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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד "קמ"

מס' תיק

ארכיון הקבוצה - מבקרים ואסירים

מלחמת יום הכיפורים בוייטנאם

מבוייטנאם

20.4.1982 - 21.4.1982

א. - 4160/6

מס' תיק מקורי



שם תיק: ארה"ב

4160/6-א

טווח פיוז

טווח פרייט R0006735

תאריך הדפסה 16/07/2020

כתובת: 3-312-1-6-3

מחלקה לתיעום מנה"ס

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דפ... מתוך... דפים  
סוג כתיבה...  
תאריך וז"ח: 1126 30 אפריל  
סט' מברק... 504/369

אל: המסרד + עטדקט

אלה

מצ"א, ממ"ד; דע: לשכת שהביט  
פגישה הייכ אבן עם סגן שר ההגנה קרלוצי.

1. במהלך הפגישה הצטרף ויינברגר לדקות ספורות לשיחה. מצידנו נכחו הנספח הצבאי, הציר והחיים.  
קרלוצי פתח בדברי נימוסין והתייחס לכך שויינברגר לא ביקר מעולם בארץ. ויינברגר מעונין בקיום בקור כזה ומקנה לו עדיפות גבוהה. על אף הבקורת המזעמעת בקונגרס על נסיעותיו ההכופות של ויינברגר, מצפה הנ"ל להזדמנות נאותה לערוך בקור זה. קרלוצי סקר בקצרה בעיות החקציב המעטיקות רבות את משרדו והדגיש כי חקציב הנטחון האמריקני חשוב גם להגנה העולם החופשי.

2. בהשבה לשאלת קרלוצי על הלכי הרוח בארץ בעקבות הנסיגה מסיני השיב אבן שישנו מצוי certain ambivalence. קיימת תחושה של השגיות על השלום עם מצרים. מאידך מחיר השלום גדול ומכאיב. אנו ויתרנו על נכסים ממשיים שעה שהמצרים ויתרו במישור הסמלי. אין להתעלם גם מהטראומה הנעוצה בשיבה אל מרחב המוקטן. אבן הביע תקווה כי מצרים תבין את ישראל. מעל כל חשוב שתהיה חקופה שקטה לפני שנגשים הלאה. קרלוצי שאל לגבי סיכויי ההסדר בגדמ"ע. אבן הצביע על קושי במציאת פתרון קבוע. חשוב לפתח דפוסי דו-קיום בשלום. יתרונו של תהליך קמפ-דוויד בכך שמאפשר לדחות החלומות של כל צד לגבי הפתרון הקבוע. הוא מספק גם תמריץ לצדדים לבדוק שוב את עמדתם ולצאת ברעיונות והצעות חדשות.

3. בהמשך עמד אבן על ההבנה הטובה עם ארה"ב לגבי סוגיות אסטרטגיות. קרלוצי הסכים עם קביעה זו והוסיף שהוא שמח לשמוע זאת מפי ישראל. ביוזם לנוכח התמקדות התקשורת על חלוקי הדעות שבין שתי המדינות. קרלוצי שאל ראינו מידה ההתנחלויות עשויות להיות מכשול בתהליך השלום. האם ישראל תתקשה לפנות אנשים מישוביהם. אבן הצביע על התאפקות של הממשלה בתקופת נהול המו"מ עם מצרים. לדעתו, המפתח בידי הצד הערבי. ישראל מוכנה לויתורים למען השלום. כמו כן יתכן מצב בו קביעת גבול אין פירושה בהכרח הזנת אנשים מנתיהם.

4. קרלוצי שאל כיצד ישראל מתייחסת למלחמה בין עירק לאירן. אבן איפיון ההתפתחויות במפרץ כ win-win situation. עם זאת, לדעת אבן עירק מציבה איום מוחשי וקרוב יותר לישראל. קרלוצי ציין כי ארה"ב נקטה ניוטוליות, אולם נצחון אירן מדאיג את ארה"ב. ארה"ב הגזימה ביכולתה של עירק לנצח את אירן. במהלך המלחמה הוכיחו המשמר



המהפכניים של אירן כושר להימח בולט.

א. ארגון כאלה, סמליות, יחידות, אשר הוקמו ופעלו חוס הגולו, ציין כי הגישה השח

6. אבן עמד על מחויבות ישראל לתהליך קמפ-דויד. ויינברגר הדגיש כי כולם מחויבים לקמפ-דויד. ציין את מאמצי ריגאן אשר הצליח לשכנע הסעודים להחזיר במספר חלבונים ולהניא הסורים מלהזיז טילים נוספים ללבנון. ויינברגר הדגיש כי הנשיא מעונין בכינון שלום בכל אזור המזרחית. אכן שלל מדינה אש"פית אשר תהווה בסיס סובייטי ומקור לאי יציבות. הביע חקווה שארה"ב תערב את ירדן במו"מ. ויינברגר מסכים עם הצורך לערב את ירדן במו"מ. לכן חשוב שירדן תראה בארה"ב מדינה ידידותית. ארה"ב זקוקה לידידות רבות במזרחית. אין זה על חשבון ידידותנו עם ישראל, אלא בנוסף לכך. ויינברגר טען כי הנו שואב עידוד מכך שממשלת ירדן מבינה עמדת ארה"ב בנדון ולא מערערת על כך שהגברת הידידות עמה לא חיעשה על חשבון ישראל.

7. סוגיית מכירות הנשק לערבים הועלתה במהלך חילופי הדברים. אבן הצביע על כך שעמדת ישראל לגבי מכירות אלו נקבעת ע"י גישה הערבים כלפיה. קרלוצי ציין כי לירדן צרכים בטחוניים לגיטימיים. כך למשל ירדן מודאגת מסוריה. ויינברגר הוסיף כי גם אירן מצויה איום לירדן. לדברי ויינברגר עליונותה הצבאית של ישראל בלתי מעוררת. ארה"ב מחויבת באופן מלא לבטחונה של ישראל ותמלא את כל התחייבותיה כלפיה.

8. אחרי עזיבת ויינברגר חזר קרלוצי והדגיש כי ארה"ב מעונינת לחזור ליחסים נורמלים מלאים. הדגיש כי ישראל הפתיעה מדי פעם את הממשל, דבר שסיבך את מאמצו לעבוד עם הערבים המתונים ולערבם בתהליך השלום. ארה"ב לא יכולה להכתיב מדיניות לישראל, שהינה מדינה רבנית. הקושי שלנו נעוץ בעובדה שהערבים מסרבים להאמין שלארה"ב יכולה מוגבלת להשפיע על ישראל. אבן הוסיף כי התייעצויות מוקדמות עם ארה"ב לגבי פעולות מסוימות היו מביכות את ארה"ב ולכן מוטב להמנע מכך.

קני-טלק 11

סוף סוף... כהן סאהי טפא אונכא אבנא ללרנא אה  
(ס אבן רובינשטיין)



4) פתח מחשבים 2 ב 2  
 אל. פו נר 504 מוס

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 01... טלפון...  
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 דחיפות...  
 תאריך רז"ח: 504/369  
 מס' מברק... 504/369

המהפכניים של אירן כושר לחימה בולט.

5. אבן העלה תהליכים והסדרים אשר הוקפאו בעקבות חוק הגולן. ציין כי הגיעה העת לשים קץ לצעדי הענישה (punitive approach) חשוב לחזור בהקדם האפשרי לעסקים כרגיל ולהפטיר את מזכר ההכנה. ויינברגר, אשר הצטרף לשיחה, השיב כי זו *Sage approach*, אולח לא פירט. ויינברגר סיפר על עומס עבודתו ורצונו לבוא לבקור בישראל, דבר אשר הועלה בשיחות קודמות עם ארנס והנספת. סיפר כי בתאום עם הייג הוחלט שלא לערוך בקור בארץ, במסגרת נסיעתו לכנס נאט"ו. ויינברגר מבין חשיבות בקור ראשון בארץ ומקוה שבקיץ הדבר יצא לפועל.

6. אבן עמד על מחוייבות ישראל לתהליך קמפ-דוויד. ויינברגר הדגיש כי כולם מחוייבים לקמפ-דוויד. ציין את מאמצי ריגאן אשר הצליח לשכנע הסעודים להתערב במסבר הלבנוני ולהניא הסורים מלהזיז טילים נוספים ללבנון. ויינברגר הדגיש כי הנשיא מעונין בכינון שלום ככל אזור המזה"ת. אבן שלל מדינה אש"פית אשר תהווה בסיס סובייטי ומקור לאי יציבות. הביע תקווה שארה"ב תערב את ירדן במו"מ. ויינברגר מסכים עם הצורך לערב את ירדן במו"מ. לכן חשוב שירדן תראה בארה"ב מדינה ידידותית. ארה"ב זקוקה לידידות רבות במזה"ת. אין זה על חשבון ידידותנו עם ישראל, אלא בנוסף לכך. ויינברגר טען כי הנו שואב עידוד מכך שממשלת ירדן מבינה עמדת ארה"ב בנדון ולא מערערת על כך שהגברת הידידות עמה לא תיעשה על חשבון ישראל.

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8. אחרי עזיבת ויינברגר חזר קרלוצי והדגיש כי ארה"ב מעונינת לחזור ליחסים נורמלים מלאים. הדגיש כי ישראל הפחיעה מדי פעם את הממשל, דבר שסיבך את מאמציו לעבוד עם הערבים המתונים ולערבם בתהליך השלום. ארה"ב לא יכולה להכתיב מדיניות לישראל, שהינה מדינה רבונת. הקושי שלנו נעוץ בעובדה שהערבים מסרבים להאמין שלארה"ב יכולה מוגבלת להספיע על ישראל. אבן הוסיף כי התייעצויות מוקדמות עם ארה"ב לגבי פעולות מסויימות היו מביכות את ארה"ב ולכן מוטב להמנע מכך.

קני-טלפון

מנהל מ/שירות רה"ב ארה"ב מ/שירות רה"ב ארה"ב  
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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 1982 (408)

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HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REJECTS FOREIGN AID REQUESTS --

THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA APRIL 29 ALTERED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1983 REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS REQUESTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983 1.083 BILLION DOLLARS, WHICH EXCEEDS LAST YEAR'S LEVEL. THE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST, HELD SPENDING LEVELS TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVELS.

REPRESENTATIVE HOWARD VOLPE, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE, STATED THAT THE "SUBCOMMITTEE'S ACTIONS TODAY REFLECT OUR DEEP CONCERN THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS TRYING TO ADDRESS AFRICA'S PROBLEMS THROUGH EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON MILITARY AND SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE. IN ITS LAST TWO

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BUDGET REQUESTS FOR AFRICA, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED A 300 PERCENT INCREASE IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND A 200 PERCENT INCREASE IN SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE HAS VIRTUALLY STAGNATED AND HAS ACTUALLY DECLINED FROM LAST YEAR'S PROPOSALS. EQUALLY ALARMING IS THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC LAW 480



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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 29, 1982 (ARM)

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REJECTS FOREIGN AID REQUESTS --

THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA APRIL 29 ALTERED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1983 REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS REQUESTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983 1.683 BILLION DOLLARS, WHICH EXCEEDS LAST YEAR'S LEVEL. THE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST, HELD SPENDING LEVELS TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVEL.

REPRESENTATIVE HOWARD WOLFE, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE, STATED THAT THE "SUBCOMMITTEE'S ACTIONS TODAY REFLECT OUR DEEP CONCERN THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS TRYING TO ADDRESS AFRICA'S PROBLEMS THROUGH EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON MILITARY AND SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE. IN ITS LAST TWO

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BUDGET REQUESTS FOR AFRICA, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED A 200 PERCENT INCREASE IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND A 200 PERCENT INCREASE IN SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE HAS VIRTUALLY STAGNATED AND HAS ACTUALLY DECLINED FROM LAST YEAR'S PROPOSALS. EQUALLY ALARMING IS THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC LAW 98



FOOD ASSISTANCE WHICH HAS DROPPED BY 50 PERCENT FROM TWO YEARS AGO."

WOLPE FURTHER STATED THAT "THESE ARE ALARMING TRENDS, ALARMING BECAUSE THEY IGNORE BASIC AND VERY FUNDAMENTAL AFRICAN REALITIES. AFRICA'S PROBLEMS ARE PRINCIPALLY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IN ORIGIN. THEY ARE NOT, FOR THE MOST PART, MILITARY AND SECURITY RELATED. TO GIVE ENHANCED EMPHASIS TO MILITARY OVER ECONOMIC AID IN RESPONDING TO AFRICA'S PROBLEMS WILL NOT ADVANCE AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. ON THE CONTRARY, MILITARY SALES WILL ONLY INCREASE THE DEBT BURDEN OF MANY AFRICAN NATIONS, DIVERT SCARCE RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS AND, IN SOME

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INSTANCES, INVOLVE AND IDENTIFY THE U.S. IN CONTENTIOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS."

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED AN INCREASE IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO TUNISIA FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVEL OF 85 MILLION DOLLARS TO A FY 1983 LEVEL OF 140 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PLACING AN EARMARK TO ENSURE THAT 85 MILLION DOLLARS IS AN ABSOLUTE CEILING ON THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT COULD BE PROVIDED TO TUNISIA.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED AN INCREASE IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO MOROCCO FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVEL OF 30 MILLION DOLLARS TO A FY 1983 LEVEL OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PLACING AN EARMARK ESTABLISHING A CEILING OF 50 MILLION DOLLARS ON FMS CREDITS TO MOROCCO. THE 50 MILLION DOLLARS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AN OFF-LINE BUDGET ITEM.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PROHIBITING U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS AND TRAINING SPECIFICALLY FOR THE WAR IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM

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VISITING MILITARY ZONES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA.

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Handwritten initials and a diagonal line.

FOOD ASSISTANCE WHICH WAS DROPPED 50 PERCENT FROM TWO YEARS AGO.

VOLPE FURTHER STATED THAT "THESE ARE ALARMING TRENDS, ALARMING BECAUSE THEY IGNORE BASIC AND VERY FUNDAMENTAL AFRICAN REALITIES. AFRICA'S PROBLEMS ARE PRINCIPALLY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IN ORIGIN. THEY ARE NOT, FOR THE MOST PART, MILITARY AND SECURITY RELATED. TO GIVE ENHANCED EMPHASIS TO MILITARY OVER ECONOMIC AID IN RESPONDING TO AFRICA'S PROBLEMS WILL NOT ADVANCE AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. ON THE CONTRARY, MILITARY SALES WILL ONLY INCREASE THE DEBT BURDEN OF MANY AFRICAN NATIONS, DIVERT SCARCER RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS AND, IN SOME

PAGE 83 -- CONGRESSIONAL

INSTANCES, INVOLVE AND IDENTIFY THE U.S. IN CONTENTIOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS."

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED AN INCREASE IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO TUNISIA FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVEL OF 85 MILLION DOLLARS TO A FY 1983 LEVEL OF 148 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PLACING AN EARMARK TO ENSURE THAT 85 MILLION DOLLARS IS AN ABSOLUTE CEILING ON THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE THAT COULD BE PROVIDED TO TUNISIA.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAD PROPOSED AN INCREASE IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO MOROCCO FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 1982 LEVEL OF 58 MILLION DOLLARS TO A FY 1983 LEVEL OF 106 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SUBCOMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PLACING AN EARMARK ESTABLISHING A CEILING OF 58 MILLION DOLLARS ON FMS CREDITS TO MOROCCO. THE 58 MILLION DOLLARS WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AN OFF-LINE BUDGET ITEM.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT PROHIBITING U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS AND TRAINING SPECIFICALLY FOR THE WAR IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM

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VISITING MILITARY ZONES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA.





משרד החוץ  
המרכז למחקר  
מדיני



בלמים

ירושלים, ז' באייר, תשמ"ב  
30 באפריל, 1982

15/82

ט"ז

אלג'יריה - ארה"ב

בחודשים האחרונים רבו השמועות, בחלקן מגמתיות, על פתיחות גדולה יותר של אלג'יריה כלפי המערב בכלל וארה"ב בפרט. נרמז שאלג'יריה נעשתה פחות קיצונית, מה גם שאינה בין המוכילות בחזית הסירוב.

הכתבה הבאה, שהופיעה בעתון האלג'יראי אלמוג'אהיד, הינה הוכחה נוספת ל"יציבותה" הרדיקלית של אלג'יריה. לא זו בלבד שהיא עוינת את מרוקו כתמיד, אלא שכל התקרבות של מרוקו או חוניסיה לארה"ב - מתקבלת באלג'יריה כחגובה חריפה ביותר.

כתבת אלמוג'אהיד, יותר מאשר היא משמיצה את מרוקו ומאשימה אותה באובדן עצמאותה לאימפריאליזם האמריקני, חוקפת את מדיניות ארה"ב.



בהסכם שנחתם ב-19.4.66 קבלו האמריקנים זכות שימוש בשדות התעופה "כמקרה שהמצב הבינלאומי יתדרדר".

התוקפנות האמריקנית נחלשה במקצת לאחר תבוסתה הצבאית בויטנאם. עם הגיעו לשלטון של רייגן הקשור למפעלי תעשייה צבאית, התעוררו מחדש השדים הקדמונים. ענין מיוחד מוענק למרוקו. רייגן ממנה כשגריר ארצו ברבאט אח ג'וזף ריד, לשעבר סגן נשיא צ'ייס מנהטן בנק" ויד ימינו של דוד רוקפלר, אחד המנהיגים של הלובי הציוני בארה"ב. לאחר מכן אנו עדים למצעד ענק של אישים שהגיעו למרוקו: וינברגר, גהרל ורטון ולטר, פרנסיס ווסט, האדמירל בובלי אימן ולכסוף מזכיר המדינה הייג. בביקורו של הייג נחתם הסכם צבאי בין מרוקו לבין ארה"ב והוחלט להפעיל מחדש הבסיסים של קניטרה ושל סידי יחיה. כדי להציל את כס מלכותו, המלך חסן השני איננו רק מחסל את ארצו ע"י שלטון חסות של ארה"ב, אלא מגביר את הסכנה המאיימת על העולם הערבי. מטרת בסיסים אלה היא להגן על היתרונות של ארה"ב ושל ישראל כאחד. צעד זה של המלך לא מפתיע אותנו, כאשר יודעים שהוא היה אחד הפעילים המרכזיים כשיחות הסכמי ק.ד.

מה מקבל המלך כתמורה?

גוזף ריד, השוכן למעשה בארפון המלכותי, לא מסתיר את מטרת ארה"ב באומרו "אנו נעייין מחדש במדיניותנו בצפון אפריקה". הנשק האמריקני יופעל לחיזוק המלכות המרוקאית. וינברגר מגדיר מטרה נוספת: "קנה המידה של ארה"ב למכירת נשק הוא כי נשק זה יסייע לבטחון הלאומי של ארה"ב".

כאשר אנו יודעים בוודאות שבמדיניות הערבית שלהם, ראשי השלטון של ארה"ב מערבבים לעיתים קרובות את בטחון ארה"ב ובטחון ישראל. אנו מבינים היטב את המשחק של חסן השני, מעבר לסכסוך הסהרה המערבית. בעוד שממשל קרטז היה מראה ניטראליות מדומה, הרי שממשל רייגן משחק את הקלף של ההתפשטות המרוקאית,

באדיס אבבה, בוועידת שרי החוץ של אח"א (פברואר 82) הפעילו דיפלומטים אמריקנים לחצים עצומים עד כדי סחיטה כספית על משלחות אפריקניות, על מנת לאלצן לעזוב את הוועידה. וכך לטרפד את קבלת הרפובליקה הערבית הדמוקרטית הסהראוית למסגרת אח"א. הלחצים ממשיכים גם כיום.

מדיניות זו של תלות, של שלטון תחת חסות, איננה מבשרת טובות לעתיד מרוקו. הדוגמא של ארצות אמריקה הלטיבית מלמדת אותנו לקח.

אך נכון, כי בשביל המלך חסן השני גורל העם המרוקאי הוא אחרון בדאגותיו. הלא אמר באחד מראיונותיו במסיבת עיתונאים, שהיה מוכן להקריב 2/3 מעמו כדי לחזק את כס מלכותו.



## סכנה ושמה רייגן - מרוקו תחת שלטון חסות

כחכה של העתונאי טאיב בלגיש. אל מוגאהיד (אלג'יריה) 25.4.

שלטון רבאט טובע יותר ויותר בקערה האמריקאית עד כדי חיסול עצמאותה של מרוקו המוגבלת ממילא. על מנת להדגיש חסות זו של וושינגטון, הגיעה לפאז משלחת צבאית אמריקנית, בראשות סגן מזכיר המדינה לענייני כטחון, ווסט, כדי להשתתף בוועידה המעורבת מרוקו-ארה"ב שתתחיל השבוע את עבודתה. המשלחת האמריקנית מונה כ-80 איש.

ארה"ב מצפה להפוך את צפון אפריקה למדורה, ובעת ובעונה אחת לחסל את התנגדות העם הסהראוי במאבקו לעצמאות.

שגריר ארה"ב ברבאט הודיע, כי ממשלתו הגישה לקונגרס בקשה להגדלת הסיוע הצבאי למרוקו לשנת הכספים 83, מ-45 מיליון דולר כיום ל-100 מיליון דולר. המלך חסן השני יגיע בחודש מאי לארה"ב כדי לחתום על ברית אסטרטגית בין מרוקו לבין ארה"ב.

ברית זו לא הייתה יוצאת דופן לולא הסכנה לעולם הערבי כולו. מדיניות ההתפרסות הצבאית האמריקנית בכל הכיוונים שעליה החליט ממשל רייגן, מעניקה חשיבות מיוחדת לאזור זה של העולם. המטרה היא להקים שורה של בסיסים ומשלטים לצבא האמריקני, כדי לכתר ולנטרל את העולם הערבי. במזרח התיכון יש כבר לאסטרטגיה זו תוצאות מדאיגות. בצפון אפריקה הדברים מתפתחים כמעט באותה צורה.

ועדה צבאית מעורבת תוניסיה-ארה"ב הוקמה לא מכבר. ארה"ב מעונינת לקבל מתקנים צבאיים בבסיס הימי של ביזרט. אך המוקד של האסטרטגיה הצבאית-מדינית האמריקנית במגרב הוא ללא ספק מרוקו. בנוסף לג'יברלטר והצטרפותה הקרובה של ספרד לברית האטלנטית, תפעיל ארה"ב יחד עם מרוקו פיקוח כללי באגן המערבי של הים התיכון, כאשר מרוקו היא האחוזת העיקרית של ארה"ב. למרוקו תפקיד מיוחד במדיניות החוץ של ארה"ב. כזכור, לאחר סירוב גרמניה המערבית לשמש כבסיס גשר, הסכימה מרוקו להיות הגשר האווירי להובלת נשק אמריקני לצבא ישראל במלחמת אוקטובר 73, למרות שחיילי מרוקו לחמו בגולן.



(TEXT) HAIG STATEMENT ON FALKLANDS CRISIS (1,200)

U.S. SUSPENDS AID TO ARGENTINA

*LJK*

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES HAS SUSPENDED FOUR TYPES  
OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA FOLLOWING  
THAT COUNTRY'S NON-ACCEPTANCE OF A U.S. COMPROMISE PROPOSAL  
AIMED AT PEACEFULLY RESOLVING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS.

SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ANNOUNCED APRIL 30 THAT PRESIDENT



200

(TEXT) HAIG STATEMENT ON FALKLANDS-CRISIS (1,282)

U.S. SUSPENDS AID TO ARGENTINA

SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ANNOUNCED APRIL 28 THAT PRESIDENT  
 AIMED AT PEACEFULLY RESOLVING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS.  
 THAT COUNTRY'S NON-ACCEPTANCE OF A U.S. COMPROMISE PROPOSAL  
 OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA FOLLOWING  
 WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES HAS SUSPENDED FOUR TYPES



REAGAN ALSO HAS DIRECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES "RESPOND POSITIVELY" TO BRITISH REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR ITS FORCES BECAUSE "THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES."

HAIG STRESSED THERE WILL BE "NO DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT" IN THE BRITISH-ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLANDS, AND SAID THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO ASSIST THE TWO COUNTRIES IN FACILITATING "AN EARLY AND FAIR SETTLEMENT."

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF HAIG'S STATEMENT:

PAGE 82 --

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW AND DANGEROUS PHASE, IN WHICH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS LIKELY. I WOULD LIKE TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHAT WE HAVE DONE, AND WHY, AND WHAT WE MUST NOW DO.

WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 582. THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR:

-- AN END TO HOSTILITIES;

-- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS;

AND

--A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE.

THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BECAUSE THE STAKES IN HUMAN LIVES AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER REQUIRED IT. FROM THE OUTSET, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN GUIDED BY THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE COLLAPSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE COULD ONLY BRING CHAOS AND SUFFERING.

WE ALSO MADE THIS EFFORT BECAUSE THE CRISIS RAISED THE

PAGE 83 --

VITAL ISSUES OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY AT A TIME WHEN THE COMMUNIST ADVERSARIES SEEK POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON THE MAINLAND OF THE AMERICAS AND LATENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN MUCH OF THE HEMISPHERE CALL FOR UNITY AND THE RESOLUTE



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FALKLANDS, AND SAID THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO  
ASSIST THE TWO COUNTRIES IN FACILITATING "AN EARLY AND FAIR  
SETTLEMENT."

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF HAIG'S STATEMENT:

PAGE 52 --

(BEGIN TEXT)

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW AND  
DANGEROUS PHASE, IN WHICH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS  
LIKELY. I WOULD LIKE TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHAT WE  
HAVE DONE, AND WHY, AND WHAT WE MUST NOW DO.  
WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE THROUGH  
IMPLEMENTATION OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 206,  
THAT RESOLUTION CALLS FOR:

-- AN END TO HOSTILITIES;

-- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS;

AND

-- A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE.  
THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT BECAUSE  
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SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE COLLAPSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE  
COULD ONLY BRING CHAOS AND SUFFERING.

WE ALSO MADE THIS EFFORT BECAUSE THE CRISIS RAISED THE

PAGE 53 --

VITAL ISSUES OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY AT A TIME WHEN THE  
COMMUNIST ADVERSARIES SEEK POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON THE  
MAINLAND OF THE AMERICAS AND LATENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN  
MUCH OF THE HEMISPHERE CALL FOR UNITY AND THE RESOLUTE



DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE.

WE ACTED AS WELL BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PARTIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM IS OUR CLOSEST ALLY, AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT LOOKED TO US TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE HAVE ALSO RECENTLY DEVELOPED A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA, AS PART OF OUR SUCCESS IN REVITALIZING THE COMMUNITY OF AMERICAN STATES. PRESIDENT BALTIERI ALSO REQUESTED OUR INVOLVEMENT.

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, I PARTICIPATED IN MANY DAYS OF INTENSE DISCUSSION WITH THE PARTIES -- IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. OUR INITIAL AIM WAS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THOSE POSITIONS MIGHT BE RECONCILED. WE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE

PAGE 04 --

MERITS OF EITHER THE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE CLAIMS TO THE ISLANDS.

AS THE PROSPECTS FOR MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES AROSE, WE PUT FORTH AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL. IT REPRESENTED OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE TWO PARTIES COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT, AND WAS BASED SQUARELY ON OUR OWN PRINCIPLES AND CONCERN FOR THE RULE OF LAW.

WE REGARD THIS AS A FAIR AND A SOUND PROPOSAL. IT INVOLVES: A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES; WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES; TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS; ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-ARGENTINE INTERIM AUTHORITY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT; CONTINUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, WITH ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION; PROCEDURES FOR ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLANDS; AND A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON FINAL SETTLEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS.

WE HAD REASON TO HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD CONSIDER A SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSAL, BUT

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WE ADDED AS WELL BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE  
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ARGENTINA INFORMED US YESTERDAY THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT IT.

ARGENTINA'S POSITION REMAINS THAT IT MUST RECEIVE AN ASSURANCE NOW OF EVENTUAL SOVEREIGNTY, OR AN IMMEDIATE DE FACTO ROLE IN GOVERNING THE ISLANDS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SOVEREIGNTY.

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FOR ITS PART, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO AFFIRM THE NEED TO RESPECT THE VIEWS OF THE INHABITANTS IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS THUS FAR REFRAINED FROM ADOPTING MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE SEIZURE OF THE ISLANDS THAT COULD HAVE INTERFERED WITH OUR ABILITY TO WORK WITH BOTH SIDES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS POSITION. NOW, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE, WE MUST TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO UNDERSCORE THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. THE PRESIDENT HAS THEREFORE ORDERED:

-- THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA;

PAGE 26 --

-- THE WITHHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES;

-- THE SUSPENSION OF NEW EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES; AND

-- THE SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GUARANTEES.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES. THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE NO DIRECT U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

AMERICAN POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY OUR CONCERNS FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND OUR DESIRE TO FACILITATE AN EARLY AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN FINDING THE SETTLEMENT. A STRICTLY MILITARY OUTCOME CANNOT ENDURE OVER TIME. IN THE END, THERE



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PAGE 02 --

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120/10

WILL HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO THE  
INTERESTED PARTIES. OTHERWISE, WE WILL ALL FACE UNENDING  
HOSTILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

(END TEXT)

PAGE 07 --

ITEM

*26*



WILL HAVE TO BE A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO THE

INTERESTED PARTIES. OTHERWISE, WE WILL ALL FACE IMPENDING

HOSTILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

(END TEXT)

PAGE 27 --

ITEM

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טופס חברת גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

91 סתוד \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_  
 מיוון בטחוני: \_\_\_\_\_  
 רשימת רביל \_\_\_\_\_  
 30000 נאצי ויזי: \_\_\_\_\_  
 872/144 ס. כ. ק: \_\_\_\_\_

טאלי

אל : מצפ"א

57 : הסברה - ירושלים יושנגטון

מאת קונכ"ל ניו יורק

מטאל שערך מספר מדינהאן בקרב מידגס ניו יורקי בינואר האחרון מצביע שרוב הנשאלים  
 אינם תומכים במיזע צבאי של ארה"ב לישראל. זאת גילה השבוע הטנטור בפגישה עם  
 מנהיגים יהודיים בלונג איילנד. מדינהאן הזמין את המטאל בחברה פירטוסיים ומטאלים  
 רדזנר, בהסתמך על תוצאות המטאל טוען מדינהאן שאלה זו הוכנסה למטאל כדרך שיגרה  
 וכי הוא לא תאר לעצמו לקבל חשבה שלילית במספרים כה גדולים. תוצאות המטאל טראות  
 שבגיליים מעל 65 היחס הוא של 2 בעד מיזע נגד 1 הכתנגד בעוד שבקבוצה הגיל מתחת  
 ל-35 היחס הוא הפוך ואילו בקבוצה מתחת לגיל 30 היחס הוא של 3 שוללים סול 1 תוסך.  
 למסקנתו של מדינהאן הסיבה נעוצה בשיכתה השואה בקרב הגילאים הצעירים יותר.  
 לדברי הטנטור דואיינו 800 איש במטאל טלפוני והוא הטעים שתוצאות אלו נראות לו קרובות  
 למציאות ברחבי ארה"ב.

לביא

מה ש/טחה מה סוף ג/ט א/טא א/טא יפה הטחה א/טא  
 א/טא

לביא 30.4.82

חאריך: \_\_\_\_\_ חשולח: \_\_\_\_\_  
 חאריך: \_\_\_\_\_ חשולח: \_\_\_\_\_



NESA-518 (4/30/82)

ck

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ARGENTINA REJECTS FALKLANDS PLAN; U.S. AID CUT (1,300)  
BY RUSSELL E. DYBVIK  
USICA DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES SUSPENDED FOUR FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA APRIL 30 FOLLOWING THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF AN AMERICAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE WITH BRITAIN.

THE ACTION WAS ANNOUNCED BY SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ONLY HOURS AFTER BRITAIN IMPOSED A TOTAL BLOCKADE OF THE FALKLANDS AND LESS THAN TWO DAYS AFTER THE UNITED STATES RECEIVED WHAT ONE SENIOR OFFICIAL TERMED "A VERY, VERY CLEAR TURNDOWN" OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS IN A WRITTEN NOTE FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

AT THE SAME TIME, HAIG SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DIRECTED THE UNITED STATES TO "RESPOND POSITIVELY TO REQUESTS FOR MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR BRITISH FORCES."

PAGE 02 -- HAIG LEAD

BOTH HAIG AND THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THERE WILL BE NO DIRECT UNITED STATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRISIS.

"THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS IS ABOUT TO ENTER A NEW AND DANGEROUS PHASE, IN WHICH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IS LIKELY," HAIG SAID IN A FORMAL, TELEVISED STATEMENT.

"AMERICAN POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY OUR CONCERNS FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND OUR DESIRE TO FACILITATE AN EARLY AND FAIR SETTLEMENT," HAIG SAID. "THE UNITED STATES REMAINS READY TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. A STRICTLY MILITARY OUTCOME CANNOT ENDURE OVER TIME."

SPEAKING TO A GROUP OF VISITING EDITORS FROM THE AMERICAN MIDWEST AT THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID: "WE ARE



WASA-218 (A230882)

ARGENTINA REJECTS FALKLANDS PLAN; U.S. AID CUT (1,288)

BY RUSSELL E. DYBVIK

USICA DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

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HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD DONE ALL IT COULD TO  
FACILITATE SUCH A SOLUTION, BUT ADDED THAT "THERE ARE STILL  
DISCUSSIONS GOING ON AT THE UNITED NATIONS." AND THE  
PRESIDENT ADDED, "NEITHER SIDE WANTS VIOLENCE."

PAGE 03 -- HAIG LEAD

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MENTIONED, THE PRESIDENT SAID ANY SUCH MATERIEL WOULD BE  
PROVIDED UNDER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES ALREADY IN  
EFFECT.

IN HIS PREPARED STATEMENT, HAIG EXPLAINED WHAT THE UNITED  
STATES HAS DONE IN THE CRISIS AND WHY, AND WHAT IT MUST NOW  
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HE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE "A DETERMINED EFFORT  
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COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, WHICH CALLS FOR AN END TO  
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FALKLANDS AND A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

AT REAGAN'S DIRECTION, HAIG HELD "MANY DAYS OF INTENSE  
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"AS THE PROSPECTS FOR MORE INTENSE HOSTILITIES AROSE, WE  
PUT FORTH AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL," HAIG SAID, WHICH  
REPRESENTED "OUR BEST ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE TWO PARTIES COULD  
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HE SAID IT WAS "A FAIR AND A SOUND PROPOSAL" AND INVOLVED

PAGE 04 -- HAIG LEAD

A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH ARGENTINE AND  
BRITISH FORCES, TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS, ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-ARGENTINE INTERIM AUTHORITY TO  
MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT, CONTINUATION OF TRADITIONAL LOCAL  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS WITH ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION,  
PROCEDURES FOR ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
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IN LIGHT OF ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE, HAIG SAID, "WE MUST TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO UNDERSCORE THAT

PAGE 05 -- HAIG LEAD

THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONDONE THE USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES."

AS A RESULT, HE SAID, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ORDERED:

- THE SUSPENSION OF ALL MILITARY EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA;
- THE WITHHOLDING OF CERTIFICATION OF ARGENTINE ELIGIBILITY FOR MILITARY SALES;
- THE SUSPENSION OF NEW EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS AND GUARANTEES, AND
- THE SUSPENSION OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION GUARANTEES.

LATER THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THE SUSPENSION OF EXPORT-IMPORT BANK CREDITS WILL NOT AFFECT EXISTING LOANS TO ARGENTINA, WHICH TOTALLED MORE THAN 1,800 MILLION DOLLARS AS OF MARCH 31, 1982.

THE SUSPENSION OF CCC CREDIT GUARANTEES WILL AFFECT PROPOSED SALES OF ABOUT TWO MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, THE DEPARTMENT SAID. AS MUCH AS 5.9 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY RELATED EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA COULD BE AFFECTED BY

PAGE 06 -- HAIG LEAD

THE BAN ON MILITARY EXPORTS.

A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, BRIEFING REPORTERS UNDER GROUND RULES THAT HE NOT BE IDENTIFIED, SAID THE "FIRST



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BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA CAME ON MARCH 28 WHEN THE BRITISH  
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DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS CONTINUED WITH BOTH BRITAIN AND  
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CULMINATING IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION APRIL 1 BETWEEN  
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THE OFFICIAL SAID PRESIDENT GALTIERI STATED IT WAS "TOO  
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ARGENTINE FORCES ACTUALLY INVADED THE FALKLANDS ON APRIL  
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PAGE 87 -- HAIG LEAD

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, INCLUDING TRIPS TO LONDON AND BUENOS  
AIRES IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.

A SENIOR OFFICIAL TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE AMERICAN  
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43



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PAGE 07 -- HAIG LEAD

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PAGE 08 -- HAIG LEAD

DISPOSITION OF BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES AROUND THE FALKLANDS, BUT HE WARNED THAT "THE PROXIMITY OF THE FORCES IS NOW SUCH" THAT IF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WERE TO VIOLATE THE "SANITIZED" 200-MILE AREA EACH HAS DECLARED AROUND THE ISLANDS, "THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CLASH IS HIGH."

LATE IN THE DAY, THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICE SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG IS EXPECTED TO MEET WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM HERE IN WASHINGTON ON MAY 2.

PYM REPORTEDLY WILL ALSO CONFER WITH UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK WHILE HE IS IN THE UNITED STATES. ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER NICARNOR COSIA MENDEZ MET WITH U.N. OFFICIALS APRIL 30.

ITEM

NRSA-521 (4/30/82)

ADD CONGRESSIONAL REPORT (250)

SENATE PANEL HEARS NOMINEES FOR ARMS TALKS --

LOUIS FIELDS, JR., PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NOMINEE TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, REAFFIRMED APRIL 30 THAT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN "REMAINS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES."

HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT THE NECESSITY OF VERIFICATION MUST BE AT THE HEART OF THE PROCESS BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COULD CONSIDER BECOMING A PARTY TO SUCH A TREATY.

AT HIS CONFIRMATION HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FIELDS STRESSED THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IS REFLECTED IN THE FACT THAT ALL NUCLEAR STATES ARE REPRESENTED.

ALSO APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE WERE MANFRED EIMER, ASSISTANT-DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY; MAYNARD GLITMAN, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE,



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NEWS-521 (422682)

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א.א.א.

אל: המשרד

ס.ד.ס. ס.ד.ס.  
דף...!...מחור...דפים  
סוג בטחוני...סודי...  
דחיסות...פנייה...  
תאריך וז"ח...8212...  
מס' מברק...481

מצפ"א מרכז

סיחה עם R PELLETREAU מנהל המחלקה הסעודית במחמ"ד מז"ח

סעודיה ומלחמת המפרץ

לדברי פלטרו הסעודים פנו בימים אלה לארה"ב והציגו בפניה תפיסתם הכוללנית לגבי האיומים הנשקפים להם מהתפתחות צפויה של המצב במפרץ. ע"פ ראיהם, הם יעמדו בקרוב מול גוש מאיים מהצפון ומול חברי אמנת עאדן העויינת - מדרום. תפיסה זו מהבטת על ההנחה שאדם חוסיין עלול ליפול ותחת שלטונו יקום משטר שיעי ראדיקאלי. משטר זה ייפתח שת"פ חדוק עם הציר הסורי איראני ויחד עימו יפעלו נגד הממלכה והנסיכויות גם יחד. זוהי כאמור תפיסת הכיתור הסעודית. בווי ברור כי הדברים נאמרו ע"י הסעודים ע"מ לשכנע ארה"ב לתמוך בעיראק במלחמה נגד איראן. כמוכן, הוסיף, זו אינה מדיניות ארה"ב (?). מחמ"ד אינה מאמינה שיקום שלטון שיעי בעיראק ואף אם יקרה הדבר ספק רב אם סוריה, עיראק ואיראן תוכלנה למצוא מכנה משותף ולשתף פעולה לאורך ימים. מכל מקום ברור שהסעודים מודאגים מאוד ומחלקתו של פלטרו עסקה בימים אלה בהכנת הסברים ארוכים לריאד שמגמתם לפזר השעות הסעודים עקב החלטת ארה"ב לקנות נפט מאיראן.

ברור שהסעודים היו מעדיפים סיום מוקדם, ככל האפשר, של המלחמה. פלטרו לא שלל האפשרות כי בתנאים מסויימים ינסו הסעודים למצוא דרכים להידברות עם שליטי טהראן. אולם, לעת עתה, אין בידי מחמ"ד אינדיקציה כלשהי על צעדים בכוון זה מצד הסעודים ולדעתם שרוב שמו של אחד מהבולטים בבית המלוכה בפרשת הקטר באיראן, נראית כטימן להחרפת היחסים בין השניים.

סעודיה - מדינות ערב

יחסי ריאד דמטק הולכים ומתדרדרים. הסעודים אמנם שלמו התשלום האחרון במסגרת סיוע בגדאד אך רחזו/איימו שבכוונתם להפסיק תשלומים אלה בעתיד בגלל התנהגותה של סוריה ובמיוחד בגלל הצעדים שננקטו ע"י אסאד נגד עיראק. הסעודים רחזו גם כי יפעלו בקרב מדינות המפרץ להפסיק הסיוע לסוריה.



ט ו פ ס ס כ ר ק

דף... 2 מתוך 3 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך וז"ח

מס' מברק 481

אל:

לפני ימים אחדים נערכה ישיבה של מועצה המפרץ - בה הוחלט לשלוח נציג לדמשק כדי להבהיר אי שביעות רצונן של מדינות המפרץ מצעדיה של סוריה. כנראה התנהל עם ויכוח מי יטול תפקיד מטרת ההחלטות לדמשק: האם יהיה זה שהי"ח הסעודי או איטיות אחרת מהנסיכויות. לדעת פלטרו, בסופו של דבר לא יצא אף נציג והחלטות המועצה התסרנה לסורים בצורה מעורפלת "ומעודנת".

באשר לעתיד היחסי עם מצרים, הסביר כי נוכח מצבה של ריאה אין ספק כי הסעודים יהיו מעוניינים שעמדה מצרים לא תהיה עויינת כלפיהם. הקטיתי האם רק בכך מדובר והאם אין הסעודים שואפים להסתייע בקהיר- בדרך מדינית בעיקר- נוכח הסכנות הצפויות להם מכל עבר. השיב כי אכן שקל היטב הגדרתו והסביר כי נוכח הזהירות הסעודית ומשקעי העבר, אין, לעת עתה, לצפות ליותר ממה שתיאר קודם לכן.

סעודיה - והתליך המדיני

לדעת פלטרו, ספק רב אם הסעודים יודעים מה לעשות במצב הנוכחי ועוד פחות מכך אם הם מוכנים לנקוט ביוזמות משלהם בעתיד הנראה לעין. ההתייחסות לתכנית פאהד כתכנית ערבית מהקבלת כסימן לרצונם של הסעודים "לשמור מרחק" ולא ל"הגות" חכמת זו. ניתן לשער- וההתבטאויות הסעודיות בכלי התקשורת מאשרות זאת - כי הם מעוניינים מאוד בהחשך חהליך השלום ואם המצרים יצליחו להביא להסכם כלשהו ניתן להניח כי ריאה תברך על כך. אולם, רק בתנאי שגורם פלשתינאי, זה או אחר, יביע דעה חיובית על הסדר מסוג זה. הערתי על כך שפירוש הדבר הוא שעמדה סעודיה תוחניה בהסכמת אש"פ. השיב שקרוב לוודאי שזהו המצב עם זאת, יתכן שיימצא גורם פלשתינאי אחר שיתבטא בחיוב על הסכם מצרי-ישראלי-אמריקאי ואז יספק הדבר את ריאה. בכל מקום, צפויה עתה תקופה של המתנה סעודית כאשר כל צעד נוסף במישור הישראלי ערבי, מותנה מבחינת הסעודים- בהתפתחות המצב במפרץ ובמישור יחסי ריאה עם העולט הערבי.

התייחסות

במהלך לחימת צבא תימן נגד ההזית הדמוקרטית הצליח להשתלט על איזורים נרחבים, יחסית, והגיעו למצב בו מאיימים על קווי האספקה של ההזית לראד"ת. התנחה כאן שראד"ת לא הטבול התפתחות מצב כזה והפעל נגד הצבא התימני. למעשה כבר בשבוע הקודם נודע על התנקשות ראשונית כאשר ארסילוריה ראד"ת פתחה באש על עמדות צבא תימן בקרבת הגבול.

ט ד פ ס      ס ב ר ק  
 דפ... 3... מתוך 3... דפים  
 סוג בטחוני.....  
 דחיפות.....  
 תאריך וז"ח... 481  
 מס' מברק.....

אל:

הסעודים כמוכן פנו גם בעניין זה לארה"ב ודרשו עזרה רבתית לתימן ארה"ב הבהירה  
 שהיא נכונה לעזור אך אין בכוונתה "להכנס לעניין" בצורה מאסיבית. הסעודים מצידם  
 הגבירו סיועם לממשלת תימן וביקור הנסיך סולטאן בצנעה (במרץ) הסתיים במתן 300 מליון  
 דולר (רובו סיוע ישיר לתקציב התימני וחלקו לפרוייקטים כלכליים מוגדרים).

נפט וכספים

תפוקת הנפט הסעודית בחודש מרץ ירדה למוצע יומי של 6.9 מליון חביות ליום. זוהי  
 כמוכן נפילה דראסטית מרמות ייצוא קודמות. במחמ"ד נבחנה משמעות רמה תפוקה זו על  
 טענה הכספי של סעודיה ועל יכולתה לעמוד בהתחייבויותיה הטונות. מסקנתם היא שאם  
 בחודשים הקרובים ימשיכו הסעודים לייצא 6.3 - 6.6 מליון חביות ליום במחיר הנוכחי  
 (34 דולר לחבית) כי אז יוכלו לעמוד בהתחייבויותיהם. התקציב הסעודי בשנה הקרובה  
 נאמד ב- 94 בליון דולר. אמדן הסעודים לגבי התכנסות מייצוא נפט לשנת התקציב הנוכחית  
 הוא 83 בליון דולר. ההפרש בין הסכומים יכוסה מהכנסות שתגענה מהסקעות סעודיות שונות.  
 זוהי פעם ראשונה שהתקציב הסעודי אינו צופה עודפי הכנסות. לדעה מחמ"ד הסעודים יוכלו  
 להפריש כ- 5 בליון דולר לסיוע לגומרים שונים כאשר חלק הארי מסכום זה יינתן, כנראה,  
 לעיראק.

מ.ל.  
 מ ר ו ס

(Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page)



שגרירות ישראל - וזשינגטון

אלו: המשרד ירושלים

לתי

ס ר פ ס ס כ ד ק

דף... 1... מחורף... 4... דפים

סוג בסחוני. P. J. J. ...

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח. 291430 באפריל 82

מסי מברק... 483

מלכות המלך

מ צ פ " א .

ח"כ אבן נפגש היום במחמ"ד, בשתי חגישות נפרדות, עם המשנה למזכיר המדינה סטאסל ועם וליוטיס עוזר המזכיר. נכחו נחושטן והח"מ וקטוף מהדסק הישראלי.

הפגישה עם סטאסל

סטאסל סיפר בקיצור על שליחותו במז"ח ועל הרגשתו כי מצרים אינה מתכוונת לתזניח יחסיה החודיים עם ישראל. לדעתו, מובארק הינו Capable אך חסריט. לו כישוריו של סאדאת. לשאלת ח"כ אבן באם המצרים העריכו הטראומה שעברה על ישראל בנושא ימיה, השיב סטאסל כי אינו יודע בכך ולמעשה התמקדו בכעיוותיהם.

סטאסל העלה נושא דברי רח"מ על אי-פירוק ישובים בעתיד. ציין שהדברים יאם לומר המינימום, אינם מתיישבים עם רוח ק.ד. וכי ממשלת ארה"ב מודאגת.

ח"כ אבן הגיב כי עמדת מפלגתו הינה כי הישובים אינם בלתי-חוקיים אך עם זאת מפלגתו אינה רוצה לסגור אופציות. שאלת הישובים צריכה טיפול טלקטיבי ובמקרה הנוכחי עדיף להשאיר הנושא לא ברור ופתוח. ח"כ המשיך כי גדולת ק.ד. הינה בכך שההסדר הקבוע פתוח למו"מ עתידי. מאידך המצרים אינם מסתירים מה רצונם לגבי עתיד השטח לאחר חמש השנים. עם זאת, חוסר הסכמה לגבי העתיד אינו צריך לחסום הדרך להסכמה על משטר הביניים.

בתשובה לשאלה העיר סטאסל שארה"ב מתכוונת להפיק תגים חדשים בשיחות האוטונומיה ובעוד זמן קצר יהיו להם רעיונות לפגישה. ק.ד. הינה התכנית היחידה המוסכמת,

ט ו ס ס  
 דף...2...מתוך...9...דמים  
 סווג בטחוני...ס.ד.1...?  
 דחיפות.....  
 תאריך וז"ח.....  
 מס' מבוק...483

אין אחרת, וארה"ב דוגלת בה. שאלה שיש לפותרה הינה שאלת המיקום ויתכן וכדאי שכל הצדדים יתכנסו בווינגטון לפגישה ראשונה. באשר לירושלים יתכן ובעתיד כאשר הרוחות יצטננו מובארק יהיה מוכן לנטוע לירושלים.

ח"כ אבן העיר שהפלשהינאים בעבר תמיד דחו הצעות פשרה, ויותר מאוחר הצטערו על כך. לתגובת סטאטל כי ערפאת אינו מצליח לגבור על הקיצוניים בארגונו הגיב ח"כ אבן כי אם ערפאת גם מזדק וגם אימפוטנטי זה מפחית עוד יותר מרצונה של ישראל להפגש אתו ואין לנו כל אמון ב"מתינותו".

בתשובה לשאלה, ח"כ אבן הדגיש את חשיבות צירוף ירדן לתהליך השלום.

סטאטל שאל על כוואו הצפוי של רה"מ ביוני. נחושטן השיב כי רה"מ מעוניין להיות בעצרת בעת שהנשיא רייגן ינאם שם. סטאטל השיב כי מדובר במועד לאחר נסיעתו המתוכננת לבון. דהיינו באמצע יוני ואכן זה מועד מתאים.

הפגישה עם וליוטיס

בתשובה לשאלת ח"כ אבן חזר וליוטיס על מחויבות הממשל לק.ד. בציינו שמדובר, בנוסף לשיקולים אחרים, בהתחייבות הממשל הנוכחי אשר עם כינונה אמצה את ק.ד. לאחר reasonable breathing space וליוטיס מקווה שפיירבנקס יחזור לאזור, דהיינו בעוד מספר שבועות. הממשל מותקף על העדר יוזמה ביישוב הסכסוך במז"ח, ואף כי מחמ"ד מטבירה שהיתה פעילות נמשכת בתהליך השלום, אין זה מספק מבקרי הממשל. הדבר היחידי המעכב יציאתו של פיירבנקס הינו צורך הממשל להתארגן.

ח"כ אבן ציין שבנושא ה-SGA דעתו הינה כי יש לתת לרשות האוטונומיה גם הפקיד



ס ו ס ס  
 דף. ג. מתוך... א. דפים  
 סווג בסחונני...  
 דחיפות...  
 תאריך וז"ח...  
 מס' מברק... 483  
 שייחוס חסר  
 מלך

ייצוגי ולא רק אדמיניסטרטיבי. לדעתו המכשול העיקרי המונע התקדמות  
 באוטונומיה הינו התנגדות ירדן והפלסטינאים להצטרף למו"מ. וליוטיס הגיב  
 כי מדובר בשאלת התרנגולת והביצה והערבים טוענים שאינם מצטרפים מאחר  
 וחוכנית האוטונומיה הישראלית מהווה Facade לקיפוח ישראלי. כדי לצרפס  
 יש להחחיל להגיע לסיכומים. לדברי וליוטיס ירון להוטה עתה להתקרב למצרים  
 ומצרים מצליחה להחדיר מושגי השלום בפורומים בין-ערביים והם יעשו זאת במסגרת  
 ק.ד.

וליוטיס סיפר בקצרה על כך כי בנסיעתו לפני חודשיים לירדן ולמדינות המפרץ  
 גילו שומעיו התענינות רבה בנעשה בתהליך השלום והאוטונומיה. "התענינות" אך  
 לא "הסכמה". (ציין ששמח שדיווחיו על כך בארץ לא הודלפו).

לדברי וליוטיס התקופה הבאה של ששה ועד תשעה חודשים מהווה "Window of  
 Opportunity לגבי סיכויי התקדמות. סוריה כמעט והוציאה עצמה מהקהילה הערבית,  
 למצרים סיכוי טוב לחיזוק מעמדה, מדינות המפרץ חוששות מתסיסה סיעית בהשפעה  
 איראנית וגם מתסיסה בקרב האוכלוסיה הפלסטינאית, ומלחמת עיראק-איראן נמשכת.  
 לשאלת נחושתן באם אין חשש אצל מדינות המפרץ מחדירה סובייטית השיב וליוטיס  
 שחששם מתמקד באיראן ולכל היותר בהשש חדירה סובייטית באמצעות איראן. יתר על כן  
 לדבריו כוונת אף מתחילה לפזול לעבר בריה"מ.

לשאלת ח"כ אבן באשר לאפשרות שהערבים יעלו תכנית אלטרנטיבית לק.ד. הגיב  
 וליוטיס שהם לא מסוגלים להסכים על תכנית כלשהיא, וגם האירופאים נוטים עתה  
 לתמוך בק.ד.

סגרי רוח ישראל - ווטינגטון

אל:

ט ל פ ס      פ כ ר ק  
 דף.....<sup>4</sup> מתוך.....<sup>4</sup> דפים  
 סווג בטחוני..... ס ו ד י  
 דחופות.....  
 תאריך וז"ח.....  
 מס' מברק..... **483**

בתשובה לשאלת ה"כ אבן על נאומו של מאגיד השיב וליוטיס שהנאום לא אושר  
 על-ידי מובארק ולא על-ידי עלי.

וליוטיס טיים בציינו שלמעשה הסכם השלום ישראל-מצרים לקח עשר שנים עד  
 שהגיעו לסיומו המוצלח וצריכים אורך נשימה לגבי המסך תהליך ק.ד.

ס ב ל

סגרי רוח ישראל - ווטינגטון  
 ביכון ג'רמיה ילדויס דלדו ית אלל



ט ל פ ס ס כ ר ק

דל...מתוך...דפים

סוג בטחוני...?

דחיפות...לגיל

תאריך וז"ח...8242912

מס' מברק...474

מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

טל

מצפ"א מרכז

פרופ' קוואנט הופיע בקבלת הפנים בסגירות ודיבר במילים נלהכות על ביקורו המוצלח בארץ. היה ברור כי הוא מרוצה מאוד מתשומת הלב שהוקדשה לו במשה"ח ובמגעים האחרים שהיו לו עם גורמים שונים.

סיפר גם שלאחר פגישותיו בירושלים יצא ליו"ש ונפגש עם כמה מנהיגים פלשתינאים. (הזכיר רק אח שמו של א. פריג אך היה ברור שדיבר גם עם פלשתינאים אחרים). לדבריו, מצא דכאון מוחלט שבא לידי ביטוי בדברי הפלשתינאים עימם שוחח. הדעה השלטת גורסת כי ממשלת ישראל, במזקזק או במאוחר, תספח את יו"ש והפלשתינאים חסרי אונים לעצור תהליך זה. קוואנט התרשם כי האישים עימם דיבר היו מוכנים לקבל כל הסדר אשר יקל הלחץ המופעל עליהם עתה, ישים קץ להתנחלויות נוספות ביו"ש ויאפשר התארגנות פוליטית. כאשר נשאלו האם הם מוכנים למו"מ כלשהו עם ישראל תשובתם הייתה כי אינם יכולים לעשות זאת וזה יהיה הפקידן של מצרים, ירדן ואש"פ.

קוואנט ציין במיוחד כי שמע דעה הגורסת כי הפלשתינאים חייבים לשנות הטקטיקה עליהם לקבל ואף לשאוף לסיפוח יו"ש לישראל ולהתחיל להיאבק על זכויותיהם כאזרחי מדינה זו ולהשיג מטרותיהם "מתכננים". בעוד שדעה זו הובעה בלהט רב ע"י אחת הזמיות הסוכרות ביו"ש (לא נקב בשם) האחרים שנכחו בשיחה שללו גישה זו.

לדעת קוואנט הסיכויים להתקדם במסגרת שיחות האוטונומיה לא נראים לו מבטיחים. אינו הושב שהמצרים יהיו מוכנים לוותר על עמדותיהם. גם אינו רואה סיכוי כלשהו בשינוי העמדה הישראלית. מטיל ספק אם ממשל ריגן ירצה או יוכל להפעיל הלחצים הדרושים כדי לקרב עמדות הצדדים. כך שלאחר סיבובים אחדים של מו"מ עלול המאמץ - להשגת הסכם אוטונומיה - להגיע לקיצו.

A.O.  
מ ר ו ס

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name "A.O." and "מ ר ו ס".

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5647

נבנס

יד 10

אל: המשרד, נר: 218, מ: לונדון  
דח: ר. ס: ט, תא: 290482, רח: 1305  
נר: סודיה

טאה

10 דד/דגיל

אל: מירופה 2, זכר סצפא  
תא: מילוא, לונדון

סודיה

משיחות עם אנשי הפורום נכפ. ליום העצמאות ב-28:  
ספרו שפסקו גם בקרב הערבים להוצאת הסעיפים השליליים הרבים  
מתוך הצעה ההחלטה בעצרת החלום - פלסטין אך נתקלו בקיר אטום  
הם מתקשים להסביר הנוקשות ולדבריהם לא הוטילו איוונ"הם  
שישראל עלולה לשקול מתוך מעמד כוחות האוי"ם באזור. התחנות  
כירדן חוששות מסודיה ואילו הסורים מפגינים נסחון טעמי ניה  
עבריים מתקשים להסביר סיבותיו. לשאלתי אם להעדיפתם לסודים  
גיבוי סובייטי לכן השיבו שסטנקפים אך יסכן שהסורים ספרשים  
באורח מוטעה הכוללות הסובייטיות.  
ארה"ב-טרנ: אופונומיה

הופר מעגרה"ב מסר לי בקבלת הפנים שגארה"ב בלונדון רמן  
ל-28.4.1957 שאנדרים עדנ"ים 4 במספר, לא כולל סודיה  
וע"אק 1 במטרה להבהיר מחדש שארה"ב צמודה לקמפ-די"ד ובדומה  
לחדש המאמצים, יחד עם ישראל ומצרים לחידוש שיחות האוטונומיה  
הצמדיקאים רואים חשיבות בהבהרת מדיניות זו אם כי תכינוס  
שבפי השגריר האמריקאי לא יהיו חידושים לאורחיו בעניני סהות  
הופר הוסיף שארה"ב תמתיך להראת הודות בארץ בעקבות הפינוי  
לפי שתיגום חידוש המאמצים

פ: מהח, סטהח, רהח, סרהח, שהבט, מוכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, טמה, דס.  
אמן, מירא, מירב, סצפא



טופס מברק צפון

טופס מברק צפון

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_  
 מס' מברק: \_\_\_\_\_  
 מס' מברק: \_\_\_\_\_  
 מס' מברק: \_\_\_\_\_  
 מס' מברק: \_\_\_\_\_

אל: המשרד  
 ד: \_\_\_\_\_  
 מאח: נאו"ם

מברק

ארב"ל 2. פר"נ.  
 רוח"ם בעצרת פירוק הנשק.  
 סבקר.

- בעקבות הסיכום על הופעת רוח"ם בעצרת פירוק הנשק ב-18 ליוני נשאלתי ע"י ד"ר הובר ג'ק סקרן שוויצ'ר האם ישנהף באירוע מסעם (כ-28 ביוני). חשבתי כי אני מצטרף על השינוי שנבע מל"ז של הויכוח הכללי במליאת העצרת. הוספתי כי אין לי ספק כי רוח"ם מחטיב מאד את הזמנתם והאירוע שיזכרו, כפי שניתן היה לחבין מסכתבו אליהם.
- במהלך השיחה העלה ד"ר ג'ק את האפשרות כי בעת שהוהו בניו-יורק יקיים רוח"ם מבישה עם משלחת מסעם הקרן אשר תכלול גם כמה חתני פרס נובל לשלום. נראה לו כי יוכל לגייס את הלורד ויחנן גט'כמה נוספים מחתני הפרס לצורך הפבישה. Philip Noel-Baker שיכא בניו-יורק בזמן Noel - Baker הוא חתן פרס נובל לשלום מ-1959 והשתתף כנציג בריטניה בוועידה העולמית לפירוק נשק מסעם חבר האומות (1932-1954) - הוא פעל גיל 90. כותב ומסיף לפירוק נשק ומכונה לעיתים כ- Grand old man of disarmament הכתחתי לד"ר ג'ק להעביר את הרעיון לירושלים.
- מציעים לסקול באהדה את הרעיון מהטעמים הבאים:
  - חתייה זו מהווה מסעם רוח"ם לקרן שוויצ'ר על הזמנתם.
  - בראש וראשונה יהיה זה כחלק הסברתי שיתמקד בעובדה היות רוח"ם חתן פרס נובל לשלום והיחיד כיום מבין החתנים הנושא בתפקיד רשמי-מסלכתי.

נאו"ם

שהיה סוניה רהא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא אנא  
 סני/פרן

תאריך: 29.4.82 השולח: א. בקי  
 חתימה: \_\_\_\_\_

12/1

Jerusalem, April 29, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Please accept my deep gratitude for your good wishes on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of Israel's Declaration of Independence. It is wonderful, I would say even astonishing, that you have found the time to write this moving letter during your 24-hours-a-day preoccupation with a curious conflict which may yet cause hundreds, perhaps thousands, of casualties. I write on Thursday. Will tomorrow, somewhere in the south of the Atlantic Ocean, witness the beginning of a war? If it is prevented, that will be thanks to your ceaseless and, may I say, heroic efforts to bring about a peaceful solution. From afar, we have all been following your labors with great admiration.

Our 34th Independence Day was, despite all the anguish and the pain, a day of rejoicing for our people. They went out, en masse, to see our modern technology and to breathe the wonderful air of our blossoming groves. I had to stay home. But I rejoiced with our people, knowing that perhaps a historic period of peace has been granted to a <sup>majority</sup> ~~people~~ which has not enjoyed that blessing for the last fifty years, before and after our renewed statehood came into being.

May I tell you, dear Mr. Secretary, that your deputy, Mr. Stoessel, did a marvelous job during his stay in the region and his shuttle between Jerusalem and Cairo. To a great extent, it is to his credit that the infringements, which had been a great obstacle to the continuing implementation of the peace treaty, were corrected and removed, and that, at the last moment, a particular agreement was reached, albeit of minor significance.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for charging Mr. Stoessel with this important mission.

As for the future - and it is the future that is decisive - we shall, I hope, always work together, in the spirit of our sincere friendship, for the welfare of our two nations and, indeed, for the ideal of liberty to which we have consecrated our lives.


Alisa joins me in sending our best wishes to Mrs. Haig and to you. I hope we shall all meet in June, during the Disarmament Conference.

Yours sincerely,

Menachem Begin

The Honorable  
Mr. Alexander Haig  
Secretary of State of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.





Jerusalem, April 29, 1982

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for your moving letter.

May I disclose to you that I intended to come out to Ben-Gurion Airport in order to see you off and to thank you for all you have done, so magnificently, for the cause of understanding and peace. Now I have no option but to express to you our gratitude in writing.

You showed not only great diplomatic skill: that is natural, considering your long and unique experience. But - what is more important - you won the hearts of all those who had the privilege to work with you, to listen to your quiet, persuasive words and to sense the goodwill you showed constantly during the important talks that took place here.

Now we are moving into the 35th year of our independence. We hope and pray that it will be a year of peace, the first year of an era of "No more war, no more bloodshed."


Thank you again, dear Mr. Secretary, for all your endeavors.

Yours sincerely,

*Menachem Begin*  
Menachem Begin

The Honorable  
Mr. Walter Stoessel  
Deputy Secretary of State of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.





טגירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המטרד

א.ל.

ט ו ט ס

דף...!...מחור...4...דפים

סוג בטחוני...שמו

דחיפות

תאריך וזיית 29 1330 אפריל 82

מסי מברק...462

מס' מברק

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

נשק למצרים.

רצ"ב ההודעה לקונגרס בדבר אספקת 300 טילי AIM 9-L למצרים.

קני-טל

קני

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, partially illegible.

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462

DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 Apr 293

26 APR 1982

In reply refer to:  
I-12515/81ct

Honorable Jamie L. Whitten  
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 82-56 and under separate cover the classified annex thereto. This Transmittal concerns the Department of the Navy's proposed Letter of Offer to Egypt for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$34 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media of the unclassified portion of this Transmittal.

Sincerely,

JAMES H. ANMANN  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF  
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

Attachments

Separate Cover:  
Classified Annex

/

4 JAN 3 93 462

Transmittal No. 82-56

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Egypt
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment*	\$23 million
Other	\$11 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$34 million</b>
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
Three hundred AIM-9L SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles with 30 training missiles, repair parts, and support equipment.
- (iv) Military Department: Navy (AAD)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:  
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Included in report for quarter ending 31 December 1981.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 26 APR 1982

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.



4 Jan 4 93

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POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Arab Republic of Egypt - AIM-9L SIDEWINDER Missiles

The Government of Egypt has requested the purchase of 300 AIM-9L SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles with 30 training missiles, repair parts, and support equipment at an estimated cost of \$34 million.

This proposed sale will contribute significantly to U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to increase the security of a friendly country of vital interest to the United States.

The Government of Egypt will use the AIM-9L SIDEWINDER missiles on Egyptian Air Force (EAF) F-16 aircraft already being procured. The missile has the capability of a head-on attack against high speed hostile aircraft, enhancing the ability of the EAF to deter or destroy attacking aircraft before they can reach vital areas of the country. EAF personnel will be able to absorb this missile into the inventory inasmuch as they already operate and maintain earlier AIM-9 series missiles.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region. Israel has purchased the AIM-9L missile and Saudi Arabia is considering a similar purchase.

The prime contractor will be either the Raytheon Company of Lowell, Massachusetts, or Aeronutronic Ford of Newport Beach, California.

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment to Egypt of any additional U.S. Government personnel. Two contractor representatives will be required in Egypt for a period of two years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.



סגרירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

אל: המשרד

אכט

ט ו פ ס ס כ נ י  
דפ...1...סחוך...5...דפים  
סוג בטחוני...אטר...  
דחיפות...  
תאריך וזיחה 1.3.25. 29 אפריל, 82  
מס' מברק...464

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

סטוסי L-100 לעירק - עדכון.

1. אתמול נשלח לנשיא המכתב המצורף בחתימת 35 סנטורים. יצויין כי אם ה *deadline* היה מוארך אפשר היה לחשיג 50 חתימות. בחירת תאריך היעד נעשתה בכדי להגיע לבית הלכן לפני יום ו' כשרשיון המכירה אמור להנתן.

2. במקביל פועלים עוזרים שונים בכדי להשיג דחיה במתן הרשיון ולאפשר לבית הלכן להגיב לגופו של ענין לנקודות המועלות במכתב. הנ"ל מבקשים את סיוע מחמ"ד גנדון ומתבטטים על הסתייגות במחמ"ד מהקו של משרד המסחר שלחץ על העיתוי הנוכחי של המכירה.

3. במקביל ישלח היום אח"צ מכתב דומה מבית הנבחרים (נוסח המכתב הועבר אליכם) עד כה למעלה מ-50 מורשים הצטרפו ליוזמת פנוויק-בינגהט.

קנז-טל  
א.פ.

1.



CHARLES H. PEACOCK, U.S. SENATOR

WILLIAM H. BRYAN, JR., TENN.	CLAUDIA M. PELL, R.I.
JESSE HELMS, N.C.	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
S. I. HAYAKAWA, CALIF.	JOHN CLERGEON, OHIO
RICHARD S. LUGAR, IND.	PAUL S. BARTON, MO.
CHARLES MC C. MATHEWS, JR., MD.	EDWARD BURNHEIM, N.Y.
MARY L. BAKER EMBURY, KANS.	PAUL E. TOWER, MASS.
RUDY BOURKHIS, MINN.	ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
LARRY PRESSLER, S. CAR.	CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.

EDWARD S. SANDERS, STAFF DIRECTOR  
SERGIO S. GARIBAYAN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 22, 1982

464  
5 JAN 29 1982

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our opposition to the Commerce Department's recent export license decisions involving the Middle East. They include the proposed sale of at least six L-100 cargo transport planes to Iraq, the removal of Iraq from the formal U.S. government list of countries supporting international terrorism and the relaxation of regulations on the sale of large aircraft to Syria and South Yemen.

In mid-April, the Commerce Department began informing Congress of its intention to issue an export license on April 30 to Iraq of six L-100 cargo transport planes, the "civilian" version of the C-130 military transport.

We believe the intended approval of such sales to Iraq and the changed regulations are premature and undermine our staunch position against international terrorism.

Several Congressional Committees have received intelligence briefings and other information on Iraq. The evidence does not support the conclusion that terrorism is no longer an instrument of Iraqi national policy, even though the emphasis may have changed.

Such a sale, it seems to us, would also undermine our government's efforts to maintain a position of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iranian war.

In sum, we believe the serious foreign policy implications of the sale should be more carefully considered by the Commerce Department before the sale is consummated. We urge you not to approve these export licenses until more time has elapsed. We also urge you to reinstate the previous regulations.

We would welcome the opportunity to review these issues with you and work out ways to accommodate our economic interests

✓

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with those of U.S. foreign policy goals, rather than have to consider legislation to tighten up the regulations.

We appreciate your early consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

*Alan J. Dixon*  
Alan J. Dixon

*Rudy Roschwitz*  
Rudy Roschwitz

*Larry Pressler*  
Larry Pressler

*John Heinz*  
John Heinz

*Arlen Specter*  
Arlen Specter

*Claiborne Pell*  
Claiborne Pell

*Paul E. Tsongas*  
Paul E. Tsongas

*Lawton Chiles*  
Lawton Chiles

*Howard M. Metzenbaum*  
Howard M. Metzenbaum

*Jim Sasser*  
Jim Sasser

*G. James Exon*  
G. James Exon

*Edward Zorinsky*  
Edward Zorinsky

1.



*George J. Mitchell*  
George J. Mitchell

*Edward M. Kennedy*  
Edward M. Kennedy

*William Proxmire*  
William Proxmire

*Gary Hart*  
Gary Hart

*Carl Levin*  
Carl Levin

*Tom Eagleton*  
Thomas F. Eagleton

*William V. Roth, Jr.*

*Quentin N. Burdick*

William V. Roth, Jr.

Quentin N. Burdick

*Max Baucus*  
Max Baucus

*Paul S. Sarbanes*  
Paul S. Sarbanes

*Mack Mattingly*  
Mack Mattingly

*Donald W. Riegle, Jr.*  
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.

*Rafone M. D'Amato*  
Rafone M. D'Amato

*Bill Bradley*  
Bill Bradley

1.

5 Jan 5 93 464

*Dave Durenberger*  
Dave Durenberger

*John H. Chafee*  
John H. Chafee

*Floyd Bentsen*  
Floyd Bentsen

*Bob Packwood*  
Bob Packwood

*Charles E. Grassley*  
Charles E. Grassley

*Daniel Patrick Moynihan*  
Daniel Patrick Moynihan

*Dennis DeConcini*  
Dennis DeConcini

BIDEN

DANFORTH

\* \* \*



אל: המשרד

א.ל.

ט ו ט ס  
דפ...ל...מתוך...דפיס  
טוב נטחוני קטור  
דחיסות...דיד'  
תאריך וז"ח. 02'1500291500  
...469...סס' מכר...  
מיוס ומס' מכר

חנכיל אוצר/דע: זכות, לובנטל, אוצר, חמכיל, מצפ"א, כלכלית, משרד

ביקור GAO.

ב-24 למאי תגיע לארץ משלחת של שלושה אנשי המח' הבינ"ל של ה-GAO כדי לבחון לעומק כל נושאי הסיוע. הכוונה, בין היתר, לבדוק גודל הסיוע וחנאי הסיוע, לרבות "חכילת קמפ דייויד". כמו כן ירצו לבדוק באיזו מידה מדיניות הסיוע נאמנה למדיניות החוץ המוצהרת של ארה"ב, לרבות לרבות אם היא אמנם מאפשרת שמירה על היתרון האיכותי המובטח. כמו כן ישמחו לשמוע על הדרכים הנוספות מלבד הסיוע שבהן ממארה"ב יכולה לסייע למשק הישראלי. קיימתי עם שיחה המוסכת ופשאצלאא ובה העליתי כל הנימוקים הידועים. בזמן הקרוב אעביר להם לכת מיוזר שבו אייע נקודות שיש לדעתי להדגיש בשיחות איתם. להערכתי רצוי כי לוח פגישותיהם יכלול מלבד משרדי האוצר והחוץ גם משרד הבטחון, לרבות תידרוך מודיעיני על מירוץ החימוש באזור וכן אנשי בנק ישראל. בנוסף יש להם ענין בפרויקט ה"לביא".  
המחקר כולו ניזוג עיי ה-GAO עצמו ואינו תוצאה של בקשה מהקונגרס. עת זאת גם למחקרים יזומים שלהם השפעה ניכרת בקונגרס.

הקבוצה תשה בארץ שלושה שבועות לפחות. שניים מחוכו H.C. Young ו-1 Nomi Taslitt (יהודיה) הם מהמשרד האירופי של GAO הנמצא בפרנקפורט. נפגשתי עם שניהם. עם השלישי הוא מהמשרד המרכזי בוטינגטון ועמו טרט ניפגשתי.  
הסגרירות בת"א קבלה היום מברק על בואם ובוודאי יעמדו איתכם בקשר באשר לתכנית.

הלפרין

הנה אנו רוצים לדעת...  
הנה אנו רוצים לדעת...  
הנה אנו רוצים לדעת...

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס חברק צפון

דף \_\_\_\_\_ מחוד \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_

סיווג בטחוני: שפור

רשימות: \_\_\_\_\_

תאריך חיוב: 29/5/30  
 מס. מבית: 834

לשימוש  
 חשאי  
 הנשי

אל: המסרד

דע:

מאת: גאר"ם

א.ג.ל

ארב"ל 2. פר"נ.  
 רוח"ם בעצרה פירוק הנשק.  
 מבקר.

1. בעקבות הסיכום על הופעה רוח"ם בעצרה פירוק הנשק ב-18 ליוני בשאלה ע"י ו"ר הובר ג'ק סקרן שוויצר האם ישחתף באירוע מטעם (ב-28 ביוני). השבתי כי אני מצטרף על השינוי שנבע מל"ז של הריכוז הכללי-בכליאת העצרה. הוספתי כי אין לי שום מידע נוסף.
2. במהלך השיחה העלה ד"ר ג'ק אה האפשרות כי בעה שנתו בניו-יורק יקיים רוח"ם פגישה עם משלחת מטעם הקרן אשר חלול גם ככה חתני פרס נובל לשלום. נראה לו כי יוכל לגייס את הלורד Philip Noel-Baker שימצא בניו-יורק בזמן ויתכן גם ככה בוספיים סחחני הפרס לצורך הפגישה.  
 Noel - Baker הוא חתן פרס נובל לשלום מ-1959 והשתתף בנציג בריטניה בוועידה העולמית לפירוק נשק מטעם חברי האומיים (1932-1934) - הוא בעל גיל 90.  
 כותב ומסיף לפירוק נשק ומכוונה לעיתים כ-  
 Grand old man of disarmament  
 הבסחתי לד"ר ג'ק להעביר את הרעיון לירושלים.
3. מציעים לסקול באחדה את הרעיון מהטעמים הבאים:  
 א. חתיה זו מתווח מטעם רוח"ם לקרן שוויצר על הוסבתם.  
 ב. בראש וראשונה יהיה זה סהלך הסכחתי שיהסקר בעובדה היות רוח"ם חתן פרס נובל לשלום וחיחודי כיום מבין החתנים הנושא בתפקיד רשמי-מסלכתי.

גאר"ם

מס' 4/5077 רח"מ א.ג.ל 29/5/30

תאריך: 29.4.82 הסולח: א.ג.ל  
 חתימה: \_\_\_\_\_



טגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

470

ט ד ס ט ס כ ר ק  
 דף... מס'... מס'... דפיס  
 סוג בטחוני... שמור  
 דחיפות... רגיל  
 תאריך וז"ח... 1220 29 באפריל 82  
 מס' מברק... 470

אגף אמל"ט-מצפ"א-אירופה 2

דע-הטגרירות-ביירט

אמ"א-איי המריבה- בהמשך לשלי 95/438 מה-27.4.

איתול ננעל הכינוס המיוחד של שרי החוץ. 17 מדינות הצביעו בעד הצעת החלטה שהתבססה על  
 הנייר הפרואנזי-בוזילאי (ראונא שלי הנ"ל). נוסח ההחלטה לא היה לרוחה של ארה"ב שנמנעה  
ויחד איחה נמנעו: קולומביה, ציילה, וטרינידד-טובגו.  
 בנוסח הסופי הוכנסו מספר שינויים מטעמותיים:

- (1) ישנה הדגשת יתר על זכויות ארגנטינה לריבונות על האיים.
  - (2) ישנה החמרה כלפי בריטניה והוספת קביעה כי נוכחות הצי באזור של TIAE הגבירה הסכנות.
  - (3) "בעלמ" התשכחות להייג ונאמר רק כי "רושמים לפניהם..." מאמצי החיזור ומקווים כי הם ימשיכו ויביאו לפתרון בדרכי שלום.
  - (4) כ"כ נעלט האיזכור של מזכ"ל האו"ם כמתווך אפשרי בעתיד וכעת מדובר על "עידוד מאמצי החיזור במישור האיזורי או העולמי" וזאת מבלי לפרט.
- לסיכום- תוצאות ההצבעה מצביעות על הפגנה של "hemispheric solidarity" כשלבנות בריתה "היבעים" של ארגנטינה מצטרפו מדינות כמו מכסיקו, ברזיל ואפילו ניקרגואה.  
 נוסח ההחלטה, אך יותר מכל דבריי רוב הנואמים, מצביעים על רגשות אנטי בריטיים וגם על נטיון להרחיב תיריעה ולהעמיד המשבר כקונפליקט בין הגוש האמל"טי מול הגוש האירופאי.  
 לצד הנצחון המדיני הארגנטיני יש לזכור כי הט נאלצו "לבלוע כמה צפרדעים" ובעיקר איזכור החלטה מועבייט 502.  
 הימנעותה של ארה"ב ונאומו של הייג לא משאירים היום ספק חיכן ולצד מי עומדים האמריקאים.  
יתכן כי בסופו של דבר זה יפגע בסיכויי של הייג להמשיך במלאכת המתווך אם כי הוא עדיין נחשב לאלטרנטיבה הטובה ביותר.

ההחלטה נכונה ויש להעמיד את המשבר כקונפליקט בין הגוש האמל"טי מול הגוש האירופאי.  
 יש להדגיש את חשיבות האיזורים האזוריים והעולמיים.

הראל

טגרינת ישראל - ורטינגטון

אל: המשרד

ט ו פ ס

דף...ל...מחון...5...דפים

טווג בטחוני. שטר...

דחיסות.....

תאריך וז"ו. 1333. 29. אפריל, 82

מסי חברת... 463

מס' חברה

אלפ

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

נסק לערביה.

רצ"ב שתי הודעות לקונגרס בדבר מכירת נסק אמריקני לסעודיה ולבחרין.

קני-טל

א.א.

בני אריות ייב מותק טאבה וז"ו חלואה לביטוח נהל

:/



5 JAN 2 93 463

Transmittal No. 82-52

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 35(b)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:
- |                          |              |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| Major Defense Equipment* | \$17 million |
| Other                    | \$ 5 million |
| TOTAL                    | \$22 million |
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
A quantity of 2,010 Improved-10W anti-armor missiles.
- (iv) Military Department: Army (VDW)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:  
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report. Case not included in Section 28 report.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 19 APR 1982

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

5 JAN 3 93 463

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia - Improved-TOW Missiles

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested the purchase of 2,010 Improved-TOW (I-TOW) anti-armor missiles at an estimated cost of \$22 million.

This sale is consistent with the stated U.S. policy of assisting other nations to provide for their own defense by allowing the transfer of reasonable amounts of defense articles and services. It will demonstrate the continuing willingness of the U.S. to support Saudi Arabia which is an important force for moderation in the region.

The I-TOW missiles will be used to maintain war reserve stock levels and will support the modernization of the Saudi Arabian Land Forces (SALF) by enhancing its anti-armor capability. The SALF will have no difficulty in absorbing these items.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the Hughes Aircraft Company of Canoga Park, California.

Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor personnel to Saudi Arabia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

1.



5 Apr 82 93 463

Transmittal No. 82-53

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Bahrain
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment*	\$ 75 million
Other	\$ 39 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$114 million</b>
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
Four F-5E and two F-5F aircraft with associated support equipment, spare parts, 60 AIM-9P-3 air-to-air missiles, training, and technical services.
- (iv) Military Department: Air Force (SAA)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:  
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Case not included in Section 28 report.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 19 APR 1982

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

1.

5 Jan 5 93

463

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Bahrain - F-5E and F-5F Aircraft

The Government of Bahrain has requested the purchase of four F-5E and two F-5F aircraft and associated support equipment, spare parts, 60 AIM-9P-3 air-to-air missiles, training, and technical services at an estimated cost of \$114 million.

This sale is consistent with the U.S. policy of assisting other nations to provide for their own defense and security by the transfer of reasonable amounts and types of military equipment. Bahrain, although a small nation in the increasingly volatile Persian Gulf area, is a member of the recently created Gulf Cooperation Council and seeks a modest defense establishment within this context. A moderate voice in the region, Bahrain is a long-time friend of the United States and allows the U.S. Navy access to facilities in the country.

The aircraft will be used by the Bahrain Defense Force to enhance its air arm. It will provide the country with a modest airborne air defense capability to supplement its ground air defense systems.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the Northrop Corporation of Hawthorne, California.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment of ten U.S. Government personnel and three U.S. contractor representatives to Bahrain for two years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.





MATHIAS SAID. HE QUOTED STATISTICS GIVEN TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATING THAT 43 PERCENT OF THE AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS TO BILATERAL POSTS MADE BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AS OF APRIL 19, 1982, WERE POLITICAL, WITH THE TOTAL JUMPING TO 49 PERCENT IF MULTILATERAL AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS WERE ADDED.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT RICHARD KENNEDY

PAGE 03 -- ADD NEWS

CALLED THE FIGURES MISLEADING, NOTING THAT "THE MIX OF AMBASSADORS APPOINTED OR RETAINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IS CONSISTENT WITH THE MIX OF ALL OTHER PRESIDENTS FOR THE LAST 20 YEARS." KENNEDY STATED THAT OF THE TOTAL, 83 WERE CAREER OFFICERS AND 34 NON-CAREER.

STOCKS CLOSE DOWN --

THE DOW JONES AVERAGE OF 30 INDUSTRIALS CLOSED AT 252.64 APRIL 28, DOWN 4.86.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

MESA-313 (4/28/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1982 (250)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPIC:

NEW MIDEAST SETTLEMENTS 'UNHELPFUL' --

ASKED ABOUT ISRAEL'S PLANS FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK REGION, FISCHER REFUSED TO COMMENT DIRECTLY, BUT HE DID RESTATE THE U. S. POSITION "THAT CONTINUED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IS UNHELPFUL" TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

*37*

*256*

38

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WILL HELP EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ELECTED SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY THAT WILL PROVIDE FULL AUTONOMY FOR PALESTINIANS LIVING IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING A FIVE YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

FOLLOWING THIS, FISCHER NOTED, "NEGOTIATIONS TO DETERMINE THE FINAL STATUS OF WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS

PAGE 02 -- STATE

POSSIBLE, AND NO LATER THAN THREE YEARS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITIES." HE NOTED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BASED ON U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

FISCHER SAID THAT THE DATE AND LOCATION FOR THE RESUMPTION OF AUTONOMY TALKS IS BEING DISCUSSED BY THE THREE NATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT "WE AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAVE EMPHASIZED OUR DETERMINATION TO MOVE FORWARD" ON THESE TALKS.

ITEM

NE SA-314 (4/28/82)

(TEXT) SHERMAN REMARKS ON U.N. RESOLUTION VOTE (1,000) U.S. DEPLORES THRUST OF RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL

UNITED NATIONS -- WILLIAM SHERMAN, THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS, SAID APRIL 28 THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THE "ENTIRE THRUST" OF A U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION WHICH CONDEMNS ISRAEL.

"IT IS AN ILL-INSPIRED, OFFENSIVE DOCUMENT THAT WILL REINFORCE AN ATTITUDE OF CYNICISM TOWARD THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND, THUS, TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF AMONG PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL," SHERMAN SAID IN EXPLAINING THE U.S. VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION.



RIGHTS ACTIVITY WHEN THEY JOINED HELSINKI WATCH GROUPS FROM

PAGE 05 --GROUP

LABOR CAMPS AND EXILE. ELEVEN HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO EXILE, AND IN ADDITION, TWO WERE STRIPPED OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD, AND ONE WAS EXCHANGED FOR A SOVIET SPY. TWO HAVE DIED. FEWER THAN TWENTY MEMBERS REMAIN ACTIVE IN ALL THE SOVIET HELSINKI WATCH GROUPS, AND ALL OF THEM ARE SUBJECTED TO "INTERMEDIARY" REPRESSIVE TACTICS PRECEDENT TO ARREST, TRIAL, LENGTHY YEARS OF CONFINEMENT, JOB DISMISSALS, SURVEILLANCE, SEARCHES, BUGGED OR DISCONNECTED TELEPHONES, DENIAL OF ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE, DENIAL OF PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE, AND BANISHMENT.

ITEM

NESEA-311 (04/28/82)

WHITE HOUSE REPORT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1982 (350)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES BRIEFED ON THESE TOPICS:

STOESSEL REPORTS TO REAGAN --

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STOESSEL REPORTED DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN APRIL 28 ON HIS OBSERVATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

STOESSEL HAD BEEN IN TEL AVIV AND CAIRO HELPING TO EASE STRAINS CONNECTED WITH ISRAEL'S RETURN OF THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE OCCUPIED SINAI PENINSULA TO EGYPT APRIL 25.

SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE SESSION, ALONG WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER WILLIAM CLARK.

ASKED TO STATE WASHINGTON'S VIEW OF ISRAELI ATTITUDES AGAINST FURTHER CONCESSIONS AND AGAINST DISMANTLING OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK, SPEAKES SAID: "OUR

34

206

PAGE 02 -- WHITE HOUSE RPT.

VIEW IS THAT WE WISH THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS TO PROCEED AND THAT THERE (SHOULD) BE TALKS THAT FIGURE ON THESE MATTERS IN THE FUTURE, AND THAT WE HOPE THEY WOULD REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION."

ASKED WHETHER WASHINGTON REGARDS SETTLEMENTS AS ILLEGAL, SPEAKES REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS "INDICATED THAT WE DON'T THINK EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS THERE IS HELPFUL."

PRESSED ON THE LEGALITY ISSUE, HE SAID, "I THINK WE'LL LET INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, PROCEED ON THAT."

ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO REGARD THE SETTLEMENTS AS PERMANENT, HE SAID, "WE'LL ADDRESS THAT AS TIME GOES BY."

SUMMIT PICTURE UNCHANGED --

SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER THAT REAGAN STILL HOPES SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WILL JOIN HIM AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN JUNE FOR A MEETING ON DISARMAMENT.

PAGE 03 -- WHITE HOUSE RPT.

BEYOND THAT, SPEAKES SAID, THE SITUATION IS WHERE IT WAS LEFT BY BREZHNEV'S INTERVIEW WITH TASS, IN WHICH THE KREMLIN LEADER RULED OUT A TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND SUGGESTED A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT LATER IN THE YEAR IN FINLAND OR SWITZERLAND. SPEAKES SAID REAGAN STILL WANTS A CAREFULLY PREPARED SUMMIT SESSION AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

ON A RELATED TOPIC, SPEAKES SAID A WASHINGTON POST REPORT THAT NEXT MONTH REAGAN WILL GIVE A TELEVISED ADDRESS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, "IS A LITTLE BIT AHEAD OF TIME." HE SAID THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION FOR SOME TIME TO THE THOUGHT OF GIVING A FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS, BUT HE SAID NO DECISION TO DO SO HAS BEEN REACHED.

THE POST STORY ALSO SAID REAGAN WOULD USE THE PURPORTED MAY ADDRESS TO ANNOUNCE THE OPENING DATE FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START).

35



WHEREVER IT, OR THE SOVIET UNION, PLEASES.

CUBA CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. NOR SHOULD THE FACT BE  
IGNORED THE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ALONE IN THIS VIEW.  
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND ELSEWHERE  
AROUND THE WORLD SHARE AMERICAN CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO

47

PAGE 01 -- VOA

CUBA.

PP0/VOA/SG 5:30

LSA

ITEM

NESEA-218 (4/27/82)

HAIG OUTLINES FUNDAMENTAL FOREIGN POLICY TENETS (850)

BY RUSSELL E. DYBVIK

USICA DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG OUTLINED THE  
FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS FUTURE  
DIRECTION IN A MAJOR ADDRESS APRIL 27 BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF  
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

HAIG'S ADDRESS DID NOT REVEAL ANY NEW INITIATIVES, BUT IT  
SET THE TONE FOR FUTURE U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EUROPEAN  
ALLIES, COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"IN THE 1980'S, THE SECRETARY DECLARED, THERE IS A "NEW  
AMERICAN CONSENSUS FOR A MORE VIGOROUS DEFENSE OF OUR  
INTERESTS," WHICH DEMANDS "A NEW BALANCE IN THE STYLE OF OUR  
FOREIGN POLICY."

IT HAS BECOME ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS  
ALLIES TO DEAL WITH THE NEW REALITIES, HAIG SAID. "THE  
COOPERATIVE IMPULSE STILL EXISTS, BUT IT WOULD BE SEVERELY

PAGE 02 -- HAIG

STRAINED BY ANOTHER DECADE OF RELATIVE MILITARY DECLINE OR  
STERILE ECONOMIC RIVALRY."

HAIG EMPHASIZED THAT "THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS AND



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STERILE ECONOMIC RIVALRY."

STRAINED BY ANOTHER DECADE OF RELATIVE MILITARY DECLINE OR

PAGE 02 -- HAIQ

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FOREIGN POLICY."

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AMERICAN CONSENSUS FOR A MORE VIGOROUS DEFENSE OF OUR

"IN THE 1980'S, THE SECRETARY DECLARED, THERE IS A "NEW

ALLIES, COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD AND THE SOVIET UNION

SET THE TONE FOR FUTURE U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EUROPEAN

HAIQ'S ADDRESS DID NOT REVEAL ANY NEW INITIATIVES, BUT IT

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

DIRECTION IN A MAJOR ADDRESS APRIL 27 BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF

FUNDAMENTAL TENETS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS FUTURE

WASHINGTON -- SECRETARY OF STATE HAIQ OUTLINED THE

(SIDA DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

BY RUSSELL E. DYBVIK

HAIQ OUTLINES FUNDAMENTAL FOREIGN POLICY TENETS (850)

NEWS-518 (4/29/85)

ITEM

PROVOKAS 7:50

CLIA

PAGE 01 -- VOA

AROUND THE WORLD SHARE AMERICAN CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO

OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND ELSEWHERE

IGNORED THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ALONE IN THIS VIEW.

CLIA CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. NOR SHOULD THE FACT BE

WHEREVER IT, OF THE SOVIET UNION, PLEASES.

Handwritten scribbles in the top left corner.



REMAINS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR SECURITY. IT IS STILL THE  
BASIC BUILDING BLOCK OF A MORE PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS  
WORLD. AND ITS BREAKDOWN WOULD MAKE DISASTER FOR THE  
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES INEVITABLE."

45

HAIG SAID, "WE WILL NEED TO DO MORE TOGETHER. BUT OUR  
JOINT CONCERN FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, RATHER THAN FINGER-  
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WITH APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE PLANNED JUNE SUMMIT OF THE  
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OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED WITH THE ALLIES.

"THE ALLIES MUST KNOW WHERE WE ARE GOING IF WE EXPECT  
THEM TO GO ALONG WITH US," HE SAID. "MUCH OF OUR AGENDA  
WILL BE DOMINATED BY THE SEARCH FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE  
RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. THIS SEARCH, ARMS CONTROL AND THE  
MILITARY BALANCE ARE ALL INTERRELATED, NOT INDEPENDENT AND

PAGE 03 -- HAIG

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"THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE WOULD BE  
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HE SAID INDIVIDUAL THIRD WORLD STATES ARE SEIZING IN  
"EVER MORE PRACTICAL WAYS" NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC  
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"SUCH A SITUATION CALLS FOR SENSITIVITY AND  
SOPHISTICATION ON OUR PART IF WE ARE TO EXPAND OUR LINKS



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PAGE 05 -- HAIG

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PAGE 04 -- HAIG

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TURNING TO THE SOVIET UNION, HAIG SAID "OUR ENDURING CHALLENGE" IS TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT RECOGNIZES THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WILL PROCEED, BUT WHICH ALSO CONSTRAINS THE USE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE.

"AN AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT BALANCES STRENGTH AND NEGOTIATIONS OFFERS THE BEST HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT," HAIG DECLARED. "WE MUST PLACE OUR POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE WORLD AND IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE THAT MAY MAKE MOSCOW MORE AMENABLE TO THE VIRTUES OF RESTRAINT."

HAIG SAID THAT AS THE SOVIET UNION EXPERIENCES A TRANSITION OF LEADERSHIP OVER THE DECADE OF THE 1980'S, "IT IS LIKELY TO FACE GREATER ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION -- A MARKED CHANGE FROM AN ERA OF UNUSUAL STABILITY AND EXPANSION."

PAGE 05 -- HAIG

DURING THIS "SENSITIVE AND DANGEROUS PERIOD OF CHANGING SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIPS, THE UNITED STATES MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT THERE ARE PENALTIES FOR AGGRESSION AND INCENTIVES FOR RESTRAINT," HE SAID. "WE ARE PREPARED TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERS THAT INTERNATIONAL MODERATION CAN HELP THEM FACE PAINFUL DOMESTIC DILEMMAS THROUGH BROADER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES."

HAIG SAID THE UNITED STATES WILL "CONTINUE TO PROBE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS GEARED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS, RECOGNIZING THAT PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS AND ARMS CONTROL IS INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY SOVIET CONDUCT AND THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS."

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49.



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W.P.



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PAGE 06 -- HAIG

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ITEM

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
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ITEM





PAGE 02 -- ADD NEWS

REPORTS FROM THE SPANISH CAPITAL SAID A LONE GUNMAN FIRED SEVERAL SHOTS AT SYRIAN CULTURAL ATTACHE HASSAN DAYOUB, BUT FLED AFTER DAYOUB FIRED BACK.

THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND THE GUNMAN ESCAPED.

STOCK MARKET DROPS --

THE STOCK MARKET RETREATED FROM ITS SIX-WEEK RALLY APRIL 27. ANALYSTS SAID THE DECLINE IN STOCK PRICES WAS A "NATURAL PULLBACK" FROM THE SIX STRAIGHT WEEKS OF GAINS.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING TRADING INCLUDED A FLURRY OF DISAPPOINTING CORPORATE EARNINGS REPORTS, FADING HOPES FOR A BUDGET COMPROMISE AND HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

THE CLOSING DOW JONES AVERAGE OF 30 INDUSTRIALS WAS 857.50, OFF 8.08.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

PAGE 03 -- ADD NEWS

ITEM

NE5A-216 (4/27/82)

WHITE HOUSE REPORT, TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1982 (850)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES BRIEFED ON THESE TOPICS:

IRANIAN OIL PURCHASE CONFIRMED --

SPEAKES SAID THE U.S. DECISION TO PURCHASE IRANIAN OIL FOR THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE WAS BASED ON



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THE CLOSING DOW JONES AVERAGE OF 50 INDUSTRIALS WAS 875.50, OFF 8.08.

(PRECEDING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

NEWS-216 (4/27/82)

WHITE HOUSE REPORT, TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1982 (820)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES BRIEFED ON THESE TOPICS:

IRANIAN OIL PURCHASE CONFIRMED --

SPEAKES SAID THE U.S. DECISION TO PURCHASE IRANIAN OIL FOR THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE WAS BASED ON



CONSIDERATIONS OF PRICE, NOT POLICY.

HE SAID WASHINGTON HAD GOTTEN AN OFFER FROM AN INTERNATIONAL TRADING CONCERN, ONE OF A NUMBER OF SUCH OFFERS, FOR SALE OF IRANIAN OIL. HE SAID THAT OFFER WAS ACCEPTED "BECAUSE OF PRICE AND TERMS." THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY HAD PURCHASED 1.8 MILLION BARRELS OF IRANIAN OIL FROM GATOIL INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED OF GENEVA. THE PRICE WAS GIVEN AS 53.12 MILLION DOLLARS.

PAGE 02 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

SPEAKES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH MOST RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH IRAN WERE LIFTED UPON RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IN JANUARY 1981, THE PURCHASE IS THE FIRST BY THE UNITED STATES FROM IRAN SINCE 1979. RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY SALES CONTINUE IN FORCE, HE NOTED.

"OUR POLICY," SPEAKES SAID, "IS TO OBTAIN SUCH SUPPLIES (FOR THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE) UNDER THE MOST FAVORABLE TERMS, UNLESS THERE IS LEGISLATION TO THE CONTRARY." TRAVEL ADVISORIES REMAIN IN FORCE, HOWEVER, AND AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE ADVISED AGAINST TRAVELING TO IRAN IN FURTHERANCE OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS.

ASKED IF THE PURCHASE IS AN INDICATION OF AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN, SPEAKES SAID, "I WOULDN'T DESCRIBE IT THAT WAY."

SPEAKES SAID THERE IS "NO CHANGE IN POLICY" REPRESENTED BY THE PURCHASE. HE SAID, "NO" WHEN ASKED IF THERE IS A "STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION IN INFUSING TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS INTO IRAN IN ITS CONFLICT WITH IRAQ."

PAGE 03 -- WHITE HOUSE REPORT

BUSH TO VISIT CHINA --

SPEAKES SAID THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL VISIT BEIJING IN EARLY MAY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP.

"THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT



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CONSIDERED X X X ETC.

ITEM

NESEA-211 (4/27/82)

*is/c*

*19*

HAIG HAILS SUCCESSFUL STOESSEL MIDEAST MISSION (270)

WASHINGTON -- AS U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESSEL FLEW FROM THE MIDEAST TO WASHINGTON APRIL 27, WINDING UP HIS SINAI SETTLEMENT MISSION, SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

STOESSEL SPENT SOME 15 DAYS IN A SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY ROLE, HELPING TO IRON OUT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT PRIOR TO ISRAEL'S FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI ON APRIL 25, ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THEIR TREATY.

A STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ISSUED APRIL 27 SAID THAT STOESSEL AND HIS PARTY CAN BE PROUD "OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OF THE CREDIT IT REFLECTS UPON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY."

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT:

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL AND HIS PARTY RETURN TO WASHINGTON THIS EVENING. ON THIS OCCASION, THE SECRETARY

PAGE 02 -- STOESSEL

WISHES TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP APPRECIATION AND ADMIRATION FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S UNCEASING EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE DURING THE FIFTEEN DAYS OF HIS EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL MISSION TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

IN UNDERTAKING TO HELP THESE TWO FRIENDS WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR TREATY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND HIS TEAM MADE AN ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HELPED SET THE STAGE FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD THE FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT FORESEEN BY THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND HIS PARTY HAVE EVERY REASON TO BE PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OF THE CREDIT IT



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STÖSSEL SPENT SOME 17 DAYS IN A SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY ROLE, HELPING TO IRON OUT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT PRIOR TO ISRAEL'S FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI ON APRIL 25, ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THEIR TREATY.

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late



ITEM

NESEA-212 (4/27/82)

*20*

LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS NEAR CONCLUSION (250)

UNITED NATIONS -- THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA IS IN ITS FINAL DAYS, WITH NO RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE DEEP SEABED MINING PORTION OF THE TREATY IN SIGHT.

THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WANT SECTIONS CHANGED TO INSURE A PRO-MINING THRUST TO THE TREATY, WHILE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE AGAINST ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT REGULATIONS GOVERNING SEABED MINING.

AFTER A MONTH OF INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES -- ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP -- SUBMITTED FORMAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION OF APRIL 15. OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO SUBMITTED AMENDMENTS TO VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY.

THE CONFERENCE THEN DECIDED ON APRIL 25 THAT ALL POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT BY CONSENSUS WAS EXHAUSTED ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND PREPARED TO BEGIN

PAGE 02 -- L05

VOTING ON A TOTAL OF 31 SETS OF AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER, AT THE VOTING SESSION APRIL 26 MOST OF THE COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- WITHDREW THEIR AMENDMENTS.

THE UNITED STATES INDICATED, THAT ITS DECISION TO WITHDRAW AMENDMENTS DID NOT SIGNAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONVENTION AND THAT IT WAS DOING SO WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD CONTINUE.

IN ADDITION TO THE U. S. AMENDMENTS ON DEEP SEABED MINING, OTHER AMENDMENTS WITHDRAWN INCLUDED ANOTHER SET OF PROPOSALS ON THE SEABED MINING BY 11 OTHER WESTERN NATIONS, ONE BY THE GROUP OF 77 ON PIONEER SEABED INVESTMENT AND A 30-NATION PROPOSAL ON SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN REGULATING PASSAGE



NEA-212 (8/27/82)

LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS NEAR CONCLUSION (250)

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THE CONFERENCE THEN DECIDED ON APRIL 23 THAT ALL POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT BY CONSENSUS WAS EXHAUSTED ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND PREPARED TO BEGIN

PAGE 02 -- LOS

VOTING ON A TOTAL OF 51 SETS OF AMENDMENTS, HOWEVER, AT THE VOTING SESSION APRIL 26 MOST OF THE COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- WITHDREW THEIR AMENDMENTS.

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*Handwritten signature and scribbles*



HEREWITH SCHED 1 AT 2215 GMT.....

NESA-201

HEREWITH NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE NO. 80

TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1982

ITEM

*6.7/6*

NESA-202

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NO SOUTH ASIA REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (30)

THERE WERE NO SOUTH ASIA ITEMS OF AREA-WIDE INTEREST IN  
THE APRIL 27 PRESS.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

ENE201

NESA-203 (4/27/82)

U.S. DEFENSE DEPT. PLANS TO SELL F-15'S TO ISRAEL (150)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS INFORMED  
CONGRESS OF PLANS TO SELL 11 F-15 FIGHTER PLANES, VALUED AT  
510 MILLION DOLLARS, TO ISRAEL.

THE PACKAGE, IN ADDITION TO THE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDES 11  
SETS OF CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS, SIX SPARE F-100 ENGINES,  
SUPPORT AND TEST EQUIPMENT.

A MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS, ISSUED BY THE PENTAGON  
APRIL 26, SAID, "THIS PROPOSED SALE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE  
UNITED STATES POLICY OF ENSURING THAT ISRAEL HAS THE MEANS  
TO DEFEND ITSELF WITHIN SECURE BORDERS SHOULD IT BECOME



NE24-201

HERWITZ NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA WIRELESS FILE NO. 80

TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1982

ITEM

NE24-202

(FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

NO SOUTH ASIA REPORTING IN THE U.S. PRESS (70)

THERE WERE NO SOUTH ASIA ITEMS OF AREA-WIDE INTEREST IN THE APRIL 27 PRESS.

(PRECEDING IS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

NE201

NE24-203 (4/27/82)

U.S. DEFENSE DEPT. PLANS TO SELL F-15'S TO ISRAEL (170)

WASHINGTON -- THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS INFORMED CONGRESS OF PLANS TO SELL 11 F-15 FIGHTER PLANE, VALUED AT 210 MILLION DOLLARS, TO ISRAEL.

THE PACKAGE, IN ADDITION TO THE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDES 11 SETS OF CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS, SIX SPARE F-100 ENGINES, SUPPORT AND TEST EQUIPMENT.

A MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS, ISSUED BY THE PENTAGON APRIL 26, SAID, "THIS PROPOSED SALE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF ENSURING THAT ISRAEL HAS THE MEANS TO DEFEND ITSELF WITHIN SECURE BORDERS SHOULD IT BECOME



NECESSARY."

THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING THE ADDITIONAL PLANES WITH ONLY MINIMAL TRAINING ON PARTICULAR DIFFERENCES CAUSED BY ENGINEERING CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE ISRAEL'S LAST PURCHASE OF F-15'S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALE MAY REQUIRE ASSIGNMENT OF FIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES TO ISRAEL FOR ABOUT TWO YEARS, THE PENTAGON SAID.

ITEM

NESSA-204 (4/27/82)

U.S. PLANS TO SELL SIDEWINDER MISSILES TO EGYPT (170)

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SELL 300 SIDEWINDER MISSILES TO EGYPT "TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES,"

ACCORDING TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCED APRIL 26 THAT IT HAS NOTIFIED CONGRESS OF ITS INTENT TO PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WITH THE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, PLUS 30 TRAINING MISSILES, REPAIR PARTS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. THE ESTIMATED COST IS 34 MILLION DOLLARS.

THE SIDEWINDER MISSILES ARE DESIGNED FOR USE ON U.S.-BUILT F-16 JET FIGHTERS ALREADY BEING SOLD TO EGYPT. THE SIDEWINDER, ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON, HAS THE CAPABILITY OF HEAD-ON ATTACK AGAINST HIGH SPEED HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

THE SALE WILL NOT AFFECT THE BASIC MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION, THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID, NOTING THAT ISRAEL ALREADY HAS PURCHASED SIMILAR MISSILES AND THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS CONSIDERING A SIMILAR PURCHASE.

ITEM

NESSA-205 (4/27/82)

HAJIG SAYS U.N. CAN RESOLVE FALKLANDS DISPUTE (500)



2

THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING THE ADDITIONAL PLANES WITH ONLY MINIMAL TRAINING ON PARTICULAR DIFFERENCES CAUSED BY ENGINEERING CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE ISRAEL'S LAST PURCHASE OF F-15'S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALE MAY REQUIRE ASSIGNMENT OF FIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES TO ISRAEL FOR ABOUT TWO YEARS, THE PENTAGON SAID.

ITEM

REF ID: A66381

U.S. PLANS TO SELL SIDEWINDER MISSILES TO EGYPT (170)

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO SELL 500 SIDEWINDER MISSILES TO EGYPT "TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES," ACCORDING TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCED APRIL 26 THAT IT HAS NOTIFIED CONGRESS OF ITS INTENT TO PROVIDE THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WITH THE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, PLUS 30 TRAINING MISSILES, REPAIR PARTS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. THE ESTIMATED COST IS 25 MILLION DOLLARS. THE SIDEWINDER MISSILES ARE DESIGNED FOR USE ON U.S.-BUILT F-16 JET FIGHTERS ALREADY BEING SOLD TO EGYPT. THE SIDEWINDER, ACCORDING TO THE PENTAGON, HAS THE CAPABILITY OF HEAD-ON ATTACK AGAINST HIGH SPEED HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. THE SALE WILL NOT AFFECT THE BASIC MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION, THE ANNOUNCEMENT SAID, NOTING THAT ISRAEL ALREADY HAS PURCHASED SIMILAR MISSILES AND THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS CONSIDERING A SIMILAR PURCHASE.

ITEM

REF ID: A66381

טגרירות ישראל - יוטינגטון

אל: המסרד

ט ר פ ס ס כ ר ק

דף...!... מתוך... דפים

סווג בעגוני... שסור...

דחיות...

תאריך וזיח... 0957 27 אפריל, 82

423

מס' מברק...

אכ

מצפ"א, ממ"ד


נשק למצרים.

הממשל הודיע לקונגרס על כוונתו למכור 300 טילי AIM 9-L למצרים. ככ"ה העיסקה 34 מיליון דולר. חודעה מוקדמת נשקלה לפני כמה שבועות, אולם שגורה לקונגרס עוכב עד אהמול.

קני-טל  
ת.ו.ו.

הנה סגורה הנה קרה סהבט דנה  
דנה ד'איה ד'צבא ד'סאן ד'איה ד'סאן





מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק צפון

ד"ר \_\_\_\_\_ סמולד \_\_\_\_\_ זכ"ס

אל: המשרד

קידום בטלגרף: מסדר

תחנות: \_\_\_\_\_

57:

הארץ וזיה: \_\_\_\_\_

לשירות  
הקשר

מאת: נאו"ם

סס. מברק: \_\_\_\_\_

271430

756

27

ארב"ל 2. פר"נ.  
הזמנה רוח"ם ע"י קרן שוויצר.  
מקרה.

1. אהמול במחיתה מושב חודעה חכמינה לעזרת סירוק הנשק הציג לפני ד"ר הומר ג'ק  
אח הגב' Mary Q. Yates אשר גם היא חברה בהנהלה הקרן ע"ש שאלברט  
שוויצר. הגב' Yates היתה בעבר כפיקח תכנית הראיונות של ה- CBS.  
"Face the Nation". ספרה לי כי במסגרת הפקדה אילו נמנעה פעמיים  
עם רוח"ם והיא שמחה על הזמנה להזמנה נשיא הקרן ומקווה כי הדבר יצא לפועל.  
(מכירה גם אח אבי פזנר).

2. הגב' Yates אחראיה גם על יחסי הצבור של הקרן ובדעה להודיע לאמצעי  
התקשורת על האירועים שיארגנו בניו יורק בה-27 עד ה-30 ביוני. במיוחד בקשה כי רוח"ם  
יכבד בנוכחותו את ארוחת הערב ומסיבת העתונאים, יחד עם יתר החני פרס נובל לשלום שיגיעו  
ב-28 ביוני בערב.

נאו"ם

סימנים חתום ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן ג'ואן

הארץ: 27.4.82 השולח: א. א. בקר אישור כנהל המחלקה: חתימה: \_\_\_\_\_



ז' סמוך \_\_\_\_\_ ז'פ"ס \_\_\_\_\_

סיווג בטחוני: \_\_\_\_\_

דחיות: \_\_\_\_\_

תאריך זיחה: 27/4/82

ס.ס. מברק: 755

לעיתים  
הקשר

אל: המסר

77

מאת: נאר"ם

ארב"ל 2. פר"נ.  
עצק פירוק הנשק.  
מברק.

1. אהמול נפתח הכושב האחרון של הועדה הסכינה לעצרת פירוק הנשק. כועדה 75 סרינות. כושב זה מעורר ענין מיוחד כי בו התגבש חכנית העבודה והסיוטות השונות לעצרת פירוק הנשק. ההכנות זוכות לחשומת לב רבה יחסית נוכח הצפייה להופעה ראשי סרינות וממשלות ושה"ח רבים בעצרת. הגיעו נציגים רבים סח-60 בג'נבה.

2. בהסגן לשלנו 441 מה-19 לאפריל: לסרות הריסומים במזכירות מדוישים נציגי איטליה וקנדה כי סרם נפלה החלטה סופית לגבי הופעה רוח"ג שלהם. לעומת זאת הבריטים הודיעו כי רוח"ס הופיע בעצרת (רשומה ל-16 ביוני). נציגים מערביים מדברים בוודאות על הופעה כל רוח"ס של סרינות סקנדינביה (נורווגיה סרם החליטה סופית). צופת הודיעה על השתתפות שה"ח (ה-11 ביוני).

3. מענין כי בקרב הכלמ"ז אין כמעט סימנים להשתתפות ראשי סרינות וממשלות. בינתיים סדנר על סנגל (הנשיא) והודו (טוקלים הופעה הגב' גאנדי). מספר סרינות בלמזיות הודיעו כבר על הופעה שה"ח (מכסיקו, אלב'יריה, ברזיל, אהיוטיה, ניגריה, סרי לנקה, אינדונזיה). כצפוי כי הרשימה חבדל. סעכירים כדיופ רשימה סנסטיביה.

נאר"ם

מה סגן סרם גוף ג'אנל ג'אנל  
ס'ה/ס'הן ה'אנל ג'אנל  
ס'הן ס'הן ס'הן ס'הן

תאריך: 27.4.82 השולח: \_\_\_\_\_ אישור מנהל המחלקה: \_\_\_\_\_ החימה: \_\_\_\_\_

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק צפון

אל: ראש המסלה

דע: כראון, אליצור

מאת: השגריר, נאו"ם

דף: \_\_\_\_\_ סתוד: \_\_\_\_\_ זמ"י: \_\_\_\_\_

סיווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיות: מיידי

תאריך זמ"י: 27/800

מס. מברק: 181

לשירות  
הקשר

דע: כראון, אליצור.

1. לבקשתך קבענו עם מזכירות העצרה הכלליה שהופעתך כמסגרת עצרה מרוק הנשק. החקיים ביום ו' ה-18.6.82 בבוקר. את האישור הסופי לכך נקבל היום או מחר. להזכירך שרה"מ בריטניה הופיע ב-16.6 ונשיא ארה"ב ב-17 בו.

2. בהתאם להנחייתך הסלמוניה כאותה שיחה, שוחחתי עם שגריר מצרים עבד אל-מג'וד ומסרתי לו כדברייך. מגיד השיב שמלכתחילה לא עמדה השאלה שיהסכו בהצעת ההחלטה אלא שהם עדיין שוקלים בין המנועה להתנגדות והתחלטה בנידון החקבל בקהיר. חזרתי וביקשתי שיעביר לקהיר בקשתנו שיחנברו להצעה חוץ הדגשה שלהצבעתם מטמעות ברורה דוקא עתה כפתיחתו של עירן חדש ביחסי שתי מדינותינו. מגיד השיב שכך אמנם יעשה.

בלום

להודעה שמה גנא ג/א/גנא ארצות איראן 2 א/א/א ארצות איראן  
27/800

*Handwritten signature*

27 אפריל 82 י. בלום

תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_ השולח: \_\_\_\_\_ אישור הנהל המחלקה: \_\_\_\_\_ החיסמה: \_\_\_\_\_



סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המסרד

אלה

ס ו פ ס ס כ ר ק

דפ...!...מתוך... דפים

סוג בטחוני... שמו

דהיפות

תאריך זי"ח 27 0953 אפריל 82

מס' מברק 42!

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

נסק לישראל.

רצ"ב ההודעה הפורמלית על כוונת הממשל למכור 11 מטוסי F-15 לישראל  
וציוד נלווה. סכ"ח העיסקה 510 מיליון דולר.

קני-טל

11.8



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 Jan 2 B  
421

26 APR 1982

In reply refer to:  
I-00921/82ct

Mr. Rhett B. Dawson  
Staff Director  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Dawson:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 82-58 and under separate cover the classified annex thereto. This Transmittal concerns the Department of the Air Force's proposed Letter of Offer to Israel for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$510 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media of the unclassified portion of this Transmittal.

Sincerely,

Attachments

Separate Cover:  
Classified Annex

/



4 JAN 3 93

421

JL

Transmittal No. 82-58

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)  
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Israel
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment*	\$342 million
Other	\$168 million
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$510 million</b>
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:  
Eleven F-15 aircraft with 11 sets (22 tanks) of conformal fuel tanks, six spare F-100 engines, associated support equipment, test equipment, depot level repair, and future releasable engineering changes for these and previously purchased F-15 aircraft.
- (iv) Military Department: Air Force (SNP)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:  
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:  
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Included in report for quarter ending 30 September 1981.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 26 APR 1982

\* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.



4 JAN 4 93

421

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Israel - F-15 Aircraft

The Government of Israel has requested the purchase of 11 F-15 aircraft with 11 sets (22 tanks) of conformal fuel tanks, six spare F-100 engines, associated support equipment, test equipment, depot level repairs, and future releasable engineering changes for these and previously purchased F-15 aircraft at an estimated cost of \$510 million.

This proposed sale is consistent with the United States policy of ensuring that Israel has the means to defend itself within secure borders should it become necessary.

The Israeli Air Force is capable of absorbing these additional F-15 aircraft with only minimal training on particular differences caused by engineering changes which have occurred since its previous purchase of this aircraft.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the McDonnell Douglas Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri.

Implementation of this sale may require the assignment of five contractor representatives to Israel for approximately two years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

\*

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "copy" and other illegible scribbles.



טגרירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

ט ו ט ס ס נ ד ק

דפ. ג. מחורן דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות

חאריך זי"ח 1000 27 אפריל 82

מסי מברק 427

אל: המשרד

טל

מצפ"א, ממ"ד

L-100 לעירק.

1. אתמול הופץ בקנט מכתב dear colleague בחתימת בושניץ. היינץ, דיקסון ופרסלר. היוזמים מפיצים גם נוסח מכתב לנשיא המבקשו להחזיר התקנות הישנות לגבי רשימת הטרור לקדמותן. כמו כן מבקש המכתב מהנשיא שלא לאשר מיד את הרישיון למכירת מטוסי L-100 לעירק.

2. איפאיק מסייע ליוזמי המכתב להשיג חתימות נוספות.

3. היעד הינו להגיע ל-20 חתימות לפני שגור המכתב לנשיא. בשיחות שונות אתמול התברר כי אף אחד אינו משלה את עצמו כי יוזמה זו תזיז הממשל מכוונתו לגבי מכירת ציוד לעירק. יוזמי המכתב סבורים כי הענות משמעותית ליוזמה זו עשויה להרחיע הממשל מכוונה למכור בעת"ז ציוד נוסף לעירק.

קני-טל

ק.א.

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ע ה ה ס ו ט ס ס נ ד ק דפ. ג. מחורן דפים סווג בטחוני שמור דחיפות חאריך זי"ח 1000 27 אפריל 82 מסי מברק 427



CHARLES H. PERCY, N.Y., CHAIRMAN

HOWARD C. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
JERRY M. BROWN, CALIF.  
S. I. HAYAKAWA, CALIF.  
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EDWARD G. SANDERS, STAFF DIRECTOR  
BEVIL H. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 23, 1982

427

April 23, 1982

U.S. SENATE

U.S. SENATE

U.S. SENATE

Dear Colleague:

We are writing to ask that you join in sending the attached letter to President Reagan in support of efforts to maintain a strong U.S. policy against international terrorism. The letter calls for a delay in the proposed April 30 issuance of export licenses for the sale to Iraq of six L-100 cargo transport planes, the civilian version of C-130 military cargo plane.

The letter also expresses our concern about the new Export Administration Act regulations which take Iraq off the formal list of countries supporting terrorism and eliminate the Congressional notification of proposed aircraft sales to two countries remaining on the list -- Syria and South Yemen.

Our letter results from a series of recent troubling decisions which directly contravene the intent of an anti-terrorism provision of the Export Administration Act. In 1979 the Congress passed Section 6(i), known as the Fenwick Anti-Terrorism Amendment, which was prompted by a number of sales in the late 1970s, such as jumbo jets and militarily-useful trucks to Libya and L-100s to Syria.

Section 6(i) underscores the Congressional position that sales of militarily-useful equipment to countries supporting terrorism may have serious foreign policy implications. Therefore, Congress should know about such proposed sales, with an opportunity to express its views, before the final licensing decisions are made. Under the Fenwick amendment, Congress would have to be given 30 days' notice of proposed sales of more than \$7 million to any nation on the government's list of countries supporting international terrorism if the equipment or services potentially could serve military end-uses or aid terrorism.

In the regulations implementing the amendment two years ago Iraq, Syria, South Yemen and Libya were placed on the terrorism list. Congress was to be notified of the proposed sale of large transport planes, helicopters, heavy duty trucks, and items with a military end use.

Then, on February 26, 1982, without meaningful consultations and convincing evidence, Iraq was removed from the formal list of countries supporting international terrorism. On March 3 regulations also were relaxed on the issuance of export licenses for large aircraft to Syria and South Yemen -- both of which remain on the terrorism list. Finally, in mid-April, the Commerce Department began informing the Senate Foreign Relations and Banking Committees of its intention to issue an export license on April 30 to Iraq for six L-100 cargo transport planes.

We believe the intended approval of the sale to Iraq and the changed regulations are premature and undermine our staunch position against international



3 93 427

terrorism. Evidence from public and other sources does not support the conclusion that terrorism is no longer an instrument of Iraqi national policy, even though the emphasis may have changed.

The attempt to change the regulations to eliminate Congressional notification of proposed sales to Syria and South Yemen also undermines our anti-terrorism policy. The danger is increased that one section or another of the bureaucracy will push through a sale without all the foreign policy and military factors being weighed fully. We note that the Congressional notification does not prohibit the sales. Indeed, Congress last year went along with the sale of five civilian airliners to Iraq, and U.S. exports to Iraq have more than doubled since 1979.

Also, it seems to us that the sale of L-100s to Iraq at this time would undermine our government's efforts to maintain a position of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iranian war.

Removing Iraq from the terrorism list and selling it this type of aircraft should be considered only if there is solid evidence over a period of time that Iraq has actually abandoned terrorism as an instrument of policy.


We are, of course, mindful of our economic interests involved in such sales. We also would like to see the Executive Branch and Congress work out these problems in a cooperative and flexible way. That is why we are expressing the hope that the differing views and the past mistakes can be resolved by administrative action.

In sum, we believe the serious foreign policy implications of the sale should be more carefully considered by the Commerce Department before the sale is consummated. We urge the President not to approve this export license until more time has elapsed. Finally, we urge President Reagan to reinstate the previous regulations.

If you have any questions, or would like to cosign our letter, please have a member of your staff contact Mike Kraft at 4-5382 or Gregg Garmisa at 4-2854. We hope to send this letter at the close of business Tuesday, April 27.

Sincerely,

  
Rudy Boschwitz

  
Larry Pressler

  
Alan J. Dixon  
  
John Helmz

1.



CHARLES W. PERRY, III, CHAIRMAN

EDWARD H. BARTER, JR., TENN.  
JESSE HELMS, N.C.  
S. J. HATTAWAY, CALIF.  
RICHARD S. LIEBER, ILL.  
CHARLES McC. LATTINER, JR., MD.  
MURRY L. KASTENBAUM, KANS.  
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, MINN.  
LARRY PRESSLER, S. CAR.

CLAIBORNE PEPPER, S.C.  
JOSEPH R. BROWN, JR., DEL.  
JOHN CLEGG, OHIO  
PAUL S. SARBANES, MD.  
EDWARD ZEPHERY, MISS.  
PAUL E. TOWER, MASS.  
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.  
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.

EDWARD W. BARUCH, STAFF DIRECTOR  
STYLD R. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

4 93 427  
United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 22, 1982

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our opposition to the Commerce Department's recent export license decisions involving the Middle East. They include the proposed sale of at least six L-100 cargo transport planes to Iraq, the removal of Iraq from the formal U.S. government list of countries supporting international terrorism and the relaxation of regulations on the sale of large aircraft to Syria and South Yemen.

In mid-April, the Commerce Department began informing Congress of its intention to issue an export license on April 30 to Iraq of six L-100 cargo transport planes, the "civilian" version of the C-130 military transport.

We believe the intended approval of such sales to Iraq and the changed regulations are premature and undermine our staunch position against international terrorism.

Several Congressional Committees have received intelligence briefings and other information on Iraq. The evidence does not support the conclusion that terrorism is no longer an instrument of Iraqi national policy, even though the emphasis may have changed.

Such a sale, it seems to us, would also undermine our government's efforts to maintain a position of neutrality in the Iraqi-Iranian war.

In sum, we believe the serious foreign policy implications of the sale should be more carefully considered by the Commerce Department before the sale is consummated. We urge you not to approve these export licenses until more time has elapsed. We also urge you to reinstate the previous regulations.

We would welcome the opportunity to review these issues with you and work out ways to accommodate our economic interests

with those of U.S. foreign policy goals, rather than have to consider legislation to tighten up the regulations.

We appreciate your early consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

\* \* \*



סגירות י.א.ל - רוטינגטון

אל: המסרד

אל

ט ו פ ס

דף...!...מחור...2...זפיט

סוג בטזוני...בלמיס

דחיפות...מידי

תאריך וזיח 27.09.44 אפקיל, 2

מסי מברק 422

מצפ"א

רצ"ב טקסט נוסח ההחלטה אשר התקבלה פה אחד בסנט. מנהיגי הסנט בייקר, בירד וסנטור סום איגלטון היו מיוזמי ההחלטה.

קני-טל

11

97th CONGRESS  
2nd SESSION

2 Jan 2 93 422

# S. RES.

(Note.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date, number, and reference of resolution.)

## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Baker, for himself and Messrs. R. C. Byrd and Thomas Eagleton

submitted the following resolution; which was

# RESOLUTION

(Insert title of resolution here)

*Resolved,*

### COMMENDING THE COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT

Whereas, on Sunday, the 25th of April, 1982, in accordance with the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Israel completed final withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula; and

Whereas, this step represents the willingness of the Government and the people of Israel to make difficult and painful decisions and also to take risks for peace; and

Whereas, this step symbolizes the continuing and enduring commitment of Israel and Egypt to the process of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region envisioned in the Camp David Accords;

Therefore Be It

Resolved, that the Senate of the United States:

Commends the Government and the people of Israel for this historic and courageous step in the name of peace;

Expresses confidence that Israel and Egypt will continue the process of normalization and realize fully the fruits of peaceful coexistence.

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including a star symbol and various illegible markings.



שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

ס ר ק ס  
 דף... מתוך... דפים  
 סווג בטחוני... סנד?  
 דחיפות... ס???  
 חאריך וז"ח... 8262617  
 מס' מברק... 418

2016

מצפ"א מרכז

שיחה עם P. STODDARD סגן מנהל I.M.R.

בדרכי אל משרדו של סטודרט פגשתי בפרוזדורי מחמ"ד מספר אנשים מ- NEA. כולם מצאו לנכון להביע הערכתם על ביצוע הנסיגה תוך ציון ההקרבה שנעשתה ע"י ישראל והמובנה היטב במחמ"ד.

עיקר שיחתי עם סטודרט נסובה על שאלת הצפוי אחרי השלמת הנסיגה: לדבריו מובנת דאגת ממשלת ישראל לגבי המסלול בו יתנהל המסך החהליך המדיני. עם זאת ברור גם שהממשל האמריקאי לא יכול היה ואף לא רצה לכבול ידיו באופן מוחלט, כך שהתחייבויות הכלולות במכתב הנשיא לרוה"מ אינן זהות עם הנוסחאות שהוגשו ע"י רוה"מ. במכתב הנשיא אושרה מחדש מחוייבותה של ארה"ב לקד, אך אין בה שלילה מוחלטת של דרכים אלטרנטיביות כלשהן בעתיד הרחוק.

לדבריו, אין במחמ"ד כל הכניה מגובשת לגבי הדרך בה ינסו לחדש המומ"ם על האוטונומיה. הסיבה לכך נעוצה - בין היתר - בהתרכזות האגף המזמ"י בחודשים האחרונים במאמץ לסלק כל מכסול מפני ביצוע הנסיגה מסיני. עתה- אם לא תהיינה הפרעות אגפיות, יחלו לעסוק בנושא האוטונומיה "ברצינות". במצב הקיים במחמ"ד ירוכז הנושא, ככל הנראה, בידי הנהלת האגף המזמ"י ו- EAGELBURGER תוך התיעצות מתמדת עם המזכיר.

סיפר שלאחרונה הוכנו ב- INR כמה ניירות על טוריה. מדבריו השתמע שעסקו- בין היתר- גם באפשרות כי הסורים יחליטו על פרובוקציה נגד ישראל אחת הדרכים בה ניתן להיחלץ מבידודה שך דמשק בעולם הערבי ומהלחצים המופעלים על המשרד מכל עבר. לדעת INR הסובייטים הבהירו כנראה לסורים כי אם צבאם יתערב בהתנקשות עתידה בין ישראל ואש"פ בלבנון, דמשק חצטרך לטפל בעניין לבדה. אולם אם ישראל תתקוף שטח טורי והצבא זהמשרד יעמדו סכנה, ברה"מ חפעל במיטב יכולתה כדי לעזור בעדה. אולם, ספק אם הבטחה כזו מספקת את אסאד נוכח נסיונם השלילי עם ברה"מ ב- 1973. על אף האמור אינם שוללים האפשרות כי הסורים יחליטו על הרפתקאה כלשהי כשפרובוקציה טרוריסטית עלולה



ס נ ס ס נ כ ר ק

וי... 2... מחוץ... 2... דפים

סוג בסחוני

דחיפות

תאריך וז"ח

מס' מברק... 418

להיות מהלך הפתיחה שתחייב את ישראל להגיב. החשוב הטורי יתבסס על ההנחה שלחימה מתמשכת בחלקה הדרומי של לבנון. מבלי שהדבר יביא לחבוסה חד משמעית לצבא, השלת את אינטרסיה של דמשק בזירה הערבית והבינ"ל כאחד. הצבעתי על כך כי ע"פ הגיון זה לחימה מוגבלת מתמשכת בלבנון נראית כאן שלילית יותר מאשר פעולה בקנה מידה גדול יחסית, עם סיכויים להכרעה מהירה. הוסיף כי חששם העיקרי הוא מהזדורות הדרגתית כאשר פעולה חבלנית תגרור תגובה ישראלית ואז תופעלנה סוללות הטילים הסוריות בלבנון. צעד זה יגרור הקיפה ישראלית נגד הטילים, מעורבות גדולה יותר של ח"א הסורי. תקיפת שדות טוריים כאשר התהליך כולו מתמשך לאורך זמן ופתוח להסתבכויות בינלאומיות.

מכל מקום ברור שהמשטר הסורי פועל היום מתוך חסכול ויאוש ומנסה להכות בכל הכוונים. בנוסף לעיראק, לבנון, ישראל וארה"ב מסתכנים עתה עם צרפת ומאיימים על הסעודים ודורשים מהתורכים לסגור הצינור העיראקי. הסעודים מצידם שלמו בחודש מרץ את "המגיע" לדמשק על פי החלטות בגדאד אך פועלים למניעת שלומים מצד גורמים אחרים. מבטה של סעודיה יחד עם מדינות המפרץ האחרות מופנה לעבר החזית האיראנית כאשר איש אינו יודע כיצד לעמוד מול הכוחות האיראנים. העיראקים "טובעים" בנשק ובציוד שנקנו בסיוע מדינות המפרץ. (יש המעריכים היקף הסיוע בכ- 30 בליון דולר) אך למרות הכל אין מענה לאתגר האיראני. מבחינה מדינית נטללת הדרך להתקרבות בין מצרים ומדינות המפרץ אם כי טרם ברור כיצד ומתי יחורגמו דברים אלה לספת המעשה. עם זאת, כבר היום מתנהלות עסקות רכש גדולות בין עיראק ומצרים, שמלבד ההיבט המדיני תורמות את חלקן לכלכלה המצרית.

סטודנט סיפר כי אחד הנושאים המעסיק אותם כרגע הוא הטכנה של התנקשות קרובה בין צבא תימן וכוחות רד"ת. הצבא התימני - הון לחימתו נגד החזית הדמוקרטית - הגיע לאיזורים דרומיים של תימן לקרבת הגבול הרד"תי - איזור שלא היו מצויים בו מזה תקופה ארוכה. המזכיר חושש מחזית חדשה של מלחמה באמצעות קליינט סובייטי. דאגה זו הינה תוצאה של האזהרות שבאו בנוסח זה מהסעודים הדורשים פעולה אמריקאית נמרצת - כמובן מבלי שמצידם יוכלו לתרום לכך דבר, מלבד סיוע כספי. (התדרוך הגיע לידי אחרי המפגש. אנסה לבחון הנושאים שלא כוסו במפגשים אחרים).

A.P

מ ר ט

אם קשה להג סלמה אנה אלוס אצלו חלילה אל פה



טופס חרוק צפון

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דף \_\_\_\_\_ מחוז \_\_\_\_\_ דפים \_\_\_\_\_  
שם \_\_\_\_\_  
מיווג בסהוגני: \_\_\_\_\_  
רגיל: \_\_\_\_\_

961830

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תאריך זיהוי: \_\_\_\_\_  
כס. מכרטיס: \_\_\_\_\_  
לשימוש  
שירות  
הקשר

אל: קדישאי, מנהל לשכת רוה"מ

דל: אליצור, משה"ח.

מאה: השגריר, נאו"ם.

הזמנת רוה"מ ע"י קרן שוויצר. שלך 804.

1. יש להבדיל בין העצרת המיוחדת בעניין פרוק נשק של האו"ם שתקיים כאן בין ה-7 ביוני וה-9 ביולי ובין הארוע המתוכנן מסעט קרן שוויצר שיערך בימים 27 עד 30 ביוני.
2. הנשיא רייגן אמר לחופיע במוי עצרת האו"ם, לפי המשוער ב-17 ביוני לאחר שובו מסעגת נאטו בכוך. גם ראשי המדינות והממשלות האחרים שיבואו לניו-יורק יופיעו בעצרת האו"ם. זכות זו שמורה כסובך גם לרוה"מ.
3. הוויכוח הכללי בעצרת פרוק הנשק יסתיים לפי המשוער ב-23 ביוני.

הב שמה.

בלום

הנה שיהינסטהי אנא אלהא אלוה אבא

תאריך: 26.4.82 השולח: י. בלום אליו מנהל המחלקה: \_\_\_\_\_ חתימה: \_\_\_\_\_

A LARGE FOLLOWING IN THE STATE OF HARYANA, WHERE THE MOST CRITICAL ELECTIONS WILL BE TAKING PLACE. BEFORE MR. LAL'S RETURN TO THE FOLD MONDAY, MR. DVANI HAD SAID THAT THE SPLIT OF THE LOK DAL HAD FAVORED MRS. GANDHI, BUT THAT MORE PRE-ELECTION MANEUVERING SEEMED LIKELY.

THE PROSPECTS OF A THREE-CORNERED RACE RATHER THAN A HEAD-TO-HEAD CONFRONTATION WITH A TACTICALLY UNIFIED OPPOSITION FAVORS MRS. GANDHI'S PARTY. NONETHELESS, WITH GRASS-ROOTS DEFECTIONS REPORTED IN THE PARTY ORGANIZATION OF MANY STATES, THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS ARE ALREADY PROVING TO BE THE SEVEREST POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO MRS. GANDHI SINCE SHE RETURNED TO POWER WITH A SWEEPING PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

(END FS MATERIAL -- PRECEDING NOT FOR PUBLICATION)  
ITEM

NESSA-103 (4/26/82)

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

MIDDLE EAST REPORTING IN THE U. S. PRESS (2100)

NEW YORK TIMES, SPECIAL FROM WASHINGTON:

PRESIDENT REAGAN ASSURED PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN OF ISRAEL AND PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT TODAY (APRIL 25) THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS "FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FURTHER PROGRESS" IN CARRYING OUT THE UNRESOLVED PART OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS DEALING WITH SELF-RULE FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP.

THE ASSURANCES, MADE IN TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE TWO LEADERS, WERE PART OF AN ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO SIGNAL A FULL-SCALE EFFORT TO END THE LONG STALEMATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON PROVIDING AUTONOMY FOR THE 1.3 MILLION PALESTINIAN ARABS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

AN OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, ISSUED TO MARK THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELIS FROM SINAI TODAY, SAID



PAGE 02 -- MIDEAST

AGREEMENT ON THE AUTONOMY ISSUE "WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK, BUT WITH THE EXAMPLE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL BEFORE US, IT CAN BE ACHIEVED."...

SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR. IN RECENT MONTHS HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ENERGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS, BUT HE HAS BEEN SIDETRACKED IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS BY THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS. RICHARD FAIRBANKS, A FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, HAS BEEN NAMED BY MR. HAIG AS HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS, AND HE AND A GROUP OF EXPERTS HAD BEEN WORKING ON IDEAS TO SUBMIT TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT ONCE THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED.

THERE HAS BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHEN AND WHERE THE TALKS SHOULD RESUME. ISRAEL HAS INSISTED THAT THEY TAKE PLACE IN CARIO, JERUSALEM OR WASHINGTON, A DEMAND THAT INVOLVES ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THEY HAVE INVITED ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO WASHINGTON, BUT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT AS YET.

PAGE 03 -- MIDEAST

TALKS WITH OFFICIALS FROM ALL THREE COUNTRIES INDICATE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE YET TO RESOLVE TWO MAJOR ISSUES. ONE IS THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON THE SIZE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY. EGYPT WANTS A LARGE BOD, OF ABOUT 30 MEMBERS, TO HAVE NOT ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS BUT ALSO LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ONES....

ANOTHER POINT AT ISSUE CONCERNS THE SECTION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS THAT CALLS FOR ISRAELI FORCES TO WITHDRAW TO AGREED PLACES IN THE OCCUPIED REGION AND FOR THE ISRAELI MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO BE "WITHDRAWN." BUT THERE IS DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE THAT ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES SHOULD PLAY IN THE FUTURE. THE ISRAELIS WANT TO BE ABLE TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT SUBERSION FROM THE PALESTINE.



LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OR OTHER FORCES OPPOSED TO ISRAEL,  
WHILE EGYPT WANTS THE ISRAELIS TO BE LIMITED TO PROTECTING  
ISRAEL FROM EXTERNAL ATTACK.

THERE IS ALSO DISAGREEMENT ON WATER RIGHTS IN THE AREA,  
WITH THE ISRAELIS WANTING SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL. AREAS IN

PAGE 04 -- MIDEAST

ISRAEL, AS WELL AS JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED AREA,  
DEPEND ON WATER FROM THE WEST BANK.

ANOTHER QUESTION -- PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT -- IS THE  
STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS RESIDING IN EAST JERUSALEM.  
THAT PART OF JERUSALEM, LIKE THE WEST BANK, WAS ADMINISTERED  
BY JORDAN BEFORE THE 1967 WAR AND WAS CAPTURED BY ISRAEL IN  
THAT WAR...

WHEN NEGOTIATIONS RESUME, THE ADMINISTRATION PLANS TO  
STRESS THAT SUCH QUESTIONS AS SOVEREIGNTY ARE NOT GERMANE TO  
THIS STAGE OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, BECAUSE ALL THAT IS  
NECESSARY IS THE SETTING UP OF A TRANSITIONAL SELF-GOVERNING  
AUTHORITY.

THOSE IN THE ADMINISTRATION WHO BELIEVE AN AGREEMENT IS  
POSSIBLE SAY THAT THE TIME THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD OF  
AUTONOMY ENDS, MR. BEGIN MAY BE GONE FROM POWER AND A NEW  
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE AREA.

THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO PERSUADE PALESTINIANS IN THE  
REGION TO AGREE TO TAKE PART IN A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY  
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD BE FAR BETTER FROM THEIR

PAGE 05 -- MIDEAST

POINT OF VIEW THAN DOING NOTHING AND THEREBY ENCOURAGING  
ISRAELI ANNEXATION.

WASHINGTON POST, WILLIAM CLAIBORNE IN JERUSALEM:

ISRAEL DECLARED TODAY THAT IT HAS REACHED THE LIMIT OF  
ITS CONCESSIONS WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS ARMED FORCES AND  
CIVILIAN SETTLERS FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA AND WILL TURN ITS  
ATTENTION TO INCREASING JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED  
WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP.





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# official text

APRIL 26, 1982

1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE RELEASE REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

THE WHITE HOUSE, APRIL 25 -- "WE NOTE TODAY THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION BY ISRAEL OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA AND THE REESTABLISHMENT THERE OF FULL EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT WITHDRAWAL REPRESENTS A TRULY MAJOR SACRIFICE BY ISRAEL AND HE ADMIRES ITS COURAGE IN TAKING THE GREAT RISKS WHICH TRUE PEACE REQUIRES. HE ADMIRES AS WELL THE COURAGEOUS EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WITHOUT WHICH PEACE WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

"ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN THE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, PEACEFUL RELATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN BY US ALL AS THE MODEL FOR THE FUTURE IN THAT TROUBLED REGION. THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE COURSE OF PEACE, UNDER CAMP DAVID, WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND DEDICATION. IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK BUT, WITH THE EXAMPLE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL BEFORE US, IT CAN BE ACHIEVED."

2. REMARKS BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE SPOKESMAN REGARDING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, APRIL 25 -- "THE PRESIDENT HAD PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN THIS AFTERNOON. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL ADMIRATION TO BOTH MEN AND TO THEIR COUNTRIES FOR THEIR STATESMANSHIP AND THE RISKS THEY HAVE TAKEN TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. IN TALKING TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WAS A VERY DIFFICULT UNDERTAKING FOR ISRAEL. HE EXTENDED WARM PRAISE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK FOR EGYPT'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED TO BOTH MEN THAT HE AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS AND READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY THAT WE CAN."

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# official text

APRIL 26, 1982

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S LETTER OF APRIL 20 ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN REAFFIRMING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AMONG NATIONS REPRESENTS THE FOREMOST GOAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, FOR ONLY THROUGH PEACE CAN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ACHIEVE SECURITY, PROSPERITY AND HOPE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS. I KNOW THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLES, HAVING SUFFERED THE RAVAGES OF WAR FOR SO MANY YEARS, SHARE THIS VISION OF PEACE AND HOPE. THUS IT WAS THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLES, THROUGH THEIR LEADERS BROKE THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND EMBRACED IN PEACE. IN THESE TIMES OF TENSIONS AND VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY THEREFORE REPRESENT THE HIGHEST STANDARD AGAINST WHICH OTHER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE MUST BE MEASURED. AS WE APPROACH THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, I THEREFORE WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM WITH YOU THE COMMITMENTS OF PEACE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT CONTINUE TO BE CENTRAL ELEMENTS IN THE SECURITY POLICY OF MY ADMINISTRATION FOR THE REGION. IT IS THEREFORE IN THE UNITED STATES' ABIDING SECURITY INTERESTS TO ENSURE THAT THE TREATY OF PEACE IS RIGOROUSLY APPLIED AND RESPECTED AND THAT CHALLENGES TO IT FROM WHATEVER QUARTER ARE MET AND OVERCOME. I AM COMMITTED TO THIS END.

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS CREATED BY THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IS INSTRUCTED BY THE PROTOCOL TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX I OF THE PEACE TREATY AND TO EMPLOY ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY VIOLATION OF ITS TERMS. THE PROTOCOL ALSO PROVIDES FOR MFO ARRANGEMENTS ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. I REALIZE THAT THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MFO DUTIES IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL. I THEREFORE REAFFIRM OUR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE MFO AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER OF THE UNITED STATES TO YOU AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL.

02





THE ABILITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO PROVIDE FOR ITS SELF-DEFENSE IS A VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDINGLY, AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, I AM DETERMINED TO SEE THAT ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE IS MAINTAINED AND AM MINDFUL AS WELL OF YOUR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO QUANTITATIVE FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON ISRAEL'S SECURITY. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THAT FULFILLMENT OF THE BINDING OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY SINCE 1973 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, REMAINS A CENTRAL ASPECT OF OUR POLICY.

IT IS EQUALLY IN OUR SECURITY INTEREST TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. YOU, PRESIDENT MUBARAK, AND I ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY AGREED PLAN TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO MAKE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PURSUE AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR FULL AUTONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY (ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL) FOR THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AS CALLED FOR IN THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT.

IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THIS TASK, ALL SIDES MUST MAINTAIN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH HAS MARKED OUR EFFORTS TO DATE. AS A FULL PARTNER IN THIS EFFORT, LET ME ASSURE YOU OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND CONTINUING SUPPORT.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, I AM FULLY SENSITIVE TO THE ANGUISH YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL ARE EXPERIENCING IN THESE DIFFICULT DAYS AND THE WEIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY YOU BEAR IN FACING THE RISKS WHICH REMAIN. I AM CONVINCED THAT HISTORY WILL SHOW THAT YOUR SACRIFICES HAVE ENSURED THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE.

WITH MY HIGHEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN





22K

# official text

APRIL 26, 1982

## 1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE RELEASE REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

THE WHITE HOUSE, APRIL 25 -- "WE NOTE TODAY THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION BY ISRAEL OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE SINAI PENINSULA AND THE REESTABLISHMENT THERE OF FULL EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT WITHDRAWAL REPRESENTS A TRULY MAJOR SACRIFICE BY ISRAEL AND HE ADMIRES ITS COURAGE IN TAKING THE GREAT RISKS WHICH TRUE PEACE REQUIRES. HE ADMIRES AS WELL THE COURAGEOUS EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WITHOUT WHICH PEACE WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

"ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN THE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, PEACEFUL RELATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN BY US ALL AS THE MODEL FOR THE FUTURE IN THAT TROUBLED REGION. THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE COURSE OF PEACE, UNDER CAMP DAVID, WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND DEDICATION. IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK BUT, WITH THE EXAMPLE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL BEFORE US, IT CAN BE ACHIEVED."

## 2. REMARKS BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE SPOKESMAN REGARDING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, APRIL 25 -- "THE PRESIDENT HAD PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN THIS AFTERNOON. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL ADMIRATION TO BOTH MEN AND TO THEIR COUNTRIES FOR THEIR STATESMANSHIP AND THE RISKS THEY HAVE TAKEN TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE MIDEAST. IN TALKING TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WAS A VERY DIFFICULT UNDERTAKING FOR ISRAEL. HE EXTENDED WARM PRAISE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK FOR EGYPT'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED TO BOTH MEN THAT HE AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS AND READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY THAT WE CAN."

0 1





אכ: 1101, נר: 731, ת: המשרד  
דח: ר, סג: ס, תא: 260482, דח: 1400  
נד: סנפיר וטיראן

ט/א

סודי/רגיל

בכל

סנפיר וטיראן

שוחחתי מספר פעמים בימים האחרונים עם קוואק בנושא זה הגם  
שהיה סרוד ככולנו למעלה מהראש בעניני המומי, תחילה בקשר  
למכתב הנשיא ריגן ואחכ' למאבה.

לאחר שהובהר לנו מושיינגטון כי עליו למפל אמר שיש בידו נוסח  
המכניס שינויים בהצעתנו אך המנסה לכתב לקראתנו. נוסח זה  
יעבור באמצעותך ונוכל להעיר ולסכם. אנא עקוב לאחר שובוכם כי  
אני הניח  
סיפנה מיומנו

חובל למסור לו לידיעה את נוסח ה-  
NOTE VERBALE שחטרנו בקהיר בנושא זה (חומר 937)

רובינשטיין \*

אפ: טהח, סטהח, רהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ד/מרכז, דם, אמן,  
מח, רובינשטיין, משפט, מצפא, דיבון, מצרים





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9152

יוציא

תמוז

מל: נ, ו, ו, נד: חוום 121, ה: המשרד  
מ: מ, סג: ש, מא: 260462, ח: 1630  
נד: עצרת החרום

תמוז/מיד

גאויים

דע: שגיוטינגטון

עצרת החירום.

היר משנ' ארה"ב התקשר כדי למסור שקלטו ידיעות לפיהן השמיט  
השגריר בלוס DEMARCHE באוני' מוכי'ל האוי'ים כי ישראל תפסיק  
את פעילות האוי'ים מצלינו אם העצרת תקבל החלטה שתכלול את  
הטעמי על עיון מחדש (REVIEW) בחברותנו. שאל אם זה נכון.

אמרו שהידיעה נכונה אבל בלתי מדוייקת: בלוס אמר למוזכ'יל  
שקבלת החלטה כזאת תחייב אותנו לשקול את יחסנו לנוכחות  
האוי'ים ופעילותו כאן. הוספתי שהתדשתי כי המוזכ'יל טמח על  
יינסקיי'י והשיטי'ט במאמציו להניא משלחות המתמוך בניר הערבי.  
היו אישר כי אכן המוזכ'יל פועל במדץ והוסיף שארה"ב פעילה  
בגידות רבות.

שאלתי האם נוסף לבירור דיוקה של הידיעה יש לו מה להעיר לגוף  
הענין. השיב שאחרי הבהרת אין לו הערה ורק שאל האם הדברים  
היו על רגל השן. אישרתי זאת. יבוא למשרד ביום חמישי כדי לספר  
לנו על פעילותם בעקבות פגישתנו עם בראון ואמו ב-2 באפריל.

אליצור. ==

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אליצור, ארנבל, מצפא, רובינסון, מהת



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הק

9106

יציא

שמו

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מכ: נוש, נד: 748, מ: המשד  
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 260482, וח: 1700  
נד: העסקה הירדנית

טל

שמו/רני

קני

העסקה הירדנית. למברק 358

ישנה אי בהירות במברק מניחים שהמלה 'לא' נשמטה בטעות וכי  
צריך לקרוא 'מתגבשת נטייה לא למכור לירדן טילי הוק וכו'.  
אשרוא

מצפא

פ: שח, סשהח, רהח, סרהח, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ר/מרכו, דס, אמח,  
חח, מצפא





the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are aged 65 and over has increased from 10.5 million to 13.5 million (19.5% of the population).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of older people, and the Government has set out a strategy for the 21st century in the White Paper on *Ageing Better: The Government's Strategy for Older People* (Department of Health 1999). This strategy is based on the following principles:

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# Camp David: Its promise, its progress

2-1/C

By John Maclean

WASHINGTON—With the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the burden of Middle East peace efforts once again falls on the United States.

The Reagan administration, which has played down its role in the Arab-Israeli dispute in favor of strengthening ties to anti-Communist Arab countries, now comes face to face with the abiding problem of the region: what to do about the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

John Maclean is a member of The Tribune's Washington Bureau.

That problem appears farther from solution today than it did in September, 1978, when Israel, Egypt and the U.S. signed the Camp David accords after a 13-day summit in the Maryland mountains.

Since then the Arab world has turned its back on the vague "framework" for settling the future of the West Bank and Gaza contained in the Camp David accords.

ISRAEL HAS PURSUED an inflammatory policy of "creeping annexation" of the occupied territories, increasing settlements and using an iron fist against the Palestinian inhabitants.

The Palestinians have refused to take any diplomatic initiative on their own behalf despite urgings by many, such as their friends in Europe.

And the Reagan administration has given low priority to the talks between Israel and Egypt on Palestinian autonomy, in sharp contrast to the great emphasis laid on that side of the negotiations by the Carter administration.

As a result, the Camp David accords have been only half fulfilled at this point. Camp David contained two agreements, one dealing with Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula and a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the other with the framework for the future of the occupied territories.

The first half is being concluded. The treaty exists and the land is being returned.

The second half never has gotten beyond the talking stage between Egypt and Israel. The Camp David negotiators recommended a series of steps leading to "negotiation of the final status of Gaza and the West Bank."

AS A FIRST STEP, Jordan was invited to help plan a five-year transitional "self-government authority" for the two areas. Once the self-governing authority was elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza "to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants," the existing Israeli military government and its civilian administration were to be withdrawn.

Israel's armed forces were to be reduced to about 6,000 and posted well away from cities. A strong local police force was envisioned, and Israeli and Jordanian forces were to man jointly control posts at border points.

No later than the third year after the transitional government took control, negotiations were to be held to determine the permanent status of the occupied territories and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

When Jordan refused to take part, Israel and Egypt began separate "autonomy talks" that have continued intermittently and with out success since then.

This failure threatens the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations in the days ahead.

Without progress on the Palestinian question, Egypt likely will drift away from its alliance with Israel and back toward the Arab fold.

SHOULD THIS be a cause for great alarm among Americans?

Americans have watched a succession of their presidents and diplomats become mired in the Middle East problem, shuttling between Mideast capitals, holding exhausting summits, wiping all other items from their agendas.

Americans accepted Camp David because it looked like a winner. It remains the one bright note in Jimmy Carter's presidency, a fact appreciated by no one more than Carter, who has sensed that Camp David is slipping badly and has offered his services in mediating among the parties. The Reagan administration has made no rush to accept.

But the American vision of Camp David has been confused from the beginning. The first and most damaging miscalculation was the assumption that moderate Arab states, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular, would go

along with Camp David, although they had not been included in the deliberations.

The negotiators at Camp David even included a clause they thought would allow the Palestinians to participate in deciding their fate.

"The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed," the accords said. It was understood that Palestinians with PLO sympathies could be part of the Arab delegations as long as they did not flaunt their PLO connections.

NO ONE HAD consulted the Palestinians, Jordanians or Saudis, however. The negotiators saw the glass half full; the Arabs looking in from the outside saw it half empty.

Egypt's Anwar Sadat had taken the step alone to open direct negotiations with the Israelis. The other Arabs chose not to follow for reasons that might have been anticipated.

"By entering into direct negotiations with Israel, the Arab states would be giving her a vital token of recognition," historian Bernard Lewis wrote as early as January, 1975, in Commentary magazine. "By refusing to negotiate, they were maintaining their refusal to recognize her existence. For Arabs and Israelis alike, the question of direct

negotiations thus acquired a symbolic significance."

The second major mistake was Carter's decision not to oppose Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on a key question left hanging after Camp David: Had Begin agreed to a five-year moratorium on new settlements in the occupied territories? His foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, and American officials said he had. Begin said no.

The watching Arab world at that time regarded the promise of a moratorium the one tangible accomplishment of Camp David, which they otherwise judged a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace excluding the Palestinian problem.

IN THE RUSH to get from Camp David to the White House to announce the accords, the language on the moratorium had not been put into final form.

At a background briefing for reporters, then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, banging his fist onto a pile of notes in an uncharacteristically emotional gesture, expressed disbelief that Begin could deny he had promised such a moratorium. The agreement was right there in his notes, Vance insisted.

There it remained. Instead of a moratorium, Begin announced a new plan to expand the number of settlements and increase the number of settlers at existing ones. During the last four years, the implementation of that plan has corroded what little hope the Arabs held for Camp David.

At a later background session with the press, after he left office, Vance acknowledged that Carter had counted up the political cost of opposing Begin on the moratorium and made his decision to forgo the battle.

These errors helped create Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's isolation in the Arab world, which led to his assassination. The glee with which many Arabs greeted Sadat's murder shocked Americans, as it should have, but it also surprised Americans, which it should not have.

Chicago Tribune  
1/27 3/1/87 2/1/87 9/2/87  
25.4.82



Sadat became a prisoner of his own image as a hero in this country. Americans smiled and nodded and smiled as he spent the last months of his life trying to persuade the U.S. to do something about the Palestinians. Everybody was glad to have Sadat around, the Arab who made friends with Israel, but nobody wanted to listen to what he said.

**ONLY LAST WEEK** Vice President George Bush tried to mollify American Jewish leaders here by defending the Reagan Middle East policy as an effort to "encourage more of them (moderate Arabs) to do what President Sadat did in making peace with Israel."

What President Sadat did was become a martyr to the collective failure to handle the Palestinian problem, a model not likely to invite imitation.

Has the U.S. learned from its errors? One of the lessons is that Arab leaders should be consulted about American policy if they are to be part of it.

But Bush's remarks about Sadat indicate that no one in the Reagan administration has listened to what the Arabs say about Sadat. The Arab leaders who might imitate Sadat loathe his memory.

The Reagan administration has pursued an active diplomacy with the Arabs, but it has been more directed against the Soviet Union than toward progress in Arab-Israeli relations. The Reagan White House first tried to force the ill-fated "strategic consensus" among Arabs and Israelis against the Soviet threat.

**WHEN THE ARAB** leaders told Reagan's envoy, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, they thought Israel a greater threat than the Soviets and the Palestinians a more urgent problem, the administration retrenched.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger carried the banner for the second assault, discussing increased arms sales with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The talks generated no outpouring of gratitude. The Arabs consider such sales a right.

Administration spokesmen have told reporters for many months that they are preparing new ideas for the Arab-Israeli problem. Until the Sinai was returned,

they say, they had to keep these ideas under wraps. Even the slightest public deviation from the Camp David accords would have jeopardized the return of the desert land, they say.

The new ideas "borrow" from the two other autonomy plans that have surfaced since Camp David, the Saudi autonomy plan and the West European initiative, the officials say.

**THE SAUDI PLAN** calls for withdrawal by Israel to its pre-1967 borders, a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital after a transitional period and

a guarantee of the right of all people of the region to live in peace. Begin called it a plan "to liquidate Israel in stages." PLO leader Yasser Arafat called it "a good beginning."

Arab states meeting last November divided over the Saudi proposal that all peoples be allowed to live in peace. Libya led the opposition, calling the Saudi plan worse than Sadat's peacemaking efforts.

"At least Sadat did it alone," said Libya's foreign minister, Abdulati Obeidi. "Sadat was shot for treason, and now the

Arab states are being asked to endorse mass treason."

The Europeans want the PLO brought into the process and have undertaken thus far unsuccessful efforts to get the PLO to accept the existence of Israel.

That would allow the U.S. to deal directly with the PLO, as it is forbidden to do under an agreement with Israel that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger calls the dumbest thing he ever negotiated. Direct negotiations would be more seemly for a superpower, but would they be any more productive than direct

talks by the Europeans?

Perhaps. The PLO would get a dose of prestige from talking with the U.S. That could make it more arrogant or more flexible. As an organization, it has a record of providing an authentic voice for Palestinian aspirations and of using that voice to destroy opportunities for a negotiated settlement with the Israelis.

**THE REAGAN** administration has shown more inclination to deal with Arab governments that can represent the Palestinians than with the Palestinians themselves. Despite protestations that they have yet to show their true colors in Mideast diplomacy, this attitude likely will continue.

The Reagan administration feels none of the affinity for Third World causes the Carter administration did. Carter likely would have broken the mold and dealt directly with the Palestinians, or so many within his administration hoped and many in Israel feared.

And it may simply be too late in Reagan's term to take on a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is what the Palestinians want to talk about. Time must pass for the Sinai withdrawal to be digested. Until Israel is convinced Egypt isn't going to run out on Camp David, the Jewish nation will be unwilling to focus on anything new, especially a radical shift from Camp David.

But the pressure will be on the U.S., nonetheless, to provide the energy and wield the influence to bring progress.

**LEFT ON ITS** own, Israel will continue to try to sever the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza from the PLO. But that connection has grown into a Gordian knot.

The Egyptians, with the Sinai theirs again, will not likely stick out their necks for the Palestinians. And the moderate Arab states prefer to sit back.

If an American effort is to have a hope of success, it will take Reagan's personal attention backed up by a well thought out strategy from the bureaucracy. Neither appears manifest today.

*Chicago Tribune*


### Mideast peace proposals compared

Issue	Camp David	Saudi Arabia*	European [Common Market]
Palestinian issue	Autonomy for Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza, with transitional period of not more than five years once self-governing council is in place. During five years, final status of areas determined, ending with Israel-Jordan treaty. Jordan would be invited to help set up autonomy.	Establishment of independent Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza; compensation for Palestinians who choose not to return.	Self-determination; "association" of PLO with peace talks.
Israel borders	To be determined in negotiations during five-year transition.	Revert to pre-1967 war.	Revert to pre-1967 war.
Israel settlements	To be determined in negotiations during five-year transition.	Removal of settlements from West Bank, Gaza.	"Legal under international law"
Jerusalem	Not specified under accords.	Becomes capital of Palestinian state with guarantee of freedom of worship.	No "unilateral initiative... to change [its] status"
Security	Multinational peacekeeping forces.	United Nations mandate over Gaza, West Bank for several months during transition.	"Concrete and binding international guarantees" with European participation.

\*Tentatively backed by Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman  
 Note: Camp David and Saudi plans do not formally deal with the issue of recognition of Israel; Camp David said signatories shall grant full recognition.

*P. 2/1/77 2/10*









אל: המסרד

ט ו פ ס  
 דף... 1... סמלון... דפים  
 סווג בטחוני... שמנה...  
 דחיפות... מינימי...  
 האריך וז"ח... 2243012...  
 מס' מברק... 303...

אנה

מצפ"א ממ"ד

פגישות אבן עם הסנטורים מטיאס, סרבנס וג'קסון

1. מטיאס בראשית דבריו ציין אבן בטיפוק כי לא מצא בחוגי הממשל שינוי לגבי המחויבות לתהליך ק.ד. לדעתו שיחות האוטונומיה מהוות מסגרת נאותה להתקדם בדרך לפתרון הבעיה הטלתינית. עמד על המסורת הערבית לדחות פתרונות מעשיים ולהתחרט על כך לאחור מכן. מטיאס ביקש לדעת כיצד ישראלים מעריכים כוונות מובארכ. אבן עמד על ההבדלים בין טאדה לבין מובארכ וציין שדווקא האחרון, המדינאי הפרגמטי, מטוגל להביא את חוסין למעגל השיחות.

2. מטיאס מודאג מהיעדר מינוי נשיאותי לגבי השליח המיוחד לשיחות האוטונומיה ושיבח בהקשר זה את לינוביץ. אבן עמד על הצורך בתרומה אמריקנית להמרצת הצדדים. מטיאס ביקש פליטים על הלך הרוחות בארץ ונענה ברוח הדברים שאבן מסר לקרלוזי. (ראה דוח נפרד). אבן הדגיש כי העולם הערבי לא יכול לדרוש התאפקות מישראל טעה שאינו מוכן לבוא לשולחן המו"מ.

3. אבן העלה חשיבות שיטת הענישה כלפי ישראל והעלה חשיבות הסיוע לישראל, תוך התייחסות ספציפית לצורך להחזיר את מפתח החלוקה של 50% - 50% לגבי מענקים והלוואות. מטיאס הציע תמיכה בכך במסגרת האילוצים המוכתבים ע"י המסגר הכלכלי בארה"ב. באשר לשיטת הענישה ציין מטיאס כי הוא שולל גישה זו, אולם באותה מידה מתנגד לשיטת ההפתעות. תחושה שאין התייעצות או הבחנת כוונות. אבן הדגיש כי התייעצויות יוצרות אסליה של

collusion

4. מטיאס שאל לגבי המצב בלבנון. אבן סיפר כי מתרשם שישנה נטיה לצנן המצב. לדעתו לא היה קונסנטוס לאומי לגבי פעולת קרקע גדולה בלבנון והממשלה הבינה זאת. מטיאס הביע תקווה כי התאפקות ישראל לגבי לבנון הימשך משום שפעולה גדולה תיצור קשיים, בתום הפגישה תביע מטיאס כוונה לבוא לביקור בארץ בחורף הקרוב.

5. סרבנס, השיחה עימו התנהלה ברוח דומה לפגישה עם מטיאס. אבן העלה נושא הסיוע לישראל והצורך בסיפור הנאיו. סרבנס הבטיח לסייע. אבן שלל מדינה אש"פית. הדגיש כי

סגרירות ישראל וטינגטון

ט ו פ ס

דפ. .... מתוך ..... דסים  
סודי  
סוג בטחוני  
חטיפות ..... מידי  
תאריך וז"ח 8242312  
מס' מברק 358

אל: המשרד

אלה

מצפ"א ממ"ד

העסקה הירדנית.

קן וואלק מתרשם, על סמך שיחות עם אנשי ממסל, כי מתגבשת, כנראה, צטיה למכור לירדן טילי הוק ביידיים ו- F-16. במקום זה מתגבשת עסקה אשר תכלול מטוסי F-5G ו- upgrading של כל צי מטוסי ה- F-5 (קרבות ה- F-5E) ע"י מכירת טילי Sidewinder . Bomb racks, Maverick

קני-טל

שהח ס/שהח רהא סורהא מנפס מ/מנפס שהב קניי רובינסטין לנ3טא  
ר/לכב ומת רפ אלן







שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלקטרו

ט ו פ ס  
דף... מתוך... דפים  
טווג בטחוני...  
דחיסות...  
מאריך וז"ח... 8252016  
מס' מברק... 300

כ/כ

הצפ"א מרכז מזא"ר

שיחה עם I. N. LIMBERG מהמח' הסובייטית ב.א. I. N.

מצרים

לימברג סיפר שלפני עזיבת משרדו היום, הגיעה לידינו ידיעה שהובאה ע"י אחת הסוכנויות הפחות מוכרות ושכנה מספר על החלפת שגרירים בין מצרים לברה"ם וכן על איחולים שנמסרו לקראת מאורע זה (שיתבצע כפי הנראה אחר 25/4) מטעם ברה"ם. לימברג הוסיף שלא ראה שום אישור על ידיעה זו ממקור אחר. כוונת הצדדים למנות שגרירים ידועה מזה זמן כך שהידיעה הנוכחית מפתיעה רק מבחינת עיתוייה. בסה"כ מבינים כי מובארכ חותר ל"נרמול" היחסים עם מוסקבה - זאת במקביל לתהליך דומה שבכוונתו לממש גם עם העולם הערבי ומדינות העולם השלישי. ארה"ב אינה מתלהבת מתהליך זה, מאידך אינה מוטרדת ממנו ובהיבטים מסויימים רואה בו גם מספר צדדים חיוביים, אין חושבים כי הנרמול עם הסובייטים ישנה ביסודו את מערכת היחסים במשולש המצרי-אמריקאי-סובייטי. ייתכן כי יגיעו עוד מספר מומחים סובייטיים ע"מ לטפל במפעלים העשיתיים שנבנו בעזרת מוסקבה. אולי יהיו גם גילויים אחרים של יחסים השופרים יותר, אך בעיקרה תישאר מצרים קשורה לארה"ב. מכל מקום ברור שהקצונה המצרית אינה רוצה לשמוע על הידוק מערכת היחסים עם ברה"ם.

שאלתי על מידע כלשהו בעניין אספקת חלקי חלוף או ציוד צבאי מברה"ם. לימברג השיב כי עד כמה שידוע להם מגיעים, מידי סעם, משלוחים סובייטיים שאינם אלא מילוי אחר התחייבויות במסגרת החוזים שנחתמו בעבר. כשהגבתי בפליאה על כך שלאחר מספר שנים כה רב קיימים עדיין חוזים בעלי תוקף, חזר לימברג ואישר שאכן בכך מדובר ואף הוסיף שמכל מקום הכמויות הן מועריות (?).

העליתי שוב הנושא של התחייבויות מוסקבה כלפי דמשק במקרה של פעולות איבה באיזור. לימברג סיפר כי חזרו ודנו בעניין זה בקהילת המודיעין האמריקאי והדיעה הנוכחית היא כדלקמן:

א. הסורים מפעילים לחץ מתמיד על מוסקבה כדי שזו תקבל על עצמה מחוייבות מפורשת בכל האפשר לבוא לעזרתה של טוריה במקרה של התקפה ישראלית. ברור גם שמוסקבה אינה



ט ד ס ט  
 2... מחור... 5... דפים  
 סוג בטחוני  
 דחיפות  
 תאריך וז"ח  
 306 מס' מברק

מתלבת מקבלת התחייבויות מוגדרות. מאידך נראה שבלחץ הטורים נאלצו הטובייטים לחייב עצמם לפתוח במידה מוגבלת.

ב. התחייבויות אלו באו על רקע העלאת סצנריו שונים - כל אחד חמור יותר מקודמו. לימברג הצביע על שלושה מהם: חקירת המחבלים בלבד בלבנון; חקירת המחבלים יחד עם חלק מהכוחות הסורים בלבנון; חקירת בלבנון המתפתחת להתמודדות עם הצבא הסורי בלבנון ובשלב מאוחר יותר גם בטריטוריה הסורית.

ג. עד כמה שניתן להעריך (לימברג הדגיש שמדובר בהערכה) הטובייטים יהיו מוכנים לתת עזרה באינטו ובהפעלת מערכת ההגנה האווירית הסורית אך ורק במקרה של מעורבות סורית ישירה בהתמודדות עם כוחות ישראלים בלבנון. זאת כמובן בנוסף להבטחות של Re Supply אם מצב הכוחות הסורים יחייב זאת.

ד. לשאלתי השיב שלדעת קהילת המודיעין האמריקאי רק במקרה הקיצוני ביותר של התמוטטות הצבא הסורי יהיו הטובייטים מוכנים לנסות בצעדים מרחיקי לכת וגם במקרה זה יימנעו-קרוב לוודאי ממצב של קונפורטציה ישירה עם כוחות ישראלים. עם זאת בהחלט רואים את האפשרות של העמדת כוחות מוטסים בכוננות במיוחד משום שצעד זה הינו האמצעי הטוב ביותר להפעלת לחץ על וושינגטון בכדי שזו תרסן את ישראל.

לימברג סיפר כי באחד ממוסדות המחקר הוכנה עבודה על נטילת סיכון מצד ברה"מ בקונפליקטים בינ"ל. מסקנות המחקר מצביעות כי הנסיון מלמד על נכונות טובייטית גדולה יותר להסתכן במהלכים צבאיים למען שמירת הקיים מאשר במצבים בהם מוטקבה מתכוונת להגיע להישג חדש. ייתכן שקביעה זו רלוונטית גם לגבי הנושא הסורי.

איראן

לימברג חזר לפני זמן מה מכנס נאט"ו שם סקרו מצב החדירה הטובייטית לאיראן והתגמות הטובייטיות במלחמת המפרץ. הסיכום, על דעת כולם, שברה"מ לא הצליחה לחדור למערכת הבטחון הפנימית האיראנית. אין גם אימות כלשהו על המצאת מתקני האזנה טובייטים בטחנה של איראן. לעומת זאת ידוע על נוכחות טכנאים טובייטים העוסקים בהחזקת ציוד טובייטי (שהיה ברשות הצבא האיראני) וגם בטיפול בשלל שנלקח במהלך הקרבות עם איראן.



סגירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל:

ט ד ס ט  
 דף... מתוך... דפים  
 טווג בטחוני  
 דחיפות  
 תאריך וז"ח  
 300  
 מסי מברק

ההנחה כאן שהטובייטים אינם מעוניינים בנצחון ברור של אף אחד מהצדדים. נצחון כזה -  
 ואין זה משנה אם מדובר בעיראק או באיראן - ייפגע באינטרסים ארוכי טווח באיזור.  
 מעניין, אומר לימברג, כי זיווקא בתקופה זו מצא לנכון הירחון הסובייטי "זמנים  
 חדשים" לחדש את הצעת מוסקבה לשמש כמחוזות להשגת פתרון בדרכי שלום במלחמה.  
 טענת הירחון - שרק ארה"ב וישראל מסיקות תועלת מהמשך המלחמה - ולדעת לימברג  
 הסובייטים אכן מאמינים בכך.

ברה"מ-פנים

בעוד שאין ידיעות חדשות על מצב בריאותו של ברג'נייב, אין ספק כי במוסקבה החל  
 המאבק על הירושה. ברג'נייב ניסה לקדם את צ'ראניאנקו והדבר נחשל. כנראה, בהתנגדות  
 גורמים בעלי משקל כצמרת. (לימברג הזכיר את יוסטינוב, גרומיקו, וכמוכן את קירלנקו).  
 הטענות נגד צ'ראניאנקו הן כי האיש חסר נטיון לא רק בתחום מדיניות החוץ ובעיות  
 הבטחון אלא גם במישור המנהל בדרג העליון.

ל.א.  
מרוק.

(הטענה היא שזוהי סתירה מוחלטת בין  
 הצדדים והיא לא תיפתר אלא  
 באמצעות פשרה)



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- 3 2/ JAN 4 13

In Kenya, the group visited the Mombasa port, where the U.S. is improving harbor facilities. It is the largest port in East Africa. It is linked by rail and roadway to a number of countries in the region served by the port.

In Mauritius, the delegation met with Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, his cabinet, and Governor-General Sir Dayendranath Ourrenchobay. It was the first visit by a U.S. congressional delegation. U.S.-Mauritian relations were discussed, including the employment of additional Mauritians on Diego Garcia. Mauritius, a non-aligned democratic state, represents a pro-western voice in that strategic region of the Indian Ocean.

In South Africa, the delegation met with senior foreign ministry and defense officials who briefed the group on Soviet-Cuban activities in southern Africa. Dr. Brandt Fourie, Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, who is slated to become South Africa's Ambassador to the United States next week, provided an overview on the South African role in Namibia.

"The trip provided an excellent opportunity to obtain firsthand information on the present course of events in a critical part of the world." Representative White said. "The United States plays an important role throughout the region, whether in terms of the Rapid Deployment Force, the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, or long-range economic and military assistance for our friends in the region.

"The areas visited by the committee are critical strategically and economically in oil and mineral resources and geographically vital to the security of Western Europe and Japan, which necessitates that these countries share in the burden of preserving their independence and secure status."

Consistent with committee policy, a detailed report, including a classified annex, will be submitted to the full committee.

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4 Jan 3 93

only in extreme cases," Representative Floyd Spence (R-S.C.), the ranking Republican on the Delegation, said. "The RDJTF's effectiveness would depend upon its ability to preposition supplies and deploy rapidly in response to crises."

Following on-site visits to air bases in the Azores and Morocco, the delegation met with President Mubarak of Egypt. He said that Egypt remains committed to the peace process established under the Camp David accords and wants to move on to resolving the Palestinian autonomy issue after the return of the Sinai to Egypt on April 25, 1982.

The delegation met with the Egyptian Defense Minister, Field Marshall Mohamed Abu Ghazala. He detailed the overall military threat facing Egypt, assessed the impact on the region of the Iranian-Iraqi war and discussed the facilities available to the RDJTF, including Ras Banas which the group subsequently visited.

In Israel, the delegation met with Prime Minister Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Deputy Foreign Minister Yehuda Ben-Mier, and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, all of whom said that Israel was committed to fulfilling its obligations to the peace treaty.

At Ophira in the Sinai, the delegation met with the U.S. contingent of 800 members of the 82nd Airborne Division assigned to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The delegation had an opportunity to talk with individual soldiers about morale aspects associated with the isolated tour.

Construction of facilities for the MFO was started in November 1981 and is expected to be completed by May 1982.

In Oman, meetings were held with Foreign Minister Yusuf al-Alawi Abdullah and the Chief of the Defense Staff, General Sir Timothy Creasey, who reviewed U.S.-Omani relations and the status of the Omani defense force. The delegation visited the Omani Air Base on Masirah Island, located 15 miles off the coast of Oman, and received detailed briefings on issues of joint concern to Oman and



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U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, D.C. 20515

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

MELVIN PRICE (ILL.), CHAIRMAN

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THOMAS P. HATHETT, S.C.  
JOHN J. FORD, STAFF DIRECTOR

ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN LEADERS ASSURE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DELEGATION  
OF COMMITMENT TO MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS

A House Armed Services Committee delegation that returned yesterday from the Middle East was assured by top Israeli and Egyptian leaders that they are committed to continuing the peace process formulated under the Camp David accords.

These assurances were given by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin while the delegation was on a 12-day overseas mission to inspect facilities being developed in several countries for use by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.

The delegation visited the Azores, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Oman, Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa.

During the inspection trip, "we were told consistently that the West, and the United States in particular, should not wait until it is too late to assist freedom loving nations that are threatened by Soviet adventurism. The delegation was advised repeatedly that the Soviet Union, through its surrogates, Libya and Cuba, was on a planned course to undermine the stability of that volatile part of the world," Representative Richard White (D-Tex.), the delegation leader said.

The delegation was told that a permanent U.S. military presence is not sought or involvement of U.S. military forces is not expected in the internal affairs or local border disputes of these countries.

"Above all, the nations we visited want to be self-reliant so that they can defend themselves and view the RDJTF as a supportive force that would be used







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STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 1982 (550)

NEWS BRIEFING -- ALAN ROMBERG, DEPUTY STATE DEPARTMENT  
SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING  
TOPICS:

NO PLANS FOR HABIB TO RETURN TO MIDEAST --

SPECIAL ENVOY PHILIP HABIB IS IN WASHINGTON FOR WHAT  
ROMBERG TERMED "PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED APPOINTMENTS IN  
CONNECTION WITH A PRIVATE TRIP TO CHINA."

HABIB WAS THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT OF THE STRATEGY THAT  
LED TO THE JULY 1981 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ALONG THE  
LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. EARLIER THIS WEEK, THE UNITED  
STATES APPEALED TO ALL PARTIES INVOLVED TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM  
RESTRAINT TO PREVENT AN ESCALATION OR PROLONGATION OF  
VIOLENCE IN THE REGION AFTER RECENT CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS  
AGAINST ISRAELIS AND FOLLOWING ISRAELI BOMBING ATTACKS

PAGE 02 -- STATE

AGAINST PALESTINIAN TARGETS IN LEBANON.

ROMBERG SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN IN REGULAR  
CONTACT WITH HABIB CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON.

"WHILE HE IS HERE HE WILL BE MEETING WITH VARIOUS  
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ROMBERG SAID. "BUT I DON'T KNOW OF ANY PLANS FOR HIM TO GO  
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STOESSEL CONTINUES CAIRO-JERUSALEM SHUTTLE --

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 1982 (558)

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PAGE 58 -- STATE

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESEL CONTINUED TO SHUTTLE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT APRIL 23 IN AN EFFORT TO HELP THE TWO COUNTRIES COMPLETE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APRIL 25 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI.

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ROMBERG SAID STOESEL SPENT MOST OF THE DAY IN CAIRO AND THAT HE HAD RETURNED TO JERUSALEM. THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON STOESEL'S ITINERARY.

D'AUBUISSON ELECTION NOTED --

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COMMENTING ON THE APRIL 22 ELECTION OF ROBERTO D'AUBUISSON OF THE ARENA PARTY TO BE PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR'S NEW CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, ROMBERG SAID:

"THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE SELECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR, WHICH WILL SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS THAT ARE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE CONTINUING AMONG THE PARTIES ON THE SELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT."

ASKED IF D'AUBUISSON'S ELECTION AS ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT MIGHT AFFECT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE ON U.S. AID LEVELS TO EL SALVADOR, ROMBERG SAID "THAT SORT OF SPECULATION IS REALLY INAPPROPRIATE."

WHEN ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IMPORTANT IN A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, ROMBERG SAID "WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR VIEWS BEFORE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY" IN EL SALVADOR AND THOSE VIEWS "REMAIN OPERATIVE."

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTANDS THAT WHILE D'AUBUISSON WILL HEAD THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN EL SALVADOR, TALKS ARE CONTINUING AMONG THE VARIOUS POLITICAL



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PAGE 53 -- STATE

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PAGE 54 -- STATE

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מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק גלוי

דל 1 מתוך 10 דפים

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיסות:

תאריך וזיח': 23/900

מס. מברק: 680

לשימוש  
הקשר

סוכן

אל: ומסדר

56:

מאח: נאר"ם

ארכ"ל 2.

עצרת הרום - סלמסין.

להלן נאום שגדירה ארה"ב כמושב עצרת הרום היום.

סיכור לב שחלק נכבד מנאומה הקדישה לאיום השעיית ישראל מהארבון.

נאר"ם

1 שיה ס' שהי רמה 1+1 1 מנב 1 מנב 2 אצבאו 2 אלו' צור איהב 2 איהב 4 איהב

*[Handwritten signature]*

חתימה:

אשר פנהל המחלקה:

הסולח:



670 7/10  
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRESS RELEASE

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY  
CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY

Press Release USUN 22(82)  
April 23, 1982

STATEMENT BY

AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AT THE SEVENTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION

APRIL 23, 1982



670 3/10

In a letter to President Kittani, which has been circulated at my request as a document of the General Assembly, I stated the reservations of my Government with regard to the "resumption" of the Seventh Emergency Special Session on "The Question of Palestine." I desire to repeat these reservations here.

The Seventh Emergency Special Session adjourned "temporarily" on July 19, 1980, having adopted a resolution which authorized "the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from member states." It seems plain that the purpose of this "temporary" adjournment was to allow for a resumption in the same time frame if events should warrant. Almost two years have passed. During those intervening twenty-one months, two regular sessions of the General Assembly, two different Emergency Sessions, and one Special Session have been held. Yet now, at the request of a group of Members and notwithstanding the passage of a substantial period of time, the Seventh Emergency Special Session has been reconvened without regard to the views of other members, or the developments that have taken place in the interim. Clearly, this dubious procedure of a "resumption" has the effect of undermining the provisions of the rules of procedure for the convening of an Emergency Special Session.

This procedural irregularity provides a fitting framework for the work of this session, which is already well on its way to creating still further obstacles to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Let me be clear. My Government shares the concern of those who are alarmed at the escalation of violence in the Middle East. We are profoundly distressed at the increase of tensions and conflict, the spreading fear and suspicion, the deepening sense of hopelessness with respect to resolving "The Question of Palestine" and achieving peace and stability in this region rent by violence and hate. But who among us sincerely believes that the exercise in which we are now engaged -- this "resumed" Emergency Special Session -- will take us closer toward that goal?

Who among us believes that the cause of peace is served by still another round of bitter denunciation of Israel?

Who among us -- I wonder -- believes that peace is even the goal of this Assembly?

This Assembly can repeat its familiar and unbalanced charges, it can issue flamboyant ultimatums, and adopt ever harsher resolutions, all with the predictable effect. That effect will be to increase -- not to reduce -- tensions; to inflame -- not to calm -- passions; to widen -- not to narrow -- divisions; and to make war more, not less, likely to take place.



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The fact that this institution, conceived to resolve conflicts, is used to exacerbate and embitter divisions among nations is the cruelest of ironies.

That is not the end of the irony. It is even worse that the United Nations, by its own actions, is being driven further and further away from the very framework of peace which it established fifteen years ago. I refer, of course, to Security Council Resolution 242. This resolution remains the only realistic framework for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. But it is not reaffirmed, it is not even recalled in current U.N. resolutions, which -- to the contrary -- violate the spirit of 242 and undermine its balanced approach to peace.

Security Council Resolution 242, along with Resolution 338 which was adopted in 1973 and which calls for immediate negotiations to implement 242, is built around four main principles:

First, it links Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 to the establishment of peace with the Arab parties to the conflict.

Second, it stipulates that Israel should then withdraw to secure and recognized boundaries established in the agreements of peace.

Third, it affirms that agreements of peace should also provide for security arrangements, including demilitarized

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zones, and guarantees of maritime rights through all the international waterways of the area.

Fourth, it affirms that the goal is true peace, as distinct from "declarations of non-belligerency" or the equivalent.

It was precisely according to this resolution, and the principles set forth therein, that peace has been achieved between Israel and Egypt, leading to the return of the entire Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty -- a process that is due to be completed this very Sunday. That process, which is based on mutual respect and reasoned agreement, stands in stark contrast to a different approach which insists on Israeli withdrawal in the absence of peace. The second approach cannot possibly achieve its putative goal, which is a negotiated peace; but, by ensuring confrontations, it can produce spurious "evidence" that peaceful settlement of disputes with Israel is impossible.

My Government believes that peace can only be achieved through respect, reason, and compromise. We recognize that while the Camp David process looks toward a comprehensive peace, it has not yet achieved this goal. It constitutes the greatest step toward peace in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And, yet, it is still but a step. There remains a great distance yet to be travelled. But we believe peace is possible -- real peace, peace in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338.



We certainly do not underestimate the obstacles to a peace settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. Yet we believe that Camp David offers the only viable basis for a settlement that will determine the final status of these territories. Camp David actually goes beyond Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for an agreement among states, by affording the indigenous population of the West Bank and Gaza the opportunity to participate in the negotiations toward a settlement. Such a settlement can be achieved only through negotiations between the parties concerned -- in this instance Egypt and Israel as well as Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people. These negotiations still await the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza and the agreement of Jordan to enter the talks.

This painstaking and protracted process will require hard bargaining, compromise, and arrangements that will establish trust and new patterns of interstate and human relationships. But that is the only way a just and lasting peace can be achieved. Only such an approach can hope to satisfy to the greatest degree possible the rights of all of the parties concerned. Only such an approach can work.

We are now reaching the point when new efforts will be devoted to the completion of the Camp David process. It would be a great tragedy if this process must go forward in the face of opposition from the United Nations. The peace

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process might suffer, and more certainly the United Nations itself would.

Mr. President, there are, as everyone knows, members of this body who desire to deny membership and/or participation to another Member State. There will be, we understand, an effort to pass, in this Special Session, a resolution that prepares the way for questioning Israel's credentials and the right to participate in the various bodies of the United Nations. To this end, one draft resolution circulating in the corridors asserts that Israel is not a peace-loving Member State, and has repeatedly violated the provisions of the Charter.

Neither this Special Session nor the draft resolutions circulating in the corridors is consistent with the purposes of the United Nations Charter. Neither seeks to maintain "international peace and security," nor "to develop friendly relations among nations", nor "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems...", least of all does it make this institution "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of...common ends." This Special Session is one more event in an ongoing process whose goals are to delegitimize a member state -- Israel, to deny it the right to self defense, to secure borders, to survive.

This Special Session and its accompanying draft



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resolutions are one more example of a strategy whose goals and tactics are clear: use a U.N. body to make "official" demands incompatible with Israel's security and survival, so as then to be able to claim that non-compliance with these impossible demands "proves" Israel an international lawbreaker -- unworthy of membership in the international community of peaceloving states.

Mr. President, if this organization established to seek, maintain and strengthen peace is used to make war by other means; if its avenues, established to provide a rational basis for discussion of international disputes, are used as battlefields in a holy war; if its procedures, designed to ensure fairness, are twisted to ensure desired political outcomes -- then the purposes and structures are transformed. The United Nations itself is transformed. It becomes, quite literally, a different organization, inspired by different purposes, dedicated to different goals, characterized by different modes of behavior; for an institution is, finally, nothing more or less than the regular interactions of its members. When the goals and behavior of members change, the institutions has changed as well.

Mr. President, how much falsification can an institution stand without destroying itself entirely? The world body cannot endure as a moral and political force if its energies are devoted to increasing conflict and conducting vendettas

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against targetted countries. If the U.N. prefers to make political war rather than peace, it must suffer the consequences in terms of its credibility and reputation. And if, in violation of its own rules, it decides to exclude the democratic state of Israel from participation, it will inevitably reap the whirlwind.

It is not too late for a majority of Member States to reverse the trend toward irresponsibility and destruction. The time to begin is now, before this trend gathers an irreversible momentum.







MILLICENT FENWICK

8th District, New Jersey

COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
EDUCATION AND LABOR  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

April 19, 1982

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MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY 07960  
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3 JUN 2 1982

The Honorable Ronald Wilson Reagan  
President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing concerning a matter that we know has always been of great importance to you. We in Congress have welcomed the strong stand that you and your Administration have taken against acts of international terrorism, and we share your determination to combat these grave crimes.

As a result, we are writing to express our deep concern about the reported intention of the Department of Commerce to grant an export license to Lockheed for the sale of six L-100 cargo planes to Iraq. It is our firm hope that this license will not be granted at this time.

Although Iraqi support for terrorism may have lessened over the past year, it remains significant. Iraqi-backed groups have conducted and participated in numerous terrorist acts in both Europe and the Middle East in the past year. As you know, many Members of Congress questioned the recent removal of Iraq from the list of countries which have supported terrorism, and we likewise do not feel that now is the appropriate time to proceed with this sale.

Despite the ostensibly civilian nature of this sale, we fear that it will be widely viewed as an indication that the United States is taking sides in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, two countries which have consistently opposed American policies and objectives in the Middle East in the past three years. We believe that our policy of neutrality in this conflict should be maintained. We are also troubled by the fact that L-100 planes can easily be converted to military use and can be used in the transport of troops and military cargo.

We urge you to reject this sale.

With all good wishes,

Respectfully,

*Jonathan B. Bingham*  
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, M.C.

*Bill Brodhead*  
BILL BRODHEAD, M.C.

*Millicent Fenwick*  
MILLICENT FENWICK, M.C.  
*Benjamin Gilman*  
BENJAMIN GILMAN, M.C.



MILLICENT FENWICK  
5th District, New Jersey

COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
EDUCATION AND LABOR  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING  
  
COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION  
IN EUROPE

3 JAN 3 1973

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
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Dear Colleague:

As you know, the Administration recently removed Iraq from its list of countries which support international terrorism, and civil aircraft from the list of goods with a military-enhancing potential. Many Members of Congress have become concerned that these actions could be seen as a weakening of the strong stance against international terrorism that has been advocated by both the President and the Congress.

Since the removal of Iraq and civil aircraft from their respective lists, the Congress has been informally notified of the intention of the Department of Commerce to grant a license for the sale of six L-100 cargo planes to Iraq. We are writing to ask you to join us in signing the enclosed letter to the President, urging him to stop this sale.

Although civil aircraft is no longer listed as a military-enhancing item, the L-100 is a cargo plane capable of transporting troops and military equipment. This could be of significant use to Iraq in its war with Iran, and the United States risks at least the appearance of aiding Iraq in this conflict.

Iraq's support for terrorism remains significant, with many verified incidents in the last year, in Europe and in Israel -- a country in desperate need of assurances of American support during this difficult transition period in the Sinai.

We hope the President will halt this sale. It might give Israel reason to doubt American support, and give Iraq tacit support in its conflict with Iran, lessening the strength of our stance against international terrorism.

If you would like to join us in this effort, please call Charles Millard at 5-7300, or John Schelble at 5-4961 by Tuesday, April 27th.

*Jonathan Bingham*

*Bee Brodhead*

*Millie Fenwick*

*Paul G. Gilman*



ד.פ.ל. מתוך... דואר...

סוג בטיחותי... גלוי...

דחייפות... קצת...

תאריך: 23.1500 אפריל 82

מס' סדר... 364

צד

מל: המודיעין

מס' סדר: 364

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING---APRIL 23, 1982

HABIB

In response to questions:

I know of no plans for Ambassador Habib to return to the Middle East. He is in Washington at this point for previously scheduled appointments in connection with a private trip to China. As you know, we are and have been in regular contact with him on developments concerning Lebanon. And while he is here, he will be meeting with various department officials to discuss the situation there. But I do not know of any plans for him to go to the region.

STOESSEL

In response to questions:

Mr. Stoessel returned to Jerusalem from Cairo just a short time ago. I believe he has got most of today, in that time frame, in Cairo, and, has now returned to Jerusalem. But I do not have anything further to give you on his schedule.

תמונה

מה שיש לי על סדר היום של המודיעין...  
הוא יחזור לירושלים...  
ביום רביעי...  
אם יש שאלות...  
אנא פנו לי...



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*[Handwritten signature]*

U. S. WELCOMES MIDEAST CEASEFIRE INDICATIONS (450)

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES IS "VERY PLEASED" BY INDICATIONS FROM ALL PARTIES CONCERNED THAT THEY INTEND TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER, A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID APRIL 22.

"OUR KEY CONCERN IS THAT THE CEASEFIRE BE MAINTAINED," SPOKESMAN DEAN FISCHER TOLD REPORTERS AT THE DEPARTMENT'S DAILY PRESS BRIEFING. HE RECALLED THAT ON APRIL 21 THE UNITED STATES CALLED UPON ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED "TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD PROLONG OR ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE."

THE APRIL 21 STATEMENT SAID THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF RECENT ACTIONS WHICH THREATENED OR VIOLATED THE JULY 1981 CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELIS AND ISRAELI AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, FISCHER SAID APRIL 22, "WE ARE VERY PLEASED BY THE INDICATIONS THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED THAT

PAGE 02 -- CEASEFIRE

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"WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS WITH INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION, BUT I AM NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE DETAILS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS," FISCHER SAID.

ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, FISCHER SAID "AS FOR CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY IS WELL KNOWN AND HAS NOT CHANGED."

HOWEVER, HE CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT GOVERNMENTS WHO HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PASSING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND THE PLO BOTH THE U. S. APPEAL FOR



*File*

U.S. WELCOMES MIDEAST CEASEFIRE INDICATIONS (4/20)

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CONCERNED INTEND TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, I THINK IT IS##

PAGE 03 -- CEASEFIRE

CLEAR TO WHOM WE ARE REFERRING." HE SAID THE UNITED STATES  
HAD RECEIVED THE INDICATIONS "FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES."

"WE ARE GRATIFIED BY THE RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS ADOPTED BY  
THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO AVOID TAKING ACTIONS THAT COULD LEAD  
TO A BREAKDOWN IN THE CEASEFIRE," FISCHER SAID. THERE HAS  
BEEN NO REPORTED RETALIATION FROM THE PLO FOLLOWING THE  
APRIL 21 SERIES OF ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIAN  
POSITIONS IN LEBANON WHICH REPORTEDLY KILLED AS MANY AS 28  
PERSONS.

ASKED IF ISRAEL HAS SAID IT WILL NOT CONTINUE THE  
BOMBING, FISCHER SAID: "I HAVE SEEN STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED  
TO ISRAELI LEADERS IN THAT CONNECTION. I WOULD REFER YOU TO  
THEM."

ITEM

73

RESTRAIN AND THE INDICATIONS OF INTENT TO RESPECT THE

CEASEFIRE.

FISCHER SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, BUT  
ADDED, "IT IS CLEAR, I HOPE, THAT WHEN I SAID WE ARE PLEASED  
BY THE INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED THAT ALL PARTIES  
CONCERNED INTEND TO RESPECT THE CEASEFIRE, I THINK IT IS

PAGE 05 -- CEASEFIRE

CLEAR TO WHOM WE ARE REFERRING." HE SAID THE UNITED STATES  
HAD RECEIVED THE INDICATIONS "FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES."  
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POSITIONS IN LEBANON WHICH REPORTEDLY KILLED AS MANY AS 58

PERSONS.

ASKED IF ISRAEL HAS SAID IT WILL NOT CONTINUE THE  
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TO ISRAELI LEADERS IN THAT CONNECTION. I WOULD REFER YOU TO

THEM."

ITEM

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MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AND UNDER-SECRETARY STOESEL,  
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, JERUSALEM, APRIL 22, 1982, at 9.00 A.M.

PRESENT: Draper, Lewis, Brown, Ned Walker, Ben-Matt, <sup>Kimche</sup> Rubinstein, Dan Merridor, Bar-On,  
Avner, Porth.

Stoessel: I come mainly to talk about Taba. We met with the Defence Minister yesterday afternoon. He told us about the air strike yesterday. We were reassured to hear that they were limited to PLO targets only, and that there is no intention to widen the conflict. Washington has tried to be very careful in its reaction, urging restraint and focusing on the importance of maintaining the cessation of hostilities. We have been in touch with all our embassies in the whole area urging the same thing. All the parties with whom we have been in touch indicate that they do not want escalation. Syria, too, seems not to want to escalate unless Israel does.

PM: I would like to comment on what happened yesterday and on what may and may not happen in the future. Several weeks ago there were rumours around the world that Israel was going to "invade" Southern Lebanon. I told Ambassador Lewis: "No decision was taken by the Cabinet to enter Lebanon." and I added: "But take note and inform the Secretary and the President that we will not allow the shedding of Jewish blood and permit those responsible to enjoy impunity." We exercised what I believe was over-restraint. There was the Sergeant killed in Gaza, A PLO spokesman in Beirut claimed responsibility and then denied. There was the Druse Policeman who was stabbed in the back and died. There was a diplomat in Paris who was killed. There was a member of our Security Services who lost a leg. Explosives have been planted in many <sup>spots</sup> but they were discovered and dismantled. There were two terrorists whom we caught they crossed the Jordan loaded with weapons and explosives. And yet, despite all this, we didn't do anything. But there is a limit. I am sure my words to Sam were faithfully reported by him. And <sup>then</sup> a young officer was killed. Allow <sup>me</sup> to say something subjective as a human being. There is always a difference when you hear of a man killed and you don't know him and when you hear of one killed whom you do know. The 21-year old officer who was killed is the grandchild of one of my most beloved friends. I know the whole family. I was at his Brith. What I say is a subjective feeling and is, of itself, no reason to make certain decisions. And then there was that other officer who was killed and wounded by a mine. Mr. Secretary, this week we commemorated our Holocaust Memorial Day. On Memorial eve I saw a film (Arthur Cohn's 'The Final Solution'), an hour-and-a-half documentary made of actual original German <sup>footage</sup>. The film showed people at the last moment fighting not for life but for human dignity. Thousands and thousands and thousands marching - men, women and children. I always see before me the picture of a little boy raising his hand, his mother looking on, as the German murderer aims his gun at him. One-and-a-half million of such little children. They had nothing to defend themselves. Nobody came to their rescue.



I spoke to Mrs. Thatcher and out of the blue she said to me: "Mr. Prime Minister, if I had been Prime Minister in those days and had to choose between winning the war and bombing Ashwitz I would have chosen winning the war." I answered that in 1944 the war was already lost. The allies were ~~xxxx~~ sending a thousand bombers over Germany a night. Germany had already lost the war. What difference would it have made to send forty-sixty bombers to destroy the railway lines to Aushwitz. Hundred of thousands of lives would have still been saved. I told her you could have delayed the massacre. And now, just three days ago, we ~~xxxx~~ had Holocaust Day. When I met Sam for the first time five years ago, I told him, it will never happen again. We will not allow the shedding of Jewish blood and grant the killers impunity. We don't want to hurt anybody. If we are left in peace there will be peace. If not we will look for them wherever they are. Our Chief of Staff said yesterday, if they are quiet and calm then there will be quiet and calm from our side. Otherwise, we shall hit back harder than yesterday. If they shell our civilian population we may decide to enter Lebanon. We want you, our best friends, to know exactly the line of our policy. The cessation of hostilities has been broken scores of times. We have exercised maximum restraint. But there is a limit. If they carry out attacks we shall counter-attack. If they again shell our Northern townships we will have no other option but to try and destroy their infrastructure. This would, of course, be a Cabinet decision. Let Habib - he has unique ways of operating - try and forewarn them. If there will be peace on their side, there will be peace on our side. We do not contemplate entering Lebanon as I told your Ambassador. Lewis: We conveyed that message we received last night from Arik. Thus far, the PLO has given orders not to initiate action. Syria assured us that they do not want to widen the conflict and will exercise maximum restraint. Your reassurances are very helpful.

PM: Thank you. Let's hope for the best.

Stoessel: From all these concerns, to go back to Taba seems inappropriate.

PM: Yet life must go on.

Foreign Minister: In Taba (laughter).

Stoessel: About Taba I think it is important to solve at least the general ~~xxxx~~ outlines if we can before April 25th so that everything can go smoothly on that day. I am impressed that a great deal has been done on the question and there is already general agreement on the basic outline. Your contribution to this has been great. The remaining kernel of the problem is Mubarak's desire for his own reason to have a time-frame for the settlement of conciliation and arbitration. Last night the Defence Minister made clear his own view. He is opposed to a time-frame. He wants to go forth on conciliation and arbitration but without time-frame. We have thought of some alternative ways and we would like to submit them to you this morning. Essentially, we have three possible ways of approaching conciliation and arbitration. The first is, the parties would agree to submit the dispute to conciliation/arbitration.



Together they would work out arrangements for procedure and they would then proceed without a time limit and we, as full partners, would participate in the negotiations. Pending agreement, the interim arrangements in the area would continue. Frankly, I don't think this would be satisfactory to Mubarak in view of his wish for a time limit. The second approach would be, the parties will agree on conciliation/arbitration and would agree that within ~~two~~<sup>three</sup> months ~~the~~ arrangements would be agreed for procedures after which the conciliators would be appointed.

PM: Each side would appoint their representatives and together would choose a third.

(NOTE: The American side did not present a third proposal. In subsequent private discussion with Ned Walker, Walker told Avner that the third proposal was not submitted since it would involve the Americans too intensively in the matter of substance.)

PM: Yesterday we had a long debate on the Taba issue. I won't hide from you that my colleagues had some differences of opinion. Ultimately we decided that our Foreign Minister and Defence Minister be empowered to decide on the matter without bringing it back to the Cabinet for decision. I would ask the Foreign Minister to talk to Arik and my recommendation would be to accept your idea (Second proposal). I know the Defence Minister feels very deeply about this and I cannot coerce him on the matter.

Foreign Minister: ~~What do you think the Egyptians are ready to accept this proposal?~~ You think the Egyptians are ready to accept this proposal?

Stoessel: I cannot guarantee but I think there is a good chance.

F.M.: Maybe after our decision yesterday (April 25th withdrawal) they will be more flexible.

Stoessel: I would hope so.

PM: You will be able to tell them that we and they will urge the conciliator to work quickly.


Stoessel: Before I ~~can~~ propose the second procedure shouldn't you first talk to your Defence Minister?

FM: But let us first try without the time limitation.

PM: The best thing is for you to be in touch this afternoon on the phone with the Foreign Minister from Cairo. We already concluded - although I do not fully accept it - on the exhausting of the negotiations. So now we come to the second stage - conciliation - and if that does not succeed, the third stage - arbitration. Then there is the question of the meaning, "life goes on." We already have a sub-committee on this - Gen. Sion on our side and Gen. Hamdi on the Egyptian side and both will add a colleague. It transpires we have agreed on 95% of the procedures.

Stoessel: So much is agreed, We have prepared in writing, sketching up what will be meanwhile the temporary arrangements for the area.

(PM. reads American paper)





PM: We shall leave it to the sub-committee. The main points are accepted. Only the question of ~~xxxxxxx~~ people staying overnight, that should not be prohibited.

(PM receives telephone call from Sharon)

PM: That was Sharon on the phone. He was in Yamit. There is now a horrible tragedy taking place there. There is horrendous violence. Our soldiers are being attacked with stones, sticks and bottles. Our soldiers are unarmed and our girl soldiers are weeping, crying, Children are lying in ~~xxxx~~ front of buses and they won't move even when they are sprayed with water. The commander had to remove Prof. <sup>Ne'eman</sup> from the area. He is a member of the Knesset and the commander says that he has been inciting. He said Geula Cohen has done much <sup>to</sup> calm the situation. We have 5000 soldiers to remove 1000 civilians. They are being ~~attacked~~ but our soldiers do not raise a hand. This has never happened in <sup>the</sup> history of any nation before. We were attacked, we won the wars, we are voluntarily withdrawing, Arik says nobody who is not in Yamit this morning would believe what is happening there. He was very outspoken. He asks me to ask you to try with the Egyptians to accept the proposal without a time-limit. Let the only proposal be conciliation/arbitration and urge them to accept. The sub-commission will decide on normal life. Arik was very emotional and expresses strong opposition to a time limit. ~~xxxxxxx~~ Having now heard Arik, I have to withdraw my previous remarks (on <sup>the</sup> second proposal). Let the original proposal stand. @ You yourself said it was forthcoming.

Stoessel: I will work on it as hard as I can.

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Meeting adjourned at 9.45 A.M.  
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המנדיר

כהפך לרשום שיחם ראש המחלקה עם סגן המלוכניר שמוסל הבוקר-


TOP SECRET.

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AND UNDER SECRETARY STOESSEL, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, JERUSALEM APRIL 22, 1982, AT 9.00 A.M.  
 PRESENT: DRAPER, LEWIS, BROWN, NED WALKER, BEN MEIR, KINCHE, RUBINSTEIN, DAN HERRIDOR, BAR ON, AVNER, PORATH.

STOESSEL: I COME MAINLY TO TALK ABOUT TADA WE MET WITH THE DEFENCE MINISTER YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HE TOLD US ABOUT THE AIR STRIKE YESTERDAY. WE WERE REASSURED TO HEAR THAT THEY WERE LIMITED TO PLO TARGETS ONLY, AND THAT THERE IS NO INTENTION TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT. WASHINGTON HAS TRIED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN ITS REACTION URGING RESTRAINT AND FOCUSING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ALL OUR EMBASSIES IN THE WHOLE AREA URGING THE SAME THING. ALL THE PARTIES WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH INDICATE THAT THEY DO NOT WANT ESCALATION. SYRIA, TOO, SEEMS NOT TO WANT TO ESCALATE UNLESS ISRAEL DOES.

PM: I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON WHAT HAPPENED YESTERDAY AND ON WHAT MAY AND MAY NOT HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THERE WERE RUMOURS AROUND THE WORLD THAT ISRAEL





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

HAS GOING TO "INVADE" SOUTHERN LEBANON. I TOLD AMBASSADOR LENIS: "NO DECISION WAS TAKEN BY THE CABINET TO ENTER LEBANON". AND I ADDED: "BUT TAKE NOTE AND INFORM THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT THAT WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE SHEDDING OF JEWISH BLOOD AND PERMIT THOSE RESPONSIBLE TO ENJOY IMPUNITY". WE EXERCISED WHAT I BELIEVE WAS OVER RESTRAINT. THERE WAS THE SERGEANT KILLED IN GAZA. A PLO SPOKESMAN IN BEIRUT CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY AND THEN DENIED IT. THERE WAS THE DRUSE POLICEMAN WHO WAS STABBED IN THE BACK AND DIED. THERE WAS A DIPLOMAT IN PARIS WHO WAS KILLED. THERE WAS A MEMBER OF OUR SECURITY SERVICES WHO LOST A LEG. EXPLOSIVES HAVE BEEN PLANTED IN MANY SPOTS BUT THEY WERE DISCOVERED AND DISMANTLED. THERE WERE TWO TERRORISTS WHOM WE CAUGHT AS THEY CROSSED THE JORDAN LOADED WITH WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES. AND YET, DESPITE ALL THIS, WE DIDN'T DO ANYTHING BUT THERE IS A LIMIT. I AM SURE MY WORDS TO SAM WERE FAITHFULLY REPORTED BY HIM. AND THEN A YOUNG OFFICER WAS KILLED. ALLOW ME TO SAY SOMETHING SUBJECTIVE AS A HUMAN BEING. THERE IS ALWAYS A DIFFERENCE WHEN YOU HEAR OF A MAN KILLED AND YOU DON'T KNOW HIM AND WHEN YOU HEAR OF ONE KILLED WHOM YOU DO KNOW. THE 21-YEAR OLD OFFICER WHO WAS KILLED IS THE GRANDCHILD OF ONE OF MY MOST BELOVED FRIENDS. I KNOW THE WHOLE FAMILY. I WAS AT HIS BRITH. WHAT I SAY IS A SUBJECTIVE FEELING AND IS, OF ITSELF, NO REASON TO MAKE CERTAIN DECISIONS. AND THEN THERE WAS THAT OTHER OFFICER WHO WAS KILLED AND WOUNDED BY A MINE. MR. SECRETARY THIS WEEK WE COMMEMORATED OUR HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL DAY. ON MEMORIAL EVE I SAW A FILM (ARTHUR COHN'S "THE FINAL SOLUTION") AN HOUR AND A HALF DOCUMENTARY MADE OF ACTUAL ORIGINAL GERMAN FOOTAGE. THE FILM SHOWED PEOPLE AT THE LAST MOMENT FIGHTING NOT FOR LIFE BUT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY. THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS MARCHING- MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. I ALWAYS SEE BEFORE ME THE PICTURE OF A LITTLE BOY RAISING HIS HAND HIS MOTHER LOOKING ON, AS THE GERMAN MURDERER AIMS HIS GUN AT HIM. ONE-AND -A- HALF MILLION OF SUCH LITTLE CHILDREN. THEY HAD NOTHING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. NOBODY CAME TO THEIR RESCUE.

I SPOKE TO MRS THATCHER AND OUT OF THE BLUE SHE SAID TO ME: "MR. PRIME MINISTER, IF I HAD BEEN PRIME MINISTER IN THOSE DAYS AND HAD CHOOSE BETWEEN WINNING THE W AND




משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

BOMBING AUSWITZ I WOULD HAVE CHOSEN WINNING THE WAR. I ANSWERED THAT IN 1944 THE WAR WAS ALREADY LOST. THE ALLIES WERE SENDING A THOUSANDS BOMBERS OVER GERMANY A NIGHT GERMANY HAD ALREADY LOST THE WAR. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULD IT HAVE MADE TO SEND FORTY-SIXTY BOMBERS TO DESTROY THE RAILWAY LINES TO AUSWITZ. HUNDRED OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES WOULD HAVE STILL BEEN SAVED. I TOLD HER YOU COULD HAVE DELAYED THE MASSACRE AND NOW, JUST THREE DAYS AGO, WE HAD HOLOCAUST DAY. WHEN I MET SAM FOR THE FIRST TIME FIVE YEARS AGO, I TOLD HIM, IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN. WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE SHEDDING OF JEWISH BLOOD AND GRANT THE KILLERS IMPUNITY. WE DON'T WANT TO HURT ANYBODY. IF WE ARE LEFT IN PEACE THERE WILL BE PEACE. IF NOT WE WILL LOOK FOR THEM WHEREVER THEY ARE. OUR CHIEF OF STAFF SAID YESTERDAY, IF THERE IS QUIET AND CALM THEN THERE WILL BE QUIET AND CALM FROM OUR SIDE. OTHERWISE WE SHALL HIT BACK HARDER THAN YESTERDAY. IF THEY SHELL OUR CIVILIAN POPULATION WE MAY DECIDE TO ENTER LEBANON. WE WANT YOU, OUR BEST FRIENDS, TO KNOW EXACTLY THE LINE OF OUR POLICY. THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES HAS BEEN BROKEN SCORES OF TIMES. WE HAVE EXERCISED MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. BUT THERE IS A LIMIT. IF THEY CARRY OUT ATTACKS WE SHALL COUNTER ATTACK. IF THEY AGAIN SHELL OUR NORTHERN TOWNSHIPS WE WILL HAVE NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO TRY AND DESTROY THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE A CABINET DECISION. LET HABIB- HE HAS UNIQUE WAYS OF OPERATING-TRY AND FOREWARN THEM. IF THERE WILL BE PEACE ON THEIR SIDE, THERE WILL BE PEACE ON OUR SIDE. WE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE ENTERING LEBANON AS I TOLD YOUR AMBASSADOR.

LEWIS: WE CONVEYED THAT MESSAGE WE RECEIVED LAST NIGHT FROM ARIK. THUS FAR THE PLO HAS GIVEN ORDERS NOT TO INITIATE ACTION. SYRIA ASSURED ASSURED US THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO WIDEN THE CONFLICT AND WILL EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. YOUR REASSURANCES ARE VERY HELPFUL.  
PH: THANK YOU. LET'S HOPE FOR THE BEST.  
STOESSSEL: FROM ALL THESE CONCERNS TO GO BACK TO TARA SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE.

PH: YET LIFE MUST GO ON.





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר


FOREIGN MINISTER: IN TABA(LAUGHTER)

STOESSEL: ABOUT TABA I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO SOLVE AT LEAST THE GENERAL OUTLINES IF WE CAN BEFORE APRIL 25TH SO THAT EVERYTHING CAN GO SMOOTHLY ON THAT DAY. I AM IMPRESSED THAT A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN DONE ON THE QUESTION AND THERE IS ALREADY GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC OUTLINE. YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS HAS BEEN GREAT. THE REMAINING KERNEL OF THE PROBLEM IS HUBARAK'S DESIRE FOR HIS OWN REASON TO HAVE A TIME-FRAME FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION. LAST NIGHT THE DEFENCE MINISTER MADE CLEAR HIS OWN VIEW. HE IS OPPOSED TO A TIME FRAME. HE WANTS TO GO FORTH ON CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION BUT WITHOUT A TIME FRAME. WE HAVE THOUGHT OF SOME ALTERNATIVE WAYS AND WE WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT THEM TO YOU THIS MORNING. ESSENTIALLY WE HAVE THREE POSSIBLE WAYS OF APPROACHING CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION. THE FIRST IS, THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO CONCILIATION/ ARBITRATION

1. TOGETHER THEY WOULD WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROCEDURE AND THEY WOULD THEN PROCEED WITHOUT A TIME LIMIT AND WE AS FULL PARTNERS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. PENDING AGREEMENT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AREA WOULD CONTINUE. FRANKLY I DON'T THINK THIS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO HUBARAK IN VIEW OF HIS WISH FOR A TIME LIMIT. THE SECOND APPROACH WOULD BE THE PARTIES WILL AGREE ON CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION AND WOULD AGREE THAT WITHIN THREE MONTHS THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AGREED FOR PROCEDURES AFTER WHICH THE CONCILIATORS WOULD BE APPOINTED.

2. PH: EACH SIDE WOULD APPOINT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND TOGETHER WOULD CHOOSE A THIRD. (NOTE: THE AMERICAN SIDE DID NOT PRESENT A THIRD PROPOSAL. IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH NED WALKER WALKER TOLD AVNER THAT THE THIRD PROPOSAL WAS NOT SUBMITTED SINCE IT WOULD INVOLVE THE AMERICANS TOO INTENSIVELY IN THE MATTER OF SUBSTANCE).

PH: YESTERDAY WE HAD A LONG DEBATE ON THE TABA ISSUE. I WON'T HIDE FROM YOU THAT MY COLLEAGUES HAD SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. ULTIMATELY WE DECIDED THAT OUR FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEFENCE MINISTER BE EMPOWERED





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

DECIDE ON THE MATTER WITHOUT BRINGING IT BACK TO THE CABINET FOR DECISION; I WOULD ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO TALK TO ARIK AND MY RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE TO ACCEPT YOUR IDEA (SECOND PROPOSAL). I KNOW THE DEFENCE MINISTER FEELS VERY DEEPLY ABOUT THIS AND I CANNOT COERCE HIM ON THE MATTER.

FOREIGN MINISTER: YOU THINK THE EGYPTIANS ARE READY TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL?

STOESSEL: I CANNOT GUARANTEE BUT I THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE.

F. M. MAYBE AFTER OUR DECISION YESTERDAY (APRIL 25TH WITHDRAWAL) THEY WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

STOESSEL: I WOULD HOPE SO.

PM: YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TELL THEM THAT WE AND THEY WILL URGE THE CONCILIATOR TO WORK QUICKLY.


STOESSEL: BEFORE I CAN PROPOSE THE SECOND PROCEDURE SHOULDN'T YOU FIRST TALK TO YOUR DEFENCE MINISTER?

FM: BUT LET US FIRST TRY WITHOUT THE TIME LIMITATION.

PM: THE BEST THING IS FOR YOU TO BE IN TOUCH THIS AFTERNOON ON THE PHONE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER FROM CAIRO. WE ALREADY CONCLUDED- ALTHOUGH I DO NOT FULLY ACCEPT IT- ON THE EXHAUSTING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SO NOW WE COME TO THE SECOND STAGE- CONCILIATION- AND IF THAT DOES NOT SUCCEED THE THIRD STAGE- ARBITRATION. THEN THERE IS THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING 'LIFE GOES ON'. WE ALREADY HAVE A SUB COMMITTEE ON THIS- GEN. SION ON OUR SIDE AND GEN. HANZI ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE AND BOTH WILL ADD A COLLEAGUE. IT TRANSPIRES WE HAVE AGREED ON 95 PERCENT OF THE PROCEDURES.

STOESSEL: SO MUCH IS AGREED. WE HAVE PREPARED IN WRITING SKETCHING UP WHAT WILL BE MEANWHILE THE TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE AREA. (PM. READS AMERICAN PAPER).

PM: WE SHALL LEAVE IT TO THE SUB COMMITTEE. THE MAIN POINTS ARE ACCEPTED. ONLY THE QUESTION OF PEOPLE STAYING





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

OVERNIGHT, THAT SHOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED. (PH RECEIVES TELEPHONE CALL FROM SHARON)  
PH: THAT WAS SHARON ON THE PHONE HE WAS IN YANIT. THERE IS NOW A HORRIBLE TRAGEDY TAKING PLACE THERE. THERE IS HORRENDOUS VIOLENCE. OUR SOLDIERS ARE BEING ATTACKED WITH STONES, STICKS AND BOTTLES. OUR SOLDIERS ARE UNARMED AND OUR GIRL SOLDIERS ARE WEEPING, CRYING. CHILDREN ARE LYING IN FRONT OF BUSES AND THEY WON'T MOVE EVEN WHEN THEY ARE SPRAYED WITH WATER. THE COMMANDER HAD TO REMOVE PROF. HEENAN FROM THE AREA. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE KNESSET AND THE COMMANDER SAYS THAT HE HAS BEEN INCITING. HE SAID GEULA COHEN HAS DONE MUCH TO CALM THE SITUATION. WE HAVE 5000 SOLDIERS TO REMOVE 1000 CIVILIANS. THEY ARE BEING ATTACKED BUT OUR SOLDIERS DO NOT RAISE A HAND. THIS HAS NEVER HAPPENED IN THE HISTORY OF ANY NATION BEFORE. WE WERE ATTACKED WE WON THE WARS WE ARE VOLUNTARILY WITHDRAWING. ARIK SAYS NOBODY WHO IS NOT IN YANIT THIS MORNING WOULD BELIEVE WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE. HE WAS VERY OUTSPOKEN. HE ASKS ME TO ASK YOU TO TRY WITH THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL WITHOUT A TIME LIMIT. LET THE ONLY PROPOSAL BE CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION AND URGE THEM TO ACCEPT THE SUB-COMMISSION WILL DECIDE ON NORMAL LIFE. ARIK WAS VERY EMOTIONAL AND EXPRESSES STRONG OPPOSITION TO A TIME LIMIT. HAVING NOW HEARD ARIK, I HAVE TO WITHDRAW MY PREVIOUS REMARKS (ON THE SECOND PROPOSAL). LET THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL STAND. YOU YOURSELF SAID IT WAS FORTHCOMING.  
STOESSEL: I WILL WORK ON IT AS HARD AS I CAN.

MEETING ADJOURNED AT 9.45 A.M.

*[Faint, illegible handwriting in red ink, possibly a signature or date]*



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מצפא, דיבון, מצרים, רובינסטין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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
א.ל.

סודי ביותר/בהוד

הסגרי

\*\* המחל נפגש אמולקעס שר הבטחון בענין שאבה אך לפני שעלה נושא \*\*  
 \*\* וה פירט שר הבטחון לגבי המלכת חיל האוויר בכרונן \*\*  
 \*\* שר הבטחון הרגיש בדבריו כי פעולת חיל האוויר הינה פעולה \*\*  
 \*\* הוגבלת שכוונתה להלום במחנות ובסיסי המחבלים וזה לאור הפרות \*\*  
 \*\* הפסקת האש על ידי המחבלים כשהפרה האחרונה אירעה אמולק \*\*  
 \*\* בבוקר כאשר המחבלים מיקשו דרכים במובלעת חדאד ובמוצאה \*\*  
 \*\* המנה נהרג קצין ישראלי וסמל נפצע קשה \*\*  
 \*\* בין אירע אמולק מקרה חבלה נוסף בשכם כמוצאה ההפרות הפסקת \*\*  
 \*\* האש של המחבלים נהרגו מאו 1 בינואר 30 בני אדם ושישים ושישה \*\*  
 \*\* נצטו \*\*  
 \*\* בטהב היו עד אמולק מאו ה-1 בינואר 81 מקרי חבלה \*\*  
 \*\* שר הבטחון הרגיש כי אין כוונתו לצאת למלחמה אך עם המחבלים \*\*  
 \*\* פועלים נגדו אנו נגיב אם לא יפעלו למען הכל פעולה שהבט \*\*  
 \*\* מאו כי בנלל רגישות של הימים הנוכחיים לא היתה לנו כל כוונה \*\*  
 \*\* לפעול אך לא יכולנו להחריש יותר לאור פעולת המחבלים מאמולק \*\*  
 \*\*  
 \*\* במובדו לדבר על ההיתקלות האווירית במטוסים סוריים אמר שהבט כי \*\*  
 \*\* לא הצינו את המרחב האווירי הסורי ולא ניסינו להתגרות בהם \*\*  
 \*\* הסורים מצידם ניסו להתערב בפעולת חיל האוויר וניסו ליידש את \*\*  
 \*\* מטוסינו דבר שהביא לידי הקרוב האווירי בו הופלו 2 מיג 23 נ \*\*  
 \*\* שהבט הרגיש שזו הפעם הראשונה שמג 23 הופל על ידי הטוסי \*\*  
 \*\* אפי 16 דבר שמוכיח שוב פעם את העליונות של הציוד האמריקאי \*\*  
 \*\*  
 \*\* לגבי הקפות המחבלים באיווד חדאד הוכיח שהבט שאדי ל כלול \*\*  
 \*\* מפורשות בהסכם הפסקת האש שהושגה על חביב \*\*  
 \*\* הוא הוכיח כי המקרה בו נהרג הקצין אמולק הוא מקרה המיקוש \*\*  
 \*\* השלישי שאירע השבוע באדייל \*\*






# מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מחוך 3  
עו"תק 4 מחוך 32 סודי ביותר

שטח ולואים בתגובתם לדברי שהבט הביעו את התכווה ליי הפעולה  
כל אמוכ לא תניא לפעולה נגדים שמטבע הדברים תביא או ליד  
הטלמה שטסל הדגיש שארהב עושה את הכל על מנת לרסן ולהשפיע  
לכיוון ריסון של הצד השני  
נמו בן הוא אמר שארהב ידעה להעריך את ההבולגה שהראינו אך  
המביעה תקווה ליי לא נגיש ליד שרשרת של תקינות השפיות  
כיצור מצד מסוכן ביותר  
על הערתו של שטסל שהפסקת האש קו ימה עד כה וכי זה היה למטות  
ככל הצוויט הגיו שהבי'ט שלמובה הצטר הפסקת האש לא קו ימה  
על ידי המחבלים אם הם ימשיכו להתקיף יהיה עלינו להגיב וכה  
בנסיסים שלהם ולא נקבל שאנשינו יהרגו הפעולה שדה המחבלים  
התבצרו לתוך הפסקת האש ובכל זאת שחרו על מות פעולה הצידם  
הסתיימה הבלגנו במשך עשרה חודשים הבנו את הבעיות שלכם  
ואם ואגומיכם אך תקופה זו הגיעה לקיצה שהבט העיר שאם הוא  
יכול היה ליישץ למחבלים הוא היה מיישץ להם להיות מאד מאד  
והיריס אין בכוונתנו לפלוש לתוך לבנון אך אנחנו נגיב  
כאמור על ההפדוח מצידם אם הם יגיבו כמשל בצורת הפגזה הר  
בטופו של הדבר הם לא יצאו יותר ונתנו לבנון אין בכוונתנו  
לכשוח ואת אך הברירה היא בידיהם גם לגבי הסודים עצמו של  
שהבי'ט היא שלא יתערבו  
בחלק זה של השיחה התיחס שהבי'ט גם לפרשת הריסתה של יה"ח  
הוא אמר שהכוונה המקודרת היתה למכור את התשתית והמבנים  
למצרים ואף הגענו איתם להסכם ראשוני בנדון אך לאחר מכן  
החלה התנועה לאצירת הנסיגה בפעולותיה היא ואנחנו עמדנו בפני  
בעיה מסוכנת ביותר השמרת המבנים היתה חומינה את פלישת אנשי  
התנועה לתוכן ופינויים מחדש אך מענו לכך לו היינו משאירים  
אם יסוגי החבל ואת העיר יהיה על גילם הרי היה נחלם יכול  
לקרות שאנשי התנועה אולי גם המ'שנים היו מסתובבים  
להסתכן לתוך החבל גם אחרי הנסיגה דבר שמטבע הדברים היה  
עליו להביע לתכריות עם המצרים  
כשאין מבנים במקום אין כאן להסתכן הסברנו זאת למצרים והוא  
אישית דיבר על כך עם חסן כאאל עלי  
שהבי'ט גם כן הגיו שהבינה כספית אנו משלמים עבור הפינוי  
ועל ידי ההריסה פעמיים לא נקבל מהמצרים כל תמורה כספית  
והי מוורב נזמנו על סכום של כמאה ויון דולר והריסת  
המבנים החבל עוליס לנו כ' 250 מליון שקל זה בנוסף לכוח  
הבארם ונצייר הרב שאנו נשלחים להשאט בו בפיוניו השנים הרב









משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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4374/3

סודי ביותר

מחור 2 דף 1  
מחור 34 עותק 4

מא: ווס, קהיר, נר: חוום 851, מ: המשרד  
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 220482, וח: 1330  
נר: טאבה

א.ל.

סודי ביותר/בהול

ארנס, שרון

טאבה

כאור החליטה הממשלה האתמול שהסמיכה את שהב"מ ואת שהב"ח

לכסי"מ את המומ' על טאבה מבלי להודק להחלטה נוספת של הממשלה

נפגש אמש שטסל עם שהב"מ

מהצד האמריקאי נכחה כל הפאליה של שטסל לואיס זבראון ומהצד

הישראלי האלוף שמיר מנבל משהו והחמ'

שהב"מ הסביר את עמדתנו בנושא והדגיש שטוד בתחילת מרץ הוא

הגיע עם כמאל הסן עלי להסכם שלפיו אנו ניסוג לקו שהמצרים

חובעים לעצמם והמצרים יתקדמו לקו שאנו רואים בו את הגבול

הבינלאומי ושהפסח בין שני הקוים דהיינו 1020 מ' יסאר כפי

שהוא עד שהבעיה תיפתר.

שהב"מ הוסיף הסברים על הצעתו של דה"מ לפתרון הבעיה

דהיינו מילוי הנחיות חווה השלום בסעיף 7 שפירושו ניהול מומ'

פישור ולאחר מכן בוררות.

כן מינוי ועדה מצרית ישראלית משותפת לקביעת סדרי החיים בשטח

זה נוכחות כרי"מ' לשמירה על הסדר וכל זה מבלי לקבוע כרגע את

שאלת הריבונות עד אחרי סיום התהליכים כפי שמופיעים בסעיף 7

של חווה השלום. שהב"מ פירט שכידוע הושגה הבנה בינינו

לכנין המצרים על רוב הנקודות דהיינו אנו ויתרנו על המסך ניהול

מומ' והוסכם ללכת לפישור ובוררות וכן מונתה ועדה ישראלית

מצרית המורכבת מאדמירל חמדי ותת אלוף שיאון


לגופם של הדברים העיר שהב"מ וכן המנבל שכל הבעיה בסופו של

הדבר מכנית וקשה להבין למה המצרים עושים אמנה בעיה מדינית

מרכזית. שהב"מ הסביר לשטסל שהממשלה החליטה לאפשר שעת לא

נגיע ליד הסכם עם המצרים עד יום א' ויסוג לקו שאותו אנו

הושרים לקו הנכון ויתכן שאז תיוצר בעיה.






# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

29 2 מתוך 2  
4 מתוך 34 סודי ביותר

המצרים רמזו כי במקרה זה הם יבטלו או ליתר דיוק לא יקיימו  
אם ההסדרים לגבי תיירות נסיג  
כזו שהביים היווצר או בעיה עבור המצרים כי אנו ניאכץ  
להגייב. שצחו היא כי המצרים לא יפגעו בתהליך הנורמליזציה  
המנכל הרגיש כי הסכמנו לבוררות ולפיסור וכן הסכמנו לא להוסיף  
כל בנינים או בניה בתוך שטח מאבה בן אמר דהיימי כי לא  
נאריך את התהליך מצידנו. אלה הן עמדות הגיוניות וסבירות  
ושכסיו על המצרים לוו מצידם וזה לפני ה-25. שטסל הגייב  
באומרו שהיתה התקדמות מונה אך לפי התרשמותו משיחותיו אומול-  
וקהיר הנשיא מונארכי וקוב להנרבת נאן לתהליך הפיסור והבוררות.  
שטסל הוסיף לכן שהרגשתו היא שהמצרים מוכנים להיות גמישים  
במקרה זאנו נסכים לפרק זמן קצוב לגבי תהליך הפיסור  
והבוררות בענין המלון.  
שלי אמר לו שהוא מוכן לזיתור בענין המלון במקרה זאנו נהיה  
כאמור מוכנים לפרק זמן קצוב בתהליך הפיסור והבוררות. שהבייט  
דחה את ההצעה לגבי פרק זמן קצוב ואמר שהוא לא ישנה את דעתו  
בענין זה אך שברור שאם שטסל מעוניין בכך יתכן וירצה להעלות את-  
הנושא פעם נוספת בפני רוהמי. שטסל אכן סיכם את הישיבה  
בקובעו שמאחר ויש לו מספר רעיונות הוא יבקש להעלות אותם  
באוזני דהיימי.

בר-און =  
50: שהח, טשהח, דהמ, סדהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן.  
לדובינסטיין, מצפא, דיבון, מצרים





ASKED IF CHINA MIGHT BE ADDED TO HIS PRESENT ITINERARY,  
BUSH REPLIED THERE IS NO PLAN TO DO SO NOW, BUT ADDED, "THAT

PAGE 04 -- BUSH  
MIGHT CHANGE."

ITEM

NESSA-411 (4/22/82)

SINAI FIELD MISSION DEPARTS AS IT LIVED -- PEACEFULLY (700)

IN THE SINAI -- REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
EGYPT AND ISRAEL GATHERED ON APRIL 22 AT THE U.S. SINAI

FIELD MISSION'S (SFM) REMOTE BASE CAMP ON A WINDSWEEP  
ESCARPMENT IN THE SINAI TO COMMEMORATE THE SUCCESSFUL  
CONCLUSION OF A UNIQUE AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.

FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS THE FIELD MISSION'S CIVILIAN  
VOLUNTEERS HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR PEACEKEEPING  
RESPONSIBILITIES WITH A QUIET, EVENHANDED PROFESSIONALISM  
THAT HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF  
PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

THEY FIRST MOUNTED AN ELECTRONIC EARLY WARNING OPERATION  
IN THE STRATEGIC SINAI PASSES. WHEN THAT OPERATION ENDED IN  
JANUARY 1980, THEY WERE ASKED TO VERIFY VIA ON-SITE  
INSPECTIONS EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE MILITARY  
LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED IN THEIR 1979 PEACE TREATY FOR A  
15,000-SQUARE MILE AREA OF THE SINAI. THIS MISSION WILL END

PAGE 02 -- SINAI

ON APRIL 25 WHEN ISRAEL COMPLETES ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE  
SINAI AND THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION'S (SSM) VERIFICATION  
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ASSUMED BY THE NEW MULTINATIONAL FORCE  
AND OBSERVERS (MFO) ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
AUGUST 5, 1981, PROTOCOL TO THE PEACE TREATY.

AT THE SINAI CEREMONY, FRANK G. TRINKA, DIRECTOR OF THE



ASKED IF CHINA MIGHT BE ADDED TO HIS PRESENT ITINERARY,  
BUSH REPLIED THERE IS NO PLAN TO DO SO NOW, BUT ADDED, "THAT

PAGE 04 -- BUSH  
MIGHT CHANGE."

ITEM

1524-411 (4/29/82)

SINAL FIELD MISSION DEPARTS AS IT LIVED -- PEACEFULLY (700)

IN THE SINAL -- REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES,  
EGYPT AND ISRAEL GATHERED ON APRIL 22 AT THE U.S. SINAL

FIELD MISSION'S (SFM) REMOTE BASE CAMP ON A WINDSWEPT  
ESCARPMENT IN THE SINAL TO COMMEMORATE THE SUCCESSFUL  
CONCLUSION OF A UNIQUE AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.  
FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS THE FIELD MISSION'S CIVILIAN

VOLUNTEERS HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR PEACEKEEPING  
RESPONSIBILITIES WITH A QUIET, EVENHANDED PROFESSIONALISM  
THAT HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF  
PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

THEY FIRST MOUNTED AN ELECTRONIC EARLY WARNING OPERATION  
IN THE STRATEGIC SINAL PASSES, WHEN THAT OPERATION ENDED IN  
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INSPECTIONS EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE MILITARY  
LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED IN THEIR 1979 PEACE TREATY FOR A  
15,000-SQUARE MILE AREA OF THE SINAL. THIS MISSION WILL END

PAGE 02 -- SINAL

ON APRIL 23 WHEN ISRAEL COMPLETED ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE  
SINAL AND THE SINAL SUPPORT MISSION'S (SSM) VERIFICATION  
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ASSUMED BY THE NEW MULTINATIONAL FORCE  
AND OBSERVERS (MFO) ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
AUGUST 5, 1981, PROTOCOL TO THE PEACE TREATY,  
AT THE SINAL CEREMONY, FRANK G. TRINKA, DIRECTOR OF THE



FIELD MISSION, PRESENTED REPORTS OF THE MISSION'S FINAL SCHEDULED INSPECTIONS OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES AND FACILITIES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO TREATY PARTIES.

35

ALSO DURING THE CEREMONY, AMBASSADOR FRANK E. MAESTRONE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, THE FIELD MISSION'S WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS, SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH AN EGYPTIAN REPRESENTATIVE WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE FIELD MISSION'S BASE CAMP BUILDINGS AND RELATED FACILITIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WHEN THE CAMP IS CLOSED.

THE FIELD MISSION'S MOVEABLE PROPERTY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND TO

PAGE 03 -- SINAI

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THE U.S. PEACEKEEPING ROLE IN THE SINAI BEGAN IN FEBRUARY 1976 AFTER THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION JOINED WITH AN AMERICAN FIRM, E-SYSTEMS, INC. OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IN A COMBINED VENTURE CALLED THE SINAI FIELD MISSION, TO INSTALL AND OPERATE AN ELECTRONIC EARLY WARNING SYSTEM MONITORING THE STRATEGIC GIDDI AND MITLA PASSES.

THE U.S. AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE THIS MONITORING RESPONSIBILITY HAD RESOLVED AN IMPASSE IN THE SHUTTLE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THEN-SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WHICH RESULTED IN THE SECOND SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT OF 1975.

WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL FAILED IN JULY 1979 TO RENEW THE MANDATE OF THE U.N. EMERGENCY FORCE, WHICH WAS TO TAKE OVER A SUPERVISORY ROLE UNDER THE PEACE TREATY, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGAIN REQUESTED THE UNITED STATES TO STEP INTO THE BREACH AND VERIFY ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY SECURITY PROVISIONS UNTIL THE FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. THE SINAI FIELD MISSION WAS ASSIGNED THIS NEW

PAGE 04 -- SINAI

RESPONSIBILITY.



FIELD MISSION, PRESENTED REPORTS OF THE MISSION'S FINAL  
SCHEDULED INSPECTIONS OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES AND  
FACILITIES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO TREATY PARTIES.  
ALSO DURING THE CEREMONY, AMBASSADOR FRANK E. MASTRONE,  
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND DIRECTOR OF  
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CLOSED.

THE FIELD MISSION'S MOVABLE PROPERTY WILL BE MADE  
AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND TO

PAGE 05 -- SINAI

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.  
THE U.S. PEACEMAKING ROLE IN THE SINAI BEGAN IN FEBRUARY  
1976 AFTER THE U.S. SINAI SUPPORT MISSION JOINED WITH AN  
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WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL FAILED IN JULY  
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WAS TO TAKE OVER A SUPERVISORY ROLE UNDER THE PEACE TREATY,  
EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGAIN REQUESTED THE UNITED STATES TO STEP  
INTO THE BREACH AND VERIFY ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY SECURITY  
PROVISIONS UNTIL THE FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE  
SINAI. THE SINAI FIELD MISSION WAS ASSIGNED THIS NEW

PAGE 04 -- SINAI

RESPONSIBILITY.



36

THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION MOVED QUICKLY TO EQUIP THE FIELD MISSION WITH HELICOPTERS TO FERRY ITS INSPECTORS ACROSS THE SINAI DESERT ON THIS NEW PEACEKEEPING ROLE. VIOLATIONS OF THE TREATY OBSERVED BY THE FIELD MISSION WERE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THE TWO PARTIES, WHO TOOK CORRECTIVE ACTION THROUGH THEIR JOINT COMMISSION. THE DEVIATIONS REPORTED OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD HAVE BEEN FEW AND MINOR AND NONE HAVE THREATENED THE TREATY'S INTEGRITY, DEMONSTRATING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS TO UPHOLD THE PEACE TREATY.

SINAI FIELD MISSION PERSONNEL, TOTALING 135 AMERICAN CIVILIAN VOLUNTEERS, LIVED AND OPERATED FROM A SELF-SUFFICIENT BASE CAMP LOCATED ON A DESOLATE 2,200-FOOT HIGH ESCARPMENT OVERLOOKING THE WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE GIDDI PASS, ENDURING ISOLATION, SAND STORMS AND THE EXTREMES OF DESERT CLIMATE TO CARRY OUT THEIR PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE CAMP WAS CONSTRUCTED WITH PREFABRICATED CONCRETE

PAGE 05 -- SINAI

MODULES ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR A HOTEL IN THE UNITED STATES.

ITEM

NESEA-412 (A/22/82)

U.S. OFFICIAL SEES SALVADOR ELECTIONS ENDORSING REFORMS  
(600)

BY VALERIE KREUTZER

USICA STAFF CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- THE MARCH 28 ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR WERE AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE REFORM PROCESS SUPPORTED BY TWO U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS, SAYS U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE THOMAS ENDERS.

"WITHOUT THE POLITICAL AND LAND REFORMS, EL SALVADOR



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PAGE 02 -- SINAI

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ITEM

ME 24-412 (A) 22/82

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(R00)

BY VALERIE KREUTZER  
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"WITHOUT THE POLITICAL AND LAND REFORMS, EL SALVADOR



טופס מ"ט

חלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

אל: המשרד.

ד: וושינגטון.

מאת: נא"ם.

תאריך: \_\_\_\_\_

שם: \_\_\_\_\_

מיקום: \_\_\_\_\_

מס' דוק. 88 2000

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אליצור. דעו השגריר וושינגטון.  
מועב"ס - הר הכית.

שבארה"ב קירקסטריק אמרה היום לשגריר בלום שבעה שסעדה עם הנשיא רייגן עוב פתחת  
הדיון במועב"ס בנושא, סיפרה לנשיא על המרטה ועל הדרישה הערבית לכינוס מועב"ס.  
הנשיא שכדבריה, דעתו על האו"ם איננה חיובית ממילא, הביע תמרון רב ע"ב שנושא זה מובא  
בכלל ועומד להודן במועב"ס ושישראל מוחזקת כאחראית למעשה.

נא"ם.

למנהל משרד החוץ, תל אביב, דרך מלמך 10, ת"א

הצריך: 22.4.82  
מילוא.



דף...! מתוך...! דפים

סודג בטחוני...גלוי...

דחיסות...ל...ל...

אל: המשרד

תאריך 22.1400 22.1400 82

327... סס' סברק

מחנכ"ל, מצפ"א

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING--APRIL 22, 1982:

STOESSEL

In response to questions:

The Deputy Secretary is now in Israel having had discussions in Cairo earlier today. He plans to return to Cairo tomorrow and after that his schedule is uncertain.

ISRAEL-P.L.O.-LEBANON

In response to questions:

Q: Have you any confirmation that the administration has sent a message to the PLO asking for restraint? That is what the PLO representative to the U.N. said yesterday.

A: We are in touch with a number of governments with influence on the situation. But I'm not going to get into the details of these discussions. And as for contacts with the PLO, our long-standing policy is well known and has not changed.

--We are very pleased by the indications that we have received that all parties concerned intend to respect the cease-fire. Again, as I mentioned yesterday, our key concern is that the cease-fire would be maintained and as you know, we called upon all the parties involved to exercise restraint and to avoid actions which could prolong or escalate the violence.

We are gratified by the responsible positions adopted by the parties involved to avoid taking actions that could lead to a breakdown in the cease-fire.

תחנות

שם סוכנה רחב סוכנה דגל/סוכנה סוכנה יחידה רחב מן אלן דגל/סוכנה







TOP SECRET  
8841/762  
2-7/4  
5

Meeting between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with Under Secretary of State Stoessel at the Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem, at 845 a.m, April 21, 1982

Present: Draper, Lewis, Avner

Stoessel: Here is the letter from the President. We try to cover all the points mentioned last night.

(P.M. read letter.)

P.M.: It is a very satisfactory letter; an excellent letter. From our point of view it is completely satisfactory. I would like to hear the Foreign Minister's opinion. He, after all, is the expert.

Why should I hide from you, our American friends, what I shall do at the Cabinet this morning? I cannot say what the vote will be. Twice in the last two weeks I was in the minority. What I can tell you is that I shall recommend. I shall recommend that we say that the infringement of the security arrangements - Egypt has taken steps to correct them. It has also taken steps to prevent the smuggling of arms. After having now received Mubarak's letter and that of the President, I shall recommend to the Cabinet that we on our side shall carry out our commitment and ~~xxx~~ evacuate Sinai by April 22. I don't know if I'll be in the majority but I see no reason why I should not tell you, my American friends.

Stoessel: It is an historic moment.

P.M.: (to Foreign Minister) The President's letter is a good letter.

F.M.: My expectations were higher.

PM: As I said he is the expert.


Stoessel: On the question of strategic cooperation, as I stated to you last night, I talked to the Secretary in London and again a few days ago and he assured me to assure you that he is fully aware of your concerns and that ~~wix~~ he will be in touch with you. It wasn't possible to include the subject in this letter since the Secretary has just returned to Washington. (From his mediation of the Falklands Islands crisis.) But he has the matter very much in mind.

Lewis: After our meeting last night, Kimche and Bar-On brought to us a text of five points you wanted included in the letter. Three are dealt with in the letter in one form or another.

PM: On the MOW, on strategic cooperation, I got two separate private messages from the Secretary. In one he said: "In the not-too-distant future" and in the other, "soon you will get good news."

Lewis: Were it not for the Falkland crisis I am sure we would be much further on the way on this. Concerning the question of ~~xxxx~~ surprise attacks, the arrangements are included in the treaty and then there are the flights and ground inspection. In addition,





we have the regular overflights by the U-2 and the existing undertakings in writing provide for special U-2 flights at your request at any time.

PM: Do we get the original photos?

Lewis: You get the results of the photos. The original photos are not part of the arrangement.

PM: On this issue we shall continue our talks with Arik perhaps next week. I hope we shall find a way. You must understand that security is the ~~main~~ soul of the peace treaty. As I said to Sadat in Jerusalem at our first meeting, the ~~xx~~ Sinai cannot again be ~~the~~ filled with soldiers. Sadat understood. The 150 kms of the demilitarized zone is our security and because of them we cannot be taken by surprise.

Lewis: We have already made the arrangements to prevent a ~~xxxx~~ surprise attack.

PM: We shall discuss this further with Arik. I am sure you will do your best to make it easier for us.

What I told you before about my recommendation to the Cabinet you can cable it now to the President but there must be no leaks. Perhaps the decision will be made by consensus or by vote. We ~~xxx~~ shall have to wait and see.

Stoessel: Can I inform the Press that I brought you a letter from the President?

PM: Yes. And also that I said to you that I shall bring it to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

Lewis: May I draw your attention to the following passage in the President's letter:  
"It goes without saying, Mr. Prime Minister, that fulfillment of the binding obligations contained in the Agreements entered into between the United States and Israel, particularly since 1973 in the context of ~~the peace process~~ the peace ~~xxx~~ process, remains a central aspect of our policy."

That is a very important passage.

PM: I see.

Lewis: It covers all the things in the 1973 and 1975 agreements.


PM: For example, the U.S. commitment not to negotiate with the PLO unless it accepts 242 etc.

Lewis: That is correct. Also, economic help and so forth.

PM: As far as the autonomy question is concerned the President writes:

"It is equally in our security interest to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. You, President Mubarak, and I are in agreement that the Camp David Framework Agreement is the only agreed plan to resolve this problem. It is for this reason that the United States remains committed to make its best efforts to pursue an early and successful conclusion of negotiations for full autonomy and the establishment of a Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, as called for in the Camp David Framework Agreement."





In our text we say "the only plan", and you say "the only agreed plan".

Lewis: I think, "only agreed", is somewhat stronger.

PM: I think it is alright. You, Mr. Secretary, have brought me good tidings. You have rendered great services to the cause of peace. And I thank you, Mr. Draper.

Stoessel: I may stay a little longer if something moves on the Taba question.

PM: Sam, I didn't thank you. As the President says in his letter, "it goes without saying." I shall be in touch with you, Mr. Secretary, after the Cabinet meeting. I shall withhold an announcement to the Press (on the Cabinet decision) until I speak to Murthada to inform President Mubarak.

Stoessel: Again on Taba, if there is anything, particularly on the time frame, I am committed to Mubarak to go back to Cairo and work out a general agreement sometime tomorrow.

PM: I shall contact you after the Cabinet session.

-----  
Meeting adjourned 9.00 a.m.

-----  
*Ok 2/1*





REDUCE FUTURE DEFICITS AND SOME EASING IN MONETARY POLICY IS NECESSARY IMMEDIATELY TO BRING DOWN INTEREST RATES. A CREDIBLE DEFICIT OF ABOUT 80,000 TO 90,000 MILLION DOLLARS BY 1984 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS, HE SAID.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SHOULD RAISE ITS MONEY SUPPLY (M1) GROWTH TARGETS FROM THE PRESENT MAXIMUM OF 5.5 PERCENT A

PAGE 07 -- OUTPUT

YEAR TO 6.5 TO 7 PERCENT A YEAR, CHIMERINE SUGGESTED.

MUCH THE SAME OUTLOOK WAS PRESENTED BY ROBERT GOUGH OF DATA RESOURCES, INC., WHO SAID HE EXPECTS AN "ENORMOUS INJECTION OF CONSUMER PURCHASING POWER" FROM THE TEN-PERCENT TAX CUT TO GO INTO EFFECT JULY 1, AND THE ESCALATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. HE FORECAST A 3.6-PERCENT REAL ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR, AND 3.8-PERCENT REAL GROWTH FOR THE TWO YEARS BEGINNING JULY 1.

GOUGH ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO BRING DOWN THE DEFICIT AND TO EASE MONETARY POLICY. "THE CASE FOR IMPROVING THE PROPOSED BUDGET AND FOR COMPROMISING THE CURRENT EASY FISCAL-TIGHT MONETARY POLICY MIX IS NOW OVERWHELMING," HE SAID.

MALRY HARRIS OF PAINE WEBBER, INC., ADVOCATED SLOWER FEDERAL RESERVE REACTIONS TO SHORT-LIVED, ABOVE-TARGET MONEY SUPPLY EXPANSION IN THE EARLY STAGES OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY. MORE AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO REDUCE INTEREST RATES WHEN THE MONEY SUPPLY FALLS UNDER THE MIDPOINT OF ITS TARGET RANGE, HE SAID.

ITEM

NSA-312 (4/21/82)

U.S. DEPLORES MIDEAST CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS (1,200)  
BY RUSSELL DYBVIK AND ALEXANDER SULLIVAN  
USICA STAFF CORRESPONDENTS

WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES ISSUED A STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT APRIL 21 DEPLORING CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND URGING ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE

34

25/c



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PAGE 07 -- OUTPUT

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ITEM

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1984-512 (4251782)

U.S. DEPLORES MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS (1,500)  
BY RUSSELL DYBVIK AND ALEXANDER SULLIVAN  
USIA STAFF CORRESPONDENTS  
WASHINGTON -- THE UNITED STATES ISSUED A STRONGLY WORDED  
STATEMENT APRIL 21 DEPLOING CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS ALONG THE  
LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND URGING ALL PARTIES TO EXERCISE



THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DEAN FISCHER ISSUED THE STATEMENT ONLY HOURS AFTER ISRAELI JETS LAUNCHED A SERIES OF AIR STRIKES AT TARGETS AROUND DAMOUR, A PALESTINIAN STRONGHOLD SOUTH OF BEIRUT, AND AT OTHER PALESTINIAN TARGETS NEAR THE LEBANESE CAPITAL.

"THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ACTIONS RECENTLY WHICH HAVE THREATENED OR VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELIS AND THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON," THE STATEMENT SAID.

"THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THESE ACTIONS AND REMAINS

PAGE 02 -- MIDEAST

COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH SERVES THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES. IT CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD PROLONG OR ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE," IT SAID.

FISCHER SAID HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAELIS NOR WOULD HE DISCUSS THREATS TO THE CEASEFIRE.

"I AM JUST GOING TO LET THE STATEMENT SPEAK FOR ITSELF ON EITHER THREATS OR ACTUAL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE," HE SAID.

ASKED IF THE APRIL 21 ISRAELI AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON HAD PROMPTED THE UNITED STATES TO ISSUE THE STATEMENT, FISCHER REPLIED:

"I THINK THE STATEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO ANY PARTICULAR SPECULATION ABOUT THE BACKGROUND AS TO WHY WE DECIDED TO MAKE THE STATEMENT TODAY. JUST ASSUME WE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE STATEMENT IF WE HAD NOT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DO SO."

PAGE 03 -- MIDEAST

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS "LOOKING INTO EVERY ASPECT OF THE SITUATION," BUT HE DECLARED TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. HE SAID THE DEPARTMENT HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS OF



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AN ISRAELI SOLDIER BEING KILLED BY A LAND MINE EXPLOSION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND WAS AWARE OF PRESS REPORTS OF AERIAL CLASHES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN PLANES.

HOWEVER, HE HAD NO SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THE REPORTS AND SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THEM.

FISCHER SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG TO MEET IN WASHINGTON WITH AMBASSADORS FROM THE REGION AND THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR HAIG TO TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD NOTIFIED THE UNITED STATES IN ADVANCE OF ITS AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON, FISCHER SAID, "NO. I DO NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT WAS THE CASE."

FISCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS "IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL," BUT HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO SUGGEST THAT THOSE CONTACTS WERE SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO THE AIR STRIKES. HE SAID HE WAS

PAGE 04 -- MIDEAST

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(HADDAD IS COMMANDER OF AN ISRAELI-SUPPORTED LEBANESE MILITIA FORCE ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF LEBANON.)

FISCHER SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT STOOD BY ITS PREVIOUS DEFINITION OF A CEASEFIRE VIOLATION, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS HOSTILE MILITARY ACTION FROM LEBANON INTO ISRAEL OR VICE VERSA, INCLUDING ACTIONS INTO ISRAEL THROUGH JORDAN WHICH BEGAN IN LEBANON OR FROM ISRAEL OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR OTHER COUNTRIES INTO LEBANON.

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS AWARE OF PRESS REPORTS THAT LEBANON PLANS TO ASK THE UNITED NATIONS

30



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PAGE 08 -- MIDEAST

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PAGE 05 -- MIDEAST

SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES, BUT HE DEFERRED COMMENT UNTIL LEBANON HAS ACTUALLY DONE SO. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE ISSUE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MEANWHILE, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE U.S. MILITARY SALES ACT, WHICH STATES THAT RECIPIENTS OF U.S. ARMS MAY USE THEM ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

SPEAKES TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS "LOOKING INTO ALL ASPECTS" OF THE ISRAELI RAID. HE REPEATEDLY DECLINED REQUESTS FOR A YES OR NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO DETERMINE IF THE LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

LAST YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HELD UP THE DELIVERY OF SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WHILE INVESTIGATING ISRAELI USE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE RAID ON IRAQ'S NUCLEAR REACTOR.

SPEAKES ALSO DECLINED SEVERAL REQUESTS TO SPECIFY WHAT

PAGE 06 -- MIDEAST

"VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELIS" THE ADMINISTRATION REFERRED TO IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT URGING RESPECT FOR THE CEASEFIRE.

"YOU ARE AS AWARE AS I AM," SPEAKES SAID, "THAT THIS IS A SENSITIVE AREA OF THE WORLD, IT IS A SENSITIVE TIME IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD AND IT SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN HAVING ADDITIONAL RHETORIC...ON THE SUBJECT."

ASKED IF THE ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT TO AVOID ANNOYING ISRAEL ON THE EVE OF ITS SCHEDULED APRIL 25 RETURN OF THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE SINAI DESERT TO EGYPT, SPEAKES NOTED "THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IT SERVES NO PURPOSE FOR US TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT BEYOND WHAT WE'VE SAID," THAT IS, THE STATEMENT URGING RESTRAINT UPON ALL PARTIES.



SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES, BUT HE DEFERRED COMMENT UNTIL LEBANON HAS ACTUALLY DONE SO. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE ISSUE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS. AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MEANWHILE, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKS WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE U.S. MILITARY SALES ACT, WHICH STATES THAT RECIPIENTS OF U.S. ARMS MAY USE THEM ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

SPEAKS TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS "LOOKING INTO ALL ASPECTS" OF THE ISRAELI RAID. HE REPEATEDLY DECLINED REQUESTS FOR A YES OR NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO DETERMINE IF THE LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED. LAST YEAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HELD UP THE DELIVERY OF SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WHILE INVESTIGATING ISRAELI USE OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN THE RAID ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR REACTOR.

SPEAKS ALSO DECLINED SEVERAL REQUESTS TO SPECIFY WHAT

"VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELIS" THE ADMINISTRATION REFERRED TO IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT URGING RESPECT FOR THE CEASEFIRE.

"YOU ARE AS AWARE AS I AM," SPEAKS SAID, "THAT THIS IS A SENSITIVE AREA OF THE WORLD, IT IS A SENSITIVE TIME IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD AND IT SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN HAVING ADDITIONAL RHETORIC... ON THE SUBJECT."

ASKED IF THE ADMINISTRATION SOUGHT TO AVOID ANYTHING ISRAEL ON THE EVE OF ITS SCHEDULED APRIL 25 RETURN OF THE LAST SEGMENT OF THE SINAI DESERT TO EGYPT, SPEAKS NOTED "THERE IS A LONG HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IT SERVES NO PURPOSE FOR US TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT BEYOND WHAT WE'VE SAID." THAT IS, THE STATEMENT URGING RESTRAINT UPON ALL PARTIES.



SPEAKES TOLD QUESTIONERS THE STATE DEPARTMENT REMARKS ON THE BOMBING ADEQUATELY REFLECT REAGAN'S PERSONAL FEELINGS ABOUT THE EVENT. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE INCIDENT AT THE NORMAL START OF HIS BUSINESS DAY.

THE TEXT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

PAGE 07 -- MIDEAST

(BEGIN TEXT)

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ACTIONS RECENTLY WHICH HAVE THREATENED OR VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAELIS AND THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON.

THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THESE ACTIONS AND REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH SERVES THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES. IT CALLS UPON ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD PROLONG OR ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE.

THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY URGES ALL CONCERNED TO RESPECT SCRUPULOUSLY THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE STABILITY AND WELFARE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

(END TEXT)

ITEM

NESEA-313 (4/21/82)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1982 (1,000)

NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN, WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

U.S. WELCOMES ISRAELI SINAI WITHDRAWAL CONFIRMATION --

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES "WELCOMES" THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION APRIL 21 CONFIRMING PLANS FOR THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SINAI ON APRIL 25.



THE BOMBING ADEQUATELY REFLECT REGION'S PERSONAL FEELINGS  
ABOUT THE EVENT. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON  
THE INCIDENT AT THE NORMAL START OF HIS BUSINESS DAY.  
THE TEXT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

PAGE 07 -- MID EAST

(BEGIN TEXT)

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ACTIONS RECENTLY WHICH HAVE  
THREATENED OR VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING VIOLENCE  
AGAINST ISRAELIS AND THE ISRAELI AIR STRIKES INTO LEBANON.  
THE UNITED STATES DEPLORES THESE ACTIONS AND REMAINS  
COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH SERVES  
THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES. IT CALLS UPON ALL THE  
PARTIES INVOLVED TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO  
AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD PROLONG OR ESCALATE THE VIOLENCE.  
THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY URGES ALL CONCERNED TO RESPECT  
SORBOLLOUSLY THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE TERMS OF THE  
CEASEFIRE, WHICH IS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE STABILITY AND  
WELFARE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

(END TEXT)

ME8A-315 (A45782)

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1982 (1,000)  
NEWS BRIEFING -- DEAN FISCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN,  
WAS THE BRIEFER. HE COVERED THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:  
U.S. WELCOMES ISRAELI SINAI WITHDRAWAL CONFIRMATION --

FISCHER SAID THE UNITED STATES "WELCOMES" THE ISRAELI  
CABINET DECISION APRIL 21 CONFIRMING PLANS FOR THE FINAL  
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SINAI ON APRIL 25.



"WE ARE PLEASED WITH THAT NEWS," FISCHER SAID.

PRESIDENT REAGAN SENT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER STOESEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST LAST WEEK TO HELP ISRAEL AND EGYPT WORK OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF THE WITHDRAWAL.

FISCHER SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN STOESEL WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON. STOESEL HAS BEEN SHUTTLING BETWEEN CAIRO AND JERUSALEM.

IT IS NOT KNOWN IF STOESEL WILL STAY IN THE REGION TO

PAGE 02 -- STATE

REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES AT THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL CEREMONIES. FISCHER SAID SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG HAD NO PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE OCCASION APRIL 25.

PYM-HAIG TALKS SET FOR APRIL 22 --

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SEVERAL HOURS APRIL 22, FISCHER SAID.

"HE WILL MEET WITH THE SECRETARY TOMORROW IN THE LATE MORNING AND THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH."

FISCHER SAID HE HAD NO DEFINITE INFORMATION ON THE REMAINDER OF PYM'S SCHEDULE AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE BRITISH OFFICIAL WOULD MEET WITH ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE NEWS BRIEFING, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY LARRY SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER THAT HAIG'S MEETING WITH PYM APRIL 22 IS THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN THE CONSULTATIONS GOING

PAGE 03 -- STATE

FORWARD ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. HE WOULD NOT SAY WHETHER PYM WILL BE BRINGING A NEW BRITISH PROPOSAL, OR A BRITISH RESPONSE TO THE ARGENTINE PLAN.

SPEAKES SAID "WE AREN'T THAT FAR ALONG," WHEN ASKED IF THE WHITE HOUSE WILL ASK FOR A THREE-WAY MEETING AMONG HAIG, PYM AND ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ, WHO IS



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"HE WAS PLEASED WITH THAT NEWS," FISCHER SAID.  
PRESIDENT REAGAN SENT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER  
STOSSSEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST LAST WEEK TO HELP ISRAEL AND  
EGYPT WORK OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF THE WITHDRAWAL.  
FISCHER SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN STOSSSEL WOULD RETURN  
TO WASHINGTON. STOSSSEL HAS BEEN SHUTTLING BETWEEN CAIRO  
AND JERUSALEM.  
IT IS NOT KNOWN IF STOSSSEL WILL STAY IN THE REGION TO

PAGE 05 -- STATE

REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES AT THE SIGNAL WITHDRAWAL  
CEREMONIES. FISCHER SAID SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG HAD NO  
PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE OCCASION APRIL

PYU-HAIG TALKS SET FOR APRIL 25 --

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM IS SCHEDULED TO  
MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG AT THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT FOR SEVERAL HOURS APRIL 25, FISCHER SAID.  
"HE WILL MEET WITH THE SECRETARY TOMORROW IN THE LATE  
MORNING AND THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH."  
FISCHER SAID HE HAD NO DEFINITE INFORMATION ON THE REMAINDER  
OF THE SCHEDULE AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE BRITISH  
DEPUTY WOULD MEET WITH ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE REAGAN  
ADMINISTRATION WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE NEWS BRIEFING, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY  
LARRY SPEAKES TOLD A QUESTIONER THAT HAIG'S MEETING WITH PYM  
APRIL 25 IS THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN THE CONSULTATIONS GOING

PAGE 05 -- STATE

FORWARD ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. HE WOULD NOT SAY WHETHER  
PYM WILL BE BRINGING A NEW BRITISH PROPOSAL, OR A BRITISH  
RESPONSE TO THE ARGENTINE PLAN.  
SPEAKES SAID "WE AREN'T THAT FAR ALONG," WHEN ASKED IF  
THE WHITE HOUSE WILL ASK FOR A THREE-WAY MEETING AMONG HAIG,  
PYM AND ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENEZES, WHO IS

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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ארנס, דע: שטון

הנוקר מסר שטסל את המכתב הבא מהנשיא ריגן לרהמ' :

APRIL 20 , 1982

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AMONG NATIONS REPRESENTS THE  
FOREMOST GOAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, FOR ONLY THROUGH  
PEACE CAN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ACHIEVE  
SECURITY, PROSPERITY AND HOPE FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS. I  
KNOW THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PEOPLES, HAVING SUFFERED  
THE RAVAGES OF WAR FOR SO MANY YEARS, SHARE THIS VISION OF  
PEACE AND HOPE. THUS IT WAS THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI  
PEOPLES, THROUGH THEIR LEADERS, BROKE THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR  
AND EMBRACED IN PEACE. IN THESE TIMES OF TENSIONS AND  
VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND  
THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY THEREFORE REPRESENT THE  
HIGHEST STANDARD AGAINST WHICH OTHER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE  
PEACE MUST BE MEASURED. AS WE APPROACH THE COMPLETION OF  
THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, I THEREFORE  
WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM WITH YOU THE  
COMMITMENTS OF PEACE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND  
ISRAEL AND THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT CONTINUE TO  
BE CENTRAL ELEMENTS IN THE SECURITY POLICY OF MY



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*ADMINISTRATION FOR THE REGION. IT IS THEREFORE IN THE \*\*  
\*\*UNITED STATES' ABIDING SECURITY INTERESTS TO ENSURE THAT \*\*  
\*\*THE TREATY OF PEACE IS RIGOROUSLY APPLIED AND RESPECTED \*\*  
\*\*AND THAT CHALLENGES TO IT FROM WHATEVER QUARTER ARE MET \*\*  
\*\*AND OVERCOME. I AM COMMITTED TO THIS END." j \*\*

\*\* THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS CREATED BY THE \*\*  
\*\*PROTOCOL BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT \*\*  
\*\*PART IN ENSURING RESPECT FOR THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE \*\*  
\*\*MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IS INSTRUCTED BY THE \*\*  
\*\*PROTOCOL TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX I OF THE \*\*  
\*\*PEACE TREATY AND TO EMPLOY ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY \*\*  
\*\*VIOLATION OF ITS TERMS. THE PROTOCOL ALSO PROVIDES FOR MFO \*\*  
\*\*ARRANGEMENTS ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH \*\*  
\*\*THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE \*\*  
\*\*TREATY OF PEACE. I REALIZE THAT THE EFFECTIVE \*\*  
\*\*IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE MFO DUTIES IS OF CRITICAL \*\*  
\*\*IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL. I THEREFORE REAFFIRM OUR FULL SUPPORT \*\*  
\*\*FOR THE MFO AND THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS \*\*  
\*\*RESPONSIBILITIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER OF THE \*\*  
\*\*UNITED STATES TO YOU AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE \*\*  
\*\*PROTOCOL. \*\*

\*\* "THE ABILITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL TO PROVIDE FOR ITS \*\*  
\*\*SELF-DEFENSE IS A VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED \*\*  
\*\*STATES. ACCORDINGLY, AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, I AM \*\*  
\*\*DETERMINED TO SEE THAT ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL \*\*  
\*\*EDGE IS MAINTAINED AND AM MINDFUL AS WELL OF YOUR CONCERNS \*\*  
\*\*WITH RESPECT TO QUANTITATIVE FACTORS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON \*\*  
\*\*ISRAEL'S SECURITY. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, MR. PRIME \*\*  
\*\*MINISTER, THAT FULFILLMENT OF THE BINDING OBLIGATIONS \*\*  
\*\*CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE \*\*  
\*\*UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY SINCE 1973 IN THE \*\*  
\*\*CONTEXT OF THE PEACE PROCESS, REMAINS A CENTRAL ASPECT OF \*\*  
\*\*OUR POLICY. \*\*

\*\* "IT IS EQUALLY IN OUR SECURITY INTEREST TO RESOLVE THE \*\*  
\*\*PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. YOU, PRESIDENT \*\*  
\*\*HUBARAK, AND I ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CAMP DAVID \*\*

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT IS THE ONLY AGREED PLAN TO RESOLVE  
\*\*THIS PROBLEM. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE UNITED STATES  
\*\*REMAINS COMMITTED TO MAKE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PURSUE AN  
\*\*EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR FULL  
\*\*AUTONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SELF-GOVERNING  
\*\*AUTHORITY (ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL) FOR THE PALESTINIAN  
\*\*INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AS CALLED FOR IN THE  
\*\*CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT."

\*\* IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THIS TASK, ALL SIDES MUST  
\*\*MAINTAIN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH  
\*\*HAS MARKED OUR EFFORTS TO DATE, AS A FULL PARTNER IN THIS  
\*\*EFFORT, LET ME ASSURE YOU OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE  
\*\*AND CONTINUING SUPPORT.

\*\* MR. PRIME MINISTER, I AM FULLY SENSITIVE TO THE ANGUISH  
\*\*YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL ARE EXPERIENCING IN THESE  
\*\*DIFFICULT DAYS AND THE WEIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY YOU BEAR  
\*\*IN FACING THE RISKS WHICH REMAIN. I AM CONVINCED THAT  
\*\*HISTORY WILL SHOW THAT YOUR SACRIFICES HAVE ENSURED THE  
\*\*SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE.

\*\*WITH MY HIGHEST REGARDS,

\*\*SINCERELY,

\*\*RONALD REAGAN

\*\* כן נמסר אמש ע"י מורתרה המכתב הוא מאת הנשיא מובארק לרה"מ  
\*\* במסגרתו למכתבו של רה"מ למוזארק מה-19 דנ"א

\*\*APRIL 20, 1982

\*\*DEAR PRIME MINISTER BEGIN,



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 19 WHICH I READ WITH \*\*  
\*\*GREAT INTEREST. AS I TOLD YOU IN MY LETTERS DATED MARCH 21 \*\*  
\*\*AND APRIL 16 AND THE ORAL MESSAGES I CONVEYED TO YOU \*\*  
\*\*THROUGH MINISTER SHARON, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT IS \*\*  
\*\*DETERMINED TO FULLFILL ALL ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE CAMP \*\*  
\*\*DAVID ACCORDS AND THE PEACE TREATY IN GOOD \*\*  
\*\*FAITH. LIKEWISE, WE EXPECT ISRAEL TO DO THE SAME. THIS IS THE \*\*  
\*\*ONLY COURSE THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH OUR INTEREST, AND \*\*  
\*\*INFACIT, WITH THE INTEREST OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE \*\*  
\*\*EAST. WHEN I REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES SINCE I ASSUMED OFFICE \*\*  
\*\*THAT PEACE TO US IS A STRATEGIC GOAL AND NOT A TACTICAL \*\*  
\*\*MANEUVER. I WANTED TO DEEPEN THE COMMITMENT OF BOTH PEOPLES \*\*  
\*\*TO THE IDEAL OF PEACE. YOU WOULD ALSO RECALL THAT I MADE IT \*\*  
\*\*A POINT TO STATE THAT THE COMPLETION OF FINAL WITHDRAWAL \*\*  
\*\*FROM SINAI WILL CEMENT THE RELATIONS OF PEACE AND OPEN NEW \*\*  
\*\*OVENUES FOR COOPERATION AND INTERACTION. THIS BEICH OUR \*\*  
\*\*RECORD, IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE INTEND TO KEEP OUR \*\*  
\*\*WORD AND HONOR OUR COMMITMENT. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT WE \*\*  
\*\*VIOLATE OUR UNDERTAKINGS FOR WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A \*\*  
\*\*CONDUCT COULD NOT GENERATE ANY BENEFIT TO EITHER \*\*  
\*\*PARTY. SINCE WE TOOK THE FIRST STEP ON THE ROAD TO PEACE, WE \*\*  
\*\*PLEGGED OURSELVES TO WORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE \*\*  
\*\*PEACE. A FRAGILE OR SHAKY ARRANGEMENT WOULD UNDERMINE OUR \*\*  
\*\*PURPOSE AND SET BACK OUR EFFORTS. \*\*  
\*\* IN THE 'FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST', WE \*\*  
\*\*MADE A COMMITMENT TO ENTER INTO 'NEGOTIATIONS ON THE \*\*  
\*\*RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECT'. \*\*  
\*\*IN ORDER TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF \*\*  
\*\*AUTHORITY, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY CONCERNS \*\*  
\*\*OF ALL THE PARTIES, IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE \*\*  
\*\*TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND CAZA FOR A \*\*  
\*\*PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING FIVE YEARS. A SELF-GOVERNING \*\*  
\*\*AUTHORITY WOULD BE FREELY ELECTED BY THE INHABITANTS OF \*\*  
\*\*THE WEST BANK AND CAZA TO PROVIDE THEM WITH FULL \*\*  
\*\*AUTONOMY. THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY WOULD REPLACE THE \*\*  
\*\*MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH \*\*  
\*\*ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN. A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES \*\*  
\*\*WILL TAKE PLACE AND THERE WILL BE A REDEPLOYMENT OF THE \*\*

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*REMAINING FORCES INTO SPECIFIED SECURITY LOCATIONS. THE  
\*\*FINAL STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND OTHER  
\*\*OUTSTANDING ISSUES WOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE  
\*\*PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS, NOT  
\*\*LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE  
\*\*TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

\*\* ON MARCH 26, 1979 AS WE SIGNED THE HISTORIC PEACE  
\*\*TREATY, WE SIGNED A LETTER CONTAINING A COMMITMENT TO  
\*\*NEGOTIATE CONTINUOUSLY AND IN GOOD FAITH TO CONCLUDE  
\*\*THESE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THE  
\*\*PURPOSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS STATED AS FOLLOWS: ' TO  
\*\*AGREE, PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS, ON THE MODALITIES FOR  
\*\*ESTABLISHING THE ELECTED SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY  
\*\* (ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL), DEFINE ITS POWERS AND  
\*\* RESPONSIBILITIES AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES'. WE INTEND TO  
\*\* CONTINUE NEGOTIATING WITH YOU, WITH THE HELP OF THE UNITED  
\*\* STATES AS OUR FULL PARTNER, UNTIL WE REACH AGREEMENT. IT IS  
\*\* VITAL THAT WE SET IN MOTION THE PROCESS OF SOLVING THE  
\*\* PALESTINIAN QUESTION, BECAUSE WE ARE DETERMINED TO REACH A  
\*\* JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE  
\*\* EAST CONFLICT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE  
\*\* CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK WHICH REMAINS THE ONLY BINDING  
\*\* DOCUMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

\*\* THIS IS OUR POLICY TODAY AND IT WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED IN  
\*\* THE FUTURE. WE ARE MOST WILLING TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF  
\*\* PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ADVANCE THE  
\*\* CAUSE OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AND WIDEN THE SCOPE OF THE  
\*\* NEGOTIATIONS. WE WANT TO ATTRACT OTHER PARTIES TO THE  
\*\* CONFLICT TO THE TABLE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS THE BEST  
\*\* GUARANTEE FOR REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

\*\* DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER,

\*\* I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING  
\*\* THE PROBLEM OF THE LOCATION OF THE BOUNDARY LINE NEAR TABA  
\*\* AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS I TOLD YOU BEFORE, I WANT TO  
\*\* ELIMINATE ANY POSSIBLE SOURCE OF FRICTION IN THE FUTURE. I



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\*\*WANT US TO COOPERATE TOGETHER IN ORDER TO GIVE OUR \*\*  
\*\*PIONEERING STEP ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR DURABILITY \*\*  
\*\*AND CONTINUOUS GROWTH. I CAN NOT EMPHASIZE TO YOU \*\*  
\*\*ADEQUATELY THE NEED TO AVOID ANY CONTROVERSY IN THE MONTHS\*\*  
\*\*AND YEARS TO COME.THEREFORE,IT IS CRUCIAL THAT WE AGRES ON\*\*  
\*\*A FORMULA FOR SETTLING THIS DISAGREEMENT THROUGH \*\*  
\*\*ARBITARATION BY A CERTAIN DATE.THE LAST DEVELOPMENT WE \*\*  
\*\*WANT TO SEE IS A PROLONGED AND PROTRACTED CONFLICT OVER A \*\*  
\*\*POINT THAT HAS A SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE TO OUR \*\*  
\*\*PEOPLE.FIXING A DATE FOR SETTLING THE MATTER WILL NOT HURT\*\*  
\*\*THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF EITHER PARTY.IT IS A TECHNICAL \*\*  
\*\*POINT THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH INVESTIGATION AND \*\*  
\*\*LETIGATION.TO REPEAT MY FAVORITE LINE: LET US CONCENTRATE \*\*  
\*\*ON THE FUTURE WITH HOPE AND OPTIMISM. I COUNT ON YOUR \*\*  
\*\*WISDOM AND GOOD JUDGMENT. \*\*  
\*\*WITH BEST WISHES, \*\*

\*\*YOURS SINCERELY

\*\*MOHAMMED HOSNY MUBARAK

\*\*קרונו לודאי שהיום אההצי, אחרי ישיבת הממשלה מתקיים עוד ישיבה  
\*\*עם מטל גנרין מאנה שבעקבותיה יש להניח שטטטל יסע פעם נוספת  
\*\*לקהיר כשיחום בנושא זה.

\*\*ג-1411

\*\*5: שהח, טשהח, נהמ, סרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, מהנכל, ר/מרכבו, רס, מאן,  
\*\*707נינטטיין, מצפא, דינון, מצרים

OPENED FIRE TO PREVENT FOUR COMMUNIST SOLDIERS FROM ESCAPING  
TO THE SOUTH.

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED FOUR DAYS BEFORE A SCHEDULED VISIT  
TO THE BORDER BY VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH DIES --

POET ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, WINNER OF THREE PULITZER PRIZES,

PAGE 04 -- NEWS RDP.

DIED APRIL 20 IN BOSTON AT THE AGE OF 89. THE CAUSE OF  
DEATH WAS NOT DISCLOSED.

MACLEISH HAD HELPED PLAN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,  
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION. IN HIS LONG CAREER,  
HE HAD BEEN A SOLDIER, LAWYER, EDITOR, HARVARD PROFESSOR,  
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BASED ON THE OLD TESTAMENT STORY OF JOB.

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL BASED ON PRESS REPORTS IS FOR  
DISTRIBUTION TO MISSION STAFF ONLY AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
ITEM

N 5A-308 (4/21/82)

20/6

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SEEKS MORE MILITARY AID FOR MOROCCO,  
TUNISIA, SLOAN (750)

WASHINGTON -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ASKED THE  
U.S. CONGRESS FOR AN INCREASE IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR  
TUNISIA AND MOROCCO IN FISCAL YEAR 1985 AS A PART OF ITS  
EFFORT TO ASSIST STRATEGICALLY LOCATED COUNTRIES THAT FACE  
SERIOUS OUTSIDE THREATS.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PETER CONSTABLE,  
APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
AFRICA APRIL 20, DESCRIBED MOROCCO AND TUNISIA AS  
"ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT" TO U.S. STRATEGY OF BOLSTERING  
COUNTRIES WHICH OCCUPY AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE REGION.



OPENED FIRE TO PREVENT FOUR COMMUNIST SOLDIERS FROM ESCAPING

TO THE SOUTH.

THE INCIDENT OCCURRED FOUR DAYS BEFORE A SCHEDULED VISIT TO THE BORDER BY VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH DIES --

POET ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, WINNER OF THREE PULITZER PRIZES,

PAGE ON -- NEWS REP.

DIED APRIL 20 IN BOSTON AT THE AGE OF 89. THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS NOT DISCLOSED.

MACLEISH HAD HELPED PLAN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION. IN HIS LONG CAREER, HE HAD BEEN A SOLDIER, LAWYER, EDITOR, HARVARD PROFESSOR, FLIGHTLIGHT AND FARMER. HIS MOST FAMOUS WORK WAS "J.B." BASED ON THE OLD TESTAMENT STORY OF JOB.

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ITEM

also

IN 24-508 (4/21/85)

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SEEKS MORE MILITARY AID FOR MOROCCO, TUNISIA, ALBAN (750)

WASHINGTON -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ASKED THE U.S. CONGRESS FOR AN INCREASE IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR TUNISIA AND MOROCCO IN FISCAL YEAR 1985 AS A PART OF ITS EFFORT TO ASSIST STRATEGICALLY LOCATED COUNTRIES THAT FACE SERIOUS OUTSIDE THREATS.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PETER CONSTABLE, APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON APRIL 20, DESCRIBED MOROCCO AND TUNISIA AS "ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT" TO U.S. STRATEGY OF BOLSTERING COUNTRIES WHICH OCCUPY AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE REGION.



"IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST FOR THESE TWO COUNTRIES -- PART OF THE ARAB WORLD, PART OF AFRICA, AND PART OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN -- TO BE SECURE FROM EXTERNAL THREAT AND TO DEVELOP IN ORDERLY FASHION UNDER GOVERNMENTS WHICH SHARE COMMON INTERESTS WITH US," CONSTABLE TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE.

*Handwritten initials and a diagonal line.*

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"BOTH MOROCCO AND TUNISIA HAVE LONG SUPPORTED OUR TWO BASIC OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA -- THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR SECURITY," HE SAID.

NOTING THAT THIS IS A PERIOD OF BUDGET STRINGENCY CONSTABLE EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION COULD STAY WITHIN LIMITS OF CONGRESS' TWO-YEAR AUTHORIZATION BILL. "HOWEVER" HE SAID, "WE HAVE NO RESPONSIBLE CHOICE BUT TO REQUEST THE HIGHER LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE THE ADMINISTRATION IS PRESENTING FOR TUNISIA AND MOROCCO IN FISCAL YEAR 1983."

"WE BELIEVE THIS INCREASE ABOVE THE FY-82 LEVEL IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN THESE TWO COUNTRIES," HE SAID.

THE MAJOR INCREASE FOR ASSISTANCE FOR MOROCCO REQUESTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IS IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS ASKING FOR 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN CREDITS, WELL ABOVE THE LEVELS OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS WHICH RANGED FROM 25 TO 45 MILLION DOLLARS.

CONSTABLE SAID THAT MUCH OF MOROCCO'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT

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IS OBSOLETE, AND THE PROPOSED INCREASE WOULD PERMIT MOROCCO TO PURCHASE NEW EQUIPMENT "INCLUDING ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURES EQUIPMENT FOR THE AIR FORCE, NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS AND GROUND SENSORS, AND THE POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF M-60 TANKS."

RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN SOLARZ, CONSTABLE EXPLAINED THAT THE ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURE EQUIPMENT WAS PROVIDED AT THE REQUEST OF THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE POLISARIJ USED SOVIET MADE SA-



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PAGE 05 -- SECURITY

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6 MISSILES TO SHOOT DOWN "A NUMBER OF MOROCCAN AIRCRAFT."

CONSTABLE SAID THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT SENDING U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS TO MOROCCO IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, BUT HE ASSURED THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING ADVISERS TO ENTER THE WESTERN SAHARA.

THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO IS REQUESTING A 600,000 DOLLAR INCREASE IN MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING FUNDS IN FISCAL 1983. THE FISCAL 1982 FIGURE WAS 1.1 MILLION DOLLARS.

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ALSO REQUESTED IS AN INCREASE OF 3.1 MILLION DOLLARS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ABOVE THE 10.6 MILLION DOLLARS PROVIDED IN FISCAL 1982, AND 36.5 MILLION DOLLARS IN PUBLIC LAW 480 FOOD AID, AN INCREASE OF 5.1 MILLION DOLLARS.

TURNING TO TUNISIA, CONSTABLE SAID THAT NATION IS "UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM LIBYA AND INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED MILITARILY." HE SAID BECAUSE TUNISIA REQUIRES A MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WITH HEAVY INITIAL COSTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS PROPOSING FISCAL 83 MILITARY SALES CREDITIS OF 140 MILLION DOLLARS, 55 MILLION DOLLARS ABOVE THE FISCAL 1982 LEVEL, "TO CUSHION THE SHOCK OF SUCH LARGE EXPENDITURES ON THE TUNISIAN ECONOMY."

CONSTABLE SAID THE FUNDS ARE NEEDED FOR F-5 AIRCRAFT, M-60 TANKS AND CHAPPARAL MISSILES WHICH TUNISIA PLANS TO ORDER IN FISCAL 1982. ALSO REQUESTED IS AN INCREASE IN MILITARY TRAINING FUNDS FROM 1 MILLION TO 1.7 MILLION DOLLARS TO TEACH THE TUNISIAN MILITARY TO OPERATE THE NEW EQUIPMENT.

ANOTHER WITNESS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS CHESTER CROCKER, TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE THAT THE

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ADMINISTRATION IS ASKING 100 MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY SALES CREDITIS AND 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY TRAINING FUNDS FOR SUDAN.

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1



THEY NEVERTHELESS WILL ONLY ALLOW THE SUDANESE TO CONTINUE  
THE PROGRAMS BEGUN IN 1982," CROCKER SAID. THESE PROGRAMS  
INCLUDE ROUNDING OUT A TANK BATTALION, ADDING TO THE F-5  
PROGRAM, COMPLETING AN EARLY WARNING RADAR SYSTEM AND  
PROVIDING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO COMBAT ENGINEERS.

RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FROM SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN HOWARD  
WOLPE ABOUT THE NEED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, CROCKER SAID,  
"WE TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY THE SECURITY OF THE SUDAN,"

"SUDAN IN OUR VIEW, HAS BEEN VERY GENUINELY THREATENED ON  
BOTH FLANKS -- THAT IS THE LIBYA FLANK AND THE ETHIOPIAN  
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ITEM

NESEA-309 (4/21/82)

REGIONAL CULTURAL BRIEF (200)

MIDEAST, SOUTH ASIA FIGURE IN 'MARCO POLO' FILM

A TEN-HOUR TELEVISION FILM SERIES ON THE LIFE OF THE 13TH  
CENTURY ITALIAN VOYAGER, MARCO POLO, WHICH PREMIERS IN THE  
UNITED STATES IN MID-MAY, TOOK FIVE YEARS TO PLAN AND  
EXECUTE, AND THREE CONTINENTS FOR FILMING.

IT BRINGS TOGETHER A CAST OF TOP AMERICAN, CHINESE,  
JAPANESE, BRITISH AND ITALIAN ACTORS. IT WAS FILMED IN 34  
LOCATIONS -- INCLUDING GALILEE AND JERUSALEM, IRAN,  
AFGHANISTAN AND MOROCCO, AS WELL AS ITALY, MONGOLIA AND  
CHINA. IT SPANS THREE CONTINENTS, AND WILL BE TELEVISED IN 70  
COUNTRIES.

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MESS-309 (4252782)

ITEM

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