

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

משרד רוהם

יוסף מדיני

ארהם

15/2/88 - 18/2/88

תיק מס'

16

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

4605/16-א

מזהה פיוז:

R00034bt

מזהה פריט:

2-111-2-4-7

כתובת:

10/08/2020

תאריך הדפסה:

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
Pacific Northwest Region
220 Bush Street, Suite 550
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 398-8885



הקונסוליה הכללית של ישראל
סן פרנציסקו

ל' בשבט תשמ"ח
18 בפברואר 1988

1158

אל: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית, סן פרנציסקו

הנדון: מכתב תמיכה

מצ"ב מכתבו של מר דן פרידמן מסן פרנציסקו המדבר בעד עצמו.

בברכה,

יפה בן-ארי

DAN R. FRIEDMAN
2000 BROADWAY #702
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94115
415-931-5923

B"H

January 28, 1988

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
c/o Consulate General of Israel
220 Bush Street
San Francisco, CA 94104

Dear Prime Minister:


I am writing to inform you of my unqualified support for present Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank. I am also writing to tell you I am an Orthodox Jew. These twin facts are not a coincidence.

The events of the past few weeks must be sobering for you and many other leading Israelis. Here, I am not referring to stones or burning tires, but something far worse. The unseemly manner in which Reform American Jews turned tail en masse and deserted the field of battle when the heat was on.

I fervently pray that you and other great Israeli leaders, both of the left and right, will reflect carefully upon this phenomenon, and study its implications for the future of Israel and the Jewish people.

There is only one reasonable conclusion: In times of war (and unfortunately we are still at war) Israel needs devoted patriots and committed partisans. In the diaspora these will only come from the ranks of those who love our Torah and cherish Yiddishkeit.

Yours fraternally,



Dan R. Friedman



CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
PHONE (312) 569-3300

ל' שבט תשמ"ח
18 פברואר 1988

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
שיקאגו

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44:2

ס.ד

אל: מע"ח

דע: הסברה/וויסינגטון (האדר)

סקירת תקשורת 11-18/2/1988

כללי

התקשורת התמקדה השבוע בבחירות המוקדמות לנשיאות שנערכו בניו המפשייר, וכן כיסחה בהרחבה את ממצאי דו"ח ועדת ההיסטוריונים שבדקה את עברו של ולדחיים והתגובות הציבוריות עליה.

אירועים בתקשורת

התקשורת המשיכה לדווח בהרחבה, אם כי כפחות בולטות, על האירועים האלימים בשטחים. במיוחד הדגישה את האירוע בו נקברו חיים 4 מהמתפרעים, וכן עסקה מדי יום בטוטו "ספינת המגורשים" עד ליום הטבעה. כן גם דיווחו ההסתתחויות במישור המדיני בעקבות ביקור מרפי ולקראת ביקור שולץ והתגובות בישראל לרעיונות וחוססאות להנעת התהליך המדיני. בדיווחים מהארץ ניכרת גם תשומת לב לתגובת הישראלים לנוכח האירועים האלימים. ברודר הסתמך על סדרת המאמרים של שייף ב"הארץ" ודיווח על הכישלון המו"יעיני שמנע התרעה והערכה ברחוב הערבי. ברודר גם דיווח בהרחבה ובאופן ציורי את מימדי האיבה בין חמפגינים ורגשות חזעם בקרב החיילים העומדים מולם.

מסר כל המכתבים למערכת שאיתרנו השבוע 9 תמכו בישראל ו-7 היו עוינים לנו.

מאמר המערכת ב"מיניאפוליס סטאר טריביון" (16/2) סוקר את החלופות המדיניות שהועלו במהלך הימים האחרונים וסוּסק שאין להם סיכוי להתממש. ועם זאת קובע חעיתון שעל הפלשתינאים והישראלים ללמוד לחיות זה בצד זה.

מאמר המערכת ב"מילווקי ג'ורנאל" (12/2) מגנה את התנהגותם תפלילית של המתנחלים המכבידים על השבת הסדר על כנו.

ב"שיקאגו טריביון" (12/2) התפרסם מאמרו של הרב הרפורמי הרברט ברונסטיין "אשר בתור יהודי מתנגד למדיניותה הנוכחית של ממשלת ישראל" לעורר תגובות חריפות בקרב היהודים כאן וכמה מהם טרחו אף לצלצל להביע רגשי זעם לנוכח פרסום המאמר.

בברכה

משח פוקס



ישראל ISRAEL

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ש-ה רה"ל שהכס נ"ב גלגל כיון נלכסו, אכילס גלגל
ש-ה רה"ל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל גלגל



חקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בלוס-אנג'לס

1/18

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN LOS ANGELES

SUITE 1700
6380 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CALIF. 90048

104-1

(213) 651-5700

אש: הרשו - יונשאים

למא: הקונסוליה הכעסה, אום אנג'לס.

אני העבירו הליכתים המצב בקונסול אחומי
היתקל אש למי שלמי ולמי חרס.

בתוצרה למאש,

עשנת קרנ'כא.

עמ' 2 מח' 3 אש' 2 ח' 1 אש' 1

National Jewish Community Relations NJCRAAC

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

(212) 684-6950

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February 16, 1988

Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Prime Minister Shamir:

The member agencies of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, meeting in Plenary Session in Los Angeles, appreciate the message we received from you at the beginning of these deliberations, which we shared with the delegates.

I am taking this opportunity to enclose a letter we sent to Secretary of State Shultz, which was endorsed overwhelmingly by the more than 400 delegates participating in the Plenum.

Also enclosed is a copy of my speech delivered today entitled "Celebrating Israel's 40th Anniversary--Israel-Diaspora Relations: Bonds, Barriers and Opportunities". Of course, I welcome any reactions or comments you might have regarding the speech.

The Plenum included an extremely lively discussion related to the role of the Jewish community relations field in maintaining American public support for Israel. When we receive the full transcript of this discussion, a copy will be forwarded immediately to members of your staff.

Shalom,

Michael A. Pelavin
Chair
National Jewish Community
Relations Advisory Council

MAP/mb

Enclosures

cooperation in the common cause of Jewish community relations

Michael A. Pelavin, Flint
Raymond Epstein, Chicago
Rae M. Ginsburg, Boston
Jack B. Jacobs, Des Moines
David Lebenbom, Detroit
My Minkoff, Women's American ORT
Michael Newmark, St. Louis
Ruth Popkin, Hadassah
Arden E. Shenker, Portland, OR
Arnold Sweet, Dallas
Bernard S. White, Washington, DC
Barry Unger, Philadelphia
Albert E. Arant, Washington, DC
Jordan C. Band, Cleveland
Lewis D. Cole, Louisville
Aaron Goldman, Washington, DC
Irving Kane, Cleveland
Jacqueline K. Levine, MetroWest NJ
Theodore R. Mann, Philadelphia
Bernard H. Trager, Bridgeport
Lewis H. Weinstein, Boston
Benjamin Yanowitz, Cleveland
Albert D. Chernin
Charney V. Bromberg
Theodore Ellenoff
Howard I. Friedman
Abraham Goldstein
Gary A. Schonwald
Burton S. Levinson
Seymour Reich
Ruth B. Hurnitz
Thelma C. Wolf
Herbert Magidson
Emanuel Murevchik
Harvey S. Friedman
Edwin Goldwasser
Lenore Feldman
Sue Plavitz
Harris J. Gilbert
Alexander M. Schindler
Sidney Kessel
Marcel Weber
Evelyn Auerbach
Franklin P. Krutetz
Des Forrest
Gertrude White
Jeffrey Berkowitz, Miami
Rabbi Donald Berlin, Baltimore
Leonard Cole, Northern NJ
Robert Friedberg, Milwaukee
David Goldman, Des Moines
Lucy Goldman, San Diego
Peter Goodstein, Flint
Helen Hoffman, Palm Beach
Howard Kahn, Minnesota
Harvey Kaplan, Kansas City
Jacob Kirshner, Middlesex NJ
Alvin Kushner, Detroit
Joseph Kornfeld, Houston
Sidney Laibson, Hartford
Lynn Lyss, St. Louis
Howard Miller, Los Angeles
Norman Patz, MetroWest NJ
Burton Perlman, Cincinnati
Lester Pollack, New York
Theodore R. Beton, San Francisco
Norman Sider, Indianapolis
Evelyn Smith, Phoenix
JoAnn R. Spiegel, Pittsburgh
Samuel J. Tenenbaum, Columbia SC
Maynard Ungerman, Tulsa
Herbert S. Wander, Chicago
Barbara Wiener, Fort Lauderdale
Julia Zimet, El Paso
Norman S. Davis, San Antonio
Frederick Frank, Pittsburgh
Milton I. Goldstein, St. Louis
Stuart A. Handmaker, Louisville
Shirley T. Joseph, Buffalo
Allan Kassen, Cleveland
H. Ronald Kisko, Philadelphia
Donald E. Lefton, Miami
Stanley H. Lowell, New York
Israel Miller, New York
Michael D. Rapp, CRC Directors Assn.
Robert A. Riesman, Rhode Island
Steven Schwarz, Wilkes-Barre
Daniel S. Shapiro, New York
H. William Shure, New Haven
Sheldon U. Tenenbaum, Savannah
Norman D. Tilles, Rhode Island
Jerry Wagner, Hartford
Marion A. Willen, Philadelphia
Maynard Wisner, Chicago
Judith Wolf, Boston

National Jewish Community Relations NICRAC

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

(212) 694-6950

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February 16, 1988

Honorable Shimon Peres
Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Deputy Prime Minister Peres:

The member agencies of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, meeting in Plenary Session in Los Angeles, appreciate the message we received from you at the beginning of these deliberations, which we shared with the delegates.

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Bennett Yanowitz, Cleveland
ALICIA J. DE CHARMAY
Albert D. Chernin
Charnay V. Bromberg
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Theodore Ellenoff
Howard I. Friedman
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
Abraham Goldstein
Gary A. Schonwald
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Marcel Weber
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FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM
Evelyn Auerbach
Franklin P. Kruetzer
WOMEN'S AMERICAN ORT
Bess Forreast
Gertrude White
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Barbara Wiener, Fort Lauderdale
Jule Zimet, El Paso
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Milton I. Goldstein, St. Louis
Stuart A. Handmaker, Louisville
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Daniel S. Shapiro, New York
H. William Shure, New Haven
Sheldon U. Tenenbaum, Savannah
Norman D. Tilles, Rhode Island
Jerry Wagner, Hartford
Marion A. Witen, Philadelphia
Maynard Wishner, Chicago
Judith Wolf, Boston

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Jack B. Jacobs, Delaware
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H. Women's American ORT
Michael H. Harkness, St. Louis
Ruth Pappin, Madison
E. Shaker, Portland, OR
Arnold Sweet, Dallas
TREASURER
S. White, Washington, DC
SECRETARY
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Albert O. Chernin
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
Chaim V. Bromberg
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(in addition to the officers)
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AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Theodore Ellenoff
Howard I. Friedman
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
Abraham Goldstein
Gary A. Schonwald
B'Nai B'rith
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National Jewish Community Relations NJCRAAC

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

(212) 684-6950

February 16, 1988

Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz:

The member agencies of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, meeting in Plenary Session today in Los Angeles, welcome the readiness of the Administration and your personal efforts to reinvigorate the peace process and to find the means for bringing the Israelis and Arabs together for direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations. As a full partner to the Camp David Accords, the United States has a central role to play in furthering these negotiations.

Throughout your term in office you have demonstrated sensitivity and a sympathetic understanding in approaching the complex and difficult problems of the Arab/Israel conflict. It is especially gratifying that the Administration has decided to press energetically to advance the peace process, even in its final months in office.

This Administration has wisely recognized that there are many avenues to the negotiating table. The real problem has not been the absence of a procedure or framework for discussion. Rather the resolve to make peace with Israel is what has been missing in the Arab world these last forty years, with the notable exception of Sadat's historic mission to Jerusalem. That singular departure from Arab rejectionism resulted in the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Again and again, over these last forty years, the Arabs have rejected opportunities that would have been responsive to Palestinian aspirations as well as to the security needs of Israel. In light of this history, the crucial message must come from the Arabs, that they are ready to sit down with Israel in direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations.

In Israel, the genuine desire for peace, which crosses all political boundaries, remains as strong as ever. Throughout its forty year history, Israel has consistently communicated a message of flexibility and peaceful coexistence; the acceptance of the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, the offer to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 War in exchange for peace, and the Camp David Accords, which explicitly recognized the need to address Palestinian aspirations within the framework of direct negotiations.

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
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We know the United States recognizes that a just and enduring peace only can be obtained through direct negotiations. A phased process, in which initial agreements on some issues can lead to progress on more complex and divisive questions, now may suggest a good prospect for success. Such a process is envisaged in the Camp David Accords.

We know you recognize that when a true hand of peace is offered to it, Israel will grasp it warmly and unhesitatingly.

Cordially,



Michael A. Pelavin
Chair
National Jewish Community Relations
Advisory Council

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Presentation of Michael A. Pelavin
Chair, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

to

NJCRCAC Plenary Session
Los Angeles, February 16, 1988

Celebrating Israel's 40th Anniversary --

Israel-Diaspora Relations: Bonds, Barriers and Opportunities

I Song of Praise

Forty years ago -- only 40 years ago -- the General Assembly of the United Nations voted on November 29th, 1947, to establish the State of Israel. Many of us still vividly recall the radio report from Lake Success as the vote was recorded... Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, aye; United States, aye... 33 ayes, 13 nays, and 10 abstentions. A truncated version of Eretz Yisrael, but Zionist leaders accepted, warmly accepted, the partition of Palestine, just as they had accepted earlier proposals to compromise the fundamental differences between Jews and Arabs.

As we have learned so painfully, however, the readiness to compromise was not reciprocated. Arab armies massed on the border of this new State. Six hundred thousand Jews were surrounded by these armies. Only three years after the end of the Holocaust Jews were threatened with, as the Secretary General of the Arab League declared, "a war of extermination and a momentous massacre." Facing this danger of annihilation were Jews who had just arrived in Israel out of the camps of Europe -- first the concentration camps and then the DP camps. Others were still behind barbed wire fences in Cyprus and Europe, while in Eastern Europe courageous young Israelis were literally carrying Jewish children on their backs over Balkan mountain ranges to bring

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them to Eretz Yisrael. As the Arab armies prepared for their massive invasion of Israel, key decision-makers on the highest levels of the United States government were urging President Truman to reverse his decision in support of partition.

The Yishuv would not be daunted, and world Jewry stood firmly with it in its determination to establish the third Jewish Commonwealth. Inspired by the bold, forceful, stubborn leadership of David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel was declared on May 14th, 1948 (fifth of Iyar, 5708). At the nadir of the history of the Diaspora, out of the ashes of the Holocaust, arose the first sovereign Jewish state in 2000 years. The prayers we had recited daily in the shtetls of Eastern Europe, in the great cities of the West, in the villages of Ethiopia and Yemen, in the oasbahs and mellahs of North Africa were answered. We had returned to Zion. The Promise had been redeemed. On the wings of the eagle thousands of Jews were delivered unto the Promised Land out of the bondage of slavery. A new modern-day exodus.

Unlike the Biblical description, they did not find a land of milk and honey. The land was barren. Life was not easy. The thousands that came had to reside in the Maabarot. Just barely were they able to eke out the essentials of life. Sacrifices were demanded of the Israelis, and sacrifices were made as the dream of rebuilding Zion drove them on. Even after they drove back the invading Arab armies, Israel continued to live in a state of siege -- its very survival constantly threatened with Arab armies poised for new invasions and Fedayeen terrorizing Israel from Gaza and the West Bank. Although the Soviet Union voted in favor of partition, only a few years after the establishment of the State, the Iron Curtain countries began to deliver armaments to the Arabs for a new attack on Israel. From the West, Israel received friendship, but not much more, even from the United States.

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In those early years Israel, fortunately, was not alone. World Jewry stood as one in its support. This new, struggling Jewish commonwealth had sparked a sense of pride among Jews throughout the world that was unparalleled in the history of the Diaspora. Who can ever forget the emotion we felt when we saw in the newsreels for the first time the Jewish flag flying over Jerusalem as the capital of Israel? Our heroes were the young chalutzim, the handsome young men and women who had returned to the soil to rebuild the Land. Our response was expressed in unprecedented generosity. But nothing we gave, nothing we did, could match the sacrifices of the builders of the State.

As Chaim Weizman said in his memoirs, "Brick by brick, dunam by dunam we shall build the State." And they did.

They built a state that provided a haven for Jews, many escaping persecution, many destitute, arriving from more than a hundred countries around the globe. They resurrected and taught them the language of our people, Hebrew; they provided housing, health care, education, employment. They built new development towns. They made certain that the doors of this land would always be open to any Jew seeking refuge.

They made the deserts bloom. They created a modern, hi-tech economy, among the most advanced in the world today.

Out of the Ha'Shomer and the Hagannah they built a strong, proud, egalitarian Israel Defense Force, capable of maintaining the independence of the State against the constant threats to its survival from a multitude of Arab nations.

Above all, they built a western, pluralistic democracy, in which the rights of all citizens, including the non-Jewish minorities, are fully pro-

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tested. If there are flaws in this democracy, they grow out of a political structure excessively concerned with providing representation in the Knesset for all points of view, however small their numbers.

While preoccupied with survival and absorption, Israel, nevertheless, in those years, became a beacon unto other developing nations, as Israelis equipped with their technological, agricultural and community organizing expertise, traveled to Africa, Latin America and Asia to assist in hundreds of developmental projects.

Israel did all of this and more while carrying the enormous burden of an escalating defense budget necessitated by wars that continued to threaten its existence in every decade of these last 40 years, ongoing terrorism, and the refusal of Arab states, until Sadat and Egypt, to recognize the State of Israel and negotiate a peaceful resolution.

In those 40 years the hand of friendship extended to Israel at its very birth by President Harry Truman, has evolved into a strong alliance between the small State of Israel and the superpower that is the United States --an alliance that no one would have anticipated 40 years ago, in which the United States and Israel are closely linked politically, economically and militarily. The source of its strength lies not only in the strategic considerations of these two nations, but in their shared roots in western democratic values.

II The Emergence of the American Jewish Community

In these same 40 years the American Jewish community also has undergone radical transformation. Forty years ago, when the State of Israel was

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created, the American Jewish community was still essentially an immigrant community. Even after the war against Nazism, anti-Semitism, racism, bigotry, and discrimination still scarred the face of this nation. The children of the immigrants were struggling to become part of the American system, even as they encountered barriers in higher education and in the great corporations of America.

The demographers of the American Jewish community in the late forties forecast a significant diminution in our numbers, which were then about five million, anticipating that by the year 2000 our numbers would be substantially reduced.

Ben-Gurion warned that unless the American Jewish community went on aliyah, it would either fall victim to anti-Semitism in America or succumb to assimilation.

We did not go on aliyah in any significant numbers. We did not become victims of anti-Semitism. Nor are we an assimilated Jewish community.

In those forty years we have become thoroughly integrated in every aspect of American society. We are first-class citizens in every sense of the word, bound together with all other Americans in this greatest pluralistic democracy in world history.

We also have emerged as a strong, cohesive, dynamic, indeed powerful, Jewish community. Our communal institutions and synagogues are thriving. Jewish learning and culture are flourishing. Our bond with Israel has grown even stronger and deeper. We are thoroughly American. We are thoroughly Jewish. Some have suggested that we enjoy the best of all possible worlds.

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It would be nice to conclude this speech now by saying, "and they lived happily ever after." Israelis singing and dancing the hora in the land of milk and honey, and the Jewish community of America happily enjoying the relationship with other Americans, with other American Jews and Israelis. That would be nice to say, but that's not the way it is. It's just not so.

III Where We Stand Today

Our future as a Jewish community in this great nation is not guaranteed. No one can foresee with certainty what will be the long-term consequences of the growing rate of intermarriage in the Jewish community. Even though anti-Semitism is at low ebb in contrast to 40 years ago, it still scars the American landscape. Most American Jews still do not feel totally safe, totally secure.

Our idealistic vision of Israel has been shaken by reality. We see in Israel severe internal conflicts. In those conflicts we see grave long-term threats to the very nature of Israel as a western, democratic pluralistic Jewish state coming from extreme fundamentalists and ultra-nationalists. Their concept of peoplehood sharply departs from the consensus that exists among most American Jews and, indeed, most Israelis. A concept of a pluralistic democracy is repugnant to those who believe they have the absolute truth. Such absolutism tends to overwhelm the moderate, who tolerate the "truth" that others assert.

Israel as a democracy and a Jewish state is confronted with a dilemma of administering territories in which more than a million Arabs live in what

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they feel is subjugation. To annex the territories and give the Arabs who inhabit them full citizenship would threaten Israel as a Jewish state. To go on indefinitely without any change in the status of these Arabs would threaten Israel as a democracy. To withdraw from these territories without formal agreements and negotiated peace treaties could jeopardize the very security of Israel. The only viable option is negotiations, which Israel has been seeking throughout its 40 years. Israel is constantly seeking partners in the Arab world who will negotiate the future of these territories without stipulating unacceptable pre-conditions.

These strains in Israel reach beyond its borders. They do affect the American Jewish community. They strain the very relationship that is so vital to both Israel and the American Jewish community. No longer do American Jews look upon Israel with awe. No longer do they view its leadership as infallible. This is especially true of younger American Jews. That they do not cling to a romanticized image of Israel is not all bad, but that they seem to be drifting away from Israel should be a matter of concern to us as we look ahead to the future of the relationship between Israeli and American Jews. We may recall the sage advice of Rabbi Stephen Wise, when he said, "Our quarrel is not with Jews who are different, but with Jews who are indifferent."

The relationship between the Diaspora, particularly the American Jewish community and Israel, has never been easy. From the early days of the State, and even before, there were sharp differences between leaders of the Yishuv and leaders of the Diaspora including the Zionist movement. The fact that the differences we face today are not new, doesn't make them easier. What we have today are two strong, dynamic Jewish communities, each with a strong sense of its identity and destiny. One represents the fulfillment of the return to Zion, viewing itself as the center of Jewish life and the fountainhead of

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Jewish culture. And the other, feeling at home in America, insists that it too can serve as the vehicle of a creative, dynamic Jewish future.

Yet, in spite of our different conceptions of who we are, growing out of vastly different historical experiences, the bond that exists between American Jewry and Israel is unbreakable. Our collective sense of peoplehood exists in every fiber of our being. The concept of Klal Yisrael is not an abstraction; it affects all that we say and do; it affects all that Israel says and does. American Jewry, and, I believe, most Israelis, recognize that Israel and the American Jewish community are each absolutely vital to the creative survival of the other, and to the continuity of Jewish life.

This recognition has led the government of a sovereign state, the government of Israel, into a relationship with Diaspora Jewry, particularly the American Jewish community, that is unique in the world. No other government's leaders, especially the prime minister, is as accessible to private citizens of a foreign country as the Israeli leadership is to American Jewry. This relationship provides the discreet channels, which properly utilized, offer opportunities for direct and honest dialogue between the leaders of the American Jewish community and Israel.

For the most part, this dialogue necessarily takes place beyond the public view. An exchange of views on issues of common concern need not and should not be undertaken on the pages of American newspapers. Conveying our concerns, in some cases our dissent from Israeli positions, or prodding as a loved one, our Israeli partners to encourage a change in their posture can best be achieved through private exchanges.

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Ample opportunities for such exchange of views exist when American Jewish leaders visit Israel and during the countless visits of Israeli dignitaries to the United States. I suggest to you, however, that we have not fully utilized these opportunities. Hardly a month goes by when we do not host highly influential Israelis, in and out of government, in our communities. But how often have community leaders, behind closed doors, conveyed to these influential Israelis their honest and candid assessments of how Israeli policies are impacting on American public opinion? Israelis do not always like to hear what we have to say, but on occasion our efforts have contributed to a shift in official Israeli policy. The shift in Israel's posture toward South Africa last year is one of the more recent examples.

Whether the issue is South Africa, who is a Jew, settlements in the administered territories, Meir Kahane, Pollard, educating youth about democratic principles, excesses by the Shin Bet, violent clashes in the West Bank and Gaza, American Jewish leadership, indeed, all American Jews, cannot be expected to be indifferent and refrain from sharing our concerns with Israel. Indeed, in recent weeks we, as leaders of the Jewish community relations field, have been severely tested as to how we fulfill our profound commitment to Israel. Public criticism or public affirmation? Which would be more responsive to this commitment and to our conscience? There is no easy answer. In NJCRAC we have privately and forcefully conveyed our concerns and assessments to key Israelis. Publicly, we have not condoned practices which we deplore; what we have tried to do is place these events in a larger context. We have done so not to obscure what is happening, but to focus on the historical reality to identify those who are really responsible for the plight of Palestinian Arabs.

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IV Channels for Structured Relationship

The question is whether the existing channels of communication between us and Israelis are adequate and whether we can better utilize them? The fundamental problem is the lack of symmetry in the relationship. Our dialogue is with the elected leaders of the government of the sovereign State of Israel, and we speak as leaders of voluntary American organizations. A peer relationship? Hardly. Their decisions, enforced by the power of the state, have far-reaching consequences, at times affecting life and death. Their accountability to the electorate is direct and clear-cut. They wear the crown of state.

To the government of Israel, as to our own, we speak as in effect lobbyists, however high minded our views might be. Our effectiveness in part depends upon our asserting what is clearly an identifiable consensus among our constituents. That requires us to ensure that the judgments we convey to the government of Israel grow out of open, and honest consultative processes with our own constituents such as take place at the Plenum.

But if we are seeking to persuade the government to accept our views, then in line with sound community relations principles, shouldn't we seek to forge a coalition with like-minded in the voluntary sector of Israel? The reality is, however, that we really do not have counterparts in Israel.

The Jewish Agency is conceived of as primarily a service vehicle, not intended to provide the table for what are essentially public policy issues, although it has played an important role in the question of amending the Law of Return. Of course, we all have engaged in many discussions and dialogues with many Israelis outside of government including leaders of private groups.

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But these informal, ad hoc channels lack continuity and have little impact on the affairs of Israel.

We have extensive ties with institutions outside of government. The American Jewish community has provided enormous financial assistance and professional expertise to strengthen the health, education, welfare, and religious institutions of Israel. While we have done it primarily through the Jewish Agency, we only have to look at the outstanding services being provided in Israel by several of our national member agencies. In addition, more than two dozen American Jewish organizations including NJCRAC national agencies maintain offices in Jerusalem. They play a valuable role in contributing to neighborhood development, educating about democracy and tolerance, fostering intergroup relations, and promoting a pluralistic society and a commitment to voluntarism.

We have not brought to bear, on building the voluntary sector of Israel, the full potential of American Jewish community resources on a planned, comprehensive basis. Should we go beyond our traditional role and play a more active and deliberate role in directly assisting Israelis in building a voluntary sector that fosters the ideals and values we share in common?

The democratic process that is Israel, I believe, could be significantly strengthened by the values nurtured among American Jews as a result of our unique experience in the United States. The obvious way of bringing those values to Israel is through aliyah. Short of that, the question is whether Jewish community relations agencies should play a larger and more direct role in assisting groups that have what is essentially a community relations agenda. There are such groups in Israel; for example -- the Israel

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Association of Civil Rights. They are at early stages of development with limited resources, but we can and should make helping them grow and flourish a priority. Through such groups we could in the future have a larger impact on Israeli society and values.

What is our rationale for doing so? There are groups in America that have had experience extending over decades in support of like-minded groups in Israel. The party structure in Israel is reflected in many Zionist organizations in the Diaspora including the United States. Clearly, religious groups in the United States have direct counterparts in Israel.

Such a proposition opens delicate and difficult questions about the nature of the relationship between the Jewish communities of Israel and the United States, but in a responsible way the member agencies of NJCRAC should explore these proposals in an appropriate forum with the leadership of other American bodies such as the CJP.

In the forty years since the establishment of the State of Israel, there has been no fundamental re-examination of the means for facilitating a structured relationship between the American Jewish community and Israel, dealing with the totality of our mutual concerns. The institutional framework, including the Jewish Agency, the WZO and World Jewish Congress, all preceded the establishment of the State of Israel, although in the last 15 years the Jewish Agency has been undergoing fundamental changes and the role of the federations in its governance has been significantly enhanced. I would urge the leadership of the American Jewish community to begin a process to reassess the institutional framework necessary for relations between to Israel and world Jewry. It should do so responsibly, deliberately, cautiously -- but it should do so.

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V Babylon and Jerusalem

However, let us not become so preoccupied with the mechanisms for exchanging views that we would lose sight of what we seek to accomplish through these channels. We, as an American Jewish community, have a direct interest in the nature and quality of Israel as a Jewish State, and Israelis have a direct stake in the nature and quality of Jewish life in America. The future of the quality of Jewish life of each is in part dependent upon the other, and while we should recognize the uniqueness and centrality of Israel, Israelis should accept the legitimacy of the American Jewish experience.

We should welcome their views on the issues on our agenda, and we believe that they should welcome our views on the issues on their agenda. As we face the next forty years, the quality of Jewish life will gain by our being active participants, not passive bystanders in each other's life and struggles.

We have accomplished incredible feats in a short time. In these past 40 years, what has emerged in Israel and in the United States is a new and different Jewish people -- proud, confident and determined to foster and preserve the continuity of Jewish life. Each stands on the edge of even greater creativity in Jewish studies, culture, and action. In the United States, this Jewish community, as in Babylon, looks forward to serving as a flourishing center of Jewish culture. But, as in Babylon, we will always look to Jerusalem. In that special relationship we each will contribute our talents and strengths to bolstering the other as we strive to carry out the mission placed upon the Jewish people to be "as a light unto nations," and unto our own people.

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71 - ווייטנאם	סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	מאח :

המצב בשטחים - תהליך השלום.

1. ועידת נאקראק השנתית בלוס אנג'לס סיימה דיוניה אתמול ה-17/2. השתתפו כ-450 נציגי הקהילות היהודיות מרחבי ארה"ב.

2. מליאה הועידה החליטה לשגר המכתב המצ"ב לשולץ, להעביר תוכנו לידיעת רוה"מ ומ"מ רוה"מ ובמקביל לפרסם תוכנו בתקשורת. העבירו נא לידיעתם.

3. דיווח על הועידה במברק בנפרד.

מרדכי ידיד

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The NJCRAC Israel Task Force recommends that the NJCRAC Plenum send the following letter to Secretary of State Shultz:

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Dear Secretary Shultz:

The member agencies of NJCRAC, meeting in Plenary Session today in Los Angeles, welcome the readiness of the Administration and your personal efforts to reinvigorate the peace process and to find the means for bringing the Israelis and Arabs together for direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations. As a full partner to the Camp David Accords, the United States has a central role to play in furthering these negotiations.

Throughout your term in office you have demonstrated sensitivity and a sympathetic understanding in approaching the complex and difficult problems of the Arab/Israel conflict. It is especially gratifying that the Administration has decided to press energetically to advance the peace process, even in its final months in office.

This Administration has wisely recognized that there are many avenues to the negotiating table. The real problem has not been the absence of a procedure or framework for discussion. Rather the resolve to make peace with Israel is what has been missing in the Arab world these last forty years, with the notable exception of Sadat's historic mission to Jerusalem. That singular departure from Arab rejectionism resulted in the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Again and again, over these last forty years, the Arabs have rejected opportunities that would have been responsive to Palestinian aspirations as well as to the security needs of Israel. In light of this history, the crucial message must come from the Arabs, that they are ready to sit down with Israel in direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations.

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In Israel, the genuine desire for peace, which crosses all political boundaries, remains as strong as ever. Throughout its forty year history, Israel has consistently communicated a message of flexibility and peaceful coexistence; the acceptance of the U.N. Partition Plan in 1947, the offer to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 War in exchange for peace, and the Camp David Accords, which explicitly recognized the need to address Palestinian aspirations within the framework of direct negotiations.

We know the U.S. recognizes that a just and enduring peace only can be obtained through direct negotiations. A phased process, in which initial agreements on some issues can lead to progress on more complex and divisive questions, now may suggest a good prospect for success. Such a process is envisaged in the Camp David Accords.

We know you recognize that when a true hand of peace is offered to it, Israel will grasp it warmly and unhesitantly.

Cordially,

Michael A. Pelavin
Chair, NJCRAC

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דחיפות מיידית

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אל. סמנכ"ל צפ"א
מנהל מצפ"א

להלן משיחה עם פרנקוהוף - יו"ר המפלגה השמרנית.

א. נושא השטחים ונושא מז"ח בכלל אינו תופס מקום במרוץ לנשיאות. להוציא נושא ה- KCF שום נושא של מדיניות חוץ מצוי על הפרק והבוחר האמריקאי מעוניין יותר בדמויות עצמן המשתתפות בתהליך ובנושא הכלכלי הפנימי. מאידך אם תחול החמרה במצב באזור, הדבר עלול להשחנות לדעהו והמועמדים יזדקקו להתייחס לנושא.

ב. הוא כמובן צריך לגלות זהירות כלפי חוץ בכל הקשור להעדפת מועמד זה או אחר, אך נראה לו כי מבחינת הרפובליקאים דול נראה כמועמד "חזק" יותר. מכל מקום המרוץ עתה פתוח לחלוטין בין דול ובוש. הוא לא רואה ברוברטסון מועמד שיחזיק מעמד. לדבריו גם צפויים גילויים לא נעימים לרוברטסון על הנושא הכספי. הוא יציע לבוש, אם זה יהיה המועמד הרפובליקאי לקחת את אליזבת דול כמועמדת לסגן נשיא אך הדבר תלוי כמובן גם ב"עסקה" בין בוש לקמפ ובצנזר הידיעות בין בוש לדול. זו הגיעה בימים האחרונים לעמפרטורות גבוהות ואנשי דול אינם סולחים לעצמם על שנהגו ברכות מסוימות כלפי בוש ולא השתמשו למשל בסרטון שהיה הרסני מבחינת בוש.

ג. בין הדמוקרטים הוא רואה את המועמד בא מבין השניים דוקיט וגפרדט ויתכן ששניהם ירוצו יחד כאשר שאלת המיקום ביניהם תקבע על-פי התוצאות בוועידה, כמובן.

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המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה
סמנכ"ל מז"תים
מצפ"א

סיוע אמריקאי.

ראו דברי וויטהד בעניין הסיוע (18.2).

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While expressing regret over continued Congressional earmarking of high levels of aid to Israel and Egypt, Assistant Secretary of State John Whitehead today said that additional aid programs for the territories and Arab states may be necessary if Secretary Shultz' latest initiative succeeds.

During an on-the-record briefing to the press, Whitehead complained that "In our current budget our foreign aid in particular has been so heavily earmarked that a number of countries will be eliminated completely from our programs....We think that earmarks are basically undesirable...."

Explaining that the high levels of assistance to these countries are a product of the Camp David Accords, Whitehead nevertheless admitted that the Administration had contemplated reducing aid in 1989. "The need of those two countries for our continued assistance is very great and no one should lose sight of that. Their economies are fragile, the people are poor in those countries, the natural resources in both countries are very limited. There is no question about the need of those countries for aid. But when you have limited resources, though, one has to look at all the recipients and think of the possibility of rationing decreasing funds to all components. Some thought was given to that [the reduction of aid to Israel and Egypt] I would say in the preparation of the budget [but] there would be very little sympathy for that reduction in Congress. And with a combination of our recognition of the need and a realistic recognition of what Congress would be likely to do, we put the same numbers in the budget for next year."

The official lamented that earmarks reduced discretionary funds for "emergencies": "For example the current Middle East peace initiative that the Secretary is talking about...surely assistance will be needed for countries in that region beyond the current level of assistance and we have to be in a position to provide that...."

Asked to outline what 'these new needs might be, Whitehead said "I can only speculate on that. It all depends on what happens and the nature of the peaceful effort. But the desperate need for economic development on the West Bank and Gaza, for example, if a settlement should be made in those territories and a more permanent structure established for the government of that territory. Certainly economic assistance in that area would be desperately needed. If other Arab countries come into a peace process and as a result maybe lose economic ties with their neighbors or assistance from their neighbors that would have to be made up in some way because we could not allow allow Arab countries that may come into settlement with Israel to flounder after they had the courage to join in a peaceful settlement."

How would the Administration finance this? "We have to embark on the process and hope and pray that the money will appear if we need money. If we sit and wait for the money to be there...I'm afraid we wouldn't be able to take much initiative in the Middle East. And the Secretary feels, and the President feels, that now is the time for us to make one last real effort for success in that difficult area."

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(*"WHAT'S IN IT FOR THEM"*). עובדה היא שאין חדש מתחת לשמש במזה"ח, ואין רעיונות חדשים מפני שמספר כה רב של אנשים חכמים עבדו בשקדנות על הנושא. מאידך ייתכן "צירוף חדש" (*A "NEW BLEND"*) של הרעיונות הקיימים. לאחרונה הוא ניהל שיחות עם אנשים רבים, לרבות שני פלסטינאים שביקרו בוושנגטון, מקובל על הכל שהסטטוס קוו אינו עונה (*IS NOT ADEQUATE*) הישראלים אינם יודעים מה לעשות כעת, ואילו הערבים אינם נלהבים משיחות ישירות, בקרוב יפגש עם הסובייטים; אינו יודע מה תהיה עמדתם, אך גם הם מודאגים מהתפשטות הפונדמנטליזם האיסלמי, אף מבית.

באשר ל"צירוף החדש" של רעיונות בדבר הפתרון, אין ברצונו להיות *FORTHCOMING* במתכוון אינו רוצה לנקוט בעמדה מפורשת - וזאת ע"מ לשמור על מרחב תמרון. עם זאת, כיסודות יש להצביע על :-

- הצורך לשנות את התנאים הפוליטיים בשטחים, ולעשות זאת תוך פרק זמן קצר.
- הצורך להגיע למו"מ על "התוצאה הסופית" (*FINAL OUTCOME*) ובמו"מ האלה יידונו כל הנושאים.
- הצורך להקים "סמכות ביניים" (*INTERIM AUTHORITY*) שתתייחס לכל הנושאים שלגביהם הושגה בזמנו הסכמה טכטיבית. שולץ הוסיף כי רשימת הנושאים המוסמכים על בסיס זה הינם מרשימתו מאד (*IT WOULD*).

(*KNOCK YOUR EYES OUT*). לדברי שולץ, כאשר מסתכלים על התמונה בשלמותה, אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות טיוס ממו"מ על שלב ביניים תוך שישה חודשים ושיושג "מועד נקוב" (*A DATE CERTAIN*) לקיום המו"מ בדבר התוצאה הסופית. יש לפעול על בסיס החלטת מועב"ט 242, החלטה שהיא "VAGUE" במקצת, אך "זה בסדר" ואף רצוי. מנהיגי הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב רוצים מאד לעשות משהו, וישראל פתוחה לשינויים.

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דפ 3 מתוכ 4 דפים

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תאריך/זייח

דחיפות

סוג בטחוני

- 3 -

הראייה לכך: ההצלחה בהכנסת שינויים לחוק המשק והמערכת הכלכלית בישראל. לא רק המנהיגים היהודיים אלא כולם רוצים לעשות משהו. כעת איש אינו אומר "לא", ואיננו שולל את היוזמה האמלקאית. מאידך, אף צד אינו מבקש לדעת^{צ"מ} היכן הוא צריך לחתום... הנשיא ריגן מתודע ומתודרך. שולץ ניהל עמו שיחות רבות, ואף ביקש שהוא (הנשיא) יהיה מעורב באופן אישי ביוזמה, כשלעצמו יתמסר שולץ לנושא לאחר ביקורו במוסקבה. לשם כך וע"מ להתפנות יותר, הוא מאציל סמכויות לסגנו, ווייטהד. ביחס למהומות בשטחים, הסכים שולץ כי ייתכן ש"מעז ייצא מתוק" וכי תיחרו צמיחת מנהיגות מקומית, הזכיר שבביקורו האחרון ביקש להפגש עם פלסטינאים, אך ^{הוא} לא באו לפגישה - "שמא מתוך פחד לחייהם".

שולץ נשאל למה מתכוון מובארץ באומרו שק"ד "מת". שולץ השיב שלמיטב הבנתו יש, אליבא דמובארץ, לאמץ מינוח חדש. המונח "ק"ד" אינו מקובל בעולם הערבי, וגם השם "אוטונומיה" אינה מטבע לשון שמיש כיום; לכן צריכים להשתמש בלקסיקון חדש.

(3) להלן מלואים ממקורות נוספים.

- (א) להערכת שולץ יש צורך בועידה בינלאומית מסוג זה או אחר ע"מ להביא לפינתת המו"מ, לשאלתו באם שולץ השתמש במונח אירוע בינלאומי (INTERNATIONAL EVENT) (במקום ועידה בינלאומית), השיב המקור שלא שם לב לכך (במפגש עם הקונגרסנים כז אימץ שולץ בטור זה).
- (ב) שולץ דיבר אמנם על 242 כבסיס למו"מ, אך נתן להבין שלגבי דידו החלטה זו, פירושה "טריטוריה בעד שלום".
- (ג) נשאל אם שקל השפעת הודעה כזו על המאזן הפוליטי הפנימי בדשחאל, והתחמק מלתת תשובה ברורה.
- (ד) ככלל, השאלות היו ענייניות מאד - ואם פה ושם הובעה נימה ביקורתית על ישראל, נמנע שולץ מלהצטרף לנימה זו והתמיד הכרזת ידידות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל (כלשון המעטה, לפי מקור אחד - שולץ היה UNFLINCHING בתמיכתו לישראל).

טוֹרֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל / נוֹשִׁינְגְטוֹן

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 4 מחור 4 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

454

ה) כ"כ ככלל, הסנטורים שהתבטאו ברכו על הירוזמה האמריקאית. בעבר לא מעטים מהם טענו שעל ארה"ב (ועל אחרים) לקחת סיכונים למען השלום, ולכן חיבדו לא רק הירוזמה אלא מעורבותו האישית של שולץ.

ו) שולץ לא שפע אופטימיות - דבר מתוך תחושה דחיפות וחוסר ברה, ^ש

יחס
למדן

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 1910 18 פבר' 88

מס' מברק

472

המשרד

אל: ממ"ד מצפ"א

מגורם עתונאי היוצא עם המזכירו למוסקבה ולמזה"ית.

1. שולץ מונע מכח שני גורמים - (א) ההשלכה השלילית המצטברת מהתקוממות הפלס' על מעמדה של ירדן לעומת השטחים, ומכך שהיא מרפה את ידו של חוסיין, בנוסף לקשיים האחרים הקיימים בלאו הכי, מלהמשיך ולעסוק בנושא תהליך השלום לאלתר. האמריקאים אינם מרבים לדבר על עמדתו של חוסיין גם מהסיבה שלא בדיוק יודעים היכן עומד אך בעיקר שלא להכביד עליו כך שימשוך ידו מהמחלך. (ב) עידוד מסויים שמצא בעמדת רה"מ שמיר במספר פרטים כגון פתיחה/ארוע בינלאומי, הלינקג' בין שלב הזמני למו"מ על הסטטוס הטופי ועוד. היה בדעה זו מאז הפגישה עם רה"מ שמיר באוקטובר 87, אך המהומות ביהש"ע עושות הפעם את כל ההבדל. המזכיר ירצה לבדוק עד היכן מגיע מרחב הזמרון של רה"מ שמיר, והאם זה מספיק להבטיח סף כלשהו לקשירת חוסיין. הביקור איפוא בארץ חשוב כשלעצמו, אך יהווה מפתח באשר לירדן. התוויית החוטים ביניהם קודמת לסוגיית השתתפות ברה"מ והפלס'.

2. פוליאקוב יגיע בשבת (20.2) לריאד' במטגרת סיורו באזור. יש בכך עדות לתקופה החדשה ביחסי שתי המדינות והמשך לדיאלוג עם פייצל ובנדר במוסקבה. שמע מגורמים סעודים שהשניים שמעו במפורש שברה"מ תתמוך בהצעת האמברגו באם תגיע להצבעת מועבי"ט. אינו בדעה שאיראן תגיב כלפי ברה"מ בשל כך מכמה סיבות - (א) יטענו ובצדק שעשו כל שביכולתם למנוע זאת, אך באשמת האיראנים הגיעו למצב שעליהם לקבל החלטה ללא אופציה זולת חמיכה בה. (ב) הסוב' עשויים למשל בתום ששה חודשים להעלות הנושא מחדש במידה והאמברגו לא יביא להפסקת אש. (ג) האמברגו ממילא לא יהיה הרמטי. לברה"מ ולמעשה לאף אחד אחר, אין שליטה על סין וצפון קוריאה (ר' פרשת המשחקים האולימפיים) שימצאו גם להבא נתיבים לאספקת נשק לאיראן. הסובייטים לוחצים על הסעודים להגדיל היקף רכישת סחורות סובייטיות. הם מעלים עתה את נושא רכישת עצים (Timber), בעקבות עסקת החיטה. בכוונת הסעודים להענות, שכן הם ממילא רוכשים עצים מתוצרת סובייטית באמצעות מדינה שליטת, ואין כל סיבה שלא יעשו זאת במישרין.

אלי אבידן
15.1

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 111 111 111 111 111 111

דף: 1	מחלקת הקשר	דחיפות:
מחור: 9	טופס מברק	בהול
א ל :	מנהל מצפ"א, לשכת שה"ח, לשכת רוה"מ	תז"ח:
ד ע :	לשכת המנכ"ל, השגריר וושינגטון	גר :
מאח :	סגן הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק	00507 e11 78

המצב בשטחים - ועידת נאקראק.

1. המצב בשטחים היה הנושא המרכזי בו עידרה השנתית של נאקראק בלוס-אנג'לס שהסתיימה

ב-17/2. השתתפו 450 נציגי הקהילות היהודיות מרחבי ארה"ב. המליאה לא הצליחה להגיע לקונצנזוס על תוכן מכתב שהיה אמור להישלח לרוה"מ ולמ"מ רוח"מ. טיוטת המכתב (המצ"ב) שחובא לדיון כלל סעיף המביע כאב הקהילה היהודית משימוש מופרז בכח כשטחים. כשטיטת המכתב הובאה לדיון, מספר רב של דוברים ביקשו השמטת סעיף זה מהמכתב. אחוז גדול אחר של נציגים לא הסכימו לשיגורו של המכתב, מאחר ואין נסוחו מכקר את ישראל בצורה תקיפה יותר. במהלך הדיון הושמעו דיעות שונות ומנוגדות לגבי מדיניותה של ישראל בשטחים.

- שיגור המכתב ירד מעל סדר יומה של הועידה, מאחר והחלטות נאקראק מותקבלות בקונצנזוס ונציג אי.די.אל. הטיל ויטו על שיגורו.

- מאמצים שנעשו להגיע לקונצנזוס לא נשאו פרי גם לא במחיר של מכנה משותף נמוך ביותר.

2. בפתיחת הועידה הסנטור מקליפורניה פיט וילסון דיבר על האלימות בשטחים ואמר כי החובה הראשונית של ישראל היא להגן על חיי התושבים, אך יש גם למצוא פתרון לבעיה תפלסטינאית. ציין כי לארה"כ יש תפקיד אקטיבי בסכסוך ויש להגביר הלחץ עד אשר נשיג הפתרון המקובל על כל הצדדים. מה שקורה בשטחים לא יפגע בידידות האיתנה בין ישראל-ארה"כ.

2/.

תאריך:	18.2.1988	שם השולח:	מרדכי ידיד	אישור:
3	2	3	1	2

(Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page)

דף: 2	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דחיפות:
מחור: 9		סוג כטחוני:
א ל :		תז"ח:
ד ע :		גר :
מאח :		507 78

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3. ס/יו"ר נאקראק, אל-צארניו הזכיר בנאומו המרכזי הקשרים הידידותיים ההדוקים בין ארה"ב וישראל (כולל ש"פ האסטרטגי) יחסים שמוסדו ושלדעתו קרוב לוודאי יימשכו באדמיניסטרציה שלאחר ריגן. העולם הערבי, להוציא מצרים לא בא לשולחן הדיונים. אל-צארניו הכיע חששו שהעולם הערבי לא ישכיל להעביר הסכסוך מרחובות הגדה המערבית ועזה לשולחן הדיונים, משום שעדיין לא למדו את לקח 40 השנים האחרונות. כשותף לקמפ דוויד על ארה"ב למלא תפקיד מרכזי בקידום המו"מ.

4. המנכ"ל המדיני ביילין הופיע בפני המליאה ודיבר על "פרספקטיבות חדשות בסכסוך הערבי ישראל". דיבר על המציאות החדשה שנוצרה ועל היוזמה האמריקאית החדשה המטפלת עתה כמהות ולא בפרוצדורה, משום שועידה בינלאומית הפכה לנושא מפלגתי קונטרוברסיאלי. שתי המפלגות הגדולות החליטו לקדם פני היוזמה האמריקאית בשל המשבר האמיתי שנוצר. בדיון זה השתתף לוינסון יו"ר אי.די.אל. שאמר, כי אין זה הזמן לפניקה מצד הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית, זה הזמן לאחדות ואת דיעותינו יש להעביר, לא באמצעות החקשורת. בכך העביר לוינסון בעקיפין ביקורת נגד שינדלר, מבלי להזכיר את שמו. התכטאות זו של לוינסון גררה תגובה של מספר נציגים שאמרו כי הקהילה היהודית זקוקה לדייברסיטי וכי יש לאפשר הבעת דיעות שונות ובקורות ואין להרתיע ולהפחיד. דיון נוסף בהשתתפות ביילין קוייס במסגרת מצומצמת יותר עם צמרת הארגון. הדיון כאן התמקד על היוזמה הדיפלומטית האמריקאית.

5. בדיון המרכזי שהיה בנושא MAINTAINING AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, הדוברים העיקריים היו טד מאן, נשיא אמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס, מלקולם הובליין, ועידת הנשיאים. אודן שנקר יו"ר כח המשימה נאקראק.

3/-

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מגורק	דף: 3
טורג בטחוני:		מחור: 2
תז"ח:		א ל :
גר : 507 78		ד ע :
		מאח :

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- טד מאן חזר על מדיניות ארגונו כי מדיניותה הנוכחית של ישראל היא INHUMANE AND UNACCEPTABLE השימוש בכח אינו מקובל על היחודים. ה-P.R קשור למהות. התייחס להודעת "אמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס" לפני 5 חודשים שבת האיצו בישראל לקיים ועידה בינלאומית. התייחס לפגישותיו עם רוה"מ, חוסיין ומובראק ואמר כי אין הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית צריכה להצדיק מדיניות של אי פשרה טריטוריאלית. יש לחשוף לדעתו את מדיניות פשיטת הרגל ואם האמצעים לכפות מדיניות זו. שתיקה כמוה כהסכמה עם מדיניות אי פשרה טריטוריאלית.

- מלקולם הונליין אמר כי ממשלת ישראל ומנהיגיה נכונים לשמוע אותנו. יש צינורות שמוסדו למטרה זו. תפקידנו וזה לגיטימי הוא לנחל ויכוח ולהביע דעתנו על כל נושא אפילו. בנושאי בטחון. אנו זכאים לכך אבל את אי הסכמתנו יש לשמור במשפחה ולא להביעה באמצעות דפי הניו-יורק טיימס. אל לנו להוסיף לכידודה של ישראל. אל לנו למסור נשק וטיעונים לאויבנו. נשיא ועידת הנשיאים מוריס אברם לא הביע ביקורת ציבורית נגד ישראל. כוחה ועוצמתה של הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית ידוע בכל העולם הערבי. התייחס לתוצאות הסקר אי.די.אל. המראה כי הסחף קטן והתמיכה בישראל נשארת איתנה.

- ארדן שנקר - התייחס לחלקה השלישי של חתקשורת. 600 עתונאים בשטחים מול 3000 חיילים. כל עתונאי מכסה 5 חיילים. דיבר על מציאות חדשה. ישראל שבויית קבע בסטטוס קו זמני.

- בדיון שהתפתח, מספר דוברים אמרו כי אינם יכולים לקיים התמיכה הציבורית בישראל מול התמונות המאמרים והחקשורת האלקטרונית. הובעה ביקורת על שמציעים להם להתנהג כאילו הכל יפה בישראל. הסקרים אינם משקפים את הביקורת נגד ישראל

4/.

אישור:

שם השולח:

חאריך:

רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מבוק	גר: 4
טווח כסחובי:		מחור: 9
תו"ל:		א ל :
גר : 507 78		ד ע :
		מאת :

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ואין להישאר שקטים. מאידך היו נציגים שהתכבאו נגד חפיסת עולמו של טד מאן. אמנם אין הצדקה לברוטליות, אך אם נחזיר השטחים. איזה ערבויות יש לנו לשלום אמיתי. כאשר טד מאן דיווח שחוסין אמר לו שהוא רוצה בשלום ובמו"מ באמצעות ועידה בינלאומית נשמעה קריאת בוז קולנית מצד מרבית נציגי הוועידה והיו שהתנגדו לזיעץ לישראל מה לעשות בשטחים.

6. בנושא היוזמה הדיפלומטית האמריקאית היתה אחידות דעים בין משתתפי הוועידה שהחליטה לשגר מכתב (הוברק כנפרד) לשולץ במגמה לחזק ידיו בקידום תהליך השלום ולהעביר לו מטר שיהדות ארה"ב תומכת ביוזמה האמריקאית.

7. במסגרת הדיון על חגיגות ה-40 ולאחר דברי הלל על ישראל והשגיה ייחודי מיכאל פאלאביון יו"ר נאקראק, חלק מדבריו ^{לחסי} ישראל התפוצות והמצב בשטחים. מצ"ב דפי 4 ו-5 מנאומו שממולץ לקראם.

8. הוועידה דנה גם בנושאי פנים. הפרדת דת ומדינה. עוני ביהדות ארה"ב, יחסי הקהילה מיעוטים אתניים. וכמוכן בסוגיית מי הוא יהודי ויהודי בריה"מ.

9 סיכום והערכה

- מצאתי עולט יהודי חצוי ומפולג ביחס למדיניותה ותגובתה של ישראל נגד ההתקוממות הפלסטינאית וביחס למהות ההסדר השלום הסופי.

- ישנה חוסר אמינות בגירסה הישראלית. מרבית המשתתפים מקבלים את גירסת התקשורת לגבי הברוטליות שבה ישראל מתייחסת לפלסטינאים. בשיחותי עם מספר נציגי הוועידה אמרו לי שהם מודים לאל על כי קיימת תקשורת החושפת את מה 5/.

אישור:

שם השולח:

חאריך:

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק סופס מברק	דף: 5--
סוג כטיוע:		מחור: 9
תו"ח:		א ל :
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		מאת :

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שמועש בשטחים.

- מתברר כי ישנם גורמים בקהילה היהודית התורמים חלקם כהפצת שמועות כזב. במהלך שהותי בוועידה שמעתי מכמה נציגים המספרים כי נודע להם ש.ש.ב.כ. הוא הגוף העומד מאחורי הכרוטליות השיטטית נגד הפלסטינאים הוצאתם מבתיהם ושכירת עצמותיהם.

- ניתן להסכיר וללכך מדיניותנו אך כל ההסברה מתנפצת כאשר המקרים החריגים, ואינם בודדים, חוזרים ונש ים. ראיתי תגובות הנציגים היהודים כאשר הגיעה הידיעה על האירוע שכו קבר דחפור של צה"ל ארבעה צעירים תושבי כפר סאלם שליר שכם.

- לבד מהכיקורת לא הועלו כל הצעות אלטרנטיביות.

- אט לשפוט על פי הדיונים והלכי הרוח בוועידה הרי שניתן לאמר שחלק גדול של הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית אינו תומך בישראל וכי חל סחף כתמיכתם.

- חזרתי מהוועידה עם תחושה קשה. אין ספק כי קל יותר להשתתף בוועידות בינלאומיות עם גויים מאשר בוועידה של נציגי הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית.

מרדכי ידיד



אישור:

מרדכי ידיד

שם השולח:

18.2.1988

תאריך:

The NJCRAC Israel Task Force recommends that the Plenary Session send the following private letter to Prime Minister Shamir and Deputy Prime Minister Peres:

DRAFT

6/9
507/78

Dear Prime Minister Shamir and
Deputy Prime Minister Peres:

The member agencies of NJCRAC, meeting in Plenary Session today in Los Angeles, fully appreciate the genuine desire for peace Israel has amply demonstrated these past forty years both in word and action. At no time was this better illustrated than in the deeply moving outpouring of warmth toward Anwar Sadat during his historic journey to Jerusalem. This instinctual response represents the sincere motivations of the Israeli people and your own deepest convictions, as well as those of the political parties you represent.

We recognize that Israel's desire for peace has been met time after time by an insurmountable wall of Arab intransigence and rejection, with the notable exception of Sadat. The tragedy has been that the path chosen by the Arabs to resolve outstanding issues has led to violence, not to the negotiating table. During the course of its history, Israel has made substantial accommodations and sacrifices in the interest of peace as evidenced in the peace treaty with Egypt.

We appreciate and respect the political debate in Israel on the most effective avenues to bring about direct negotiations with the Arabs. Because the issues currently being addressed relate directly to state security, we understand the intensity of this debate. As a democracy, like Israel, the American people

Prime Minister Shamir and
Deputy Prime Minister Peres

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too have experienced such periods of debate and soul-searching on issues of profound impact upon American national interests. We are confident that if a realistic opportunity for peace arises out of the present negotiations, you will not hesitate to seize it.

We share with you the attached letter to Secretary of State Shultz, in which we welcome the renewed readiness of the United States to pursue new initiatives as a full partner to the Camp David Accords. We know you share the view that we have expressed to the Secretary that throughout his term in office he has demonstrated sensitivity and a sympathetic understanding in approaching the complex and difficult problems of the Arab/Israel conflict. That this Administration is undertaking this role in its last year provides a singular opportunity which should not be lost.

While recognizing Israel's responsibility to maintain order in the West Bank and Gaza, we are pained by any excessive force employed to achieve this purpose. These excesses have contributed to the perception that there has been a departure from Israel's longstanding policy and practice of restraint. There is a real danger that this perception may have a negative impact on Israel's image in the American mind. We trust that Israel will take steps to demonstrate continued dedication to its longstanding policy of restraint.

As the State of Israel addresses the many difficult and complex issues it faces, we offer our unwavering support and solidarity.

Cordially,

Michael A. Pelavin
Chair, NJCRAC

Zion, viewing itself as the center of Jewish life and the fountainhead of Jewish culture. And the other, feeling at home in America, insists that it too can serve as the vehicle of a creative, dynamic Jewish future.

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III Where We Stand Today

Our future as a Jewish community in this great nation is not guaranteed. No one can foresee with certainty what will be the long-term consequences of the growing rate of intermarriage in the Jewish community. Even though anti-Semitism is at low ebb in contrast to 40 years ago, it still scars the American landscape. Most American Jews still do not feel totally safe, totally secure.

Our idealistic vision of Israel has been shaken by reality. We see in Israel severe internal conflicts. In those conflicts we see grave long-term threats to the very nature of Israel as a western, democratic pluralistic Jewish state coming from extreme fundamentalists and ultra-nationalists. Their concept of peoplehood sharply departs from the consensus that exists among most American Jews and, indeed, most Israelis. A concept of a pluralistic democracy is repugnant to those who believe they have the absolute truth. Such absolutism tends to overwhelm the moderate, who tolerate the "truth" that others assert.

Israel as a democracy and a Jewish state is confronted with a dilemma of administering territories in which more than a million Arabs live in what they feel is subjugation. To annex the territories and give the Arabs who inhabit them full citizenship would threaten Israel as a Jewish state. To go on indefinitely without any change in the status of these Arabs would threaten Israel as a democracy. To withdraw from these territories without formal agreements and negotiated peace treaties could jeopardize the very security of Israel. The only viable option is negotiations, which Israel has been seeking throughout its 40 years. Israel is constantly seeking partners in the Arab world who will negotiate the future of these territories without stipulating unacceptable pre-conditions.

These strains in Israel reach beyond its borders. They do affect the American Jewish community. They strain the very relationship that is so vital to both Israel and the American Jewish community. No longer do American Jews look upon Israel with awe. No longer do they view its leadership as infallible. This is especially true of younger American Jews. That they do not cling to a romanticized image of Israel is not all bad, but that they seem to be drifting away from Israel should be a matter of concern to us as we look ahead to the future of the relationship between Israeli and American Jews. We may recall the sage advice of Rabbi Stephen Wise, when he said, "Our quarrel is not with Jews who are different, but with Jews who are indifferent."

The relationship between the Diaspora, particularly the American Jewish community and Israel, has never been easy. From the early days of the State, and even before, there were sharp differences between leaders of the Yishuv and leaders of the Diaspora including the Zionist movement. The fact that the differences we face today are not new, doesn't make them easier. What we have today are two strong, dynamic Jewish communities, each with a strong sense of its identity and destiny. One represents the fulfillment of the return to Zion, viewing itself as the center of Jewish life and the fountainhead of Jewish culture. And the other, feeling at home in America, insists that it too can serve as the vehicle of a creative, dynamic Jewish future.

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Yet, in spite of our different conceptions of who we are, growing out of vastly different historical experiences, the bond that exists between American Jewry and Israel is unbreakable. Our collective sense of peoplehood exists in every fiber of our being. The concept of Klal Yisrael is not an abstraction; it affects all that we say and do; it affects all that Israel says and does. American Jewry, and, I believe, most Israelis, recognize that Israel and the American Jewish community are each absolutely vital to the creative survival of the other, and to the continuity of Jewish life.

This recognition has led the government of a sovereign state, the government of Israel, into a relationship with Diaspora Jewry, particularly the American Jewish community, that is unique in the world. No other government's leaders, especially the prime minister, is as accessible to private citizens of a foreign country as the Israeli leadership is to American Jewry. This relationship provides the discreet channels, which properly utilized, offer opportunities for direct and honest dialogue between the leaders of the American Jewish community and Israel.

For the most part, this dialogue necessarily takes place beyond the public view. An exchange of views on issues of common concern need not and should not be undertaken on the pages of American newspapers. Conveying our concerns, in some cases our dissent from Israeli positions, or prodding as a loved one, our Israeli partners to encourage a change in their posture can best be achieved through private exchanges.

Ample opportunities for such exchange of views exist when American Jewish leaders visit Israel and during the countless visits of Israeli dignitaries to the United States. I suggest to you, however, that we have not fully utilized these opportunities. Hardly a month goes by when we do not host highly influential Israelis, in and out of government, in our communities. But how often have community leaders, behind closed doors, conveyed to these influential Israelis their honest and candid assessments of how Israeli policies are impacting on American public opinion? Israelis do not always like to hear what we have to say, but on occasion our efforts have contributed to a shift in official Israeli policy. The shift in Israel's posture toward South Africa last year is one of the more recent examples.

Whether the issue is South Africa, who is a Jew, settlements in the administered territories, Meir Kahane, Pollard, educating youth about democratic principles, excesses by the Shin Bet, violent clashes in the West Bank and Gaza, American Jewish leadership, indeed, all American Jews, cannot be expected to be indifferent and refrain from sharing our concerns with Israel. Indeed, in recent weeks we, as leaders of the Jewish community relations field, have been severely tested as to how we fulfill our profound commitment to Israel. Public criticism or public affirmation? Which would be more responsive to this commitment and to our conscience? There is no easy answer. In NJCRAC we have privately and forcefully conveyed our concerns and assessments to key Israelis. Publicly, we have not condoned practices which we deplore; what we have tried to do is place these events in a larger context. We have done so not to obscure what is happening, but to focus on the historical reality to identify those who are really responsible for the plight of Palestinian Arabs.

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P.01

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Handwritten signature/initials

חקונסוליה חכללית של
ישראל בלוס-אנג'לס

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN LOS ANGELES

SUITE 1700
6380 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CALIF 90048

TEL: 551 5700

Handwritten: 85 (ה) / 8 1/6

מל: ארמניסון
מל: אן אלג'אס

העצם הינו דחוף-בהחלט.
אנא העבירו במהרה והאפשרות איננה.

במחשבות

אשר קורט

Handwritten list of names and numbers:
עמ 2
מח 3
מל 3
מל'ח 1
ג'מל 2
ת'מל 1
מל'מ 1

FEB. 18 '88 10:32 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL LOS ANGELES

F.03



הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בלוס-אנג'לס

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN LOS ANGELES

SUITE 1700
6380 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
LOS ANGELES, CALIF. 90048

(213) 651-5700

16 פברואר 1988

אל: קשר - ירושלים
מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית לוס אנג'לס

אנא העבירו המברק והמכתב הלוטה אל:
מנכל מדיני,
לשכת רוה"מ,
לשכת מ"מ רוה"מ,
מצפ"א.

מצורפים 4 דפים.

י.ב. הלאה בזה העדכם כאמ"מ בשרמן סק חקלא סכניג.
אגב הס'חה.

FEB. 18 1988 10:34 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL LOS ANGELES

P.03

תאריךמדינהשם פרטישם משפחהמספר

16/2/88

מדינה

כל"מ"ס

אל: מנכ"ל קריני לשכות רוה"מ, מ"מ רוה"מ

מצפ"א

דני: השגריר, נעים וושינגטון

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית לוס אנג'לס

הנדון:

114 א.ס.

מליאת נקראק אישרה נוסח המכתב הלוטה למזכיר המדינה שולץ. היו"ר פלאביו מבקש להביא
הנוסח לידיעת רוה"מ ומרוה"מ.

בנצור.

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P.04

02. 16. 88 11:44 AM A. B. C. L. A. HILTON P01



AMERICAN HOTEL BUSINESS CENTER, INC.
Los Angeles Hilton Hotel & Towers
939 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 629-4321 Ext. 3362

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

DATE: 2/16/88

FAX NUMBER: 213-651-3123

TO: HON. EYTAN BENTSUR

COMPANY: CONSULATE OF ISRAEL

FROM: RABBI M. GROSS

COMPANY: JEWISH FEDERATION - COUNCIL
OF LOS ANGELES

ROOM NUMBER:

PHONE NUMBER: 213-852-7750

NUMBER OF PAGES TO BE TRANSMITED, INCLUDING THIS ONE: 3

MESSAGE:

THANK YOU,

AND FAX NUMBER FOR RETURN MESSAGE:

The NJCRAC Israel Task Force recommends that the NJCRAC Plenum send the following letter to Secretary of State Shultz:

DRAFT

Dear Secretary Shultz:

The member agencies of NJCRAC, meeting in Plenary Session today in Los Angeles, welcome the readiness of the Administration and your personal efforts to reinvigorate the peace process and to find the means for bringing the Israelis and Arabs together for direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations. As a full partner to the Camp David Accords, the United States has a central role to play in furthering these negotiations.

Throughout your term in office you have demonstrated sensitivity and a sympathetic understanding in approaching the complex and difficult problems of the Arab/Israel conflict. It is especially gratifying that the Administration has decided to press energetically to advance the peace process, even in its final months in office.

This Administration has wisely recognized that there are many avenues to the negotiating table. The real problem has not been the absence of a procedure or framework for discussion. Rather the resolve to make peace with Israel is what has been missing in the Arab world these last forty years, with the notable exception of Sadat's historic mission to Jerusalem. That singular departure from Arab rejectionism resulted in the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Again and again, over these last forty years, the Arabs have rejected opportunities that would have been responsive to Palestinian aspirations as well as to the security needs of Israel. In light of this history, the crucial message must come from the Arabs, that they are ready to sit down with Israel in direct face-to-face bilateral negotiations.

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02.15.88 11:46 AM *A. B. C. L. A. HILTON FOC

-2-

In Israel, the genuine desire for peace, which crosses all political boundaries, remains as strong as ever. Throughout its forty year history, Israel has consistently communicated a message of flexibility and peaceful coexistence; the acceptance of the U.N. Partition Plan in 1947, the offer to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 War in exchange for peace, and the Camp David Accords, which explicitly recognized the need to address Palestinian aspirations within the framework of direct negotiations.

We know the U.S. recognizes that a just and enduring peace only can be obtained through direct negotiations. A phased process, in which initial agreements on some issues can lead to progress on more complex and divisive questions, now may suggest a good prospect for success. Such a process is envisaged in the Camp David Accords.

We know you recognize that when a true hand of peace is offered to it, Israel will grasp it warmly and unhesitantly.

Cordially,

Michael A. Palavin
Chair, NJCRAC

NOTE (1) THIS DRAFT WAS APPROVED BY THE NJCRAC PLENUM
2-15-88 (EVENING SESSION) - LOS ANGELES

→ (2) KINDLY FORWARD TO JERUSALEM

1988-02-17 18:53

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סגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף מחוד 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 17.2.88

405

מס' מבוק

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

הסברה

מאת: עיתונות

המצב בשיטחים

להלן מאמר מערכת של ה"וושינגטון פוסט" 17-2-88.

יוסי גל

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שם רחל שמש גל/גל ביין גל/גל ביין גל/גל ביין
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The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Latest on the West Bank

ALMOST EVERY DAY, it seems, something new and frightful is reported on the West Bank and Gaza that brings Israel's occupation policy into deeper disrepute among Israelis and foreigners alike. Last week it was a report by American medical experts accusing the army and police of loosing "an unrestrained epidemic of violence" in the last two months—the more than 50 deaths and several thousand beatings meted out to civilians there. Over the weekend one could read of Israeli soldiers forcing their way into a West Bank hospital and beating up four Palestinians who were giving blood. Yesterday it was a stomach-turning account of an Israeli master sergeant ordering a bulldozer driver to bury alive four young Palestinians; villagers later pulled them out and they survived.

After each of these reports or events, certain things are said in mitigation of them: that there was heavy and sometimes life-threatening provocation; that discipline slipped and the response got beyond the bounds of policy; that the very excess demonstrates the occupation was never set up to restrain defiant civilians; that Arabs have regularly done worse to each other; that Arab hostility has made peace-minded Israel a nation at permanent war; and

so on. There is a measure of truth to all these assertions, but none of them cancels out the root truth: what Israelis are doing on the West Bank and Gaza is terrible and indefensible. There is no excusing these things, and many Israelis do not excuse them. Rather, they take the latest events and the international agitation they have stirred as occasion for a fresh look at what Israel must do to ensure a good and secure future.

The debate in Israel is over whether to make grudging tactical concessions until the storm blows over or to use the storm to move Israel into direct address of the basic question Israel has dodged through 20 years of occupation: Should Israel give back territory for peace? It is keenly in the American interest to see that Israelis address that question. Having gone along in low gear for a year with a slow-moving proposal for an international conference, Washington is now shifting into high gear with an alternative approach over which it would have more control. This makes sense as a way to keep up Israel's confidence in its American patron, but of course it puts on the United States the obligation to bring Israelis along if Palestinians are able to field a representative negotiating body ready to accept Israel.

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דפ 2 מחוק 5 דפים

סוג מסחוני דחיפות תאריך/ז"ח

2. לשאלתי בדבר שה"פ הצבאי בין ארה"ב וירדן, השיב צ'סני שבהשוואה למשל למצרים, היא במתכונת מצומצמת. לירדן ע"פ דוגמה זו חסרה מתכונת שה"פ בתחום התעשייה הצבאית אך בעיקר בשל תפיסת הבטחון הירדנית, על אף המסורת שה"פ הארוכה יותר של ירדן. צ'סני מנמק זאת בשל שיקולים גיאוגרפיים. (א) הרכב האוכלוסייה (ב) הרגשת נחיתות צבאית כלפי איום חיצוני, בד"כ סוריה. מצב זה גורם לכך שירדן "חשדנית" ועצורה יותר ופחות נוטה ל"הפתח" בתחום האינטימי של התחום הצבאי. ההרגשה היא שהחששות יתר בתחום זה יוצרת בקרבה סיכונים בתחום הפוליטי/צבאי.

3. באשר למצרים, תהיתי, האם להכרתו את הממסד המצרי הצבאי, ישראל עדיין נתפסה כאויב מוחשי והאם חל או עשוי לחול שנוי בכירדן זה לאור חזרתה של מצרים לעולם הערבי בעקבות פסגת עמאן. צ'סני נוטה לאור נסיונו לתפיסה אופטימית. ראשית, לא ידועה לו עובדתית, ע"פ דיווחי השגרירות בקהיר שהממסד הצבאי שם מחנך את שורות הצבא לראות בישראל אויב במובן הקלסי של המילה. את מקומה הבלעדי של ישראל בעבר תופסת עתה לוב. צ'סני מדגיש שעם כל הפליאה בדבר כשמדובר בצבא (לובי) שכמעט הובס בידי צבא בלתי מפותח כצ'אד, יש פחד נעלם ובלתי רציונלי באשר לאיום הפוטנציאלי מהכיוון המערבי. יתכן שניתן להסביר זאת יותר על רקע של טרור וחתרנות לובית פנימית במצרים המתגלה מעת לעת ושמא הדי המערכה הבלתי מפותחת באשר לביצועי הצבא המצרי מול הצבא הלובי כפי שנתגלה במלחמה האחרונה ביניהם לפני שנים. כך או כך ישנו מומנט בלתי רציונלי בגישה אל לוב, הבלתי נחזית. אויב נוסף, אם כי היולי הוא האיום האיראני שיש המנסים לראות אותו מבעד לתופעת הפונדמנטליזם האיסלמי במצרים. צ'סני מנסה לבסס את גישתו האופטימית באשר לראיה המצרית את ישראל ע"ס הנתון הבסיסי שמצרים הינה תודעה של שורשיות באזור הנשענת על עבר של אלפי שנים המלווה בתופעת של הרגשת בטחון. אפשר ולשנן סימני שאלה לגבי מידת שורשיותן של מדינות כירדן ואולי אף סוריה, אך היא אינה קיימת כשמדובר במצרים. מובראכ אמנם אינו בקנה מידה של סאדאת, אך הישגו העקרי בתחום התפיסה האסטרטגית הוא בהשכיחות עם קודמו בכל הנוגע לישראל תוך כדי ביסוסה והעברת המסר שלה.../3

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דפ 3 מחזק 5 דפים

סווג בטחוני _____ דחיפות _____ תאריך/זייח _____

בציבוריות המצרית. אין מדובר בנתון זמני וחולף אלא במעב בסיסי המשרת בראש
ובראשונה את האינטרס המצרי הלאומי. אדרבא ברי לצ'סני באם ניתן לעשות תחזית
מסוג זה, שטאדאת היה ממשיך בנקודה ממנה החל מבראכ - אסט' של שלום השמה סיוגים
ברורים באשר לתחום המדיני-לאומי המפריד בין ישראל ומצרים. מעב בסיסי זה
מסביר גם את הקו המפריד בין שני הממסדים הצבאים והמביא למעב "טבעי" של ניתוק
ביניהם, כגון העדר חילופי נספחים צבאיים וכד'. צ'סני גם אינו "נבהל" מתופעת הפונדמנטליזם
האיסלאמי במצרים כשמדובר ביציבות הפנימית של המשטר. זו אמנם קבלה תאוצה עם עליית
משטר הרפובליקה האיסלאמית באיראן, אך היא קודם כל קיימת בזכות עצמה.
למצרים ישנה מסורת ארוכה של שורשיות דתית זה מאות בשנים והיא חלק מהמורשת
הסופית המצרית. היא "אוייב" של כל משטר חילוני במצרים בין ימני או שמלאני.
כמובן שהיא ניזונה מהתפתחויות חברתיות ואזוריות אך בסה"כ היא תופעת קבע שיש
לה מימד פנימי טהור (GENUINE) ואין לתלותה כגורם שלילי (ישראלי) או חיובי
(איראני). שאלת התגברותה לאיום מעשי על יציבות משטר תלויה בראש ובראשונה
ביחסי הגומלין עם המשטר ולא בגורם חיצוני זה או אחר. בשלב זה נראה שקיימת
מערכת מאוזנת, יחסית המבוססת כל גישת המשטר שלא יסבול מעבר "קווים אדומים"
אך פרט לכך הוא מותיר מרחב מחיה לא קטן לפונדמנטליזם הדתי. שני הצדדים מכירים
מגבלותיהם. המשטר מכיר ביחודיות של הזרם הדתי בנושא האסלאם ומנגד הצד השני
מקבל, אולי לא באהבה יתרה, שהשלטון הוא רע הכרחי אך יש להמנע מעימות כוחני
חזיתי. המסקנה של צ'סני מניתוח אסט' זה היא שכל עוד יישמרו הפרמטרים הנוכחיים
של מערכת היחסים בין מצרים וישראל הוא אינו צופה שינוי בסיסי בהם. "פכים קטנים"
כגון אי החזרת השגריר המצרי וההסתייגות מתכנית "ספינת השיבה" של אש"ף משמשים
עדות מסייעת לכך.

4. מבחינה מעשית שני נושאים עומדים על הפרק. כאשר לשה"פ הצבאי אמריקאי-מצרי, פיתוח
משותף של הטנק A1 וחוב ס-FM5, נושאים שיעלו בביקורו הבא של אבו גזלה בושינגטון.

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דפ 4 מחוכם 5 דפים

סווג בטחוני דחיפות תאריך/זייח

עד עצם היום הזה טרם נקבע המועד, כאשר נוקבים בחודש מרס או אפריל לכך. נושא הטנק נמצא בראשית הדרך. מבקשת לו"ז הרי שתחילת הפרוייקט תהיה בהודעה לקונגרס במהלך חדשי האביב (אפריל-מאי). צ'סני אינו חוזה קשיים בגבעה ולכן יעברו לשלב הבא אי שם בקיץ או אף בתחילת הסתו (ספט'), בשעה שהממשל כאן יהיה נתון בקדחת הבחירות לנשיאות. בשלב זה יבחנר התכניות הספציפיות ותצוץ שאלת המימון. המצרים אמנם מדברים על יצור משותף אך צ'סני, כאחרים, בדעה שריאלי יותר לדבר במונחים של הרכבה משותפת לפחות בשלבים הנראים בעין, כאשר התחזית היא שטנק כזה יורכב לא לפני 1992. שאלת המימון מסובכת יותר. האמריקאים עומדים על כך שהמצרים לא רק שינקבו בעלות הפרוייקט אלא בפרוט מקורות המימון. בנתונים של היום מדובר ב-3-4 מיליארד דולר. במונחים אלה המצרים יצטרכו לשעבד את מרבית ההקצבה ל-FMS, דבר שיעמיד בסימן שאלה פרויקטים נוכחיים, כגון מטוסי ה-F-16, פרויקט ה-EC2, תמרונים משותפים הצנחה, ים ועוד. המצרים מדברים על תהליכים מזורזים - יהתכנון של השמוש בכספי ה-FMS, מימון היצוני (מפרציק) הסבת מפעל הטנקים M-60 ועוד. הם מדברים במונחי חשיבה אמריקאית אך עוד יצטרכו להסתגל למציאות המצרית.

5. שאלת תשלום החרגה ה-FMS רחוקה מפתרון כפי שהייתה. השיחות עם מובראכ בסוגיה זו נוצלו ע"ס להסיר מסדה"י את נושא מימון הבנקים הפרטיים ל-PREPAYMENT שהמצרים דבקו בו. הוסבר לו שמעבר לערבויות המצריות לא יוכלו לעמוד בתשלומים הגבוהים, גם אם הריבית תקטן בשל סידור זה. ישנם שתי אלטרנטיבות אחת בלתי מעשית והשניה מסובכת. הראשונה היא כמוכך "מחילת חובות". צ'סני מסביר שתי משוכות בלתי עבירות הראשונה שממשלת ארה"ב תצטרך להעביר על מקור אחר של מימון שאינו בנמצא להחזרת החוב. שנית יש בכך פעולה אנטי-כלכלית. ממשלת ארה"ב הנפיקה אגרות חוב בגדול הריבית (14%) ויצאה עמם לציבור כהמלצה להשקעה טובה לטרוח ארוך. קיצוץ הריבית וקיצוץ זמן הפרעון יתקבלו כפגיעה "במשקיעים" ויצוץ את הממשלה כבלתי אמינה .. /5

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 5 מחוד 5 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

426 5/

האלטרנטיבה השניה היא כמובן בתוקף החוק באמצעות הקונגרס שיחול על מדינות חבות אחרות. צ'סני סבור שבסופו של דבר לא יהיה מנוס מהעברת הכדור למגרש הקונגרס בהסתמך על כך שמדובר בבעלות ברית כ"ישראל ומצרים. תיאורטית ניתן לקיים לובי חזק לכך אך הקשרו למדינות אחרות מהווה מחסום.

6. צ'סני המכסה גם את אפגניסטן בנוסף לישראל, מצרים, סוריה, ארצות המערב, הודו ופקיסטן, סיפר שבידי האמריקאים הוכחות סבירות לכך שבידי האיראנים נמצאים כ-8 סטינגרים על משגריהם. צורת העברתם, מידי המוג'הדין, "משיכה" או רכישה, טרם פוענחה, אך המצאותם של אנשי קשר איראנים בשטח מסבירה פשרם. החשש הוא שהכלי עשוי למצוא בסופו של דבר את הדרך לידיים סובייטיות. צ'סני מצטרף לדעתם של אלה הרואים בו את הגורם שהביא לתפנית במערכה בין המוג'הדין והסוב' באפגניסטן. לאו דוקא מדובר בהפלת מטוסים סוב' כמו בהכנסת אלמנט חדש לזירה. מצב זה הביא לשינוי בתפיסה הטקטית הסוב', בכל הנוגע להפעלת חי"א הסוב', שהוא הזרוע העקרית במלחמה עם המוג'הדין. נוצר איום אסתי על שליטת חי"א של ברה"מ בשמי אפגניסטן.

אלי אבידן

א.א.

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כ י ס ס מ ב ר ה

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 17.2.88

מס' מבוק

431

1/3

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מאת: עיתונות

מחמ"ד קימה היום תדרוך לכתבים לקראת נסיעת המזכיר למוסקבה.

המתדרכת היתה רוזאן ריזנבאי.

להלן הקטעים הרלוונטיים לנו.

יוסי גל יוס' 10/8

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טרה יונה טהכס ג'נס ג'נס ב'יין ג'נס
ג'נס הסכיה ו'ג'נס 2 4 4 4 4
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Q Well, can you tell us about this Middle East a little bit? That's not usually as prominent

or as current a topic as that might be on this trip. Will the Secretary -- how should I put this question so we can get you to do -- to say what the Secretary is saying? I was going to ask you if the Secretary would ask for the Soviet's blessing in his approach to an international conference, but please take it anyway you wish?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Of course -- yeah, I think the regional issues -- no doubt Afghanistan will be prominent, the Iran-Iraq Gulf war, the UN work on a follow-up to 598 and the Middle East. Clearly, if I had to pick three, it would be those three. I don't mean to exclude the possibility of their touching on Cambodia, or Korea or that kind of thing. But, I think the prominence will no doubt go to those three.

In the past when they have discussed the Middle East and it has been in terms of an international conference, there have been the two views, and the Secretary has always put forward his view of what a conference would have to do if the conference idea were going to be legitimate. That position, of course, hasn't -- hasn't changed. In light of everything else that's happened, that general position, I think on an international conference hasn't changed.

I would expect the Secretary to maybe share some of his thinking with the Soviets on the Middle East, but I don't have any sense that it's going to be in great detail. I think they'll talk about the Middle East. If the Secretary's going to be traveling in the region, that's an obvious question from the Soviet side, "Well, you know, what do you -- what do you think you'll be doing? What's the direction of this?" But, I don't think that -- a direct answer to your question, Barry -- I don't expect the Secretary to be asking the Soviets for specific support on specific US ideas.

Q Has there been an exchange in advance of this visit on the Middle East specifically?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No. The only exchange in advance -- and I may have missed one somewhere along the line, the only exchanges that I have seen were a general follow-up at the end of the Washington Summit just sort of reviewing what had happened, and that's already, you know, been covered all over the place; and then the arrangements of working groups and arrival times and programs.

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Q But didn't the Secretary signal to Shevardnadze that he wanted to discuss the Middle East, and Shevardnadze said, fine, we'd like to do that as well?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, we did that in doing up the, you know, the agenda, as to what might be on it. Bob?

Q Do you have a sense, or are you attempting to say that the Secretary thinks that his Middle East initiative can succeed with the Soviets sitting on the sidelines, not being asked for their support?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, I'm not trying to say that at all. I'm trying to specifically answer the question: How do I think it will come up at this time? And how do I think the subject, Middle East, will come up at this time in Moscow? And I expect it to come up in the context of the broad review of regional issues. I expect part of the background to be the Secretary's own recent work in this area -- the fact that he's going to be traveling in the region. But I'm not in a position -- I mean, maybe somebody else could tell you differently, but I'm not in a position to say to you that the Secretary intends to go there to ask specifically for Soviet support. Now I was not -- you know, for what he is about to do. It would be wrong to extrapolate from that any suggestion that we're not interested in Soviet views, we're not interested in Soviet behavior in the region. But you'd also be wrong to rely on me to be the Middle East expert. So, if you want to pursue that one, get somebody else down here. (Light laughter.)

Q What about the --

MS. OAKLEY: The number of refuseniks -- wait a minute --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Oh, the number of refuseniks. Of the 11,000 who specifically were on that list, I don't know how many are out. The rate is continuing on Jewish emigration about, let me say, 8,500 a year as an annual rate. I'm told by those who work this issue on a daily basis that about 80 percent of the people getting out represent refuseniks, and 20 percent are new people -- you know, not long-term applicants, people who are just applying to get out.

I don't know how many are -- even doing the math wouldn't allow me to tell you how many are left, because there has never been agreed figure in this country or anywhere else as to what the total population of the refusenik group was; you could hear from 11 (thousand) to 20,000. And I don't -- we're just not counting it that way. We're just -- the position we're taking to Moscow is let everybody go who wants to leave. And we're not seeing that happening.

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431 3/3

שגרירות ישראל וושינגטוןטופס מברס

416

המשרד

דפ 1 מחוכ 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי דחיפות רגיל תאריך/זיכ 17 1315 פבר' 88

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, מנחל מצפ"א

מאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

בחירות 88 - ניין המפשייר

מאז הבחירות לנשיאות ב-1960 לא נבחר נשיא בארצות הברית שלא ניצח בבחירות המוקדמות בניין המפשייר. אם קו זה יימשך חרי נשיא ארצות הברית יהיה ג'ורג' בוש או מייקל דוקקיס. אבל ייתכן ש-88' תהיה הפעם הראשונה שכלל זה יופר שכן עדיין המרוצים נראים צמודים למדי ובלתי ברורים.

אמנם בוש הצליח לחביר את כל המשאלים ולנצח את דול בהפרש של 9 אחוזים, אבל הדרך עוד ארוכה וצפויים עוד מרוצים לא קלים בין השניים.

גם לגבי דוקקיס הוא אמנם זכה בהפרש ניכר לעומת השני ג'פארדט אבל חלק מן ההפרש נובע מהיתרון המוקדם שהיה לו כמושל מדינה שכנה נכאחד האישים הפופולאריים ביותר באזור עוד לפני המרוץ.

לגבי השאלה הקריטית היא האם ישיג הישג נאות בדרום ויוכיח כי ליברל צפוני יכול לנצח גם באזורים שמרניים יחסית.

לגבי שאר המועמדים המצב נראה כרגע כך:

ברפובליקנים, יצא ג'ק קמפ שלישי עם 13 אחוז דבר שיאפשר לו לנסות ולהמשיך לפחות עוד כמה שבועות במרוץ.

דופונט לא הצליח להשיג את המקום השלישי וסיכוייו להמשיך קלושים אבל עדיין הוא יכול להרשות לעצמו כספית להשאיר במרוץ.

רוברטסון לא הצליח להפתיע הפעם אבל יש לצפות ולראות כיצד יוצא בדרום - שם עיקר כוחו.

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סוף 2 רגיל 3 גלוי 3 גלוי 1 כיין 2 גלוי 1 יאליכס 1 גלוי 4

טופס מברסשגרירות ישראל וושינגטוןדפ 2 מחזק 2 דפים

416

סוג בחרוני' _____ דחיפות _____ תאריך/זי"ח _____

בדמוקרטיס יצא בסתאנדט שני והדבר נותן לו תנופה לקראת המאבקים הבאים ואילו פול סיימון יצא שלישי בהפרש אמנם קטן אבל לא מספיק כדי לתת לו תנופה. סיימון ינסה את מזלו בשבוע הבא בבחירות המוקדמות המתקיימות כ-3 מדינות: מיניסוטה, ד. דקוטה, וד. קרוליינה, אם יצליח באחת מהן יוכל לנסות ולהישאר במרוץ אך אם ייכשל לקבל את המקום הראשון יאלץ להסיר את מועמדותו.

ברוס באביט עומד להודיע כנראה מחר על הסתלקותו מן המרוץ ואילו גארי הארט שיוצא גם כאן במקום האחרון הודיע כי יישאר במרוץ אף כי כבר הפך בעיני כל לבדוחה טראגית.

ג'סי ג'קסון הצליח בניד המפשייר כמו באיובה להשיג מספר נכבד של קולות לבנים במדינה שאין בה כמעט שחורים כ-8 אחוזים - כ-8 אחוזים מהקולות. וכך לחזק את הרושם שהוא לא רק נציג של שחורים.

אלברט גור שלא ניהל מסע בניד המפשייר זכה למרות זאת בכ-7 אחוז מן הקולות הדמוקרטיים.

עתה הכל מצפים ל"דוט שלישי הגדול" ב-8 במרס אם כי לפניו מתקיימות בחירות מוקדמות בכ-6 מדינות בינוניות וקטנות.

דני בלור ק/אתי

1988-02-17 . 18:45

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף מחור 4 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 17.2.88

מס' מבורק

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תהליך השלום

להלן:

(ו) טור של אבנס ונובק.

(2) מאמר מערכת של ה"וול סטריט גורנל".

10/1
ירמיה גל

[illegible]

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Shultz's Mideast Move

Tom Dine, head of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, startled guests at a private dinner last week when he flatly disagreed with Rep. Steve Solarz that the 1988 election year was no time to launch a U.S. peace offensive in the Middle East.

Democrat Solarz, a liberal leader in the pro-Israel congressional bloc, warned that with Israel also holding a 1988 election campaign, U.S. pressure on hard-line Israeli leaders would make peace moves "counterproductive." Dine, the brainy director of the potent pro-Israel lobby, startled the other guests at Pamela Harriman's Georgetown house by saying, in effect: I disagree. I support George Shultz.

With Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the liberal rabbi from New York, and other Jewish leaders also supporting Shultz's surprise Mideast peace plan in the administration's waning months, the question is, what is the secretary of state's goal? Is it to defuse the Palestinian time bomb and end for now the killings that are damaging Israel's reputation? Or is it an international peace conference and overall settlement?

Dine, Schindler and most other pro-Israel U.S. leaders are silent about supporting basic changes in Israeli policy that the Reagan administration knows are essential for West Bank peace. That suggests their objective may be less than the broad Israel-Palestinian peace Shultz says he is out to get.

If so, despite firm rhetoric and announced purpose, Shultz will seek only short-term measures to end Palestinian deaths and relieve the ugly condition Israel finds itself in today.

The secretary's veiled purpose became all the more obscure with his answers to questions at a

private Feb. 9 State Department background session—the same day Harriman gave her dinner for some of the specialists who attended Shultz's briefing.

He was asked about President Eisenhower's threat to cut off all aid when Israel dragged its feet on withdrawing from the Sinai after its 1956 Suez invasion. Shultz gave no audible reply. But, in fact, no official believes Shultz would risk turning the pro-Israeli lobby against him by threatening Israel's \$3 billion U.S. aid package.

Likewise, Shultz is saying nothing, at least publicly, about Israel's ending its colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. Jewish towns that have mushroomed along the high ridges of the land Israel captured in the 1967 war are a major cause of the revolt. Palestinians regard the land as their birthright.

But some officials here disagree that Shultz has suddenly ended years of personal isolation from the Mideast cauldron just to give Israel short-term relief. They argue that he has moved beyond merely appeasing the pro-Israel lobby by trying to end the nightly TV drama of Arab beatings.

"Shultz has the Mideast bit in his teeth," we were told by one official, who for the past six years had been trying to convince the secretary to use his personal clout with Israel as he did with the Kremlin over Afghanistan and arms control. He claims the conversion is deep and real.

If so, that might explain the self-confidence that has made Shultz almost exuberant on the Mideast. An official of a former administration suggested to Shultz that he might find it easier

to bend Israel if President Reagan invited former presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter to help on a first step: getting Israel to stop building new West Bank towns.

Not a chance, said Shultz. He would not "cop out" and he would not "turn this over to someone else." He insisted the job was his and President Reagan's alone.

One participant at the State Department briefing told us the secretary seemed to resent suggestions that he could use the help of the three former presidents. Shultz tells aides that the sole outsider he might recruit is former Mideast envoy Robert Strauss, his close friend and a Democratic insider who is highly regarded by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

But not even his closest aides know how committed Shultz is to the idea of an international conference. Several days after the State Department briefing, Solarz, who was there, told us it was mind-boggling that "following years of playing Rip Van Winkle on the Mideast," Shultz has suddenly admitted during an election year that to get Arab-Israeli peace the United States "has to be fully engaged all the time."

That adds a final element of mystery as to what the secretary has in mind. Having played an activist diplomatic role everywhere except the Middle East, Shultz may have acquired a touch of hubris from his proclaimed success in dealings with the Soviet Union and arms control.

But his own record shows how dangerous hubris or even modest confidence can be in the Middle East, starting with the tragic failure of his 1983 Lebanon-Israel accord.

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REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Shultz in Israel

Secretary of State George Shultz will travel to the Middle East next week to have yet one more try at a final settlement of the 40-year-old problem of Palestinian refugees. Arab riots and demonstrations on the West Bank, in Jerusalem and along the Gaza Strip, and the harsh responses of Israeli troops attempting to restore civil order, once again have focused world attention on the region. These unpleasant events, fully covered by the world's newspapers and TV cameras, are generating a great deal of nervousness among Israel's friends.

At the very center of this storm is Yitzhak Shamir, the doughty little prime minister of Israel. He is fighting a lonely battle to resist a new attempt to "internationalize" the Palestinian problem, principally through a settlement that would be sponsored by the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union wants that approach. Mr. Shultz's peace plan, which he has floated with Israeli and Arab leaders and presumably will discuss directly with Mr. Shamir at the end of his visit, envisions international discussions. Egypt and Jordan yesterday appeared to have agreed on the idea of a final settlement with international backing, judging from reports from Cairo. And finally, Shimon Peres, Israeli foreign minister and leader of the party in opposition to Mr. Shamir, supports the internationalization idea.

So surely, one might think, Mr. Shamir's lonely position means he's made a serious mistake? Hasn't Mr. Peres, no less an Israeli patriot but far more flexible, had the right approach all along, as the riots and the buildup of anti-Israeli opinion now make clear? By the time Mr. Shultz sits down with Mr. Shamir a week from Sunday, that truth hardly will be worthy of debate.

Or will it? Let's begin with the venue for these international discussions, the United Nations. Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union and China, do not recognize Israel. The U.N. General Assembly is tilted heavily against Israel, as it has demonstrated time and again in its resolutions. It can be argued that the U.N. has in fact prolonged the agony of the Palestinians through the refugee camps that have kept the problem festering for 40 years. So if Mr. Shamir has some suspicion of U.N.-sponsored solutions, it is not altogether surprising.

What about the Soviet interest? The Reagan administration seems to

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think it is dealing with a new kind of Soviet leader in Mikhail Gorbachev. Maybe Mr. Shultz and Mr. Reagan know more about this than we do, or maybe they're fooling themselves. We certainly see no outward evidence of change in the Soviet Middle East policy. Its dynamic was set in motion years ago with Soviet sponsorship of Arab socialism, which has as one of its most important manifestations the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The PLO and Syria, a Soviet client state, effectively have intimidated anyone who might be interested in a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, a tactic that has included the murder of moderate West Bank mayors. Does the Soviet Union really want a solution to the Palestinian problem or does it want that problem to remain a thorn in the side of the Americans and Israelis? All past evidence would suggest the latter.

Which finally brings us to the Reagan administration plan, which carries the heading "territory for peace." The Israelis give up territory they have occupied in their wars with the Arabs and they, in turn, are assured of peace. The precedent, of course, would be the Camp David agreement with Egypt.

It's instructive, though, to recall that the Camp David agreement had no Russian participation. It was worked out by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, with Jimmy Carter as intermediary. If the true precedent were being followed today, Mr. Shamir would be negotiating the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with King Hussein and Hosni Mubarak, with Ronald Reagan or George Shultz as mediator.

Any such approach effectively has been blocked by the Soviets and the PLO. Given this set of circumstances, isn't it just possible that when the Soviets and the PLO use the word "territory," what they really have in mind is possession of new bases for operations bent on the ultimate destruction of Israel?

Now, maybe Mr. Shultz has figured out a way to persuade the Soviets, the PLO and the Syrians to get out of the way, allowing Mr. Shamir, Mr. Peres, Mr. Mubarak and King Hussein to work out a truly peaceful solution to the problems of the Palestinians, who certainly have been hostage to Middle East politics far too long. Miracles have happened before. But given the odds, it's hard for us to fault Mr. Shamir and like-minded Israelis for their continued concerns about national survival.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

היזמת האמריקאית

להלן מפגישת המזכיר עם חברי בית הנבחרים (16.2).

רשימת המשתתפים בסוף הדווח.

המזכיר פתח בתאור כללי של הרעיונות האמריקאים על-פי הקווים הידועים לנו. אמר שהנושא יותר מדי חשוב מכדי להשאירו לאחרים ולכן הוא מתכוון לנהלו אישית. זהו "המשחק" שלו. הפרסטיגיה שלו מונחת על כף המאזניים והמדובר הוא לא בהזייה חולפת. לא לנקוט ביזמה עתה גובל בחוסר אחריות והוא מקבל פניות רבות, כולל מישראל המבקשות מארה"ב להיות מעורבת ולתרום לפתרון הסכסוך. שולץ אמר שהוא מבקש להדגיש שלא יופעל לחץ על ישראל. הוא שמע ממספר אנשים שישראל מקבלת 3 ביליון דולר ואולי אפשר "להסתייע" בהם ולכן הוא מתנגד. זאת לא הדרך ולא יהיו כל איומים. הדרך היא לערב את כל הנוגעים בדבר. חזר ואמר שיש צורך בתהליך שימייחס לא רק לשלב הביניים אלא גם לשלב הסופי. כמו כן אמר שיש צורך ב- *International Kick-start* כך שחוסיון יוכל לבוא לשולחן הדיונים. אמר שמבין את רגישויותיו של חוקיין בשתי נקודות אלו, היינו השיחות על השלב הסופי והצורך בפתיחה בינלאומית. בנקודה השנייה נשאר די מעורפל ואמר רק שצריך רק ב- *Some sort of International Trigger Mechanism*. מאחר והמהות מסוכנת קודם לכן לא צפויה בעייה בנושא זה.

את השאלות פתח קובגרסמן ביל גרין (יהודי, רפ. ניו-יורק), שאמר שהערבים נושאים באחריות לאי ישוב הפליטים בסרבם לעשות זאת במשך כל השנים ואין זו אחריות ישראל. שולץ אף שהסכים אמר שזו לא הדרך לפתוח את המו"מ.

סיד ייטס (יהודי, דמ. אילינוי), אמר שהוא נרגש מיוזמת שולץ. שאל למה היה צריך ראה"מ שמיר לדחות רעיון ה"אדמה תמורת שלום". זהו לדעתו של ייטס אלמנט חשוב וזו היא הדרך היחידה

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להתקדם. כך גם ראו זאת מנהיגיה הראשונים של ישראל כמו בן-גוריון. מדוע ראה שולץ צורך לחזור ל-242 (כפי שעשה בפתיחה - ע.ע.). שולץ בתשובתו לא התייחס ישירות ורק אמר שהוא רוצה להתחיל התהליך.

מל לויין (יהודי, דם. קליפורניה) אמר שהוא מרוצה מכך ש-242 אוזכרה ואמר כי הוא הוטרד מהכתבה הבוקר ב"ווישינגטון פוסט" שכן הנוסחה של "אדמה תמורת שלום" היא - Don starter עבור שמיר וארת"ב לא צריכה לחוות דעתה. הבעיה היא איך להתחיל את התהליך. על ארה"ב להיות ערה גם לרגישויות בישראל וללחצים. ב-1982 נעשו מספר טעויות "פרוצדורליות" כאשר הוצאה לאור "יוזמת רייגן" ולכן טוב ששולץ מתייעץ עתה עם כל הגורמים המעורבים. לויין ציין שמצרים שוגה בעניין זה כאשר היא מתעלמת לחלוטין ממחצית ממשלת ישראל. שולץ אמר שהוא מסכים שצריך ליצור מסגרת הקבילה על כל המעורבים. ציין שהיו ויש לו יחסים טובים עם ראה"מ שמיר המתלבט (struggling) כיצד להגיע לבסיס מוסכם למו"מ (במשך השיחה חזר שולץ מספר פעמים על טיב יחסיו עם ראה"מ שמיר וסרב להתייחס לשאלות ש"הזמינו" בקורת).

סמית (יהודי, דם. פלורידה) שאל מדוע יש להגיע לשלב השיחות על ההסדר הסופי טרם מוצה הסדר הביניים שכן חוסיין לא יתייחס ברצינות לשיחות על שלב הביניים. שולץ ענה שלחוסין יש תמריץ להוכיח כוונות רציניות ורצון טוב בשלב הביניים, שכן הוא מבקש שישראל תגלה אותה גישה בשיחות על השלב הסופי. כמנהל מו"מ בעל וותק הוא גם יודע שיש צורך בתאריכי יעד (deadlines). מאידך אמר שהוא רוצה להיות רגיש לדאגותיו של ראה"מ שמיר. בנקודה זו פנה למרפי ושאל רטורית "האין זה נכון שבהיותך בישראל היה שמיר בר-שיח (interlocutor) קונסטרוקטיבי?" (מרפי הסכים). גילמן (יהודי, רפ. ניו-יורק) שאל לגבי תפקיד הסובייטים. שולץ ענה שהוא אינו יודע

מה עמדתם אבל מתכוון לשוחח על כך עם שברדנדזה. הוא היה מעדיף לא להעלות המז"ח ראשון ולהניח לשברדנדזה לעשות זאת. על הרוסים לעשות עוד רבות לפני שיהיו כשירים להשתתף בתהליך. הוא הציב שלושה תנאים להשתתפותם - (1) יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים עם ישראל. (2) יחס טוב יותר ליהודים בברה"מ. (3) מדיניות הגירה גמישה יותר. - להערכתו יהיו הנושאים האזוריים בעלי עדיפות רבה יותר במפגש זה, בעיקר בשל אפגניסטאן ולכן הוא מניח שגם המז"ח יזכה לטיפול רחב יותר. בעבר לברה"מ היו כוונות ליצור חוסר יציבות באזור, אך יש גורם חדש המטריד גם את הסובייטים והוא האסלאם הפונדמנטליסטי ובכך דאגתם משותפת גם עם העולם הערבי. הוא לא יודע אם זה ישנה את גישתם המסורתית של הסובייטים, אך חייב להיות ברור ומוסכם מלכתחילה (done deal) כך שלא תהיינה כל הפתעות או אי הבנות בהמשך. בנתיים אין כל הבנה כזו.

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באשר לסוריה אמר כי הסורים נוקטים קו נוקשה כפי שהימין הקיצוני בישראל עושה (זאת היתה לדברי המקור הבקרת היחידה של שולץ על ישראל - ע.ע.). הרגשת ארה"ב היא שיש צורך לדווח לאסד ולנסות לכלול גם אותו.

לאגומרסינו (רפ. קליפורניה) שאל לעמדת ערב הסעודית ושולץ ענה ששמח שהשאלה נשאלה. הסעודים מאד תומכים (supportive) אך מגלים זהירות ואינם רוצים להיות בחזית. תקוותם שיצא משהו מהיזמה. פחד אמר שכל הכעיות במז"ח הן תולדת הבעייה הפלשתינאית (שולץ עצמו התייחס בבדיחות להערכה זו).

לשאלת ברמן (יהודי, דמ. קליפורניה) אמר שולץ שהוא מבקש סיוע בעזרת רעיונות, תמיכה כללית ובכך שאם יש למישהו ביקורת שיבוא תחילה אליו. פאסל (דמ. פלורידה, יו"ר ועדת החוץ) והמילטון (דמ. אינדיאנה, יו"ר ועדת המשנה למז"ח) הביעו תמיכה ביזמה. שולץ הביע רצון להישאר עם הנוכחים בקשר ואמר גם ששומר על קשר הדוק עם מנהיגי הקהילה היהודית.

בפגישה שארכה כשעה ורבע נכחו מצד הקונגרס החברים היהודים ברמן, גילמן, גליקמן, גרין, ייטס, להמן, מל לויין, סנדי לויין, מילר, סמית, שומר. ^{קול} חברים אחרים שנכחו היו תום פולי - מנהיג הרב, מייקל, מנהיג המיעוט, צייני, אחד הבכירים הרפובליקאים, פאסל, המילטון, אובי מקדייד, אדוארדס. לאגומרסינו, ^{רפ} רפ.

מצד מחמ"ד נכחו גם קמפלמן, מרפי, צירלי היל ואד פוקס (איש הקישור לקונגרס).

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ערן

להלן נקודות נוספות, מדווח שקיבל למדן על אותה פגישה:

- א. ככלל, דיבר יותר על PROCESS מאשר על SEQUENCE.
- ב. לוח הזמנים - מוכתב על-ידי מועד הבחירות בישראל.
- ג. שולץ פונה לאלו שיש להם "insights" - הזכיר במיוחד וכפירוש מקס קמפלמן ובוב שטראוס.
- ד. הייצוג הפלסטיני: "כל מי שישראל יכולה לחיות עמם".
- ה. ארה"ב לא תגלה (set out) תכנית משלה.
- ו. לא מדברים על ק"ד, אם כי כל אחד מכיר כללי ק"ד.
- ז. ארה"ב מנסה לספק "תאוצה" (impetus) לתהליך.

** נכנס

טורי

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הודעת: 2,9086

אל:המשרד

מ:-לוסאנגלס,נר:94,תא:170288,זח:1500,זח:מ,סג:טו

נד:ג

טורי/מידוי

אל:מצפא

דע:השגריר,ושינגטון

מאת:הקונסוליה הכללית לוסאנגלס

לא-116

יורי הא.ד.אל שוחח עם שולץ ביחידות בועידת הא.ד.אל.
בפלורידה. בשיחתם אמר שולץ שבדעתו להגיע בהקדם לטיפול
במהות שמעבר לפרוצדורה. לוינסון שאלו האם הזכיר ניתן.
היאן אפשר לפסוח על הפרוצדורה כשאיננו יודעים מי
יהיו הצדדים לדיון במהות. שולץ העיר שהוא מבין שרוה"מ
שינה מעט עמדתו בנוגע לוועידה או חסות בינלאומית. לוינסון
אמר ששמע שרוה"מ יסכים לוועידה בינלאומית למשך
24 שעות בלבד, מעין פתיחה בינלאומית גרידא. שולץ העיר
שניצבת שאלת המהות ומה מוכנים הישראלים לעשות בנושאים
המהותיים. לוינסון שוב היקשה עם מי ישוחחו הישראלים
על המהות. שולץ אמר כי בביקורו הקודם במוסקבה ישוחח
עם שבודנצה על התוכנית האמריקאית במזה"ת ולברר
אם הסובייטים יקבלו את עיקריה (WILL GO ALONG WITH
THEM).

שולץ הוסיף שבעבר היה מצבה של כלכלת ישראל בני דע
 והוא שולץ, הבהיר למנהיגי ישראל שארה"ב לא תוכל
 להשלים עם תחלואי הכלכלה הישראלית ולהתגבר עליהם
 בכספי משלס המיסים האמריקאי. שולץ קרא לממשלת ישראל
 לכבש האינפלציה ולרסנה. לוינסון הגיב שאם משתמעת
 מדברי המזכיר אנלוגיה לגבי התחום המדיני הרי שהיא

משורד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

איננה תופסת, שכן ההחלטות בתחום הכלכלי היו כולן של ישראל. לא נך בתחום המדיני. לוינסון הוסיף שאולי האנלוגיה נכונה במובן שעל ישראל-גט בתחום המדיני לאחר השור בקרניו ולא לברוח מקבלת החלטות. כאן השמיע לוינסון באזני שולץ רעיון משלו. לזמן ועידה או פתיחה בינלאומית ובמקביל לנהל שיחות זו צודדות בין מדינות לא ללא זיקה ביניהן לפרוט הבינלאומי, היינו מו"מ במקביל לוועידה הבינלאומית ולא בחסותה. שולץ הגיב שאיש מבין עוזריו הרבים לא העלה מחשבה כזאת. לוינסון שאל המזכיר מה תפקיד ייועד ליהדות ארה"ב אם בכלל. שולץ השיב שעל יהדות ארה"ב למלא תפקיד קונסטריקטיבי במובן של עידוד הקמת קואליציה בישראל שתקיף 75-70 אחוז של קונצנזוס שיהיה בכוון להתגבר על המסתייגים. שומה על יהדות ארה"ב להשפיע על שתי המפלגות הגדולות למען תיווצר אחדות שתאפשר קבלת החלטות והנעתו מחדש של התהליך המדיני. שולץ הוסיף שיש להזיז התהליך ולהשלים מהלך כלשהו עד סוף השנה, גט אם הדבר כרוך בקבלת החלטות קשות. שולץ הוסיף שאם תהליך קבלת ההחלטות יידחה אל מעבר לכהונת הממשל הנוכחי, קשה יהיה לשמר המומנטים והאפיק בו החל הממשל לפעול. לוינסון סיפר עוד שלפני ארוחת הצהרים בה שוחח אישית עם המזכיר פנה ביאליקין למזכיר בנוכחות אנשים לחוץ על מנהיגי ישראל לגבש עמדה אחידה ולתבוע מהם להכפיף השיקולים הפוליטיים מפלגתיים להחלטות בקנה מידה לאומי ומתון אחריות לעתידה של ישראל.

בנצור.

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בירן, מצמא, תפוצות

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EDITORIALS

Newsday
Feb 16, '78

A Sensible Goal In the Mideast

Going for the gettable



Shultz

It's about time Secretary of State George Shultz decided to plunge into Mideast negotiations. A direct, forceful American role is a necessary condition in any attempt to relieve tensions in the West Bank and Gaza and

to take advantage of new opportunities brought about by the Palestinian uprising.

But — with elections in both Israel and the United States this November, an Israeli government without a consensus on how to proceed and no certain interlocutor in the Arab world — Shultz faces a daunting task.

He seems to be proposing a three-level approach: First, direct talks about autonomy among Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians. Second, an international peace conference. Third, negotiations over the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. But how the levels relate is unclear. Evidently, Shultz believes that Jordan's King Hussein will participate in the autonomy talks only if there is agreement to proceed with an international conference. But Shultz should concentrate on what can be done in the short term. That means devising ways for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to gain more control over their lives.

The secretary should not allow an international conference to become the centerpiece of his effort. At a conference, there is always pressure to compromise at the lowest, most radical common denominator — a formula that does not work. Recent history shows that progress in the Mideast comes in small steps.

המדינה, משרד החוץ, תל אביב, 16.2.78

מס' תיק: 24684

שם השולח: [חתימה]

א-יור: [חתימה]

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Grandiose plans invariably lead to dead ends.

The dramatic change in the last two months has been in the West Bank and Gaza itself. Having finally rebelled against occupation, there is the possibility that there are now *resident* Palestinians with newfound credibility who are prepared to stand up and negotiate for political autonomy.

But for even that modest plan to work, the Israeli coalition government must agree to a meaningful autonomy. It must not be a cover for Israeli domination of the entire West Bank. There has to be a recognition that Israel cannot permanently



Hussein

control territory inhabited by 1.5 million Palestinians. Without such assurance, Shultz's mission will be stillborn.

Despite all the contention, there is one point on which there actually seems to be a consensus: Without an all-out, high-level American effort, the region will continue its most recent spiral into violence and chaos.

PEACE, PEACE, WHEN THERE IS NO PEACE'

**NORMAN
PODHORETZ**

N.Y. POST
Feb. 16, 1968

THE other day I heard it said, not for the first time, that peace is breaking out all over — in U. S.-Soviet relations, in Afghanistan, in Nicaragua — and that hard-liners like me are very unhappy as a result.

On this particular occasion the charge was made by a liberal intent on insinuating that, no matter what they may find it prudent or expedient to pretend, most conservatives, in the secret recesses of their hearts, actually prefer war to peace.

It is worth noting, however, that much the same charge was made by the eminent liberal sociologist David Riesman against a liberal candidate running for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960. According to Riesman, Sen. John F. Kennedy was a contemporary representative of those American patricians "who since Theodore Roosevelt's day have seen war and preparation for war as the condition of national health."

To complicate matters still further, no less prominent a conservative than Ronald Reagan has hurled a related accusation at those of his fellow conservatives who are appalled by what they regard as his politically adulterous embrace of arms control and detente. In fact, a few of them are so appalled that they have even gone so far as to call Reagan a dupe of the Soviet Union and to

by pacifists, but now an article of faith among many people who do not consider themselves pacifists — that peace is the most important of all values, and that it is always and in all circumstances more desirable than war.

In addition to believing that there are things worth fighting and dying for, hard-liners are persuaded that not all conflicts are capable of resolution by diplomatic compromise. There are, in our opinion, wars (some hot, some cold) that can end only with the defeat of one side or the other.

But suppose that for the sake of an intellectual experiment we were to set those convictions temporarily aside. Suppose we were to practice a kind of Coleridgean "suspension of disbelief" toward the view that peace is breaking out all over. Suppose we were to "give peace a chance" at least in the realm of speculation. What would we then be required to think about the conflicts in question?

In the case of the one between the U.S. and Soviet Union, we would have to accept (as Reagan evidently now does) that the Soviets are no longer imperialistic and that they

rank him with Neville Chamberlain as an appeaser of totalitarianism. Stung, Reagan has retorted that the reason these conservatives oppose the INF treaty is that they think war with the Soviet Union is inevitable.

To be sure, this reversal of alliances on arms control does not extend to all other issues. On Afghanistan, Reagan (unlike some in his own administration) is still with the conservatives in favoring continued aid to the resistance. And on Nicaragua, Reagan remains united with conservatives of every stripe in support of the contras, while the liberals are entirely as one in accusing them all of refusing to "give peace a chance."

Now, it is certainly true that we hard-liners reject the idea — once held only

have given up on the ambition, which has driven them from the very beginning, to work toward a new international order in which they would be the dominant power.

To accept this, we would have to assume further that the Soviet leaders are ready to betray their Leninist principles, even though doing so would deprive them of any justification

whichever for the power they wield over their own people, let alone over the peoples of their empire.

Accepting all this, we would then have no trouble in believing that more than eight years after invading Afghanistan, the Soviets are about to withdraw without leaving behind a government that would be strictly subordinate to their will.

In the case of Nicaragua, we would have to agree with President Arias of

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Costa Rica and the Democratic Party of the U.S. that the Sandinista regime is just as ready to give up on its own Leninist commitments as the Soviets are on theirs. Like Arias and the Democrats, we would have to take the position that once the contras are gone, and in response to nothing more than the "moral pressure" of world opinion on which

the Arias peace plan depends, the Sandinistas will permit free political competition at home and will refrain from trying to export revolution abroad.

It is, I suppose, conceivable that all the lions are about to lie down with all the lambs. Shifting the focus to a different political context, it is even conceivable that if Israel withdrew from the West Bank and Gaza and acquiesced in the establishment of a new Palestinian state there, the Palestinians would surren-

der their claim to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Perhaps at that point the other Arab states would also renounce the goal of wiping Israel off the map — even though they have been pledged to this goal since the moment of Israel's birth, even though they are all (with the recent exception of Egypt) still pledged to it, and even though, with Israel more militarily vulnerable, they would be in a better position than before to achieve it.

To all these visions of lions lying down with lambs, the facts say no, common sense says no, history says no. Even the Bible, from which the image of the lions and the lambs comes, often says no — as when the prophet Jeremiah complains about those who cry "peace, peace, when there is no peace."

Nevertheless, with disbelief still willfully suspended, I stipulate that no one can be absolutely certain that "there is no peace" in store today.

The question, however, is: do we wish to bet our freedom, and the freedom of others who rely on us for help, on so tiny a possibility? As lions facing other and hungrier lions, should we be turning ourselves into lambs on the assumption that (to mix biblical metaphors) the leopards out there are suddenly not only willing but able to change their spots?

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Israeli Opposition

By Ira J. Hechler

ISRAEL IS at the crossroads.

In one direction is peace and the possibility of increased business with the Arab bloc, while the other road seems to lead to unending hardship and, possibly, war.

The choice lies with the Israelis in their elections next November, but it is crucial that we New Yorkers exert our considerable influence in Israel now, while the opportunity for an international peace conference remains very much open.

After all the dashed hopes for peace in recent years, why should we be optimistic?

My optimism is the result of a trip late last month as a member of an American Jewish Congress "peace mission" to Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

Our trip has convinced me that all three countries have much to gain from an international conference.

But, ironically, opposition in Israel is the single greatest impediment.

Our first stop was in Egypt, where President Hosni Mubarak made clear his desire to help solve the problems in the West Bank and Gaza and to build a lasting peace for Israel with all the Arab countries, once a just solution to the Palestinian problem is found.

He explained that Arab leaders' fear of extreme fundamentalism — long entrenched in Iran and newly rising in the West Bank and Gaza — makes this an ideal time to act.

He also explained King Hussein of Jordan's problem in joining peace talks.

In the Arab world, he said, you can negotiate only if you are sure of achieving total success. Anything less is humiliating failure.

For this reason, Hussein will enter negotiations only under the umbrella of an international conference to protect himself from criticism.

Prevents a Peace Conference

*'It is crucial that we
New Yorkers exert our
considerable influence in
Israel now, while the
opportunity for an inter-
national peace conference
remains very much open.'*

Hussein confirmed this when we met with him a couple of days later. He said he would be delighted to negotiate alone with Israel — were he guaranteed in advance that all his demands would be met. Since this is impossible, a conference is necessary.

And Israel? Our meetings with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres convinced us that the two are unlikely ever to agree. Peres and his Labor Party support an international conference.

In fact, when he was prime minister, Peres secretly met with Hussein in London, where they agreed on the need for such a conference, which would include negotiations between Jordan and the Palestinians on one side, and Israel on the other. These would be conducted with the understanding that whatever agreements they reached would be accepted by the international conference, and that no solution could be imposed on them.

However, the proposed conference was defeated by two votes in the Knesset.

It was defeated because Shamir's Likud Party, aligned with the religious parties, opposed it. Shamir and the Likud refuse to give up one inch of territory — a position Palestinians will not accept. A group of leading West Bank Palestinians told us that they would accept an international conference, and that they would agree to a moratorium on strikes and demonstrations during it.

The Likud position is based primarily on concern for security. Yet Gen. Ezer Weizman, a Labor leader, scoffed at this argument.

"When Israel concluded an agreement with Egypt on the Sinai, it was agreed that there would be no military planes, tanks or large guns in the Sinai," he told us. "In the eight years since the treaty, those provisions have been observed." Any solution for the West Bank or Gaza would require a similar agreement, he said, and it could be strictly enforced.

Further, Jordan would have similar anxieties and would be sure to push for the demilitarization of the West Bank.

What you would have, then, is Israel, probably the strongest military power in the Middle East, facing off against a demilitarized West Bank.

Where is the threat? The truth is there would be none. The security argument is merely a psychological weapon used by those who do not want to give up land.

Those of us in New York who support peace must mobilize now if we are to influence the Israeli elections next November.

We can make a difference by supporting Jewish organizations here and in Israel that support peace efforts, and by encouraging Israeli friends and relatives to vote for candidates who favor an international peace conference.

*Ira J. Hechler is a businessman in
Manhattan.*

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Israel Detains 2 In Burial Alive Of Palestinians

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Feb. 15 — The Israeli Army said today that it had opened an investigation into reports that its troops had buried four young Palestinians alive. It said that it had detained two soldiers and that it expected to detain others.

Witnesses said soldiers severely beat four Palestinians Feb. 5 in the West Bank village of Salim, then ordered them to lie face down and dumped dirt from a bulldozer over them. Reports of the incident shocked many Israelis as the details appeared in the Israeli television and press in the last 24 hours.

After the army left Salim, villagers dug the youths out, according to witnesses. Three were treated at the hospital in Jericho and released, and one was kept there for eight days with fractures in both arms.

A General's Warning

"Even in my worst dreams, I would never imagine such a thing," Gen. Amram Mitzna, the commander of troops in the West Bank, said of the case. He spoke to the army radio today from the Arab village of Abu Dis, where soldiers dismantled protest roadblocks, ripped down Palestinian flags and arrested 18 people.

The general said, "I constantly warn commanders to expect the most awful things could happen when soldiers find themselves all of a sudden commanding and deciding the lives of civilians."

The army expects more demonstrations Tuesday. The protests are described as a "Day of Anger" in leaflets from the underground leadership of what Palestinians are calling the "uprising."

As scattered clashes continued to-

day, the Palestine Press Service reported that a Palestinian, identified as Mohammed al-Rai, died Sunday of injuries he suffered during a beating by Israeli soldiers in the Shajaiye quarter of Gaza city. He was the 58th Palestinian reported to have been killed by Israeli troops during the unrest, now in its third month, and the fifth said to have died of injuries suffered during a beating.

Since Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin described a policy of "force, might, beatings" in mid-January, Israel has drawn international criticism as its soldiers clubbed Palestinians and broke hands and arms in what ranking officers have described as an effort to prevent stone-throwing and to instill fear.

General Mitzna, among the army's most respected officers, defended the conduct of the troops under his command at a news conference Jan. 28, insisting that the beatings were "exceptions" that would be investigated. "We, the Israelis, the Jews, have a very sensitive conscience," he said then.

'A Horrible Impact'

Many in this country, where the army is a revered institution to which virtually every family has a connection, seemed anguished as the reports of the live burial began unfolding on television Sunday night and in this morning's newspapers.

"It had a horrible impact — even people on the extreme right said it went much much too far," said Yehuda

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Litani, an editor at The Jerusalem Post. "Someone working with me who is known for his nationalist views said he wanted to bury himself out of shame."

"People feel it went beyond all borders and that it has to be stopped," Mr. Litani said, adding: "But when you allow people to beat and harass, that's one of the results. The Minister of Defense and generals think you can control it, but you cannot."

On Sunday night Israeli television viewers watched a resident of the Arab village of Salim, Yusef Hamdan, describing a soldier ordering the four youths to lie face down on the ground.

"He hit them on their heads and told the soldier driving the bulldozer to run them over," Mr. Hamdan said. "When the driver refused to do so, he was told to cover them."

"How can I go on living here?" asked a teacher who is a devoted Zionist and the mother of three sons who have

served in the army. Deeply depressed after watching the television news, she asked, "What do I have in common with the people who did that?"

The incident is said to have begun after Moslem Friday prayers when village residents staged a protest and built barricades of big stones and burning tires.

The army came and, according to the villagers, forced four youths to clear the stones, then beat them and forced them to lie face down. Then, the villagers said, the troops called over an army bulldozer that was building an earthen rampart to seal off the village, and had it dump its load on the four, covering them with about a foot of dirt.

The army announcement today said: "This investigation is receiving the highest priority. So far two soldiers have been detained and other detentions are expected in the near future."

The army began its investigation after inquiries by journalists.

Accusations of 'Barbarism'

In an editorial titled "Barbarism," the Hebrew-language newspaper Yediot Ahronot said today that even those who support "a hard hand against the rioters in the territories will be shocked."

"The investigation is still continuing, but the army already confirms that this horrible act did take place: A tractor bearing army markings buried alive four village youths as a 'punishment' for participating in disturbances."

"An official policy of a hard hand is one thing; barbarism in the form of a 'private initiative' is something altogether different, which must not be agreed with or passed over silently," the editorial said.

"In more than one case, the strong arm has become the sadistic arm," the independent daily Haaretz said in an editorial this morning.

The incident occurred more than a week ago, and had been the subject of widespread rumors in Palestinian villages. But it is being widely reported only now because many of the Israeli and foreign journalists crisscrossing the West Bank had assumed it was too outlandish to be more than a rumor.

Even the minority of Israelis critical of the Government's policy in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were surprised that there could be a report of a burial alive.

"My wife wouldn't believe it when I showed her the paper," said Michael Groton, a psychiatrist who, along with his wife, is active in a newly formed organization of mental health workers who oppose the occupation policies.

"People are shocked. Israelis have a certain kind of ideal of the Israeli soldier that he will handle himself with decency. These are the kinds of things that other armies do — the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam."

Amos Elon, the writer, said, "I'm afraid it's not going to be a turning point, as it might have been, because this is now a brutalized population."

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Camp's People Hardened by Despair

By Timothy M. Phelps
Newsday Middle East Bureau

El Arrub Camp, Occupied West Bank
— Every 100 yards the blackness and bitter cold of the night is broken by a bonfire, where clusters of men and boys stand guard with their clubs, like cave-men.

A man of 70 leans into the fire, his weight concentrated on a thick stick, his wrinkles and white stubble of a beard framed against the intense orange light.

The man is preoccupied, and so, it seems, is every one of the approximately 5,000 Palestinian refugees who live here, with the possibility that an attack by Israeli settlers armed with submachine guns could come at any time.

"The Palestinians here called to all the world, East and West, to protect them. But we have to protect ourselves. They have their weapons; I have my stick. If I die, I die in peace," says the old man, Mohammed.

The settlers have come to the El Arrub refugee camp only once in recent weeks, and then they caused more fear than harm. But the Israeli army has come in many times, shooting and sometimes killing people, breaking bones and smashing houses.

Still, it is the civilians, settlers whose nearby lights burn as a bitter reminder of lost Palestinian land, whom the refugees fear. Fear and rumors about the settlers have swept the West Bank, fueling the riots that invoke harsh response by the Israeli military.

The preparations for the long night began at dusk, when the crackle of burning branches was heard through the narrow alleys and pathways of the crowded camp, which is more town than camp since the tents for the 1948 refugees from Israel were replaced with tiny houses in 1960.

Tension shoots up in the twilight with shouting in an alley, but it is only the *shebab* — the youth — who have become the leaders of this traditionally patriarchal society, collecting bread for a nearby village where three young men were shot and killed after a disturbance ignited by settler rumors.

Seldom in the past have the construction workers and waiters who live in the camps rushed to help the farmers in the villages, but the perceived settler threat has helped unify the Palestinians. Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin has acknowledged as much in public statements criticizing the actions of settlers.

The fear of settlers' attacks is a recurrent theme in this camp and throughout

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the West Bank. It is a fear nurtured by rumors that spread after settlers staged raids, usually in retribution for rock-throwing incidents or demonstrations on the highways. The rumors themselves become the essence of the fear that the settlers may come at any time, and, outside the law, attack. Rabin acknowledged concern that action by the settlers on the West Bank would serve to inflame passions on both sides. He criticized the settlers for going on armed patrols and demanded restraint.

After a couple of hours, the darkness is complete but for the bonfires that have become the streetlights of El Arrub.

"We are hoping the people from Kiryat Arba [one of the most militant Israeli settlements] come here. The young men and the old men, we want to teach them a lesson," said Mohammed, who was born a year after the Jewish migration to Palestine began in earnest with the Balfour Declaration of 1917. In the declaration, the British cabinet endorsed "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Mohammed complained that the soldiers help the settlers enter the camp and then defend them by shooting the residents.

"Does a dog bite his brother's ear?" he asked, using the saying to explain how the soldiers help the settlers. "The people here will either live or die. The army and the settlers come here to slaughter us."

"Why did the Israelis around every village or camp put a settlement? Why did Israel arm the settlers? Why? To shoot birds or to shoot people? They gave them weapons to slaughter the Palestinians."

Mohammed closed his eyes in weariness and pain. Behind him was a big green cactus that bears sweet red fruit in August. It is considered by the Palestinians a symbol of their own ability to endure under the harshest conditions.

"Do you permit someone to enter your home while you are sleeping, to hit your children or to arrest them?" asked Mohammed, coming alive again to talk about the midnight arrests and beatings by the soldiers. "Are you forbidden to ask for your rights? Why am I forbidden to speak? Do the Israeli people have fires like this? Why can't the Palestinian people live like the Israeli people? Are Israeli people creatures of God and Palestinian people creatures of the devil?"

Almost a third of the 900,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and most of the 500,000 residents of the Gaza Strip are refugees who lost their homes and land in Israel in 1948. Twenty years later, after the 1967 war, they found themselves again within Israeli-controlled territory.

Many of the refugees have moved out of the camps, going to Jordan, the Persian Gulf or the United States, or to the cities of the West Bank and Gaza. Those who remain are the most militant opponents of the Israeli occupation.

There is always an army patrol outside or inside El Arrub, whose residents persist in throwing stones at Kiryat Arba's buses despite the 12-foot fence separating the camp from the main road. It is their own militancy, their proximity to the highway and to Kiryat Arba that doom Arrub's residents to their unusually high level of conflict with the settlers.

The 27 United Nations-administered refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza are overcrowded, often with 12 to 15 people living in two rooms, sometimes along with some chickens or rabbits.

The septic tanks in Arrub always seem to be overflowing. Some houses have no running water. The UN schools work in double shifts.

But this is no slum, at least not by Third World standards. Plaster may be unpainted, cracked and flaking, but the houses are immaculate. Many residents, especially those with relatives earning money in the Persian Gulf, have enlarged their dwellings, and some houses are substantial. Most houses have a garden or a courtyard, which gives them a sense of openness they would not otherwise have.

Living rooms with cushions around the perimeter become bedrooms with wall-to-wall mattresses at night. In a poorer house, the only furniture may be a sideboard, with dozens of tiny cups for coffee, and a television. The televisions, the only sign of opulence in many of these homes, are often smashed by soldiers during Israeli military sweeps.

However, it is not living conditions alone that create grievances against Israeli rule.

Residents cite the lack of political freedom and limited legal rights, the loss of the farmland that each family once had in Israel, the heavy hand that the Israeli military exercises and the threat of losing what they still possess to the settlers — these are the issues that have brought the refugees to the point of rebellion.

A reporter spending the night at El Arrub found many people willing to talk about the reasons for this new atmosphere of revolt. As the Big Dipper rose to cap the sky, a 21-year-old youth

in a black leather jacket and blue jeans suspiciously but eloquently answered a reporter's questions at another bonfire.

One of the first children born under the occupation, he is obviously the leader of this menacing group of 30 youths, each holding thick clubs or pieces of pipe.

He will not give his name, but says he is a student at nearby Hebron University, which has been closed indefinitely by the army, like all the Arab schools in the West Bank. Likewise, most Palestinians in the camp are boycotting their jobs, and even if they wanted to go to work, many merchants have closed their stores.

"Have you ever seen a country without schools, without universities?" he asks. The Palestinians, who have little else, treasure education.

"The Israelis take sixty shekels in taxes and return only ten in services. The occupation has been twenty years. There hasn't been any development. We're the ones who built the [larger] houses." There are "no street lights, not a single telephone. Seventy percent of the people are sick with giardia [an intestinal parasite].

"We're fed up. We're not even allowed to talk politics. I'm afraid to talk to you. We have rights. We are people. We must have political rights. We are not allowed to make decisions for ourselves."

Why, he was asked, did the uprising erupt two months ago, not before or after?

"First, the situation was strangling

... Please see CAMP on Page 29.

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us. Then there was the Arab summit [in November], when the Iran-Iraq war became the first priority instead of the Palestinians. Also the settlers, and the procedures taken against the people by the authorities.

"The Israeli army doesn't have discipline. They're all terrorists. And you see how my people live. Anything that I can do against the occupation, I must do it even if I have nothing but rocks."

"Rock throwing clarifies the situation for the whole world. We have done more in two months than the Arabs have done in twenty years. Because of the rocks, the world has become aware that there are people here, so everyone continues."

He was asked if there is a solution

to the problem.

"If we get our rights, it's possible. Under an independent Palestinian state, we can live in peace."

The explanation was impassioned. But the tone changed and conversation halted when questions arose about decision-making among the *shehab*, about differences among the young people at the heart of the protest in the territories. The crowd became hostile, and the reporter retreated to a nearby house.

In this sanctum, a family, the men in one room, the women in another, are talking politics. Before a midnight supper of flat, pizza-sized, home-baked bread eaten with white cheese, hummus (a chickpea paste that is a Mideastern staple), hard-boiled eggs, tomatoes and peppered green olives, Ahmed and Has-

san talked politics with their host, Amer.

The television earlier had been tuned to the Israeli news in Arabic while the radio was broadcasting the PLO radio station in Baghdad.

Ahmed had arrived carrying a red, bell-bottomed club. Hassan displayed a homemade, razor-sharp knife.

Hassan, 41, works in a cloth factory in Israel. He used to work in Kiryat Gat, the Israeli city 20 miles due west built on what was the town of Araq el Menashe. Hassan left there when he was 1, and many of Arrub's residents come from the same place.

Hassan was fired several years ago but goes back on his days off to see the land his family used to own.

"We've been patient, patient for

forty years," he said.

"There's no fear left. There is nothing left to worry about. If I die, it doesn't matter. The problem now is with the settlements."

"I have to take someone with me. If they come and kill me, I have to take someone with me. I have to."

"The solution is Israeli recognition of the PLO and for the PLO to recognize Israel within its 1948 borders. Everyone has secure borders."

The night passed peacefully, and when the roosters crowed at dawn, everyone was still asleep.

Normally the men would be going off to Israel, the children getting up for school, the women doing the washing.

But nothing is normal right now on the West Bank.

וושׂינגטון , בטחון

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ערן
דע: קאונובסקי, אלון - משרד הבטחון
רובינשטיין - משרד רה"מ
קרפ - משפטים

סו פה

נודה אם חוכל להעביר את ה-Non-Paper הזה לשותפים.

אם יבקשו כבר לדרון על מועד ומקום, מוצע שתבקש מהם
הצעת תיזה.

סיבל
16.2.88

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Confidential

Israel has given careful consideration to the U.S. non-paper of Jan. 15, 1988.

On the understanding that all contracts in connection with the HNSAP agreement would as from now be awarded solely to Israel contractors, Israel is willing to commence immediate negotiations with a view to concluding as soon as possible a Status of Forces Agreement for U.S. forces in Israel.

The terms and definitions of such an agreement would of course have to be mutually satisfactory and its implementation after government approval would entail Knesset legislation.

Although the proposed SOFA would apply only to U.S. forces, parallel with such negotiations Israel would wish to negotiate an Executive agreement concerning the status of Israel forces in the U.S., containing provisions similar to those accorded to U.S. non-NATO allies.

If the U.S.G. finds this proposal acceptable we would suggest that the U.S. negotiating team be in contact with the Israel Embassy in Washington to discuss possible venue and time for a proposed meeting.

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דף מחזור דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 16.2.88

מס' מבוק

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אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לחקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תהליך השלום

בה רואיינו ברזינסקי וקיסניגר

Night line

להלן תמליל התכנית

מיום ד' 11.2.88

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יוסי גל

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ABC'S "NIGHTLINE"
INTERVIEW WITH
DR. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE AND
DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZENZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1988

MR. KOPPEL: Joining us now from our New York studio is Henry Kissinger, who as Secretary of State, was principal foreign policy advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Mr. Kissinger was instrumental in mediating between Israel and Egypt to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and mediating between the Israelis and the Syrians to bring about Israel's disengagement from the Golan Heights. Joining us here in Washington is Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. Mr. Brzezinski was a major player in the Camp David process which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

Dr. Kissinger, for a mediator to have useful ground on which he can work, both sides have to be not only willing but eager to have a mediator step in. There almost has to be a sense of desperation. Are the Israelis and the Palestinians desperate enough yet, do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether the -- I think the Israelis are clearly looking for a way out. And I don't know whether the -- the negotiating partner should be the Palestinians or the other Arab states. I don't think there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, there is a Palestinian group with which to negotiate. The question is whether the Israelis will be willing to negotiate with them, and that's the PLO.

DR. KISSINGER: And I think it is out of the question for Israel to give up territory on the West Bank -- which is about 25 miles wide -- and give it up to the PLO which has been a group that in its nature, whatever its formal program, which also, incidentally, stands for the destruction of Israel, but which in its -- which in its nature cannot be satisfied with the status quo of -- that might be established by a negotiation. So I think there has to be an intermediate step in which the other Arab states, especially the moderate states -- Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, take responsibility for what territory Israel will give up in Gaza and on the West Bank.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Brzezinski, you have just returned from a few days in Israel. Is it your impression that the young Palestinians there now and those YOUNG (speaker's emphasis) Palestinians -- those under the age of 21 -- I've been told that they represent now about 75 percent of the population, for example, on the West Bank -- are they prepared to let the Saudis or the Jordanians or the Egyptians represent them even in preliminary discussions?

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DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I'm not quite sure whether these young people have any defined political perspective. I think they have a rather clear view of what they do not like. And they do not like the status quo. But one of the problems is that the Palestinians are disorganized, moderate leadership is not in charge and there's no clear Palestinian perspective or even strategy.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, I mean, there is a clear Palestinian perspective it would seem, at least in the minds of the leadership of the PLO. But as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out, the Israelis are not going to negotiate with the PLO. I mean, ultimately, are we just being sucked into some kind of a vortex that has to be resolved in violence, where the two sides simply cannot or will not talk to one another?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I would hope not. But it does seem to me that one has to, so to speak, go through the options: Can we mediate? Well, Henry mediated back in the '70's and of course, President Carter and his team mediated late in the '70's. But then you had an American leadership that was willing to bite the bullet -- was willing to stick with it. Henry stuck with it for

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day after day, and President Carter stuck with it. That isn't the case today. Secondly, you had an Arab leader willing to take a chance on peace -- Sadat -- even to risk his head for it. That is not the case today. And thirdly, you had an Israeli leadership with a defined strategy which accepted a notion of peace and was willing to bargain for it. And that isn't quite the case today with a stalemate. So that's out.

The second option is to have this large international circus that the administration is talking about. I frankly doubt that this is going to solve the problem and lead to anything tangible.

The third option, the one which I favor personally, is to try to prevail on the Israelis to take some unilateral initiatives right now regarding the West Bank, not trying to resolve the issue ultimately, but trying to create somewhat more propitious conditions. And I think there are some things that they could do.

MR. KOPPEL: Very quickly, if you would, go through two or three.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, simply two. One is simply impose the autonomy arrangements that were provided for in Camp David. They don't need to negotiate about this with the Jordanians. There are enough Palestinian mayors and officials with whom this could be worked out. Alternatively, have elections in the West Bank. In either case, you'd begin to change the atmosphere, you'd begin to change the rules of the game. And I think that is needed right now.

MR. KOPPEL: I'll tell you what, we're going to take a break in just a moment. But when we come back, Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to raise with you option two that Dr. Brzezinski just mentioned. In the past, you have always been opposed to bringing the Soviets into the Middle Eastern process. But there's a new Soviet leadership these days who is -- I mean, we're talking now about Mr. Gorbachev, who is far more creative in some of his thinking. And I'd like to get your thinking about how useful it might be to bring him into that process. We'll continue our discussion in a moment.

(Commercial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our conversation now with Zbigniew

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Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger, during the early '70s you worked very hard to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East. Is it now time to bring them into the process?

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DR. KISSINGER: The problem with Soviet participation in the Middle East is that they can take -- or have taken in the past, the position of their radical Arab friends. And the practical consequence of this is that it would isolate us at any international meeting, put us in the position of a lawyer of Israel, while they are making hay with the Arab countries. Where in fact, the only country that can really bring progress is the United States.

Now, we could have exploratory conversations with the Soviets quietly, in which we can find out what their idea of a political settlement is. If it turns out that they are prepared to ask compromises of their Arab friends, then we can make the determination whether they can play a useful role. Otherwise, I think we will be in the same dilemma in the '80s that we were in the '70s.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me ask you about something that reportedly happened today. Apparently the Attorney General, Mr. Meese, has decided to close down the PLO Office to the United Nations in New York. Question, Dr. Kissinger, if we are going to present ourselves as being, you know, the honest broker ultimately between Palestinians in general and the Israelis; or Arabs in general and the Israelis, was that a smart move?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think that is not a move that I consider of major consequence. I think it is not -- I would

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probably not have recommended making that particular move even though I'm against having the PLO participate in the negotiations. If they were accredited to the United Nations, I think basically we ought to let the United Nations make the determination of what units -- or what organizations are accredited to it. That isn't the key problem. The key problem is do we know what we consider to be a fair settlement? Are we prepared to stand for it? If other nations want to help in principle there's no reason not to have them, but it is a disaster to spend all our time on procedural maneuvers to see how to assemble a conference without knowing what the conference is supposed to do and when a deadlock is the most likely outcome.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me bring you back to your own question. Do we know the elements of a reasonable solution? Would you be able to outline for us, for example, steps one, two and three?

DR. KISSINGER: I have my ideas, but that doesn't mean that this is necessarily what a careful examination and the government would do. I think a number of steps -- one, Israel has to recognize that it cannot continue to govern a hostile population by force. So it has to give up Gaza and part of the West Bank. Second, Israel cannot return to the 1960's southern borders because it would not be defensible. That would leave Israel in the position of Czechoslovakia after Munich. Third, the giving up of any territory on the West Bank would be such a traumatic experience for Israel

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that to put the PLD there at the same time seems to me absolutely out of the question.

MR. KOPPEL: So there would be an interim ---

DR. KISSINGER: So therefore the moderate Arab states have to recognize this and have to create at least a transitional period in which the process of self-government in the West Bank can be examined. Now if this framework is not acceptable to other nations, assuming our government agrees with that, I see no point in the conference.

MR. KOPPEL: All right, let me, let me ---

DR. KISSINGER: If it isn't that framework, there should be some other framework.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me stop you there for a moment and turn to Dr. Brzezinski. Whether now we are to assume that your proposal is implemented or Dr. Kissinger's proposal is implemented, let me draw both of your attentions to the simple fact of the matter that we are now smack dab in the middle of an American presidential election year, and given that fact is any kind of American proposal which is going to cause -- which is going to call on the Israelis to make what Dr. Kissinger correctly refers to as traumatic moves -- is that viable? Is that going to happen until after this election is over?

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DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't think we would be able to implement it at this stage. We don't have the will. As you said, the elections are upon us. We can't focus on this. That's one problem. But I have a further problem with the notion that we ought to have a concrete concept of the eventual settlement, and it is this: at this stage, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians or the Arabs more generally are prepared

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to agree on what the final settlement ought to be like. And therefore, we need a transitional phase in which both sides get accustomed to cohabitation, to living with each other under somewhat different conditions. And this is why I have always felt that the notion of autonomy for the Palestinians should not be viewed as a single, discrete event, but rather as a process, a process in which the perceptions of both sides towards each other are altered by the fact that they begin to live peacefully, in a more collaborative relationship.

MR. KOPPEL: If I may, let me interrupt. We have to take a break. We'll continue our discussion with Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Brzezinski in just a moment.

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(Commercial break)

MR. KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion now with Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Dr. Kissinger, your reaction, first of all, to the possibilities of doing anything in an American election year.

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I think we have to formulate a policy. We may not be able to implement it completely. Incidentally, I think that Zbig's idea of a unilateral Israeli step is a very creative idea with which I would concur. The only thing I would point out is this, whatever area is put under self-government, is the area that will eventually have to be put under Arab rule. And therefore, the issue of where the line is of the West Bank cannot be avoided in this manner. If it is a device simply to continue Israeli rule, it will not work. So the Israelis will have to face the fact that the area that is put under autonomy will eventually be the area that international opinion will ask it to put under Arab government.

MR. KOPPEL: You are both dealing with some very sophisticated, and if I might add, at least medium-range, possibly long-range realities. The reality that we're dealing with right now is the one that Avi Posner(?) referred to in the end of that set-up piece, and that is the daily drum beat of propaganda that is created by these pictures that we see coming out of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Now, Dr. Brzezinski, what impact, given my impression that this is going to go on for some time, what impact is that going to have on the possibility of any kind of logical, sensible talks taking place?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Oh, I think it makes it much more difficult. Although when I was in Israel itself, I was rather encouraged by the attitude of the Israeli public. I think there's a great deal of soul-searching going on, and a realization that something has to be done. I think there's a world of difference between the public attitudes in general, especially within the politically active segment of the Israeli people and the Israeli leadership, which is gridlocked and less able to move.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, we have about 30 seconds left -- a question you probably won't want to answer, but is there any real leadership in Israel right now that is capable of kind of grabbing the reins and saying, painful as it may be, we have to take some tough action?

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DR. KISSINGER: They have an absolute responsibility to develop such a leadership in the course of this year. They cannot ask the United States to solve their internal problems. They must develop a strategy. Right now they do not have it, but they must develop it. It is their obligation for survival.

MR. KOPPEL: Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski, I thank you both very much for joining us this evening. That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here in ABC News, good night.

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דחיסות	רגיל

אל: מעה, מצפ"א
דע: וושינגטון - נר 11

לחלן מאמרי מערכת ה"גלוב" וה"הראלר".

אורן .

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FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

16.2.88

The Boston Globe

A new peace formula

After seven years of abstention, the Reagan administration seems ready to undertake a serious diplomatic initiative to resolve the symbolic problems of justice for the Palestinians and security for Israel.

Previous efforts faltered each time US envoys encountered resistance from the parties to the conflict. In frustration, Secretary of State George Shultz said last year that he would not work for a diplomatic settlement until the states in the region had moved toward agreement on their own.

Now the Palestinians of the occupied territories, in a telegraphic display of their frustration, have reminded the statesmen that the status quo is untenable: that timorous decisions to do nothing can have terrible consequences.

The new peace formula which Shultz and his envoys have broached is a patchwork composed of the Camp David autonomy plan, the international peace conference favored by Shimon Peres and King Hussein, and the direct bilateral talks demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

The prospect of an Israeli withdrawal from occupied land has already caused senior figures in Shamir's right-wing Likud to denounce the US proposal. At the same time, the PLO and indigenous leaders of the uprising in the territories have rejected it because it does not guarantee the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The patchwork quality of the plan is meant to offer each of the parties to the conflict a rationale for entering into negotiations. Throughout this decade, the Likud position has been to insist that any negotiations must be direct and bilateral, and be conducted within the framework of the Camp David autonomy scheme. These conditions are now met, at least formally.

If elections are held this summer in the occupied territories, as envisioned in the US plan, the practical result will be the election of

local officials loyal to, and approved by, Yasser Arafat's PLO. In that event, the PLO would be democratically legitimized as the representative of the Palestinian people.

Since these elections precede negotiations about a permanent resolution of the Palestinian problem, Arafat would have a much stronger claim to negotiate on behalf of his people than he has ever had before. He could assert this claim not only against Israeli objections, but also to counter the ambitions of King Hussein and of Arafat's bitter enemy, Hafez Assad of Syria.

What is more, the US plan does not exclude the possibility that negotiations concerning the final status of the West Bank and Gaza could culminate in Palestinian statehood.

It will not be easy to make diplomacy work. The cruelties of the past have engendered profound fears and resentments on both sides.

Shamir and senior members of his Likud bloc, adhering to the right-wing nationalism of Menachem Begin and his revisionist mentor, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, scorn as heresy any deviation from an ideological claim to sovereignty over all the land of a greater Israel.

In the Palestinian camp, there are similarly extreme forces that reject any solution to the conflict other than Palestinian sovereignty over all the land now ruled by Israel.

Yet there are parties to the conflict who now recognize the need for negotiation, compromise, peace and justice. This recognition starts from an understanding that the present situation is inherently unstable.

Israel's repression of the Palestinian uprising has created a far greater problem than public relations for the Jewish state. It has created a crisis of morale for Israeli soldiers, and a moral crisis for many civilians. It has illuminated a desolating future, one which lucid Israelis want to avoid.

The time has come to bring the parties to the bargaining table, and the invitations must be issued from Washington.

28 The Boston Herald, Tuesday, February 16, 1988

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Boston Herald

PATRICK J. PURCELL, Publisher

KENNETH A. CHANDLER, Editor

ALAN S. EISNER,
Managing Editor

PHILIP BUNTON,
Sunday Editor

RACHELLE COHEN,
Editorial Page Editor

If Israel withdrew

A PARADE of Israel's "friends," from NPR commentator Rod MacLeish to the left-wing New Jewish Agenda, has urged Israel to end the violence in Gaza and the West Bank by just "ending the occupation" — i.e., by simply withdrawing from the territories. Some of them would allow Israel the fig leaf of an "international conference" (attended by the Soviet Union and the PLO). But by and large, their position is roughly on a par with the old antiwar bumper sticker: "The best way to get out of Vietnam is to just get out."

Few who displayed that bumper sticker in the '60s and '70s ever thought about the monstrous consequences that would befall the people of Southeast Asia. We suspect even fewer have thought about the consequences of an Israeli pullout from the occupied areas.

David Bar-Illan, the renowned concert pianist, has, in an acid letter to the Washington Post, Bar-Illan lays out a chilling scenario:

● If the Israelis leave, "a rather nasty dispute will erupt" among Arab factions vying for control: the PLO, the Moslem Brotherhood, the communists, and the pro-Hamasites. The PLO — better trained and organized than the others — would likely emerge on top, after a year or so of bloodshed.

● But that would only be

the quarter-finals. The semi-finals would pit "the Arafat, Habash, Hawatmeh, Gibril, Abu Musa and Abu Nidal factions of the PLO" against each other, writes Bar-Illan. "If the Lebanon experience is any guide, the toll ... will be somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 people."

● When the faction backed by the strongest sponsor — Syria — won, the Syrians would be "invited" in to keep order. (Damascus has long maintained that Israel and the territories, like Lebanon, are part of "Greater Syria").

● Israel, of course, could never allow the Syrian army and air force to be stationed in the suburbs of Jerusalem, and another Israel-Syria war would break out. "With tank force, air, and missile battles raging 15 miles from Israel's population centers, and with the Palestinians flanking Jerusalem on three sides and Tel-Aviv on two ... the price of victory will be at least 100,000 Israeli casualties" and twice as many Syrians and Palestinians.

Before casually advocating simple-minded "solutions" that could result in the massacre of a quarter of a million human beings, Israel's friends — and foes — might take time to ponder one of the lessons of Vietnam:

The status quo may be troubling and difficult. The alternative is often incomparably worse.

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דף 1 מחוד דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות קיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 16.2.88

מס' מבוק

סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המש"כ, 286
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אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, חסברת
דע: יועץ שה"ח לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת
מאת: עיתונות

המצב בשטחים - תקרית כפר סאלח

הסיפור זוכה כאן לפרסום נרחב ולכותרות בעמודים הראשונים של כל העיתונות
הגדולה.
להלן מתוך ה"וושינגטון פוסט" 16-2-88.

יוסי גל

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Israel Holds 2 In Probe of Live Burials

ISRAEL, From A1

he said. "It's difficult to think of such a thing, but we should have thought."

Army officials said Mitzna acted quickly in arresting the alleged perpetrators in order to send a clear signal to his own men and to the public that such conduct would not be tolerated.

"We could have tried to hide this, but instead we chose to make it plain that this is wrong and the people who did this will go to jail," a military spokeswoman said.

But some critics contend that the burial incident is a logical result of a get-tough policy, including use of beatings, that Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has said was designed to reestablish "the fear of death" into a Palestinian population emboldened by the two-month-long wave of civil unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The incident also raises questions about cooperation between the Israeli Army and Jewish settlers in the area.

One of those being questioned is Nissim Haba, a Jewish resident from the nearby settlement of Elon Moreh who the witnesses said helped beat the four men before they were buried and egged on the soldiers, shouting, "Well done" in Hebrew.

Haba's eight-year-old son Rami was battered to death in a cave outside the settlement last year in a murder that has never been solved but that settlers blame on Arabs.

Haba was not at his home this afternoon. His wife, Ruth, said her husband had hitched a ride on an Army jeep that day but denied any involvement in the burial incident. But, speaking in a living room whose walls are lined with photographs of her dead son, she declared grimly: "The Arabs killed my son. I wouldn't care if my husband buried them all."

Some Elon Moreh residents, however, said they were shocked by the incident and hoped that whoever is responsible would be punished.

There were scattered incidents of unrest in the occupied territories today, but the worst violence was in

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Israel Holds 2 Soldiers In Assault

4 Arabs Reportedly Were Buried Alive By Army Bulldozer

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

SALIM, Feb. 15—The Israeli Army today announced the arrest of two of its soldiers, one of them a master sergeant, for allegedly burying alive four young Palestinians with an Army bulldozer in this West Bank village 10 days ago. A military spokesman said more arrests were likely.

Witnesses said that after the bulldozer dumped a full load of earth on the four while they lay, as ordered, face down in a muddy road—and a Jewish settler shouted, "Well done" to the soldiers—the sergeant ordered the driver to run over them, but he refused.

The soldiers left about 15 minutes later and residents pulled the four men, unconscious, from under a 30-inch-high mound of dirt. All survived, according to residents, although two are still recovering from their injuries.

The incident in this village just outside the West Bank city of Nablus had been the source of conflicting rumors and unconfirmed reports ever since it happened Feb. 5, until the Army announced the arrests today.

"Even in my worst dreams I would never imagine such a thing," Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, military commander of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, told reporters this morning.

He said the Army investigation into the incident would have "the highest priority."

Mitzna, who announced the two arrests, added a note of self-reproach. "I warn the commanders all the time to expect the worst possible things when soldiers in certain places find themselves in control deciding about the lives of civilians."

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Arab East Jerusalem. Police cracked down in the Sur Bahir neighborhood after disturbances there, pulling youths out of houses, pummeling them and smashing furniture and car windows with their clubs, according to witnesses.

Nearly 40 people were arrested there and elsewhere in and around the city in what officials said was an effort to round up instigators of the recent violence.

Elon Moreh and Salim both are located a few miles east of Nablus, the Israeli settlement atop a plateau, the Palestinian village in the valley below.

But like many other remote villages in the West Bank, Salim has gradually been swept into the violence that has resulted in at least 54 Palestinian deaths. The incident here took place on a Friday afternoon after stone-throwing youths tried to block the road to Elon Moreh, according to a military spokeswoman.

She said the Army pushed them back to the village, where they built barricades and set them afire. The local military commander left the area after an Army bulldozer was brought in to block off the two main

roads of the village with earthen mounds.

Meanwhile, witnesses said, soldiers accompanied by a settler whom the residents identified as Haba began entering houses and dragging out young men to clear away the roadblocks. They said several young men and family members were beaten with rifle butts and wooden clubs. Under military law, soldiers can order civilians to remove such barriers and, from many witness accounts in recent weeks, it appears to be common practice among soldiers to beat those who refuse.

When the debris was removed, the master sergeant, known here only as Charley, ordered four young men to lie face down and had soldiers walk on their legs and heads while clubbing them, witnesses said.

One of the victims, Assam Shtiyeh, 20, said a soldier picked up a large rock and pummeled his left leg with it. The leg still appears badly bruised 10 days later and Shtiyeh has been convalescing in bed in his parents' house here.

Shtiyeh's cousin said that after he and his three friends had finished

clearing the burning tires with their bare hands and scraping away the debris of the makeshift barricade, they had hoped Master Sgt. Charley would let them go.

But according to three Palestinian witnesses, he ordered the four young men to lie face down in the mud along the main road at the entrance to their village and commanded the military bulldozer to bury them alive.

The four reportedly remained buried between 10 and 15 minutes before the soldiers left and residents pulled them from under the dirt and carried them home. Because the Army had put a curfew on the village, they stayed in their houses until the next day, when they were taken to a hospital in Jericho about 20 miles away. Nablus has a bigger government-run hospital, but it was also under curfew.

A local teacher who asked not to be identified said relations in the past between the Jewish settlers of Elon Moreh and Arab residents of Salim were correct but not warm. Now, he said, there is deep anger. "After we die, they can bury us, not before," he said.

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רחיפות: רגיל	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	1 י"ף:
סוג כטחוני: שמור		2 מתור:
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גר : 00436 45 קטון		ד ע :
		מאת : נאו"ם

אל : מנהל פר"ן
דע : מנהל קש"ח וא"א
מאת : יששכרוף

מושב המיוחד לפר"ן
לשלך חוזם 5943

1. חדו"ח הסופי של ועדת ההכנה שיוגש למושב המיוחד, יופץ בעוד כשבועיים. מיד עם קבלתו נעבירו אליך.
2. לגבי ההסדרים הנוחליים במושב עצמו, סוכם שיהיו שלוש ועדות עבודה, ועדה של המליאה (COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE), וכן כמובן המליאה. קיימים חילוקי דעות לגבי ועדות העבודה, בשני עניינים. קראשון הוא ה- TERMS OF REFERENCE - של כל ועדה, והשני הוא חלוקת היו"רים של הועדות, כאשר קיימות שתי אלטרנטיבות - ייצוג איזורי (אפריקה, אסיה, וכו') או ייצוג פוליטי (בלמ"ז, הגוש הסוציאליסטי והקבוצה המערבית). נושאים אלה טרם טוכמו, ויידונו כנראה לקראת הכינוס באמצעות מגעים לא פורמליים.
3. לגבי כתב-ההאמנה, נקבעה שועדת כתבי-ההאמנה תהיה זהה בתרכבה לזו של העצרת ה-42. עוד מוקדם לדעת מה תהיה הכוונה של הקבוצה הערבית לגבי כתב-ההאמנה. יוזכר שועדות ההכנה למושב המיוחד פעלו על סמך הקביעה שכללי הנוהל ^{של העצרת} יחולו לגביהן, אם כי, לגבי שאלות של מהות יעשה כל מאמץ לקבל החלטות בקונסנסוס. אם קונסנסוס לא יהיה אפשרי על היו"ר להודיע על כך, כדי שהחלטות תתקבלנה בהתאם לכללי הנוהל של העצרת. עד כה כל ההחלטות של ועדות ההכנה היו בקונסנסוס, וסביר שישתדלו לשמור על כך במושב המיוחד. סביר להניח שאם הערבים יעמדו על ערעור לגבי כתב-ההאמנה שלנו, הדבר יעמיד את כל המושב המיוחד בצל האיום של ארה"ב לפרוש ו/או לטרפד כל מסמך סופי של המושב.

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

שם השולח: ג' י. יששכרוף
תאריך: 16.2.88
אישור:

דחיפות:

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

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סוג כטחוני:

טופס מברק

2: יתור

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העדר/נא לקטמון

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
45 לקטמון

ד מ:

לכן נדמה, שבשל הבעיות הפר"ניות הרבות האחרות הכרוכות במושב, תהיה נטיה לא להכניס נושאים פוליטיים אחרים, כל עוד שיש סיכוי שהמושב יוכל לעבור בקונסנסוס. אם לאו, אז יתכן שהדבר ישפיע לרע ויפתה את הערבים לערער על כתב-ההאמנה שלנו. יוזכר שבועידה הכינ"ל לפר"ן ופיתוח אשתקד, לא היה כל ערעור על כתב-ההאמנה, אך שם נקבע בכללי הנוהל, שכל החלטה יכולה להתקבל על ידי קונסנסוס בלבד. מכל מקום, נראה שרצוי לקראת המושב המיוחד לקיים התייעצות כילטרלית עם ארה"ב כדי לבחון את סוגיה זו, ולהכין את עצמנו מבעוד מועד. כן מוצע שלקראת המושב נקיים התייעצות כאן כלשכה המשפטית של המזכירות כדי לקדם כל סכנה.

4. הזמנה רשמית נשלחה לרה"מ שמיר במישרין.

נאו"ם



אישור:

שם השולח: ג. יששכרוף

תאריך: 16.2.88

הגדרות ישראל / וושינגטון

32

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דף מתוך דפים

סוג בסחוני גלוי

דחיפות מידוי

תאריך/ז"ח 16.2.88

מס' מבוק

תאריך 377 1/4

אל: מצפ"א

מע"ת

דע: יועץ רוח"מ לתקשורת

מאת: עיתונות

תחליף שלום

להלן מתוך ה"וושינגטון פוסט" 16-2-88.

י.ו.ס.י. גל

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Shamir Opposes Land-for-Peace Trade

U.S. Formula Can't Be Basis for Negotiations, Israeli Says

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has sent an envoy here to tell Secretary of State George P. Shultz that President Reagan's "territory for peace" principle cannot serve as the basis for Israel's entering new peace negotiations on the fate of the strife-torn occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The envoy, Ehud Olmert, a member of Shamir's Likud coalition in the Knesset, met Sunday with Shultz's executive assistant, Charles Hill, to discuss the proposed new American approach to the Middle East peace process.

The approach envisages initial Arab-Israeli talks on limited autonomy for the occupied territories and then negotiations on their final status, starting within six months, based on the "territory for peace" principle contained in President Reagan's September 1982 speech on the Middle East.

Radio Israel reported that Olmert told Hill that Shamir would "never" accept to negotiate a final settlement for the territories on the basis of this formula and warned that if Shultz continues with this approach, the new American peace initiative is doomed to failure.

Shultz recently told visitors to the State Department that all parties must clearly understand that the new U.S. peace initiative will go forward only on the basis of the "territory for peace" formula and U.N. Resolution 242 guaranteeing peace and security for all Middle Eastern nations.

An Israeli Embassy spokesman confirmed that Olmert met Hill Sunday "for a discussion of the American initiative." He described it as "an important meeting" but said it was "not ground-breaking."

The spokesman, Yossi Gal, said Olmert had been in Palm Beach, Fla., for a meeting of the B'nai

See SHAMIR, A16, Col. 5



YITZHAK SHAMIR
... sends emissary to Shultz

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Shamir Opposes U.S. Plan For Restarting Peace Talks

SHAMIR, From A1

B'rith Anti-Defamation League, where Shultz was the guest speaker Friday. Olmert reportedly met Shultz briefly there but, because he did not have time to discuss the new American initiative, Olmert came here Sunday to see Hill.

Yesterday Shamir, leaving Israel for a visit to Italy, publicly stated his opposition to any negotiations based on the "territories for peace" formula. A State Department official said there would be no comment on Shamir's statements or the visit of his latest envoy.

More than 50 Palestinians have been killed and thousands arrested by Israeli authorities in the territories in the past two months. The violence has spurred the Reagan administration after months of diplomatic inactivity to search for ways to revive the long-stalled peace process.

Shamir appears to be hardening his position on the issue of peace talks in preparation for Shultz's visit to the region to discuss the new American peace approach starting Feb. 24. Shultz is expected to meet with Shamir Feb. 28-29, after visiting Egypt and Jordan.

Shamir's mounting opposition to opening negotiations on anything other than limited Palestinian autonomy at this time suggests the new U.S. peace initiative calling for final-settlement negotiations as well may be headed for difficulties.

However, Shultz appears to have found an unexpected ally in the American Jewish community, which has been extremely supportive of his new approach and is pressing Shamir to show flexibility. A delegation of 60 Jewish leaders is planning to visit Jerusalem for talks with Shamir at the same time Shultz is there, according to Radio Israel.

The Israeli prime minister is also pressing Shultz to avoid spelling out any American position on the outcome of the final status negotiations ahead of time and to remain non-committal, according to Israeli sources.

Reagan, in a September 1982 Middle East address, called for Palestinian self-government in the territories "in association with Jordan"

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and Arab-Israeli negotiations "involving an exchange of territory for peace."

Israel would have to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for Arab recognition of the Jewish state and guarantees for its security, Reagan said. Shamir has always steadfastly opposed any moves that would lead to such an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, which he refers to by their biblical names, Judea and Samaria.

Israel radio further reported that Olmert has told Hill that Shamir is opposed to any automatic "linkage," or "interlocking mechanism" as Shultz is calling it, between talks on interim arrangements for the occupied territories and subsequent negotiations on their final status.

Both Olmert and another close Shamir associate, Dan Meridor, who was here last week, have argued with Shultz that if Jordan and the Palestinians know in advance that the final status negotiations will begin on a specific date, they will never take the initial limited autonomy talks seriously.

Shamir wants to stick to the limited autonomy plan envisaged by the 1978 Camp David accords, which called for a five-year trial period for Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories before any decision is reached on their final status. Talks on this plan between Israel and Egypt broke down after 1981, and both Egypt and Jordan have opposed their restitution.

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שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

המשרד + ~~מכא~~ 392

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דפ 1 מחזק 4 דפים

סוג בשחוני גלרי דחיפות מייד תאריך/זייח 1500 16 פבר' 88

אל: מעפ"א
אברהם אלון, המח' לקשרים בינ"ל של ההסתדרות פקס: 03-269-349 תל-אביב. - אל: ~~העל/א~~

מאת: דני בלור, רושונגטון

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להלן החלטת מועצת הפרעצות האיגודים המקצועיים מהיום על המצב בשטחים.

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ATTENTION: DANNY BLUM

Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council

on

IsraelFebruary 16, 1988
Bal Harbour, FL

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For over two months, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been the scenes of often violent Palestinian demonstrations against Israel. In their effort to maintain order, the Israeli Defense Forces have on occasion resorted to unnecessary force, and those incidents have been widely and vividly reported in the media, to the detriment of Israel's image.

No doubt such incidents can be attributed to the inexperience of the Israeli army in riot control and other police functions, and to the frustrations of Israeli soldiers as they confront young Palestinians hurling stones and petrol bombs. These factors may explain but they cannot excuse, and the AFL-CIO cannot condone, the use of excessive force against civilians.

But neither can we accept the view, fomented by sensationalized media accounts of the violence, that Israel has lost its moral bearings and no longer merits the support of the democratic community. Some have gone so far as to liken Israel's behavior to that of South Africa, a calumny we categorically reject and resent.

Israel is a democratic polity of some 4.2 million citizens, Arabs and Jews alike, who enjoy the right to vote and the freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly, and association. Arabs and Jews alike actively work side by side in Israel's trade union movement, Histadrut. They are all represented in a single Parliament. In short, Israel's Arab citizens enjoy the very democratic rights they are denied in the Arab states.

To compare such a society with South Africa, the majority of whose population is denied those very rights, is not only to slander Israel but to rob democracy of its defining characteristics and thus to subvert the very idea of democracy.

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With equal vigor, the AFL-CIO also rejects the notion that Israel must now redeem itself by turning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over to the PLO or the Islamic fundamentalists who are fueling the flames of violence in the occupied territories. The complex historical realities of the Israeli-Arab conflict cannot be reduced to lurid 30-second TV film clips; nor are real solutions to the Palestinian tragedy to be found in the field of public relations.

The real solutions, as the AFL-CIO has repeatedly stated, lie in negotiations between Israel and responsible Palestinian leaders. Israel has already proven its willingness to negotiate withdrawals from other territories it had occupied temporarily to protect itself from its Arab neighbors, having returned vast tracts of occupied land to Egypt and withdrawn troops from Lebanon.

The real tragedy of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is that they have failed to develop leaders willing and able to negotiate with Israel, owing largely to the PLO's intimidation of moderate Palestinian leaders and to the continuing Arab self-declared "state of war" with Israel. These remain the fundamental obstacles to resolving the Palestinian problem; they are not altered and must not be obscured by the current turmoil in the occupied territories.

That turmoil does, however, lend new urgency to a more aggressive diplomatic effort on the part of the United States to press Jordan, Syria and other concerned Arab states toward more constructive policies that would permit the establishment of a framework of negotiations and an atmosphere conducive to their success. Such an effort now appears to be underway with the dispatch of American diplomats to Middle East capitals and with the upcoming visit to that region by the Secretary of State. The AFL-CIO supports this initiative and hopes that it will be fruitful.

The frustrations of Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza Strip are understandable. Their resort to violence is wrong. So, too, is the focus of their current

Israel

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rage. Their interests have been ignored for decades--but not by Israel, which has established universities and schools in the territories and sought, despite an economy badly strained by military expenditures required to stave off Arab aggression, to ensure a minimum standard of health care and social services, often in cooperation with agencies of the United Nations.

For the Palestinians there is a challenge: to create a responsible and credible leadership to defend their interests, above all, by pressing Jordan and others to come to the table and talk with Israel.

The AFL-CIO historically has had a strong bond with Israel, a nation built by the trade union movement. In this trying time, we reaffirm our solidarity with her citizens, Arabs and Jews alike, and call upon her Arab neighbors to end their intransigence and belligerence, to recognize Israel's right to exist within recognized and secure borders, and thus create the basis for justly resolving the Palestinian question.

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תאריך: 17.02.88

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דף 1 מתוך 5

החוק-מחלקת הקשר

עותק 3 מתוך 32

נכנס

* חוזם: 2,8195

* אל: המשור

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* אל: מנבל מדיני

* מכנ"ל רהמ'

* שיחת ארז - מרמי (16.2)

* לזכרי מרמי הרעיון מאחורי המסע היה לתת בזמק ובריאד

* החושה כללית לגבי ה-CONCEPT החדש, בן שלא

* תיווצר בשתי בירות אלו הרגשה של אי שיתוף. במעבר

* בפרוזאמר רינעאי למרמי שגם הוא נוסע לזמק ומאחר

* והוא מתכוון למסור שם את דבריו חבוב, כדאי שגם מרמי

* יהיה יותר מפורט על-מנת שלא ינוצר הדושה שווינגסטון

* ניסתה להסתיר משהו מהטורים.

* בלונדון נגש את שה"ח האר ומקידים אחרים. הבריטים

* הביעו דאגה כאילו רעיון הוועידה הבינלאומית נדחק

* לקרן זווית ומרמי ענה שבמשך שנתיים ניסו אותו ושם

* דבר לא זז. בעזרת ה-CONCEPT הם מקווים שנושא

* זה, של האלמנט הבינלאומי יהיה יותר MANAGEABLE. הבריטים

* אמרו שמקבילים אן שנושא הוועידה "חשוב".

* בסוריה בילה עשר שעות בשיחות עם אסד ועם שה"ח. הסורים

* חזרו מספר פעמים על עמדתם של התנגדות לצעדים חלקיים

* הסודי ביניים וכו'. ורוצים בהסדר מלא. הסוד הביניים

* הוא לדעת הסורים קמף-דיוויז ולכן שאלו האם התכנית

* איננה אלא חזרה אל ק.ד. מרמי אמר שהטביר להם ההנחלים

* לדעתו הסורים לא קלטו את הנשמעות של ה-CONCEPT

* וזו גם היתה התרשמות היודגניט משיחותיהם עם הסורים

*. מרמי אמר שהסורים שאלו האם ה-CONCEPT

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 3 מתוך 32

* הוא כולל וגם הנדשא שלהם ולבנון מופיעים בו, מרמי אמר
* שענה בחיוב אן שטיקר המטרה היא לטפל בנושא הפלסטינאי.

* חלק גדול מהשיחות במד// בזמקס הוקדש לנושא הלבנוני.
* מרמי אמר כי ציין בפני הסורים שהשתרשמות ארהב היא
* שטוריה אינה מעוניינת בדיאלוג בין שני הצדדים בענין
* הרפורמה הקונסטיטוציונית. הסורים הכחישו זאת ואף טענו
* שהיו רוצים שזה יהיה לפני הבחירות בספטמבר, כן שהנשיא
* החדש כבר יקבל מבזס חדש ומערכת יחסים חדשה בינו לבין
* הפרלמנט ובינו לבין הקבינט. מכל מקום, הוסיף מרמי
* לארהב אין כל הונחה שטוריה נמצאת בקשר עם ג'רמאניא
* ובינתיים החזאללה הולך ומתחזק והקיסרוב הולך וגדל.

* לשאלת ארז על עמדת הסורים לגבי היוזמה חזר מרמי שהסורים
* רוצים בהצהרה כללית שארהב דוגלת בהתירן כל היבטי
* הטכני, ושזה יעשה על ידי הבאת כל הצדדים לשולחן
* הדיונים. לשאלה נוספת אמר מרמי כי הסורים ירצו להמשיך
* בדו-שיח ויחליטו יותר מאוחר: בשלב זה הם לא סגרו את
* הדלת ולא נתנו כל התחייבות, מה גם שארה"ב לא בקשה
* זאת. מרמי הגדיר את הגישה הסורית כ- PUZZLED AND
* SUSPICIOUS. THEY HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE FOR TOO LONG
* בשלב זה לא הוחלט אם המזכיר יטע גם לזמקס אן כי הירדנים
* מעוניינים בן. גם מובארק אמר שצריך לחזור שוב אל
* הסורים.

* בביקור בריאז אמרו הסעודים שהפלסטינאים הם לב העשייה
* ושכל שאר העצמות באזור הן תולדה של בעייה זו. היו
* מעוניינים יותר בשיחות על המפץ .

* לשאלת השגריר האם הביקור הוליד שינויים ב- COCEPT
* אמר מרמי שבני שנאמר לחי"ב אולמרט, זהו ה- COCEPT
* אן כי הוסיף WE ARE STILL DIGESTING. שואל מה היתה
* הרגשתם של החנ"ים מריזור ואולמרט והשגריר ענה שיש
* להם הרגשה יותר ברורה של ה-
* CONCEPT ושל הקשיים שבו. הח"ם אמר שאולי שמעו מרוב
* רב יותר של מרביבי הקונספציה האמריקאית ממה שרובינו שטיין
* שמע ומרמי העיר שאכן בביקור בארץ ניכר היה שרובינו שטיין
* הרגיש משהו כמו UNFAIR AND
* UNCOMFORTABLE. לשאלה כיצד יציגו האמריקאים את ה
* CONCEPT *

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 3 מתוך 32

* בפני הסובייטים אמר מרמי שעדיין לא דן על כך עם המזכיר
* , אך שהסובייטים ביקשו ממגש בדרג ממוחית ונדחו בשלב
* זה. הוסיף שהם מוקשים מהסובייטים תשובה לגבי חמש הנקודות
* שהוצגו ביולי, שהסובייטים אומרים שכבר התייחסו אליהן
* בצורה כללית חיובית וכי הם חוזרים ואומרים שזו לא
* היתה תשובה רצינית.

* לגבי ביקור המזכיר אמר מרמי שכל מה שידוע הוא תאריך
* היציאה 25.2 ותאריך העזיבה של האזור-1.3

* ערן

* תת: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, ממנכל, ממנכל, רט, אמנ, בירן, מצמא

●

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

FIGURE 1. THE SCHEMATIC OF THE DATA ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA

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סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון 11

דף 1 מחוז דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 16.2.88

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המשרד

מס' מבוק

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: עיתונות

סיוע חוץ

להלן מאמר מערכת מה"וושינגטון פוסט" 16-2-88.

1/10 יוסי

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מחוזות 2 3 3 1 2

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Foreign Aid-Speak

IN THE mid-1970s the United States greatly increased its foreign aid, especially military and military related. Most of the increase went to Israel and later also Egypt. For fiscal as well as political reasons, the amount was blurred. In the first of what became a series of such contrivances, a substantial part of the aid was given as "guaranteed loans" for which, unlike grants and direct loans, only partial appropriations then needed to be made. The understatement was the greater because most of these were not the usual guaranteed loans from a private source. Here the government itself provided the money; the Defense Department then promised the Treasury to make good if the client country failed to repay. The transaction was a direct loan by another name.

By the mid-1980s the debt so easily entered into had become too great for some of the borrowing countries to sustain—and for the executive branch and Congress to continue to obscure. A profound change in policy occurred—a shift back from loans of any kind to grants. But once again there was a blurring. The accounting rules were stiffened so that guaranteed loans (genuine and confected) had to be included in the budget and confronted in appropriations bills. But Congress also took a half step back. Instead of admitting it was giving grants, it began to dispense much of the aid in what are called forgiven loans: made and forgiven in the same utterance, but loans they remain.

The nonloan loans deal with the problem prospectively, but not with the \$20 billion in old loans

left behind. Some recipient countries can't repay. Others say—and some in government agree—that while they can repay, the burden would be too great and they shouldn't be required to. It is pointed out that these countries are armed for U.S. purposes as well as their own.

By another roundabout device, the government is already helping these countries defray their military loans. It gives them so-called economic support funds. Technically these civilian funds cannot be used to satisfy military debt, but money is fungible, and in the case of Israel Congress has explicitly said that economic support shall never fall short of military debt service.

Now steps have also been taken to lower the interest on these loans, some dating from the high-interest 1970s and early 1980s. One of the plans is similar to a favor Congress struggled to do last year for the nation's rural electric cooperatives, which also have high-interest debt. The administration vigorously opposed help for the coops on the grounds that it would add to future deficits. It was much less vigorous about the parallel step in foreign aid.

Many of the debtor countries, especially Egypt, say the easing of interest won't be enough. They want a broader form of forgiveness. That would amount to recognition that much of this aid has consisted of disguised grants all along. Perhaps it has. It would be useful to discuss this extensive program—now about \$10 billion a year, much of it vital to the national interest—in something other than beclouding aidspeak.

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שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

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המשרד + אס"ר

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מדינת

דחיפות

גלוי

סוג בטחוני

תאריך/זי"ח

אל: מצפ"א

דע: אברהם אלון/המח' לקשרים בני"ל של ההסתדרות תל-אביב פקס: 03-269349 -

מאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

שולץ במועצת ה - AEL-CIO

מזכיר המדינה שולץ הופיע היום בישיבת סגורה של מועצת פדרציות האיגודים המקצועיים במיאמי. הוא סקר נושאים בינ"ל שונים ובתוכם המזה"ת. בתום הישיבה קיים מסיבת עיתונאים ועיקר השאלות היו על הנושאים שלכר. שולץ אמר בתשובה לשאלה על פרשת ספינת אשף כי ממשלת ישראל אמרה בברור שלא הניח לספינה להגיע לחופיה והדבר ברור כי שום מדינה לא הניח למי שרוצה לחגוע לחופיה בלא אבחנה גם ארצ"ב לא תיתן לכל מי שרוצה להכנס חופשי לנמל ניר יורק. צריך לקבל אישורים, ויזות, וכל מדינה מחליטה עפ"י שיקוליה.

בתשובה לשאלה על הפיצוץ באונייה אמר כי ממשלת ישראל הכחישה על מעורבות בעניין, ולו אין שום מידע נוסף.

בתשובה לשאלה על עמדת שמיר השוללת את הגרסאה "שטחים תמורת שלום" השיב שולץ כי שמיר אמר זאת פעמים אחדות וזה לא מפתיע אותו. אנר מנסים לקדם את תהליך השלום ובמקום הדין על פרוצדורה שהיה עקר, התחלנו לדבר על התוכן ולבדוק מהם הדברים שניתן להתחיל במהירות יחסית גדולה.

שולץ הוסיף כי הוא איננו רוצה לחלק צירונים לעמדות הצדדים, אלא לנהל מו"מ ישיר עם הצדדים כמתווך וכמפשר תוך הגברת האמון של כל הצדדים. הבסיס למו"מ הוא 242 אך על הפרטים צריך לנהל מו"מ. מוכרחים לחגוע לתהליך של מו"מ כי זהו המוצא הנחיד. ..2

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טופס מברסשגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

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2/2 דפ 2 מחזק 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני דחיפות תאריך/זי"ח

נמסר לי כי בדיון הטגור במועצה הוסיף שולץ כי ברור שאיש לא ידרוש מישראל להיכנע ולוותר על האינטרסים החיוניים לבטחונה.

שולץ שיבח את החלטת הפדרציה (המבורקת בנפרד) אך בהתייחסו לפסקה המדברת על זכות ישראל להתקיים אמר שולץ כי זו פסקה מיותרת ואולי אף מעליבה שכן איש בעולם אינו מתפקד בזכותה של ישראל להתקיים.

בתום מסיבת העתונאים, ביזמת אנשי ה-AFL-CIO נפגש שולץ לשיחה פרטית בת כ-20 דקות עם נואף מסאלחה חבר הועדה המרכזת של ההסתדרות שהופיע יום קודם לכן בפני הועדה בעניינים בין"ל של פדרציות האיגודים.

מסאלחה סיפר לשולץ על האוירה הקיומת בקרב ערביי ישראל וציין כי אם לא יתחיל תהליך שלום בחקדם צפויה הקצנה ניכרת בקרב הערבים המתונים שעד כה תמכו במפלגת העבודה או במפלגות השמאל המתונות, שולץ שאל אותו מס' שאלות לגבי מצבם של ערביי ישראל והעובדים הערבים בשטחים והאם אנשים כחנא סניורא יכולים לשמש כנציגים פלשתינאים בתהליך מו"מ, מסאלחה ענה כי לאחר שיתחיל מו"מ - אישים פלשתינאים מתונים כסניורא, יכולו למלא תפקיד בעל ערך.

בשיחה חשתתפו רק שולץ ומסאלחה וכן טוני פרידמן, יועץ המזכיר לענייני עבודה בין"ל.

דני בלור / א.א.י. (צ.א.)

ה' כ"א כסלו

Jerusalem, February 15, 1988

Personal

Mr. Morris B. Abram
Chairman
Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Morris,

I have read with great interest your thoughtful and courageous letter of February 10.

I welcome every thought and -- as you have known for some time -- am in complete agreement with the sense of urgency you convey. Indeed, in all candor, I must confess that when I tried to instill this very sense of urgency, I was disappointed to find many asking what was the hurry; what was wrong with the status quo. I knew then, as I know now, that the illusion of a status quo exists only in the minds of the reluctant. As you may recall, I was concerned both with the likely impact of a stalemate on regional developments as well as with the consequences of awaiting a new administration in Washington, thus entering the process without the shielding friendship of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. Indeed, we have long sought to "enshrine" the understanding of the present administration in an MOA that will sustain currently available "safety valves" that may prove critical to protecting our vital security interests once negotiations are under way.

To my regret -- not personally but in the context of the responsibility derived from the hour and the office -- my advocacy fell on deaf ears. Indeed, even as the current administration reinvigorates its efforts, we already note the same efforts to block progress on the new American initiative.

It was in the same spirit that my proposal for a joint session with Secretary Shultz's envoy, Dick Murphy, was rejected. Indeed, it is regrettable that the pattern we initiated with the establishment of this government for dealing jointly with major issues (e.g. Lebanon, Taba, economy) ended with "rotation".

- 2 -

I must confess that I am astonished by the continued advocacy of political inaction until calm is restored to the territories. Not surprisingly, this course is advocated by the very same "nay sayers" who sought shelter in the illusion of the status quo and opposed previous initiatives for peace when the situation seemed stable.


I am convinced that concurrent efforts for peace will place the entire situation in a new light: the renewed image of a peace-seeking Israel struggling with peace-rejecting extremists is bound to restore confidence in, and support for, our efforts. This was the situation during the last three years. This can be the situation again.

At a time when we must all unite in support of our troops, carrying out a most difficult mission, it is our duty to offer them as well as the Palestinians -- indeed, all of us -- some hope that there is a viable alternative to violence. I am not at all certain that the re-emergence of hope will immediately put an end to frustration-triggered eruptions. Yet, I am convinced -- as I was when we last spoke prior to the current wave of disturbances -- that, without hope, escalation is inevitable. As we meet every security challenge with a solid sense of confidence in the unqualified capacity of the IDF to handle it, I consider it our primary duty to do our utmost so that we can look each soldier in the eye and tell him that when he is asked to face danger it is not because we missed an opportunity to prevent it.

I have taken the trouble of sharing these details with you only to accentuate my regrets that your sense of urgency and the need for unity is not shared equally by all parties to the National Unity Government.

I wish to conclude in the same spirit with which I opened: the hour calls for utmost responsibility. We are at a historic moment, and I still hope that all those who hold the responsibility of office will rise to the occasion.

Sincerely yours,


Shimon Peres

February 15, 1988


Arie Mekel
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Mekel,

Enclosed please find 'hasbara' compiled and distributed by the University Service Department/AZYF, Student Division, WZO (USD) in the United States for use on college campuses.

While the USD usually deals with positive Zionist/Israel education and the promotion of programs in Israel, the current situation with Israel's image in the media prompted them to assemble the enclosed as the negative press coverage began with full force. These materials are being used locally by students who are involved with activities on campuses.

Sincerely,



Lisa Kohan
Coordinator, North America

cc: Michael Jankelowitz, Head, Student Division, WZO

מק ארז

Jerusalem, February 15, 1988

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
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