

9/12/73

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

מס' תיק

סג' אכ"ר אכ"ר יגל החמ"ר אכ"ר

אזע והמט"ל ב"ר אכ"ר אכ"ר

הנ"ל קיסוס (22.10.1973)

10/1973 - 10/1973



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מחלקה

לשכת ראש הממשלה

מס' תיק מקורי

7047/445

Chaya Naor
4 Rehov Tziporin
Ramat HaSharon

October 23, 1973

Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

B I L L

For recording and transcribing two meetings held
between Prime Minister G. Meir and Dr. Kissinger of US and
their staff members, on October 22, 1973, in Tel-Aviv:

Recording fee:	IL. 50.00
Transcript: (immediate copy)	
34 pages at IL. 5.- :	<u>170.00</u>
TOTAL:	IL 220.00 =====



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LUNCHEON MEETING

Tel-Aviv
Monday, October 22, 1973
3 p.m.

Participating:

USA:

Dr. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary
of State

Mr. Joseph Sisco, Asst. Sec'y of
State

Mr. Alfred Atherton

Ambassador K. Keating

Mr. R. McCloskey

Mr. Lord

Mr. Eagleburger

Mr. Rodman

ISRAEL:

Prime Minister Golda Meir

Deputy Prime Minister
Y. Allon

Defense Minister M. Dayan

Foreign Minister A. Eban

Mr. Kidron, Foreign Office

Mr. Evron, Foreign Office

Mr. M. Gazit, Prime
Minister's Office

Mr. Y. Rabin

ERASABLE

BOND

NO CONTENT

NOTE: In addition to the recorded conversations, there were separate, simultaneous conversations going on from time to time among the participants, which were inaudible.

DR. KISSINGER: I have to tell the other Israelis here - I have already told the Prime Minister - you have an absolute guarantee in our Ambassador. He has never been on the losing side in a war. You should have seen some of his reactions when we made proposals you didn't agree with. You only made your point once but he wouldn't stop.

MR. ALLON: What you said about your Ambassador, was that supposed to be a compliment?

DR. KISSINGER: I have a certain pleasure because in the Indian-Pakistani war when we said units had returned to the status quo - he sent me the most outraged telegrams, when he was in India. This time I was glad to see he is taking the Pakistani view. (laughter).

MR. EBAN: Have the Indians become reconciled now?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, yes, we have excellent relations now with India.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Since I left.

MR. EBAN: She was very abrasive.

MRS. MEIR: There you have a nice Prime Minister, no intransigent. She is not stubborn, she always gives in, she never goes to war. Nice woman.

MR. EBAN: She doesn't believe in the acquisition of territory by force.

MR. SISCO : My comment was this - you both win wars.

DR. KISSINGER: All the women prime ministers are in Sisco's area.

MRS. MEIR! That's right, all three of them. How can you take that?

MR. SISCO: I love it. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: I will never forget, during 1957 Khrishna Menon for hours and hours would preach to us about why we didn't go back. And then they did that trick on Goa. And he came back and at the airport, the newspaper man asked him: What about Goa? He lifted his cane - Goa, that's his, that's different.

(Mrs. Meir toasts Le-Hayim, folbwd by separate conversations among participants)

DR. KISSINGER: Are you going to get some sleep?

MRS. MEIR: I slept for two hours.

DR. KISSINGER: You look very well.

MRS. MEIR: This is psychological warfare against Sadat. We look so well.

MR. EBAN: These long periods with no tension do that.

MRS. MEIR: Last night about 8 o'clock, Mrs. Kedar said to me: Look, everything is quiet. Go home, watch television together with your grandchildren. I said: Okay. And then: boom. I didn't get out of the room until 8:30 this morning.

GEN. DAYAN (referring to message he has been handed):
... that we got from you and from Russia that Sadat announced that he is ready to stop the fire and hostile acts starting with

1700 hours Egyptian time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is the same as yours?

GEN. DAYAN: It's 6 o'clock our time. And he is asking whether Israel is ready to do the same.

DR. KISSINGER: Officially, through us?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

DR. KISSINGER: We have a message that they want an official statement from you. But you make it on your own. We don't have to intermediate for that.

MR. ALLON: Didn't we made an official statement when we published the decision of the Cabinet?

MRS. MEIR: Yes, but that was not in hours.

MR. EBAN: It means containing a time.

MRS. MEIR: All we need now I think is that we have accepted that, and that an order has been sent to the forces.

GEN. DAYAN: I told the Chief of Staff if we get an official communique from the Egyptians or anybody that they accept the cease-fire and if on the ground our forces can see that the do stop, then we stop at the time. So we have to have two announcements; one, a formal announcement that they are accepting the cease fire, and then a practical one to see that they are stopping the fire, and our forces have been notified about that already.

DR. KISSINGER: Did you notify anybody that you have told this to us? We are not asking for it, but should we do it?

MRS. MEIR: That these are the orders that were given, is that it?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not asking. You can do it on your radio.

MRS. MEIR: No, we can let you know.

GEN. DAYAN: This is an order that was given to the forces. Now, the question is have we got an official statement?

DR. KISSINGER: We have an official communication which we have been asked to transmit to you.

GEN. DAYAN: So once we get this communication and you tell me that you say they are going to do it, then I can tell the forces that once we have to do that, we have to anticipate it, and it is about 6 o'clock, and if they really stop firing then we stop too.

MR. EBAN: To use the same channel that they used to transmit it to us would be normal.

DR. KISSINGER: Us? Then, why don't we communicate to them that we have their message and that you are prepared to stop 1800 hours your time, provided their forces actually carry out the orders which have been published on Cairo Radio. Larry, do it now please.

MRS. MEIR: From Syria, it is quiet.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: The Iraqis have said they do not accept it.

MRS. MEIR: Look, you people will have to do something about the difference in time. You don't know what happened. Sapir was in the States for about 5 or 6 days, and my military attache, poor man, I don't think he slept for two hours any night. Every night he kept calling him and saying: Tell me what is the news. He didn't sleep much anyhow. And what we do to Simha is terrible. He asked me yesterday if the Secretary will come here can he come, so I said: sure. But then it was too short.

When do you get it in fact? (Referring to Nobel Prize)

DR. KISSINGER: On December 10 in Oslo. The Swedes have not invited me. Normally the winner goes to the cathedral in Stockholm for a prayer service, but they have cancelled that for me. I don't think I'd be the ideal subject for a Lutheran service anyway.

GEN. DAYAN (returning to room): Apparently there is no difference between Egyptian time and Israeli time. That means 1700 hours, but that will be only 11 hours from the Security Council resolution.

MR. EBAN: The resolution said no more than 12 hours.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: I don't wonder the Egyptians want to stop a little quicker.

GEN. DAYAN: What should we do about it? I would rather not stop before the 12 hours are up.

DR. KISSINGER: That is in your domestic jurisdiction. I will be on an airplane.

GEN. DAYAN: And that is only about Egypt. No message from Syria.

DR. KISSINGER: The reason you won this war is because I didn't give you any advice on strategy. I am not going to start on the last day.

MR. EBAN: But you expressed a strong interest in developments.

GEN. DAYAN: I suggest we say that we stop according to the UN resolution.

DR. KISSINGER: Just say you stop at 1800 hours provided - what we are communicating to the Russians is that we have been informed you will stop at 1800 hours provided the Egyptians forces in fact stop firing. And we are also communicating that to the Egyptians. I will tell you one thing, Madame Prime Minister, you get more information than my current colleagues did before I assumed my present position. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: Is it cold in Moscow?

MR. SISCO: Very cold, very penetrating.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Wet?

MR. SISCO: No. We had a little snow the other day but it cleared down.

MR. ALLON: Maybe they will need some more grain next year.

MRS. MEIR: We say we are subsidizing the Russians.

DR. KISSINGER: How?

MRS. MEIR: By paying more for grain.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, not everything has been shipped yet. Our unions have refused to load because of the Soviet actions in the Middle East.

MR. EBAN: George Meany made some robust comments on the detente.

DR. KISSINGER: It is all right for him to do it. I don't think the detente has worked to Israel's disadvantage.

(referring to message). Cairo Radio, we have been told, President Sadat has given his orders to the armed forces to cease fire at the time specified by the UN Security Council resolution, conditional upon Israel observing the cease fire. So, no problems, exactly the same thing. Will you say this on your radio? It might be a good idea.

MR. EBAN: Did the Security Council give a specific time?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it said no later than 12 hours. I would just give the exact hour.

MR. EBAN: Someone has to fix what the lines and positions are.

MRS. MEIR: Nobody knows who is going to decide where anybody is. What is the line where we have to stop.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Positions as they are.

MRS. MEIR: Who is going to decide the positions?

MR. ALLON: No mechanism has been set up?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but I think we could propose a UN force tomorrow. We could put the UNTSO personell in.

MR. SISCO: It is a question if you want to avoid any formal Security Council proceedings. I would think if one of the other parties got in touch with your Chief of Staff on the ground and ask that he assist in helping to arrange the practical elements of the cease fire, this is the way to do it without getting involved in a lot of these formal proceedings in the UN. My judgement is that he has sufficient mandate.

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't you do it? It may cause one phone call again with Waldheim. You didn't keep him here very long. I am trying to farm him out for two months every year to each country.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: He didn't go over very well here. He wasn't properly briefed.

DR. KISSINGER: In the early stages of the crisis, he called me about three times a day.

(To Mr. Eban) Are you coming back to New York?

MR. EBAN: It depends if there is any ^{thing} useful or necessary for me to do. I am coming anyway in December.

DR. KISSINGER: You will come to Washington for a longer period. I think we have really exemplary contact.

MR. ALLON: When are we starting peace negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we can get started pretty soon. I have talked with the Prime Minister. And this is a firm understanding between us.

MR. ALLON: The Syrians and Egyptians ... vis-a-vis prisoners of war, I don't know why. This is a good chance to get our boys out.

DR. KISSINGER: We have an understanding - we cannot say it publicly - that both sides will use their maximum influence to bring about release of prisoners immediately. We are now using our influence with you to release your prisoners, which you are willing to do. We will inform them of this.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Henry, you know they have not given a list of prisoners.

MR. ALLON: Only a few names.

DR. KISSINGER: When I have my press conference I will say there must be an immediate release of prisoners, exchange of prisoners.

(At this point, several simultaneous conversations take place)

GEN. DAYAN: You see, we more or less told our people we will not agree to a cease fire unless we will get our prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: I have been given reason to believe that-

GEN. DAYAN: It is all right with us if we get it from you, ^{we} won't ask you-

DR. KISSINGER: Let's say I told you. I don't want to say it flatly - how could we say it? I have told you that we can

expect release of prisoners.

GEN. DAYAN: That there will be an exchange of prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you see I have been told the Russians will use their influence.

GEN. DAYAN: Well, I am afraid we will be in trouble.

DR. KISSINGER: When I give my press conference, I can express my understanding easily. But what I am trying to avoid is that you speak for me which will produce a negative reaction before I can even say something in America.

GEN. DAYAN: We don't have to mention you. It is enough if we say we have been assured that there will be an early exchange of prisoners, without mentioning your name.

DR. KISSINGER: Won't they ask by whom?

GEN. DAYAN: We are not obliged to answer.

MRS. MEIR: Just a week ago last Tuesday, I made a statement in the Knesset that there will be no cease fire agreement without exchange of prisoners. If I am not in a position to say we have been informed that this will be-

DR. KISSINGER: Can't you say you are confident?

MR. ALLON: But if Henry is making a statement to the press.

DR. KISSINGER: It will be on Wednesday.

GEN. DAYAN: If we order our troops to stop firing without having an assurance that there will be exchange of prisoners we will be in trouble. We will be reproached about why we agreed to stop firing before getting such a promise.

DR. KISSINGER: Can you hold it by saying you have been assured, without saying by whom?

MRS. MEIR: Yes.

GEN. DAYAN: An early exchange of prisoners.

MR. RABIN: When will you be able to say so?

DR. KISSINGER: Wednesday.

MR. RABIN: Can't you say it tomorrow?

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe. I have to talk to McCloskey.

MR. ALLON: If it is tomorrow, then the Prime Minister can quote you.

DR. KISSINGER: That would be the best. Maybe I can get McCloskey to say it tomorrow. Well, you can count on our saying it.

MRS. MEIR: That would be best. They won't forgive us, and they shouldn't.

MR. EBAN: There is a time factor. We would like it to be on the wires before we begin at the Knesset tomorrow. We begin at 3.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, we are sending a message to the Soviets now.

(to Mr. Eban). How would you like to have Allon as a student, Mr. Foreign Minister? It is not conducive to strict discipline.

MR. ALLON: He is against me, because he went to another university.

DR. KISSINGER: The only thing I would need is to have Dayan also as a student. I have had more trouble with Israeli generals.

GEN. DAYAN: Once in six years they are all right.

DR. KISSINGER: We wanted to borrow you for Vietnam.

GEN. DAYAN: I think our maneuvers on the Egyptian front were really ? and very successful, very successful. Today we are getting the best dividends. It is a pity you came too early. Today is the best day. On the Southern part of the Bitter Lake, we are now approaching that area. There is one thing that I am really curious to see, what will happen with the farmers there. They left everything behind. Of course, we didn't destroy anything. If they come back right away they can go on with their normal life there. You have to irrigate there every day and they left behind all the-

MRS. MEIR: You will have open bridges there?

GEN. DAYAN: We are on the other side of the bridges. (laughter). But otherwise, the whole area will dry up.

MR. SISCO: Will the government let them return?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

MR. ALLON: The Egyptian government encouraged the Egyptians to leave all of the Canal Zone after the Six Day War.

GEN. DAYAN: The whole thing will be complicated, the question of how the Egyptians will take this cease fire. Will they really

mean to maintain it, and for a long time, and have normal life, or will they say: no, we don't care about the farmers, we will start going back.

DR. KISSINGER: I can't see the Arabs starting a war so quickly again. It was costly for Israel but it was very rough for them.

GEN. DAYAN: The trouble is, they are 35 million, the Egyptians.

DR. KISSINGER: But it is trained manpower that matters.

GEN. DAYAN: They trained their army people very quickly. And they have the Algerians, the Iraqis, the Sudanese and what not, all kinds of them. Probably not efficient forces but a lot of them. Even the Kuwaitis and Palestinians were fighting.

DR. KISSINGER: How did they fight, better this time?

GEN. DAYAN: I am sorry to say, yes. And they kept fighting. Even the Palestinians, not only the regular Egyptians forces, the Palestinians that were there along the Bitter Lake. They used Egyptian tanks and they fought quite well.

MRS. MEIR: The army people say that as long as they were going according to the book, it was all right. But if something happened and they had to quickly change, that didn't work anymore.

DR. KISSINGER: The Syrians fought better, didn't they?

GEN. DAYAN: More devoted and fanatic. I don't know whether they were very bright.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: There is a great confusion up there, firing at each other.

GEN. DAYAN: Some of them fought a whole-hearted kind of fanatic Jihad, not professionally well, but emotionally.

DR. KISSINGER: I saw a report yesterday that the Egyptians shot down 11 of their own planes. Did that come from you?

MR. ALLON: They took our credit.

MRS. MEIR: There are rumors that many of the Jordanian tankes were not found by the Iraqis.

MR. EBAN: They were firing in the wrong direction up in the North.

MR. ALLON: I think the Jordianians think it was deliberately done.

GEN. DAYAN: Are you going to contact the UN people again in Jerusalem, the observers?

MR. SISCO: No, we think you ought to do it.

GEN. DAYAN: Do we? Why?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no firm opinion yet on the subject.

MR. EBAN: The question is whether we need any neutralization on the ground or not.

GEN. DAYAN: I am happy without them. Let the Egyptians approach them. They have their officers, their liaison officers. If they want UN staff, let them approach them.

MR. SISCO: Will the Egyptians know whom to contact?

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, they have the liaison officers in Cairo.

MR. SISCO: I meant in terms of your army.

GEN. DAYAN: Then they would approach us. I don't see how they can physically approach us directly, unless they use some embassy or cross the line with a white flag and say they want to establish contact.

MR. RABIN: Can't we use a direct linke between the Israeli army and the Egyptian army for maintaining of the cease fire?

GEN. DAYAN: I suppose we can send an officer or a soldier with a white flag after the fire has stopped and say let's have mutual arrangements, something like that.

MR. SISCO: I mean ^{say I will} send General X to such and such a place and see what happens.

MRS. MEIR: But how does the message get there?

MR. SISCO: On the radio.

DR. KISSINGER: We will give it some thought and no doubt you will give it some thought.

MR. ALLON: In '48-49 we had direct contact.

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, but it didn't start that way. It developed later on. It started with the UN people.

MR. SISCO: I think they will prefer to contact a representative of the UNTSO, knowing the past history.

GEN. DAYAN: Let's give them a chance and the initiative and see what they do about it.

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MR. EBAN: Who took the initiative in '67? I think they did.

GEN. DAYAN: In 1957 we had hardly any contact with Egyptian troops because we had the French and English in between.

MR. EBAN: But in 1967 I think there was the initiative by Bull.

DR. KISSINGER: In 1957, when you advanced, there were no Egyptians?

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, and we took prisoners, but we didn't get as far as the Suez Canal.

MR. ALLON: Because of Anglo-French stupidity.

MRS. MEIR: We pulled back in 1957.

DR. KISSINGER: Your Ambassador hasn't had much sleep either, Madame Prime Minister.

MRS. MEIR: Ours, no. What we did to him!

MR. EBAN: The hours are all wrong.

DR. KISSINGER: When he gets instructions from the Prime Minister he calls immediately even if it's 3 in the morning.

MRS. MEIR: Direct action.

MR. EBAN: Was it 5 or 6 when we got the message on the 6th of October?

DR. KISSINGER: I got it at 6.

MRS. MEIR: 6 in the morning?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Luckily, all my key people were in New York with me. Joe was up there for the meeting I had with

Dayan² and then with the Foreign Minister on Thursday afternoon. He was helping me with the speech.

MR. EBAN: When you said nothing much would happen until November.

DR. KISSINGER: I said nothing much diplomatic would happen before November. I was trying to reassure you.

GEN. DAYAN: There will be many problems now. For instance, the line. Last time we had a Canal between us, so it was a kind of natural line dividing the forces. Now there is no canal between the forces.

DR. KISSINGER: You know, I had the experience in Vietnam and everyone told us it would be unmanagable and we'd have to get teams out there. And we had endless arguments about whether you can control the zones. It turned out it shook itself out very nicely. Where the forces are you know where they are.

MRS. MEIR: But there was a lot of shooting.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, there was some shooting. Because the Vietcong were trying to grab additional territory. But we had counted on that and they lost a great deal in their efforts.

MR. EBAN: Was that what made the Canadians leave?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, that and the fact that it was really sabotage by the Hungarians and Poles. But our experience in Vietnam is that the physical preponderance area by area determines who controls what, and that took about three or four weeks to establish.

MRS. MEIR: Both on the West and East sides, some places it is mixed up a bit.

GEN. DAYAN: On the East side we are not really touching one another. Where the Egyptians crossed to the other side, our forces are far away a bit. I suppose practically it is the same on the West side. No soldier is touching the one one, but then you have the question of the SAM missiles. If they will start pushing them forward, and I don't know anything about a standstill being promised, so I don't think we shall like that after all the work we did to destroy them, to have them again and have them pushing them forward.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: You have had experience with that already. That is the thing that worries me.

DR. KISSINGER: We didn't think this was something we should attempt to negotiate in Moscow.

MR. ALLON: But it may create a problem, once we begin.

MR. SISCO: No, of course there were no commitments on either side and it may very well create a problem.

GEN. DAYAN: Practically the question is whether they do want to have a real solid cease fire or they don't. If they do, they will be interested too to come to some arrangements.

DR. KISSINGER: More important is whether they want to have real talks, and I do not exclude that now. I mean real talks, not just stating abstract demands. I don't know, I will

have to see what happens in the next few weeks.

MR. EBAN: Real talks means talks that are not public.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think they will start publicly and I have no great hopes for the public talks, but I think the third point of the resolution, which is very clear if you look at the legislative , which I will go over with your ambassador when we get back, there is no question whatsoever that it means direct talks. There was no question about this.

MR. EBAN: Neither in the Soviet minds?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. What it will mean in the Arab mind I don't know, but since it is indissolubly linked with other provisions, you cannot have implementation of 242 without paragraph 3 which defines what 242 means. And so I think that is going to be an event of great significance, which for 25 years you have sought. Then I believe once that symbolic event is over, then the test will be in the secret talks conducted in many ways.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Do you anticipate that the talks in the first instance will be only between the confrontants?

DR. KISSINGER: That is our expectation, and Jordan probably. It is conceivable to me, for example, that a formal meeting has all of them, and then breaks up with each one. I think once we get the progress started, there are possibilities. As I said to your Foreign Minister in New York, and I want to repeat, we are

not going to float an American plan. That is not our policy and that is not my method, insofar as we get involved in this at all. First, one has to crystallize what the issues are. And I have been telling, as Joe knows, every Arab minister, when he said: Are you going to use your influence with Israel? I say: First you have to give us something on which we are going to use our influence. Until you do that, there is nothing to use our influence about. And that will continue to be our basic approach. We will not have a process where we are going to be shot at by all sides because we have the solution and no one else is willing to agree. But I think the beginning of the process will be an historic event, even if it totally stalemates, which I expect, frankly.

MR. ALLON: By the inclusion about the 242 resolution, we won't see again a Dr. Jarring around? I say a Dr. Jarring, maybe himself, or someone else. I don't think it is good.

DR. KISSINGER: This is not our idea of how it might work.

MRS. MEIR: I think Ambassador said yesterday that the 242 resolution is linked to the 3.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we do not think Jarring or the Secretary General are the appropriate auspices for these talks.

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POST-LUNCHEON MEETING

October 22, 1973

4:15 p.m.

Participating: In addition to participants at luncheon meeting:

Chief of Staff D. Elazar

Deputy Chief of Staff Y. Tal

Chief of Air Force B. Peled

Chief of Intelligence E. Za'ira

Col. Y. Lior

Mr. Eitan Ben-Zur

Mr. Eli Mizrachi

U. S. Military Attache

Mr. Violeti, U.S. Embassy

CONTINUATION OF LUNCHEON MEETING

WITH PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR OFFICERS OF I.D.F.

4:15 p.m.

GEN. D. ELAZAR, CHIEF OF STAFF: I shall try to describe our military situation very briefly. I will start from the Syrian border. This is the cease-fire line (pointing to map). On the Southern part along the cease fire line we managed to penetrate in the northern part to capture a part of Mt. Hermon, to penetrate along the road from Kuneitra to Damascus, about 25 km. and to penetrate here on another axis towards another road to Damascus. Here there are Syrian forces and a little bit more than one Iraqi division, and two Jordanian armored brigades. That is the situation along the Syrian front and we are quite satisfied with it.

DR. KISSINGER: They have no offensive capability?

GEN. ELEZAR: I would say that they can attack in another few days but they will not have the same capability as they had in the first days. That is to say, they attacked with about 1,300 or 1,400 tanks at the beginning. I don't believe that they are in a position to concentrate again such a force, so we are not worried because we are now in better positions, in better readiness. And I would say they can try to recapture a certain part, it is a possibility, it may happen in let's say one or two days, but I don't believe that they have any chance to recapture something, inspite of the Iraqi and Jordanian forces.

Now, along the Suez Canal. At the beginning, as you know, the Egyptians established along the whole front a line, something between 8 to 12 km. We managed to penetrate here. We had a bridgehead, then we reinforced on the other side, and now we have a force surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. Here is a big mountain. We managed to close the roads from this area, from the town of Suez to Cairo. Unfortunately, we didn't manage to finish the Third Army. I believe it is possible that it can be done in two, maybe three days. It consists of about three divisions and actually now we are in very good advance. We are advancing towards the Suez Canal. Maybe we shall succeed to get a point on the Suez Canal, I don't believe we shall do much more. But the idea was to surround, encircle the Third Army and to destroy and to capture the forces. In the central part of the Suez Canal, we have now about 15 km of the Canal on both sides, that is the bridgehead. And we have another force advancing towards the road from Cairo to Ismailia. I still don't know what our final positions along this road will be. I believe we shall manage to get a position on the road from Cairo to Ismailia.

Here there is no change, and they still have their forces along both sides of the Canal in the northern part. That is the situation until now.

DR. KISSINGER: Under cease fire conditions, how do you visualize they can supply any of their forces? Can they, unless

they make an agreement with you, if you have cut all the roads?

GEN. ELAZAR: Yes, they can supply their forces. There is another road. They have to go around this way, around this mountain and they can get to the town of Suez. But not on the main roads from Suez to Cairo. There is a possibility. I mean we managed to surround them, but it is not a complete siege. And there is a way here.

We have no problems of course. We have all the possibilities.

DR. KISSINGER: When you go like that, is it really like this, or are there pockets of other forces all around?

GEN. ELAZAR: No pockets as far as I know. I may happen that there is a small number of tanks or a small unit here or there but actually I don't think there are any pockets here.

GEN. B. PELED, CHIEF OF AIR FORCE: Our major problem was, until this morning, the ground to air missiles, and especially the SA-6. And they were pretty effective in creating attrition for the first few days, of which we took not account, because we couldn't. Only after a few days did we start to work mainly against the batteries while continuing air defense and ground support.

The situation as of now is that we have completely lost 32 Phantoms, 53 Skyhawks, 11 Mirage type aircraft, and 6 Super-Mysteres. All in all, 102 fighter aircraft of all kinds. We have had supplies mostly in Phantom aircraft, for which we are grateful. Our problem for the time being is the number of crews

we have left. We have 69 or 70 crews for Phantoms, which can make use of around 80 to 100 Phantoms.

As of today, we have broken the whole air defense system in Egypt on the Canal. It took long days of doing together with the artillery and ground forces, but today we have launched an attack to destroy the 5 or 6 batteries that were still present in the Suez area. This area was cleared around 9 o'clock, and our aircraft is totally to fighting what is left of the Egyptian Air Force, and everyone is devoted to air support.

The position in the North is that in this area still held by the Syrians there are about 16 to 17 batteries, most of them mobile SA-6s.

DR. KISSINGER: From what missiles did you lost most of your planes?

GEN. PELED: The SA-6. Also to the SA-7, but a lesser amount. The only missile for which we had no definite, positive answer was the SA-6 because of its mobility and its good performance and also because of the fact that the West knew almost nothing about it.

DR. KISSINGER: Did you capture any?

GEN. PELED: I have no evidence that we have a complete unit in hand. We had a few missiles that were duds that fell in our area, from which we drew a lot of information but not a total set. We have made use of every missile we found, and at

least we have the frequencies that we didn't know, of the guidance of the missile, which we have already incorporated in our ? which we received from you a few days ago. But the information is absolutely not complete yet.

As for the Egyptian Air Force, I can say that the Egyptians have suffered at least the following losses to date, that means 1400 hours today, and we can add about 10 aircraft. They lost 113 MIG-21s, 49 MIG-17s, 35 Sahoï 7s, 4 Sahoï 20, 7 Hunters, 3 Mirages, 1 Topolov 16, 33 MI-8s and 9 Dolphins. They even used Dolphins, those L-29s they started using yesterday. This totals 254 aircraft.

The Syrians have lost to date 205 aircraft: 100 MIG-21s, 47 MIG-17s, 37 Sahoï 7s, 9 Sahoï 20 and 12 MI-8s.

The position of both air forces is that the Egyptians do not lack aircraft. They have received a shipment of 110 MIG-21s since the beginning of the war. Their problem now is crews and leaders. The Syrian air force is in a worse position. After we have hammered away at their air bases and done quite a lot of damage in air to air dogfights. They are trying to defend the area and they carried out a stubborn attack yesterday on Mt. Hermon while we were trying to land forces there and they also suffered losses. And they didn't appear today.

I would say that we have found that in the situation in which we started in this war, we had to do everything in reverse

order and because it was a reverse order, it was much harder.

DR. KISSINGER: What is the reverse order?

GEN. PELED: First of all, trying to work without dealing properly with ground to air missiles. Ground support immediately without regard to losses, and only then-

DR. KISSINGER: That is why you lost so many planes in the first four days?

GEN. PELED: And the only thing that we didn't have a sufficient answer to was the SA-6, and not a sufficiently quick answer for the destruction of dense ground to air concentrations. I don't think we had the correct weapons, the stand-off weapons, that could have saved us a hell of a lot of aircraft and also would have turned the tide much sooner because the main interference to massive ground support for our ground forces was the fact that there were still capable ground to air missiles, especially the mobile SA-6, which we had to eat away slowly and carefully without losing too many aircraft.

They have established another line of SA-6 and SA-2 and 3s at a mid distance between the Canal line and Cairo. It is not very effective in the areas in which we have to work. The Air Force has carried out 11,000 strike and interception sorties in the past days, at the cost of 105 aircraft. This includes helicopters lost, and this is another aspect of the light aircraft and helicopters. We did not have enough to give our ground forces high mobility from point to point. Most of

our helicopters are still committed to electronic warfare and jamming, which is a poor man's solution, and also deprives the ground forces of the helicopters they were supposed to have. So we have to play with a small number of helicopters. We have had requests for more. And the only thing we did get was the C-130 which did excellent work from the moment they arrived and they are still landing at the airport now.

We have definite deficiencies in certain equipment. The Egyptians succeeded in surprising us with the Kelt weapon and they have had two direct hits on two radars, at Sharm el Sheikh and BirGafgafa. This is a missile that is launched from a distance of about 90 km. and homes on the PBS-43. Until we learned such a weapon existed, we didn't know, we lost two radars and from then on we found a countermeasure which is simply closing down this radar during the time these are in the air, and they usually do it at night.

We can still carry on.

GEN. DAYAN: The last one will be the Chief of Intelligence to tell you how we think they feel and what they have.

GEN. ZAIRA, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE: First of all, I just got a message that there are two Russian Foxbats now flying over the Canal. These are flown by Russian pilots and they take off from Cairo West. In the morning they had the first flight but

only in the West desert, and now they are over the Canal.

Now, the Syrians began the war with the order of battle of 1700 tanks, and they lost about 1,000. They have a lot of Russian tanks coming by ship, and the main process now is to rebuild the Syrian armored divisions. We see every day a few hundred tanks coming to the port and shipped immediately to the units. This is why we believe that in a few days they will be completely ready for another strike. This is the most typical phenomenon in the Syrian army - the rebuilding of armored units.

The second thing that happened in Syria is that they got already about 200 Iraqi tanks and 150 Jordanian tanks in order to build an attack force. They have a plan of recapturing the area that is east of the line before the 6th of October, and they believe that they will be able to concentrate about 1400 tanks for this attack.

DR. KISSINGER: You think they can succeed?

GEN. ZA'IRA: I doubt it, but they will have a lot of tanks in that area. We are prepared. I see the main problem there is the big number of anti-aircraft missiles in the area. We have about 15 battalions south of the bulge and about 10 northeast of the bulge and this will be a hindrance to our air force. I believe the ²tows and ? we just got from the U.S. Government will help a lot in repulsing such an attack.

In Egypt, they operated in two armies, the Second Army up here and the Third Army from here down, with two infantry divisions, one mechanized and one tank division, altogether four divisions here. They operated here with 3 infantry divisions, one mechanized and one tank division. The first echelon was composed mainly of infantry which just swarmed all along the Canal and captured the first mile or two, and then came the mechanized and then the tank divisions. After a few days, after establishing about 10 km., the tank divisions with the mechanized opened a general attack, which was repulsed, and our main thrust here was aimed at concentrations of the 21st tank division which was here, and the 16th infantry division. This was a very fierce battle in which these two divisions were more or less destroyed, and from that time on the main battle was not against the Second Army but against the Third, and also against reserves that came from Cairo.

The situation today is that the 4 tank divisions are more or less destroyed and the same applies to the six mechanized divisions and what happens here is that our armor is destroying the rear echelon of the Third Army, and also some of its armor.

Basically, the Egyptians today have here two infantry divisions, not in very good shape, here two infantry divisions, and remnants of a mechanized division, whereas here in Cairo, they have about 200 tanks, two armored brigades of tanks. I would say

that the Egyptian army is more or less destroyed in its offensive capability. I mean ^{and air force} armor. It is not completely destroyed in its infantry capability, because still the two divisions here and two divisions here are more or less in good shape because we didn't deal with them too much.

I have to add that there is a reinforcement in Egypt of one Libyan and one Algerian armored brigade and if I add to this the Jordaian, Iraqis and Saudis, we see here quite a big international force.

DR. KISSINGER: Are they any good, the Libyans and Algerians?

GEN. ZA'IRA: They have not yet been engaged. We engaged with the Jordanians. They are quite good. The Iraqis are not very good and the Morocans are also not very good. They were more or less destroyed.

As to weapons, I would say that on the ground we encountered the most modern Russian weapons which are very interesting from a technical point of view, and in very large quantities. Many of the tanks had on their speedometers 50 km, 100 km, most of them brand-new. In the air, I have to add that in addition to the Egyptians and Syrians, there were Iraqis in Syria, Iraqis in Egypt, Algerians in Syria, and also North Koreans in Egypt.

DR. KISSINGER: Which army do you rate higher, the Egyptian or the Syrian, as a fighting force?

GEN. ZA'IRA: Well, I believe that the Syrians are a little bit better, but we have other experts here.

DR. KISSINGER: Because of the quality of the troops or the leadership?

GEN. ZA'IRA: Quality of the troops, aggressiveness. I think the Syrians are a little bit more aggressive.

GEN. ELAZAR: I would say in this war both of them were better than in 1967.

DR. KISSINGER: Significantly better?

GEN. ELAZAR: Significantly better.

DR. KISSINGER: How was their leadership?

GEN. ELAZAR: The leadership was better and I would say the main phenomenon, to some extent surprising, was that they didn't give up even after the breakthrough. We were used to break through and to make a first shock and then to continue more easily. This time we have to fight with every echelon. There is no disintegration.

DR. KISSINGER: And your successes are due, in your judgement, to what? Superior leadership? Because you had inferior weapons.

GEN. ELAZAR: There is still enormous superiority in the leadership and quality of troops. We are fighting all the time with small forces against big forces. Even here, for example, we penetrated with one division against two divisions. Here we are with three small divisions altogether something between 3 and 400 tanks, against at the beginning one, and then a second

and a third division. So we are fighting against big forces, but there is a superiority in quality of troops.

GEN. ZA'IRA: I wanted to add two things. First that in Egypt and Syria this was a battle which was prepared for for years. I mean the Syrian and Egyptian armies were trained for a certain battle and they rehearsed each unit for exactly the same thing for years. Point number two, we see a lot of Russian influence in the sense of having a big improvement in security, in communications, in capability of listening to us, in electronic warfare and in deceit. For example, we found quite a number of anti-aircraft missiles in which there was only the radar and all the missiles were dummies. We found in Syria a battery of guns in which only one gun was a real one and 5 out of the 6 were dummies.

GEN. PELED: And massive jamming, which is still being carried out on all our frequencies.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you very much. I want to express our admiration for everything you have done.

(I.D.F. Officers leave the meeting).

DR. KISSINGER: I want to thank you for the very warm hospitality. I want to express on behalf of the President and all my associates our admiration for the heroic battle which you have so successfully concluded. We believe you have achieved a great

victory, both militarily and politically in that the Arabs for the first time for direct negotiations, which we insist is the meaning of the third article of the resolution. As I told you, we will point out our understanding, which is supportable, of the prisoner issue.

From my point of view, we have had very useful talks which not only covered the past but laid out a strategy for the future, and it is a pleasure to be in a country where one is among friends.

MRS. MEIR: Thanks a lot. I want to thank you on behalf of my colleagues, the Government, I think everyone in Israel, that you found it possible to make this stop-over. It means an awful lot, not only that the discussions I think were very useful but one is sometimes surprised what things mean a lot to a little people. And you have seen our men, we have done pretty well, but you see them, you see the wear and tear on them. It is because of the war and tear they saw on many of the men they led, and everyone of us knows that if it weren't for the President and you, Mr. Secretary, the American government, what you have been doing and are doing at the present time, in these days ^{which} to us were the worst ever.

To take a minute, I remember one evening in 1948 when we were attacked, veterans of the Jordan Valley kibbutzim, tough people who came here in 1906 and suffered everything, they came

to see Ben-Gurion, who was then head of the Government and the Ministry of Defense, and they said: the Syrians are attacking. They are ruining our kibbutzim, we can't stand the crying of the cows. And Ben-Gurion said: I have nothing to help you with. Everything I had, I sent to Jerusalem. He told this story over and over again, and he said: When I saw these three men weep, I thought: everything was lost.

We didn't weep these ten days, but I am sure, Mr. Secretary, you know we had very, very bitter hours, and your Ambassador was with us through all the agony. And things changed, and when they did change, you had a great share in it.

Please give our best regards and appreciation to the President. We can't give you another Nobel Prize. I think that a person gets that only once in his life, doesn't he? But if the memory of the small people still fighting for its very existence counts, you are on the books. And we really thank you very much and all your colleagues for coming here. We hope next time we will be over the negotiations for peace, and that we can really have peace.

DR. KISSINGER: Madame Prime Minister, we can only hope and be confident that you will be as successful in this as you have been in these trying days, but wherever you will be, you can count on us as friends.

ERASABLE
UNION SKIN
LUNCHEON MEETING

Tel-Aviv
Monday, October 22, 1973
3 p.m.

Participating:

USA:

Dr. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary
of State

Mr. Joseph Sisco, Asst. Sec'y of
State

Mr. Alfred Atherton
Ambassador K. Keating

Mr. R. McCloskey

Mr. Lord

Mr. Eagleburger

Mr. Rodman

ISRAEL:

Prime Minister Golda Meir

Deputy Prime Minister
Y. Allon

Defense Minister M. Dayan

Foreign Minister A. Eban

Mr. Kidron, Foreign Office

Mr. Evron, Foreign Office

Mr. M. Gazit, Prime
Minister's Office

Mr. Y. Rabin

NOTE: In addition to the recorded conversations, there were separate, simultaneous conversations going on from time to time among the participants, which were inaudible.

DR. KISSINGER: I have to tell the other Israelis here - I have already told the Prime Minister - you have an absolute guarantee in our Ambassador. He has never been on the losing side in a war. You should have seen some of his reactions when we made proposals you didn't agree with. You only made your point once but he wouldn't stop.

MR. ALLON: What you said about your Ambassador, was that supposed to be a compliment?

DR. KISSINGER: I have a certain pleasure because in the Indian-Pakistani war when we said units had returned to the status quo - he sent me the most outraged telegrams, when he was in India. This time I was glad to see he is taking the Pakistani view. (laughter).

MR. EBAN: Have the Indians become reconciled now?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, yes, we have excellent relations now with India.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Since I left.

MR. EBAN: She was very abrasive.

MRS. MEIR: There you have a nice Prime Minister, no intransigent. She is not stubborn, she always gives in, she never goes to war. Nice woman.

MR. EBAN: She doesn't believe in the acquisition of territory by force.

NOTE: In addition to the recorded conversations, there were
several, simultaneous conversations going on from
time to time among the participants, which were
inadvisable.

DR. KISSINGER: I have to call the other people here.
I have already told the Prime Minister - you have an absolute
preference for your ambassador. He has never been on the losing
side in a war. You should have seen some of his reactions
when we were negotiating your little game plan. You only made your
point once but he wouldn't stop.

MRS. ALLEN: When you said about your ambassador, was that
intended to be a compliment?

DR. KISSINGER: I have a certain pleasure because in the
Indian-Pakistan war when he said nothing returned to the other
side - he sent me the most outrageous telegram, when he was in
India. This time I was glad to see he is taking the Pakistan
view. (Laughter).

MR. BRAN: Have the Indians become reconciled now?
DR. KISSINGER: Oh, we have reached the situation now

with India.
AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Since I left.

MR. BRAN: She was very responsive.
MRS. KISS: There you have a nice Prime Minister. Do

intelligent. She is not stupid. She always gives in the last
word to war. Nice woman.

MR. BRAN: The beam's follow in the negotiation of
certainty of force.

MR. SISCO: My comment was this - you both win wars.

DR. KISSINGER: All the women prime ministers are in Sisco's area.

MRS. MEIR: That's right, all three of them. How can you take that?

MR. SISCO: I love it. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: I will never forget, during 1957 Khrishna Menon for hours and hours would preach to us about why we didn't go back. And then they did that trick on Goa. And he came back and at the airport, the newspaper man asked him: What about Goa? He lifted his cane - Goa, that's his, that's different.

(Mrs. Meir toasts Le-Hayim, folbwed by separate conversations among participants)

DR. KISSINGER: Are you going to get some sleep?

MRS. MEIR: I slept for two hours.

DR. KISSINGER: You look very well.

MRS. MEIR: This is psychological warfare against Sadat. We look so well.

MR. EBAN: These long periods with no tension do that.

MRS. MEIR: Last night about 8 o'clock, Mrs. Kedar said to me: Look, everything is quiet. Go home, watch television together with your grandchildren. I said: Okay. And then: boom. I didn't get out of the room until 8:30 this morning.

GEN. DAYAN (referring to message he has been handed):
... that we got from you and from Russia that Sadat announced that he is ready to stop the fire and hostile acts starting with

1700 hours Egyptian time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is the same as yours?

GEN. DAYAN: It's 6 o'clock our time. And he is asking whether Israel is ready to do the same.

DR. KISSINGER: Officially, through us?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

DR. KISSINGER: We have a message that they want an official statement from you. But you make it on your own. We don't have to intermeditate for that.

MR. ALLON: Didn't we made an official statement when we published the decision of the Cabinet?

MRS. MEIR: Yes, but that was not in hours.

MR. EBAN: It means containing a time.

MRS. MEIR: All we need now I think is that we have accepted that, and that an order has been sent to the forces.

GEN. DAYAN: I told the Chief of Staff if we get an official communique from the Egyptians or anybody that they accept the cease-fire and if on the ground our forces can see that they do stop, then we stop at the time. So we have to have two announcements; one, a formal announcement that they are accepting the cease fire, and then a practical one to see that they are stopping the fire, and our forces have been notified about that already.

DR. KISSINGER: Did you notify anybody that you have told this to us? We are not asking for it, but should we do it?

1700 hours Egyptian time

DR. KISSINGER: That is the same as yours?

GEN. DAYAN: It is 3 o'clock and time. And he is asking

whether Israel is ready to do the same.

DR. KISSINGER: Officially, through me?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

DR. KISSINGER: We have a message that they want an official

statement from you. But you said it on your own. We don't have

to intercede for that.

MR. ALLON: Didn't I make an official statement when we

proposed the resolution of the Cabinet?

MRS. MEIR: Yes, but that was not in hours.

MR. DAYAN: It wasn't containing a time.

MRS. MEIR: All we need now I think is that we have accepted

that, and that an order has been sent to the forces.

GEN. DAYAN: I told the Chief of Staff it was not an official

commitment from the Egyptian or anybody else. They accept the cease-

fire and it is on the ground our forces can see that we stop, that

we stop at the time. So we have to have two announcements, one

a formal announcement that they are accepting the cease fire,

and then a practical one to see that they are stopping the fire

and our forces are demobilized from that already.

MR. KISSINGER: Did you really say that you have to

do this? Is it not enough for you to say that you have to

OPTION 2/11

END OF TAP

MRS. MEIR: That these are the orders that were given, is that it?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not asking. You can do it on your radio.

MRS. MEIR: No, we can let you know.

GEN. DAYAN: This is an order that was given to the forces. Now, the question is have we got an official statement?

DR. KISSINGER: We have an official communication which we have been asked to transmit to you.

GEN. DAYAN: So once we get this communication and you tell me that you say they are going to do it, then I can tell the forces that once we have to do that, we have to anticipate it, and it is about 6 o'clock, and if they really stop firing then we stop too.

MR. EBAN: To use the same channel that they used to transmit it to us would be normal.

DR. KISSINGER: Us? Then, why don't we communicate to them that we have their message and that you are prepared to stop 1800 hours your time, provided their forces actually carry out the orders which have been published on Cairo Radio. Larry, do it now please.

MRS. MEIR: From Syria, it is quiet.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: The Iraqis have said they do not accept it.

MR. MEIN: That these are the orders that were given.

Is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: No, not a minute. You can do it on your

radio.

MR. MEIN: No, no can do you know.

MR. MEIN: This is an order that was given to the forces.

Now, the question is have we got an official statement?

DR. KISSINGER: We have an official communication which we

have been asked to transmit to you.

MR. MEIN: So once we get this communication and you

tell us that you say they are going to do it, then I can tell

the forces that once we have to do that, we have to anticipate

it, and it is about a clock, and it they really stop firing

then we stop too.

MR. MEIN: I see the same channel that they used to

transmit it to us would be normal.

DR. KISSINGER: But I am not sure we are going to

them that we have their message and that you are prepared to

stop 1500 hours your time, and that is a force and that is

all the orders which have been published on Castro Radio. Later,

do it now please.

MR. MEIN: Your radio, it is quiet.

AMASSADOR KISSINGER: The radio have said they do not

accept it.

MRS. MEIR: Look, you people will have to do something about the difference in time. You don't know what happened. Sapir was in the States for about 5 or 6 days, and my military attache, poor man, I don't think he slept for two hours any night. Every night he kept calling him and saying: Tell me what is the news. He didn't sleep much anyhow. And what we do to Simha is terrible. He asked me yesterday if the Secretary will come here can he come, so I said: sure. But then it was too short.

When do you get it in fact? (Referring to Nobel Prize)

DR. KISSINGER: On December 10 in Oslo. The Swedes have not invited me. Normally the winner goes to the cathedral in Stockholm for a prayer service, but they have cancelled that for me. I don't think I'd be the ideal subject for a Lutheran service anyway.

GEN. DAYAN (returning to room): Apparently there is no difference between Egyptian time and Israeli time. That means 1700 hours, but that will be only 11 hours from the Security Council resolution.

MR. EBAN: The resolution said no more than 12 hours.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: I don't wonder the Egyptians want to stop a little quicker.

GEN. DAYAN: What should we do about it? I would rather not stop before the 12 hours are up.

DR. KISSINGER: That is in your domestic jurisdiction. I will be on an airplane.

GEN. DAYAN: And that is only about Egypt. No message from Syria.

DR. KISSINGER: The reason you won this war is because I didn't give you any advice on strategy. I am not going to start on the last day.

MR. EBAN: But you expressed a strong interest in developments.

GEN. DAYAN: I suggest we say that we stop according to the UN resolution.

DR. KISSINGER: Just say you stop at 1800 hours provided - what we are communicating to the Russians is that we have been informed you will stop at 1800 hours provided the Egyptians forces in fact stop firing. And we are also communicating that to the Egyptians. I will tell you one thing, Madame Prime Minister, you get more information than my current colleagues did before I assumed my present position. (laughter).

MRS. MEIR: Is it cold in Moscow?

MR. SISCO: Very cold, very penetrating.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Wet?

MR. SISCO: No. We had a little snow the other day but it cleared down.

MR. ALLON: Maybe they will need some more grain next year.

MRS. MEIR: We say we are subsidizing the Russians.

DR. KISSINGER: How?

MRS. MEIR: By paying more for grain.

1945
1945

MR. BAYNE: And that is only about 1945. No message

from Berlin.

MR. KIRKWOOD: The reason you won't let it be known I

didn't give you any notice on Saturday. I am not going to state

on the last day.

MR. BAYNE: But you expressed a strong interest in

development.

MR. BAYNE: I suggest we say that we are not reporting to

the UN resolution.

MR. KIRKWOOD: Just say you lost 1800 hours provided

what we are communicating to the Russians is that we have been

informed you will stop at 1800 hours provided the Russians

force in that area. And we are also communicating that

to the Russians. I will tell you one thing. I have been

informed you are not interested in our current position

did before I received my present position. (Laughter).

MRS. BAYNE: Is it cold in Moscow?

MR. BAYNE: Very cold, very interesting.

AMERICAN REACTION: Yes.

MR. BAYNE: We had a little snow the other day but it

cleared down.

MR. BAYNE: Maybe they will need some more grain next year.

MRS. BAYNE: We say we are subsidizing the Russians.

MR. BAYNE: Now?

MRS. BAYNE: By paying more for grain.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, not everything has been shipped yet. Our unions have refused to load because of the Soviet actions in the Middle East.

MR. EBAN: George Meany made some robust comments on the detente.

DR. KISSINGER: It is all right for him to do it. I don't think the detente has worked to Israel's disadvantage.

(referring to message). Cairo Radio, we have been told, President Sadat has given his orders to the armed forces to cease fire at the time specified by the UN Security Council resolution, conditional upon Israel observing the cease fire. So, no problems, exactly the same thing. Will you say this on your radio? It might be a good idea.

MR. EBAN: Did the Security Council give a specific time?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it said no later than 12 hours. I would just give the exact hour.

MR. EBAN: Someone has to fix what the lines and positions are.

MRS. MEIR: Nobody knows who is going to decide where anybody is. What is the line where we have to stop.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Positions as they are.

MRS. MEIR: Who is going to decide the positions?

MR. ALLON: No mechanism has been set up?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, not everything has been changed yet.
Our plans have not been changed because of the Soviet action in
the Middle East.

MR. BAKER: George Bushy made some rough comments on this
subject.

DR. KISSINGER: It is all right for him to say that. I don't think
the doctrine has been changed to Israel's disadvantage.

(referring to message): Cairo Radio, we have been told,
President Sadat has given the order to the armed forces to
take up the line specified by the UN Security Council resolution
conditional upon Israel observing the cease-fire. So, no problems,
exactly the same thing. Will you say this on your radio? It
might be a good idea.

MR. BAKER: Did the Security Council give a specific thing?
DR. KISSINGER: No, it said no later than 12 hours. I would
just give the exact hour.
MR. BAKER: I suppose that is the time and position.

MR. BAKER: Nobody knows who is going to handle that, any
body?

MR. BAKER: That is the time when we have to know.
MR. BAKER: That is the time when we have to know.

MR. BAKER: Who is going to handle the position?
MR. BAKER: The mechanism has been set up.

DR. KISSINGER: No, but I think we could propose a UN force tomorrow. We could put the UNTSO personell in.

MR. SISCO: It is a question if you want to avoid any formal Security Council proceedings. I would think if one of the other parties got in touch with your Chief of Staff on the ground and ask that he assist in helping to arrange the practical elements of the cease fire, this is the way to do it without getting involved in a lot of these formal proceedings in the UN. My judgement is that he has sufficient mandate.

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't you do it? It may cause one phone call again with Waldheim. You didn't keep him here very long. I am trying to farm him out for two months every year to each country.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: He didn't go over very well here. He wasn't properly briefed.

DR. KISSINGER: In the early stages of the crisis, he called me about three times a day.

(To Mr. Eban) Are you coming back to New York?

MR. EBAN: It depends if there is any ^{thing} useful ~~or~~ necessary for me to do. I am coming anyway in December.

DR. KISSINGER: You will come to Washington for a longer period. I think we have really exemplary contact.

MR. ALLON: When are we starting peace negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we can get started pretty soon. I have talked with the Prime Minister. And this is a firm understanding between us.

MR. ALLON: The Syrians and Egyptians ... vis-a-vis prisoners of war, I don't know why. This is a good chance to get our boys out.

DR. KISSINGER: We have an understanding - we cannot say it publicly - that both sides will use their maximum influence to bring about release of prisoners immediately. We are now using our influence with you to release your prisoners, which you are willing to do. We will inform them of this.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Henry, you know they have not given a list of prisoners.

MR. ALLON: Only a few names.

DR. KISSINGER: When I have my press conference I will say there must be an immediate release of prisoners, exchange of prisoners.

(At this point, several simultaneous conversations take place)

GEN. DAYAN: You see, we more or less told our people we will not agree to a cease fire unless we will get our prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: I have been given reason to believe that-

GEN. DAYAN: It is all right with us if we get it from you, ^{we} won't ask you-

DR. KISSINGER: Let's say I told you. I don't want to say it flatly - how could we say it? I have told you that we can

ERASABLE

expect release of prisoners.

GEN. DAYAN: That there will be an exchange of prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you see I have been told the Russians will use their influence.

GEN. DAYAN: Well, I am afraid we will be in trouble.

DR. KISSINGER: When I give my press conference, I can express my understanding easily. But what I am trying to avoid is that you speak for me which will produce a negative reaction before I can even say something in America.

GEN. DAYAN: We don't have to mention you. It is enough if we say we have been assured that there will be an early exchange of prisoners, without mentioning your name.

DR. KISSINGER: Won't they ask by whom?

GEN. DAYAN: We are not obliged to answer.

MRS. MEIR: Just a week ago last Tuesday, I made a statement in the Knesset that there will be no cease fire agreement without exchange of prisoners. If I am not in a position to say we have been informed that this will be-

DR. KISSINGER: Can't you say you are confident?

MR. ALLON: But if Henry is making a statement to the press.

DR. KISSINGER: It will be on Wednesday.

GEN. DAYAN: If we order our troops to stop firing without having an assurance that there will be exchange of prisoners we will be in trouble. We will be reproached about why we agreed to stop firing before getting such a promise.

expect release of prisoners.

MR. TAYLOR: That there will be an exchange of prisoners.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you see I have been told the Russians

will use their influence.

MR. TAYLOR: Well, I am afraid we will be in trouble.

DR. KISSINGER: When I give my press conference I can

express my understanding easily, but when I am trying to avoid

is that you speak for me which will produce a negative reaction

because I can even say something in America.

MR. TAYLOR: We don't have to mention you, we are enough if

we say we have been assured that there will be an early exchange

of prisoners, without mentioning your name.

MR. KISSINGER: Don't say that, why?

MR. TAYLOR: We are not obliged to answer.

MR. TAYLOR: About a week ago last Tuesday, I made a statement

in the House that there will be no such thing as an exchange

without exchange of prisoners. If I am not in a position to say

we have been informed that this will be the case.

MR. KISSINGER: And if you say you are confident?

MR. TAYLOR: I will have to make a statement to the press.

DR. KISSINGER: It will be on Wednesday.

MR. TAYLOR: If we could not expect to stop firing without

having an assurance that there will be an exchange of prisoners

we will be in trouble. We will be repeating everything we

agreed to stop firing but are getting such a promise.

DR. KISSINGER: Can you hold it by saying you have been assured, without saying by whom?

MRS. MEIR: Yes.

GEN. DAYAN: An early exchange of prisoners.

MR. RABIN: When will you be able to say so?

DR. KISSINGER: Wednesday.

MR. RABIN: Can't you say it tomorrow?

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe. I have to talk to McCloskey.

MR. ALLON: If it is tomorrow, then the Prime Minister can quote you.

DR. KISSINGER: That would be the best. Maybe I can get McCloskey to say it tomorrow. Well, you can count on our saying it.

MRS. MEIR: That would be best. They won't forgive us, and they shouldn't.

MR. EBAN: There is a time factor. We would like it to be on the wires before we begin at the Knesset tomorrow. We begin at 3.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, we are sending a message to the Soviets now.

(to Mr. Eban). How would you like to have Allon as a student, Mr. Foreign Minister? It is not conducive to strict discipline.

MR. ALLON: He is against me, because he went to another university.

MR. KISSINGER: Can you hold it for me, please?

MR. KISSINGER: Yes, I can hold it for you.

MR. KISSINGER: Yes, I can hold it for you.

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MR. KISSINGER: Yes, I can hold it for you.

DR. KISSINGER: The only thing I would need is to have Dayan also as a student. I have had more trouble with Israeli generals.

GEN. DAYAN: Once in six years they are all right.

DR. KISSINGER: We wanted to borrow you for Vietnam.

GEN. DAYAN: I think our maneuvers on the Egyptian front were really ? and very successful, very successful. Today we are getting the best dividends. It is a pity you came too early. Today is the best day. On the Southern part of the Bitter Lake, we are now approaching that area. There is one thing that I am really curious to see, what will happen with the farmers there. They left everything behind. Of course, we didn't destroy anything. If they come back right away they can go on with their normal life there. You have to irrigate there every day and they left behind all the-

MRS. MEIR: You will have open bridges there?

GEN. DAYAN: We are on the other side of the bridges. (laughter). But otherwise, the whole area will dry up.

MR. SISCO: Will the government let them return?

GEN. DAYAN: I don't know.

MR. ALLON: The Egyptian government encouraged the Egyptians to leave all of the Canal Zone after the Six Day War.

GEN. DAYAN: The whole thing will be complicated, the question of how the Egyptians will take this cease fire. Will they really

mean to maintain it, and for a long time, and have normal life, or will they say: no, we don't care about the farmers, we will start going back.

DR. KISSINGER: I can't see the Arabs starting a war so quickly again. It was costly for Israel but it was very rough for them.

GEN. DAYAN: The trouble is, they are 35 million, the Egyptians.

DR. KISSINGER: But it is trained manpower that matters.

GEN. DAYAN: They trained their army people very quickly. And they have the Algerians, the Iraqis, the Sudanese and what not, all kinds of them. Probably not efficient forces but a lot of them. Even the Kuwaitis and Palestinians were fighting.

DR. KISSINGER: How did they fight, better this time?

GEN. DAYAN: I am sorry to say, yes. And they kept fighting. Even the Palestinians, not only the regular Egyptians forces, the Palestinians that were there along the Bitter Lake. They used Egyptian tanks and they fought quite well.

MRS. MEIR: The army people say that as long as they were going according to the book, it was all right. But if something happened and they had to quickly change, that didn't work anymore.

DR. KISSINGER: The Syrians fought better, didn't they?

GEN. DAYAN: More devoted and fanatic. I don't know whether they were very bright.

...to maintain it, and for a long time, and have normal life.
...with them say: no, we don't care about the future, we will
start doing better.

DR. KISSINGER: I can't see the Arab wanting a war so
badly again. It was necessary for Israel but it was very tough
for them.

GEN. DAYAN: The trouble is, they are 15 million, the
Egyptians.

DR. KISSINGER: But it is a trained manpower that matters.
GEN. DAYAN: They trained their Arab people very quickly.
And they have the Algerians, the Iraqis, the Jordanians and these
not all kinds of them. Probably not efficient workers but a lot
of them. Even the Saudis and Palestinians were fighting.

DR. KISSINGER: How do they fight better than this time?
GEN. DAYAN: I am sorry to say, yes. And they keep fighting.
Even the Palestinians, not only the regular Egyptian forces, the
Palestinians there were along the Suez Canal. They used
Egyptian tanks and they fought quite well.

MRS. MEYER: The army people say that as long as they were
going according to the book, it was all right. But if something
happened and they had to make changes, that didn't work.

DR. KISSINGER: The Arab people, did they?
GEN. DAYAN: Not devoted and fanatic. I don't know whether
they were very brave.

ORIGINAL SKIN

DAYAN, ABRAHAM

AMBASSADOR KEATING: There is a great confusion up there, firing at each other.

GEN. DAYAN: Some of them fought a whole-hearted kind of fanatic Jihad, not professionally well, but emotionally.

DR. KISSINGER: I saw a report yesterday that the Egyptians shot down 11 of their own planes. Did that come from you?

MR. ALLON: They took our credit.

MRS. MEIR: There are rumors that many of the Jordanian tanks were not found by the Iraqis.

MR. EBAN: They were firing in the wrong direction up in the North.

MR. ALLON: I think the Jordanians think it was deliberately done.

GEN. DAYAN: Are you going to contact the UN people again in Jerusalem, the observers?

MR. SISCO: No, we think you ought to do it.

GEN. DAYAN: Do we? Why?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no firm opinion yet on the subject.

MR. EBAN: The question is whether we need any neutralization on the ground or not.

GEN. DAYAN: I am happy without them. Let the Egyptians approach them. They have their officers, their liaison officers. If they want UN staff, let them approach them.

MR. SISCO: Will the Egyptians know whom to contact?

TRANS/DOT 10/1/61 There is a great emphasis on...

REASABLE

THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE HOUSE FOR A LONG TIME...

THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE HOUSE FOR A LONG TIME...

MR. KISSINGER: I am a recent visitor with the Egyptian...

and that is of their own choice. The fact is, from your...

MR. ALLEN: They took out credit...

MR. TERRY: There are twenty thousand of the Jordanian...

which were not found by the Israelis.

MR. TERRY: They were living in the wrong direction...

in the house.

MR. ALLEN: I think the Jordanians think it was neither...

early home.

MR. TERRY: Are you going to contact the U. people again...

as Jerusalem, the observance?

MR. TERRY: No, we think you ought to do it.

MR. TERRY: No, we think you ought to do it.

MR. KISSINGER: We have no firm opinion yet on the subject.

MR. TERRY: The question is whether we need any further...

action on the ground of non-

MR. TERRY: I am happy without them. Let the Egyptians...

approach them. They have their own efforts. Let the Jordanians...

If they want to start, let them approach them.

MR. TERRY: The Egyptians know how to contact...

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, they have the liaison officers in Cairo.

MR. SISCO: I meant in terms of your army.

GEN. DAYAN: Then they would approach us. I don't see how they can physically approach us directly, unless they use some embassy or cross the line with a white flag and say they want to establish contact.

MR. RABIN: Can't we use a direct linke between the Israeli army and the Egyptian army for maintaining of the cease fire?

GEN. DAYAN: I suppose we can send an officer or a solider with a white flag after the fire has stopped and say let's have mutual arrangements, something like that.

MR. SISCO: I mean ^{say I will} send General X to such and such a place, and see what happens.

MRS. MEIR: But how does the message get there?

MR. SISCO: On the radio.

DR. KISSINGER: We will give it some thought and no doubt you will give it some thought.

MR. ALLON: In '48-49 we had direct contact.

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, but it didn't start that way. It developed later on. It started with the UN people.

MR. SISCO: I think they will prefer to contact a representative of the UNTSO, knowing the past history.

GEN. DAYAN: Let's give them a chance and the initiative and see what they do about it.

MR. EBAN: Who took the initiative in '67? I think they did.

GEN. DAYAN: In 1957 we had hardly any contact with Egyptian troops because we had the French and English in between.

MR. EBAN: But in 1967 I think there was the initiative by Bull.

DR. KISSINGER: In 1957, when you advanced, there were no Egyptians?

GEN. DAYAN: Yes, and we took prisoners, but we didn't get as far as the Suez Canal.

MR. ALLON: Because of Anglo-French stupidity.

MRS. MEIR: We pulled back in 1957.

DR. KISSINGER: Your Ambassador hasn't had much sleep either, Madame Prime Minister.

MRS. MEIR: Ours, no. What we did to him!

MR. EBAN: The hours are all wrong.

DR. KISSINGER: When he gets instructions from the Prime Minister he calls immediately even if it's 3 in the morning.

MRS. MEIR: Direct action.

MR. EBAN: Was it 5 or 6 when we got the message on the 6th of October?

DR. KISSINGER: I got it at 6.

MRS. MEIR: 6 in the morning?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Luckily, all my key people were in New York with me. Joe was up there for the meeting I had with

MR. LAM: Who took the initiative in '87? I think they did.

MR. LAM: In 1987 we had hardly any contact with the

French because we had the French and English in between.

MR. LAM: In 1987 I think there was the initiative by

MR. LAM: In 1987, when you advanced, there was no

MR. LAM: Yes, and we took initiative, and we didn't get

MR. LAM: Because of Anglo-French studies.

MR. LAM: We pulled back in 1987.

MR. LAM: Your Ambassador here had been there

also, Madame Prime Minister.

MRS. LAM: Yes, when we did so.

MR. LAM: The house was all wrong.

MR. LAM: When we had instructions from the Prime

Minister he said immediately even it is a 3-4th meeting.

MRS. LAM: Direct action.

MR. LAM: Was it 3 or 4 when we had the meeting on the

1st of October?

MR. LAM: Yes, that is right.

MRS. LAM: Yes, I am not sure.

MR. LAM: Yes, I am not sure.

MR. LAM: Yes, I am not sure.

Dayan and then with the Foreign Minister on Thursday afternoon. He was helping me with the speech.

MR. EBAN: When you said nothing much would happen until November.

DR. KISSINGER: I said nothing much diplomatic would happen before November. I was trying to reassure you.

GEN. DAYAN: There will be many problems now. For instance, the line. Last time we had a Canal between us, so it was a kind of natural line dividing the forces. Now there is no canal between the forces.

DR. KISSINGER: You know, I had the experience in Vietnam and everyone told us it would be unmanagable and we'd have to get teams out there. And we had endless arguments about whether you can control the zones. It turned out it shook itself out very nicely. Where the forces are you know where they are.

MRS. MEIR: But there was a lot of shooting.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, there was some shooting. Because the Vietcong were trying to grab additional territory. But we had counted on that and they lost a great deal in their efforts.

MR. EBAN: Was that what made the Canadians leave?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, that and the fact that it was really sabotage by the Hungarians and Poles. But our experience in Vietnam is that the physical preponderance area by area determines who controls what, and that took about three or four weeks to establish.

...the morning of Thursday afternoon.

He was helping ...
...the morning of Thursday afternoon.

...the morning of Thursday afternoon.

...the morning of Thursday afternoon.

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...the morning of Thursday afternoon.

STANDARD
ERASABLE
MRS. MEIR: Both on the West and East sides, some places it is mixed up a bit.

GEN. DAYAN: On the East side we are not really touching one another. Where the Egyptians crossed to the other side, our forces are far away a bit. I suppose practically it is the same on the West side. No soldier is touching the one one, but then you have the question of the SAM missiles. If they will start pushing them forward, and I don't know anything about a standstill being promised, so I don't think we shall like that after all the work we did to destroy them, to have them again and have them pushing them forward.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: You have had experience with that already. That is the thing that worries me.

DR. KISSINGER: We didn't think this was something we should attempt to negotiate in Moscow.

MR. ALLON: But it may create a problem, once we begin.

MR. SISCO: No, of course there were no commitments on either side and it may very well create a problem.

GEN. DAYAN: Practically the question is whether they do want to have a real solid cease fire or they don't. If they do, they will be interested too to come to some arrangements.

DR. KISSINGER: More important is whether they want to have real talks, and I do not exclude that now. I mean real talks, not just stating abstract demands. I don't know, I will

have to see what happens in the next few weeks.

MR. EBAN: Real talks means talks that are not public.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think they will start publicly and I have no great hopes for the public talks, but I think the third point of the resolution, which is very clear if you look at the legislative , which I will go over with your ambassador when we get back, there is no question whatsoever that it means direct talks. There was no question about this.

MR. EBAN: Neither in the Soviet minds?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. What it will mean in the Arab mind I don't know, but since it is indissolubly linked with other provisions, you cannot have implementation of 242 without paragraph 3 which defines what 242 means. And so I think that is going to be an event of great significance, which for 25 years you have sought. Then I believe once that symbolic event is over, then the test will be in the secret talks conducted in many ways.

AMBASSADOR KEATING: Do you anticipate that the talks in the first instance will be only between the confrontants?

DR. KISSINGER: That is our expectation, and Jordan probably. It is conceivable to me, for example, that a formal meeting has all of them, and then breaks up with each one. I think once we get the progress started, there are possibilities. As I said to your Foreign Minister in New York, and I want to repeat, we are

not going to float an American plan. That is not our policy and that is not my method, insofar as we get involved in this at all. First, one has to crystallize what the issues are. And I have been telling, as Joe knows, every Arab minister, when he said: Are you going to use your influence with Israel? I say: First you have to give us something on which we are going to use our influence. Until you do that, there is nothing to use our influence about. And that will continue to be our basic approach. We will not have a process where we are going to be shot at by all sides because we have the solution and no one else is willing to agree. But I think the beginning of the process will be an historic event, even if it totally stalemates, which I expect, frankly.

MR. ALLON: By the inclusion about the 242 resolution, we won't see again a Dr. Jarring around? I say a Dr. Jarring, maybe himself, or someone else. I don't think it is good.

DR. KISSINGER: This is not our idea of how it might work.

MRS. MEIR: I think Ambassador said yesterday that the 242 resolution is linked to the 3.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we do not think Jarring or the Secretary General are the appropriate auspices for these talks.

