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מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

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משרד רוהט

יוסף מדיני

ארה"ב

26/3/88 - 31/3/88

תיק מס'

תיק מס'

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מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיוז: 4606/5-א

מזהה פריט: R00034by

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-7 תאריך הדפסה: 10/08/2020

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LEE H. HAMILTON

FOREIGN AFFAIRS NEWSLETTER

2/3 789

2167 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 202-225-5115
VOL. VIII MARCH 1988 NO. 3

THE 1988 MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE

Violence in the Israel-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza shows that when the peace process does not move forward, events in the Middle East move backward, toward conflict. No peace talks have occurred in the Middle East in over 6 years. The recent disturbances have refocused world attention on this troubled region, and energized U.S. peace efforts.

The situation in the Middle East has changed markedly in just a few short months. The Arab Summit meeting in November concentrated on the Iran-Iraq war, not the Arab-Israeli dispute. The December Reagan-Gorbachev summit barely discussed the Middle East. This news of neglect contributed to an explosion of frustration among the 1.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza -- a wave of stone-throwing, demonstrations, and strikes which began December 9, 1987.

A traffic accident in Gaza ignited the protests. Four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli truck driver, and rumors spread that the incident was revenge for the killing of an Israeli settler. Demonstrations first swept Gaza, then the West Bank. Youths who have known only the 20 years of Israeli occupation have led the Palestinian uprising. Most protests have been spontaneous. Radical Islamic groups and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have since tried to exploit them.

The violence, shootings and beatings in the West Bank and Gaza have helped to activate U.S. diplomacy. Secretary of State Shultz has been to the Middle East twice since January, and there have been high-level talks with the Soviets. The U.S. wants to focus on substance, but discussions are still dominated by procedural issues.

The new U.S. peace initiative builds on old approaches and past achievements. It outlines three steps: (1) an international conference; (2) direct talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on a transition period of self-rule for the West Bank and Gaza; and (3) talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

First, under the U.S. proposal, an international conference would begin by May 1, 1988. Secretary Shultz has said that the Arabs require a conference to launch negotiations, and without a properly structured conference there will be no negotiations. The envisaged conference would be open to the five permanent Security Council members -- the U.S., Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union -- and parties to the conflict which accept UN resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce terrorism. The conference could receive reports on direct bilateral talks but could not impose solutions or veto agreements.

Second, direct talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would begin within two weeks of the international conference, with a year-end deadline. The subject would be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, which are intended to last for three years.

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Third, direct talks between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the final status of the West Bank would begin before the end of 1988. The U.S. believes direct, bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors are the way to achieve peace. This third step may also include direct talks between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and negotiations on the status of Jerusalem.

Each party has problems with the U.S. proposal. Syria wants all power to reside in an international conference. The PLO wants a separate place at the table. Jordan is fearful of a transition regime for the West Bank and Gaza will last indefinitely. Israel is divided: Prime Minister Shamir opposes an international conference and short transition regime; Foreign Minister Peres supports U.S. efforts. Strongest support for the U.S. proposal comes from Egypt.

Serious questions remain unanswered. Is the proposal realistic, given upcoming elections in the U.S. and Israel? Who will speak for the Palestinians, and can Palestinians be found who are prepared to co-exist with Israel? How will elections in the West Bank and Gaza be conducted? What will be the rights of the 60,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza? Can the Soviets play a constructive role?

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Difficult choices are necessary if peace is to be achieved. - The Palestinians and the PLO will have to participate in a Jordanian delegation and accept less than statehood if they want greater self-rule. Jordan will have to enter direct talks without knowing the precise outcome of exchanging peace for territory. If it wants return of the Golan Heights, Syria will have to talk directly to Israel and accept peace. Israel must realize the status quo is untenable, and that it will no longer be a Jewish or democratic state if it keeps the populous West Bank and Gaza.

This peace plan re-engages U.S. leadership in the Middle East. After a long lull, American leadership is welcome. The U.S. should not, indeed cannot, dictate the terms of the settlement. Yet it can set forth a vision of how the parties can achieve security and self-determination, and protect human rights and promote economic development. We can also support the exchange of territory for peace, and concepts of federation or confederation.

So far, no one has said "no" and no one has said "yes" to the U.S. proposal. Parties are rethinking old positions. They sense that it is time to negotiate, but have argued so far about the shape of the table and who will sit with whom. They are reserving their positions, and we may not know who will participate in a peace conference until one is scheduled.

The U.S. proposal offers a way out from the current violence in Middle East. This initiative may not succeed, but U.S. interests are protected best when we pursue the peace process. The need to go forward is urgent, because the alternative is escalating conflict.

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ס ו ד י

לו"ז ביקור שולץ

יום א' - 3.4.88

18.00 - הגעה לישראל.
בלילה - בירושלים.

יום ב' - 4.4.88

9.00-10.50 - פגישה עם רה"מ.
11.00 - שר החוץ.
- שר הבטחון.
20.00 - א"ע בבית רה"מ.
בלילה - בירושלים.

יום ג' - 5.4.88

- טיסה לעמאן (פגישה עם חוסיין).
- דמשק (אסאד).
בלילה (מאוחר) - חוזר לירושלים.

יום ד' - 6.4.88

7.30
8.00-09.00 - פגישה עם רה"מ.
10.00 - שר החוץ.
- טיסה לקהיר.
בערב - טיסה לעמאן (פגישה עם חוסיין).
בלילה - בעמאן.

יום ה' - 7.4.88

- ר' אד.

בלילה - בעמאן.

יום ו' - 9.4.88

עוזב את האזור.

אריה מקל

March 30, 1988

1. The GOI is not a party to this issue and has no interest to be involved in it.
2. The only interest GOI has in this subject is to help the U.S.
3. GOI would like to be assured that the U.S. President and Secretary of State are apprised of the request.
4. Mr. M. Harari is now a private individual. However, it could be arranged that he fulfil the role of intermediary for the purpose of concluding an agreement between the U.S. and N. GOI will not be involved in the negotiations nor in the substance of the agreement. It should be mentioned, in this respect, that Mr. Harari enjoys the confidence of N. (This is his main "asset" in this affair) and he does not want to cause N. any harm.
5. If Mr. Harari's role, according to these stipulations is secured, USG will be required to appoint a high-level accredited U.S. representative with whom Mr. Harari will deal directly. Preferably, negotiations with Mr. Harari's involvement should not take place in Washington, D.C.
6. This entire issue must be kept in strict confidence and all possible measures to prevent a leak must be taken.

G.M. 10/11/79

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SHULTZ HEADS TO MIDEAST HOPEFUL OF ADVANCING PEACE PLAN
(VOA interview)

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz is traveling to the Middle East this weekend determined to move ahead with a peace initiative.

"There is some opportunity," Shultz told a Voice of America interviewer March 30, "and as long as there is some opportunity I think it is important to keep working for a more stable situation."

Shultz noted that none of the parties involved has said no to his plan, "and everybody encourages us to keep working at it." In some conversations, he added, "there have been some reasonably positive things said."

He explained that the centerpiece of his plan is "face-to-face negotiations between the parties" with an international conference as a way to start the process. This differs from the Soviet view calling for an international conference where the substantive issues would be discussed and, hopefully, settled. "We don't think that would work," said the secretary.

Secretary Shultz insisted that the Palestinians must be a part of the negotiating process "from the beginning...and we believe the right way is within a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation."

Following is the transcript of the Shultz VOA interview:

(begin transcript)

Q: Mr Secretary, you are about to leave on another tour of several Mideastern countries, your second tour within a short time. Does that mean that you are still hopeful about advancing your peace proposals?

Shultz: Yes, of course, and I think whatever the difficulties may be and however much skepticism there may be, there is some opportunity and as long as there is some opportunity I think it is important to keep working for a more stable situation.

Q: Since none of the parties involved has come out clearly in favor of your integrated plan, what is it precisely and specifically that makes you think another trip is worthwhile at this point?

Shultz: Nobody has wanted to say no, everybody encourages us to keep working at it and so that general attitude suggests that minds are still open. And, as a matter of fact, in some of our private conversations there have been some reasonably positive things said. So we will keep working at it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the idea of holding an international conference, according to your plan, is meant as an umbrella that would quickly lead to direct negotiations. Does the Soviet Union agree to this type of formula?

Shultz: Our conception of how to go about the peace process in the Middle East is to have as the centerpiece direct, face-to-face negotiations between the parties. The reason for that is that the people to a negotiation understand their problems, the subtleties of them, the difficulties of them, the importance of them, better than anybody else does. And so that's the way to work it out and so that is the centerpiece of our idea, and we would propose an international conference that doesn't have the power to tell anybody what to do or veto anybody's agreements, as a way to get that process going and as a

way to receive reports from the parties. The Soviet view, at least as they have expressed it here -- not necessarily their view forever -- but anyway what they told me was that their centerpiece is an international conference and everybody will be at the international conference and there will be discussion of all these substantive issues there and somehow in that conference everything will get settled. Now, that's a different conception entirely and we don't think that would work.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are differing views and interpretations on the land-for-peace idea as stated in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. What is your definition of this principle?

Shultz: Well, we have in our initiative put resolutions 242 and 338 alongside each of the direct negotiations so we think those principles should apply to each one and so you can read what that document says and apply it to each category of negotiations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in view of your recent meeting with two prominent Palestinian-Americans, what are the prospects of your meeting with Palestinian representatives in the occupied territories when you are in the area?

Shultz: It is hard for me to say because I've tried on two occasions to arrange such a meeting and people haven't been able to come. I have been told they have been threatened if they came so I can understand their reluctance. But I have met with two Palestinians from the occupied territories here in Washington some weeks ago. I went to the meeting place that we had arranged for the meeting the last time I was in Jerusalem, then made a statement to the Palestinians, and I met with a couple of Americans who are of Palestinian extraction here in Washington the other day. So I am making it clear that I understand that Palestinians must be a part of this process from the beginning and they have to be represented and we believe the right way is within a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. But whether or not it is possible to arrange a meeting, I don't know.

Q: The Syrians have in effect given the green light to Jordan for participation in the process but have also criticized your plan. Does that mean that Syria will keep its distance from this process during this visit?

Shultz: Well, you have to ask the Syrians. I will go to Syria and as far as I know they will receive me there and I'll continue my discussions with them. But as to their attitude, it is for them to say what that is.

Q: If I may move to a different area, Mr. Secretary. Your visit will include Saudi Arabia. Is there any likelihood that you would bring up the subject of the Chinese missiles with the Saudis?

Shultz: Well, that is a subject that is of great concern to everybody. And, of course, it isn't only the Saudis that have missiles but they are becoming more and more common around the world and in the Middle East and since they can go a long distance and do a lot of damage it is a real problem. And so that is something that certainly will be a matter of continuing discussion.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the Voice of America and millions of its listeners we thank you very much for giving us the time to answer these questions.

Shultz: Thank you. (end transcript)

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happy in our day

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סווג בטחון שמור

דחיפות מייד

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מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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וונשור

אל: ממ"ד, בינ"ל 1

מאת: אלי אבירן, וושינגטון

שירות שברנדז.

משיחה עם סטיב יאנג (מחמ"ד/ברה"מ)

1. מזה"ח. הסוב' גילו "התרוממות רוח" (UP BEAT) בדיון בסוגיית התהליך המדיני ע"פ יוזמת המזכיר אך נהגו בזהירות יתרה באשר לאימוצה, הגם שטרחו שלא לטרוק דלתות. הדגישו שאף צד לא אומר הן או לא, אף שבאחת ההזדמנויות טענו שישראל דחתה אותה, טענה שנדחתה ע"י מרפי, לאמריקאים היה קשה לדובב (PIN DOWN) את הסוב'.

2. השאלה המרכזית הייתה האם מקובלת על ברה"מ סוג הועב"ל שארה"ב צמודה לה, המוגבלת בסמכויותיה והמותירה את כר הפעילות לצדדים עצמם. הסוב' נהגו בשיטת המטרת שאלות, טרחו לומר שמקובל עליהם שלא תכפה עצמה אך שמהיח בעלת יכולת (POWER). התעניינו מה ה- ~~המלצות~~ של המלנוס - האם והנה לה "תחזקה" מחתזורה. חדירות הפגישות בפורום זה (פעם הצדיקו כינוס שבועי ופעם חודשי) האם צריכה להפנות הצעות/דעות משלה לצדדים. הם דוגלים (FAVOR) שתבואתה מהפלנוס, גם אם שני הצדדים לא יתבעו זאת. לצורך זה מספיק צד אחד.

3. אשי"פ. בשאלת הייצוג הפלסי הסוב' עמדו על עקרון שיתופו על בסיס שווה. מעשית ניתן לחרג (CONSTRUCT) זאת באמצעות הזמנה לפלסי מטעם האו"ם. מטרידה אותם הצורה בה אשי"פ יוזמן, כאשר הם לא מוציאים מכלל ספק שהוא ישתתף. העלו אפשרות שיגור משלחת ערבית משותפת (ברוח התביעה הסורית) באם תתקבל על דעת הערבים, אך נמנעו מלהביע דעתם באם יתמכו באפשרות כזו. הסוב' המשיכו בשאלת ההגדרה העצמית. דעתם שיש לתת לפלסי זכות ההחלטה על קבלת מעמד של מדינה (STATEHOOD) או כל מעמד אחר באם יבחרו בכך. הפלסי הם שבסופו של דבר חייבים לפרש עקרון זה.

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שגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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4. מרפי-פוליאקוב, השיחות ביניהם בעקבות שברנדזה-שולץ עמדו מחצית הסוב' בסימן דברי שתייה חסוב' שיש הרבה מן המשותף, אף שהמזכיר חלק על כך. והתאם לכך הוא לא חרג מהעמדות שהציג שברנדזה שלא להכנס לפרוט, מרבית הזמן הוקדש לברור עמדת ברה"מ.

פוליאקוב בקש לברר מה תפקיד המעצמות בועב"ל ונענה "לא גדול", אלא בעידוד הצדדים בצורת *GOOD OFFICES*. לא ינתן לה מנדט, לדוגמה סין אמנם חברת מועב"ט אך אין לה תפקיד במזה"ת ולכן מעמדה בועידה יקבע בהתאם, במקביל האמריקאים העלו שאלה מצדם האם ברה"מ תמלא תפקיד קונסטרוקטיבי, בראש ובראשונה הם ישפיעו על סוריה ואש"פ. הסוב' לא השיבו בשלילה. סיפרו שהם מדבריהם יותר עם נציג הירדנים מאשר עם אש"פ ולכן אולי יש להם מרחב תמרון גדול יותר בשאלת היוצוג הפלסטי.

5. הסוב' לא במעמד של מציעים חוץ כמובן מויטו במועבי"ט, מאידך הם לא רוצים להראות כמתחילים (SPOILER) לגבי הערבים האחרים, שמא חסין וצדדית אחרונה החוטרדוט מהנעשה בגדמ"ע מוכנים ללכת. הם עשו רושם על מרפי שלא תמיד מבינים את ישראל. נשאלו למה אינם מקיימים קשר עם רה"מ שמיר, ענו שהקשרים הם עם משה"ח הישראלי. הם מקיימים קו של *SEE & WAIT* ובינתיים מעוררים את "אנשי השלום" בישראל. הוסבר להם מפורשות ששום ממשלה בישראל לא תקבל ועידה סמכותית, או מתן תפקיד לאש"פ.

6. יאנג מסכם את עמדת ברה"מ כדלקמן (א) אין ספק שהפכה חלק מההליך. (ב) חוסר מחויבות מרחיקת לכת מעבר לעמדות הצדדים (ג) צפייה והמתנה לבאות. במקביל ניתן להבחין "בעצבנות" סוב', שהרי מדובר בתכנית אמריקאית והם עדיין "בצדה השני של הדלת". מול זאת עומדות טענות אמריקאיות וזו של מהם רואלים וביטוי מודחשי לפדגוגיהם בתחום השפעתם על בעלי בריתם - סוריה ואש"פ. יש דמיון בבעיות שהסוב' מוצאים עצמם "מטופלים" בדיונים עם הגורמים הנ"ל באותן הנקודות שהאמריקאים מנהלים ויכוח עם הגורמים האחרים - ישראל וירדן. הערכת האמריקאית ו"פ השאלות שנושאלו היא שהחור' מוחזק להחיל החושה שהם מוטרדים יותר בנושא הועב"ל מאשר בנושא אש"פ.

7. אפגניסטן. חוברי שזהו נושא קשה מבחינתם. הסוב' לא באו עם מחשבות פורדות (CREATIVITY) הציגו עמדה עקרונית הנשענת על מעורבות ממשלה בקאבול בחסכם, ולחלופין לעצממה, שתחייב 1/3

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

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גם את פקיסטן, האמריקאים נקטו בגישה פרקטית. מוכנים להכריז על מורטוריום משותף¹⁴ אספקת אמל"ח לצדדים למשך מרעז הפיגור (כפי שהוסכם בג' נבה) בתוספת של 3 חדשים מעבר לכך. הסוב' לא הסכימו. באשר לפקיסטן, ארה"ב מוכנה להיות GARNATOR שזו תעמוד בהסכם, אך פקיסטן לא תהיה צד להסכם עם קאבול כפי שהסוב' דורשים. הסוב' חוששים משני מצבים "רעים" מבחינתם (א) הסכם על הפא"ש ע"פ הסכם בג' נבה יאלץ פקיסטן להפסיק העברת סיוע צבאי, אך יוציא את ארה"ב מאיסור זה (ב) הסכמה סוב'-אמריקאית להפסקה הדדית של הסיוע הצבאי תותיר את ברה"מ בעמדה המפירה את החוזה שלה עם קאבול. אפשרות שלישית פיגור סוב' חו' צדדי על בסיס לא כתוב כששני הצדדים ממשיכים לספק נשק לצדדים הזוג בחזקת הפקרת ה - PDPA מול המוג'הדין ראבדות לסוב' במהלך הפיגור.

האמריקאים צופים התייעצויות רמות דרג בתוך ההנהגה הסוב', כולל בחינת האפשרות של פרזשה מהשיחות בג' נבה. הפקרת ממשלת קאבול לגרילה בדומה למה שעשו האמריקאים בוייטנאם אינה בבחינת תסריט מלבב לסוב'. מכל מקום הכדור במגרש הסוב' והאמריקאים ממתנינים לראות כיצד יפול דבר שם.

8. על דתר הנושאים במפגש בשיחה נפרדת עמו.

אלי אבידן

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שמור

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נ.מ. 3162 - 210.02

נאום

ביין - יששכרוף

מועב'ט - שטחים

א. לקראת הדיון הצפוי במועב'ט, ולאור ההנחה שהערבים מתכוונים בעיקר לדיון שישרת תעמולתם (ביקור ועדת הליגה הערבית יציאת מזכיר המדינה לאזורנו, יום האדמה וכו') כדאי שמטרת התבטאותנו תהיה שלא לתרום מצידנו להשגת היעד התעמולתי הערבי.

ב. אנו ממליצים על נאום קצר, אשר יתמקד בנימה של אירוניה בכינוסה החוזר ונשנה של מועב'ט ע"י מדינות ערב בכל פעם שהדבר נראה להן נוח לאינטרס המדיני שלהן. (הפעם כנראה הכוונה לפגוע בהמשך תהליך השלום).

ג. תוכלו להביע תמיהה ופליאה על האלמנטים הבאים:

1. העתוי לכינוס המועצה. יש להצביע על כך שהשגריר הטוניסי כתב לנשיא המועצה כבר ב-15 במרץ על 'המצב המחמיר', אך לא ביקש כינוס המועצה. גם במכתבו מה-25 במרץ לא ביקש כינוסה. האם עלינו להסיק שדווקא בימים אלה, כאשר מסתמנת רגיעה יחסית בהתפרעויות, מבקשות מדינות ערב לתת זריקת עידוד למתפרעים האלימים ע"י חימום האווירה ונאומי הסתה במועב'ט.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2. החיפזון שבו מתחילה ההתרוצצות במועצה ברגע שהערבים נותנים סימנים שהם מעוניינים בכינוסה. היו בימים האחרונים מאורעות עקובים מדם בחלקים שונים של העולם (להדגיש בעיקר הפצצות פגזים ע"י עיראק) ולא ראינו שארצות ערב נזעקו והזעיקו מועב'ט. (ראה בעניין זה גם המאמר מ'אקונומיסט' מה-12 במרץ שהעברנו לכם).

3. להדגיש בקיצור שישראל אחראית בלעדית על שמירת החוק והסדר בשטחים ותמשיך לעשות כל שביכולתה מבחינת חוקית כדי לשים קץ לאלימות. יש להדגיש שאין המדובר במפגני - מחאה תמימים אלה בהמון מוסת ואלים שהורג ופוצע (ראו בעניין זה סיכום הנפגעים הישראלים בשטחים שהוברק לכם ע"י הסברה - מזת'ים).

4. אם הערבים וידידיהם יעלו מחדש טענותיהם על תחולת האמנה הרביעית מוצע שתחזיר עוד פעם על עמדתנו הרשמית שהוברקה לכם בח/15736 מה-25 בינואר, ותדגישו שהארגונים ההומניטריים הפועלים בשטחים ובעיקר הצל'א ממשיכים בפעילותם השוטפת ללא הפרעה. (ראו בעניין זה מברקנו ח/24066 מאתמול בקשר לפעילות הצל'א בזמן סגירת השטחים).

5. בעניין דו"ח המזכ"ל, אם תראו עצמכם מחוייבי המציאות להשיב, ראו ההנחיות שנשלחו אליכם בחוזם המוזכר בסעיף 4 דלעיל.

ד. במגעכם השוטפים עם האמריקנים בניו-יורק ובוושינגטון מוצע שתדגישו העובדה שעצם כינוס המועצה (שלא לדבר על נסיון להעביר גם החלטה) בודאי לא יסייע לתהליך השלום ולשליחותו הקרובה של מזכיר המדינה. (סעיף זה תואם עם סמנכ"ל מצפ'א).

מנהל ארב'ל 2

א.א.ר

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד, ברנע, ארב'ל, 22, בירן, מצפא, ליאור, מזת'ים, מתאסשטחים

[illegible]

הנהגת הממשלה לא הייתה מוצלחת במיוחד, והיא לא הצליחה להשיג את המטרות שהיא נקבעה להשיג. הסיבה לכך היא שהממשלה לא הייתה מסוגלת להתמודד עם המורכבות של המצב. היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להבין את המצב, ולכן היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להחליט על המהלכים הנכונים. היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להנהיג את המדינה, ולכן היא לא הייתה מסוגלת להשיג את המטרות שהיא נקבעה להשיג.

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א' רישת סכנתם כמות סכנה ותשמש תיפחות לא, אישית
ל' א

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ΠΡΟΣΧΕΔΙΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΓΙΑΣ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΥ

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
סופס מברק	מחור: 7
מצי"א, לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רוה"מ	א ל :
השגריר - וושינגטון	ד ע :
סגן הקונסול הכללי	מאת :
מס' תעודת זהות: 301400	
מס' תעודת זהות: 0 0767	
מס' תעודת זהות: 128	

סנטור אל גור - ועדת הנשיאים.

מצ"כ דברי סנטור אל גור בפני ועידת הנשיאים ב-29 במרץ.

מרדכי יריד

מס' תעודת זהות: 301400
מס' תעודת זהות: 0 0767
מס' תעודת זהות: 128

א.ב.נ.

אישור:

שם השולח:

30.3.88

תאריך:

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Remarks of
SENATOR AL CORE
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
Tuesday, March 29, 1988

CONTACT: Mike Kopp
(703) 979-1988

I want to begin by paying tribute to your chairman and my fellow Southerner, Morris Abram -- educator, attorney, civil rights activist, and tireless champion of the Jewish people. I also want to pay tribute to all the organizations represented in this Conference, and to your membership. Together, we have fought for a decent society in which every citizen has equal rights and a fair chance, and for a principled foreign policy that stands up for American values and America's friends.

One cannot come before the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations without recalling the famous encounter between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. Nixon complained of the burden of being the President of 200 million people. To which Golda replied, "That is nothing compared to being the Prime Minister of 2 million Presidents." You know, I'm rather looking forward to sharing the title President with you.

Today I want to tell you who I am, what I've done, and what kind of President I'll be.

The race for President in 1988 is not about media and momentum -- it's not about polls and pundits -- and it's certainly not a contest to see which Democrat can raise the most money. This is a race to select the best leader for the greatest nation on earth.

I believe there are three critical tests for those of us who seek the Presidency:

* Who will best rebuild America's economic strength and stand up for working families?

* Who will best promote social justice? And,

* Who will best stand up for a strong and intelligent role for America in the world?

Today I want to talk about the third test -- standing up for a strong and intelligent American role in the world. Our country cannot afford an Administration that fails to meet that test. I believe I'm the only leading candidate in this race who can pass it.

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Mike Dukakis and Jesse Jackson haven't spent so much as one day in national government. They haven't faced up to a single one of the tough choices needed to keep our defenses strong and our diplomacy steady. They haven't mastered the intricacies of arms control, on which the very survival of our planet may depend.

I am proud of my record on these issues. I've spent 12 years in the House and Senate. I've studied the problems, I've made my choices, and yes, I've taken heat for some of them. I've offered innovative arms control proposals to bolster stability and build a safer world. And throughout, I've stood up for our vital interests and historic friendships abroad.

Nowhere is this more important than in the Middle East.

In less than two months, the State of Israel will celebrate its 40th anniversary. Forty years since the dream of the Jewish people became a reality. Forty years of gathering in the exiles flung across the diaspora. Forty years of building a nation, of sacrifice and hope, of ordinary people doing extraordinary deeds. Forty years of struggle against those who would deny her the right to exist.

My family's connection with this struggle goes back even further. In the 1940s, as a member of Congress, my father, Albert Gore Sr., traveled to Cyprus in an attempt to persuade British authorities to permit Jewish immigration to Palestine. Later, as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on foreign assistance, he passed the first U.S. foreign aid to Israel ever provided.

I have carried on that family tradition. As someone who knows and loves Israel; who has visited the Western Wall and felt its timeless majesty; and who has stood high in the Judean Hills and seen the stark realities of Israel's geography -- I understand the threats to Israel's survival. And as the only Democratic presidential candidate to have attended last December's massive and inspiring rally for Soviet Jewry, I feel the yearning of Jews everywhere to live in freedom.

All of us have felt the pain of the events of the past few months. The anguish Israel faces is on my mind, as I know it is on yours.

At times like this, Israel must know that the next American President is someone who sees the world as it is, not just the way he wishes it to be -- who seeks peace, but who also understands the harsh impediments to peace -- who is committed to making this a safer world, but who knows that this cannot be done unless we maintain American strength, and unless we are prepared to use it when necessary. At times like this, Israel must also

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know that the next American president will neither take sides in Israel's internal debates nor act to exacerbate those divisions.

I have been criticized for occasionally adopting positions on foreign policy issues that are at odds with many in my party. Last May, I supported the Reagan Administration's decision to refuel Kuwaiti oil tankers and beef up the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. I knew this was a risk, but I refused to let the Ayatollah drive us out.

If the Administration had not done so much to damage American credibility over the past seven years, there might have been another way to defend our interests. But Republican blunders are no excuse for Democrats to dodge tough foreign policy questions. If we won't stand up for our interests in the Persian Gulf, where will we do so?

Whatever the problems and pressures of the moment in the Middle East, we must not lose sight of certain unchanging truths.

The first truth is that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is one of friendship and strategic partnership. It is the friendship of two fellow democracies, and of two peoples who share deep and abiding bonds. It is the partnership of two allies who share common strategic interests and common foreign policy objectives.

We all know how vital American support is to Israel. But too often, people forget how vital Israeli assistance is to us. Together, we combat the scourge of international terrorism. Together, we coordinate military contingency planning. Israel is a friend, and a strong one. Together we serve each other's security needs far better than either of us could do alone.

That is why, throughout my 12 years in Congress, I have been a strong and consistent supporter of American aid and America's commitment to Israel.

That is also why I have repeatedly voted against the Reagan Administration's proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states whenever I felt they might endanger Israel's security. And I am proud of that record.

The second of these basic truths is that no matter what peace plan we design in Washington, there never will be peace in the Middle East unless Israel has Arab negotiating partners.

Let us remember the lessons of history. In 1947, it was Israel who accepted the partition plan, and the Arabs who rejected it. After the Six Day War, it was the Arabs who declared at Khartoum, "No recognition, no negotiation, no peace." In 1979, Israel traded the Sinai for peace with Egypt and accepted a framework for further progress. But still the other

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Arab states wouldn't negotiate. And it was just a few months ago that King Hussein refused to meet with Prime Minister Shamir under the aegis of the most recent Reagan/Gorbachev summit. It has been rightly said that "peace will come to the Middle East only when the Arabs decide that improving the lives of Arabs is more important than taking the lives of Jews."

When will another Arab leader follow in Anwar Sadat's footsteps and step forward to recognize Israel's right to exist? When will another Arab leader step forward and publicly say yes, he does prefer peace to war? The simple fact is, no real solution to this conflict can emerge without direct negotiations among the parties.

As you probably know, I recently met here in New York with Prime Minister Shamir. I believe his concerns about the Shultz plan should be given serious and respectful consideration. Especially since it's not as if Assad or Arafat or King Khalid or even King Hussein have mailed in their acceptances.

I myself am not inherently opposed to the idea of an international conference -- or better still, some other international auspices. But I do have reservations about the Shultz proposal. Will it facilitate direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and Jordan, which are the key elements in a peace settlement? Or will it complicate them and box Israel in?

I also question the timetable for the transition from the current situation to limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza to negotiations on their final status. Palestinian autonomy is an unknown quantity. None of us can really know whether it will be part of the solution, or whether it will make the problems and the threats to Israel even worse. Any timetable for transition therefore needs to be sound and workable in the long run, and not just a response to the pressure of the moment.

Finally, I am concerned about the role the Soviet Union will play. I do not dismiss out of hand the changes we have been seeing under Mikhail Gorbachev. But we should not let style replace substance. We should challenge Mr. Gorbachev to match Soviet words with new Soviet deeds. Specifically:

When will the Soviets restore diplomatic relations with Israel? When will they end their support for PLO terrorism? When will they restrain their arms sales to Syria? And when will they use their influence over their allies to bring about real concessions for peace?

Whatever the structure of the peace process, it is my firm view that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 must be the basis for a settlement--a basis fully accepted by all parties.

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Let me underscore what this means. The issue is not just whether Israel is prepared to exchange land for peace. It is also whether the Arab states and the Palestinians are truly prepared to offer peace for land.

As for the PLO, let me make my position very clear: a Gore Administration will not recognize the PLO, or negotiate with it, unless it fully and credibly accepts 242 and 338; unless it eliminates its call for the destruction of the State of Israel; and unless it ends its unconscionable acts of terrorism.

In this connection, I must question last week's meeting between Secretary Shultz and two representatives of the Palestinian National Council who have frequently acted as Yasser Arafat's emissaries in the United States. Yesterday I sent Secretary Shultz a letter expressing my concern that while he, of course, has the right to meet with any American citizen, this encounter has elements of a surrogate discussion with the PLO. And I expressed my fear that this episode has damaged the essential bond of trust between America and the people of Israel at precisely the moment when the Secretary of State is trying to restore America's credibility as an honest broker.

I believe the next administration can more effectively search for peace in three key ways. First, we must break the Reagan-Bush Administration's on-again-off-again pattern of diplomacy. I propose to appoint a top-ranking Special Ambassador to be my personal representative and agent, and to give full and high priority attention to the Middle East peace process. And as appropriate, I will get personally involved. That's how the Camp David Accords were achieved.

Second, we must build on the existing Strategic Cooperation Agreement for increased American-Israeli military cooperation. We already have conducted a number of highly successful joint military exercises and training programs. In light of the problems with Spain and Greece over renewal of U.S. military bases, and given the needs for a rapid response to a crisis in either the Persian Gulf or the Eastern Mediterranean, our strategic cooperation with Israel takes on ever-increasing importance.

Third, we need a strategy for the threats we face throughout the Middle East. We must stand firm in the Persian Gulf. And we must pursue a tough, consistent policy against terrorism. I supported its 1986 bombing raid against Libya. As President, I will not shy away from using force against terrorism whenever necessary. And there will be no arms-for-hostages fiascos in a Gore Administration.

On many of these foreign policy issues, there are important differences between myself and the other Democratic candidates.

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Quite frankly, I question whether Mike Dukakis can translate his good intentions into sound policy. His view of the world reflects what I think is a naive legalism, an exaggerated faith in the United Nations, and a seeming reluctance to ever have the United States act on its own when necessary.

Mike Dukakis and I also differ over the recent letter publicly criticizing Israel sent by 30 of my Senate colleagues. He says he would have signed it. When I was asked to sign, I declined. I do not for a minute doubt that those of my colleagues who signed the letter did so with the highest motives, particularly since the difficulties of that approach were not easily perceived when so many friends of Israel first initiated it. But one must wonder about the foreign policy judgment and experience of someone who gratuitously endorsed the letter days after the difficulties became widely apparent.

And the content of the letter is not the point. I simply don't believe that public pressure is the best way to proceed. At this time of tension and violence, such action sends precisely the wrong message.

I also could not disagree more with Jesse Jackson's views on many foreign policy issues. Over the course of this campaign, Reverend Jackson has energized millions of voters and has put forward a number of ideas on such issues as drugs and the economy. But I part company with him over his opposition to such mainstays of our national defense as the F-15 and the cruise missile. I categorically reject his notion that there's a moral equivalence between Israel and the PLO. And I am dismayed by his embrace of Arafat and Castro.

The differences could not be starker, and New Yorkers could not have a clearer choice. In a Gore Administration, no one will ever have reason to doubt America's commitment to the survival and security of Israel. The people of Israel will know that the United States stands ready to help them defend themselves against their enemies. And they will know that the United States is equally prepared to stand with them and work with them in pursuit of a stable and secure peace.

In a few days, Jews everywhere will celebrate Passover -- the immortal story of the flight from Egypt and the quest for the promised land. I was forcefully reminded of the meaning of Passover on my most recent trip to Moscow, when I again met with dozens of refuseniks in a crowded apartment and heard the story of their struggles. Let us work together to hasten the day when the promise of freedom is made real for men and women everywhere. Let us work to build a future with hope.

-- end --

February Top Stories

(ranked in order of minutes of coverage)

	Total	weeks					ABC	CBS	NBC
		# 1	# 2	# 3	# 4	# 5			
1 1988: New Hampshire primary	134	3	50	81	0	0	43	50	41
2 Panama's Noriega under pressure	115	29	29	5	39	54	37	38	40
3 Israel-Palestinian conflict	88	16	19	21	26	20	32	32	24
4 1988: Iowa caucuses	82	31	51	0	0	0	26	22	34
5 Contra war peace plan: reject aid	58	57	1	1	0	4	19	20	19
6 Winter Olympics held in Calgary	54	0	13	26	15	0	25	11	19
7 Lebanon Marine Colonel kidnap	44	0	0	37	6	3	12	19	14
8 1988: Pat Robertson campaign	36	3	10	7	13	9	10	9	17
9 1988: Super Tuesday run-up	29	0	0	17	5	32	13	10	6
10 TV preacher Swaggart sex scandal	29	0	0	4	25	0	11	9	8
11 Meese pipeline bribe trouble	24	10	2	0	12	0	11	7	7
12 1988: Bush-Dole feuding	21	21	0	0	0	0	6	7	8
13 FY89 Federal Budget proposed	18	0	0	11	7	0	6	7	5
14 1988: SD, Minnesota votes	15	0	0	2	13	0	5	7	3
15 Nofziger ethics conviction	15	5	10	0	0	0	4	6	5
16 1988: Richard Gephardt campaign	13	5	2	2	4	7	5	2	6
17 Austria's Waldheim criticism	13	0	5	8	0	0	7	3	4
18 S.Africa opposition ban	13	0	0	0	7	6	3	4	6
19 New York Stock Exchange activity	10	4	2	2	2	2	4	4	3
20 Surrogate Baby M case	10	10	0	0	0	0	7	1	2
21 Colombia cocaine cartel threat	10	0	5	2	3	15	0	5	6
22 US-USSR Black Sea collision	9	0	5	4	0	0	3	3	3
23 NFL Super Bowl: Redskins win	9	9	0	0	0	0	2	6	1
24 Flynt-Falwell porno parody	9	0	0	0	9	0	2	6	0
25 Afghan War: Soviet pullout plan	8	0	8	1	0	5	1	5	2
26 Children-guns deaths increase	8	0	8	0	0	0	8	0	0
27 1988: Alexander Haig quits race	8	0	8	0	0	0	2	3	3
28 Inner-city drug violence	8	0	0	0	1	7	0	4	4
29 NC newspaper race protest seige	8	8	0	0	0	0	2	2	4
30 Persian Gulf tanker war	7	0	3	3	1	0	2	3	2
Total TOP 30 stories	907	211	233	231	189	165	307	302	298
All other stories	416	105	82	82	126	153	132	146	137

TYNDALL
TOP 30
FILE

Week #1: 01Feb88-05Feb88

Week #2: 08Feb88-12Feb88

Week #3: 15Feb88-19Feb88

Week #4: 22Feb88-27Feb88

Week #5: 29Feb88-04Mar88 (four days
not counted in monthly totals)

The data and analysis in The Tyndall Report are produced as a result of a scrutiny of the New York broadcasts of ABC World News Tonight (6:30 feed), CBS Evening News (7:00 feed) and NBC Nightly News (7:00 feed) each evening during the week (Monday-Friday). The newscasts are videotaped and time-printed so that the duration of program elements can be measured second-by-second. The monthly data represent time, in minutes, devoted to news stories and features during these broadcasts. Times for commercials and program openings, closings and logos have not been counted in the totals.

Before publishing The Tyndall Report, ADT Research supplied analysis of the format and content of network news evening newscasts, morning programs and news magazine programs for the Research Department of one of the television networks.

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סגירות ישראל / וויסינגטון

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דף 2 מחור 4 דפים

סוג בסחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

260 2/4

והסכמה לרבות ללכת למוסקבה בחסות הפסגה. לנטוט סבור שהנזק בסגירת השטחים לתקשורת קטן מהנזק בחמונות המוקרנות. מעריך שעובשים בעלי השלכה כלכלית הם היעילים ביותר.

5. הבוקר תדרך מרפי בדלתיים סגורות חברי ועדת החוץ. באו ששה קונגרסמנים: המילטון, לוין, גילמן, וייס, לנטוט, ויין אונס. לא חידש בנושא התהליך מעבר לדברי המזכיר אתמול. הדיון התמקד ב^{שאלה} המצב בלבנון תוך דגש על בחירות ואפשרות חוקה חדשה וכן שאלת הצבת הטילים הסניניים בסעודיה. המורשים ובעיקר לנטוט וגילמן טענו שאין די במחאות דיפלומטיות מצד ארה"ב ועליה למצוא דרך מעשית להתמודד עם הבעיה. רידג'וויי הופיעה גם היא היום בערום קגור בגבעה. מעבר לדרישת בריה"מ לוועידה *plenipotentiary* לא ידוע לי על דבריה.

טאה תצ
טובה הרצל

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

March 30, 1988

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

760 3/4

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing to express our support for your efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process. In particular, we want to wish you success in your upcoming visit to the region. It is our hope that your endeavors will bring all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict together in direct, bilateral peace negotiations and, ultimately, bring an end to decades of violence and bloodshed in the area.

Nonetheless, in advance of your trip, we wish to raise two items of concern. First, it is important to keep in mind a fundamental distinction over the peace process between Israel and every Arab state save Egypt. Much of the attention regarding the Shultz plan has focused on the reaction of the Israeli government, and whether or not it will accept your proposal as presented. No one disputes that there is a split within Israel on certain aspects of the plan. However, the vigorous debate in Israel over your peace initiative contrasts starkly with the apparent absence of debate in Arab capitals, where the question is not how to make peace, but whether--even after 40 years--to make peace at all.

In short, Mr. Secretary, anything Israel decides is irrelevant if there is no serious Arab interlocutor. Therefore, it is our belief that you should seek, on this visit, public and unequivocal statements from the Arab governments and the Palestinian leadership on their commitment both to living in peace with Israel and to a diplomatic solution based on direct negotiations. The debate over an international conference must not be allowed to serve as a diversion from these key objectives.

Second, this is the time when all partners to the peace process should feel full confidence in past commitments made by the U.S. It is crucial that American assurances withstand the test of time. Such promises were essential elements of the Israel-Syria and Israel-Egypt disengagement agreements following the 1973 war, as well as the Camp David Accords. Similar assurances will play a vital role in any future settlement. Israel in particular cannot be expected to take the necessary risks for peace if there is uncertainty about America's ability to stand by its pledges.

American credibility is essential to moving this process forward. We cannot ask Israel to take great risks for peace and security and to rely on U.S. assurances about elements of the peace plan while, simultaneously, we seem

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to be violating a commitment on the PLO which has been honored and restated consistently since 1975.

It is our express hope that, during your trip to the Middle East, you reassure Israel and remind the Arabs that the U.S. position on the PLO--as enunciated by written agreement and by law--remains unchanged until the PLO explicitly accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, accepts Israel's right to exist, and renounces terrorism. Ambiguity on this fundamental point can only retard the prospects for peace.

Thank you for your attention to our concerns and, again, we wish you success in your trip.

Sincerely,

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידית

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מס' מברק

המשרד + בטחון

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אלו מצפייא

דע: לשכת רה"מ

מקשיח - משהביט

שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון (29.3): המאורעות בשטחים, ונשק למדינות ערב

להלן מתוך שיחה של הציר והח"מ עם הנ"ל (ידיד ותיק מטקסס, חבר בוועדת חמשה לפעולות זרות ולתקציב הפנטגון):

א. המאורעות בשטחים

1. הציר פתח בצינו את הדברים שהשמיע וילסון בארוחת הבוקר עם רה"מ מטעם ועדת החוץ ב-27.3, לפיהם עברה עליו (וילסון) "תפנית נפשית" (SOUL CHANGE) ביחסו כלפי ישראל לנוכח התנהגותו בשטחים. וילסון הגיב מתוך התרגשות מורגשת: אמר מה שאמר לכת"מ מאחר וסבור שידידינו אינם כנים כלפינו, אינם אומרים את כל האמת ואינם משקפים במלוא חומרתם את הדברים שהוא קולט מקרב עמיתיו בבית הנבחרים. בשבילו, כידיד נפש של ישראל למשך שנים רבות, "שאין לו מחויבות פוליטית כלפי ישראל", זה נושא כואב מאוד. לגבי דידו, אנו נוהגים בברוקלין בשטחים ומפעילים כח מופרז. אין זה "CIVILIZED BEHAVIOUR" לירות באנשים בלתי חמושים, ולנקוט במדיניות של הכאות ושבינות עצמות. נכון שבמלחמה קורים דברים איזמים, ונכון שבמלחמה ויטנאס ארעה תקרית מיי-ליי אל ככל הידוע תקרית זו הייתה חריגה ובודדת, והאחראי לה עדיין יושב בבית הכלא. בדרום קוריאה ואף בדרום אפריקה אינם יורים לתוך ההמון. נדמה שאנו פועלים מתוך הדעה שהרי יש לנו הכח והנשק ולכן אנו נפעיל כל האמצעים ע"מ לדכא המחומות. עלינו לדעת שאין זו "התנהגות אנדרשית" ואיננה מקובלת על חברה מתורבתת. הוא (וילסון) הכיר ואהב את השר רבין כשגריר בווינגטון אך עפשו הוא מאוכזב ממנו ואינו מבין אותו. הוא משוכנע שישאל עם כל היכולת (COMPETENCE) שלה מסוגלת למצוא דרכים אחרות להשלטת הסדר והרגעת הרוחות.

2. הציר השיב באריכות. בין היתר, עמו על כן שאין מדיניות של הכאות ואין מדיניות של לשמו. הודה שפה ושם היו מעשים חריגים אך שאל בכמה צבאות אחרים היו מראים לכל החיילים את הקטעים מתוך שידורי החדשות של ה-CBS ע"מ למנוע השנות מקרה כזה.

הח"מ: 1. המאורעות בשטחים 2. שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון 3. המאורעות בשטחים 4. שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון 5. המאורעות בשטחים 6. שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון 7. המאורעות בשטחים 8. שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון 9. המאורעות בשטחים 10. שיחה עם הקונגרסמן צירלי וילסון

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החיים טען שיש להבחין בין הפרספציה העולה מתמונות הזוועה על מלעי הטלויזיה לבין המציאות: ישראל איננה חברה בזוטלית, לא אבדה ערכית ולא אבדה הדרך. וילסון הטכנים שקיימת ביעה של פרספציות ואף ציין לשבח את התבטאויותיהם של מפקדים בכירים בשטחים.

3. הערה: מן הראוי לציין שספק אם הצלחנו לשכנע את וילסון לשנות את דעתו. בין היתר התעורר בנר שהוכן לאחרונה, מסווג "לא לעיני זרים" המטכס את מנין ההרוגים בשטחים עד ה-16.3. לפי סיכום זה נהרגו 113 פלסטינאים (צויין כי ישראל איננה מקבלת אחריות לשמונה מהם ושלשה מהם נהרגו ע"י פלסטינאים). הסיכום, שנערך בצורת טבלה, מפרטת גם את גילי ההרוגים ונסיבות מותם ("נורה בראש ע"י צלף צה"לי", "יתנוק - נפל קורבן לגז מדמיע וכו'). לדברי וילסון, יתכן שסיכום זה יתפרסם באחד מהימים ברקורד הקונגרסיונלי.

4. יצויין גם שכל דברי הביקורת הקשים של וילסון היו מכוונים נגד התנהגות צה"ל ושהב"ט. הוא לא נגע בשאלה הפלסטינאית ולא הזכיר במילה את הצד שכנגד; [התנהגות המתפרעים] וההתנכלויות מצידם. באשר לתהליך השלום, התיחס לו אגב אורחה - בהעריכו שבקרוב יוחלט להקדים את הבחירות בישראל, מהלך שיהיה בו לשים קץ ליוזמת שולץ.

5. הציר הציע שוילסון יבקר בישראל בקרוב ויבלה זמן עם יחידות צה"ל ע"מ להכיר את המציאות מקרוב. וילסון לא גילה להיטות, אך מתוך היסוס או אולי מתוך נימוס אמר כי יתכן כי הוא צריך לבקר בישראל "במהלך אחד מביקוריו לאיזור" (כידוע, וילסון מקורב למצריח ורן החותך הגדול בקונגרס של המורדים באפגניסטאן). לא התחייב ולא נקב במועד.

ב. מכירות נשק למדינות ערב

1. הציר אמר שהופתע לקרוא את דברי וילסון בעת ויוון בשם הולעה שבו האשים כביכול את ישראל בכך שסעודיה פנתה לסין לרכש טילים. סימני הקלה היו ניכרים על פניו של וילסון "כי הרי מדובר בבעיה פוליטית גרידא, ולא בשאלה רגשית", כדבריו. לאחר דיון קצר על האיום שבטילים אלה לבטחון ישראל (הציר הצביע על סכנת חימוש הטילים בראשים כימים), טען וילסון שמזה שנים רבות הוא חולק על מדיניות ישראל כלפי מכירות נשק למדינות ערב. אנו - ותומכינו בארה"ב - מתנגדים לכל המכירות האלה וכתוצאה מכך התעודיח והירדויח ואלצים לפנות לספקים אחרים. המגמה התחילה עת שהבאנו להגבלות על מספר מטוסי האס-15 ועל דגמי המטוס שניתן למכור לסעודיה.

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מגמה זו מוצאת ביטוייה גם ברכישות מטוסי הטורנדו ע"י הירדנים ועתה ברכישת טילי ה-EAST WIND הסינים ע"י סעודיה, לו היה לסעודים "COMFORTABLE RELATIONSHIP" עם ארה"ב בכל הקשור לרכש צבאי, דבר זה לא היה קורה.

2. הציר דחה טיעון זה: במשך השנים ואף בשנה האחרונה מכרו האמריקאים כמויות אדירות של נשק לסעודיה, יש יסוד להניח שבטח הכל החליטו הסעודים שהם רוצים בטילים ארוכי טווח אך ורק מכיון שולב המדינות באזור יש טילים ארוכי טווח; וחיות וחבהירה גא. נונסו האמריקאי היא בין טיל הלאנס שלו טווח קצר ביותר וקין טיל הפרשינגגרציני מדי. בליית ברירה פנו הסעודים למקור אספקה אחר.

3. לדברי וילסון, יתכן שיש דברים בגו, אך בסופו של דבר הוא משוכנע שלו מדיניות ישראל חיתה אחרת, הסעודים היו בטוחים באמריקאים כמקור אספקה ולא היו פונים לאחרים. מובן לו שקשה למישראל לשנות מדיניות מושרשת ומסורתית אך לדעתו מוטב שארצ"ב תוכל למכור נשק למדינות ערב בלי מעצורים ובדרך זו להבטיח בקרה על הנשק והשימוש בו. אחרת יוסיפו מדינות ערב לפנות למקורות נשק חלופיים ולא יהיה סיקוח כלשהו על הכלים הנמכרים ועל תנאי העסקות.

ג. סיכום

ברור שוילסון מוטרד מאוד משיטות שנראה לו כי אומצו ע"י צה"ל בשטחים ושתמיכתו בנו מעורעת ואף מכורסת באופן רציני. לא ניתן לשפוט באיזו מידה הוא מדבר עבור מורשים אחרים, ולא דווקא הידידותיים שבניהם, אך לרוב אין להתעלה מוענתו שהוא קולט דברים קשים עלינו ושרבים אינם מוכנים לדבר עמנו במלוא הכנות. מאידך, בטוח שלע"ע לא יהיה ניתן לסמוך כבעבר על קונגרסמן מרכזי זה (בעל ההשפעה בשתי ועדות משנה עיקריות מבחינתנו) - ושיש לקח בכך.

יוסף אלמ
למדן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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דפ...2...מתוך...2...דפים

סוג בטחוני...ש.ט.ג.ר.

דחיות...מ.ג.ר.ג.

תאריך וז"ח.

מס' מברק.

אל:

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5. השגריר מטרסניצין לקבל תגובה ראשונית עד היום אך לא הצלחנו. נדווח על שיחה זו, ומכיוון שהוא יוצא ארצה במוצאי שבת (וחג) לקראת ביקורו של המזכיר שולץ, ינסה לדבר אישית עם שר האוצר בנדון. השגריר נזהר מלחת להם כל התחייבות ואף הכשיר את הקרקע לתשובה מאכזבת (תוך שימוש בהומור כן וכן הסברים קצרים על בעייתיות הבקשה).

סולמאן
למדן

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דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 30.3.88

מס' מברק

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המשרד


אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

פגישת מזכיר המדינה עם העתונאים הישראלים

בהמשך למברקנו מאתמול, להלן התמליל המלא של דברי המזכיר בפגישה

 יוסי גל

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INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
ISRAELI JOURNALISTS
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1988

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I thought we might have a little session here this morning. I was discussing it with Chuck, and usually when I'm going for a NATO meeting or going to Asia, or we're about to have a ministerial with the Soviets, or something like that, we have a session beforehand with people from the press -- relevant press -- and I thought, well, why don't we do that as we go to the Middle East. Try it out, an experiment, see how it works. So why don't you ask me some questions?

QUESTION (Ha'aretz, Tel Aviv): Mr. Secretary. I don't mean to belabor those fine subtleties, however, Mr. Redman suggested the other day that the distinction between the PNC and the PLO is not only a matter of American policy, it's a matter of fact. However, it is a fact that is not accepted by most Palestinian authorities who refer to it as an integral part of the PLO.

Now, if restrictions apply only to meetings with the PLO, does that mean that as of now on Americans can talk, negotiate, deal, you name it, with PNC people? Perhaps you could meet the Speaker of the Palestine National Council who, according to your definitions, is not a member of the PLO?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in this case we felt that, first of all, there is a difference between these two units, and it's important to talk to Palestinians. People from the PNC have been talked to by high officials in the American Government on earlier occasions -- this is not anything that set a precedent -- so I thought it was a good idea to go ahead and have this discussion. And I think that people have to recognize that somehow Palestinians are involved, and we have to find a way to communicate with them.

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Now, the two individuals that I invited are interesting, accomplished people. They're not terrorists. They don't advocate terrorism. They support U.N. Resolution 242. They are very comfortable with the idea that Israel is there. They don't expect Israel to go away. They recognize that Israel is a permanent part of the scene.

One of them commented to me that he was a little mystified at the objections to talking to him, and he said, "After all, I'm a member of the Columbia University Faculty. Have you ever looked around there? Most of my friends are Jewish." And he said, "One of my most interesting and moving experiences lately was I was invited to speak at a Synagogue." And he said, "We went on and on. It was interesting, informative, stimulating, and the kind of dialogue that people like me," he said, "who are Americans but of Palestinian ethnic origin, need to have with the Jewish Community and with the Israelis."

So I thought it was a good thing, and it doesn't in any way change our policy which I follow, not simply because it was set out in 1975, but I think it's a very important idea that we're not going to talk to and negotiate with the PLO, because the PLO, at least as the organizational unit that I identify, has promoted terrorism. And it in its essence doesn't need to be able to bring itself to recognizing that Israel exists, has a right to exist, and is going to continue to exist. And Resolution 242 -- and I really -- if they want to come to the peace table, I don't see any reason why they can't meet these conditions. They don't seem particularly onerous to me. They seem obvious.

So we maintain that posture very strongly, but in the case of this discussion it worked out quite well. It was worthwhile, interesting. And I might just say parenthetically, both of these men are American citizens and somehow for me as Secretary of State to get put in the position that I'm not allowed to talk to American citizens is just beyond the pale, as far as I'm concerned.

But that's not the main point. The main point is that being very firm about the PLO, nevertheless, Palestinians are part of the peace issue, and we've got to find a way to be in contact with them.

QUESTION: Just to follow up, you just mentioned you would like to be able to meet all American citizens. Hassan Abdul Rahman, who is the head of the PLO office in Washington, is also an American citizen as well as other officials in the organization.

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My question is, first of all, what is the next step as regards -- do you expect when you will be in the region to meet Palestinians, to meet people like Mr. Sayez Abu Loghod in the territories -- something that you weren't able to do before. And, if I may widen the scope of the question, there was a lot of talk in Israel that actually your initiative cannot go much further now. Is it not stuck with the sort of limbo answers that you've been getting from anybody, and maybe you care to say what you think about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I ordered the closure of the PLO office in Washington, because it was an office supported wholly by funds from the PLO, foreign funds, so to speak, coming into the United States to support the PLO. And given what I have just said about the PLO, you can see why I would feel that way.

Now, in America we have a right of free speech, obviously, so we're not going to tell people they can't propagandize for whatever they want to propagandize before, but let them do it as American citizens. And, if some American citizens want to set up an office that promotes whatever they want to promote in Washington, that's up to them to do. There's no problem as long as they -- it's their office and not an office funded by another country.

Now, the PLO office in the United Nations is an entirely different matter. We have a treaty that establishes the United Nations, and the United Nations basically decides what countries are going to be accredited to it and what missions are going to be in a way accredited to it. And we don't like the fact that they have accredited the PLO, but they have, and the result of the action taken -- and we, of course, enforce the law. If Congress passed the law, we'll enforce the law. But the result of that has been to in effect legitimize the PLO in the international community, because they get votes. The only country that voted with us was Israel. We're always glad to stand with Israel but, nevertheless, you get all of our allies and friends voting for the PLO and against the United States, it's kind of dumb.

Now, as far as further meetings with Palestinians are concerned, I hope I can have some more meetings with Palestinians. The Israelis have to figure out how to talk to Palestinians, as we all do, but that doesn't mean talking to the PLO.

Now, I have tried to organize a meeting with Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza on two occasions when I was in Jerusalem, and on both occasions it didn't come off, and at least as the information we got was that for the most part

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people didn't feel they could come, because they were threatened. In fact, they said they would like to have come and talked to me, but they didn't feel that they could do so, and I don't have any reason to doubt that.

The last time I was there, we put up the meeting at a place we thought would be comfortable for them, and that did break a pattern of before, for a Secretary of State, and I went over, as you know, and I read a statement that was by way of saying, "If you had come, this was what I would have told you."

So my attitude is that I would like to speak with reasonable, legitimate Palestinians who are not PLO. I don't have any plan to organize something. I think I've done that now, and that's up to perhaps the Palestinians to take some initiative, or maybe Jordan will or Egypt will, or somebody will.

Now, your second question was --

QUESTION: Is the peace initiative not dead already as most of my colleagues in Israel were predicting in the last few weeks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, one of the characteristics you find when you work on this subject -- and you often find it in negotiations -- is that everybody is busy telling you what won't work -- what they say no to. And everybody is busy saying, "You can't have this, and you can't have that, and you can't have something else," and so on. And the "no's" don't fit together. They don't give you a yes.

But what we have to find -- and those who say no have a responsibility here -- what you have to find is a way to say yes to peace, because it's needed, I think, very clearly so, and what we have tried to do is put something together that is a package that has in it things that everybody wants and that have been points of reluctance for some in every respect, but which as a package has a chance of appealing broadly.

And we're going to keep working at it and, obviously, we're going to have to hold that package together, and we will, and we will discuss it and explain it and develop it. But I think, as I have listened to the criticisms of it, that the package still holds up pretty well.

For example, we have proposed that the centerpiece of negotiations be direct face-to-face negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. We've said that's comprehensive in that Israel -- and I have been assured this, and it's not a new thing -- Israel is willing to sit down face to face with each of its neighbors, and that's a fundamental building block and

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shows the peaceful intentions and the readiness to negotiate on the part of Israel, and I think people ought to remember that.

Now, we have set out as a result of a lot of discussion a substantive set of things that need to be gone through insofar as negotiations between Jordan and Israel are concerned; and I believe that the idea of establishing interim arrangements, giving some time for people to see how they work and feel how they work, so to speak, and that a good outcome of that will have an effect on final status -- I think that's a correct theory.

And so that idea is in our proposal. It's an idea that is advocated by many in Israel. I agree with them. I think that's right, and that's in our proposal.

The Arab side is interested in the final status talks primarily. So we have tried in our proposal to give them as much assurance as we can give in the mechanics of a proposal that final status talks are going to take place, and they're going to take place reasonably promptly, and that they are going to have as their basis U.N. Resolution 242.

But we've also argued with them -- the theory that you should first agree on final status, and then you can figure out the interim steps necessary to get there -- we say that is not -- that may sound intellectually good, but as a matter of practice it's -- we're talking about human beings here among whom there is a great deal of stress and strain. And so if you can make some rearrangements as is represented in the interim arrangements, and then let people get used to that a little bit, it's going to have a major impact on the final status talks themselves. So that whole idea is embedded in there, but with this interlocking arrangement that we think is important also.

So we've discussed this set of arrangements quite a lot, and I have yet to hear anybody that really, at least to me, convincably breaks that notion down. I think it holds up pretty well.

Now, how do you get to these direct face-to-face negotiations? Well, you've all thought about it a lot and worked on it, and I have, and I think that for these to take place, key individuals, particularly the Jordanians, need to see the legitimacy that comes from an international conference involving the Security Council from which resolution 242 after all was issued, and 338. That's what they've argued, and I can understand that, although we would just as soon go to what we regard as the centerpiece, namely, direct negotiations.

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So we've proposed an international conference that doesn't have any authority to cancel agreement or tell people what they have to agree to. It gets the process started and can receive reports according to some agreed manner.

Now, when I discussed this with President Assad, he rejects that idea. He said, "Why do I want to go to such a conference. It doesn't have authority." When I discussed it with the Soviet Foreign Minister, he said, "Well, our idea of a conference is something that has authority." We say, "Well, that's not our idea. We won't go to your kind of a conference. In fact, we vetoed that kind of a conference in the United Nations." But we think the kind of conference we've proposed is not going to damage the interests that we see as strong and of Israel's interests, and it's going to be -- it's a necessary ingredient in getting the thing going that we want to see going.

So we've seen -- I'm just indicating that we've heard arguments back and forth, and I think the notion we've put forward is a sensible one, and it potentially can work, but people have to struggle at it and struggle at it. I think it's also important that Palestinians be -- they have to be there -- we all agree on that -- that they be in a Jordanian-Palestinian negotiation, because at least as I would see it, the idea of an independent Palestinian state is just not in the cards. And so we should structure things from the beginning in a way that associates Palestinians with countries and doesn't have them out there all by themselves.

So these are all things we've thought about, and I think perhaps the reason why, while people haven't said yes, they haven't said no, is that really deep down they don't have a better idea, and they know that somehow it's important to say yes to peace if you can find your way to it. I'm personally convinced that if Prime Minister Shamir, Peres, one or both, sat down with their opposite numbers in a genuine good-faith negotiation where people were serious, that there are answers there that can be found -- I'm absolutely convinced of it -- that would be satisfying to people. But you've got to get into those negotiations, and they're going to take a while, and they'll be difficult, but good faith can find answers.

MR. REDMAN: You've asked some big sweeping questions, so in ~~essence~~ we've more than used our time, but let me just do one more. Short question?

QUESTION: Yes. Mr. Secretary, you are going now to the Middle East, and all of us, we can write is now nobody will tell you yes, nobody will tell you no. My question is, are you going to

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ask the Secretary General of the U.N. to have these famous invitations to the international conference after you come back? What are you going to do after, because it's so simple -- nobody will say no to the Secretary of State, but then what else? What next?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we'll have to see what happens when I'm there, and maybe I'll get some people who are saying -- who refuse to say no may say maybe, and some people may say, "If he says yes, I'll say yes," or some -- I don't know what complexion of things there may be. We'll have to see.

QUESTION: What about the invitation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Now, as far as the Secretary General is concerned, there's no point in my asking him to do something until I know what people are ready to do, and if enough and the right people are prepared to go to a conference such as of the type that we have in mind and are willing to sign up to that, then it's worthwhile for him to issue the invitations.

But remember, the kind of conference we have in mind has distinct limitations to it and, if people accept the invitation, they're accepting the limitations, and they should know that we will insist on holding to those limitations.

MR. REDMAN: Okay? Thank you.

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שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

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בית הנבחרים - התהליך המדיני ומסעות המזכיר

1. המורשים לויין, שומר, טוריסלי, וובר ועוד יגייסו חתימות למכתב הרצ"ב למזכיר, ובו שתי נקודות עיקריות: העדר החתיבות מצד מנהיגי ערב על הרצון בטלום (בעוד בישראל מחקיים ויכוח על כיצד להשיגו) והחשש משחיקת התחייבות ארה"ב כלפי אש"פ. בגלל הנסיעה הקרובה ופגרת הפסחא (החל ממחר בערב) יש רק יומיים לגיוס חתימות.
2. הנ"ל רמז לפגישה עם המל"פ, ללא איזכור מפורש שיהווה ביקורת ישירה על המזכיר. כך, לדוגמא טוריסלי (ראו מברק הציר 722 על פגישת קונגרסמנים עם המזכיר) מסכים שנעצם הפגישה יש איתות שלילי אך טבור שהתגובה הישראלית החריפה היתה מזיקה: וכי יעלה על הדעת שממארה"ב תבקר מנהיגי מדינה שניה הניגשים עת אזרחיהם? הנושא נוגע לחופש הביטוי ואל לה לישראל למצוא עצמה בצד הלא נכון בויכוח מעין זה. ובנוסף, תדמית אש"פ בציבור בארה"ב אינה כוללת אינטלקטואלים מעובדים תפרינסטון, ועצם הביקורת (ותשומת הלב) שיסרו התדמית.
3. בהקשר זה, הקונגרסמן ג'ו קנדי III, בביטויים מאוד ציוריים, אמר שהתחייבות של קיסניג'ר מ-75 אינה נוגעת כהוא זה לבוחריו ושימוש בטענות מסוג זה כדי לסרב לשוחח עם בר-הפלוגתא ימשיך לפגוע בתדמית הנשחקת. בוחריו מריעים כאשר הוא מדבר נגד תמיכה בנאט"ו והפגס בטעון האסטרטגי תופס גם לגבינו, ולכן להיות ואנחנו נתפסים כמי שמתנהגים בחוסר הגינות התמיכה תימוג. המאבק הוא על יחסי ציבור וישראל מפסידה כל יום, ו"נדבר בעוד עשר שנים ונראה האם צדקתי". ביקש להרגיעני ולומר שבפומבי הוא מגן על ישראל.
4. גם טוט לנטוס סבור שהמאבק הוא על יחסי ציבור. לדבריו, המזכיר שותף לחששו שררה"מ יואשם בכשלון ולכן הוא, לנטוס, מציע שררה"מ יחזור על ביטויי נכונות

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שגירות ישראל / נושיוננטון

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~~בהסכמה לרבות ללכת למוסקבה בחסות הפעגה. לנטוש סבור שהנזק בטגירת השטחים לתקשורת קטן מהנזק בחמונות המוקרנות. מעריך שעונשים בעלי השלכה כלכלית הם היעילים ביותר.~~

5. הבוקר תדרך מרסי בולתיים סגורות חברי ועדת החוץ. באו ששה קונגרסמנים: המילטון, לוריין, גילחן, ויזה, לנטוס, ויין אינט. לא היוש בנושא התחליף מעבר לדברי המזכיר אתמול. הדיון התמקד באלה המצב בלבנון תוך דגש על בחירות ואפשרות חוקה חדשה וכן שאלת הצבת הטילים הסיניים בסעודיה. המורשים ובעיקר לנטוס וגילמן טענו שאין די במחאות דיפלומטיות מצד ארה"ב ועליה למצוא דרך מעשית להתמודד עם הבעיה. רידג'ונאי הופיעה גם היא היום בפורום סגור בגבעה. מעבר לדרישה בריה"מ לועידה plenipotentiary לא ידוע לי על דבריה.

טאה ת"צ
טובה הרצל

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

March 30, 1988

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing to express our support for your efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process. In particular, we want to wish you success in your upcoming visit to the region. It is our hope that your endeavors will bring all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict together in direct, bilateral peace negotiations and, ultimately, bring an end to decades of violence and bloodshed in the area.

Nonetheless, in advance of your trip, we wish to raise two items of concern. First, it is important to keep in mind a fundamental distinction over the peace process between Israel and every Arab state save Egypt. Much of the attention regarding the Shultz plan has focused on the reaction of the Israeli government, and whether or not it will accept your proposal as presented. No one disputes that there is a split within Israel on certain aspects of the plan. However, the vigorous debate in Israel over your peace initiative contrasts starkly with the apparent absence of debate in Arab capitals, where the question is not how to make peace, but whether--even after 40 years--to make peace at all.

In short, Mr. Secretary, anything Israel decides is irrelevant if there is no serious Arab interlocutor. Therefore, it is our belief that you should seek, on this visit, public and unequivocal statements from the Arab governments and the Palestinian leadership on their commitment both to living in peace with Israel and to a diplomatic solution based on direct negotiations. The debate over an international conference must not be allowed to serve as a diversion from these key objectives.

Second, this is the time when all partners to the peace process should feel full confidence in past commitments made by the U.S. It is crucial that American assurances withstand the test of time. Such promises were essential elements of the Israel-Syria and Israel-Egypt disengagement agreements following the 1973 war, as well as the Camp David Accords.

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to be violating a commitment on the PLO which has been honored and restated consistently since 1975.

It is our express hope that, during your trip to the Middle East, you reassure Israel and remind the Arabs that the U.S. position on the PLO--as enunciated by written agreement and by law--remains unchanged until the PLO explicitly accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, accepts Israel's right to exist, and renounces terrorism. Ambiguity on this fundamental point can only retard the prospects for peace.

Thank you for your attention to our concerns and, again, we wish you success in your trip.

Sincerely,

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דחיפות: מ ל ד י סורה כסותיני: ג ל י	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1 מתוך: 7
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סנטור אל גור - ועדת הנשיאים.

מצ"כ דברי סנטור אל גור בפני ועידת הנשיאים כ-29 במרץ.

מרדכי יריד

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Remarks of
SENATOR AL CORE
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
Tuesday, March 29, 1988

CONTACT: Miko Kopp
(703) 979-1988

I want to begin by paying tribute to your chairman and my fellow Southerner, Morris Abram -- educator, attorney, civil rights activist, and tireless champion of the Jewish people. I also want to pay tribute to all the organizations represented in this Conference, and to your membership. Together, we have fought for a decent society in which every citizen has equal rights and a fair chance, and for a principled foreign policy that stands up for American values and America's friends.

One cannot come before the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations without recalling the famous encounter between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. Nixon complained of the burden of being the President of 200 million people. To which Golda replied, "That is nothing compared to being the Prime Minister of 2 million Presidents." You know, I'm rather looking forward to sharing the title President with you.

Today I want to tell you who I am, what I've done, and what kind of President I'll be.

The race for President in 1988 is not about media and momentum -- it's not about polls and pundits -- and it's certainly not a contest to see which Democrat can raise the most money. This is a race to select the best leader for the greatest nation on earth.

I believe there are three critical tests for those of us who seek the Presidency:

* Who will best rebuild America's economic strength and stand up for working families?

* Who will best promote social justice? And,

* Who will best stand up for a strong and intelligent role for America in the world?

Today I want to talk about the third test -- standing up for a strong and intelligent American role in the world. Our country cannot afford an Administration that fails to meet that test. I believe I'm the only leading candidate in this race who can pass it.

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Mike Dukakis and Jesse Jackson haven't spent so much as one day in national government. They haven't faced up to a single one of the tough choices needed to keep our defenses strong and our diplomacy steady. They haven't mastered the intricacies of arms control, on which the very survival of our planet may depend.

I am proud of my record on these issues. I've spent 12 years in the House and Senate. I've studied the problems, I've made my choices, and yes, I've taken heat for some of them. I've offered innovative arms control proposals to bolster stability and build a safer world. And throughout, I've stood up for our vital interests and historic friendships abroad.

Nowhere is this more important than in the Middle East.

In less than two months, the State of Israel will celebrate its 40th anniversary. Forty years since the dream of the Jewish people became a reality. Forty years of gathering in the exiles flung across the diaspora. Forty years of building a nation, of sacrifice and hope, of ordinary people doing extraordinary deeds. Forty years of struggle against those who would deny her the right to exist.

My family's connection with this struggle goes back even further. In the 1940s, as a member of Congress, my father, Albert Gore Sr., traveled to Cyprus in an attempt to persuade British authorities to permit Jewish immigration to Palestine. Later, as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on foreign assistance, he passed the first U.S. foreign aid to Israel ever provided.

I have carried on that family tradition. As someone who knows and loves Israel; who has visited the Western Wall and felt its timeless majesty; and who has stood high in the Judean Hills and seen the stark realities of Israel's geography -- I understand the threats to Israel's survival. And as the only Democratic presidential candidate to have attended last December's massive and inspiring rally for Soviet Jewry, I feel the yearning of Jews everywhere to live in freedom.

All of us have felt the pain of the events of the past few months. The anguish Israel faces is on my mind, as I know it is on yours.

At times like this, Israel must know that the next American President is someone who sees the world as it is, not just the way he wishes it to be -- who seeks peace, but who also understands the harsh impediments to peace -- who is committed to making this a safer world, but who knows that this cannot be done unless we maintain American strength, and unless we are prepared to use it when necessary. At times like this, Israel must also

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know that the next American president will neither take sides in Israel's internal debates nor act to exacerbate those divisions.

I have been criticized for occasionally adopting positions on foreign policy issues that are at odds with many in my party. Last May, I supported the Reagan Administration's decision to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and beef up the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. I knew this was a risk, but I refused to let the Ayatollah drive us out.

If the Administration had not done so much to damage American credibility over the past seven years, there might have been another way to defend our interests. But Republican blunders are no excuse for Democrats to dodge tough foreign policy questions. If we won't stand up for our interests in the Persian Gulf, where will we do so?

Whatever the problems and pressures of the moment in the Middle East, we must not lose sight of certain unchanging truths.

The first truth is that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is one of friendship and strategic partnership. It is the friendship of two fellow democracies, and of two peoples who share deep and abiding bonds. It is the partnership of two allies who share common strategic interests and common foreign policy objectives.

We all know how vital American support is to Israel. But too often, people forget how vital Israeli assistance is to us. Together, we combat the scourge of international terrorism. Together, we coordinate military contingency planning. Israel is a friend, and a strong one. Together we serve each other's security needs far better than either of us could do alone.

That is why, throughout my 12 years in Congress, I have been a strong and consistent supporter of American aid and America's commitment to Israel.

That is also why I have repeatedly voted against the Reagan Administration's proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states whenever I felt they might endanger Israel's security. And I am proud of that record.

The second of these basic truths is that no matter what peace plan we design in Washington, there never will be peace in the Middle East unless Israel has Arab negotiating partners.

Let us remember the lessons of history. In 1947, it was Israel who accepted the partition plan, and the Arabs who rejected it. After the Six Day War, it was the Arabs who declared at Khartoum, "No recognition, no negotiation, no peace." In 1979, Israel traded the Sinai for peace with Egypt and accepted a framework for further progress. But still the other

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

תהליך מדיני.

המזכיר הופיע אמש בפני 13 חברי בית הנבחרים. הסביר (לשאלת חמילטון) כי מטרתו העיקרית היא להוכיח בחישה ובני חמה זו שצו לא לצפות זאת. לוווי. הוא חושש להתחשך בתהליך עז אשר יתבהרו לחלוטין הדברים (Chips will fall) וכל אחד מהצדדים יבהיר עמדתו. אמר כי אינו מצפה שחוסין יקבל את היוזמה ולכל היותר יאמר "כן אבל". מצפה שסוריה תתן תשובה שלילית מוחלטת, והוא מקווה בכל ליבו ועל כך חזר מספר פעמים, שישראל לא תאמץ לא. באשר לעמות יוון הוסיף שהוא מטעיל עליה לוציט וון מצויט, ולשאלה פרטית של אחד המשתתפים אחרי הפגישה, אמר שגם את הסעודים. לשאלת הנרי ווקסמן מדוע חוסין זקוק לוועידה בינלאומית, ענת שולץ כי ירון היא מדינה חלשה והמלך "רגיש ועצבני". הסכים להערכת אחד המשתתפים שהארועים בשטחים גורמים לדאגה וחרדה אצל חוסין וצריכים לשמש כתמריץ עבור המלך להכנס למהלך מדיני.

לשאלת בדבר פגישתו עם שני חברי המלי"פ אמר כי המדובר הוא בשני אזרחים אמריקאים, וכי הוא ממשיך למלא אחרי ההתחייבות מ-1975. לויין אמר לו כי אחרי הפגישה ראה על מסך הטלביזיה את אדוארד סעיד אומר כי הפגישה חואמה עם ערפאת ובנקודה זו התפרץ טוריצילי וטען כי לדעתו היה מקום לקיום הפגישה. שולץ אמר כי התעקש בשיחתו עם שני חברי המלי"פ כי הייצוג הפלשתינאי יהיה רק במסגרת של משלחת ירדנית-פלשתינאית ואמר עוד לסעיד כי בוודאי זו הסיבה שסעיד אינו מסכים עימו כי הוא, סעיד, רוצה במשלחת אש"ף ובמדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית אך הוא, שולץ, מתנגד למדינה כזו. ממשחתף בפגישה, שניכר עם זאת ששולץ נהנה מהפגישה עם השניים, ובמיוחד מסעיד וציין את הופעתו של האחרון בפני ארגונים יהודיים.

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שירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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עוד לגבי חוועידה הבינלאומית אמר כי יתכן ויחפש דרך על-מנת לבטל את החששות הישראליים מפניה, אך לא פרט, אמר שיתכן ושמיר רואה סטייה בעמדה האמריקאית לאור מה שקרה באוקטובר אשתקד. שולץ הוסיף שציפה אז ששמיר יגיד "לא", חוסיין יגיד "כן" וכמוהו גם הסובייטים. בדיעבד, שמיר אמר "כן", חוסיין "לא" והעניין לא הועלה בפני הסובייטים. סולארז אמר כי המו"מ הישיר הוא הפתרון העדיף, אך זה לא יקרה ולכן היוזמה של שולץ *the only game in town*.

הנוכחים: ברמן, גילמן, גרין, דורנן, המילטון, ווקסמן, טוריצ'לי, מל לויין, סנדר לויין, סולארז, לארי סמית, ניל סמית.

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני
מנכ"ל ראה"מ

תהליך מדיני.

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עוד לגבי הוועידה הבינלאומית אמר כי יתכן ויחפש דרך על-מנת לבטל את החששות הישראליים מפניה, אך לא פרט, אמר שיתכן ושמיר רואה סטייה בעמדה האמריקאית לאור מה שקרה באוקטובר אשתקד. שולץ הוסיף שציפה אז ששמיר יגיד "לא", חוסיין יגיד "כן" וכמוהו גם הסובייטים. בדיעבד, שמיר אמר "כן", חוסיין "לא" והעניין לא הועלה בפני הסובייטים. סולארז אמר כי המו"מ הישיר הוא הפתרון העדיף, אך זה לא יקרה ולכן היוזמה של שולץ the only game in town.

הנוכחים: ברמן, גילמן, גרין, דורנן, המילטון, ווקסמן, טוריצילי, מל לויין, סנדר לויין, סולארז, לארי סמית, ניל סמית.

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- "ברדלי" וטילי וחצרו לערב החסידות.

ראו נא את הודעת הממשל לקונגרס על הכוונה למכירת הפריטים לערב הסעודית והייצור המשותף של ה-AI עם מצרים.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs

RECEIVED

MAR 30 1988

March 25, 1988

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FROM: John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: Advance Notification of Intention to Issue a Letter of Offer

Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to notify the Congress that he intends to issue a letter of offer to sell to a foreign country or international organization defense articles or defense services valued at \$50 million or more, or any major defense equipment for \$14 million or more, 30 calendar days before the letter of offer can be issued.

In order to alert the Congress to the fact that a given sale to which Section 36(b)(1) may apply is under consideration, the Executive Branch has agreed to furnish the Committee with information relating to such prospective sales 20 days in advance of the formal, statutory notification.

In accordance with this agreement, the Department of Defense has advised the Committee that it has under consideration an offer to **Saudi Arabia** for **Bradley M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles** and **TOW II Missiles** tentatively estimated to cost \$50 million or more. This offer was originally submitted to Congress by the Department of State in accordance with Section 36(c) of the AECA on January 21, 1987 and cleared the Congress on February 20, 1987. It is now being renotified as a foreign military sales offer at the request of the Saudi Arabian government and resubmitted under Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA. The Defense Department has also advised the Committee that the Department of State is considering an offer to **Egypt** for **M1A1 Abrams tanks coproduction** tentatively estimated to cost \$50 million or more. The advance notifications, together with the attached policy justifications are available for your review in the main Committee office, Room 2170 Rayburn.

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לנמענים בלבד

מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ

בקור המזכיר

להלן משיחה עם צירלי היל.

לדברי צירלי אלו המטרות העיקריות של בקור המזכיר:

(א) להבהיר כי הועידה הבינלאומית המוצעת על ידו איננה אותה מסגרת ממנה חושש רה"מ. המזכיר מעוניין להרהיר שהמסגרת המוצעת על ידו איננה זו נגדה נאבקים והראייה טובה ביותר הן חילוקי הדעות עם הסובייטים בנושא, כפי שבאו לידי ביטוי במפגש האחרון.

(ב) המזכיר ירצה לשמוע דעתה של ישראל ומדיניותה של ישראל בהקשר להסדרי הביניים

וכיצד ניתן יהיה לשלב אותם עם ההסדרים לטווח ארוך. המזכיר יחזור ויבהיר כי הוא רואה התכנית כשלמות אחת ולא ניתן לבחור ממנה חלקים. הוא מקווה כי ישראל לא חשיב בשלילה כי ע"י הכשלת היוזמה תיוותר ישראל לבדה ללא יוזמה או תהליך מדיני כלשהו.

לסיום ציין צירלי היל כי כמו לפני כל ביקור הם חשים ששוב מטילים דופי בידידותו

ובאמינותו של המזכיר (ציטט מובאות מהעתונות הישראלית) והם סבורים כי פרסומים אלה

לא תורמים לאוירה הדרושה למפגש.

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EDITORIAL PAGE

by MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN
Editor-in-Chief

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THE LAND OF CAIN AND ABEL

The core of the Middle East conflict, which we feature this week as our cover story, is a struggle between two peoples, two communities and two nationalisms that cannot be resolved to either party's satisfaction. It is also one in which the best of intentions can lead to the worst of results, and that is precisely where the muddled good intentions of Secretary of State George Shultz are likely to lead in the proposed international conference.

The Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs are two peoples without common bonds of faith, tongue, sentiment, thought, aspirations, culture or values and with opposing views of the history of the land. Each claims a legitimacy that is mutually exclusive; in the land of Cain and Abel, only one child has birthright to the soil. The Jews see Israel as their home, established by right, not just by force. The Arabs see Israel as an intruder. The Arabs will have to settle for something less than perfect self-determination and the Israelis for something less than perfect security. The question is: What balance can be struck between these natural but unrealizable aims of both sides after 40 years of bloodshed?

Today, the Jews rule in Jerusalem and Israel for the same reason that the British ruled before them and the Ottoman Turks before them and others before them—because they fought for and conquered land. Without their power, no one doubts that the Israelis would be wiped out by the Arabs. The paradoxes are many. If the Arabs had accepted the original state of Israel proclaimed on May 14, 1948, they would have plenty of land for the Palestinian state envisaged by that U.N. partition. Instead, they chose to fight three wars and lost them all. Perversely, they see Israel now not simply as an intruder that grabbed half of Palestine but as an expansionist power.

And Israel, which accepted its original boundaries, is now obliged to prove the Arabs right: It knows today that, even with recognition, it could never return to the pre-1967 boundaries and must retain a substantial portion of the West Bank, having returned to Egypt 90 percent of the land it conquered in the Six-Day War. Security for Israel's

borders must run beyond its narrow pre-1967 frontiers into the 30-mile-wide occupied zone of the West Bank. But this is not expansionism for its own sake. Even now, Israel's population lives vulnerably in a small, L-shaped corridor only about 7 to 10 miles wide, an area narrower than most U.S. cities.

Land is time: Israel, if attacked, needs 48 hours to mobilize its citizen Army of 500,000 to defend itself, reducing the ratio of Arab to Israeli forces from 10 to 1 to 3 to 1. History, geography and the need for time, not simple expansionism, compel Israel's Army leadership to regard the Jordan River, with the hills to the west of it, as a minimum defense line.

The Camp David agreements were easier because in Sinai there was strategic depth. In Sinai, unlike the West Bank, distance could make demilitarization an effective buffer. An Egyptian Army would have to cross 120 miles of easily observable desert, then face an additional 60 miles—much of it densely populated by Jewish settlements—before reaching 'Iel Aviv. Crossing the West Bank, an unimpeded tank force could be at the heart of Israel within 2 or 3 hours.

What if the Arabs promised to live in peace and to recognize Israel in exchange for the return of the occupied territories? Peace in the Middle East cannot rely on signatures on paper and declarations of peace. Iran and Iraq are legally at peace today. In the 1980s, various Lebanese factions kept none of the 10-plus peace agreements they signed.

What guarantees peace in the Middle East is only what has endured historically—land. On the West Bank, the Israelis need land for security as much as the Palestinians need land for self-government. The aspirations of the Palestinians who live on the West Bank are understandable. The Arabs' economic lot has improved, but their self-respect and their hopes were lowered. Not only have they endured an occupying force—and no occupying power is ever welcome—but they have seen Israel sprinkle the West Bank with settlers, so that there has been a creeping de facto annexation. And the Palestinians have been betrayed by the wilder dreams of the PLO. Its dedication to



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the destruction of the Jewish state has led only to the destruction of Lebanon, and it has failed to gain an inch of disputed land for a Palestinian state. The key question is whether any compromise on the West Bank can avoid ending up in the creation of a state dominated by the PLO.

Understanding the PLO is crucial to the equation—especially since many in the West question Israel's refusal to deal with Yassir Arafat and his minions. Most of the PLO members live in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza—not on the West Bank—and belong to the PLO for a simple reason: They seek to return to their homes before partition—to places like Haifa and Galilee in what is now Israel proper. Making peace would preclude their dream of returning home; if Arafat accepted such a peace, he would no longer be their leader. Were Israel to negotiate with the PLO, that would be immediately construed as recognition in principle of a PLO-dominated Palestinian state in the West Bank—a magnet for refugees and, inevitably, a terrorist base more dangerous to Israel than anything that has previously existed.

Is there any hope in diplomacy? America has demonstrated an ability as mediator to produce settlements in the Middle East, capped by the Camp David agreements. But direct Israeli-Egyptian talks were initiated originally by Anwar Sadat as a way to scotch an international conference involving the Soviets. Secretary Shultz, in resurrecting such a conference, has failed his history course. Both Eisenhower and Nixon acted to keep the Soviets out and avoided an international conference. As Nixon said, "The Americans want peace in the Middle East. The Russians want the Middle East."

Shultz's conference is a trap for the United States. It legitimizes the Soviets' role in the Middle East and gives them a platform to support their extremist Arab clients (Syria and the PLO), therefore making it much more difficult for a moderate like King Hussein to compromise on the sensitive issue of land for peace. Then it brings in China, which is so fanatically pro-Arab it makes the U.S.S.R. look moderate. Finally, it stacks the international conference with Britain and France—two countries that believe Israel should withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines, raising the prospect of "piling on" Israel with overwhelming international pressure. This would leave Israel with a choice of caving in on vital national-security interests or being forced to bear the worldwide onus of walking out of the conference.

What is the U.S. doing in promoting such a

conference? Its role can only be to bring pressure on Israel—or to object to pressure on Israel by walking out. But where would that get us all? It would leave the Soviet Union as the champion of the Arab cause and isolate America. It is all very well for Shultz to insist that the conference is simply the launching pad for bilateral negotiations and that the U.S. will not allow the conference to make decisions of its own. But by giving each party the right to refer disagreements in direct negotiations back to the international conference, it would eliminate any incentive to reach agreements between the parties directly involved. And, of course, any conference with the five permanent members of the Security Council could hardly be expected to be silent, passive and mute.

Nothing can or should happen before the American and Israeli elections, both scheduled to take place in November. Then the time will come not just to react but to take a thoughtful initiative in the Middle East. The Arab leadership must know that improving the lives of Palestinian Arabs is more important than taking the lives of Jews. The Jews must know that they must allow their lives to be defined not only by their fears and their memories but also by their hopes and their deeds.

The American approach should be to go back to a dialogue with Israel in which an agreed position can be worked out—one that may not meet Israel's desire for perfect security but one that will also not meet Palestinian demands for perfect self-determination. The beginning of an understanding with Israel must be a firm American recognition that the Israelis can never give up the Golan Heights, because Syria is never to be trusted, and that Israel will always hold fast to Jerusalem because it is the soul of the country. But the West Bank is amenable to dialogue. The focus must be on what portion of the West Bank and what sovereign powers can be yielded in association with Jordan to form a Palestinian entity. The Israelis cannot wait for negotiations to begin before offering more self-determination than they previously have.

America should bring this blueprint for the West Bank and Gaza to the Arab countries. Such a blueprint as Israel and America might work out could satisfy America's doubts about Israel's willingness to compromise, as well as unify Israel. An Arab rejection of this plan would underscore why Israel must do the unpleasant things necessary to survive as a good country in a difficult region. The Israeli goal cannot be the Promised Land but a secure land.

WORLD REPORT

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A HOUSE DIVIDED

Israelis are fighting a two-front war—with the Palestinians in the occupied territories and among themselves. The core issue: Should Israel swap land for peace when so many Palestinians still deny the Jewish state's right to exist?

BY MICHAEL KRAMER

To much of the world that cares about the Middle East and celebrates Israel's existence, Teddy Kollek represents what's best about the Jewish state. For two decades, in ways large and small, the 76-year-old mayor of Jerusalem has tried to prove a point: That respect for one's adversary and an appreciation of ethnic diversity can be turned to advantage; that Jews and Arabs can live and prosper in harmony on land both believe is theirs alone.

But today, Teddy Kollek can be fairly described as a broken man. The "coexistence" he has championed is dead. Kollek himself has said so—although the notion so jars him that he has sought to modify his judgment despite its accuracy. When the *intifada* (the uprising) sweeping the occupied territories began last December, Kollek earnestly believed that his Palestinians would sit it out, that the benign paternalism he embodies would be seen as a better way.

Now that the dream has shattered, both Kollek and his fellow citizens are re-examining their assumptions.

Richard Z. Chesnoff contributed to this article and conducted the conversations on the following pages. Anna Clopet took the pictures.

Even the most politically disengaged in Israel are wondering what to do. After 40 years as a nation-state, it is axiomatic: The status quo is gone forever. People no longer say, as Golda Meir once did, that "there is no such thing as a Palestinian." A new way must be found.

The core question is: What will the Palestinians settle for? The answer, Israelis know, is unknowable. To yield any land requires leaps of faith that ignore 40 years of evidence. They will address the central issue soon enough—for the first time, the upcoming elections will force Israelis to choose among competing visions of their future—but for the moment, and as a way of escape, they are consumed with tactics and with issues at the periphery.

There is, for example, a lively debate about the uprising's origins: Does it date from 1985, when 700 of the most unrepentant Palestinian terrorists were re-

turned to the West Bank? Did that action and similar expressions of "weakness" only invite aggression? They argue, too, about



Across the border: On the West Bank, part of



YASSIR ARAFAT: Presence by proxy



Sur Bahir, once a Jordanian village, is now the Jerusalem neighborhood of East Talpiot, housing Jewish settlers



Arresting a young Palestinian: Israel is trying less provocative tactics to quell the uprising

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Militant rabbi: Levinger traces Israel's claims to history and God's will

'Arabs don't want peace'

Moshe Levinger's followers consider him something of a prophet, his critics, a dangerous fanatic. A driving force behind Jewish settlement in the West Bank since Israel first took the territories more than 20 years ago, the 52-year-old Jerusalem-born rabbi lives with his wife, his 11 children and a handful of gun-toting faithful in the fortresslike old Jewish quarter of Hebron with 40,000 hostile Palestinians as neighbors.

Conversation: Shimon Peres believes that George Shultz is the Messiah. And George Shultz believes that if we give up the territories we will have peace. But how can you give back what is yours? Samaria and Judea belonged to the Jewish people even before 1967. We've known that they belong to us all throughout history—just as we know that someday we will receive the East Bank of the Jordan as well. It's God's will. No Jew prayed three times a day that he'd come back to Tel Aviv or Haifa, but for centuries we did pray to come back to Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. The tombs of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are here. Hebron was David's capital. And until the Arabs slaughtered the community of scholars in the 1920s, there were Jews in Hebron during all the years of the Diaspo-

ra. Now, we suddenly call it "occupied territory."

Jews are always ready to make peace—it's our wish and our prayer. But not at the cost of pieces of our body. The Bible tells us that the Ammonites offered Saul peace if every Jew gave up one eye. Saul refused the offer. Now, they say they'll give us peace if we cut the heart from our body.

There is a special problem of democracy in Israel. Before the Six-Day War, when Hussein ruled this territory, no one spoke about "Palestinians." A Palestinian state is a Jewish invention, like many other gentile *mishegossim* [madnesses]. The demonstrations are a product of Jewish self-doubt. Suddenly, for some Jews, a Palestinian state is more important than the Ten Commandments.

I don't believe that the Arabs really want to make peace with us. The demonstrators talk of Arafat; they don't talk about Israel and Jordan. To say they are talking of peace with us is nonsense.

We can live with the Arabs; we've had good relations with them in some days past. After all, they are our cousins. But having good relations doesn't mean turning the other cheek. We have to help them, we must work with them, provide education and health—but we can't give them the country. As one of our ministers of education once said, "Arabs have all rights in the Land of Israel but no right to the Land of Israel."

the media's role in fanning the *intifada*. Television lenses focus when the stones are thrown. They rarely cover the taunts and provocations that are often the cause of Israeli overreaction. If the media won't show Palestinians screaming, "Hitler was right," should the press be banned from the territories?


Jewish Israelis wonder as well about their own Arab citizens. Do they prize being Israelis enough to avoid joining the uprising? And what about the Shultz plan? Is an international conference an acceptable mechanism for negotiations?

Pores's brush with reality

There is also, echoing Kollek, genuine dismay that Western measures of progress have failed to impress the Palestinians. Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister and the ranking advocate of compromise, regularly offers statistics proving that the lot of the average Palestinian has improved markedly since Israel assumed from Jordan the burden of governing the territories 20 years ago. Peres thought higher standards of living would win the day. He came face to face with evidence of his miscalculation several weeks ago when he visited a Bedouin school in the Negev.

Peres's brief that day involved a comparison of press freedom in Israel and Jordan. "How many of you want the kind of press we have in Israel," asked the Foreign Minister, "the kind where every argument, the whole truth, all sides, can be read about in the papers and seen on television?" When none of the students raised a hand, Peres thought he'd been misunderstood. So he tried again—again there were no takers. Exasperated, Peres asked: "O.K., how many of you like the kind of press they have in Jordan, where nothing seems ever to happen, where there's no robust debate, where all you see is what the King did that day?" Hands shot up as one.

The biggest tactical evasion, of course, concerns Israel's response to the uprising, which everyone debates every day. First, there were shootings; then there were beatings. Now, to quell the uproar over these tactics, the weapon of choice is economic intimidation. Exports have been restricted, travel between the West Bank and Gaza has been curtailed, telephone service between the territories and the outside world has been cut, fuel and gas deliveries have been halted, the flow of funds from Jordan has been impeded. "What these measures have in common," says Eli Ben Elissar, a member of the Knesset and Israel's first ambassador to Egypt, "is that they can't be filmed, or at least not as graphically as the beatings. In that sense, we've gotten smart."



Gittings and arrows: The rock throwers and rioters now play to the cameras as Davids against Israel's Goliath

Intimidation is a favored weapon for the other side as well. Those Palestinians who want no part of the uprising have been effectively cowed. The *intifada's* leaders have caused the resignation of half of the Arab policemen in the territories, and commerce is routinely controlled by instructions issued in leaflets that flood the West Bank and Gaza.

Strategy for struggle

The battle between the Palestinian activists and the Israeli authorities has become a struggle in all phases of life to determine who really controls the territories. "The activists are trying to sever contact between the Palestinian population and Israel in order to create alternative institutions and services," says the *Jerusalem Post's* Joel Greenberg. And there is a revealing congruency between the specific instructions issued by the uprising's leaders and a booklet titled *Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories*. Its author, Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian American, couldn't be happier. "Collective punishment at this time is good for us," Awad told Greenberg. "Israel's economic measures are doing the job of separation for us. Collective punishment strengthens us

morally, spiritually, and unites us. We have come to the point where those working in Israel will be called collaborators and traitors and be pressured to stay home. We have to be willing to starve for freedom. The population suffers, but it is nice to suffer under occupation. If Israel relaxes its hold on us, it won't be helping us as Palestinians. More punishments will create better resistance."

Toward what end? Certainly not to win further improvement in their material well-being. The Palestinians aren't rioting for better wages and work rules. They want political rights. They want to control their own destiny.


How Israel meets this demand,

whether it grants political freedom at all and in what form is, finally, Israel's decision alone. The United States will pressure Israel to deal, but no matter how severe America's budget restrictions become, it is unlikely that any administration will severely cut the annual \$3 billion subsidy Washington provides Israel. But even if that aid were diminished, Israel would never act against its own perceived security interests.

What are those interests exactly? On this score, Israel is a house divided. Some Israelis want to annex the territories and expel the Palestinians, but they are a minority. In principle, the majority would gladly trade land for peace. Some would even sanction an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, although many more favor some kind of confederation with Jordan. King Hussein, they believe, could effectively patrol the peace Israel will demand in exchange for any concession.

Would any land satisfy

Would that satisfy the Palestinians? Would anything short of the disappearance of Israel itself satisfy them? Those are the questions Israel must resolve before it even begins to think about compromise. And unless Israelis can



Soldier's story: Clearing his eyes of tear gas

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Industrialist: Wertheimer's solution is cooperative capitalism

How to survive: 'Expand exports'

Stef Wertheimer, 60, left his native Germany in 1937. A Royal Air Force technician in World War II, he fought in Israel's war of independence and served in Israel's Knesset as a representative of DASH, a liberal party. His multinational ISCAR company, which produces cutting tools and precision blades for jet planes, is one of Israel's leading export firms.

Conversation: Jews and Arabs have had problems now for more than 60 years. I don't put much faith in the Shultz plan in solving them; things are far too complicated. The fact is, Israelis are here to stay, and so are Palestinians. What we should both do is find a new enemy—either the American or Japanese export markets, for example.

Problem is we're wrapped up in the Mediterranean syndrome of bickering. The North made the steel and the money; the South was relegated to tourism, spaghetti and intracommunal fighting. But now we're in the age of computers and automatics. The old social systems are gone, and if we're going to survive—all of us—we have to stop fighting and start working.

Listen. I don't want the territories. I'm not a security expert, but I know we have an excellent Army, and I'm not frightened. I also don't want to deal with all the Arabs. What I'm in-

terested in are joint ventures with Israeli Arabs.

We have the potential to be some sort of Mediterranean Switzerland. But we've got to rid ourselves of old ideas. We're in a country where, partly because of the defense problems, 60 percent of the people are employed—directly or indirectly—by government. Our real problem is to make the government poor so our people will get rich. People usually think of Israel as a country in need. We're not. You can't count a nation's strength by its number of people—you have to count by its export figures.

I've tried an experiment up in the Galilee near where our plant is. It's an industrial park we call Tefen, a sort of capitalist community cum Harvard Business School of free people who want to live together and concentrate on developing new export businesses. We have about 300 families—Jews, some Arabs, some Druze. Eventually, there will be 15,000 people.

Anybody who comes in has to have an export product to sell and develop. We provide them with a base, protect them against this country's bureaucracy, help them set up production, marketing systems and export. No handouts, no free meals.

We need challenge for our young people. There are half a million Israelis living abroad; I want to attract them back. The earliest phases of Zionism were settlement and defense. The next is export.

to believe that a peace can be final—or at least as final as anything can be in the Middle East—nothing will happen.

So what do the Palestinians want? Can they ever come to accept Israel's right to exist, which is an altogether different matter from accepting the fact of Israel, the latter representing little more than a rational appreciation of Israel's military strength—a calculation that can change for the worse over time?

"For me," says Eli Ben-Elissar, "the answer is no. Regretfully. For a while, I had hope. As our first ambassador to Egypt, as someone who worked for the Camp David treaty, I thought things would change, at least with Egypt. But today, Cairo tolerates anti-Semitic statements and slogans in the government's official newspapers and in school texts. Some say this is a clever way for Mubarak to control his population, but what will come later from a population inculcated with such ugly sentiments? The sad fact is that a decade after the peace, Egypt accepts us only because we are strong. If we are weak, or if we are perceived to have let down our guard, even Egypt I think might be tempted."

The lessons of the Six-Day War

Other Israelis without Ben-Elissar's first-hand Arab experience share his pessimism—and support their view with the history they themselves have lived. For them, the Six-Day War of 1967 is dispositive. Before that conflict, the Arabs controlled the West Bank and Gaza, and no one ever spoke about a Palestinian state. In other words, the '67 war was fought for Israel proper, for Tel Aviv and Haifa, for the demise of Israel itself. "It is true," says Othman Halak, a prominent West Bank Palestinian businessman, "that the dream of all Palestinians is to have it all—all of Israel. Anyone who tells you differently is lying." But, adds Halak, "it is a more complicated matter. For those of us inside, that is, for those of us in the occupied territories, we have learned to accept the reality of Israel. We, here, could accept back what existed before the Six-Day War. But other Palestinians, the many more who currently live outside, in Lebanon and elsewhere, come not from the West Bank but from Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities. For them, Israel itself is home. That is where they want to return. They don't want to come to the West Bank even if we create our own state here, because that might mean that they must give up their quest for the whole."

Halak's inside-outside distinction is true for many Palestinian elites on the West Bank—men like Mayor Elias Frej of Bethlehem, who has for years signaled his willingness to accept a two-state solu-

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tion. The problem is that the younger Palestinians who have known nothing but Israel's occupation—the post-1967 generation—want much more than Halak and Frej. Every journalist who has covered the *intifada* has an anecdote, and too many stories conclude with a 14-year-old rock thrower's saying that he wants Israel "liberated" for a "whole Palestine"—or worse, an Islamic fundamentalist nation.

The notion that once Palestinians achieve a sense of ownership (e.g., a West Bank Palestinian state) they will be loath to continue the struggle for fear of jeopardizing their hard-won victory is simply unsupported by the evidence. And for those who dismiss the comments of "young hotheads exhilarated by battle," as one West Bank leader calls "the kids," there is this: In a 1986 poll commissioned by the West Bank newspaper *Al Fajr*, 78 percent of West Bank residents favored a Palestinian state that would include all of present-day Israel.

Now consider Yassir Arafat and the PLO—designated at the 1974 Arab summit in Rabat as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Arafat is quite clearly the one leader universally admired by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but his main constituency is still "outside." He "must provide an answer to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, in Syria and in Jordan," says Israel's Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. "A state composed of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem [in other words, everything lost to Israel in 1967] would give him no such answer." Were he to surprise the world and renounce the drive for all of Israel, Arafat would likely suffer Anwar Sadat's fate—either at the hands of harder line PLO elements or at the order of the Arab rulers for whom a continuous struggle against Israel is a symbolic ideological prop to their regimes.

The PLO's unyielding agenda

Recall the central fact: The PLO was founded in 1964, three years before the Six-Day War. Its goal has always been the liberation of all Palestine via the destruction of Israel. For the PLO, accepting a mini-Palestine state on the West Bank could only be viewed as an installment on the ultimate objective. What has changed since the PLO's establishment has been little more than cosmetic. Since 1974, it has pursued a "strategy of phases." As explained in "The Future of Peace in the Middle East," a 1982 article written by Khalid al-Hasan, the most articulate intellectual in Arafat's inner circle, the PLO is willing to accept "an independent Palestinian state on any part of the land of Palestine that would be

liberated, provided that this would not include any condition that would prevent the realization of the final objective."

Toward this goal, the PLO, through its 1974 10-Point Program, embraced politics, diplomacy and negotiations as avenues for attaining its objective because, as al-Hasan stated in 1986, "in the absence of an Arab military option, the role of [armed struggle] has fallen back from the vanguard role in the liberation activity...."

Following this road map (which al-Hasan has defined as including "political maneuvering and deception"), Arafat has raised to an art form his devotion to still another principle articulated by

onism as a form of racism and still others that uphold the right of Palestinians to struggle for their rights by all means, including armed force.

Sometimes, even 242 "in conjunction with other U.N. resolutions" is too much for Arafat to swallow. Sometimes he reiterates the longstanding PLO line that 242 has "no bearing on the Palestinian question." When pressed to square his various views, the PLO chairman either vamps or retreats. As he told one journalist who pushed too hard not long ago, "Please, no details. This is an interview, not an interrogation."

The conclusion is inescapable. As far as the PLO is concerned, the Arab-Israeli conflict isn't about borders; it is about Israel's very existence. As an Arafat-controlled publication has explained: "On the strategic level, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination means the right of this people to determine the political fate of Palestine after [emphasis added] its liberation from Zionism.... [The PLO] could not recognize the Zionist state, even if the counter-value of such recognition were an independent Palestinian state... in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

"Real peace is not comprised of formulas," says Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir. "It must find expression on the ground, in the education of peoples. And what you see today is exactly the opposite. You hear the most extreme views that have nothing to do with peace."

Shamir is right—so why should Israel deal at all? For three reasons involving security, politics and character—as articulated by three particularly thoughtful Israelis.

Security. Aside from religious zealots like Rabbi Moshe Levinger,

for whom the West Bank is Israel, most Israeli defenders of the status quo base their argument on the need for secure borders. But security in the late 20th century has two components. The first concerns a frontal assault by Arab states. Every professional soldier always wants all the territory he can get his hands on, but a majority of Israel's senior generals are known to feel that Israel could cede much of the West Bank and still guarantee the nation's safety against a land invasion from Jordan. "We have a tradition of not talking publicly about this."



Dangers of the street: A tour guide does double duty as bodyguard for a group of children in Jerusalem.

al-Hasan: Adopt "language that [is] not very revolutionary... [language that] your allies [can] uphold in the camp of your enemies." Thus Arafat regularly issues statements that Westerners deem hopeful. Listen carefully, however, and you will notice that while Arafat sometimes endorses U.N. Resolution 242 (which implies Israel's right to exist), he never does so without declaring equal devotion to "all other applicable U.N. resolutions," including those that recognize the Palestinians' right to repatriation, self-determination and independent statehood; resolutions that condemn Zi-

says one Israeli general constrained by policy from being identified, "but simply by keeping several strategic outposts in the West Bank we can do the job."

"Far more important to me, and to everyone else familiar with the facts here, is the problem of terrorism. And that can be dealt with only through a political solution. We'll never stop it all—we're too hated for that—but some of it may end if we yield territory and are seen by the Palestinians as at least trying to accommodate their interests. I know we'll never satisfy them all—and believe me I worry that they'll use whatever we give them as a base to go for more—but for me, and I think for most of us senior in the Army, compromise is worth the risk."

Politics. When "I talk about peace for political sake," says Gen. Ezer Weizman, a former Israeli Defense Minister, "I'm saying a few things. First, we live in a particularly small area where a defense equation begins with political agreements. We would have much more land—the Sinai—if we didn't have a peace treaty with Egypt, but would we be more secure? Of course not. So the notion of trading land for peace can make us more secure if the peace that's made is the right one—and if we don't relax our strength. I'm like everyone else here—from dove to hawk. I know we're not loved. I know we continue to exist because of our power and that's why the second political reason for us to compromise is so important. I need my F-16s in reserve. To have that kind of backup and the economic assistance we need as well, and also to have a decent chance of denying our enemies a comparable military capability, I must retain the good will of America and others. So we must take into account the views of our friends. And their views—which happen in this instance to coincide with my own—demand that we compromise."

Character. "I don't fool myself either," says the Israeli philosopher David Hartman. "The most some of the Arabs have done is to accept us as a fact, because of our strength. They still don't see us here as a matter of right. So I must keep my planes and my commandos and my frogmen. But as long as I have those in my pocket, I'll always take the chance to see if the Palestinians have changed. I'll always be willing to compromise. We can risk it because we talk from power and that means we can always take it back if they act up later."

"The more important reason for not making the status quo into an ordinary involves our character as a Jewish state," continues Hartman. "Now that we, the victims, have taken control, our



Artist: Wakstein and partners sketch out other ways forward

'We have to look eastward'

Sabra David Wakstein, 34, and Israeli Druze Asad Azi, 33, are artists who helped start a cooperative gallery in Tel Aviv. Its latest exhibit took as its theme, "Dialogue With the Palestinians."

David Wakstein: For years, we believed that all we had to do was show the Arabs force and we could quiet them down. But they're not playing our game any more. For the first time, Palestinians have taken responsibility for themselves, and I respect them for it with all my heart and all my head. Till now, we were leery of them, but we never respected them. Now, people in the street are learning something new about the Arab. We see him as David, not Goliath.

There can never be a good occupation—not for Jews. Every 18-year-old who has to serve in the territories is going to feel the dirt of what's happening there. We have to hear what the Palestinians are saying, and then perhaps we can start talking.

If we Israeli Jews want to live here, we have to become part of this landscape. We're scared of becoming Levantine. But we can't have dialogue with just the West. We have to look eastward.

Asad Azi: I served in the Israeli Army, two of my brothers are officers in the Israeli Army and my fa-

ther was killed serving in the Israeli Army. But I knew almost from the day I was born that I was a minority within a minority. I realized a long time ago that I could never be an ambassador here, never a pilot, never a government minister. This is a deep problem for me.

I don't want to live in a Palestine or in any Arab state; I'll pass on that pleasure. In all the 22 Arab states, there isn't one serious art gallery. But how can I say I'm an Israeli as long as Israel doesn't recognize me completely, till we have better schools, better roads, electricity, sewerage—mundane things that make you feel part of the place?

That's why I have something in common with people here who are struggling now over what's happening in the territories. If we don't solve the problem there, the uprising will come here. People like Wakstein and myself will be fighting for what we think is right.

I sometimes feel like packing up and getting out. But the real solution has to be optimism. The other side is optimistic. That's why the Palestinians are throwing stones. If they thought they could get it by guns, they'd do that.

I want Israel to speak to the PLO—not because I chose the PLO, but because [the Palestinians] have chosen them. I have no illusions; a PLO state is going to be pro Soviet. If the PLO were smart, they'd drop the Russians and say they are pro-American.

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Factory owner: Maymon's Arab workers get equal pay and ignore strikes

'This is our only country'

Ben-David "Benda" Maymon was 11 when his family reached Israel from Morocco in 1950. His first home in Israel, like those of many of the 700,000 Oriental Jews who flocked to Israel from Arab and Islamic countries, was a corrugated-metal hut in a scruffy *ma'abara* [immigrant camp]. The *ma'abara* in Jerusalem's Talpiot quarter is long gone, as are the other Jewish refugee camps that dotted Israel in the 1950s and early 1960s. In its place is Jerusalem's sprawling Talpiot Industrial Zone, where Maymon owns and operates a thriving bakery and frozen-food factory.

Conversation: Our hut was maybe 200 yards from where my factory stands today. Times were tough. We had no money. Rain poured in during winter, and in the summer, it was almost as hot as my ovens. But my father had dreamed all his life of coming to Jerusalem, of living freely as a Jew among Jews.

I didn't come here to throw Arabs out. But don't forget for a minute that this is our only country. We have no other place to go. I don't think we should leave Judea and Samaria. It's part of our defense, and what we need on the West Bank are more Jewish settlers, not fewer. Anyway, there's room for us all, Arabs and Jews.

People forget what it was like here before 1967: Any crazy Jordanian soldier could open fire from across the border. We can live in peace. But I don't believe most of the Arabs are interested. I don't understand why not. We have had Arab workers from Hebron here at my factory for 10 years now. They make the same salary as our Jewish workers, get the same benefits. And none of them pays attention to all these strikes and demonstrations. If roads are blocked, they sleep here so they don't lose a day's work. For us, life goes on.

There are 22 Arab states. Why doesn't one Arab leader say to the Palestinians, "Come, I'll welcome you to settle here." Did any Jew from Iraq or Syria or Morocco or anywhere sit around in refugee camps collecting welfare for 40 years? The truth is they don't want to leave the camps, and the Arab leaders don't welcome them.

They should have some autonomy. But it should be in an Israeli framework. Now, with all the trouble, they have more freedom than they had during Hussein's rule. I watched from a border post years ago when there was a demonstration in the Old City—Hussein's soldiers came out and opened fire on them and that was that—it was over.

If we sit down at a peace table with Russians and Chinese, they'll all be telling us what to do. I say to the Arabs: "You want peace with me, then sit down and talk to me!"

first goal must be to not become like them. We can't, without negating all that is best about Judaism, turn around and say that now it's our turn to delegitimize the Palestinians. For our own peace of mind, for our own souls, we have to say that we know the pain of the stranger and wish that pain on no one else. Most of us feel ashamed about what's happening in the territories. Our actions there threaten Jews everywhere. Israel is the Jewish people's synagogue. Jews all over the world have chosen Israel for their identity and if Israel doesn't exist as a *mensh*, then the Jewish culture will disappear. Therefore, we must risk compromise in order to save the Jews as Jews, not just as 3 million people here in Israel. In our souls, we must know that we have reached out, that we have tried, that we have been reasonable. At the very least, we need to feel that way, in order to be able to fight. Until my son, who is a frogman, can say 'Abba [father], you tried your best,' his will to fight to preserve the state will not be what it should be."

Putting the issue squarely

Whether to deal at all will be decided by Israel at its next election. Prime Minister Shamir has publicly offered a compromise that is basically a restatement of Camp David—a position known to be totally unacceptable to the Palestinians. Some discount the obvious implication—that Shamir has no desire to deal—and say that the Prime Minister's seeming intransigence is merely a tactic dictated by the politics of his Likud Party. They say Shamir finally realizes that Israel must compromise significantly, and that he himself will lead the way once he is re-elected. Whatever Shamir's private thinking, at election time voters will perceive him as they always have, as a bulwark against negotiation. A vote for Shamir will be viewed as a vote to do nothing.

"Which is why this election is so critical," says Shimon Peres, who will become Prime Minister if Shamir loses. Peres sees a historic opportunity receding quickly. "We have to use our power to make peace and if we don't act now, we'll be weaker a few years from now because we'll lose international support."

Assuming though that even Shamir wants to deal, the current flap over an international conference has stood the peace process on its head. By focusing on procedure rather than substance, the Reagan administration and Shimon Peres have confused priorities. On this matter at least, Maj.-Gen. Ariel Sharon—a former Israeli Defense Minister—is right. "We are a divided nation, everyone knows that," says Sharon. "So our first objective

must be to decide the matter for ourselves. We have to agree on the substance—what are we willing to do for the Palestinians and what are we not prepared to do."

It is interesting that others who despise Sharon's politics and disagree with him on substance nevertheless support his analysis. "We need to give the Palestinians a sense of reality," says David Hartman, "a sense of what we can live with—parameters like demilitarization that are nonnegotiable. I'm sorry if it's not all they would like, but they've yet to prove that they will actually live with us on the same land in peace."

Even a prominent Palestinian agrees. "We need to know the substance first because it goes to the limits of what we can expect from Israel regarding our self-determination," says Bashir Barghouti, editor of *A-Taliah* in East Jerusalem. "We need to know what we will be able to do on the land that's given to us no matter what the borders of that land are. The negotiating mechanisms are secondary."

There is also an important public-relations benefit possible for Israel by emphasizing substance over procedure. To the world at large and to many Israelis as well, Israel has its head in the sand. By getting its act together and declaring, substantively, what exactly it is willing to trade for peace, Israel can get itself off the perception hook. The idea is to present a cogent peace proposal that will appear reasonable to most Israelis and to the rest of the world as well. Then, if the Palestinians reject Israel's offer—as they have every other since the first partition agreement more than 40 years ago—Israel can say, "Shalom—come talk to us again when you've grown up."

Accepting Israel's right to exist

Israel has suddenly become the bad guy in the Arab-Israeli conflict—as one might expect given its often-abominable behavior during the current uprising. But a crucial bottom line has been lost as the world fixates on what war photographers call the "bang-bang." It is this: Israel has never acted to negate the very existence of the Palestinian people—while the Palestinians and many other Arabs have sworn death to Israel. There is no moral equivalence in the Middle East, and there never has been. Accepting Israel as a *fact* because of its military might is, by definition, only a temporary exercise. Accepting Israel as a matter of *right* is the only action that can seriously alter reality in the Middle East. A tip-off will occur when Egypt—a nation officially at peace with Israel—has the moral courage to reform its school curriculum and permit its children to study maps with the name "Israel" on them.



Student: Chafets finds schmaltzy togetherness has its limits

'It's tough on our soldiers'

Sixteen-year-old Michal Chafets was born in Jerusalem, where her American-born parents settled soon after the 1967 Six-Day War. She is a junior at Jerusalem's Hebrew University High School for gifted children.

Conversation: My views have changed. I used to think we should keep the territories because they belong to us historically. But, after what's happened these last few months, I think we should get out as fast as we realistically can. Having a million Arabs under our rule is a time bomb that just keeps exploding. I used to live in East Jerusalem, but I moved out because I was scared to stay there.

Giving them autonomy within Israel isn't the answer. That's the worst solution because they won't be satisfied and we keep the terrorists. Give it back to them with specific terms, and let's start dealing with them as we deal with any other Arab country. Not as stone throwers but as another hostile country.

Let's not fool ourselves. It's always going to be difficult here. We're not living in Switzerland; we're living in the Middle East, and it's a dangerous place. There's always going to be someone somewhere trying to take this country away from us.

I think it's wonderful that we have a courageous Army. But I'm not as proud of it or as confident in it as I used to be. Our soldiers are hitting women, taking people and breaking their bones. I know what they're up against—it's tough on our soldiers. The problem is, we have an enemy with different standards: The Arabs play dirty; Israel is always expected to be good. We should find new enemies or maybe a different image of ourselves. After 40 years, I don't think this image of being a special country has gotten us anywhere. It's bullshit. We want to eat hamburgers and wear sneakers, not sit around eating gefilte fish and being a light unto the nations!

I was at a get-together of Jewish and Arab kids—all Israelis. The Arabs came from Nazareth. But when they described themselves, they all said they were Palestinians—first, Israeli residents second. When we watched a basketball game together, we cheered for Macabi, the Israeli team, but the Arab kids cheered for the French team. It was very depressing. None of them said they wanted to move to a Palestinian state if there were one, but they felt left out of Israeli life because they saw limited opportunities for themselves because they were Arabs. It got schmaltzy at the end, and people hugged and kissed and exchanged addresses. We're still suspicious of one another, but I want to see them again and get to know them.

COVER STORY

Land is for leapfrogging

High-tech arms are changing warfare, but borders still count

Concepts of territorial compromise have been calcified in Israel for two decades. Not a single Israeli politician has put forward a land-for-peace plan since the late Yigal Allon drew a map dividing up the West Bank back in 1967. The Israeli general staff has operational plans for almost every conceivable confrontation with the country's neighbors. Yet it has never undertaken a study of the consequences of returning territory or the strategic implications of such a move.

Even now, as Israel's military planners place the final touches on a 10-year plan for the 1990s, they continue to base their calculations on the assumption that Israel's next war will be fought from today's borders, that the prepositioning sites and early-warning stations deployed in the West Bank and Gaza will be at their continued disposal, and that the defenses now in place along the Golan Heights, the Jordan River and the Negev-Sinai border will remain intact.

For these strategists, territory is a buffer allowing Israel the two days needed to mobilize its reserves—an estimated 80 percent of its 540,000-man armed forces—and, in the worst case, a battlefield in which to meet the enemy outside its population centers.


Land for peace remains an esoteric notion for most Israelis. They have no clear understanding of what Israel needs for strategic purposes and what it can afford to give up. They know that retaining the territories is a political and demographic time bomb. But they also know that 90 percent of Israel's population lives in an area the size of Indianapolis, 7 minutes' flying time from Jordan and 12 minutes' flying time from Damascus. Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi missiles cover almost every major strategic target in Israel, including all its oil refineries, its airfields, ports, arms depots and major crossroads.

Technological changes in weaponry now make it possible for both attackers and defenders to leapfrog territory. But

Israeli strategists believe that territory remains the key to Israel's defense. They hold to the specter of enemy tanks crossing Israel's frontiers, with vanguard units reaching the coastal plain in some 7 hours, and of artillery pounding virtually every Israeli target in the opening stages of a surprise attack from the pre-1967 borders. While there is no underestimating the power of the missiles deployed by Israel's potential enemies—to which add Saudi Arabia with its new Chinese missiles—Israelis believe they do not pose the same overwhelming threat as legions of ground forces that could occupy parts of the country, cutting off north from

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, more than 2,800 Israelis were killed and 8,000 were injured. If today Israel were to face the same coalition of forces it faced then, the losses from a surprise attack would be infinitely higher. The Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian armies have all grown in quality and quantity. The Iraqi Army has more than quadrupled; the Egyptian Army has been Westernized and made mobile, and the Syrian Army has been totally restructured and re-equipped with front-line Soviet weapons.

Israel's Army has also improved dramatically since 1973. Between the Yom Kippur War and the early 1980s it tri-



A tank for a tank: Israel is no longer playing numbers catch-up. But quality is no contest

south at the narrow belt around Netanya, for example.

Syria is the main enemy

It is clearly impossible to predict the strategic environment of the Middle East a decade from now—which is the military planners' minimum horizon. But Israelis make three assumptions: That peace with Egypt will endure, that King Hussein will remain in power in Jordan, despite dangers to the stability of his throne, and that the main enemy will continue to be Syria. There is very real fear that, for all their present hostility, Syria and Iraq could join forces in the not too distant future, reinforcing the threat to Israel.

pled in size. Then economic reality came along in the form of triple digit inflation, forcing cuts in the defense budget and the size of the Army. Military planners abandoned their efforts to match the Arabs tank for tank and set out instead to widen Israel's qualitative edge.

New-generation weapons on both sides will change the nature of any future war in a fundamental way. They will allow competent armies to destroy small targets at great range and to mine large areas quickly and efficiently. They will be capable of dispensing antipersonnel munitions that can penetrate defenses and allow soldiers to see at night and in all weather. An anti-aircraft battery can now

be disabled by destroying its radar system; an armored brigade can be crippled by a pinpoint attack on its communications, command and control functions. Computers, micropackaging, fiber optics and ceramics are rapidly making current weapons systems obsolete.

Weapons already in the development pipeline will, without doubt, make it easier for Israel to give up territory and retain a high degree of security. But they must be supplemental to, not in place of, a viable and stable diplomatic accord. The question is *what* territory can be ceded for *what* type of peace.


If Jordan offered a deal...

Most Israelis believe that Israel must retain the main east-west corridors on the West Bank that could serve as express lanes for invading Arab armies along with several high spots on the Samarian and Judean ranges, although both are surrounded by densely populated Arab towns and villages.

But suppose Jordan agreed to demilitarize the West Bank, plus 5 kilometers east of the Jordan River into Jordan itself, and this demilitarization were guaranteed by mutually acceptable international forces; suppose Jordan also agreed to cooperate with Israel in policing the territories to ensure that they do not become a base for terrorist operations. Israel then would no longer have to fear that Netanyahu is only 9 miles from the Jordanian border because the nearest Jordanian tanks would be 32 miles from Netanyahu. Moreover, tanks would have to pass over several internationally guaranteed tripwires en route to the border, giving Israel a clear *casus belli*, and enough time to launch a pre-emptive strike and mobilize its reserves. In such circumstances, Israel could afford to relinquish military control over the east-west axes.

Another key variable, apart from peace terms, is Israel's access to new American intelligence-gathering technologies and resources. If this were assured, and made impervious to political change in Washington, it would be theoretically possible for Israel to give up its early-warning stations on the Samarian heights. Israeli generals would also feel readier to compromise on their territorial buffer if Israel's Army were equipped with high-tech defensive weapons, such as an anti-tactical-ballistic-missile system [ATBM] and a mix of new-generation weaponry such as "brilliant" stand-off munitions, attack helicopters and precision-guided weapons.


These arms are not only prohibitively expensive. They incorporate technologies that Israel has neither the expertise nor the economic resources to develop. They would require even higher levels of



Surrounded by enemies: The battlefield equation

Israel, by any measure, is a tiny country—roughly the size of New Jersey—with 90 percent of its population living in an area about the size of urban Indianapolis. As a result, its potential vulnerability to the collective Arab forces massed around it is a matter of proximity: The air bases of such hostile countries as Syria and Iraq are less than a half-hour

away by jet fighter, and tanks rolling from Jordan to the East could reach the heart of Israel in a matter of hours unless they were intercepted. Surface-to-surface missiles emplaced in nearby Arab countries easily cover Israel's major population centers, military bases and industrial infrastructure. And the missile threat seems to be increasing: The number of Soviet-supplied Scud B missiles targeted on Israel by five Arab countries, for example, increased from 200 in 1982 to 340 in 1986.



ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY BALANCE

			Arab coalition*	Israel	Ratio
ARMY	Personnel	Regular	845,000	130,000	6.5:1
		Reserve	710,000	310,000	2.3:1
		Total	1.56 mil.	440,000	3.5:1
	Divisions		26	12	2.2:1
	Independent brigades		48	20	2.4:1
	Tanks		8,205	3,800	2.1:1
	Other armored fighting vehicles		9,860	8,000	1.2:1
	Artillery and mortars		5,500	1,100	5:1
	Surface-to-surface missile launchers		85	12	4.5:1
AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE	Personnel	Regular	229,000	30,000	7.6:1
		Reserve	62,500	50,000	1.3:1
		Total	291,500	80,000	3.6:1
	Total combat aircraft		1,453	620	2.3:1
	Transport aircraft		123	98	1.3:1
	Total helicopters		514	215	2.4:1
	Military airfields		49	11	4.5:1
	Long-range surface-to-air missiles		323	NA	NA
NAVY	Personnel	Regular	34,000	10,000	3.4:1
		Reserve	17,500	10,000	1.8:1
		Total	51,500	20,000	2.6:1
	Submarines		19	3	6:1
	Naval bases		18	3	6:1
	Surface combat vessels		149	NA	NA

NA = Not Available

* Arab coalition is defined by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies to include the full forces of Syria, Jordan, PLO, Egypt, Libyan Navy and partial forces of other Arab countries. Iraq is excluded because of its current involvement in the Iran-Iraq War.

USDAWIT—Basic data: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Jerusalem

But Israel is hardly a pitiful, helpless midget. Hardened by 40 years of conflict and five wars initiated by its Arab neighbors, the Israeli government has used U.S. military and economic aid and its own ingenuity to build one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world. The Israeli Air Force, crucial in any conflict with the Arabs, is considered second to none. The standing Army is small, but Israeli citizens remain in the reserves until age 55, and the country can mobilize within 48 hours in the event of war. Isra-

el has also set up a network of pre-positioning sites—weapons depots—close to potential battlefields, enabling its reserve Army to respond quickly.

Israel has also counted on a massive edge in the quality of its military hardware to offset the quantitative advantage held by its Arab adversaries. But the qualitative gap is narrowing: In recent years, Arab countries have been buying hardware that is more lethal, sophisticated and yet easier to operate, forcing Israel to run even harder to stay ahead.

American aid than the \$3 billion a year Israel now receives. They would also require a changed American attitude toward the transfer of military technology.

The more sophisticated the Middle Eastern battlefield becomes, the more Israel's relative advantage grows. It is vastly better equipped than any of its neighbors—sociologically, industrially and economically—to exploit the advantages of the new technologies. Its Army has a proven record in ingenious adaptability on the battlefield. It has the technologically skilled manpower needed to operate advanced weapons, especially when centralized control functions break down. It already manufactures many of the weapons of the future and is a world leader in such crucial areas as kamikaze drones, smart weapons and advanced electronics.

The brain factor

Israeli strategists have always assumed that Israel has to take a direct approach toward its enemies: To attack the enemy where he least expects it, under conditions that will allow Israel forces to exploit their relative strengths and maximize the enemy's weaknesses. By finding the enemy's Achilles' heel, Israel's Air Force did in 1982 when it shot down 86 Syrian planes with no Israeli losses by blocking Syrian air-to-ground communications, brain can move than compensate for lack of brawn.

Israel is best at a quick, fluid and mobile war. The Arabs are weakest at ingenuity and adapting to new situations. In this context, the new technologies clearly work in Israel's favor and, just as clearly, must be taken into account when working out the security-for-territory equation.

Whether Israel gives up territory will be a political, not a military, decision. Although many fear that Gaza could be a base for future terrorist operations against Israel and a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism, there is nonetheless a broad national consensus for giving it. Conversely, no Israeli government could bargain away a united Jerusalem and survive politically. There is little prospect of Israel's negotiating with Syria in the near future, which takes the Golan Heights out of the current debate. So only territory at issue is the West Bank.

Peace backed by guarantees and guarantees backed by military strength should allow Israel to make considerable concessions. Whether these will ever satisfy Palestinians and those who have yet to recognize Israel's legitimacy is another question. The world's statesmen have to advance as quickly and efficiently the weapons at their disposal.

by Hiram Goodman in Jerusalem

COVER STORY

Across the chasm: Voices of reason

A model dialogue for Arabs and Jews

They are voices in the wilderness. But a handful of Israelis and Palestinians are talking to one another. *U.S. News* recently brought two of the most articulate together in Jerusalem: Israeli David Hartman, 56, American-born director of Jerusalem's Shalom Hartman Institute for Jewish study, and Palestinian Sari Nusseibeh, 39, professor of Islamic philosophy at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank. Nusseibeh has already found that dialogue has its dangers: Last year, he had his arm broken by a gang of masked Palestinians after he talked with Moshe Amirav, a maverick member of the Likud bloc; Amirav was later drummed out of the Likud.

Nusseibeh: What is happening in the West Bank and Gaza could be translated into something constructive for both sides. But there's also a dynamic of deterioration, of racial and civil confrontation that may lead to real war. The problem is that while the chances of the situation's getting better are better, so are the chances for its getting worse. The only certainty is that things won't return to what they were four months ago.

Hartman: I agree. And I think that both alternatives exist in Israel: A push for even greater control over the territories and a realization that we can't rule a people against its will. That said, I think that the solution fundamentally depends on you, the Palestinians. It's a simple question: Are you ready to accept our permanent presence—our right to be here—or not?

Nusseibeh: That's wrong. It's Israel that has to make the choice: Either continued hegemony over the people in the occupied territories and the South Africanization of this country or an equitable peace. I'm depressed because, given Israeli politics, I don't see how things can possibly get better. As far as I can tell, the Palestinians are now ready for peace negotiations—and by "Palestinians," of course, I mean the Palestine Liberation Organization. But I'm not convinced the Israeli government wants to negotiate a resolution to this conflict. If it were serious, it would test it all by challenging the PLO—by saying: "O.K., you want to negotiate. Come on!"

I also don't think it's necessarily correct to ask the Palestinians to accept preconditions for negotiation. Don't misunderstand me: Personally, I don't mind a renunciation of terror, just as I would like to see Israel renounce violence as a precondition. But I think that it's really only in the negotiating room that we can come to an agreement that involves mutual recognition, security for Israel and sovereignty for the Palestinians—with peace for both sides. If we Palestinians don't accept that in negotiations, then Israel can say to everybody, "Look, the PLO hasn't delivered."

Hartman: This is a standard disagreement between us. I

don't think you appreciate the profound effect that Palestinians have on the Israeli soul. It may seem that we call the shots and define the power moves. But the real problem here is an Israeli sense that the Palestinians have yet to come to terms with our permanency, that you still fail to see our reality as organic to this country, that you don't understand that every time I put a shovel in the ground here, my *zayde* [grandfather] comes out, that I believe that this country represents not only my past and my present but my future. When you speak of a Palestinian state, what you're really talking about is not just the West Bank and Gaza but the heartland of Israel.

Mideast politics are defined by memories. For Israelis, Yassir Arafat is the incarnation of the Amalekites, who sought the destruction of the Jewish people. This is the metaphor and ultimately the label. So when you insist on Israel's negotiating with the PLO, I think it's a nonstarter. I would rather do it in another way. Instead of talking about "with whom?" let's set the conditions for the "whom" we talk to: (a) That they seek national Palestinian sovereignty without military power and (b) that in no way do they claim Israel is a passing episode with no real right to be here. If you choose otherwise—if you choose military power—that means you've chosen permanent war with Israel, and we will have to respond with all our power.

Nusseibeh: Palestinians view their roots in this land with at least as much spiritual passion as you view yours.

As for practical negotiations, anything that tries to get off the ground without the PLO is a nonstarter. Let's also distinguish between addressing Israeli public opinion, which is a legitimate exercise that Palestinians haven't tried, and addressing Israeli officials through secret diplomacy, which the PLO has tried.

Also, I'm not going to tell you that the Palestinians in the refugee camps or even the Palestinians in general don't want Haifa and Jaffa. Maybe they do, deep down. But the question is whether they are

ready to give up that dream in return for something smaller. I believe that this readiness exists in the Palestinian community. It didn't 15 years ago, but it does today.

Hartman: If Yassir Arafat says, "That's what I believe," then I personally have no problem with him. But, some way, we have to correct the terrible sense that if Israel negotiates with these people, it causes its own destruction.

Nusseibeh: Look, I can apply the same arguments. I can tell you we cannot sit down with Shamir, Sharon, Rabin or any member of the Israeli government, because of their association in the Palestinian mind with injustice and terror.

If we can negotiate with the Israelis despite how we view them and their past, then why can't you negotiate with the PLO? And if they sit down together, would that not constitute recognizing each other's right to exist in its own state? My answer is that this can be the basis for negotiations. But the negotiations have to be held not about principles but about millions of details: How to construct the future framework of coexistence in the economy, in tourism, water, open borders.

Hartman: The crucial question is: Who can deliver, and how can we begin the process in a fruitful way? I'm saying there is mutual hatred here that is not unredeemable. I'm saying the hatred is born from mythological images of the other and that



Philosophers: Hartman, left, and Nusseibeh tackle big issues

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we can break them. If you had asked me two weeks before Anwar Sadat came here in 1978 whether people in Israel hate Sadat, I would have answered "Yes." But as soon as he arrived here and there was a sense of his acknowledging our presence, everyone in Israel opened their hearts to him. There was an unbelievable atmosphere in Jerusalem. That tells me there was no deep ideological ground for the hatred; it can be corrected. The anger, terror and suspicion are not an unchangeable psychic national hatred. Sometimes in a marriage, people throw dishes at one another and call each other names, and you think, "What's going on here?" Then you realize the trouble is because one came home from work and the other didn't ask, "Did you have a hard day?" And suddenly what looked like elemental rage turns out to be something that could be alleviated. I believe the terror can be alleviated.

Nusselbeh: You Israelis keep mentioning the word *terror*. Put let's be fair. Terror is practiced by two sides. And right now, the predominant terror is practiced by Israel against Palestinians. It's *our* villages where people are being harassed, tortured, killed.

Do Palestinians practice what you call "terror" as part of their natural behavior, or is it a reaction to dispossession, to the denial of national dignity, to 40 years of diaspora and refugee life? I believe that if we address the cause, if we satisfy our national aspirations in the context of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, then the chances for violence will greatly diminish. People's national energies will then be directed not against Israel but toward constructing the future Palestinian state.

Hartman: That's only a partial explanation. Palestinian terror against Jews predates Israel, and your diaspora came precisely because you constantly sought my destruction. So admit the mistake of believing we would disappear!

That said, I appreciate the pain you feel when Israel is always portrayed as the victim and the Palestinians as the terrorists. We keep on talking about each other's deepest humiliations and fears—and we're not moving. That's the deepest problem. We're stuck in our mutual image as victims. And then Jews come with this great elemental memory of their own sense as a suffering people. It's not paranoia, and that's the amazing phenomenon—that even though we have such a powerful Army, we still see ourselves as victims.

You have to hear that, Sari, and listen, because it's not just a loincloth covering up a desire for aggression. There is a very deep sense within the communal psyche that we are victims. It may seem a funny notion—a "victim" with the most powerful Air Force. But, believe me, that combination is very dangerous—because when you are a victim and you have an F-15, then you are impregnable, because there is no moral criticism of your power because you are a victim—and sometimes you don't see what you are doing because you are a victim. When a victim has power, then it is a very, very dangerous combination. But you have to hear the fact that there is a very deep, elemental feeling of uncertainty, a feeling of terror. "They" want us in the sea; It's the old pogrom all over again.

Remember, Israel wasn't created by people who came out of Princeton or Yale and 300 years of American experience; it

was created by people who came out of Eastern European and Islamic ghettos, by people with deep bruises on their psyches. When you suddenly talk about formal principles, about accepting U.N. Resolution 242 or 338 after 40 years of talking about destroying us and of rejecting peace, I feel you've missed our real fear of becoming homeless again. Our concerns are born from an appreciation of our history and our vulnerability. Address them! Talk to us the way we perceive ourselves, not as the powerful aggressor you see us as. What I'm saying is that you have to help us. The national psyche of the Jewish soul can't be healed by a Jewish psychiatrist; it needs a Palestinian analyst. So help me heal the traumas.

Israelis have to start off by saying there is a Palestinian nation: You are a nation—not individuals, not wild terrorists. Those who express their pain in the West Bank today express a national will for self-determination. I'm not going to define who should represent you; you should do it. If you want to confederate with Jordan, without Jordan—that's your decision. But address my fears—not with U.N. resolutions but by saying that you accept total demilitarization, that we'll have open borders and that you don't want to see a Jew suffer, just as I don't want to see Palestinians suffering. This doesn't mean there won't be madmen in the Palestinian community who seek all of Israel and want my destruction, just as there are

those in Israel who seek the "greater Israel" and the dispossession of Palestinians. We'll control our madmen—as you must control yours.

Nusselbeh: The only true security border Israel can have is the one drawn in Palestinian hearts. If we achieve our minimal requirement—to live as a nation with dignity—then Israel needn't worry about its security. And, remember, my fears also have to be alleviated. As for madmen, I cannot control them.

Hartman: So if you need help, we'll work together on it. It seems so simple to me.

Nusselbeh: If it's so simple,

why doesn't your government come out with it? You don't want to see any Palestinians suffering; I don't want to see Jews suffering. You recognize me as a nation; I recognize you as a nation. So why is there no peace? Because your government doesn't share your opinions, whereas, in my case, I'm confident that the PLO, if challenged, shares my opinion.

Hartman: I think there's more of a gap between yourself and the PLO than you admit, and less than you imagine between my position and that of significant leadership in the Israeli government. But, frankly, I don't think either the Israeli government or the PLO is going to solve this. Imagery and rhetoric have paralyzed too many of the leaders on both sides. They're locked in position—afraid that if they move boldly, they lose their constituencies. Something has to take place independent of governments, something that creates a grass-roots framework.

Nusselbeh: It's possible. Instead of moving things from the top, you move things from the bottom. But I still feel my own leadership is ready for negotiation, ready for a two-state solution. The minute the PLO is challenged and refuses to deliver, then it will be a different story to me and to the Palestinian people.

Hartman: For me, our friendship and mutual trust is the way we begin. You build a world by ones.



Victims: Mirror images of terror and hatred on both sides

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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כל אימת שהוא נדרש לפעולה מצידו הוא פשט "נעלם". הסדרים משקול שלהם אינם במצב של דחיפתו למשהו שמעבר לשגרה. הגורם הסוני כמעט שאיננו קיים. התוצאה - אצל הגורמים הנ"ל שולטת כבר ההכרה שיש להביט מעבר לתקופת נשיאותו של אמין ג'מיל. דהיינו הולכת ונרחבת התאוריה. אח ורל"ה הצחה קדומה, ל"תבודד" נמר. האמריקאים עדיין מאמינים שבסופו של עניין אסד יתרצה לדיאלוג כלשהו עם אמין מתוך האינטרס העצמי של העברת תהליך הבחירות בעזרה חלקה. כל זאת כפוף להתפתחויות בשטח שסביר להניח במידה רבה לסדרים את הקצב בהעוצמה. כאמור, הניו הטורקים כאשר האמריקאים ממתינים לראות כיצד יפרעו את התחייבותם לקיים ברור עם בנד בריתם. ג'ורדן הדגיש שאין צורך לאמריקאים לבוא עם תכנית משלחם. ההצעות השונות בנושא הרפורמות הפוליטיות נמצאות כבר על השולחן והתהליך חייב להפתח בחיפוש אחר נקודות מגע ביניהם ע"מ לחבר את הקצוות.

3. הנושא היחיד, אולי, המציק לסדרים קשור להתעצמותה של החזבאללה כפוטנציאל מסוכן לטוריה. ג'ורדן הסביר שיתכן ולטורקים יש מחשבות כלפי הגוף הנ"ל אך תרגומם במציאות הוא מהם והלאה. ראשית מדובר, בכל מצב של טיפול שורש במהלך צבאי המרתיע את דמשק, שנית אי אפשר לנתקו ממערכת היחסים עם איראן.

4. ג'ורדן, ששהה רק בחלקה המזרחי של ביירות הופתע במידה מסוימת מהרגיעה היחסית במצב, לפחות כלפי חוץ. ביחוד התרשם מהעדר משטר המליציות ברחוב הלבנוני. הביטוי המובהק לכך הוא העלמון של נקודות הביקורות בדוכנים. הדעת נתונה יותר למצב הכלכלי מאשר לזירה המדינית.

5. סוריה. התרשמותו המרכזית היא ממצב הכלכלה הסורית. ג'קא בדמשק המצב חמור יותר מאשר במקומות אחרים (בירר גם בחלב ובחמאת). אע"פ לא נתקל ב"מדפים ריקים" אך יש מחסור במצרכי מזון טריים כירקות ומוצרי בשר. סיור בשוק של חלב מגלה מבחר גדול יותר. הסברו הוא שגידולי החקלאות הסובבים את המקום מוצאים עצמם ביתר קלות לשוק המקומי מאשר למקומות אחרים. ישנם ריטונים ברחוב, אך יותר על רקע של הסכנה עם המצב הקיים מאשר אות כלשהו לבאות. החודשים הארוכים של חוסר מעש מצד השלטון בתחום הכלכלי ופרידתה של כלכלה שניה ושלישית (שוק שחור), בה ניתן להשיג "הכל" למי שידו משגת, יצרו מצב שהרובד של המעמד הבינוני העליון .../3

שירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מחור דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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העליון שהיה מטרגל לשמור על רמת חידט גבוהה יחסית, ירד בסולם החברתי והפך למעמד בינוני נמוך, בט"כ צריך להבחין בין מצב הכלכלה הלאומית העומדת איך שהוא על רגליה לבין מצבו של הפרט הנאבק בתנאים כלתי רגזליט ע"מ לקיים עצמו. דעתו של המשטר מופנית בראש ובראשונה לכך שהסכרים לא יפרצו ברמה הלאומית.

6. בטחון הפנים. בולטת בבירה נוכחותם האזרחית של גורמי הבטחון. המצויינים בקלשניקובים (K-47). ניכרת חשמירה המוגברת על בנינים אס"י, מפלגה בית השידור וכד' שם, הרבה מעבר לערים האחרות בהן ביקר. במרכזים אלה מוצבות נקודות ביקורת החוסמות את הגישה אליהן. ג'רדן אינו יודע למה לייחס זאת. בט"כ ישנה רגזעה יחסית במצב בטחון הפנים, לפחות כפי שמזדקר "לענין תייר לרגע.

7. התהליך המדיני. הגישה הרגועה כלפי היוזמה האמריקאית נובעת בחלקה מהכרה טורית שלפי שעה שום דבר לא התרחש וספק גם יתפתח משהו בעתיד, ובחלקה מכך שטוריה בתמונת המצב הן בכל הנוגע לארה"ב והן באשר לירדן. יחד עם זאת עדיין קיומת חגישה חטו"י ווילאטיו שגט במצב זה. אסור להרפות מהחשדנות שג'רדן מגדירה כ"פרנויה". זו מופנית ל-3 מגזרים בהתאם לסדר ירדן (א) ברה"מ. הסורים ע"פ ג'רדן נמצאים באפלה (בלא-א-א) נאשו למויגיות ברה"מ במזח"ת ובעיקר בנושא הועידה הבין"ל עד כדי שהח דוחר חומרים וכל הדיווחים האמריקאים באשר לטגעיחם עם הסוב' מאשר על דיווחי האחרונים. האמריקאים מתרשמים שהסורים לא מוציאים מכלל ספק ואולי מעבר לכך אפשרות של "תפתעה" סוב'. (ב) ארה"ב. הנימת המכובדת בזיאלוג עם המזכיר, בכונה. בחלקה, אך היא מושלמת בביטויים הכוטים יותר בכלי התקשורת הסורים באשר ליזמה האמריקאית. אין לו ספק שהם נותנים ביטוי אמיתי יותר לעמדת טוריה כלפי היזמה המדינית הנוכחית. האמריקאים ממתנינים לתשובה פורמלית מהסורים. (ג) ירדן-אש"פ. מכלול זה כרגע אינו בעייתי לסוריה. שתי המדינות נמצאות במצב של הזדקקות הדדית שביטוייה הוא מידת תאום גבוהה, בין אם זה ע"י רה"מ ריפזאני או המלך עצמו. אין בכך לשרש החשדנות הטבעית הנמשכת מעבר למצב היחסים הנוכחי. במישור הסורי-אשפ"י לא מתרחש למעשה דבר והדיווחים על מגעים נשאר בגדר של שמועות. אסד וערפאת צורכים מידת רבה של אנטרפטעה הדדית במישור האישי ע"מ שניתן יהיה להתגבר עליה. ג'רדן לא .. / 4

שוכירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 4 מחוד דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

4/4

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הבחין דאגה מיוחדת בסוריה כאשר לנעשה בגדמ"ע ולכך שיש לחתור שורות אינטקט עליה.

8. נשנוע ונא צפויה להגיע לוושנגטון משלוחת הליגה הערבית המסיירת בבירות ובהו נציגי סוריה (שארע) סעודיה ואלג'יריה.

9. ירדן. משחתנו הקצרה כעמאן למד לדעת שאנשי משה"ח הירדני עם נפגש מנותקים בכל הקשור לתהליך המדיני. נזכרת דאגה מהמצב בגדמ"ע המלוח בפסומיות רבה. התחושה היא שהתהליך המדיני אינו מבשר טובות וקיים ספק באם ימריא לגובה רב. הגישה הירדנית, ע"פ הגורמים עם נפגש היא שירדן חייבת לצעוד בדרך דו-מסלולית (א) חתירה לתאום בינערכי, במה שקרוי עמדה ערבית (ב) המתנה לראות כיצד יפול דבר במישור הישראלי והאמריקאי.

אלי אבירן

ל.ל.



ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחוד דפים

סוג בטחון שמור

מיידי דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 88 25 1730

מס' מברק

1/4

619

המשרד + לשכת רה"מ + לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

אריה לקן
על פי דבריו אף ה"ה באלפון
לא במורה במסלול ואני אמוני
באלפון זה אולי באלפון
לויטה

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ
לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

מכתב בושביץ לרה"מ

לטעיף 5 (י"א)

במברקנו 417 מה-18.3

(1) לנוחיותכם, רצ"ב ממכתב, חתום ע"י 29 סנטורים, כולם רפובליקאים.

(2) להזכירכם, בעבר היו פניות דומות (לטובת מוסדות חינוך אחרים) שנעשו ישירות לשר האוצר מסנטורים שונים, לרבות קסטן, בושביץ והכט.

בושביץ מבקש להפגש עם השגריר ביום ד' (30.3) בהשתתפות שניים-שלושה סנטורים נוספים, ולדון עמו בנדון. במידת האפשר, נודה לתגובה ראשונית למכתב בושביץ עד אז.

(3) לידיעתכם, המכתב פרי יוזמתו של הרב בלקני, איש חרדי ואחד מגדולי המתרימים למפלגת הרפובליקאים מקרב היהדות האורתודוקסית.

לדברי עוזרי בושביץ, בלקני נלחץ ע"י התורמים שהוא מגייס, המבקשים שהוא יפעיל סנטורים לטובת מוסדות דתיים בארץ, ואילו הסנטורים מוכנים לחתום על המכתב לנוכח גודל התרומות שבלקני משיג. בושביץ מהווה נקודת המגע בסנט לא רק בגלל שהוא יהודי אלא גם מכיוון שהוא יו"ר הוועדה הרפובליקאית המווסתת כספים למועמדי המפלגה לסנט.

למזל
למזל

3/13 2/31 1/1 3/3 3/3 2/3

Dear Sir,
I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst.
and in reply to inform you that the same
has been forwarded to the proper authorities
for their consideration.

Yours faithfully,
J. H. [Signature]

CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8225

GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES P. LUCIER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 16, 1988

2/4
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The Honorable Yitzhak Shamir,
Prime Minister
State of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As always, it is a pleasure to see you in the United States. We wish you much success in advancing the cause of peace that the people of Israel have for so long sought.

We write to you today, however, on a different, but important, matter: to express our support for three projects in your country. All of them would be of major benefit to a great number of American students attending school in Israel. The first of these is for Machon Alta Lubavitch School in Safed. The projected cost for their building and dormitory facilities is \$4.5 million. The second is a building for the Jerusalem Institute of Talmudic Research in Jerusalem. The cost is estimated at \$3.5 million. Thirdly, the Vishnitz Institution of B'nei Brak has a capitol construction and operational budget of \$8 million, and again needs State assistance.

We understand that you and Minister Nissim have been contacted by a number of United States Senators and Members of Congress requesting funding for these projects. To date, we are unaware of any response on any of these three very worthwhile institutions. All of them have more than 60% of their budgets covered by private American donations.

We would very much appreciate your kind attention to this matter and look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Most sincerely,

R. Tzisk

Rudy Boschwitz

Attila M. Lomell

Ben Wint

$\frac{3}{4}$ 619

James A. M. Clure

Paul Whiteman

Unshu Gracely

John McCom

John Halper

Dave Kamas

Phil F

John Humphrey

Don J. J.

John H. M.

John S.

John J. H.

Chic Weck

Steve Symms

Richard B. Logan

Don Nick

Ch. Ringan

John V. Omenar

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Samuel Evans

Julius Peters

Strom Thurmond

Bill East

Paul Hunsinger

Bo Farrow

Larry Pressler

END

דחפוח: זכא לזכר	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דפ: 4
סוג כטחוני: שמור	סופס מברק	מחור: 3
תז"ח: 291700	המשרד, וושינגטון	א 5:
0 0747		דוע:
124 אל		מאת: נאו"ם



אל : מנהל ארבל 2 *העליון*
 דע : סמנכ"ל ארבל, מתני וושינגטון
 מאח : ג'רמי ששכ"ר

1. אתמול אחה"צ (28/3) נפגש המזכ"ל עם מזכ"ל הליגה הערבית וכן בנפרד עם שר החוץ של אלג'יריה כיו"ר ועדת השבעה של הל"ע.
2. היום (29/3) בבוקר, נפגש המזכ"ל עם נציגי ועדת השבעה כולל שה"ח אלג'יריה, שה"ח סוריה, שר המדינה של ערב הסעודית, מזכ"ל הליגה ופרוק קדומי. רצ"ב הודעת דובר המזכ"ל אודות הפגישה. נודע כי בפגישות אלה לחצו הערבים על המזכ"ל בין היתר, לשגר שליח מטעמו שוב לאיזור וכן לאפשר פידסום של מידע המדווח מסוכנויות או"ם ביש"ע ובישראל על המצב בשטחים.
3. בתדרוך דובר המזכ"ל הודיע הדובר שהליגה הערבית ביקשה כינוס מועכי"ס למחר יום ד' (30/3).
4. מועכי"ס מתכנסת היום אחה"צ להתייעצויות וצפויה להתכנס לדיון פורמלי מחר אחה"צ. קדומי אמור להתבטא וכן שה"ח אלג'יריה.
5. יש שמועות סותרות על אפשרות של הגשת הצעת החלטה. יש אומרים שהערבים מעדיפים להתבטא בלבד מחר ואולי כיום ה', ואז להמתין לדו"ח המזכ"ל על הועידה הבינ"ל שאמור לצאת עד ה-31/3 לפני שיחליטו מה יקרה.

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס : מברק	רף: <u>2</u>
סוג כטחוני:		מתוך: <u>3</u>
תז"ח:		א ל :
בר 0 0747		ד ע :
124 אל		מאת :

ולייעץ לערכים לחסותפק בדיון בלבד.

נאו"ס

אישור:

שם השולח: ג'. יששכרוף

29.3.88

תאריך:

U 0747/

STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

29 March 1988

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The Secretary-General received a delegation from the Arab League Committee on the Occupied Territories, led by the Foreign Minister of Algeria and including the Foreign Minister of Syria, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Director of the Political Department of the PLO. The delegation expressed to the Secretary-General their support for the uprising of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories, their concern about the latest developments there and their commitment to the search for a peaceful settlement by means of an international conference under UN auspices. The Secretary-General reaffirmed his conviction that a political solution could only be found through an international peace conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the parties directly concerned. He also expressed his acute concern about the deteriorating situation in the Occupied Territories and especially the continued killing and wounding of unarmed civilians. He is particularly disturbed by recent press reports of statements in Israel to the effect that the problem in the Occupied Territories will be resolved by force. As the Secretary-General has previously stated, he believes that such a policy can only lead to further violence. He is convinced that there must be a political solution which recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

*

Committee To Protect Journalists

36 West 44th Street, Room 911, New York, N.Y. 10036 • 212/944-7216

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TELEXES SENT:
March 25, 1988

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Affiliations are listed
for identification only

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem, Israel

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
Ministry of Defense
Kaplan St., HaKirya, Tel Aviv 61909, Israel

The Committee To Protect Journalists is extremely disturbed by the wide-scale arrests of Palestinian journalists in recent weeks and the increased restrictions on the Arabic press in the Occupied Territories.

To the best of our knowledge, at least nine journalists are now under administrative detention, which allows for detention for renewable six-month periods without charges or a trial:

Ribhi Al-Aruri, with *Tariq Al-Sharara* (which authorities closed in February), held since February;

Radwan Abu Ayyash, head of the Arab Journalists Association, editor at the Palestine Press Service and *Al-Awdah* magazine, held since December;

Najib Farraj, freelancer in Bethlehem, held since January;

Hani Al-Issawi, freelancer in Jerusalem, held since January;

Nabhan Khorelshe, an *Al-Fajr* journalist who was under town arrest for six years until his detention in February;

Sam'an Khouri, a Jerusalem freelance journalist who strings for Agence France-Presse, held since January;

Ahmed Abu Lasheem, editor at Gaza Press Service Office (a news agency), arrested in March;

Na'im Al-Toubasi, Ramallah correspondent of *Al-Shaab* daily;

Salah Zuhelkeh, editor of *Al-Shaab* daily, held since January.

The following journalists are also reportedly being held at present:

Abdallah Awad, with *Al-Bayadir Al-Siyasi* weekly, arrested weekend of March 19-21;

Adnan Damiri, with *Al-Awdah* magazine, arrested in March;

Muhammad Erekat, with *Al-Bayadir Al-Siyasi*, arrested weekend of March 19-21;

Tawfiq Abu Hosa, Gaza correspondent for *Al-Fajr* daily, arrested in February;

Jawdat Mana', with Bethlehem Press Office, arrested in March;

Ibrahim Sajadiyeh, with *Al-Awdah* magazine, arrested in March;

Sallim Abu Saleh, with *Al-Awdah* magazine and Palestine Press Service, arrested in March;

Mutawakil Taha, with *Al-Awdah* magazine and the Palestine Press Service, also head of the Association of Authors and Poets of the West Bank and Gaza, arrested in February.

/please turn/

Executive Director
Anne Nelson

CPJ Affiliates

London
Caroline Moorehead
The Times

Toronto
Nick Fillmore
Canadian Committee
To Protect Journalists

Paris
Christine Ockrent



Telexes to Messrs. Shamir and Rabin
March 25, 1988
Page Two

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Israeli authorities have asserted on many occasions that no journalist is punished merely for practicing his profession as a journalist. However, the large-scale detentions of reporters and editors, as well as the tightened censorship of the Arabic press and the temporary distribution bans imposed on three of the Arabic dailies for varying periods since December, suggest strongly that Israel is indeed taking measures against the press as an institution, in order to restrict the flow of information and ideas.

As a nonpartisan organization of journalists seeking to uphold the human and professional rights of journalists worldwide, we view the measures against the Palestinian press as inconsistent with Israel's professed commitment to press freedom. We maintain that all journalists should be released unless they are promptly charged with offenses that are recognizably criminal by international standards and granted fair trials.

We would therefore appreciate receiving information about the legal status and the reasons for the arrest of any and all journalists now being held. We welcome your comments on this and any other matter.

Anne Nelson
Executive Director



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 10 דפים

סיוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1945 29 מרץ 88

מס' מבדק

המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מצפ"א

דע: ארבי"ל, מז"תים, מקש"ח - ביטחון

בית הנבחרים - המצב בשטחים.

מצורפת עדות של שיפטר ודברי הפתיחה של היו"ר גוס יטרון בדיון על המצב בשטחים, שהתקיים בוועדת המשנה לארבי"ל וזכויות האדם ב-29 במרץ.

טובה הרצל

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Testimony by

Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Richard Schifter

before the

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Subcommittee on International Organizations
and Human Rights

on

Recent Disturbances in the Territories Occupied by Israel

March 29, 1988

7/19/538

3/10

A few weeks ago you were kind enough to give me the opportunity of testifying before you on the subject of the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. On that occasion I noted that throughout the world we can identify four distinct categories of human rights violations. One of these categories I described as follows:

"Democracies in which policemen or soldiers, usually without being authorized to do so by the highest level of government, use excessive force or brutality in what they view as law enforcement, riot control, or suppression of insurrection."

The human rights violations which have been reported in recent months from Israel's Occupied Territories fall, by and large, into the category which I have just described. As I have just indicated by referring to my earlier testimony, the recent occurrences in the Occupied Territories are regrettably not unique, but part of a worldwide phenomenon.

The specific acts to which I want to address myself in this testimony can be said to fall into three distinct classes. First, and indeed most troublesome, is the brutalization of Palestinian prisoners immediately after they have been taken

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into custody and of beatings administered to persons who were not taken into custody and who were not suspected of or known to have been engaged in any conduct in breach of civil peace.

Second, there are troublesome reports of physical mistreatment in the process of interrogation and detention.

Third, there is the question of the use of lethal force in riot control.

Turning to the first of the set of acts to which I have referred, namely the brutalization of prisoners and the random beating of civilians, I want to state most emphatically that these acts must be condemned, and we have done exactly that. We have made representations at the highest level of the Israeli Government, urging that these acts of brutality or indiscipline be brought to an end and be punished.

The Israeli government has made efforts to avoid the incidents I have just described. There have also been reports that courts martial proceedings have been instituted in some cases. We believe it to be essential that the Israeli Defense Forces, which have prided themselves of their commitment to what they have referred to as "the purity of arms," live up to that tradition by cracking down hard on any violations of the standards of military behavior and by bringing these truly shocking actions completely to an end.

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By the same token, we believe that physical abuse of prisoners in detention, whether for the purpose of eliciting information or for deterrence must also be condemned. These means cannot be justified by any ends. We have urged that instructions be issued to end such practices.

While one can without difficulty pass judgment in the circumstances which I have just described, this task becomes more difficult when we focus our attention on the third class of incidents, the resort to lethal force in riot control.

I need at this point to identify the problem. Since last December there have been serious disturbances of public order in the Occupied Territories. Thousands of Palestinians, mostly young people, have taken to the streets to engage in violent protests, causing damage to property, intimidating non-protesters, and physically attacking troops engaged in law enforcement activities.

In assessing the issues posed by the current unrest in the Occupied Territories we must thus keep in mind, when we speak of demonstrations in the Occupied Territories, that there is a sharp difference between a peaceful march, in which slogans might be displayed or shouted, and acts of violence. While we must insist on human rights grounds on respect for the right of peaceful assembly, this right does not extend to assembly for the purpose of throwing rocks and firebombs.

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In our view Israel clearly has not only the right, but the obligation, to preserve or restore order in the Occupied Territories, and to use appropriate levels of force to accomplish that end. The question of whether the force used was appropriate or excessive can almost never be answered in a clear-cut manner. The facts as to what may have happened in a particular clash between rioters and troops are almost impossible to reconstruct. What we do know is that riots are taking place daily, involving the burning of tires, the erecting of barricades, and the throwing of rocks and gasoline bombs, and, in one case, the shooting and killing of an Israeli soldier. We also know that the contingents that are called upon to try to maintain law and order outside East Jerusalem do not consist of skilled policemen, trained in riot control and equipped to function in a riot-control capacity. Rather, these are soldiers who are trained and equipped for military combat.

There is, in fact, a striking difference between the experience with riot control in East Jerusalem, on the one hand, and the West Bank and Gaza, on the other hand. The Jerusalem police force is trained and equipped for police duty, including riot control and confrontation with civilians. It has been able to handle incidents in East Jerusalem in a manner which has minimized casualties. The Israeli Defense Forces, which have had responsibility on the West Bank and Gaza, have faced more difficult problems with less preparation.

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As noted earlier, it is not possible for us to pass judgment as to whether a specific soldier who fired his rifle had sufficient grounds to fear for his personal safety so as to resort to lethal force. What we do know is that the rules of engagement under which the Israeli Defense Force operates are in keeping with accepted international standards. But, as I have just noted, the basic problem is that the Israeli army is not a police force. It is trained and equipped for military operations, not for riot control.

Can an army be re-equipped and retrained in short order? Probably not. But an effort to do so should surely be made. Recent information indicates that Israel has now begun training IDF personnel in tactics appropriate to controlling and dispersing violent civilian demonstrations. However, we need to keep in mind that many of the soldiers serving in the Occupied Territories are reservists, who serve a short tour of duty and then get replaced by other reservists, who will also have to be retrained.

As for equipment, it is our understanding that Israel has made a significant effort to provide the IDF with hardware that is appropriate to its present mission of riot control in the Occupied Territories. This includes water cannons, and rubber bullets as substitutes for live rounds, as well as teargas masks, dispensers and similar items which will allow for a more

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measured response to situations that are not inherently or imminently life-threatening. The Israeli government has also begun to acquire additional protective gear, which might enable IDF personnel to avoid some of the situations where the individual soldier feels he has no choice but to protect his life at the expense of the life of a demonstrator engaged in acts of violence.

In this context I need to note that questions have also been raised as to whether the likelihood of the need to resort to lethal force would be reduced if Israel were to stop sending out small patrols, which can easily be surrounded by a large number of civilians, and perhaps engage in more limited patrolling, but do it with larger contingents. A small patrol, two or three men, often including inexperienced reservists, can find itself easily surrounded and unable to extricate itself in any manner other than by firing live ammunition. We have conveyed our concerns in this regard to the Israeli government, although we in the field of human rights must concede that we are not in a position to expound upon the "proper" or "ideal" military or police tactics required to quell a disturbance.

In determining our own role in dealing with the issues which I have here discussed, we need to keep in mind that Israel is a democracy in which all aspects of governmental affairs, including the behavior of troops in the Occupied

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Territories, are subject to close public scrutiny. The incidents to which I have referred are matters of extensive public debate in Israel and have resulted in a great many expressions of anguish and condemnation. Where inexcusable transgressions have occurred, it is the general public that will insist on proper punishment. To the extent to which this self-correcting mechanism may, however, not be working as well as it should, we shall continue to apply ourselves to effect the results which I have here identified.

Having spoken of Israel as a democracy, I need to add, of course, that the residents of the Occupied Territories are not participants in that democracy nor do they have democratic institutions of their own. Their concerns have to be understood, and resolved, through peaceful negotiation. That is, of course, the underlying problem with which we are dealing. For the root of the difficulties which we face in this situation do not lie in the area of human rights. The underlying problem is the state of war which has existed in this area for close to forty years, which has caused the shedding of blood across the decades, and which continues to have this sad result. That is, of course, why we are seeking to find the path to a peaceful solution to this conflict.

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THE HONORABLE GUS YATRON
"Recent Turmoil in the West Bank and Gaza Strip"
March 29, 1988

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THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MEETS TODAY TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS REGARDING THE RECENT TURMOIL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP. SINCE THE PALESTINIAN UPRISINGS STARTED LAST DECEMBER, ISRAEL HAS BEEN CONFRONTED WITH A DILEMMA WHICH THREATENS ITS SECURITY AND HAS LENT GREATER URGENCY TO ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE DAILY NEWSCASTS OF ISRAELI SOLDIERS CLASHING WITH PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATORS HAS RENEWED THE DEBATE, BOTH HERE AND ABROAD, ABOUT ISRAEL'S CONTINUED ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORIES UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS. IT HAS NOT, HOWEVER, WEAKENED SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

ISRAEL REMAINS A STRONG DEMOCRATIC ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. AS ALLIES, ALL ISSUES OF CONCERN, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO OUR UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE VIEWED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEALS.

IN CONSIDERING THE CURRENT UNREST, IT IS CRITICAL TO VIEW THE PROBLEM IN TWO PERSPECTIVES. THE FIRST IS A LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND PRESERVING ISRAEL'S SECURITY AS PART OF AN ENDURING PEACE IN THE REGION. IN THIS RESPECT, THE UNFORTUNATE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS IS LARGELY THE RESULT OF THE REFUSAL OF THE ARAB WORLD TO ADDRESS THEIR PROBLEMS AND ASPIRATIONS IN A SINCERE AND HUMANITARIAN MANNER. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EGYPT, MANY OF THE ARAB STATES SEEM WILLING TO ALLOW THE PALESTINIANS TO REMAIN IN A STATE OF LIMBO WHILE PURSUING A POLICY OF ELIMINATING ISRAEL.

THE SECOND PROBLEM, AND THE FOCUS OF THIS HEARING, IS ISRAELI POLICY IN QUELLING THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS. SUBSTANTIATED AND CREDIBLE REPORTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND BY SUCH NOTED HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AS AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES ARE ILL-EQUIPPED TO HANDLE THE UNREST IN A SAFE AND HUMANITARIAN MANNER.

THE BEATINGS POLICY EMPLOYED BY THE ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES TO CONTAIN THE UNREST IS UNACCEPTABLE BY ANY STANDARD. THESE BEATINGS ARE INHUMANE. THEY MUST STOP AND THEY MUST STOP NOW.

IT IS MY HOPE THAT TODAY'S HEARING WILL ESTABLISH A SINCERE AND PUBLIC DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION AS TO HOW THE U.S. MIGHT WORK WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN IMPROVING THE CONDUCT OF THE SECURITY FORCES IN THE TERRITORIES. IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE THREATS TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY WILL NOT GO AWAY. BUT AS A DEMOCRACY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמר

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 88 29 מרץ 1930

מס' מברק

המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מצפ"א

דע: ארבל, מז"תים

מקשי"ח - משהבייט

בית הנבחרים - המצב בשטחים.

ועדת המשנה לארבל וזכויות אדם קיימה כמתוכנן ב-29 במרץ את הדיון על המצב בשטחים. העידו בפניה שיפטר ווילקוקס ממחמ"ד. הדיון כולו נמשך מעט יותר משעה, והשתתפו בו היו"ר יטרון, הדמוקרטים לנטוס, אקרנון, לויגן, סולארז ופיהן, והרפובליקנים טולומון, מאיירס, דורנן, מילר וכריס סמית'. דברי הפתיחה של יטרון ועדות שיפטר - בנפרד. וילקוקס לא הגיש עדות. הטקסט במלואו בדיוף למצפ"א.

על-פי נוכחות אנשי ביטחון באולם, ניתן להעריך שציפו להפגנה כלשהי, אולי נוסח "מחאת החולצות", כפי שהיתה במהלך עדות מרפי בוועדת המשנה של אובי בשבוע שעבר, אולם מעבר לנוכחות רגילה של נציגי שגרירויות ערביות וארגונים ערביים, לא היתה שום פעילות חריגה.

דברי הפתיחה של יטרון, שיפטר וסולומון נתנו את האות ליתר הדיון. כאשר הקונגרסמנים מדגישים את הידידות לישראל, ומבטאים חוסר נוחות מעצם הצורך לקיים את הדיון, וטורחים להדגיש ולתאר את התמונה הגדולה (חוסר ההכרה הערבית בישראל וכו'). מגמה זו נכרה מצד שיפטר

בדברי הפתיחה, ציין שיפטר את החומרה שבה רואים הכאת עצירים או אנשים שאינם חשודים, אך אמר שישראל מנסה למנוע תופעות מסוג זה. חופש הכינוס אינו חל על התארגנויות לצורך זריקת בקבוקי תבערה. חובת השמירה על הסדר חלה על שלטונות ישראל. צה"ל פחות מיומן בכך מהמשטרה, אך ניכר ניסיון לשכלל שיטות טיפול.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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אמר שיחידות פטרול קטנות מהוות פיתוי למיתקפה, המביאה תגובה באש חיה, ויתכן והתופעה היתה נמנעת לו היו הפטרולים גדולים יותר וסגורים סחות. בתגובה לשאלות, אמר שהארועים היו קורים גם ללא התקשורת, אך אישר שיתכן והיא מלבה אותם.

וילקוקס אמר שעד כה יש 118 הרוגים פלשתינאים, מהם ארבעה מירי מחבלים, ושניים קורבנות של פלשתינאים אחרים.

שיפטר אמר שבעקבות ועדת לנדאו כיכרו שיפורים בחיפוד השב"כ, אך וילקוקס התקשה לאחר אותם. שיפטר אמר שהמכות אינן התופעה הרגילה, אך וילקוקס אמר שהיו מקרים.

וילקוקס העריך שקשה להגדיר באופן אחיד את מטרות המתפרעים, ואישר שיש סתירות בין עמדות שונות. הביע צער על מעצרו של ארבעה פלשתינאים שעסקו בדיווח משפטי על הנעשה בשלטונות האמריקנים.

שיפטר אישר שהנוהלים המשפטיים אינם בהתאם לקריטריונים האמריקנים, אך אמר שלא קיים קנה מידה בינלאומי אחיד, אליו ניתן להשוותם, מצטער שהכוונה להקים רשות ערעור עליונה, כפי שהמליצו האמריקנים, כנראה נמוגה נוכח הארועים בחודשים האחרונים. העריך שהארועים היו ספונטניים מלכתחילה, אבל אחר כך מצאו יד מכוונת.

יצויין, שאיש לא-שאל על סגירת השטחים לנשן שליש ימים.

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טובה הרצל

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סנידרות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 29.3.88

מס' מברק

678 ח/א

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

טילים סיננים לסעודיה

להלן כתבתו של דויד אוטוואי ב"וושינגטון פוסט" 29.3.88.

יוסי גל

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Saudis Hid Acquisition Of Missiles

Deception Indicates Significant Failure Of U.S. Intelligence

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Using a wide variety of carefully crafted ruses, Saudi Arabia successfully hid from U.S. intelligence agencies for more than two years its acquiring of Chinese ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles, according to an informed diplomatic source.

The fact that Saudi Arabia, which has such close military and security ties with the United States, was able to carry out this deception suggests a significant failure of U.S. intelligence.

No evidence about the Saudi acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles, or construction of their sites, was picked up before last fall, according to congressional sources. But U.S. intelligence concluded that the Saudis were indeed obtaining the missiles less than two months ago, according to several sources.

"There was a deliberate and extensive effort to hide it," said one congressional source.

The informed diplomatic source said China agreed in principle to sell the missiles in July 1985 when Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, negotiated the deal in Beijing. The first missiles reached Saudi Arabia late last year, the source added.

The United States did not directly confront the Saudi government with satellite evidence of the 66-foot-long missiles and their sites until March 6, when Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy met with Prince Bandar at his home

here and demanded to know whether Riyadh had obtained "nuclear" missiles from China, the source said.

The administration was alarmed by the evidence because the Chinese missile, which the Chinese call the DF3A and the U.S. intelligence community the CSS2-class, had heretofore been used by the Chinese only to carry nuclear warheads. It had never before been exported.

Bandar reportedly confirmed that Saudi Arabia had obtained the weapons but categorically denied the kingdom had obtained, or ever sought, nuclear warheads from the Chinese. He told Murphy that the Chinese had modified the missile especially for the Saudis to carry a large conventional warhead, a change that reduced the missile's range.

This particular version of the Chinese missile normally travels about 1,600 miles. The exact range of the modified Chinese missile the Saudis have bought could not be learned, but it is somewhat less than that.

Having been taken by surprise by Saudi acquisition of the missiles, the Reagan administration now fears that Israel may carry out a pre-emptive strike against them that would complicate Saudi-U.S. relations and destroy any chance for Arab acceptance of the new U.S. Middle East peace initiative.

The Saudi decision to turn to China marks a major turning point in the traditionally close U.S.-Saudi military and security relations, including the sharing of much intelligence information.

The Saudis have refused U.S. requests to inspect the missiles to verify firsthand that they do not carry nuclear warheads, telling the Americans this is a question of strict confidentiality between Saudi Arabia and China and reminding them that it does not allow the Chinese to inspect U.S.-provided AWACS surveillance aircraft.

Saudi diplomats, who have been briefing members of Congress on their newly acquired Chinese missiles, have emphasized that Riyadh turned to Beijing for help only after Congress repeatedly rebuffed its efforts to obtain U.S. arms, including F15Es and the short-range

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Lance missile, which has a range of about 70 miles.

"They felt naked. They did come to us. They asked us for . . . the Lance missile and we were not prepared to sell so they went elsewhere," Murphy told a House committee last Thursday. "I regret it."

Murphy said there had been "grave concern" in the administration that the Chinese missiles carried nuclear warheads, but said both China and Saudi Arabia have provided assurances that this was not so. Bandar has delivered a March 12 letter from King Fahd to President Reagan conveying the assurance in writing.

The Saudis went to great lengths to deceive Washington about their purchase of missiles from the Chinese, according to one knowledgeable source. According to the source, the Saudis have taken the position that they never lied outright to the Americans, but also never told them the whole truth.

The Saudis used a budding economic relationship with China, specifically in the petrochemical field where the kingdom was in search of markets for expanding Saudi production, to develop secret contacts with the Chinese. (Saudi Arabia has diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and does not formally recognize China.)

Bandar's visit to China was made

under the pretext that he was trying to persuade it to stop selling arms to Iran. The Saudis told the Americans they had "offered" to compensate the Chinese for the loss of arms sales to Iran by buying the same weapons, including Silkworm missiles, for Iraq. The Saudis also "offered" to have the Iraq-bound missiles from China pass through Saudi territory to assure their security from Iranian attack.

The Chinese then shipped the missiles destined for Saudi Arabia together with those being transshipped through the kingdom to Iraq. After both sets of missiles were counted leaving Saudi ports, those destined for the kingdom were trucked south into the great Saudi desert known as the Rub el-Khali, or Empty Quarter.

There, the Saudis told the Americans they were building a huge "ammunition depot" that they wanted to keep for security reasons far from their cities and populated areas. In fact, the depot was a training and storage area for the Chinese missiles.

The source said the Saudi cover was finally blown in January when the Americans discovered that trucks carrying some of the presumed Iraq-bound missiles were traveling south, rather than north, from Saudi ports.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 29.3.88

מס' מברק

ח/א

678

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

טילים סיניים לסעודיה

להלן כתבתו של דויד אוטוואי ב"וושינגטון פוסט" 29.3.88.



יוסי גל

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Saudis Hid Acquisition Of Missiles

Deception Indicates Significant Failure Of U.S. Intelligence

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Using a wide variety of carefully crafted ruses, Saudi Arabia successfully hid from U.S. intelligence agencies for more than two years its acquiring of Chinese ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles, according to an informed diplomatic source.

The fact that Saudi Arabia, which has such close military and security ties with the United States, was able to carry out this deception suggests a significant failure of U.S. intelligence.

No evidence about the Saudi acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles, or construction of their sites, was picked up before last fall, according to congressional sources. But U.S. intelligence concluded that the Saudis were indeed obtaining the missiles less than two months ago, according to several sources.

"There was a deliberate and extensive effort to hide it," said one congressional source.

The informed diplomatic source said China agreed in principle to sell the missiles in July 1985 when Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, negotiated the deal in Beijing. The first missiles reached Saudi Arabia late last year, the source added.

The United States did not directly confront the Saudi government with satellite evidence of the 66-foot-long missiles and their sites until March 6, when Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy met with Prince Bandar at his home

here and demanded to know whether Riyadh had obtained "nuclear" missiles from China, the source said.

The administration was alarmed by the evidence because the Chinese missile, which the Chinese call the DF3A and the U.S. intelligence community the CSS2-class, had heretofore been used by the Chinese only to carry nuclear warheads. It had never before been exported.

Bandar reportedly confirmed that Saudi Arabia had obtained the weapons but categorically denied the kingdom had obtained, or ever sought, nuclear warheads from the Chinese. He told Murphy that the Chinese had modified the missile especially for the Saudis to carry a large conventional warhead, a change that reduced the missile's range.

This particular version of the Chinese missile normally travels about 1,600 miles. The exact range of the modified Chinese missile the Saudis have bought could not be learned, but it is somewhat less than that.

Having been taken by surprise by Saudi acquisition of the missiles, the Reagan administration now fears that Israel may carry out a preemptive strike against them that would complicate Saudi-U.S. relations and destroy any chance for Arab acceptance of the new U.S. Middle East peace initiative.

The Saudi decision to turn to China marks a major turning point in the traditionally close U.S.-Saudi military and security relations, including the sharing of much intelligence information.

The Saudis have refused U.S. requests to inspect the missiles to verify firsthand that they do not carry nuclear warheads, telling the Americans this is a question of strict confidentiality between Saudi Arabia and China and reminding them that it does not allow the Chinese to inspect U.S.-provided AWACS surveillance aircraft.

Saudi diplomats, who have been briefing members of Congress on their newly acquired Chinese missiles, have emphasized that Riyadh turned to Beijing for help only after Congress repeatedly rebuffed its efforts to obtain U.S. arms, including F15Es and the short-range

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Lance missile, which has a range of about 70 miles.

"They felt naked. They did come to us. They asked us for . . . the Lance missile and we were not prepared to sell so they went elsewhere," Murphy told a House committee last Thursday. "I regret it."

Murphy said there had been "grave concern" in the administration that the Chinese missiles carried nuclear warheads, but said both China and Saudi Arabia have provided assurances that this was not so. Bandar has delivered a March 12 letter from King Fahd to President Reagan conveying the assurance in writing.

The Saudis went to great lengths to deceive Washington about their purchase of missiles from the Chinese, according to one knowledgeable source. According to the source, the Saudis have taken the position that they never lied outright to the Americans, but also never told them the whole truth.

The Saudis used a budding economic relationship with China, specifically in the petrochemical field where the kingdom was in search of markets for expanding Saudi production, to develop secret contacts with the Chinese. (Saudi Arabia has diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and does not formally recognize China.)

Bandar's visit to China was made

under the pretext that he was trying to persuade it to stop selling arms to Iran. The Saudis told the Americans they had "offered" to compensate the Chinese for the loss of arms sales to Iran by buying the same weapons, including Silkworm missiles, for Iraq. The Saudis also "offered" to have the Iraq-bound missiles from China pass through Saudi territory to assure their security from Iranian attack.

The Chinese then shipped the missiles destined for Saudi Arabia together with those being transshipped through the kingdom to Iraq. After both sets of missiles were counted leaving Saudi ports, those destined for the kingdom were trucked south into the great Saudi desert known as the Rub el-Khali, or Empty Quarter.

There, the Saudis told the Americans they were building a huge "ammunition depot" that they wanted to keep for security reasons far from their cities and populated areas. In fact, the depot was a training and storage area for the Chinese missiles.

The source said the Saudi cover was finally blown in January when the Americans discovered that trucks carrying some of the presumed Iraq-bound missiles were traveling south, rather than north, from Saudi ports.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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מס' מבדק

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המשרד

אל : תצפ"א

מז'ת'ט

דע: לשכת רה"מ

לשבת שהבייט

מצורף בזאת העתק מכתב מהוועד להגנה על עתונאים שלדברי הארגון שוגר אל רה"מ ושה"ח.

לידיעתכם.

מתנ"י

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Committee To Protect Journalists

36 West 44th Street, Room 911, New York, N.Y. 10036 • 212/944-7216

TELEXES SENT:
March 25, 1988

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Jerusalem, Israel

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
Ministry of Defense
Kaplan St., HaKirya, Tel Aviv 61909, Israel

533-67

The Committee To Protect Journalists is extremely disturbed by the wide-scale arrests of Palestinian journalists in recent weeks and the increased restrictions on the Arabic press in the Occupied Territories.

To the best of our knowledge, at least nine journalists are now under administrative detention, which allows for detention for renewable six-month periods without charges or a trial:

Ribhi Al-Aruri, with *Tariq Al-Sharara* (which authorities closed in February), held since February;

Radwan Abu Ayyash, head of the Arab Journalists Association, editor at the Palestine Press Service and *Al-Awdah* magazine, held since December;

Najib Farraj, freelancer in Bethlehem, held since January;

Hani Al-Issawi, freelancer in Jerusalem, held since January;

Nabhan Khoreishe, an *Al-Fajr* journalist who was under town arrest for six years until his detention in February;

Sam'an Khouri, a Jerusalem freelance journalist who strings for Agence Franco-Presse, held since January;

Ahmed Abu Lasheem, editor at Gaza Press Service Office (a news agency), arrested in March;

Na'im Al-Toubasi, Ramallah correspondent of *Al-Shaab* daily;

Salah Zuhelkeh, editor of *Al-Shaab* daily, held since January.

The following journalists are also reportedly being held at present:

Abdallah Awad, with *Al-Bayadr Al-Siyasi* weekly, arrested weekend of March 19-21;

Adnan Damiri, with *Al-Awdah* magazine, arrested in March;

Muhammad Erekat, with *Al-Bayadr Al-Siyasi*, arrested weekend of March 19-21;

Tawfiq Abu Hosa, Gaza correspondent for *Al-Fajr* daily, arrested in February;

Jawdat Mana', with Bethlehem Press Office, arrested in March;

Ibrahim Sajadiyeh, with *Al-Awdah* magazine, arrested in March;

Salim Abu Saleh, with *Al-Awdah* magazine and Palestine Press Service, arrested in March;

Mutawakil Taha, with *Al-Awdah* magazine and the Palestine Press Service, also head of the Association of Authors and Poets of the West Bank and Gaza, arrested in February.

/please turn/

Executive Director
Anne Nelson

CPJ Affiliates
London
Caroline Moorehead
The Times

Toronto
Nick Fillmore
Canadian Committee
To Protect Journalists

Paris
Christine Ockrent



Telexes to Messrs. Shamir and Rabin
March 25, 1988
Page Two

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Israeli authorities have asserted on many occasions that no journalist is punished merely for practicing his profession as a journalist. However, the large-scale detentions of reporters and editors, as well as the tightened censorship of the Arabic press and the temporary distribution bans imposed on three of the Arabic dailies for varying periods since December, suggest strongly that Israel is indeed taking measures against the press as an institution, in order to restrict the flow of information and ideas.

As a nonpartisan organization of journalists seeking to uphold the human and professional rights of journalists worldwide, we view the measures against the Palestinian press as inconsistent with Israel's professed commitment to press freedom. We maintain that all journalists should be released unless they are promptly charged with offenses that are recognizably criminal by international standards and granted fair trials.

We would therefore appreciate receiving information about the legal status and the reasons for the arrest of any and all journalists now being held. We welcome your comments on this and any other matter.

Anne Nelson
Executive Director

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט"פ ס מ כ ר

דף מחוד דפים

סוג בטחון שמור

דחיפות רגיל

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מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מזת"ים

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

לפנישת המזכיר עם סעיד ולוגוד

מקור עתונאי יד דותני אשר בשנחה שיש לראות בפגזת שולץ עם סעיד ולוגוד כנסיון
נראש מצד מחמ"ד ושולץ לחפש ולקיים קשר כלשהו עם כל גורם פלסטיני אפשרי.
ואין כאן כוונה לשנות או ליצור עובדות חדשות כלפי אש"ף.

חקה עליה לא וק

מתני

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אל: מצי"א, לשכת רה"א

מחנה: עמריה

בשיחת אקראי עם דן קורצר העלה ביוזמתו את נושא ביקורו של רה"מ בוושינגטון ואת כוונותיו של המזכיר לקראת נסיעתו הקרובה לאזורנו.

1. ביקורו של רה"מ מבחינת ארה"ב היה כשלון והוא מהפלא על כי האוירה הכללית שלווה את רה"מ היתה של הישג. לא היתה כל סיבה להסיק כי המזכיר יוותר על יוזמתו או על מרכיבים בה. אלו שפרשו את קבלת הפנים המבוזבזה לא נכון גם לא טרחו לקרוא את דבריו החריטים של הנשיא בטקס הפודרה בבית הלבן.

2. כוונותיו של המזכיר המשכנה להיות רציניות מאוד עד לשלב שאחד הצדדים יאמר לו "לא" בפרוט. בהעדר חשבוניות כאלו כל הדיבורים על גניעתה של התכנית אין להם על מה לסמוך. אדרבא, המזכיר מאוד רציני ויעשה הכל לקידום הסיכוי לפתיחת התהליך.

3. בביקורו הקרוב במז"ח אין המזכיר מתכוון להניח לצד הישראלי להממן את הניכוח. לכן שאף אינו לא הציע. הוציאת חב"ל אותה חוקר רה"מ אינה ולא היתה הוציאה לה התכוון שולץ.

4. מציע לקרוא שוב את מאמרו של שולץ (קורצר כותב עבור המזכיר נאומים ומאמרים) שהופיע ב"וושינגטון פוסט" למונוי צ"א רה"מ את וושינגטון. זהו מאמר המגדיר היטב את עמדותיה של ארה"ב מחד, ואת נחישותה לקדם את התהליך משני.

5. דבריו של המזכיר בעקבות סיום השיחות עם שבדנדזה, דברים שנשמעו בוכים בהבהרת חילוקי הדעות בין ארה"ב וברח"מ במקשר לוועידה הבין-לאומית, צריכים להקרא וקונסטקסט הכללי של יחסי שתי המעצמות. הסובייטים הגיעו לושינגטון בלי שום כוונה לחתום דבר באף אחד מהנושאים ומלבד תאריך לפסגה לא היו מוכנים לשום דיון מהותי. רק מסיבה זו היה המזכיר Tough. כדי להבהיר לרוסיים שהמפתחות לחז"ח בידו.

יוסי גל

יוסי גל

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

סמ"כ

ליוק
לעויר
למדינת

28 מרץ 1988
י' ניסן תשמ"ח

אל: מצפ"א
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן
לשכת המנכ"ל המדיני
לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

הנדון: מורי אמיתי ומכתב הסנטור קרל לוין

לעיונכם רצ"ב כתבה בנדון שמורי אמיתי מפרסם בטור הקבוע שלו
בכתריסר עיתונים יהודיים ברחבי ארה"ב.
אין זה תמה שהכתבה מרגיזה מאוד את לוין וראש משרדו, מר גורדון
קר (עמו אני הסתבכתי) כבר התקשר עם אמיתי וצעק עליו קשות.

בברכה,

ג'א/א
יוסף למדן

העתק: השגריר, הציר

March 21, 1988

MORRIS J. AMITAY - COLUMN #6

It was a classic "man bites dog" story - thirty U.S. Senators writing a letter widely interpreted as being critical of Israel. And, predictably, the usual gaggle of critics were quick to applaud this unique occurrence and exaggerate its significance. Notwithstanding the preponderance of positive statements in the letter, the media pounced on the "dismay" expressed by the Senators over Prime Minister Shamir's refusal to publicly announce, (in advance of any negotiations) that Israel should give up territory for "peace". It should also have been predictable that the reaction to the letter from pro-Israel activists would cause additional dismay to the signers of the letter.

Some of the Senators who signed the letter were obviously impressed by the religious affiliation of the letter's originator, Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, and three other signers, Senators Boschwitz, Lautenberg and Metzenbaum. By hindsight most of the signers now question the wisdom and timing of having sent such a message. In fact, in its aftermath, not a single signer would agree to a televised debate with Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania who had refused to sign the letter. Although Specter is regarded as one of the brightest members of the Senate, it should not have taken a genius to foresee the negative effect of having the letter on the front page of the New York Times a day before Shamir arrived in this country for his talks with the Administration on the Shultz peace plan.

With the best of intentions, the letter injected thirty American Senators directly into the internal politics of a fellow democracy and displayed a degree of naivete of the realities of the Middle East and the significance of the Camp David Accords.

The Camp David Accords, which all the Senators had supported, wisely dictated an interim period of five years in which intentions could be divined and human contact developed prior to final agreement over the disposition of the Territories. The letter, however, not only short circuited the Camp David process, it cut the ground out from under Israel's eventual negotiating position in direct talks with Jordan and Palestinian representatives. It is important to note that Shamir, as the democratically elected head of his government, spoke for Israel - and criticism of Shamir was widely interpreted as a rebuke to Israel.

The motivation behind the letter's author, Sen. Carl Levin, was to try to change a status quo he regarded as intolerable, and also provide support for Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. But change for the sake of change without knowing where it will lead can be dangerous. No one questions the right of the Senators to be critical. But unhappiness over Israel's reactions to violence in the Territories, or over Shamir's positions, could have been delivered to him directly - as friends usually do. Instead, the letter could actually be seen as promoting confrontation between Israel and the United States. Despite Levin's long-standing support of Israel and his good intentions, it is difficult to see how the letter advanced the peace process. Not known particularly in the Senate as a foreign affairs or Middle East expert, and never having spearheaded any Israel-related initiatives previously, Levin, however, was obviously a good persuader. Not heeding the objections of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's, Tom Dine, (but also without the knowledge of other pro-Israel activists), Levin succeeded in quickly attracting twenty nine others to his initiative -- and saw to it that it received maximum publicity.

What did the letter accomplish? Did it give aid and comfort to Israel's critics? Certainly. Will it affect Israel's ties to the U.S. in the long run? Probably not. Will the signers cease to be supportive of Israel in the future? Definitely not.

It is also fairly certain that there will be more circumspection and less haste in the future in judging these issues. In this regard, it is worth noting that besides Senator Specter, such outstanding and veteran friends of Israel in the Senate as Bob Packwood of Oregon, Bill Bradley of New Jersey, John Heinz of Pennsylvania, David Durenberger of Minnesota, Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, and Jim Sasser of Tennessee would not join in the letter, aware its inappropriate timing and judging, correctly, how it would be perceived.



Down the road there will be foreign aid and arms sales votes in the Congress and, hopefully, at some point, peace negotiations. It is safe to say that solid majorities in both Houses of Congress will continue to be supportive of Israel because in a very real sense, Israel's successes or failures are also our own.

דחיסות: חידודי לברקר סורג כסחובי: שמור תולדות	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	4 - 3 -
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אל : מנהל ארכל 2
 דע : סמנכ"ל ארכל: וושינגטון
 מאח: יששכרופ

מועבי"ס - יש"ע

1. רצ"ב מכתב יו"ר הקבוצה הערבית (תוניסיה) הלוטה מכתב (למחלקת חק) (28.3) מה-15/3 ובו דרישה שמועבי"ס שוב תשקול המצב בשטחים, על מנת להגן על העם הפלסטינאי ולשם כך למעשים של ישראל.
2. מפי היועץ הצרפתי נמסר שמחר (29/3), אמור פרוק קדומי להגיע לניו יורק בקונקורד, אך טרם ידע על מועד שנקבע לדיון על יש"ע.
3. מקמרון היום (ארה"ב) נמסר שהערבים בקשו לכנס את מועבי"ס ביום ד' (30/3), והקבוצה הערבית התכנס היום ומחר לשקול את צעדיה.
4. נראה שאש"ף הוא זה אשר דוחף לדיון, ועניין הגעתו של קדומי לניו יורק ויום האדמה ביום ד', מחזקים את האפשרות של התחלת הדיון כבר באותו יום.
5. ג'יימס וואט (בריסניה) מסר זה עתה ששלושה מנציגי וועדת השבעה של הליגה הערבית אמורים להפגש עם המזכ"ל היום, ומחר ימשיכו לווינגטון, ואז מתכוונים לחזור לניו יורק לדיון מועבי"ס ביום ד'. לדבריו, הערבים אינם מתכוונים להגיש הצעת החלטה להצבעה אלא רוצים "מחצית דלת" על ידי דיון בלבד, שיצטרך לדעתו להסתיים עד יום ה' בערב עם חילופי נשיאי מועבי"ס (הבא הוא זמכיה). בל ארה, המועצ א יום 3' למחרת הלין, נראה לו נאצל סגור.

אישור:  28.03.88
 שם השולח: ג. יששכרופ
 שם הנמען: 
 תאריך: 28.03.88
 מס' תיק: 114-011



Security Council

706 2/3

Distr.
GENERAL

S/19684
25 March 1988
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 MARCH 1988 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
TUNISIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that you have circulated, as an official document of the Security Council, the letter which I sent you on 15 March 1988 in which the Arab Group asked the Security Council to consider the increasingly dangerous situation prevailing in the occupied territories.

(Signed) Ahmed GHEZAL
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Tunisia to the United
Nations and Chairman of the Arab Group

Annex

7.10.6 3/3

Letter dated 15 March 1988 from the Permanent Representative of
Tunisia to the United Nations in his capacity as Chairman of the
Arab Group for the month of March 1988 addressed to the President
of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of March 1988, I wish to draw your attention and, through you, the attention of the members of the Security Council to the critical situation in the occupied Palestinian territories resulting from the escalation of the campaign of repression, violence and abuse which the Israeli occupation authorities are waging against the defenceless Palestinian people, including women, children and old men, thereby persisting in their violation of the most elementary human rights.

Within this framework falls the recent decision of the Israeli authorities giving their military leadership powers to declare the occupied territories closed to the various information media that have been assiduously transmitting the truth about what is happening in the occupied territories in order to apprise world public opinion about the terrorist crimes and operations of oppression and repression which are being carried out by the occupation authorities and which threaten the lives of the Palestinian people.

In the face of the escalation of these repressive and provocative acts and in the absence of the necessary protection for the Palestinian people, the Arab Group considers that the time has come for the Security Council to assume its responsibilities fully and face this grave situation squarely in order to protect the Palestinian people and the occupied territories and to put an end to the arbitrary Israeli policies and practices, in accordance with Security Council resolution 605 (1987) and in implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, as contained in his report in document S/19443 of 21 January 1988, and that it is incumbent on the Council to consider the matter in the light of the daily recurring grave developments in the occupied territories.

Accept, Sir, etc.

(Signed) Ahmed GHEZAL
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Tunisia
Chairman of the Arab Group



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

24 MAR 1988

In reply refer to:
I-01829/88

665

513

2/3

Honorable Albert G. Bustamante
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bustamante:

During 15 March hearings before the Procurement Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee concerning the potential Egyptian M1A1 tank coproduction program, you asked that the Administration's understanding of third country transfer policies be provided as part of the Congressional Record. Data for the Record will be provided, and I wish to take this opportunity to provide an interim reply on this subject directly to you.

In the matter of third country transfers we are bound by Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. Subsection 3(a)(2) prohibits the further transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles and services furnished under the Act without the prior consent of the President of the United States, and Subsection 3(d) requires the President, before giving his consent to transfers of items over specified dollar thresholds, to inform the Congress of his intent to approve such a transfer. The Congress then has 30 days in which to enact legislation prohibiting the transfer.

The Administration may not legally approve any request for third country transfer of defense articles or services unless we would be prepared to make a direct transfer of the same articles or services. This decision involves an evaluation of the proposed recipient's need for the capability, the effect on the regional military equation, the ability of the recipient to operate and maintain any equipment involved and to safeguard it should it contain sensitive technology, and any impact on our defense industrial base, our workforce and our economy.

A standard condition of each government-to-government agreement providing for the transfer of defense articles and services to foreign governments requires that the recipient agree not to transfer the article or service to a third party without the prior written consent of the U.S. Government. This same restriction would be contained in a memorandum of understanding that would govern a coproduction or coassembly arrangement. As long as there are U.S.-origin components sold under the Act in any item of military equipment or U.S. technology is used in its manufacture, our approval would be required before any third country transfer could take place.

665/513 3/3

2

This prohibition of third country transfers is viewed very seriously by the Administration and by our foreign defense partners. We would consider a violation of the agreement not to further transfer defense articles and services as having the potential to cause the suspension of part or all of our security assistance relationship with the transferring country. In the case of Egypt, this would not only disrupt the tank coproduction program but would surely hazard the financial assistance currently being provided by the U.S. Government. The Egyptians would not risk this penalty.

I trust this information will be helpful to you and am prepared to discuss it further should you so desire.

Sincerely,



CHARLES W. BROWN
Lieutenant General, USA
Director



16

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 28.3.88

מס' מברק

652 493

המשרד , בטחון

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת
 דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת
 יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

מאת: עזרנות

1. רולי אבנס, בעל הטור מהצמד אבנס ונבוק מתעתד להגיע ארצה עם רעיתו לביקור בו כמה ימים לפני נסיעתו לפסגה במוסקבה. יגיע ביום א' (22.5.88) או ביום ב' (23.5.88) וישהה אצלנו במשך שלושה ימים (24-26.5.88).

2. מבקש לפגוש את רוה"מ שמיר ואת השר שרון. כמו כן מבקש שנסדר לו פגישות עם הח"כים ארנס, אולמרט, מרידור ורמון ועם לובה אליאב, עדו דיטנציק וכני בגין.

3. אבנס מבקש גם להזמין את משפחת רבין לא"ע באחד הערבים.

4. ביקש עזרתנו בשריון מקום ב"מלון המלך דוד" לאותה התקופה.

5. הודיעונו נא.

יוסי גל

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

13

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סווג בטחון שמור

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 88 28 1130 מרס

מס' מברק

638

המשרד

אל; מנכ"ל מדיני. מנהל מצפ"א

גיוסות 88

נצחוננו של ג'סי ג'קסון במשיגן: הפתעת השבוע היא נצחוננו הסוחף של ג'סי ג'קסון בבחירות המוקדמות במשיגן. הוא זכה ב-55% מהקולות. לעומת 28% לדוקקיס, ו-13% לגפהארדט. בחלוקת הצירים ההפרש קטן יותר - 61 לג'קסון, 50 לדוקקיס, 22 לגפהארדט, ו-7 בלתי מזדהים. (תוצאות לא סופיות). אין נתונים ברורים על התחלקות המצביעים, ובסך הכל בגלל השיטה המסובכת של משיגן, הצביעו פחות מ-20% מן הדמוקרטים הרשומים. נראה, כי ג'קסון זכה בתמיכה מסיבית של המצביעים השחורים, כן זכה בתמיכה ניכרת של המצביעים ממוצא ערבי, סטודנטים רבים וכן פועלי-תעשייה לבנים.

ההצבעה במשיגן מבטיחה כמעט בברור כי אף מועמד לא יגיע לוועידה הדמוקרטית עם רוב ברור, וזיתכן מצב שבו לג'קסון יהיה המספר הגדול ביותר של צירים. בינתיים יש לדוקקיס 604 צירים לג'קסון 598, לגור 363, גפהארדט 167, סימון 172 ובלתי-מזדהים 363 (לפי ספירת תורל טרנט ג'ורגל). לג'קסון המספר הגדול ביותר של קולות המצביעים ב-32 המדינות בהן כבר נערכו בחירות מוקדמות.

ג'קסון מעודד מתנצחון במשיגן כבר מדבר על עצמו כעל מועמד אפשרי לנשיאות, וראשי המפלגה אינם כה בטוחים כי יוכלו למנוע זאת ממנו, אם תמשך המגמה הנוכחית. יש לראות כיצד יראו התוצאות במוקדמות הבאות: קונטיקוט, אוהיו, פנסילבניה וכיוצא בזה. עדין לזכור כי הסנטור גורי, שחשיג במשיגן 2% בלבד, עוד לא זכה בשום הדג ממשי באף מדינה בעפון או במערב התיכון.

גפהארדט שקיווה להישג משמעותי במשיגן לא זכה בו והוא עומד להודיע היום על פרישתו מהמרוץ, ועל הצגת מועמדותו לתקופת כהונה נוספת בבית הנבחרים.

דני בלור

הנהגה של ארץ ישראל / וושינגטון

1 2 1 3 3 2

END

שגרירות ישראל / יוסינגטון

המשרד + בטחון

509 661

ט ו ס ס מ ב ד קדף 1 מחוד 1 דפיםסוג בטחוני - גלוידחיפות - מידניתאריך/ז"ח 17:00 28 מרץ 88מס' מברק

אלו מצפ"א

דע: מקשיח - משתב"ט

דברת - אוצר

רובין - לשי' רה"מ

ציר כלכלי - כאן

קונגרס: סיוע חוץ לשתי"א 1989

לשלנו 502

א. בית הנבחרים: בסוף השבוע שעבר אימצה מליאת הבית את הצעת החוק כפי שהוכנה ע"י הועדה (פרוש הדבר, תוך הנחה, בין היתר, שמדינות ק"ד יוסיפו לקבל סיוע ברמה הנוכחית).

ב. סנט: היום התחילה ועדת התקציב את מלאכת הכנת ההצעה שלה לתקציב.

עוקבים ועוד נדווח,

יוסף אלמ
למדן

- 25 -

שם חתג גש 3 3 2
ג/מא 1 1
חובין/מחשג 1 1
אלב 3 3

אל : הקונס"ל, ניו-יורק

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים
סיווג בטחוני : _____ בלמ"ס
דחיפות : _____ מידי
לשימוש } תאריך וזמן רישום: _____
מח' הקשר } מס. מברק : @ _____

אנא העבר מיידית לממוענים את המכתבים הרצ"ב. המקור בדיפ.

(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב).

אריה מקל/לשכת רה"מ

השולח : אריה מקל/לשכת רה"מ אישור מנהל מחלקה : _____
אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : _____ (לציון תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)
תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 28.3.88

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה :

הנושא :

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, March 27, 1988

Mr. Stanley Horowitz
President
United Jewish Appeal, Inc.
99 Park Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10016

Dear Mr. Horowitz,

I would like to thank you for all your help during our recent visit to the U.S.

I have no doubt that the receptive atmosphere at the meeting of the Young Leadership of the U.J.A. was largely due to your efforts. The meeting set the tone for the whole visit, and was invaluable in galvanizing support for the positions of the Government of Israel.

I hope we may always count on your friendship and on your untiring efforts on behalf of the State of Israel.

With best wishes for a happy Pesach and warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, March 27, 1988

Mr. Malcolm Hoenlein
Executive Director
Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Malcolm,


Thank you for your help and support during our recent visit to the U.S. It is good to know that we can count on your talent, hard work and devotion in trying times.

We were all particularly pleased by the excellent arrangements and good turn-out at the meeting of the Jewish Leadership on March 20th. I know your efforts had much to do with the supportive ambience and the excellent results.

With best wishes for a Kosher and happy Pesach and warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, March 27, 1988

Mr. Morris B. Abram
Chairman
Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Mr. Abram,

I would like to thank you for all your help before and during our recent visit to the U.S.


Your devoted, consistent support in these trying times, your deep understanding of our problems, and your eloquence in presenting Israel's case to the Administration and in the media have been invaluable to our national endeavor.

I hope we may always count on your friendship and extraordinary talents.

With best wishes for a happy Pesach and warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Yitzhak Shamir



17

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1030 26 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

1/2

626

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

פגישת שולץ - חברי מלי"פ.

להלן מכתבם של גילמן-לויז.

ערן

2 עתה 3 רחג 3 גשג 3 א/גנס 2 ביין 2 גצכו 1 ח/גהפ 2 גג 2

MEL LEVINE
27TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL
MAJORITY REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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122 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
TELEPHONE: 202-225-8461

DISTRICT OFFICE
8280 WEST CENTURY BOULEVARD
SUITE 447
LOS ANGELES, CA 90048
TELEPHONE: 213-410-8418
213-293-4135 (SANTA MONICA)

March 25, 1988

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We understand that it is your intention to meet with two members of the Palestine National Council (PNC) on Saturday, March 26. As you know, the PNC is the PLO's "parliament-in-exile."

While we want to reiterate our support for your efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process, we also wish to express our concern at what might be seen as an erosion of the U.S. position regarding the PLO. In our view, this is the time when all partners to the peace process should feel full confidence in past commitments made by the U.S. In particular, by written understanding--the September, 1975 agreement between the U.S. and Israel, and by law--pursuant to the 1985 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, the U.S. is prohibited from having contacts or negotiating with the PLO until that organization accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, accepts Israel's right to exist, and renounces terrorism.

We would therefore urge you not to do anything which might be construed as a weakening of this commitment which has been honored and restated consistently since 1975. Equally as important, we believe it unwise to take any steps which might jeopardize American credibility in the peace process at this especially sensitive point in time.

We hope you take these views into consideration in advance of your meeting.

Sincerely,



Mel Levine
Member of Congress



Ben Gilman
Member of Congress