

# מדינת ישראל

## משרדיה הממשלה

משרד

עו' תינוק

חטיבת: משרד ראש הממשלה

תת חטיבת: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה

שם תיק:

רהיימץ יצחק רבין - [עניןיהם מדיניים וביטחוניים]

תקופת החומר:

24/02/2011

סימול מקורי:

א-10 / 8199

שם תיק: רהיימץ יצחק רבין - [עניןיהם מדיניים  
וביטחוניים]

מזהה פיזי: **8199/10-A**

מזהה פריט: 7120000000

כתובת: 2-111-8-4-1

תאריך הדפסה: 28/05/2017

עו' תינוק, מ.ב.מ.

מעקב

(Dictated from Washington, June 2, 1977)

Dear Mr. President,

It is some time since I had the opportunity to be in direct touch with you and I would have hesitated to trouble you at this particular moment, when I am about to hand over the stewardship of the Government of Israel to my successor, were I not deeply troubled about some trends which might create the impression that the basis on which our common search for peace in the Middle East IS NO LONGER THE ONE WHICH I have believed existed until now.

I refer in particular to some of the more recent pronouncements which might create a perception in the mind of the Arab States that there already exist certain parameters of a plan which would form the basis for an eventual settlement, parameters which are different from those which have always been at the heart and core of our common endeavours.

We in Israel have always been certain that the only road to the long-sought for peace in the Middle East lies through the closest possible cooperation between the United States and Israel. This cooperation, for which we have always been deeply grateful, was and is based on our commonly held convictions that the achievement of peace in our area can only be based on principles which have been initiated by the United States Government already in 67.



These same principles later found their expression in Security Council resolutions<sup>242</sup> which together with Security Council resolution 338 have become the sole basis accepted by all parties as the framework in which the current political process and the search for peace can take place.

The achievement of the two interim agreements with Egypt and the disengagement agreement with Syria came into being within the framework of these resolutions and, as you will recall, Mr. President, in the memorandum of agreement between our two governments, which certainly is one of the cornerstones of our common search for peace, the United States Government declared that it will oppose any change in resolutions 242 and 338.

Security Council resolution 242 was a carefully balanced document on which, as one of its cardinal principles, the question of the future boundaries had been left to an agreement between the parties. The boundaries themselves, in the words of the resolution, have to be "secure and recognized." It is clear that the resolution did not envision withdrawal by Israel to the lines which existed on June 4, 1967. President Johnson said in 68, "We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. They must be secure and they must be recognized borders .... such lines must be agreed to by the neighbors involved."



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## משרדיה הממשלת

משר

נו, תיק

חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה

תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה

שם תיק:

רהי' יצחק רבין - [ענינים פוליטיים וביטחוניים]

6/1977-1/1976 תקופת החומרה:

24/02/2011

סומול מקורי:

8199 / 10 - A

סזמה פריוי:

8199 / 10 - A



שם תיק: רהי' יצחק רבין - [ענינים פוליטיים  
וביטחוניים]

א-10/8199

סזמה פריוי: 00002f7v

תאריך הדפסה: 28/05/2017

כתובת: 2-111-8-4-1

מזהה

סזמה פריוי

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growing. The population is still small, but is increasing rapidly. The country is  
mostly forest, which is gradually being cleared for agriculture. The area  
is sparsely settled, with many small towns. The soil is mainly sand  
and gravel, with some loam. The climate is temperate, with a cool and  
humid summer, and a dry, cold winter.

There are two main rivers, the River Gull and the River Wren, both  
of which are navigable. The River Gull flows through the town, and  
the River Wren flows through the surrounding country. The River Gull  
has several tributaries, and the River Wren has a few smaller tributaries.  
The River Gull is the larger of the two, and is navigable for small  
vessels. The River Wren is smaller, and is only navigable for small  
canoes.

The town is situated on the River Gull, which flows through the town. The  
River Gull is the larger of the two rivers, and is navigable for small  
vessels. The River Wren is smaller, and is only navigable for small  
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As far as the Palestinian problem is concerned, this too is not mentioned in resolution 242. We, as you know, on our part, are convinced that a peace settlement in the area cannot be achieved without solving this problem both in its emotional and in its human dimension. We would be the first to doubt whether the Arab-Israel conflict could be brought to a peaceful conclusion if this question would not be tackled. However, we are equally convinced, and I am sure that I am expressing in this not only the sentiments of the present government but also those of the vast majority of our people, that this solution cannot be in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Should such a state come into being, then it would constitute a permanent threat to the security of Israel and, therefore, harbour within it the seed of a new conflict.

All of us are bound by a burning desire to see a permanent peace established in our region. I am convinced that you, Mr. President, share my belief that the urgency in which we all address ourselves to this goal should not becloud our vision and lead us to sow new seeds of conflict.

It is in this spirit, Mr. President, that I would like to sum up my part ~~at~~ this juncture, namely that we should not alter the principles on which our common endeavours are founded, those which are the basis for resolutions 242 and 338, which can lead to fruitful negotiations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States, knowing full well that these principles neither ~~ask~~ for Israel's withdrawal to the armistice lines of 67 nor to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.



As I said at the outset, I am about to wind up the work of my government and would be grateful indeed if you would share with me some of your thoughts on these matters which are so crucial to the security of all our citizens.

May I say in conclusion how grateful I am to you for the opportunity which I had of meeting with you in March and the friendship which you have extended to me over the past few years. I am equally grateful for the enormous energy that you and your government are investing in the search for peace in the Middle East, and I can assure you that I am certain that the U.S. will also in the future, as it did in the past, find in Israel a most eager partner in the search for peace.

Sincerely yours,

can be added 200 mg. of copper and 100 mg. of zinc to  
each liter of 10% dilution of yeast. This mixture will be  
sufficiently nutritious to develop 100% of each animal's  
maximum weight in 100 days at 60° C. (68° F.)

After weaning, the 10% dilution may be increased to 20% dilution  
and the animal will soon adapt to this mixture. It will  
then require 100% dilution to maintain the animal's weight.  
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〔註〕此處所引的「新舊約全書」，是新舊約全書的合稱，並非指舊約全書。

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and, while acknowledging the difficulties of defining and measuring  
such an outcome, we believe that it is important to do so. In this paper we  
outline a conceptual framework for assessing the impact of interventions on  
the health of the elderly population. We also describe the results of a pilot  
study of the framework in a sample of elderly people in the United Kingdom.  
The framework is based on the concept of health as a state of well-being  
and is concerned with the health of the elderly population. The framework  
is designed to be used in a variety of settings, including the home, hospital,  
and community. The framework is intended to be used in a variety of settings,  
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Health is a state of well-being that is characterized by the absence of  
disease and infirmity, and by the ability to work and participate in  
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Sincerely yours,

WRF

WRF in R

$P_{xy^0} \rightarrow xy^0 112^f$

$P_{xy^0} \rightarrow xy^0 10y^1 11$

$113^f 113^f \rightarrow 1111^f$

gyratin R, 151 (0.0001)

$xy^1 \rightarrow xy^1 \rightarrow xy^1$

$xy^1 \rightarrow xy^1 \rightarrow xy^1$

לען (מפל) ספינול

מִזְרָבָן / פִּיקְרָבָן

סְפִינָל (פִּיקְרָבָן) לְעֵנָה

לְעֵנָה מִזְרָבָן מִזְרָבָן  
סְפִינָל מִזְרָבָן סְפִינָל  
לְעֵנָה סְפִינָל סְפִינָל

לְעֵנָה . מִזְרָבָן סְפִינָל

סְפִינָל . סְפִינָל - מִזְרָבָן

סְפִינָל (סְפִינָל) מִזְרָבָן

סְפִינָל . מִזְרָבָן סְפִינָל סְפִינָל

סְפִינָל / מִזְרָבָן סְפִינָל / מִזְרָבָן

סְפִינָל . סְפִינָל / מִזְרָבָן סְפִינָל

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1255 5 87  
טלאן

13 01 - 5 מאי 76

תמס

א.כ.

א.מ. 1

ט.מ. 2

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וועדת השרים המינוחית שモגהה לדון בהמלצות המועצה להשכלה גבוהה  
להעניק למכללה שנקרא. היתר והכרה, מוכנה עתה להציג המלצותיה  
וסיכומיה החיוביים לממשלה, אודה לך את המלצותה תופענה בסדר היום  
של ישיבת הממשלה ביום ראשון ה-8 בפברואר, וזאת, עקב החשיבות  
הרכبة לכך שהחלה תי'poll עכשו לקרה שבוע האופנה, אשר מארגני  
THONEL, הם חברים כחבר הנאמנים הבינלאומי של המכללה המתכנס בעוד  
שבוע ומחזפים להחלטה החיובית והסופית.



1700

196 198

טלפון: 091799 936

אלן מילר

מאות ביז' גורק

מ. קדרוג. מאורם ב".  
ס"ג ונה לפק ב-2.9.50.  
מ. קדרוג. מאורם ב".

ס' פ'ר כ' קראת תום מושב מועבייט בחודש טעט', פנו אל המזci'יל  
 "חרירות חשובות בזעקה" וככג מדיניות מפדי'ית מצרית במקשה  
 "לשונות טהרו" כדי "להזיז דעתם". נאומו של ווללהיים ביום  
 הרצינעה כלל "הבטחה" כי "עשה מיטב יכלתו", בעקבות זאת קי'ם מגע  
 עם האזר'יקאים חסובייטים הערבים וישראל.  
 מוחילה גטה המזci'יל לחתת אישית לטיור בז'ית כדי לעמוד מקרוב  
 על עדות ה毛泽לות, אך לאוד התיעצות בז'ירות סומם כי עדיף שמלבד  
 הנוכחות יא גו'יר "לבדוק את העבודות". שכט המזci'יל  
 יצא בלאו כי לחיות באזרור בחודש טט' ולפיכך איב' זה רצוי שי'א  
 כבד עזה לשליהות שמת'ים בעטם בלא כלום ותיז'ור רושם של מחלך בטל.  
 האזר'יקאים וחסובייטים לא הבינו מושבות קוגניטיות בפנ' המזci'יל.  
 חסובייטים לא היו בהרים די הוציא ביחס למחקרים הקיימים ונגנו מלבין  
 כי אין מתחי' ביב' מלה'.

בתקופת זה אמד כי עד סוף 1975 הייתה וענודה חסוריית בסוגיה זו שיט  
אתני. פ' אדריכל מוצא פשרה שוחטבל על דעת אדריכלים אלה.  
סתנוגדות לחרחות אש"מ, ומכיוון שסוריה מתנה החרחות בסנתנות  
על המשולים המוגעים כ"גוס ג'נבה", מחד שאותו פ' וישראל  
ג'ונגה חביבר כי עיקר הבעיות הגוכחות היא מפואר כיצד מותגין  
חוסיפ' כי אונתנו הפתגנו לחייב אליהם השובה ביום לפזות וואש' גגתו'ג'.

иъ: памят  
жизн: это же

иъ: быт  
жизн: быт же

о, фырь, оно съ.  
ок: гла фырь съ, съ:  
жизн: яхърь съ.

стар съ съмъ съ съмъ съмъ съмъ съмъ, съмъ иъ памятъ  
\*\*памятъ памятъ съмъ съмъ\*\* тъл памятъ съмъ иъ съмъ съмъ  
\*\*съмъ съмъ\*\* съмъ \*\*стар тълъ\*\*, съмъ иъ памятъ съмъ  
памятъ съмъ \*\*памятъ\*\* съмъ съмъ тълъ, съмъ тъл съмъ съмъ  
иъ памятъ памятъ памятъ памятъ тълъ.

старъ съмъ памятъ съмъ иъ съмъ съмъ съмъ съмъ  
иъ памятъ памятъ, иъ памятъ памятъ съмъ съмъ съмъ съмъ  
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-2-

לשאר הזמנה לאש"י. ובಅפ"לו אם לא יהיה נוכח בועידה, אם כן אמצע שוטוריים יסכוימו עדין כי היורדיים ישררו הזמנה לאש"י. במקביל לאש"י יופיע בועידה בעוד שם עצם כב יופיעו ויטענו כי הצליחו לאש"י הזמנה לאש"י. פתרות לאש"י מסרב להופיע, סביר להניח כי גיונה לחייב עראתה אחותו בחתת אג.בי.ס.י. שאנו סחוטו תיאר גיונה כא נוכחות להחותי. בצד כלהו.

ביחס להזמנה לא נטה לא הודייע עדשתה כי אף לא נטה בועידה על מס' 248, כפ" שארם בעבר. עראתה של מחותמך מתחילה אם יש לסתוב השואל הזמנה עבורה.

כ"גוס הטרלמגט על ידי חוסיינ.

שתי הטענות קלטו בענין זה:

הראשון, ספ" שרפ', שגירדן באום, ולפיה כוונת המלך והינה למגוע מישראל מצב בגודה שבו לא חזיה לתושבים זיקה לעתן או לאש"י. ישראל מנסה עזה לגבות סנהיגות מקומית עם אינטלקטוס משלמה ויש מבוע זאת מעתה. לעומת גיונה זה הטענה שנתנו הטענות היידניים מסורים ולטעודים ועל כן נא דעתה מילז ביקורת אותה מצד דשאך ויריאד כלפי הפלך זהה של חוסיינ.

השנייה, טקורת מערביים בעיקר ולפיה המלך עיר לדברי מנהיגים יישראליים בדרם. "האופציה היידנית". ומעוגין עיר ביקורו בוראשי נגטונג מאותה כי הוא מזוהה גם לאפשרות הזאת.

ג. סוריה.

סביר כי סוריה מתרכזה ביום מטאון על הבתaga העולם הערבי ואחד הכלים החשובים מטאון זה הוא בידודה של מצרים. סוריה איבדה מעוגין בנת על כב בתגועה דיפלומטית אשר תחכץ את מצרים סקשיים אליהם נקלעו. אונם בתגיית וולחאים-קדום אמר ואחרו כי סוריה תחיה מוכנה לשוב על תזר נסוף בגולן. אך קדום, הבהיר כי סוריה תעשה כב אם יופכו שג' תגאים: אחד שככל וזרכים האזרות הסומות מחלוטין. שג' כי הסדר הנוסף "గדר נס'ה סובטנטיבית בית יישראליות בגולן" אסאך וחדאמ חזרו ואמרו חמיד כי לא סדרבו לקבל טרייטוריה סורית בוספת. ככלית, שוכנעים והסורים כי יישראל לא תוחדר כליל על הגולן כל עוד



-3-

איג הם סוכנים לטעמם מהותית ומוחדר שבעוגניינט לטעמיכם ולכבודך  
את סוחאת יש להניחס כי מחת כל תבואה כל ישועה, גהفورך הוא.  
לפ"ז הדרסה במצוירות יהיו הטעורים סוכנים לטעמה מלחותה החשוה בינו  
האביב לקי"ז.

המצאים סוכנים ללית לא' גבנה מחר בתגנאי שהטעמ' הראתוג ייהו השותפות  
אפש"ם. אם הדיווג בסעיף זה יסת"ים בכללן והיה פארים סוכנים להסתכל  
מג הועידה ולחשיל את כלונגה על י"שאלא-אורה"ב כד"ז לרכוש מחדש את  
היווקה בעולם והערבי". זהה לדעת ג'ונס שטבות הטעות סוחאת לפב'  
ססט" שטבות כי א' אפשר לבנם ג'ונס לפ"ז "המתקנות הקודמת".  
ג'ונס ילווה את גו"יר מס' זורו האפוי במצוית אונגי"פ וטס"ג" ביחס לבעדות  
ל-2.17. שיב עלי'ו למקור בתקנות אונגי"פ וטס"ג" ביחס לבעדות  
שללו חוכ ביצוע הטעם לדברה פאלת הטעות האמור"יקנית".

נאות--

חתום רחם המכ' שטב ארגוב רוזן י. ובייב מ. קדרין מארם ב פאלת באהם

חער רס און

רע/אמ

Изъ по архива чистоти описаніи таихъ ворогъствъ съзъ съссѣдъ  
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№1015. Сдел. в 1950-х гг. в. Типичная погонка.

## Watch

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ירושלים, כ"ג באדר א' תשל"ו  
4.2.76

לכבוד  
מר ישראל ישביתו  
יו"ר הכבאות  
כגט

ארובי תי"ו",

ע"פ סעיף 55(א) לתקנון הכבאות מוגשת בהזאת סימן  
היליכוד לתביע אי-אפשר לממשלה על הזרועה גדרות "המקודר הבלתי"  
בפמליית דאה-הממשלה בוראטיות, כי רשות הרכס שהוגשה לאורה"ב  
גרם בזיהו לישראל.

הוילה להביעו היא בדלהין :

הדרות "המקודר הבלתי" הישראלי בדאה-הממשלה, כי  
הגשת רשות הרכס שהוגשה לאורה"ב גרם בזיהו לישראל, תביעה דק  
בל-ישראל לאירועים נחוצתיים ולמפעלה של ישראל באורה"ב.

הזרעה כזו המסדרת בחו"ל, בעט ביקוד רשות של  
ראט-הממשלה, אם על-ידי ואם בהשתתפות ובהסכמה, היא הזכתה לבור, כי  
אין ממשלה זו סמכלה למפקד.

בכבוד רב

( - )

משה גפין

( - )

חיים לבראר

( 182 - 182 )

1920-1921  
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
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
20172-20173


20173-20174


20174-20175


20175-20176











פהיה. פ.קידרין העומד דיביז/וושינגטונ.

(מִינִיבִּיצַּ אַיִּטִי).

ונטהרין הטמיגני מִזְמַרְתָּ. כפז כי הוזמג למסיבה על ידי מונל  
ביו יודק לכבוד רוחות רחצת דעת אם יוכל שוטוף כמה פילים עם רוחות  
בנפרד בעת המסיבה. רפז כי היה מעוניין מושוחו אוור בעת ביקורו צה  
בתרם אותו מסינה בירם אי. המסתור ליהודים כל.

נפגש לאחר מועביט עם קדומי. הוא פאל את קדומי אזב חם זענבו  
כהזמנה לבוא לאגדבה. תשומתו על קדומי היהנה כי על בסיס טיעות זהה  
זהופלה על ידי הרוט האפריקאי היו מוכנים, אולם מכירב מהבזים היום  
יהיה 242 יסדרו לקל הדמנה לאגדבה גם חותבל.

פאלו ומלוחים ביחס לעמדת הסוחרים ענה כי מעתו יסוריים יסכו  
כבודו לאגנבה לאחר הסכם ביגרים גוספ.  
ומלוחים תבע תמייה מהחר ובעת הדין בדעתו בנובמבר אמרו לו אנד  
וחודם כי איב מקומם להזקם ביגרים גוספ.  
קדומי ענה כי זאת הייתה גישה טקטית לאור התוצאות עם אונדוף וכי היום  
הגיש שלוחו תאגה מה גם שאז דברה ישראל על התקופים קוסטיזי,  
והוא מביא כי דפעם מחר על פזם יהוד מטעות.

ומלחים הופתע לפניו מתי נקודות אלה וסביר כי הם יכולות לעביד אונדוף.  
באשר למועביט סיפר:

א. למרות טנפיא מועביט שאלים הודי על התיקוב המתוגן נאדי עקב ההגדות  
הstorית והדריפה אף נציג אחר להעתור הגמורה על מלוחים מה  
הנישם להצעה.

ב. כולם הופתעו על ידי המרגיל הדריטי ומלוחים נגד תיקון  
מתיקוד בשעגה כי ממש האפריקאים יטילו ווטו.  
הערבים רגוז באורה קיזוגית על הבדיטים, התיקוב הדריטי בא כדען עקב  
הויכוח והדריף ביג וילסונג מלוחם.

ומלחים הצביעו אני כי לא היה הגיון בהצעה המתיקוד ואחיך המגנות לאחר  
הזיהת התיקוב. ואנגלים לדעתו מבחן הגזביה היו אריכים להצביע גאץ.  
הפרשנה תפופה והערבים רוגזים מפבי שכתוצאה מכך נפלת החמיכת תזודית  
והאטיקית. באותו בונך אמר לו רידבק החודי כי הזראות הנבראות מטעוכ  
שהצעה הטעוכה. חוזק הראזוב בפערלה  
הדריטית נובע בדצוג מהזחות עם האפריקאים יתר על האיזה  
ולא להחרוך יתר על המידה מהדרופאים.

ג. הערבים הנקדו בהנאה כי העדכו שיפגשו 11 קולות.

עו"ר מסמכיים אדרילים מעד מלחצע סייג ולוב אכ ללא הוועיל.

בכל הדיון אף היו יוצרים מטרות משאר כוריה. אמר לי כי קדומי אמר לו כי למדות דמויות של פרגי, היו מוכנים לקבל את ההזקמה הבלתיית וכי פרוש והמלחמות ~~אלא~~ <sup>הנורא</sup> הוא הראה למשה בקיום מדינת *Palestine* <sup>הירא</sup> ישראל.

שלא כמו נדוע אם כב כא יכריז על הטרוש הזה ומלהיים עבה כי נאכט  
הגבים של אשפ מוגע בעד אנד צה. שאל לדעתך על לבנוב.  
על ידדך ועל העמדות השובות שלנו ואמר כי הוא ישמנו אם נטהפ אותו  
במחנות אלנו כנראה אנדים גוספים **מקדמת** ועידות גיבנה, התייעצויות  
בלני פורטליות וככ'.

1. 4. 75

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|-------|------|------|------|
| 1:3   | 8000 | 2690 | 500  |
| 1:5   | 4850 | 982  | 650  |
| 1:3.5 | 1487 | 419  | 800  |
| 1:2.1 | 156  | 73   | 1000 |
| 1:9.9 | 197  | 20   | 1000 |
| 1:13  | 65   | 5    | 800  |
| 1:1.9 | 34   | 12   | 500  |
| -     | 12   | -    | 1000 |

1. 4. 75 - 1000 1000 1000 1000



1.4.26

| on'     | 718                 | 628   | 6.20 |
|---------|---------------------|---|------|
| 1: 2.9  | 9000                | 3133  | 2.20 |
| 1: 5    | 5150                | 1044  | 6.20 |
| 1: 3.3  | 1635                | 448   | 6.20 |
| 1: 1.6  | 225                 | 137   | 6.20 |
| 1: 11.9 | 238                 | 20  | 6.20 |
| 1: 13.4 | 67                  | 5   | 6.20 |
| 1: 3.4  | 55 <del>33-12</del> | 18  | 6.20 |
| -       | 12                  | -  | 6.20 |



סודרי ביזורא. כמויות טנקים סופקם לארכוזה ערבי מאז יוה"כ

| העדות                             | לוב       | עירק    | سورיה       | מצרים     | סודן הסבך |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|---------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| בריה"ט                            | 300-400   | 200-300 | 600-700     | 400-450   | T-62      |
| בריה"ט, צ'כיה, פולין<br>ירגנסלביה | 400-500   | 200-300 |             | 650-700   | T-55, 54  |
| בריה"ט                            |           |         | בודדים בספק |           | T-64      |
| סה"כ                              | 700-900   | 400-600 | 1100-1300   | 1050-1150 | סה"כ בלאי |
|                                   | 3250-3950 |         |             |           |           |

ב. ירידות על חודדים נספחים החודתיים

|   |   |  |  |          |
|---|---|--|--|----------|
| 2 עיסוקות<br>על 1000<br>טנקים מחרוכם<br>סופקו כבר<br>השאר יסופקו.                                     | נחתם בערך<br>על אספקט<br>500 הצעה<br>החללה דצט'<br>75 | נחתם באוקט<br>על אספקט<br>300-350<br>מסוג זה | לא ידוע                                | T-62     |
| נחתמה עסקה<br>עם א'כיה<br>על 1000<br>כבדר סופקו<br>100-200<br>נחתמה<br>עסקה עם<br>פולין לאספקט<br>400 | נחתמו ב-75<br>500<br>למעלה יהיו<br>מסוג זה            | נחתמו ב-75<br>500<br>לאספקט<br>300-350       | נחתמו ב-75<br>500<br>לאספקט<br>300-350 | T-54, 55 |
| נחתמת ב-75<br>אספקט 200   | כבראה שאחדדים<br>למעלה יבללו                          |  |  | T-64     |
| סה"כ 2800-3050  | סה"כ בלאי 2000-2200                                   | 500  | 300-350                                | סה"כ     |

ג. הספקה מארה"ב לישראל

1) מלחמת יוה"כ סופקו לישראל

1055 טנקים


70 טנקים

1125 טנקים

בשנת 76 יסופקו

סה"כ

העדות: בנוסף לאמור לעיל סופקו למדינת ערבי המערב כ-130 טנקים וצפוים בשנת 76 עוד כ-90-70 טנקים. ההספקה ע"י - ארה"ב, צרפת ובריטניה.



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