree. I would have thought that the answer to that is "yes". There is of course the bigger question as to whether the United States and the Soviet Union can agree to limit the upper range of the advance nuclear weapons. This would be the most important thing that the world has seen for a very long time, because this escalation, apart from the ultimate dangers, absorbs so many resources which ought to be coming into other fields of development.

Miss Pauline Frederick (National Broadcasting Company): Sir Alec, do you see the possibility of the 90-day ceasefire between Israel and Egypt being extended in order to give any resumed peace talks a chance?

Sir Alec: I would hope so. I would hope that the fighting would not be resumed because as long as it is not resumed there is always a better chance of relaunching Dr. Jarring's Mission.

Mr. Vincent Ryder (Daily Telegraph): Reverting to Miss Khaled, Sir Alec, you say the Berne group will have to look at the position again, in view of the fifteen hostages. Does this mean that Britain will remain within the Berne group for this review of the position now?

Sir Alec: Well I can't tell you what attitude the Berne group will be taking. I can only tell you what attitude we have been consistently taking. And that is that all the hostages, all the prisoners should be released. This is a factor which

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still remains valid. It would be a very dreadful thing if the rest of the hostages were not released. And the Berne group will undoubtedly be considering the latest situation with the attitude that they have always taken very much in mind.

Mr. Robert H. Estabrook (Washington Post): Sir Alec, when you were Prime Minister you talked a good bit about the importance of a continued nuclear deterrent for Britain. In the intervening years have you had any reason to change your feeling from what it was at that time?

Sir Alec: No.

Mrs. Kay Rainey Gray (Greenwich Time): Sir Alec, could you tell us something about a reported new initiative taken by the British Government on behalf of the hostages?

Sir Alec: No initiative has been taken by the British Government alone on behalf of the hostages. We have consistently in the Berne group with our colleagues, the Americans, the Germans, the Swiss and the Israelis, we have consistently sought a solution in which all the prisoners are released. That as far as I know is still the position, so there is no initiative taken in relations to the hostages. Our hostages and the German and the Swiss have been found and released by the Jordanian army. But they, so far, apparently haven't found the others.

Mr. Gerry L'Ange (Argus Newspapers): Sir Alec, could you comment on the prospects for a settlement acceptable to your Government of the Rhodesian situation?

Sir Alec: Well it's got to be consistent with the five Principles which are so well known. The central one of those Principles is what we have called unimpeded progress towards majority rule - not a programme with a timetable but unimpeded progress towards majority rule. And that was the central feature of the 1961 Constitution which Mr. Smith discarded. So I think the answer to your question is this - we hope for a settlement and we would look for one within those Principles. Another of the Principles is that any settlement must be acceptable, broadly acceptable, to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. But the central one is the unimpeded progress towards majority rule.

Mr. William N. Oatis (Associated Press): What in your opinion was it that led the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan? Was it the work of the Jordanian army or the pressure from the Big Four?

Sir Alec: I would think it was a mixture of both, but I think the Jordanian army perhaps played the biggest role.

Mr. Alexander Gabriel (Transradio News Agency): Sir Alec, in regard to Rhodesia there are a number of Africans who have openly expressed themselves in the general debate - some Foreign Ministers and one President of a country - that maybe you ought to stop talking to Mr. Smith. Maybe the time has come when silence or an embargo on talking would be more effective. How do you feel about this attitude?

Sir Alec: Well boycotts I think don't pay. We have seen that boycotts harden this kind of situation. Provided we stick to the Principles which have been the position of both the British Governments in the last six years, then I think that an attempted settlement is wise and right. I understand the emotions of the

/African

African countries but I think that countries have to recognise the dangers of using force in these circumstances and particularly the dangers involved in freedom fighting. As I said yesterday in my speech to the Assembly, so often the freedom fighters turn on the Governments that give them refuge, and encouragement.

But I should add, of course, that in the context of the negotiation with Rhodesia, we have said that we would naturally maintain the sanctions which are there now.

Mrs. Anne Weill-Tuckerman (Agence France Presse): Sir Alec, there is in principle a decision to have a Security Council at the level of the Foreign Ministers but the date for it has not been set as far as we know. Could you tell us whether you think it will take place during this session, if you would attend, and what time do you think would be the most opportune?

Sir Alec: Well I don't know. There was talk about it at the end of October. I would be glad to attend it if I am here at the end of October. I am told we would review the state of the world. I have often done that before. I will be glad to do it again if it is decided that there should be a special Security Council meeting.

Mr. Robert Estabrook (Washington Post): Sir, in your speech yesterday you talked some about the need to lower barriers between East and West Berlin. Would you make some sort of agreement on Berlin a preliminary to British or Western participation in a European Security Conference?

Sir Alec: Well I think it would make a great difference to the prospects of a European Security Conference if the Russians were accommodating on Berlin and would allow more civilized arrangements for the people in that city. This could certainly make a difference because it would translate words into action. Again, looking further ahead towards the possibility of a Security Conference, the rule applies to it as to most conferences: they are not much use unless you have something specific on the agenda which is worth talking about. Two suggestions have been made in this context. The first is that of mutual reduction of forces on each side of the confrontation line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the other one that some organ that might be set up. I think organ is the word that the Soviet Union uses. Some organ might be set up which would deal with specific European problems and it might be that balanced reductions of forces would be one of the problems which such an organ could consider.

Thus there are two answers to your question. The first is that we have no objection in principle to a European Security Conference, and that the path towards it would certainly be eased if there is action which makes more tolerable the life of the people of Berlin. Secondly, if it comes we must be sure that there is something worthwhile for it to discuss and something concrete on the agenda which could lead to better conditions later on.

Mr. Chakravarti Raghavan (Press Trust of India): Mr. Foreign Secretary, the Secretary-General has been trying to promote the idea of a summit level meeting of the Big Four - either formal or informal - here at the time of the Commemorative Session. What do you think are the prospects, particularly in the light of the current situation in the Middle East and reported coolness by the United States to any such summit meeting now?

Sir Alec: I don't know. I can't answer that question because I don't know what the feeling of the heads of government of the other three countries is. Mr. Heath will be here if anything of that sort was to be arranged.



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BY UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE

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The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P., United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, interviewed by Mr. John Osman of the British Broadcasting Corporation for "24 Hours" on 25 September, 1970.

Mr. John Osman: Sir Alec, we have heard that British and West German hostages of the hijackers have been freed. Will Britain now continue to hold Miss Leila Khaled until the American hostages are released?

Sir Alec: I am so delighted to hear the hostages have been rescued by the Jordan Army; this is very, very good news. Most of all, of course, for the relatives.

We have been dealing, as you know, with this matter in the Berne group which consists of ourselves, the Germans, the Swiss, the Americans and the Israelis - and I think that the hostage question will have to go on being dealt with where it is now; our purpose has been to get all the hostages released. Now I take it that this is still the purpose but I can't comment as to what the Berne group will be doing now because I simply don't know. But they will be meeting, no doubt, in the new circumstances. That has been the principle which has governed the Berne group up to now.

Mr. John Osman: You can't give me a definite answer on Miss Khaled?

Sir Alec: No, I can't, obviously, because there is the new situation - but our purpose has always been that all the hostages, including the Americans - I think there are 35 Americans and two of dual nationality - should be released. I take it they will be trying to find out where they are and on what conditions they could be released.

Mr. John Osman: Now that the crunch seems to have passed in Jordan immediately, do you see any hopes of a move towards resumption of Dr. Jarring's peace mission?

Sir Alec: It was absolutely necessary, first of all, that foreign intervention in Jordan should be removed and I think with the removal of the Syrian tanks this was the first thing that really gave the hope that Jordan could get control of her own affairs again. This was an essential pre-condition, of course, to any resumption

/of Dr. Jarring's

of Dr. Jarring's peace mission, or any chance of the peace talks being resumed - because the object of the Fedayeen, remember, from the start, had been to prevent the Egyptians and Jordanians taking part in talks.

Now there is a further complication and that is there have been accusations by both sides that the ceasefire conditions had been broken, so the minimum basis of trust is simply not there for resuming the talks at the moment. But I hope it can be restored; I think it must be the object of all of us now to try and get Dr. Jarring back on the job, because that is the only chance of long-term peace in this area.

Mr. John Osman: How can this be done in Egypt, for example, with the Israelis demanding a roll-back of the Soviet missiles?

Sir Alec: I noticed here in New York a night or two ago that the Permanent Representative of the U.A.R. seemed to suggest that possibly in certain circumstances the missiles might be returned whence they came. I don't know what that means, it is too difficult to put an interpretation on that. But if this was a feeler, so to speak, to see if peace talks could be resumed on certain conditions, well this might hold out some hope.

Mr. John Osman: He also suggested a guarantee, perhaps by America, against Israeli attack; would Britain, for example, be prepared to go along with that sort of idea?

Sir Alec: I don't know - I think it is too early to say what sort of conditions could be attached. I think the essential thing in this is not so much guarantees as that any breaches of the ceasefire should be rectified. Otherwise you can't start from a basis of trust and nobody will have any faith in the rest so to speak of the package deal which would have to be constructed.

Mr. John Osman: In this respect, how has the attitude of the Russians developed? I am thinking in two contexts: (a) they have presumably backed the Egyptians in the move and (b) they presumably exercised some pressure on Syria to withdraw in Jordan; does this help with the atmosphere, at all?

Sir Alec: Yes, because I think they have been exercising brinkmanship very dangerously in this whole area of the Middle East. As everybody knows, they have been pumping arms into Egypt. It may be that they really did get frightened when they saw it all getting out of hand and I would think that they probably did use their influence with the Syrian Government. I think that the main thing which made the Syrian Army withdraw was they got a pretty good punch on the nose from the Jordanian Air Force; but I have no doubt the Russians behind the scenes have used influence with the Syrians not to extend the war, because this began to look too dangerous for all the countries concerned.

Mr. John Osman: One further question, Sir Alec, switching from the Middle East to southern Africa: you are, I believe, talking to Commonwealth African leaders here and the South African Foreign Minister. Are any developments likely soon on a British Government decision about arms to South Africa?

/Sir Alec

Sir Alec: No, this is part of the programme which we indicated we would undertake. We are discussing this matter with Commonwealth leaders and I have seen four or five of them here; Mr. Heath and I will be seeing others at the end of October when we come here; and some in London. So we are telling them our point of view and listening to what they have to say. This process will go on, at any rate until the end of October and maybe a little bit beyond, because the Commonwealth leaders are always difficult to collect together and contact. But these discussions will go on. I have said that if there was any action to be reported, this will be reported to Parliament and that still stands.

Mr. John Osman: But you are not very keen on the boycott, I gather?

Sir Alec: I never think of boycott - I mean this is in the context of South Africa in particular - I never think a boycott pays. You have got to co-exist with a nation like South Africa and find ways and means of doing it. So I am an anti-boycotter. We have, of course, got, in relation to Rhodesia the sanctions programme and we have said that we will keep this in operation until we see how negotiations go. But I am not in general a boycotter. I think we have got to live with Communists; we have got to live with countries that practise apartheid; we have got, by example, to try and get them to change their methods if we don't like them. But not by force.

Mr. John Osman: Thank you.

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Jerusalem

Extract by from Mr. George Brown's
Speech to the 5th Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly
on 21 June, 1967

Nations as primarily responsible for peace-keeping. I repeat what I said there. We have had long-standing ties of friendship with all the Arab states in the Middle East, and also with Israel. If I may speak personally in a moment, I have for a long time felt a deep concern for these countries. Our friendship with them has, I believe, been of great mutual value in the past. It is my desire to see it renewed and strengthened in the future; and I for one will work for that purpose.

The attitude of the British Government is clear. We want the area to be at peace. We recognise that peace demands the greatest possible measure of justice in its political arrangements. And on this foundation the progress of its peoples, especially of those whose need is greatest, must be based.

I now want to set out certain principles which I believe should guide us in striving collectively for a lasting settlement.

Clearly such principles must derive from the United Nations Charter. Article 2 of the Charter provides that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". Here the words "territorial integrity" have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in earlier speeches. I see no two ways about this, and I state this very clearly. In my view war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.

Reports suggest that one particular point may be of special urgency. This concerns Jerusalem. I call upon the Government of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to that Government that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will isolate them from world opinion.

Having made clear my stand on this issue, I go on to recognise that in all this both the Arabs and Israel have matters to raise which they are entitled to feel must be heard and treated with respect. And we in the international community also have our legitimate interests which must similarly be respected.

What are some of these matters? First, there are the interests and welfare of the refugees. This very serious problem has been with us for a long time. The problem has been made more difficult by what has happened in the last few weeks. It now requires a great international effort to alleviate the problem. I shall have something more to say about this in a moment.

Secondly, any settlement must recognise the right of all states in the area to exist in true dignity and real freedom, including the ability to earn their living in assured peace. I understood this to be the view of Mr. Kosygin and I hope my understanding was correct.

Thirdly, there must be respect for the right of free and innocent passage through international waterways for the ships of all nations. There is too the immediate practical problem of getting the Suez Canal cleared. Once this is done this great international waterway must be reopened as soon as possible. This is of vital importance to very many countries represented in this Assembly.

Jerusalem: Extract from Lord Caradon's speech to the General Assembly on 14 July, 1967

We warmly welcome what the United Nations has already been able to do—achieving a cease-fire, in ensuring that it is observed, and in making a start in dealing with the vast problem of relief of suffering and hardship. We have constantly advocated that amongst the first steps should be a request to the Secretary-General to send his Special Representative to the area to consult with all concerned on disengagement, withdrawal and the building of foundations for a permanent settlement.

We also warmly welcome the efforts to find common ground of agreement. And we believe that there is in fact far more general agreement than our public speeches allow to appear. Good will and good sense make slow but steady progress upstream, against a torrent of recrimination.

I am bold enough to believe that the framework of a lasting settlement is clear to most of us. There must be disengagement and withdrawal. There must equally be final security against renewed hostility. There must be relief and rehabilitation on a new and imaginative scale never before contemplated. There must be demilitarised frontiers. There must be an end of the arms race. There must be a restoration of international authority. All the peoples concerned must be enabled to earn their living in peace and security and hope. The Holy City must be not a centre of discord and conflict but a summit of concord and conciliation.

When I was myself 21 years of age I first went to live and work in Jerusalem. And in my first week in my first post I saw the first Wailing Wall riots—one of the bloodiest communal riots that even the Holy Land has known. I saw then the terrible results of religious and political violence and conflict. And in the intervening decades there has been division and dispute and bitterness and bloodshed. The time has come, Mr. President, to finish it. We have an opportunity now, so I trust, to bring good out of evil. The very intensity of recent animosities and the counteracting influences of opposing interests gives us at last, so I believe, the hope of a secure settlement.

It is the question of the Holy City which is the immediate issue. This is the heart of the problem. This is the issue which excites both the fiercest feeling and the noblest aspirations.

When the Foreign Minister of Israel comes to advocate the deep longings of his people for freedom and unity and peace his brilliant advocacy touches us all. When he speaks of relief and reconciliation we all should welcome what he says. We respect the depth of his feelings and the sincerity of his devotion.

But he would not claim that his people have any exclusive concern for the Holy Sites sacred to three great religions. Moslems and Christians too have a deep and passionate concern.

It is this coincidence of concern and this common devotion which must now be respected, and it is this concept of joint interest which led my Foreign Secretary to give his solemn warning in this Assembly last month, a solemn warning that Israel should not purport to annex the old City or legislate for its annexation. He warned us, as you will remember, against any such step which would isolate Israel from world opinion.

We welcome, we certainly welcome any steps to relieve distress and dislocation and to facilitate the return of refugees. But what we have already stated would be wrong, and what we maintain would be wrong now, any attempt now to alter or prejudice the future status of the City. We trust that Israel will recognise and accept the force of that conviction and that strong contention.

In the immediate situation our first obligation is for the welfare and relief of all the people concerned, and in particular that there should be an easing and not a worsening in the refugee problem.

We have noted all that the Israeli Foreign Minister has said but we remain convinced that this Assembly was right to judge the Israel measures invalid. They were invalid because they went beyond the competence of an occupying Power as defined in international law.

We are not here to-day to deal with the long-term solutions. Some speak of proposals for internationalisation. We are of course fully in favour of freedom of access for all to the Holy Sites, but we think it would be wiser to defer for the time being consideration of the ultimate settlement. We are not dealing with the ultimate settlement now.

We are dealing with an immediate question. We deplore any immediate and unilateral action on a separate issue. We believe that all such issues of conflict should be settled in the framework of an eventual general settlement.

Accordingly, Mr. President, we restate and reinforce our statement that there should be no annexation of the Old City. There should not be any other present action which prejudices the City's future status.

It was for that reason that we voted for the resolution passed last Tuesday. We have not changed our strong views on this central question. Neither by unilateral legislation nor by annexation can or should the future of Jerusalem be now determined. It should be determined by a subsequent settlement in which the interests of all must be fully protected and permanently insured.

I thank you, Sir.

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