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קיטין אוכביד

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אתנו ותיק. השנה לונכיה בר-און - ביקור צויר המציגו

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ארכiven המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראת מקום להוצאה תעוזות ייחודות*

תיק מס': 130-2
מיכל מס': 7083/5
תאריך התעודה: 26/11/82 (ט' נס' מא)
שם הנכען: _____
שם מחבר התעודה: _____
סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקומות המתאימים):

- מכתב
 מבוק
 תזכיר או מיזכר
 דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דין
 פרוטוקול של שיחה, דין או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה, העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

מודיעות ישראל

משרד החקלאות
ירושלים

תאריך: א' בשבט תשמ"ב

25 בינואר 1982

מספר:

אל:

מאת: מצפ"א

הנדון: בקורס מזכיר המדינה של אריה"ב

רצ"ב תמצא בתיק את המסמכים הבאים:

1. עמדות אדריכליות בקשר האוטונומיה - סכום ש寥חות המזכיר 14-15.1.1
 2. עמדות מעריות בקשר האוטונומיה
 3. סנפיר וסילאן
 4. העימרות היכלן-סורי.
 5. פרוטוקולים משיחות המזכיר
- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| 14.1.82 | שיחת המזכיר - שח"ח |
| 14.1.82 | שיחת המזכיר - שחב"ט |
| 14.1.82 | שיחת המזכיר - רה"מ |
| 14.1.82 | שיחת המזכיר - שח"ח באירוע ערב |
| 15.1.82 | שיחת מזכיר המדינה - ועדת השרים |
| 21.1.82 | שיחת רה"מ - סול לינובי |
| 6. התייאוויות מעריות | |
| 15.1.82 | שדר ראיון עלי ברדי טונטה קולו |
| 20.1.82 | הופעת מרבך בראש נ.ב.ס |
| 22.1.82 | ראיון עלי ל"אל מנזר" |

בברכה

יוסי גל

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משרד החוץ
המרכז למחקר
מדפי



סודדי ביזה

ירושלים, ב' בשבט תשמ"ב
26 בינואר 1982

אל : מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל

הנדון : העימנות היידנגי - סורי

הנגידר המצע"ב הוכן ע"י מנהל מחלקת ערבי 2, תונ תאורם עם המ"ט.

בב רכח
פנחס אליאב
מנהל המרכז

העתק : מנהל לשכת שח"ח

משרד החוץ
המוכר למחקר
מדיני



סודדי בירור

ירושלים, ב' בשבט תשמ"ב
26 בינואר 1982

העימנות הירדני - סודרי

1. הנתק המתמשך בין שתי המדינות החמיר בשבועות האחרונים במספר תקירות ביחס לפעולות שתי המדינות זו את זו. בתחילת ארע פיגוע בעמאן (ב- 11 ב- 11) בו היו מספר נפגעים ושלגביו האשימה ירדן את סוריה ו אף טענה שאיש שגרירותם בעמאן הסידר את הפיגוע ונמלט אחר-כך לדמשק. הירדנים אף טענו שהויאל ומדובר בחנות נוצרית למטר משקאות חריפים שנפגעה, היתה גם כורנה להטעה בינו-גדתית וליצירת עימות בין השלטונות והחובגים הדתיים המוסלמיים. (הסורים מאמינים ירדן דרока בטיפור קשר זה ובמתוך עידוד לפעולות החתרנות של האחים בסוריה מtower ירדן). אטמול הכחישה סוריה טענה זו בגין שטירה לימיופה-הכח הירדני בדמשק, וטענה שהמודיעין הירדני עצמו הוא אשר ארגן את הפיגוע. התקשות הירדנית מודה דחנה הגרסת הסורית והביעה פליאתמה מדויק זה ארך 11 יום עד סוריה הגיבה על האשמות עמאן.

2. מאידע ארעה ב-21 תקנית בדראע שבسورיה שבמהלכה נהרגו 2 אנשי בטחון סוריים. دمشق האשימה מיד את עבאס ירדן בכך שעבר הגבול וידם ההתקשרות בעמאן כMOVEDן הכחישה העורבות מעבירות על כך שפעלה כאן חוליה של "האחים המוסלמיים" בתוך סוריה, אלא שאחר-כך נמלט חלק מחבריה לירדן. ברור שאין סוריה מעוניינת להזדהות בכך וטופלת האשמה על הירדנים, שמדובר אינם רועים להראות כמסייעים לחתרנות.

3. ראיית ההדררות ביחסים בין ירדן וسورיה נוצר עד תמיון הירדנית בעיראק במהלך המפרץ והדברים הגיעו לשיא בקשר בהקשר הפשגה הערבית בעמאן (נובמבר 80'). אזת ההחירמה סוריה ובנון-ברית, ושלאחריה אף היה ריכוז כוחות משני העדדים תוך השמעת איזוטים עבאיים. העילה להדררות היחסים ה זו היתה, כפי שהציג זאת אסד, גם צביעה מחוסידיו לחדר מתייכתו ב"אחים המוסלמיים" הופיעים נגד המשטר הסורי ולהכריז על בלעדותו של אש"פ כמייצג הפלטינאים (תביעות מחוסידיו לא יכול היה, כמובן, להיענות להן כי היו מתרשות כאלו עד אז תמן ב"אחים" והסתיג מ אש"פ). אולם למעשה ביטא האיום הסורי חילוקי דעתות עמוקים הרבה יותר, שכן אסד חש שבסגנה שיארכ בעמאן גנסה חוסידיו קיבל גושפנקא ערבית לערבות במלחין השלים. החרמת הייעודה וכן האיום העבאי נועד לחוריכת חוסידיו ולוושינגטן כי ביד دمشق הכח לשבש מלחכים וכי אfillו מהוצע לוועידה משקלת רב בבלימת מדיניות שאינה נראית לה.



4. המחלוקת בין ירדן וסוריה היא מתחמתה ונובעת מ תפיסת עולם שונת לגבי תהליכי השלים וכי שני הצדדים מיעגים מחרות מגורדים: בעוד חוסיין מבקש אחר דרכיהם אלטרנטיביות להמשך המומנטום לשלים, אם כי בஸלול שונח מקמף-דיוויד (תוך תקווה שיחות האוטונומיה ייכשל) ו אף מחפש מהלכים אל מטרים של מובארק, הרי אסד מתמיד בקיעוניותו ומשיר לתבוע ביטול ההסכמים וחיסול ישראל. בהתאם למגמה זו מעוננת דמשק לעדרל פעילות הרעדה המתחפת היידנית-אש"פית כדי לבודד ירדן ולהמשיך לפרש הסורה על אש"פ, אולם היא נאלצת להסכים לקיום תוכן התהשבות באינטראשי אש"פ.

5. פער העמדות הומחש לאחרונה בפסגת פאס, שהיתה אמורה לדון בתוכנית 8 הטעיפים של פחד. לפרט שוגם לחוסיין הסתייגויות מכמה סעיפים בתוכנית, הרי מתר שאייפתו להסדר היה מעוניין לעבד תוכנית זו ולגבש העזה ערבית "קורנסטרוקטיבית", בעוד אסד העדייף שלא לבוא לפאס ובכך לפעול לגניזת התוכנית.

6. ההתקפות החדשה עתה ומגל החדש של החששות ההדרתיות מחטיריהם היחסים בין שתי המדינות המתיצגות תפיסות מדיניות שונות בתכלית. על אף התמיכה היידנית בסוריה בא"ס בנושא הגולן, הרי שזירה העربية שבאייזור, הנכונות היידנית לתמוך בסורים מפרקמת יותר וחוסיין אף אמר שאיננו מוכן לתמוך אוטונומית בדמשק אם תפרוץ מלחמה בין ובין ישראל. ("אלנחר אלערבי ואלדולבי", 28.12).

7. מכל מקום גם אם הסערה בין שתי הבירות תשכך עתה, אולי שוב בתיווך סעודי, הרי שוב הומחש הפער המדיני העמוק ביןיהם, שכמוך, נתען לאחרונה גם בגל תהליכי ההתקשרות ההדרתי בין ירדן וטערים של מובארק בעוד שאיבת דמשק לקהיר נמשכת. מאידך גוברת החששות ההדרתי ממושך חתירה, להם מובן רגשים במוחם הסורים במצבם הפנימי המודען.

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Meeting between
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir
and
Secretary of State of U.S.A., Mr. Alexander Haig

Thursday, January 14, 1982, 11:30 a.m.
Sharett Hall, Foreign Ministry
Jerusalem

Present:

For Israel:

Dr. Y. Ben-Meir
Prof. M. Arens
Dr. D. Kimche
Mr. H. Bar-On
Mr. E. Rubinstein
Mr. S. Divon
Mr. E. Bentzur
Mr. Y. Ben-Aharon
Mr. P. Eliav
Mr. A. Pazner

For USA:

Mr. S. Lewis
Mr. N. Veliotis
Mr. R. McFarlane
Mr. W. Cluverius
Mr. W. Brown
Mr. E.S. Walker
Mr. W. Kirby
Mr. G. Kemp
Mr. S. Goldberg
Mr. P. Hare

H.E. MR. SHAMIR: I must say it is a real privilege to greet among us Secretary Haig, with his colleagues, to our Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. You have our admiration for your efforts the last days and the last months in all the international problems all over the world, and we are very happy that you decided to find time to come here and to do something important to advance the peace process in this area. All of us are eager to listen to your views and ideas and proposals after you have been in Egypt. The floor is yours.

H.E. MR. HAIG: Thank you! I know I speak for my colleagues that we are always very, very pleased to return to Israel, to sit down with you and your colleagues to discuss important matters.

As I suggested to you in the car, I had, in making assessments early in the Reagan administration, concluded that we would have to energize the autonomy process probably as early as October, this past year, and that was really the game plan, if you will, that we had adopted in Washington. Unfortunately, there were so many unplanned historic events over the last 11 months, 12 months, that that schedule was constantly interrupted by events. In many respects, in hindsight, I think our original judgments were exactly right.

It would be my assessment that we have had after the start of our working group activity in September and the progress made, which was real, by the working groups - I think they made real progress - erosion, and probably on both sides. Erosion.

Now, this worries me. It worries me more in strategic sense than in contemporary sense and we have to think strategically. For that reason, in assessing and reassessing over the last two weeks - and we have had our ambassadors back and looked at it very carefully - there were differing views on this subject, some of them which tended to converge with the Egyptian view and that was the view which increasingly suggested that autonomy was a potential problem, that we should not have an agreement certainly before the scheduled date for the return of the Sinai, for two reasons, one being that perhaps it would be an irritant here in Israel and create objective conditions that might disturb the Sinai problem itself and that here in Israel the plate was so full with Sinai and the settlement question that there could be no flexibility of any kind on the question of autonomy.

Secondly, a very subjective and strongly felt concern that were autonomy to be agreed to before the return of the Sinai, it would be portrayed throughout the Arab world as a sell-out by Cairo in order to get the Sinai back.

Now, I argued very, very strenuously in Cairo against those two theories. I don't believe them. I don't discount that those pressures exist, but they are not the essential pressures of the peace process at all, and for that reason I got a commitment from President Mubarak - I think they finally accepted our logic - and that logic was that the time is now to do the best we can, without deadlines, but with a massive, major effort, and such an effort will only achieve results if there is a political will, and I think we were able to generate such a political will in Cairo. I may be naive but certainly President Mubarak agreed and Hassan Ali agreed that it was in our joint interest to try, and to give the next two months of our time to energetic effort in that direction.

Now, I want to make it clear, Mr. Minister, to you and your colleagues, that we are not here on a pressure-generating, concession-extracting exercise. It wouldn't work if we thought it would. And we don't. On the other hand, for a host of strategic reasons, I believe it is not only in the U.S. interests but it is imminently and fundamentally in Israel's best interests to do what we can to strengthen the peace process before the Sinai is returned and not to wait until after, because it is going to be more difficult after, inevitably. That is the strategic reality we are dealing with.

What I would like to do here is to do something very similar to what we did in Cairo and that is to look at autonomy in depth, intensely, to go through the five functional areas which I think we all agree exist, to ask a series of questions with respect to those areas and your attitude here. We have done that in Cairo in great depth and we have put all the answers we got in a box and I have closed the box, and I will do the same thing here. The answers we get we will put in a box and we will close the box. I will not suggest to you how far the kinds of questions we are going to ask will reflect what is in the closed box, the Egyptian side, but I think you have to be able to deal with us with the assurance that we are not huckstering or peddling views between sides but rather looking for solutions. And so, if in these two days we get the answers to all of these questions, we would then return to Washington and analyze them very, very carefully and see if we can come up with some bridging proposals, come back here and, again, not pose either of the parties with surprises but to do the same kind of a thing we did on this occasion: go back and separately express views and see if indeed there is a potential. If it looks like there is a potential, then to convene a ministerial, tri-lateral meeting and see what we can do to move the process forward.

So I am being very frank about what we are up to and what we are not up to, and that is the purpose of the exercise and how we would like to go about it.

I do want to emphasize that after asking all the questions in Cairo, I see there are great differences, perhaps insurmountable differences, I don't like to accept that they are insurmountable. But

the area of greatest difference, first, is the security area, simply because they have not had your presentation yet, and so they don't know, but I think their conception of your needs in that area are such that this will be very manageable, and, therefore, I would urge that as soon as possible General Sharon get to Cairo and get that presentation, whatever it may be, put forward.

Now, we should talk about this today, because it may help in finalizing your own thinking on that subject, but I believe, and my colleagues, I am confident, share by view, that is a very manageable category.

The areas that are less manageable, as I see it, involve two important issues and perhaps a third. The first and most difficult, and I think we must talk about it with great intensity here, with the Prime Minister and with you, is the East Jerusalem question. There can be no doubt that this is the tough nut to crack.

Beyond that is the powers, if you will, of the central Governing Authority. I am more optimistic that we can crack that one. And the third, to a lesser degree, is lands and territories, and I am optimistic that we can crack that with good sense on both sides.

I want to mention one other thing and I talked to Minister Shamir about it on the way in from the airport. We were all very sensitive to changing rhetoric in Cairo. We used to hear "any reasonable agreement would be acceptable". Now we hear "any reasonable agreement must be acceptable". And by acceptable it is clear it is the view that the Palestinians and the moderate Arab world are to accept the outcome. I challenge that. I said we didn't go into Camp David

under that conception and we must not now apply it to the autonomy. But rather we must return to the conception that the negotiating parties must in their own conscience determine whether or not the autonomy agreement is reasonable. And I think I got a reluctant acceptance of that. It will remain to be seen, if it is only theology now. But I think we all have to understand that that is not an acceptable approach. We have consciences of our own and we know what is reasonable and what is not and that is the way Camp David was arrived at and we should stay within that.

Now, having given you all the bad news in terms of differences, I believe with a creative approach - creative approach - we could come up with a reasonable solution, and I think we could do it fairly quickly. My God, we have been at this thing for three years. There isn't a twist or a turn in the road that the experts don't know inside out and backwards. In fact, the more astute they get at it, the more difficult it becomes.

Political will. I won't go into the lengthy exposition that I have given to Minister Shamir and which I intend to give to the Prime Minister as why this is in our strategic interest, the U.S. Israel's strategic interest strategic interest,/to do everything we can to have a creative approach that will achieve results, without a deadline, without deadlines, without creating expectations, in the press, among our peoples. That is why I rejected, after careful thought, engaging in a repeat of the shuttle diplomacy and the Nobel quest of my distinguished predecessor. If I were to stay a half-hour longer here in Israel or go back to

Egypt, the press would be foaming at the mouth and it is very unjustified for any foam to develop at this point; the distances are so far and the problems so severe, but I am optimistic, if we are creative - creative. You notice that I use that word, not flexible, not concession-giving, but creative.

I left Egypt encouraged that President Mubarak is dedicated to the peace process and that he genuinely wants this process to continue beyond the return of the Sinai date. While in Europe I bludgeoned, kicked and cajoled our European partners to come forth with the letter, which arrived yesterday, I think, here. I have been over that letter, at least the original draft of it, and I hope and pray to God that we do not hear any more about it, but in democracies you always hear.

I also think the question of the islands, which caused some disturbance, is a non-issue. We keep it in Zone C. It will be provided by the Multinational Force. I think the modalities of how is far less important than the fact that it will be; that Egypt agrees that it will be. They don't want any discussion about sovereignty or turn-over, and I don't expect that there will be any offers from Cairo on this question so far as Riyadh is concerned, because they both have totally divergent views and that works to our advantage. So I think we have put our fears about that behind and provide for that in the modalities of the peace-keeping force.

Again, I want to compliment the working groups of the autonomy. I think they have really done excellent work. One cannot

criticize them. It now comes to/political will question.

I have got some questions here; let's start with the most difficult, because that is the most fun. Jerusalem. I think we all agree, and I think this will not be a contentious issue so far as the fact that we will not impinge on the final status of Jerusalem in these negotiations, and I think Egypt agrees with it clearly. But they have a feeling of great urgency, and I think we are going to have to deal with it, of dealing with the subject in some way, and what we are looking for is creative ideas. We ran a few creative ideas around the table over there, only one of which partially survived.

We talked about the voting issue. Have you got any creative ideas on this subject which do not violate our basic principle?

MR. SHAMIR: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your expose, but, as I said before, you will have the opportunity to know all our positions, all the details of our proposals about autonomy. We think that our proposals are very generous and they can be acceptable to the Egyptians. I don't know if they will be acceptable to the PLO - Maybe not.

MR. HAIG: I think we can say at the table: nothing that you give will be acceptable to the PLO. We know that.

MR. SHAMIR: And I am sure the Prime Minister will tell you what he heard from Sadat when he asked what will happen if the agreement we will reach with the Israelis will not be accepted by the Palestinians. Then the answer of Sadat was that I will say: we go ahead. We do it without you. That is, we, the United States, the Egyptians and the Israelis. We do it without. It means that this agreement, in all points of the agreement, must be acceptable to us.

Now, before we go into the details of the autonomy, all our proposals, I think that not like in Egypt, here you will have the details mainly from the Prime Minister, because in all the details of the autonomy process, he is better than all of us and any one of us.

But before going into the details of this autonomy, I want to make a few remarks. Two remarks. First, that all the efforts that we will make now for the achievement of autonomy, all these efforts are accompanied by two, maybe, dangerous phenomena. First, the view that is heard now, especially by the media, that this part of the Camp David Agreement concerning the peace treaty is already implemented, complete, completely implemented. The peace exists. There is nothing to worry about it and we have now to focus all our efforts on the other part of the Camp David Agreement: the autonomy.

I must say that this is not true. We have to give great attention, much attention, to the keeping of the peace, now, and in the future, because there are many reasons to be worried about the peace with Egypt. The peace is still at the beginning and it will face a lot of dangers.

During the time, we will go into detail. Normalization is not satisfactory and I think the United States, especially the United States, will have a great responsibility and a lot to do in the future in doing everything possible that the peace will last forever or as long as we can see the future. And there is a lot to do about it.

The second point: there is a theory that if we will not

reach agreement about autonomy, all the process of Camp David will collapse. I think this theory - maybe there is something in this theory ; but it is not in our interest to encourage this theory. We have to say to everyone that the peace treaty is a very great achievement. I think we can be proud about this achievement. Peace between Egypt and Israel is a revolutionary event in the area, and we have to make all the efforts possible to reach an agreement about autonomy, but not to forget that the peace treaty, the peace between us and Egypt, is the most important achievement of the Camp David process, and we have to do everything that this peace will last as long as possible and the Egyptians have to know that if they will change their minds about this peace, then they will be in a very difficult situation. If we will say all the time that we have to work only on autonomy and not to do anything about the peace, about the normalization, there is a danger of a certain devaluation in the peace itself, and I think we have to remember it now when we are going to make a great effort to advance the autonomy. I think we have to remember the view, the concept of Sadat, that a peace treaty between us and Egypt can exist and last for a long time even if the autonomy negotiations will take a long time. I think we have to be ready for it. We have to be ready and do everything possible, because the peace treaty with Egypt was not an accident. The divergence of interests and views between us and the Egyptians were the least important in the Arab world. The differences between us and all the Arab countries are more important, and, therefore, it was easier to reach a peace treaty with Egypt than with

other Arab factors.

Therefore, this peace treaty is the first. It is not a separate peace. It is the first peace treaty. It is the beginning of the peace process. Maybe with Jordan, with Saudi Arabia, it will be more difficult.

Well, these were only some remarks. I don't propose to get conclusions to these remarks, but only to remind you..

Then about autonomy. We have explained to the Egyptians and we have proposed now an approach to all these negotiations about autonomy. In our view it would be much easier to concentrate all our effort not on the future, the coming years after the five years of the transitional period of autonomy. We have proposed to concentrate on the conditions during the next five years and, therefore, we propose not to touch now the question of Jerusalem. Jerusalem was discussed at Camp David, and the solution was to postpone it. What use will there be if we start it again now? Let us postpone it. Jerusalem may be the most difficult problem between us, between us and the Arab world, not only with Egypt. Let us postpone it, because all the other problems will be much easier and they are easier. If you accept this approach, we can continue.

MR. HAIG: Well, I think that goes without saying that we accept that approach. On the other hand, in accepting that approach we have certain questions we have to deal with involving the Central Governing Authority, and that is all I want to touch upon. I think our policy is commin with yours, and I think Egypt accepts that, that

Jerusalem will be deferred, the question of Jerusalem, and that is clearly understood by all.

What I am talking about is the question which has certain domestic problems, here in Israel, and I don't want to get us engaged in that problem in any way, because it's none of our business, and I want to avoid it like the plague.

On the other hand, I think the question itself and the question of a creative approach to it is not going to be avoidable, and I am talking about that narrow question of ways for the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem to participate in the Self-Governing Authority.

MR. SHAMIR: This is a part of the question of Jerusalem. You cannot separate the question of the participation of the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the Self-Governing Authority from the general problem of Jerusalem. Therefore, our proposal is to postpone also this part. It is part of the problem.

MR. HAIG: I don't disagree. Don't misunderstand me. It is why I said it is the most difficult question we have and it is why I put it on the agenda for the first item. I am not here to conduct extractions, but I would leave you with the simple thought when we turn to another question, ^{the} that premise of your introductory remarks, that I don't disagree with either, but if we think in a post-Sinai-return period ^{in peace} that there is sufficient momentum/to keep the process viable and healthy, I think we are engaging in self-delusion. And I am speaking from American interests as well as Israeli interests. I am as concerned, for our own strategic interests in this region, that we do all we can to keep Egypt locked into this process and it is not

in our interest to create conditions that work against that objective, which is your objective, but if we believe that the/term "peace" has a momentum of its own, I think history would suggest to the contrary, and we'd better be very, very careful about that. ^{ephemeral}

Now, I won't say anything more. I will raise it with the Prime Minister. It is an unfortunate thing, in timing, that you have a domestic problem on that subject.

(Prof. Arens joined the meeting.)

MR. SHAMIR: Can I present to you, Prof. Arens.

MR. HAIG: I know the Professor well....I think we all know at this table what I am saying. Let's turn to something more easy. I didn't want to be accused of being a greasy fellow, so I raised the touch issue right at the beginning. We are friends and we talk about touch issues. Let's say something about the land and settlements, which is maybe a little easier.

I think we made the point successfully in Cairo and I won't give anyone concern here to suggest that we have ... engaged in making judgments on legality or illegality on settlements. The settlement question - as you know, President Reagan has made a statement on that subject himself and he has a convergent interest with you that this not be a topic which is addressed in anything involving land and territories - the legality question. And we are not going to get engaged in the question of the future of the settlements. That's for further down the road. I think we agree that the ultimate fate of state land and existing settlements is for the final negotiations.

We agree that under these conditions the autonomy agreement cannot attempt to judge legality and illegality. We believe that the Egyptians agree with that concept and understand the reality of our position.

Having said that, it is also important we find a formula for the interim period, which creates some sense of confidence and which will contribute to an ultimate solution, will make final peace achievable.

I'd like very much to hear your views. Maybe this would be an easier one for you, on how we might handle the land issue, in a way which protects your fundamental position and at the same time assures the Arab populations, the Palestinians, that their final status, positions, are also not prejudiced. I think that's a fair question.

MR. SHAMIR: I will ask our legal adviser.

MR. E. RUBINSTEIN: We are happy that you mentioned the position of President Reagan that the settlements are legal, and this is, of course, our concept and we do restress it and reaffirm it and this is part of the overall concept on which we are working. The Prime Minister has clarified the position time and again in the past that in the five-year transition period, we think that the Jews in the areas would be under Israeli jurisdiction - that is as far as the settlements and the Jews in the area - and I think this is a position that is logical and consistent in some respects with the Egyptian idea that the Jews will not vote for autonomy and not be part of the autonomy, which is autonomy for the inhabitants.

So far as land is concerned, our main concept has also been

presented in the negotiations and we think that private land would by no means be affected. Private land would be fully guaranteed, fully kept, in the areas; the private land of the inhabitants.

As far as public land is concerned - you know the question of security and specified security locations - and it is our concept that land which is under specified security locations and land which is part of the Jewish municipalities should be under our Israeli control in the five-year period. On the other hand, public land which can be used for the benefit of the population and which would be needed for schools, roads, public buildings and so on, would, of course, be available for that, and we thought that it should be under joint effort, joint approval, of our authorities and the autonomy. This is the concept that was presented. And we think that for the five-year transitional period this can answer the need and keep the interests of all concerned guarded and guaranteed.

MR. HAIG: Let me explore that in greater depth. You, in effect, are saying that private land would be dealt with during this transition period in accordance with normal practice. That is, a private owner can do as he sees fit. Public land will be the subject of joint management. Is that what I understood?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Well, the machinery can be agreed upon. It can be joint management. It can be some sort of joint management. The idea is that public land we divide generally into two, I would say, categories. One would be the category of the specified security locations which is part of the security concept, which will be

presented. And the Jewish municipalities, the Jewish settlements. They are all, as you know, on state land, on public land, and they should be given the opportunity to be on that land and develop properly. The other segment, or the other category, which is, as you can imagine, is a substantial, significant, very substantial portion of the public land, would be the public land that can be used for all other purposes, including roads and schools, public buildings and whatever is needed so far as the interest of the population and of all concerned, and this should be under some sort of joint management. And I am sure the Prime Minister is going to dwell more upon it, and he has probably his own way to put it, but this is the main concept. So the needs of the population, of the inhabitants, to public usage of land would be that way ensured, while also guaranteeing and ensuring the needs of all other parties concerned.

MR. HAIG: Does that joint management constitute a freezing in public land of settlement activity? I think that's what you are saying.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Can you repeat that? A freezing of settlement activity?

MR. HAIG: On public land.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I wouldn't call it that way. It would be a sort of misunderstanding.

MR. HAIG: Plus the security area that would be fenced off.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I mentioned also the Jewish municipalities and their needs and this has been explained. We are not speaking of a

freeze in public land. We speak of the possibility of developing of the Jewish municipalities and, on the other hand, satisfying the needs of the inhabitants in the areas, which fall into the other category.

MR. HAIG: What is your position on the settlements which exist in the territories with respect to future development of facilities and populations?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I would put it this way: The municipalities in the area are original municipalities. I do not think, at least I cannot view a concept, in which there is a freezing of any further Jewish settlement in the area. The Jewish municipalities should be able to develop and this includes in the original municipalities the possibility of developing more Jewish localities and whatever they are in these areas. The details and the overall picture can be developed, but the idea is: we do not speak of a freezing of the Jewish settlement activity. We see in it a concept, which was fully explained in the past and is also now explained, in the overall, existing land portions of the specified security locations and the Jewish original municipalities. I would like to be accurate in that -

MR. HAIG: That's almost Haig speaking. (Laughter) I think what I discerned you said was that with respect to existing settlements, it is the Israeli position that they can be both further developed, practically, with structures, and can be further thickened with populations. I hope what you have also said is that public land which has not been agreed upon for security purposes will be subject to joint decision in the future.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I'd like to be, since it is very important, a very delicate and very sensitive subject, more accurate again and I hope the Prime Minister will be able to dwell upon it and develop it. On this happy note, I am not going to commit Israel for things that have not been proposed and the idea, if I may in one sentence repeat it: We have private land. That's fine. Everybody understands, That's under people and people have rights and the rights are going to be fully guaranteed and no question about it. There are the specified security locations. It is understood that this land, which is under the specified security locations, is under Israel for security purposes, and I believe there is no problem about it.

MR. LEWIS: Can you stop right there FOR clarification? Are you also saying that within those security areas new settlements or Nahal units could be established?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Personally speaking - I hope this is the government's position too and I think it is - this is part of the way to help out this question, without making it too political, by using -

MR. LEWIS: I understand the argument.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: The answer is, yes; there can be a settlement developed -

MR. LEWIS: Within the specified security locations?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: As I said, the argument can be used also politically, in a good sense, and there are probably Jewish municipalities - and I can't personally speak on the specified security locations - but there are municipalities and original settlements and regional

settlements which are outside the specified security locations, and supposing there are such and I assume there are, these also should have the right to develop and this is part of the public land which will be allocated to them and under their control. Beyond that there is a significant, a substantial portion of public land which is not in these categories and this public land is going to be used by approval of both parties to all needs of the development and needs of the population.

MR. CLUVERIUS: Can I seek clarification? You seem to be saying that there is joint management -

MR. RUBINSTEIN: This is not the term.

MR. CLUVERIUS: Some kind of joint decision making and discussion process and you are saying that the existing settlements being territorially expanded into land which is not in the security locations is presently unspecified public domain. How would you envision that happening under the SGA?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: The categories have to be defined. The idea is that we have the Jewish region and municipalities and the public land under them. This should be agreed and specified before the autonomy is there and everybody would know where it stands exactly.

MR. CLUVERIUS: You mean the detailed autonomy agreement would assign at that time new land for settlements at the beginning of the transitional period? I'm not clear.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: It's quite simple. I wouldn't use the language you use. But the idea is: when we come to the full and

detailed autonomy agreement, everybody would know where are the Jewish municipalities and what is their status for the five years, including the land which is under them. You know, we have regional Jewish municipalities. It means, these sort of regions and Jewish municipalities include some settlements each. And so, when we come to the agreement, everybody should know. I can't go into the technique now, what exactly is the volume, the size and so on of the Jewish area and then everybody would know what are the other public lands which are to be used for the population's needs and, as I said, and joint approval.

MR. HAIG: You're satisfied with that answer.

MR. CLUVERIUS: I understand.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: It's a bargain. I would say to the Palestinians, grab it; it's a bargain.

MR. HAIG: Maybe we could ask some questions on the nature of the autonomy and Israel's role in that regard. We understand that the Governing Authority would administer its responsibilities with respect to the Arab inhabitants and that its character should not suggest that it's an infant state. We also understand that Camp David does not tend to create barriers between Israelis and the inhabitants of the territories and that arrangements will be needed to encourage Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate to their mutual benefit. However, we also appreciate the Egyptian concern that the SGA will be able to make a real difference in the daily lives of the inhabitants; that it be seen as an effective representative of the inhabitants and that it operate in its spheres of responsibility autonomously.

without Israeli oversight as such.

There are a number of potential misunderstandings in this area, so I wonder what are your ideas on how your basic positions will be protected while at the same time giving to the SGA the real ability to make a significant change in the lives of the inhabitants and also serve as an effective political voice for the inhabitants in the Continuing Committee and in the final stages of negotiations.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: First of all, I think that we should address ourselves for a second to what is offered as the SGA powers and responsibilities, and the powers and responsibilities as offered are a long, exhaustive list of subjects, which in fact, as the Prime Minister has said, is a quasi-government. If you take the American Cabinet and strike out Haig and Weinberger - I can't imagine it! . . . You have the powers and responsibilities of the SGA (AC), and I don't want to take the time of all of us by reading the whole list, but it is a very impressive, comprehensive list.

MR. HAIG: I am aware of it. I agree it is impressive.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: That's one facet of it. The other thing is the question of how they can feel that this is a political, as you put it, voice. This is an elected body. There's never been in Palestinian history; I would say in ironical terms, in the Arab world you don't find too many democratically elected bodies, and, in fact, if you take history, you will find that the municipal elections in 1972 and 1976 were two of the rare occasions in the Arab world. Here you have the idea of an elected body; a body being elected. This has to be, I would say, amplified and fully explained. This is the political voice.

You elect people. The fact that they are elected makes them representatives. That's one thing.

{And this goes also to the question of the size of the body. In the past there was a lot of talk about the size and the Egyptians thought it's not enough that it be functional. The people are elected. This is representation.

I didn't fully understand what you meant by the power of the Continuing Committee, which is a different story. There are talks about it and we know what it is all about, but I would like to find out what you meant by the Continuing Committee in this context.

MR. HAIG: Well, I think we all know that there's been discussion of a Continuing Committee, which I suppose is a revolutionary body and an adjudicator as such. Clearly, the interests of all must be represented in that, whatever its composition, and I think we have talked about composition.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: The idea of the Continuing Committee; you know, this goes back to Camp David. This was originally something that was aimed at working on the solution of the question of the displaced Arabs of 1967. Then it also said that some other matters of common interest, something of the kind, and we sort of expanded a little bit the powers of this Continuing Committee. And the Prime Minister agreed, I think in 1980, to expand in some respects the power of this body. I wouldn't call it sort of an overall judge or something that would deal with everything. This can't go that way, but it certainly can be more specific talks and more specific detailing of the powers that this

body would have. I don't think that we did that in our talks in full. This can still be explored. What should be stressed, that we don't see, a sort of overall judge for everything, because this might lead to a deadlock sometimes and also is subject to what would be agreed in all the other subjects.

DR. KIMCHE: If I may add one word to this. When as we said, you have the Self-Governing Authority, you have the administrative bodies which will be responsible for a list of subjects, which I'm sure you know very well. Now, in view of the fact that this autonomy and the people, the Palestinians, will be moving freely in this country - after all, it is not a separate state, as you know; it is an autonomy and people will be moving freely in this country - obviously there are many subjects which have to be coordinated and cooperated with us, I mean for the good, for the benefit of both people. You take a simple subject like foot and mouth disease and one can go on ad infinitum. There are many subjects which when you have this interlocking of free movement, you have to have these things fully coordinated and cooperated, which means that even if you have a party which is responsible for a subject, agriculture, you have to coordinate things. You have to coordinate questions of exports, questions of diseases and any number of subjects, which we call either cooperating or coordinating between the two bodies for the benefit of the two. And I think that's important to realize, because the Egyptians at times have said: we are giving with our righthand and taking away with our lefthand on these particular subjects, but these are very necessary for the realistic on-going in this country.

MR. HAIG: I think we understand what we are talking about about that.

The question came up on size, while we are on the subject of the Self-Governing Authority, and its elected representatives versus its administrative, functional responsibilities. I know that you have talked in a very narrow sense of the size of that body and the Egyptians have talked in a very sizeable sense. Frankly, I am a little bit puzzled by both positions. I am speaking just as an observer because what we are talking about is political representatives, elected representatives, some of whom, I think in a democratic sense, "should have functional responsibility as selected by the whole. In other words, you would appoint an administrator for agriculture and for various functional areas. The way the Egyptians seems to view it, that you believe that those two hats should be worn in such a way that there would be no more ^{of} than the number of functional activities that have to be dealt with, 15, or so.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: This is based upon basically the Camp David framework, which is our bible for a change; I say, as a change from the Egyptian position at this point because this is called in Camp David "Administrative Council". It means that it has to administrate and administration means it has to administrate the functions under it, and the representatives to the Administrative Council are being elected. The next stage then is how big. We speak of an Administrative Council that has to administrate. What do they administrate? The functions allocated. We spoke about 12-13. You spoke of 15. This is up to negotiation. As the Prime Minister said, this is a normal sort of quasi governmental body, or executive, or administrative, whatever.

governmental body, which is the Administrative Council responsible in the autonomy. And this was put in Camp David very clearly and on purpose, because we did not envisage a semi-state or a state all but in name by adding all kinds of parliamentary or whatever you call it (ians) around the functionaries. We believe that our position is based upon, first of all, Camp David, and secondly does reflect the concern of the other party about the representative character, by being elected.

MR. HAIG: Well, again, I think I understand your position, but I don't know that it is a particularly significant issue, if all the other factors are clearly in line with the concept you have outlined. In other words, I think it is ludicrous to say that there would be 120 or even 80. And if I were trying to be an advocate for Palestinian influence, one could make a case that the more of them there are, the less influence they will exercise. You know, we all have the experience with that in our democracies, and I think in our House of Representatives, and what you get is gaggles of coalitions which consist of self-neutralizing interests. So, I mean, I can argue the logic of a small, efficient approach from every point of view. But I don't see that it poses a problem or a real challenge to the concept or your concerns about parliamentary activity, if the representation is broad enough to give a sense of confidence that some real voice, in an autonomous sense, can be applied through elected representatives.

I just raise that with you, and I would like for something in between the two extremes that we have heard as acceptable without jeopardizing the concerns you have.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: You know, they are going to have a machinery - There are 12,000 employees right now in the civilian administration of the military government - 12,000 people and many of them senior people, directors general, spokesmen and whatever, from the local population of the inhabitants. All these people are going probably to go on with the Administrative Council and these people will be around. They will be having the say in the machinery and, as you know, some assistant secretary of state might have some more power than a senator or a representative from this point of view.

MR. HAIG: We believe that.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: So the voice will be there, but the concept of Administrative Council should be an Administrative Council and the size should be in accordance with that.

MR. HAIG: I guess I am having some trouble. You believe that Camp David says that the Self-Governing Authority is the Administrative Council?

DR. BEN-MEIR: That's why it's in parenthesis. The elections are for the Administrative Council which is embodied in the SGA. That's our position.

MR. CLUVERIUS: The SGA is the Administrative Council.

DR. BEN-MEIR: It is a Self-Governing Council-Administrative Council, which will have all the functions of a quasi government mentioned.

MR. SHAMIR: The differences are clear, I think. We are not interested to have there a parliament, a quasi parliament.

MR. HAIG: I understand that, but I don't think I necessarily

understand from reading the agreement that the Self-Governing Authority is the Administrative Council in the sense that they are inter-changeable.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I couldn't see any other reading. You will have a hard time finding a lawyer to give any other opinion.

MR. BEN-MEIR: I'm sure that the Prime Minister will go into it. At the time of the Camp David discussions we suggested in parenthesis to add "Administrative Council" and El-Baz objected strenuously saying that if Administrative Council is added the first time, that will clearly be the reading throughout Camp David for SGA, to which Prof. Barak answered that that's exactly what we mean. And after that, it was discussed back and forth it was accepted and I'm sure the Prime Minister will mention it, if you discuss it with him. That is what was decided, that it is an administrative council.

MR. HAIG: I am not raising consensus issues. I am really trying to plumb precisely where we are on this thing and, therefore, I sound rather obnoxious and I will continue to. If we meant that in drafting a document of that kind, I think we would have never used the word Self-Governing Authority and used Administrative Council.

DR. BEN-MEIR: It's written in order to express the function of the Administrative Council.

MR. LEWIS: Even if you accept that for purposes of discussion, and I am sure, as you say, the Prime Minister will give us further elaboration, those of us who were there remember the discussions at some length, but even taking that proposition, let's say, an Administrative Council, we have lots of examples of administrative councils.

which govern cities, for example, which are not parliaments, which are not legislative bodies, which have some rule-making authority, pass ordinances. Some are as big as 80 or 100 members. There are city councils in the U.S. of upwards of 80 members, with a smaller executive but they are administrative councils and are so defined. So the numbers thing linked strictly to functions seems to me is kind of a red herring.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: If we are in the terms of reference of the Middle East, let's take the old Mandatory period. When they wanted to do something quasi-parliamentary or whatever, they called it legislative council. We intentionally did not put something of that kind. We are not calling it legislative council. We call it Administrative Council, in terms of the area, and in terms of regular executives that you have. Take the Government of Israel, though it has expanded for political reasons, it doesn't come to more than 20. We don't speak of a government. We speak of an Administrative Council which is not a state all but in name. By the way, frankly, speaking, I don't see, having participated in all negotiations, I don't see the on this subject. This is something which can be overcome, and by climbing the tree and sitting on a tree and yelling all kinds of things, it won't help and it is of no use. When these people will be elected and work, this will be an achievement; not if there will be 80 or 17 or 15 or whatever.

MR. HAIG: I think that is my judgment too. I think it is not that significant an issue, providing the other parameters of the SGA are there, those that really determine its character, and not the number of people.

DR. BEN-MEIR: The responsibilities and powers.

MR. HAIG: That's right. What I am suggesting is that that's an area that a solution can be found, and, frankly, if the Egyptians are shortsighted enough to insist on larger numbers, I wouldn't be concerned about that, subjectively. It really will be a blow to efficiency and effectiveness and a diversion of authority. Just the more numbers you have, the more it is weakened, and I have so told them. That's my view and I think maybe they started thinking about it a little more positively.

Can we touch the question of sovereignty? I guess we agree that issues indicating sovereignty reasonably defined should be held aside for the transition period. I think the Egyptian side is comfortable in that. We can agree as well that where practical problems arise in this area that require practical solutions, not disagreement on principle, we have to function. I think the Egyptians agree with this as a principle, although there is a contradiction, but they have problems and I know you do too in this area when you get down to practical solutions. Can we find a way to put sovereignty issues aside, away from both Israel and the SGA during the transition period? Is there a way to do that? Have you got some ideas?

MR. SHAMIR: It doesn't exist. The problem of sovereignty during the transitional period doesn't exist. There is no sovereignty involved.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: It is not part of the game now.

MR. SHAMIR: It is not part of the autonomy scheme. We will start to discuss it in three years after reaching an agreement.

MR. CLUVERIUS: I think the Egyptian concern is, and ye

have discussed it under other headings: residual power. In foreign affairs no one has power to represent the territories abroad; not the SGA. That principle is not exercised; no one possesses it and that's become a real issue, Eli, with the Egyptians. If you put them aside, no one has them. It's not just a question of exercising.

MR. RUBINSTEIN; I would say - this is a partial definition from our point of view - what we say is and this is the position: we think that the so-called source of authority, which is not being discussed as such, but we do believe that the source of authority, legally speaking, is sort of in the shadows but is under us in the five years, and, of course, it would have some practical implications with the security things, with the Jewish settlements and so on. But would not be expressed by representing the autonomy in the UN or something of that kind or making speeches for them. This is obviously not meant to be. In practical terms, we think that in the five year period, such things that have the sense of foreign affairs should not be dealt with by anybody practically. This is apart from the legal consequences which I just put forward and the thing will go on. We don't see there is any urgent need or any real need that, let's say, international agreements or treaties would be made for the areas, for five years. Who needs them? This is something which just would waste the time and there is no problem, real problem, that necessitates it.

So we think these things should not be. The same thing with problems which have been raised which we call the "residual" and the Egyptians call the "reserve" powers. We don't think there should be a currency for the autonomy, because currency is a symbol of sovereignty.

So everybody is comfortable now with Israeli and Jordanian currency around there. Some people have dollars too, probably, though this is not legal tender. Just for the sake of making you feel better. And the idea is that this currency situation will go on for the five years. What's wrong about it? Let's push the thing through without sticking into it new inventions, things like stamps and whatever. These things are considered symbols of sovereignty and in practical life it won't hamper anybody if this won't exist.

MR. HAIG: I must say, I don't feel that we have a problem with this thing. It's sort of an air bag; the more you punch it, the less is there. I have a problem, unless my colleagues do, in the light of our exchanges in Cairo to know just what the problem is.

MR. CLUVERIUS: I think the phrase "issues indicating sovereignty reasonably defined" - I do think we have a better feeling from Cairo that we can sit down and reasonably define it and find practical solutions that we will be better off than before. It's a definition of which ones are -

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Why do you call it "issues of sovereignty"?

MR. SHAMIR: Sovereignty has nothing to do with autonomy.

MR. CLUVERIUS: Indicators. How you handle indicators of sovereignty.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I think we should use a different phrase.
(General discussion)

MR. HAIG: Let me go a step beyond and maybe think the unthinkable. Suppose a question did come up in practical, contemporary

terms. I heard you on that issue, but is it important that it be dealt with the way you said it or isn't it possible to have an issue of that kind dealt with within the framework, as it is already worked out, of a Continuing Committee. Let me raise it that way.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Let's leave the devil rest. If I am personally asked - I'm not sure what is the full position we will develop. I think this has to be negotiated and the powers of the Continuing Committee have not been fully explored.

MR. HAIG: I would never allocate those powers because we decided to set them aside. So you won't allocate those powers. They are set aside. But, I think as an understanding for dealing with practical questions, as distinct from powers, but a practical question which is really of such nebulous character that you could probably call it an elephant or a hippopotamus or whatever you wanted to call it. But as I am looking at the character of a Continuing Committee, it seems to me those kinds of non-descript issues, whether one would call it a sovereignty question or another question, undefined in the principles, because all we are talking about is a statement of principles, would lend itself to that kind of thing.

DR. KIMCHE: I would say, if I may say a word here, that this is very much a non-issue. As our Minister said, sovereignty doesn't arise during this period. I mean, on no account are the Palestinian Arabs going to be represented by anybody in the UN or in foreign capitals, neither by us or anybody else. We have never done it up to now and there is no need. It is a non-issue. Similar with all the other

trappings. The other question is one of security. This is the one question which I think exists. It is a serious, concrete, solid question which has to be decided. All the others are completely non-issues and my approach would be, as it is a non-issue, let's not make it into an issue. Let's leave it. Let's not go into it and let's not define it as an issue at all, because it isn't one. The security one is. This is definitely an issue, and the security has to be tackled, solidly, clearly, and well defined.

DR. BEN-MEIR: It is a practical issue not related to sovereignty.

DR. KIMCHE: All the other issues don't really exist.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: And on top of that, the question of settlement of disputes, which is usually a part and parcel of every reasonable agreement, was not yet fully explored. We have to find sort of the machinery to resolve issues that might come up and let's not call them issues of sovereignty but practical issues that would come up. There would be machinery to settle disputes. It is agreed upon. The question is how. I think we can do it, and I believe this is something that can be overcome.

MR. BAR-ON: It is a pragmatic affair - this one in particular.

MR. HAIG: I agree with that.

MR. BAR-ON: Therefore, I would imagine that this is one of those issues when in the course of the more detailed negotiations in a very pragmatic approach, actually later on a nearly case-by-case basis, have to be found and the machinery.

MR. HAIG: Everything you say, I'm very comfortable with. But in pragmatic terms, when you sit down and start defining the role of a committee, the Committee, I think you are going to find it is a stump for all unvisualized problems that are not coordinated out of the area of difficulty. And I can see that developing and it will ultimately develop. I say that to be perfectly honest that something could come pragmatically that no one had foreseen, that cooperation and coordination did not resolve in a pragmatic sense and that, therefore, would need to be dealt with, unless it were specifically provided for, and if you specifically provided for, then you get into some great difficulty, and I notice the care which you used in describing sovereignty. That's all I am saying so that we all understand what we are talking about.

Is everyone comfortable on this subject or uncomfortable?

Maybe we can turn to security. And I again emphasize that on the Egyptian side they were not able to really address the issues and our questions were because they are still waiting your contribution in this area, and I only urge that that happens as quickly as it can be done. I know they are ready immediately to receive either General Sharon or whoever you want.

MR. SHAMIR: The problem of security was already presented to them once, I think a year ago.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: May 1980.

MR. LEWIS: But in very general terms.

MR. SHAMIR: We will have an opportunity to have a presentation. We are ready to present it to them at any moment.

MR. HAIG: Fine. In the frankness of this table, I got the impression that there was some reason why they didn't have it yet. They had a date and it was postponed.

DR. BEN-MEIR: Technical reasons.

MR. HAIG: I don't want to over-dramatize it.

MR. VELIOTES: The longer it is postponed the more imaginations run. The basic fear is that you have got something up your sleeve that you don't want to tell that will result in taking away all of the powers on security.

MR. SHAMIR: I don't remember that we were asked to present it and we refused.

DR. KIMCHE: There were to be autonomy talks last week in Cairo and those talks were postponed -

MR. HAIG: That's correct.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: The American delegation - I don't pass the blame - asked for postponement because of your visit and this was scheduled for this week. It would have been presented had it not be asked to postpone.

MR. LEWIS: There were also postponements during the fall; back in September when we met at the Ministerial level, it was to be done in October and then other things occurred. Now it is January. That's the whole point; things have intervened. Time is essential.

DR. BEN-MEIR: Minister Sharon wanted to present it personally and the time wasn't yet opportune.

MR. SHAMIR: We are ready to do it at any moment.

MR. HAIG: All right. I think on that subject, certainly we agree on the US side that external security of the eastern front relates to Jordan. And, therefore, it should not be dealt with in this round at all.

How can Israel define its security needs in a manner which minimizes any interference with the powers transferred to the SGA and the impact of the Israeli security forces on the daily lives of the inhabitants? I think this is both a delicate and a difficult question, but I'm not pessimistic that we can't work it out to everyone's satisfaction.

MR. SHAMIR: I cannot see any difficult in this. You will have the opportunity to raise this with our Minister of Defense this afternoon, I think.

MR. HAIG: All right, I guess what I am specifically interested in getting your view on is: I assume that you assume that the SGA will have an internal security role?

MR. SHAMIR: Strong local police force, according to the agreement, Camp David Agreement.

MR. HAIG: And I suppose there is no problem here in principle in reflecting that in the agreement.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Strong local police. I wouldn't use the term "internal" security" because it involves problems of terrorism.

MR. SHAMIR: There is a problem of internal security beyond this problem of police. I assume the Egyptians know about that.

MR. HAIG: And I don't think I see a problem in the Egyptian approach to this from what would have to be your needs here. A couple of questions, though, I think, would be important for my own thinking. I would assume that police force would be an evolutionary thing; you have to develop and train and have increasing competence for internal security in what I call law enforcement, day-to-day. Then you get to the question of arms, for example, in the territories. Clearly, that is a very serious question, from everyone's point of view. Would you visualize that they would be disarmed, that these territories would be disarmed as such?

MR. KIMCHE: You mean light arms, rifles and things like that?

MR. HAIG: Yes.

MR. KIMCHE: We have already distributed some arms to these local village authorities. There have been some arms.

MR. HAIG: To defend themselves?

DR. KIMCHE: Yes.

MR. BEN-MEIR: In the context of the police force.

MR. HAIG: But the citizens have no right to hold arms? Let me ask another question then: in the question of search and entry - I'm just asking these questions. They didn't come up in Cairo but they worry me because I know they have heavy political overtones. In the question of search and entry, suspicion of infiltrators and terrorists.

MR. SHAMIR: I think it was raised already.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: Our concept, and probably the Minister of Defense would explain it, is that we should have the responsibility

for that so far as the fight against terrorism and so on is concerned and this would be under our authority.

DR. BEN-MEIR: In other words, not the normal procedure of day-to-day law enforcement. The fight against terrorism would be in our responsibility, whatever it would include.

MR. HAIG: Would that involve the employment of your security forces that are enclaved in the territories?

MR. RUBINSTEIN: I would assume so, but I'd leave it to the Minister of Defense. The answer would probably be yes.

MR. SHAMIR: I think the internal security will be in our responsibility.

MR. HAIG: What you are really saying is "external"?

MR. SHAMIR: And external.

MR. HAIG: The instigated threat to internal security. This wouldn't come from its own. It would have to involve either persons or weapons that have been infiltrated.

MR. SHAMIR: It would be included in the fight against terrorism. All what concerns fight against terrorism will be our responsibility.

MR. HAIG: Let me ask another question, which is related to that, and has a high political content. Do you visualize circumstances in which Israeli armed forces would move into territories for exercises or training or any other purposes, barring an external threat of security to the territories?

DR. BEN-MEIR: Training would be in specified security locations.

MR. HAIG: But not that Israeli military forces would move in

for that purpose, I would hope that you wouldn't ask for that, because it is politically dynamite, in any point of view, and awfully hard to justify;

MR. LEWIS: You mean forces normally stationed in the Negev being moved into the specified areas for training?

MR. BAR-ON: Into the specified areas or non-specified.

MR. HAIG: Either. You are going to have a rotation of forces. I don't think anybody would mean that.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: We are not going to freeze things. Those that are stationed there will not be freezed there only for the five years. You change forces, You move forces.

DR. KIMCHE: That's obvious. Personally, I think you should raise that this afternoon,

MR. HAIG: The reason I raise it: it is a paranoia, sensitive question, that troops are moved to intimidate and achieve political results, and I would think if those security forces in the territories are properly designed and structured and missioned, that you would never have a need to do that.

Let me ask another question that we didn't get to when we talked about the territories, land and what have you and under this concept of - and I feel very strongly about this concept; that we are really talking about a peace process, and when we talk about a peace process it means assimilation and compatibility of ethnic populations, differing ethnic populations. Therefore, I would be a strong advocate for no fences and no barbed wire and yet there are real problems

of commercial and other kinds that have to involve control of activity and entry, at least from the standpoint of management functions. I can't visualize it not being that way and even taxes and things of that kind, which inevitably come up, as I know between our - even in the States - boroughs and between, say, New York City and Brooklyn, where you have real problems that come up if you haven't got some way to gage what the flow is, transient workers, and you have many that will be coming from the territories into Israel proper.

MR. BAR-ON: I think that our concept is open borders. I think this is the basis; open borders for goods and persons, all around. Of course, all economic problems, taxation. We, for example, will run add have already discussed at length; direct taxation is one thing which we would not touch. Indirect taxation, added value taxes, become an entirely different affair. This type of thing exists. It exists in transportation. I wouldn't say the licensing, but what kind of vehicles, what you do under circumstances of this sort. This is precisely why we had tried to introduce the concept of cooperation and coordination. We know, of course, that the Egyptians at a certain point thought, as Eli said before, that we are trying to give with one hand and take back with the other, which isn't really so, because what we are trying to regulate or trying to come to some kind of agreement on is precisely this cooperation and coordination within the framework of free borders, open borders, all along and yet, of course, with the concept of autonomy and regulating their own daily lives. Certainly budget and direct taxation and all which flows from this is not in the

cooperated or coordinated side. On the other hand, indirect taxation with all this implies. At the moment, of course, frankly, the cooperation and coordination partly of the West Bank is that quite a number of them do get salaries on two sides and don't pay taxes to either. But I am quite sure that the SGA (AC) will not be terribly interested to not get the taxes out of them. So, obviously, this is a vast pragmatic problem, where I think we realize that the political connotation to it, whilst there is no political connotation, is basically a practical one.

MR. HAIG: Well, I think of one practical problem that Israel can itself will want to be able to deal with very, very carefully and it really got down to an issue raised in Cairo, to be very frank with you: there would have to be, while there are open borders, certainly some check-points and some ability on the road to -

DR. BEN-MEIR: Why?

MR. HAIG: Let me tell you why, from your point of view. If I were here.. Suppose you have a problem of weapons and terrorist activities?

MR. SHAMIR: There will not be frontiers between the autonomy and the other side, because the autonomy is for the inhabitants. It is not two countries.; It is not a matter of two states.

MR. RUBINSTEIN: This goes against the whole basis of the five-year concept. There should be open frontiers, open lines, fully open lines, economically, free movement. Everybody can come and go out. These things which you mentioned which are grave problems, they should be taken care of by the security arrangements as such, but not

by putting a check point on the road. By the way, Gaza and Judea-Samaria are separate, physically.

DR. BEN-MEIR: You gave the example of NYC and Brooklyn; there's New York and New Jersey,

MR. HAIG: I wouldn't like to talk about two states!

DR. BEN-MEIR: Here there are no states at all.

MR. LEWIS: Between some states, they do stop and inspect cargoes. There are these things between our States, agricultural inspections. You go from Nevada to California, you go through quite an inspection for agricultural products. So there are these practical matters.

DR. BEN-MEIR: You have a completely free flow,

MR. CLUVERIUS: Since you now control the territories, you control what comes into Israel. You can tell the farmers, 100 tons of melons into Israel. Under SGA he is going to decide for himself how to grow. You are going to have to control what he sends in and you are not going to be able to go to the farmer to tell him what to do if he is an autonomous farmer.

MR. HAIG: I am raising what I think are questions that you will have to grapple with.

MR. CLUVERIUS: That is a practical problem that the Egyptians are concerned about and they get suspicious. There are some physical points where the SGA is responsible and 100 meters further on it is not. Take a road that crosses what used to be called the Green Line. Maybe that road is falling apart on your side and trucks go back and

forth and you say, we are going to fix it. You say to the SGA, let's fix it. We think that's a good idea. They say, we don't have the budget; we are not going to fix it. You fix your part. So to some point there's a road that you are fixing. Are they going to be free to not fix? If they say, we don't want to fix it; we don't have the budget this year. That's the kind of issue.

DR. BEN-MIR: It's not a check-point.

MR. CLUVERIUS: Some physical point where they are free to decide. Dumping dairy products, for instance. We don't want that many eggs. We are trying to build up an egg industry of our own. Are they free to say, you can't bring the eggs in? Where are they going to check on the eggs?

MR. SHAMIR: There will be cooperation between the Transportation Department, our Ministry of Transportation and theirs.

MR. CLUVERIUS: The Egyptians are concerned whether that is mandatory or voluntary. Can they say, no, we don't want that many eggs this year and they are free not to accept the eggs?

(General discussion)

(Press and photographers entered room.)

MR. HAIG: If I may, at the outset I made some comments about Egyptian attitudes in the long-term aspect of the situation. These are only subjective observations. They did not come from anything that I ascertained in Cairo and I want to be sure that we know that and how sensitive it would be if anyone were to suggest that I was reflecting Egyptian attitude.

I was very impressed with the Egyptian demeanor on this peace process and on the autonomy talks and the willingness to get on as quickly as we can and arrive at a solution.

When I raised those two concerns, I am giving you a reflection of my assessment of their problems on the subject, so I hope it will not leave this room because it will be damaging for our mutual confidence.

Secondly, I want to mention something that came up in your introductory remarks. Following this visit here, I am going to ask Mr. Veliotis to go on to Amman to hold their hands, to tell them what we are doing and be sure they understand and don't misread something which will further contribute to distrust in the current situation and then go on to Jeddah and do the same thing. I think we should at some point in these discussions here talk a little bit, at least exchange views, on where we go from here, if we have a prolonged or what looks to be difficult or less than optimistic outlook for autonomy, and also how we would proceed from a post-Sinai period on the peace process itself. Whether we should consider efforts to enlarge or not and vehicles to do that. I think it is awfully important in the light of your observations about the peace process itself and peace.

And that's really all I had to say, other than to thank you.

MR. SHAMIR: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thank you for all the efforts made so far and I am sure we will continue to discuss the same and other questions tonight, with the Prime Minister and tomorrow with what is called the Committee on Autonomy and I hope that you will arrive

to positive conclusions.

MR. HAIG: At least there will be conclusions!

MR. VELIOTES: I think we should explain. Included in my charge is not to divulge the discussions here we are having but to explain to them the purposes of the Secretary's meetings.

(The meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m.)

5

פגישת שר הבטחון עם מזכיר המדינה הייג ב-14 לינואר שעה 15.00

נכחו: לואיס, מקפרליין, וליוטיס, בראון
רמטכ"ל, ר' אמין, אלוף טמיר, ר' מורייפ, רליש הרמטכ"ל, רליש שהבייט
בציג אמין, חי"ג ארנס, מנכ"ל משהח, בר-און

שהבייט פתח דבריו באומרו שיש לו אמנס רשימה של נושאים שברצונו להעלות אך לפני הכל בכוונתו להזכיר נושא אחד שלו הוא מיחס חשיבות והוא נושא טיראן וסנפיר. שהבייט אמר שהוא מעדיף לשמעו שכמ"ר לא יהיה פרום בטיראן ושלא תהיה נקודת צפיפות קבועה במקומות. ברצונו להבהיר שאין כל אפשרות שנוכחות כלשהיא תוכל לבוא במקומות צהיל אלא הכוח הרוב לאומני. עיינתו היא שאמ כמ"ר לא תהיה במקומות, דהיינו בטיראן ובשארם א-שייר הרי לא יוכל לעמוד. הסכמנו עם הפקוד של כמ"ר על הפרישה המוצעת של הכח. נכוון שיחבנו שהפרישה במקומות מסוימים באזרור היהת יכולה להיות עבה יותר אך בכל זאת הסכמנו. רק בנקודת אחת אין יכולתנו להסכים וזה להיעדרות של נוכחות קבועה של כמ"ר בטיראן.

שהבייט אמר שהוא רוצה לשמעו את דעתו של המזכיר בעניין זה. המזכיר הזכיר בקצרה את תולדות הטעוגיה הדעת. הוא אמר שהגושא עלה לאחרונה מאחר והסודים הצעירו לפני שבועות אחדים העירה לא נבונה (impudent). המצרים אינם מקבלים את ההצהרה הסודית. הם תובעים לעצם את הריבונות על האיים דבר שモגן איננו מתאפשר עם התביעה הסודית.

שהבייט העיר שלנו אין כל עניין בסוגיות הריבונות. מה שמענינו אותנו איננו בידי מי הריבונות על האיים אלא שכמ"ר יהיה נוכח בטיראן.

הזכיר המשיך בתיאורו ו אמר שהוא העלה את הטעוגיה בשיחותיו במצרים. מבחינתו וזה אושר גם ע"י המצרים המצב הוא שהאים נמצאים באזרור C ואזרור זה הוא חחת פקוח הcam"r. מנקודת מוצא זו הוא סבור שתהיה אפשרות למצוא פתרון.

שהבייט אמר שביעיתנו אנו היא הפיקוח על המצרים. לשם פיקוח ייעיל חיבטים לפחות שניים צידי המיצר, המקום האחד הוא ראש נסראני ושם תהיה נקודת צפיפות של כמ"ר והמקום השני הוא האי טיראן.

וوليוטיס העיר שאחרי שיחתו של המזכיר עם המצרים בעניין שני האיים מטר לו כמל חסן עלי שמצרים מתכוונת להציג בטיראן נקודת משטרת וכמובן שהdagל המצרי יהיה בשני האיים. הוא וوليוטיס התבקש ע"י כמל חסן עלי למסור לנו על החלטה זו.

שהבייט העיר שבחינתו אין לנו כל התנגדות לתהנות משטרת אזרוחית והנפת דגליים באיים מאחר וזה בהחלט מותר לפי חוזה השלום. תהיה בעיה חמורה אם לא תהיה נוכחות של כמ"ר במקומות. ברצונו להבהיר שוב שرك ייחידת כמ"ר תוכל להחליף אותנו באיים. הוא היה מודה למזכיר באם המזכיר אישת היה מתערב בסוגיה זו.

המציר האיב ב亞ウטרכו שהוא אכן מכיר בצורה מספקת את הבעיה האסטרטגיית-צבאית שיש לנו במקום אחר ומעולם לא ביקר במקום. אך נדמה לו שבתקופתנו אנו ישנן דרכי לא מעות על מנת להתגבר על סוגיה זו. ברור שחייבים לדאוג לזרימה מתמדת של מודיעין על הנעשה שם.

שהבייט במשובתו אמר שהוא אגנו בדעה זו. יתכן ונכitan להגיד זאת לאגבי מקומות אחרים באזרע C וכן אם הסכמנו לפרטה יחתית דלה של כמיר אך על מנת לשלוט במיצרים חייבים להיות משנה צידי המיצר, ומכאן שהכמיר חייב להיות נוכח בטיראן. שהבייט המשיך באנטרו שהוא חשב לנכון להעלות נקודה זו כפי שהוא מתכוון להעלותה בשבוע הבא כאשר יבקר במיצרים,

המציר האיב באנטרו שהוא אכן מכיר כאמור את המקום באופן אישי, מבחןתו ברור בוא שהאים נמצאים באזרע C ולכך תחת פיקוח והאחריות של הכמיר. הוא, המציג מקנה משקל רב לדעתו של שהבייט שעל מנת לשלוט במיצרים חייבים להיות משנה הצדדים של המיצר, שהבייט ביקש לאחר דברים אלה לעבור לנקודות אחרות.

הנקודה הראשונה שהעלה הייתה ידיעת מודיעינית הנמצאת ברשותנו ושאלת רצח להסביר תשומת לבו של המציג. לפי הידיעה הזאת ידוע לנו שפורטוגל מנסה לרכוש שני מטוסי תובלה מהדגם 0-130 C עבור עיראק. שהבייט ביקש את התערבותו של המציג לסקל עסקה זו. שהבייט העיר שהוא יודע שהציג התעורר בזמנו לאגבי עיסקה שעמדה להתבצע כאשר ירדן ניסתה לרכוש תותחי 55 מ"מ עבור עיראק.

ווליוטיס שאל האם מדובר בעסקה שבה מעורבת ממשלה פורטוגזית או גורמים פורטוגזליים פרטיזיס. שהבייט האיב שלו אישית אין ידיעת ברורה בעניין זה. ר' אמרין מכר שהוא העביר את פרט הידיעה לפנוי יומיים להילית המודיעין האמריקאית. שהבייט ביקש לעבור לנושאים נוספים ומנה אותם חיללה.

הנושא הראשון נוגע למכירות ציוד וידע לרומניה ויוגוסלביה. לנו היו בקשרות מהרומנים לרכישת מכבים מטויים מתוצרתנו שבו רכיבים אמריקאים. כן הם ביקשו את תמייתנו הכללית בסוגיות הטעידות ומודרגניציה. משלחת ישראלית ביקרה לאחרונה לרומניה ושם דברו הרומנים איתנו הן על מטוס הקרב שלהם מפתחים במשותף עם יוגוסלביה והן על grading up של טנקים וציוד אחר. דברים דומים קורים ביוגוסלביה.

היינו מודיעים לו ? כולנו קיבל תgovותכם לעניין זה. כזכור עניין המכבים לרומניה כבר על עבר והיינו מודיעים על תשובה. מכל מקום אין אנו רוצחים לעשות דבר לפני שנקו מתדיים את אריהיב.

נושא נוסף שברצוננו של שהבייט להעלות לדין הוא מכירות לאירן והנושא האחרון הוא מכירות כפיר לטאייזון.

המציר אמר שברצוננו קודם כל להתייחס לסוגיה הטעי ווננית מאמר והיא שאלת ראייה ביותר. (most sensitive).

ארה"ב אחריו יונקים ממושכיםagiuh/l'misknah לא לשפר רמת המטושים של טאיוון ארה"ב במאת בעיצומן של שיחות מסובכות מאוד עם ממשלה פקינג בסוגיות הספקת חימוש. שיחות אלו יימשכו עד מען לחודש. שיחות אלו יכולות להיות גמר בネット קשה בין ארה"ב לבין טין או בתוצאות טובות וסבירות. תהיה לכך חשיבות עליונה (vitally important) שלא נואש עייני הסינים ב-double-dealing. כאשר אנו מקרבים לטאיוון לספק מטושי 5-F אנו לא יכולים להסכים להטפקת כפירים. התוצאות, אם לא נוכל לטפל בסוגיה זו בצורה נבונה ביותר עשויות להיות מסוכנות ביותר. כאשר ראש ממשלה גרמניה ביקר בושינגטון בשבוע שעבר הדבר הראשון שהוא ספר לנו היה שבדן ביקורו בגרמניה לkom אוטו הונקר הצדקה ואמר לו טין עומדת לחזור למפנה הטוציאלייטי. הוא, חייג איבנו סובר כך ואיבנו מאמין שזה אכן יקרה, אך חייבים לדעת שהמצב בטין הוא כיום מסוכן. ס/רואה ימ צינגן נמצא ביום במעמד יותר חלש מוקדם, لكن הקזונה הסינית היא היום לא מרוצה. גם לא רואים את פירוט הרפורמה.

כמעט ואין בעיה עולמית שהיא יותר ראייה מהשאלה הסינית. טין יכולה להיפך למשמעותה שתחזור בצורה מיליטנטית ביותר בעולם השלישי.

המציר סיים דבריו בסוגיה זו ואומרו שלמכירה של כפירים לטאיוון יכולות להיות תוצאות מסוכנות לאה"ב אך אם לחשיה הצבאית הישראלית. המזכיר הוסיף שהוא בטוח שהבאים יודע למה כוונתו.

שהבאים ביקש לעבגר לסייעו בסוגיה הרומנית וביקש מר' פויף למסור בקצרה על ביקורו ברומניה. ר' מוויף מסר לרומנים עבין רב ב-^{Avionics} מתחום ישראל, במכים וכן גילו עבין רב בשיפור טנקים מסוג 54-5 ובעקבות פרטיו ציוד אחרים שפותחו בארץ.

המציר הגיב באומרו שהוא רואה שתי בעיות עיקריות. קיימת בעיה של הסכמה לשיפור כושר הציוד של מדינה שהיא חברה נאמנה ברית וורשה. הוא המזכיר אינו יכול לחזות מצב בו סוגיה מעין זו תהיה מתקבלת אישור המועצה לבוחן לאומי האמריקאית, זאת בגין לפוליטית בתוך ארה"ב.

יגוסלביה זו בעיה שונה.

ר' מוויף אמר שהוא נוכח לדעת בביוקו רומניה שבידי הרומנים רק ציוד מיושן מאוד. המזכיר הגיב שזה דוקא מצב מאד משכיע רצון. הוא אישית איננו יכול לחזות מצב שבו רומניה תתקומם נגד ברה"ם. במקרה הטוב ביותר ביותר זאת יכולה להיות התפתחות בעוד כ-10 שנים אך היא לא נראה יותר קרובה.

הוא כלל לא מתנגד לסייע כלשהו ליוגוסלביה אך לבטח לא דרך הרומנים. הוא גלכשעטמו מתנגד לשיפור הציוד של רומניה.

שהבאים שאל מה אם כך המצב בקשר ליוגוסלביה. המזכיר אמר לגביו עבין זה ברצונו לסייע.

ר/מוני העיר שלמרות ושתי מדיניות אלו משתפות פעולה לפיתוח מטוס קרב הרי הרכיבים והתשומת
איננה בהכרח זהה.

המצחיר הגיב באומרו שהוא איננו יכול להסכים לסייע כלשהו שיכל להיות לעזר לרומנזה.

(החל מכאן נרשמה השicha עיי קזרנית ממשהבייט)

שם : חנן בר-און

M E E T I N G

ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MR. ARIEL SHARON, and delegation
and

U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. ALEXANDER HAIG, and delegation

Thursday, January 14, 1982
approx. 3 p.m.
King David Hotel, Jerusalem

(NOTE: The first 10-15 minutes of this meeting were not
recorded verbatim; the recording commenced at 3:30 p.m.)

MR. SHARON: We won't do that without your being informed.

MR. HAIG: You have been telling the Yugoslavs the same thing.
If they asked us, we would tell them the same thing.

MR. SHARON: We will discuss it with them and let you know.

We talked about the Soviet bloc. We'd like now to speak about
a country in America, and that is Honduras. They want to purchase
some of our equipment but Honduras, as you know, is Honduras, and
although we are ready to give the credit we wanted to know if you
will be able to give the guarantees for this credit. Because other-
wise we can't do it. And I think it's important to do something in
this part of the world. They were interested in buying the Kfir,
some training aircraft, some equipment for the Navy, some radars, etc.
So we'd like to know what will be your position about Honduras.

MR. HAIG: We discussed this I think earlier in the context of Africa, after your trip there. And the concept I am very comfortable with. I think it's good and I think Honduras is even better than some of the African countries would be, which are also good. We do have some legislative problems, and I'd like to take this back and give you an answer.

MR. SHARON: What about the Iranian case?

MR. HAIG: I wanted to talk about that. We had a report which we haven't been able to verify, that Iran and the Soviet Union have just concluded a five year friendship agreement with guarantees which would give the Soviets the right to intervene in support of Khomeini. This was printed in one of our newspapers last week, in Time Magazine I think. And we are trying to investigate this with great intensity. It worries us tremendously. And I don't know whether you have heard something about this.

MR. SHARON: I will tell you what I heard. You know that for quite a long time about this ammunition and artillery shells that we supplied to Iran. Our contacts were generally through people who are living outside of Iran, mostly connected with the group of generals whom we knew for many years. They are now mostly in Europe, etc.

Recently, about two weeks ago, I had somebody who came here directly from Iran. I asked him if his arrival was known to the authorities. So he answered: look, the situation in Iran is that

there is a government within a government within a government, and what I can tell you is that our embassy in Athens knew because I came through there, the Minister of Defense knew about it and the military circles that are righting int he front know about it, know that I am here. In the meantime he came here again and I saw him again. And I was very much interested in talking to him because our appreciation is that with the time, if there may be a change in Iran, those who may be in power in the future will not be those generals that are in exile now either from their own will or because they are afraid to go back. But I think the new leadership will come from those fighting officers who are fighting a very hard war, suffering heavy casualties, although they had some achievements and then the Iraqis suffered casualties. Altogether their situation on the front is not so bad now; it was not so good about two or three weeks ago, but it is better now.

But I think it is important if we are trying to look to the future, to try to see with whom we might one day have to deal. And I believe they will come from these fighting officers who are now fighting in the field, and they may form the next administration in Iran. Not those that are abroad, and Khomeini himself is an old man, although there are many of his kind there. But I believe in the future mostly they will succeed in the war - and I don't have to emphasize that it is our interest that the Iraqis will be tied down at the front because that is one of our guarantees that nothing serious can develop on our eastern front.

So when he came now and also the first time two weeks ago, we were talking about having a meeting between our officers and their officers. Nothing has been fixed yet, but it's the first time someone has come from Iran, with an Iranian passport, and gone back. And although he said that the circles of Khomeini do not know he came to Israel, but the army knows and they are seeking for a new contact, etc. I believe in this contact. They now urgently need ammunition, 155 mm. for Tow anti-tank missiles. They urgently need the 106 mm recoilless guns, which neither you nor we use any more, but maybe you have them in your stores. And we can do it along the same contact we discussed then. Exactly what you told me then. They need very urgently now artillery, mostly 175 mm. guns. You now use the 8 inch gun, I don't think the American army uses that any more but I believe you have it in your stores. Personally I believe it is very important to at least have a hope of again having a foothold in Iran, to help this military circle that is fighting now. That is our assessment and our appreciation of the situation there now.

MR. HAIG: Well, I think the report I just mentioned together with several other factors made us perhaps a little more sceptical than we were when we spoke last. We did speak about the F-4 spares and we are prepared to go ahead with that. But we have I think the urgent task of finding out whether or not there has in fact been a Soviet guarantee, which I think would be a very serious

strategic event for all of us, for you as well as for us.

I wish that you could tell me your visitor was interested in being president or emperor or whatever he wanted to call it. Because it would make it much easier.

MR. SHARON: Maybe we can increase his ambitions.

MR. HAIG: Leadership training when he comes to visit. I think the best way to deal with this is let's go through this analysis we are doing. The other thing we understand is that the Khomeini regime is stronger today than ever. Most of the factions have been brought under control, including those on the left. That is why that doesn't fit very well with the Soviet report. But we are prepared to go ahead and we have already given an okay I think for the F-4 spares.

MR. SHARON: I talked to Bill just a few days ago about that, and we have got the list here. I have a list of many things, maybe 40 or 50 different parts, like M-60 tank engines, and they need spare parts for Phantoms and many other things. And of course 155 mm. shells and artillery, the 175 mm and here it is more a matter of the barrels for the guns than the guns themselves.

(To Gen. Sagi) Do you know anything about what Secretary Haig mentioned?

GEN. SAGI: I never heard about that before. The only thing I heard is that the Soviet Union suggested to the Iranians a kind of military support but didn't get an answer yet. So it

doesn't go very well with your information. But that is the only thing I heard in the last month.

MR. SHARON: So the point is, what is the situation now, does what we were discussing on November 30 exist or not? Assuming that we are going to give this list, and I have it here. I can give it to Bill now and it can be transferred in the normal way or through you; it doesn't make any difference. And except for one thing, it's all FMS.

MR. BROWN: Everything on the list is FMS?

MR. SHARON: Yes, besides one thing, mines. That's the only thing I think.

MR. MCFARLANE: Items to be transferred have to be procured through a commercial purchase. Now, the fact that they are generically items that you also buy under FMS doesn't rule them out. It just means that those specific items that you already have in your inventory which you got through FMS cannot be transferred. So you have to buy new items.

We have been dealing with the concept of the F-4 spares and I think that you could go ahead and contract for those, and again within the guidelines of no single item being above 7 million dollars and the total not exceeding 25 million.

MR. SHARON: Yes, the deal should not exceed 25 million. These figures were mentioned then; if we do include artillery then the artillery part should not exceed 7 million. We know that. My question is can we do it now.

MR. McFARLANE: Well, the Secretary discussed with you back on the 30th that the F-4 spares concept was one with which we concurred.

MR. SHARON: So about the air force we can do it.

MR. McFARLANE: Yes.

MR. SHARON: And about other things?

MR. HAIG: The other things we will have to go through a whole new determination on because we moved with a determination on the original request which was for F-4 spares. This was raised with me in Cairo and subsequently we discussed that. I raise this other issue with you because it will affect subsequent requests, artillery or anything else. The justification we got, quite frankly, for the F-4 spare parts sale was based on the need to keep lines open to the Iranian military and to have an alternative to the madness that now rules Iran, that is moderate and more consistent with your policies and our policies. If we were to discover that things are moving farther in the other direction and Soviet influence is getting stronger in Iran, it would be a harder judgement to make. It would also be a harder judgement if it were extensive supplies. Just as a matter of principle. You can understand where our interest is a little different than yours in the context of Iraq. Not that Iraq is any favorite child-

MR. SHARON: I would say Iraq is fully and completely under Soviet influence. We don't see any change in Iraq.

MR. ARENS: I think they have a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.

MR. HAIG: Yes. I don't claim to be a champion of Iraq, you know that. I am not the favorite fellow in their capital either. But I think you understand that the judgements here are not easy to come by. We pushed very hard to get the first approvals because Mr. Begin had raised it with me. We also had a balancing proposal which has since fallen apart to get some sensitive aircraft material and to provide some equipment to Iraq in return for that. That fell apart.

MR. SHARON: But we will try to replace it maybe by our initiative. That is the request on the T-72. Did you hear that, Raful? (Exchange in Hebrew between Chief of Staff and Mr. Sharon).

MR. HAIG: I hope he is saying: yes, we'll get you a T-72.

MR. VIOLETES: Back to the F-4 spares, don't we need the list to look at?

MR. SHARON: I will give it to you today. I have it here.

MR. McFARLANE: When you have a list you can price it out and make sure you fall within the 7 million and 25 million threshold.

MR. SHARON: That will be our responsibility. Every deal should not exceed 25 million. And altogether I don't see so many deals of 25 million, so we don't have a problem with that.

So we will expect your answer on Honduras, about the Phantom parts for Iran we can go forward with that, and about the Yugoslavs we will check. On Taiwan, we got your answer.

So again we come to the Soviets now. The Soviets applied to private industries here that produce computers and things like that, and want to buy from them. We are not eager to sell to the Soviets, but you know these are private companies and we cannot tell them what to do. But there are American components in them, and we thought it important to bring it to you and hear what you have to say about it. If they will accept our interference or not is another question, maybe we have the power to pressure them. But at least I wanted to know. If you'd like a list of these things we can give and you a list/then you can give us your answer.

MR. HAIG: I'd like a list for our intelligence purposes. As a matter of principle, we are doing all we can/^{to}get our European friends to join our major clamp-down on technology transfer to the Soviets, especially in the computer area. We have recently had some extremely sensitive intelligence and it confirms what many of us have suspected and that is that the Soviets have developed all of their military capability by stealing it from the West either through covert action or by buying it from American firms. And it is the major objective of their annual intelligence effort to acquire technology, especially electronic, from the West. And so we just can't conceive of ever joining in anything that would help them, but to do everything we can to hurt them.

MR. ARENS: Is there a total clamp down of American sales to the Soviet Union?

MR. HAIG: There is now in the wake of Poland. We are not going to approve any licenses. We are trying to get our European friends to do the same. But we are also separately, and we will meet under COCOM this month, and anything directly or indirectly connected to military activity we are going to try to bar under COCOM regulations, and that has nothing to do with Poland but has to do with what we have learned about what we are doing to ourselves. We are adding to the threats against all of us.

MR. SHARON: I can tell you what they are asking for. They'd like to buy medical electronic equipment that we produce..

MR. ARDEN: The CAT scanner?

MR. SHARON: I don't know if that specifically. They are also looking for electronic components, civilian, nothing to do with any military equipment. They are looking for communications equipment, again civilian, and mini-computers that we produce. And we'd like to know what your attitude is.

MR. HAIG: If it were not for Poland, it might not be a problem because we sell such things. I am somewhat surprised. When was this contact made?

MR. SHARON: They applied to us to ask us our position about a month ago.

MR. HAIG: Before Poland?

MR. SHARON: It's hard to say. But if our people applied to us a month ago, and if it took time because it's not a direct contact, so I believe it was before Poland.

MR. HAIG: Well, I think in the near term we would be opposed because of Poland. In the longer term if there were no Poland or the situation there resolved itself, if the equipment could not be in any way contributory to military capability, then I think under our standard policy it would be all right.

MR. SHARON: You mean not now?

MR. HAIG: We don't want to do anything for the Russians now except make them suffer.

GEN. BEIT-HALACHMI: This is a list of the additional items the Minister mentioned and he'd like to have them checked..

MR. McFARLANE: I'll take this also but what I would like is the list of spares.

MR. SHARON: Okay, we will get that for you.

There was another thing we discussed in Washington and that was the possibility to cooperate in Africa. Our relations are developing there. We are training some of the troops of Zaire. We had military missions in Gabon and Zaire and we have a representative in the Republic of Central Africa. Of course, having people there so we immediately get contacts, people talking and discussion etc. We are developing faster in Zaire than anywhere else.

And when I came to Washington I raised the question of cooperation, on a small scale and of military equipment and so on that we may supply. Of course, manpower we can supply. But the main point I raised then was cooperation in food production and development.

Again, we are learning the situation there and I hope to be in Africa again in March. And I believe there are still some countries there which were not yet under Soviet influence.

MR. HAIG: I agree.

MR. SHARON: And I believe our goal should be to save these countries, and one may save them by being there, by working there by developing there, and so on.

If you remember, Mr. Secretary, I did not recommend to give them money, because we know those countries. What I recommended was to go for large scale development projects, mostly food production, etc. Maybe that part of the world is one where one can still develop conventional agriculture on a large scale and that can give an answer to one of the main problems of the world, and the same applies to Africa, in the '80s and '90s.

So we'd like to know what is your position now after all the things that have happened since November. Some things happened since then. And we'd like to know your position now. If you would like to cooperate in that, I think it is very important.

We have the manpower and people who are living to live, as you know, in the farthest places. We have people working in Peru in the driest desert upon the earth in the Chilean border, we have people living with the peasants in the highest mountains of Nepal, and we have people working in the poorest sections of Italy, in southern Italy. We are working now in more than 30 countries all over the

world, and that is something that Israel has a unique capability of having the kind of people who are ready to go, leave the country for two or three years and live among the local population, to teach them. And I can only tell you that in the last 25 years Israel has been working in more than 70 countries. We trained more than 60,000 agricultural experts. Half of this number, about 30,000, were trained here in Israel, and the rest were trained in their countries. And many of these countries never had any diplomatic relations with Israel, not that they broke relations, but they never had them, like India for example. About 7,000 Israelis were involved in these operations.

So we have this tremendous capability, but we don't have the means. We have the know-how and the people, we have the equipment. We can supply the agricultural input, like seeds and fertilizers, small and medium size agricultural machinery, that we can do. The only thing we don't have is the means to do it. So if the free world - and when I speak about the free world there is one country we can talk to and that is the U.S. - if you are interested to contain the Soviet expansion there, we studied the subject and we found that one of the best ways is to act there. For instance, some of the countries are now asking us to take care of their youth, to do something like what we have here as the Nahal, which is a combination of farming and military service by youth, and they would like to start this way. We did it in past years in Africa and other places.

So I think it's very important. I raised it then and I don't know what your position is. If your position is positive, so it is worthwhile to prepare a real plan. We have done this as a matter of fact, but I'd like to know where it stands now. Are you willing to do it, or are you interested? We are not going to impose anything of this kind. We are not trying to convince you because we have done it for years and years, and I would say from the moral point of view we have been doing that but of course on a small scale. Together with you we could have done it on a tremendously large scale and I think that could have been the main answer to these countries.

Of course, they need some military strength. If you take Zaire, they have 50 tanks, half of which are no good. They need of course some military strength but the solution there is not money and not I would say large scale military equipment, but mostly development and food production.

So that was our proposal, and if you have answer I'll be glad to hear it.

MR. HAIG: Well, as you know, General, what you are trying to do is precisely what we have been doing and are trying to do more of. This is the first year in three years we have managed to get a foreign aid bill through the Congress instead of having a continuing ^{does} resolution. It doesn't provide additional funds for African states, not as much as we would like but better than what we have had.

On Zaire as a special case, we think it is absolutely vital that we do all we can to help Zaire. And we are giving them both economic assistance and military.

So in general, in principle, the more you do to take these developing states and bring them into what I call the Western industrialized family, the better we like it. We have a converging interest, and that includes left-wing states because I don't think these black leaders in Africa are idealized. They might in the beginning claim to be Marxists but we have learned that very often they are not. For example, in Angola they want us back, they want the Cubans out and the Russians out, and we have to help them do that.

So what I'd like to do on that is get some of the experts to sit down, because what you are talking about is redundant with what we are trying to do ourselves with limited assets. So let me make an assessment because this is more specific than we spoke about the last time. You are talking about a broadly based program of African development where you have people and skills, We have a Peace Corps that does precisely that. We have an AID program that does that. So what I'd like to do is go back and crank what you have said to me, which is somewhat broader than our earlier discussion, into the computer and see how it goes. Because it is all resource driven. You are interested in resources. We are interested too.

MR. SHARON: We are interested in the problem and we'd like to do it. Israel can live without that, but as you know we are very much aware of further Soviet expansion. For instance, what you told us about Iran worries us very deeply. You have to understand that. Every farther step of the Soviets or the Cubans in Africa worries us. So we know what we can do in this field and we are ready to do it. One of the things we have that others may not is that we can do things immediately.

MR. HAIG: You can do another thing, and that is what I am talking about, why we have to look at it systematically - you can go into countries that would not want us. They would want you and be happy to take you tomorrow. So this is the kind of thing we have to take a look at.

MR. SHARON: So should we expect an answer from you?

MR. HAIG: Yes.

MR. SHARON: So if we will get a positive answer, then of course we will immediately send a detail plan of what we suggest to do. I would not start with something too large; these countries cannot immediately absorb what a Western people can do or the U.S. or Israel. It should start on a moderate scale and develop. And again I emphasize that the assistance should be given not by money to these countries, because money will disappear but by production and development.

MR. SHARON: Now we have one more last thing. And maybe altogether we just worried you and you didn't have any questions for me.

MR. HAIG: No, I have some questions. I have one sensitive one that you may want to do in a small group. It has to do with some of the things Mr. Casey is working on, and I want to be sure we leave enough time for that.

MR. SHARON: Okay. I have only one sentence. I'd like consideration to be given that the military assistance we get, that 50% of that be given as a grant. We have tremendous problems. We cut our defense budget in 1981 by 10%, and that is a tremendous effort. In various fields we really came to a red line. And we also have problems with the airfields. They were to cost 1,337,000,000, but they will cost between 80 to 100 million more than was expected, and only 800 million, which I admit is a lot of money, is a grant. But that put us into difficulties. If we could have gotten a change here that all the expenses of the airfield will be covered as a grant that would be very important.

I don't know if I can complain, but everyone can complain - when I was in Washington last time, I was promised that \$100 million out of the military assistance of 1.4 billion will be exchanged for Israeli currency in order to support the local industry and as far as I understand that was . . . ? . . . We asked for 200 or at least 150 million. That puts us into heavy difficulties. If you have an answer on that, I'd be glad to hear it. And now I am at your disposal.

MR. HAIG: Now we have some time together we just worried you out of it for us.

MR. HAIG: I think that last item is an MOU item, is it not? You discussed it at the Pentagon.

MR. SHARON: I discussed it with Secretary Weinberger.

MR. ARENS: It is not part of the MOU.

MR. SHARON: No it is not, but we discussed that on my arrival on November 30th to sign the memorandum.

MR. HAIG: Let me look into that as soon as I get back.

I wanted to say a word, General, before going into that very sensitive issue. A number of your colleagues here have heard some of this this morning, but it has to do with the peace process and autonomy and my great concern that we keep that process on in an intensified way. We are trying to learn, at least in the last two months, whether it will be achievable in the near term, achievable in the long term, or not achievable at all, which is about where I am coming out in my assessment. And if that is a reality, then we'd better know it. Because I think the strategic significance of such a reality for all of us, for Israel and the U.S., would be very, very serious.

Now, when I say that I am pessimistic it is because thus far the differences I am finding are extensive and broad ranging and cross a number of fields. I personally believe they are all fixable, if there is ingenuity applied on both sides. And the purpose of this is to try and get as close a fix as I can on these differences and go home and think about it and then come back and talk to you about them again. Because I said also to Foreign Minister Shamir quietly

in the automobile that I sense a worsening of the climate. I sensed that before I came here. It was one of the reasons I felt it essential that I do come.

MR. ARENS: A worsening in Egypt?

MR. HAIG: Between both Israel and Egypt. I sense it. I must say nothing I heard in Egypt, with some mild exceptions, would contribute to that. But I have a nose and I make my own assessments from a distance. And one of the problem areas may be amenable to improvement. And I am talking about - I don't like to use the term but I am talking about a growing feeling perhaps on both sides that autonomy is not achievable. And I think that is a very dangerous attitude to develop on either side or both.

Secondly, that things are happening on the West Bank and continue to happen that are creating a de facto annexation. I don't think that is true but I think we have to be very, very sensitive to it. You were in Egypt in September and you mentioned the effort to improve things collaterally. But there are some problems. There are prisoners that are a very sensitive issue in Cairo. I know you have taken some action on a great number of them but I think in the near term, especially as April approaches, and given the growing possibility of trouble, I would urge you to look very carefully on whether or not you could take some additional steps. Again, I offer that as a friendly suggestion, understanding how sensitive it is.

The questions there may involve also free transit, a loosening of some of the transit in the territories.

MR. SHARON: In Sinai?

MR. HAIG: No, on the West Bank. Transit of mayors and newspapers and what have you. It's just that, as I said to the group this morning, Cairo is using a new term to describe autonomy - reasonable and acceptable. Acceptable meaning acceptable to others. We know we can't achieve that and we won't accept that. On the other hand, I think if the pressures and all they are hearing from the Palestinians are a deterioration, it doesn't help the climate. And I think you ought to take a look and see what you could do in good conscience, without unacceptable risks, that will improve the climate. That is what I am talking about. I am offering this advice as good offices, not claiming to know better than you do.

On autonomy, the security question, which I know you are the expert on, and we found, as I told the group this morning, that Egypt is anxious to hear Israel's views on the security. I think if we are not careful, if it takes too long to give them these views, they will suspect there is something tricky coming, and I know that is not the case. But I would urge you at the earliest opportunity to give them the benefit of your thinking on it, A, because it will enable us to expedite autonomy, and B, it will help to dissipate some of the concerns that may be developing under the surface. I must tell you that my discussions in Cairo on the subjects of security led me to believe they are very comfortable

with what I think your own thinking is, and I don't think it will be a problem in the autonomy category. I sincerely do not. There are many real problems, but I don't think this will be one of them. On the other hand, there are certain definitions and what have you that I think you can assure them on very substantially when they hear your expressions on them. So I would urge that.

I think on the subject of autonomy in general, it would be - I intend to continue this discussion especially with the group tomorrow and with the Prime Minister this afternoon, because I know he has the [?] stake from Cairo where President Mubarak seems less interested in the details and less knowledgeable and I know Prime Minister Begin has always had a very intimate knowledge of them, and I will explore that information in depth.

Please understand that what I am raising here is designed to be helpful and not to be a "buttinsky." I am trying to get an improvement in the climate. It is not good to have it go down hill. I recognize that is a very subjective subject for everyone.

MR. SHARON: Would you like to have any answers to these questions?

MR. HAIG: If you care to, I'd be more than happy to listen.

MR. SHARON: First, about presenting the security arrangements, I think we made it clear that that will be presented when the autonomy talks will be held, some time at the end of the month. I think the Egyptians may have thought I would present it now, next week, but I have to take care not only about security in the

autonomy, but I have to take care of my personal security. I don't think my colleagues would like it very much if I did it on my own. Sometimes you have to decide between external and internal problems. So in this case I want to do it in the presence of my colleagues, the members of my team, not because I want to postpone it but because it's part of the autonomy and I believe they'd like to participate in the presentation. I can only assure you that I have discussed it informally with Gen. Ali many times and we spoke in detail. They know exactly what we mean and we made it very clear. Personally, I don't see any problems there. When it comes to external security, that was stated in Camp David; that is our responsibility, we are not going to have any participants in that. When it comes to internal security, again according to the Camp David accord, there are some parts especially when it refers to public order, that should be taken care of together with the strong local police force that will be established and might include Jordanian citizens, etc. exactly as stated, and we are ready for that.

I believe one can achieve autonomy. I have been saying that to Ambassador Lewis. To every American representative who came here to this country, I have repeated again and again that we could have achieved that already, and I believe it is achievable, and I think it's important.

But one thing should be remembered. And I had a visit from the Egyptian ambassador a few days ago and I told him one thing. First of all, that we'd like to hurry, I think it's important, and

I think it's important for Egypt also. I am not sure they think so, but I think so. Secondly I told him, take it for granted that there is not going to be any other solution for Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than the autonomy according to the Camp David accord, and no other plan will be accepted by us, not the Fahd plan or any other plan. We have one plan and we are ready to go along this plan and we are ready to go all the way. But nothing will be done on any other plan.

About the atmosphere in the area, I think we took steps that should enable really the implementation of autonomy, by dividing the civilian administration from the security steps. Altogether now the atmosphere is quiet. But one thing - we are ready to make every possible arrangement so that life will be easier there, and we did - besides one thing - there will be law and order there and we will not allow any terrorist activity. And take that exactly as I say it - we will now allow terrorist activity there just as we will not allow terrorist activity against us from Lebanon. We made that very clear.

About the civilian population we take all the steps to make it easier. The people dealing with that are civilians and I am quickly replacing the military people with civilians, and I believe that will create a good atmosphere, and we are taking steps. Except for one thing - we will not allow a situation that in Judea, Samaria and Gaza there will be a second Palestinian state or a corridor to a second Palestinian state, and we will not accept terrorist

activity. About the rest, everything is open.

Believe me, if I could have advocated to the Arabs, I would have told them: people, take this autonomy; you have never been offered anything better than that. You were under first Iraqi occupation, then Jordanian and Egyptian, for 19 years. You were never offered anything like that, take it, you are going to run your own lives. And when one signs an agreement, it is the beginning of a process, and not the end of it. And if everything goes well, so things are developing.

But if there is something that might encourage us it is that among the population there is an increasing number of people who believe the PLO is not the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs. And there are more and more Arabs coming to us asking - not to cooperate - I can assure you that not one of them wants us to be there, we know that - but more and more people are coming and asking us for weapons to protect themselves from terrorist organizations and not because they like us - some of them would like King Hussein back, some would like an independent state - it's not because they like us, they are not collaborators - but they understand that the PLO is not the only and sole representative of the Palestinian people and we see that as an important change and development.

These are my answers to the questions. And about that last subject, of course we would like to talk privately.

--(Adjourned at 4:20 p.m.)--

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ירושלים, כ"ב נובמבר תשמ"ב
17 בינואר 1982

ס. 6. 2

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ס. 6. 2

אל : המנכ"ל

מאת: מנהל לשכת השר

הבדון: שיקום הייג-שטיינטץ בארוחות הערב
14.1.82

רצ"ב ורישום של השיטה שנוהלה בעת ארוחת הערב במלון
המלך דוד בין שר החוץ והטשלחת הישראלית לבין מזכיר
המדינה הייג ומלוויזו.

הרישום נעשה על-ידי החר"ם עם חלומות מנהל מצפ"א.

ב. ב. ר. כ. ה,

ג.ח. בן-אברהם

העתק: השגריר, וושינגטון
 Amar Ch. בר-און, המשנה למנכ"ל
 מנהל מצפ"א

14.1.1982

משתפים מזכנו: שר החוץ, מנכ"ל, חנן בר-און, ס/ח"ר י. בן-מאיר, מ. ארנס, פ. אליאב, א. רובינשטיין, א. בנגנור, א. פזבר, י. בן-אתון.

משתפים אמריקאים: שהייח הייג, השגריר לואיס, מקרלין, וליאוטיס, קמפ, גולדברג, בראון, זיילמן, הר, קווזליצ', פישר.

יהודות בריה"ם

שה"ח: פתח בברכה למזכיר וזכה לחתיכל בנוסא יהדות בריה"ם. המזכיר שהייג עומד להפגש עם גرومiko (ב-26 לחודש) ולכע' אנו מבקשים ממנו שיעלה בפניו שר החוץ הסובייטי מצוקה של יהדות בריה"ם ושל מסורבי העלייה והפעילים באופן מיוחד: מmedi עלייה ירדנו מכ-4,000, לחודש לפניהם שבים מסר ל-400 בחודש שuber. כמה שירותים אליי משפחות ברשו ומתיבנות לשינוי עלייה. הרבה פעילים נמצאים במער ומרורים לעברית נחרפים. יש ככל המתינים שנים מספר לאחר הגשת המטמכים להגירה וטרם נענו. אריה"ב הציג נושא זה אצל הרוסים בעבר ואנו מכווים שתעשה זאת גם תלאה.

הייג: הטעים שאנו הנושא מועלה על-ידו בקביעות ב מגעינו עם הרוסים. הדבר נוגע לא רק בייחודים המבקשים להגר. קבוצת אנשים מכת הפנטקוסטים במצב בשגרירות אריה"ב במוסקבה זה של שנים וחצי עשו עכשו שביתת רעב בשל סירוב השלטונות להתייחס אליהם. המזכיר ספר שהעלה נושא זה 4 פעמים עם דוברינין ופעמים עם גרוםiko. גם הנשיה התיחס לזה במקבילים לבירז'נייב. ברור שהמשבר הפולין איבנה מלה בנוסא זה, אם כי יתכן שזה היה קטליזטור בכוכן אחר - חיובי יותר - ע"פ מה שיתפתח בפולין. הוא המשיך שבדעתו להעלות נושא זה גם בז'נבה. הסובייטים מודעים היטב לערמת אריה"ב. בעיתו של שרנסקי היה מיעוד וקשה, אם לשפוט לפי תשובות דוברינין וגרומיקו. יתכן שגישת הרוסים מלמות משאו על האיש עצמו. לגבי סחרוב שונח המכתב ואולי זה אגוז שניית יהיה לפצחו, לא כן באשר לשרנסקי שחרוסים טוענים שהוא מרגל ישראל - ולא סוכן של CIA.

הזכיר הטעים להערכו של שר החוץ שזו האשמה שוטית. יש להבדיל בין פרשׂת העליה ^{על דרכו של סען סוכן פון} הנסיון למד, מאז תקון גיקסון-ווניק שיש לפעול בעיקר בקשר לצנורות דיפלומטיים, הרי שרנסקי יש צורך בלחש צבורי תמיד וחזק. הנטיון למד שלחש כזה לפעמים משפייע. המזכיר אמר שהוא הנחה את אנשיו בהתאם.

תהליכי השлом

שה"ח: הודה למזכיר ו עבר לדיוון במצב תהליכי השлом. הוא ספר שיש אמנים קשיים ובעיות מבית באשר לנגישת מסיני ולקירת היישובים והפיצוזים למתיישבים, אך הקושי הגדול הוא חוסר הבתוון לגבי התמורה שתתקבל ישראל, לכרבנות ולסיכון שנטלה, ולגבי תוכן השлом. הנורמליזציה ביחסים איבנה פועלת כפי שקיינו וציפינו ויש חששות כבדים. שר הקרייה מתווך מברק

שנתקבל מהשגרירות בקהיר על התכליות המשטרת החשאית המצרית לגתיניהם מצרים שבקו לקרים מגע ולפתח קשרים עם ישראל בתחום התרבות והאמנות ולהסתיגות עד כדי שנה - בקרב הפקידות והשכבה המשכילה כלפי ישראל.

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שר החוץ המשיך שהמקרים שספר עליהם אינם יוצאי דופן אלא טפוזים, וכי שדווח עליהם מקהיר הוא ישראלי הידוע כבעל השקופת מדיניות של אמונה בשלום עם מצרים. לכן שואלים עצמנו מה יקרה לאחר אפריל 82.

במשרד החוץ נערכה ספירת מלאי ומאזן בתחום הנרמול ואמנם נרשמה תנועה בתחוםים שונים כמו תתיירות וכוכו הרי שבתום שלוש שנים(mskna) היא שמצרים נותנת את הפירוש הצר והמצומצם ביותר לעניין הנרמול. שר החוץ אמר שהביקורים התקדירים של משלחות ואישים מצרים הם, להערכת מומחים, בבחינת אחזית עיניים ואין בהם ממש. השלטונות המצרים צעדיו של תהליך זה והיקפו בזדון והדברים ידועים בקרב הצבור הישראלי ומשרים הרגשת אכזהה כללית. ישראל איננה מפאה ליחס מיוחד או העדפה מצרים אלא רק בצעד אמיתי של חוזה השלום. שר החוץ אמר שבתהליך השלום ויתרנו ויתרנו מפליגים שניתן היה לאזנים על-ידי הנרמול ביחסים ביןנו לבין מצרים אך זה לא קרה. יש לצפות שלאחר הנסיגה המצת לא ישפר אלא להיפך. השר סיים בפניה למצויר ושאל לדעתו בנקודה זו.

היגג: בקש לארה"ב כמה הערות בכנות ובידידות. לדעתו לא צריכים להיות מופתעים לנוכח התופעות שתיאר שר החוץ לגבי הקורת למצרים. רמת ההשכלה והתחום למצרים שונה במידה ניכרת מזו שבישראל וסידאת בלט בנוף המצרי כתופעה לא טיפוסית. פועלותיה של ישראל יכולות להשפיע על מצב העניים למצרים. ברור למצויר משיחות עם מובruk שהוא נזהר שלא לסתות מהקו שיסודותיו הונחו על-ידי סידאת ביודעו שאם יסטה, לא יחזק מעמד. מצרים חסופה ללחצים מצד גורמים כסוריים ואשי"פ והחדרות שם רבים.

עברו על העולם הערבי כמה צעוזעים כתוצאה מעשה של ישראל. המזכיר ספר שבתקופתו של סידאת לא שמע מהמצרים בקורס על ישראל בנוסאים כגון עמדת באוטונומיה ואך לא בעקבות ההתקפה על הכור עיראקי. על ישראל להתמודד עם הביעות הללו ואך כי שמעה כמה פעמים התריעת לביקורת צעדים שיגבירו אימון העربים, הרי שכבר בכל זאת נחוץ. אפשר שצדדים כאלה מצד ישראל יסייעו לשיפור האוירה בטוחה הקצר אם כי אין לדעת לגבי הטווח הארוך יותר.

אשר לגישה של ארה"ב, המשיך המזכיר, הרי שם יתברר למצרים עוסקת בתרמית (farce) היא חייבות לדעת שהדבר ישפייע מאוד לרעה על היחסים הבילטרליים בין ארה"ב למצרים. זה אמור לא רק לגבי המצת שלאחר תום הנסיגה, אלא אף לפניהם. היגג אמר שיחו למצרים לא התעלמו מדבריו אלה. עליה בידו לעורר למצרים המודעות שלתרמית יהיה מחיר. יש (to engage) מצרים בתהליך. לוais ייעיד שבחינה זו יהיה שיפור מפגש למפגש (במהלך הביקור למצרים). האלטרנטיבת היחידה הניצבת בפנינו זה לחשוב על ה-tabletting, לברר מהניתן להשיג ומה לא. זה לא בלתי ניתן להשגה, אם אמר זה יהיה אטי. ועידת ה-angel הפגינה את חוסר האחדות בעולם הערבי. הוטיף שיש דרך רסם אלא אם כן ניתקל במשהו עמוק ביותר (profound) אך עדיף שיהיה זה דבר עמוק (גולם עמוק) ולא משחו הנובע ממה שבتفسות כעיקשות (intransigence) כי אז אנו עלולים לגלוש ל-fiscal calculation. אין מנוס מלגשות ולבוחן האם הגעד שהזוב אכוavit להגশמו או לא ולא נדע אלא אם ננסה. כן יש צורך לחזק את תהליך על-ידי נסיבות להרחב מעגל המשתתפים בו, ולהרחיב את תהליך קמפ-דיויד, במגמה לצרף אליו מדינות כירדן ויראיד. ארה"ב הייתה תמיד בדעה שלאחר למצרים תיכנס היטב לתהליך, יצטרפו במשרץ הזמן גם האחרים.

שהיה: הגיב שמה שמספריע לישראל היא העובدة שמשלת מצרים לא ניסתה להשפיע על הלכי הרוח בצבור כדי לבנות תמייה צבורית חזקה לתהיליך שלום. יש למשלת האמצעים והדרכים והיא גמינה מכך. זה מודיאג ולכון חשובים שגם אם יושג הסכם אוטונומיה לא ישפיע הדבר על הלכי רוח אלו. תהיליך הבוצע של הסכם האוטונומיה יהיה כרוך בהכרח בנסיבות חכוך ומחולקת רבות וזה לא ישנה המצב הבטיסי שר החוץ הביע החשש שהשלום לא יהיה יציב ואיתן. המחייב שלמה ישראל אכן גבורה ולכון חשוב מה שאמור המזכיר בדבר השפעתו של צעד מצח שלילי על יחס מצרים עם אריה"ב. זה מרביב חשוב לחשוך תהיליך שלום והבטחתו מפני עצוזים. המרכיב השנוי הוא עוצמתה של ישראל. תנאי לעוצמת זו והנסכמת הוא בקיום יחסים קרובים בין ישראל ואריה"ב. אם מ|צראטן
 יתר מדיניות ערבית יחושו שנוצר פער בין אריה"ב וישראל והיא נחלשת כתוצאה מכך הרי שיסיקו שאין צורך לסתות מהקו שלילי ולא יטלו על עצם סכון. אלה, איפוא, שתי הערכות שלום ושמירתו:

- שיחסו אריה"ב עם מצרים יסבלו אם תפטע מצרים
- שישראל תהיה חזקה ויחסה עם אריה"ב הדוקים.

על ישראל ואריה"ב להשיקו מאץ כדי להבטיח את השלום שהוגשם כיוון שהישג האמריקאי הגדול בשנים האחרונות ותחילהו במשל רפובליקני קודם.

היגי: הסכמים להערכות השר. הוא המשיך וציין ששר החוץ נגע בנסיבות שהיא בבחינת חלום הבלאות שלו מאז כניסה הממשל לשטון. כל אימת שפולה ישראל בצורה חריגה (הכוונה לשיליה - trespass) הוא ביהל וכוח קשה עם אלה שתבעו לחעניש את ישראל וטعن כלפיהם שענישת תסכן את עצם התהיליך שאריה"ב עצמה מעורבת בו בצורה כל כך עמוקה. היבט זה של הבעיה חייב להיות ברור לගמרי למשלט ישראל כשהיא עומדת לקבל החלטם על פוליה זו או אחרת. מאידן, הגיון המנהיגות המצרית יהיה להציג לאחיהם הערבים שההיליך שלום הוא התהיליך הנכון והמניב תוצאות. לכן הוא המזכיר נמצא עתה באזרע. אולי הגיע מאוחר מדי. הלוואי ויכול היה לבוא באוקטובר כי אד פער הזמן הנוכחי היה רחב יותר. הנהגגה המצרית חייכת להבין שפעולתה של מצרים לא הייתה מושם בגידה בירת ארצות ערבי אלא דבר שנייתו לעשותו ולהגשימו.

לוais: בקש להעיר שאם כי היחסים בין ישראל ואריה"ב כל כך קרובים ו/inetimilim יש לקחת בחשבון שיש תמורות בקיהר ומצב רוח משתנה. הוא עלול להשתנות (לרעה) אלא אם כן יידאגו ישראל ואריה"ב לכך שמצרים תכנס בצורה מחייבת ובלתי-חזרה לתהיליך הרצוי. מובruk מוכיח עצמו כיורש של סדרת והשלום הוא הישג גדול שהמצרים לא יותרו עליו במהרה.

לוais המשיך והזכיר שבזופעתו בכנסת, סדרת ציון שהוא שואף להשיג שלום לא רק למען מצרים, אלא גם לפיליטינים ולעולם הערבי. אך בשנה האחרונה תרמה ישראל במשיה להתרחבות מחייע שהציג סדרת. מעשה של ישראל עצעו את תהיליך שלום יותר מכפי שזעוזו את אריה"ב, היכולת לפסוג עצוזים. אך מעשה של ישראל דחפו את מצרים לעבר המסקנה שתאוטונומיה לא תקיים. עם זאת לא היה לוais מסיק מכך שאיחרנו את הרכבת. על אף הפערים בעבר, ניתן להציג את המצב אם לא יהיו מעשים בחורדים הקרים שיפגעו עוד ביחסים ישראל עם מצרים.

המנכ"ל: בקש לצין שכתוכאה מגעינו הרבים והתקופים עם מצרים הוא מאמין שרוב העם המצרי מאמין שישראל תקיים התחזיזיות ותשלים גם את הפנו.

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היג: הסכימים לגביה המנכ"ל. העיר שהמצרים חושים עתה מהלינקגו שישראל נזקkt לו כל הזמן בתיחסוותה בפומבי. למצרים יש ספקות וחששות כל הזמן. מברך שאל, למשל, מה התחווו ראש הממשלה באיגרתו לנשיא מצרים כאשר אמר שלא ישמש בכוח כדי לסלк את המתישבים מימית. בר-און: משלחות קונגרסונליות שביקרו בקהיר הופטו מידת הדראה שמצוותם במצרים לגביה כוונת ישראל לספק סייני. בר-מאלר: ניסיתי להרגיע המשלחות במצרים שמה שהובטח בקמף-דיויד גועם ומתי מכיוון שישראל מספקת את לוואיס: הוסיף שיש הרגשה ברורה במצרים שמה שהובטח בקמף-דיויד גועם ומתי מכיוון שישראל מספקת את השטחים שאמוריהם להיות נושא למשא-ומתן.

שה"ח: זו תעמולה בלבד.

היג: לא. זו איננה תעמולה. בתקופה זו עד אפריל יש הרבה המאמינים שישראל תנקוט צעדים רבים בכוחו של ספוח מבלי שמצרים וארה"ב יוכלו להגביל על כך. מצב זה לא יכול על המומי. לכן כאשר המזכיר מעלה את המצב בשטחים ופעולות ישראל בהם הוא מבטח חששות אמיתיים.

שה"ח: אמר שהוא התרשם מדברים שאמר סדרת פעם בהופעתו בפני הפרלמנט האירופי בסטרסבורג. סדרת הצעיר שהוא שואף להביא לנצח במצרים של אף חלוקי דעת בין מדינות, אלא לא יוביל למלחמה. זהו המצב הנורמלי ביבשות אחרות, של אף חלוקי דעת בין אומות, הן אינן נזקקות בשל כך למלחמה כל פעם. לכן, המשיך שר החוץ, קיימים חוזה שלום עם מצרים והוא חייב לעמוד יציב ואיתן גם אם קיימים חלוקי-דעות על העניין הפלסטיני. יש לנו חלוקי דעת כלשהם גם עם בריטניה וצרפת אך לא מעלים על הדעת לפתרן במלחמה. על רקע העבר חוזה השלום עם מצרים הוא מאורע מהפכני וצריר. לחתה לו זמן של 5-7 שנים כדי לראות אם יש לו חיים שלו. רק אז יוכל להטיק מסקנות מבוססות אם הסכמי קמף-דיויד והקרבות שהרכנו היו מוצדקים.

לוואיס: הגביל שיתכן ויש הגיון בדברי השר אך לצערנו זה איננו מה שסוכם בקמף-דיויד. שם סוכם על מועד קצר לבוצע ההסכם ולא 7-5 שנים.

שה"ח: ישראל תעשה ככלות יכולתה, אך אין הדבר תלוי רק בה. שר החוץ פנה להיג והתייחס לדבריו שיש לשואף להרחיב תחילה השלום ולצרף אליו את סעודיה וירדן. יש מדה של חפיפת אינטרסים בין שתי אלה לבין ישראל. שלשתן מעוניניות בהעלו של אש"פ שהוא סכנה לכולן.

היג: הביע הסכמתם לדברי השר.

שהיה: לשלוותן ענין משותף ביציבות באזורה, למשל בים האדרים. הבעה היא שם פוננים לירדן כדי להגיע להסדר, היא תציג בתנאי ראשון החזרת ריבונות ערבית על מזרח ירושלים וכן החזרת ירושה. הדברים נבדקו מקור ראשון. בהתייחסו לשילוחות וליווטיס לעמאן ורייד, שהו יזק למסור לחוסיין הכוועס על הצהרות ישראל שירדן היא מולצת הפליטינאים, שדברים אלו אינם מכובדים בגדי אישית וישראל איננה מתכוונת כלל לומר שהיא מדיפה את ערפאת על פניהם חוסיין בשליטת המדינה. ההיפך הוא נכון. מצדנו, חוסיין יכול לחשוף השליט ורק רצוי מה שיקרא לממלכתו פלسطينה כפי שכנהה חשב פעמי לעשות.

שר החוץ עבר לספר על הברים ששמע משר החוץ האיטלקי קולומבו על מתיינותם של הסעודים שעמם נפגש טמור לפגישתו עם שר החוץ ברומה. השר ספר שהוא ציטט באזני קולומבו (וגם שלח לו בכתב) דברים שאמר שר החוץ הטועדי בועידת פז שהופיעו במלואם בפרוטוקולים שפורסמו בעיתון הבירותי "אל-ספיר". סעוד אל-פייצל אמר בפז שהמזרחה והמערבה מכירות בקיום ישראל ולכן חכנית 8 הנקודות של פתח נועדה להציג נוכחות ערבית לאותה להכיד בקיום ישראל ככל פוחז, אך זאת באמצעות תכנית שלבבים של חסול ישראל. שר החוץ המשיך ואל את המזכיר על בסיס מה, אם כן, הוא חושב לצרף את הסעודים לתחליף השלום?

היג: בקש לחזור עשר שנים אחורנית ולהזכיר האם חלם מישחו על חוצה שלום עם מצרים באותו ימי? מדבר ככלות הכל, במדינת הגודלה במדינות ערב. שלום הוא מצב פסיכולוגי ולא רק מדיני וצריך לפעול ליצירת המצב הזה גם מצד הסעודים. לפניהם שניות אחדות הסעודים לא היו מעלים על דל שפתיהם את המלה ישראל בשיחות עם אמריקאים. המלך פייצל לquo פעם את היג הצדקה ונתן לו הרצאה על הקשר הציוני-מרכזיסטי וסכבותיו. יש טיפולוגיה לחוד ופרקтика לחוד. עליינו לפתח אצל הסעודים הכרה של האינטראם שלהם העולה בקנה אחד עם השלום. קיימות ציטוטות לרוב בשני הכוונים - מתו וקיצוני אחד. היג אמר שאולי בסוף Mai אשתקד היה רגע נוח לכך.

מנכיל: ציין שיש לנואדים רבות לכך שהסעודים אינם מסתפקים בגישה עוינית בתחום התיאולוגי והתיאורטי אלא ב务实ים של ממש: הם היו המאיצים למצאים יחסית של תורכיה עם ישראל ע"י לחץ והבטחת תמיכה כספית. הם פועלם בטאיוואן כדי למנוע רכש מאתנו. אותו דבר כבר בקורס-ריקה ובמדינות נוספות.

היג: הגיב שלא התכוון לומר בדבריו שהסעודים ירידיים ישראל. צרייך "לעבוד" עליהם כדי להוביל אותם בכוון הרצוי. כפי שנעשה במקרה של מצרים. אשר לאשייף דעתו של המזכיר היא שאכן הוא בדרך החוצה והתחליף יימשך.

אליאב: העיר שגדה סוריה נשאה מבודדת על אף מאמציו של אסף לנצל את חוק רמת הגולן כדי לצאת מבדידותו.

שית במלחצי טירן ומשפט הים

שה"ח: הצעיר לעבור לנושא השיט ובקש מהיוועץ המשפטי להציג הנושא.

רובינשטיין: הסביר שההגדירות שנכללו בחוזה השלום עם מצרים בקשר לשיט במלחצי ליבורליות יותר מallowו שננקטו בדיונים על האמנה בדבר משפט הים. ישראל מבקשת שארה"ב תנקוט עמדת ברורה של תמיכה בהגדירות שהוזעה כדי למנוע החלשתן בבואה העת ע"י אמתת משפט הים.

הילג: הגב שקיבלו בקשתנו בכתב בעניין זה והנושא נמצא בבדיקה על מנת להביא המלצות לאישור הנשייא. עדמת ישראל בנושא תלקח בחשבון ויתהדרלו לחתם ביטוי של תמיכה בסעיף המתיחס לשיט בחוזה השלום.

אפריקה

שה"ח: בקש המנכ"ל להציג הנושא של יחסינו עם אפריקה ובקשתנו מארה"ב בקשר זה.

מנכ"ל: חדשנו מגעים עם מדינות רבות באפריקה, ולגביה חלק מהן לא היה ניתוק כל הזמן. קיימת חולשה של רוב המשטרים ביבשת ויש אכזבה מהמדיניות האירופית שלטוט באפריקה לפניהם. לנוכח מציאות זו פנו לישראל כמה משלות באפריקה ובקשו עזרתה בתחוםים שהקלו וודעים שישראל תוכל לסייע בהם, על סמך נסיוון העבר. היו פניות אלה מטעם ומأتיאופיה. בכמה מקרים התזדקקות האפריקאית היא קטנה מאוד בהיקפה, אך בנתונים הכלכליים הקשים שהן פועלות הממשלה הללו, גם הסיווע הקטן הוא בעומק שמעות רבתה. ישראל יכולה לפעול במספר מקומות ביבשת אך אין לה אמצעים הכספיים לכך. דוגמא נוספת - האיים הקומוראים שמצבם הגיאוגרפי הוא בעל חשיבות אסטרטגית.

בר-אורן: בקש להעיר שגם היבט זה יש בו משוב תרומה לתהילך השלום כיוון שמדינות אפריקה ניתקו יחסית על רקע יחסם ישראל עם מצרים.

הילג: תגיב שהדברים מקובלים עליו, אך יש שטחית שבhem קשה לאלה"ב לפעול ורצוי שישראל תהיה שם, אך קיימת בעיה של אמצעים. לדעתו קיימת אכזבה באפריקה גם מבריה"ם. באנגולה, למשל, רוצים להחזיר את הפורטוגזים למקום כי התאכזבו קשות מrossoים ותקובנים. המשבר האמתי הוא כלכלי והוא שורש הרע שפגע גם בשאר מדינות העולם. מכל מקום, העניין טעון בדיקה והתייעצות.

Meeting between
Minister of Interior, Dr. J. Burg, Chairman
Committee on Autonomy
and
USA Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig

January 15, 1982, 10:45 a.m.
Cabinet Room
Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

Present: For Israel

Mr. Y. Shamir
Mr. A. Sharon
Mr. Y. Modai
Dr. Y. Ben-Meir
Mr. Y. Zamir
Mr. Ch. Kubersky
Dr. D. Kimche
Mr. M. Gabay
Aluf A. Tamir
Mr. H. Bar-On
Mr. R. Rubinstein
Mr. E. Bentzur
Mr. A. Naor
Mr. G. Stern
Ms. T. Elinson
Mr. N. Annir
and others

For USA

Ambassador S. Lewis
Asst. Sect. Veliotis
Counselor McFarlane
Mr. D. Greenlee
Mr. W. Cluverius
Mr. N. Walker
Mr. J. Bovis
Mr. G. Kemp
Mr. B. Brown
Mr. W. Goldberg
Col. Pianka
Mr. W. Kirby
Mr. F. Fukuyama
Mr. D. Haendel
Mr. A. Kreczko
Mr. D. Fischer

H.E. MR. BURG: Mr. Secretary, Ambassador, my Colleagues, all the family around the table. Good morning! We are a little bit late, but I can only testify to this, that the Secretary of State started his day very early and he had for breakfast also the Opposition, so now he comes here with an all-round picture of the Israeli democracy. We are here, and I greet in the name of all our Israeli

friends the man whose reputation is a worldwide one, and he is in our book written as a friend, as a real friend, and a friend in need is a friend, indeed, as we sometimes know.

I thank you for all the endeavors, the energy, that you put into this part of the world problems. The globus is large enough and round enough to have a lot of problems for you, but if you take and spare time and spare energy and come with this well-informed entourage to our country, we are very happy to see you and we are hopeful that our cooperation will be fruitful into the proper direction.

The first time that Mr. Vance was here, he complimented me on my knowledge of the English language, and I said to him: I know very fine words in English but my pronunciation was only accepted in four places in America. So he said, Which ones? I said, my pronunciation is accepted in Brooklyn, accepted in Bronx, accepted in Washington Heights in New York and was also accepted in the State Department (Laughter) I tell this story, that Mr. Vance enjoyed very much, because he changed the pronunciation and the accent there, in order to say that sometimes persons change but the problems remain, and therefore we are here.

I can only say that in all good spirit Israel adheres to the Camp David Agreement and Accords, in spirit and also in letters. And if I can say that during one year and one-half there was almost no real negotiation, I don't say something exaggerated. Only in September, when the late President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin met in Alexandria, there was a push forward. We afterwards followed up in Cairo in the Mena House. Our experts also worked according to a

schedule that was decided upon in Cairo, but there remained quite a lot of basic questions and, therefore, also the relatively modest wish to come to a Memorandum of Understanding also could not be fulfilled.

I believe that should be our target in the shortest of time, to come to a maximum of understanding. We are here in a no man's land, I think, between politics and psychology. A nation has its own psychology and looking forward to April is something that has very heavy psychological weight.

I would not like to start this meeting without expressing our satisfaction for the worthy contribution that your American delegation gave in these negotiations; technical, diplomatic assistance, in formation of issues, in formulation of formulations that could be a little bit of a solution. I remember our meeting in Cairo; a very worthy contribution on behalf of the American team and I would like to say it so that it should be written down in our protocol.

There are suggestions, and yesterday I gave it to you in an official way. It will not be published. It should not be published until you come home. I believe we did quite a lot of good things and if there are new ideas, we are always ready to hear, but with the adherence, strict adherence, to the Camp David Accord.

I had the privilege to see the Secretary of State before this meeting - I am not the reason for our being late - and I ask/the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, that he should be so kind to give us his impressions of his visits in different parts of the world, especially the north-eastern part of Africa, if he wants, and also tell us what are his ideas and suggestions, and he agreed very kindly

to what I was asking for.

And so, Mr. Secretary, it is my distinct pleasure and privilege to give you the floor.

H.E. MR. HAIG: Thank you, Doctor. I am reluctant with some of our colleagues who have listened to some of this yesterday, but I recognize that this is the real autonomy group, and as somebody said when we came in, it appears to be becoming the largest industry in Israel.

I think we all know how we got to where we are, and I want to say a word about that, before I comment on the observations as a result of our stop in Cairo. But as we know, following the Camp David, there were efforts made on autonomy, now running almost three years on the clock, but not in terms of practical efforts. There were two American special negotiators during the period: Strauss and Linowitz. But certainly in the year approaching the American elections, which happened to coincide with elections here in Israel, the talks went into some kind of a drift and it became apparent that the divergencies between the two parties most immediately involved became wider. And, frankly, when we came in in January, we were faced with two problems. One was how to get autonomy moving and the second was how to put the modalities for the Sinai withdrawal together. And in both instances the differences were rather wide and I found that during my visit here during last spring, with Israel, on the one hand, with respect to the Sinai, wanting a largely American force and certainly not a UN force, for very understandable reasons; Egypt on their part

not wanting U.S. participation at all, and it took the efforts last spring to get President Sadat to modify the Egyptian position, which ultimately resulted in the composition that we have today, and which I hope - I hope - even with the European participation will proceed on schedule.

With respect to autonomy, our original plan, and we applied great pressure in Egypt, I'll be very frank with you, last spring in my discussions with Sadat and diplomatic activities as well as efforts here to have a more serious effort on autonomy. One might suggest that it was a little late getting started but by September I think this group was ready to go and the discussions in Alexandria got it moving. I think the progress initially was very good, and I think every one involved is to be complimented. The problems were sorted out. The differences were clear. But we have had a number of jolts, politically, militarily and historically and not the least of which was the tragedy in Cairo.

And since that time, we in Washington ^{have} sensed not only a stalemate in autonomy progress, but the same trend we witnessed a year earlier: greater divergence between the two parties most concerned.

Now, had it not been for a number of events, the crisis in Lebanon, murder of President Sadat and some other things which I won't mention, we would have been here probably in October doing what I am trying to do now, and, frankly, it would have been far more timely, because it would have been a greater gap between the events of April and the work that we had to do.

But we concluded long before now that it was important that

we make a concerted effort to move the autonomy talks forward.

Now, I went to Cairo with that view in mind and the initial attitudes we found there were somewhat worrisome. They suggested that the leadership in Cairo felt that it would not be advantageous to us to have an autonomy agreement before the 28th of April. I think their attitude was premised on two factors, the first being that were we to arrive at a Memorandum of Agreement or set of principles, or whatever you want to call it, it would be portrayed to the Arab world as a price that Egypt had paid for returning of the Sinai. Secondly, they said with some conviction that they felt that the return of the Sinai was such a traumatic event here in Israel, that all of the energies, flexibility of approach to autonomy would be consumed in that trauma. And, therefore, the prospects for any commonality of approach were very dim between now and the end of April, and that greater flexibility in Israel and by implication in Cairo would emerge after the Sinai had been returned.

I will be frank with you: I rejected both of these theses. I said both were specious. And I believe they are, although justified from a subjective point of view in Cairo.

A second thing that worried me was when we discussed the objective of autonomy, it was clear that there has been an addition to the Egyptian vocabulary. Not only was a reasonable agreement necessary, but an acceptable agreement has suddenly become necessary, and the term "acceptable" when we plumed it was suggested to represent acceptable to the Palestinians and the Arab world.

We rejected this as well, and I made the point that Camp David and the Peace Treaty were not arrived at under such a conception, but rather the consciences of the individual parties involved in the negotiation, who at the time, I think, Sadat described as "doing their duty".

In all three cases, these three worrisome attitudes that we found, President Mubarak agreed to abandon them, at least in practice. He said he would agree to give a major effort to autonomy, at least over the next two months, to see if it were possible to arrive at an agreement. They are very concerned, however, that we not set a deadline of the 28th of April, and you know the linkage question. And I think it is in our mutual interest not to do such a thing.

The second aspect is that he agreed that the determination of reasonableness must be left to the negotiating parties. Now, that represents some progress in my view and was an encouraging attitude.

I do believe, and I say this with conviction, that despite the worrisome signals that we see from time to time, it is Egypt's view that the peace process is in their interest and they intend to continue with it, with the view towards getting an early solution, but with also the view towards continuing with it if unsuccessful beyond the return date or for however long it takes.

But it is my personal judgment that never again will there be a convergence of forces which parallel those that exist at this moment and that it will be harder, not easier, to get an agreement after the Sinai is returned.

Now, I happen to feel that despite the great differences in

the five major categories of the negotiations, that there is a bible. There is a Camp David Agreement, which while it is replete with ambiguities, it provides a philosophic and fundamental road map and with that road map, men of goodwill who are not overly restricted by theology - Dr. Burg doesn't like me to use that term - and who are impressed by the realities of the local situation, the reality, combined with the imperative, the sense of concern about the imperative to have a solution and not let this thing drift, will be able to find a way, and I am frankly optimistic that we can do that.

But I am also worried that we will not do that if the two parties continue to drift towards splendid isolation and mutual suspicion and that's why I think the U.S. has a very special obligation to attempt to rectify that recent drift, to become more actively engaged at a higher level.

Now, with respect to that, I would like to tell you what we are doing so you will have a feel for it and what decisions have not been made and what maybe have been made.

This process has been one of finding facts. We are in a fact-finding mode; me and my colleagues here. We have asked a number of questions in Cairo on every functional area of the five areas. I think we left Cairo with not a precise but a pretty clear picture of where they come from on each issue. We don't have all of their bottom lines, but we have a bracket on where their bottom lines will be.

We have attempted to do the same thing here, and I think it is invaluable. Your paper, which I am impressed to hear Dr. Burg suggest will not be made public, I think should not be made public

because I will tell you simply what will happen if you make it public. There will be a counter-paper from Cairo which will go to the extreme and which will contribute not to a convergence and a merger of our respective positions but a further exacerbation of already existing differences.

Now, at some point that paper of course should be made public because it lays out some very positive and forthcoming attitudes, but I would suggest not until such time as we have decided whether an agreement is achievable in this current activity.

Now, I will mention this to the Prime Minister this morning, before I leave, because I could certainly understand the desirability from your own point of view of having that paper out in the public, but if we are serious about trying to make a good effort, I think in the long run it would be counter-productive in the near term to have it out.

I think as you reflect back on your activities and as our observers or our participants, our two Ambassadors and our team have given me very good reports from the first moment of your activities in September, and, frankly, I think more progress has been made since September - we tend to forget this - than there was made in the period before in the whole three years, and for that reason I must compliment you, and I mean that in all sincerity.

The problems began to develop with some political jolts, which I will leave unmentioned, and with the tragedy in Cairo, and since then you have been confronted with the problems that our previous

negotiators have been confronted with. There is only one way there will be an agreement and that is if there is political will to have one. There will be no magic breakthroughs by honest men sitting around the table trying to solve extremely difficult problems. There must be political will. And I hope we will be able to contribute to the development of that political will in Cairo as well as here in Israel, although I think it was less difficult here in Israel, because you can see the future as well as we can; maybe far better; probably far better.

So, I think that's enough in a general background way, Dr. Burg.

MR. BURG: Mr. Secretary, I am very grateful for your candid report. You defined part of your impressions as worrisome. I was very attentively listening to your philological remarks of the addition to the Egyptian vocabulary going from reasonable to acceptable and that to me means unreasonable if I look at those who have to accept this.

You see, there is a big difference: for the Egyptians, the problem is a political one. For us, the problems are existential ones and I don't need to dwell on this and I don't need to give details. I believe that is the definition and you know it, surely, by the matters you deal with where you have political questions and where something starts to be existential ones.

For us, all the atmosphere, giving back the rest of Sinai, after having given back 90 percent of the oil and 100 percent of the

oil, those are sorrows of existential nature and of existential weight.

If you agree, I would ask my colleagues if they want to refer to what you said. If I am right, in the five areas you mentioned, with your own enumeration, are voting rights of Arabs in East Jerusalem, land and settlement, residual or sovereign powers - sovereign they are not because the autonomy is not sovereign - and security, and the whole nature of the autonomy and Administrative Council and its jurisdiction and scope.

If you agree, I will ask my colleagues, whoever wants, to give his impressions or expression to his impressions. Let us start. Arik?

MR. A. SHARON: Dr. Burg, with your permission. Mr. Secretary, I listened carefully to every word that you said and I would like to start from your sentence emphasizing the importance of political will in order to solve the problem, but I would add that as far as I can see, it is not enough to have a political will, whether the political will is in Cairo or Jerusalem.

The most important thing is that you yourself and the American administration will understand and believe that the autonomy plan, according to the Camp David Accord, that is the only solution that Israel will agree to, before the end of April or after the end of April. And talking here as friends, friendly, I have some worries about that. I am not sure, I am not completely sure, Mr. Secretary, that you - when I say you, I mean the American administration, at the

present time, really believe that the autonomy plan according to the Camp David Accord, that that is the only and sole solution that Israel will accept, and that should be a basic starting line. And I am sure, completely sure, that after April there will not be any change in the Israeli position about the autonomy. We made it very clear. We made it very clear. We will never allow, and I am using the words of Prime Minister Begin in one of his letters, attached letters to the Camp David Agreement, Israel will not allow the establishment of a Palestinian state in Samaria, Judea and the Gaza District. In those day, I wanted very much to add one word to this sentence and the word is: Israel will not allow the establishment of a second Palestinian state. There is a Palestinian state and we will now allow, and Mr. Secretary, take it for granted, we will not allow, and we took all the necessary steps, first of all by having the decision. Secondly, by having the Camp David Accord from which we are not going to move right or left, not before April and not after April, but in order to be on the safe side, we have even better guarantees for that and these are those 85 settlements, towns, that we established in Samaria and Judea and they are stronger than any political terms, any political agreement, written agreement.

So I think it is important to understand that there will not be any change in our position. We will not accept and I was glad to hear, Mr. Secretary, that you didn't accept what you were told in Egypt, that there might be certain flexibility in Israel after the trauma of the end of April. It is a mistake. There is not going to be any flexibility whatever.

Mr. Secretary, if you ask me, on the contrary, because until April we wanted, though we were always against any linkage, but we wanted to have the two parts of the Camp David Accord being signed, decided, signed and concluded by, I would say, April. In order to reach that, I think that we showed flexibility, but if somebody expects us to show any flexibility afterwards, it is a mistake. We are not going to show any flexibility, and one thing I think that you know, you have some problems with us from time to time, but one thing I think you know by now, that we stick to the things that we say. We are not going to surprise you. The Egyptians should understand that there is not going to be any further flexibility after April. On the contrary, less flexibility.

The Egyptian position that we are seeking a plan that will be accepted by the Palestinians and by the rest of the Arab world, that is a dream; that is not a realistic approach.

DR. BURG: Excuse me: it is realistic if you need it and you say it in order/to have any agreement with Israel. Then it is realistic.

MR. SHARON: I would like to emphasize, as I said, what is our position. I believe that the autonomy plan might be accepted - it will take time - by the Arab inhabitants of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza District. It will never be accepted, and I speak now about the autonomy plan, for this transitional period. It will never be accepted by any other Arab country; no one will ever accept it. So if the Egyptians are talking about that, the meaning of it is that

they are looking for something else. So I think it is good to know now that there will not be any other plan.

I met the Egyptian Ambassador just a few days ago. He wanted to see me, and I told him that Israel will not move right or left from the autonomy plan which was discussed at Camp David. We are not going to move right or left, not before April and not after April and we will not accept any other plan.

There is a plan, a plan that the three participants agreed and signed and we will not move. I talked to the Egyptians very frankly about the situation after April, and I warned them and I told them: People, we took a tremendous risk by withdrawing to our international border. We secured ourselves by having these 100 miles of the demilitarized zone. Please, I asked them, don't violate this agreement. Don't try and change this territorial status in Sinai, because then, what will happen and it will take - and, again, don't be surprised - 24 hours; we will be back in Sinai. Because we cannot accept it.

And I told them, look, People, you, the Egyptians, don't want it; we don't want it; no one needs it, but be careful; because we took all the risks. I saw the polls in the United States, and it asked: who contributed more towards peace, Egypt or Israel, and 60 percent of the population saw that the concessions made by Egypt were greater than those made by Israel. I wouldn't like to repeat everything that we gave. You know exactly what we gave: all of Sinai, the oil fields, the road that we built, the airfields that we constructed, all the towns and settlements. We gave a free road from Sinai to Jordan, north of Eilat, as part of the agreement, and we gave a position to Egypt in

every future negotiation with the rest of the Arab world; something that they never dreamed of.

But besides that, we lost our warning system. We used to have a warning system that covered Egypt. We lost it when we withdrew. We had a warning against air attacks of 16 minutes and it went down to a minute and one-half. We had a capability in Sharm 1-Sheikh to control the Red Sea to Bab-1-Mandeb to the Indian Ocean and that is of tremendous importance to us. Being in Sinai, we had much better warning system covering very important parts of Saudi Arabia and I can proceed and go on more and more about our concessions.

So we have done it. What was left there, I would say, are these 100 miles of demilitarized zone and that is the security, the only security, that we got there. And I told them, People, we are going to find ourselves in war if as a result of a situation that we will not arrive to agreement about the autonomy, you will try or dare to change the territorial status in Sinai, because we - and I don't want you to be surprised - gave the instructions; we have all the plans; we will be back there in 24 hours. All of us will lose.

Therefore, I always thought it is better to sign, to finish before that in order not to create a possibility of a situation like that in the future. And Mr. Secretary, believe me, if we say that we will be there in 24 hours, we will be there in 24 hours.

And what bothers me is your approach towards the plan. I am afraid that you don't believe any more in this plan, and I wanted to put it: please don't have any expectation; we won't accept any

other plan because we are not going to accept any other plan.

I understood very much your worries, when we talked yesterday, about a change in the situation and a deterioration of the situation, that that might happen. We also worry because we want to stick to the peace. We want this peace. We want to stick to it. We like this peace even if we have complaints about normalization and so on. We like this peace and we want to keep it. We think it is important.

But there is no hope whatever to arrive to any decision unless you, the American administration, are fully convinced that the autonomy plan is the only solution that Israel will accept in Samaria, Judea and the Gaza District. I am not sure if, I would say, these activities now - and I am sorry for talking so frankly to you but I think it is important - I am not sure if all these activities now are not, I would say, to bridge this period until April, to give us certain hopes and, you know, to tie our hands that we will not act on some other front. About the other fronts, I told you that we don't have any intention to act, but we will act if something will happen. We made all the preparations, but we will try to avoid it. Maybe there is a fear that Israel will stop the withdrawal. There may be many, I would say, possibilities that bring you now to these activities, and maybe a hope that after April there will be a possibility to bring new options, new plans to that. So it will not be. We will not accept any other plans.

Because of all these reasons, I think that it is very

important to try really to finish it by April and please don't create any expectations, anywhere, that we will accept any other plan. We will not accept.

This paper that was given yesterday, Israel is a democracy and the government decides; we vote like in a democracy, but I believe that this paper should be published. It is very important. We live in a democracy. We live in a society that must understand, because we are facing a difficult period, that we have gone forward, that we propose serious proposals and that's very important because we also have problems here and we have problems around the world. I think it is important that everyone will know, as early as possible that Israel proposed and that Israel was ready for free concessions in order to implement the second half of the Camp David Accord.

So in any case, on my side - it is not for myself to decide - on my side, I will try to convince that this paper will be known to the public because it is very important.

MR. BURG: The question is when.

MR. SHARON: As early as possible. We cannot decide here. Thank you very much for listening.

MR. HAIG: I am always delighted and encouraged to hear General Sharon because as a military man I understand where he comes from, but I also suspect that he has some psychological hang-ups that are not justified in any sense, if I listened carefully to his words. If we are, as I believe we have been, allies in a common endeavor, it must be clear to General Sharon that his fears of the post-Sinai turnover period and the implications of that strategically for Israel and

the United States are very convergent fears. And it is very easy to suggest that we are here to look for other approaches, but I think if you will go back to what I said at the beginning, in the discussions we have held thus far, it's been strictly within the confined of the Camp David Accord. I think I laid out to you that that is a bible, and if it is viewed any other way, or interpreted any other way here, you may not only have a problem of your suspicions of Cairo, but you have a problem with your suspicion of us, and that will neither be justified nor constructive. So I want to be sure that we have the air cleared on that subject.

And if you could perhaps indicate to me any advantage for the United States of pursuing policies which result in the outcome that might follow a failure to get agreement, then I will be happy to listen. But I know of none. So I just want the air cleared on that subject.

MR. BURG: We will continue in our discussion. I understand that General Sharon, Minister of Defence, gave you his views that there will not be another basis or another bible than the bible of Camp David and he made it very clear and you made very clear your point of view.

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MR. SHAMIR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have already had some occasion, some opportunities, to explain our views, but I want only to add a few words. I think we have to remember now that the Camp David Accord is a compromise and this compromise was very

far from the initial Israeli position. This compromise was a result of painful Israeli concessions. I cannot see until this moment any real effort of the Egyptians to make any concessions and such a disproportion when only one party is ready to contribute to the achievement of a compromise, such a disproportion cannot last forever. And I think that now, when we are approaching the limit of time that we have to conclude an agreement, I think this disproportion must cease. And now I think it is the time for the Egyptians to prove their flexibility, their readiness, to contribute something to the peace effort. I think that this team which you see here has invested a great intellectual effort all the time and there is a limit to it. We think you appreciate your efforts. You have to convince the Egyptians to make a similar effort, and to prove to us that they are willing, seriously, to reach a compromise, to reach an agreement. I think this must be our message to the Egyptians now. Thank you.

MR. MODAI: Thank you very much, Dr. Burg, and with your indulgence, Mr. Secretary, my feeling is that the position is much worse than I thought it is. I thought that here there are two parties which for reasonable reasons cannot reach an agreement, but you have been very candid to tell us that there are other reasons, which I will define for lack of another word a negative linkage. They don't want to reach an agreement because it will look like the Egyptians are paying us/for giving them back the Sinai, number one, and because Israel undergoes a trauma in April. That is absolutely a linkage, a negative one, and I thought that there is no linkage between

the two parts of the agreement.

Of course, you rejected these positions, but it is still the Egyptian position. It is at least the reason that the negotiations have not proceeded so far. If they will proceed now, that will be a very good indication that they have rejected their current positions, but if it will not, you can't blame us, Mr. Secretary, for suspecting that they still hold these two reasons.

Now, in my view, this is a different situation altogether. It is not what we have been discussing over the years. It is not the substance.

Now, another comment, with your permission, that I'd like to make. Your impression, Mr. Secretary, or you said you noticed a wider divergence between the positions of the parties, and you were kind enough to explain right away where do you see it in the case of the Egyptians. You said it is no more "reasonable" and now it should be "acceptable" and acceptable to whom. Where is this parallel on the part of the Israeli position? I mean, did we take a more divergent position than the original one? And if so, on what issues? It seems to me that we have been making throughout the period, and it is easier for me probably to notice it because I haven't been personally involved - just studied it in one go - it seems to me that we have made an effort, as Our Foreign Minister has just indicated, to come closer. The entire team was sitting, working on it.

The last comment is really in the realm of the basic approach to the Camp David Agreement. I don't know whether the autonomy

issue was a pay-off or not a pay-off. I don't know. I was not there in Camp David. All I know is that there were two parts to the agreement, maybe two sides to the agreement. Whether it was because anybody wanted to balance or not, I would not know. But what I would know is that the part that no doubt goes further towards the Egyptian interest is implemented and the part that I have learned today - I had some indications before - that is less favorable to the Egyptians is not implemented. That should leave one with some thoughts at least, if not beyond it.

I only made these comments, Mr. Secretary, which occurred while you were kind enough to report to us your impressions from Cairo. I only made these comments because I understand that you are going back home with the information that you have collected and you will be collecting on this trip in order to evaluate the situation, not to re-evaluate the basic position. I mean, we have only one agreement, one basis, one bible. You went that far to say: one bible. Now, granted, even the original Bible, the real Bible, has a lot of interpretations. You take one sentence and you see half-a-dozen interpretations, but they have one common denominator, all of them: they don't change the wording or the spirit of the Bible. They do not, because then they are no more an interpretation. They are a re-writing of the Bible. And I have said everything, Thank you!

DR. BURG: The first Speaker of the Knesseth, Mr. Prinzak, SAID THAT THE Speaker is called the Speaker because he is not allowed to speak (Laughter) but now I, not as the Chairman, but as a member of the team, would like also to say something.

There is one logical predicament, because the outcome of Camp David is in two ways: Peace Treaty and the will, continuously and in good spirit to continue the talks about the negotiation, about autonomy. The Peace Treaty is defined. It is defined in geographical terms, in topographical terms. The Peace Treaty is defined in chronological terms. To this date, this territory; to this date, the status of this territory will be so and so. So you have exact definitions.

Concerning the second outcome of Camp David, you have no exact definition; only a declaration of goodwill to do something, to negotiate and this is a logical predicament, because here you have the hours; the clock, the calendar moving, and here the autonomy talks were not moving, and this is the big difference between the both things.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will take with you the impression and the real, founded impression that we are interested in the most, in the fastest way - the mostest and the fastest, as another general in the United States once said - to proceed and not only because of the impact of April. The impact of April is a moving factor for us to come out with something positive, with something constructive concerning the autonomy talks. And if you were a little bit dissatisfied with the hang-ups, as you said, that Mr. Sharon brought up in his talk, I can only say as counsel for the defence, it was good that he spoke about the hang-ups in order to prevent the hang-over afterwards. I believe he made it very clear that we adhere in strict adherence to the Camp David concerning also the autonomy, and that it will not be

another West Side Story; only the Camp David story.

Now, after having said this, our target is at least to arrive to a Memorandum of Understanding. I can repeat what I said yesterday at the Prime Minister's home: that concerning technical aspects of elections and so on, you did quite a good job. I would give a laudation to the experts, our Israeli experts, your American experts and also as far as they have a free hand, to the Egyptian experts that the technical, juridical part of the negotiations made very, very fine progress. But it is not enough.

We have the impression, I said it to you this morning, that the Egyptians are stalling. We were told that they were stalling because they don't want to be accused that they were traitors to the cause of the Palestinians in order to get their territory back. Against this line there is something very logical and I say it very clearly, and the consequence of what I say should be to give more urgency to the talks and the procedures and the going on. Against the line that we hear from Cairo that they don't want to be accused of being traitors to the cause of their fellow Arabs, the Palestinians, I can say only one logical thing: if the Egyptians are not moving and not forthcoming now when they still have to get something, I cannot imagine that they will be nicer and more forthcoming after they've got it. I believe it is a logical point and here logical points and psychological points are coming together. We have no target date. Our experience with the 26th of May as a target date is not a too encouraging one and there is no juridical linkage between the Peace Treaty and Autonomy talks and be-

tween the fulfillment of every part of the Peace Treaty, where unto today, to the dot and to the date, we implemented, to the dot and to the date.

But there is a psychological linkage; there is a psychological synchronization, and this should, I believe, give more energy in urging the Egyptians to come forward and not to let it drift slowly like the waters of the Nile.

I would like to conclude my words in asking you, Mr. Secretary of State, how you see the next weeks and the next months concerning the issue of our negotiations. I know that if there will not be a change that the team of experts will meet between the 24th and the 28th of this month in Egypt. I have for the moment no mobilization order for the Cabinet members of the negotiating team, but I would very much like to hear how you see the next weeks: where, when, how we will proceed, and I believe that will be a fine concluding note, and I give you the floor.

MR. HAIG: First, let me answer your question first and then I want to make an observation or two. What we have been doing is attempting to gather facts and to put the fact that we got from Cairo in one box; put the facts that we have gotten here in another box. We go home and we will assess those facts and see in our own judgment whether or not there are opportunities to bridge differences consistent with the Camp David Accord. And let me assure you, Doctor and General, we are not producing the New Testament! (Laughter)

DR. BURG: The Old One is very difficult to live up to, believe me.

MR. HAIG: And it's been my view, frankly, that from the American point of view, I want President Reggan to know, before the 28th of April, whether or not there will ever be autonomy, because if we can't ascertain the answer to that question now, it will be far more difficult to ascertain it after the 28th.

Now, assuming we arrive at the optimistic conclusion, and that depends on some questions to be answered yet today by the Prime Minister, then I think we would return at a very early date and prior to President Mubarak's scheduled visit to Washington in early February, in which case we would engage again in bilateral discussions, not trilateral, and I am talking about a time schedule which would be associated with my return to Europe for the discussions with Gromyko in Geneva on the 26th and 27th of this month, and I would anticipate, following those discussions, to move promptly to Cairo and spend a day or two - I think a day will be long enough - and then come here and spend a day or two, following which an overall assessment can be made. If the thing looks movable and doable, I would look forward to a very high level, trilateral meeting.

It is my own feeling with respect to the work of the working groups that that should not be affected by what I am saying, and that above all, the momentum in that area should continue.

Now, I have heard a lot of very strong and I think fervently felt words here this morning and that's as it should be. How else could it be? We are dealing with vital interests. But I think also there is a tendency to hear some of my words and retain them and to pass

by some of the others. I WANT to make it clear that in Egypt I left with a firm conviction that President Mubarak is dedicated to the peace process as it was agreed to at Camp David, and that for reasons, for whatever motives you apply, for reasons even beyond his control, it will be necessary for him to stay dedicated to that peace process. These are both philosophic reasons and practical reasons.

I think we were able to clear the air in Cairo at least with respect to creeping sophistry. I think it is also important that we recognize that there have been a number of jolts in Cairo, some of which came from Israeli actions in the recent past, some of which and probably most of which are associated with the loss of a man who from your perspective here and from ours was able to break the mold and the pattern of Arab thinking, and so it is not unusual that you would have found some regression. I think we have to be sensitive to it, not tolerant of it, but understand that we must work with it and attempt to change it, because that man needs a vested interest as his predecessor had, and we can provide that vested interest. It is in our common interest to do so. That will avoid both the hang-ups and the hang-over. And I do believe that when we left Cairo, President Mubarak and his Foreign Minister, and especially his Foreign Minister, as distinct from some of the specialists who are engaged in other things, and as I said yesterday, we always have to remember the differences in society. You have a very sophisticated, educated, enlightened, communicative society. Everyone knows and understands what is going on. They may not draw the same conclusions from this fact. But that is not true in Egypt; never has been; never will be. So we are

talking about the leader and the need to impress upon him the imperative of keeping this peace process alive, and I think we did that. I think he joined in our concerns that time is not working in our favor, unless we take the opportunity to make a major effort.

Now, we get to the question, and the last thing I want to touch upon, you know, as a third party, coming into the maze, I found in both capitals the same attitude: here comes the American from Washington, looking for concessions and both sides staked out their positions in that regard. This is understandable. We are not looking for concessions. What we are looking for is ingenuity, to enable us to settle questions in five major functional areas, most of the details of which have been sorted out ad nauseum. We have been at this for years. There isn't an awful lot that is mysterious and I basically believe it is doable.

Somebody said last night, how could you broaden this thing, bring Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia in? And I said, who would have said a decade ago that you would be sitting down at the table with the Egyptians and had a Treaty of Peace? So it is doable. And I think if we apply our collective intelligence and wisdom, we keep our strategic perspective above all, that we may just surprise ourselves. And I think we don't have the alternative not to try. We do not have the alternative not to try. That's where we are.

MR. SHARON: There was a question asked yesterday and I checked it meanwhile. This was about the Isle of Tiran. I was asked: do we have there a permanent position? Until half-a-year ago, from, I would say, 1967, we had a camp there and positions and so on, observa-

tions posts and a camp, on the southern part of the Isle. Six months ago, as part of our withdrawal from Sinai, we left it, and we are patrolling there, but we had that almost for 14 years. For 14 years we kept there positions because of the importance of the place.

MR. LEWIS: On the south-side?

MR. SHARON: The base was in the southern part; the observation post was up on top.

MR. HAIG: Don't let my less than definitive reply say that there is any hang-up on Tiran. I have no hang-up on Tiran. I just heard it yesterday in the context you presented and I think I owe it to myself and to my President to analyze this problem before we give you an answer. It doesn't represent any position one way or another.

MR. SHARON: I want you to know the facts.

DR. BURG: That was information and not negotiation.

We will adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 12 noon.)

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משרד החוץ – מחלוקת הזרע

טופס מברך צפוי

דבirs מתחוד 1 סוף 5 דפים
סיווג בטחוני: סודי ביתוחן
דחיפות: דחיפות
תאריך זויה: 30/8/1866 } סימטש
מספר מס. מס' ברוך: 1561 } פה הקשר

אל: נושיבגטנו

מagenta ב- 20 י"ח משיחת ראש הממשלה עם סול ליבונוביץ מה-21 ביבנואר 1982.

לשכת שהייח

(קשר - אבא המצ"ב)

אינטראקטיבי

האריג: גשומות; אינטראקצייתם: אינטראקצייתם: אינטראקצייתם: אינטראקצייתם:

שיכון ראש-הממשלה עם סול לינוביץ - בירום ב"ד בטבת החשמ"ב - 21 בינואר 1982

ו.ב.ה. ירושם: יהודה אבנר

لينוביツ פחח והסביר כי הרא נמצא בארץ בבדיקה פרטי עם בני משפחתו, לאחר ביקורו הפרט במצרים, לאורחו של הנשיא מובאך, אשר חידש את הזמנתו האישית של הנשיא סאדאת אליו.

لينוביツ הרחיב את הדיבור על הבדיקה במצרים בתיירumi-הנילוס. רה"מ העלה מחלוקת על הניגריה הבלתי שבין הצייליזציה המצרית העתיקה לבין המציאות המצרית של היום, אשר בה העוני המזועג והפאר ~~הנוסף~~ החיצוני משמשים בעירוביה.

لينוביツ מסר לרה"מ כי הרא מביא שני דרישות שלום - מהגברת ג'יהאן סאדאת ומהנשיא מובאך. הרא סיפר כי הגברת סאדאת גילהה לו לראשונה, כי חדשים מופיע לפני מותו, הקליט סאדאת על רשות קול את תחרותו שהוא עומד למות בקרוב וכי בעת ההתקשרות בתייר, גרא קם על רגליו תוך ידיעה שהוא עומד להירצח.

רה"מ הבהיר שביחסו לאחדרונה עם סאדאת, סאדאת דיבר על הצעדים הנמרצים שהרא עומד לנ��וט נגד הקיצוניים הדתיים. רה"מ העיר כי יש להניח שסאדאת לקח בחשברן שיגreso להחנקם בר. רה"מ המשיך כי יש הרים סימנים של ~~הסבירות~~ בקשר ~~הסבירות~~ במצרים. לינוביツ הסכים אך ציין כי מרבניאויר של סאדאת עדיין חלויות בכל מקום, כולל במשרדי הממשלה. הרא העיר גם כי בניגריה פעלות האזרחות של הגברת ג'יהאן בתייר של א' בעלה, הרוי הגברת מובאך נחאת לכלים.

הרא הסביר שהגברת ג'יהאן נורתה עתה להסתגר ויש-Calala בשלטון אשר מנסים לקשרו את שמה עם אלה אשר היר קרובים לasadאת ומרזכרים כיום באשמי ס ^{במעשיו} שתיירות.

لينוביツ תיאר את מובאך כאישיות שוניה לגברי מסאדאת. הרא מנשה להציג את עצמו כמנהיג בזכות עצמו, אם כי חסра לו הכריזמה של קודמו. לינוביツ הבהיר שמרבאך אישית בשאר נאמן כדר של סאדאת אך יש מסביבו המנסים להמעיט את המוניטין של קודמו.

لينוביツ אישר שגם באותו שעה שיחתיר עם סאדאת, הרא היה מתעלם ממרבאך כפי שעשה למשל כאשר סאדאת שוחח עם ראש-הממשלה. לינוביツ תיאר את מובאך כשליח נאמן של סאדאת, אך מבליל שיגלה שום תרשיה משל עצמו. רה"מ אמר כי לאחר שיחתו הראשונית עם מובאך, בדור היה כי סאדאת לא שיתף אותו בכל. התרשמותו של לינוביツ על מובאך היא שהאדם בלי תרשיה משלו, חסר מחשבה זקורית, אך כנה ובאמת להבטחותיו. מתוך שנים של היכרות מסיק לינוביツ כי מובאך הרא אדם שאפשר לטרור על דבריו. כאשר שוחח אותו בקהייר עכשו, התחשש כי הרא גדול עם התפקיד וכי הרא

מגלה סימנים של מנהיגות נשיאותית. הרא מגש עדיין להתרות עצמן קו מנהיגות ומגלה רגשות לגבי הדמיתו כציבור. בדוגמה ספר לינוביין כיצד בתום השיחה עמו, שניהם עמדו לצאת לעתונאים בחו"ז, אך בפתח הדלק מובאך החליט כי מוטב שלא יצא איתו. לינוביין ספר כי מובאך מגלה עצנות לקרה ביקורו הקרוב ברושינגטון. הרא עומדת לצאת לשם בלי לקחת עמו משהו של ממש והוא יודע שברשות-הברית ישר השוראות בין לבין דמותו של סאדאת. שר החוץ עלי אמר לLINOBIEN שמדובר עבוני לקרה הביקור וכי איינו יודע לשם מה הם נועסים.

LINOBIEN אמר לרה"ם כי מובאך חזר והודיעו' את מחריבתו לAMP-דירושיד וכי הרא איינו מוצא כי חועלת לא בתכנית פאהד ולא בירצמה האירופאית. מובאך ספר לו כי הרא מוכן להתקדם במורים על האוטונומיה אך הרא איינו מאמין שאפשר להשיג הסכט 26 באפריל. הרא הדגיש כי תאריך זה איינו מהרזה מכשול ובום לא תאריך יעד. LINOBIEN שאל את מובאך מהן בעיניו הבעיות העיקריות - מובאך ציין במירוח את נושא הסמכויות וביעית ירושלים. LINOBIEN ספר לרה"ם כי הרא אמר למובאך שלגביה הסמכויות אפשר לדוחו למזרא פתרונות וכי בעין ירושלים רצוי לשמור על ראש פתוח, הרא גם הדגיש בפניו מובאך כי זו תהיה שגיאה לא לנסות ולהשיג הסכם עד ל-25 באפריל. מובאך הביע לפניו את המחשבה כי יושב הסכם טרב יותר לאחר תאריך זה, כי הרא מאמין לא-ערבי כי, היה אז גמישים כי לא תעמד בפניהם אלטרנטיבת אורתה.

MOVAKH ספר כי הסעודים מסרו לו באופן סודי כי הם פערניניים בהמשך AMP-דירושיד. הרא גם אמר כי הירדנים יצטרפו למורים עד תום שנת 1982, אך הרא לא גילתה מה המקור למידע זה. LINOBIEN ספר כי דאלי ואלבז לוחצים על מובאך לדחתה כל הסכם עד לאחר 25 באפריל, לאחר זה ייראה ממכירת האינטנסים של הפלשינאים. מайдך, ח'ליל ועלי מאמין שעבשו הרא הזמן הטרוב להגיע להסכם, כי התקופה זו, עד 25 באפריל, הדרמה של ארץ-הברית יברלה להיות הכி מועילה.

LINOBIEN החرس כי מובאך נע בין שני שתי הגישות הנ"ל וטרם הגיע לעצמי עמדה משלה. היה בדור לLINOBIEN כי מובאך החכב מביבורו של הייג. רה"ם אמר כי הייג ספר לו שהרא, מצד', החכב מביבורו בקثير וכי הרא היה פסימי בעדב' את המקומות. הייג אמר כי הרא שמע שם התבטאות שלא מצאו חן בעיניו כגרון; "פתורון חייב להיות סביר ומקובל", - סביר בעיני הפלשינאים ומקובל על העולים הערבי. רה"ם ספר לLINOBIEN כי הייג דירוח לו כי הרא אמר למזרים שארץ-הברית לא אמר בגישה כזו. רה"ם ספר לLINOBIEN כי הייג הרא ידיד של ישראל וכי הרא מבין את בעיותינו. LINOBIEN אמר כי בתקופת המישל מעמדו של הייג עדיין נחوت ממעמדו של ריינברגר, וכי כל פעם של LINOBIEN משוחח עם הייג, הרא שומע מפיו על "אריביו הקרובים לנשיה".

רה"ם אמר כי ריינברגר עשה שגיאה רצינית בהקשר למיוצר ההבנה בעניין שיתור הפעולה האסטרטגי. רה"ם הסביר לLINOBIEN את השתלשות ניסוח מזכוי הבהנה. הרא הסביר, בין השאר, כי מבחינה משפטית אפשרות של השעיה איננה מופיעה בשום מקרים בטקסט. רה"ם אמר שהשלב זה אין לנו

ידיעות על עתיד המזכר, אם כי יש להניח כי האמריקנים ישרבו אליו בקרוב. ובינתיים שיתרף הפעולה ממשיך בפועל. לינובייז הביב כי המישל מחפש פריצת דרך להתגבר על העניין. רה"מ תאר איך למשה ניסה המישל לנצל את חידוש המזכר לקידום הן בקשר האוטונומיה והן בעניין המצביע. ישראל, הסביר רה"מ, דרחה את הנטיון להפוך את מזכיר הבהנה, לבן-ערובה לכל נושא שהוא.

רה"מ מסר לינובייז העקבים של שני מסמכים: א) מסמך הצעות ישראל בעניין האוטונומיה מה-13 בינואר 1982 שהובן על-ידי משרד החוץ ו-ב) המסמך ~~העומק~~ שסידאת-היבש בקמפ-דיירoid ב-5 בספטמבר 1978. לגבי המסמך הראשון רה"מ הביע דעתו שתכנו יכול לשמש בפריצת דרך למ"ט לארטונומיה. הרא פירט את תוכנו. לגבי המסמך השני, הסביר רה"מ כי ההתקשרות האחרוניות המציגות ממציאות על כך שם חזרדים לעמדות הרובע בארץ מטמ"ז ואשר נדחו על הסע על-ידי כיוום הראשון בקמפ-דיירoid. רה"מ סיפר בהרבה אין לאחוי שסידאת הקרה את המסמך לפניו ולפנוי קרטר, הרא, רה"מ, הביב "עטוף בסאנסically": וכי מיד לאחר מכן, הנשיא קרטר אמר לו באירוע-עיניים, כי אין לו מה לדאוג וש המסמך גם לא מתקבל על האמריקנים. סידאת, הסביר רה"מ, ציר את המסמך ~~במיוחד~~ לשורת המשלחות החלו בעבורה אשר הולידה את הסכמי קמפ-דיירoid. רה"מ הביע את המחשבה כי ברוח המסמך המקורי היה אלבז' וכי תחת השפעתו על הנשיא, מציגות העמדות אלו. גם עלי מתבטה ברוח זו. רה"מ סיפר כי עד עכשו הרא נמנע מלבלות את דבר המסמך כדי לא להזכיר את סידאת, אך חשב עתה שהגורמים הנוגעים בדבר ידעו את סיגי המשעה. רה"מ סיפר כי הרא אמר להיבז כי רצונה של ישראל להציג הסכם עד ל-26 באפריל הן לבורר של עניין זהן לטרחת המציגים. אחרת, יבוואר מדיניות הטירוב ויאשים את מרכזארק כי הרא קיבל חזקה את סיני, אך לא השיג דבר עכבר הפלשינאים. רה"מ הביע את הדעה כי המציגים חזרדים לעמדות הראשוניות שבמסמך אשר הביא עמר סידאת לקמפ-דיירoid, כתשובה מראש לטענה הנ"ל, וכך יש להסביר את עמדות הנוקשה העכשווית. רה"מ הדגיש כי הרא היה רוצה להציג הסכם לפני ה-26 באפריל-זאת איננו רואה טרגדיה בכך המר"ט יימשך לאחר תאריך זה. הרא אמר כי המציגים חוששים שאנו לא ישלים את הנסיגה בסיני באם המר"ט יימשך לאחר תאריך זה. אם כי זה נוחן מימד פסיקולוגי מסריים לקידום המר"ט לפני השלמה אך אין כל האזקה לחשש זה, אם כי זה נוחן מימד מתחנחים בסיני, אך רוב רובו של הציבור בארץ הנסיגה. רה"מ אמר כי ישנו אמונת בעיות עם חלק מהמחנחים בסיני, אך רוב רובו של הציבור בארץ מך בעמדת הממשלה. רה"מ הביע תקווה כי אפשר יהיה להשלים את הפינורי ללא התגבשותה. הרא הדגיש בפנוי לינובייז את הכאב הטמור בפינוריים של ערביי אדמה אשר הביאו חיים לחולות סיני. רה"מ חזר והדגיש שהסכם השלום יקיים ~~על-פי~~ סיגי.

لينובייז הביע התרומות אישית שאפשר להציג להסכם לפני השלמה הפינורי. והפתוח הרא ~~לתקבב~~ אונסחה אשר תפאר למרכז להציג פומביות כי הרא השיג משאר. הרא שאל את רה"מ האם הרא מסמכים למזכיר הבנה מוגבל בקשר. רה"מ אישר כי אnder מוכנים לניסוח עקרוניות. לינובייז שאל את המדובר הרא מעין מזכיר אשר ישאיר נושאים מסכימים פתרחים למ"ט עם הפלשינאים. רה"מ הביב אמר כי סידאת אמר לרב-סגן של שאלה רטוריית: "וכי מה יקרה אם אnder, אריה"ב מציגים וישראל, מגיעים לידי הסכם אשר יידחה על הפלשינאים? אני, סידאת, מшиб כי מלאנו את חובתנו. עתה זה תלוי בהם". רה"מ הסביר כי זאת הייתה בישתו של סידאת וכי הרא חזר עליה לאחר מכן פומביות במסיבת עיתונאים. הרא גם אמר באותו מסיבה כי איננו רוצה בשיתוף אש"ף ממש ומתן. לינובייז

אמר כי בירושה ראיון שפירושם מובארך בחודש לפניו מותח של פאדתם בר הוא אומר את אותם הדברים, אבל, המשיך לינוביץ, מובארך עומד בפניהם לחץ של אלה הטוענים שיש להשיבו בדבר שהוא מקבל על הפלתינויהם. לינוביץ הביע את המחשבה כי הניר הישראלי יכול לשמש כפרצת דרך עבור הייג לקידום המרי"ם.

ירושלים, ינואר
בנושא ירושלים רה"ם הסביר את ההבדל שבין השתתפות הירוש"בים הערבי-סובטדרה ירושלים בבחירה לפלמנט הירדני, ובין השתתפותם בבחירה למועצה המינלאית של האוטונומיה: השתתפותם בבחירה בירדן איננה יוצרת סמכות ירדנית עליהם, בניגוד להשתתפותם בבחירה בנושא האוטונומיה בירושה סטטוס של סמכות של המועצה המינלאית הנבחרת עליהם. הדבר יזרום למעשה חלופה חדש של ירושלים ואצלולא תיתכנה שתי סמכויות לתושבי עיר אחת. כמו כן ראש הממשלה: זה את המושג של עוזן ועוזן בהקשר זה.

בסיכום אמר לינוביץ שבשובו לאלה"ב הוא ידרות להייג, הוא סיפר לרה"ם כי ב��cker הבא של הייג הוא יחליט אם הרוצחים ינהל אישית את המרי"ם בשם האמריקנים. בהשובה לשאלת מטה אמר גורי לרה"ם כי הוא אינו רואה את עצם כרומד להירוח נציג אמריקני במשה ותן כי רק איש אשר מדובר אישית עם הנשיא, יכול לשמש בתפקיד זה. הוא סיפר כי הייג שורף להצלחה אישית בנושא האוטונומיה, כדי לתקן את מעמדו בירושינגרן.

משרד החוץ - מחלקה הקשר

טופס מבוק גלו

אל: גמיישראל ווшибינגן
טלפון 3-2618
סיווג בטחוני: מיידי
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך ויה: 18.11.82
מספר מבוק: 186
לסייעות הקשר

אל:

עברון.

בקור קייג. עמדות מצריות.

להלן שדור רדיו מונטה קרלו מה-15 דגא:-

(קשר נא העבירו הרצ"ב)

בר-און

תאריך: 18.11.82 השולח: ת. בר-און אישור מנהל המחלקה: אישות המכnil: ד"ר

המצרים הבהירו להיזג כי מצרים לא מסכימים להסכם פגום בבגושה האוטונומיה

אלא רק להסכם מלא שיתקבל על דעת הפלשינים ומדיניות האחרות.

אין ספק כי בזיג הביג שיזהה כורך בזמן רב הרבה יותר מאשר עד 26 אפריל, משומש חילוקי הדעת הם שטחים ואפ' העמיקו עם סיפוח ירושלים והגולן והחבות ההתנהלות.

חסני מברך הבהיר כי לא נקבע בשום מקום בהסכם שלום או במסגרת הסכם!

קמף-דייוויד מודיע לסיום שייחות האוטונומיה או לשגת הכרזת עקרונות.

נספר כי מברך אמר להיזג שהוא איננו יכול לוודר בשם מצרים על אף אחת מהזכויות הערביות והוא איננו מוכן שייאשימו את מצרים במשור העברי או הבינלאומי במילוי שמדובר בזכויותיהם של אחרים, עתידם וגורלם. דבר זה איננו חוק וAINENO BA BTSHBON.

הכתבת הרא תופיק הפנה את התשאלות הבאות אל כמאל חסן עלי:

ש. מהי העמדה הסופית שנספר עלייה להיזג?

ה. ראשית העמדה היא שמצרים איננה יכולה לוודר על מה שאיננו שייך לה. ריא איננה יכולה לפגוע בעתיד הפלשינים ולא בעתיד שלום בכל

הקשר לאספקט של השתתפות צדדים ערביים נוספים כמו ירדן, למשל,

בתהלילכ שלום.

שנית מצרים אמרה להיזג כי היא מוכנה רק להצהרת עקרונות כזאת

שהבטיחה אוטונומיה אמיתית ובוחוג לפלס, בגדיי' וברצועת עזה.

שלישית אסור שיצמחו ממנה זכויות שאינן מגיעות לישראל ולכג' יש

לדבק בברשות מחוקקת, משפטית ומבצעת וא' אפשר לוודר על היזגים

שהושג לפלשינים בקייד. אלו הם זכויות מיליון ושלוש מאות אלף פלשי.

להיות מזוהים כחוק בברשות האוטונומיה.

רביעית ישנים עניינים הקשורים בריבונות אשר לא יתכן להשתירם ביד.

ישראל בתקופת המעבר, למשל ענייני הגנה ומדיניות חוץ. לכן, הצעה מצרים

להרשות עניינים אלה ביד, ועדה קבועה במבש תקופת המעבר עד אשר יחוליטו

הקשרו לאספקט של השתתפות צדדים ערביים נוספים כמו ירדן, למשל, בטהיליך השלום.

שניהם מזכירים אמרה להיזג כי היא מוכנה רק להצלה עקרונות צאת
שחמיות אוטונומיה אמיתית ובוחן לפיסי בגדיי ע וברצועת עזה.

בזהירות מיצגים כחוק ברשות האוטונומיה. מהו שאלון זכויות מלאו
לדיכוי ברשות מחוקקת, משפטית ומבצעת ואי אפשר ליתר על הישגים
שלישית אסור שיצמחו ממנה זכויות שאזנו מגיעה לישראל ולכבוד יש-

ההוּת מִזְגָּאִים כְּחֵק בְּשָׂמָחָה וְבְשָׂרָב
רַבְּלַעַיָּה יִשְׁנֶם עֲנִינִים הַקְשׁוּרִים בַּרְיבּוֹנוֹת אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִזְחַכֵּן לְתַאֲירָם בִּזְדִּי
יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּתַקּוֹפַת הַמּוּבָר, -לְמַשְׁלֵעַ עֲנִינִי הַגָּנָה וּמְדִינִיזָוֹת חֹזֶק. לְכָנָן, -הַצִּיעָה מִצְרָיִם
לְהַפְּקִיד עֲנִינִים אֱלֹה בִּזְדִּי וְעַדְתָּה קְבוּעָה כְּמַשְׁכָּב תַּקּוֹפַת הַמּוּבָר עַד אֲשֶׁר יִחְלִיטוּ
הַפְּלַטְטִינִים בָּעֵצֶם מַה הֵם רֹצִים?

חשיבות הביקור של היזג היא בהגדרת נקודות המחלוקת ועמידת היזג על ההחלטה המצרית במלואה.

לצד הישראלי כדי לדוג בחלוקת דעתם. המתוכנת שהציגו מצרים לעדיכת הדזונים בין היישובים לצד המצרי ובין הייאoga. ואחריו, אם ייערכו פגישות דו-צדדיות או מושלשות בדרגת של שרים, זהה, הצעד הבא הוא שהצד האמרי' יציג כמה תקופות העשויות להוות מתרוג.

בינתן להבין כי פגישה ראשונה במסגרת זאת תערכ כפברואר כאשר יצא חסני מבארך וככאל חسن עליו (לאראה יב).

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סְנָאָתָה

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שְׁגָרִירָה יִשְׂרָאֵל - וּוֹסִינְגְּהָוָן

אל: המפרץ

מִמְּכִיל. מִצְפֵּיָה. מִעֵדָה. הַמְּרַבֵּן

מִזְבָּרָק - 3 *Today*

הַנְּפִיאָה מִזְבָּרָק הַוּפִיעָה הַיּוֹם (20.1.82) בְּרָאִיוֹן לְתַכְנִית

SATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE January 20, 1982 7:45 AM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Interview with President Hosni Mubarak

JANE PAULEY: Palestinian autonomy, the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, all of these important questions to be asked immediately in the Middle East. Tom Brokaw spent a good deal of time in the Middle East since he left us, and is in Cairo live this morning.

Good morning, Tom. You spent time with Hosni Mubarak today.

TOM BROKAW: Yes, Jane, I did. And just a few moments ago President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt told me that he agrees with President Reagan that there can be no strict deadline on Palestinian autonomy agreements worked out between Israel and Egypt. Mubarak said there are simply too many differences to work out between now and April 25th when the Israelis are due to turn back the Sinai to the Egyptians.

PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK: I know that there's a big gap between their opinion and ours. But it should be narrowed. We should find a way for that. We should find a way to reach this reasonable principle.

We stated our position several times, and they know it. And we can't give any concessions. It's something which we [don't] possess. I can't give -- I can't give concessions [words unintelligible]. The West Bank and the Gaza are not Egyptian land at all, so I can't give concessions.

BROKAW: I saw Chairman Arafat in Beirut recently, and he told me he could never accept anything negotiated by the Israelis.

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PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I didn't hear that.

BROKAW: You never heard that then.

Let me ask you about an Israeli concern. The concern in Israel is that once Egypt gets the Sinai back after April 25th, it will only drag its feet, or that it will align itself once again with the wider Arab world. And so it must have some kind of an agreement before the return of the Sinai.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: ...planned concession [words unintelligible]. The 25th of April is not a barrier to overcome. We signed a treaty with Israel that the complete withdrawal will be fulfilled by the 25th of April. We are not going to change our policy after the 25th. Why?

For one simple reason. Now we have relations with Israel. We have diplomatic relations and other kinds of relations. I think, and I am sure, that with these good relations with the Israelis we could play a good role to relieve any tension which may arise at any time with our Arab [words unintelligible]. And this may help a lot in the future to push the peace process in its correct way and to convince here or there with the good ideas and what we could achieve.

BROKAW: When the Sinai is returned will you extend that offer to the Arab world? Will you say that on behalf of Egypt I'm not prepared to be a middle negotiator, a good friend to both sides?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I said that several times. After I've been elected I said that our doors are open for our friends, the arabs, but not on the expenses of our relations with Israel.

BROKAW: Do you think the Arab world will ever be prepared to accept Israel's right to live in peace in this part of the world?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Why not? Israel is an existing state now. We can't remove it. And upon this conception, President Sadat started the initiative and carried on the peace process. Israel is guaranteed before we started the initiative and before the peace process ever took place, and all the nations in the world. How could we remove it? It's a fact.

BROKAW: You have had a well publicized corruption trial in Egypt featuring a prominent Egyptian politician. How could that corruption not be well known before? Did President Sadat know about it, for example?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: You are speaking about the corruption. Corruption is everywhere. We have the minimum corruption. Corruption is everywhere in the world. But we are unlucky that we are focusing about one or two or three cases here. No different now...

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BROKAW: No deeper than that?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I don't think so.

BROKAW: President Mubarak, we've all noticed a distinctive difference between your style and the style of the late President Sadat. He had many official residences, you have one. Mrs. Sadat became a prominent member of Egyptian society, well known in the United States for speaking out on women's rights. You have instructed the press, I am told, not to dwell on Mrs. Mubarak. Do you think that that's important for your political popularity in this country, that President Sadat overstepped himself, so to speak?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: Let me be very frank in this point. From the experience of what happened during the late President Sadat period, and according to my personal habits and traditions which I'm following now, I'm not exchanging my ideas or doing something opposite what President Sadat did. But I'm following my own conception. I'm giving -- I don't like the media to take my personal things to be popular.

When one of our newspapers published something about my wife, that she [word unintelligible] green dress or that dress, I was very upset, because I'm not used to this; I don't like it. As I said, my personal -- my own things not to be published here and there.

BROKAW: Do you think, however, that President Sadat's style hurt him with the Egyptian people?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: We had that experience in the last year. I don't want just to open the past again. From that experience I'm trying to benefit from it for the future.

BROKAW: President Mubarak also told me, Jane, by the way, that there are elements involved in the Sadat assassination who are still at large, but he insists that he is not worried about his personal security. But then he travels very little in public these days, and always under extremely heavy guard.

Jane?

PAULEY: Thank you, Tom, who's been traveling extensively.

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משרד החוץ
המרכז למחקר
מדיני



ירושלים, כז' בטבת, חשמ"ב
22 בינואר 1982

21/82

אל : מר פ. אליאב, ראש המרכז

מאת: מחלקת ערב 1

הנדון: שה"ח עלי מגדר שוב עמדת מצרים ביחס לאותונומיה


במה ש屡記 18/82 מ- 17.1.82

בראיון לשבועון "אל מוצר" (22.1.82) התיחס שה"ח עלי לטוגיות האוטונומיה בזו
הלשונית (סימז'ית) :

1. הצהרת עקרונות, בקשר לאותונומיה, שתהיה מקובלת על מצרים, היא הצהרה
שאינה מקנה לצד זה או אחר זכויות הקשורות למעמד הסופי של הבעייה הפלסטינית.
הצהרה שתדגיש שכל ההסדרים המוסכמים הם הסדרי מעבר שאינם משקפים את המצב הסופי.
הצהרה זו צריכה להיות מקובלת על הפלסטינים ועל הערבים וمبוסת על הפרשנות האמיתית
של רוח ק.ד. ועקרונות הסכם המלג'ור בדרכו הסדרי כולל.

2. אין שינוי בעמדה המצרית. הסכם העקרונות אינו קשור במועד מסויים. חיינו רוצים,
לא ספק, להגיע להסכם כזה מהר והדבר אפשרי אך בו בזמן אנו מוכנים להמשיך במאי'ט
אחרי אפריל.

3. הבעייה איןנה לאגיע להסכם בכל מחיר אלא להסכם שיזרים דם חדש בעניין הפלסטיני.
הסכם חייבי שיתרום למשיכת גורמים חדשים אל שולחן המו"מ. מה הטעם בהסכם שהפלסטינים
והירדנים לא רואים בו גורם מעודד? הפלסטינים והירדנים, הרי הם גורמים בסיסיים
בקביעה המuder הכספי של הגדה והרצעה. מה הטעם בהסכם הקובע מראש עניינים הקשורים
למהות קיומם הפלסטיני ועתידו?



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מדין



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4. מטרת ביקורו של הייג הייתה להMRIץ שיחות האוטונומיה בתסתמך על ק.ד. שהו הבסיס הכספי להסדר שלום ולמנוע סיבוכים מצד ישראל שיגבירו את תאי יציבות באיזור לפני ה-25 באפריל.

5. מצרים הבהירה להויג את דעתה בנושא חלמת האוטונומיה על תושבי ירושלים הערבית, היקף הייעוג במנגנון האוטונומיה והתקפיד המנהלי והתקתקתי של האוטונומיה ודרך התייחסות בין המינהל הישראלי, מעמד התחנכוויות וסתמונחים בתקופת המעבר, מושג הבטחן בק.ד. והדרך לישומו לגבי כל הצדדים. הצד האמריקני גילה הכנה מוחלטת להשגת העצמאות ולעקרונות שליהם היא מושתת. מצרים לא תסעה מעמדת כי האוטונומיה תהיה על הטוח ועל התושבים אחד.

6. בתשובה לשאלת כיצד ארהייב יכולת להתגבר על עמדת ישראל בנושא אחרון זה, השיב שה"ח עלי: "הגייה העת שהאמריקנים יציגו את רעיון ונאותם שלם. העת לינובייך יכולה להתקבל א: תחודש אולם כת החובים האמריקניים על הצעה אלטרנטיבית קשורה לנושאים המהווים סלע החלוקת. אחרי שהויג שמע עמדת ישראל בסיפורו האחרון, ניתן להעלות הצעות אמריקניות שיהיו מקובלות על שני הצדדים."

7. עלי נשאל, כיצד ארהייב יכולת לעודד את הפליטינים לזמן עמדת הטרבות, השיב: "כל מפגש עם האמריקנים אנו מפכירים בהם לעשות זאת וכן גם עושים גורמים הגיוגרפיים בולדת העברית. אני סבור שהנטור פרטי התרטש כך וכך הייג עצמו שמע מהפליטינים בדברים כאלה, כאשר נועד עם ראש עירית בית לחם. אנו מושוכנים בצדך בנסיבות זו ובנסיבות שהדבר אפשרי."

עד כאן.

ב. ר. כ. ה.
! י. מ. ק. ל. !
יצחק לבנו

העתק: המשנה למנכ"ל
מר. ש. דיבון, סמן. סמן. סמן.
לשכת שה"ח
לשכת המנכ"ל
מר. א. רובינשטיין, היועץ המשפטי
מח' מצרים
השרירויות, וושינגטן

