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סלבי

א. מ. צ'י

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בדיסל

התחבבות מ. צ'י

90.11.72

נפתח:

31.8.73

נסגר:

7



בריטניה - התכתבות מדינית

שם:

חצ - 7289/3

05/08/2007

130.23/12 - 1959

02-120-01-09-01

מזהה פיזי:

מזהה לוגי:

כתובת:

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

מס' 136

ש מ ו ר

נשלח: 131700 אוגוסט

אל: לונדון

מאת: המשרד

קאן ברויטניה B

י.כצ הציר הכלכלי לונדון.

המשכ למברקנו מה-6.8.73 להלן פירוט נתוני מאזן הסחורות והשרותים

אנגליה - ישראל לשנים 1971-1972:

1972		1971	
חובה(סיפ)	זכות(פוב)	חובה(סיפ)	זכות(פוב)
555	263	417	220
365	113	277	100
190	150	140	120
30	35	27	35
8	12	7	10
99	83	75	62
14	4	12	4
30	2	6	2
9	14	13	7
			סחורות ושרותים
			סחורות
			שרותים
			מזה: תחבורה
			תיירות
			ביטוח
			הכנסה מהשקעות
			ממשלה לנ.מ.א.
			שרותים אחרים

מאזן הסחורות אנגליה-ישראל לחודשים ינואר-מאי 1973 והתקופה המקבילה ב-1972.

ינואר-מאי 1972

55.0

157.4

ינואר-מאי 1973

63.5

216.3

יצוא(פוב)

יבוא(סיפ)

א.רפ/האוצר=

אוצר לוריא רפאל אמיר כלכלית אירופה כי חש
סכ/רג

מס' 128
תאריך: 1972-05-15

מס' 128

מס' 128
תאריך: 1972-05-15

המחלקה הכלכלית

המחלקה הכלכלית
מס' 128-05-15
תאריך: 1972-05-15

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מס' (ש"ח)	מס' (ש"ח)	מס' (ש"ח)	מס' (ש"ח)
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המחלקה הכלכלית
מס' 128-05-15
תאריך: 1972-05-15

1972		1971	
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2000	2000	2000	2000

המחלקה הכלכלית

המחלקה הכלכלית
מס' 128-05-15
תאריך: 1972-05-15

B בייטן

27 ביוני 1973

בריטניה והמזה"ח =====

המדיניות המזתי"ת של בריטניה לא השתנתה מהותית ורשמית בשנתיים האחרונות. לנאום הנציג הבריטי במועבי"ט ב-11.6.73 נתייחס להלן בנפרד. מרכיביה העיקריים של מדיניות זו הם:

- א. הסדר שלום עפ"י החלטה 242 כשהסדר זה הוא תוצאת דיאלוג בין הצדדים, ללא כפייה מבחוץ. למרות ספקותיהם, מוכנים הבריטים לחייב נסיון ארה"ב לחדש הפעילות למען הסדר חלקי בתעלה כתנאי שהסדר חלקי זה יהיה וייראה כצעד לקראת הסדר כללי בהתאם להחלטה מועבי"ט 242.
 - ב. בריטניה עדיין בדעה שהמהלכים הראשונים לקראת הסדר חייבים להעשות בין ישראל למצרים ולא בין ישראל לירדן.
 - ג. הגבלות מסוימות באספקת נשק לצדדים ללא הטלת אמברגו. ניסוח הגבלה זו איננו יותר "שמירת איזון או מאזן הכוחות" אלא הימנעות מאספקת אותם סוגי הנשק העלולים להגדיל סכנת פרוץ לוחמה באזור. בעיני הבריטים לא חל סייג זה על מדינות ערב שאינן בגדר "מדינות עימות".
 - ד. שמירת יחסים כילטרליים תקינים עם שני הצדדים לסכסוך.
 - ה. אי רצון להסתכן במז"ת ויחד עם זאת מרגשת נכונות לפעילות ויוזמות מוגבלות. נאום הרוגייט מיום 31.10.1970 (ראה הקטעים הרלבנטיים בנספח) זכה לאישור מחודש כנאום הנציג הבריטי ג'יימיסון במועבי"ט ביום 11.6.73.
- אישור מחודש זה הביא לראשונה את המימד הסריטוריאלי של הרוגייט לכפיפה אחת עם החלטה מועבי"ט 242. יחד על כן, הגבול הבי"ל בין א"י למצרים הובלט ע"י איזכור נפרד כנאום זה.
- בריטניה חוזרת וטוענת שאין כנאום שום שנוי לגבי 242, אלא בחוי לתפישתם את ההחלטה לאחר קפאון בן 6 שנים.
- הדאגה שקפאון זה הוא הרה סכנות, הינה במידה מסוימת נחלה כלל אירופית. על רקע זה יש גם להבין הדמיון בין הנימוק הבקורות הבריטיות והכלל אירופיות כלפי ישראל, יחד עם הרצון לחת, ע"י פעילות נומינלית, ארכה נוספת למשטר סאדאת. באור זה ניתן לראות העמדה הבריטית בגזויים לאחר פעולת ביירות ולאחר הפלת המטוס הלובי באיקאו. נאום ג'יימיסון מצטרף לשורת דוגמאות זו. בעת הדיון על הפעולה בביירות בלטה הנכונות הבריטית לשותפות עם צרפת כדי לעבד ולשלבן הצעה החלטה אנטי-ישראלית ופרו ערבית עד סף הסיכון בווטו אמריקאי, אך לא מעבר לכך.

0-122

20-10-1968

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK DURING THE YEAR 1968

The work of the Department during the year 1968 has been carried out in accordance with the programme of work approved by the Council in 1967. The main areas of activity have been the study of the properties of the various types of polymers and the development of new methods for their synthesis.

The work has been carried out in the following areas: (a) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (b) the development of new methods for their synthesis; (c) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (d) the development of new methods for their synthesis.

The work has been carried out in the following areas: (a) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (b) the development of new methods for their synthesis; (c) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (d) the development of new methods for their synthesis.

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The work has been carried out in the following areas: (a) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (b) the development of new methods for their synthesis; (c) the study of the properties of the various types of polymers; (d) the development of new methods for their synthesis.

לנאום ג'יימסון לא ניתן להתייחס כאל משחק מלים בלבד. אם כי אין בו כדי לגרום לשנויים ממשיים באזור, הרי שלא מן הנמנע שהחבטאות במועבי"ט של נציג המדינה שחיברה את 242 עלולה לחזק דפוסי מחשבה בלתי רצויים. בראש וראשונה מדובר, כאמור, באלמנט הגאוגרפי הנמצא בסמיכות בלתי נעימה ל-242.

שנית, הוכנס האלמנט הפלסטיני בקביעה שבכל הסדר צודק ובר קיימא יש לקחת בחשבון את השקפות כל העמים באזור, כולל הפלסטינאים.

שלישית, תקוות רבות נחלו ב-"מערכת ערביות בטוחה".

יחד עם זאת הודגשה גם בהזדמנות זו התפישה הבריטית שאין לכפות "הסדר מן החוץ".

לממשלת בריטניה אין חרופת פלא שתפשר את הקפאון הפוליטי בסכסוך ישראל ערב, אך קיימת, כאמור, אווירה בקורחית כלפינו. הרגשתם היא שבמצב הנוכחי נוח מדי לישראל הנוטה להחזיק בשטחים לטווח ארוך וליצור בהן עובדות קיימות לקראת הסדר עתידי. הם מאמינים שישראל החמיצה הזדמנות לשבור את הקרח עם מצרים בשני מומנטים פסיכולוגיים, כאשר המצרים השיבו "בחיוב" לתזכיר יארינג, מפברואר 1971, וכאשר סאדאת סילק את היועצים הסובייטים.

לעתים, ובעיקר באו"ם, נוח לממבריתניה ליצור הרושם כאילו השוק המשותף המורחב מתחיל לשחק תפקיד דיפלומטי פעיל ועצמאי. אך במקביל, יש לזכור שאין הבריטים מעוניינים לאפשר לצרפתים להופיע באו"ם כדוברי אירופה או כפשרונים בלעדיים של האינטרס הערבי. קל לכן להבין הופעת שתי מדינות אלה בתפקידים מרכזיים במועבי"ט, תוך השארת האחריות הישירה לשמירת השלום באזור לשתי מעצמות העל.

כאן גם יש מקום לציין עניינה של בריטניה בשמירת מרחק מסויים מעמדת ארה"ב במועבי"ט (בנושא המזה"ח), אך זאת תוך מאמץ להמנע מתמיכה בהצעה שתגרום להסלת ווטו אמריקאי.

בריטניה מתפארת בכך שהיא היחידה מבין חברות מועבי"ט השומרת על יחסים תקינים עם שני הצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך. אין הם רוצים להגיע ליחסים קרירים איתנו כדוגמה יחסי ישראל-צרפת. לעומת זאת אל לנו להשלוח עצמנו שהם יאמצו לעצמם את עמדתנו.

ולסיום כמה מלים על התפישה הבריטית בבעיית נסיגה וגבולות. בריטניה מעולם לא גרסה את הפרוש הערבי של 242, היינו נסיגה סוטאלית. בנאום הרוגייט ובהודעת הנציג הבריטי הוזכרה הנסיגה לגבול הבי"ל עם מצרים. ביחס לירדן הם גורסים שנוי גבול קלים ומוסכמים ע"י הצדדים. את הבעייה הטריטוריאלית עם סוריה אין הם רואים כאקוטית כל עוד סוריה לא קבלה על עצמה החלטת מועבי"ט 242. בנאומי זה בהרוגייט, הוסיף סיר אלק שכאשר תקבל על עצמה סוריה החלטת 242, ינחו גם לגבי הגבול עמה אותם העקרונות שיופעלו במיקום שאר הגבולות.

ניסוח זה משאיר את השאלה פתוחה לאיזה עקרונות התכוון סיר אלק - אלה שיתוו את הגבול הבי"ל כגבול בין ישראל למצרים או אלה שיאפשרו שנויים קלים כדוגמת הגבול עם ירדן.

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בריטניה ומשבר האנרגיה

מכל מדינות אירופה נראה שבריטניה היא היחידה שבעיות האנרגיה שלה עשויים להיפתר בעשור הקרוב, הערכות (האופטימיות אמנם) מראות שבריטניה תהיה תוך 3 שנים אוטרקית באספקת גז טבעי ועד השנים 81-1980 תפיק את כל כמות הנפט הנחוצה לצריכתה מהים הצפוני והאירי.

יש לכך מקום להבחין בין חרדה בריטית למקורות האנרגיה אשר תוך פחות מעשר שנים, לא יהיה לה כנראה על מה להתכסס, לבין חרדה בריטית לאנטרסים של הנפט או ליחר דיוק אינטרסים בריטיים בחברות הנפט.

בהקשר זה מן הראוי גם לציין שנוי התוכנית לחסולך ההדרגתי של מכרות הפחם יחד אם תשומת לב יתירה בבריטניה לפיתוח מואץ של כורים גרעיניים להפקת חשמל.

בנימין נבון

FROM SPEECH OF SIR ALEC D. HOME, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO THE YORKSHIRE AREA
COUNCIL (CONSERVATIVE PARTY) ON 31 OCTOBER 1970 AT HARROGATE

I believe that a settlement should establish a definitive agreement on territorial questions. Such an agreement would be the answer both to Israel's fear for her existence and, at the same time, to Arab fear of Israeli expansionism. This is why the balance between the provisions for Israeli withdrawal and secure and recognized boundaries is so important. No outsider can prescribe exactly where these boundaries should be. If they are to be recognized, they must first and foremost be agreed by the countries concerned. Between Israel and Egypt, an international boundary has existed for a long time. I believe that this boundary should once again be recognized in a settlement, subject to whatever arrangements might be made to deal with the special problems of Gaza, problems that derive from the immense concentration of refugees in the Gaza area, whose future would have to be resolved by a settlement.

Between Israel and Jordan, the problem is more difficult. There has never been a recognized boundary between the two countries. But I believe that the Resolution implies that secure and recognized boundaries should be based on the Armistice Lines which existed before the war of 1967, subject to minor changes which might be agreed between the two countries.

Between Israel and Lebanon there is no problem; the present boundary though troubled by fighting like so many other areas in this troubled region, has never been questioned and should remain.

Between Israel and Syria there is of course the very sensitive problem of the Golan Heights. Syria has not accepted the Security Council Resolution. It is therefore impossible yet to discuss how the dispute between Israel and Syria should be resolved. But I would expect that, once Syria accepted the Resolution, the general principles governing the location of the other boundaries would also govern the boundary between Israel and Syria.

14.5.73 לונדון

מנכ"ל בריטניה B

דו"ח דו-חודשי, טירסה ראשונה

1. הצטרפותה של בריטניה לקהיליה הארופית התחילה לתת אותותיה בכל שטחי החיים. השפעה זו מורגשת בייחסי החוץ של בריטניה - לא רק אשר לארצות החברות אלא בכלל.

2. כחברה מלאה בקהיליה על בריטניה ~~צמצמה~~ להתמודד עם שורה שלמה של בעיות קהיליות הנוגעות לכל שטחי החיים הלאומיים. מצב זה גרם לרקמת קשרים ענפה והדוקה ~~בזר אחד~~ ^{בבריטל וביתר הבירות} לפסיפס של עמדות משותפות ומנוגדות עם כל ארצות הקהיליה, אך בראש וראשונה עם צרפת.

3. המגמה השמרנית עליה הוכרז עוד ב-1970 עם כניסת המפלגה לעול השלטון - לנהל מדיניות חוץ בריטית לאומית, שמטרתה-המרכזית והמכרעת הנה לקדם ולבצר אינטרסים בריטיים סהורים - באה לביטוי הולך וגובר כאז הצטרפותה לקהיליה. מגמה זו איפיינה לא רק את הופעתה של בריטניה במסגרות השונות של הקהיליה, אלא את יחסיה עם העולם החיצון בכלל. הסגנון המדיני הבריטי נעשה ציני וחקיף יותר - לעיתים עד כדי פגיעה בידידים ותיקים חוץ גישה של "אי אכפתיות". (הדוגמה הקיצונית מהווה אולי המקלחת הקרה שנתנו לנו-זילנדים בדבר הניסויים הגרעיניים הצרפתיים באוקינוס השקט).

4. בעיצוב יחסיה עם הקהיליה ממשיכה בריטניה לראות בצרפת את השותף המרכזי והמכריע, גם לחוב ולשלילה. דוקא משום הופעתה החקיפה ועמדתה הבלתי מתפשרת בשורה של עניינים קהילתיים הנראים חשובים בעיני הבריטים (הופעתם בפרלמנט הקהילתי, מאבקם העיקש על קבלת מספר משרות מפתח במנגנון הקהיליה, עמדתה העקשנית בדבר ה- *floating* של הלירה סטרלינג, הופעת גודבר במו"מ על

המחירים החקלאיים, השאיפה המהמדת לגרום לארוזיה של המדיניות החקלאית
המשוחפת, חביעתה הנמרצת להבטיח תמיכה לחקלאים הסקוטיים באזור ההר - כדי
להזכיר רק את הבעיות ~~אמאמאמאמא~~ החשובות ביותר) הם מגלים נכונות לויתורים
לעמדות צרפתיות בכל מיני שאלות אחרות, כולל עניני המזה"ת.

5. המחילות והרגשה הקיפוח (משני הצדדים) השוררת ביחסי מערב ארופה - ארה"ב,
מעמידה את הבריטים בפני מצבים עדינים, ואמנם יש רועם שחל קרטום נוסף
ברצון הבריטי לשמור בכל מהיר על האום הדוק ויחסי אסון שלאים בינה לבין
ארה"ב. הקופת "היחסים המיוחדים" הלכה לעולמה: עד כדי כך שהמחשבה שבריטניה
וארה"ב תופענה בעמדות מנוגדות - יהיה זה במסגרת או"ם או במסגרת בינלאומית
אחרת - אונה מפחידה עוד את הבריטים ואינה מרחיעה אותם בקביעת עמדתה.

יחד עם זה עדיף למנוע
~~למנוע את המגמה להגדיל את ההתרחקות מצב כזה, אך בכמה שאלות~~
ולפעול בהתאם

ובינהן עניני מז"ת - אין ספק ש"המשיכה" לצד צרפת הולכת וגוברת והלחץ
האמריקאי הנגדי משפיע פחות ופחות. ערעור מעמדו האישי של הנשיא ניקסון
בעקבות שערוריות "ואטרבייט" ^{נוספת} נוהן ~~חשיפה~~ לכלל הההליון הזה.

6. כל המגמות הנ"ל באות לביטוי גם המדיניות המזרחית הבריטית. אין לבריטים
אשליות לגבי השפעתם בעניני המז"ת. גישתם מתבססת על כמה הנחות יסודיות -
שלעתיד הקרוב לישקאל יחרון צבאי מכריע על כל מדינות ערב (יתרון שילך
ויעלם ע"י יכולת ההצטיידות וע"י ההשפעה המדינית שיצטברו בידי הערבים
כתוצאה מהכנסות הענק הצפויות מנציול הנפט הערבי);

- שהמדיניות הישראלית של סגירת האופציות בפני סאדאם על מנת להביא

בדרך זו לשולחן הדיונים - אין לה שום סיכוי להצליח כי שום מנהיג

מצרי לעולם לא יסכים לוותר על טריטוריה מצרית ריבונית (רצועת עזה אינה

כלולה בהגדרה זו). אורבא - יש לחשוב שמדיניות זו תביא במוקדם או במאוחר

לחידוש הקרבות;

- שחידוש הקרבות עלול לפגוע חמורות באינטרסים אבריטיים רבים (יצוג

דיפלומטי, אספקת גז עם כל ההשלכות לגבי חיי הכלכלה הבריטיים, החרפת רכוש

בריטי, חיסול היצוא הבריטי ועל כל אקלים ~~אמצא~~ הכללי של *Dentante*

השורר בעולם;

- שלכן המשימה המרכזית של מדיניות מזרחית ^{בריטית} חייבת ~~אמצא~~ להיות ולפעול למניעת

חידוש הקרבות;

- שהדרך הטובה ביותר ואולי אף היחידה הפתוחה בפני בריטניה, הנה לתת

לערבים מקסימום של תמיכה וטיפול בזירה הדיפלומטית ובמיוחד בזירת או"ם,

בתקווה שזה יביא את סאדאם מצעד של יאוש ומאידך יקנה לבריטניה יתרונות

דיפלומטיים בעולם הערבי. כל זה תוך הערכה שצעדים אלה לא יסכנו בטחונה של

ישראל ושמהמשחק באו"ם למעשה לא ישפיע על יחסי הכוחות בשטח) *a battle with*

wordless stars הגדרה של פארטונס).

7. לסווח יותר ארוך קיימת אולי גם התקווה שבכוחות משותפים (הקהיליה)

יוכלו להשפיע על המדיניות המזרחית של ארה"ב.

8. נאום הארוגייט של סיר אלק נשאר המטמך הבסיסי המגדיר את המדיניות

הבריטית אך אין להפריז בהשיבותיו. המדיניות הבריטית לגבי במזה"ת נשארה

פראגמטית ואם צעד זה או אחר יראה להם כמבטיח שלום "דיבידנדה" - לא יהססו א

לעשותו בלי להתחשב עם הארוגייט.

9. אין לראות סימנים הטובים על שינוי בסגנון מדיניות החוץ הבריטי -

בעתיד הקרוב. המאמץ לקידום ה- *en toute* הבריטי-צרפתי - תוך שמירת

אינטרסים בירטיים היוניים ימשך וזה ימשיך לתת את אותותיו בענין המזה"ת.

יש חשש שעם כניסתה של מערב גרמניה לעול המצוות האומיות בסתיו זה יעשה נסיון

לצרף גם אותה ל"קונסנטוז" הבריטי-צרפתי.

2010 210
Meeting between

THE RT HON LORD BALNIEL PC MP
Minister of State, Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
GREAT BRITAIN

and
MR. ABBA EBAN, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, ISRAEL

Sunday Afternoon, 5:50 p.m.
July 1, 1973
Jerusalem

MR. EBAN: We are very glad to have you here. It gives us a welcome opportunity to discuss things more fully than we can in any other way. I hope that in addition to talking, you will see something of the country and the landscape and the development.

LORD BALNIEL: First of all, thank you very much for the invitation. It is a very good, a very opportune moment to come to Israel and hear your thinking and the nice thing is that we can exchange views very freely and we can speak very openly and even where there are differences of opinion we can express them and remain, I think, the best of friends. I believe there are differences of opinion as to how one tackles some of these points.

First, before we turn to other matters, can I say one thing. I want to say something which hasn't, I would say, worried me, but which is something which does a little bit disturb me and that is a kind of comment which I hear, you know, from members of Parliament in my own House of Commons who are great friends of Israel, and reading reports of your local press, I read that there

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to stand between

THE HON. MR. ALAN TAYLOR
Minister of State, External
Affairs, and
Chief of Mission

MR. ALAN TAYLOR, Minister of State,
External Affairs, Ottawa

Monday, 25th March, 2:50 p.m.
July 1, 1973
Ottawa

MR. TAYLOR: I am very glad to have you here. It gives
us a welcome opportunity to discuss things more fully than we can
in any other way. I hope that it is a fruitful one for you.
The similarity of the country and the language and the develop-
ment.

MR. TAYLOR: First of all, thank you very much for
the invitation. It is a very good, very important moment to
come to New Zealand and meet your thinking and the things that
we can exchange views very freely and we can work very closely
and often where there are differences of opinion we can discuss
them and remain, I think, the best of friends. I believe there
are differences of opinion as to how the people view of these
beliefs.

First, before we turn to other matters, can I say one
thing. I want to say something which needs, I would say, saying
at all, but which is something which does a little bit. I think we
and that is a kind of remark which I hope, you know, from members
of Parliament in my own House of Commons who are good friends of
Israel, and reading reports of your local press, I read that there

is a low point in Anglo-Israel relations. They are not. They are good and we wish you well. We wish to have the closest conceivable relationship. We wish always to speak openly to you. I simply do not believe those reports to be the case, I have seen newspaper reports that relationships are not good, because I think it's been proved by your ability to speak openly to me on points -

MR. EBAN: Yes, I was asked the question on the radio. I said there were some differences. I said I hoped that these meetings would reveal how narrow those differences are, and apart from revealing, they might help to change or diminish them or underline the unifying elements.

But it wouldn't be friendly, because I think, frankly, it is the first duty of friendship to be frank; it would not be friendly or frank to deny that there is a shadow and I think it is not difficult to say where it comes from.

LORD BALNIEL: Let's talk about it.

MR. EBAN: It comes from certain attitudes and votes and speeches, chiefly votes and attitudes in international gatherings, especially in the Security Council. That's also the weak point in our relationship. It is true we don't believe that the United Nations is a very effective force, and we are not alone in believing that the national security and interests are

it is a low water in Anglo-Israel relations. They are well. They are
good and we have you well. We wish to have the disease.

concordable relationship. We wish always to speak openly to you.
I always do not believe these reports. No, no, no, I have seen

newspaper reports that relationships are not good, however.
This is a good move by your ability to speak openly to me on

points.
MR. BAKER: Yes, I was asked the question on the table.

I said that was some difference. I said I hoped that these
relations would be better than these differences are, and

apart from revealing, they might help to bring in further news
on matters the right of citizens.

and I would be very happy because I think frankly
it is the state duty of friendship to be known. It would not be

friendly or frank to say that there is a shadow and I think it is
not difficult to say what it means.

MR. BAKER: Let's talk about it.
MR. BAKER: It comes from certain articles and votes

and speeches, chiefly votes and speeches in international
conferences, especially in the recently held II. I think since the

year going in our relationship. It is true to say I believe
that the United States is a very effective force and we are not

alone in believing that the national security and interests are

more than this or that recommendation. I know that is your position on many recommendations that have come.

What does interest us is how does Britain appear in this triangle Israel-Britain-and the Arab States, and this has gone on for quite a long time. It goes back to the vote on the El Aksa Mosque, where the British, your predecessor, voted in favor of the resolution which almost hinted that we set fire to the Mosque. It was certainly not open to refutation. That and coming up to the two problems on which, I believe, we are; how to combat the terrorists. This came into expression in the Beirut discussion in the Security Council.

There is a feeling of lack of sympathy in the British government for our desire to have a negotiated settlement which can include boundary changes, and I will talk about this later. That shadow comes especially since the Harrogate speech, which we thought drew the map too sharply and definitively.

These problems of how to deal with terrorists and how to keep open our option for territorial change, these are fundamental problems for us, and on both we expect the British position to be closer to us than what it has been.

I think that the intensity of this feeling - and the Minister discussed it with you this morning - developed in the discussions that I don't want to revive here on the operation in Beirut. When we discuss our views on what is happening in

than this or any other

have

now the as your position on many points of view

which does interest me in the fact that

this change in the situation and the fact that

now we are in a very time, it goes back to the vote on the

of the situation which the British

my interest, voted in it or of the situation which

which was not due to the fact that it was certainly not

does not represent it. That and other in the fact that

which, I believe, we are

concerned. This was the expression in the British situation

in the Security Council.

There is a feeling of lack of sympathy in the

British government for our desire to have a negotiated settlement

which can include boundary changes, and I will talk about this

later. That makes very especially clear the situation

which we thought there was no sympathy, and definitely.

There are problems of how to deal with the situation and

how to keep open our option for territorial changes. There are

on technical problems for us, and on how to deal with the British

position as an effect of the fact that it has been.

I think that the necessity of this feeling - and

the situation demands it with you this morning - has been in

the discussion that I don't want to rest in here for the situation

in Beirut. When we discuss our views on what is happening in

Lebanon as well as in Egypt and Jordan, we will definitely assert that there's been an improvement and that since and because of our rigorous reaction, the Lebanese government, I think for the first time, has tried to take its own sovereignty in hand and is in much greater control of the situation than before. The situation has improved. But in that discussion, we did not ask the British for endorsement. But when the British government sponsors a resolution that has a definite punitive action, so much so that the United States has to threaten or promise to veto it, then we think that is an indication that something is off center. We think it too far away from the United States, too far away from Israel, too far away to be good for the Middle East and the relationship, and I think that was a very extreme development. We never envisaged in our wildest dreams that Britain would sponsor a resolution that was so totally in , in our opinion and not our opinion alone. I think that that has had its effect. These things don't have to be permanent. There are other discussions in which it is always possible to efface the previous impression by taking a more central attitude.

But I think that it did shock because it was not expected.

The other matter is a little longer of duration. It dates back to the Harrogate address. Before then the British policy has spoken in general terms about boundaries and the necessity to

...as well as in Egypt and Jordan. We will definitely accept
that there is a need for development and that there are problems of our
own. We are not a rich country. I think for the time
being, we should be able to take the necessary steps and to ensure
a steady growth of the situation that exists. The situation is
aggravated, but in that situation, we did not see the situation
for improvement, but when the British government is asked to
consider that there is a definite positive action, so that we have
the United States has to be trusted on this point. I think
that that is a definite step towards something in our country. We think
it has been away from the United States. We are away from that.
We think we can be good for the Middle East and the relationship
and I think that is a very serious development. We have
analyzed it in our White Paper. We think we have analyzed it
in our situation. I think that that has been the effect.
These things have to be permanent. There are other things
which in which it is always possible to make the progress
improvement by taking a more careful attitude.
But I think that is the way because it was not

The other matter is a little larger of dimension. It
leads back to the Harrogate subject. Before that the British policy
has often in general terms about development and the necessity to

combine the principle of withdrawal with the principle of peace - the formulations have been more flexible - and here there was a pinpointing of boundaries in a way that ruled against our hopes of change. That's in relation to the international boundary with Egypt and in relation to the Golan Heights. The Harrogate speech is one of the few which does not show sympathy for our position on the Golan Heights, because it applies the principle of previous international boundaries there, and on the Jordan question, the insistence that changes must be minimal. I think those are the really major points: the terrorist problem on which we hope that there would be a more understanding attitude, because the phenomenon of terrorism is not unique in the Middle East and nobody has had an answer, not a better answer than we have.

On other matters there was some disquiet concerning the EEC. I think that's been set at rest and we found a formula which opens the way to a serious relationship between us and the EEC. Insofar as we foresee obstacles, they don't seem to concern Britain so long as you don't start growing masses of citrus fruit, which I think in the existing climatic conditions you are not likely to do. But I think those are the things.

I put that into the general context/^{briefly} of how we see the situation in the area and I think this is a good week for doing it, because my feeling is that the Arabs, especially Egypt, must be in a state of agonizing appraisal. It might be ?

...the principle of subsidiarity with the principle of proportionality - and that there was a distinction of powers, a way that rules against one power of change. That is related to the international boundary with regard to the relation to the other states, the division of power. In one of the documents that was given for our position on the other side, because it applied the principle of subsidiarity, international boundaries there, and on the other side, the distinction that changes must be made. I think those are the results in our position: the principle of subsidiarity, which we hope that there would be a new understanding of it, because the distinction of powers is not unique in the world. I think nobody has had an answer, not a better answer than this. On other matters there was some disagreement concerning the EEC. I think that's not so bad and we found a formula for opening the way to a new relationship between a new EEC. I think it's not so bad. They don't seem to be so far from what we want. I think it's a good way for the future, which I think is the existing situation and I think you are not likely to do. But I think there are the things. I think the general conclusion is that we are in a situation in the area and I think this is a good way for doing it. Because of feeling that the EEC, especially in the area of a unified economic area, it might be

that four or five things have happened which refut the general principle that they have considerable international support for their position. There is the Summit meeting in Washington, following the Moscow meeting which disappointed them last year. I think they are even more disappointed with the results this year, because if Sadat's hope was that instead of a negotiated settlement with Israel a settlement would be produced by external pressures and especially with the Two powers that have a major interest in the Mediterranean, there was nothing in that discussion to give any consolation. It is quite clear that the United States and the Soviet Union regard their own rapprochement with each other as being more important than anything that happens in the Middle East and Kissinger's interpretation seems to be valid that they did not reach agreement on how to solve the Middle East problem but they do agree that they will not let that crisis or situation bring them into a confrontation.

That leaves the Middle Eastern states pretty much on their own. At any rate, it leaves them with a much higher degree of responsibility than Egyptian diplomacy would tend to assume.

even
I don't think they get much sympathy or comfort from the Paris meeting where it seems that the Middle East was discussed in a general atmosphere of desultory gloom. We are told that the Soviets didn't even raise it at all, and that the

I don't think they get more sympathy or comfort from the Arabs than they do from the Israelis. We are all in a general atmosphere of hostility. We are all in a general atmosphere of hostility. We are all in a general atmosphere of hostility.

French President did raise it, expressing pessimism about the immediate future of a settlement and that all the Soviets could say, well, there is a difference between the United States and the Soviet Union. So that was an added explanation why ? could be expected to move.

Then there is the Security Council. So far the meeting there indicates that they may overestimate the efficacy of the Security Council as an instrument for unfreezing the situation. Nobody there seems to know precisely what Egypt wants. They may still make some verbal proposal but the first few weeks were pretty much of a repetitive fiasco.

Whatever happens at the end - and we'd like to talk about that - is not likely to be sufficiently important or weighted, as to set anything in motion unless the Egyptians are prepared for a negotiation. There was also more talk at the Security Council this time than before about the difficulty of making progress unless the parties themselves create a content of negotiation in movement with the general spirit of the times.

In addition to these frustrations in Washington and Paris and United Nations Headquarters, there is the Brussels decision which doesn't affect them directly, but it does indicate that the EEC wants a more serious and concrete relationship than has ever existed before, and this is a

French President did raise it, expressing his opinion that the
immediate future of a settlement and that all the parties could
say, well, there is a difference between the United States and
the Soviet Union, so that it was an added explanation why
it should be expected to move.

Then there is the Security Council. As for the
meeting there indicates that they may expect to the
efficiency of the Security Council as an instrument for expressing
the situation. Nobody there seems to have precisely what they
want. They may still make some verbal proposal but the first
few weeks were pretty much of a repetitive process.

Whatever happens at the end - and we'd like to talk
about that - is not likely to be sufficiently important or
weighted, as to not anything in motion unless the Russians are
prepared for a negotiation. There was also more talk at the
Security Council this time than before about the difficulty of
making progress unless the parties themselves agreed a
moment of negotiation in movement with the various aspects of
the issue.

In addition to these discussions in Washington and
Paris and United Nations Headquarters, there is the Helsinki
declaration which doesn't affect these directly, but it does
indicate that the East wants a more serious and concrete relation
and that has been ever existed before, and that is a

time when Europe knows what its interests are also in the Arab world. Nevertheless Europe feels that there should be a more close relationship with Israel as a trading partner, a partner in technological and industrial areas.

Finally, there is a very brief result in Geneva where the ILO met the usual condemnatory resolutions presented by the Arab states. They seem to have annoyed everybody there. These bodies like the ILO and WHO have very concrete things to do beyond talk. They have pragmatic interests to do in health or in education or in nourishment or in labor relations, which do affect people's lives. Apparently the Arabs just take over and fulminate against Israel for two weeks as a result of which they go home not having done any work and we had this cry of pain from the Director General, Mr. Jenks saying something which should have been said so many times before, that if they are going to condemn first and institute inquiries with terms of reference to confirm the condemnation, then all the principles of due process of law are brought into contempt and the international organizations will fall into disrepute.

I wish it had been said by other directors general. The result is that they were rebuffed in their attempt to get in condemnatory resolutions. They had 40 delegates at the ILO - workers delegations and governmental delegations.

MR. COLES: Mr. Jenks is British!

line when we know what the interests are also in the
Arab world, nevertheless we have to be aware of the
this close relationship with Israel as a trading partner,
partner in commercial and industrial areas.

Finally, there is a very brief report to Geneva

where the ILO met the Arab countries, no action presented
by the Arab states. They seem to have enjoyed everything there.
These bodies like the ILO and WHO have very concrete claims to
do beyond this. They have presented a number of questions to do in health
or in education or in housing or in labor relations, which
do affect people's lives. Formerly the Arab just said
and Chinese saying Israel for two weeks as a result of which
they do have not having done any work and we had this day of

from the Director General, Mr. Vannieu, saying something
which should have been said so many times before, that if they
are going to condemn Arab and Chinese relations with Israel

of reference to continue the condemnation then all the

operation of the process of law are brought into contact

and the international organizations will still into discussion.

I think it had been said by other directors general.

The result is that they were troubled in their attempt to get
done

in contemporary resolutions. They had 40 resolutions as the ILO

Western delegation and governmental delegations.

Mr. Gouss: Mr. Vannieu is brilliant.

MR. EBAN: He is. I think they will be asking themselves questions. They have three alternative courses. One is to get fed up and to make war. The other is to take the brave line and negotiate, either by talking to us without all these pre-conditions on the overall settlement or by looking more favorably carefully on the idea of a phase by phase settlement. The third chance that they will let themselves go on as they are while making propaganda manoeuvres and our strategy should be and is designed to be such as would persuade them that the second course is better, that war isn't any good and that letting things go on as they are isn't the best thing to do, but the best thing to do is to cut through this complex about negotiations, in the same way that so many others have cut through, China and America and Russia, Germany, the Koreans, India-Pakistan. To cut through this idea that because of this hostility you cannot negotiate, or because you haven't settled everything about legitimacy or recognition you can't negotiate. To cut through all this and get to the table.

Well, we would like therefore to reduce the other possibilities, to reduce the chances of their going to war. I don't think the chances are great, because they wouldn't gain anything even politically by a military venture that would end in disaster. I think they would end by being weakened not only militarily but politically as well. They do not have the Soviet

MR. TUCKER: No, sir. I think they will be asking

themselves questions. They have three alternative courses. One is to get tied up and to make war. The other is to take the peace line and negotiate, either by talking to us without all these

pre-conditions on the overall settlement or by looking more favorably on the idea of a peace settlement. The third chance that they will let themselves go on as they are while

making proposals themselves and our strategy should be and is designed to be such as would persuade them that the second course is better, that war isn't any good and that talking things go on as

they are isn't the best thing to do, but the best thing to do is to cut through this complex about negotiations, in the same way that we have done with Europe, Japan and America, and

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negotiation you can't negotiate, to cut through all this and get to the table.

Well, we would like to reduce the other possibilities, to reduce the chances of their going to war. I don't think the chances are great, because they wouldn't gain

anything even militarily by a military venture that would be in character. I think they would only be weary and only slightly and militarily as well. They do not have the Soviet

Union with them in a warlike course. They are farther away from the Soviet Union than ever before. We haven't fully explored what is behind the relative passivity and moderation of the Soviets towards ^{us} in Brezhnev's speech in Washington and his communiques with Nixon and with Pompidou, but if Egypt feels that the Soviet Union is not pulling its full weight on their behalf, I think they will be quite reasonable in thinking that, and to go into a war with the Soviet Union as well as the Western Powers very much against any breakdown of the cease fire, I don't think they are so b or frenetic as to do that.

We would like them to think that there is something better than going on as we are now, and that the best thing to do would be to try the negotiating gambit.

We follow the signs of torment on this problem. Bourghiba made some speech at Geneva, at the ILO - a strange place to make it. He gave a speech in which he gave a whole list of conflicts in which negotiations have taken place, despite very strong inhibitions and reservations, and indicated that that might be the only way out for the Arab States as well. I understand that he was attacked by Algeria and Libya. One of them indicated that he is a kind of agent, that he is making my speeches there, because we have often made this list of precedents, salutary precedents for negotiation.

Union with them in a similar course. They are further away from the Soviet Union than ever before. He hasn't fully explained what is behind the relative passivity and moderation of the Soviet stance in Moscow's speech in Washington and his exchanges with Nixon and with Pompidou, but it's not true that the Soviet Union is not giving its full weight on these points. I think they will be more responsible in taking care, and as to take a war with the Soviet Union as well as the Western powers very much against any breakdown of the case files. I don't think they are so far from the truth as to think.

We would like them to think that there is something better than going on as we are now, and that the best thing to do would be to say the negotiating committee.

We follow the signs of comment on this problem. Khrushchev made some speech at Geneva, and the TSO - a stronger place to make it. He gave a speech in which he gave a whole list of conditions in which negotiations have taken place, despite very strong opposition and reservations, and indicated that this might be the only way out for the Arab states as well. I understand that he was attacked by Algeria and Libya. One of them indicated that he is a kind of agent, that he is making my speeches there, because we have often made this list of conditions, and that's for negotiation.

And he retreated in a cloud of smoke saying that he meant that he is willing to talk to us if we would first accept to go back not to the 1967 lines, because they are old fashioned but the 1947 lines, which would leave us very diminished and stultified. But nevertheless the torment is there.

Mr. Zayyat also has produced certain sorties and retreats indicating that he would be prepared to meet me in the presence of Jarring, and I said I'd be quite happy to have Mr. Jarring there. There isn't much difference between whether he is there or not. He has this talent for quiescence which would leave most of the initiative to the two parties in any case. But again he said, no, we have to take this under condition of withdrawal. He is not a fool. He knows the Israel government -

LORD BALNIEL: I didn't understand -

MR. EBAN: Mr. Zayyat said when we reacted favorably to the idea of meeting him in Jarring's presence, he said his condition is not only that Jarring should be present but we should declare our willingness to go back to the boundaries recommended in 1947. But they are obviously in a state of frustration or of not knowing where to go, and I think a lot depends on what the outside world advises him to do.

Quite briefly what we would like the outside world and you in Britain to do is avoid getting into the substance of the matter, not to have an Egyptian-American negotiation or an

And he returned in a cloud of smoke saying that he meant that he is willing to talk to us if we would like to go back not to the 1957 issue, because they are old fashioned but the 1957 issue, which would leave us very dissatisfied and dissatisfied, but nevertheless the answer is there.

Mr. Sayyid also has produced certain articles and letters indicating that he would be prepared to meet us in the presence of Mr. Sayyid, and I said I'd be quite happy to have Mr. Sayyid there. There isn't much difference between whether he is there or not. He has this talent for persistence which would leave most of the initiative to the two parties in any case. But again he said, no, we have to have this under condition of withdrawal.

He is not a fool. He knows the Israeli Government.

JOHN SAYYID: I didn't understand.

MR. SAYYID: Mr. Sayyid said when we reacted favorably to the idea of meeting him in Sayyid's presence, he said his condition is not only that Sayyid should be present but we should be willing to go back to the position we recommended in 1957. But they are obviously in a state of frustration of not knowing where to go, and I think a lot depends on what the outside world advises him to do.

JOHN SAYYID: What we would like the outside world and you together to do is to avoid getting into the situation of the matter, that is to have an Egyptian-Israeli negotiation or

Egyptian-British negotiation but to recommend very strongly to get a negotiation with Israel. Obviously world opinion would follow that negotiation and I don't fool myself by the idea that the powers and the continents would have nothing to say or influence to bear, but I don't think they can do anything unless the major initiative comes from the area itself and I understand that was the principle that you yourself emphasized on arriving here. The main responsibility must be that of the parties and others can have some influence or help if there is a negotiation.

I have spoken about Egypt because you might have heard from some of my friends this morning that our intelligence about Jordan is that although they are more advanced in thinking about negotiation and they would probably be less rigorous about avoiding a compromise, they have a rather natural desire not to be alone or the first and if they would be first, they would be alone, and if King Hussein's friends do not want to press him to do more audacious things which would incur the violent objection of Egypt and Syria and Iraq and Algeria and Libya and the Palestinian Organizations and heaven knows whom, I think it is wise for him to think twice before putting himself in a position or acting outside a general Arab consensus. He is not, after all, the major power, the major force, in the Arab world. He has a smaller population and lesser influence.

[illegible]

I have spoken about this because you didn't have heard from some of my friends this morning that our intelligence about negotiations and they would probably be less rigorous about avoiding a compromise. They have a rather natural desire not to be alone on the line and if they would be lined, they would be lined and at King's College's friends do not want to leave him to do more audacious things which would mean the violent rejection of Negroes and Syria and Iraq and Algeria and Libya and the Palestinian organizations and I never know when I think it is wise for him to think twice before putting himself in a position or setting out once a general and commander. He is not, after all, the major power, but not for, in the Arab world. He has a smaller population and lesser influence.

Lebanon we have always assumed that they would be the second or the third but not the first to make peace. They are even less able than Jordan to give Arab nationalism a new direction and a new content.

Therefore, it comes back to the question how we get Egypt to understand that talking about war isn't any use and these international discussions have really wore themselves out and they ought to look at one of two possibilities, to negotiate on the overall settlement which could be with Jarring there but then if they want to get us there, they can't us in advance for what they should try to get in the negotiation itself. You can't have a negotiation on a limited liability with absolute assurance that you will get 100 percent of what you want. If they do get what they want in advance, there wouldn't be anything to negotiate about. In other words, our Egyptian position is this: to say that Israel must accept the position of Egypt in advance, that isn't the way any negotiation begins. Or if the overall negotiation is still too complicated, we'd like them to have another look at taking the first step on withdrawal and disengagement and opening the Suez Canal, and we would definitely give an undertaking that that is not the end of the process, that it is a phase, leading towards an overall settlement.

We wouldn't have any trouble in indicating that the overall settlement can be described in terms of Security Council

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We wouldn't have any trouble in indicating that the
overall settlement can be described in terms of Security Council

resolution 242, not as they interpret it but as it was and as it is, with all the little words that are not there, not there.

And we would like them at some time to face that option. I think what we need to do now is to see that the Security Council debate does not try to put them to sleep, as it were, or to offer illusory hopes by changing the international jurisprudence or by quoting it out of balance.

I frankly think that the United Nations in the present situation in the world is not an instrument for solving conflicts. It is an arena for waging . . . It belongs to the polemic rather than the operative part of conflicts. But we really said everything about each other that we can say, in terms of accusations, reproaches, self-justification of arguments. I think it is beginning to bore the protagonists themselves and the rest of the world. In fact, one of the frustrations of the Egyptians about the UN meeting was that the newspapers have even stopped being interested in it and television doesn't even come, especially the American television has much more peak hour things to discuss at the present moment. Therefore, they had the idea of going to Geneva.

I think public debate is the wrong course to take now, and it would be much better for this chance of negotiation if the Security Council were not to meet or not to adopt resolutions or if it has to adopt, not to add or subtract anything from the existing jurisprudence. When we say that the public debate

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I think public opinion is the wrong course to take
now, and it would be much better for this chance of negotiation
if the Security Council were not to need to adopt resolu-
tions or if it has to adopt, not to add or subtract anything from
the existing framework. When we say that the public debate

is harmful, we have already had evidence of that. We think that not only has it not done any good. It has done harm, because it has elicited from Egypt a more extreme formulation of position than in other debates. We have looked at Zayyat's statements there, repeated in Egypt, and he says very strongly, which has had a bad effect in Israel, in internal discussions about whether the eternal Egypt wants peace or not. He has strengthened the hand of skeptics by saying it is not enough to go back to the 1967 borders; that's as the start, but then the only borders for Israel are the 1947 recommendations; recommendations which they opposed and which in any case were made before most Israelis were born. But that's a definite extreme. That's a more extreme view than they have sometimes expressed. When he adds also that the solution of the Palestine problem, he gives the impression that he is so far from reality that it is hard to interpret his attitude as someone who wants a negotiation for peace settlement at an early date.

There is in this business of 1947, there is an added Jordanian aspect. He is saying that the Palestine Arabs must be separated from Jordan, because that was the essence of the 1947 idea. So when he proposes this explosive formula for dismantling Israel and Jordan at the same time, it is not ^a very serious or a very helpful formulation to make. ^{is what} The feeling in Israel is that the essence of the matter seems to be a procedural question but is not really procedural. Because to get to the negotiating

is important, we have already had a number of cases. We think that not only has it not been any good. It has been bad, because it has elicited the type of a more serious consideration of position than in other respects. We have looked at Egypt's statements there, repeated in Egypt, and he says very strongly, which has the effect of a bad effect in Israel, in that it has shown that Egypt would not be any more. He has expressed the kind of skepticism by saying it is not enough to go back to the 1947 conference. As the state, but then the only powers for Israel are the 1947 recommendations, a consideration which they opposed and which in any case was not a helpful word. Israel's view here, but that's a definite attitude. That's a more extreme view than they have sometimes expressed. When he adds that the solution of the Palestine problem, he gives the impression that he is in fact from reality that it is hard to interpret his attitude as someone who wants a neutral state for peace settlement as an early date.

There is in this business of 1947, there is an added Jordanian aspect. He is saying that the Palestinian Arabs must be separated from Jordan, because that was the essence of the 1947 idea. So when he proposes this exclusive Jordanian not dismantling Israel and Jordan at the same time, it is not very serious on a very helpful consideration. The feeling in Israel is that the essence of the Palestinian is to be a practical question but is not really practical. Because to get to the negotiating

table, I think the breakthrough must be on the level of communication and not substantial agreement ahead of negotiation. It has always come in that way. In these other conflicts as well. Chancellor Brandt gave us a seminar of the Ospotitic. It was quite clear that the gist of it was to forget about recognition and legitimacy, what you have been saying about each other for twenty years and come to the table with your positions as they are and not try to create too much pre-negotiation but to get into contact without changing your views on juridical problems by the act of negotiation.

We would welcome European and British influence on behalf of the principle of negotiation, saying that public negotiation has been tried, wars have been tried, international votes have been tried. All of these haven't led anywhere. Summit meetings have been tried. It is about time that the states, which after all wanted their independence, should express their independence by taking responsibility for negotiation.

I am certain that if there is a negotiation, if the peace that they suggest is real and positive, I don't feel that the boundary changes would be the major obstacle. Everybody knows what the primary issue is in Sinai. It is Sharm el-Sheikh and how not to make Sinai a springboard for wars every five or ten years. That doesn't involve our staying in the whole or most of Sinai in times of peace.

basic, I think the breakthrough came on the level of communication and not substantial agreement ahead of negotiation. It was always done in that way. In these other conflicts as well. Ambassador Bunker gave us a seminar of the Capital. It was quite clear that the gist of it was to forget about recognition and legitimacy, that you have been saying about each other for twenty years and come to the table with your positions as they are and not try to create one which pre-negotiation but to get into contact without changing your view on historical problems by the act of negotiation.

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On the Jordan front the changes that we would seek would be in the unpopulated areas, in the Jordan Valley, which means that the great majority of the Palestine Arabs in the West Bank would revert to Arab rule under some system either federative or other and they would have an Arab destiny because for our own reasons as well as for general reasons, our peace proposal that most of us would suggest does not suggest breeding a million Arabs and their territory into the Israel organism.

So they have a lot to gain provided that they are prepared for something less than one hundred percent. If they say all or nothing, we can't help them. If they say, let's see what is the most that we could do to cut our losses and explore that in a negotiation, I think there are very big incentives there.

For us the real question is whether the dramatic step endangering our position on the Suez Canal and in the areas west of the Jordan would really be balanced by real peace or simply by a new war a few years later, and it is in this context that Zayyat is not helpful when he says that even if we gets us back to the 1967 lines, which also he cannot do entirely in my view, that wouldn't be enough and they would go on to order us back even further.

The other thing which makes us skeptical and causes skepticism about their desire for peace is their refusal to meet, the lack of interest in any kind of step by step approach and

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to the 1957 issue, which also he cannot do anything in my view
that Syria's is empty and they would go on as before as back even
better.
The other thing which makes an important and obvious
the Jewish side that desire for peace is their refusal to accept
the fact of interest in any kind of Arab population and

the constant indication that what they mean by peace isn't what we mean by peace. They mean something which involves no diplomatic relations, no economic relations, no free movement. This is what we understand from their talks in Washington in February. It is the passive part of peace but not the active content which makes a peace as a last resort durable.

But we are not asking for mediation. If friendly countries say, what can we do to help, and I understand that that is what you are asking, we say, get behind this idea that there must be an Egyptian Israeli negotiation. And Egypt must overcome its inhibitions and we would give assurance that we wouldn't regard it as having abandoned its juridical views, but I wouldn't think by meeting us they have recognized or changed their views on legitimacy. After all, the Germans met on the basis of non-recognition of each other, and then there is the Vietnam meeting where nobody recognized anybody, absolute juridical anarchy; the United States, Vietcong, Saigon and Hanoi. We would just like our friends to advise Egypt to move with the spirit of the time.

The last thing I would say is about time. I know some of our friends think that it is working against us and therefore we often hear, this is a good time to settle. I agree. If we could settle now, we should settle now. But the implication is that we have a possibility of settling now and we have some mistaken belief that it will be better to settle later

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on.

We think we don't have an opportunity to settling now because they tell us they won't talk to us until we go back to some prehistoric boundary. But I think they are on the wrong track if they believe that time is really working in their favor. It has not worked in their favor for six years. I think that's empirically capable of being proved. They are not anywhere nearer to their objective than they were six years ago.

There are some Arabs who are courageous enough to say that time is not working for them. Here is a statement by Charles Malik, which is interesting because it was published in an Arabic paper, Al Nahar, in Beirut. It is not a majority view. It didn't use even to be a minority view. He says, "Israel is a modern industrialized state of the first order. All Jews throughout the world lend it their support with all the possibility and influence at their disposal. It is also supported by scores, if not hundreds of millions of Gentiles, who admire its spirit, progress and achievements and believe in its culture and its right to exist.

"Its scientific and technological advancement by far exceeds the progress of all the Arabs put together. It is on the technological industrial plane entirely different from that of the Arabs. In all likelihood the range and depth of its theoretical and practical research will continue to improve. Its scientists and scholars maintain contact and exert recipro-

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cal influence upon the thinking of scholars in the world.

"How different is the Arab situation."

And then he says, "I believe that this international understanding and support will never.." that's the word.."never allow the Arabs to blot out Israel from the face of the earth or even to weaken, and the reason for this industrial supremacy.... is a deeprooted Jewish mysticism which becomes ever more intense. . . If you want to know the truth about the situation, that is the truth. That is what we are facing...."

I think that is the truth and that it is an illusion to think that they will be better off five or six or ten years from now than today. But we can't talk to them. We are chasing Bourghiba around a mulberry bush looking for the fire and the smoke and frankly we are told that he is not at the height of his intellectual power but we have to play this for image anyhow. We can't go around saying what some of our European friends have said about him, and in any case Masmudee has come into the dialogue and the Tunisian government is important here and so that we have not only responded in public but we have asked friendly government, that of Italy, because he was going to visit them.

LORD BALNIEL: Masmudee?

MR. EBAN: The Tunisian government. They didn't go to Bourghiba. We thought that he was going to go to Italy on an

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Israeli government, that is Italy, because he was going to visit

him.

MR. BELL: I understand.

MR. BELL: The Italian government. They didn't go

to Baghdad. He thought that he was going to go to Italy on a

official visit and that was a good time. He didn't come, but he went into a hospital or a sanatorium in Geneva so they raised the question Tunisia itself or in Rome, but through the diplomatic channels and they haven't had a reply except a statement by Musmadede saying that he understood the Swiss government is active, which it isn't at all, in this problem and the general feeling that they might be interested in the dialogue.

MR. A. J. CRAIG: What question did you ask?

MR. EBAN: We said that we noted his statement. He said things like he wanted to me. He made a great case how others had met. He also said that he wants the 1947 recommendation. All right, we have heard that and we will nevertheless be ready to talk to him. That's his position. Let him explain that position and we will explain why we have a different one. We didn't say there's no negotiation, there's no use talking. Let him bring that. He must bring it as his position but he can't possibly convert that into an Israeli position. In other words, we didn't do anything to discourage the idea, and the same with Zayyat. We said, if your position is what it is, it is not very encouraging, all right, but come to the table and hear what we say about that.

I think the Summit meeting was helpful in not entering the matter in detail. If they look at us lucidly, they will find that we are not getting weaker, that in the foreseeable future the balance of strength will not be changed, that no great power is

official visit and that was a good name, the first of course, but he went into a hospital for a number of days in Geneva so they missed the question of his visit to the home, but through the diplomatic channels and they haven't had a reply except a statement in the newspaper saying that he understood the Swiss government's position. I don't see all in this problem and the general feeling that they might be interested in the situation.

MR. A. J. CRAIG: Have questions did you ask?

MR. FRY: He said that we noted his statement. He said things like he wanted to see. He said a great deal more about the situation. He also said that he wanted the 1947 recommendation. All right, we have heard that and we will nevertheless be ready to talk to him. That's the position. Let him explain that position and we will tell him why we have a different one. We didn't say there's no negotiation, there's no real talking. Let him bring that. He needs bring it as his position but he has a possible counter-claim into an Israeli position. In other words, we didn't do anything to disavow the fact, and the same which says, we said, if your position is what it is, it is not very encouraging, all right, but come to the table and hear what we say about that.

I think the basic meeting was held in an interesting way. The meeting in detail. It may look as if they will find that we are not getting nearer, but the fundamental interest in the balance of power will not be changed. That no other power is

going to help them in a war against us and that economically and in every other way our European link seems to be likely to help us forward again.

And I really don't know what they are waiting for but ^I as/say, you can tell them that if you want much more easily because you are in touch and we are not.

[?]
LORD BAINIEL: I won't say I don't agree, but basically what we want all to achieve is a settlement which is durable and which is acceptable, and the question at issue is how do we draw them into negotiation, how do we draw both yourselves and the Arab governments into negotiation? It is certainly obvious that ultimately there must be direct negotiations. One can't solve any international problem without direct negotiations but the question is how do we achieve this, and frankly I think at the moment the prospect of direct negotiations are very limited. I will come back to this in a moment or two.

Just going back to the subject you opened on and this was the resolution which worried you about the strike on the terrorists, on the terrorist organization in Lebanon. If I may say so, in a way, the way you put it, although very agreeably, in a way, it epitomized what I was trying to say to begin with. You see, there was a - I can't remember the words; I am terrible about remembering words of resolutions - I remember there was a very firm [?] ~~clerk~~ of the resolution condemning violence in general and

going to help them in a war against us and that economically and in every other way our interests seem to be likely to help us forward again.

And I really don't know what they are waiting for but really, you can tell them that if you want them really because you are in touch and we are not.

LORD BARNETT: I won't say I don't agree, but basically

what we want all to achieve is a settlement which is durable and which is acceptable, and the question at issue is how do we draw them into negotiation, how do we draw both ourselves and the Arab governments into negotiation? It is certainly obvious that ultimately there must be direct negotiations. One can't solve any international problem without direct negotiations but the question is how do we achieve this, and frankly I think at the moment the prospect of direct negotiations are very limited. I will come back to this in a moment or two.

Just going back to the subject you opened on and this was the resolution which worried you about the strike on the territory, on the territorial organization in Lebanon. In I may say so, in a way, the way you put it, although very simply, in a way, it epitomized what I was trying to say to begin with. You see, there was a - I can't remember the words, I am terrible about remembering words of resolutions - I remember there was a very first part of the resolution condemning violence in general and

and then there was a chunk condemning what frankly we do think is a different scale of violence, when a sovereign state acts in another sovereign state's territory to eliminate terrorism.

But I comment on this because it seems to me too often in our relations people pick on that part of a resolution or that part of the speech with which one can niggle us. There is always another part, and that in fact if I remember right was a very balanced resolution, the more especially as you used British passports to operate the thing. This wasn't something which we were pleased about at all. Again if I remember right, it was a Lebanese resolution which we went to considerable trouble to modify and make balanced, if I remember.

MR. EBAN: There was balance in the resolution as accepted, I agree. What concerns us in our British-Israeli relationship was what the resolution would have been if the United States had not told us quite officially that they would veto your resolution. Your resolution didn't condemn acts of violence. It condemned repeated military attacks against Lebanon and deplored acts of violence, creating therefore that discrimination and
? (should have been)
contained something which was left out. It called for all states to refrain from providing any assistance which facilitates such military attacks That was the heart of what we thought the was/offensive part. And British-Israel relationship, I am afraid, was determined by this text and not by the expurgated version which

and then there was a much considerable gap between the two as
a different state of violence, when a country where there is
another country where there is violence, to violence, to violence.
But I cannot in this paper. It seems to me that
there is a considerable gap between the two as
that part of the speech which was one of the things that
always another part, and that in fact I remember right was
very painful resolution, the same especially as you said British
government to observe the thing. This was something which we
were pleased about at all. Again I remember right, as we
Japanese resolution which we want to consider something to
really and really, in I remember.
In fact, there was a gap in the resolution as
observed, I think, when someone was in our British-Japanese
relationship and that the resolution would have been at the United
States had not been as good or really that they would have been
resolution. Now resolution didn't really solve the violence. It
understood a great many things against Japan and Japan
and all violence, against the whole of the discrimination and
(which is a law)
contains something which was left out. It called for all sorts
to obtain from providing any assistance which might be
Military attaché. . . . There was a part of what was thought
very, very, very, and British-Japanese relationship, I am afraid.
was determined by this text and not by the expected version which

was eventually adopted, and what surprised us was the willingness of Britain to propose the text in its previous less balanced form.

BORD BALNIEL: We do think there is a big difference between, you know, a sovereign state attacking elements which are thoroughly undesirable, of course, the terrorist organization in another sovereign state, and the activities - again we deplore it. We want to stop it, just as you do. There is a cancer which is spreading throughout the world, and unless we can find a way of stopping them, they are worrying the future. But, as I say, the wording in fact had been different if we hadn't tried to moderate it and make it more balanced.

You then went on to talk about the Harrogate speech. Well, that is the established position of the British government as set out by the Secretary of State as our views, and that is how we interpret resolution 242.

Are we going to have a discussion about the Community affairs? Later on, or are we discussing it now?

MR. EBAN: I thought at our next meeting we could discuss all our economic relations, bilateral and Community. But if I could just make one comment on the UN part, we could even say something about theEEC now.

We know that the Harrogate speech was your position, but we think it was carrying it further when instead of being a national position, it was put into an international debate as

was eventually adopted, and was included in the Billings
of 1914 to protect the text in the original form.
form.

ROSE BATES: We do think there is a big difference
between, on the one hand, a country which is not a member of the
League of Nations, and on the other, the League of Nations.
In another country state, and the League of Nations we believe
it. We want to show it, just as you do. There is a danger which
is spreading throughout the world, and which we can find a way
of stopping them, but we worry the League of Nations, as I say,
the working in. It has been difficult to get the League of Nations
to get it and make it more balanced.

You can find on the League of Nations page
will show the established position of the League of Nations
as set out by the League of Nations, and that is how
a League of Nations is.

As we going to have a discussion about the League of Nations
League of Nations, or are we discussing it now?
MR. BATES: I thought at our next meeting we could.

It was all our business, religious, political and community.
But as I could not make any comment on the League of Nations, we could even
try something about the League of Nations.

Now that the League of Nations is your position,
but we think it is very important to know what the League of Nations
national position. It was put into an international context as

an interpretation of 242. We think, frankly, that the parties will interpret . Its more admirable quality is ambivalence and obscurity. I think there is a little too much precision and too much constructive ambivalence. I have not entered the map-drawing contest in Israel, because once you draw a map, then it becomes impossible for the other side to accept simply because we have drawn it. The resolution, because it is abstract and algebraic and not arithmetical, leaves a great hope for the Arabs on withdrawal and some hope in Israel on territorial change. And when you cut away the amount of area of negotiating ability on territory, we are left very tight in that resolution.

We really did accept it because it did not say "all the territories", because the British Foreign Secretary at the end of 1969 said that the omission of the words "all the" was deliberate and your Prime Minister at that time has said what he actually said to me before the resolution was adopted, that the intention was not to insist on a rigorous restoration of the 1967 lines.

I'd just like to say by way of memoirs that the resolution was adopted in November 1967, the 22nd. Before we could accept the Jarring Mission on the basis of that resolution, we had to know what it meant. Did it mean that it was withdrawal from all the territory, in which case we wouldn't play with it. In Jerusalem, you can see one reason why. Or does it leave some

an interpretation of 343. We think, frankly, that the matter
will interest the more sensitive people.

In substance and substance, I think there is a little too
much speculation and too much conjecture in the matter. I have not
entered the map-making contest in Israel, because once you draw
a map, then it becomes impossible for the other side to accept
it. I think because we have drawn it. The resolution, because it is
abstract and unrealistic and not all-inclusive, leaves a great hope
for the Arabs as withdrawal and some hope in Israel on territorial
changes. And when you cut away the amount of area of negotiating
ability on territory, we are left very tight in that respect on
the matter. It does not mean it does not say all

the territory, because the British Foreign Secretary at the
end of 1957 said that the criticism of the words "all the" was
balancing and your Prime Minister at that time has said what he
actually said to us before the resolution was adopted, that the
intention was not to insist on a rigorous restoration of the
1947 lines.

I'd just like to say by way of remark that the
resolution was adopted in November 1957, the 32nd. Before we
could accept the Jewish Mission on the basis of that resolution,
we had to know what it meant. Did it mean that it was withdrawal
from all the territory, in which case we wouldn't play with it,
in the region, you can see one reason why. Or does it leave some

option for territorial negotiation. I was in New York and I went to London simply to find out what the British government meant by the terms "secure and recognized boundaries". I went to the Prime Minister who spoke exactly as he has since that the wording is meant to leave some leeway and I went to Dorneywood where I had a convivial evening with Mr. George Brown, as I suppose all my meetings with him were, and in much more emphatic terms he said, he said, if they wanted the words "all the" in, they would damn well have put them in. And they were not there because you cannot reconstruct the whole thing as though it had never been disputed, and this was ascertained before.

LORD BALNIEL: Frankly I don't think it makes much difference between whether the statement is made by the Secretary of State in Harrogate or the Secretary of State's representatives in the United Nations. The statement by the Secretary of State at Harrogate has been repeated by the diplomatic representatives of the Secretary of State.

MR. EBAN: But it was new.

LORD BALNIEL: That remains -

MR. EBAN: New to us in relation to 1967. New in the sense that it made things negatively precise, whereas the intention had been that if there is a difference of interpretation, let the parties negotiate the difference and let them reach agreement on what the resolution means, and we are prejudiced that others come along and say, now this is what it means in geographical terms.

option for territorial negotiation. I was in New York and I
sent to London simply to find out what the British government
meant by the term "secure and recognized boundaries". I went
to the Prime Minister who spoke exactly as he has since that the
wording is meant to leave some leeway and I went to Downing Street
where I had a very late evening with Mr. George Brown, as I suppose
all my meetings with him were, and in which were explicit terms
he said, no such, if they wanted the words "if the Government
don't well have put them in. And they were not there because you
cannot remember the whole thing as though it had never been
discussed, and that was secreted before.

LORD SALISBURY: Frankly I don't think it makes much
difference between whether the statement is made by the Secretary
of State in connection of the Secretary of State's representative
in the United Nations. The statement by the Secretary of State at
Washington has been reported by the American press, and it is
the Secretary of State.

MR. HARRIS: For it was said.

LORD SALISBURY: That was said.

MR. HARRIS: Now to us in relation to 1957. Was it the
idea that it made things negatively precise, whereas the intention
had been that there is a full freedom of interpretation, but the
action negates the full freedom and that was a statement on
what the resolution means, and we are entitled that every one
stop and say, what is what is meant in geographical terms.

LORD BAINIEL: Well,

I suppose that one cannot be wildly optimistic about the outcome of the Security Council, but I actually wouldn't take as despondent a view as you did. You used the phrase "repetitive fiasco". In fact, considering the emotions which are involved and the kind of sense of despair and lack of knowledge of where they are going, in fact I think the Security Council conference has gone relatively well so far. Partly because of our persuasion, the Egyptians haven't put down a resolution right to begin with. There has been a period of debate, maybe not very exciting, but the more extreme kind of statements which used to be such a feature of the Security Council debate, they haven't taken place at all.

? non-violent attempt to look forward. We feel that this in fact is being put forward and the debate has not aroused passions and ultimately we will have to come to a resolution.

Now, you said, and I agree, that there are three options before the Egyptians. Either they can make war or they can negotiate and this is what we want to do. We want to draw, and I think the United Nations is a medium by which we draw to negotiations. We want to draw them into negotiations, or there is a third alternative, and here I do tend to express a personal opinion, just carrying on as before. You read your quotation from Mr. Malik saying that time was against the Arab countries. Well,

t

I suppose

some similar: well,

that may change the whole picture about the amount of the security council. I really wouldn't take as the amount a view as you did. You had the power to resist it. In fact, considering the situation which was involved and the kind of sense of desert and lack of knowledge of what they are doing, in fact I think the Security Council's composition has been relatively

well so far. Butly because of our position, the system haven't put down a resolution right to begin with. There has been a period of debate, maybe not very exciting, but the more extreme kind of statements which tend to be much a feature of the Security Council debate, they haven't taken place at all. non-violent attempt to look

forward. We feel that this is not as being put forward and the subject has not changed position and ultimately we will have to come to a resolution.

Now you said, and I agree, that there are three options before the Security Council. Whether they can make use of them or not is what we want to do. We want to discuss and I think the United Nations as a whole by which we have to negotiate. We want to turn them into negotiations, or there is a third alternative, and here I do want to express a personal opinion just as you are before. And what your suggestion from it, with saying that also was against the first committee, well,

this is a very subjective judgment. Who knows? There are arguments which would point very much the other way. I mean, the whole of the Middle East is going to become the world's wealthiest section of the world. They will use their wealth to invest in education. They will use their economic power no doubt to bring influence to bear and this gap, this enormous technological gap and industrial and educational gap between your own country and the Arab countries, anyone can well argue is likely to diminish in the years rather than increase. It is debatable. Nobody knows. Nonetheless, I believe whether time works for the Arabs or works for you, I believe it is desirable to ^{try to} get negotiations going as soon as possible

The only other point apart from the question of the boundaries about which I don't think there is much prospect for success, and this comes from talking to quite a lot of people, is your step by step kind of process. It is put in many different ways by the Arabs. They say, what is the point in making a first step on a staircase until you know the last step on the landing. Or Dr. Zayyat who puts it differently: what is the point of buying a ticket to London unless you know that you have booked your accommodations in London? What they are saying in different ways: what is the point to embark on step by step negotiations unless you know the ultimate objective which you are going to reach. I'm not saying that one can begin negotiations

This is a very subjective judgment. Who knows? There are many
countries which would not be nearly as rich as the other way. I mean, the
whole of the Middle East is going to become the world's wealthiest
region of the world. They will see their wealth to invest in
education. They will see their economic power as a result of being
influenced to have and this will, this enormous technological
gap and industrial and educational gap between your own country
and the Arab countries, anyone can well see is likely to
diminish in the years rather than increase. It is desirable.
Nobody knows. Nevertheless, I believe whether time works for the
Arab or against the Arab, I believe it is desirable to get
negotiations going as soon as possible.

The only other point which comes from the question of
the population which I don't think there is much ground
for success, and this comes from talking to quite a lot of
people, in your area by the kind of progress. It is not in many
different ways by the Arabs. They say, what is the point in
making a treaty with an Arab unless you know the Arab and
on the landing. Or Dr. Sayegh who puts it differently. What is
the point of paying a ticket to London unless you know that you
have booked your accommodation in London? What they are saying
is it seems very much to the point to expect an Arab to be
negotiations unless you know the Arabs objective which you
are going to know. I'm not saying that one can begin negotiations

by knowing the exact destination. This I agree. Now, we believe that they must negotiate. We agree that they must meet face to face. I believe, like you, Jordan would do so. Jordan is very pragmatic, very sensitive in the approach by King Hussein, but he is not going to do it.

MR. EBAN: It would do any good to make an agreement and end up dead on the steps of the mosque.

LORD BALNIEL: I can't pretend we have got any great ideas as to what the outcome of the Security Council should be. But if you can't reach agreement between yourselves as to a negotiating process, they can't come face to face. Sadat wouldn't survive for two minutes, I should have thought, as the leader. As it is Gadaffi has arrived in Cairo with 40 crates of his own furniture, I'm told. Of course, you know the contents of the 40 crates.

The only way - maybe it's not practical - the only way is to draw them in through the process of the UN, which is a kind of re-energizing, regaling of Dr. Jarring. You say, and I don't blame you, you should meet face to face, but if you were in their position, if you were President Sadat and you had an Israeli spear in your heart, I don't believe that you would negotiate direct with them, direct with Israel at the moment. I don't believe.

MR. EBAN: Why not? What harm would it do? The

by putting the same question. This I asked. Now, we believe

that they must negotiate. We agreed that they must meet face to

face. I believe, like you, Jordan would do so. Jordan is very

pragmatic, very realistic in the approach of this situation, and he

is not going to do it.

Mr. Jordan. It would be very good to have an agreement

and not to have the stress of the moment.

JOHN BAXTER: I can't pretend we have not very great

ideas as to what the outcome of the Security Council should be.

But if you can't reach agreement between yourselves as to a

negotiating process, they can't come to an agreement. Right?

wouldn't arrive for two minutes, I should have thought, as the

(1)

leader. As it is difficult to arrive in time with 60 minutes of

the two minutes, the total, of course, you know the outcome of

the 60 minutes.

The only way - maybe it's not practical - the only

way is to draw them through the process of the UN, which is a

kind of re-negotiating, re-negotiating at the UN. You say, and

I don't think you should meet face to face, but as you were in

their position, if you were President Carter and you had in Israel

to say to yourself, I can't believe that you would not take

it over with them. Direct with Jordan at the moment. I can't

believe.

Mr. Jordan. My wife. That is all. That is all.

Germans did it and the Chinese and Americans. All these grievances were there. India-Pakistan.

LORD BALNIEL: I agree that you can think of others. But Sinai is Egyptian sovereign territory and if I were a Scotsman and were driven to and the rest of England is occupied by an unfriendly power, the last thing I would do is negotiate.

MR. EBAN: But if we do not negotiate, then we stay in the whole of Sinai. It is only by negotiation that they can get a large measure of satisfaction in Sinai. It is a vicious cycle.

LORD BALNIEL: Of course, you will stay in Sinai and no one will stop you. Can dominate -

MR. EBAN: If they negotiate, then they could end up by coming into Sinai themselves.

LORD BALNIEL: Can you see Sadat saying - he is the leader of a b , all around is a b type government - can you see him saying that and surviving in Egypt? Right, I am now going to settle down at the table; no pre-conditions. We have got to accept the fact that Israel is in Sinai; she's in Jerusalem; she's in the West Bank, on the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, I am going to settle down and start.

MR. KIDRON: They did it in Rhodes.

MR. EBAN: I think he could say, I want to get my Egyptian territory. Six years by predecessor and we have not had any hope with this and we see no hope. The Israelis are there. I

Heaven did it and the Chinese and Americans. All these things
were there, in the East.

MR. HARRIS: I agree that you can think of others.

But I don't see why you should be so sure that it is a
good thing to have the rest of England in control

by an arbitrary power. The fact that I would be in control.

MR. HARRIS: But it is not arbitrary, then we stay

in the hands of the East. It is only by negotiation that they can get

a large measure of satisfaction in China. It is a vicious cycle.

MR. HARRIS: Of course, you will stay in China and

no one will stay in China. Can dominate -

MR. HARRIS: If they negotiate, then they could end up

by coming into China themselves.

MR. HARRIS: Can you see that saying - in the

leader of the East. All around is a

government - can you see it saying that and surviving in the

East. I am now going to settle down in the East, no pre-conditions.

We have got to accept the fact that Japan is in control of the

East. I am going to settle down in the East, no pre-conditions.

MR. HARRIS: I am going to settle down in the East.

MR. HARRIS: They are in the East.

MR. HARRIS: I think he doesn't say. I want to get

to the East. I think he doesn't say. I want to get

to the East. I think he doesn't say. I want to get

want to negotiate and the Egyptian position in the negotiation would be that I want to get Sinai back and I am going to negotiate in an attempt to secure that.

LORD BALNIEL: Would you think this is going to happen?

MR. EBAN: I think if the only alternative is to let things go on for another six years, I think it might occur to him that it is the best thing to do; that he could reserve his position. He could say by negotiating I don't change my position about the Palestine cause or about the recognition of Israel. I have only one objective, a concrete, pragmatic one. I am going to see if by negotiating I can get back what I want. But I frankly think that looking at all the precedents, it is not realistic that in a conflict as deeprooted as this, you can jump the whole distance in one step. It hasn't happened in any of the other cases. The Chinese and Americans didn't solve all their problems. The European settlement didn't solve everything at once. To say that it is all or nothing and that you either stay where you are with ourselves at the Suez Canal or you have a settlement where everything forms into a beautiful jigsaw puzzle boundary with Sharm el-Sheikh and the Golan Heights and refugees and everything has to be done. I don't think that can happen except in Walt Disney, where the house is and all the bricks fall in place. You have to build brick by brick

LORD BALNIEL: I agree. Someone has got to start the

would be that I want to get ahead and I am going to negotiate
in an attempt to secure that.

Now, Mr. [Name], would you think this is going to be a
thing so on for another six years, I think it might occur to the

that it is the best thing to do, that he could reserve his
position. He could say by negotiating I don't change my position
about the Palestine case or about the recognition of Israel. I
have only one objective, a concrete, pragmatic one. I am going
to see if by negotiating I can get what I want. And I

frankly admit that looking at all the [Name], it is not
realistic that in a conflict as deep-seated as this, you can have
the whole situation in one day. It has happened in any of
the other cases. The Chinese and American didn't solve all their
problems. The European countries didn't solve everything at

once. To say that all is over nothing and that you either have
solve you are with ourselves at the Canal or you have a
solution of everything comes into a beautiful [Name], as is
evident with Spain, [Name] and the [Name] [Name] and [Name]
and everything has to be done. I don't think that can happen except

in this [Name], where the house is
fall in place. You have to build brick by brick.

Now, Mr. [Name], I agree. Someone has got to start the

building. Do you see it being built? Sadat and yourselves? I can see it being built perhaps, perhaps not very effectively, perhaps by other people talking to you or talking to the Egyptians.

MR. EBAN: That's been tried for six years and I remember Jarring in this room in 1967 saying, nothing will mean anything unless we will get you together. That's what he said he will do. He tried to do it in 1968. I always remember those words, because in fact nothing has happened since we haven't been brought together. That's why when Zayyat said that he would talk to me if Jarring were there, so that we call it international, UN conference, instead of calling it a meeting with Israel - these words might matter - we said, yes. At the Armistice Conference in Rhodes, we met them and because the UN was there in the chair, they said, this isn't a meeting with Israel. We have got a UN Conference. It happens that the Israelis are also around. We have gone to meet the United Nations representative, Dr. Bunche, and they called it the UN Armistice Conference.

LORD BALNIEL: What you are saying is that they have to have some kind of subterfuge, some facade, veil, that they can cover the fact that they were meeting directly. I think something of this nature is needed. I don't see them coming in the not naked, but coming to talk to you face to face. I don't see this happening. What we have to do is a kind of subterfuge.

MR. EBAN: The Americans suggested a subterfuge which

they called proximity talks; practically something like shuttling up and down.

LORD BALNIEL: The proximity talks were linked to withdrawal at the Canal and move over and then you take another step. They were very closely linked to that step by step approach and I think I am right in saying that the Americans accept the fact that this is not possible to proceed very far. They haven't raised it again in the Security Council.

MR. EBAN: I think they might be prepared to try it again. I don't know with what prospect. I understood from Mr. Rogers that if the Security Council, as he anticipated, will not take the matter further operatively and if the Summit, as they envisaged then would not change the situation, then some time in July or August there would be a situation where they might think that this is the best alternative. They could reserve their position on the final settlement. We could reserve ours. They could say they are discussing the step by step approach but they hope and believe that the final step must be total withdrawal. We would say that we enter this negotiation; there will be withdrawal but we can't say now from where, because it has to be negotiated.

In other words, instead of each party trying to graft its position on the other, let each party state and affirm its full position and without prejudice to it to see what can be done to bring the positions together. In other words, there are very

They called on me to say a few words in connection with the situation.

up and down.

LOUIE BELLAMY: The committee is now linked to
withdrawing from the Council and now we are going to take another
step. They were very closely linked to that step by their approach
and I think I am right in saying that the Government cannot take
any step that is not possible to prevent very far. They have not
raised it again in the Security Council.

MR. BELLAMY: I think they are prepared to try to
again. I don't know with what prospects. I understand that the
Report that is the Security Council, we are anticipated, will not
take the matter further positively and in the Security Council, as they
advantage that would not change the situation, then some time in
July or August there would be a situation where they might think
that this is the best alternative. They could reserve their
position on the final settlement. We could reserve ours. They
could say they are discussing the question and then we could say we
hope and believe that the final step must be taken which means we
would say that we enter this negotiation there will be withdrawal
and we can't say we are now where we are to be negotiated.
In other words, instead of each party trying to prove
its position on the other, let each party state and explain its
full position and without prejudice as to how and when we can
be bringing the positions together. In other words, there are very

many formulas and methods if they really want to get to a context of negotiation with us. But when they talk about 1947, we begin to wonder.

LORD BALNIEL: This was in Zayyat's speech?

MR. EBAN: And further on in Copenhagen and in Egypt itself. Some of our people who tried to decode what their real position is feel that Sadat's real position, his objectives are internal domestic consolidation and that he cannot negotiate pragmatically because of domestic problems and also inter-Arab problems with Gaddafi and . Instead of saying he doesn't want to negotiate, which doesn't sound respectable, you put your terms so high that it has the same results. I was speaking to an international lawyer who didn't want to take a certain case. Instead of saying to the client, I won't take your case, he asked him for hundreds of thousands of pounds, which is another way of getting out of it. This is a possible interpretation of these statements. Because they are intelligent people. They know Israel can't accept the 1947 resolution. So if they want conditions which they know that we cannot accept, they know something about Israel; there must be some reason behind it.

But all I can say is not to regard the position as static. I don't know that Jarring is capable of galvanization. It is interesting that the Summit meetings have en stopped the incantations about Jarring. It is the first time that the Soviet-

many countries and perhaps it they really want to get to a point of negotiation with me, but when they talk about that, as before, to words.

NOT TALKING. This was in my first speech.

MR. TALKER: And further on in the speech and in what

itself, some of our people who tried to become what I call

positions in the United States position, his objectives are

international domestic communication and that we cannot negotiate

characteristically because of domestic problems and also international

positions with regard to and

positions, want to negotiate, which doesn't sound negotiable, you

and your terms to fight that it has the same position. I was speaking

to an international lawyer who didn't want to take a certain word

instead of saying to the client, I would take your word, he asked

him for a number of thousands of pounds, which is a very big

getting out of it. This is a possible interpretation of this

agreement. Because they are not sufficient people. They know that

and a society and that position. So is they want something which

they know that we cannot accept. They know something about it.

there must be some reason behind it.

But all I can say is as to regard the position in

status. I don't know. But I am in a position of negotiation.

It is interesting that the British people have an attitude

independence about it. It is the first time that the United-

American communique didn't reiterate support of the UN effort. They said they will tell us why. They are disillusioned by various UN proceedings, including the terrorist debate and the Panama debate and all of these things; the feeling that they are usually left alone by their allies and they have started veto wieldings which they will do again if anything is said that misquotes 242 or if anything is done to give special emphasis to some article, as for instance the "inadmissibility of territory by force". Our position is that by voting that without the rest of it, that is a change, and they think that there might be a dozen votes but it wouldn't pass. That's the way they put it. I don't think you can get a fruitful result.

In the meantime the Secretary General has approached us about coming out here. The idea came originally from Cairo, and he doesn't want to go to Cairo and not come here. So he sounded us out recently and we gave him a reply to the effect that we would welcome him here, but there is a link with the Security Council debate. What we have suggested is that he might announce in general terms that he would come to the Middle East, but not actually come until the Security Council meeting has come to an end. And then, of course, if he is going to do anything, it is better that the Security Council should not do anything that makes either party too unhappy. In other words, that might be a kind of incentive to allow the Security Council either to subside or

and I am sure that the support of the UN is
the only way to win. They are still
in process, including the Committee on
Disarmament and all of these things. The feeling is that they are actually
lost along by their allies and they have started with
which they will do again if anything is said that is
on it anything is done to give special emphasis to make
as for instance the "independence of territory by force".
Our position is that of voting that without the rest of it, that is
a danger, and they think that there might be a danger vote but
won't pass. That's the way they put it. I don't think you
can get a final result.

In the meantime the Secretary General has recommended
a short meeting out here. The idea came originally from Gaito
and he doesn't want to go to Cairo and not come back. So he
rounded as out recently and we gave him a reply to the effect that
we would welcome him here. But there is a little bit of security
Council matter. What we have suggested is that he might announce
in general terms that he would come to the Middle East, but not
actually come until the Security Council meeting has come to an
end, and then, of course, if he is going to be speaking, he
must have the Security Council should not be anything that makes
either party to a danger. In other words, what might be a kind
of incentive to allow the Secretary General either to submit or

or to come to an end without anything which would make us or the Egyptians feel that they have a different position than before.

I don't know what will come out of this. He will come, I understand under the Charter, not in pursuance of the resolution; the Secretary General has a right to go to any member state, but it would require some sort of activity. One of the problems is the Egyptians have to have something happening to explain why they are not making war. Even that is something and such a visit could perhaps fit in, and it might elicit something or it might not.

If they are in a position in August or July in which they haven't achieved anything by another way, then perhaps if somebody said to them, why don't you negotiate something like the Austrian treaty settlement or like the whole list, it might be easier for them to respond. But anyway, that's something that hasn't been decided yet, but I believe that is a possibility.

LORD BALNIEL: I can't see it too much more than creating an atmosphere of activity, frankly.

MR. EBAN: Still. It is more likely to do something than the Security Council which would start arguing about the next six years. I think it could create more texts, more of these texts.

MR. CRAIG: We also are puzzled by Zayyat's reference to the 1947 resolution, which he didn't mention to us in London, when he was passing through. We have the impression that he was

or to come to an end without anything which would mark an end
to the situation. I feel that they have a different position than before.
I don't know what will come out of this. He will come
I understand under the Charter, but in opposition of the resolution
the Secretary General has a right to do in any manner state, but
it would be very hard of execution. One of the problems is
the Egyptians have to have something before they can explain why they
are not making war. Even that is something and such a visit could
be made fit in, and it might also be possible or it might not.
If they are in a position to make a visit or they are
which they have a solved a system by another way, then perhaps
it would be good to them, why don't you negotiate something like
the American treaty agreement or like the other list, it might be
better for them to know. But anyway, that's something that
hasn't been decided yet, but I believe that is a possibility.
JOHN GALLAGHER: I can't see it too much more than
existing an atmosphere of activity, generally.
MR. TUNNEY: Still, it is more likely to be something
than the Security Council which would start giving about the next
six years. I think it would create more force, more
of these things.
MR. TUNNEY: We also are guided by Secretary's reference
to the first resolution, which he didn't mention to us in London,
when he was passing through. We have the impression that he was

only using it as a sort of a fortiori argument. What I am asking for, he is saying, is the 1967 boundaries. There is nothing very g in that request because, heaven above, the UN has gone on record as supporting boundaries much more favorable to us, but that it wasn't a serious proposal which he must have known would be totally unacceptable.

MR. EBAN: That might have been the case in the United Nations. But he made a more definitive statement in Copenhagen and in Cairo, repeating again and again, in Cairo or Copenhagen, or both: I don't want you to think that 1967 is the end of the story. That is the liquidation of the 1967 war. But then there is a problem of the final boundary and that should be 1967. And since what he says is reported here, it is a very unhappy development, and at first I thought the UN thing was staged repartee, but when he says it three times he must have higher authority for saying it.

LORD BALWIEL: I wanted to ask you a question on the possibility of sovereignty versus security. The possibility of leasing territory that is essential for your security. We realize that there are territories in the Sinai which we generally regard as Egyptian sovereign territory. The thing to do, perhaps, is some kind of arrangement, I don't know exactly what, where in fact you lease them, although the sovereignty remains under Egyptian control.

only using it as a sort of a technical argument. That I am
asking for, as is saying, in the 1967 amendments. There is nothing
very 9 in that regard because, heaven above, the
it has gone on record as a completely bona fide bona fide
able to do, but that it wasn't a serious argument which he must
have known would be totally unconvincing.

MR. BARNES: That might have been the case in the
United Nations. But it is a more definitive statement in
Copenhagen and in Cairo, resulting again and again, as Cairo ex-
Copenhagen, or before I don't want you to think that 1967 is the
end of the story. That is the indication of the 1967 war. But
then there is a question of the final boundary and that should be
1967. And since there no says in repeated here, it is a very
happy development, and as far as I thought the UN thing was
stayed together. But when he says at times there no must have
higher authority for saying it.

JOHN BARNES: I wanted to ask you a question on
the possibility of sovereignty versus security. The possibility
of locating security that is essential for your security. He
feels that there are territories in the United States which we generally
regard as Egyptian sovereign territory. The thing to do, perhaps
is some kind of arrangement, I don't know exactly what, where in
fact we leave them, although the sovereignty remains with
Egyptian control.

MR. EBAN: I remember that Sir Alec asked Mrs. Meir that and she didn't say no. But I understand that he tried this out. They said they don't want only sovereignty but full withdrawal. I am afraid they are not only concerned with the juridical aspect. They have a double claim. Certainly they want their sovereignty. We haven't discussed the juridical part of it. They also want the Israelis out.

LORD BALNIEL: Mind you, they have made, you know, they vary, one week one statement, one week another. They have said, I understand, that they are perfectly prepared to consider a total demilitarization of Sinai.

MR. EBAN: Not recently. They used to. Jarring brought us that message in 1969, but they say now sovereignty means they must bring their troops where they like. Sometimes they say, there can be an equal demilitarization on both sides. That means if we demilitarize half of Sinai we will have to go as far as Iraq. And since they know their map that -

But I would say this - again I come back to the other negotiations in Europe and Asia, and what I found was that what the parties say to each other, when they negotiate at the table, there is very little resemblance to the speeches or the interviews they were making a few weeks before, and my feeling is that the pre-negotiation rhetoric tends to widen the gap, and I questioned Brandt on this as well, and he said it is true. Before

MR. BRYAN: I remember that all these things were said.

that and the other day no, and I understand that he tried this
out, they said they don't want any, especially not self-willness.
I am afraid they are not only concerned with the judicial report.
They have a double mind. Certainly they want their sovereignty.
We haven't discovered the judicial part of it. They also want
the judicial out.

MR. BRYAN: Mind you, they have made, you know,
they want one week one week, and one week another. They have
said, I understand, that they are perfectly prepared to consider
a total demilitarization of China.

MR. BRYAN: Not necessarily. They need not. During
because the end message is 1909. But they say now sovereignty
means they must bring their troops where they like. Sometimes
they say, there can be an equal demilitarization on both sides.
That means if we demilitarize parts of China we will have to go so
far as Iraq. And also they know their own mind.
But I would say this - again I come back to the
other negotiations in Europe and Asia, and what I found was that
that the parties say to each other, when they negotiate as the
truth, there is very little resemblance to the speeches of the inter-
view. They were making a few worse notes, and my feeling is that
the one negotiated on rhetorical words to widen the gap. And I
questioned them on this as well, and he said it is true. Before

the negotiation the atmosphere is polemic, also tactical, because you know you are not going to get everything. So you tend to maximalize your position, and it is in negotiation itself where there is created a different context and atmosphere and you begin to talk and say things which you hope the other man might be able to accept and not put possibilities that you know he is politically or militarily unable to accept. That's/our ^{been} experience with the Arab states^{even}. If you look at the statements they made ahead of the armistice conference; they didn't talk like that once they sat down at Rhodes, and that's another reason for trying to break this negotiation deadlock. It does change the atmosphere context and psychology in which the discussion goes forward.

LORD BAINIEL: Well, we have got no panacea for it.

MR. EBAN: I don't think it is right to ask. We are responsible and Egypt is responsible. We live here and one should try to put the responsibility on the nations concerned. After all, they and we have agitated for independence, and historically you are in a good position - you tried to kick out everybody on it - for God's sake, be independent and negotiate. Negotiation is one of the responsibilities of independent states. And not be too protective or tutelary or, I would say, paradoxically, not try to be too helpful, because if they feel that the onus is upon them, they it might make some move. Egypt has always made the move whether for good or ill. They made the decision about the 1948 war. They

the negotiator in the atmosphere is political, also tactically, because you know you are going to get everything. So you tend to maintain your position, and it is in negotiation itself where there is created a different context and atmosphere and you begin to feel and act in a way which you hope the other man might be able to accept and not feel dissatisfied that you know he is politically or militarily liable to accept. That's your experience with the Arab negotiators. If you look at the negotiators they were used to the immediate consequences they think like that and they are down of knowledge, and that's another reason for trying to make this negotiation deadlock. It does change the atmosphere and the psychology in which the discussion goes forward.

MR. BARNETT: Well, we have not a program for it.

MR. BARNETT: I don't think it is right to say, we are

responsible and have a responsibility. We have to and we should try to put the responsibility on the negotiators concerned. After all, they and we have created the independent, and basically you are in a good position - you tried to make one everybody on it - for God's sake, be independent and negotiate. Negotiation is one of the responsibilities of independent states. And not be too protective or defensive or, I would say, psychologically, not try to be too self-righteous. Because if they feel that the case is open and they might make some move, maybe they will make the right move for good or ill. They made the decision about the 1948 war. They

nearly didn't come in, but they did. But they also made the decision about the Armistice. Nasser made the decision in 1967, dragging poor Hussein with him. I don't think it was a very useful or profitable thing to do, and Egypt made the decision in 1970 about the cease fire, and I think if they come to enough political strength and independence to make a decision at least on a new procedural gambit, they could even - they like to blame something - we all do: Not only the Americans are terrible people but the Soviets also are terrible. The Soviets let them down. What can we do when our allies and our friends are so unhelpful?

I suggest - I would like to discuss the Community in two contexts: the EEC in its political concentrations and how the Middle East comes out of that, the question of trying to reach common agreements or trying to reach separate policies. That's a matter which does arise. As we discussed with Chancellor Brandt, we'd like to discuss in the same way, and then the specific matter about how to carry the negotiation forward from today until the end of the year on the new agreement. But since that links up closely with some of the commercial aspects about which my colleague, Sapir, wants me to say some words from the depth of a wounded heart, wounded by imbalance of our trade, perhaps we could take that up tomorrow together.

LORD BALNIEL: I think we have covered the ground, and left the enormous question: how one goes forward from here, and

nearly didn't come in, but they did. But they also made the
 decision about the situation. I think they made the decision in 1971.
 I don't think it was a very happy
 or profitable thing to do, and they made the decision in 1970
 about the same time, and I think it was a very happy
 decision and independence to make a decision on a new
 economic system. They could even - they like to have a
 new one. Not only the Russians are trying to get the
 Soviets also are trying. The Soviets let them down. They can
 do when our allies and our friends are so unhappy.
 I suggest - I would like to discuss the situation in
 two contexts: the first is the political context and the
 second is the economic context. The question of trying to reach
 common agreements or trying to reach economic policies. That's a
 matter which has existed as we discussed the Channelled Group.
 We'd like to discuss in the same way, and then the specific
 matter about how to carry the negotiation forward from today until
 the end of the year on the one hand, but also that kind of
 closely with some of the dramatic events about which my colleagues
 spoke, while we have some words from the desk of a witness.
 First, wounded by imbalance of our trade, perhaps we could have
 it to be necessary together.
 And finally, I think we have covered the ground.
 and left the remaining question: how can we move forward from here, and

God alone knows. We don't know how to do it.

MR. EBAN: I think one just has to pick and probe and therefore when Waldheim said he might come, I said - I think it is better to talk to people on the spot than in New York, because the people in New York have to refer back and they are also the people who are involved in polemics. We, therefore, welcome if friendly governments or international agencies go to Cairo or Jerusalem.

LORD BALNIEL: The good thing about the Council so far, it hasn't gone to some , of its wildest statements or resolutions put down which are quite unacceptable. Anything might happen next week, but so far there is nothing unobjectionable.

MR. EBAN: That depends on the member states. They might put something one-sided and we would hope that we can be closer together than we were before. The things to avoid, I think, are first of all obviously to avoid an attempt to interpret the Council's resolution by putting words into it, to avoid interpretation by voting out of general context any specific paragraph. They are very about the paragraph about the inadmissibility of territory obtained by war, whereas we think that only has meaning within the context of making peace and secure and agreed boundaries. In other words, we don't say that war or force is the basis for acquiring but to interpret that (before) in a peace treaty, you make a territorial modification, that's so

And since then, we don't know how to do it.

MR. BARN: I think one thing we do know and know

and therefore when we talk about it, we should know it and I think

it is better to talk in terms of the past than in New York.

because the people in New York have to reflect back and they also

the people who are involved in business, the business, which

is extremely important in international relations, and so to

be clear.

LONG BARN: The good thing about the Council is

that it hasn't gone to work

statements or resolutions but down which are quite unexpected.

Anything might happen next week, but so far there is nothing in

opportunities.

MR. BARN: That depends on the weather station. They

right, but something has happened and we would hope that we can be

clearer together than we were before. The thing to avoid, I think

is that of all objectives to avoid an attempt to influence the

Council's resolution by using words that it is an event, interests

also by voting and of course, control and control is important.

They are very about the government about the responsibility

of security obtained by war, whereas we think that only has

meaning within the context of making peace and secure and spread

countries. In other words, we don't say that war or force is

the basis for something but to influence that

peace treaty, you make a constitutional modification, that's

absurd that it can't have any attention. To change boundaries by agreement . We haven't acquired territory. As you have seen, it is under occupational regime, what we call the military administration. We distinguish between, and the Israeli law doesn't apply, apart from the special position of a city divided, which couldn't . We don't say that we have acquired Sinai. We haven't acquired the West Bank. We hold it as is necessary for security pending a negotiation which will determine where the boundaries run.

MR. RAFAEL: This documentary consensus, however imperfect, might one day be needed. Therefore, let's not tamper with it. Indeed, it will be needed if one of the things which will say their face in a resolution . Therefore, we didn't want to change or quote part without the rest, and either you quote the whole thing from beginning to end or nothing. Then you are really left - I don't know what the Council should do except to ask its representatives, the UN representztives, to resume contacts with the parties and to discuss with them how to make progress.

LORD BAINIEL: That's not objectionable to you?

MR. EBAN: No.

MR. RAFAEL: We agreed to that as far back as 1970.

In connection with the cease fire of August 1970, we said that we would cooperate in the implementation of Resolution 242 in all

appears that it doesn't have any objection. To change procedure

by agreement. We haven't noticed

anything. As you have seen, it is under consideration, really.

And we will the military administration. We distinguish between

and the military law doesn't apply, apart from the special position

of a city divided. Which couldn't

say that we have submitted this. The haven't accepted the West

that. We have it as a necessary for security pending a negotiation

which will determine where the boundaries are.

MR. HARTLEY: This documentary document, however

correct, might one day be needed. Therefore, let's not keep

with it. Indeed, it will be needed in one of the things which

will say that this is a resolution

Therefore, we didn't want to change or delete part without the rest.

and either you move the whole thing from beginning to end or

nothing. Then you are really left - I don't know what the

General should do except to ask the representatives, the

representatives, to come together with the parties and to

discuss with them how to make progress.

MR. HARTLEY: That's not objectionable to you?

MR. HARTLEY: No.

MR. HARTLEY: We agreed to this as far back as 1946.

In connection with the census of August 1946, we said that we

would cooperate in the implementation of a resolution and in all

its parts, spelling out what the parts are.

MR. EBAN: That still commits us.

MR. RAFAEL: That's still the position, and very much, in my opinion, will depend on the leadership of the British delegation, because you will be in the chair, and perhaps it will be more suitable for all concerned to end the meeting in a consensus instead of taking the debate of the proceedings to a vote. If you vote, the other side may ask, may demand things which are unacceptable to one member of the Council and force a veto and create a situation which would not be a most constructive one in that situation as we find ourselves. Therefore, if the Waldheim proposal looms - and I guess that he will make a statement that he proposes to go to the area -

LORD BAINIEL: I am rather surprised that he'd want to go. He puts his whole prestige behind it, the prestige of the Secretary General getting involved in the most intractable of all political problems in the world.

MR. EBAN: Jarring hasn't been here for a long time. I think the Secretary General's does not go to the Middle East as a very strange phenomenon. Hammarskjold was here about ten times.

MR. COLES: The Egyptians made the invitation?

MR. EBAN: Yes, and obviously he can't go to Egypt and not come to Israel, probably Jordan as well. If he goes to the

the matter, and I am sure that the public will

Mr. [Name] has also written me

Mr. [Name] has also written me the position and very much

to my opinion, will depend on the leadership of the British

delegation, because you will be in the chair, and perhaps it will

be a disadvantage for all concerned to end the meeting in a

momentous decision of taking the debate of the proceedings to a

vote. If you vote, the other side may not, may demand things

which are unacceptable to one member of the Council and force

upon me a decision which would not be a good constructive

one in that situation as to find ourselves, therefore, in the

position of a proposal to vote - and I guess that he will give a statement

that he proposes to do so the day

John [Name] I am rather surprised that he is

to go. He has been quite positive about it, the president of the

Secretary General, getting involved in the last interview of all

political problems in the world.

Mr. [Name] I am sure that he will have a very good

I think the Secretary General's does not go to the middle last

as a very strange phenomenon. [Name] was very about the

line.

Mr. [Name] The President made the invitation

Mr. [Name] Yes, and obviously he can't go to the

and not come to himself, probably because as well. It is good to see

Middle East, it's the Middle East and therefore he must have our concurrence, concurrent invitation or readiness, and we have given this reply in principle, in this principle that if he wants to come, we will give him all the hospitality and discussion the Secretary General ought to have from a member state, but because the Council is meeting, we suggest that he keeps that in abeyance until then and the fact that it is in abeyance might moderate the Council, if as you believe there is an impulse for moderation.

MR. RAFAEL: He only asked us to treat the matter very discreetly. It is a complicated -

MR. EBAN: We only gave our reply in the last two or three days. The United States knows about it from us or from Egypt. Since he really hasn't said, I am definitely going, we haven't published. There was something in the press saying that he might go, but he might not.

MR. CRAIG: What is it you said, that he will announce that he will be coming before the debate?

MR. EBAN: Yes, because it gives the debate - if the debate gets into a cul-de-sac or gets very nasty in a way you and we would think that it is getting unconstructive, this may be a way to cut through. It's best to leave it and go on a general basis to make contact with the parties.

MR. CRAIG: Could that conceivably be the result?

middle East, like the Middle East and elsewhere he must have
our concurrence, necessary investment in a building, and we have
given this right in principle in this principle that it is what
to say, we will give it in the possibility and discussion
the Secretary General must to have in a member state, but
because the Council is meeting, we suggest that he keeps that as
provision until then and that that is in the future might
reconsider the Council, it is not possible that it is not possible to
reconsider.

MR. TAVEL: He only asked us to transfer matter
very dramatically. It is a complicated

MR. TAVEL: He only gave one reply in the last two
of three days. The United States knows about it from the
report. Since it really hasn't said, I am not going to
say anything. There was something in the press saying that
he had said that he might not.

MR. TAVEL: What is it you said, that he will announce
that he will be coming before the Council?

MR. TAVEL: Yes, because it gives the Council a right
to debate this into a full-scale vote very early in a way you and
we would think that it is getting increasingly clear that
a way to get through. It's best to leave it and go on a general
basis to make contact with the Council.

MR. TAVEL: Could that possibly be the result?

MR. EBAN: It could be a concensus from the chair.
Mr. Rafael said you will be in the chair.

LORD BARNIEL: From today.

MR. EBAN: In so far as we discussed, it would have to be the end of July or early August. I have to be in Latin America in early August. I gather that's what he was thinking of. It could fit. I don't see it as going to be the salvation of the problem. It could help to prevent things from taking a rather virulent course, because you can't end up saying nothing at the United Nations. If it is going in such a way that you are going to have bad resolutions and vetoes and all this, it might be better for the Chairman to say, to offer the advice to the Council to wish Waldheim well and let him go and let's see how he sees the situation.

(A short remark by Mr. Rafael.)

MR. COLLES: He must make some kind of report.

MR. CONAY: It is on that point, if I may. From my own experience, this is dangerous. I think that it should avoid saying that within a certain time the Secretary General should report to the Council. It must be left entirely to this discretion as to report as and when he thinks fit, because if you compel him to report on something which has achieved nothing, then it can only be harmful.

MR. BAKER: I would be a cooperator from the chair.

MR. BAKER: I would be in the chair.

MR. BAKER: I would be in the chair.

MR. BAKER: I would be in the chair.

to be the end of only an early answer. I have to be in the chair.

as well as early answer. I have to be in the chair.

is quite true. I don't see it as going to be the end of the chair.

the problem. It should be of great help to the chair.

rather a violent answer, because you can't say anything nothing.

of the United Nations. It is going to be such a way that you are

going to have had resolutions and reports and all this, it might be

better for the chairman to say, to give the answer to the Council.

to give the answer to the Council. I don't see how he can do it.

situation.

(A short answer by Mr. Baker.)

MR. BAKER: I would be in the chair.

MR. BAKER: I would be in the chair.

and suggesting. This is dangerous. I think that it should be

having that which is certain that the Secretary General should

report to the Council. It must be left entirely to the discretion

to report on and when he thinks fit, because as you know, this

to report on something which has achieved nothing, then it can only

be harmful.

MR. EBAN: We have suggested that he shouldn't come as it were as the emissary of the Council but as Secretary General of the organization. We are one of the 130-something countries. He's been to Tokyo and Asia. It's quite simple for him. I don't know how U Thant managed without coming here.

MR. RAFAEL: After his experience in Cairo in 1967?

LORD BALNIEL: We weren't in fact thinking along these lines.

MR. EBAN: We weren't either. I can only say that this was a suggestion by Egypt. It might be constructive. They might be concerned with a vacuum. They may end up some time on the X of July with nothing much in hand, and then they have to say, now what is the next stage? And if you don't have a next stage, this is the time to make a war. He can say, there is another effort. Something is coming out of the UN, and we are going to try to persuade him to have a rectitude of the view. At least it is diplomatically helpful even if it is not politically or substantively effective.

LORD BALNIEL: Good.

MR. RAFAEL: In the announcement, so far as I understand the timetable of the Secretary General, he is going to Geneva, leaving for Geneva and I think he will not announce anything before coming back to New York, around the 8th or 10th. So I think there will be no outward movement on that.

MR. FRANK: We have suggested that the Committee should

it was in the attempt to the Committee on Security General
of the organization. We are one of the 100,000 members
we're back to Tokyo and Asia. It's a matter of time, I think,
know how I think suggest without coming here.

MR. FRANK: After the meeting, when in 1937,

JOHN BARTON: We were in a room at night along

these things.

MR. FRANK: We weren't alone. I can only say that

this was a suggestion by myself. It might be constructive. They

might be concerned with a vacuum. They may and we know that

on the X of July with nothing much in hand, and then they have to

say, now what is the next step? And if you don't have a name

stage, this is the time to make a move. In any case, there is

another effort. Something is coming out of the UN, and we are

going to say to persuade him to have a meeting of the UN, and

later it is slightly better, but it is not completely

an absolutely effective.

JOHN BARTON: Thank you.

MR. FRANK: In the meantime, so far as I understand

stand the situation of the Security Council, he is going to continue

looking for ideas and I think he will not announce anything before

coming back to New York, around the 1st of July. So I think there

will be no further movement on this.

LORD BALNIEL: He won't announce anything except surely in response to a request by the Security Council?

MR. RAFAEL: By the parties.

MR. EBAN: Egypt has asked him. The only thing which prevented him accepting is that he wanted to make it broader than Egypt. This is an Egyptian initiative and we are, as it were, creating the conditions which make it possible -

MR. COMAY: The Council might take note of his statement that he ends to go out, rather than making him the agent of the Council by asking him to go out. It should be the other way around.

LORD BALNIEL: The parties ask and the Council takes note.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 7:10 p.m.)

LORD BARNARD: He won't announce anything except

himself in response to a request by the Security Council.

MR. BARNARD: By the article.

MR. BARNARD: Egypt has asked him. The only thing which

prevented him accepting is that he wanted to make it better than

before. This is an Egyptian initiative and is not, as it were,

meeting the conditions which make it possible.

MR. BARNARD: The Council might take note of his views.

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of the Council by asking him to go out. It should be the other

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LORD BARNARD: The parties ask and the Council takes

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Thank you very much.

(Whereupon the meeting adjourned at 7:10 p.m.)

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Meeting between

THE RT HON LORD BALNIEL PC MP
Minister of State, Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
GREAT BRITAIN

and
MR. ABBA EBAN, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, ISRAEL

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Monday morning, 11:50 a.m.
July 2, 1973
Jerusalem

MR. EBAN: Could I have a few afterthoughts from
yesterday?

LORD BALNIEL: Of course, yes.

MR. EBAN: One point refers to the Jarring mission.
One reason why it is difficult simply to say, all right, why
doesn't the Security Council tell Jarring to resume is that that
doesn't deal with the problem which brought about the deadlock,
namely that he has attached himself to a memorandum, which is not
an agreed document and made that part of his terms of reference,
and I doubt whether the Egyptians would support or would ask
their friends in the Council to support a simple renewal of his
mission without reference to the February 1971 memorandum, and if
there is a reference then that rules us out. That is the deadlock
and if that were to be the Security Council jurisprudence, we
would be carrying the deadlock into the Security Council. We
tried to break it once with the four African President saying
that the positions of the parties are such to justify resuming
negotiations. That didn't get a majority in the General Assembly.

Meeting between

THE RT HON LORD BARNARD
Minister of State, Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
GREAT BRITAIN

and
MR. ABRA KHAN, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, ISRAEL

Monday morning, 11:50 a.m.
July 2, 1973
Jerusalem

MR. KHAN: Could I have a few strengthening from

yourself?

LORD BARNARD: Of course, yes.

MR. KHAN: One point refers to the timing mission.

One reason why it is difficult simply to say, all right, why
doesn't the Security Council tell Jarring to resume is that that
doesn't deal with the problem which brought about the deadlock,
namely the fact he attached himself to a memorandum, which is not
an agreed document and made that part of his terms of reference,
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and is that were to be the Security Council jurisdiction, we
would be carrying the deadlock into the Security Council. We
first to break it once with the four African President saying
that the positions of the parties are such to justify resuming
negotiations. That didn't get a majority in the General Assembly.

Only about 23 countries voted for it. That was the last attempt made to cut through that particular deadlock. That is one reason I think that the Secretary General has thought of going out. Because when you say "Jarring", the Egyptian mind immediately says "February Memorandum". That is the association. Whereas another United Nations representative is not quite so caught up in that jurisprudence and can perhaps be a little more vague about it.

At any rate, the development since yesterday is that our Ambassador at the UN spoke to the Secretary General who had met with Magid who is the head of the Egyptian delegation. Waldheim told him that the date that is convenient is the end of July or the beginning of August. [?] He would suggest that they therefore postpone the date of the second phase of the Council. The Egyptians would like him to come out between now and the Council meeting, which is quite impossible. It is impossible for us. So if they want, if the holding of the meeting in mid-July is essential for them, we would suggest that he waits until that is over. And that might also, as we have said, enable, and he mentioned the possibility and he said some of the smaller, the non-permanent members don't quite know how to bring this to an end and some of them have spoken of some consensus rather than a resolution which would divide the Council or raise veto problems, and perhaps a visit of his could be part of that.

The Egyptian delegate simply said he would discuss the

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now, comments rather than a resolution which would divide the
Council on these wide problems, and perhaps a visit of his could be
part of that.
The Egyptian delegate simply said he would discuss the

date with Cairo. He can't say whether or not the end of July or early August is convenient for them in view of diplomatic visits. At any rate, that's the position now. Egypt has made the invitation. We have added ours and we have suggested the date. There is a negotiation about dates now.

LORD BALNIEL: I am grateful to you for adding to what you said yesterday and I appreciate your reservations about Jarring. I take the point. It was a new idea to us, the concept of Waldheim going out, based on a concensus and, you know, it seems -

MR. EBAN: After a concensus. I don't know whether he wants to base it on anything but a Secretary General visiting a member state in one of the areas of tension. It had arisen before. I remember discussing it with Sir Alec when last in London, and he said that might be a way out. He didn't think there was much importance whether it was Jarring or Waldheim. The important thing, he thought, was to get the UN moving or at least appearing to move so that there isn't a sense of deadlock.

: The original Egyptian idea seems to have been that Waldheim should go out before the Council.

MR. EBAN: I think it would not be very logical because it would even make the debate, if he came back and reported that he hadn't gotten anywhere, that makes the position even worse, and now it is not technically possible. One wants to do this with a certain amount of dignity and propriety, so that I

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JOHN LAMMIE: I am grateful to you for adding to what you said yesterday and I appreciate your reservations about Germany. I take the point. It was a new idea to us, the concept of Weidmann going out, based on a concession and, you know, it seems -

MR. STAN: After a conference. I don't know whether he wants to base it on anything but a Secretary General visiting a member state in one of the areas of tension. It had arisen before. I remember discussing it with Sir Alan when I was in London, and he said that might be a way out. He didn't think there was much importance whether it was taking or Weidmann. The important thing, he thought, was to get the UN moving on at least something to move so that there isn't a sense of deadlock. The original Egyptian idea seems to

have been that Weidmann should go out before the Council. MR. STAN: I think it would not be very logical because it would even make the debate, if he came back and reported that he hadn't gotten anywhere, that makes the position even worse, and now it is not technically possible. One wants to do this with a certain amount of dignity and propriety, so that I

I can be here and the Prime Minister and then the end of July, up to about the 5th of August, when I have to be in Latin America would be better. It is a technical matter with us. Except that I think that it is not just a question of chronology. If we want to get the best advantage out of it, either it should come either without the second round or if that is not feasible, then after it. Not be in its shadow. We would prefer it instead. If they won't play with that, all right, we will take our luck in the second round, and there might be created the situation for good or for ill where somebody could be helpful if he came out after. At any rate, that creates a certain continuity. They have the second round and then you have the chance of somebody taking the matter further during the summer months. They have the Assembly. Especially if I understand the one thing that is important for them is not to have a situation of complete diplomatic immobility at any stage. That is for them, I think, the most difficult position of all. How to explain an act of if there isn't something whereby you can justify abstention.

I am told that at the meeting in Luxembourg the Foreign Minister of Germany Federal Republic threw this out as one idea, of the Secretary General going out. Did you get that from Brussels?

MR. RAFAEL: 5th of June. When he gave his report on his visit to the Arab countries. There was not a long discussion

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one idea, of the Secretary General doing so. Did you see that
from Luxembourg?
MR. TAVEL: 25th of June. When he gave his report
on his visit to the Arab countries. There was not a very discussion

at all as far as I understand on the Middle East, but the only idea which was contributed was by Schell that the Secretary General can do something about the situation.

MR. EBAN: Perhaps Schell heard that in Cairo because that's about the same time, or a week later that the Egyptians began to raise it with Waldheim himself.

I'd like to say a word about the Helsinki Conference, the European Security Council. When I was in Vienna Kriskie thought it would be the height of wisdom to have the Middle East debate in Helsinki and I explained with as much frankness as an official guest can mobilize that it is not a very good idea. We also heard from the United States that they don't like it, and the Soviet Union is desperately hostile to the idea. When I spoke to your government, I think it was Sir Alec - at any rate, I understood that you didn't want it. The Scandinavians told us they didn't want it. The Rumanians who have a proprietorial ? on the Helsinki Conference very much don't want it. They feel that the Conference on European Security should deal with European security and not have the classical Arab-Israeli debate. One can make a case for saying that the European security is affected by the Mediterranean and the Middle East, but after all, that's an indirect effect. The conference has direct European problems to discuss. So there is a very general reservation.

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~~It is not necessary to have a separate~~

of the President in. However, at the same time, we should be
getting along with the work of the President. With the intention
that the President should be able to do the work of the President
consequently, the work of the President will be the same -
and the same: the same?

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which are to be used for the purpose of the survey. The names are to be written in the first column, and the addresses in the second column. The names are to be written in the first column, and the addresses in the second column.

I'd just like to say what our attitude is. It is better that neither they nor we should be there. We have lots of platforms in which to argue about and I think the major participants in the European Security Conference have quite a different agenda. But if two Arab mediterranean countries take part, then we are asking to take part, not because we want to take part but we think that's the best way of neither of us being there. Some friendly Europeans have told us that's the best way to scotch the whole thing; to face an Arab request with an Israeli request, and that will strike terror into everybody's heart and they will say, look, will you all stay at home because we have other business to do?

That's the spirit in which I made this application.
Also frankly, if they are there and they don't make speeches about

the dispute, we can't possibly not be there.

I'd like to tell you intimately that our hope is - we have no ambition to be there, and we think the Middle East shouldn't arise. That's not the forum for it.

LORD BALNIEL: At any rate, I don't know if it is possible. We share your view; it is not the forum and the Helsinki conference has big enough problems in any case to discuss and to embark on the problems of the Middle East is not in our view the agenda for the purpose of the Helsinki conference. So we neither wish the subject to be raised, although it is not utterly in our hands whether it will be raised or not. Nor do we think it right that the participation should be extended. Again, the participation of those who are actually there is big enough and in general terms, we don't want the addition.

Where do you stop? You go down to South Africa?

MR. EBAN: It stops in Europe. United States and Canada is understandable because of the security relations, but Tunisia, Algeria, Israel, is not quite the same as America and Canada in relation to the security of Europe. But we agree - I draw this distinction - if there is a general debate, anybody can say what he likes and some foreign minister will talk about the Mediterranean. We distinguish between that which is quite unavoidable and an agenda item, which is avoidable, because that has to be voted by the participants. Most of them are not in favor.

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distinction. We distinguish between that which is quite unobjec-

tionable and an agenda item which is avoidable, because that has to

be voted by the participants. Most of them are not in favor.

LORD BALNIEL: Speaking very openly about it. I don't know, if in fact it does come to the agenda and there is a discussion on the Middle East, what is your position about observers on that? Not Participating?

MR. EBAN: We would say: we have no ambitions there. Whatever is decided for the Arab states, we would ask for the same. If they want to be there, whatever their status is, ours would be. If they send their foreign ministers, then we would. If they are content with, which we think would be the best thing, to have their observer the ambassador, our ambassador is there anyhow, so that we will have somebody watching. Then we would have the same status. But we think that the best contribution of the European Security Conference to the area is to get on with the business of European Security. That was also Chancellor Brandt's attitude. If agreement is reached on the European part of the agenda, then indirectly that is going to have a good effect on the Mediterranean by creating rapprochement between east and west and removing that competitiveness in Soviet-Western relations, which is one of the irritants in this part of the world, and that's the way that we would like the Middle East countries to look at it.

The same is true of the Rumanians, which is the first country to seek support for a European Security Conference, and we heard indirectly that the Soviets are - Their opposition may have very many reasons. One is - and the fact is I really don't

NOTE: I don't know, it is fact it does come to the agenda and there is a discussion on the Middle East, what is your position about observing on that? Not participating?

Mr. KENNEDY: We would say: we have no position there.

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know why the Arabs are so keen. If you ask yourself what the Helsinki Conference is about, it is a very massive and somewhat spectacular conference for the purpose of legitimating territory by force and the Soviets may be aware of that contradiction. I just don't know why the philosophy of the European/^{Security}Conference should appeal to the Arab States. They just might not have thought it out.

That brings me to Europe in general, and we understand that British policy in the Middle East will operate very largely within the European framework. And there are two problems there: the question of the political attitude taken by the Nine and the question of the specific negotiations on the agreement. I know there are different views among the Nine about what the future of the Community is, whether it is going to be a political union which is what Mr. Brandt said was the eventual hope, or whether it is going to be Europe de partie, as President deGaulle said. In other words, the national identity of each and the national sovereignty of each member must be emphasized and preserved.

But there is a tendency already for consultation, which we understand, but we would be disturbed if the pursuit of concensus was to be made such an obsession that countries were to adopt policies which they don't believe in just because six or seven of the others do. We have found that in the UN. Some

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That brings me to Europe in general, and we under-
stand that British policy in the Middle East will operate very
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which we understand, but we would be disturbed if the purpose
of convection was to be made such an occasion that countries were
to adopt policies which they don't believe in just because that
or a man or the other do. We have found that in the past. Some

governments have said, we don't really agree with everything that is in a certain resolution, but since a majority of the Nine will go with it, then we will abandon our reservation and go along with it.

The Israeli problem arises, quite frankly, in the context of the tendency of the Six, before the Three joined, to formulate documents which were really laid down by the French, who since 1967 have had a special complex about Israel. We are trying to reduce it. I think we are having some success. The atmosphere of French-Israel relations is less abraisive than it was earlier. We have never really plumed the origins of their very strong pro-Arab attitude taken on the 24th of May and thereafter.

I certainly remember that whereas all the other Western countries were quite clear that Israel was the victim of a lawless act - historically, incidentally, because I know this was discussed with our Prime Minister yesterday, it so happens that the first government which used this "you are the victim of a lawless act" was the British government through its Prime Minister on the 24th of May when I was in London. He said the opposite of what President DeGaulle had said to me a few hours previously. As I said, the motives for taking such a one-sided determination have never been explored. The latest contribution to the historical literature are the memoirs of Bolyn who said that DeGaulle pointed to a chair which he kept in that room, "Mr. Eban sat in that chair." I said to him, " ",

and you know what happened. They didn't listen to us; us in royal plural. (French) And this enormity weighed upon them for many months. But there we are trying to reach a more viable relationship.

But on the Middle East problem they took the view that the resolution calls for the absolute and exact reconstruction of the previous map and they have stated this much more often and definitively than other Western countries. They even claimed that one oughtn't to read English documents at all but that in the French translation it says "evacuation of the territory" to which our reply is that we didn't negotiate the document in that language. We negotiated in English and the word "the" was a major issue. Between Johnson and Kosygin there was correspondence as to whether the definite article should be inserted. Apparently there isn't such a thing in the Russian language but the Soviets were aware that it does exist in the English language. They wanted it put in and it was refused.

The Six used to come to a consensus on the basis of French policy, France being the only one of the Six with Middle East experience. Since the Six became the Nine, there's been less tendency to draw up blueprints about how we should draw our maps, and I think that's a salutary development. If the Nine could develop a common policy on the general principle of a settlement in accordance with 242 - and they have said that - and also with the hope that the parties will negotiate such a

And you know what happened. They didn't listen to us; in the
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could develop a common policy on the general principle of a
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and also with the hope that the parties will negotiate such a

settlement, I think that would be both proper and useful, but we would not like the Nine to try to work out a boundary scheme which would pre-empt our negotiating freedom. In other words, we would like a certain amount of political abstentionism on the details of the settlement.

We have discussed this with other Ministers from about ? the Nine who have been here. They have all been, incidentally except the French, but they are tormenting themselves with that possibility now as well. We had a meeting of the mixed committee and we had some Irish representatives for the first time. They didn't want to talk about oranges. They wanted to tell us about their rectitude on the dispute in Northern Ireland. We don't have an embassy there, although we have contacts.

I think that on the political aspect of the Middle East the Ministers are doing well to go slow. The Italian Foreign Minister Medici said very frankly that Europe has a great deal of wealth but not very much power and therefore its contribution should be to the economic development of the area, refugee resettlement, economic development within the context of a peace settlement, while resting on the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are the two powers who have a strategic presence in the area and therefore a special security responsibility.

Chancellor Brandt said that although he is one of those who look forward to a political union - he is the most Federalist in his thinking apparently of all the leading members

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Christopher Brandt said that although it is one of those who look forward to a political union - he is the most Federalist in his thinking amongst all the leading members

of the Community - for historic and moral reasons, Germany would not be able to join a consensus which Israel thought was against its vital interests. There is the special German background which you probably understand more intimately by your visit to the Memorial this morning.

So that we think that there are good reasons for Europe to give the advice which some are giving to our neighbors, to get themselves into a negotiating context, and we think the main contribution of the EEC in the immediate future should be to develop as close relations as it can with Israel and with any Arab states who are willing for that relationship and even if that is an economic relationship, I think it would have a psychological and political effect if Israel and Tunisia, Algeria, perhaps Egypt, Lebanon if they wanted, had exactly the same kind of contractual relationship with the EEC. That could create some kind of a link, give Europe some role.

European institutions began as purely economic institutions, steel, coal and so on, but they have developed a political form, as you know far better than we.

And, therefore, I think that the idea of close relationship between the EEC and Mediterranean countries is a useful one. On the other hand, when Mr. Shumann said that there should be a global Mediterranean arrangement, we welcomed it because it broke what was then a deadlock in our efforts to maintain our

on the Community - for historic and moral reasons, Germany would
not be able to join a community which Israel thought was against
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European institutions have an purely economic
institutions, itself, and so on, and they have developed a
political force, as you know far better than we.
And, therefore, I think that the idea of closer
relationship between the EEC and Mediterranean countries is a
full one. On the other hand, when Mr. Giscard said that there should
be a global Mediterranean arrangement, we welcomed it because it
shows what was then a deadlock in our efforts to maintain our

interests in the Community and to develop our agreement into a new agreement. When he said that, we were in a catastrophic position because the adherence of Britain to the Community without any arrangement regarding Israel would have been a very heavy blow to us because of the preponderance of Britain as a trading partner of Israel. And his intervention enabled us to sign a protocol defending our position in 1973 and leading to an agreement to which the EEC is committed in 1974.

But what we are now concentrating on - and this is largely as a result of our discussions in London - is not ? the philosophy of globalism or non-globalism. We are interested in the treaty between Israel and the EEC and if that's similar or not similar to other agreements, that is a separate question. We are negotiating on a bilateral basis.

The Commission of the EEC will begin to negotiate on the 11th of July with an Israeli delegation about what the agreement between the EEC and Israel should contain. Nevertheless we are keeping an eye on Spain and on the Maghreb and they are keeping an eye on us, because if we make a gain in some point, Spain is going to try to get that and if Maghreb gets 80 percent concession on its citrus, then we are certainly going to try to get equality with them. So that they can't push themselves, for example, into the British ahead of us. We have had this tradition in that market.

We will be discussing later what our suggestions

interest in the Community and to develop our relationship into a
new agreement. When he said that, we were in a categorical
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protocol extending our position in 1971 and leading to an agreement
to which the EEC is committed in 1974.

But what we are now contemplating is - and this is
largely as a result of our discussion in London - is not
the philosophy of liberalism or non-alignment. We are interested
in the treaty between Israel and the EEC and if that's similar or
not similar to other agreements, that's a separate question. We
are negotiating on a bilateral basis.

The conclusion of the EEC will begin to negotiate
on the 15th of July with an Israeli delegation about what the
agreement between the EEC and Israel should contain. Nevertheless
we are keeping an eye on Spain and on the situation and they are
keeping an eye on our progress. It's a race to see who is going
Spain is going to try to get that and it means that 80 percent
concession on the system, that we are certainly going to try to get
agreement with them. So that they can't turn themselves into a
head of us. We have had this

conclusion in that market.

We will be discussing later what our suggestions

are. At the moment we are going to make them to the Commission, but for background I would like to say what the two major points are.

The mandate which was voted on the 26th of June is all right on the industrial products. We are going to have a free trade area for our industry -

LORD BALNIEL: What do you mean "it is all right"? It's the most wonderful thing that's happened to you for ages. You don't show the enthusiasm I would have thought.

MR. EBAN: That's because I met our Minister of Agriculture - they are the difficult people in the market - this morning. I suppose because farmers are never satisfied. It is either too much rain or too little. These are the only situations the farming community recognizes.

But we certainly think it was a very good development. On the agricultural, especially the citrus, they propose the 60 percent concession to our produce but apparently an 80 percent to the Maghreb countries. We will negotiate very hard to try to get up to 80 percent ourselves. That's the first item. And I don't believe our problems are with Britain; they are rather with France and Italy.

As regards the concrete interests that are involved, I would like that Britain would have an anti-inflationary interest in the British housewife being able to buy this produce as cheaply as possible and not have another item to push up the price level.

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are.

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Now, what do you mean "it is all right"?
It's the most wonderful thing that's happened to you for ages. You
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MR. HENRI: That's because I met our Minister of
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try to get up to 80 percent ourselves. That's the basic item.
And I don't believe our problems are with Britain; they are rather
with France and Italy.

As regards the concrete interests that are involved,
I would like that Britain would have an anti-inflationary interest
in the British housewife being able to pay this produce as cheaply
as possible and not have another item to push up the price level.

Therefore, if we get our 80 percent, our produce will be cheaper than if only 60 percent, and since the British people, I think, will buy Israeli oranges whatever happens and whatever the cost, because of the essential respect for quality; therefore, they may as well be as cheap as possible.

The other matter concerns opening our own market. We have the Reverse Preference idea, not because we like it, but because I don't think it is realistic for a market, nor is it possible, not to open itself up to European produce and yet to ask that we get into Europe free. This is a country with an international trade of \$7 billion a year, with an import from the EEC of \$1 billion a year, which is more than all the contiguous Arab countries put together and with a high rate of technological growth and with a per capita income that is now higher than some of the EEC countries. So I don't know that you can get away saying that we are poor relations that we must get free into your market and not give the same in return.

MR. CRAIG: You yourself asked us for special
? , asked for reverse preference.

MR. EBAN: Because otherwise we wouldn't get an agreement at all. It is hopeless to try and portray Israel as a country like Lebanon or like Tunisia in respect of its economic level. We have to accept reciprocity for that, and we think it is good for our industry, frankly, to get out of the protectionist phase and to be submitted to the shock of competitiveness. It

therefore, if we get our 60 percent, our produce will be cheaper than if only 50 percent, and since the British people, I think, will pay tariffs on whatever happens and whatever the cost, because of the essential aspect for quality; therefore, they may as well be as cheap as possible.

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MR. CRAIG: You yourself asked us for special

asked for revenue preference.

MR. SMITH: Because otherwise we wouldn't get an agreement at all. It is impossible to say and justify tariff as a country like Lebanon or like Tunisia in respect of its economic level. We have to accept reciprocity for that, and we think it is good for our industry, frankly, to get out of the protectionist phase and to be subjected to the shock of competitiveness. It

will cause a lot of pain, but we think it is salutary pain.

Nevertheless, there is an imbalance because this means that at a certain date in the 1970's or 80's, all the industrial produce from Europe will get in here without any customs, and that's 90 percent of what Europe exports to Israel, whereas oranges, about 55 percent of what we send into Europe will be getting in free because 45 is agricultural and that is what we call the imbalance. Those are the two points that we will try to negotiate.

I would like to say that we have received some stern homilies in Washington, but that's really about the whole policy of the EEC. They tell us that it is scandalous that Europe is ungrateful economically, that the EEC market is a protectionist market, that American goods are discriminated against, and now to add insult to injury the Israeli market will be available to Europe on a better basis than to the United States, and then the Europeans want to create big global chunks of the map. That will be closed off to America or at least not open on similar grounds. And Mr. Shultz ambushed me in Washington and then had a talk with Mr. Sapir last week.

Our reply is that we are not the address for this grievance. This is an American grievance against the policy of the European Community as a whole, and they ought to negotiate with the big boys, with the Commission and with the major powers there if there is a grievance, an economic grievance.

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Nevertheless, there is an imbalance because this

means that we have a deficit since in the 1970's or 80's, if the

industrial produce from Europe will get in here without any duties,

and that's 90 percent of what Europe exports to Japan, whereas

exchanges, about 25 percent of what we send into Europe will be getting

in free because it is agricultural and that is what we only can

improve. Those are the two points that we will try to

negotiate.

I would like to say that we have received some

information in Washington, but that's really about the whole

policy of the EEC. They tell us that it is reasonable that Europe

is unprofitable economically, that the EEC market is a protectionist

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Mr. Schultz admonished me in Washington and then had a talk with

Mr. Blair last week.

Our reply is that we are not the address for this

dispute. This is an American grievance against the policy of

the European Community as a whole, and they ought to negotiate

with the big boys, with the Commission and with the major powers.

There is a grievance, an economic grievance.

Whatever is decided by the EEC will obviously apply to those associated. Whatever is done to counterbalance. When I asked Mr. Shultz, are you really suggesting that Israel stay out of an agreement with the EEC, he said, I can't ask you to commit suicide. But I can tell you what a scandalous thing the whole matter is that it hasn't been arranged. And there was a visit by the representative of the Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, and I hoped that would solve it and create agreement. Apparently it did not. But we are aware of this. Some times the Americans say that if it were only Israel and Spain they could live with it, because for Spain there are political reasons for doing whatever Europe does, which includes reverse preference. For Israel, there are economic reasons; the structure of our economic is more akin to the European structure than is that of any of the Maghreb countries. They don't like the extension of this on the global scale.

We have listened and we have said that we think that you should talk about this in Brussels, in London, in Paris, in Bonn, and whatever is agreed between the EEC and the United States will obviously have its repercussions on Israel and the United States. In addition, we will probably have to discuss with them some specific arrangements. They think we don't buy enough of their goods. We take their dollars and spend them all in Europe.

MR. CRAIG: You send the Americans to an address that belongs to you.

Whatever is decided by the UN will obviously apply to those associated. Whatever is done to counterbalance, then I asked Mr. Shulim, are you really suggesting that Israel stay out of an agreement with the UN? He said, I can't ask you to commit suicide. But I can tell you what a scandalous thing the whole matter is that it hasn't been arranged. And there was a visit by the representative of the Commission, Sir Christopher Gurnea, and I hope that would solve it and create agreement. Apparently it did not. But we are aware of this. Some times the Americans say that it is worse only Israel and Spain they could live with it, because for Spain there are political reasons for doing whatever Europe does, which includes revenue protection. For Israel, there are economic reasons, the structure of our economic is more akin to the European structure than is that of any of the Moslem countries. They don't like the extension of this on the global scale.

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MR. CHAIR: You send the Americans to an address that belongs to you.

MR. EBAN: Supposing we did make an arrangement?
That wouldn't solve. Their major grievance/^{is}with the EEC.

MR. CRAIG: Remember when you came to London to put your case to be treated on the same basis as Spain, not being classified with Lebanon? We did forecast then that the Americans wouldn't like it, and we said that if we went ahead with this policy, we hoped that you would be the lobbyists, because of your close relations, to persuade them, because it was in your vital interests to get this special treatment they will understand.

MR. EBAN: Well, we used this argument. They say that their grievance is not against Israel. Their grievance is against 14 governments, against the Nine and now against the Five, and some of them say that if it were really only Israel and Spain, that wouldn't alarm them so much, although they would even then ask for certain correction of injury. They think we don't buy enough of their motor cars. The reason is that they are too damn big and use a lot of petrol. They don't say that we are the decisive factor there. They rather want us to go back to the others and say, be more grateful historically and be more careful about American sensitivity.

MR. CRAIG: I am afraid it was the instructions of the European desk in Whitehall to make the point to you that we would rely upon you to win the Americans around.

MR. EBAN: All they have said is that they don't

MR. SWAN: Suggesting we did make an arrangement
is

that wouldn't solve their major grievance with the BCC.

MR. CRAIG: Remember when you came to London to the

your case to be treated on the same basis as Spain, not being

connected with Lebanon? We did know it then that the Americans

wouldn't like it, and we said that if we went ahead with this

policy, we hoped that you would be the lobbyist, because of your

close relations, to persuade them, because it was in your vital

interests to get this special treatment they will understand.

MR. SWAN: Well, we used this argument. They say

that their grievance is not against Israel. Their grievance is

against its government, against the King and not against the Jews,

and some of them say that it is really only Israel and Spain,

that wouldn't harm them so much, although they would even then

ask for certain correction of injury. They think we don't pay

enough of their motor cars. The reason is that they are too poor

and use a lot of petrol. They don't say that we are the

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American sensitivity.

MR. CRAIG: I am afraid it was the instructions

of the European desk in Whitehall to make the point to you that

we would rely upon you to win the American ground.

MR. SWAN: All they have said is that they don't

advise us to stay out, but they want us to use our small voice or our ears to understand that they have a grievance and they are going to take it up with everybody concerned.

MR. COMAY: It is a small part of a much bigger problem. This is their attitude.

MR. EBAN: They say that the original injury is their exclusion from the Six and now the Nine and now the Nine are becoming 11 or 14 and it is proliferating. But on the whole, our position is that the European Community is a fact and it is based on a certain economic structure. We are here, which is the backdoor of Europe and not of America. Our trade with Europe is far greater than with the United States. I am speaking of the Nine. We can't possibly hope to dominate their markets. We are in the European market very strongly and proximity is what counts here, and if you look at the map and if you look at the industrial and scientific map, we are simply closer to Europe than to the United States.

For us the important thing now is time. If we are not to have a vacuum in our trade relations by the end of the year, it is important that the Nine should try to reach their conclusion by the end of December. And since they are only beginning on the 11th of July, some degree of speed is essential, some degree of urgency. Haran, is there anything more.

MR. HARAN: First of all, on the question of oranges, it is more than just a question of losing our position.

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on our side to understand that they have a grievance and they
are going to take it up with everybody concerned.

MR. GOWDY: It is a small part of a much bigger

problem, this is their attitude.

MR. EMMETT: They say that the original inquiry is

their examination from the 5th and now the 10th and the 15th and
becoming 11 or 12 and it is really rather. But on the whole, our
position is that the European Community is a fact and it is
based on a certain economic structure. We are here, which is the
backbone of Europe, and not of America. Our trade with Europe is
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and scientific map, we are simply closer to Europe than to the
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For us the important thing now is time. It is time

not to have a vacuum in our trade relations by the end of the
year. It is important that the White House should try to reach their
conclusion by the end of December. And also they are
beginning on the 15th of July, some degree of need is essential,
some degree of urgency. There is there anything more.

MR. EMMETT: First of all, on the question of

negotiation, it is more than just a question of losing our position.

I think the United Kingdom has such a historical responsibility as our main market for many years just as the French sought to give special facilities for the Moroccan and Maghreb oranges and obtain the 80 percent preference for them. We feel that in view of the big weight of our oranges on the UK market, we have a certain right to ask the United Kingdom to take up our cause in this particular instance.

The second point is the question of cooperation. The agreement foreseen will include what is called a valid

and so far the instructions to the Commission are rather narrow. Now, the possibilities of cooperation between Israel and Europe, especially in the field of industrial cooperation and technical, scientific, economic - except financial - are extremely wide and our chances of making use of them are extremely good, so it is extremely important for us that the mandate so far as cooperation is concerned should be as wide as possible, and we would say that information so far obtained is that it is on the narrow side and restricted to trade per se and here again we look to the United Kingdom as one of our major economic partners for some help.

And the third point is on this point of the European department of the Foreign Office's instructions concerning Israel talking to the United States. Certainly we are projecting this dialogue, but all I can say is here: why pick on us, because

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on our main market for many years just as the French sought to
give special facilities for the Moroccan and Maghreb regions and
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Israel talking to the United States. Certainly we are protecting
this dialogue, but all I can say is here, why pick on us, because

after all -

MR. EBAN: They say they pick on us, because we happen to be around.

MR. CRAIG: Because you asked for it.

MR. HARAN: If I make a list, first of all I'd say Greece, Turkey, Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Morocco and Tunisia, plus any additional countries in the Mediterranean to whom this global arrangement is actually open, plus all the association arrangements which have been negotiated with the countries.

MR. EBAN: Ex-Commonwealth countries.

MR. HARAN: Both in Africa and in the Carribean will be open. Now, there the matter is still open, we know, but at least as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, to the best of our knowledge, we are just one a whole list of countries. So when we heard that you told us, talk to the Americans, we didn't hear anything about saying the same thing to the others and we feel that we are in the same boat as they are.

MR. EBAN: I think the point is that reverse preference applies to us and not to the others.

MR. CRAIG: The reason why we, the British, picked on you, the Israelis, was simply that in our original thinking we were not in favor to ask you for reverse preference. Therefore, the fact that you are asked for reverse preference, which annoys the Americans is a direct result of your own intervention. For that

After all -

MR. ELLIS: They say they didn't on me, because we thought

to be wrong.

MR. ELLIS: Because you asked for it.

MR. ELLIS: It is a list, kind of all I'd say.

Greece, Turkey, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Morocco and Tunisia, plus

any additional countries in the Mediterranean to whom this policy

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MR. ELLIS: In connection with countries.

MR. ELLIS: Both in Africa and in the Caribbean will be

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ledge, we are just one whole lot of countries. So when we have

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MR. ELLIS: The reason why we, the British, looked on you

the Israelis, was simply that in our original thinking we were not

in favor of asking you for reverse preference. Therefore, the fact

that you are asked for reverse preference, which changes the

situation is a direct result of your own intervention. For this

reason we feel that we have the right to ask you to say, okay we have agreed with your thesis, we have come around and it's got through in the mandate. Could you please do your part in this operation, i.e. defend us and defend the idea to the people who don't like it, i.e. the Americans.

LORD BALNIEL: I am sure the Americans will talk to whomsoever they want.

If we are moving off from the European business, just let me say my main purpose was to listen to your views and I and my officials will weigh them up. That's my main point in attending these meetings. On your rather general point about your ? and playing a role in the Middle East, I think one has got to accept the fact that our entry into the Community is designed to achieve a greater economic cohesion, a greater strategic influence, a greater political cohesion and ultimately a greater cohesion over foreign policy, and I think you used the phrase - I forget who used it - that the Continent had wealth but not power. One of the great arguments for our entering and other countries entering the Community -

MR. EBAN: That was Medici's phrase. He was speaking of strategic power, aircraft carriers.

LORD BALNIEL: You know, there is an enormous truth in it. One of the kind of underlying thoughts always has been in British minds that for too long in the post-war world, the civiliza-

reason we feel that we have the right to say to say, okay

we have agreed with your thesis, we have some agreed and it's

not through in the market. Could you please do your part in this

operation, I am asking as and defend the idea to the people who

don't like it, I am the American.

LONG BARRER: I am sure the Americans will only be

whatever they want.

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let me say my main purpose was to listen to your views and I am

very grateful with what you have said. That's my main point in attending

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and playing a role in the Middle East, I think one has yet to accept

the fact that our entry into the Community is destined to involve

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western policy, and I think you used the phrase - I forget who

said it - that the Community had wealth but not power. One of

the great arguments for our entering and other countries entering

the Community -

MR. BARRER: That was Mr. Barlow's phrase. He was speaking of

economic power, strategic interests.

LONG BARRER: You know, there is an enormous truth in

it. One of the kind of underlying thoughts always has been in

British minds that for too long in the past we were, the English

tion of Europe, one doesn't hear its voice. One hears in world affairs the voice of America. One hears the voice of the Soviet Union. One hears the voice of China. But the voice of Europe as a cohesive foreign policy expression, one doesn't often hear, and undoubtedly this is one of the purposes that Europe should wield a greater influence in world affairs. And although this is quite true that at the moment there is no cohesion of view on the Middle East, I think it is a fact that gradually this cohesion of view will establish, not in a search for a consensus. This would be wrong. That is setting the cart before the horse, but I think inevitably a consensus of view will gradually emerge and the influence which Europe will wield in world affairs will gradually become similar to the influence which America or the Soviet Union wields, and I would hope in fact it would be a beneficial influence, because the Mediterranean is a bridge between the Middle East and Europe, and no more.

So you talk about documents, agreed documents. At the moment there are as far as I know no agreed documents.

MR. EBAN: I think our objection is not to the principle, but to the context of a particular consensus.

LORD BALNIEL: This is what I suspect.

MR. EBAN: When Brnadt said to me, supposing the Six said something which you liked, you wouldn't argue against the principle of consensus? I think that was right. In other words, the

tion of Europe, one doesn't hear its voice. One hears in world affairs the voice of America. One hears the voice of the Soviet Union. One hears the voice of China. And the voice of Europe is a negative factor, only expression, one doesn't often hear. And undoubtedly this is one of the purposes that Europe would wish a greater influence in world affairs. And although this is quite true that at the moment there is no cohesion of view on the Middle East, I think it is a fact that gradually this cohesion of view will materialize, not in a search for a consensus, this would be wrong. What is lacking the only before the house, but I think inevitably a consensus of view will gradually emerge and the influence which Europe will wish to world affairs will gradually become similar to the influence which America or the Soviet Union would wish. And I would hope in fact it would be a beneficial influence, because the Mediterranean is a bridge between the Middle East and Europe, and so on.

So you talk about documents, agreed documents. At the moment there are no but I know no agreed documents. MR. BROWN: I think our objection is not to the principle, but to the content of a particular consensus. LORD BURNHAM: This is what I suggest. MR. BROWN: When I said and so on, suggesting the fact that something which you think, you wouldn't argue against the principle of consensus? I think that was right. In other words, the

emphasis should be consensus which ought to include the affected parties as well. Try to get the consensus between the Nine and Israel and the Arab states, but not try to ^{ad}judicate against one or the other.

LORD BALNIEL: As I said, there is no agreed European position being expressed on the Middle East politics at the moment. Where there has been agreement is in a particular field, which is the next part of your remarks, in the economic field. Here we agree with you that there has to be; we agree that timing is important. We hope the negotiations which you are embarking on will in fact be concluded by the end of this year, and I am going to say that I thought you skipped over rather too lightly the remarkable, at least it seems to me, industrial agreement.

MR. EBAN: Even there what worries our Minister of Trade and Commerce is the speed with which we will be expected to open our markets to European goods. We will try to get more leeway on that.

LORD BALNIEL: If I understand the position, the industrial sector is going to move towards free trade, I think 80 percent by July 1977 and 95 percent by 1980 and then the full free trade by 1985, and I suppose there are certain sensitive and ^{that} difficult things, but not presumably what you and I are going to negotiate.

MR. EBAN: There are some industries that really do

negotiations should be conducted which ought to include the interests
parties as well. Try to get the consensus between the nine and
Japan and the Arab states, but not try to negotiate against one
or the other.

LORD RAINIER: As I said, there is no agreed European

position being expressed on the Middle East position at the
moment. Where there has been agreement is in a particular field
which is the next part of your remarks, in the economic field.
Have we agreed which you think there has to be some that timing
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will in fact be concluded by the end of this year, and I am going
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MR. RAINIER: Even there what worries our Ministers of Trade
and Commerce is the speed with which we will be expected to open
our markets to European goods. We will try to get more leeway on
that.

LORD RAINIER: As I understand the position, the
industrial sector is going to move towards free trade, I think by
percentage by 1975 and 95 percent by 1980 and then the tariff free
trade by 1985, and I suppose there are certain sensitive and
difficult things, but not excessively what you and I are going to
negotiate.

MR. RAINIER: There are some industries that really do

need more protection, some of them because they just began like electronics and advanced chemicals. That would be a pity not to protect.

MR. AMIR: A technical point. The question of agricultural exports combined in the question of American reservation. They always say, what was America's reservation vis-a-vis our wish to enter some other of the sections of the Community. It is not real free trade area because it doesn't affect the majority of your exports. Therefore, inasmuch as the agricultural exports, our exports to the Community, will have all the signs of a real full comprehensive approach; therefore, one of the arguments of the Americans against our entering will disappear. I don't know if I make myself clear. Therefore, they are calling us to GATT for consultation because they say even our 1970 agreement is out of order according to their conception. So, therefore, those that want just to do away with American arguments against should take into account that our agricultural exports should become an integrated part of this agreement that they are looking for.

LORD BALNIEL: Yes, I see.

MR. EBAN: I think there is a certain weakness in the American attitude. They like the political results of this cooperation, both between the Nine and the Mediterranean. But I think they don't understand sufficiently that you wouldn't have gotten that except on the basis of a very solid economic interest.

need more protection, some of them because they just happen like
electronic and advanced chemicals. That would be a pity not to
protect.

MR. AAR: A technical point. The question of agricultural

is somewhat complicated in the question of American reservation.

They always say, what was America's reservation vis-a-vis our wheat

to enter some other of the members of the Community. It is

not real free trade even because it doesn't set the majority

of your exports. Therefore, I am not an agricultural expert

our experts to the Community, will have all the rights of a real

full comprehensive approach; therefore, one of the arguments of

the American against our entering will disappear. I don't know

if I have myself clear. Therefore, they are calling us to wait

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American attitude. They like the political result of this

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backed that away on the basis of a very solid economic interest.

You can't have it both ways. To get the political results of integration and not expect that it will include a certain amount of clubishness on the economic front. Politically they like the idea of Europe and the Mediterranean being close together.

LORD BALNIEL: I think on the agricultural aspects, and I won't go into the details, your problems arise basically with other countries, and we are not, I think - There has been a liberalization, a protective mechanism. This is going to be helpful. I think it is Italy which is your main problem.

MR. EBAN: They could be placated with a certain compensation. I think that's why it might effect the other Nine.

LORD BALNIEL: Are there any point on the commercial side that anyone wishes to make to make sure we have understood the Foreign Minister's viewpoint absolutely clearly? These are technical matters -

MR. COLES: I think I understood.

MEMBER OF UK DELEGATION: I wouldn't want to ask for any clarification. I think I followed all the points. There was just one point from our side which perhaps I can reinforce because it also was touched on and that is our general impression that the arrangements now being offered to Israel are pretty good. Of course, there are things which are not ideal from your side. These were certainly in our mind and I am sure of our partners in the Nine. Many of them have problems which we don't, particularly

You can't have a both ways. To get the political results of
the situation and not expect that it will include a certain amount
of adjustment of the economic front. Politically they like the
idea of Europe and the Mediterranean being close together.

LORD BAINBRIDGE: I think on the political aspects.

and I won't go into the details, your problem seems basically
with other countries, and we are not, I think - there has been
a liberalization, a protective mechanism. This is going to be
the plan. I think it is fairly well in your main problem.

MR. BAINBRIDGE: They could be placed with a certain amount of

tion. I think that's why it might affect the other side.

LORD BAINBRIDGE: Are there any points on the commercial
side that anyone wishes to make or make sure we have understood
the Foreign Minister's viewpoint thoroughly clearly? There are
technical matters.

MR. COLLES: I think I understand.

MEMBER OF UK DELEGATION: I wouldn't want to ask for

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it also was covered on and that is our general impression that
the arrangements now being offered to us are pretty good. Of
course, there are things which are not ideal from your side. There
were certainly in our mind and I am sure of our partners in the
area. Any of them have problems which we don't, particularly

about the agricultural side, but overall, it seems to us a considerable advance on what it might have been at one stage, and perhaps now will be discussed in further detail by your people when they get into detailed negotiations. But we feel it's been a move towards what you were wanting.

MR. EBAN: Certainly the 26th of June was a red letter and day for us, because it broke through the procedure of technical and political problems, and it is a relief to be dealing only with these pragmatic problems. Even with the Americans the orange is one of the problems, surprisingly, because of the Florida orange.

MR. AMIR: On the refined petrol problem - and your delegation was very favorable to our interest for which we are grateful.

LORD BALNIEL: I appreciate it. This is the first step.

MR. EBAN: I think it will come back to the Ministers. I think the next stage is to go into the details with the Commission and then it will come back to the Nine and then the problem of expeditious action is important. The Commissioners say that the Ministers arrive and begin to look at the timetables as soon as they arrive, how to get back to London and Rome and they leave them without sufficient rope to proceed during the next month sort of thing.

Could I say something about the bilateral trade

about the agricultural side, but overall, it seems to us a considerable advance on what it might have been at one stage, and perhaps now will be discussed in further detail by your people when they get into detailed negotiations. But we feel it's been a move towards what you were wanting.

MR. BARN: Certainly the 28th of June was a red letter day for us, because it broke through the procedure of technical and political problems, and it is a relief to be dealing only with these pragmatic problems. Even with the Americans the orange is one of the problems, surprisingly, because of the Florida orange.

MR. AMIN: On the technical problem - and your delegation was very favorable to our interest for which we are grateful.

HON. SALAMIN: I appreciate it. This is the first time.

MR. BARN: I think it will come back to the Ministers.

I think the next stage is to go into the details with the Commission and then it will come back to the Ministers and then the problem of expedition action is important. The Commissioners say that the Ministers arrive and begin to look at the situation as soon as they arrive, now to get back to London and Rome and they leave them without sufficient time to proceed during the next month sort of thing.

Would I say something about the bilateral trade

relationship. We have the figures for 1972 and the total figures, including diamonds, are that we import from Britain goods to the extent of, it would amount to about 140 million pounds Sterling, about, and Israel exports to Britain less than 50, ? 112, so it is a three to one gap. Even if you include the diamonds it is a two to one gap, and we draw attention especially to the relative slowness of growth in exports. It is in dollars. So that we can see in relation to the total. The dollar value of our exports, 1971, \$97½, now \$112 million, and the question is what can be done on governmental level to increase our exports to Britain, to make the British businessman more aware of what can be bought in Israel.

I know we operate in free market economies and our business must be with the business community. But in so far as the commercial ministries can give a push and a recommendation, we would like more governmental support or encouragement. I often thought that one way of exploring it - we have the trade fairs, of course - I think at different times we have discussed the idea of a mission, a commercial delegation coming and having a total look at what there is and what there isn't in Israel. Perhaps that might be the best way. I don't know what is the practice, whether those missions consist of government and private, or both. But I recommend that that is one way of trying to push this thing above the routine increases. I think there are developments in the

relationship. We have the figures for 1972 and the total
 figures, including diamonds, are that we import from Britain goods
 to the extent of, it would amount to about 120 million pounds
 sterling, mostly, and largely exports to Britain less than 20, 2 1/2
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 it is a two to one gap, and we draw attention especially to the
 relative slowness of growth in exports. It is in dollars, so
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 of a mission, a commercial delegation coming and having a series
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 might be the best way. I don't know what is the official position,
 these missions consist of government and private, or both. But I
 understand that that is one way of trying to open this thing up
 the future increase. I think there are developments in the

Israeli economy which are simply not known enough.

LORD BALNIEL: I realize this has been a worry, this imbalance. Our figures, for some unknown reason, never agree with your figures.

MR. AMIR: Which side? (Laughter)

LORD BALNIEL: In scale. Because I understand the position to be that exports to you - I am sure it is just a difference of - 135½ million, of which 65 million is our re-export business of diamonds to you. So that brings our exports to Israel to 69 million - 70, I would say, and the UK imports to Britain of 57 million, which, I agree, there is an imbalance, but it is not, I think, quite on the scale which your figures would indicate.

But, the question is, obviously we want to do the maximum trade we can with Israel. There is money in it and we are a commercial society, and you want to do the maximum business you can with us. And really, there is no impediment that I know of. There is absolutely no hindrance that I know of which stands in the way of your business. I am told we have removed recently the import restrictions to Israel cotton textiles, and I don't know whether it is worth following up, in your own interests, the concept of a trade mission. I am not the trade minister, but nevertheless governments have common interests in this, and in a way there is a market for your goods. It is a free market. We can't force people to buy Israeli oranges or Israeli citrus, but people like it. It

largely company which are already well known.

JOHN BARNES: I realize this has been a very

difficult one for you, but I am sure you will agree with

your figures.

MR. BARNES: Which side?

JOHN BARNES: In some cases, because I understand the

position to be that exports to you - I am sure it is just a

difference of - 135 million, or 135 million.

our export business of 135 million to you, so that brings our

exports to Israel to 65 million - 70, I would say, and the UK

imports to Britain of 51 million, which I agree, there is an

imbalance, but it is not, I think, quite on the scale which your

figures would indicate.

But, the question is, obviously we want to do the

maximum trade we can with Israel. There is money in it and we are

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quest for your goods. It is a free market. We don't force people

to buy Israeli oranges or Israeli citrus, but people like it. It

isn't a matter of pushing. It is a very free market, and if you think it would help, I would certainly cooperate in what you suggest, a trade mission.

MR. COLES: We think more of an Israeli trade mission going to Britain -

MR. EBAN: That might end up in our people buying more than now. They will be shown a lot of excellent things and they will buy. Perhaps we could invite a certain reciprocity.

MR. COLES: They come here anyway.

MR. EBAN: I don't know why we have done much better with the Federal Republic. The figures are more close. Whether something can be done by encouragement of investment, by giving some sort of guarantee to investors. Anyway, we will take this up in diplomatic channels.

LORD BALNIEL: Here you get into the big political thing. We can't select Israel and give special preferential credit facilities or anything like that, and I suppose your worry is the general political worry which might impede investments. Again, if you felt that a visit by essential investors will be helpful, we have no objection.

MR. EBAN: Perhaps we will draw up a paper on what we think would help to increase British purchase of Israeli goods and have that discussed in diplomatic channels. It might include the idea of delegations and other matters and have a look at it as

that's a matter of timing. It is a very tight market, and if you think it would help, I would certainly cooperate in what you suggest, a trade mission.

MR. COHEN: We think more of an Israeli trade mission

going to Britain.

MR. EBBE: That might end up in our people trying more than now. They will be shown a lot of excellent things and they will buy. Perhaps we could involve a certain restriction.

MR. COHEN: They come here anyway.

MR. EBBE: I don't know why we have done much better with the Federal Republic. The figures are more close, whether something can be done by encouragement of investment, by giving some sort of guarantee to investors. Anyway, we will take this as a diplomatic channel.

MR. EBBE: Have you got into the big political

thing. He can't believe Israel and give special preferential access facilities or anything like that and I suppose you worry about the general political worry which might include investment. Again, if you felt that a visit by senior investors will be helpful, we have no objection.

MR. EBBE: Perhaps we will draw up a paper on what we

think would help to increase British business of Israeli goods and have that discussed in diplomatic channels. It might include the idea of delegations and other matters and have a look at it as

a whole.

LORD BALNIEL: We will certainly cooperate. Most happy.

MR. EBAN: There is the problem of the Arab boycott activities. They try to intimidate companies against trading with Israel. Our experience is that the companies which resist very rarely suffer and those who have held out, such as BOAC or TWA, American Express, find it is quite possible to trade with Israel and with the Arab countries. I don't believe there is a single case in which they have effectively carried out the threat. The essence of the problem is to get the business community not to recognize these intimidation pressures. A British company ought to have a sovereign right to trade with Israel or with Egypt and Saudi Arabia without one of them saying that we won't trade with you unless you stop with the other fellow. And we would welcome a strong governmental attitude at least against the principle of intimidation in commerce. Sometimes businessmen like to be told by their government what the policy is, what you want, what you would like them to do.

We would like you to say that you would like them to follow the logic of trade interest and not be blackmailed by anybody.

LORD BALNIEL: It is deplorable the boycott, and it is not something which we find agreeable in the least. It is a fact. This is a problem and it is for the businessmen themselves, I think, to judge whether they continue trading with Israel or

whole.

LONG MARCH: We will certainly cooperate. Most happy.

MR. MANN: There is the problem of the Arab boycott.

activities. They try to intimidate companies engaged in trading with

Israel. Our experience is that the companies which resist very

strongly and those who have held out, such as S.A.C. or TWA,

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with you unless you stop with the other fellow. And we would

assume a strong governmental attitude at least against the

principles of discrimination in commerce. Sometimes we have

like to be told by the government what the policy is, and you

say, that you would like them to do.

He would like you to say that you would like them to

leave the field of commerce open and not be discriminated by

anybody.

LONG MARCH: It is impossible for the boycott and it is

is not something which we find agreeable in the least. It is a

fact. This is a problem and it is not a business question.

I think, to judge whether they continue trading with Israel or

whether they think their interests are too adversely affected. I think you absolutely underestimate the impact which it has. It is just about the only effective weapon which is being utilized in fact. Other means of pressure on Israel are ineffective. But the boycott is to some extent effective.

MR. EBAN: It is not effective as a general strategy, because in fact if we want to sell anywhere, if the product is good, we can find a market. Maybe there's been a tactical success with this or that company. But if I were the Arab boycott committee I would feel depressed after all these things, all these attempts to strangle, we find this enormous eruption of our exports, where it now exceeds \$2 billion. It is not a successful boycott where we find our exports grew from 48 million and reached 2 billion. If I were a boycott man in Cairo, I would commit hari-kari. You might say that without that pressure, it might have been even greater, but probably not much. So it is an irritant politically.

LORD BALNIEL: I am not sure I follow the logic. You are talking about export trade? To where? Not to Arab countries?

MR. EBAN: We accept their sovereign right not to buy our produce but they shouldn't prevent us from exporting to Britain or Holland or Germany or Thailand or Japan. That's what we are trying to do. It is legitimate for them to decide not to buy their goods from us, but it is not their business to tell Britain, Holland, France whether or not to buy Israeli goods, and they have not had an strategic success. They might have prevented something

...they think their interests are too adversely affected.

I think you thoroughly understand the interest which it has.

It is just about the only effective weapon which is being

utilized in that. Other means of pressure on Japan are

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MR. BROWN: It is not effective as a general strategy.

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to say the least, we find this enormous expansion of our exports, where

it now exceeds \$5 billion. It is not a successful boycott where

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If I were a boycott man in Cairo, I would be very happy. You

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LEAD BROWN: I am not sure I follow the logic. You

are talking about export trade? To what? Not to Arab countries.

MR. BROWN: We accept that situation right now to put our

exports but they shouldn't export to you exporting to Britain

or to India or Germany or Thailand or Japan. What's what we are

trying to do. It is legitimate for them to decide not to buy

their goods from us, but it is not their business to tell Britain

Holland France whether or not to buy Japanese goods. And they have

not had an economic success. They must have prevented something

happening in a particular way. The growth of our international trade shows that it is simply an irritant, creates bad will. And we have found that when governments say, ministers of commerce say to their businessmen, we are against this whole principle of political interference with trade, and if that's said strongly and clearly, it does have an effect.

Of course,

MR. AMIR: /We are worried about the effects of the boycott all over the world and in many countries business is not being done because of the Arab boycott. But we have the feeling that in Great Britain it is perhaps having a bigger effect than in other countries in Europe. For instance, may I call your attention to a very concrete case of the Cable and Wireless Company, which is, I understand a government-owned company, and when last month, May, it was willing to subcontract some of its items to certain country countries, it asked it to fulfill a declaration that this company doesn't do any business with Israel and when Cable and Wireless was asked why does it behave that way; that they simply comply with the instructions of the Arab boycott office in Beirut.

Now, we know it is rather a painful situation, but still we believe that perhaps you would be willing to consider to take some more active intervention in those cases and to give active support, and certainly such a big company, if it would say to the Arab boycott, we are not ready to comply to the Arab boycott, we will not yield - As our Minister said, many other big corporations

happening in a particular way. The growth of our information

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Arab boycott, we are not ready to comply to the Arab boycott, we

will not yield - as our Minister said, many other big corporations

that by being strong didn't yield to the Arab boycott. We just have in mind some active support in those cases. Because there is a whole list of companies, bigger and smaller, that wrote to our businessmen very strongly that they can't do business with us because of the fear of the Arab boycott or and actual request to fulfill that declaration.

LORD BALNIEL: You see, that long list rather confirms what I suspect; it is more effective than - we don't condone it. We deplore it. But ultimately it must be for the individual company to decide.

MR. AMIR: It is supported by the government.

LORD BALNIEL: I think the fact that you have a long list of company who have said we have this problem and find we can't invest or trade in Israel does indicate that this is the most effective weapon which is being deployed. It is just another argument for reaching a peaceful settlement. Ultimately, I think you will agree, the decision must rest with the company concerned.

MR. EBAN: We think a government should have an attitude. You can't force a company to act against its wishes, but a government must have a principle whether this is or is not -

LORD BALNIEL: Our attitude of principle has been said many times.

MR. EBAN: It is exactly the wrong way to promote international trade. (Where)

MR. CONAY: The company in question has been waivering

that by being strong China's yield to the Arab boycott. But just
have in mind some other support in these cases. Because there is
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many times.
MR. BROWN: It is exactly the wrong way to promote
international trade. (Where?)
MR. BROWN: The concept in practice has been wrong

and doesn't want to do this, and we feel that if the government strongly disapproves this might be decisive with that particular company. It might tip the balance. Often it is not very clear to the company itself as to how it should behave in such a situation or where its interests lie and there government influence can be important indeed, and this is what the Minister is suggesting.

MR. RAFAEL: The United States has a declared policy which is against trade discrimination. It is imbedded in the law. The Department of Commerce in the United States advises all trading corporations not to submit to any threat, extortion, blackmail or boycott. That is a declared policy and submitting to it would be against the law of the United States. It would be also against the obligations, the international obligations under GATT. Because you are a signatory in Gatt with other countries, which excludes the practices of discrimination. It would be against many resolutions of nations which have been sponsored mainly by the Soviet Union against boycott practice. So it is not just a private decision of companies how to behave, we believe, but of governments how to act.

MR. CRAIG: It is quite impossible for the British government to order a firm to take -

MR. EBAN: Short of ordering, there is a whole range of pointing out interests, other organizations; there is Gatt.

MR. AMIR: The new wording instructions to exporters is

and doesn't want to do this, and we feel that if the government strongly disapproves this might be helpful with these particular company. It might stop the balance. Often it is not very clear to the company itself as to how it should behave in such a situation or where its interests lie and there government influence can be important indeed, and this is what the Minister is suggesting.

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MR. CHAIR: It is quite impossible for the British government to order a firm to do so -

MR. PATER: About of ordering, there is a whole range of pointing out interests, other organizations, there is GATT.

MR. AMIN: The new working instructions to exporters is

"make sure that you are under no false impression regarding the extent of the Arab boycott". If it would say, don't be afraid too much and give examples of other -

MR. CRAIG: Then subsequently a company will come to us and say, why did you not warn us?

MR. EBAN: You can't have one hundred percent success. Our experience is that the firmness and emphasis with which governments say this, that this is a very objectional way of behaving, that in some cases will have an effect, because as the Ambassador said, sometimes it is a 51-49 percent decision, whether to yield or whether to come in. There are also various ways of coming in in full wait, with a lot of face-saving. Some firms change their name by one initial and manage to come in. We have had some very eccentric experience. You know, we get all our oil from the Persian Gulf, which means from Iran. They just deny that they sell us a single drop. They sell it to a Swiss Consortium, and they go around like the milkman, where they deliver - They know perfectly well and nothing happens to Iran. They tried to prevent BOAC, BEA, TWA and they all come in and they go to Cairo.

MR. CRAIG: ? after building submarines for you, they lost a contract for the dry-dock at Bahrein.

LORD BALNIEL: In general principle, I entirely agree. I think it is deplorable and I take note of the general point, but I come back to this: that it is ultimately that it must be for the

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will be a single drop. They sell it to a Swiss Corporation, and
they go around like the willow, where they deliver - They know
perfectly well and nothing happens to Iran. They tried to prevent
some, they say they all come in and they go to Cairo.

MR. CHAIR: After making a statement for
you, they issued a statement for the day-book at Baghdad.
LORD BARNES: In general principle, I entirely agree.
I think it is dangerous and I take note of the general point, but
I come back to this: that it is absolutely clear it must be for the

firm.

I don't know whether you had other points to discuss with me. I was in fact to be seeing the press, and I don't know if there are further points that you wish. I am very much in your hands.

MR. EBAN: I think on the economic question, I would say I think that our relations are very fruitful. It consists not only of exports but when there are Israeli interests on international boards, like the Maritime Fruit Company, for example, they made the determination in favor of Britain because our businessmen have this feeling of being at home, but it is very competitive. There is now the underground railway. German and British bids, and the general climate of economic relations does have an effect, and I think you know my colleague, Mr. Sapir is rather gruff about the British balance at the moment.

MR. COLES: He's been worried about it but he says at the same time that the solution is more trade in both directions, and we have one bit of good news - I know whether you heard it already - but you were worried that the British quota on citrus juices coming in from the United States might be lifted in the near future. I think it is not going to be lifted until 1975. Is that correct? (Affirmative response.)

LORD BALNIEL: I know nothing about the underground. All I suggest is that you buy the best. I think, you know, you put the

him.

I don't know whether you had other points to discuss with me. I was in fact to be seeing the press, and I don't know if there are further points that you wish. I am very much in your needs.

MR. SMITH: I think on the economic question, I would

say I think that our relations are very friendly. It consists not only of exports but when there are special interests or international boards, like the Maritime Trade Company, for example, they make the determination in favor of British because our businessmen have this feeling of being at home, and it is a very competitive. There is now the underground railway.

And the general attitude of economic relations does have an effect, and I think you know my colleague, Mr. Taylor is rather angry about the British balance of the account.

MR. COLLIER: He's been worried about it but he says at the same time that the solution is more trade in both directions, and we have one bit of good news - I know know whether you heard it already - but you were worried that the British trade on other terms coming in from the United States might be linked to the pound. I think it is not going to be linked until 1955, is that correct? (Affirmative response.)

LORD BRINTON: I know nothing about the underground. All I suggest is that you pay the best. I think you had, you had the

point very clearly and we have taken full note and we will weight them up.

(The meeting adjourned at 12:50 noon.)

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about very clearly and we have taken full note and we will write

them up.

(The meeting adjourned at 12:50 noon.)

ש מ ר

י' בסיון תשל"ג
10 ביוני 1973

620

אלו מ.ר. קדרון

מאת: מאו"ס ב'

הנדון: עמדת בריטניה בענין הגבולות

בשיחת הקוע-ג'יימסון (מברק 132 מאו"ס) הבהיר
הבריטי כי עמדת בריטניה הובדרה בנאום הארובייט מאוקטובר
70, ובנאום קראו בעצרת אותה שנה, ושאינן אמירות שהבריטים
יזוו מדברים אלה.

רצ"ב דברי קראו בעצרת הכ"ה בענין החסר הטריטוריאלי.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אלו.
יבחק אלדן

העחק: מר א. לוריא, יועץ
אירומה ב'



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27. In the case of Jordan the lines which existed before June 1967 were not boundaries and had never been recognized as international frontiers; they were only armistice lines. In some areas they were impractical, dividing villages from their fields and even houses from their gardens. What is required is agreement on a definitive boundary.

28. We believe that this should be based on the lines existing before 5 June 1967, but that there could be minor rectifications to these lines. The criteria for determining such minor rectifications might be the suppression of anomalies which make difficult the maintenance of local security or impede interior surface communications or normal surveillance of the boundary.

29. In the case of the United Arab Republic, we consider that the international boundary of the former Mandated Territory of Palestine should constitute the frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic, except for the Gaza area, for which special arrangements will have to be made and embodied in the agreement.

30. The frontier between Israel and Lebanon should be the international boundary of the former Mandated Territory of Palestine.

31. As for the boundary between Israel and Syria, we believe that the general principles governing the remainder of the settlement should also govern the settlement between Israel and Syria, once Syria has accepted the Security Council resolution.

Sir Colin Crowe (United Kingdom), United Nations
General Assembly, Twenty-Fifth Session,
1893rd Plenary Meeting, 2 November 1970)

27. In the case of Jordan the lines which existed before 1947 were not boundaries and had never been recognized as international frontiers. They were only administrative lines. In some areas they were impractical, dividing villages from the fields and even houses from their gardens. What is required is agreement on a definitive boundary.

28. We believe that this should be based on the lines existing before 1947, but that there could be a few modifications to these lines. The modifications for determining such minor modifications ought to be the suppression of any area which makes difficult the maintenance of local security or in some minor border communications or normal surveillance of the boundary.

29. In the case of the United Arab Republic, we maintain that the information regarding the former mandated territory of Palestine should continue to frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic, except for the Gaza area, for which special arrangements will have to be made and provided in the agreement. 30. The frontier between Israel and Lebanon should be the international boundary of the former mandated territory of Palestine.

31. As for the boundary between Israel and Syria, we believe that the general principles governing the constitution of the settlement should also govern the settlement between Israel and Syria, once Syria has accepted the Security Council resolution.

Sir Colin Cross (United Kingdom), United Nations General Assembly, 15th Session, 1960, 15th November 1960

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון חוקי העונשין (בטחון המדינה) (חסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים). תשי"ז - 1957.

ש מ ו ר

מס-108

נשלח 122030 מאי 73

מ י י ד י

אל:המשרד

מאת:לונדון

אל:לוריא אירופה כי קדרונ.

העתק נאום ניו יורק (העבר במסי 300)

הדיון במועביט.

נשה להתנבא מה יהיה היחס הכריטי להצעות או נוסחאות שעדיין היפוטיטיים, וזאת בעיקר משתי סיבות- ראשית עדיין אין דוח המזכל-ירינג, לא ברור מה ידעו המצרים ותהליך ההתיעצות בין חברי מועביט רק בראשית הדרכ. שנית כפי שהופגן שוב בסיבוב האחרון. הכריטיים מנסים לומר בין העמדות השונות במועביט בכדי להשיג תוצאה שתזכה לרוב מבלי להזמין ווטו. דהיינו מתאימים עצמם למצבים פרלמנטריים ותכסיסיים. יחד עם זאת מוטב לרשום מחדש מאפר שיקולי יסוד שלפי התרשמותנו והערכתנו ממשיכים להשפיע על עמדתם ומגבילים שטח תימרונם.

א. 242- רוצים לשמור על הנוסח המדויק ועל האיזון הפנימי העדין בין המרכיבים ויעמדו נגד שינוי. רואים בהחלטה הישג דיפלומטי ממדרגה ראשונה וחוששים שכל נסיון לשנות משהו רק יפרק הקונסנסוס שהושג ב-1967 וישחרר צד זה או אחד מהסכמתו לקבל את הנוסח המקורי תור בסיס.

ב. יארינג- הנל מזמנ איבדו כל אימון ביארינג וכל תקווה שהסדר על פי 242 יוסג באמצעותו. לכן מוכנים לחפש מכשיר אחר שלמעשה יעקוף יארינג מבלי לחסלו באופן פורמלי, דבר שיפגע לחלכה ב-242 ג. הגורם המצרי- למרות שהפסקת האש מחזיקה מעמד כמעט שלוש שנים ממשיכים הכריטיים לחשוב ולטעון שהמצב באיזור איננו יציב ועלול להתדרדר שוב. בראש וראשונה חוששים או שסאדאת יהיה נאלץ ללכת לפעולה צבאית ואז לא תהיה יותר שליטה על המצב או שמסטר אדאת

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים).

תש"ז 1957

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יפול דבר שהבריטים היו מצטערים עליו. מסקנתם הייתה שאין להשתמש
עם קפאון דיפלומטי ויש לזרוק לסאדאת איזה חבל שיקל עליו לעמוד
נגד לחצים. באספקלריה זו עצם קיום הדיון עלול לשחק תפקיד עם
כל התסבוכות הכרוכות בו ואם יצא מהדיון משהו שיאפשר למצרים להרויח
זמן לעוד כמה חדשים, נאמר עד לעצרת, מה טוב.
הקריטריון איננו איפוא אם הדיון יתרומם להשגת הסדר אלא אם יעזור
לשמירת השקט באזור לטווח קצר.
ד. הגורם הצרפתי- הבריטים אינם רוצים לתת לצרפתים להופיע באום
בתור הדובר האירופאי או להופיע לכד בתור פטרון האינטרס הערבי.
כנ ההופעה המשותפת עם צרפת רצויה להם. מה עוד שבמזגיה מועדיה
בריטניה וצרפת יכולות לשחק תפקיד דיפלומטי מרכזי אך כיוצא בזה קאמיון
הישירה לשמורת השלום באזור לשתי מעצמות העל.
ה. הגורם האמריקני- גוף לבריטים לשמור על מרחק מזוייז בינם לבין
ארה"ב בקשר למזת, יחד עם זאת ישתדלו הבריטים לא להיקלע לימצב בו
יהיה עליהם לתמוך בהצעת החלטה שתגרום להטלת ווטו אמריקני.
ו. הגורם הישראלי- זו אשליה לחשוב שבריטניה יחקר חיתנו אך היא
מתפארת על כך שבינן חברות מועביט קבועות בריטניה היא היחידה
שעדיין שומרת על יחסים תקינים עם שני הצדדים למחשוכ. אינם רוצים
להגיע ליחסים קרירים אתנו דוגמת אלה הקיימים בינינו לבין צרפת.
ז. סנקציות- יש הכיל יחודי בין איומים והחלטת גינוי על פעילות
צבאית נגד מדינה אחת לבין איומים כאלה בהחלטה הנוגעת להסדר
שלום. הבריטים אמנם ביקורתיים על התנהגותנו בעבר בחיפוש להסדר
אך התפלא לשמוע שהיו רואים מקום לגינויים או לתמיכה עם סנקציות
בהקשר זה.
ח. נסיגה וגבולות- בריטניה אף פעם לא הזדהתה עם הגירסה הערבית
שפירוש 242 היא נסיגה טוטלית. טענו כנאום הדוגייט וממשיכיה
לטעון שיש אמנם מקום לשינויים מוסכמים אבל עליהם להיות מינימליים.
גישתם איננה עקרונית אלא פרגמטית ואיננה מצפה שירחקו לכת מנאום
הדוגייט. בקשר לסיני אינם מסתירים דעתם שלגופ העניינא נגיע
להסדר עם מצרים אם נעמוד על ויתורי שטח מצדה. יש לחפש פתרון אחר
לבעיית שארם על בסיס אחר.

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

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ט. הגורם הפלשתינאי - נאום הרוג'ייט קבע ושהחדר שלום צ"כ להביא
בוזבזונ את שאיפות הפלשתינאים וזה נשאר הפזמוני אני מניח שיחזרו
על כך בדיון ואינן זאת אומרת שיהיו מוכנים לשינוי נוסח 242
בנקודה זו.
י. לוח הזמנים לביצוע 242- לא מתקבל על הדעת שהכרוטיים יחייבו
לוח זמנים או DEADLINE כלשהו למאמצי האום לקדם הסדר במזת.
הג מבינים היטב שזה עסק לטווח ארוך ושבמוקדם או במאוחר הצדדים
צטרכו להגיע למום ביניהם ושיהיה מגוכח להדביק לתהליך זה לוח זמנים
כפי שסאדאת עשה ב-1971.

ק ו מ י י =

שהח רוהמ אלון דיין מכלל ממכלל מאוס א ב אירופה א ב מצפא מזתים חקר אלגום
(רם אמן - בנפרד)
תא/אם

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

ס ו ד י

מס. 321

נשלח 291230 מרצ 73

אל : לונדון

מאת: המשרד

מ י י ד י

- שיחת שה"ח עם לדוידג' ביום 27.3.
- השיחה לבקשת השגריר נמשכה כשעה בנוכחות לוריא בנצור ונבונ. השיחה הוגדרה ע"י לדוידג' כ- TOUR
1. מדיצ"י. השר סוקר השיחות עימו ומזכיר רעיונות מדיצ"י לסיוע כלכלי מאסיבי מאירופה כתשלמה להסדר החלקי.
 2. סיור איסמעי'ל. השר מזכיר שאיסמעי'ל לא הביא עימו חדש. איכזב האמריקאים וגם בלונדון גרם לאכזבה. לדוידג' מסכים.
 3. ההתייחסו לנאום סאדאת מציינ' השר שהלה לא קבע כמנהגו תאריכים ובינתים האופציה המדינית פתוחה. מצב הלא שלום ולא מלחמה קכ"ל על הצבא ולכן כרגע לא נראית סכנה לממשל. יכולת סאדאת לתמרן מבחינה מדינית תראה כשאיסמעי'ל יפעל שוב. לדוידג' מציינ' קש"י סאדאת ואם ייעלם הוא צופה במקומו למשטר רדיקלי של קצינים ולא לממשל מתקדם וליברלי.
 4. הסדר ביניים וכולל. השר סוקר עמדת מצרים וישראל ומציינ' שמצרים לא תוכל לקבל מאתנו הצהרה על קבלתנו גירסתם של הפתרון הכולל. לדוידג' מסכים שאין ביכולתנו לתת הצהרה כזו.
 5. השר מציינ' ששוררת עתה אוריה באירופה לפיה יש לתת למהלכים הנוכחיים הזדמנות (מזכ"ר שיחות שרי ה-9, השיחות עם מדיצ"י ודברי הרציפ ברוח זו). לדוידג' מסכים ומציינ' שיש לתת עדיפות למגע' איסמעי'ל בארה"ב.
 6. השר מצביע על עמדתו האיתנה של חוסיין בהשוואה לעבר.
 7. טרור. השר: סוריה ולבנון אינן מסוגלות לספוג התגובות הישראליות לפעולות הטרור ויש כאן שיפור. אין שיפור בעובדה שב"ירות מושב הטרור הערבי.

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7. אסד. לדוידגי צופה שאם תהיה התקדמות עם מצרים לא יקשה
to manage אסד.

8. לשאלת השגריר צופה השר שיהיו מהלכים גם בתקופה עד הבחירות ומציין
שלא האמנו שהבחירות בארה"ב יהיו climax. האמנו שהעזרה
תמשך. לא היינו בטוחים שניכסון ירצה לפרסמה. אם עשה זאת מטרתו להדחיע.
גם השגריר אינו רואה שנוי במדיניות ארה"ב ועל הערכים והדוסיים להביא
זאת ומיחס חשיבות להרתעה הנ"ל.

9. ישראל והשוק. השגריר מציין שבעייתם היא העמדה האמריקאית.
השר משיב שלא נקבל טובות הנאה מאירופה ללא ותורים מצדנו. כמובן שאין
האמריקאים רוצים שחלקי עולם יעדיפו יכוא אירופי על אמריקאי.
10. ובשי"א. השגריר מגדיר הנושא כמסוכן. אינו מאמין בהתקדמות אפקטיבית
עד אשר תקויים שיחה בין כרזינייב וניכסון.
11. לדוידגי מציין רצון כלניאל לבוא במועד מאוחר יותר השנה ולכך יש
אישור מלונדון. הוא מזכיר גם בקורו של סיר קיט שלגביו יוצעו תאריכים
חדשים. כן יבוא שר ממשדד המסחר.

אירופה 2==

שהח רוחם אלון דיינ מנכל מ/מנכל סמנכל אירופה כ מצפא מאומ א/כ
מזתימ חקר אלגומ רמ אמנ

ב 11-1
משרד החוץ

בלתי מסווג

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס

מס' 157

בשליח: 111830 יוני 73

אל: המשרד

מאת: בניר יורק

א. קדירוב מאומ ב, העתק ורשיבגטון (העבר)
להלן באומר של הנריטי במועניט מהיום.

MIDDLE EAST NO. 15

STATEMENT BY MRM K.D. JAXIESON IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MONDAY, 11 JUNE, MQOUE

I MAKE NO APOLOGIES, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR SPEAKING EARLY IN THIS DEBATE. PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO US ALL. FIRST, IT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA WHO HAVE FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS LIVED IN THE AFTERMATH OF HOSTILITIES AND WITH THE THREAT OF FURTHER FIGHTING HANGING OVER THEIR HEADS. BUT IT IS ALSO OF GREAT CONCERN TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE AREA, NOT LEAST TO MY OWN. MY GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY CANNOT REGARD WITH EQUANIMTY THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY AND FRAGILE SITUATION OF "NO WAR, NO PEACE". FURTHERMORE, SO LONG AS THIS SITUATION CONTINUES THERE IS THE MCONSTANT DANGER THAT ATTITUDES WITHIN THE AREA WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY RIGID AND EXTREME AND THAT THIS WILL BE REFLECTED IN A CORRESPONDING HARDENING AND POLARIZATION OF SWTIBEGIN LINE OVER ATTITUDES OUTSIDE THE AREA. ANYTHING OF THIS SORT WOULD INCREASE THE SEIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND AT THE SAME TIME MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE.

IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT MY GOVERNMENT ARE ANXIOUS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE THE MOST OF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY. AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS NOTED IN HIS ADMIRABLE REPORT WHICH PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS A WHOLE SINCE THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION 242 OF 22 NOVEMBER, 1967. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS RECOGNISED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR TH SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE PROBLEM AGAIN. WE THEREFORE LOOK UPON THIS DEBATE AS A RESPONSIBILITY AND A CHALLENGE. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO US ALL TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK OUT OF WHAT THE SECRETARY - GENERAL, IN INTRODUCING HIS REPORT A FEW DAYS AGO, DESCRIBED AS "A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF ACTION AND REACTION, VIOLENCE AND REPRISAL" AND TO ESCAPE FROM, AGAIN I QUOTE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WORDS, "THE SERIES OF SEEMINGLY INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES TO THE PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND SETTLEMENT". MY DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, FACES THIS DEBATE WITH DETERMINATION AND HOPE.

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MIDDLE EAST NO. 12

STATEMENT BY H.M. K. D. JALILSON IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MONDAY, 12 JUNE, MOORE

I MAKE NO APOLOGIES, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR SPEAKING EARLY IN
THIS DEBATE. PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE
TO US ALL. FIRST, IT IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE PEOPLES
OF THE AREA WHO HAVE FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS LIVED IN THE
AFTRMATH OF HOSTILITIES AND WITH THE THREAT OF FURTHER
FIGHTING HANGING OVER THEIR HEADS. BUT IT IS ALSO OF GREAT
CONCERN TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE AREA, NOT LEAST TO MY OWN.
MY GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY CANNOT REGARD WITH EQUANIMITY THE
PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY AND FRAGILE SITUATION OF "NO WAR,
NO PEACE". FURTHERMORE, SO LONG AS THIS SITUATION CONTINUES
THERE IS THE CONSTANT DANGER THAT ATTITUDES WITHIN THE AREA
WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY RIGID AND EXTREME AND THAT THIS WILL BE
REFLECTED IN A CORRESPONDING HARDENING AND POLARIZATION OF
ATTITUDES OUTSIDE THE AREA. ANYTHING OF THIS SORT WOULD
INCREASE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND AT THE SAME TIME
MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE.

IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT MY GOVERNMENT ARE ANXIOUS THAT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MAKE THE MOST OF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY.
AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS NOTED IN HIS ADMIRABLE REPORT
WHICH PROVIDED THE BACKGROUND FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS, THIS IS THE
FIRST TIME THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE MIDDLE
EAST PROBLEM AS A WHOLE SINCE THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTIONS
OF 22 NOVEMBER, 1947. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS RECOGNISED THAT
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT
RESOLUTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE PROBLEM AGAIN. WE THEREFORE LOOK UPON
THIS DEBATE AS A RESPONSIBILITY AND A CHALLENGE. IT IS A CHALLENGE
TO US ALL TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK OUT OF WHAT THE SECRETARY -
GENERAL, IN INTRODUCING HIS REPORT A FEW DAYS AGO, DESCRIBED
AS "A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF ACTION AND REACTION, VIOLENCE AND
REPRISALS" AND TO ESCAPE FROM, AGAIN I QUOTE THE SECRETARY -
GENERAL WORDS, "THE SERIES OF SEEMINGLY INSURMOUNTABLE
OBSTACLES TO THE PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND SETTLEMENT".
MY DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, FACES THIS DEBATE WITH DETERMINATION
AND HOPE.

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I HAVE SPOKEN OF THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS. BUT IN FACT SOME ADVANCES HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE THE WAR OF JUNE 1967 TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THESE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE UNDONE.

FIRST, THERE IS RESOLUTION 242 ITSELF. THIS RESOLUTION CONSTITUTED THE FIRST SERIOUS ATTEMPT SINCE 1947 BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TACKLE THE ROOTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS OPPOSED TO PALLIATING THE SYMPTOMS. IT WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND HAS SINCE RECEIVED OVERWHELMING SUPPORT. WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO JEOPARDIZE THAT SUPPORT. I HAVE THERE ARE OTHER ADVANCES TOO THAT MUST BE PRESERVED. IN PARTICULAR, I HAVE IN MIND PYA DECLARED WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, TO ENTER INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL IF THAT STATE WOULD GIVE CERTAIN COMMITMENTS COVERING THE IMPLEMENTATION ON ITS PART OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. JORDAN TOO HAS GIVEN AN ANALOGOUS UNDERTAKING. THESE ARE VERY CONSIDERABLE ADVANCES AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD, IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM, ENSURE THAT THIS HARD EARNED GROUND IS RETAINED.

BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT WE MUST NOT THROW AWAY THE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE, THAT WE MUST PRESERVE RESOLUTION 242 INTACT. THAT IS INDEED THE DUTY OF THIS COUNCIL. BUT IT IS ALSO THE COUNCIL'S DUTY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS PUTTING THAT RESOLUTION INTO PRACTICAL EFFECT. THAT IS THE REAL CHALLENGE HERE TO DISCUSS AND AGREE UPON. BUT MY DELEGATION HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT WHICH JUQQXQFHBQN BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE IN THE MCBNSULTATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THIS DEBATE. WE WELCOME TOO THE WORDS OF THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT WHEN HE HAD "NOT COME HERE TO SCORE POINTS OR TO SDEK A VERBAL VICTORY" AND WE WERE GLAD TO HEAR THESE WORDS EHOED IN THE INITIAL STATEMENT OF THE PEJMANENT OF ISRAEL. WE HOPE THAT WE CAN GET BACK TO THAT CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND CONSIDER HOW PROGRESS CAN BE MADK, WE HOPE THAT POLEMICS WILL AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BE AVOIDED. THE PROBLEM WITH WHICH WE ARE DEALING IS FAR TOO SERIOUS FOR US ALL, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TOO IMPORTANT FOR US TO ALLOW OUR PROCEEDINGS TO DEGENERATE INTO THE SORT OF SLANGING MATCH WITH ENDLESS RIGHTS OF REPLY TO WHICH WE HAVE GROWN ALL TOO WELL ACCUSTOMED IN PREVIOUS COUNCIL DEBATES. IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THAT WHICH WE FACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ANY INSTANT SOLUTION. BUT OUR TASK HERE IS TO SEE TO IT THAT THE SEARCH FOR THE SOLUTION IS VIGOROUSLY PURSUED AND THAT SOME GENUINE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS GETS GOING.

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I HAVE READ THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT WITH MUCH INTEREST. IT PROVIDES A CLEAR, IF DEPRESSING, ACCOUNT OF THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242. ABOVE ALL, THE REPORT IS A TESTIMONIAL TO THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS PREDECESSOR, AND IN PARTICULAR BY THEIR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR JARRING. THE PATIENCE AND INGENUITY WHICH AMBASSADOR JARRING HAS SHOWN OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS HAVE EARNED THE ADMIRATION OF ALL. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT HIS FAULT THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR NOT MET WITH SUCCESS.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT DEALS MAINLY WITH THE EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AS MOST PREVIOUS SPEAKERS HAVE STRESSED, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT, IN ADDITION TO THE EFFORTS MADE WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY OTHER EFFORTS. WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO LIST THEM ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT SOME OF THEM. FIRST, THERE HAVE BEEN THE EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE UNITED STATES, TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A LESSENING OF TENSION IN THE AREA AND TO INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT. FOR OUR PART, MY GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY WELCOMED THESE EFFORTS. IT WAS LARGELY THANKS TO AMERICAN EFFORTS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WAS ESTABLISHED ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL IN AUGUST 1970. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHOULD ALL TAKE TO HEART THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OBSERVATION IN HIS REPORT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL REMAIN PRECARIOUS AND UNSTABLE SO LONG AS A JUST AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM IS NOT IN SIGHT. MORE RECENTLY, AMERICAN EFFORTS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, DESIGNED TO RESULT IN SOME MEASURE OF WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAELI ARMED FORCES AND THE CONSEQUENT REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE ALWAYS MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE SUCH AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT COME INTO EFFECT ON ONE IMPORTANT CONDITION, THAT IS THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE, AND BE SEEN TO BE, A STEP TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, AS WELL OF COURSE AS BEING ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES. MOST RECENTLY, WE HAVE WELCOMED PRESIDENT NIXON'S AFFIRMATION OF HIS CONTINUING INTEREST IN SEEKING A SETTLEMENT, NOTABLY AS EXPRESSED IN AMBASSADOR SCALI'S STATEMENT ON 30 MAY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE US HAS A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE.

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OTHER EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS INCLUDE THE MISSION OF THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE IN 1971. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT AND HELPFUL INITIATIVE BY A GROUP OF STATESMEN WITH AN IMPARTIAL INTEREST IN PEACE AND JUSTICE, AND THEIR BALANCED CONCLUSION QUOTED TO US LAST WEEK BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF NIGERIA SEEMED TO MY DELEGATION TO OPEN UP A PROMISING APPROACH. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN USEFUL BILATERAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES REPEAT ABOVE TWO LINES A OVER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND CONSULTATIONS, BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE, AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES. THESE CONSULTATIONS, WHICH BECAME KNOWN AS THE FOUR POWER TALKS, WERE NOT FORMALLY SET UP BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT COVERED IN ANY DETAIL IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. THOUGH THE FOUR POWER TALKS UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT SUCCEED IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, AND WHILE THE PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES RECOGNISED THAT THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE, PROGRESS WAS MADE AND VALUABLE WORK WAS DONE, PARTICULARLY ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THIS IS A SUBJECT OF OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE. WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THAT THERE IS A CLOSE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE SETTLEMENT ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 242 AND ABVIOUSLY, IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON A WATERTIGHT SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES, THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES TOWARDS OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SETTLEMENT. IN ANY CASE GUARANTEES CONSTITUTE A SUBJECT WHICH OBVIOUSLY LENDS ITSELF TO STUDY BY THIRD PARTIES, SINCE IT IS THEY WHO WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE THEM. IF IT APPEARED THAT FURTHER SUCH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE USEFUL, FOR OUR PART, MY DELEGATION WOULD BE READY TO TAKE PART IN THEM.

IT WAS IN THE COURSE OF THE FOUR POWER TALKS THAT MY DELEGATION FIRST SET FORTH BRITISH VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM. SUBSEQUENTLY, THESE VIEWS ON THE ESSENTIAL OUTLINES OF A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT, ON HOW THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND COMMITMENTS TO PEACE COULD BE CEMENTED INTO REALITY, WERE SET OUT IN A MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT WHICH MY FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME, MADE IN HARROGATE ON 31 OCTOBER 1970 AND WERE REPEATED BY SIR COLIN CROWE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 2 NOVEMBER OF THE SAME YEAR.

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HEMSHE

THESE VIEWS, COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS AND COMMITMENTS TO PEACE, THE PROBLEMS OF THE REFUGEES AND OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES AND SO ON - THESE VIEWS HOLD AS GOOD TODAY AS THEY DID IN THE PAST AND MY GOVERNMENT FULLY STANDS BY THEM. I HAVE NO NEED TO REPEAT THESE VIEWS AT LENGTH. BUT THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT RAISED TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS AND CONCERNING THE FRONTIER BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND ISRAEL. AS I HAVE SAID, ALL THE VIEWS IN THE POLICY STATEMENTS I HAVE REFERRED TO STILL HOLD GOOD, BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM OUR VIEWS ON THESE TWO POINTS: FIRST, THAT AS REGARDS THE PALESTINIANS, MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH IS TO JUST AND LASTING MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS, OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA BEGIN LINE OVER SECONDLY, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, WHICH HAS EXISTED FOR A LONG TIME, SHOULD ONCE AGAIN BE RECOGNISED IN A SETTLEMENT, SUBJECT TO WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE AGREED TO DEAL WITH THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF GAZA.

I HAVE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO REFER THAT THESE EXAMPLES OF EFFORTS MADE OUTSIDE THE DIRECT UN FRAMEWORK. FOR WHILE, AS I HAVE SAID, IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NEVER BE POSSIBLE TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION ON THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT FROM OUTSIDE OR AS MY SECRETARY OF STATE HAS PUT IT TO "DICTATE A PEACE", THERE IS VERY CLEARLY A ROLE FOR OUTSIDERS TO PLAY. THAT IS WHY WE WELCOME ANY CONTRIBUTION THAT ANY COUNTRIES, LARGE OR SMALL, CAN MAKE, INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY. THAT OF COURSE IS WHY WE WELCOME THIS PRESENT EFFORT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE STORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IS A SAD STORY OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. IT IS QUITE EXTRAORDINARY HOW EACH TIME THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LASTING PEACE IN THE AREA, OR AT LEAST PROGRESS TOWARDS IT, HAD APPEARED TO BE AT HAND, SOMETHING HAS HAPPENED TO DESTROY THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE THOSE CONCERNED CAN PLUCK UP THE COURAGE TO SEIZE IT. AND UNFORTUNATELY EACH TIME THAT AN OPPORTUNITY IS MISSED A FURTHER OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IS CREATED, A FURTHER COMPLICATION INTRODUCED INTO THE PROBLEM. THAT IS WHY MY GOVERNMENT FEEL SO STRONGLY THAT THIS PRESENT OPPORTUNITY MUST NOT BE LOST AND THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO MOVE FORWARD.

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AS I HAVE SAID, THE STARTING POINT, THE FIRM BASE FOR THIS FORWARD MOVEMENT IS RESOLUTION 242 AND IT IS IN OUR VIEW THE DUTY OF THIS COUNCIL TO PRESERVE THAT RESOLUTION INTACT. NOW, THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IS PART OF THAT RESOLUTION AND WE FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IT TOO BE RETAINED - INDEED NOT MERELY RETAINED BUT RE-ENERGISED. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER THAT THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ANY ACTION TAKEN BY THIS COUNCIL SHOULD PROVIDE RENEWED IMPETUS TO THE MISSION OF AMBASSADOR JARRING IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WILL GENERATE ITS OWN MOMENTUM. THIS MISSION REMAINS IN THE VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT THE BEST HOPE FOR PROGRESS. AS MY SECRETARY OF STATE HAS PUT IT: "NO PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM THE MOMENTUM AND INTENSITY OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IS ACCELERATED". IF THERE IS TO BE ANY HOPE OF PROGRESS, THE PACE OF THE PROCESS MUST BE QUICKENED, THE RANGE SHORTENED.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS NOTED IN HIS REPORT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE ONLY FORUM WHERE ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MEET TOGETHER IN THE SAME ROOM. THAT IS WHY THIS DEBATE HAS GIVEN US, THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY ON WHICH WE SHOULD SURELY NOW BUILD. AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE OF THE DEBATE MY DELEGATION HAS NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO PUT FORWARD. BUT THE ESSENTIAL IS SURELY THAT THIS COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION IN ORDER TO GET A GENUINE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS GOING IN WHICH ALL CONCERNED WILL COOPERATE. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE PROGRESS, HOWEVER ACHIEVED, TOWARDS BREAKING THE PRESENT INTOLERABLE DEADLOCK, TOWARDS RECHARGING AND PUTTING IN MOTION THE AT PRESENT STALLED MECHANISM WHEREBY PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS THE AIM WHICH WE ALL SHARE, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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שהח רוחם מכל אלון דיין ממכלל סמכלל מאום א+ב איר ב מעת הסברה מזמים אלגום
חקר(רם אמב - בנפרד) תעוד אילסר
מב/רע

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Mr. Carr : I cannot give my hon. Friend the exact numbers off the cuff. I think it was over 100 last year, and a further 100 under the supplementary benefit scheme. It is impossible to forecast what change these new, relaxed conditions will bring about.

VIETNAM

Q1. Mr. Peter Archer asked the Prime Minister whether he will invite the respective heads of Government of North and South Vietnam to visit the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath) : I have no plans to do so. President Thieu may, however, be making a short visit here in April, and if he does I expect to meet him.

Mr. Archer : Will the right hon. Gentleman seize the opportunity to press the cause of the 200,000 civilian political prisoners of all shades of political opinion, many of whom have no one to plead their cause, and many of whom are too ill to earn a living and have no homes or families to return to? Will he press not merely for their release but for an international rehabilitation operation under the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees?

The Prime Minister : The objects of any talks we might have have not been fixed because it is not yet definite that President Thieu will come. There has been considerable conflict of view about the number of prisoners involved. It was agreed at the Paris conference that this was a matter which should be settled by the two parties in South Vietnam.

MIDDLE EAST

Q2. Sir Gilbert Longden asked the Prime Minister if he will seek to make an early official visit to the Middle East.

The Prime Minister : I have at present no plans for such a visit.

Sir Gilbert Longden : Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a feeling abroad that, all other agencies having patently failed, Her Majesty's Government, either alone or in collaboration with our Community partners, might act as a catalyst to bring the two sides

together? Is he aware that the Arabs have at last conceded the right of Israel to exist but will not sit down and negotiate until she withdraws to her pre-1967 frontiers? Could my right hon. Friend not mediate?

The Prime Minister : The Foreign Ministers of the Community have been discussing this matter. At the moment they do not feel that the time is right to take a fresh initiative. I very much agree with my hon. Friend that the best means of trying to reach a solution would be by negotiation round a table. He is right that at the moment not all parties are prepared to do this. When meeting those concerned, I have always taken the opportunity to say that if either side is in doubt about the sincerity of the other the best way of testing the matter is to sit round a table.

Mr. Walters : Does my right hon. Friend agree that the most recent developments in Egypt show an increasing urgency for something to be done? Bearing in mind that Egypt responded favourably to the Jarring questionnaire and that the Soviet presence was thrown out of Egypt without much positive reply from the United States, could we not now put more pressure on the Americans to make them feel there is real urgency about getting a settlement in the immediate future?

The Prime Minister : I agree that there is a great degree of urgency here. The American administration is well aware of this and on my last visit to see President Nixon in Washington in February I discussed it with him. I do not think there is any doubt about the urgency of the need for action. What is difficult is to bring the parties concerned to the point where they negotiate.

COUNTER-INFLATION POLICY (PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH)

Q3. Mr. Wyn Roberts asked the Prime Minister if he will place in the Library a copy of his public speech on counter-inflation delivered at the annual general meeting of the Bexleyheath Conservative Association on 9th March.

The Prime Minister : I refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave on the 27th of March to the hon. Member for

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה. כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק מס' 100 וסדרת רשמיים).

תשי"ז - 1957
נשכח 041900 מאי 73

משור החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

סודי

מנר נכנס-מסווג

אל: המשור

מאת: ניו יורק

סודי.

מאוימ ב. העתק וושינגטון. (הזיר)

מוסטון ב-4.5.

בעת הדיון על תלונת לבנון דבר זייאת על קדיון הקרוב בנושא המזהית
במנחים אפוקליפטיים דהיינו, שבדיון ירצה להראות כי נכשלו כל הדרכים
לפתרון ולהגדיר האשמה על כך. הבריטים הגיבו שבכך יהיה עושה שרות
לישראל אשר אולי תשמח לסיים את מעורבות אוימ בנושא המזהית. מאז
לא קיימו מגעים עם זאית על נושא זה.

המגע שקיימו עם זייאת היה כשזה הזמין שגרירם בקהיר ובקש הסבר לידעה
ביימערביים. לפיה סיפקה בריטניה לישראל מידע שהשיג חיל האוויר המלכותי
על מטוסי מיראז' לוכים בשדות תעופה במצרים.

בשיחות שקיימו לאחרונה כאן עם מגיד, הסביר להם דעתו אשר הבריטים
מקוים כי תהיה גם דעת ממשלת מצרים כדלקמן:

מטרתו היא להשיג אחד מהדברים הבאים בדיון הקרוב:-

1. להתחיל בתהליך GENUINE המוליך לשלום, להבדיל משליחות
יאריןג, שאחרי שנים לא הביאה תוצאות.

2. אינטרפטציה של 242 או RE-STATEMENT של

עקרונותיה. בצורה שתחזק העמדה המצרית. (ווסטון מבחין בין הנל ובין

RE-INTERPETATION שלדעתו פרושה הוספת THE לפני

המלה שטח'ם).

3. קביעת אחריות ישראל לכשלון מאמצי האויים.

לדעת ווסטון ניתן להלכה להשיג פתיחה בתהליך לקידום שלום באחת משתי
מסגרות:

1. במסגרת המזכירות, וזה על ידי הפעלה מחדש של יאריןג או הפעלת המזכיר
או ועידת שלום בצורה זו או אחרת. (העיר כי הדיבורים ששמעו עד כה על
ועידת שלום דברו עליה כמבצע בחסות המזכירות - ולא מועבייט עצמה).

2. ועדה של מועבייט - או של כל 15 החברות או של חלק מהחברות.

לדעתו ואף לדעת משלחתו כאן, אולם עד כה שלא על דעת לוונדון, הברירה

הטובה ביותר היא וועדה של כל 15 החברות, הסביר כי לפי הנוהל'ם המקובלים
פגישותיה של ועדה כזו תהיינה סודיות והחלטותיה תצטרכנה להתקבל כקונסנסוס

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסיחוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משור החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

-2-

לדעתו האישית יהיה המגדט של הועדה לחפש דרכים לשלום במדינת ישראל.
נראה לו שאינן להוסיף הנחיות נוספות או עקרונות נוספים אלא אם כן
יוסכמו על ידי הכל כולל ישראל ומצרים.
נראה לו ש-242 לא תוזכר וזה בגלל הסתייגויות הסינים כלפיה, כמו
כן לא יוזכרו יארינג או תזכירו של יארינג ולא החלטות עצרת אחרות.
בפני הועדה יופיעו ישראל ומצרים תחילה אולי בנפרד אך בעקב
כשתייהן יושבות ליד שולחן הועדה. יהיה בכך לא רק שיחות קרבה אלא
ישיבה ליד שולחן אחד. ואם להשתמש במונחים מכתם השתמש כבר שהיה
הבריטי הרי שהשתמש של המוים יהיה מהיר יותר והטווח קרוב יותר.
מדגיש שהמגדט של הועדה לא יכלול מסמכים שונים שאינם לרוחנו והוסיף
שכל עוד ישראל אינה רוצה להפסיק לשתף פעולה עם האו"ם הרי דרכו
היא הנוחה לנו ביותר. לדעתו אם יסכימו האמריקנים לרעיון הועדה
הרי שישתתפו בה אולם הבריטים טרם דברו עם האמריקנים על הנושא.
תז עומדים לדבר עם אחיב בווינגטון היזם או בראשית השבוע הבא כן ידברו
עם הצרפתים, הסובייטים והסינים וכן אתנו ועם המצרים.
מאשרתתי לו דעתי עד כמה חסרי משמעות הן יתרונותיי כפי יכול עליון הוא
מצביע ועל הנזק, המתיחות, והסכנות במזית עצמו שתזמין פתיחה בתהליך
המוצע. שאל אם כן איזו דרכ טיפול אומית עדיפה יותר.
לא השכתי על השאלה. והצבעתי על הפגיעה בסיכוי מוים עניני שיפגע כל טיפול
במסגרת אומית.

סיפר שהכונה היא שלפני הדיון יתקיימו מגעים הדוקים בין כל חברי
המועצה וכן עם ישראל ומצרים. ספר שהמצרים כבר בקשו הסובייטים
והסינים להמנע בדיון הבא מפולמוס ביניהם כפי שעשו בדיון על תלונת
לכנון. הביע תקווה כי נישלענין בראש פתוח ולפחות לא נדחה את הדיון
פני שני יסיונו אותו

גורדון-

שהח רדהם מנכל אלון דיין סמנכל מאום א ב מצפא מזמים איר א ב מאסוק אלגוס חקר

(רם אמן בנפרד)

אב / חב

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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון 37/73

שמואל

ט' אדר ב' תשל"ג

13 מרץ 1973

א ל: מר א. לוריא, יועץ מדיני לשר

מאת: עודד ערן, לונדון

הנדון: בריטניה, מז"ת וישראל

להלן רשום מתוך ישיבת עבודה שנערכה ביום 12/3/73 בפוראופ.
נוכחו בצד הבריטי - אנטוני פרסונס, דויד גור-בות ופטרישיה
לונג. מצידנו - מר י. ענוג, מר א. רופין והח"מ. הדיון
נמשך כשעתיים ונערך באווירה ידידותית ביותר.

א. הסכסוך במזה"ת

השיחה החלה דוקא בנתוח תוצאות הבחירות בצרפת. פרסונס טען
שהם כמובן מרוצים מנצחון הגוליסטים אף כי מסיבות אנוכיות שלהם
היו מעדיפים רוב גוליסטי קטן יותר שהיה מאלץ את ממצרפת לנקט
עמדות פחות רדיקליות. לגבי מדיניות צרפת במזה"ת הוסיף פרסונס
שבניגוד לדעתנו הם משוכנעים שחלה התקרבות בעמדות צרפת כלפי
עמדותיה של בריטניה מכל מקום, עובדה אחת בולטת היא שלטות
שישנה התקדמות לקראת הרמוניה בעמדות התשע כלפי הסכסוך,
הרמוניה זו רחוקה מלקבל אופי מבצעי. הוא עצמו פועל לשכנוע
עמיתיו באירופה שאין מקום ליוזמות אירופאיות ומאוחר יותר
הוא הסביר, בכנות רבה, את הסיבות לכך. אחת ממטרותיו של
איסמעיל בנסיעתו האחרונה למספר בירות מערביות היתה מטרה פנימית
הכרוכה כמובן בצורך של סאדאת להוכיח פעילות כלשהיא. מטרה
נוספת היתה להסביר בצורה המדויקת והמוטמכת ככל האפשר את
העקרונות שמנחים את עמדות מצרים וליתר דיוק, לנסות ולמחק
רשם כאילו מצרים הגמישה את עמדתה ונכונה עתה לפשרות שונות.
מאחר וגם בצד ישראל לא נכרת כל דינמיקה של נכונות לוותרים
הרי שדוקא עליה צריכה ללחץ. מאחר ולאירופאים אין כל מנוף
ללחץ כזה על ישראל נותרות ארה"ב כמעצמה היחידה המסוגלת
לעשות זאת. (פרסונס מהר להוסיף שבתנאים ובנתונים הנוכחיים
אין לארה"ב כל ענין בלחץ כזה).

פרסונס הרחיב את הדיבור על עמדת מצרים. לדעתו אמץ סאדאת
אסטרטגיה של יצירת אקלים והכנה בארצו לכך שהמצב הנוכחי
ימשך זמן רב. ביקורי השרים והיועצים הבכירים (אגב, חאפז
איסמעיל יסע בסוף החדש לפריז - בקורו שם נדחה בשל הבחירות)
משתלבים באסטרטגיה זו שכן עתה יוכל סאדאת להכריז כי הביקורים
הוכיחו בצורה חותכת כי אין סכוי לפתרות פוליטי מידי. ישראל
מתעקשת ולא נכונה לוותרים ואי לכך חייבת מצרים להכין עצמה
לקראת המאבק. לדבריו אל לנו להשלות עצמנו כי נמצא נכונות
כלשהיא לפשרה אצל המצרים בענין שארם א-שייך או אצל הירדנים
בלא שנעניק לירדן יותר מזכות הנפת הדגל על המקומות הקדושים.
על אחת כמה שאין סכוי להתפשרות על עקרון השיחות היסודיות.
יחד עם זאת זרק פרסונס רעיון שאני עצמי חושש שנשמע עליו



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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

שמור/2

בחדשים הקרובים. לדברי פרסונס נותרה אפשרות אחרת בהנחה שהאמריקאים לא יתחילו בפעילות לפי קווי ההסדר החלקי, שולדחים, על בסיס 242, יזמן אליו את הצדדים לניו יורק. פרסונס עצמו מודה שהרעיון עשוי לעלות על שרטון ברגע שהמצרים יטרפדו אותו ע"י סרוב לקבל ההזמנה שיש בה משום שיחות ישירות, ושאל מה תהיה עמדתנו. גם מר ענוג וגם מר רופין ענו בצורה מתחמקת. פרסונס שאל גם על "יזירת העובדות" בסיני ומר ענוג ענה שבמרכז סיני נעשות רק פעולות בינוי צבאיות, ובאשר לשאום-א-שייך ולרצועת החוף המזרחית עם ישראל, הרי שזה בהתאם למדיניות ישראל שהאזור חייב להשאר בשליטתנו.

ב. יחסים בילטרליים

פרסונס פתח ואמר שהוא רוצה להסיר כל ספק מליבנו ולהבהיר שאין כל קשר בין הבעיות שנערמו ביחסי שתי המדינות לאחרונה וגם עצם העובדה שהן נערמו באותה עת אינה מכוונת. מר ענוג ענה שמסכים להבהיר זו אם מקבלים את ההנחה שבריטניה מבקשת לתת יותר סיפוק לפחות מלולי, למדינות ערב ושהישראלים רגישים לקולות אלו.

1. באשר לקהיליה הרי שבדאי נוכחנו כי עמדו בהבטחתם והוסיף כי ברצונו לחזר ולהבהיר שגישתם לבעיה הכלכלית של ארצות המזה"ת מנותקת מגישתם לבעיה המדינית. פרסונס חזר על החלוקה המנחה את העמדה הבריטית, בין מדינות מועמדות לחברות לבין מדינות לא מועמדות, ובתוך הקבוצה השנייה, בין מפותחות למתפתחות. הוסיף כי הבנתם היא שאנו "נשפל" בארה"ב כשיגיע ההסכם החדש לשלב מעשי.

2. פרסונס העלה את שאלת פעולות ה-British Council ומר ענוג עמד בהרחבה על הקושי "האסמתי" הנגרם לנו ע"י הכוונת פעולות ה-British Council מהשגרירות הבריטית בעמאן. אין אנו עומדים על כך שהדבר יעשה סת"א אך בודאי שאין אנו יכולים לתת גושפנקא לפעילות השגרירות בעמאן בתחום זה. פרסונס הבטיח לעיין בפתרון נאות.

3. בהודמנות זו עמד מר ענוג גם על הפרובלמטיקה של הקונסוליה הכללית הבריטית בירושלים. אין אנו רוצים ליצור בעיות או מכשלות לעבודת הקונסול הכללי אבל המצב הנוכחי שבו אין לקונסוליה הכללית סטטוס פורמלי מחייב דיסקרציה מצד שני הצדדים ויש לנו הרגשה שהקונסול הכללי אינו ער לחלוטין לצורך זה, של שמירת הדיסקרציה.

4. המעון לעוורות. מר ענוג מסר כי בעקבות פגישת שר המשפטים עם הארכיבישוף אפלטון יש סכוי טוב לפתרון משביע רצון עבור כל הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר. מאידך ברצוננו לעמוד על כך שחלק גדול מעגמת הנפש והעכוב בטיפול היה נמנע, לו הטיפול של הפוראום היה פחות פורמליסטי ויותר פרגמטי, ואילו היה הדבר מובא לידיעתנו בשלבים הראשונים של הפרשיה. התערבות הקונסול הכללי גם היא לא תרמה כטובן לפתרון מהיר, והדבר נכון בודאי לגבי עצם הגישה העקרונית לבעיה.

פרסונס הבטיח שהם יקחו נקודות אלו לתשומת לבם במגמה להקל הטיפול בבעיות המתעוררות.

ג. אספקת נשק למדינות ערב

פרסונס העלה נושא ביוזמתו ואמר כי לא תהיה כל סטיה מהמדיניות



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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שמו / 3

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

בתחום אספקת הנשק למדינות באזור כפי שנקבעה בחדשים הראשונים של 1971. יחד עם זאת הם חייבים כמובן לקחת בחשבון את השינויים שחלו בעקבות יציאת הסובייטים ממזרים, ההופכת את האחרונה לקליינטית פוטנציאלית. ואכן המצרים החלו להתעניין בפריטים רבים שבהם לא התענינו כל עוד נמשכה הנוכחות הסובייטית. אחד הטענות המרכזיים של המצרים כבואם עם רשימת קניות היא שאם הבריטים משתמשים בעקרון של שמירת המאזן הצבאי בין הצדדים לסכסוך הרי שמתחייב מכך שעליהם לחזק את הצד הערבי על סגת להביאו לאיזון זה הנוטה בצורה ברורה לצד הישראלי. סאחר והבריטים מקבלים טעון זה היה עליהם לשנות את נסוח המדיניות. אי לכך הנסוח הנוכחי הוא שבריטניה לא חספק לשני הצדדים כלי נשק "העלולים לגרום להתפרצות מעשי האיבה". פרושו של דבר שלא יסופקו כלי נשק אופנסיביים כגון מטוסי תקיפה, טנקים כבדים וטילי אוויר קרקע. בתשובה לשאלת מר ענוג אמר פרסונס שה"יגוארים" וה"צ'יפטנים" לא יסופקו למדינות המערבות ישירות בסכסוך. הם אינם מקבלים את ההגדרה הצרפתית של "מדינות העימות" שעבורם מצרים ולוב נחשבות כמדינה אחת. מצרים בקשה את ה"יגואר" ונתקלה בסירוב מפורש. לעומת זאת יעינו באפשרות מכירת מטוס זה לסעודיה, אם זו תבקש זאת. אם יוחלט למכור מטוסים אלוי לסעודיה או מדינות ערב אחרות אין כל סכוי שאלו מקבלנה אותם לפני 1976, לאור התור הארוך. מכירה כזו, אם תצא לפועל, תעשה בתנאי מפורש שהמטוסים לא ימסרו למדינה שלישית ואפשר לעמוד על מלוי תנאי זה מאחר ובריטניה תהיה קשורה גם אח"כ למדינה הרוכשת ע"י אסון אספקת חלקי חלוף וכו'. כאשר ל"ליטנינג" הרי שכו היצור סגור וכדי לפתחו מחדש יש צורך בהזמנה של 200 יחידות לפחות ובשלב זה אין כל התענינות בו. אין גם התענינות מצד מדינות ערב ב"הארייר".

ד. בקורי שרים בריטים בארץ

על שאלת בקור קית ג'וזף הברקנו בנפרד. באשר ללורד בלניאל סוכס שהענין יבדק עם טובו מחרתים במסרה לקיים את הביקור במאי - יוני.

פרסונס נשמע מאוכזב על שנסיעתו לארץ נדחתה. כגלל הצורך באיזון לא יוכל להצטרף לבלניאל בביקורו בארץ שכן הפקיד שהצטרף לבלניאל בבקור הנוכחי בארצות ערב היה זוסר. הוא ישתדל להתפנות בסוף אפריל או בחחילת מאי וזאת כמובן בהנחה שבינתים לא יקבע שאכן איש כלכלי העוסק ומבין בעיניני הקהיליה, צריך לנסוע.

כברכה

3314
עודד ערן

העתק : מר מ. ששון סמנכ"ל
גב' י. ורד, מנהלת מוז"ים
מר ב. נבון סגן מנהל אירופה ב'
לשכת השר
לשכת המנכ"ל
תקכ.

בריטניה יוזמת עמדה אירופית

(סוף מעמוד 1)

עכשיו נטלה על עצמה) הרי שהמאמץ הבריטי מכוון בעיקר כלפי בון.

מכאן, שהנושא הזה עתיד לחפוס מקום מרכזי בשיתות עם ראש ממשלת בון. וילי בראנדט, העומד לבוא לישי ראל לביקור רשמי כנראה ב" חודש יוני.

בעיצוב מדיניות החוץ הגרמנית נודע משקל מדי חיע לעמדתו של הקאנצלר בראנדט ובבעבר אין לי הניה, שתיתכן יזמה אי רוסית בנושא המזרח תי מוני אם בון תתנגד לכך.

הפעלתנות הבריטית הי סמוייה לא הפתיחה גורמים ישראליים, שכן זה זמן רב שבמדיניות החוץ הבריטית שולט הקו של פיוס הערבים. יש להניח, כי יועצו של נשיא מצרים, חאפז איסמעיל, גילה בביקורו בלונדון הבנה גדול לה יותר משגילה בכל בירה אחרת שביקר בה בשבועות האחרונים במסגרת המיתקפה הדיפלומטית המצרית.

מרבית המדינות האירופיות, ובכלל זה פאריס, העדיפו בי עת האחרונה לא לנקוט יוזמה מדינית בנושא המזרח תיכור, כי, אלא להשאיר את הדבר

לוואשינגטון, אשר ביקשה ממדינות אירופה להניח לגור שא זה.

לונדון אינה שוללת משאומתן בין הצדדים, אבל היא סוברת, שיש "להשפיע" על ישראל "לי לפת לקראת המצרים".

ייתכן, שאין בריטניה במגד עיה עם בירות, "השוק האי רופי" מתכוונת בשלב זה לי יזמה מדינית של ממש, אלא רק לגיבוש עמדה, שיהיה בה כדי להשפיע על וואשינגטון, בפעילותה הקרובה להביא לי ידי הסדר חלקי לפתיחת תע לתיסואץ.

ורשות השידור

למשתמשים ולמכשירי (254)
פרטים והרשמה בבית ברנר
הדר 2 טל. 22211

אומרת:

"טיפה אחת עשויה
לשנות את גורלך..."

פרטים בקרוב

חליפות לחג

החל מ-255 ל"י

מבחר חליפות חדישות בכל
המידות מתוצרת **בגיר**

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מכונות כביסה

GALA

אצל א. שמעיה

מרכז חנויות אילת טלפון 2853

ברייטניה יוזמת "עמדה אירופית" נגד, עקשנות ישראל וסירובה לסגת

מנסה לשכנע מדינות ה"שוק" לחתור לפתרון במזה"ת תוך פיוס הערבים * הנושא יידון עם

הבריטי, כי יש בענין זה אח"כ דות דעים עם פאריס ומשום כך חשוב, לדעתו, כי כל שאר המדינות של הקהילה האירופית יעטרפו לעמדה זו. מכל הידוע כאן, ממשיך רות מערביים, גילה ה' מדינאי המערבי המנה ל' עמדה זו ואף אמר זאת מפורשות לאיש שיחזו ה' בריטי. כן אמר שחוזת דעת מפורשת יותר ויכל למסור בהתקצרות הקרובה של שרי החוץ של ה' מדינות החברות ה"שוק". משקפים סבורים, כי בשים לב לכך שאת צרפת נקל ל' שכנע בענין זה (בעצם, פא' ריס היא שמילאת בעבר תפ' קיד מדרבן מן הסוג שלונדון (סוף בעמ' 2, מדרים 4, 5, 6)

הקאנצלר וילי בראנדט שיבקר בישראל כיוני

שיחה בענין זה שניהלה אי' שיות בכירה במשרד החוץ הבריטי עם אחד המדינאים החשובים במערב אירופה. כי אותה שיחה נאמר למדינאי המערבי כי אי אפשר יהיה להשיג שלום בלי שישראל תיסוג וכי "העקשנות והנוקף שות" של ישראל היא אשר מונעת את השלום. בנסיון לשכנע את מדינות הקהילה האירופית בעורך לגלות יוזמה בנושא המזרחי תיכונני טען המדינאי הבריטי, כי תואיל ולאירופה אינ' טרם כלכלי חיוני במזרחי התיכון חייבת היא לנקוט יוזמה ולמצוא פתרון לסכסוך באזור זה. כן אמר המדינאי

היון במערב אירופה. ממקורות מהימנים נודע על

מאת יוסף חריף
ברייטניה מנסה לגבש
עמדה אירופית בשאלת ה' מורה התיכון והתכולת זו

ביקור קוסיגין בשוודיה מתוכנן כמו מיבצע צבאי

שר-ההגנה הבריטי – יטפל בעיסקות-נשק

מאת רינה בן-זאב
סופרת מעריב בשטוקהולם

ראש ממשלת ברית המועצות, אלכסיי קוסיגין, יבוא מחר לשטוקהולם וישהה ב"שוודיה עד ה-6 לחודש.

ביקורו של קוסיגין ופמלייתו תוכנן כ"מיבצע צבאי" ממש, מפורט ומדויק מרגע נחתתו של המטוס בשדה ה"תעופה", ארלאנדה" שליד ש"טוקהולם ועד להמראתו בתום הביקור.

מקומו של כל אחד מהמש"תחפים בקבלת הפנים לאורח נקבע מראש וכן סדרי הטקס,

ואפילו קטעי המוסיקה שישו"ר בצו בין ברכה לנאום. ראש ממשלת שוודיה אולוף פאלמה, שר החוץ, מר ויקמן ואחרים יהיו בין מקבלי פניו של קוסיגין בשדה התעופה. משמר כבוד של תלמידים מ"בית הספר הממלכתי השוודי יצדיע לו.

הביקור מחולק לשנים: חלק מדיני, שבו יתנהלו שיחות בין מר קוסיגין לבין מר פאלמה ואחרים, וחלק שיכלול ביקור במפעלי תעשייה.

ביום הראשון יהיה קוסיגין, לאחר פגישה עם פאלמה, אורחו של המלך השוודי לארוס

מאת סופר "מעריב" בלוגרין שר ההגנה הבריטי, לורד קרינגסטון, עומד לבקר ב- מעוריה, ובמדינה ערבית נוספת אחת לפחות – ב- נראה לבנון – מכשר ל-

טניה נחפזה להיבנות מהחלי-
טת הנשיא ניכסון לספק לי-
ישראל עוד מטוסים קרבניים
וסוגי נשק אחרים. היא הגיעה
לכלל מטקנה, שמעכשיו תוכל
לעשות בגלוי עיסקות להספקת
אנחה כמות, לכל הפחות, ל-

וצרפ-
לי"ש
כן
30
שריו
ציוד

שרת התרבות הר

Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion I have had to speak in the Council under your Presidency, may I congratulate you upon your accession to this high office and inform you of the pleasure it gives us and assure you that we will do our best to co-operate with you in your very difficult task.

Also, may I perhaps take the opportunity to congratulate our new Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Shevchenko, and join in the warm welcome that you have already accorded him.

Apart, however, from the pleasure of congratulating you, Mr. President, I must confess that it is in a spirit of profound depression that I take part in this debate. It is depression that, as the years go by, far from moving forward we only go backwards. Far from peace and counsels of moderation prevailing, we witness ever-increasing violence --- a vicious circle of reprisal and counter-reprisal with the scene dominated increasingly by extremists and extreme counsels. The arguments that we hear are too often dominated by the past when we should be looking to the present and the future. I must also confess that I am further depressed by the prolonged exchanges to which we have been subjected on matters totally unconnected with the agenda, and I hope that the appeal that you, Mr. President, made yesterday will not go unheeded.

My Government has consistently deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East wherever and by whomsoever they have been committed. To take only the incidents of recent weeks, we deplore, and we must all deplore, the tragedy of Khartoum and the senseless terrorist activities in Nicosia. We deeply sympathize with the cause and the fate of the Palestine refugees who have been the subject of endless debates and resolutions in the United Nations which seem to have no influence on their lot. As they sit in their camps, often almost in sight of their former homes, it is not surprising that bitterness and hatred should grow in their hearts and that in despair some of them should turn to violence and extremism. But this is not the way to win sympathy for their cause. The international community cannot tolerate the killing of innocent people, the murder of diplomats and the disruption of communications that has been caused. Not only must the Palestinian leaders exercise restraint but also all the Governments concerned in the area must exert themselves to control this violence. They must not permit

(Sir Colin Crowe, United Kingdom)

the wild men to disrupt international order. We have all given our endorsement to the Declaration on Friendly Relations and we are all committed to the Charter principles which it embodies. It is surely time for all of us to respond wholeheartedly to the appeal with which the Declaration ends --- that is, its appeal to all States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict observance of them.

But to deplore the acts of violence of the terrorist organizations is in no way to condone the action of the Israeli Government in its attacks on Lebanon which are the occasion for the present meeting. Those too must be condemned. That was a Government-organized operation into the territory of another sovereign State, an act of official violence which can under no circumstances be justified under the Charter. For the international community to accept such action as tolerable would be, not a return to the jungle as some speakers have said, because in many respects the jungle has its own natural laws, it would be rather to revert to a state of international anarchy. The representative of Israel has stated here that because the action in Beirut was directed against terrorists it needed no justification. In the view of my delegation every act of violence needs justification. Where the violence is international, the United Nations is legitimately concerned with it. The object of the United Nations is to try to establish order and peace in international relations. Recent events have cut at everything for which the United Nations stands.

But I said earlier that what we must do is to look towards the future. We must try to break out of this horrifying spiral of violence, counter-violence and further violence. As I said to the Assembly last December, while my Government cannot accept that terrorism is in any circumstances justified, we are not blind to the need to eradicate its root causes and to deal with the problems underlying it. We must show the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere that the world has not forgotten them. We must take note of, and we must take action on, their legitimate aspirations which must not be overlooked in any final settlement. In short we must once more give them a reason for living and hope for the future.

(Sir Colin Crowe, United Kingdom)

The debate here these last days has ranged widely from the subject which is on our agenda, the Israeli attacks on the Lebanon on 9/10 April. But while we must focus on that event we cannot close our minds to the wider issues of the Middle East situation as a whole. Until we grapple with those issues we can have little hope that incidents like this will cease. This situation has been at the heart of many of the interventions we have heard, notably that from the Foreign Minister of Egypt whom we are delighted to see back here in the Council, though I only wish that we were seeing him for some other less melancholy occasion. As he said, all efforts to work towards a solution have been at a standstill for many months now and it is the duty of us all to do what we can to get things moving. We have watched with sympathy the efforts made, for example, by the United States and we were particularly encouraged when President Nixon said that the Middle East would have for him "a high priority" in his second term.

But it is also the duty of the Council to play its part. Thus my delegation would be glad to see the Council call upon the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, to renew their efforts to promote agreement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) and we stand ready to help them in any way we can. In the past we have participated in talks on the Middle East between the permanent members of the Security Council and we remain ready to do so again.

Something must be done and it must be done urgently. The danger to peace in the Middle East region is such that none of us can afford to allow the present deadlock to persist indefinitely. We must all of us bend every effort to try to find a settlement. It is to this objective that my Government will remain dedicated.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the cordial words he has addressed to me.

17.4.73 6.27/100 16.7.73 2.3.73 N/KJ 6
B 24602/1
I MUST CONFESS THAT IT IS IN A SPIRIT OF PROFOUND DEPRESSION THAT I TAKE PART IN THIS DEBATE. DEPRESSION THAT, AS THE YEARS GO BY, FAR FROM MOVING FORWARD WE ONLY GO BACKWARDS. FAR FROM PEACE AND COUNSELS OF MODERATION PREVAILING, WE WITNESS EVER INCREASING VIOLENCE - A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF REPRISAL AND COUNTER-REPRISAL WITH THE SCENE DOMINATED INCREASINGLY BY EXTREMISTS AND EXTREME COUNSELS. THE ARGUMENTS THAT WE HEAR ARE TOO OFTEN DOMINATED BY THE PAST WHEN WE SHOULD BE LOOKING TO THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE. I MUST ALSO CONFESS THAT I AM FURTHER DEPRESSED BY THE PROLONGED EXCHANGES TO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED ON MATTERS TOTALLY UNCONNECTED WITH THE AGENDA, AND I HOPE THAT THE APPEAL THAT YOU MR PRESIDENT MADE YESTERDAY WILL NOT GO UNHEEDED.

MY GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEPLORED ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHEREVER AND BY WHOMSOEVER THEY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED. TO TAKE ONLY THE INCIDENTS OF RECENT WEEKS, WE DEPLORE, AND WE MUST ALL DEPLORE, THE TRAGEDY OF KHARTOUM AND THE SENSELESS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NICOSIA. WE DEEPLY SYMPATHISE WITH THE CAUSE AND THE FATE OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ENDLESS DEBATES AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH SEEM TO HAVE NO INFLUENCE ON THEIR LOT. SITTING IN THEIR CAMPS, OFTEN ALMOST IN SIGHT OF THEIR FORMER HOMES, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT BITTERNESS AND HATRED SHOULD GROW IN THEIR HEARTS AND THAT IN DESPAIR SOME OF THEM SHOULD TURN TO VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM. BUT THIS IS NOT THE WAY TO WIN SYMPATHY FOR THEIR CAUSE. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT TOLERATE THE KILLING OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, THE MURDER OF DIPLOMATS AND THE DISRUPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS THAT HAS BEEN CAUSED. NOT ONLY MUST THE PALESTINIAN LEADERS EXERCISE RESTRAINT BUT ALSO ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN THE AREA MUST EXERT THEMSELVES TO CONTROL THIS VIOLENCE. THEY MUST NOT PERMIT THE WILD MEN TO DISRUPT INTERNATIONAL ORDER. WE HAVE ALL GIVEN OUR ENDORSEMENT TO THE DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND WE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO THE CHARTER PRINCIPLES WHICH IT EMBODIES. IT IS SURELY TIME FOR ALL OF US TO RESPOND WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO THE APPEAL WITH WHICH THE DECLARATION ENDS - THAT IS, ITS APPEAL TO ALL STATES TO BE GUIDED BY THESE PRINCIPLES IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT AND TO DEVELOP THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THEM.

BUT TO DEPLORE THE ACTS OF VIOLENCE OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS IS IN NO WAY TO CONDONE THE ACTION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THEIR ATTACKS ON LEBANON WHICH ARE THE OCCASION FOR THIS PRESENT MEETING. THESE TOO MUST BE CONDEMNED. THIS WAS A GOVERNMENT ORGANISED OPERATION INTO THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN STATE, AN ACT OF OFFICIAL VIOLENCE WHICH CAN UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CHARTER. FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ACCEPT SUCH ACTION AS TOLERABLE WOULD BE, NOT A RETURN TO THE JUNGLE AS SOME SPEAKERS HAVE SAID, BECAUSE IN MANY RESPECTS THE JUNGLE HAS ITS OWN NATURAL LAWS. IT WOULD BE RATHER TO REVERT TO A STATE OF INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL HAS STATED HERE THAT BECAUSE THE ACTION IN BEIRUT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST TERRORISTS IT NEEDED NO JUSTIFICATION. IN THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION EVERY ACT OF VIOLENCE NEEDS JUSTIFICATION. WHERE THE VIOLENCE IS INTERNATIONAL, THE UNITED NATIONS IS LEGITIMATELY CONCERNED WITH IT. THE OBJECT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS TO TRY TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. RECENT EVENTS HAVE CUT AT EVERYTHING FOR WHICH THE UN STANDS.

BUT, MR PRESIDENT, I SAID EARLIER THAT WHAT WE MUST DO IS TO LOOK TOWARDS THE FUTURE. WE MUST TRY TO BREAK OUT OF THIS HORRIFYING SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE, COUNTER-VIOLENCE AND FURTHER VIOLENCE. AS I SAID TO THE ASSEMBLY LAST DECEMBER, WHILE MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCEPT THAT TERRORISM IS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED, WE ARE NOT BLIND TO THE NEED TO ERADICATE ITS ROOT CAUSES AND TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS UNDERLYING IT. WE MUST SHOW THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES IN JORDAN, SYRIA, LEBANON, GAZA AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE WORLD HAS NOT FORGOTTEN THEM. WE MUST TAKE NOTE OF, AND WE MUST TAKE ACTION ON, THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS WHICH MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN SHORT WE MUST ONCE MORE GIVE THEM A REASON FOR LIVING AND HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

THE DEBATE HERE THESE LAST DAYS HAS RANGED WIDELY FROM THE SUBJECT WHICH IS ON OUR AGENDA, THE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE LEBANON ON APRIL 9/10. BUT WHILE WE MUST FOCUS ON THAT EVENT WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR MINDS TO THE WIDER ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AS A WHOLE. UNTIL WE GRAPPLE WITH THESE ISSUES WE CAN HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THIS WILL CEASE. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AT THE HEART OF MANY OF THE INTERVENTIONS WE HAVE HEARD, NOTABLY THAT FROM THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT. AS HE SAID, ALL EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION HAVE BEEN AT A STANDSTILL FOR MANY MONTHS NOW AND IT IS THE DUTY OF US ALL TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET THINGS MOVING. WE HAVE WATCHED WITH SYMPATHY THE EFFORTS MADE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE UNITED STATES AND WE WERE PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON SAID THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD HAVE FOR HIM "A HIGH PRIORITY" IN HIS SECOND TERM.

BUT IT IS ALSO THE DUTY OF THE COUNCIL TO PLAY ITS PART. THUS MY DELEGATION WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE THE COUNCIL CALL UPON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR JARRING, TO RENEW THEIR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242 AND WE STAND READY TO HELP THEM IN ANY WAY WE CAN. IN THE PAST WE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WE REMAIN READY TO DO SO AGAIN.

MR. PRESIDENT, SOMETHING MUST BE DONE AND IT MUST BE DONE URGENTLY. THE DANGER TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION IS SUCH THAT NONE OF US CAN AFFORD TO ALLOW THE PRESENT DEADLOCK TO PERSIST INDEFINITELY. WE MUST ALL OF US BEND EVERY EFFORT TO TRY TO FIND A SETTLEMENT. IT IS TO THIS OBJECTIVE THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN DEDICATED.

CROWE

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות רשמיים).
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

סודי

בהול

אל: המשרד

מאת: לונדון

מס. 118

נשלח: 181300 אפר' 73

לוריא, מ. קדון, אירופה ב'. הציג מק'א (הצי מ.פ. 396)

שיחתי עם סר אלק הבוקר .

נכחו: רופ'נ, פארסונס, גור-בות ואקלנד .

1. הצעת ההחלטה-חזרתי על הסיבות מדוע אנו פוסלים הנוסח המסתובב
כעת באוי"מ. סר אלק השיב שאינ מנוס מגינאי פעולה צבאית ממלכתית בשטח
של מדינה אחת. לגבי מדת האיזון והסעיפים שאנו טוענים שיש בהם גימט
סנקציות, הנוסח שבידינו איננו סופי וממשיכים בנסיון לשפרו. מניחים
שאי"ב תטיל וטו על הנוסח כפי שהוא כעת, חזר על כך שלא יהיה
נוסח שיביא אותם לשינוי מדיניות הדכש המוצהרת. לפי דעת פארסונס
מועבייט לא תסתיים לפני ערב שבת כי יהיה עוד ויכוח ממושך מאחורי
הקלעים על הנוסח .

2. בקשר לדרכונים מסרתי בהתאם למברק לוריא מהבקר שאנו דוחים מחמתם
ולידיעתם ^{NO} ISRAELI PERSONNEL שהשתתפו בפעולה נשאו דרכונים
בריטיים .

סר אלק הגיב ברוגז מסוים שהוא דוחה דחיתנא I REJECT YOUR REJECTION

בדקו הענייני היטב ויש להם הוכחות חותכות CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
האנשים שהיו מעורבים ושהשתמשו באותם הדרכונים הבריטיים המזויפים
בשלוש הזדמנויות - בכניסתם ללונדון, ברישום במלון ובשכירת המכוניות .
הוא איננו יכול לומר אם שלושתם היו אזרחים ישראלים או יי שכירים יפניים
אבל אינן להם שום ספק שלקחו חלק בפעולה .

כל המוסד תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוק וסודות גשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

משרד החוק

מחלקת הקשר

מברק נכנס-מסווג

- 2 -

אמר שאם נכחיש זאת בפומבי
יצטרכו לגלות בפומבי מה היסוד העובדתי למחאתם(כתלם הזה של השיחה היה
מורגש מתח מסויים והיה ברור שנפגעו ומוכנים ללכת לעימות פומבי אתנו
בנדון אם נאלצם לעשות זאת. היה ברור לי שסר אלק אישית שוכנע מעבר לכל
ספק באמיתות טענתם. ניתנ גם לשער שעשו מאמצ לשכנע הלבנונים שהדרכונים
לא היו אמיתיים ושלא היו בריטים מעורבים בפעולה. ===

קומ"י.

שהח רוהמ נמנכל אלון דיין סמנכל אירופה ב' מאוס א+ב מצפא אלגוס דס ר/ אמן

יריב

אב/אר



London, EC4P 4DE. Telephone: 01-236 2000

DE ALREADY

It is true that the both pay and price required by Phase Two. Increases in earnings 10 per cent and a rise in prices of up to 7 per cent far from a deep freeze. On the other hand, with world forces developing as they have been, it is no doubt that in the Phase One both pay and price would by now have accelerated well into double figures. Moreover, the with which the Ford the footplatemen and the gas workers have away from the prospect of conflict with the Government and the law would have been predicted by the optimistic three months ago. The simple truth is that the statutory policy, which the Government rejected for too long, has already saved Britain from the greatest inflation of our history.

Of this shows, as has been stated so often before, that a declared mandatory policy is being fairly and squarely to all members of the community will finally be respected, at least the anomalies become intractable. A large part of the why individuals will under all conditions make decisions which they know to be realistic is the feeling that they are getting away with it—Cousins's determination to be part of the all. Apply the rule-of-the-road to everyone and most will observe it voluntarily.

There is nothing in the slightly revised draft of the Price and Incomes Bill published yesterday to modify our earlier view that Phase Two has been constructed as firmly and fairly as is possible in an imperfect world. Trade unions and the Labour Party have argued that the policy puts more severely on pay than

on prices because the policy does not pretend to control those prices which cannot be controlled (except by open-ended subsidy).

The stock market conversely believes that profits will be squeezed between rising cost pressures and limited price increases. On this particular issue it is in fact extremely difficult to be sure in which direction the division of rewards between capital and labour will be affected. Rudimentary macro-economic arithmetic does suggest that, as a partial counter-part this year to the Government's huge planned financial deficit and with the personal sector finding real disposable incomes rising more slowly than in the past two years, the company sector will enjoy a large temporary financial surplus.

In theory the profits limitation under Phase Two should lead to this being passed back to the personal sector in the form of lower selling prices. But in practice a strong growth of export profits, which are not controlled, may sustain a large temporary rise in profits. There is no certainty about this. What is certain is that the Government's quite absurdly large borrowing requirement makes the counter-inflation policy more difficult, and that it is so large that industry does not believe it can be maintained without a check.

With that qualification there is everything to be said for seeing the statutory policy through; it may be possible to move to a voluntary policy in Phase Three, but only if the statutory power is maintained to enforce it. The Government's attitude to lifting the statutory controls should be the same as its attitude to refixing the value of the pound, namely that it will do so "as soon as conditions permit", in other words not in the foreseeable future.

IN THE EEC

European states, and the sooner the better. But equally there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the present Spanish regime under the present Spanish constitution has no place in a community so defined.

Spain could perhaps be encouraged to think of herself as in a position analogous to that of Greece. The agreement on Greek membership with the EEC was

freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the right of everyone to "take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives", periodic and genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage with a secret ballot, the right to form and to join trade unions.

Yet to ask a government simply to conform to the Universal Declaration is asking at once too

Right to claim compensation

From Mr Alex Lyon, Labour MP for York

Sir, The Select Committee on the Maplin Sands Bill approved an amendment which is of considerable importance to all amenity societies who are concerned about damage to the environment from major developments which require legislation.

The amendment gave the Nature Conservancy the power to claim compensation to allow them to re-create elsewhere conditions to repair the damage to the flora and fauna done by the reclamation of Maplin Sands. Although primarily designed to conserve the Brent Goose it will help them to provide a new habitat for any kind of animal, bird or flower which is of importance even if that requires the purchase of land.

To my knowledge and that of Mr Frank Layfield, appearing for the Government, this is the first time an amenity body has been given the right to claim compensation. It is a precedent which I hope that other amenity bodies will consider when appropriate.

Yours sincerely,
ALEX LYON,
House of Commons.

Air safety

From Dr K. G. Bergin

Sir, It is over a month since Israeli aircraft destroyed a Libyan airliner, resulting in the death of 107 civilian passengers and crew.

Despite expressions of regret by Israel and appeals for more positive international reaction from governments and such associations as the International Air Transport Association, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the Arab Air Carriers Association, there appears to be no visible sign yet of any impartial inquiry being instituted into the tragic affair.

The lay-witness, the co-pilot, is still in an Israeli hospital. I am sure that he has had, and is receiving, the best possible medical attention, but from the point of view of the wider public, and in particular of world opinion, one would hope that independent medical advice is being made available to him.

This military attack on a civilian airliner presents a completely new hazard to international air transportation. It would be a serious matter if world opinion were to sweep this terrible tragedy under the carpet, either because it just didn't want to know, or because in this violent world one tragedy so quickly follows another.

Yours faithfully,
KENNETH BERGIN,
The Athenaeum, Pall Mall, SW1.

Bird-trapping in Cyprus

From Dr John Allison

Sir, In the spring of 1968 a team from the Smithsonian Institute carried out a detailed study of bird-

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Change through democracy

From Mr W. J. L. Wallace

Sir, For the past 14 years I have been a member of a political movement whose objectives are to bring about major changes in British politics, including changes in its system of government. During that period it has attracted at any one time between 100,000 and 300,000 members; it has received the steady support of some 10 per cent of the British electorate, and on a number of occasions a further 20 per cent or more have indicated their support. Throughout these last 14 years this movement has worked through constitutional means in the belief that a minority viewpoint, consistently expressed over a period of years, will in time gain proper representation and concessions from the majority.

Throughout that period the movement, the Liberal Party, has remained grossly under-represented in Parliament, and both major parties have refused to consider that there could be a case for greater representation. The Labour Party, whose individual membership during this period has sunk below 500,000, has joined with the Conservatives in insisting that each is the only "realistic" alternative to the other.

From time to time the more radical elements within the Liberal Party have despaired of working within the existing rules of the British constitution, and have turned to direct action as the only way to win concessions. In recent years the party has found it harder to attract politically active students, whose disillusionment with the possibilities of achieving change through democratic channels has swollen the ranks of the various radical movements, advocating an overthrow of the existing system by direct action, violent if necessary.

Now we are told that the violence used by intransigent minorities in Northern Ireland has made it necessary to change the constitutional rules of that province, to ensure fuller representation of the range of opinion. Both major parties hasten to add that no such change is necessary in Britain, where the two-party system provides "adequate" representation.

By what criterion can Parliament's present representation of opinion be described as adequate? Not only the Liberals under-represented; 10 per cent or more of the Scottish electorate who support the SNP, only one MP, the 10 per cent more of the Welsh electorate who support Plaid Cymru have none.

Hardships of allies

From Dr C. E. C. Wells

Sir, Your correspondent Mr Geo Wansell (article, March 24) in that the hardships of prisoners of war in Germany during 1940-45 were exaggerated. Although most of the distinguished prisoners, like the distinguished, whom he interviewed, would

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא

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סאט: המסר

קדם י.

הממדים הלווי

DISINGENUOUS

לשקול דפתך אם להשיב או לאו למכתב ה--

DR. K. G. BERGIN, בסיימס-27 מרס. להלן העובדות. א. בישיבתה ב-6 מרס
TO INSTRUCT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO INSTITUTE A FACT FINDING
INVESTIGATION AND REPORT TO IT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
בדיון שקדם להחלטה הייתה הסכמה כללית על 2 נקודות :-

THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE A TECHNICAL INQUIRY, COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, COVERING THE PERIOD BETWEEN PREPARATIONS FOR THE FLIGHT AND THE CRASH OF THE AIRCRAFT.

IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY A GROUP OF EXPERTS, DRAWN ENTIRELY FROM THE SECRETARIAT IF POSSIBLE. IF SOME SPECIAL EXPERTISE WAS REQUIRED FOR A PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE INVESTIGATION IT SHOULD BE SOUGHT IN ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; IF IT COULD NOT BE FOUND THERE, IT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE NECESSARY TO GO OUTSIDE, BUT THE EXPERT OR EXPERTS WOULD, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION, BE WORKING AS PART OF AN ICAO TEAM.

KOL HATZITUTIM HANAL MEHA- DRAFT MINUTES
SHEL FOURTH MEETING (CLOSED) OF 78TH
SESSION. ICAO COUNCIL
MONTREAL 6 MARS 1973 MISMACH DRAFT, C-MIN 78/4 (CLOSED).

בהתאם לסיכומים וההחלטה הנל מזכיל איקאו (דד אסד KOTAITE מלגגד)

מיבה חמסא מוסחים, כולם חברי מזכירות איקאו.

TO ASCERTAIN THE RELEVANT FACTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FLIGHT OF
THE AIRCRAFT 5A - DAH .

(ציטוט ממכתב המזכיר לנציג ישראל ליד איקאו מ-8 מרץ). המומחים נמצאים כבר

באיזור ויביעו לישראל בשבוע הראשון של אפריל. - זה על פי החלטת הממשלה.

ACCORDING TO WHICH COMPETENT INTERNATIONAL BODIES WOULD BE
ENABLED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL CONCERNING THE
INTERCEPTION OF THIS AIRCRAFT.

(תשובת נציג ישראל ליר איקאו למכתב הגל של המזכר)

ב-6 מרס קיבלנו מאת הוועדה הבינלאומית של הצלב האדום בבגדאד המברק הבא חתום מ"י
MARTIN. ICRC DOCTOR DELEGATES PROF GEMPERLE, REANIMATION SPECIALIST,
AND DR BERNATH, SURGEON, HAVE VISITED MARCH 5 IN HADASSAH HOSPITAL
JERUSALEM AND BEERSHEVA HOSPITAL SURVIVORS LIBYAN BOEING. HAVE
REPORTED AS FOLLOWS CONDITION PATIENTS WHO ARE GIVEN EXCELLENT
MEDICAL CARE.

- 2 -

הקטע על טייס המשנה הלובי כולחלן :-

MAHADI YUNES AYAD (LIBYAN) CONDITION VERY SATISFACTORY
STOP LUNG COMPLICATIONS BEING RESORBED STOP NO LONGER NEEDS
ARTIFICIAL VENTILATION STOP IS EXRUBE BLOOD GASES NORMAL STOP
WILL BE TRANSFERRED IN TWO DAYS TO ORTHOPEDIC SECTION FOR
OSTEOSYNTHESIS OF FRACTURES TO BOTH LEGS STOP NOT TRANSPORTABLE
FOR MOMENT .

GC

מאז החולה עבר הנתוחים האורטופדיים הנל בהצלחה. הוא בגבס ועושה

STEADY PROGRESS . בציגי ה- ICRC מבקרים אותו בקביעות.

אשתו הצטרפה אליו למחנה המקדית ושנתה אחר בבית החולים עד 20 מרס כשחזרה

לאתונה.

מ. קדרון

שהח דוהם אלון דיין מנכל מ/מנכל סמנכל אירופה ב כלכלית משפט מאוס אב
מזתים חקר אלבום וים אחן שמגר/יועץ משפטי יריב שר התחבורה מנכל תחבורה
גלבוע תחבורה זוסמן / תעופה אזרחית.

חא/כר

מעון לעוורות - לוח ארועים

כדי לאמת העובדות בשטח המופקע יצא ביום 18.2.73 שעה 08.15 ח"מ יחד עם צלם, ומנהל תביעות למקום. כן השתתפו ש. בלקינד מנכ"ל החברה הכלכלית לירושלים, ה"ה יקיר ופסל ממינהל מקרקעי ישראל ומר עוזי סיון מנהל לשכת שר המשפטים.

בטיור החבר ללא צל של ספק שאין כל מבנים על החלקה - לא מוגמרים ולא בתהליך בנייה. המבנים שהוקמו סמוכים לחלקה וצפונה לה. בחלקה הסמוכה מדרום יש מבנים בתהליך בנייה. ממצאים אלה סותרים לחלוטין את ההודעות בכתב של החברה הכלכלית לפיהן כבר הוקמו 3 מבנים על החלקה, ו-3 נמצאים בשלבי בנייה מתקדמים (מכתב מ. ויץ מיום 31.12.72 ומכתב בלקינד לד"ר קולבי 28.6.71).

באותו יום שעה 17.30 החקיימה ישיבה בנדון אצל שר המשפטים בהשתתפות מר א. לוריא, י. ענוג, ד"ר מ. רוזן וב. נבון ממש"ח, מר צ. טרלו וע. סיון ממשד המשפטים וכן שני אנשי מינהל מקרקעי ישראל.

לאחר ששר המשפטים קיבל העובדות החליט -

1. להורות על הפסקת כל העבודות בחלקה לאלתר.
2. לשקול ביטול ההפקעה והחזרת החלקה לבריטים, חוץ ציון העבודה שהחלקה מצויה בלב אזור תעשייה ואינה מתאימה לכן לצרכי מעון עוורות אך אם ירצו יורשו לבנות המעון בחלקה זו. יחד עם זאת חוצע להם חלקה אלטבנטיבית שלא הייתה קודם לכן בבעלות ערבית - יהא מחירה אשר יהא.
3. להורות על בדיקת האפשרויות להעברת תוואי מתוכנן של כביש שאמור היה לעבור בחלקה לתוואי אחר.
4. להורות ליועץ המשפטי לממשלה לבדוק את האפשרויות לפתיחת הליכים משפטיים נגד אנשי החברה הכלכלית לירושלים שמסרו לממשלה מידע שאינו נכון. כמו כן ביקש שר המשפטים שנודיע לשגרירנו בלונדון את ממצאי הבדיקה בשטח ע"מ שתתוקן האינפורמציה הבלתי נכונה שנמסרה.

ב-19.2.73 כתב שר המשפטים למ. זורע, מנהל מינהל מקרקעי ישראל בין השאר: "לאור הממצאים הנ"ל החלטתי לבקש להורות להחברה הכלכלית לירושלים להפסיק כל עבודה בחלקה הנדונה מיד ולחפש פתרונות לשינוי התיכנון הקיים בשטח כדי להעתיק תוואי שתוכנן על כביש שתוכנן לעבור על החלקה".

ב-19.2.73 הבריק שגרירנו בלונדון (מברק 141 לאמור: "כתבתי היום לבלניאל שנעשה הכל כדי להגיע להסדר סביר וכינתיים הפסקנו העבודה. הוספתי שנמתין עם תשובה פורמאלית לאגרתם עד שנודע תוצאות המו"מ המחודש בירושלים. בהזדמנות זו תקנתי הסעות בקשר למבנים במקום".

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
PUBLISHED WEEKLY
CHICAGO, ILL., MAY 1, 1936

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ב-20.2.73 הבריק הציר בלונדון (מברק 154):

"כרגע טלפן קרייג מהפוראופ ומסר כולהלן:

לפי דווח מ-19 של סנודבס בוצעו אחמול עבודות מדידה לשם הקמת מבנה. לפי דווח נוסף של קלוזייר, איש המעון, התחילו הבוקר בעבודות הקמה. אם ידיעות אלה נכונות הן נוגדות הודעתכם שהעבודות הופסקו ושוב מעמידים אותנו במצב עגום כלפי הפוראופ לאחר מכתבו של השגריר לבלניאל מאחמול בו הוא מודיע על הפסקת העבודות"

ידיעה זו גם הוזכרה בשיחת השגריר לדויג' עם מר י. ענוג והח"מ ב-20.2.

ב-21.2.73 שעה 09.00 יצא הח"מ לחלקה ומצא כ-10 פועלים קודחים בעזרת מקדחים הידאוליים וקומפרסור חורים בקרקע הסלעית. כן בלטו בשטח סימוני עץ שלא היו קודם לכן בשטח. בחשובה לשאלה השיבו מנהל העבודה שהחלו בעבודה ב-19.2.73 שעה 11.30. העבודה עבור מר סופר מ"תעשיית מתכת". מר לוריא ניסה להשיג את שר המשפטים ומשלא הצליח - דיבר עם עוזי סיון. בשעות הצהריים נאמר לח"מ ע"י עוזי סיון שמר זורע הורה על הפסקת העבודה.

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year.

2. The second part is a detailed account of the work done during the year.

3. The third part is a summary of the work done during the year, and a list of the names of the persons who have been employed during the year.

4. The fourth part is a summary of the work done during the year, and a list of the names of the persons who have been employed during the year.

5. The fifth part is a summary of the work done during the year, and a list of the names of the persons who have been employed during the year.



המשלחת הקבועה
של ישראל לאומות המאוחדות
PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

OXFORD 7-5500

9 בפברואר, 1973

563

שמו

אל : מאו"ם ב'

מאת : אורי גורדון, מאו"ם

הנדון: הגדרה של עמדת בריטניה כלפי
בעיית המז"ח באו"ם

ב-1 לפברואר 73 נשא וסטון הרצאה בפני כינוס של
Model United Nations באוניברסיטת נברסקה
בעיר לינקולן (אוניברסיטת נברסקה בקשה כי לורד קרדון
יופיע אולם וסטון נשלח במקומו).

נושא ההרצאה היה "האו"ם ומדיניות בריטניה כלפיו".
לאחר ההכרזה שוחחנו על רשמיו, על ניסיוני בהופעות
דומות בארה"ב ועל המטודולוגיה של הופעות מסוג זה.
מסר לי העתק הנוסח של הרצאתו ובקש לשמוע הערותי לאחר
שאקרא הניר.

להלן ציטוט הקטע המוקדם למו"ח:

The Middle East.... provides a good example of the
shortcomings of the United Nations. An outline for
the solution was contained in Security Council
Resolution 242, which was adopted unanimously on
22 November 1967 and continues to have the support
of all those primarily concerned with seeking a
solution - with the important exception of the
Palestinians. As for the British Government's
position on the Middle East, we remain wedded to
Security Council Resolution 242. In our view, this
Resolution, which contains the basic ingredients for
any Middle East settlement - withdrawal of Israeli



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forces and the right of all states in the area to live in peace with their neighbours, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, and a just settlement of the refugee problem - will have to be implemented in full if the aim of a just and lasting peace is to be achieved. But this does not mean that we believe that it is impossible to achieve the final goal by stages, for example by starting off with an interim arrangement to permit the re-opening of the Suez Canal. The British Government has always supported - and continues to support - the efforts of the United States Government to this end, on the understanding that such an arrangement would be a step towards a comprehensive settlement. The British Government also continues to back the Secretary - General and his Special Representative, Dr Jarring, and we shall support any efforts which they may in due time make to advance towards a settlement. For example, we have recently noted what the Secretary-General has said about the possibility of visiting the area himself and also his remarks concerning the possibility of convening a Peace Conference.

הריני מעלה הדברים על הכתב מאחר ונראה לי שיש בהם
ענין, אולם אבקש מאד לראות בהם חומר שלא לייחוס, שכן לא
לשם כך נמסרו לידי. הניר הוא פרטי, לא רשמי ולא פורסם.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אורי גורדון



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העתיקים: מר מ. קריון, יועץ לשר
מר י. מרוז, סמנכ"ל
מר א. עברון, סמנכ"ל
מר מ. ששון, סמנכ"ל
לשכת השר
לשכת הסמנכ"ל
אירופה א'
אירופה ב'
אירופה ג'
מזחי"ס
הקר
מר ארבל, המוסד

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES

London, 13-16 January 1973

The Board of Deputies of British Jews is associated with the convening of the Conference

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COMMUNITY REPORT

UNITED KINGDOM

(Prepared by Mr. Abraham Marks, Secretary,
Board of Deputies of British Jews)

Demographic data

The Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies has estimated the size of the Anglo-Jewish Community to be some 410,000, of whom 280,000 are in the London region and 130,000 in the provinces. The two largest centres in the provinces are the Manchester and Salford district (36,000) and Leeds (19,400).

Structure of Community organisations

The Board of Deputies of British Jews founded in 1760, is the oldest Jewish representative body in the world. From the beginning of the 19th century when its active history commenced, it has taken a leading part in all movements which in any way affected the civil and political rights of British Jewry. It represents the Jewish community in all matters affecting its welfare at the government and local authorities levels. It has taken up the cause of Jews in other countries who have suffered from persecution in all its manifestations. In recent years the Board associated itself with the campaign against prejudice and intolerance directed at Commonwealth immigrants.

Although representation on the Board is based primarily on the synagogue, during the past 60 years there has been an increased representation by lay institutions and organisations such as Friendly Societies, Zionist youth and other organisations, the Inter-University Jewish Federation, Women's organisations and provincial representative councils. The wide range of its activities is indicated by the nine separate committees responsible for the functional work of the Board.

Other major bodies dealing with Community functions

(i) The Anglo-Jewish Association founded in 1871 is concerned inter alia with Jewish education, communal affairs and Israel. It provides grants for schools and students and collects information about the conditions of Jews throughout the world.

(ii) Organisations affiliated to international bodies:

- (a) District Grand Lodge of Great Britain and Ireland of B'nai B'rith working particularly in the fields of philanthropy, social and educational affairs. It sponsors Hillel Foundation.
- (b) British Section of the World Jewish Congress, concerned with political, economic, social and cultural problems of Jews and the rights and status of Jews.

(iii) A large Zionist movement with all its religious and political shades represented. The largest of these is the Zionist Federation.

Political status and participation in public and civic life

British Jews have been active in public life since their civic and political emancipation in the 19th century. Of the 39 Jewish Members of Parliament the Rt.Hon. Sir Keith Joseph is the Minister of Social Services in the British Government; Ald. Michael M. Fidler, J.P., is the President of the Board of Deputies; Mr. Greville Janner, Q.C., an active Deputy - is the Secretary of the All-Party Parliamentary Committee for Soviet Jewry; Mr. Maurice Orbach is the General Secretary of the Trades Advisory Council; Mr. Maurice Edelman, Chairman of the Anglo-Jewish Association External Affairs Committee; and Dr. Maurice Miller is a leading figure in the Poale Zion.

Of the 29 Members of the House of Lords, Lord Janner is a past President of the Board with a distinguished record of achievement in public affairs. Lord Shinwell was a Cabinet Minister in the Labour Government.

In Local Government: Among leaders of the Board, its Vice-President, Sir Samuel Fisher, J.P., was the first Mayor of the Borough of Camden; Mr. Victor Mishcon, D.L., was the Chairman of the former London County Council; the late Ald. Abraham Moss, who had been a President of the Board, was the former Lord Mayor of Manchester.

Co-operation between Jews and Christians: promotion of inter-group understanding

At all levels in many parts of the country, Jews co-operate with their fellow citizens in social service activities, youth work and in other spheres.

The Board of Deputies through its Central Jewish Lecture Committee, and in close co-operation with the Council of Christians and Jews, (founded in 1942), has done much to develop understanding between British Jews and their Christian neighbours by providing lectures throughout the country on Judaism, Jewish life and inter-group relations. The Lecture Committee and the Council of Christians and Jews have for many years undertaken considerable educational programmes from school to University levels, by the provision of appropriate material dealing with inter-group relations, prejudice and Judaism in the context of World Religions. The Secretary of the Board is one of the Joint Hon. Secretaries of the Council of Christians and Jews National Executive.

Antisemitism

Antisemitism is not a major problem, but the Jewish Defence and Jewish Group Relations of the Board of Deputies with the co-operation of the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and Women maintains a close watch on any possible manifestations.

The racialist parties avoid antisemitic references due to Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965 whereby deliberate incitement to racial hatred was made an offence and concentrate their propaganda against coloured immigration. The Race Relations Act of 1968 deals with discrimination in employment, housing, education. Both Acts do not protect "religion".

Criticism of Israel and allegations of "Zionist colonisation" and "expansionism" mainly emanates from the extreme Left and Right Wing groups.

Relations with Christian Churches

The Council of Christians and Jews, with the Chief Rabbi, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council and the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, as its Presidents provides a valuable forum for discussion between the Jewish Community and the Christian churches. The Board of Deputies is in regular contact with the British Council of Churches, the Free Church Federal Council, the Catholic Church, the Methodist Church and the United Reformed Church. Generally there is much understanding between the religious organisations in this country.

Jewish Community life

Ashkenazi - Sephardi Division

The leading role of the Sephardim in community life after the re-establishment of the Jewish Community in 1656 has since been taken over by the larger Ashkenazi element. There is close co-operation between these two groupings at various levels including in the functions of the Chief Rabbi and the Haham and in all communal spheres.

Religious trends

The Chief Rabbinate has under its jurisdiction the United Synagogue and a large number of other congregations in Great Britain and overseas. The London United Synagogue, established in 1870, is the largest synagogal organisation. It maintains the Beth Din and is the main contributor to the maintenance of the Chief Rabbinate. It provides religious facilities for over 40,000 families and takes a considerable share in the Community's social and philanthropic work.

The Community of Spanish and Portuguese Jews - the Sephardim - established in the middle of the 17th century, is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Haham. It has congregations in London and Manchester.

The Federation of Synagogues was established in 1887 with synagogues especially in Greater London. Its organisations include a Beth Din and Burial Society.

The Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, established in 1926 to protect traditional Judaism, also has its own institutions.

The constituents of the Reform Synagogues of Great Britain are derived from the West London Synagogue which was established in 1840. It has synagogues in London and the provinces and an Assembly of Ministers.

The Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues, established in 1902, has synagogues in London and the provinces and its Rabbinic conference.

Social welfare and social problems

The key institution dealing with social welfare, the Jewish Welfare Board established in 1859, is continuously expanding its activities to reflect the needs of our times. It has 19 homes for old people, provides convalescent homes, assists families in periods of hardship, helps young people in their careers and employment, and looks after the mentally and physically infirm. It has a field welfare staff of 35 social workers who look after 3,500 people living in their own homes, while 1,000 old people live in the Board's homes and flatlets.

In 1971 a Central Council of Jewish Social Service was set up which includes representatives of the Jewish Welfare Board, Norwood Homes for Jewish Children, the Jewish Blind Society, the Jewish Home and Hospital for the disabled. This new Council is reviewing the social needs of the community as a whole, assessing available resources and will produce detailed proposals for co-ordination of its associated bodies.

Role of Jewish women

The role of women in the Jewish community in recent years has increased in significance, with an increasing involvement of Jewish women's organisations in significant community development. Since the establishment of the Association of Jewish Women's Organisations in the United Kingdom in 1965, it has indicated its important contributions in furthering communal understanding and in promoting a sense of unity among Jewish women of varying shades of opinion. Recently it has taken a prominent role in co-operation with the Board of Deputies in making known the plight of Soviet Jewry.

At the Board of Deputies and in many other community organisations women are playing a more active role. The British Section of the World Jewish Congress has had for many years, as its President, Eva, Marchioness of Reading. The Anglo-Jewish Association has for the first time a woman Vice-President.

Relations with Israel, Zionism, Aliyah

Israel, Zionism and Aliyah, are central aspects of the work of the Zionist Federation, the Mizrachi - Hapoel-Humizrachi Federation, Poale Zion, and other organisations.

Fund-raising

(a) Israel: The Joint Palestine Appeal, the Jewish National Fund, and specialised organisations raise funds for Israel.

(b) Foreign needs: The Central British Fund for Jewish Relief and the Federation of Jewish Relief Organisations are the chief bodies concerned with helping needy Jewish people and Jewish refugees in many parts of the world.

(c) Local needs: Fund-raising is undertaken by each organisation separately.

Assimilation and mixed marriages

While there are no statistics on assimilation and mixed marriages, the Jewish Community is frequently warned about these trends and dangers.

Dominating features of life of the Community in recent years

The acute problems of Soviet Jewry and Israel and the effects of Arab propaganda are in the forefront of communal activities. In connection with Soviet Jewry, the Board of Deputies appointed a special officer and has a co-ordinating group of organisations. A Committee of Parliamentarians interested and active in trying to assist, has been established.

The need to make the British public fully aware of issues which confront Israel at present is undertaken by various organisations of the Jewish community, primarily the Zionist bodies. Here, too, a Committee of Parliamentarians has been in existence for some time. The Board of Deputies has a special Erets Israel Committee.

Education and youth

The 1971 estimate of Jewish school population gave as the maximum figure 73,800 in primary and secondary schools.

Part-time classes and Talmud Torahs

In 1971 the London Board of Jewish Religious Education, the largest of its kind in Great Britain, indicated that there were 7,339 children attending its synagogue classes and Talmud Torah centres, and 1,143 children at withdrawal classes, i.e. classes arranged for Jewish children attending local education authority schools. 1,000 children receive their religious education under the auspices of the Talmud Torah Council of the Federation of Synagogues. There are also Talmud Torahs provided by the Board of Orthodox Jewish Education. There are Religious Education Boards in Jewish communities in provincial centres.

Synagogue classes are also provided in London and the provinces by the Reform and Liberal Synagogues.

The decline in numbers of children at synagogue classes is attributed to the drop in the Jewish birth rate and the growth of Jewish day schools.

Jewish day schools

The number of pupils in 1971 was as follows:

	<u>London</u>	<u>Provinces</u>	<u>Total</u>
Nurseries and nursery schools	1,591	594	2,185
Primary schools	3,752	2,956	6,708
Secondary schools	2,348	1,237	3,585
	Grand Total		12,478

Classification of day schools

(a) The London Board of Jewish Religious Education is responsible for the J.F.S. Comprehensive school, with 1,390 pupils (the largest Jewish day school in the country). The London Board works with the Zionist Federation Educational Trust and the Jewish Agency, which have founded a number of Jewish day schools.

(b) Another group consists of schools created by the Jewish Secondary School Movement.

(c) There are also schools which aim at a Yeshivah type of education such as the Yesoday Hatorah and Lubavitch schools.

There are Jewish secondary, primary and nursery schools in the following provincial towns: Gateshead, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Leeds, Newcastle on Tyne, Southend and Sunderland.

Carmel College for boys and girls is the only Jewish school in the United Kingdom organised on the lines of public schools, which have a special significance in the British education system.

Teacher-training

The supply of sufficient well qualified teachers is a serious problem for all Jewish educational organisations.

Teacher training courses are provided at Jews' College, the Beth Jacob Council, which has a London Seminary, and the Gateshead Teachers Training College. There is also a faculty for the training of teachers at the Trent Park College of Education which enables Jewish students to take Jewish studies as their main subject within the general educational curriculum.

The Leo Baeck College has a teachers training department in connection with the Borough Road College of Education, Isleworth.

Proposals for the development of Jewish education

The Chief Rabbi, in his document "Let my people know", has proposed the establishment of additional primary and secondary schools, the organisation of scholarship schemes, which will train future teachers and administrators, and the appointment of specialised advisors and inspectors. He also makes suggestions regarding sixth form colleges, and teacher-training. In order to carry out this outstanding plan for the future of Jewish education, the Chief Rabbi has established a Development Trust Fund for obtaining the necessary financial support.

Youth and student activities - their orientation

The Jewish Youth Organisations Committee, which works under the auspices of the Board of Deputies, provides a convenient means through which the various organisations are able to discuss common problems.

The following are the main youth organisations:

(a) Groups with religious affiliations: Ezra, youth organisation of Poale Agudas Israel; Lubavitch Foundation; United Synagogue Council of Youth Synagogues; Jewish Youth Study groups; the Youth Association of the Reform Synagogues; and the Youth Section of the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues.

(b) Zionist groups: the Federation of Zionist Youth; Habonim; B'nai Akiva, the youth movement of Mizrachi; Hanoar Hatzioni; Young Poale Zion.

(c) Organisations with general Jewish cultural or amateur sport interests like the Union of Maccabi Association; the Jewish Guides Advisory Council; Jewish Lads Brigade; Jewish Scouts Advisory Council; B'nai B'rith Youth Organisation.

The largest Jewish youth organisation is the Association for Jewish Youth, established in 1899. It provides a variety of services for Jewish youth including sporting and cultural activities.

(d) Student organisation: the Inter-University Jewish Federation co-ordinates activities of Jewish and Israel societies in British universities. It works in close conjunction with the Hillel Foundation. It has a comprehensive educational programme for students dealing with Judaism, Zionism, Jewish history, philosophy and education.

Although there are no statistics available it is known that there are many students who are apathetic or indifferent to the Jewish community and prefer to be assimilated.

Many young people are unattached and seem to be self-sufficient and not interested in belonging to any type of organisation.

Cultural activities: trends

Cultural, including educational activities are undertaken by varied organisations:

- (a) The United Synagogue, through its local synagogues, has a cultural programme including Judaism, Jewish history and Hebrew.
- (b) Jews' College Extra-Mural Department provides series of lectures on Judaism, Jewish history, philosophy and similar subjects at a number of London synagogues and other institutions.
- (c) The Zionist Federation provides lectures and courses on modern Hebrew.
- (d) Leo Baeck Evening Institute has a programme for the study of Judaism and Jewish history at a number of its synagogues.
- (e) Lectures and conferences are undertaken on historical and cultural themes by the Jewish Historical Society, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, and other organisations. Friends of Yiddish and the Yiddish Committee of the World Jewish Congress British Section provide talks on cultural themes in Yiddish, and the Brit Ivrit Olamit branch in Hebrew.

The following are some of the main cultural activities: annual Jewish Book Week, Jewish Musical Festival, Warsaw Ghetto Holocaust Commemoration, Jewish Child's Day celebrations.

The main cultural institutions are: the Mocatta Library, University College; Ben Uri Art Gallery; Brodetsky Library; Hillel House; Jewish Museum; Jews College Library; Parkes Library, University of Southampton.

Orchestras: Ben Uri Orchestra and Chamber Music Group; Jewish Youth Orchestra.

Choirs: Zemel; Jewish Male Voice Choir; Kinor; Zimriah (Jewish musical activities are co-ordinated through the Jewish Musical Council).

Theatres: There is no Jewish theatre. There are, however, groups who perform in Yiddish at various communal centres. Dramatic performances are undertaken by youth organisations. The Cameo Players, an Anglo-Jewish theatre group established in 1945, presents significant plays of Jewish interest in

English and encourage new dramatists.

Anglo-Jewish press

The Jewish Chronicle, which dates from 1841, is acknowledged as the leading Jewish newspaper and is renowned for its world-wide coverage of Jewish news. Its controversial treatment of a number of communal matters often leads to lively reactions.

Jewish newspapers and magazines are published in Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Glasgow and Birmingham. The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, published under the auspices of the Zionist Federation, specialises on Israel and neighbouring countries. The Jewish Vanguard represents the views of Poale Zion; The Jewish Review the Mizrahi movement; and the Jewish Tribune, which appears in English and Yiddish, is the organ of Agudas Israel of Great Britain.

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency and the Jewish Chronicle News Service publish daily news bulletins. The World Jewish Congress publishes a twice weekly digest of Jewish items in national and foreign papers and of the Jewish press.

World Jewry is the review of the World Jewish Congress. There are two literary periodicals, the Jewish Quarterly and the Yiddish Loshon un Leben.

Scholarly activities

(a) Research in connection with Jewish social and similar problems are undertaken by the following: Statistical and Demographic Research Unit of the Board of Deputies; Institute of Jewish Affairs (under the auspices of the World Jewish Congress); Jewish Welfare Board; Demographic and Sociological Unit of the Merseyside Jewish Representative Council. Social research is also undertaken on Jewish themes at the following Universities: Greater London: City, Brunel, London School of Economics, Queen Mary's College. Provincial: Bristol, Liverpool, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield, and the Open University near Bletchley.

The World Jewish Congress publishes the Jewish Journal of Sociology and the Institute of Jewish Affairs publishes Patterns of Prejudice (on antisemitism and race relations); Soviet Jewish Affairs; and a survey Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism.

Hebrew studies and Judaica at the following Universities

London: University College and School of Oriental and African Studies, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Leeds and Glasgow. Recently readerships in modern Jewish history were established at the new Universities of Warwick and East Anglia.

Role of Jews in academic life

More Jews are now active in academic life than in earlier periods. At nearly every University there are Jewish academics from professors to young lecturers in various disciplines. Distinguished Jewish scholars have been prominent in the activities of leading national organisations and institutions such as the Royal Society, the British Academy, in medical and scientific councils and organisations.

Jewish intellectuals do not, however, appear to take sufficient part in the life of the Jewish community. But at a number of universities, the Jewish academics have been helpful in the work of the local Hillel houses and Jewish societies. Some are co-operating with the Board of Deputies Demographic Research Unit, the Institute of Jewish Studies, the Leo Baeck Institute Society for Jewish Study, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, and the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress.



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שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

ה' בשבט תשל"ג,
8 בינואר 1973

אל: לשכת דיבון,
מאת: השגרירות, לונדון.

הנדון: ועידת המדור האנגלי של
הקונגרס היהודי העולמי -
תגובות הפוראוף על החלטותיה.

כשהתיעצו עמי בזמנו על הגשת הצעות החלטה לוועידה
הנ"ל, הצעתי את נושא יהודי מז"ת כדי להבטיח גם בדרך
זאת הבאת הבעיה לידיעת הפוראוף. לא הנחתי שעוד תשמע
הצעת ההחלטה נושא להתכתבות ב"טיימס" ולחלופי הדברים
בבי.בי.סי., כפי שהיתה בזמנו. עתה קבלתי את תגובת
הפוראוף להצעת ההחלטה, ואני מצרף אותה כאן לידיעתכם.
תגובה זאת ניתנה בכתב למזכ"ל הקונגרס.

בברכה,

ע. זאב סופות.

העמק: אירופה ב'.

αλ: εφελ. ρ' αλ,
 ελ: πελ. ρ' ελ, ν' ελ.

REPORT: EXTRA POWER BALANCE OF
EXTRA POWER BALANCE -
EXTRA POWER OF EXTRA POWER

72 190 01870

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS BRITISH SECTION

Congress House, 55 New Cavendish Street, London, W1M 8BT. Cables: Worldgress, London. Tel. 01-935 0335/9

President : The Marchioness of Reading, C.B.E., J.P.

Chairman : Mr. J. Halévy, M.Sc.

General Secretary : Mr. Jack Barnett

CONFIDENTIAL

2nd January 1973

BS/C/1
BS/C/5

To : Mr. E.Z. Sofutt
From: Jack Barnett - General Secretary

SEVENTEENTH BIENNIAL ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE

We have received the following detailed reply from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in response to our submitting for their attention the Political Resolutions adopted at our Seventeenth Biennial Annual National Conference. A set of these is enclosed for comparison.

I would be grateful for any comments you may care to make.

" In his letter of 28 November the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary said that we would be writing to you about the Resolutions adopted at your 17th Biennial National Conference.

We have the following observations on these Resolutions.

State of Israel

The attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards Middle East questions is well known. Their policy remains to help in any way they can towards a peaceful settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242.

Peace in the Middle East

As the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said in his speech on 18 September, UN Security Council Resolution 242 enshrines the basic principles which must be honoured if a real settlement is to be achieved. It is not a "precondition" but a framework for a settlement and has been accepted as such by the greater part of the international community including, of course, Israel.

Her Majesty's Government believe that if a just and lasting peace is to be concluded in the Middle East there will have to be negotiations between the parties. But to be successful any negotiating procedure must have the support of both sides to the dispute. At present, direct negotiations do not.

The policy of Her Majesty's Government on arms sales to the Middle East is well known. They are ready to consider applications for the supply of arms from countries in the area (including both Egypt and Israel). But they would not be prepared to permit the supply of equipment which, in their judgement, would increase the chances of a resumption of hostilities or impede the search for a peaceful settlement.

Soviet Jewry

Although we have no formal standing to intervene with the Soviet authorities on matters concerning Soviet citizens, HMG have drawn the attention of Soviet authorities to the strength of feeling in this country about the emigration issue both in public and in private, and in particular on the recent emigration tax.

-Page Two-

Hijacking

Her Majesty's Government have frequently made it clear that they condemn terrorism in all its forms. We are playing an active part in the International Civil Aviation Organisation in seeking agreement for effective international action, including denial of air services, against countries which fail to deal adequately with hijackers. The ICAO Council has now invited all member states to a special meeting of the ICAO Legal Committee in Montreal in January for this purpose. We will support whatever proposals for effective international action the international community is prepared to accept. We do not however consider that we should be justified in taking action to stop air services to or from member countries in the absence of an international framework within which states can determine the facts of the case and agree on the joint action to be taken. The essence of success of any such action is in its collective application by the international community. With regard to national legislation, a bill has been introduced into the House of Lords to enable the UK to ratify the Montreal Convention.

Terrorism

As stated above, Her Majesty's Government condemn all acts of terrorism whatever their source and have made it clear that they are ready to join other members of the international community in devising ways to bring terrorism to an end. There can be no government, Arab or non-Arab, which is not fully aware of this attitude.

Jews in Arab Countries

We have no formal standing to intervene with the Iraqi and Syrian Governments with regard to their treatment of their own citizens. Moreover, in the absence of diplomatic relations between HMG and the Iraqi and Syrian Governments, it has not proved possible to initiate direct enquiries about the allegations of persecution of Jews in these countries. Other sources have been unable to confirm reports that a number of Jews were arrested in Baghdad. On 26 November Israeli forces radio carried an announcement by Mr. Eban "on the release of the 8 Jews detained in Iraq....." Recent indications are that life has improved for Jews in Iraq and on 28 November a Jewish agency official announced that the "Iraq Government is allowing the Jews of Iraq to leave the country". He added that there are now only 300 Jews left there.

— We have no recent information about the condition of Syrian Jews.

2201 K 101 11/12/72
B. J. L. 101
jr
Jerusalem, 27 December 1972

To Ambassador M. Comay, London

From Arthur Lourie, Jerusalem

Dear Mike,

Talk between Sar Hahutz and
Leader of the Opposition Harold Wilson

Wilson met with the Sar at his house for an hour-and-a-half's talk which included a variety of matters some of which I record below.

1. Wilson criticised Britain's support for the U.N. Middle East resolution and in particular the clause "deploring" our continued occupation of the territories and which, he said, distorted the balance of 242. He agreed with the Sar that 242 did not mean automatic withdrawal or a restoration of the June 4, 1967 lines but a boundary based on security and to be worked out in negotiation between Israel and the Arabs.

Wilson, had expressed his views on this recently in his speech to B'nei Brith in Leeds. He added that he did not see Britain's role as being to take up positions half-way between that of the U.S. on the one hand, and France and the Soviets on the other. This would merely give the Soviets a new starting point for further concessions beyond the British position.

2. The Sar emphasised the undesirability of promoting any European initiative which might encourage Sadat to believe that there was a way out other than to seek an accommodation with us through negotiation. It was essential not to foster in him the illusion that others would pull his chestnuts out of the fire. Once he reached that conclusion, perhaps in the spring, (i.e. that there was no other option open to him), we might expect a real advance on the question of a partial settlement.

3. The Sar stressed the importance to us of Britain as a potential arms supplier even if this meant that there was no embargo on arms to Egypt. In particular we looked to Britain to help us remedy to some extent the gross imbalance between us and Egypt in the naval field. We accordingly welcomed the submarines deal. Wilson said an important element in this was unemployment in the Barrow shipyards.

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Letter of the Commission to the
President of the United States

1. The Commission has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th of June, 1947, in which you requested that the Commission should report to you on the progress of its work.

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S E C R E T

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4. In answer to Wilson the Sar said that despite discordant noises the recent public discussion on the future of the occupied areas and the possibility of a return of territory in the context of peace, had been salutary. The consensus was clearly in favour of such a return.

5. In talking of the period immediately prior to the 1967 war, at which time Wilson was Prime Minister, he said that Prof. Brecher, whom he had met during his current visit, had posed the question whether it would not have been better so far as the international reaction were concerned, if Israel, instead of waiting as long as she did had taken action immediately following Nasser's closing of the Straits on 23 May. Wilson had told him that because of the delay the Americans and British had developed a "guilt complex" which worked in Israel's favour after the war. In Wilson's opinion the guilt complex was stronger and more justified in America than in Britain, since Britain, in relation to its capacity had "pushed out ahead" on the Straits issue. One of the elements in the growth of caution in late May had been that Canada became more and more hesitant. Pearson had been a disappointment. He felt personally humiliated by the ouster of UNEF and did not want to get into a position where he would be humiliated again. Another factor was that Johnson was encountering difficulties in the Senate. Wilson thought that these inhibitions might perhaps have been overcome a few days later, but meanwhile Israel took the initiative.

Mr. Wilson mentioned in this connection that he had himself been going over the page proofs of Gerald Kaufman's book on the history of Israel to be published in the spring.

6. Wilson said that the Foreign Office was to-day completely "Arabised". He himself had insisted, when Prime Minister, on having as his contact with the F.O. on Middle East affairs, a man on whom he could rely to see that his instructions were understood as he wanted them to be understood. Of three candidates who had at that time been recommended to him, two were committed pro-Arabs. He chose the third, even though he happened to be the least able of the three.

7. Wilson was concerned about the growth of pro-Arab elements in Labour. He mentioned in this connection, at Transport House, Gwyn Morgan, and to-day Tom McNally. The latter had prepared notes for his B'nei Brith speech which he had had to discard because of their pro-Arab bias. He remarked that Manuela Sykes, although she kept off the subject in her election campaign, lost the Uxbridge election because of her ardent support for the Batah.

4. In answer to Wilson's question as to whether the
policy of the United States was to support the
Government of the Republic of China, the
Secretary of State, Mr. Clegg, said that the
policy of the United States was to support the
Government of the Republic of China.

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United States was supporting the Government of
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China which was friendly to the United States.

S E C R E T

- 3 -

Wilson urged us to try to get Jim Callaghan to pay a visit to Israel.

8. Wilson said he had had a talk with Said Amami, the unofficial representative of the P.L.O. He had tried without success to get a clear indication from him of the territory to be included within the Palestinian State. The clear inference, however was, all of pre-1948 Palestine west of the Jordan!

9. On the internal British scene he said that if an election were held in the near future he thought Labour would win because of the massive rise in the cost of living - 23% in the last two years. The freeze on prices and wages was only a temporary palliative. There was also disenchantment among the Tories about Heath's leadership. He ruled out Maudling as a successor, and as potential candidates at this time, mentioned Whitelaw and Carr.

10. Wilson expressed his regard for Edgar Ruppin.

Arthur Lourie

כ"ט בשבט תשל"ג
3 בינואר 1973

אל : המנכ"ל
מאת: השגריר לונדון

הנדון: מכתב דו-חדשי
חוזר מ-2.11.72

1. מדיניות בריטניה המזתית לא נשתנתה מהותית ורשמית במשך השנתיים האחרונות. המרכיבים העקריים למדיניות זו הם: א. הסדר שלום על-פי החלטה 242 כתוצאה מ"דיאלוג" בין הצדדים בלי כפייה מבחוץ. למרות ספקנותם, מוכנים הבריטים לחייב נסיון אה"ב לחדש ענין ההסדר החלקי בעלה. הם עדיין בדעה שהצעד הראשון צריך להיות בין ישראל ומצרים ולא בין ישראל וירדן. ב. הגבלות מסוימות על אספקת נשק לצדדים ללא הטלת אמברגו. ג. שמירת יחסים בילטרליים תקינים עם שני הצדדים בסכסוך. ד. אי רצון להסתכן במז"ת או לנקוט ביוזמות וטענה שהאחריות הבינלאומית לשלום האיזור חלה על אה"ב ובריה"מ.

2. לעומת זאת אין להתעלם מכמה גורמים העשויים להשפיע על מדיניות בריטניה בכוון בלתי רצוי לנו כגון: א. הצטרפות בריטניה לקהיליה האירופית מוקדם להחלטה אין יתמחה השוק המורחב ומה יהיו המערכים ומוקדי הכח בחוכו, אך יש לצפות לכך שיתחזק הרצון להאט עמדות החברים בעניני חוץ מלבד אותם הנושאים שיש לגביהם אינטרסים מנוגדים. נוסף לכך בריטניה חנטה לשמור על חזית משותפת עם צרפת או לפחות למנוע חכוכים אתה, כל עוד היא זקוקה להבנה צרפתית, ועניני השוק שעדיין עומדים על סדר היום וחיוניים לבריטים כגון: איזורים נחשלים ומדיניות מוניטרית. המאבק הפנימי על ההצטרפות לשוק ואי התלהבות הצבור בנדון מגבירים הצורך למנוע קשיים עם צרפת. ב. התלות האירופית במדינות ערב בענין הנפט. יש כעת מחשבה רצינית כיצד להקטין את התלות בעתיד (סימן לכך - שינוי התכנית לחיסולן ההדרגתי של מכרות הפחם) אך ברור לכולם שלא תהיה בכך גאולה לעתיד הקרוב. הבעיה היא כפולה: הן שליטה הערבים על מקורות נפט חיוניים לאירופה ובריטניה והן הצטרפות הון בקנה מדה עצום בידי שליטי ערב. לכן חלך וחגבר הנטיה לפייס את הערבים בזירה הטוליטית ולשמור על מאזן התשלומים ע"י הגברת יצוא למדינות ערב, הגברת מכירת נשק להם ומשיכת השקעות הון מהם. ג. לממשלת בריטניה אין "פסנט" איך לשבור את הקפאון הפוליטי בסכסוך ישראל-ערב, אך קיימת אידה ביקורתית כלפינו. לפי הרגשתם, המצב הנוכחי יותר מדי נוח לישראל אשר נוטה להחזיק בשטחים לטווח ארוך וליצור עובדות לקראת הסדר בעתיד. לפי דעתם החמיצה ישראל הזדמנות לשבור את הקרח עם מצרים בשני מומנטים פסיכולוגיים, כאשר המצרים השיבו "בהיוב" לתזכיר יארינג מאפריל 1971 וכאשר סאדאת סילק את היועצים הסובייטים.

בברכה,

מ. קומיי

העתק: מר א. לוריא, יועץ מדעי לשה"ח
אירופה ב'
לשכה השר

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON, W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091



שגרירות ישראל

לונדון

אל: ד. נהון סגן מנהל אישי.

בברכות מאת

With the Compliments of

עוזר

מנחם פריד
מנחם פריד

7-1985 ON - P. 165 of the 1st 1/2 of 1985

SHADOW CABINET

12 Dec. 1972.

(9)

Mr The Rt. Hon Harold Wilson X

Mrs. Judith Hart, Overseas Development +

Mr. James Callaghan, Shadow Foreign Secretary +

Mr. Fred Peart - responsible for Defence +

Mr. Michael Foot) +
Mr. Peter Shore } + ~~XXXXXX~~ E.E.C.

Mr. Edward Short - Deputy leader of the Party +
and Shadow leader of the House

Mr. Harold Lever, D.T.I. relating to Company Law +

Mr. Norman Merlyn - Northern Ireland Affairs

Mr. Denis Healey, Shadow ~~XXXXXX~~ Chancellor +

Mr. Antony Crossland - Environment, Housing and Local Govt. +

Mrs. Shirley Williams +

Mr. A. Wedgwood Benn - Trade and Industry +

Mr. Reg. Prentice - Employment and Labour +

Mr. William Ross - Scottish Affairs +

Mr. John Silkin, Social Services +

Mr. Roy Hattersley - Education +

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אנדריוס

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON, W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091
13 דצמ' 1972
ח' טבת תשל"ג



סודי

סגרירות ישראל
לונדון
261

אל: י. ענוג, מנהל ארופה ב'

מאת: הציר, לונדון

הנדון: סמה הערות על רקע שיחת שה"ח-סיר אלק.

שעה שאני מכתב הערות אלה, למחרת השיחה, מונחת לפני הסיכום של הדיווח במברק כפי שנרשם ע"י עודד ערן. אני למד ששה"ח הכניס שינויים מספר והחליט שיקח עמו דו"ח זה שיופץ אליכם בירושלים ולא כמברק מכאן. על אף זאת אני מצרף את הסיכום המקורי תוך הדגשה שהדיווח שתקבלו מאיתן הוא הדו"ח המוסמך. הביקור במשה"ח כולל השיחה המקדימה עם בלניאל ערכו למעלה משעה וחצי. אגב, יענין אותך לדעת שבלניאל, גם משיחה אחי לפני כמה ימים וגם הפעם, הפגין גישה ידידותית אך יחד עם זה עורר אצלי רושם שאינו שולט בנושא ולמעשה כולו נחון בידי הפקידות. כנגד זה, סיר אלק לא נזקק כלל לפקידים אשר ישבו סביבו, פרט לענין ההקפאה של הסדרי הקהיליה. בענין זה הופנו כמה שאלות לקרייג. מכך אני מבין שהוא נכח בסיבובים האחרונים של השיחות בבריטל. אעפ"כ גם הוא לא הצטיין בבקיאות רבה. גם הענין שסיר אלק הראה בסוגיה זו היה מצומצם, אדרבא - הוא עשה עלי רושם משועמם למדי ~~ב~~ בקטע זה של השיחה והיה לי הרושם שאיש מהנוכחים לא מהמציא בנושא עד תום. סיר אלק כנראה ^לבר משהו קלוש שה"ח הקפאה" אינה שלמה ושיש איזשהו יוצא מהכלל. ענין ה- Reference Prices עלה כאשר השר או השגריר אמרו שאי הפעלתם כלולה אצלנו במושב ההקפאה ושקרייג השיב שזה גם רצונם. קרייג הציג את המצב כאילו ענין ההקפאה הוא רצון והצעה בריטיים אך שארצות הקהיליה טרם סמכו ידיהן על הצעה זו. חיזוק להערכתי זו קבלתי כאשר פטרישיה לונג ^לצללה הבוקר לעודד ערן וביקשה למסור נוסח של מה שקרייג ביקש לאמור:

The Community had proposed that we should treat Israel in 1973 in the same way we treated any third country and the details of this proposal are still beeing discussed.

ענין גרמ"ז הוכנס לשיחה לפי בקשתי וזה ודאי ישמח את לבו של ידידנו יוחנן מרוז. היה לי רושם כאילו הד מהשיחות המכילות שניהלתי במישור של מנהל מחלקה עלו עד לשולחנו של דאלגלס יום. תגובתו היתה חיובית בעיקרה אך למעשה לא מחייבת ביותר. מכל מקום היא נותנת לי אפשרות לחזור ולדבר בנושא עם מנהל מע"ר כשהפעם אני יכול להודות לו או לבשר לו ש"מלמעלה" יש גישה המחייבת הענות לבקשותינו בנוגע לצד המדיני. אוסיף הערה שאינה שייכת לשיחות סיר אלק - אנחנו מנסים לעורר חברי פרלמנט להעלות את הסוגיה בוויכוח על עניני חוץ שנועד להתקיים בסוף השבוע.

וכעת לקטע המזת"י של השיחה. עוד לפני השיחה, הבהיר לנו שה"ח שאינו רואה טעם בהחרפת הניגודים ביננו על רקע התנהגות בריטניה בעצרת. אין לנו ענין שכאילו עניני או"ם יעיבו על היחסים הבייליטריים כשעל רקע זה יפרוץ ויכוח צבורי. שני בני השיח לא ^לכירו את השדר של שה"ח והשיחה התנהלה באוירה ועל פסים שאנו רגילים להם מפגישות קודמות. בדברי סיר אלק היו שתי נימות שלהן הוא נתן בסוי ברור יותר מאשר בעבר. הוא דיבר על הבידוד ההולך וגובר של ישראל בזירה הבינלאומית כשביסס זאת על השואת תוצאות ההצבעה בעצרת בעניני המזה"ח בשנים 70-72.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

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[Illegible text block]



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN.
LONDON, W8, 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091

סגרירות ישראל
לונדון

- 2 -

אם מותר לי לפרש: רצה לומר שתמיכת דעת הקהל העולמית נמצאת בקו של ירידה עד שאנו נשארים למעשה מבודדים פרט לתמיכה אמריקאית. הנימה השניה שמתקשרת לקודמת היתה שמתחזק יותר ויותר הרושם שפנינו אינן לנסיגה. בלי שניכנס לפרטים ובלי שבסס "Chapter Verse" מה מקור התרשמות זו, היה ברור שכוונתו למדיניותנו של "יצירת עובדות" בשטחים. בהקשר זה אני מזכיר לך את הדווח שלי על שיחה עם פייק בה מוזכר בהדגשה דווח שהם קבלו בפוראוף על תוכניותיה של הרשות לפתוח סיני. אני סבור כמו כן שלא נסעה אם נניח שהצהרות של כמה משרינו והויכוח על עתיד השטחים מלאו תפקיד בגיבוש הדעה הנ"ל. שה"ח אמנם ניסה לערער גישה זו אך אינני משוכנע אם הצליח לעשות זאת. לא יכולתי להמנע מהרושם שאמינותנו בענין זה נפגעה בעיני הבריטים - אולי פחות בעיניו של סיר אלק מאשר בעיני הפקידים, שהם משוכנעים שקיימת כאן מדיניות מחוכמת ומחושבת אשר מטרתה הבסיסית היא לא להחזיר שטחים. בלי שאוכל לומר זאת בבטחון, אני מניח שהדווח המגיע משגרירותם בת"א משמש יסוד לכך, ואצל אנשים כמו קרייג ודויד גורבוס אין צורך לטרוח הרבה כדי לגבש אצלם דעה כזו לגבי כוונותינו. אם להאמין לדבריו של פייק, השפיעה התרשמות זו במדה מסוימת על התנהגותם של הבריטים בעצרת.

נקודה אחת בה מצאתי ענין הנה המגמה של דאגלס-יום לחזור לרעיון החכירה לגבי שארם-א-שייך. יתכן שיש גם ענין בתאור מהלך השיחה כיצד הוא הגיע לנקודה זו. בשלב מסוים שאל סיר אלק על יחסינו עם ירדן וכמובן שעלתה שוב שאלת יחסינו לתכנית הפעולה הפדרטיבית של חוסיין. שה"ח תאר יחסינו עם הירדנים אך לבסוף הגיע למסקנה שאין לצפות שהמלך יוכל לצעוד קדימה לבד ובניתוק מיתר ארצות ערב לקראת כריחת הסכם כזה שגם אנחנו נוכל לקבלו. אילו היתה איזושהי תזוזה ביחסינו עם המצרים, כי אז יתכן זה היה פותח אפיק כזה לפני חוסיין. כשהגיעה השיחה לנקודה זו, התעוררה כמובן שוב שאלת יחסינו עם המצרים ואז חזר סיר אלק לסוגיה: מה עושים וכיצד נוהגים כדי: To unlock את העמדות הקפואות של שני הצדדים, ומתוך כך הגיע לבעיית שארם-א-שייך. כשהעלה את רעיון החכירה הזכיר לו שה"ח תגובתה של רוח"מ בזמן פגישתם בירושלים. כבעבר, הקשה סיר אלק גם הפעם בנקודה זו ולפי הערכתי הוא רואה ברעיון זה אמצעי אפשרי ואולי היחידי לשבור את הקפאון. שה"ח לא הוסיף מהרהוריו בנדון זה אלא הסתפק בכך שחזר והזכיר את השיחה עם רוח"מ. הוא הוסיף שלפי כל הסימנים התגובה המצרית לרעיון זה הנה שלילית והבטוי לכך הנו בכך שהמצרים תובעים "נסיגה" מהשטחים ולא "ריבונות" על שטחים. הוא מבין שזו בעצם גם ההתרשמות הבריטית. על כך לא בא בעצם ערעור מצד סיר אלק ומצד הפקידים. עם זאת אני סבור שסיר אלק לא יניח לרעיון הזה וישנן ויעלה אותו גם בעתיד. הוא הוסיף והרהר שאם הנכחות הצבאית הישראלית אותה אנו תובעים חייבת להיות בלעדית או אם אפשר גם לראותה במסגרת רב צדדית, כגון: אנחנו, מצרים ועוד שתי ארצות אחרות. על זאת השיב שה"ח בהסתייגות.

ב ב ר כ ה
א. רופין

מ"פ (כ"ט) אירופה ב'

סוגי

אל : המנכ"ל

11.12.72


מאח : קוממי

להלן מתוך שיחת שה"ח-סר אלק. נכחו מצדנו: הח"מ, הציר, ערן.
מצדו: לורד בלניאל, פארסונס, קרייג, גור-בוח ואקלנר (מזכירו של סר
אלק). השיחה נמשכה כ- 75 דקות.

בחלקה הראשון של השיחה נעדר סר אלק שהשתתף בישיבת קבינט. עם שובו
עברה הפמליה לחדרו ושה"ח חזר על דבריו בנושאים שהועלו עם בלניאל.

א) השוק המשותף. אנו רואים בחיוב את החלטת מועצת השרים
(בנובמבר) לאמץ את רעיון "ההסדר הגלובלי" שכן היא מפלת בתוכה שני
יתרונות עברנו. הראשון בתחום הכלכלי וזאת בהנחה שהיפתרונה בעיות
יצואנו (החקלאי והשני בחשיבותו לטווח הארוך. ראיתם של הקהיליה את הים
התיכון במקשה אחת הפותחת הדלת להחקשרויות נוספות להן שותפות כמה
מדינות ערב וישראל במסגרת גופים על-לאומיים, החקשרויות העסויות
להקהות את עוקץ הסכסוך במז"ח. השר הדגיש כי קיים פער עצום במאזן
המחר בין ארצות השוק וישראל ובמיוחד בין ישראל ובריטניה. אנו מבקשים
כי יצואנו לא יפגע ולא חוטלנה עליו מעמסות נוספות ומכאן שתיונית
הקפאת המצב הנוכחי כל עוד דנה הקהיליה בצדדיו הטכניים של ההסדר במסך
1973. באם לא תאושר הקפאת התנאים הנוכחיים תהיה לכך השפעה מזיקה
ביותר על יצואה של ישראל לבריטניה. סר אלק ולורד בלניאל ענו כי
ההקפאה היא גם המלצתם לשאר חברות הקהיליה וכי יחזרו לכך בישיבת
הקרובה של מועצת השרים שתחזור וחדון בנושא.

ב) גרמ"ז. שה"ח האר את יחסינו עם גרמ"ז שהצטמצמו למעשה
לסרוב מוחלט של גרמ"ז להכיר בחלקה היא באחריות לשואה. ב- 1951 הגשנו
חביעה לגרמ"ז ולרפ"ג היורשות של גרמניה הנאצית. ורק רפ"ג נענתה
בחיוב. גרמ"ז המשיכה ביחסה העויין שהיום ניתן לחארו כקיצוני יותר
מזה של בריה"מ. גרמ"ז מבקשת להתקבל בקהיליה הבינלאומית כמדינה לכל
דבר ולזכות בהכרתן של מדינות העולם. אנו מבקשים כי ידידותינו חבהרנה
לגרמ"ז כי חלה עליה חובה מוסרית כבדה שעליה למלאה. סר אלק ולורד
בלניאל הסעימו כי יחסיה של בריטניה עם גרמ"ז אינם מהשופרים ביותר.
בנושא זה הקהיליה מבקשת לאמץ מדיניות משותפת תוך החכסות על הייעוץ
הרפ"גי. יבדקו אפשרות להביא בקשותינו לפורום זה.



(ג) הדיון באו"ם. סר אלק פתח ביוזמתו בנושא זה בהדגישו כי בריטניה אינה נוקטת במדיניות אנטי-ישראלית. מאידך הם מבקשים להסב תשומת לבנו לירידה ניכרת בתמיכה הבינלאומית (במדיניות) ישראל כלפי השטחים כפי שהדבר משחק בהצבעות בשל ^ההעצרות האחרונות. שה"ח השיב שמה זמן רב הגענו למסקנה שהאו"ם אינו המסגרה שממנה ניתן לצפות להחלטות מאוזנות ושקולות. למדינות ערב והגוש הקומוניסטי 40% מן הקולות ובשל כך מסוגלות לסחוט הצבעות גם ממדינות אחרות הזקוקות לקולות גוש זה בנושאים אחרים. השר העיר כי בריטניה עצמה חשה זאת על בשרה בפרשה (גיברלטר) ורודזיה. סר אלק אישר זאת. יחד עם זאת מצאו שמנה מדינות אפריקניות את העוז ולא תמכו בהחלטותיהן מתונה מזו שמדינות אפריקה אישרו ברבאט. 23 מדינות אמריקה הדרומית והלטינית אף הן נמנעו (רובן ככולן) להתמוך בהחלטה זו. (לדעת שה"ח המקום הטבעי של בריטניה היה בין הנמנעים. צאצא) מבין אלו שתומכות בהצעות ההחלטה הפרו-ערביות יש רבות המסבירות לנו כי עבורנו ועבורן הדיונים וההצבעות בנושאי מז"ת מחוסרי ערך אך בשל שיקולים של אוכלוסיה מוסלמית, חלות כלכלית בארצות ערב וכו' הן נאלצות לתמוך בהחלטות אלה. מאידך ציין שה"ח חשובה לנו הופעתן של כספר מדינות אירופה בויכוח ובמיקוח מאחורי הקלעים על הנוסח הסופי. המישקע החמור ביהסי ישראל בריטניה נובע מכך שבריטניה התכוננה להצביע בעד ניסוח קודם שריח סקנציות נדף מהן. זו ססיה בולטת מהצבעותיה של בריטניה בעבר שלא היה בה כל הכרח שכן המצרים לא הסתירו את נכונותם להתפשר על נסוחיהם בלבד שיזכו בחמיכת מדינות מערב אירופה בהחלטה.

סר אלק ולורד בלניאל מהרו לענות כי בעיניהם לא נראה ^הניסוח כקורא לסנקציות ובמילא הוא מוגבל לקונטקסט של השטחים המוחזקים. שה"ח אמר כי דווקא הנציג הבריטי בהביאו את התיקון אמר כי המגמה היא "לעקור כל שמץ סנקציות". ניסוח זה מוכיח כי אותו "שמץ" היה קיים בנוסח הקודם שבריטניה כאמור התכוננה להצביע בעדו. עוד הוסיף שה"ח כי גם הסבר סר אלק אינו מובן שכן אין להטיל ספק בלגיטימיות של הכבוש בהווה. לא קיימת שאלה של "הכרה" בכיבוש כי ישראל לא מבקשת זאת עכשיו. כשנגיע לגבול מוסכם עלינו ועל שכינינו נבקש הכרה בינלאומית בו. כל מה שאנו הורשים עתה היא הכרה בזכותנו להיות בקווי הפסקת האש מכח החלטות מועבי"ס מ-1967, ולהפעיל שליטהנו לפי כללי החוק הבינלאומי ובהתאם לצרכי בטחוננו.

סר אלק ענה כי קיימת דאגה ניכרת לאור מעשינו בשטחים הנראים כמיועדים למגמה אחרת לאמור לישיבת קבע בהם וכצעדים לקראת סיפוח. שה"ח ענה כי קיימת הגזמה מרובה בתיאור המצב בשטחים המוחזקים. להוציא את ירושלים, רק יהודים מועטים גרים עתה בשטחים ובכל מקרה מסעמים הגיוניים. לו היו פנינו לסיפוח היו עשרות אלפים יהודים מאכלסים את השטחים. ממילא, מעולם לא אמצנו העקרון שבכל מקום שבו יושב ישראלי אחד שם יעבור הגבול. אנו שומרים בקפדנות על כך שהחוק הקודם חל בגדה והשר הצביע על הבחירות לרשויות המקומיות, על הפרדה בתחום החינוך וכו'. מרבית הישראלים אינם רוצים בסיפוח אוכלוסיה ערבית גדולה שחקקעקע את זהותה ההיסטורית והתרבותית של ישראל. מאידך רובם שואפים לגבול יותר בטוח מקווי שביחה-הנשק ולפי מגמות אלו אנו מכוונים את האיחודיות שלנו ופיתוחנו. אין בדעתנו לחדש עלינו את המפה הקודמת וגם לא להנציח את המפה הנוכחית.

(ד) ירדן. כאן עבר השר לתאור יחסינו עם ירדן. השינויים הסטוריאליים שאנו נבקש הם כאלה שמרבית האוכלוסיה והסמך של הגדה יישארו מחוץ לגבולותיה החדשים של ישראל. ישראל אינה מבקשת לקבוע גורלה של אוכלוסיה זו אחרי חתימת הסכם השלום עם ירדן וזהו ענין שפתרוננו יבוא בדו-שיח שבין שליטי עמאן ויושבי הגדה. החיפונים (המהותיים) החיוניים לצרכינו הבטחוניים נובעים בעיקר לאזורים צחיחים שלאורך נהר הירדן (וכל פעולתנו הייתה מודרכת על ידי שיקול זה) הערת או"ם על שינוי הדמוגרפיה הערבית אינה אלא ניחוח. לירדן אינטרסים חיוניים ליבוא חקלאי ולחופש חנועה לים ~~אחא~~ התיכון. אין שום הצדקה לחסימת הגדה בפני גישה יהודית למקומות בעלי חשיבות היסטורית. אין כל סיבה מדוע לא יחיו כמה מאות יהודים בחברון כשם שאלפי ערבים חיים בישראל. המכשול בדרך לפורמליזציה של הדו-קיום נעוץ בחוסר יכולתה של ירדן להיות החלוצה שתפרוץ את מחסום האיבה. כל עוד לא תחול התקדמות כלשהיא בכיוון מציאת הסדר בין ישראל ומצרים ספק אם תוכל ירדן לחרוג מהמצב הנוכחי. לשאלת סר אלק כיצד מתגברים על הקפאון הנוכחי ענה שה"ח כי קיימות דוגמאות מעטות בלבד להסדרים מלאים חובקי עולם ואין זו שאלה של הכל או לא כלום. יש להתייחס אל הבעיה כמורכבת משלבים שלבים. זו היא גם ראיתה של וושינגטון העומדת כפי שנראה לחדש יוזמת ההסדר החלקי אחרי ינואר 1973. הקושי נעוץ בגישור הפער בין התביעה המצרית לישראל תחייב מראש לנסיגה מלאה לבין עמדה ישראל שהיא רואה אמנם את הקו החדש כזמני אך שהמעבר ממנו לגבול הגבוע הוא ענין למו"מ. סר אלק ציין כי נכון שאין זה נהוג להפקיר את קלף המיקוח היעיל ביותר עוד לפני חחילת המיקוח עצמו.

יחד עם זאת דעו שאנו יכולים להצהיר כי אין בכוונתנו לספח
סריטוריה מצרית סוברנית אך אנו רוצים בהסדרים במקומות מסויימים. ^{כ"ב} ^{א"ב} ^{א"ב} סר
אלק אמר כי דו"מ אמרה לו כי ישראל אינה מעוניינת כריבונות כי
אם בהמשך השליטה הצבאית בשרם אל סו"ח. שה"ח אישר כי אנו עמדנו ועומדים על
שליטה ישראלית וטרם התווכחנו על האפשרויות היורידיות כי אם המצרים
שוללים את עצם סיום שליטתנו בשום מקום בסיני וכאן נעוץ הקפאן. הסב
אינו שמצרים הסכימה לשליטתנו ויש רק וויכוח על ההגדרה המשפטית.
מאחר והפער אינו ניתן לגישור בשלב זה והוא מעכב התפתחויות היוניות
בגזרות אחרות, רואה ישראל את הפתרון החלטי כמעשי ביותר. סר אלק חזר
והציע את נוסחתו בדבר הצהרה על אי כוונה לספח כי לדעתם חל שינוי
מהותי במצב עם הוצאת הסובייטים ממצרים. שה"ח ענה כי ההסגר במצרים
הוסל עוד לפני שהופיעו הסובייטים והנסיגה העגום בעשרים השנים האחרונות
מהייב אותנו למשנה זהירות בספלנו בבעיה זו. אבן הנגף היא התעקשותה
של מצרים על נסיגה מוחלטת ששום ממעלה ישראלית לא הסכים לה.
סר אלק הבהיר כי בריטניה אינה נוקטת יוזמות ובמידה שהערבים נקטו
יוזמה פעלה בריטניה לעקירת קוצים ועל כן אוירה כאילו בריטניה
התנכרה לישראל אינו מובנת לו.

להלן מתוך שיחת שה"ח - סר אלק. נכתו מצדנו: שה"ח, הציר, ערן.
מצדנו: לורד בלניאל, מארטונס, קרייב, גור-בוט ואקלנד (מזכירו של
סר אלק).

בהלקה הראשון של השיחה נעדר סר אלק שהשתתף בישיבת הקבינט. עם שובו
עברה התמליה לחדרו ושה"ח הדר על דבריו בנושאים שהועלו עם בלניאל.
א. השוק המשותף. אנו רואים בחיוב את החלטת מועצת השרים לאמץ את רעיון
"ההסדר הגלובלי" שכן היא מקפלת בתוכה שני יתרונות עבורנו. הראשון
בתחום הכלכלי וזאת בהנחה שתיפתרנה בעיות יצואנו החקלאי והשני בחשיבותו
לשיווק הארוך. ראיתה של הקהיליה את המזה"ח כמקשה אחת פותחת הדלת
להתקשרויות נוספות להן שותפות מדינות ערב וישראל במסגרת גומים על-
לאומיים, התקשרויות העשויות להקנות את עוקץ הסכסוך במז"ח. השר הדגיש
כי קיים פער עצום במאזן הסחר בין ארצות השוק וישראל ובמיוחד בין
ישראל ובריטניה. אנו מבקשים כי יצאנו לא ימנע ולא תוטלנה עליו
מעמסות נוספות ומכאן שחיוניות הקפאת המצב הנוכחי כל עוד דנה הקהיליה
בצדדיו הטכניים של ההסדר במסך 1973. באם לא האושר להשתתף הקפאת התנאים
הנוכחיים תהיה לכן המעשה מזיקה ביותר על יצואה של ישראל לבריטניה.
סר אלק ולורד בלניאל ענו כי ההקפאה היתה גם המלצתם לשאר חברות
הקהיליה וכי ההקפאה יחזרו לכך בישיבת הקרובה של מועצת השרים שתחזור
וחדון בנושא.

ב. גרמ"ז. שה"ח תאר את יחסינו עם גרמ"ז שהבטממנו למעשה לטרוב מוחלט
של גרמ"ז להכיר בחלקה היא באחריות לשואה. ב-1951 הגשנו תביעה לגרמ"ז
ולרפ"ג היורשות של גרמניה הנאצית ורק ש רפ"ג נענתה בחיוב. גרמ"ז
המשיכה ביחסה העוין שהיום ניתן להארו כקיצוני יותר מזה של בריה"מ.
גרמ"ז מבקשת להקבל בקהיליה הבינלאומית כמדינה לכל דבר ולזכות
בהכרתן של מדינות העולם. אנו מבקשים כי ידידותינו תבהרנה לגרמ"ז
כי הלה עליה חובה מוסרית כבדה שעליה למלאה. סר אלק ולורד בלניאל
הטעימו כי יחטיה של בריטניה עם גרמ"ז אינם מהתשופרים ביותר. בנושא
זה הקהיליה מבקשת לאמץ מדיניות משהפת חוך ההכנסות על היעוץ הרפג"י.
יבוצו אפשרות להביא בקשותינו לפורום זה.

ג. הדיון באו"ם. סר אלק פתח ביוזמתו בנושא זה בהדגישו כי בריטניה
אינה נוקטת במדיניות אנטי-ישראלית. מאידך הם מבקשים להטב חשופת לבנו
לירידה ניכרת בחמיכה הבינלאומית בישראל כפי שהדבר משתקף בהצבעות
בשלוש העצרות האחרונות. שה"ח השיב שזה זמן רב הגענו למסקנה שהאו"ם
אינו המסגרת שממנה ניתן לצפות להחלטות מאוזנות וסקוליות. מדינות ערב
והגוש הקומוניסטי מגיטות 40% מן הקולות ובשל כך מסובלות לסחוט
הצבעות גם ממדינות אחרות הזקוקות לקולות גוש זה בנושאים אחרים. השר
העיר כי בריטניה עצמה חשה זאת על גשרה בפרשת רודזיה וסר אלק אישר זאת
יחד עם זאת מצאו שמונה מדינות אפריקניות את העוץ ולא חמכו בהחלטה
יותר מתונה מזו שמדינות אפריקה אישרו ברבאט. 23 מדינות אמריקה
הדרומית והלטינית אף הן נמנעו מלהמוך בהחלטה זו. מביין אלו שתומכות

בהצעות ההחלטה הפרו-ערביות יש רבות המטבירות לנו כי עבודתנו
ועבודת הדיונים וההצבעות בנושאי מז"ח מחוסרי ערך אך בשל שיקולים
של אוכלוסיה מוסלמית וחלות כלכלית בארצות ערב וכו' הן גאלצות
לתמוך בהחלטות אלה. מאידך ציין שה"ח חשובה לנו הופעתן של מספר
מדינות אירופה בויכוח ובמיקוח מאחורי הקלעים על הנוסח הסופי.
אנו מתקשים להבין כיצד הסכימה בריטניה לתמוך בהחלטה שריח סנקציות
נדרף מאן. זו סטיה בולטת מהצבעותיה של בריטניה בעבר שלא היה בהן
כל הכרח שכן המצרים לא הסתירו את נכונותם להתפשר על נסוגיהם והם
בלבד שיזכו בחמיכת מדינות מערב אירופה בהחלטות.
סר אלק ולורד בלניאל מהרו לענות כי בעיניהם לא נראה בנטוח כקורא
לסנקציות ובמילא הוא מוגבל לקונצקסט של השטחים המוחזקים.
שה"ח ענה כי גם הסבר זה אינו מובן שכן אין להטיל כמק בלגיטימיות
של הכבוש בהווה. לא קיימת שאלה של הכרה בכיבוש כי ישראל לא מבקשת
זאת. כשנגיע לגבול מוטכם עלינו ועל שכנינו נבקש הכרה בינלאומית
בו. כל מה שאנו דורשים עתה היא הכרה בזכותנו להיות בקווי הפסקת האש
מכת החלטות מועבי"ט מ-1967.
סר אלק ענה כי קיימת דאגה ניכרת לאור מעשינו בשטחים הנבאים
כמיועדים לישיבת קבע בהם וכצעדיים לקראת סיפוח. שה"ח ענה כי קיימת
הגזמה מרובה בתאור המצב בשטחים המוחזקים. להוציא את ירושלים, רק
2000 יהודים גרים עתה מעברם של גבולות 67. לו היו פנינו לסיפוח
היו עשרות אלפים יהודים מאכלסים את השטחים ובמילא מעולם לא אמצנו
העקרון שבמקום שבו יושב ישראלי שם יעבור הגבול. אנו שומרים
בקפדנות על כך שהחוק הירדני הוא שיחול בגדה והשר הצביע על הבחירות
לרשויות המקומיות, על הפרדה בתחום החינוך וכו'. מרבית הישראלים
חרדים מסיפוח אוכלוסיה ערבית גדולה שתקקע את זחותה ההיסטורית
והתרבותית של ישראל.
י. ירדן. כאן עבר השר לתאור יחסינו עם ירדן. השינויים
הטריטוריאליים שאנו מבקשים הם מינימליים כך שמרבית האוכלוסיה
הערבית ושטח הגדה מחוץ לגבולותיה החדשים של ישראל בגזרה זו. ישראל
אינה מבקשת לקבוע גורלה של אוכלוסיה זו אחרי חתימת הסכם השלום עם
ירדן וזהו ענין שפתרנונו יבוא בדו-שיח שבין שליטי עמאן ויושבי
הגדה. התקונים החיוניים לצרכינו הבטחוניים גוגעים בעקר לאזורים

מצומצמים וצחיחים לאורך נהר הירדן.

שה"ח עמד על זהות האינטרסים שבין ישראל וירדן ועל קיומם של צנורות חקשורת פתוחים מאז 1967. אינטרסים אלו חיוניים לירדן הזקוקה ליבוא חקלאי ולמוצא לים התיכון. במסגרת זו ניתן גם לפתור את בעיית הגישה ליהודים למקומות הקדושים בגדה. אין כל סיבה מדוע לא יחיו כמה מאות יהודים בחברון כשם שאלפי ערבים חיים בישראל. המכשול בדרך הפורמליזציה של דו-הקיום נעוץ בחוסר יכולתה של ירדן להיות החלוצה שתפרוץ את מחסום האיבה. כל עוד לא תחול התקדמות כלשהיא בכוון מציאת הסדר בין ישראל ומצרים לא תוכל ירדן לחרוג מהמצב הנוכחי. לשאלת סר אלק כיצד מתגברים על הקפאון הנוכחי ענה שה"ח כי קיימות צובמאות מעטות בלבד להסדרים מלאים חובקי עולם ואין זו שאלה של הכל או לא כלום. יש להתייחס אל הבעיה כמורכבת משלבים שלבים. זו היא גם ראייתה של וושינגטון הקומדת כפי הנראה לחדש יוזמת ההסדר החלקי אחרי ינואר 1973. הקושי נעוץ בגישור הפער בין התביעה המצרית שישראל תתחייב כבר בשלב הראשון לגסיגה מלאה לבין עמדת ישראל שהיא רואה אמנם את הקו החדש כזמני אך שהמעבר ממנו לגבול הקבוע הוא עניין למו"מ. סר אלק ציין כי נכון שאין זה נהוג להפקיד את קלף המיקוח היעיל ביותר עוד לפני תחילת המיקוח עצמו. יחד עם זאת דעתו היא שאנו יכולים להצהיר כי אין בכוונתנו לספח טריטוריה מצרית סוברנית אך אנו רוצים בהסדרים כגון חכירה. שה"ח העיר כי כעקרון זו היא עמדתנו שכן אין פנינו לסיפוח וגם בשארם א-שייך הדגשנו את רצוננו בנוכחות צבאית בלא להכנס לשאלה היורידית של הסוברניות. מאחר והפער אינו ניתן לגישור בשלב זה והוא מעכב התפתחויות חיוביות בצורות אחרות, רואה ישראל את הפתרון החלקי כמעשי ביותר. סר אלק חזר והציע את נוסחתו בדבר הצהרה על אי כוונה לספח כי לדעתם חל שינוי מהותי במצב עם הוצאת הסובייטים ממצרים. שה"ח ענה כי ההסגר במצרים הוסל עוד לפני שהופיעו הסובייטים והנסיון העמום בעשרים השנים האחרונות מחייב אותנו למשנה זהירות בספלנו בבעיה זו. אבן הנגף היא התעקשותה של מצרים על נסיגה מוחלטת, יותר מאשר על חזרה לגבולות 67 שמשמעותה שלילה של נוכחות צבאית ישראלית גם כשזו אינה מלווה בסוברניות.

מס': 18

בשלה: 101500 צצמ' 72

אל: המשרד

מאת:

מייד

(החבר) (18/11/72) (החבר) (18/11/72)

LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, ONE IS TEMPTED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE EFFORTS NOT ONLY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE FAILED AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS TOWARDS CARRYING OUT THE RESOLUTION. SUCH AN ASSESSMENT WOULD, I BELIEVE, ALTOGETHER TOO PESSIMISTIC. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEM, IT IS SCARCELY SURPRISING THAT NO "INSTANT IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE RESOLUTION HAS MATERIALISED. A CLOSER LOOK AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS SHOWS THAT SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.

FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAS BEEN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMITMENT TO ENTER INTO A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THIS COMMITMENT INCLUDED THE IDEA OF DEMILITARISED ZONES AND UNITED NATIONS GUARANTEES. THIS WAS A VERY CONSIDERABLE CONSIDERABLE ADVANCE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS UNFORTUNATELY NOT BEEN MATCHED BY ANY EQUALLY CLEAR AND POSITIVE STATEMENT BY ISRAEL ON WITHDRAWAL, MY DELEGATION HAS NOTED WITH INTEREST THE RECENT RESTATEMENT BY THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A MEASURE OF WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE NOT GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE A PARALLEL UNDERTAKING OF ITS OWN WHICH GOES FURTHER THAN THIS.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAS, HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 IS A LONG AND DIFFICULT PROCESS. ANYONE ACQUAINTED WITH THE AREA WOULD NOT HAVE EXPECTED OTHERWISE. FOR THIS REASON IF NO OTHER, AS MY SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN A RECENT SPEECH IN LONDON, WE - THAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - MUST NOT ADOPT COUNSELS OF DESPAIR: RESOLUTION 242 WAS THE FIRST SERIOUS ATTEMPT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SINCE 1947 TO FIND A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ ISRAEL CONFLICT. NEITHER AT THE TIME OF ITS ADOPTION NOR SUBSEQUENTLY HAS ANYONE, LEAST OF ALL MY DELEGATION, PRETENDED THAT THE RESOLUTION IS PERFECT OR SAYS THE LAST WORD ON ALL THE ISSUES WITH WHICH IT DEALS. BUT THE FACT IS THAT IT REPRESENTS THE REPRESENTS THE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR OF AGREEMENT OBTAINABLE, EITHER THEN OR NOW. MOREOVER, IT ENSHRINES THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST BE HONOURED OF A TRUE SETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

AS I HAVE SAID, MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT

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RESOLUTION 242 WILL HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN FULL BEFORE A REAL PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE AREA. IN SAYING THIS, HOWEVER, I DO NOT MEAN TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT IMPLEMENTATION MAY BE ACHIEVED BY STAGES. CLEARLY ANY PROGRESS ON THE GROUND WOULD BE A STIMULUS AND AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO FURTHER ADVANCE. THAT IS WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE IN THE PAST WELCOMED EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL INVOLVING THE RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THIS APPROACH WAS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF EGYPT AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY FAVOURED BY THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER. IT MAY BE WORTH FURTHER STUDY. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, IF AGREED, COULD CONCEIVABLY UNLOCK THE DOOR TO AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE DISPUTE. IT IS HOWEVER SELF-EVIDENT THAT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, NO LESS THAN A FINAL SETTLEMENT, WILL NEED TO BE AGREED BY THE PARTIES. IT CANNOT BE IMPOSED. FURTHERMORE, IT SEEMS CLEAR TO MY DELEGATION THAT ANY SUCH INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE LINE THEY A PRESENT OCCUPY ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL. AND, MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE RECOGNISED AS NO MORE THAN A STAGE IN THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THEY COULD NOT REPLACE SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

SUCH ARRANGEMENTS ARE ONE WAY FORWARD. THEY MAY BE THE BEST WAY. BUT THERE MAY BE OTHERS. IN A CASE SUCH AS THIS, WHERE A SOLUTION HAS ELUDED US ALL FOR SO LONG, NO OPTION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE FORECLOSED, NO POSSIBILITY OVER-LOOKED. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT MY DELEGATION APPROACHES THE PRESENT DEBATE. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE USED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENDS, TO INCREASE THE OPTIONS OPEN AND NOT TO REDUCE THEM. AND WE HOPE THAT THE OUTCOME WILL PERMIT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN DUE TIME TO RESUME THE QUEST FOR WAYS AND MEANS OF BREAKING THE PRESENT DEADLOCK, USING WHATEVER PROCEDURES THEY JUDGE TO BE APPROPRIATE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I PLEDGE MY DELEGATION'S FULL AND CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR ALL THESE EFFORTS AND SAY THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT REMAINS READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY WE CAN. WE HAVE DONE SO IN THE PAST, FOR EXAMPLE BY OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS, AND WE REMAIN READY TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. AS WE SEE IT, THE METHODS OR MEANS ARE OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. WHAT MATTERS ABOVE ALL IS THE CREATION OF A MOMENTUM TOWARDS PEACE, HOWEVER ESTABLISHED. ONCE SUCH A MOMENTUM IS CREATED, THERE IS SOME CHANCE THAT IT WILL BE SELF-PERPETUATING.

IF SUCH A MOMENTUM IS TO BE ESTABLISHED, HOWEVER, THOSE CONCERNED MUST ENSURE THAT NO STEPS ARE TAKEN ON THE GROUND

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WHICH MIGHT OBSTRUCT EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. THAT IS WHY I CANNOT CONCEAL MY GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN THAT ATTEMPTS TO "CHANGE THE FACTS" IN THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 MAY HINDER, IF NOT DESTROY ALTOGETHER, THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING THE GOAL ON WHICH WE ARE ALL AGREED. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE ONLY FACT THAT MUST BE CREATED IS THE FACT OF PEACE.

OUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SHAPE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST ALSO BE FOCUSED ON THE FATE OF THE REFUGEES. THE FATE OF THESE HELPLESS AND HOMELESS PEOPLE, WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH, LIES AT THE HEART OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM- OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM AS IT COULD STILL PERHAPS MORE MEANINGFULLY BE CALLED.

WE HAVE WITNESSED RECENTLY A VIVID DEMONSTRATION OF THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THIS SAD HUMAN SITUATION - I REFER TO THE ESCALATION IN THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE AND COUNTER-VIOLENCE WHICH HAS MARKED THE LAST FEW MONTHS. MY DELEGATION HAS MADE CLEAR ELSEWHERE THAT WE UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMN ACTS OF TERRORISM, WHATEVER THEIR SOURCE, AND ARE DETERMINED TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN TAKING PRACTICAL MEASURES TO END THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRISAL WHICH THREATENS TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE RULE OF LAW.

WHILE MY GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCEPT THAT TERRORISM IS IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED, WE ARE NOT BLIND TO THE NEED TO ERADICATE ITS ROOT CAUSE AND TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS UNDERLYING IT. WE MUST SHOW THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES IN JORDAN, LEBANON, SYRIA AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE WORLD HAS NOT FORGOTTEN THEM. WE MUST TAKE NOTE OF, AND ACTION ON, THEIR LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS WHICH MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN SHORT WE MUST ONCE MORE GIVE THEM A REASON FOR LIVING AND HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.

MY GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN FOR THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS IS IN NO WAY INCONSISTENT WITH OUR SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, TO WHICH WE ARE, AND WILL REMAIN, COMMITTED. THIS IS A FIRM COMMITMENT, OF WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE PAST. BUT WE SHOULD RECOGNISE THAT THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS MUST FEATURE AS A PART OF ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT.

I CANNOT HELP WONDERING THEREFORE WHETHER A FIRST STEP

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TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES MIGHT BE AN AGREEMENT BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW BACK TO THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN THE PERSONS DISPLACED IN 1967. AS WELL AS BEING AN IMPORTANT HUMANITARIAN GESTURE, SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD PROVE VITAL FIRST STEP IN PROVIDING THE REFUGEES WITH A STAKE IN THE FUTURE, THUS REDUCING THE DESPAIR WHICH BREEDS HATRED AND VIOLENCE. IT MIGHT ALSO, LIKE AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ON THE CANAL, HELP TO GIVE MOMENTUM TO THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERALL SOLUTION AND TO CREATE THE CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NOW SO SADLY LACKING AND WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED IF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE ARE TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS MORE TO BE GAINED BY A JUST AND LASTING PEACE THAN BY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT HAZARDOUS STATE OF NO PEACE AND NO WAR.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT TACITLY ACCEPT THE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, POSING AS IT DOES THE CONSTANT THREAT OF A WIDER CONFLICT. AS MY SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN HIS RECENT SPEECH IN LONDON TO WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED, "WE THINK IT IS A SAD AND BITTER THING THAT BOTH SIDES TO THE DISPUTE SHOULD HAVE TO DEVOTE TO THE MEANS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION GREAT HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, WHICH OUGHT TO BE CONTRIBUTING TO THE WELL-BEING OF THE AREA". THE PRESENT SITUATION MUST EVENTUALLY GIVE WAY TO A PEACE, A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, IN WHICH ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA, ARABS AND ISRAELIS, CAN LIVE SIDE BY SIDE IN HARMONY, GRADUALLY RESTORING TO THIS AREA, THE CRADLE OF OUR CIVILISATION, ITS FORMER WELL-BEING AND PROSPERITY. IT IS THE DUTY OF US ALL TO HASTEN THAT TIME.

שהח דוחט מנכל אלון דיין ממנכל סמנכל מאום א+ב אר' ב' מצפא מזתים הקר אלגום מעט הסברה רם אמן תעוד .

חד/אר

AD KAN
NAUM---

458/1

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word "מחשבה" (Thought) and a signature.

7 December 1976

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN,
LONDON. W8. 4QB.
TEL: 01-937 8091

טו' טבת, תשל"ג

20 דצמבר 72

סגרירות ישראל

לונדון

262

אל : כלכלית

אירופה ב'

משה אלון, בריטל

מאת: הצד לונדון.

הנדון: בריטניה והסדר הגלובלי היס תיכוני

קיימתי ייחזה עם בטלר מנהל המחלקה, בהעדרו של רובינסון. מטרת השיחה היתה לעבוד על קנקנס של הבריטים ועל עמדותיהם לאחר השיחות האחרונות בבריטל. הקראתי לבטלר את הסיוטה של הפרוטוקול בין הקהיליה לביננו ושל ההצהרה של הקהיליה. נזהרתי כמובן ולא גיליתי שגם הסיוטה של ועדת השוק ל"מנדט" ידועה לנו, אלא ניסיתי להניע אותו לספר לי מה ידוע לו בנדון. בטלר טען שאין טיוטה כזו ולא יכולה להיות טיוטה כזו כי אין בשלב זה אחדות דעים על חוכן המנדט. לא היה על כך וכוח יסודי והבריטים מסתייגים מכמה רעיונות שמנסחים בבריטל. דבר אחד שנראה להם כבלתי פציאותי הנו לדבר על הכללת 80% של היצוא החקלאי של ארצות האזור בהסכם המצופה. כמו כן דבקים הבריטים בתפיסתם המקורית לגבי ה- Reverse Preferences היינו, שיש להבדיל בין הארצות האירופאיות שבסופו של דבר יוכלו להגיע לחברות מלאה בקהיליה לבין אלה כגון ישראל שאינן יכולות להגיע למצב כזה. שוב הושמעה הדאגה לגבי העמדה האמריקאית והרצון להטנע מחלוקי דעות אתה בנדון. כמו כן חזר בטלר והעלה את ענין ארצות ה- Commonwealth שהיו קודם לכן מוסבות בריטיות. ממבריטניה לא תסכים של ארצות היס התיכון יהיה טוב יותר מטובן של ארצות אלה.

כדי לסכם; הבריטים מעמידים פנים כאילו הם לא זוו מעמדתם שהנה חיוניות לגבי העקרון של ההסדר הגלובלי, אך חולקת לגבי פרטיו ועל הסלב אליו הגיעו במגעים עד כה. הם רואים בשני המסמכים עליהם צריכה להיות טושחתת "ההקפאה" הישג גדול עבורנו. אשר להפלת מחירי המינימום, זוהי הכרחית לדעתם ואין שום סיכוי שהצרפתים יוותרו בנדון. לדעתם, הדבר גט אינו צריך לפגוע בנו באופן מיוחד לאחר שמחירים אלה יחולו במידה שווה לגבי כל הארצות היס תיכוניות (נדמה לי שאין זה נכון ?).

ב ב ר כ ה

א. רופין

יג' טבת/תשל"ג

כ' בכסלו תשל"ג
26 בנובמבר 1972

אלו: הציר, לונדון

העמק: מד א. לוריא, יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

1155

מאת: מנהל אירופה 2

הנדון: ג' יומם קרייב, מנהל מז"ח וצפון אפריקה בפוראוס.

הביקור היה קצר ותועלתו לא ברורה לי. הרכה נחת מן האיש לא תהיה לנו, אולם היה טוב שסיפקנו לו רשמים מדומים שונים, שהיה בהם כדי לערער בטחונו העצמי בקשר למומחיותו בנושאנו. ספק אם יאהב אותנו יותר אולם דומני שיכבדנו.

אתה תיארת אותו טוב מאד. הוא שיין לגזע שהולך ונעלם אפילו בסוריין אדמים. "אתם כאן - אין ספק. אבל אין לכם זכות להיות כאן. גירשתם עם אתר" - ובאחד הוא אומר זאת - הטר הדיסון הטבעי והמזויף של המעמד החברתי שהוא אינו שיין לו ואשר בדרך כלל מחליק יחסים. אצלו זה די "דוגרי" ועל כן אפשר להסיב.

אני משער שניצלנו טוב את הזמן. נחננו לו את השון, קדרון, היחה לי שיהא ארוכה עימו שאסכמה בקיצור כאן. בארוחת הצהריים אצלי היו שמעון שמיר, דוד אריאל, מיכאל אלקינס, מיכאל בריצ'ר, אצל לוריא הוא ראה את איתן, פרידלנדר ואחר. קדרון. הוא נפגש במכון שילוח עם סספר מזרחנים, כשהכוונה שלנו היא להרשימו מבישם ומומחיותם, הפגישה עם זעירה או טגנו לא יצאה לפועל ואין בכך כל רע. לא ט"כ מגיע לו.

היה בהשגחתו של סנודגרס יומיים - שלושה והואכל מטעמים מזרחיים. מבחינת כי שמחגעע לדוביי במקום שירות היטה ביותר, היה זה ודאי תחליף כלשהו.

ידוע לך ודאי שהוא מכיר היטב את דגור מלונדון (מי שייצג את שותרי האוניברסיטה והלה המליץ על מבישה עם פרופ' טלמון. נדמה לי, כי זה לא יצא אל הפועל. אבל המדיהים הוא שקרייב קרא את מאמרו של טלמון - סופר-יונה לכל הדעות - וכועס עליו דווקא על שהוא טוען לזכות בלתי מעוררת היהודים לפלשתיין.. איזו זכות?

בחליפת דברים עמו בעקבות זה פלט קרייב, שאולי יש לנו זכות לגרינלנד. אבל למה לפלשתיין? מפני שהיינו כאן פעם?

יחד עם זה הוא סספר בדיחות יהודיות בכסרון רב. אם אתה רוצה להחמיא לו - אגב, הוא מחבב אותך ולדעתי יכול וצריך אתה להכביר על ערביותו על ידי פגישות הדירות - חבקט ססנו שיספר לך על ההבדל בין "שלומיאל" ו"שלימזל". הוא עונה את זה טוב.

אני לא התרשמתי מן הקליבר שלו, אבל אינני מאושר שהוא היכן שהוא. על הסיחה עימי, בקצרה:

ההחיל בהיאור האטוקליפטי של הפיכת מדינות הנפט, תוך 10-15 שנה לענקים פיננסיים שיכחיבו לעולם את התנהגותו. עושרם הדימיוני יכול להעביר אותם על דעתם, יקנו לעצמם כוחות סחיטה בלתי מעוררים, עלולים להכסיק את הנפט - מה נעשה כולנו?

ההטובה, מפורסת יותר בשיחה, היחה מבוססת על ההנחה, כי מה שהוא מאיע לקידום פני הדעה, זוהי התקבלות ישראלית לאלתר. אמרתי בערך שאם אמנם יוצא הדברים

כאשר דיבר על יכולתם הצבאית המוגדלת שחבוא לערבים מעושרם האדמי, אמרתי לו שאזלת ידם הצבאית של הערבים לא נבעה אף פעם מחוסר אמצעים וישל הפער הטכנולוגי שלהם לא יגשרו המיליארדים הנוספים. מאידך - אם אמנם נכון הדבר האפוקליפטי - והחזון צריך לזעזע אותנו - ודאי שהמשחמץ טכך שהדבר האחרון שעלינו לעשותו הוא להתקפל עכשיו. במלים אחרות (לא אמרתי): אם הוא צודק, הרי שהמצבנויט בינינו צודקים עוד יותר.

נקודה אחרת בעלת ענין החקירה כשעל יסוד הנ"ל פלט מלה על ה- commitment של בריטניה לקיומה של ישראל. שאלתיו מיד מה פירוש הדבר והאם זה סוג מלחמה 67? לא זלזלתי בתוכן המוסרי של המשחק מיהם הם לישראל של משלחו (דיברתי ארוכות על היהם ההם במיוחד של ישראל לבריטים), אך הבאתי אותו לידי הדאגה בלתימפורשת אמנם, כי גורל האיזור נתון בידיהם הבלעדיות של הצדדים לסכסוך ביילם של שתי מעצמות העל. בהקשר זה התפתחה שיחה על "התוצאה האינצידנטלית של עקשנות ישראל" (מלים שלי) במניעת ההחלטה סובייטית על האיזור כולו ומכאן שגם הקטנה נוכחותם במצרים טעידה על שינוי מעמדם מסכנה לסובייטיזציה של מלחמה כאיזור למעמד מסכנה זו אינה כרוכה בו בהכרח.

כפגישה השתתפו - השגריר הבריטי 'לדוידג', היועץ ג' יפארד המזכיר הראשון ואליס רב. נכון.

השתדלתי, במסגרת הנימוס הטוב, לתת לו להבין שאנו שכינים את הצהרונתים
התדירות הטכונות לסבר האוזן הערבית (חך התעלמות מן הרגישות הישראלית
הקיימת אף היא) כביטויים הבאים לסייע לבריטים במדיניות היום יומית - אך
הבעתי ספק באפקטיביות לטווח ארוך. הסדר מזה לא יצמח והדרי זהו הדבר הקרוב.
כרמתי זאת ביוזמות האירופיות.

הכוונה הכללית הייתה - ודומני שהיא עברה - כי אנחנו יודעים להעריך יפה את מסקלן של ההתערבויות הזרות למיניהן.

אני בהחלט ממליץ על פגישות הדדיות עימך. אני בטוח, כי ימצא בהן ענין.
כמובן שאנו מעונינים לסייע רשמית היקורו באיזור וכאן לא רק מפיו, אלא
בעיקר מפי עוזריו המתוסבכים פהות.

ג'תשנ"א

23. 5. 1954

השיחה התקיימה במשרדו של הסמנכ"ל מ. ששון וארכה כשעה וחצי. נכחו מהצד הבריטי: השגריר, קראיב, היועץ ג'יפארד והמזכיר הראשון ואליס. מצדנו: מ. ששון, י. אלגוס, ב. נבון (שרשם).

קראיב:

בסיוור הנוכחי במז"ח ביקר בבירות - 5 ימים, בסוריה - 3 שעות ובירדן - 5 ימים: בסוריה בדק ההתקדמות בעניין חדוש היחסים. זה שנה שמקיימים מגעים ספורדיים. כך למשל כשרומ"מ סוריה חליפאי בא ללונדון להנחת שוחחו עמו חת השר גודבר והסמנכ"ל פארסונס בנדון. כן פעיל בנושא שגריר לבנון בבריטניה נדיב דמשקיה. בכל פעם שהתקדמו קרה משהו (כגון מכירת צוללות לישראל). הסורים ביקשו שממבריתניה תשלח משלחת פרלמנטרית לסוריה. הוסבר להם שהמשלחה אינה מסמכת לכך אך הוסדר ש-4 חברי פרלמנט פרו-ערבים יצאו לדמשק.

בביקורו הנוכחי בדמשק נועד קראיב עם עבדול אל חאני, חת שה"ח, ושאלו מה התקדם. הפגישה היחה מאכזבת. קראיב הזכיר לבן שיחו שסוריה היא שניתקה היחסים וכי בריטניה לא תוכל לחזור אחריה. אל חאני אמר שמסכים אך ההחלטה בידי הדרג הפוליטי. קראיב סעד צהריים עם אל חאני.

לדברי קראיב הבריטים אינם יודעים הרבה על סוריה. לדעתם המסטר הנוכחי של אסד הוא הטוב ביותר או הפחות רע. אמנם ממפלגת הבעת' אין לצפות להרבה אך לפחות אינם זורקים איש את רעהו מהחלון. אתמול סעד עם ד"ר משה מעוז בירושלים וזה חיזק את התרשמותו זו. שאל אם נכון שמ. ששון נולד בדמשק. נענה בחיוב.

בירדן ראה את רוח"מ לוזי, את ראש לשכת המלך אחמד טוקאן ואת שר ההסברה וכן שוחח כמה דקות עם הנסיך חסן. לא ראה את שה"ח צלאח אבו זיד שהיה בועידת שרי החוץ וההגנה הערבים בכווית. כן השתתף קצת בישיבות הועידה הכלכלית.

החדוש בשבילו היה הצורה בה שרים בעמאן חברו על נכונות להסדר: אמרו שאינם רואים צורך להמחין לצעד מצרי ראשון; גם בלי שלום פורמלי רואים אפשרות לש"פ עם ישראל. כל מה שעל ישראל לעשות לקבל 242. לשאלתו מה פרוש, השיבו - חזרה לגבולות 67' בחיקונים קלים הדדיים. אמר שעם גמישות גדולה יותר יש מקום למכניזם.

קראיב לחץ אותם ביחס לצעד הראשון אם חייב להיעשות ע"י מצרים או יוכל להעשות ע"י ירדן. השיבו שירדן תוכל להיות הראשונה ולעמוד בלהץ. קראיב עצמו מסיל ספק אם אמנם הם יוכלו לעמוד. לעומת זאת הרגשתי שלאחר הסדר חלקי ישראלי-מצרי - אולי. שאל את הירדנים על ירושלים ונענה שירדן מוכנה ל"עיר מאוחדת".

אחמד טוקאן הבהיר: לא עוד גדר חיל מפרידה אך חייבת להיות סוברניות ירדנית על העיר העתיקה כולל זכות גישה (ליהודים) שאינה ניתנת לערעור. תיתכן נוכחות או"ם כמו גם נוכחות ישראלית ברובע היהודי אך בתנאי שתהיה נוכחות ערבית בחלקים שהיו ערביים במערב העיר.

ששון:

בשנה האחרונה מדברים הירדנים פחות על מלחמה - כאילו ניתקו עצמם מרעיון המלחמה כדרך לפתרון. הסביר ההבדלים בין גישת מצרים לגישת ירדן - בנושא המלחמה. לאחרונה מדברים הירדנים יותר על מהות השלום - יחסים נורמליים: ראיון המלך חוסיין לרולו. הירדנים רואים עצמם "ממונים" על הבעיה הפלסטינית ובעליה והבעיה בעיניהם בעיה פנימית שלהם. לאור זה מוסברת עמדתם לפיה, עם פתרון בעיה ישראל-ירדן כל הסכסוך יפתר גם הבעיה הפלסטינאית.

לדעת המצרים, הבעיה הפלסטינית בעיה היצונית. מטרתם אינה פתרון הסכסוך "אלא חיסול תוצאות חקפנות 67'". פתרון הבעיות מצרים-ישראל לא יביא, לדיוס, לפתרון "בעיה פלסטינית" שחוסיין, מבחינתם הם, להיות חלויה ועומדת. אם כי ירדן דורשת פורמלית כל השטחים יש אצלה, כנראה, נכונות לשינויים קטנים - בתנאי שיהיו הדדיים. לעומתה מצרים אינה מוכנה ליום שנוי טריטוריאלי. הירדנים הדגישו בשנה האחרונה יותר ויותר את ענין ירושלים - לעומת גמישותם לגבי הליכים המובילים להסדר הם יותר נוקטים בענין ירושלים. הקושי הוא שהירדנים דחוקים מאד מלהביץ עומק משמעות החלטה להצטרף, בזמנו, למלחמה ב-1967.

תוכנית חוסיין ממרס ש.ז. לא רק "כל השטחים" אלא גם "שטחים אחרים שישוחררו (עזה ואולי הגליל...) הווה אומר: מנסליות של הבטחת תוצאה המלחמה בחברה בסוח ותביעה לגבי כל ההשקעה פלוס פרמיה. כן אין הירדנים מבינים שיש לחשוב במושגים חדשים ולא במושגים של החיאת העבר אם מבחינת ישראל ואם מבחינת האוכלוסיה בשטחים. הדגשת הירדנים על ירושלים איננה תרומה ירדנית חיובית אלא מסבכת.

מדיניותינו: אין לנו רשימת עדיפויות - אנו ננהל מ"מ עם כל מי שיהיה מוכן להיות ראשון סוריה, לבנון, מצרים, ירדן, אך הערכתו כי לדרוש מירדן גם להיות ראשונה וגם להסכים לפשרות - אין זה ריאלי.

קראיב: העובדה היא כי חכנית חוסיין הנה הכרה בישראל.

ששון: לא, אם מדברים על החכנית כי אז יש לקבוע כעובדה שבחוכנית אין מוזכרת ישראל ולא 242. אולם אם מדברים על עמדת ירדן כי אז השנוי הוא בזה שהירדנים מכירים שאין הם או העולם הערבי יכולים יותר לזרוק אותנו ברוב הסדס הם מכירים בזכותנו כמדינה להחקיים.. אולם מבחינתנו לא זה העיקר. כדי להיות איננו זקוקים באיזור, מבחינתנו החשוב הוא שלום בר קיימא בגבולות בטוחים ובני הגנה. לפי השקפתם אסור ספוח שטחים בכוח אך אנו מקבלים עמדה עקרונית זו ואומרים שאנו נמצאים היום על הקוויים בהתאם להחלטת הפסקת האש ונהיה במקומות שונים בהתאם להסכם שלום, אולם הסעון שלהם אינו חופס כי הם עצמם ספחו בכוח את הגדמ"ע וירושלים ורק בריטניה ומקיסטן הכירו בספוח, ואף לא מדינה אחרת, אף לא מדינה ערבית. אם מצרים תעשה הצעד הראשון הכולל ירדן להתקדם עם פתח חשש. הערכתנו שהעולם הערבי מתקרב - אמנם באיטיות רבה מדי. וחוק קשיים - לרבע של אמת.

קראיב: לא מקבל התאוריה שלך שהיא ישועית בדבר אי ספוח בכח אך בוודאי שלא אשכנעם.

ששון: החשוב הוא לא הארגומנטציה אלא הצרכים האמיתיים. איננו מחפשים התפשטות אלא בטחון. בשטחים איננו מחפשים "הינטרלנד", ידנצים בטחון. אנו רוצים לנהל מ"מ על בעיות הבטחון שלנו שהן רציניות והמחייבות בין השאר, גם שינויים טריטוריאליים.

קראיב: אמרת שההתפתחות עם ירדן היא בכוון הנכון אך אין זאת אומרת שתזוזה זו המשך עד אין סוף. שאר הערבים יגידו: בדרך הזו ירדן לא הגיעה לכלום; סאדאת יוכל לאמר שהירדנים היו גמישים ולאן זה הוביל אותם.. סאדאת יוכל לאמר אם כל זה נחוץ כדי להביא לנסיגה של 20-30 ק"מ וזה כל מה שאוכל להשיג - לא כדאי. על ישראל לעודד אותם להתקרב! דרוש מחווה ישראלית.

ששון: עשינו מחווה כלפי ירדן בעצם במדיניותנו בנושא הפלשתינאים.

קראיב: איפה המחווה?

ששון: אנו מכירים בעקרונות (לא במפה!) של חכנית חוסיין כלפי הפלשתינאים.

קראיב: מה האלטרנטיבות שלכם?

ששון: ראה מה עושות שאר המדינות הערביות. ראה מה אומרים אצלנו בציבור, בעתונות, במפלגות - כמנת כל האפשרויות המוצעות. אנו בחרנו באפשרות מסוימת שמבחינת ירדן היא הרצויה גם לה. אם יש למישהו טרוניות בהקשר זה, זה לנו. כי היום אין העולם הערבי מכיר בירדן כמייצגת הבעיה הפלשתינאית. יש כאן מחל ירדני.

קראיב: האם ישראל היתה מסכימה לדון עם הארגונים?

ששון: אנו דנים רק עם ממשלות רבוניות. הארגונים רוצים פוליטיסייד. מי הם הארגונים הפלשתינאים - מה-ה- credetials שלהם. בעינינו ירדן מדברת בשם כל המערך המצוי ממזרח לנו - כאשר במסגרת הסדר יקבע פעם גבולנו המזרחי יהא זה עניינם מה ייעשה מעבר לגבול זה. יחד עם זה דעתנו היא שאין מקום לשתי מדינות ממזרח לנו.

השגריר: אם ערפאת יתפוס השלטון בירדן - גם אז תראו את ירדן כדוברת הפלשתינאים?

ששון: זו שאלה תיאורטית אך לא מעשית. אם המלך יירצח לא ערפאת יישב על כסאו, אמנם יהיה טבח נוראי של פלשתינאים ע"י הצבא והשבטים הבדואים, אך השלטון יישאר בידי הירדנים ולא יעבור לידי הפלשתינאים - בוודאי לא לידי ערפאת, הוואתמה חבש וכו'.

קראיב: הממשל של חוסיין הוא הטוב ביותר מבחינת ישראל.

ששון: לדעתי האישית עבדאללה היה יותר טוב, אחריו חוסיין. טוב לירדן קודם כל מאחר שאין ניגוד אינטרסים, טוב גם מבחינה ישראלית.

קראיב:

שגבריסטניה בעמאן ראו צטוסיס מדברי מנהיגי ישראל שכוונתם כאילו להחליש עמדת חוסיין. ראשית: עניין הפילגש של חוסיין ושנית ר"ה"מ ג. מאיר שבחה את חוסיין והשתמע כאילו חוסיין מוכן להקריב את ירושלים ורוצה מו"מ עם ישראל. מסקנת שגבריסטניה בירדן שישראל אינה רוצה באמח במו"מ ושמחה שהטרוכ למו"מ בא מצד הערבים ושישראל שמחה שאין מו"מ והדברים נאמרים כדי להקטין סכויי מו"מ.

ששון:

שאל את עמיתך בח"א ויתנו לך הצד השני של המטבע. קיימת כמובן דילמה: איזה הצהרה ישראלית תעזור למלך יותר: אם נבנה את חוסיין? מה יעזור אם נסחיר את דעתנו בענין ירושלים? לדעתי הטוב ביותר הוא לאמר את השקפתנו האמיתית ולא לעורר אשליות או להטעות.

נכתו: השגריר הבריטי לדוידג', היועץ גיפארד, המזכיר הראשון ואליס
וב. נבון שרשם.

קרייב: מספר שאף שר בריטי לא ישחחף בדיון המז"ח באו"מ, הוסיף שכלל לא
נסוח אם - בניגוד למחוכן - הוא עצמו יסע. הופתע מן "התאולוגיה"
שזחלה לתוך ההתייחסות האו"מית לסכסוך המז"ח ומהחשיבות היתירה
שמיחסים לפורטים בקונטקסט זה.

קדרון: היהודים האמינו מאז ומתמיד בארגונים ומסגרות בינ"ל והעבירו אמונתם
זו מחבר הלאומים לאו"מ ומוסדותיו. גישתנו הייתה אידיאליסטית קצונית
ויש בינינו כאלה המאשימים אותנו בקבלת לוב לאו"מ - המכנו בקבלה והיא
החקבלה ברב של קול אחד. מאז התכנסנו וגבשנו לעצמנו צפיות למה מסוגל
האו"מ הן ביחס לישראל והן ביוחס לסכסוך.

לערבים והמכיהם 50 קולות ויותר עבור כל הצעה שיציעו. קולות אלה גם
מעניקים להם שליש חוסם. הם מסוגלים להעביר כל החלטה כי ירצו בה.
להדגשת האבסורד - ביכולתם להעביר החלטה שכדור הארץ שטוח ושיש להפיל
את ישראל מקצה המסע.

לנו אין אשליות שהשלום במז"ח יושג בעצרת או במועבי"ס. לרוטן של ארה"ב
היה Salutory effect והערבים כבר לא מביאים כל חקריהם בבול למועבי"ס.
אנו רואים בהחלטות העצרת את סוף העולם. למעשה אנו יודעים עוד בתחילת
העצרת, מה תהיינה ההחלטות ומה יהיה הכרוסם התמידי.

קרייב: פעילות או"מית זו וההחלטות המתקבלות מעניקות לערבים סיפוק ומשמעות להן
החליף לפעולות אחרות, קרי: פתיחה באש.

קדרון: האם זה מקרב את ההסדר?

קרייב: מביא כדוגמא את ההחלטה שהתקבלה לגבי לבנון. ממלבנון ידעה שאינה
יכולה לעשות דבר, אך היא יכלה לאמר לעמה: אנו לוקחים את הענין לאו"מ.

קדרון: אם הערבים לא היו מקבלים החלטות - אולי היו עושים משהו לגבי ההסדר.

קרייב: אנו טוענים שהם עושים.

קדרון: אנו רואים שההחלטות אינן מועילות להם. היפוכו של דבר, ההחלטות עוזרות
להן להימנע מלעמוד מול המציאות.

קרייב: הערבים יסענו שאין חוק שמימי שאת הסכסוך יש לפתור במו"מ ישיר ולא
במסגרת האו"מ.

קדרון: עובדה היסטורית שכל סכסוכים בינלאומיים נפתרו לבסוף בדרך מו"מ ואין
סכסוך שנפתר באו"מ.

קרייב: אם אתם סבורים שההחלטות אי רלבנטיות, למה אתם מגיבים כחריפות?

קדרון: אנו מצטערים על החלטות וארגומנטים עקרים שלדעתנו מרחיקים הערבים מהרגע
של אמת - דהיינו שאין מנוס ממו"מ ישיר אהנו.

קרייב: אתם חושבים שאנו מצביעים רק כדי לשמוע על האינטרסים שלנו. אך אני
יכול להבטיחך שאנו חושבים על צדק ואי צדק. איננו/הולכים בקו הצרפתי
המחושב.

קדרון: היו מקרים בהם הייתם יותר צרפתיים מן הצרפתים.

קרייב: מדיניותנו שונה לעתים מזון של הצרפתים ואז גם איננו הולכים עם הצרפתים.
היו מקרים בהם אמרנו שנחמוך בהצעתם אם שאר האירופים יחמכו.

קדרון: אין אנו מאושרים מכל הצבעותיכם, הנה אתמול הייתה הצבעה בעניין הקרוי
"פליטים" אבל בהחלטה מדובר ב-"זכויות החוקיות של הפלשתינאים". הרגשתנו
שדברים אלה מעוותים את המציאות.

הגיון העמדה הערבית שיש לשמור את בעיית הפליטים כבעייה הוא הגיון סוריאליסטי. אין אנו מחבישים בכוונתנו לפתור הבעייה. אנו היינו רוצים בחיסול המחנות וביצירה תעסוקה וחנאי מחיה סבירים עבורם. אנו מנסים לעשות זאת בצורה פרגמטית שאינה מעוררת בעיות. ישנם vested interests סביב ובחוף סו"ת. אנו מודעים לכך ומנסים לשנות מבלי לפגוע. הנה יש תעסוקה מלאה בגדמ"ע ויש גם תעסוקה ברצועה. אין אנו משנים לא את מעמד הפליטים ולא את מעמד סו"ת. אנו מנסים לספר ולהיות קונסטרוקטיבנים אבל כל העת נחקלים בקשיים (מזכיר הדוגמא של חלוקי הדעות סביב פנוי האשפה במחנות ברצועת עזה).

קרייג: הערבים אומרים שניתן לפתור הבעייה ע"י החזרת הפליטים.

קדרון: אנו רוצים בהפשרת הבעייה. אני מסכים שכל מה שאנו עושים אינו עונה על האספירציות הלאומיות. מה שאנו יכולים לעשות זה "לנגוס את קצות הבעייה".

קרייג: הערבים יאמרו שלהקטנת הבעייה מימד פוליטי המסנה את המצב לאשורו.

קדרון: ככל שההחלטה נוקשה יותר (בענין הפליטים), פחות סכויים שהיא תשפיע.

קרייג: כאשר זיאת ביקר בלונדון, לא ידע מה תהיה המדיניות שלהם. יעצנו להם לא לחמס את הויכוח ולהשאיר הדלתות פתוחות. זיאת לא התחייב.

סודי
B

הנדון: בריטניה - ישראל - והסוה"ת

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1. בחדשים האחרונים מורגשת יותר מאשר בעבר השפעתם של שני מרכיבים בשיקולים הבריטים בנושא המזת"י: כניסת בריטניה לקהיליה האירופית והדאגה להבטחת אספקת חומרים אנרגטיים לכלכלה הבריטית. השפעתם של שני מרכיבים אלה עדיין מוגבלת ואין סימנים שהם השפיעו על שינוי יסודי בעמדות הבריטיות.
2. הנטיה הבריטית הבסיסית כפי שגובשה לאחר עליה לשלטון של השמרנים (קיץ 1970) - הנחיות מחקופת היוזמות והפעלחות נושא "קאראדון" - מאופיינת עדיין ע"י גישה פסיבית.
3. אין זאת אומרת שלבריטים אין כלל דעה והשקפה. השקפתם מבוססת בין היתר על המרכיבים הבאים:
 - יישוב הסכסוך המזת"י, מקדם ככל האפשר, הנו אינטרס בריטי;
 - אין בכוחה של בריטניה להשפיע באופן ישיר על הצדדים המעורבים בסכסוך כדי שיינקטו צעדים לפי רוחה;
 - במדה ויש השפעה על הצדדים הנה בידי ארה"כ ובריה"מ.
4. באופן ספציפי יותר, לגבינו, שרירה וקיימת התורה כפי שמצאה בטוי בנאום הרוגייס של שה"ח הבריטי:-
 - 242 כיסוד ומסגרת להסדר.
 - תקוני גבול קלים לטובת ישראל;
 - נסיגה מכל השטחים פרט למקומות בהם יהולו שנויי גבול קלים;
 - הבטחת בטחונה של ישראל בכל דרך שהיא פרט לצרוף שטחים נרחבים;
 - אי השלמה עם עמדת ישראל כשליטה יחידה בירושלים המאוחדת;
 - הענות מסוימת לחביעות הפלשתינאיות, בלי לקבוע עמדה ברורה או הגדרה כיצד ובאיזו מדה צריכות חביעות אלה לבוא על סיפוקן. יחד עם זה ברור שמתן סיפוק כנ"ל אסור שיפגע במדינת ישראל כפי שהיתה לפני מלחמת ששת הימים.
5. בעמדה הבריטית כלולה ביקורת לגבי עמדתנו בנקודות הבאות:-
 - התשובה הנוקשה שנחננו לתזכיר יארינג מפב' 1971, בו בזמן שהתשובה המצרית היתה מעודדת;
 - חוסר ילמה והפגנה גמישות מצדנו לאחר הוצאת הכוחות הסובייטים ממצרים;

המפיקות, תיווצר זרימת הון ענקית לארצות ערב. הדבר יכביד על צאצאצא אאאאאאאאאא

מאזן החשלומים של הארצות החעשיות. חובה על בריטניה בעלת מאזן החשלומים הפגיע למצוא דרכים למיתון תופעה זו, יהיה זה ע"י יצוא מוגבר לארצות המפיקות, יהיה זה ע"י משיכת השקעת הון מארצות אלה.

12. אין ביכולתי לתת הערכה כיצד ישפיעו שני המרכיבים הללו על המדיניות הבריטית במו"ה בכלל ולגבי ישראל בפרט. כרגע יש הרגשה שמסקלם נמצא בעליה ושההשפעה היא לקרב את העמדות הבריטיות יותר לעמדות הצרפתיות מכפי שזה היה בעבר. אין לפסול אפשרות שמגמה זו תתקזק במשך החדשים ואולי אף השנים הקרובות.

13. עם זאת קיים רצון לא לערער את היחסים הדו-צדדיים עם ישראל. קיימת הבחנה בין הצהרות, מחוים וקביעת עמדות בפורומים בינלאומיים ובין היחסים הדו-צדדיים בין שתי הארצות. במתכונת הרב-צדדית יורגש רצון להסביר פניק לארצות ערב ולספה היחסים אתם. יהיה בזה גם אלמנט הפגנתי ראיתי. אשר ליחסים אתנו, ימשיכן הבריטים לספח יחסי מסחר, חרבנות ומדע וכל אותה רקמה של קשרים דו-צדדיים המאפיינים את הקשרים אתנו.

אנ'ה ש'חול ש'יו

14. אין ~~לעקרו~~ בעקרונות המנחים את המדיניות הבריטית של מכירת נשק לארצות האזור (לא אמברגו כללי אך המנעות ממכירת נשק העלול לזעזע את מאזן הכוחות). יחד עם זה לא מן הנמנע שהבריטים יפרשו עקרונות אלה בליברליות יתרה לגבי ארצות ערב: זאת מתוך מניעים מסחריים ואולי גם יוקרתיים - לא להדחק לקרן זוית ע"י הצרפתים - וגם מתוך הערכתם שיחרוננו הצבאי הנו אדיר.

א. רופין

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

מברק יוצא - מסווג

ש מ ו ר

מס' 240

בשלה: 201530 דצמ. 72

אל: לונדון

מאת: המשרד

מ י י ד י
הגנרל B

כז. תעופה.

1. עם הבטול של שתי הטיסות השבועיות של בי.אי.איי. ב-15 דצמ ביטלו הבריטים 2 טיסות אלעל.
2. התעופה האזרחית שלנו סירבה שוב לאשר ל-בי.אי.איי. טיסות מיוחדות במקום השתיים שבטלו. עם זאת בהתחשב בעובת השיא של חג המולד אישרנו, עוד באוקטובר 17 טיסות מיוחדות לבי.אי.איי ואחת לבי.או.אי.סי. וכן ביומיים האחרונים אושרו 2 טיסות מיוחדות בוספות לבי.אי.איי. לכוון אחד בלבד.
3. אלעל ביקשה לאחרונה 9 טיסות מיוחדות לעונת חג המולד. אחת בוצעה אתמול. לגבי האחת שצריכה הייתה להתבצע היום ועוד 7 שאלעל ביקשה בתקבל סירוב מגורדנר.
4. לאור זאת הודיע היום זוסמן לגורדנר באמצעות מוברלי שאם אכן לא יתקבל האשור לגבי טיסת היום ושבע הבאות לא תהיה לנו ברירה אלא לחזור בנו ולבטל את 15 הטיסות שטרם בוצעו (14 לבי.אי.איי. ואחת לבי.או.אי.סי.).

כלכלית

שהה רוהם מנכל מ/מנכל אמיר מרוז לוריא כלכלית איר ב זוסמן/תעופה אזרחית
בן ארי, שרם/אלעל מנכל/תחבורה
חד/שא

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C7. 数量関係。

1. ԵՍ ԱՐՏՈՐԸ ԿԸ ՕՈՒՆ ԱՐՏՈՐԱ ՊԱՅԿԱՐԵՐԱ ԿԸ ԸՄ.ՄԻ.ՄԻՄ. Ը-ՀԻ ԴԵՆ ԸՐՏՈՐ ԱՐՏՈՐՈՍ Ե
ԱՐՏՈՐԱ ՊԱՐԿԸ.

[illegible]

Հ. ԽճԷ՛ ԵՐԱՅԱՆ ՎԱՍԻՔԱՆ Ե՛ ԱՅՈՐԱ ԱՅԻՐԱՐԱՆ ՎԵՐԱ ՈՒ ՈՐԵ՛Ն. յԱՌ ԵՐԵՈՒ ՅԱՐԵ՛. ՎԵ՛Ր
 ՆԱՌԱ ՍԽԻՐԵՍ ՈՐՈՒ ՎՈՒՅԿԵ ՈՐԴԱ ԲԱՐԵ՛ Ի ՍԽԷ՛Ն ԵՐԱՅԱՆ ԼԱՐԵ՛Ն ՕՐԵՐԱ ՍԻՐԵ՛Ր.

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סודי ביותר

סיזוג

משרד החוץ

מזכר

אל :

מאת :

אל : מר י. ענוג, מנהל אירופה 2

מאת : א. לוריא

הגישת השר עם ג'וליאן אמרי

במקרה שמעתי אתמול שבזמן ביקורו האחרון באנגליה נפגש השר
יחד עם השגריר לשיחה אישית וסודית עם ג'וליאן אמרי. ג'וליאן
אמר לו שאף על פי שהחוסם התענינותו בפוראופ כולל בין היתר את
אירופה והמזרח הרחוק ואילו המזרח התיכון נופל בתחום אחריותו של
לורד בלניאל - הרי בכל זאת הוא מקבל את כל הניירות ויכול, אם
מחזיקים אותו בחסונה, להיות לעזר. אמרי ציין גם שמכתבו האישי
של השר לסיר אלק הגיע קודם לשולחנו הוא ועל ידי כך עלה בידו
להשפיע על סיר אלק לתקן הנוסח המקורי של הצעת ההחלטה בסעיף המזח"י
שהבריטים כבר החליטו, יחד עם אחרים, להגישה. בנקודה זו העיר השר
שמר קומי אמר לו שיש משהו בדבריו של אמרי.

בברכה,

א. ל.

ארחור לוריא

19.12.72

סודי ביותר



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משרד החוץ

עמנואל
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אל: אייל 200

הית: לא נספק נשק-התקפה למצרים

לונדון, (עמ"א), כרי.
מניח לא תספק למצרים
נשק השמדה וגם אם תח-
ליט לספק למצרים כלי נשק
אחרים, לא יהווה הדבר
תמונה במידור הערבי -
זאת הכרזו ראש ממשלת
בריטניה, אדוארד הית, ב-
מכתב לנשיא בני ברית-
בבריטניה, דוד שטרן.

מכתב זה נשלח בתשובה על
אגרת מאת שטרן, בה התלונן על
עיסוק נשק שעליה נמסר, רשמי
מסגרתה אמורה בריטניה לספק ל-
מצרים נשק בשווי של יותר מ-
100 מיליון ל"ש.

התגובה
ב

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Parsons

RECORD OF MR CRAIG'S CONVERSATIONS IN ISRAELI MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JERUSALEM. 21 NOVEMBER 1972

1. Mr Craig went with the Ambassador to call on Mr Sasson, Assistant Director-General (Middle East), Mr Kidron, Political Adviser (UN) and Mr Anug, Director, Europe II Division. Mr Navon of Europe II Division, and Mr Giffard and Mr Wallis were also present.

MR SASSON

2. Mr Craig told Mr Sasson that he had been in the Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. He had spent three hours in Damascus to assess the chances of restoring diplomatic relations between the UK and Syria. There had been no progress but we hoped to hear again from the Syrians in a month or two. It was up to them. We thought that the present Syrian regime was the best - or the least bad - which Syria had enjoyed for some time. Mr Sasson recalled the three meetings between the Israelis and the Syrians in the context of the Mixed Armistice Commission on the eve of the Six Day War. He had been amazed to find the Syrians behaving like Soviet officials.

3. Mr Craig said that in Jordan he had found a new atmosphere. It was true that when the Jordanian position was analysed there was no apparent change of substance in it; that though the Jordanians seemed prepared for direct negotiations, they insisted that Israel first announce her commitment to the full implementation of Resolution 242. Nevertheless, they were prepared to be the first Arab country to make a settlement and were not afraid of Arab reactions to such a settlement in the absence of progress on the Egyptian front. They had some potentially useful ideas for Jerusalem, including a UN presence though they insisted on sovereignty over East Jerusalem. And they talked of real peace and cooperation after a settlement, and not simply an end of belligerency. They seemed generally flexible and anxious for a genuine reconciliation.

4. Mr Sasson recognised the following differences between Jordan and Egypt :-

- (a) In the last year, the Jordanians had emphasised dis-engagement from the war in contrast to the Egyptian emphasis on "the battle".
- (b) The Jordanians had a clear concept of peace (bon voisinage, in the words of King Hussein) whereas the Egyptians talked only of non-belligerency.

/ (c)

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- (c) For the Jordanians, a settlement would solve the Palestinian problem whereas for the Egyptians a settlement would not be final.
- (d) The Jordanians could contemplate frontier rectifications (even though only minor ones).
- (e) The Jordanians were more flexible over procedure.

But the following problems remained :-

- (i) Though Jordan might be flexible on practical details for the administration of Jerusalem, the question of sovereignty was one of principle.
- (ii) Jordan did not accept that the Six Day War had created a new situation.
- (iii) The Hussein Plan envisaged Jordanian sovereignty over a wider area than before 1967.
- (iv) Even though the Hussein Plan offered too little to Israel, it was still criticised by Egypt.

5. Mr Sasson summarised the present situation between Israel and Jordan as follows :-

- (a) The Six Day War and its aftermath had brought great changes to both Israel and the Arab population of the territories which must be recognised in a settlement.
- (b) Jordan's offer of even minor frontier rectifications had not been echoed by Egypt and Syria.
- (c) The Jordanians were increasingly emphasising Jerusalem as a matter of principle.

6. Mr Sasson went on to outline Israeli policy on Middle East questions. Israel had no firm priorities: but she did not think that she could ask Jordan both to be the first country to negotiate and to make concessions. Jordanian confidence was not surprising in view of the continuing divisions in the Arab world (shown most recently at the Kuwait Conference). Nevertheless it was safer and more realistic to start with Egypt. A change of approach to Israel in the Arab World and a willingness to recognise her was not enough. The Arabs still lived in a dream world in which they believed they could apply the principle of non-acquisition of territories by force to deny Israel peace based on new frontiers. Israel was ready for

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compromise, but in Sinai and Jerusalem the Arabs were not. There had to be a process of peace-making in Sinai as on the West Bank. The Arab world was slowly advancing to the moment of truth when it would realise that it had no choice but to make peace with Israel. Israel was not expansionist: she had a genuine need for security. She had to prevent another war: paper agreements with Arab Governments were unreliable, as the Soviet Union had discovered.

7. Mr Craig said that the new atmosphere in Jordan might not last; there were those in Amman who already advocated closing the bridge. If Jordanian flexibility met no response from Israel, President Sadat too would be less inclined to flexibility. Mr Sasson said that Israel was not discouraging Jordan: her response to the Hussein Plan and her policy with regard to the Palestinians on the West Bank suited Jordan very well. He said that the Jordanian regime was not yet the true representative of the Palestinians and its image should be made more Palestinian. Israel could not negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organisation which was not a Government and which was dedicated to the destruction of the State of Israel. He saw no likelihood of a PLO takeover in Jordan.

8. Mr Craig said that some public statements in Israel had weakened King Hussein's position and asked if they had been made intentionally in order to postpone negotiations. Mr Sasson said that this was not so. Whatever Israel said about King Hussein could be misinterpreted. But the King's prestige was growing and he was beginning to recognise the new circumstances created by the Six Day War. Israel could wait for further changes in Arab attitudes. In the meantime Arab illusions should not be fostered.

MR KIDRON

9. Mr Kidron referred briefly to the UN debate on terrorism. He said that Israel was concerned lest the Resolution might seem to exclude Arab terrorism, even though it was the Munich affair which had led the Secretary-General to raise the subject in the first instance. He saw no point in making concessions to the Arabs or the Soviet Bloc on the text of the Resolution.

10. Mr Kidron said that Jews were 'traditionally in favour of International Organisations as such and in the early days of the UN Israel's vote had often been dictated by idealistic considerations. She was now wiser. Faced with a 50-vote Arab bloc and the practice of voting "deals" in the UN, the only resolutions which Israel could hope to defeat were those calling for sanctions against her or for her expulsion from the UN. The recent US veto however had shown that the UN was no longer a completely open forum for the Arabs and this salutary effect was

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demonstrated by the fact that the last incident on the Syrian border had not been brought to the Security Council. (Mr Kidron was speaking while the incidents of 21 November were taking place but before we had knowledge of them.) He said that there was no guarantee that the practice of passing resolutions against Israel would not be revived; but that would not be the end of the world. UN resolutions had done the Arabs no good. Mr Craig suggested that resolutions were a safety valve: without the Security Council to appeal to, the Lebanese Government might have had a good deal more internal pressure to contend with over the Israeli raids. If the Israelis did not care about UN resolutions, why did they make such a fuss (eg with HMG) before and after them? Mr Kidron resolutions did not make Israel any more cynical about the UN but they encouraged Arab irrationality. It was for this reason that Israel could not ignore them; and her reaction to hostile votes was not inconsistent with her generally sceptical view of the UN. Bilateral meetings in the context of the UN were useful but direct negotiations between parties to a dispute were more effective than international machinery. The African and Arab countries thought that the UN existed only for their own purposes. It was a tragedy that all votes in the UN were politically motivated.

/said

11. Mr Craig said that the British position in the UN was based not only on British interests. European unity was also important to us; in particular we could not appear to isolate France. But the UK had its own policy, as did other European countries, and we tried to influence French policy and would not necessarily vote with France if she stood alone.

12. Mr Kidron referred to our votes in the UNRWA debate the previous day. Sometimes quite trivial affairs were taken to the UN. Mr Craig said that Arabs had a genuine - and logical - fear that apparently trivial activities in the occupied territories were the thin end of a wedge - eg the current dispute over the mosque at Hebron. Mr Kidron said that this logic led to the maintenance of the refugee problem. Israel wanted this problem solved. She did not want to upset UNRWA but UNRWA had acquired vested interests and UNRWA methods were not always the best. Israel was offering the alternative of a de facto change in the status of the refugees. Of course, this had political advantages for Israel but Israel's position was that the national aspirations of the refugees could not be satisfied without a Middle East settlement. Negotiations for a settlement would only come through confrontation between the parties to the dispute. The human problem of the refugees should not be part of the balance sheet. The refugees themselves wanted an improvement in their conditions, which Israel offered.

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13. Referring to the UN debate on the Middle East, Mr Kidron said that he thought the Arabs might want a reference to the illegality of occupation (which was illogical given their support of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and a quotation from the Jarring Memorandum would interpret Resolution 242 in their favour. A tough resolution would have a psychological effect on Israel, but would make her neither more flexible nor less inclined to negotiate an interim agreement. He agreed that the advice which we had given to the Egyptian Foreign Minister about the content of a resolution was right, but he wondered whether the Egyptians had passed on our advice to the Arab Conference in Kuwait.

MR ANUG

14. Mr Craig said that the Arab countries had a third option in addition to the alternatives of peaceful negotiation and war. They could simply wait. He had been speculating about the possible implications of their choosing the long haul. In some countries the income from oil for the years 1970 - 75 would be treble what it would have been at 1970 prices. This enormous growth in their financial resources could pose threats not only to Israel but also to the Western world. A number of the oil-producing States would shortly be able to afford to cut off oil supplies, to set up an arms industry and hire management for it and even to upset the world financial system. All this might in turn influence American and European foreign policy. North Sea oil supplies would help the UK but such resources now had to be shared with Europe, and Europe and the United States would remain heavily dependent on Middle East oil. The UK was committed to the survival of Israel and would do nothing to threaten her existence but her own interests might not always coincide with those of Israel.

15. Mr Anug thought that the increase in the oil revenues of the Arab States would not create a new situation. The military option had not been ruled out by any shortage of funds. The fact was that the Arabs would never be efficient until they had reformed their educational system, technically and morally. At present, time was not working for the Arabs in all respects. Moreover, if the Arabs did acquire the power which Mr Craig suggested, they would use it whether or not they got a satisfactory settlement with Israel. The West therefore had more reason to be afraid than Israel. In general the interests of the two super powers would remain the most important factor in the balance of power within the region. Although therefore he took note of Mr Craig's point about the increase in Arab resources, today's decisions could not be based on such considerations, for the following reasons:-

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- a. Appeasement of the Arab States now would not avoid a confrontation in the future.
- b. A future confrontation would be harder for Israel if she made territorial concessions now.
- c. The outside world would have to take an interest in the implications of the growth in Arab power. The effects of this interest could not be calculated now.

16. Mr Anug went on to say that Israel was not the only barrier to good relations between the Arab world and the West. Nor was the Arab/Israel conflict the only reason for Russia's entry into the Middle East: indeed the conflict had now led to a reduction in the Soviet presence. Only the Egyptians had suffered from Soviet policy in the Middle East. Even a total European commitment to the Arab world would not change the balance of power in the Middle East; and such a commitment was unlikely. Israel's survival coincided with Western interests. The West should simply leave Israel to conduct her own struggle with the Arab countries. Mr Craig said he did not accept the thesis of Israel as a stronghold of Western interests in the Middle East: in his view the Arab countries were by nature closer to the West than to the Soviet bloc, whose authority in the Arab world would never have grown to its present size but for the existence of the Arab/Israel dispute.

17. Mr Anug referred to Anglo/Israel relations and to the mixture of friendly and suspicious feelings which Israelis had for the UK. The Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not share these suspicions. The Ministry accepted that British policy must be based on British interests and wanted Britain to have a stake both in Israel and in the Arab world. The Ministry expected disagreements between Israel and the UK from time to time. But relations were generally developing smoothly. There was however, in his view, room for more consideration of Israel's position. The general climate was satisfactory but particular expressions of British policy, such as the Harrogate Speech, were liable to upset Israeli public opinion.

18. Mr Anug recognised that the supply of British arms for Egypt was likely to be limited by moral and practical considerations and could never affect the situation to the extent that Russian supplies had done. But he saw the need for a public announcement to make clear the limited significance of our possible sales. A wrong impression had been given to the Arab world by stories leaked in London and this ought to be rectified. The assurance given to Mr Eban by the Ambassador the previous day was welcome and its confidentiality would be respected: but he hoped that further consideration would be given to a public clarification. The Ambassador said that he had already passed this request to the FCO.

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19. Mr Anug said that Israel had no interest in trouble between the West and the Arab world. But there was too much regard in the West for Arab opinion. Individual Israelis were more concerned about the Middle East conflict than were the ordinary people in Arab countries, and found the burden greater. Mr Craig said he would not say that if he had seen the oppressive gloom in Cairo. Mr Anug did not think that the conflict alone was responsible for Arab depression; nor would the return of the territories dispel it.

20. After some further general discussion of the rights and wrongs of the Middle East conflict, and illusions in the Arab world, Mr Anug quoted Jabotinsky to the effect that the basic confrontation was between Arab appetite and Jewish hunger. He also said that, whatever the changes elsewhere in the region, Britain might find that Israel remained a stable, strong and friendly country. Mr Craig said we had been a trifle put out by Mr Anug's implication that British policy was governed only by British interests. Of course interests played an important part; but there was also sentiment (which in Britain was stronger for Israel than against her) and a concern for justice. We would hardly vote for a pro-Arab resolution in the UN unless we felt that on the issue in question the balance of justice was on the Arab side.

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT

28 NOVEMBER 1972

cc Mr Pike

Chanceries Tel Aviv ✓
Amman
Beirut
Cairo
UKMIS New York
Washington
Paris

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מברק נכנס-מסווג

משרד החוץ

מחלקת הקשר

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו
או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך
לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון
דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה
יחסי-חוץ וסודות רשמיים),
תשי"ז - 1957.

סג"ר

ש פ ו ר

נא ג"ק יצחק מאיר גניסמן
אל : המשרד
מאת: סן חוזה

מס' 18

בשלה: 061800 דצמבר 72

ב ה ו ל

תקופ(הועבר במס' 194) העתק לוריא, קדרון.
בשדר שהח לסיני אלק הובהג עפ"י בקשת רוחם השיגרי דלהלן:

LEAD THE G O I TO CONSIDER THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF
S C RES 242 AS A BASIS FOR AN AGREED PEACE SETTLEMENT IN
THE M.E. AND THE U N AS A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR THIS
PURPOSE.

במקום

LEAD TO ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM RESOLUTION 242 AND
FROM...

בא לשימת לבך.

בבצור

6

יהח רוחם מנכל משנה למנכל לוריא סרוז מ. קדרון מאוס ב אירופה ב
מב/קל

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מס' 191

בשלה: 072200 דצמבר 72

אל : המשרד

מאת: ניר יורק

ידי

מ. קדרון, מאוס נ, העתק שהח לונדון, ורשינגטון (הועבר).
להלן תיקונים שהוגשו על ידי בריטניה בסליחה ב-7.12.

1 AFTER THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, ADD THE FOLLOWING:

" REAFFIRMING THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242(1967)
OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN ALL ITS PARTS,"
2 REPLACE THE EXISTING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 BY THE FOLLOWING
FOLLOWING TEXT, WHICH WOULD BECOME PARAGRAPH 5:

"REAFFIRMS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE
FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED
IN THE RECENT CONFLICT,

B TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND
RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY
STATE IN THE AREA AND ITS RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN
SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS
OF FORCE,"

THE EXISTING PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BECOME PARAGRAPH 6.

3 AT THE END OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8, ADD THE FOLLOWING
WORDS: "AND REQUESTS ALL STATES TO AVOID ACTIONS, INCLUDING
ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF AID, THAT COULD CONSTITUTE

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1 AFTER THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, ADD THE FOLLOWING:

" REAFFIRMING THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242(1967)
OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN ALL ITS PARTS,
REPLACE THE EXISTING OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 BY THE FOLLOWING
FOLLOWING TEXT, WHICH WOULD BECOME PARAGRAPH 6:

" REAFFIRMS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE
FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED
IN THE RECENT CONFLICT,
B TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND
RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY
STATE IN THE AREA AND ITS RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN
SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS
OF FORCE,

THE EXISTING PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BECOME PARAGRAPH 6.

3 AT THE END OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8, ADD THE FOLLOWING
WORDS: " AND REQUESTS ALL STATES TO AVOID ACTIONS, INCLUDING
ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF AID, THAT COULD CONSTITUTE

==?==

RECOGNITION OF THAT OCCUPATION."

PARAGRAPH 8 WOULD THEN READ AS FOLLOWS:

" CALLS UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNIZE ANY SUCH CHANGES AND MEASURES CARRIED OUT BY ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND INVITED ALL STATES TO AVOID ACTIONS, INCLUDING ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF AID, THAT COULD CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF THAT OCCUPATION."

4 DELETE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 9 AND RENUMBER THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ACCORDINGLY.

נאום

שהחירוהם מכל ארון דיין משנה למכלל סמכל טאום א+ב אירופה א+ב סזמים חקר
אלגום מעת הסברה (רם אמן-בנפרד) תשוד
חד/קל

משרד החוץ

מברק נכנס-מסווג

אל : המשרד
מאת : לונדון

כל המוסר תוכן מסמך זה, כולו או מקצתו לאדם שאינו מוסמך לכך - עובר על החוק לתיקון דיני העונשין (בטחון המדינה) תשי"ז - 1957.

מחלקת הקשר

SIR CHRISTOPHER SOAMES 15-2 דנא.

הטברתי לו השתלשלות יחסיו עם השוק ויחסיו להסדר גלובלי עם מדינות
ימ תיכוניות. הביע חבנה אכ ציינ שאין להם ברירה אלא לחשלים עם דברים
כ-XX REFERENCE PRICES שאינם מצדקים לגופ העניין אכ כבר קיימים
כחלק אינטגרלי מיסודות השוק. תוכ כדי שיחה התלוננ שתשוק תקוע בפרטי
מוצרים ומחירים במקום להבהיר לעצמו היעדים האסטרטגיים לטווח ארוך יותר
הביע ביקורת על משטר העדיפויות שמהווה הקו המנחה על רקע עברם הקולוניאלי
של חברי השוק וגם קבל על עמדות אהייב מסוימות תשייכות לעבר ולא להווה.
מובנ מאליו שחייב להיות קשר הדוק בין אירופה לבין אגן הימ התיכוני
אכ העניין בראש וראשונה מדיני ואסטרטגי ולא מסחרי ואולי מוקדם לחשוב על
הרחבת משטר העדיפויות לכלול המדינות המזתיויות. בחקשר זה שאל אם אנו
לא נותלים כבר בלחצ אמריקני נגדי. תשכתי שהכל טוב ויפה לדבר במושגי מ
אסטרטגיים לטווח ארוך אכ מדינה קטנה כישראל איננה יכולה לחדשות לעצמה
לוקסוס כזה. הסדר ההדדי שלנו עם מערב אירופה ואנגליה חיוני עבורנו.
לני יש דרישה פרוזאית ומידית וזאת לדעת היכן נעמוד בקרוב ועל איזה
בטיס נמשיך הסדר עם הרחבת השוק SOAMES הסכים שגישתנו טבעית
ויש לטפל בעניין בכובד ראש. בקש שאמשיך לעמוד במגע עמו עד כאן.
בדבריו אפשר היה לחוש הלכי המחשבה שמצאו ביטוי בגישת סר אלק בשייבת
מועצת חשרים האחרונה בבריטל. יש להניח שלא הייתה שום כוונה דוקא
לפגוע בנו אלא שמישפעים עיני שיקולים כלליים כגון:
א. רצונם להפגין שאינם מקבלים באופן עורר עקרונות ויסודות השוק שנתגבשו
לפני הצטרפותם אלא שיש צורך לבחון אותם מחדש לקראת העתיד. ז. א. ששוק ה-9
לא יהיה סתם שוק ה-6 פלוס 3 חברים.
ב. רצונם לשמור בחקשר החדש על תפקידם בתור המגשרים בין אירופה ואהייב.
ג. מקומ למצוא עצמם במחנה אירופאי שהולכ לקראת עימות עם אהייב.
ד. נקודה לחזית אירופאית אחידה בבעית הנפט.
ה. יצירת קבוצת מדינות קטנות בתוך השוק המורחב תחת מנהיגות בריטית
(יש לציין שבישיבה האחרונה האירי והדני תמכו כמעט אוטומטית בסר אלק
ספק שלבריטניה תהיה תשפעה ניכרת גם על הולנד בלגיה ולוקסמבורג)
ו. תחזית הנייל כמובנה טנטטיבית ביותר בשלב זה. קומיי