

מדינת ישראל

מושדי הממשלה

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2011/16/10

20. 11. 1980 — 4. 11. 1980



שם תיק: ראש הממשלה מוחם בגין - אוטונומיה לערביי
יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה

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מזהה פריט Awm000

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הילך

בב. נ.ד. ס.ל.ב.

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מדינת ישראל
משרד הפנים

המנהל הכללי

ירושלים, י"ג בכסלו התשמ"א
21 בנובמבר 1980

ס 6 6 6

אל : ראש הממשלה
שר החוץ
שר הפנים

הנדון : דוח משלחה עם השגריר ליאונרד

ביום ח, י"ב בכסלו התשמ"א (20.11.80) קיבלתי שיחה עם השגריר ג'ים ליאונרד.
להלן דיווח על עיקרי הנושאים שעלו בשיחה :

1. ליאונרד מסר לי שעצות האמריקאי חיל ברכיב זה החומר להכנות הדוח
שימסר לצוות המתאים במיל של המיעוט, בתקופת המעבר. עיקר העבודה
נעשית בירושינגרן. חלקיים מצומצמים יוכנסו על ידו כאן וישוגר
לעצות בירושינגרן. הדוח יכלול, כאמור, סקירה אינפורטטיבית,
כרונולוגית וענינית, ויכלול בחלק השני נירוח, הערכות והמלצות
למשך. לדבריו יתכן שלינובייך יעדיף להגיש חלק מ ניתוח ועהרכותינו
ברצואה בע"פ לעזרות המיל של המיעוט בנוסף לחלק הכתוב.
כיעשה מאמע להשלים את הדוח עד ליום 10.12.80, כדי שימסר לפניו
הפרה. בכוונתנו להמציא את החומר - ככל או חלקיים ממנו - להעדרות
הצוותות של מערם וישראל. יבקשו גם לשמעו רעיכונות.

2. ברי ליאונרד שלינובייך והודו עטמו לפסיקו טיפולם בנוסא עם כוונת
המישל החדש. מניח שחלק מהאנשים האחרים בעוזת האמריקאי ימשיכו
גם בעתיד לחיות מערב בעבודה זו.

3. ליאונרד קיים ביום ג', 20.11.80 פגישה עם שר החוץ המצרי גנראל
חסאן במאול עלי. לדבריו אין כוונה מצורית לחדש בתקופה הקרובה
את מסלולי השיחות, אלא אם כן יהיה ברור שנקבע מועד לפסגה והשיחות
יתקיימו לקראתה. עם זה מניח שיכבדו את הסכום בדבר פגישתם בעוד כמה
שבועות בישראל. בז' החתרנומיות שגיבש לעצמו בעקבות שהותו במצרים :

א. המצריים הדרופו באמונתם כי יוכל להציג עם ממשלה הנוכחת
של ישראל להסכם בנוסח האווטרנומיה.
ב. הם מעוניים לחייב שלטון בישראל ומניחים כי יוכל עליהם להציג
להסכם עם ממשלה שבראה יעמוד מך פרט.

4. ליאונרד התיחס לקשיים שנתגלו בפגעים על -
Memorandum of understanding .
לדבריו הביקורת הקשה שבה נתקלו בעקבות הגשת הנימיר האחורי (שהוגדר
ב - Non paper) הפתיעה אותו. הוא טען כי לא סטו בהרבה
ורק ניסו לעשות את ה"מסמר" אטרקטיבי יותר. הוא טען כי היו זהירים

ס 6 6 2

ולרגעיים ככלפי העמדות היסודיות שלנו. לדבריו אין בנסיבות שלנו בנסיבות קרע, מים ובטחון בגירסה שלנו כדי לעודד את הפלשינאים. הם ניסו לתת תוקן ממשי יותר בנוסח קרע וממים. לא היתה בפיו תשובה להערתי, כי בעת הגשת המסמך בושינגטון במחיצת אוקטובר, הם שיבחו אותנו ואפללו הפליגר מדי בהערכתם את העמדה כפי שנוסחה על ידינו. "מה קרה שאז הגדרתם זאת כתרומה קונסטרוקטיבית וחיזוקית ועתה אתם מצללים בכך?" - שאלתי. לא היתה לו תשובה לسؤالה זו והיה מבוכחה מסודימת.

במשך ביקש לקבל את הניסוח האלטרנטיבי שהיה לנו בשעתו בנסיבות הבטחון והבטחתי לתתו לו (חגוסח אישר בשעתו בזעמת הדרים אפשרות אלטרנטיבית).

5. ליאונרד הביע חשש, שאם יעברו כמה חדשים ללא שהתחלין ימשר יגברו הספקות בסמכות התחלין. לדבריו ישראל ערכיה לחושש יותר מקרים מהתקפות כזו. לדעתו מקרים לא תפגע גם אם יעלג רעוננות אחרים בקשר לכירוניה הפטרונית. זה אך יוביל את נאמנותם לעניין הפלשינאי. חזך זה צידר את עניין ה-
Chaim Kowarsky
Building Confidence Measures

בברכה
Chaim Kowarsky

מדינת ישראל
משרד הפנים

ירושלים, א', בטבת תשמ"א
8 בדצמבר 1980

המגנה הכללי

סודם בדוחת

אל: ראש הממשלה
שח החוץ

הנדון: דיווח על פגישתו של שר הפנים ד"ר יוסף בורג עם השגריר
פול לינובייך

1. הפגישה התקיימה ביום ו', 12.12.80, בלשכתו של סול לינובייך, באגף המשרדים של הבית הלבן בושינגטון. הפגישה החלה בשעה 9.30 ונסתיימה בשעה 11.15. נכח בפגישה גם השגריר בושינגטון, אפרים עברון ומנכ"ל משרד הפנים חיים קוברסקי.

ד"ר בורג פתח את השיחה בהערכת ממצעיו של לינובייך, הביע ספק לגבי כוונותיהם של המצריים לקיים מ"מ דעתי במושא האוטונומיה וביקש מLINOBIICH להסביר על מה הוא מבסס את דעתו שקיים עתה נסיבות מיוחדת לפחות מאמץ לקידום המ"מ על האוטונומיה. למעשה מאמץ הפגישה של ראש המשלחת להציג המ"מ אמתתי. ימי הפגישה הממושכת באכדייה בראשית מאי בזבזז על ויכוח במושא ועדת בטחון ולאחר ה-8.5.80 לא הייתה עוד פגישה בדרכו של מיליאת השרים. במקומות זה התנהלה קורספונדנציה בכתב בין סאדאת וראש הממשלה ובין גנראל עלי וד"ר בורג, בנוסף לפגישה ראש המשלחת ערבי בחירות בושינגטון. ד"ר בורג הביע דעתו שקיים מעצרים לتوزאות בחירות בארץ"ב ועתה מחייב כנראה לتوزאות בחירות בישראל...

2. לינובייך אמר כי בשכירות האחרוניים חל מפנה חיובי בפגישה של סאדאת למ"מ. הוא מגיע למסקנה זו בהתבסס על כמה עובדות:

(א) לינובייך נפגש השבוע פעמים אחדות עם סגן נשיא חוסני מובאrk. הוא שמע ממנגו דברים מפורטים על נסיבות זו. בסעודה לכבוד מובאrk שערן סגן נשיא מונדייל שטיען מובאrk דברי התקפה וביקורת על סוריה, ירדן, לבנון, סעודיה, עיראק וישראל. לא הושמעה אפילו חערה קלה שבלות על ישראל. לדעתו זה מובאrk אחר.

לינובייך תרשם מшибתו עם מובאrk שסאדאת מודאג מהADMINTISTRATIVE החדש של הרפובליקאים. הוא כועס על כך שרים עלה העות בכירון של חוסני. סאדאת מתכוון לבקש מריגן מחויבות לתהלייר קמף-דייניד. לדברי מובאrk היה סאדאת מרכז לנסות להגיא להבנה עם ישראל בעניין האוטונומיה עוד בתקופת קטר. משום כך הגיא לו מובאrk לבקר הפעם תחילת בישראל ואח"כ לבוא למצרים.

לינקוביץ נפגש ב-22 בנובמבר עם שגריר קנדה בארץ"ב. הנ"ל דיווח לו בין השאר - לפि ראשי פרקים שהועברו לו ע"י משרד החוץ הקנדי - על שיחתו של טרונדו עם סאדאת. בשיחה זו השמע סאדאת דברים קשים נגד אש"ף, מתח ביקורת על היזמה האירופאית, הביע התנגדות לאופציה הירדנית, תמן חד-משמעות בתהיליך קמף-דייניך ובקש מקנדה לא לקים מגעים עם אש"ף ובמקום זה לנטר לחשפי על ישראל, שמה מקילת קנדה יחשץ ידידות, להגמיש עמדתה במ"מ, כדי להגיע להסכם.

4. ד"ר בורג העיר שפפי ידיעת שודרה ב"קול ישראל" בבקשת ראלי שטמיר לדוחת את המר"ם עד לאחר ה-20 בינואר והרי הדבר סותר את המובא בשם סאדאת ע"י מרובארק.

5. קובסקי העיר, שבדברים שהובאו לעיל בדיוח של לינקוביץ יש כמה אלמנטים מסתכנים ויש בהם כדי להבהיר את ההתרשות בדבר נוכחות כביבול של סאדאת. העובדה שסאדאת ביקש טרונדו להשפי על ישראל ושמרובארק העז לリンקוביץ לבת תחילה בישראל, ממידה שמערדים מבקשת ללחוץ על ישראל ולא רק לנחל אתה מר"ם חופשי מלחצים.

יש לזכור שישראל מעולם לא הפסיקה את המר"ם ולחוץ לקיומו הסדייר. גם התנגדותה של הפקידות המצרית במפגש ובדיונים בגיזה לפני כ-3 שבועות לא העידה על נכונותם מר"ם ממש. הורגת שהיו להם הנחירות להעביד את הזמן אך לא לפתח דילון אמיתי.

6. השגריר עברון העיר על התבטאותם של צייגי מצרים בפורומים בינלאומיים. בוטרדים ראלי לא נקרא מעולם לסדר ע"י סאדאת. אילו הדברים הינו בוגדים לרוחם ולרצונו של סאדאת, היה בכוונה לשנות את הדברים.

7. בתגובה להערות הנ"ל אמר לינקוביץ כי הוא מבחין במפורש בין סאדאת ובין האחרים. גם ב-3 בספטמבר כשהציגו להסכמה עם סאדאת על ההודעה המשופפת, אמר לו הנשיא כי הוא יודיע שאנשינו יתנגדו לך, אך הוא מאשר כי זו הדרן ועלינו ללחכט בה. לינקוביץ הוסיף ואמר כי הרגשות חזקה שיש אפשרות להתקדם עם סאדאת אפילו לפניו חילופי השלטון בארץ"ב וכי הוא, אישית, יכול לתרום בכיוון זה.

להלן מסר לינקוביץ לד"ר בורג את ההודעה שפרשם הבית הלבין על ביקורו הקדוב במצרים ובישראל. לינקוביץ הוסיף ואמר כי הנשיא קרטר רצה לבסם אפיילו ביוםיהם אלה את תהיליך קמף-דייניך, הוא רודاه בו גROLת הכותרת של הישגיו המדיניים והוא מבקש להקשורת על נסיגת המיטשל הבא מדרך זו. בפגישת הקבינט בסוף השבוע (שהיתה כנראה האחראיה לפניו חילופי המים) אמר הנשיא קרטר שיקיים שיח מהorzת עם הנשיא הנבחר על המחויבות של אריה"ב להשלים את תהיליך קמף-דייניך.

8. ד"ר בורג ביקש מלינקוביץ להתזכיר לדו"ח המסכם שהוא מכין על שיחות האוטונומיה. כמו כן הזכיר ד"ר בורג את הערתו של ליאונרד במפגש גיזה, כי יהיה בו גם discouragements ולחצים.

לינקוביץ אמר כי בדו"ח הוא מתכוון להציג באופן חIROBI את אשר הרג. Powers and Modalities הושגה הבנה דביה וגם בקשרו responsibilities יש הסכמה על מספר מושגים של תפקידים וסמכויות. יש גם הבנה בסיסית לגבי העורק בתיאום ובשותוף פועלה. הוא ימינה כמובן גם את הבעיות שאין בכך הסכמה או התקדמות המחייבת המשך מאמץ מושג וחדירות. 10.

השגריר עברון העיר שבתדרוך שקיים המזכיר מסקי עם העתונות הרא הינה אבעה מאשימה כלפי ישראל, שאליו גילתה גמישות יכולו להתקדם יותר. לינקוביץ לא ידע על כך. עם זה אמר שחדו"ח שהוא מכין אינו עיריך להתריד אונגו. 11.

להלן העלה לינקוביץ העזה שבנסיבות ביקורו באזרנוג תפרנס הודה על Re-Commitment לדעתו מבחינה מדינית בinalgומית וככלפי המישל החדש בירושינגן. הוא אמר שהשניה קרטר מעוניין בפרסום העזה משותפת כזו. 12.

קוברסקי העיר שבודדות מסווג זה כתפרנס כבר פעמים אחדות בעבר. אין מניעה מלחזות עליה, אורלם כדי להוכיח רצינותו וממשותן יש להבהיר קודם כל חידוש המושג ופיתוח דינמיים רציניים וענינניים. למעשה מאז חדש מי מתחמי המציגים מודיעין כזה. קוברסקי העיש למעשה שיעזם מפגש ראש לשוש המשלחות למושג אנו מפגש מלאה בדרוג שירות בעת שהותו באזרן ולא להסתפק בחזרה בלבד. לינקוביץ לא התחייב על קיומה של אפשרות כזו, אך הבטיח לבדוק אותה. כמו כן הודיע שיעביר לד"ר בורג באמצעות השגריר עברון העזה לנוכח הודה משותפת. 13.

להלן העיר לינקוביץ כי ישראל לא נתנה לו מרחב תמרון לצורך מגע עם המציגים. יתכן שהפסדתם אפשרית שהיתה לכם - אמר. ד"ר בורג העיר שבגיגשה שהתקיימה עמו בראשית ספטמבר בירושלים, הלהה ישראל לקרהו בכמה עיפויים ואעפ"י כן לא הביא הדבר לחידוש ממשי של המושג. השגריר עברון הסביר כי ישראל היא מדינה דימוקרטית בראש הממשלה פועל במסגרת הקונסנסוס הלאומי וההסכמה הקואליציונית ובמקרים יכול סאדאת להרשות לעצמו נקיטת עמדות גם על דעת עצמו. 14.

קוברסקי הזכיר לינקוביץ את המחמות שניתנו על ידו לישראל במפגש ראשי המשלחות באוקטובר, בירושינגן, על תרומות הקונסטרוקטיבית ותחביבית בטיעות ה-MOU שהגישה.

אם יש היום דעה אחרת בירושינגן בנושא זה? - שאל קוברסקי.

לינקוביץ הגיב, שכאן הוא עצמן נתן את המחמות בפורמי והוא דיבך בכך גם עתה. הוא הזכיר את הופעתו בועדת החוץ של הסימאט. 15.

סמל לינקוביץ שאל את ד"ר בורג אם הוא יכול להודיע לנציגים ישראלי מרכנה לדין בנושא הבוחן כאשר יתחדש המושג. לדבריו זה יכול לעודד אורותם להחיקות את המושג. ד"ר בורג אמר כי ישראל תקיים את אשר הבטיח ראש הממשלה לנשיה קרטר באפריל והיא תציג במושג אינפורמציה כנדרש

ותכנוריתיה בנוסח הבוחין, הכל לפי העניין והמחויב לפי קמפ-דיינרייך אך אין הוא רוצה לתת זאת כנדונה לצורך חידוש המר"ט. אם ית釐ש המר"ט נדוע בכל נושא וגם במתחביב לדוע בנוסח הבוחין.

16. בשיחה עלתה גם שאלת היורש לינובייך במיshall הרפובליקאי. לינובייך לא ידע לנქוב בשם, אך העיר "אולי בכל זאת הנרי". אבל מיליד הויסיף ואמור, הוא הרי נגד הפטرون שאל אוטונומיה כיוון שידעתו זה יוביל למדינת אש"ף.

17. לשאלת ד"ר בורג אם יש אולי מוקם בישראל תפרסם עתה מחדש את המודל שלה ואת נספח ה-*MOU* שלו, כדי לפתח תНОפת הסברה מוגה. לינובייך המליך שלא לעשות זאת עתה. לדעתו יתענו שדו חזקה על תכנית בגין המקורית.

18. בסירום הוגש חזר לינובייך והבטיח שמצדנו יעשה להצעיג באורח חביבי וואופטימי את אשר הושג במר"ט אעפ"ג שאלות הקשורות מחלוקת עדיין לפטרון.

בברכה
ח. קוברסקי

העתק: שר הפנים

דו"ח משיחה עם דר' מוסטפא חלייל

ודר' בוטרום ראלி

תל-אביב, מלון ר마다, י"א טבת תשמ"א
(18.12.80), שעה 15:00

noc'him: דר' מ. חלייל

דר' ב. ראלி

דר' ג. בורג

מר ח. קוברסקי

במה הפגישה הוברר שדר' ראלி טילפון כבר לפני הצהרים לבתו של דר' בורג וביקש למסור דרישת שלום.

פגישה היה אופי של ביקור נימוסין ושיחת רעים ידידותית.

דר' חלייל הזכיר את הספר שהוא כותב על ישראל, במגמה להציג את עם ישראל ומדינת ישראל בצורה פופולרית לפניו הציבור המצרי.

החלפו דברים בנוגע למשא ומתן על האוטונומיה.

דר' בורג אמר שלמעשה מזא הפגישה בהאג לא התקיימו משא ומתן רציני. צוינו על ידי המשתתפים התואות המשמעות של השיחות בעיקר בענייני הבחירה וגם בענייני הסמכויות והתפקידים.

דר' חלייל הסביר שהמצרים חושים מאוד מפני קיום מפגשים בדרגת שרים כיוון שאם פגישה בדרגת כזה איבנה מביבה פירוט הדבר עלול לעורר את הרגיעה שישנה היום סביב המשא ומתן על האוטונומיה.

モטב בשקט במאצ'י הבהיר וرك אם מתחמת אפשרות לסייעים נוספים, אד להתכנס ולחת גושפנקה בדרגת המביסטריאלי.

מר קוברסקי: העיר שאגם בדרגת המונחים לא היה ביטוי לבוגנות לקיים דיון ממשי, ולודוגמא הנו הביא את המפגש האחורי במצרים במאצ'י חודש נובמבר. ישראל הציעה במפגש זהה כמה דרכים לפתח מסלולי עבودה כדי שההלייר ימשך ועל מנת שיעשה מאמץ למצות את כל האפשרויות לפתורן בעיות השונות. אך למצרים היו הוראות שלא להכנס למשא ומתן כזה.

דר' חלייל ודר' ראלי אמרו שאין להם התנגדות לכך שדרגת המונחים ימשיך בפגישותינו בכיוון שהוצע על ידי מר קוברסקי. אך הם הציבו על הקושי הקיים בשל העובדה שהאמריקאים נמצאים עכשוו בשלב מעבר וזה לא יהיה באה שהפגישות הערילאטראליות הפוכנה לבילאטראליות. עם זאת, אם האמריקאים יסכימו לשגר בציגים למפגש כזה, הוא יוכל להתקיים עוד לפני תום כהונתו של המישל הנוכחי באראהייב.

מר קוברסקי קיבל על עצמו לברר זאת עם האמריקאים ולהודיעם למצרים באמצעות שגרירות ישראל בקהיר על מפגש שיתקיים בישראל בתחילת ינואר 18.

דרי חיליל אמר שהוא רוצה לקבל את תמייתו של הנשיא סאדאת להפעלה דרג המומחים ומקוה שתמיכה זו תינתן. הוא בקש שיאפשרו לו עוד לעסוק בכך מספר ימים.

Low key - to explore the problems סוכם שבשלב ראשוני מתנהלנה השיחות ב- כדי לא לעורר ציפיות מוגזמות. אם העבודה התקדם יוחלט על האגרה הקצב והעלאת הדרג.

בהמשך הוחלפו דברים בנושא הבוחן. דרי חיליל שאל אם אפשר לאמץ את סעיף 5 מהסכם השלום בין ישראל למצרים. לדבריו לפי סעיף זה ניתן כעbor כמה שנים, בהסכמה הדדית לבדוק את סיורו הבוחן. במקרה כזה סיורו הבוחן לא יהיה סטטיים אלא תישמר האפשרות להתאים אותו להתקויות שתהיינה, למשל בחזית המזרחת.

דרי בורג אמר שאנו יכול להתייחס לנקודת זו מיד אולם יבקש חוות דעת בקשר לזה ויבדוק אם הדבר תואם את האמור בקמף דיביזיד.

דרי חיליל הביע במהלך השיחה בוחן שבסוף דבר יושג הסכם בעניין האוטונומיה. הוא הוסיף העורט בזכותו העממת הנורמליזציה.

המשתפים סיכמו שבמקרה שעונאים יתעבינהו, יאמר שהשיחת הייתה שיחת בימוקים אישית.

מדינת ישראל
משרד הפנים

מגנול חבללי

ירושלים, י"ט בחשוון תש"מ
29 בספטמבר 1980

ס 12 ?

אל: שר הפנים, יועיר ועדת השרים לאוטונומיה

הנדון: שיחה עם נד וווקר

1. כפי שטוכם בינו שוחתי אמש עם נד וווקר (עווזרו המדיני של סול לינובייז בייטייט דפרטמנט). להלן עיקרי הדברים שעלו בשיחה זו.
התקבנית לפגישת שלוש המשלחות בירושינגןון ב- 14 - 15 באוקטובר בעינה עומדת. מטרת המפגש - חידוש פורמלי של המו"ם. וווקר לא יכול היה לומר לי מה נועד לදעתם להיות נדונ בפגש זה, פרט למבחן ביטוי פומבי של התחדשות המו"ם. לגבי הרכב אמר כי כל צד יקבע לעצמו היקף והרכב המשלחת.
2. הפניתי תשומת לבו לכך, שקיים מפגש כזה יעורר ציפיות רבות וללא הכרנה מוקדמת ומדוודקת של פרטינו יכולת גם לבוא השבכחות נוספת בתחום. הדכתי בהקשר זה שאלת כיבוסה של ועדת ההיגוי כדי לתכנן את המגעים הבאים.
3. וווקר אמר לי כי יבדקו אפשרות קיום פגישת ועדת ההיגוי בירושינגןון בסוף השבוע הבא או בראשית השבוע שבו יתקיימים מפגשי שלוש המשלחות. תגוביתי לכך היתה, שבחינתנו רצוייה החכמתית ועדת ההיגוי בשבוע הבא באזרע, אבל עצתו היא המביבים הדרושים, כדי להכין את המפגש של המשלחות.
4. בשיחה הוזכר גם עניין הדיוון בינו ובין האמריקאים על Memorandum. וווקר שאל אם אפשר היה להמציא להם לעיון את הבנייר עוד לפני בואנו לירושינגןון. הסברתי לו שאין לנו רוצחים לשגר אליהם מכתב אלא להציג מסמך ולהסביר את תפישתנו ומשום כך רצוי שהמסמך ימסר על ידינו לעיונם באותו צורה שהם הציגו לנו לפני את הטירטה שלהם. הוא הצידיק עמדתנו זו.
שאלתיו, אם יוכל להזכיר בואנו לצורר זה, אמרתי שאין הדבר נטוח וכי יוכל לקיים את הבירורים בינו ובין האמריקאים בנושאי זה, בימי התכנסות ובמקביל לפגישות המשלחות, או להשאר לצורר זה לכמה ימים לאחר המפגש המשולש.

U

מדינת ישראל
משרד הפנים

המגזר הכללי

ס 1 2 2

- 2 -

Memorandum
6. לשאלתי בדבר אופי הדיוון שהתקיים בינו לבין המצריים בקשרו תחינה אמר לי כי דברו במשך 8 שעות בקשרו עם עמר מוסה. לדבריו היה תחינה מיט מיגעת. כליה אמר שכמה בשאינם המצריים הראו בכוכנות להגנש עמדתם, אולם חלק היה לו קשוח. הוא לא פירט. בדףו במיוחד עמדת הקשוחה והמתעתקת בעין ירושלים. באיל הפרעות אי-אפשר היה להרחבת דבריהם בזקודה זו בשיחה הטלפונית.

7. סיכמנו שביום ד' תהא שיחה טלפונית בין ובין סול ליבוביץ (הוא נמצא עד אז מחוץ לירושלים).

בערך
ח. קוברסקי

העתק: ראש הממשלה
שר החוץ

U

הנ' ג. 10.10.80

ס 1 ד 2

שייחת טלפון

ביום 30.9.80 בשעה 22:50 סילפון השגריר עברון לשר חפניהם
והודיע שלינקוביץ מחוץ לעיר אבל השגריר השיג את לינקוביץ.

לינקוביץ חושב שבסביב ל-14-15 לאוקטובר צרייכיםקיימים
פגישת ראש המשלחות: א. שביל שייחת תלת-צדדיות בעניין
הסדרים במשא ומתן. ב. שייחת דו-צדדיות בעניין המטמרק.

שר החוץ שמר בדעתו שלא צרייכיםקיים הפעם פגישת מלאיה.
הוא יביא את הצעותיו עם שובו לארץ.


השגריר אמר שלינקוביץ יטלפון לשר חפניהם ב-1.10.80 בשעה 13:00.

חתוק: ראש הממשלה
מ'ם שר החוץ
מנכ"ל פנים



התק מס' 7 מתור: 7

דף מס' 1 מתור: 5



סוד

דיווח מפגישה בין שגריר ארה"ב
מר לויס ושר הפנים דר' בורג
ירושלים, כ"ו תשרי תשמ"א (08.10.6)

נוכחים: דר' י. בורג, שר הפנים
מר סם לויס, שגריר ארה"ב בישראל
מר חיים קוברסקי, מנכ"ל פנים
מר מ. שטרנברג, שגרירות ארה"ב
מר י. לביא, משרד הפנים

לאחר שקידם בברכה את הנוכחים דר' בורג ציין שקיבל את המכתב של מר לינוביץ.

מר לויס: ישנה ידיעה של עוזי בנדמן בארץ אודות אי הבנות שאתה הבעת באשר לשיחת עם לינוביץ.

דר' בורג: הידיעה אינה מדויקת. אמרתי ששיחת הטלפון שלי עם לינוביץ הופרעת רבות והיו קשיים טכניים בשמייה, על כן ביקשנו שתוכן השיחת יופיע בכתב. הבינו שהפגישה בושינגטון אמורה להיות פגישה של שלושת ראשי המשלחות ליבוביץ עלי ובורג. אטמול בעת ישיבת הממשלה הגיעו ידיעות שעלי בדרכו הביתה להכיר בשחיתת ביניים בשוויץ אמר שהשיחות מיעדרות להכנת פיסגה זו הבוקדשה בה יש חילוקי דעתות בסיסיים בין בגין לבין טאדאת. סאדאת רוצה רק פיסגה ולא דיבורים על אוטונומיה. כל פעם יש להם למצרים טיפול אחר בעקבותיהם האלה.

מר קוברסקי: אבי חשב שטיף 3 להודעה שפירסם לינוביץ היה ברור באשר הוא קבע ש: "The parties agreed to resume the autonomy negotiations at a mutually agreed date and to consult regarding the preparation, venue and timing of a summit meeting".

דר' בורג: וזה מכיוון שעלי פה ובורג פה, שאלנו מודיע לא לקיים את המפגש באזרע. על כן הבררתי לאפי עברון את המברק בו ציינתי שהיינו מעדיפים שהפגישה מתקיים באזרענו, לאחר שרי החוץ של ישראל ומצרים חזרם השבע ואין כבר סיבה מיוחדת לקיום הפגישה בושינגטון דזוק. עם זה, כמחווה להזמנת ארצות הברית ואמ האמריקאים עומדים על קיום הפגישה בושינגטון, נסכים לכך. אם ההצעה לקיום המפגש בושינגטון עומדת בתקפה אנו חוזרים ומציעים שבימים 12-13 באוקטובר תקיים שם גם ועדת היגוי, כדי להכין את המפגש על כל פרטיו. קוברסקי יגיע לבני-זירוק ביום ששי 80.10.10 ויבוא לושינגטון ביום א' 12.10.80. צטרף אליו פרופ' לפידות. קוברסקי יציג לפני האמריקאים את מסמך ה- *Draft of Memorandum of understanding* ביחס להפנות תושמת לבו של לינוביץ לטיף 3 בהודעה שנתפרסמה ביום 3 בספטמבר על ידו בשם הנשיא סאדאת וראש הממשלה בגין וצוטטה זה עתה על ידי מר קוברסקי. ישראל עומדת על כך שיחיה בורר מראש כי המפגש נועד למלא את החלטה של חידוש המשא ומתן על האוטונומיה ובשם פנים לא להחליש עובדה מוסכמת זו. בינתיים יש לי רושם, זה רושם שלי, שידידינו באפריקת אינם מעוניינים לקיים את הפגישה.

מר לויס: זה דבר חדש לגבי. לי לא ידוע.



העתק מס' 7 מתוך 7
דף מס' 2 מתוך 5

סודי

- 2 -

דר' בורג: למעןה פרוש מכתבו של לינובי שמחילה שיחות דו-צדדיות, על -
Draft of Memorandum ותלת-צדדיות על המשך המשא ומתן.

מר לויס: דיברתי עם חברי בושינגטון והריעון הוא שחייב יسع ימים מספר קודם
וידונו בתగובות שלכם על המסמך שלנו.

מר קוברטיקי: אין לנו תగובות. יש לנו נייר שהוכן על ידנו ואושר על ידי צוות השרים
ואותו אנו מתחווים להביא אותו.

מר לויס: אם כן תוכלו להגיב.

מר קוברטיקי: ברצוני להבהיר לנו בעזה כי שatoms נחגטם כאשר צורת התגובה היא באמצעות
מסמך ולא בתגובות על מסמן.

מר לויס: אני משער שגם נייר ומהדיוון הזה ברכוננו לכת לדיוון תלת-צדדי
לגביו אותו נקודות בהן יש הסכמה או התקרובות בין הצדדים ותוכלו אולי
לעבוד על אותו נקודות.
אני מאמין שבכל יוסכם ועל כך יתקיים דיון.

דר' בורג: אני רואה דיון זה מתקיים בנסיבות של מלאיה.

מר לויס: נכון. הכוונה בראשונה לדון בצורה דו-צדדיות על המסמך ולאחר מכן תלת-צדדיות
על לוח זמנים ורמות המפגש. כן יהיה צורך למקד את אותו נקודות שהן
ידונו בפיסגה ובזה יש מעין הינה לפיסגה.

דר' בורג: אם מדובר על פיסגה זה עניין של בגין כולל קביעה המקומ' הזמן וככ'.

מר לויס: החומר שיובה לדיוון בפיסגה, הוא ברדיון הלא כן?

דר' בורג: כאמור זה Clearing Station, בין פגישתנו בושינגטון לפיסגה אם ומתי
שתחקיק. יש מישורים שונים לכך להמשיך. יש ראשי ועדות יש הצעות. הכל לפנינו
הפיסגה ואז ישנה אפשרות להגיא להסכמה בנסיבות מסוימים.

מר לויס: אני חושב זהה יפתר את הבעיה.

דר' בורג: אני מוכחה למזור ולאמר, שעליינו לקיים מלאיה.

מר לויס: האם אתה אומר שבין הפגישה בושינגטון לבין הפיסגה צריכה להיות פגישה
התזמורה כולה?

דר' בורג: אני חשב שנctrar דבר זה. כי עד לפיסגה יctrarco הרבה פגישות ואני
מאמין שעדר ה-5.12.80 נוכל להגיא להישגים ללא פגישות.



העתק מספר: 7 מtower: 7
דף מספר: 5 מtower: 5

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סוד

מר לויס: מר בגין אמר כי הפיסגה תהייה בתחילת דצמבר. הוא יהיה ב-12.11.80. בושינגטון, מועד שאני אצטרף אליו. בגין יחזור לאחר מכן לארץ ויטע פעם נוספת. אם כי אחת צודק שום דבר טרם הוסכם.

מר קוברסקי: ברצוני להיות ברור. יש לנו כאן שני אלמנטים, האחד המשך השיחות וצריכה להיות הרגשה הציבור שיש המשכיות בשיחות-

דר' בורג: שאלתי אותו (את קוברסקי) בבוקר אם עלי לומר בסוף המפגש שזו הייתה הינה הינה לפיסגה, מה הייתה אז?

מר קוברסקי: זה לא מטריד אותי, כי אני מביא שתימצאנה המיללים הבוכנות. צריך שתהיה הבנה עם המוצרים על המשכיות ומשא ומתן כפי שזה מופיע במסמך לינובי. הבעייה היא שעליינו להיות בהרגשה שהשיחות נשכחות ולא היינו רוצחים לבוא לושינגטון ולאחר מכן שלא יהיה המשך כלשהו. כפי שכברקרה בעבר.

דר' בורג: את הדוגמאות אתה יודע.

מר לויס: היו מפגשים לאחר يولיה הקהיר.

מר קוברסקי: הייתה שמח אם ועתה ההיגוי הייתה נפגשת לפני כן ואיני יודע אם המוצרים הסכימו לכך והאם זה אפשרי. על כל פנים זה לטובת האינטראס המשותף של כל הצדדים. כך נוכל לדון ולהגיע למשהו מוסכם זה יעזור להמשך המשא ומתן.

מר לויס: אני חושש שזה יעוזר.

דר' בורג: נראה מה תהיינה התוצאות הפגישה בין לינובי לבין אפי.

מר קוברסקי: הבעייה שלא דנו עם האמריקאים. הבעייה היא עם המוצרים וגם לנו ווקר הייתה הרגשה שזה יעוזר. הוא היה בדעתו שכך יקיים את ועתה ההיגוי.

מר לויס: יתכן, איני יודע. לדעתו, אובייקטיבית זה לא צריך ליזור קושי כלשהו כי צריך לקיים שיחות מוקדמות ואפשר לקיים את זאת במישור שר או מנכ"ל.

דר' בורג: יהיו עלי וגאלி כי אם אין עלי לא יהיה גם בורג.

מר לויס: מי יהיה מצדכם?

דר' בורג: אני חשבתי על שפיר, אבל הוא יבוא ביום ג' ואז בדע.

מר לויס: הפגישה זו היא של ראש משלחות?

מר שטרנברג: ראש משלחות



העתק מס' 7 מtower:
דף מס' 7 מtower, 7

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סוד

מר לויס: הבינות שהמיקום שאותם מעוניינים בו זה דוקא באזור. אך כיוון שהוא בדעת שיש צורך לקיים זאת בשינגטון אמת לא תתנגדו.

דר' בורג: יש לי רון בעית של נלמי וויל שאמור להוולד בשבוע הבא.

מר קוברסקי: אני אהיה ביום שני בבניו-יורק ואז נדונ עם אנשי וושינגטון לגבי המשך.

מר לויס: האם אוכל להעלות בושא קרוב? נשאלתי על ידי ליבוביץ באשר לנושאים שקיימות עליהם שיחה, בין השאר מסמך 14 הנקודות.

מר קוברסקי: זה לא קיים כמסמך.

מר לויס: זה, נייר-לא נייר. אתה (דר' בורג) אמרת שמדובר ליבוביץ.

דר' בורג: הוא הזכיר זאת ואבי לא רציתי לקחת את זאת.

מר לויס: זה היה בידיהם של כל השירותים בועדה. וידין שוח על זה עם כל מיני גורמים.

דר' בורג: איני רוצה ליגוע בנושא ברצוני לדעת מה הנקודות העיקריות שאותם מעוניינים להעלות עת?

מנקרת בראשי שאלה: למי זה חשוב? האם זה יביא להבאת הפלשטיינים? האם זו חטלה למכרים?

מר לויס: אנו אמרנו לך מבינים ממהנו עם הפלשטיינים שצדדים מסוימים גורמים לקשיים ולהקשות מצדדים. לעומת זאת יש צדדים שיכולים להוביל לקרוב ויטלו חלק על ידי יצירת אקלים יותר טוב. אפשר להשיג הרבה, זאת מוחשבנו. מה שכן קיימים דיון עם ראש הממשלה והוא אמר לי שהיתה ניתנת לשחרר אי אלו אסירים מעזה. האם ליבוביץ סיפר לך על זה?

דר' בורג: אברור.

מר קוברסקי: סמ', עד כמה שאני זוכר הייתה לך פגישה עם ראש הממשלה והוא אמר שאותם דיברתם על מסמך שלא נדונ עם המצריים.

דר' בורג: מה עוד מלבד אסירים?

מר לויס: עדיין בעניין האסירים. יש כאן שהוא מודר המצריים אמרו שנתנו רשימה של 200 אסירים לפני חדשים.

דר' בורג: אני זוכר שהוא עמו. אברשה בודאי יודע, דובר על זה שחלק שוחררו. נברר בכל אופן.



העתק מס' 5 ממוד' 5
דף מס' 5 ממוד' 5

אתם חעיפו מבט חדש, על 14 הנקודות ואם תוכלו לאמר לי משהו על הנקודות, זה יהיה לMouseEvent. יש נקודה שיש לה השפעה פסיכולוגית והיא הקשיש שאותם מערימים על תנועות החופשית של ראש העירייה ואישים אחרים בשטחים. זה גורם להם לחוש מה מטרתכם האמיתית בנושא האוטונומיה.

מר לויס:

אבי מציע שלא תשבח שি�שנה סיבת פעלילות הזה שלנו. הם ביצעו פעולה אקטיבית של תעומלה אנטטי-ישראלית שאינה עוזרת לשקט באזורה.

דר' בורג:

זה גורם לשקט, אבל זה מריר.

מר לויס:

הפגש של ראש העירייה עם גסטון פורן היה הצגה של ה-O.L.P.

דר' בורג:

אבל כל עוד שם מרגשים שמדינת ישראל לוחצת וכל מה שנאמר על האוטונומיה הוא ההפך מהצורה שבה מתנהלים החיים במנזרת, הרוי זה מביא לחוסר רצון וקיוונה.

מר לויס:

יש עוד טרור ופעולות חרדיות, אין פלשתינים שירצו לשבת. מי הציע להם את האוטונומיה, הירדנים? אש"פ? מדיניות ערבית? אבחנו

דר' בורג:

מה משמעות האוטונומיה? איך תשבחו אותם כאשר המצב הוא כזה? המלה אוטונומיה קיבלה משמעות משמעות של מלא מילוקומת עצם. ניסינו להבהיר את הפלשתינים לשיחות נפגשנו עמם וඅנו מושכנים שהיחס שלהם עוזה את זה לקשה יותר ויתר. זה חלק מ-14 הנקודות. ואותם אינכם לוקחים ברצינות את דברינו. אמרו לי האם בכלל הסתכלתם על הרשימה?

מר לויס:

לא באחרוננה.

דר' בורג:

ליינובייז אמר שלא חוש בשום חגובה.

אני מרגיש שיש לי מחויבות או שנותי מחויבות כלשהי ביחס ל-14 הנקודות. 14 הנקודות שיכוות לרמה של ראש הממשלה. אמונם יש בהן שתיים שלוש נקודות השיכוות למשור שלי אבל לא זכור לי שנותי התמייבות.

דר' בורג:

יתכן אתה צודק. אמי קיבלתי החלטה לשאול כפי שאלתי.

מר לויס:

דובר על אסירים ועל עוד נקודה.

דר' בורג:

מושלchner של

חיים קוברסקי

18/10
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כְּ וְ כְּ וְ כְּ וְ

אל תִּתְּנַשֵּׁא לְבִנְךָ כִּי כִּי כִּי,
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בְּבִנְךָ
אָל תִּתְּנַשֵּׁא

5/11/80

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US NON-PAPER DRAFT MOU

November 4, 1980

The Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Israel, and the United States of America are agreed that the document entitled "Memorandum of Understanding" is a preliminary agreement on the nature of the arrangements to be established for the transitional period envisioned in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("Framework") their objective is to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority and to give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. They reaffirm that the aim of the Framework is a comprehensive peace based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts, assuring Israel's security in the transitional period and beyond and recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

The parties agree that the principles in the Memorandum of Understanding must be more fully elaborated in a final autonomy agreement, and they have committed themselves to this end.

The parties further agree that the participation of the Palestinian inhabitants is essential to meet the goals envisioned in the Framework, and the parties therefore encourage Palestinian participation in completing the definition of the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority (administrative council). In order to provide the most constructive atmosphere for the elaboration of these principles, the parties recognize that the negotiations must rest on a firm foundation of mutual understanding and trust. They agree to seek to ease tensions which have arisen in the areas and invite the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to join in this effort. Further, the parties reaffirm their commitment to the Camp David Framework and agree to take actions to encourage its faithful implementation.

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The parties also recognize the significance of a comprehensive peace to the international community. Accordingly, the parties reiterate their invitation to all other concerned parties to support the on-going peace-making efforts. All states should consider ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of the existing peace process and to conform their policies and actions accordingly in order to further the attainment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the nature of the transitional arrangements provided in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("The Framework"). Therefore, in order to achieve the objectives set forth in the Framework, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel have, subject to the terms of the final Autonomy Agreement ("The Autonomy Agreement"), agreed as follows:

Elections

In order to provide full autonomy, a self-governing authority will be freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

Elections will be free elections based on the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot. Arrangements will be agreed upon to assure preservation of law and order during the electoral process.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The elections will

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be organized, conducted and supervised by a central electoral commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel, local Palestinian Arabs and other civilians -- individuals and institutions -- as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators. There will be free access for the international media and experts pursuant to agreed procedures.

Structure and Procedure

The self-governing authority will consist of one body of members. It will constitute an administrative council and allocate functions among its members. The SGA(AC) will select its officers from among its members and determine its rules of procedure.

The Transitional Period

There will be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five (5) years.

The SGA(AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Civilian Administration

The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as the SGA(AC) has been established and inaugurated to replace the existing military government in the West Bank and Gaza. At that time, the SGA(AC) will assume the powers and responsibilities defined in the Autonomy Agreement. The transfer of authority will be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner.

Withdrawal of Israeli Forces

A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will begin promptly and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

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Powers and Responsibilities

(1) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility in the following areas: Administration of Justice; Administrative Operations and Civil Service; Administration of Public Buildings and Moveable Property; Agriculture; Education and Culture; Environmental and Energy Affairs (including Natural Resources); Finance (including Budget, Taxation and Banking); Health and Social Welfare; Housing and Public Works; Industry, Commerce and Tourism; Internal Transportation, Communication and Posts; Labor and Man-power; Local Police; Municipal Affairs and Public Utilities; and Religious Affairs.

(2) The SGA(AC) will, in addition, have the responsibilities with respect to land and water defined in the sections below dealing specifically with these matters.

(3) The SGA(AC) will also constitute the strong local police force stipulated in the Framework and will have the responsibilities with respect to assuring public order and internal security set forth in the provisions on security in the Autonomy Agreement.

(4) Provisions will be made in the Autonomy Agreement for the establishment of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the SGA(AC) and Israel.

(5) The SGA(AC) will have the powers necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities, including all powers necessary to formulate plans and policies, supervise the implementation of policies and legislation, employ staff, sue and be sued, collect and disseminate public information, and fulfill its responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the West Bank and Gaza including the right of the inhabitants to lawful travel.

(6) Following its establishment, the SGA(AC) will participate in all stages of subsequent negotiations provided for in the Framework as the representative of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

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(7) In addition to other principles and limitations as may be agreed upon, the SGA(AC) will not:

- (a) Curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, nationality or ethnicity;
- (b) Alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank and Gaza; and
- (c) Conduct foreign relations.

Land

(1) The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

(2) During the transitional period:

(a) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility with respect to private land transactions. Lawful private possession of and ownership of land by any person will be protected without discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality or ethnicity.

(b) Public land will be administered in accordance with the following principles:

(I) The title of public land will **not** be alienated or otherwise affected.

(II) Specified lands allocated for security purposes pursuant to the Framework will be administered in accordance with the security provisions of the Autonomy Agreement.

(III) Existing lawful uses of public land will not be disturbed and the administration of such land will be consistent with this principle.

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(IV) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility to administer and ensure the protection and preservation of public parks, grazing lands, and nature preserves.

(V) Presently unutilized public lands will be available during the transitional period for new uses which will be subject to approval by a joint body involving representatives of Israel and the SGA(AC). Priority will be given to use of such land for the rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees and for the development of housing and infrastructure for the benefit of the inhabitants.

(3) Claims concerning the lawfulness of possession or use of land during the transitional period may be submitted for determination to a joint body involving representatives of Israel and the SGA(AC). Pending such determination by agreement, an existing use will not be disturbed.

Water

(1) The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

(2) During the transitional period:

(a) The SGA(AC) will, consistent with the procedure and principles described below, have the responsibility to administer and determine the uses of the following water resources:

(I) Surface and subsurface water sources which lie solely within or under the West Bank and Gaza;

(II) The current relative rate of flow presently used in the West Bank and Gaza and

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derived from sources that underlie or flow between the West Bank and Gaza and one or more of its neighbors; and

(III) Such additional water resources as the SGA(AC) might obtain through negotiations.

Procedures will be set forth in the Autonomy Agreement to assure that existing users will not be adversely affected and to guard against depletion and spoilation of common water resources.

(b) A joint body involving representatives of both the SGA(AC) and Israel will deal by agreement with such matters as changing water needs affecting both the SGA(AC) and Israel and the preparation of cooperative development projects for the benefit of all those involved. All increases in the use of water resources which underlie or flow between the West Bank and Gaza and also Israel must be approved in advance by agreement of this body subject to the following principles: (I) The present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and of Israel will not be adversely affected; and (II) equitable apportionment will be promoted.

(3) Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body representing the peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources of the area for the benefit of all these peoples.

Security

To assure the security of all parties during the transitional period:

(1) There will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

(2) Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.

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(3) To assist in assuring internal security. a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC), which will assume its responsibilities as its capabilities are developed. The local police force will maintain continuing liaison in internal security matters with designated Israeli and Egyptian officers.

Arrangements to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors beyond the transitional period will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status.

Laws

Laws in the nature of sovereign enactments presently in force in the West Bank and Gaza will remain in force to the extent consistent with the Autonomy Agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the Autonomy Agreement. The SGA(AC) will have the authority to issue necessary supporting legislation in its areas of responsibility consistent with the aforesigned laws in force. All supporting legislation must conform to the provisions of the Autonomy Agreement, and in particular the provisions concerning security.

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel and the SGA(AC) will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The committee may also deal with other matters of common concern.

The committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity, unless otherwise provided in the Autonomy Agreement.

The United States will be invited to participate in the committee.

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US NON-PAPER DRAFT MOU

November 4, 1980

The Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Israel, and the United States of America are agreed that the document entitled "Memorandum of Understanding" is a preliminary agreement on the nature of the arrangements to be established for the transitional period envisioned in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("Framework") their objective is to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority and to give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. They reaffirm that the aim of the Framework is a comprehensive peace based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts, assuring Israel's security in the transitional period and beyond and recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

The parties agree that the principles in the Memorandum of Understanding must be more fully elaborated in a final autonomy agreement, and they have committed themselves to this end.

The parties further agree that the participation of the Palestinian inhabitants is essential to meet the goals envisioned in the Framework, and the parties therefore encourage Palestinian participation in completing the definition of the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority (administrative council). In order to provide the most constructive atmosphere for the elaboration of these principles, the parties recognize that the negotiations must rest on a firm foundation of mutual understanding and trust. They agree to seek to ease tensions which have arisen in the areas and invite the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to join in this effort. Further, the parties reaffirm their commitment to the Camp David Framework and agree to take actions to encourage its faithful implementation.

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The parties also recognize the significance of a comprehensive peace to the international community. Accordingly, the parties reiterate their invitation to all other concerned parties to support the on-going peace-making efforts. All states should consider ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of the existing peace process and to conform their policies and actions accordingly in order to further the attainment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the nature of the transitional arrangements provided in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("The Framework"). Therefore, in order to achieve the objectives set forth in the Framework, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel have, subject to the terms of the final Autonomy Agreement ("The Autonomy Agreement"), agreed as follows:

Elections

In order to provide full autonomy, a self-governing authority will be freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

Elections will be free elections based on the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot. Arrangements will be agreed upon to assure preservation of law and order during the electoral process.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The elections will

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be organized, conducted and supervised by a central electoral commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel, local Palestinian Arabs and other civilians -- individuals and institutions -- as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators. There will be free access for the international media and experts pursuant to agreed procedures.

Structure and Procedure

The self-governing authority will consist of one body of members. It will constitute an administrative council and allocate functions among its members. The SGA(AC) will select its officers from among its members and determine its rules of procedure.

The Transitional Period

There will be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five (5) years.

The SGA(AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Civilian Administration

The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as the SGA(AC) has been established and inaugurated to replace the existing military government in the West Bank and Gaza. At that time, the SGA(AC) will assume the powers and responsibilities defined in the Autonomy Agreement. The transfer of authority will be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner.

Withdrawal of Israeli Forces

A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will begin promptly and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

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Powers and Responsibilities

(1) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility in the following areas: Administration of Justice; Administrative Operations and Civil Service; Administration of Public Buildings and Moveable Property; Agriculture; Education and Culture; Environmental and Energy Affairs (including Natural Resources); Finance (including Budget, Taxation and Banking); Health and Social Welfare; Housing and Public Works; Industry, Commerce and Tourism; Internal Transportation, Communication and Posts; Labor and Man-power; Local Police; Municipal Affairs and Public Utilities; and Religious Affairs.

(2) The SGA(AC) will, in addition, have the responsibilities with respect to land and water defined in the sections below dealing specifically with these matters.

(3) The SGA(AC) will also constitute the strong local police force stipulated in the Framework and will have the responsibilities with respect to assuring public order and internal security set forth in the provisions on security in the Autonomy Agreement.

(4) Provisions will be made in the Autonomy Agreement for the establishment of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the SGA(AC) and Israel.

(5) The SGA(AC) will have the powers necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities, including all powers necessary to formulate plans and policies, supervise the implementation of policies and legislation, employ staff, sue and be sued, collect and disseminate public information, and fulfill its responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the West Bank and Gaza including the right of the inhabitants to lawful travel.

(6) Following its establishment, the SGA(AC) will participate in all stages of subsequent negotiations provided for in the Framework as the representative of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

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(7) In addition to other principles and limitations as may be agreed upon, the SGA(AC) will not:

- (a) Curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, nationality or ethnicity;
- (b) Alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank and Gaza; and
- (c) Conduct foreign relations.

Land

(1) The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

(2) During the transitional period:

(a) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility with respect to private land transactions. Lawful private possession of and ownership of land by any person will be protected without discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality or ethnicity.

(b) Public land will be administered in accordance with the following principles:

(I) The title of public land will not be alienated or otherwise affected.

(II) Specified lands allocated for security purposes pursuant to the Framework will be administered in accordance with the security provisions of the Autonomy Agreement.

(III) Existing lawful uses of public land will not be disturbed and the administration of such land will be consistent with this principle.

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(IV) The SGA(AC) will have responsibility to administer and ensure the protection and preservation of public parks, grazing lands, and nature preserves.

(V) Presently unutilized public lands will be available during the transitional period for new uses which will be subject to approval by a joint body involving representatives of Israel and the SGA(AC). Priority will be given to use of such land for the rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees and for the development of housing and infrastructure for the benefit of the inhabitants.

(3) Claims concerning the lawfulness of possession or use of land during the transitional period may be submitted for determination to a joint body involving representatives of Israel and the SGA(AC). Pending such determination by agreement, an existing use will not be disturbed.

Water

(1) The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank and Gaza will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will take place as soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

(2) During the transitional period:

(a) The SGA(AC) will, consistent with the procedure and principles described below, have the responsibility to administer and determine the uses of the following water resources:

(I) Surface and subsurface water sources which lie solely within or under the West Bank and Gaza;

(II) The current relative rate of flow presently used in the West Bank and Gaza and

derived from sources that underlie or flow between the West Bank and Gaza and one or more of its neighbors; and

(III) Such additional water resources as the SGA(AC) might obtain through negotiations.

Procedures will be set forth in the Autonomy Agreement to assure that existing users will not be adversely affected and to guard against depletion and spoilation of common water resources.

(b) A joint body involving representatives of both the SGA(AC) and Israel will deal by agreement with such matters as changing water needs affecting both the SGA(AC) and Israel and the preparation of cooperative development projects for the benefit of all those involved. All increases in the use of water resources which underlie or flow between the West Bank and Gaza and also Israel must be approved in advance by agreement of this body subject to the following principles: (I) The present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and of Israel will not be adversely affected; and (II) equitable apportionment will be promoted.

(3) Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body representing the peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources of the area for the benefit of all these peoples.

Security

To assure the security of all parties during the transitional period:

(1) There will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

(2) Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.

(3) To assist in assuring internal security. a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC), which will assume its responsibilities as its capabilities are developed. The local police force will maintain continuing liaison in internal security matters with designated Israeli and Egyptian officers.

Arrangements to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors beyond the transitional period will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status.

Laws

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הערות כלליות

א. נראה לי כי זהו הנכיר האמריקני החמור ביותר מבחינתי לא רק מבחןת תכנו אלא גם מפni שהוא בא לאחר הנכיר הישראלי מ- 21.9.80 אשר ניסה לגשר על הפערים. בראת כי האמריקניים לקחו את הבכיר הישראלי בנסיבות מוצא מובנת מלאיה ועתה הם מבסים לדחוף את ישראל לעמדות אחרות תוך ויתור על עמדות אמריקניות ומצריות בסיסיות.

ב. התפיסה האמריקנית הכללית הנובעת מהכתוב במסמך בראית כלהלן:
ישראל מחד ויוש ועה מאידך היבן שתי ישויות טריטוריאליות נפרדות לחלוין בעלות משטר שונה לחלוין, כל אחת מהן שולטה על שטחה כאשר מקור הסמכות בשטחי האוטונומיה הוא ההסכם שיווג על מהויה.

ישראל איינטראים מסוימים בשטחי האוטונומיה הנובעים מרכיבה הבתוחנויות בלבד ויש למצוא דרך לשמר על אינטראים אלה (בושא המים הוא חריג אך גם כאן יש צורך למצוא דרך כizard לשמר על האינטראים של ישראל מבלתי שתיה לשליטה כל שהיא).

ג. האוטונומיה תהיה ישות פלטינאית עצמאית בכל, פרט לשם, נשלטת ע"י רשות מיבנה עצמי שהיא מעין מועצה מחוקקת שתבחר עצמה את המושלה, סמכות החקיקה תהיה אמינה מוגבלת אך היא תאפשר במידה מסוימת ע"י ההסכם שיחתמו ואשר יהיה את מקור הסמכות.

ד. ישראל תיסוג מהגדמך יעדת, תעביר את הסמכויות במלואן לרשות המיבנה העצמי, אינטראיס של ישראל יישמרו באמצעות שיתופה בעודות משותפות לבושים שונים שבחלקן לא תהיה לה אפילו זכות זו.

ה. בושא בתחון הפנים יועבר בהדרגה למשטרה המקומית והיא אשר תהיה אחראית לו באופן בלעדי. בושא בתחון ישראל או בתחון החוץ בשאר לגבי תקופת המעבר להטכם האוטונומיה הסופי ולגבי התקופה שלאחריה לדיוון על הפטוטוס הסופי.

ו. הפתיחה שהוספה במסמך מתאפיינת בשני אלמנטים מדאיים:
ההילכה לקראת מצרים בדבר שימוש הפלטינאיים: הן במוניהם על האוטונומיה והן בברוגע לעצדים שעיל ישראל לנוקות בשטחים כדי לאפשר שיתופם.
ההעמלות מירדן מחד (גם במסמך עצמו) ומайдר הקראיה למדיינות אחרות (והפניה בברור היא לארופה) לנוקות יזמות מקבילות כדי לתמוך בטהlixir הנוכחי.

ז. צורת הגשת המסמך וכל הכלול בו בוטעים בלבו את ההרגשה שעליינו לדחות המסמך כולם מבלתי להתייחס לפרטים הכלולים בו.

א. האמריקנים הוסיפו הקדמה שלא ברור מה מעמדה.

ב. המשפט הראשון לקוח מהצעה האמריקנית מ-3.9.80. הרגש הוא כמפורט על היות *preliminary agreement* במסמך הנוכחי.

ג. המטרות לא ברור אם הן של הצדדים החתום או של ה- *arrangements*.

ד. הוסיף המשפט הלקוח מ.א. בוגר ל- *legitimate government* לתושבים לעומם *legitimate security concerns of the parties involved*. להבנת טעיף זה יש חילובות רבת והוא מעיך למשמעותה של התפיסה האמריקנית של תחיליך.

ה. הפסיקת הבאה מדברת על מטרות הסכם ק.ד.: שלום כולל המבוסס על אקלל חליקה, הבטחת בטוחן ישראלי בתקופת המעבר ואחריה (טעיף זה מורחב אתייכ'), הכרה בזכויות הלאומית של העם הפלשינאי ובצריכיו הצדקיים.

ו. הפסיק על הצורך בגיבוש עקרונות שונאי מהתהoctה ישראלי והפסיקת כאן היא שהעקרונות בקביעים בניגיר שלפנינו ופירוטם יבו אתייכ' ואין הסכם זה תלוי בהסכם שיבוא אחריו.

ז. המשפט הוא הליכה ברורה לקרה המצריים: שיתוף התושבים הפלשינאים (צروف חדש) הכרחי להשגת המטרות של ק.ד. הגדרה חדשה שלא הוכלה בק.ד. עצמו. הפלשינאים מוזמנים להשתתף בהשלמת הגדרת הסמכויות ותחומי האחריות של המועצה המינימלית - מכאן נובע כי הניגיר הנוכחי מכונן להיות ההסכם עצמו, הפרטים יוספו תוך שיתוף הפלשינאים בהסכם האוטונומיה. יש פה הליכה ברורה לכורן המצרי הסכמה על עקרונות וายלו את הפרטים צריכה ישראלי לסכם עם הפלשינאים.

ח. המשפט הבא מתייחס למטרות המבוקשות עי' המצריים כדי לטהר את דואירה ביו"ש ועזה.

ט. המשפט האחרון בעמ' הרISON הינו חזרה מiotram ומעלייה.

י. המשפט האחרון בהקדמה הינו קריאה לכל המדיינות (!) - מדינות ערבי, אירופת, הגוש המזרחי, הבלמייז - ולא רק לירדן לחמור בתחילת. יש פה קריאה ברורה ליזמות מעד, מדינות אחרות, זאת בוגיוד לעמלה האמריקנית המוצחרת בגדי זמות אחרות.

יא. בהקדמה ובמסמך כולם הושמטה הערה בת נאמר כי ישראל רואה בגדי זמות את יהודת שומרון.

המכוון

א. מכיוון שחלקו של המכוון הובא בהקדמה הרו' שני האלמנטים המרכזים בכך הם אלה: הסכמים וההנחות אינס לגבי הצדדים שהצדדים ינקטו כפי שנאמר במסמך הישראלי
אלא לגבי מהות (צורה) הסדרי המעבר.

*subject to the terms of the final
Autonomy Agreement.*

נאמר כאן כי הטעיפים הבאים הם:

הבחירה

א. במשפט הראשון הושמו טוגריים המכילים את המועצה המינימלית ולא נאמר כי יוסכם
ה- *modulities*

measures to prevent disruption ב. הושמטה התייחסות במשפט הבא ל-
 וגם שמירת החוק והסדר בתוגה להסכתם.

ג. גם במערכת הבחירה הושמטה התייחסות לשירות הסדר הציבורי.

ד. הוכנס משפט על צורה הבחירה האזרית בהתאם לאוכלוסייה ולגבולות המוניציפליים.

ה. הושמטה התייחסות להסכמה על המפקדים מבין הפלשינים וכן הוספה התייחסות לאמצעי
התקשרות ולמוסחים בהתאם לדרישת המצריים.

מבנה ופרודוריה

א. הטעיף הוכנס שוב מיד לאחר הטעיף על הבחירה ולא כפי שופיע בהצעה הישראלית
לאחר הדיוון בסמכויות ובאחריות.

ב. יש כאן הפרדה ברורה בין הגוף הנבחר לבין המינימלית הוגוף הנבחר *יקיימ*
מועצה מינימלית ויחלק תפקידים בין חבריו.

ג. בעוד שבתחליה מדבר על רשות המינימלית העצמי בלי טוגריים המכילים את המועצה
המינימלית הרו' לפטע מופיעים ראש התיבות (AC/MS) ללא שהיא לכך כל התייחסות
מוקדמת.

תקופת המעבר

א. המשפט הראשו לקווח מק.ד. אולם הכוונתו כאן באה להציג את ארעיות ההסדר ^{כשנוסף (ב) או (ג) לאן} not exceeding

בשלגת המישל הצבאי ומיננהלו האזרחי

א. בכוורת המסרך הושמטה המילה ^{כלי} ופירוש הדבר נסיגה של כל מיננהל אזרחי אחר ולא רק של המישל הצבאי.

ב. חזר הביטוי ^{ללא סס} לא ^{במקום} במקום הביטוי ^{במקרה} שהוצע ע"י לישראל.

ג. הדגש פה הוא על ^{ר' עזרא} של הסמכות בגדרמ"ע ועזה-ולא ^{ר' עזרא} התושבים.

ד. רשות המיננהל העצמי קיבל את תפקידית מן החקלאם השלכה ברורה מקור הסמכות הינו החקלאם.

ה. העברת הסמכות פירושה אחד ובמשפט האחרון כלולה אזהרה עליבת הלאום...

נסיגת כחות ישראל

א. סעיף זה הוכנס כאן מודר כוונה להבהיר כי כחות הצבא של ישראל מטרתם אך ורק בטחון ^{ישראל} ^{ישראל}. משום כך גם הושמט חלקו הראשון של הטעיף, בסעיף המדובר מיותר יותר על בטחון. ההקשר כאן אינו בטחוני אלא מחייבת הסמכות בשיטה.

ב. הוכנשת המילה ^{עליזר} שאינה מצויה בשום מסמך קודם כולל ק.ד.

סמכויות ותחומי אחריות

1. א. התייחסות היא לסמכות בלבד ולא ברבים הכוונה הילא לחמצע אפשרות העברת חלק מהסמכויות מכיוון שלא מדובר כאן בתפקיד הישראלית של משרדים אופרטיביים אלא בתחוםי אחריות בלבד.

ב. ברשימה הסמכויות כוללים מספר אלמנטים שישראל התנגדה להם בעבר או חדשם שלא ברורה מהותם:

פועלות אדמוניגיסטרטיביות

ביהול בניני ציבור ונכסי דיביזי (?)

aicrót hspbilh, ubilbi anrgia (coll shabim tbeuim)

hepirut bengibi cspim - tkzib, misoi vbgkot.

hochzr nosh h - *public utilities*

hospf nosh hbriloth.

2. ג. איזכור סמכות המועצה בנוסאי החקק והמים מענין כי נאמר *the responsibilities*

3. ד. התיחסות למשטרה היא, חדש מכיוון שלא המשטרה אחראית לפדר הציבורי ובתחום הוגנים אלא רשות המינהל העצמה לא חוויה ישראל.

ה. מדובר כמובן בסעיפים בנוסאי בתחום ה הסכם האוטובומיל.

(4) ז. סעיף זה מעמיד את ישראל והמוסעה כשתि ישויות נפרדות שותה במעמדו שילש פשוט לדאוג לשחרף פעולה ותיאום בלביהו. אין שום זיקה אחרת.

(5) ז. סעיף זה נותן סמכויות נרחבות ביותר למוסעה והופך אותה לממשלה לכל דבר:

- סמכויות תיכבזו
- קביעת מדיניות ופיקוח על ביצועה
- שמירה על ביצוע החוק
- גוף משפט
- שליטה על אינפורמציה

ח. היפיסה על חופש התנועה מקורה במצרים ולא ברור لماذا הכוונה לכך (דרכונים)?

(6) ט. הסעיף על השתחפותה של הרשות בכציגת התושבים לדיוונים המאוחרים יותר איבנה תואמת את קמף-דיינויד שם מדובר על צורת נציגות אחרת.

(7) י. באיסורים המוטלים על הרשות בסעיף (9) הושמטה התייחסות ל- *residence, and citizenship*.

הושמטה התייחסות לסמכוויות השיווריות

קרע

(1) א. מכיוון שההיפותה של כל הסעיף בנושא הקרקע שוניה הרי אין למעשה צורך בהתייחסות להסדר הסופי והוא הוכנס כנראה רק כדי להראות ליש"א שמקבלים חלק מນיסוחה.

(2) ב. התוספת המשמעותית היא סמכות הרשות על כל העברת קרקע שפירושה שליטה הרשות על רישום המקראין. ההשמטה המשמעותית היא של התייחסות לתרשבות ואדרונות.

ג. החלוקה שלא הייתה קיימת במסמר הישראלי והיא קיימת כאן בין קרקע פרטית לקרקע ציבורית.

ד. ישראל אינה מוזכרת באחראית על קרקע כלשהיא - אפילו לא באזורי הבטחון. בנושא זה השליטה על הקרקע תיקבע בהסתמך על הבטחון. שיבוי יודי קרקע - בשיתוף ישראל עם הרשות.

ה. העדיפות בשימוש הקרקע ליישוב עכורים ופליטים - ביסוח ועמדת הגדרת הנאמר בקמף-דיינויד.

ו. אין התייחסות ליישובים ולטושבים הישראלים.

(3) ז. תביעות לגבי שימושי קרקע (וואולי כאן הכרובה ליישובים הישראלים ולכך כאן מקונה של ישראל לא נפקד) על ידי ועדת משותפת.

ח. בכל מקום בו יש ועדת משותפת לא נאמר כיצד יתකלו החלטותיה (מה-אחד, רוב?)

四

(1) א. הסעיף על הפטדר הסופי איבנו בחוץ לאור הנאמר לאחר מכן.

(2) ב. התפיסה העקרונית היא שהרשאות שליטה על כל המים שברשותה והזורמים במתוחמת לתחום שכניתה. היא אמנים לא יכולה לעשות בכל העולה על רוחה במים הזורמים לשכניתה אך הזכות לחייב שינועים בשימוש.

ג. הרשות תוכל לבטל משא ומתן על רכישת מקורות מים מגורמים אחרים (מצרים?) ירדנו?) בගוף עצמאי ותוכל לשלוט שליטה מלאה על מים אלה.

ד. העקרונות נקבעים כאן, הפרטים יקבעו בהסכם האוטוכומיה והתתייחסות היא רק לאי פגיעה בשימושים נוכחים ולשמירה על טהרתם המים.

ה. ישראל משותפת רק בನושאי המים הנוגעים לה ולרשوت ורק בשיבוי או בהגדלת השימוש ובטכניות לפיתוח מקורות משומפים – וגם בזעדה זו הזכות מותנית בהסכמה הדרית. התנאים לפיתוח ולשיבוי שימוש: האחד הוועץ על ידי ישראל ואילו השבי קשה לעיכול מכיוון שלא ברור מהו ה-*equitable apportionment*.

(3) ו. הסעיף האחרון מקובל על כולם בהיותו הצהרה יפה לעין ולאונץ.

בטהר

א. השיבוי בפתחה הרא מבתוון ישראל זאכברותיה לבתוון כל תצדדים.

ב. בסעיף (1) הושט החלק המתיחס לנסיגת של כוחות ישראלים מכיוון שהוא הוכנס כבר בהקשר של סמכויות המועצה המינהלית.

ג. סעיף (2) זהה להצעת הישראלים בהיותו נייטרלי וללא תתייחסות לסמכוויות ישראל.

ד. בנוגע למשטרת נאמר בהצעת ישראל *in existing in existing in* כאן נאמר *պונישגין*. אולם האלמנט העיקרי כאן הוא העברת של סמכויות בעבינגי בטוחן פנים למשטרת בהתאם ליכולתה ולהתפתחות האמצעים שברשותה.

ה. הצעיות מקס-דייוויד בנוגע ל קישור אינו מדויק ואיינו נכון.

ו. הסעיף האחרון נוגד את עמדות ישראל הבסיסית.

חוקים

א. האמריקיקנים עשו שיט כאשר קיימת הפרדה בין חוקים שם *sovereign state* לביןם *subsidies* שבקשר זו יש הכוונה היא לחוקים הירדניים, לבין צו המישל. החוקים הירדניים בינם לשינוי בהתאם למוסכת בהסתמך האוטונומיה (מקור הסמכות) ואילו צו המישל ניתנים לשינוי על ידי הרשות באמצעות *legislative* סמכותם בנגדן לניסוח ישראל *constitutional* (הבדל הפטנטי הוא גם הבדל מהותי).

ב. החוקים הם טריטוריאליים ואיןם חלים רק על אנשים הcpfים לסטמות האוטובומית.
ג. בפיקוח האחראונה יש רמז למחיקת הבתוון שתופיע בסופו של דבר בהסכם האוטובומית.

הועדה המומדמת

א. הביסות כמעט זהה לגיסוח הישראלי פרט לשינויים "פערתיים":

- הושמטה התחישות לירדן לחברת ועדת.
- הושמטה התחישות לשימוש כלכלי ולהסכם האוטובומית.
- הושארה האפשרות, בהסכם הסופי, לאפשר קבלת החלטות לא פה אחד ולגנרטל הצבעת וטו.

הושמטה התחישות, שהופיעה בגירוי הישראלי, לישראלים המזוינים ביו"ש ועזה.

1) במסמך המקורי הייתה הקדמה אחת. יש יסוד להשערה, כי בעצת המצריים הוסיף האמריקנים הקדמה שנייה, שהיא מיותרת מבוחינה מהותית. המשפט האחרון שבסה (על השתתפותם של Palestinians) הורא בודאי מזיך. על עניין זה כתוב בהסכם קמפ-דייריד כי הם יכולים להיות במשלחת המצרית, או הירדנית, או בהסכם הכל. בכתב המשוחף של הנשיא סאדאת ושל הודיערן ^{על ג'נין} אין לחזר כלל לעניין זה מרטב למחוק את כל הקדמה השנייה (שהיא הראשונה).

2) בהקדמה המקורי נוסף משפט שלא היה במסמך המקורי, כאמור:
 the security concerns of all the parties
 בהסכם קמפ-דייריד יש גם משפט אחר:
 the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved
 זהה תוצאה של ציטוט מקרי, מוצא מן הקשר. מוטב לוותר על התווסף.

3) מלאה על (administrative council) elected body או חזרה "Council" /
 Self-Gov. authority (Council) elections

4) elections במסמך המקורי, על-פי הצעתו נאמר:
 in accordance with modalities to be agreed
 במסמך המקורי – מצרי (זה שמו הנוכחי) כתוב
 agreed modalities הנוסח שלנו הוא המתאים למציאות.

5) את כל שאר הפסיקות על הבחירה (שאינם כלל במסמך המקורי) יש להוציא, כדי למסור את הדירון בשירות הבחירה וכו' לועדה מיווחדת.

6) The transitional period

canal – elected body

7) Withdrawal of Israeli Military Gov.

and its (להוציא) Civilian Administration

הכינוך והספורט

לעומוד ולהשאיר את הנרטה שלנו. העניין הוא עקרוני: מקור הסמכות. המסמך האמריקני - מצרי (פסקא שנייה בסעיף הופך את הקורה על פיה).

Structure and Procedure

(8) אבסורדר: the elected body will consist of one body

למחוק את המלים החדשנות
to its representational nature

להשאיר את הנרטה שלנו: appropriate to and determined by...

הסיפה אינה מופיעה כלל בהסכם קמפ-דיוויד.

Powers and responsibilities (9)

להשאיר את הרשימה שלנו, בלי התוספת המלאכותיות.

(10) להוציא את התוספת החדשה ולהשאיר את המשך ככזה במסמך המקורי (על-פי העתנו).

Water Land (11)

שר החקלאות יציג העורתי בשני שטחים אלה.

Laws (12)

להשאיר את הנרטה שלנו.

Security (13)

למחוק את המלים (המסוכנות!) as provided in the final autonomy agreement

elected body ...

Dispute Resolution (14)

פסקא מירורת שיכת להסכם שייקרא "סופי"

Negotiations regarding final status.

זוהי חזקה מילולית על פסקא שלמה של הסכם קמפ-דיוויד. לשם מה היא דרשה? צריך למחוק אותה. היא לא מורידה, אך גם לא מוסיפה דבר.

1) במסמך המקורי הייתה הקדמה אחת. יש יסוד להשערה, כי בעצם המזרים הרסיפר האמריקניים הקדמה שנייה, שהיא מירורתה מבחינה מהותית. המשפט האחרון שבת (על השתתפרותם של Palestinians) הרא בדאי מזיק. על עניין זה כתוב בהסכם קמפ-דייריד כי הם יכולים להיות במלחת המצרית, או הירדנית, או בהסכם הכל. במתב המשותף של הנשיא סאדאת ושל הودען אין לחזור כלל לעניין זה מוטב למחוק את כל הקדמה השנייה (שהיא הראשונה).

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 זהה תרואה של ציטוט מקרי, מוצא מן ההקשר. מرتبط יותר על התוספת.

3) elections במסמך המקורי, על-פי הצענה נאמר:
 elections in accordance with modalities to be agreed
 במסמך המקורי – מצרי (זה שמו הנוכחי) כתוב
 מלאה על (administrative council)
 Self-Gov. authority

4) elections במסמך המקורי, על-פי הצענה נאמר:
 elections in accordance with modalities to be agreed
 elections with agreed modalities
 במסמך המקורי – מצרי (זה שמו הנוכחי) כתוב
 הנוסח שלנו הוא המתאים למציאות.

5) את כל שאר הפסיקות על הבחירות (שאינן בכלל במסמך המקורי) יש להוציא, כדי
 למסור את הדיון בשיטת הבחירות וכו' לועדה מיוחדת.

6) The transitional period

כנ"ל – elected body

7) Withdrawal of Israeli Military Gov.

and its Civilian Administration (להוציא)

בכינזת וציוויל

לעומוד ולהשאיר את הנרטה שלבו. העניין הרא עקרוני: מקור הסמכות. המסמך האמריקני - מצרי (פסקא שנייה בסעיף הופך את הקורה על פיה).

Structure and Procedure

(8) אבסורדר: the elected body will consist of one body

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להשאיר את הנרטה שלבו: .. appropriate to and determined by..

הסיפה אינה מופיעה כלל בהסכם קמפ-דיוויד.

Powers and responsibilities (9)

להשאיר את הרשימה שלבו, בלי התוספתה המלאכוהירות.

(10) להוציא את התוספתה החדשה ולהשאיר את המשך ככזה כמספר המקורי (על-פי הצענהו).

Water Land (11)

שר החקלאות יציג הצעתו בשני שטחים אלה.

Laws (12)

להשאיר את הנרטה שלבו.

Security (13)

למחוק את המלים (המסוכנות!) as provided in the final autonomy agreement

elected body ... Dispute Resolution (14)

פסקא מירורת שיכת להסכם שייקרא "סופי"

Negotiations regarding final status.

זרחי חזקה מילולית על פסקא שלמה של הסכם קמפ-דיוויד. לשם מה היא דרשה?
צריך למחוק אותה. היא לא מורידה, אך גם לא מושיפה דבר.

משרד הפנים
לשכת השו

10.12.82

בגצה נסעה
בבבאניה

בגצה נסעה

בבבאניה (בבבאניה)

בגצה נסעה
בבבאניה

בבבאניה

בבבאניה

Meeting

Sunday, November 16, 1980, 6:30 p.m.
Mina House, Giza

Present:

For Israel

Mr. Chaim Kubersky
Mr. Meyer Gabay
Prof. Ruth Lapidoth
Brig. Gen. A. Tamir
Mr. Gilad Stern

For Egypt

Ambassador Shash
Ambassador Latif
Mr. A. Mussa
Mr. N. Isdawi
Ms. Nour Attia

MR. SHASH: Let's see what we can do. There's been a change of administration in the United States. So we have to think about this.

MR. KUBERSKY: The Autonomy is not for the United States. We can see what we two, the Egyptians and the Israelis, can do. We have to progress, to investigate all topics where work can be done. For example, on the Memorandum of Understanding, we have been talking through the United States and not directly. We can consider this. On legal matters some progress can be made. Several problems can be analyzed together in order to provide alternatives for the summit meeting which may take place. We can prepare the issues for the higher level.

MR. SHASH: Did you study the US newspaper?

MR. GABAY: There are two avenues which are not exclusive. In local matters, some useful work has been done.

MR. SHASH: But not completed. . . I still have to explain my

10.4

8.2

20.97

31.54

20.97

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12.40

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ideas to Prof. Zamir.

MR. GABAY: We can take these ideas and items and decide to continue in legal matters. Or on modalities there are items to be discussed and elaborated as well. Or in powers and responsibilities, there are also items. We can prepare a paper.

PROF. LAPIDOTH: There is also the economic group.

MR. GABAY: Despite not discussing the non-paper, we can in parallel discuss other substantive issues.

MR. SHASH: We decided to resume the talks to prepare for the summit. Now there is no summit. What is our destination? The third leader is to fix the date of the meeting. What is the purpose of working now?

MR. KUBERSKY: We are talking informally. I don't want to open a principle discussion of what was decided. Ali and Ghali in Washington tried to put the emphasis on the summit meeting. But the Israeli party and Ambassador Linowitz stressed that there were two elements: firstly the resumption of talks and secondly the preparation for a summit. In Linowitz' announcement he mentioned this. We should stick to this. When the summit dates are set, we can put the weight on this. But the international community understood that the talks were being resumed. We should be in conformity with what was decided. We can't force each other. I believe we must work day and night. In May 1980 we should have done this instead of having an interruption. Now we must try and serve the process without embarrassing each other. We can point out subjects where we can do the work so that there shouldn't be a vacuum in the

talks. Maybe we can summarize what was done so far. We should act in good faith to do what we can and leave for the heads of government what they can do. What are your ideas?

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: We know from the beginning that we would some day have a summit. All that we have done so far is as a basis for a summit. We should continue with the process and try to narrow the gaps. We should do staff work.

MR. LATIF: In this frank discussion I can say that in the committees we made progress and then the Israeli government made certain steps . . . the Jerusalem resolution and steps taken against the Palestinians. This forced certain issues and created a certain atmosphere. The negotiations were interrupted and Sadat proposed a summit to clear the atmosphere, to help the negotiators in practical steps. Also, in the face of the Jerusalem resolution and the West Bank steps. . . Egypt won't overlook this. With these steps you made it difficult for the Egyptian party to continue. You pre-judged the final status. Linowitz came and there was a formula on continuing the negotiations. Your thesis was that nothing has happened, but we could not resume the negotiations unless under a pretext. The summit was the pretext. This formula balanced the requirements of both parties. The Washington meeting reaffirmed that on the 17th we should do both things. We can only continue under the umbrella of a summit, but the summit is a question mark. We can prepare for a theoretical summit which will take place some time but it will be an illusion. Let us think of ways to continue work without going back to the committees. But we can't talk of working for a summit.

the 2000 election over 2000
legislators and candidates from
the 1250+ state legislative
districts in the United States
and the 1250+ congressional
districts in the United States.

It would embarrass the United States. I suggest that tomorrow we can't talk of either. We have to improvise tomorrow.

MR. KUBERSKY: I appreciate your frankness.

MR. SHASH: We have a third difference. We haven't agreed on the geographical scope of the autonomy. . . elections. . . where. . . Jerusalem or what?

MR. LATIF: Before we spoke of Jerusalem without mentioning Jerusalem, knowing it would come up some time. Now we can't be theoretical. It would seem that we condone non-participation of East Jerusalemites.

MR. GABAY: That's a good example. An advantage in modalities was that we avoided the question of Jerusalem. It was to be dealt with by the heads of state. If we refuse to talk of other things we aren't helping the heads of state.

MR. LATIF: Would you say in the modalities committee that the Jerusalem question is open?

MR. GABAY: We left the Jerusalem question open in our work. We can't reverse the order. Let us leave the principle issue for later.

MR. LATIF: Things have changed. We would have carried on on the assumption that the Jerusalem issue would eventually be addressed but the Jerusalem resolution spoiled this. If Israel is ready to confirm the previous position. . . that Jerusalem is open to negotiations at a later stage, well and good.

MR. MUSIA: Now you have heard the Egyptian worries and understand them. Do you have a suggestion to deal with our worries?

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MR. GABAY: In April your parliament. . .

MR. MUSSA: No, no. . . on a point of order . . .

MR. GABAY: Allow me to finish. In April your parliament pre-judged the Jerusalem issue. Secondly, I don't think the Jerusalem law changed the position. We have always maintained that Jerusalem is not included in these negotiations. You will remember Prime Minister Begin's letter to Sadat after Camp David. There is no reason that we can't discuss the overall question of autonomy. You are asking us to state something which we were never willing to state, even before the Jerusalem bill. In practical terms we should return to a pragmatic approach, leaving certain items to the heads of state. We are technicians.

MR. IATIF: Gabay speaks as if I didn't speak at all.

MR. MUSSA: Do you have an answer to our worries concerning the new situation in the wake of the Jerusalem bill? I subscribe to your opinion that the Jerusalem bill changed nothing, for different reasons. Regarding the Egyptian parliament's Jerusalem bill, it was one of many international declarations and has no bearing on the law in the city. Again I ask: can you help the Egyptian delegation pass this hurdle?

MR. IATIF: We don't need an immediate reply. You can sleep on it.

MR. KUBERSKY: You mentioned not only Jerusalem. Let me think aloud. You have a problem. You agree to resume the negotiations under the umbrella of a summit and now we don't know about the summit, and we don't want to embarrass ourselves by continuing. On the 3rd

September 10, 1998
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Karpov,
I am writing to you to express my thanks for the kind words you said about me in your letter to the *Times* on September 10. I am deeply grateful for your support and encouragement.

of September the Jerusalem bill existed when Prime Minister Begin and Sadat made the statement about the summit. Since the 3rd of September nothing has changed in the area except the election of a US President.

MR. LATIF: Yes.

MR. KUBERSKY: On the 3rd of September we agreed concerning the summit. The changes in the United States caused the difference.

MR. LATIF: You are taking the words at face value. For us the resumption meant the summit, as a launching point for the resumption of the talks. This remains our position. Lincowitz' formula was to meet our concerns. Now the resumption has a question mark until the summit is fixed. . .or we should find other frameworks.

MR. KUBERSKY: Let us try to keep the two elements and be in conformity with the understanding reached then. We can say we are reviewing the work done until now. We don't have to resume work in modalities but we can meet and discuss subjects where we don't have to use tools which cause us problems. You mentioned Jerusalem. You know our position. I am sure that when Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat meet, they may discuss it, if they choose to. I understand what you say but you must know that our answer is that given by Gabay. We will report to our superiors that you raised the question. We can't give you a better answer tomorrow morning.

MR. MUSSA: We appreciate your frankness but we also can't give another answer. The Jerusalem law raises difficulties and we can't simply go back to the old system. What about the confidence-building measures? These are linked to the acceptance by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza of what we are suggesting to them. An

Geographical area	Number of cases	Number of deaths
Central America	105	10
Caribbean	1020	14
South America	102	1
North America	943	10
Europe and Central Asia	101	10
Africa	1014	10
Other countries	100	0
Total	5092	100

answer to this might help. Secondly, what did Gabay mean by a paper which might be worked out? Thirdly, there is a third party, the Palestinians. We can't embarrass them. We can't simply keep things going by modifying committees and continuing all the same. We have to address ourselves to problems.. After seventeen months we have achieved almost nothing because of the Jerusalem bill and the settlements.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: There are four partners in these negotiations: Israel, Egypt, the inhabitants and Jordan. Jordan is the main factor for security problems. Two parties are missing. I hope that Jordan and the Palestinians will join. The United States is not a partner in the autonomy. They participate in the negotiations. I think we can reach an agreement. All things which aren't agreed can be discussed at the summit. But we can't say that the Jerusalem law doesn't exist. We are now discussing the transition period and not the final status. The question of the residents of East Jerusalem voting does not relate to the status of Jerusalem.

MR. MUSSA: You are right.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: The Arabs of East Jerusalem are Jordanian citizens and can vote for the Jordanian parliament.

MR. SHASH: All West Bankers are Jordanian citizens.

MR. KUBERSKY: He is talking of Jerusalem.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: It is a vital interest of all parties to continue the negotiations. I am optimistic. People in Israel complain about normalization, about the International Supervision Force in Sinai, etc. There are lots of obstacles for us as well. We can

continue until the summit and, if necessary, change the structure as Kubersky said. But we should fill the gap until the summit in a dynamic fashion.

MR. KUBERSKY: Let me narrow the scope to tomorrow's meeting. We should review a list of problems which have to be discussed and solved. . . where we have reached full understanding, where we have reached partial understanding or where there is no understanding - where we can't make any progress and leave things to the heads of state. Then we can have a picture. . .

MR. GABAY: This was the paper I mentioned. . .

MR. KUBERSKY: Then the leaders can decide what they want to talk about. We can't force them to accept our agenda. We can make a common assessment. What you said about Jerusalem was heard by us. You have said it publicly too. We can list the problems to be discussed and tackled. Whether we prepare for a summit or continue the negotiations, this work has to be done. We can also decide, understanding your difficulties, to take a few subjects on which we can sit together in the coming weeks to prepare staff work, an analysis of certain issues and our standpoints. The question of the date of a summit is not known but the fact of a summit is agreed to. We can forward items to the summit. The Americans can participate in this. This way we can keep the process as an on-going process. We can discuss how often to meet. We don't have to exaggerate, but we should keep the process going.

MR. MUSSA: With one proviso: how to deal with the hurdles.

MR. KUBERSKY: We heard what you said.

MR. LATIF: We also heard. Let's carry on informally tomorrow.

MR. MUSSA: Kubersky has a fine way to put things, but there were lacunae.

MR. KUBERSKY: I don't want to say more than I am authorized to say. We heard what you said and we will report it. Gabay's answer was correct and open and reflects what goes on in Israel.

MR. MUSSA: What about the confidence building measures?

MR. KUBERSKY: Dr. Burg received a request and I don't know whether he discussed this with the Prime Minister.

MR. GABAY: Many prisoners were released already.

MR. MUSSA: I am not talking of prisoners but of things happening in the West Bank and Gaza.

MR. KUBERSKY: Dr. Burg is an honest man and will give an answer. He is not responsible for the West Bank and Gaza. The Prime Minister, as Defence Minister, is. We have discussed a lot this evening.

MR. SHASH: Your list. . .you want to discuss this tomorrow?

MR. KUBERSKY: Yes.

MR. MUSSA: 11 a.m. tomorrow.

MR. KUBERSKY: With the US?

MR. LATIF: Yes. Tomorrow is the 17th.

MR. SHASH: Mr. Kubersky, is the list from the past or is it for the future?

MR. KUBERSKY: There could be three categories. One, the past; two, those items which have to be worked on, and, three, categories for a summit.

MR. SHASH: That will be a long time off.

MR. KUBERSKY: Our leaders are strong and well.

MR. SHASH: We must still discuss this idea.

(The meeting ended at 8 p.m.)

The meeting was recorded
by Gilad Stern.

Meeting

Monday, November 17, 1980, 11 a.m.

Mina House, Giza

Present:

For Egypt

Ambassador Shash
Ambassador Latif
Mr. A. Mussa
Mr. S. Anwar
Mr. N. Isdawi

For Israel

Mr. Chaim Kubersky
Mr. M. Gabay
Prof. R. Lapidoth
Brig. Gen. A. Tamir
Mr. G. Stern
Mr. E. Dubek

For USA

Ambassador J. Leonard
Mr. M. Sternberg
Mr. E. Edleman
Mr. A. Kreczko
Mr. D. Kurtzer

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MR. SHASH: It is my pleasure to welcome the Israel and US delegations. We will have lunch together at 1:30 p.m.

MR. MUSSA: We can go to any other restaurant if you prefer not to stay at Mina House.

MR. KUBERSKY: This can be the first point of understanding.

MR. SHASH: Yesterday, we, the Egyptians and the Israel delegations, had informal talks on the development of the negotiations. To you, Ambassador Leonard, we want to say that we appreciate the US role and the US participation is essential for these talks. What is the US opinion on the situation in the coming months? Do you have any suggestions?

MR. LEONARD: Thank you, Ambassador Shash, for your words of hospitality. We agree to the lunch as suggested by you. We take your words on the US contribution very seriously. I will see that this point is made and brought to both the new and old administrations' attention.

Let me make some comments on the US elections. I am repeating things that I already said to some of you. There is a transitional transfer of administrations. The present administration maintains its responsibility for affairs but there are no new initiatives. The Reagan administration has begun to carry out the transition process but there are no serious contacts yet. What we, the US delegation, can do at this meeting is limited. We hope you understand this. We will be keen to hear your views and hear how you think we should go ahead. We probably won't be able to react to your suggestions or your proposals. We are grateful for your courtesy for allowing us to express our views but this time we are playing a low-key role.

MR. SHASH: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Once again, thanks to you for your contribution. Now we can inform you of our talks yesterday. Mr. Kubersky has an idea which he would like to develop.

MR. KUBERSKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is again a pleasure to meet with our Egyptian and US colleagues. For a year and one-half we have worked together. We want to see this work continue. We believe that the best way for this process is to go on. We know that in our countries the governments change, but the general ideas continue. We are here as agreed on the 3rd of September by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and as read out by

Mr. Linowitz. In Washington recently when General Ali, Dr. Burg and Sol Linowitz met, Mr. Linowitz read out a text and said, "Representatives of Egypt, Israel and the US will attend a tripartite meeting in the area on November 17th to discuss this revised Memorandum of Understanding, to review the work done thus far and to deal with such issues as can then be appropriately considered, as well as to further preparations for the summit conference. The parties will then decide as to the next steps in the negotiations and in the summit arrangements."

I would suggest that we do what we intended to do and spell out what was intended in the common understanding. We suggest that we do certain things at this meeting and, if necessary, that we continue at the coming meetings. We should try to sum up those items where understanding was reached or almost reached. Secondly, we should try to list those subjects where more discussion is needed and where we can even draft alternatives, and then we can expect our leaders to meet at the summit - We understood what our Egyptian colleagues said yesterday about the change in the United States, but we can prepare a list, and this is the third item, of subjects where we have exhausted our efforts and where we recommend them for a summit meeting. We can also exchange views on working on a Memorandum of Understanding, although the circumstances have changed. The Memorandum was originally started in April as a tool for the 26th of May. Even now it could be useful to arrive at such a preliminary Memorandum, or we can invest all our efforts on the final agreement. Today or tomorrow morning, if we continue tomorrow

morning, we can point out certain subjects which we might go into. I understood our Egyptian colleagues when they said they would not like to continue with the present institutional structure. We can change this. We can have a list of subjects and people here can discuss them. We recommend not to leave a vacuum for several months. It is our obligation to negotiate continuously and in good faith as Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat wrote to President Carter. Thank you.

(Short break for tea.)

MR. LATIF: I would like to associate myself with what was said about our American friends. We hope for their continued cooperation in the transition period.

MR. LEONARD: Camp David said, "...the transition period and beyond".

MR. LATIF: Before commenting on yesterday's discussion, I want to comment on what Mr. Kubersky said about the decision to meet. This very meeting is in fulfillment of the decision made. He was selective in quoting from the 3rd of September announcement. It didn't stop where he said it stopped. Also in the Washington statement it didn't end there. Kubersky was very selective.

MR. KUBERSKY: I fully agree with you that we have to honor all that was agreed.

MR. LATIF: On the 3rd of September, the summit idea was used as a way out of the disruption. The disruption was firstly caused by the Jerusalem resolution in the Knesseth. It introduced a new element which shouldn't have been imposed on the negotiations and

which pre-empted and pre-judged steps for the future. The negotiations couldn't simply be carried on as before. It would be misrepresented as condoning it. Secondly, the steps taken on the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli authorities, by deporting the mayors, created an atmosphere which wasn't conducive to positive autonomy negotiations. When these two elements made themselves felt, it needed a new step to move forward. President Sadat proposed a summit to give new impetus and give meaning to the Palestinians after the Jerusalem resolution. It was agreed that such a summit would take place and give political directives to the negotiations. When Linowitz came to the area and made the statement of September 3rd, it tried to take into account the Israeli and Egyptian requirements for negotiations in preparation for a summit. This was our expectation. The meeting here on the 17th was decided upon and held with this purpose in mind. . . preparation for a summit. . . we proposed a preparatory committee and it wasn't agreed to. It was called a general committee to discuss the Memorandum and to review the work done and to discuss whatever work it deems necessary and to prepare for the summit. Now we are meeting in fulfilment of the agreement. The first item on our agenda is to see what work we will do in this general committee. The subject is open to discussion. We are perfectly in order and everything is in accord with what was decided. The Egyptian view of what to talk about is as follows:

There is a changing situation around us. In the forthcoming weeks we will not be in a position to decide on anything and it would not be proper to present our US colleagues with anything to take any decision about during this period. The question of the

summit. . .it is the raison d'etre of this meeting, but we can't talk about this in a definite way. We have to discuss what we can achieve today and tomorrow. I agree fully with what Kubersky said. The best way is to carry on the process. I hope I made myself clear. We can discuss among ourselves any proposals from any side.

MR. SHASH: Thank you. Can you, Ambassador Leonard, help us in order to proceed, taking into account the present situation. It would help us very much. We are not asking for a concrete suggestion, just for ideas.

MR. LEONARD: One comment to underline the difficulties. Ambassador Latif has explained the role of the summit and the importance given to it at the Washington meeting. It is the one area which is the most difficult to address ourselves to. . .we understand the difficulty it causes to our partners and especially to the Egyptians because of the importance they attach to the summit.

(At this point, there was a pause of about 30 second in which nothing was said.)

MR. KUBERSKY: I agree with what Ambassador Latif said. We should be constructive in order to see the main part, as he said, to carry on the process; it is our common target despite the difficulties. I want to make a very slight correction on the information side. The basis for our work is Camp David. None of us wish to depart from Camp David. It is a strong basis and it is our obligation. Secondly, I didn't intend to quote selectively. I agree with you, you are right, there are two elements in the September 3rd statement: the agreement to continue negotiating and the summit

meeting. We have to deal with this and we should omit no elements. You are right. This is what Sol Linowitz said at the press conference. Thirdly, it was not agreed at Washington to establish a general or a preparatory committee. General Ali and Butrus Ghali suggested this. We are called, however, the "representatives of Egypt, Israel and the United States". We have not been given a new institutional role.

MR. LATIF: We will be nameless and faceless.

MR. KUBERSKY: We are not faceless. I am happy to represent my government, and I want to be very frank, we weren't called to Washington in order to ratify the suspension of the talks but in order to resume talks. Therefore, if the target is to carry on the process, let us see what we can do at this meeting. Let us point out items of agreement, not all together in this forum, but possibly by having meetings on designated subjects. We have to work out an agenda, as you suggested, and to do preparatory work for a summit. We can be flexible and try our best. I put this concrete suggestion to you and you can put your suggestion. Let us try to proceed. I understand that our US friends are not in a vacuum. They are in a transitional period but not in a vacuum. They will report things and let us try to go on.

MR. MUSSA: I want to add a few words. There are three or four main points. Firstly, we, as Kubersky said, are working on the basis of Camp David and will continue to respect all its provisions. But Camp David is not a document in a vacuum. It is part of an inter-related system, the charter of the UN, with all its resolutions too.

Secondly, it isn't only Israel, Egypt and the US negotiating but also the Palestinian people or, to use the words of Camp David, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. . .their interests should be safeguarded. Thirdly, the changes. . .I agree with Kubersky that the US government continues. The changes I talk of are the situation regarding Jerusalem and in the occupied territories. We want you to know that the situation in these talks since the Jerusalem law has changed. You know the importance we attach to this and the unanimous international stand in this. We can't conceal the situation. The Palestinian inhabitants are disturbed by Israeli military government activities and also by the Jerusalem resolution. Egypt requested a summit to deal with these issues in an atmosphere of dialogue and triologue. We want you to know in this meeting that the atmosphere was disturbed by the Jerusalem action of the Knesset.

Fourthly, the resumption of the talks. . .we are talking so that we don't interrupt, but interruptions are caused by Jerusalem resolutions, settlements, etc. We went to Washington to discuss this. You know of the document which we gave you and the Americans on the confidence building measures. We know each other's restrictions. We will make a concrete suggestion to be considered with yours. Basing ourselves on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and the effects on the atmosphere in these talks, we should at this meeting consider two points. Firstly, the rationalization of the work should deal with the confidence building measures. This is the basis. And also the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and other procedural suggestions submitted by any party. Secondly, the

preparation for the summit. . .all the suggestions made. . .to fix the target, which is the summit and to consider how to prepare for it. We should take our time considering the difficulties. Thank you.

MR. SHASH: We have two ideas, an Israel one and an Egyptian one. . .to consider both in order to find a way out. Should we break for lunch and continue in the afternoon?

MR. GABAY: There is no difference between us on Camp David as the basis. The question of Jerusalem is an issue on which the parties differed right from the beginning. There was no ambiguity here. Throughout the negotiations, while every part expressed its views, in modalities for example, we could find formulations which would enable the parties to raise objections at the appropriate stage. Jerusalem was an issue which we weren't able to resolve. We could continue our work and ask the heads of state to resolve the problem. There is no great difference between the proposals this morning. There are three key words: continue our work, review what has been done and what is to be done, prepare for the summit... continue, review, prepare.

MR. MUSSA: I have another word.

MR. GABAY: I know. I don't think it is worth going into the Jerusalem issue. Some international experts think the Jerusalem bill didn't alter the status or the decision of the Egyptian parliament in April. . .we know what happened in the past. We perceive there will be a summit in the future. Let us concentrate on our work. If there is a basic understanding in a practical

manner, we can take Kubersky's suggestion. Firstly, issues resolved; secondly, issues where we can indicate options, and thirdly, issues for the summit. It can give this committee a positive course if we start to work on this. I think we don't have to eliminate committees, but Kubersky has indicated that he sees your views and we can set up a new administrative structure.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: May I add a word on confidence measures? Jerusalem is one point. Also the military government headquarters and prisoners. We are dealing with this and hope to find the solution. But regarding the West Bank, without an agreement on autonomy we keep this status as it is today since the day we asked Hussein, and I was Ezer Weizman's assistant at the time, not to go to war. We are the military government in the areas. If we told you what the mayors did, you will see that we behaved very liberally. It was brought to the high court. We are responsible for security. We have the military law for lives and for security. Our system is very liberal compared to other systems in the world. This status will remain until we reach an autonomy agreement.

To review, Jerusalem is one issue. On the military government and the prisoners, we have begun to find a solution. Security is a very intricate issue for us. We are defending ourselves and we are taking measures which we hope won't affect the population. At the moment it is quiet. I hope that these things won't happen again.

MR. SHASH: General Tamir, you mentioned the deportations.

Meeting

Monday, November 17, 1980, 11 a.m.

Mina House, Giza

Present:

For Egypt

Ambassador Shash
Ambassador Latif
Mr. A. Mussa
Mr. S. Anwar
Mr. N. Isdawi

For Israel

Mr. Chaim Kubersky
Mr. M. Gabay
Prof. R. Lapidoth
Brig. Gen. A. Tamir
Mr. G. Stern
Mr. E. Dubek

For USA

Ambassador J. Leonard
Mr. M. Sternberg
Mr. E. Edleman
Mr. A. Kreczko
Mr. D. Kurtzer

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MR. SHASH: It is my pleasure to welcome the Israel and US delegations. We will have lunch together at 1:30 p.m.

MR. MUSSA: We can go to any other restaurant if you prefer not to stay at Mina House.

MR. KUBERSKY: This can be the first point of understanding.

MR. SHASH: Yesterday, we, the Egyptians and the Israel delegations, had informal talks on the development of the negotiations. To you, Ambassador Leonard, we want to say that we appreciate the US role and the US participation is essential for these talks. What is the US opinion on the situation in the coming months? Do you have any suggestions?

PROF. LAPIDOTH: Ambassador Shash and Mr. Mussa mentioned international law. As you know, we think, as we said in the letters, that we had the right to our actions. In the UN we never agreed to the discussions taking place. They were foisted on us and by participation we didn't agree that that body has a right to discuss the issues.

MR. SHASH: We can meet at 5 p.m. Lunch will be around the swimming pool.

(The meeting ended at 1 p.m.)

The meeting was recorded by
Gilad Stern.

Meeting

Monday, November 17, 1980, 4:30 p.m.

Mina House, Giza

Present: (Same as morning session, 17.11.80)

MR. SHASH: We have two proposals, an Israeli proposal, where Mr. Kubersky suggests three lists. First, points of agreement; secondly, points where we have to progress and, thirdly, where a political decision on a higher level is needed. We also have a proposal by Amer Mussa. There are two sides to this proposal. One, a rationalization of our work; two, to start preparing for a summit. Mr. Kubersky, do you want to develop the idea or is it developed enough?

MR. KUBERSKY: I like my idea. It is clear.

MR. SHASH: Does the US have anything to say?

MR. LEONARD: I could comment on this, but more in terms of what we the US naturally have to do in the weeks ahead. We are in a transition and don't have full freedom of action. I have listened carefully to the two proposals. I see differences but also overlap and parallels. There is less of a fundamental difference than a substantial one. We have encountered this problem in our reports to Washington. There are often five or ten ways to say the same thing. In reporting to Washington, we can talk of issues which are n't resolved, issues which need work, issues which are in negotiation or in the environment of the negotiations. In this case we will report back to Washington to give them a feel and to make recommendations on how to go forward in the future. One way we

originated was the MOU. .a check list of main problems in an attempt to put down on paper where we were. It wasn't instructive what happened in the memorandum. Often we thought that we were close to agreement, but almost invariably in writing it down we created a wider gap and opened up new problems. It was a disappointing experience and reflects on the attempt to find new topics of agreement and disagreement. Nonetheless, we will report to Washington on the progress and on both sides' view of Camp David. There is a common dedication to Camp David but there are different approaches. The Israelis focus on what is inside the Camp David envelope and the Egyptians on things that are around Camp David in order to attract the Palestinians. We will report this to the new administration. We must prepare this report and discuss it with both of you. We have had a long gap and only superficial discussions with both sides, only regarding those items which are included in the Memorandum of Understanding. I would propose that we arrange to go over our draft report, and I will be open with you about what we plan to say to Washington and state honestly, I promise, your comments on whether you think our reporting is right. I think that out of this will come a consensus on what the situation is. I think we should next meet in Israel, but on the timing and the contents of the meeting, I don't see agreement yet. I think that by that Washington will give us instructions, instead of the don't do this and don't do that, which we get now.

In referring to the MOU, Ambassador Linowitz referred to this in his press conference in Washington. He said we would take it up

here. I don't want to get into it. I just have one or two conclusions about the MOU.. Several of you have cited reasons, purposes the MOU. . .especially the 26th of May. That was a reason but not the only one. There are two more important reasons. Firstly, to provide a basis and to make a new appeal to the Palestinians. This is still valid. I am pleased to refer to this and I urge you not to lose sight of this. A piece of paper can do this job. This pretext is not satisfactory but it is potentially useful. Secondly, to make us work harder on some difficult issues, by using the US drafting. We were disappointed by the spirit by which both sides approach certain issues and we felt that on those subjects it was not worth continuing unless one side evaluated its position. I say this to both sides equally. This is true on secondary and even smaller issues. There is a need for recommitment on the small issues; otherwise we won't be able to present a small number of issues to the summit. We will have to present 200 or 300 issues.

I hope we did our work well on the MOU. I don't know if we always did. The MOU can still serve us as a focus for dealing with certain subjects. I am pleased there haven't been leaks of this document. Anyway, it would be almost unintelligible to a person not involved. We will continue to refer to the positions of the two sides when certain issues come up in the MOU.

That's an awful lot of talk. My basic point is that we will be making a report and I hope to consult with you and make recommendations to you on the basis of Washington's instructions.

MR. SHASH: Thank you for your wisdom. The US side has always contributed to our discussions. Can you clarify. . .you will prepare your report after this meeting on the basis of the MOU and our comments. . .?

MR. LEONARD: Yes.

MR. KUBERSKY: I found Ambassador Leonard's thoughts interesting. I would like to warn ourselves not to focus our activities or disactivities according to an internal process in the United States. We are in the middle of an on-going process and we have to exhaust what we can. If Ambassador Leonard wants to consult with us, we will be pleased to speak to him. This can't be an alternative, however, to the work which we have to do at this table.

I have a remark to make in the spirit of people who have been involved together, as a family. I find too much inconsistency in the way we work. In December 1979, we decided to discuss models. We didn't continue. In May we started with problems of security and we said that the negotiators would continue with these issues of security. There has been no continuation. Then we entered the Memorandum of Understanding and now we are leaving it. We can't agree to any method. We aren't doctrinaire, but we shouldn't jump around. Our problem is political, but we have to establish a methodology. We are speaking amongst ourselves. There is no press here. If we want the former structure, we agree to continue. If we agree to put all our efforts into the MOU, it is okay with us. If we want partly the former structure, partly preparations for the summit, that's fine, but a vacuum shouldn't be created. The process should be

continuous. We can sit from today on a continuous basis and work. If we work we have a chance to achieve something. If we don't work we get nowhere. Difficulties were created, our rabbis said, in order to overcome them. We received the MOU and we made our comments and submitted our own draft. We received even some public compliments in Washington. Mr. Shash asked me in Washington if we were prepared to exchange our documents. . .

MR. SHASH: That was on a personal basis. . .

MR. KUBERSKY: Let's say that I suggested it. We can exchange papers and work on it. The US draft was a non-draft, or we can return to the former US draft which was not a non-draft. We can see if we can work with it. You may say that the MOU way is not applicable today. We can discuss it but we shouldn't leave the table today without knowing where we are going.

MR. SHASH: You misunderstood things. We aren't intending leaving this table and forgetting the autonomy talks. We have diplomatic channels. We don't intend to stop but things happened and we are keen that the process should be successful and give results. We don't want to spoil the process. We want to remove the obstacles. We don't want to forget the autonomy talks. We signed Camp David and we are attached to the autonomy process. It wasn't our fault that the process was disturbed. The next three months will not be negative. We can get together, we can maintain contacts through our embassies in Israel, Egypt and Washington. We won't simply close down.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: The autonomy talks are based on Camp David. These are negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with the US participation. What is the use in waiting until the new US administration comes into office? For example, the US hasn't yet finished the supervision agreement, but the process continues. We won't stop the process even if the US finishes the job or doesn't finish the job. I don't see why we should stop the negotiations.

MR. SHASH: We can have bilateral talks.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: Embassies have nothing to do with this negotiation. Camp David said we should negotiate until we finish. Sometimes I feel as if an axe hangs over my head and I am a moderate.

MR. SHASHA: By diplomatic channels, I mean that Ambassador Shash, for example, will come with ideas. . . it is not only embassies.

MR. GABAY: It is important to continue to negotiate. That way we have a chance to progress and limit the amount of issues to be presented to the summit.

MR. SHASH: Issues are interlinked. We talk of modalities and then the Jerusalem issue comes up.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: Two things. Our interpretation of the talks in Washington is that we should continue the talks until the summit meeting. We can't accept a gap. There are three sides and we can't accept a vacuum. There is the continuing of negotiations and the preparation of the summit. Secondly, there are many disagreements about things which aren't in Camp David; for example,

the settlements and the source of authority. Here we have to discuss and state our views. One can't say that no progress is possible. We feel there is an axe over our heads. We are always punished by the stop-start of the talks. I have said in my country that we have a peace process. In Camp David it says that we have to continue until we reach an agreement. We know why the Palestinians don't come. . . because of Mr. Arafat. For the two main countries involved to wait for a report, etc., in the third country is not the way.

MR. MUSSA: General Tamir has exaggerated. We don't understand and totally reject all references to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. We know you are a moderate man but the references did not go concealed and were noticed. Both Kubersky and Tamir referred to the protracted negotiations. . . to the stop-start. I want to say that we shouldn't take the negotiations at face value. You know what Geula Cohen did. You know what the Knesseth did.

MR. KUBERSKY: May I correct you. . .

MR. MUSSA: Wait, Chaim. We know what happened. There are mistakes on your part. Why were the negotiations interrupted? We are committed to Camp David. . .

MR. KUBERSKY: A slight correction. You said the suspensions had reason. I want to keep it all pleasant without raising my voice. We met in the Accadie until the 6th of May and decided to come to Egypt on the 12th of May. I even suggested that you spend one extra day in Israel to plan the meeting. That was before the Geula Cohen bill. The suspension of the talks in May took place

before the bill.

MR. MUSSA: No.

MR. KUBERSKY: Yes. You can check this and if I'm wrong, I will apologize. What has happened since our recent meeting in Washington? No Israeli steps have been taken. If Egypt wants to stop the talks. . .but we are ready to fulfill what the joint letter of Begin and Sadat says, in difficult and easy times. In Washington we decided to continue the negotiations. What has changed? We have received no explanation. I reiterate my suggestion that we make a plan for continued negotiations in whatever form that we decide on but if we don't continue the negotiations we don't fulfill our duty. We all have to report to our governments. I would like as a man who has been involved for one and one-half years that our report will contribute to the good atmosphere.

MR. LATIF: We don't want to suspend the talks. In fact, there are three proposals to continue. Ambassador Leonard has told us of his report. Let us take the contents of your proposals, Mr. Kubersky, and the substance of Mr. Leonard's proposal and then find ways and means to find the form in the negotiations. Mr. Kubersky, can you tell us the contents of your proposals again? Gabay said continue, review and prepare. . .Can't we relate this to Ambassador Leonard's suggestion? This is what negotiations are about. Let us discuss this and try to relate this work.

MR. SHASH: I agree with Latif. Even the three proposals can be married together.

MR. KUBERSKY: I wouldn't like to complicate things. I don't want to repeat everything I said. Maybe we can take three people, and this is a proposal, in order to prepare a proposal which can be the conclusion of this meeting here. They can try to draft something and we can meet tomorrow to approve it. I want to be constructive, not polemic.

MR. MUSSA: I didn't get it. Can you repeat it?

MR. KUBERSKY: As there are three proposals and as our intention is to continue, these three people, one from each delegation, can sit together to understand the real intentions and try to find a positive outcome.

MR. SHASH: Let's take ten minutes for consultations and tea.

(After a half-hour break for consultations, each party appointed one representative: Egypt, Amer Mussa; Israel, Meyer Gabay; US, Michael Sternberg. The representatives spent one hour discussing the proposed draft.)

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The meeting was recorded by
Gilad Stern.

Meeting

Tuesday, November 18, 1980, 10 a.m.

Mina House, Giza

Present: (Same as previous day, 17.11.80)

MR. SHASH: Allow me to read the text which was arrived at at the meeting yesterday:

"It was agreed that the delegations of Egypt, Israel and the U.S.A. will continue to evaluate the state of the negotiations.

In this context the delegations of Egypt and Israel noted that the U.S.A. delegation is preparing a comprehensive report on the process of negotiations which will also be submitted to the parties.

"The parties agreed to study further and reconsider those issues which remain to be resolved. In preparation for the summit meeting the parties will also prepare reports on their work including unresolved issues.

"The representatives of Egypt, Israel and the U.S.A. will meet in Israel within the next few weeks. Contacts will be made to decide upon the exact date of the meeting."

(After reading the text, all parties agreed that the text was acceptable.)

MR. KUBERSKY: We have made a good conclusion but what have we really done? I'd like to know what we intended to do practically. I read this morning in the Egyptian Gazette that representatives of Egypt and Israel and the US met to review the US paper and to review positions on the stalled process, and that Egyptian sources said that they did not expect real progress. . . that this meeting was basically just for show.

MR. SHASH: I won't comment on this. I didn't see any

journalists.

MR. KUBERSKY: I know. But the public get cynical from such writing. We want to search for a solution, not to make the impression of momentum. We are prepared to negotiate. The summit is not a replacement for the negotiation. For the Israelis, we are not sure that there can be a summit if there are no negotiations. We came here with reports prepared but we didn't find a willingness to negotiate. We found a feeling of escapism, not negotiation. If we really want to pursue the process, we must try to work systematically and rationally to assist our leaders. I have said what I said and would like you to think about it. I have concrete solutions. The contacts must go on. Every week or second week we should meet for at least a half-a-day. Yesterday you said the US was a neutral partner. They are participating but all of us are objective. The two sides who undertook to negotiate are Egypt and Israel. The US is a full participant. A waiting stage doesn't serve the good of these negotiations. We should see each other and speak to each other. We are neighbors at peace and we don't need proximity talks any more. I would be happy to receive your reaction.

MR. SHASH: Thank you. I share your keenness to proceed. I said yesterday that there was no thought of suspending the talks. There are diplomatic channels. We have decided to prepare. We can have consultations. Be sure that everyone here is keen to serve the talks, not to suspend the talks. We have to prepare reports. On normalization we had committees which met from time to time. We could do the same thing.

MR. KUBERSKY: I would like to ask you, Mr. Shash, would it be useful for one of you to meet in two weeks time in Tel Aviv or here? It may not serve the purpose to meet in a formal meeting, but we should consult and do staff work. Let us make arrangements for a steady contact. I would also invite our US colleagues. I understand your problems. Maybe Michael Sternberg can participate informally. Otherwise, I see problems arising on the horizon.

MR. SHASH: I take note of the idea and will talk to my superiors about it.

MR. GABAY: Suppose we have another meeting like this. We haven't covered some of the issues which we should have. We have to work on the reports. Let us take two or three persons who can meet and take one or two subjects like legislation.

MR. SHASH: You can add so much if you prepare so much. If from now until the summit you can prepare on Jerusalem, it would be useful.

MR. KUBERSKY: Please, Mr. Shash, be aware that the summit for us is part of the process but it is not a replacement for the process. Therefore, we must have a routine of negotiations. If the people in Israel feel that there are no negotiations, there will be difficulties.

MR. MUSSA: What sort of difficulties?

MR. KUBERSKY: We also have a public opinion in Israel. It is a common interest to start to build on those things which we have in common. We have to continue and we can't guarantee success but Therefore, we have to do our very best with the summit as a highlight. / We

should have steady contacts within the process without the long intervals.

MR. GABAY: If we are going to prepare the work and agree on options and possibilities, we have to sit together and work.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: If I take as an example the process leading to the peace process, we had two summits, one at Camp David and the other during President Carter's visit to Israel. We knew the main differences leading to the summit from talks between ourselves. There were three drafts of the principles. We knew the points of difference. Now, we don't know your opinion on water, land. . . . we gave a model and didn't see your views. General Ali gave a lecture on security at the Accadia and this is still to be discussed. We always knew there would be a summit. There is a need for discussion. I would suggest to my Prime Minister not to raise security at the summit because we don't know each other's views. There has to be discussion beforehand. We have to talk of how to attack this problem. We will thereby prepare for the summit and narrow the gaps between us. It is not a question of keeping the momentum. .we can combine preparation for the summit and preparation of issues. Otherwise, each of us will bring his own report to the summit. In Camp David we came prepared for a draft of the final agreement. There is also a difference now as compared to the period before Camp David. Then we didn't have peace and the US played an essential role. Now we have direct talks with US participation.

On the Memorandum of Understanding we haven't seen your paper.

Why don't we exchange papers? Maybe we will find only differences of language in some areas. I could list the issues for the summit right now. Camp David is the basis for a transitional solution. One of the dangers is that we leave this basis because of Europe, because of the new President, the elections in Israel. . . Camp David is a strong basis.

MR. MUSSA: Why this lecture? We all accept CAmp David.

BRIG. GEN. TAMIR: I am stressing why it is important to prepare the summit well.

MR. SHASH: We have obligations in accord with the paper we prepared. It is not a press statement or a communique. We are keen to have the peace process go on. We take note of your views. We want to make it easier for our leaders. We may prepare our leaders. We must show them what we the technicians have done. We are committed to the process. I will report in full to my superiors. I can't bind myself to any action. I will report to my minister or ministers. Leave the matter of invitations to you or me, to our ministers. Thank you for your efforts. They are not in vain. We have diplomatic channels now. You, General Tamir, are a military man. You said we have peace. I say we have diplomatic channels. I can always call Ambassador Ben-Elissar to talk. I appreciate your contribution and look forward to seeing you again and wish the best to the autonomy talks and to the area.

MR. LEONARD: A final word on the question of how to go forward on what Kubersky says. We had a method, the Memorandum of Understanding. As I said, it led to a serious discussion of issues and

and to a deadlock on those issues. Speaking very frankly, I don't see how much use there is in taking up those subjects again unless one party or the other brings new views. On other issues, Tamir mentioned some, we haven't discussed enough. It would be welcome if either or both parties, even in the transition period now, came forward and wanted to discuss these things. We will draw attention to all these categories in our report to the new administration. This is an outline of a very frank but discouraging report if on January 20th the negotiations are where they are today. It is up to both parties now to move things forwards. I hope you will find ways to change the tone of our report. We can't do this; the initiatives must come from you.

MR. KUBERSKY: Allow me to thank our hosts for the hospitality and for the good atmosphere and also to say that we hope to meet our US colleagues again.

MR. LEONARD: Yes. Michael Sternberg and myself will be in the area and we would be pleased to meet with you.

(The meeting ended at 11 a.m.)

The meeting was recorded by
Gilad Stern.



official text

NOVEMBER 20, 1980

TEXT: AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ ON THE MIDDLE EAST

WASHINGTON -- HERE IS THE STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR SOL M. LINOWITZ, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY NOVEMBER 19 TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I GREATLY APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THE GENERAL PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS A LITTLE OVER TWO YEARS AGO. WITH THE ELECTION BEHIND US, AND WITH THE TRANSITION FROM ONE ADMINISTRATION TO THE NEXT NOW UNDERWAY. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO ASSESS WHERE WE ARE AND TO FOCUS ON THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE WHICH EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES HOPED WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TO TRY TO MAKE THIS DREAM A REALITY, THE FRAMEWORK SET FORTH THREE BASIC GOALS: FIRST, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE AND A CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL; SECOND, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE INHABITANTS OF THESE AREAS WITH "FULL AUTONOMY" WHILE ASSURING PRESERVATION OF ISRAEL'S (SECURITY) AND THIRD, THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO RESOLVE THE FINAL STATUS OF THESE TERRITORIES FOLLOWING THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

DURING THE PAST YEAR, I HAVE SERVED AS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND I SHALL WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU WHERE THEY STAND TODAY AND THEIR PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. BEFORE DOING SO, HOWEVER, I WANT TO FOCUS ON THE EXTRAORDINARY AND DEEPLY GRATIFYING SUCCESS ACHIEVED WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST GOAL OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, THE PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. FOR THIS IS AND MUST BE THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR EFFORTS TO HELP BRING A BROADER PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

ON MARCH 26, 1979, EGYPT AND ISRAEL SIGNED A TREATY OF PEACE. THIS TREATY, LET ME REMIND YOU, MARKED A PEACE WITHOUT VICTOR OR VANQUISHED, ENTERED INTO BY TWO NATIONS DETERMINED TO REJECT A LEGACY OF HOSTILITY AND WARFARE. SINCE THEN, BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY. THUS ISRAEL TURNED OVER TO EGYPT ON SCHEDULE NOT ONLY THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE SINAI, BUT ALSO THE ALMA OIL FIELDS, DESPITE THE IMMENSE BURDENS THAT THE LOSS OF THIS OIL IMPOSES ON THE ISRAELI ECONOMY. FOR ITS PART, EGYPT HAS PROCEEDED DILIGENTLY TO NORMALIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN THE FACE OF STRONG, EVEN FIXED REACTION OF ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS AND FORMER ALLIES. EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN OPENED AND AMBASSADORS EXCHANGED. TODAY THE FLAG OF ISRAEL FLIES IN EGYPT AND THE FLAG OF EGYPT IN ISRAEL.

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EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN THESE TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS, HOWEVER, IS THE ACHIEVEMENT IN SPIRIT. TODAY AN ATMOSPHERE OF COOPERATION AND TRUST PREVAILS WHERE ONLY BITTERNESS AND HATRED AND SUSPICION ONCE REIGNED. EVERY TIME I SIT DOWN WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND WITH MY COLLEAGUES IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, I AM REMINDED THAT THESE SHIFTS IN ATTITUDE ARE DEEP AND GENUINE IF WE REFLECT...ATTITUDES OF THEIR PEOPLES; OVER THE PAST YEAR, I HAVE WATCHED THE MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE GROW SLOWLY BUT STEADILY. THIS WAS VIIVIDLY EVIDENCED BY THE HISTORIC WELCOME THAT THE PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL, YITZHAK NAVON, RECEIVED JUST THREE WEEKS AGO WHEN HE PAID THE FIRST OFFICIAL ISRAELI STATE VISIT TO EGYPT. MY FREQUENT TRAVELS TO BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL DURING THIS PAST YEAR HAVE CONVINCED ME THAT BOTH NATIONS HAVE SET THEIR FEET FIRMLY ON THE ROAD TO PEACE, BOTH UNDERSTAND THERE CAN BE NO TURNING BACK. AND BOTH ARE DETERMINED THAT THERE WILL BE NO TURNING BACK.

AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, I WANT TO MOVE TO THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED AS A "FULL PARTNER" WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS; THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS CALL UPON THE PARTIES TO DEVISE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND PERMIT THEM TO ELECT A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. THE ACCORDS CALL FOR THE PARTIES TO DEFINE "FULL AUTONOMY" BY NEGOTIATION OF THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES THAT THE ELECTED BODY WOULD EXERCISE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THEY ALSO CALL FOR THE AUTONOMY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENSURING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER DURING THIS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. IN SUM, AND IN THE WORDS OF THE ACCORDS, THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE TO GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION BOTH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE INHABITANTS OF THESE TERRITORIES AND TO THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNs OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED."

NO ONE AT CAMP DAVID IN 1978 BELIEVED THAT THE NEGOTIATION OF THESE MATTERS WOULD BE EASY. THE ISSUES ARE EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX; THEY ARE EXTRAORDINARILY EMOTION-LADEN FOR THE PARTIES; AND THEY COULD INVOLVE MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH, OF WAR AND PEACE. THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS, ALL THREE PARTNERS HAVE HAD TO ENSURE THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WERE METICULOUSLY EXAMINED, AND WE HAVE HAD TO PROCEED WITH EXTREME CARE AND WITH (GARBLED) OF BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AS WELL AS THE PALESTINIANS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS HAS BEEN MADE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT IN RECENT MONTHS BY A HOST (OF PROBLEMS) AND TANGENTIAL DISTURBANCES AND DISTRACTIONS WHICH HAVE DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM THE CENTRAL ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION. (GARBLED) AS VIOLENCE ON THE WEST BANK, THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS (NUMBER) OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS, AND THE VARIOUS ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS BEARING ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM HAVE INTERFERED WITH AND EVEN INTERRUPTED OUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS ON THE COMPLEX AND CRITICAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

BUT DESPITE THE FRUSTRATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS, I AM GRATIFIED TO BE ABLE TO TELL YOU THAT WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR; AND I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT A CONTINUED AND SUSTAINED EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT AS CALLED FOR BY THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS CAN BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

THE PROGRESS MADE HAS INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON A LARGE RANGE OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE EXERCISED BY THE ELECTED SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, AND THE MODALITIES FOR THE FREE ELECTION PURSUANT TO WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WOULD BE CHOSEN. AND IN RECENT DAYS WE HAVE BEEN FOCUSING ON FIVE CRITICAL AND DECISIVE ISSUES WHICH THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS MUST RESOLVE IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT:

1. HOW CAN ISRAEL BE ASSURED THAT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS WILL BE FULLY PRESERVED AND PROTECTED UNDER THE AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENT?
2. HOW CAN WE ASSURE THAT THE LIMITED WATER RESOURCES OF THE REGION WILL BE FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY SHARED?
3. HOW SHOULD WE DEAL WITH THE PUBLIC LANDS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND HOW SHOULD SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BEAR ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THESE AREAS?

4. WHAT SHOULD BE THE NATURE OF THE POWERS EXERCISED BY THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY, RECOGNIZING THAT THE AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS ARE TRANSITIONAL AND THAT THE FINAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES WILL HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BY AGREEMENT AMONG ISRAEL, EGYPT, JORDAN, AND THE PALESTINIANS?

5. SHOULD THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS FOR THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY?

DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, WORKING BOTH BILATERALLY AND TRILATERALLY, WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HELP THE PARTIES MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON SEVERAL OF THESE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. SPECIFICALLY, ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE NARROWED THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THE (QUESTION OF) LAND AND WATER. IN ADDITION, OUR WORK DURING THE PAST MONTHS INDICATES THAT THE PARTIES ARE FAR CLOSER ON THE VITAL ISSUE OF SECURITY THAN MANY HAD THOUGHT. WE HAVE ALSO BEGUN, I BELIEVE, TO NARROW DIFFERENCES ON THE NATURE OF THE POWERS THAT THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY SHOULD APPROPRIATELY EXERCISE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. IN SUM, THROUGH THEIR SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS OVER THE PAST MONTHS, ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE BEGUN TO BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON EVEN THE MOST CRITICAL, COMPLEX, AND EMOTIONAL ISSUES.

IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AUTHORIZED ME TO RELEASE A JOINT STATEMENT ON THEIR BEHALF. IN THAT STATEMENT, THEY AFFIRMED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL "REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND PROCESS AND ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY OFFER THE ONLY VIABLE PATH TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." BOTH EMPHASIZED THEIR DETERMINATION "TO SEE THE PROCESS THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION REGARDLESS (OF DIFFICULTIES) THAT MAY ARISE ALONG THE WAY." LAST WEEK, DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN REASSERTED THIS DETERMINATION.

THE REAFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENT BY PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS OF IMMENSE IMPORTANCE. IT IS PREMISED ON THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT DESPITE THE DISAGREEMENTS, FRUSTRATIONS, AND ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CAMP DAVID APPROACH REMAINS ESSENTIALLY SOUND. TO THEIR VOTE OF CONFIDENCE, I WANT TO ADD MY OWN. MY EXPERIENCE DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS CONVINCED ME MORE THAN EVER THAT THIS APPROACH REMAINS BOTH VALID AND PROMISING.

SOME HAVE CRITICIZED THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS FOR ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS IMMEDIATELY THE ULTIMATE QUESTIONS: THE FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA; THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING JERUSALEM; AND THE PERMANENT ASSURANCE OF ISRAELI SECURITY. THESE CRITICS, HOWEVER, MISS THE CENTRAL POINT. FOR IT WAS THE GENIUS OF THE NEGOTIATORS AT CAMP DAVID TO RECOGNIZE THAT TOO MANY PAST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD FAILED PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY HAD GRASPED FAR TOO MUCH TOO SOON. THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE ISSUES IN THIS REGION ARE SO COMPLEX, THE EMOTIONS SO DEEP, THE CONTENDING FORCES SO MANY, THE STAKES SO GREAT, THAT THE PROBLEMS DEFY SHORTCUT SOLUTIONS. THE WISDOM OF CAMP DAVID WAS TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT BITTERNESS DIES HARD WHILE TRUST GROWS SLOWLY. THE KEY TO CAMP DAVID WAS ITS RECOGNITION THAT THE BEST HOPE FOR ENDURING PEACE LAY IN A PHASED PROCESS -- ONE IN WHICH AGREEMENTS ATTAINABLE AT ONE STAGE BECOME BUILDING BLOCKS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS ON MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES.

AT NO TIME DURING MY INVOLVEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE I DISCOVERED ANY VIABLE ALTERNATIVE COURSE, AND I HAVE CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT THE ADVICE OF LEADERS AND EXPERTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES TO ASCERTAIN IF ANY ALTERNATIVE EXISTS WHICH WOULD OFFER GREATER PROMISE OF SUCCESS. THE SIMPLE UNDENIABLE FACT IS THAT THERE IS NONE. NOT ONLY IS THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN; IT IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE APPROACH AT THIS TIME.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO UNDERSCORE AN IMPORTANT POINT WELL-UNDERSTOOD BY THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE -- THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AND REMAINS A BIPARTISAN MATTER AND ONE WHERE CONTINUITY IS VITAL. PERHAPS IN NO OTHER AREA OF THE GLOBE IS THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH CONTINUITY AND BIPARTISAN COMMITMENT BETTER EVIDENCED THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE EFFORTS OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

AFTER THE JUNE 1967 WAR LED TO U.N. RESOLUTION 242, WHICH TODAY REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE. THE INTENSIVE SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY OF SECRETARY KISSINGER UNDER BOTH THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATION ENABLED ISRAEL AND EGYPT AND SYRIA TO TAKE THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD PEACE. AND NOW PRESIDENT CARTER'S UNPRECEDENTED EFFORTS HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL ARAB NEIGHBOR AND ESTABLISHED AN ONGOING NEGOTIATION PROCESS WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, PLACES ON THE SAME (AGENDA) RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL.

IN ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY AND INCREASINGLY PLAYED AN ACTIVE AND ESSENTIAL PART IN OUR COMMITMENT TO WORK ACTIVELY AND UNCEASINGLY TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE WE SEEK IS BASED ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE UNTHINKABLE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE THAT A FUTURE CONFLAGRATION IN THE VITAL MIDDLE EAST REGION MIGHT PRESENT. SUCH A U.S. ROLE IN PURSUIT OF PEACE ADVANCES OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS WHILE FURTHERING OUR MORAL COMMITMENT TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. I KNOW THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN JOINS PRESIDENT CARTER IN RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CONTINUATION OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND THE VITAL ROLE THE UNITED STATES MUST PLAY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THROUGHOUT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT TO PLAY AN ACTIVE AND ESSENTIAL PART AS A "FULL PARTNER". INDEED, AS RECENTLY AS TWO DAYS AGO, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE COUNTRIES MET IN CAIRO IN FURTHERANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ACT AS A CATALYST AND A CONSTRUCTIVE SPUR TO PROGRESS, AND HAVE TRIED TO HELP BOTH PARTIES FIND COMMON GROUND AND NARROW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. IN DOING SO, I THINK THAT WE HAVE EARNED THE TRUST AND RESPECT OF BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

I BELIEVE THAT MEANINGFUL FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THE COMING MONTHS IF THE UNITED STATES REMAINS RESOLUTE IN ITS COMMITMENT TO WORK INTENSIVELY, TIRELESSLY, AND PATIENTLY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT IS BOTH THE CHALLENGE AND THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY WHICH WILL GREET THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION. EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AND NATIONS AND PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND AROUND THE WORLD, EXPECT THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO THAT CHALLENGE AND THAT OPPORTUNITY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL NOT FAIL THEM. THE WORDS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT ARE TRULY RELEVANT TO OUR POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY.

"THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE AN OPTION AS TO WHETHER IT WILL OR WILL NOT PLAY A GREAT PART ON THIS ISSUE. IT MUST PLAY A GREAT PART. THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER WE WILL PLAY THAT PART WELL OR BADLY."

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Press bulletin

JERUSALEM, 18 DECEMBER 1980

JOINT STATEMENT
BY
PRESIDENT ANWAR EL SADAT (EGYPT)
AND
PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN (ISRAEL)

DECEMBER 18, 1980

SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WE HAVE, WITH THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES, MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AIMING AT THE REALIZATION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ACCORDS.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THROUGH PERSEVERANCE AND MUTUAL RESOLVE WE CAN FULFILL FULLY THE PROMISE OF CAMP DAVID. ACCORDINGLY, WITH THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IS THE ONLY VIABLE PATH TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY, WE AGREE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

WE ARE GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT CARTER FOR THE PART HE AND HIS ADVISERS PLAYED IN HELPING US TO MOVE FORWARD IN OUR QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE GRATIFIED BY THE AFFIRMATION BY PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

/SA
(INST)

17:00 HOURS



official text

DECEMBER 8, 1980

VISIT OF AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ TO THE MIDDLE EAST

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE ON AMB. LINOWITZ'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST:
BEGIN TEXT:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR SOL M. LINOWITZ TO TRAVEL TO BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND THEIR COLLEAGUES ON HOW TO ENSURE CONTINUED MOMENTUM AND PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

THROUGHOUT HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS ACCORDED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO FURTHERING PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND, THEREFORE, TO MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS.

BOTH PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN HAVE PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO ENSURE CONTINUITY AND AN EFFECTIVE TRANSITION IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

UPON HIS RETURN, AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ WILL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT SO THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN INSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT-ELECT WILL BE FULLY INFORMED AND PREPARED WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED STATES' EFFORT TO ATTAIN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

01

מַזְכָּר

(להתקבצויות פיזיות במרחב הרוחני)

אל:

24/10
הנתיר
תיק מס:

ירון גפן כהן

נתה:

מג'ז, י.י.

הנIRON:

ברוך גן

לעומת רון כהן, מרגלית

21.9.100 מטרים (נאות/נאות) כהן גפן י.י.

לעומת רון כהן, מרגלית כהן גפן י.י.

ברוך גן

+

תזכיר הבנה מילידי

הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים ומדינת ישראל (להלן "הצדדים"), בתאום עם ארה"ב של אמריקה, הגיעו למספר הבנות והסכמים אשר צעדים אשר יקבעו כדי לישם את תנאי הסכם המוגרת לשלו בזיהית, עליהם סוכם בקמף דיוויד (להלן "המוגרת").

לכן, ע"מ להעניק אוטונומיה מלאה לתושבי ירושה וחבל עזה, ולהבטיח מעבר שקט ומוסדר של סמכויות ואחריות, להבטיח בטחונה של ישראל ושכנותיה, ולהציג את שאר היעדים אשר הובאו במוגרת, הסכימו הצדדים לזכיר הבנה מילידי זה אשר יהיה כפוף לתנאי ההסכם הסופי על האוטונומיה (להלן ההסכם).

בחירה

1. רשות מינהל עצמי (מועצת המנהלית) תבחר בחופשיות ע"י התושבים בהתאם לנוהלים אשר יוסכם עליהם.
2. בחירות יהיה בתחום חופשיות מכוונות על שמירת הזכויות להתקלות שקטה, חופש התבטאות והצבעה שאית וצדדים מתאימים למניין אי סדרים, בהתחשב בצורן לשימרה על החוק והסדר, כמו כן על העקרונות המנחים של המוגרת.
3. תומלת בחירות חופשית תובטח כפופה לצעדים אשר הוזכרו בסעיף 2 ובהתאם להסכם על נוהלי בחירות. הבחירה יוארגו, יונחה ויהיו תחת פיקוחה של ועדת בחירות מרכזית, אשר תהיה מרכיבת מכוח אדם אזרחי ישראלי מוסמך ופלשינאים ערבים מקומיים אשר הוסכם לגבייהם ע"י מנהלי המועדים על האוטונומיה, ביחיד עם אזרחים נוספים - בודדים ומוסדות - כפי שיוסדר ויוסכם ע"י מנהלי המועדים על האוטונומיה.

תקופת המעבר

רשות המינהל העצמי (מועצת המנהלית) תיקון ותיחנוך תוך חודש לאחר הבחירה ובמועד זה תחל תקופת המעבר של חמישת השנים.

בסיגת הממשל הצבאי הישראלי ומהינהל האזרחי של

כאשר תיקון ותיחנוך רשות המינהל העצמי (מועצת המנהלית) תהיה בסיגת של הממשל הצבאי הישראלי ומהינהל האזרחי שלו. תהיה העברת מסודרת ממשלה הצבאי לרשות המינהל העצמי (מועצת המנהלית) של אותו סמכויות ואחריות אשר בהתאם להסכם יופעלו ע"י רשות מינהל העצמי (מועצת המנהלית)

סמכויות ואחריות של הרשות למנהל עצמי (מועצת המנהלית)

כפוף למנאי ההסכם ולהקמתם ותיפוים המוסדרים של מנגנוני מתאים לשימושם פעולה ותיאום עם ישראל, תועברנה אחריות בשטחים הבאים לידי רשות המינהל העצמי (מועצת המנהלית)

ПТСР РССР АСГРД

първите първите съвети са съвети за уважение (член 1 "първите"), споменани във
награди, първите съвети са съвети за уважение (член 1 "първите")

СЛІДІВ

документ

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та пос пасене пасене и пасене пасене.

СВЕДЕНИЯ ПОДДЕРЖАНИЯ ПОДГРУППЫ ПОДГРУППЫ ШЕСТЬ

զարգացնելու աշխատավորությունը կազմում է 1000 մագիստրոսական աշխատավորությունը (աշխատավորությունը կազմում է 1000 մագիստրոսական աշխատավորությունը)

сарф ձուռա բնագա բարեկե՞ս պաօդրե՞ս աէ ձեւը պակաս ձաւուր աւքէն բուռե զա բարեկե՞ս, պաշտա նորութիւն անուս ուստի ձեւը բար ուստի պակաս (պարսկա ուստի պակաս)

ביהול המערכת המשפטית

חקלאות

כספיים

השירות הציבורי

חינוך ותרבות

בריאות

שיכון ועובדות ציבוריות

תחבורה, תקשורת ודרך פנים

עבדה, כוח אדם ורווחה חברתית

עניבי העירייה

משטרת מקומית

עניבי דת

תעשייה, מסחר ותעשייה

לרשוט המינהל העצמי (המועצה המינימלית) יהיה, כפוף לתנאי ההסכם, סמכויות הדרשות לה כדי למלא את חובותיה.

הסדרים לתיאום ושיתוף פעולה יוגדרו בהסכם:

בנוסף לעקרונות ומגבלות נוספות אשר יוסכם עליהם, הרשות למינהל העצמי (המועצה המינימלית) במיוחד לא -

1) תגביל או תשתתת סמכויות אישיות;

תפלת נגיד פרטימ, קבוצות או אישיות משפטיות אחראות על בסיס גזע, דת
מין, לאום או מוצא אתני, מקום מגורי ואזורות.

2) משנה את סמכות שיפוטה, תרחיב סמכותה או תשפייע על מעמדם של בייש
וחבל עזה.

3) תבטל יחס חוץ

סמכויות ואחריות שאריות (RESIDUAL)

סמכויות ואחריות אשר לא תועברנה למועצה המינימלית תשמרה בידי ישראל.

כל שיבוי המתייחס לסמכוויות ואחריות והפעלתן בהתאם יוכל להשות אך ורק

בנסיבות פה אחד של הצדדים.

מבנה ובוהל

המועצה המינימלית תהיה מורכבת מגוף אחד. מספר חברי יהיה בהתאם לו ויקבע על פי המפקידים בפועל שימלאו חברה. היא תחלק תפקידיה בין חברה ותקבע כללי
בוחל המתיחסים לבוחלה.

מ 1 מ

1) התדר הסופי בגוש המים בייש ווחבל עזה ייקבע במהלך המואם על המועד הסופי אשר יחל לא יותר משלוש שנים לאחר תחילת תקופת המעבר.

2) במשר תקופת המעבר, כל פטור בוסף של מקורות המים בייש ווחבל עזה ומשמש
יהיה מבוסס על:

א) השימוש הבוכחי במקומות של תושבי ירושה וחבל עזה וישראל לא יושפע לדרעה.

ב) החלטה פה אחד של ישראל ורשות המינהל העצמי (המועצה המינהלית).

3) גופ משותף לישראל ולרשות המינהל העצמי (המועצה המינהלית) יורשה לעסוק בשינויי הדרישה במקומות ובבנייה מפעלי פיתוח לטובה כל אלה המעורבים בכך, אשר יוסכם עליהם פה אחד ע"י ישראל ורשות המינהל העצמי (המועצה המינהלית)

4) מקרים, ישראל וארה"ב יראו בברכה הקמתו של גופ איזורי אשר יציג את עמי האיזור למטרת פיתוח ושימוש של מקורות המים לטובה עמים אלה.

ק ר ק ע

1) ההסדר הסופי בנושא קרקע ביישן וחבל עזה ייקבע משך המורים על המועד הסופי אשר יתחיל לא יותר משלוש שנים אחרי תחילתה של תקופת המעבר.

2) במשך תקופת המעבר

א. חזקה פרטית חוקית ובעלויות על קרקע ע"י כל אדם שהוא מוגנת ללא הפליה מטעמי דת, לאומי או מוצא אתני, מקום מגוריים או אזרחות:

ב. קרקע, הנמצאת בחזקה של או שהוקצתה ל- או מボלה ע"י סכבות מישבות ע"י ישראלים וקרקעות בתחום איזורי בטחון הישראלים יונחה ע"י רשות שתיקבע ע"י ישראל.

ג. השימוש בקרקעות נוספות יהיה כפוף להסכמה של גופ משותף לישראל ולרשות המינהל העצמי (המועצה המינהלית)

מ ש פ ט

החוקים, התקנות והצווים הנמצאים בתוך ירושה וחבל עזה וכל הסמכויות המוקנות על פיהם ישרו בתקוף במידה והם תואמים את הנסיבות, אלא אם כן יושנו בהתאם למליצים אשר יותרו בהטכם. הנסיבות יגדיר סמכותה של הרשות למינהל עצמי (המועצה המינהלית) להוצאה (Issue) (קייקת משגה הדרישה בהתאם לחוקים וצווים קיימים בתחום אחריותה.

חוקת המשגה תהיה כפופה להטכמה או לבחינה מחדש בהתאם לתקנון אשר יוסכם עליו בהטכם.

בטחון

ינקטו כל העדרים הדרושים ויעשו כל ההסדרים כדי להבטיח את בטחונה של ישראל ושבותיה במשך תקופת המעבר ולאחריה.

1) תהא נסיגת של כוחות מזוינים ישראלים ותהייה פרישה מוחודשת של הכוחות הישראלים אשר ישרו באיזורי בטחון שייפורטו.

2) יושמו הסדרים ע"מ להבטיח בטחון היבטים וחוץ והסדר הציבורי.

3) כדי לסייע בשמירה על בטחון פנימית תכנון הרשות למינהל העצמי (המועצה המינהלית) כח משטרתי מקומי חזק.

ועדה מתמדרת

בהתאם להוראות המסגרת במשך תקופת המעבר, יהו נציגיהם של מצרים, ישראל, ירדן והרשויות ל민יבאל העצמי (המועצה המיניבאלית) וועדה מתמדרת כדי להחליט מtower הסכמה על העקרונות להכנתם של בני אדם שעזבו את ירוש' וחבל עזה ב-1967, יחד עם אמצעים נוחוצים כדי למנוע אנדראלומוסיה ואי סדר.

ועדה זו תוכל גם לטפל בבעיות אחרים בעלי ערך משותף (כגון שיתוף פעולה כלכלי וכוכ') בהתאם להוראות הטעם.

הועדה תבצע פועלותיה ותקבל החלטותיה על בסיס של הסכמה פה אחד.
ארה"ב תזמין להשתתף בועדה.

ישראלים ביור'יש וחבל עזה

הסמכויות והאחריות של הרשות ל민יבאל העצמי (המועצה המיניבאלית) לא תחולגה על כוחות צה"ל ולא על אזרחים ישראלים ביור'יש וחבל עזה.
ישראלים לא ישתתפו בבחירה למועצה המיניבאלית.

SECRET

19.9.80

21.9.80 11.00 1510 08.00 19.9.80
Preliminary Memorandum of Understanding

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel ("The Parties"), in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("the Framework"). Therefore, in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza District, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, the Parties have agreed to this preliminary Memorandum of Understanding which will be subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement ("the Agreement").

Elections

1. ~~Free elections.~~

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA (AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

2. ~~Conduct and Limitations of Campaigning, of Political Expression and Elections~~

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

2. Elections will be free elections based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

3. Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians - individual and institutions - as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA (AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

When the SGA (AC) is established and inaugurated, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn. There will be an orderly transfer from the military government to the SGA (AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement will be exercised by the SGA (AC).

Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

Subject to the terms of the Agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, responsibility^{for} in the following ~~areas~~^{areas} will be transferred to the SGA (AC):

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Finance

Civil Service

Education and Culture

Health

Housing and Public Works

Internal Transportation, Communications and Posts

Labor, Manpower and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Industry, Commerce and Tourism

The SGA (AC) will, subject to the terms of the Agreement, have powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the Agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA (AC) will, in particular not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, residence and citizenship;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank* and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations.

Residual Powers and Responsibilities

Powers and responsibilities which are not transferred to the SGA (AC) will be reserved to Israel.

Any change concerning the powers and responsibilities and the exercise thereof can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the Parties.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA (AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course

of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period, every additional development of water resources in the West Bank* and Gaza District and their use will be based on the following:
 - a. the present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District and Israel will not be adversely affected;
 - b. a unanimous decision of Israel and the SGA (AC).
3. A joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects for the benefit of all those involved, which will be decided upon unanimously by Israel and the SGA (AC).
4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body representing the peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources for the benefit of these peoples.

Land

1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period -

- a) lawful private possession and ownership of land by any person will be protected without any discrimination on grounds of religion, national or ethnic origin, residence or citizenship;
- b) land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Israelis and lands included in the Israeli security locations will be administered by an authority designated by Israel;
- ~~c) other lands will be administered by [REDACTED]~~
- c) Uses of other lands will be subject to approval by a joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC).

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank* and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the Agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the Agreement. The Agreement will define the authority of the SGA (AC) to issue the necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. ~~All~~
^{on review}
~~The~~ such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.

1. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
2. Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.
3. To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA (AC).

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA (AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the 'West Bank' and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g. economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the Agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the West Bank* and Gaza District

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA (AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA (AC).

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19.9.80

Preliminary Memorandum of Understanding

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel ("The Parties"), in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("the Framework"). Therefore, in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza District, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, the Parties have agreed to this preliminary Memorandum of Understanding which will be subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement ("the Agreement").

Elections

1. Free elections.

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA (AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

2. Conduct and Limitations of Campaigning, of Political Expression and Elections.

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

(2) Elections will be free elections based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

(3) *Subject to the modifications mentioned in section (2)*
Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians - individual and institutions - as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA (AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

When the SGA (AC) is established and inaugurated, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn. There will be an orderly transfer from the military government to the SGA (AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement will be exercised by the SGA (AC).

Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

Subject to the terms of the Agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, responsibility in the following areas will be transferred to the SGA (AC):

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Finance

Civil Service

Education and Culture

Health

Housing and Public Works

Internal Transportation, Communications and Posts

Labor, Manpower and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Industry, Commerce and Tourism

The SGA (AC) will, subject to the terms of the Agreement, have powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the Agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA (AC) will, in particular not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, residence and citizenship;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank* and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations.

Residual Powers and Responsibilities

Powers and responsibilities which are not transferred to the SGA (AC) will be reserved to Israel.

Any change concerning the powers and responsibilities and the exercise thereof can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the Parties.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA (AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course

of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period, every additional development of water resources in the West Bank* and Gaza District and their use will be based on the following:
 - a. the present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District and Israel will not be adversely affected;
 - b. a unanimous decision of Israel and the SGA (AC).
3. A joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects for the benefit of all those involved, which will be decided upon unanimously by Israel and the SGA (AC).
4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body representing the peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources for the benefit of these peoples.

Land

1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period -

- a) lawful private possession and ownership of land by any person will be protected without any discrimination on grounds of religion, national or ethnic origin, residence or citizenship;
- b) land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Israelis and lands included in the Israeli security locations will be administered by an authority designated by Israel;
- c) other lands will be administered by the SGA (AC):
 - c) Uses of other lands will be subject to approval by a joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC).

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank* and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the Agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the Agreement. The Agreement will define the authority of the SGA (AC) to issue the necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. All such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.

1. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
2. Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.
3. To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA (AC).

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA (AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank* and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g. economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the Agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the West Bank* and Gaza District

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA(AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA(AC).

19.9.80

Preliminary Memorandum of Understanding

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel ("The Parties"), in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("the Framework"). Therefore, in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza District, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, the Parties have agreed to this preliminary Memorandum of Understanding which will be subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement ("the Agreement").

Elections

1. Free elections.

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA (AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

2. Conduct and Limitations of Campaigning, of Political Expression and Elections.

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

(2) Elections will be free elections based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

(3) Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians - individual and institutions - as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA (AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

When the SGA (AC) is established and inaugurated, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn. There will be an orderly transfer from the military government to the SGA (AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement will be exercised by the SGA (AC).

Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

Subject to the terms of the Agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, responsibility in the following areas will be transferred to the SGA (AC):

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Finance

Civil Service

Education and Culture

Health

Housing and Public Works

Internal Transportation, Communications and Posts

Labor, Manpower and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Industry, Commerce and Tourism

The SGA (AC) will, subject to the terms of the Agreement, have powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the Agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA (AC) will, in particular not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, residence and citizenship;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank* and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations.

Residual Powers and Responsibilities

Powers and responsibilities which are not transferred to the SGA (AC) will be reserved to Israel.

Any change concerning the powers and responsibilities and the exercise thereof can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the Parties.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA (AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course

of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period, every additional development of water resources in the West Bank* and Gaza District and their use will be based on the following:
 - a. the present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District and Israel will not be adversely affected;
 - b. a unanimous decision of Israel and the SGA (AC).
3. A joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects for the benefit of all those involved, which will be decided upon unanimously by Israel and the SGA (AC).
4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body representing the peoples of the area in order to develop and use the water resources for the benefit of these peoples.

Land

1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period -

- a) lawful private possession and ownership of land by any person will be protected without any discrimination on grounds of religion, national or ethnic origin, residence or citizenship;
- b) land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Israelis and lands included in the Israeli security locations will be administered by an authority designated by Israel;
- c) other lands will be administered by the SGA (AC):
 - c) Uses of other lands will be subject to approval by a joint body of Israel and the SGA (AC).

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank* and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the Agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the Agreement. The Agreement will define the authority of the SGA (AC) to issue the necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. All such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.

1. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
2. Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.
3. To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA (AC).

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA (AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank* and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g. economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the Agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the West Bank* and Gaza District

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA (AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA (AC).

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17.9.1980

Preliminary Memorandum of Understanding

The Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel ("The Parties"), in coordination with the United States of America, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("the Framework"). Therefore, in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza District, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, the Parties have agreed on this preliminary Memorandum of Understanding which will be subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement ("the Agreement").

Elections

1. Free elections.

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA (AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

2. Conduct and Limitations of Campaigning, of Political Expression and Elections.

Elections will be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians - individual and institutions - as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA (AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

When the SGA (AC) is established and inaugurated, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn. There will be an orderly transfer from the military government to the SGA (AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement will be exercised by the SGA (AC).

Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA (AC)

Subject to the terms of the Agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, responsibility in the following areas will be transferred to the SGA (AC):

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Finance

Civil Service

Education and Culture

Health

Housing and Public Works

Internal Transportation, Communications and Posts

Labor, Manpower and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Industry, Commerce and Tourism

The SGA (AC) will, subject to the terms of the Agreement, have the powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the Agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA (AC) will, in particular not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, nationality;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank* and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations or enter into international agreements.

Residual Powers and Responsibilities

Shared

Power and responsibilities which are not transferred to the SGA (AC) will be reserved to Israel.

Any change concerning the powers and responsibilities and the exercise thereof can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the Parties.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA (AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank* and Gaza District will be determined in the course

of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period, every additional development of water resources in the West Bank* and Gaza District and their use will depend on the fulfillment of two cumulative conditions:
 - a. the present use of water by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District and Israel will not be adversely affected;
 - b. both Israel and the SGA (AC) have given their consent.
3. A joint body of the SGA (AC) and Israel will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects which will be subject to approval by the SGA (AC) and Israel.
4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favor the establishment of a regional body including all the peoples of the area in order to develop and use all the water resources for the benefit of all these peoples.

Land

1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the transitional period

- a. all the lands in the possession of private owners of any race, religion, sex, nationality, national or ethnic origin, who live in the West Bank* and Gaza District, will be in the possession of their lawful possessors for any lawful use. The rights of the possessors will be protected against any violation.
- b. all the lands that are in the possession of any category of localities inhabited by Israelis will be administered by an authority designated by Israel.
- c. all the lands included in the Israeli security locations will be under the administration of an authority designated by Israel.

The authority designated by Israel to administer the lands of the security locations will, as far as possible, permit the continued cultivation of agricultural lands situated in the security locations.

- d. all other lands will be under the administration of the SGA (AC).

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank* and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the Agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the Agreement. The Agreement will define the authority of the SGA (AC) to issue the

necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. All such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

- a) All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.
 - 1. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
 - 2. Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order.
 - 3. To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC).

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA(AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank* and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g. economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the final autonomy agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the Areas

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA(AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA(AC).

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15 September 1980

Draft Proposal for the Ministerial Committee
Memorandum of Understanding
(Agreed Interim Report)

The Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Israel and the United States of America are agreed that the document "Memorandum of Understanding" is a preliminary agreement on the nature of the arrangements to be established for the transitional period envisioned in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("Framework"). They agree that these principles must be more fully elaborated in a final autonomy agreement, and they have committed themselves to this end. The present Memorandum of Understanding (Agreed Interim Report) will become binding and operative when the final autonomy agreement ("The Agreement") enters into force

Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework. Therefore, to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza during the transitional period, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have agreed as follows:

Elections

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA(AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

Elections will be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians -- individual and institutions -- as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA(AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

a) The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn after the inauguration of the SGA(AC). There will be an orderly transfer from the military government and its civilian administration to the SGA(AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement, will be exercised by the SGA(AC).

or b) The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn after the inauguration of the SGA(AC).

The replacement of the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will occur through the transfer to the SGA(AC) of those powers and responsibilities which will be defined by the final autonomy agreement.

or c) The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn after the inauguration of the SGA(AC).

The replacement of the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will occur through the transfer to the SGA(AC) of the powers and responsibilities which will be defined in the final autonomy agreement.

Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA(AC)

There is understanding between the parties that, subject to the terms of the final agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of

adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, the SGA(AC) will exercise responsibility in the following areas:

Administration of Justice

Agriculture

Finance (Budget - Public Consumption; Direct, Personal and Property Taxation)

Civil Service

Education and Culture

Health

Housing

Internal Transportation

Labour and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Tourism

Any additional change concerning the exercise of powers and responsibilities in the areas can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the parties.

The SGA(AC) will have all powers, subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement, which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the final autonomy agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA(AC) will, in particular, not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, nationality; or interfere with the rights of the parties under the final autonomy agreement;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the West Bank* and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations or enter into international agreements.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA(AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

- a) To be deleted.
- b) 1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.
- 2. During the period of the autonomy, every additional development of water resources and their use will depend on the fulfillment of two cumulative conditions:
 - a. the present use of water by Israel and by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District will not be adversely affected;
 - b. both Israel and the SGA(AC) have given their consent.
- 3. A joint body of Israel and the SGA(AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects which will be subject to approval by Israel and the SGA(AC).
- 4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favour the establishment of a regional body including all the peoples of the area in order to develop and use all the water resources for the benefit of all these peoples.

Land

- a) Delete.
- b) 1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the period of the autonomy, there will be four categories of land:

- a. all the lands in the possession of non-Israelis will be within the responsibility of the SGA(AC);
- b. all the lands in the possession of Israelis will be under Israeli administration;
- c. all the lands included in the security locations will be under Israeli administration;
- d. all the remaining lands will be administered by agreement by Israel and the SGA(AC) and will be used, by common consent, for the following purposes: rehabilitation of refugees, regional development, development of settlements, public utilities, etc.

/ Fall-back for category d: all the remaining lands will be within the responsibility of the SGA(AC). /

Inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District who own land situated in the security locations, will be allowed to continue to cultivate it.

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the final autonomy agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the agreement. The agreement will define the authority of the SGA(AC) to issue the necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. All such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

- a) All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond.

(1) A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

(2) Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order. (3) To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC).

or b) All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond.

(1) A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

(2) Arrangements will be implemented as provided in the final autonomy agreement to assure internal security and public order. (3) To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC).

Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA(AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank* and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g., economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the final autonomy agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the Areas

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA(AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA(AC).

15 September 1980

Draft Proposal for the Ministerial Committee
Memorandum of Understanding
(Agreed Interim Report)

The Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Israel and the United States of America are agreed that the document "Memorandum of Understanding" is a preliminary agreement on the nature of the arrangements to be established for the transitional period envisioned in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("Framework"). They agree that these principles must be more fully elaborated in a final autonomy agreement, and they have committed themselves to this end. The present Memorandum of Understanding (Agreed Interim Report) will become binding and operative when the final autonomy agreement ("The Agreement") enters into force

Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework. Therefore, to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza during the transitional period, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have agreed as follows:

Elections

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA(AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

Elections will be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians -- individual and institutions -- as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

The SGA(AC) will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five (5) years will begin.

Withdrawal of Israeli Military Government and Its Civilian Administration

a) The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn after the inauguration of the SGA(AC). There will be an orderly transfer from the military government and its civilian administration to the SGA(AC) of those powers and responsibilities which according to the Agreement, will be exercised by the SGA(AC).

or b) The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn after the inauguration of the SGA(AC).

The replacement of the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will occur through the transfer to the SGA(AC) of those powers and responsibilities which will be defined by the final autonomy agreement.

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Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA(AC)

There is understanding between the parties that, subject to the terms of the final agreement and to the establishment and proper functioning of

adequate mechanisms for cooperation and coordination with Israel, the SGA(AC) will exercise responsibility in the following areas:

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Agriculture

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Civil Service

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Internal Transportation

Labour and Social Welfare

Municipal Affairs

Local Police

Religious Affairs

Tourism

Any additional change concerning the exercise of powers and responsibilities in the areas can be made only with the unanimous agreement of the parties.

The SGA(AC) will have all powers, subject to the terms of the final autonomy agreement, which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

Arrangements for coordination and cooperation will be defined in the final autonomy agreement.

In addition to other principles and limitations to be agreed upon, the SGA(AC) will, in particular, not

- 1) curtail or suspend individual freedoms; discriminate against individuals, groups, or other legal personalities on the basis of race, religion, sex, national or ethnic origin, nationality; or interfere with the rights of the parties under the final autonomy agreement;
- 2) alter its jurisdiction, enlarge its powers, or affect the status of the * West Bank and Gaza District;
- 3) conduct foreign relations or enter into international agreements.

Structure and Procedure

The SGA(AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

Water

- a) To be deleted.
- b) 1. The final settlement of the subject of water in the West Bank and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.
2. During the period of the autonomy, every additional development of water resources and their use will depend on the fulfillment of two cumulative conditions:
 - a. the present use of water by Israel and by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District will not be adversely affected;
 - b. both Israel and the SGA(AC) have given their consent.
3. A joint body of Israel and the SGA(AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects which will be subject to approval by Israel and the SGA(AC).
4. Egypt, Israel and the United States will view with favour the establishment of a regional body including all the peoples of the area in order to develop and use all the water resources for the benefit of all these peoples.

Land

- a) Delete.
- b) 1. The final settlement of the subject of land in the West Bank and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status which will start not later than three years after the beginning of the transitional period.

2. During the period of the autonomy, there will be four categories of land:
 - a. all the lands in the possession of non-Israelis will be within the responsibility of the SGA(AC);
 - b. all the lands in the possession of Israelis will be under Israeli administration;
 - c. all the lands included in the security locations will be under Israeli administration;
 - d. all the remaining lands will be administered by agreement by Israel and the SGA(AC) and will be used, by common consent, for the following purposes: rehabilitation of refugees, regional development, development of settlements, public utilities, etc.

/ Fall-back for category d: all the remaining lands will be within the responsibility of the SGA(AC)./

Inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza District who own land situated in the security locations, will be allowed to continue to cultivate it.

Law

The laws, orders and regulations in force in the West Bank and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force to the extent consistent with the final autonomy agreement, unless changed in accordance with procedures to be outlined in the agreement. The agreement will define the authority of the SGA(AC) to issue the necessary subsidiary legislation in accordance with existing laws and orders, in the areas of its responsibilities. All such subsidiary legislation will be subject to approval in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the agreement.

Security

- a) All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond.

- (1) A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.
- (2) Arrangements will be implemented to assure internal and external security and public order. (3) To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC).

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Continuing Committee

In accordance with the provisions of the Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the SGA(AC) will constitute a Continuing Committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank* and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g., economic cooperation, etc.), as provided in the final autonomy agreement.

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

Israelis in the Areas

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA(AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in the West Bank* and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA(AC).

15 September 1980

Draft Proposal for the Ministerial Committee
Memorandum of Understanding
(Agreed Interim Report)

The Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of Israel and the United States of America are agreed that the document "Memorandum of Understanding" is a preliminary agreement on the nature of the arrangements to be established for the transitional period envisioned in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David ("Framework"). They agree that these principles must be more fully elaborated in a final autonomy agreement, and they have committed themselves to this end. The present Memorandum of Understanding (Agreed Interim Report) will become binding and operative when the final autonomy agreement ("The Agreement") enters into force

Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have arrived at a number of understandings and agreements with regard to the steps they will take to implement the terms of the Framework. Therefore, to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank* and Gaza during the transitional period, to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours, and to achieve the other objectives set forth in the Framework, Egypt and Israel, in coordination with the United States, have agreed as follows:

Elections

A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA(AC)") will be freely elected by the inhabitants in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon.

Elections will be free elections based on the principles of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, bearing in mind the need to preserve law and order as well as the underlying principles of the Framework.

* In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. Representation will be apportioned with due regard to population and municipal boundaries. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators, together with other civilians -- individual and institutions -- as worked out and agreed upon by the autonomy negotiators.

The Transitional Period

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to varying degrees of severity, and the following symptoms are
commonly observed:

1. **Diarrhoea.** This is the most common symptom, and is
usually of the diarrhoeal variety, but may be of the constipating

variety. It is usually associated with abdominal cramps, and
is often accompanied by a sense of fullness and distension.

2. **Abdominal pain.** This is a common symptom, and is usually
of the crampy or colicky variety, and is usually associated with

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changes that have taken place in the last 100 years. The
first priority is to have a broad-based education of the
young people.

Challenges of education in the 21st century

Education is a very important part of our nation's future. It is
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the educational system must be able to keep up with these changes.
Education is a fundamental right for all people, and it is important
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Conclusion

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