

# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

תוק מספר 2 / 4606

משרד ראש

יועץ ראש

ארה"ב

3/3/88 - 10/3/88

מחלקה

חוק מס

מס. 4



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

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10/08/2020

תאריך הדפסה





WITNESS: GEORGE SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1988

SEC. GEORGE SHULTZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Edwards, I appreciate your warm words of support. And I think as it regards to the Middle East, it is very helpful that people throughout the region in all of the countries can see that there is a broad bipartisan general support for energetic efforts to try to help them toward peace and it makes it easier for me, as somebody that's moving around on behalf of the country, to have people see that that's the case. So, I appreciate the statements that were made.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, you've commented on that, Mr. Chairman, and I won't go into it further. We had a lot of discussion yesterday, and again, I'd be glad to respond to questions. But I think perhaps the most useful single comment I could make is just to say why I think, from everybody's standpoint, but let's think of it from Israel's standpoint, why it's so important that we take advantage of any opportunity there may be for peace.

First of all, there is the obvious, very large benefit that would come from a more stable, more assured, more constructive and open set of arrangements in the region. And Israel would benefit greatly from that, and from a reduction in the burden of defense that it carries, as well as a more open economic situation potentially. So there are great potential fruits that could be gained.

Second, it seems to me, Israel needs to focus on the fact that there is a very large, clearly ticking demographic timebomb. Many, many people who are disenfranchised and who are there. And in some manner or another, that problem must be dealt with; it cannot be ignored. And so peaceful -- moves toward peace that will grapple with that problem successfully are very important. It has to be done. The longer it goes unattended, the more difficult it will be.

Third, there is no doubt that we live now in the world of the missile. And missiles that go further and further and are more and more accurate are becoming more and more common. People know how to make them. There aren't very many countries in a class with ourselves and the Soviet Union, but people are catching up. And that means that security, of course, will always have to reflect defensible borders and arrangements of that kind. But when somebody who's a long ways away from you can inflict very, very damaging blows, then your concept of defense has to be different, and I think, fundamentally, that concept has to be one of seeking peace in the neighborhood.

So, I believe the stakes are very high and I know the people in the region are more aware of it even than we are, and the desire for peace is quite tangible, and I hope that in one way or another we'll be able to make progress. And the general support and understanding that you have exhibited and others here have, I'm sure helps a great deal.



In the Persian Gulf, our naval presence there has been very successful. We've put some backbone into the situation. Nevertheless, the Iran-Iraq war continues, and we continue to give very strong support to UN Security Council Resolution 598. We believe that it has long passed time for a second resolution to be passed.

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A principal stumbling block, as I see it, is the Soviet Union and they seem to be very reluctant. It's an irony that they have suddenly called for a resolution against the so-called "War of the Cities," and this is a situation where missiles made in the Soviet Union are being lobbed from Iraq at Iran and from Iran to Iraq. But the point is not to focus just on that, but that the whole situation needs to have a cease-fire, which Resolution 598 calls for.

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And insofar as

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

2362 RAYBURN BUILDING

RE: FY89 APPROPRIATIONS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION

RE: DAVID A. OBEY (D-WI), CHAIRMAN

WITNESS: GEORGE SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

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A principal stumbling block, as I see it, is the Soviet Union and they seem to be very reluctant. It's an irony that they have suddenly called for a resolution against the so-called "War of the Cities," and this is a situation where missiles made in the Soviet Union are being lobbed from Iraq at Iran and from Iran to Iraq. But the point is not to focus just on that, but that the whole situation needs to have a cease-fire, which Resolution 598 calls for.

And insofar as I can see in talking with people who talk to both countries and know them well, the best prospect for bringing about peace is the denial of arms to the country that refuses to accept the resolution. And while we know that arms embargoes are not 100 percent effective usually, nevertheless they are -- they do have an impact and they will be disruptive, and that's the reason Iran is struggling so hard to put off any kind of a vote. But we will work hard for that, and I think we perhaps are making some progress, but it's disappointing that we haven't gotten that follow-on resolution as yet.

I'm not quite sure where to start. Let me ask one question on the Middle East first. I think there's some confusion from press reports and from the letter which -- which some senators sent about Jordan's position on the idea of a Jordanian -- of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It's being reported that Jordan has backed away from the concept of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Is that, in fact, the case? Is Jordan demanding separate representation for the PLO at an international conference, as has been reported?

SEC. SHULTZ: No.

Re: Obey on budgets...



and show me how they would allocate the money so that we could meet their priority interests all around the horn. And secondly, I even volunteered to take the personal heat for a 2 percent cut in earmarking for the two most political earmarks in the bill -- Israel and Egypt -- because at that time the peculiarity of outlay rates meant that if we cut 2 percent from Israel and Egypt -- very small amounts -- \$24 million, \$36 million, we could generate in budget authority for other countries in the FMS account over \$750 million. I didn't do that again because I took particular pleasure in knocking off those earmarks, but because I thought that if we could establish a most-favored-nation principle in the bill and apply that to all other programs in the bill as well, that our -- that the highest priorities would get 98 percent and we would have some money left for other people. And I was told at the time that the Administration preferred not to pursue that route.

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CHAIRMAN OBEY: I'm sure you do, but let me say that with one exception, I have the votes on my side of the table last year for the two percent approach, and I think we could have done it if we'd had a united approach on it.

And the other point I would simply make is that, in terms of earmarking, the charges to which you had better direct most of your comments is on the other side of Capitol Hill because as you know this Subcommittee kept earmarking to a bare minimum. When the bill left the House, we earmarked, with the exception of Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Philippines, we had earmarked very few additional items and most of the earmarking came on the Senate side to which we acquiesced in conference as part of an effort to divide up a very small number.

CHAIRMAN OBEY: Middle East...

Let me -- let me ask, Mr. Secretary, if we could move to -- back to the Middle East: There have been a number of -- I -- there's not a day goes by that I don't get a call or a letter or -- usually many more than that -- questioning what's happening on the West Bank, and asking, "What are we...", you know, quote, "What are you guys doing about it?" And, so, what I would like to ask is this question: In relation to the incidents that we've seen on television with people on the West Bank being beaten -- sometimes young people, what has -- I think -- I -- I think the American public would simply like to know what our government has done to convey our concerns on that issue? What have we said to the Israelis about those incidences? Is our Ambassador or our other officials in the area raising these problems with the Israelis? And are -- have we specifically taking -- taken up with and Israeli officials the beatings, that we've seen from time to time, of young people in those incidents?

SEC. SHULTZ: Yes, we have. We have commented publicly and we have had lots of private dialogue about the methods used to deal with the problems. We took part in debates in the United Nations Security Council. We expressed ourselves there against the deportation tactic used. So we've made our views known to Israel, both in a public sense and a private sense.



We have felt, however, that there came to be a kind of cascade of effort through the UN Security Council that would have wrapped the whole problem into an authoritative type international conference, which we opposed, and was developing a situation in which we would find ourselves struggling with UN resolutions of one kind or another very frequently. And we decided that that should be stopped, and so we vetoed. That didn't mean that we were any less concerned about the methods being used in some of the instances of contending with violence on the West Bank and Gaza.

Now we have to recognize that Israel has a problem, and that Israel has to maintain law and order. That is its responsibility. And it's struggling with something that's basically new to it. And I don't believe myself that this in any way excuses some of the brutality that we've seen. It's unnecessary and uncalled for. Nevertheless, they have to exert a will to see that conditions are stable and lawful. So they have a real problem in doing that, and I think they have been shifting their tactics somewhat. But still, the problem is acute.

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REP. PORTER: It's shameful, Mr. Secretary, it's absolutely shameful. I certainly agree with you. However, I also think that while we should oppose the policies that China has followed, for example, regarding abortion and forced sterilization, that should not imperil our support for voluntary family planning in the 130 other countries that don't follow such practices. And that's what we've done by cutting off funding to UNFPA, it seems to me.

In the Middle East, is it our policy to condition Soviet participation in a Middle Eastern peace conference not only on Soviet reestablishing its recognition of -- its diplomatic relations with Israel, but also on a return to the 1979 levels of Soviet-Jewish emigration?

SEC. SHULTZ: I don't think it's realistic to impose that kind of a condition if we're able to get people to agree to the kind of international conference that we've proposed recently. However, I have told the Soviets, and I believe this is so, that whether they come to a conference or not, they cannot expect to play a genuinely involved role in Middle East affairs as long as they treat Soviet Jewry as they do, as long as they have the restrictions on immigration that they have, and as long as they fail to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. And that's just the fact of the matter.

REP. PORTER: Thank you for doing that, Mr. Secretary. I have

REP. YATES: Mr. Secretary, it's nice to see you again, and I want to commend you for your efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. Certainly it's an area that should have had peace many, many years ago after the long series of wars that they've had. Israel and the Arab nations have been at war continuously since 1948, have they not? And how many of the nation -- of the Arab nations -- how many of the Arab nations who have been engaged in wars with Israel have made peace with Israel? Egypt is the only one, is it not?

SEC. SHULTZ: That's correct.

REP. YATES: And technically a state of war does exist between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iraq, Israel and the other nations in the Middle East at the present time -- Arab nations in the Middle East?



SEC. SHULTZ: That is technically accurate, although fortunately it is not literally so.

REP. YATES: Well, I suppose both technically and practically you have an armistice that is in existence there?

SEC. SHULTZ: An uneasy situation.

REP. YATES: An uneasy armistice, that's right.

SEC. SHULTZ: And that is why Israel has to carry such a huge burden of armaments. I mean, you just look at the burden they carry in proportion to their size, and it isn't only the amount of money but the people who have to serve and are on call and so on, and the disruption to their lives that are involved in that. So it's a huge effort.

REP. YATES: It is a fact too, is it not, that between 1948 when the first war between Israel and the Arabs took place and the war in 1967 Jordan controlled the West Bank -- so-called West Bank and there were no initiatives for peace with the PLO at that time, isn't that correct?

SEC. SHULTZ: Correct.

REP. YATES: All during that 19-year period. When we speak of the PLO and there has been a lot of reports in the press that this is what is -- that peace is being sought with the PLO -- is there a unified PLO with whom peace could be achieved? Are there not many factions in the PLO?

SEC. SHULTZ: Yes, there are many factions in the PLO and it's very -- just in reading

and getting intelligence about it, you see, a many-faceted organization, if that's the right word for it, and, you see, statements made by Mr. Arafat that are -- kind of, on all sides of things at the same time, so, he seems always to get himself in the position where he can say, "I supported this -- but I also supported that," and so on. So, it's a very contradictory picture.

REP. YATES: Both the -- not both but the -- Camp David Accords looked to the establishment of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank in Gaza, did it not?

SEC. SHULTZ: It proposed a negotiation for what was called autonomy, and such negotiations went on for quite a period of time, involving Egypt and Israel, with ourselves as partners in that negotiation, but those negotiations, basically ended in -- well certainly -- they ended after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and they were not doing very well before that.

REP. YATES: Are you seeking to bring those negotiations into effect again? Is that -- what did you achieve in the Middle East? I'm sorry, I wasn't here earlier, I had another committee that I had to chair, and that was the reason.

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, I don't know whether I achieved anything much.

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REP. YATES: Well, I think you did. I think just your presence and your efforts are commendable, and I want to -- I want to assure you, certainly, that I will do my best to try to help you achieve peace in that area. And, I haven't read of what you concluded as a result of your travels around there and that was the purpose of my question, I guess.

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, through intensive discussions with a stream of people who came from Israel, here, and with our ambassador in Israel -- with the Egyptians when they were here in a very fruitful visit -- President Mubarak played with his team through a lengthy session that we had with the King of Jordan and his associates through Phil Habib's mission, and then with other countries. We developed a -- sort of a concept -- and I took that concept around in a number of sessions with leaders of Israel, with leaders of Jordan,

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and twice went to Syria. And out of that, we developed a proposal. And in the last swing that I made, I took that proposal in the form of a letter to King Hussein and to Prime Minister Shamir and to President Assad. And we set out a proposal that is printed in the New York Times today. The New York Times got scooped by the Jerusalem Post, (laughter) I think. But, anyway, it's from my standpoint since I gave it privately to the leaders -- I find it useful to have it printed here (laughter) so I can refer to it. I didn't release it (laughter), but this is an accurate text.

And you can see in reading this in today's paper the general flow of what we have proposed. We've tried to propose something that is comprehensive in a sense of dealing between Israel and all the countries on its border. And before I went, I said to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel that I want to be able to say, for example, to President Assad that you're willing to sit down and negotiate with him. And they said, "Certainly. We are." And, of course, that's been so for some time. But I wanted to affirm that.

So we have here a concept that's comprehensive in that sense. If anyone is not included in it, if it gets going, that will be their own doing to exclude themselves. We talk here about security for all states in the region. We talk about the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. I might say that phrase can be found in many documents, including in Camp David accords. We propose that we get started early on negotiations. We think time is awasting. And it may be that people's minds are a little more open now than they've been in some time, and we should take advantage of that.

And so we aspire to see things start on the first of May. And we say in our letter that each of the negotiations, that is between Israel and any of the countries that wish to do so, would be based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and all their parts, each of the negotiations. And that they will -- each will work out their procedure and agenda. We have here the phrase -- quote -- "All participants in the negotiations must state their willingness to negotiate with one another." If there's anybody that wants to sit at the table with Israel has to state its willingness to negotiate with Israel. In other words, Israel's right to exist.



Then we have a paragraph on the negotiations between a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation on the one hand, and an Israeli delegation on the other hand. That is by way of saying first of all, that Palestinians must be represented, and we believe the right way for them to be represented, and the most fruitful way, is to be part of a Jordanian delegation. And as I said in response to a question from the Chairman earlier, Jordan's view is that that is the desirable way to go.

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Composing such a delegation is not the easiest job in the world, so -- Palestinians will have to be found who are legitimate and really represent Palestinians, and have the confidence, and who are of such a nature that Israel is willing to sit down with them. And particularly given recent events, that's not going to be the easiest thing to put together, but I think that is a desirable objective.

Our view is that this negotiation should first address what we have called, "transitional arrangements." We've tried to stay away from words that cause people problems, and perhaps the word, "transitional arrangements," is satisfactory, at least nobody balked at it. We believe that such negotiations could be concluded within six months if they got started. And we base that estimate on the fact that there has been a great deal of work done already -- so -- that the terrain has been worked over well, and on the evident desire on the part of the government of Israel to complete such negotiations. And in a kind of reverse way, I think I can fairly say that Jordan is -- believes that the final status negotiations are the ones that really count, so assuming they would commit themselves to undertake these negotiations, they'd want to get them behind them as rapidly as possible.

So we think that there is a good chance that these could go rapidly. And we have stated here that if those take place the United States will be prepared to table a complete draft agreement when the negotiations start. Obviously people will have different views, but it's useful to start with something and -- that shows the different compromises that have to be made and one way of doing it, and then people can struggle with that.

We have proposed here what we've called an interlock between transition arrangements, and the negotiation of them, and final status negotiations. So whenever the negotiations started -- let's say, May 1st -- if they ran for six months -- it probably would take that much time, but it could be completed by then -- you would have completed the negotiation of transition arrangements. It probably will take you three months, as we would estimate it, to put into place the administrative arrangements for making them work. So between the end of the six-month period and before the start after three months, we would start negotiations in final status. So there'd be an interlock here. The final status negotiations would begin before the transition arrangements were implemented, but after they'd been agreed to.



We think the transition arrangements should be thought of as lasting for a specified period. We suggest three years. What that means is that the final status negotiations, which we'd like to see completed in a year, would not be completed until after there was some experience to look at, with transition arrangements, how they are working. And I believe the theory that people can feel more comfortable possibly in making decisions about final status if they see in place transition arrangements that are working, I believe that theory is a good one. Now -- so we would see this interlock in place, as we would project these negotiations.

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It is essential, particularly from the standpoint of the Arab side, that there be an auspices for these negotiations, something that gives them legitimacy. The legitimacy is basically UN Resolutions 242 and 338, coming from the UN Security Council. So we have proposed an international conference consisting of the five permanent members and the Israel -- and the parties to the dispute, Israel and the immediately surrounding countries, with Palestinians represented in the Jordanian delegation. We proposed that this conference initiate these bilateral negotiations, that it be

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a body that can receive reports from the parties on the status of their negotiations, but that, and I'll read this out, "the conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached." In other words, it is not an authoritative conference or a plenipotentiary conference, to use the Soviet expression, but a conference that would convene -- people will make whatever statements they want to make -- but it would be a way of getting the negotiations going and be a body that could receive reports from time to time.

So, that's basically the program that we tabled, and we have asked people to respond by next week, and whether they will or not or what they will say, I don't know. But, it was apparent to me throughout the region that everybody is reaching and wanting to find some way to get going in a more constructive and peaceful manner -- everybody is. And people have looked at our ideas, and while nobody is saying yes, nobody wants to say no, because it's the only game in town. And I think it's sensible and balanced, and we intend to stay with it and to work at it and not to -- I mean, people will probably -- would even dodge and object and so on, but we're going to keep working and see if we can't bring something out of this.

REP. YATES: Thank you.

I wanted to followup one thing that you mentioned to Mr. Yates. You indicated that your letter had spelled out that each of the conferences which was to take place in the Middle East would be based on 242 and 338.

SEC. SHULTZ: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN DBEY: And that -- does that, in your view then, get at this problem -- we've had -- I've had some people express to me the concern that you might various parties in the Middle East to agree to the first procedural steps, each hoping that the other one would wind up dragging their feet in some way, so that they could



avoid moving on to the final discussion about how to deal with the problem long-term. Does that -- in your view, does the fact that you refer to these resolutions at each discussion stage, preclude an interpretation that you would -- that -- for instance, land for peace, which has been talked about, would be tied into actions already taken through past agreements. Do you think it makes clear that you're talking at each stage about applying these resolutions to new actions?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, what the letter says, is that each of the negotiations, the one involving, in effect, the West Bank and Gaza and the others, would be based on Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their parts. And we think that covers the situation well, and is a way of putting it, that perhaps is acceptable all around. Because everyone says they accept Resolution 242 and 338. And if we apply it to negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza, or for that matter, to the Golan Heights, then it can find an expression there.

CHAIRMAN OBEY: But it would not be sufficient to suggest that 242 and 338 had already been met because of actions taken through, for instance, the prior agreements reached between Egypt and Israel, between Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, what it -- No, it wouldn't. We say here, that each of these negotiations would have as a -- would be based on the Resolutions, 242 and 338. So the fact that 242 and 338 have, so to speak, been applied to the Sinai, doesn't lessen the applicability of them to other negotiations.

CHAIRMAN OBEY: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I should also clear up one other point in my discussion with you about my conversations last year with Mr. Whitehead. When I referred to the offer I had made at that time to explore the two percent solution across the board, I should make it clear that I was -- that we were -- that I was -- we were talking about it at the time back when conditions were fairly calm in the Middle East. I'm not suggesting that we ought to still pursue that for this year, given existing circumstances, because -- because the Congress has made its decisions for the year -- for this year, and the President signed the CR, and I think we all have to live with those decisions that were made.

The -- I would also, Mr. Secretary, like to thank you for the -- for the cooperation which your department has given me in pursuing the question of whether or not the killers of US marines in El Salvador would be released or not. As you know, we certainly don't feel that -- that that would be an appropriate application of amnesty. And I appreciate your keeping me and my staff fully informed on the developments on that issue. dddddd

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דחיפות

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SEC. SHULTZ: Yes, we have. We have commented publicly and we have had lots of private dialogue about the methods used to deal with the problems. We took part in debates in the United Nations Security Council.

We expressed ourselves there against the deportation tactic used. So we've made our views known to Israel, both in a public sense and a private sense.

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CHAIRMAN

Subcommittee on Human Rights

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March 8, 1988

Honorable Yitzchok Shamir  
Prime Minister  
State of Israel  
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Prime Minister Shamir:

We care deeply about the State of Israel and are concerned about the ongoing Arab violence and rioting. We are presenting the following suggestion for consideration in the hope that it will contribute to the restoration of tranquility in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

We respectfully urge the government of Israel to consider banning the media from the riot afflicted areas of the West-Bank and Gaza for a two month period. We believe and it is widely acknowledged that the presence of television news cameras contributes directly to the violence. Arab youths are performing for the world media and their leadership is more than willing to accept the casualties incurred since the ultimate aim and goal is the dismantling of the Jewish State. The banning of the press in special circumstances was British policy under Prime Minister Thatcher during the Falkland Islands hostilities and United States policy under President Reagan during the invasion of Grenada.

We all cherish freedom of expression and freedom of the press but exceptional circumstances require exceptional and unusual tactics.

It is clear that the PLO, the Arab League and the rioters are willing to continue to shed blood to pursue their "Armed struggle" to destroy Israel while the press willingly or unwillingly contributes to the chaos with their sense of new found morality directed against the State of Israel.

With the help of G-d the results of the hate directed against the



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Jewish state will lead to the defeat of Israel's enemies.

Sincerely yours,

*Glenn Warren*

Glenn E. Warren (R-Dutchess)

*Samuel Colman*

Samuel Colman (D-Monsey)

*Richard H. Miller*

Richard H. Miller (R-Broome)

*Nettie Mayersohn*

Nettie Mayersohn (D-Queens)

*Peter J. Abbate, Jr.*

Peter J. Abbate, Jr. (D-Brooklyn)

*Rhoda Jacobs*

Rhoda Jacobs (D-Brooklyn)

*Hector L. Diaz*

Hector L. Diaz (D-Bronx)

*Hyman M. Miller*

Hyman M. Miller (R-Onondaga)

*Richard I. Coombe*

Richard I. Coombe (R-Sullivan)

*Frederick E. Parola*

Frederick E. Parola (R-Nassau)

*Howard L. Lasher*

Howard L. Lasher (D-Brooklyn)

*Dov Hikind*

Dov Hikind (D-Brooklyn)

*Alan G. Hevesi*

Alan G. Hevesi (D-Queens)

*Sheldon Silver*

Sheldon Silver (D-New York)

*Audrey Pheffer*

Audrey Pheffer (D-Queens)

*William L. Larkin, Jr.*

William L. Larkin, Jr. (D-Orange)

*Mary M. McPhillips*

Mary M. McPhillips (D-Orange)

*Daniel Frisa*

Daniel Frisa (R-Nassau)

*Thomas P. DiNapoli*

Thomas P. DiNapoli (D-Great Neck)

*Joseph Crowley*

Joseph Crowley (D-Queens)

*Edward Abramson*

Edward Abramson (D-Queens)







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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מחוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 10.3.88

מס' מברק

1/2

המשרד

237

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

חאח: עיחונות

חכנית השלום וביקור רוה"מ

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" (10.3.88).

עיחונות

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237

# Shultz Bids to Quiet Criticism of Israel

## Hill Urged to Avoid Publicly Pressing for Acceptance of Peace Plan

By John M. Goshko  
and David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writers

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, seeking to dampen overt criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on the eve of his crucial visit here, yesterday urged members of Congress not to pressure Israel publicly to accept the new U.S. plan for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"He said we're not going to pressure Israel, that they are our friend, our ally, and we're not going to push them in a corner," said Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.). Shultz briefed House members about progress in reviving negotiations on the future status of Israeli-occupied, Palestinian territories during his recent Middle East trip.

In the House meeting, and in a private session with three prominent American Jews, Shultz appeared to be trying to soften the White House's warm endorsement Monday of a letter 30 senators sent Shultz last week that criticized Shamir. The letter, whose signatories included some of Israel's strongest congressional supporters, criticized Shamir's refusal to accept the "land-for-peace" principle that would involve Israel relinquishing the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for Arab acceptance of the Jewish state.

The unusual White House endorsement of the letter, by spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, was widely viewed as part of an administration effort to pressure Shamir and his

hard-line Likud bloc into accepting Shultz's blueprint for peace.

Well-informed sources said that at the meeting with the Jewish leaders, Shultz denied that he had solicited or orchestrated the Senate letter, and said Shultz had expressed reservations about its effectiveness and the White House endorsement.

The letter, originated by Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), underscored the degree to which the tough measures Israel has used to deal with three months of rioting in the territories has caused unease in Congress and the American Jewish community.

Shultz's appeal, coupled with behind-the-scenes maneuvering by pro-Israeli forces anxious to avoid confrontation, appeared to have headed off a drive to generate a similar letter from House members.

"I think this is a time for a great deal of restraint," said Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.). "I think we should be cautious about pressures on any party."

Gilman and several other representatives said there was little interest at this time in following the Senate's lead. A number of congressional aides and lobbyists said they believe there is significantly less sentiment among House members now than earlier in the week over the need to send a strong American signal to Israel.

They said that shift seemed due in part to Shultz's efforts. Several members of Congress and others who have talked with Shultz this

week said he gave the impression that his aim is to convince Shamir to accept the plan through persuasion and assurances that the United States will not desert Israel, rather than through coercion.

"Shultz realizes that Shamir represents the most flexible wing of political party that is philosophically opposed to surrendering the territories," one source said. "His aim is to convert Shamir—and through him the Likud—not by squeezing him but by putting his arm around Shamir's shoulder and reminding him that he and President Reagan have been faithful friends to Israel and can be trusted."

After his meeting with House members, Shultz received warm words of support for his difficult mission. Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said his panel is "unanimous in support of what the secretary is trying to do."

"We are all very motivated by the need to find a way into the peace process that provides security for all the nations of the Mideast," he said.

Fascell said that when it meets with Shamir next week his committee will not try to convince him to accept the Shultz proposal. "The important role here is for the United States to demonstrate its interest and to put forth concepts . . . as a starter. There will be no imposition. The only solution will be when the parties agree to a solution," Fascell said.

Staff writer Tom Kenworthy also contributed to this report.











שבירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 2 מחור דפיםסוג בטחונידחיפותתאריך/ז"חמס' מברק

251 2/2

עם ערפאת. מסתבר ששידורי תחנת המחבלים מדרום סוריה מתבססים על מידע עדכני על הנעשה בצדמ"ע. ושנוצר קשר בין גורמי המחומות לבין דמשק. אסד יעשה הכל לחזק הממסד הפלס' הרדיקלי (האנטי ערפאתי) בגדמ"ע. המגעים בין גורמי אש"פ לדמשק עד עתה לא נשאן פרי.

5. במחמ"ד ישנה הרגשה אופטימית למרות חמקסולים הרבים. החערכה, ע"פ מילר, היא שבחירות מוקדמות בישראל (א) יקפזו למעשה את תכנית המזכיר וגם בתנאים האופטימאליים הקדמת הבחירות הוא לא ירחש מעשית לפני תום השנה. (ב) נסיון העבר הוכיח שמרכיב אחד בממשלת ישראל גם אם תפול הכרעה, אינו מספיק להשגת הסדר. חערכתו היא שאין ענין לדחוק את רח"מ שמיר לפינה.

הממשל יעשה הכל ע"מ למצות עד תום את כל האפשרויות הגלומות בתכנית בהנחה ששום גורם לא ישיב תשובה שלילית, הממשל ע"פ מסקנות אגף התכנון מתייחס במירב הרצינות להנעת התהליך המדיני ובתנאים הנדוכים, מוצגת לראשונה תכנית מאוזנת שיש בה כל המרכיבים העשויים לחבוא לכך, למרות שלא מתעלמים מקידם משובות גבוהות שטרם הוסרו.

אלי אבידן

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

המשרד

דחיפות מיידי

249

תאריך/ז"ח 17:00 10 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשי' רה"מ

בית הנבחרים בשולי מכתב הסנטורים

1. ג'יימס טרפיקנט הפיץ אתמול בקרב עמיתיו פניה המבקשת שיצטרפו למכתב לרה"מ, שהוא ביקורתי למדי, ונדרש לשמות ברט גולד (מהאמריקן ג'ורנל) ואיש קומיטי) הרב בלפור בריקנר, דוד ספרשטיין (מהתנועה הרפורמית). אתמול התבטא קצרות במליאה וביקש הצטרפותם. טרפיקנט נחשב לאחת הדמויות "הציוניות" בביה"נ (הוא רץ לנשיאות כל פעם...). ובד"כ קשה לו לגייס תמיכת עמיתיו ביוזמותיו. נכון לעכשו, איש לא הצטרף ליוזמה בת היממה וממשרדו אומרים שיערכו את המכתב מחדש. נוכח הנ"ל ספק אם יצא לפועל.

2. הרעיון של קונגרסמנים ידידותיים שדווח בעבר בדבר מכתב "מאזן" לא יצא לפועל בשלב זה, בעיקר בגלל אילוצי זמן (הבית התפזר בצהריים למשך סוף השבוע), יתכן ויפעלו בשבוע הבא.

3. הרבעון הקונגרסיונלי ראיין אנשים על תגובתם למכתב הסנטורים. יש להניח שיקדיש לכך כתבה בשבוע הבא.

4. מל לויין דיבר היום במליאה בגנות אש"ף.

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שגרירות ישראל / זושנגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88 - 21:00

מס' מברק

אל : ה מ ש ר ד

223

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל רה"מ

הקונגרסמן ג'רי סטאדס ומכתב לשולץ

למברקנו מאתמול (בשולי מכתב הסנטורים)

עוזרו של סטאדס מוסר לעוזרים בגבעת שהמורשה חחליט כגד שיגור מכתב לשולץ

(ייתכן בעקבות דברי שולץ שלדעתו לחץ על רה"מ שמיר אינו מועיל - ראובא

הדיווח על שיחת שולץ עם הקונגרסמנים - בנפרד).

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שגרירות ישראל / נושיונגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

אלברט גור, הוכיח את צדקת האיסטרטגיה הדרומית שלו כאשר ויתר על מאמץ באיובה וניו-המפשייר, הוא זכה במקום ראשון בארבע מדינות: טנסי, קנטקי, אוקלהומה, ארקנסו, אך ברוב המדינות האחרות זכה להישג מכובד, ומספר הצירים שלו אינו נופל בהרבה מדוקקיס וג'קסון. השאלה היא אם יצליח להפגין תופעה חזקה בבחירות המוקדמות הבאות - במדינות כאילינוי, מישיגן וניו-יורק.

ריצ'רד גפהארדט, הוא המפסיד העיקרי אצל הדמוקרטים, כאשר הצליח לנצח רק במדינתו מיסורי, ובשאר המקומות יצא לרוב במקום רביעי ובמרחק רב משלושת הגדולים. עתה נותר לו רק לנסות את מזלו באילינוי ובמישיגן, שם ייתכן כי המטר הפרוטקציוניסטי שלו יזכה לתמיכה מסויימת.

גארי הארט, זכה לאחוזים בודדים בלבד, והוא מעשית, אינו קיים על מפת הבחירות.

הדמוקרטיה ככלל מרוצים מכך שהמועמד הנגדי יהיה, כנראה, בוש ולא דול, שכן כל המשאלים מצביעים על כך שהמאבק נגד בוש יהיה קל יותר. הם מציינים כי מועמדיהם המובילים זוכים כבר למעמד יוקרתי, נפטקו כינויי הזלזול בהם כגון "שבעת הגמדיים", ההנחה הרווחת היא כי אף אם לאף מועמד לא יהיה רוב בתום הבחירות המוקדמות, הרי ער לוועידה ייעשו הסכמים שיאפשרו לאחד מהם להבחר ולא להזדקק למועמד חדש שלא עמל בבחירות המוקדמות. צריך לזכור שגם אט גפהארדט וסיימון יסתלקו מן המרוץ, הרי הצירים שנבחרו מטעמה חייבים להם נאמנות והם יכולים בהטכם לתעבירם לתמיכה באחד המועמדים האחרים.

ואלו התוצאות הלא-רשמיות בצירים של הבחירות אתמול :

רפובליקנים : בוש - 572

דול - 99

רוברטסון - 10

קמפ - 4

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תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דמוקרטים : דוקסיס 370 -  
 ג'קסון 353 -  
 גור 316 -  
 גפהארדט 95 -  
 תארט 1 -  
 בלתי-מזוהים 7 -

דני בלור  
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טגרירות ישראל / נושנגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח 20:30 - 9.3.88

מס' מברק

אל : ה מ ש ר ד

224

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל רח"מ

בית הנבחרים - שולץ ותהליך השלום.

1. המזכיר שולץ נפגש היום (9,3) בדלתיים סגורות עם חברי בית הנבחרים. השתתפו (לסירוגין) כ-80-100 מורשים (בלי עוזרים), ובסוף השיחה, שארכה יותר משעה, נשארו כ-20 מורשים.

2. שולץ פתח בדיווח על מסע הדילוגים שלו באיזור, ולאחר מכן השיב על שאלות. להלן הנקודות העיקריות כפי שנמסרו ע"י אחד המשתתפים (לא בסדר כרונולוגי אך למיטב זכרוננו).

(א) לגבי רח"מ שמיר: שולץ שיבח את רח"מ, בין היתר על: שהסכים למסגרת בינלאומית כלשהי. ייתכן ששמיר נראה כלפי חוץ נוקשת ובלתי גמיש, אך להערכתו (של שולץ) יגלה רח"מ גמישות במו"מ על "המעמד הסופי".

(ב) שולץ ציין בדברי הפתיחה שבכוונת ארה"ב להגיש נייר אמריקאי בתחילת המו"מ על תקופת חמער. עטיב סולארז' שאל אם בכוונת ארה"ב להגיש נייר דומה בתחילת המו"מ על המעמד הסופי. שולץ השיב שטרם נתנו את הדעת לזאת. מדיניות ארה"ב נשארת "תכנית ריגן" 1982.

(ג) הועידת תבינלאומית: שולץ הדגיש שלוועידה לא יהיה כל תפקיד פעיל, בתשובה לברמן ולויין, לא הסכים שעמדת ארה"ב לגבי הועידה השתנתה: חוסיין זקוק לוועידה...

(ד) השתתפות בריה"מ בוועידה: אינם דורשים שהסובייטים יכוננו יחסים דיפלומטיים מחדש עם ישראל כתנאי להשתתפותם בוועידה. אך אם ירצו למלא תפקיד משמעותי בתהליך, אזי יצטרכו לחדש היחסים הדיפלומטיים ולשנות מדיניותם לגבי הגירת יהודים.

(ה) עמדת הסובייטים. נראה שלא ירצו להיות SPOILERS - גם להם דאגות, הן

המזכיר שולץ נפגש היום (9,3) בדלתיים סגורות עם חברי בית הנבחרים. השתתפו (לסירוגין) כ-80-100 מורשים (בלי עוזרים), ובסוף השיחה, שארכה יותר משעה, נשארו כ-20 מורשים.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיות בהול לבוקר

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באיזור והן מבית (הפונדמנטליזם האסלמי ועוד)

(ו) השתתפות אש"פ בועידה; בתשובה לשאלה, אשר שהם יהיו רשאים להשתתף אם יטכינו לתנאים המפורשים במכתב שולץ לשמיר, לרבות הכרה בישראל.

(ז) המכתב לשמיר; שמיר "הירשה" לו למסור העתק לשה"ח פרס. אינו יודע כיצד המכתב התגלגל לעתונות בישראל.

(ח) "טריטוריה תמורת שלום". הדגיש שהוא אינו משתמש בנוסחא זו, והיא איננה מופיעה במכתב לשמיר ולאחרים. במתכוון מאמץ פורמליות אחרות ע"מ להקשות על ה- NAY-SAYERS.

(ט) הצעות שולץ ותגובות הצדדים, חוסיין טוען שמדובר בתכנית שמיר נוכיון שהיא כוללת תקופת מעבר, ואילו שמיר סבור שמדובר בהצעה ירדנית מאחר שיש בה התייחסות למו"מ על המעמד הסופי.

(י) ג'ו קנדי ביקש לדעת אם הצעירים שמיידיים אבנים בשטחים יסתפקו בפחות ממדינה פלסטינית (לדברי שני משתתפים ידידותיים בפגישה, שאלות קנדי לא נעמו לאזניהם). בתשובה ציין שולץ שמדברים על ייצוג פלסטיני והזכויות הלגיטימיות של הפלסטינאים.

(יא) אי-נכונותם של הפלסטינאים להפגש עם שולץ בירושלים; איימו בהם ואף איימו להורגם, ולכן לא נענו להזמנה להפגש עמו. אך עדיין קיימים צרכים TO COMMUNICATE עמם. מקווים שיטלו חלק במשלחת הירדנית-הפלסטינית.

(יב) מובארכ': ממלא תפקיד חיובי מאד. משמיע התבטאויות חיוביות ומועילות.

(יג) אסד. העיד בשיחתו עם שולץ שאופי ועידה הבינלאומית לא נראה לו. לדבריו, הוא אינו זקוק לוועידה בינלאומית. אם ירצה לנהל מו"מ עם ישראל, יוכל לעשות זאת בלי ועידה בינלאומית. מששולץ שאל אותו מדוע אינו עושה זאת, השיב אסד שאינו רוצה לעשות כך, אך אם תתכנס ועידה בינלאומית, היא חייבת להיות בעלת סמכויות.

3. על פי רוב, המורשים הביעו תמיכה בשולץ ובמאמציו. השאלות היו ענייניות ולא נשאלו

שאלות ביקורתיות. עד כאן.

למס' 1





שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני ש מ נ ר

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/2  
222  
38

5. הארגונים היהודים ובראשם ה- *JCR* בניו-יורק יודעים ורוגזים על הפגישה והסיכום.

6. בעצה אחת עם השגריר והקבוצה המכינה הביקור, *אבהיר* חד-משמעית לסנטור מצנבאום ולקונגרסמן ייטס (כזקני היהודים בשני הבתים) שמדובר בשיחה פרטית - לא לייחוס ולא לפירסום.

*יוסף מלך*  
למדן - הרצל



ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני ש מ ר

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88 - 18:00

מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

222

38

אל : המשרד

זע : ניו-יורק

אל : מצפ"א

זע : לשכת מנכ"ל מדיני, לשכת מנכ"ל רח"מ

הקונב"ל ניו-יורק

בית הנבחרים: ריטה האוזר ושות' - ותהליך השלום

לשלבו 193 מאתמול

1. בעתון נושין פוסט אתמול (8.3) מצוטטת ריטה האוזר ("ממייסדי המרכז הבינלאומי לשלום במזה"ת") כפועלת בקונגרס ע"מ להבטיח ששמיר ייתקל בחומת ברזל מוחלטת בהגיעו לוושינגטון.

2. אתמול, לפנות ערב, האוזר ושותפיה נפגשו עם כתריסר קונגרסמנים יהודיים. יוזמי השיחה: ברני פרנק (ממסצ'וסטס) וד"ר גרין (מניו-יורק, שלא התייצב). יחד עם האוזר באו הרב ארתור הרצברג, סטיב שלום, מרטי שונברג (ליברל מקליפורניה, עד כה בקושי מזוהה עם ישראל) וג'ק שטיין (שטוען שתשתף בכדי לאזן את האוזר והרצברג).

3. האוזר ושות' טענו שהם מייצגים מירב היהודים בארה"ב. הפצירו בקונגרסמנים שישגרו 'סול' מכתב זמנה לזה של הסנאט, הקונגרסמנים פונק, ווייט (ניו-יורק), וולב (מישיגן) ובוקסר (קליפורניה) הסכימו. סולארז (ניו-יורק) גכנס לזמן קצר, ובצאתו העיר שייתכן שיחתום על מכתב כזה. לנטוט (קליפורניה) לא נקט עמדה. ברמן (קליפורניה) הביע סקפטיות לגבי התבונה (ידוע לנו שהוא מתנגד למהלך). שומר ושויר (שניהם מניו-יורק) הביעו התנגדות נחרצת לרעיון.

4. סוכס לא (א לא) לשלוח מכתב בשל חוסר אחדות הדעים. עם זאת, הוחלט:

(א) להבהיר לרח"מ במהלך ארוחת הצהרים עמו ביום ג' את אי-הנחת של הקונגרסמנים הסתייגויותיהם ממה שמוגדרת כ"מדיניות שמיר".

(ב) למסור עמדתם לעתונות מייד לאחר הפגישה.

2  
לסול' מכתב זמנה לזה של הסנאט, הקונגרסמנים פונק, ווייט (ניו-יורק), וולב (מישיגן) ובוקסר (קליפורניה) הסכימו. סולארז (ניו-יורק) גכנס לזמן קצר, ובצאתו העיר שייתכן שיחתום על מכתב כזה. לנטוט (קליפורניה) לא נקט עמדה. ברמן (קליפורניה) הביע סקפטיות לגבי התבונה (ידוע לנו שהוא מתנגד למהלך). שומר ושויר (שניהם מניו-יורק) הביעו התנגדות נחרצת לרעיון.

3  
לסול' מכתב זמנה לזה של הסנאט, הקונגרסמנים פונק, ווייט (ניו-יורק), וולב (מישיגן) ובוקסר (קליפורניה) הסכימו. סולארז (ניו-יורק) גכנס לזמן קצר, ובצאתו העיר שייתכן שיחתום על מכתב כזה. לנטוט (קליפורניה) לא נקט עמדה. ברמן (קליפורניה) הביע סקפטיות לגבי התבונה (ידוע לנו שהוא מתנגד למהלך). שומר ושויר (שניהם מניו-יורק) הביעו התנגדות נחרצת לרעיון.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 2 מתוך 2 דפיםסווג בטחוני ש מ רדחיפות מ י ד יתאריך/ז"חמס' מברק

2/2 222 38

5. הארגונים היהודים ובראשם ה- JCR בניו-יורק יודעים ורוגזים על הפגישה והסיכום.

6. בעצה אחת עם השגריר והקבוצה המכינה הביקור, לבחיר חד-משמעית לסנטור מצנבאום ולקונגרסמן ייטס (כזקני היהודים בשני הבתים) שמדובר בשיחה פרטית - לא לייחוס ולא לפירסום.

י/ס/מ/ב  
למדן - הרצל



הפיקס - היטלה

דחיפות: מינדי זלמן סוג כחונני: סודי	<b>מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק</b> <b>סופס מברק</b>	רה: 1 מתור: 1
תז"ח: 091700	אל : המשרד,	
בר : 00245	ד ע :	
מאח : באו"ם		

אל : מנהל אירופה ג'  
 דע : ממ"ד בינ"ל 1 : מנהל ארבל 2 : קב"ט-כאן  
 מאח : יששכרוף

אלקסנדר באנוב (בריה"מ)

- הנ"ל ניגש אלי ב-DELEGATES LOUNGE ושאל אם ישראל החליטה כיצד להשיב לתוכנית שולץ. כן ניסה לדלות פרטים על התוכנית עצמה. ציין שידוע לו שמכתבו של שולץ הופיע בעיתונות הישראלית, אך טרם ראה פרטיו. התחמקתי לגבי פרטי התוכנית (אמרתי שאני מניח שעוד מעט ישמעו ממורפי עצמו), והשבתי שהנושא נדון בממשלה, ולפי מיטב ידיעתי, הדיונים נמשכים. באנוב אמר שמורפי אכן מגיע למוסקבה אחרי אירופה כדי לעדכןם, והוסיף שעד כה הם רק שמעו על תוכניתו של שולץ כמונחים מאד כללים. כמוכן המעניין ביותר מבחינתם הוא אופיה של הועידה הבינ"ל.
- באנוב ציין שמאד קשה להבין מה אש"ף רוצה ואם קיימת אצלו גישה מדינית רצינית שמקובלת על כל הארגון, אם בכלל דבר זה ניתן. הביע דעתו האישית שהפיגוע בדרום הארץ שלשום היתה טעות אדירה מבחינתו של הארגון והוסיף שאילו הפיגוע לא היה קורה היה "המוסד" צריך להמציא אותו. השבתי שהפיגוע הנ"ל ואחרים לאחרונה ממחישים יותר מכל מה טבעו הרצחני של הארגון ולאן מיועדות פניו - כלומר לטרור בלבד ולא כל פתרון מדיני.

באו"ם

*(Handwritten signatures and initials)*

תאריך: 9.3.88	שם השולח: ג' יששכרוף	אישור:
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 2

דח"פחות:	מחלקת הקשר	דח: 1
מ ל ד י	ניו-יורק	מחור: 2
סורג כטחובי:	עופס מברק	
ש מ ו ר		
חז"ח:	א ל : מנהל מצפ"א, לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רוח"מ	
091000		
00212 : בר	ד ע : השגריר/וושנינגטון	
39	מאח : סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	
ell		

להלן משיבת נציגי הארגונים היהודים הארציים, ( 8/3 ) בראשות רבי איזי מילר ואל צ'ארנין כנאקראק. - ISRAEL STRATEGY COMMITTEE.

א. מכתב 30 הסנטורים היה הנושא המרכזי של הדיון. השתתפה נציגת איפאק שציונה:

1. על קיומו של המכתב נודע לאיפאק ביום רביעי ה-2/3 בערב. לא היה ידוע להם שסנטורים נוספים יחתמו על המכתב. תום ייעץ ללוין לא לנוע קדימה עם המכתב אבל לוין עמד על כך.

2. היו טלפונים מצד סנטורים לאיפאק בימי חמישי ושישי ואיפאק ייעץ להם לא לחתום על המכתב.

3. סנטורים מטווימים טוענים כיום שלא ידעו כי היתה כוונה להחתים על המכתב קבוצה של 30 סנטורים ולפרסם את המכתב בניו-יורק טיימס.

4. מספר סנטורים טוענים כי קיבלו מאזור הבחירה שלהם בקשות לנקוט בפעולה ולזרז את תהליך השלום.

ב. היתה הסכמה בין המשתתפים כי איפאק לא פעל כהלכה בכך שלא הביא לידיעת הארגונים היהודיים הארציים בניו-יורק, דבר קיומו של המכתב ברגע שנודע על כך. הארגונים היהודיים מצפים להסברים מצד איפאק.

21.

תאריך: 8.3.1988 שם השולח: מרדכי ידיד אישור: נח אהוד



דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 2
סוג מסמך:		מחור: 2
תז"ח:		א ל :
גר : 00212		ד ע :
39 0/1		מאח :

- 2 -

ג. סוכם כי נאקראק ינסח הנחיות ל-CRC'S לעודדם לש גור מכתבים  
ל-30 הסנטורים מבלי להיכנס למהות *גא/ס* אך תוך התייחסות  
לעיתוי שיגור המכתב במהלך המו"מ ולביקורת מחז צודית. אם יצליחו  
להגיע להסכמה כיחס להנחיות, ישגרו גם מכתב ל-30 הסנטורים  
בחתימת הארגונים היהודיים הארציים המעוניינים בכך ואף זאת מבלי  
להיכנס למהות השלום.

מרדכי ידיד



אישור:

מרדכי ידיד

שם השולח:

8.3.1988

תאריך:

END

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר קשירותי ישראל / וושינגטוןדף 1 מחזור דפיםסוג בטיחוני ש מ רדחיסות מ י ד יתאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88 - 21:30מס' מברק

225

1/2

אל : המשרד

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל רה"מ

תהליך השלום - הקואליציה תימודית הלאומית ותמימשל

1. אחמול נאמני ה-"NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION" ביקרו בושינגטון ונפגשו עם הנשיא, מזכיר והגנה, היועץ לבטיחון לאומי ודיק מופי.

2. לדברי אחד מהמשתתפים, הנשיא היה טקסי בלבד. קרלוצי התלונן על הקיצוצים בחקציבו המגבילים יכולתו להרחיב את הסיוע עבור ישראל (כך - י.ל.); ופאול התרכז על נושא זכויות האדם, רק מרפי דיבר באופן סובטנטטיבי, אך למעשה חזר על פי רוב על דברים ידועים למדי. עם זאת, מספר נקודות לא מצאו חן בעיני אנשי הקואליציה:

(א) הועידה הבינלאומית. חייבת להיות יותר ממטריה. מדובר על ועידה מתמדת (PERMANENT CONFERENCE) אך לא יהיה לו כוח ווטו ולא תחפד כערכא משפטית בעלת הסמכות הסופית.

(ב) השתתפות אש"פ בתהליך השלום. על מנת למלא תפקיד (TO BE A PLAYER) על אש"פ לחזור בו מהשימוש בטרור וכו'. מאידך באשר לתהליך השלום, אש"פ הינו גורם בכל "GAME PLAN" (מרפי לא פירט, אך להערכת המקור הוא רצה לומר כי אש"פ חייב להיות נכלל או מיוצג בתהליך בכדי להבטיח הצלחה).

(ג) המו"מ והנייר האמריקאי. מרפי הזכיר כוונת ארה"ב להגיש נייר "כנקודת מוצא" במו"מ על תקופת המעבר. הרעיון מטריד אנשי הקואליציה, החוששים שמא הנייר יגביל מרחב התימרון של ישראל.

(ד) באשר לירושלים, אמר מרפי שעמדת ארה"ב לא השתנתה. בסגנו של דבר, העיר חייבת להשאר מאוחדת וחייבת להיות גישה חפשית למקומות הקדושים מאמיני כל הדתות. עם זאת שאלת ירושלים נשארה "מכשול גדול".

המסמך נשלח למרפי ונאמר לו שיש לו חלק במסמך  
4 3 4 4 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 3



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 2 מחזור דפים

סוג בטחוני ש מ ו ר

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

225 2/7

כ. רצ"ב :

(א) הודעה לעתונות על השיחות .

(ב) תגובת הקואליציה למכתב 30 הסנטורים.

י/סלם אלמ  
למדן

225 3/4

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
CONTACT: SCOTT LIPPE  
202-547-7701

On March 8, 1988 the members of the Executive Committee of the National Jewish Coalition (NJC) met with President Reagan at the White House to express their appreciation for the President's leadership and his firm support for Israel. Among those present were the four officers of the National Jewish Coalition, Honorary National Chairman Max M. Fisher of Detroit, National Chairman Richard Fox of Philadelphia, Co-Chairman Gordon Zacks of Columbus, Ohio, and NJC Co-Chairman George Klein of New York.

Before meeting the President, the NJC leaders met with Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, National Security Advisor to the President General Colin Powell, and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who has just returned from the Middle East.

Ambassador Murphy told the NJC leaders that the time is right to move to negotiations in the Middle East. The framework proposed by Secretary of State Shultz involves an ongoing international conference to begin in May which would include five members of the UN Security Council, Israel, and those Arab states and Palestinian members of the joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation which have done the following: accepted UN resolutions 242 and 338, renounced terrorism, and agreed to negotiate directly with Israel.

While the international conference would be more than merely an umbrella for talks, Murphy said, the UN Security Council members would have no right to veto decisions made by the Middle Eastern participant. Furthermore, direct negotiations between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation would take place individually, with talks on both the final status of the administered territories and the transitional process to be held at the same time.

In their meeting with the President, NJC National Chairman Richard Fox reminded President Reagan that the members of the NJC had supported him in 1980 and 1984. "We have been loyal supporters," Fox said, "and we have been happy to serve the most pro-Israel president in our nation's history."

In his remarks to the NJC, President Reagan said, "I appreciated your support in 1980 and 1984 and your help with issues such as the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court, contra aid, SDI, and our presence in the Persian Gulf. Our greatest goal is freedom for all, including Soviet Jews, and the people of Nicaragua and Afghanistan."

2



225 4/2

"our administration has worked to enhance Israel's security," the President continued, "by increasing our strategic cooperation and our commercial cooperation, by agreeing to a Free Trade Area, and by raising the level of our aid to Israel. Our latest peace initiative will not threaten Israel's security."

President Reagan went on to say that "We have pressed the issue of Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev. It has been the first item on the agenda in every meeting between American and Soviet officials."

"The Sandinista government in Nicaragua is not just anti-American," said the President, "it is also anti-Israel. The Sandinistas have very strong ties to the PLO. The United Nations has also been very anti-Israel, but our administration has supported Israel against attacks in that body."

The NJC Executive Committee members presented the President with a Steuben crystal statue and a plaque which read, "Presented to President Ronald W. Reagan for his courageous leadership of the free world in the quest for peace with justice and freedom for all."

After meeting with the President there was a short press conference with NJC National Chairman Richard Fox, who said, "The National Jewish Coalition believes there should be direct talks between Israel and her neighbors, and those direct talks can only take place within the framework of UN resolutions 242 and 338. As for Israel trading land for peace, we feel that Israel should do what it has to do in its own interests to achieve peace and at the same time maintain its security. We are not Israelis, we are not there on the scene. It is our belief that the best thing we in the United States who are concerned about Israel's safety can do is let the Israelis develop their own position in their own best interests. We are sure it will be in the best interests of peace as well."

At the NJC Executive Committee meeting which preceded the meeting with the President, the NJC took up the question of how to respond to the letter to Secretary of State Shultz circulated by Senators Levin and Boschwitz. The letter criticizes Israeli Prime Minister Shamir. The National Jewish Coalition released the following statement on this matter:

"On March 3, thirty members of the Senate addressed a letter to Secretary of State Shultz which criticized Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's purported position on territorial compromise. While we know that these distinguished senators are long-time friends of Israel and their motives are well-intentioned, we do however believe that at this most sensitive time in the efforts to initiate the negotiating process, the interference in the ongoing internal political debate within Israel is counterproductive and most untimely."

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"We do believe that while the United States should do everything possible to encourage a negotiated end to the conflict in the region, we should take no steps, nor pressure the Israeli government to take steps, which will endanger Israel's national security in the long run."


NJC Executive Committee members at the meeting with the President were:

Gary Abramson--Washington, D.C.  
Stan Adelstein--Rapid City, IO  
Leonard Bell--Miami, Florida  
Paul Borman--Detroit, MI  
Matthew Brown--Boston, MA  
Michael David Epstein--Washington, D.C.  
Joseph and Alma Gildenhorn--Washington, D.C.  
Leonard Greenberg--Boynton Beach, FL  
Sylvia Hassenfeld--New York, NY  
Jerry Hirsch--Phoenix, AZ  
Philip Hixon--Washington, D.C.  
Jeffrey Lichtenberg--New York, NY  
Jacob Stein--New York, NY  
Sydney Sussman--Trenton, NJ  
Arnold Thaler--New York, NY  
Phil Winn--Denver, CO  
Randy White--Boston, MA

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5/2

Chris Gersten--NJC Executive Director  
Matt Brooks--NJC Political Director

PHOTOS ARE AVAILABLE





NJC Statement--March 8, 1988

225 6/7

The National Jewish Coalition condemns the continuing violence in the Israeli-administered territories of the Judea and Samaria. The restoration of law and order in these territories and end to the loss of life, injuries, and economic disruption there are of the highest priority.

We support the efforts of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz to find a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. The National Jewish Coalition agrees completely with our government's firmly stated policy that negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors must be direct, face-to-face, and without preconditions. United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis and framework for any peace negotiations. Only direct negotiations between Israel and her neighbors can lead to a lasting peace in the region.

On March 3, thirty members of the Senate addressed a letter to Secretary of State Shultz which criticized Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's position on territorial compromise. While we know that these distinguished senators are long-time friends of Israel and their motives are well-intentioned, we do however believe that this letter is both counterproductive and untimely. We hold this position because it is our belief that the letter tends to represent a direct interference in the internal policy debates of the State of Israel.

We do believe that while the United States should do everything possible to encourage a negotiated end to the

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conflict in the region, we should take no steps, nor pressure the Israeli government to take steps, which will endanger Israel's national security in the long run.

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דף 1 מחור דפים

סוג בטחוניס ו ד י

דחיפות בהול לבוקר

תאריך/ז"ח 19:30 - 9.3.88

מס' מברק

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אל : המשרד

אל : מנכ"ל מדיני {  
לנמענים בלבד { מנכ"ל רה"מ

שיחת שולץ עם אברם, אשר ופישר (9,3).

המזכיר שולץ נפגש הבוקר עם מוריס אברם, בוב אשר ומקס פישר. רצ"ב הרשימות שרשם מקור מהימן שתיחקר את אחד מהשלושה לאחר הפגישה.

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#### 1. SENATE LETTER :

Shultz...We didn't drum up Levin's letter and I was unhappy with the Fitzwater quote.

Goal at this point is to give Shamir the ability to participate. If you get involved in something construed as domestic Israeli politics could be hurtful.

#### 2. PEACE INITIATIVE:

This is a serious moment for Israel. My goal is to help them in any way we can.

Our position on the violence will continue as is. We have said our view on deportation. (He didn't mention excessive force.) When the UN wanted to continue going, we vetoed. We are with Israel. It is an unshakeable alliance.

The Prime Minister had asked for an MOU, formalizing the JEDG, JPMS, JSAP, the Under-Secretary and Director General meetings, etc.

Other things are in the process - now grinding their way in the bowels of the building. This is another way of showing our support for Israel (No linkage).

Re: Peace Process, we have purposely separated it from the violence. First, the peace process may not have an impact. Second, there is now an opening, no doubt in part brought on by the violence.

#### 3. PERSONALITIES:

Mubarak...has been very good, he spoke supportively in public, likes what we are doing.

King Hussein...is worried, but kind of favorably inclined. Issue of Palestinian representation is more difficult than ever, since West Bankers and Gazans have stood up.

Shultz expecting King Hussein's reply before Shamir arrives, a letter needing help and clarification.

Assad...Went to him because it was important to King Hussein. Don't expect Assad to come, give him opportunity to turn it down.

Shultz offered extraneous points:

- Closing PLO mission at UN is a loser
- Gives PLO legitimacy we don't want them to have.
- Problem with our diplomatic facilities in Israel...Chancery is very vulnerable; spot outside Tel Aviv could be terrific. Helm's amendment - unhelpful. Would take old residence and consulate, and take YMCA area to build.

#### 4. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:

(ASSESSMENT: It is clearly open to negotiation. It is not set in concrete.)

It has no authority, but an ongoing role. Statements will be made we won't like but it will get us to direct negotiations.

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-Believes Shamir will agree to an event jointly chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union. Shultz has to go to the Soviet Union, and it has to change his stance on diplomatic recognition and Soviet Jews.

-We are walking on a narrow course here. Give the King something but not much.

-Would consider a sideletter to Shamir if that's what it takes to give Shamir comfort.

-An international conference is consistent with the London Agreement; it does not go beyond.

-Willing to look at constructive things.

FISHER - Will Israel be protected by the US, withstanding any outside pressures against Israel?

SHULTZ - "Yes"

SHULTZ- What we need is Israel's ability to be strong and working, and peace will do that for Israel.

X





Richard Cohen

## ... and the Silent Critics

What is the sound of one hand clapping? It's the sound of Israelis talking about peace. The sound coming from the other hand, the Palestinians, is either silence or the noise of continuing terrorism. Twice in the past week, this has been the sound coming from Palestinians.

The first incident was doubly astounding. While Secretary of State George Shultz was in Jerusalem, a bomb-laden car was discovered near his hotel. In Beirut a caller told the Associated Press that the bomb was the work of the Al Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Yasser Arafat, and that Shultz was the target. The PLO denied it, but the AP said the caller was known to its reporters.

What's the explanation? As one State Department source put it, "Who knows?" Maybe there was an attempt to assassinate Shultz, although probably not by the PLO. What we do know is that the incident was treated as—yawn—just another example of Arab terrorism. The State Department, according to one source, has not received a single press inquiry about it.

What's going on here? It's one thing to hold Israel to a high standard, to treat it as a member of the community of Western democracies, and expect that it will conduct itself accordingly. Thus, it's fair to condemn it for incidents of brutality. And it's not at all illogical to hold the Arabs to a lower standard of conduct. The Palestinians, in particular, are led—or misled—by a collection of leaders ranging from the responsible to the deranged.

But it is quite another thing to hold the Palestinians to no standard at all. That, though, seems to what is being done. The other day, for instance, three Palestinians hijacked an Israeli bus and demanded the release of Arab prisoners being held in Israel. To back up their demands, they murdered a civilian passenger. When troops stormed the bus, two more civilians—and all the Palestinians—were killed. In a broadcast from Baghdad, the PLO took responsibility for the incident—which is to say the cold-blooded murder of civilians.

It will be interesting to see whether the world condemns the PLO with the same vehemence that it has Israel. Maybe there is no comparing these

things, but the murder of civilians really is worse than the beating of them. There is no excusing—as opposed to explaining—what the Israelis have done recently, but so far as we know they have not killed innocents in cold blood. To their credit, Israeli authorities have arrested some of the soldiers accused of brutality.

In a New York appearance recently, the former Israeli representative to the U.N., Abba Eban, said that no one should underestimate the Palestinian ability "to miss no opportunity to miss an opportunity for peace." This is no hard-line right-winger talking; Eban is a dove who would trade land for peace, and so his quip is both telling and sad.

Of course, Palestinians are burdened by a factionalized leadership. Arafat, the personification of the terrorist to most Israelis and many Americans, is suspected by some Arabs of being a moderate. To his left is an array of zealots who would try to kill him if he ever recognized Israel's right to exist. Lacking a state, and therefore a central government, the Palestinians are in a position similar to that of Palestinian Jews before Israel achieved independence. They, too, had their terrorists and militants.

But explanations are not excuses. The refusal of Palestinians to commit to the peace process and their infatuation with terrorism do no one any good. Those actions vindicate the views of hard-line Israelis who, echoing what used to be said about American Indians, think the only good Palestinian is a dead one—either that, or living far away in Jordan. The recent bus incident alone did much to ease the pressure on Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to accommodate Shultz and his desire to trade land for peace.

Four times before the bus incident, the PLO attempted to infiltrate terrorists into Israel. A week ago, someone attempted a car bombing in Jerusalem that, had it succeeded, surely would have killed many innocent people. A world and a press that rightly condemn Israel for its excesses and intransigence cannot allow the PLO's even worse excesses to go uncriticized. Silence to the ear is like beauty to the eye of the beholder. To the PLO, apparently, it sounds like approval.

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WP

op. ed.

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*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

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# Shamir's PLO Ally . . .

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WP  
op. ed.

The sudden introduction of PLO-style terror into the Palestinians' "stone revolution" against Israel, from car bombs to bus hijacking, takes the pressure off Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir when he arrives here next week to defend himself from the harshest U.S. criticism of Israel since the birth of the Jewish state.

The political climate changed with the discovery near the King David Hotel of a car bomb, a staple of PLO terrorism, that appeared to be aimed at visiting Secretary of State George Shultz. Reagan administration officials say privately that the discovery of the car bomb began to blacken the image of youthful Palestinian freedom fighters. For three months the Palestinians used stones, not explosives, against the Israeli guns that produced unprecedented public rebuke of Shamir by Israel's closest friends here.

But inserting lethal explosives into the murderous West Bank equation hands Shamir much-needed U.S. political support.

In terms of damaging the Palestinian cause, escalating the battle with explosives is similar to the PLO's orders not to meet Shultz at all. Those orders to leaders inside the West Bank came from outside, presumably from Yasser Arafat.

These political blunders reflect a longtime senseless quality in Arafat's political style, typified by flaunting firearms in the United Nations, that has proved so destructive for Palestinians. Just as Israeli brutality was turning American and world sentiments, he risked losing that gain and plunging the PLO back into obloquy with the United States. That makes him Shamir's unwitting, perhaps priceless, ally.

Never had the time seemed brighter for the Palestinians, or harsher for Israel. Several congressional aides, in Baghdad in mid-January, ignored U.S. Embassy advice and arranged closed-door talks with Arafat to persuade him to recognize the existence of Israel. Such an approach by American public officials would have been unlikely at any previous time.

In the same vein, the letter last week from 30 senators to Shultz was unprecedented. It sharply criticized Shamir's refusal to go along with the "territory for peace" formula that has been U.S.

policy since 1967 and that now is the basis of Shultz's West Bank peace formula.

But what really stunned politicians here and in Israel was that the signers included three of Israel's most loyal, rock-hard allies in the Senate: Democrat Alan Cranston and Republicans Rudy Boschwitz and Bob Kasten.

Until now, they could be counted on to oppose their own secretaries of state and their own presidents to support Israel whenever a split developed. They had defended every wayward step by Israel, even when the Reagan administration, Israel's most stalwart benefactor ever, advised otherwise.

The senatorial letter did not challenge then-secretary of state Kissinger's pledge to Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur War that the United States would not negotiate or even talk to Arafat or his agents until the PLO recognized Israel as a sovereign state. But behind the scenes there is growing speculation cutting across ideological and party lines that no solution will ever be possible without talking to the PLO.

Rep. Henry Hyde is one of those who suspect the Kissinger pledge has become self-defeating. A key conservative Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, Hyde fears that the loss of U.S. influence throughout the Arab world poses dangers in the larger East-West struggle.

"Unofficial, informal talks with the PLO must be held," Hyde told us, "because no matter how long we wait for other leadership to rise up in the West Bank and Gaza, it never rises, and it always comes back to the PLO." Hyde never has had a friendly word for the PLO, but increasing West Bank and Gaza brutality "has the makings of a conflagration that would swallow up a lot more than Israel."

With such unorthodox but sensible sentiments growing out of the West Bank tragedy, Arafat's machinations to cast a no-talk boycott around the first serious effort George Shultz ever has made on behalf of the Palestinians are self-defeating. So is the escalation from stones to explosives. Shamir will not need to strangle Shultz's peace plan; Arafat handles that chore all by himself.

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Q I wanted to ask you about the letter from 30 senators to Secretary Shultz, making the point that Yitzhak Shamir ought to recognize that he's going to have to give back some of the land. What is Shultz' view of having received this letter?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the administration, of course, welcomes the support and advice from this group. They are senators of considerable stature and interest and involvement in these -- in Middle East affairs. The Secretary Shultz has just returned from the Middle East. He will brief the President this afternoon at 3:30. And Prime Minister Shamir visits on the 16th. So we are in the midst of an ongoing process. The views of these senators is helpful to us, and probably instructive to other parties in the region. But at the moment, we proceed on a pace

that's fairly well structured, and has been laid out by Secretary Shultz and his shuttle diplomacy of the last several days.

Q Well, may I just say -- you say it's helpful, instructive. Are we to read that as saying that the views generally coincide with (inaudible)?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I don't want to imply any views -- certainly don't want to give any views to the Secretary nor to the Administration. We are approaching this as a catalyst to get the peace process forward. It's not helpful on our part to express views one way or the other.

Q But you have, have you not? I mean, the United States still refers to Resolutions 242 and 338, does it not?

MR. FITZWATER: That's correct.

Q Believes they are the basis for any type of settlement in the Mideast?

MR. FITZWATER: That's correct.

Q And Shamir is saying that he doesn't.

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have a process started here that involves a blend of some new ideas and new beliefs; and we find that in the Middle East, it's more important not to say anything that prohibits the process or acts as a stoppage than it is to try and say something that might stimulate activity. We are approaching this with a certain degree of openness in terms of getting the parties together. I think Colin Powell said on the trip -- he used the analogy of the football stadium where he tried to get everybody in the stadium and on the field, and then we'll see how the game was played. And that is pretty much where we are, Sam. Andre?

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Q Do you have any reaction to Shamir blocking Paris' effort to get the Israeli government to commit one way or the other on the peace plan, on the Shultz plan?

MR. FITZWATER: No. I don't have any comment on that. Everyone knows the internal political situation. We will discuss the issue with Prime Minister Shamir. But we wouldn't comment in any way on their internal affairs. Gene?

Q It sounds like you're ruling out retaliation. Are you ruling out retaliation?

MR. FITZWATER: There's nothing to retaliate for, no. Wendell.

Q I'm interested -- the Palestinians catch a lot of -- well, our basis for not dealing with them is their refusal to accept 242 and 338. Now do the Prime Minister's comments concern you at all, since he is the Prime Minister, and he would appear to be rejecting Resolution 242? Obviously we're not going to stop discussions with Israel. How much concern is there on the part of the President? The Prime Minister appears to be rejecting Resolution 242.

MR. FITZWATER: We'll have to undergo any number of discussions in the weeks ahead. I'm not sure your interpretation is quite right there, Wendell. But rather than get into a debate here, I'd just say that all of the viewpoints will be considered as we move through. But our policy has not changed with regard to the Palestinians.

Q Can you help me, then? Two-four-two is not land for peace. And Prime Minister Shamir has not rejected it. Where am I off?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, there are a lot of aspects to that, and I'm not going to debate the meaning of it or the interpretation of it by various countries. As I said, we have a process here with a lot of disparate points of view being brought together. And I don't intend to start offering definitions at this point. Yes.

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שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מחוך 3 דפיםסווג בטחוני רגילדחיפות מיידיתאריך/ז"ח 9.3.88מס' מברק

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המשרד

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אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עיתונות

מכתב הסנטורים

להלן דברי דובר הבית הלבן לגבי המכתב בתדרוך היומי 7.3.88.

  
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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני ש מ ר

דחופות

אל : המשרד

תאריך/ז"ח 19:30 - 9.3.88

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מס' מברק

ערב 2, ממ"ד .

מגורם עתונאי שראיין את זייד אלרפאעי בלונדון, שלא לפרסום .

1. הארועים בגדמ"ע נתפסים לטווח ארוך כתהליך של רדיקליזציה במחנה הפלסטינאי .  
יש עמס איום על היציבות בירדן עצמה, זאת למרות שבטווח הקצר ירדן רואה בכך  
ברכה לפחות משני כיוונים :

(א) אילוף על ארה"ב לצאת מהסתגרותה בכל הקשור לתהליך חשלוס, שיביא כך מקווה  
ללחץ מצדה על ישראל.

(ב) חיזוק חמערך ומחנה חשלוס לקראת תבחירות. תפיסת זו של רה"מ ירדן עומדת  
בניגוד לדעות ששמע מגורמים ירדנים בארה"ב ובלונדון הרואים במחזמות  
רק ברכה לערבים.

2. ירדן עומדת על קיום ועידה בינ"ל מהסיבה המרכזית שזוהי המסגרת היחידה שבה  
תוכל לעשות ויתורים לישראל, מקובלת עליו העובדה שויתורים הכרחיים במסגרת  
של תהליך שלום. מאידך מצב היפוטטי של קבלת תנאי הערבים במלואם-נסיגה לקווי  
67, הגדרה עצמית לפלס'י יבטל הצורך בוועידה כזו.

3. אי שם לאורך הדרך (A LONG THE WAY) של התהליך חייבת להיות התיחסות  
לכך ש-242 בוגעת (APPLYS) לגדמ"ע, עזה והגולן .

4. הגדיר חיחסים עם ארה"ב. בסיסית טובים אף כי לא הסתיר שקיימים חילוקי דעות  
באשר לגישתה לתהליך ולישראל.

אלי אבידן

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ההחלטות של הוועדה  
הועברו למשרד  
החוץ והגולן  
לטיפול  
הנדרש

END





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## Shultz Vows Not to Change Mideast Plan

### *Shamir Associate Is Given Message*

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz has told a close associate of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that he is ready to clarify his proposed Mideast peace plan but not to change its substance or timetable in discussions with Shamir here next week, Israeli sources said.

The blunt Shultz message was also conveyed to the Israeli government through Radio Israel, whose correspondent here, Shimon Schiffer, in a broadcast last night quoted a high administration official as saying Shultz was not ready to change "even one single detail" of the plan.

Shultz reportedly wanted to convey the Reagan administration's message to Israeli leaders before a special cabinet meeting is held today to discuss the controversial Shultz plan.

Meanwhile, Shultz last night dispatched assistant secretary of state Richard W. Murphy to Moscow to brief Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on the plan, a State Department official said last night. Murphy is to travel subsequently to various western European capitals for the same purpose.

Shultz appears determined to

keep momentum going in his peace efforts, as well as keeping pressure on Shamir, and to prepare for a meeting here later this month between Shultz and Shevardnadze, where Shultz is expected to seek Soviet support for his plan.

Shultz met yesterday with Moshe Arens, former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. and Israeli defense minister, who protested the U.S. proposal for holding new Arab-Israeli peace talks under the auspices of an international conference.

Arens told Shultz Shamir opposes the conference because he fears it would have too much authority and result in "extreme positions," according to an Israeli spokesman.

The conference, such as Shultz envisages it, would be "a danger" to Israel because it would have the authority to "impose solutions," Arens reportedly told Shultz.

Arens spent an hour with Shultz discussing his plan and the unrest in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, the spokesman said.

Shamir is expected to use the proposed international conference as a main reason for opposing the Shultz peace plan in discussions with Reagan administration officials during his four-day visit here starting next Monday.

The exact powers of the proposed conference as outlined in Shultz's letter to Shamir last Friday remain unclear, but the letter says explicitly that "the conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached."

According to the Shultz letter, this is how the conference would work:

The U.N. secretary general would be asked to invite "the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict" as well as the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council two weeks before negotiations start.

All participants would have to accept U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which incorporate the principle of "land for peace" and renounce violence and terrorism. The letter also proposes that "the parties to

each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference in a manner to be agreed."

In addition to bilateral talks between Jordan and Israel on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, others could be held between Israel and Syria on the occupied Golan Heights or between Israel and Lebanon.

Shamir is also reportedly concerned that the U.N. secretary general could invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a party "involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict." If the PLO accepted the U.N. resolutions and renounced violence and terrorism, it would then be able to participate in the conference.

Shamir's Likud bloc in the Israeli parliament steadfastly opposes the PLO's direct participation.

Shultz's plan stipulates Palestinian representation in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that is to negotiate with Israel "independently of any other negotiations."

W.P.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיפות מיידית

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מס' מברק

המשרד

174

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל רה"מ

הנדון: הסנטור לוין ותהליך השלום

מניחים ששמתם לב לתיקונים שהוכנסו לגרסה הסופית של מכתב הסנטורים.  
בפסקה הרביעית הוחלפה ההתייחסות לפלסטינאים במקום ההתייחסות לסוריה, ובסעיף ה-6  
כתוב שלפי האינטרפרטציה האמריקאית של 242, חשקול ישראל ויתור על טריטוריה  
תמורת "חוזת שלום שמבטיח הכרה בישראל וקבלתה מצד הירדנים והפלסטינאים".

נא  
למדן

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דחיסות: מ י ד י סווג כטחוני: ב ל מ'ס	<b>מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק</b> <b>טופס מברק</b>	1 5 מחור:
תז"ח: 18/7/88 38-211 00210	אל : לשכת רה"מ - הארי הורוביץ, מצפ"א רע : השגרירות/וושנינגטון מאח : סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	

חטיפת האוטובוס.

1. מצ"ב הודעת איגוד בתיה"כ האורתודוקסים אותה נתבקשנו להעביר ליהינת רה"מ.

2. כמו כן מצ"ב הודעת אמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס בנידון.

מרדכי ידיד

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א.ש.ל.

אישור:

מרדכי ידיד

שם השולח:

8.3.1988

תאריך:

news from...

March 8, 1988

Orthodox Jewish  
Congregations  
of America

45 WEST 36TH STREET  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10018 (212) 663-4000

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

28/210 2/15  
Mr. Sidney Kwestel, President of the Orthodox Union, issued the following statement on yesterday's PLO murderous attack on Israeli civilians.

The cold blooded murder of Israeli civilian hostages by Palestinian guerrillas is a chilling reminder that the objective of the Palestinians and the PLO is not self determination but the destruction of the State of Israel. The PLO has starkly and gruesomely demonstrated to the world once again that it is nothing but a terrorist organization that makes war on innocent men, women and children. Yesterday's act of murder confirms that the Palestinians and the PLO are the true stumbling block to any peace initiative in the Middle East. The Palestinians' stubborn refusal to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz on his recent peace mission to the Middle East, the Jordanians' insistence that the PLO be represented in any peace negotiations and the new PLO violence make a mockery of any good faith attempts to engage in a fruitful peace process.

To be sure, we welcome the efforts of Secretary of State George Shultz to bring peace to the Middle East - a condition for which Israel has been striving since its establishment in 1948. But in view of recent events, we hope that his mission will not seek to reformulate the Camp David Accords or the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 or to impose any conditions which will inhibit direct negotiations free of outside





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domination. It must also be borne in mind that Israel - America's true friend and ally - is the only democracy in the Middle East. It ill behooves our nation which cherishes and understands the democratic process to interfere with that very process in the State of Israel. We know that democracy does not produce results as quickly as we wish but that is no reason for us to criticize Israel's duly elected leaders who are working within the democratic process, or to impose our views on the Israeli people. Rather, the key to success in the peace process is to convince the Arab states that they should consent to negotiate face-to-face with Israel without any pre-conditions as Israel has always stated it was prepared to do with the Arab states.

The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America is the spokesman for more than 1,000 orthodox synagogues throughout the United States representing more than one million Jews.

*news*

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**AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS**  
STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE, 15 EAST 84TH STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10028 • 879 4500

Contact: Ron Kaplan  
212-879-4500

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

**AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS BLASTS ATTACK  
ON ISRAELI BUS PASSENGERS BY TERRORISTS**

Expressing ~~a sense of~~ horror and outrage in the wake of an attack on Israeli civilians aboard a bus by members of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Theodore R. Mann, president of the American Jewish Congress, reiterated his organization's belief that the PLO had no interest in peaceably resolving tensions in the Middle East and no place at the negotiating table. The attack claimed the lives of three passengers and resulted in numerous injuries.

Despite the PLO's "purported disavowal of terrorism and talk about recourse to political means for a resolution of the conflict," observed Mr. Mann, it has once again demonstrated its commitment to an "armed struggle" against Israel, showing a predilection towards "defenseless civilians whose only 'crime' is their entirely random appearance in terrorists' gunsights."

Mr. Mann called upon the government of Egypt to maintain the integrity of its security, noting that the terrorists penetrated ~~the~~ Israel through their borders.

The full text of Mr. Mann's statement follows:



We are horrified and outraged by the indiscriminate terrorist attack on innocent Israeli bus passengers in which a man and two women were murdered and many others injured. According to survivors, the terrorists identified themselves as members of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO.

For all its purported disavowal of terrorism and talk about recourse to political means for a resolution of the conflict, the PLO has again exposed its true nature as a fundamentally terrorist organization committed to "armed struggle" against Israel. As in countless cases in the past, the PLO's preferred targets have been defenseless civilians whose only "crime" is their entirely random appearance in terrorists' gun sights.

This brutal attack comes hard on the heels of the PLO's refusal to permit a delegation of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to meet with Secretary of State Shultz and the attempted car bombing at the King David Hotel in which the Secretary was staying. These acts reflect a pattern of rejectionism and violence which underscores the illegitimacy of the PLO's claim to a seat at the negotiating table.

We note with concern that the PLO terrorists penetrated Israel through the Egyptian border. We call on the Egyptian government to take whatever steps are necessary to safeguard its borders against the recurrence of any such incidents.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ר קדף ומחוד 3 דפיםסוג בטחוני גלוידחיפות מידיתאריך/ז"ח 8.3.88מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הטברה, ממ"ד

מאת: עיתונות

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" (8.3.88).

בא/נ  
עיתונות

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MARY McGRORY

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## Mideast Peace: Where to Start?

**F**ormer secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger told The New York Times that disclosure of his blood-curdling secret plan to end the Palestinian uprising was "sort of disgusting."

What was infinitely more disgusting than the revelation was the content of his off-the-record advice to prominent American Jews. Television should be banned from the trouble spots "a la South Africa" and the army should be sent in to put down the insurrection—"overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly."

That, as it happens, is pretty much the policy of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Kissinger, despite his background as a refugee from Nazi Germany, has never blinked at the use of force. He was willing to bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age, and has always taken street demonstrations as a personal affront. Clovis Maksoud, the U.N. representative of the Arab League, said that the Kissinger solution shows that "beneath the veneer of sophisticated articulation lies a cruel intellect devoid of a sense of fairness and concern for the Palestinian people."

Just as the Kissinger initiative was being revealed, 30 senators took what they probably considered a bold step. To support the present secretary of state, George P. Shultz, who has been whirling through the Middle East looking for takers for his new peace plan, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) wrote him a letter advocating the "land for peace" approach.

Doubtless Levin and his 29 cosigners hope to encourage Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who believes in territorial concessions. Shamir, who comes here next week, gives summary dismissal to the idea: "This expression of territory for peace is not accepted by me."

The letter was page-one news in Israel, and it at least ended the shameful

three months' silence from Capitol Hill about Israeli crisis management. But it won't help the cause of peace, because the senators say they understand perfectly that Israelis cannot negotiate with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only representation Palestinians will accept.

Last year, in yet another deep obeisance to the Israeli lobby, Congress passed a bill that not only closed the PLO office in Washington but also mandated the elimination of the PLO mission to the United Nations.

These acts ratify Israeli insistence

that the PLO is a terrorist organization that represents nothing but masked murderers who blow up school buses and ambush tourists. But Jordan's King Hussein, on whom we have rested our hopes for the last 20 years, refuses to be a stand-in for the PLO. If there are to be peace talks, the Palestinians must have an independent delegation.

The United States looked pretty foolish in the United Nations when a vote condemning the U.S. action passed, 143 to 1, the one being Israel. The General Assembly noted that the United States has solemn treaty obligations and called for steps that will inescapably lead to another bad day in the World Court. It was a lamentable soundtrack for the Shultz peace mission.

What the uprising has done for Americans is to humanize the Palestinian plight, which for 40 years has been something unfortunate but mercifully remote. Now there is no escaping it. The grinning, unshaven face of PLO leader Yasser Arafat has been replaced by hundreds of other faces: teen-age rock-throwers, grandmothers, mothers, children, who are terrified, anguished, outraged and often being beaten with clubs.

The Israeli soldiers don't know what to do. Neither does their divided government. The Kissinger outburst, the Shultz mission, the senators' letter, the reluctance of King Hussein, all offer evidence that nobody knows where to begin without alienating either Jews or Palestinians.

The recriminations rage on with the violence. The Palestinians brought it on themselves by refusing to accept Israeli citizenship when Israel was declared a state. So says B'nai B'rith in a full-page ad in The New York Times, which further declares that "American Jews stand in unity and identification with the embattled nation of Israel."

That is not true, either. Many American Jews stand horrified.

A visitor from Israel, Ehud Sprinzak, who teaches at Hebrew University, spoke to the Brookings Institution about "the revolution of stones" as "a miracle," one "which surprised everybody." He had a startling suggestion as to who might break the deadlock: none other than Ariel Sharon, the most controversial, unrelenting and hard-line of the Israeli generals.

"He is a very dangerous person," said Sprinzak, "but a very shrewd political animal." He was making the point that something must be done. "The price for Israel goes up every day."

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MARY McGRORY

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CBS THIS MORNING  
INTERVIEW WITH MOSHE ARENS,  
MEMBER OF KNESSET AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1988

MR. SMITH: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir visits Washington next week for further talks on the Reagan Administration's Mid-East peace plan. With us this morning is the man widely regarded as Shamir's most likely successor as leader of the conservative Likud Party. Moshe Arens is former ambassador to the United States, former defense minister of Israel, and now a member of the Israeli parliament. Good morning.

AMB. ARENS: Good morning, and thanks for the compliments.

MR. SMITH: Party -- your party is seen as blocking some of the possibilities for the Shultz peace plan, the land for peace initiative. Is that position likely to change?

AMB. ARENS: Well, first of all, our party is looking out for Israel's best interests. Israel lives in a very volatile part of the world, in the middle east. You see what's going on between Iraq and Iran, you've got to be very careful there, you've got to be strong. And we want peace as much as anybody would, more than anybody, I would say. But we want terms that will assure Israel's survival. And so that's the motivation behind the positions taken by our party and our prime minister.

MR. SMITH: The -- the subject that comes up again and again and again, though, is the land for peace initiative. Is that, in and of itself, at least on the outset, unacceptable?

AMB. ARENS: I think it's really not relevant at the present time. The important thing is to get the negotiations going, and we believe, because we've had this one example, the one precedent of Israel's negotiations with Egypt, that once they get going, even though the two parties may start from quite divergent views, they will bridge the gap. So far the negotiations haven't started, and the reason they haven't started is because the Arab world has not been ready to negotiate with Israel. Even at this time Jordan is not ready to negotiate with Israel directly, face to face. This is

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what Sadat of Egypt did. And the suggestion of an international conference is one that doesn't really bode very well for these negotiations, because in such a conference there would participate the Soviet Union and Communist China -- two countries that have no diplomatic relations with Israel, a history of hostility towards Israel -- and two other countries, Britain and France, that say quite openly that they want Israel to go back to the pre-'67 borders, that are non-defensible borders.

MR. SMITH: Who do you -- who do you negotiate with, as far as the Palestinians are concerned?

AMB. ARENS: Jordan is a Palestinian state, King Hussein is King of Jordan, he's one of the last absolute monarchs left in the world, but he is the ruler in Jordan. He controls Israel's eastern border, and we have to make peace with him, just as we've made peace with Egypt.

MR. SMITH: Is there any way to negotiate with the people -- with Palestinians who are within the borders of your country?

AMB. ARENS: That's a problem for Israel. I know that many Palestinians really do not recognize the legitimacy of King Hussein as ruler of Jordan. But this is something that Israel really can't interfere in.

MR. SMITH: Let's go to another subject: Television has played a large part in the visibility of the violence in Israel between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and especially over the last three or four months. There has been a sort of a new censorship rule, in terms of not allowing television cameras into certain areas. Is that a good representation for Israel, and it's history as being a democratic nation?

AMB. ARENS: Well, you know the democratic nations have difficulty in dealing with mob violence, and that is our problem in Israel today. Totalitarian countries, a country like Syria and Jordan, have no problem at all, the Soviet Union. Democratic countries do have a problem. Now, in the discussion in the Israeli cabinet as to whether television cameras should be allowed in the area, one of the ministers said, "By breaking the mirror you don't change reality." Now that sounds really good and correct, but it really isn't, because we found that the presense of the mirror affects reality. Many of these rock throwers, many of these people engaging in violence, are playing to the cameras. Now if it's true that the presense of the cameras stimulates the violence, then I think we've got something to think about.

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MR. SMITH: Very quickly, 30 Senators sent a letter to the State of Israel, condoning and -- condemning -- condoning the peace process, but also at the same time condemning the lack of movement. What did you think of the letter?

AMB. ARENS: The people who signed the letter are some of Israel's best friends in the Senate. I think I know each and every one of them. I think, however, the letter is misplaced. The problem today is getting the negotiations going, and not trying to undercut Israel's negotiating position. And I think that that might be the the effect of that letter, and that's unfortunate.

MR. SMITH: Moshe Arens, thank you very much for joining us this morning.

END

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דף \_\_\_\_\_ סודי \_\_\_\_\_  
 סיווג בטחוני: \_\_\_\_\_  
 דחיות: \_\_\_\_\_  
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מנכ"ל רה"מ  
 מנכ"ל מדיני/משה"ח  
 השגריר וושינגטון - 101300

להלן רשום שיחת ארנס עם מזכיר המדינה שולץ (8.3.88).

ארנס פתח באומרו שאנו עוברים מבחן קשה לישראל והוא מלא דאגה שהמצב טומן בחובו סכנות כמעט קיומיות. לדעתו האלימות אינה סכנה ואין בה איום פיזי למדינה אף כי הפרט פגע בפעולות איבה. הסכנה לדעתו היא בהתפתחויות שנבעו מהאלימות והשפעותיהן מטילות עליו אימה. ביניהן הוא מונה את הקיטוב בישראל. קיטוב פוליטי זה משקף כמובן את הקיטוב באוכלוסיה עצמה. עצמתה של ישראל נבעה בין השאר מתדמיתה של חברה מאוחדת ובתדמית זו חל סחף חמור. תופעה אחרת הוא הפיצול במחנה ידידי ישראל. הדבר מתבטא בהתבטאויות מנהיגים יהודים מסוימים או במכתב הסנטורים. שולץ: "אני לא מעורב". ארנס: "אני יודע. אחרת לא הייתי מרשה לעצמי לפנות אליך בנקודה זו". נקודה שלישית המטרידה אותו, המשיך ארנס, היא תדמית יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב. בשנים האחרונות יצרנו מכשירי ש"פ ותאום ואת חילוקי הדעות ביננו פתרנו ביננו בלא ביטויים פומביים. סה"כ היחסים הקרובים האלו יצר רשת בטחון ולאו"ב ישראל היו מחשבות שניות באשר לשימוש בנשק כדי לפתור הסכסוך. אם בתדמית זו יחולו נזק וסחף, המשיך ארנס, יעורר הדבר תהליכים מסוכנים. אין אנו רוצים להלחם מלחמה שבעית. די היו לנו בשש הקודמות.

ארנס אמר כי התמונות מהמאורעות יוצרות כמובן דאגה וגם היא מודאגת מתופעות מסוימות. הוא ניהל שיחות רבות גם עם ערביי ישראל מתוך חרדה לנסיגה במערכת היחסים בין יהודים וערבים בישראל. לדמוקרטיה מערבית יש בעיה בטיפול באלימות המוניים. לרוסים ולסורים אין בעיות. בישראל מתנהל וויכוח על דרך הטיפול ויש לרבים וגם לו הסתייגויות ממה שנעשה או נאמר אבל ברור שזה מצב קשה ולא ברור אם צבא מערבי אחר היה מטפל בבעיה דומה ביתר הצלחה. חלק מהתופעה מושפע מהאסלאם הפונדמנטליסטי ואנו נתקלים בתופעות של שנאה לישראל וליהודים. אין בידי המתפרעים טילים כפי שיש לאראנים אך יש להם אבנים. לבריטים היתה בעיה דומה שאח"כ נקראה "המרד הערבי" שגרר את "הספר הלבן" שבין השאר אסר עליה יהודית לארץ ישראל ובכך חשבו הבריטים שיפתרו את הבעיה. הוא, ארנס, משוכנע שלנו תהיה יותר הצלחה בפתרון הבעיה. הנחתו היא שהמאורעות הם שגרמו למזכיר לצאת ביוזמתו.

שולץ קטע דברי ארנס בשוללו הנחה זו. כבר זמן רב הוא חושב כי ישראל פגיעה. א. בשל גדלה של האוכלוסיה משוללת הזכויות והסכנה לדמוקרטיה הישראלית כתוצאה מכך. ב. השינוי במערכות הנשק וכניסתם של טילים ויכולת הנזק שלהם. אלו הובילו אותו למחשבה שפתרון שיושג במו"מ עדיף על המצב הנוכחי. זמן רב בוזבז בוויכוח על פרוצדורה. אי אפשר ללכת למו"מ ישיר כי המלך חוסיין לא מסכים לכך בטענה שאין GIVE ישראלי. ישראל אינה מסכימה ללכת לוועידה בינלאומית כפי שהערבים דורשים ולמען האמת, גם הוא, שולץ, לא היה הולך אליה. כך הגיעו למבוי סתום. לכן הוא בדעה שיש לדבר על המהות ואח"כ לחזור לפרוצדורה. הוא מתרשם שיש רצון לדיון והוא למשל התרשם עמוקות מהמכתב שקיבל מרה"מ בינואר והתייחס אליו ברצינות רבה. בהתייחסו לארועים אמר שולץ כי דברו איתנו על שיטות טקטיות ולא עם כל מה שעשינו הסכימו. ארה"ב הביעה בצורה ברורה את התנגדותה לגרוש אבל אח"כ הטילה ווטו על הצעות החלטה במועבי"ט וזה לא היה ווטו קל כי ארה"ב נתקלה בבקורת. בכל השיחות שניהל על תכניתו לא התייחס לאלימות אף כי ברור שיש השפעה והוא גם מקווה שקבלת תוכניתו תגרום להפסקת האלימות.

הבסיס החיוני לשלום לדברי שולץ הוא ישראל חזקה ותמיכה אמריקאית בלתי מסויגת בה כך שאויביה יווכחו כי אין כל אלטרנטיבה למו"מ. בקונגרס ול-WAVERING BROTHERS אמר כי אף פעם לא ידוע מי ידידך אלא בשעת מצוקה זה הזמן

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להוכיח ידידות ולכן הוא התבטא ברוח זו בפומבי על אף שכאמור לא מסכים עם הדרך שבה טיפלנו במהומות. חושב שההצעה לסגור את השטחים לטלביזיה איננה נכונה אף כי ברור שחלק מההפגנות נובע מנוכחותן של המצלמות.

שולץ אמר שדיברו עם כל המעורבים בסכסוך ואפילו בסוריה, כדי שלא יאמרו שם שלא דיבר עמם. צ'רלי (היל) דיבר עם אנשי רה"מ ושה"ח. ניסינו להבין, להעביר רעיונות. שוחחנו עם ירדן ומצרים. לבסוף הצגנו את ה-CONCEPT מתוך תקווה שיתקבל, אך הוא, שולץ, לא יודע מה יקרה בגורל הירדנים שלא לדבר על הסורים. רואים בתכנית שתיתן זכויות מסוימות לתושבים המקומיים אך אף פעם לא יהיו שיחות על הסטטוס הסופי. לכן ניסתה ארה"ב ליצור משהו שיש בו את ה-INTERLOCK אך שלקח בחשבון את הצעות רה"מ היינו שבתחילה יהיה נסיון לשנות משהו בחי היום-יום של הפלשתינאים. הוא מסכים עם דברי רה"מ כי יש צרך בנושא של הסדר ביניים שיתרום לשיחות על הסטטוס הסופי. הרעיון הזה נכלל בתכנית האמריקאית. כמו-כן ניסתה ארה"ב לבנות רעיון של ועידה בינלאומית שיהיה מקובל על הצדדים. יש בתכנית גם מו"מ בילטרלי וצרך בהסכם על משטר ביניים לפני שיהיו שיחות על הסופי. אחרי סבובי שיחותיו הוחלט לשים את התכנית על השלחן ועתה כל אחד מורט ממנה חלקים. הירדנים רוצים סיכום על הסטטוס הסופי ורק אח"כ לחזור להסדר הזמני. "מה עושים לגבי היצוג הפלשתינאי?" שאל שולץ רטורית והוסיף "איני יודע". גורם חיובי הוא דאגת הערבים המתונים והרואים סכנה גם עבורם אף כי יש להם יכולת גבוהה ל-RUTHLESSNESS שאיננה מתאימה למדינות דמוקרטיות כישראל. שולץ סיים קטע זה בדבריו באומרו כי אם התכנית תעזור להפסקת האלימות מה טוב, אך לא זו הסיבה לזמנתו.

מר ארנס אמר כי אכן המצב לא יציב אך כל האזור אינו יציב מטבעו ובאופן מוזר לביש המזל ישראל היא אי של דמוקרטיה. יש כאן סחף מהיר במיוחד בראיית ישראל כמדינה חזקה והעולם הערבי כבר איננו רואה אותה ככזאת. הנחתנו היא שיש צרך במו"מ וכאשר זה יתחיל יהיה שיפור במצב (שולץ: "זו גם הנחתי ואני מסכים בכך עם רה"מ שאת יחסי עמו אני מעריך" הנחה זו מבוססת על הנסיון עם המצרים אבל כאן המצב יותר מסוכן. חוסיין גם הוא במצב קשה ולא ברור אם מצבו מדבר בשם הפלשתינאים. שולץ: LESS SO NOW. ארנס אמר כי יתכן שחוסיין יעדיף שלא לקחת כל סיכון ולחזק את מעמדו בתוך ממלכתו. מכל מקום אנו עדיין מאמינים במו"מ אבל המדובר במו"מ קונבנציונלי, ישיר. העובדה שהמלך אומר שאינו רוצה מו"מ ישיר ורוצה בוועידה בינלאומית היא הוכחה לקושי וגם לכך שהעולם הערבי מתייחס לוועידה כפורום המיועד לדחוף ישראל לפינה. כפורום נמצאות שתי מדינות שלהן אין קשיים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל ושתי האחרות דורשות חזרת ישראל לקוי 67. אין ערבויות שיבטלו סכנה זאת והסובייטים רואים את הוועידה כ-REFERENCE POINT שולץ הסביר מה אומרת תכניתו בנקודה זו וארנס ענה שזה הרחיק לכת מעבר שניתן להבין כאשר הרעיונות הוצגו לנו בפעם הראשונה. שולץ ענה כי ברור שהוועידה אינה יכולה להטיל וטו או לכפות פתרונות ואסד טען כי אינו זקוק לוועידה כזו. הוא רוצה בוועידה שתכפה על ישראל לסגת מרמת הגולן ולשם שיחות ישירות עם ישראל הוא אינו זקוק לוועידה. ארנס אמר כי עובדה שהוועידה צריכה לקבל דווח. הערבים יודעים מה תהיה התגובה לדוחו"ת. דאגתו היא לא מפתרונות שיוטל עליהם וטו אלא מהגדר מו"מ ישיר. שולץ: "אבל זה לא יקרה לעולם" לדעתו של שולץ חוסיין רוצה בכניסה למו"מ על הסטטוס הסופי ולכן הוא חוזה סיום וסיכום מהירים של השיחות על הסדר הביניים. מאחר והתקיימו כבר דיונים ממושכים בעבר על חלק מהנושאים זה יאפשר מו"מ מהיר וישום הסדר הביניים. קיימת כמובן מחלוקת על מהותו של הסטטוס הסופי ומה יחשב כהסדר סביר אך יש לקוות שמשהו חיובי יתפתח. מכל מקום, לפחות יהיה משטר ביניים והתחלה של שיחות על ההסדר הסופי בדרג נמוך. השיחות הסודיות אינן תחליף לשיחות הפתוחות שבצעם קיומן יש מעין הכרה.



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מר ארנס אמר שהאפקט הזה יוחלש בוועידה בינלאומית. הצד הערבי יפנה לוועידה ע"מ להאשים את ישראל בנקיטה בעמדות בלתי מתפשרות. שולץ ענה כי הסיכוי לכך קטן בכל מה שקשור להסדר הזמני כי ישראל מעוניינת בו ובירדן כפרטנר למו"מ וזה יהיה יותר קל מאשר המו"מ עם מצרים כי כשטח יש כבר IMPLICIT STRUCTURE ירדני כגון בתחום החינוך. דווח על חלוקי דעות צפוי לדעתי יותר בשיחות על ההסדר הסופי. ארנס העיר כי כלל לא ברור אם חוסיין מעוניין בהסדר זמני שעלול לפעול כנגד האינטרסים שלו ושולץ ענה שאת חוסיין "יקנה" את מרכיבי התכנית, הוא גם מקבל את ההסדר הזמני. אם תושבי השטחים יראו במה המדובר קרוב לודאי שגם הם ירצו להכנס למו"מ כי זה יספק חלק מדרשותיהם. שולץ הוסיף שכאשר נכנס לתפקידו כבר נפסקו שיחות האוטונומיה אך כאשר קיבל לאחרונה את מכתב רה"מ הוא ביקש לקבל "שעורים" במה כבר הושגו IT-KNOCKS YOUR EYES OUT הנחתו היא שאם נתחיל נוכל להשלים את הסדר הביניים והדווח יהיה שהוא הושלם. אחרי יישומו ואחרי הבחירות בישראל יתחיל המו"מ על ההסדר הסופי.

מר ארנס העיר כי עלול להווצר מצב שבו חוסיין ימצא תמיכה בעמדות קיצוניות על אף ויתכן שהיה מוכן לקבל פתרונות מתונים יותר. שולץ ענה שאם ההנחה אמנם היא שהמצב אינו יציב הרי שיש שתי אפשרויות. האחת היא להמשיך במצב הקיים ו"לגלגל" הלאה את האילוצים והבעיות והדרך השנייה היא להגדיל את הסיכוי למו"מ על הסדר זמני שיוביל לפתרון על הסטטוס הסופי. שולץ אמר כי מובראק תומך בתכנית ועמד בלחץ בנושא יחסי מצרים-ישראל. לא ברור לו מה יהיה תפקיד שימלאו סוריה או חברי מועב"ט אף כי ברור שהם אינם מגיבים ופועלים כפי ארה"ב פועלת. "אין לי ספק" המשיך שולץ "שררעיון שהמלך ישב לשיחות ישירות לא יעבוד. הוא זקוק למידה של לגיטימיות לשיחות עם ישראל". ארנס שאל איך מעניקים לו הסובייטים למשל לגיטימיות כזו ושולץ ענה שהבסיס הוא החלטות מועב"ט 242 ו-338 שאותן כולם קיבלו, כולל ישראל. כאשר מנהלים מו"מ על בסיס החלטות אלו ותחת מטריית מועב"ט ניתנת לשיחות לגיטימיות בינלאומית. ארנס העיר שהמלך זקוק לגיטימיות ערבית ושולץ ענה שהוא מקבל אותה מעצם העובדה שמדינות ערב הן אלו שרוצות ועידה אף כי לא כזו המוצעת על ידי ארה"ב. שולץ שוב חזר והדגיש את יחסי ישראל-מצרים ואת העובדה שקיומם מקל על חוסיין וכמוהם חזרת העולם הערבי למצרים. ארנס העיר שיחסי ישראל-מצרים הושגו על בסיס היותה של ישראל חזקה ויחסים הדוקים בין ישראל וארה"ב כדי שאלה יהיו הבסיס למו"מ ולא הנשק.

שולץ סיים השיחה באומרו:

THINK ABOUT IT DEEPLY I'LL /appreciate/ A SIGNAL BEFORE BUT CERTAINLY DURING THE VISIT.

נכחו בשיחה הח"מ וצ'רלי היל.

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דחיסות: מ י ד י סוג כטחוני: ב ל מ'ס	<b>מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק</b> <b>טופס מברק</b>	דף: 1 מחור: 5
תז"ח: 18/7 נר: 38-211 00210	א ל : לשכת רה"מ - הארי הורוביץ, מצפ"א ר ע : השגרירות/וושנינגטון מאח : סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	

חטיפת האוטובוס.

1. מצ"ב הודעת איגוד בתיה"כ האורתודוקסים אותה נתבקשנו להעביר ליהיעת רה"מ.

2. כמו כן מצ"ב הודעת אמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס בנידון.

מרדכי ידיד

הנהגה 3  
 ג'ואיש 3  
 ח"ן 1  
 ג'ואיש 9  
 5/3/88  
 הנהגה/אחראי

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הנהלת

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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

March 8, 1988

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Mr. Sidney Kwestel, President of the Orthodox Union, issued the following statement on yesterday's PLO murderous attack on Israeli civilians.

The cold blooded murder of Israeli civilian hostages by Palestinian guerrillas is a chilling reminder that the objective of the Palestinians and the PLO is not self determination but the destruction of the State of Israel. The PLO has starkly and gruesomely demonstrated to the world once again that it is nothing but a terrorist organization that makes war on innocent men, women and children. Yesterday's act of murder confirms that the Palestinians and the PLO are the true stumbling block to any peace initiative in the Middle East. The Palestinians' stubborn refusal to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz on his recent peace mission to the Middle East, the Jordanians' insistence that the PLO be represented in any peace negotiation and the new PLO violence make a mockery of any good faith attempts to engage in a fruitful peace process.

To be sure, we welcome the efforts of Secretary of State George Shultz to bring peace to the Middle East - a condition for which Israel has been striving since its establishment in 1948. But in view of recent events, we hope that his mission will not seek to reformulate the Camp David Accords or the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 or to impose any conditions which will inhibit direct negotiations free of outside



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domination. It must also be borne in mind that Israel - America's true friend and ally - is the only democracy in the Middle East. It ill behooves our nation which cherishes and understands the democratic process to interfere with that very process in the State of Israel. We know that democracy does not produce results as quickly as we wish but that is no reason for us to criticize Israel's duly elected leaders who are working within the democratic process, or to impose our views on the Israeli people. Rather, the key to success in the peace process is to convince the Arab states that they should consent to negotiate face-to-face with Israel without any pre-conditions as Israel has always stated it was prepared to do with the Arab states.

u The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America is the spokesman for more than 1,000 orthodox synagogues throughout the United States representing more than one million Jews.



*news*

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**AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS**  
STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE, 15 EAST 84TH STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10028 • 879 4500

Contact: Ron Kaplan  
212-879-4500

For Immediate Release

**AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS BLASTS ATTACK  
ON ISRAELI BUS PASSENGERS BY TERRORISTS**

Expressing ~~a sense of~~ horror and outrage in the wake of an attack on Israeli civilians aboard a bus by members of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Theodore R. Mann, president of the American Jewish Congress, reiterated his organization's belief that the PLO had no interest in peaceably resolving tensions in the Middle East and no place at the negotiating table. The attack claimed the lives of three passengers and resulted in numerous injuries.

Despite the PLO's "purported disavowal of terrorism and talk about recourse to political means for a resolution of the conflict," observed Mr. Mann, it has once again demonstrated its commitment to an "armed struggle" against Israel, showing a predilection towards "defenseless civilians whose only 'crime' is their entirely random appearance in terrorists' gunsights."

Mr. Mann called upon the government of Egypt to maintain the integrity of its security, noting that the terrorists penetrated ~~the~~ Israel through their borders.

The full text of Mr. Mann's statement follows:

We are horrified and outraged by the indiscriminate terrorist attack on innocent Israeli bus passengers in which a man and two women were murdered and many others injured. According to survivors, the terrorists identified themselves as members of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO.

For all its purported disavowal of terrorism and talk about recourse to political means for a resolution of the conflict, the PLO has again exposed its true nature as a fundamentally terrorist organization committed to "armed struggle" against Israel. As in countless cases in the past, the PLO's preferred targets have been defenseless civilians whose only "crime" is their entirely random appearance in terrorists' gun sights.

This brutal attack comes hard on the heels of the PLO's refusal to permit a delegation of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to meet with Secretary of State Shultz and the attempted car bombing at the King David Hotel in which the Secretary was staying. These acts reflect a pattern of rejectionism and violence which underscores the illegitimacy of the PLO's claim to a seat at the negotiating table.

We note with concern that the PLO terrorists penetrated Israel through the Egyptian border. We call on the Egyptian government to take whatever steps are necessary to safeguard its borders against the recurrence of any such incidents.

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אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל מדיני, לשכת רה"מ

קונגרס: בשולי מכתב הסנטורים ובעקבותיו

א. השתדלויות העניינים

1. מברורינו עולה, שטום דיין היה הראשון שידע על כוונות קרל לויין. הסנטור זימן אותו ביום די' (2.3) בערב, וסיפר לו על רעיון המכתב. דיין ניסה להניאו, אך לויין היה נחוש בדעתו לפעול. דיין לא מסר לאיש באיפא"ק.
2. כעבור 24 שעות, ביום ה' (3.3) לפנות ערב, קיבל דיין טיוטא למכתב, אך לא חזר ללויין.
3. במקביל, נודע לנו על קיום הטיוטא. כמדווח בשלנו 94, דברתי פעמיים עם לויין אישית באותו ערב - ללא הואיל. דברתי גם עם עוזרו של לויין, והוא מסר שנוסח הטיוטא אינו סופי (ראו נא שלנו 118).
3. בושביץ הוכנס לתמונה רק למחרת (4.3), כאשר לויין פנה אליו והציע שושבינות דו-מפלגתית. לויין ביקש תשובה תוך זמן קצר מאד, ובושביץ הסכים (יתכן מבלי לעיין במכתב עד הסוף) בהנחה שמקובר במכתב פרטי לשולץ על חתימתם של חצי תריסר סנטורים. לדברי עוזרו, לא עלה על דעתו שהמכתב יימסר מייד לתקשורת.
4. בין החותמים הסנטור קנדי. הוא פנה לטום דיין (שפעם עבד אצלו) והלה ניסה לשכנעו לא לחתום. גם עוזרתו לענייני חוץ התנגדה, בטענה שאין זו הדרך לקדם את השלום, אך קנדי חש חובה "לעשות משהו". הוא דיבר גם עם סטו אייזנשטד שהציע שקנדי יפעל לתקן מספר ניסוחים במכתב, אך הנוסח כבר היה סגור - וקנדי חתם בכל זאת.
5. בעת ההצבעות במליאת הסנט (שלנו 118) נהרו סנטורים לחתום על המכתב, ויתכן שחקק לא טרחו לקרוא את המכתב לאחר שראו שלויין ובושביץ היו היוזמים. בעתון וושינגטון היום, מצוטט עוזר אחד כאילו אלמלא אילוצי הזמן, יכלו להחתים 80-85 סנטורים. נזמה שיש כאן הגזמה, אך אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות חתימתם של רוב מתוך 100 הסנטורים, אילו לא יצאו אלה לפגרה ביום ו' בערב.

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דחיפות

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ב. בעקבות המכתב

1. בעתונות היום תהודה רחבה לדברי דובר הבית הלבן שבירך אתמול (7.3) על המכתב, תוכנו ושולחיו - דבר שיש בו אולי לאשר החשש (מברקנו 94) שלויין קיבל אור ירוק מהמימשל לפני שהחליט סופית על המהלך.
2. המכתב מכה גלים בבית הנבחרים, ולדעת קונגרסמן ידידותי (החולק על במהלך) מברשית רבים מחייבים את תוכנו.
3. הקונגרסמן ירני פרנק נשא דברים היום במליאה (ריקה) בהט-הזדהה עם אלה (מבלי לנקוב בשמות) המפצירים בישראל לוותר על טריטוריה חמורת שלום. גם אתר שמונת ואף רצוי שידידים ישמיעו דברי ביקורת על ידידים, במיוחד כאשר האחרונים אינם עושים לטובתם הם. תוך מאמץ להיות הוגן ו-*SEVEN HANDED* אמר בין היתר שישראל עושה משגים בשטחים ויש לתקנם, קרא להקמת מדינה פלסטינית בשטחים, בתנאי שהטריטוריה שלה תהיה מפורזת, והפציר בישראל להסכים להצעות שולץ אם יהיו מנהיגים ערבים המוכנים לעשות שלום עם ישראל כמו אנואר סאדאת - ולהענות בחיוב מבלי להתווכח על אופי הוועידה הבינלאומית, כי הרי יש לישראל התחייבות אמריקנית שלא ייכפה עליה פחרון טאינו קביל. הנוסח המלא מתוך הרקורד הקונגרסיונלי יוברק מחר.
4. פנו אלינו ממשרדו של ג'רי סטאדט (דמוקרט ממסצ'וסטס, חבר בוועדת החוץ, בלתי אוהד) ושאלו על לוח הזמנים של רה"מ, מכיוון שהם שוקלים מסירה מכתב בתמיכה ליוזמת שולץ. האצתי בעוזרו שלא יפעלו, היות וברור שכל מכתב יהיה *COUNTERPRODUCTIVE*. מצדו אמר העוזר שמחשבותיהם בשלב טרומי ביותר ויתכן שלא יספיקו לעשות דבר לפני בואו של רה"מ. עוד ננסה לבלום יוזמה זו, אך לנוכח עוינותו של סטאדט, ספק אם נצליח.
5. נודע לנו גם על מחשבות אצל קונגרסמנים יהודים לעסוק בפעולה-מנע. הם שוקלים מכתב משלהם, שיהיה חיובי מבחינתנו במגמה למנוע מכתב מבית הנבחרים דומה לזה של הסנטורים.
6. הסנטורים הרפובליקנים השמרנים ג'סי הלמס וצ'יק הכט שוקלים פעולה משלהם וגד חכתב לויין - או מכתב או מאמר "ספ-ס".



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7. אנו קולטים שיהודים שמרנים שעזרו כספית לסנטורים מצנבאום ולאוטנברג בשל תמיכתם בישראל, מאיימים להפסיק את תרומותיהם למערכות הבחירות של השניים עקב חתימתם על מכתב לויין.

אין ספק שתהיינה התפתחויות נוספות בימים הקרובים - נעקוב ועוד נדווח.

למדן











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# Shamir Rejects U.S. Deadline

*Two More Arabs Killed in Clashes with Soldiers on West Bank*

By Dan Fisher  
Los Angeles Times

JERUSALEM, March 6—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today rejected an American deadline for responding to the latest U.S. plan for Middle East peace talks, arguing that he needed more time to "clarify" some points in the proposal.

Shamir's rejection, which coincided with reports of at least two more Palestinian fatalities in the three-month old uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, came during the regular weekly meeting of the Israeli Cabinet.

It also came after ministers of the centrist Labor faction in the Cabinet argued that the government must reach a firm decision before Shamir's scheduled state visit to Washington next week.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who delivered a formal U.S. proposal to Jordan's King Hussein Thursday and to leaders of Israel, Syria, and Egypt before leaving the region Friday, had asked for replies within 10 days.

Shamir, leader of the rightist Likud bloc in the coalition government, has been cool to the American plan since the beginning. His party rejects the principle of trading occupied land for peace with Israel's Arab neighbors, a principle that is considered the linchpin of the American peace proposal.

Shamir is scheduled to leave for Washington next Sunday night and to return to Israel March 22.

Shultz, who was already working on what many observers considered an impossibly tight negotiating deadline, had called for responses by March 14 so that an international Middle East peace conference

could be convened as early as possible during the first half of April.

Shamir's stance would apparently destroy most of what little chance there might still be to meet that target, and it is likely to confront sharp reaction in the United States.

In the occupied territories today, Palestinian and hospital sources said two youths were shot to death by Israeli troops during West Bank demonstrations.

The Army said that during disturbances at the Askar refugee camp in Nablus today, troops heard gunfire and then saw two men run-

ning away. They opened fire, hitting one of the two in the forehead. The man, who died at a hospital, was identified by Palestinian sources as Khaled Ardah, 18.

An Army spokeswoman said it was unclear whether Palestinians had opened fire.

Troops also opened fire during violent disturbances in Mazraa Sharqiya, north of Ramallah, killing Ayman Salim Ajak, 18, and wounding a second Palestinian.

At least three more Palestinians were wounded by Army gunfire during West Bank protests today.

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## SHAMIR FOILS VOTE ON U.S. PEACE PLAN

### Two More Palestinians Killed by Israelis on West Bank

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 6 — Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today blocked an attempt by his rival, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, to force a Cabinet vote on the new peace initiative brought by Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

The move came as Israeli soldiers shot dead two more Palestinians during continued protests in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"I don't fear any decision," the Prime Minister said, in resisting the efforts by Mr. Peres's Labor supporters to bring the American initiative to a vote at the weekly cabinet meeting.

#### 'No Reason Not To'

"There is no reason not to reach a decision," Mr. Peres, the Foreign Minister in the bitterly divided coalition government, replied. "Not reaching a decision is rejecting the matter."

The peace plan Mr. Shultz put forward calls for a timetable of interlocking negotiations that would begin with an international conference in April, then talks on an interim phase of self-administration for Palestinians, then negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Mr. Shamir, head of the hard-line Likud bloc, insisted that a letter from Mr. Shultz outlining the plan was "not

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## Shamir Foils Cabinet Vote on U.S. Peace Plan

Continued From Page A1

an ultimatum."

The Prime Minister said the matter should be set aside until he visits Washington next week. At that time, he said, he would "explain the seriousness of the problems to the Americans, and clarify points that need to be clarified such as what the substance of the agreements they are seeking to achieve is."

Mr. Shamir's long-scheduled visit on March 13 is likely to turn into a difficult one. The Prime Minister was criticized yesterday in a letter by 30 United States Senators, many of them strong supporters of Israel, as obstructing Middle East Peace efforts.

### Accusation of Interference

Mr. Shamir asserted tonight that the United States, under great pressure to "interfere" in the Middle East because of three months of violence in the occupied territories, had reversed its position and now favors an international conference that he said would put Israel at a disadvantage.

In a speech to the National Religious Party, he said successive Israeli governments had backed direct negotiations "until this international conference leapt up to torment us."

"The United States is Israel's greatest and most loyal friend," Mr. Shamir said. "But we do not have to accept even from our best friend things likely to endanger our state. A blow from a friend hurts no less, perhaps hurts more, than a blow from an enemy."

As the acrimony mounted within the

stale-mated Government, senior Likud figures were said to be sounding out members of the small religious and right-wing parties that hold the balance of power in hopes of gaining a 61-member majority in Parliament for moving up to July the elections that are scheduled for Nov. 1.

### Timing of Elections

The Likud leaders, who are committed to holding onto the territories under Israeli occupation since 1967, are said to believe that the plan advanced by Mr. Shultz during his recent visit leaves them no choice but to dissolve the Government and go to elections.

Mr. Peres has portrayed his Labor Alignment as the party of peace, ready to meet under the auspices of an international conference and trade land for peace. Mr. Shamir has strongly objected both to the idea of an international conference and to the concept of trading territory for peace.

The growing animosity was demonstrated today when a photocopy of Mr. Shultz's letter appeared on the front page of the afternoon paper Yediot Ahronot, in a disclosure that can only benefit Mr. Peres.

According to the Israeli radio, Mr. Shamir was asked during the Cabinet meeting who was responsible for the leak and answered: "I only know who saw the document. Besides myself, only two people: King Hussein and Shimon Peres."

Later, the Prime Minister's office said it was considering asking the police to investigate how the letter got to the newspaper.

The letter, which was reportedly de-

livered to the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt, called for negotiations between Israel and any willing neighbor to begin as early as May 1. A first stage of talks would be for a three-year transition period in the occupied territories, worked out between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. A second set of talks, to begin seven months after the first and to last a year, would discuss a "final status" intended to bring peace to the area.

### 2 Palestinians Killed

As the Israeli Government continued its wrangling, two Palestinians were shot dead by troops during the day. Khaled al-Ardah, 17 years old, was shot in the head at the Askar refugee center near Nablus, according to a spokesman at Hadassah Hospital. Ayman Salim Ajak, 18, died in a hospital after being shot in Mazra al Sharqiya, a village near Ramallah, during what the army said were violent protests.

In addition, a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Saafin, 27, died overnight of injuries he received on Feb. 4, the Palestine Press Service reported. His death raised the number of Palestinians known killed by Israeli gunfire or beatings during the current wave of demonstrations to 82.

An Israeli army captain and two soldiers were formally charged today with brutality and assault in severe circumstances in connection with the beating of two handcuffed Palestinian captives. The incident was filmed by CBS News and caused consternation among Israeli officials.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

7 מרץ 1988  
יח אדר תשמ"ח

אל: לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

מאת: קצין קישור לקונגרס

הנדון: מכתב הסנטור ליידי לרה"מ  
למברקנו 688 מה-29.2

רצ"ב מקור המכתב לשם העברה לרה"מ.

בברכה  
יוסף למדן



ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA  
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WISCONSIN  
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII  
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA  
LAWTON CHILES, FLORIDA  
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA  
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, NORTH DAKOTA  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
JIM SASSER, TENNESSEE  
DENNIS DUNCAN, ARIZONA  
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS  
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PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO  
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA  
DON NICKLES, OKLAHOMA

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
J. KEITH KENNEDY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

February 24, 1988

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister  
State of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to express my grave concern about recent developments in the West Bank and Gaza. As a long-standing friend of Israel, I am profoundly disturbed by the way events are unfolding as Israeli authorities respond to the Palestinian demonstrations.

I have been contacted by hundreds of Americans, the great majority strong supporters of Israel, who share my concern about this situation.

The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is beyond question. This is one issue where the views of the Executive Branch and the Congress are indistinguishable. We have provided and will continue to provide support and assistance to Israel.

But the face democratic Israel is showing the world as it approaches its 40th birthday is an unfamiliar one. Every day Americans read of Palestinians who have died of gunshot wounds and beatings, many young teenagers. Palestinian youths have been beaten senseless as a result of official policy. Defense Minister Rabin says there is no end to the violence in sight.

Some people say that if Israeli leaders give their soldiers better training and equipment and soften their blunt statements to foreign journalists about beatings and deportations, the familiar image of Israel will reemerge. It is argued that if the world can just see how intransigent the Palestinians are, people will understand that the actions of Israeli forces are justifiable.

Such advice, however well-meant, is mistaken and a disservice to Israel.





His Excellency Yitzhak Shamir

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February 24, 1988

The response of the last three months is wrong and harmful. It cannot lead to any lasting solution to this burning problem of the Palestinians. No matter how effective police tactics become, the riots brutally underscore realities which have been ignored for far too long.

Secretary of State Shultz has said that the turmoil demonstrates that the status quo--complete inaction--in the Middle East peace process is no longer an option. There must be movement that offers all parties alternatives to violence.

As a friend of Israel, I strongly agree. I cannot emphasize too strongly how harmful it is for the world to see night after night on television shootings and beatings. I am convinced that it is in Israel's deepest interests to find a way to replace this policy of the iron fist with negotiations and a chance for the two peoples--Israeli and Arab--to find coexistence.

As one who cares so deeply for democratic, humane, liberal Israel, I support the Reagan Administration's efforts to restart the peace process and urge Israel to respond courageously. Israel now needs to take the initiative in the search for peace so that the world can see the true Israel, a beacon of democracy, respect for human rights, and peace among the peoples of the Middle East.

I am sending an identical letter to Foreign Minister Peres.

Sincerely,



PATRICK LEAHY  
United States Senator

The response of the last three weeks is very  
negative. It cannot lead to any further action in this  
direction. The position of the Palestinian people is  
very difficult. The situation is very serious.  
The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.

Secretary of State Carter has said that the  
situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.  
The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.

In a letter of Israel, I strongly agree. I strongly  
agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree.  
I strongly agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree.  
I strongly agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree. I strongly agree.

As you know, the situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.  
The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.  
The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious. The situation is very serious.

I am sending an official letter to the Secretary of State.  
I am sending an official letter to the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel





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Nice to have both of you with us. Mr. Abram, it is now the nightly focus on most of the television news shows. More than 85 Palestinians dead since the violence there began. And you came out of Israel saying, the time is not right to publicly criticize Israel's handling of this situation. When is it going to be the right time? Why are American Jews being so muted in their reaction to what's going on there?

MR. ABRAM: Oh, I don't think it's wrong to criticize anything. I simply say that at the present time, it is not a good idea to try to stiffen the opposition to Israel. The facts are, that Israel is seeking peace. Even Mr. Shamir, whom I spoke to just before I left, is perfectly willing to come to any face to face negotiation at any time, and negotiate on the lines of the resolution of the United Nations, 242, without any conditions whatsoever. And you may remember, that in October of this year he agreed to come to Washington when Gorbachev and Reagan were there, and to negotiate face to face with King Hussein without any preconditions. And King Hussein rejected.

I think the time is coming, and it's now, when Jordan should be asked whether it is prepared to give up any of the territory that it held, and which it lost in a war of aggression against Israel, for peace. And I think sometimes that criticisms of Israel are placed on the wrong shoe. I don't doubt that criticism is justified. I don't doubt that some of the actions of some of the Israeli soldiers are things that no one is going to approve. But by and large, the moral quality of the state is good and fine. I visited the soldiers. I saw their families. I am confident they want peace with all their heart, but they want security.

Even this morning, there was this incident of this bus that was attacked by terrorists. The issue is not just territory, it's the fact that the Arabs have never been willing to negotiate peace with Israel for 40 years.

MR. GIBSON: All right, let me turn to Rabbi Schindler. First of all, your reaction to that. You've been rather outspoken in criticism of the handling of the situation. Does that stiffen the backs of the opposition? Does it hurt Israel's position in negotiations?

RABBI SCHINDLER: Yes, and there's always a risk. There's a tendency on the part of people to be self-defensive. Even the very people who agree with you sometimes attack you for being critical. I remember during the Viet Nam war having the same thing happen to me. I was essentially an anti-Viet Nam war activist, but when I came to Europe and the French attacked the Americans, I sounded like the second in command to Nixon, or to Johnson, whoever happened to be there. So there is a natural tendency. Of course I feel that it is our obligation to speak up, principally because the government of Israel is divided, and if we are silent, we support one side. So even our silence is making our views known to Israel, perhaps in the wrong way.

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MR. ABRAM: I want to make very clear that as Chairman of the Conference of Presidents, and when Rabbi Schindler was the President -- held the same office -- we had, and have, no hesitation in saying to the leaders of Israel, whose doors are always open to us and other Jewish leaders in the United States, any criticism we wish. And they receive us respectfully and they listen. The only issue, is whether on matters of defense and security, whether or not Americans have the right to go public and try to divide opinion in areas in which their sons may die, and in areas in which our sons are not involved, in which they have the vote and we do not.

MR. GIBSON: But you have a deeply divided government in Israel anyway. And that's one of the problems. You have a divided governmental structure there -- deep divisions in that country. Do you deepen the divisions if American Jews go public with their criticism?

RABBI SCHINDLER: Well, I don't think so. And that's why I felt free to go more public. Moreover, it must be noted that my colleague Morris Abram has to represent, if I brought a consensus, as Chairman of the Conference of Presidents --

MR. GIBSON: But you have said that the Israeli policy is an offense to the Jewish spirit. And I wonder if Israel, a) needs to be held to a higher standard, and b) really is an embodiment of the spirit to Jews all over the world, and if this doesn't undercut their moral strength?

MR. ABRAM: I think Israel has to be held to a high standard, but Israel holds itself to a high standard.

MR. GIBSON: Is it meeting it now?

RABBI SCHINDLER: I have not the slightest doubt the Israeli nation and people hold the same high standards we do in this country.

MR. GIBSON: Is it meeting that standard now?

RABBI SCHINDLER: Not totally. But America holds itself to a high standard. We had My Lai, we've had all kinds of police brutality. I think, measured by Western civilization, Israel holds itself to an extraordinary standard.

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MR. GIBSON: Rabbi Schindler?

RABBI SCHINDLER: I agree. I mean there certainly are aberrations which are offensive to the Jewish spirit. I was appalled when there was an enunciation of indiscriminate policy. I felt that was not only morally wrong, but practically (inaudible) and counterproductive, because it will only increase the cycle of violence and intensify hatreds. On the other hand, I take pride in the fact that the Attorney General of Israel condemned these very things as illegal. Now that would happen in very few other countries.

MR. ABRAM: Or an investigation. Investigations are going on because of these aberrations. And no other army I know court-martials soldiers who simply react to violence against them by violence. It shouldn't be done, in the sense of brutality, but the government of Israel is a democracy and does react in a lawful, law-abiding way, in which law is the ultimate arbiter.

MR. GIBSON: Let me give Rabbi Schindler the last 15 seconds and ask you if you think there is a danger of Israel losing support of American Jews.

RABBI SCHINDLER: Well, obviously if -- there should be a total recalcitrance, an unwillingness to come to the table, which I do not fear. And I agree with Morris Abram on that, I think when push comes to shove, the majority in Israel will support a move toward peace. But if there should be a total reluctance on the part of Israel to enter these negotiations, then I think there is a danger of the erosion of support, not only among Americans generally, but American Jews too.

MR. ABRAM: May I just say one thing? I think no one has yet asked Hussein whether he is prepared to give up any of the territory that he lost in an aggressive war for peace. I think that's the question that should be asked by the American public, the American press, and the American government, of King Hussein. He has never been willing to give up an inch of the territory that he gained in a war of aggression.

MR. GIBSON: On that note, I'm going to have to leave it. Thank you both for being with us this morning.

MR. ABRAM: Thank you.

END





# SHAMIR: 'International' talks would be stacked against Israel

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**USA TODAY:** Are you comfortable with what U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz is trying to accomplish?

**SHAMIR:** Absolutely. First of all, we are interested in peace. This is the main goal of our foreign policy. There is no more important target of our foreign policy. Peace is our main goal.

**USA TODAY:** Does the USA have a key role to play?

**SHAMIR:** I am convinced that the United States is the only power in the world that could be useful in such an effort to bring peace to the area because of the simple fact that the United States is the only power that has friendly and close relations with Israel and, at the same time, with Arab countries.

**USA TODAY:** But you don't feel that the Soviets should be involved?

**SHAMIR:** It's not the case with the Soviet Union. With us, the Soviet Union doesn't have normal relations and, therefore, we don't have talks. For us, it's clear the United States is the only honest broker between us and the Arab countries. We trust the United States.

**USA TODAY:** We spoke with President Mubarak in Cairo yesterday. He seemed very interested in making sure that, if the process moves along toward an international conference, the Soviet Union be a strong or equal player with the United States.

**SHAMIR:** This is the prob-

lem. You know, it's the same as Jordan's King Hussein. I don't understand why Mubarak, who is getting such assistance from the United States and who is so strongly linked to the United States, why he is so interested in Soviet participation in this process. It is well known that the Soviet Union has a very anti-Israel position.

**USA TODAY:** Why couldn't the United Nations be helpful in these peace efforts?

**SHAMIR:** You know, we don't like very much the involvement of the United Nations in the peacemaking process. They don't have a record for achievement in this regard. In the United Nations, we have always an automatic majority against us — for the most simple subjects. For instance, Israel will bring a proposal to the United Nations that today is Thursday, and we will have an automatic majority against us. It's always the same.

**USA TODAY:** Even though you're opposed to an international conference, you would accept some kind of direct talks among the interested parties by the United States and the Soviet Union?

**SHAMIR:** I told Secretary Shultz I am ready today for an international opening, let us say, with the Soviet Union, the United States in only a formal ceremony. It gives an international image to this process. And immediately after that, we start direct negotiations.

**USA TODAY:** And how does that differ from the international conference?

**SHAMIR:** The Soviets call it a plenipotentiary conference. It means that we yield the power to such a conference to decide about our own future. But I do not accept an international conference because the Soviets would be the great protector of the Arab interests and support their most extreme demands. The United States will be in a very difficult situation. And we will be isolated.

**USA TODAY:** You've been against giving up any occupied land. But now you're saying everything is open for discussion. Does that mean a trade of land for peace is possible?

**SHAMIR:** Everything is negotiable. But I will not say in advance what my position would be at negotiations. No preconditions. For me, it's important to start the process of negotiation. The start itself could be very important for the future. We are talking with each other. If you talk, you don't shoot.

**USA TODAY:** Do you think any of the current uprisings are being staged for TV?

**SHAMIR:** A great part of it. A great part of it. Today, I read that on *Nightline* in the United States, there was a symposium of Ted Koppel with the participation of some experts about the coverage of the riots here by the American TV. In these experts' opinion, Israel will be compelled to close these territories for the coverage by TV because Israel doesn't have any alternative. They say it. The media.





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## MUBARAK: International talks are best path to Mideast peace

3/13  
USA TODAY: Can the USA succeed in its efforts to make peace in the Mideast?

MUBARAK: It's very important to keep trying. There should be progress in the peace process — in the West Bank and Gaza. As I told Secretary of State George Shultz, his effort is the big step. I told him, "Don't neglect it." I told him they could just put down the uprising in the occupied territories by using force, but there will be explosions outside of the area — everywhere.

USA TODAY: You seem to think the USA has a key role to play.

MUBARAK: Everybody is relying on the United States as a main element to push the peace process. That's why I told Shultz, "Please, this uprising will not wait until the elections in the United States or Israel." This is not something you can turn on or off. It's very, very dangerous. This uprising is just an alarm.

USA TODAY: Do you think the suspicions of some Arab countries of the USA can be sufficiently overcome?

MUBARAK: This is the feeling, frankly, of the other Arab countries. For a long time, they have felt the United States was only looking at one side — taking the side of the Israelis. It's made them very suspicious. Even Jordan. I told the secretary of state, "Be careful. Try to remove all the suspicions. Keep the image of the United States as it should be: a fair judge."

USA TODAY: How strong a role should the USA play in an international conference?

MUBARAK: Frankly speaking, the United States is a friend of Israel. The Arabs also. So the United States should convince Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and his group that they should go ahead with the international conference, that they shouldn't fear the international conference.

USA TODAY: Do you think Shultz can convince Shamir and Israel of that?

MUBARAK: Look, the international conference has been accepted by countries all over the world now: Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc. Everybody except Shamir. But believe me, if we could reach a comprehensive settlement in the international conference, this would be in the interest of not only the Europeans and the Americans but also for the Israelis. They will live in peace. Peace is very precious. There has to be some kind of sacrifice to achieve peace.

USA TODAY: Isn't domestic politics in Israel a major factor because of the upcoming elections?

MUBARAK: You have the Jewish community with their leaders who could persuade the Israelis. This comprehensive settlement will not hurt Israel. I would like to know one thing: Why do they fear the international conference? Why do they fear to negotiate the final stages? Everything is nego-

table. All cards should be on the table. The international conference will lead to the negotiations. This is what Shamir wants.

USA TODAY: What role do you see for the Soviets in the peace process?

MUBARAK: I think they are very important. They have their own interests also in this area. The United States has an important role with the Israelis, but without the Soviet Union, I don't think the peace process will prosper. They are not going to make it easy because they want to be participants. The Soviets have Syria in the process, so we have to please them.

USA TODAY: You recently talked with King Hussein of Jordan. You have good relations with other Arab leaders. Is it possible for you and Prime Minister Shamir to talk directly with one another on this?

MUBARAK: I am ready to receive any message from Shamir or any envoy. I have written several messages to him. I sent our deputy prime minister of foreign affairs several times, asking him for an international conference and telling him, "You are not going to lose anything. All of us will have peace prevailing. Peace is very important for people of both sides: your people and our people." The usual answer: "No" to the international conference. I can't understand it. Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is more flexible than Shamir.







# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 3, 1988

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The Honorable George Shultz  
Secretary of State  
21st and C Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz:

We are writing to express our support for your effort to break the dangerous Middle East stalemate, a stalemate that has led to the current cycle of violence and counter-violence.

We support your mission of peace, which is based on United Nations Security Resolution 242 (as restated in Resolution 338), a resolution which has been at the foundation of United States diplomacy in the region through five Administrations and which has been endorsed by Israel and most of the Arab parties to the conflict.

The meaning of this resolution is clear. It requires the Arab states to accept Israel's right to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force...." It requires Israel to withdraw from some of the territories occupied during the 1967 war. It can be summarized in three words: land for peace.

Unfortunately, with the exception of Egypt, no Arab state has demonstrated willingness to implement this formulation. To one degree or another, the Arab states have resisted recognition of Israel and peace with it. As for the Palestinians, they not only refuse to recognize Israel, they have refused to meet with you during your visit. For some 50 years, those who have indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel have paid with their lives. Others have been intimidated.

Israel, for its part, has manifested its commitment to Resolution 242 and the "land for peace" formula in a tangible way. In return for Egypt's recognition of Israel and its acceptance of peace, Israel returned the Sinai peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty including the oil fields located therein.

Successive Israeli leaders have declared their dedication to the Camp David Accords including Resolution 242's "land for peace" formula and have indicated that it would apply to the West Bank and Gaza. According to this formulation, Israel would contemplate the relinquishing of territory in exchange for a peace treaty guaranteeing Jordanian and Palestinian recognition and acceptance of Israel.

That has always been our understanding.

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Accordingly, we were dismayed to read in the New York Times of February 26 that Prime Minister Shamir had said that "...this expression of territory for peace is not accepted by me."

We hope that the Prime Minister's statement did not indicate that Israel is abandoning a policy that offers the best hope of long-term peace. Israel cannot be expected to give up all the territory gained in 1967 or to return to the dangerous and insecure pre-'67 borders. Resolution 242 does not require it to do so. On the other hand, peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli government's position rules out territorial compromise.


We are also disturbed by reports that Jordan may be backing away from the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with the Israelis at a peace conference. These accounts indicate that Jordan may insist on an independent PLO presence at the negotiating table.


We hope that these reports are without foundation. Israel rejects negotiations with the PLO, and rightly so. However, its officials have indicated that it would negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Jordan's abandonment of the joint delegation concept now would deal a serious blow to the peace process.

We believe that it is only through compromise by both sides that we will achieve Middle East peace.

We applaud your effort to get the peace process moving and share your determination to build a Middle East where every nation and people can live in peace, security and, ultimately, even friendship.

Sincerely,


  
Rudy Boschwitz

  
Lowell Weicker Jr.

  
George J. Mitchell

  
Carl Levin

  
Alan Cranston

  
Howard M. Metzenbaum



*Brock Adams*

Brock Adams

*Tom Daschle*

Tom Daschle

*Bennett Johnston*

Bennett Johnston

*Don Riegle Jr.*

Don Riegle Jr.

*Daniel Inoué*

Daniel Inoué

*Tom Harkin*

Tom Harkin

*Edward Kennedy*

Edward Kennedy

*Warren B. Rudman*

Warren B. Rudman

*Robert Kasten Jr.*

Robert Kasten Jr.

*J. James Exon*

*Patrick Leahy*

Patrick Leahy

*John F. Kerry*

John F. Kerry

*MITCH McConnell*

MITCH McConnell

*William Cohen*

William Cohen

*Alan Simpson*

Alan Simpson

*Christopher Dodd*

Christopher Dodd

*Dennis DeConcini*

Dennis DeConcini

*Frank R. Lautenberg*

Frank R. Lautenberg

*Kent Conrad*

Kent Conrad

*John Glenn*

John Glenn

*Timothy E. Wirth*

Timothy E. Wirth

*Wendell Ford*

Wendell Ford

*Daniel P. Moynihan*

Daniel P. Moynihan

*Bob Graham*

Bob Graham





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Q Yeah, from the 30 Senators.

MR. REDMAN: Oh, he'll certainly be responding to that.

Q But he hasn't yet?

MR. REDMAN: I don't believe so.

Q Well, do you have any comment on Prime Minister Shamir's statement that he wouldn't be ready to have an answer by the time of his visit to the United States?

MR. REDMAN: In keeping with our policy that we applied during our time in the region, I'm not going to be in a position of answering or getting into exchanges with any of the parties to this process. So that I would just stick in general terms to the kind of things that the Secretary said, to the effect that this is an ambitious proposal. That as you know, we have asked for early responses from all of the parties and that we believe that all of the parties understand and appreciate the reason that we have asked for those kind of responses.

Q Back to the mysterious (?) visit, you said in your statement that these talks will cover the developments in North Africa. Does this include any concerns with the new kind of relations between Tunisia, Algeria and Libya?

MR. REDMAN: I'd prefer to leave it in general terms at this point. That visit is still some weeks off. I think there are a wide range of issues involving North Africa could possibly be on the agenda, but I'm not in a position to be any more specific.

Q (Off-mike) of the visit, are you having any concerns with regard to a new Libyan approach to other North African countries?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything by way of specific concerns. And I haven't seen anything, in fact, in recent weeks even. You know what our continuing position has been regarding Libya and its activities in the world, and the fact that it would seem to us that it continues to be desirable to stay at somewhat an arm's distance from that kind of a regime, to keep it isolated.

Q Chuck, do you have anything on Ambassador Gillespie shuttling between Damascus and Beirut?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not so sure it's a shuttle, as you would put it.

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Q That's what the report said.

MR. REDMAN: She was, of course, in Damascus when the Secretary was there. She stayed on following the Secretary's departure. She also met with a number of Lebanese leaders in Beirut yesterday, March 6th. Those people included President Gemayel, Prime Minister al-Huss and Parliament Speaker Hussein (?) Hussein (?). Those meetings focused on the current political situation in Lebanon and on reconciliation efforts. She arrived in Beirut yesterday, and she departed the same day.

MR. REDMAN: I'm not sure where she went after that.

Q And what -- did you discuss the election, the coming election (inaudible)?

MR. REDMAN: I'll leave it with the description that I've just offered.

Q Were you able to say whether the Lebanese government will be invited in some formal way, with some letter, as four other countries have been, to participate in some part, at least, with the Middle East negotiations?

MR. REDMAN: Exactly how that will be done, I'm not in a position to say.

But Lebanon is one of the neighbors of Israel, and would be invited in its particular way to be involved in the process. Yes?

Q But you can't -- would the -- you can't specifically say whether she has actually brought such a letter to the President of Lebanon?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not aware that that was her mission. I have described her mission. I don't rule that out, but I wouldn't steer you in that direction.

Q While we're at it, I just wondered, are there other countries that are welcome? I mean, Iraq, for instance. Saudi Arabia.

MR. REDMAN: This process involves Israel and its immediate neighbors.





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Q I know, but you invited Egypt, which already has a peace treaty with Israel. It became clear that you are inviting, you know, a number of countries in the area even if they don't have a current dispute to resolve.

MR. REDMAN: The Secretary described the Egyptian role as different and special in its own way. But these other countries that you refer to beyond the immediate neighbors of Israel with whom there is something to negotiate, these other countries are interested in many cases, and as you know, we have dispatched Ambassador Cluverius to Saudi Arabia to brief them fully, and through our embassies, other people in the region will likewise be receiving information in briefings.

Q What is the latest assessment of the United States on Iran's intentions regarding ending the war or not ending the war, and the communication which surfaced at the United Nations late last week?

MR. REDMAN: This is the so-called "Iranian non-paper". (laughter) Now, I know those of you who follow diplomatic affairs know what a "non-paper" is. I'm not sure the viewing audience understands that. (laughs) A non-paper is in fact a paper on which words are written, but which has no attribution and in fact, in official or diplomatic terms, doesn't exist.

Q Like a background? (laughter)

MR. REDMAN: I don't want to go into too detailed a parallel. But this so-called "Iranian non-paper" contained an ambiguous statement implying that an earlier letter from Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati to the UN Secretary General constituted, quote, unquote, "acceptance of Resolution 598." In fact, the non-paper is neither official nor definitive. The Foreign Minister's letter to which it makes reference appears only to reiterate Iran's willingness to accept the Secretary General's plan to implement Resolution 598 in accordance with Iran's own interpretation; that is, a de facto cease fire only, and the findings of a commission of inquiry on responsibility for the war before implementation of other provisions, which would include withdrawal of forces.

We also note that several Iranian spokesmen have issued statements over the past few days disavowing the non-paper released in New York. In those statements, the Iranian government has reiterated its demand that as a condition for any settlement, Iraq must be condemned as the aggressor, and the Iraqi regime must be punished. As we said before, we would welcome an explicit, official declaration by the Iranian government that it accepts Resolution 598 without conditions. Until now, that has not been forthcoming, however, and until it is, we believe it essential to pursue efforts to implement Resolution 598 through early adoption of an embargo resolution.

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So, in short form, concerning this so-called Iranian "non-paper," we don't see anything new, and we very much doubt that anyone else does, either.

Q And you are not going to relax your pushing for an embargo? This doesn't -- because there have been many ambiguities from Tehran that sort of slowed things down. Will you let this -- does this require some further head scratching, or will go straight ahead?

MR. REDMAN: I think I've answered in relatively succinct terms that we don't see anything new, and we don't think anyone else does, either. A draft resolution is still under discussion in the Security Council. We are continuing active consultations with other Council members to achieve consensus on this resolution, which we're convinced would help bring the Gulf War to an end. We believe that all permanent members and -- I'm sorry, that all Council members, and particularly the permanent members, have a responsibility to act promptly to implement 598 through appropriate enforcement measures. Our objective, as I just said, remains to reach agreement on a resolution at the earliest possible date.

Q Can you say yet if China or/and the Soviet Union are aboard? Or is at least China neutral, or what?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on that particular kind of question, other than to say that there are active consultations on-going.

Q Do you have any comment on the bus hijacking today in Israel?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any details, beyond those which have already appeared in the media. We condemn this act, and note with sadness that, at a time when the majority of people in the region are looking for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorists emerge to attack the innocent.

Q -- who's responsible? Does the State Department have anything further on that?

MR. REDMAN: No.





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Q Chuck, terrorism seems to be on the rise since the Secretary of State went to the Middle East. Do you suppose on thing has anything to do with the other?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know of any reason to draw a connection.

Q Could it be that in some way, his visit has increased the possibility that people who want certain things think they have a better chance to get them now from the United States?

MR. REDMAN: I can't --

Q Do you think it's possible that the Secretary has whetted the appetite of Israel's enemies?

MR. REDMAN: I really don't see how I can address that kind of a question in terms of motivations of the kind of people that do these things. I have spoken to the issue that occurred today. There has never been any secret that peace has its enemies. Whether or not these kind of incidents are the works of those kind of people, I really can't say at this point.

Q On the West Bank, the press has been barred from covering that story. Do you have any comment on the Israeli government position?

MR. REDMAN: The issue was raised Friday at the briefing, and so there is that material on the record. Our information is that most of the restrictions imposed on access last Friday were only in effect one day; that these restrictions do not appear to be based on any change in Israel's policy toward freedom of the press; and we hope that these restrictions will be eliminated entirely.

Q Has the United States said anything to Israel about the restrictions?

MR. REDMAN: We've expressed our concern to the government of Israel about those restrictions that were in effect last Friday. We continue to watch the situation closely.

Q Chuck, going back to terrorism, do you have any confirmation on the reports from Eastern Europe that Eastern European countries are closing down Abu Nidal offices and and expending(?) their contacts with this organization?



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MR. REDMAN: No, I don't have anything. I could only refer you to the various reports that we have routinely put out on the question of terrorism, and those kinds of issues may be addressed in there. But I don't have anything new. Yes? The gentleman in the back?

Q On Friday, the Fatah wing of the PLO came out and said that they were responsible for this car bomb that was planted and aimed at the Secretary in Jerusalem. Today, this group called something-17 came out and said it was responsible for the attack in the Negev Desert, and both are connected to the PLO. Does the State Department have any comment on this -- PLO's current terrorist attacks at a time of the peace talks?

MR. REDMAN: I've commented, in fact, on the incident in the desert already.

And so I'm on the record on that already. Concerning responsibility for the bomb in Jerusalem, I really don't have any way to confirm or deny the particular claims.

Q Chuck, during all this mission of Shultz, you haven't convinced the Israelis to stop killing the Palestinians? Now there's more than (700?). I mean, where's your influence in Israel?

MR. REDMAN: We've spoken to that question many times before.

Q You haven't spoke (sic) about stopping the killings of (word inaudible) Palestinians.

MR. REDMAN: We've spoken to the question many times before and I really have nothing new. DDDDD

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ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, March 7, 1988

Dear Senator Levin,

I would like to refer to your letter of March 3, 1988 to Secretary of State Shultz, which was co-signed by some of your colleagues in the US Senate and was published in the media.

Your letter came as a surprise, at a crucial moment in the peace efforts that were being conducted by Secretary Shultz. We have been doing our utmost to ensure the success of these efforts, because we have sought peace relentlessly, but our Arab neighbours, except Egypt, still have to prove in deeds that they are willing to negotiate peace with us.

Although you correctly blame the Arab side for refusing until now to recognize Israel and make peace with it, we were astonished by the words of criticism you levelled at us on the formula of "territory for peace".

As you yourself state, Resolution 242 provided the basis for a peace settlement. Israel has accepted this resolution and implemented it in the Camp David Accords. These Accords, to which Egypt and the US are committed, produced an agreed formula for settling the territorial issue, and Israel made a considerable sacrifice to achieve agreement on this very sensitive issue.

In accordance with this formula, Israel was required to withdraw from the entire Sinai peninsula to the international border between it and Egypt.

Senator Carl Levin  
The Senate  
Capitol Hill  
Washington, D.C.



On the Eastern sector, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin devised an agreed formula that would grant the Palestinian Arabs self-rule, following which the sides would negotiate the final status of the territories in question in a vastly - improved setting of coexistence and cooperation between Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.

In other words, the government of Israel is committed to negotiate the ultimate disposition of Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza in the context of the implementation of the Camp David Accords.

I must add that, whereas, the Sinai was uncontested Egyptian territory and therefore it was returned to Egyptian sovereignty, Judea, Samaria and Gaza were occupied militarily and illegally by Jordan and Egypt and their status must, therefore, be determined in the peace negotiations.

I, therefore, fail to understand the reasons for your criticism which hurts even more because it comes from friends who have Israel's security and welfare at heart.

Are we now expected to wipe away the Camp David Accords, for which we paid such a high price?

If we are going to lose faith in solemn American and Egyptian commitments under these Accords, how can we be assured of future commitments that will require us to take even further risks to our security and future?

In a few days I shall be in Washington to continue our deliberations with an Administration that has strikingly demonstrated its friendship with, and support of, Israel. I am also looking forward to meeting our numerous friends on Capitol Hill.

Let me assure you: nobody yearns for peace more than the people of Israel whom I have the privilege to represent.

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It is the free and democratic people and government of Israel that will have to decide the issues of peace and security. It is their future and wellbeing that is at stake and I shall endeavour to ensure them to the best of my capacity.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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סיוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 7.3.88

מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: לשכת השר, מצפ"א מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאח: עיתונות

מכתב הטנטורים למזכיר המדינה

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" וה"ניו-יורק טיימס" (7.3.88).

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## 30 Senators Write to Shultz To Criticize Shamir Remarks

A group of 30 senators, including some of Israel's strongest supporters, last week wrote Secretary of State George P. Shultz criticizing statements by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that the senators said could block Middle East peace efforts.

The March 3 letter to Shultz, who returned from the Middle East Saturday after a trip to promote a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, cited a statement by Shamir expressing his opposition to having Israel give up some of the occupied territories in return for a peace treaty.

[Meanwhile, in Plains, Ga., former president Jimmy Carter, who helped formulate a peace accord between Israel and Egypt, yesterday called "horrible" and "excessive" the armed Israeli response to the rock-throwing and other incidents in the three-month-old uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[Carter told reporters the reaction "has brought discredit on Is-

rael, and it has concerned some of the strongest supporters in this nation of Israel, including me.]"

The senators wrote Shultz, in the letter first reported by The New York Times, "We hope that the prime minister's statement did not indicate that Israel is abandoning a policy that offers the best hope of long-term peace."

Although Israel "cannot be expected to give up all the territory gained in 1967 or to return to the dangerous and insecure pre-'67 borders," they said, "peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli government's position rules out territorial compromise."

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, head of Israel's Labor Party, has expressed a strong interest in Shultz's approach, which ultimately contemplates an agreement by Israel to cede territory in return for a peace treaty.

However, Shamir and his Likud Party have signaled opposition to the Shultz plan.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES

## 2 in U.S. Senate Dispute Criticism of Shamir

By NEIL A. LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 6 — Two United States Senators expressed disagreement today with a letter signed by 30 of their colleagues criticizing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, suggesting he was obstructing peace efforts.

Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican who is widely viewed as among the strongest supporters of Israel in Congress, said: "I was asked to sign it and I declined. It's a very bad idea for us in Washington to be giving any such advice to people in Israel thousands of miles away." He said if

any senators disagreed with Mr. Shamir's publicly stated resistance to ceding occupied territories for peace, they should tell the Israelis privately.

Senator Chic Hecht, a Nevada Republican who was not asked to sign the letter, said the comments expressed in it were ill-advised. "The people of Israel elected their own leadership," Mr. Hecht said. "Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East and we should not interfere."

Two leaders of American Jewish organizations who were asked to comment differed in their reactions. Abraham H. Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League of League

of B'nai B'rith, said the letter could undercut attempts to achieve a Mideast peace settlement. "I think it's well-intentioned," he said, "but premature and counterproductive."

But Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee said the senators acted appropriately because the issue is being debated in Israel and the United States. "I accept this as a legitimate process that is going on," Mr. Bookbinder said.

Mr. Foxman suggested that the American criticism might deepen rivalries between Mr. Shamir's Likud bloc and the Labor Party.

The two-page letter sent to Secretary

MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1988

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of State George P. Shultz this weekend supported his efforts to forge a new settlement between Israel and Palestinians. The letter was signed by several of Israel's staunchest supporters in the Senate, including Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat; Rudy Boschwitz, a Minnesota Republican; Alan Cranston, a California Democrat, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a New York Democrat.

The letter's principal point was to object to the stance taken by Mr. Shamir and his Likud party in opposition to trading territory for peace.

The letter reads in part:

"Successive Israeli leaders have declared their dedication to the Camp David Accords including Resolution 242's 'land for peace' formula and have indicated that it would apply to the West Bank and Gaza. According to this formulation, Israel would contemplate

the relinquishing of territory in exchange for a peace treaty guaranteeing Jordanian and Palestinian recognition and acceptance of Israel.

"That has always been our understanding.

"Accordingly, we were dismayed to read in The New York Times of Feb. 26 that Prime Minister Shamir had said that 'this expression of territory for peace is not accepted by me.'"

"We hope that the Prime Minister's statement did not indicate that Israel is abandoning a policy that offers the best hope of long-term peace. Israel cannot be expected to give up all the territory gained in 1967 or to return to the dangerous and insecure pre-67 borders. Resolution 242 does not require it to do so. On the other hand, peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli Government's position rules out

territorial compromise.

"We are also disturbed by reports that Jordan may be backing away from the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with the Israelis at a peace conference. These accounts indicate that Jordan may insist on an independent P.L.O. presence at the negotiating table.

"We hope that these reports are without foundation. Israel rejects negotiations with the P.L.O., and rightly so. However, its officials have indicated that it would negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Jordan's abandonment of the joint delegation concept now would deal a serious blow to the peace process.

"We believe that it is only through a compromise by both sides that we will achieve Middle East peace."



שגרירות ישראל / נושיונגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מחוד 3 דפיםסוג בטחוני רגילדחיפות מיידתאריך/ז"ח 7.3.88מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

להלן מתוך ה"נושיונגטון פוסט" (8.3.88).

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THE WASHINGTON

# U.S., Syria Coordinate Efforts to

ON POST

... R1 TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1988 A27

## Mediate Lebanese Peace Talks

By Patrick E. Tyler  
Washington Post Foreign Service

DAMASCUS, Syria—An important by-product of the U.S. peace mission to the Middle East appears to be increased cooperation between Syria and the United States in Lebanon, according to western officials here.

A senior western official said Secretary of State George P. Shultz, in discussions with President Hafez Assad and other Syrian officials here last week, conveyed new proposals on power sharing between Lebanon's long-divided political factions put forth by Lebanese President Amin Gemayel.

In another cooperative step, Assad said Syrian armed forces deployed in Lebanon would do what they could to obtain the release of U.S. Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins, who was abducted Feb. 17 by gunmen near Tyre, Lebanon, where he was assigned

to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

Western officials said they were not optimistic that Syrian troops could go any further toward recovering Higgins than had the Shiite Moslem Amal militia, which has intensively searched villages in southern Lebanon and has arrested several suspects believed to have been involved in the kidnaping.

One western official noted that Syrian forces are not deployed as far south as Tyre and can be of limited assistance except to support Amal's effort.

On Lebanon's political future, Shultz and Assad were said by western sources to have agreed to work toward mediating political reforms in Lebanon. Syrian officials will advance the positions of Lebanon's Moslem and Druze leaders, and American officials will convey the position of the Christian minority.

[A State Department specialist on Syrian and Lebanese affairs, April Glaspie, met Lebanese President Amin Gemayel Monday

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after holding talks in west Beirut Sunday with senior Moslem government officials, Reuter reported.

[Political sources said her visit, under escort by Syrian and Lebanese troops, was a prelude to the expected arrival in Damascus next week of Undersecretary of State Richard Murphy. Glaspie reportedly met acting prime minister Selim Hoss and Speaker of Parliament Hussein Husseini to discuss Christian-Moslem reconciliation.]

The Christians have dominated Lebanon's power structure since the country gained independence in 1943, when they formed a plurality of the population. In 1976, unresolved religious and sectarian pressures erupted into a devastating civil war.

U.S.-Syrian cooperation in Lebanon, where elections for a Maronite Christian president are set for later this year, would be a significant step forward for Americans and Syrian officials after a long period of cool bilateral relations.

Five years ago, Shultz shunned Assad during negotiations over a U.S.-brokered peace accord between Lebanon and Israel. Syria objected to the pact and supported a Lebanese Moslem militia uprising in early 1984 that led to Lebanon's abrogation of the accord.

The U.S. role in brokering the accord and Syria's role in its collapse caused deep resentment on both sides, with Shultz accusing Assad of bad faith and Syria accusing the United States of going too far in pursuing Israel's interests.

At the low point of U.S.-Syrian relations during that period, the two were virtually on a war footing in Lebanon, with U.S. warships off Lebanon pounding Syrian positions in the mountains above Beirut and U.S. warplanes attacking Syrian missile emplacements. Syria shot down two American F14 fighters, which led to the death of one U.S. Navy flyer and the capture of another.

In 1986, Assad attempted to broker his own power-sharing agreement between the Christian, Druze and Moslem factions, but Gemayel rejected it as an infringement by Syria on Lebanese sovereignty.

As the new Lebanese peace proposal appeared to gain momentum, Prime Minister Hoss, a Sunni, and Parliament Speaker Husseini, a Shiite, arrived here last week for talks on political reforms with Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

They were joined in Damascus by Nabih Berri, Lebanon's justice minister and leader of the Amal Movement, and Druze militia leader Walid Jumblatt, who is minister of public works and tourism. They were scheduled to review Gemayel's proposals and work with Syrian officials to prepare a response.

Among the key issues facing the parties are the powers of Lebanon's presidency, Cabinet, parliament and military forces in a representative government that acknowledges Lebanon's shift to a Moslem majority.



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דחיסות מידי

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מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנהל מצפ"א

בחירות 88

בבחירות המוקדמות בדרום קרוליינה זכה סגן הנשיא בוש בנצחון מוחץ, בניגוד להרבה תחזיות מוקדמות, והגיע ל-48 אחוז מן הקולות.

הסנטור דול קיבל רק 21 אחוז, רוברטסון 19 אחוז, הרבה פחות מכפי שציפה, וג'ק קמפ כ-12 אחוז.

התוצאות מחזות חישג עצום לבוש לקראת הבחירות המוקדמות בכל מדינות הדרום ביום ג'. מצפים כי ג'ק קמפ יסתלק מן המרוץ בימים הקרובים ויכול להיות שגם רוברטסון יפרוש אם לא ישיג חישג משמעותי בכמה מדינות בדרום.

אצל הדמוקרטים לא היו בחירות מוקדמות בדרום קרוליינה.

בחירות מוקדמות נערכו גם בקנזס ובווימינג. בשני המקומות זכה דול. בקנזס מדינת מוצאן ובווימינג מדינה קטנה שבה זכה בהפרש קטן לעומת בוש. בווימינג ניצח הסנטור אלברט גור אצל הדמוקרטים בהפרש קטן לעומת המושל דוקקיס.

אין שינוי בתחזיות המוקדמות לגבי מה שיקרה ביום ג', המאבק אצל הרפובליקנים הוא בין בוש לדול כשלבוש סיכוי ניכר, ואילו אצל הדמוקרטים נראה כי ג'קסון ודוקקיס יתבססו בצמרת בהפוש קטנים ביניהם. גור וגפהארדט מנהלים מאבק קשה על עצם הישרדותם בהמשך המרוץ.

דני בלור כ/א.ת.

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כד' באדר תשמ"ח  
6 במרץ 1988

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אל : השגריר, וושינגטון  
ציר הסברה/וושינגטון  
ס/קונכ"ל, ניו-יורק  
קונכ"לים

מאת : ס / מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון : ועידת מועדון הנשיאים, ירושלים, 28.2-2.3.88

סיכום זה ישתדל להביא בפניכם הלכי-רוח ואוירה כללית ששררו בכנס במשך הימים שהתקיים. בנספח תוכלו למצוא תקצירים מחלק ממספר דיונים. הועידה עמדה בצל ארועי השטחים וביקור המזכיר שולץ. נכחו כ-60 משתתפים כאשר הדמויות הבולטות היו אישים כהווארד סקוואדרון, קן ביאלקין, ג'ק שטיין, שרלוט ג'יקובסון, רות פופקין, ג'ורג' גרואן וסימור רייך. (האחרון הנו המועמד הבולט להחליף את מוריס אברם ביולי כיו"ר המועדון).

הועידה נפתחה בק"פ בה נכחו בין השאר מ"מ רה"מ ושה"ח פרס, השרים שרון וברלב, יו"ר הסוכנות דיניץ וטדי קולק. המזכיר שולץ ורעייתו כבדו את הנאספים בנוכחותם באירוע, כאשר המזכיר נואם במשך כרבע שעה על יהדות בריה"מ ועל רשמים אישיים/הכרויות עם אישים ישראלים ויהודים.

נכר היה שרובם מודאגים בעליל מן המתרחש בשטחים וביחוד מהשתקפות הארועים בתקשורת. משאלות שנשאלו ושיחות במהלך הועידה הצטיירה תמונה של מנהיגות מודאגת ומוטרדת אשר שמה לה למטרה להפגין אחדות שורות וליכוד עקב כובד האחריות של התכנסותם כאן דוקא בימים אלה. קרוב לודאי שגם היצוג הנכר של גורמים המייצגים את היהדות האורתודוקסית והעדרות של ראשי הקונגרס היהודי-אמריקני והתנועה הרפורמית היתה אחת מהסיבות למצב זה; לדברי אחדים מהמשתתפים, לא יכולה היתה המנהיגות הנבחרת של יהדות ארה"ב להרשות לעצמה שיקרה את אשר קרה בכנס נקראק האחרון בלוס-אנג'לס ועוד כאשר המזכיר שולץ וכל אמצעי התקשורת העולמית שוהים באותו מלון.





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באשר ליוזמת שולץ, הודגש יותר מפעם אחת שהם עומדים ותומכים ביוזמתו ובטוחים שהמזכיר לא יתפשר על אנטרסים בטחוניים חשובים לישראל. מוריס אברם עצמו הדגיש שועידת הנשיאים ביוזמתה תומכת ונותנת גיבוי למזכיר ואין הדבר נובע מלחץ או בקשה כלשהי שבאה ממחמ"ד או הבית הלבן.

בשיחות פרטיות ושלא לפרוטוקול, נכרת היתה תקוותם שאין ישראל מועדת לעימות פוליטי ישיר עם ממשל רייגן כאשר אגפיה בקונגרס והקהילה היהודית אינם בטוחים כבעבר. הבולטים במנהיגים העריכו שיהדות ארה"ב אכן תתייצב לימין ישראל במדה ויהיה נסיון להתפשר עם אנטרס בטחוני חיוני אך, ביחד עם זאת, אם יגיע המצב לידי "וכחנות ועקשנות" ישראלית על לוח זמנים ופרוצדורה יהא זה קשה בקריעת ים סוף לאחד את השורות לא רק להודעות תומכות אלא קל וחומר לפעילות (משמע טלפונים, מכתבים וכו')

קיים חשש רב בקרבם מהחודשים הבאים במדה ואכן לא תחול התקדמות בתהליך השלום. החשש לא נובע מהמשך התמונות הקשות בטלביזיה, תהליך שלדברי רבים מהם התייצב ונמצא בקו ירידה. החשש הוא יותר לבקורת גוברת והולכת בקונגרס ולפרוד גם בשורות הארגונים עצמם בין אלה שאמנם לא יבקרו את ממשל ישראל אך בודאי לא יתמכו לבין אלה שכן יביעו תמיכה. הרושם של קהילה יהודית מפולגת הוא חששם הגדול ביותר. באשר לויכוח הפוליטי הפנימי בארץ, הקפידה הועידה כגוף לא להביע עמדה לכאן או לכאן. רובם התיישרו על הקו שאותו קבע מוריס אברם במסיבת העתונאים שפתחה את הכנס וגם בהודעת הסיכום של הועידה:

- א. תמיכה בבטחון ישראל והכרה בשאיפתה לשלום.
- ב. על מדינות ערב והפלשתינאים להוכיח שהן מוכנות להכיר בישראל ולנהל עמה שיחות ישירות.
- ג. אכזבה ובקורת על אי נכונות מנהיגות פלשתינאית להדבר עם המזכיר שולץ.
- ד. המצב הנוכחי לא יכול להמשך והמשך הסטטוס-קוו לא יכול לבוא בחשבון כאפשרות ראלית. יהדות ארה"ב תומכת לכן ביוזמת המזכיר שולץ ומביעה בטחונה שידיד זה לישראל לא יתפשר על אנטרסים בטחוניים חיוניים לה.

יש לציין שקריאתו המפורשת של רה"מ למנהיגות היהודית (בא"ע המסכמת) שיהא זה בלתי מתקבל על הדעת שיהדות ארה"ב תרשה שישתמשו בה כקלף לחץ נגד ישראל נרשמה בתשומת לב ע"י המשתתפים. בעוד שהיתה הסכמה כללית שמצב כזה אכן לא צריך לקרות, לא מעטים הביעו חשש שהמנהיגות היהודית תעמוד בפני פרשת דרכים אם וכאשר נגיע למצב שבו ממשלת ישראל תעמוד בוויכוח עם הממשל הנוכחי באשר ללוח הזמנים ונוהל בתהליך השלום. החשש הנו שעצם שתיקתם במצב שכזה יכול להתפרש כנטילת עמדה פאסיבית ובהכרח אי התייצבות אוטומטית לצד ישראל.




- 3 -

נתן לסכם פרק זה ולאמר שעל פני השטח באה לישראל מנהיגות יהודית שהחליטה מראש להפגין אחדות והזדהות עם ישראל בשעותיה הקשות ומבחינתם הם אכן פעלו לפי קו זה. אך ביחד עם זאת, OFF THE RECORD, לא הסוו להביע את חששם מהמילכוד העלול להסגר סביבם בתקופה הקרובה: לאחר התמיכה הפומבית שנתנו ליוזמת שולץ, עוד עלולים לבוא ולבקש מהם שיפרעו את השטר במדה ויתעוררו ויכוחים או חילוקי דיעות בין הממשל לישראל. או אז עשוי להגיע רגע אמת וחילוקי הדעות שבישראל בודאי ישתקפו גם בקרבם ופרוד זה בודאי שלא יתרום, לא להם וגם לא לישראל.

עד כאן רשמים של הח"מ באשר להלכי רוח ודיעות שנקלטו במשך ארבעה ימים עמוסים.

הדיונים שנתקיימו בכנס עמדו על רמה גבוהה וזכו להתענינות ערה ופעילה של מרבית המשתתפים. את חלקם תמצאו בנספח המצורף למכתב זה והוא בפרוש מומלץ לעיונכם; מרבית הכתוב יוכל לשמש אתכם נאמנה בשיחות רקע או הופעות הסברה.

ב ב ר כ ה,  
  
משה בר

העתק: לשכת מ"מ רה"מ ושה"ח  
מנכ"ל מדיני  
סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן  
ראש מ"מ  
סמנכ"ל אמית"ק  
יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות  
מנהל הסברה





# Shultz Details Formula for Mideast Peace

## *Plan Would Unfold In Interlocking Steps*

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz has set forth a detailed plan for solving the Palestinian problem that stands as the first serious U.S. attempt to spur the moribund Middle East peace process into motion again since the 1978 Camp David Accords.

After 21,000 miles of travel, five rounds of talks with Israeli leaders and two sessions each with the presidents of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Shultz has come up with a formula for opening the first door to what he hopes will be a comprehensive Middle East settlement.

The first steps would bring limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the plan seeks to integrate and interlock the various stages of negotiations over the ultimate fate of the occupied territories by setting fixed dates beforehand for each step along the way—an "integrated package" as Shultz calls it that must be taken as a whole.

However, there is no similar scheme and "timeline" for negotiating a new status for the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel. Nor does the plan address specifically, as far as is known, what is perhaps the most difficult problem, the fate of Arab East Jerusalem. Israel has annexed it, united it with West Jerusalem and sworn to keep it forever as its capital.

But the Shultz plan opens the door for negotiations on a possible comprehensive settlement of all

these issues by fixing a date for final-status talks on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and convening an international conference to oversee the whole process.

The plan marks a striking reversal of Shultz's reluctance to become personally engaged again in the quest for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict since his failure to negotiate a peace accord between Israel and Lebanon in 1983.

Whether his new peace plan will work or break apart on the rocks of impassioned Israeli and Arab politics remains to be seen.

Success would mean uniting a divided Israeli government behind giving up Arab lands, some of which Israel formally, and informally, annexed years ago.

It would also require the Palestine Liberation Organization, now riding high on the crest of three months of sustained Palestinian protests in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, to forgo its ambitions for a separate delegation at the peace table and let Jordan take the lead.

Syria, too, would finally have to come face-to-face with its sworn enemy, and Israel would have to reverse its formal annexation in December 1981 of the Syrian Golan Heights, which it seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The odds seems long on all three accounts.

But Shultz said he believes that three months of upheaval in the occupied territories have changed attitudes and cracked opened doors to the peace process.

Not all details of his "integrated peace package" have been divulged. But based on what Shultz and his aides told reporters traveling on his whirlwind odyssey of Middle Eastern capitals over the past 10 days, the peace process would, in theory at least, proceed as follows:

Some time in early April, an international conference would be held with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, the Soviet

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P 1... cont...



Union, China, France and Britain—and all the interested parties attending. The conference would be "nonauthoritative," meaning it could not impose its own solutions or veto any bilateral agreements reached.

The conference would meet mainly to approve the start of a first set of negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians on limited Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. Shultz would like to see these talks begin May 1 and completed within six months. Palestinians ideally approved by the PLO but also acceptable to Israel would join with Jordan to form a single delegation.

Any "interim arrangements" on Palestinian self-rule would last three years, but they would not go into effect until negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began in December.

These latter talks would be completed in one year, according to the U.S. scheme, so that the final disposition of the territories would be known during the last two years of Palestinian autonomy.

Shultz said "the guiding principles" for these negotiations would be those spelled out in U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which call on Israel to withdraw from "territories occupied in the recent [1967] conflict" and for Arab recognition of all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized borders.

He admitted that there are differing Israeli interpretations of Resolution 242 regarding which "territories" are involved and said, "We have put forward an interesting way of handling it." But he refused to say what this was.

Shultz said his proposed "time-line" for the start and finish of these various negotiations is "very ambitious." But he argues that nothing will fix attentions and force decisions like clearly set deadlines.

The secretary has carefully crafted his plan to give something to each party and require each to make some important concessions in its present position.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had been insisting on a trial period for Palestinian autonomy before moving to a final settlement for

the territories. He would apparently attain a three-year autonomy period. But he would also have to accept a fixed date for starting the final-status negotiations, which he has been strongly resisting, and he would also have to accept that those talks be held on the basis of an exchange of land for peace, which he has so far adamantly refused to do.

King Hussein of Jordan, who has been leading the Arab campaign for U.N. sponsorship of the peace talks,

would have to settle for a watered-down version of this, with the Security Council's permanent members involved but the United Nations not serving as the official sponsor.

In return, Hussein would receive the assurance he has been seeking that the negotiating process would not come to an abrupt halt once the Palestinian autonomy talks were completed. There would be a fixed date for the start of final-status negotiations, and Shamir would not be

given his experiment with autonomy until after they started.

This mechanism would protect Hussein from radical Arab charges—namely from Syria—that he has become party to another "partial and unilateral solution"—one of the main Arab accusations leveled at Egypt's assassinated President Anwar Sadat after the Camp David Accords and that he fears will be leveled next against him if he agrees to become involved in the Shultz plan.

WP

Shultz

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רח"פ: כהן לבור סוג כסחוב: שמור	<b>מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק</b> <b>טופס מברק</b>	תאריך:
תז"ח: 051900	א ל : מיל לשכת השר, מיל"ת, מצ"א	
נר: 00131 21-01	יו"ץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יו"ץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכ"ל הממשלה, וושינגטון	
עתונות, ניו יורק		

15-15  
 יום קפ"ו וא' כסלו

סגירת אזורים לתקשורת

כצפוי, הנושא תפס אתמול מקום ברחב הן בשיחות והן בחדשות. נתקבלו פניות מרשתות ומתכניות שונות שביקשו לדעת מה המצב לאשורו ואם אפשר עוד לשדר מן הארץ. ABC ו-CBS שדרו כתבות ארוכות בנושא, תוך ציון העובדה שסגירת אזורים לא מנעה מותם של עוד 2 פלסטינים. הגדיל לעשות פטר ג'ינגס, כמובן, אשר בדברי הקישור שלו ציין כי בכך מצטרפת ישראל לשורה ארוכה של מדינות כגון "איראן, עיראק ו... כן - דרום אפריקה".

בשיחה ארוכה שקיימתי עם עורך החוץ של CBS אתמול, שב הלה וטען בפני כי לא ברור דבר מסגירת אזורים, אולם קיבל את דברי כי אין מדובר בסגירה כוללת אלא בצעדים מקומיים שננקטו סביב מועד תפילת יום שישי. שב ופירט באזני את הקוד המיוחד של CBS להחנהגות כאזורים בהם צפויות מהומות וחזר על הטיעונים כי לא הטלביזיה היא שמעוררת מהומות. CBS, מכל מקום, במנעה מלשדר אמש כתבה על סגירת השטחים לתקשורת.

המסר הכללי שקיבלתי אתמול - ביקורת רבה, דאגה מפני השפעת הסגירה על סיקור החדשות והבעת תקווה כי לא נחרף את הצעדים מעבר למה שנעשה אתמול.

בינה

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תאריך:	5.3.88	שם השולח:	ב. בינה	איזור:	2
1. מנהל מחלקת הקשר 2. מנהל מחלקת המידע 3. מנהל מחלקת החדשות 4. מנהל מחלקת המערכת 5. מנהל מחלקת המכשירים 6. מנהל מחלקת המכשירים					









סגירות ישראל / זושנגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

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דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1530 4 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל רה"מ

דע: מנכ"ל מדיני, מצפ"א

הטנפור דן אינווה ותהליך השלום

רצ"ב מכתב בנדון לרה"מ מאת אינווה, המדבר בעד עצמו. מקור המכתב בדיפ.

יוסף אלמגור  
למדן

מח 2  
מח 3  
מח 3  
מח 3  
מח 2

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025

March 3, 1988

Honorable Yitzhak Shamir  
 Prime Minister  
 State of Israel


Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your very thoughtful message. I deeply appreciate your kind words regarding my role in securing approval of enhanced assistance to Israel this year.

You were also very gracious in giving recognition to my undiminished support for the security and survival of the Jewish people. Because you know of my devotion to that cause I am certain that you will understand my candor in telling you that I am deeply concerned about the effect continued violence on the West Bank and in Gaza is having on American public opinion. It is acutely important that Israel, at this moment in its history, be seen as a nation which looks positively towards peace. While I recognize that Israel may find certain aspects of the Reagan Administrations' peace initiative unpalatable, I hope you will endeavor to shape a positive response which builds on acceptable elements of the proposal.

I hope that we can remain in close contact as the situation develops. Please be assured that the people of Israel have my undying faith and confidence in their ability to promote peace and justice in Israel and the Middle East.

Sincerely,

  
 Daniel K. Inoué  
 Chairman  
 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee  
 on Foreign Operations

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שגרירות ישראל / נושיונוטין

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סוג בטהוני סודי

דחיפות מיידי

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מס' מברק

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המשרד, משהביט

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א  
ממ"ד  
מקשיח - משהביט

עסקות בשק  
לשלנו 093

הרשימה במברקנו אינה מלאה. הממשל שוקל -

- א. חוטפת F-16 למצרים
- ב. בקשה של כורית ל-F-16
- ג. חידוש הבקשה לטטינגרים לעומאן. (שגריר ארה"ב בעומאן סיפר לי כי באוקטובר אשתד חגו מספר מטוסים של וד"ת מעל שטח הטולטנות וקבוצ זעם על שאין לו במה לנסות ולפגוע בהם מהקרקע).

ערו

סמנכ"ל צפ"א 2  
ממ"ד 3  
מקשיח 1  
שגריר ארה"ב בעומאן 1  
חידוש הבקשה לטטינגרים לעומאן 1  
ב. בקשה של כורית ל-F-16 1  
א. חוטפת F-16 למצרים 1  
מס' מברק 4  
תאריך/ז"ח 0915 4 מרץ 88

טג-לרות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטיחוני שמור

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 1530 4 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

121

המשרד, משהביט

אל: מקשיח - משהביט

דע: מצפ"א

נסי מציח, כאן

הסנטור אינוה ושהביט

1. רציב מכתב מאת דן אינוה עבור שה הביטחון.

2. באשר לבקשה בסעיף השני, אנשי צוות העוזרים של ועדת אינוה פנו אלינו בנדון לפני שבועיים-שלושה. הזכרנו בפניהם את שמותיהם של סגן הרמטכ"ל ומתאם הפעולות בשטחים, אך הראשון לא בא והשני קיצר את ביקורו בווינגטון. כעת אנו מנסים למצוא פתרון באמצעות הנספחות.

3. מקור המכתב בדיפ.

למדן  
3-1-88

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*Yitzhak Rabin*

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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025

March 3, 1988

*121*  
*101*

*2/2*

Honorable Yitzhak Rabin  
Minister of Defense  
State of Israel

Dear Mr. Minister,

Thank you for your gracious note. I am confident that your experience and understanding will help to guide Israel safely through this difficult passage.

It was, indeed, useful for me to hear your impressions and views of Israel's attitudes and security needs. Much, however, has happened since we last met and it would be useful for the Subcommittee to have an up-to-date report on the present crisis on the West Bank and in Gaza. My staff has been unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain, through customary channels, a briefing from authoritative sources having first-hand knowledge of recent events. I would be grateful if you could arrange for one of your field officers to share current information with the Subcommittee staff in the near future, perhaps during a scheduled visit to the United States.

I hope you will keep me informed as the situation develops. Please be assured that the people of Israel have my continued support.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
Daniel K. Inoué  
Chairman  
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee  
on Foreign Operations

דפוס.....דפוס  
כונן בטחוני...קנדה...  
דחירות.....מדינה  
המדינה ודחירות...מדינה  
מדינה...מדינה

מדינה המדינה

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אנחנו בארץ

אל: המנכ"ל המדינה  
דע: מנכ"ל רה"מ

המנכ"ל לוי ומהלך השלום

94

לידיעתכם רצ"ב הצעת המכתב לשולץ כפי שנוסח אתמול (3.3), לאחר שיחותי עם לוי. הוכנסו מספר חידושים קלים - בסוף העמוד הראשון, "אמר" שישראל תשקול ויתור על טריטוריה תמורת הכרה ו"חזרה שלום" עם הירדנים והפלסטינים, ובעמוד השני יתייחסו למכשולים שהפלסטינים מערימים בפני השלום.

בכוונת לוי להתחיל ידידים מובהקים של ישראל על המכתב ואינו מעוניין באחרים. יעשה זאת היום בעת החצבעות השונות במליאת הסנט.

אשר לוי  
למדן

לוי  
3  
3  
3



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 3, 1988

Secretary of State George Shultz  
State Department  
C and 21 Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Shultz:

We are writing to express our support for your effort to break the dangerous Middle East stalemate, a stalemate that has led to the current cycle of violence and counter-violence.

We support your mission of peace, which is based on United Nations Security Resolution 242 (as restated in Resolution 338), resolution which has been at the foundation of United States diplomacy in the region through five Administrations and which has been endorsed by Israel and most of the Arab parties to the conflict.

The meaning of this resolution is clear. It requires the Arab states to accept Israel's right to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force...." It requires Israel to withdraw from some of the territories occupied during the 1967 war. It can be summarized in three words: land for peace.

Unfortunately, with the exception of Egypt, no Arab state has demonstrated willingness to implement this formulation. To one degree or another, the Arab states have resisted recognition of Israel and peace with it. Syria, in particular, has supported acts of terror against Israel and has armed the most fanatical terrorist factions. Those who have indicated a willingness to negotiate with Israel have, in some instances, lost their lives. Others have been intimidated.

Israel, for its part, has manifested its commitment to Resolution 242 and the "land for peace" formula in a tangible way. In return for Egypt's recognition of Israel and its acceptance of peace, Israel returned the Sinai peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty including the oil fields located therein.

Successive Israeli leaders have declared their dedication to the Camp David Accords including Resolution 242's "land for peace" formula and have indicated that it would apply to the West Bank and Gaza. According to this formulation, Israel would contemplate the relinquishing of territory in exchange for Jordanian and Palestinian recognition and acceptance of Israel.

That has always been our understanding.

*[Handwritten mark]*

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Accordingly, we were dismayed to read in the New York Times of February 26 that Prime Minister Shamir had said that "...this expression of territory for peace is not accepted by me."

We hope that the Prime Minister's statement did not indicate that Israel is abandoning a policy that offers the best hope of long-term peace. Israel cannot be expected to give up all the territory gained in 1967 or to return to the dangerous and insecure pre-'67 borders. Resolution 242 does not require it to do so. On the other hand, peace negotiations have little chance of success if the Israeli government's position rules out territorial compromise.

We are also disturbed by reports that Jordan may be backing away from the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with the Israelis at a peace conference. These accounts indicate that Jordan may insist on an independent PLO presence at the negotiating table.

We hope that these reports are without foundation. Israel rejects negotiations with the PLO, and rightly so. However, its officials have indicated that it would negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Jordan's abandonment of the joint delegation concept now would deal a serious blow to the peace process.

We believe that it is only through compromise by both sides that we will achieve Middle East peace.

We applaud your effort to get the peace process moving and share your determination to build a Middle East where every nation and people can live in peace, security and, ultimately, even friendship.

Sincerely,

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*[Handwritten signature]*



טופס מברק

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 סוג בשחוני: בלמ"ס  
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 תאריך וז"ח: 13:30 4.3.88  
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אל: המשרד

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אל: מצפ"א

האירועים בשטחים; הרקורד הקונגרסיונלי

להלן מתוך הימים האחרונים:

- מרבין דיימלי (ראש הקאוקוס השחור) כלל ברקורד (29.2) את נוסח המודעה המצורפת. די ברשימת החותמים להעיד על תוכנה. התבטאות קודמת קצרה שלו ב-28.1 נועדה "לשבור את השקט הקונגרסיונלי".
- ג'ו קולטר (בעל התבטאויות סבירות עד כה) התבטא במליאה (25.2) בצורה חריפה מאוד. נוסח דבריו מצורף.
- מרסי קפטור כללה (25.2) דברים התומכים במסע שולץ לאזור.
- ביל ריצ'רדסון (מברקני ההיספנים) כלל (17.2) ברקורד את תוצאות הסקר שנערך עליה נגד השמצה (20-24.1) המעיד על המשך התמיכה בישראל. בדברי ההקדמה שלו נאמר כי "It's fascinating and heartening" לראות שהציבור מסוגל להתבונן מעבר למסך הקטן ולראות את התמונה כולה.
- עוד ברקורד (25.1) מברקו של הרב אלכסנדר שינדלר לנשיא המדינה (ביל גרין), ומאמר של דונלד קימליאן שהופיע בפילדלפיה אינקוויירר תחת הכותרת "האם התקשורת אשמה" כפי שכלל ברקורד (28.1) ג'יימס פלוריד, אחרי דברי ההקדמה ובהם שיש צורך בתמונה מאוזנת, ושההשוואה לדרא"פ פשטנית מדי.

טובה הרצל  
 טובה הרצל

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# JEWISH AMERICAN CONCERNS ABOUT UNITED STATES-ISRAELI RELATIONS

HON. MERVYN M. DYMALLY

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 29, 1988

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to your attention the following advertisement which appeared in the Nation magazine on February 13, 1988:

## TIME TO DISSOCIATE FROM ISRAEL

We are Americans and Jews and we come together at this time publicly to express our strong desire to see the United States take meaningful steps to dissociate our country from the policies of Israel.

For some years we have witnessed Israel increasingly deviating from political policies that we find acceptable and from moral values that we hold dear. These developments are not the responsibility of any particular political party in Israel but rather stem, in our judgment, from a tragically misguided approach toward the Arab world in which Israel is located, a racist ideology and a growing militancy. We can no longer condone or be associated with such Israeli behavior, nor, do we believe, should our country.

In recent years Israel has twisted away from basic commitments made at Camp David in 1978; annexed further territories, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, while continuing to expand settlements in all the occupied territories; and grotesquely invaded Lebanon, resulting in the death of tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians as well as hundreds of Israelis and Americans, and the taking as hostages of many others.

Furthermore, Israeli policies and attitudes toward the Palestinian people have made it evident that only major changes in Israel's basic posture will allow for a peaceful political settlement with the Palestinians.

Israeli complicity in Iran and Contra-gate coupled with Israel's employment of

American Jews as spies against our country further underscore the growing dangers inherent in the current U.S.-Israeli relationship. The close identification in the public mind between Israel and Jews—an equation vigorously fostered by both the Zionist movement and the American Jewish lobby, which has come under its control—threatens to stigmatize Jews everywhere.

The recent acts of killing, beatings, curfews, expulsions and house arrests—all against unarmed Palestinians living in areas Israel has occupied for 20 years—further demonstrate that Israel has become a badly divided country with many unfortunate similarities to the situation that prevails in South Africa.

Our ancestors came to the United States because, as a result of their Jewishness, they were discriminated against and abused. The European experience culminated in the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust. How tragic that in our own time the very state established by Jews in the aftermath of this evil has become a place where racialism, religious discrimination, militarism and injustice prevail; and that Israel itself has become a pariah state within the world community. Events taking place today are all too reminiscent of the pogroms from which our own forefathers fled two and three generations ago—but this time those in authority are Jews and the victims are Moslem and Christian Palestinians.

We believe that Israel's course could not be maintained but for the continuing financial, political, military and covert support of the U.S. government. And we fear that unless firm steps of disengagement from Israel are taken now our country might get dragged into a major war for which preparations are under way.

In addition, we believe that unless the United States takes serious steps to distance itself from Israel the Israelis will mistakenly continue to think that the course they are on is one acceptable to the American people.

For all these reasons we believe the time has come to normalize the U.S. relationship with Israel. A complete re-evaluation of what has become since 1987 the American sponsorship of Israel is required. The unprecedented amounts of economic aid should be cut back over the next two to three years to much smaller levels. Furthermore, the considerable military and intelligence assistance should also be radically reduced.

Unfortunately, during the years of the Reagan Administration much the opposite course has been followed, and Israel has practically become a ward of the United States. In this election year we urge an open debate about the serious problems and dangers which have resulted from the current structure of U.S.-Israeli relations. Few foreign policy issues are of such importance to our country. Consequently we urge our leading politicians to resist the widespread inhibitions from speaking up about Israel, inhibitions which result from the severe financial, political and ideological pressures often brought to bear against those who do.

We further believe that the time is overdue for negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO, which is quite clearly the chosen representative for the great majority of Palestinians—negotiations that should quickly lead to a Palestinian state in the occupied territories and reasonable security guarantees for all parties. In the security guarantees we think our country should participate; but no longer in the financing and supporting of the kinds of policies Israel has been pursuing. The continual oppression and denial of the Palestinians of their right to self-determination is an injus-

tice which has become intolerable not only to those demonstrating for their freedom in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and throughout Israel itself.

The citizens of Israel, of course, will ultimately choose their own country's destiny. But at the very least the citizens of the United States should stop financing and supporting policies that are contrary to the principles and values we hold precious as Americans and as Jews.

Professor Yigal Arens, Computer Science Department, USC, Santa Monica, CA.

Mark Bruzonsky, Former Washington Associate, World Jewish Congress, Washington, DC.

Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor, MIT, Cambridge, MA.

Rabbi Susan Einbinder, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY.

Professor Herbert Hill, University of Wisconsin—Madison, Former Labor Director, NAACP, Madison, WI.

Jane Hunter, Publisher, Israeli Foreign Affairs, Berkeley, CA.

Jeremy Levin, Former CNN Bureau Chief & Former Hostage in Lebanon, Washington, DC.

Professor John Mack, Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, MA.

Professor Seymour Melman, Professor Emeritus of Industrial Engineering, Columbia University, New York, NY.

Eileen Newmark, Ph.D., Intercultural Communications, Boston, MA.

Professor Don Peretz, Professor of Political Science, SUNY, Binghamton, NY.

Henry Schwarzschild, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY.

Professor Steven Schwarzschild, Professor of Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Washington University, St. Louis, MO.

Saul Wechter, Retired, General Motors, San Jose, CA.

Gertrude M. Welch, Interfaith Peace Coalition, San Jose, CA.

Richard Walden, President, Operation California, Los Angeles, CA.

Danielle Yark, Computer Analyst, Pasadena, CA.

Solomon Zeltzer, Attorney, San Jose, CA.

## PLEASE JOIN US

To add your name to this statement or to make a contribution to enable its wider dissemination please send your name and check made out to "Statement" to:

Statement: P.O. Box 18367, Washington, DC

We hope many American Jews will take this opportunity to register their disapproval of both Israeli policies and excessive American support for Israel. Upon receiving your name and/or contribution you will be contacted by one of the original signers whose names are below. For information: (202) 362-2096.



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### ISRAEL'S EXERCISE OF IRRESPONSIBLE POWER

(Mr. KOLTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KOLTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today saddened and in shock over the recent actions taken by the Israeli Government to quell the recent upsurge in civil disobedience in the occupied territories.

Edward Bellamy, a noted and well respected American author, once wrote that tyranny is, "an exercise of irresponsible power." No statement could better assess the current actions taken by Israeli forces. Their brutal use of force in an attempt to control

and influence a different people and culture is tyrannical.

On February 5, in a small village just outside the West Bank city of Nablus, four young Palestinians were seized and ordered to lie face down in the muddy road that is the entrance to their village.

The Israeli master sergeant in command then ordered the driver of a nearby military bulldozer to bury them alive. Obeying his commander, the driver buried the four youths with a full load of earth.

With that accomplished, the master sergeant then ordered the driver of the bulldozer to run over the four Palestinians buried beneath the soil.

The driver refused.

After the soldiers left the village, residents pulled the four unconscious Palestinians from their makeshift grave. All are alive and recovering.

Had the driver of the bulldozer followed orders without question and killed defenseless men buried beneath a pile of dirt, a lot more would have died than four Palestinians. Israel itself would have been mortally wounded.

It is time to stop the bloodshed. Time to face the inevitable. Israel and Jews all over the world have faced persecution throughout history and have struggled to build a homeland. By continuing irrational acts of violence and persecution, Israel has become its own worst enemy.

Out of persecution, freedom is born. Israel stands as a testament to that fact. However, vengeance, hatred and violence are beasts that grow uncontrollably. If Israel does not soon stop they will have become the very beast from which they fled.

### TRAGIC SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HON. MARCY KAPTUR

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 25, 1988

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Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, the recent rioting and unrest in the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza has prompted a worldwide sense of urgency for an alternative to the violence which has seized Palestinians and Israelis alike these past several weeks. Palestinian aspirations for human rights are passionate and understandable. Democratic freedoms must ultimately be theirs. Yet we also know that this occupation is a product of a war directed at the destruction of Israel. The State of Israel has the right to exist as well. Yet rioting and violent demonstrations that have claimed the lives of so

many, and left so many others seriously wounded, have yielded no permanent solution to this tragic situation.

As a nation, the United States must act in its foreign policy in a way that honors our long-held democratic principles—that is, all people have a right to own property, to be safe in their homes, to raise families without fear, to practice full citizenship with the right to vote and to express their opinions freely, and to have their human rights upheld by the laws and courts of the Nation. If you read the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights, it is to these principles that the United States is devoted at home. We must also practice them abroad in the exercise of our foreign policy.

I represent a district in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims live together. All are equally appalled by the violence and unrest afflicting the peoples of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They realize only too well that there are no victors when peaceful negotiations give way to violent demonstrations and reprisals. Recently, Mr. Speaker, I received letters from several teenage young men and women in my district addressed to President Reagan regarding the tragic situation in the Middle East. I would like to take this opportunity to read one of them. Together, they express so eloquently the hopes and fears which are harbored by all men and women, young and old alike, committed to peace and respect for the human rights which are fundamental and inalienable to all citizens of the world.

DEAR MR. REAGAN: I am a 15 year old girl. The reason I am writing this letter is because of the situation in Palestine. I think we should be trying to stop this and compromise for a solution. Something has got to be done about this, and soon! Please, Mr. Reagan, help solve this problem before it's too late! We need your help to live a happier and safer life!

Mr. Speaker, I ask President Reagan to employ the full powers of his office in assisting the Palestinian and Israeli people to negotiate a peaceful settlement. While it must be kept in mind that any sense of expectation must be tempered by the realization that if there were an easy solution it would have been seized years ago, I urge my colleagues today, Mr. Speaker, to join me in extending our deepest encouragement to Secretary Shultz as he embarks on his important mission for peace and human rights for all people of that region.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד, ביטחון

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מנהל מז"תים

דע: א. הבר - לשכת שהב"ט

כיסוי טלביזיוני בשטחים.

התקשר פיל וילקוקס על-מנת לומר שדוברת מחמ"ד נתקלה בשאלות רבות בנדון. מאחר ולא היו הרבה פרטים בידיהם, נמנעו מחשובה סובסטנטיבית, אך הוא, וילקוקס מבקש להוסיף כי הם troubled על-ידי ההחלטה ולדעתו זה רק יוסיף ביקורת שלילית. ישראל על אף כל הבעיות מוצגת כאחת הדמוקרטיות הבודדות בעולם ולכן זה יהיה מצער לראות שינוי בתדמית.

ערן

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סוג בתחוני סודי דחיפות מייד תאריך/זייח 88 מו 4 9:00

אל: סמנכ"ל מצפ"א

קונגרס: הלך הרוחות לגבי הארועים בשטחים ותהליך השלום

1. היום, כמעט שלושה חודשים מאז פרוץ המהומות האלימות בשטחים, ברור שהצטבר בקונגרס מסע לא קטן של אי-נחת, דאגה ומשכול, שטרם צף מעל פני השטח במלוא עוצמתו. הסיבות לנצרות ההתייחסות למאורעות בשטחים מורכבות, וביניהן ניתן להצביע על:
  - המספר הלא-גדול יחסית של מכתבים שהתקבלו מהבוחרים (להוציא פניות מאזורי ביירה שבהם נמצא ריכוז של יהודים וערבים, או שלהם ציר יהודי ו/או פרו-ישראלי מובהק).
  - ההרגשה הכללית שבנושא השטחים טמון חומר נפץ פוליטי (קרי, בין היתר, חששות מ"הסדולה היהודית") ומוטב לא לגעת בו בפומבי (תופעה שבאה לביטוי מובהק בארוחת הבוקר שנערכה ב-22 בפברואר לכבוד המשלחת הקונגרס-ובלית חניו יורק כאשר רוב רובם של המורשים התחמקו מהנושא, ואילו אורת הכבוד, טום פולי (מנהיג הרוב בבית הנבחרים) העדיף למקד את מעט הדברים שהקדיש לסכסוך יוזמת השלום של שולץ, לקשרים הבלתי-שבירים בין ארתי"ב וישראל).
  - השאיפה "לעשות משהו" - בחנאי שה"משהו" יהיה קונסטורקטיבי, וכאן יש תחושה של חוסר אונים (לדוגמא, לפני כשבועיים פנה הקונגרסמן השחור ג'ון קונירס (הבלתי אהוד) לקונגרסמן היהודי הליברלי סם גייזנסון והציע שינקטו יוזמה לאור המתרחש בשטחים נכון לעכשו לא פעל בכיוון זה או שלא מצא קונירס שותף או שלא מצא רעיון וכיוון חיובי).
  - אי-קיומם עד כה של דיונים והצבעות בקשר לנושאים הנוגעים ישירות לישראל וכן במישור הועדות והן במליאות בשני הבתים.
  - התמיכה הרחבה ביוזמת השלום של המזכיר שולץ, ובכלל זה הרצון העז להמנע מלהפריע לסיכויי ההצלחה של שולץ.
  - הדעה שהצד הערבי, יש לו חלק נכבד בקפאון שהביא למצב בשטחים ולהסתבכות יוזמת השלום.

החל 3 סמנכ"ל מצפ"א 1/3  
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דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

3/26

2. בין אם מהסיבות הנ"ל או בין אם מטעמים אחרים, עובדה היא שהפניות הידומות מהגבעה אלינו היו מעטות. 1-3 מחוקקים בלבד (הסנטור פט ליידי והקונגרסמן אד פיהן) ואו לנכון לשגר מכתבים לרה"מ ולשה"ח. מאידך, לא חסרו שיחות פרטיות עם קונגרסמנים וסנטורים, החל בשגריר ובאנשי השגרירות, עבור לאפרים סנה וכלה בח"כים המזדמנים לרושינגטון. מהמגע עם האלה <sup>ואה"צ</sup> שאנו קולטים ממקורות אחרים מצטיירות תמונה ברורה למדי. עולה שהקבוצה שחש הכאב והדאגה האקוטית ביותר היא הקונגרסמנים היהודים שבשיחתם עם השגריר ב-25 בינואר (מיד לאחר התמונות הראשונות של הכארת) התבטאו במונחים של ברוטליות, ברבריות, חוסר הצדקה מוסרית, רגשי בושה כיהודים ומבוכתם ממדינת ישראל האהובה עליהם. לקבוצה זו מצטרף ללא ספק מחנה לא מבוטל של ידידים לא יהודים הן מהאגף הדמוקרטי הליברלי והן מהאגף הרפואי המתון, שזועזעו מהתמונות על מרקעי הטלוויזיה. אך ורק מכיון שמדובר בישראל התאפקו הפעילים בתחום זכויות האדם בשני הבתים (בראשם הקונגרסמן ג'ון פורטר והסנטור עד הרקין) ולא קיימו עד כה הירינגס בנושא מדיניות שר הבטחון והתנהגות חיילי צה"ל בשטחים - אך אין פרוש הדבר שהחזירו את הביקורת שלהם מאתנו ומאיפא"ק, ואין פרוש הדבר שלא יבוא יום הדין וההשבון.

3. עם מרוצת הזמן נראה שהולכת וגוברת ההבנה לדילמות ולא-3ים בפניהם ניצבת ישראל בשטחים, כפי שעולה בבירור משיחת השגריר ערב צאתו לישראל עם הסנטור פול סרבנס (יו"ר ועדת החושה למזה"ת) ומשיחתי השבוע עם מייק ואן-דון, המשקף נאמנה את דעתו של המורשה לי המילטון (מקבילו של סרבנס בבית הנבחרים). אנשים אלה, המייצגים את המרכז ואת ה-MAINSTREAM האינטלקטואלי בקונגרס, מסכימים ששומה עלינו כקדימות ראשונה להחזיר את הסדר על כנו. כ"כ מכירים שמשימה זו כמעט בלתי אפשרית, ולדעים שכל עוד נמשכות ההתפרעויות, יוסיפו אבדן החיים והמטלות הקשות על חיילי צה"ל. בום, כפועל יוצא מסבך זה, להם ברור שימשכו הפגיעה החמורה בתדמיתנו והשחיקה בתמיכה בנו מקרב הציבור הרחב (ויוצאין מקרב היהודים בפרט) - תהליך משולב ומסוכן שיש בו להתנקט בנו באחד הימים, הואיל ובשלב מסוים ובנסיבות מסוימות לא יוכלו המחוקקים להתעלם ולהתנער מלחצי דעת הקהל.

4. אי-לכך המחוקקים תולים תקוות גדולות ביוזמת השלום של שולץ. מקובל אצלם כי "אקסיומה" שהמצב בשטחים כיום הינו "UNDESIRABLE", ועצם השליחות מאפשרת להם להזדהות עם פעולה חיובית. לכן פניותיו האישיות של שולץ אליהם התקבלו בברכה, ולכן החייצבו לימינו תוך מחן "ברכת הדרך" חמה ביותר. אין לזלול בכמיהה האמיתית לשלום ובמשאלה (אולי הבלתי-בציאותית



ט י פ ס מ ב ר ק

י"ד מחד 3 דפים

סיוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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להתקדמות. כ"כ אין להמעיט בקונצנזוס הרחב לפיו כל מו"מ ישיר חייב להיות מבוסס על 242, שפרושו "טריטוריות תמורת שלום", ואם ישראל אינה מוכנה לגשת למו"מ על בסיס זה, אין על מה לנהל מו"מ. תקוות אלה גורמות לציפיות וכן לדאגות - ולגבינו הדאגות, המובעות בשיחות רבות בגבעה, הן שממשלת ישראל אינה מאוחדת דיה, שלא תגלה את הגמישות הנדרשת, שתעסוק בהתנצחויות אישיות, ובמילה אחת שחתרום להכשלת שליחות המזכיר שולץ. המחוקקים ערים לכך שיש בעיות אינטגרליות קשות בהצעות שולץ, שהמלך חוסיין לא טרח אפילו לחזור לרבת עמון, ושהפלסטינאים טרם נאותו להעגש עם המזכיר. אך זו לא תהיה הפעם הראשונה שנדרש לשאת נטל בלתי פרופורציונלי של הקולר בקונגרס ומחוצה לו, אם היוזמה תכשל.

5. כעת הכל בעמדת המתנה, וכל עוד יוזמה השלום בעיצומה, סביר להניח שהמצב הנוצר בקונגרס לא ישתנה, אולם אין ספק שהמאורעות של שלושת החודשים האחרונים הותירו משקע (תקריב) הזחפור וההכאות במכנית החדשנה של CBS לא ישכחו במהרה. שתדמיתנו נפגעה, שהתעוררו שאלות שמקודם לא היו ושהודלקו אורות אזהרה: גדול ידידינו בקונגרס כמו המורשה צירלי וילסון מטקסס מוטרם על כרסום רציני במעמדנו, ואילו הסנטור דן אינווה בראיון בערוץ הג'ויש וויק ב-25 בפברואר מעיד שבשלב מסוים יהיה זה "הגיוני" אם אש"ף יוכנס למו"מ, נכון גם שיו"ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בבית הנבחרים, דייויד אובי, הודיע ב-8 בפברואר במליאת בית הנבחרים שהסיוע עבור ישראל חייב להשאר INVIOLE, אך בחדרי חדרים נשמעים גם קולות נביאי הזעם השואלים כאם אין להפעיל לחץ על ישראל באמצעות הסיוע. נכון להיות לחישות אלה משקפות תחושת תרעומה מהנעשה בשטחים וחטכול מחוסר פריצת דרך בהליך השלום, אי-הנחת אינה מפריעה למגעינו היומיומיים עם מחוקקים ועוזריהם, אך היא קיימת והיא עמוקה - ומן הדין שלא נתכחש לה.

אולי  
למדן









MITZ10.PRT

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אל : רושינגטון

דע : שה"ח, רה"מ, מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל, ר/מרכז, ממ"ד, בירן, ליאור.

להלן הטכסט של נאום שולץ (בפגישה שלא התקימה) עם חמישה עשר המנהיגים הפלשתינים.

מנהל מצפ"א  
3 במרץ 1988

Handwritten notes and signatures:

- Two large signatures at the top left.
- A circle containing the text "אורי מילר" (Uri Miller).
- Handwritten numbers: 2, 1, 3, 3, 2.
- Handwritten names: "ד"ר אורי מילר", "ד"ר אורי מילר", "ד"ר אורי מילר".



22  
100x  
Palestinian participation is essential to success in the peace process. I had hoped to carry this message to East Jerusalem this evening, and to hear first hand from leading Palestinians about your aspirations and your point of view. Peacemaking is difficult. Peace has its enemies. Even small steps toward peace can be significant in moving beyond mistrust and hatred. In a small way, I wanted to do that this evening.

All the peoples of this land need to be able to look to a future of dignity, security and prosperity. New respect for rights and new readiness for political change must replace old recrimination and distrust.

The United States is for positive and rapid change. Fundamental considerations guide our approach.

First, Palestinians and Israelis must deal differently with one another. Palestinians must achieve control over political and economic decisions that affect their lives. Palestinians must be active participants in negotiations to determine their future. Legitimate Palestinian rights can be achieved in a manner which protects Israeli security. Israeli security and Palestinian security are necessary conditions for a better future for Palestinians, as well as for Israelis.

Second, these moves must be part of a broader effort to reach a comprehensive settlement. Israel and the occupied territories do not exist in isolation. Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestinians living outside the territories have concerns which need to be resolved. In moving toward a comprehensive settlement, Resolutions 242 and 338, in their entirety, must be the basis for negotiations.

Third, what we are seeking must be achieved through negotiations. Negotiations work. Negotiations produce agreements which meet the fundamental concerns of all parties. Experience shows you that you can make an agreement with Israel, and it will be kept by Israel.

Fourth, the start of negotiations must be soon, and the pace of negotiations must be rapid, so that results can be achieved with equal rapidity.

The human resources and potential of Arabs and Israelis are boundless. They have energy and drive which, if not directed against each other, can be marshalled collectively to explore science and technology, literature and the arts. This region, which nurtured three great world religions, carries within it a powerful and moral force. Islam, Christianity and Judaism can work together in creating a more durable moral and spiritual world for all of us.

Our vision is of Israelis and Palestinians living together in peace in this land; where the rights of each are respected; where the energies of all are directed at peaceful purposes; where security and trust exist. Israelis and Palestinians need to see in each other the embodiment of their own dreams. They will realize that the fulfillment of their own dreams is impossible without the fulfillment of the other side's dreams. They will see that dreams rooted in reality are dreams which can be fulfilled.

Opportunity knocks loudly on your doors. Now is the time to get to work. We have a workable plan, and we are ready to commit our efforts to it. The time is right, together, to make decisions of historic importance. Let us translate our dreams into the reality of peace, rights and security for all.

תאריך : 38 יולי 1988 החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 1 מתוך 2

עותק 3 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר

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נכנס

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חוזם: 3/3663

אל: המשור

מ-: רוש, נר: 94, תא: 030388, זח: 1930, נח: טב: טב

נד: ט

סודי / ביותר - מיוחד

ח.ר.ב.

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

דע: מנכ"ל רה"מ

הסנטור קרל לוין ותהליך השלום .

1. נודע לנו הערב שבכוונת הסנטור הנ"ל לשגר מחר (4.3) מכתב למזכיר המדינה, על חתימתו ועל חתימת מספר עותדיו בטנט. במכתב יביעו תמיכה בשולץ וביוזמתו, המבוססת על החלטת מועדו"ט 242, ואף יביעו תקווה שאין זה נכון (כפי שעולה לאחרונה מכלי התקשורת) כי ממשלת ישראל מתחילה להסתייג ( IS BACKING OFF ) מהחלטה זו (שפירושה אליבא דאמריקאים טריטוריה תמורת שלום).

2. פניתי פעמיים ללוין והוצאתי בו לחזור מועדון שיגור המכתב - אן הוא נשאר בשלו. במעט הראשונה טענתי שאם בני אין עוררין על זכותו לתמוך בשולץ, הרי תוכן המכתב כפי שהוא ידוע לנו עלול להתקבל רע מאוד בארץ, במיוחד אם יתבטל ב- SINGLING OUT

של ישראל. לוין השיב שאין בן הדבר, ונתייחסים במכתב למדינות אחרות (ירדן וטורקיה). לשאלתי 'ומה עם הפלסטינאים' שסברו עו כה להבגש עם שולצי ענה לוין כי מזכירים הבעיות האין-סופיות בהן נתקל שולץ, אן העיקר לתמוך בו. הוא (הסנטור) רוצה לעשות דבר קונסטרוקטיבי ולא ייתכן ששולץ יעסוק במסע דילוגים במזה"ת מבלי לדעת





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2  
עומק 3 מתוך 12

\* שטנט ארה"ב עומד מאחוריו. בפעם השנייה חזרתי אליו  
\* לאחר התייעצות עם הממונה בשגרירות ושמתי את הדגש  
\* על כך שהמור"מ נמצא בעת בשלב עדין מאוד והמכתב המוצע  
\* עלול להתפרש כהתערבות בלתי רצויה ובלתי מועילה בשיחות.  
\* לזאת השיב לוין שלא היה עושה דבר שהמזכיר אינו רוצה  
\* בו (כלומר נתן להבין כאילו שולץ רוצה, אולי מבקש  
\* את המכתב).

\* 3. כאמור, לוין נשאר בשלר. חזר ואמר שהמכתב אינו אלא  
\* RE-STATEMENT של מדיניות ארה"ב בטונים נמוכים וטבירים  
\* ואיש לא יוכל לראות בו התקפה על ישראל. הוא ועמיתיו  
\* תומכים ביוזמה שולץ בכל מאודם, ועליהם לתת לזאת ביטוי  
\* במגמה לחזק את ידו של שולץ.

\* למדן. =

\* תמ: שהח, ורהמ, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל



1. The first part of the report  
describes the general situation

in the country. It is a very  
interesting and useful report.  
The second part of the report  
describes the situation in the  
different regions. It is also  
very interesting and useful.

The third part of the report  
describes the situation in the  
different regions. It is also  
very interesting and useful.

The fourth part

describes the situation in the

שירותי ישראל / רושנינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ס

דף מחור דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות קטן

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

078

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה. מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: דני בלור, רושנינגטון

בחירות 88

דמוקרטיה קנדי: מקורות טובים באיגודים מוסריים כי ברור הלחץ על קנדי לחבר  
נכונות להיות מועמד בועידה כדי להציל את המפלגה הדמוקרטית מסכנת כוחו המהגבר  
של ג'יסי ג'קסון.  
ג'קסון עצמו קיבל תמיכה פומבית חשובה מנציג החקלאות של טקסס ג'ים הייטאוואר.

רפובליקנים: בוש - כל המקורות מעריכים כי אם בוש יבחר לנשיא יהיה שר האוצר  
ג'ים בינקר מזכיר המדינה שלו. ההערכה היא כי אם יזכה בוש כפי שצופים הטקנים  
ב"יום השלישי הגדול" הוא ירביץ במספר הצירים הגדול ביותר בהפרש ניכר מדול.  
כמעט בלתי-אפשרי יהיה להביסו בשאר ה"פריימריז" והוא יהיה המועמד הרפובליקנים.

דני בלור

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CBS "THIS MORNING"  
INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ  
(FROM BRUSSELS, BELGIUM)

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1988

WYATT ANDREWS: Mr. Secretary, good morning. Thanks for being with us.

SEC. SHULTZ: Good morning.

MR. ANDREWS: You have now been appointed once again by the President to try again in the Middle East, although it'll be a very, very short trip, virtually a day and a half, but swinging through almost all the region. The question is, with such a short return, what's the point? What do you think you can accomplish in such a short time?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, first, it's a measure of keeping working at it. Second, I went around for several days, talked with the parties intensively, and have now come back and had a chance to talk further with the President about it. So I feel as though I have something to say that comes from the President and my discussions with him, and I'll go around and say it.

MR. ANDREWS: Is that an important message, sort of a midstream (?), that "I've been to see the President, and he's fully behind this; he's not here, but he wants me to be here"?

SEC. SHULTZ: Sort of.

MR. ANDREWS: To Shamir?

SEC. SHULTZ: Everybody.

MR. ANDREWS: But especially Mr. Shamir?

SEC. SHULTZ: No, not especially; especially everybody. Everybody is involved in this. And our effort is to do something that's comprehensive. Obviously you have to work country by country. But nevertheless, we've developed an idea that each country can take part in. And I have talked to Mr. Shamir and Mr. Peres and said to them, "Is Israel ready to sit down with each of its neighbors and tried to work out the ingredients for peace?" They say, "Yes, we are." So in that sense, we have a comprehensive effort, and so I want to continue to talk to each, in each country.

MR. ANDREWS: Are you disappointed that so far you have not had face to face discussions with the Palestinians?

SEC. SHULTZ: I certainly want to have continuing face to face discussions. And I've had one, and I've had a chance to communicate with them quite extensively and get feedback from them. But it would be desirable to have -- and I'm sure, as time goes on, I will be able to have face to face meetings with them. I did have a

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65 3/3

meeting with two Palestinians who came to Washington. Then I have let them know that their problems are very much a part of this, as I see it.

Then I asked them, a group of them, to a meeting in a hotel that's located in an area with which they're very familiar, rather than coming to where I happened to be staying. And when they didn't find it possible to come, I went over there, and for their television and for their written press, made a statement that was designed to say, "Here's what I would have told you if you had come, and I look forward to hearing your point of view." And of course, I've had a lot of feedback from that statement, as people have given me information. And on the whole, it's been rather positive.

MR. ANDREWS: The men that you met in Washington, one of them Hanna Siniora, one of his messages is that -- and as he speaks to us -- is that King Hussein is the wrong man to lead the Palestinian cause. Do you think you're setting up a straw man in the King by asking him to lead this Palestinian delegation?

SEC. SHULTZ: No, I don't. I think the King knows a great deal about it, and he's a person of stature; he's been a long time there. He understands the issues very well. It is Jordanian law and practice that governs a lot of what takes place on the West Bank and Gaza. So he's a very relevant person, and he's also the head of state and government of one of Israel's neighboring countries. Now the King has always said, and the Israelis fully agree with this, that there must be Palestinians there themselves, so they can speak. And the King's idea is that there will be Palestinians there; they'll be part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. So they'll be there, but as part of his delegation.

MR. ANDREWS: Mr. Secretary, we're out of time, but you're on your way to a very fast trip through the Middle East. Best of luck. Thank you for being with us.

SEC. SHULTZ: Thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW

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*[Handwritten mark]*

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סוג מסמך סודי

דחיפות מידית

תאריך/ז"ח 1730 3 חרץ 68

מס' מברק

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המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: מקטי"ח, משהב"ט  
נספח הגנה - כאן

קונגרס: מכירות נשק למדינות ערב.

3/10

1. כידוע, לפי חוק הפיקוח על יצוא הנשק, חייב הממשל להגיש מדי שנה רשימה ("רשימה יעבץ") הכוללת פרטים על מערכות הנשק שברצונו למכור למדינות זרות במשך השנה. רשימה זו הועברה בחילת השבוע לוועדות החוץ בשני הבתים, ואחמול (2.3) חודרכו אודותיה הסנטורים (חברי ועדת החוץ בבית הנבחרים יתודרכו ביום ב' הקרוב).

2. התדרוך הועבר על-ידי אלן הומס (האחראי לעניינים פוליטיים-צבאיים במחמ"ד) וגלן ראד (סגן ראש ה-DSAA בפנטגון). השתתפו סנטורים פל, לוגר ובוטביץ', ומספר עוזרים. הסנטורים לא היו מרוצים מהתדרוך (שערך כחצי שעה) - (א) מכיוון שברשימה אין ציון של כמויות הנשק שברצון הממשל למכור; ו-(ב) כיוון שלא קבלו התחייבות שמדובר ברשימה הסופית של המכירות המוצעות (בהעדר התפתחויות בלתי צפויות, כמובן). לכל היותר המתכרכים היו מוכנים לומר שמדובר ברשימה "מקיפה", ואילו הסנטורים הבהירו חד-משמעית שלא יסתכלו בעיין יפה על תוספות לרשימה שהוגשה.

3. כאמור, הרשימה מתייחסת למדינות בכל רחבי תבל, אך באשר למדינות ערב הורשמו הסנטורים שהיא מדוללת עד למינימום האפשרי. היא כוללת מכירות למצריים, לסעודיה ולמפרציות בלבד. אין הצעות לגבי ירדן, ואין בה כלים "פרובלמטיים", לכאורה.

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27... 3 1 4 2 1 3 1 2 1 4 2



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דף 2 מחור 3 דפים

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דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

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4. להלן רשימת מערכות הנשק עבור מדינות ערב (מפי מקור מהימן שניסה לרשום את הרשימה במלואה):

א. מצרים

- מטוסים נוספים מדגם E2C
- טנקים נוספים מדגם M-60
- נגמ"שים מדגם M-113
- טילים מדגם מבריק
- ערכות השבחה לצוללות מדגם רומיאו

ב. סעודיה

- טנקים מדגם ברדלי (שווי העסקה כ-500 מיליון דולר)
- תחזוקה למטוסי האוואקס (שווי החוזים כ-400 מיליון דולר)
- 'LINK 11 DATA LINK'

ג. בחריין

- ארבעה מטוסים מדגם אף-16 (C או D) - כחליף, על-בסיס אחד לאחד, כשיהיה צורך בכך.
- קיטים לאמצעי לוחמה אלקטרונית
- מכ"מים
- משוריינים

ד. כווית

- מערכת להגנה אווירית מדגם פלאנקס
- מערכת מכ"מים להגנת חופים
- ערכות להשבחה האלקטרוניקה בהוקים המשופרים שכבר בידי הכווייתים.

ה. האמירויות

- תכנית השבחה להוקים המשופרים שבידיהם
- מכ"מים לטווח ארוך

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דף 3 מחוד 3 דפיס

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דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ד

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5. חלק ניכר של התדרוך הוקדש לשאלות שהסנטורים העלו בקשר לתכניות להרכבת טנק ה-1-M במצריים (התעניינו במיוחד בנעיות העברת טכנולוגיה ומכירות למדינות שלישיות). חכניה ההרכבה תתחיל רק ב-1991. אך בכוונת המצרים לקנות 15 טנקים שלמים וחלקים להכנת קו הייצור כבר במשך השנה הזו. בגלל ממדי המכירות, המימשל יהיה חייב להודיע עליהן בכתב לקונגרס והדיון בסוגיה זו יתנהל אז ברצינות.

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למדן