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
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TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND  
ITS ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL

by

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Attitude as a cognitive structure is an organization of experiences and data with reference to an object.<sup>1</sup> It is always a part of a wider context, functioning in accordance with its relationship to that context. Little as we know about the mechanism of the formation and change of attitudes, their dependence on external circumstances is an empirical fact. In the case of a collective, it may be reasonably expected that changes in political realities, constellations of power, public climate, orders of priorities, images of self and others, and prevailing world-views would affect -- congruently or incongruently -- attitudes to any relevant object. It is the purpose of this brief paper to discern broad trends of development in the Arab world, since the Six Day War, which have a bearing on attitudes towards the conflict with Israel, in certain parts of Arab society. By focussing on cases of changing attitudes, it is hoped, some insight may be gained into the makings of the attitude itself.

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The immediate impact of the June 1967 defeat on the Arabs could hardly be misread. Basically, as we all know, the roots of Arab animosity to Israel have always been dual : concrete and symbolic. Before 1967, on the concrete level, there were mainly the loss of territories in Palestine and

the appearance in the midst of the Arab world of an unabsorbable dynamic force which was seen as threatening the regional supremacy of the forces of Arabism. On the symbolic level, the confrontation with Israel became the microcosm of that cataclysmic confrontation with the West, which underlies the profound crisis that has been convulsing Arab-Islamic society since the nineteenth century. For the Arabs, anguished as they were by humiliation and dislocation, the triumphant emergence of Israel has become a constant reminder of their earlier historic setback. If these, indeed, are the roots of Arab hostility to Israel then the Six Day War could only have intensified them, for the defeat obviously aggravated matters on both levels. As the result of the war, the Arabs were compelled to evacuate territories belonging to both Syria and Egypt, in addition to the totality of the area of Palestine, including the old city of Jerusalem. They lost strategic control of the Gulf of 'Aqaba, of the sources of the Jordan waters, and of the Suez Canal, and their stature in international politics has been considerably reduced. For the majority of Arabs the symbolic implications were possibly even graver than the concrete ones. For them, the Israeli victory shattered not merely a military machine but a painfully acquired new self-dignity. Unlike previous contests, this time the Arabs had confronted Israel with the might of the Revolutionary regimes - particularly that of Nasserism - the cherished symbol of national regeneration and the culmination of their intensive efforts at modernization. The Six Day war, more than ever before, exposed the inherent weakness of Arab society and scorched its already wounded sense of pride. A few days after the war, Laylā Baʿlabakī, a leading Lebanese novelist, wrote : "We have been living a great lie, treachery and disgrace ... only war will regain for us our honour."<sup>2</sup>

Six eventful years separate us from the days when these words were written. The sense of trauma still hangs heavily over Arab society and is likely to remain there for many years to come. Yet the Arab world



itself is not that of 1967. The war precipitated, if not actually generated, processes of change whose bearing on attitudes towards the conflict with Israel is not always congruent with the spirit of irreconcilable revanchism. The exploration of these processes, it should be stated from the outset, is not undertaken here with any spirit of undue optimism. The rejection of the Israeli state is deeply rooted in Arab society and cannot be expected to change but as a result of a very long process. The obstacles on the road to Middle Eastern peace are formidable, they have been exhaustively discussed and their overwhelming weight is fully acknowledged. But it is also a fact, albeit of less common knowledge, that since the Six Day War, voices calling for a serious accommodation with Israel and coming from such circles as Egyptian intellectuals, West Bank Palestinians, Lebanese Christians, and the Jordanian ruling élite, have often been heard. The evolvment of these new attitudes, per se, undoubtedly deserve analysis, and the question of their political potentialities can be taken up at a later stage. Again what should be remembered, at this point, is that we are not dealing with the prospects of peace settlement, but with some Arab attitudes towards it. The following is, therefore, not a prognosis but rather a diagnosis.

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Firstly, the nature of inter-Arab relations has been transformed. Before the Six Day War, radical pan-Arabism, represented by the so-called "liberated" regimes, was a dynamic force engaged in a fierce struggle with the regimes it termed "reactionary." The struggle had been sustained up to the eve of the June war and, indeed, it may be argued that it was this polarization of the Arab world, upon which super power competition was superimposed, that constituted the most significant element in the pattern that precipitated the breakdown of the status quo in June. In pre-war Arab political life,



radical pan-Arabism, led by Nasserite Egypt, commanded the claim for legitimacy. States like Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Jordan, who desired to maintain their political particularity, were constantly put on the defensive. Although there evidently had existed elements in Arab society who maintained some scepticism about the politics of Arabism, they were unable to articulate them legitimately. Adherence to the programme of Arab unity, and commitment to such Arab causes as the Liberation of Palestine, were like articles of faith and any dissent bordered on heresy.

Today, the panorama of the Arab world looks quite different. The Arab cold war has subsided. The major Arab states now counterbalance each other in a much more stable pattern. The Arab world has become definitely polycentric. The position of Egypt has declined while that of countries like Saudi Arabia has considerably consolidated. Saudi Arabia, as well as Jordan, Tunisia and others, no longer feel a need to apologise for their policies. The unification of the Arab world remains an article of faith but not much more than that, and particularism, as an operational policy, is perfectly legitimate. Jordan can afford to crush the Fedayeen and gets away with it. It still does not have the capacity to negotiate a separate peace with Israel but neither has it ever been so close to that capacity.

In several Arab countries a revival of local nationalist sentiment can be discerned. It is particularly significant in Egypt where it has evidently pervaded the élite and induced the government to accommodate it by various gestures, including the rehabilitation of the name "Egypt." Egyptianism is often accompanied by disenchantment with the Arabs in general, and with the Palestinians in particular. The Arabs are frequently depicted as the source of Egypt's troubles, who first involved her in the conflict with Israel, and then deserted her to fight it out alone. In an interview with a Lebanese journalist the leading Egyptian publicist, Aḥmad Bahā' al-Dīn, said that the Arabs wanted the Egyptians to die so that they might live. In the same

interview, the Egyptian writer, Dr. Husayn Fawzī, in answer to the journalist who challenged Fawzī's opinion that the Palestinians should establish a state for themselves in the West Bank, said in a furious outburst : This is your attitude - you the Arabs - for you it is 'all or nothing'!<sup>3</sup>

The correlation between an active pan-Arab policy and an uncompromising attitude towards Israel is self-evident. Belligerency vis-a-vis Israel is not only the natural implication of a pan-Arab policy, but also its most effective instrument. Conversely, only a successful pan-Arab policy can, through coordination and collaboration, create the conditions which would make active belligerency seriously tempting. It is thus reasonable to expect that the relative decline of pan-Arabism would have a potentially moderating effect on the conflict. Nowhere has this been demonstrated better than in Egypt, where the very same group of writers who are identified with the revival of Egyptianism, recently attempted to lobby for direct negotiations with Israel. According to Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, one of the central figures of that group, their action had been motivated by the conviction that they were doing a great service to President Sādāt.<sup>4</sup>

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Another development of the post-1967 period is the transformation of the images the Arabs hold of Israeli society and their own, and the re-evaluation of the regional balance of power that this entails. No longer is Israel depicted as a grotesque puppet-state, artificially kept alive by the Western powers and lacking any power or will of her own. As reflected in Arab publications and corroborated by field studies, now the image of Israel is that of a formidable garrison-state whose power is based on superior technology, meticulous organization, a ruthless militaristic spirit, social solidarity, resourcefulness and courage. Now it is the story of the tail that wags the imperialist dog, and not vice versa.

At the same time, the self-image of the Arabs as a mighty giant who only needs reawakening has dramatically deteriorated. In the wake of the war, a literary wave of self-criticism has flooded the Arab world. In dozens of books and hundreds of articles the origin of the "new catastrophe" was attributed to Arab society itself. Arab backwardness and its concomitant inherent weaknesses, such as unrealism, verbalism, emotionalism, factionalism, opportunism and eclecticism, were mercilessly scrutinized. Contrary to what might be expected, with the passage of time, this self-criticism has become even more penetrating, at least in some sections of Arab society. Initially, the prevailing tendency was to concentrate on the lag in such acquired capacities as technological know-how, thus implying that rapid recovery was feasible. However, since this recovery, as demonstrated in the War of Attrition, has not materialized, more intrinsic inadequacies were apprehended and pointed out. Undoubtedly, the ignominious failure of the Fedayeen movement, on which so many Arabs had pinned their hopes for the effective harassment of Israel and the rehabilitation of the Arab self-image, has contributed a large share to this new outlook.

The ensuing conclusion was that the scales of power had turned in Israel's favour and that a drastic change in this state of affairs was not in the offing. While a few weeks before the June War an expert of a Beirut research center could publish a book proving -- through an abundance of facts and figures -- the military superiority of the Arabs,<sup>5</sup> now there are Arab experts, such as Professor Zahlan of the American University of Beirut, who specialize in studies showing the wide, and sometimes widening, gap between Israel and the Arabs, particularly with regard to scientific and technological capacity, which is essential for modern warfare.<sup>6</sup> Some have even gone so far as to conclude that time, in fact, was working in favour of Israel. This pre-occupation with the newly discovered Arab technological lag has apparently been so widespread that one of the government controlled



papers in Egypt warned against its demoralizing consequences and demanded the government ban it.<sup>7</sup>

To be sure, it is inconceivable that the long-held Arab conviction that their potential resources by far exceed those of Israel has significantly been modified. But it appears that as far as the foreseeable future is concerned, there are hardly any expectations of a successful military solution to the problem. Even those who support the resumption of hostilities do so more out of desperation than with hope of strategic gains. Short of that, there are options of a continued no-peace no-war situation or of some sort of accommodation with Israel. Both options are unpalatable, but the latter, to some Arabs, apparently less so than the former -- especially to those who realize that although the outlook for a distant future may be brighter-- policies today are rarely formed in terms of a range which exceeds a decade. There are two trends in Arab thought, explained recently Ihsān 'Abd al-Quddūs (the successor of Muḥamad Ḥasanayn Ḥaykal as the mouthpiece of Egyptian rulers) -- the one wishes to continue the resistance but the other demands to recognize realities and make peace with Israel.<sup>8</sup>

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This re-evaluation of the state of the conflict is also nourished by developments in the global scene. In the second half of the fifties and the first of the sixties, the notion prevailed among Arabs that Arabism possessed sufficient leverage in world affairs, at least in regard to their own priority issues, to bend the powers to its will. This notion, embodied in the doctrine and diplomacy of "Positive Neutralism," was solidly based on the realities of the bi-polar cold war between the super powers. The emergence of what was then believed to be an influential Afro-Asian bloc,

one in which the Arabs played a leading role, was considered another source of Arab international influence. Arab regimes which skillfully managed to manipulate the disposition of forces in the international situation, scored great successes in mobilizing economic aid and political support. Applying this formula to the conflict with Israel, many Arabs believed that the Arab world possessed the capacity to mobilize increasing support for its side while gradually neutralizing the external sources of support for Israel -- at least to the point where an Arab defeat would become inconceivable. To their mind, this had already been demonstrated in 1956-57, when Arab international influence turned defeat into victory, compelling the Israelis to evacuate -- promptly, totally and virtually unconditionally -- the territories they had occupied.

By the mid-sixties, partly as the result of blunders committed by President Nasser and mainly as the result of the changing global situation, "Positive Neutralism" had become a dead letter. This, however, was scarcely comprehended in the Arab world. Nasser's calculations on the eve of the war had been founded on some of the outdated premises of "Positive Neutralism" as was the widespread expectation after the war that, within a short time, 1957 would repeat itself and a withdrawal would be enforced by the international community. It took Nasser four years, the last years of his life, to realize that in the present international circumstances the Arabs had neither the capacity to involve the Soviets in a direct and decisive participation on the Arab side, or the leverage to effectively neutralize U.S. support for Israel.

This realization meant, in fact, the collapse of the Egyptian doctrine of what they termed the "political solution." That doctrine, so eloquently articulated by Haykal, envisaged a settlement which would involve some Arab concessions but basically would be an arrangement imposed by

the international community. This was contraposed with what they called a "diplomatic solution," i. e. a compromise settlement negotiated with Israel, as Israel indeed demanded. The pillars of the "political solution" were expected to be -- as shown by Haykal's words and Nasser's deeds -- the following : (a) continued military attrition, backed by the concerted efforts of a unified Arab front; (b) growing Soviet involvement and, conversely, an "even-handed" U. S. policy exercising pressure on Israel to accept an international solution; and (c) the political and moral support of the European nations, the Afro-Asian world and the U. N. community in general through its various bodies. Within the last six years, these expectations have become fallen pillars. The decline of pan-Arabism (which also explains the disintegration of the "Eastern Front") and the failure of the War of Attrition (which relieved the pressure on Israel) have already been mentioned. The limited significance of the disposition of international factors other than the super-powers has also been demonstrated in that period. Of supreme importance was the fact that the same period coincided with the emergence of an era of unprecedented co-ordination and co-operation between the powers of the East and the West. The likelihood of the powers playing the game according to Arab rules has thus receded, in the early seventies, even further than in the late sixties.

The realization of this development (which in Arab political literature is symbolized by Nixon's trip to Moscow in May 1972) was to many Arabs more alarming than the fact of the Israeli occupation itself. Seen in the light of this development, the June 1967 defeat, which the Arabs had strained to see as merely an episode, acquired, for the first time, a dimension of decisiveness which called for a re-assessment of the Arab position.



That the super powers have been exercising a moderating influence on the Arab governments is beyond doubt : they have acted in accord to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, to localize the conflict and to narrow the gap between the positions of the two parties. What is perhaps more relevant to our discussion is the fact that such influence, in one form or another, pervades the Arab public as well. Arab audiences were listening when Rogers declared in Kuwait that the only course of action open to the Arabs is direct negotiations. Or when Beylayev said in Beirut that the key to solution is in the hands of the Arabs themselves, who should pay more attention to their social development and be less preoccupied with the issue of a direct Soviet involvement on their side.<sup>9</sup>

All this cannot be unrelated, for example, to the fact that Egyptian leaders, and the Egyptian communications media, have increased their attacks of late on what they called "the defeatists" who wish for a compromise settlement with Israel. To discredit them, the authorities usually depict this trend as extremely to the left or the right,<sup>10</sup> but there is sufficient evidence to suspect that a good part of it flows right down the mainstream.

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If scepticism concerning the purposefulness of the present stage of the conflict is increasing, it follows that the willingness to bear the burden of its perpetuation must diminish. Indeed, one of the salient developments in Arab society in recent years has been the growing awareness of the high price that the conflict exacts from the Arabs. This is particularly noticeable in Egypt which now spends annually over 20% of its GNP on the military machine, at the expense of vital investments in the economy. The constant state of alert has disrupted the proper functioning of public services

and the execution of development projects. Only recently have the authorities begun to release from service recruits who have been serving consecutively since the war; the new recruits, now including students as well, face the prospect of prolonged service.

A society, of course, would sacrifice much more than that, but its members usually wish to know to what purpose. In the deliberations of a special committee convened last year to re-examine the programme of the Arab Socialist Union, Khālīd Muḥyī al-Dīn, himself a leftist, said that people from the middle and affluent classes were complaining that "Egypt spends annually E.£. 700 million for preparations for war and nothing definite comes out of it." They have reached the conclusion, he said, that Egypt must make peace (ṣulḥ) with Israel for, they say, "what do we have to fear from peace?"<sup>11</sup> Another leftist, Aḥmad Ḥamrūsh, this time speaking for himself, warned in an influential Egyptian weekly that war was a great catastrophe for a developing nation, for it would halt social progress. Peace was preferable even if, he said, "there does not exist a form of ideal peace which is detached from realities."<sup>12</sup>

Liberal intellectuals, such as the novelist al-Sharqāwī, have pointed out yet another area in which Arab society has been paying a high price for the perpetuation of the conflict -- that of domestic political life.<sup>13</sup> The conflict, they say, has been exploited by power-hungry rulers, mainly military officers, to maintain their oppressive regimes. The mobilization for the confrontation with Israel merely supplies a convenient excuse to trample on civil rights and crush any opposition. These views were also voiced recently by some of the students demonstrating at the Cairo universities. One of their banners was reported to have carried the inscription "Sinai Can Wait."<sup>14</sup>

Whether these critics themselves proceed to re-evaluate their attitude towards the conflict with Israel or not is beside the point. What matters is the pervasiveness of their mood in society at large and the consequences it entails.

Second thoughts on the conflict are apparent in other Arab societies who are paying a price, albeit different in kind, such as the Lebanese society whose integrity and stability are threatened by the activities of the Fedayeen. The most radical reappraisals can be heard from West Bank Palestinians -- the main sufferers from the previous rounds of the conflict, many of whom candidly admit that they fear that another round may be fatal for the survival of their community in this land. It is this section of Arab society that has formulated, and at certain points in the course of the last six years, even disseminated in the form of published pamphlets and newspaper articles, the most pragmatic and rational concepts of peaceful solution.<sup>15</sup>

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The final trend of development that should be included in this survey is the least tangible and yet, perhaps, is the most significant : the decline of the messianic spirit in Arab life. The vision of the redemption of Arabism and its ultimate triumph and glory -- evoked by the movement of Nasserism, and to a lesser degree by that of the original Ba'th -- has inflamed the minds of Arabs everywhere and thrown their public life into turmoil. For almost two decades Arab politics were characterized by intensive ideological fervour and deep emotional commitment to the tenets of the new movements. For the first time in the modern era, the Arabs were offered a vision that referred to the roots of their anguish and anxiety and appealed to their innermost aspirations -- and they responded



accordingly. Needless to say it was this messianic spirit that had pumped vitality and intensity into the animosity towards Israel, for it made the conflict highly relevant to the lives of Arabs everywhere, even to those who were otherwise indifferent to the concrete aspects of the conflict. This commitment to the conflict focussed mainly on its symbolic aspects, precisely those which are not susceptible to pragmatic solutions.

The decline of messianic Arabism could be perceived in the mid-sixties when Nasserism found itself at a dead end and the Ba'th movement was taken over by a clique of ambitious officers. The Six Day War was, perhaps, no more than the coup de grâce which, for all practical purposes, finished it off. The passing of the messianic movement is best demonstrated by the fact that the chief pretender to the role of all-Arab leader and successor to Nasser, is no other than Col. Mu'ammār al-Qadhafī whose message (unlike his material resources) arouses only limited interest in the Arab public.

To be sure, Sādāt still swears by the name of Nasserism, and Ba'thism is still the formal creed of both Syria and Iraq, but the dynamic radicalism has largely faded away. Sādāt's basic outlook on life is distinctly traditional, while both Asad of Syria and al-Bakr of Iraq are distinguished by their pragmatism. More than at any period since independence, Arab governments tend to concentrate on their domestic problems and on those of their immediate vicinity.

This line seems to be well-suited to the prevailing mood of their countries. Political rulers are today viewed with greater mistrust, and ideologies arouse little enthusiasm. Some sections of Arab society have experienced, to use Weber's conception, "a demystification of the world" and like their counterparts in the West, suffer from alienation and a tendency to withdraw into their own circles, or into what an Egyptian

novelist, Husayn Kāmil, called their "sacred valleys." It may be surmised that they thus become less prone to the mass hysteria of Holy Wars.

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That today the Arab attitude towards Israel is not monolithic is thus beyond any doubt. Many questions, however, remain open. How profound and how widely spread are the attitudinal changes which have been effected by the trends of development described above ? To what extent do they, in effect, add up to a discernible process which would have a significant impact on Arab-Israeli relations ? The period under discussion is obviously too brief and the developments pointed out too embryonic to allow any definite answer. It has already been said and should be reiterated that the forces working against a settlement have an overwhelming weight today. Furthermore, the possibility of the emergence of other developments which could affect Arab attitudes perversely should also be taken into account. Such an effect could be produced, for example, by the increase in the importance of Arab oil. This could give the Arabs new leverage in international politics, relieve the economic burden of the conflict, boost their self-confidence and arouse fresh expectations of imposing their will upon Israel. The most practical question is, of course, to what extent can these developments affect, not only sections of Arab society, but the Arab decision makers ? What can be said of the situation at the present is that if the test for a placatory attitude is an orientation towards a bargaining process with the aim of achieving a bilateral settlement with Israel, then King Husayn would probably qualify while President Sādāt would not. It is plausible that while Husayn's attitude is the result of his capacity to re-adjust to new realities, that of Sādāt's is a measure of his attachment to outdated Nasserite terms of reference. Whether the trends of development discussed in this paper have the capacity to induce Sādāt, or his successor,

to re-evaluate their position, is again unanswerable. It may be supposed, however, that they do affect the domestic constraints on the decision-making process and thus they make, even today, a peace settlement with Israel fall within the range of possible options.



## FOOTNOTES

1. S.E. Asch, "Attitude as Cognitive Structure," in M. Jahoda and N. Warren (eds.), Attitudes (London 1966), p. 32.
2. Al-Usbū' al-ʿArabī (Beirut), 10 July, 1967.
3. Al-Ṣayyād (Beirut), 25 March, 1971.
4. Al-Ṣiyāsa (Kuwait), 12 March, 1973.
5. Anīs Sā'igh, Mīzān al-quwā al-caskariyya bayn al-duwal al-carabiyya wa-isrā'īl (Beirut 1966).
6. For example A. B. Zahlan, "The Science and Technology Gap in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 17-36.
7. Akhabār al-Yawm (Cairo), 22 July, 1972.
8. Akhabār al-Yawm, 15 April, 1972.
9. Report on Beylayev's speech in Beirut in al-Hayāt (Beirut), 20 March, 1973.
10. Al-Ṣayyad, 1 June, 1972; Akhabār al-Yawm, 15 April, 1972.
11. Text of discussions in al-Ṭaḥf'a (Cairo), June 1972, p. 94.
12. Rūz al-Yūsuf (Cairo), 2 November, 1970.
13. Al-Jumhūriyya (Cairo), 10 April, 1968.
- 14.
15. See for example Muḥammad Abū Shalbāya, Lā salām bi-ghayr dawla filasṭiniyya ḥurra (Jerusalem n.d.).

## MISCOMMUNICATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS IMPACT ON THE BREAKING-OUT OF WARS

George H. Quester

### Some Abstract Causes of War

Is all war caused by miscommunication? Must there always be error or stupidity on one side or on both, for such mass destruction and homicide to occur, in the Middle East, or anywhere else? The humanist might be tempted indeed to blame all war on miscalculation and faulty communication between the parties to a conflict, and he can extract more than a few case studies from history to bear him out. Yet at the least we would have to sort out some different kinds of miscalculation and miscommunication, since the direct cause of war is indeed not always the same, since the remedies required to head war off might have had to be diametrically opposite. Moreover, we may discover plausible instances where war was not in any way dependent on such human error, but rather emerged from a conflict of interest so deep that the two parties quite calmly and rationally preferred to settle the issue violently rather than peacefully.<sup>1</sup>

There can indeed be wars which in no way relate to any lack of wisdom or communication, but simply reflect some enormous incompatibility of life styles, such that neither side is willing to offer the other any space within which to maintain life. If such be the case, the winners of a war can not offer the losers any better terms than death or expulsion. The losers do not fight on in false hopes of victory, but because they have no alternative prospect preferable to continued combat. This indeed may have been the case between European settlers in North America and the American Indian, since the life-styles and economies of the two were enough incompatible so that many settlers would say "The only good Indian is a dead Indian."

If this is the true cause of war, there will be almost no miscalculation or miscommunication that an outsider could relieve to restore peace. The sides simply hate each other, in the operational sense that neither can live as it wants to when the other is around. When can war be more rational than this? When can the situation be more gloomy? Where war is the result of faulty communication, we can at least take solace in the fact that communication might always be improved. When war is not based on error, however, it may be more inevitable.

If hostility of this intensity sometimes plagues mankind with irreconcilable differences, a different plague is the false illusion of such hostility, which often enough has driven nations to battle each other needlessly in the wake of a basic miscommunication. This second cause of war thus may seem more tragic if only because violent conflict was so unnecessary.

Analysts of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States since 1945 at times have argued that there was no real basis for such tension, but merely a set of fearful initial impressions which induced precautionary counter-moves, which then seemed on each side to confirm the initial impressions of hostility, etc.<sup>2</sup> We have thus entered a world of communication and miscommunication here whereby propositions can threaten to confirm themselves. An all-knowing outside observer can perhaps restore peace by acquainting each party with its adversary's true feelings, but how does one endow such a peace-maker with the credibility to achieve this purpose, to eliminate the mirror-image miscalculations that cause war?

A third kind of war may seem to resemble the war based on simple misunderstanding, but the imperfect information involved is even more difficult to remedy, and the leaders involved are hardly to be condemned. This is basically what is known as the "prisoners' dilemma" in game theory. What if the geographic and strategic situation is such that whoever strikes first comes out ahead for



having done so? And what if there is no way for either side to tell in advance whether the other is striking on a path of violent hostility, until the blow is felt? In such unhappy situations, each side may feel that it must take the hostile road, on the correct calculation that it comes out better by doing so, no matter what the adversary does. If the other side is double-crossing us, we are better off for having double-crossed him. If he is not double-crossing us, we would also be better off for having double-crossed him. Of such stuff are many kinds of political conflict made, including wars.<sup>3</sup>

We can thus easily note in 1914 that neither side might have mobilized its reserves, if only it could be sure that the other side was not mobilizing either. Yet it is hard to condemn error when the Kaiser could not know for certain what the Czar was doing, but knew that Germany was better off mobilized either way. A surer means for letting each side monitor the other's day-by-day or hour-by-hour actions might have averted World War I, as well as some later wars, but if the means could not be provided, how resolutely do we wish to condemn the "miscalculation" of the decision-makers involved?

The "prisoners' dilemma" situation therefore can not simply be blamed on a misreading of each other's intentions by the two sides; it merely reflects the temptations of a military situation that offers too much to the side which is first to take the non-cooperative road. When both sides respond to such temptations, the result can be a war which is far worse for each side than peace. Yet that war is unfortunately still better for each than being conquered after a unilateral decision to pass up the offensive temptation. Miscalculation here might be relieved by reconnaissance satellites, or by reliable neutral observer missions, or by secure defensive embankments, but not by any further study of comparative culture. War is not preferable to peace in these situations, for the interrelationship of the two groups is not totally hostile. But deceit is

preferable to trust, since the system does not verify trust, and war is the result.

Yet these are not yet the only kinds of miscalculation or miscommunication or ignorance relevant to war. Groundless distrust of a neighboring state can lead to war, and so can a lack of reliable information on what a neighbor is up to. But misplaced confidence in an opponent's aversion to war can sometimes also cause or prolong a war. Exactly the opposite kind of miscalculation thus has occurred when each side fights a war or extends a crisis on the expectation that the other side will tire first. Here we deal again with what can be called "miscommunication" as well as miscalculation. If both sides expect to out-endure the other, one must be in error, and an outsider might serve peace by exposing the error. Yet who can really tell whether the Hanoi regime or the Nixon regime has the greater endurance? To make things worse, predictions on this question tend to be just as self-confirming as those noted in the second model above. Being told that the other side is about to surrender may erase one's own inclination to early surrender. The winning of these endurance contests is very much like the tug-of-war, where victory goes by default to the side that only persisted a slight amount longer. If a wise outsider could tell in advance who would win the endurance contest, he could dispel the miscommunications and thereby spare all sides the need of actually carrying through with the contest. Yet we do not know how to make such an observer so unerringly accurate as to be believable.

Fifth and finally, wars can obviously occur if both sides expect to win. One military staff must have miscalculated when this happens, and an outsider might have done a service for peace by dispelling such false optimism. If Prussia was bound to defeat France in 1870, by this logic, a British commentator might well have advised the French to "settle out of court," to give

Bismarck whatever he was demanding and thus to spare all concerned the bloodshed of the Franco-Prussian War. Yet again the outsider may himself have difficulty in determining whose optimism was false, even if he is a skilled military analyst free of the emotional passions infecting the parties actually involved in the conflict.

This last form of violence is chargeable more to miscalculation than to miscommunication; the impressions of objective military strength and capability drive the two sides on, more than any mutual misreading of intentions. As with the other pressures for hostility, outside advice could avert bloodshed if only the advice were accurate and absolutely credible. Wars continue to happen at least in part because no one has this quality of advice to give.

#### War in the Middle East

Is there indeed a particular one of these models that accounts for war in the Middle East, specifically war between Arab military forces and the Israeli community? Or have several or all of these models shown themselves, as the style of Arab-Israeli war has shifted from decade to decade, and year to year?

Spokesmen for Zionism and Israel have indeed been prone to account for the war on the basis of the second model, that Arabs have mistakenly seen hostility in Zionism, and then foolishly began military operations which in turn forced the Jewish community to defend itself. It is this foolishness, rather than genuine conflict of interest which presumably explains the reluctance of Israel to accept the return of Arab refugees who fled their homes in 1948, and the exclusion of Moslem Arabs within Israel from service with the Israeli Army. Note is often made of the high standard of living of Arabs living in Israel, and of the possibilities of beneficial economic and social cooperation between Israel and the Arab communities all through the region. Middle Eastern war, in this



view, is very much the result of miscalculation, Arab miscalculation of the nature of peaceful coexistence with Israel.

Spokesmen for the Arab position ever since 1920 would have claimed instead that the first model of hostility applied, a simple incompatibility of life-styles between Arab Palestine and Jewish Israel. Such spokesmen would claim further that Zionists have been fully aware of this incompatibility, so that claims of peaceful cooperation are merely a propaganda smokescreen used to appease outside public opinion. Arab Palestine by this argument could never be the same after the Jewish population had risen from 56,000 to 700,000 and then to two million. The Zionist determination to employ Jewish labor on land purchased from Arab landlords only proved a desire to create a Jewish community in which Arabs would have no place. Arab Palestinians, in this view, have no choice but to carry on warfare if they wish to be Palestinians, for Israel is determined to keep them from ever reappearing in Palestine.<sup>4</sup>

However much one accepts this more pessimistic view of the nature of Arab-Israeli conflict, it does not suffice as an explanation of Middle East wars, if only because it can not account for the periods of peace which have been interspersed with these wars. Perhaps Israelis can indeed not accept the surrender of Palestinian Arabs, because to accept their surrender would be to accept them again as near neighbors. Yet the Palestinians, and especially their Arab patrons, have not yet been driven to so desperate a choice, as let us say, that of the Indian tribes of Eastern North America which fell victim to virtual genocide.

Palestinians, and other Arabs, have had some option for peace, even if it is a peace that gravely violates their sense of what is just. All-out war is worse than this peace, and a decision to go to war has thus necessarily involved some particular calculation from case to case, a calculation that may yet ex-

hibit the further kinds of error that we have catalogued. Even if an observer questioned the Zionist view that coexistence offers the Arabs extensive benefits, the Arab performance grudgingly demonstrates that the coexistence of the truce is periodically preferable to war. When war is preferable, it is not just desperation that prodded the Arabs on, but some calculation of gain.

It is good propaganda for Arabs to overstate the desperation of their position, and the totality of the conflict over Palestinian real estate. Conflicts over real estate indeed may be the most difficult kinds of war to adjudicate. While more militant Israeli spokesmen occasionally echo this sense of irreconcilable conflict, in general the Israeli propaganda advantage lies in stressing the opposite. The Arabs are thus shown as having fanatic or irrational motives for wanting to "drive Israel into the sea," rather than any rational motive. Yet as long as the Palestinians themselves have been driven into other Arab lands rather than into the sea, Arab propaganda can not convincingly rule out the option of peace either.

The remainder of this paper will thus seek to examine specific outbreaks of war in the Middle East and the kind of error or miscommunication that contributed to each case. We thus will be seeking something beyond any such "basic error" as Arabs misreading the advantages Zionism offered them, or any such "basic conflict" as would inevitably set Arabs senselessly into armed conflict with Israeli. War has not been inevitable in the Middle East; the proof is that peace has repeatedly broken out. But conflict is not illusory at its core in the Middle East either, any more than conflicts of life style and political style are simply silly misperceptions.

It will be argued through this paper that the specific outbreaks of war between Israel and the Arab powers of the Middle East must be traced to the three remaining models of war. Violent conflict in Palestine has several times arisen

because the military technology or geographical situation of the moment heavily favored taking the offensive, so that each side could be stampeded into beginning a war, our third model. It has several times been prolonged because one side hoped that the other would not have the stomach for conflict, our fourth model. And more than anything else, conflict has finally persisted because both sides have expected ultimate victory, when only one side could be correct in such expectations, by definition.

#### 1918 - 1948

The first Middle Eastern "war" between Zionist and Arab commenced in the wake of the Balfour Declaration and World War I, as Arab terrorists in the 1920's and the 1930's sporadically sought to dissuade Jewish settlers from entering the Palestine mandate, or to dissuade the British from allowing such settlers to enter. This seems clearly to fall into harassment pattern of most guerilla wars, as Arab forces never attempted to stake out any firm lines through which Jews or British would not be allowed to pass, but rather sought to impose daily costs on the Jewish community, to exhaust Zionist or British resolve.

This "war" obviously involved some costs for the Arab community also, in the disruption of everyday life resulting from such terror, in the wages lost in general strikes, etc. On the lines of the desperation argument, Arab spokesmen such as the Grand Mufti would have claimed of course that Arab peasants had no choice but violence when their land was being bought out from under them. Yet reprisals by the British or by the Jewish settlers themselves were an additional cost that made this kind of terrorism bearable only under special assumptions. The Arab calculation was clearly that Zionist resolve would fade. If this was a miscalculation, perhaps it was only so because the rise of Hitler to power stiffened the determination of Jews to come to Palestine; otherwise there were



indeed times in the 1920's when the outflow of Jews from the mandate exceeded the inflow.<sup>5</sup> In terms of violence, therefore, the British mandate amounted mainly to an endurance contest in which each side was betting that the other would give up first.

In terms of territorial control, however, a different sort of campaign was on, generally non-violent, involving each side's effort to use the laws and policies of the Mandate to tip the balance of population and land tenure in its own favor. One could ask whether this conflict was unnecessary and the result of misunderstanding, or whether it was a core conflict that was unavoidable even with the best of information available to either side. British policy during the Mandate has been attacked by both Jew and Arab, and often indeed seemed a hapless attempt to split differences in ways which satisfied neither side. Yet one could have defended British policy as a sincere effort to avoid a "war" of land tenure and population figures, for free immigration and unrestricted land purchase would set up the prisoners' dilemma situation whereby neither side could trust the other to maintain any status quo. Unfortunately for the relations between Britain and the Jewish Agency, the needs of Jewish refugees from Hitler now very much overshadowed the prerequisites of stable peace within Palestine.

The presence of British armed forces until 1948 thus had several important impacts on the nature of conflict. Such forces prevented either side from going to war in hopes of military victory, or in fear of military conquest by the other side. Military operations per se were thus limited to the terrorism of the guerilla operations by each community, which had to be based on one side's underrating the willingness of the other to bear up under a prolonged campaign. Yet the very presence of British forces maintaining a law and order may have facilitated the processes of immigration and land purchase which drove the two

sides to preempt and distrust each other. Could the Arab leadership really trust Zionists who seemed intent on establishing defensible posts all across Palestine, and on bringing in large quantities of manpower from Europe? Could the Jewish leadership really trust Arabs who seemed intent on squeezing Jewish settlement into a narrow non-viable strip along the Mediterranean coast? Could the British have maintained law and order and normalcy in Palestine in any way that mutually reassured the two communities against each other?

One need not therefore conclude that the two sides exaggerated each other's hostility during the years of the Mandate. Perhaps each had to distrust the other because the laws of the Mandate favored "territorial imperative" preemption. Perhaps each side underrated the other's hostility, in that Arabs thought Jews might go away quietly, and Jews thought the same of dispossessed Arabs.

It is at least possible that the conflict emerging from such causes generated excessive fears on each side, which in turn produced further conflict. Noone will argue that the Middle East conflict between Israel and the Arab states is totally devoid of mutual misunderstanding, by which either side misses the conciliatory gestures and peace signals of the other. Rather the question must be whether such miscommunication amounts to the root cause of conflict, as perhaps it has been in other wars between other peoples. Between Jew and Arab, this kind of illusion of hostility does not seem to be the root of the problem. If it were, such conflict would be easier to solve.

#### 1948

The first real war between Arabs and Israelis thus broke out as British forces were departing from the Mandate in 1948, a war going beyond the simple terrorism of the guerrilla campaign. A militarily-unreal world had existed for the last years of the Mandate, as the British Army kept open the roads for either

side, while Zionist and Arab forces staked out defenses or launched offensives away from the roads and from the British. Yet was war inevitable in the wake of the British withdrawal, or was it the product of misunderstanding? Couldn't the two communities simply have consolidated the territories they held, and then in a defensive standoff have come to terms with each other?

War is more likely, as noted, whenever military technology favors quick military initiatives over contemplation, whenever the offensive is a better tactic than resting on one's defenses. Part of the conflict of 1948 thus simply reflected the temptation of seizing strong points and crossroads and ammunition dumps as they were vacated by the British. Yet another and larger part was occasioned by the very pattern of land tenure that had arisen through the Mandate. For one reason or another, Jewish settlement had not been consolidated simply into a single contiguous mass along the Mediterranean, but had leapfrogged (exploiting the British maintenance and policing of roads) across much of Palestine. Such a pattern of settlement would tempt either side to test the outcome of a military solution. The defenses of such settlements were typically strong enough to repulse attack. Arab forces now expected that such settlements could be eliminated by closing the roads which supplied them. If so, a short war of siege would have delivered much of Palestine into purely Arab hands. Israeli hopes of maintaining and consolidating such settlements conversely had to be based on an offensive superiority along the roads leading to them. When one side can attack the established positions of the other successfully, and has good reason to do so, war will result often enough. The 1948-49 war thus consisted basically of a series of Israeli offensives along the roads previously policed by the British, with the object of relieving individual settlements before they succumbed to Arab siege.

The war of 1948 thus occurred importantly because, in prisoners' dilemma



fashion, the roads of Palestine were not defensible by the Arabs who lived along them, against Israeli motorized forces seeking to open them. The war therefore occurred in part because Jewish settlements had been established deeply enough into the interior to tempt the Arabs to try a blockade, and then to force the Israelis to seize the points of blockade.

War could perhaps have been avoided, but probably only by the kinds of measures which would have left Israel much smaller than its boundaries under the 1949 truce. Rigorous bans on Jewish settlement might have left Palestine in 1947 neatly divided into two homogenous segments with no temptation for either side to take the offensive. But wouldn't this have tempted Arab armies to try to push the smaller Israel into the sea as well? Perhaps, although the vulnerability of places like Haifa and Tel Aviv can easily have been exaggerated by Zionist spokesmen seeking support from the outside world. The important point may well have to be that war-avoidance was not at the forefront of either side's imagination in 1947, as designs on segments of territory were more important.

The 1948 war also occurred importantly because Arabs had overestimated their military strength as compared with the Israelis. While the outside world often saw the Israeli community in great danger of defeat and slaughter, by Arab armies of legendary military prowess, a calmer analysis even at the outset of Israeli independence might have concluded that the advantage was on the Jewish side, postponed only by the need to bring in some boatloads of modern weaponry and military-age reinforcements. A European military technology would not be stopped by ad hoc formations of Arab guerrillas trying to bloc the roads of Palestine; if T. E. Lawrence's Arabs had so easily ambushed and destroyed Turkish railroad trains, it would be far less easy to stop Israeli armored cars and tanks pushing along roads.

The confused interspersing of Arab and Jewish settlements had made war

seem appropriate to each side in 1948 and 1949, and had made war appear likely even to the outside world. Yet the outside world's aversion to war was nonetheless strong, so that threats of economic sanction made it difficult for either side to pursue open combat once the battle lines were more clearly drawn. An awareness of this outside aversion has all along thus been an ~~important~~ reinforcement for any communications required for peace.

### 1949 - 1956

The Arabs clearly lost the 1948-1949 war, whether or not such a loss should have been predictable all along. The ensuing period did not however see the Arab leaderships become reconciled to such a loss, and the resulting preparations for war must thus again be examined, to see if errors and miscommunication were plausibly the cause. Did Arab regimes again simply expect that continual harassment would dissuade Jews from remaining in Israel, and would discourage additional immigration? Did the Arabs thus exaggerate Israeli aversion to war? Or was it the reverse, as Arab spokesmen sometimes claim, that the Arab regimes genuinely feared further Israeli attempts at conquest, and were maintaining and bolstering their defensive posture of resistance?<sup>7</sup>

More than this was involved. Perhaps the plight of Arab refugees from the 1949 war made peace per se unbearable, the staple of Arab propaganda. Yet, dreams of victory still were integrally woven into the intransigence of the Arab side. We must thus ask whether it was foolish hopes of military victory that played the decisive role in frustrating a real peace for the Middle East. Importantly linked to false expectations of victory here are the notions of justice and revenge. It may be that all cultures are somewhat disposed to throwing good money after bad in pursuing the righting of old wrongs, but Islamic morality and Arab culture may have accentuated this in ways that make peace more difficult. Since

1949, any Arab ruler who showed signs of writing off old grievances and claims in Palestine has run the risk of assassination. If one believes that God and the universe ordain revenge, one ipso facto comes to believe that the victory of revenge and justice is possible. Arabs consistently have expected to win wars against Israel since 1948, precisely because it was right and just that they should win, and few of their rulers can dare to question this. If Germans can adjust to the Oder-Neise line and Mexicans can adjust to the Rio Grande border, Arabs as yet have shown no willingness to adjust to any defined boundary with a Jewish state.

If wars may happen because both sides expect to win, with one side in fact grossly overestimating its military competence, this is hardly uniquely present to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is peculiar to the Middle East is the persistence of this phenomenon. While it explains only occasional outbursts of war elsewhere (whereupon one side or the other "learns its lesson") it may explain war after war between the Arab states and Israel.

Perhaps the Muslim sense of revenge would in any event thus have produced miscalculation, and thereby wars, as Arab states refused anything but temporary peace in the Middle East. Yet some other development now served to enhance the likelihood of war in the years after 1950. First and foremost was the rise to power of Nasser in Egypt, who mortgaged his own political future to the need and feasibility of revenge against Israel, and who extended his ambitions to a union of Arab states. Arab expectations of military victory would not have been raised nearly as much if President Nasser had not plausibly aspired to unifying all the Arab states under his leadership; the prospect of Arab unity, however illusory, offered a suggestion of military competence in the future, to avenge the victories of the past. It focussed the spotlight of attention on Nasser and on any promises he had made, making it all the more difficult for him to



back away from the revenge he had vowed.

A second development was the removal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, and the diminution of British influence throughout the Middle East. Since the British had some vested interest in peace, their presence might have served to avert misunderstandings and situations of military preemption. The third development, of course, was the sale of Czech arms to Egypt after 1955. The arms sales were again only in part significant because they might in reality have reversed what otherwise would have been Israeli battlefield victories. Much more importantly, they raised Arab popular expectations of victory, expectations which were to put Arab states into the mood for war without putting Israelis into the mood for surrender.

The expanding volume of Arab terrorist attacks in the early 1950's, many of them launched from bases in Egyptian-controlled territory, thus suggested that a real peace in the Middle East was far away. Whether or not these by themselves constituted war (and one must note how large the regular volume of Israeli casualties stood in this period against the base of Israel's total population),<sup>8</sup> it certainly set the stage for the war of 1956.

Neutral observers of the United Nations have many times commented bitterly on an Israeli policy of excessive retaliation for border incidents, a policy of "one-upmanship" which responded to each Arab guerrilla attack with one measured to be of greater intensity. Has this merely been some sort of Israeli brutality, or a new Israeli machismo that takes pride in outdoing the opposite side in violence?<sup>9</sup>

A more reasonable explanation can be found. Arab terrorism since 1949 has been based on two kinds of assumption, each of which can be mistaken. One was that Israelis might tire of being harassed and begin to abandon their home in Palestine. More centrally such attacks might begin to demonstrate a military prowess that portended larger-scale military campaigns to come in the future.

The illusion of diminished Israeli determination, and the illusion of enhanced Arab military competence, are (as noted earlier) valuable for their own sake, for they may indeed be self-confirming. Israeli retaliation has thus symmetrically been intended to prove beyond doubt the intention to hold the territory taken, and to discourage any expectations that Arab armies can soon defeat those of Israel. Armies which have just been defeated and humiliated often fight less well thereafter simply as a result of the embarrassment suffered, the male pride wounded. A fair amount of Israeli reasoning on stable relations with the Arab states has thus really concentrated on humiliations designed to dissipate the Arab hope of ultimate victory. Israeli retaliations are designed less to deter than to prove that the military balance in the Middle East has not changed.

The policy of one-upmanship can of course be challenged as worsening Arab hostility rather than easing it. If each Israeli armored probe once again demonstrated the weakness of an Arab army, it also constituted another injustice in Arab eyes, necessitating further revenge, and perhaps thereby assuring that in the end it must come. Questions could thus be raised on whether Israelis were miscalculating on the best way to reduce Arab expectations of revenge. It also was always possible that Israelis were exaggerating Arab hostility, or that Arabs were perceiving more Israeli hostility than really was there. Yet the years immediately after 1949 do not support this possibility very strongly, again at least not as the root source of conflict.

#### 1956

The Israeli attack in Sinai in 1956 might thus be interpreted simply as a morale-destroying lesson for the Arab side. War in this view was never necessary except for the Arabs' persistent overoptimism about their military strength. A war now to teach a lesson might reduce the frequency of the wars Israel had to

fight later on, because the war would replace bad information with good. With British and French cooperation, a joint attack on Egypt might at least have delayed any Arab expectations of a near-term victory over Israel. It might also have substantially weakened Nasser's appeal as a pan-Arab leader. If the joint operation had actually led to Nasser's removal from power in Cairo, Arab expectations of victory might have been even more clearly eroded. The war of 1956 may thus have been simply a war of military miscalculation, or on the Israeli side, a "war to end miscalculation."

Yet, what if there was more reality than this to Arab unity, and to the Arab military reinforcement, especially with Soviet weapons? If time was really running against Israel, wasn't war preferable at an earlier time rather than a later, precisely because it would effect who would win? Only the most optimistic Israeli leader would have ruled out totally the possibilities of a successful Arab military unification and mobilization within a decade or two, especially since Israel's peculiar frontiers seemingly invited attack from so many directions. If Russian military equipment could be captured and destroyed, and strategic positions in the Sinai desert could be seized, Israeli defenses could have been objectively reinsured for a longer time into the future.

Was the prospect of Arab unity thus so real that Israel had to fear it, and to try to head it off? If so, then Arab hopes of revenge by military victory may never have been totally misfounded. A traditional balance-of-power analysis suggested that a state like Israel held a vested interest in maintaining disunity among its neighbors. Given the ideological and dynastic rivalries endemic in the Arab world, there were indeed a great number of divisions for the Israelis to exploit, and still are. Yet the machinations here could never be as open as in the traditional balance model. Catholic rulers of France could openly consort with Turkish Moslems or Swedish Protestants, but no Arab ruler could



openly cooperate with the Israelis without losing his constituency and/or his life. Even to resist Nasser on other grounds ran the risk of revolution. Yet this latter version raises some different questions about Arab miscommunication. If he was pursuing real Arab unity and real Arab military strength, did Nasser not foresee that an Israeli preemptive attack was likely to come? Did he mistakenly assume that world opinion and world legitimacy would inhibit such Israeli action? Was it just a fluke that the uproar over the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the ensuing British and French grievances gave Israel some military allies in this case, and generated enough "noise" in the system to prevent any clear condemnation of Israeli aggression?

The war of 1956 may thus have been a war of miscommunication rather than simple miscalculation, in that Nasser overrated Israel's commitment to peace. Arab propaganda aside, the Egyptian support for Fedayeen attacks prior to 1956, and the closing of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, did not come in anticipation of an imminent new Israeli offensive intended to conquer more Arab land. Rather such harassments of Israel were conducted on the opposite expectation, that Israel would not attack, but might be worn down morally and economically, until some day an Arab victory could come. The Israeli attack came first.

#### 1956-1967

At first glance, the powers that had invaded Egypt in 1956 seemed to have gained little from their initiative, since Nasser remained in power and the invading armies were all required to withdraw; territorially, Israel achieved only an opening of the Straits of Tiran, so that the port of Elath might be used. Yet there was a very real significance in the United Nations Emergency Force which had interposed itself between Egyptian and invading forces in the Suez

Canal Zone and then was moved to the truce line between Israel and Egypt.

Such a force changed calculations and miscalculations on possible wars in three important ways.

First, if there was very much mutual fear of sudden sneak attacks in the system, the presence of these forces as observers and hostages could reduce this considerably, since each side knew that the other was much less likely to launch an attack while these forces were in the way. The "prisoners' dilemma" problem was thus eased, as each side would have an added incentive to wait and see in a future crisis.

Second, this force also made it more difficult for either side to carry on a war-of-endurance by the guerrilla-terrorist campaigns that had characterized this sector prior to 1956. Egypt, to be sure, could still close the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping in the hope that this would handicap Israel's economic development, but it could far less easily now dispatch Fedayeen with explosives on the same task. The Israeli port of Elath remained open.

Third, Nasser's acceptance of these forces in his hour of need in 1956, and subsequent tolerance of their deployment on Egyptian soil along the border, generally reduced Arab anticipations that he could be the initiator of a new military offensive against Israel. If the Middle Eastern peace problem has continually been that both sides have expected battlefield victory, any change to discourage either side reinforces peace. Almost nothing could now plausibly have discouraged Israeli military expectations enough to put the population into the mood for a negotiated surrender and evacuation to North America. But the UN presence might have discouraged Arab expectations substantially.

Could Nasser now have maintained this position in Egypt and in the Arab world, while reconciling himself to such lowered expectations of revenge? We must again acknowledge that statesmen almost everywhere are forced to throw

good money after bad. As long as one has not yet admitted defeat, one may still retain a mandate, with the promise that the ultimate victory will redeem all the losses and suffering endured in earlier stages. To admit defeat may be to surrender office. This was President Johnson's problem on Vietnam; it was the problem of the German and British governments during World War I. With the defeat of 1956 added to the defeat of 1949, Nasser might only with the most astute statesmanship have been able to steer Arab attention to other matters; perhaps the Arab inclination toward revenge and justice is very much stronger than that of other populations, so that it makes such statesmanship impossible once one has assumed office with a commitment to revenge.

Yet perhaps it was not impossible, given the United Nations presence. Nasser, to be sure, tolerated the continued presence of the UNEF. This might only have been because the outside world would have resented any Egyptian eviction of this force, so soon after it had come to Nasser's aid. Yet it gave Nasser a ready excuse not to resume warfare. Nasser also soft-pedalled any open discussion of an early resumption of hostilities with Israel. Still, the official line of Cairo matched that of all other Arab capitals in rejecting any acceptance of Israel as a state with a place in the Middle East. Perhaps Israel missed some subtle signals on the refugee question, the question to which Arab spokesmen always return, signals that Arab hostility was not as total as the radio broadcasts suggested. Yet the continued conflict seems based on more than such missed signals.

If the UNEF could prevent guerrilla attacks on the Sinai border, much would depend on whether such terrorism could be avoided on other fronts. It was not. From the Israeli point of view, this may simply prove that all the Arab states might have been intent all along on resuming a policy of harassment, so that Nasser's front was quiet only because of the unwanted presence of the UN force.



Consistent with this view, the resumption of Fedayeen raids from Jordan and Syria displayed the recurrent dreams of victory in Cairo and every other Arab capital, again testing the arena on which great battles were to be fought in the future. Simple Arab vindictiveness, or foolish Arab hopes that Israel might still lose its nerve, presumably were again showing themselves.<sup>10</sup>

However true this picture might be, the situation assuredly was exacerbated by a new form of preemptive exchange on the use of water resources of the upper Jordan River. After Arab rejection of earlier plans for joint development of these resources, Israeli plans went ahead for a unilateral exploitation, to which the Arab response was loud protest and renewed violence. If the waters of the region had been easily divided, so that neither side could physically divert the bulk of them to its own purposes, a bone of contention would have been eliminated. Nature was not so kind, and one more of the unresolved issues of the division of Palestine thus now stirred each side into seizing the initiative itself. Israeli physical moves on water diversion were subjected to artillery bombardments and guerrilla raids, while a counter-diversion by Lebanon produced Israeli air raids. Rumor spread of impending more serious Israeli retaliations against Syria.

Could Nasser have remained free of the trap of this prisoner's dilemma, given that the UNEF had defused his front of any military preemptive temptations toward the offensive? Not if he were to continue his aspirations to Arab leadership. Nasser had gone so far as to criticize the Arab escalation of the dispute on water diversion, and to attack loose Arab talk advocating an early war. Yet there was a limit to how much he could disassociate himself from an Arab conflict with Israel and still be the Arab unifier. If Israeli attacks were expected on Syria, because the Israelis seemed bellicose, or simply because the geography of watersheds was naturally egging each side into

further escalations, the Egyptian leader may have felt compelled to join in.

By the logic outlined above, it was now imperative for Nasser to share the risks of war borne by Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, thus to give up whatever peace insurance was provided by the U.N. Emergency Force still interposed along the Sinai border. While this certainly does not prove a desire for Egyptian-Israeli war, it was a conscious choice to accept an increased risk of such war. Nasser only displaced the UNEF from a portion of its positions in May of 1967, but this caused Secretary General U Thant to withdraw the entire force from the frontier. It remains difficult to gauge whatever errors of communication are thus to account for the events of 1967. Didn't Nasser correctly measure the likelihood of preemptive war between Israel and Syria? Or was he indeed overestimating the Israeli threat in the north, so that we for a change really have illusory hostility and miscommunication accounting for a Middle Eastern mobilization and war? Or was he instead underestimating the likely Israeli response in the south, guessing that Israel would not fight, and thus that Egypt would not have to fight, as the whole Egyptian operation would merely be a charade to bolster Syrian confidence in Arab strength and Nasserian leadership?

Nasser according to subsequent accounts may not have expected or wanted the total removal of the UNEF,<sup>11</sup> but even a partial withdrawal would have removed much of the preemptive first strike insurance which had existed for eleven years; whichever way the crisis was now to unfold, because of this first Egyptian action it was to unfold in much more of an atmosphere of shoot-first, ask-questions-later. It is thus possible that Nasser already felt himself further along than his original caution would have allowed. Yet there may now have followed a cascade of optimism based on previous years of hope for ultimate revenge and victory, a cascade whereby initial fear and caution about Israeli militance,

in a surge of self-confidence which was to end in a most bitter and humiliating defeat. To begin, the apparent moderation and indecision of Israeli decision-making after the UNEF expulsion all too plausibly suggested that Arab military strength had now at last really been enhanced enough so that the Israelis were reluctant to attack. If so, perhaps 1967 indeed came to seem the year of revenge from Nasser's point of view, when shortly before he had been resigned to waiting much longer for it. While Russian advice had apparently been that the Israelis were planning to invade Syria before Egypt acted, the internal divisions of Israeli party politics now may have suggested to the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv, or to Nasser more directly, that Israel was politically less resolute and militarily less strong than in 1956, and thus not in a position to invade anyone. The simple experience of mobilizing the Egyptian army and moving it up into the Sinai desert moreover led Nasser and his generals very plausibly to impute greater competence to their forces now, with all their Soviet equipment. The mobilization of forces on either side of a confrontation runs the risk that decision-makers will be overly impressed by their suddenly-collected potential, a potential that was not so tangible a week before, that might be gone a week later.<sup>12</sup>

Nasser's following action was thus to announce that the Straits of Tiran would be closed to shipping bound for the Israeli port of Elath. Such a closing may or may not have posed serious threats to the Israeli economy, but it cast Egypt as a serious violator of the status quo, and thus conditioned world political opinion much more to expect and tolerate Israeli military action in response. The outside world's disapproval of military initiatives has all along been a reassuring and stabilizing force for peace in the Middle East. When that disapproval is neutralized deliberately or inadvertently, war becomes more likely. Nasser may thus have miscalculated in not sensing how much world opinion would



object to a blockade of an international waterway. Even the Soviet Union, otherwise very supportive of the Egyptian actions, made no supporting reference to the closing of the Straits.

The final Egyptian move was to come with the announcement of an alliance between Nasser's Egypt and King Hussein's Jordan, which would place Jordanian forces under Egyptian command for at least the length of the crisis. The prospect of any Arab unity drawing together rulers who had been bitter rivals had to alarm the Israeli leadership at least a little, as well as conditioning the outside world somewhat to such alarm, and thus again preparing it for war. The alliance might be rationalized simply as an Arab defensive move to guard against Israeli attacks after the closing of Elath. Yet an alliance with Jordan would obviously be seen as more than this throughout the Middle East, capturing the offensive for the Arab side, psychologically at least, if not militarily.

### 1967

By the end of this string of events, is it possible that Nasser could still have wanted to avoid war? What might have started as a limited morale-building gesture, with a hope that war could be risked but avoided, may have cascaded into a Egyptian expectation that war now could be fought and won. The closing of the straits and the forming of the alliance certainly were a provocation; the fact that Israeli forces could not stay mobilized indefinitely was a prod.

Yet Nasser by his own calculations still did not yet need a war right handy to come out ahead. If Israel had been considering an attack on Syria, given the openness of the frontier to the north, perhaps Nasser had prevented this by opening his frontier on the south by the expulsion of the UNEF. By this move, and the Elath closing, and the Jordanian alliance, he had further raised Arab morale, and renewed the essential dreams of ultimate revenge. Militarily

speaking, Egypt did not strike the first blow in 1967. Why indeed did she not, since all that was known about mobilization timetables and air combat suggested that waiting had great disadvantages now, as compared to seizing the initiative?

Since Egypt had struck all the first blows on the diplomatic front, the world might hardly have been tolerant of an Arab military initiative also. Various accounts suggest that the USSR was strongly cautioning Cairo against the initiative, on the theory that this would bring in the United States, while an Israeli initiative would conversely produce outside sympathy for the Arab side. It may also be that Arab generals did not yet feel prepared to exploit a military initiative, either on the ground or in the air, so that the option of a preemptive first-strike was really available only to the Israeli command.<sup>13</sup> Yet any Arab initiative would surely have produced better military results than those which emerged from the Israeli surprise attack.

The Egyptian desire to wait rather than strike thus might have to be accounted to an ambivalence on the desirability of war as suggested above. Perhaps the Israelis would not attack, whereupon the Arab side would have won a major victory by default, and could add new pressures at its leisure. Perhaps the Israelis would strike belatedly, but would be repulsed, with great moral reinforcement then coming to Cairo from world opinion. Nasser was not underestimating both the likelihood and the strength of an Israeli attack.

Because he was underrating the strength, he failed to appreciate how likely it was. Indeed, major victories by armies seizing the initiative tend to disarm world opinion and reduce the costs. Except in France, Israel was largely forgiven for starting the outright war of 1967, precisely because it won it so decisively and rapidly. The negative world opinion that the Russians and Nasser may have been counting on to deter Israeli initiatives did not materialize.

Conversely, Nasser underrated the strength of the Israeli attack because

he underestimated the likelihood. The apparent indecision on Israeli military responses to Egypt's first moves had surprised all the world, and suggested weakness and irresolution which had not plagued Israel in the past. If Israel now struck after the Egyptian alliance with Jordan had been announced, might it not be more half-heartedly and incompetently executed than Nasser would previously have feared?

Nasser thus might have wanted war by June of 1967, but still only a war he could win. A series of unchallenged initiatives would surely have been preferable to a war Egypt lost so clearly. He misread the likelihood of war resulting from his initiatives, as well as how that war would turn out. War happened because Egypt expected to have a good chance to win, and because Egypt expected to see Israel give up the points at issue without war.

Nasser knew that Israel could not keep its forces mobilized indefinitely without damaging its economy. War would thus come early, or not at all. Could Egypt keep its forces mobilized longer? Perhaps. An Arab attack might thus have come a month or two later, after Israeli soldiers had returned to their homes. But perhaps it would not have come at all, as the world would have seen other Arab pressures on Israel instead.

Israel's boundaries similarly suggested an offensive initiative, just as in 1956, because there was no room for maneuver within such boundaries. Above all, the nature of air war suggested taking the initiative for either side, since an air force that is in the air has such a marked advantage over one still on the ground. Nasser and his generals clearly did not anticipate the extent to which the technology of preemptive attack could be exploited by the Israeli Air Force. Yet they generally underestimated the gap between Israeli and Arab military technological competence as well.

Could Nasser have avoided war by limiting the psychological gain he was



trying to come away with in his moves of 1967? Expelling the UNEF reinforced his claim to militance on the Arab side, and to Arab leadership, but per se opened the possibility of hostilities. Perhaps if Nasser had been content with this, war might yet not have happened, but the implicit renewal of Arab dreams of victory would have been difficult to contain. Closing the Straits of Tiran and negotiating the pact with Jordan obviously increased the risk. Could war have been averted if the Straits had been reopened after the closing, perhaps in response to outside pressure on Egypt? Perhaps. It was good propaganda for Israeli spokesmen to refer to this closing as in the years before 1956, as an "act of war," thus justifying their own following recourse to armed force. Yet the blockade was not an act of violent hostility as the ensuing air and tank battles were to be. Israel fired the first real shots of 1967, and fired them very well.

As things stood, it would have been difficult for Israel to accept a reopening of Tiran as a gift from the outside world, for the image would have remained that Egypt had demonstrated a new military clout, as outsiders had been required to rescue Israel. If the Israeli problem is one of keeping Arabs from assuming a military competence they do not have, only war in 1967 might have addressed the problem. Nasser's maneuvers in the spring of 1967 were aimed at winning Arab leadership, and in keeping alive the expectation of Arab military strength and victories of the future. Israeli maneuvers, including a war in the end, were as much intended to cast doubt on this expectation.

If Nasser perchance had not intended to begin any war in 1967, was the Israeli attack significantly based on misunderstanding? Did war come because of faulty communication from Cairo? The above analysis suggests otherwise, that the technological temptation to strike first was just too good to pass up when the outside world would be temporarily tolerant of such an attack, while the

military risks of any great boost for Arab morale were unacceptable for Israel.

1967 - 1973

The impact of the Six Day War can easily enough be exaggerated, but the war certainly produced some enormous changes in the environmental conditions relevant to war and peace in the Middle East, and the communications problems related thereto. Israel's borders, after the conquest of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, are no longer of a shape inherently inviting to attack. The Suez Canal in particular serves as moat strengthening defenses and reducing the risk of a preemptive tank strike in either direction, perhaps far more than a UNEF brigade. The humiliating defeat of Arab armies had to cast doubt on any early Arab victories over Israel in combat.

Yet war has continued in the Middle East, in the artillery bombardments which were carried on along the Suez Canal from 1969 into 1970, accompanied by exchanges of air strikes, and more recently in the terrorist activities of various Arab terrorist groups, within Palestine and then in the last years outside of the Middle East. What calculations and conditions account for these wars? What miscalculations and miscommunications account for them?

If the truce lines of 1967 are more stable militarily, they may be even less acceptable politically for the Arab side. Not only has Palestine been lost, but soil which has been unmistakably Egyptian and Syrian by all standards of international law sits under Israeli occupation, with the Suez Canal itself serving as a military fortification rather than a means of commerce.

The first round of post-1967 conflict is basically to be explained by our tug-of-war model, whereby President Nasser apparently was betting that he could impose enough casualties on the Israeli armed forces in regular artillery barrages to make Israel willing to withdraw rather than pay this cost. Every tug-

of-war involves conflicting guesses on whose endurance is greater, with one side by definition being guilty of miscalculation. Casualties on the Israeli side might only have been one or two a day, seven or ten a week, but with Israel's limited population, this was functionally equivalent to 700 to 1000 a week in the United States, a figure far above the casualty rates which taxed and exceeded American endurance in Vietnam. The Israeli response could only have been to give in or to respond in kind. There followed therefore a series of Israeli air raids on Egyptian artillery positions, justifiable enough to the outside world in that military targets alone were under attack, but devastatingly costly to Nasser in terms of high casualties among Egyptian men in uniform. The introduction of Russian anti-aircraft missiles and piloted aircraft in the summer of 1970 may have raised the costs for Israeli persistence with such air raids, but this would tend to explain Israel's willingness for a cease-fire rather than Egypt's; Israel after all was already a status quo power. Egypt's acceptance of a truce in August of 1970 thus suggests that Israel won this test of endurance again.

The death of President Nasser clearly raised and raises hopes for peace between Egypt and Israel, if only because the incumbent who had made so many pledges of revenge against Israel would have found it more difficult to change the subject than a successor who is not so party to these pledges. Sadat's subsequent decision to expel Soviet advisers and military personnel is all the more significant, not so much for any change in comparative military potential, but precisely because the act suggests to all Arabs that victory against Israel is even further away. An Arab leader who explicitly suggests forgetting past grievances against Zionism runs the risk of a Bourguiba, and can not survive in most Arab states. But Sadat, in a seemingly "nationalistic" act of ousting a group of obnoxious Europeans, has conveyed the same message. More than this



will be required in communication between the sides, and communication between Arab governments and Arab peoples, for peace to become highly likely. But at least the hope remains.

This brings us to the role of the continuing terrorism confronting Israelis today all around the world. Terrorism of one sort or another has, as noted, been a continuing part of Arab resistance to Zionism ever since the 1920's. Is it based on the hope that Israelis will give up their hold on Palestine and Sinai? Only partly, for if there was doubt about Jewish determination in the 1920's, or 1930's, there can not be very much now. Comparative casualty figures are illuminating, of course, always comparing 2 million Israelis with 200 million Americans. What if the United States had endured 100 times the Israeli dead and wounded of 1949-1956, or 1967-1972? Would it have surrendered territory? Probably not, if there were no other territory to retreat to. Would it have struck out preemptively somehow, to try to terminate the harassment? But who is there now for the Israelis to strike out against, if Palestinian organizations are clearly operating in defiance of most Arab governments, governments which fear Israeli retaliation enough to wish to avoid the contest of endurance.

There is little in the way of preemptive offensive advantage to explain terrorism. In terms of casualties, etc., Al Fatah does not do so well by striking first; it would do better if it waited in prepared defensive positions for Israeli attacks to come across the truce lines. The Arab guerrilla operations thus almost show that the Arabs do not expect Israel to try to expand beyond the territory it controls under the current status quo. It is precisely this status quo that the terrorists are unwilling to tolerate. In part this may be, as suggested at the outset, that some Palestinian Arabs truly find the status quo so intolerable that even a battlefield death is preferable. In larger part,

however, the campaign is premised even yet on hopes that Israel will give up sooner or later, or that sooner or later an Arab victory must come.

### Some Conclusions

How much role, then, in summation, does miscommunication play in the wars of the Middle East? A few Arab spokesmen, and a few right-wing Israelis, would say that the conflict of interest is so strong that missed signals play no role at all. "One man's meat is another man's poison." "One side's Palestine is another side's lack of a national home in Palestine." Yet this would have to make war more inevitable than it has shown itself to be. Spasms of war in the Middle East have been separated by periods which in many ways resemble peace.

At the same time, the Arab-Israeli conflict is surely not simply a misunderstanding. The optimum for the Israeli position may never be the same as the optimum for Arabs. What typically makes other peoples get along is not total agreement, but an awareness that defenses are strong enough to make aggression costly when compared to the nature of the dispute. Palestine and the land around it, in addition to being holy territory, has unfortunately also been tank territory, favoring offensive maneuvers in the military technology of the twentieth century, and discouraging any reliance on the defense. Even the fortifications of the Golan Heights proved to be less formidable than the Maginot or Siegfried Lines of old. Perhaps the Suez Canal moat will serve peace better, but it has problems of its own. When the offensive advantages of a political-military situation can be eliminated, war is almost always less likely.

Finally, war in the Middle East has been much due to a different kind of missed signal or miscalculation, as Arabs repeatedly have guessed that Israelis would lose their will or their military strength in the end, even as the Crusaders succumbed in resolve and prowess after 99 years. Perhaps it will take

#### NOTES

1. The typology of causes of war set out here is similar to one set out in an earlier article, "Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1970.
2. For examples of this kind of analysis applied to the Soviet-United States Cold War, see Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962) or Erich Fromm, *May Man Prevail?* (Garden City, Doubleday, 1961).
3. For a full theoretical discussion of the prisoners' dilemma phenomenon, see Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Channah, *Prisoner's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965).
4. A useful historical survey of the arguments arising during the Mandate period can be found in Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel* (London, Collins, 1965).
5. Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
6. A good summary of the 1948 military campaigns is presented in Edgar O'Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War: 1948* (London, Faber and Faber, 1956).
7. A fuller account of the sorting out of positions in the 1949-1956 period can be found in Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York, Pegasus, 1969).
8. See Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 45 for figures on Israeli lives lost in the period.
9. For an example of such criticism of Israel by a UN military officer, see Carl Von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (New York, McCay, 1967).
10. See Walter Laquer, *The Road to Jerusalem* (New York, Macmillan, 1968) for an extensive account of the 1956-67 period.
11. See Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-287.
12. This is spelled out very clearly in Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-293.
13. Accounts of the 1967 war can be found in Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War* (London, Heinemann, 1967) and Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, "Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967," *Adelphi Papers*, October 1967.



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SEMINAR: "SYSTEMATIC THINKING TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS  
OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT"

POWERS AND POWER IN MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

Dan A. Segre and Daniel Ben Yaakov

There is a question which has troubled me every time I have tried to apply accepted concepts in international relations to the M.E. situation. The question is : why is Israel so frequently misunderstood? Why are most Israelis convinced that their government is sincerely seeking peace and half of the world - I do not mean only the Arabs - is convinced of the contrary? Why does almost every Israeli believe that he has been fighting to survive and all of our enemies and some of our friends are convinced that we have been fighting to conquer.

The answer could be that the Israelis are abnormal, or at least that they could be acting in an abnormal way in their relation with other states, within and without the area.

In order to say what is abnormal and what is not, there must be some norms of references. A quick perusal of the definition of the term norm and normal will convince anyone of the difficulty of finding one. In the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, the terms in question simply do not exist. Webster's gives two definitions of normal : 1) someone free from psychosis, which means that, at least in this part of the world, nobody is normal. 2) That normal is a "balanced, well integrated functioning organism .. within the limits imposed by environment and in accordance with the pattern of one's biological endowment". Which means that everyone can be normal within the limits of its own madness. For the New Oxford Dictionary a norm is "a standard, a pattern, a model or a type". I defy anyone to find a common political pattern or model between revolutionary Lybia and revolutionary Cuba, between revisionist Russia and imperialist America, between Egypt and Japan, Canada and the Congo. The only common denominator of all states is sovereignty, which is one way of saying that one is different and has the right to be so. So there are no norms by which one can decide whether a state is normal or not, a cancerous growth or a benign organism. There are only conditions which allow, prevent or mould the existence of a political body.

These conditions may indeed have been easier to define in the past than in the present because some of their constituting elements

were more stable then than now. For instance, the element of geography, which for the politician and the soldier is essentially perceived in terms of communication and of speed related to obstacles. Geography had remained the same for Alexander the Great and Napoleon because both measured it by the speed of infantry and cavalry. It is now changing at the speed of progress in communication. Up to the development of nuclear weapons, military power was conceived in terms of quantity rather than of destructive capacity. A relation which perpetuated Bismarck's principle that potatoes are an important ingredient of foreign policy, since without them regiments, at least Prussian regiments, could not march. Today there is less emphasis on the relation between the quantity of weapons and the ability to achieve destruction. One of the principles which made the SALT talks possible was that man - Russian or American - cannot be killed twice. It is thus useless to carry on the nuclear weapons race indefinitely.

But even in the past, 'norms' of political behaviour could be misunderstood. Viscount Melville (formerly Henry Dundas), the moving force behind the British Navy in Pitt's time, claimed in a speech in the House of Commons in 1803 that the main source of Napoleon's power were France's sugar colonies. Since then, the whole world has been living under the political norms not of sugar economy but of the Nation-in-Arms which, thanks to the French



revolution, has destroyed what de Vattel (1714-1767) thought to be the fundamental norm of political life, among civilized nations. That "regular war, as to its effects, is to be accounted just on both sides"<sup>(1)</sup>

This stands to prove that norms change and develop historically and that revolutions, social or scientific, make the abnormal normal when, to use Thomas Kuhn's language, they turn the abnormal into a new paradigm.<sup>(2)</sup> Professor Boulding has advised the futurologist to be prepared to be surprised<sup>(3)</sup> Martin Buber gave his own version of this essential rule when he said "when you are driving fast on a winding country road be prepared for what you are not prepared for".<sup>(4)</sup> The trouble with the M.E. is that here and now everyone - even those who are familiar only with camel driving - are using very fast home-made or imported vehicles, on very winding and dangerous roads. The Israeli vehicle is, in itself, something of a novelty in the field of political engineering. Author Amos Oz has compared it to a strong, inelegant scooter, moving quickly through the political jam created by the big cars of the Powers. It has, he claims, a good chance to arrive first at the traffic light of politics. But it is yet unaware of the historical road which it will eventually choose.

That novelty should be an obstacle to legitimacy is only natural. It took nearly 100 years for Holland to be recognized as a state in Europe and a century for Italy to become united and a

Mediterranean power. The refusal to accept the legitimate existence of a new nation may have serious effects, like in the case of Russia and Finland. From 1917 to 1944 the Finns were three times obliged to fight their overwhelming powerful neighbour, Soviet Russia, to defend their right to be independent. The last of these wars (1939-40), in which 250,000 Finns held the Red Army at bay, convinced Hitler more than anything else that an attack on Russia was feasible. The Russian refusal to recognize Finland's independence - a fact which did not pose any real threat to Leningrad - almost brought a disaster on the Soviet state. It is difficult to see, at least in the light of the Russian Finnish experience, the logic of the Arabs challenging the much superior power of Israel. But one cannot exclude the possibility discussed by Vatikiotis<sup>(5)</sup> that the Arab insistence in challenging the legitimacy of Israel by the force of arms may uncover the inability of some Arab countries to qualify as states. Which, in turn, raises the question of the danger they may face not only from the side of Israel but from other directions as well. I am referring, for instance, to what Binder calls the new imperial vocation of Iran.<sup>(6)</sup>

Let us however stick with the "abnormal" Israeli case. When looking at the M.E. from a geopolitical-historical point of view, we are struck by the many similitudes of this region with the Balkans at the end of last century.<sup>(7)</sup> In both areas we find vast



stretches of land inhabited by poor peasants; we find many active minorities to whom religion serves as a criteria for national identity; elites which are culturally ambivalent, divided between their admiration for the West and their devotion to the mythical image of their past; leaders who are restless and frustrated because the ideologies which they uphold are as impractical as they are ambitious. In the M.E. the Russians play on a combination of pan-Arabism and socialism not differently from the way they played on pan-Slavism in the Balkans. What is, of course, different is political development. After World War I, the imperial power in the Balkans and in central Europe was replaced by a system of nation-states which soon proved unworkable. After it fell under the blows of the Germans, it was replaced, with few exceptions, by another mechanism : that of indirect Soviet imperial rule, quite effective even if disrespectful of national rights. In the M.E., on the contrary, the defeated Turkish imperial system was not replaced immediately by nation-state system. For almost thirty years the vacuum was filled by France and Britain. When they finally withdrew, in the fifties, a vacuum of power was reopened. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt by the U.S.A. to fill it - I refer to the Eisenhower Doctrine and the landing of Marines on the shores of Beyruth - the responsibility for maintaining the stability in the area was discreetly handed over to Nasser's Egypt,



which looked as a new Bismarckian state to some U.S. circles<sup>(8)</sup>. Nasser's non-alignment did, in fact, satisfy two of the Great Powers' demands : that the M.E. should not serve as an offensive base against Russia; that western oilfields should not come under the control of the Soviets. There were of course other important interests to be promoted or defended by both blocks : freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, the rights of the Christian minorities, the survival of Israel, the expansion of the ideological and economic influence of the two systems. But, on the whole, the Great Powers were satisfied with Nasser or, at least, could not think of a better alternative. So they gave Egypt the credit and the recognition she deserved as the major power in the region, even if such enhanced status bore no relation to the true strength of the Nasserite regime. It was a classical example of recognition superior to achievements, which sooner or later had to cave in. But at the time - we know it from the exchange of letters between Ben Gurion and Kennedy<sup>(9)</sup> and what has been published of the De Gaulle - Ben Gurion meetings in Paris - the stabilizing and vacuum-filling role of Nasserism was considered effective enough to exclude all need for associating Israel to the stability-keeping mechanism of the M.E.

The came the Six-Day War. It changed the face of the M.E. in three ways : a) by enormously increasing the already existing

gap of kinetic power between Israel and the Arabs; b) by radically changing the balance of potential power between the two; c) by reopening the power vacuum in the region.

Let me recall very briefly some well-known aspects of this change. As far as the relation of kinetic forces is concerned, it was already clear in 1948, even to some Arab political analysts,<sup>(10)</sup> that the defeat had been caused by the weakness of the Arab social system, incapable of translating potentialities into actual strength, rather than by military inferiority. The 1967 Arab defeat only confirmed the diagnosis and its logical corollary, namely that in underdeveloped countries the more sophisticated, the less effective military equipment is.

As to the relation of potential forces between Israel and the Arabs, the 80.000 square kilometers which the Arabs lost to Israel in the wake of the 1967 war, are a very small portion of their territory. But it supplied 50% of the agricultural production of Jordan and 25% of the oil production of Egypt, at the time. The passing of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights under Israeli control, transformed, from the defence point of view, a topography highly unfavourable to Israel into one unfavourable to the Arabs. Egypt lost the control and the revenues of the Suez Canal, a major strategic and international waterway, while Israel gained the control of two major pipelines (the Ashdod-Eilat and the Trans-

Arabian) passing through its territory. The Israeli influence over the Red Sea has been extended to Aden, with immediate reductive consequences for the Russian presence in that area. The massive investments required to develop its sophisticated military industries forced Israel to step up an industrial revolution, which had already started and put a definite end to the Zionist pyramidal model of a state with a large number of farmers and a small number of intellectuals.<sup>(10a)</sup> Israeli society went back de jure, not only de facto, to the traditional 'abnormal', inverted pyramid model - few manual workers, many intellectuals. It was a Jewish model, but also the prototype for a highly industrialized society. As a result, it elicited, or at least made possible, the absorption of an increasing number of immigrants from industrialized states. This, in turn, activated the pace of the industrial revolution and at the same time increased the gap between the social structure of Israel and that of her neighbours. As a result the Israeli GNP grew at an unprecedented rate, second only to that of Japan (10% in the last 9 years) equalling that of Egypt - and her 33 million inhabitants - in 1972. Foreign currency reserves tripled in 5 years - from 460 million to over 1,200 million - and stand now proportionally higher than those of Germany, in spite of still worrisome balance of payments deficit and continued inflation. Foreign trade almost equals that of India; the population rate-of-increase, due to



immigration, has been greater than that of China (3.5%), with the result that the proportion of 1 Israeli to 53 Arabs in 1948 has been reduced to 1 to 11 by 1973. A more important, economic consequence of the 1967 war, has been the dismantling of the barriers of economic relations with the West Bank which had been erected in 1948. An economic unit of 4.5 million people, (5.5 if one considers the exchanges of the West Bank with Jordan) has been reconstructed. At least, from the point of view of population size, this begins to compare favourably with Switzerland (6.5 million), is 30% larger than Norway, double that of New Zealand. The most startling statistical details come, however, from a study of the University of Beyruth on the disproportion of science production between Israel and the Arabs.<sup>(11)</sup> It claims that the scientific production of 3 million Israelis is 2.4 times greater than that of 126 million Arabs.

Victory alone cannot explain these dramatic changes. It only stresses the abnormalcy of the Israeli case. The norm of victory is, in fact, Vae Victis, while in the case of Israel it is Vae Victoribus. Why? Certainly because of the novelty of the Israeli power but also because of the very special type of human energy on which Israel relies - world Jewry.

The 1967 war has certainly increased the feeling of identity between the Diaspora and Israel and has produced a whole new

system of cooperation channels, of which the Economic Conference - the idea of late Premier Levi Eshkol to create a Common Market between Israel and the Diaspora - is a remarkable example.<sup>(12)</sup>

But these new channels could not have produced many practical results if world Jewry had not, meanwhile, undergone, too, a dramatic revolution. Contrary to what had happened in the past, the Jews find themselves in this last quarter of the 20th century in increasing control of sources of energy. They have paradoxically reached this position of prominence partly as a consequence of their previous social marginal situation. At the time of the first industrial revolution they were not in control of any source of energy. They did not own mines, heavy industries or vast agricultural properties. In fact, they did enter, in increasing numbers, by vocation or necessity, fields which were then considered as marginal to political and economic power, such as university teaching, technology and communication. These professions have now become vital to development in the second science-and-technology based industrial revolution, in which we all begin to live. The State of Israel is now, in any case, able to draw a great deal more from the new energy of the Diaspora than the Zionist movement was, prior to 1948. Jewish power is certainly not self-oriented, as anti-semites claim. But it is power just the same and can be cumulative and productive.

All these factors have contributed to increase manifold the power of Israel. This power, in turn, makes itself manifest within a frame of political and ideological images and - as far as Jews are concerned, also of long-standing prejudices - which do not readily adapt themselves to the new realities of the M.E. situation. The discrepancy between realities and perceptions exists on the Israeli and Jewish side too, a situation which does not facilitate the recognition of the true significance of the emergence of Israel in an area of both established and shifting interests. It coincides with what Prof. Boulding has called the shift from a system of threat-submission, characteristic of the imperial colonial relationship, into that of threat-counterthreat system, namely deterrence. Thus, while the presence of Israel on the West Bank may appear and indeed be anachronistic, from the threat-submission point of view, it may not be so from the deterrent point of view. In this connection one should also take into consideration the fact that the balance of impotence of the great powers has increased the freedom of action of all small states and their nuisance value. This is particularly true for Israel, which is a small state with a potential nuclear deterrent of its own. The transformation of a refugee state into a power of these dimensions, within a mere 25 years, and in a former colonial area is something which cannot be easily perceived. It is simply too abnormal even in a normless system.



It is only through the study of the peculiar nature of the Israeli power that it is possible to understand some of its performances and see how they can fit with the interests of the great powers and of the other states in the M.E.

There would appear to be a convergence of interests of the great powers on two main points : a) to avoid being dragged into a direct conflict by the quarrels of their respective clients b) to keep the M.E. status-quo so that both the U.S.A. and USSR can maintain their respective positions of influence. For the West, this means to protect the flow of oil and assure the stability of pro-western countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirate, Lebanon, Jordan. Since the U.S.A. is convinced that the maintenance of the balance of power between Israel and her neighbours is a condition for such a stability, Israel has, for the first time, a role to play within the framework of the strategic interests of a great power. For Soviet Russia, on the other hand, the maintenance of the status-quo of no-peace and no-war guarantees the continuation of her military and especially naval presence in the Mediterranean. Thus, at least for the moment, the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia do not compete in the M.E. but rather discreetly cooperate. They are not searching for a solution of the conflict but for solutions which could strengthen their respective positions without adding to their responsibility (as in the case of the reopening of the

Suez Canal). Because of this cooperation, many people urge Israel to do something, to reach an agreement with the Arabs, while the Great Powers are, so to say, in a benevolent mood. What they fail to perceive is that the main obstacle to an Arab Israeli agreement is now the problem of the power vacuum created by the defeat of Egypt in 1967 and the emergence of Israel as the strongest power in the area. There is little the Great Powers can do about it. At best, they can use this new situation for their own benefit, whenever possible: the Russians to justify their presence against mounting Arab disillusionment; the Americans, by adroitly using Israel as a kind of "proxy" to help their Arab allies when in trouble, (as in/<sup>the</sup>case of the Syrian-Jordan crisis of 1971 and of Lebanon now).

This situation is neither secure nor pleasant for Israel, but it is probably the best she can get under the circumstances. It may not lead to peace but it has given Israel time : time to consolidate her gains; time to promote the slow change in perceptions, without which there is no hope that her new status will ever be recognized. As things stand now, the situation in the M.E. is still being interpreted according to political norms which no longer fit the realities. They are, in fact, inherited from the diplomatic system and beliefs of the first World War and which brought chaos in Eastern Europe. "The victors of 1918, wrote Professor Carr,

lost peace in central Europe because they continued to pursue a principle of political and economic disintegration in an age which called for larger and larger units".<sup>(13)</sup> This is, to a certain extent, what is still happening in the M.E., that the Great Powers cannot break the stalemate of the Israeli-Arab crisis. Having presided over the creation of Israel, they tried to soothe the Arabs by pressing for territorial concessions on the part of Israel rather than promoting, as Israel demanded, the conditions in which the Jewish state could collaborate with the Arab state in a wider political and economic M.E. framework. As for the Arabs, they have so far spent most of their energies in inter-Arab rivalries and in disastrous war against the only state of the region which could have contributed to their modernization. The result has been what New Statesman and Nation's editor, Paul Johnson, has called the paradoxical transformation of the Jewish State into the unwilling policeman of the M.E.<sup>(14)</sup> The Arabs and the Communists call this role a new version of Western colonialism, more hideous because it is carried out by what they consider to be a lackey of American imperialism. The natural, inevitable development of this situation, and this is their norm they say, will lead to the destruction of the Zionist state by virtue of its own anachronistic colonialist nature and of its internal contradictions. This view is often shared by some friends of Israel, and by authoritative Israelis who continue to think in terms of patterns of ideological and economic determinism.



But nobody, and here again we deal with Israel's abnormalcy, has been able to prove that Western colonialism fits the case of Israel. As a matter of fact, it could be claimed that the political behaviour of Israel is inspired less by the U.S.A. than by the Soviet example. Premier Golda Meir is on record for asking why the Oder-Neisse border is a defensive one, while a security border on the Jordan or at Sharm el Sheikh would be an offensive one; why everybody understands why Russia prefers security without peace treaties, to peace treaties without security, but such a preference becomes inexplicable in the case of Israel. There is another pattern by which Israeli political behaviour can be explained without having to refer it to Western imperialism. It has been proved by historical experience that any country, whichever its government, tends to develop an intransigent conduct when its achievements are not accompanied by recognition. The reasoning behind the new American policy towards China has been based on the assumption that it was necessary to upgrade the international status of Peking in order to contain her, without using force. The Arab attempt to maintain Israel in a quasi-"pariah" status in the M.E. and in a posture of perpetual defendant at the U.N. is certainly not contributing to reduce the active defence mechanism of Israel and what has been called the "Massada complex".

The Arabs, of course, claim that to appease Israel would only

serve to give in to her imperial ambitions. What they fail to perceive is that even a purely hypothetical Israeli empire would not conform to stereotyped imperial norms. It would be a hypothetical empire which, whether one likes it or not, would always be characterized by a high moral legacy; an empire the energy of which will always be drawn more from world Jewry than from recalcitrant Arab subjects and that, therefore, it would be Diaspora-based and not founded upon the actions of imperial legates; an empire, characterized by the intrinsic solitude of its Jewish nature. The fact that there are no other Jewish states in the world, is not, by itself, a determining factor. There is also only one Japan or Ireland. But the psychological-historical conditioning of the Jews adds immeasurably to their feeling of solitude, which means that a hypothetical Israeli or Jewish empire has little integrative power outside its own Jewish framework. Jewish political power is fundamentally neutral and its territorial expansion is brought about more by reaction to external challenge than by political or ideological vocations of its own.

All this should, theoretically, make Israel the natural ally of the Arabs, not their natural enemy. So did Sir Mark Sykes believe, together with Sir Reginald Wingate, Col. Hogart and other British proconsuls,<sup>(15)</sup> at the time of the Balfour Declaration. They even bruited the idea of a natural coalition between the Armenians,

the Jews and the Arabs as a protection - at least for the Armenians and the Arabs - against a recrudescence of Turkish and possibly Iranian imperialism. So did King Feisal I believe and his father, Hussein of Hedjaz - if we read the Weizmann papers correctly.<sup>(16)</sup>

But there is little chance that such dreams or hopes of Jewish Arab (and Armenian) cooperation will come true. It will not happen, in the present M.E. political context, till political realism will replace the political symbolism which dominates, on both sides, the perceptions of the policy-makers of the elites and of the masses.

If this view is correct, then the formula of a balanced solution of the crisis, based on the exchange of territories against a contractual peace will never work, unless it is preceded by provision for formal or informal, but clear recognition of the rights of Israel, not only to exist as a sovereign state, but also to live as a normless major political factor in a normless international society.



SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF EXTENDED CONFLICT ON DECISION MAKERS

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN

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The decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy and international relations, was pioneered by Richard C. Snyder and his colleagues H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962). The approach identifies the nation-state as the actor in international relations, and boldly asserts that the best representation of the nation-state as international actor is the decision-making group. The event to be explained in the field of international relations becomes the decisions of such groups.

This approach opens up the field of foreign policy to the psychologist for it emphasizes the role of individuals and the role of small groups as the locus of concern. The approach is most clearly social-psychological for it raises the central social psychological questions of the relationship between social structures and personality and the relative weight to be given to the individual's values, perceptions and attitudes, and the situational constraints and boundaries of his perceptual capacities and behavioral potentialities.

It is no surprise then that a central focus of analysts using this paradigm has become specific decision situations, and in particular crisis decisions. In the crisis situation we have the co-occurrence of (1) the importance of the event to be studied; (2) a clear focus on a group of men on one side making decisions which are both stimulus and response to decisions being made by a group of men on the other side. The crisis situation is the situation of foreign policy and international relations which maximizes the potential for locating the issues of international conflict in the decisions made by decision-making actors. Other models of foreign

policy processes, for example, an organizational process model (Allison, 1971) and even more so all other events of international conflict, make crises seem like the inevitable outcome of enormous and rather blind organizational outcomes. Conflict, or at least crisis in such a model, seems like the unlucky confluence of bureaucracies in different social systems carrying out non-intentional incompatible results of the standard operating procedures. To paraphrase Matthew Arnold we have ignorant bureaucracies clashing by night.

The decision making models assume a bounded rationality, and more to the point here an intentional process of decision and consequent action that is influenced by the interplay of role definitions, of individuals, and of the internal conflict and processes within each decision-making group.

The subject of this conference--the conflicts in the Middle East and I say conflicts advisedly, as it seems that is necessary to analytically separate at least the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, between Israel and Egypt, between Israel and Jordan, between Israel and the Soviet Union--does not fit easily into a crisis-oriented model. In particular, I have been asked to speak about the effects of prolonged conflict on decision-makers and the best of recent research and theory on decision-making traces the effects of crisis on decision-makers (e.g. Zinnes, 1966; Hermann, 1963, 1969; Holsti, 1972; Robinson, 1972; Allison, 1971).

This paper then will discuss some of the central findings in the analysis of crisis decision-making particularly with reference to the effects of crisis stress on the decision making process and the decision making group. The research on the more clinical aspects

of the effects of stress will be only briefly discussed since there has been little valuable work in assessing effects on clinical variables of foreign policy decision makers. (Parenthetically, I myself will be participating in a detailed study of the major clinical psychological and physical effects of prolonged stress on air-traffic controllers who are constantly making critical life effecting decisions. Some preliminary physical health studies have led to this more broad-based research project but I will leave this for the discussion period if there is interest.)

The question that will be central to our considerations will be to ask what elements of the theory and research on crisis are relevant to the much neglected study of long term conflict and its effects on decision-makers. Finally, as a non-expert, but in the spirit of this conference, I will make some speculation about the application of these conceptual frameworks to our Middle East conflicts.

### I. Crisis Decision-Making

The very concept of crisis is difficult to define but recent systematic studies (e.g. Hermann, 1969) have tended to focus on three elements: high threat, surprise, and short decision time. A reasonable definition then might be: crisis is a situation of unanticipated threat to important values where there is restricted decision time.

Some theorists (Schwartz, 1967, 1972) have emphasized that threat is not only a situational variable but a perceptual variable. It is the perception of decision-makers which determine whether any threat situation is serious enough to be treated as crisis. However, this is not <sup>5</sup>efficient. The other variables are perceptual as well. The judgement that a decision must be made in a short time is a result of the decision-maker's perception that some increased damage will be



done by allowing more decision time, some damage that would be avoided if a relatively quick decision were made. Similarly, surprise is clearly a function of the expectations of the decision-makers as to the relative likelihood of various kinds of events in their overall decision-making environment. Surprise comes from either a lack of sufficient planning on the part of decision-makers or a misperception of the nature of the other actors in the system. Furthermore, surprise is the variable most likely to be greater among the general public than among decision makers, since the latter have done, presumably, more planning of the likelihood of various events and the response to them.

We might use the example of the Israeli decision-making process pre-June 1967. A major part of the revisionist analysis of Israeli decision-making of that time involves the gap between the nature of the situation and the perception of the situation by decision-makers. With regard to threat, there was clearly and remains today divergent views as to the extent of threat to primary Israeli values and goals of the Egyptian mobilization and the removal of UNEF forces. Without entering this controversy itself, it is important to note that much of the political argument about the May, 1967 situation can be seen as an argument about the relation between perception and reality. The point is that threat <sup>in decision-making</sup> cannot be analytically treated except as a perceptual process of the decision-maker.

Even within Israel at the time there was considerable argument as to decision time. The debate as to whether a decisive action had to be taken immediately was critical in the definition of the situation as one of crisis. As we shall see, it is one of the critical elements of protracted conflict that many individual situations of conflict occurring on a continuous basis can be defined by either side in the conflict as of crisis proportion. And furthermore, the definition of a situation as crisis can be an important level of decision-making in determining further escalation or deescalation of

a conflict situation. Defining a situation as crisis permits the introduction of forms of decision-making and actions that <sup>the absence of</sup> ~~no~~ crisis would not allow or make much more difficult. In this regard, for example, crisis has allowed the suspension of civilian government and the imposition of crisis governments abrogating civilian law or drastically narrowing the range and size of decision-making groups.

The point is that definition of a situation as a crisis is a critical element in prolonged conflicts where objectively similar events may be either downgraded in significance or escalated in importance by decision-making groups.

The May, 1967 example is also instructive with regard to the elements of decision time and surprise. The arguments as to whether Israel had a well-planned response and as to whether Israel could have waited for a longer period for more negotiation before striking at Egypt makes it clear that somehow the definition of a situation as crisis seems to provide a legitimacy for precipitous action, even violent action that a non-crisis situation would not allow. One recalls, for example, the leisurely approach of the Soviet Union in the last week of May, 1967 in the Security Council about international shipping. There was no crisis; matters, therefore, could be adjudicated by the international legal system. Israel, on the other hand, defined the situation as a crisis, therefore requiring immediate decision-making and legitimating extraordinary acts.

These considerations lead us to add one further element to the three factor definition of crisis. The factor involves the chronic-traumatic dimension of the situation. This element of perceived uniqueness of the threat situation can operate to make a situation crisis-like even though it may have been partially anticipated and even though the decision time may be indeterminate. This is true because the importance of crisis is not only in its antecedents but more so in its outcomes, particularly outcomes in unusual decisions taken in response to it.

A situation becomes a crisis when intended operating procedures seem to be inapplicable to the situation and, therefore, a decision must be made by those involved not only in implementing the consequences of previous decisions, but <sup>by</sup> those decision-making elites involved in policy settling itself, strategic or tactical.

The first aspect of crisis decision-making, therefore, is the definition of the situation as a crisis. This involves a psychological mobilization and indeed a physical mobilization of key decision units who are faced with the task of acting, in one way or the other, but still acting. Seldom are they able to make the decision not to decide because of this mobilization and to use Smelser's term (Smelser, 1973) because of the development of the generalized belief that there is a situation of high threat and little time to respond.

The definition of a situation as a crisis has one other important hidden assumption. Crisis suggests the possibility of response, of undoing the negative effects of the situation. Crisis is not disaster itself but the threat of disaster. It is essential to the crisis situation that the response and decision-making process are seen as critical to the costs (and even benefits) to accrue from the crisis situation. In this sense we are in a different situation from the kind of demoralization and disintegration which follows a natural disaster (Wallace, 1957) and which in its initial phase is characterized by a suspension of activity rather than a flurry of activity. A crisis is a situation where there is some sense of efficacy on the part of the actors that they have some choice to make; perhaps a choice of very few alternatives, but a choice nonetheless, though the decision process may be simply one of convincing oneself that there is only one alternative that is clearly superior to all others in its ability to reduce the



threat or eliminate it. My own research on moral indignation has demonstrated that the ability to attribute causal responsibility to a single human or national actor is an important prerequisite for moral indignation as opposed to feelings of resignation or even sadness. In the international arena, the likelihood that the decision-makers will define the situation as a crisis rather than as a disaster or fait accompli or indeed a historical inevitability may be a function of the perception of the capability of some concrete responses to the situation. The occurrence of a crisis then, should not be looked on as only a failure of the organizational system but may be an indication that the decision-makers perceive a threat situation as for the first time amenable to some response on their part. It may be that the frequent crises in American-Israeli relations surrounding the Rogers Plan resulting among other things in the dissolution of the Six Day War crisis cabinet is an indication of the emergence of the possibility of Israeli alternative choices in relation to the United States, rather than indication of any greater than usual disparity of views between the two governments.

To summarize, this initial discussion of crisis definition, both in the conceptual sense and in the situational sense is an important element of crisis decision-making that has been underplayed in the pre-decisional phase where a situation becomes defined as a crisis. This definition of a situation as a crisis creates legitimacy for departures from previous norms and practices, mobilizes decision-makers to act in such a way that the efficacy of the decision-making group is affirmed and sets the stage for the atmosphere and structure in which deliberations will take place.

What is the psychological state of the individual decision-maker in a situation defined as a threat to some major aspect of national identity or security? Several references to heightened anxiety seem inadequate. It is worthwhile to turn <sup>to</sup> some of the social psychological literature on individual stress for this purpose.

#### B. Individual Responses to Threat

There are two studies in particular that I would like to focus on. The first is a study by Janis (1958, 1969) on patients in a hospital in the pre-surgery and post-surgery conditions. Janis found <sup>that</sup> the familiar U-shaped function of the ~~relation~~ <sup>relationship</sup> between cue and arousal (Hebb, 1958, 1963) was true as well for the relation between anticipatory fear and post-operative adjustment. Some patients in the period before their operation showed no fear at all. They seemed oblivious to the sometimes serious operations that they were about to undergo. They were not worried. In the post-operative phase these people felt intense resentment against the hospital staff, refusing to cooperate with post-operative treatment, unable to cope at all with the various discomforts they experienced. It is no surprise that people who were very fearful in the pre-operative situation exhibited a high level of post-operative anxiety and great difficulty in adjusting to their new situation. However, it was the patient with moderate anticipatory fear who in the post-operative phase had high morale, cooperated with this treatment and generally exhibited the ability to adjust well to the discomforts and recover quickly.

The individuals with a moderate level of anticipatory anxiety and fear were able to cope with the coming crisis by focusing on gathering information about threat relevant cues. They had, in the pre-operative stage a sense of limited vulnerability as compared to the sense of invulnerability that the low anticipatory fear patients exhibited. These people faced with life crisis were completely disoriented and threatened to move to a situation of feeling totally vulnerable, constantly threatened by an indiscriminately hostile environment.

For the decision-maker in a situation of unanticipated threat, the possibility of such a shattering of the sense of trust in the environment may be of particular concern. However, in the case of extended conflict the matter may be more complicated.

One possibility arises out of extended conflict where there is one side that perceives itself in clear superiority over the other side. In this case, the possibility exists of a sense of total invulnerability and even minor successful actions of the other side may produce an exaggerated level of anxiety and a reduced ability to cope with the real proportions of the situation. (My own sense of things in the Israeli case, and here I am speculating, is that for some Israelis this sense of invulnerability may have existed with regard to Palestinian terrorism against Israeli civilians.<sup>o</sup>)

However, a different face of the situation presents itself if we think of not only extended conflict but protracted conflict in the sense understood by Mao Tse Tung (1954) and Strauss-Hupé (1959). In Protracted conflict the theory is the constant harassment, maneuvering and deception of the enemy wherein no battle until the very last is

<sup>o</sup> Note also the war of attrition where attrition is understood not in a military sense but in the sense of attrition of the will to resist



decisive. Here the psychological meaning is to gradually create a state of total vulnerability where the enemy cannot distinguish between the situation of threat and the situation of no threat because all cues are potentially threat cues. This indiscriminate sensitization characteristic of traumatization creates a state of worry<sup>es</sup> and lack of trust that can make cooperation with others impossible and a constant level of vigilant anxiety the only state of mind. Furthermore, there is a marked decrement in performance in subsequent stress situations. This weakening of the discriminatory capacity between serious threat and normal situations weakens the judgment capability seriously leading to severe counteraction which may further escalate the situation and gain adherents for the practitioners of the theory of protracted conflict.

From time to time this seems to have been a theory at least partially upheld by Palestinian movements. Guerilla and terrorist activity can be not as a military solution but as a political tool, <sup>It may</sup> ~~for~~ maintaining the awareness of conflict and hopefully by a process of attrition and demoralization weakening the enemy so that the final blow, though, though it may be decades away, will come to a weary, confused nation unable to distinguish threat and safety and unable to trust those others who may be helpful.<sup>1</sup>

1 It may be interesting in the discussion period to pursue this question asking whether, indeed, there is a strong adherence to the theory of protracted conflict among Palestinians and asking also whether there seems to be any evidence that the theory is working either in (a) creating the climate for producing new adherents to the cause; (b) making the conflict live on in political and psychological reality; and (c) creating a state of indiscriminate vigilance among Israelis, decision-makers and others. My own sense of it is that the success is very small in this regard largely because the implementation of the necessary techniques of terror and psychological warfare have been only marginally successful and that in special circumstances rather than in random situations. Random terror seems to me an essential aspect of the demoralization by terror and guerrilla warfare. If it is random or seems random, it can be ubiquitous and, therefore, constant vigilance is necessary. The moment that there is perceived some respite or place of refuge (other than resignation and surrender) from the threat of terrorism, the full-scale constant psychological mobilization can be relaxed and the tension and anxiety broken. This explanation may apply also to Egyptian support of PALESTINIAN actions.

The work of Lazarus (1962, 1964) may be of interest for those more oriented towards individual differences in the reaction to stress. Rather than focusing on physiological measures of stress, I would simply point out that there are serious perceptual sets or defense mechanisms, to use the psychoanalytic term, which can influence the response to stress. Lazarus has shown that the susceptibility to different cognitive sets depends on the predominant pattern of the individual. For example, individuals, who are prone to denial, or not perceiving the threatening aspects of the stressful situation tend to be more action-oriented; while those tending to intellectualization or detachment from and depersonalization of the situation are less likely to be action-oriented but more contemplative.

Lazarus develops the idea of cognitive appraisal as a mechanism whereby the stimulus is seen as threatening or not depending on the individual appraisal. An important part of some of his research has been altering the likelihood of difficult appraisals by various pre-stress communications to his subjects. This psychological approach of cognitive appraisal bears a striking resemblance to the more sociological conceptual framework developed earlier of definition of the situation. What is intriguing about the application of the Lazarus idea is that it suggests some useful techniques for explaining and predicting whether a particular decision-maker will conceive a situation as threatening or not given some knowledge of the predominant ego defence mechanism of that individual. For some decision-makers, downplaying of the potential damage of a particular outcome may reduce the perception of the situation as stressful. For others, a more abstract interpretation involving the distancing of the threat consequences from the self may be more effective. Analysis of hostile communication as that by Zinnes (1972) would benefit from some analysis of the type of individual decision-makers perceiving the communication as a variable in its perceived threatening character.



### C. The Decision-Making Group under Stress

From the point of view of the social psychologist one of the most significant elements of stress effects on decision-making involves group processes. Janis (1971, 1972) has coined the term group think to emphasize the fact that under severe stress the very process of solidarity that seems so necessary to successful resistance to threat can become a serious liability as group solidarity replaces <sup>integral</sup> ~~rational~~ criticism and analysis of policy alternatives as the central operative group process.

There is a long history of debate among social psychologists as to the quality of decisions produced by groups, but the consensus (in this context one is hesitant to use the word!) is that under stress group decision making tends to deteriorate. I think it might be worth pointing to some of the specific processes of the norm of group solidarity and its attendant conformity enhancing properties.

In a classic experiment, Stanley Schachter (1951) showed how deviants in group discussion would at first receive large amounts of communication in an attempt to change the deviant's mind, to bring him or her around to the consensus. However, when these attempts failed, the group would gradually turn away from this individual and exclude him from the group.

This conformity-seeking element of small group behavior is exaggerated by the crisis atmosphere. As we have seen, the threat to the group's values or survival may be intense and there is a heightened fear that raising doubts would crack the feeling of self-confidence and efficacy in coping with the crisis.

Unanimity and consensus provide a feeling of greater assurance and the confidence in the decision comes to bear a closer relationship to the consensus which it commands than to its effectiveness as a decision. The



orientation, and here Halperin and Allison (1972) come into focus, becoming the management of internal consensus rather than the decision making of the opposing forces in conflict.

There is a well-worn assumption in highly solidary groups that silence is indicative of agreement, a finding familiar to most people who have worked with groups. Furthermore, there is a loyalty to past decisions partly growing out of the attempt to create normalcy out of crisis by following previous decision making patterns. Shared illusions and a special language of communication can heighten group feelings so that the group members perceive themselves as the full reality of the situation. Ward Edwards (1961, 1968) in reviewing behavioral decision making theory has emphasized the conservative information processing of the individual. The individual tends to collect much more information than needed to decide.<sup>2</sup>

However, the group situation tends to a more risky form of decision-making, particularly in a crisis situation. Holsti (1972) and others have shown how the volume of communication in crisis rises very sharply, so much so, that Brecher (1972), among others, uses volume of communication as a measure of both the centrality of Israel in Middle East politics and the extent of crisis at different time periods. With this volume of communication, we have the possibility of spending all one's time, and recall that time is severely limited or gathering of facts rather than in searching out a wider range of alternative responses. With this volume of communication it

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<sup>2</sup>"Human conservatism in processing available diagnostic information may lead to the collection of too much information when the collection process is costly....a conservative information processor may wait too long to respond because he is too uncertain what response is appropriate." Ward Edwards, Decision-making: psychological aspects in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 4, p. 40.

also becomes more possible to selectively attend to only that communication which already conforms to the perception inherent in the first alternatives considered.

Another major effect of crisis on decision-making groups is the constriction of authority. As the threat grows, it seems important to gather together a small group of decision-makers who are the most powerful and also the most deeply involved in the crisis. Janis and Holsti emphasize the narrowing of the decision-making group itself. However, this is inadequate. A small decision-making group may be more efficient and could be less tied to internal and domestic bureaucratic considerations rather than the national interests involved in the crisis. What is characteristic and detrimental about the constriction of authority is that it includes only those directly involved in the specific crisis area. Elements of the top leadership associated with economic considerations may be left out in favor of those involved in strictly military matters. In this way, it is not only authority that is constricted, but the range of views to be heard.

In the context of the top leader choosing those to be involved in the inner circle of decision-makers, the potential for selecting for consensus and for selecting out deviant attitude is compounded with the fact that deviant attitudes are often a function of these bureaucratic roles. Persons representing the cultural-educational-identity aspects of a society are likely to have different views not only for personality reasons, but because the bureaucracies they are most closely linked with have divergent interests from the bureaucracies associated with military, diplomatic, political or even economic concerns.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>This constriction of authority and its detrimental effects on decision-making are becoming painfully clear in the current scandals of Washington. Contrary effect in May 1967 of expansion of authority will be discussed in detail orally.

The threat to values leads to a search for consensual solidarity. To create such consensus the coalition of the meaning and the significance of the stress situation proceeds apace. The threat becomes interpreted not as a localized threat, (in Parsonian terms "situational facilities"), but as a threat to central values. National security is invoked in order to maintain the high level of solidarity.

How much do these "groupthink" processes and other negative effects of crisis correspond to a situation of long-term conflict? The real danger here is that the initial crisis situation will set a pattern for between crisis conflict periods such that the need for consensual solidarity and the appeal to higher values and national interests becomes a constant element of the political environment so that dominant views and non-conformity are rejected and are not perceived as a critical element in the pursuit of ~~rational~~ decision-making processes *that are effected by a wider set of criteria.*

I can claim no expertise in the decision-making processes of Israel so I am sure that what will be said about it here will be treated in that way. Brecher's (1973) detailed study of Israeli decisions regarding German reparations point up the advantages of the parliamentary system for legitimizing and guaranteeing serious debate in controversial matters. The requirement of responsibility to a cabinet with divergent bureaucratic responsibilities and the legitimacy of opposition emerges in this discussion. However, it also points to two limitations of the Israeli model: first, the fact that within the cabinet decision was so clearly made by the top decision-maker over opposition, though perhaps not majority opposition. Second, that on the parliamentary debate, solidarity of the cabinet was insisted upon. Of course, the branch of



13.  
this solidarity was often seen by Ben-Gurion as an alterable act but for the purposes of critical decision-making it seems nonetheless essential.

The German Reparations<sup>or</sup> case is unusual in that it did not directly involve the long-term conflict. An analysis of such a decision will be important to assessing these conformist processes as they operate on a regular basis in the Israeli system. The constriction of authority, however, has become a problem because the nature of extended conflict is that secrecy falls over a central aspect of societal policy and the tendency to ~~grow~~ narrow kitchen cabinets grows.

Note: For reasons to be explained at the time of the delivery of the paper the next two sections (D) Problem Solving Workshops (E) SUMMARY will be given orally.

SPC

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

REPORT OF THE  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE  
LAND OFFICE  
IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION  
PASSED BY THE BOARD OF  
LANDS AND MINES  
ON JANUARY 10, 1890  
RELATIVE TO THE  
LANDS BELONGING TO THE  
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

BY  
J. M. SMITH  
AND  
J. H. HARRIS

1891

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ARMS RACES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOME  
ARMS CONTROL MEASURES RELATED TO THEM \*

by

Y. Evron

Prepared for the Seminar :

"Systematic Thinking Towards Alternative Solutions of the Arab-Israel Conflict"

The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse some of the various aspects and features of the arms races in the Middle East. This will include some of the political and strategic inferences which could be drawn from the rate and scope of these races. In addition, I shall discuss briefly the relevant impact that bureaucratic behaviour, on the one hand, and international interactions, on the other, have on the rate and dynamism of arms races in the Middle East. Finally, there will be a short discussion of the relevance of some arms control measures to the Middle East.

The Middle East regional subsystem<sup>1</sup> is characterised by the following features which have special relevance to the problem of arms races: a high level of conflictive behaviour between the local actors;<sup>2</sup> a high level of accumulation of arms and the development of large -- relative to local resources -- armies; a high level of super-power penetration which is partly

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\* This paper is based on part of a larger study on problems of arms races conducted at the Davies Institute of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Prof. Rueben Gavriel, Dr. Dan Hurewitz and Prof. Raymond Tanter for their help and advice. The responsibility for the paper is of course entirely mine. I am grateful to Mr. David Danieli and Miss Zofnat Havshush for their helpful assistance.



demonstrated by large-scale military aid, including the supplying of modern weapon systems in large quantities to the local actors. The super powers, however, are critically constrained in their ability to exert pressure on the local powers.<sup>3</sup> They also find it increasingly difficult to contain the local arms races, if they are interested in doing so -- a rare occurrence. There have been several attempts to impose arms control measures on the region, efforts which have met with widely varying success. But in most cases, the local actors on the Middle Eastern stage have proved able to demand and get from the super powers the arms they need, in the quantities they wish.

Because of the dependency on outside sources for the supply of the main weapon systems, however, the local actors remain persistently fearful that the suppliers might decide to impose limitations on the supply of arms. This fear is partly justified, since such limitations have indeed been imposed in the past. Furthermore, even though a requested weapons system is given, the decision regarding its supply is often made only after long and frequently frustrating negotiations. Thus a peculiar situation is created : on the one hand, the weapons eventually are supplied and the arms race goes on without being contained by the super powers; on the other hand, the anxieties of the local actors concerning their sources of supply are heightened. These anxieties lead to an additional motivation to accelerate the arms race -- either by concentrating on the development of a local arms-production capacity and/or by readiness to purchase large quantities of weapons before they are needed, simply out of fear that at a later stage an embargo may be imposed and the opportunity lost.<sup>4</sup>

The politico-strategic situation in the Middle East is such that a cluster of conflicts coexist, with many interactions among them. In the "core area" of the region there has been the perennial Arab-Israel conflict; the competition among several of the Arab countries themselves; and lastly, the conflict between Arab countries within the "core area" on the one hand,

and Iran and Arab countries outside the central core on the other. Two such examples are the Egyptian-Saudi rivalry and the Iraqi-Irani conflict. This complex situation leads to a multiple and many-sided arms race or, rather, a series of arms races in the region. Increases in the military capabilities of one actor -- in itself merely a reaction to one conflict -- spills over into that actor's conflict with still another adversary. This gives an impetus to yet another arms race.

#### Definition of Arms Races.

There are several different definitions of an arms race. Of these, that of Colin Gray appears to be most relevant, namely : "That there should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties."<sup>5</sup> This definition does not tackle the causes of arms races but does however supply a general "behavioural" description of arms races. For the purpose of this paper, two points should be emphasised : first, Gray's definition does not sufficiently point up the competitive character of arms races. Secondly, although Gray is certainly right in suggesting that some phases of arms races are not expressed in a rapid rate of growth in defence expenditure,<sup>6</sup> nevertheless, most races and certainly those in the Middle East are expressed in such terms, as will be shown below.

Huntington, in his definition, placed the emphasis upon the element of competition : "An arms race is defined as a progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears."<sup>7</sup> Huntington's definition is somewhat ambiguous however, precisely because of his attempt to include in it a definitive list of the causes of arms races. Huntington as well as Gray, however, overlooks the defence-expenditures element as at least an important indicator of the rate of the arms race.

That there is a common historical phenomenon of arms races appears a priori to be the case. It is indeed true that the work on the theory regarding arms races is still limited. At the same time, however, it is one of the few areas in the study of International Relations where some serious attempts at both the construction of formal models and some systematic historical works have been undertaken. Thus, although Gray<sup>8</sup> is correct in pointing out the need for large scale comparative studies of arms races, he somewhat exaggerates the shortcomings of the pre-theoretical work which has already taken place in the field. Richardson's attempt to develop formal models of arms races, although suffering from gross oversimplification, nevertheless remains an important theoretical advance.<sup>9</sup>

The Richardson definition of arms races as those instances in which there must be an annual exponential growth in defence expenditure seems to be inapplicable to most arms races. On the other hand, most such competitions do involve a rapid growth in defence expenditure over a period of time. As will be pointed out, arms races in the Middle East do have this characteristic, rapidly-growing defence expenditures.



At the same time, the exclusive concentration on defence expenditure as the actual substance of an arms race is misleading. In the last analysis, arms races are arms races<sup>10</sup> -- and these are not always expressed in defence budgets. (Decision makers react to the growth in an adversary's actual weapons and not defence budgets.) Moreover, the annual basis of defence budgets makes it even more difficult to decipher the mechanism of the arms race. (For further comments of caution about the study of arms race through an analysis of defence budgets see below.) Thus, only a model which includes both defence budgets and the actual weapon systems acquired as variables could supply a comprehensive explanation of the mechanism of the arms race.

Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in a study of the arms race through an analysis of defence budgets, I shall proceed however to do that, while reminding the reader that a comprehensive study of arms races in the Middle East should include the study of the actual arms transfers and acquisition.<sup>11</sup>

Safran,<sup>12</sup> in a pioneering study, has dealt with the dynamism of the arms race in the Middle East through the method of investigating the defence budgets of several Middle Eastern countries for the period 1950 to 1965. He analysed the various phases of the arms race and studied the dynamics of the overall Arab-Israeli competition through an examination of the burden of defence on national economies. Both these objectives were achieved by a study of the percentage of the total GNP of different countries represented by the defence budget. There is no point in repeating Safran's findings. Suffice it to say that one of his principal conclusions -- as far as the Arab-Israeli arms race was concerned -- is that because of the much faster annual growth of the Israeli GNP compared to that of Egypt (and other Arab countries), Israel was (and by inference, still is) in a position to "win" the arms race. A second central conclusion was that the arms race between Israel and the

Arab states during the years under investigation could be divided into four main phases.

In this discussion I shall proceed in the following manner. First I shall continue the Safran approach and apply it to the period 1966-70. Thus the two years before the 1967 war broke out and the first four years after that war will be covered as well as the earlier 15-year span. Secondly, I shall look at the arms races in the Middle East in terms of the annual growth in defence expenditures. Such an approach enables us to get a better look at the dynamism of the race element in the arms acquisition process. The survey of defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP clarifies the economic constraint on defence expenditure, whereas the examination of incremental growth in defence budgets gives an indication of interaction level between the parties to the arms race.

#### Limitations to the Approach.

There are several qualifications to the use of a defence budget as a valid indicator in the arms race. Firstly, the arms race is primarily about the process of acquisition of weapon systems and the size of armed forces. The translation of these elements into monetary terms is not necessarily determined by generally agreed-upon criteria. Secondly, terms for repayment of major arms deals vary. Thus arms bought and supplied in one year are sometimes paid for over a period of several years. Any specific arms deal therefore appears in the defence budgets only gradually, even over a period of years. Conversely, other arms purchased are paid for in advance. Thus a certain weapon system perhaps arrives only several years after the actual payments for it began. It therefore follows that defence budgets in themselves are only partial indicators of the actual build-up of arms on both sides. Thirdly, in areas such as the Middle East, which are dependent to a large extent on imports of weapon systems, changeovers in

armaments -- new systems or models -- and hence defence expenditures depend to an extent on the available opportunities. Thus, a new arms deal results not necessarily solely from the needs of the consumer; it also depends to a great degree on the readiness and the self-interests of the supplier. It follows that changes in defence expenditures are not necessarily indicative of the level of interaction between import-dependent parties to an arms race in a way similar to the situation between self-sufficient powers. This observation would apply, however, only to the party which initiates a new phase in the race, or a new quantitative or qualitative "jump." It does not apply to the other party or parties which will respond to this new departure. Finally, the official defence budgets of the Arab countries are, to an extent, considered to be not very reliable in any case.

As against these it could be argued that : first, notwithstanding the "spreading" of repayments over several years, during these years there still is a significant growth in the defence budgets which is indicative of a certain trend; and second, even if the weapon systems per se are not always overtly represented in the defence budgets, the need to create an infrastructure for their absorption is clearly demonstrated in the defence budgets. Thus, even though the payments for new weapons are spread over several or many years, still the infrastructure expenditures will be made in the year of the weapons' arrival and will be represented fully in the budget for that year.

Thus, defence budgets serve as an adequate indicator of trends over periods of longer than one year, but accuracy as an indicator of yearly developments is somewhat less.



The Problem of Soviet Military Aid to Egypt.

Apart from the above qualifications, there is a further major problem when analysing the arms race through the instrument of defence budgets of the local powers in the Middle East. Over the years, external powers, primarily the super powers, have given extensive military aid to the local powers. It can be assumed that part of this aid was not represented in the defence budgets. There is a major difference here between Israel on the one hand and the Arab states -- primarily Egypt but also Syria and Iraq to a much lesser extent -- on the other.

Israel has received military aid from other states, but most of it has been included in its annual defence budgets. West German military aid to Israel at the beginning of the sixties was not included in the annual defence budgets, but in the present study - following Safran -- are added to the Israeli defence budgets of that period. American military aid to Israel, which began in 1970, is included in Israeli defence budgets. One can surmise that there has been some aid which was not so listed over the years by Israel, but this apparently accounts for a very small part of the overall expenditure on defence.

In the case of Egypt, on the other hand, the situation appears to be different. It seems that from 1965 on -- or at least during 1967-1968, and possibly after that -- Egypt ceased to pay for a large "slice" of Soviet military aid.<sup>13</sup> It follows that this "slice", or most of it, is not included in the Egyptian annual defence budgets. Soviet military aid to Egypt during the period 1967 through 1970 is estimated differently by various sources. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has estimated such aid at the staggering figure of 4.5 billion dollars at free-market prices, i. e. Western prices, for the whole of this period.<sup>14</sup> From this, 2 billion dollars worth of supplies were furnished from the 1967 War up to the end

of 1969, and about 2.5 billion dollars during 1970 alone. However, it is estimated that most of the latter figure was spent on weapons initially, at least, manned by Russian personnel.<sup>15</sup>

The IISS figure was widely criticised as too high.<sup>16</sup> The U.S. State Department estimate of Soviet military aid to Egypt is 1.7 billion dollars for the period 1963-1970.<sup>17</sup> The figures of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI)<sup>18</sup> are also much lower than those of the IISS. The question remains, however, as to what extent this military aid should be added to the Egyptian defence budgets before using the latter as a basis for reliable comparison with Israeli defence budgets. A partial solution is to add this aid to The Egyptian defence budgets, but to deduct from the same budgets the sum total of the huge loss incurred by the Egyptian armed forces during the 1967 War and since then. It has been estimated that the total loss to the Egyptian armed forces due to the war was in the region of 2-2.5 billion dollars. Another 180 Egyptian planes were shot down from the end of the Six Day War to 1971. Furthermore the rate of accidents in the Egyptian air force is reported to be extremely high due to the very low standards of maintenance.<sup>19</sup> If these losses are taken into account, then virtually the whole of Soviet military aid during 1967 and 1968 only equalled the losses incurred during the war and the period since then.<sup>20</sup> In addition, apart from the losses in equipment, the entire structure of the Egyptian armed forces was critically crippled by the 1967 war and the later war of attrition. Bringing the Egyptian armed forces back to their pre-war level required substantial investment, a sum almost impossible to estimate. Thus, for the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the defence budgets as published represent the relative growth of the Egyptian forces after 1967 - but probably not the Soviet investment in the positioning of their forces in Egypt during 1970. It must be emphasized, however, that further study must be carried out concerning these points.

TABLE 1

Defence <sup>\*</sup> Expenditure as Percentage of G. N. P.

| Year | Israel | Egypt | Syria | Iraq  | Jordan |
|------|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| 1953 | 6.15   | 4.59  | 4.35  | 6.62  | 23.31  |
| 1954 | 6.67   | 5.71  | 4.11  | 6.03  | 19.03  |
| 1955 | 6.54   | 8.38  | 5.19  | 6.38  | 18.29  |
| 1956 | 13.42  | 7.97  | 6.03  | 6.96  | 16.86  |
| 1957 | 8.68   | 5.53  | 5.75  | 7.19  | 17.69  |
| 1958 | 8.28   | 6.11  | 12.17 | 7.11  | 17.88  |
| 1959 | 9.55   | 5.99  | 12.36 | 7.91  | 20.28  |
| 1960 | 9.47   | 6.99  | 9.78  | 8.43  | 18.07  |
| 1961 | 9.28   | 7.08  | 8.75  | 8.06  | 14.63  |
| 1962 | 10.48  | 8.45  | 8.51  | 8.04  | 14.52  |
| 1963 | 10.85  | 10.98 | 9.59  | 9.90  | 14.97  |
| 1964 | 11.57  | 12.22 | 10.40 | 10.94 | 13.08  |
| 1965 | 11.84  | 12.59 | 10.90 | 11.43 | 11.10  |
| 1966 | 10.62  | 11.76 | 8.81  | 10.64 | 11.93  |
| 1967 | 16.19  | 11.59 | 8.55  | 10.21 | 11.10  |
| 1968 | 18.00  | 12.91 | 12.42 | 9.30  | 13.90  |
| 1969 | 21.79  | 16.71 | 10.32 | 13.14 | 16.55  |
| 1970 | 25.31  | 19.11 | 9.33  | 10.09 | 20.00  |

\* 1950-1965 Defence expenditure according to calendar years.

1966-1970 Defence expenditure according to financial years.



(Another legitimate approach is to assume that the average percentage of growth in the years 1967 and 1968, in which the relative Egyptian growth was surprisingly limited, is similar to the percentage growth during the years 1969 and 1970 and hence, the 1967 and 1968 growth should be adjusted upwards. This was not done in the present version of this study but will be added in the revised edition.)


Analysis of Data Concerning Percentage of Defence Expenditure in National GNP, as Represented by Defence Budgets.

The first conclusion that emerges from consideration of Fig. 1 is that the dynamics of arms build-up after the 1967 war are different for different Arab countries :

Syria : In Syria there was a significant increase in 1968 as compared to 1967, probably due to the war's outcome and the fact that a great deal of arms and equipment was destroyed. But from then onwards, to 1971, there was a steady decrease in the percentage of defence expenditure compared with the GNP. This appears to indicate a certain policy concerning Syria's list of priorities. Obviously, the Syrian regime decided not to make the same relative allocations to defence as did Egypt. Moreover, growth dropped to a level not much higher than the rates of increase before the war. It appears, therefore, that Syria during this period implicitly decided not to prepare for another war against Israel. This finding correlates with the actual, as opposed to the declared, behaviour and objectives of the Syrian regime -- namely to abandon seeking the "military solution" against Israel. The declared Syrian position, of course, has consistently been very extreme.

It is also significant that even in 1970, the year of the civil war in Jordan in which Syria played a role, there was no increase in the percentage of GNP devoted to defence. That the Jordanian civil war did not affect Syrian allocations for defence was probably due either to the suddenness

Fig. 1 Defence Expenditure of percentage  
of G. N. P. : Middle East



1950-1966 Defence expenditure according to calendar years.  
1967-1971 Defence expenditure according to financial years..

and short duration of the Syrian intervention or to the lack of a genuine Syrian interest in the whole affair. There have been some indications that in 1972, Syrian relative defence investment and Soviet military aid to Syria have again been on the rise.

Iraq: There had been no significant increase in the Iraqi defence budget after the 1967 war. In fact, as compared with the GNP, there even had been a decline in 1968. The trend changed in 1969, presumably because of the intensification of the war with the Kurds. (An agreement was eventually signed between Baghdad and the Kurds in March 1970.) In any event in 1970 the percentage of the GNP devoted to defence reverted to approximately the level of the years 1964-1967. The conclusion which could be reached is that Iraq also apparently decided to opt out of a "military solution" to the conflict with Israel, or at least is not preparing herself for such a confrontation. Another possible cause affecting the diminishing allocation to defence is the withdrawal of Iraqi units from Jordan in 1971.

The Treaty of Cooperation signed in 1972 with the Soviet Union will probably lead to a change in this trend, as it was followed by extensive military purchases. This increase is due primarily to the situation in the Persian Gulf and to the conflict situation which has developed over the years between Iraq and Iran. Over the last few years Iraq has therefore become less of a party to an Arab-Israeli arms race and more of a party to a local Iraqi-Irani (and to a lesser extent an Iraqi-Irani-Saudi) arms race. This conclusion has also some important theoretical and practical implications as to the structure of the Middle Eastern subsystem and the distribution of conflicts in it.

Jordan: In the case of Jordan we see a closer correlation between developments in the Arab-Israel conflict on the one hand and Jordanian defence allocations on the other, than is the case regarding Syria and Iraq. In



1967 there was a significant increase in defence expenditure as compared with the previous year, undoubtedly due to expenses incurred in the war and the need to re-equip the armed forces. Then in 1968 and 1969 the increase in defence expenditure continued, due to the limited military confrontation with Israel and, probably, the need to prepare for an eventual confrontation with the Palestinian organisations. It is, however, surprising that in 1970 itself -- when the civil war took place -- the defence expenditure as part of Jordan's GNP declined somewhat, from 20 percent to 17.5 percent.

Israel : The years following the war witnessed a great increase in the Israeli defence budget. There has been, in fact, a qualitative jump in Israeli defence expenditure, due to a mixture of several causes : First, limited information about the extent to which Soviet military aid merely replaced or considerably supplemented and increased Egyptian military capabilities; second, the fact that the new Soviet shipments to Egypt involved arms of a better quality and of a later generation than previous Egyptian equipment; third, that the Israeli planners were seeking to move from an arms race strategy of "marginal inferiority" (as far as quantities were concerned) to a position of "parity" with the Egyptian forces. Colin Gray has suggested five types of strategies of behaviour in arms races : clear inferiority, marginal inferiority, parity, marginal superiority, clear superiority. (The Israeli superiority in terms of organization, morale and everything concerned with the human factor is well known and compensated for marginal inferiority in terms of quantities of weapons.)<sup>21</sup> This would mean that the Israeli command, when it realised that the Egyptian forces suffered considerably from the war and that Israel had achieved a more favorable position vis-a-vis Egypt in terms of arms as compared to the pre-1967-war period, was reluctant to give up this new superiority; fourth, Israel had also to repair its damaged equipment and to replace that destroyed in the conflict.

fifth, because of the French arms embargo Israel had to develop a major local defence industry as well as switching to arms purchases from the United States, which are far more expensive. The effect of France's embargo has been very pervasive. The anxiety felt in Israel about possible eventual closure of foreign sources of supply forced Israeli planners to move quickly to purchase as early as possible items which were not, as yet, embargoed.<sup>22</sup>

Eventually the increased rate of Israeli defence expenditure was also dictated by the worsening security situation along the borders, especially following the launching of the war of attrition, which started in earnest in March-April 1969 (although the first shots took place in October 1968). The final cause of the increased allocations -- and the biggest Israeli jump, in 1970 -- was the intensification of the war of attrition and the Soviets' limited involvement in the war. This involvement forced Israeli planners to consider the possibility of further Soviet military intervention, which could take several different forms, and to prepare for such an eventuality. One of the possible scenarios discussed in Israel was the large-scale Soviet air participation to supply a defensive umbrella for an Egyptian attempt to cross the Suez Canal.

The fear of a possible limited Soviet action against Israel probably continued to dictate Israeli defence planning. It will probably continue to do so until a complete Soviet reversal of position on the Middle East or a complete Soviet withdrawal from the region.

Nevertheless, the end of the war of attrition and American assurances about the continued supply of arms to Israel have affected the rate of growth in Israeli defence expenditures since 1970. The budget continued to increase in absolute terms, but the percentage of the GNP assigned to defence somewhat declined. At the same time an added rationale for the continuation of

the arms race, or the Israeli contribution to it, is supplied by the need to deter the Egyptians from contemplating the possibility of a renewal of hostilities. Thus, Israeli military superiority in the Middle East is considered by Israeli planners to be an essential factor in deterring the Egyptians from a new "round" of fighting. Indeed, Israeli superiority has succeeded in performing this task in the three-odd years since the ceasefire was declared. (For a further discussion of this point see below.) The need to maintain this superiority has dictated Israeli behaviour in the arms race.

Egypt : Egypt's defence-expenditure curve also shows a continuous growth in the period 1967-70. This growth, however, is smaller, when compared to the Israeli increase. The explanation of this probably lies in the large-scale Soviet military aid extended to Egypt during this period. During 1967 and 1968, Egyptian behaviour was probably the result of the need to absorb the Soviet military aid and bring the armed forces to their pre-1967 level. During 1969 and 1970, after the Egyptian forces had already achieved this objective, they were able (at least superficially) to both absorb the Soviet military aid and also to increase in a significant way their own defence budget. As the war of attrition was a continuing drain on Egyptian military capabilities, the defence budget in 1969 and 1970 was also aimed at the absorption of wartime losses.

#### Comparison between Israeli and Egyptian Behaviour after 1967.

Israel's very rapid annual growth in GNP allowed her to increase the absolute allocations to defence at a much faster pace than Egypt was able to. Thus, Safran's conclusion that Israel was "winning" the arms race became even more a reality after 1967. Israel's diversion to defence of a growing part of its GNP, as compared to the Egyptian allocations, showed a deliberate decision to maintain the position of military superiority achieved in 1967.



Because the Israeli GNP per capita is so much higher than that of Egypt, ability to divert resources to defence without severely crippling her economic development is also much greater.

#### An Overall View.

Thus a look at the development of the arms race in the Middle East, when viewed through the percentage of defence expenditure in the GNP over the entire two decades from 1950 to 1970, supports the following conclusions :

- a) There were three main phases to the race -- until 1955; from 1957 to the 1967 war; from the war through 1970.
- b) There was a persistent gradual trend of increase in the percentage of GNP devoted to defence in Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria during 1957-1965. This gradual trend was preceded by a major "break" for Israel, Egypt and Syria -- in the years 1955 to 1957. During these three years each of these countries significantly increased its defence appropriations, though the boosts occurred in different years : Egypt led the way in 1955 with the Czechoslovak arms deal signed that year; Israel followed in 1956 with military purchases from France; and finally Syria joined in in 1957.
- c) In 1965-1966 -- and especially in 1966 -- the gradual increase in the defence budgets somewhat subsided. Thus precisely in the two years prior to the outbreak in 1967, the Middle East arms race slowed down somewhat. Indeed in 1966 all the participants in the arms race appeared to have reached a certain plateau or, indeed, a point of equilibrium. One is almost tempted to find it similar to what Richardson calls a "stable arms race." A plateau, in terms of percentages of GNP contributed to defence, means that the participants tacitly agree to consider the economic constraint as a crucial one in calculations about defence budgets. In terms of the actual weapon systems acquired, it seems that the two main contestants achieved more or less equality, in qualitative terms, in central weapon systems. Both had

acquired by that time Mach-2 aircraft -- the Israelis flying the Mirage and the Egyptians, the MIG-21. Both also had already received or were soon expecting effective fighter-bomber systems in substantial numbers -- the Israelis, the Skyhawk, and the Egyptians, the IL28. Thus, the arms race could have become somewhat more stable in the sense that the percentage of GNP devoted to defence did not appear to increase. There was, of course, one basic inherent instability, which we have already pointed out -- namely that because of Israel's faster-growing GNP, Israel could progressively contribute comparatively more financial resources to defence than Egypt was able to do, even though both contributed a constant proportion of their total resources.

d) Throughout the period, Jordan had a completely different pattern of defence allocations as compared to GNP. From a high level at the beginning of the fifties it went down to a lower level in 1965-1967, when Jordan started, immediately after the war, to increase its defence allocations. Jordan did, however, join with the other participants in the race in reaching a certain point of equilibrium in 1966.

e) The third phase of the arms race began after the war and was characterised by a change in the pattern of the race. Israel took the lead with Egypt following. But if Soviet military aid in 1970 is added as well, the Egyptians in fact led the Israelis. Jordan has completely reversed the trend prevalent there before the 1967 war : the percentage of GNP allocated to defence by the Hashemite Kingdom rose in a significant manner. Iraq and Syria, however, adopted -- up to 1970 -- a different approach. Thus the participants in the race applied differing strategies. The post-1967 phase is also characterised by a qualitative change as compared to previous periods. Defence allocations increased dramatically and both Israel and Egypt attained the position held by several medium powers (on the global-international level) in absolute sums allocated to defence.<sup>23</sup>

### Annual Increments in Defence Budgets

The defence expenditure as percentage of GNP throws light on basic decisions about the size of defence allocations and on the economic constraint on the decision makers. A consideration of the annual increments in defence budgets could, however, explain more adequately the dynamics and direction of the arms races,<sup>24</sup> and the process of interaction between the actors involved in the arms race. The dynamism of an arms race is not directed "purely" by the interaction between the participating actors. There are several other factors involved in the process : the bureaucratic behaviour of each actor -- that is, the mechanisms directing policy according to internal organisational procedures and logic; the effect of the behaviour of the other actors participating in the race; the strategic doctrines applied by the actors; and lastly, the degree of economic constraint (which could be identified by looking at the relation of defence expenditure to the GNP). In the Middle East -- as in other areas in which there is a high level of outside interference in the arms race by external powers either supplying or, conversely, embargoing arms -- there is also the element of the behaviour of the outside interventors.

Changes in the strategic doctrines are related to the level of interaction with the other actors participating in the arms race. The relationship with the outside suppliers is also part of the level of interactions between the participants in the arms race and the international environment. Thus, the first analytical distinction in a model of the arms race should include the distinction between the bureaucratic-organisational behaviour level and the international interaction behaviour level.<sup>25</sup> To use the current terminology, the distinction is between the level of reaction and the level of repetition. It should, however, be emphasised that the level of "reaction" in this context denotes not just a reaction to outside behaviour but also initiation of actions by actor, directed at other international actors.



Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are based on the following calculations :

- (1) It is assumed arbitrarily that half of the defence outlays is spent in foreign currency.
- (2) This half is taken at the official exchange rates.
- (3) From the other half, the rate of local inflation is deducted.
- (4) Ideally, the element of foreign currency should also be based on the effective exchange rates. Unfortunately, however, there is no available information about these rates in the Arab countries.

TABLE 2  
ISRAEL (Calendar years)

| Years | Defence Outlays<br>(millions I. L. )<br>(1) | Change Per year<br>(millions I. L.) | Defence Outlays<br>(millions U. S. \$)<br>(2) | Percent per<br>year change<br>local currency |
|-------|---|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1950  | 31.3  |                                     | 87.6  |  |
| 1951  | 54.1  | + 22.8                              | 151.5   |  |
| 1952  | 75.5  | + 21.4                              | 75.5  |  |
| 1953  | 82.0  | + 6.5                               | 63.8  |  |
| 1954  | 117.6                                       | + 35.6                              | 65.3  | 41.04  |
| 1955  | 139.0                                       | + 21.4                              | 77.2  | 17.69  |
| 1956  | 340.0                                       | + 201.0                             | 188.9   | 140.23                                       |
| 1957  | 255.0                                       | - 85.0                              | 141.7   | - 24.24                                      |
| 1958  | 279.2                                       | + 24.2                              | 155.1   | 9.33   |
| 1959  | 368.9                                       | + 89.7                              | 204.9   | 31.99  |
| 1960  | 411.5                                       | + 228.6                             | 228.6   | 11.38  |
| 1961  | 483.6                                       | + 72.1                              | 268.7   | 16.97  |
| 1962  | 654.2                                       | + 170.6                             | 218.1   | 33.75  |
| 1963  | 816.5                                       | + 162.3                             | 272.1   | 24.04  |
| 1964  | 1006.1                                      | + 189.6                             | 335.4   | 22.65  |
| 1965  | 1170.8                                      | + 164.8                             | 390.3   | 15.80  |
| 1966  | 1375.6                                      | + 204.8                             | 458.53  | 16.85  |
| 1967  | 1669.9                                      | + 294.3                             | 543.13  | 21.22  |
| 1968  | 2332.3                                      | + 662.4                             | 666.37  | 39.25  |
| 1969  | 3186.2                                      | + 853.9                             | 910.33  | 36.17  |
| 1970  | 4371.6                                      | + 1185.4                            | 1249.0  | 36.13  |
| 1971  | 5252.0                                      | + 880.4                             | 1411.8  |  |

(1) Sources : Safran, N. From War to War (1969), p. 133 (1950-1966).

Bank of Israel Reports (1967-1971)

(2) Official exchange rates.

TABLE 3  
EGYPT (Calendar years)

| Years | Defence Outlays<br>(millions L.E.)<br>(1) | Change per year<br>(millions L.E.) | Defence Outlays<br>(millions U.S. \$) | Percent per<br>year change<br>local currency |
|-------|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1950  |   |                                    | 1 L.E. = 2.87 \$                      |  |
| 1951  | 41.9                                      |                                    | 120.2                                 |  |
| 1952  | 45.0                                      | + 3.1                              | 129.1                                 |  |
| 1953  | 44.1                                      | - 0.9                              | 126.5                                 |  |
| 1954  | 51.0                                      | + 6.9                              | 146.4                                 | 15.98  |
| 1955  | 73.9                                      | + 22.9                             | 212.0                                 | 44.97  |
| 1956  | 90.0                                      | + 16.1                             | 258.3                                 | 21.56  |
| 1957  | 78.0                                      | - 12.0                             | 223.8                                 | - 13.06                                      |
| 1958  | 71.4                                      | - 6.6                              | 204.9                                 | - 8.45                                       |
| 1959  | 79.5                                      | + 8.1                              | 228.1                                 | 11.33  |
| 1960  | 92.3                                      | + 12.8                             | 264.9                                 | 16.08  |
| 1961  | 106.1                                     | + 13.8                             | 304.3                                 | 14.89  |
| 1962  | 125.8                                     | + 19.7                             | 1 L.E. = 2.82 \$<br>354.7             | 18.87  |
| 1963  | 174.9                                     | + 49.1                             | 493.2                                 | 38.85  |
| 1964  | 230.0                                     | + 55.1                             | 648.6                                 | 30.94  |
| 1965  | 264.0                                     | + 34.0                             | 744.4                                 | 13.82  |
| 1966  | 280.0*                                    | + 16.0                             | 1 L.E. = 2.30 \$<br>644.0             | 5.81   |
| 1967  | 282.0                                     | + 2.0                              | 648.0                                 | 0.71   |
| 1968  | 305.0                                     | + 23.0                             | 671.5                                 | 8.00   |
| 1969  | 373.85                                    | + 68.8                             | 859.8                                 | 22.19  |
| 1970  | 490.65                                    | + 116.8                            | 1128.50                               | 30.66  |

(1) Safran, N. *From War to War* (1969), p. 125 (1950-1964), I. B. R. D. R 71-188, July 1971 U. A. R. T. S. 1 (1965-1970).

\* Estimated expenditure inferred from expenditures in 1965 and 1967.



TABLE 4  
SYRIA (Calendar years)

| Year | Defence Outlays<br>(millions S. L.)<br>(1) | Change Per year<br>(millions S. L.) | Defence Outlays<br>(millions U. S. \$)<br>(2) | Percent per<br>year change<br>local currency |
|------|--|-------------------------------------|---|--|
| 1950 |  |                                     |   |  |
| 1951 |  |                                     |   |  |
| 1952 | 86.2                                       |                                     | 23.0  |  |
| 1953 | 93.3                                       | + 7.1                               | 25.7  |  |
| 1954 | 89.9                                       | - 3.4                               | 25.1  | - 3.8  |
| 1955 | 104.8                                      | + 14.9                              | 29.3  | 16.67  |
| 1956 | 166.3                                      | + 61.5                              | 46.7  | 54.90  |
| 1957 | 160.0                                      | - 6.3                               | 46.4  | - 3.71                                       |
| 1958 | 276.8                                      | + 116.8                             | 77.4  | 75.40  |
| 1959 | 271.3                                      | - 5.5                               | 75.9  | - 1.95                                       |
| 1960 | 285.1                                      | + 13.8                              | 79.7  | 4.96   |
| 1961 | 299.9                                      | + 14.8                              | 83.9  | 5.14   |
| 1962 | 339.7                                      | + 40.0                              | 91.6  | 13.54  |
| 1963 | 374.7                                      | + 35.0                              | 98.1  | 10.20  |
| 1964 | 405.8                                      | + 31.1                              | 100.0   | 8.06   |
| 1965 | 408.0                                      | + 3.8                               | 107.6   | 0.95   |
| 1966 | 412.6                                      | + 4.6                               | 107.3   | 1.10   |
| 1967 | 448.0                                      | + 35.4                              | 116.5   | 8.48   |
| 1968 | 611.6                                      | + 163.6                             | 159.0   | 35.89  |
| 1969 | 681.0                                      | + 69.5                              | 177.0   | 11.41  |
| 1970 | 680.6                                      | - 0.5                               | 176.9   | - 0.7  |
| 1971 | 687.5                                      | + 6.9                               | 178.7   |  |

- (1) 1952-1964 Safran N. From War to War (1969), p. 144.  
1965-1969 Banque Centrale de Syrie (1971), p. 40.  
1970-1971 I. M. F. September 24, 1969 SN/69/145 Syria  
(2) Free exchange rates - 1952-1965/0.26 S. L. = 1 \$ - 1966-1972

TABLE 5  
IRAQ (Calendar years)

| Year            | Defence Outlays<br>(millions I. D.)<br>(1) | Change Per Year<br>(millions I. D.) | Defence Outlays<br>(millions U. S. \$) | Percent Per<br>year change<br>local currency |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1 I. D. = 2.8\$ |  |                                     |  |  |
| 1952            | 15.6                                       |                                     | 43.7                                   |  |
| 1953            | 19.0                                       | + 4.6                               | 53.2                                   |  |
| 1954            | 20.0                                       | + 1.0                               | 56.0                                   | 5.32   |
| 1955            | 21.8                                       | + 1.8                               | 61.0                                   | 8.86   |
| 1956            | 27.1                                       | + 5.3                               | 75.9                                   | 23.57  |
| 1957            | 29.7                                       | + 2.6                               | 83.2                                   | 9.36   |
| 1958            | 31.0                                       | + 1.3                               | 86.8                                   | 4.45   |
| 1959            | 35.8                                       | + 4.8                               | 100.2                                  | 15.59  |
| 1960            | 42.4                                       | + 6.6                               | 118.7                                  | 18.12  |
| 1961            | 44.9                                       | + 2.5                               | 125.7                                  | 5.26   |
| 1962            | 48.3                                       | + 3.4                               | 135.2                                  | 7.55   |
| 1963            | 58.2                                       | + 3.9                               | 163.0                                  | 7.92   |
| 1964            | 68.4                                       | + 9.8                               | 191.5                                  | 16.95  |
| 1965            | 81.4                                       | + 13.0                              | 227.9                                  | 19.05  |
| 1966            | 84.3                                       | + 3.9                               | 229.6                                  | 4.76   |
| 1967            | 83.8                                       | - 0.5                               | 234.6                                  | - 0.58                                       |
| 1968            | 82.9                                       | - 0.9                               | 232.12                                 | - 1.07                                       |
| 1969            | 113.1                                      | + 30.2                              | 316.7                                  | 34.91  |
| 1970            | 118.4                                      | + 5.3                               | 331.5                                  | 4.59   |

- (1) 1952-1964 Safran, N. From War to War (1969), p. 150  
1965-1968 Central Bank of Iraq : Annual Report 1969, p. 254  
1969-1971 E. I. U. Iraq No. 2 1972, p. 8.

TABLE 6  
JORDAN (Calendar years)

| Year              | Defence Outlays<br>(millions J. D.)<br>(1) | Change Per year<br>(millions J. D.) | Defence Outlays<br>(millions U. S. \$) | Percent Per<br>year change<br>local currency |
|-------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1 J. D. = 2.80 \$ |  |                                     |  |  |
| 1950              |  |                                     |  |  |
| 1951              |  |                                     |  |  |
| 1952              |  |                                     |  |  |
| 1953              | 9.3  |                                     | 26.0                                   |  |
| 1954              | 10.2                                       | + 0.9                               | 28.6                                   | 9.68   |
| 1955              | 10.5                                       | + 0.3                               | 29.5                                   | 2.94   |
| 1956              | 12.8                                       | + 2.3                               | 35.9                                   | 21.90  |
| 1957              | 13.5                                       | + 0.7                               | 37.7                                   | 5.47   |
| 1958              | 15.9                                       | + 2.4                               | 44.6                                   | 17.18  |
| 1959              | 20.1                                       | + 4.2                               | 56.4                                   | 26.41  |
| 1960              | 19.1                                       | - 1.0                               | 53.6                                   | - 4.97                                       |
| 1961              | 18.6                                       | - 0.5                               | 52.2                                   | - 2.62                                       |
| 1962              | 19.0                                       | + 0.4                               | 53.3                                   | 2.15   |
| 1963              | 20.6                                       | + 1.6                               | 57.5                                   | 8.42   |
| 1964              | 21.0                                       | + 0.4                               | 58.9                                   | 1.94   |
| 1965              | 21.1                                       | + 0.1                               | 59.1                                   | 5.24   |
| 1966              | 22.5                                       | + 1.4                               | 63.0                                   | 6.63   |
| 1967              | 25.58                                      | + 3.35                              | 72.38                                  | 14.89  |
| 1968              | 34.86                                      | + 9.0                               | 96.80                                  | 34.81  |
| 1969              | 43.0                                       | + 8.14                              | 120.40                                 | 14.45  |
| 1970              | 43.1                                       | + 0.1                               | 120.7                                  | 0.22   |
| 1971 *            | 42.7                                       | - 0.4                               | 119.5                                  |  |

(1) 1953-1965 Safran, N. *From War to War* (1969), p. 152.

1966-1971 : I. M. F. May 13, 1970 : *Recent Economic Development*, p. 13.  
I. B. R. D. 1969, p. 38.

\* Estimated expenditure.



TABLE 7  
Annual Percentage Increment of Defence Outlays  
1954-1970


| Years | Israel  | Egypt   | Syria  | Iraq   | Jordan |
|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1953  | -       | -       | -      | -      | -      |
| 1954  | 41.04   | 15.98   | - 3.80 | 5.32   | 9.68   |
| 1955  | 17.69   | 44.97   | 16.67  | 8.86   | 2.94   |
| 1956  | 140.23  | 21.56   | 54.90  | 23.57  | 21.90  |
| 1957  | - 24.24 | - 13.06 | - 3.71 | 9.36   | 5.47   |
| 1958  | 9.33    | - 8.45  | 75.40  | 4.45   | 17.18  |
| 1959  | 31.99   | 11.33   | - 1.95 | 15.59  | 26.41  |
| 1960  | 11.38   | 16.08   | 4.96   | 18.12  | - 4.97 |
| 1961  | 16.97   | 14.89   | 5.14   | 5.26   | - 2.62 |
| 1962  | 33.75   | 18.87   | 13.54  | 7.55   | 2.15   |
| 1963  | 24.04   | 38.85   | 10.20  | 7.92   | 8.42   |
| 1964  | 22.65   | 30.94   | 3.06   | 16.95  | 1.94   |
| 1965  | 15.80   | 13.82   | 0.95   | 19.05  | 5.24   |
| 1966  | 16.85   | 5.81    | 1.10   | 4.76   | 6.63   |
| 1967  | 21.22   | 0.71    | 8.48   | - 0.58 | 14.89  |
| 1968  | 39.25   | 8.00    | 35.89  | - 1.07 | 34.81  |
| 1969  | 36.17   | 22.19   | 11.41  | 34.91  | 14.45  |
| 1970  | 36.13   | 30.66   | - 0.7  | 4.59   | 0.22   |

This "initiative" is decided -- as has been noted above -- by changes in strategic doctrines and by perceptions about the reliability and readiness of outside actors to supply arms. But for the purpose of the present study, only the level of interaction with (or reaction to) local actors participating in the arms race is extensively analysed. This is done by a consideration of the various correlations between defence expenditures of the local actors.

The level of organisational and bureaucratic behaviour (repetition) in the arms race could be determined by considering the internal consistency in the diversion of resources to defence expenditure. Thus, bureaucratic and organisational behaviour could be identified through the level of inertia in the pattern of defence allocations. This could be achieved by consideration of the correlation between the level of expenditure in year  $t$ , and the level of expenditure of the same actor in year  $t-1$ .

If this was the only distinction in a model of the arms race, then the model would appear as : <sup>26</sup>

Figure 2



A Note About Data

Apart from the data supplied in Tables 2-7 another set of figures was used. This last set is taken from SIPRI, The World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, 1972, Table 4A.8., pp. 86-87. The figures in this table appear to be less reliable than the data supplied in Tables 2 to 7. On the

other hand, the SIPRI figures are given in US \$ at 1960 constant prices and 1960 exchange rates and thus enable us to correlate annual increments in defence budgets in absolute sums.

### Conclusions Emerging from Table 7

First, Table 7 substantiates all the main conclusions emerging from Table 1. Table 1, however, shows a much more ordered pattern of gradual development as compared to Table 7. Second, Israel is "leading" in average annual percentage increments over the years, with Egypt following in second place. The average incremental growth is :

Israel, 28.83%; Egypt, 16.08%; Iraq, 10.86%; Jordan, 9.7%.

Israel's lead could be explained by its rapid annual growth in GNP (see above) as well as by other considerations which are basically similar to those influencing the GNP growth. Third, it appears that as far as Israel is concerned, a certain distinction can be drawn between the three main phases in the annual increments : 1954-1956; 1957-1966; 1967-1970. The first phase is characterised principally by two "jumps," one in 1954 and a much larger one in 1956. Indeed the 1956 increment, along with the developments in the last three years, affects the overall average increase to a large extent. The heavy expenditures in 1956 resulted, of course, from the Israeli-French arms deals and the Sinai campaign of that year. If this division into phases is projected to the other contestants, then the averages for the three phases will be as follows :

Table 8

### Average annual increments (in percentages)

| <u>Country</u> | <u>17 years (1954-1970)</u> | <u>10 years (1957-1966)</u> | <u>4 years (1967-1970)</u> |
|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Israel         | 28.839                      | 15.852                      | 33.192                     |
| Egypt          | 16.068                      | 12.808                      | 15.39 *                    |
| Syria          | 13.952                      | 11.362                      | 13.927                     |
| Iraq           | 10.862                      | 10.905                      | 9.462                      |
| Jordan         | 9.691                       | 6.585                       | 16.092                     |

\* Soviet military aid not included.



A consideration of these figures will show again that a) Israel is leading in percentage annual increments in all three phases (when Soviet military aid is not included), while Egypt, Syria, and Iraq follow, in a declining order according to the same pattern -- that is, in all three phases these three states rank in the same positions on the scale. The only exception is Jordan, where there was a significant jump after the 1967 war. This again shows a high correlation between defence expenditure and the actual strategic situation. In the cases of Syria and Iraq, however, there is an interesting development. In both countries the difference between the averages in the last phase are not significantly different from those during the overall seventeen years. This again corresponds to the conclusions drawn from Table 1 (see above).

The most "stable" phase was the middle ten years. During this period the arms race went on but its momentum was slower, as compared with the other two phases.

#### Correlations between the Annual Increments of Defence Budgets

Table 9  
Partial Correlations (percent per year) \*

|               |        |
|---------------|--------|
| Israel-Egypt  | .4750  |
| Israel-Syria  | .3606  |
| Israel-Iraq   | .2983  |
| Israel-Jordan | .4181  |
| Egypt-Syria   | -.2038 |
| Egypt-Iraq    | .0737  |
| Egypt-Jordan  | .3142  |
| Syria-Iraq    | -.1039 |
| Syria-Jordan  | .2335  |
| Jordan-Iraq   | -.0416 |

\* Based on Table 7.

Table 10

Partial Correlations (changes per year in absolute sums) \*

|               |          |
|---------------|----------|
| Israel-Egypt  | .73294   |
| Israel-Syria  | .15032   |
| Israel-Iraq   | -.239463 |
| Israel-Jordan | -.011632 |
| Egypt-Syria   | .2575    |
| Egypt-Iraq    | .03089   |
| Egypt-Jordan  | -.06483  |
| Syria-Iraq    | .41433   |
| Syria-Jordan  | .08564   |
| Iraq-Jordan   | .42532   |

\* Based on the SIPRI data.

Table 11

Multiple Correlations of One Country and the Other Four Countries  
(percent per year) \*

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| Israel-other 4 | .7007 |
| Egypt-other 4  | .5831 |
| Syria-other 4  | .5745 |
| Iraq-other 4   | .3871 |
| Jordan-other 4 | .6342 |

\* Based on Table 7.

The correlations in Tables 9 to 11 control for time.

The correlations in Table 11 demonstrate that Israel's behaviour in the arms race could be explained by its interaction with all the other four countries. If partial correlations are concerned then Table 9 demonstrates that the behaviour of both Israelis and Egyptians is primarily explained by

their mutual conflict situation. The Israeli-Egyptian interaction as a major explanation for their behaviour in the arms race is mostly demonstrated by Table 10.

Because of the differences between Tables 9 and 11, on the one hand, and Table 10, on the other, drawing further conclusions from the correlations should be postponed pending additional study of the data. It should, however, be added that in all Tables, Iraq appears to be the odd man out. Her pattern of behaviour in the arms race appears to be decided primarily by factors which lie outside the main area of adversary relationship of the other contestants.

Correlations between the five countries at  $t$  and  $t-1$  on the basis of Table 7 have not produced significant results, but a further study must be carried out.


#### The Effect of Bureaucratic-Organizational Behaviour

The element of bureaucratic behaviour could be located by identifying the element of repetition and inertia in the growth of defence budgets. At the same time, the element of inertia could be identified by considering the byplot No. 1. The length of the vectors and the angle between the vectors of any country at  $t$  and at  $t-1$  present the element of bureaucratic inertia. The longer the vectors and the bigger the angle, the smaller is the element of inertia. Thus, from byplot 1 it could be concluded that the element of inertia and repetition is the lowest in Israel. The four Arab countries are more affected (to varying degrees) by the pressure and logic of bureaucratic-organizational behaviour.

This means that Israel decides upon her defence allocations each year primarily on the basis of her interactions with the other contestants in the arms race; the behaviour of the outside suppliers; and lastly decisions



Byplot 1



concerning changes in strategic doctrines. (The correlation of Israel at  $t$  with Israel at  $t-1$  is  $-.345$  whereas the correlation of Egypt at  $t$  with Egypt at  $t-1$  is  $.422$ . [correlations based on Table 7].)

#### Arms Races in the Middle East and War

There have been four Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East : in 1948-49; in 1956; in 1967; and the war of attrition in 1969-70. The first -- the war of Israeli Independence -- is not included in our study, which concentrates on the other three wars. An analysis of the pattern and pace of the arms race in the Middle East preceding these three wars supplies us with some information regarding the question as to what extent arms races in the Arab-Israel region cause wars. From all the tables presented, it clearly appears that the Israeli-Egyptian war of 1956 was preceded by a major "jump" in the arms race, a jump which occurred in the years 1955 and 1956 -- with Egypt leading the way in 1955 (although Israel did make a certain quantitative "jump" in 1954) and Israel following by a major move in 1956. This leads to the conclusion that this war was at least related to the arms race. Indeed this view -- that the 1956 war was to a large extent the result of the arms race -- is substantiated by other sources as well. But this is not to say that the arms race was the only cause of the 1956 war. The war resulted from a combination of several causes apart from the arms race, including the mounting violence along the borders between Israel and Egypt, and the general fear and suspicion of the Israeli leadership concerning the intentions of the Egyptian leadership. What happened was that the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal of 1955 created great alarm in Israel. The perception of the Israeli decision makers was that this arms deal was the first preparatory move on the road leading to an Egyptian war against Israel. Eventually the pressing question for the Israeli decision makers came to be : What will be the lead time for the absorption of the new arms by the Egyptian armed forces ?


The Israeli preventive war that ensued was therefore a direct result of the Israeli perceptions (or misperceptions)<sup>27</sup> of the objective of the arms deal, coupled with the escalation along the borders.

The 1967 war came as a result of a different set of factors. The tables presented here show that although the arms race continued up to 1967, in fact its rate had slowed down by 1966. But two other factors did apparently affect the war -- namely, the violence along the borders (which was in fact on a smaller scale as compared with before the 1956 conflict) and, more importantly, the mechanism of alliances in the Arab world itself. Egypt felt compelled -- because of intra-Arab politics -- to aid Syria in what appeared to the Egyptian leaders to be the imminent possibility of an Israeli attack on that country. The Egyptian leadership acted as it did in the hope that this move will reestablish Egyptian hegemony in the Arab World. Thus, the process of arms accumulation in the years preceding the war does not appear to have played an important role in the initiation of the crisis of 1967.

: Formal Model of Causes of the 1956 War



A model for the 1967 war will be somewhat more complex :





The 1969-70 war of attrition was in fact the second stage of the 1967 war. The purpose of this stage being to rectify (from the Egyptian point of view) the situation created by the earlier war. This stage came about not because of Egypt's will to uphold its position in the Arab world (which forms part of the mechanism of alliances and guarantees). Nor was it the result of prior violence along the Israeli-Egyptian ceasefire lines. (A low level of violence persisted there during 1967-68 but it was by itself more of an intermediate epilogue rather than a prologue to war.) The arms race between Israel and Egypt certainly went on and indeed underwent a major change in the level of resources diverted to it, but then again, it appears that this was not the real cause of the war. The arms race contributed to the war only in one way -- to the extent that the Egyptians perceived that they had replenished their arsenals and were again in a position to mount a battle against Israel, albeit a battle on a limited scale. The immediate and central cause to the war was therefore the element of grievance that the Egyptians had, grievance on a scale much greater than at any previous phase of the Arab-Israel conflict.

On the basis of this brief discussion one can infer : (a) an arms race in the Middle East did, on one occasion, serve as the main cause leading to a war. Thus, Milstein's conclusions (see American and Soviet Influence, Balance of Power, and Arab-Israeli Violence, p. 165 and also pp. 160-162) that "Arab and Israeli violence is generally independent of the weapons balance between Israelis and Arabs" is not applicable to the 1956 crisis and war. Milstein may be right about limited actions along the borders but is mistaken about one full-scale war. (b) At the same time, an arms race as such does not appear to necessarily be conducive to war, and here 1967 serves as an example. (c) Israel initiates war when it feels that the overall balance of power might change and in a disadvantageous way. The threshold for such change is very low. The Egyptians initiate war when a

high level of perceived grievance combines with self perception of even a limited military capability vis-a-vis Israel. The element of grievance must be not only a general Arab one, but primarily an Egyptian one. It could be assumed, however, that if the Egyptians will have a substantial military superiority, the element of grievance motivating them to launch war against Israel may be smaller.

Arms Races, Stability and Arms Control in the Middle East : Some Observations

To an extent the concepts of both an arms race and of stability escape definition. The difficulties in defining arms races have already been mentioned above. As for international "stability", the definition I suggest here is : The continuation of the structure and patterns of interaction of an international system without outbursts of major violence. This definition emphasises both continuity and the limitation of violence to a tolerable level.

The objective of arms control, in the last analysis, is precisely to assure such stability within the framework of the realm of the military. Arms control aims at the creation of strategic stability but its real and more fundamental objective is political stability as defined above.

The interactions between adversaries in a situation of strategic conflict are determined by a host of factors. Basic among them are the elements of political grievance on the one hand and the military-strategic balance on the other. In the Arab-Israeli region it seems to me that the central strategic (and indeed political) issue is the future relationship between Israel and Egypt. The Palestinian problem is, of course, important in human terms and has its effect on the course of the development of the Arab-Israel conflict in general. However, in Realpolitik terms, the central issue is the Israeli-Egyptian politico-strategic relationship. This relationship will decide the future of the core area of the Middle East and the course of development of

the Arab-Israel conflict in general. In passing it should be added that this is not to say that other Arab-Israeli issues should not be tackled beforehand. On the contrary - if one disgresses into current political issues - it appears probable to me that a settlement between Israel and Jordan would be conducive to an Israeli-Egyptian settlement.

The Israeli-Egyptian adversary relationship at present is highly unstable. For almost the past three years an uneasy ceasefire has prevailed, underwritten by clear Israeli military superiority, a superiority of such magnitude that even the Egyptians realise that an attack by them will end in a devastating military defeat. But at the same time, the presence of the Israeli forces along the Suez Canal, and the continued Israeli control of Sinai creates a permanent source of great humiliation and grievance to the Egyptians. This source of grievance is much more painful to the Egyptians than the more distant issue of the Palestinians. Thus, an Israeli-Egyptian conflict has emerged, distinct from the general Israeli-Arab conflict.

It could be assumed, therefore, that whenever the Egyptians change their perception about the relative power relationship between them and the Israelis they will try and change the new territorial status quo. Another possibility is that under strong pressure the Egyptian leadership might decide to change its calculation of gains/risks involved in a military operation. The government in Cairo might come to consider that even significant losses are worth being accepted, reasoning that in the process of military action the international reaction will be such as to compel Israel to moderate its political demands. Lastly, there could be a completely irrational Egyptian action which will ignore altogether the gains/risks calculation or, alternatively, will consider that the gains could be measured by the "restoration of Egyptian pride" through battle -- whatever the price may be.

Moreover, as long as the strong element of "pain" persists for the



Egyptians, there is the possibility that new developments in the technology of war might change Egyptian perceptions about the outcome of a war with Israel. Thus, for example, if the relationship between defence and offence, which at present is heavily tipped in favour of the offensive system, will change and defensive systems will outbalance offensive ones, the Egyptians might be tempted to start some variant of a war of attrition, or launch limited small-scale commando-type operations, hoping that their defensive systems can withstand the expected massive Israeli retaliation.

It appears therefore that only a combination of adequate Israeli deterrence against any Egyptian attack coupled with a diminution of the element of grievance existing at present between the two countries will insure a stabler system. This would mean, on the political level, some kind of -- at the first stage -- partial settlement along the Suez Canal which would diminish the Egyptian grievance while at the same time not affecting the Israeli military superiority necessary for the maintenance of credible deterrence against the Egyptians. It is true that the Egyptians are concerned also about Israeli military superiority even if it does not relate to the Israeli presence along the Canal and in Sinai. This leads to the conclusion that both sides need adequate mutual deterrence systems. On the other hand, there is always a danger that if there is any ambiguity about the Israeli clear superiority, the Egyptians might interpret it as an Israeli weakness and try to use the opportunity to launch a military operation. Thus, a demonstrated Israeli superiority is a necessary condition for the maintenance of stability. This is necessary not only because of Egypt's possible misperceptions about its ability to defeat Israel, but also because a change in the military balance to the point of Egyptian "perceived" superiority over Israel, or even equality with Israel might create Israeli anxieties. These, on their part, might lead to an Israeli preemptive strike.

The discussion of the relation of arms races to stability must therefore be conducted within a wider framework, where the following elements interact and interdepend : strategic doctrines; the perception (by both sides) of the mutual military strength; the element of grievance; and lastly, anxieties about the possibility of change in the military balance owing to technological changes or embargoes or major arms deals.

In the past, as has been pointed out, the Middle East arms race once served as a major cause for a war (in 1956) and once was irrelevant to the war. In the next decade or so -- if Israel remains in Sinai and there is no settlement -- it appears that no local arms race might lead to an objective Egyptian superiority or even equality with Israel. Hence the race is to a large extent irrelevant to the possibility of war. It might become relevant only under the following conditions : if there is a major technological breakthrough which will enable the Egyptians to change their perception about the military balance between them and Israel (such as a change in the relationship between defence and offence or the introduction of nuclear weapons); if there is a meaningful embargo on Israel alone which might lead Israel to suspect that her superiority might be affected; and finally, if the expenses of arms will fundamentally increase and Egypt will obtain huge financial resources from the Arab oil countries while the United States ends financial aid to Israel. In all these circumstances there might be an Egyptian change of perception about the relative military relationship, a change which might lead either to an Egyptian attack or to an Israeli preemptive strike.

These scenarios do not appear to be very feasible in the next decade, but they cannot be completely dismissed as impossible. The objective of arms control measures in such a situation will be to limit the possibility of developments in precisely such directions, but as long as the political situation remains what it is, the possibility of such measures being adopted and agreed upon is very limited if indeed it exists at all.

At the same time, it does not appear that any of these scenarios described above will really develop. It follows, therefore, that the continuation of the arms race along the same lines will be irrelevant to the question of stability -- simply because the superiority of one side is assured under most circumstances. This does not mean that an arms race between Israel and Egypt is conducive to stability, but only that in most imaginable situations in the next decade, such a race will not bring about a new war by itself. If war breaks out it will be because the element of political grievance will act as the major motivation.

The continuation of the present arms race is, however, far from being necessary for the continuation of stability. In some cases -- as has been pointed out above -- this continued competition might involve dangers (however remote) to stability. Furthermore, the arms race does affect adversely economic and social developments in the countries involved. The diversion of huge sums of money to the requirements of defence hinders the solution of pressing social problems. A limitation of the arms race is therefore in the interests of the local powers and will not destabilise the present situation provided it is carried in a more or less symmetrical way.

If a partial political solution is achieved along the Suez Canal, then the application of arms control measures in order to assure strategic stability will become a major concern. These must involve primarily measures aimed at the reduction of anxieties about the threats to launch surprise first-strikes by aircraft. These measures must refer to weapon systems, facilities for inspection and early warning, and the development of channels of communications between the adversaries. The study of such measures should constitute a central part of any negotiations about any settlement between Israel and Egypt.



## NOTES

(1) The concept of regional subsystems in international politics has been discussed in a number of books and articles. For a few examples see : Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies : The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, 15, 2, January 1963; Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions," International Studies Quarterly, 13, 4, 1969; Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," International Studies Quarterly, 13, 4, December 1969. For a discussion of subsystems in connection with problems of regional integration see Karl Keiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems : Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns of the Role of the Super Powers", World Politics, October 1968. For discussions of the Middle East subsystem, see inter alia Leonard Binder, "The Middle East As a Subordinate International System", World Politics, X, 3, 1958; Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System and its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, 13, 2, 1969; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (OUP, 1971), Ch. 3; Yair Evron, The Middle East : Super Powers, Nations and War (London and New York, June 1973), Ch. 6. The concept is used or at least implied in several other works on the Middle East.

(2) For some quantitative studies of conflictive behaviour in the Middle East see Journal of Conflict Resolution, July 1972. See especially the studies by Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al; Barry M. Blechman; Robert Burrows and Douglas Muzzio.

(3) For a study of the strategies applied by the local powers in the Middle East for pressure upon and threats against the super powers see inter alia Evron, op. cit. Ch. 5.

(4) On the arms races and the process of arms acquisition in the Middle East see inter alia Jeffrey Milstein, "Soviet and American Influences on

the Arab-Israeli Arms Race : A Quantitative Analysis", Peace Research Society (International) Papers, Vol. 15, 1970, pp. 6-27; Nadav Safran, From War to War, the Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-67 (Pegasus, 1969), Chs. 4 & 5; SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament Year Book, 1972, pp. 70-71 and 86-88; SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, pp. 44-48 and Ch. 17, also pp. 768-781; J. Kemp, Arms and Security : The Egypt-Israel Case, Adelphi Papers No. 52 (London, ISS, 1968); John C. Lambellet, "A Dynamic Model of the Arms Race in the Middle East," General Systems, Vol. XVI, 1971. After the bulk of this paper was written I had the opportunity of reading Michael Mihalka, Understanding Arms Accumulation : The Middle East as an Example, Mimeo, to appear in Joseph Ben-Dak (ed.) International Conflicts : The Methodology of their Assessment (New York, 1973); Milstein, "American and Soviet Influence, Balance of Power and Arab-Israeli Violence."

(5) "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World Politics, October 1971, p. 40.

(6) Ibid., pp. 51-52.

(7) See Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races : Prerequisites and Results," reprinted in S.E. Mueller (ed.) Approaches to Measurement in International Relations, p. 15.

(8) Arms Races and their Influence Upon International Stability, with Special Reference to the Middle East, pp. 3-4. Richardson has been followed by others as well. Gray made an important contribution to the theory by suggesting a taxonomy of arms races; see his "The Arms Race Phenomenon", op. cit. For the view that indeed the study of arms races is one of the few fields in which adequate formal models have been developed, see Oran R. Young, "The Perils of Odysseus" in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, Theory and Practice in International Relations, pp. 183-184.

(9) See his Arms and Insecurity (London, 1960). For an elaborate and comprehensive review and critique of Richardson's work on both the arms races and other causes of war, see Anatol Rapoport, "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 1, No. 2. For further critique of Richardson's approach see inter alia Raymond Tanter, "International System and Foreign Policy Approaches : Implications for Conflict Modeling and Management" in Tanter and Ullman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 8-9; Young, op. cit., p. 184.

(10) Attempts to look at the mechanism of the arms race in the Middle East, through the prism of the actual weapon systems acquired are : Kemp, op. cit., Amelia C. Leiss with Geoffrey Kemp et al. Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, Arms Control Project, Centre for International Studies, MIT (mimeo, 1970); lastly, an innovative attempt to quantify the effectiveness of weapon systems and relate them to the Middle East arms race was done by Mihalka, op. cit.

(11) There are however two major technical difficulties in approaching the arms race phenomenon in the Middle East exclusively from the point of view of weapon systems : (a) Although the nature and characteristics of new weapon systems introduced into the Middle East are well-known, still their actual quantities are a matter of state secrecy. There are various approximations but no conclusive evidence about the quantities. (b) The effectiveness of weapon systems depends to a large extent on the human factor. A study based on the quantification of weapon systems must therefore include a quantification of the human factor which operates the weapons.

(12) See Safran, op. cit.

(13) See Marshal I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, (New York, 1967, p. 240), who claims that the suspension in Egyptian payments for Soviet military aid



occurred in 1965. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (1971), p. 182, however, points out that the suspension took place only after the 1967 war and in view of the heavy replacement needs that the Egyptian army faced because of the war. President Nasser said that the Russians did not ask for payments for arms supplied after the 1967 War. See Times, 10.11.1968.

(14) See the Strategic Survey, 1970 (IISS, London, 1971), p. 46.

(15) According to communication from the IISS, 4 May, 1973.

(16) See ibid.

(17) See Gur Ofer, The Economic Burden of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East, The Soviet and East European Research Centre, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Research Paper No. 1, mimeo, April 1972, p. 9. Ofer relies on the State Department estimates. On the basis of a compilation of several sources, Ofer suggests in his Table 2 estimates of Soviet military aid in different periods. When one studies column 4 of this Table, the conclusion reached is that during 1968-70 all of Soviet military aid to the Middle East went to Egypt.

(18) See The Arms Trade with the Third World, pp. 506-510.

(19) See for example, article by Martin Miller published in Ordnance, and reprinted in The Israeli Airforce Publication, April 1973, pp. 33-42.

(20) According to Egyptian sources, the reequipment of the Egyptian forces ended by late 1968. See The Arms Trade with the Third World, p. 525.

(21) For the "contribution" of the French embargo to Israel's increased appropriations for defence, see Y. Evron, "French Arms Policy in the Middle East," The World Today, March 1970.

(22) For this thoughtful categorization of the different strategies of arms 'racing' see Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon," pp. 57-63.

- (23) See IISS, The Military Balance 1972-1973.
- (24) On the position that percentage annual increments in defence budgets is a better indication of the arms race dynamics than are absolute levels, see Nazli Choucri and Robert North, "Dynamics of International Conflict : Some Policy Implications of Population, Resources and Technology," in Tanter and Ullman, op. cit., p. 117 fn. 10.
- (25) This distinction is of course implied by the regression equation for navy budgets in Choucri and North, op. cit., p. 120. These authors, however, add other variables to the equation.
- (26) This model is similar in its structure to Tanter's formal model of intensity of interactions in the Berlin Crisis. See Tanter and Ullman, op. cit., p. 22.
- (27) For the Israeli perceptions, see inter alia Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (London), p. 5.

THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
AND THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Prepared for the Seminar: "Systematic Thinking Towards Alternative  
Solutions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict"

The prevailing Israeli concept of national security is one of the less studied attributes of the Arab-Israeli conflict in spite of its far reaching consequences for the prospects of war and peace in the Middle East. The purpose of this paper is to examine this concept from two points of view: as an almost model case of a strategic outlook on foreign relations, and as a reflection of the constraints, some of them external, some self imposed, which leave Israeli decision-makers in the realm of foreign and defence policy with very few options to choose from.

The Israeli concept of national security is predicated on two interrelated premises: a) that Israel has no choice but to treat the Arab-Israeli conflict as "given" and b) that she is bound to take into consideration her narrow margin of security deriving from lack of geographic depth and demographic quantitative inferiority.

The rationale of operating on the basis of these premises has been presented in different forms by different Israeli politicians, ideologists and political commentators. Some of them, referred to



this context to the historical predicament of the Jewish people or Israel's own experience, others to an 'Israeli theory of Arab encirclement' analogous to the alleged Soviet theory of 'capitalist encirclement'. The more pragmatic presentations were mostly based on the logic of a 'worse case analysis' often coupled by the impact of the Arabs' own statements about their intentions towards Israel. The common denominator of these different presentations of the case for the Israeli concept of national security has been the pessimistic anticipation of the behaviour of the other actors in the international arena and Realpolitik evaluation of the limited validity of the loose norms of the semi-institutionalised international system.

The consequences of such an outlook for the conduct of Israel's foreign and defence policy made this policy appear like an incarnation of the strategic studies approach to world politics. Foreign policy tended to become an extension of national defence policy i.e., subjected to considerations deriving from involvement in a conflict perceived as a struggle for survival between nation-actors with irreconcilable interests.

It is apparently these characteristics of Israel's foreign relations which account for their susceptibility to an analysis in terms of concepts introduced by the exponents of the strategic studies approach to international relations.

Some of the components of the Israeli concept of national security are worth mentioning in this context.

a) self-reliance - In its broader sense the notion of self-reliance is rooted in the fundamental Zionist idea of self-emancipation which inspired the Jewish colonization in Palestine since the eighteen-eighties. In a narrower political sense it has been prescribed by David Ben Gurion and other advocates of 'orientation on ourselves' as a guideline for the conduct of Israel's foreign and defence policy. However, partly through the influence of Ben Gurion, who presided over the formation of Israel's defence establishment, and partly under the impact of imposed near-isolation in the early fifties, the notion of self-reliance has been incorporated into the prevailing Israeli doctrine of national security.

In spite of the bluntness of some of the slogans associated with the notion of 'self-reliance', such as Ben Gurion's saying 'What matters is not what the Gentiles say but what the Jews do,' the context of Israeli references to self-reliance in matters of national security indicate that it is taken to imply autonomy rather than autarky. In other words, the emphasis is put on the autonomous self-interest of Israel as the appropriate frame of reference for decision-making in the realm of foreign policy and national defence. Only in the specific context of war waging self-reliance appears to acquire a connotation of autarky as in General Dayan's statement : on

the eve of the June 1967 war 'I do not like American or British boys to be killed here and I do not think we need them.'

The emphasis on the autonomous self-interest of a nation-state as an actor in a system composed of such actors is compatible with the strategic studies approach and with such endeavours as the application of game-theory models to the study of international relations. An international system composed exclusively of autonomous nation-state actors whose actions are consequential upon their respective subjective utilities can be expected to lend itself rather easily to a reductionist analysis which focuses on the resources and strategies of the parties involved. Many of the limitations of the analytical tools suggested by the strategic studies school derived from the hypothetical nature of such a system. Israel is one of the few countries whose policies often resemble those likely to be prescribed by a strategic analyst for an actor in such a hypothetical system.

It is noteworthy that the similarity between the outlook of the Israeli decision-makers on the conflict in which their country is involved and those of the strategic studies school is confined to method and some basic premises. It does not, however, embrace the variety of specific models developed by strategic analysts in the context of the cold war. The cold war has been analysed mainly in the framework of a bi-polar international system while the Israeli



decision-makers are fully aware of the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a sub-system which is open to the inputs of the wider international system. The very presence of the super powers on the scene of Middle Eastern politics (even though they are not inclined to intervene directly in an Arab-Israeli confrontation), is sufficient to exclude any interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of an interplay between two participants.

b) dormant war - The definition of the 'neither war nor peace' conditions which prevailed in Arab-Israeli relations between 1949 and 1967 (except for the short interval of the 1956 war) as a state of 'dormant war' is General Rabin's. In other expositions of the Israeli approach to national security the same idea has been expressed in other terms. Ben Gurion maintained in 1955 that the Arab countries continue to wage war against Israel 'by different means'. Yigal Allon argued that the Arab claim that the 1949 armistice agreement did not imply a termination of a state of belligerency forces Israel to think in terms of a 'state of war' between herself and the neighbouring Arab countries. General Dayan considered what he called 'military operations in peace-time' a legitimate instrument of Israel policy-making in the particular conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Shimon Peres, Ben Gurion's closest associate, argued like Allon that the rules of the game of the Arab-Israeli conflict are determined by the Arab short-of-war

belligerency approach. In fact there appeared to be a consensus among Israeli policy-makers about the consequences of the warlike characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict even in periods of apparent tranquillity. The dichotomic perception of war and peace was thus alien to the Israeli decision-makers who apparently took for granted the interplay between elements of conflict and common interest in war and peace alike, on which theoreticians of the strategic studies school such as Thomas Schelling put such a strong emphasis.

Israel's wars were limited wars in more than one sense since the exercise of violence was invariably subjected to political restrictions deriving not only from the openness of the Arab-Israeli conflict system but also from Israeli calculations concerning inter-Arab politics. On the other hand Israel had never experienced a state of formal peace. Periods in which no hostilities took place were invariably associated with less binding legal arrangements such as truce, cease-fire or at the most armistice.

The impact of the non-dichotomic perception of war and peace is traceable in aspects of Israeli policy-making. Partial understanding and limited co-operation with potential or actual enemies were pursued and sometimes achieved regardless of the question whether or not hostilities took place at the same time.

An understanding of this kind with King Abdullah of Jordan accounts for some of the restrictions imposed by the Israeli government on the Israeli field-commanders in the later stages of the 1948 war.

The precarious cease-fire conditions after the 1967 war also provided many examples of co-operative activities carried out alongside limited hostilities. Recurrent clashes along the Jordan Valley did not prevent the implementation of the 'open bridges' policy and the production and transportation of oil in the Gulf of Suez by both Israel and Egypt had not been interrupted by the 1969-70 War of Attrition. In fact the post-1967 war was paradoxically characterised by an increase in both the exercise of violence and the partial co-operation between Israel and her hostile neighbours compared with the pre-1967 war period.

One of the factors which facilitated the increased partial co-operation after the 1967 war was the opening of new channels of communication as a result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of Jordan. The West Bank elite, and in a later period also visitors from Arab countries who came through the open bridges, provided Israel and the Arab countries, Jordan in particular, with an additional channel for indirect communications. However, the availability of new channels of communication did not change the basic characteristics of the war-like state of communications between the parties to the conflict.



The only level on which direct and overt communication between official representatives of Israel and the Arab countries has ever taken place was that of the Mixed Armistice Commissions which ceased to play an active role before the 1967 war. On other levels communications were either indirect or overt or both. In addition to messages delivered through official and unofficial emissaries, some of these self-appointed, there were on several occasions secret direct contacts between official representatives of Israel and the Arab countries. But even after the 1967 war when some of the covert direct contacts involved political leaders of high rank, such communications were only complementary to the continuous process of 'tacit bargaining' and conveyance of intentions through actions in the Schelling sense. Israeli military reprisals, for example, were presented by Israeli decision-makers as a means of conveying messages to the Arab countries about the threshold of Israeli restraint. In fact the whole policy of reprisals had been in essence an exercise in tacit bargaining on the rules of the game of the Arab-Israeli conflict involving conveyance of messages through action in expectation for a desirable response.

But perhaps the most daring Israeli exercise of tacit bargaining was General Dayan's attempt in the course of the 1970 War of Attrition to delineate a line which would delimit both the range of Israeli air attacks on military targets in Egypt and the area of direct Soviet intervention in the air war.

This attempt to convey Israel's intentions to the Soviet Government culminated in an act of brinkmanship in the form of shooting down four Soviet-piloted Mig 21 aircraft. The tacit bargaining continued after the 1970 cease-fire came into effect and the Soviets moved their missile batteries forward. The Suez Canal itself has been apparently accepted as the line east of which 'Soviet involvement' is regarded by the Israelis as constituting 'Soviet intervention'.

It is noteworthy that the practice of tacit bargaining remained associated with the conditions of unresolved conflict in the state of either active or dormant war. The official Israeli prescription for the resolution of the conflict has been direct negotiations. Tacit bargaining, mediation and covert unofficial contacts were not considered sufficiently binding to provide for a lasting settlement. Like other manifestations of the non-dichotomic perception of war and peace the substitutes for direct and overt communication provided the Israeli decision-makers with a limited degree of manoeuvrability within the framework of the constraint of the dormant war assumption. But neither tacit bargaining nor such options as the exercise of violence in short-of-war conditions or the pursuit of partial co-operation alongside the use of force were expected to compensate for the conditioning effect of the assumed state of war, whether active or dormant.

Consequent upon such an assumption is the subjection of foreign policy to considerations of national security. The thwarting of the supposed Arab goal defined by a leading Israeli strategic analyst as 'politicide' has been given priority in the conduct of Israel's foreign relations over the promotion of the Israeli official goal of a peace treaty with the Arab countries.

This order of priorities also had an impact on the time span serving as a frame of reference for Israeli decision-makers. Except in the case of the decision to embark on a programme of nuclear development national security considerations implied short and medium-term policy while the pursuit of reconciliation with the Arab countries tended to require long-term policies often involving taking security risks in the short run. Worth mentioning in this context are the Israeli positions concerning the refugee problem and Arab unity. In both issues the Israeli attitude was affected by the immediate security implications of the return of the refugees and of advancement towards Arab unity, rather than by the long-term prospects of relaxation of tensions deriving from the pressure of the refugee problem and from the competition among the Arab states in expressions of hostility towards Israel.

The same order of priorities also accounts for the Israeli rejection, after the 1967 war, of proposals for a settlement which did not satisfy the demand for 'secure borders'.



The preponderance of national security considerations also explains the decisive role played by arms purchases in Israel's respective relations with France, Germany and the U.S.A. But above all it was demonstrated in Israel's readiness to initiate a preventive war in 1956 rather than allowing the balance of power to be tipped against her. The 1967 war, on the other hand, had been conceived by the Israelis as a pre-emptive strike aiming at depriving the Egyptians of the ability to exploit the military advantages created by their deliberate and unilateral departure from the tacit rules of the game which maintained the short-of-war level of conflict. Yet in spite of the differences between the two wars they were both consistent with the dormant war assumption which implies among other things an expectation for a rapid transition from short-of-war conditions to those of full scale hostilities. Israeli political and military leaders repeatedly emphasised the high probability of such a contingency which the whole Israeli system of emergency mobilization is geared to meet.

c) Controlled exercise of violence - The controlled exercise of violence is the essence of the conduct of limited military operations. As a consequence of their experiences in the limited war of 1948-49 and the pre-independence struggle of the Jewish military organizations against the British authorities, the Israeli defence establishment had been predisposed to think in terms of a restricted exercise of

force aiming at the attainment of limited and politically conditioned objectives. This predisposition paved the way for the adoption of the policy of reprisals in the early fifties. Some border incidents in which regular army units were involved on both sides and an increased terrorist infiltration from the neighbouring countries induced the Israeli government and army command to adopt a twofold strategy aiming at responding to two different challenges referred to by the Israelis as 'Basic security' and 'Current security' respectively. The problem of 'basic security' was that of the threat of a full scale war which might put Israel's existence in peril. The problem of current security on the other hand was that of limited violent provocation not necessarily carried out by the official military forces of the neighbouring Arab countries.

The Israeli response to the basic security challenge was a defence posture based on the combination of a core of standing army (composed of both professionals and conscripts) and a much larger well-trained and available at short notice reserve force based on the concept of a 'nation in arms' i.e., a nation whose civilians are, as one of the Israel Army Chiefs of Staff once put it, 'soldiers on an annual eleven months leave.' The answer to the 'current security' had been the adoption of a strategy of controlled retaliation involving a restricted application of limited force.

The requirements of Basic security and Current security were competing with one another for the scarce resources of manpower and finance and the Israeli Government and General Staff were resolute in their insistence on an order of priorities which would prevent their army from becoming virtually border police. Thus, lacking the necessary reserves for containing infiltration effectively by defensive means, the Israeli defence planners turned to more offensive measures which did not aim at sealing the border but rather at 'putting a high price on our blood' as General Dayan had put it. This Israeli version of 'graduated response' in a non-nuclear environment had been contrived in order to resolve a specific dilemma rooted in the local conditions, but it had much in common with the conceptual framework within which such notions as 'escalation', 'continuum of violence' and 'graduated response' have evolved.

The rationale of the Israeli violent response to hostile activities instigated by the Arab countries or at best carried out from their territory was thus rooted in the expectation that the damage inflicted by the reprisals will convey a warning about the cost of similar provocations in the future. The Arab countries were expected to be deterred from initiating provocations or alternatively compelled to restrain other actors such as terrorist groups and guerrilla organizations operating from their territory or crossing through it. The Israeli assumption at least in the early fifties



had been that the aim of the reprisals can be achieved without triggering a chain reaction of mutual retaliatory actions. The assumption that military operations are controllable and that escalation can be checked led to attempts by the political level to control military operations to the extent of restricting the number of enemy casualties allowed in particular operations. Such attempts were not always successful and some reprisals such as Kibia on October 15th 1953 and Kinneret on December 13th 1955, exceeded the limits anticipated by the political decision-makers.

The problem of control was threefold. (a) It had a political aspect which had been at the root of some of the most bitter controversies in both the Jewish community in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel and in Israel during the 1948 war. The national institutions of the Jewish community in Palestine controlled the largest underground military organization - the Haganah - but their authority had been undermined by the activities of splinter military organizations who operated against the British authorities. It had thus been one of Ben Gurion's main concerns after the establishment of the State to secure the absolute political control of the government over the military. The remains of the splinter organizations were dissolved after the 'Altalena affair' and even the separate command of a loyal elite force - the Palmach - had been abolished since Ben Gurion feared that it might develop

into a potential centre for a cadre of officers inspired by a left-wing kibbutz movement. (b) The second aspect of the problem of control was institutional: how to prevent deviations from the decision-makers' intentions in the process of planning and implementation of military operations? Supervision procedures and discipline were the standard answer but the famous 'Lavon affair' of 1954 as well as some of the operations during the 1956 Sinai campaign indicated that the Israeli procedures of control were not always fully adequate. (c) The third and most complicated aspect of the problem of control was its relational context, i.e., the dependence on the enemies' response. The conduct of limited military operations is conditioned on the correct anticipation of the enemy's behaviour and a failure in this respect is apt to lead to unintended escalation. Moreover, the Israeli experience of the mid-fifties showed that the possibilities of different assessments of the enemy's expected response might render the political and institutional controls useless. The biographer of Moshe Dayan, for example, describes how in his capacity as Chief of Staff in 1955-56 he advocated the conduct of small reprisals anticipating a chain reaction of mutual escalation which would lead to a 'preventive war' which was not sought by the government who authorised these operations. Thus, the objectives of the reprisals were raised from the level of current security to the level of basic security without defying the political and

institutional controls but also without the government being fully aware of the change. Since the mid-fifties there were considerable improvements in the channels of communication between the Government and the different component bodies of the Israeli defence establishment and the quality of intelligence data now available to the Israeli government makes a repetition of the mid-fifties situation most unlikely. But the controllability of limited military operations is still dependent to a considerable extent on the predictability of the enemies' behaviour.

d) Deterrence and compellence - The awareness that military force can be an effective instrument of policy-making without being actually exercised is consequent upon the non-dichotomic perception of war and peace. This awareness on the part of the exponents of strategic studies led to Herman Kahn's distinction between 'force' and 'violence' as well as to the introduction of such terms as deterrence and compellence to the vocabulary of the study of international relations.

In Israel, the term deterrence is the most commonly used of all the jargon of strategic studies except perhaps 'escalation' after the June 1967 war. It has become an integral part of the vocabulary of public debate since the adoption in the early sixties of the idea of deterrence as a major component of an Israeli strategy aiming at consolidating the post-1956 war status quo both in terms



of territory and 'current security'. This adoption of the concept of deterrence by the Israeli defence establishment in the sixties can be at least in part attributed to the influence of the American school of strategic studies. Yet the idea of utilizing military power without actually exercising it had already been familiar to the Israeli political leaders before Israel became an independent state. Indeed, the dominant political elite of the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine, namely that of the Zionist Labour movement, had developed a political strategy that without excluding the possible use of force put an emphasis on the attainment of political objectives by means of accumulation of power rather than by its actual application. Moreover, the line of argument pursued by some of the Labour movement leaders in the course of the debate with the extreme right wing of the Zionist movement corresponds to the logic embodied in such concepts as deterrence and compellence. Moshe Shertok (Sharett), who was later to become the first Foreign Minister of Israel, had even referred in 1946 to the deterrent "Power" of 'political defence' which works like physical defence and thereby 'paves the way for peace.'

Hence, he emphasized 'the political impact of power' as distinct from decision through actual application of power.

The preference for 'political defence' was not shared by all Sharett's colleagues but 'activists' and 'anti-activists' (the

Israeli equivalents of 'hawks' and 'doves') alike were conscious of the potentialities of an unexercised power and it was the more activist Ben Gurion who authorised the successful attempt to decide the shapes of the eastern border of Israel in 1949 by threatening to use force rather than actually using it.

The manner in which the Israelis then conveyed their intentions to the Jordanians by a deployment of troops while the bargaining process in Rhodes continued makes the circumstances in which the 1949 Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement had been signed look like a text book example of an exercise in compellence in the Schelling sense.

The threat to activate Israel's military superiority over Jordan continued to play the role of an effective Israeli instrument of policy-making. But since the signing of the 1949 armistice the Israeli attitude was essentially that of a status quo power and thus the threat was used in the form of deterrence rather than compellence. The repeated Israeli warnings that an Israeli action can be expected to ensue from a change in the status quo in Jordan is an example of the manner in which the Israelis operated.

The complexity of the circumstances made the effective exercise of deterrence conditional on its subtlety. In most cases there were actors other than the Jordanian regime itself who were expected to be dissuaded from changing the 'status quo'. In fact,

a change in the status quo which would induce the Israelis to act was most likely to involve a toppling down of the Jordanian regime. In addition to it, too explicit warnings could invite an international diplomatic response which could undermine the credibility of the Israeli threats. In these circumstances the Israeli decision-makers tended to present their warnings in vague terms avoiding a clear definition of the conditions which amount to a violation of the status quo as well as an unequivocal commitment to specific response to such a violation. The credibility of the Israeli threats was thus dependent on the realization that Israel would not tolerate any change in the status quo which might result in the deployment of non-Jordanian troops on the West Bank. Hence, in this, as in other cases, it was the strategic rationale of the Israeli warnings which apparently made them credible.

The independence of Jordan was not the only vital Israeli interest which had been vulnerable to short-of-war violations of the status quo. Thus, the period between the 1956 and 1967 wars was characterized by an extension of the strategy of deterrence in order to secure such interests. Thus, the violation of the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran was declared as constituting a casus belli. Additional casus belli were included in lists suggested by senior Israeli politicians involved in the formation of national defence policy such as Allon and Peres. Unofficial as



they were these lists were consistent with the Israeli strategy of deterrence as a method of defending vulnerable Israeli interests considered vital to the country's security. One of the consequences of the adoption of a strategy of deterrence in a non-nuclear environment had been the creation of a new potential casus belli. The effectiveness of the Israeli deterrent was dependent on a rather shaky credibility which in the absence of a 'balance of terror' could be undermined by the ostensible quantitative superiority of Israel's enemies in men and equipment coupled with the inclination towards self-delusion often attributed to the Arabs.

Sensitivity to what General Dayan called the 'Arab evaluation of Israel's power' thus became an important consideration in the conduct of Israel's defence policy. It affected the scope of the Israeli response to Arab actions regarded as provocative and strengthened the Israeli commitment to the defence of vital interests declared as casus belli. An awareness on the part of one of Abdul Nasser's close associates of the implications of this Israeli attitude was demonstrated in the course of the May 1967 crisis. 'Israel cannot accept or remain indifferent to what has taken place,' wrote the editor of Al Ahram, Hasanayn Haykal, on May 26th 1967: 'It is not the matter of the Gulf of Aqaba but something bigger: it is the whole philosophy and Israel's

security.' Thus he predicted that 'Israel must resort to arms.' Several statements made by members of the Israeli general staff who retired from the Army after the war indicated that their rating of the credibility issue among the considerations which induced Israel to resort to arms had not been much different from Haykal's. 'We had always said that if our power to deter fails, our power to determine will be put to the test' said the 1967 War Chief of Staff, General Rabin, epitomizing their argument. His words reflected the awareness on the part of the Israeli defence establishment of the limitations of the strategy of deterrence in a non-nuclear environment. It was, however, assumed by them that the 'power to deter' is dependent on the 'power to determine' or rather on the Arab belief in its effectiveness.

e) Balance of power - The assumption that the 'power to deter' was dependent on the 'power to determine' implied a pursuit of a favourable military balance. The Israeli position has been that in order to maintain a deterrent stance Israel needed not only a defensive capability but an offensive one as well. The deterrence strategy has been adopted as an Israeli answer to the challenge created by the lopsidedness of the conflict system which gave the Arab countries the strategic initiative enabling them to tip the balance of power in their favour without actually resorting to force. In this respect it could be (and indeed was) presented

as an essentially defensive strategy. But on the operational level its implication was an offensive disposition which required a pursuit of military superiority which would provide not only for containing the enemy but also for defeating him.

The apparent weak spots of Israel's strategic posture and her inclination towards the adoption of an offensive military strategy had been a source of confusion in Israel itself after the 1948 war. At that time there were still two schools of military thought in Israel, one of them advocating an offensive military strategy, the other a strategy of counter-attack following an absorption of the enemy's first strike. The latter school attached more importance to the political implications of the military doctrine and thus preferred a strategy which would spare Israel the need to decide on pre-emptive war whenever its basic security was in peril. The considerations which resulted in deciding the issue in favour of the offensive school were rooted in Israel's narrow security margin and lack of strategic depth.

It was claimed that Israel cannot absorb an enemy's attack since she has no territory that can be temporarily sacrificed and not enough men to be spared for territorial defence. In addition, the offensive strategy was in tune with the prospect of a short war which was both anticipated (since the world powers were expected to intervene) and considered desirable (since Israel, whose military



capacity was dependent on the reserves system, could hardly endure a long period of mobilization without her economy being paralyzed). The adoption of an offensive doctrine on the basic security level coincided with the application of a corresponding offensive doctrine on the current level in the form of reprisals. It was also associated with 'deterritorialization' of the Israel Army's infantry reserve brigades which made them mobile and available for deployment anywhere in the country.

The pursuit of a military balance of power which would enable Israel to conduct offensive military operations preceded the adoption of a doctrine of deterrence which in the Israeli context implied a reliance on the deterrent effect of military superiority to secure not only the territorial integrity of the country but also vital interests such as the 'status quo' in Jordan and the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. The existence of potential triggers of war in the form of manifest casus belli made military equality between Israel and her Arab neighbours seem in Israeli eyes not only militarily insufficient but also politically dangerous. In these conditions the Arab countries and above all Egypt needed only a sound defensive capability in order to violate the status quo in one or more of Israel's weak spots and get away with it. The threat to see such a violation as a casus belli appeared thus to be meaningful only in conditions of an Israeli military superiority.

Consequently, in their bid for sophisticated military equipment from the western powers, the Israeli officials repeatedly argued that denial of such equipment in the form of partial qualitative or quantitative embargo might undermine peace and stability in the Middle East rather than strengthening them.

The different conceptions of 'sufficiency' with regard to the military balance of power which were often at the root of differences of opinion between Israeli and American officials cast light on one of the fundamental causes of instability inherent in the pre-1967 war Arab-Israeli conflict system: Israel pursued military superiority in order to make up for the Arab countries' potential strategic advantage, but such superiority, once attained, could be used for more than deterrence. No equilibrium could be struck which would enable both parties to defend themselves against one another without giving either an advantage which could be used for offensive purposes. Consequently, in the absence of a clear point of optimum stability, the military balance of power by itself could not be relied upon to provide against the precariousness of the state of 'neither war nor peace'. Military equality which implies that a confrontation is likely to end in a stalemate meant potential Arab advantage deriving from the vulnerability of vital Israeli security interests to a 'short-of-war' Arab unilateral action. On the other hand, an Israeli military superiority which through its deterrent effect

annuls the potential Arab advantage meant an Israeli effective advantage, i.e., an advantage which more than outweighed the Arab one. In other words a military balance which satisfied the requirements of the deterrent component of the Israeli concept of national security was bound to provide Israel also with the capacity for waging a preventive or pre-emptive anticipatory war.

f) Preventive war and pre-emptive (anticipatory) war - The introduction of the time factor into the Arab-Israeli balance of power equation might in certain conditions provide a motive for an Israeli initiated preventive war. The 'dormant war' assumption and Israel's narrow margin of security imply that the Israelis could not remain indifferent to a situation in which time was on the Arab countries' side in terms of the military balance of power. Thus, since the signing of the 1949 armistice agreements the probability of war started by Israel has been directly correlated with projected changes in the power ratio between Israel and her neighbours, Egypt in particular.

This implication of an Israeli assessment that militarily time is on the side of the Arabs was demonstrated after the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal in September 1955. The idea of preventive war was openly discussed in Israel during the September 1955-October 1956 period and Prime Minister David Ben Gurion found it necessary to reject the idea in public speeches. Yet he himself hinted at



such a possibility in his secret talks with Robert Anderson, President Eisenhower's special envoy, which were made public by Ben Gurion himself 15 years later. Ben Gurion was also aware that the then Israel Army's Chief of Staff, General Dayan, recommended an Israeli large scale military offensive. However, it was Ben Gurion's eventual conversion to the idea of a preventive military operation against Egypt which paved the way to Israel's participation in the co-ordinated 'Sinai' and 'Suez' ventures. An authoritative Israeli source later described 'the main and most salient objective of the Israeli government' in the Sinai campaign as 'the defeat of the Egyptian army in Sinai ... in order to prevent a grim possibility of a war between Israel and Egypt when Israel will be weak and isolated while Egypt is stronger ...'

The role of the time factor in the context of the Arab- Israeli balance of military power had been a controversial issue within the Israeli defence establishment after the 1956 war. The pre-war prevailing view that time is on the side of Israel's enemies was still held by policy-makers such as the Deputy Minister of Defence, Shimon Peres. But it was increasingly challenged by army officers who claimed that the introduction of modern but non-nuclear war technology tended to increase rather than decrease the role played by the qualitative human factor in warfare. The latter view became the basis for Israel's strategic planning in the sixties under Levi

Eshkol as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and General Rabin as the Israel Army's Chief of Staff. Its adoption had far-reaching consequences for Israel's foreign policy and national defence. In the field of defence planning, it implied a priority for the strengthening of Israel's capability to wage a conventional war over the development of an Israel 'nuclear option' on which Ben Gurion and Peres had put a stronger emphasis, compared with Eshkol and Allon, the strategic expert in Eshkol's cabinet. Thus, the way was also paved for a new bid for arms from the U.S.A. which, unlike France, had been committed to a policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and was thus interested in exercising some control over Israel's advancement towards the attainment of nuclear capability.

In the broader sphere of political strategy the assessment that time was on the side of Israel meant that so long as the development of the Israeli army was not impaired by the embargoes on the sale of sophisticated weapons, aircraft in particular, she could afford to act as a status quo power without putting her existence in peril. In this context, unlike in those of the allocation of scarce resources and the choice between 'European' and 'American' political 'orientations' there was a basic agreement between the advocates of an emphasis on the development of nuclear action and the advocates of priority for attainment of conventional military superiority:

both aimed at consolidating the territorial and political status quo. Thus Israel's foreign policy between the 1956 and 1967 war was essentially in tune with the U.S.A. policy of maintaining stability in the Middle East in conditions of an unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict.

An Israeli preventive war was therefore no longer 'on the cards' in the post-1956 war period. Yet an Israeli-initiated war was still possible in response to a 'short-of-war' violation of the status quo by an Arab country in one of Israel's weak spots. A deployment of non-Jordanian troops in the West Bank or concentrations of Egyptian forces in Sinai could change the balance of power in the sense that Israel's standing army would not be able to cope with a surprise attack unless the reserves were mobilized. In such a contingency the likely scenario in the framework of the Israeli concept of national security was: Mobilization first and if the 'status quo ante' could not be restored soon, pre-emptive strike later. The Israelis were confronted with such a situation twice. In February 1960 when three Egyptian divisions moved into Sinai the crisis was resolved by a partial Israeli mobilization and withdrawal of the Egyptian troops following international diplomatic intervention. In May-June 1967 the combined effect of threatening concentrations of Egyptian troops in Sinai and the closure of the Straits of Tiran induced the Israeli government to



decide on a pre-emptive strike. The difference between the 1956 'preventive war' and the 1967 'pre-emptive war' was in the Israeli estimate of the time factor in the context of the potential threat to Israel's national security. In 1956 the Israeli estimate was that the absorption of the new Soviet equipment by the Egyptian army required several months. In 1967 it had been estimated that the transformation of the Egyptian deployment into an offensive one could be a matter of hours, and though an Egyptian first strike was not expected to result in an Israeli defeat, it could deny Israel a decisive victory as well as substantially increasing the human and material cost of war for Israel.

Thus, the usage of 'pre-emptive war' and 'preventive war' in reference to Israel's national security connotes not only different time perspectives of an anticipated enemy's attack but also a different Israeli evaluation of the status quo. In the case of pre-emptive war the Israeli initiated confrontation was most likely to ensue from an Arab violation of the status quo which could endanger Israel's national security. In the case of preventive war an anticipated change in the balance of power which would induce Israel to initiate a military confrontation was unlikely to involve an immediate threat to the territorial or political status quo. Both conceptions, however, became less relevant to Israel's national security as a consequence of the extra margin of security

gained by the outcome of the June 1967 war. The post-war cease-fire line unlike the former armistice line provided Israel with the capacity to absorb an enemy's first strike without her reserves being already mobilized and committed to a defensive array.

Israel's senior officers and military commentators repeatedly emphasized two aspects of the post-war military situation; the defensibility of the cease-fire lines along the Suez and the Jordan Valley and the extended early warning against air attacks from airfields in Egypt. The political consequences of the Israeli desire to retain the security advantages deriving from strategic depth has been the demand for secure borders which according to Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, are borders 'which can be defended without a pre-emptive initiative.' The strategic depth gained by the occupation of Sinai and the West Bank enabled Israeli military planners to think in defensive terms and envisage a situation in which Israel will absorb an enemy's attack without trying to anticipate it by striking first. This new option of avoiding pre-emptive action had considerable influence on the Israeli response to the threat of direct Soviet military intervention. Israeli decision-makers had to take into consideration the assumption that the credibility of the Soviet Union as Egypt's ally was undermined by her defeat in 1967 and by the failure of the attempts to exert pressure on Israel to accept a settlement which would deprive her

of the strategic advantages gained in the war. Israeli leaders such as General Dayan were inclined to adopt the view that there was a limit to Soviet tolerance of Egyptian defeats. Consequently they rejected the idea of major offensive operations west of the Suez Canal suggested by Israel 'hawks' such as the former head of the staff branch G.H.Q., General E. Weizman.

The strategic approach recommended by Weizman was essentially an application of the preventive war strategy to the post-1967 war period context. It was based on the assumption that Israel's own actions have little effect if any on the probability of Soviet intervention which is in this view dependent on the availability of an adequate logistic infra-structure in Egypt and the deterrent effect of the U.S.A. political and military presence in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the official Israeli position has been based on the assumption that both the degree of Soviet intervention and the response to it on the part of the U.S.A. were likely to be affected by Israel's own actions. This assumption led the Israeli government to adopt a twofold strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the Israeli government was prepared to concede to those Soviet threats which amounted to an exercise of deterrence aiming at maintaining the status quo. On the other hand, the Soviet attempts at a compellence aiming at changing the status quo were met with firm resistance which was demonstrated in



the shooting down of 4 Mig 21 aircraft with their Soviet pilots.

Thus, the attainment of strategic depth as a result of the June 1967 war provided for a qualified departure from the doctrine associated with the name of David Ben Gurion, according to which the Israeli army will never fight the military forces of a major power. The readiness to think in terms of a possible limited military confrontation with Soviet forces indicated that this doctrine was not considered by Israeli decision-makers as binding any longer. Such flexibility with regard to strategic doctrines associated with Ben Gurion's national leadership had already been demonstrated by the Israeli leaders in 1967 when they had decided on pre-emptive war regardless of another of Ben Gurion's doctrines according to which Israel should not go to war unless she secured in advance the political support of a major power capable of supplying her with military equipment when the war was over. Yet it is noteworthy that post-war Israeli strategy has been based on a clear distinction between Soviet involvement in the defence of Egyptian-held territory on the one hand, and Soviet offensive intervention on the other, and that the readiness to fight Soviet forces was confined to the latter case. It is not without significance in this respect that the Israeli government had called a halt to air raids on military targets deep in Egyptian territory when Soviet pilots became involved in the attempts to intercept

the Israeli aircraft. The public debate in Israel which followed this decision showed that unlike some of their critics the Israeli decision-makers were still inclined to confine the application of an Israeli offensive military strategy to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The threat of massive Soviet intervention on the other hand has been conceived essentially as a political issue with global strategic implications to which the prescription of self-reliance hardly applies.

#### Conclusions:

The analysis of Israeli policy decisions in the realm of foreign policy and national defence and the attitudes of Israeli decision-makers reflected in their public statements, indicate the conditioning effect of a common and enduring pattern of strategic thinking. Since this pattern has never been given a formal institutionalized sanction the somewhat weak notion of a concept (of national security) appears to be more suitable for its definition than the stronger notion of doctrine.

The derivation of a generalized ideal type such as the Israelis' 'concept of national security' from the various available sources and the identification of its components is a procedure involving methodological shortcomings which are apt to produce some bias resulting from the sacrifice of rigour in pursuit of meaningful insights. Thus, the interpretation of Israel's foreign and defence



policy in terms of a prevailing Israeli concept of national security tends to overemphasize the manifestations of consensus and continuity in Israeli politics while underemphasizing the manifestations of dissensus and change. Nevertheless the study of Israeli decision-making and public debate reveals an order of priorities and perception of foreign and defence policy issues sufficiently consistent and coherent to justify the attempt to construct an ideal type of the Israeli concept of national security. The examination of the components of this concept suggests that it has many features in common with the concepts developed by the post World War II school of strategic studies.

1. It is strategically-oriented in the sense that it seeks to attain national goals in an international environment characterized by a struggle between antagonistic or at least competing interests of nation-state actors.

2. It is based on a non-dichotomic perception of peace and war and thus provides for limited war as well as for the utilization of violence in peacetime.

3. It is inclined towards 'worse case analysis' and hence towards the pursuit of the broadest possible margin of security.

4. It is 'power politics' oriented in the sense that it does not prescribe compliance, on moral or legal grounds, with the loose rules of the game associated with the attempts to institutionalize world politics.



As a consequence of these common denominators of the Israeli concept of national security, and the strategic studies approach, such notions as 'deterrence', 'compellence', 'escalation', 'preventive war' and 'pre-emptive strike' could be easily applied to the Israeli situation and incorporated into the body of Israeli strategic thought. However, correspondence between the Israeli concept of national security and the ideas originated in the work of the strategic studies, theoreticians fall short of rendering them identical. The Israeli concept of national security is the product of relational thinking in the context of an acute Arab-Israeli conflict rather than a derivation from an abstract perception of the nature of international politics, consequently its crystallization was associated with the adoption of specific strategies in response to specific national security problems.

In this respect it is possible to distinguish three periods which correspond to three phases in the development of the Israeli concept of national security: i. the 1949 armistice - 1956 war period; ii. the 1957 withdrawal - 1967 war period; iii. the post-war period.

Period i - was characterized by ambiguity about the requirements of national security which derived from a lack of consensus regarding major political issues: (a) the effect of time on the balance of power, (b) the exercise of force in peacetime, (c) the offensive

versus 'absorption followed by counter-attack' strategies, (d) the acceptance of the territorial status quo, (e) the acceptance of the prevailing 'rules of the game' of the conflict, i.e., the political status quo.

Period ii - was characterized by crystallization of the concept of national security. Its consequences with regard to the above-mentioned issues were: (a) an effort to retain military superiority so that time will remain on Israel's side, (b) limited and controlled exercise of force in peacetime subjected to political constraints, (c) an offensive strategy of pre-emptive strike if and when deterrence fails, (d) an acceptance of the territorial status as satisfactory, (e) an acceptance of the political status quo including rules of the game whose violation is considered a casus belli.

Period iii - is characterized by partial transformation of the Israeli concept of national security (although not of its basic premises) and a renewed public debate on some of the major strategic issues: (a) the impact of time on the balance of power is a controversial issue but only in the context of the threat of Soviet intervention, (b) limited exercise of force subjected to political considerations is considered legitimate and useful, (c) a revival of the 'absorption first' strategy in conditions of strategic depth and a threat of Soviet intervention, (d) ambiguity regarding the shape of the secure borders which should replace the territorial 'status quo'

is a controversial issue following recurrent changes in (e) the rules of the game as a result of 'big powers' involvement in the conflict.

The renewed public debate on strategic issues after the June 1967 war indicated that the prevailing Israeli concept of national security could not any longer secure consensus among Israeli political and military leaders on foreign and defence policy. The promotion of consensus can be seen as one of the latent functions of the Israeli concept of national security. In this respect the post-1967 war situation exposed some of its shortcomings.

Three such shortcomings are worth mentioning in this context:

1. The concept of national security did not provide for consensus on the shape of 'secure borders'. The rejection of the territorial 'status quo ante' as strategically inadequate and the official admission that the new status quo exceeds the minimum requirements of 'secure borders' left the Israeli decision-makers without a clear, salient and easily conveyable map of 'secure borders' which could provide a focus for the crystallization of consensus. In these circumstances the political considerations involved in the apparently strategic issue had come to the surface.

2. The concept of national security did not provide for consensus on the strategic response to the threat of Soviet intervention. The concept of national security evolved in the relational



context of the Arab-Israeli conflict where strategic issues could be reduced to military considerations. The Soviet involvement and the increased dependence on American support made such a simple reduction impossible.

3. The concept of national security did not provide for consensus about the requirements of a peace settlement and the way to achieve such a settlement. Being the product of a conflict regarded as given, it could hardly contribute to the promotion of consensus on a strategy aiming at its resolution.

ARMS RACES AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON INTER-  
NATIONAL STABILITY, WITH SPECIAL  
REFERENCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

by

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focus upon political differences and upon perceptions of the likelihood that the adversary(ies) might decide upon a roadtest of the military balance, would yield a title different from that appointed for this paper. Instead, one would be investigating the influence of international (in)stability upon arms races. The distinction is important. A priori, an arms race should be both symptom and cause of international instability, but the tone and balance of the discussion is not unaffected by which end of the lens one chooses to look through.<sup>3</sup>

In pursuit of understanding, simplification is essential. Indeed, the very richness of historical detail that the case study provides is the enemy of general comprehension.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, with respect to the analysis of arms races, there is as yet an inadequate complexity in the extant literature for one to be at all confident that the rejected detail is only marginal or of background significance. Fortunately for this paper, the arms competition(s) in the Middle East has been studied more extensively, both as an arms race and in terms of the weapons transactions involved - for reasons that are discussed below - than has almost any other arms race in history. Students of international relations who, in the mainstream of contemporary American international relations scholarship, aspire to the building of a systematic theory of arms races, have yet to provide sufficient pre-theoretical analysis for one even to discern very clearly the healthy emergence of what is termed "the taxonomic fallacy". This last statement requires some explanation. There are many possible meanings that may be attached to the term theory:<sup>5</sup> a useful rigorous definition has been provided by Oran Young in these words:

"A theory is a set of general statements such that: (1) some of the statements (the assumptions or premises) logically imply the others (the theorems), and (2) the theorems can be cast in the form of falsifiable predictive statements about the real world."<sup>6</sup>

An earlier stage in the theory-building process would be when scholars had explored their subject matter to the point where at least there was a general consensus as to the identity of relevant variables or variable clusters. Listings of logically unmanageable factors that are



'probably relevant' would be the building blocks for a future predictive theory. Fallacy is to be attached to taxonomic only when scholars believe that in the essentially unrelated menus of relevant variables they have provided anything of much explanatory value.<sup>7</sup>

The relevance of the above comments to the central concern of this paper is obvious if one states the desirable path of procedure in juxtaposition to the feasible. Ideally, it would be convenient to have begun by outlining the body of general arms race analytical wisdom, and then to have progressed by applying this general wisdom (possibly, only of powerful propositions, or of questions that have been found to be most useful, in a heuristic<sup>8</sup> sense, in the analysis of other arms races) to the variety of races in and tangential to the Middle East. This is not possible. Superficially, the most rigorous strain of arms race analysis has been that conducted by Lewis Fry Richardson and his followers.<sup>9</sup> Even the modest claims made for the value of the mathematical stimulus-response models of the conflict theorists are probably excessive.<sup>10</sup> This is not a defence of innumeracy among analysts, it is simply a comment to the effect that the reduction of actual (and not a hypothetical 'typical') historical arms races into the terms manipulable by modern mathematical statistics would, on the evidence available, seem to be an attempt to run before we are able even to crawl. The tight stimulus-response, or action-reaction, assumption that is beloved of mathematical theorists flies in the face of known internal considerations, and is particularly inappropriate in a context such as that of the Middle East wherein there is a major constraint provided by the willingness or otherwise of the external arms supplier to provide the means of military sustenance.

Unfortunately, the so-called British tradition in international relations offers scarcely more enlightenment on the 'what do we know about arms races?' front than does its allegedly-American counterpart.<sup>11</sup> John C. Lambelet has commented to the effect that:

"Thus, as of this writing (1968-1969), and at least to this writer's knowledge, there seems to have been no effort to use the methods of modern mathematic statistics for a confrontation of theory and observed data in the context of a specific arms race."<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Lambellet need not have been so restrictive. Regardless of methodological instrument, there are published, extant, no case studies of particular historical arms races that have betrayed consistent interest in the arms race nature of the subject under examination.<sup>13</sup> The term arms race is a popular one for inclusion in a book or article title, but no serious interest in the arms race phenomenon is to be presumed from such usage.

Whether or not a general theory of arms races will ever be possible may be left for history to decide. In the short term, for an approach to reasonably confident answers to be given in response to the title of this paper, one vital development is required. A body of scholars must engage in the comparative analysis of arms races. That is to say, the population base of events for analysis must be identified and each race must be analysed with attention given to an identical set of questions.<sup>14</sup> This orientation of research is very close to the minimum definition of the 'scientific' provided by James Rosenau.<sup>15</sup> However, the kind of analytical discipline required of scholars for the building of a set of 'known to be useful' questions is most difficult of attainment (As Rosenau himself unwittingly demonstrated in his very loose editorship of Linkage Politics).<sup>16</sup>

Implicit in the above comments is a belief that has yet to be demonstrated to be valid. Namely, that an arms race is an arms race - that arms races, in different periods, between different adversaries, and involving the improvement and amassing of very different weapon systems, do indeed contribute a single class of events in international relations. An exploration of this potentially troublesome question takes one to the heart of methodological and substantive differences in ambition between most students of international relations and most students of history.<sup>17</sup> Also, substantive differences of opinion over what has changed in the conduct of international relations during the last one hundred years are brought to light. It is the opinion of this writer that arms races from the 1840's to the 1970's may usefully be viewed as enjoying sufficient similarities - certainly with respect to motivations, internal



debates, and domestic and external consequences - that one framework of analysis should suffice for all.<sup>18</sup> In the World Politics of October 1971, this author suggested one overarching framework, in the form of a set of taxonomies, by which arms races could be 'cracked open' for investigation.<sup>19</sup> In a more recent long paper, a framework for investigation of "the rationales for arms racing" has been provided.<sup>20</sup> In seeking to map explicitly the region of why actors feel the 'urge to compete' (or to renew a competition), - and of the rationales offered, the following propositions were suggested (they are here abbreviated for convenience): deterrence; defence; diplomacy; the 'functional' threat; vested interests; reputation; and technology. This is really an opening shot across the bows of aspiring arms race analysts. Variations upon the seven broad, non-exclusive categories of arms race justification identified above are certainly possible. What is important, if understanding is to advance, is that the transnational (barely) body of arms race analysts communicate extensively with each other and that they fine-hone agreed-upon frameworks for investigation. This is beginning to occur.<sup>21</sup>

At present, there is no good reason for pessimism on the score of historical comparability. To cite just one, admittedly prominent, example, the similarities between Anglo-American-Japanese (and French and Italian) competition in the period 1917-1935, and contemporary Soviet-American competition are compelling.<sup>22</sup> Unfortunately, it is rare for a scholar to be equally competent in the vagaries of contemporary O.M.E. analysis<sup>23</sup> and in the no less esoteric tradeoffs of an earlier era involving capital ship quality, tonnage and island fortification rights.<sup>24</sup> This argument pertains to the fact that much contemporary scholarship in strategic studies, as in international relations, suffers from a lack of historical depth. If one is concerned with the development of a genuinely additive wisdom on arms race behaviour, the shortage of numbers in the post-war population of possible events does cast some doubts over the worth of the strategic generalities that are retailed as the revealed wisdom of our time.<sup>25</sup>

To date, the historical evidence of arms race activity is so scattered, that useful anecdotal employment may be made of it by any



'scholar' in search of some supporting historical ballast for a policy prescriptive argument. A major study of arms control agreements in the inter-war period offered, among its conclusions, the following delightful, if unhelpful, sentence:

"Perhaps the truest statement that can be made about the inter-war arms control pacts is that, singly or collectively, they can be used to provide historical precedent for nearly any sophisticated argument one chooses to advance". 26

The authors then proceeded, by their choice of a generally favourable interpretation of the cost-benefit consequences of inter-war arms control agreements, to demonstrate the truth of their statement.<sup>27</sup> What is possible, but what would seem to have eluded the authors as a potentially powerful explanation, is not so much that history is ambivalent, but rather that the framework adopted for enquiry was of an unduly undisciplined character. This is not necessarily to suggest that a more 'scientific' assault would have revealed the truth about (for example) the gains and losses to international peace and security of the Washington Treaty régime, but rather that the kind and quality of information yielded by an enquiry is not unrelated to the pertinence and systematic nature of the questions asked.

The stress laid in this paper upon the need for discipline in enquiry is not an attempt to deny the variety of historical experience. A most appropriate initial response to the title of the paper would be 'to which arms race do you refer?', and 'what do you understand by international stability?'. Granted the inescapable distinctiveness of each historical event, it is still incumbent upon the social scientist to search for regularities. If none are to be found, so be it. However, that cannot fairly be presumed in the absence of even an exploratory assault.<sup>28</sup>

Above, I commented upon the fact that in contrast to other weapons competitions, the rivalry between Israel and its Arab neighbours has enjoyed unprecedented, and fairly even-handed, attention by Western analysts. From the point of view of the comparative analysis of arms races, these

studies leave much to be desired.<sup>29</sup> But, as examples of a willingness to look at the total arms race system, some of these analyses are distinctive in the literature of strategic studies/international relations.<sup>30</sup> Unlike his more 'scientific', or historically-minded brethren in other regions of international relations, the strategic analyst, has, typically, been seeking to promote one value of outstanding importance - namely, the national security of the United States.<sup>31</sup> The immediacy of this legitimate, if sometimes implicit concern, has promoted the elevation of the term arms race, and of one of a small number of powerful theories of arms race workings, to a front place ahead of a disciplined and in-depth analysis of the phenomenon under discussion.

In short, general arms race analysis has been invoked in the aid of policy prescription.<sup>32</sup> This would be entirely legitimate had the general arms race analysis in fact reflected a disciplined and sophisticated study of many arms races over time. Alas, this has not been the case. The American strategic aviary of hawks, doves, et al., has freely invoked various models supposedly explanatory of arms race behaviour, while in fact they reflected nothing more solid than the ill-substantiated convictions and the good intentions of the policy advocate. Taking their lead from the articulate 'muscular liberal' arms control community, the American and many foreign presses have disseminated misinformation on the workings and cost/benefit of arms racing. The stimulus and instantaneous response mechanism that was assumed for the sake of convenience by Lewis Fry Richardson,<sup>33</sup> has become - with some obeisance paid to the fact of 'lagged' reaction times - the arms control litany of today. Despite the shelf-loads of books and monographs on defence policy and arms control, the Soviet-American arms race has yet to be studied systematically as an arms race.<sup>34</sup> The 'arms race' dimension to Soviet and American defence interactions came to the fore in articles and congressional testimony in 1969 - in response to the felt need to add some theoretical weight to arguments intended to condemn or to defend the ABM. The mainstream of American arms control advocates condemned the Sentinel and Safeguard ABM proposals on <sup>only the most minimal of</sup> ~~no~~ scholarly basis ~~whatsoever~~.<sup>35</sup>



Mirror-image assumptions of the adversary were retailed to a gullible press and a 'willing to be convinced' group of liberal Senators. Similarly grounded in Western, and particularly American, experience, the pendulum has now swung, to some degree, away from the rational strategic actor model that still holds sway in American arms control citadels. Instead, we are instructed to be sensitive to the organisational processes and to the bureaucratic politics that actually 'crank out' defence decisions.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, as Gallagher and Spielmann have demonstrated convincingly, the bureaucratic politics paradigm is every bit as ethnocentric as was the unduly rational actor model that it seeks to supplement (if not replace).<sup>37</sup> Soviet bureaucracy is not American bureaucracy. The political system, the political culture, and - very often - the personal authority and personality of top leaders must somehow be built into one's increasingly complex model of how and why the arms race 'works' the way that it does.<sup>38</sup>

The comments offered above reflect nothing more than that contemporary strategic studies, and (more contentiously) the leading edge of international relations <sup>SCHOLARSHIP</sup> are overwhelmingly American in authorship.<sup>39</sup> It is not here implied that American scholars are uniquely guilty of ethnocentricity. Nonetheless, scholars of the American 'style' in foreign policy have had and will have a field day with the serried ranks of the arms control faithful - assuming a very mechanistic ritual of arms race action and reaction, and assuming that 'big' and complex government is 'big' and complex government, regardless of the nature of the political system.<sup>40</sup>

The vice of the value of American or British national security that has so diminished the worth of analyses of Soviet-American competition, has become a virtue (with some qualification) when transposed to the races in the Middle East region. Analyses of the quality represented by J.C. Hurewitz or Geoffrey Kemp for Arab-Israeli rivalry are not to be found for the Soviet-American competition.<sup>41</sup> With an 'interest' founded fundamentally in the security of the United States and Great Britain,



these scholars are wedded to the defence interests of neither Arab nor Israeli. To recite a platitude, analysts in the United States and Great Britain are interested in a stable peace in the Middle East region. From this 'good of the regional system' as a whole perspective, to the potential annoyance of Israeli and Arab friends, analysis of a far higher quality is produced than is that stimulated by the felt need to promote co-operative and/or effective competitive behaviour vis a vis the Soviet Union. The persuasive fallacies that have paralysed the innovative intelligence of Western defence and arms control analysts in their advocacy of particular short-term measures for the conduct of Soviet-American strategic relations, are irrelevant (with some due qualification) when it comes to the analysis of arms races in the Middle East region.<sup>42</sup>

Some cautionary words must be advanced concerning the often baneful influence of arms control perspectives upon national policy and upon the difficulties of arms race definition.

Too much has probably been made of the promise of arms control over the past fifteen years.<sup>43</sup> The notion that arms control could discipline usefully the armament inventory acquisition policies of states in acute political conflict has been accorded, in the United States and Great Britain at least, too easy an acceptance. Sensible national defence policies should require no arms control discipline, while - to cite the American experience with SALT I - the idea that arms control can solve problems left by inadequate national policies is simply quixotic.<sup>44</sup> It would seem that every generation is doomed to need to relearn the lessons of the past. To cite the American SALT experience again, it would be tantamount to heresy to suggest - in the context of the Harvard-M.I.T. arms control seminar - that to Soviet leaders arms control is viewed, not as a unique opportunity for co-operative behaviour for the improved joint management of the central strategic balance, but rather as an opportunity for the waging of political struggle.<sup>45</sup> Arms controllers, and there are many analysts who <sup>would</sup> define themselves as such, have a vested interest in arms control. This point is relevant to this paper in that 'the arms race', or regional arms races (to the extent that they are distinguished)<sup>46</sup> are often perceived as unmitigated evils. To demonstrate

that this is not necessarily the case is one of the tasks of the more balanced scholar.

Thus far, the definitional quibbles attendant upon usage of the term arms race have been eschewed. Arms race is one of those terms that invites such comment, as 'I know one when I see one'. Thus, the exception taken to other scholar's definitions tends to relate to the marginal event. More to the point perhaps, the exception which this author would take to every arms race definition that he has seen is that they all include in the definition that which remains to be proven. The following are two examples of attempts at arms race definition:

"The term 'arms race' is used to describe a situation where two or more countries increase their armaments in response to increases in the other country's arms, because of the threat they believe to be involved". 47

This definition is vulnerable on the grounds of, rational actor fallacies; action-reaction assumptions; insufficient breadth of imagination concerning the 'urge to compete', and; a lack of attention to the rapidity of inventory improvement (arms race). Or, one might consider the following:

"If one wants to restore some useful meaning to the term 'arms race' it should be confined to referring to the acquisition of arms by adversary states that are intended to alter the relative power relationship between or among them". (Italics in the original) 48

The weaknesses in this definition are, the exclusive inter-state focus; the rational actor fallacy; the fact that arms race actors may race, because of imperfect knowledge, or in order to retain the same relative power position. This author sees no good reason to alter the definition that he offered in the World Politics of October 1971.

"there should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties." 49

This definition is far from immune to analytical assault, but it does avoid some of the more heinous definitional crimes.



## International Stability: Platitude and Deceivable Value

International stability is a term that encourages the often misleading distinction between inter and intra-state politics,<sup>50</sup> while it may seduce the unwary author into an analysis that is laden with unexamined value assumptions.

For a definition containing only an inescapable minimum of difficulties, one may assert that international stability refers to a condition in the relations between state-actors that is expected to endure. Stability, from this perspective, is value neutral. One claims neither that it is desirable nor undesirable. Furthermore, the enduring relations may be those between a hegemonial Power and its dependents. Stability, like its associated term order, is compatible with - indeed, may well require - some measure of violence (latent and applied).<sup>51</sup> More pessimistically, one might argue that stability (and order) rests upon prudent general acceptance of a particular international hierarchy of actors.<sup>52</sup> All actors are not equal. To pursue this line of argument, stability and order would be threatened were the old adage to be ignored - that 'Great Powers are greater than Small Powers', with both the rights and the duties appropriate to the necessity for their effective functioning as actors in the extant international system. History offers ambiguous lessons, but a very fair case can be made for the proposition that when a Great Power, or an 'essential national actor' in the language of balance of power theorists,<sup>53</sup> is not permitted to defend what it considers to be its vital interests, it is very likely to feel entitled to take extreme unilateral measures that will put the entire international system at risk. Austria-Hungary in the early years of this century is an obvious example of this phenomenon.<sup>54</sup>

Since the subject matter of international relations is dynamic, and since stable-unstable is a spectrum of possible conditions - at any particular point in time being open to very divergent interpretation - it is clear that international stability is a term to be employed only with the utmost caution. A stable situation is not one wherein there are no challenges to the status quo. Similarly, a stable situation is not one



wherein there are no crises, wars, terrorist activities or coups d'état. Syrian and Iraqi governments may come and go, but the pattern of Arab-Israeli relations may remain essentially unchanged. A search for semantic precision in this area may be likened to a group of earnest Jesuits, debating how many Ba'athists of a particular persuasion are able to dance on the turret of a T-54.

Broad-brush characterisation, or caricature, of a pattern of international relations tends to be unhelpful. International stability is of a piece with bipolar and multipolar, in that one central idea is conveyed, but none of the detail.<sup>55</sup> By the very minimal, and admittedly very state-centric,<sup>56</sup> definition provided above, international stability must be threatened by any development, in either the external or the domestic situations of the actors, that threatens to overturn the major pillars of contemporary perceived reality. Arms rivalry, as a direct derivative of competing political claims, obviously qualifies as one potential source of international instability. Whether or not such instability is a 'good' or a 'bad thing' is a matter for each individual to decide with respect to the specific details of place, participants and time.<sup>57</sup> The arms rivalries potentially significant for stability in the Middle East offer a bewildering challenge to the arms race analyst. Taking J.C. Hurewitz's broad understanding of the Middle East region<sup>58</sup> - as extending from Morocco to Pakistan - the range of distinct and overlapping races is indeed formidable. Also, to the despair of the analyst - and, yet again vindicating Hegel's pessimism over the utility of the philosopher - Middle East politics are so volatile that analysis by still photography will capture a present that is already past.<sup>59</sup>

The races most obviously potentially subversive of that elusive quality, stability, are those between the Super Powers, between Israel and her neighbours (particularly Egypt, Jordan and Syria, in major key - with some qualification due in the case of Jordan; and with Iraq in minor key) - with the complication of financial support for the front line Arab Powers by the better endowed rear-echelon oil-rich (and due to become much more rich)<sup>60</sup> states - notably, Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; between the Arab states themselves (Morocco-Algeria; Egypt-Saudi Arabia); and between an Arab state and another regional Power (Iraq-Iran; Syria-Turkey).<sup>61</sup>

If we conceive of the Middle East as a system, the distinct arms races (and possible arms races) within the system do not comprise neat sub-systems. The weapons acquired in onepolitical context, may be employable in another (perhaps to the despair of the external arms supplier, with his neat end use requirements).<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, the pentagonal power balancing act conceived of recent years in the White House basement and expressed in a very peripatetic United States' diplomacy, is not without significance for the attempted management of Middle East affairs by the Super Powers.<sup>63</sup>

With respect to Israel and Egypt, the United States and the Soviet Union are more akin to captive giants than they are to aspiring hegemonial Powers, feeding their clients with military morsels as considerations of Super Power Grössspolitik would seem to indicate to be appropriate. In the Middle East today, to be an arms client is not to be a client state.<sup>64</sup> There are both gains and losses to international stability inherent in this very limited control by the Super Powers.<sup>65</sup>

In the title of this section the author employed the word "platitude". This usage was intended to remind readers that an improbable gathering of Israeli and Arab notables would undoubtedly achieve unanimity on the question of the desirability of international stability. However, if the essential supplementary question were put to our imaginary meeting of - 'identify the characteristics of a stable Middle East', some very divergent responses would be forthcoming.

It could be argued that ~~permanent~~, enduring though the present pattern of Arab-Israeli relations would seem to be-based essentially upon Israel's existing and expected to be continuing military superiority - the present context is unstable in that all of the more important of Israel's neighbours (and beyond), plus many of the people currently governed by the state of Israel, reject the legitimacy of the status quo.<sup>66</sup> Whether or not this political fact constitutes international stability is a matter of choice of definition. Since, for the foreseeable future, Israel is going to continue to enjoy the benefits of conventional military superiority, since unconventional hostile action is no more than an expensive



annoyance,<sup>67</sup> and since Israel's nuclear option could be invoked ~~a~~ fairly short notice to redress any impending conventional military imbalance<sup>68</sup> - it is a little difficult to see how the current power relationships in the Middle East can be labelled anything other than stable, or enduring.

Barring some very drastic shifts in Super Power policies, some quite improbable measure of new Arab military competence, or some equally improbable Israeli incompetence - a major war in the Middle East every ten years (for as many decades ahead as one feels bold enough to pronounce upon) could end in only one result - Israeli victories. In the very long term this may not be true, but for the very long term no prediction is worth the paper upon which it is written. That the above enduring condition is undesirable is beyond dispute. To be a 'garrison democracy'<sup>69</sup>, unable to relax its defence endeavours, is expensive and diverting of Israel's scarce resources,<sup>70</sup> it is foolish for the Arab states and peoples, because they cannot win - and it is dangerous for the world community, for there is always a small (if immeasurable) possibility of a Middle East conflict having a catalytic effect upon Super Power military interactions.<sup>71</sup>

Stability, like order, is not synonymous with peace. Peace has many possible meanings, but it is useful in this context to understand a peaceful Middle East to be one wherein, not merely would there be no organised violence (of inter-state or transnational varieties), but wherein every actor felt that its legitimate interests were compatible with the ~~existing~~ <sup>existing</sup> regional political structure. Given the existing zero-sum character of the Palestinian Arab-Israeli conflict - i.e. only one of us can hold Palestine - it is clear that for the foreseeable future, stability, rather than peace, is the most reasonable condition for which interested external parties are able to work.

The above comments reflect the political judgment and not the ultimate values of the author. It is tempting to assert that a particular stable order cannot endure unless it is founded upon a recognition of the core values of all interested parties - in other words, unless the order is compatible with justice (as defined by those affected by the particular



enduring order). A bow may be made to this line of argument by claiming that the particular order currently and foreseeably holding sway in the Middle East would be more stable were more parties to the enduring central Arab-Israeli conflict to have a stake in the endurance of the existing pattern of relations.<sup>72</sup> However, over the long term, ideas of what is just or unjust - on all sides - are subject to alteration. This is not to argue that if only Israel will hold implacably to the gains of June 1967, the inter-state and transnational conflicts will wither away.

With some profit one might enquire as to who is interested in international stability in the Middle East region? A stable international context, from the perspective of one particular actor, would be one wherein there would be little incentive for the taking of unilateral initiatives in order to change the existing pattern of relationships. In the Israeli case, this need not mean that Israel is satisfied with the existing state of 'no-war, no-peace', but rather that every alternative to present policies might seem to promise negative returns. The spending on defence of the highest percentage of GNP of any country in the world,<sup>73</sup> the diminishing sympathy of traditional external friends, the relatively high casualties suffered as a consequence of forward deployment in Sinai, on the Golan Heights and on the West Bank - all of these may seem worth paying for the benefit of immediate national security. An international stability that included the notion of 'justice for all' is fairly heavily discounted by governments as being a desirable future situation, but one for which little should be paid in the short to medium-term future. A government is in the business of protecting the vital national interests of its own society, as the first if not necessarily the last call upon its energies. This may sound like a very Hobbesian world view. The extent to which short-term vigilance may be relaxed in the interest of future harmony must depend upon the nature of the ambitions of one's identifiable adversaries and the degree to which co-operative behaviour is believed to be likely to induce reciprocal action abroad.<sup>74</sup>

The term 'stable' is securely placed near the top of the list of good words in the lexicon of very many Western analysts. Stability tends to be associated, naturally enough, with the status quo - or, at least,

with only 'orderly' change.<sup>75</sup> Western, and particularly American, social scientists have often - either explicitly, or more often, implicitly - argued as though they knew what was best for other people.<sup>76</sup> Homilies to the effect that violent change is the path to tyranny, or that Western-style economic development will be 'good for you' (and for us)<sup>77</sup>, have foundered upon the rocks of values and cultures seemingly impervious to the logic of impeccable Western political, economic and military scholarships.<sup>78</sup> With the very distinct feeling that the Middle East is a grave-<sup>and</sup>yard for the good intentions of outsiders, this author is very loathe indeed to step into the mire of prescription for the principals in local conflict.

For a Palestinian refugee, as for a Syrian or Egyptian politician whose political (at the least) life depends upon his 'doing something' about Israel, it is difficult to see the attraction of an international stability that is founded upon the present de facto political boundaries in the Middle East. Similarly, it is difficult to see how an Israeli could be much attracted to any condition of international stability other than the present one of secure borders (if a large insecure, alien, Arab population), given the daily-repeated 'total' objectives of Arab politicians. 'Justice' for many Arabs could mean simply less secure borders, an encouragement to Arab extremists to capitalise upon the ebb tide of Israeli withdrawal, and no external guarantees in which any confidence could be placed.<sup>79</sup>

#### Arms and Stability: The Negative Aspects

The author's personal values are not being slipped by an analytical backdoor into the titles of this and the succeeding section. International stability in ~~these~~<sup>is</sup> section~~s~~ is employed to refer to rather more than just a continuation of one particular pattern of relations. Since change is a law of life, it is here assumed that stability should refer to the endurance of the major features of an international structure that is capable of accommodating the vital interests of the most relevant parties - as they define them.<sup>80</sup> This redefinition does not contradict the analysis in the previous section: the more ~~vigorous~~<sup>rigorous</sup>, minimal definition of stability as referring simply to the persistence of a particular



structure of relations should also be kept in mind. The difficulty with that simple definition is that it requires an analyst to judge arms race activity as being negative or positive in its effects - solely with reference to its probable consequences for an alteration in existing power relations. That would provide far too narrow a focus.

Furthermore, the author favours peaceful change and presumes that inter-actor relations may be viewed as a non-zero-sum as well as, on occasions, a <sup>2</sup>zero-sum game. Hence, for the success of inter-actor bargaining procedures, formal or tacit, it is very likely (certainly in the Arab-Israeli case) that each party is going to have to settle for something less than its maximum demands.<sup>81</sup>

Value judgments are not here eschewed. It is assumed that war and a near-permanent garrison state condition are undesirable. These assumptions are not beyond challenge. However, as will be argued below, war and near-total mobilisation in the expectation of war are, from time to time, easily defensible as essential activities. If we borrow from Lenin, it must be admitted that war very often is the "midwife of revolution", in the same way that revolution is very often the midwife of tyranny. In the same way that many Palestinian terrorists would not view war as a negative outcome of the overlapping arms races in the Middle East (and of the political antagonisms upon which they are founded), so there may be some Israelis who see some positive aspects to a state of protracted national siege.<sup>82</sup> Social integration, the control of youth, a high value placed upon public service - if not self-sacrifice - and, less happily, a continuation of personal influence - all of these should be the result of a continuing and undeniable grave external threat.

The negative consequences of arms racing really require little analysis.<sup>83</sup> What is particularly unsatisfactory about much of the popular and academic comment upon these consequences, is that commentators tend to ignore the distinction between true (in all cases) statements, and statements of probability or tendency. For any actor in an arms race system (the word actor is employed not so as to appease the gods of Political Science Jargon, but rather to avoid the presumption that states are the only parties to arms races), the following are consequences that



one may fairly deem to be negative. It is granted that they, or some of them, may also be necessary evils.

- (1) Quantitative and/or qualitative arsenal improvement, if conducted in such a manner that normal replacement is not the explanation,<sup>84</sup> and if conducted in a context of mutual adversary identification, may promote the very dangers that it was designed to alleviate.
- (2) The national security managers may acquire undue influence over policy in an arms race context. As a consequence, foreign policy may be militarised as the decision-making élite comes to focus more and more upon the military instrument as the solution to foreign policy problems.<sup>85</sup>
- (3) The opportunity costs of energetic arms racing may be very high indeed. The costs of an arms race are obviously multidimensional: to cite a few, financial, human and material resources expended upon weaponry and 'national security' more broadly, are resources not expended for the maximisation of other values.<sup>86</sup>
- (4) As a somewhat vague category, one should mention societal damage. This catch-all concept may include such features as the abrogation of human rights, a widespread condition of fear, anxiety, apathy and possibly cynicism. The human consequences attaching to the economic opportunity cost category are also relevant. Housing, domestic energy supplies, welfare - all may have to be subordinated to the needs of defence.
- (5) Finally, inherent in the idea of an arms race is the notion of a rapid change in some if not all aspects of the weapons inventory. The ability of human beings, in<sup>an</sup> organisational context (often as an added source of constraint upon adaptability)<sup>87</sup>, to absorb the meaning and possibilities inherent in new technologies, is limited.<sup>88</sup> Succinctly, in an arms race situation, decision-makers (and even the military operators) may not fully comprehend the military machine that is available - still less may they understand the likely military and

diplomatic consequences of an interaction of two or more such dynamic military machines in the test of battle.<sup>89</sup> There are unsystematic lags between ideas, policy and technology. Generalisation is not possible, save at an unhelpful level of near-platitude.<sup>90</sup> The capacity of societies to absorb and plan for the useful employment of a very dynamic military technology is as variegated as are their, more generally, capacities for collective action.<sup>91</sup>

Unlike the positive feature of an arms race ( a form of words that is widely regarded as heretical, or even deplorable - as though one were endorsing pollution), the five categories of possible costs to stability cited above have been analysed, if not repeated in the form of an arms control credo, almost ad nauseam. Familiarity should not breed contempt.

If it is granted that some arms race activity is necessary, in the sense that all of the alternative policies seem likely to prove to be even more costly (war, surrender, benign neglect/faith in providence), then it should also be granted that the task of the responsible analyst should not be defined almost solely in conscience terms (reminding decision-makers that war, and all associated phenomena are evils),<sup>92</sup> rather should he seek to minimise the negative aspects that are to some degree ineradicable from an arms race landscape.<sup>93</sup>

Our 'responsible analyst' is a somewhat vacuous creature unless one is very specific concerning why the relevant actor is racing. While all men everywhere of a rational<sup>al</sup> cast of mind<sup>94</sup> may be expected to agree that the damage that may be wrought by an arms race upon a society, an economy and a political system should be minimised, and while all may agree that the hazards of war through accident or miscalculation should be reduced where possible<sup>95</sup> - not all would agree that the statements contained in (1) to (5) above were a fair summation of their cost categories. Ethnocentricity and special interests beset us all.

All arms races, crises and wars are not the product of inadvertence, bad luck, irresponsibility, etc. - they all can be deliberate acts of policy.<sup>96</sup> Hence, one may not deliberately initiate an arms race, in the sense of the issuing of an unambiguous challenge to compete<sup>97</sup> - after all, who would



not prefer <sup>his</sup> ~~the~~ rivals not to respond? - but one may acquire arms for the express purpose of seeking to extract political concessions and, should that fail, of submitting the dynamic military balance to the road test of war. This might usefully be conceived of as a process of 'offensive' arming. The likelihood of arms race, crisis, and war are all accepted as probable international outcomes, tolerable because one expects to be victorious and to gain spoils more than commensurate with the costs incurred. These ideas of the deliberate waging of an arms race, possibly of the deliberate initiation of an acute crisis, and certainly, should they occur, of the conduct of arms control negotiations in the spirit of intense political struggle, sit uneasily upon the heads of the mainstream of the Western arms control community. The incisive executive session testimony of William van Cleave before the Jackson Subcommittee attests to (as one example) the very great differences of approach and probably of purpose that separated the Soviet and American negotiating teams at SALT I.<sup>98</sup>

If an actor is racing because it seeks political gains upon which very great value is deemed to rest, then (1) to (5) above appear in a very different light. The 'tensions' that may erupt into violence will be negative only if they propel one into a war for which one is as yet not fully prepared (thinking of Egypt in the Spring of 1967).<sup>99</sup> War itself may have very few, if any, negative connotations. It may be believed to be necessary (i.e. there is no other way to expel the Israelis, "bag and baggage") - at some point - and the values at stake may be incapable of satisfaction short of organised violence: for example, national (or ethnic) honour to remove the stain of past defeats, or personal political security.

Also, much of what to a Westerner might appear as societal damage, might well - in Egypt, Pakistan or India for examples - pass muster as necessary <sup>AND BENEFICIAL</sup> social mobilisation. Such mobilisation could require the encouragement of hatred of the enemy/adversary, leading to near hysteria at identified slights to the national interest/honour. The fear and anxiety that the political context of an arms race may encourage - to be reflected in hatred, xenophobia, demands for vengeance - should not summarily be dismissed by Western analysts as a dimension of arms race pathology.



← It depends upon one's values. After all, jingoism and war-hysteria are not that far removed in time from the contemporary political games played by the Western Powers.<sup>100</sup> As Graham Allison has reminded us, "where you stand depends on where you sit".<sup>101</sup> Oxford common rooms or the Harvard Faculty Club may not be the best loci for the acquisition of an understanding of why Arabs and Israelis are less interested in promoting a Western-value-laden notion of regional stability, than they are in righting perceived existing ~~wrongs~~<sup>wrongs</sup> and safeguarding the national security. One need not applaud, but, at the least, one must seek to comprehend.

Arms acquisition policies are rarely unambiguous as indices of political intentions. A neat conceptual distinction between a "true" arms race, that is one allegedly propelled by external considerations,<sup>102</sup> and a (presumably) false arms race, that is one conducted almost entirely with domestic bureaucratic or domestic dissident considerations in mind, is not very helpful. Arms acquired for one purpose are not infrequently capable of being employed for other purposes. Past attempts to identify 'offensive' as opposed to 'defensive' weapons, or (as in the case of Great Britain and South Africa) weapons for external as opposed to internal use, have faltered under the weight of the multi-task flexibility proffered by modern technology. This is not to deny the worth of the distinction altogether. Soviet arms supply to Egypt would certainly seem to have been informed by a determination to withhold from the arms client the means for a blitzkrieg success.<sup>103</sup>

An appreciation of anthropomorphic fallacies rarely yields comfort to an arms race analyst. In other words, he is aware that the United States or Israel or the Soviet Union are shorthand terms for those often unknown procedures and individuals that - by due and sometimes devious procedures - decide upon arms policy. But, arms race motivation is always complex, while different political systems, structures of government and geopolitical interests render the reconstruction of others' decision processes a hazardous course. One reasons back from the deployment of 313 Soviet 'heavy' ICBM's, to what?<sup>104</sup>

Arms race systems differ profoundly in terms of their structure and also in terms of the reasonable alternatives believed to be open to the

adversary(ies). In the Soviet-American context, one may fear war by accident, war through an inadequacy of central political control, but scarcely war by miscalculation and, even less likely - a war by calculation.<sup>105</sup> The tensions promoted by armament in the Soviet-American example, clearly should be somewhat more tenuous than those promoted by arms in the Arab-Israeli case. The endurance of war as an instrument of policy has been affirmed in Arab-Israeli relations three times in twenty-five years, organised violence at lower levels has been almost continuous, and one side (to oversimplify) constantly reaffirms its intention to crush the other. Furthermore, the hardware referents for a stable military balance (defined, in this context, as a situation wherein all parties prefer to go second) are fundamentally different in the Arab-Israeli and the Soviet-American competitions. The present and foreseeable Arab-Israeli military balance is one <sup>(CHARACTERISED BY)</sup> approximating "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack" that was so eloquently dissected in the RAND vulnerability studies of the 1950's.<sup>106</sup> Maintaining a quantitative (and even in some respects a qualitative) military balance in the Middle East has little meaning for stability, so long as he who strikes first stands an excellent chance of winning.<sup>107</sup>

To restate, arms races may be waged by parties who expect to have to fight each other (i.e. Israel and her Arab neighbours; the United States and Japan, 1918-1922; France and Germany before 1914), and also - and this points to the multi-dimensionality of arms race motivation - between parties that have little expectation of war (Great Britain and the United States, 1918-1930; Great Britain and Germany, 1898-1912, these examples and the dates are highly debateable).<sup>108</sup>

In the Arab-Israeli case, <sup>5</sup>tension-major war (instability, in the sense of an expectation that the entire structure of present regional relations might be violently overthrown in a very short time span) analysis is vastly complicated by the 'two-tiered' structure of the race. The mysterious processes by which armaments provoke 'tension',<sup>109</sup> which provoke ever-more frenetic arming which etc.... to the point of war, should be, to some degree, controllable by the upper tier of the arms race. The arms suppliers, in this instance, have no interest in the securing by their clients of military victories (at least, in the Soviet-Egyptian/Syrian cases



of definitive military victory). However, they do have a continuing interest in the denial of victory to the client of the rival Super Power.<sup>110</sup> For an understanding of the lagged action and reaction process whereby Egypt and Israel proceeded in twenty years from World War II surplus stocks to, respectively, MIG 21 C/Ds and SA-3s, and to F-4E's there is no alternative to an appreciation of the different, if sometimes complementary, political motivations driving supplier and client.<sup>111</sup>

In graphical form, it is often demonstrated that were it not for the factor of cost, many arms races could proceed almost indefinitely.<sup>112</sup> Beyond a point where diminishing marginal returns are perceived to set in, the opportunity cost of each succeeding, and militarily less significant, unit should become more stark.<sup>113</sup> Actors do not spend themselves into economic ruin through arms racing. All arms races have a qualitative dimension that serves to undercut the worth of amassing ever-greater quantities of one particular generation of equipment,<sup>114</sup> while - even in the most hostile of political environments - maximisation of defensive capability against the enemy, ~~is~~ rarely has other than a relative top priority call upon the treasury. This is no cause for rejoicing. The damage done to domestic societies and to the more co-operative strains in international relations might be considerably less were actors less able to sustain an arms race than has in fact proved to be the case.<sup>115</sup>

If we assume that the burdens of arms racing are assumed only for the most serious and legitimate of political motives (which is not necessarily the case) - namely, that core national values are believed to rest upon the outcome - it would be analytically satisfying if close correlation could be reported between 'believed to be uniquely favourable' states of military imbalance (or expected imminent imbalance in the favour of the other side) and decisions for trial by combat. Wars occur according to no such rational strategic logic. Certainly in the Arab-Israeli cases, it is very difficult to see a clear relationship between perceptions of the military balance and the decisions for war of 1948, 1956 and 1967.<sup>116</sup> Sadat's putative identification of 1971 as "the year of decision" may have been more directly related to anticipated (falsely) arsenal improvement. To the despair of 'scientific' analysis, wars like arms races, are motivated, caused and precipitated by a host of factors.



In times of perceived foreign danger, with the ~~amassment~~<sup>amassment</sup> of armaments by neighbours taken as one very important index of the scale of that danger,<sup>117</sup> it is natural that the managers of, spokesmen for and operators of the military establishment (perhaps, more broadly, the national security establishment) should be the men of the hour, the Guardians entrusted with the keys of the kingdom. In a climate of public opinion wherein 'national security' is a much-venerated value, and one that would seem - in the recent past - to have been well-served by prompt military action, it is not difficult to see how men (and their arguments) of other persuasions concerning the relative weight to be placed upon the various instruments of foreign policy, should be ignored - or, at least, 'placed in reserve'. This is a general rather than a specific truth. The degree of attention accorded the spokesmen for ~~'firm'~~<sup>'firm'</sup> arms racing and/or military action should depend upon the margins of safety believed to obtain.<sup>118</sup> There is no presumption here that the advocates of (in the Israeli case) the purchase of more Phantom F-4E's, or of massive retaliation raids against guerrilla training areas are always in error. However, to the extent (and it is a very, very uncertain extent) to which an arms race sustains and legitimises the advocacy of military solutions to short (and beyond) term problems, to that uncertain extent may one dimension of the cost of an arms race be said to lie in the denial of weight to arguments calling for less violent policy moves.<sup>119</sup> Individuals, bureaucracies and states are, in important respects, the captives of their past successes. If the problem has been immediate national insecurity, and if military action has always, at least for a time, solved that problem, it is not difficult to see the kind of inhibitions that would attend any determined move to shift policy action from one instrument to another.<sup>120</sup>

The self-sustaining nature of a very heavily, and apparently successful, militarised foreign policy is clear. After all, in the last resort self-help is a fundamental rule of international politics. No deus ex machina, and not even the Sixth Fleet, can be relied upon to save the state. Military insecurity is reduced by winning the arms race, and by periodic bursts of successful military action. However, as the aftermath of the 1967 June war has demonstrated, the long term banes of Israeli insecurity remain - if anything, they have been exaggerated by the scale of the Israeli victory.<sup>121</sup> There is no anti-Israeli animus in these

comments, simply the reflection that actors would seem, for very understandable reasons, to continue to pursue lines of policy that have solved problems for them in the past. It is appreciated that policy makers always exist in the short term, and that undue concern for long term stability - defined as in the opening of this section - of the Middle East region, could result in one's short or medium-term demise.

Stability, in the sense of the persistence of extant relationships, may be ensured by the disciplinary effect of vigorous arms race management. Deterrent and diplomatic weight, and defensive potential, may enable one to evade the possible costs of taking some risks in the direction of appeasement (or just settlement). The cost of a sustainable arms race remains, of course, in the Middle Eastern example, the continued illegitimacy (in Arab eyes) of the international order that is thus stabilised. To repeat, the arms race is not the villain of the piece, If there be villainy it lies in the unwillingness of both sides to compromise their maximum political demands. To restate the chain of reasoning above; political incompatibilities promote the arms race (and military action), which lends authority to those bearing most obviously the mantle of national security around their shoulders. These men, understandably, tend to advocate that the tried and true, and least risky (in the short term) instrument of state policy continue to be accorded first place in the orchestration of measures for the national defence.

#### Arms and Stability: The Positive Aspects

Whether a stable international order be identified solely as one that endures, or whether it be taken to include such normative additives as justice and a very low level of inter and intra-state violence<sup>122</sup> - though it may be noted that crusaders for their conception of 'right' tend to be insensitive to the 'necessary' casualties thereby incurred - the relevance of armaments is all too easily apparent. Since, as the writers of textbooks on international politics are fond of telling us, the international arena is, in important respects, precisely that<sup>123</sup> - an arena, not a seminar, or a town meeting, or a court of law - there is no way in which arms in the hands of others may be countered save through prudential



armaments in one's own hands. A crude notion of an Hobbesian external world in contradistinction to domestic societies characterised by the rule of law, the legitimacy of political authority, and the monopoly on the use of legitimate violence (absolved in the more pleasing term, force) is of course a vast oversimplification.<sup>124</sup> The threat and/or the use of force does not characterise the majority of inter-state inter-actions that comprise an important dimension of international relations,<sup>125</sup> while there are many societies for which the legitimacy of power-holders (or of the character of the political system itself), the rule of law, and a state monopoly on the instruments of coercion should be viewed as little more than phrases from an alien text-book.<sup>126</sup> Indeed, a promising case could be made for the proposition that in the light of scholarship in the areas of transnational relations,<sup>127</sup> bureaucratic politics and political system analyses, international relations - as an aspiring discipline - were better buried. We ~~are~~ left, simply, with politics.<sup>128</sup>

Regardless of the analyses and occasional excesses of tough minded 'realists' determined to vindicate the traditional state-centric, 'international life is dangerous', perspective upon their subject,<sup>129</sup> or of trans-national relations analysts determined to demonstrate how porous are the frontiers of states, and how multifarious are the actors in international relations, the fact remains that - save only for absolute pacifists - the application of force, on the behalf of interests retail-able as vital, is still accepted as the legitimate ultima ratio of actors in international relations.

As Michael Howard has eloquently argued, the application of pure coercion is, for most actors, a policy expedient of declining legitimacy.<sup>130</sup> If arms be sanctified for the generally accepted ends that they should serve, then - ipso facto - so may an arms race, because the same ends may be well served only by a prudent attention to inter-actor military balance and imbalance.

The generally negative connotations of the term arms race may in good part be ascribed to the popular misconception that arms races are futile or possibly self-defeating. A further popular notion that is widely held is to the effect that the harder that you race the more insecure you



become.<sup>131</sup> This nonsense proposition has delighted many U.S. Senators of recent years. In no sense is this author casting a general benediction over all (or even most) arms race activity. However, there is a difference between a hypothesis and a demonstrable social science truth. Arms races may be waged for good and (to the taxpayers and the national security managers) sufficient reasons;<sup>132</sup> indeed, for the same basic reasons why nearly all states maintain armed forces.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, competitive armament need not be self-defeating. Arms races can be and have been won.<sup>134</sup> There is no law of international politics which states that all arms race victories will prove to be only temporary. Even if there were such a law, many actors may be willing to settle for some immediate security, ephemeral though it could prove. Also, arms race victory should not necessarily be defined in terms of an ability to prevail in war. Many different arms race 'state of balance' objectives are possible.

The arms race futility strain of reasoning is fuelled by the notion that each actor requires only sufficient armaments, a quantity to be determined by a unique national arithmetic exercise. Certain magical numbers, usually based upon some calculation (not entirely of a military strategic character), do certainly enjoy a protracted grip upon the popular imagination. One thinks of the 70 cruisers demanded by the Royal Navy at the time of the London Conference of 1930,<sup>135</sup> of the 15 capital ship requirement that has endured in the U.S. Navy, despite changes in technology and adversary,<sup>136</sup> or of the 105 and, later, 70 Group demands of the USAAF in the 1940's. More recently, the 400 O.M.E. requirement for the United States' assured destruction mission is a good example of the useful basis for argument of a familiar number, that - in this instance at least - may readily be supported by one form of analysis.<sup>137</sup> The case of the 105 Group figure cited above is a less defensible one.

"... the planners selected a large figure which seemed to have some high-level War Department support and used that as the starting point in the planning process." <sup>138</sup>

Unfortunately, in the real world 'what we require' may not be ascertainable by reference solely to absolute national requirements. Apart from possible debate as to the military validity of the claimed

'requirements', an arms race is rarely a matter of defence alone. A strategic arsenal may lend needed diplomatic weight,<sup>139</sup> may have a role to play in a strictly domestic hubris ('we are only happy when we are first'), and - more to the point - it may be believed to be important to look equal. In short, an arms race may, in part, be a race in appearances.<sup>140</sup> This is not to be despised. After all, armaments are supposed to have political meaning.

Prominent and analytically defensible figures for a sufficiency of ICBM's or of capital ships are economically attractive, are appealing to those who see an arms race as a mutually defeating spiral of tight action and reaction, but they may pave the road to national if not international catastrophe should the adversary not be playing the arms race game guided by a familiar logic. This is no counsel of despair, nor an assertion of the inevitability of 'the arms race as usual'; one can - after all - seek to persuade the adversary to accept a common set of rules.<sup>141</sup> However, one does have to grant the possibility that if the adversary is apparently not susceptible to sweet strategic reason, the only way to foreclose upon the possibility that he may try to road test his larger (if militarily insignificant) arsenal for political advantage, is to match him missile for missile. The crudeness and lack of sophistication of this argument - apart from its expense and general undesirability - have contributed to its being rejected by the mainstream of the contemporary trans-national arms control community.<sup>142</sup>

The following are five areas of justification, in terms of which it should be admitted that a race may contribute to international stability. The particular meaning to be ascribed to stability need not here be identified.

- (1) An arms race may be an expensive but non-lethal substitute for war, while frequent assessment of the relative standing of the competitors may serve as a functional substitute for the acute international crisis. Thus, an arms race may be more than, in the conventional phrase, 'an expression of political conflict', it may also serve as the chosen instrument for struggle.<sup>143</sup> Tacitly or formally, the winner of the race (or of one round of a protracted race) may be accorded his



spoils.<sup>144</sup> This line of thought is somewhat akin to the idea that accurate psephology could substitute for the expense and ritual of elections. This idea of an arms race as a functional substitute for war does of course run directly counter to Western arms control theory. It may be no less valid for that. Arms race activity is one means by which states may balance power. A dynamic military equilibrium, sustained by two or more states of comparable wealth and/or motivation, could result in a condition of protracted stalemate. Neither side might 'win' the race.

- (2) An arms race may be seen as providing time for conflict resolution (or at least amelioration) processes to work. It is true that one could argue that a continuing arms race, occasionally slowing to a walk or even a crawl, keeps alive the hope of victory in war tomorrow. On the other hand, so long as all parties to a conflict are persuaded that arms inventory improvement will yield a better outcome should war come tomorrow, barring accidents there will be no war today. In a context of profound - and possibly irreconcilable (in the short and medium terms) - political differences, a continuation of a no-war condition may be a very considerable achievement. This argument certainly lacks many attractive features, but its relevance may be seen not just in the contemporary Middle East, but also in the debates over preventive war that surfaced in the United States from 1949 until 1954 (at least).<sup>145</sup> Even when most analytical contenders agreed that war with the Soviet Union was extremely likely, a decision to 'wage it now' would be a decision transforming a very likely future into a certain present.

Not all conflicts should be expected to wither away in the foreseeable future. For political, though not military comparison, the Arab-Israeli conflict would seem to be like the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, or the difficulties posed for Canada by the French 'fact'. These are conditions to be lived with and ameliorated where possible, rather than problems to be solved by an ingenious diplomacy.<sup>146</sup> Sometimes one must settle for just 'keeping the lid on'. In the Middle East case, it would seem to be unfortunate



but a fact that a protracted arms competition is a feature of that particular condition. To the extent that the competition encourages hopes for victory tomorrow, and thus diminishes the incentives to fight today, it may be said to contribute to one definition of international stability.<sup>147</sup>

- (3) An arms race may be seen as one mechanism by which the international political system accommodates a rapidly changing military technology with minimum disturbance. Bernard Brodie has made this point with particular reference to the changes in maritime technology in the second half of the Nineteenth Century.<sup>148</sup> In an era wherein the differentials between the levels of military effectiveness of rapidly succeeding generations of technology are very great, the stability of a particular international hierarchy would be endangered were not all essential actors to race at approximately the same speed (or, were not each essential actor to enjoy close political links with such a racer). More particularly, inadequate racing activity by status quo Powers (or by Powers that have a very substantial stake in the endurance or stability of the existing order) may, by default, yield the game to a Power aspiring to hegemony.<sup>149</sup> To a greater or lesser extent, all races are qualitative ones. Product improvement in strategic weaponry may well be futile in the sense that the expenditure of billions of dollars may yield no greater security than was enjoyed at the outset. However, the consequence of righteous self-abnegation with respect to the research and development engine of the arms race may not promote co-operative behaviour.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, given the competitive essence of many international political relationships and given the extreme difficulty of monitoring weapons development before they reach the prototype stage for testing, a decision not to absorb new technologies could be a decision for disaster. This is no prescription for 'technological superiority', the margin for a technological lag consistent with national safety might be quite considerable.<sup>151</sup>
- (4) One of the most compelling rationalises for racing activity is the possibility that one might actually have to fight. If it be granted that a condition identifiable as international stability is not

necessarily incompatible with war, this argument is difficult to resist.<sup>152</sup> With respect to particular actors, the defending state may lack confidence in the rationality of some decision makers.<sup>153</sup> Rephrased, one could say that the logic of others may prove difficult to unravel or to predict. Regardless of the outcome of war games, informed by the most reliable of strategic intelligence, how confident are Israelis that Sadat (or his successor) will not decide upon, or feel that he has no better alternative other than war in the very near future? What he ought or ought not to do is beside the point. Similarly, how confident can Egyptians feel that Israeli forces will not be unleashed in great strength across the Suez Canal - undoubtedly for limited purposes - in the near future? If war (to use the old fashioned term, with its connotations of formal declaration, withdrawal of diplomatic personnel and distinctiveness from pre and postwar peace) is believed to be a very likely future, and if the means of effective defence are either to hand or are obtainable (at a price) to race hard may well be compatible with every definition of stability. Pre-emption may be invited, and - by the same logic - may be attractive, but deterrence might also be the result.

- (5) An arms race may be the one non-lethal instrument by means of which status quo Powers are able to prevent change which seems to them to be undesirable. From an American perspective, to supply Israel with most of the advanced arms that are requested, is to ensure a continuation of the extant Israeli superiority of military power.<sup>154</sup> The present condition of the Middle East is very/<sup>un-</sup>satisfactory from an American point of view, but it would seem to be preferable to/<sup>the</sup>most probable obvious alter<sup>N</sup>atives.<sup>155</sup> For the United States to be genuinely even-handed in Israel's troubles with her neighbours might result in (A) Israel exercising her nuclear option,<sup>156</sup> or (B) Israel's defeat, if acute advanced equipment starvation set in, and if no nuclear compensation were sought. The conditions, currently frozen, that are working to undermine the present stability, are not alleviated by this policy of ensuring Israel's conventional superiority, but this is probably viewed in Washington as a case of adopting the best of a set of poor policy options.



There is a school of arms race thought in the United States which adheres to the notion that any condition short of unambiguous American strategic superiority over the Soviet Union is in fact a condition of inferiority.<sup>157</sup> It is claimed that the imbalance between the respective political drives for hegemony or influence of the Super Powers, in a context of considerable Soviet geo-political advantage (the interior lines of a Heartland Power), plus the Soviet superiority in many categories of general purpose forces - all amount to the fact that a ratification of strategic parity is a political victory for the Soviet Union of great magnitude. According to this logic, the ability of the United States to influence regional actors in the Middle East - and the Soviet Union over Middle Eastern issues - ought to decline.

For better or worse, no 'ordering' Power is able, today, to freeze its conception of a stable international structure. The global reach symbolised by forward naval deployment, and the World Power status affirmed through an identification of not incredible interests around the globe, are really close to irrelevant in terms of the scope for manipulation by latter day Metternichs in Moscow and Washington. Even in an arrangement approximating that of a condominium,<sup>158</sup> the Super Powers would be hard put to it to discipline 'parochial' and de-stabilising elements in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. With societies, world-wide, in varying degrees of ferment, even the installation of Soviet-American proconsuls, with the apparatus of coercion to hand, would be unlikely to ensure that the Soviet-American conception of a stable world order would persist.<sup>159</sup>

These remarks sceptical of the likely achievements of even a benign condominiumal Superpowermanship should not be taken to imply that strategic preponderance through energetic racing has no utility. The influence attained over specific close rivals might be most salutary (for the endurance of the superior Power's conception of behaviour conducive to stability), while the influence thereby attained in other regions might prove marginal - as suggested above - but still worth having.<sup>160</sup> At the very least the machinations of a rival, adhering to a very different definition of a stable order, might be precluded or disciplined.

In seeking to strike a balance between the negative and possible



positive consequences of arms races for international stability, the need to counter the conventionally very negative views of arms racing may appear to induce missionary enthusiasm on the part of the analyst. Converts for arms races are not here being sought. Indeed, as noted earlier, many of the arguments employed in this section would be deemed by most Western defence/arms control experts to be beyond the pale of their analytical embrace.<sup>161</sup>

#### Arms Races and Stability in the Middle East

With respect to some arms races it is not implausible to argue that regardless of the political antagonisms which initially catalysed competition, beyond a certain point the race moved into a phase of self-sustained growth. Beyond this point the arms are not merely expressions of political distaste, they are, in themselves, providing positive feedback for those domestic fears that originally sparked the race.<sup>162</sup> Periods of détente may thus be threatened by the not incredible threat analyses conducted by the domestic threat-analysing establishment. Better relations and a larger stick may not in theory be opposed,<sup>163</sup> but in practice the pace and character of the military preparations of an identified potential enemy do, not unnaturally, tend to be taken as one index of his political intentions.<sup>164</sup> This belief that deeds speak louder than words, or 'discount the rhetoric and the gestures and note the rate of missile silo construction', often reflects a rather naïve faith in the dubious proposition that the facts of a developing military capability speak for themselves.<sup>165</sup>

An 'arms and instability' spiral model does not fit easily upon the history of Middle Eastern politics since 1948. Israel has been understandably fearful of losing the arms race, precisely because of the apparently unlimited nature of some Arab ambitions. A very dynamic military balance must promote an acute anxiety state because, should the race be lost (or should many important Arabs believe that Israel is temporarily behind), then political aspiration would be translatable through military action into political fact. The arms race between Israel and her neighbours has not created new Arab policy goals vis a vis Israel.<sup>166</sup> The determination to

throw Israelis into the Mediterranean pre-dates the arms race.

One is here pointing to the obvious asymmetry of stakes in the conflict. The worst that can happen, from the Arab point of view (barring the possibility of an Israel, facing imminent defeat, choosing to flex some nuclear muscles)<sup>167</sup> is that Israel remains as an unpleasant reminder of their military impotence. For Israel there can be no military solution to her security problems. Geography, demography, local Arab sentiment, public opinion abroad, Super Power interest, all indicate the truth of this statement. To the extent that one might term the likely future condition of international relations in the Middle East unstable, this instability would seem to spring from the irreconcilability of actor interests. The Arab-Israeli arms race is no autonomous villain, dragging the regional system toward an Armageddon by its own apolitical momentum. This is not to say that the Arab-Israeli and some inter-Arab races are not causes as well as symptoms of a deep-rooted regional instability. Clearly, a grave military imbalance in favour of Egypt (either with or without the assistance of sister members of the Arab League) would pose the very real possibility of a fundamental change in intra-regional relations.

The point of the above paragraphs was to emphasise that competitive military procurement in the Middle East region has not "taken-off" from limited political goals. It is difficult to escape the implications of the argument that the present arms imbalance in Arab-Israeli relations ensures a regional stability of the immobilisme variety, while the regional bases of a notion of stability that incorporates such ideas as justice and a 'shared conception of a legitimate order' (or cannot be admitted to exist) in anywhere near adequate strength.<sup>168</sup> <sup>Do not exist</sup> L

The principal implication of the above argument for American arms supply policy is that really there is no sensible alternative to the present White House determination to sustain some measure of Israeli conventional military superiority. The instability thus encouraged (continued frustration of 'just' Palestinian demands, continued embarrassment to Arab governments), is clearly preferable to the instability that might well result from a far more restrictive arms supply policy. Despite



the compelling logic that argues for a continuation of the present arms race with respect to the Middle East region, Western analysts continue to search for a middle (in the absence of better alternatives) ground for (above all) American<sup>169</sup> diplomatic manoeuvring that would permit a greater measure of Super Power control, and - perhaps - a lesser degree of Super Power involvement should major inter-state violence recur in the region. For example, in 1971, Robert Hunter wrote as follows:

"Playing flexible middleman, not becoming frozen into an unequivocal, partisan position, is the best American role". 170

Alas, "the best" is rarely attainable. Hunter was arguing that a pro-Israeli stance should not be sustained in the mistaken belief that it was synonymous with an anti-Soviet stance,<sup>171</sup> while a reflexive anti-Soviet stance in the Middle East would be incompatible with the interests of the United States. A further quotation from Hunter is illustrative of an analysis toward which this author feels considerable sympathy, yet which nonetheless fails to grasp the central problem pertaining to peace and conflict in the region. We are advised that

"If the Soviet Union were secure in its legitimacy as a major outside power in the Middle East, it could develop a greater sense of shared responsibility for stability in the region and feel less need to secure its position with force deployments - deployments ~~have~~ have their own expansionist momentum." /Emphasis added/ 172 ~~that~~

Stability is not defined in the article, yet it is because Soviet and many Arab conceptions of a stable order in the Middle East differ, that Soviet influence in Egypt was so drastically (if possibly temporarily) reduced in July 1972.<sup>173</sup> Hunter's analysis was really addressed to the wrong problem. Soviet and American conceptions of stability in the region are not distinguishable by any unbridgeable principles. On the basis of U.<sup>N.</sup>S. Security Council Resolution 242,<sup>174</sup> the Super Powers, if not the 'Big Four', should certainly be able to devise a compromise package that accorded with a sufficient number of ~~all~~ of their interests.<sup>175</sup> Unfortunately, as M.H. Haykal's analyses in Al Ahram have exposed all too clearly, the region is not capable of being stabilised by Great Power agreement.<sup>176</sup> More to the point, perhaps, despite the extant single-arms



supplier dependence of the principals to the local conflict, there clearly is no effective way in which the arms suppliers are able to move their clients away from political positions identified as intransigent and/or irresponsible.<sup>177</sup>

Some of the political simplifications that have been employed in this paper thus far must now be exposed. In the face of a widespread identification of impending 'Israeli aggression', it is true that brother Arabs rally to the cause. But, if one is seeking to identify a condition of Middle East politics that would be compatible with the legitimate interests of most of the actors in the region,<sup>178</sup> such a condition is not too difficult to isolate. Politicians live in a short term world and do what they must. The continued existence of the state of Israel may be an affront to Arab dignity and a constant reminder of past humiliations. However, it should not be forgotten that the existence of Israel does have its positive sides also for many Arab politicians. To be specific:

- opposition to Israel is the one slogan/policy upon which all Arabs are able to agree (though they differ over the means, and the timing of application of the means);
- Israel performs a classical external threat function for some Arab countries beset by domestic ~~problems~~ incapable of short-term solution (excitement, dashing leadership possibilities, suppression of opposition voices etc., are all provided and/or facilitated by Israel's convenient presence);
- The alternatives to the state of Israel should be distinctly unattractive to Egyptians, Syrians, Libyans and Jordanians. An Arab Socialist Republic of Palestine would have the most serious border problems, it would pose a challenge to all existing Arab leaderships, and it would be sitting on an industrial and scientific agricultural base unique to the Middle East (if they survived the war, that is). Perhaps this writer is unduly cynical, but the one thing worse than the presence of the state of Israel for politicians in Egypt, Syria et al., would be the demise of the state. This, of course, is a devious example of rational actor analysis that may be irrelevant,

even over the long term, to the actual behaviour of Arabs.<sup>179</sup>

Regardless of the above, the Arab states are at present locked into a context of apparently remorseless military confrontation with Israel. In this situation, no measure of attempted arms race management by the principal supplying Powers seems likely to promise superior pay offs (in terms of their not totally incompatible notions of regional stability) than do the present supply policies. So long as the local principals to the conflict are unable to act upon a tolerably common conception of a stable regional order, then so long must each party arm competitively for a further war that could erupt at any time. A state of constipation in the arms supply channels, perhaps enforced by the Big Four, would certainly have major repercussions upon the central regional arms race, but those repercussions might not all be of a nature favoured by the governments of former supplying countries.

The Arab-Israeli arms race would no longer be characterised by such dramatic and prominent moves as the purchase and/or gift of F-4E's or MIG-21 C/D's, but the race would still be on in the areas of repair and maintenance, rapidity of mobilisation, combat efficiency, strategic and tactical ideas, the local production of military goods, and the search for new external arms suppliers.<sup>180</sup> Israel's superior "capacity for collective action" and her advanced state of industrial development should ensure that - for the foreseeable future at least - a total choking-off of external arms supplies from major suppliers would contribute only to the status quo. These comments must be considered in conjunction with an appreciation of factors relevant to future Israeli insecurity other than the possibility of an unfavourable shift in the inter-state military balance.

Israel is a Jewish island in an Arab sea.<sup>181</sup> Even within Israel itself, the demographic fact of an extant and rapidly growing non-Jewish potential fifth column is one source of mockery for the apparent security gained in June 1967.<sup>182</sup>

In the Middle East the United States would like to be friends with everybody, an 'honest broker', influential and respected by all parties.



This is not possible, because, in the last resort, Israel's demise (possibly in a context of nuclear abandon) is generally appreciated to be unacceptable, from the viewpoint of American policy. This certainly is a fact today, but - as David Watt has indicated - a hardheaded American reappraisal of their interests, could yield a different judgment.<sup>183</sup>

The demise or imminent demise of Israel would be scarcely less embarrassing to the Soviet Union than it would be to the United States. In the face of serious American measures to brake the Middle East arms race and induce some mellowing in Israeli policy, the Soviet Union might be tempted to seek to ensure that the flow of necessary advanced arms to Israel continued (though not in the form that camouflaged military assistance took in 1956 and 1967!). Gratitude is no more prevalent or enduring a feature of inter-state politics than it is of inter-personal relations. Indeed, the very acknowledgment that (for example) "Soviet arms and training made our victory possible", would clearly detract from the glory attendant upon a defeat of Israel. Furthermore, the need for continuing Soviet assistance would be very, very sharply reduced, as would be the need to endure Soviet high-handedness. Thus, for Soviet policy, Israel's continued existence is strongly desirable.<sup>184</sup> When Sadat was informed (we may fairly presume) in Moscow in October 1971 that 1971 was not going to be "the year of decision", there is no need to place a great deal of emphasis upon the effects of Soviet considerations of its relations with the United States.<sup>185</sup>

Since it would seem to be necessary for the Super Powers to continue to supply arms to their regional clients (neither Super Power wishing to disavow its somewhat tenuous measure of local influence), since the vital interests of no local society, save for that identifiable as a politically and geographically fractured Arab Palestinian one, are at stake in the present conflict - there is a great deal to be said in favour of a prudentially modulated<sup>186</sup> arms competition that ensures Israel's conventional military superiority. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that because it has most at stake, Israel must be accorded the diplomatic freedom of manoeuvre granted by military superiority.<sup>187</sup> It is far from certain that well-meaning attempts by arms race managers external to the Middle



East deliberately to increase Israeli feelings of insecurity in the hope of increasing her diplomatic flexibility would have the desired results.<sup>188</sup> The interests as opposed to the aspirations and rhetoric of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian politicians would not seem, in the long-term at least, to be incompatible with those of Israel.<sup>189</sup> The only losers must be those Palestinians who believe, and are encouraged to believe by Arab politicians, that the name of the central Middle Eastern political game is 'who gets Palestine'. As stated earlier, all are not equal in international politics.<sup>190</sup> A stable international order in the Middle East is incompatible with any serious measure of appeasement of those Arab Palestinians who demand that they be granted political ascendancy in Palestine. Holding no brief for Israeli interests, and believing that a stable international order could but be strengthened by the provision of justice for all (by their own definitions), this author is compelled by the evidence to reach the above somewhat unwelcome conclusion.

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March 1973

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### FOOTNOTES

1. On the prospective benefits of arms race theorising see P.E. Chase, "The Relevance of Arms Race Theory to Arms Control", General Systems, Vol.XIII (1968), pp.91-98; J. David Singer, "The Outcome of Arms Races: A Policy Problem and a Research Approach", in Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Third General Conference (Assen, Neths.: Van Gorcum, 1970), pp.137-146.
2. See the author's "The Arms Race is About Politics", Foreign Policy, No.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp.117-129.
3. Note the brief comments by the editor in John Mueller, ed., Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp.11-12.
4. Oran R. Young, "The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations", in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.196.
5. See Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Science Recent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp.127-168; and, in the best / introductory work on international politics, Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think? (San Ram<sup>C</sup>an, Cal.: Consensus, 1972), pp.18-19.
6. "The Perils of Odysseus", p.180.
7. Ibid., p.198. This is a slight expansion of Young's argument.
8. 'Heuristic' means simply that the approach or proposition so described has value for the new lines of investigation that it suggests might be useful.
9. For Richardson's writings see Arms and Insecurity (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960); and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (London: Stevens

and Sons, 1960). An example of post-Richardsonian mathematical arms race analysis is Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.573-582.

10. For an example of such claims see Michael Nicholson, Conflict Analysis (London: The English Universities Press, 1970), pp.121-139. "The thorough investigation of arms races from a scientific point of view is still in its infancy, and this chapter has the standing of a pediatrician's report to the general public on the infant's progress; happily, the prognosis for a useful and healthy life for the theory seems excellent". P.139.
11. See Hedley Bull, "International Relations as an Academic Pursuit", Australian Outlook, Vol.26, No.3 (December 1972), pp.255-256 particularly.
12. "A Dynamic Model of the Arms Race in the Middle East, 1953-1965", General Systems, Vol.XVI (1971), p.145.
13. Although, as stated earlier, the Middle East has suffered less neglect than have other regional or inter-regional arenas of arms rivalry. See my "Social Science and the Arms Race" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, forthcoming.
14. For a near self-parodying example (with respect to a different class of international events) of a work that is crammed full of dazzling insights, and that is based upon deep historical immersion, yet which eschews the scientific approach in favour of anecdote, see Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). See particularly footnote 4 on p.6.
15. "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research", in Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp.23-65.



16. (New York: The Free Press, 1969). Writing in 1971, Rosenau was honest enough to state that: "The failure of the linkage strategy doubtless stemmed from several sources, not the least of which was my own failure to provide any theoretical substance to the 144 types of linkage that formed the basis of the strategy. Since it provokes new thought and empirical research, erroneous theory - even far-fetched theory - is preferable to no theory..." /In Fred W. Riggs, ed., International Studies: Present Status and Future Prospects (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, October 1971), p.231.<sup>7</sup> It is difficult to improve on the following comment: "... analysts whose theoretical explorations come to grief are likely to print the results anyway on the grounds that the results have heuristic value. You get to read a lot of bad theory that way". Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics, p.19.
17. For an analysis that is ~~both~~ profoundly sceptical of the relevance of pre-nuclear arms race experience, ~~yet which does not hesitate to plunder the historical record, in his other writings, where appropriate illustration would seem to be on offer,~~ see Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of its Hazards", Daedalus, Vol.89 (Fall 1960), pp.764-778. Also see my "Social Science and the Arms Race".
18. Pending the completion of comparative, cross-historical studies of arms races, this statement must stand solely as the author's opinion - although it is based upon much historical reading informed by a concern for the development of races qua races.
19. "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World Politics, Vol.XXIV, No.1 (October 1971), pp.39-79.
20. Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing", unpublished paper (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, January 1973).

21. For example, the work of Dr. Dieter Senghaas at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in Frankfurt is closely allied to work in North America that is on the frontier of arms race analysis.
22. See Hedley Bull, Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties (Chicago: University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, Occasional Paper, 1971); Donald Watt, "Historical Light on SALT: Parallels with Inter-War Naval Arms Control", The Round Table, No.245 (January 1972), pp.29-35.
23. O.M.E. stands for "one megaton equivalent". The capability to inflict surface damage of a warhead force of a certain size is calculable by reducing the various yields of the weapons into a single O.M.E. figure (The O.M.E. of a nuclear warhead is calculated in terms of the  $\frac{2}{3}$  power of the yield). See Ian Bellamy, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence", Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol.118, No.4 (March 1973), pp.28-34.
24. See Valerie C. Gray, Anglo-American Naval Rivalry 1916-1922 and The Issue of 'Parity' at the Washington Conference, unpublished M.A. dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto, Department of History, May 1972).
25. The criticism of the more 'scientific' scholars of international relations to the effect that their more traditional colleagues pick and choose examples (anecdotal evidence) for the illustration of their arguments are very much to the point. See Singer, "The Outcome of Arms Races"; and the same author for a more sweeping indictment, in "The Behavioural Science Approach to International Relations: Payoff and Prospects", in Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, pp.65-69.
26. Richard D. Burns and Donald Urquidí, Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939, Vol.IV, Conclusions, ACDA/RS-55



(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 1968), p.1.

27. The arguments in ibid. make interesting reading when considered in juxtaposition with the judgments offered in Donald Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment", The Journal of Modern History, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (June 1956), particularly pp.165-166. The differences between these two works would seem to stem essentially from the different values placed upon arms control (almost) as an end in itself by the authors.
28. See Singer, "The Outcome of Arms Races".
29. The 'arms trade' literature that began to emerge in the middle 1960's is <sup>very</sup> most informative concerning most aspects of arms acquisition by Middle Eastern states. However, a persistent fault in this literature is for the essential nuts and bolts of weapon system and transfer detail to serve apparently to paralyse systematic assault upon the Middle East arms races as regions of enquiry. This line of thinking has been very well expressed in Geoffrey Kemp's review of the SIPRI volume, The Arms Trade With the Third World. See Orbis, Vol.XVI, No.3 (Fall 1972), pp.809-816.
30. Outstanding examples are J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp.438-488; and the contributions by Geoffrey Kemp and by Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia L. Leiss in J.C. Hurewitz, ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp.21-54. The author has also benefited greatly from a reading of the papers prepared by J.C. Hurewitz and Geoffrey Kemp for the Conference on Comparative Defense Policy, U.S. Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs), 7-9th February, 1973. Respectively, these papers are entitled "Weapons Acquisition: Israel and Egypt", and "Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture 1967-1972".
31. See my "What RAND Hath Wrought", Foreign Policy, No.4 (Fall 1971), pp.111-129.



32. The confidence with which many arms control analysts have approached their task is an example of self-delusion. The most blatant example of academic over-confidence may be located in George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race", Scientific American, Vol.220, No.4 (April 1969), particularly p.24. Persuasive arguments for a greater caution in progress<sup>NOSES</sup> may be located in Johan J. Holst, Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation (Chicago: University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, Occasional Paper, 1971); Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Development (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., P-4913, October 1972); and, above all, in Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp.3-16.
33. See my "The Arms Race Phenomenon", pp.49-52.
34. The 'stability of the system' or 'control of the arms race' perspective was certainly prominent in the arms control literature of the early 1960's; while the very simple action-reaction arms race model that has captivated many was popularised in very authoritative form by former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. To date there is no book length study of "arms races in international politics" (or in national politics- which is just as important) - a deplorable fact which this author is now seeking to correct. ~~Blessed-~~ly, This is one of the few judgments in this paper with respect to which the facts do 'speak for themselves'. Readers inclined to the opinion that this author is exaggerating are hereby challenged to search the open literature for studies of the arms race phenomenon.
35. The reaction-proneness (in the direction of offensive offsetting actions) of a basically American arms race adversary was just presumed. On the strong possibility that a defence-defence race was just as probable as the allegedly futile defence-offence possibility, see Michael M. May, Strategic Arms Technology and Doctrine under Arms Limitation Agreements (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of

International Studies, Research Monograph No.37, October 1972), particularly pp.18-20.

36. The "organisational process" and "bureaucratic politics" literature is a growing one. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, unpublished manuscript (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 1972); and Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications", in Tanter and Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations, pp.40-79.
37. To restate, there is a certain functional similarity between the old and now unfashionable notion that 'billiard ball' states 'pursue their interests', and the proposition that bureaucrats contend for the spoils of influence - and the more tangible referents of influence. Both ideas cast some light upon what is often termed foreign policy behaviour, but neither is alone adequate as a dominant conceptual lens, while both need to be leavened with a close attention to the political system and culture whose interests are pursued and whose bureaucrats play games. Soviet Decision-Making for Defense.
38. The idea that there might be national arms racing styles - akin to foreign and defence policy and war-waging styles - has yet to be accorded more than the most glancing of analytical attention. At present, the limited amount of folklore available concerning arms race styles were best forgotten. The oft-cited alleged defensive-mindedness of the Soviet Union flies in the face of revealed Soviet strategic doctrine. American arms controllers over the past decade have tended to see the Soviet devotion to large-scale air defences, to some ABM defences and to civil defence, as examples of a lack of strategic sophistication. If the defensive-mindedness notion had been taken very seriously in the United States, the action-reaction logic of a defence-offence arms race could hardly have been invoked to condemn American ABM programmes to perdition.



39. On strategic studies in the United States, see the acute analysis in Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington, 1971), particularly 1-21. Also see the incisive analysis of the American national style in Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp.94-175.
40. American arms race experience is exactly that, American arms race experience. It is not synonymous with arms race experience writ large.
41. See the works cited in fn.30. Also to be noted is Geoffrey Kemp, Arms and Security: The Egypt-Israel Case, Adelphi Papers, No.52 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1958).
42. Superficially, it might be argued that the American arms control community ought surely to be able to analyse the system as a whole without fear or favour. The fact remains that arms control, in a domestic context, is an interest - and the representatives of this interest must perforce advocate strongly in a fairly hostile environment. Given the required team solidarity of official spokesmen, it is quite legitimate for arms controllers to seek to demonstrate (for example)/<sup>how many</sup>inadequacies there are in the Safeguard ABM. However, such an adversary stance detracts from balanced analysis.
43. A superb overview of much of the arms control experience of the 1960's may be located in Elizabeth Young, A Farewell to Arms Control? (London: Penguin, 1972).
44. This is, admittedly, a very contentious line of argument. The SALT experience may be approached through the following sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess.(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); and the very useful collection of



essays in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973).

45. See Johan J. Holst, The Russians and "Safeguard", (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, HI-1176/4-P, April 18th, 1969), particularly p.3-1; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, International Negotiation, The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications, Memorandum by Uri Ra'anap, 92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 10th, 1972).
46. Some analysts will persist in identifying all defence expenditure, everywhere, with some mysterious - but believed to be self-evident - "global arms race". One prominent example of a study indulging in this form of misleading shorthand is the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, A/8469 (New York: U.N. General Assembly, October 22nd, 1971).
47. Nicholson, Conflict Analysis, p.121.
48. Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, "Arms Transfers and Arms Control", in Hurewitz, ed., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle-East, p.43.
49. "The Arms Race Phenomenon", p.40.
50. The principal 'finding' (which may be too exalted a term) of a major excursion into 'systematic history' was that "there tends to be a correlation between international instability and the domestic insecurity of elites". Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p.304.

51. See Michael Howard, "Military Power and International Order", in Howard, Studies in War and Peace (London: Temple Smith, 1970), pp.198-212.
52. An enlightening discussion of this issue may be found in Hedley Bull, "World Order and the Super Powers", in Carsten Holbraad, ed., Super Powers and World Order (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), pp.140-154.
53. The most illuminating treatment of the conceptual vagaries of 'the balance of power' remains, Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power", in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp.149-175.
54. A very articulate recent defence of this position is Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak", The Journal of Modern History, Vol.44, No.3 (September 1972), pp.319-345.
55. Rosecrance's identification of five stable (or "equilibrium") and four unstable (or "disequilibrium") international systems since 1740 raises as many questions as it answers. Action and Reaction in World Politics. The discernment of bipolar and multipolar periods in international politics since 1945 also is a very unsatisfactory exercise. See Alastair Buchan, "The End of Bipolarity", in East Asia and the World System, Part I: The Super Powers and the Context, Adelphi Papers, No.91 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1972), pp.21-30.
56. On state-centricity in international political analysis see George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp.1-17.
57. One's conception of a 'just' international order may well conflict with one's conception of actions appropriate to a stable international order in the short and medium terms. A similar dilemma is

apparent in the international peace movement. To some scholars, peace research as an applied social science requires more than the very slow dissemination of knowledge concerning the scientific basis of a peaceful world - it requires commitment and action on behalf of just causes. See Alan G. Newcombe and Hanna Newcombe, "Approaches to Peace Research", in Alternative Approaches to Peace Research, Peace Research Reviews, Vol.IV, No.4 (February 1972), particularly pp.7-11.

58. Middle East Politics, p.VIII.

59. A number of 'area specialists' in international relations seem to believe that wisdom and 'hot from the press' news are nearly synonymous. It is the task of journalists to strive to uncover the details of the day, academics should not seek to compete in this endeavour.

60. See John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso, The West and the Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), pp.49-52.

61. This author is far from convinced that the military interactions of Morocco-Algeria, Egypt-Saudi-Arabia, Iraq-Iran, Syria-Turkey, and - on the periphery - Pakistan-India, may sensibly be labelled as arms  races. For an interesting statistical exercise in linear regression employing the conventional instrument of defence expenditures see Emile Benoit, et al., Effect of Defense on Developing Economies, Vol.II (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., Center for International Studies, C/71-6a, 1971), p.168.

62. On end-use controls see John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The International Trade in Arms (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), pp.38-47.

63. For a devastating critique of the Nixon-Kissinger '5-Power Concert' idea, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs, Vol.50, No.4 (July 1972), pp.618-643. In 1969, for example, the White House certainly encouraged the belief that co-operative Soviet behaviour towards a Middle East settlement was crucially linked to the initiation and likely success of strategic arms limitation talks. A 'proper respect' for the legitimate interests of other Great Powers is a theme of policy <sup>(CONCERN)</sup> ~~cannot~~ somewhat at odds with the former notion of 'keeping the Soviet Union out of (or expelling them <sup>FROM</sup>) the Middle East.'



64. Both Egypt and Israel must be sensitive to the expressed preferences of their major arms suppliers, but - in the last resort - each is able (and indeed the leaderships are under considerable domestic/regional pressure) to defy and/or punish its arms principal with some assurance that national security is not thereby likely to be very seriously endangered.
65. The Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be orchestrated by the Super Powers in the interest of their bilateral détente. Also, Soviet-American global competition for influence is but very imperfectly reflected in the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli region.
66. For discussion of a stable order that include notions of legitimacy and justice see Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations", in Butterfield and Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations, pp.102-111; and Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored, Europe After Napoleon: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), pp.1-6.
67. On the expense of the annoyance, with particular attention to the personnel drain on Israel represented by protracted <sup>100,000</sup> guerrilla operations and by the 1969-1970 "war of attrition", see Kemp, "Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture 1967-1972". For a statement of - in most respects - well-justified Israeli confidence vis à vis the 'unconventional' threat see Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, Adelphi Papers, No.53 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1968).
68. The best treatment of Israel as a nuclear threshold Power remains George H. Quester, "Israel and the NPT", Survival, Vol.XI, No.10 (October 1969), pp.317-323. Surprisingly little of value has been added by the extensive writings of Fuad Jabber. See Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Option and Future Strategies (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971); and Israel's Nuclear Option and U.S. Arms Control Policies (Santa Monica, Cal.: Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, February 1972). Far more incisive is J. Bowyer Bell, "Israel's Nuclear Option", The Middle East Journal, Vol.26, No.4 (Autumn 1972), pp.379-388.

69. To borrow from Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p.357.
70. See Benoit, Effect of Defense on Developing Economies, Vol.II, pp. 379-392, and Summary, Vol.I, pp.31-32.
71. One fairly standard scenario would have the U.S. 6th Fleet shooting its way through a screen of vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla in order to rescue an Israel about to fall. A wide variety of imaginative alternatives is not difficult to envisage.
72. Rosecrance has written that: "An international system is conceived to be stable if its outcomes fall within limits generally 'accepted' by the major participants in the system. All elites do not have to be 'satisfied' with all the outcomes". (Emphasis in the original). Action and Reaction in World Politics, p.231. A variety of possible Israeli-Arab Palestinian arrangements are conceivable that should satisfy at least the minimum demands of <sup>MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES</sup> each. Samaria and Judea, for example, could be autonomous Arab entities within Israel, linked to Jordan, etc. A stable Middle East does not rest upon the very unlikely possibility that those extreme elements within the various Palestinian liberation organisations who thrive upon (depend upon!) instability in the Middle East, might be wooed to a compromise solution. See Stephen Oren, "Israeli Politics and the West Bank", Worldview, Vol.16, No.2 (February 1973), pp.28-34.
73. The Military Balance, 1972-1973 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp.70-71.
74. These points have been dramatically summarised in the terse language of Richard Falk, when he wrote: "Try talking to an Arab or Israeli about the importance of World Order!" This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival (New York: Vintage, 1972, first publ. 1971), p.41.
75. For a gloriously Western illustration of this point see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).



76. Not infrequently, commentators tend to view military expenditures in Third World (an oversimplifying, misleading and vaguely insulting usage) countries as symptomatic of waste. All too rarely are attempts made to relate the weapons acquired to the reasonableness (from whose point of view?) of the motivations for acquisition. For very brief comment upon this phenomenon see the author's "Traffic Control For the Arms Trade?" Foreign Policy, No.6 (Spring 1972), pp.155, 168-169.
77. Fairly recent appreciation that <sup>the prospect of</sup> a 'developed' 'Third World' poses an apparently politically intractable conflict between the values of justice and order, has prompted some attempt to 'square the circle'. The ecological consequences of 700 million plus affluent Chinese could be profound indeed. If the Planet Earth cannot sustain an affluent majority, the implications are politically most unpalatable. See Falk, This Endangered Planet, pp.1-36; and F.H. Knelman, "What Happened at Stockholm", International Journal, Vol.XXVIII, No.1 (Winter 1972-3), pp.28-49.
78. The sociology of 'scholarship' is an unpopular area of concern. The 'leading edge' of scholarship in international relations has undoubtedly been American over the past twenty years. The bias innocently resulting from a Super Power conceptual lens does mar the general validity of propositions developed by American social scientists. Having taught introductory courses in international politics and strategic studies in Canadian institutions, this author is possibly oversensitive to the limited utility of an international relations literature that is dominated by American and British authors.
79. On the question of "guarantees" see Alan Dowty, "The Application of International Guarantees to the Egypt-Israeli Conflict: A Review of the Literature", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.XVI, No2 (June 1972), pp.253-267.
80. This formulation allows for the possibility that some extremist Arab Palestinian and Israeli pro-annexationist factions might have to be suppressed/ignored in the interests of regional stability.



81. This is, of course, no revelation. The problem is how can an Israeli coalition government satisfy the moderate annexationist (or 'secure frontiers' - as a rallying slogan) support upon which it must depend, at the same time that insecure Arab governments are able to agree to some limited loss of Arab lands lost in 1967 (or really, if the agreement is formal, since 1947!). The Jihad against Israel called for by President al-Qaddafi of Libya is clearly a pertinent inhibitor of President Sadat's freedom of political action. Libya enjoys the positions of being both financially independent and also significantly 'less at risk' to Israeli counteraction than is Egypt (or Jordan or Syria)
82. Many problems of social integration within Israel could well be aggravated, or - more fairly - be granted their full due, were the "garrison state" to lose its rationales for eternal unrelenting military vigilance. For negative comments upon the very close-knit and somewhat self-perpetuating nature of Israel's national security managerial elite see Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons. Also see Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, pp.357-378.
83. The economic, social and human costs of arms racing receive only the minimal treatment ~~below~~ because they are both obvious and because they are most adequately covered in the Report of the Secretary-General, Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race...
84. See Bloomfield and Leiss, "Arms Transfers and Arms Control", pp.41-44.
85. A persuasive and sophisticated development of this theme may be discussed <sup>covered</sup> in Alexander George, "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy", in George, et al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp.1-35.
86. See Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp.147-165.

87. 'Institutional absorption capacity' clearly cannot be studied in near-isolation, because 'the environment' - constituting other institutions, political masters, and domestic society - are all vitally relevant to the costs or benefits of idea and/or weapon system adoption. See my "Strategic Ideas and Defence Policy: The Organisational Nexus", in Martin H.A. Edmonds and Roger Beaumont, eds., Horizons of War (London and Lexington, Ky.: Macmillan and University of Kentucky Press, forthcoming 1973).
88. Conservative attitudes and personal/institutional interest may cohere to stifle innovation - or adaptation to innovation.
89. In terms of political ecology, although the Royal Navy - by 1914 - had grasped very clearly the operational limitations attendant upon a naval context fraught with minefields, submarines and destroyer-torpedo boats, the general public still, apparently, expected imminent naval victories in the Nelsonian tradition. 'Distant blockade' and the destruction of individual German commerce raiders was not quite what the attentive public of British Sea Power understood by the gaining <sup>and to exercise</sup> of Command of the Sea.
90. The interaction and precedence of ideas, policy and technology have never been examined systematically. The common logic of technology to which Roman Kolkowicz has referred [Kolkowicz, et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp.36-37.] may be a common logic of politics. In the words of Michael Howard: "It is not in the nature of great powers to acquiesce in the monopoly by their rivals of a major military weapon, if they are in a position to acquire it themselves." Howard, Studies in War and Peace, p.149.
91. The term "capacity for collective action" is borrowed from Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp.47-70.
92. See Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Schocken, 1964).



93. It could be argued that the constructive insider is fatally inhibited from seeking answers to basic questions pertaining to the legitimacy of the defence structure that he serves. Writing of the proper defence attitude of the foreign policy analyst toward the machinery of state, James Eayrs has written: "He must also stay out of the consulting business. A mind whose function it is to keep watch on itself /Eayrs' definition of an intellectual/ cannot function properly when <sup>tested</sup> out to special pleaders." Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.55.
94. Here understood to mean a man who, over the long term will maximise his values in the light of a careful consideration given to prospective costs and benefits.
95. On this problem see Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards"; Fred Charles Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, No.2 (January 1973), pp.267-285; and, for the complete study, <sup>Ikle</sup> Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century? (Santa Monica; Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, January 1973); Joel Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967).
96. On the notion that crises may be not acts of gods, nor the products of mismanagement (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral), but rather may be created as deliberate acts of policy see Dror, Crazy States, p.8.
97. On arms race initiation see Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Pre-requisites and Results", in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Graduate School of Public Administration, 1958), pp.54-65.
98. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, International Negotiations, Hearings, testimony of William R. van Cleave, 92nd Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 25th, 1972), pp.199-246. A contrary, though far less authoritative view, because he was not privy to the SALT negotiations, is Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The USSR and the Arms Race", Worldview, Vol.16, No.2



(February 1973), pp.40-47.

99. The story of 'how war came' in June 1967 has been very well told - with the usual limitations that must attend recent history and analysis of the most sensitive region of intra-governmental debate. See Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, Adelphi Papers, No.41 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1967); and Walter Laqueur, The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-8 (London: Penguin, 1969, first publ. 1968).
100. On the contribution of super-patriotic sentiments to a psychological preparation for holocaust see Michael Howard, "Reflections on the First World War", in Howard, Studies in War and Peace, pp.99-109.
101. Essence of Decision, p.176.
102. For this usage see Nicholson, Conflict Analysis, p.122.
103. This is not to argue either that (A) a successful Egyptian surprise attack is an impossibility, or that (B) the Soviet Union has been parsimonious in its replenishment (and updating) of Arab arsenals since 1967. Basic data on Soviet arms supplies to the Middle East since 1967 may be located in the annual publications of the <sup>INTERNATIONAL</sup> Institute for Strategic Studies of London - The Military Balance, and Strategic Survey. A useful analysis of Soviet military aid policy may be located in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade With the Third World (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp.180-214. Also see Stanley and Pearton, The International Trade in Arms, pp.194-209.
104. See Gallagher and Spielmann, Soviet Decision-Making for Defense, pp.11-14.
105. The "wargasm" of Rung 44 is not here implied. Fears of an uncontrollable slide down to Rung 44 (perhaps a better mixed metaphor than the idea of an escalation ladder, with its connotations of deliberation and calculated control) certainly ought to inhibit the deliberate initiation

of a process of interacting acts of violence that could lead to the insanity of mutual civilian hostage execution en masse.

106. For example, see Albert J. Wohlstetter, et al., Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950's and 1960's (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., R-290, 1st September, 1956).
107. Particularly eloquent on this point is Stanley and Pearson, The International Trade in Arms, pp.194-209.
108. That the German Naval Law of 1898 was an opening bid in a naval race with Great Britain is now very clear. See Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (London: Macdonald, 1965). What is equally clear is that the British Admiralty's first tentative threat identification of the German Navy as the principal future danger was not reflected in British naval policy until late 1904-1905. See Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (Hamden, Conn.: Hamden, 1964, first publ. 1940), pp.464, 495, 543-545.
109. See J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.11, No.1 (March 1958), pp.90-105.
110. The recurrent defeat of clients certainly ensures the continuing need for upper-tier military supplies. But it also serves to emphasize the lack of congruity between the political goals of the supplier and client (and the differential between their risk-taking propensities), while it yields some prestige spin-off to the victor's client, in that its equipment secured the victory.
111. No attempt will be made here to duplicate the excellent analysis in Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, pp.457-488. In the writings of Hurewitz and Kemp, the races in the Middle East region have found their Boswells.
112. In the writings of Lewis Fry Richardson, an unstable arms race is one



in which defence expenditures rise exponentially. Arms and Insecurity, pp.74-75. Also see Nicholson, Conflict Analysis, pp.121-139.

113. This economic logic is most clearly illustrated by reference to the divination of the assured destruction requirement (in terms of O.M.E.'s) of the United States vis à vis the Soviet Union. Arsenal size and character may (by one rational actor hypothesis) be deemed to have been determined by the facts of Soviet demographic and industrial distribution, with conservative allowances made for expected 'degradation' factors (such as: missile unavailability, launch and in-flight mission aborts, active and passive defences - and enemy first strike decimation). In practice, some of the anti-ABM advocates in the United States have argued a case that essentially rests upon a law of 'increasing negative marginal returns'. The greater your ABM deployment, the higher your costs (in all respects) are likely to be.
114. Huntington, "Arms Races: Pre-requisites and Results", pp.65-79.
115. The reverse of this argument cannot be ignored. Namely, that the ability to sustain a dynamic military equilibrium through arms racing may preclude decision makers from being attracted to a preventive war option.
116. Briefly summarised; war in 1948 was the product of the declaration of Israel's statehood; war in 1956 was geared to an Anglo-French timetable; while war in 1967 occurred apparently because Nasser was riding a tiger of Arab opinion from which he could not dismount.
117. In the case of Israel at least, competitive arming cannot deliberately be eschewed, in the context of a perceived disturbing index of adversary intention, in the hope that the arms race game need not be played. Restated, if a state wishes not to race, it may perceive an arms race challenge, yet behave as though the challenge had not been offered. The consequences for Israel of such deliberate sophisticated neglect could prove fatal. For a theoretical formulation of this case see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.192-193.



118. This need not be the case. Confident identification of degrees of extant danger may be expected to be rare, particularly in countries that have lived, very heavily, by the sword.
119. With respect to Israel's reprisal, defensive and deterrent strikes across its borders, see Barry M. Blechman, "The Impact of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed at Israel", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.XVI, No2 (June 1972), pp.155-181.
120. Specifically, an official focus upon negative sanctions may drive out any sustained consideration of the possible benefits to be derived from the proffering of positive sanctions.
121. This judgment refers to the facts that Arab demands for revanche have both increased in stridency and in legitimacy, while Israel has also acquired <sup>well in excess of</sup> 660,000 additional Arabs to be administered. *(The particular figure refers solely to Jerusalem and to the West Bank)*
122. The most penetrating discussion of the real and fallacious tensions between the values of 'order' and 'justice' is Hedley Bull, "Order vs. Justice in International Society", Political Studies, Vol.XIX, No.3 (September 1971), pp.269-283.
123. See Modelski, Principles of World Politics, p.2. For a very pessimistic <sup>analysis</sup> ~~account~~ of the nature of inter-state relations see Falk, This Endangered Planet, pp.37-92.
124. A very clear statement of the traditionally perceived differences between the domestic and international contexts is George Modelski, "The Promise of Geocentric Politics", World Politics, Vol.XXII, No.4 (July 1970), p.617.
125. A useful taxonomy of relations of influence is offered in Kalevi J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations", in Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., ed., Politics and the International System (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969), particularly pp.146-148.

126. The variety of real-world political experience confounds the sense in the sub-disciplinary boundary lines drawn around 'international relations', 'comparative politics' and 'political development'.
127. Transnational relations have been rediscovered with appropriate academic fanfare, and duly celebrated in the excellent collection of essays, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., "Transnational Relations and World Politics", International Organization, Vol.XXV, No.3 (Summer 1971). Allegedly, the 'high security' politics focus of the 'realist' school of international relations scholarship has promoted a <sup>d</sup>disdain for transnational interactions.
128. This line of argument has suggested itself to many scholars, but - as yet - none have braved the wrath of their academic peer groups and proceeded to explore the full ramifications of it.
129. A very competent treatment of the nature of inter-state politics is John W. Spanier, Games Nations Play (London: Nelson, 1972), pp.9-61.
130. "The Relevance of Traditional Strategy", Foreign Affairs, Vol.51, No.2 (January 1973), particularly pp.253-255. For a comprehensive discussion, see Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
131. Herbert F. York, "Military Technology and National Security", Scientific American, Vol.221, No.2 (August 1969), p.29.
132. See my "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing".
133. The best treatment of this subject remains James Eayrs, "Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada", Behind the Headlines, Vol. XXVIII, Nos.1-2 (April 1969).
134. See Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p.274. France was outraced by Great Britain. It would be a mistake to conceive of arms races as rare events in international politics, waged for a few years only - with desperate choices expected and anticipated. Great Powers,



Super Powers <sup>AND</sup> regional rivals should be expected to maintain a careful watch over the building programmes of their international status reference group. Thus, an arms race or a series of parallel races, may be sustained for a very considerable period - at times more resembling a walk or a crawl than a race. Similarly, a race may fade away, a result perhaps appropriate to an interaction process that reflected normal Great Power politics and that had been pursued in an occasionally fairly desultory fashion. See ibid., p.426. External 'pacers' of domestic defence endeavour are administrative conveniences. The 'fixing' upon Germany as Britain's naval rival (a process completed by 1905), was as natural as was the 'fixing' upon the United States after the German High Seas Fleet was eliminated as a 'pacer'.

135. See Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 1: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968), p.558.
136. The Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty (1922) provided for both the United States and Great Britain retaining 15 capital ships - to be reached by 1941. The persistence of a figure in the 14-16 range for capital ships - in this case for attack aircraft carriers - into the 1960's and 1970's would be deemed little short of remarkable were one wedded to the notion that 'the strategically rational' was the only area to which one should look for explanation.
137. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp.207-208.
138. Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), p.62.  
<sub>Press</sub>
139. As a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives was told in 1919, a navy on the scale previously advocated would not be adequate "to give due weight to the diplomatic remonstrances of the United States in peace..." Admiral Badger, quoted in Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the



World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, first publ. 1940), p.56.

140. Prior to the signing of the SALT I agreements (May 26th, 1972) at least, President Nixon would seem to <sup>HAVE</sup> adhere to an approximation of this position. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: February 9th, 1972), p.53. For a reasonable critical view of SALT I with respect to the 'appearances' question see William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements", Orbis, Vol.XVI, No2 (Summer 1972), particularly p.35. If mutual assured destruction capabilities are the touchstone of a stable strategic balance, then a parity in military appearances is a strategic absurdity, given the demographic and industrial distribution differences between the two Super Powers.
141. There is some evidence to suggest that well-intentioned American officials and arms control experts approached SALT in the spirit of academic enquiry. SALT was to be a protracted strategic seminar in which both sides would seek after truth in the realm of deterrence theory. To be clear in one's own mind as to one's strategic objectives and as to the general character of an acceptable agreement should be more important than the question of "negotiability". On this and related matters see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, International Negotiations, Hearings, testimony of William R. van Cleave, particularly, pp.200-206.
142. The proposition (until very recently widely regarded as a revealed truth) that strategic power, beyond a level adequate for assured destruction, has no political meaning, is now beginning to be challenged. At the very least there is a growing appreciation that the possible political implications of military imbalance are worthy of renewed consideration. See Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, eds., SALT: Strategic Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's, p.381. The still-orthodox apolitical wisdom on strategic imbalance may be approached in Joseph I. Coffey, Strategic Power and National Security (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).

143. To spend 23.9% (estimate for Israel<sup>147</sup>) of GNP on defence should be considerably less costly than would be a short war possibly not made to order. That is, if struggle there must be.
144. The benefits of limited or definitive arms race victory have yet to be systematically analysed. Such an endeavour would have to consider the following: influence abroad, popularity at home, the value of feelings of enhanced security.
145. See George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York: Dunellen, 1970), pp.67-69; and Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp.229-248.
146. In the tradition of 'the difficult we do today, the impossible we do tomorrow', well meaning American social scientists (and officials) have often seemed to their foreign friends to place undue confidence in the tractability of political, social and economic problems to social and diplomatic engineering. 'Rogers plans', no less than Mr. Eric Johnston's plans (back in 1955) for the equitable division of the Jordan's waters, have foundered upon the political parameters of distrust and hatred.
147. This is the 'enduring structure of existing relations' definition. As John Spanier has indicated, a definition such as this is a standard system framework one (theory is too elevated a term to append to system). "Stability, from the systemic point of view, may be defined as the probability that the system will retain its principal features..." The remainder of the definition is open to question: for example.. "that no nation will attain dominance", (but Israel is dominant). Games Nations Play, p.125.
148. Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp.252-257.
149. See Coral Bell, Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.68-69.



150. A slackening of the qualitative pace may be perceived not as a sophisticated bid for a more stable strategic system, but rather as an index of a decline in relative technologically innovative skills - to be exploited.
151. Arguments for forces 'good enough' for the support of fairly unambitious political goals, naturally run afoul both of the 'future combat considerations' interest of the users (that is, the military men), and of the national 'autarkic' characteristics of arms race dynamics. Specifically, leaving aside bureaucratic interests, every weapon will suggest its own counterweapon (ICBM's spawn ABM's; tanks spawn anti-tank weapons etc.). Thus, the research and development community of a racing state is very inclined to run a qualitative arms race with itself. See <sup>REPORT OF THE</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race..., p.13.
152. In the definition of stability/<sup>provided</sup> by John Spanier (fn.147), stability was held to be incompatible with major war. This is reasonable, since wars are rarely as brief or militarily decisive as was - say - that between Israel and her neighbours in 1967. So long as a major war in a region can have only one outcome (i.e. Israeli victory), that must serve to reaffirm the status quo, it is not clear why such a war should be incompatible with one definition of stability. The remote possibility of an Israeli defeat would be an appropriate rejoinder in defence of Spanier's position.
153. See Dror, Crazy States.
154. The United States has also felt compelled to continue supplying arms to her traditional regional clients (particularly to Iran and to Saudi Arabia) - both to foreclose upon Soviet military aid diplomacy, and to strengthen the leadership of those countries against those regional rivals that are under some measure of Soviet influence. More generally, arms to 'moderate' Middle Eastern states other than Israel does preserve at least the appearance of some degree of American even-handedness in regional conflicts. See SIPRI, The Arms Trade With the Third World, pp.161-164.



155. See Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, pp.46-48. The costs to the United States of maintaining Israel's military superiority are not light ones, but the cost of an Israeli defeat would be far greater.
156. Jabber, Israel's Nuclear Option and U.S. Arms Control Policies, pp.40-41.
157. An excellent example of this viewpoint is U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance, Memorandum, by Ra'anah.
158. See Carsten Holbraad, "Condominium and Concert", in Holbraad, ed., Super Powers and World Order, pp.1-24.
159. Hedley Bull has made the interesting argument "that any world order has to have its special custodians and guarantors, that no world order is possible that is not the preferred order of some group of states". "World Order and the Super Powers", pp.153-154. While there is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in Bull's argument, this author believes that Bull exaggerates the ordering potential of the Super Powers (as the legatees of the former Great Powers), and he wonders quis custodiet ipsos custodes? To the extent that they balance each other, in dynamic fashion, they may - as Bull allows - contribute significantly to disorder.
160. The argument that Soviet leaders would like to disengage from most of their Middle Eastern entanglements is not very persuasive to this author. Soviet ambitions and difficulties in the Middle East have been extensively analysed. See Robert E. Hunter, The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I: Problems of Commitment, Adelphi Papers, No.59 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, September 1969); Robert E. Hunter, The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part II, Oil and the Persian Gulf, Adelphi Papers, No.60 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1969); Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1958-68 (London: Penguin, 1972, first publ. 1969); A.S. Becker and A.L. Horelick,

Soviet Policy in the Middle East (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., R-504-FF, September 1970); and Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); John C. Campbell, "Moscow's Purposes", Problems of Communism, Vol.XXI, No.5 (September-October 1972), pp.40-54.

161. For a very rare exception to this generality see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, Hearing-Symposium, 92nd Cong. <sup>1st</sup> Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), Professor Samuel P. Huntington, p.108.
162. Thus, in de facto alliance, the defence community in each arms racing state provides the rationales for the continued budgetary health for the others. There is a large body of 'mad momentum' literature, purporting to demonstrate how an uncontrolled technology dictates continued expenditures upon futile parallel arms race spirals. This literature is likely to prepare a defence community somewhat imperfectly for negotiations with an adversary who does not believe that his technology is out of control, nor that the state of military balance is without political meaning. As an example of 'the arms race itself (duly reified) is the danger' opinion, Herbert York has written thus: "The technological side of the arms race has a life of its own, almost independent of policy and politics." Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p.180.
163. If it would appear that the adversary is prone to accept the opportunities for influence granted it by default or miscalculation - rather than that one is dealing with an adversary with a flexible masterplan for the attainment of a politically exploitable measure of strategic superiority - then better relations should attend a context of military strength, not one marked by the provision of signals and indices (in the form of a unilateral slackening of the pace of military endeavour) of goodwill. In an arms race system, a new deployment venture cannot automatically be presumed to be likely to induce greater hostility. The adversary might appreciate that, for



example, (A) an ABM was being deployed because it was a sensible thing to do, or (B) an ABM was being deployed as a 'bargaining chip' for arms control negotiations. Even an apparent arms race over-reaction to an anticipated political or military action could encourage "better relations", in that it might offer vital evidence for those more moderate leaders, <sup>beginning</sup> who are seeking to argue that energetic military and political competition will be self-defeating.

164. The massive Soviet deployment of air defence systems and personnel to Egypt in the Spring and early Summer of 1970 (following Israeli deep penetration raids over the Nile valley in response to Nasser's "war of attrition") was widely interpreted to be a move both vital to the health of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and also intended to enhance Soviet influence in Egypt. Had general war erupted in the region prior to the very substantial Soviet withdrawal in July 1972, it is certain that the Soviet air defence system would have vastly complicated the Israeli task of attaining early air superiority. However, the air defence system was generally seen as a defensive move, in terms of its intended effect upon Israeli-Egyptian relations. With the defence of Egypt essentially in Soviet hands, and with the Soviet Union betraying no desires for a renewal of the 1967 war, Sadat's dreams of revanche were clearly dependent for their fulfilment upon Soviet acquiescence. See Strategic Survey, 1970, pp.46-50.
165. The continuing debate over the political and strategic intentions that underlie the expansion and forward deployment of Soviet maritime capabilities is illustrative of the ambiguity of the facts of hardware and deployment. On this particular area of analytical contention see Michael McGwire, ed., Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, Dalhousie Maritime Workshop, 1973).
166. The political basis for the arms race was the Arab appreciation (and Israel's appreciation of that appreciation) that only through the securing of a large inventory of modern weapons could the military verdict of 1948 be reversed.



167. See Bell, "Israel's Nuclear Option". To pursue Bell's argument that the most likely targets of an Israeli nuclear capability would lie in the Soviet Union and not in Egypt, Israel's credibility problems would centre far more upon capability than they would upon willpower. Knowing that Israel<sup>is</sup> had everything to lose, and appreciating the ruthless quality of many Israeli actions in the past, the Soviet Union would have every reason to seek to discipline Arab excess.
168. The following words of Hedley Bull are very much to the point:  
"When then, demands for justice are put forward in the absence of a consensus within international society as to what justice involves /What would be a just order in the Middle East? stable because founded upon a sufficient consensus.<sup>7</sup>, the prospect is opened up that the consensus that does exist about order or minimum coexistence will be undone. The question then has to be faced whether order or justice should have priority". "Order vs. Justice in International Society", p.282.
169. The Middle Eastern roles, interests and activities of other Western Powers are well set out in Campbell and Caruso, The West and the Middle East, pp.14-25, 30-40, 52-71.
170. "In the Middle In the Middle East", Foreign Policy, No.5 (Winter 1971-72), p.137.
171. Ibid., p.139; and Campbell and Caruso, The West and the Middle East, p.29.
172. "In the Middle In the Middle East", p.145.
173. Excellent brief analyses of Soviet-Egyptian differences are Shlomo Slonim, "Egypt's Conflict of Alliances", The World Today, Vol.28, No.3 (March 1972), pp.124-132; and Anthony McDermott, "Sadat and the Soviet Union", The World Today, Vol.28, No.9 (September 1972), pp.404-410.
174. Unanimously adopted on 22nd November, 1967. For conflicting views of the possibility of Soviet-American cooperation for a regional settlement

see Charles Yost, "Israel and the Arabs", Survival, Vol.XI, No.6 (June 1969), pp.180-186 (the optimistic view); and Bernard Lewis, "Conflict in the Middle East", Survival, Vol.XIII, No.6 (June 1971), pp.192-198 (an implacably pessimistic view).

175. Hunter explores very well the problems for American policy, and the challenge to now-traditional attitudes, attendant upon a Super Power 'deal' that must incorporate American recognition of Soviet 'rights' in the region. "In the Middle In the Middle East".
176. See M.H. Haykal, "Soviet <sup>1</sup>Arms and Egypt", Survival, Vol.XIV, No.5 (September-October, 1972), pp.231-235.
177. The sad tale of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy from 1967 until the present day betrays frenetic activity but no progress. The sole exception to this point being the adoption of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' cease fire proposal for the Suez Canal area as of 7th August, 1970. The terms of the cease fire were abrogated immediately by Egypt and the Soviet Union. For the small change of proposal, counter-proposal and Super Power frustration, see the issues of Strategic Survey since 1967.
178. These legitimate interests must include a commitment to a particular international order. This order, to endure, must be upheld - by force if necessary - by the consensual Powers. Deviant actors determined to overturn a particular, generally tolerable order, must be disciplined.
179. For an analysis of Arab attitudes towards Israel, that offers little hope of a short to medium term mellowing trend setting in, see Daniel Heradstreit, "Arab Demands and Desires in the Conflict with the State of Israel", Cooperation and Conflict, 2 (1971), pp.115-135. This article makes the point that a high conflict level with Israel does not promote social cohesion in Jordan and Lebanon.
180. Excellent detailed analysis of the relative self-help abilities and potentials of Israel and Egypt may be located in Kemp, "Israel and



Egypt: Military Force Posture, 1967-1972". On the variety and competence of non Super Power arms suppliers see Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts", International Conciliation, No.377 (March 1970), pp.18-21.

181. Thinking of <sup>the</sup> Israeli-United States linkage no doubt, Haykal has expressed himself thus: "The piece of land occupied by Israel looks like an aircraft carrier stuck to the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean." "Soviet Arms and Egypt", p.232.

182. Israel 'gained' <sup>how to assimilate</sup> ~~650,000~~ non-Jewish inhabitants in June 1967. The demographic problem is the West Bank with its 600,000 Arabs. To safeguard the Jewishness of Israel, a floodtide of Jewish immigrants is required. The only pool of potential immigrants of adequate size is the Jewish community in the Soviet Union.

183. "Four More Years - Of What?" Foreign Policy, No.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp.14-15.

184. A necessity would be too strong a term, because it would imply that the Soviet Union had truly vital interests at stake in, and by means of, the Middle East. The region is certainly not a distant playground offering opportunities for Soviet adventuring - with expendable pawns. However, the core values of Soviet society are clearly secure from much harm by events in the Middle East (save only for the very, very unlikely event of a general conflict being catalysed by regional actors).

185. See Slonim, "Egypt's Conflict of Alliances", particularly pp.128-129. The Soviet leaders were sufficiently insensitive as to announce Nixon's forthcoming visit to Moscow, while Sadat was still in Moscow (October 10-12th, 1971). Since Sadat had gone to Moscow, in the eyes of many Arabs, in order to finalise the details of the imminent day of reckoning with Israel, hardly anything could have been more calculated to weaken Sadat's standing among his activist <sup>pe</sup>ers in Libya, Syria, the Sudan and Algeria.



186. Particularly by the Super Powers. One can hardly expect Egypt and Israel to ask for less than what they believe the traffic will bear.
187. In effect, of course, this means the right to insist (and make the insistence stick) upon no withdrawals prior to a final political settlement.
188. 'Holier than thou' denunciations of Israeli intransigence and unreasonableness do read a little oddly when they come from scholars of a country that has chosen to adopt very extensive understandings of the geographic domains of its vital security interests. A typical statement may be located in Campbell and Caruso, The West and the Middle East, p.68. In this instance, Israeli policies are described as "rigid" (which, one presumes, is 'bad').
189. But, as critics of the 'realist' school of international politics never tire of indicating, states do not have a fixed list of ascertainable 'interests' (beyond the unhelpful platitudes of peace, justice, security etc.), or real interests that would be pursued if only politicians could be educated as to their importance. History is replete with examples of governments ignoring what a fair minded commentator (particularly one enjoying the benefits of twenty-twenty hindsight) would identify as national interests.
190. Inequality, or conditions of dominance and hegemony sanctified by the acknowledged existence of an international hierarchy, could be held to be necessary for the maintenance of a stable international order. See Bull, "World Order and the Super Powers", pp.142-146. The conclusions in the text above are very close to those reached by Senator Frank Church in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on Study Mission to Israel, August 22-27th, 1972, 92nd Cong. 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1972). As the Senator wrote: "If peace is to come to the Middle East, it must be based on acceptance of the fact that Israel <sup>now</sup> ~~was~~ the 6-day war. It is an illusion that the clock can be turned

back and Israel made to accept former boundaries which, in her view, offer insufficient security. The Arabs cannot regain at the bargaining table what they could <sup>not</sup> hold on the battlefield." P.12. The "Recommendations" on pp.12-13 are eminently sensible ones.

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"THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTIES:  
MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE"

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(Seminar on "The Ways Towards Peace in the Middle-East,"  
Jerusalem, Israel, May 27-31, 1973)

Prediction is a dangerous occupation, especially in social systems, which are subject to irreducible uncertainties and random shocks. Indeed, I suggest that every prediction, like cigarette packages, should contain a warning: "Believing in this prediction may be injurious to your health." Nevertheless, images of the future are necessary to guide our present behavior, simply because decisions are always about the future and never about the past; so in spite of the dangers, some attempts must be made. In social systems, however, we have to remember that, while it is important to make projections, it is also important not to believe them too much. The best advice, indeed, one can give to anybody thinking of the future is "Prepare to be surprised."

The international system is particularly full of surprises. The random element in it is much stronger than it is, say, in the economic system, where decisions may be distributed among very large numbers of people, and hence may be statistically predictable. In the international



system the number of actors is small, power is concentrated, decisions themselves are subject to strong random influences, and the processes by which powerful roles are filled with individuals may be even more random. The international system, therefore, is particularly prone to superstition, which might be defined as the perception of order where, in fact, there is none, and the attempt to impose a perceptual order on sequences of essentially random events.

A special form of superstition to which the international system is particularly subject might be called "overlearning." The actual occurrence of a somewhat improbable event always leads to a great overestimation of its probability, at least in the immediately following future. Thus, in the years following a great but improbable natural disaster, like the thousand year flood, the event is vivid in the minds of the people who have experienced it and their estimates of reality may be distorted thereby. Hitler, for instance, may well have been a "thousand year flood" in the international system, that is, a rather improbable event which actually happened. There are signs indeed that many people in the international system overlearned from this event.

It may be true, also, that "underlearning" is just as likely as overlearning and may be even more dangerous. This arises from the fact that small probabilities tend to pass below the threshold of

awareness and become, in effect, equated with zero. This effect indeed may not be irrational, and it may have certain selective advantages. If we worry too much about disasters of low probability, we may become neurotic and unable to operate within the range of the normal probabilities of life. On the other hand, the problem of how to create a sufficient and rational awareness of large dangers with low probability is a real one for social organization. Institutions as apparently as diverse as political constitutions, flood plain zoning, and religious belief may arise out of this problem. The survival of the Jews, for instance, surely one of the most extraordinary and improbable events of human history, may be in large measure the result of the ability of Jewish religion to produce unusually rational adaptations to disaster.

In social systems another element in the predictive process which sometimes takes on great importance is what might be called "feed forward." This is the effect of images of the future on the future itself. The future of social systems is by no means independent of our knowledge and beliefs about them. There is a marked contrast here with celestial mechanics, where man's ability to predict the future of the movements of the solar system has no effect whatever, as far as we know, on the movements themselves. Social systems, however, have a strong teleological element in them in the sense that behavior is directed towards a present image of a future condition. The extreme

case is that of the self-justified prediction, in which a given prediction actually brings about the future that it predicts. The famous example of shouting "Fire" in the crowded theatre is a prediction of disaster which is almost certain to fulfill itself. If a prestigious analyst predicts a rise in the stock market, his prediction may very well create the rise itself. In the international system, predictions of war often bring about the war which is predicted. Cases of complete self-fulfillment are, of course, very rare. But it is by no means uncommon for predictions to increase the probability of the future which they predict.

At the other end of the scale are self-correcting prophecies. One of the most famous examples of this is that of Jonah, who predicted the destruction of Ninevan if it did not repent, whereupon it did repent and was not destroyed, somewhat, it seems, to Jonah's annoyance. The prediction of a coming energy shortage, if it is believed, will almost certainly spur activity and direct research and exploration towards the discovery of new energy sources so that the shortage may be averted. Prediction of a depression may produce the development of institutions and legislation which will help to prevent it. There is a good deal of evidence that the discovery of the hog cycle, that is, a fairly regular cyclical fluctuation in the output of the price of hogs in many countries, led to its elimination. The fact that there



was practically no business cycle in the United States in the 1960's led some economists, perhaps too optimistically, to judge that we now understood so much about the cycle that it could be eliminated. A correct diagnosis of disease may cure it.

A critical question which is of particularly great importance for the future of the international system is that of the circumstances under which prophecies are self-fulfilling or are self-correcting. Thus, a prediction of future war may create an arms race which will end in the predicted war. In the international system this indeed seems to have been the commonest response. On the other hand, if there are what might be called "therapeutic patterns" available, an awareness of the high probability of future war might set in motion processes to diminish that probability, through for instance, cultural exchange, a search for the settlement of disputes, exploration of negotiating and mediating machinery, a deliberate shift in national images and national interests toward mutual compatibility, and so on. A good example of this is the Khrushchev Doctrine of peaceful coexistence, which was a deliberate unilateral attempt to reduce the probability of war between the Soviet Union and the United States, and which so far, at least, has been very successful. By contrast, Hitler's image of a Germany surrounded by implacable enemies was self-fulfilling. It is not easy to specify all the circumstances which can turn a self-fulfilling

prophecy into a self-correcting one, but certainly one of the major differences is whether the image of the future is that of an inevitable fate, or whether it includes possibilities of correction.

The parallel with therapy in the medical profession, particularly in the treatment of mental illness, may be illuminating here. The neurotic personality suffers almost inevitably from self-fulfilling prophecies. If a man believes that everybody else is his enemy, he will tend to act in such a way as to fulfill this prediction. The business of the therapist is to create images of alternative futures and alternative modes of behavior, whether this is done by psychoanalytic exhortation or by operant conditioning. Whatever the therapeutic theory, the practice always involves some kind of widening of agendas and the development of images of alternative and presumably preferable futures. Unfortunately, the therapeutic treatment of the international system is in its infancy and the behavior of nation states shows every sign of mental ill health. It is not beyond reasonable expectation, however, that the concept of international therapy will develop, and perhaps we can see the beginnings of a profession of international therapists even at present. This is not to claim, of course, that therapy is always successful. It has been said, indeed, that even the medical profession only began doing more good than harm at a date within living memory. The search for therapy, however, is the

beginning of some kind of wisdom. Bad doctors may be worse than no doctors, a condition which is by no means unknown in the international system, but surely good doctors are not only better than bad doctors, but should be better than no doctors!

With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the international system itself, and examine the nature of some of its dynamic processes to see if there is any hope of therapy.

The principal actors of the international system are the 150 or so sovereign states. One should also include in the principal actors the international governmental organizations, for instance, the United Nations and its various agencies. There are also large numbers of subsidiary actors, particularly the INGO's, the international nongovernmental organizations, and also the international corporations, some of which are larger, at least in terms of their economic product, than most of the national states themselves. Furthermore, the national states cannot be regarded as wholly homogeneous from the point of view of the international system, for internal processes within the national state may change it from the point of view of its behavior in the international system. An internal shift of political power or a shift of the national image may result from primarily internal causes, but may have large consequences in international behavior.

One should probably also add to the international system the



colonies and territories, many of which are incipient nations, which are attached to the sovereignty of some nation, but which are in some sense separate and often have potential sovereignty of their own. The nation states themselves are very diverse. They range in size all the way from super powers to mini-nations, from the 750 million people of China to the 100,000 people of the Maldiv Islands. They are grouped regionally and ideologically, culturally and linguistically, and by relationships of friendship or enmity. They differ greatly in their accessibility, geographical, political, and economic.

As with all social systems, the relationships among the actors of the international system fall into three broad categories-- threat relationships, exchange relationships, and integrative relationships. Threat is a far more important relationship in the international system than it is in any other subset of the total social system, although the extent of the significance of the threat relationship differs markedly between different pairs or clusters of nations. The threat relationship, however, is one of considerable complexity. Unlike the exchange relationship, it is often very hard to identify and measure, as its major significance is in subjective belief and credibility rather than in objective capability. Capability (objective capacity to carry out threats) and credibility (belief that threats will under given circumstances be carried out) are by no means unrelated, but the

relationship is often surprisingly loose.

A threat may be said to exist when the behavior of one actor is modified because of an expectation that, in the absence of modification, the threatener will be able to produce undesirable consequences to the threatened. Several elements in this situation make identification difficult. One is the fact that it is often very hard to tell how behavior has been modified. We can never directly observe what would have been the behavior in the absence of the threat. All we can observe is change of behavior, and we can never be sure how far this is due to a change in threat and how far it is due to other things. Another difficulty is that perceptions of threat may vary substantially between the threatener and the threatened, and there is very little machinery in the international system, or in another social system involving threat, for bringing these different perceptions into conformity. A threatener may not even perceive that he is being threatening at all. He may not perceive any behavior modification on the part of the threatened, whereas the threatened party may be highly conscious of threat because he is comparing his actual behavior with what he might otherwise have done, which is, of course, unknown to the threatener. It is not surprising that a system of this kind is full of misunderstandings and what might be called "perverse dynamics," that is, dynamic processes which make everybody worse off.

There are several modes of the threat relationship and a critical problem of the dynamics of the international system is the stability of these various modes. One important mode is threat-submission, in which the threatened party modifies his behavior sufficiently to avoid the carrying out of the threat by the threatener. This modification may not correspond to the modification ostensibly desired by the threatener, but the cost of the threatener carrying out the threat can be taken into consideration by the threatened party in considering how far to modify his behavior. For this reason, there is always a considerable element of bluff in threat systems. We see this even in such a classic threat-submission system as slavery. The slave owner, in effect, says to the slave, "You work for me, or I will kill you." Under these circumstances, the slave can work as little as possible, knowing that if the slave owner kills him he will no longer have a slave, so the cost of carrying out the threat is severe to the threatener. This is probably why slavery has always been a relatively inefficient mode of social organization. In the international system, also, the cost of carrying out threat is often so great that the effectiveness of the threat system depends a great deal on the linking of threat to integrative relationships, as we shall see. The United States experience in Vietnam shows, indeed, how ineffective an enormous threat system is, when it is costly to the threatener to carry out the threats and is



not tied into some system of legitimacy.

The threat-submission system is characteristic of imperial-colonial relationships, or of relationships of dominance. It has a certain tendency, however, to shift into a system of threat-counterthreat, that is, deterrence. The threat system begins when one party says to another "Either you do something that I want, or I will do something that you don't want." It passes into deterrence when the threatened party also achieves some threat credibility and says, in effect, "If you do something that I don't want, I will do something that you don't want." The whole balance of power theory indeed is a theory of deterrence. It supposes a system of relatively equal nation states, none of which is dominant over the others, but each of which is restrained from the carrying out of threats by the fear that it will be subject to counterthreat. It is often not possible, historically, to distinguish between an original threat and a counterthreat. Usually by the time a system of deterrence is in operation, the historical question of "Who started it?" is no longer interesting, and under a system of this kind, the parties soon become highly symmetrical.

Another possible reaction to threat is that of avoidance, and, although this is only possible to a very limited degree in the international system, it is a very important response to personal threat, as indeed the whole history of migration shows. The whole process of putting a

suitable distance between one's self and a threatener is a very ancient human institution. It rests on the fundamental principle that the capability of threat is a declining function of the distance of the threatener from the threatened. This is the famous principle of "the further, the weaker." One can, indeed, interpret the foundation of Israel, in part, as a move to increase the distance between the Jews and their possible threateners, just as, indeed, the New England pilgrim fathers put distance between them and their persecutors. On the national scale, this response is much less possible, particularly in the light of the decline of the cost of transport and the consequent shrinkage of the socially significant earth. There is now visibly no place to go.

It is still possible, however, to put social distance between a nation and its possible threateners--Japan in the Tokugawa period is a good example, so perhaps is Burma in the last twenty years. Thus, even though a nation cannot pick up and flee in a physical sense, it can up to a point withdraw from the international system, particularly if its geographical position is favorable. This strategy was easier for the Swedes, for instance, than it has been for the Czechs, simply because the Swedes live in a corner of the globe that is not very much on the way to anywhere, whereas the Czechs have the misfortune, like the Belgians, to live in an international thoroughway, and are constantly getting run over as a result.

The stability of these three forms of response to threat is a very important element in the dynamics of the system. A threat-submission system may be fairly stable as long as it is accepted by both the parties, and as long as the threatener maintains the credibility of his threat and the threatened are unable to bring to bear any counterthreat. South Africa perhaps is a case in point; in its internal relations it is a very efficient police state, and as long as the Afrikaners, in particular, retain their morale and sense of internal legitimacy, this society is likely to be almost deplorably stable. It has often been remarked that it is not the balance of power, but the imbalance of power that makes for stability, as in the case of the Roman Empire. The threat-submission relationship, however, does seem to be subject to long-run erosion. The threatener, however successful he is in enforcing submission, is in a weak position in the integrative system. Because he is hated by those who submit to him, he frequently comes to hate himself, and that is usually the end of him, for the threat system cannot be sustained unless it is internally legitimated. Historically, then, all threat-submission systems have eventually come to an end, either through a decline in the submissiveness of the submitter, or a decline in the morale and credibility of the threatener.

Deterrence systems, likewise, while they may be stable in the short run, are always unstable in the long run. There can be no



such thing as stable deterrence if a long enough period of time is taken. The reason for this is simple--if deterrence were permanently stable, it would cease to deter. For deterrence to be permanently stable means that the probability of the threats being carried out is zero. If this were so, this would be the same as their not existing, and the whole system would disintegrate. There is a possibility, however, that as a deterrence system decays it may be replaced by an integrative structure which eventually makes the threat and the threat capability unnecessary.

The faith in nuclear deterrence is perhaps one of the greatest long-run dangers to the human race. A system of this kind must always contain at least a small probability of failure, that is, of the threats being carried out. In the case of the nuclear weapon, this means that the international system as at present constituted contains a small, but finite probability of almost total disaster, perhaps of irrecoverable disaster. As long as the present international system continues, the human race is under an indeterminant sentence of death. Therefore, one must regard a system of deterrence as essentially an opportunity to use the temporary stability which it provides to get rid of it, and to replace it with an integrative system.

Even the threat-avoidance system is subject to erosion just like the others. There seems to be an irreversible tendency in the

world to diminish the cost of transport and reduce effective distances. This is true even of social distance. Even the most determined efforts at isolation seem eventually to break down in the face of the clamor of a tiny and still shrinking earth. One has to conclude therefore that no threat system, unless perhaps it is deeply embedded in a close integrative structure, and perhaps not even then, is ultimately capable of stability. And, indeed, it is a very important question today as to whether the diminution of the role of the threat system is not a necessity for human survival.

The exchange system, which involves such things as trade, negotiation, and bargaining, grows up along side the threat system and seems to have a much larger horizon. Its impact on the international system, however, is curiously peripheral. International trade is simply that subset of the total volume of exchange relationships which happens to cross national frontiers. It is, of course, affected and distorted by the existence of national states because of national currencies, tariffs, quotas, exchange restrictions, and the like. National states, however, modify the structure of international trade, but they do not create it, and they may not even modify it as much as they think. If there were no nation states and the world were a single country, there would, of course, be no international trade. The kinds of regional specialization and the flows of the total system of exchange would

undoubtedly be somewhat different from what they are now. But it is hard to believe that they would be radically different, except perhaps in respect to the division of the world into a socialist camp and a capitalist sector, which does interfere severely with trade across the boundary of the two camps.

Empires and communities of all kinds tend to channel trade within them and diminish the flow of trade across their boundaries. Thus, if it were not for the existence of the socialist camp, Poland would undoubtedly trade more with the West and less with the East than it does now. But even if the world were a single country, what is now Poland would almost certainly export hams and would import bananas. Furthermore, the world structure of trade is so flexible, and for every particular channel of trade there are so many alternatives, that conflicts about trade are rarely important as a source of international conflict and war, as a number of recent studies have suggested.

The development of a quantitative approach to economic history has revealed that political domination and empire rarely produce much in the way of economic benefits for the conqueror or the imperial power, mainly because the costs of a threat system to the threatener are frequently likely to outweigh the benefits in "tribute." The disintegration of empires in the second half of the twentieth century is a reflection, in part, of the belated recognition



on the part of the former imperial powers that empire simply did not pay. If proof of this were needed, one has only to look at Portugal--with the largest empire and the lowest per capita income in Europe! This is not to deny, of course, that empire pays some groups in the imperial power. The group that is benefited, however, is usually very small and its capacity to pull the wool over the eyes of the rest of the people shows, like so many other things, a constant tendency to erosion.

Another aspect of the exchange system which impinges on the international system is deferred exchange or investment. International flows of capital may have a profound effect on the international system, especially in so far as threats may be invoked to enforce, or to try to enforce, the fulfillment of international long-term contracts, as, for instance, in payments on a loan. Capital flows are certainly more modified by the structure of the international system than are trade flows. Under a single world capitalist government the flow of capital between regions would certainly be considerably different from what it is now, even though it would undoubtedly still flow from rich areas, where capital is plentiful, to poor areas, where it is scarce. The monopolization of capital in socialist states, however, and the substitution of political decisions for economic, undoubtedly diminishes the total flow of capital, and

markedly changes its direction. The receipt of foreign investment may also create internal strains within a country, which may ultimately lead to revolution and to a change in its international posture.

International capital is in some sense a hostage, and countries, like individuals, are not above the occasional temptation to enjoy temporary advantages by destroying their credit ratings. It is a curious paradox that, from the point of view of foreign investment, domination often benefits the dominated. Thus, India was able to borrow at 3 1/2 per cent in the nineteenth century on the London money market, terms which would make the less developed countries green with envy today. Furthermore, the more unstable and uncertain the political regime of a country, the higher the rate of interest or profit it will have to pay on any foreign investments to counteract for uncertainty.

One point where economics and the exchange economy impinges more and more on the international system is in the conflicts within nations between the claims of the civilian economy and the claims of the military. In any society that has reasonably full employment, any increase in the military must be paid for by a diminution in the civilian economy, either public or private. Where, as in many countries, there is a rough conventional ceiling on the proportion of gross national product which goes to government, the conflict is particularly acute, because then any increase in the military usually

must be paid for by diminution in the civilian government product which often includes such high priority things as education, health, welfare, and so on. The rise of the "welfare state" which has come with the democratization of government, has created constant internal pressure in a great many countries to diminish its external influence, which is usually exercised through the military, and to expand the civilian economy.

The traditional international system of the eighteenth century was a system in which the decision-makers were usually not responsible to, or even for, the bulk of the people in their own countries, and were able to play their little games without much consideration of the effects on the majority of the people. This kind of system has been eroded by the development of democratic governments committed to the use of government authority or internal welfare. This conflict between internal welfare and external power indeed may be one of the most significant long-run dynamic effects on the international system. It is certainly very largely responsible for the abandonment of empire by, for instance, Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It may be responsible, also, for the profound shift in the international posture of the United States which seems to be coming about as a result of the Vietnam War, even though this absorbed a relatively small proportion of the American gross national product. The



international system is increasingly perceived as a pathological and expensive part of the total world social system, and the willingness to support it seems to be subject to long-run decline.

The third great dynamic process of the social system, which is the development of an integrative structure of relationships, is much harder to define and to measure, but in the long-run it probably dominates all other elements in the system. Integrative relationships are those which involve legitimacy, the recognition of status, the development of personal identity, the acknowledgment of community, the development of benevolence or malevolence, and the growth or decline of trust, a concern for system maintenance as over against "winning or losing," and similar social parameters.

The integrative system provides the framework within which both the threat and the exchange system develop. A threat which is regarded as illegitimate, such as that of the bandit, may organize a temporary social system, but is incapable of organizing permanent relationships or organizations. Similarly, exchange cannot develop unless it is regarded as legitimate. Trading with the enemy has always been regarded as of doubtful propriety. There must, therefore, be at least non-enmity if exchange is to develop, though it does not necessarily mean there has to be a strong sense of community or identification. Seen in this light, the national state represents one

stage, sometimes very useful, sometimes destructive, in the long, slow, irregular, but nevertheless persistent, development of a world integrative structure. The international organizations, small and weak as they now are (It is a shocking reflection, for instance, that all the international agencies put together are not much bigger than the Ford Foundation!), have a lot more legitimacy than their size warrants, and it is a legitimacy which is drawn from the future, in the sense that these organizations foreshadow, however imperfectly, the more unified world to come. This is not to say that reversals of this process are impossible. They have indeed taken place in the past and they may very well take place in the future. Nevertheless, these reversals of the general integrative movement into smaller, if often more intense, nationalisms, racism, and sectarianisms, are only a backwash and an undertow. The tide that advances is the tide of increasing integration and unification.

There is indeed a danger in this movement as well as a promise. Unification may mean equilibrium, which may mean stagnation--the end of the long dramatic process of human evolution in a dull stationary state. It may well be, indeed, that one of the greatest problems of the human race in the centuries to come will be the preservation of peculiarities, variety, and ecological complexity. We are already witnessing an alarming destruction of biological species on the earth.

as a result of the disappearance of isolated ecosystems and the development of a single unified ecosystem of the whole earth, in which the dodo and the moa, and perhaps the condor and the blue whale, will be unable to survive. We are likewise seeing a uniform superculture of airplanes, automobiles, electric power and steelframe powerful shoeboxes, international styles in clothing, music, art, and literature, which are overwhelming the cultural islands of traditional society, so that the Tea ceremony and the Bar Mitzvah, the Irish wake and the Hopi katchina doll will all suffer the fate of the dodo. One fears that everything that is "counter, original, spare, strange,"\* will be washed away in the great gray uniformity of the world superculture. To avoid this, we must value variety for its own sake and develop a movement of all humanity in the defense of each other's peculiarities. I have called my ideal society a "mosaic society," perhaps in both senses of the word. "Life, like a dome of many-colored glass, stains the white radiance of eternity" says Shelley in Adonais. So I see world society as a great mosaic picture of many pieces of different colors held together within a framework of law and mutual respect. This framework is "mosaic" in the second sense--more

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\* Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems, Second Edition, p. 30.



permissive of variety perhaps than the great law maker of Israel would have wished, but still justified by intimations of eternal law and eternal truth, however hard these may be to find.

What, then, in the light of all this discussion, can we say about the international system in the next twenty years? The safest thing, of course, is to say nothing. If I had been writing this in 1953, I think I would have said then that the chances of our getting to 1973 without disaster were very slim. At that time I think I would have predicted that by 1973 the world would be failing to recover from a devastating nuclear war, most of the world cities would have been destroyed, radioactivity would have made life impossible over large areas, and that the very existence of the human race was threatened. That prediction, fortunately, would have been wrong. In 1973 there seems to be a much smaller chance of nuclear war than there was in 1953; the whole international system is more stable at the moment of writing in February. There is no overt international war going on anywhere in the world, although there is some civil war, some sporadic violence, and still a strong sense of threat.

I think it most likely that we will get to 1993 without a major war, that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will settle down very much as they settled down in the nineteenth century between the United States and the British, to an uneasy, but

increasingly stable, peaceful coexistence. There are still many parts of the world where revolutions of various kinds could break out. Nevertheless, the improved relations of the United States with China, and the strained, if tolerant, relations with Chile, suggest that ideological considerations are no longer as important as they used to be, and that we are becoming reconciled to a kind of law of political irony--everything turns out to be its opposite and nothing is what we think.

It is ironic, for instance, that the American Revolution produced an increasingly monarchical society in the United States, even though it is true that the monarch is elected and temporary, and produced a much more truly republican form of government in Great Britain. It is ironic that the Russian Revolution produced a gigantic state corporation, far larger, more impersonal, and more monopolistic than General Motors, and produced a subservient working class, pushed around by an increasingly bourgeois Communist Party. The Chinese Revolution produced an emperor, sustained by the loftiest arts of Madison Avenue-type persuasion. The Gandhian Revolution produced an India which is a depressing carbon copy of a nineteenth-century European power, even with Queen Victoria at its helm! The sense of irony, however, produces apathy, and even though maybe it is apathy that we need to produce peace, apathy is

always vulnerable to the nonapathetic. It seems not unreasonable, however, to look forward to a world slowly settling down after the unusual disturbances of the last two hundred years, so that perhaps, to quote Tennyson, "The kindly earth will slumber, lapped in universal law."

On the other hand, there is always the possibility of upsets. The international system is a bit like an earthquake system--it accumulates increasing strain, until finally there is some sort of break. Strain can result from many sources. In the past it has frequently resulted from what I have called "overtakes," that is, where one nation overtakes another in the power hierarchy. This is frequently associated with differential changes in the gross national product. Even though this is only one of the elements of national power, it is the one that seems capable of most continuous growth. It is not unreasonable, for instance, to interpret the Napoleonic War in Europe as the overtaking of France by Britain; the war of 1870 as the overtaking of France by Germany; the war of 1914 as the overtaking of Britain by Germany and the overtaking of everybody by the United States, of which the war of 1939 was only a continuation, with the additional complication of Japan overtaking Europe.

Looking at the next twenty years, it seems unlikely that



there will be dramatic changes in the international pecking order, with the possible exception of Japan. The Soviet Union is not going to overtake the United States, China is not going to overtake anybody, and Japan, fortunately, has profited so well from defeat that it seems to have made a pretty fundamental decision to be Swedish and to abstain from the international power game, to which its GNP might entitle it. A possible uncertainty in the situation is a United Europe, which would certainly represent a much larger GNP than the Soviet Union, but hopefully would have learned a lesson that a Drang nach Osten does not pay. While, therefore, we may see local political seismic events of considerable magnitude, the world system may well have entered a period of relative stability.

I have argued elsewhere, indeed, that we may be close to, or may even have passed, the watershed of a very fundamental change in the international system. The sort of system we have had in the last 150 years has had slowly growing islands of stable peace, like North America and Scandinavia, embedded in a matrix of unstable peace in the general system. These islands of stable peace have had a tendency to grow, and we may now be facing a system in which the figure becomes the ground, and in which we have a world system of stable peace with islands of unstable peace. These islands, of course, may be quite large, like Africa, the Middle East, or Asia,

but they will essentially be islands and the central system will hold firm in peace.

Of the places where strains may increase to the point of an international or internal political earthquake, Africa certainly seems like a good candidate. Nevertheless, it now has less internal war than it has had for a very long time, with the end of the war in the Sudan. South Africa represents a potential strain point with the unpleasant prospect that if the status quo is disturbed, it may go very much the other way from what the Black African nations would wish, and we might find a militant South Africa dominating the whole southern half of the continent. Portugal and the Portuguese colonies are an anachronism and this, too, is a potential source of international strain. A great deal could happen in the southern half of Africa, however, without involving the rest of the world very much.

Another possible source of shock would be the Soviet Union, which, again, is an anachronism almost like Portugal. It is, after all, the old Czarist empire; it is almost certainly a great drain on the Russians, and it is a source of real cognitive dissonance. If Poland can be an independent country, why not Lithuania or Latvia or Usbekistan, all of which are more ancient countries than Russia? The Russian-Chinese relationship is another source of danger, again, because of the essential imperial character of the Soviet Union.

The boundary between Russia and China cuts across a good many cultural units and is a legacy of the high-water mark of Czarist expansion. The Chinese certainly are not building bombshelters in Peking for fear of either the Americans or the Japanese. While their fear of the Russians seems rather paranoic to Westerners, who have rather got used to the Russians, the Chinese-Russian border, at least, represents a kind of San Andreas fault of the world political system, along which earthquakes can certainly be expected. Southeast Asia, with its heterogen<sup>e</sup><sub>o</sub>us countries, can likewise expect to be at least a source of aftershocks for a long time, though the dreadful experience of Vietnam may scare it into stability, especially now that the Pakistan division has been accomplished.

The other great earthquake center is, of course, Israel. Like White South Africa, it is an enclave of the great world superculture in an environment of struggling traditional societies. The Arab countries, of course, are very far from uniform. Egypt trembles on the edge of a Malthusian disaster, which may well be speeded up by the ecological disaster of the Aswam Dam. The oil-rich countries, however, are in a very different position, mostly rather sparsely populated and sitting on large reserves of a natural resource which may well become increasingly scarce and expensive. In the absence of internal revolution in these countries, which would seem at the



moment improbable, unless Yemen is a straw in the wind, most of these countries will accumulate larger and larger riches in the hands of a very small governing class. Socialist revolutions indeed might not change this situation much, except to change the name and personnel of the governing class. The internal pressures to redistribute these new riches may not be very strong and the temptation to use them for international adventures may therefore be large. In the absence of any real breakthroughs in nuclear fusion, the price of oil may rise spectacularly by the end of the century and the Arab ruling class may well find itself, if it invests wisely, with a very substantial slice of the capital of the United States and Europe. At the same time their countries will not really have modernized. This is a very uncomfortable prospect.

The really critical question in the Middle East is whether any growth of the integrative structure is possible. At the moment the Middle East probably has the highest levels of malevolence of any part of the world. This malevolence presents extreme dangers, particularly in the light of the probable proliferation of nuclear weapons. Continued reliance on the level of the threat system which now exists would seem a recipe for eventual total and irreversible disaster. Very serious thought must be given, therefore, to the sources of this malevolence and what can be done to diminish it.

The fact that it may be based much more on symbolic injury than on real economic injury makes it all the more difficult to handle, and how far economic policies on the part of Israel, for instance, compensation of displaced Palestinians, would improve matters is very hard to say. The prospects at the moment do not look very good and the appalling persistence of ancient animosities, generation after generation, is all too vividly illustrated in Northern Ireland, which is a model that is very frightening. What seems most important at the present time is to take the existence of malevolence seriously, to study its sources and its myths, and to develop a plan for diminishing it. Under these circumstances, the expectations of disaster may be self-correcting rather than self-justifying. One hopes indeed for a new Jonah, the Jonah of Ninevah, not of the whale, to turn away by a successful call to repentance, the almost unimaginable nuclear disaster which threatens the Middle East in the next generation.

RATIONALITY, FANATISM AND WAR : A THEORETIC  
MODEL AND APPLICATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Prepared for the Seminar :

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Discussion Draft

A. Introduction.

1. This is a tentative paper, prepared to serve as a basis for discussion at the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation's seminar on "Systematic Thinking Towards Alternative Solutions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict." To serve this function, the main ideas are presented in oversharpe formulation, without suitable hedging and elaboration. Also, footnotes and references are avoided in this version of the paper.

2. Intellectually, this paper is based on work on three strategic subjects, namely : (1) fanatic behavior; (2) small power strategies; and (3) the Middle East conflict. This paper utilizes concepts and dimensions of fanaticism as presented in my book : Crazy States : A Counterconventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, Mass : Heath Lexington, 1971). Some of the assumptions and ideas presented briefly in this paper will be fully discussed and explained in further publications dealing with preferable small power strategies and with the Middle East conflict.

3. This paper is divided into two main parts : a rudimentary theoretic model on rationality, fanaticism and war; and an application of the model to the Middle East conflict.



## B. Theoretic Model.

4. There is a widespread tendency to assume that "irrationality" leads to wars, while "rationality" results in peace. More sophisticated theories reject so simple a view of reality, substituting for it more complex models which recognize a variety of relations between "rationality", fanaticism, war and peace. Nevertheless, many available models tend towards oversimplification. In particular, they lack suitable concept packages which can serve to explicate the multiple dimensions of reality and to construct models sufficiently isomorphic with reality to serve behavioral and prescriptive study, and which, at the same time, are compact enough to be operational and at least qualitatively exercisable. To overcome these weaknesses within the limited domain of this paper, I propose the following concepts as building stones for my model :

Goals : The policy goals of the multiactors, as resulting from the aggregative policymaking process, whatever its dominant mode may be. Reducing multidimensional and dynamic non-linear vectors to a simple dichotomy, I classify these goals as "aggressive" or "non-aggressive," in respect to defined other multiactors.

Values on violence : This concept refers to the acceptability of violence by the multiactors as a legitimate tool for achieving their values. For more careful analysis, violence must be subdivided into different levels and forms, ranging from conventional warfare to terror, nuclear war, genocide, etc. But, for a first cut at the problem, I am using a binary nominal scale, regarding violence as either "acceptable" or "unacceptable" to defined multiactor (again, after aggregation of their policy values through their policymaking modes), in respect to other defined multiactors.

Instrumentality : This concept refers to instrumental-rationality in the strict sense of the term, namely the extent to which means are picked

on the basis of a kind of benefit-cost calculus. Again, adopting a highly oversimplified binary classification, I distinguish for the purposes of this paper between "yes instrumental" and "non-instrumental." For more advanced analysis, different degrees of instrumentality in respect to various decision situations must be considered, as well as the difference between "subjective" instrumentality, (e. g. as seen by the multiactor) and "objective" instrumentality.

Capacity image : This concept refers to the image by a multiactor (again, aggregated through different processes) of his capacity to achieve his goals through violence. "Yes" means that the multiactor tends to hold the opinion that he can achieve his goals through violence, and that violence is the most efficient means for achieving his goals. "No" means that the multiactor is of the opinion that he cannot achieve his goals through violence or that violence is an inefficient means for achieving the goals. More advanced analysis must distinguish here between shorter-range and longer-range views of capacity; should examine the variables creating capacity images; and introduce risk-preferences and lottery-values as a critical element of capacity images.

5. Most conventional terms can be translated into the proposed terms, as follows :

"Reasonableness" is a culture-bound term. In Western cultures, especially among peace-supporting scholars, "reasonableness" implies non-aggressive goals and rejection of violent or a main policy instrument.

"Rationality" is either used loosely, or referring to "reasonableness", or strictly, as referring to "instrumentality," or as referring to an undefined mix between these two. (Mannheim and other scholars distinguish explicitly between instrumental-rationality and substantive-rationality; but most strategic literature ignores this essential distinction).

"Fanatism" refers to some combination of aggressive goals, acceptance and even liking for violence as a policy instrument and non-instrumentability. (For a sub-classification of fanaticism by defined dimensions, see Crazy States, op. cit.)

6. The dangers of oversimplification involved in binary classification must be emphasized. Keeping this warning in mind, I propose the following simple concept package for building the model, as explained above.

| <u>Goals</u>   | <u>Values on Violence</u> | <u>Instrumentality</u> | <u>Capacity Image</u> |
|----------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Aggressive     | rejected                  | yes                    | yes                   |
| Non-aggressive | accepted                  | no                     | no                    |

7. Our simple model is now constructed by taking all the combinations of these concepts and examining what combinations result in propensity to war (again, yes or no).

| <u>Goals</u>        | <u>Values on Violence</u> | <u>Instrumentality</u> | <u>Capacity Image</u> | <u>Propensity to War</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Aggressive      | rejected                  | yes                    | yes                   | no                       |
| (2) Aggressive      | rejected                  | yes                    | no                    | no                       |
| (3) Aggressive      | rejected                  | no                     | yes                   | yes or no                |
| (4) Aggressive      | rejectable                | no                     | no                    | yes or no                |
| (5) Aggressive      | acceptable                | yes                    | yes                   | yes                      |
| (6) Aggressive      | acceptable                | yes                    | no                    | no                       |
| (7) Aggressive      | acceptable                | no                     | yes                   | yes or no                |
| (8) Aggressive      | acceptable                | no                     | no                    | yes or no                |
| (9) Non-aggressive  | rejected                  | yes                    | yes                   | no                       |
| (10) Non-aggressive | rejected                  | yes                    | no                    | no                       |
| (11) Non-aggressive | rejected                  | no                     | yes                   | yes or no                |
| (12) Non-aggressive | rejected                  | no                     | no                    | yes or no                |
| (13) Non-aggressive | acceptable                | yes                    | yes                   | no                       |
| (14) Non-aggressive | acceptable                | yes                    | no                    | no                       |
| (15) Non-aggressive | acceptable                | no                     | yes                   | yes or no                |
| (16) Non-aggressive | acceptable                | no                     | no                    | yes or no                |



8. This oversimplified model leads to the following suggestive findings:

a. In a number of cases, non-instrumentality may result in war, namely in those cases where instrumentality results in no propensity to war, while non-instrumentality may result (yes or no) in war. This is the situation in cases 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 15 and 16.

b. In one case, non-instrumentality may prevent war, namely in the case where instrumentality results in yes propensity to war, while non-instrumentality may result (yes or no) in no war. This is the situation in case 7. This is the case where instrumental decisions, under the defined conditions, would lead to war.

9. Using more colloquial terminology : Usually, "rationality" reduces the probability of war, though in a particular case rationality increases the latter : When goals are aggressive ("unreasonable" in colloquial Western terminology), violence is accepted and the image exists that war will deliver the desired goods -- then irrationality may prevent the instrumental conclusion that war is preferable.

When goals are non-aggressive, violence is rejected or the capacity image is that war will not efficiently deliver the goods -- then rationality will reduce the probability of war, while irrationality will increase it.

10. The often made assertion that increased rationality (strictly defined) will always reduce war probability is, therefore, not universally correct. Neither is it correct that increasing rationality (assuming that policy instruments exist to achieve such an aim) is always a preferable way to reduce probability of war. Rather, ways to reduce probability of war include :

- a. Changing goals from aggressive to non-aggressive;
- b. changing values on violence from acceptance to rejection;
- c. changing capacity image from viewing war as efficient to viewing it inefficient (either by making war ineffective or providing

alternative, more effective means);

d. usually increasing rationality, but sometimes decreasing it.

11. Somewhat to compensate for the oversimplicity of the above model and its implications, let me consider in short two complications :

a. The interactive nature of adversary systems must be taken into account. Mutually expected behavior influences behavior, which in turn shapes expectations, and so on. Situations exist where behavior, that is non-instrumental from the point of view of each multiactor, will result in better payoffs to the adversaries themselves, or where enforcement by an external multiactor operating in the interest of the adversaries is preferable to autonomous, rational decision making by the multiactors themselves. This is the case in situations approximating the Prisoner's Dilleman, with a payoff matrix such as :

|       |        |
|-------|--------|
| 5, 5  | 20, 0  |
| 0, 20 | 15, 15 |

In other situations, mutual images determine behavior, as illustrated in situations approximating the Bell Game, namely :

|        |       |
|--------|-------|
| 15, 15 | 10, 0 |
| 0, 10  | 5, 5  |

b. The goal of preventing defeat needs separate consideration. Faced with a situation where a multiactor expects to be attacked, preventive or preemptive war may become probable, as well as -- under some conditions -- coercive war directed at reducing danger by enforcing peace. This situation can be analyzed in detail by a model analogue in its basics to the model presented above. Even though relevant, under some assumptions, to the Middle East situation, I am leaving this case for detailed analysis in the

revised version of the paper. This is a very important situation which should be born in mind. Mutual deterrence is a special case which belongs, in part, to this category.

12. Up till now I handled the case of war initiation or intensification. The situation becomes different in parts when war termination is considered. Here, inter alia, sunk costs must be taken into account, whether in the form of political feasibility, organizational inertia, economic interests etc. Even more complex is the situation when no binary choice of the nature of yes/no war initiation or yes/no war termination is faced. When conflicts take multi-dimensional forms with many possible combinations of different patterns of conflict behavior -- then modelling becomes much more difficult and perhaps, in respect to some facts and with present knowledge and tools, nearly impossible. This is just the case in respect to the Middle East, where choices war/no war take a much more complex and multiple form. Therefore, the proposed model can perhaps serve as a useful metaphor for handling some aspects of the Middle East situation, but should not be regarded as having high isomorphism with the Middle East situation as a whole. But, taking the present state of the art of strategic analysis, metaphors (e.g., part-models of suggestive power) present often one of the preferable methodological tools.

13. Recognizing the partial nature and oversimplified characteristics of the proposed model, I therefore regard it nevertheless as a helpful tool for analyzing some concrete situations, even in its present rudimentary form. This impression can be tested by application of the model to parts of the Middle East situation.

#### C. Application to Middle East.

14. Trying to insert the Middle East conflict parameters into the model presented above, the following picture may approximate reality sufficient to serve as a starting point for explorative discussion :



| <u>Multiactor</u>    | <u>Goals</u> | <u>Values or Violence</u>                     | <u>Instrumentality</u> | <u>Capacity Image</u> | <u>Resulting War Proponents</u>                                     |
|----------------------|--------------|---|------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| United Arab Republic | aggressive   | accepted                                      | Yes-No                 | No                    | Some war probability  |
| Hashemite Kingdom    | aggressive   | accepted                                      | Yes                    | No                    | No war probability  |
| Libya                | aggressive   | accepted                                      | No                     | Yes-No                | Some war probability  |
| Extreme Palestinians | aggressive   | accepted                                      | No                     | Yes-No                | Some war probability  |
| Israel               | aggressive   | accepted for defence<br>rejected for coercion | Yes                    | Yes                   | Defensive war probability if endangered;<br>Coercive war improbable |

15. To explain the parameters inserted into the model, the following observations are in order :

- "aggression" is treated as seen by the adversary.
- external actors, such as the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R., are treated as operating via the internal actors, e. g., through influencing their capacity image and their instrumentality.
- the model deals with the probability of war, in the sense of higher levels of violence. Propensity to reduce levels of tension, e. g., move towards peace -- require a more elaborate model which includes additional variables.
- the cost of non-intensification of war are not explicitly treated in the present version of the application.

16. Again, the oversimplifications require treating the application as a suggestive metaphor rather than an isomorphic model. Nevertheless, I think

suggestive conclusions can be derived from it. These conclusions are of two kinds : Predictive and prescriptive. Predictively, the model indicates possible war intensifications. Prescriptively, the model provides some pointers for possible action to reduce war propensity. In particular, the following tentative conclusions and guidelines can be mentioned :

a. Fanatism in the sense of aggressive goals, acceptance of violence and non-instrumentality -- is undoubtedly a main factor increasing war probability in the Middle East.

b. Given aggressive values and acceptance of violence, rationality helps in reducing war probability only as long as the capacity image is negative. Therefore, keeping the capacity image negative, constitutes a main way to reduce war propensity assuming instrumentality, aggressive values and acceptance of violence. Similarly increasing instrumentality is a main way to reduce war propensity, given a negative capacity image.

c. Given low instrumentality and the absence of policy instruments to influence this variable, a negative capacity image cannot be relied upon to prevent war. Therefore, for instance, a deterrence strategy is inadequate for the Middle East as a tool for war prevention.

17. If more complex issues are considered, the analysis must become more elaborate. Thus, consideration of war termination or of nuclear confrontation in the Middle East requires further development of the model and of its application. But, in general, I regard the approach presented in this paper as a useful one for analyzing conflicts, including the Middle East situation. If the model stands the test of initial application to simple situations, then further elaboration and application with more complex parameters will become justified. The present version of the paper is designed to check the usefulness of the model by presenting it in outline and subjecting it in its more rudimentary form to professional examination and criticism.

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THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL-ARAB STRATEGIC RELATIONS :  
FOUR TENTATIVE SCENARIOS. <sup>1</sup>

by

Yehezkel Dror

Prepared for the Seminar :

"Systematic Thinking Towards Alternative Solutions of the Arab-Israel Conflict"

1. These scenarios constitute preliminary hypothesis within a study on alternative Israel-Arab futures, which in turn is part of a broader study by the author on alternative Israeli futures.

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When dealing with predictions, we must beware the mistaken human tendency of viewing the future as a simple continuation of the present or of reading into it the fulfillment of our hopes. Especially when dealing with so complex a problem as Israel-Arab relations, it is necessary to take into account the many variables which will shape the future, including some important ones outside the Middle East itself (such as relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.) and some accidental ones (such as the life span of individual leaders and the personal characteristics of their successors). Therefore, unless we engage in dangerous oversimplification, it is necessary to present the future in terms of alternative possibilities.<sup>2</sup> With the help of sophisticated, modern prediction methods, it is sometimes possible to allocate probabilities or at least to identify critical factors which influence the future in the direction of one or another defined possibility. One of the first phases of any prediction must, therefore, always include alternative futures, which in turn can serve as a basis for more sophisticated forecasting and for purposeful human endeavor aiming at increasing the chances of those alternatives which we prefer, and at reducing the chances of those which we dislike.

In order to present some of the alternative futures of Israel-Arab relations, I will use a methodology developed in modern strategic studies, namely scenarios. A scenario is a description by stages of the evolution of a situation from the present into an alternative future. A scenario should show us how any future can be realized, with special attention paid to the consistency of the changes predicted.

Elaboration of main alternative scenarios for Israel-Arab relations, is a complex job requiring thorough discussion of multiple assumptions.

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2. See Yehezkel Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences (N. Y. : American Elsevier, 1971), Chapter 5.

In this short article, I will present some main ideas taken from a longer study of mine. To show the great variations in possible futures of Israel-Arab relations, I will present four scenarios dealing with main prototype situations : Scenario No. 1 presents the possibility of peace resulting from decisions by the Middle Eastern countries themselves; Scenario No. 2 explores the possibility of peace resulting from Big Power dictate; Scenario No. 3 presents perpetuated status quo; Scenario No. 4 deals with the unpleasant but not impossible case of total war in the Middle East with global involvement.

For convenience, the scenarios are presented in the form of consecutive text. But they should be read as presenting parallel and mutually interdependent developments and actions by various multiactors.<sup>3</sup> The basic matrix on which the scenario textual description is based, can be presented as follows :

|           | <u>Israel</u> | <u>Arab Countries</u> | <u>Palestinians</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>USSR</u> | <u>Other Countries</u> |
|-----------|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------|-------------|------------------------|
| 1975-1980 |               |                       |                     |            |             |                        |
| 1980-1990 |               |                       |                     |            |             |                        |
| 1990-2000 |               |                       |                     |            |             |                        |

This matrix will be further elaborated during more advanced phases of the study.

#### Scenario No. 1 : Real Peace Resulting from Decisions of Middle Eastern Countries.

1975-1980.

Israel. The "doves" gain political power, with anti-annexation politicians occupying most cabinet positions and the annexationist parties losing an unexpectedly large number of seats in the Knesset. Public and elite opinions

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3. On the concept "multiactor" which I prefer to the misleading term "actor", see Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States : A Counterconventional Strategic Problem, Lexington, Mass : Heath Lexington, 1971), p. XIV.



support a partial settlement. The Israeli Army succeeds in weapons development programs, increasing sense of strategic security even with some withdrawal. Large immigration from U.S.S. R. successfully absorbed, also adding to sense of internal challenge and strategic security. Improved relations with U.S.S. R. and other countries reinforces sense of optimistic hope for possible peaceful settlement. Partial settlements with Egypt and Jordan signed.

Arab countries. In Egypt, a strong, charismatic leader becomes president. He proposes putting main emphasis on socio-economic development of Egypt, playing down the importance of conflict with Israel. He declares himself ready to "try out Israeli good will" by agreeing on partial settlement, as a first step towards an "eventual settlement." Under U.S. auspices, a withdrawal of Israeli troops to about 30 miles from the Suez Canal is arranged, with only some Egyptian police crossing the canal : the canal is reopened to shipping, with Israeli ships carrying some flag of convenience passing through the canal undisturbed. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan follows Egypt and signs an "interim settlement," more or less in accord with the Allon Plan (i. e., Israeli military control over the West Bank with strong-points along the Jordan River; some border adjustments; full Jordanian civil control over the West Bank, including local police). The Jerusalem issue is left open, with Arab inhabitants holding double citizenship. Other Arab countries condemn these moves, but internal doubts about their policy begin to assert themselves.

Palestinians. A new leadership asserts that a settlement with Israel is the only way for national survival. They reach an accommodation with Jordan, accepting shared power and the conception of a Jordan-Palestine federation. Extreme elements are either absorbed or repressed. (In Europe, repression is accomplished with the tacit cooperation of Egyptian and Israeli secret services.) The partial settlements are received enthusiastically, combining the advantages of political sovereignty and economic cooperation with Israel.



U.S.A. Success in arranging Egyptian-Israeli partial settlement strengthens determination to let the Middle Eastern countries try and solve their own problems. Continuing military aid to Israel is combined with massive economic aid to Egypt and Jordan. As part of further improving relations with the U.S.S.R., that country is given credit for helping to defuse the Middle East.

U.S.S.R. A strong reaction against "adventurism" in the Middle East takes place, with some turnover in those responsible for the policy. Diplomatic relations with Israel are renewed together with the opening of the Suez Canal. Large immigration to Israel is permitted, at the same time as good trade relations with the U.S.A. help in strongly improving internal economic situation.

Other Countries. Most countries strongly support the new trend in the Middle East. As part of its rapprochement policy, China avoids any aggressive action in the Middle East. The Afro-Asian U.N. Bloc passes a resolution in the General Assembly congratulating the Middle Eastern countries and asks them to "continue their efforts to achieve real peace."

#### 1980-1990.

The trend continues. Israel, Egypt and Jordan-Palestine sign a "Settlement Document" in parallel procedures, providing for continuing withdrawal of Israel from Sinai and the West Bank by stages, with demilitarization and some border adjustments. At the same time, Egypt and Israel publicly announce reduction of their defense budgets by 25%, with further cuts promised for the coming years. Syria in a sudden move, joins the agreement, leasing parts of the Golan Heights to Israel for 99 years, and demilitarizing, under international control, other parts of the Golan Heights from which Israel withdraws. A Jordanian-Palestinian Commission is put in charge of the Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem, with its own flag flying

over the locations. Intense trade between Israel and Jordan-Palestine develops, including informal sightseeing tours by Israelis to Jordan. On a global scale, international tension decreases in other areas as well, while interest in the Middle East as a political issue diminishes.

1990-2000.

A formal peace treaty is signed between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan-Palestine, with full establishment of normal relations. Lebanon formally accedes to the treaty, with Syria "accepting the new status quo." The Nobel Peace Prize is given collectively to the governments of Israel, Egypt and Jordan-Palestine. Preparations are under way for the establishment of a Middle East Common Market. Defense budgets continue to go down in the Middle Eastern countries. Global trends continue towards reduced tension, with international attention focusing on problems in Africa and South America.

Scenario No. 2: Real Peace Resulting from Big Power Dictate.

1975 - 1980.

U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. America and the Soviet Union reach full agreement to enforce settlement on Middle East with stages of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, some changes on the Jordanian and Syrian borders, international repression of Arab extremists, and assurance of Israeli security through demilitarization of Sinai, the Golan and West Bank. Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem recognized, on condition of Israeli-Jordanian condominium over Holy Places. To enforce settlement a joint U.S.A. - U.S.S.R. naval task force is assembled in the Mediterranean and a full blockade - including freezing of all Arab and Israeli assets abroad - is threatened. As positive incentives, intense economic aid is promised, with the U.S.S.R. adding that large emigration of Jews from the U.S.S.R. would be permitted.



Israel and the Arab countries. American and Soviet action received with shock, but some opinions are expressed that "this is the only hope for peace." Big Power pressure brings Israel and Arabs to sign an interim agreement including more or less the same provisions as the partial agreements in Scenario No. 1.

Palestinians. American and Soviet action received as the last of all evils. A new leadership emerges which supports a positive settlement with Israel, with the Palestinian issue being solved by a federation with Jordan. Extremist groups disappear following successful police actions in Europe, encouraged by the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

Other countries. Most European countries support the Big Power moves, as do some Third World countries. China verbally condemns the moves, but does not interfere.

#### 1980-1990.

Following positive experience with the partial settlements forced on the Middle East by the Big Powers, the Middle Eastern countries themselves begin to like the arrangement. Informal contacts develop, leading to a locally initiated agreement to move on towards a real settlement. A strong motive for doing so is a common feeling of anger at American and Soviet interference and a desire to be rid of Big Power control. Movement towards a real peace based on local agreement begins to gain momentum, developments proceeding along lines parallel to Scenario No. 1. The Big Powers welcome this movement, diverting their main attention to other international trouble spots, especially in Africa and South America.

#### 1990-2000.

Similar to Scenario No. 1.



### Scenario No. 3 : Status Quo Perpetuated.

1975-1980.

Israel. Israeli political and public opinion adopts the position that the status quo is the best settlement that Israel can achieve, in view of Arab rejection of peace with secure borders, increasing radicalization of Arab countries and intense Big Power competition in the Middle East. Large investments in defense combine with significant immigration to generate belief that Israel can easily maintain status quo and that annexation of territories is essential for absorption of immigrants and to provide strategic areas needed for new Israeli weapon systems. Arab terror perceived as proof that Arabs do not really want peace.

Arab countries. Arab political and public opinion continues to believe that only war can get back the territories from Israel. At the same time, it is realized that a social-technical revolution is necessary before Israel can be militarily challenged. Therefore, while individual terrorist groups are supported, war is deferred "until we are ready."

Palestinians. In the Israeli-occupied territories, economic prosperity goes hand in hand with political apathy and a small number of low-intensity sabotage acts. In Europe, Arab terrorists are active, but with little success, because of Israeli and local countermeasures.

U. S. A. , U. S. S. R. and other countries. International relations continue unchanged, with competition between the various blocs combined with determination not to permit a serious armed conflict. The U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. support, respectively, Israel and the Arab states, with an informal balance of armaments being preserved, preventing the Arabs from getting weapons which they regard as necessary to attack Israel successfully.

1980-2000.

Continuation of first stage, with intermittent, limited conflicts on Israel-Arab borders, which do not change the situation.

Scenario No. 4 : Total War in the Middle East with Global Involvement.

1975-1980.

Israel. Increased Arab talk of a sudden attack on Israel and intensified Russian involvement result in agreement in Israel that war is imminent. All resources are invested in defense, including development of nuclear weapons.

Arab countries. Extremist leaders gain power in Egypt and Jordan. The U.S.S.R., fearing the loss of its influence in the Middle East, supports these regimes. War rhetoric increased with the slogan : "Finish off the Israeli cancer once and for all." All resources are invested in the military and a common Middle Eastern Arab Command is set up, which controls all Arab armed forces.

Palestinians. Extremists gain the upper hand. Passive mass resistance in the Israeli-occupied territories result in repressive measures, further encouraging extremists. Some dramatic terrorist successes agitate public opinion and polarize positions.

U.S.A. Military assistance to Israel continues at accelerated rate. At the same time, internal problems preoccupy the leadership, creating the impression abroad that the U.S.A. really has no endurance for external action.

U.S.S.R. Following an internal struggle, the leadership decides to prove that its Middle Eastern policy was correct by helping the Arabs to gain a limited success. Attack weapons are provided, and Arab airfields and naval facilities are very much enlarged. Soviet-Chinese competition further pushes the U.S.S.R. to prove its toughness in the Middle East.



Other countries. Failure by the U. N. to achieve any impact on the Middle East result in condemnation of Israel by the Communist-Arab-Asian bloc, and a call for sanctions. This is regarded by the Arab countries and the U.S.S. R. as legitimization for decisive anti-Israel action.

1983.

U. S. S. R. Decides to support limited Arab action against Israel, namely to provide air cover for the Arab armies over Sinai. A large number of Mig-23 are moved to Arab airfields around Israel and the U. S. S. R. declares that it will support military action to recover occupied territories. Russian planes piloted by Russians interfere actively in fighting over Sinai providing strong air support to invading Arab forces. Russian planes with unidentified pilots attack military and civil targets in Israel, including Dimona nuclear reactor.

Arab countries. Arab troops cross into Sinai and attack on the Syrian border. Libyan aircrafts and troops participate in attack. All oil exports from Arab countries to Western countries are stopped, with an ultimatum to refrain from aiding Israel.

Palestinians. Widespread terror attack around the world succeed in some spectacular killings. Attempts at sabotage in Israel and occupied territory fail.

Israel. Israeli initial counterattacks in Sinai are beaten back with heavy losses to Israel airforce fighting against great numbers of well trained Russian pilots. All other Arab attacks beaten back. Israel accuses Soviet Union of direct intervention and threatens suicidal war including use of "unconventional means which will destroy Arab countries and cause terrible damage to U. S. S. R." unless the Soviet Union immediately withdraws all its forces. In Israel the choice is reviewed as either achieving total victory or being completely destroyed.



U.S.A. Declares national emergency, activates nuclear alert and puts the Mediterranean forces on battle stations, while approaching Israeli coast. Speaking with Soviet leaders on red line, U.S.A. President demands immediate action to stop war.

Other countries. European countries declare various degrees of national emergency. United Nations bodies start debate on situation.

WITHIN TWO DAYS :

Possibility A. Both the U.S.S.R. and then the U.S.A. withdraw their forces, leaving Israel and the Arab countries to fight it out, resulting in overwhelming Israeli victory and peace coercion.

Possibility B. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. agree to stop the fighting, with the reestablishment of an uneasy status quo.

Possibility C. By design or accident, some nuclear weapons are used, leading to limited or general nuclear war. Most of the Middle East is completely destroyed.


The different variations of the final phase in Scenario No. 4 illustrate the multiplicity of possible permutations. In addition, the following main variations among many can be mentioned :

Variation 1. Beginning as in Scenario No. 1 but with a sudden breakdown, the Arabs try a sudden attack on Israel, and limited or local war breaks out.

Variation 2. Beginning as in Scenario No. 2, with Israel determined to resist the Big Powers. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. give up their attempt, or cooperation between them breaks down, or open conflict between Israel and blockading forces leads to various forms of war in the Middle East.

Variation 3. Beginning as in Scenario No. 3, status quo breaks down because of Arab action. The U.S.S.R. intervenes to save the Arab countries, leading to a general war, or Arab countries lose, with return to status quo or an Israeli invasion in depth of some Arab countries, followed by either a peace imposed by Israel or various forms of international or Soviet intervention.

Additional scenarios can deal with other possibilities, such as a balance of terror following introduction of nuclear weapons. But I think the scenarios and their variations presented above are sufficient to achieve the objective of this short paper, namely to encourage debates and stimulate research or alternative futures of Arab-Israeli strategic relations.





SEMINAR: "SYSTEMATIC THINKING TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS  
OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT"

Background Material for Professor R. Lapidoth's Lecture

UN RESOLUTION 242

Ever since the Security Council of the United Nations passed Resolution 242 on the solution of the Middle East crisis (22 November 1967), it has been the object of so much controversy that a close examination of its aims and provisions seems called for.

The resolution was drafted in response to an urgent United Arab Republic (UAR) request (7 November 1967) for an early meeting of the Security Council 'to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied as the result of the Israel aggression committed against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria on 5 June 1967'.<sup>1</sup> In answer to this request, the Security Council was duly convened and debated the crisis in its sessions of 9, 13, 15, 16, 20 and 22 November.

In its deliberations, the Security Council could fall back on two draft resolutions, one jointly submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria, the other prepared by the United States. In the course of the discussions, two further draft resolutions were submitted, one by Great Britain (16 November) and another by the USSR (20 November). In the end only the British resolution was put to the vote, and was carried unanimously. Representing a compromise between the various

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drafts, it was, as so often happens in such cases, somewhat vague and imprecise; indeed, the slight ambiguity of its wording may well have been the reason it proved acceptable to all members of the Security Council. The resolution as passed reads:

'The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the UN have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

(1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

(2) Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political

tical independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

(3) Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

(4) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.'

Before analysing the details of the resolution, it is imperative to decide whether it is a 'recommendation' for the peaceful solution of conflicts as dealt with in Chapter VI of the UN. Charter, or whether it represents a 'binding decision' which the Security Council can, according to Chapter VII of the Charter, impose when confronted with 'threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. Although it has not been expressly stated under which heading of the Charter the resolution was eventually passed, the preceding debates make it quite clear that it was envisaged as a 'recommendation'. Lord Caradon, the British representative, was quite explicit on this point when he remarked that the Security Council's non-permanent members 'agree that we should act within the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter'. Arthur Goldberg, the American representative, also stated that the Council was unanimously agreed on proceeding with this matter in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter.<sup>2</sup>



The Nigerian delegate, Mr. Abedo, put the matter most succinctly when he remarked:

'It may be that at some time in the future the Security Council will feel that the situation in the Middle East requires action under Chapter VII. Speaking for my country, I hope that stage will not be reached. We hope that a decision under Chapter VI, such as we recommend, will be complied with genuinely by both parties so that there will be no question of anybody asking for action under Chapter VII of the Charter'.<sup>3</sup>

The contents of the resolution also seem to indicate that it was adopted under the provisions set out in Chapter VI, for the majority of its demands merely constitute a framework, a list of general principles which can become operative only after detailed and specific measures have been agreed upon. Moreover, the resolution explicitly entrusts a Special Representative with the task of assisting the parties concerned to arrive at a settlement in keeping with its own conciliatory spirit. Had the intention been to impose a 'binding decision', agreement between the parties would not have been one of its major preoccupations.

Finally the question arises whether it is possible to differentiate between the first and the second part of the resolution and to argue that the requirements under article 1 demanding Israel's withdrawal and an end to belligerency, etc. constitute a Security Council order, while the proposals under article 2 relating to freedom of navigation, territorial inviolability, etc. represent merely 'recommendations'. Such an interpretation would appear rather far-fetched. Firstly, the resolution is an organic whole, and there is nothing to warrant the assumption that its various parts have different legal status. Furthermore, such an interpretation would run counter to that part of article 1 which states:

'The Security Council . . . affirms that the fulfilment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles'. The use of the word should clearly indicates that the clause represents a 'recommendation'. Again, under paragraph ii, article 1 speaks of 'secure and recognized boundaries', evidently presupposing agreement as to where they should run; hence, even the first article of the resolution cannot possibly qualify as a Security Council order. Again, under article 3 the Special Representative is enjoined to 'promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution'. The principles mentioned refer to the first part of the resolution, and their status cannot differ from that of those listed in the second part; it follows, therefore, that both parts represent 'recommendations' for the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

To conclude, both the wording of the resolution and the debates preceding it provide convincing proof that the Security Council conceived it as a 'recommendation'.

Before and after it was passed, the resolution was subjected to different and contradictory interpretations by various national delegations, some of whom even tried to persuade its author, Lord Caradon, to consent to minor textual alterations. He invariably refused to consider any modification or to associate himself with any specific interpretation:

' . . . I would say [if] is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the resolution, the whole resolution and nothing but the resolution.'<sup>4</sup>

Lord Caradon's statement suggests that the resolution should be scrutinized by itself in the light of the UN Charter, without reference to the various interpretations it received from different delegations.

The resolution's preamble immediately raises the question whether the introductory passage, stressing the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war', means that, in the opinion of the Security Council, Israel's retention of the territories occupied in 1967 is illegal. To answer this question, it is necessary to draw attention to the fundamental difference between military occupation and the acquisition of a territory's sovereignty. The former does not entail any change in a territory's national status, although it does give the occupier certain rights until peace has been concluded. Mere military occupation of the land does not, however, confer any legal title to sovereignty. The right to military occupation has been considerably restricted by the prohibition of the use of force, and can nowadays only be claimed when, as in the case of self-defence, a recourse to arms is lawful. The General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation between States of 24 October 1970 upheld the legality of military occupation provided the force used to establish it was not in contravention of the UN Charter.

The passage in the Security Council resolution thus denounces 'the acquisition of territory by war,' but does not pronounce on its occupation under the circumstances of 1967. It is revealing to compare the finally accepted version with the formulation used in the draft presented by India, Mali and Nigeria. There the relevant passage reads: 'Occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the



United Nations'.<sup>5</sup> It is, therefore, of some significance that the preamble of the version finally accepted, while reiterating the injunction against the acquisition of territory, refrains from commenting on its military occupation. Consequently, it cannot be argued that the Security Council regarded Israel's presence in these territories as illegal. As an act of self-defence, their military occupation was and continues to be legitimate until a peace treaty is signed.

Any other interpretation of the passage, suggesting, for example, that it was intended to denounce any military occupation, contradicts not only its wording but also the established rules of international law. Its form, its place in the preamble rather than in the body of the resolution, and a comparison with the subsequent passages clearly indicate its concern with the implementation of existing norms rather than with the creation of new ones.

The third paragraph of the preamble is also of a merely declaratory nature. It emphasizes that member states 'have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter', which, as will be remembered, spells out the principles on which the UN is founded. Three of them have a particular bearing on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first concerns the 'sovereignty equality' of all member states. Even though it does not follow that all members must therefore automatically extend full diplomatic recognition to each other, the Arab attitude towards Israel, adopted at the Khartoum Conference (1.9.1967), of 'no peace, no recognition and no negotiations', seems hardly in keeping with this principle. Nor, for that matter, are Arab threats to annihilate Israel; they also are in complete breach of paragraphs 3 and 4, which enjoin members 'to settle their international disputes by peaceful means . . .' and 'to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force'.

In article 1 of the resolution, the Security Council insists that, in order to establish a just and lasting peace in accordance with Charter principles, Israel must withdraw her armed forces from occupied territories while her opponents must end the state of belligerency against Israel and acknowledge her territorial integrity and political independence.

While these two preconditions for a just and lasting peace can be examined separately, they are nevertheless interdependent. The interpretation of the passage relating to Israel's withdrawal presents some difficulties, owing to discrepancies in the French and English versions of the resolution. In this context, it should be recalled that in 1967 French and English were the only working languages of the Security Council, although Russian, Spanish and Chinese were also official languages of the United Nations. While the English text speaks of 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict', the French translation envisages 'retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit'. These divergencies, it must be pointed out, constitute not two different interpretations of the text, but are in fact two different versions of the resolution itself. The English text is identical with the original version of the British draft on which the resolution was based; it also appears in the American draft which, however, was not voted upon. The French is in line with the draft resolution jointly submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria, and also with that of the USSR, neither of which were put to the vote.

The question therefore arises whether the resolution enjoins the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from all occupied territories as the French version apparently implies; or only from 'territories occupied in the recent conflict', as stipulated in the English formu-

lation. The latter interpretation, it seems, is the correct one, since the wording of the English version already figured in the British draft which became the text of the resolution. Despite the fact that French and English enjoy equal status at the UN, the English version ought in this instance to take precedence in accordance with the well established rule in international law that the interpretation of multilingual texts should be based on the working language in which they were negotiated and drafted.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, since article 1 mentions, together with the withdrawal, 'the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries', it can only be inferred that military forces should retire to new and mutually agreed borders. This interpretation would also conform to a recognized rule in international law which permits the occupation of territories to continue until a peace treaty defines their status. In this context, the emphasis in article 2, paragraph C of the resolution on the need to establish demilitarized zones in order to guarantee the 'territorial inviolability' of every state in the area is also of some significance. This would hardly seem necessary if the resolution was merely aiming at a complete withdrawal to the frontiers as they existed before 4 June 1967. The attitude taken by the UN lends additional weight to these arguments, for the General Assmebly (4.7.67) rejected various Afro-Asian, South American and Russian motions, and the Security Council also rejected a similar Soviet-sponsored initiative (13/14.7.67), demanding the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces.

An analysis of the text therefore appears to indicate that the resolution envisaged a withdrawal of Israeli forces to new and mutually agreed frontiers.

The second principle laid down in article 1 of the resolution is more complex: termination of all states of belligerency and



recognition of the right of every State in the area to live in peace within recognized boundaries. As to the termination of belligerency, it will be remembered that, since its inception in 1948, the Arab countries have claimed belligerent status vis-à-vis Israel, using it as a justification for closing the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping. Such a contention is legally untenable and also contravenes the UN Charter. Since, but for a few specified exceptions, the Charter forbids resort to war, member states may not declare or maintain a state of war between each other, and therefore cannot claim special rights deriving from a pretence of belligerency, particularly after the cessation of all active hostilities. Article 1 therefore enjoins the Arab states to withdraw any claim under this head.

With its insistence on the 'acknowledgement of the sovereignty . . . territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area', the resolution aims at the recognition of Israel by all countries in the region. The Arab states have so far refused to recognize Israel, and the Security Council stresses the need for an end to non-recognition.

The passage emphasizing the 'right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries' embodies a principle already referred to when discussing troop withdrawal. It centres on the demarcation of new boundaries which, if they are to be reciprocally recognized, must be the result of an agreement. Obviously, even though the Security Council has not listed them, complex legal, political, strategic, economic, demographic and historical considerations will have to be taken into account in drawing up new frontiers.

To sum up: article 1 of the resolution insists on an Israeli withdrawal to new and freely agreed boundaries, the termination of any state of belligerency and the recognition by all parties of

each other's independence and statehood. The last two demands are addressed, though implicitly, at the Arab states.

In article 2, the Security Council emphasizes the need to achieve three important objectives: freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; solution of the refugee problem; and guarantees of territorial inviolability - objectives which could in fact provide the headings for an eventual peace settlement. Each of them raises a number of legal and political issues which can only be outlined here.

The resolution mentions freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area without, however, naming them. In fact, they are the Straits of Tiran and of Bab-al-Mandeb, as well as the Suez Canal. The two straits are natural maritime straits, and therefore fall under Article 16, paragraph 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which provides: 'There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through Straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.' Up to now, free passage through the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb had never been seriously challenged. As to the Straits of Tiran, the Arab states have tried to justify their closure to Israeli shipping on various grounds. The Gulf of Aqaba, it was argued, constituted an 'internal sea', or a 'historic bay'. Alternatively, it was maintained that the right to free passage can only be invoked in times of peace and did not apply to Israeli shipping, in view of the Arab state of belligerency. Another argument was that Israel was not a legitimate riparian state bordering on the Gulf of Aqaba, since her presence there derived only from an armistice agreement which does not confer sovereignty; besides, it was alleged that her entry into Elath in March 1949 was in breach of the armistice



concluded with Egypt on 24 February 1949.

None of these arguments make legal sense; the Gulf of Aqaba is not an internal sea since it has a natural outlet to the high sea and adjoins several countries; nor has it been internationally recognized as a 'historic bay'. As already explained, no UN member state can claim special rights against another on the grounds of belligerency. Finally, Israel's presence in Elath is perfectly legitimate, having been established before the conclusion of the Israeli-Jordanian armistice of 3 April 1949, which left the town in Israeli hands and which is the agreement relevant for this zone. Israel's sovereignty over this region as well as over the rest of her territory has in fact been recognized by the majority of States.

The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway and as such subject to a different régime. Canals, unless specific agreements to the contrary have been concluded, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country through which they run.<sup>7</sup> This applies, for instance, to the Canal of Corinth which, being part and parcel of Greece, can be closed by her to foreign shipping. The Suez Canal, however (like the Panama and Kile Canals) is not subject to this general rule since its use and accessibility was agreed upon, under the 1888 Constantinople Convention, by Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. The Convention laid down the rules governing the passage through the Canal, the following being the most important:

1. Free passage without distinction of flag at all times, even in time of war.
2. This applies to 'every vessel of commerce or of war', not excepting warships of belligerents. In wartime, however, belligerents must not disembark or embark troops, munitions or materials of war within the Canal and its ports of access.



3. Neutralization of the Canal.

4. Egypt's right to secure by her own forces her defence and the maintenance of public order without interfering with the free use of the Canal.

In defending the closure of the Canal to Israeli shipping, the UAR used four arguments: that Israel was not a signatory to the Constantinople Convention; that a state of war existed between the UAR and Israel; that the UAR had a right to act in self-defence, and in defence of the Canal. Again, these arguments are either legally untenable or irrelevant.

To answer them one by one: Israel, even though not a signatory, is entitled to invoke the Constantinople Convention because it belongs to that group of treaties which create new rights for the benefit of the international community; no UN member can legally be at war with another member nation; the UAR's claim to act in defence of herself and of the Canal does not give her the right to hinder the passage of ships through it (Article 11 of the Constantinople Convention).

In view of the fact that the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal formed one of the points at issue between Israel and the Arab states, the Security Council demanded that this issue should be resolved by mutual agreement in the peace settlement. The wording of the resolution seems to recognize a right of unimpeded passage through these waterways, the proposed settlement having only to guarantee its practice and implementation.

One of the thorniest Middle Eastern problems is that of the Arab refugees who fled to neighbouring countries in the course of the 1948 War of Independence and the Six Day War. In emphasizing the need for a 'just settlement', however, the Security Council

failed to intimate what it would regard as a just solution.

The issue has humanitarian and political aspects. On the humanitarian level, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) was set up and financed by voluntary contributions of member states in order to provide emergency assistance for the refugees. Politically, however, since they serve an exceedingly useful purpose in anti-Israel propaganda, the Arab states are somewhat reluctant to consider political solutions. In December 1948, the General Assembly decided to create a special Conciliation Commission to take steps 'to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them'.<sup>8</sup> The refugees are among the problems mentioned in the resolution; article 11 suggests that 'refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible'. For many years this article has been quoted both inside and outside the United Nations, accusing Israel by implication of having flouted one of its provisions. However, it must be realized that this - like most resolutions passed by the General Assembly - is merely a recommendation. Nor must it be forgotten that it advocated the return only of those refugees willing to live peaceably among their neighbours; the disinclination of most Arab refugees to live in peace in an Israeli environment is, however, well-known. Moreover, Article 11 is only one item in a complex package, and it is quite inadmissible to single it out and demand that it should be observed separately.

Among the many UN resolutions on Arab refugees passed after the Six Day War, that adopted by the Security Council (14.6.1967) is particularly important. It asked Israel to facilitate the return of civilians who had fled from the battle area. The General Assembly, congratulating the Security Council on its initiative, used its wording in its own resolutions of July 1967, December 1968, and recalled it again in December 1969, 1970 and 1971. The Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 emphasized the need for a 'just settlement' of the refugee problem without, however, referring to the General Assembly's 1948 recommendations. The just solution the Security Council had in mind provided, no doubt, for the return of some Arab refugees, compensation for those unwilling to go back, and their resettlement in the underpopulated areas of the Arab world, as well as compensation for Jews forced to flee from Arab countries.

Paragraph C of article 2 of the Security Council's Resolution demands adequate safeguards to guarantee 'the inviolability and political independence of every state in the area'. These guarantees should, no doubt, apply to the new 'secure and recognized boundaries' to be established. It suggests the setting up of demilitarized zones, one of the commonly used methods of keeping the peace and preventing border clashes. A demilitarized zone, according to one standard work,<sup>9</sup> is 'a territory in which by agreement the state exercising jurisdiction forgoes, for the duration of the agreement and in accordance with its terms, the right to use it for fortifications or other military installations, or for the stationing of troops'. The exact extent of these prohibitions is specifically laid down in the agreements covering each case. Best-known among them are perhaps the demilitarization of the Antarctic (Washington Convention 1959), and the partial demilitarization of Outer Space (1967), as well as the numerous demilitarized



zones created after the World Wars. Several international waterways like the Suez Canal and the Magellan Straits have also been demilitarized under special agreements.

It may be assumed that eventually demilitarized zones will be created in order to guarantee the tranquility of some frontiers in the area. But in drawing up the regimes of these zones, due attention should be given to the bitter experience gained in the demilitarized zones created in 1949 by the armistice agreements on Israel's borders with Egypt and Syria. Although this is not the place to analyse the reasons for that failure, it must be stressed that the terms under which the proposed demilitarized zones are to function must be so drafted as to preclude any repetition of the old controversies and incidents.

Among other means of safeguarding the frontiers, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact has been mentioned, as well as the stationing of UN peace-keeping forces in the frontier regions. Here too the lessons of the recent past have to be fully learnt, so that such a force - if installed - does not find itself in the same predicament as in 1967, when the UAR successfully insisted on its immediate withdrawal at the precise moment its presence was most urgently required.

Another suggestion was that the new frontiers should be jointly guaranteed by the Great Powers or by the Security Council. Such guarantees, although not unknown to international law, are in Israel's experience, not always reliable. For, notwithstanding the tripartite declaration of 25 May 1950 in which Britain, France and the USA guaranteed the armistice lines, two of the signatories denounced their undertaking on the eve of the Six Day War when Israel's survival was at stake.

To sum up, article 2 of the Security Council's resolution outlines certain issues: free passage through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran and Bab-al-Mandeb; the equitable solution to the refugee problem; frontiers safeguarded either by Great Power guarantees, demilitarized zones, or peace-keeping forces, which must be resolved by the peace treaty.

Article 3 of the resolution requests the Secretary General to despatch a 'Special Representative' to the Middle East in order 'to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned', and to assist them in achieving an accepted peace. The Secretary General has entrusted this mission to Dr. Gunnar Jarring who, it must be noted, is to act, according to the Security Council resolution, as the special representative of the Secretary General. He is therefore not a representative of the Security Council itself, and in this respect his status and mission differ from that of Count Folke Bernadotte, whom the General Assembly appointed as a mediator in 1948, and who was the representative of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Dr. Jarring's powers do not extend beyond the use of his good offices to promote direct negotiations between the parties concerned, who should themselves reach an agreed peace settlement: whereas the UN mediator of 1948 was an active negotiator, fully entitled to make suggestions and present proposals for the resolution of the conflict.

Finally, article 4 requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of his representative's endeavours.

The principles enshrined in the Security Council's Resolution 242 form a 'package', an indivisible whole. Its various recommendations and suggestions are interlinked and interdependent, and at no point support the contention that a withdrawal of Israeli forces is the necessary and intended prerequisite for the implementation of any of its other provisions.

NOTES

1. Document S/8226, 7 November 1967.
2. Security Council Official Records, 22nd year, 1373rd meeting, 9 November 1967, p. 18, s. 164; 1377th meeting, 15 November 1967, p. 6, s. 54.
3. Ibid. 1373rd meeting, 9 November 1967, p. 12, s. 107.
4. Ibid. 1382nd meeting, 22nd November 1967, p. 7, s. 59.
5. Document S/8227, 7 November 1967.
6. See C. Rousseau, Principes généraux du droit international public, Vol. I, 1944, p. 722; and Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1961, p. 434.
7. See C. Rousseau, Droit international public, 1953, pp. 405-406.
8. Resolution A/RES/194(III) 1948, 11 December 1948.
9. Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Sirey, Paris, 1960).



(FIRST DRAFT)

SEMINAR: "SYSTEMATIC THINKING TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS  
OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT"

Some Implications of the Changing Power  
Ratios between Egypt and Israel\*

G. Sheffer

I

On the one hand a new symmetry has been established between the Super Powers' positions in the Middle East. On the other hand Egypt and Israel, which are still the most important factors in the core Middle East, have reached a situation of marked asymmetry in their power values. The main focus of this paper will be directed at drawing out some of the implications which emerge from such a new set of relationships between all four of the two pairs of states involved (The United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt and Israel.) Considering the implications, three fundamental questions will be asked - (i) are the trends which have led to the present set of relationship reversible? (ii) given the present trend, can or

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\* This paper is based on a detailed historical analysis of these processes that has been jointly prepared by Dr. N. Mandel and the present author and which will be published separately. In more than one sense the present paper is the product of that work.

should the Super Powers actually reach a meaningful level of cooperation leading to attempts at solving the Arab-Israeli conflict?; and (iii) in the changed global environment how can the regional states turn their predicament - essentially of being small states - to their advantage?

Put differently, our approach will be to start from the point that at present the two tiered Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g. Arab states vs. Israel, and some Palestinian segments vs. Israel) is basically a complex "non zero sum" conflict among regional states. Each of these states is supported by various regional and/or extra-regional factors. However, because of rapid shifts in the composition of these supporting factors (or in the intensity of their support), each of the states, plus their supporting factors, form loose coalitions. The behaviour of each small state towards its adversaries and towards its more permanent supporters, then becomes one of the focal points of the analysis. Another focal point is Super Power - small states relationships.

## II

Three features of the current reshuffle of the international system are also particularly relevant to our central theme. The first is that the two established Super Powers are moving towards a possibility of employing cooperative strategies vis-à-vis various international problems. The second is that additional powers are

striving to reach the apex of the international system. The third is that the two established Super Powers are moving away from a strategy of protecting their foreign interests in certain areas through massive presences abroad. A move towards the use of protégés or allies, as guardians of interests, is apparently the United States' intention not only in South East Asia, but also in the Middle East. More interesting, the Soviet Union seems to be in a process of adopting a similar main strategy in the Middle East as well.

### III

Different conceptions among global powers about the nature of domestic and international politics produce different foreign policy and strategic doctrines. These doctrines may be expected to result in different strategies and tactics towards specific issue areas or problems. However, it is striking that the United States and Russia (and, one could add, Great Britain before them) despite fundamental differences in temperament, basic values, ideologies and conceptions about international politics - have followed a basically similar "pattern of Presence" in the Middle East in recent years. They have also followed each other by deliberately modifying their strategies and tactics towards the states in the region.

Before proceeding to examine the similarities in the Super Powers' present positions and their implications, some inherent similarities in the objectives and reasoning behind the Supers{



actual policies in the recent past, which led to their present postures, call for brief mention in view of our questions regarding the probability of the reversibility of the pattern.

First, for example, as the Johnson administration's decisions regarding arms supply to Israel, and as the Soviet Union's swift reaction to Sadat's demands for the withdrawal of their forces may indicate, both Powers adopted and modified their policies and strategies in the region as a result of complex calculations and not merely by dint of circumstances. This point may look banal, but in our minds it implies that the cumulative effect of past decisions - and the lessons drawn from them by the Powers - are such that while they will continue to make deliberate decisions, these decisions are not likely to lead to a return to strategies already employed and proved unsatisfactory.

Another implication of this observation is that there may occur a time lag between the final stages of the implementation of one strategy or policy, and the move to a different strategy or policy, and to their implementation. Its corollary is that it provides small states with opportunities to pressurize, or persuade the Super Powers to take a course preferable to them, or to prepare to resist unfavourable decisions. This, of course, would depend on the small state's capability to accurately gauge the intentions of a Super Power.

The second inherent similarity in the reasoning behind the Powers' decisions towards the region, concerns the post-penetration patterns of their involvement and commitments.

According to the prevailing rules of the global and regional game, the United States and the Soviet Union were confronted, after the phase of penetrating the region, with a choice, for practical purposes, between just two feasible strategies : (i) that of establishing massive presence to protect their interests; and (ii) that of using protégés for that purpose.

Indeed until now, alternative strategies of either dividing the region into mutually recognized spheres of influence, one wholly based on intensive economic penetration or one of unilateral complete withdrawal, were apparently considered politically unfeasible. The question in the case of a stable détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, is whether each or both Super Powers may consider such options. If so, a decision in any such direction would mean a new trend in the Middle East with far-reaching implications.

The third similarity in the Super Powers' mode of thinking is that the shift from one of the two feasible strategies to the other depended on the order of priority which the Super Power attached to its various interests in the region.

The Super Powers' interest in the Middle East was never solely restricted to the region's geostrategic importance or to its oil. There were always four closely interwoven clusters of interests which the Supers weighed when determining their desiderata in the region

- \* The Diplomatic/Political Cluster - which includes inter alia regional states' diplomatic support for the Supers' interests in international and regional arenas and organizations, the frustration of penetration by other hostile or competing powers, or of other power drive to a hegemony.
- \* The Economic Cluster - which includes commerce (even though the Middle East has still to achieve its purported potential as a market); investments (both of foreign investors in projects in the region, and of regional states in external banking, industrial and investment enterprises) and finally, of course, the oil factor.
- \* The Geostrategic Cluster - the region's geographical location in relation to the flank of Europe, the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Subcontinent lends it importance.
- \* The Cultural/Religious Cluster - the region remains a market for the Powers' cultural "exports"; and it also contains the centres of two important religions (Islam and Judaism).



Again with the changes of the international system and of the postures adopted by the Super Powers, certain interests which in the recent past seemed to have been subordinated to the geostrategic or to the (oil) economic clusters and caused analysts to dismiss them as unimportant, may be moved up in the ladder of priorities.

Thus, for instance, in a multipolar peaceful ladder system the diplomatic/political cluster may acquire new importance. The investment element of the economic cluster has already become a major concern of the United States and the West. Acquiring markets for regular commerce is one of the chief targets of both Germany and Japan. The effects of a concerted Jewish action are felt by both the United States and the Soviet Union governments, as the issue of free Jewish emigration has been tied to questions related to the bilateral economic relations of these powers. Finally, the energy crisis will produce a certain far-reaching effect on both the small states and the Super Powers.

The order of priority which the Super Powers accorded to their various interests in the Middle East, altered against the background of their domestic and global conditions, but significantly also as a result of the behaviour of regional states.

The development to the present situation has been parallel for both of the Powers. Without going into historical details (covered in our separate paper) the phases for each power may be

summed up as follows: (1) The United States - (a) penetration during an assertive phase in its foreign policy (from the height of the Cold War onwards) by use of high-profile political presence, and Britain as a front runner. (b) Attempts at establishing massive military presences in view of wider strategic needs and in order to consolidate gains made during phase (a). (c) Contemporaneously, with phase (b) attempts to "reorganize" the area primarily by regional pacts. (d) In view of the limited success, if not failure, of phase (c), reliance on pro-Western stable regional protégés, most vividly through Israel, whose power value was reassessed, and through Iran.

(2) The Soviet Union - (a) penetration during a powerful reactive phase in their foreign policy, by exploiting small anti-western states in need of external support such as Syria and later Egypt. (b) cautious and slow-moving shift to massive military presences in order to consolidate gains made during phase (a), for instance in Egypt; and (c) in view of the high risks flowing from (b), a desire (now apparently on the way to realization) to rely on regional protégés, most vividly through Syria and Iraq.

Thus, currently the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves in almost completely symmetrical positions regarding the region as a whole and regarding certain states in it respectively. The underlying assumptions here are then that on

the one hand the Soviet Union has gradually relaxed her assertiveness towards the region, without losing her inherent interest in it, and that on the other hand, the United States is still very much involved in the region's politics, maintaining and probably also increasing its level of interest. Thus the Soviet Union is now not on the offensive and the United States is now not primarily the balancing power. Moreover, it seems as if the United States is even more committed to certain states (and not only to Israel) than the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States seems to be inclined towards political and diplomatic activities with Egypt in addition to Israel.

One further similarity is that both Super Powers share a problem of controlling their Middle Eastern protégés. This looms large in the light of a number of possible, or actual, developments on each of the following dimensions : the instability characterizing regional interstates relations (possible uncontrolled escalation of the conflict); attempts of penetration by the new emerging Super Powers (Japan and China) or other powers (Germany and France); and the Super Powers' own bilateral relations with other regional states (e.g. America and Saudi Arabia or Russia and Algeria); and the grading up in the importance of certain factors in the Middle East.

The control of the Middle Eastern protégés is a difficult matter. This is not only because the Super Powers are not in a



position to coerce the small states either by threats of force, or threats concerning arms supplies or economic aid. It is difficult to control them because of their distinctive features as small states which are involved in a protracted conflict.

#### IV

At this point some brief general remarks should be made about small states. It is facile and indeed unhelpful to say, as some do, that a small state is one which, in relation to others, is not large or medium-sized (no matter whether the yardsticks are simply the size of territory, population, GNP, or more sophisticated indicators such as scientific and technical capabilities, etc.) Moreover, it reveals little about the nature of the small state itself to view it in terms of the increment in power value it adds - or does not add to bigger ones or wider alliances in certain circumstances.

It is rather essential to focus on the intrinsic nature of the small state itself in order to understand its behaviour. We would therefore suggest that the small state's distinctive features lie in a special configuration of its "structural" and "behavioural" elements and in its high degree of dependence on its various external environments. This configuration in small states is different from that of medium-sized or big states.

In aggregate the small state's own components are likely to be inadequate for the solution of the major problems confronting it as an ongoing political entity. Hence it is forced into a marked degree of dependence on the external environment. From the small state's view-point the "dilemma of dependence" on the external environment is expressed in terms of how to find the optimum balance between maintaining its political independence and receiving of sufficient external help to overcome its inadequacies. Shifts in that delicate balance will determine the degree of Super Power readiness to support it as well as the manner which the small state will adopt in its relations to other powers or states.

The territorial size of a small state, the size of its population and its posture may distort perceptions of its true power quotient. It has taken the Super Powers almost two decades to recognize the asymmetry regarding Egypt and Israel. For Egypt tried with some success after the 1952 coup d'etat to behave like a medium-sized power, but by the mid-1960's, was exposed as a state of questionable power value. Israel, on the other hand, behaved from her establishment as a small state which, again by the mid-1960's has come to act as a medium-sized power in certain areas. It is, however, still questionable whether Egypt and Israel

have themselves fully recognized the implications of these distinctions. And this is probably now the crux of the Middle Eastern conflict.

V

In a sense it was "natural" for Egypt to think of herself as a medium-sized power in 1952, when the present regime came to power. With its vast territory and its large population, she could not prima facie regard herself as small by global standards, and especially within the Arab World where she was undoubtedly the most powerful state. But today, to illustrate one point, Egypt is in the position of having failed to balance her dependence on external markets and her political independence.

In aggregate, Egypt's limited military operative capability, her failures in pursuing foreign policies aimed at achieving long range policies, her low rate of scientific and technological development, her unsuccessful modernization and slow economic growth have in fact reduced Egypt's power value to that of a small state. As the regime's failures have become discernible and its dependence on the Soviet Union, Europe or on other Arab States (ironically, also on micro-states) indistinguishable, it has become difficult to continue to pursue previous policies for yet another reason. Domestic questions, including that of the "dilemma of dependence", have begun to loom large, and may oblige the



Egyptians to revise their perceptions of their country's size and, in turn, of her goals, capabilities and behaviour, particularly in her external affairs.

Over the same period Israel's development has been the opposite of Egypt's. In the early years of the State, Israel's awareness of her smallness was acute. Her small territory, population and her vulnerable borders prevented her from accurately conceiving of her real power potential. Nor was her self-image enhanced by the external environment. Both regional and global factors did not really accept that Israel would become a permanent element in the international system, whatever the merits of her case for existence might be.

However, Israel's awareness of her smallness has diminished over time. This process culminated with the Six-Day War in 1967 and its consequences. As is well accepted, Israel's power value has increased many times. In all spheres - territorially, militarily, economically, politically and socially - Israel has been transformed. But more importantly, from our point of view, Israel's sense of dependence on the external environment did not increase in proportion with her cultivation of her foreign markets - and this for several reasons, all the opposite of the Egyptian case, mutatis mutandis. First, as a result of her external connections, the predominant feeling in Israel gradually turned into being less

isolated, not more dependent. Second, Israel was successful in creating her external markets differentially, and with the minimum of Super Power penetration. Third, there had been a tendency towards segregation in decision-making, thus blurring Israel's general awareness of its aggregate inadequacy (although not necessarily reducing the urge for "self sufficiency" at all costs).

In contrast to Egypt, the net result of these developments (which have multiplier as well as cumulative effects) is that Israel's behaviour pattern in certain areas has been changed into one approximating to that of a power far larger than one of Israel's specific gravity. Thus, Israel has been flexing her new muscles and demonstrated that in the present international system a small state can possess the power not only to withstand efforts to have Super Power designs imposed upon it, but can also bring about modifications in Super Power strategies.

The changed pattern of power relationships between Egypt and Israel seems clear. It is one of Egypt growing steadily weaker, facing an Israel growing steadily stronger. And in the same way as one can ask whether the trends in the Super Powers' pattern are reversible, one can ask whether the trends at the lower tier - between Egypt and Israel - are likely to change. Our estimate is that they will not, and that the asymmetry will become more pronounced.

This assumption, together with the assumption that the symmetry in the relationships between the Super Powers in the region will continue, form the basis for the next part of this paper. It addresses itself to the implications of the present position as we have presented it.

Before proceeding, three wider assumptions, connected with the global system, which will function as parameters on the behaviour of all the actors in our two-tiered relationship, must be recalled. They are:-

- (i) the broad détente between America and Russia will be extended;
- (ii) China, Japan and Europe will vigorously promote their economic and/or political interests;
- (iii) the energy crisis will be aggravated.

## VI

The implications can be discussed on five interrelated levels:-

- (i) Egyptian and Israeli domestic affairs;
- (ii) regional interstate relations;
- (iii) relations between the regional states and the Super Powers and/or other extraregional powers;
- (iv) relations between the Super Powers and other extraregional powers; and
- (v) mutual relations between the Super Powers over the Middle East.



There are at least two major implications on the level of the Egyptian and Israeli domestic affairs. The first is that regardless of global conditions affecting each of these states, and regardless of the defence or foreign policies that their governments may adopt, the full realization of the changes in their power ratios is bound to induce wide sections of the populations in both countries to demand desegregation of the important decision areas. That is to say, the public will tend to exert pressures on the political elites to consider foreign and defence policies not in isolation, but in relation to social, economic and domestic political issues. These pressures may create new dilemmas for the policy-making elites, which will in turn influence their future decisions regarding the questions of dependence on external markets, as well as their relations with their adversaries.

The second implication is that when that asymmetry becomes very clear, the internal polarization of the politically aware segments of the population may increase. This is already evident in Israel where its newly recognized power has had a polarizing effect on the public in a manner that cuts across the traditional political lines.

(ii) While there are similarities in the implications of the situation on the domestic level, the implications on the level of attitudes towards regional interstate relations may assume

different characteristics in respect of each side. Israel is capable of choosing between two feasible alternative active policies (apart from a decision to maintain the status quo, which may become less probably in view of the growing internal polarization). One active policy is that of annexation of the occupied territories, and the other a more "aggressive" policy towards partial or interim settlement which may cost Israel a withdrawal from parts of Sinai, (and other occupied territories).

Egypt seems bound, (unless there is a radical change in her attitudes or unless she launches a "crazy" strategy like the use of nuclear weapons or total withdrawal, which are both of low probability and should be discussed at length separately,) to opt for maintaining of the regional political status quo, as she is likely to lose out if she chooses either to attack Israel or to agree to negotiate. Although in these circumstances, a strong isolationist tendency may develop in Egypt, it is also conceivable that in the meantime she may try to promote federative ideas in an attempt to establish some form of union with other Arab countries which may compensate it for her own inadequacies. However, particularly in view of the energy crisis, such a move to stabilize her coalition is not likely to be enthusiastically accepted by oil-producing Arab states, on whom she is heavily dependent. The possibility that Egypt may be able to establish and use her own system of protégés has of course been considerably reduced. On

the other hand, Israel will be able to pursue more confidently her shadowy role as the protecting power for the weaker Arab states on her borders.

(iii) On the level of the relations between the regional states and the Super Powers and/or other extra regional Powers - the increasing power value of Israel and the new posture of the two established Super Powers, reduces to zero any probability that any Super Power or any other extraregional power, would seriously consider a long range strategy aimed at eliminating Israel (or Egypt).

Regarding the Super Powers, the phases of their experience in the region are likely to indicate to them that it is both extremely difficult and unprofitable to attempt to "reorganize" the area or to aim at establishing defence pacts. On the contrary, the energy crisis which has led the Oil Producing Countries to establish an organization of their own will probably induce the Super Powers to aim at dealing separately with the various regional states and to encourage local nationalism - a policy that Israel would undoubtedly support.

Only the Soviet Union, which is cautiously supporting the weaker side of the pair ((Egypt), may more seriously attempt to approach the stronger side of the pair (Israel). By this the Russians may acquire new leverage on their other protégés. It is



unlikely that the United States would go out of its way to undertake full support of the weaker side of the Middle Eastern pair in view of its gains through supporting Israel. For what might be labelled as a "counter domino theory" had been worked on the ground to the satisfaction of the United States. This "theory" would imply that once a significant American "piece" holds up, other "pieces" will hold up too; the process has a "carry forward effect" and so additional gains may be forthcoming, as the recent cases of Sudan, Yemen, some of the Trucial States, and Jordan may indicate. A possible qualification which seems reasonable to suggest is that the United States may consider a reduction in its support for Israel on the assumption that (i) an alternative "key" domino (e.g. Iran) can be firmly erected and (ii) Israel will master enough capabilities for most contingencies.

A reduction in the commitment or the support of a Super Power towards its protégé, which nevertheless is still in need of dependence on outside sources for its continued existence as an independent political unit, may induce that state to seek support from new sources. The changes in the international system, and particularly the emergence of new rich powers, would facilitate the regional states' endeavours in this direction - this especially in view of the energy crisis, and European and Japanese purchases of Middle Eastern oil. These countries are also anxious to encourage economic relations,

including arms sales on a pure commercial basis. Such developments would impinge on trends at the next level.

On the level of the relations between the Supers and other extraregional powers - again the game would be complicated. But its most probable features are those of tension on the one hand, between the United States and Europe and Japan, and on the other hand between Russia and China and Europe.

The cause for this tension and a source of complication is that these countries may make serious bids for influence on the protégés of the two established Super Powers (V) on the fifth level, that of mutual relations between the two established Super Powers over the Middle East, and particularly as regards Egypt and Israel; it seems that basically each of them has three feasible courses of action, two involve cooperation and the third is uncooperative: they can either (i) attempt to maintain the status quo, (ii) try to push their protégés towards some kind of an interim or partial settlement, (iii) determine their own objectives and pursue them without paying much attention to conflicting or competing forces. The adoption of the third strategy has a low probability in view of our parameters. Pursuing the first would increase the risk of other powers' penetration and of independent Egyptian or Israeli action. Promoting a process towards a settlement without specifying ultimate goals and without drastically changing their commitments

to their respective protégés, or dividing the area into spheres of influence may turn out to be their best middle range policy in this situation.

Summing up these implications, the outcomes for both of our pairs of actors appear to be as follows: (whose symmetrical interest in the region will continue because of a new ordering of the priorities.)

As regards the Supers' interests, their most feasible strategy would seem to be to work in parallel towards some processes which may eventually lead to an interim or partial settlement of the Egypt-Israel conflict. But in so doing, the cooperation or coincidence of interest between the Supers will probably not be emphasized, in order to avoid weakening their standing in relation to their respective protégés and/or facilitating the entry of other competing exterearegional powers. Such a strategy may have a stabilizing effect on the Middle Eastern system.

As regards the regional, their asymmetrical power relationship will continue. However, changes in their attitudes towards solving the conflict between themselves will not be immediate, given the time lag between the realities of the growing asymmetry and the recognition of its full implications. Ultimately Egypt may revise her self-image and modify her assessment of her foreign policy options accordingly. Likewise Israel may recognize that in view



of her growing power value she also enjoys a wider series of foreign policy options, including the possibility of influencing the Super Powers directly. But as of now, Egypt will apparently stick to the policy of maintaining the political status quo in the region (since any alternative by her present lights is less desired), while Israel can choose between a variety of active choices (provided that the growing domestic polarization does not lead to a continuation of a totally non-active foreign policy). If indeed the international system will be that of stable peace with islands of unstable peace, the Middle East will continue to be one of these unstable islands.

## OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

by

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Prepared for the Seminar :

"Systematic Thinking Towards Alternative Solutions of the Arab-Israel Conflict"

It is easy to construct models on how the Arab-Israel conflict may be resolved but, it is more difficult to contrive how to put history on the rails of such models and induce it to move submissively in the right direction. Political scientists, historians and specialists in international relations may prescribe methods to end this conflict, based on generalizing from analogies with other conflicts as if there are commercial patent medicaments for conflicts and as if wisdom distilled from their learning is sufficient to ordain them as general practitioners and healers, absolving them from the need to learn the specifics of this conflict. Some hasten to offer detailed prognosis without tarrying on diagnosis, as if it were only a superfluous technical detail.

In this paper I shall undertake the unpleasant task of describing some of the specific difficulties lying in the way of settling this conflict, some of the factors that contribute to its obduracy. These factors are not necessarily insurmountable and they do not enjoin eternity on the conflict. They may someday disappear. However, as long as they are in force they constitute components of paramount importance in their influence on the developments of the conflict and its resolution. They are gordian knots which have to be cut.

This paper is limited to an analysis of the present situation and does not at all involve policy recommendations. It does not pretend to preach to

any of the protagonists what their position should be or criticize them. Criticism is levelled only in cases of refusal to see the outcome of such positions.

#### The Gap Between the Contestants.

As a result of the Six Day War there has been a move from the Arab side towards acceptance of Israel. If the gap was somehow closed from the Arab side, Israel's demands for territorial changes, notwithstanding their justification, have enlarged the gap.

I have discerned four schools of thought among the Arabs on the conflict (Gesher, December, 1972) :

- a) Peace school. Those who would like to conclude a peace agreement and liquidate the conflict.
- b) Tactical school. These Arabs advocate announcing acceptance of the 242 resolution as a public relations gesture, for the Arabs, they reason, do not run the risk of having to pay the penalty of such acceptance by recognizing Israel and concluding peace with her, since Israel cannot allow herself to accept the resolution and will obstruct its implementation.
- c) Strategic schools. These desire that the 242 resolution would be implemented, but do not consider that a peace settlement will terminate the conflict. In the long run, coexistence between Israel and the Arabs is impossible. Thus, the conflict will re-erupt. However, implementation of the 242 resolution will improve the Arab position.
- d) Rejecting any settlement. These argue that the Arabs will close the technological gap which gave victory to Israel. The quantitative factor is constant, while the qualitative variable can be changed. Numbers will ultimately prevail, provided the conflict continues to blaze.



My guess is that the center of gravity among the Arabs lies with the second school.

The spectrum of positions in Israel ranges from holding to the present lines to, at most, readiness to return to the 1949-1967 lines. Motivation varies from emotional, historical, religious considerations to the more pragmatic considerations of security. One cannot belittle the importance of religious nationalist vindication that the anxieties on the eve of the war, the sudden alleviation of victory, and the frustrations the aftermath gave rise to. However, when the chips are down it seems to me security considerations will predominate. The central majority of Israeli public opinion and, what is more important, the governmental position calls for significant changes in the boundaries as dictated by security considerations.

Israel's sensitivity to its security stems not only from the urge to ensure its existence but also to ensure the continuance of its "success story." Other states may exist if they are not successful. But Israel's success is imperative for its existence. This, at least, is the conviction of both its leaders and many of its people, who believe that otherwise it will not attract the necessary immigration and capital. No doubt this is a weakness which may one day pass. One can criticize it and even ridicule or condemn it. However, for the present, it is an operative factor of utmost importance.

Moderate Arabs demand Israeli withdrawal to the 1949-1967 lines. They consider that such withdrawal from the present lines is not a concession for which they have to pay in territorial terms, but simply a fulfillment of an international injunction for which Israel will be handsomely remunerated by the sheer conclusion of a peace agreement. They deny any justification for satisfying Israel's security sensitivities.

If all the Arabs were moderates, perhaps Israel's security vindication could be more limited. But the fact that there are important extremist circles

and states who call for Israel's liquidation will loom heavily on any settlement with a moderate state. Israel will not be able to treat a settlement with one of its neighbours as if it had been made with all of them.

The gap between the contestants can be seen in the following examples:

The claim to the Golan seems natural and self-explanatory to most Israelis, even the moderates -- at least the strip of the Golan heights dominating the settlements in the Hula valley. The Syrians, if they came around to agree to a settlement with Israel, may consider the Golan rise as the only obstacle on the road to Damascus. It is unthinkable that Syria will be ready to give up the Golan when it changes its present mood of absolute rejection of a peace settlement. Egypt, too, as an ally of Syria, cannot reach a settlement that returns Sinai but not the Golan.

Jerusalem is a very difficult bone of contention. The position which commands a wide consensus in Israel, i. e., united Jerusalem under Israel sovereignty, is unacceptable to Jordan and the other Arab states.

These are a few examples of the gap between Israel and the Arab states.

Many doves in Israel deceive themselves if they think that peace can be achieved on their terms. The Israel hawks feast on a corpse which the doves have slaughtered.

The settlement which may at present be tolerable to some Arab circles is not acceptable to most moderates in Israel. This hard fact should not be swept under any carpet.

It is always self-comforting to dismiss positions that upset expectations on the grounds that they are only opening positions, and that a compromise will be struck mostly by the rivals' retreat. Such hopes may be self-defeating. Thus, negotiations between the rivals may not only be beneficial by closing the gaps, but may be destructive, as both sides will realize the width

of the gap, which may make them even more intransigent. Negotiations that fail may be more harmful than no negotiations.

### The Structure of the Conflict

Most conflicts have been between two entities, be they two states, or two coalitions. The structure of this conflict is rather unusual : One entity - the State of Israel, against a multiplicity of entities - the Arab states and the Palestinians. This structure produces paradoxical results. In times of war it makes it difficult for the Arabs to coordinate their action, and thus efficiency is impaired. It makes it difficult to achieve peace, as there will always be extremist factors who would oppose peace and incite against it.

The conflict is a burden only to a minority of the Arab states - the states contiguous to Israel and the Palestinians. The rest, and especially such states as Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, even derive benefits from the continuation of the conflict as a means of diverting internal discontent. The conflict serves, for some states, as a safeguard against attempts by other states (like Egypt) to foment revolution. The states who have no interest in the termination of the conflict, though they are not directly involved in the conflict, exercise pressure on the other states not to make peace and they are ready to subsidize the conflict as long as it does not run wild and jeopardize their interests, such as oil.

It is hardly thinkable that Egypt can reach a settlement with Israel against the opposition of Libya and Syria. In fact, Egypt, in the Treaty of Federations, accepted the obligation that important issues like peace, war and sovereignty (territory) should be determined by a unanimous vote of the three presidents. Syria and Libya may tolerate a settlement with Israel only if it will be transitory and prejudicial to Israel's interests. However, such an eventuality will be opposed by Israel.



Arab tolerance of a protracted conflict.

A small state beaten by a big one will tend to resign itself to the results of the showdown as a final verdict of history. A big state defeated by a small one may tend to rebel. Despite their disunity and violence, the Arabs consider themselves as constituting a communality, greater than Israel in area, manpower, resources, religion, allies and supporters and the justice of their cause. History, many believe, will eventually vindicate their cause and the balance of power will be reversed. Israel's victories, though impressive, are not such that they leave no alternatives but to seek peace. The Arabs can absorb defeats.

The Arabs can sustain the stance of no peace and no war from a long time. Furthermore, the U.N. and the big powers shield them from pressure to choose between these alternatives. The present world-order not only contributes to the resolution of conflicts, but their perpetuation as well.

For most Arab actors the present situation of no solution is not at all intolerable, so that they may not feel a compulsion to opt for a settlement. True, for Egypt the termination of the present situation has become an obsession, though to a great extent artificial. Golan is not less important to Syria than Sinai to Egypt. Still, Syria is not preoccupied with "the battle to regain the lost territories" as Egypt is. Egypt may try to lower the importance of Sinai in national priorities, i. e. , act deliberately to Golanize (alias Taiwanize) Sinai and thus allow for the present situation to go on.

The West Bank is a Jordanian desideratum, though with some ambiguities, as the Jordanian establishment may fear that its return would strengthen the Palestinian element and endanger the Jordanian domination. Jordan may fear to make peace alone in the teeth of the opposition of the other Arab States.

### The Palestinians.

The Palestinians constitute a difficult hurdle in any settlement of the conflict. It will be superfluous to repeat my analysis and argumentation which appeared in the Gesher article and the article : "The Problem of the Palestinians."

The Palestinians in the West Bank are not a political, autonomous factor with whom a settlement can be achieved. At most, in the present stage they may be Israel's partners in practical (not political) arrangements which in a cumulative way may assume political significance. The debate on the West Bank is inconsequential if the problem of means is not treated along with aims. In the present stage of deadlock, these areas are more than "Shtahim Muhzakim" - they are, regrettably, "Shtahim Mahzikim." The problem is not whether it is desirable to annex them, but also how to dispense with them.

The contradiction between Israel and the P. L. O. is antagonistic. The clash is on the idea of Jewish statehood, whatever its size, which Israel does not give up and they do not agree to. They define the "solution of the Palestinian Problem" or "the restoration of Palestinian rights" in a fashion which is not compatible with the existence of the State of Israel. Despite their failures they constitute a hard core of irredentism.

### Radicalization in Arab Societies.

Arab societies are in the throes of a grave crisis which is political, social and cultural at the same time - a general malaise. All expectations of political, social and cultural achievements have been disappointed. Internal disintegration, alienation, nihilism, a feeling of collective nothingness are rife. As a prominent poet bewailed, "we are consumers of civilization not its producers." This malaise drives Arabs to look for a remedy in a total

revolution and towards radicalization which is evident in the young generation. (A. Hottinger. "The Depth of Arab Radicalism", Foreign Affairs, April 1973; and my own analysis in Arab Lessons from their Defeat, "Am Oved", Tel-Aviv, 1969.) Frustration begets greater radicalization in a vicious circle.

Hottinger sees radicalization taking one direction towards the left, which he evaluates will sweep the conservative regimes and subvert them. It seems to me that radicalization may take a polarized form of social anti-Islamic radicalization and Islamic plus social radicalization epitomized by Qadhafi.

In fact, the conflict has recently been more counter-revolutionary than revolutionary, as the external emergency it produces diverts attention and pressure for internal change. However, for both brands of radicalization, the conflict and the hostility to Israel are important weapons. For lack of a proletariat with class consciousness and revolutionary peasantry, many left radicals, in their realization that they cannot engineer a revolution on the Marxist or Maoist models, pin their hopes that the conflict, by the heat it generates, will usher in the revolutionary situation. Thus, they need the conflict outside of the narrower confines of Jews versus Arabs, as a main agent and a catalyst of salvation. Furthermore, their opposition to Israel is vehement as they consider that the struggle against her is of class nature as well, between Arab toilers and Israel, which is by nature bourgeois, representing the forces of imperialism and foreign domination. A good socialist Israel, they explain, is a contradiction in terms.

Islamic radicalization injects new life into the caustic anti-Jewish elements in Islam and for it, the conflict serves as a means to galvanize the Arabs under the banner of Islam and Arabism.

Internal developments in Arab society are an important component in any evaluation of the factors which affect the Arab-Israel conflict. Radical-



ization may give rise to countervailing forces. Yet, balancing the possible eventualities, it seems that these trends, even if not culminating in revolution, may produce instability which in itself is not conducive to a conciliatory mood needed for a settlement of the conflict.

### The Depth of the Conflict

Though the conflict is originally political as a contention over land, it has spilled over into cultural, psychological, ideological fields. The great efforts by Arabs to ideologize the conflict has consolidated and reinforced their position. The Arab position in the conflict is not limited to the political, diplomatic level, but has seeped into the national level and is now enshrined in national writs and included in the educational system. True, Israel is not the sole concern of the Arabs, yet they have forged their national thought on the anvil of the conflict to a greater extent than could have been expected. Thus, a real change towards permanent, as distinct from transitory, acceptance of coexistence with Israel is not a diplomatic or political act, but a national transformation; not a change of a norm but of a value.

Frequent descriptions that extreme steps taken by Arab leaders were meant to satisfy a public pressure or were motivated by their urge for popularity imply that hostility against Israel is popular, as only by manipulating a popular symbol can one achieve popularity.

Changing Arab demonological imagery of Israel, though important in itself, does not necessarily impinge on their political stance. Arabs did not reject Israel because of depraved imagery of the Jewish hatred. They first and foremost rejected Israel and that influenced their emotions and conceptions of Israel and the Jews. Thus, a change in the imagery of Israel, starting in the West Bank and spreading elsewhere by Arab visitors, does not affect the political position, for example, of Libya or Egypt. It does not touch upon the nub of the conflict. If, previously, Arabs complained that "nasty Jews usurped the land" they, at most, may now concede that "nice Jews usurped the land."

The real grievance of usurping is not modulated by the cognitive dissonance between the goodness of the perpetrators and the evilness of their act.

The Six Day War has perhaps persuaded most Arabs that the liquidation of Israel is not on the order of the day. It has not convinced many of them that this hope had to be given up altogether. Postponing the achievement of such an objective may eschatologize it and eventually deprive it of practical importance. This is only a possibility but by no means a necessity. Furthermore, this is not the way that the "second school," who considers a settlement as transitory, sees it. There is no evidence that their pronouncements about the continuation of the conflict after the settlement are only a public relations device to throw dust in the eyes of their detractors.

The Arab position may change in the future. In the last scores of years, Arab ideology was a better guide to the main thrust of Arab behaviour than diplomatic exchanges. Diplomatic transactions, seemingly portending a change in the Arab position, were like ripples on the main tide of Arab rejection of Israel which their ideology portrayed and which did not affect the mainstream. Repeatedly, it transpired that the change was only verbal. Chancelleries and diplomats (including Israelis) were reluctant to acknowledge it, presumably as it seemed downgrading to their art. Historians and Political Scientists too may be fascinated by the episodic day-dreams of "ifs." History then hinges on a grotesque procession of missed opportunities. Arab leaders' faint and mostly ambiguous expression of a change in their position are then described to be like the momentary opening of the skies at Pentecost (Shavuot) midnight which lapses unless instantaneously seized upon. However, the texture of basic trends in history is woven of cords of social forces rather than the flimsy cobweb of fleeting spasms in individuals.

I do not claim at all that Israeli diplomacy has always been wise and adept. Unfortunately, I came to the sour conclusion that, even had it been a paragon of wisdom, it would not have changed basically the substance of the Arab stand. Only those who are intoxicated with their own wisdom consider that the rival cannot withstand the overwhelming effect of their persuasiveness.

Let us acknowledge that Arab rejection of Israel is not only an expression of malice. People express their human quality by rebelling against what they consider unjust. It is the grandeur of man to sometimes say No.

I do not imply that diplomacy is of no importance. Far from it. But it seems that diplomacy follows changes in reality more than it creates them. The change in the Arab position has started and will hopefully continue.

It does not mean that change is unilateral on their side, excluding us. Let us postpone the blowing of the horn for the Messiah's arrival to the time when he really comes.

The tragedy of the conflict, from the Israeli side, lies in the fact that deep feeling of injustice the Arabs harbour induced an extremely pugnacious obdurate position on their side. In its turn, it may produce an extreme unconsidering nationalistic position on the Israeli side. Symmetry will be achieved to Israel's moral loss. That too will produce a grave obstacle to peace. The way to combat such developments is not by facile prescriptions of solutions, nor lighthearted prognostications of imminent peace which will court disappointments and hardening of the position, but spreading better knowledge on the realities of the conflict. The alternatives in this conflict were never so-called optimism versus pessimism, but sober description versus cavalier misleadings. Understanding the tragedy of this conflict, with all its inconveniences, is the first line of defence against the deformation, moral, social and political, that the conflict may cause.