

המטה הכללי של צה"ל

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מנוג בטחוני סורי - ארבע

דחופות מידרי

האריד/ז"ח 1145 2 פרץ 88

מס' מברק

051

המטרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני
דע: מנכ"ל לשכת רה"מ

תהליך השלום

מאת מקור מהימן

שולח התקשר טלפונית עם מקס פישר, מחר שהעניינים אינם מתקדמים טוב עם הישראלים, ואירעה להפגש עם פישר, אברם ואשר בשבנו לארה"ב.

יבנה ואב
למדו

מ 2
מ 3
מ 3
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שאלה ציר, ביקר, אמת, אביא, אמת, אמת, אמת

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

חאריק/ז"ח 1230 2 במרס 88

מס' מברק

043

1/3

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: הצייר-יועץ, רושינגטון

בחירות 88

דמוקרטים מול רפובליקנים: מן המשאלים האחרונים מסתבר שהמדינות בוש-דול פוגמות בסיכויי הנצחון של הרפובליקנים בבחירות לנשיאות, ואילו לפחות חלק מן המועמדים הקיימים במחנה הדמוקרטי מתחילים להצטייר כמי שמסוגלים לנצח את יריביהם הרפובליקנים בנובמבר. מבין הרפובליקנים מצטיירים סיכוייו של דול כטובים במקצת משל בוש, וזאת משום שדמוקרטים ועצמאיים מוכנים לשקול הצבעה עבורו, אך כפי שחמשאלים האחרונים מצביעים הרי סיכויי דול בקרב הרפובליקנים רק פוחתים. יצוין כי העליה בסיכויי הדמוקרטים מופיעה גם במשאל ארצי, וגם במשאל בקליפורניה, המדינה בעלת מספר האלקטורים הגדול ביותר, ואשר במערכות האחרונות לנשיאות הצבדע בעד המועמד הרפובליקני. ואלה תוצאות משאל ארצי של לו האריס (נערך בפברואר 18-23):

(טעות אפשרית 3%)

<u>דול מול ג'פ הארדט</u>		<u>בוש מול ג'פ הארדט</u>	
42%	54%	48%	48%
<u>דול מול דוקקיס</u>		<u>בוש מול דוקקיס</u>	
46%	50%	50%	47%

ואלה תוצאות שערך מכון מרוין פילד בקליפורניה (פברואר 17-21, טעות אפשרית 5%):

<u>נובמבר 87</u>		<u>פברואר 88</u>	
49		43	בוש
36		52	דוקקיס

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מ"מ דן דן אלוף מירון לויס רובינסון

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61:82 20-80-8861

טופס מברק

דף 2 מחוד 3 דפים

43 2/3

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

נובמבר 87

53

24

49

33

57

17

46

43

45

36

פברואר 88

דול 45

דוקקיס 43

בוש 41

גפהארדט 46

דול 47

גפהארדט 39

בוש 42

קרומו 47

דול 47

קרומו 44

בוש ודול ממשיכים להוביל גם בפברואר כשמעמידים מולם את גור, סדמון או ג'קסון. רוברטסון מפסיד מול כל מועמד דמוקרטי, כולל ג'קסון ואילו קמפ מפסיד מול כולם, למעט גור וג'קסון.

מדינות "יוט שלישי הגדול": משאל חדש של וושינגטון פוסט ורשת אי.בי.סי בכל 16 המדינות המקיימות פרימריז ביוט שלישי הבא הראה כי בוש מוביל ביחס של 3 ל-1 מול רוברט דול. לרוברטסון רק 12 אחוז, וכוחו חלש ברוב המדינות מלבד אוקלהומה ואלבמה.

בקרב הדמוקרטים מובילים בצמוד דוקקיס וג'קסון (כ-28 אחוז) אחריהם גור - 20% וגפהארדט 15%. דוקקיס, למרות תמינתו הצפונית-ליברלית מגלה חוזק ניכר ברוב מדינות הדרום ובמיוחד בשתיים הגדולות - טקסס ופלורידה. דוקקיס וגפהארדט התחזקו במידה ניכרת מאז איזבה וניו-המפשייר ואילו הסנטור גור לא שינה בהרבה את מצבו. ..73

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מחוד 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

43 3/3

(הסקר נערך ביין ה-17 ל-21 בפברואר). עורכי הסקר מציינים כי דיתכנן עוד שינויים רבים, בעיקר בדמוקרטיים, שם שעור המהססים די גבוה, וכך ייתכן שאוהדי רוברטסון יגינו ברגע האחרון ויפתיעו.

ראוי לצדין כי בקרב הרפובליקנים שולטת השיטה של "האנל" לוקח הכל" כך שיתרוננו של בוש יתורגט למספר גדול יותר של צירים, בעוד שכזמוקרטיים הכלל הוא שכל מי שזוכה בלפחות 15% מן הקולות, ישתתף בחלוקת הצירים לוועידה, בעוד שב-84 היה הסף גבוה הרבה יותר ופעל לטובת מונחידל.

דרימה: ב"פרימרי" בלתי-מחייב ("תחרות יופי" בארגון הפוליטי כאן) זכה אצל הרפובליקנים בוש ברוב גדול. אצל הזמוקרטיים יצא דוקקיס ראשון ואחריו ג'סי ג'קסון בהפרש קטן.


דני בלון

2017

תאריך : 02.03.88
משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ירצא

בלמט

חידום: 2017/3

אל: 68/ט

מ-: המשרד/תא: 020388/ח: 1936/מ: ט: 77

ג: 78

בלמט/מיידר

לשכת השגריר

אנא העבירו הסדר הבא למחמ"ד:

JERUSALEM, MARCH 2, 1988

CABLE:

RICHARD MURPHY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON DC USA

PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEP CONDOLENCES AT THE PASSING AWAY
OF YOUR BROTHER.
MAY YOU AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE BEREAVED FAMILY BE
CONSOLED IN YOUR GRIEF.

YITZHAK SHAMIR

PRIME MINISTER

גב/רנ

תמ: רהט

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2022

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 02.03.88

ירצא

בלמט

הרזם: 2022/3

אל: רוש/57

מ-: המשרד, תא: 020388, זח: 1943, דח: מ, טג: בל

נד: 2

למט/מירז

לשנת השגור

אנא העבירו המסר הבא למחמ'ר:

JERUSALEM, MARCH 2, 1988

CABLE:

RICHARD MURPHY

ASSIATANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR NEAR AESTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON DC USA

I WAS GRIEVED TO HEAR OF YOUR BROTHER'S PASSING AWAY.
PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES IN YOUR
BEREAVEMENT.

YDSEF BEN-AHARON

DIRECTOR GENERAL: PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

אא/אג

תג: דחמ

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משרד החוץ - ירושלים

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שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

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דפ 2 מחוכ 2 דפים

27-67

סוג בטחוני מ"ו דחיפות מ"ד תאריך/ז"ח

ג. תהליך השלום - ואן-דונן מבדיל כמובן בין המצב בשטחים לבין תהליך השלום, וכאן אינו בטוח שהסובלנות כלפי ישראל תחזיק מעמד לאורך ימים. לדעתו, קונגרסמנים רבים סבורים שעל ישראל לחשוב מחדש ולשנות כוון בכדי ללכת לקראת המזכיר שולץ ולקדם את תהליך השלום. היה ולא תהיה גמישות מצד ישראל ונכונות ליעדים שהם ברי-השגה וישימים, תלך ותגבר הבקורת על ישראל בבית הנבחרים.

ד. הירינגס - לדבריו, חברי ועדת המשנה של המילטון חלוקים בנדון. חלקם לוחצים בעד קיום הירינגס על המצב בשטחים, וחלק מהם אינו רואה תועלת בכך ולכן מתנגדים. המילטון מזדהה עם המחנה השני.

2. עם זאת עלינו לצפות לקיום ארועים בלתי רשמיים בגבעה. לדוגמא, ארגון ה- Quakers פנה לפני שבועיים-שלושה ובקש שיועמד לרשותו חדר לאייצ בלתי רשמית, בה תשתתף די"ר שרה רוי שבקרה לא מזמן בשטחים ורוצה להציג דו"ח למספר קונגרסמנים ועוזרים. הארוחה הזו חתקיים מחרתיים (3.3). ואן-דונן הזדרז וציין שתמיד נענים בחיוב לפניות כאלה, כפי שנענים בחיוב לפניותינו (כאן חזכיר הופעותיהם בשנה האחרונה של נציג גוש אמונים, הפרופ' איתמר רבינוביץ, האלוף (מיל') אהרון יריב ותא"ל (מיל') אפרים סנה).

3. ב-9.3 יופיע דיק מרפי בדלתיים סגורות ויעיד על החכנית להחקנת טנק ה-M1 במצרים. להערכתו, חברי חת הועדה יתמקדו בארבעה נושאים: אובדן מקומות עבודה באוהיו (הצביע על הקונגרסמנים פיהו, ודה-וויין); בעית העברת הטכנולוגיה; שאלת מכירות למדינות שליטות; ושאלת הצרכים המצריים (העיר שאין זו הפעם הראשונה שהמצרים נכנסים לעסקת שאיננה תואמת את צרכיהם הצבאיים).

4. ב-10.3 יופיע מרפי בהירינגס פתוחים, וידווח על ההתפתחויות האחרונות במזה"ת.

ה. ביקור שר הבטחון המצרי - אבו זאלה יבקר בווינגטון שבוע לאחר ביקור רה"מ. טרם בקש להפגש עם ועדת המשנה של המילטון או עם המילטון עצמו, אך אין להופיע אפשרויות אלה מהפרק.

אולסן
למדן

Jordan Urging Separate PLO Seat at Talks

Reported Shift Is Seen Likely to Complicate American Peace Effort.

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

AMMAN, Jordan, Feb. 29—Jordan will no longer press for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to any Middle East peace talks and will support a separate Palestine Liberation Organization seat at the table, sources familiar with King Hussein's thinking said here today.

The Jordanian position, conveyed to reporters accompanying Secretary of State George P. Shultz, seems certain to complicate Shultz's task of finding a basis for peace talks mutually acceptable to Israel and the Arabs.

The PLO already has told Jordan that it no longer has any interest in a joint delegation in the wake of three months of violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO. The U.S. government is forbidden by law to have contacts with PLO representatives until the organization renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel.

U.S. officials have been assuming that any Palestinians participating in new negotiations would be part of a joint delegation with Jordan and would include individuals approved by the PLO.

An aide to Shultz said such a delegation had "always been part of the concept" of a new peace conference and said "it's not an issue." But he would not say whether he thought Jordan would be willing to press the PLO to join a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources made clear, however, that Hussein is not going to repeat the experience he went through in 1985 and 1986, when he carried out extensive negotiations with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on a joint platform and delegation.

While agreement was largely reached on a delegation, the king broke off his negotiations with Arafat in February 1986 be-

cause the PLO leader would not make clear his stand on recognizing Israel and renouncing terrorism.

The Jordanian sources made clear today that the Arab position generally has hardened in the wake of the uprising in the occupied territories. They said the Arab world regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In their view, it would be the United Nations, not Jordan, that would issue invitations to a new peace conference.

If the PLO wanted, and could obtain, a separate invitation, Jordan would go along with it, the sources said.

A PLO executive committee member, Mahmoud Abbas, was in Amman in mid-February to reestablish contacts with Hussein but also to tell him that the PLO had no interest in a joint delegation.

The Jordanian sources also made clear that Hussein hopes the United States will find a way to open a dialogue with the PLO. They repeatedly referred to the Palestinians who met with Shultz in Washington Jan. 27 as PLO representatives and suggested those talks should continue.

The two were Hanna Siniora, editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper Al Fajr, and Fayez Abu Rahmeh, head of the Gaza Bar Association. They are known to be strong PLO supporters but are not considered formal members, making it possible for Shultz to see them.

Both were also acceptable to Israel as potential members of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation being discussed in 1985-86 before the Hussein-Arafat talks broke down.

Shultz came here today to answer questions the Jordanians raised about his peace plan during his first visit here Saturday. The Jordanian sources said Amman welcomed Shultz's efforts to revive the peace process.

But they said the Shultz plan needed to be detailed further and a commitment to basic principles of new peace talks agreed to.

Shultz still has not presented any formal plan, although he keeps talk-

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Washington
Post, p. 1.

cont...

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ing about a "package" that has to be considered as a whole.

His package envisages only a brief "international event" to start the negotiations, hosted by the United States and the Soviet Union rather than all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

An aide to Shultz took issue with the Jordanian description that the Arab position was hardening in the wake of the West Bank and Gaza Strip violence.

He said the Jordanians were "certainly seriously interested" in the U.S. plan, the Egyptians clearly supportive and the Syrians interested in continuing their discussions with Washington.

"I don't see any sign that Arab positions are hardening," he said.

Shultz met the same group of Jordanian officials today that he held talks with Saturday, including Crown Prince Hassan, Prime Minister Zaid Rifai, and Foreign Minister Tahir Masri.

Rifai is scheduled to fly to London tonight to brief King Hussein, who is scheduled to meet Shultz Tuesday in London.

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סגירות ישראל / נושנגטון

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סונג בסחונני גלוי

דחיסות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 1100 1 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

003

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המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח, הסברה

הגיון השלם

להלן מאמר המערכת של הנושנגטון פוסט היום 1-3-88

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סגירות ישראל / וויסינגטון

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21-

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Mideast Stirrings

GEORGE SHULTZ is giving the Reagan administration's new Mideast peace initiative its first international airing. The initiative is an invitation to a proceeding that at this stage is to unfold under American aegis, not under the American-Soviet sponsorship foreseen in the now-sidetracked proposal for an international conference. That alone was enough to put off Mikhail Gorbachev. The plan is "inconsistent," he said, and does not engage all sides. Still, he reported that he and the American secretary of state had agreed to "resume the exchange of opinions after George Shultz makes a trip to the Middle East."

Mr. Shultz has been taking Mideast soundings. In Israel, the first response was polarized, which is good because consensus means paralysis. It will take a hard fight for a more reasonable view—the view of the Labor opposition, led by Shimon Peres—to win through. Meanwhile, Mr. Shultz has been getting a good exposure to the unreasonable view of the government. Most of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Likud bloc still embraces the annexationist aims so thoroughly undermined by the Palestinian resistance. Likud rejects the basic American tenet of the negotiated exchange of land for peace. But even Mr. Shamir is on the defensive, fearful that talks on West Bank-Gaza autonomy might slide irreversibly into

early talks on the final status of the occupied territories—as the American plan intends—but not eager to take on the onus of stopping the negotiations before they even get started.

The "moderate" Palestinians, in their familiar confusion, stood up Mr. Shultz, who patiently explained—as he will have to explain a hundred times again—how self-defeating it is for them to shun a role in the making of their own political destiny. The key Arab governments involved, Syria and Jordan, heard out the secretary, but basically hid behind the Palestinians' skirts. The PLO leadership is now attempting to catch up with the stone-throwers. Evidently the PLO thinks this is the moment to draw the United States beyond its acknowledgment of unspecified "legitimate Palestinian rights" into approval of Palestinian "self-determination," code for statehood. But this is not the moment—not if the United States wants, as it does, to give Likud incentive to look at the new facts the stone-throwers have created in the West Bank and to keep a space open for Labor in next November's Israeli elections.

The violence goes on in the West Bank, and Palestinians are dying. But American diplomacy is stirring, and there is a thrust to it and some hints of show-me receptivity to it too. Nobody else seems capable of getting something moving.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מחוד 7 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלרי

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1545 29 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

11/7

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה. מנהל מצפ"א

בחירות 88

"Caucus" במדינת מיין נערכו בסוף השבוע בחירות מוקדמות בשיטת אסיפות חברי המפלגה ברפובליקנים זכה בוש ברוב הקולות, והוא יזכה בכל צירי המדינה. אצל הדמוקרטים זכה דוקקיס ב- 36% וג'קסון ב- 31%, אך בשל שיטת ההצבעה יזכה דוקקיס ב-12 צירים וג'קסון ב-6.

יש לציין את הישגו של ג'יסי ג'קסון במדינת שאין בה כמעט תושבים שחורים, ואשר ג'קסון כמעט ולא השקיע בה מאמץ או כוח. עיקר מצביעיו באו מקרב עובדי צווארון כחול, מובטלים, חקלאים קטנים.

להלן לקט של משאלים ממדינות "יום שלישי הגדול" וכן מספר משאלים כלליים וממדינות נוספות. המשאלים מאשרים בדרך כלל את ההערכה כי בוש מוביל בהפרש ניכר אצל הרפובליקנים, ואילו בדמוקרטים מובילים בין המצביעים הלבנים דוקקיס וג'קסון, בעוד שגור מגלה חוזק במדינתו טנסי ובמדינות הגובלות בה. אולם אחוז ה"לא יודעים" עדיין גדול ביותר ומבטיח שינויים והפתעות.


דני בלור

ע"ה 2
ע"ה 3
ג'קסון 3
ה'יין 1
ג'קסון 2
ה'ג'קסון 1
ג'קסון 4

***** POLL UPDATE *****

2/7

*51 MISSOURI POLL SHOWS GEPHARDT WITH BIG LEAD, BUSH EDGES DOLE
 The ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH poll of 1,000 registered voters conducted by SRI Research interviewed 500 respondents in each party who said they are likely to vote in the primary. The three-day poll completed Feb. 25 has a margin of error plus or minus 4.4%. (ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, 2/28)

686
 2/7

DEMOCRATS			REPUBLICANS		
		leaners			leaners
Gephardt	53%	57%	Bush	35%	37%
Dukakis	8	9	Dole	29	32
Jackson	7	5	Robertson	8	10
Simon	5	5	Kemp	4	4
Hart	3	3			
Gore	1	2			

*52 BUSH HOLDS BIG LEAD OVER DOLE, DUKAKIS TOPS DEMS IN FLORIDA
 A telephone survey of 1,027 Florida voters conducted by the MIAMI HERALD, WTVJ in Miami, and WTVT in Tampa has a margin of error plus or minus 4%. (MIAMI HERALD 2/28)

DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS	
Dukakis	22%	Bush	46%
Gephardt	12	Dole	17
Jackson	11	Robertson	3
Gore	7	Kemp	3
Hart	6		
Simon	3		
Undecided	39		

*53 SUN-TIMES POLL SHOWS SIMON WITH STRONG LEAD IN ILLINOIS
 A Chicago SUN-TIMES poll of 1,205 voters across Illinois taken Feb. 19-23. More than half of Simon's supporters described themselves as "strongly committed" to his candidacy. Simon was the favorite of 57% of white Democratic voters and 20% of blacks. (CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 2/28)

DEMOCRATS

Simon	46%
Jackson	19
Dukakis	12
Gephardt	10
Gore	1

*54 GORE LEADS DEMS; BUSH OVER DOLE IN BLUEGRASS STATE POLL
 (LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL)

Democrats		Republicans	
Gore	28%	Bush	51%
Dukakis	20	Dole	28
Hart	10	Robertson	7

Gephardt	8	Kemp	2
Jackson	6	Undecided	12
Simon	5		
Undecided	24		

686

*55 SOUTH CAROLINA POLL SHOWS BUSH, JACKSON AHEAD
 The poll was conducted by THE STATE newspaper of Columbia, S.C., 2/23-2/27. (THE STATE, 2/29)

REPUBLICANS

Bush	48%
Dole	25
Robertson	19
Kemp	3
Undecided	5

DEMOCRATS

Jackson	35%
Dukakis	17
Gephardt	11
Hart	11
Simon	6
Gore	4
Undecided	16

*56 JACKSON LEADS DEMS, GOP FAVORS BUSH IN VA POLL
 The poll was based on telephone interviews between 2/21 to 2/24, with 218 respondents who plan to vote in the Democratic Primary and 233 who plan to vote in the Republican contest. The margin of error claimed is plus or minus 4%. (RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 2/28)

REPUBLICANS

Bush	43%
Dole	23
Robertson	12
Kemp	2
Undecided	20

DEMOCRATS

Jackson	17%
Dukakis	12
Gephardt	9
Gore	8
Simon	2
Hart	1
Undecided	51

*57 NY TIMES/CBS NEWS POLL
 National telephone poll conducted by the NY TIMES/CBS NEWS, 2/17 - 2/21, finds wide support for Bush among Republicans, undecided the favorite among Democrats. The margin of error is plus or minus 4%. (NY TIMES, 2/26-2/27)

REPUBLICANS

Bush	42%
Dole	27
Robertson	7
Kemp	3
Other/No opinion	22

DEMOCRATS

Dukakis	21%
Jackson	13
Gephardt	12
Hart	10
Gore	8
Simon	6
Other/no opinion	30

*58 BUSH ON TOP IN SOUTH CAROLINA POLL

The poll was conducted 2/12 - 2/17 by the CHARLOTTE OBSERVER and surveyed 737 South Carolina residents, which included 687 registered voters. The margin of error is 3.7%. (upi, 2/26)

REPUBLICANS

Bush	41%
Dole	29
Robertson	13
Kemp	4
Undecided	12

*59 N.C. DEMOCRATS DIVIDED AND UNDECIDED

The poll was conducted 2/12 - 2/17 and surveyed 737 North Carolina residents who said they were likely to vote in the Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor in May. (The Raleigh NEWS AND OBSERVER, 2/26)

DEMOCRATS

Gore	17%
Jackson	15
Gephardt	13
Dukakis	12
Hart	6
Simon	4
Babbitt	2
None/Undecided	24

*60 CALIFORNIA POLL: BUSH LEADS, DOLE NEXT, UNDECIDED THIRD

The poll, which was conducted by Mervin Fields from February 17 to February 21, is based on interviews with 331 registered California Republicans. The margin of error is plus or minus 5.5 percent. (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 2/26)

	Feb 88	Nov 87
Bush	38%	43%
Dole	26	22
Robertson	8	5
Kemp	8	5
Undecided	20	17
(Haig)	--	6
(du Pont)	--	2

57

686

5/7

*61 TEXAS POLL: BUSH LEADS; DUKAKIS AND GEPHARDT ON TOP

The poll, which was conducted Feb 24-26 by University of Houston political scientists Richard Murray and Kent L. Tedin for the DALLAS MORNING NEWS and the HOUSTON CHRONICLE, is based on interviews with 302 likely Democratic primary voters and 298 likely Republican primary voters. The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 6 percent. (DALLAS MORNING NEWS, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 2/28)

Republicans		Democrats	
Bush	60%	Dukakis	22%
Dole	14	Gephardt	21
Robertson	8	Jackson	12
Kemp	3	Gore	10
Undecided	14	Hart	8
		Simon	1
		Undecided	26

*62 KRC POLL: BUSH LEADS, FOUR DEMS BUNCHED

The BOSTON HERALD-WBZ-TV poll, which was conducted Feb 25-28 by KRC Research, interviewed 600 likely Democratic primary voters and 607 likely Republican primary voters in 14 Southern and border Super Tuesday states. The margin of error is plus or minus 5 percent. (UPI, 2/29)

Republicans		Democrats	
Bush	50%	Gephardt	21%
Dole	25	Dukakis	19
Robertson	12	Jackson	17
Kemp	4	Gore	16
		Hart	12
		Simon	9
		Undecided	12

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***** POLL UPDATE *****

*51 DUKAKIS, GEPHARDT GAIN; BUSH STILL LEADS FLA POLL
A Mason-Dixon Opinion Research poll was conducted 2/19-2/21.
507 likely Florida Democratic primary voters were surveyed along
with 336 likely Florida Republican primary voters. (MIAMI NEWS
2/25)

686

6/7

	Republicans		Democrats
Bush	47%	Dukakis	23%
Dole	20	Gephardt	18
Robertson	10	Jackson	17
Kemp	3	Gore	10
Undecided	20	Hart	6
		Simon	3
		Undecided	23

*52 DUKAKIS SOLID IN HOME STATE

KRC Communications Research surveyed 400 Massachusetts likely
Democratic primary voters on 2/24 for a WBZ poll. The margin of
error is plus or minus 5%. (KRC Communications Research for WBZ,
2/25)

	Favorable	Unfavorable
Dukakis	79%	14%
Gephardt	47	20
Gore	21	31
Hart	14	68
Jackson	54	25
Simon	51	21

If the primary were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?

Dukakis	61%
Gephardt	11
Simon	8
Jackson	4
Gore	2
Hart	1

[Handwritten signature]

***** POLL UPDATE *****

7/7 686
7/7

*51 KRC COMMUNICATIONS POLL SHOWS BUSH AHEAD IN MA

A poll of 400 Massachusetts GOP voters conducted Feb. 22-23 with a margin of error plus or minus 5% asked "if the Republican primary election were being held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?"

Bush	48%
Dole	27
Kemp	8
Robertson	3
Don't know	12
Refused	1

*52 DUKAKIS SURGING, JACKSON SECOND IN CALIFORNIA POLL

The California Poll, which was conducted by Mervin Field the week after the New Hampshire primary, surveyed 356 registered California Democrats. (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 2/25)

	2/88	11/87
Dukakis	27%	16%
Jackson	15	19
Gephardt	13	3
Simon	11	9
Hart	9	--
Gore	4	7

*53 HOUSTON CHRONICLE/DALLAS MORNING NEWS TEXAS TRACKING POLLS

The polls were conducted by University of Houston political scientist Richard Murray for the newspapers, Feb. 21-23. 301 likely Democratic voters and 294 likely Republican voters were interviewed. The margin of error is 6 percent.

DEMOCRATS		REPUBLICANS	
Jackson	19%	Bush	60%
Dukakis	18	Dole	15
Gephardt	15		
Gore	12		
Hart	6		
Simon	5		
Undecided	24		

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February 29, 1988.

מזכירות הממשלה

Mr. Albert D. Chernin
Executive Vice Chairman
National Jewish Community
Relations Advisory Council
443 Park Avenue South
New York NY 10016
U S A

Dear Al,

Thank you for your letter of February 25, 1988 and its enclosures. I shall faithfully convey it to the Prime Minister.

I look forward to meeting with you soon.

Warmest regards,

Cordially,

E. Rubinstein

✓ (Unshown copy to the Prime Minister)

National Jewish Community Relations
NJCRCAC
Advisory Council

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

(212) 684-6950

February 25, 1988

Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein
Government Secretary
Office of the Prime Minister
3 Kaplan Street
Kiryat Ben-Gurion
Jerusalem, Israel 91919

Dear Eli:

You may have heard about the lively and heated discussion we had at the Plenary Session in Los Angeles of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council. The particular session was focusing on strategies to maintain American public support for Israel. It was attended by about 500 delegates from communities throughout the United States and each of NJCRAC's 13 national member agencies.

The delegates were not able to arrive at a consensus on the issues debated at the session, but they did believe it was important for the leadership of Israel's Government to be informed of the views and concerns expressed there. At the direction of the Plenum we share with you the complete transcript of the session that includes the full text of the three presentations as well as the discussion that followed. The Plenum would welcome your conveying the views of the delegates to Prime Minister Shamir. I should add that the session was off-the-record and the transcript is confidential.

I look forward to receiving any reactions and comments you may have.

Warmest regards.

Cordially,


Albert D. Chernin
Executive Vice Chairman

ADC:ej
enclosures

P.S. Also enclosed are excerpts from my opening presentation to the Plenum and the text of Michael Pelavin's address entitled "Celebrating Israel's 40th Anniversary -- Israel-Diaspora Relations: Bonds, Barriers and Opportunities."



cooperation in the common cause of Jewish community relations

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CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

6TH FLOOR
37 YORK STREET
SYDNEY, N.S.W. 2000
TELEPHONE: 264 7933

טופס מכרק בפקטימליה

קונסוליה כללית
של ישראל
סידני

בלמ"ס

נר 95

תאריך 29.2.88

דחיפות מיידית

אל מנהל מע"ת

מאת קונכ"ל סידני

דע שג קנכרה (הועבר)

הנדון: - התכנית "60 דקות"

בהמשך להתברקויות בנושא.

1. אתמול בלילה שודרה הכתבה על עזה שהצוות הכין. כתבת זוועה בתמונות ובמלל שעלתה על כל מקרי הזוועה המשודרים, לדאכוננו, מדי ערב כאן.
2. ראשיתה של הכתבה בתמונות מזעזעות בב"ח בעזה של ילדים עם כוויות בפנים ובגוף, כאשר האמא, באמצעות רופא בית החולים, מסבירה שהחיל הישראלי עשה זאת בכוונה. (האם יש פרטים על כך?).

3. בהמשך ראיונות עם בני משפחה אבו גזא לה האמידה, בנם בן ה-11 כאנגלית רהוטה: יש יהודים טובים ורעים אך החיילים הישראלים הם רעים והוא מוכן להרוג אותם.

אבי המשפחה טוען: THE ISRAELIS KILLED THE PALESTINIAN NATION

וכי עזה היא בית סוהר גדול. כין הראיונות, המצלמה משוטטת בין חדרי החווילה ומכוניות הפאר של המשפחה. בת המשפחה המתגוררת בחו"ל, בהדגשה, לא תחזור להתגורר בעזה עד שתשוחרר.

4. ראיון עם פואד קדים מג'אכליה בליווי תמונות פרצופים שותתי דם, מאמין רק ב-

MACHINE GUN ושוב תמונות של הכאות ללא רחם לעיני המצלמות. כאשר התמונות נגמרות, מראיינים שוב את גב' אבו גזא לה המתארת הכאה אכזרית של ילד לעיני אמו.

5. במשולב קטעי ראיונות עם מירון בנבנישתי שלא חוסך דברי שבח מילדי האבנים ומאשים את ישראל בטפול בפלסטינים לא כבחיות אלא כב-SUBHUMAN.

6. מסיימים את הכתבה במשפט: FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PALESTINIANS ARE NOT TO BE BLAMED

7. הכתבה אינה כוללת התנשאות של שר או קצין צה"ל בכיר, כפי שמפיק התוכנית ואנו

המלצנו במכרקנו נר 23, אין שום הצגה או תגובה מצד אנשינו בארץ. התוכנית כאילו אורגנה ע"י צוות הטלוויזיה באופן עצמאי.



Handwritten notes in Hebrew and Arabic, including the number '2/...' and various signatures and dates.



A faint, horizontal line or mark is visible in the center of the page, possibly a scanning artifact or a very light pencil stroke.

נר. 95 (חמשד) דף 2 מתוך 2

8. מיותר להדגיש שמאז אתמול ידידים יהודים ואחרים פוגים אלינו מי בדאגה ומי בשאלה אך כולם מחייבים את הרעיון של סגירת השטחים בפני עתונאים ובמיוחד מצלמות הטלביזיה. תגובותינו על "מקרים חריגים" של הכאות וקבורת חיים אינו נשמעות יותר, שכן לפי דיווחי התקשורת נוצר הרושם שה"מקרים החריגים" הם הכלל. נראה לי שיש מקום לשקול ברצינות החצעה לסגירת השטחים. המציעים מסתמכים על תקדימים של בריטניה בפוקלנד, של ארה"ב בגרנדה ובשבוע האחרון של אינדונזיה שמנעה מהעתונאים המלווים את שה"ח היידן מלהכנס לשטחה.
9. בינתיים אבקש דיווח על ביקור צוות "60 דקות" בארץ, שכן אני מתכוון להעלות את נושא הכתבה הזוועתית עם מנכ"ל התחנה ומפיק התוכנית.

צבי גבאי

SECRET

28-FEB-1988

4-PRO'-809

PEACE PROCESS CONCEPT

- * The objective is a comprehensive peace.

- * Negotiations based on U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 will start on an early date certain, between Israel and each of its neighbours which is willing to do so. (May 1).

- * As concerns negotiations between an Israeli and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation:

 - * Negotiations will begin on arrangements for a transitional period with the objective of completing them within six months.

 - * Seven months after transitional negotiations begin, final status negotiations will begin with the objective of completing them within one year. That is, if transitional talks start on May 1, final status talks will start on December 1.

- * Final status talks will start before the transitional period begins. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional agreement and will last for three years.


- * The U.S. will participate in both negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion. In particular, the U.S. will submit a draft agreement for the parties' consideration at the outset of negotiations on transitional arrangements.

- * An international conference or auspices will launch the negotiations and serve as a reference point for them in an agreed manner. It will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached. The U.N. Secretary General will issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. Palestinian representation will be within the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

- * All participants in the conference must accept U.N.S.C. resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce violence and terrorism.

- * The Palestinian problem will be dealt with in the negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations. Negotiations between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will proceed independently of any other negotiation.

כבודיך קיום



הנהיג ~~הנהיג~~ (5) ~~הנהיג~~



The Prime Minister of Portugal informed us of their decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. This will be done in stages over a period of one to two years. Their Ambassador in Rome will first be accredited, then a chargé will be put in place, followed by a resident Ambassador.



12.2.88
אלק
מק
מ/ב
P

דו"ח פעילות מס. 28
יורם אטינגר
יוסטון, ינואר 1988

א. הערכות כלליות

1. תגובות לארועי יו"ש ועזה: לעניות דעתי, לאור מפגשים ושיחות עם גורמים בערים ובעירות מחוץ ליוסטון, ועל רקע קשר הדוק עם הצבור הלא-יהודי, יש פער בין דוחי התקשורת (וחלק מחברי הקונכ"לים) לבין המצב בשטח.

יש להבחין בין דווחים המבוססים על אמצעי התקשורת (צמאי הדרמה, הסנסציה, החריג והארועים מעוררי הרגשות) לבין תחושות הצבור הרחב. מן הראוי לציין כי אמצעי התקשורת (ובמיוחד 3 רשתות הטלוויזיה הגדולות) אינם נהנים מרמת אמינות גבוהה בעיני הצבור. כאשר רייגן מנע כסוי הפעולה בגרנדה זכה לגבוי מלא מן הצבור. התגובות לעימות בין סגן הנשיא, בוש, לבין דן ראטר מ-C.B.S. המחיש את ירידת קרנם של הקריינים הבכירים. הפער בין אמצעי התקשורת לבין הצבור הומחש בבחירות 1980 ו-1984 (רייגן זכה למרות עמדתם של אמצעי התקשורת), ובזמן עדותו של הקולונל אוליבר נורת' אשר הוכפש ע"י אמצעי התקשורת אך זכה להצדעה רבתי מן הצבור הרחב.

ההנחה הפשטנית הקובעת כי אמצעי התקשורת מבטאים את דעת הקהל, מתעלמות מן ההבדל הקיים בין חברות טוטליטריות לבין חברות מערביות. בחברה טוטליטרית קים קשר ישר בין המדיניות, התקשורת ו"דע"ק". לעומת זאת, בחברה המערבית קיים, בד"כ, קשר רופף או הפוך בין גורמים אלו, להוציא משברים חריגים. התקשורת בארה"ב (ובישראל?) נוטה לבקר את מדיניות החוץ של הממשל בכל הקשור למרכז ודר' אמריקה, דר' מז' אסיה, העמות הבינגושי, המפרץ הפרסי והמזה"ת. הזהות המבורכת בין הממשל בווינגטון לבין ישראל תורמת למטחי הבקורת התקשורתיים כלפי ישראל המכוונת גם כלפי הממשל בווינגטון.

ההנחה השגורה כאילו חשים מנהיגי הארגונים היהודים את דופק הצבור איננה עומדת במבחן המציאות. הפניקה שתקפה רבים מהם בתקופת שערוריית פולארד (להבדיל מחרדה ודאגה ותדהמה לגיטימים) הובהרה כמשוללת יסוד גם עם התפרצות השערוריה לאמצעי התקשורת, ועוד יותר מכך עם חלוף חודשים (לאור סקרי דע"ק מהימנים). גם הפעם ניזונים אמצעי התקשורת, והצבור ואולי אף הממשל בישראל מדווחים של מנהיגים יהודים, ומקבלים אותם כאילו שיקפו המציאות בארה"ב.

בחינה מדוקדקת של הקשר בין דעת הקהל הרחב לבין רחשי לב הצבור היהודי ממחיש פער עמוק ביותר. בדיקת רמת התענינות הצבור האמריקאי בנושא הקונטרס והסנדיניסטאס מבהירה כי הנושא אינו מעסיק צבור זה (להוציא מעוט המקורב לנושא אידיאולוגית וגיאוגרפית). אפשר להניח כי רמת ההתענינות בארועי עזה ויו"ש מזערית עוד יותר. אין ספק כי רמת ההתענינות או ההסתייגות קטנים בהרבה יותר מאשר אלו אשר הופגנו בעת פרשת פולארד אשר נגעה ישירות לבטחון ולגאווה הלאומיים של ארה"ב. ארועי יו"ש ועזה אינם מהווים נושא העומד במרכז (אם בכלל בזירה) של מערכת בחירות של צירי ביה"נ וסנטורים. קשה לקבל ברצינות טענה כאילו גורלו של חבר קונגרס תלוי בעמדתו כלפי ישראל על רקע הארועים.

הצבור הלא-יהודי (לפחות בדר' מע' ארה"ב, וכנראה גם בקרב "הרב הדומם" ברחבי ארה"ב) ממשיך להפגין אהדה כלפי ישראל המבוססת על ראיתה כמדינה של NO NONSENSE, תעוזה, כח-יצירה, בת-כרית חריגה באמינותה וכשוריה, אנטי-סוביטית, לוחמת בטרור ברדיקליות, וכל זה על בסיס של ערכי הדמוקרטיה המערבית וערכים יהודים-נוצריים.



תשתית כה מוצקה של יאהדה (בצמוד להסתייגות עד סלידה מהמכלול הערבי-מוסלמי) קשה לערער ע"י מערכה של אמצעי תקשורת אשר אינם זוכים לאהדה מן הצבור בארה"ב (דראפ" לא היתה אף פעם חביבת הצבור ולכן לא קשה להציגה כ"איש רע"). קשה גם לקעקע את היחס החיובי כלפי ישראל כאשר המדובר בעמות בין ישראל לבין מפגינים המזוהים עם גורמים אפלים במזה"ת המנסים לנתץ אינטרסים אמריקאים וחוטפים בני ערובה ומשליטים טרור ואלימות. תמונות של לבוש ערבי מסורתי יחד עם תפילות של מפגינים מוסלמים בארה"ב, אינם תורמים לאהדה בקרב הצבור, להוציא חריגים "אינטלקטואלים".

נראה לי כי מן הראוי לבחון את סדר היום של נציגים ישראל בארה"ב- האם הוא מוכתב ע"י PROFESSIONALS (בד"כ ליברלים ואנשי שמאל) ומנהיגים יהודים (אשר לא בהכרח מבטאים גם רחשי הצבור היהודי), או ע"י הצבור האמריקאי?! מפגשים עם חברי KIWANIS, LIONS, ROTARY, כמו גם עם MOVERS & SHAKERS בערים הגדולות (מעוט האוכלוסיה) ובערים ובעירות הקטנות (רב הצבור) ממחישים עד כמה עמוק ורחב הנתק בין ההנהגה והצבור היהודים לבין הסובב אותם. ברור כי הדאגה היהודית למצב ביו"ש ובעזה מוצדקת ומבורכת, אך החרדה (עד כדי פניקה) למעמדה של ישראל בעיני הצבור הרחב ולהשלכות על מעמד היהודים משוללת כל יסוד. אפשר לומר כי דע"ק הכללית מובילה ומקדימה את דע"ק היהודית המהססת. נקודה נוספת למחשבה היא- האם קולטת ישראל את ההבדל המשמעותי בין ארה"ב לבין ה-INSIDE THE BELTWAY של וושינגטון וניו יורק? המועמדים לנשיאות קלטו זאת, האם אנו יכולים לאפשר לעצמנו להתעלם מכך?

ב. פעילות שוטפת

1. תקשורת: שני מאמרי אופ-אד ב"יוסטון קרוניקל" (8.1.88) ו"יוסטון פוסט" (26.1.88) העוסקים בארועי יו"ש ועזה (מצ"ל). ראיונות ב-TALK SHOW בנושא יו"ש ועזה: KPRC ביוסטון, KGBC בגלבסטון, KRLD ו-KCBI הנוצרית בדאלאס, WSMB בניו-אורליאנס, KTOK באוקלהומה סיטי ו-KVET באוסטין. ראיונות טלוויזיה: ABC ו-CBS באלבוקרקי ואוסטין. ראיונות עתונות: "מורנינג ניוז" ו"טיימס הראלד" בדאלאס, "טריביון" ו"ג'ורנל" באלבוקרקי. בנוסף לכך התקיימו תדרוכים עם הנהגות ZOA, AJC, ADL, AIPAC והנהגה הצעירה ביוסטון, כמו גם בקהילות דאלאס, אוסטין, אלבוקרקי וסנסה פה.

2. סיורים: אלבוקרקי וסנסה פה (13-14.1.88): הנהגות יהודיות (הרולד אלברט, ארט וג'ודי גרדנשוורץ, יונתן ומלכה סאטון, פרנק וזורה הס, פיטר הס, אליסה סיימון המנכ"לית וכו') יו"ר המפ" הרפובליקנית, המנהיג ההיספני והמועמד המוביל במרוץ לכס ביה"נ אד לואן, והמועמד הרפובליקני הנוסף - התובע המחוזי היהודי הציוני והפעיל סטיב שיף; ראיונות ותדרוכים ל"ג'ורנל" ו"טריביון" של אלבוקרקי; 2 מפגשים עם צבור יהודי באלבוקרקי (150) וסנסה פה (25).

אוסטין (21-22.1.88): מושל טקסס, ביל קלמנטס (שיחה בנושא האפשרות לשת"פ משטרתי-בטחוני); מפגש קהילתי-יהודי (25) ונציגות איפ"ק בעיר; מועדון רוטרי יוקרתי (85); TALK SHOW עם אולין מרל מרדיו KVET, וראיון לטלוויזיה (CBS) KTBC עם אד קלארק; מפגש TIE (שת"פ טקסס-ישראל) עם שר החקלאות ג'ים הייטאוואר, המרכזת מטעם השר ננסי אפשטיין, והפעילים סטיב גוטאו, מני רוזנטל, באדי ודולורס ווילקינפלד, רלף ומוריאל פינקוס, ריק גולדברג.

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

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PROFESSIONALS; תדרוך לכותבי מאמרי המערכת של שני העתונים "מורנינג
ניוז" ו" טיימס הראלד" (קוני היליארד ורוג'ר וויזרספון הביקורתיים),
ומפגשים עם פעילים מטיילר (סם רוסט ובארי גרין) ארלינגטון (דן
ואליוט בלומברג) ופורט וורת' (מרשל ברקמן) הסמוכות.

by Yoram Eytan-Ettinger

"EVEN WHEN the story is happening before our eyes, even when our access to the event is unimpeded, we can unwittingly distort its meaning by being unaware of the full context." That assertion by David Broder, whose columns appear on the Chronicle's Editorial Page, and who is author of *Behind The Front Page*, provides a valuable instrument in the examination of the coverage by the media of current Palestinian unrest in Gaza, Judea and Samaria.

Such an examination should divorce itself from emotionally driven and ill-advised charges of media bias, and should assume that criticism is an inherent privilege of democratic systems. It is also based on the assumption that — while frustrations characterize all parties to the conflict — a political solution will be forthcoming once another Arab leader follows the footsteps of the late Anwar Sadat in negotiating directly with Israel.

Are we indeed witnessing a wave of riots similar to human-rights demonstrations in other parts of the globe? Are the demonstrations consistent with the peace process? Is the current unrest orchestrated by outsiders, or is it the result of a spontaneous set of individually prompted actions by frustrated Palestinians?

Studying the panoramic context of the disturbances sheds light on the issue of their ostensible spontaneity, and on the identity of their leaders. Thus, on Dec. 10, a day following the killing of a Jewish salesman in Gaza, and a few days before the severe escalation of the riots, the Palestine Liberation Organization Radio from Baghdad, Iraq, repeatedly incited "the heroic sons of Gaza, West Bank, Galilee and the Negev . . . (to) escalate the disturbances . . . and teach the enemy an unimaginable lesson. . . ." Simultaneously, a campaign of telephone and house calls by PLO activists urged women and children to assault Jewish civilians and soldiers.

While it was a spontaneous local demonstration (over the death of four Gaza residents in a car accident involving a Jewish driver) that triggered the initial outburst, it has been the externally generated instigation that has significantly extended the scope of violence and casualties (through a series of "spontaneous" riots which are designed to be organized within 20 minutes). Documents seized in Balata and Jibalya refugee camps (in the outskirts of Nablus and Gaza) directly implicate the Shabiba (young guard of Yasser Arafat's Fatah) and the fundamentalist Moslem Brotherhood in fomenting internal and anti-Israel violence in refugee camps. Both have established an effective system of operators, and have employed terror, intimidation and liquidation as an instrument of mob mobilization, in an attempt to transform the camps into a series of Lebanon-like "Fatahlands." Both organizations have also collaborated in Jordan. They have intended to undermine King Hussein's authority in the radical north, thus forcing (in 1988) the Hashemite ruler to close down 15 Fatah offices and deport dozens of its top activists there, including Arafat's first deputy, Abu-Jihad. No United Nations condemnation of Jordan followed! In fact, King Hussein was joined by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in ruthlessly quelling — for security reasons — attempts by Palestinians to demonstrate in solidarity with their brethren in the "occupied territories."

The notion of spontaneity may also be diagnosed through the lenses of the Mideastern institution of the *Faza'a*, which is the practice of mob deployment through the dissemination of false and passion-inflaming rumors. This practice was employed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in instigating against the Shah of Iran, and it is noticeable in the operations of Moslem fundamentalists and other subversive elements in Egypt and other Arab countries. False rumors — reminiscent of Middle Ages fanaticism — were speedily and "spontaneously" spread (immediately following the car accident in Gaza) through a well-established network. They reached the front pages of Arab media and were summarily communicated — through loudspeakers of the minarets — to the masses: "The killing in Gaza was a deliberate Jewish conspiracy," "the Jews have poisoned our water wells," "Arab wounded are taken to Jewish hospitals to be exterminated."

The comprehension of that reality may help to put the criticism of Israel in context. That context is further clarified by a hate campaign currently launched by the surrounding Arab countries. Egypt's education ministry just replaced classroom maps with maps which do not show Israel, and Saudi King Fahd recently called upon Khomeini to join the march on Jerusalem. Furthermore, it has been that atmos-

PLO incites violence to block a true peace

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phere which unleashed inflamed mobs — equipped with rocks, iron bars, knives, Molotov cocktails and homemade bombs — against individual Jewish civilians and a relatively small number of soldiers (patrols of four to five soldiers were customary in an attempt to minimize military presence and friction). Unfortunately, some of the media have chosen to ignore much of that context, which is responsible for most of the ensuing bloodshed, in favor of a focus on the Israeli response.

The relationship between the peace process and the largely externally generated unrest may be further construed when realizing that the top local instigators have been in the forefront of the anti-Sadat axis. They have been instrumental in the PLO and Moslem Brotherhood-incited violence that followed some movements toward peace, which would not yield to terrorists' demands. Such was the case in the aftermath of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and the appointment of moderate mayors and firing of PLO-connected officials. Currently, the tools of violence and terror have been once again harnessed by radicals, aspiring to forestall a potential Israel-U.S.-Jordan dialogue. Their concern has risen as a result of growing reports on meetings between King Hussein and Israeli leaders, and between the latter and Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, who was instrumental in convincing Sadat to prefer direct talks over an international conference.

It may be maintained that rather than being the result of a non-resolved Arab-Israeli conflict, violence and terrorism have been deliberately used as a major obstacle on the way toward the resolution of that conflict.

The PLO's interest in fomenting violence at this particular time is further clarified in light of the results of the recently convened Amman Arab summit and the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Both focused on issues other than the PLO, the Palestinian problem or the Arab-Israeli conflict, and thus relegated the PLO to its lowest ebb ever.

The message stemming from the recent unrest is: "I intimidate, instigate, terrorize and demonstrate, therefore I exist." That message — exacerbated by positive media coverage — may discourage moderate anti-PLO elements, while encouraging other radical elements throughout the world. They watch Western attitudes toward Israel's attempts to clamp down on terrorism as a barometer of the Free World's determination, or hesitance, in face of violence.

The West, for its part, should decide whether it is going to tolerate elements which employ violence in order to obtain concessions otherwise unattainable through conventional politics? Heeding David Broder's advice, and scrutinizing the context rather than being fascinated with some dramatized news presentations, may provide the proper response to the challenges ahead. The more acquainted we are with reality, the lesser is the threat of hastiness, complacency and despair, and the stronger become our patience, resolve and clarity, which are so vital in the preservation of the Western political order.

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
The paper you read is shaped by unstated, implicit values and biases. . . . I admit that the mirrors we use to reflect reality are inevitably flawed by our own presuppositions and prejudices.

— David Broder

By Yoram Ettinger

(Mis)perceptions shape view of Israel

Show of strength should not lead to an assessment of blame



Some friends of Israel might be tempted to use that candid assertion by Washington Post Associate Editor David Broder in his book *Behind the Front Page* to castigate the news media for their portrayal of Israel as the aggressor in the current disturbances in Judea and Samaria (often referred to collectively as the "West Bank") and the Gaza Strip. However, rather than resort to ill-advised charges of media bias, it is better to examine certain perceptions and misperceptions affecting the molding of public opinion and the formulation of policy that have been recently perpetrated by some of the media.

For instance, conventional (mis)perception implicates Israel as the party responsible for the distressing poverty in the refugee camps, which in turn is supposed to nurture the current riots. However, almost unnoticed went a U.N. General Assembly resolution last Oct. 30 "reiterating strongly its demand that Israel desist from the removal and resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip . . ."

That annual condemnation — approved initially in 1971 — expresses U.N. disenchantment with a 1970 Israeli initiative attempting to eliminate the squalor and misery that have been institutionalized in the refugee camps ever since their establishment in 1949 by the U.N., Egypt (in Gaza) and Jordan (in Judea and Samaria). In fact, it is the U.N. Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) that still administers the social, educational and economic environment of the camps. Israel's authority is limited to the security aspect alone.

The Israeli initiative consists of nine housing projects — including infrastructures of water, electricity, sewage, roads, health clinics, schools and mosques — built outside the camps for some 10,000 refugee families. That the initiative earns a positive response from some of the refugees has been most impressive in view of repeated U.N. denunciations, brutal Arab

pressure and a systematic campaign of intimidation and terror against the refugees by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Moslem fanatics lest the refugees acquiesce to the Israeli "conspiracy." Such opposition apparently stems from concerns that alleviating personal plights may deprive radicals and terrorists of an instrument that fuels the machine of violence.

The (mis)perception of Israel as an aggressor was reinforced following its decision to expel a few of the leading organizers of the recent disturbances. Observing the volume and the tone of the resulting

protest, one would think the personal freedom of Mother Theresa-like human rights activists was at stake. Actually, the current expulsion saga evolves around some senior operatives whose record is much closer to that of Jack the Ripper.

All of them are veterans of planning and execution of terrorism and incitement on behalf of the Moslem fanatics and the PLO. They are intimately connected to elements responsible for hijackings and mid-air bombings of planes and for systematic intimidation and killings of innocent bystanders. Their colleagues have frequently

been deported — for justifiable security reasons — from Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan. (Yasser Arafat's first deputy, Abu-Jihad, was deported from Amman, along with many of his lieutenants in July 1986.)

However, no condemnation by the U.N., Western media or policy makers followed those expulsions. Unlike their colleagues deported by Arab regimes, those expelled from Israel have recourse (while still in the country) to a judicial consultative committee and then to the Supreme Court.

Long before expulsion, they had been warned by the authorities, then (when the warnings were ignored) placed under administrative detention, sentenced to various prison terms including life imprisonment (when the fomenting of violence continued), and then released on condition that they refrain from engaging in subversive activities — a condition they violated repeatedly.

Contrary to common (mis)perception, Israel's major concern in activating expulsion as a last resort is deterrence rather than punishment. At stake is the safety of the population in the area, rather than any satisfaction that might be derived from severe retributions such as capital punishment or life imprisonment which could be applied against the instigators. International law-watchers may note that according to the Geneva Convention, the Jordanian law — which allows for expulsions — should be adhered to in Judea and Samaria.

Misperceptions add fuel to the fire in an already unstable reality. Thus, a misperception is formed by focusing on the rather young ages — rather than on the actions — of some of the demonstrators who throw Molotov cocktails, homemade bombs, iron bars, knives and rocks at civilians and soldiers. It certainly dramatizes the story; it also tends to draw moral and ideological conclusions. But is it relevant? Is it constructive?

The ancient Greeks would not allow children to partake in their famous plays, lest emotions prevail over logic in observation of the play. Is a Molotov cocktail lobbed by a teen-age demonstrator less lethal than the one used by an adult? Are the demonstrators involved in a human rights sit-in or in a riot with the intent to injure and kill?

Teen-agers and women have been used

as a political tool of convenience in the attempt to cloud the ideological identity of the major instigators (the PLO and fanatical Moslem ringleaders) involved in the unfolding drama in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. They have also been employed, by the instigators, in an attempt to disguise the underlying goals of the current disturbances.

The PLO has been known to exploit this technique in its subversive activities in Lebanon and Jordan, especially during periods of drastic decline in its political fortunes. Thus, experiencing a low ebb following its July 1986 semi-expulsion from Jordan, the November 1987 Arab Summit and the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, the PLO is once again trying to revive its political stock at the expense of Palestinian lives.

Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, just like the Moslem fanatics in Gaza, has realized the potential of teen-agers as an emotionally recharging instrument in the attempt to maintain the religious and military zeal of his troops. Are the Iraqis to be condemned for firing at the assaulting Iranian teen-agers?

The responsibility for the killing of some demonstrators does not lie with those who are torn between the need to ensure public safety and the equally critical need to avoid casualties, which escalates violence. Rather, it lies with those who exploit them for violent political ambitions.

A basic misperception has been perpetrated by those who depict Israel as being short on resilience in the face of violence, and low on patience in view of the absence of an Anwar Sadat-like Arab leader willing to stick his neck out in order to advance the chance of peace.

Furthering such misperceptions may add to the drama of news presentations. However, it may feed the forces who believe in their ability to defeat Israel through violence; it may undermine moderate elements who subscribe to political negotiations as a means of resolving conflicts; and it thus may result in a setback to the cause of stability.

Ettinger is consul general of Israel in Houston. From 1976 until his arrival here in 1985, he was editor of the *Contemporary Mideast Background*, a Jerusalem-based biweekly publication on contemporary inter-Arab politics published by the Israeli government.

Man in the News

Yitzhak Shamir Zionist fighter with a stubborn resolve

By Andrew Whitley



AT A TIME when many in Israel are agonising over the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the long-term consequences for the Jewish people of ruling another race, Mr Yitzhak Shamir has no such qualms. As he told a persistent questioner last year: "I don't know what you are talking about. I know nothing about any occupation... Who are we occupying? When the Zionist movement launched its activity, we knew there were Arabs in this country. Well, what about it?"

The right-wing Prime Minister says Israel's rule over the territory he calls "Eastern Eretz Israel" (the eastern part of the Biblical Land of Israel) is "what destiny wanted, this is what our history wanted, this is our duty."

Mr Shamir is a man of few words, as Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State - now in the midst of what promises to be the Reagan Administration's last effort to resolve the Palestinian question - has come to realise. What words he does utter are usually on subjects dear to his heart, such as his determination to relinquish "not one inch" of the Arab territories captured in 1967, and the supreme cause of Jewish immigration to Israel.

Over the past nine months this former underground fighter has twice successfully sandbagged Mr Shultz, the US official he refers to in public - with good reason - as "Israel's greatest friend". In May last year he managed to block Mr Shultz's planned trip to the Middle East to pursue the peace process before it even began. In October, his clear-cut opposition to the proposal for an international conference - a US initiative espoused with varying enthusiasm by every other party to the dispute - effectively neutered it.

But, as a top Israeli official noted this week, the moment of truth may be approaching. If Mr Shamir does not budge

on the central question of territorial concessions - and everything in his 72 years indicates he will not - then Mr Shultz might as well pack his bags and go home. Any shuttling between Jerusalem and various Arab capitals would be a cosmetic exercise.

Yitzhak Shamir came late to the rough-and-tumble world of Israeli politics. He was 50 years old before he teamed up with Mr Menachem Begin, his former comrade from the Jewish underground movement of the British Mandate period. And it is only lately, following Mr Begin's surprise resignation as Prime Minister in 1983, that his successor's political skills have begun to blossom.

There had never been any doubt, however, about Mr Shamir's political leanings. He was born Yitzhak Yzernitzky in a district of Poland now annexed by the Soviet Union. As a young teenager, he was active in a militantly anti-socialist Zionist movement affiliated to the Revisionist movement of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the hardline Jewish leader.

The qualities which helped Mr Shamir consolidate his position in Israeli politics after becoming Prime Minister by default are those which served him well in his years in the shadowy world of underground warfare: patience, stubbornness, unflappable composure under pressure.

His character has been permanently marked by 30 years of cloak-and-dagger life, first with Lehi, an extremist breakaway group from the militant Irgun movement, then in successive jobs with the Mossad secret service, ending as head of its Western European operations. Even his present name was originally an alias from a false identity card.

This diminutive, grandfatherly man has a clear-eyed, baleful view of the outside world. An Israeli journalist once summed it up like this: "He never believes an Arab, any Arab, rarely believes a non-Jew and basically thinks that news is good news."

In 1986, when Foreign Min-

ister, he was confronted with a nasty scandal over the deaths of two young Arab bus hijackers in the custody of the Shin Bet, Mossad's domestic counterpart. He tried strenuously to block a commission of enquiry, saying: "Sometimes I ask myself: Creator of the Universe, is it just because two terrorists have died that we must endanger this most vitally important security tool? There is no need for this."

For Mr Shamir, the Palestine Liberation Organisation is, and always will be, a terrorist organisation dedicated to the extermination of Jews. Yet as operations chief of Lehi, he was personally involved in the murder in Cairo in 1944 of Lord Moyne, the British Minister in the Middle East, and the assassination in Jerusalem in 1948 of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations envoy.

Like many other Israelis of similar political views, Mr Shamir cannot bring himself to accept the legitimacy of the Palestinian case. Indeed, like Mr Begin and Mrs Golda Meir, he refers not to "the Palestinians", but to "the Arabs of Eretz Israel".

He fought against the 1978 Camp David accord which he now defends, in its narrowest possible interpretation, as the only route for peace negotiations with the Arabs. And, when asked today what he will offer King Hussein of Jordan in return for a formal peace treaty, he replies simply: "peace". If that is not enough? He shrugs. Time is on Israel's side; he is not in a rush.

When dealing with outsiders, the Israeli Prime Minister believes that firmness of resolve is of paramount importance. Stick to your guns and keep saying no, and eventually your opponents will either tire and go away or else come to you on your terms. Mr Shultz will have to draw on all the resources at his disposal if he is to achieve a breakthrough.

מ.א.ר

אל : זוהר, ווש'
דע : מושיר, הסברה/ניו-יורק

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים

סיווג בטחוני : בלמ"ס
דחיפות : מידי
} לשימוש
} מח' הקשר
תאריך וזמן רישום:
מס. מברק :

לשלך 419

- 1. עו"ד רובין פנוי להופעות בווש' ב 6/3 בערב וב 7/3 - כל היום. (מלבד הערב).
2. בניו-יורק, פנוי ב 8/3 (מלבד הערב), וב 10/3 בבוקר ואחה"צ, וב 11/3 בבוקר.

להלן תולדות חיים.

(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב).

אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ

השולח : אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ
אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : (לציון תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)
תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 1.3.88

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה :

הנושא :

BIOGRAPHY OF ADVOCATE YAACOV RUBIN

- Born in Tel-Aviv in 1936.
- Son of Baruch (born in Brisk) and Batya (born in Cologne).
- Educated at the Bet Hakem Junior School, the University High School, and the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University. Completed studies with distinction in 1958.
- Compulsory service with the I.D.F., as military defence counsel. Reserve service with the Military Defence Unit, sometime deputy military chief defence counsel and also military judge of the Judea and Samaria Courts Martial.
- First year of articles of clerkship with the then President of the Supreme Court, the late Justice Sussman. Second year with the firm of Spaer-Tussia Cohen. A member of the Israel Bar since 1963.
- Since 1961, a lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and since 1965 a lecturer at the Tel-Aviv extension, and thereafter at the Faculty of Law of Tel-Aviv University until 1985.
- Subjects of Instruction: Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, the Law of Evidence, Martial Law, the Law of Arbitration, various seminars and the Laws of Evidence in Quasi-Judicial Hearings. In private practice as an advocate since 1963.
- Chairman of the Beautiful Israel Society in Jerusalem.
- Chairman of the Jerusalem Friends of the Hebrew University Association.
- Chairman of the District Committee of the Israel Bar in Jerusalem, 1983 to 1987.
- President of The Israel Bar- elected on March 9th, 1987 for 4 Years.
- A member of legal committees on various subjects such as powers of the courts in land cases, drafting the Pharmacists Ordinance, the Civil Procedure Rules and the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) Rules.
- Married to Shlomit (nee Kurtz) and father of four sons, Baruch-Avi-Ed, Ariel-Elisha, Dror-Zvi and Hanan-Binyamin.

תוכנית נסיעה - עו"ד יעקב רובין - ראש לשכת עורכי הדין

מגיע לווינגטון ביום 6/3/88 בצהרים, עסוק שם עד השעה 15:00 -
(הרצאה בפני 250 סטודנטים משפטנים יהודים).

נשאר בווינגטון עד ה-7/3/88 לפנות ערב -
ניתן לקבוע פגישות ב-6/3/88 בשעות הערב, וביום 7/3/88 בשעות הבוקר הצהריים
ואחה"צ.

ביום 8/3/88 מגיע לניו יורק בשעה 17:00 להרצאה.
ניתן לקבוע פגישות באותו יום בבוקר בצהרים או בשעות הערב המאוחרות.

ביום 9/3/88 בשעה 12:30 נמצא ב"קווינס קולג'" ובשעה 17:30 יהיה ב"הופסטר".

ביום 10/3/88 עסוק בשעה 20:00 על כן ישנה אפשרות לקבוע פגישות בשעות הבוקר
ואחה"צ.

ביום 11/3/88 - יום שישי ניתן לקבוע פגישות בשעות הבוקר.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד 419

דע: ניו-יורק 92



ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דפ. מתוך..... דפים

סוג בטחוני... ג.ל.מ."ס

דחיפות..... מ.י.ד.י

תאריך וזייח. 14:00. 17.2.88.

מס' מברק.....

אנחנו אהבים אתכם
אנחנו אהבים אתכם
אנחנו אהבים אתכם
אנחנו אהבים אתכם

אל : אריח מקל, לשכת רה"מ
דע : הסברה, מושיר - הסברה/ניו-יורק

עו"ד יעקב רובין.

קיים ענין לשלבו במספר הופעות בקרב ציבור משפטנים באזור ניו-יורק. הברקנא
איפוא ועד מתי ישהה בארה"ב ובאילו ימים הוא פנוי. במידה וניתן להסתייע בו
הננו זקוקים בדחיפות גם לתולדות חיים.

ז הר

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הסברה 2

6.3 אה"ע ת"ש' - 1500 106

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Handwritten signature

ח צ ב

26.02.88 / 843 / 024

ז' אדר תשמ"ח



Handwritten note:
כתיבה
סגורה

כתבה / סקירה

כתבה / סקירה

- ראיון עם שה"ח האמרי שולץ, בנושאי המזה"ת
- סקירת תוצאות ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב

מקור: אלמצור, מצרים, 5 פבר' 88

ממקורות ערביים/לועזיים

עיקרי דברים

01. בכוננה טובא ראיון שקייט העורך הראשי של "אלמצור" המצרי, מכרט מחמד אחמד, עם שה"ח האמר' ג'ורג' שולץ, עם תום ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב.

בראיון התייחס שולץ למכלול נושאים, ובכלל זה הערכת שיחות הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב, עמדתו ארה"ב בנושא תהליך השלום במזה"ת והועידה הניב"ל לשלום, המצב ביהו"ש ובאזח"ע יוזמת השלום של מבארכ וחידוש יחסי מצרים-ערב.

02. כן מבוא בכתבה דיווח מפורט של מכרט מחמד אחמד על הוצאות ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב. עורך "אלמצור" סוקר נדיווחו בהרחבה את "ההתקדמות הממשית" שהושגה, לדבריו, בשלושת העניינים שבהם התמקדו השיחות שערן הנשיא המצרי בואשינגטון: הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי, מלחמת עראק-איראן והיחסים הבילטרליים בין מצרים לארה"ב.

חצב

מד: 25.02.88/848/0099/0

מקור: אלמצור, מצרים

תזפ: 5 פבר'88

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הנדון: ** - ראיון עם שה"ח האמר' שולץ, בנושא המזה"ת
- סקירת תוצאות ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב
 =====

01 ראיון עם שה"ח האמר' שולץ, בנושא המזה"ת

המקור: "אלמצור", מצרים, 5 פבר' 88 (עמ' 4-7)

שה"ח האמר' ג'ורג' שולץ אמר, בראיון שהעניק לערוך הראשי של "אלמצור", מכתב מחמד אחמד, עם תום ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב:

א. שיחות מבארכ בארה"ב

ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ זכה להצלחה גדולה שעלתה על כל הציפיות. מבארכ העניק לתפקיד הגדול שממלאת מצרים חשיבות רבה יותר, בזכות אישיותו הדגולה. במהלך שיחותינו התבהרו נתונים והשקפות חדשים. הצלחנו במהלך הביקור לדון בגילוי לב ולעומק ביחסי מצרים-ארה"ב על כל היבטיהם, נמלחמה המפרץ, בעניין השלום במזה"ת ובעיות בינ"ל נוספות כגון הבעיות באפריקה ויחסי ארה"ב - ברה"מ בעקבות חתימת ההסכם לצמצום הטילים הגרעיניים.

הננו מייחלים בדיוק כמו מצרים להשגת התקדמות במאמצי השלום. עשינו מאמצים רצופים למען השגת יעד זה, ואנו מוכנים לחדש מאמצים קשים אלו, כפי שהדגשנו בשיחות עם הצד המצרי. אנו אף עשויים להיות מוכנים לקדם מאמצים אלו למיטוריט אחרים, בנסיבות ההולמות.

בשיחותינו עם הנשיא מבארכ, העלה הצד המצרי את עניין ההשפעה הלילית האפשרית שתהיה לבחירות לנשיאות ארה"ב על הסיכויים לחדש את מאמצי השלום. מצידנו הבהרנו שאין זה הכרחי שעניין הבחירות "ישתק" את פעילותו של המימשל האמר', שהרי הנשיא ריגן אינו נמנה על המועמדים, ולפיכך הוא מקדיש את כל מאמציו וזמנו למילוי תפקידו כנשיא ארה"ב. בנוסף לכך, הפופולריות העצומה לה זוכה כעת הנשיא ריגן בארה"ב מאפשרת לו לעסוק בעניינים חשובים במזה"ת כפי שהוא יכול לעסוק בעיות המזרח והמערב או בכל בעיה אחרת בעולם. מגמת היסוד שלנו היא נחישות שהמימשל האמרק' הנוכחי יוסיף להיות פעיל עד היום האחרון לכהונתו.

ב. הועידה הבינ"ל לשלום:

שוחחנו ארוכות (עם הצד מצרי) בנושא הועידה הבינ"ל וכל צד הבהיר את השקפתו. לדעתנו, אם אנו רוצים לממש בפועל דבר זה במזה"ת, יהיה קשה להשיג דבר זה בלעדי מו"מ ישיר בין הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר. הנני סבור שמצרים מבינה זאת, אולם הדגשנו בפני הצד המצרי את נכונותנו לבדוק את כל הדרכים למען השגת יעד זה, ובכלל זה הועידה הבינ"ל. זאת בעוד שכאמור, אכן הפינה בהשקפה האמר' היא שהמפתח היסודי הוא מו"מ ישיר, שכן הועידה

חצב

הבינ"ל בפני עצמה עלולה שלא לממש הרבה, ולכן אנו מדגישים את הצורך הדוחק לפנות ישירות למו"מ ישיר. אולם אם ניתן יהיה להשיג יעד זה באמצעות ועידה בינ"ל, הנני סבור שאנו מוכנים להגיע להבנה.

ערכתי שיחות אחרות עט צדדים רבים ואישיט רבים בנוגע להישגים שיכולה הועידה הבינ"ל לממש, ורבים מוכנים נעת לומר: "אכן, אין מנוס מו"מ ישיר, אולם אין מנוס גם מועידה בינ"ל שבה יידונו סוגים מוגדרים של הבעיות הקיימות". וכאשר אנו שואלים מהו אופי הבעיות שהועידה הבינ"ל צריכה לדון בהן, אנו מגלים טרבות מבעיות היסוד נדרש פתרון בועידה בינ"ל ולא בוועדות המו"מ הישיר.

הנני חושש שחלק מהצדדים הנוגעים בדבר סבורים שלמען פתרון בעיית המזה"ת אין מנוס מכך שתיערך הועידה הבינ"ל כדי שתפרטם הודעות והחלטות ביחט להיבטיט השונים שלה עניין. אולט לדעתנו זהו עניין שמזיק ולא מועיל והוא אף עלול להוביל להריסת הכל.

ג. יוזמת השלום של מבארכ:

ש': כאשר הכריז הנשיא מבארכ על חמשת רעיונותיו להחייאת מאמצי השלום, נראה היה שארה"ב התלהבה יותר מכל מהרעיון הראשון הקורא להפסקת האלימות באדמות הכבושות, בשעה שצמצום הרעיונות המצריים במסגרת זו לבדה עלול לעיד, לדעת גורמים מסויימים על חתירה להרגעת התקוממות הפלס' בלעדי התחייבות לפתרון הבעיה הפלס', וזאת בעוד שהמצרים סבורים שחמשת רעיונותיו של הנשיא מבארכ מהווים השקפה אינטגרטיבית אחת.

ת': דנו עט הידידים המצריים, בכל ההצעות ובכל הצעדים שיש לנקוט אחרי הפסקת האלימות; הפסקת פעולות האלימות הכרחית, כיון שהאלימות הוודית לא תוביל לתוצאות המיוחלות. אולם נקיטת צעדים קונטרוקטיביים לטיפול בשורש הבעיה היא החשובה יותר. דנו בכך עם הנשיא מבארכ, ואין זה נכון כלל וכלל שגילינו ותלהבונו רק ביחט לרעיון הראשון מבין חמשת רעיונותיו.

ד. עמדת ארה"ב כלפי תהליך השלום במזה"ת

ש': בקרוב תחדשו את הדו-שיח עט המלך חסין, שעשה שהן מצרים והן ירדן סבורות שהועידה הבינ"ל היא המטגרת האידיאלית להשגת הסדר צודק, ובשעה שהמלך סבור שהממשל האמר' הנוכחי נתון להשפעה הולכת וגוברת של הקיצונים הישראליים ושאררה"ב איבדה יכולת לממש איזון סביר בין "הניצים" ל"יונים" הישראליים.

ת': למלך חסין הזכות לבטא את דעותיו. לאמיתו של דבר, בישראל כעת יש ממשלת אחדות לאומית, כלומר ישנן שתי מפלגות שונות המרכיבות את הממשלה, ולכן עלינו לקיים מגעים עם שני הצדדים, שכן לא יתכן לבוא במגע עם צד אחד ולא עם משנהו.

חצב

ש': אולט לאור מחוייבותכם כשותף מלא בשלוט במזה"ת, אין די בכך שתשקיפו מעל ל"גדר" כמשקיפים בין שתי קבוצות שביניהן חילוקי דעות ביוחס לעתיד האדמה הכבושה. מה ביכולתכם לעשות למען עניין שלום, בעודכם משמשים משקיפים מאחורי חומות המפרידות בין שתי הקבוצות השונות בשלטון?

ת': הבהרנו את עמדותינו פעמים רבות, וביסודן - תמיכה ברעיון המו"מ הישיר למען השגת הסדר, גט אם ייערך במסגרת ועידה בינ"ל. הננו סבורים שהרעיונות שהציג הנשיא ריגן בשנת '82 ביחס להסדר הם עודם רעיונות נכונים וסבירים. רעיונות אלו לא זכו לתמיכה מספקת מהצד הערבי, כלומר רביט בעולם הערבי נהגו להדגיש בפנינו, בלחש, את השתכנעותם בנוגע לרעיונות אלו.

ה. המצב בגדמ"ע ובעזה:

בו בזמן, עמדנו בראש החותרים למציאת פתרונות לבעיות הקשות העומדות בפני הפלסטינים בגדמ"ע ובעזה ולסיוע להם במישור הכלכלי ובמישור המדיני לשם שינוי רמת החיים שם. כל זאת לא עמד בסתירה לרצוננו לטפל בבעיות הגבול והעתיד, כאשר בתחום זה השגנו הצלחה כלשהי, אולם כעת רצוננו גדול יותר להמשיך בקרוב מאמצינו בתחום זה.

חתרנו תמיד ואנו ממשיכים לחתור ליצירת אוירה טובה יותר במזה"ת. אין ספק, כי הסכט השלוט המצרי-ישראלי היווה צעד חיובי גדול בדרך לשלוט במזה"ת. הצלחנו גם למצוא את הדרכים ההולמות לפתרון בעיית טאבא. כן עשינו מאמצים לשיפור רמת החיים בגדה ובעזה, ולדוגמא שמחנו כאשר בנקיט ערביים פתחו סניפים בגדה, הגט שאיני יודע כעת מה יעשו בנקים אלו בצל המצב הקשה השורר בגדה. הייתי מייחל שנמצא פתרונות לכל בעיות האיזור, אולט איננו מסוגלים לעשות זאת לבדנו, שכן תפקידנו הוא לתרוט ולטמש שותף ועוזר.

ו. חידוש יחסי מצרים-ערב:

ש': מה דעתכם לגבי שיבת מצרים לעולט הערבי, בייחוד בשעה שרבים עודם סבורים שואשינגטון חותרת תמיד "לגמד" את תפקיד מצרים בעולט הערבי?
ת': זוהי דעה חסרת בסיס; ארה"ב סברה תמיד שהמצב במזה"ת יהיה "בריא" יותר אם מצרים תשוב לשמש שותף פעיל בעולט הערבי. אנו שמוחים ששלב הניתוק הערבי ממצרים בא לסיומו. אנו מקדמים בברכה את התפקיד שממלאת מצרים באיזור המפרץ, שכן לדעתנו יהיה זה תפקיד קונסטרוקטיבי לטובת יציבות האיזור ועמיו.

הנני סבור שמצרים הנוכחית, שלה יחסים עם ישראל, מסוגלת לשמש כלי לדו-שיח וגשר להבנה בין עמי האיזור. אט מוטל עלינו להמשיך במשימת שלום, משמעות הדבר שהאיזור זקוק לגשרים שיובילו ליחסי קיום בצוותא בין עמי המזה"ת. והרי מצרים היוו הצד היחיד שהוא בעל יחסים עם כל הצדדים, דבר המכשירה למלא את התפקיד הגדול בו היא נושאת למען שלום האיזור ויציבותו. הרינו להזכיר כאן את הצעד בועז שנקט המלך חסין כאשר חידש היחסים עם מצרים ובכך ניפץ את "הר הקרח" שחצץ בין מצרים לעולט הערבי.

חצב

ז. השקפתו האישית של שולץ ביחס למזה"ת

ש': כאשר נתמנינו לשר החוץ האמרי, צפו חוגי רבים בעולט הערבי שתגלה התלהבות לפתרון הבעיות הקשות באיזור, אולט הנדמיו הנוכחית של שה"ח האמרי בעולט הערבי היא שלאור לבנון הוא איבד את ההתלהבות ביחס לבעיות המזה"ת. אתמול (סוף ינו' 88 - חצב) אמרו לי חנא סניורה ופאיז אבו רחמה, לאחר שנועדו עימך, כי הבטחת להם להעמיד את העניין הפלס' בראש סולט העדיפויות שלך. מה גרט לשינוי ברגשותיך?

ת': דבר לא השתנה. רגשותיי הם כפי שהיו מאז שנתמנתי לשה"ח, והט שהמזה"ת הוא אחד העניינים העיקריים בתחומי ההתעניינות שלי. העובדה שלא הצלחנו להשיג הסכם שיחייב את ישראל לצאת מלבנון לא שינה זאת. יתכן שהקדשתי לאיזור זה זמן ומאמצים יותר מאשר לכל איזור אחר. העובדה שלא נסעתי שוב למזה"ת אינה מעידה על היקף המאמצים שאנו עושים בתחום זה, שכן הנני סבור שביקור של שה"ח האמרי במזה"ת צריך להיות קשור בתמורות חיוביות הכרוכות בהשגת התקדמות ממשית בדרך השלום, אולם תמורות אלו לא הושגו בעבר על אף המאמצים שעשינו.

עם זאת, ביכולתי להדגיש שהמזה"ת נמצא כעת בתחום ההתעניינות העיקרי של ארה"ב. יתר על כן, יש לי סיבות אישיות המבססות התעניינות זו באיזור הזה שבו שהיתי חלק גדול מחיי - ושבו יש לי עדיין ידידים ומכרים בהיקף שיהיך שהוא גדול יותר ממספר מכריי בשאר ארצות העולם.

(חצב: זוהי הכתבה לנר מ"ד 3.2.88/836/0583).

02. תוצאות ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב

-(עמ' 14-8)

מכרם מחמד אחמד מדוח מואשינגטון על תוצאות ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ בארה"ב, כלהלן:

בשעה שביקור הנשיא מבארכ בואשינגטון התמקד בשלושה עניינים עיקריים: הסכטוך הערבי-ישראלי, מלחמת המפרץ ויחסי מצריט-ארה"ב, בינולחנו לומר שהושגה התקדמות ממשית בשלוש החזיתות הללו:

א. במסגרת הסכטוך הערבי-ישראלי

הצד המצרי והצד האמרי הגיעו להסכמה בנוגע למספר עקרונות וצעדיט שיש בהם כדי לערוב לחידוש מאמצי השלום ולהימשכותם, בד בנד עם שנת הבחירות האמרי.

1) הוסכט שלא יתכן כי המצב הנוכחי בגדמ"ע ובעזה יישאר כפי שהוא, בייחוד מאחר שההתקוממות הפלס' הוכיחה לכל הצדדים שהפלסטינים נחושים בדעתם להתנגד לכיבוש הישראלי גט אם לשם כך יש להם רק צואריהם החשופים. לפיכך, זהו הכרח להעניק לתושבי האדמה הכבושה הגנה ובטחון שיערבו לשמירה על כבוד האדם שלהם ולזכותם לביטוי עצמם במישור המדיני במסגרת ההסכמים והחוזים הבינ"ל המארגנים את זכויות האזרחים באדמה כבושה.

חצב

- (2) הוסכם שיש צורך בכך שהמימשל האמרי הנוכחי והצדדים הנוגעים בדבר יחדשו לאלתר את מאמציהם המשותפים לבדיקת האמצעים לחידוש תהליך השלום, בד בבד עם סגור הבחירות האמרי, בייחוד כיון שלמימשל האמרי הנוכחי יש היכולת להפוך את העניין לקל יותר עבור המימשל הבא, אם יצליח מימשל ריגן להשיג לכל הפחות הסכם כללי שינסח את העקרונות, התפיסות הכלליות והצעדים הדרושים שעשויים להיות מדריך עבודה לועידה הבינ"ל, אם עריכתה תתאחר מעבר לתקופת כהונתו של המימשל הנוכחי. במסגרת זו, נשקלת קביעה שלב מעבר למשך שנה אחת, שבמהלכה יוכשרו הנבאים הדרושים לעריכת הועידה הבינ"ל ויימצאו אמצעים יעילים להגנה על הפלסטינים בגדה ובעזה.
- (3) (הוסכם כי) ינוצלו האלמנטים המשותפים ליוזמות השלום האחרונות, שביכולתם יהיה לעצב את ההסכם ביחס לעקרונות הנ"ל, והן: יוזמת פאס, יוזמת ריגן וחמשת הרעיונות של הנשיא המצרי. במסגרת זו, בא ביקורו של הנשיא מבארכ במרוקו, למטרת עריכת התייעצויות נוספות ביחס לנושאים הללו.
- (4) הוסכם בנוגע לתכנית עבודה מוואמת, כאשר הצד הערבי ייטול לידי את התפקיד של מציאת פתרונות מעשיים קבילים לבעיית הייצוג הפלס' במסגרת משלוח פלס'-ירדנית משותפת שבה ישתתפו אישית פלס' מוגזבים מבלי להתייחס לזהותם, ובו בזמן ייטול הצד האמרי לידי את התפקיד של עריכת דו-שיח עם ישראל במטרה לחזק את מחנה השלום.
- (5) הוסכם כי יש צורך בהתחלת המגעים עם שאר הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר; המלך חסין, יצחק שמיר ומספר אישית פלס', ובראשם חנא סניורה ופאיז אבו רחמה, אשר שולץ הדגיש בפניהם את בחינותיהם של ארה"ב לנצל כל הזדמנות לדיון בעניין הפלס' מכל היבטיו.
- במסגרת מגעים אלו נועד עצמת עבד אלמג'יד בואשינגטון עם חנא סניורה ופאיז אבו רחמה והדגיש בפניהם כי:
- (א) מצריט הדגישה בפני הצד האמרי שהועידה הבינ"ל היא המסגרת היחידה לחידוש שיחות ההסדר.
- (ב) חמשת הרעיונות של הנשיא מבארכ מהווים יחידה אינטגרטיבית והסכמת הצד האמרי רק לעקרון של הפסקת האלימות בגדה ובעזה לא תשיג דבר.
- (ג) מצריט ביקשה מהמימשל האמרי לנצל את פרק הזמן שנותר עד הבחירות לנשיאות להכשרת הקרקע להשגת הסכמה נרחבת ביחס לועידה הבינ"ל.
- (ד) מצריט הדגישה שבועידה צריכית להיות נוכחית 2 המעצמות, 5 החברות הקבועות במועבי"ט, משלחת ירדנית-פלס' משותפת, משלחת מצרית ומשלחת סורית.
- במסגרת זו, שולץ גמר אומר לבקר באיזור תוך החודשיים הבאים, אם יופיעו באופק סימנים להסכמה בעניין התיאום הירדני-פלס'.

חצב

ניתן לומר, כי מאמצי מבארכ להאיץ במימטל האמר' לחדש את מאמצי השלום זכו להצלחה מהסיבון הבאות:

- (1) הימשכות ההתקוממות הפלס' שהפתיעה את כל הצדדיט וחשפה את היעד האמינות של מדיניות שמיר אשר הכריז בטלויזיה האמר' עשרה ימים לפני פרוץ ההתקוממות כי הא סבור שהפלסטיניט באדמה הכבושה חייט במצב טוב יותר מאשר בעבר ושהוא אינו סבור שהערבים ישובו להציב את העניין הפלס' בראש סולט עדיפותיותיהם.
- (2) תמיכת חלק גדול מקבוצות השדולה הציונית בארה"ב ברעיון הועידה הבינ"ל והתנגדות הגלויה לעמדת שמיר אשר עלולה להעמיד את ישראל בפני סכנות גדולות, בצל היעד האפשרות לדו-קיוט פלס'-ישראלי בצל הכיבוש.
- (3) הודמית המחפירה של שיטות הדיכוי הישראליות כפי שנקלטה בעדשות של מצלמות הטלויזיה אמר' במהלך ההתקוממות והועברה לדעון הקהל האמר'.

ב. במסגרת מלחמת המפרץ:

- (1) הצד האמר' קידם בברכה תפקיד מצרי במפרץ, שימש משענת לאסטרטגיה של הצד הערבי מול העקשות של איראן.
- (2) הצד האמר' הדגיש המשכת אחריותו להבטחת חופש השייט במפרץ ולשמירה על כך שמלחמת עראק-איראן לא תאייט על בטחונן של מדינות המפרץ השכנות.
- (3) (הודגשה) החתירה להבטחת חופש השייט של כל הספינות הניטרליות ולא רק של הספינות הנושאות דגל אמר'. במסגרת זו, נערכת כעת התייעצות אמר'-מערבית לנקיטת צעדים מעשייט בתחוט זה.
- (4) הצדדיט הבינ"ל האחרים, ובייחוד ברה"מ, נקראו לעיין מחדש בהטלת סנקציות על איראן, אם לא תציית להחלטת מועבי"ט בנוגע להפסקת המלחמה.
- (5) שני הצדדיט הסכימו כי הסכנה של הונפשות מלחמת המפרץ למדינות השכנות ממשיכה להיות מוגבלת, שעה שכוחה של איראן אינו מאפשר לה כעת לבצע את איומה בנוגע להתקפה כוללת על בצרה.
- (6) הצד האמר' תומך בהסכמה בין מצריט למפרץ בנוגע לצורך לערוך עיון מחדש כולל במצב אט תצליח איראן להיות איום ממשי על בצרה, שכן בנסיבות החדשות הללו ייווצר הצורך להוציא לפועל את הסכט ההגנה הערבית המשותפת כדי לסייע למדינות המפרץ, ובייחוד לכווית, שבטחונה יעמוד בפני איום ישיר אם תיפול בצרה.

חצב

ג. במסגרת יחסי ארה"ב-מצרים:

ניתן לומר שהדרישות המצריות במסגרת היחסים הביטורליים עסקו בשלושה עניינים עיקריים:

- 1) עניין הריבית על החובות הצבאיים, כאשר ידוע שהנשיא מבארק הביע חוסר התלהבות להפוך את החוב הממשלתי שהיה כרוך בפרעון החובות הצבאיים מלפני שנת '81 והריבית עליהם, בסך 4.5 מיליארד דולר, לחוב מסווגי, שהריבית עליו תרד ל-10%. זאת כיון שמצרים סבורה שגם אם ייהפך החוב הממשלתי לחוב מסחרי בריבית נמוכה, הוא יוסיף להיות נטל כבד על הכלכלה המצרית. לפיכך ביקש מבארק שהמימשל האמרי יפעל לפטור את מצרים באופן חלקי מהצורך לפרוע חובות אלו. ואכן, קיימת השתכנעות בנוגע לצורך לדון בכל האמצעים החלופיים שעשויים להקל חלק מנטל זה המכביד על הכלכלה המצרית.
- 2) עניין ההקצבות המצטברות של הסיוע האמרי המגיע לכדי יותר מ-2 מיליארד דולר, ובכלל זה 1,500 מליון דולר שיועדו לפרוייקטים שהעיון בהם התעכב, השיחת שערך ד"ר עאטף עביד עם שר האוצר האמרי ועם האחראים על רשות הסיוע התנקדו בצורך להסיר את המכשולים כדי שניתן יהיה לנצל הקצבות אלו המהוות מענקים לשיפור מצב הכלכלה המצרית.
- 3) עניין הייצור המשותף של הטנק "אט-1", בתנאי שמצרים תיהנה מאותן הזכויות שיאפשרו לה לטווק ייצור משותף זה לארה"ב ולמדינות נאט"ו. אעפ"י שחוגים רבים בקונגרס חתרו להכטלת פרוייקט זה, ברור בוואשינגטון שההסכם בנוגע לפרוייקט זה ייחתם ללא בעיות או מכשולים מיוחדים.

שגרירות ישראל / רוסינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיסות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 26.2.88

מס' מברק

המשרד, בטחון

535 637

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

יועץ שהבי"ט לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

המצב בשטחים

כתבתו של בוב סיימון ותמונות הזוועה ששודרו אמש והבוקר ברשת CBS הביאו לנו היום מספר לא קטן של תגובות אותן ניתן לאפיין כתדהמה, זעזוע וחרדה. כמה מידידנו אמרו לנו כי זה הקש שישבור את גב הגמל, באשר הברוטליות שהפגינו לובשי המדים היחה מחרידה ומדכאת, ובאשר היא מעמידה בסימן שאלה את טענותינו כי מדובר בחריגות, לאחר שכל כך הרבה כאלה נחשפו אם בדו"ח הרופאים, אם בתקרית כפר סאלם ואם בתמונות הקשות הנראות כאן מדי ערב ובוקר.

ידידים אחרים מיעצים לנו שמן הראוי כי הדין שיעשה עם האחראים לארוע הקשה יראה היטב.

יוסי גל

2 1 3 1 3 2
 2 1 3 1 3 2
 2 1 3 1 3 2
 2 1 3 1 3 2

21

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים
סוג בטחוני: בלמ"ס
דחיפות: מייד
תאריך וז"ח: 26/2/88-12:00
מס' מברק:

אל: המשרד

629

אל: סמנכ"ל הסברה, מנהל מצפ"א

ארועים בשטחים והקהילה היהודית.

הויכוח הפנימי בקרב היהודים על המתרחש ביש"ע, שהתחיל בביקורת בפורומים פנימיים, עבר להתבטאויות פומביות, לראיונות תקשורת, עבר השבוע גם לתחום פירסום מודעות בעיתונות.

1. 2 מודעות חיוביות על עמוד שלם בניו-יורק-טיימס:
 - א. מטעם נשיא בני ברית
 - ב. מטעם אדם פרטי ג'אק מונדלאק יהודי מכסיקאי במוצאו, החי כיום בני"י.
 המודעות מאשימות את מדינות ערב והמנהיגות הפלסטינאית במצוקה הפלסטינאית ואי מציאת פתרון לסיכסוך הערבי ישראלי. כן הן מותחות ביקורת על הכיסוי התקשורתי ומעודדים הממשל האמריקאי לסייע במציאת פיתרון.
2. לעומת זאת פורסמו 2 מודעות שליליות.
 - א. בלוס-אנג'לס-טיימס מטעם יהודים העוינים לישראל באופן מסורתי (נועם חומסקי, יגאל ארנס, ג'רמי לוין ואחרים).
 - ב. בג'וואיש אקספוננט (פילדלפיה) הקוראת לישראל להפסיק הברוטליות ולמצוא פתרון באמצעות ועידה בינ"ל.

המודעות בדיפ.

אשר נעים

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including phrases like 'אשר נעים', 'המשרד', and 'הקהילה היהודית'.

20

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ד ר ק

לף 1 מתוך דפים

סווג בסיוני ש מ ו ר

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 14:30 - 26.2.88

מס' מברק

אל : המשרד

528

630

אל : סמנכ"ל הסברה, מנהל מצפ"א .

דע : יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, יועץ ממ"ר רוה"מ ושה"ח לתקשורת.

שיחה שבועית עם הקונכליים ב-26.2.88 .

שיחת הקונפרנס ודיווחי הקונכליים החמקדו בתגובות ציבוריות לכיסוי הטלויזיוני של שימוש בכח במהלך דיכוי המהומות.

על הכיסוי השבועי העיבה במיוחד כתבת CBS, של בוב סיימון, שהראתה 4 חיילים ישראלים מכים 2 צעירים ערביים בעקבות פיזור הפגנה. ההכאה נערכה במצב בו השניים היו ישובים ופאסיביים לחלוטין וכללה מכות באגרופים, נעליים, קעדה ואבן גדולה שהונחתה באופן חוזר על כתפו וזרועו של אחד מהם. סיימון דיווח שאקט ההכאה נימשך כ-40 דקות ולועג לחצהרות ישראליות שהברוטאליות בטיפול במפגינים היא מעשה חריג. אורך הכתבה ששודרה בחדשות לאומיות מחוץ אל חוף היה כ-60 שניות (שהוא זמן ממושך במדיום הטלויזיוני). השידור עורר גל מחדש של תגובות ציבור לשגרירות ולקונסוליות שבחריפותן טרם התנסינו.

הסברינו שמדובר במעשה חריג ושימוצה הדין עם האשמים, איבדו מאמינותם ואינם מתקבלים יותר לאור העובדה שמדובר במקרים החוזרים ונשנים.

הננו עדים לגל ביקורת גואה וגובר כאשר כל שבוע שחוף מחריף את טון הביקורת הציבורית עלינו והשבוע הננו בפעם הראשונה בקונפרונטציה עם ביטויי "שנאה לישראל" הבאים גם מקרב יהודים.

בבחינת כיבוי שריפה מידי חובה עלינו להיות במצב בו נוכל לדווח שהמעורבים בפרשה אותרו ונעמדים לדין.

אשר נעים

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word 'פועל' (verb) and other illegible text.

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מחוד 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

638 2/2

לשאלת מילוא אמר דג'ריגיאן כי אשיף מנסה TO CATCH UP ומנסה לנצל המצב לטובתו. ערפאת אומר דברים שונים לאנשים שונים.

באשר לסובייטים אמר מילוא - הדיווח בעתונות היה כאילו הם אמרו לשולץ במוסקבה שהם מוכנים לקיום ועידה בלא השתתפות אשיף. דג'ריגיאן אמר שאין זו אמת וחדר על כך פעמיים. הוא הוסיף שהם NON-COMMITAL ונוקטים בגישה של WAIT AND SEE ומבקשים לראות כיצד יעלה ביקור המזכיר. מכל מקום, הסובייטים מאמינים בוועידה בינלאומית "מלאה". המסר של ארה"ב לברה"מ, אמר דג'ריגיאן הוא שאם ברצונם למלא תפקיד רציני עליהם לשנות גישתם כלפי ישראל, סוריה ואשיף.

לשאלת דג'ריגיאן אמר מילוא כי ב- CONCEPT האמריקאי יש כמה קשיים מבחינתה של ישראל. קושי אחד קשור לוועידה הבינלאומית. באוקטובר אשתדד הסכים ראה"מ, בהרבה קושי, לקבל את בקשת שולץ לפגישה בחסות הפסגה והוא לא יוכל, אמר מילוא, להרחיק מעבר לכך. הקושי השני קשור לסטייה מק"ד. בהסכם ק"ד טמונה הנוסחה הטובה ביותר שהושגה עד כה לפתרון הנעימה. יש הרבה נעלמים במצב החדש באזור והנוסחה של תקופת המעבר נותנת אפשרות לכל הצדדים לבדוק את המשמעות של השינויים ואת יכולתם לחיות זה-בצד-זה. המאורעות החדשים רק מדגישים את הקשיים. ישראל חייבת להביא בחשבון גם את ההשפעות של המאורעות לאחרונה על ערכי ישראל. מכל מקום, ישראל מעוניינת בההליך ומוכנה לשתף פעולה עם המזכיר בנושא בקצב הנכון והמתאים. יש גם שיקול של השפעת המאורעות והההליך על המצב המדיני הפנימי בישראל.

דג'ריגיאן אמר שה- CONCEPT האמריקאי לא מאלץ איש לוותר על טובת האינטרס המהותי שלו, אף כי כל אחד מהצדדים יצטרך לוותר במשהו ויש לדבריו מקום ל"פשרה פרודוקטיבית". הירש, שנכח בשיחה, שאל על בחירות מוקדמות ומילוא אמר שקשה לנבא, אך שאם תוצג לליכוד תוכנית שהוא בשום פנים ואופן לא יוכל לקבלה, יתכן שהוא ירצה בהקדמת הבחירות. לשאלה נוספת של הירש, אמר מילוא שקשה להעריך את השפעת המאורעות על הבוחר הישראלי, אך להערכתו הבוחר, אם אכן יהיה תהליך, ירצה במנהל מו"מ בצד הישראלי שיעמוד בתקיפות על האינטרסים החיוניים של ישראל.

ע"י

תאריך : 38 משטרת החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דן 1 מתוך 1

עותק 3 מתוך 13

טודי ביותר

15547

3371

נכנס

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הודעה: 2,15547

אל: המשד

מ-: רוש, נו: 591, תא: 250288, זח: 1100, זח: מ, סג: טב

נד: ט

טודי ביותר/מיד

אל: מנבל רהמ'

מנבל מדיני, מנהל ממד

דברי הנשיא

שאלתי את רוט מנין בא השפט של הנשיא במסיבות העתונאיים

אתמול -

"... WE HAVE HAD INTIMATIONS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CERTAIN PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF BEING TERRORISTS, OUTSIDERS COMING IN, NOT ONLY WEAPONS BUT STIRRING UP AND ENCOURAGING THE TROUBLE IN THOSE AREAS"

אמר שאין לו מושג כי בכל התדרוכים הכתובים דוע'נ' לא נאמר שום דבר ברוח זו. הרגשתו היא שנאשר הנשיא נלחץ הוא ענה באופן אינטנטקטיבי על פי התרשמות שהיתה לו משיחות בשלבים הראשונים של הארבעים.

ערן

תמ: שהח, רהמ, מנבל, ממנבל, בירן, נצמאר, מרנז

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

[Illegible text block]

31

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוך 7 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ד 25.2.88

מס' מברק

1/7

489

במשרד, בטחון

587

אל: מצפ"א, מעיית, ממ"ד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ, לשכת שהב"ט (הוצ"ה)

מאת: עיתונות

להלן תמליל מסיבת העיתונאים של הנשיא ריגן אמש (24.2.88).

[Handwritten signature]

יוסי גל

¹ ארצות הברית ² ארצות הברית ¹ ארצות הברית ¹ ארצות הברית ³ ארצות הברית ³ ארצות הברית
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2/7

489/587

Good evening. Before I take your questions, I have a brief opening statement. Secretary of State George Shultz today reported to me on his recent trip to Moscow, and it was encouraging. Progress continues to be made on our four-part agenda, and the commitment remains to do all that we can to advance the cause of peace and to settle regional conflicts.

In the Middle East, it's time for all parties to rid themselves of old ideas and stances that cannot work and to begin a serious process of negotiation and reconciliation. Any process that is undertaken must meet Israel's security needs and satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

Secretary Shultz leaves tonight for the Middle East to see if practical and real progress can be made that provides a pathway to a comprehensive settlement, and he carries with him my full support.

There's another regional conflict that has serious implications for our country's security interest—Nicaragua. Our policy consistently has been to bring peace and freedom to all of Central America.

Today, four of the five Central American countries choose their governments in free and open democratic election. Independent courts protect their human rights, and their people can hope for a better life for themselves and their children. One country, Nicaragua, with its communist regime, remains a threat to this democratic tide in the region.

So, our message to the people of Nicaragua tonight is the same as it has been for the past seven years—freedom based on true democratic principles. In the past several months, there have been some limited steps taken by the communist regime in Nicaragua toward reform.

Now it's not the time to, it is not the time to reverse that process so there's no argument that all of us seek peace and democracy in Nicaragua, and the difference is how to achieve that goal.

On Feb. 3, Congress voted on continued support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua and, to my disappointment, the majority in the House of Representatives voted to remove the pressure of the democratic resistance on the Sandinista regime.

However, the Senate agreed with me that we cannot leave those fighting for freedom in Nicaragua at the mercy of the communist regime and expect the process toward democracy to move ahead. We've already seen what happens when pressure is removed.

In just two short weeks, the Sandinistas threatened the only free press in that country and rejected a ceasefire proposal made by the mediator, Cardinal [Miguel] Obando [y Bravo], which incorporated the essential elements laid out and agreed to last August.

And, in the first two months of 1988, Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua has almost doubled compared to the same period in 1987. These do not represent signs of peace. These remain troubling indications of a regime determined to crush its opposition and threaten its neighbors.

There is a choice. We must act to ensure that freedom is not smothered in Nicaragua and to guarantee that these latest promises will be kept in a timely way.

Treatment of Palestinians

Through the years, you've been very eloquent on the subject of human rights and the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. The question really is: Why have you never condemned the treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied areas? Shooting unarmed protesters, beating people to death, children, trying to bury some alive, and I'd like to follow up.

We have made, we have spoken to the government there, and we've also spoken to Palestinian leadership because there's every evidence that these riots are not just spontaneous and home-grown. But we have spoken, and that's why, part of the reason why the secretary of state is going back over there. We don't support that sort of thing, and we're trying to persuade all the participants to try to arrive at a solution representing justice for all.

Well, if you want that, and you say you believe in security for Israel and legitimate rights for the Palestinians, why don't you go on the public record now and say that there should be an exchange, a removal of the occupation and peace?

Well, I don't think it's up to us to dictate the settlement in the Middle East.

Well, we're supporters of Israel, so we certainly have some input.

Yes, we've used that a number of times and are using it now. But we think that, and the thing that's taking the secretary of state there, we think that the necessity is for all who are represented in that situation on both sides should come together, when you stop to think that legally a state of war still exists there in the Middle East between the Arab nations and Israel. And that it's time for us to arrive at a true peace and recognize the rights of all.

Efforts to Find U.S. Hostages

Shiite militiamen are scouring southern Lebanon for [Marine Lt.] Col. [William] Higgins, the American kidnaped last week, and you've expressed a determination to get him out. Can you say that the same intense efforts, the same kind of dragnet will be used to find the other American hostages, one of whom, Terry Anderson, is about to mark the end of his third year in captivity?

We have never given up on that. As you can realize, it's very frustrating to try and establish a location, knowing, of course, that you are governed by the fact that unwise action on our part could bring about harm to the hostages. But we've never let up, and we never will in trying to obtain the freedom of all the hostages.

Pat Robertson said today that his Christian Broadcasting Network once knew the location of American hostages in the Middle East and that the United States, in effect, missed an opportunity to rescue them. I understand he's clarified that remark, but I wonder if you have any thoughts about the tone that he's setting in this campaign?



Well, all I can say, I don't want to comment on the campaign, but I can only say this—that it'd be very strange if he actually did have information as to the location of those hostages. Isn't it strange that no one in our administration was ever apprised of that? We have tried our best and through every kind of channel to establish their whereabouts because that's the beginning of efforts to try to get them free. But, if he thought that he knew, he kept it to himself.

Will U.S. Talk to the PLO?

As of now, is there any change in our policy of not talking with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in light of the fact that there are reports out of Geneva that Mr. [PLO leader Yasser] Arafat is now willing to accept U.N. Resolution 338 and 242?

Well, I know that this is one of the things we're pursuing, if he really is, and if he is willing to acknowledge the right of Israel to exist as a nation. This has been one of the blocking points, that how do you sit down and try to get into a talk about peace when someone says they have no right to even exist? And I'm sure that the sec-

retary of state is apprised of that fact, and we'll see what we can do there.

Given the 40-year hostility in the area which has been built up, how can you, as the Great Communicator, try to alleviate some of the antagonism between the Israelis and the Palestinians before you leave office?

Well, we are trying to, and we'll continue to try to. That's a goal that I think would, I would think would be one of the greatest achievements of this administration if, before I leave, we could bring about a peace in the Middle East.

Who Is Behind Middle East Riots?

Who precisely are you criticizing when you say that the riots are not home-grown and not spontaneous?

Well, we have had, it's a little difficult for me because there are some things that I shouldn't be saying, but we have had intimations that there have been certain people suspected of being terrorists, outsiders coming in, not only with weapons but stirring up and encouraging the trouble in those areas. Now that isn't something you can go out and say we absolutely know, but certainly the violence is both ways.

But it would seem, sir, that that's still a generalization, if you say some people from the outside. Can't you not be specific and say just who it is?

No, because I get into areas there that would be violating security rules, and I don't think I should.

PLO? Russians?

No.

The Iraqi Pipeline

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It's my understanding that, in 1985, your national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, briefed you on the Iraqi pipeline project and got and gained your approval for it. In light of the difficulties that your attorney general, Mr. [Edwin] Meese (III), is encountering now, could you explain your position on the pipeline and tell me if you think it was a good idea at that time?

I have no recall of knowing anything about this pipeline plan until fairly recently and then found out with regard to the transmittal of the letters that have now been turned over to the special investigator. And this was about the first information that I recall having. Now, I can't say to you that something, that I was given information earlier, because I just have to tell you, if I was, I have totally forgotten it. I have no knowledge of anything of that kind.

'Confidence' in Meese

Does it trouble you at all that your dear friend Mr. Meese has become entangled in this project and it has yet been another case which has brought him some, some would say, embarrassment?

Let me just say one thing: I have every confidence in his integrity. I have known him for more than 20 years, but I cannot comment in any way on this case that is now before a special investigator.

South African Ban on Dissenters

The white minority government of South Africa has now effectively banned activities by dissenting organizations, even when those activities are peaceful. What is your view on that, and what can you do, if anything, to reverse it?

Well, the State Department has already contacted them about that, and we are making our feelings clear that they should be working toward a multiracial democracy and not oppressing organizations, political organizations there. And we've made our feelings clear about that.

Assistance to the ANC

Have you considered sending aid to the "freedom fighters," the ANC (African National Congress) or any other organization against this oppression, just as you send aid to other freedom fighters around the world?

No, we have not involved ourselves in that other than things such as the sanctions and so forth. We have tried our best to be persuasive in this very difficult problem and to find a, to encourage a, better solution.

What's the difference?

Well, the difference is that we don't have an armed insurrection going as we have in some other countries, and we have a great division even among the people who are being oppressed. It is a tribal policy more than it is a racial policy, and that is one of the most difficult parts here.



Ethics and 'Lynch-Mob Atmosphere'

Throughout your administration, when members of your cabinet or members of the administration have been accused of any kind of wrongdoing or simply of bad judgment, it's been your policy generally to say nothing. Is your loyalty more important to you than the perception that the members of the government must be above reproach?

No, and I have to say that I do not favor violations of ethics or laws at all in or out of government, but I do want to call your attention to one thing. I think, and this has gone on pretty much throughout the time that I've been here, that there is a kind of lynch-mob atmosphere

that takes place and people are, the memories are there of this person, that person and so forth, but no attention is paid to the fact of how many of them when it actually came to trial was found to be totally innocent. But, in the meantime, they have been smeared nationwide, and it's very difficult for people to remember what the outcome was. They only remember the other of the, in other words, guilt was by accusation and not by actual trial and conviction.

And I could call to your attention to [former labor secretary] Ray Donovan, [former head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration] Jim Beggs of the space program, both of them totally cleared of any wrongdoing whatsoever. And this has been true of a great many others, but those that were doing something wrong and were apprehended and it was proven on them, they're no longer with us.

People have asked if, as in the case of the Iran-contra affair, when the committee which investigated it said that, noted that you never condemned the actions of those members of your staff who were involved, the question was raised whether your silence meant that you did not find their actions objectionable?

No, when they came under the judgment of the law and the judgment was made, and great regret if someone was guilty of wrongdoing, but they were punished accordingly.

Improving Trade With Soviet Union

What are you doing to make things easier for corporations to trade with the Soviet Union in nonstrategic items, such as food processing, pharmaceuticals, automotive and hotels, for instance, and do you believe the Soviet Union should join GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and will you discuss these and other trade items with Mr. Gorbachev in your forthcoming summit?

Well, I can't relate to you discussions about those particular things with him, but I do know that there has been consideration of them involving themselves in the GATT procedure. And that, of course, is being reviewed among those of us who are participants now, but I don't know whether that answers your question or not. But our trade with the Soviet Union is restricted mainly on the basis of where we might be giving them technology and information that is, could be used one day against us.

Bush Position on Iran Arms Sales

I know you have to remain neutral in the Republican race, but you could clear up a major issue right now by telling us whether George Bush, in fact, did have reservations about the sale of arms for Iran, whether he had reservations about Israel's role in that policy and whether, in fact, he's telling the truth when he tells us that he did have those reservations.

Yes, in the general discussion, and that's not unusual here, I've ordered our people, on Cabinet matters or anything else, that I want to hear what they really feel. I don't want to be surrounded by "yes" men. And yes, there were reservations, but I'm not going to go into that, just as he wouldn't in one of the private discussions that we may have had.

But I think it's time for me to point out what the opposition was based on of anyone who did oppose. Particularly, it's been revealed that [then-Defense] Secretary [Casper W.] Weinberger and George Shultz both objected. They did not object the idea of, that we were trading arms for hostages. Their objection, they knew what we were trying to do.

This had been a request that came to us from some people not in the government of Iran but who wanted to privately meet with us on how there could be a better relationship if and when the day came that there was a new government in Iran. And, if you remember, back in those days almost every other day there was speculation that the health of the [Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini was failing to where there might be this contest for a new government.

Their objection was, what we had done, we'd gotten this request and, in dealing with it, in this conversation with these private individuals, we pointed out our feelings about terrorism and so forth. They agreed with us, and the thing was that they, the Hezbollah as we know, is philosophically attuned to Iran. The idea was that they could perhaps influence the Hezbollah to give up some of our hostages and, indeed, as the talks went on, they did.

We got two of them free, but their objection was that, if and when this became known—as it would be—it would be made to appear that we were trading hostages for, or arms for hostages. Now we were, we were giving these arms to these individuals because we felt that maybe they could influence the Hezbollah. We weren't dealing with the kidnapers at all, and this was what the whole situation was. But it turned out that George [Shultz] and Cap [Weinberger] and those who had doubts were right in that, when it did become known by way of a henchman of the ayatollah, then everyone just automatically said that, and to this day are saying, it was arms for hostages.

Dole-Bush Campaign Feud

On the issue of George Bush and his role, though, this has become one of the major issues between the vice president and Sen. [Robert J.] Dole [R-Kan.]. Now, although you have to remain neutral, as the author of the 11th commandment—thou shalt not criticize one's fellow Republican—do you have any advice for these two men, and aren't you getting a little concerned that they might be hurting the Republican chances by their very bitter political feud?

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Well, whether I'm concerned or not, I'm not going to comment on things like that, I am going to say that they know my feelings, all of them, about the 11th commandment.

No advice at all for them?

[Recognizes next questioner.]

Size of the Naval Buildup

The resignation of Secretary of the Navy [James H.] Webb [Jr.] has ignited a controversy about the, your buildup of the United States Navy. And the question is: Are you satisfied that the budget cuts in the military have not damaged our national security, and are you still committed to a 600-ship Navy at a time when the Soviets are not cutting their navy?

I am committed to a 600-ship Navy, and I want you to know that, from the very beginning since I've been here, the Congress has cut my request for defense every time. And sometimes they have tried to pretend that that is an effort to reduce the deficit spending and so forth. But in a five-year period, the Congress cut my defense budgets a total of \$125 billion at the same time that they increased my requests for domestic programs by \$250 billion.

And this budget which is now being attributed to me, no, this isn't as low as they originally wanted to cut it. But it was as high as we could get it in the negotiations for the present budget, and it has been harmful. But let me tell you that, in 1980 when we came here, the Navy had 479 vessels and by 1987 we had 568 and by next year it will be 580.

And so what has happened is there will be a little delay in the achieving of the 600-ship Navy. But I can't help but remind, or tell all of you, when I was campaigning in 1980 and knew the state of our defenses, I was faced with the question, and some of you will recall I did a lot of campaigning on question-and-answer basis. At almost every gathering, there would be a question—well, if I came to a choice between deficit spending and buildup of our defense structure, which would I choose? And every time, I said, in responsibility, I would have to choose the buildup of our defenses. And every time, in every audience in America that I said that to, gave me an applause that was almost an ovation for saying that.

The second part of the question was: Is it a threat to the national security that the Navy is not going to have 600 ships on the schedule that you had in mind?

I don't think right at the moment and, with where we're progressing in various treaties and so forth, I don't believe that the threat is that immediate. And because very shortly we will achieve our 600. We want 15 carriers in their squadrons, and we've just launched the 15th carrier, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines and four battleships, and we're achieving that.

Panama's Certification on Drugs

You must certify by March 1 whether Panama has been cracking down on drug trafficking through that country or whether aid to Panama should continue to be suspended. What are you going to do?

I can't give you the answer yet because we're still working on that and still collecting the facts as to what their effort has been at trying to intercept the drugs and join us in that campaign. But, as you said, March 1 we will be giving the answer.

Some officials in your administration have suggested that, if [Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio] Noriega would step down and go into exile, that you would stop the prosecution of him on drug charges. Would you consider that kind of deal?

No, and I'm not going to comment on something of this kind. This man has been indicted by a federal grand jury. And so I'm not going to make any comment of that kind, nor have we made any advances or suggestions of that kind to the government of Panama. What we would like to see is a return to democracy and a civilian government in Panama and not this domination by literally a military dictator.

Pressure on Greenspan

Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan today objected to pressure from the administration regarding the formulation of monetary policy such as is contained in the budget and the economic report and a Treasury letter to Federal Reserve Board members. Don't you have confidence in your appointee to the Fed, Alan Greenspan, the chairman?

Yes I do, and I'm going to have to find out what this is all about that you're talking about because nothing of that kind has been directed to me.

Aid to Contras

Back to the contra aid question. In your opening statement, you seemed to suggest that the Sandinistas are taking advantage of Congress not coming through with contra aid to withdraw some of the concessions they had made. With Congress about to consider new humanitarian aid, both the Democratic and Republican plan, is it worth it to pass humanitarian aid without military aid?

Well, I think the only comment that I can make there is that anything that will keep the freedom fighters as a pressure on the Sandinistas is worth doing. Just as when we tried to pass our own bill and it narrowly failed, you could see that the military aid was down the road a ways, it was not necessary right now. The other aid, humanitarian aid, is more imminent and so, if we can get that, that's fine. And then we'll take our chances on the other in trying to get it. But they do still have some military store for a limited period of time.

There are two plans that are being considered. The Democrats want the Defense Department to deliver whatever stores and supplies are authorized. The Republican plan would give that responsibility to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Do you favor either course?

I certainly would favor the CIA. I think that involving our military when there is no need to is very rash and foolish because you would be putting our military into a combat situation, and this is what we've been trying to avoid in Central America all the way.



6/7

Higgins in Southern Lebanon

I'd like to ask you about the latest hostage situation. Do you think it was responsible for your administration to allow Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins to operate in southern Lebanon at a time when eight Americans were already being held in that country and when your own State Department was recommending against travel there and considering the ramifications of the abduction of [CIA Beirut station chief] William Buckley [who died in captivity] earlier?

I don't think that you can use that as a measure of where officers can be assigned to duty. They're in a dangerous business to begin with, and we are a part of the United Nations and we have obligations to the U.N. with regard to the UNIFIL [United Nations Interim

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Force in Lebanon] force that has been there for a number of years now. And this particular officer happened to volunteer when there was a vacancy at that spot, volunteered for that.

And I think that we have to have the confidence, and I do have the confidence, in men like him that someone would have a hard time getting secrets that could harm this country from a person of that kind.

Probes and Politics

Democratic National Chairman Paul [G.] Kirk [Jr.] this morning called your administration the sleaziest and most corrupt in recent American history. Even if you have full confidence in people like Ed Meese that they will be cleared, do you have any concern that all these charges and all these investigations are going to be used effectively by the Democrats against all the Republican candidates in 1988?

I don't know whether they could be used effectively or not. I know they're going to be used, they have been for quite some considerable time now. As a matter of fact, if anyone listened for more than 15 minutes to their candidates, you would decide that we're in an economic slump, we're burdened by inflation, high interest rates and unemployment, when at the moment none of those things are true and we have a higher percentage of our potential employee pool employed than ever in our history and are continuing the longest expansion, economic expansion in our history.

And tomorrow morning. I think you'd find a little good news around about 8:30 tomorrow morning is going to be released with regard to the economy.

So I just think that, you know, the kids will play. [Laughter.] And, as long as they want to do that, but I hope it'll easily be forgotten.

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Helping the Homeless

The budget that you have proposed to Congress would not, would eliminate three housing programs for the

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homeless. It would make deep cuts in an emergency food program, and it would end a job-training program for the homeless. Do you believe that the problem of the homeless is less pressing now than just a year ago when you signed legislation from Congress to create these programs?

No, but I do know that we're doing a great many things, and we also are keeping track of the extent to which the private sector is joining in and helping on this. And this budget is the result of long, long weeks of negotiation, with the Democrats and ourselves, and I think that we're meeting the problems.

Again, I also have to say that sometimes our budget and programs can reflect another program we've had going which is a management program, and we have had a team for a considerable period of time now that had been actually investigating the management practices of government programs as compared to the way they're done in the private sector. And there are millions and millions of dollars that are being saved so that something that maybe looks smaller does not mean that the people in need are going to get less. It means that we are able to provide that with less administrative overhead.

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When I came here from a governorship, as a governor I had seen federal programs administered in our state in which it was costing the federal government \$2 for every \$1 that reached a needy person. This is something we've been trying to change, and we've made some progress in it.

Good Side to Deficit?

The chairman of your Council of Economic Advisers (Beryl Sprinkel) told us last week that the deficit might have a good side if it forces your successor and Congress to make choices in social programs. Do you see a good side to the deficit?

I have said that I think that there is a great reform that is needed throughout many of those programs, and it is a reform to where we can get these programs to where their goal will be to remove people from dependency and make them independent of government help, instead of doing what we've been doing for too many years now, and that is actually involving them in dependency to the place where they never can get out. We've made them permanently dependent on government, and we're trying to change that.

*



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February 25, 1988

His Excellency Yitzhak Shamir
c/o The Honorable Benjamin
Netanyahu
Ambassador to the U.N.
800 Second Avenue, 15th Floor
New York, NY 10017

Excellency:
Dear Mr. Prime Minister :

Re: The Textbook Edition of Foreign Affairs/AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1987/88

It is my privilege to enclose a complimentary copy of the textbook edition of AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1987/88. Since 1978, Pergamon Press has made this textbook edition available annually for use in hundreds of courses in foreign policy and international relations throughout the world. The textbook edition consists of the complete issue of Foreign Affairs with the advertisements removed.

I trust that you're as pleased as we are that your article is being read by many thousands of students in addition to the usual readership of Foreign Affairs and hope that you will recommend adoption of the textbook edition by colleagues in academic settings.

Cordially,

Jerome B. Frank
Vice President

JBF/mgl

enc.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 25.2.88

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המשרד, בטחון

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אל: מנהל מע"ת

יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

ישראל, המצב בשטחים ורשתות הטלויזיה

הטכום המצ"ב, המתיחס למספר דקות השידור שהוקדשו ל-30 הסיפורים הגדולים של חודש ינואר ברשתות, מאלף.

165 דקות שידור בשלושת הרשתות (כש-ABC מובילה) מסתכמים ב-23% מכלל הזמן שהוקדש לסיפורים הגדולים וכ-13% מכלל הזמן שהוקדש לחדשות לאומיות.

יוסי גל

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers 1, 2, 3 and various illegible text.

January Top Stories

(ranked in order of minutes of coverage)

	Total	weeks					ABC	CBS	NBC
		# 1	# 2	# 3	# 4	# 5			
1 Israel-Palestinian conflict	165	24	45	46	44	27	67	48	50
2 1988: Iran-Contra: Bush role	66	0	6	7	7	47	17	33	16
3 Contra war peace plan: aid debate	58	0	0	4	34	19	21	14	23
4 Winter snow, flood, tornado	50	10	39	3	8	0	15	16	20
5 1988: Gary Hart campaign finance	32	1	1	12	19	1	11	12	9
6 1988: Iowa caucus run-up	29	0	6	9	8	6	3	16	10
7 New York Stock Exchange activity	28	5	19	4	2	2	12	10	6
8 Oil spill pollutes Monongahela	21	0	21	0	0	0	10	3	8
9 Reagan's final year State Of Union	18	0	5	0	2	12	5	2	11
10 Afghan War: Soviet pullout plan	18	6	14	1	4	0	5	10	3
11 1988: Bush-Dole feud	17	0	6	9	8	6	5	7	5
12 US-Japan trade problems	17	2	0	16	0	0	3	9	5
13 1988: national campaign overview	14	0	0	12	0	2	13	0	1
14 Utah polygamy compound seige	14	0	0	0	6	8	7	4	3
15 NASA Shuttle program delays	13	8	5	0	0	8	5	4	4
16 US dollar prices	13	13	13	0	0	0	5	5	3
17 1988: Richard Gephardt campaign	13	0	0	3	6	4	2	5	5
18 NFL Super Bowl preview	13	0	0	0	0	13	5	3	4
19 Az Gov Evan Mecham in trouble	12	0	0	8	3	1	5	2	5
20 Martin Luther King day observed	12	0	0	0	12	0	2	6	3
21 Broadway's Phantom Of The Opera	11	0	0	0	3	8	3	3	5
22 FBI peace groups surveillance	11	0	0	0	0	11	5	2	3
23 Overturn special prosecutor law	10	0	0	0	10	0	3	4	3
24 Acne cream removes skin wrinkles	10	0	0	0	7	2	2	2	5
25 US trade deficit statistics	9	0	0	9	0	0	2	2	5
26 Panama's Noriega under fire	9	0	4	0	0	5	4	4	1
27 Persian Gulf tanker war	9	6	5	2	2	0	4	5	0
28 Paterson NJ HS principal Clark	9	0	8	1	0	0	3	3	3
29 Hostages in Beirut: Islam Jihad	9	0	0	0	6	3	3	4	2
30 Aspirin-heart attack prevention	9	0	0	0	0	9	4	2	2
Total TOP 30 stories	717	76	196	147	185	187	251	241	225
All other stories	568	196	120	168	131	130	166	210	191



Week #1: 28Dec87-01Jan88 (four days not counted in monthly totals)
 Week #2: 04Jan88-08Jan88
 Week #3: 11Jan88-15Jan88
 Week #4: 18Jan88-22Jan88
 Week #5: 25Jan88-29Jan88

The data and analysis in The Tyndall Report are produced as a result of a scrutiny of the New York broadcasts of ABC World News Tonight (6:30 feed), CBS Evening News (7:00 feed) and NBC Nightly News (7:00 feed) each evening during the week (Monday-Friday). The newscasts are videotaped and time-printed so that the duration of program elements can be measured second-by-second.

The monthly data represent time, in minutes, devoted to news stories and features during these broadcasts. Times for commercials and program openings, closings and logos have not been counted in the totals.

Before publishing The Tyndall Report, ADT Research supplied analysis of the format and content of network news evening newscasts, morning programs and news magazine programs for the Research Department of one of the television networks.

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שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

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דף מתוך דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

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המשרד

תאריך/ז"ח 1300 25 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, מנחל מעפ"א

מאת: דני בלור, רושינגטון

בחירות 88

הסנטור פול טימוןן חודיע כי לא ינהל מערכת בחירות פעילה בדרום בשל מחסור בכסף אך לא יסיר את מועמדותו. הוא דתרכז במערכה לקראת המוקדמות באילינוי, מדינתו. זאת מתוך הנחה שעד הועידה לא יתגבש רוב בעד אחד המועמדים ואז יהיה לר בלוק של צירים והוא יוכל להשתתף מתוך עמדה של כוח מסויים במו"מ למציאת מועמד מוסכם.

דני בלור

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תאריך/ז"ח 1200 24 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

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המשרד

אל: מנהל מז"תים

פגישת אישים מהשטחים עם קלווריוס. שלך 557

בתור "תרגיל" בדקתי מה בדיוק נאמר על-ידי קלווריוס. מקור שקרא את הדווח של קלווריוס אומר שבפגישה לא דובר על תקופת מעבר של שלוש שנים (אלא על תקופת מעבר). קלווריוס לא דיבר על יצוג אשי"פ בכל דרך שהיא ולא דיבר על בחירות ובוודאי לא על בחירות מוניציפליות. קלווריוס ביקש והפציר בהם לא לדחות את ההזדמנות שנקרתה לידיהם. אם ימשיכו רק לזרוק אבנים ולהפגין לא ישיגו דבר. קלווריוס הוסיף שלכל צד יש השגות, אך שברעיונות האמריקאים יש חלקים שכל אחד מהצדדים יכול למצוא בו משהו חיובי, ועל מה שלא מוסכם ידונו במו"מ.

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מס' מברק

581 2/2

לקי"ד אך שאכן אפשר להוציא מקי"ד את הרעיונות הטובים וככלל, ארה"ב רוצה להתרחק מהכותרות כגון "קמפ-דיוויד", "יזמת רייגן", "וועידה בינלאומית" וכוי. אף כי צריך להבין שבסופו של דבר יהיה איזה "ארוע בינלאומי" במגמה לספק, ולו חלקית, את המלך חוסיין. אפילו רה"מ שמיר, הוסיף רוט, היה מוכן באוקטובר למשתו בנושא זה. רוני מילוא אישר והוסיף שהמלך חוסיין סרב.

רוט הוסיף שמצרים וירדן אינן מחוסנות מפני מה שקורה בשטחים והסכנה של הפנדמנטליזם האסלאמי עומדת לנגד עיני הכל במז"ח. רוני מילוא התערב באומרו שמשום כך נחוצה תקופת מעבר רצינית שבמהלכה יוכלו כל הצדדים לגלות מה יכולתם לחיות זה לצד זה.

רוט אישר שאכן כוונתם היא להתחיל בתקופת מעבר אך יחד עם זאת להבטיח, כפי שחוסיין מבקש שהסדר הביניים אינו הסדר סופי. המלך מנדאג מן המצב ולכן יש לו עניין להשיג הישג משמעותי עבור הפלשתינאים - זו הסיבה שהוא ינהל המו"מ על הסדר הביניים באופן רציני. רוני מילוא אמר שסמיכות התאריכים בין ישום הסדר הביניים ותחילת השיחות על השלב הסופי עלולה להיות לרועץ ורוט ענה שחוסיין מוכרח לתת הסבר לערבים מדוע הסכים לקבל את הרעיון של הסדר הביניים, שאותו דחה עד כה בעקשנות רבה. רוט הוסיף שהמזכיר יוצא הערב לאזור ויביא עימו פרוט נוסף של ה-Concept האמריקאי.

קולין פאוול סיים השיחה באומרו כי המזכיר מאד רוצה להתקדם. הוא קיבל תמיכה נלהבת ממנהיגי הקהילה היהודית ומידידי ישראל בקונגרס. גם הנשיא מאד רוצה להשיג התקדמות, מה גם שהוא משוחרר מלחצי בחירה מחדש.

במהלך השיחה ובשוליה אמר אוקלי, שהשתתף בשיחות במוסקבה, כי הסובייטים חזרו על הרעיון של הוועידה הבינלאומית ולא גילו עניין רב ב-Concept האמריקאי. הצד האמריקאי אמר כי הוא ימשיך לפעול בכיוון ממוש רעיונותיו וכי אם לסובייטים עניין הם חייבים לסטות מהעמדות הידועות שלהם ובגישתם לגבי ישראל והנושא היהודי.

ערו

Richard Cohen

Speak Out!

569

2/3

The old gunrunner called from Baltimore the other day. He owns a store now, but he said that once—right after World War II—he ran guns to what was then Palestine. He wanted to talk to me about the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, about which he had private misgivings. The caller made an important point just in passing: American Jews helped in the establishment of Israel.

That point is now either forgotten or ignored. Instead, the American Jewish community has largely adopted the posture insisted on by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister. Shortly after Israel won independence in 1948, Ben-Gurion issued a dictum: diaspora Jews, especially the numerous and wealthy ones in the American Jewish community, would have no say in the way Israel was run. Responding to a leading American Zionist, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of Cleveland, Ben-Gurion announced that no one "could sit in Cleveland and give directions to Tel Aviv."

That quotation, cited in an article written for

"American Jews have an obligation to help Israel face its hard choices."

Present Tense magazine by Arthur Hertzberg, has been exhumed for a purpose. Hertzberg argues that American Jews, if only because they played an instrumental role in the creation of Israel, have a legitimate right to voice their opinions about events there. Hertzberg's brief is grounded in history—the financial support of Zionism by American Jews and their presence in organizations that have spoken for the Jews of Palestine. He does not mention gunrunning, but there was some of that too.

Yet American Jews have largely (but not entirely) remained silent as Israel—out of panic, fear or, sometimes, just plain racism—has implemented a horrific and repugnant

policy in the occupied territories. Some 60 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli soldiers; scores of others have been methodically and brutally beaten, and four Israeli soldiers stand accused of having buried some Palestinians alive.

It is to Israel's credit that the four soldiers are under arrest. It is to Israel's credit that its press remains free and vibrant. It's good that the Israeli attorney general has recommended the arrest of a government interrogator who allegedly tortured a Palestinian to death. But none of this changes the fact that these events—the killings, the beatings, the torture—have happened and continue to happen. Nor can democracy excuse a wrongheaded and ultimately tragic policy in which the West Bank and Gaza—both demographic time bombs—are retained.

At the moment, the cliché is to compare Israel to South Africa. At best, the comparison is premature. But in an article in The Jerusalem Post, Israel's former head of military



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intelligence, Yehoshafat Harkabi, uses an equally ominous, and probably accurate, metaphor: Northern Ireland. He writes of the "Belfastization of the territories"—the prospect of bitter, ugly, sectarian warfare. He calls for surrender of the West Bank and Gaza, negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and, ultimately, the creation of a Palestinian state.

Harkabi's plan—bold, almost shocking—may or may not be a prescription for peace. But his description of the territories as another Northern Ireland seems apt. The evidence appears nightly on television and daily in the press. Events have seized Israel by the collar. It's losing control of its destiny and squandering its moral inventory. It has no choice, really, other than to ultimately surrender the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has no choice other than to recognize Palestinian nationalism.

American Jews have an obligation to help Israel face its hard choices. Yet, by and large, the Jewish community has remained silent,

keeping its agony "within the family." But "the family" was instrumental in the founding of Israel. It has supported it over the years with an awesome generosity, and its good will cannot be disputed. Its most significant contribution at the moment could well be criticism (or, at the very least, a tolerance of any criticism uttered by intimidated American politicians and policy makers), a cry of protest at both policy and behavior—a reprimand with a reminder that Israel is a Jewish nation, not just a nation, and that the adjective has both historical and moral implications.

The late Arthur Koestler once rebuked another Englishman for not protesting Hitler's treatment of Jews. "As long as you don't feel . . . ashamed of being alive while others are being put to death, you will remain what you are, an accomplice by omission." Koestler's words could now be directed to those in the American Jewish community who, like the old gunrunner, are grieved but mute. By their silence, they are accomplices by omission.

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שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

טווס סברס

המשרד

688

דפ 1 מתוכ 1 דפים

11/13

סווג בטחוני שמור דחיפות מיידי תאריך/זייח 88 פב' 29 17:00

אל: לשכת רחיים

דע: מנכ"ל מדיני, מצפ"א

הסנטור ליהי, הארועים בשטחים ותהליך השלום

לעיונכם, רצי"ב מכתב בנדון לרה"מ מאת הסנטור הדמוקרטי מוורמונט, פט ליהי, המכתב, שהתקבל בשגרירות היום, מדבר בעד עצמו (המקור בדיפ"). המכתב הזה לשה"ח (ראו נא הסייפא) טרם התקבל.

יוסף לוי

למדן

מה 2
מה 3
גוף 3
גוף/א 1
הי"ח 1
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8026

688 2/B

February 24, 1988

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister
State of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to express my grave concern about recent developments in the West Bank and Gaza. As a long-standing friend of Israel, I am profoundly disturbed by the way events are unfolding as Israeli authorities respond to the Palestinian demonstrations.

I have been contacted by hundreds of Americans, the great majority strong supporters of Israel, who share my concern about this situation.

The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is beyond question. This is one issue where the views of the Executive Branch and the Congress are indistinguishable. We have provided and will continue to provide support and assistance to Israel.

But the face democratic Israel is showing the world as it approaches its 40th birthday is an unfamiliar one. Every day Americans read of Palestinians who have died of gunshot wounds and beatings, many young teenagers. Palestinian youths have been beaten senseless as a result of official policy. Defense Minister Rabin says there is no end to the violence in sight.

Some people say that if Israeli leaders give their soldiers better training and equipment and soften their blunt statements to foreign journalists about beatings and deportations, the familiar image of Israel will reemerge. It is argued that if the world can just see how intransigent the Palestinians are, people will understand that the actions of Israeli forces are justifiable.

Such advice, however well-meant, is mistaken and a disservice to Israel.

His Excellency Yitzhak Shamir

Page 2

February 24, 1988

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The response of the last three months is wrong and harmful. It cannot lead to any lasting solution to this burning problem of the Palestinians. No matter how effective police tactics become, the riots brutally underscore realities which have been ignored for far too long.


Secretary of State Shultz has said that the turmoil demonstrates that the status quo--complete inaction--in the Middle East peace process is no longer an option. There must be movement that offers all parties alternatives to violence.

As a friend of Israel, I strongly agree. I cannot emphasize too strongly how harmful it is for the world to see night after night on television shootings and beatings. I am convinced that it is in Israel's deepest interests to find a way to replace this policy of the iron fist with negotiations and a chance for the two peoples--Israeli and Arab--to find coexistence.

As one who cares so deeply for democratic, humane, liberal Israel, I support the Reagan Administration's efforts to restart the peace process and urge Israel to respond courageously. Israel now needs to take the initiative in the search for peace so that the world can see the true Israel, a beacon of democracy, respect for human rights, and peace among the peoples of the Middle East.

I am sending an identical letter to Foreign Minister Peres.

Sincerely,


PATRICK LEAHY
United States Senator

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחוך דפים

שמור

סווג בטחוני

מיון

דחيفוח

תאריך/ז"ח 1430 24 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

1/2

579

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: דני בלור, רושדנגטון

בחירות 88

בבחירות המוקדמות בדרום דקוטה נבמינסוטה לא היו הפתעות לגבי המנצחים. ההפתעה הבולטת היתה בהשגו של פול רוברטסון שהגיע למקום שני מכובד בשתי המדינות והישגו של ג'יסי ג'קסון במינסוטה, מפתיעה גם הופעתו החלשה של בוש, שאף כי זיתו מראש על הנצחון, בידעו את כוחו של דול, הרי לא ציפה לתוצאה כה חלשה, ואלה התוצאות: בדרום דקוטה: דמוקרטים: גפהארדט - 44%, דוקקים 31%, גור 8%, סימון 6%, הארט 5%, ג'קסון 5%, רפובליקנים: דול - 55%, רוברטסון 20%, בוש 19%, קמפ 4%.

במינסוטה: (תוצאות כמעט סופיות). דמוקרטים: דוקקים - 34%, ג'קסון - 20%, בלתי-מזדהים 19%, סימון 18%, גפהארדט 7%, גור 1%, הארט 1%. רפובליקנים: דול 43%, רוברטסון 28%, קמפ 15%, בוש 8%.

ברפובליקנים עוברת המערכה לדרום בטונים גבוהים בין המועמדים, כאשר רוברטסון טוען כי מטה בוש הוא שהצליף את הספור על פרשיות השין של המטיף ג'ימי סרוגארט, כדי לחבל ברוברטסון. מטה בוש חושש כי מטות דול ורוברטסון משתפים פעולה ומחלקים בזניהם אזורים שונים, כדי להקטין את סיכויי בוש להגיע למקום ראשון. רוברטסון הוכיח שוב את יכולתו להביא את נאמניו לבחירות.

בדמוקרטים עיקר המערכה היא עתה על הקולות הלבנים בדרום בין השלושה דוקקים גפהארדט וגור. דוקקים מעודד מנצחוננו במינסוטה, המוכיח כי הוא חזק גם מחוץ לאזורו, אך השאלה היא האם יגדע: להשגים מרשימים מספיק בדרום. ג'קסון הוכיח במינסוטה כי ביכולתו לצרף לשורותיו חקלאים ופועלים מתוסכלים ולהרחיב את בסיסו מעבר לקהילה השחורה.

מס' חמ 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 4

1988-02-25 00:00

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחור דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/2

579

חניו יורק טיימז פרסט אתמול תוצאות סקר על חוזקם של המועמדים במישור הכלל הארצי ובמדינות "דום שלישי הגדול". ואלה התוצאות, בתשובה לשאלה את מי היית רוצה שמפלגתך תמנה כמועמד לנשיא?

מדינות דום שלישי הגדול	ארצי	דמוקרטים
13%	21%	דוקקיס
11%	12%	גפהארדט
16%	8%	גור
10%	10%	הארט
19%	13%	ג'קסון
4%	6%	סיימון
2%	3%	מישהו אחר
3%	4%	אף אחד
22%	23%	לא יודעים
		רפובליקנים
51%	42%	בוש
20%	27%	דול
3%	3%	קמפ
12%	7%	רוברטסון
2%	2%	אף אחד
11%	19%	לא יודעים

מבחינת התקשורת גארי הארט כבר כמעט ואינו קיים מבחינה פוליטית. סיימון זפרוש בזמן הקרוב וקמפ עושים מאמצים נואשים כדי להחזיק מעמד עד לחודש הבא ולהכנס לתפקיד כלשהו בין בוש לדול, כך שתהיה לו יכולת לתבוע את משרת סגן-הנשיא.

דני בלור
דני בלור

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כ"ס

3

אל:

רושינגטון

טופס מברק צפון

דף 1 מחוד 3 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: מא

דחיפות: א"צ

לשימוש

מס' הקשר

תאריך וזמן רישום

מס. מברק: 1037

24/2/80

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח)

לידיעת:

אומן.

סגירת אוניברסיטת בית לחם. שלך 507.

1. מצ"ב מכתבי לשגרירות רומא מ 7/2 כולל התשובה שמסרתי לפראטיני, סגן

הנציג האפוסטולי באותו יום בו העלה בפני את טענותיו.

2. המכתב הוא לידיעתך כרקע. את תשובתך ליוג'ין פישר תבסס אך ורק על נקודות

שהעברתי לפראטיני. מובן שאין צורך להתייחס לטענה שצהל תפס את הקמפוס.

3. במכתבו אליך "מבטיח" פישר כי ידיעת הסוכנות הותיקנית מ 4/2 תופץ

ברחבי ארה"ב. אנו כאן לא ראינו הדיס לכך. האם הגיעו אליכם הדיס לידיעה

בתקשורת האמריקנית * בכלל ובקטולית בפרט.

אורי גורדון.

אגודת חסידי אשכנז

השולח: א"י גרין אישור מנהל המחלקה: [חתימה] אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: [חתימה]

[לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר]

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ד"ר נענט העש"ח

7.2.1968

420.1 470
מ"ר

שטר

אל : מר טירון גורדון, השגרירות רוסא
מאת : אורי גורדון, יועץ לכה"ח

הנדון: פקידת הכציגות האפוסטולית בנושא סגירת אוניברסיטת בית-לחם

ביום ג' 2/2/68 בקרני טונטיניור *FRATINI*, האיט השני בנציגות האפוסטולית, עצה לאחר שביקש פגישה דחופה. סיפר שאוניברסיטת בית-לחם, אשר הנציג האפוסטולי הוא הנגיד (*CHANCELLOR*) טלה היתה סגורה במשך שלושה חדשים עד יום 29/1. בשנת ויום א' 30-31/1 לא התקיימו לימודים בגלל טרף השבוע וב-1/2 יום ב', נפתחה. באותו ערב הודיע הצבא לאוניברסיטה כי מאחר דעספר סטודנטים השתתפו בהפגנות בעיר נסגרה האוניברסיטה החל מ-2/2 *INDEFINITLY*. הוסיף כי האח אנטוני שהוא ש"ס נשא האוניברסיטה (הנשיא הקודם שישל צבאח עונה לאחרונה כפטריון הלטיני) שדווח על כך דרוח גם שהצבא נכנס לקמפוס ותפס אותו וכי הכמרים הגרים עם חילבים להראות תעודות זהרניות כממאסר בית. הוסיף כי הם עקרויים שהצבא יפנה הקמפוס וטגירת האוניברסיטה תבוטל. אחרת יצטרכו לדווח לרוסא וזה עלול להיות לא נעים. הבטחוני לברר בכל ההקדם.

שוחחתי עם מושל בית-לחם ואת דבריו סיכמתי בנקודות בכתב, לנדטה זה קבלתי אישור ותיקונים קלים שלשכת דובר ראש המינהל האזרחי ליד"ש ואחריו משערך דובר המתאם בת"א אשר הכניסו דיוקים בנוסח ואשר התרשמתי כי הם בקלאה בעה שנעשה וכי הגירסה אטינה.

להלן הנקודות שטסרתי טלפוניית לפרטיני כמידע שקבלתי ממושל בית-לחם:

1. הצבא לא נכנס לקמפוס דאף לא התקרב אליו. ההיילדט אף לא פינו מחסומי אבנים בקרבת הקמפוס כדי שלא להתקרב אליו.
2. ב-1/2 בערב גיטב מושל בית-לחם עם האח אנטוני סטר לו על החלטת הסגירה "עד הודעה חדשה" והסביר הי היא באה בגלל שהסטודנטים תורפים הרבה מאד להתפרעויות בעיר. חלק גדול מאד שהסטודנטים באוניברסיטת בית-לחם מביעים ללימודים מחוץ לעיר, רבים מאד מהם מאזור עזה.

(כהמשכה למאבקים שמתנהלים בקרב הסטודנטים הזכרונות לפרטינני דרישת ארגון סטודנטים מוסלמיים לחקים שטגד בתוך הקטפוס דבר שהביך מאד את ההנהלה).

סביר לפני פתיחת האוניברסיטה ישב המושל עם ההנהלה. ביקש לחשיבה על התכונות הסטודנטים והזהיר שאם הסטודנטים יגרמו לאי סדר תיטגר האוניברסיטה לזמן ארוך. אולם להנהלה אין כנראה די השפעה עליהם.

בתוך שלושה חודשים בהם היתה האוניברסיטה סגורה היה שקט יחסי בבית-לחם. ביום בר כפתחה ללימודים באר הסטודנטים ואחרי שהיה טיטלית בקטפוס יצאו לבית-לחם. כבר ב¹ות הבוקר נראה זרע של סטודנטים צוהר העירה גואז החלו התפרעויות. בשעה 12.50 טלפן המושל לאח אנטוני וזה השיב לשאלתו דענה כי יש מעט מאד סטודנטים העוטים בלימודים. עד כאן הנקודות שמסרתי לפרטינני.

תחילה התחיל פרטינני להתרועע עם הגירטה שסרתי. אח"כ אמר שהוא רוצה לדבר עם הנציג האפוסטולי. תוך שתיים שלוש דקות שב ואמר, כנראה על פי הנראה הנציג, כי ייתכן שהאח אנטוני רואה הדברים בצורה טובה מאשר המשל הצבאי וכי הוא שסס לפניו את הדברים. לידיעתכם בטקרה שהדבר ידעלה אצלכם.

ב ב ר כ ה.

אורי גורדון

העתקים: המשכה למכ"ל.
מנהל עזאיי"ט.

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המשרד, ביטחון

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, מצפ"א

דע: לשכת רה"מ, לשכת שהב"ט

תהליך השלום: שיחת השגריר - הסנטורים בושביץ, קרנסטון והיינץ (23.2)

1. ערב צאתו ארצה, ביקש השגריר להפגש עם הסנטור רודי בושביץ (כבכיר המיעוט בוועדת המשנה למזה"ת שליד ועדת החוץ). מיוזמתו פנה בושביץ לסנטורים נוספים והשתתפו בשיחה (שארכה כחצי שעה) גם אלן קרנסטון (דמוקרט מקליפורניה) וג'ון היינץ (רפובליקאי מפנסילוניה). כמו כן נכחו עוזריהם של בושביץ וקרנסטון לענייני חוי"ב, והח"מ.

2. השגריר פתח בציינו שהוא חוזר ארצה בערב ע"מ להשתתף בשיחות מזכיר המדינה שם, ושיקדים את בואו של שולץ ב-24 שעות. יהיה לו לעזר רב אם יוכל להגיע ארצה עם תחושה מעודכנת של הלך הרוחות בסנט. בושביץ חייב את פניית השגריר, בהעידו שלאחרונה קיים שיחות עם סנטורים אחרים, והם גיבשו מספר נקודות שרצונם להעביר למקבלי ההחלטות בארץ:

א. תקוותם היא שישראל תהיה מעורבת באופן פעיל ביוזמת שולץ.
ב. שולץ הינו מזכיר המדינה האוהד ביותר לישראל מאז עליית מימשל רייגן לשלטון, ואולי מאז קום המדינה. להבדיל משלושת קודמיו, הוא כבר מכהן מספר שנים בתפקיד וצבר לעצמו מאגר עמוק של יוקרה והשפעה. הוא פעל אישית וחרם רבות להביא את מערכת היחסים בין ארה"ב וישראל לרמה הגבוהה שידענו אי פעם.

ג. לאחרונה עמל שולץ באופן שיטתי לגייס תמיכה ביוזמתו. בין השאר נפגש בשבוע שעבר עם קבוצה גדולה של סנטורים (וכאן ציטט בושביץ מהדברים שהשמיע שולץ בדבר הקשרים הבלתי-שבירים בין שתי המדינות, כמדווח בשלנו 454).

ד. כ"כ תקוותם היא שממשלת ישראל **WILL NOT GET BOGGED DOWN** בהתנצחויות אישיות או בפרטי ההצעות, כך שימנעו קיום שיחות השלום.

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ה. חשוב מכל שהשיחות יתחילו ושינוהל מו"מ. תמיד אפשר **TO TALK YOURSELVES OUT** מהשיחות, או להגיע לפתרונות בלתי צפויים, כפי שקרה בק"ד. מכל מקום, אל לישראלים להראות כאלה שמונעים קיום השיחות. (להערכתו האישית, הוסיף בושביץ, הפלסטינאים יהיו אלה שיבלמו קיום השיחות, ולכן למה לישראל להיות מואשמת בסרבנות).

3. כאן פנה בושביץ לקרנסטון וביקש ממנו לשאת את דברו. הלה אמר שכל ידידי ישראל חשים ב-**ANGUISH AND CONCERN** אודות המרחש בשטחים - אם כה הם מכירים בכך שישראל איננה אשמה ושהאירועים הם תולדת סירוב מדינות ערב להכיר בישראל ולסייע לפליטים. האחרונים מתייאשים וייאושם מגיע לביטוי באלימות. ידידי ישראל יודעים גם כמה קשה לטפל באלימות, במיוחד כשמצלמות הטלוויזיה עוקבות אחר כל תקרית. אולם המהומות והטיפול בהן משפיעות גם על תומכי ישראל מובהקים, כפי שעולה מעצומה שהתפרסמה בזמן האחרון בעתון היהודי בלוט אנג'לט על חתימתם של כ-90 מנהיגים יהודיים בולטים מכל המגזרים. המזכיר שולץ תקווה להצלחה. הוא מכיר שאין חזרה למינוח ק"ד, ולפיכך מדברים על **TRANSITION** במקום אוטונומיה, אך חשוב לחזור לפתרון, ובייחוד לקראת קביעת גבולות - כי הרי, כפי שאמר לו ידיד יהודי, לא נגיע לכל הסכם עם הפונדמנטליסטים (מאחר שדבר לא ישיע את רצונם) ועל כן עדיף להגיע להסכם עם האלמנטים המתונים יותר בקרב החושבים המקומיים ע"מ להפריד בשורות הפלסטינאיות.

4. היינץ דיבר בעקבות קרנסטון, בהעירו שרוב הדברים כבר נאמרו. השגריר נמצא אצל ידידים שרוצים בטובת ישראל. שולץ וגם הנשיא רייגן הם חיוביים וחזקים. אנו תקווה שהמזכיר יתקבל באופן חיובי. לא יהיה מועיל (**HELPFUL**) אם ישראל תגרום לחילוקי דעות בין שתי המדינות. המטר היסודי ביוזמת שולץ: נא להתחיל לדבר. כעת דעת הקהל בארה"ב מכירה בכך שאם כי ישראל לא יצרה את המצב הנוכחי, עליה לחיות עמו ב-**DIGNITY AND HONOUR**, והפרספציה היא שישראל נכשלת באתגר זה. מאמרה של ג'יין קירקפטריק (שהתפרסם בעתון וושפוסט אתמול) המצביע על עומק הדאגה מקרב ידידי ישראל. כולנו מכירים בקשיים אך תקוותנו היא להתקדמות ולא לקשיים נוספים.

5. השגריר הודה לסנטורים עבור המסר הידידותי הברור. ימסור אותו אישית לרה"מ ולשה"ח תוך פחות מ-48 שעות. ה-**ANGUISH AND TORMENT** אצל ידידינו כאן ידועים לנו, וגם בישראל תחושות אלה עוברות עלינו. אך, כמובן, אין די בכך כי הרי אנו צד לסיכסוך ועלינו להציג עמדה ברורה. אנו מוכנים לכך, ואין זה מעניינו "לחת ציוניס", אך חבל שהמלך חוסיין אינו

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מיחס מספיק חשיבות לשליחות שולץ כדי לחזור מחופשת הטקי שהוא עושה באירופה.

6. אין זה סוד שיש חילוקי דעות בתוך ממשלת ישראל, אך השרים מכירים באחריות המוטלת על כתפיהם. המזכיר שולץ יתקבל לא רק בידידות, אלא גם בלב ובראש פתוח. רוחשים לו יחסים אישיים טובים, ולכן קיימים יסודות חיוביים, שיהוו תמריץ לקידום התהליך. עם זאת, הוסיף ארד, חובתו לא להשאיר מקום לאשליות - לא נראה שתהיה תוצאה מיידית מביקור שולץ באזור. טרם ראינו את קווי היסוד (ה-**BLUE-PRINT**) של יוזמת שולץ, אך הקונספטים ידועים לנו, וייתכן שיש בהם מרכיבים שאינם ניתנים לביצוע במהירות שהמזכיר רוצה בה. הוא יסקף נאמנה את מסר הסנטורים בשיחותיו בארץ.

7. השגריר המשיך ואמר שאנו קולטים אותו מסר מהקהילה היהודית, והוא מבקש להצביע בפני הסנטורים על הרצון הכללי בישראל, החל ברה"מ, להשיג התקדמות לקראת שלום; ונתוך הכרה באילוצים הפוליטיים הקיימים, אנו חותרים להתחלת התהליך ולהשגת פתרון.

8. קרנסטון העיר שלפני השיחה פנו (הוא ובושביץ) לכ-10 סנטורים נוספים שלא יכלו להיות נוכחים בשל ההתראה הקצרה ובשל התחייבויות אחרות, אך לא יכלו להשתתף, היו מצטרפים לדברים שנאמרו. בושביץ הפטיר באומרו שאין הם טוענים שהמצב פשוט; נהפוך הוא - אך יש לנו האיש הנכון למשימה, המזכיר שולץ, ומן הראוי שנעבוד עמו ושנשתף פעולה עמו.

יוסף אמרן
למדן

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ששב ועשה בוועידת ז"א בג' נבה בשבוע שעבר, שאש"פ רוצה "בכל ארץ פלסטיין". להערכת השגריר, שולץ מציאותי ואין לו אשליות לגבי סיכוייו. הוא מצפה לתמיכה מחוסיין וממובראכ' ובנטיבות אלה מקווה שימצאו פלסטינאים שיטלו חלק בירזמה. לא ידוע באיזו מידה הנחות אלה מבוססות, אך ימיט יגידו.

4. כאמור, לאורך השיחה לא הורפה סרבנט מנושא המחומות ומהצורך בריסוק המפגנים. בתשובה לשאלותיו, העיד השגריר שאנו חשים בליאות מסויים מצד התושבים בשטחים, אך אין ספק שיעשו מאמץ להראות לעולם שירזמת שולץ איננה הדרך לגבי דידם, במיוחד לאור העובדה שהמדינה מהורה כלי נוח מאד לצורה זו של לוחמה. סרבנט תהה באם חזונו את המחומות כזו הרדי הרבה היה תלוי בהיערכותנו מראש. בכל מקרה, לאחר התפרצותן, הוא רוצה להאמין שאנו כוחנים באופן רצוני את השיטות ואת האמצעים שאנו נוקטים בהם לשם החזרת הסדר על כנו. הוא ביקש לדעת גט באם הממשלה ציפתה לכיטוי, ולאופי הכטוי, שזכינו לו בתקשורת. השגריר העיר שהבעיה מסובכת יותר ממה שעולה במרקעי הטלויזיה: הפגנות לשם העברות מסר מדיני הן דבר אחד, אך אנו נתקלים ב **LOW INTENSITY WARFARE** ובו מרכיב מעבר להתנגדות לכיבוש והוא המאבק על אדמת ישראל, דבר שכא לבטוי חד-משמעי לא מכבר בתכנית "48 שעות" ברשת CBS.

5. הסנטור הוסיף ושאל מדוע בעת הפגנות בעזה אין אנו סוגרים את הרצועה ונותנים למקומיים להתפרע, הוא גילה הבנה לתשובת השגריר שלמעשה נשחק לידי ההמון, ותוך פרק זמן קצר יאשימו אותנו בעולם הגדול במניעת אספקה ושירותי רפואה וכו"ב. ארד ציין גם שאם מאחורי השאלה מסתתרת המחשבה שניסוג מעזה, אזי פירוש הדבר העברת השלטון לידי הפונדמנטליזם האיסלמי והפוכת האיזור למנרף להתקפות על ישראל. כמובן ניתן לחטום את חבל עזה לפני כלי התקשורת ולנקוט בצעדים קשים עוד יותר ואולי נשיג תוצאות - אך אין זו מדיניותנו ואיש אינו סבור שניתן לפתור את הבעיות הקולוניאליות באמצעי שיטור מהומות. סרבנט הסכים שלא נוכל לוותר על השלטון בשטחים, אך הביע דעתו שכל עוד לא נמצא תשובה נאותה להפגנות, נעסוק במדיניות בעלת סיכונים גבוהים לממשלת ישראל ולעם ישראל.

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6. להלן נקודות נוספות שסר, בנס העלה בשיחה:
 - (א) יש להפריד את המהומות מיוזמת השלום של שולץ.
 - (ב) הנסיונות שנעשו באוקטובר אשתקד, ואולי ההזדמנויות שנתגלו, לא זכו לתהודה בקרב הציבור.
 - (ג) יש בעיות מסויימות בגישת שולץ כיום (בניחוח הזיקה בין פתרון הביניים והאמצעי הסופי) אך יש לו סיכוי להצלחה וכדאי שכנסה.
 - (ד) הוא מסכים שקיימת "אחדות מסויימת" בישראל, אך חילוקי הדיעות מספקים הזדמנויות למתנגדי השלום. הסמיכות בין המהומות וחגיגות שנת ה-40 הקנה צירוף מקרים בלתי נוח אך בלתי נמנע.
 - (ה) בקונגרס כעת אין נושאים שדורשים החלטה מיידית, ולכן אין לישראל בעיה מיידית בגבעה וגם זו לטובה.

7. הסנטור התעניין הביטויים רבים של הסבך והמכלול (מקור המהומות והתארגנות / עמדות ירדן ומצרים מזה וברה"מ מזה, הלך הרוחות בקרב ערביי ישראל, האפשרות של הקדמת הבחירות בישראל ועוד).

- אך בסוף הסכים עם הערכת השגריר לפיה הנזק העקרי לישראל טמון בהצגת האירועים ע"י כלי התקשורת, ובעוד שקיימות תמיהות ותהיות רבות, נותרת התמיכה הבסיסית לישראל. סרבנט הוסיף שאסור שנהיה STAMPED ע"י התקשורת ושיכפו עלינו פתרון בלתי רצוי, כי הרי בטחוננו שברירי מדי (Too Tenuous).

ב.ג.ה.
למדו

אנא אוקידיטא -

Dr. Moshe Yegar
Consul General of Israel
New York

לכ"ר דקל

(ובן סוף אפי"ר)

החלה דניס בוק 22 בפברואר 1988

~~צמ הערטים של דור דקל - באפי~~

~~אריה יפיצו היטן ויתן למצוי.~~

~~ואל פיוגורו~~

~~(לתי)~~

אפי"ר ממוט בקארהסאט צו

האפי"ר ה באו ל פי דקל

(הפרק של מ-10 בפברואר): זרמן

אן, קאנסול ההסרה ויטורו ברטל,

צייק בר. מסורקא לפי דקל

יטורק עם ~~ה~~ קאנסול.

באנו ל עזר יצק וואו. יטמן. /

הנהגות

הנהגות ושינוי פ' יבנה אלוהי קיימנו

הנהגות - הנהגות Speakers Bureau

הנהגות ושינוי אלקה אלוהי

הנהגות ... ביחוד לא בתנאי הנהגות

הנהגות

הנהגות אבני

הנהגות

Dr. Dekel

Prof. Laizer (3x)

Illinois University

Department of Specialized Psychology

Dekalb, Ill. 601152854

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Henry Kissinger

What a Mideast Peace Could Look Like

Convinced that the status quo is becoming unsustainable, shaken by Arab-Israeli violence on the West Bank and responding to appeals by such Arab moderates as King Hussein and President Hosni Mubarak, the United States seems ready to undertake another search for peace in the Middle East.

Secretary of State George Shultz is about to leave for the Middle East to see if a peace process can be started up again. He follows Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who traveled through the area with a proposal that, according to press accounts, envisages early elections to implement self-government for the West Bank and Gaza as anticipated by the Camp David accords of 1978. This is to be part of a negotiation toward an overall settlement in which an international peace conference is to play a significant, as yet undetermined, role.

It is to be hoped that recent violence will enable the parties to resolve the three issues that have defeated them in past autonomy talks: What area is subject to self-government? Who shall govern it? How can Israel's security concerns be met? The answer to these questions will shape a final settlement, for the area under autonomy will almost surely be also the area eventually returned to full Arab sovereignty.


Once the negotiations leave the well-traveled terrain of Camp David, the United States should involve itself only if it is prepared to see the process through to a conclusion. Every agreement negotiated between Israel and Arab parties has had U.S. participation as the indispensable ingredient.

At this writing, an international peace conference is emerging as the *deus ex machina* of Middle East diplomacy. Its goal is often stated to be contractual peace—as if peace were a legal concept. But India and Pakistan, and Iran and Iraq, which live in contractual peace, have fought bitter wars and killed more people than Israelis and Arabs. The lesson, then, is that peace emerges not from documents but from concrete conditions; a definition of substance must be the first goal of Middle East diplomacy.

Neither the parties nor the international community is anywhere near a consensus as to what sort of compromise should be sought. They do not agree even on who the appropriate negotiating parties should be. In Israel, the Likud bloc of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is opposed both to an international conference and to any territorial concessions; the Labor alignment of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres favors both, but it is afraid to put forward concrete ideas lest it lose support in the forthcoming Israeli elections. In the Arab world, moderates ask for the '67 frontiers, including the return of the Old City of Jerusalem; radicals oppose any settlement with Israel. The Soviet Union supports an international conference, the political program of friendly radical Arab countries and undefined international guarantees. The other permanent members of the Security Council advocate a conference and see no sense in risking Arab friendships by deviating from Arab

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positions.

Then there is the problem of what to do about the Palestine Liberation Organization. It will be traumatic for Israel to cede any part of the West Bank. To see established there an entity whose program throughout its history has included the destruction of the Jewish state is both unwise and beyond the competence of any foreseeable diplomacy. Whatever

BY JANUZZ KAPUSTA

“The ideal interim solution would be a unilateral Israeli initiative declaring its readiness to place Gaza and certain heavily populated areas of the West Bank under Arab control.”

after which concrete issues will be negotiated bilaterally between Israel and the relevant Arab party. And America apparently has promised Israel that the bilateral talks cannot be referred to the plenary session without the consent of both parties and that if Israel decided to withdraw from the conference, America would walk out too.

These procedural devices cannot possibly prevent the isolation of the United States, or of Israel for that matter. To begin with, the current situation is not even remotely comparable to 1973. Then, Israeli troops were astride the Suez Canal and 12 miles from Damascus. The United States alone was in a position to alter that state of affairs. Its substantive program was buttressed by the argument that there existed no alternative to American mediation. A great Arab statesman was prepared to stake his prestige on the step-by-step approach.

None of these conditions exists today. Israel is deeply divided; no Arab leader is in a position to undertake solitary initiatives. The idea that Israel and the United States could walk out of an international conference together is naive. In the unlikely event that the United States would join such a desperate gesture, it would only mean a change of venue. For the United States could not possibly accept a prohibition against continuing talks in normal diplomatic channels or through special emissaries.

The idyllic picture of an international conference proceeding to a conclusion through a give-and-take in bilateral negotiations is a mirage. Deadlock is the almost certain result of direct talks, after which there would be increasing pressure on the United States to break the deadlock based on the same arguments used to assemble the conference in the first place.

The United States must not delude itself. Most

legalistic formulae may be conceived will be rejected by significant, violent factions of the PLO, and those who pay lip service to them will not be permanently satisfied with the part of Palestine that could become theirs under any foreseeable territorial compromise. King Hussein, the target of several PLO attempts to unseat him, and conscious of his inability to negotiate a common bargaining position with Yasser Arafat, knows very well that he would be once again the first target of PLO expansionism.

The irreconcilable positions of the parties, the ambiguity of the Soviet position and the differences with our European allies are supposed to be overcome by a conference where all the parties can exhibit their incompatibilities. The model, we are told by advocates of the conference, is the 1973 Geneva conference, which met in plenary session only once. Thereafter, several agreements were negotiated between the parties under American auspices, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Israeli officials have claimed that there exists an agreement between Israel and King Hussein (which he has never confirmed) to confine such a conference to a ceremonial opening role



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advocates of a conference want to use it to maneuver America into imposing a settlement. The Soviet Union, in particular, is receptive because a conference would restore it to a central role in the Middle East and enable it to take credit for having made America induce Israel to yield. Soviet participation therefore could be constructive only if the Kremlin were prepared to sponsor a genuine compromise—in other words, if it would ask the same sacrifice of its radical Arab allies that a conference will undoubtedly expect of America's friends. The same, to a greater or lesser extent, is true of the other permanent members of the Security Council. If America wants to avoid being isolated, accused by the majority of acting as Israel's lawyer and by Israel of betrayal, it must obtain clarity about substance before a conference from all parties that seek to participate.

In these exploratory talks the U.S.-Israeli dialogue is especially delicate. The United States clearly has an obligation not to weaken the security of an old, reliable, democratic ally. But it cannot perform this role unless Israel speaks with the approximation of a single voice. The incompatible positions of the prime minister and the foreign minister will put a nearly impossible burden on even the most well-intentioned U.S. government.

The ideal interim solution would be a unilateral Israeli initiative declaring its readiness to place Gaza and certain heavily populated areas of the West Bank under Arab control and inviting negotiations to discuss governance and security arrangements. Since Israeli divisions almost certainly preclude this, negotiations under American auspices would be the best approach. But, whatever the forum, even if matters have gone too far for a unilateral American effort, the focus of American diplomacy must be on establishing a substantive framework.

The following principles should be part of such a framework:

- Israel must face the fact that it cannot permanently occupy territory inhabited by a reluctant population.

- The Arab parties must give up the illusion that they can achieve their maximum program simply in return for accepting the state of Israel. Everywhere else, recognition is the beginning of diplomacy, not the end of it. For Israel to return to the 1967 frontiers would leave it in the position of Czechoslovakia after Munich. The corridor between two of Israel's principal cities, Haifa and Tel Aviv, was 10 miles wide before the 1967 war. It would be indefensible under modern conditions. "Minor rectifications"—the sacramental formula—is too imprecise. The criteria must be security and defensibility.

- Guarantees by outside powers cannot be a substitute. The challenge can always be kept below the threshold of unambiguous threat. And guarantees can be used as a lever to prevent retaliation for fear of jeopardizing the guarantee. Moreover, an international guarantee is almost always subject to a veto by one of the guaranteeing powers.

- The city of Jerusalem cannot again be divided, though a special status for the Holy Places and ensured access to them is essential.

- The areas ceded by Israel must be demilitarized under an inspection system in which Israel participates.

- Either Jordan or a consortium of moderate Arab states must assume responsibility for the civil administration of Gaza and those West Bank territories given up by Israel. Obviously, Palestinians will play an important role in such an administration, but not the PLO as a political organization.

The task of American diplomacy is to get from all parties in advance of any international conference an agreement that sacrifices and compromises are essential for progress toward peace. Only if that is done can an international conference make sense. Otherwise, the United States is far better served by unilateral initiatives.

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Jeane Kirkpatrick

What Is Israel to Do?

"Israel now confronts the most serious crisis of its history," a leading French journalist wrote last week, expressing a view widely held around the world. Is it true? And what is the nature of the crisis?

It is a many-layered problem. At its most superficial level, the problem is continuing violence that has more and more taken on the character of a popular rebellion. But deeper down, it is a problem that involves the future of not only the Palestinians but of Israel itself.

The violence is a blatant, head-on challenge to Israel's authority in the territories. It cannot be ignored and it confronts the government of Israel with an ultimate choice: either reestablish order or accept the loss of the territories and the collapse of policy—and the collapse of hopes for more secure borders and peace.

Each alternative is more dangerous than it initially appears. It is extremely difficult to reestablish order when there is a large supply of young Palestinians ready to risk death. Moreover, the use of force to put down the challenge is extremely costly to Israel's international reputation.

The persistent violence of Palestinians has put Israel in a double bind, the kind described by Carlos Marighella, Brazilian tactician of revolution, in his "Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla." According to Marighella, a small band of violent men can create a situation in which "the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people and of suspects, closing off streets, make life in the city unbearable."

In the wake of these repressive measures, Marighella continues, "the general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents." Eventually, as repression grows, "the political situation in the country is transformed into a military situation in which the militarists appear more and more to be the ones responsible for errors and violence, while the problems in the lives of the people become truly catastrophic."

Marighella might well have been describing life today in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel possesses the necessary force to quell the uprisings, but could not use it against a civilian population. In fact, the force already used by Israel has brought harsh condemnation. If those engaged in violence are rounded up and deported, the U.N. Security Council describes the act as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. If those engaged in violence are shot or beaten, Israelis and friends of Israel around the world are deeply repelled.

But not everyone is equally repelled by violence.

"You freed us from the Latin age of political logic and taught us to be crazy,

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too," Arab poet Nizar Kabani wrote of the students of Gaza. "Teach us," he implored the "crazy" young Palestinians who risk their lives daily against Israeli occupation authorities. "Teach us to become men."

Nizar Kabani is not alone in his pride. Many older Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are proud of the young men who take to the streets day after day to hurl stones, break windows, start fires and risk death. The uncalculating courage of these would-be martyrs has sparked wide admiration in the Arab world.

A preference for violence over "political logic" is hardly new to this region, where religious, ethnic and political differences lead not to pluralism but to assassination, anarchy and war. In this region violence is regularly a vehicle for changing regimes, and murder frequently triggers succession. There

is no ruler in the region who has not been targeted by an assassin and no minority that has not been oppressed.

Often in the politics of this region intransigence is mistaken for courage and compromise for cowardice.

This is also the region where governments demonstrate their commitment to each other by refusing to accept the existence of Israel and by punishing deviation from the policy of "no peace with the Zionist entity."

These facts give a special edge to the demand that Israel "compromise" its position with those who seek its annihilation. Only this week, "moderate" leader Yasser Arafat called Israel "our country," reaffirming his view that Israel is Palestine and that the PLO is engaged in a war to win it.

Prospects for diplomatic settlement are no better than for a cessation of violence. In a recent interview with

L'Express magazine, Jordanian King Hussein rejected any and all interim arrangements for autonomy on the West Bank or Gaza and reiterated that the only acceptable step in a peace project is an international conference consisting of permanent members of the Security Council and the countries of the region.

No sooner had George Shultz suggested a U.S. initiative than Syria's Hafez Assad rejected it out of hand. And now Arab countries, including Egypt, have publicly rejected the Camp David Accords as a basis for negotiation. This latest hardening of the Arab position makes capitulation by Israel a precondition to negotiation.

What then can Israel do? In this double bind, the government of Israel is left with those policies that can be adopted unilaterally. Israel can and should:

1. End beatings because they are brutal, brutalizing and unbearable to less violent political cultures. Arrest, imprisonment, deportation are surely preferable to breaking bones and shooting stone-throwers—even very violent stone-throwers.
 2. Eliminate discriminatory economic regulations and open up market outlets for the agricultural and industrial products of Palestinian Arabs.
 3. Maximize the autonomy of Palestinian areas on the model that Mayor Teddy Kollek has pioneered in Jerusalem.
 4. Cultivate maximum respect for the economic, social and human rights of Palestinians in the territories.
- None of this comprises the "complete solution" demanded by Israel's adversaries, but it's better than the alternatives.

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END





RABBI ALEXANDER M. SCHINDLER • UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS
PRESIDENT 838 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 (212) 249-0100

February 22, 1988
4 Adar 5748



The Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister
The State of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for giving me so much of your time, all the more so because of the many other more urgent demands of your office. I am certainly grateful for the warmth of your reception.

I retain my conviction that the resolution of the current crisis rests with Israel's political and not with its military leadership, and that only the beginning of a negotiating process will achieve domestic tranquillity and secure Israel's future.

Your strong leadership in that direction will, I am absolutely confident, gain the fullhearted support of Israel's citizenry as well as of the Jewish world, even as it will secure your place in our people's history.

Again, my thanks for your courtesies.

Respectfully,

Alexander M. Schindler

AMS:jc

דחיפות: מ ל ד י	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1
טווח בטחוני:		מחור: 2
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עמדות צירי קונגרס מאיזור ניו-יורק.

ב-21 נערכה ארוחת הבוקר השנתית חמסורתית של ה-JCRC של ניו-יורק עם צירי הקונגרס של איזור זה. הנוהג הוא שכל ציר קונגרס משמיע הודעה קצרה על הנושאים המעניינים אותו או שהוא עסוק בהם כבית הנבחרים. בד"כ משמיעים בהזדמנות זו הודעות בסוגיות המעניינות את הקהילה היהודית. ישראל תופשת תמיד מקום בולט בהודעות אלה.

אתמול נפתח האירוע בדברי לטטר פולק, יו"ר JCRC, שהשמיע דברי תמיכה בלתי מסוייגים בישראל בשם הקהילה היהודית בניו-יורק. אחריו דיברו, בזה אחר זה, 12 צירי קונגרס. (6 נעדרו מסיבות שונות). לא כל הדוברים הזכירו את ישראל. היו כאלה שדיברו על יהודי בריה"מ ונושאים אחרים. בין אלה שדיברו על הנעשה אצלנו בלטו: בנימין גילמן (יהודי) שהביע תמיכה במסעו הקרוב של שולץ. טד וייס (יהודי) הזכיר שלמהומות יש רקע הסטורי שצריך להבינו. עם זאת אמר שהוא מקווה שישראל תדע לשמור על ערכיה וסיפר שהוא מקבל מכתבים רבים מאיזור הכחירה שלו (ווסט סייד של מנהאטן) בענין מדיניותנו ביש"ע. אחריו דיבר צ'רלס שומר (יהודי) שהביע תמיכה בלתי מסוייגת בישראל ואמר שאין לה בני-שיח ערכים לנהל עם מו"מ. ג'ורג' הוכברוקנר (לא-יהודי) נאם נאום תמיכה חם וסיפר על ביקורו בארץ זה לא מכבר ועל התרשמותו ממימדיה הזעירים של ישראל. לפני ביקורו לא ידע שישראל כה קטנה! מיג'ור אוון (שחור) הבטיח לשומעים שהתמיכה בישראל בקונגרס עומדת בעינה עם זאת מתח ביקורת מתונה על מדיניות ישראל. רוכרט גרסיה (לא-יהודי) ממוצא היספני) אמר שדיווחי התקשורת על הנעשה בישראל אינם מאוזנים. ביל גרין (יהודי) הזכיר שעם קום מדינת ישראל נערכו חילופי אוכלוסין ערכים-יהודים. הפליטים היהודים מארצות ערב נקלטו בישראל ואילו הפליטים הערכים נשארו

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תאריך:	22.2.1988	שם השולח:	משה יגר	אישור:
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דחלפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 2
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במחנות. בעיה זו יש לפתור. הדובר האחרון היה תומס פולי, מנהיג סיעת הרוב בבית הנבחרים, שהיה אורח הכבוד. הוא איננו מאיזור ניו-יורק, אלא ממדינת וושינגטון. הוא שיקף את דברי קודמיו כנאום תמיכה תקיף בישראל באומרו שהיא בעלת ברית של ארה"ב. הוא דיבר על הפרספקטיבה החסטרית של המהומות ואמר שמה שקורה אצלנו לא ישפיע על מחויבות ארה"ב לישראל.

יתכן שה-JCRC יכין סיכום מפורט יותר על הדברים. נעביר לכם כשנקבלו. בארוח בוקר זו השתתפו ראשי הפדרציה היהודית בניו-יורק, נציגי ארגונים יהודים שונים, נציגי קהילות אתניות אחרות, נציגי התקשורת וכן גם שלשה מעמיתינו בושינגטון.

זו השנה השלישית שאני נוכח באירוע זה וכמו לפני שנה (בתקופת פרשת פולרד) ולפני שנתיים, כך גם הפעם היתה זו הפגנה פומבית של תמיכה בסיסית של צירי הקונגרס של ניו-יורק רבתי בנושאים המעסיקים את הקהילה היהודית כאן ובעיקר בישראל. להערכה זו שותפים גם ראשי ה-JCRC שארגנו את האירוע ושאלתי אותם להתרשמותם.

יגר



אישור:

משה יגר

שם השולח:

22.2.1988

תאריך:

רה: 1
מתור: 6

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

טופס מברק **בהול**

דחיסות: ק"ה

סוג כסחובי: ME

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א ל : מנהל מצפ"א, לשכת שו"ח, לשכת רה"מ.

ד ע : השגריר וושינגטון

מאת : סגן ווקונסול הכללי - מרדכי ידיד

עמדות צירי קונגרס מאיזור ניו-יורק.

1. איזחת הבוקר והשנחיה הקונגרסיונלית להסגנת ידידות וחמיכה בישראל. בהמשך לויווח הקונכ"ל נר 565 מהיוט, מצ"ב חמליל מספר והכסאויות של קונגרסמניט.
2. ה"דיילי ניוז" סקר היוט בקצרה האירוע.
3. אשר נעיט - מניח שחעביר המצ"ב לידיעה וקונכלי"ח.

מרדכי ידיד

מה שחמליל
המסבחה
2
אשר נעיט
מניח שחעביר
המצ"ב לידיעה
וקונכלי"ח.

איטור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

619/93
2/6

JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL OF NEW YORK
CONGRESSIONAL BREAKFAST
FEBRUARY 21, 1988

TRANSCRIPTION OF STATEMENTS

CONGRESSMAN BENJAMIN GILMAN, ROCKLAND AND WESTCHESTER

In my position in the House Foreign Affairs Committee we are very much involved in what is happening today. We hear a great deal of comments both pro and con throughout our nation on what should be done and what is being done. I think that at this very troubled period it is extremely important that we examine the root causes of the problem rather than to give so much attention to the symptoms. We should take a look at what the underlying disease is. Of course that is the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that depends on direct negotiations. For years Israel has proclaimed its willingness to sit and have direct negotiations and yet there has been a resistance by the most effective of all of the Arab leaders, the one that could do the most to resolve this issue and of course that is King Hussein of Jordan. Until we can get Israel and the Arab leaders, where ever that leadership may be, to sit directly across the table from each other the problem will continue to foment. At at this point in this very troubled time I think it is important that we remind folks that it is extremely important that we resolve the underlying issue, through negotiations, through direct negotiations and try to find a vehicle to solve the problem. That is why Secretary Schultz is in the Soviet Union meeting with Foreign Minister Shevrenasky and that is why he's on his way to the Middle East. He met with a number of us before he went with a declared determination to try to find some new solutions, some new vehicles and perhaps out of this tragedy that is occurring today in Israel, these violent protests, riots we will find a new vehicle and a new motivation and new incentive to bring the opposing parties together. I think there is another opportunity and the Secretary of State is becoming involved because he senses that opportunity. He is attempting to do something very important in that respect. He has strong support from the congress on both sides of the aisle. Many of us met with the Secretary before he left and assured him of our staunch support. We in the Foreign Affairs Committee issued a public statement just this week expressing our strong support.

6/19/93
3/6CONGRESSMAN TED WEISS, MANHATTAN, BRONX

Let me talk a minute about my sense to the reaction of what has been happening in the West Bank and Gaza in Israel. I think what Ben Gilman has said is absolutely correct, there is a tendency on the part of many people to like only at the days footage on the television and to believe that history began that very day and to forget the 40 years of crisis that Israel has had to live under. I think there is also a willingness to forget that any governmental authority in fact has to exercise authority that it comes with the business of government administration. But I think that those people in the leadership of the Jewish community who have been, such as I think of Morris Abram, but there have been a lot others, who have at the same time that they reaffirmed the undying commitment to the survival and straightening of Israel have also expressed concern for making sure that Israel's values continue to be maintained and to be presented to the world is extremely important. I have gotten a tremendous number of calls and letters and communications from people within my district, Jews and NonJews alike and it is happening to all of our colleagues across the country. I think that we ignore the concern that people have about what they see happening at Israel's peril. So I think that it is important to approve the Israeli government's commitment now publicly to review some of the policies and in fact to react with more concern as to how those policies and carried out and how they are viewed by the rest of the world. I think that Israel just means too much to all of us to allow what is happening at the moment to be wiped out and to wipe out all the goodwill that Israel has around this country. What is going to be a continuing struggle I think for all of us, but I think that with sensitivity and commitment Israel will persevere.

6/9/93
4/6CHARLES S. SCHUMER, BROOKLYN

We've all watched film clips with anguish and we've wondered sometime or other what is happening in Israel and what will happen in the future. That is something that as Jews and as Americans we should be worrying about. When ever I am confronted by either one of my colleagues or just someone who is saying what the heck is going on here I always think back to what the nexus of the problem is. It could probably be summed up by a brief segment that was on a CBS news show 48 Hours. They brought the 7 or 8 leaders of the Gaza rebellion from the Palestinian camps and put them on TV with hoods on. They had hoods on because they didn't want to identify themselves. They asked each one if they would accept somewhere in what was considered before 1948 Palestine a Jewish State, they asked each one of these leaders, 'it wouldn't even have to be 1967 Israel' the commentator stated, just a portion of that, to a person each one said NO. There isn't Palestinian leadership at this point that will accept the state of Israel and there is frustration and anguish and concern in the camps and some of us would like, and some say well perhaps we can find it somewhere or other, but at this point its not there and that's the dilemma at the bottom of it all. I don't think we should forget that. I don't think we should be letting some of our friends forget that because when you think through the problems faced with an independent Palestinian state or even some kind of autonomous entity that doesn't have military power on the West Bank or in Gaza the bottom line, the reason that it is so difficult is that the mainstream of Palestinian opinion doesn't accept the existence of Israel and until they do we are not going to be able to have any kind of constructive solution in the Middle East.

6/9/93
5/6CONGRESSMAN MAJOR R. OWENS, BROOKLYN

People like Foley can be found in great abundance in Israel and that the present challenges that Israel faces can be eventually met by those people if they are allowed to come forward and participate in the process. The government will share decision making with some of the people outside the government. I don't pretend to have any solutions for the kind of problems that Israel presently faces. I do know that as Ted Weiss said the pressure on congressmen are tremendous in terms of taking positions. First and most important for those of us in congress who are friends of is to let it be known that we are still friends and we would like to make certain that Israel knows that it has the umbrella of support, meaning loyalty and patience. That umbrella of support is there and Israel does not have to hysterically rush in to some kind of attempt to solve the problem that meets the deadlines of the evening news. It is important to spread the umbrella and keep it there to allow those forces within Israel, I'm sure the ratio of brilliant young people and wise men in Israel is as great to the ratio of the general population as it is any where else in the world and that they will come forward. There is a need to understand that we may not have any miracles similar to the miracles made by Anwar Sadat and Menahem Began, history like lightning doesn't strike twice in the same place. History doesn't repeat itself in such a short span of time. It is not likely to have those kinds of miraculous solutions or there's not likely to be, we know there's not another Jimmy Carter in the White House ready to extend himself. Some other solution, probably some other set of processes are going to have to generate a solution. I hope that since I am a dove, I was against the war in Vietnam I am for the people to people diplomacy in connection with Nicaragua and in numerous ways I would identify myself as a dove, if I was in Israel I'd be the peace movement. I'd be a dove there also. I'm also a member of the Civil Rights, Martin Luther King and a follower of Martin Luther King, not blindly, not dogmatically. I can understand the need for violence, violent response in certain places in the world, A and C and the black in South Africa will never be able to get their rights via the non violent process. Israel could never have survived, could not survive unless it had developed one of the worlds most efficient fighting machines. That's necessary for survival, but survival now and I don't think the present crisis is anything like crises Israel has had to face in the past. They have faced crises and difficulties far worse than this, they will overcome this one, but the present does require that the doves and the hawks get together and somehow the government make room for people who have new kinds of wisdom and are willing to do something perhaps unheard of in history of the world. To have a power the government in power must be a proponent of non violence in order to overcome a situation were certainly the people, the Palestinian people are in rebellion and its a civilian rebellion, but I don't think its correct to call it a non violent movement. It is not non violent to use stones and burn tires, stones and tires if they had them would be converted to bombs and napon if you have that kind of thinking, so we don't have a non violent movement there. The possibility is there Chuck that leadership could develop and arise within the Palestinian people if only you could keep the PLO out and stop them from murdering those people when they come forward. That you would have a Martin Luther King develop among the Palestinian people and somewhere from among the Israeli society the institutions that are there to support its people will come together and fashion a solution which in concert with

619/93
6/6

a new kind of leadership among the Palestinian people would prevail. Our job is to remain steadfast and loyal and keep that umbrella of support over Israel so that it knows it has time to work out a solution and it can do it properly.

MAJORITY LEADER THOMAS S. FOLEY

Events in the Middle East have caused a focus on the continued state of disruption and lawlessness and potential war in that region of the world. I'm constantly asked a question that I think is troubling question if is: Will the congress and the American government put pressure on Israel through the form of withdrawing or holding on question our support in order to achieve some solution to the problems of peace in the region? In the first place I think the question is terribly misplaced because Israel has sought peace, it has been the neighbors of Israel who have rejected the opportunity to bring about peaceful solution. Secondly in a totally pragmatic way there is noway that we can try or should even think about truing to bring pressure on Israel to accept a solution that is not seen by Israel as solution to the problem being on the front line of that confrontation. Thirdly, I think one of the greatest achievements and the great credits of American post-war policies has been the strong alliance with Israel, cultural, military, bonds of friendship and concern that are not going to be broken. We have the opportunity and the obligation to give Israel our consul and our concern, but certainly our commitment should not be in question and will not be in question.

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דחיפות: מיד סוג בטחוני: שומר	לקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	
תז"ח: 221330		המשרד
נר : 00601		
50 e		נאו"ם

אל: מנהל ארכל 2
 דע: סמנכל ארכל
 שגריר/ציר/מחני- וושינגטון
 מאת: יוחנן ביין

כינוס מחודש של העצרת ה-42 - משרדי אש"פ - שיחה עם שגריר ניו זילנד.

1. כדי לעמוד על הלוך הרוחות בקרב הקבוצה המערבית - שוחחתי עם שגריר ניו זילנד DAVID A. MCDOWEL היו"ר התורן של קבוצת "המערביות ואחרות".
2. מחר (23.2) יהיה מפגש של ראש לשכת נשיא העצרת עם יושבי ראש הקבוצות האיזוריות.
3. הוא עצמו מחוסכל מהמצב - שכן כידוע, WEO אינה קיימת, כביכול, לדיון בנושאים מדיניים, אלא בעיקר לסיכום עמדות בנושאים מנהליים וכספיים. אין עמדה מערבית מגובשת - וסביר שגם לא תהייה כזו. כל שהוא יכול לעשות בשלב זה הוא להיות צינור חד-סיטרי, דהיינו להעביר מחשבות הקבוצה הערבית והבלמ"ז אל המערביות. הוא לא יוכל להכיע דעה כשם קבוצת ה-WEO, כיוון שאין דעה כזו.
4. לאחר שמיעת דברי הנשיא וראשי הקבוצות האיזוריות, ייאלץ לקיים דיון עם כל אחת מחברות הקבוצה המערבית ולנסות למצוא מכנה משותף.
5. בשבוע שעבר הודיעו היו"ר התורן של הקבוצה הערבית, שגריר כחריין, כי אין בדעת הקבוצה לפעול עד שהתובע הכללי של ארה"ב יודיע על החלטתו. היה בדעתם אז לכנס העצרת ולהביא להצעת החלטה שתקרא לבוררות (ARBITRATION). עתה כשנודע שבדעת התובע הכללי לדחות ההודעה על החלטתו עד לאחר סיום מסעות המזכיר שולץ - וכיוון שנראה לקבוצה הערבית חשוב שהעצרת תכונס לפני ה- 29 דנא (90 יום לאחר החלטת הקונגרס) - יש בדעתם לקרוא לכינוס העצרת כמחוקנו, וכינון

שם השולח: אישור:


Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including names like "מ"ר" and "המשרד".

דחיסות:	לקת הקשר ניו-יורק	2
סוג כסחוני:	טופס מברק	4
תז"ח:		
נר : 00601		
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שצפוי שארה"ב לא תהייה נכונה לבוררות - יקרא כנראה לחוות דעת ביה"ד הבי"ל.

6. סיכמנו כי אתקשר עימו שוב מחר (23.2) בצהריים כדי לשמוע מה העלתה הפגישה עם המזכ"ל, ולהתייעץ על המהלכים הבאים.
7. לוטה נוסח מחודש של פניית שגבחריין לכינוס העצרת. בנוסח זה - בשונה מקודמו - הפניה היא אל נשיא העצרת ולא אל המזכ"ל.

נאו"ם



אישור:

שם השולח:

יוחנן ביינר

22.2.88



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/42/919*
19 February 1988
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

Forty-second session
Agenda item 136

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY

Letter dated 18 February 1988 from the Permanent Representative
of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the General Assembly

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of February 1988, I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the Chairman of the Sixth Committee at the 62nd meeting, held on 11 December 1987, to the effect that the Committee would remain seized of item 136, "Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country", with a view to keeping it under active review. This statement was confirmed by the President of the General Assembly in the statement he made at the 92nd meeting of the Assembly, which is fully reflected in decision 42/460, adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1987.

I also wish to refer to General Assembly resolution 42/210 B and to the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 February 1988, issued as document A/42/915.

In the light of the foregoing, I have the honour to transmit to you, on behalf of the Arab Group, a request that the forty-second session of the General Assembly should be resumed as soon as possible, and no later than 29 February 1988, in order to complete the consideration of item 136.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

00601 /90 4/4

A/42/919
English
Page 2

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter distributed as an official document of the forty-second session of the General Assembly under agenda item 136.

(Signed) Karim Ebrahim AL-SHAKAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
State of Bahrain
Chairman of the Arab Group

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סגירות ישראל נושין גטונ

534 1/2

דפ 1 סחוכ 2 דפס

סוג כסחוני טמ/ דחיפות ל"נ- תאריכ/זייח 1905 : 22

אז: מלכת לפני נצק
צא: אלמ והפ

בית הקברות והבית הגדול

הצב נכח שפילה ודניכ המיעוט כולל צב

החוף וכולל צב המלחמה המכה המכה

אמצע המכה המכה 17-18

יום אמר פקיסט למ חרתי
בית הקברות כחמ"ב

המכה מצד מצד המלחמה

לחמה

אידיעט

יום אמר

לחמה 2 3 3 2
אמר 1 1 1
בית 2 1 1

LEE H. HAMILTON, Chairman
 BUS VAYTON, Pennsylvania
 STEPHEN J. BOLAND, New York
 DON BONNER, Washington
 BERRY S. STUBBS, Massachusetts
 BOB WEAVER, Florida
 EDWARD WOLFE, Michigan
 BOB W. GOODRICH, Jr., Michigan
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 PETER W. ROSENBLUTH, Pennsylvania
 ROBERT S. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
 LAWRENCE J. BROWN, Florida
 HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
 MEL LUTWIG, California
 EDWARD J. FEIGHAN, Ohio
 TED WYLLIS, New York
 GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
 GEORGE S. LOHMEYER, Arizona
 CHESTER S. ATENDE, Massachusetts
 JAMES SHELTON CLARKE, North Carolina
 JAMES S. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
 JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada
 WAYNE OWENS, Utah
 FORD C. BURDA, American Samoa
 JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff

One Hundredth Congress
Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
 Washington, DC 20515

WILLIAM F. BRIDGES, Illinois
 BENJAMIN A. GILOM, New York
 ROBERT J. LADOGARINO, California
 JOE LEECH, New York
 TONY ROTH, Washington
 SYLVIA J. SCHINE, Maine
 BERRY J. WYDE, Illinois
 HERALD H. BOLDEN, New York
 BOUC BRESLITER, Wisconsin
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 CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
 DONALD W. RYAN, Pennsylvania
 MICHAEL BENTON, Ohio
 SAM BURTON, Indiana
 JIM WYBURN, Kansas
 JOHN MILLER, Washington
 DONALD E. BUELL, Louisiana
 BEN BLAZ, Utah
 STEVEN K. BERRY, Majority Chief of Staff

February 17, 1988

534 2/2

The Honorable George P. Shultz
 Secretary of State
 Department of State
 2201 C Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:


We appreciated the opportunity to discuss your forthcoming trips to the Soviet Union and to the Middle East. You are to be commended for your dedicated efforts in advancing peace and we support them fully.

We share your concerns about the recent events in the West Bank and Gaza, and we are aware of the complexities of trying to reenergize peace efforts at this time. Based on our own discussions with leaders in the Middle East, we share your judgment that there is an opportunity in the present environment for achieving some progress. It is appropriate to pursue that opportunity, given that all parties believe that maintaining the status quo can only lead to a worsening of the present volatile climate.


We wish you every success in your journey for peace and look forward to continuing a dialogue with you on this important issue.


With best regards,

Sincerely yours,


 Dante B. Fascell
 Chairman
 Committee on Foreign
 Affairs


 William S. Broomfield
 Ranking Minority Member
 Committee on Foreign
 Affairs


 Lee H. Hamilton
 Chairman
 Subcommittee on Europe
 and the Middle East


 Benjamin A. Gilman
 Ranking Minority Member
 Subcommittee on Europe
 and the Middle East

ד' באדר תשמ"ח
22 בפברואר 1988
4-דש-27

לכבוד
גב' לאה סידיס
מצפ"א
משרד החוץ

הנדון: סם רוטברג (מכתבך מן ה-18.11.87)

ועדת ההיגוי לחגיגות שנת ה-40 דנה בנושא
ב-18.2.88. לשכת שר החינוך תעביר למשרד החוץ תשובה
מוסמכת.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אריה מקל
יועץ מדיני לראש הממשלה

11. 11. 1904

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מגכיר הממשלה

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זוהי גוף כ"ב

לפיכך - אסגל הממשלה כ"ב

ההיקף; לפי המצב הנוכחי

א כ"ב

א"ק
א"ל

מדינת ישראל

תאריך 20/12/03

אל: אילי רובינשטיין
נואת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

אנו בעדף של הרצ"ב? אין לנו
הסמך - מן הנ"ל (רובינשטיין) אלא
מכרזי קריטריונים. אולי צריך להצטרף
אלה - היצירה למקום נוסף
במסגרת של 40? הרי
הנשואים שלה היוצרים וההיא?
א/יה

א/יה רובינשטיין
מזכירות הממשלה
תקבל



כ"ו חשוון תשמ"ח
18 בנובמבר 1987

1688

ת"ן אר"מ

אל : לשכת רה"מ - א"י י"א (ת"ן)
מאת : מצפ"א

הנדון: סם רוטברג

נשיא הבונדס, בלצברג, הציע שבמסגרת ארועי שנות ה-40 (אם אפשר בין ה-16-21.4.88) יעניקו רה"מ ומ"מ רה"מ ושה"ח אות הוקרה לסם רוטברג כהערכתם לפועלו ותרומתו למען ישראל.

מר בלצברג מבקש לדעת אם הצעתו מתקבלת. אנא הודיעונו.

ב ב ר כ ה,

א"י י"א

לאה סידס

Text of letter to Finance Minister Moshe Nissim from Secretary
of State George P. Shultz, February 22, 1988

Dear Mr. Minister:

Allen Wallis and Herb Stein told me that the recent meeting of the JEDG was one of the most encouraging we have had. We appreciated the frank appraisal by your delegation of the successes and difficulties of your government's stabilization programs and the steps toward structural reform. We were struck by the extent to which your economists and ours agreed on the successes achieved and the challenges that lie ahead. Our continuing concern for Israel's economic well-being stems from the belief that a broad and healthy economy is one of the best foundations for Israel's continued security. Under Secretary Wallis will be writing you separately with more detailed observations about the Israeli economy.

Difficult steps remain to be taken to ensure economic stabilization. Much of the welcome good news still bears seeds of future problems. The lower budget deficit was partially due to increased indirect tax revenues resulting from an unhealthy increase in consumption. Rapidly rising real wages, together with the current exchange rate policy, has led to a further deterioration in the trade account -- a clear danger signal. These problems could require painful policy adjustments in the future resulting in increased unemployment, unless they are closely monitored now.

I appreciate the emphasis you place on sound fiscal policy. I agree with you that fiscal restraint, supporting monetary policy, and structural reform are steps that will lead Israel from its hard-won economic stability to sustained growth.

Continued sound fiscal and monetary policies accompanied by a responsive exchange rate policy, will be key in addressing Israel's balance of payments problems. The careful formulation and coordination of these policies will maintain the benefits of the stabilization program while helping to control the external balance.

In the coming months there may be even greater pressures to increase spending. I want you to know that you have our full support as you implement your courageous and sound policies of fiscal restraint. I know that they will allow Israel to begin its next forty years with a new era of economic growth.

/Signed/ Sincerely yours,
George P. Shultz

WOJAC

הארגון העולמי של יהודים יוצאי ארצות ערב
المنظمة العالمية لليهود النازحين من البلدان العربية
WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES JUIFS ORIGINAIRES DES PAYS ARABES

ג' באדר תשמ"ח
21 בפברואר 1988

לכבוד
מר אריה מקל
יועץ רוה"מ לענייני תקשורת
משרד ראש הממשלה
קרית בן-גוריון
ירושלים

שלום רב,

אחת המטרות שהצבנו בכנס וושינגטון היתה להעמיק מודעות
הקונגרס האמריקאי אודות זכויות יהודי ערב.

אנו שמחים לציין שמטרה זו הושגה ומצרפים שלושה מסמכים
שהוכנסו לדברי הקונגרס אודות נושא ווז'ק והחלטותיו
בוושינגטון ע"י חברי הקונגרס: גארי אקרמן, ברני פראנק ומל
לוין, זה אחרון הגיש הצעה לתיקון חוק סיוע החוץ האמריקאי,
בענין יהודי ערב, שאושרה ע"י הקונגרס בארה"ב.

בכבוד רב,

מרדכי בן-פורת
יו"ר ההנהלה העולמית

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1987

Congressional Record



United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 100th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

TY.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to explore, through diplomatic consultations with other members of the United Nations Security Council, the feasibility of creating a United Nations peacekeeping force to maintain freedom of the sea in the Persian Gulf. These consultations should include consideration of—

(1) the possible creation of a United Nations naval force in the Persian Gulf, with the prospect of reducing, but not necessarily eliminating, the role of individual nation state activities, and

(2) the possible flagging of commercial vessels by the United Nations.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall report to the Congress on the results of consultations carried out in accordance with subsection (a).

—Page 145, insert the following after line 18:

SEC. 766. ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA BY OTHER COUNTRIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) President Arias of Costa Rica proposed, and on August 7, 1987, the President of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed, an historic agreement to bring peace to Central America; and

(2) the peace plan in that agreement calls for ceasefires, amnesties, dialogue, democratic processes, and the reduction of military forces.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that unless and until—

(1) the Nicaraguan Government is in full compliance with its obligations under the Central American Peace Agreement signed in Guatemala City on August 7, 1987, and

(2) democratic institutions are established in Nicaragua which result in broad respect for fundamental human rights of all citizens of that country.

the Governments of the countries of Western Europe should not provide any direct assistance to the Government of Nicaragua. Any assistance to the Nicaraguan people should be limited to aid provided through organizations which are not under the direct or indirect control of the Government of Nicaragua.

By Mr. LEVINE of California:

—Page 16, after line 7, insert the following:

SEC. 116. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SALES OF MISSILES.

Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended in the first sentence—

(1) by striking out "or" after "\$200,000,000 or more,"; and

(2) by inserting "or any missiles, rockets, or associated launchers or any artillery projectiles (without regard to the amount of the proposed sale)," after "\$14,000,000 or more,".

—Page 16, after line 7, insert the following:

SEC. 116. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF STINGER MISSILES TO PERSIAN GULF REGION.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no STINGER anti-aircraft missiles may be sold, leased, donated, or otherwise provided, directly or indirectly, under the Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to any foreign government in the Persian Gulf region during fiscal year 1988 or fiscal year 1989.

—Page 94, after line 21, insert the following:

(d) FUNDS FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—It is the sense of the Congress that a priority use of any funds—

(1) which are made available for fiscal year 1988 or fiscal year 1989 to carry out

chapter I or part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to development assistance) or chapter 4 of part II of that Act (relating to the economic support fund), and

(2) which are unobligated at the end of that fiscal year and would otherwise be returned to the Treasury,

should be the furnishing of assistance to Jordan to support the West Bank and Gaza development initiative.

—Page 109, after line 8, insert the following:

SEC. 617. FLIGHT OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) many Jews presently living in Israel and the Diaspora are originally from Morocco, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and the other countries in the Middle East and North Africa representing the proud heritage of oriental Jewry;

(2) the number of Jews who are still citizens of these countries has dropped drastically, as can be seen when comparing 1948 to 1984: Syria, 45,000 versus 4,500; Morocco, 40,000 versus 17,000; Iraq, 125,000 versus fewer than 300; and Libya, 40,000 versus none;

(3) these numbers demonstrate that thriving Jewish cultures and communities, each unique, each historic, each contributing substantially to the enrichment of their respective countries, have been decimated; and

(4) the execution of the leader of the Lebanese Jewish community, the tightening of the noose by the Syrian government around the necks of its Jewish citizenry, the shooting and stabbing of a pregnant Jewish woman and her two young children by unknown assailants in the Syrian town of Aleppo, and other such incidents remind us that, with the notable exceptions of Morocco and Tunisia, those Jews remaining in Arab countries continue to suffer deprivations, degradations, and hardships, and continue to live in peril.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should—

(1) call upon the governments of those Arab countries where Jews still maintain a presence to guarantee their Jewish citizens full civil and human rights, including the right to lead full Jewish lives free of fear and to emigrate if they so choose;

(2) specifically urge the Government of Syria to halt its intolerable policy of holding its Jewish citizenry hostage through harassment and intimidation and to allow them to emigrate; and

(3) commend countries such as Morocco and Tunisia for their tolerant treatment of their Jewish minorities and for the protection afforded to them.

By Mr. LEWIS of Florida:

—Page 80, strike out line 23 and all that follows through line 13 on page 84 (sections 509 and 510) and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SEC. 509. ASSISTANCE FOR BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, AND PERU.

(a) CONDITION ON ASSISTANCE.—For fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1989, all foreign assistance for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru shall be suspended unless the President reports to the Congress that the production in that country of illicit narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances was at least 25 percent less during the calendar year in which that fiscal year began than it was during the preceding calendar year.

(b) DEFINITION.—As used in subsection (a), the term "foreign assistance" means assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (other than under chapter 8 of part I, relating to international narcotics control), the Agricultural Trade Development and

Assistance Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act.

—Redesignate sections 511 through 513 as sections 510 through 512, respectively.

By Mr. DONALD E. LUKENS of Ohio: —Page 192, after line 20, insert the following:

(d) PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—Assistance may not be provided under this section for projects or programs in any country—

(1) which receives from the Soviet Union more than three-quarters of the military assistance that it receives from foreign countries, or

(2) in which there are more than 55 military personnel (serving in any capacity) from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cuba, or any other Soviet bloc country.

—Page 192, strike out lines 1 through 4.

—Page 150, strike out line 16 and all that follows through line 4 on page 151; page 177, at the end of line 22, insert closing quotation marks and a period; and page 178, strike out line 1 and all that follows through line 10 on page 180.

By Mr. MARKEY:

—Page 217, strike out line 18 and all that follows through line 19 on page 218; and page 218, line 20, strike out "(d)" and insert in lieu thereof "(b)".

—Page 219, line 14, strike out "and"; line 18, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof "; and"; and after line 18, insert the following:

(3) the acquisition by Pakistan of those aircraft will not substantially exacerbate the danger of nuclear weapons competition with India; and

(4) the President has received reliable assurances that Pakistan has not modified, and will not modify, any aircraft provided to Pakistan by the United States to serve as a delivery vehicle for a nuclear explosive device or to assist in the delivery of a nuclear explosive device.

—Page 226, strike out lines 5 through 10.

—Page 226, after line 10, insert the following:

SEC. 930. ANNUAL REPORT ON PAKISTAN.

The President shall submit a report to the Congress each year which details—

(1) the extent to which Pakistan has received assistance or support from other countries for activities related to nuclear enrichment or the development of nuclear weapons and the extent to which Pakistan has cooperated with or assisted other countries in nuclear enrichment or nuclear weapons development activities; and

(2) the extent to which Pakistan has shared sensitive United States military technology or information with any other country or allowed such technology to be compromised.

By Mr. McCOLLUM:

—On page 216, line 21, strike the period and insert a comma and add the following: "and that the President should withhold any and all appropriated funds for India until the government of India announces a plan to facilitate this growth in contacts."

—On page 217, line 7, after the word "Pakistan" add the following: "and India"

—On page 217, line 8, after the word "Pakistan" add the following: "and India"

—On page 217, line 11, after the word "Pakistan" add the following: "and India"

—On page 218, line 25, after the word "Pakistan" add the following: "and India"

—On page 210, line 18, strike the period and insert a comma and add the following: "or any invading country."

—On page 226, line 10, strike the period and insert a comma and add: "provided that first

100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3100

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 16 (legislative day, DECEMBER 15), 1987

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

AN ACT

To authorize international security and development assistance programs and Peace Corps programs for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “International Security and Development Cooperation Act of
6 1987”.

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of
8 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

131

24 SEC. 620. PLIGHT OF JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES.

25 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

1 (1) many Jews presently living in Israel and the
2 Diaspora are originally from Morocco, Syria, Yemen,
3 Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, and the other countries in the
4 Middle East and North Africa representing the proud
5 heritage of oriental Jewry;

6 (2) the number of Jews who are still citizens of
7 these countries has dropped drastically, as can be seen
8 when comparing 1948 to 1984: Syria, 45,000 versus
9 4,500; Morocco, 40,000 versus 17,000; Iraq, 125,000
10 versus fewer than 300; and Libya, 40,000 versus none;

11 (3) these numbers demonstrate that thriving
12 Jewish cultures and communities, each unique, each
13 historic, each contributing substantially to the enrich-
14 ment of of their respective countries, have been deci-
15 mated; and

16 (4) several incidents, including the execution of
17 the leader of the Lebanese Jewish community, the
18 tightening of the noose by the Syrian government
19 around the necks of its Jewish citizenry, and the shoot-
20 ing and stabbing of a pregnant Jewish woman and her
21 two young children by unknown assailants in the
22 Syrian town of Aleppo, remind us that, with the nota-
23 ble exceptions of Morocco and Tunisia, those Jews re-
24 maining in Arab countries continue to suffer depriva-

1 tions, degradations, and hardships, and continue to live
2 in peril.

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the sense of the
4 Congress that the United States Government should—

5 (1) call upon the governments of those Arab coun-
6 tries where Jews still maintain a presence to guarantee
7 their Jewish citizens full civil and human rights, in-
8 cluding the right to lead full Jewish lives free of fear
9 and to emigrate if they so choose;

10 (2) specifically urge the Government of Syria to
11 halt its intolerable policy of holding its Jewish citizenry
12 hostage through harassment and intimidation and to
13 allow them to emigrate; and

14 (3) commend countries such as Morocco and Tuni-
15 sia for their tolerant treatment of their Jewish minori-
16 ties and for the protection they have provided against
17 attack from the Moslem majorities.

18 SEC. 621. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE
19 PERSIAN GULF.

20 (a) CONSULTATIONS REGARDING FEASIBILITY.—It is
21 the sense of the Congress that the President should direct the
22 United States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
23 tions to explore, through diplomatic consultations with other
24 members of the United Nations Security Council, the feasibil-
25 ity of creating a United Nations peacekeeping force to main-

Vol. 133

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1987

No. 184

Congressional Record



United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 100th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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R&E Electronics of Wilmington, N.C., has entered into direct negotiations with Japanese telecommunications/computer firm NEC to market NEC's product line in the United States, according to Mr. Vega. Too, Hispanics could be new competition in areas where Japanese and Taiwanese companies hope to market, which makes getting to know them all the more important.

Getting to know Hispanics, though, has proven to be somewhat strange experience for the Japanese, who live in a largely homogeneous society. It was not surprising that when the trade mission delegates held meetings with government officials or private business representatives, there was first an explanation of who U.S. Hispanics are and what they represent within the broader context of the United States economically, politically and culturally. It was thus appropriate that in his opening remarks, Rep Torres said, "Much like the Republic of China, which is situated on an island, in a sense we too are a people that constitute an island within the vast ocean of society in the United States."

TRADE WARS

Following Mr. Torres' remarks were strong words from Republic of China (ROC) Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. John H. Chang, who went directly to the heart of a growing sentiment among the Free Chinese about the United States' reluctance to normalize formal political relations with Taiwan. "While we have been patient and shown flexibility in our efforts to demonstrate that we seek to be a stabilizing partner in trade and commerce, we will not be forced to accept terms dictated to us that plunge our industries into dependence again on foreign interests," Mr. Chang said.

The flexibility to which Mr. Chang refers has become a central issue Taiwan has raised in its discussions with U.S. officials. H.E. Robert Chien, Minister of Finance, briefed the Hispanic delegation on steps the government has taken to affect its current multimillion dollar trade imbalance, including the removal of more than hundreds of items from its list of import products taxed upon arrival at Taiwan's ports of entry. Further, of the items that remain, there has been a general reduction of import duties imposed, he added.

Taiwan has also started to liberalize some of its internal monetary policies, particularly in the area of foreign investments by

ROC individuals and groups. Investors now can depart the country with millions of dollars and not be questioned about how the funds will be used. This step was taken specifically to encourage development of joint venture projects outside Taiwan.

"We believe these policies are clear examples of our sincere interest in meeting and overcoming any imbalances which may exist in our present trade picture," Mr. Chien said, "but this will take time and we need the understanding and patience of the United States while we adjust this situation. Also, the United States must do its share to encourage more development of its technologies and its businesses must be willing to do trade with the Republic of China. Why should we be penalized for being successful at business simply because others are unable or unwilling to improve their products?"

One Hispanic Caucus congressman, however, noted that the Nationalist Chinese are beginning to realize they need to improve their image in the world trade community. "For a long time now, they have been prospering but at the expense of other economies, including our own," he says. "Their lower cost of living allows them to manufacture and export products into the world marketplace, including the U.S. market, at a disproportionate advantage over U.S. manufacturers, many of whom helped the Nationalist Chinese first develop their industries. Now, they know that there needs to be a readjustment of economic relationships, but it's a bitter pill to swallow when they've been seeing all the money coming in."

Some Taiwanese voice this view privately. "The leadership of this country is living in a political vacuum and it has created a fantasy that it does not want disturbed," says one Taiwanese businessman. "While this economic situation may represent a confrontation of philosophical differences, to us who must live with whatever decisions are reached, it has become a matter of survival. I believe that we must be willing to face the tough realities now."

Back in Washington, D.C., Rep. Torres says the trip built the bridge that will permit reciprocity to begin between Asians and U.S. Hispanics. "It provided a tremendous degree of opportunity for the Hispanic community, which heretofore was not known to have specific products or services to offer in Japan and Taiwan," Mr. Torres says. "Men and women with goods and serv-

ices to provide were given the opportunity to demonstrate they have the capability and ability to deliver on time and competitively with everybody else."

WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES

HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, November 17, 1987

Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. Speaker, I would like to pay tribute to a unique organization, the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries [WOJAC]. Since 1975, WOJAC has represented over 2 million Jews from the Arab world, approximately one-half of whom now live in Israel.

It is a little-known fact that enormous numbers of Arabs have immigrated into and emigrated out of Israel since its founding in 1948. Indeed, 750,000 Arabs have moved to Israel from such diverse countries as Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. At the same time, approximately 500,000 Arabs have left Israel to settle in the Arab world. This enormous shift in population is not often recognized.

WOJAC represents Arab Jews who have immigrated to Israel and those who have remained in their native countries. Among many other activities, WOJAC petitions Arab nations on behalf of Jews who want to emigrate, and it seeks to gain material compensation for Arabs who left personal and religious property in the Arab world. It supports development projects that improve the quality of Arab immigrants' lives in Israeli West Bank and Gaza. WOJAC also works to stop persecution of Jews still living in Arab nations, by calling for civil, human, and religious rights.

Last month, WOJAC held its third international conference here in Washington. The sessions drew participants from around the world who care about these vital issues. I salute WOJAC at the time of its international conference, and applaud its efforts to bring attention and justice to Arab Jews living in Israel and elsewhere.

Vol. 134

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988

No. 3

Congressional Record



United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE *100th* CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

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**TRIBUTE TO HIS EMINENCE,
JOHN CARDINAL KROL**

HON. ROBERT A. BORSKI
OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 27, 1988

Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to His Eminence, John Cardinal Krol, retiring Archbishop of Philadelphia.

Cardinal Krol has had an extraordinary 51-year career in the Catholic Church. This son of Polish immigrants was ordained to the priesthood in Cleveland in 1937. He studied canon law in Rome and at Catholic University, where he received his doctorate.

In Cleveland, then Monsignor Krol served as Chancellor of the Archdiocese. He was consecrated as a bishop in 1953, and served as auxiliary bishop to the Archbishop of Cleveland.

In 1961, John Krol was named Archbishop of Philadelphia, and became the spiritual leader of the city's 1.3 million Catholics. In 1967, he was elevated to the Sacred College of Cardinals by Pope Paul VI.

While Archbishop of Philadelphia, the Nation's fourth largest Catholic diocese, Cardinal Krol served as an undersecretary of the Second Vatican Council, president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and as host of the International Eucharistic Congress in 1976.

Cardinal Krol has also distinguished himself as a member of the President's National Citizens Committee on Community Relations and as a trustee to both the Catholic University of America and the Catholic League for Religious Assistance to Poland.

His tireless efforts have led to countless honors, including the gold medal from the Padewski Foundation, the Philadelphia Freedom Medal and the Legion of Honor gold medal of the Chapel of Four Chaplains.

Cardinal Krol's reputation as an able administrator and authority on canon law has earned the respect of Catholics and non-Catholics alike, both in this country and around the world. His celebrated career of religious leadership and 27 years as Archbishop of Philadelphia merits our gratitude and our admiration.

I join the people of Philadelphia in paying tribute to John Cardinal Krol.

**THIRD INTERNATIONAL WOJAC
CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS**

HON. BARNEY FRANK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 27, 1988

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, there are a number of grave problems in the Middle East which attract newspaper headlines and television coverage. But there are other serious issues in that region which get less coverage, in part because they involve fewer people than some of the more dramatic issues, and in part because they are played out in societies which are repressive and do not allow free access to the news media. Among those problems is that of the Jews who remain imprisoned against their will in Arab countries.

The great majority of Jewish inhabitants of Arab countries have left for Israel and other places, as a result of the tensions which tragically divide the Arab and Jewish communities in the Middle East. But there are Jews who remain behind in Arab lands, and in many cases they are the victims of prosecution and oppression. This is a particular problem in three Middle Eastern countries which unfortunately are governed in ways which are antithetical to democracy and which do not recognize human rights: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

To represent the interests of those people left behind in Arab countries, and to represent as well the interest of those who are expelled from Arab countries, there exists an organization known as the World Organization of Jews From Arab Countries, or WOJAC. Recently, WOJAC held its third international conference here in Washington at the Omni Shoreham Hotel. I had the privilege of meeting with representatives of that organization at that time, and I was struck by their commitment to alleviating the plight of those less fortunate than themselves. A great deal of attention is legitimately given to the severe problems afflicting the Arab refugees of the series of Middle Eastern wars. It is clear that peace will only come to that troubled area when these Arab refugees are treated fairly and an overall political solution in the area must deal with this. The representatives of WOJAC also point out that an overall settlement must also look to the interests of those Jews left behind in Arab countries, and their questions of compensation for those forcibly resettled because of the Middle Eastern war should apply equally to Arabs who fled what is now Israel, and Jews forced to flee Arab countries.

Mr. Speaker, I insert the resolutions of the Third International WOJAC Conference:

**RESOLUTIONS OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE WOJAC—THE WORLD ORGANI-
ZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES—
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON, DC,
OCT. 28, 1987**

Whereas United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29th 1947 was rejected by the Arab League, which waged war against Israel, and this war gave rise to an exchange of populations between Palestine Arabs and Jews from Arab countries

Whereas some Arab States still deny human rights to Jews, in violation of basic international instruments, including "the right to leave," as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Whereas more than 900,000 Jews who left Arab Countries as refugees those who today number nearly half the Jewish population of Israel and those living in other countries constitute a major Middle East refugee movement that has not been adequately recognized.

Whereas Israel, having limited resources, absorbed the Jewish refugees from Arab countries at a cost of over \$11 billion.

Whereas the Arab League rejects a humanitarian solution to the Palestinian Arab refugee problem.

Whereas the State of Israel has declared, in a resolution adopted by the Knesset on October 26th 1987, that "Israel, for its part, has made it known that within the framework of a peace settlement, it will be prepared to compensate the Arabs who left Israel," and

Whereas UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 stipulated that a comprehensive solution of the Arab Israeli

conflict must necessarily include "a just settlement of the refugee problem," which includes the claims of Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

The World Organisation of Jews from Arab Countries urgently calls upon those Arab Governments concerned, particularly Syria, Iraq and Yemen:

To cease persecution of those Jews still living in their midst and to grant them their basic rights, and permit those who wish to emigrate to do so without hindrance; at the same time, the conference notes with appreciation those Arab governments which have adopted a moderate attitude toward their Jewish citizens.

WOJAC calls upon Syria to permit all those Jews who wish to emigrate to do so, and particularly to grant exit permits to Jewish women wishing to marry, in accordance with the promise made by President Hafez Al Assad to President Jimmy Carter in Geneva in 1977.

WOJAC calls upon the Arab States: To meet their international obligations by providing full compensation and indemnification for property and assets, as well as their cultural patrimony of which Jews were deprived.

To return to Jewish ownership and administration all religious and cultural properties.

To cease the political exploitation of the Palestinian Arab refugees and to work for a prompt humanitarian solution.

The World Organisation of Jews from Arab Countries reaffirms its solidarity to Israel's ongoing efforts to implement the Peace Treaty with Egypt and to develop friendly relations and establish a lasting peace with other Arab States.

WOJAC appeals to Jews throughout the world:

To support its struggle on behalf of Jews from Arab countries for the realization of their legitimate rights.

WOJAC appeals to the International Community, as well as to the United States government, presently negotiating for the release of hostages held in the Lebanon, not to forget the tragic plight of the Lebanese Jewish hostages, nine of whom have already been executed.

To use its influence upon Arab governments to fulfill their obligations for the protection of their Jewish minorities and to support the legitimate rights and claims of Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

WOJAC appeals in particular to the government and people of the United States of America to intensify their efforts to resolve the longstanding problems of Arab and Jewish refugees and to facilitate their integration into the societies in which they live.

**CONGRESSMAN DALE E. KILDEE
PAYS TRIBUTE TO REV. AVERY
AND MILDRED ALDRIDGE**

HON. DALE E. KILDEE

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 27, 1988

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to an extraordinary couple whose compassion and spiritual integrity have been a powerful force for good in my hometown of Flint, MI—Rev. Avery and Mrs. Mildred Aldridge.

On Sunday, January 17, Dr. Aldridge and his wife celebrated 31 years of pastoral service at the church Dr. Aldridge founded, the Foss Avenue Baptist Church in Flint. Their

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, HAID, ECON, EG, US

SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REVIEW, FEBRUARY 18, 1988

THIS REVIEW COVERS THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS (GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED; AROUND ONE MILLION CIRCULATION) AND THE OPPOSITION PRESS (NORMALLY WEELIES). BOTH CATEGORIES REFLECT THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESS. THE OPPOSITION PAPERS ARE NOT ONLY LIMITED IN CIRCULATION (10,000-50,000, EXCEPT FOR THE WIDER CIRCULATION AL-WAFD) BUT ALSO WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS IRRESPONSIBLE. NONETHELESS, THEIR STORIES FORM PART OF THE CAIRO RUMOR MILL; THEY CAN PROMPT DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AND INSPIRE PARALLEL STORIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PRESS.

HIGHLIGHTS

-- AMBASSADOR WISNER SPEAKS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ALEXANDRIA.

ד"ר אהרן

- FOREIGN MINISTER ARRIVES IN IRAQ ON A ONE-DAY VISIT.
- FAMOUS WRITER COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS AND ISRAEL, AND CAMP DAVID.
- ACQUITTAL OF ALL DEFENDANTS IN THE BAHAI CASE.
- ATTORNEY GENERAL TO ANNOUNCE INDICTMENT IN THE "EGYPT'S REVOLUTION" CASE.
- OPPOSITION AL-WAFD CLAIMS PERES WILL SHORTLY VISIT CAIRO.

~~פיוס~~
 נגרי הסכריו
 נאמר ג'ון
 קרייב :

ESTABLISHMENT PRESS: INTERNATIONAL NEWS

1. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WISNER. THE FRONT PAGE OF AHRAM AND GUMHOURIYYA QUOTE AMBASSADOR WISNER AS SAYING IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ALEXANDRIA THAT THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING HAS CREATED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN THE US AND ISRAEL UNDERLINING THE NECESSITY OF FINDING A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE.


פיוס

AMBASSADOR WISNER ADDED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING DIRECT OR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ISRAEL'S OBJECTION TO THE CONFERENCE. DESCRIBING ISRAELI REPRESSION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS INHUMAN, AMBASSADOR WISNER SAID THAT THERE WAS US DISSATISFACTION AND REJECTION OF THE POLICY ADOPTED BY ISRAEL TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS. HE ADDED THAT THE EXISTING PEACE-SEEKING SPIRIT IN THE REGION SHOULD BE EXPLOITED TO RESOLVE THE (PALESTINIAN) ISSUE. AMBASSADOR WISNER NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN COULD SERVE THE PEACE PROCESS BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE, FOR HE WAS NOT NOMINATED FOR ANY POLITICAL POST AND HAS NO POLITICAL DEBTS. COMMENTING ON ISRAEL'S BLASTING OF THE SHIP CARRYING THE EXPELLED PALESTINIANS, AMBASSADOR WISNER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PROOF OF ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS INCIDENT; AND THE US REJECTED TERRORISM OF BOTH SIDES. ON SECRETARY SHULTZ'S VISIT, AMBASSADOR WISNER SAID THAT THE RESULTS WOULD NOT BE GUARANTEED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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2. ISRAELI PRACTICES. ALL PAPERS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HEAVY COVERAGE TO ISRAELI "MASSACRES" IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. PAPERS REPORT ISRAELIS' CALL FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND PERES' STATEMENT THAT THE IDEA OF A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION IS NECESSARY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. UNSIGNED EDITORIALS IN PAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK ISRAELI POLICY AND PRACTICES, AND SHAMIR'S RIGID STAND.

3. SUPERPOWERS/ISRAEL. PROMINENT WRITER EHSAN ABDEL QUDDOUS WRITES IN EL-AHRAM THAT EGYPT CANNOT ABOGATE THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT IS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE US AND NOT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. EGYPT WAS COMMITTED TO THE USSR, AND THEN THE US TRIED TO WIN EGYPT'S SIDE BY ACHIEVING FOR IT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES, WHICH WAS DONE AGAINST THE WILL AND OF ISRAEL. THEREFORE, ESTABLISHING PEACE WITH ISRAEL MEANS ESTABLISHING PEACE WITH THE US. "IF ANY ARAB COUNTRY IS COMMITTED TO THE USSR, THE US WILL HAVE ISRAEL DEAL A BLOW AT THAT COUNTRY. ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE, OCCUPIES SYRIAN TERRITORIES AND ATTACKS IRAQ; THIS SITUATION WILL CHANGE ONLY IF SYRIA AND IRAQ CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE US." IF EGYPT ABOLISHES THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT, IT WILL HAVE TO FACE US AND ISRAELI FORCES ALONE, FOR THE USSR WILL NOT STAND BY EGYPT'S SIDE. THE ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IS THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS.

IN HIS DAILY COLUMN IN ALHABAR, MUSTAFA AMIN WRITES THAT ISRAEL IS PLAYING THE ROLE OF A BULLY OR AN OUTLAW IN THE REGION AND DEPIES THE WHOLE WORLD, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO ESCALATE ITS "SAVAGE" PRACTICES, FOR IT KNOWS THAT NO ONE IN THE US DARES TO SAY A WORD AGAINST IT SINCE IT CAN SUPPORT ANY CANDIDATE WHO UNCONDITIONALLY DECLARES LOYALTY TO WORLD ZIONISM. SECRETARY SHULTZ'S VISIT TO THE REGION WILL NOT INTRODUCE ANY SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE BECAUSE THE US IS NOW TRYING TO WIN THE FAVOR OF ISRAEL AND NOT THE ARABS. "MR. SHULTZ IS NOT COMING WITH SOLUTIONS TO OUR QUESTIONS BUT WITH ANESTHETICS TO GAIN TIME UNTIL THE US ELECTIONS." WHAT THE US WANTS FROM THE ARABS IN RETURN FOR PASING THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY BURDENS IN THE GULF WAR IS TO HALT THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, PUT OFF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND HOLD BILATERAL TALKS INSTEAD, ACCEPT ISRAEL'S HARDLINE STAND, AND FREEZE ANY ARAB POSITION SO THAT THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT WINS IN THE COMING ELECTIONS.

4. EGYPT/USAID. ALHABAR REPORTS THAT WITHIN THE US 1988 ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM WHICH TOTALS 315 MILLION DOLLARS, EGYPT WILL SIGN TWO AGREEMENTS WITH THE US, WHEREBY THE LATTER WILL EXTEND A GRANT OF 180 MILLION DOLLARS FOR CONSOLIDATING THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND A GRANT OF 50 MILLION DOLLARS FOR FINANCING ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE GOVERNORATES.

5. EGYPT/IRAQ. ALL PAPERS REPORT FM ABDEL MEGUID

UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO 004043/02

DELIVERED A MESSAGE FROM MUBARAK TO IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM
HUSSEIN ON BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE CURRENT ARAB
SITUATION. ABDEL MEGUID, IN IRAQ ON A ONE-DAY VISIT, WILL
ARRIVE IN CAIRO TODAY FEBRUARY 18.

UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO 004043/02

6. EGYPT/USSR. AKHBAR REPORTS MFA FIRST UNDERSECRETARY OSAMA AL-BAZ WILL RECEIVE SOVIET ENVOY POLYAKOV, IN CAIRO ON A ONE-DAY VISIT DURING HIS TOUR OF THE REGION TO DISCUSS THE CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING.

DOMESTIC NEWS

7. ALL BAHAIS ACQUITTED. AKHBAR REPORTS ON THE FRONT PAGE THAT ALL 50 DEFENDANTS IN THE BAHAI CASE HAVE BEEN PROVEN INNOCENT.

8. "EGYPT' REVOLUTION" CASE. ALL PAPERS REPORT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TODAY FEBRUARY 18 WILL ANNOUNCE THE INDICTMENT IN THE "EGYPT'S REVOLUTION ORGANIZATION" CASE. THE AG WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND DETAILED CONFESSION OF DEFENDANTS, WHO SAID THAT THE MAIN TARGET OF THE ORGANIZATION WAS TO IMPEDE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND ASSASSINATE MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN CAIRO.

9. POWER SHORTAGES COMING: AKHBAR QUOTES THE MINISTER OF ELECTRICITY AS SAYING THAT STARTING IN JULY, ELECTRICITY WILL HAVE TO BE CUT OFF PERIODICALLY IN SOME AREAS TO REDUCE ELECTRICITY LOADS AND CONFRONT AN EXPECTED POWER SHORTAGE OF 850 MEGAWATTS. ADDING THAT THE NUCLEAR ENERGY STUDIES ARE BEING PREPARED TO SUBMIT THEM TO THE CABINET, THE MINISTRY NOTES THAT THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AIMS AT PROVIDING ADDITIONAL ENERGY OF 5600 MEGAWATTS TO CONFRONT THE PROGRESSIVE INCREASE IN ELECTRICAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE COMING FIVE YEARS.

10. GRANTS TO PRODUCTIVE FAMILIES. AKHBAR REPORTS THAT INTERNATIONAL GRANTS OF 22 MILLION DOLLARS WILL BE PROVIDED OVER THE COMING THREE YEARS FOR EXPANDING THE PRODUCTIVE FAMILY PROJECT. THE NUMBER OF PRODUCTIVE FAMILIES IN THE GOVERNORATE OF AL-MENOUFIYA IS 635 SOCIETIES WHICH ARE FINANCED BY LOCAL AID OF 95 PER CENT AND GOVERNMENT AID OF 5 PER CENT.

11. PRIVATE SECTOR DEBTS. AHAM REPORTS THAT THE ECONOMY MINISTER'S DECREE REPAYING PRIVATE SECTOR FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBTS FROM THE PROCEEDS OF EXCHANGE MARKET WILL BE EFFECTIVE AS OF APRIL.

12. INVESTMENT LAW. AHAM REPORTS THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF EGYPT'S INVESTMENT AUTHORITY HAS TOLD THE KUWAITI NEWSPAPER "AL-SIYASSA" THAT EGYPT'S UNIFIED INVESTMENT LAW IS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT BY SIMPLIFYING THE EARLIER NUMEROUS LAWS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE POINTED TO EGYPT'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY WHICH PROVIDES AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTORS.

13. EXCHANGE RATES. ALL PAPERS THE BANK EXCHANGE RATE FOR FEBRUARY 17 WAS: USD 1 EQUALS L.E. 2.245 (BUYING) AND

UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO 004043/03

L.E. 2.251 (SPELLING). THIS WAS UNCHANGED FROM THE
PREVIOUS DAY'S RATE.

UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO 004043/03

OPPOSITION NEWS

14. EGYPT/ISRAEL. AL-WAFD REPORTS THAT PERES WILL VISIT QCAIRO SHORTLY HEADING A BIG DELEGATION TO ALLEVIATE TENSIONS ALONG THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BORDERS AND REACTIVATE BILATERAL RELATIONS SO AS TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE THE COMING ELECTIONS.

15. LAWYERS' STRIKE. AL-WAFD REPORTS SOME TRADE UNIONS HAVE RESPONDED TO THE CALL OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION TO HOLD A SIT-IN STRIKE TOMORROW FEBRUARY 19 IN PROTEST AGAINST ARBITRARY SECURITY MEASURES AND THE CONTINSE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY LAW. REPORTEDLY, FIFTY JOURNALISTS HAVE SENT CABLES TO THE LAWYERS CURRENTLY ON STRIKE CONFIRMING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE STRIKE TOMORROW. STUDENTS FROM CAIRO AND EIN SHAMS UNIVERSITIES HAVE ALSO DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE.

16. EGYPTAIR. AL-WAFD REPORTS THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPRESENTING 12,000 EGYPTAIR WORKERS HAS PROTESTED EGYPTAIR CHAIRMAN RAYAN'S DECISION TO BRING IN OUTSIDE PILOTS AND OTHER PERSONNEL TO DEAL WITH THE RECENT PILOTS' STRIKE AND EGYPTAIR'S APPROVAL OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEPARATE GROUND-HANDLING COMPANY. THE ASSEMBLY IS THREATENING A SIT-DOWN STRIKE AT CAIRO AIRPORT IN 10 DAYS.

WISNER
BT
#4043

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED CAIRO 004043/04

2000 - 1000 = 1000

1000 + 1000 = 2000

~~446.666~~ 666

~~1250 - 1000 = 250~~

21.2.88
4-ארה"ב-20

אל: ראש הממשלה
המנכ"ל

מאת: היועץ המדיני

הנדון: תוכנית ביקור מזכיר המדינה באיזור (25.2.88-1.3.88)

בפגישה עם צוות החלוץ של המזכיר, ועם סאליבן משגרירות ארה"ב, נמסרה לי היום תוכנית ביקורו של מזכיר המדינה באיזור. התוכנית איננה סופית וייתכנו בה שינויים.

יום ה' - 25.2.88

16.00-17.00 - הגעה לישראל.

ערב - חופשי, מלון הילטון בירושלים.

יום ו' - 26.2.88

08.30 או 9.00 - פגישה עם רה"מ במשרד רה"מ. הפגישה תמשך שעתיים.

- פגישה עם שה"ח (שעתיים)

צהרים - ארוחת צהרים עם שר הבטחון.

אחה"צ - פגישה עם משלחת עולים מבריה"מ.

ערב - פגישה עם פלשתינים (לא סופי)

- לינה בירושלים.

- (הערה: ביום שישי לפני הצהרים תתקיים גם פגישה עם הנשיא. טרם נקבעה שעה מדויקת).

יום שבת - 27.2.88

בוקר - טיסה לעמאן.

אחה"צ - טיסה מעמאן לדמשק

ערב - שיחות בדמשק.

בלילה - חזרה לירושלים.

יום א' - 28.2.88

בוקר - האמריקאים מבקשים שהזמן יישאר פנוי לפגישה עם רה"מ, לצורך דיווח על השיחות בעמאן ובדמשק.

- טיסה לקהיר.

ערב - חזרה לירושלים.

יום ב' - 29.2.88

בוקר - האמריקאים מבקשים שהזמן יישאר פנוי לפגישה עם רה"מ, לצורך דיווח על השיחות בקהיר.

- טיסה לעמאן.

ערב - חזרה לירושלים

- פגישת סיכום עם רה"מ. (ייתכן שפגישה זאת תתקיים ביום ג' בבוקר).

יום ג' - 1.3.88

בוקר - פגישת סיכום עם רה"מ (אם לא התקיימה בערב הקודם).

9.00 - המראה לאירופה.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אריה חקל

EDWARD F. FEIGHAN

19TH DISTRICT, OHIO

MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY



1124 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
202-225-5731

2951 FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING
1240 EAST NINTH STREET
CLEVELAND, OH 44199
216-522-4382

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

February 19, 1988

The Honorable Moshe Arad
Ambassador
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I ask for your assistance in transmitting the enclosed letter to Prime Minister Shamir.

I look forward to working with you and I hope we will be able to get together soon. Until then, I appreciate your assistance with this letter.

Sincerely,


EDWARD F. FEIGHAN
Member of Congress

EFF:nal



טובת ישראל וזשינגטון

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דף 1 מחוד 8 דפים

סווג בטחוני בלמ"ס

דחיסוח רגיל

חאריד/ז"ח 1215 19 בפבר' 88

מס' מברק

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480

104 372

המשרד - בטחון + ניו יורק

אל מעפ"א

דט: משהב"ט/מקש"ה, מנכ"ל אוצר, ומש"ן/ניו יורק

תקצוב 1989, (וסיוע).

אחמול (18) הגזש הנשוא דויגן לקונגרס את הצעת התקצוב האחרונה שלו. דבה בקשה לשלושה ביליון דולר לישראל ל-1989. הצעת התקצוב, המסתכמת בהרוב ל-1.1 טריליון דולר, הוכנה ע"פ הפשרה שהושגה ב"פסגה" התקצובית בין הממשל לקונגרס שהתכנסה אחר התמוטטות הבורסה אשתקד.

התגובות לתקצוב הן בעיקר בנוסח "לדחות את הכאב" - (להתמודדות עם הגרעון התקצובי האמיתי, ולא זה המצוייר בנתונים ובהנחות האופטימיים בהצעת התקצוב) הווהר ליוזשים: הן הממשל והן המחוקקים מודעים להיות זו שנה בחירות וימנעו ככל האפשר מנקיטת צעדים לא פופולאריים. כדברו אחד הקונגרסמנים, זו תהיה "השנה של הקדיצה הגדולה".

הנתון הכולט הוא הבקשה לזימון תקצוב ההגנה - הגידול לעומת 88 אינו מכסה את האינפלציה, ונזפל בכ-30 ביליון דולר מהסכום שהנשיא חזה במועד זה אשתקד עבור התקצוב הנוכחי. נתון זה משקף הכייה בצורך להמנע מעימותים.

לפונקציה 150 (עניינים בינ"ל) ביקש הנשוא 18.1 ביליון דולר בהרשאות ו-16.5 ביליון בהוצאות בפועל. טכום זה כולל גם הוצאות מחמ"ד, רשויות הרדיו הבינ"ל וכו'. לצורך סיוע חוץ גרידא מבקש הנשוא הרשאה (budget authority) בסך 16.515 ביליון מזה 13.334 בהוצאות בפועל (outlays) מספיים אלו הם בהתאם לסיכומים שהושגו בפסגה התקצובית האמורה שדוברת על גידול תקצוב הסיוע בשנז אחרזים. בגלל מורכבות הנהלת החשבונות, אינן גידול זה משתקף במספרים המצורפים.

מקבל התקצוב מצורף נספח, המפרט ביתר הרחבה את כוונות הממשל. מצורף הפרק על סיוע חוץ מתוך הנספח הנ"ל, ומעיון שטחי נראה שבנושאים הנוגעים לנו (ובודאי גם לאחרים) הוא מאמץ ושירות ניסוחים של החלטת ההמשך מאשתקד. בודאי תשימ לב לפרק הארוך על פריסת חובות זה GPF.

טובה הרצל

להיה 2
יהא 3
מנכ"ל 4
מנכ"ל 1
היון מנכ"ל 2
בדיה 1
3116 3

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FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

UNANTICIPATED NEEDS

Federal Funds

General and special funds:

UNANTICIPATED NEEDS

For expenses necessary to enable the President to meet unanticipated needs, in furtherance of the national interest, security, or defense which may arise at home or abroad during the current fiscal year, \$1,000,000 (Executive Office Appropriations Act, 1988.)

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-0037-0-1-802			
Program by activities:			
00 01 President's Special Review Board	242		
00 03 U.S. Secret Service	325		
00 04 White House Office	193		
00 05 Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms		150	
00 06 Reserved for future allocation		850	1,000
10 00 Total obligations	762	1,000	1,000
Financing:			
25 00 Unobligated balance lapsing	238		
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)	1,000	1,000	1,000
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net	762	1,000	1,000
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year	38	199	199
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year	-199	-199	-199
77 00 Adjustments in expired accounts	-22		
90 00 Outlays	579	1,000	1,000

These funds enable the President to meet unanticipated needs in furtherance of the national interest, security, or defense.

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-0037-0-1-802			
ALLOCATION ACCOUNTS			
11.1 Personnel compensation: Full-time permanent	21		
11.2 Other than full-time permanent	43		
11.8 Special personal services payments	19		
11.9 Total personnel compensation	83		
12.1 Civilian personnel benefits	5		
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons	33		
22.0 Transportation of things	1		
23.1 Rental payments to GSA	24		
23.3 Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	53		
24.0 Printing and reproduction	72		
25.0 Other services	410	150	
26.0 Supplies and material	26		
31.0 Equipment	54		
92.0 Undistributed, reserved for future allocations		850	1,000
99.9 Total obligations	762	1,000	1,000

EXPENSES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

Federal Funds

General and special funds:

EXPENSES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

For expenses necessary to improve the management of Executive agencies by providing a consolidated Federal budget and financial

information system, under the direction of the Office of Management and Budget, and to provide a comprehensive office automation system, including equipment and software, for the Office of Management and Budget, \$5,900,000, to remain available until expended.

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-0061-0-1-802			
Program by activities:			
00 01 Budget and financial information systems			1,800
00 02 Office automation			2,400
10 00 Total obligations			4,200
Financing:			
21 40 Unobligated balance available, start of year	-228	-228	-228
24 40 Unobligated balance available, end of year	228	228	1,928
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)			5,900
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net			4,200
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year			-800
90 00 Outlays			3,400

These funds enable the President to develop and implement improvements in the management, organization, and operation of the agencies of the executive branch. The budget request will support a more integrated approach to the management of government-wide financial activities. These funds will be used to modernize existing financial and management information systems into a consolidated budget and financial information system housed in the Office of Management and Budget. Funds identified for office automation will be used to provide networked support facilities for the Office of Management and Budget.

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-0061-0-1-802			
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons			20
23.3 Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges			150
25.0 Other services			100
26.0 Supplies and material			30
31.0 Equipment			3,900
99.9 Total obligations			4,200

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Federal Funds

General and special funds:

FOREIGN MILITARY [CREDIT] SALES CREDIT

For expenses necessary to enable the President to carry out the provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act, \$4,049,000,000, of which not less than \$1,800,000,000 shall be available only for Israel, not less than \$1,800,000,000 shall be available only for Egypt, \$250,000,000 only shall be available for Pakistan, not less than \$12,000,000 shall be available only for Morocco, \$334,000,000 only shall be available for Turkey, and not less than \$918,000,000 shall be available only for Greece: Provided, That to the extent that the Government of Israel requests that funds be used for such purposes, credits made available for Israel under this heading shall, as agreed by Israel and the United States, be available for advanced

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I-D2

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE—Continued
Federal Funds—Continued

APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989

General and special funds—Continued

FOREIGN MILITARY [CREDIT] SALES CREDIT—Continued

fighter aircraft programs or for other advanced weapon systems, as follows: (1) up to \$150,000,000 shall be available for research and development in the United States; and (2) not less than \$400,000,000 shall be available for the procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense services, including research and development.] \$4,160,000,000. *Provided [further]*, That [Israel and Egypt] all countries receiving funds under this heading shall be released from their contractual liability to repay the United States Government with respect to all credits provided under this heading[, and Pakistan shall be released from such liability with respect to \$30,000,000 of the credits provided under this heading, and Turkey shall be released from such liability with respect to \$156,000,000 of the credits provided under this heading]. *Provided further*, That during fiscal year [1988] 1989, gross obligations for the principal amount of direct loans, exclusive of loan guarantee defaults, shall not exceed [\$4,049,000,000. *Provided further*, That any funds made available under this heading, except as otherwise specified, may be made available at concessional rates of interest, notwithstanding section 3)(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act: *Provided further*, That the concessional rate of interest on foreign military credit sales loans shall be not less than 5 percent per year: *Provided further*, That all country and funding level changes in requested concessional financing allocations shall be submitted through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations: *Provided further*, That funds appropriated under this heading shall be expended at the minimum rate necessary to make timely payment for defense articles and services] \$4,160,000,000.

[FOREIGN MILITARY CREDIT SALES]

[(RESCISSION)]

[Of the funds made available in fiscal years 1985 and 1986 for expenses necessary to enable the President to carry out the provisions of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act, \$32,000,000 is rescinded.]

[FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DEBT REFORM]

[(a) REFINANCING.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized during fiscal years 1988 through 1991 to transfer existing United States guarantees of outstanding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit debt, or to issue new guarantees, either of which would be applied to loans, bonds, notes or other obligations made or issued (as the case may be) by private United States financial institutions (the private lender) to finance the prepayment at par of the principal amounts maturing after September 30, 1989 of existing FMS loans bearing interest rates of ten percent or higher, and arrearages thereon. The loans, bonds, notes or other obligations are hereinafter referred to as the "private loans": *Provided*, That such guarantees which are transferred or are made pursuant to paragraph (a) shall cover no more and no less than ninety percent of the private loan or any portion or derivative thereof plus unpaid accrued interest and arrearages, if any, outstanding at the time of guaranty transfer or extension: *Provided further*, That the total amount of the guaranty of the private loan cannot exceed ninety percent of the outstanding principal, unpaid accrued interest and arrearages, if any, at any time: *Provided further*, That of the total amount of the private loan, the ninety percent guaranteed portion of the private loan cannot be separated from the private loan at any time: *Provided further*, That no sums in addition to the payment of the outstanding principal amounts maturing after September 30, 1989 of the loan (or advance), plus unpaid accrued interest thereon, and arrearages, if any, shall be charged by the private lender or the Federal Financing Bank as a result of such prepayment against the borrower, the guarantor, or the Guaranty Reserve Fund (GRF), except that the private lender may include, in the interest rate charged, a standard fee to cover costs, such fee which will be set at prevailing market rates, and no guaranty fee shall be charged on guarantees transferred or issued pursuant to this provision: *Provided further*, That the terms of guarantees transferred or issued under this paragraph shall be exactly the same as the existing loans or guarantees, except as modified by this paragraph and including but not limited to the final maturity and principal and interest payment structure of the existing loans which shall not be altered, except that the repayments of the private loan issued debt may be consolidated into two payments per year: *Provided further*, That the private loan or guarantees transferred or issued pursuant to this paragraph shall be fully and freely transferable, except

that any guaranty transferred or extended shall cease to be effective if the private loan or any derivative thereof is to be used to provide significant support for any non-registered obligation: *Provided further*, That for purposes of sections 23 and 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the term "defense services" shall be deemed to include the refinancing of FMS debt outstanding at the date of the enactment of this Act: *Provided further*, That not later than ninety days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) shall issue regulations to carry out the purposes of this heading and that in issuing such regulations, the Secretary shall (1) facilitate the prepayment of loans and loan advances hereunder, (2) provide for full processing of each application within thirty days of its submission to the Secretary, and (3) except as provided in section 24(a) of the AECA, impose no restriction that increases the cost to borrowers of obtaining private financing for prepayment hereunder or that inhibits the ability of the borrower to enter into prepayment arrangements hereunder: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate, a copy of the text of any agreement entered into pursuant to this section not more than thirty days after its entry into force, together with a description of the transaction.]

[(b) INTEREST RATE REDUCTION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby appropriated such sums as may be necessary, but not more than \$270,000,000, to be made available after October 1, 1988 to the Secretary of Defense for the Defense Security Assistance Agency for deposit into a new account, to remain available until expended: *Provided*, That the funds shall be used solely for the purpose of lowering the interest rate on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits which were financed through the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) for countries which do not refinance one or more FFB loans pursuant to paragraph (a) of this heading, and which loans have interest rates exceeding ten percent, down to an interest rate of ten percent for the remaining life of such loans: *Provided further*, That these funds shall be available only subject to a Presidential budget request: *Provided further*, That it is the intent of the Congress that these funds shall be available to all countries having FMS credits from the FFB that carry interest rates in excess of ten percent.]

[(c) ARREARAGES.—(1) None of the funds provided pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (relating to Foreign Military Sales credits) or pursuant to chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act (relating to the Military Assistance program) shall be made available to any country for which one or more loans is refinanced pursuant to paragraph (a) of this heading and which is in default for a period in excess of ninety days in payment of principal or interest on (A) any loan made to such country guaranteed by the United States pursuant to paragraph (a) of this heading, and (B) any other loan issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act outstanding on the date of enactment of this provision.

[(2) In conjunction with any interest rate reduction pursuant to the authority provided in paragraph (b) of this heading, the President shall require the country to commit in writing that within two years of the effective date of the interest rate reduction it will be no more than ninety days in arrears on the repayment of principal and interest on all loans for which the interest rate is thus reduced and will remain no more than ninety days in arrears for the remaining life of all such loans. None of the funds provided pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act or chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act shall be made available to any country during any period in which it fails to comply with such commitment.]

[(d) PURPOSES AND REPORTS.—The authorities of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this heading may be utilized by the President in efforts to negotiate base rights and base access agreements, and for other bilateral foreign policy matters: *Provided further*, That the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate a joint report detailing the United States financial and foreign policy purposes served by implementation of this authority on a country by country basis not later than March 1, 1989, and a second joint report not later than August 1, 1989.] (*Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.*)

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE -- Continued
Federal Funds -- Continued

I-D8

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

480/372/104

MEMORANDUM

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-1082-0-1-152			
Program by activities:			
Credit and guarantees			
00 01 Forgiven loans	3 100 000	3 286 000	4 460 000
00 02 Concessional loans	953 441	763 000	
10 00 Total obligations (object class 33 0)	4 053 441	4 049 000	4 460 000
Financing			
14 00 Offsetting collections from Non-Federal sources	- 739 435	- 6 614 409	- 3 019 480
17 00 Recovery of prior year obligations		- 32 000	
31 00 Redemption of debt	739 435	6 614 409	3 019 480
39 00 Budget authority	4 053 441	4 017 000	4 460 000
Budget authority:			
40 00 Appropriation	4 053 441	4 049 000	4 460 000
40 00 Appropriation rescinded (unobligated balances) (P.L. 100-202)		- 32 000	
43 00 Appropriation (adjusted)	4 053 441	4 017 000	4 460 000
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net	3 314 006	- 2 565 409	1 440 520
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year	6 763 772	6 319 544	5 985 970
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year	- 6 319 544	- 5 985 970	- 6 335 368
78 00 Adjustments in unexpended accounts		- 32 000	
90 00 Outlays	3 758 234	- 2 263 835	1 091 122

SUMMARY OF BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS

(in thousands of dollars)

	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
Enacted/requested			
Budget authority	4 053 441	4 017 000	4 460 000
Outlays	3 758 234	- 2 263 835	1 091 122
Credit reform			
Budget authority			155 250
Outlays			155 250
Total:			
Budget authority	4 053 441	4 017 000	4 615 250
Outlays	3 758 234	- 2 263 835	1 246 372

Status of Direct Loans (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-1082-0-1-152			
Position with respect to appropriations act limitation on obligations:			
1111 Limitation on direct loans	4 053 441	4 049 000	4 460 000
1150 Total direct loan obligations	4 053 441	4 049 000	4 460 000
Cumulative balance of direct loans outstanding:			
1210 Outstanding, start of year	23 868 437	24 934 897	19 864 881
1231 Disbursements, Direct loan disbursements	4 497 869	4 350 574	4 110 602
1251 Repayments, Repayments and prepayments	- 1 203 874	- 6 728 706	- 3 151 521
1264 Adjustments, Other adjustments, net ¹	- 2 227 335	- 2 691 884	- 2 530 568
1290 Outstanding, end of year	24 934 897	19 864 881	18 293 394

¹ Forgiven credits

Status of Guaranteed Loans (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-1082-0-1-152			
Position with respect to appropriations act limitation on commitments:			
2111 Limitation on guaranteed loans made by private lenders			
2131 Guaranteed loan commitments exempt from limitation		5 152 900	2 300 000
2150 Total guaranteed loan commitments		5 152 900	2 300 000
Cumulative balance of guaranteed loans outstanding:			
2210 Outstanding, start of year	160 000	140 000	5 272 900
2231 Disbursements, Disbursements of new guaranteed loans		5 152 900	2 300 000
2251 Repayments, Repayments and prepayments	- 20 000	- 20 000	- 20 000
2290 Outstanding, end of year	140 000	5 272 900	7 552 900

2299 U.S. contingent liability for guaranteed loans outstanding, end of year 140 000 4 745 610 6 797 610

Estimate of guaranteed loan subsidy:

2320 Subsidy amount (in percent) 7.5
2330 Subsidy amount (in thousands of dollars) 155,250

This account provides funds to finance credit sales of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services to foreign countries and international organizations. It includes asset sales authorized in the foreign military sales debt reform provisions of Public Law 100-202. The activities in this account reflect the issuance of new guarantees authorized in the foreign military sales debt reform provisions in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 1988.

FOREIGN MILITARY [CREDIT] SALES CREDIT

(Proposed for later transmittal, proposed legislation)

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
11-1082-6-1-152			
Program by activities:			
00 02 Loan guarantee subsidy			155 250
10 00 Total obligations (object class 41 0)			155 250
Financing:			
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)			155 250
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net			155 250
90 00 Outlays			155 250

This schedule shows the effects of the Administration's credit reform proposal. The amounts in this schedule reflect the estimated grant-equivalent subsidy for Federal guaranteed loan commitments made by this program. An explanation of the proposal is included in Part 6b of the Budget.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

For necessary expense to carry out the provisions of chapter 4 of part II, [\$8,188,920,000] *Provided*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than \$1,200,000,000 shall be available only for Israel, which sum shall be available on a grant basis as a cash transfer and shall be disbursed within 90 days of enactment of this Act or by October 31, 1987, whichever is later: *Provided further*, That not less than \$815,000,000 shall be available only for Egypt, which sum shall be provided on a grant basis, of which not more than \$115,000,000 may be provided as a cash transfer with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms which are additional to those which were undertaken in previous fiscal years, and not less than \$200,000,000 shall be provided as Commodity Import Program assistance: *Provided further*, That in exercising the authority to provide cash transfer assistance for Israel and Egypt, the President shall ensure that the level of such assistance does not cause an adverse impact on the total level of nonmilitary exports from the United States to each such country: *Provided further*, That it is the sense of the Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Egypt and Israel are based in great measure upon their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading \$220,000,000 only shall be available for Pakistan: *Provided further*, That not less than \$124,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be available only for the Philippines: *Provided further*, That not less than an additional \$50,000,000 of the

I-D4

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE—Continued
Federal Funds—Continued

5/8

APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988

General and special funds—Continued

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND—Continued

480/372/104

funds appropriated under this heading shall be available only for the Philippines to assist in the implementation of agrarian reform in the Philippines if (1) the Government of the Philippines initiates an effective agrarian reform program and requests assistance from the United States for that program, and (2) a substantial majority of the resources for the implementation of that program will be provided by the Government of the Philippines or other non-United States donors, or both: *Provided further*, That if the conditions on agrarian reform in the Philippines are not met by August 31, 1988, these funds may be made available for assistance under this heading for other countries or programs: *Provided further*, That not less than \$20,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be available only for Morocco: *Provided further*, That not less than \$10,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be available only for Tunisia: *Provided further*, That not less than \$15,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be available only for Cyprus: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading \$35,000,000 only shall be available for Ireland: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading \$185,000,000 only shall be available for El Salvador, \$80,000,000 only shall be available for Guatemala, \$90,000,000 only shall be available for Costa Rica, and \$85,000,000 only shall be available for Honduras: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading for El Salvador, 10 percent of such funds may not be obligated until enactment of the "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989", and may be obligated only if, by the date of enactment of such Act, the accused murderers of United States marines in El Salvador have not been released from prison as a result of an amnesty program: *Provided further*, That not less than \$18,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available for Jordan, of which a substantial proportion of these funds shall be in support of the development program for the West Bank: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than \$90,000,000 shall be available for Sub-Saharan Africa: *Provided further*, That notwithstanding section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 up to \$1,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading may be made available to assist the Government of El Salvador's Special Investigative Unit for the purpose of bringing to justice those responsible for the murders of United States citizens in El Salvador: *Provided further*, That a report of the investigation shall be provided to the Congress: *Provided further*, That \$20,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available to carry out the Administration of Justice program pursuant to section 534 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, of which \$300,000 shall be made available for programs for Haiti and not less than \$2,000,000 shall be made available for programs for Guatemala: *Provided further*, That if funds made available under this heading are provided to a foreign country as cash transfer assistance, that country shall be required to maintain these funds in a separate account and not commingle them with any other funds: *Provided further*, That such funds may be obligated and expended notwithstanding provisions of law which are inconsistent with the cash transfer nature of this assistance or which are referenced in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying House Joint Resolution 648 (H. Rept. No. 98-1159): *Provided further*, That all local currencies that may be generated with such funds provided as a cash transfer shall be deposited in a special account to be used in accordance with section 609 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: *Provided further*, That at least 15 days prior to obligating any such cash transfer assistance to a foreign country under this heading, the President shall submit a notification to the Committees on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, which shall include a detailed description of how the funds proposed to be made available will be used, with a discussion of the United States interests that will be served by the assistance (including, as appropriate, a description of the economic policy reforms that will be promoted by the cash transfer assistance): *Provided further*, That not more than \$5,000,000 of the funds made available under this heading may be available to finance tied aid credits, unless the President determines it is in the national interest to provide in excess of \$5,000,000 and so notifies the Committees on Appropriations through the regular notification procedures: *Provided further*, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated under this heading may be used for tied aid credits without the prior approval of the

Administrator of the Agency for International Development: *Provided further*, That \$25,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available for earthquake relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance for El Salvador in accordance with section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which amount shall be accounted for separately and, of which amount, not less than \$2,000,000 shall be available for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the National University of El Salvador and other institutions of higher education: *Provided further*, That the Office of the Inspector General of the Agency for International Development shall monitor the use of funds made available under this heading for earthquake relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance for El Salvador and shall provide, by April 15, 1988, a detailed accounting to the Committees on Appropriations of the uses of the funds made available for El Salvador during fiscal year 1987 for earthquake relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction: *Provided further*, That \$1,000,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available, notwithstanding any other provision of law, only for the support of the independent Polish trade union "Solidarity": *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading not less than \$1,000,000 shall be made available, notwithstanding any other provision of law, only for the promotion of democratic activities in Chile leading to a transition to democracy: *Provided further*, That funds made available under this heading shall remain available until September 30, 1989: *§ 8,268,500,000, to remain available until expended. (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)*

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1037-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
Program by activities:			
00 01 Country and regional programs.....	3,887,047	3,254,386	3,268,500
00 02 Reobligation of country programs.....	25,205	12,500	12,500
10 00 Total obligations.....	3,912,251	3,266,886	3,281,000
Financing:			
17 00 Recovery of prior year obligations.....	- 5,643		
21 40 Unobligated balance available, start of year.....	- 95,470	- 66,056	
22 40 Unobligated balance transferred, net.....	- 300,000		
24 40 Unobligated balance available, end of year.....	86,266		
25 00 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	1		
39 00 Budget authority.....	3,576,205	3,200,820	3,281,000
Budget authority:			
40 00 Appropriation.....	3,251,000	3,188,320	3,258,500
42 00 Transferred from other accounts.....	300,000		
43 00 Appropriation (adjusted).....	3,551,000	3,188,320	3,268,500
50 00 Reappropriation.....	25,205	12,500	12,500
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net.....	3,912,251	3,266,886	3,281,000
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year.....	4,422,634	4,839,589	4,744,973
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year.....	- 4,839,589	- 4,744,973	- 4,567,274
77 00 Adjustments in expired accounts.....	- 23,921		
78 00 Adjustments in unexpired accounts.....	- 5,643		
90 00 Outlays.....	3,465,731	3,361,502	3,458,699

Note.—Total obligations include local cost support charges of \$14,915 thousand in 1987.

Status of Direct Loans (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1037-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
Position with respect to appropriations act limitation on obligations:			
1111 Limitation on direct loans.....			
1131 Direct loan obligations exempt from limitation.....	109,231	25,000	
1150 Total direct loan obligations.....	109,231	25,000	
Cumulative balance of direct loans outstanding:			
1210 Outstanding, start of year.....	6,304,579	6,309,566	6,266,783
1231 Disbursements: Direct loan disbursements.....	69,014	65,217	
1251 Repayments: Repayments and prepayments.....	- 81,123	- 108,000	- 73,000
1261 Adjustments: Capitalized interest.....	17,095		
1290 Outstanding, end of year.....	6,309,566	6,266,783	6,193,783

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

6/8 460/372/104

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE—Continued
Federal Funds—Continued

I-D5

Estimate of direct loan subsidy:		
1320 Subsidy amount (in percent)	46.2	44.7
1330 Subsidy amount (in thousands of dollars)	50,465	11,175

This account is used primarily to provide economic assistance to selected countries, in support of U.S. efforts to promote stability and U.S. security interests in strategic regions of the world.

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)			
Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE			
25 0 Other services	23,294	19,452	19,536
26 0 Supplies and materials	4,000	3,340	3,354
33 0 Investments and loans	119,938	100,153	100,586
41 0 Grants, subsidies and contributions	3,757,805	3,137,917	3,151,474
99 0 Subtotal, International Security Assistance	3,905,037	3,260,862	3,274,950
ALLOCATION ACCOUNTS			
41 0 Grants, subsidies, contributions	7,214	6,024	6,050
99 9 Total obligations	3,912,251	3,266,886	3,281,000

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including administrative expenses and purchase of passenger motor vehicles for replacement only for use outside of the United States, [\$700,750,000: *Provided*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading not less than \$125,000,000 shall be made available only for the Philippines: *Provided further*, That \$40,000,000 shall be made available only for Morocco: *Provided further*, That up to \$30,000,000 shall be made available only for Tunisia: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading not less than \$7,000,000 shall be made available only for Guatemala: *Provided further*, That none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act may be used for the procurement by Guatemala of any weapons or ammunition: *Provided further*, That \$156,000,000 only shall be available for Turkey, and \$30,000,000 only shall be available for Greece: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading not more than \$28,000,000 shall be used for general costs of administering the Military Assistance program: *Provided further*, That not more than \$2,400,000 of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available for Haiti; any material assistance provided from such funds shall be limited to nonlethal items such as transportation and communications equipment and uniforms: *Provided further*, That funds made available under this heading for Haiti shall be made available only through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations: *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this heading \$10,000,000 shall be used for the purposes of section 506(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make reimbursement for the cost of defense articles, defense services and/or defense training provided to the Philippines pursuant to the President's determination of September 16, 1986, or for an additional amount for use for the general costs of administering the Military Assistance program if the Secretary of Defense so directs in writing: *Provided further*, That, after September 30, 1989, none of the funds appropriated under this heading shall be made available for the purposes of section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: *Provided further*, That funds appropriated under this heading shall be expended at the minimum rate necessary to make timely payment for defense articles and services: *Provided further*, That section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended (1) by amending subsection (b)(2) to read as follows: "(2) The value of such additions to stockpiles in foreign countries shall not exceed \$116,000,000 for fiscal year 1988," and (2) by amending subsection (c) by inserting ", Thailand," after "Korea": *Provided further*, That funds appropriated under this heading shall remain available until September 30, 1990] \$167,000,000: *Provided*, That the proviso under this heading in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988, prohibiting the use of military assistance funds after September 30, 1989 for the purposes of Section 503(a)(3) of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is repealed. (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)			
Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
Program by activities:			
00 01 Country programs	955,774	662,750	421,000
00 02 General costs	45,039	38,000	46,000
10 00 Total obligations	1,000,813	700,750	467,000
Financing:			
14 00 Offsetting collections from Non-Federal sources	- 1,073		
21 40 Unobligated balance available, start of year	- 50,000		
25 00 Unobligated balance lapsing	250		
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)	950,000	700,750	467,000
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net	999,740	700,750	467,000
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year	23,884	665,998	733,853
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year	- 665,998	- 733,853	- 517,057
77 00 Adjustments in expired accounts	- 1,721		
90 00 Outlays	355,705	632,895	623,796

This account provides grants to cover the cost of administering the military assistance programs and to finance the provision of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services to selected countries to improve their military capabilities.

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)			
Identification code	1987 actual	1988 est.	1989 est.
Direct obligations:			
Personnel compensation:			
11.1 Full-time permanent	5,117	4,783	4,927
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	128	103	106
11.5 Other personnel compensation	21	22	23
11.8 Special personal services payments	17,207	16,018	16,499
11.9 Total personnel compensation	22,473	20,926	21,555
12.1 Civilian personnel benefits	1,237	1,118	1,152
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons	2,719	2,304	2,419
22.0 Transportation of things	434	440	462
23.1 Rental payments to GSA	236	219	230
23.2 Rental payments to others	2,514	2,048	2,150
23.3 Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	1,417	1,230	1,292
24.0 Printing and reproduction	51	44	48
25.0 Other services	963,642	667,760	432,429
26.0 Supplies and materials	966	702	790
31.0 Equipment	1,878	925	1,350
99.0 Subtotal, direct obligations	997,567	697,715	463,817
99.0 Reimbursable obligations	3,246	3,034	3,123
99.9 Total obligations	1,000,813	700,750	467,000

Personnel Summary			
Direct:			
Total number of full-time permanent positions	235	221	214
Total compensable workyears			
Full-time equivalent employment	230	216	213
Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours	4	5	5
Reimbursable:			
Total compensable workyears			
Full-time equivalent employment	118	106	98
Full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours	2	2	2

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, [\$47,400,000] \$52,500,000. (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

I-D6 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE—Continued
Federal Funds—Continued

APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989

General and special funds—Continued

7/8
490/372/104

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING—Continued

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1081-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Program by activities:			
10 00 Total obligations	55,763	47,400	52,500
Financing:			
25 00 Unobligated balance lapsing	237		
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)	56,000	47,400	52,500
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net	55,763	47,400	52,500
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year	36,773	39,889	39,730
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year	-39,889	-39,730	-45,224
77 00 Adjustments in expired accounts	-1,560		
90 00 Outlays	51,087	47,559	47,005

This program provides grants for training foreign military personnel in the United States and abroad.

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1081-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
25 0 Other services	48,968	44,275	46,150
26 0 Supplies and materials	5,965	2,295	5,500
31 0 Equipment	830	830	850
99 9 Total obligations	55,763	47,400	52,500

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, \$31,689,000 [Provided, That, notwithstanding sections 451, 492(b), or 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other provision of law, these funds may be used only as justified in the Congressional Presentation Document for fiscal year 1988; Provided further, That, to the extent that these funds cannot be used to provide for such assistance, they will revert to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts]. (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1032-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Program by activities:			
10 00 Total obligations (object class 41.0)	37,314	31,689	31,689
Financing:			
21 40 Unobligated balance available, start of year	-5,625		
40 00 Budget authority (appropriation)	31,689	31,689	31,689
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net	37,314	31,689	31,689
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year	23,836	15,628	14,668
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year	-15,628	-14,668	-9,823
90 00 Outlays	45,522	32,649	36,534

This account funds U.S. assistance to international efforts to monitor and maintain the peace in areas of special concern to the United States. In 1989, contributions will be made to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and to the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

ASSISTANCE FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES IN ISRAEL

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-1088-0-1-152	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Financing:			
14 00 Offsetting collections from Non-Federal sources			5,419
17 00 Recovery from prior year obligations	-400		
32 49 Balance of contract authority withdrawn	400		5,419
39 00 Budget authority			
Relation of obligations to outlays			
71 00 Obligations incurred, net			5,419
72 40 Obligated balance, start of year			
72 40 Appropriation		341	158
72 49 Contract authority	5,818		5,419
74 40 Obligated balance, end of year			
74 40 Appropriation		-158	
74 49 Contract authority	-5,419		
78 00 Adjustments in unexpired accounts	-400		
90 00 Outlays	188	158	

Status of Unfunded Contract Authority (in thousands of dollars)

	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Unfunded balance, start of year		5,819	5,419
Collections applied to liquidate contract authority	-400		-5,419
Unfunded balance, end of year		5,419	

This account shows funds available to pay potential court claims related to the construction of two airfield in Israel.

Public enterprise funds:

GUARANTEE RESERVE FUND

[There are hereby appropriated \$532,000,000 to be made available to the Guaranty Reserve Fund for payment to the Federal Financing Bank subject to claims under guarantees issued under the Arms Export Control Act; Provided, That if during fiscal year 1989] If during any fiscal year, the funds available in the [Guaranty] Guaranty Reserve Fund (Fund) are insufficient to enable the Secretary of Defense (Secretary) to discharge his responsibilities, as guarantor of loans guaranteed pursuant to section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or pursuant to [this Act] the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988, under the heading "Foreign Military Sales Debt Reform," the Secretary shall issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities, and subject to such terms and conditions, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Such notes or obligations may be redeemed by the Secretary from appropriations and other funds available, including repayments by the borrowers of amounts paid pursuant to guarantees issued under section 24 of the AECA. Such notes or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States of comparable maturities during the month preceding the issuance of the notes or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury shall purchase any notes or other obligations issued hereunder and for that purpose he is authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act are extended to include any purchase of such notes or obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury may at any time sell any of the notes or other obligations acquired by him under this heading. All redemptions, purchases, and sales by the Secretary of the Treasury of such notes or other obligations shall be treated as public debt transactions of the United States. (Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988.)

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

480/372/104

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)		1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Identification code 11-4121-0-3-152				
Program by activities:				
10 00	Total obligations	826,946	1,229,814	737,838
Financing:				
14 00	Offsetting collections from Non-Federal sources	-826,946	-697,814	-94,642
25 00	Budget authority		532,000	643,196
Budget authority				
40 00	Appropriation (current)		532,000	
67 10	Authority to borrow (permanent, indefinite) (P.L. 100-202)			643,196
Relation of obligations to outlays				
71 00	Obligations incurred, net		532,000	643,196
72 40	Obligated balance, start of year	15,656	248,936	57,918
74 40	Obligated balance, end of year	-248,936	-57,918	
77 00	Adjustments in expired accounts	116,471		
90 00	Outlays	-116,809	723,019	701,114

Status of Direct Loans (in thousands of dollars)		1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Identification code 11-4121-0-3-152				
Cumulative balance of direct loans outstanding:				
1210	Outstanding, start of year	1,420,206	1,324,909	1,684,381
1232	Disbursements: Disbursements for guaranteed loan claims	710,136	1,257,286	737,838
1251	Repayments: Repayments and prepayments	-826,946	-697,814	-94,642
1264	Adjustments: Other adjustments, net	21,513		
1290	Outstanding, end of year	1,324,909	1,884,381	2,527,577

This fund was established to make payments to lenders of foreign military sales credit guaranteed loans for late payments and rescheduled loans. Estimated activities in the account are shown below (in thousands of dollars).

	1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Fund balance, start of year	15,656	248,936	57,918
New FFB claims	1,072,570	894,852	710,366
Prior year claims		362,434	27,473
Total claims	1,072,570	1,257,286	737,839
FFB payments:			
Delinquent payments	697,885	337,353	116,211
Accrued interest and rescheduled loans	12,251	557,499	594,155
Prior year claims		362,434	27,472
Total FFB claims	710,136	1,257,286	737,838
Other disbursements:			
Egypt payment credited to receipt account	91,390		57,918
From Egypt escrow		53,034	
Total other disbursements	91,390	53,034	57,918
Collections:			
Regular repayments	-826,946	-697,814	-94,642
Egypt payment deposited to receipt account	-91,390		
Erroneous transfer from FFB	-116,471		
Total GRF collections	-1,034,807	-697,814	-94,642
Replenishment:			
Appropriation		532,000	
Borrowing authority			643,196
Total replenishment		532,000	643,196
Egypt escrow	-110,952	-57,918	
Erroneous transfer to GRF by FFB	-116,471		
Collection not reported to Treasury by FFB	-21,513		
Fund balance, end of year	-248,936	-57,918	
Amount claimed by FFB but not paid (non-add)	362,434	27,472	
FFB adjustment (non-add)		137,984	

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-4121-0-3-152		1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
33 0	Investments and loans	578,010	1,229,814	737,838
44 0	Refunds	248,936		
99 9	Total obligations	826,946	1,229,814	737,838

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE
Federal Funds

General and special funds:

MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS

CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

For payment to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the United States share of the paid-in [share] portion of the increases in capital stock, [\$40,176,398 for the General and Selective Capital Increases,] \$70,915,000, to remain available until expended: *Provided*, That no such payment may be made while the United States Executive Director to the Bank is compensated by the Bank at a rate in excess of the rate provided for an individual occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, or while the alternate United States Executive Director to the Bank is compensated by the Bank at a rate in excess of the rate provided for an individual occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.

LIMITATION ON CALLABLE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTIONS

The United States Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development may subscribe without fiscal year limitation to the callable capital portion of the United States share of increases in capital stock in an amount not to exceed [\$437,320,185] \$2,292,988,000. (*Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.*)

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 11-0077-0-1-151		1987 actual	1988 est	1989 est
Program by activities:				
10 00	Total obligations (object class 33.0)	55,806	40,176	70,915
Financing:				
Unobligated balance available, start of year:				
21 40	Appropriation	-1,948,350	-1,948,349	-1,948,350
21 47	Authority to borrow	-5,715,000	-5,715,000	-5,715,000
Unobligated balance available, end of year				
24 40	Appropriation	1,948,349	1,948,350	1,948,350
24 47	Authority to borrow	5,715,000	5,715,000	5,715,000
40 00	Budget authority (appropriation)	55,806	40,176	70,915
Relation of obligations to outlays:				
71 00	Obligations incurred, net	55,806	40,176	70,915
72 40	Obligated balance, start of year	276,183	276,388	86,383
74 40	Obligated balance, end of year	-276,388	-86,383	-63,822
90 00	Outlays	5,581	230,181	93,475

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) finances development projects in less developed countries. By applying banking principles to the achievement of development goals, it promotes increased economic productivity and helps developing economies meet more of the basic needs of their people. Since its founding in 1945, the Bank has made loan commitments of approximately \$146 billion.

The Bank's 1987 lending program included 127 loan commitments to 41 countries for a total of \$13.2 billion.

רח"פ: ב ה ר ל 1100 נטוונני: ש פ ו ר	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1 מחור: 6
תז"ח: 191500	מנהל מצפ"א, לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רוה"מ	א ל :
נר : 00537 87-011	השגריר רושינגטון	ד ע :
	סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	מאת :

המצב בשפחים - חהליך השלום.

1. אחמול (18/2) הופיע השגריר משה ארד בפני ועידת הנשיאים כראשונה מוריס אברם. מצ"כ תרשומת על הישיבה שהוכנה ע"י ארלין בהר.

2. שתי נקודות הודגשו על ידי השגריר:

- א. כשלב זה אין חכנית אמריקאית מגובשת לפתחך השלום.
- ב. ההחלטה הסופית בנושא היא בידי ממשלת ישראל.

3. מצ"כ הודעה א.ד.ל. המביעה חמיכה חד משטעית בישראל. ראויה לציון גם הופעתו ועמידתו של לוינסון בוועידת נאקראק בלום אנג'לס. כזכור א.ד.ל. הסיל ויסו על שיגור מכתב לרוה"מ ולממרוה"מ וכו' ביקורת על שימוש בכח מופרז. אייב מוקסמו אמר לי במרירות מסויימת כי ידענו להביע ביקורת נגד א.ד.ל. על התבטאותם הראשונה בנושא במחצית דצמבר אך לא שמעו מאחורו דבר מאז על אף שהכחירו קו חמיכתם בישראל באורח ציבורי וחד משמעי. מניח שתמצאו דרך לחקן הרושם שנוצר אצלו.

מרדכי ידיר

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אישור:

מרדכי ידיר

שם השולח:

19.2.1988

חאיר:

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MEETING WITH PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE
Thursday, February 18, 1988 - New York

AMBASSADOR MOSHE ARAD

~~~~~  
This closed-session meeting was well-attended (approx. 60 ppl) with top executive leadership of the Presidents Conference. Morris Abram chaired the meeting which lasted approx. 1 1/2 hours.

In his opening remarks Morris gave an overview of the present situation, making reference to the following points:

- Distortions of the media
- Double-standard at the UN
- Immobility of Hussein
- Aberration in behavior of soldiers (In some cases which may be due to genuine fright of the soldiers, but in some circumstances perhaps due to less honorable motives)
- Elections in both Israel & US
- NACRAC meetings in Los Angeles
- Prospects that present govt. in Israel has potential to move along lines of Begin in terms of peace settlement
- Need for Jewish community to let Congressmen and Senators know of their continued support for Israel (their is no "flood" of letters)
- Shultz expression of appreciation for work of Ambassador Arad

MOSHE ARAD

Amb. Arad gave an overview of events during past month (since his last meeting with the PC).

In response to concerns of erosion in support for Israel, Amb. Arad referred to the recent ADL poll which concluded that there is no such drastic reduction in perception. However, he noted, the cumulative impact of the media reporting out of context, distortions, etc. has been extremely damaging -- but not to the point of damage to entire public opinion. Overall there has been enormous concern and sympathy for Israel's need to confront the violence. Thus, we have to be careful not to mix media coverage with public opinion. Israel, he added, is entitled to get all the views but does not have to accept all the proposals.

Additional points were made on the following:

- Israel's appreciation for extraordinary efforts of Morris Abram
- Despair of Palestinians being used as a weapon
- Statement of non-confidence in the Palestinian leadership- What is emerging is difficult to identify and not expected to be less radical than Arafat, et. al. living outside of Israel. But they may be willing to be more pragmatic since they have to live with Israel.

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- Israel is being judged by different standards because we are setting the standards
- Aberrations due to duress and provocation in some cases where more force may be used than necessary. Adding that Israel is not licensing use of indiscriminate force, beatings. IDF is not prepared for this kind of warfare. Israel had not felt need to develop a special police force to deal with riots, demonstrations, as such, and proudly so. Israel is using adequate/minimum force necessary. But there are no sterile methods to deal with this kind of warfare.
- Recognition in Israel of need for political dialogue with responsible Palestinian leadership. Events brought home message that issues were dormant/paralyzed - not due to lack of political will but of Arab leadership and willingness to negotiate.
- Expectations of our friends to stand with us. Israeli efforts merit support of the Community.
- Israel welcomes US initiatives and determination to bring parties together. Israel is eager to reach a solution and is ready to be put to test. Ideas being presented are viewed as a new blend of old ideas with somewhat new packaging. This is a high agenda item for Shultz
- Anticipation of accelerated time-table due to elections. Expects talks in Dec. '88 whether or not interim reaches ultimate target. (with '79-'82 autonomy talks as basic ingredients of interim solution)
- Concerns facing Israel a) linkage, between interim and long-term solution; b) difficulty of agenda items.
- Expectation in Israel of an "international event" (does not foresee a full-dressed international conference) with composition of Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to be initially worked out between Egyptians & Jordanians with Palestinians; with subsequent acceptance by Israel
- US and Israel will not let Arafat torpedo present efforts by his presence in Geneva. The UN agenda will not interfere with the peace process
- Israel government has ultimate decision-making responsibility

## Q U E S T I O N S

Ambassador Arad took about 10 questions from the floor. While there was some underlying commentary, it was one of concern referring mainly to the deterioration in minds of public here, both Jews and non-Jews, toward Israel with reference to recent NACRAC meetings in Los Angeles. The majority of the questions were well-focused dealing for most part on the composition and components for the expected international "event," future talks and overall prospects.

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## Questions/Comments

- 1) What are chances for coming to an arrangement before the end of the present Administrations in Israel and US?
- 2) Since the Arabs have swept aside the Camp David Accords what are prospects for coming to an acceptable basis for negotiation?
- 3) What are prospects for early elections in Israel?
- 4) In reference to Heckler (AJ Congress) meeting with Hussein & Mubarak a comment was made that Israel should make it clear that the government of Israel will decide for the country what its policies will be.
- 5) Does the Israeli government have better information on the infrastructure of the areas and community as a results of uprisings.
- 6) In reference to Arafat and upcoming UN meeting in Geneve - what is Israeli response?
- 7) Who will choose the international delegation for the international "event" and could you further elaborate on Soviet-American initiatives?
- 8) Commentary was made on need for better PR efforts needed to combat distorted press. This person felt that the activities of the Jewish community can add to escalation of bad press and should take a "calmer stand"
- 9) Reference was made to NACRAC meetings in L.A. where opinions left deep and troubling polarization amongst participants.
- 10) A final comment was made that we are letting the world forget the horrors of the Holocaust and the sufferings of the Jews

ARLENE C. BEHAR  
19/2/88

**Anti-Defamation League**  **of B'nai B'rith**  
 823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 212-490-2525 Telex 649278

LYNNE IANNIELLO  
 Director, Communications Division

ADL PRESS OFFICE, Tuesday, February 9,  
through Saturday, February 13  
 Sand Drift I, Main Floor  
 The Breakers Hotel  
 Palm Beach, Florida

Hotel Switchboard: (305) 655-6611  
 Direct Lines: (305) 659-8443, 659-8439

Contacts: Lynne Ianniello  
 Jay Axelbank

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Palm Beach, FL, February 13....The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith today unanimously adopted the following resolution at a session of its National Executive Committee meeting here at the Breakers Hotel.

"The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reaffirms its support for the people and government of Israel. We stand with our brothers and sisters who are redeeming Zion and seeking to maintain a free and just society in the tradition of our forefathers. We call on the Israeli government and people to remain strong in their resolve to preserve civil order in a firm and reasonable fashion and to not yield to the violence of the street and those who would seek to impose their will by threats and pressure.

"Israel has stood ready to meet its neighbors in direct and constructive negotiations to achieve a way of living together in peace. Until all Arab states come to accept Israel as a free and

(more)

Our 75th Year



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legitimate state reflecting the historic rights of the Jewish people, Israel must recognize the dangers it faces and be vigilant to defend its existence. We know that when the hand of true peace is offered, Israel will grasp it eagerly and firmly. We pledge our firm support for Israel and for the justice of Israel's cause."

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AJ,C,IP,JSP,LAJ-Sp.PB-88

END

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|------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
| דחיפות:<br>בהורל       | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק<br>טופס מברק     | דף: 1   |
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| תז"ח:<br>191400        | מנהל מצפ"א, לשכת השר, לשכת מ"מ רוה"מ | א ל :   |
| גר<br>00529            | השגריר וושינגטון                     | ד ע :   |
| 85 אל                  | סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק          | מאח :   |

**בהיר**

ביקור משלחת ועידת הנשיאים.

1. מצ"ב סיוטת תכנית הביקור כפי שנמסרה לנו הבוקר על ידי מלקולם הונליין.
2. שוחחתי עם מלקולם הונליין ואמרתי לו כי אנו רואים יותר ויותר דיווחי תקשורת המדווחים על כך כי המשלחת בעת ביקורה מתכננת להפעיל לחץ על ממישראל בכל מה שקשור לתהליך השלום. אמר כי הם מקיימים מסיבת עתונאים ביום ראשון ה-27 דנא טרם צאתם.

מרדכי ידיר

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS MISSION TO ISRAEL

FEBRUARY 28 - MARCH 3, 1988

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

Saturday, February 27

El Al flight 008 departs 10:45pm

Sunday, February 28

Arrival 4:05pm

Transfer to Hilton Hotel

7:00pm  
Hilton Hotel

Presidents Conference Reception  
with Israeli leaders  
Briefing for Mission delegates

Monday, February 28

7:45am

Breakfast with Finance Minister  
Moshe Nissim

9:00 - 11:00am

Panel A: The Territories: Current  
Situation - Options for Solutions

Dr. Asher Susser, The Dayan Research  
Center, Tel Aviv University  
Ehud Olmert, MK, Likud  
Amnon Linn, MK, Labor  
Amos Gilboa, Advisor to the Prime  
Minister on Israeli-Arab Affairs

11:00 - 1:00pm

Military and Intelligence Briefing

General Ehud Barak, Deputy Chief of  
Staff  
Amnon Shahak, Chief of Military  
Intelligence, IDF  
Dr. A. Levran, Jaffe Center for  
Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univ.  
Ron Ben Ishai, Galei Tzahal/Yediot  
Anaronot

1:15pm

Lunch hosted by El Al

3:15 - 5:15pm

*Mayor Frey*  
Free Time



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5:00 Depart for Knesset

5:15 - 6:45pm Meeting with the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee

7:00pm Dinner hosted by the Speaker of the Knesset, Shlomo Hillel, celebrating Israel's 40th anniversary

Tuesday, March 1

7:45am Breakfast with the Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek

9:00 - 11:00am Panel C: Israel-US Relations

Dan Meridor, MK,  
Yossi Ben-Aharon, Director General,  
Prime Minister's office  
Dr. Nimrod Novik, Political Advisor to  
Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign  
Affairs, Shimon Peres  
Prof. Itamar Rabinovitch, Chair,  
Dayan Research Center, Tel Aviv Univ.

11:00 - 1:00pm Panel D: Society, Demography, Voting Patterns

Prof. Ozer Shield, University of Haifa  
Eli Dayan, Mayor of Ashkelon  
Eli Hileli, Mayor of Dimona  
Hanoch Smith, Pollster

1:15 - 2:45pm Lunch with Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres

2:45 - 3:45pm Endangered Jewish Communities

5:15 - 6:45pm Meeting with President Chaim Herzog at President's Residence

7:00pm Reception, Siebenberg Museum  
Guests of honor: former Soviet  
refusenik leaders  
Chaired by Simcha Dinitz, MK, Chairman  
WZO  
Hosted by America Israel Friendship  
League



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Wednesday, March 2

7:30am

Breakfast with Defense Minister  
Yitzhak Rabin

9:00 - 11:00am

Panel E: Trade and Economics

David Klein, Senior Director,  
Bank of Israel

I. Kessar, General Secretary of the  
Histadruth

Daniel Doron, Director, Israel Center  
for Social and Economic Progress

Dov Lautman, Chairman, Israel  
Manufacturers Association

11:00 - 1:00pm

Panel F: Israel's Image and the Media

Yosef Goell, Jerusalem Post

Dan Fisher, Los Angeles Times

Martin Fletcher, NBC News

Dan Pattir, Chairman, The Jeane

Kirkpatrick Institute, former

Press Advisor to PMs Rabin & Begin

1:00 - 2:30pm

~~Lunch with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir~~

2:45 - 6:00pm

Guests of the IDF with General Mitzneh,  
and officers at headquarters

7:00pm

Dinner

*JAC*

Thursday, March 3

8:30am

Departure, El Al flight 035





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ארגון בני-ציון.

העברנא ברכת רה"מ שמיר לנשיא הארגון.

מצפ"א  
משה בר  
19 בפברואר 1988

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גשא 3  
בין 1  
ג3ס' 2



Jerusalem, 19 February 1988

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Dear Friends,

I wish to extend best wishes to Bnai Zion, which celebrates 80 years of devoted work for the well-being of the Jewish Community and for Am Yisrael and Eretz Yisrael. We greatly appreciate all your efforts for health services and other worthy causes in the Jewish State.

As in the life of man, 80 is an important milestone for an organization such as yours. Henceforth, you should demand even greater efforts from yourselves.

Your wise choice of Morris Abram and Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu as your honorees highlights our shared recognition of their leadership in the fight for the defence of our people's rights, security and honour.

Kol Hakavod!

Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister of the State of Israel