

# מדינת ישראל 3

משרדי הממשלה

חש'ק 43.5

א/4666 / חש'ק גסס 3  
4606

מסנך ר'וה'ה

י'ו'ח' מסנ'י

א'ר'ו'ב'ה

23/3/88 - 10/3/88

משרד

מחלקה

חש'ק מס'

חש'ק מס'



שם ופיק: החש'ק המדיני לראש הממשלה - א'ר'ו'ח'י'ב

4606/3-N

מס'ה פיק'ו

מס'ה פיק'ו: R00034bw

10/08/2020

תאריך הדפסה:

2-111-2-4-7

מס'ה פיק'ו



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות\*

חטיבה מס': 43.5  
מיכל מס': 4606 / א  
תאריך התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
שם מחבר התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
תיק מס': 3  
שם הנמען: \_\_\_\_\_

22/3/1988  
25/4/1988

סוג התעודות (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

- מכתב ☐  
מברק או הודעת טלקס ☒  
תזכיר או מזכר ☐  
דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון ☐  
פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה ☐

הנמקה\*\*:

תאריך 17/8/2020

שם הכותב לוי בלל

חתימה [Signature]

\*הטופס ימלא בשני עותקים. העותק הימני יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;  
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

\*\*נא לרשום את ההנמקה רק ביותק הלבן.

~~0.002~~

$\frac{1}{2}$

$$\frac{1}{2}$$

Handwritten signature: *Handwritten signature*

102  
 102

לשימוש מח' הקשר בלבד

ה'תשנ"א

RECEIVED



1034  $\frac{2}{2}$

23 MARCH 1988

THE HONORABLE GEORGE SHULTZ  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON D.C.

URGENT

DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY YOUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN JERUSALEM THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS GOING TO ISSUE NEW TRAVEL ADVISORY REGULATIONS REGARDING THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND EAST JERUSALEM, CALLING FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO AVOID TRAVELING IN THESE AREAS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

CERTAINLY, AS FAR AS EAST JERUSALEM IS CONCERNED, IT IS REASONABLY QUIET AND ISSUING SUCH TRAVEL ADVISORY REGULATIONS COULD BE HARMFUL AND WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO MAINTAINING THIS RELATIVE CALM.

FURTHER MORE, SUCH A STEP WOULD NOT BE IN THE SPIRIT OF EASTER AND PASSOVER, AND WOULD ESPECIALLY HURT THE EAST JERUSALEM RESIDENTS OF OUR CITY WHO ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO PILGRIMS VISITING OUR CITY DURING THE HOLIDAY SEASON.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING AGAINST ISSUING SUCH NEW TRAVEL ADVISORY REGULATIONS FOR EAST JERUSALEM AT THIS TIME.

YOURS.

TEDDY KOLLEK



יוצא \*\*

שמו

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\*\*

חוזם: 3,19272

אל: 917/י

מ-: המשרד, תא: 230388, זח: 1529, דח: ב, סג: שם

נד: 8

שמו/בהול

נ.מ. 205.03-2987

נאום

שאלת פלסטין - ועידה בינ'ל. לשלכם 371, 529

א. עדיף למסור תשובה בעל-פה כהצעת איימה תוך הקפדה על מניעת אפשרות לאי-הבנה או ציטוט חלקי עי' הקראת התשובה מן הכתב כפי שעשייתם בשעתו במסירת עמדתנו לגולדינג לגבי דרום-לבנון (הכרסומים).

ב. יש להדגיש שישראל התנגדה באופן עקבי לכל החלטות האום בנושא זה מאז 38/58/C ועד להחלטה האחרונה. הנימוקים להתנגדותנו מפורטים בחמשת הסעיפים המופיעים ב'תדרוך והנחיות לקראת העצרת ה-42' (החוברת הצהובה) בעמוד 5 סעיפים 1-4. בהקשר זה תוכלו לאזכר גרידא גם מכתב בלום מה-26/4/84.

ג. לסיום נבקשכם לצטט הסעיף החמישי המדגיש החיוב שבעמדתנו והסותר את הגדרתנו כ'מכשול העיקרי' לוועידה בינ'ל כפי שנכתב בדוח המזכ'ל וצוטט בהחלטה. להלן שנית לשון הסעיף: 'התנגדותה של ישראל לוועידה בינ'ל על פי החלטה זו אינה סותרת את מדיניות ישראל לנהל מומ' ישיר עם שכנותיה במסגרת בינ'ל מוסכמת על הצדדים למומ' הישיר'.

ד. נסחונא בהתאם לאמור בסעיפים ב-ג דלעיל תשובה קצרה אותה תמסרו מילולית בעפ'. הבריקונא הנוסח לידיעתנו.

WOLF

1924 年 5 月

畢昇

— 卷 一 —

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0130:27591.8

MS: L'V'19

В-: ПДШГГ, ПХ: 885025, ПП: 9521, ГП: 1, ДА: ШХ  
ЛГ: 6

WELFELDS

L.R. 7895-ED.205

LITERATURE

952. יצא צו' פ' ח' - יצא צו' פ' ח' - יצא צו' פ' ח'

[illegible]

היום תושבת לכל יבשה נשואה חזקה שיש לה שני בנים.  
 מ'קצות. המושבה המהירה של 1821/82 היא של  
 המושבה המהירה מ'קצות המושבה המהירה  
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 1821/82. המושבה המהירה של המושבה המהירה של המושבה המהירה.

וְלִפְתָּאֵיכָא בְּיָהּ שִׁיחָתָהּ יִשְׁמַחַת קִישָׁתָהּ מִמַּצָּח סַבְבָּלָהּ סִיטָה ג.  
מִכְשָׁא יִשְׁט סִיטָה גְּזִיטָה יִרְקִישָׁה לְזֻשְׁמִיכִי וְלִפְתָּאֵיכָא חָא פְתוּסָה  
פְתוּזָלָהּ: קִישָׁתָהּ קוּשָׁה חִישָׁה נִשְׁטָה. חִשְׁתָּהּ מִשְׁחָה יִשְׁמַחַת מִשְׁחָה  
חִישָׁתָה חָא פְתוּסָה חִישָׁה וְזִי חִשְׁתָּהּ יִשְׁט סִיטָה גְּזִיטָה יִרְקִישָׁה יִשְׁמַחַת  
יִשְׁט חִשְׁתָּהּ סִיטָה גְּזִיטָה חִשְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ  
יִשְׁט חִשְׁתָּהּ סִיטָה גְּזִיטָה חִשְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ חִישְׁתָּהּ

הַיְּהוּדִים הָיוּ מְשֻׁלָּמִים בְּכָל הַיָּמִים הַלָּלוּ. וְהַיְּהוּדִים הָיוּ מְשֻׁלָּמִים בְּכָל הַיָּמִים הַלָּלוּ.

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ברנע, ארבל2, משפט, סייבל, ר/מרכז, ממד



RE: WDP, FGB, NLCT, NBLC, LFLU, HFLS, BWED, D'LE, FVBCY, BBT

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

19689

תאריך : 23.03.88

דף 1 מתוך 1

עותק 3 מתוך 12

יוצא

סודי ביותר

\* חוזם: 3,19689

\* אל: ווש/739

\* מ-: המשרד, תא: 230388, זח: 1935, דח: ר, סג: סב

\* נד: @

\* סודי ביותר/רגיל

\* ח.ר.ב.

\* השגריר - לעיניו בלבד

\* עסקת טק'ק סין-סעודיה

\* הממונה על שגרירות ארה'ב הביע תמיהה על שלמרות המחאה  
\* שהושמעה גם באזניכם על ידי מרפי, חזר מנכ'ל משרד רוה'מ,  
\* יוסי בן-אהרון והשמיע אותם דברים עצמם בפומבי.

\* לדבריו, אם בתחילה היה מקום להניח כי היתה כאן 'התחלקות'  
\* הרי שעתה יתכן כי מדובר בניצול חסר אחריות של נושא רגיש  
\* ביותר. לדבריו בכך סיכן בן-אהרון את מאמצי הממשל לטפל  
\* בנושא בצנורות הדיפלומטיים.

\* נמרוד נוביק

\* מ.ג.י

\* תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל

1988-03-08

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ט      מ ב ג ד

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות      מידי

23.3.88 תאריך/ח"כ

מס' מברק

524

## המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

טעלם סיניי'ם לסעודיה

להלן מתוך ה"יושינגטון פוסט" 23.3.88.

Q. 101.

עתונות

[illegible]

THE WASHINGTON POST

... WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1988 A23

# Talk of Israeli Raid on Saudi Missiles Concerns U.S.

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States has expressed its "concern" to Israel about a statement a senior Israeli official made suggesting that his country might strike intermediate-range Chinese missiles Saudi Arabia is acquiring, U.S. and Saudi sources said.

In a Sunday interview with Radio Israel, Yosi Ben Aharon, a close aide to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said "the possibility always exists" that Israel might strike at the missile sites. "We have a reputation that we do not wait until a potential danger becomes an actual danger," he said, according to a translation of the Hebrew text provided by Radio Israel last night.

The missiles have a range of more than 1,000 miles—2,000 for the most sophisticated—and could easily strike Israel.

Saudi sources have said the kingdom wants the missiles because of the widespread use Iran is making of missiles in its war with Iraq. There has been increasing hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the past two years, and Iran

has periodically threatened to attack Saudi Arabia for supporting Iraq.

The Israeli radio interview provoked immediate concern and "nervousness" in Saudi Arabia that Israel might be planning a strike. The Saudis contacted the U.S. government. And Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy called Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad on Sunday night.

"We expressed our concern and said this kind of statement was very unhelpful," a State Department official said last night. "This kind of public statement was very unhelpful and gets people nervous."

Israeli officials at first sought to deny Ben Aharon had made an implicit threat. But Radio Israel has rebroadcast the interview twice.

The Saudis apparently took the threat seriously because of the surprise, long-range attack Israel launched on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor outside Baghdad in June 1981. In addition, Israeli warplanes are also known to have flown along the Saudi western coast and to have entered Saudi airspace.

Ben Aharon is director general of the prime

minister's office and was involved in Shamir's wide-ranging talks with top administration officials here last week during the prime minister's visit.

Shamir is reported to have expressed his deep concern about the Chinese missiles both at the White House last Wednesday and during his talks with Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Saudi Arabia has assured the United States "categorically" that it does not have, nor intend to acquire, a nuclear capability. And China has assured Washington it will not export nuclear weapons to the Saudi kingdom, according to the State Department officials.

But Israel is reported to be concerned the Chinese CSS2 surface-to-surface missiles could be fitted with chemical warheads and fired at Israeli airfields or other targets, crippling its military capabilities.

The United States has been working to head off any misunderstanding over the missiles among Israel, Saudi Arabia and China while making clear to the Saudi government that it is unhappy the missiles have been introduced into the Arab-Israeli military situation.







שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/2

429 553

מדעתי (האישית) שהסיכויים הם זולשים וחסישים.

ג. הסיוע למצוינת ולדוד

לדבריו, המורשה דוד אובי מתכוון ברצינות לחזור לנושא המימון ה-CRF ומור  
 כדי כך להציע מחדש הצעתו לקצץ שני אחוזים מה-10.3. הזכרתי לו התבטאות אובי במליאת הבית לטעם הסיוע לדודאל  
 מברקנו 248 מה-10.3. חייב להיות /NVI/LATE, אך כנראה הוא (גוראלי) אינו בונה על הכרזה זו, ונשאר  
 מודאג מקיצוץ אפשרי.

3/1  
 למדן

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 2303881310

מס' מברק

המשרד

530

אל : מנכ"ל מדיני, מנכ"ל חצפ"א

בחירות 88

דוקקים: הסנטור ביל ברדליי מניו ג'רזי עומד להודיע היום על תמיכתו בדוקקים.

להודעה החתימה יש חשיבות רבה גם בהשפעה בניהול ג'וי. עצמה וגם משום שברדליי נחשב למועמד אפשרי בעתיד. אתמול הודיעו על תמיכה בדוקקים מושל קונטיקוט אוביל והסנטור הדמוקרטי ממדינה זו כריסטופר דוד. המוקדמות שם מתקיימות בשבוע הבא. עתה מופעלים לחצים על מושל ניו יורק קומו לציאת בתמיכה בדוקקים.

הודעה התמיכה של ברדליי תשודר בטלביזיה בניהול יורק ובפילדלפיה, שידורי טלביזיה

המקסימלית המקיפים ארבע מדינות חשובות לדוקקים: ניו יורק, פנסילבניה, קונטיקוט וניהול-ג'רזי. פרשנים טבורים שהעיתוי של ברדליי מצויין, ובזה היתה גם גדולתו ככוכב ספורט - העיתוי מתי להכנס למשחק ולנצח.

משאל של רשת אי. בי. סי. והושינגטון פוסט מראה כי דוקקים הדמוקרט היחיד היכול להביס את בוש בשיעור של 50% לעומת 45%. את כל המועמדים האחרים - ג'קסון, גור או גפהארדט יכול בוש לנצח בחפז ניכר.

בוש: בוש התייצב לימינו של רייגן בהטלת וטו על חוק הקשור בנושא שיוויון הזכויות (לפיו יופסק כל מימון פדראלי לגוף, אשר אף בחלקו, מפלה מטעמי גזע, מין או נכות). אך הוטו בוטל אתמול ע"י הסנאט והבית ברוב מוחץ והדמוקרטים מקווים לנצל נושא זה נגד בוש בבחירות הכלליות.

  
דני בלום

ל מ ה ה ה ג 2 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 4

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחור דפים

סוג בטחון שמור

דחיפות בהול לבוקר

תאריך/ז"ח 1600 23 מרס 88

543

משרד רה"מ

מס' מברק

אל: בן אהרן/לשכת רה"מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

לשלך 725

שוחחתי עם צירלי היל אשר הבטיח להביא לתשומת לב המזכיר ענינו של יולי קושרובסקי  
 כדי להעלות אותו בשיחה עם שברדנזה.

משה ארד

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

19387

תאריך: 23.03.88

שמו

יוצא \*\*

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חוזם: 3,19387

אל: 725/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 230388, זח: 1659, דח: ב, סג: שמ

נד: 8

שמו/בהול

השגריר

ראש הממשלה מבקש שתזכיר למזכיר שולץ להעלות עם שברנדזה את ענינו של יולי קושרובסקי.

בן-אהרון

צ.ש.י

תפ: רהמ

XX  
XX

6406 288

מסמך 336067  
תאריך: 23.03.88  
מסמך 336067



סוג כטחוני:

ש מ ר

תז"ח:

א ל :

מצפ"א; לשכת שה"ח; לשכת רוה"מ

ד ע :

השגריר וושינגטון

מאת :

סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק

ניו-יורק 0565 0

94 - 011

המצב השטחים ותהליך השלום.

1. במקביל לביקור רוה"מ ניצלנו שהותו של אליקים רובינשטיין להופעה בפני המנהיגות הצעירה של דור המשך ולפגישה עם צמרת JCRC בראשות לסטר פולק וקן ביאלקין. אליקים תידרך על ביקור רוה"מ כושינגטון ועל המצב בשטחים.

2. כפגישה עם צמרת JCRC דווח לנו על פגישתם עם סנסור מונייהאן, (בעקבות צירוף חתימתו למכתב 30 הסנטורים) שהובילה מונייהאן לשגר ההודעה המצ"ב לתקשורת.

מדרכי ידיד

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אישור:

מדרכי ידיד

שם השולח:

22.3.1988

תאריך:



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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March 21, 1988

Dear Friend:

Knowing of your interest in the Middle East I thought I might write you about events of the past few weeks. Secretary of State George Shultz's peace initiative represents a significant American effort to build upon the Camp David accords and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This undertaking should be welcomed by those of us who support a secure State of Israel. At the same time, valid questions have been raised as to the appropriateness of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China being invited to a Middle East Peace Conference when they continue to refuse to recognize the State of Israel and are active participants in the ongoing international efforts to delegitimize Israel and brand Zionism as a form of racial discrimination.

Secretary of State Shultz has undertaken this initiative at a time of increased violence in the territories Israel occupied during the June 1967 war. The news reports from the region are troubling to anyone who values human dignity and examines the long and troubled history of these areas. Israel did not set out to conquer the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. Her armies occupied these areas in a war started by Israel's enemies with the stated aim of "driving the Jews into the Sea." After the June 1967 war Israel waited to negotiate a peace treaty but, as Abba Eban has pointed out, "the winner may have sued for peace but the loser demanded unconditional surrender."

Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem in 1977 and got back the territory his predecessor had lost in a war of aggression. The world waits, as it has waited in vain since 1917, for a Jordanian or Palestinian Arab leader of similar courage who is prepared to meet publicly with the leaders of Israel in the name of peace. Time after time -- in 1921, 1936, and 1947 -- Jewish leadership accepted partition of Palestine, and the Arab leadership refused. Both the West Bank and The Gaza Strip were included in the Palestinian Arab state approved by the United Nations and accepted by the Zionist leadership in November of 1947. An invasion by five Arab armies killed this partition plan in the cradle and Egypt and Jordan unilaterally occupied territory promised to a Palestinian Arab State.

I have visited Israel and spoken with her democratically elected leaders about peace. I can attest to how strongly the people of Israel desire peaceful relations with their neighbors. I am pleased that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir has reiterated his nation's support for the principles embodied in the Camp David accords and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These principles continue to remain the best hope for peace in the Middle East. We are all aware of the ongoing debate within Israel concerning the

precise nature of an acceptable formula for peace. This open and vigorous debate bears witness to the vitality of Israeli democracy. There have been only eleven free elections in the long history of the Middle East. All eleven have been in Israel. Israel remains the only country in the entire Middle East in which the full array of conflicting political ideas are openly debated. This, in the final analysis, should remind Americans of just why we support Israel.

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Sincerely,



Daniel Patrick Moynihan

סגירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

אל: המשרד + בטחון

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סגירות  
דפוס...  
סווג בטחוני...  
דחיות...  
תאריך וד"ח...  
סיכום...

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקשיח - משתב"ט

לשי מנכ"ל האוצר, דברת /אוצר

לשי רה"מ (כ"כ/1)

קונגרס: סיוע חוץ לשתי"א 1989

440 -

1. בעוד שועדת התקציב בסנט עדיין מקיימת "שמיעות", הועדה המקבילה בבית הנבחרים כבר ערכה MARK-UP והכינה הצעת בית הנבחרים לחוק התקציב.

2. רצ"ב הקטע מהטיוטא לדו"ח הועדה הנוגע לסעיף 150 (עניינים בינלאומיים). כפי שתראו, רשמו "הנחה" שמדינות ק"ד יוסיפו לקבל סיוע ברמה הנוכחית (כלומר שלושה בליון דולר עבור ישראל).

למדן

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398-67

## FUNCTION 150: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Committee recommends \$16.60 billion in budget authority and \$16.20 billion in outlays for this function for fiscal year 1989. These totals represent an increase of \$0.20 billion in budget authority and a decrease of \$0.10 billion in outlays from the CBO program freeze level.

## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION

(in billions of dollars)

	1989 Budget		1990 Plan		1991 Plan	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
CBO Program Freeze (using OMB economic assumptions).....	16.40	16.30	17.20	16.05	17.80	16.05
Recommended changes:						
1. Federal Employee Pay Raise..	-0.05	-0.05	...	...	...	...
2. Adjustment to conform to summit agreement.....	+0.25	-0.05	+0.30	+0.05	...	...
Total changes from freeze...	(+0.20)	(-0.10)	(+0.30)	(+0.05)	(...)	(...)
Committee recommendation.....	16.60	16.20	17.50	16.10	17.80	16.05

## EXPLANATION OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

## 1. Federal Employee Pay Raise

The recommendation assumes a pay raise of three percent for military and civilian employees, effective in January 1989, and assumes the agencies will absorb 50 percent of the cost of the raise.

## 2. Adjustment to Conform to Summit Agreement

The recommendation includes the necessary fiscal year 1989 discretionary program funding adjustments to conform to the summit agreement of \$10.1 billion in budget authority and \$16.1 billion in outlays for discretionary programs in this function. The outyear entries show the Congressional Budget Office projections of the outyear effects of these adjustments.

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Other Assumptions

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398-67

The Committee assumes that the recommendation to abide by the summit agreement for this function will allow for continuation of the current levels of assistance to those countries covered by the Camp David accords.

**SUMMARY OF CREDIT RECOMMENDATION, NEW DIRECT LOANS AND PRIMARY LOAN GUARANTEES**

(in billions of dollars)

	1989 Budget		1990 Plan		1991 Plan	
	DL	LG	DL	LG	DL	LG
CBO Program Freeze (using OMB economic assumptions).....	5.55	9.50	5.55	9.85	5.55	10.30
Recommended changes:						
1. None						
Total changes from freeze...	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)
Committee credit recommendation...	5.55	9.50	5.55	9.85	5.55	10.30

This table summarizes the Committee's recommendation for new direct loan obligations and new primary loan guarantee commitments for credit assistance programs in this function. The recommendations reflect the effect on credit program levels of the spending recommendations discussed above.

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גדרות ישראל / וושינגטון

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מיון

דחופות

תאריך/ז"ח 88 מרץ 22 1730

מס' מברק

המשרד

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אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

בריה"מ - מז"ח

להלן מתורגם על-ידי סוזן רידג'ווי על בקורו של שר החוץ תסובייטי.

101  
יוסי גל

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING  
ON THE VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE  
BY ROZANNE RIDGWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1988

Q On a regional issue, does the Secretary, do you expect there to be any sort of resolution of a schedule -- timetable for a Soviet withdrawal on -- from Afghanistan?

SEC. RIDGWAY: We certainly will be discussing Afghanistan, and about Central America, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq -- both at the expert level -- they've brought a very large team with them, and they'll be meeting with, you know, Chet Crocker and Dick Murphy and Mike Armacost, people like that. We'll certainly be talking, with respect to Afghanistan, about withdrawal schedules and symmetry. But I'm not making any predictions as to what the outcome will be. But that certainly will be discussed. Yes?

Q Do you know how late those news conferences will be on Wednesday? And will they be separate, as they've been in the past?

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Q On the issue of the Middle East, based on the series of discussions and talks you had with the Soviets, is it your understanding now that the Soviets do acquiesce or accept the proposed international conference by the United States?

SEC. RIDGWAY: My own understanding of that issue is that the -- as last expressed by publicly by the Soviet Union -- is that their view of an international conference, their view of that conference is quite different from ours, and that it is in their mind a plenipotentiary conference. And that's what we know to be their on-the-record public view of that.

Q The status and expectations you have concerning arms embargo against Iran.

SEC. RIDGWAY: Well, certainly, we tried in February in Moscow to take account of what we heard the Soviet side saying about the need to, perhaps, have a more vigorous diplomatic exchange, and the need to give the Secretary General the impulses that he said he needed; some concern about not being hasty with respect to an embargo. And so, we said to the Soviet side when we were in the Feers and artillery to the Afghan government, and Blowpipes and Redeyes and Stingers provided by the United States to the mujaheddin. So will you explain one more time what symmetry means, and does simultaneity become a part of symmetry?

On the Middle East, the Secretary certainly, I think as he did in February, and as others have done -- Dick Murphy has also been to Moscow -- will want to bring the Soviet side up to date on where the initiative in the Middle East is, and to continue to seek Soviet views despite the very pronounced public description -- difference by the Soviets in their view of an international conference, but to see what kind of a response that we get.

Iran-Iraq, I think that the -- the dialogue has been one that we have carried out in the United Nations following the notion in Moscow in February that perhaps there are other ways to construct a second resolution, and which would take into account some of the Soviet views about more effort being needed, more dialogue; and not too quick a move to the implementation of an embargo. But that has produced nothing, and I think we will certainly want to ask the Soviet Union, then, what its intentions are with respect to Iran and Iraq, and a second resolution.

That will be the general shape of things. There will be expert meetings and the like, but I think that will be thrust of it.  
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מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

אל: לשכת רה"מ

דע: ארבי"ל 2

מזח"ים

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

לחלן מכתב לרה"מ מהועד האמריקני למען הפליטים. במכתב מציינים בין השאר שאכן גורמי טרור מוצאים מקלט במחנות.

לידיעתכם.

מ ח ג י

שח"מ רה"מ ג"ש ג"א/ג"מ  
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## UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

815 Fifteenth Street NW, Suite 610  
Washington, DC 20005  
(202) 667-0782

*Informing the public since 1958*

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March 14, 1988

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir  
Embassy of Israel  
3514 International Dr., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On the occasion of your visit to Washington, D.C., I am writing to express the concern of the U.S. Committee for Refugees about the deterioration of human rights and physical safety of refugee camp populations in the Occupied Territories. We are particularly distressed that traditional sanctuaries from violence have been violated with increasing frequency as the overall situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has continued to deteriorate.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees is a nongovernmental organization dedicated since 1958 to the protection of refugees throughout the world. In our experience, we have frequently found refugee camps to be located in conflict zones and too often have seen civilian populations put in jeopardy due to excesses of insurgent and government forces alike. We appeal to both sides to spare civilian populations from attack.

Most refugees have very limited options for escaping violence and persecution. Oftentimes presenting themselves for life in a refugee camp is their only hope for protection against the forces of violence. It is therefore of the utmost importance that every step be taken to ensure that refugees in camps be protected from threats to life and limb.

Palestinian camps in Lebanon as well as the Israeli-administered territories have not been treated as sanctuaries from violence. This, we recognize, is in no small measure a result of combatant Palestinian elements operating from these very areas. We are therefore aware of the difficulty inherent in avoiding civilian casualties in such circumstances.

However, we would suggest that certain steps could be taken to lessen the threat to noncombatant refugees.

Sanctuaries traditionally are marked by thresholds: the borders refugees cross in their initial flight; the fences surrounding their refugee camps; the walls of their hospitals and places of worship; the doors to their homes. Security requires an understanding of what lines will not be crossed. We understand that one of the factors that may have contributed to the volatility





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512 of the Palestinian rioting in December was a change of policy whereby Israeli border police pursued stone throwers into their homes. We are aware of instances in the Balata camp where injuries both to refugees and Israeli security forces resulted after homes had been entered and clashes broke out with mothers of young rioters. Women who previously had stayed in their homes were drawn into conflict from which they otherwise would have remained apart. We believe that this policy ignored important cultural traditions about the sanctity of the home and of women and that it caused far more damage to pursue stone-throwing children into their homes than whatever gains could have been made from apprehending them.

It has been widely reported that Israeli troops have been entering hospitals in search of rioters as well. This too has resulted in clashes with hospital personnel, including doctors, who by training and medical oath are charged with healing the sick and injured without regard for politics.

Most recently we learned that helicopter borne troops raided the Jelazoun refugee camp near Ramallah on March 5 and commandeered an UNRWA school to hold some 50 Palestinian prisoners. We, of course, are aware of the subversion for military purposes of the UNRWA school in Sibliin, Lebanon, discovered following the 1982 invasion. We deplore the subversion of UNRWA schools by any forces. It is vital that international organizations be respected, especially UNRWA. UNRWA and other international organizations play a vital role in protecting the rights of refugees, in providing children with hope for their futures through educational programs, and in lending stability to the region as a whole. The long-term damage to peace and stability by converting an UNRWA school into a temporary prison far outweighs any temporary gains on the part of security forces. Essentially, the principle of sanctuary is further undercut, making it more likely to erode even more due to continued abuse by all combatant forces. In such a context, the prospects for the future are not bright.

We implore you on strictly humanitarian grounds to set distinct limits on Israeli military and security movements--to say clearly and forthrightly that Israel will not violate the sanctity of hospitals, places of worship, UNRWA facilities, or homes without a limited and specifically drawn warrant. We recognize that there are those among the Palestinians who will abuse those limits, and that setting such limits therefore is very difficult for you. However, we believe that such a course of action is dictated not only by moral considerations, and regard for the safety of civilian refugees, but also because it is in Israel's practical long-term interests to maintain pockets of civility, healing, safety, and peace in the midst of the forces of violence and hatred.

Sincerely,



Roger P. Winter  
Director

cc: Yitzhak Rabin, Minister of Defense  
Chaima Dorez, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Moshe Arad  
UNRWA







1988-03-22

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דחיפות:

מילדי

סוג כסחוני:

גלוי

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

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
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מזכ"ל ועידה איסלאמית

רצ"ב מסר המזכ"ל לוועידה האיסלאמית ברכת עמון כולל התייחסות  
כיון היתר ליוזמת שולץ.

נאו"ם

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## Press Release

Department of Public Information • Press Section • New York

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SG/SM/4097  
21 March 1988

### SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MESSAGE TO MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Following is the text of a message from Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, read on his behalf today in Amman by Abdulrahim A. Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions and Regional Co-operation:

It gives me great pleasure to send my warm greetings to the distinguished Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Your organization is confronted with major political issues which are among the foremost concerns of the United Nations. Furthermore, you are meeting at a time when most of these issues are at a critical and delicate stage. Though different from one another in nature and origin, they have a common denominator: each cries for a just and honourable solution and each calls for the deployment of statesmanship of the highest order.

The catastrophic war between Iran and Iraq is a problem which involves two neighbours, each of whom is an important member of the Islamic Conference itself. This war is now in its eighth year. The world has reacted in horror as the war has exacted a mounting toll of human life and suffering and material destruction in both countries, threatened neutral shipping and the freedom of navigation and posed an ever present danger to the security and stability of the region where the present meeting is taking place.

The recent resumption and intensification of the war of the cities, in spite of many appeals of the international community, has deepened this anxiety and underscored the paramount and urgent need to bring this war to a swift end in accordance with resolution 598, which the Security Council adopted unanimously on 20 July 1987.

In pursuance of a mandate given to me by the Council under that resolution, I have engaged in several rounds of intensive, high-level consultations aimed at the full and rapid implementation of the resolution. In the light of recent developments, I have now proposed to the Governments of Iran and Iraq to undertake with me at New York a new round of consultations

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Press Release SG/SM/4097  
21 March 1988

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for a limited period to explore the possibility of moving forward towards that goal. I very much hope that both parties will respond positively and with a constructive spirit. I also count on the support of the international community -- and, in particular, the members of this organization -- in creating conditions conducive to the success of these efforts.

The recent developments in the Israel-occupied territories have been a poignant and tragic reminder of the plight of the Palestinians living under occupation and of the need for a solution to the Palestinian question.

Last year in my statement to the Islamic Summit in Kuwait, I drew attention to the dangers inherent in a stalemated peace process and expressed the need for renewed efforts aimed at a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. It was with this in mind that I then undertook a special effort to promote the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East. I felt that there was widespread agreement on the part of the international community that the convening of such a conference, under United Nations auspices, offered the best chance of successfully negotiating a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, despite this favourable trend and my sustained efforts, it proved not to be possible to overcome one major obstacle, namely, the inability of the Government of Israel as a whole to agree on the principle of an international conference under United Nations auspices.

The uprising in the occupied territories which started last December has brought into sharper focus the necessity of resolving the fundamental problems of the occupation and injected a new sense of urgency into the efforts to promote a peaceful settlement. As you know, the Security Council has, since the middle of last December, held a number of consultations and meetings on the situation in the occupied territories. In my report of 21 January to the Council, I outlined a series of steps that I felt would be helpful in effectively addressing both the immediate and the longer-term problems. Moreover, in my concluding remarks I pointed out that the underlying problem in the occupied territories could only be resolved through a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and taking fully into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. Such a settlement should be negotiated by means of an international conference under United Nations auspices, with the participation of all the parties concerned.

In this connection, there is a wide measure of agreement within the international community that it should be based on three considerations: withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied since June 1967; acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the States in the region and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, and finally a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian problem based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. Within this context, the question of Jerusalem also remains of primary importance.

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21 March 1988555  
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We must seize the opportunity created by the dramatic and moving events of recent weeks to promote actively the search for a solution. Any diplomatic effort that will advance the process is helpful, and in this connection I am following with great interest the United States initiative. For my part, I will maintain my special effort and continue to explore with the parties ways of moving ahead. In this endeavour, I will continue to rely on the support of the Security Council, particularly that of the permanent members.

It is most regrettable that, at this critical stage, domestic legislation has been adopted in the host country of the United Nations which, if enforced, would impede the functioning of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations. As you know, I have taken a very firm stand on this matter and the General Assembly has strengthened my position by taking serious cognizance of this problem and calling for effective measures to ensure full respect for the Headquarters Agreement of 1947. It is vitally important to the United Nations that international law prevail in this as in any other matter which involves the fulfilment of their legal obligations by Member States.

The situation in Lebanon, particularly southern Lebanon, continues to be of concern to me. In spite of persistent efforts, UNIFIL has not been able to fulfil the objectives set by the Security Council, namely the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the restoration of international peace and security. Those objectives remain as valid today as they were 10 years ago when the Force was established, and we shall continue to pursue them. In this regard, I must repeat my condemnation of the recent abduction of an unarmed officer serving with UNIFIL. Quite apart from humanitarian considerations, such acts undermine both the effectiveness of the Force and the readiness of Member States to continue to contribute military personnel to it.

Over many years now, I have been continuously involved, through my Special Representative, in a sustained effort to achieve a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. As you know, a round of talks is being held at this moment at the Palais des Nations at Geneva. All are following these talks with ardent hope that this long and difficult effort will come to an early and successful conclusion. What is at stake is peace in Afghanistan as well as the consolidation of an entirely different approach to the solution of regional conflicts.

Another urgent concern of the United Nations, shared by your organization, relates to the deteriorating situation in southern Africa. Here is a region endowed with considerable natural resources and composed of young States anxious to establish stable political conditions and embark on the great tasks of development in an environment of peace. Most regrettably, their aspirations continue to be thwarted by South Africa's policy of entrenched racial discrimination, by its aggressive acts of destabilization against neighbouring States and by its refusal to implement the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

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21 March 1988555  
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At the core of these problems is the policy of apartheid. It has been condemned by all nations as a gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. Over and above the iniquity of the system itself, the situation has been aggravated by South Africa's latest measures to stifle peaceful protest against apartheid, and to prohibit public statements by opposition leaders. Unless rescinded, such measures threaten to block all avenues of peaceful change and lead to a spiral of violence. There is no alternative to determined efforts by the international community to maintain pressure on South Africa. The object is to make South Africa abandon the dangerous course it has followed so far and enter into a meaningful dialogue with the recognized leaders of its people, regardless of race and colour, with a view to the establishment of a democratic and racially harmonious society. Nothing less will address the root cause of the problem and eliminate a source of continuous tension in a vital region of the world.

I remain concerned by the state of affairs in Cyprus. Negotiations have been deadlocked for the past two years and a favourable climate, necessary to create a minimum of mutual confidence, continues to elude us. The reversal of this trend and the resumption of an effective negotiating process remains one of my priority objectives. I shall, therefore, persevere in my effort to assist the parties to reach an agreement that would establish the federal republic envisaged in the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. Towards this end, I have appointed a new Special Representative who has recently taken up his functions in Nicosia. I have appealed to all concerned to take fresh stock of the situation and to make positive gestures that will help my Special Representative to begin his work under the most favourable conditions possible. It is important that the current opportunity not be missed as there can be no doubt that the continuation of the existing situation is in no-one's interest.

Finally, I would like to stress that if there is a positive factor operating at present in relation to all these issues, it is that the attention of the United Nations is focused on all of them in one way or another. There is a greater consciousness now than existed some time ago of the impelling necessity of achieving their just and pacific settlement. While this by itself does not lessen the suffering and agony of the people involved, it certainly holds out the promise that if the necessary effort is made in a co-ordinated manner, solutions can and will be achieved. This is an element of promise but it is also an element which accentuates the challenge to your organization and to the United Nations itself. A renewed spirit of pragmatism consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations is the key to making the appropriate response to this challenge.

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הסברה - נ'ו-י'ורק

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שג וושינגטון , קונסולרית

JOHN BENVENUTO : 11717

לשולך 00357 מ'יום 15 מרס 88

1. בבדיקה שנעשתה עם כל הגורמים המוסמכים ניתן לקבוע בוודאות גמורה כי הנ"ל לא חוזר לא 'גורש' מן הארץ. כמובן לא נמנעה ממנו הזכות להאריך את רשיון ישיבתו בישראל או בשטחים.

2. מאז 1986 האיש בא ויוצא מן הארץ ללא כל עיכובים. לאחרונה הוא נכנס לכאן ב-4.1.88, ויצא לארה"ב לפני כשבועיים והחשוב מכל להפרכת טענותיו, על גירושו כביכול, היא העובדה שהוא רשאי לשוב ארצה בכל עת שיחפץ.

3. להערכתנו נוח לו, מטעמים השמורים עמו, להציג את עצמו בפני הציבור האמריקאי כקורבן למדיניות הישראלית בשטחים, בכך שגורש כביכול וע'י זאת להוסיף לעצמו מימד של יוקרה או גבורה. נראה כי ההסבר המעשי היחיד לנסיעתו לארה'ב בשבועות האחרונים הוא בשל היותו מובטל מעבודתו בהוראה, בגלל סגירת בתי-הספר ברמאללה בחודשים האחרונים.



05-10-1964

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4. יש להכחיש את טענותיו לגירוש מכל וכל. לחיזוק טענותיכם בפני, ידידיכם בניו-יורק המתעניינים לסיבות גירושו, תוכלו להסתייע במידע הבא:

א. הנ'ל נטל חלק בהפגנה אלימה שהתקיימה ברמאללה ב-7.2.88, ושבה היו מעורבים תלמידים ומספר מורים מביה"ס לבנות של הקוויקרים בעיר. למרות העובדה שהיה מעורב בהתכתשות פיזית עם כוחות צה"ל בתקרית זו-הוא לא נעצר באותו תאריך.

ב. במספר ארועים בחודש פברואר 88 נראה האיש בנסיבות חשודות במקומות שונים ברמאללה שבהם התקיימה פעילות אלימה של מפגינים ומתפרעים מקומיים בהפרות סדר.

ג. ב-27.2.88 נעצר למשך יממה אחת, לאחר שמשטרת רמאללה מצאה בכליו פרסומים ועלונים החשודים כחומר הסתה. למחרת היום שוחרר ממעצרו לאחר שמנהל ביה"ס הקוויקרי ברמאללה הפקיד ערבות בסך-5000 ש"ח כי האיש יופיע כאשר ייקרא ע"י בית-המשפט, אשר עתיד לדון בהאשמות המיוחסות לו.

5. לידיעתכם - זהו מקרה מובהק שבו אין לנציגויות הקונסולריות האמריקאיות בישראל שום טענות כלפינו, ובניגוד למקרים אחרים הם לא ביקשו את התערבותנו או את חקירתנו. לדבריהם ההאשמות המיוחסות אליו מצביעות, לכאורה, על הפרות החוק והם בטוחים שהאיש יזכה למשפט הוגן ויוכל לטעון שם להגנתו, בהתאם לכל הזכויות השמורות לו ע"פ החוק.

ש.בינו

ת.פ.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,שהבט,אביטל,הסברה,ליאור,מזתים,בירן,  
מצפא,סייבל,משפט,קונס,מתאשטחים,פשלמה/בינו

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the results of the survey.

2. The second part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different regions of the country.

3. The third part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different sectors of the economy.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different social groups.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different administrative regions.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different administrative regions.

7. The seventh part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different administrative regions.

8. The eighth part of the report deals with the results of the survey in the different administrative regions.



\* אדם : שם-רשום / שטח / מרחב / זמן / אזור / יישוב / מקום

\*ת.פ: שעה, דקה, שנייה, מנ.כל, נ.מנ.כל, ר/מ.רנ.ז, רנ, אמן, בירן, מצפא

1. The first part of the report  
describes the general situation  
of the country.

2. The second part of the report

describes the situation

in the various districts of the country.

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7. The third part of the report

describes the situation

in the various districts of the country.

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9. The fourth part of the report

describes the situation

in the various districts of the country.

10. The fifth part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

11. The sixth part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

12. The seventh part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

13. The eighth part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

14. The ninth part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

15. The tenth part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

16. The eleventh part of the report

describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

17.

18.

19.

20.

The twelfth part of the report describes the situation in the various districts of the country.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

384/1

\* 19028

\* תאריך : 23.03.68 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 2 \*

\* שותק 3 מתוך 32 \*

\* \*\* טודי ביותר \*

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\* חוזם: 3/19028 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* מ-: רוש, נר: 503, תא: 220368, זח: 1730, זח: מ, ס: 1730 \*

\* נד: 2 \*

\* טודי ביותר/מיד \*

\* אל: מנכ"ל מדיני \*

\* מנכ"ל ראשי \*

\* מנהל מ"ד \*

\* תהליך מדיני \*

\* להלן משיחה עם דניס רוס ומרסין אינדיק, שחזר זה עתה \*

\* משיחות במז"ת (בירדן) נפגש עם הנסין חסן, מרואן קאס \*

\* עזון אבו-עודה ואחרימ). \*

\* א. תשובת חסין. רוס אמר שהמלך לא נתן לחיוב תשובה \*

\* שלילית ואמר שברצונו להמשיך לעבוד עם גורמים באזור \*

\* כאשר ברור, לני רוס, שנוכחתו להחזרת התמיכה הערבית \*

\* ובניכוח השבת תמיכת אש"ף. המלך גם הוסיף שברצונו לקבל \*

\* הבהרות נוספות, אך לא נרש מהן. המלך לא התבקש לתת \*

\* תשובה עם תאריך מסוים, אך אמר שיתנה בקרוב (SOON) \*

\* הערכתו של רוס היא שהתשובה תהיה "כן אבל" כאשר \*

\* המלך מבקש לדעת אם ברה"ט וישראל מעוללות בתכנית ונתנו \*

\* לה תשובה חיובית. \*

\* אינדיק אמר שהתרשמותו הברורה משיחותיו הוא שהירדנים \*

\* אינם רואים דחיפת הנוצרת התנועה. הנסין חסן אמר \*

\* לו שהם מקבלים אותו כ- TIME LINE אך לא כ- DATE LINE. \*

\* הירדנים מעריכים כי המאורעות בשטחים לא החמירו את \*

\* מצבם ונסונו של דבר בהיותם מרניו מרנזי בכל מתרון \*

\* יאלצו הפלשתינאים ושותפים אחרים לסבסון לבוא אליהם. \*



1. The first part of the report  
describes the general situation  
of the country.

2. The second part of the report  
describes the situation in the  
different regions of the country.

3. The third part of the report

describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

4. The fourth part of the report

describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

5. The fifth part of the report  
describes the situation in the  
different regions of the country.

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different regions of the country.

7. The seventh part of the report

describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

8. The eighth part of the report

describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

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describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

10. The tenth part of the report

describes the situation in the

different regions of the country.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2  
עמק 3 מתוך 32

\*היורדנים שונדים על כן שערבאת יקבל את הנאיהם למשלחת  
\*משותפת כאשר הם שומרים לעצמם את הברירה במשלחת כזו.  
\*(לפי דוס אמרו הסובייטים ליורדנים כי הם תומכים בייצוג  
\*פלסטינאי במסגרת משלחת נשותמת - כן אמרו להם היורדנים  
\*רהם מצנים לשמוע האט הסובייטים יאשרו זאת בשיחות  
\*(מחר). היורדנים גם מוקשים תמיכה טכניות סודית במהלכיהם  
\*ותמיכה כללית של שאר מדינות ערב. וראינו משום כן  
\*בשלילה את הנסיון לכנס את הליגה הערבית, שכן ברור  
\*להם שההחלטות שתקבלנה רק תתמנה באש"פ ותחלשנה את  
\*יורדן. היורדנים, לפי אינדיק, קיבלו בהשדנות את ביקורו  
\*של חביב במרוקו לאור 'התרגיל' שעשה להם המלך חסן  
\*ב-1985 בהציעו הנאים 'משונדים' לאש"פ. דוס אמר שנסיעת  
\*חביב למרוקו באה להשלים חלל מסויים ביחסים בין שתי  
\*המדינות לאור מספר ביטולים של ביקור המלך כאן ואי  
\*יכולתו של המזכיר להתערב במרוקו בשל אילוצי זמן ללואד  
\*יצא חביב, לפי דוס, במקום מרבי שביקורו שם בוטל בשל  
\*מותו של אחיו).

\*ב. השיחות עם ברה"מ. לפי דוס הסובייטים מתכוונים לשיחות  
\*משמעותיות בנושא מז"ת, שכן הביאו את כל הצוות העוסק  
\*בנושא, להוציא ברוטנץ. לדבריו, הצד האמריקאי עומד  
\*לומר לסובייטים שאם ברצונם בתפקיד בלשהו בתהליך עליהם  
\*על הסובייטים TO DELIVER  
\*את אש"פ ואת סוריה. במהלך השיחה התפתח ויכוח כאשר  
\*אינדיק רצה'מ שואלים את דוס מה היא הגדרת ה- ROLE  
\*שיתנו לסובייטים תמורת 'השרות' שהם מבקשים מהם,  
\*ומדוע צריכים הסובייטים להסכים לדרישה האמריקאית.  
\*דוס טען שבשיחות מרבי בנוסקה היה ברור שלסובייטים  
\*רצון עז להשתלב בתהליך, מה גם שהמדובר ביוזמה אמריקאית  
\*כאשר הסובייטים אינם רוצים להראות 'מחוץ למשחק'.

ערן. =

את: שהח,רהם,שהבט,מנכל,תמנכלר/מרנז,רב,אמן,בירן,מצפא





שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

1/2

505

המשרד

סגור  
ד.../... מחור... 2... דפיס  
סוג בסחוני... שמור  
דחיסות... קל  
מאריך וזייח... 1645.22 מרס 88  
שם... 505

אל: לשכת רה"מ

דע: ארכ"ל 2

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

המ"ב לידועתכם, למקרה שלא הגיעכם במישרין. ההעתק הגיע לשכת השגריר כאן.

מתני

החל 3  
קתן 1  
סאנא 2  
גס 3

**AMNESTY  
INTERNATIONAL  
USA**

Group #228 Columbia-Laurel, Maryland

March 18, 1988

505  
2/2

Yitzhak Shamir  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Hakiriya  
Ruppin Street  
Jerusalem 91919  
Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As a member of the U.S. section of Amnesty International, I wanted to take the occasion of your visit to the United States to raise certain concerns about the recent deterioration of human rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These abuses include severe and often indiscriminate beatings of Palestinian demonstrators and bystanders, including women and children, by Israel Defense Forces personnel. Beatings with rocks, rifle butts, and clubs have resulted in scores of serious injuries and go well beyond what might be considered reasonable force, even in response to stone throwing.

We find abhorrent that beating of demonstrators has become an officially stated policy of your government. The Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Rabin, gave license to the armed forces to beat indiscriminately when he announced in mid-January, "The first priority is to use force, might, beatings." Such a policy is inconsistent with the norms of a civilized society.

Thousands of Palestinians have been subject to arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention in the past several months as well. The circumstances of these detentions give rise to fears that mistreatment could occur during incarceration and interrogation. We understand that lawyers and family members have had extreme difficulty in visiting detainees or even in finding out their whereabouts. Amnesty International has received numerous reports, including affidavits, that detainees have been beaten, kicked, and punched on arrest and while being taken into custody. Interrogation methods described by former detainees include hoodings, beatings all over the body including the head and genitals, falaqa (beatings on the soles of the feet), being hung by a rope from the ceiling and swung from wall to wall, prolonged exposure to cold weather or air conditioning, solitary confinement for between 2 to 15 days, prolonged sleep deprivation, electric shocks, and verbal abuse and threats. Lawyers' complaints to the court or the IDF about allegations of mistreatment have been ignored.

We respectfully ask you to call for an immediate stop to beatings and torture, to ensure that no one is subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, and that fair and prompt trials are guaranteed for all. We further call for an independent judicial inquiry into all killings and allegations of torture.

Sincerely,

Bill Frelick



Amnesty International is a worldwide human rights movement which works impartially for the release of prisoners of conscience: men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, color, ethnic origin, sex, religion, or language, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence. Amnesty International opposes torture and the death penalty in all cases without reservation and advocates fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners. Amnesty International is independent of all governments, political factions, ideologies, economic interests and religious creeds. It has consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC), UNESCO and the Council of Europe, has cooperative relations with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and has observer status with the Organization of African Unity (Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees). Amnesty International was the recipient of the 1977 Nobel Prize for Peace.

5" J.H.F.

5" ✓

~~new line~~

by v. d.

Footmen in the

in the garden

7 1/2  
11

24 1/2  
25 1/2





# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 21, 1988

Dear Friend:

Knowing of your interest in the Middle East I thought I might write you about events of the past few weeks. Secretary of State George Shultz's peace initiative represents a significant American effort to build upon the Camp David accords and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This undertaking should be welcomed by those of us who support a secure State of Israel. At the same time, valid questions have been raised as to the appropriateness of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China being invited to a Middle East Peace Conference when they continue to refuse to recognize the State of Israel and are active participants in the ongoing international efforts to delegitimize Israel and brand Zionism as a form of racial discrimination.

Secretary of State Shultz has undertaken this initiative at a time of increased violence in the territories Israel occupied during the June 1967 war. The news reports from the region are troubling to anyone who values human dignity and examines the long and troubled history of these areas. Israel did not set out to conquer the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. Her armies occupied these areas in a war started by Israel's enemies with the stated aim of "driving the Jews into the Sea." After the June 1967 war Israel waited to negotiate a peace treaty but, as Abba Eban has pointed out, "the winner may have sued for peace but the loser demanded unconditional surrender."

Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem in 1977 and got back the territory his predecessor had lost in a war of aggression. The world waits, as it has waited in vain since 1917, for a Jordanian or Palestinian Arab leader of similar courage who is prepared to meet publicly with the leaders of Israel in the name of peace. Time after time -- in 1921, 1936, and 1947 -- Jewish leadership accepted partition of Palestine, and the Arab leadership refused. Both the West Bank and The Gaza Strip were included in the Palestinian Arab state approved by the United Nations and accepted by the Zionist leadership in November of 1947. An invasion by five Arab armies killed this partition plan in the cradle and Egypt and Jordan unilaterally occupied territory promised to a Palestinian Arab State.

I have visited Israel and spoken with her democratically elected leaders about peace. I can attest to how strongly the people of Israel desire peaceful relations with their neighbors. I am pleased that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir has reiterated his nation's support for the principles embodied in the Camp David accords and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These principles continue to remain the best hope for peace in the Middle East. We are all aware of the ongoing debate within Israel concerning the

precise nature of an acceptable formula for peace. This open and vigorous debate bears witness to the vitality of Israeli democracy. There have been only eleven free elections in the long history of the Middle East. All eleven have been in Israel. Israel remains the only country in the entire Middle East in which the full array of conflicting political ideas are openly debated. This, in the final analysis, should remind Americans of just why we support Israel.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. Moynihan', with a stylized, flowing script.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan





1029 2/3 - 2 -

המצרים, שראו את עראפת בקהיר ובטוניס, טענו שאש"פ רגוע יותר לגבי היוזמה האמריקאית ולכן חושבים שיכולים היום ללחוץ על אש"פ להגמשת עמדותיו.

לטענתם, עראפת מבין חשיבות היוזמה אך האנשים סביבו לוחצים לגיבוש קו נוקשה.

חביב הדגיש שאין מקום לאש"פ אלא אם ימולאו החנאים הידועים. מובראק השיב שיפעל כך שלא יעשה דבר אשר ימנע מישראל לשבת לשולחן המו"מ.

מובראק דווח לחביב על מאמצי מצרים לחתום בין ירדן לאש"פ ועל נסיונו לעודד פגישה בין עראפת למלך, אבל חוסר האמון ביניהם הוא בסיסי ומהותי.

מגיד העלה אפשרות של מתכונת תלת-צדדית (מצרית-ירדנית-פלסטינית). מובראק לא הלך בכוון זה. עם זאת, מובראק לא מנע מאוסמה לפתח הרעיון של חפקיד מרכזי יחד למצרים.

ממגיד הובן שמצרים רואה עצמה כמחוץ בין ירדן לפלסטינים, עקב הפער הגדול וחוסר האמון בין שני הצדדים.

המצרים עודדו המזכיר להפגש עם קבוצה של פלסטינאים. מהשטחים ומחוץ לשטחים.

המצרים חושבים שהדרך לקיום מפגש כזה בעמון עודה ארוכה, מבחינת המצרים החשיבות היא לעצם קיום המפגש ולא למיקומו. מוכנים לארח בקהיר אך לא עומדים על כך.

המצרים ביקשו מארה"ב שלא ללחוץ יחד על המידה בענין קצב ההתקדמות ביחסי ירדן-אש"פ.

בהקשר הטרור, חביב ביקש מהמצרים ללחוץ על אש"פ להפסיק הטרור.

הנשיא ושה"ח דווחו לחביב על מחאתם נוכח דברי שמיר כאשר למעורבות מצרים ומידת השיחוף שלהם, כביכול, בפיגוע בנגב.

מובראק הודיע לחביב שהמצרים יעמדו בכל התחייבויותיהם בהקשרי הסכם השלום עם ישראל.

1029 3/3

המצרים הודיעו לחביב שהם מוכנים בהקשר מחנה קנדה לשלם את עלות העברת הנושפחות (הנושא עלה בהקשרי ההפגנות בצד המצרי של הגבול).

נמרוד ביקש מחר היוז לבדד מה עומד מאחורי הרעיון של שיחות טרילטרליות (מגיד) ותפקיד משמעותי למצרים בשיחות הביטרליות (אוסמה).

היוז הבטיח לבדד. הבטיח גם דווח על שיחות חביב בירדן כבר הערב, או מחר בבוקר.

היוז מדווח כי חוס פקרינג יחזור ארצה ביום ה' או בשבוע הבא.

"אנ. סט"ח"

2

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	ר"ר: _____
עופס מברק	מחור: _____
יחידות:	
מכרז לכרזה סוג כסחובי:	
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	מאת : גאו"ס

אל: ארבל 2  
רע: סמנכל ארבל  
מאת: יוחנן ביין

שאלת פלסטין - ועידה בי"ל למברקם 751 (חוזם 15649)

1. במקביל לאיגרת המזכ"ל אלינו ולשאר "הצדדים", שיגר המזכ"ל איגרת גם לנשיא מועבי"ט כמתחייב מסעיף אופרטיבי 7 בהחלטה ס A/42/66. נראת שנשיא מועבי"ט יערוך כימים הקרובים התיעצויות בילטרליות בנדרון עם חברות מועבי"ט - וישיב למזכ"ל על תוצאות התיעצויותיו.
  2. שוחחנו עם כמה חברות - וכולל מצרים - שאינן מייחסות חשיבות לאיגרת ולבקשה להשיב תוך שבוע. לא ברורה להם סיבת הפניה בכתב דוקא השנה. אשתקד כזכור היו התיעצויות, וכן איתנו (המנכ"ל) ושליחות גולדינג לאיזור. עתה מסתבר שהמזכ"ל מבקש לצאת ידי חובה בלכוד בדיווח פורמלי כמתבקש בהחלטה.
  3. שוחחתי עם ז'אן קלוד איימה. גם לו לא היה הסבר מדוע מצא המזכ"ל לנחוץ לפנות השנה באיגרת - אמר כי אשתקד, כזכור, חרג המזכ"ל בשיחותיו מ-C 38/58, ורצונו עתה רק למלא הנדרש ממנו בלבד במסגרת ההחלטה ולשם דגווח זה דרושות לו תגובות פורמליות. אלה יכולות להינתן בכתב או בע"פ.
  4. מוצע כי בתגובתנו נפנה המזכ"ל לתשובתנו במסמך A/39/214 מ-27 באפריל 1984 (ראו נא מברקנו 371 מ-15 דנא) תוך ציון שלא חל שינוי בעמדתנו.
  5. א: אשור נא.
- ב. לשיקולכם והכרעתכם האם לענות בכתב או בע"פ.

נאו"ס

אישור:

שם השולח: יוחנן ביין

תאריך: 21.3.88

END



# In Israel, Shamir Stands at Center of Right and Left

By Amos Perlmutter

WASHINGTON

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's U.S. visit raises a number of questions about his position in Israel's government. Is Shamir just a dogmatic ideologue, an unrepentant terrorist, a defiant member of the old guard, a right-wing extremist? The answer is perhaps a surprising no, and lies in the nature of contemporary Israeli political life. It says much about Shamir, the political bloc he represents and the party he heads, as well as about the nature and standing, politically and electorally, of the "opposition" Labor Alignment.

The current political situation in Israel is complex and cannot be perceived correctly by looking at public-opinion polls which, in any case, are often deceptive and misleading.

The political spectrum in Israel is clearly divided between two major political and ideological camps—and electoral blocs—containing diverse and sometimes extreme subgroups. Shamir's power and appeal lie in the Nationalist bloc, composed from left to right of the National Religious Party and Herut moderates, to the Liberals, to the Herut radicals, to the now splintered Renaissance Party and to the extreme-right Kahanite fringe, considered pariahs. Shamir is leader of this bloc.

The alternative, the other major political bloc, is the Liberal bloc, comprised of the Mapam Marxist Party, the Progressive List for Peace (the Jewish-Arab minorities party), the Citizens Party, the Liberal Party and Labor, which is deeply divided into several factions. Peres heads the center group of Labor. Jerusalem party secretary Uzi Baram heads the old, historic Mapai Party while the current defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, heads the United Kibbutz Movement. Ranging to the right, there is also the faction of the Moshavim (cooperative agricultural settlements), which is as close as the Liberal bloc gets to a "complete Israel" movement, causing a convergence with the

20/3  
moderates of Herut in Likud.

If you lay out the two camps on an electoral map stretching from the Kahanites on the extreme right to the Progressive List for Peace on the extreme left, one would find Shamir occupying almost the exact center—along with Peres. The difference between the two is that Shamir is slightly to the right of center, Peres slightly to the left.

Shamir is hardly the extreme, fringe politician he is often perceived to be. In fact, he approaches the center of the center, which explains the role of Likud, the most powerful group in the Nationalist bloc. Likud has repeatedly demonstrated it can win at the polls and can put together coalitions to form a government. In the 1981 and 1984 elections, it stood as a party that could win as a right-of-center party. It is Likud that can form a coalition government, albeit a narrow one, with the support of the nationalist bloc. The crucial fact about Labor is that it cannot form any sort of government in coalition with the Liberal bloc, even if the Arab Communist Party rallies to its side.

Likud today is what Mapai was in the days of David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, an institutionalized party able to form a narrow government coalition. Menachem Begin, a brilliant tactical, electoral and parliamentary politician, built Likud into a center-conservative party with radical and nationalist ideological tendencies. However, its electoral support comes from the parties to the right of Likud.


Ze'ev Jabotinsky built Zionist Revisionism, Likud's forerunner, as a one-man party. It stayed that way under Begin and remains so with Shamir. Jabotinsky and Begin were both charismatic leaders, something Shamir obviously is not. Nonetheless, Likud is a single-leader party. Jabotinsky and Begin, however authoritarian and authoritative, were constantly challenged from within by powerful and ambitious Zionist Revisionists. Both weathered the opposition, and so has Shamir to date.

Labor, on the other hand, was historically a party divided by ideological splits typical to socialist movements in Europe and the United States, between Marxists and Democratic Socialists. It was never dominated by a single person, even under Ben-Gurion. Herut and Likud were domi-

Amos Perlmutter is a professor of political science at American University. His most recent book is "The Life and Times of Menachem Begin" (Doubleday).

LA Times cont...





RICHARD MILHOLLAND / for The Times

dominated by charismatic figures like Jabotinsky and Begin and to a lesser degree, Shamir and his allies, the "Princes"—such as Benjamin Netanyahu, now Israel's ambassador to the United Nations—comprising almost a familial rule of Herut-Likud. They give the party its tone, deciding on issues, government appointments and promotions.

Like Begin, Shamir and his followers are ideological pragmatists, a description that would appear to be inherently contradictory; how can someone be ideological and pragmatic at the same time? Yet,

there is a long history of nationalist, highly ideological leaders who were precisely that, stretching from Charles de Gaulle to Winston Churchill; and in the United States, from Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin D. Roosevelt and even to Richard M. Nixon. These leaders were not seduced to the point of ideological dogmatism by their own rhetoric and seized historical moments with utter pragmatism. Only De Gaulle could have torn France away from Algeria, and only the staunchly anti-communist Nixon could have launched the U.S. initiative toward China.

Closer to the issue at hand is Begin himself who was seen, when elected, as an unregenerate ideologue of the worst sort—unbending, unrepentant and irresponsible. Yet it was Begin who responded to Anwar Sadat's challenge and seized the moment to negotiate the Camp David accords.

Then it was Begin who pursued completion of the accords and voted for them, even as Shamir and all Herut members of the Knesset voted against them. Today, Shamir maintains a relationship to his party's radicals, such as Ariel Sharon and Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, similar to Begin's earlier relationship to him. Shamir could defy Begin just as Sharon is sure to defy him if Shamir should back an international peace conference to negotiate the projected autonomy of Gaza and the West Bank—the occupied territories.

In 1979, Shamir opposed the Camp David accords but since he took power in 1983, he has moved his party and allies closer to the center—even though few are willing to credit him for such a feat, preferring to see him as an extremist of the right.

Why then has Shamir not become the ideological pragmatist that Begin was and unraveled the Palestinian deadlock? Because Shamir lacks a Sadat for a partner—there are no pragmatic ideologues in the Palestinian camp. Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization is unacceptable as a negotiating participant and partner, not only to Shamir but also to Peres. Today, there appears to be no political alternative to Arafat among the Palestinian leaders, not even among the stone-throwing rebels. The PLO remains extremist and terrorist, as it demonstrated by the hijacking of a civilian bus recently, with predictably tragic and bloody results.

In any election, Shamir stands to gain considerably. The Nationalist bloc is better organized and mobilized than the Liberal bloc. It is sewn into one ideological cloth while the liberal group is far less cohesive, a divided mixture of Marxists, Socialists and the urban middle class of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem.

Shamir, like any politician in a democratically elected country, can act only within the confines of his given political mandate. The mandate now is neither clear nor conciliatory. Like Begin, he is careful not to endanger the future of his party; he wants to win the next election. For him to go beyond his constituency he needs a Palestinian partner, that person who continues to be so conspicuously absent. □

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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סוג בשחוני סודי  
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המשרד + משהב"ט

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: מקש"ח/משהב"ט

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

טילים טילים לסעודיה

מכרזת בודין, מח' סעודיה במחמ"ד. לדבריה, המידע הזה כפניהם לא יותר משבועיים - שלושה. הם גם הופתעו. להערכתה, המדליף הוא מהפנטגון וכדונתו מגיעה בטעויות. מעולם הסעודים לא הראו על כוונה לרכוש טילים מסוג זה ואין לאמרוקנים כאלה לאספקה לסעודיה. במחמ"ד יש כעס-מה על סין שהפכה ספקית נשק וטילים לכל מדינות המפרץ ללא אינהיביציות, לא ידעה על מחשבה או תגובה כלשהי לגבי סין.

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\* אל:המשרד

\* מ-:רוש,נר:405,תא:170388,זח:2100,זח:ב,סג:סב

\* נד:@

\* סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

\* אל:מנכ"ל מדיני

\* מנכ"ל ראה"מ, לוס אנג'לס

\* השגריר, לוס אנג'לס

\* יזמת שלום.

\* מרמי מטר שמילין חביב יוצא מחר לירדן ויפגש עם המלך

\* ביום ב' הקרוב.

\* ערן.==

\* תמ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל

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\*  $\mathcal{H}_1 = \{X_1, \dots, X_n\}$  and  $\mathcal{H}_2 = \{X_1, \dots, X_n\}$ .





סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

דף.....מחור.....דפים

סוג מסמך.....

דחיות.....

תאריך וז"ח.....

שם מי שכתב.....

אל:

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מבלי שהסורים "הרגו" אותו. (ה) חזרת מצרים למחנה הערבי. ודיט רואה, לא בכדי, כסמלית את התמטות "חזית העמידה האיתנה" עם חידוש יחסי 'רד'-ת-מצרים. נכון שרד"ת מעולם לא היתה כה מוביל בה, אך אין לו ספק שברה"מ שותפת סוד להליכת עדן לעבר מצרים. לכך יש תוצאה ממשית המתבטאת בירידת מעמד פלג הבע"ת הפרו סודי ברד"ת, אסד כבר גם לא בטוח בעמדת אלג'יריה. מה שברור לו, כלאחרים, שהוא עתה עמוד נושא של אש"פ. (ה) אש"פ. ודיט משוכנע שהשמועות על שפור כביכול ביחסים מכוונות מסוריה ללא בסיס. אסד רוצה לערער את בטחונו העצמי של ערפאת (גם בעקבות ההתרחשויות בגדמ"ע) בכל הקשר לחדוש הדיאלוג אש"פ-ירדן. הידיעות על נכונות לשיפור יחסי דמשק-אש"פ המופצות ע"י סורים שונים (כגון אלו בניקוסיה) מכוונות להכניס ספק בערפאת שמא יש אמת כלשהי באשמות לשפר היחסים והן הליכה לעבר ירדן תסגל בסיכויים לכך. (ו) ישראל. אסד לא מעוניין בתהליך שלום בשל חוסר אמונתו שישראל תוזזר הגולן. במצבו האסטי הנוכחי אין לו אופציות פתוחות. השונון האסטי' הולך ונעלם. במשך 5 שנים אסד טפח חלום זה, עתה המציאות טופחת על פניו. סוריה בונהליך של החלשות צבאית (ארגון חצבא, צמצומים, חקטנת התקציב וכדו"ב) וכלכלית. לאסד אין ראיות מבוססות שקניית זמן מחזקת אותו. טענת התעמולה הטורית, שעלתה גם בשדחת אסד-חסיין שהמרי בגדמ"ע ירחמי ואז ארח"ב וישראל תאלצנה "לחשוב מחדש" בכיוון של ויתורים - הוא טעון טקטי ולא עמדה בסכסוך. המטרה לשכנע את הערבים שאטור למהר ושש לחמתין לזמנים טובים יותר. (ז) כלכלה. מיותר להרבות במלוח.

3. לבנון. ודיט מתאר את המאמץ האמריקאי הנוכחי לשכנע את טוריה להניע מחדש את חפיוס הלואמי בלבנון, קרי חידוש הדיאלוג עם אמין. באחרון לפני תחילת מערכת הבחירות שם. קושי נוסף הוא שהסורים משלבים את הנושא הלבנוני במאמצי השלום הנוכחיים. אין סיכוי שיקדימו מהלך בלבנון טרם שיובהר להם לאן מאמצים אלה מובילים. הזיקה ביניהם ברורה. אע"פ שווייט מעט להתייחס לנושא זה. (אשמע על כך מברנד).

אלי אבידן

k.c

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL  
Pacific Northwest Region  
220 Bush Street, Suite 550  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
(415) 398-8885



הקונסוליה הכללית של ישראל  
סן פרנסיסקו

כ"ח באדר תשמ"ח  
17 במרץ 1988

אל: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: הקונסול הכללי, סן פרנסיסקו

לוטה בזה מכתב תמיכה מעמק הסיליקון בקליפורניה. מול מבול מכתבי המחאה מן הראוי  
לשים לב גם למכתבים אלה.

בברכה,

יעקב סלע



Linda (Tehilla) Weinstein  
19947 Merribrook Drive  
Saratoga, California 95070, USA  
(408) 867-3858  
March 9, 1988

Dear Prime Minister Shamir,

On behalf of myself, and I hope, other American and Israeli Jews, I would like to both thank and commend you on not yielding to pressure to "trade territories for peace." It is more likely that Israel would "trade territories for war," if we were reduced to pre-war less defensible borders.

The world should know:

There is no "Palestine"; there is only Jordan and Israel. There are no "Palestinians"; there are only Arab refugees whom the Arab countries refused to resettle, and Jewish refugees from Arab lands, most of whom were resettled in Israel long ago. The words "Palestine" and "Palestinians" are only propaganda to obscure the real issue, that the Arabs refuse to resettle their own people in order to use them as a tool to destroy Israel.

As a member of Likud, I share your concern for Israel's national security. The question is, how to have a secure Israel without hostile Arab inhabitants?

Until the riots are stopped, I agree that restricted press coverage is good policy. The Arabs are rioting mainly for publicity; no publicity means no (or less) reason to riot.

To stop the riots, Israel needs to let the rioting Arabs know:  
(1) Israel will not tolerate riots or rioters in the territories or in Israel proper.

(2) Rioting Arabs will be deported.

(3) Deport them to Lebanon, etc., en masse if necessary, ie. by families, towns, etc. Deportation of rioters must be swift and certain if it is to be effective. Rioting non-Israeli Arabs (from Israel or the territories) should have their visas lifted and be deported as soon as possible. Rioting Israeli Arabs should initially lose their Israeli citizenship, and only subsequently be deported if they continue to riot.

Knowing that such action will be effective, the Arabs will try to marshall world opinion against it. Only after Israel has swiftly implemented and accomplished its deportation policy,

should Israel defend its actions to the U.S. and others with the stand that, "The deportations, which recently ended the riots in Israel, were a matter of national security, as well as a means to accommodate those Arabs who no longer wished to live under Israeli sovereignty."

The rapid deportation of rioting Arabs will:

- (1) Rid Israel of "the enemy from within."
- (2) Stop the riots.
- (3) Halt the demoralization of the IDF and charges of IDF "brutality."
- (4) Help end the disunity and demoralization of Israel and its allies.

(Datim and Christian Fundamentalists may be interested in the biblical precedent of Abraham who was ordered by HaShem to "deport" Ishmael and Hagar after Ishmael mocked Isaac.)

Arabs in the territories:

After the deportation of rioters, stateless Arabs in the West Bank shall receive Jordanian citizenship; while stateless Arabs in Gaza shall receive Egyptian citizenship. The territories themselves shall be incorporated into Israel proper and Jewish settlements there shall be encouraged. All non-Israeli Arabs living in the territories shall be bound by Israeli law, and shall pay a public service tax to Israel to compensate for the public services which they receive from Israel. Non-Israeli Arabs shall be exempt from military duty, but shall vote and pay income tax in their country of citizenship. As long as they do not participate in riots or other actions subversive to Israel, they may continue to live in Israel on renewable "guest visas."

What does this proposal offer to its participants?

The Arab refugees shall gain citizenship in an Arab nation, and the right to settle in their country of citizenship, or to continue living in Israel, whichever they choose.

The Arab nations, especially Jordan and Egypt, shall gain world-wide prestige for contributing to the Middle East peace process, and for contributing to the well-being of the Arab refugees, as well as increased leverage and power in the Arab League and



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March 9, 1988

world-wide. In addition to increased revenues from taxes, Jordan and Egypt, (or whatever Arab nations choose to participate in a Middle East peace settlement), could be given access to trade and educational opportunities in Israel, and possibly, the U.S.

Israel will benefit in retaining the territories, but without hostile Arab inhabitants. Israel will have more land for settlement, more secure borders, better demographics vis-a-vis the Arabs voting in Israel, and hopefully increased trade, cooperation, and acceptance by its Arab neighbors leading to real peace in the Middle East.

If the Arabs do not accept this proposal, we will still have an Israeli peace plan to protect Israel's national interests and to counter any other peace plan, which is detrimental to Israel. An Israeli peace plan can be used to take the pressure off of Israel, and to put the onus on the Arabs to repatriate their own people.

In addition, Israel can press for the release and aliyah of Jews held hostage in Arab lands (about 30,000?). In an overall peace settlement, this might be possible, and if not, it is still good propaganda. Prior to the deportations, as mentioned earlier, perhaps Israel could publicize an offer to exchange Arabs who do not wish to continue living under Israeli sovereignty for Jews held hostage in Arab lands.

The world must know:

Israel will not be destroyed. Neither swiftly by wars or diplomacy, nor slowly by rioting, the pressure of world opinion, or terrorism. Not from without, and not from within. We will not let the Arabs finish what the Nazis began. We will survive.

Respectfully,

*Linda (תהילה) Weinstein*

Linda (Tehilla) Weinstein



\* תאריך : 38-09-1981 החוץ-מחלקת הקשר \*

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נכנס

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\* חוזם: 3/15135 \*

\* אל:המשרד \*

\* מ:-רוש,נר:384,תא:170388,חז:0930,זח:מ,סג:סב \*

\* נד:מ \*

\* סודי ביותר/מיד \*

\* אל:מאט, טמנבל אמטריק \*

\* דע:מנבל מדיני,מנבל,לשכת רהמ' \*

\* ללא תמוצה נוספת \*

\* שיחות שה'ח הסיני ברושינגטון \*

\* משיחה עם ג'פרי באדור, סגן מנהל מח' סין באגף מזרח \*

\* אטיה. \*

\* א. בנושא טכסון ישראל ערב \*

\* נושא זה תפס שליש מזמן הדיונים בין שולץ לור. עוד  
\* לפני בואו שיגר לו שולץ מכתב ובו פרט הסעותיו במז'ת  
\* כמצע לשיחותיהם בנידון. במגישה פתח שולץ וציין  
\* הידוע לנו שעד כה ארהב התרכזה בנושא שיחות בילטרליות  
\* שלא הובילו לתוצאות. שולץ ציין עם זאת שאין אהדה בישראל  
\* לרעב'ל. כל פתרון,המשין שולץ, צריך להיות כולל  
\* (COMPREHENSIVE) הפלטטינים חייבים להיות מיוצגים  
\* במסגרת משלחת ירדנית-פלסטינית. שולץ עמד על הצורך  
\* בהסדר ביניים.

\* שה'ח הסיני,ורו, אמר שבמז'ת קיימות 3 בעיות:-

\* 1.ישראל נבשה אדמותיהם של אחרים. ור ציין שמטר זאת  
\* במגישתו במסגרת העצרת עם שה'ח פרס.

1. The first part of the report

is a general introduction

to the subject of the report, and a statement of the purpose of the study.

The second part

is

a

description

of the methods used in the study.

The third part

is a description of the results of the study.

The fourth part

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The nineteenth part

is a list of the names of the institutions of the authors of the report.

The twentieth part is a list of the names of the sponsors of the report.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 4  
עותק 3 מתוך 14

2. אשפ' חייב להיות מעורב במומ' שה'ח וז ציין גם  
שאשפ' משנה עמדותיו מדי פעם ומבצע מעשי טרור אך אשפ'  
בטורו של דבר הוא ארגון מדיני מוכר ע"י מדינות רבות  
בעולם. שה'ח הסיני ציין שעם בואו לווינגטון קיבל  
אשר מערמאת באמצעות שגטין בתוניס. לפי השדר, חזר  
אשפ' על עמדתו הקבועה לגבי המומ' (כן כתוב בדוח  
ממנו הקריא לי ג'פרי) אך לדברי רו מגלה אשפ' גמישות  
בנושאים מסוימים, "CERTAIN ISSUES"  
(בדוח שתי מלים אלה היו עם מרכאות) שה'ח הסיני לא  
פרט.

ג'פרי העיר לי שבבעבר היו שדרים מאשפ' לארהב באמצעות  
הסינים. אין הדבר מצביע, לדעת ג'פרי, על יחסים מיוחדים  
בין אשפ' לסין אלא אשפ' טבור שסין תעביר יותר טוב  
מאשר בריה"מ, למשל, את מסרי אשפ' לארהב.

3. קשה למצוא קונסנזוס בין מדינות ערב ליישוב הסכסוך  
מצרים, ירדן וצפון אפריקה בעד יישוב הסכסוך.  
גם במסגה הערבית אין קונסנזוס לאור תמיכת ברה"מ בחלק  
מהמדינות.

שה'ח הסיני המשיך ואמר, אמנם יש שינוי מאז עליית גורבצ'וב  
אך סין אינה בטוחה עדיין בעמדתה של ברה"מ. סין מטילה  
שפק ביכולתה של ועידה בינלאומית אם אין קונסנזוס  
בין מרבית חוזר מרבית מדינות ערב (גם ג'פרי שם לב לסתירה  
בין קונסנזוס מחו ו"מרבית" מאידך).

עמדתה של סין נקבעת עפ"י 3 נקודות גם כן :-

1. נסיגה משטחים שנכבשו במלחמת 1967.

2. לכל המדינות זכות קיום

3. דאגה לזכויות הלאומיות הלגיטימיות של הפלסטינים

שה'ח הסיני התייחס לפגישתו בטענת עם שה'ח פרט והגדירו  
כ- ENLIGHTED לצורך בגמישות. לדברי שה'ח הסיני הוא אמר  
גם לשה'ח פרט שסין לא תתנגד לכל הסדר שיהיה בו קונסנזוס  
של הערבים.



1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year.

The second part is a detailed account of the work done during the last year. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second section deals with the work done in the field. The first section is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, the second part deals with the work done in the field, and the third part deals with the work done in the laboratory.

The second section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field. The first part is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, the second part deals with the work done in the field, and the third part deals with the work done in the laboratory.

The third section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field. The first part is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, the second part deals with the work done in the field, and the third part deals with the work done in the laboratory.

The fourth section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field. The first part is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, the second part deals with the work done in the field, and the third part deals with the work done in the laboratory.

The fifth section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field.

The sixth section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field.

The seventh section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field.

The eighth section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field.

The ninth section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, and the second part deals with the work done in the field. The first part is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the work done in the laboratory, the second part deals with the work done in the field, and the third part deals with the work done in the laboratory.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 4  
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\* שה"ח הסיני אמר לשולץ שהצעותיו אינן מתייחסות לאש"פ  
\* ואם אש"פ אינו כלול קשה יהיה למצוא הקונסנזוס. המזכיר  
\* השיב בו במקום שהמלסטינים צריכים להיות חלק מהמשלחת  
\* הירדנית. הירדנים בוודאי יתייעצו עם אש"פ ויבדקו  
\* עם ישראל.

\* נו המשין ואמר שאמנם מצרים וירדן מוכנות להסדר אן  
\* אין להם השפעה על כל מדינות ערב. השקפותיהן של סוריה  
\* וירדן, אש"פ ומצרים יהיו המפתח.

\* המזכיר השיב שמאחר שקשה שכולם ביחד יסכימו צריך יהיה  
\* CONCEPT  
\* שיהיה בו די כדי שאלה שרוצים, יכולים להמשיך בתהליך  
\* אשר למלסטינים, אמר המזכיר, בשל המהומות בי"ע  
\* קשה לומר שירדן או אש"פ יכולים לדבר בשם כל חוזר כל  
\* המלסטינים.

\* נו השיב שהמהומות הוכיחו האנגוניזם בין המלסטינים  
\* וישראל. הגישה ה- HIGHHANDED שלה הקשתה על המצב.

\* לבטוח שאל המזכיר את נו אם סין תסכים ליטול חלק בועידה  
\* לפי התנאים האלה אם ייענו חלק מהצדדים ועל כן השיב  
\* נו שאם מרבית מדינות ערב יסכימו סין תיטול חלק.

\* ב. נושאים אחרים במגישה עם המזכיר

\* 1. המפרץ : לארהב יש הוכחות שמאז הסתיו לא נשלחו טילים  
\* נגד ספינות ולכן הודיעה ארהב שתתחיל מחדש בדיונים  
\* הבינמשרדיים שמכניס את ההמלצות שיוגאו לפני קוקוס  
\* בדבר הקלות בייצוא טכנולוגיה. כלומר מעשית טרם שוחררה  
\* טכנולוגיה. מסתבר שהאמריקאים הסתפקו רק בנושא טילי  
\* ים, כי לפי המידע שביום סין מכרה ב-1987 נשק לאיראן  
\* בסך 1.3 מיליארד דולר ובמקביל מכרה ב-700 מיליון  
\* לעיראק. לג'מרי לא היה מידע בדבר טיוע סיני להכנת  
\* תשתית לתעשית נשק באיראן.

\* 2. נקיסטאן -אפגניסטאן. עמדת סין קרובה לזו של ארהב  
\* ולא היו דיונים מורחבים בעניין

\* 3. דרום מזרח אסיה. הסינים כאן היו הדברנים והאמריקנים

1. The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the treatment on the response of the subjects.

2. The subjects were divided into two groups: the control group and the treatment group. The control group received a placebo, while the treatment group received the active ingredient.

3. The results of the study showed that the treatment group had a significantly higher response rate than the control group.

4. The study was conducted in a double-blind, randomized manner to ensure the validity of the results.

5. The study was funded by the National Institutes of Health.

6. The study was published in the Journal of Clinical Investigation.

7. The study was conducted between 1980 and 1985.

8. The study was conducted at the University of California, San Francisco.

9. The study was conducted by Dr. John Doe.

10. The study was conducted in the United States.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 4 מתוך 4  
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היו השומעים : הסינים אמרו שהם תומכים בסיימון.  
הסינים, לדבריהם, הבהירו זאת הן לקמאריס האדומים  
והן לסון-טאן. הם הבהירו לקמאריס האדומים שהם לא  
UNDER CUT סיימון, הוא צריך להיות המנהיג בכל הסדר  
בקמבודיה והפג של צריך להיות המועדף.

דימרי אמר שארהב אינה מגלה פעילות בנושא זה כי אינה  
טבורה שפעילות ושינוי תועיל לאינטרסים של ארהב באזור  
וכי טראומת וייטנאם עדיין קיימת.

4. טיבט. האמריקנים העלו הנושא ותשובת הסינים היתה  
האשמת הולאי-לאמה בליבוי המהומות

עד כאן. מכאן וגישות המקור אנא שימוש זהיר בחומר

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תש: שהח,רהמ,מנבל,הדס,אטיה

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## המשפט

387

11  
12

מאת: אלי אבידן, רוסינגטון

סורדה. שלך 531

1. הזדמן לי לשוחח קצרות עם אפריל גלספי בק"פ לרה"מ בשגרירות (טרם קבלת מברקכם הנ"ל).

2. אסד הבטיח למזכיר להשיב תשובה למכתבו, אך לא נקב במועד. האמריקאים אינם רואים בהתבטאויות התקשורת הסורית ואף לא בדבריו שאדע, שלדעתה לא הוסמך לאמדם משום דחיה פרמלית של התכנית, אף כי לאמריקאים אין אשליה באשר לעמדת סוריה. זאת בעקבות היכוח בין גורמי מחמ"ד ביצע יש להתייחס לעמדת התקשורת (המודרכת) עדמשה.

3. שיחת אסד-שולץ בה נכח שארע היתה גינוחה ואף ברור טובה. אסד היה בעמדת מאזין לשולץ שדבר רוב הזמן. חזר על עמדות סוריה כאשר לפתרון כולל כפי שכבר פורסם מאז הביקור. הרושם הברור הוא שלא היתה שום נימה של ~~discouraging~~ מצד אסד כאשר לשליחות המזכיר. בלט שביקור המזכיר בדמשק ההניפו לשליטה.

4. נוסח מכתב המזכיר לאסד זהה לנוסח שקבל רה"מ ישראל לחסין פרע לקטע העוסק במשולש ישראל-ירדן-פלס'. קרי בהסדרי ביניים. הוחלט שמאחר ואינו נוגע לסוריה הוא יושמט מהמכתב. המזכיר מסר זאת לחסין בלונדון ובקש ממנו לדווח לאסד על המכתב. תחסיין קבל. הדגישה שהמזכיר מנהל משחק גלוי עם כל הצדדים, לרבות סוריה.

11/2

36

10	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
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ט 1 8 9  
97.....מחור.....דמי  
פועל בשחובי  
דמי פועל  
פועל ודמי  
פועל ודמי

אל:

387

2/2

היעד האמריקאי הוא לסנוע הפרעה סודית למצווי המהלך הנרכז, גם אם לא כל חלקיו מקובלים עליה.

3. המשלחת האמריקאית התרשמה ברורות שהגורם הסובי, מדאג את הסורים. המדובר בעמדת ברה"מ בנושא הועידה הבינ"ל (אופיה, הרכבה וכד') המותירה אותם באפלה מוחלטת. גלספי מעריכה שהסובי פועלים במודע כך שהסורים יוותרו בעמדת נדחש והמרכה לגבי עמדתם. נראה לה שהמידע הזורם בצנור מוסקבה-דמשק הוא דל ביותר. שלושה גורמי מפתח חשובים למהלכי סוריה-ירדן, אש"פ וברה"מ. חסין פועל בתאוס רב עם אסד המוצא עצמו רגוע ג'ס"ס למהלכי המלך. אש"פ קרי ערפאת מהורה אמנס בעיה אך בידי הסורים מנופים לבלזמתו במידה ויחצה "קוויס אדמיס". נותרה ברה"מ היכולה במהלך "אנטי סורי" להותיר את אסד בעמדה מבודדת. הסכמת ברה"מ להשתתף בוועידה בינ"ל האלץ את אסד לנהל החלטה לא קלה. (ראה דו"ח משיחה עם וויז וייט בנפרד) מכאן מובנת החשיבות הנוספת שמייחס אסד עם ארה"ב.

6. לבנון. אפריל תארה המצב כ- CHADS. הסורים טרם נעתרו לבקשת ארה"ב לפתור במהלך מדיני בלבנון, דהיינו חידוש הדואלוג עם אמין ג'מיל, כהרגלם הם לא נותנים פורקן למחשבותיהם. המירב שהשיגו היה "הבטחה" שהנושא נמצא בבדיקה. נשבעה שאינה מסתירה מאתנו מידע, סה"כ מיואשת מהמצב.

7. גלספי תעדר בשבוע הבא. סכמנו להפגש בשבוע של ה-27.3.

אלי אבידן

h.h





שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מחוך 1 דפיםסווג בטחונידחופותתאריך/ז"חמס' מברק

374 2

3. מו"מ על הסדרי ביניים. קורנדט הדגיש שאמנם יש לסיוקם הגדרת מצבי הביניים לפני הסופי, אך אם המו"מ יתחיל מטופו דחיונו מחסדר של קבע הוא יכנס לדרך ללא מוצא. כאשר למצבי ביניים, יש בכך יתרונות לשני הצדדים. לערבים - אפשרות לקיום בחירות, פעילות כלכלית, נושאי מים, אדמה וכיו"ב. לישראל - הסדר בטחון, סיום מצב הלוחמה והחרם ועוד. בקונספציה היא של גבולות פתוחים, פדרציה/קונפדרציה התיושבות חפשית, פעילות כלכלית וכד'.

קורנדט הגדיר התפיסה כ- LONG TERM PEACE בין ישראל הטריטוריות וירדן. כאשר ללו"ז, הודגש שאינו מואץ כמו זה של שולץ אך המשך הסטטוס קוו הוא בעיה לא רק לישראל אלא גם לארה"ב בשל זיקתו עמו לאור מערכת היחסים ההדוקים עם ישראל.

4. בתשובה לשאלות חציר:

(א) מדינה פלס. נשמעו דעות שונות בין משתתפי הדו"ח. הדו"ח מגדירה כמזיקה (DETRIMENTAL). חייב לחול שינוי באש"פ טרם שיוכשר למו"מ

(ב) ירושלים, פחות בעייתיות ממה שניתן לצפות. הכרה בינ"ל לבירת ישראל בכל מו"מ לשלום. עיר מאוחדת עם גישה לכל הדתות. הדו"ח לא עוטף באדזה אופן יחולק המנהל העירוני.

(ג) ועידה בינ"ל, פתיחה בינ"ל בראשות ארה"ב וברח"מ כשם שרה"מ שמיר מציע מעניקה לברה"מ מעמד חזק יותר מאשר ועידה המוצעת בחסות האו"מ.

5. קן וולאק אחד מחברי הצוות טיפר בנפרד שישראל יכולה לחיות עם הדו"ח ושכסה"ג ההגדרות הם די נוחות לישראל, זאת לאחר מאבק קשה שהוא וטאס לואיס ניהלו עם קבוצה קיצונית מבין חברי הצוות היהודים ובראשם ריטה האוזר, הנרי סוגמן, ג'ודית קיפר, ולצדט האל סונדרס. הקבוצה הערבית - ראשיד ח'לדי, פואד מוגרבי, פול ג'אבוי חיתה יחסית נוקשה פחות.

אלי אבידן  
16.11





סגרי רוח  
דף..... מחזור..... דפים  
סוג בסחונני  
דחיות  
מאריך וז"ח  
סיכום

אל: 3/3  
325

יאנג מפרש את תגובת ברה"מ כמעניינת. הסוב' לאורך השיחה עם מרפי גילו עניין ביזמה המזכיר וניסו לדלות פרטים עליה מעבר למדווח להס. הו"פער מ-5 נקודות המוצא כדלהלן.  
(א) מעורבותו האישית של המזכיר ביזמה הנושאת את שמו (ב) עצם העובדה שנטל על עצמו את המשימה להפגש עם ראשי המדינות באזור, לאחר שטען זמן רב שהיזמה צריכה לבוא מהצדדים עצמם. בנקודה זו הסוב' שמו לב במיוחד למאמץ האמריקאי לעבר סוריה.  
(ג) ארה"ב מדברת על הסכם כולל (ב) אז התכחשותה לברה"מ (ה) התמקדותה בנושא הוועידה הבינ"ל המורכבת. הסוב' התרכזו ב-2 נושאים (א) תפקיד הוועידה ומהן מצוות "עשה ואל תעשה" הקשורות בה כגון סמכויות, דינאמיות וכיו"ב. כיצד מפרשת ארה"ב את נושא זכויות לגיטימיות לפלס". מרפי בתשובה, ע"פ יאנג, העדיף שלא להתייחס לכך ישירות וחזר על יעדי הביניים וזיקתם להסדרם הקבע. לשאלתי האם מרפי בדק עמדת ברה"מ בנושא היעודג הפלס", השיב שלא היה זה המקום לרדת לפרטים בסוגיה. ארה"ב מעוניינת לדעת מה היא יכולה לצפות עקרונית מהסוב' בשלב זה. לא היתה כוונה שמרפי יכנס למו"מ ענייני בשלב כה מוקדם.

3. בשיחה עם ברוטנס חזר מרפי על עמדת ארה"ב, תוך שהדגיש פעם נוספת המישור הסוב'-סורי-אש"פ.

ברוטנס שנקט עמדה חיובית כלפיה, ע"פ יאנג, הגיב (א) ברה"מ לא אמצה אך גם לא דחתה עם התכנית האמריקאית (ב) המזכיר יוכל להמשיך במאמציו *ALL-OUT EFFORT* אך בהמשך, כך הדגיש יונה עורך להגדיר את תפקיד ברה"מ בתהליך.

4. אפגניסטן. מרפי חזר על הא-סימטריה בנושא הסיוע הצבאי לעדדים. הסוב' היו נוקשים והתחפרו בעמדתם בנושא פיגועי כוחותיהם. מרפי עמד על כך שארה"ב דורשת קבלת לוח מפורט ושהסוב' חייבים לבוא עם *UPFRONT GESTURE* לגבי הימים הראשונים של הפיגוע. זאת ע"מ לשכנע את העדדים שהיא רצינית ומעשית. יאנג רואה במפגש בשבוע הבא בווש" נקודת הכרעה לגבי עמדת ברה"מ.

5. עיראק-איראן. בשיחות התברר שברה"מ יוצאת מ-2 נקודות מוצא. (א) נזכרת שלא לגרום מורת רוח (OFFEND) לאיראן. יאנג הטעים שהיות ולברה"מ נושא אפגניסטן טרכזי יותר אין להערכתו סיכוי מעשי שתאמץ את נושא הסנקציות. היא משחקת עם כולם - איראן, עיראק, סעודיה והמפרציות. מרפי הצביע על כך שלברה"מ חלק בעקשנות איראן. סוגיה זו הדגיש תשפיע על עמדת ארה"ב בנוגע לשיתוף ברה"מ בתהליך המדיני במזה"ת. 3/3

ס ו ר י  
ד פ . . . . . סחור . . . . . דס"ס  
סווג בסחובי  
דחיות  
תאריך וז"ח  
סחור סחור סחור

אלו

3/3  
325

הסוב' מנצלים את סוגיית "מלחמת הערים" בכיוון שאינם במצב ללחוך ולרכך את האיראנים.

6. יאנג העיר המזכיר הגדיר את השיחות במוסקבה (23.2) כטובות ביותר בנושאים האזוריים. במפגש שבוע הבא בווינגטון ידונו נושאי אפגניסטן מפרץ ומזה"ת - בהתחשב בתוצאות השיחות עם רה"מ שמיר.

7. יאנג מסכם את עמדת ברה"מ כלפי התהליך במזה"ת ע"פ הנקודות הבאות (א) יש לה עניין להיות מעורבת התהליך. רק ארה"ב יכולה לחבטת זאת (ב) עמדתה תקבע גם ע"פ התפתחות התהליך. מוסקבה לפי שעה לא חייבה עצמה. (ג) לוקחת ברצינות את מאמצי ארה"ב לקדם שלום (ד) ה"ח"ל לה שהמבטן מבחינתה ע"פ המפיטה האמריקאית יהיה בעמדתה כלפי אש"פ וסוריה.

8. יותר מאוחר יאנג סיפר שהסוב' כבר פנו רשמית לאמריקאים על כך שפוליאקוב יצטרף לשברנדזה וישוחח עם מרפי בנושא הוועידה הבין"ל. מסתבר שהאמריקאים בדילמה. מחד, קשה יהיה לסוב' ויתכן שישמעו מהסוב' דברים מפורשים יותר ואולי יזכו בכמה חשובות לשאלות שהפנה מרפי בשעהו ושטרם נענו. מאידך האמריקאים בטח"כ די מרוצים שהנושא נדון ברמה מניסטריאלית שכן הדין עניני יותר ובעיקר פחות מפורט וטכני, בניגוד לחטנות של פוליאקוב. נוסף על כך שום דבר לא התרחש בתחום זה מאז חזר מרפי ממוסקבה. יאנג הודה שהרבה הלוי במה שישמעו מרה"מ שמיר. מכל מקום ההחלטה לבבי פוליאקוב תפול בין המזכיר למרפי. תתכן הצעת ביניים לקיום השיחות בחודש אפריל באם לו"ז יאפשר זאת.

אלי אבידן  
א.א.







ס 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

דף.....מחור.....דפיס

סוג בסחוני

דחיסות

תאריך וז"ח

שם חבר

מלו

373  $\frac{1}{2}$

כתוצאה מהתוצאות באילינוי מתקרב מספר הצירים של ג'קסון לכמעט שניון עם דוקקים.  
על פי חישובי רשת CBS לדוקקים - 565 צירים. לג'קסון 520, גור 411, גפחאדוט 155,  
סימון 180. ברפובליקנים לבוש - 822 דול 183, רוברטסון 35.

דני בלור

1. 4/1/16  
2. 11/1/16

4460 Bering St.  
San Diego, Ca. 92115  
3/16/88

Permanent Mission of Israel,  
800 Second Ave.  
New York, N. Y. 10017

Dear Ambassador Netanyahu,

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir  
is right in his thinking.  
We go along with him  
100%.

Sincerely,  
Mrs. E. Carson

(Encl)

שופט מברק

1/28

276

352

דף 1 מתוך דפים  
סוג בשחוני: בלמ"ט  
דחיפות: מידי  
תאריך וז"ח: 15.3.88 18:00  
מס' מברק:

אל: המשרד + עתונות + בטחון  
ניו יורק

74 ←

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת  
דע: לש' רה"מ, לש' שהב"ט, ניו יורק

מרפי בועדת החוץ

עוזר המזכיר הופיע היום (15) אחרי מספר דחיות בפני ועדת המשנה לאירופה ומז"ת. הדיון נמשך כשלוש שעות, והחלק הארי הוקדש לתהליך השלום. כן הוקדשו שאלות למפרץ, ללבנון ולפיתוח טנק אמ-1 במצרים. נושא ההירינג מועבר במלואו.

להלן נקודות בולטות מדבריו, בתשובות לשאלות:

- נכון לעכשו איש לא אמר כן אך גם לא אמרו לא להצעה. ככל שהזמן עובר ללא סירובים הוא יותר אופטימי, כי קשה יותר ויותר לסרב.

- תאריך אמצע מרס לקבלת תשובות אינו במסמרות.

- אם המצב בשטחים ימשך, המנצחים היחידים יהיו הפונדמנטליסטים.

- אישר שמדינות ערב הן שיזמו המלחמות עם ישראל עד כה.

- השתתפות חמש הקבועות במועבי"ט - הענות לרצון המלך למנוע פולריזציה.

בתשובה לשאלה אישר שלאש"פ יש למעשה וטו על ביצוע היוזמה, כפי שיש לכל צד, וזה היופי שבהצעה.

- לו ישראל רצתה יכולה לפעול ביתר תקיפות לדכא את המהומות אך אינה פועלת כך.

- בתשובה לשאלות לא פרט המשך התהליכים והתוכניות ואמר שהניר שפורסם בתקשורת הינו היחיד שהוגש עד כה.

- לא נדרש ספציפית לשיחות עם רה"מ.

טובה הרצל

האג (א) 1  
האג (ב) 2  
האג (ג) 3  
האג (ד) 4  
האג (ה) 5  
האג (ו) 6  
האג (ז) 7  
האג (ח) 8  
האג (ט) 9  
האג (י) 10  
האג (יא) 11  
האג (יב) 12  
האג (יג) 13  
האג (יד) 14  
האג (טו) 15  
האג (טז) 16  
האג (טז) 17  
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST  
OF THE

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

RE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
AND THE PERSIAN GULF

CHAIRMAN: LEE H. HAMILTON (D-IN)

74 / 276 / 350

2 / 28

WITNESS: RICHARD W. MURPHY, ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1988

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: (Sounds gavel) The meeting of the Subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets in open session today to review recent developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Because of scheduling difficulties and the hectic pace of recent US diplomatic efforts in the region, this is the first formal public hearing with administration witnesses this year. This hearing follows two hearings held in mid-December on the West Bank and Gaza, and on the Persian Gulf. Today's hearing will focus primarily on United States efforts to restart the Middle East peace process, the continued violence on the West Bank and in Gaza, and the situation in the Persian Gulf.

We are pleased to have with us today Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy. Secretary Murphy, we appreciate your appearance today. We know this is a very busy time for you. We understand you have a prepared statement. That statement, of course, will be entered into the record in full, and we want to allow ample time for questions. You may proceed, sir.

SEC. MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very happy to be able to be here today to brief the Subcommittee on developments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. You spoke of a hectic pace, and I take it that that is your acknowledgment that I was not trying to dodge one of these hearings over the last couple of months. There was some suspicion expressed by your staff. But there has --

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: There's been no charge levied against you, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. MURPHY: No, but I -- I felt if I didn't make it today, there just might be, so --

There's been concern in the past, Mr. Chairman, that the United States had been consigned to the sidelines as a passive observer of events in the Middle East as a region. The facts of the past several months belie these assertions. In the Middle East today we

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consider we're at a moment of critical decision; after years of strife that the time may at last be ripe for major movement towards a negotiated peace. The challenge before the parties in the region today is to seize the opportunity for progress toward peace that lies before them.

The Secretary of State has met at length with the leaders of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. We have consulted closely with our European allies. The mood in each of these countries

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is one of seriousness and of an honest desire to find ways to move forward. We have received constant encouragement to continue and to expand our efforts.

Our objective is a comprehensive peace, a peace that provides for the security of all states in the region and that satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It would be achieved through negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts.

Our approach to the West Bank and Gaza includes negotiations on a period of interim arrangements which is firmly interlocked with an early date certain for the start of negotiations on a final settlement. Negotiations would be kicked off by a properly structured international conference opened to permanent members of the UN Security Council, and parties to the conflict to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 and who denounce terrorism and violence. A conference could not impose solutions or veto agreements reached between the parties.

The proposal which the Secretary presented to the leaders in the region, and that was on the 23th -- 24th -- 25th of February, is an integral whole. It will not work if the parties accept some portions and reject others. The Soviet leadership is impressed by the high level of commitment which the President displayed in Secretary Shultz to the region with initiatives that aim at a comprehensive settlement. We will continue to remind them that without expanded opportunity for Jewish emigration and full diplomatic relations with Israel, their seriousness will remain in question.

On Lebanon, we have been actively engaged in promoting in Lebanon the process of constitutional reform and national reconciliation. The efforts of the Lebanese themselves to restructure their political system are critical to the future of their country and to regional stability. We'll continue to do what we can to help restore Lebanon's sovereignty, unity, and territorial independence.

The Iran-Iraq war remains the primary cause of instability in the Gulf region. The recent resumption of the war of the cities throwing the missiles back and forth between Baghdad and Tehran

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has underscored the need for the earliest settlement of that war. The administration is continuing to pursue its two-track policy, working to end the conflict through diplomacy, while protecting American interests in the region.

Our most publicized short-term measure, increased naval presence to protect US flag shipping in the Gulf, has been an unqualified success. Since July of last year, over 40 convoys have been completed. Over time, we've been able to draw down assets stationed in and around the Gulf, with no decrease in the amount or quality of protection which we provide. Our demonstrated staying power has given credence to our commitment to help protect our friends in the region from Iranian intimidation, to help keep international waterways free of mines, and thus to ensure access to the vital oil reserves of the region.

Our overall goal, of course, remains a negotiated end to the war, in accordance with Resolution 598, a resolution which Iraq has accepted. Iran, however, continues to insist on rewriting that resolution as a precondition for its willingness to implement it. Our objective of bringing about a second resolution has been thwarted, in large measure by Soviet unwillingness to proceed. The Secretary discussed this issue intensively in Moscow during his visit there in February. I raised it in my own talks last week in Moscow. We're not yet convinced -- we have not yet convinced the Soviets. This issue, therefore, will again be high on the agenda when Secretary Shultz meets next week in Washington with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

An important element of our policy has been the limiting of the sale of arms to Iran. Nineteen eighty-seven was one of the busiest and most successful years for Operation Staunch. The most positive results were achieved in Western Europe. In 1984, some 15 Western European nations sold more than one billion dollars of arms to Iran. In 1987, this dropped to six nations selling about \$200 million worth of arms. In various European countries, their own media inquiries into alleged arms sales to Iran have mobilized public interest and sparked political controversy.

As a result, Iran generally has had greater difficulty buying the parts and replacements for the modern Western weaponry which it inherited from the shah's regime, as well as new high tech Western military systems. It is believed that China supplied Iran with well over half of its arm imports in 1987, including surface-to-air missiles, artillery and ammunition.

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We've made major efforts to persuade China to reduce arms exports to Iran. We discussed this issue further with Chinese Foreign Minister Woo on March 7 and 8. He reiterated that China would not sell silkworm missiles and would support a follow on arms embargo resolution in the Security Council if there is a majority in favor. We've said we would begin taking measures to move ahead on liberalization of the COCOM tech/transfer regime but cautioned that China's words and deeds would be important for keeping the process on course.

This years proposed arms sales to the region are modest and we feel non controversial. Many sales of a follow on support items, routine procurement of standard military items or for modernization packages for systems previously sold. This year's sales directly supports the ongoing U.S. initiatives to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs in the Middle East, the Gulf and Afghanistan. Military sales to moderate, pro-Western Arab states promote the ability of our friends to defend themselves as is now the case in the volatile Persian Gulf.

Our military sales to Israel, much of it financed through forgiven FMS credits, pay a key role in helping Israel to maintain its qualitative military edge over potential opponents. We will not sell weapons in the Middle East that will threaten Israel's qualitative military edge. Again, I thank you for this opportunity to appear and would welcome questions.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: The Chair understands that Mr. Smith of Florida has himself to Chair a meeting in a few minutes, so questions will begin with Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your consideration. I appreciate the consideration of my colleague from California, Mr. Lantos. Mr. Ambassador it's good to have you back again, and I want to say that many of us share the great hope that Secretary Shultz and you both have that we can achieve somekind of even small breakthrough to stop the process and the negotiating moving forward. I think that's everybody's hope. And you know, received a letter from this House with about 38 or 39 members on it that was part of what we believe, an emphasis of how we feel about the process moving forward. Whatever shape it takes, it needs to be shaped by the parties in the area, but at the very least, the United States needs to be the advancer of the process and I think that we are forming a very accurate and capable role.

Let me, however, digress

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from that a little bit, if I could, because I have something which is of somewhat immediacy, and talk to you about just one issue. There's been confusion over whether the impending M1-A1 co-production tank agreement with Egypt provides for a congressional review period should Egypt desire to export the M1-A1 to a third country, so-called "third country transfers."

So that the administration is clear on at least my position, I think many other members of Congress as well, I think -- I would refer you to the Arms Export Control Act, section 3(d) 2(a), which law explicitly states that the transfer of defense articles to a third country can take place only if Congress does not enact a law prohibiting such a transfer within 30 days of the notification of the proposed transfers to the Congress. Obviously we've used that many times before.

Mr. Ambassador, I believe this type of agreement is of great importance. The strong relationship between the United States and Egypt is obviously in our mutual interests, and in the best interests of this country, and certainly the strengthening of Egypt, the best interest of that country, to try and bring peace to the Middle East, a strong Egypt is obviously an indispensable part of the equation.

For the sake of facilitating approval of this kind of agreement, I respectfully request that your legal counsel would provide for the record the State Department's interpretation of the applicability of the Arms Export Control Act section that I read to you, as it relates to the M1-A1 co-production agreement. It -- and I might add, that if it does not in your estimation apply, I, for one, among other members, would have to try to do something in order to ensure that we could have that apply, because I believe that is an important part of the consideration of having this deal struck. We think it's a good one. We think it obviously has mutual advantages. We want to make sure, however, that American technology of high capability does not wind up going where it couldn't if this arrangement was not otherwise in place.

So I'd like your comment, if you have any, with reference to it, and then a letter from the office of your legal counsel, Mr. Sofaer.

SEC. MURPHY: Thank you, Congressman.

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We have been consulting informally with various members about the program, and we envision informal notification standard procedures to the Congress before it recesses, hopefully before it recesses for the Easter recess. So, I think the answer is straight off, normal procedures will be followed on notification.

We have tried to address in our informal discussions concerns about Third Country sales. We'll be happy to talk further to that issue. Normal restrictions will apply. The program, as currently envisioned by the government of Egypt for that number of tanks, is for Egypt's own consumption, own utilization, and, of course, there would have to be consultations, discussions, should there be any issue of Third Country sales.

REP. SMITH: Will you provide us with a letter with reference to your focus of legal affairs as to whether or not they believe that the section of the Arms Export Control Act actually applies to the possibility of Third Country transfers of tanks that would be manufactured under this full production agreement inside the territorial boundaries of Egypt?

SEC. MURPHY: Be happy to.

REP. SMITH: Thank you very much, and, once again, good luck. I know that the Prime Minister of Israel and the Secretary of State and others are meeting today, and I certainly hope that you can find some common ground for moving closer to the process. Thank you very much. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, we of course want to question you carefully about the proposals that are pending and now the subject of discussion between the Secretary and the Prime Minister. But let me go back just a bit from that and ask why the administration, at this point in time, chooses to push a Middle East peace initiative. After all, for the last several years, the United States has not chosen to push the peace initiative and I'm interested in the question why you choose to do it now.

SEC. MURPHY: Well, I'd go back, Mr. Chairman, to a comment made by the Secretary, very commonly expressed by him

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over the years that we couldn't want peace any more ardently than the peoples and their responsible leaders in the region. I think there has come together in the region a sense that there is an opportunity to move now, and there is a welcome for American involvement to exploit that opportunity. I don't think it's any more complicated than that. We have tried to move over the past several years. There was not the acceptance of a move. It's always the hardest thing to do is to orchestrate readiness to move on the part of all the parties that have to move.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Is there any relationship between your decision to move on the peace process now and the situation on the West Bank and Gaza?

SEC. MURPHY: I'd prefer to say that the situation on the West Bank and Gaza has created this sense of opportunity. It has demonstrated very vividly that the status quo, as we have said, is not a viable option. And the events in the West Bank and Gaza have driven that point home very, very forcibly.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Would it be correct to say that the peace initiative that we are now seeing would not have occurred had it not been for the violence in the West Bank and Gaza in the last few weeks?

SEC. MURPHY: When you put the question that way, you're in effect asking me to say that we are driven only by violence, and that we would come up with ideas to present a workable proposal or construct a program only to reward violence. That isn't the way we're approaching it. But I can't disassociate in time and place the events in the West Bank and Gaza.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: There obviously is some linkage between those events.

SEC. MURPHY: There is some; yes.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Now, one of the things that has struck me, in the conversations we had with Secretary Shultz before he went to the Middle East, he said repeatedly, and I think he said it publicly, that he wanted to skip over a lot

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of the procedural problems and try to get to the substance of the matter. And yet if you look at the Secretary's letter for example and your statement today and all of the public statements, it seems to me you're still focusing on procedure and not substance. Would you care to comment on that. Is it because you don't want the substantive aspects of your proposal to be public at this time and if that's the reason, I personally would understand that. I'd like to hear you comment on this apparent discrepancy.

SEC. MURPHY: Well, I agree that as you look at the proposal, the letter which was handed over in confidence and took at least 36 hours to be published, as I recall, but the fact is that the essence of the proposal is out there, has been published in the American media as well as in the region and in Europe, you do see a great stress on procedure. You see a great stress on acceleration on the calendar moving ahead on the negotiations. The closest that you come to a substantive statement in that proposal is that it, the negotiations will be based on Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts. And that's been repeated at, a couple of times in the proposal.

The issues of substance, as we went further in our discussions, were not that novel. There were after all several years of discussions after the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty was signed on issues of what we call transitional arrangements for the occupied territories. How the Palestinians would achieve greater political and economic control of their own decision making,

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how the military occupation would be ended. And out there, in the category of issues that we call final status are the issues of territory, of sovereignty, so --

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: I guess what I want to understand is, has the United States put forward, as part of this integral package that you talk about, fairly specific suggestions with regard to substance?

SEC. MURPHY: Most of the effort has been focused on the organization of the negotiations. The -- I can say this, Mr. Chairman, that the only document that has been presented is the one that has been published. We have discussed issues of substance with the parties; we have presented a calendar, a time frame, a concept of how to tie the different stages of negotiations together, but this is the only -- and it comes down to a single page -- the only document that has changed hands between the United States government and those other governments.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: So, there's been discussion by the United States with the parties involved with respect to substance, with the interim arrangement, also the final status as well, or -- no substance?

SEC. MURPHY: Not really on final status. We have said that our positions on final status issues would come as no surprise to any party. They were, as stated by the President in September of 1982, in the Reagan initiative, but --

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Now, those substantive proposals you've chosen not to make public, I presume.

SEC. MURPHY: Well, we've not made any formal, substantive proposals on final status issues.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: And interim proposals as well?

SEC. MURPHY: To a certain degree we have, but they've been informal discussions.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you note on page 8 of your testimony, with regards to the arms embargo, with regards to Iran, that you raised it in your discussions in Moscow recently. Secretary of State George Shultz has also raised it, as have many of our representatives to the UN. What is the status of that effort? You've indicated that you hoped that we would have had that in the Security Council in February, and obviously we have not. Do you have high hopes that the Soviets will

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accede to our requests, and what is their main obstacle to  
supporting the arms embargo?

SEC. MURPHY: The Soviets have said they don't

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in principle oppose a second resolution, but they have not agreed to the timing of it. They have continued to state that they consider the potential of Security Council Resolution 598 has not been fully explored, fully exhausted. Now we don't agree. We think that Iran has led the Security Council on a merry dance for these last seven, eight months. But we do hope to persuade the Soviets that the time has come for that resolution to be passed, and for an international effort to be joined on squeezing down the sources of arms -- arms sources -- reaching Iran.

We've been accused of trying for a quick media success, a quick political success -- "Look, the United States has pulled a rabbit out of the hat." We've been at great pains to say that if you look at our own program, Operation Staunch, it's scarcely been an outstanding success. We claim 50-percent success rate -- 60 percent -- of all of the countries that we've talked to, and contracts that we've been able to cut off. But if we could add to that a Soviet and a Chinese effort with their friends and their allies, we think we could have a much stronger pressure on Iran. And it's going to be slow in coming.

The fact is, the bulk of the campaign season is passed for this winter. We have not seen -- there has not been a major campaign launched. For that, we say some credit is due to the efforts on arms control. The weapons are more expensive, harder to get, spare parts harder to get. And this has had its influence on the battlefield. It'd be nice if we could get the Soviets and the Chinese formally on board and engaged actively in, say, restricting --

REP. SMITH: What was the Chinese Foreign Minister's view of this? Was he more open this time during his visit?

SEC. MURPHY: Well, he said that they would support it if a majority of the Council did. So we could try to go outside of the five permanent members and organize positive votes. That would really defeat the point of the whole effort. It is not a propaganda gesture we're trying to make. We would like to get the active involvement of the Soviets, the Chinese. And for that purpose, we have gritted our teeth and said, "Well, we'll keep working." We think the time is long past for this resolution.

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REP. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, do you share the view that events in the Occupied Territories have strengthened the PLO? And is the 13-year old US policy of not negotiating with or recognizing the PLO under review with the Administration?

SEC. MURPHY: That's a question I can't give a "yes or no" answer to, Congressman. I don't think that anyone is particularly strengthened by the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. Our view is that if there's going to be -- if this continues and there's going to be a victor, the victor will not be the PLO, the victor will not be the State of Israel or the Government of Jordan or any of the others; it will be a victory for fundamentalism and a victory for those elements that would like to see more Iran and more Lebanon in the region. Our policy of negotiating or discussing with the PLO is not -- not under review.

REP. SMITH: I appreciate that -- one final question. There have been a number of criticisms concerning the news coverage of events in the occupied areas and there are many who have suggested that the coverage has been biased and that the very presence of cameras on a day-to-day basis have actually precipitated some of the violence, that the protestors are playing to the world's stage. And since a majority of Americans and really a majority of people in Western democracies receive most of their information from television, it has been a way to try to divide a wedge between a traditional solidarity with the nation of Israel and with the Arab countries and particularly with those in the occupied areas. What is your view of the handling of the news media, particularly the networks? Do you think they have been fair? Do you think they've been biased? I'd appreciate your answer.

SEC. MURPHY: Well, violence is news; bad news is always news. I don't think it would be fair to accuse the media of creating the violence or even --

REP. SMITH: I'm not suggesting that. But however unwittingly, do they become part of the drama of --

SEC. MURPHY: They do, yes. Inevitably, they become part of it surely. But the situation out there is difficult. The situation is violent, and they have captured some of the incidents on camera. They -- the camera never gives you the whole story.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Mr. Lantos.

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REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to have you give us a historical perspective of the events which are unfolding. After all, it seems to me that if you focus on the moments on television, and the most recent proposals of the State Department or any other party in this endeavor, without a firm grasp of the historical background, we are like a cork bobbing on a stormy sea without a compass buffeted by every gust of wind and movement of water. So,

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what I'd like to ask you to do, Mr. Secretary, and I realize that these are very complex issues, and you and I both understand the complexities, but nevertheless in sort of capsule form, give me your view of the genesis of the four wars in that area, '48, '56, '67, and '73, because that is part of the historical memory of the players in this drama. People don't forget what happened a few years ago, or twenty years ago or thirty years ago. Tell me if you would why you or the State Department apparently now feel that the Soviet Union has the same interest in the region that we do, namely a negotiated, peaceful, stable settlement of the outstanding issues, because that clearly is not our view of Soviet goals and objectives in many other parts of the world.

Tell us if you would the rationale for this extraordinary international forum, namely the five permanent members of the United Nations. Tell us why, for instance, the lack of diplomatic relations between China and Israel and the Soviet Union and Israel would not disqualify these two countries from participating as a tribunal in this entire matter. Would it not make sense to, as a minimum condition for their participation, to have them establish diplomatic relations with all of the countries involved in the region.

And finally, to sort of clear another bit of the historical record, I wonder if you would enlighten the Subcommittee

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on what, in fact, happened to Secretary Shultz's proposal prior to the Washington summit between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan. My understanding is that Secretary Shultz proposed a convening of a meeting involving the top leadership from Jordan and Israel, simultaneously with the Gorbachev-Reagan summit here in Washington last December; that the Prime Minister of Israel agreed to this Shultz proposal, but King Hussein turned it down. Is this an accurate impression that some of us have? And if so, would you care to speculate as to why King Hussein chose not to participate in what would have been a very forthcoming response to his repeated request to provide an international forum for the commencement of the negotiations?

My final question, Mr. Secretary, relates to the nature of the international forum, the role of the United Nations in it, and the degree of permanence that this forum has. It seems to me that initially Secretary Shultz spoke of an international forum which would be quasi-ceremonial in nature. It would commence the discussions, but then would dissolve itself, and the parties, on a bilateral basis, would proceed with their discussions. What I see now is a permanent international tribunal made up of the five permanent members of the United Nations, two of which do not even have diplomatic relations with the state of Israel. And my understanding is that we are prepared to table a proposal, both for the interim settlement and a long-term settlement.

Now if, in fact, the Secretary's proposal, as it is now before us, is what you call an integral whole (?) -- in your opening testimony, you said parts of it cannot be modified or removed or changed or altered -- another term for integral whole (?) would be an ultimatum. I mean, if nothing can be changed, not the components, not the modalities, not the timing, then you are dealing with a sort of a "take it or leave it" proposition. Is that the intent? Or is there, in fact, far more give than appears on the surface?

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(MB)

SEC. MURPHY: This ought to eat up the rest of the week's hearings to answer, Congressman.

REP. LANTOS: Well, you may summarize your response.

REP. : He can take his time.

SEC. MURPHY: (Chuckles.) Well, capsule description, always inaccurate when you summarize of the wars. The '48 war for Israeli independence; '56, over Suez --

REP. LANTOS: Who initiated the hostilities in the '48 war?

SEC. MURPHY: The Arab armies moved in to counter the declaration of independence of the state of Israel -- the foundation of the state of Israel.

REP. LANTOS: So that first war was initiated by the Arab armies.

SEC. MURPHY: Yes.

REP. LANTOS: How about '56?

SEC. MURPHY: Fifty-six, the

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(RJB)

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Suez conflict -- the Suez war with the landing of the British and French over the Canal dispute, and the actions of the -- of Nasser in having to -- in having nationalized the Canal. Who initiated? The political action to which Europe responded in terms of London and Paris was the act of nationalization; '67, a war that has been written up very, very extensively. As to who actually initiated those incessant threat from Cairo, from President Nasser going to mine the straits and mine the territory of waters around Israel.

REP. LANTOS: Is there doubt in your mind as to who is responsible for the '67 war?

SEC. MURPHY: No. In terms of stirring the pot so vigorously, I think in that case, it was the Arab side. The first strike was the strike by the Israeli Air Force preempting, wiping out the Egyptian Air Force in Sinai. Seventy-three ['73] was, as Sadat himself described it, a political war with the objectives of wrenching the Arab-Israeli conflict by into the consciousness of the West and trying to get political movement. Again though, in that case, an Egyptian-Syrian concert to strike militarily on Israel. Yes, they started -- they started it. So, I suppose, '56 would be the only exception where you had the British and French moving with Israel on the Canal.

REP. LANTOS: In what sense would that be an exception -- the war between Israel and Egypt in '56? Where would you place the burden of responsibility for that war? Did Israel initiate that war or did Egypt initiate that war? What actions precipitated --

SEC. MURPHY: The political act of nationalization of the Canal, I suppose, is what would be identified as the act initiating the war, but that's one I've not gotten involved with, I'm afraid, in much of any historical sense.

Now let me start on your more specific questions about why I and the State Department feel the Soviet Union has --

REP. LANTOS: Could you speak a bit closer to the mike, Mr. Secretary?

SEC. MURPHY: Now you suggested in the way you put your question, that I and/or the State Department feel the Soviet Union has the same interest or might have the same interest in the region. Absolutely unproven that they have the same interests in the region that we have. Whether they are interested in a negotiated peaceful, stable settlement of the regions. Those, I would say, yes, are our goals. Those are the goals which they have spoken to, but as we have said very frankly to the Soviets over the years, we don't see that your actions in the region support the announced objectives you have for stability in the region and we'd like some evidence. Their reaction has always been guarded to our diplomacy. They felt that they were tricked back in '73 at the Geneva Conference into a

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negotiation, which in fact had been rigged to exclude them. So perhaps once bitten, twice shy. I found that, as I said in my statement, when I had the occasion last week in Moscow to describe our proposal, they listened very carefully; they did not commit themselves. They said that this raised questions about what we envisaged as the Soviet role, what we envisaged as the role of a conference. These were serious questions, and they would pursue them when Mr. Shevardnadze came to -- comes to Washington next week.

But they said they found positive elements, which they wanted to cite right off -- positive elements that the President had sent the Secretary to the region for such an intensive effort, that it sounded as if it was a comprehensive proposal, comprehensive settlement, that it did involve an international conference. But that still doesn't answer your questions. It -- but I want to assure you that none of us in the administration have had those questions answered to our satisfaction either.

Several of your questions relate to why this international conference involving the five permanent members of the Council -- why should it -- why should we even be considering that? The Secretary addressed one aspect of that, when he talked -- I believe it was at the -- testified to the Obey Committee last week. He was asked, is it our policy to condition Soviet participation in the Middle East peace conference not only on diplomatic relations, but on a return to the high levels of the late 70s of Soviet Jewish immigration. And his reply is on the record. I just have a sentence or two from it I'd like to repeat. That he said, "I don't think it's realistic to impose that kind of condition if we're able to get people to agree to the kind of international conference that we proposed recently." And that's a very thoughtful sentence, that "the kind of international conference that we proposed recently."

But in any event, he had told the Soviets that whether they come to a conference or not, they can't expect to play a genuinely involved role in

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(MG)

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Middle East affairs, as long as they treat Soviet Jewry the way they do, and as long as they do not have diplomatic relations. But he was saying, in effect, it's not a price upfront. But I underline for you the kind of international conference that we have proposed.

Why the five? That request has been made consistently by the government of Jordan, by the King of Jordan, over the last several years. Why has he said it? Why has he talked to five? Why not just the United States, which was one possible way of proceeding, as the only mediator. Why not go back to Geneva of '73? Why not just the two, the superpowers? Well, he feels very strongly about just the two as a prescription for polarization of the area. He does have friends in Europe, good friends in France and Britain. He would like to see them involved. And he doesn't like the idea of a conference dynamic developing in any way that might put -- draw the line Arab-Soviet versus American-Israel. And I respect his reasoning on that.

What happened to October '87? Well, it was -- it didn't work. It was an idea born out of sense that there was no way that the parties could get together. It was an attempt to start the negotiations, which each one of us has been told -- and they were telling us they've been ready to have direct face-to-face negotiations, only if Israel would like it just simply as that -- direct, bilateral, face-to-face negotiations, without any preconditions or any framework constructed which might obstruct the getting to those direct negotiations.

But Israel stands alone among the parties of the region. The others are not willing to have that kind of negotiation. They want some kind of international framework to give legitimacy, to give guidance. We felt we couldn't get there, so in October '87, that idea that you referred to was raised in Israel, and then subsequently raised with the Jordanians. The Israelis were not easy -- at ease -- with the concept. They had many reservations. Where would it lead? There were many

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unknowns, just how it would work. But it -- the attractiveness of it was, it would be a single event, and then direct negotiations. That was, and that's what we found constantly in the effort to put the peace process on a movable track, a track which you can go down.

The mirror image was that the Jordanians, for that precise reason, couldn't accept it. They did not -- could not accept a negotiation which would be kicked off in a one-day ceremonial event, or a meeting arranged at the summit, and then everyone leaves and there are just the two parties left to negotiate.

But the Israelis, yes, gave a qualified acceptance, a flickering light, a green light, but with many concerns expressed at the same time, to be perfectly honest about it. But the proposal died. Its attraction to us was that with nothing -- no other prospect of moving, it just might be a way to jump-start the very, very cold engine of last fall.

The Chairman mentioned the relationship of the events in the Territories beginning in December. I have to say yes, they have had their effect. It has changed perceptions. It perhaps has created a sense of more openness and flexibility throughout the region towards a new initiative, and that's why you have the proposal that we're talking about today.

The nature of the forum -- not defined in great specifics. Touched on in that proposal when it speaks -- in our proposal when we speak of the parties to each bilateral negotiation, and for us the heart of the whole effort has got to be accepted by everyone as direct negotiations, and in geographic committees. "The parties to each

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bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the Conference in a manner to be agreed." Here, again, words that have quite a heavy meaning, and the meaning is limitation. We are not going to tolerate efforts to turn this into an authoritative, a plenipotentiary conference, such as some parties would like to see. And up to this moment, I would have to put the Soviet Union in that category, the government of Syria in that category. We cannot accept that. I know that even if we could accept it that Israel could not accept it, would not accept it. But it's a limited conference with as -- with a plenary to which reports may be referred by the negotiating parties.

So, no, your words "permanent, international tribunal," I think, put a coloration on the concept which simply isn't there. The last thing we will accept is that any such conference would be a court of last resort. If the parties themselves, in dealing with these terribly intractable issues, have the sense that any hour of the day or night they can go to a plenary and get a ruling which will somehow, with some wisdom that has yet to -- or authority that is yet to be displayed by the Security Council itself, then they're deceiving themselves. There is going to be no such authority in the conference; there can be none. The issues are far too sensitive, far too existential, for the states involved. And not one of them would be dictated to or imposed on by a plenary.

Your final questions about our -- well, our preparedness to table a draft, is what we've spoken of, for transitional arrangements.

REP. LANTOS: It's the integral whole issue is what --

SEC. MURPHY: The integral whole, yeah. But you mentioned -- if I might just say a word on the idea of our tabling a draft, we are convinced that there is an opportunity to work with now, and that opportunities in the Middle East don't last, they never have. They come and they go, and they're normally missed. We'd like to make this one of the exceptions of the last 40 years. And so to speed things along, we are prepared to put our concepts down on paper as to what would be workable, transitional arrangements. It is not put down as a -- would not be put down as a dictat(?) to A, B, or C, but to negotiate against, to negotiate off of. The whole concept is that it would speed things up. Is it an ultimatum when we speak of an integral whole? Well, I can answer it this way, Congressman, we are working today with a set of ideas which have evolved from many hours, many visits, many contacts over the last several years. This is what we think is workable. Now we've said it's integral not to make it a dictat(?), not to make it an ultimatum, but say, gentlemen, if you pick this out, if you think you're standing in the cafeteria line and you want strawberries instead of peaches,

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forget it. Because you take that and he's going to demand this and then the whole package will unravel. We think the concept, particularly as regards procedures and the substance, which has to be negotiated, the way we're approaching it, makes sense and can work. It can work only with difficulty, only with pain to each of the parties. And they, I can tell you, I can assure you, have expressed that sense of pain very directly, openly, in frank and constructive talks throughout the region. But it's integral in that sense. It's not conceived as an ultimatum, but it's trying to share this sense that there are tradeoffs here for each of you. And we think that the proposal will meet each of your essential concerns. But I don't bring, I don't sit here today to tell you that we have a yes from any party. What I'm happy to tell you today is that we don't have a no from any party so, so far so good.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON: Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Let me join in welcoming you Mr. Ambassador and complimenting both you and the Secretary on the initiation of an extraordinarily important and sensitive process which we all very urgently hope succeeds. I share your assessment that we are at a period of time in the region where we do have some unique opportunities. Some of those incidentally I believe were created by the success of the Persian Gulf policy that you outlined earlier and I share your assessment of the success of that policy. I think that it has been after some initial wobbly beginnings put on the appropriate footing and has made a big difference with regard to our presence and credibility in the region.

I just briefly want to comment on two of the points you made in your answer to Mr. Lantos' questions. One is that I applaud your conclusion at the end that nobody has yet said no, and I wish to underscore it. At the same time I would like to suggest a caveat that I hope will be in everybody's mind as this process proceeds and that is, almost nobody has said no, or nobody has said definitely no,

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(JL)

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but certainly the PLO has come about as close to saying No as anybody can when Mr. Arafat makes clear to the 15 Palestinians who were acceptable to all sides that their life expectancy would be significantly curtailed if they met with Secretary Shultz and when Mr. Arafat proudly claims credit on Baghdad Radio for the murder of three innocent Israeli citizens in Dimona and apparently suggests to his minions that a car bomb might be directed toward our Secretary. That is hardly the type of response that I think keeps the door open from that hard line terrorist group and it causes me a great deal of anguish to see people who purport to want to have a role in the process playing the type of negative and terrorist role that they obviously have been playing since our Secretary and you and the administration have made the kind of strides and efforts that you have to open doors.

Secondly, I'd like to draw your attention, myself, for a moment, to the international conference issue that you were just discussing. Because the fact is that the definition of the international conference has, in fact, changed. And the fact is, as you outlined in your response, that even though the Israelis in the form of Prime Minister Shamir, had a great deal of concern and a number of caveats with regard to the Secretary's proposal of the Reagan-Gorbachev framework as a jump-start to some negotiations between the Israelis and the Jordanians, the fact is Prime Minister Shamir said Yes and King Hussein said No, I had hoped that that was symptomatic of King Hussein's concern about the Inman conference and that subsequent to the Inman conference where he did as well as he did, he would have some additional security and feel a little bit more comfortable about saying Yes to the type of jump-start that the Secretary had outlined before his trip to the Middle East would be the framework of the international conference.

The fact is the description of the international conference before the Secretary's visit to the Middle East was significantly more narrow than the description of the international conference at this point. I would like to just throw a suggestion out for your consideration and if you don't feel like responding to it directly, I would understand. But the suggestion might be that we might return a little bit closer to the definition of the international conference that the Secretary himself suggested if we thought in

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terms of a framework similar to that which you have outlined, but lasting only until November 1988 or January 1989, with an opportunity to review it and, perhaps, renew something similar to it, depending upon the success of the discussions or the negotiations during the auspices of this administration. I can definitely understand the sensitivity of the Israelis with regard to a process which they have understandable skepticism lasting well beyond the auspices of people who are framing this -- framing this procedure. And, perhaps a ground that might bring us a little bit closer to what was originally suggested, but still meet the concerns that the other parties are offering, might be the one that I just outlined.

SEC. MURPHY: Let me just ask you, I have a number of questions and I see that even that before I've asked them my time is rapidly coming to a close. But, let me ask you two, very briefly, and I'll hold the others until the second round.

First, have we said to King Hussein that his suggestion on the PLO was not helpful and came at a most inopportune time, and do we believe that this suggestion was a sincere suggestion that the King actually wants the kind of PLO involvement that he outlined, or was he simply trying to protect his flanks with regard to the type of caution that he may have about the dynamics of the process, or was he merely creating another condition in order to himself avoid coming forward and joining the process.

REP. LEVINE: Can you give me your assessment of where the King is at this point, is he likely to come forward? How serious was he with regard to his PLO suggestion that we, at least, read about, and how accurate were the reports of the PLO involvement that were reported in the American press as proposed by the King.

SEC. MURPHY: Let me speak more to certainly my -- or our understanding of thinking about Palestinian representation. We keep using the word workable, realistic. We consider the only way that this negotiation is going to work is if it's in -- as regards to the occupied territories

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(JL)

if it's in a joint delegation, joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Now, any Arab leader, not just the king, has to live with the slogan that the PLO is the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. So I wouldn't expect anyone to oppose PLO representation, but we have said, and actually, I don't think there's any change in the king's position. I think he does understand and certainly we spared no effort on the concept of a joint delegation that what has to be produced is a delegation with -- formed by the government of Jordan and Palestinians who are credible.

They've got to be credible -- they got to be credible with their own people. But they've got to be people whose very presence are not going to drive Israel away from the table. If that happens, we have no conference. We have no negotiation of any nature. So, I think he does accept the concept of a joint delegation as a realistic one, because -- that -- that anyway reflects the nature of the conversations we've had and the -- the other words, I don't see that he was -- he's actually pushing for a separate Palestinian delegation.

REP. LEVINE: Have you any response or thoughts or comments on the international conference suggestion I had? Or would you prefer not to?

SEC. MURPHY: Well, the concept of limiting the conference or at least this outline of how the conference might proceed to the life of this administration -- let me answer it indirectly perhaps.

REP. LEVINE: It's a real (inaudible) person compliment, I want you to know.

SEC. MURPHY: To answer indirectly?

REP. LEVINE: No, to suggest this process.

SEC. MURPHY: Ah, yes. Well, you -- I assume you have your own ideas as of next January. (Laughter.)

REP. LEVINE: I won't pick that one up. (Laughter.)

SEC. MURPHY: We've been asked by several of the governments in the region -- you know -- this is all very well -- and they see that the calendar is driven heavily by the life of the Reagan administration. And what then? The answer is very simple. If this is working, there isn't any administration of any stripe that is going to walk away from this process. So I don't think there's any reason for doubts that if it turns into a workable negotiation and the effort was to get it in the life of this administration to the stage of having started the second set of talks on the most complex of all aspects of the negotiation -- the future of the territories, the future of the Palestinians and to get that done under

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leadership which has given great study to the problem and has some credentials in the region, so that there wouldn't be -- obviously any new administration is going to re-study -- not if it's going -- if it's a success story -- no one is going to want to tamper with it.

So I -- that's an indirect answer. I don't think I can do better than that.

REP. LEVINE: No, that's helpful and I appreciate it.

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
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
שאלת פלסטין - ועידה בינ"ל

1. רצ"ב איגרת המזכ"ל המבקשת התייחסותנו להחלטת העצרת במכלול שאלת פלסטין בעניין הועידה הבינ"ל במתכונת של א38/58.
2. המזכ"ל מבקש התייחסותנו המעודכנת לסוגיה עד ה-25/3 כדי שיוכל להגיש את הדו"ח לא יאוחר מה-31/3.
3. רצ"ב לנוחיותכם תשובתנו למזכ"ל מאפריל 1984 בנידון.

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The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to resolution 42/66 D, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 1987, concerning the question of the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 38/58 C. The text of resolution 42/66 D is enclosed.

As the Permanent Representative/Observer will be aware, this question was first raised at the General Assembly's thirty-eighth session when resolution 38/58 C was adopted and has since been the subject of annual reports by the Secretary-General, following consultation with the Security Council.

Operative paragraph 7 of resolution 42/66 D requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts with a view to convening the Conference and to report thereon to the General Assembly not later than 31 March 1988. In order to assist him in the preparation of his report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General would be grateful to receive by 25 March 1988 an up-to-date statement of the position of the Government of Israel on the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with resolution 38/58 C.

9 March 1988

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The General Assembly.

Recalling its resolutions 38/58 C of 13 December 1983, 39/49 D of 11 December 1984, 40/96 D of 12 December 1985 and 41/43 D of 2 December 1986, in which it, inter alia, endorsed the call for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East,

Recalling also the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 39/49 D, 40/96 D and 41/43 D, in which it, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts with a view to convening the Conference,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 November 1987, 3/ in which he, inter alia, stated that "the major obstacle at present, however, is one of a different kind, namely, the inability of the Government of Israel as a whole to agree on the principle of an international conference under United Nations auspices",

Expressing its regret that, owing to the attitudes of some Member States, the difficulties regarding the convening of the Conference have remained essentially the same, and expressing its hope that those Member States will reconsider their attitudes,

Having heard the statements made by numerous representatives, including the statement by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation,

Taking note of the resolutions as well as the Final Declaration of the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference, held at Amman from 8 to 11 November 1987, in which, inter alia, the Arab leaders declared that "in the context of promoting peaceful efforts and endeavours seeking to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East region in accordance with international legality and the resolutions of the United Nations and on the basis of the return of all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, the leaders supported, as the only appropriate means of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict in a peaceful, just and comprehensive manner, the convening of the International Peace Conference under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation, on an equal footing, of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people, and the permanent members of the Security Council", 4/

3/ A/42/714-S/19249.

4/ See A/42/779-S/19274, annex.





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Noting with satisfaction the growing international consensus in favour of convening the Conference under the auspices of the United Nations, and in conformity with its relevant resolutions, to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the just solution of the question of Palestine, which is the core of this conflict,

Emphasizing the need to bring about a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has persisted for nearly four decades,

1. Takes note of the reports of the Secretary-General; 5/
2. Noting with satisfaction the ever-increasing international consensus in favour of the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, as reflected in the statements made during the debate;
3. Determines once again that the question of Palestine is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East;
4. Reaffirms once again its endorsement of the call for convening the Conference in conformity with the provisions of resolution 38/58 C, particularly the guidelines and participation determined therein;
5. Reiterates its endorsement of the call for setting up a preparatory committee, within the framework of the Security Council, with the participation of the permanent members of the Council, to take the necessary action to convene the Conference;
6. Stresses once again the urgent need for additional concrete and constructive efforts by all Governments in order to convene the Conference without further delay;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, to continue his efforts with a view to convening the Conference and to report thereon to the General Assembly not later than 31 March 1988;
8. Decides to consider at its forty-third session the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the present resolution.

89th plenary meeting  
2 December 1987





General Assembly Security Council

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27 April 1984

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Thirty-ninth session  
Item 36 of the preliminary list\*  
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL  
Thirty-ninth year

Letter dated 26 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of  
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's letter of 9 March 1984 regarding resolution 38/58 C, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on 13 December 1983, on the question of the convening of an "international peace conference on the Middle East".

Israel's position on this matter was clearly reflected in its vote against General Assembly resolution 38/58 C. As stated in Israel's explanation of vote before the vote (A/38/FV.95, p. 47), the said resolution was

"not the General Assembly's first attempt to undermine Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by setting guidelines that are incompatible with and contrary to that resolution. These guidelines would actually eliminate the carefully balanced meaning and intent of resolution 242 (1967). In fact, resolution 242 (1967) is, very significantly, not even mentioned at all in the draft resolution. The intent is clear. The sponsors of the draft resolution seek to eradicate the only viable resolution which has already proved its constructive value as the sole agreed-upon basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a doubt, in keeping with the predetermined and biased course defined by the present draft resolution, the proposed conference would harm the chances for peace".

Moreover, General Assembly resolution 38/58 C also subsumes the decisions and recommendations of the "International Conference on the Question of Palestine" held at Geneva in August-September 1983. Initiated and sponsored by the Palestine Committee, which is itself an instrument of the terrorist PLO within the General

\* A/39/50.

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Assembly, that conference was dominated by the automatic majority against Israel within the United Nations and was the progenitor of the idea of the "peace conference" proposed in resolution 38/58 C. It also served as a forum for the dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda.

In the light of these facts, and of the consistency of Israel's position in this regard, Israel will not be a party to any conference dedicated to such purposes and objectives.

I wish to reiterate on this occasion Israel's position that the sole path to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East is that of direct negotiations, based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) - which has already proven effective in bringing about the Camp David Accords and, through them, the Israel-Egypt Treaty of Peace of 26 March 1979. General Assembly resolution 38/58 C is contrary both to the Camp David Accords and to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on which they are based. Any serious attempt to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East - as distinct from the hollow propaganda exercise exemplified in resolution 38/58 C - must be initiated through direct negotiations based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 36 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM  
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Israel  
to the United Nations



טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים  
סוג בטחוני: גלוי  
דחיפות: מיידי  
תאריך וז"ח: 14.3.88 15:00  
מס' מברק:

0315

אל : המשרד

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: לש' מנכ"ל מדיני  
לש' מנכ"ל רה"מ  
מנכ"ל רה"מ - כאן

הסנטורים הלמס והכט ומהליך השלום  
למברקי 300 מה-13.3

1. רצ"ב הצעת המכתב שהופץ ע"י הסנטורים הנ"ל.
2. עד כה הצטרפו לשובבינות בנוסף להלמס והכט הסנטורים המפרי, בונד, ארמסטרונג, סימס וקרנס.
3. המלה האחרונה בסעיף השני במברקנו הנ"ל צריכה להיות "שגוייה" (ולא שגואה).

ה'א"ת  
למדרן

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March 8, 1988

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0315

The Honorable George Shultz  
Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Peace and stability in the Middle East are vital to the United States for religious, strategic and cultural reasons. Your past efforts as well as your current willingness to act as a mediator between the various countries there has put the United States in an excellent position to facilitate long-lasting peace and stability in this vital region.

Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East. Its military strength and consistent cooperation with our country makes it the chief deterrent to Soviet adventurism in the region. In addition, our strong cultural and religious ties to Israel makes that country important to many -- if not most -- Americans.

During Prime Minister Shamir's upcoming visit to Washington, it is our belief that Administration officials should refrain from public criticism of the Prime Minister's negotiating stance in regards to various peace proposals.

Any such public criticism might well be interpreted as an attempt to affect the domestic political situation in Israel. The people of Israel will be going to the polls sometime this year. Any efforts on our part to affect the elections of another free nation would not be appropriate, and indeed, could be counter-productive.

In addition, regardless of how any of us as individuals feel about the concept of "trading land for peace", we believe it is not the place of U.S. government officials to cast aspersions upon the Prime Minister's political and strategic judgment. After all, it is not our land that is at issue, nor our country's security which is immediately at stake.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE



03/14/88 12:32

AIPAC

02

The Honorable George Shultz  
March 8, 1988  
Page Two

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Israel is a country surrounded by hostile forces -- many of which receive support and encouragement from the Soviet Union. Because of this, Israelis live in a unique world which may be difficult for many Americans used to secure frontiers to appreciate.

The people of Israel, better than anyone else, understand their own security needs. They have elected their own leadership, and it should be the job of their leaders to decide when and if their country should accept "land for peace" with regard to territory currently administered by Israel.

Finally, we hope you will make it clear to the Prime Minister that future U.S. assistance to Israel would not be affected by his response to any particular peace proposal.

Our assistance to Israel is not provided as leverage to force acquiescence in negotiating positions which Israel may not see in its interest. Rather, such assistance is based on Israel's strategic, military, religious and cultural importance to the United States.

Mr. Secretary, the various parties in the Middle East will come to a peaceful agreement only when the Arab countries are convinced of our unwavering support for Israel and its strategic needs, and only when each country involved sees such an agreement to be in its own self interest. We are confident that with time and the efforts of the United States, such an agreement can be found.

Sincerely,

END





- ש מ ר -

14 מרץ 1988  
כה' אדר תשמ"ח

11.3.88  
רה"מ

אל: מנהל מצפ"א  
דע: ס' מנכ"ל צפ"א ופרי"ן  
לשי' מנכ"ל מדיני

לשי' מנכ"ל רה"מ  
מאת: קצין קישור לקונגרס

הנדון: מכתב רה"מ לסנטור לוין  
וכתבתו של צבי בראל בעתון הארץ (11.3.88)  
למברקי 289 מה-11.3

1. היוונים הקדומים היו הורגים את השליח המביא את הבשורות הלא טובות. עצם העובדה שעוזריו של הסנטור לוין, לידיהם העברתי מכתב רה"מ ב-9 דנא, מהרו ומסרו ספור מעוות לחלוטין לעתונאי ישראלי מרמז על כך שרצו להרוג את השליח.

2. בהעדרו של הסנטור (שהיה בברה"מ), את תגובת רה"מ מסרתי לידי מנהל משרדו, מר גורדון קר, בנוכחות מ.ג'. רוזנברג, עוזר הסנטור לענייני מזה"מ (והמנסח של "מכתב ה-30") שלא פצה פה במהלך הפגישה. שררה אמנם מתיחות בשיחתנו, אך מן הראוי לציין שחשתי במתח זה אצל קר ורוזנברג מלכתחילה - מן הסתם עקב הביקורת המופנית לעבר הסנטור לוין ע"י גורמים יהודים מאז פרסום המכתב לשולץ.

3. לאחר שעיינן קר בתגובת רה"מ, שאלני לכוונתו של מר שמיר. השיבותי שאיני מוסמך ואיני מסוגל לתת פירושים למכתב רה"מ. אחר-כך ביקש קר לדעת מדוע רה"מ ראה לנכון לשגר מכתב ללוין, כי הרי מכתב ה-30 מופנה למזכיר שולץ. בצייני את פרסום מכתב הסנטורים בכלי התקשורת, העדתי שאיני יכול אלא לחזור על דברים שאמרתי ללוין יום לפני שיגור המכתב:

א. המכתב יתקבל כ- **SHALING OUT** של ישראל - ואין זה הוגן או מוצדק. בפועל, המכתב נתפס בעתונות כאן ובישראל כהתקפה אישית על רה"מ שמיר.



ב. המכתב יהווה התערבות בלתי רצויה ביוזמת שולץ, עת שהמו"מ בשלב עדין. עתה ברור שעל אף רצונו של הסנטור לקדם את היוזמה, הושגה תוצאה הפוכה.

4. קר לא הרפה: תהה מדוע רה"מ לא התיחס לנקודה המרכזית במכתב לוין (היינו פרוש 242, שאליבא דסנטור הינו "שטחים תמורת שלום"). כאן הבעתי תמיהה, תוך שימוש-בהתלוצצות אך גם בחום - בבוטוי ססגוני "ARE YOU OFF YOUR ROCKER" ("האם ירדת מהפסים?") הסברתי שזוהי בעצם הבעיה המרכזית במכתב לוין - בדיפלומטיה אין צורך לרשום הכל בלשון "ירחל בתך הקטנה", ו עוד באותיות של קידוש לבנה. הפירושים המפורטים שהם יחסו ל-242 מכבידים מאוד על רה"מ ומאמציו לבוא לקראת המזכיר שולץ.

5. דברים אלו לא מצאו חן בעיני קר - בלשון המעטה. בתרעומת רבה שאל האם סבורני שהם לא רצו לקדם את השלום. השבתי בשלילה, בהוסיפי שהדברים שהשמעתי נאמרו מכל הלב - לא רק כנציג רשמי של ישראל אלא גם כאזרח פרטי החפץ בשלום ומצטער על כל מהלך שיש בו כדי לפגוע בנסיונות להשיג את השלום.

6. בכעס וזעם אמר קר שלא מקובל עליו שישאלוהו אם הוא ירד מהפסים. במבוכת-מה, הערתי כי חשבתי להייתי במחיצתם של ידידים ושהערכתי כי לאחר עבודה משותפת במשך שלוש שנים קיימים ביננו יחסים כאלה המאפשרים לי להתבטא בכנות ובגילוי לב. בקרירות מודגשת פסק קר **RELATIONSHIP** כזה אינו קיים - וייתכן שיצטרכו למצוא צינור מחילופי לקיום מגעים עם השגרירות. בהקשר זה התייחס קר גם לשיחה קודמת בה הבהרתי לרוזנברג בצורה שאיננה משתמעת לשתי פנים את התוצאות השליליות האפשריות של מכתב לוין - שיחה שהביאה אותם לשנות את נוסח המכתב במקצת.

7. אחרי הדברים הקשים האלה התרכך קר במידת מה. ביקשתיו למצוא דרך להודיע ללוין במוסקבה על תגובת רה"מ, שמא המכתב יגיע לידי התקשורת. קר הודה על מסירת המכתב, וכך נפרדנו. לא נתבקשתי "לעזוב את החדר" ובוודאי לא סולקתי משם, כדברי עתון הארץ. מיותר לציין שלא הועברה כל מחאה ולא הושמעו דברי עלבון כלפי הסנטור.

8. יום לאחר התקרית פנה אלי צבי בראל, ובקש פרטים. נמנעתי מלמסור פרוט כלשהו, אך כפי שבראל מציין בכתבתו, כן הבעתי הדעה שהארוע לא ישפיע על מערכת היחסים עם משרדו של לוין ועם לוין עצמו, אשר ישאר ידידה של ישראל וידיד אישי. דעתי זו בעינה עומדת, ובימים הקרובים אדבר עם הסנטור לוין כדי ליישר ההדורים ולהבטיח את המשך הקשרים הטובים וההדוקים עם משרדו.

ב ב ר כ ה  
יוסף למדן

העחק: שגריר, ציר, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, כ"א.

רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	רה: 1
תל"ד:		מחור: 3
סוג כטורני:		
ש.מ.ר:		א ל:
תו"ח:		מנהל מצפ"א
גר:	לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רוה"מ, השגריר וושינגטון	ר ע:
מאח:	סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	

מכתב הסנטורים.

1. הארגונים היהודיים לא חוזר לא הצליחו להגיע לקונצנזוס על מכתב משותף שהיה בדעתם לשגר כתגובה ל-30 הסנטורים.

2. חלק מהארגונים פועלים בצורה אינדיבידואלית. מצ"ב מכתב נשיא כני-ברית מה-10 כמרס לסנטור בושוביץ.

מרדכי ידיד

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אישור:

מרדכי ידיד

שם השולח:

14.3.1988

תאריך:



**B'NAI B'RITH INTERNATIONAL**

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 867-6553

BEYMOUM D. REICH

March 10, 1988

The Honorable Rudy Boschwitz  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Boschwitz:

We appreciate the good will intended in your March 3 letter to Secretary Shultz. We also know of your long-standing commitment to Israel.

We share your concern over the apparent hardening of the Arab position, including King Hussein's defection from the concept of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to his more recent insistence on a separate PLO delegation. The PLO, of course, has just chalked up an additional outrage against Israeli civilians -- the attack on the bus in the Negev -- one more brutal affidavit, as if it were needed, of that organization's inherent unfitness to be at a negotiating table.

What we must take strong issue with in your letter, however, is its criticism of Prime Minister Shamir. With all respect, we think that criticism is unfair and unfounded. Mr. Shamir has not disavowed Resolution 242, which requires relinquishing territory; to the contrary, he is on record as having fully embraced it.

A good negotiator is like a good poker player. He does not reveal his hand until the right time. The Israeli Prime Minister has chosen to play it close to the vest. He wants to get to the negotiating table and find out what the other side -- propaganda and rhetoric aside -- is really prepared to offer in hard, real-world bargaining. Only then is he going to say what Israel will give in return. It should also be noted that Secretary Shultz has not asked Mr. Shamir to be more explicit on the territory for peace question as a condition for Israel's participation in a peace conference.

What worries Mr. Shamir is not so much the concept of territory for peace, but the Arab formulation of that concept. I am sure you will agree that whatever territorial concessions Israel makes, she cannot go back to the impossibly vulnerable, indefensible pre-1967 lines.

We will only know what each side is really prepared to do once the bargaining begins. The problem is to begin. As you know, the Arabs have put every conceivable obstruction in the way, the latest being the Palestinian refusal to meet with Mr. Shultz when he was last in Jerusalem, as well as King Hussein's shift.

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
We agree with your letter's statement that "It is only through compromise by both sides that we will achieve Middle East peace." We believe that Yitzhak Shamir understand this, and will, at the appropriate moment, make the compromises necessary to make peace.

But first Israel has to get to the table. For 40 years, with the lonely exception of Egypt, the Arabs have refused to sit down with Israel face-to-face. Perhaps Secretary Shultz can succeed where others have failed. B'nai B'rith has certain reservations about the U.S. initiative as described in the Secretary's last letter to the concerned parties, but we support the Secretary's overall mission in the Middle East.

Thank you for this opportunity to clarify the record.

With every kind wish.

Sincerely,



Seymour D. Reich

SDR:vb  
0477w

cc: Thomas Neumann,  
Executive Vice President  
B'nai B'rith







שמור

בכנס \*\*

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חוזם: 11934/3

אל: המשרד

מ-: דוש, נר: 309, תא: 140388, זח: 1000, דח: ר, טג: שמ

נד: פ

שמור/רגיל

אל: מנהל מצמא

דע: ממכלל מדיני, אמיתק, הסברה, הקוננלים בארה"ב

הסברה ע"י AJC

בחש האחרון נערכו פגישות יזומות של פעילי הוועד היהודי  
האמריקני עם מנהיגי קואליציות לז"א-נוצרים, נשים,  
איגודים מקצועיים, שחורים וכו' לדיון על המצב בישראל.  
המפגשים מועילים בפגישות אלה ניתנה הזדמנות למתן  
אינפורמציה ולהתבטא באופן כללי הם דורשים מישראל למצוא  
'דון אחרת לטפל במצב'. אין להם פתרונות או תשובה משלהם  
אך קיימת דרישה כללית להגמשה פוליטית רגילי נכונות  
למוס. רק מיעוט דורש שארה"ב תשתמש בסיוע האמריקני  
כאמצעי לחץ על ישראל למשרה פוליטית ובד"כ דרישה זו  
נדהית ע"י המשתתפים האחרים בהיות ישראל יודעה לאמריקה  
וסנקציות הם קונטרפרודקטיביות

ב 28-29 במרס יתקיים כנס ברושינגטון של פעילי AJC  
ברושינגטון כדי להרחיב הפעולה בקרב הקואליציות לז"א  
לערים אחרות ושיכלול

א.מפגשים עם עורכי העיתונים שיצאו בבקורת על מדיניות  
ישראל בישראל ובהליך השלטון כדי להדגיש חוסר הנכונות  
הערבים

ב. לארגן מפגשים יזומים עם חברי הקונגרס והסנט באזוריהם  
בחופשת הפסחא (1-10 באפריל) זאת במיוחד לאור הלחץ

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REPORT OF THE  
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THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.  
ON APRIL 1, 1964, AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK.  
RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-  
RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-  
RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-

RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-

RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-

RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-  
RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALIEN; C. I. NO. 1-100-100000-

11

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים  
 סוג בטחוני: גלוי  
 דחיפות: מיידי  
 תאריך וז"ח: 14.3.88 16:00  
 מס' מברק:

64 0318

אל: המשרד + ניו יורק

אל: מצפ"א  
 דע: לש' מנכ"ל מדיני  
 לש' מנכ"ל רה"מ  
 הקונכ"ל - ניו יורק

סנטור מוינאהו  
 למברק ידיד נר 294

למען הסדר הטוב יש לציין שהודעתו של מוינאהו לא שוחררה להפצה כללית. היא נמסרה ע"י עוזרו לענינים יהודים בניו יורק לידי אישים נבחרים בקהילה היהודית בעיר. ההודעה לא הופצה כלל בושינגטון וכמוכן לא למקבלי הדואר ממשרד מוינאהו. יתכן שתמסר לעתונות היהודית השבוע, גם באמצעות משרד הסנטור בניו יורק.

א/א/ג  
 למדן

למברק ידיד נר 294  
 3 2 3 2





סוג כספוני:

טופס מברק

13

תז"ח:

מס' לשכת השר, מע"ח, מצפ"א

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נר : 10296

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38

גאון

עתונות, ניו יורק

להלן חלק מן המתפרסם ב-"ניו יורק טיימס" של מחר בבוקר, יום א' 13 במרץ:

1. מאמר מערכת, "שגיאותיו של מר שמיר"
2. כתבה של דייוויד שיפער ב-"WEEK IN REVIEW" - "האם יכולה ארה"ב לשכנע את שמיר להכנע בעניין של בטחון?"
3. כתבה של תום פרידמן ב-"WEEK IN REVIEW" - "התקוממות הפלסטינים איננה סרט שנעשה עבור הטלביזיה"
4. כתבה של אלאן קוול בעמוד הראשון על התפטרויות פלסטינים בשטחים
5. כתבה שלג'ון קיפנר בעמוד ראשון על מלחמת צה"ל בערכים ובתדמית

עוד בעמוד ראשון תמונה גדולה של הפגנת "שלוש עכשיו". כמו כן בעתון מודעה על עמוד שלם הקוראת "THE TIME HAS CCME; END ALL AID TO APARTHEID ISRAEL" (וחומה בעיקר ע"י ערכים אמריקאים); כתבה על השפעת המהומות על ערכי ארה"ב, המגבירים מאמציהם, כתבה על הפצצת חיל האוויר בלכנון וכתבה על נאום שה"ח הקנדי בביקורת על ישראל והשערוריה שעורר שם.

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# Mr. Shamir's Mistakes

Thirty United States senators wrote to Secretary of State Shultz to support his Middle East peace plan and to criticize Prime Minister Shamir for rejecting the heart of the plan — land for peace. The Israeli leader replies that he is "astonished" by the letter and that the only valid part of the Shultz plan is the Secretary's signature.

Perhaps Mr. Shamir badly misunderstands the senators' wisdom and restraint. Or perhaps he gets their point all too clearly, but irrevocably opposes giving up land for peace in the West Bank and Gaza.

Either way, on the eve of his meetings in Washington this week, Mr. Shamir is making a mistake. Those 30 senators are among Israel's firmest friends, as are President Reagan and Mr. Shultz; so are the likely Presidential nominees. Their common message is that if Mr. Shamir's Likud bloc remains committed to the status quo, it will damage Israel's security over the long run. They are also telling him that Israel should not be or appear to be the obstacle to serious negotiations.

The confrontation in the occupied territories is in its fourth month. Mr. Shultz responded to it with a new proposal: an international conference to legitimize direct negotiations; immediate talks on Palestinian self-administration of the territories, and overlapping talks on a long-term settlement based on peace for land. Foreign Minister Peres says he'd go along but Mr. Shamir balks, vehemently. Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, says he is also opposed, though he tries to make positive noises about peace.

Two of Israel's staunchest supporters — Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Republican of Minnesota, and Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan — or-

ganized their colleagues to reaffirm the principle of land for peace as a basis for negotiations.

Their letter did not call on Israel to relinquish all of the occupied territories. On the contrary, it showed appreciation for territorial adjustments to protect Israel's security. The letter did not call on Israel to accept the Shultz plan as is or to weaken Israel's bargaining position. It called for Arab undertakings to match. Nor did it condemn Israel's handling of the violence; many of the senators sympathize with the need to be tough to restore order.

Mr. Shamir's response to the senators was mostly sophistry. He wrote that he accepts U.N. Resolution 242, which calls on the parties to trade land for peace. He insisted that the terms of the resolution were fulfilled in the Camp David peace agreement of 1978 whereby Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt. And he argued that this principle does not apply to the occupied territories. These, he maintained, are covered by the Camp David accords' formula of local self-government for the Palestinians. Mr. Shamir did not mention that he has never supported those accords.

Last week, Mr. Shultz rightly described the growing Arab population under occupation as a "ticking demographic time bomb." He and the 30 senators also recognize that a hurried and unsatisfactory peace would be equally dangerous. They know as well that a negotiating process might lead to one-sided pressures on Israel.

Mr. Shamir has used these problems as an excuse to procrastinate and avoid negotiations. Israel's friends in this country are trying to tell him that it's time for him to start thinking about how to manage and overcome the problems. Perhaps in his U.S. visit this week, he will get the message.

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By DAVID K. SHIPLER

WASHINGTON  
**W**HEN Secretary of State George P. Shultz set out last month to promote an ambitious plan for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, his strategy seemed to be aimed primarily at Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

If the uprising by Palestinians under Israeli occupation had instilled enough alarm among Israelis, some of the Secretary's aides reasoned, and if King Hussein of Jordan could be induced to accept a negotiating formula, Mr. Shamir would find it difficult to say no, especially in light of the Israeli elections to be held in November. He would not want to look like an obstacle to peace, and once talks got under way, the momentum would place the issue of territorial compromise at the top of the agenda for Israeli voters.

Yitzhak Shamir is an old guerrilla fighter, however, and George Shultz is a conventional warrior, an easy target. Last week, Mr. Shamir took aim in a couple of sharp interviews with Israeli newspapers, telling the daily Haaretz: "The only word in the Shultz plan I accept is his signature. Apart from that, the document does not serve the cause of peace or advance it even by one centimeter." Mr. Shamir then had his spokesman, who was in Washington, try to soften the blow for the American audience by asserting that his words had been taken out of context, that he respected Mr. Shultz, that he would be arriving in Washington Monday "with ideas that he hopes will be able to bridge the gap between his position and the American plan."

Mr. Shamir, who fought in the Jewish underground in pre-1948 Pal-

estine, knows how to draw from his political arsenal, and he has only begun. One possible weapon is a move for early elections, which would freeze the diplomacy until a new government is installed.

However this peace effort finally plays out, it is likely to demonstrate a good deal about the neurotic relationship between Israel and the United States — two interdependent friends who do not quite trust each other to act wisely. It is a test, in a sense, of whether an Administration whose support and commitment to Israel is unquestionable can bend Israeli policies on central issues of security. It is a test of whether a divided Israel, uncertain in its course, can be led to careful compromise by a caring benefactor.

Israel gets \$3 billion a year from


the United States, more than any other country in the world. The normal rules and restrictions that entangle other recipients of economic aid are waived; the money goes directly into the Israeli treasury, no strings attached.

In addition, the military relationship has grown increasingly intimate under the Reagan Administration, with Israel now occupying the same status as NATO allies in the freedom of its industries to bid for Pentagon contracts. This has been a boon to Israel's defense contractors, whose annual sales to the United States went from \$9 million in 1983 to \$252 million in 1987. But the Administration has placed none of this in jeopardy over the peace efforts, nor is it likely to.

Despite growing distress in Con-

# Can U.S. Persuade Shamir to Yield on an Issue of Security?

Talks Between Friends Who Doubt Each Other's Wisdom



Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel

Gamma-Liaison/F. Apesteguy



gress over the television scenes of Israeli troops shooting, beating and burying Palestinians, and despite a letter from 30 Senators criticizing Mr. Shamir for opposing territorial compromise, the political strength and skill of American supporters of Israel practically preclude any serious disaffection on Capitol Hill. Like an organism defending itself against a disease, Congress reflexively rejects any measure labeled anti-Israel. And the Congressmen's haste to please Israel's supporters has led them into conflict even with this pro-Israel Administration.

Congress did the "dumbest thing," Mr. Shultz said last week, in enacting legislation to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's observer mission to the United Nations, a step that has not helped the Administration's peace effort.

### Sweet Talk and Finesse

Mr. Shultz has pursued Mr. Shamir with sweet talk and finesse. Always the devoted friend of Israel, always putting the question in terms of Israeli interests, Israeli security, Israeli morality, the Secretary has been careful to avoid any hint of pressure or sanctions. In public at least, Mr. Shultz originally played down the issue that American officials know will have to be confronted in negotiations — an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, territories occupied since the 1967 war and home to about 1.4 million Palestinian Arabs. (The turmoil and the role of television, page 2.)

Mr. Shamir and his Likud bloc are firmly opposed to such a pullout, while Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, the head of the Labor Party, accepts the idea. Mr. Shamir even opposed the Camp David accords in

## Optimism Against Odds

*This is the Middle East peace plan timetable proposed by Secretary of State Shultz to a number of heads of state; it has received little support.*

**April 1988** — International conference would convene with Israel, Syria, Egypt, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. Conference would have continuing role but could not veto or impose settlement.

**May 1, 1988** — Israel and "each of its neighbors" would begin six months of negotiations on an interim phase of self-administration for Palestinians living in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip, including election of administrative council by Palestinians.

**December 1988** — Talks, to last one year, would begin between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the final status of occupied territories. An interim phase of self-administration would not go into effect until these talks had begun.

**December 1989** — Talks on the final status of occupied territories would conclude.

**December 1991** — Earliest possible effective date for agreement on the final status of occupied territories.

agreement that sidestepped the question of what would happen to the West Bank and Gaza. That ambiguity now appeals to Mr. Shamir, who has taken to using Camp David as a convenient shield against the more demanding Shultz plan.

Deftly, sometimes elliptically, Mr. Shultz has broached the question of yielding territory. He has based his proposal for negotiations on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which provide for an Israeli withdrawal and a recognition of all countries' needs for secure

borders. At a Congressional hearing last week, he appealed for new definitions of security.

"Israel needs to focus on the fact that there is a very large, clearly ticking demographic time bomb," he said, referring to the Arabs and their high birthrate. And missiles with longer range and greater accuracy diminish the value of narrow strips of land as military buffers, he suggested. "Your concept of defense has to be different," he said. "That concept has to be one of seeking peace in the neighborhood."

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## Occupied Territories

# Uprising by the Palestinians Is Not a Made-for-TV Movie

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

**T**HE 4,000 residents of this tiny Arab village in the West Bank mountains say they have held some 20 demonstrations since the Palestinian uprisings began last Dec. 9. The village's Israeli-appointed leaders have all resigned and its youth have broken apart one of the ancient stone terraces on the hillside sloping down from Mazraa Sharqiya in order to build a series of roadblocks at the entrance to the town. Two of the village's residents have been killed, one shot by soldiers, another by a Jewish settler. When an American reporter walked into the hamlet last week, he found scores of people, young and old, congratulating a teen-ager who had been grazed by an Israeli bullet that left an inch-long hole in his shirt sleeve. What is noteworthy is that television cameras have not recorded any of this. The uprising here began without television, it widened without television, and now it is part of local legend without television.

"Sure, television is important," said a Mazraa youth, "but we have not gone out and demonstrated for television, and if the Israelis ban the the press from coming here they will see that it makes no difference."

Nonetheless, in recent weeks a range of people from right-wing Israeli politicians to former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger have advised that if Israel

banned television from the occupied territories and then quelled the riots with an iron fist it could solve its problems. Brig. Gen. Zeev Livneh, the Israeli commander responsible for the northern half of the West Bank, believes such a ban would be a mistake. "This whole situation did not start because of television," he said. "I think we should wrestle with the real problem and not the media."

Having said that, however, General Livneh added that the army will use its legal power to "tactically" close towns or specific areas of the West Bank to the media for temporary periods when it believes television cameras are fueling a demonstration or if the Palestinians are staging a demonstration solely for the purpose of television, as has occasionally happened.

If television has had a distorting impact on the events in the occupied territories, it has not been so much through its lenses, but through its implicit script, argued Meron Benvenisti, an Israeli expert on the West Bank. Television was drawn to this story out of the belief that it was about David turned Goliath, historical Jewish victims turned victimizers, he said.

"The media want to identify with the oppressed, and they cannot do it if he behaves like a terrorist, so they have to turn what is essentially a communal war into Palestinian civil disobedience," said Mr. Benvenisti.

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"But what they are missing is that while this confrontation is not between equals — the Jews have far superior firepower — the stake that each side feels it has in the outcome is very equal: communal survival."

"I was in al-Amari refugee camp last week with a lot of foreign cameramen as well," said Ehud Yaari, Israel Television's Arab affairs correspondent. "Israeli soldiers were standing off at a distance, facing a big violent crowd of Palestinian demonstrators who were throwing rocks, bottles, Molotov cocktails. The following conversation took place between the cameramen and the Israeli officer in charge: The officer said, 'We are not going to go in. We are not going to do it for you.' And the cameramen said, 'You will have to go in, so you might as well do it now.' Everyone understood his role very well. Eventually the soldiers went in and as soon as they started breaking into homes to capture rioters who had fled, the cameras all started to roll."

The focus on Israeli beatings is not necessarily a negative for Israelis or an unalloyed benefit for the Palestinians. When CBS News took its film of four Israeli soldiers beating two Palestinian prisoners, the film was turned over to the Israeli army and widely shown to senior officers, forcing them and the whole society to confront the brutal reality of their occupation. The danger for Palestinians is that their visibility on television depends on their role as victims, and this role can become an end itself — rather than a phase, or an instrument, to bringing about a peaceful resolution. At some point they will have to get off stage and collectively decide how they want to live with the Israelis.

### Why They Throw Stones

Many have assumed that the reason the Palestinians are throwing rocks, flaming bottles and other primitive weapons is because they have made a political-moral decision to use nonlethal violence. But when Palestinian youths are asked why they use stones they say it is for operational military reasons. They throw stones in order not to have to face Israeli tanks. If they used the few guns they have, it would give the Israelis an excuse to come in with their full firepower and finish them. More than 80 Palestinians have been killed in the uprising; but if the Israeli army had used its full lethal force the number

could have been 800, which might have ended the rebellion a long time ago. No Israeli soldiers or civilians have been killed by the rioting Palestinians, but dozens have been injured by the primitive weapons.

The daily dialogue between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli soldiers is also not something drawn from the teachings of Gandhi. It often goes something like this: "I am going to rape your mother," "I am going to rape your sister," "You're a maniac," and, a favorite

of Palestinians "If you were a real man you would put down your gun and come over here and fight."

All the time that television has focused on stones, the P.L.O. has been making constant attempts to infiltrate gunmen into Israel. Finally, last Monday, it managed to send three men in by way of Egypt. They hijacked a civilian bus, causing the deaths of two Israeli women and a man, before they themselves were killed.

The first reaction of many observers to the bus attack was, "How could the P.L.O. be so stupid? They were winning the media war with stones." But the P.L.O. was not being stupid; it was being the P.L.O. It knew its audience: Many Palestinians in the territories were pleased with the attack, saying that it was about time they got some help from the outside. As for the many Israelis who quietly expressed relief at the incident because, they said, it reaffirmed the true nature of the conflict, they were not being callous; they were being Israelis. They and the Palestinians know that this is not a media war but a real war.

"This is not cowboys and Indians here," concluded Mr. Benvenisti. "It is an authentic Palestinian uprising born of real desperation and national feelings and not a made-for-television docudrama. And the Israeli reaction is the authentic response of a community that feels itself threatened. A real reporter here would not be gloating over this story and passing judgments like a voyeur. He would be crying — crying for two people who feel that they are compelled to fight each other forever."

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• The immediate challenge came from the People's Consultative Assembly, a partly appointed, partly elected body that is convened every five years to elect the president and vice president.

Instead of rubber-stamping the new Government and its policies as it has in the past, the assembly seized the moment to question Mr. Suharto's choice for vice president and took the unusual step of forcing a vote on religious, educational and other issues. More surprising, the assembly, which is overwhelmingly dominated by the President's party, accepted the nomination of a second candidate for vice president.

Mr. Suharto's choice was State Secretary Sudharmono, his closest political adviser and chairman of his party. The second nominee, Jailani Naro, head of a small Moslem-backed party, never had a chance of winning, even before Mr. Suharto forced him to withdraw in the hours before the vote. But his candidacy was regarded as a gesture of defiance, if not a warning, sustained by behind-the-scenes support from the military.

Influential officers said they believed that Mr. Sudharmono, who was eventually elected by acclamation, was once too close to the Communists — an irony, given Mr. Suharto's strong anti-Communism.

The rift between Mr. Suharto, a 66-year-old former general, and the military, his base of support since he eased the country's first president, Sukarno, out of office in 1966, is already being regarded as a milestone.

It comes at a time when civilian leaders — some in the President's own party — as well as intellectuals, students and others are becoming more outspoken in their criticism of Mr. Suharto's closed political system, his growing isolation and the behavior of his friends and family members who are reported to be enriching themselves on protected monopolies and corrupt practices.

"Sukarno may have been crazy, his ideological views were all wrong, and he led a decadent private life chasing women," said an erstwhile opponent of Sukarno. "But he didn't steal."

Students have reacted to the accusations of official corruption and greed by making a virtual cult of puritanism. At the Bandung Institute of Technology, several students were recently detained for producing a skit about official greed. At Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, a political scientist told how a popular teacher was abruptly dropped as a student hero after he gave up his bicycle for a car.

Many of the students had not yet been born when Mr. Suharto came to power. It is a tragedy, the elders say, that the young people's dismal expectation of a future of underemployment and political powerlessness blinds them to the older generation's appreciation of his earlier successes.

A quarter of a century ago, Indonesia was a military threat to its neighbors and an international bully. At home, President Sukarno faced economic disaster and a leftist insurgency growing in the villages.

Mr. Suharto abandoned inflammatory nationalism. He welcomed foreign investors and turned national development over to an impressive team of technocrats, most of whom were educated in the United States. Today, Indonesia, an important oil-producing country, is self-sufficient in rice and its textile industries are thriving. Non-oil export earnings are rising.

The world's fifth most populous country, Indonesia has become a stabilizing influence in the region. President Suharto helped to create the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Last year, he insisted that the group's third summit be held in Manila as a show of support for President Corazon C. Aquino. At the same time, Jakarta keeps a line open to Vietnam, hoping to broker a withdrawal by Hanoi from Cambodia.

President Suharto, looking to the future, refers frequently to the past. His children have published a book of his sayings. A multimillion-dollar museum is rising at the edge of Jakarta to enshrine his life and work. A hymn to him was sung on television after Friday's inauguration.

The people are not sure that these displays are what Indonesia needs. Though they do not take to the streets and are respectful of authority, many said that they hoped for a signal of change to come from Mr. Suharto last week. They did not get it.

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## PALESTINIANS QUIT AS ISRAEL'S POLICE IN OCCUPIED AREAS

### ENTIRE FORCE MAY RESIGN

Departures Are Called Worst  
Blow Against Authorities  
Since Uprisings Began

By ALAN COWELL

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 12 — Palestinians working for the Israeli police in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were resigning from their jobs tonight amid predictions that the entire 1,000-member Palestinian force would quit by Sunday. Police officials said almost 500 had already resigned in a dramatic protest that began Friday.

A Western diplomat called the mass resignations the most significant blow against Israel's control of the occupied territories in three months of revolt that has killed at least 85 Palestinians.

Elias Freij, a moderate Palestinian Mayor of Bethlehem, where a police station was attacked by demonstrators today, condemned the resignations of the Arab police officers.

#### 'Big and Dangerous Vacuum'

"Their resignation will leave a big and dangerous vacuum," he said. "There will be robberies and murders that will require police intervention."

Israeli television said tonight that the occupation authorities would strongly resist any attempt by the Palestinians to form their own police force.

The Palestinians in the Israeli police are not part of the security forces embroiled in quelling the uprising. Police officials said they work mostly in crime control and traffic departments.

The resignations, the diplomat said, showed a profound erosion of loyalty toward the Israelis among some of the most prominent of the 17,000 to 18,000 Palestinians working for the occupation authorities.

The resignations appeared to have expanded the revolt from the physical clashes between the Israeli Army and rock-throwing demonstrators to a fundamental challenge of authority.

On the eve of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's departure for a visit to Washington, unrest continued today in Israel's occupied territories. Sporadic clashes were reported between troops and Palestinians.

#### Arab Woman Is Wounded

In clashes today, a 50-year-old Palestinian woman, identified in Palestinian reports as Safiyah Ibrahim, was shot and wounded in a West Bank refugee center after a car belonging to the Israeli prisons service was stoned.

Last night, an army spokesman said, soldiers wounded a Palestinian who threw a grenade at an army patrol. The Palestinians have mainly used rocks and gasoline bombs against Israeli soldiers.

In Bethlehem, demonstrators threw rocks and bottles at the Israeli police.

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station, reflecting a deepening campaign to undermine official control in the occupied territories.

The resignation from the police followed a call from a clandestine leadership of what Palestinians call the uprising in the occupied territories. In its latest communiqué, issued Thursday, the clandestine leaders urged Palestinians working as policemen or tax collectors for the Israelis to resign.

By late yesterday, 300 policemen from the occupied West Bank south of Jerusalem were reported to have obeyed. Tonight, officials said 30 more had resigned in the northern part of the West Bank and 165 had resigned in Gaza.

An Israeli police spokesman said the police were trying to persuade the officers, reportedly led by a self-appointed committee of 14 senior officers, to withdraw their resignations.

Lieut. Mustafa Adawi, the ranking Palestinian officer in the police, described the mass resignation as "national duty." He said a committee of 14 officers decided earlier in the week that if the clandestine leadership, known as the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, repeated its call for officers to resign, then they would do so. He expected the entire force to resign by Sunday.

#### **Vulnerability Is Illustrated**

The leadership apparently is trying to break down Israeli control over the occupied territories by forcing the withdrawal of civilian Palestinian cooperation with the authorities. The vulnerability of Palestinians working for the Israelis has already been illustrated by the murder of two Palestinians — one an intelligence agent, the other a policeman — accused of collaborating with the authorities.

Additionally, a radio station run by a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization and based in Syria has broadcast the names of suspected collaborators. In many Palestinian vil-

## **Diplomats see mass departures as a severe blow against authority.**

lages, towns and refugee camps, demonstrators and political activists say they have lists of collaborators whom they are pressing to resign.

Until the resignations of the last two days, the campaign against Palestinians working for the Israelis had scored no major or dramatic successes, and the resignations are certain to be taken as a sign of the influence wielded by the underground leadership of the revolt. The Israeli authorities have displayed deep concern about the resignations, seeking to suppress reports about their extent.

The Peace Now movement, supporting territorial concessions in return for a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue, held a rally in Tel Aviv, and the number attending was estimated at 50,000 to 80,000. "I think that this shows an expression of sentiment in favor of the peace process among a growing number of Israelis," said Janet Aviad, one of the organizers.

A small group of Israelis from a group called Stop the Occupation also visited a Palestinian refugee camp near Ramallah in the West Bank today to display support for its occupants. As they were leaving, however, the Palestinians in the camp staged a demonstration against soldiers outside the camp, who fired tear gas.



# Israel's Army Battles Arabs And an Image

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 10 — The Israeli Defense Force, the citizen army that has seemed to many Israelis the finest expression of their nation's modern spirit, is facing a difficult and divisive battle as it struggles to suppress Palestinian protests in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The army's problem is not just the Palestinians, but increasingly, its own morale, the integrity of its command structure, its battlefield reputation and, ultimately, Israel's future.

The top commanders are known to believe they have been assigned an impossible task by the nation's stalemated political leadership. And the troops in the field are fastened and angry at what they see as restrictions on the punishing of protesters who attack them with rocks thrown from the streets and roofs.

## A Range of Tactics

As the protest Palestinians call "the uprising" enters its fourth month, the army has run through a range of tactics, from firing live ammunition, to selective arrests of purported leaders and beating up of young protesters, many of whom have inflicted injuries on the soldiers. It has tried mass punishment of refugee districts and villages, including curfews and cutting off

electricity and water and large-scale arrests. Now, it is increasing the use of live ammunition again, without noticeable success.

Day after day, Israeli soldiers in full combat gear chase rock-throwing teenage Palestinians through narrow

streets bedecked with outlawed Palestinian flags. Casualties on both sides have mounted. The deaths of at least 85 Palestinians, along with hundreds of serious injuries, have drawn international criticism and internal political debate over incidents like one recently in which four soldiers methodically kicked and pounded two handcuffed Palestinians, unaware they were being videotaped for American television.

## 'The Army Has a Problem'

"The army has a problem, there's no doubt about it," said Zeev Shiff, a veteran Israeli military correspondent. "It's a new war of attrition, and the perception is seeping in, especially in the command echelons, that it is perhaps even tougher than an ordinary war."

The Israeli Defense Force is a citizens army: Israelis, with few exceptions, undergo three years of active service and yearly reserve duty until the age of 50. The army has built up an image as an intrepid fighting unit cherishing a singular moral code, summed up in the Hebrew phrase *taharat hanehek*, or "purity of arms."

That image has been tarnished over the past three months. The Israeli soldiers and the Palestinian protesters, said a Western military professional, "are like one riot chasing another."

"The situation in the occupied territories is like putting a pot on the fire," said one of the Israeli Army's highest-ranking officers, who asked that his name not be used. "Soon it will boil over. You can keep the lid on by applying more weight. It seems quieter, but that is clearly only the result of massive force. It is simmering below the surface and will boil over again."



### 'Social Phenomenon'

"The source of the problem is a long process of 20 years of deep frustration," he added. "It's not like the masses have been tricked."

"This is an authentic social phenomenon. We're an apolitical organization, but we have no illusions. We clearly understand the whole thing should be treated politically."

At the same time, the commander, one of Israel's most decorated soldiers, was unbending on the need to restore what he called "relative tranquillity."

"We have not yielded to Arab attempts to destroy us by military force, we cannot afford to yield to Arab terror," he said. "And the state of Israel cannot afford to yield to this violent uprising."

Indeed, the Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip find themselves in hostile territory, alone on empty streets of shops closed by a strike. For weeks, the army tried to force the shops open, saying it could not cede the political ground to "inciters." Now it has given up.

"This is a struggle, the roots of which is a struggle between two national entities over this country," said a brigade commander. "Things are very complicated and challenge a soldier's discipline: it may be very difficult — when chasing a kid or not allowing a woman with vegetables to leave her house during a curfew — to see what we have here is a struggle of great extent and depth."

The Israeli Army consists of roughly 112,000 troops on active duty, including 88,000 conscripts serving their three years, and 494,000 reservists, accord-

ing to the latest figures from the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies. In addition, the paramilitary border police, which in the past patrolled the occupied territories and East Jerusalem, numbers 4,500, though the police ranks are likely to be expanded.

The policing duties have largely fallen to the elite Golani and Givati infantry brigades.

These brigades are likely to include poorer and less educated troops of Moroccan and other Sephardic backgrounds. Many high school graduates try to get into paratroop or intelligence units.

Unlike most armies, the Israelis do not have a cadre of career non-commissioned officers, which may account for some of the discipline problems. Career officers usually gain their rank late in their active service and then pass on to the reserves.

### Reflection of the Nation

The army is a reflection of the nation — and of its doubts and divisions. One group of reserve officers has signed a

letter opposing the occupation and some of the officers have refused to serve; others have just formed an organization calling for tougher measures.

There has been considerable public hand-wringing over the army's crack-down. High school civics classes this week discussed an anguished letter from a soldier who said "the hand that was educated to wave in peace" found itself brandished at "a 12-year-old boy in Ramallah" and demanded an explanation of "Goliath's justification."

But Mr. Schiff and other military experts say the troops are more likely to feel what he called "extremism toward the Arabs — the desire to settle accounts with them."

Soldiers have been forbidden to talk to the press, but after the four soldiers televised beating the captive Palestinians were ordered arrested by their commander, Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, angry members of their unit pulled aside the Israeli defense correspondents from the newspapers Hadashot and Yediot Ahronot in the military headquarters in Nablus.

"My commander should have defended me and not say he's shocked," said one. "What is he, living up in the air? He does it know what's going on here?"

#### Beatings Called 'Deviations'

"We're just soldiers, and there are right-wingers and left-wingers among us," said another. "Since we got here, all the right-wingers have gone even further right, and the left-wingers have started turning to the right."

There is actually little conflict among the rank and file over the beating of Palestinians, said one Western military officer whose frequent contacts with the Israeli Army have left him with a critical but not unsympathetic attitude. "Most of them," the officer said, "don't regard Arabs as humans."

Publicly, commanders have insisted that the beatings of Palestinians were "deviations."

Privately, a top-ranking commander conceded that the soldiers had raided homes at night, pulled out people and beaten them and smashed up property. This was wrong, he said, but "it took some time for our second-echelon commanders, even the colonels, to understand this."

"Human nature has a tendency to drift toward the more violent," he added.

"We need to make it clear to the whole corps of commanders that there is no non-verbal message, that the generals really mean what they say," he said. "We are converging on it gradually. It is a painful process."

Perhaps the most significant casualty has been the carefully nurtured reputation of the Israeli Army as an invincible, practically superhuman force. This reputation, with its origins in the 1967 War and a series of daring commando raids including the 1976 rescue at Entebbe, Uganda, has served as a deterrent both to Arab countries and to the local Palestinians.

#### 'Need to Reinstill Fear'

"It used to be when the army walked in, everybody hid under the beds," said a Western officer. "It's no longer true. These people are standing toe to toe with them. The Israeli leaders are publicly talking about the need to rekindle fear."

"What is most worrisome is the feeling that the I.D.F. has lost a great deal of its deterrent force with Arabs in the territories," Mr. Schiff wrote in the newspaper Haaretz in January. "Many Army men were astonished by the Arabs' boldness, by their willingness to attack armed soldiers, to beat and stab, without fear of being injured."



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The Israeli Army has faced Arab armies lacking organization, motivation and military skills. But its reputation among Arabs eroded with the Lebanon war and, most recently, with an initially confused and ineffectual response to the November hang-glider attack, when a Palestinian guerrilla killed six soldiers before being shot down.

Officers and soldiers say the army was trained for combat, not police work. Commanders are introducing riot control techniques in basic training. But they are worried about keeping young soldiers too long in the occupied territories or about creating a special occupation force. Many officers assert that other armies with fewer restraints — particularly Arab armies — would make short work of the protesters.

The army is also facing practical difficulties. Its crucial training schedules have been completely disrupted, with combat troops and even officer candidates pulled out of classes and other assignments to serve in the territories. This could be a major problem over the long run because the training that makes up much of the three-year active duty tour is the basis of the quickly mobilized reserve forces that form the army's strategic depth.

In the first days of the protests, in early December, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the military commanders promised a tough crackdown would swiftly put an end to disturbances. There is little such expectation now.

"We'll have this under control by April," said one of the army's top commanders, adding with a grim smile, "The year, we'll announce later."



# official text

03/11/88

## SHULTZ OUTLINES U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (Text: Testimony to House Appropriations panel)

Washington -- Secretary of State Shultz went before the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations March 10 and presented an overview of State Department world-wide plans and programs and need for funds.

Here is the text of Shultz's statement, as prepared for delivery.  
(begin text)

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to come before the subcommittee to discuss the foreign operations component of our FY 89 budget request. The funding we are requesting complies with both the letter and the spirit of the budget summit compromise. It is the bare minimum we will need to support our fundamental foreign policy objectives and interests. We would have preferred more. We can't do the job with less.

From the outset, President Reagan has been guided by the conviction that the United States must remain a fully engaged force around the globe for peace, prosperity, democracy and humanitarian values. We have been making impressive strides in fulfilling these goals.

At the core of our diplomacy are our efforts to ensure the strength and unity of our alliance relations, the effective management of East-West issues, the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and the advancement of our broader security and economic interests. With our tangible support and encouragement, democratic and free market values are gaining strength among the peoples of Latin America, in the Philippines, in Korea and in Africa. That's good news for everybody. Countries with free people, free elections and free markets aren't the countries that threaten our security. Democratic countries respect the rule of law both at home and abroad; they are more stable internally from both an economic and a political standpoint; and they are more capable of resisting aggression through their own efforts.

Our achievement of the historic INF treaty offers convincing proof that success in advancing our peaceful objectives depends not only on cohesion and clarity of purpose, but also on the political will to provide the means necessary to meet our objectives. The treaty would not have been possible had we or our allies balked at the



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economic or political costs of countering the Soviet SS-20 menace.

Working for peace means building up and sustaining our military strength and that of our friends while concurrently engaging in hard-nosed diplomacy. The daily effort to defend our security, to establish more stable and workable relations with our adversaries, to ensure continued economic growth and to achieve negotiated settlements in strife-ridden areas is a costly exercise. But, instability and war are even costlier, and not just in monetary terms.

It is indeed ironic that just when the need for effective U.S. leadership in the world is increasing and we are scoring remarkable successes, we find that we lack adequate means and enough flexibility either to advance our interests or to meet our commitments to friends and allies.

The realities of our time dictate that the United States cannot achieve our interests and objectives alone, nor can we do so with insufficient resources. Other countries around the world cannot adequately protect their security, ensure their domestic welfare or protect their democratic institutions absent the active support of the United States.

And, especially now, when the dangers of terrorism and the broad range of threats to many societies posed by international narcotics trafficking are becoming so stark, we must marshal the means necessary to counter these assaults on human dignity and civilized society. I have committed the State Department -- and you have my personal commitment -- to use every opportunity and every resource at our disposal to combat these twin scourges.

#### East-West Relations

The United States and our allies have set in motion a number of efforts that could, with Soviet cooperation, bring major strides toward a safer, more secure and more humane world. Will we have that Soviet cooperation? Yes, we will, if we shape the right conditions. And how do we shape these conditions? By being fully and actively engaged and by committing the necessary resources.

The critical importance of worldwide U.S. engagement came through loud and clear to the president during his recent meetings with his NATO counterparts. In Brussels, we and our NATO partners agreed that if we expect to advance our agenda with the East, we must demonstrate the same resolve and be prepared to commit similarly vital resources as we did in our pursuit of the INF treaty.

That agenda includes\* greater openness and full respect for human rights in the East; and on arms control, three priority tasks -- 50 percent reductions in offensive strategic arms, a global and truly verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and correction of the imbalance in conventional forces.

Realism, strength, and dialogue will remain America's watchwords as we continue the high-level exchanges begun in 1985 with the Soviet leadership. Through this ongoing process, our relationship with the Soviet Union is now developing on a more stable and constructive basis. I will be meeting regularly with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the period leading up to the next summit in Moscow.

We will pursue the full range of issues that concern us, including human rights, arms control, bilateral matters and settlement of regional conflicts. We will continue vigorously to challenge the Soviet government to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in the USSR as well as the sovereign rights of its neighbors. We will pursue progress toward a S.T.A.R.T. treaty -- the president has made clear to all of us that he wants no let up in our



effort to achieve a good treaty.

#### Regional Issues

Afghanistan. After eight long years, the courage and tenacity of the Afghan resistance and people may be about to pay off in the resumed negotiations at Geneva. We are proud to stand with them and with Pakistan. The United States will continue its support for Pakistan and for the Afghan people and will continue to press Moscow to withdraw its troops expeditiously and cease military assistance to the Kabul regime. The United States remains fully and firmly committed to a rapid departure of Soviet forces, the restoration of Afghanistan to an independent and non-aligned status, genuine self-determination for the Afghan people and return of the refugees in safety and honor.

The Middle East. In the Middle East, this is a time of decisions. The situation on the ground does not serve anyone's interests, and rapid change through negotiations must occur. My discussions with the leadership in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt focussed on the need for realism in our approach to negotiations.

The approach we are pursuing is ambitious and compelling. It calls for an early start of interlocked negotiations on transitional arrangements and final status. These will be launched and supported by a properly structured international conference. This process can and should begin as early as mid-April. The mechanics of our approach meet everyone's fundamental concerns and provide for serious negotiations.

But the mechanical aspects of this are secondary to what can be accomplished. Our objective is a comprehensive peace.

-- Israeli security can be enhanced. Israel can enjoy the recognition and respect which flow from negotiations. Israelis can be free from the increasing human and moral burdens of occupation -- free to devote their considerable talents and energies to improving their quality of life. Most important, Israel can achieve peace with its neighbors.

-- Palestinians can achieve rapid control over political and economic decisions which directly affect their lives. Palestinians can participate actively in negotiations to determine their political future. Palestinians can achieve their legitimate rights and live lives of dignity and self-respect.

-- The Arab world can turn a corner, resolve this festering conflict and get on with the business of meeting human needs. The refugee problem can be solved. A stable new environment can be created in which the human and economic resources of the Middle East can flourish.

This a moment of testing for the leaders of the Middle East. All must face up to the challenge of peace and beat back the forces of radicalism. Violence and threats achieve nothing. They stand in sharp, empty contrast to what negotiations can accomplish.

No resolution of this conflict can fulfill all dreams. Compromise is required. The plan we have put forward is compelling. It is an integral whole. We have asked for decisions soon, so that we can proceed rapidly toward a comprehensive peace.

Central America. In Central America, we must be equally realistic and determined in our efforts. The cause of peace, stability, and democracy in Central America, already severely challenged by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and its Cuban and Soviet allies, received another blow recently when General Noriega refused to accept his suspension as head of the Panama Defense Forces.



The United States has rejected Noriega's attempted dismissal of President Delvalle -- a dismissal which is, in essence, a coup d'etat without a visible military presence.

What we face in Panama is a threat to democracy; a threat to our ability to stop the international drug traffickers; a threat to the safety and stability of this hemisphere. We will not shirk our responsibility to defend ourselves against this triple threat -- to stop the drug dealers, the tyrants and the terrorists.

Our policy in Panama is straightforward and consistent: we support fully and unequivocally the government of President Delvalle. And so do many others. Just this week, President Delvalle received enormous support from a broad spectrum of the Panamanian opposition. They made a commitment to unity for democracy. We applaud that effort.

The struggle for democracy in Panama also has received widespread support from the other democracies in this hemisphere. Perhaps El Salvador's President Duarte put it best when he said: "El Salvador, as a democratic nation, will never agree to a solution based on abuse of power and imposition of Noriega's dictatorship on the Panamanian people."

We and the democratic world will do what is necessary to help democratic government survive and bloom in Panama. We will continue actively to cooperate with President Delvalle and his government in their efforts to reassert legitimate civilian authority.

The deteriorating situation in Nicaragua further illustrates my point that failure of the United States to materially reinforce democratic government and efforts to gain a peaceful settlement to conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador can only harm our own security interests. Unless we back up our policies with adequate resources, our friends and foes alike around the world will conclude that America's words lack substance, our commitments, credibility, and our plans, effective execution.

Since Congress ended U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, the Sandinistas have once again reverted to their true totalitarian goals. Their repression and intransigence have increased. Two weeks ago, the Sandinistas rejected proposals by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, the mediator they themselves selected, to further the plan. Those proposals had been immediately accepted by the representatives of the resistance. Then, the Sandinistas informed Cardinal Obando that his services as mediator are no longer required. Just recently, the Communists balked again and postponed a meeting with the resistance. Sandinista mob violence against Nicaraguan citizens has increased dramatically in recent weeks.

It is time for the Congress to sit up and take notice: the Sandinistas are brutalizing their own people. Those who may have believed that cutting off aid to the freedom fighters would help achieve peace and freedom have made a grave mistake. They must undo the error before it is too late. As Violetta de Chamorro, the head of Nicaragua's leading opposition newspaper recently wrote President Arias: "The Sandinista regime, taking advantage of the suspension of military actions by which it had been besieged, has entered into a phase of total indifference" to the terms of the Guatemala Agreement.

Persian Gulf. Elsewhere in the world, an engaged U.S. presence and our sustained support remain essential to international stability and well-being. In the strategic area of the Persian Gulf, our reflagging policy is protecting basic U.S. interests, and allied governments are following our lead. We will continue to stand by the



security commitments we have made to our friends in the region. We are at the forefront of international efforts to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war via U.N. Security Council Resolution 598. We are working within the Security Council to adopt an enforcement resolution imposing sanctions against Iran as long as it refuses to comply with 598. And, we are continuing our own active efforts to staunch the flow of arms to Iran.

East Asia. In East Asia, the remarkable worldwide trend toward democratic government has had two notable successes in the Philippines and South Korea.

We are supportive of the major steps the Republic of Korea has taken toward full democracy over the past year. We are cooperating fully with South Korea as it strives to host the 1988 Olympics in a secure and peaceful atmosphere. And, we are assisting President Aquino in leading her nation in building democracy and accelerating economic growth as the Philippines contends with a virulent communist insurgency.

The struggle against Communist aggression is evident in Cambodia. We are supporting ASEAN and the Cambodian non-communist resistance in their efforts to bring about a political solution to the Cambodian conflict encompassing a complete Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and self-determination for the Cambodian people.

Southern Africa. Apartheid is at the heart of South Africa's problems and is a principal source of instability in the southern African region. Our goal remains its rapid and peaceful demise. To that end, we are working to foster negotiations among all elements of South Africa's population that will lead to the creation of a democratic society with equal rights for all. At a time when the misguided actions of the South African government are stifling the interplay of ideas so essential for the evolution of a free society, and isolating South Africa from the free world, we must do all we can to keep dialogue alive and new ideas coming in.

Despite the recent serious escalation of repression in South Africa, we remain firm in our belief that this can best be accomplished through a mix of diplomatic and political pressures on the one hand and a series of positive initiatives on the other. It is critically important that we maintain strong support for U.S. programs designed to assist victims of apartheid and to empower black South Africans to achieve their own peaceful liberation through higher education and growing economic leverage. We are working with our democratic allies to exchange data on assistance programs and to explore ways of assuring a free flow of information to South Africa in the face of rising censorship and repression.

Elsewhere in the region, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement involving withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Angola and Namibia and the achievement of Namibian independence. We now look to the Angolans to make concrete their professions of support for a phased complete withdrawal of Cuban forces and to South Africa to honor its commitments under U.N. Security Council Resolution 435. To promote economic independence and stability throughout the region, we also strongly support the work of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. In addition to bilateral aid, we are providing SADCC with 50 million dollars in assistance for FY 1988.

International Economics. In the field of international economics, we are entering a new era. The world economy is changing profoundly as new technologies are developed and the capability to



apply them is spreading to all regions of the globe. National boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant as production, finance, technology and knowledge become increasingly globalized. In order to make the most of the changes now underway, America must first ensure that our economic and social institutions are prepared and willing to compete in this new global economy. We must promote policies that enable market forces to direct international patterns of trade and financial flows. And, along with our allies in the industrial world, we must keep our sights on sustainable, non-inflationary economic growth as the principal objective of economic policy.

#### The Specifics of our Funding Request

This brief review of the foreign policy challenges that face us is enough to show how busy this administration will be in the coming year. If this administration -- any administration -- is to realize America's fundamental foreign policy objectives, it must have both adequate funding and sufficient flexibility to use financial resources to best advantage.

But, today, in a time when our active engagement is more important than ever, a steady erosion of our resources and severe constraints on our ability to apply them threaten our leadership position and our vital security, economic and humanitarian interests in the world.

For foreign affairs, or Function 150 in total, we seek 18,100 million dollars in discretionary spending authority for FY 1989. The foreign operations component of our budget request includes most forms of foreign assistance (excluding only PL 480 food aid) and is the largest single component of our request as a whole. The funds we make available under this heading help our friends and allies, but, first and foremost, they serve America's own interests abroad.

We seek a total of 14,000 million dollars for foreign operations. The discretionary element, that is to say funding for everything except the Guarantee Reserve Fund and Foreign Service Retirement, totals 13,300 million dollars, or 73 percent of our entire request for foreign affairs appropriations. This also represents an increase over the comparable FY 1988 level of about 2 percent.

Let me emphasize once again that this modest request in no way reflects any diminution in the scope of our foreign affairs interests, or in the depth of our commitments to friends, allies, and the international system. Rather, our very tight request reflects a compromise between our foreign policy needs and our recognition that we must play our part in reducing the budget deficit.

Let me try to put this discussion in a broader perspective by describing how the foreign assistance resources we seek serve our national goals and values -- and commitments to allies and friends.

#### National Security

As we have seen, the unwavering commitment of our allies to America's security -- and ours to their own -- is essential if we are to maintain the defensive framework which protects us all. Many of our friends in the developing world lack the resources to see to their national security while at the same time they are struggling to provide for the basic economic needs of their own people. Because we know that they must do both if they are to survive and grow, we give these nations economic support and help them finance the modernization of their armed forces. We also provide defense and economic support to some of our NATO allies to help them to modernize their military forces and to grow economically. The enhanced capabilities which



result from our assistance contribute directly to the common defense.

For FY 1989, our total request for discretionary military assistance funding under Title III of the bill (MAP, FMS, IMET and Peacekeeping operations) is 5,000 million dollars. That compares with 4,800 million dollars in FY 1988 and 5,100 million dollars in FY 1987.

In percentage terms, the increase is under 4 percent; however, if the Congress refrains from the massive earmarking which characterized FY 1988 military assistance programs, we should be able to restore funding to the dozens of key friends and allies from which we were forced to terminate funding in FY 1988.

Despite the small increase relative to FY 1988, what we are seeking for military assistance is still below the level appropriated in FY 1987. The percentage reductions from the levels appropriated in FY 1985 and 1986 are even more severe.

For the two major military assistance accounts -- Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Military Assistance (MAP) -- we are requesting respectively 4,500 million dollars and 467 million dollars.

Due to the major debt burdens which many security assistance recipients face, we plan to provide all FMS and ESF resources on a grant basis.

The switch from credits to grants in our FMS program represents a major improvement in the quality of the assistance we are providing. By providing the assistance in the form of forgiven FMS credits, those countries with the bureaucratic infrastructure capable of doing so will be able to apply FMS funding to commercial purchases, a process that is not possible under MAP, which is strictly government-to-government. This all-grant program initiative is consistent with a trend which began in the Congress a few years ago. In 1985, Congress for the first time permitted concessional, on-budget FMS programs. Two years later, it expanded this authority by authorizing the administration to make all FMS programs concessional, except, of course, those programs for Israel and Egypt where repayment was forgiven. And in the current fiscal year, Congress again liberalized FMS by permitting forgiven FMS programs to Pakistan and Turkey.

Our present efforts to reinvigorate the Arab-Israeli peace process underscore the critical importance of the Middle East to the United States.

Israel and Egypt, two key partners in the Middle East process, will receive the largest component of our security assistance (i.e., military assistance and Economic Support Funds, or ESF) in FY 1989 (5,100 million dollars, or 62 percent of the total), just as they have for the past several years. Our security and economic assistance programs to Israel and Egypt have played a key role in keeping peace in these areas.

In the West Bank and Gaza, our foreign assistance funding is direct evidence of our determination to help produce a better life for the people of the occupied territories. Of the 12.5 million dollars in ESF we seek for Middle East regional programs, 7.5 million dollars would be channelled through private voluntary organizations in the West Bank and Gaza. And, of our 18 million dollars ESF request for Jordan, 6 million dollars is for activities in the West Bank.

In addition to the funds for Israel, Egypt and the occupied territories, we are also requesting an additional 196 million dollars in this bill in assistance for our close friends Tunisia, Jordan, Oman and Morocco, thereby furthering the prospects for stability and growth in the region as a whole.



Security assistance is also used to strengthen the defenses of friends and allies which provide us with access to military facilities in the interests of their own security and ours. During the past few years, and particularly in FY 1988, cuts in our budget requests and extensive earmarking have combined to make it impossible for us to meet our "best efforts" commitments to some countries or to provide the level of support necessary for countries to perform effectively in the defense area. For Portugal, our assistance is well below the "best efforts" commitment we undertook when we signed the current base agreement; this situation recently has led the Portuguese prime minister to request consultations on the agreement. Assistance to Turkey is already hundreds of millions of dollars below the level necessary if our Turkish allies are to meet their NATO commitments. Our assistance to Greece has fallen one-third below the level provided following the signing of our 1983 base agreement.

Our FY 1989 budget request will not accommodate enough to make up for past shortfalls. We must begin to reverse the downward trend. Therefore, for these three countries we are requesting 1,100 million dollars in FY 1989.

In the Philippines, our assistance program has been directed toward helping a struggling ally revitalize democracy, beat back a communist insurgency and promote economic growth. Because of the extraordinary challenges faced by President Aquino in recent years, we have been able to provide significant assistance levels that are crucial to the success of her programs. Despite budget stringencies, we cannot lose sight of the important mutual security interests at stake in the Philippines and the need for substantial support.

I would note that we will shortly undertake with the Philippine government the five-year bilateral review of our bases agreement. We look forward to its successful completion, which would set the stage for an extension or renegotiation of the bases agreement, the fixed term of which ends in 1991.

Central America is of vital importance to the United States because of its geographic proximity and strategic position. We have long recognized that the best way to protect our interests in the region is to pursue a multi-faceted policy aimed at promoting regional security, democratization and social and economic development. We are requesting approximately 900 million dollars in FY 1989 to serve these ends.

With respect to Nicaragua in particular, the administration continues to seek funding from Congress for the contras. At the same time, we will continue our varied forms of assistance to our friends in the region. In the event the current efforts to secure peace and substantially ease the repression in Nicaragua fail, our provision of security assistance to the other countries in the region will serve as a bulwark against spreading instability.

#### Promoting Prosperity and Development

Ensuring our domestic prosperity in today's increasingly integrated world economy requires us to do more than keep our own economic house in order. It means assisting other countries to develop their own economies. In this way, we develop in the global economy a growing demand for U.S. goods and services. American growth and prosperity is, more than ever, influenced by conditions abroad. I am not just speaking of conditions in Western Europe and Japan, important though they may be, but of those in the developing countries as well. These countries take over a third of our exports. The production of one out of every 20 workers in our manufacturing plants



and one out of every 5 acres of our farm land is sold in Third World markets.

By promoting economic development abroad we make a direct contribution to our own economic well-being. Current economic stagnation in a large number of developing countries, especially those with heavy debt burdens, illustrates the point vividly and painfully. For example, between 1981 and 1986 the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean experienced sharp declines in their real incomes. Our exports to that region dropped by over 11,000 million dollars. For the same reason, in Africa, our exports dropped by 2,800 million dollars. In contrast, our significant role in the development of Pakistan has paid us dividends. In 1960, Pakistan's per capita income was barely 100 dollars. By 1985, Pakistan had more than doubled its income and had become a major purchaser of U.S. products. Since 1979, U.S. exports to Pakistan have risen by more than half.

We are requesting appropriations of 7,600 million dollars for bilateral and multilateral economic assistance programs (including ESF). That constitutes almost 60 percent of our total discretionary foreign operations request. It includes development assistance, voluntary contributions to international organizations, assistance provided through multilateral development institutions, the Peace Corps and other bilateral assistance programs, as well as 3,300 million dollars for ESF (Economic Support Fund). ESF serves economic stability and development as well as security objectives.

Again, we seek only a modest increase of 80 million dollars, or 2.5 percent, in ESF, but we enjoin Congress to refrain from the massive earmarking which required us in FY 1988 to eliminate funding for numerous countries, particularly in South America and the Caribbean. Our allocation of the ESF request would allow resumption of important programs in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and throughout the region.

In addition to ESF, economic assistance takes many forms.

- Development assistance (1,600 million dollars, including the new Development Fund for Africa) to fund projects administered by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) in such areas as agriculture, education and human resources development, health, nutrition and private sector development.

- Funding for the Multilateral Development Banks (1,300 million dollars)\* 70 million dollars will go to the World Bank as the first installment of our contribution to the new General Capital Increase which, together with the contributions of others, will support 75,000 million dollars in new Bank project lending and support of growth-oriented structural adjustment and policy reform. The largest component, 958 million dollars, will be used for a U.S. contribution to the eighth replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA). IDA is the "soft" loan window of the World Bank which finances development activities in low-income developing countries and, sometimes in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supports essential economic policy reform in these countries. Because of the Budget summit ceiling, none of these funds will be used to pay U.S. arrears (currently about 400 million dollars) to any of the Multilateral Development Banks. MBD arrears raise serious questions about our credibility, and we will have to address the arrears problem in FY 1990.

- Funding for Peace Corps programs (150 million dollars).

- Voluntary contributions to such international organizations as the U.N. Development Program (110 million dollars) and UNICEF (31



million dollars).

Our domestic prosperity is also furthered by helping U.S. exporters compete with financing arrangements offered by foreign governments. For this purpose, we are requesting 705 million dollars for the Export-Import Bank's direct credit programs. These programs provide U.S. exporters the financial support they need to match foreign officially-supported export credits. EXIM financing is also critical in markets in which commercial financing is limited or unavailable because the risk is too great for commercial banks.

#### Promoting Democratic and Humanitarian Values

The American people fully support our efforts to strengthen democracy around the globe. The United States has a vital stake in promoting democratic values around the world and supporting new and growing democracies. Democratic institution building is a slow and difficult process. Fragile new democracies face daunting political, economic and military challenges that we must help them meet with more than mere words of encouragement.

In Central America and the Caribbean our support for democratic forces has shown good results. Democratic institutions are taking root in countries where just a few years ago many despaired of that ever happening.

These new democracies desperately need our help. The president's Caribbean Basin and Central America Initiatives, based on the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America provide comprehensive strategies for such support. For FY 1989 we are requesting 643 million dollars in economic assistance (not including PL 480 food aid) for the countries of Central America and 148 million dollars for those of the Caribbean.

The United States is never more true to its most cherished values than when we defend human rights and humanitarian values abroad. In our turbulent and often cruel world, the defense of human rights means more than just speaking up, although speaking up in itself is important. We must also provide funds to help the refugees fleeing oppression and the populations devastated by want and disaster.

Over the past few years, the assistance we have provided has meant the difference between life and death for literally millions of Africans who faced the worst drought and famine the continent has experienced in this century. During the crisis, the United States provided 2.2 million metric tons of food aid at a cost of over 1,000 million dollars; another 150 million dollars was spent to provide medicines, shelter, wells, and the other immediate needs for those worst affected by the drought. This was all in addition to the regular economic assistance we provided during the same period.

Similarly, we assisted Colombia at the time of its volcanic disaster, we contributed to major earthquake relief efforts in San Salvador and Mexico City, and we helped to combat locust infestations in 17 African countries. Our support for the World Health Organization and UNICEF has helped rid the world of some of the most deadly and contagious diseases and has dramatically reduced infant mortality.

We can be proud of America's record of assistance to the world refugee population. Since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the American people have offered new homes to more than half a million refugees -- a greater number than has been provided by all other resettlement countries combined.

For FY 1989, we are requesting 340 million dollars for migration and refugee assistance, less than 2 million dollars more than the FY



1988 appropriation. Of that total, we plan to allocate 217 million dollars for relief assistance for refugees in first asylum camps around the world administered by such agencies as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Relief and Works Administration. An additional 115 million dollars will be available for refugee admissions to the United States for a minimum of 68,500 refugees -- the same number as in FY 1988. Since we will have fewer dollars than we do this year to admit at least the same number of people, we will have to reduce the services we provide to these refugees. If we did not do so, we would have to cut down on admissions at a time when the pressure of admissions is growing, given the likely increases in refugees from Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Cuba and perhaps other countries as well.

#### Combatting International Narcotics Trafficking and Terrorism

Since 1981, stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States has been a foreign policy issue of the highest priority for the Reagan administration. As we have seen graphically in Colombia, and most recently in Panama, international narcotics trafficking poses a threat not only to the health and welfare of our citizens, but to the national security of democratic governments throughout the world. And the threat continues to grow.

For FY 1989 we are requesting 101 million dollars for international narcotics control, an increase of only 2.25 million dollars from the amount appropriated in the continuing resolution for FY 88. This INM budget includes 31 million dollars in direct assistance to Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela. Our narcotics control strategy gives top priority to helping key Latin American and Caribbean countries stop cocaine trafficking. Airlift capacity -- meaning helicopters and planes to support aerial and manual eradication of coca and for transporting police and paramilitary troops on raids against cocaine labs -- is crucial in the Andes. We plan to use another 18 million dollars to provide aircraft and maintenance support.

These programs constitute only a part of our total effort to control international drug trafficking. Our direct assistance to many foreign governments and private self-help organizations lets them carry out public awareness programs and projects to find alternative crops for farmers who now depend on growing drug crops for their livelihood. We are also strengthening the capability of military forces to eradicate fields and destroy drug labs.

International terrorism, like international narcotics trafficking, offends the most cherished humanitarian values of democratic societies and poses a serious threat to international stability. Through long and often bitter experience, we have developed an effective policy to deal with this modern day barbarity. We have developed a better understanding of terrorist methods. We are working closely with other countries, in part by pooling intelligence resources. We are also working to persuade countries reluctant to cooperate in combatting international terrorism of the error of their ways. We are providing training and training-related equipment to those with the will but not the means to cooperate. We have strengthened security measures to protect our citizens at home and abroad. And, we have gone on the offensive to bring terrorists to justice, disrupt their operations and destroy their networks. But we must remain prepared and vigilant.

In 1987, we counted 832 international terrorist incidents. Among



the casualties, over 600 were killed and 2,200 wounded. These figures tend to understate the actual level of terrorist activity, since incidents confined to one country, with the nationals of only one country involved, are not included.

U.S. programs to enhance the counterterrorism skills of other nations consist of training and provision of equipment and logistical support. These efforts are coordinated by the State Department, and are carried out by the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the intelligence community and other concerned agencies. For FY 1989 we are requesting 9.8 million dollars to continue the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program. With the requested funds we will be able to train some 1,500 security officers from around the world in a variety of antiterrorism skills. These officers are selected for training because they have major responsibilities for the security of embassies, Americans living abroad and travellers. They will join a group of nearly 6,000 other officials from 46 countries who have received antiterrorism training during the first four years of this program and who are now cooperating with us in our counterterrorism efforts.

#### The Need for Resource Flexibility

To meet all of these major foreign policy objectives, we will need more than your support for our total funding request, which is already at the bare-bones level. We will also need legislation that gives the executive branch the latitude we need to manage the very limited resources we have effectively.

The Continuing Resolution for FY 1988 does not give us that flexibility. In the security assistance area, almost 95 percent of the total appropriation is earmarked for particular countries or programs. Of course, in many instances congressional earmarks are consistent with the levels we recommended and represent a congruence of views between the administration and the Congress regarding the priority of particular programs.

But the overall effect of massive earmarking in the context of sharp cuts across the board is to place the burden of those cuts disproportionately on programs which must be funded from the 5 percent of the budget which is not earmarked. We have been forced to cut drastically ESF, MAP and/or FMS programs to such staunch friends as Turkey, Portugal, El Salvador, Honduras, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Zaire. Moreover, we have been forced to eliminate entirely programs in a whole host of other countries, particularly in South America, the Caribbean and Africa.

If we are given the needed flexibility, the levels of funds in the budget request for FY 1989 will enable us to reconstitute on a modest scale many programs we had to curtail or cut off this year. And, what is the alternative?

Can the United States withdraw its support for long from so many areas of the world and still protect the security, ensure the prosperity and promote the democratic values of the Free World? My answer is an unequivocal no. We could debate the point here in the comfort of a committee room, but out there in the world, I can assure you that we will not have the luxury of making the wrong choice.

#### Conclusion

In closing, I would like to draw your attention to the American eagle on the seal of the United States. I am fond of pointing out that our internationally recognized symbol is clutching an olive branch in one set of talons and a bunch of arrows in the other. The eagle's head is turned in the direction of the olive branch, Our



far-flying eagle is grasping both olive branch and arrows because America must commit military strength to the service of peace if we are to remain true to our values and advance our interests abroad.

Today, I have described the particulars of an austere foreign operations budget for FY-89. During the next fiscal year, two successive administrations will shoulder the burden of America's global responsibilities. Both will face the challenge of fulfilling our national objectives in a complex and changing world. To meet this challenge, both administrations will need not only the full amount of requested funds, but also the latitude to apply them effectively.

The message I want to leave with the Committee today is this: We must not allow the American eagle to become so undernourished or so encumbered in her flight that she loses her grip on either the arrows or the olive branch. Neither this administration nor the next one can afford to let that happen. Far too much is riding on her wings.

(end text)





# news report

03/11/88

SHULTZ EXPRESSES HOPE FOR PROGRESS ON THE MIDDLE PEACE  
(Article on Shultz at House appropriations panel)  
By Edmund F. Scherr  
USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- Secretary of State Shultz said March 10 that the United States "hopes for progress" in the Middle East peace efforts.

The secretary told a congressional hearing that "it is important to take every opportunity for peace."

He said that through "intensive discussions" with officials from Israel, Jordan and Egypt, the United States developed a Middle East peace concept, and after talks in the region, "we developed a concept...that I took in the form of a letter" to the leaders of Israel, Jordan and Syria.

"We tried to propose something that is comprehensive" to deal with Israel and all the countries on its borders, he said. The U.S. proposal, he continued, talks about security for all states in the region and the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people."

The secretary proposed "starting early" on the negotiations -- May 1 -- stressing that negotiations between Israel and any of its neighbors would be based on United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 -- the so-called land-for-peace resolutions.

The letter says that all nations must express their willingness to negotiate with one another. "Anybody that wants to sit at the table with Israel has to state its willingness to negotiate with Israel," Shultz said.

He said the U.S. plan calls for Palestinians to be represented in talks with Israel as part of a Jordanian delegation. "Jordan's view is that is the desirable way to go," Shultz said. He also said that it will not be easy to find Palestinians who are "legitimate and really represent Palestinians" and with whom "Israel is willing to sit down."

The secretary said the Israeli negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would first deal with "transitional arrangements" and that the United States believes these negotiations could be concluded within six months. If these talks take place, he continued, the United States would be prepared to table a complete draft agreement when the negotiations start -- as a starting point for



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the talks on the transitional period. He then foresaw talks on a final "status" agreement beginning three months after the transitional agreement.

To give the talks the legitimacy sought by the Arab side, he said, the United States has proposed an international conference -- within the framework of resolutions 242 and 338 -- composed of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Israel and its immediate surrounding countries. "We propose that this conference initiate these bilateral negotiations, that it be a body that can receive reports from the parties on the status of their negotiations and that the conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached," he said.

Shultz indicated that the United States has asked the parties to respond to the U.S. proposals by next week. "It is apparent to me throughout the region that everybody...wants some way to get going in a more constructive and peaceful manner," he said. While nobody is saying "yes" to the plan, the secretary observed, "nobody wants to say 'no' because it's the only game in town."

Shultz told the congressmen that the United States publicly and privately has made its views known to Israel on its use of force in the occupied territories. He noted that Israel seeks to maintain law and order, and that Israel has "shifted tactics somewhat," but the use of force problem is still acute.

On the role of the Soviets in any peace effort, Shultz said he has told the Soviets that "they cannot expect to play a genuinely involved role in Middle East affairs" as long as they treat Soviet Jewry "as they do," as long as they have restrictions on immigration, and as long as they fail to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.

He made the comments when answering questions at a hearing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The group was discussing the State Department's foreign operations component of its fiscal year '89 budget request. He called the budget, worked out under congressional guidelines, "not adequate." Shultz said the investments that are needed to help U.S. military strength and "our friends" are a "real bargain."

In defending his request for foreign assistance, Shultz said that the United States has interests that need to be looked after and that includes a peaceful world, based on democratic principles, both in government and in the marketplace. He also stressed the importance of strength and unity "in our alliance relations."

Shultz also made the following points.

-- Korea. He noted in South Korea the "political miracle" of the presidential transition through elections along with the "economic miracle" in that nation. On the question of U.S. forces in South Korea, he pointed to the continuing threats from the North. "It is important that North Korea sees that our resolve is steadfast and that the military capability to deter them will be present."

-- Afghanistan. The "courage" of the resistance may be paying off. The United States will stand behind the freedom fighters and Pakistan. The Afghan people should work out their own political arrangements.

-- INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. It showed the "cohesion" of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance and was an exhibition of "political will" combined with "strength."

-- Nicaragua. The Sandinista government has not lived up to the Guatemala Peace Accords and seeks to avoid living up to them.

-- Panama. It's an "intense problem." The selection of a new president after the military coup or attempted coup by Panamanian General Noriega was a "sham." Shultz said the United States will continue to push for Noriega's ouster. "Because we recognize Delvalle as president, We find it perfectly proper...to honor" his requests concerning Panama's assets.

"We are very determined that the situation as it exists in Panama must change," Shultz said.

-- Gulf. The U.S. naval presence has succeeded. The Iran-Iraq war continues, and the Soviet Union is the "stumbling block" in efforts to pass a United Nations Security Council resolution to enforce its call for a cease-fire in the conflict.

-- Philippines. There has been "remarkable progress" there in the past year.

-- South Africa. The biggest problem continues to be apartheid. "We are against apartheid." He called for the parties involved to "sit down and talk and negotiate and reform...we have to keep working, stay engaged."

-- Angola. There is "no military solution" to the civil war there. The United States and other parties will continue to work on getting Cuban troops out of Angola.

-- Cambodia. There is a "little bit of movement" on getting Vietnamese troops out of there. There is a "more active negotiating process." Diplomatic and economic pressures "must be giving a message to Vietnam."

-- Base agreements. He defended funds for countries where there are U.S. bases. He pointed to the very important base in the Azores and he did not like efforts to cut aid to Portugal. The secretary said that Turkey and Greece need millions in assistance to help them fulfill their NATO obligations.

-- Cyprus. There are positive developments toward reunification, and this "new atmosphere may give a thrust" to United Nations efforts aimed at this.









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SUITE 710  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TELEPHONE  
(202) 847-8011

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March 10, 1988

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Dear

If you were "dismayed" over a report in the New York Times regarding Prime Minister Shamir's alleged negotiating position, think of how "dismayed" I was to see how the letter you signed is being interpreted.

I am very much aware, of course, of your own strong commitment to a secure Israel as being in the best interests of the United States. But it could have been foreseen that, despite all the positive statements in the letter, the media would focus on the "land for peace" issue and interpret the letter as a significant rebuke of Israel.

The Camp David Accords (which we all supported) wisely dictated an interim period in which intentions could be divined and human contact developed prior to direct negotiations over the final disposition of territory. Your letter not only short circuits the Camp David process, but it also cuts the ground out from under Israel's eventual negotiating position in direct talks. (Note: I say "Israel's" not "Shamir's" because he still is the democratically elected head of Government.)

With the best of intentions, the letter injects the U.S. Senate directly into internal Israeli politics and demonstrates haste if not some degree of naivete. Abe Rosenthal, in his enclosed March 8th column in the New York Times, puts the situation into its proper perspective.

One further thought. Wouldn't such an expression of sentiment have been better addressed to Prime Minister Shamir - as friendly advice - instead of to George Shultz? Unwittingly, it sets up a confrontation between Shultz and Shamir next week over whether Israel should commit in advance of negotiations with its neighbors to cede territory vital to

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~~The~~ survival. We know exactly what withdrawal from territory means, but in the context of the volatile Arab world, can we be certain of what kind of "peace" Israel could possibly get in return? We may have different views on Shultz's peace plan, but in the end, it is the Israelis who will have to live next to Arabs, not the Americans.

Naturally, I would be pleased to discuss any or all aspects of this entire issue with you at your convenience, and I look forward to hearing from you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Morris J. Amitay

MJA:vrh

Encl:

END



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

המשרד

סוג בטחוני שמורדחיפות מיידיתתאריך/ז"ח 12:30 11 מרץ 88

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מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשי מנכ"ל רה"מ

תשובת רה"מ לסנטור לוין / כתבתו של בראל בעיתון הארץ מהיום

- 252022 מ.ה.א.

הכתבה איננה מדויקת והצגת הדברים הוצאה מהקונטקסט (תמקור במשרד לוין, כמובן).  
תשובת רה"מ נמסרה לראש משרדו של לוין בנוכחות עוזרו של הסנטור לענייני מזה"ת, באוירה  
של מתח ששררה אצלם. לא הובעה כל מחאה ולא הושמע כל עלבון כלפי הסנטור. דו"ח מלא בדיפ'.

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תאריך/ז"ח 11.3.88

מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עיתונות

תכנית השלום

להלן מה"נושינגטון פוסט" 11.3.88.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

# Shultz: U.N. Resolutions Cover Arab-Israeli Talks

*On Hill, Secretary Disputes Shamir's View*

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz strongly disagreed yesterday with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's view that a key U.N. resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Testifying before a House appropriations panel, Shultz said that "each of the negotiations" to be held between Israel and its Arab neighbors under a new U.S. peace plan must be based on U.N. Resolution 242 and 338.

The first resolution, adopted following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, calls for Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in return for Arab acceptance of peace with the Jewish state. The second, voted after the 1973 war, reaffirms the same principles as the basis for any negotiations.

Shamir replied Wednesday to criticism by 30 senators, many of them strong supporters of Israel, who in a March 3 letter to Shultz said they were "dismayed" by the Israeli prime minister's refusal to accept the "land-for-peace" formula as the basis for negotiations.

Shamir said Israel already had "accepted" and "implemented" this principle when it returned the Sinai to Egypt as part of the 1978 Camp David Accords. But he argued that the same principle does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip be-

cause they were occupied "militarily and illegally" by Jordan and Egypt.

"Their status must therefore be determined in the peace negotiations," he said. "I, therefore, fail to understand the reasons for your criticism, which hurts even more because it comes from friends who have Israel's security and welfare at heart," he added.

Shamir's letter, addressed to the two cosponsors of the Senate letter, Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), was published in Thursday's New York Times.

Asked by Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.), chairman of the House foreign operations subcommittee, whether Israel's return of the Sinai would be "sufficient" to meet its obligations under Resolution 242, Shultz replied bluntly, "No, it wouldn't."

"Each of these negotiations would be based on the Resolution 242 and 338. So the fact that 242 and 338 have, so to speak, been applied to the Sinai doesn't lessen the applicability of them to other negotiations," he said.

Shultz said the same principle "for that matter" would apply if Israel and Syria agreed to negotiate over the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights.

Shamir is due to arrive here Monday on a four-day visit that is expected to focus on the Shultz peace plan. It calls for the start of negotiations by May 1 on interim arrangements for Palestinian autonomy in the West

Bank and Gaza Strip and the beginning of talks to settle their final status in December.

Shamir is opposed to any negotiations over the "ultimate disposition" of the West Bank and Gaza other than within the framework of the Camp David Accords, which the Arab side has rejected.

He is also opposed to Shultz's proposal for holding new peace talks under the umbrella of an international conference, with the U.N. secretary general issuing invitations to the five permanent member of the security council, including the Soviet Union, and all parties to the conflict.

Moshe Arens, the former Israeli ambassador here who is a close associate of Shamir, described his unhappiness with the "concept" of the conference at a meeting with Shultz Tuesday.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Arens said he had not visited Shultz to "protest" on Shamir's behalf about "anything," but made it clear that he and Shamir have strong objections to Shultz's concept of an "ongoing conference." He said this would allow the Arab side to take its grievances against Israel to the plenary body whenever there was a deadlock.

Shamir will take "a very firm attitude" against a conference in his talks here next week with Shultz, according to his spokesman, Avi Pazner. He said he doubted Shamir would accept a conference, even if the United States gave explicit assurances that its powers would remain limited, because Shamir is opposed "to the very principle of a conference," Pazner said.

Meanwhile, President Reagan, in an interview with French television yesterday, denied he intends to apply "pressure" on Shamir to accept the U.S. peace plan. "I don't think it's so much pressure as it is just an attempt at persuasion," he said.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל מדיני

לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

יוזמת שולץ: מכתב הטנטור גראם

רצ"ב מכתב שהטנטור הנ"ל שלח ביוזמתו ממשרדו בטקסס בעקבות מכתב לוין ושאר 30 הטנטורים.  
המכתב הגיענו במכונת פקס באיכות גרועה.

10:00 א"מ  
למדן

שלה 2 רה"מ 3 מ"מ 3 מ"מ 2 מ"מ 1 מ"מ 2 מ"מ



MAR. 11 '88 14:07 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL HOUSTON

P.01

TO: CONGRESS - EMBASSY

FROM: YORAM ETTINGER - HOUSTON

PHIL GRAMM  
1988

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 7, 1988

2/2 293

Hon. George F. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
2201 C Street NW  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want you to know that the recent letter signed by some 30 senators does not represent my view, either in its implicit intrusion into internal Israeli politics or in its view that Israel must be coerced into abandoning control of territory which is clearly vital to its survival as a nation.

Common sense, the narrow confines of Israel's borders and Middle Eastern history since 1945 all combine to emphasize the apparent flaw in a concept which holds that Israel must trade proven protection for promises. Israel cannot be expected to blindly accept a proposal which appears to significantly impair its ability to repulse an invasion. I am personally dubious and, given the stakes for Israel, I find it wholly reasonable to expect a high level of concern among many Israeli officials. Ultimately, Israel may approve some version of the proposal, but the decision to accept this or any other peace plan must be left to the Israelis who also will have to live with its impact.

Frankly, I would have preferred that your negotiations proceed without the advice to be found among your JSS assistant secretaries in the House and Senate. Now that such advice has been offered by a bloc of senators, however, to withhold a differing view would be irresponsible.

Yours respectfully,



PHIL GRAMM  
U.S. Senator

END

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח 11.3.88

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאח: עיתונות

תכנית השלוח

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" 11.3.88.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

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By David B. Ottaway  
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סיכום תקשורת 4-11/3/88

הירידה בכמות הכיסוי הטלוויזיוני על הנעשה בשטחים, אשר החלה עוד בשבוע שעבר, קשורה אמנם בהתגברות המתמדת של העניין בבחירות (וכן פרשת פנמה מוסיפה לבלוט), אך מכחינתנו מעיינת בראש ובראשונה "התרגלות" של התקשורת (בעיקר האלקטרונית) למצב והפיכתו לנחור יומיומי. כך אומרים לי בני שיחי ברשתות המדישנים כי לא ירדו הביקורת כלפינו כלל וכלל. מתפתחת, איפוא, עייפות מטוימת מן הנושא אך אין אנו יוצאים נשכרים ממנה שכן עד כה לא איתרנו שינוי במגמות הכיסוי.

בסה"כ איתרנו בתקופה הנסקרת 25 כתבות ב-4 הרשתות, 2 ראיונות בחכניות בוקר, וכן 3 מאמרי מערכת, 9 טורים, 10 מכתבים למערכת ולמעלה מ-60 כתבות בעתונות הכתובה. להלן נתרכז בעיקר הכיסוי הטלוויזיוני שכן העתונות הכתובה מוברקת יום יום.

6 כתבות בטלוויזיה עסקו במהומות; המסר העיקרי היה כי המהומות מצליחות ללחוץ על מנהיגי ישראל ורה"ב (למשל, ג'ים ביסמן, NBC, 6/3) וכי אין ישראל מסוגלת למצוא להם תשובה הולמת (למשל, דין ריינולדס, ABC, 8/3, ש"נגמ"ש האבנים" אינו מצליח לפעול בטמטאות) לעתים שבים הכתבים לנימות פילוסופיות רגשניות (למשל, מייסון, CBS, 8/3, ש"כיום הרגל" נשרפו רגלי ישראל בעוד דגל אש"פ "מתנוסס ברוח הקלה"), בעתונות הכתובה זכה הנושא ל-34 כתבות.

ביקור שולץ ותכנית השלום שלו זכו ל-6 כתבות ברשתות אשר עמדו על כך שהתכנית לא נדחתה ע"י איש אך הבליטו עמדת רמ"מ ישראל המעבכת את התהליך כשלב זה. מכתב הסנטורים זכה ל-2 כתבות (CBS ו-CNN) ודווח כצעד שנועד ללחוץ על רה"מ לקראת ביקורו כאן. CBS (וויאט אנדרוס, 4/3) ציינה כי שולץ לא נפגש עם פלסטינים ומסרב לפגוש בערפאת "על אף שפגש באסאד העומד בראש מדינה שמחמ"ד מגדירה כטרוריסטית". CBS גם יצאה בגילוי (דאג סונל, 8/3) כי שגריר ארה"ב לאו"מ, ורנון וולטרס, נועד בתוניס עם ערפאת. להכחשת וולטרס ענתה הרשת למחרת כי היא דבקה בגירסתה. בעתונות הכתובה טופל ביקור שולץ ב-24 כתבות ו-6 טורים (שעסקו גם במהומות) המסר דומה לטלוויזיה.

בשולי נושא זה מוסיפה לעלות הפעילות בארגונים היהודיים. ביקור מועדון הנשיאים דווח במסגרת הדיווחים על מסע שולץ. בשובו הנה התעמת מוריס אכרס עם שינדלר ב-GOOD MORNING AMERICA. פעילותם של ריטה האוזר והרצברג עוררה עניין ושאלות.

4212

איוור:

ב. בינה

טס השולח:

11.3.88

האריך:

1 / מרפא תל אביב פיר מלחמ מוסמכת משרד המשפטים



4 כתבות עסקו בעיקר בהגבלות על התקשורת וכבר דיווחנו על כך בגפרר. נציין עוד כי הנושא מצא ביטוי גם בכתבות רבות על נושאים שונים, ומוסיף לעלות בשיחותינו מדי יום. עד לפני יומיים קיבלנו פניות יומיות (בד"כ בשעות הערב) מרשתות ותחנות לגבי הכיסוי, ושאלות בנוסח "האם מותר יהיה לצלם מחר". בדרך הטבע הרשתות עסקו בנושא יותר מהעתונות הכתובה, וביקרו אותנו קשות (למשל, ביטרמן ב-NBC, ב-4/3, "ארץ הנפטרת מחופש העתונות שלה"). ההתקפה על אוטובוס קמ"ג כוסתה בהרחבה ברשתות (4 כתבות). נציין הבדל בין NBC, אשר הן בדברי הקישור של תום ברוקו והן בגוף הכתבה של ביטרמן כינו את התוקפים "טרוריסטים" בעוד CBS מכנה אותם "GUERRILLAS" ולא שוכחת לציין כי האוטובוס היה בדרכו ל-ISRAEL'S TOP SECRET NUCLEAR PLANT. הגדיל לעשות כדרכו פיטר ג'נינגס ב-ABC, אשר התייחס ל"6 הרוגים" בטה"כ, את התוקפים כינה "ARMED PALESTINIANS", בציין כי אכן "SOME PALESTINIANS DO COME ACROSS THE BORDER TO DO BATTLE". הכיסוי בעתונות היה ענייני וצמוד. מאמר מערכת אחד (9, NYP) וטור אחד (אכנס ונובאק, 9). הבליטו כי בכך גרם אש"פ נזק גדול לעצמו וחזק עמדת הליכוד. כך גם בכתבות הטלוויזיה. נציין עם זאת, כי בשונה מארועים דומים בעבר לא מצאנו עצמנו מתו'איינים ומגיבים בנושא באופן נרחב, ואולי גם בכך יש מסימני הזמים הללו.

נושאים נוספים: משרד אש"פ (ר' מאמר נתניהו), יובל ה"אנשלוס" באוסטריה, איראן-עיראק.

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49  
36  
קטח





שגדירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף      מתוך      דפים

סיוג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1145 11 מרס 88

מס' מברק

## המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנהל מצפ"א

## 88 בחירות

ד"ר: מטה הבהירות שלו במצב קשה, כספי ומוראלי, וכשלושת רבעי מחצות שלו פוטח עקב צמצום, ד"ר גנז את כל חשדיו הפרטומת שלו באילינוי, ויחליפם באחרים. נראה, כי אם לא דשג הישג ממשד באילינוי יסתלק מן המרוץ.

תמפ: בהודעתו על הפרישה מהמרוץ רמז כי ישמח להיות מועמד לסגן-נשיא, וכך דנסח  
אוג מזלר בשנית בפעם הבאה.

ג'קסון: בכינוסי המפלגה הדמוקרטית באלאסקה אתמול קיבל ג'קסון 36% מהקולות, דוקקיס - 20% והיתר - בלתי מזדהים.

לקראת אילוצני: משאל של אי.בי.סי/רושינגטון פוסט מעלה לגבי המוקדמות באילוצני:  
רפובליקאים בוש 58% דול 31%, רובלסטון 6%, קמפ 4%.

דמוקרטים 38%, ג'קסון 33%, דוקקיס 16%, גפהארדט 6%, הארט 3%, גור 2%.

דני בלור

2 12 sand, 1031 112 64/1 62 100 112



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel Aviv

March 11, 1988

Excellency:

Secretary Shultz has asked that I deliver the following message to you:

"Dear Yitzhak:


"I want to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for the vigilance and timely action which your security forces displayed when they discovered and removed the car bomb located close to my hotel. The successful countering of this terrorist threat demonstrates once again the high caliber and professional quality of your force. Please convey my gratitude to and admiration for all of the individuals participating in the elimination of that threat.

"With warm regards,

"Sincerely yours, George P. Shultz"

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Thomas R. Pickering  
Ambassador

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister of the  
State of Israel  
Jerusalem





שגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף מחזור א' דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

24° 2/2

4) הסנטורית נכסי קסנבאום (5) מושל אוליבר ג'יט תומפסון. מועמדים נוספים  
הסנטור לשעבר פול לקסלט. המושל למר אלכסנדר. מזכיר החינוך ויליאם בנט. חבר  
הקונגרס הנרי הייד. חוארד כייקר, ראש מטה הבית הלבן. השופט סנדרה דיי אוקונור.  
אך בעיקר יש להתמקד ברצינות לחמש המועמדות. מועמד שאין העתון מזכיר ואף הוא  
נחשב כאפשרי הוא מושל ניו-ג'רזי תום קין.

משאל כללי העתון USA Today מפרסם משאל ארצי המציג את כוש לעומת המועמדים  
הדמוקרטיים העיקריים.  
במשאל שנערך ביום רביעי נשאלו 701 בוחרים רשומים. לפי המשאל מנצח כוש בכל  
המקרים:

בוש	56%	ג'סי ג'קסון	26%
בוש	47%	גור	32%
בטש	44%	דוקקיס	38%

צוה"צ  
דני בלון





שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ט מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

25° 2/3

13/1, העבטם כעוללות וכדי כמודל שהסוב' יעתיקו אותו, ע"מ לפשט את תהליך האימות. כתוצאה מהסכם ה- INF הוקמה סוכנות מיוחדת הכוללת 600-800 אנשים שהוצבו ל- ONSIGHT INSPECTIONS לבדיקת 165-160 אתרים. ב- START מדברים על 2000 אתרים לבדיקה והעלירות יהיו עצומות. חמסר היה אפוא שיש להתחיל לאלתר בנושא שיטת ותהליך האימות.

3. THRESHOLD) NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY. ב-76' הוסכם שלא לנסות ראשי נפץ מעל 150 קילואט. מסתבר שהסוב' עברו דמה זאת. האמריקאים רוצים עתה לבדוק, כל מעטן מעל 75 קילואט. הסוב' מתנגדים, אך הסכימו לשאת ולתת על הדדיות מוכנים לבקורת של 2-4 פעמים בשנה בכל מדינה (JOINT VERIFICATION SYSTEM) במרכזים בארה"ב ובבריה"מ. הביקורת הראשונה תתבצע בחודשי יוני-יולי '88.

4. המשוכות הגבוהות, מעבר לבעיות האימות התגלו כניכוח על הטילים הניידים. האמריקאים עמדו על כך שאם לא יוכלו להגיע לשיטה יעלה של אימות יש לחסלם. הסוב' העלו את נושא טילי השיוט האמריקאים (SILKOM'S). הוסכם ששתי המדינות יגישו בג' נבח פרטיכל על שיטת ותהליך חיסול מערכות טילים בעתיד, האמריקאים מתכוונים להציע פישוט נוסף של התהליך - קבלת DATA על שלבי יצור הטילים. לאמריקאים יש עניין לקבל את מירב המידע על היצור בברח"מ. מסתבר להם שרובם לא מוכרים להם.

5. חלל. הנושא הועלה אך לא התקיים דיון. הצדדים נשארו בעמדותיהם.

6. שרי החגנה יפגשו בשבוע הבא בברן. שיחות קרלוצ'י-יאזוב יעסקו ב- 4 נושאים כלליים - דוקטרינה צבאית, אמצעי בטחון למניעת תקלות בידן שני הצדדים (לינהרד לא רואה את תקרית הים השחור מלפני שבועות מספר כשיזכר לקטגוריה זו), פרוק נשק ותקציב הגנה.

7. פסגה. קיים ספק רב האם הסכם בנושא ה- START יחיה מוכן בלו"ז הקצר שנותר. יש גורמים אמריקאים הגורסים שגורבצ'וב כה לחוט להגיע להסכם שיאמר לחתום על מסגרת כללית שניתן לעמוד בה בלו"ז הנתון. לינהרד לא מאמין בכך אך הוא מטפל עתה בהכנת הצעה אמריקאית כוללת כך שאם ברה"מ תסכים, ארה"ב תהיה במצב שתוכל להניח אותה על השולחן. 3/3

END



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

250 3/3

8. נאט"ו. הצעת ארה"ב בעניין ה-START על דעת כל חברות נאט"ו. גרמניה היא מקרה מיוחד בשל המצב הפוליטי הפנימי וחילוקי הדעות בנוך בין CDU, ה-SPD וגנשר. החשש הוא שימצאו במצב מאוויים ושכן דורשים ערבויות בנושא הטילים קצרי הטווח. מכאן דרישה לדון בנושא ה-NUCLEAR FORCE THEATER. היתר מסכמים שיש להתרכז בנושא הנשק הקרבנציונלי, נשק כימי ועוד. חנוסחה שנמצאה עם הגרמנים היא שלא ללכת לפי שעה למודרניזציה של מערכות נשק גרעיניות. לינהרד מדגיש שהמדובר יותר בפרספציה ציבורית שכן האמריקאים עוסקים זה מכבר בחידוש המערכות "בשקט".

אלי אבידן

א.א.

