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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מסד רותם

יוסף מקיני

אונדב

20/8/88 - 24/4/88

תיק מס'

3

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

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כוחה פנימי

מזהה פריט: R0003409

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ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות\*

חטיבה מס': \_\_\_\_\_  
 מיכל מס': 4607 / א  
 תאריך התעודה: 31/7/1988  
 שם הנמען: \_\_\_\_\_  
 שם מחבר התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_

סוג התעודות (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

- מכתב ☒  
 מברק או הודעת טלקס ☐  
 תזכיר או מזכר ☐  
 דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון ☐  
 פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה ☐

הנמקה\*\*:

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תאריך: 1

שם הכורך: א/ר 7/א/מ

חתימה: \_\_\_\_\_

\*הטופס ימלא בשני עותקים. העותק היורק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;  
 העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

\*\*נא לרשום את ההנמקה רק בעותק הלבן.







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Jan 1/77

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THE BOST

# A foreign-policy adviser for Dukakis

**H. D. S. GREENWAY**

Foreign affairs may not be Michael Dukakis' strong suit, but his wife, Kitty, has a foreign policy agenda of her own that she pursues with vigor and passion. It has to do with the world's wretched and the homeless — the refugees.

A couple of weeks ago she went to Washington to testify before the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs, where she argued the case for the dispossessed in Indochina.

"There are thousands of refugees with family ties to America and to other nations who remain alone, in limbo, and in squalor," she told members of Congress. "These families have endured so much already; they deserve at long last to be together with their loved ones."

She spoke of Hout Pich, whom she found in a camp on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1985 and helped bring to the United States. He "saw his mother, father, a sister and three brothers die from starvation," she testified.

On the coffee table in her house in Brookline she has a framed picture of Pich, who graduated from high school this year and will attend Brandeis University in the fall.

It was during that trip to Thailand that she went down on her knees before a recalcitrant functionary who wanted to keep her out of the camps. "I think he was so thunderstruck by my doing that and knew I wasn't going to get off my knees until he said 'yes,'" she recalls.

Less publicized has been her efforts to improve the lot of refugees from Laos, and her help getting five families out of Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program. She also intervened in the case of two Afghan refugees who were detained in Boston some time ago, hapless victims snared in the bureaucratic thickets that await those without proper papers.

"I have been very concerned and have been in touch with both Sen. Kennedy's and [Sen.] Mark Hatfield's offices about the push-backs of Vietnamese in the China Sea," she says of boat people who are not allowed first asylum. "I kept being assured by certain people on the Hill that that wasn't happening, when I knew darn good and well that it was! I had sources in Thailand who kept calling me and telling what was going on on a daily basis."

"This is not to criticize the Thais," she says, "because they have, for the most part, an admirable record. But things need to be better. The protection issue at the border is another issue which is a great concern. The incidents of suicide and rape as a result of the behavior of soldiers is something that needs to be addressed."

As for the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, "I am not in a position to do anything to fix it right now, but I have been very frustrated, as have others," she says. "This ought to be a compassionate, sensitive agency, and I'm appalled at stories I hear in district offices. I know there are some very good workers for INS, and I've met them and I applaud them. I also know there are those who are

insensitive to the extraordinary fear that refugees and immigrants feel when they go into that kind of office. It's like a child going to the dentist for the first time."

"Once you express an interest in a piece of the whole refugee scene and immigration, you begin to be the recipient of all kinds of material," she says, "and I am outraged about what's happening in Mozambique now. The whole thing is just ...". She shakes her head in disgust.

Kitty Dukakis also opposes Israel's efforts to make emigrating Soviet Jews go to Israel, instead of using their Israeli visas to leave Russia and come to the United States, as most of them do. "The Soviet Jews ought to be given the freedom to make a choice about that."

Her interest in refugees comes from her first visit to Israel in 1976. It was then that she became fully conscious of her Jewish heritage. A visit to the Holocaust museum in Jerusalem was "probably the turning point for me," she says.

When she returned to Boston, "I began going to conferences and began reading, and I began to see areas of sameness to the Armenian genocide. I brought in some Armenian friends of Michael's and mine and they brought others, and we started the National Center for Genocide Studies as a joint effort to teach the lessons of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide."

To Kitty Dukakis, the lessons of those great tragedies have not been sufficiently learned. She says she was "outraged, and I am outraged still" over the pope's embrace of Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, who has been accused of complicity in Nazi war crimes.



Dorothy Ahle illustration

And so, governor, if you make it to the White House and you are looking for someone for the State Department who will stand up and say what she thinks, you needn't look too far.

*H. D. S. Greenway is an associate editor of the Globe.*



# Iran Gives Moderation an Exploratory Whirl

By SHIREEN T. HUNTER

Immediately after the U.S. Navy shot down an Iran Air jumbo jet, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for all-out war with the United States. Since that initial reaction, however, Iran's response has been unexpectedly mild—despite the emotional rhetoric of Iran's foreign minister in the United Nations on Thursday.

Given its current economic difficulties and overwhelming U.S. military superiority, Iran can ill afford a further confrontation with the United States. Thus, seasoned Iran-watchers did not expect military retaliation or other foolish acts like harming American hostages in Lebanon. But even these observers have been surprised by the unequivocal manner in which Iranian authorities have said that they will not retaliate against the United States.

There are several explanations for this sudden moderation. Some relate to the effect of recent events; others derive from a long and painful process that Iran and its Islamic leaders have undergone in learning and adjusting to the international political system.

In March, Iraq's massive and indiscriminate bombing of defenseless Iranian cities had a traumatizing effect, even worse in its effect on the public was the United States' retaliatory bombing of Iranian oil facilities in April. The silent majority of Iranians has always opposed their government's reckless actions, which have brought so much destruction and tragedy to Iran. Recently, popular fears regarding Iran's future have increased, and so has resentment toward a government that seems incapable of either winning or settling the eight-year-old war with Iraq.

As a result, many Iranian leaders have come to realize that a continuation of the current situation could become politically very costly. Similarly, any rash action by Iran against the United States, leading to more U.S. military strikes, would increase popular dissatisfaction with, and resentment toward, the government in Tehran.

While growing more sophisticated about domestic political concerns, Iran's leadership also has matured in its outlook toward foreign affairs. Like other post-revolutionary regimes, most recently Chi-

na's, Iran has reached the point of adjusting to the international political system.

When Iran's revolutionary leaders came to power, they—like others before them—had no experience in running the country's foreign relations (or, for that matter, its domestic affairs). Moreover, the revolutionary purification of Iran's bureaucracy—especially its diplomatic corps—of undesirable elements deprived Iran of adequate expertise.

The result was a belief that revolutionary slogans could replace careful and painstaking diplomacy. The Iranian revolutionaries—again, like others before them—had an inordinate belief in so-called people power. If only Iran could reach the people of the Middle East or the Muslim world, it could dispense with government-to-government relations. In the view of the revolutionaries, these other governments were corrupt and unjust. Once their people heard Iran's message, they could not last long. All that was needed to bring victory was faith and courage.

Events during the last few years have cured Iran's leaders of many of these illusions. Irrespective of the value of Iran's message, and notwithstanding some sympathy for it, the pull of ethnicity and sectarianism has proved stronger. There has been no mass uprising in support of Iran, not even among the Shia Muslims of Iraq and the Persian Gulf states.

In addition, many Muslim countries have joined other nations in trying to contain Iran. The result has been broad support for Iraq, even though that country started the war and despite the unsavory nature of its regime. Some countries, including those of the West, have penalized Iran by denying it military equipment, imposing economic pressures and to a great extent ostracizing it. The result has been devastation reaching tragic levels.

Iranian opinion has also been shaped lately by the deployment of U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf and American strikes against Iranian facilities there. These have punctured the myth that, after Vietnam and Lebanon, the United States would not use force in the defense of its interests.

As the culmination of this process, it has finally dawned on many Iranian leaders

that the international system will not bend to Iran's ideological designs. Instead, it has tried to contain these designs or eliminate them through countermeasures. Thus, if Iran wants to avoid national suicide, to protect its interests and even to advance some of its ideological aspirations it must adjust to the international system's requirements and act according to its rules.

Nevertheless, there are elements in the Iranian regime that are not totally convinced of these facts. In the current contest for power they try to stigmatize the realists by accusing them of the sin of having abandoned Iran's revolutionary principles.

In order to increase the chances that realism and moderation will prevail in Iran, the international community must respond favorably to the Iranian leaders who accept that living outside the rules of the international system, no matter how unfair they might be, cannot succeed. They must be shown that good behavior does pay off.

*Shireen T. Hunter is the deputy director of the Middle East project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, and the editor of "The Politics of Islamic Revivalism" (University of Indiana Press, 1988).*

LAT  
Friday  
2/15





OFFICE OF THE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

DON SIEGELMAN  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36130  
(205) 261-7400



STATE OF ALABAMA

July 13, 1988

Elyakim Rubinstein  
Government Secretary  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Hakirya  
Kaplan Street, No. 3  
Jerusalem 90919  
Israel

Dear Elyakim:

Recently, I had the pleasure to visit Israel for the first time.

As a member of a delegation of Attorneys General, sponsored by the American-Israel Friendship League and the Israeli Foreign Ministry, I had the opportunity to participate in this delightful and pleasant trip. While all of us had some degree of uneasiness because of the news reports of unrest and violence in the occupied territories, all such feelings were quickly dispelled.

Israel is a beautiful country rich in history and culture. After meeting with several of Israel's key political figures, social leaders, and citizens, I feel certain that Israel will continue to be a bright spot in a tumultuous Middle East.

Attached is a rendition of my first visit to Israel and my thoughts on some issues important to that country.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Don Siegelman".

Don Siegelman  
Attorney General



DS/mr

Attorney General's Trip to Israel  
May 22-June 3

Upon our arrival at Ben-Gurion International Airport, we were received by representatives of the foreign ministry and saluted with a glass of freshly squeezed orange juice. We were then ushered to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem for the beginning of what was a most interesting, enjoyable and informative trip.

For those of us who have had some opportunity to travel and are interested in politics and history, it was a once in a lifetime adventure and an educational experience. While reinforcing my desire for peace and justice and strengthening my respect for international law and order, the trip provided me with information to develop a more complete understanding of an avenue to peace as well as the obstacles to that peace.

Some general information first: We stayed in some beautiful hotels, the King David and the Dan Hotel. The Dan Hotel is a 70-year old kibbutz guest house overlooking the valley and hills connecting Israel with the Lebanese border. We also stayed at the Hodhamidbar which is located in a resort/spa area overlooking the Red Sea.

The food was phenomenal with a tremendously wide assortment of fruit, cheeses, breads, and the best coffee for those of us who are avid coffee drinkers. Lunches and dinners included ample servings of lamb, turkey, chicken, and the freshest vegetables. (I gained five pounds in one week!) Usually these meals were offered with a variety of incredibly smooth Israeli wines, most of which are not sold in the United States.

The trip was made better by the quality of the guides and the information they provided, the people we visited, and the places we were able to see. For example, when we visited Yad Vashem, the most emotional and devastating portrayal of the Holocaust imaginable, a Rabbi, who was also the Director of Communications, served as our guide.

The political agenda provided us with the top government officials including Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin. We met with Ely Rubenstein, Secretary of the Government and former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Rubenstein was also the deputy head of the mission at the Embassy of Israel in Washington. We also met with an eloquent and intellectual member of the Knesset, Dan Meridor, an up and coming leader of the conservative Likud Party.

We visited with the leaders of the Israeli Bar



Association, several Supreme Court Justices both in official and unofficial settings, the Judge Advocate General of the Israeli Defense Forces, and Halil Silwani, the highest ranking Arab Justice in the occupied territory.

I must also add that we all had the pleasure of meeting the renowned international law professor Yorum Dinstein of Tel Aviv University with whom we discussed politics and international relations.

During the trip, we visited several holy sites in Jerusalem and throughout the rest of Israel. We spent four nights in Jerusalem, a night on the Dead Sea facing the State of Jordan, and one night near the Lebanon border with visits to the famed Masada, site of Jewish resistance to the Romans. We passed through Tiberius, an area surrounding the Sea of Galilee, the Golan Heights, Jericho, Arab refugee camps, and visited with U.N. peace keeping forces touring Lebanon. We also had infrequent occasions to shop for extraordinarily well-designed crafts including art and silver jewelry.

Because of media reports focusing on violence in the occupied territories prior to our visit, there was some question as to what we might find in Israel when we arrived.

I found that the reporting and editorializing had greatly overstated the violence, and I left Israel convinced that the media had done a disservice not only to Israel but to the cause of peace. The media's unfair treatment of Israel's response to the PLO-inspired violence served only to whet the appetite of the PLO and Arab neighbors and to further their seemingly ultimate goal-the demise of the State of Israel.

Israel is a democracy and, like the United States, it is an open society where freedom of the press is cherished. There are more international journalists in Israel than any other country in the world with the exception of the two super powers. Israel protects the freedom of the press even though it is surrounded by enemies which refuse to acknowledge Israel's right to exist as a nation/state.

There are some 1.5 million Arabs living in Israel. The Arabs living in the occupied territories have far greater freedom than the Arabs living in any Arab country. Housing and health care have been provided by Israel without any financial support from any Arab state.

It is hard to do justice to a trip of this significance on paper. It is an experience that must be lived. I strongly encourage those people who are interested in understanding the motives and determination of Israel and those people concerned with politics, world peace, and justice to visit Israel in the near future.

The following are other positions which I believe the United States should take toward Israel and the Middle East and are based on certain fundamental beliefs that I have held over the years and which were recently confirmed when I visited Israel.

#### BACKGROUND

I believe that the establishment of the State of Israel, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, represents one of the greatest triumphs of the human spirit and will. The timely recognition of the Jewish state by the United States was a proud moment in American diplomacy.

Since that time, a special relationship has existed between Israel and the United States which works immeasurably to the benefit of both nations. I am committed to preserving and strengthening the alliance that exists between Israel and the United States.

Israel and the United States are linked by a deep bond of shared fundamental values. In a world threatened by the spread of totalitarianism, terrorism, and extremism, the United States and Israel stand united in the defense of individual liberty, political democracy, and basic human rights.

The "miracle" of Israel is its commitment to democracy. There is no nation with a more vigorous free press or parliamentary debate or thriving democracy than Israel. Israel has accomplished this freedom although it is a tiny nation, outnumbered and surrounded by its enemies.

Israel is America's only democratic ally and America's most faithful friend in the Middle East. Israel's strength protects and promotes western interests in one of the most important and volatile regions in the world. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East should be based on the fact that Israel is a friend and represents a major strategic asset to the United States.



Israel's Security and the Peace Process

Israel's enemies claim that the cause of conflict in the Middle East is the "Palestinian question." That claim is false for at least two reasons.

First, much of the conflict in the Middle East has nothing to do with Israel, or the Palestinian Arabs. Iran is at war with Iraq; Syria harbors historic designs over Lebanon and threatens Jordan; Islamic fundamentalists threaten the Saudi and Egyptian regimes; Shiites are at war with Sunni Moslems; Morocco is at war with Polisario guerillas--all of these conflicts are based on historical rivalries that have nothing to do with Israel.

Second, it stands historic truth on its head to claim that the "Palestinian question" is the central problem in the Middle East. The root of the "Middle East conflict" has been from the first--and remains today--the refusal of the Arab's states to recognize Israel's right to exist. The peace process can move forward only when the Arab nations agree to recognize Israel's right to exist and negotiate their differences face-to-face.

Therefore, the starting point of American foreign policy in the Middle East must be a clear and an unequivocal commitment to Israel's survival and security. America must make it clear to the Arab nations that Israel's security will never be negotiable nor will the United States ever abandon its fundamental commitment to the existence of the Jewish state.

The Camp David Accords offer an effective model of how the peace process might proceed. When offered true peace and recognition, Israel has always been prepared to reciprocate. Israel responded to President Sadat by relinquishing the Sinai to Egypt, including valuable oil fields, strategic positions, crucial bases, and important settlements.

Peace proposals which seek to define and to impose in advance a comprehensive settlement retard instead of advance the peace process. The focus of U.S. diplomacy in the region should be to persuade Israel's Arab neighbors to recognize Israel and enter into direct negotiations on the basis of revived Camp David Accords.

The United States should neither seek to impose unilateral solutions upon the parties as a substitute for direct talks nor should the U.S. reward with sophisticated weapon systems those countries who refuse to enter into negotiations with Israel. The Camp David Accords should remain the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East.



Peace under Camp David was defined as much more than the absence of war. Peace was to include the normalization of relations, an exchange of ambassadors, expanded tourism, exchanges of citizens, and trade. Unfortunately, under President Mubarak, Egypt has failed to deliver on these promises. Egypt has made the peace process and relations with Israel hostage to the overall state of Arab/Israel relations. This represents an escape from peace rather than a route to it.

The United States should use its substantial influence with Egypt, including its aid, to ensure that Egypt reverses this policy and moves forward energetically on normalization.

#### Strategic Cooperation

Israel is the most important strategic asset and ally to the United States in the Persian Gulf region. Israel's strength, strategic position, stability, and reliability promote and defend Western interests in the region.

The United States should move forward aggressively to construct a comprehensive program of strategic cooperation with Israel. Close strategic cooperation would serve the peace process and provide a strong deterrent to the threat of Soviet-backed Arab radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

#### A Sound Investment: Economic and Military Aid

U.S. military and economic aid to Israel represents more than an enduring investment in our national security. American aid to Israel, much of which is spent in the United States, strengthens our only permanent, democratic ally in the Middle East and helps Israel promote and defend U.S. interest in the region.

I support continued American aid to Israel to ensure its security. Israel's military superiority must be unequivocal. Israeli strength is the surest guarantee of peace in the Middle East and the pre-requisite of progress for the peace process.

Israel is in dire economic need, because it is forced to devote 24% of its GNP to defense, an enormous burden the weight of which falls on the citizens of Israel in the form of heavy taxation. The conversion of U.S. aid from loan to grant is a positive step toward helping Israel's economy by reducing its foreign debt burden. The United States should also aggressively expand bi-lateral trade with Israel, an action which would be economically beneficial to both our nations.



One critical point that was made clear in discussions I had while in Israel was that American leaders need to educate the American people about the cost-effective value of U.S. aid to Israel. If the United States was forced to deploy its own military resources in the Middle East as a substitute for Israeli forces, the cost would entail an incalculable new burden on American taxpayers.

#### U.S. Arms Sales to Arab States

Israel's security, its capacity to promote western interests, and the prospects for peace in the Middle East depend first and foremost upon Israel's ability to maintain a favorable military balance in the face of Arab hostility.

Arab countries on Israel's borders have engaged in massive military build-ups of sophisticated equipment obtained from the United States and other countries. The United States' interest in maintaining stability in the region, and the survival of Israel, require a U.S. commitment to maintain Israel's margin of military superiority.

The United States should, therefore, refrain from sales of sophisticated weapons to Arab states which refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist or refuse to join in a peace process with negotiations directly with Israel.

#### Secure and Defensible Borders

United Nations Resolution 242 provides for "secure" borders for Israel. Israel's permanent borders must be determined through face-to-face negotiations by the parties themselves. Israel cannot return to the instability and threat posed by its 1967 borders.

Israel must also be assured of security along its northern border with Lebanon. For years, the PLO used southern Lebanon as a terrorist base for infiltrating Israel and bombing Israel's northern villages. Israel agreed to withdraw from Lebanon within the context of concrete security arrangements negotiated for its northern border. Israel must be assured of an effective security system to prevent a regression to the terror of the past.

#### Palestinians and the P.L.O.

The PLO is a terrorist organization committed to the liquidation of Israel. The PLO is supported by the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria, and other radical groups in the region all of which seek to subvert American interests. The burden is not

on the United States to explain why it should not negotiate with or recognize the PLO. The burden is on the PLO to change its policy and goals.

Since 1975, official U.S. policy has declined to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist, officially renounces terrorism, and commits itself to United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. I support this policy strongly. Suggestions by some in the U.S. to relax this policy toward the PLO serves to strengthen Arab intransigence and radical elements and impede the prospects for direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations.

The U.S. should encourage face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the moderate Arabs, particularly those Arabs of the "West Bank." The United States should oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. Such a state, backed by the Soviet Union and Arab radicals, would become a base of operations on Israel's borders, fomenting terrorism and instability.

#### Israel's Capital - Jerusalem

Jerusalem is the heart and soul of the Jewish people and the capital of Israel. The United States should continue to make a strong commitment to a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. Israel has guaranteed the free access to all religious sites since it took possession of the city in 1967. This is in stark contrast to the Jordanian occupation prior to 1967 which denied Jews and others access to those holy sites.

Current U.S. policy does not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The U.S. embassy is located in Tel Aviv and the U.S. only maintains a consulate office in Jerusalem. This denies Israel the right as a sovereign nation to choose its own capital, a right denied no other country by the United States.

The United States should move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In doing so, this would affirm the United State's commitment to all parts of the Camp David Accords.

#### The United Nations

The United Nations was born in great hopes as a forum to promote peace, human rights, and the rule of law in the international community. However, the Soviet Union and Arab-bloc states have turned the General Assembly into a forum for anti-western and anti-Israel rhetoric. In too many



instances, the U.N. and its organizations have become a rubber stamp for anti-Israel and anti-western diatribes.

Congress has affirmed the policy that the United States will walk out of the U.N. if Israel is expelled. Our nation should make it clear that the United States will quit the U.N. the day Israel is expelled. The United States should continue to use its influence and the promise of reduced contribution or withdrawal, to end the anti-Israel, anti-western bias of U.N. agencies as it did by withdrawing from UNESCO.

#### Energy Independence and U.S. Security

The oil producing countries of the Middle East use the leverage of oil production and pricing as political tools, not as responses to free market conditions. The threat of oil scarcity in the past, and the heavy western reliance on imported oil, dangerously tilted power in the world toward OPEC and the Arab nations, compromising U.S. security and diplomatic independence, and wreaking havoc with the international economy. Indeed, much of the terrible inflation which the U.S. experienced in the 1970's, and the dangerous indebtedness of many developing nations today, can be traced back to OPEC's stranglehold over oil production and its self-serving pricing policy.

The United States should not wait until another crisis is upon the West before taking strong action to reduce its reliance on imported oil. The current temporary glut in world oil supplies and weakness within OPEC offers the United States an important opportunity to move towards energy independence. The U.S. should work for a strong national commitment to increase energy conservation, reduce oil imports, and increase reliance on domestic energy production such as coal.

#### Prospects for Peace

After discussions with both Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin, members of the Knesset, the Supreme Court, and citizens, it is clear that Israel only wants peace, it only wants to be left alone to develop and flourish as it has been able to do under the most difficult of circumstances since 1948. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the longer peace is delayed, the more tense the situation becomes. Violence only breeds more violence.

Virtually everyone agrees that key, strategic military positions which were gained in the 1967 war will never be returned under any circumstances. To give back the occupied territories, in my judgment, would lead to national disaster.

The Palestinians have a home in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The Arabs living in Israel could continue to live in Israel. They could live, raise and educate their families, prosper and grow as a community as long as armies were not raised with the intent to overthrow and destroy the State of Israel.

Israel asks for nothing more. Israel will accept nothing less.

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
סודי

ווישינגטון

ערן, סיבל  
ד.ח. 548

מקורן  
לחלן נוסח ה-NON-PAPER שהוגש היום לחולי וויליאמסון חשגי  
ארה"ב.

סגן היועץ המשפטי



אלן בקר  
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NON-PAPER

The Maqarin Dam project is designed to capture the natural flow of Yarmuk waters previously utilised by Israel or lost due to flow variability. Hence the project will seriously affect Israel's utilisation of the Yarmuk waters.

Israel has been utilising some 70 mcm annually of Yarmuk waters and is entitled to continue to use such waters. This allocation is in addition to the 25 mcm for the Yarmuk triangle during the summer irrigation season.

We believe that direct negotiations with Jordan would be the most efficacious way to reach an agreement on this issue.

Allocation of the Yarmuk waters should be on the basis of an agreement between Israel and Jordan.

Whatever the avenue chosen the end result must be a binding agreement that would fully and finally determine the allocation of waters between Israel and Jordan.



# Mike Dukakis for President

105 Chauncy St., Boston, MA 02111  
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*For [unclear]*

MIKE DUKAKIS ON ISSUES OF CONCERN  
TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

July 1988

MIKE DUKAKIS ON ISSUES OF CONCERN  
TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

This is a summary of Mike Dukakis's record and positions on various issues of concern to the American Jewish community. They represent strong, committed, unequivocal statements of the principles that will guide his conduct as President of the United States.

PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL

>>> Israel and the United States. He believes there is a fundamental relationship between the United States and Israel which is broadly shared by the American people. "[T]he American people have understood that Israel's fate is our fate. That our security interests are linked. And that our historical and cultural bonds cannot and will not be broken. The first thing anyone must understand about the Middle East is that we will never let Israel down."

>>> Direct Peace Negotiations. He believes a lasting and secure peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors can only be achieved through direct negotiations. "Real progress toward peace will not be made until Arab leaders are willing to negotiate directly [with Israel]; until they accept Israel's right to exist, and to exist within borders that are secure and defensible."

>>> Arms Sales. He believes arms sales to Arab nations which undermine Israel's security are unacceptable. "We will oppose arms sales that would endanger the security of Israel or her people...."

>>> Zionism and Racism. He believes the United Nations resolution 3379 equating Zionism and racism is "an expression of the world turned upside down." He signed a Commonwealth of Massachusetts proclamation condemning any linkage between the two and calling for repudiation of the resolution, "[which] should be considered bigotry and therefore inconsistent with the declared purposes of the United Nations."

>>> Israel's Borders. He believes a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders is unacceptable. "Israel needs room to breathe, and a return to the 1967 borders is out of the question."

>>> Soviet Union in the Middle East. He believes the United States should set stringent conditions on Soviet involvement in the Middle East peace process. "The next President must challenge the Soviets to use their influence with Syria to end that country's obstructionist approach to the peace process. He must press the Soviet Union to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Israel and...cease [its] support for resolutions seeking to expel Israel from the United Nations."



>>> Jerusalem. He believes Israel should retain control over a unified Jerusalem, and that the United States should accept Jerusalem as Israel's capital. "If Israel wants its capital in Jerusalem, then, as far as I am concerned, its capital is in Jerusalem....That's their judgment to make....They say their capital is in X, then that's where we go."

>>> Arab Boycott of Israel. He believes the Arab boycott of Israel is "morally reprehensible," and became the first governor in the nation to require companies doing business with the Massachusetts state government to agree not to participate in the boycott. "We are saying...that companies which want state business must make a choice -- compliance with the Arab boycott will mean the loss of state contracts."

>>> Aid to Israel. He believes generous levels of economic and military assistance to Israel and Egypt must be maintained. "[O]ur close working relationship with Israel...makes the Israeli component of our foreign assistance program beneficial and productive for the United States itself."

>>> Strategic Cooperation. He believes in shared United States-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation, and has repeatedly stated that, as President: "I will strengthen America's strategic relationship with Israel."

>>> Negotiations with the PLO. He believes the PLO must be excluded from Middle East peace negotiations "until it renounces terrorism in word and deed; until it accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and until it clearly and explicitly renounces its own covenant...that peace can only come at the price of Israel's right to exist."

>>> Terrorism. He believes the United States must deal forcefully and unequivocally with terrorists. "We must never again make concessions to terrorists....And we must be willing to use force...to respond to or prevent terrorist attacks, and to apprehend those who have committed acts of terrorism...."

>>> Arab Recognition of Israel. He believes the refusal of Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and defensible borders has been the major obstacle to peace in the Middle East. "...[T]his situation wouldn't be a problem today if leaders of the Arab world had done what they should have 40 years ago or 20 years ago or 15 years ago, and that is to sit down and negotiate a permanent peace which recognizes Israel's right to exist."

>>> Palestinian State. He believes the issue of an independent Palestinian state is for the parties to resolve. "As a practical matter, if Israel and/or Jordan don't want an independent

Palestinian state...you are not going to have an independent Palestinian state." He has also opposed resolutions calling for Palestinian self-determination proposed for the platforms of the Massachusetts Democratic Party (1985), the California Democratic Party (1988) and the national Democratic Party (1988).

>>> U.S. Imposition of a Peace Settlement. He believes outside powers cannot impose a stable peace agreement in the Middle East. "The United States cannot and should not seek either to dictate a peace process, or to impose a peace settlement, in the Middle East. No proposed settlement that is unacceptable to Israel and Jordan will be acceptable to the United States."

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ISRAEL

>>> Massachusetts-Israel Exchange. Under his leadership, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to enter into a comprehensive, formal agreement with the State of Israel to foster mutually-beneficial economic development projects in the areas of trade, science and technology, travel and tourism, education and medicine.

>>> Target Market. Massachusetts lists Israel as one of its international business target markets, along with Japan and the principal industrial nations of Western Europe.

#### ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE HOLOCAUST

>>> Anti-Semitic Violence. He believes racial, religious and ethnic intolerance are abhorrent, and, as Governor, he signed religious vandalism legislation, which put teeth in existing state laws prohibiting acts of harassment and vandalism motivated by such intolerance. "Intolerance of a person's race or religion or ethnic background is a terrible thing. When that intolerance is shown by senseless violence against churches, synagogues, schools or burial grounds, the good people of this state won't tolerate it...."

>>> U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Mike and Kitty Dukakis have been in the forefront of Holocaust awareness, and, in 1985, chaired a state dinner at the Massachusetts State House to benefit the construction of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. The first event of its kind in support of the Museum, the dinner raised over \$1 million. Kitty Dukakis was a member of the President's U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council.



>>> Annual Holocaust Service. Mike and Kitty Dukakis host the annual Holocaust memorial service at the Massachusetts State House. Mike Dukakis observed at the 1988 service: "...[H]ow many could have been saved if there was an Israel then -- that too we must contemplate, while, thankfully, there is an Israel now -- 40 years later -- that the United States will never let down."

#### SOVIET JEWRY

>>> Political Intervention for Refuseniks. He has taken a leading role among American political leaders in seeking freedom for Soviet Jewish refuseniks. "The President of the United States is uniquely suited to achieve significant breakthroughs with the Soviet Union on behalf of [Soviet Jewish refuseniks], as part of a consistent and coherent approach toward this country's dealings with the Soviet leadership. As President, such efforts would be a major priority of my administration."

>>> Jackson-Vanik Amendment. He supports the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which makes "most favored nation" trade status for the Soviet Union dependent upon increased emigration from the Soviet Union. "I support the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We must continue to review carefully the policies of countries subject to Jackson-Vanik to ensure the greatest flow of emigration possible."

>>> Freedom for Soviet Jews. He personally intervened in the successful efforts to gain freedom for the Fuchs-Rabinovich, Aronov and Charny families.

#### CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION

>>> Separation of Church and State. He is firmly in the American political tradition of separation of church and state. "Jefferson's view of the desirability maintaining a 'wall of separation' between church and state is as valid today as when he pronounced it 200 years ago...I oppose attempts to introduce religion in our public schools. And I oppose vouchers or tuition tax credits for private schooling."

July 1988

# George Bush for President

Nike -  
FII  
Marshall G.

## MIDDLE EAST POSITION PAPER

### I. Overview

The U.S. believes that promoting the security of Israel and the pro-Western Arab states offers the best path to promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Few foreign policy objectives are more central given the region's chronic instability, strategic location, and central role in the world's long-term supply of energy.

International conflict, sub-national and trans-national terrorism, confessional strife, and the fruits of decades of Soviet ambition and massive supplies of weapons have made the region chronically unstable. This instability threatens America's interest by jeopardizing free nations and placing our access to the region at risk. Located at the confluence of three continents, the Middle East is linked to America's economic security interests in Europe, Africa and Asia. Possessing 75 percent of the free world's known petroleum reserves, the Middle East is vital in the long term to the economic prosperity of democratic regimes throughout the Western alliance.

America's strategic interests are clear; they are:

- The region should be stable, and its nations controlled by governments friendly to the U.S.;
- Israel must remain free, democratic, militarily secure, and economically strong;
- Freedom of the seas and free trade are American traditions. American and allied access to the sea lanes and petroleum resources of the region should be free from interference, whether from regional troublemakers, the Soviet Union, or terrorists.

We must pursue these interests energetically. We will continue to work with moderate Arab nations willing to co-exist with Israel. This should be done in concert with allies where appropriate and practical. But we should be prepared to support our interests in the region alone if necessary to protect the security of the U.S.



## II. U.S.-Israel Relations: Partners in Freedom

The Bush Presidency will take advantage of the new relationship built with Israel during the Reagan/Bush Administration to enhance the prospects for regional peace and security.

Israel and America are both nations of immigrants. Both were founded by people fleeing religious persecution. Both were born of revolution. Both have a frontier heritage. Both are established in the values embodied in the Holy Scriptures. Both are democracies, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Both cherish the fundamental rights of man -- freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship.

The evolution of Israel's political status with the U.S. -- from that of a threatened dependent in the 1970s to that of an ally and regional partner of the U.S. in the 1980s -- is a crucial transformation. No longer is Israel simply a democratic nation which shares America's religious and immigrant origins, Israel shares our security burdens as well.

Israel is a strategic ally to the U.S. By virtue of its military capability and the values and political objectives it shares with the U.S., Israel buttresses the alliance in its most vulnerable area -- the southern region of NATO and the Eastern Mediterranean. By establishing appropriate policies and institutions, the goal of strategic cooperation with Israel has been achieved. It will be sustained through continued security and economic assistance to Israel, and expansion of existing elements of strategic cooperation including joint exercises, pre-positioning of dual-use stockpiles (including combat equipment, spare parts, and ammunition), intelligence sharing and contingency planning. These measures will serve to strengthen American military power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A joint U.S.-Israeli effort now underway will produce one of the free world's first anti-tactical ballistic missiles in the 1990s, at a time when the proliferation of ballistic missiles is creating new dangers. Joint development efforts now underway for advanced conventional weapon systems will bear the fruit of lower cost, but more effective defense for our two nations in the 1990s. The improved institutions supporting defense cooperation will enable us to jointly strengthen our armed forces in the region, thereby contributing to regional stability. This could only be accomplished by a President who possesses the courage to stand alone as Israel has so often done, to defend freedom and democratic institutions in the region. We will continue to maintain Israel's qualitative advantage over any adversary or coalition of adversaries.

We will seek the assistance of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions where it will fit into a free nation's own diplomacy. But we will never allow the United Nations or any other multilateral institution to place Israel's or America's security interests at risk.

The domination of the United Nations by nations hostile to both the U.S. and Israel has diminished the usefulness of the organization in the region. The U.S. will not allow the United Nations Security Council to become a forum for one-sided resolutions against our allies, including Israel.

The continued existence of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 which equates Zionism with racism constitutes a fatal flaw in the ability of that organization to serve a useful purpose in the region. We will seek repeal of this Resolution. Failure to repeal that Resolution will justify attenuation of our support of the United Nations to reflect its diminished effectiveness in international affairs. Moreover, the U.S. will withdraw from the United Nations if Israel is ever denied membership.

We oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state; its establishment is inimical to the security interests of Israel, Jordan and the U.S. We will not support the creation of any Palestinian entity that could place Israel's security in jeopardy.

We are proud of the role America has played in the 1980s in encouraging the restructuring of Israel's economy which can lead it from one dominated by governmental institutions to one responding to free markets. The evolution of Israel's economy and the Free Trade Area agreement negotiated with Israel in 1985 will enable the Bush Presidency to bring Israel fully into the economic community of free nations for the long term benefit of both Israel and the U.S.

### III. Peace Process

The process of establishing an enduring peace in the region has evolved over many past Presidencies. The Camp David Accords established a model for the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute through direct negotiations with American assistance. The benefits of peace to both Israel and Egypt are substantial. Both Israel and Egypt are more militarily secure, and both are cooperating effectively with the U.S. in the region.



The American role as an active, steadfast and fully engaged participant in the search for peace in the Middle East has rewarded the U.S. as well. By assisting both Israel and Egypt to negotiate directly and providing appropriate economic and military assistance subsequent to the Camp David Accords, the three countries have been able to limit the expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union in the region.

Ultimately, direct negotiations are the only viable means of securing peace between Israel and its neighbors. The U.S. cannot and will not impose a settlement, nor will we be a party to any effort to do so through a multilateral entity.

The U.S. will not support any role in the peace process for the PLO unless it recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, renounces terrorism and removes language from its charter demanding Israel's destruction.

The search for peace requires continuous creativity and innovation to adapt to the shifting political requirements in the region. Formulas which were useful points of departure in the past may not be suitable in the future. American diplomacy can remain flexible by building on the bedrock of the peace which now exists between Israel and Egypt. In the long run, the need for both peace and security in the region are not mutually exclusive -- they are mutually reinforcing. To achieve this end, the U.S. must remain powerfully engaged, and to assist in providing an environment where those most immediately concerned can negotiate directly and without fear or intimidation. President Reagan's September 1982 Middle East peace proposal provides a compelling basis for addressing the peace process as well as the Palestinian problem. We will build on this proposal to aid in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. We believe that the most hopeful course of ending the anguish of the Palestinians is to re-energize the peace process. We recognize that there will never be a lasting peace in the area until an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem is found and that the Palestinians must be involved in every step of the process.

Economic growth -- both in Israel and throughout the region can also contribute to peace. More jobs and more opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, for example, could increase the confidence of Palestinians and make it easier for them to participate directly in shaping a negotiated peace. More jobs and more opportunities in adjoining countries might draw the energies of more young people into building a world for themselves rather than destroying someone else's.

The U.S. should focus its economic development efforts in the region on critical resource issues. For example, the impending water crisis which will be faced by so many countries in the area -- but most particularly by Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Regional stability could also mean new foreign investment in sorely needed infrastructure projects such as road and electricity.

We will neither give up our hope for peace nor our commitment to helping achieve it. We have no illusions about the difficulties of trying to achieve peace. But the difficulties do not justify despair and should not be an excuse for indifference.

#### IV. U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Middle East

The next President of the U.S. will face a very dynamic situation in the Middle East. The conditions in this vital strategic region have become more satisfactory for Western interests during the Reagan/Bush years. Our strategic relationship with Israel has become firmly established. Acceptance by other Arab states of Egypt's relationship with Israel has been achieved and marked with a reduction in the effectiveness of the radical Arab states and Iran. But there are also new dangers as more and more nations gain access to more destructive long range weapons, and new sources of conflict arise. The Soviet Union we will have to deal with in the Middle East is more sophisticated and more active diplomatically and more credible than at any time in recent years. We would be foolish to ignore the extent to which many of our Middle East friends, including Israel and the pro-Western Arab countries, are making closer contacts with Soviet diplomats.

If the Soviet Union is to have a more constructive role in the region, important changes in its policies need to be made. Its arms export policies have frustrated efforts to end the Iran-Iraq War and have supplied the most violent terror-exporting nations in the region -- Libya and Syria -- with the means to threaten regional peace. The continued Soviet support for the position of the rejectionist Arab states, its refusal to establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, and its reflexive opposition to Israel at the United Nations and other international fora remain obstacles to peace.

This means we must remain strongly committed to those of our policies that have served us well in the past, including military support for our closest friends. But we must also present our own vision of a Middle East and South Asia that demonstrates our own concern about the need for a peaceful resolution of local conflicts and reflects our understanding of the complicated and interlocking trends which are at work throughout the region.



## V. Jerusalem

We believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with free and unimpeded access to all holy places by people of all faiths.

## VI. Egypt

Egypt is the catalyst in the Arab world for advancing the cause of regional peace and security. As the only Arab nation to have formally made peace with Israel, it is reaping its benefits. With American economic and military assistance, Egypt has been increasingly integrated with the economic and defense-related institutions of the West. Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and its subsequent acceptance into the Arab world demonstrates that an Arab nation can make peace with Israel, be an ally of the U.S., and remain in good standing in the Arab world. The Administration's formal designation of Egypt as a "major non-NATO ally" has served to strengthen American ties with Egypt and will provide the basis for further gains for America's ability to advance the prospects for regional peace and security during the Bush Presidency.

## VII. Jordan

Jordan is an indispensable element of the Middle East peace process. Moreover, its posture of moderation has served to diminish the effectiveness of the radical rejectionist states of the region. Jordan's contribution to regional stability will be strengthened by continued U.S. encouragement of its economic development. Jordan deserves continued American support, particularly if it is to take the risks of pursuing peace in the Middle East.

## VIII. The Gulf

Seventy-five percent of the free world's proven oil reserves are in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding Gulf states. It is imperative for the economic well being of Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. that friendly hands remain on the spigot of Arabian Peninsula oil and that the sea lanes and the Strait of Hormuz remain free and open. Our continued support of Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western states in the Gulf is an essential component of our policy. In support of these interests, the U.S. is correct in deploying a naval task force to join with other naval forces to keep the international waterways open during the Iran-Iraq War.

Allied naval forces are sharing this responsibility by lending the same protection to their vessels that we are providing to U.S. ships and by helping in tasks such as mine sweeping. By doing so, we have led the way in which the burden is shared among our principal allies. Moreover, it has created political leverage for us which has countered Iranian coercion and helped to sober the Iranian leadership. In doing so, it has helped to create the conditions to help bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War.

Because of the critical importance of the Gulf region, now and for the long term, we will build on the increased security cooperation with the pro-Western Arab states of the Gulf achieved by the Reagan/Bush Administration to enhance their security while serving U.S. interests.

#### IX. Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a low point in America's international experience during the Carter Administration. Encouraged by the fall of Iran and the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Soviet Union took this action in the atmosphere created by the Democratic Administration's illusions about Soviet intentions and about world politics generally. We were then unable to respond effectively because of the unprecedented deterioration of our relationship with our traditional ally, Pakistan, that had taken place when President Carter controlled American foreign policy.

Forcing a Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was one of the greatest achievements of Reagan/Bush international policy. If the Soviet Union carries through the withdrawal, Afghanistan will join Grenada as one of the first countries where a communist dictatorship submitted to change. This result could not have been achieved without all three mutually-supporting elements of Reagan/Bush policy: negotiations, rebuilding our relationship with neighboring Pakistan, and military assistance to the freedom fighters to change the facts shaping Soviet intentions.

American resolve in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters has achieved its first objective -- forcing a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. This unprecedented event did not take place in a vacuum. Assisting Pakistan in modernizing its armed forces and reforming its economic system was no less important than providing assistance to the freedom fighters. The best guarantor of a free Afghanistan is a pro-Western, democratic, secure and prosperous Pakistan. The initial fruits of our efforts have strengthened our regional influence and enhanced the ability of a Bush Presidency to promote regional peace.



When the U.S. is engaged in helping Pakistan help itself, we are assuring continued cooperation with Pakistan to create a free Afghanistan as well as advancing other regional objectives such as nuclear non-proliferation and an enduring peace on the Indian subcontinent. The outcome in Afghanistan is not yet irreversible and will continue to require active American engagement.

#### X. Lebanon

Continuing instability in Lebanon is not in the interest of the U.S. Until order is established, Lebanon will be a source of international terrorism and regional instability. Therefore, in order to re-establish normalcy in Lebanon, the U.S. must help to strengthen the hand of the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, who are committed to an independent, peaceful and democratic Lebanon.

In order to achieve this goal, the policy of the U.S. should be based on the principles of preserving the unity of Lebanon; supporting the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; recognition of and respect for the territorial integrity of Lebanon; the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of Lebanon; and finally, the reassertion of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the nation and recognition that its safekeeping must be the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon. We will strive to help Lebanon return to its days as a peaceful country where various religious groups lived in harmony with each other, where international commerce flourishes and international terrorism was non-existent. I have a personal, special investment in a Lebanon at peace.

#### XI. Iran-Iraq War

The U.S. maintains neutrality in the conflict and supports United Nations and other regional efforts to bring about an arms embargo, and a withdrawal of all military forces behind the pre-1980 boundaries, and a permanent peace settlement. The U.S. recognizes that neither an Iranian nor Iraqi military victory would be in the U.S. interest in the region.

#### XII. North Africa

Building upon historically close relations with Morocco and Tunisia, the U.S. should continue military and economic aid to these two countries and continue to be supportive of efforts to resolve the Western Saharan issue.

In Algeria, the U.S. should seek to strengthen the currently friendly and correct relations to ensure access to oil and gas fields and support Algerian efforts to resolve peacefully the Western Sahara issue.

The U.S. should support all North African efforts aimed at peaceful regional cooperation.

#### XIII. Syria and Libya

Syria and Libya remain hostile and violence-prone elements in a region that yearns for peace and stability. It is unlikely that they will change their policies with the present leadership. However, it remains in our interest to take advantage of a genuine change in policy that would allow these two nations to work toward participating in a meaningful way in the regional peace process.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 31.07.88

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עותק 3 מתוך 28

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\* סודי ביותר/מידי \*

\* אל: סמנכל צפ'א (משה'ח) \*

\* דע: המנכל \*

\* לשכת שר הבטחון \*

\* מאת: השגריר \*

\* (בטחון נר 635) \*

\* להלן מתוך שיחה עם בוב אוקלי מהמועצה לבטחון לאומי: \*

\* מלחמת איראן - עירק \*

\* 1. הנשיא רייגן שלח אגרת לסאדאם חוסיין ובה קריאה לעיראק \*

\* לקבל על עצמה בהקדם הסכם הפסקת אש בהתאם להחלטת 598. \*

\* האמריקנים ביקשו את המצרים, הכוויתים והסעודים להפעיל \*

\* את השפעתם בבגדד כדי שעיראק תשתף פעולה עם מזכיר \*

\* האומ' במומ' המתקיים עתה בניו-יורק. \*

\* שגריר סעודיה בוושנינגטון, הנסיך בנדר, יצא אמש לניו \*

\* יורק לפגישה עם טריק עזיז עם מסר מריאד כדי לעודד \*

\* העיראקים לגלות גמישות בשיחותיהם עם מזכיר האומ'. \*

\* האמריקנים תומכים במאמצי מזכיר האומ' להביא להפסקת \*

\* אש בשלב ראשון מבלי להכנס עתה לדיון ביישום יתר סעיפי \*

\* החלטת 598. לדבריו, הבריטים סבורים שיש לכפות מיד \*

\* הפסקת-אש על הצדדים וניתן היה להבין קצת מדבריו כי \*

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 3 \*  
\* עותק 3 מתוך 28 \*

\* לארה"ב לא איכפת שהמומ' יימשך עוד מספר ימים ושהאיראנים  
\* יקיזו עוד קצת דם בימים אלו.

\* סין - טילים \*

\* 2. אוקלי חזר על טענותיו שבפיתוח מערכות ההנחיה של  
\* הטיל M-9 שנבנה ע"י הסינים הסתייעו הסינים  
\* בידע ישראלי.

\* הכחשתי הדבר מכל וכל וציינתי שבעת ביקורו האחרון כאן  
\* מסר שר-הבטחון דיווח מפורט לקרלוצ'י על תחומי שיתוף  
\* הפעולה הבטחוני עם הסינים ונושא זה לא נכלל בתחומי  
\* שיתוף הפעולה עמם. אוקלי עמד בתוקף על דבריו וציין  
\* שאירוני הדבר שהסינים מנהלים עתה מומ' עם הסורים לגבי  
\* אפשרות רכישתו של ה-M-9 ואולי גם עם גורמים אחרים  
\* וכי זוהי תוצאה של חריצות- יתר מצד הישראלים.

\* חשוב לדעתי שאם אמנם טעות בידם -להבהיר שוב לאמריקנים  
\* העובדות לאשורן.

\* באותו הקשר סיפר אוקלי שגנרל ברנס הממונה על פירוק  
\* הנשק יוצא השבוע לפקינג במטרה להבהיר לסינים הסכנה  
\* הגדולה שארה"ב רואה במכירתם של טילים לטווח קצר ובינוני  
\* למדינות במזה"ת באותה עת שארהב וברהמ' עושות מאמצים  
\* לצמצם מירוף החימוש בתחום זה. מגעים אלו הם בהמשך  
\* לשיחותיו של מזכיר המדינה בבקורו האחרון בפקינג.

\* האיום המרומז שבידי גנרל ברנס-יהיה באזהרתו כי שתוף  
\* הפעולה בין ארהב לסין בתחום הצבאי והמדיני יעמוד  
\* בסכנה אם סין תמשיך במדיניותה הנוכחית של מכירת  
\* טילים לכל מי שמסוגל לקנותם.

\* עיסקת הנשק ארהב-כווית \*

\* 3. אוקלי ציין שביעות רצונם מההבנה שהושגה בין הממשל  
\* לקונגרס בענין והביע אמונתו כי ממשלת כווית המתכנסת  
\* ביום א' הקרוב תאשר העיסקה המוצעת במתכונתה החדשה

\* עם זאת סבור שדרושה הידברות ישראל-אמריקנית לטווח  
\* ארוך לגבי נושא אספקת הנשק למזה"ת.

\* טר 5      שולח 5  
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3  
עותק 3 מתוך 28

אורד

\*תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בירן, מצפא, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן

\* ΓΡ Ε      ΕΠΙΓ Ε  
\* ΔΙΠΣ Ε      ΕΠΙΓ ΒΣ

\* ΜΕΡ

\* ΡΕ: ΜΕΡ, ΡΕΑ, ΚΙΣΤ, ΚΑΙΣΤ, ΔΙΓΓ, ΚΑΧΕΝ, ΓΑΧΕΣΤ, ΙΒ, ΚΑΙ



משרד ראש הממשלה

29/7

תאריך

אל: ר"ג

מאת: המנהל הכללי

לר"ג

בשרי. זה חוצצו זמן (אשרי לו היה בשרי).

1) שפרו המינים אקטיים גדלים והולכים  
שהיו אדוקים מאוד ילדים משפחה  
אחרת. הכוונה היא אקולוגים מתקבלים  
ואינן אדוקים במדויק. אחר. לז. זין  
שאלה נחלקים מחזורים, כי משפחה  
מאזן חלפה א זרנו ואז לז א חלפה  
למזן אחרת מקשים מתוודע וקולעים.

2) בקשר ל- 753 שנינו למזן, זין  
הסדר ששפרו מזן מורטוב שאלו שני  
(היה מורטובים אף נזיו אחרת א 753  
מזה מורטובים אלא המינים ששפרו  
אם זין. זין אחרת אחרת אחרת אחרת

**מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

17493 0230/2

תאריך ● 27.07.88

1	* דף	2	מתוך
4	* עותק	16	מתוך
		סודי ביותר	
		נכנס	

\* עותק 4 מתוך 16 סודי ביותר נכנס \*\* \*

*	**	書
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※ 電話: 02-2201-0001

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\* 110\* ב' ו' ח' תר' / מ' י' ד' ק' 117 \*

\* זעל. מורל רבמ' מווייב למורל 1 1111 ד. רבמ' 11-1111 (11 ר. 48 למל 1111)

著者：(VVV7117) 48 117 1 用 110111.1, x113. , 73117 110111, 11011 73117. 7111

著

\*מאת: הצי"ר

\* יהודי בריהמ'.

...

\*שיפטר השגריר לפגישה דחופה ובשל לוז' עמוס של השגריר\*

\* קיימתה אני.

[illegible]

אם אנו מוכנים ללמוד, אז אנו יכולים ללמוד. אם אנו מוכנים ללמוד, אז אנו יכולים ללמוד.

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\*שיפטר ב'קש שלא ארשום המשפט הבא. שלפ'ו שולח אמר כי לעיתים\*

\*ה'ישראלים נותנים לו את ההרגשה, שאין הם זואגים לגודל ה'הודים'\*

\*שאינם רוצים לצאת לישראל.\*

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the solution on the adsorption of the dye. The concentration of the solution was 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0, 10.0, 15.0, 20.0, 30.0, 40.0, 50.0, 60.0, 70.0, 80.0, 90.0, 100.0, 150.0, 200.0, 300.0, 400.0, 500.0, 600.0, 700.0, 800.0, 900.0, 1000.0, 1500.0, 2000.0, 3000.0, 4000.0, 5000.0, 6000.0, 7000.0, 8000.0, 9000.0, 10000.0, 15000.0, 20000.0, 30000.0, 40000.0, 50000.0, 60000.0, 70000.0, 80000.0, 90000.0, 100000.0, 150000.0, 200000.0, 300000.0, 400000.0, 500000.0, 600000.0, 700000.0, 800000.0, 900000.0, 1000000.0, 1500000.0, 2000000.0, 3000000.0, 4000000.0, 5000000.0, 6000000.0, 7000000.0, 8000000.0, 9000000.0, 10000000.0, 15000000.0, 20000000.0, 30000000.0, 40000000.0, 50000000.0, 60000000.0, 70000000.0, 80000000.0, 90000000.0, 100000000.0, 150000000.0, 200000000.0, 300000000.0, 400000000.0, 500000000.0, 600000000.0, 700000000.0, 800000000.0, 900000000.0, 1000000000.0, 1500000000.0, 2000000000.0, 3000000000.0, 4000000000.0, 5000000000.0, 6000000000.0, 7000000000.0, 8000000000.0, 9000000000.0, 10000000000.0, 15000000000.0, 20000000000.0, 30000000000.0, 40000000000.0, 50000000000.0, 60000000000.0, 70000000000.0, 80000000000.0, 90000000000.0, 100000000000.0, 150000000000.0, 200000000000.0, 300000000000.0, 400000000000.0, 500000000000.0, 600000000000.0, 700000000000.0, 800000000000.0, 900000000000.0, 1000000000000.0, 1500000000000.0, 2000000000000.0, 3000000000000.0, 4000000000000.0, 5000000000000.0, 6000000000000.0, 7000000000000.0, 8000000000000.0, 9000000000000.0, 10000000000000.0, 15000000000000.0, 20000000000000.0, 30000000000000.0, 40000000000000.0, 50000000000000.0, 60000000000000.0, 70000000000000.0, 80000000000000.0, 90000000000000.0, 100000000000000.0, 150000000000000.0, 200000000000000.0, 300000000000000.0, 400000000000000.0, 500000000000000.0, 600000000000000.0, 700000000000000.0, 800000000000000.0, 900000000000000.0, 1000000000000000.0, 1500000000000000.0, 2000000000000000.0, 3000000000000000.0, 4000000000000000.0, 5000000000000000.0, 6000000000000000.0, 7000000000000000.0, 8000000000000000.0, 9000000000000000.0, 10000000000000000.0, 15000000000000000.0, 20000000000000000.0, 30000000000000000.0, 40000000000000000.0, 50000000000000000.0, 60000000000000000.0, 70000000000000000.0, 80000000000000000.0, 90000000000000000.0, 100000000000000000.0, 150000000000000000.0, 200000000000000000.0, 300000000000000000.0, 400000000000000000.0, 500000000000000000.0, 600000000000000000.0, 700000000000000000.0, 800000000000000000.0, 900000000000000000.0, 1000000000000000000.0, 1500000000000000000.0, 2000000000000000000.0, 3000000000000000000.0, 4000000000000000000.0, 5000000000000000000.0, 6000000000000000000.0, 7000000000000000000.0, 8000000000000000000.0, 9000000000000000000.0, 10000000000000000000.0, 15000000000000000000.0, 20000000000000000000.0, 30000000000000000000.0, 40000000000000000000.0, 50000000000000000000.0, 60000000000000000000.0, 70000000000000000000.0, 80000000000000000000.0, 90000000000000000000.0, 100000000000000000000.0, 150000000000000000000.0, 200000000000000000000.0, 300000000000000000000.0, 400000000000000000000.0, 500000000000000000000.0, 600000000000000000000.0, 700000000000000000000.0, 800000000000000000000.0, 900000000000000000000.0, 1000000000000000000000.0, 1500000000000000000000.0, 2000000000000000000000.0, 3000000000000000000000.0, 4000000000000000000000.0, 5000000000000000000000.0, 6000000000000000000000.0, 7000000000000000000000.0, 8000000000000000000000.0, 9000000000000000000000.0, 10000000000000000000000.0, 15000000000000000000000.0, 20000000000000000000000.0, 30000000000000000000000.0, 40000000000000000000000.0, 50000000000000000000000.0, 60000000000000000000000.0, 70000000000000000000000.0, 80000000000000000000000.0, 90000000000000000000000.0, 100000000000000000000000.0, 150000000000000000000000.0, 200000000000000000000000.0, 300000000000000000000000.0, 400000000000000000000000.0, 500000000000000000000000.0, 600000000000000000000000.0, 700000000000000000000000.0, 800000000000000000000000.0, 900000000000000000000000.0, 10000000

\*אחכ' הוסיף שיפטר את דבריו הוא:

\*קיימת סכנה רצינית, ויתכן שנחמיץ הזדמנות לחלץ את יהודי\*

[illegible]

אָפֿן גאָלדן שטעקל, און דאָס וואָס דאָס גאָלדן שטעקל האָט געזאָגט, האָט ער געזאָגט:



מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2 מת 2 \*  
16 מת 4 \*

\*אלטרנטיבה, צריך לדאוג לפליטים אחרים המגיעים לארזה, יו"ר  
\*מאשר לאלו היהודים. כתוצאה מהעכוב בטפול בבקשות לאשרות  
\*ומהקיצוץ בתקציב, ממילא לא תוכל ארהב לקלוט את כל היהודים  
\*היוצאים, כך שקרוב ל-35 אחוז מהם יגיעו לישראל. מכאן  
\*שהוא מציע שנעבוד בשפ', עמ' למנוע את הנזקים.

\*שיפטר הוסיף שבמחצית הראשונה יצאו 8289 יהודים, הסובייטים  
\*אמרו לו שלהערכתם (לא נתנו בפעם הראשונה מספר מדויק) יש כ-  
\*3200 בקשות בצינור, ואם מוסיפים ילדים, המדובר הוא בכ-4300  
\*נפש. לדברי שיפטר יש גידול במספר הפנטקוסטלים שהרוסים  
\*מוהלים' לתוך היוצאים היהודים, ובחודש זה כ-23 אחוז מאלו  
\*שהגיעו לווינה שייכים לקבוצה זו. שיפטר ציין את המספר הגדול  
\*של גרמנים שיצאו בחודש שעבר-3800.

1728

□□◆

\*תפ: שוהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בירן, איר, מצפא

# משרד ראש הממשלה

29/7

תאריך

אל: ר"מ

מאת: המנהל הכללי

לצ"ל

בזמנו של גלוקס בן-לוי ורוב

יבקש ממורים אייבוב שיצרו גם ילדי

ADL

בן-לוי ר"מ מורים מוסתנים


זו שמה נעדרת ארז של מה סגל  
וקולונס שהיו הנסקה הכוונה ונלכדו

על אייבוב שהיו קילוני ואנציוני  
מצי, גם ~~הוא~~ יחסי לילד והאציה  
שהיו נלקח.

ברוך ש"ס' סוזל כסאוי וליק

אמצע קטנה סקסיה בי לטסיה מחנה  
שלימים, בן גמלין לישראל וכן בגי  
שנים אייבוב ונאווה בליה שסוקן לכיוון





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

16695

תאריך 26.07.88

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 7,16695

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלס, נר: 99, תא: 250788, חז: 1500, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: גס: מצפא

נד: @

סודי/מיד

אל: מצפא

דע: שגריר, למדן

מאת: לוט אנגלס

לא 139

הנדון: העיסקה הכווייתית

התקשר יו"ר האי.די.אל לוינסון למסור, שהוא הבהיר אתמול למורשה על לויין ולאנשי ממשל, כארמיטג' ואחרים, שהאי.די.אל איננו גורס עמדת א'פ'ק בקשר לעסקת הנשק עם כוויית. הוסיף שנתקל בווישינגטון במרירות רבה נוכח העיסקה הסעודית - בריטית ותחושה רווחת שאל לה לארה"ב להפסיד פוטנציאל מכירות של נשק בבליזונים נוספים. ציין, שחשוב להבהיר שהקהילה היהודית בארה"ב לוקחת בחשבון מכלול האינטרסים הקשורים בסוגיה ומכאן הצורך שראה האי.די.אל בנקיטת עמדה, השונה מעמדת א'פ'ק.

בנצור.

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בירן, מצפא

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36666 חוקי חשוד בעידן על 36666



型(1F)の低圧用

11:45 AM - 12:00 PM

DATE: 11/11/11  
PAGE: 1

לול

דתי: פחות: מידע	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: טרדי	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 2
תאריך: וזמן: חצות: 1100 29 ביולי 1988		אל: ממ"ד, ערב 2
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
609		כאח: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

ירדן - גמ"ע

משיחת הכרות עם דויד ניוטרן, השגריר שחזר זה עתה מבגדאד ומחליפה של אפריל גלספי כרמ"ח ירדן-פלס', סוריה לבנון.

1. האמריקאים נמצאים עדיין באפלה לגבי מהלכי ירדן הצפויים כלפי הגמ"ע, מחמ"ד אמנם ניסתה באמצעות שדר להניא את המלך מצעדים דיסטיים שפשרם כאמור לא ברור ע"מ להנמיך את הנזקים הצפויים אך בהרגשה היא שהמלך נחוש לבצע המדיניות החדשה שלו.

2. ניוטרן בדיעה שצריך לראות מכלול זה בראיה רחבה יותר של התפתחויות במזה"ת בחדשים האחרונים, כשהיריה הראשונה נורתה מצידו בפסגה באלג'יר, צעדי משקפים את הלך רוחו. ב-3 מכלולים (א) המאבק עם אש"פ על מתן תפקיד לירדן בהסדר בעיית השטחים, בתחום זה ישנה אירוניה בתמיכת הגורמים הערבים בו שבאה לידי ביטוי בפסגה באלג'יר. (ב) האינטרסדה. (ג) מורת רוח מעמדת ארה"ב בתהליך השלום, מהתמיכה בישראל, ובעיקר בהקפאת כל רכש צבאי ממנה. ציפיותיו לסיוע כלכלי במסגרת פרויקט הגמ"ע התנפצו גם הם. (ד) סרבנות ישראל ותקוה קלושה לשינוי עמדתה.

3. יחד עם זאת הערכה כאן בהעדר נתונים מספיקים שהמלך הירדני הוא בעיקרו טקטי ולא דוקא מהפך אסט'. הזכיר שהיו לכך תקדימים בעבר במצבים של הנתקות/התחברות ירדנית בנושא הגמ"ע. ניוטרן מפריד בין צעדים טקטיים בנושא הפלס' לבין המשך מחויבות ירדן לתהליך השלום שממשיכה לדעתו להיות תקפה. בלתי סביר שירדן תנתק עצמה מהגמ"ע ותהליך השלום שכן אחד משני מרכיבים אלה מהווה את ה של חסין. ויתור על שניהם פרושו הקמת "חומה סינית" מסביב לממלכה.

..12

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4	3	4	1	



דחיפות:	סגירות ישראל/ווינגטון טופס פבוק	קד: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
609		פאת:

4. הוכחה לקיום מצב אפשרי זה תהיה באם חוסיין ינקוט בצעדים ממשיים כגון סגירת גשרי הירדן או הפסקת תשלום משכורות ירדניות בגדמ"ע. בגטול תכננת החומש וחילופי גברא בממשלה לרבות החלפתו של רפאעי ( מוזכר שמו של מד'אר בדראן ) הם עדיין במסגרת משחקי הכח של חסיין ובבחינת תצלום מצב פוליטי מסויים אך עדיין לא בגדר מחפכה.

5. ניוטון מודאג מהמסר השלילי לתומכי ירדן בגדמ"ע. הגורמים הללו ממילא לא רבים והשפעתם על האירועים שם בלתי מורגשת. החשש הוא שלחסיין יהיה קשה לשקמם בבוא הזמן. מעניין יהיה לראות האם משלחות מטעמם יעלו לרגל לעמאן לשינוי הגזירה. בתנאים הנוכחיים יקשה עליהם להפגין זאת.

6. בנפרד דיווח על עיראק.

אלי אבידן

f.k

תפוצה:

דחיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל/וויינגטון טופס פברק	זר: 1
סוג: כלמ"ס		מתק: 3
תאריך וזמן חבור: 1988 29 ביולי 1615		אל: ממ"ד, ערב 2
כס' פברק: הפסד:		דע:
620		כאח: אלי אבידן, רושנינגטון

1777

להלן מה "רוש' פוסט" מה - 29.7.88.

אלי אבידן

1/16

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תפוצה:

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620

2/3

## Jordan Drops Funding Plan For W. Bank

By Loren Jenkins  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, July 28—Jordan's King Hussein, apparently troubled by his waning influence among Palestinians revolting in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, today canceled his ambitious \$1.3 billion development plan for the economically depressed territory.

The move, announced after a Cabinet meeting in the Jordanian capital of Amman today, was seen here as an attempt by the king to make clear to the West Bank Palestinians, now in their eighth month of revolt against their Israeli occupiers, that Jordan still has an important role to play in their cause.

In Jordan, the official news agency Petra said that Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat had requested the cancellation because the development fund raised questions about Jordan's West Bank policy.

The development plan was canceled, a Jordanian statement said, to "end any misinterpretation of any effort Jordan makes to sustain the steadfastness of the Palestinians under occupation." The action would also "highlight the Palestinian identity and allow the PLO to shoulder its full responsibility," the statement added.

Jordan administered the West Bank from 1948 until it was seized by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Ever since a 1974 Arab summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, that recognized the PLO as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," Hussein and Arafat have competed for influence over the 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In the course of the uprising, which began last December, Hussein's influence and prestige in the West Bank and Gaza have been eclipsed by that of the PLO, which is widely reported to be directing the revolt.

The king set up the five-year plan in 1986 to provide schools, water, agricultural projects and welfare for West Bank residents.

Today's Jordanian statement said the move was taken because the PLO and other Arabs had criticized the scheme as an attempt by Hussein to compete with the PLO for influence in the West Bank.

It said the decision was made in light of resolutions at last month's Arab summit meeting in Algiers in which Arab leaders turned down Jordan's bid to lead a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to a proposed international Middle East peace conference. The leaders also rejected Hussein's long-held plan to place the occupied territories under a confederation with Jordan in the event that Israel relinquishes them.

[A senior Jordanian official told The Associated Press that the action "is part of King Hussein's decision to free himself from representation of the Palestinian people and leaves the doors open for the PLO to shoulder responsibility on its own. The king's decision also reflects the PLO's wish to take over all Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."]

The official statement implied that Hussein might take further measures to reduce his ties to the West Bank. Arab sources here said there have been hints from Amman that the king might also disband the lower chamber of parliament, whose 60 seats are equally divided between the West and East Bank territories of the Jordan River.

Palestinian leaders here, however, said Hussein's action would have little impact on West Bank Palestinians, especially because the cancellation did not include the all-important Jordanian payment of salaries to 13,000 West Bank civil servants.

"The move is irrelevant," declared Feisal Hussein, a leading Palestinian leader here said to be close to the PLO. "Hardly any of the development funds money ever reached the West Bank. Now it will be up to the PLO to fund the socio-economic programs the development program was supposed to sponsor."

Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij, traditionally a supporter of Hussein in the West Bank, also discounted today's action as representing a break with the West Bank. "It is not that easy to cut all ties," he said, "The East Bank and the West Bank need each other."

The Israeli government also shrugged off the importance of Hussein's act. A spokesman for Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it would have no impact on Israel's administration of the occupied territories. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said he did not consider the act a "change in Jordanian policy" toward the West Bank as long as the king "does not declare war on us and does not close the bridges" across the Jordan River.

Hussein set up the West Bank development fund in 1986 after an agreement collapsed between him and Arafat for a joint Jordanian-PLO strategy on Middle East peace talks.

As envisioned, the \$1.3 billion fund was to be disbursed over five years from contributions by Jordan and other concerned nations. But only Jordan and the United States contributed, and these contributions were far below initial expectations.

Since 1986, Jordan has put \$27 million in the fund and the United States another \$25.5 million, including \$7 million turned over to Jordan last week.

The PLO had been critical of the plan from the beginning, denouncing it as just another effort by Hussein to curry favor among West Bank Palestinians.

3/3

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The Jordanian statement said the development plan had been described as "suspicious actions aimed at exercising condominium [over the occupied lands] and containing the PLO, and not consistent with the aspiration of the Palestinian people for independence in their lands."

Today's cancellation follows an announcement by Arafat last week that he planned to visit Amman soon, presumably to resume his sporadic and often contentious dialogue with Hussein over the future of the occupied territories and efforts to convene an international Middle East peace conference.

b



ד"ר: 1 סמל: 4	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טובס פרוק	דתיקות: רגול סמל: סדד
אל: סמ"ד, ערכ 3	תאריך ודפן חיצוני: 1988 29 בדול 1430	ד"ר:
כאמ:	כס' פרוק: תשע"ד: 628	אלי אבירן, וושינגטון

## עירייה

משיחה עם דויד ניוטון, מחליפה של אפריל גלספי (NEA / מחס"ד)

1. כציבור היתה צפייה לסיום המלחמה, אם כי לא היה לה ביטוי גלוי ברחוב, העיראקים סגורים ואינם מגלים לזרים רחשי ליבם, זוהי בסופו של דבר מדינת משטרה מה גם שמדובר בעתות מלחמה.

2. מקדמת דנא קיימת חשדנות כלפי איראן, הגישה אליה היא של התגרונות, דבר המטביר אולי את ניהול צורת המלחמה הדפנסיבית שאפיינה את הצבא העיראקי במשך שנות המלחמה. הגישה כיצד להתגרנן מפני איראן, הכתיבה לעדאם חרסין מדיניותו למן עליית ח'מיידי לפרוץ המלחמה. הוא ניסה לעשות זאת בכך שהציע לו לשאת ולתת עמו על מכלול הבעיות או נדחה. המלחמה, מבלי להכנס לריכוז מי החל בה נראתה בעיני העיראקים כמלחמת מגן ולא נמצאו עוררין עליה בציבור עד כמה שניתן לשפוט לאחר שהחלה. הסברו לכך שהשיעה העיראקית נשארה אדישה כלפי ח'מיידי בכך שהמטטר השכיל לטפח יחסים עם העדה עוד-שרם פרוץ המלחמה.

3. ניוטון חוזה תהליך ארוך של מש"מ. המשטר העיראקי יעמוד על סידורי בטחון מקסימליים וקפדניים בנוסף להסדרים פוליטיים.

כבר עתה מסתמנים הברלי גישה מהותיים. עיראק חותרת למסגרת של הסכם מקיף שיכלול את כל הערבויות שעיראק יכולה להשיג מאיראן ומתקבלת הכינ"ל ע"מ לכבול את איראן בשרשרת של הסכמים שיחסמו בפניה השמוש באופציה צבאית, לפחות מבחינת ליגליות, בעתיד. במסגרת זו הוא אינו שולל דרישה אפשרית מעידת לרורזיה בהפכם אלג'יר נקבעת. קו בשאט אל ערב. מכלול זה חשוב במיוחד להבטחת יצוא הנפט של עיראק כיום וחופש השייט אליה. איראן לעומת זאת פועלת מתוך מצב שנכפה עליה ולכן תרצה לצמצם 2/2.

תפוצה: 35 מה רח"ה שמה גמל גמל ח"ן גמל ח"ן גמל ח"ן

גמל ח"ן גמל ח"ן  
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תאריך: 2	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	תאריך: 2
סוג: 4	טופס פרוק	סוג: 4
מס': 628	תאריך: 2	מס': 628
מס': 628	מס': 628	מס': 628

את הנושא לנושא הצבאי אך לא מעבר למה שעשוי להשתמע כמתן לגיטימציה למשטר בעיראק. העיראקים אכזריים (RUTHLESS) ככל שיהיו, והם אמנם כאלה, נגשים למלאכת ניהול טו"מ בצורה יסודית מאד, בשעה שהאיראנים ע"פ ניוטון חלקלקים ונוטים להשאיר דברים בסערופל.

4. שלטוננו של צדאס חוסיין יציב מאי פעם ככל שהתרשם 4-5 שנות כהונתו כבגדאד. המשטר תחתיו עבר מהפכה פנימית בשתי דרכים (א) דור אנשי הבעת' הותקנים הולך ונעלם. רובם של אלה שליוו אותו כבר לא מצויים בקרבנו. המאפיין אותם, כגון נעים חדאד, סעדון שאכר ואחרים - דלאחרונה - הם המעצבים של המערכת. מסורים למפלגה ספוגים בצבע אידיאולוגי חזק אך נעדרים השכלה ברמה גבוהה. מחלופיהם הטעים ניוטון בעלי תוארי דוקטור וחניכי אוניברסיטאות מערביות. טיילת המפתח אצל צדאס חוסיין היא יעילות, בעיקר לגבי אלה שעוסקים בנושאים כלכליים. סמלו של המעמד החדש לידו הם אמנם מדי הבעת' אך נכיסו השרוול בולטים עטי הזהב. (ב) הגורמים הסובבים את השליט מחויבים על ידו בשני דברים נאמנות אישית לשליט וגילוי משמעת קפדנית. רובם ככולם באים אחר שרות במשרד הנשיאות שהוא מקור לקאדרים הנבחרים. המאפיין אותם שאפתנות קריירתית בלתי נללת.

5. באשר לאן פני עיראק בעתיד, מטבע הדברים תחיה תקופה בנושא האיראני. על כך יקיד טיננו של שר המדינה לענייני חוץ לתפקיד שה"ח ע"מ שטארק עזיז יטפל אך ורק בנושא איראן. ניוטון מעריך שצדאס יתעמק בנוסף. גשתי סוגיות (א) שיקום הכלכלה. יש לו מעין מחויבות אישית לפצות את האוכלוסייה על סבלה במשך 8 שנות המלחמה בכיורון רוחות הפרט. (ב) הינמדה מחדש של עיראק על מפת הבינ"ל. הכיורונים בתחום זה יהיו לדעתו לעבר הפחתת התלות בברה"מ ופיתוח דרכי גישה לעולם המערבי. צדאס חוסיין בעל זכרון ארוך לגבי מדיניות ברה"מ כלפי איראן במשך המלחמה, לרבות היותה זו שמנעה במשך חדשים ארוכים כפידת 596 על איראן ע"י גרידת רגליה בזירת האר"מ. העיראקים לא היססו /3

תמונה:

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 3
סוג:		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן חצור:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
628		פאת:

להביע מורת רוח על כך בפני הסוב'. כאשר לזירה הבינ"ל - צדאס - RESPECTABILITY בעיניו במחירם העולם השלישי, על בסיס של ניהול מדויקת בלמז"ית, אין זה סוד שאחת הדמויות הנערצות עליו הוא טיטו.

6. בתחום היחסים עם העולם הערבי, הוא סובר שצדאס תוסיף יתרון עדיפות מנדגשת ליחסיו עם המפרציות בעיקר להמשך הסיוע הכלכלי מהן, שלא יהיה כל כך אטרקטיבי בעיניהן. הגושה למצרים היא אמביוולנטית, הברית תודה על עמדתה כלפי עיראק המהולה ברגשי בוז אליבא לניוטון בשל רגשות העליונות העיראקית. דוגמה לכך מהווה היחס המשפיל לפועלים המצרים בעיראק. ניוטון אינו חוזה התקרבות עיראקית לסוריה, העוינות האישית והתהום הפעורה בנושא בל"ת הבעת' עברו כמעט את השלב של חזרה, אף שהוא ער לנסיונות הפיוס שבדאי יעשו מצד גורמים ערבים בתום מלחמת המפרץ, מבחינה כלכלית עיראק אינה תלויה בסוריה והדעת נותנת של צדאס תוסיף אין עניין להפעיל את צנור הנפט ובכך להיטיב עם הכלכלה הסורית.

7. ישראל. ניוטון רואה כבלתי סביר הצבת הצבא העיראקי בגבול המזרחי של ישראל מיד בשובר מהחזית האיראנית. ראשית יקח זמן עד שתהליך כזה יקרה. כל הסכם עם טהראן יצטרך להיות מוגן (BACKED) ע"י הצבא העיראקי, שנית, יהיה זה אבסורד להשקיע את הצבא העיראקי במלחמה נוספת אחר הטראומה בת 8 שנים. ניוטון מבסס הערכה זו על כך שחל שינוי בגישת עיראק כלפי הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי באשר לחלקה בה. הסכסוך עם איראן כפה עליה, בין אם מתוך שיקולים טקטיים או אסטר' חלטה הרוואה בסכסוך אספקט ישראלי-פלס'י ופחות ישראלי-ערבי ועל המופקדים לכך לטפל בעצמם. ניוטון מציין ששם כל השלילה כלפי הסכמי ק.ד. - ניוטון מזכיר א' התנגדות עיראק להסכם השלום עם לבנון ב-83' - עיראק בניגוד לסוריה מקבלת אותם כעובדה מוגמרת וככזו המסירה מסדה"י מלחמה רבתי נוספת עם ישראל.

..14/

תפוצה:

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 4
סוג:		כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן חשוד:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דצ:
הפסד:		
628		כאונ:

במקביל נמשכת העוינות העיראקית כלפי ישראל, ביטויים כגון "הממשלה הצירנית"  
 "הצירנים" וכד' הם עניין של שגרה בהתייחסות אליה, צדאט חרטיין לא רק שנפגע  
 מעצם ההצעת הכור הגרעיני, אלא שרואה בפעולה השפלה שכורנה אישית נגדו, יש בה  
 משום תיידים לגבי אפשרות הישנות תקיפה נוספת נגד עיראק.

אלי אבידן  
 א.א.

תפוצה:



דחילות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל/וויסינגטון נופס פבוק	קף: 1
סוג: סודי		כתוב: 1
תאריך יזכור: 15:00 29.7.88		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פבוק: <u>הפסד:</u> בטחון:	מקש"ח - משחב"ט	דע:
620 615		כאח: קישור לקונגרס

בית הנבחרים - נשק לכווית  
לשל הציר 571 (577 לבטחון) משלשום

ח"עסקה" עדיין לא סגורה לגמרי. אתמול בבוקר שוב נפגשה הקבוצה המתוארת במבוק לעיל, ובמהלך היום המשיך לארי סמית לדבר על mark up אר יס אפנה שדבריו בגדר צעד טקטי.

ממשלת כווית טרם סמכה ידה על הפשרה וכנראה תדון עליה בישיבתה ביום ראשון הקרוב. (והלוביסטים של יצרניות הנשק שהיו אתמול בגבעה ופרנסתם תלויה בדבר הביעו דאגה...)

להזכירכם שביום ששי הבא יאזול פרק הזמן הניתן לקונגרס להביע אי-הסכמה לעסקה ואז תכנס לתוקף. אם כל הצדדים יסכימו לא יהיה צורך בהודעה נוספת מצד הממשל - כל עוד אין תוספת יסודות חדשים, די בהודעה טכנית על שינוי.

טאד וויצ  
טובה הרצל

ל הוה ריהא שהבט אנכא אמנא דלעריצ 2  
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2

תפוצה: 36

שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	ק"י: _____
שם: _____	כתובת: _____
תאריך: 29.7.66 15:00	אל: _____
פס' פרוק: _____	ד"ר: _____
הפסד: _____	קדשור לקונגרס
617	

המשלחת במסקנה

הודיעו בחוזר האם יש רצון להפגיש מבקרים מארה"ב עם המשלחת, ואיזה פרופיל מומכי רועים עבודה.

השאלה עתה ספציפית בקשר לביקור קונגרסמן סולרז, שיבקר באמצע אוגוסט בחזמנת הסובייט העליון, וביקור עוזר של קונגרסמן לויין (היוצא היום) אך תעלה בודאי בהקשרים אחרים - עתונאים, משלחות יהודיות וכו'.

טובה הרצל  
טובה הרצל

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1 2 3 4 5 6  
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ירצא \*\*

שמור

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הודעה: 18979/7

אל: וו/ש/813/ני/898

מ-: המשרד/תא: 280788/זח: 1912/זח: ר/סג: שח

תח: פ גט: ארבל

נד: 8

שמור/רגיל

נ.מ. 6243 - 203.01

ערך, מתני-ווש

זע: ביין/נאר'ס


ביקור ויליאמסון.

א. שיחת הנימוקים של ויליאמסון עם ראה'מ התקיימה במתכונת  
ב-26 ביולי. לויליאמסון כללה ביקוריו. מצדנו השתתפו  
בן-אחרון, מקל, מלמד.

ב. ויליאמסון הודה לראה'מ על תמיכתה העקבית של ישראל  
בארה'ב בהצבעות בעצרת (אחרי ההצבעה הזוהי הגבוה ביותר  
בין כל מדינות העולם). ציין שארה'ב תמשיך להלחם נגד כל  
הנסיונות לבידודה של ישראל בזירת הארגונים הבינ'לי,  
למרות שהשכנה יש לבנות להגברת ההתקפות בגלל המצב בשטחים.  
הוא מעודד מהצלחת המאמץ המשותף ב-ILO.

ג. ויליאמסון סקר ההתפתחויות האחרונות באפגניסטן, נמיביה,  
עיראק-אירן וציין שבמקרים כאלה בהם היריבים מגיעים  
להסכמה הזוית על גמר הסכסוך, האו'ם יכול לשמש ככלי  
מועיל ומזרז לתהליך השלום, או כמפלט 'למניעת ברושות'  
כמו לגבי הנסיגה הסובייטית מאפגניסטן. למרות הנ'ל  
ויליאמסון נשמע מכונה מאד לגבי היכולת האמתית של האו'ם  
במכשיר להשגת השלום ולשמירתו. הוא גם נשמע מאד שלילי  
כלפי האו'ם כזירה לרמיסת ערכי הדמוקרטיה שארה'ב וישראל  
דוגלות בהם.





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הכל

ד.ראה'מ הביע הערכה למעילות ארה'ב באו'ס ותמיכתה העקבית  
בנו באו'ס ובסוכנויות המיוחדות. התבונן בתוצאות ועידת  
ILO.


ה.ויליאמסון העלה נושא ציונות-גזענות וביקש לשמוע דעת  
ראה'מ להערכה המתגבשת בווינגטון שאין חוזר אין השעה  
כשרה למתקפה חזיתית נגד ההחלטה בעצרת האו'ס. ראה'מ  
ציון שלדעתו מוטב שלא להעלות הנושא באו'ס, כל זמן  
שאיננו בטוחים בתוצאות.

ו.לידעתכם: נאלצנו לבטל בגישה ויליאמסון עם מ'מ ראה'מ  
ושה'ח שנקבעה לאותו יום אחה'צ, בגלל עניינים בלתי  
צפויים ודחופים שצצו בלוח הזמנים של השר.

מנהל ארבי'ל 2

א.ב.צ

תמ: שהח,רהס,מנכ"ל,ממנכ"ל,בירן,הצמא,ברנע,ארבול2,סויבל,ר/מרנז,  
ממז





16

דמיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל/ווישינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: בלור		מתוך: 3
תאריך וזמן חבור: 1988 28 ביולי 1530		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
596		פאת: דני בלור, ווישינגטון

בחירות 88

להלן ניתוח משאל הבחירות האחרון של ה - "דול סטריט ז'ורנל":



דני בלור

שם 2  
מח 3  
מש 2  
א/א 1  
ק"מ 1  
גצסא 2  
ה/א 1  
א 2

תפוצה: 22-



52 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL THURSDAY, JULY 28, 1988

# Poll Finds Dukakis Widening Margin Over Bush And Favorably Impressing Critical Swing Voters

By RICH JAROSLOVSKY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Michael Dukakis fulfilled his major aims at last week's Democratic convention: He widened his lead over George Bush while favorably impressing the swing voters who will be critical to his chances in November.

A new, nationwide Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll conducted last Saturday through Monday shows that the Democratic presidential nominee holds a lead of 51% to 34% over Vice President Bush among those voters most likely to vote in November. This margin of 17 percentage points is up from the 12-point edge Mr. Dukakis held in a Journal/NBC poll conducted just before the convention.

In particular, the survey shows that Mr. Dukakis is doing well among two groups



that together form a critical voting bloc. These are strictly independent voters—those who normally lean toward neither party—and the self-described Democrats who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984. Mr. Dukakis leads the vice presi-

dent among both groups, which together account for about 27% of the likely electorate; among Reagan Democrats, he enjoys a huge 4-to-1 lead.

Conventions often give a candidate a boost in the polls, but such increases usually prove ephemeral. Moreover, Vice President Bush can probably look forward to a boost of his own following the Republican National Convention next month.

Still, the Journal/NBC survey demonstrates that Mr. Dukakis largely succeeded in his difficult balancing act of keeping the party happy without appearing to important segments of the electorate to be pandering to the party's various factions.

Among those likely voters who knew something about the Democratic convention, nearly four times as many said the convention made them more likely to vote for Mr. Dukakis as said it made them less likely to vote for him. About half said the convention wouldn't affect their vote.

Mr. Dukakis's favorability ratings—a standard measure of how candidates are perceived by the electorate—were clearly bolstered by the convention. In the new poll, 62% of all likely voters said they have a favorable opinion of the Massachusetts governor, while 18% have an unfavorable opinion—a spread of 44 points. In the previous Journal/NBC poll, which was conducted the week before the convention

## 'DO YOU have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Michael Dukakis?'

July 28-29 July 8-11

Favorable



Unfavorable



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL/NBC NEWS POLL

opened, the figures were 58% to 25%, a 33-point spread.

In contrast, Mr. Bush—widely pilloried in such Democratic speeches as Sen. Edward Kennedy's "Where Was George?" broadside—is viewed favorably by 44% of likely voters and viewed unfavorably by 46%. Two weeks ago, 49% had a favorable opinion of him and 42% had an unfavorable view.

The poll also showed that Mr. Dukakis pulled ahead of the vice president on the question of which man the voters would rather see in the White House in case of a sudden crisis requiring swift, decisive action. The question is a vital one to the vice president, since a cornerstone of his strategy is to stress his greater foreign-policy experience and paint himself as the steadier hand in a crisis.

Two weeks ago Mr. Bush narrowly led the Democratic candidate on the question by 44% to 40%. In the new poll, Mr. Dukakis leads, 51% to 41%. And likely voters agreed by a margin of almost three to one with the statement that Mr. Dukakis "is a strong leader who is willing to make tough decisions."

Many voters found Mr. Dukakis adroit in his handling of Jesse Jackson, his defeated rival for the Democratic presidential nomination. Three-quarters of all likely voters in the Journal/NBC survey believe that Mr. Jackson was treated fairly at the convention. Nearly two-thirds said Mr. Dukakis treated the civil-rights leader "about right," while 12% believe the nominee gave in too much and 14% think he didn't give in enough.

However, a plurality of voters—45%—think Mr. Dukakis made "a lot of private promises" to win Mr. Jackson's support.

Mr. Jackson clearly remains a polarizing force to some of the electorate, but 49% of likely voters now have a favorable view of him, while 40% have an unfavorable one. Should Mr. Dukakis win the fall election, 23% of voters believe that Mr. Jackson would have "a great deal" of influence in his administration—but only 14% think he should have that much influence.

At the same time, 55% of likely voters would favor seeing Mr. Jackson appointed to a cabinet position in a Dukakis administration, while 31% would oppose such an appointment.

By a margin of 54% to 19%, the Journal/NBC poll shows, voters approve of Mr. Dukakis's selection of Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen to be his vice presidential running mate. Voters don't yet know much about Sen. Bentsen, the poll found: Nearly half aren't sure whether they have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of him. Among voters who do have an opinion, though, those who view him favorably outnumber those with an unfavorable view by more than two to one.

The poll shows that Mr. Dukakis now has a lead of 56% to 28%—better than two to one—over Vice President Bush among women likely to vote. Mr. Dukakis also leads among men likely to vote, although only by a margin of 46% to 43%. The Massachusetts governor continues to lead in every part of the country, and since the Bentsen selection and the convention Mr. Dukakis has widened his margin in the South—Mr. Bush's strongest region—to 13 points from five in the preconvention poll.



The poll clearly shows Mr. Dukakis's success so far in wooing back to the fold

### 'DO YOU have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of George Bush?'

July 23-25 July 8-11

Favorable



Unfavorable



the Democrats who supported Mr. Reagan against Walter Mondale four years ago. Not only does he lead Mr. Bush by a 67%-17% margin among such voters, but seven in 10 of them agree that he is a strong leader.

Moreover, 49% of such voters who heard or read about the Democratic convention said it made them more likely to vote for the governor, while only 9% said it made them less likely to support him.

Mr. Dukakis also leads in the poll among independent voters, by a margin of 38% to 29%. But many of these voters—one in three—aren't sure how they would vote if the election were held today.

These independent voters split almost evenly on the question of which man they want to see as president in a crisis, 45% choosing Mr. Bush and 42% Mr. Dukakis. But by a margin of better than two to one,

### How Poll Was Conducted

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

The Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll was based on nationwide telephone interviews conducted July 23-25 with 2,238 adults age 18 or older.

The sample was drawn from a complete list of telephone exchanges, chosen so that each region of the country was represented in proportion to its population. Households were selected by a method that gave all telephone numbers, listed and unlisted, a proportionate chance of being included. The results of the survey were weighted to adjust for variations in the sample relating to education, age, race, sex and region.

Chances are 19 of 20 that if all adults in the U.S. had been surveyed using the same questionnaire, the findings would differ from these poll results by no more than three percentage points in either direction. The margin of error for subgroups may be larger.

they agree that Mr. Dukakis is a strong leader.

As a rough barometer of sentiment among those voters who are still most up for grabs, The Wall Street Journal designed a "swing group." The group includes independent voters, Democrats and Republicans who are undecided about their vote this year, and those Democrats who voted for President Reagan in 1984 and still approve of his performance as president. The group comprises over 25% of all likely voters.

According to the poll, this group agrees by a margin of 58% to 21%, with the statement that "Michael Dukakis is a strong leader who is willing to make tough decisions." In addition, this "swing group" gives Mr. Dukakis a favorability ratio of 56% to 14%—significantly better than Mr. Bush's 47% to 34% ratio.





## CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

6TH FLOOR  
37 YORK STREET  
SYDNEY, N.S.W. 2000  
TELEPHONE: 264 7933

טופס מברק בפקסימיליה

קונסוליה כללית  
של ישראל

ס י ד נ י

ב ל מ"ס

כבוד  
מח  
דע  
לע  
קניי (הוצגו)

נר 46  
תאריך 28/7/88  
דחיפות / מידע  
אל מע"ת  
מאת המונכ"ל, סידני

הנדון: - ראיונות טלוויזיה עם רוה"מ ומ"מ רוה"מ ושה"ח

1. אתמול בלילה (20), שודרה במסגרת תוכנית חדשות יומית, כתבתו הטלוויזיונית הראשונה של הכתב החדש של רשת הטלוויזיה והרדיו הממלכתיים של אוסטרליה, GRAIG WHILES MITH - ABC, שהחליף את פטר ג'ורג', שלא שבענו ממנו נחת.

כתבת הטלוויזיה כללה שני ראיונות: אחד עם רוה"מ במשרדו ובשני עם מ"מ רוה"מ מחוץ למשרד, ונמשכה כ- 10 דקות.

2. שני הראיונות היו חיוביים מבחינה הסברתית והעניקו תמונה בחירה על עמדת הממשלה בנושא ההסדר המדיני והודגש הקונצנזוס הקיים בישראל ביחס לאש"פ. בסיום הראיונות הובאה תמונה של מפגינים ישראלים שקראו להדברות עם אש"פ, אך הכתב הוסיף שהמפגינים אינם מייצגים את רוב הישראלים והם נחשבים לכוגדים. צופים הביעו בפנינו את שביעות רצונם מהגינות הכתב החדש ומדרך הצגת נושא הסכסוך. אנו נעקוב אחר המשך שידוריו ונעדכנכם.

צבי גבאי



היגוס  
אלהאניה  
אלהאניה  
גמ  
הסברה



16

דחיות דגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתוב: _____
תאריך יזמן מעור: 1988 28 ביולי 1515		אל: מעפ"א
פס' פרוק: 59 הפסד: 59 59	דע: אברהם אלון, מח' לקשרים בינלאומיים של ההסתדרות, תל-אביב	
	פאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון	

האיגודים והמצע הדמוקרטי

בארוחת צהריים שערכה צמרת ה - AFL-CIO לכבוד סיום כהונתי בווינגטון אמר לי לידן קירקלנד כי לדעתו, חבל שהסתייגות ג'קסון בנושא הפלשתינאי לא הועמדה להצבעה בוועידה הדמוקרטית כי היו תומכים בה פחות צירים מכפי שתמכו בחסתייגות האחרות של ג'קסון. לדבריו בעבודת הכנה שערכו האיגודים הם דאגו לכך שחברי איגודים שהיו צירים במחנה ג'קסון לא יתמכו בחסתייגות, ואכן רובם היו אמנם מצביעים נגדה. בוב ג'ורג' ין, נשיא איגוד עובדי המנחה הוסיף כי מנהיגים שחורים שונים במחנה ג'קסון לחצו שלא להעלות את ההסתייגות אפילו לדיון, ביניהם חברי הקונגרס ביל גרדי וצ'רלי רינגל, אלינור נורטון, רון בראון, מנהל סיעת ג'קסון בוועידה ועוד. קירקלנד הוסיף כי הלוחצים העיקריים על ג'קסון היו אנשי זוגבי וכן כמה יהודים שמאלנים, ג'קסון עצמו הבין שעליו להמנע מלהביא את הנושא להצבעה, שכן התוצאות לא היו בטוחות מבחינתו.

באשר לבחירות - קירקלנד מעודד מתוצאות המשאלים האחרונים אך מעיון כי הדרך ארוכה ואחרי הוועידה הרפובליקנית בודאי יצטמצם הפער בין דוקקים לבוש, עם זאת התרשם מאישיותו של דוקקים, דבקתו במטרה, יכולתו האינטלקטואלית והארגונים ומיכולתו להפגין חמימות במגעים אישיים וגם בפני קהל.

דני בלור

דני בלור

מח' לקשרים בינלאומיים של ההסתדרות, תל-אביב

תפוצה: 2



דחיפות: דחוף	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון		דף: _____
סוג: שמור	טופס פרוק		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן מעור: 17:00 28 ביולי, 1988	שר החקלאות		אל: _____
פס' פרוק: _____	מגן - כאן	לשכת רה"מ לשכת שה"ח מצפ"א	דע: _____
המסרד: + תבטחון	ווינגטון		פאת: י. שחורי +
600 603			

פניית משרד סגן הנשיא כוש בנושא הבצורת

התקשרו איתי עתה ממשרד החקלאות. קולובל מינרצ'יק ממשרד סגן הנשיא דבר עימט.  
משרד החקלאות לא מתלהב מהרעיון עצמו, וכמובן גם לא מזה שהמשלחת תהיה בחסותם.  
אמרו שפנו ל-FARMERS BUREAU FEDERATION שיסייעו ברעיון, ובהמשך השיחה אמרו  
שהיו מוכנים לקבל משלחת מקצועית וסיוורים בתחנות נסיונות ובאוניברסיטאות.

הגבתי שלדעתי זו לא היתה הכוונה של מינרצ'יק למשלחת כזו, ובאשר ל-  
FARMERS BUREAU FEDERATION אנחנו בקשר איתם, בעניין ארגון סמינר לתקופה יותר  
מאוחרת. לעצם הרעיון של משרד סגן הנשיא לא התייחסתי, ואמרתי שעודני ממתינה  
לתגובה מהארץ.

בקשתי שלאחר שיודיעו את עמדתם לקולונל מנרצ'יק שיתקשרו עימי. מקוה שעד אז תהיה לי תשובה.

י. שחורי

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$

תפילה: ה

90

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון  
טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1  
דחיפות: מידי  
סוג: גלוי  
תאריך וז"ח: 27 יולי 5100 BB  
מס מברק:  
המשרד: 563

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: לשכת רה"מ  
מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

ארה"ב - אש"ף

בתשובה לשאלת כתב ישראלי לתגובתנו לדברים שאמר ריצרד מרפי כי  
התחייבות ארה"ב מ-1975 לישראל אוסרת על מו"מ אך לא על מפגשים עם  
אנשי אש"ף אמרנו כי !

מאז 1975 הובנה ההתחייבות כאוסרת גם מו"מ וגם מגעים וישראל מקווה  
שלא תהיה שחיקה בהתחייבות האמריקאית בנושא זה, התחייבות המעוגנת  
גם בחקיקה של הקונגרס.

10/1

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המסמך המסמך המסמך המסמך  
2 1 1 1 1





2/18

563

2/18

היו מספר שאלות על אש"פ: מסמך אבו-שריף הופץ לכתחילה אנונימית וכפי שאמרו ביוני, יש טון חדש אך לא ניתן לומר שהמסמך AUTHORITY, עראפת לא סמך ידיו עליו והקיצונים בארגון תקפוהו.

המילטון אמר שיש בארה"ב המבקרים את ארה"ב על כך שהיא מכתילה לפלסטינאים מי ייצג אותם במו"מ, כפי שאינה עושה כלפי אף גורם אחר, ומה הסיבה לכך? מרפי אמר שארה"ב לא תסכים למו"מ עם גורם שנוכחותו תגרום לפרישת ישראל, ואישר שאם כך, השיקול הוא פרגמטי.

לסולרז אישר שאמנם אין ודאות שאש"פ יסכים להשתתף בדו-שיח ישיר או בועידה בינ"ל עם ישראל גם אם ישראל תסכים אך יש די אינדיקציות שאש"פ ירצה להשתתף בועידה בינ"ל (והיו סקנדלים פוליטיים בישראל על פגישות ישראל עם אש"פ שדנו על מה לדון).

בענין אחר אמר שבפסגת אלג'יר דובר על נוסחה לפיה התרומות לאינתיפאדה יחושבו לפי השעורים שנקבעו בבגדד לפני עשור אך הנוסחה לא התקבלה. לא מגיעים כספים רבים ואמנם הארועים הביאו לפגיעה בכלכלת ישראל, אך בשטחים, שאין פיצוי על אובדן עבודה, הלחץ מורגש יותר.

תהליך השלום כמעט ולא נדון. בתגובה לשאלת המילטון (האם הוא "מת") אמר מרפי שיזמת המזכיר הינה האופציה היחידה על הפרק. אין לו תכנית ספציפית לנסוע לאזור אך יעשה זאת אם יראה שיש טעם. המלך אינו מחוץ לתהליך - אמנם מתוסכל אך אינו יכול להתעלם מהגבול המשותף עם ישראל.

ממש לפני סוף הדיון לחץ המילטון על מרפי עד שהודה שהחלטת הממשלה לגבי יהודי ברה"מ אינה מאפשרת חופש בחירה, אמר שארה"ב דוגלת בחופש בחירה, לארה"ב אין כוונה לשנות תקנות ההגירה באופן שיקנה לעוזבים מעמד פליט.

גם עירק תפסה מקום בהירינג: הוא לא יכול להגדיר לסולרז האם ביחסה לישראל היא "מתונה" או "סרבנית", עפ"י ההגדרה המקובלת. יוכל לומר רק שפקידים עיראקים אומרים שבעבר היו "יותר אש"פ מאש"פ, יותר ויטנאם מויטנאם", אך כעת יקדישו מאמציהם לשיקום. ללנטוס, שהביע זעזוע משתיקת העולם נוכח השימוש שהיא עושה בנשק כימי, והעדר ביקורת כלפיה, שהמשטר נלוצ כמו אירן, אמר שכבן של קצין שנפגע במלחמת העולם הראשונה מגז חרדל הוא מאוד רגיש לנושא, ומעלה אותו, אך החומר הבסיסי הוא בר השגה בשוק העולמי ואינו חושב שיש מדינה המוכרת לעיראק בכוונה תחילה, אצמן יצוי יצא.

לנטוס גם רצה לדעת כיצד ארה"ב מגיבה כלפי פרשת ההברחות המצריות ובאיזה דרג בממצרים ידעו על הנעשה.

גם הפאש' במפרץ וכוונת ארה"ב לצמצם כוחותיה אח"כ, הפיצויים למשפחות הרוגי המטוס האירני והנעשה בלבנון (מי שיבחר לא יהיה בהכרח בובה סורית, הסכנה לישראל דווקא מחוסר היציבות שם, האינדיקציות שהחטופים חיים וכולם בלבנון) נדונו, וכמו תמיד, הסטינגרים הנמצאים בידי קטר שאיש לא יודע כיצד הגיעו ומה מספרם.

למה יצא  
טובה הרצל

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I am pleased to come before you once again for this update. We have significant new regional developments to discuss -- particularly in the Persian Gulf. I believe that the consistent and steady U.S. policy there over the past eighteen months has begun to bear fruit. I want to also bring you up to date on our efforts toward Arab-Israeli peace and will welcome any other questions of interest to you.

#### IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 a week ago represents a watershed in the history of the Gulf War. With the personal approval of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's willingness to seek a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war is the authoritative signal which the outside world has been waiting for. In the year since the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 598, there has been extended debate and controversy over the question of Iran's aims -- which really came down to the basic question: was Iran ready for peace? There have been differences of opinion, but we have held that Iran's public, explicit and authoritative acceptance of 598 was required to demonstrate a real commitment to negotiation. We now have that confirmation.


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Because of the special interest which this Subcommittee has shown toward our Gulf policy, I would like briefly to step back and review the reasons I believe Iran has finally made this dramatic -- and historic -- move. I submit that U.S. steadfastness and toughness, in combination with pressures brought to bear on Iran by many countries, played a significant role in creating an environment in which the top Iranian leadership decided to opt for a negotiated peace.

It is safe to infer from Ayatollah Khomeini's lengthy statement, as well as other public comments by senior Iranians, that Iran's internal deterioration -- military, political and economic -- had reached such a state that they assessed that continued pursuit of the war would place the Islamic revolution at risk. They presumably still hope and intend to export the revolution -- but by non-military means. The impact of this Iranian decision will have a ripple effect in the region -- both in the Gulf and in Lebanon as well as other areas of the world where post-revolutionary Iran has sought to spread its worldview. We will have to watch and assess carefully what comes next, but there seems little doubt the Khomeini statement marks a watershed.

The two-track policy we have been following paid dividends. First, there was our active diplomatic effort aimed





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at ending the war -- launched in the U.N. Security Council in January 1987. The first phase of this effort culminated in the historic, mandatory Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987. Secretary of State Shultz represented the U.S. at the meeting and the President contacted heads of state from other UNSC members to secure their support. Then began for us a year long phase of trying to get Iran to accept 598 and all that it signified: an end to the war and negotiations which addressed the basic concerns of both belligerents.

When it became clear that Iran would not accept 598, we pressed for a follow-up resolution -- to penalize Iran through an arms embargo for its unwillingness to accept and implement 598. The Soviet Union and China, however, delayed, and would not agree to join in an arms embargo. Nonetheless, our campaign -- maintained through our own arms embargo, Operation Staunch -- encouraged other governments to press Iran to negotiate and kept the diplomatic focus on Iran's unwillingness to negotiate. And it helped the Secretary General's effort to flesh out his own plans for the implementation of 598.

On a second track along with this sustained diplomatic effort, the President put our Navy on the line in the Gulf escorting U.S. flag vessels. This arrangement, initially controversial to some of the Congress and elements of the

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American public, gradually won general acceptance. Our leadership and steadfastness inspired other NATO allies to play a role in the Gulf to the point where their vessels came to outnumber our own. In coordination with five European Allies and the Gulf Cooperation Council states we stood firm against Iranian provocations -- including minelaying in international waters, missile and gunboat attacks -- all part of a more generalized effort by Iran to intimidate and coerce governments friendly to us.

Following both tracks, we demonstrated that the U.S. was a dependable friend and ally. We succeeded. Not only did Iran not dare to use its silkworm missiles at the Strait of Hormuz and scale back its reported plans for laying mines, but over the past four months the number of Iranian ship attacks fell to half what it was in the first three months of the year. Our friends and allies took risks along with us, and we can say today that the risks have paid off.

#### NEXT STEPS

To secure implementation of Resolution 598 is a complex challenge. 598 establishes a solid and fair basis for a negotiated settlement. It is not an anti-Iranian platform. It promises to meet Iranian needs as long as Iran is sincere in looking for a negotiated and comprehensive end to the war.

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598 demands a cease-fire on all fronts -- land, sea and air and a withdrawal of forces to international borders. It also calls for an exchange of prisoners, the establishment of an impartial body to investigate responsibility for the conflict, and efforts to begin the task of reconstructing and rehabilitating the economies of Iran and Iraq. 598 also calls for negotiations between Iraq and Iran to "achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues."

Iran's acceptance last week of Resolution 598 does not appear to be a tactical decision designed to buy time, but rather a strategic choice to end the war. Nevertheless, the war is not over. Difficult negotiations lie ahead. We support the efforts of the Secretary General to get these negotiations started and will use our influence to bring about a comprehensive peace. During the negotiations, there is a provision for U.N. observers to help maintain the cease-fire. A U.N. survey team has already been sent to prepare for such and observer force. We strongly support it and are examining together with the U.N. and other governments means of financing it.

598 must be implemented as an integral whole. We do not support a temporary cease-fire. We support a full accounting

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for all prisoners of war on both sides and their voluntary repatriation as soon as possible. Iran's decision to drop its demand that Iraq be condemned for initiating the conflict as precondition for implementation of the resolution is deeply significant. We believe the impartial body called for in 598 should be established and should begin to inquire into responsibility for the conflict in a balanced and deliberate manner. Finally, we are urging Iraq to exercise military restraint so that this opportunity is not lost.

#### U.S. GULF ROLE

We intend to stay the course in the Gulf. We have always said that the size of our naval deployment in the Gulf is a reflection of the ongoing threat to civilian shipping. We want to return to our traditional presence in the Gulf. Until the cease-fire is established and sustained, we will continue to escort U.S.-flag vessels and under certain circumstances we will assist friendly, neutral vessels in distress.

The same vital national interests which dictated the commitment of our large naval deployment to the Gulf argue that our disengagement be gradual and directly linked to a reduction in the level of tension and anxiety. I want to underscore, however, that our strategic interests in the Gulf are long-term

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and require active engagement. We will maintain a naval presence in the Gulf as long as our interests require it.

Those interests also dictate that we sustain the current high level of cooperation with friendly Gulf Arab states, continue to improve our relations with Iraq and, over time, re-establish a more normal relationship with Iran. We can pursue all these efforts simultaneously but success will depend on our ability to meet the security needs of our friends. Insecurity and anxiety will stay at high levels in the Gulf region for the foreseeable future.

U.S. ARMS SALES TO GULF STATES: KUWAIT F-18s

This brings me to a subject of special interest to this Subcommittee. Many of you heard directly the views of a senior Gulf Arab leader, the Prime Minister of Kuwait, two weeks ago when he discussed the war, the U.S.-Kuwait relationship and Kuwait's desire to purchase fighter aircraft from the U.S. You have before you for markup and referral to the full House Foreign Affairs Committee a Resolution of Disapproval which seeks to bar the sale to Kuwait of nearly \$1.9 billion in F-18 aircraft, associated munitions and services. I wish to underscore emphatically the view of the Reagan Administration

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that passage of this Resolution would undermine our national interests in the Gulf region over the long-term, as well as have an immediate negative impact upon relations with Kuwait.

You are familiar with the justification for the sale. You know of Kuwait's role in the face of Iranian intimidation, and direct attacks over the past several years. You know of the political and logistical support Kuwait has given to our naval deployment in the Gulf. You know of Kuwait's admirably strong record on counter-terrorism. You know of our important financial relations with Kuwait and the prospects for increased trade. You heard the Kuwaiti Prime Minister's direct public endorsement of our current efforts at creating the negotiating context for Arab-Israeli peace talks. This is consistent with Kuwait's long record of advocating diplomacy and moderation to resolve disputes.

The only new element for your consideration is whether the Iranian acceptance of Resolution 598 eliminates the projected threat environment for which Kuwaiti defense planners -- and the United States -- must be prepared. First, even if 598 takes hold permanently, Kuwait will be faced with potential threats. These are well-known and based on familiar history and geography. The fact is that Kuwait has very valuable, strategically located territory to protect and has larger,

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potentially threatening neighbors. The Government of Kuwait has clearly demonstrated its determination to protect its territory, particularly over the last eighteen months. Second, if we are able, as anticipated, to drawdown our naval forces as the 598 process takes hold, it will be even more important for moderate states to be their own first line of defense. Kuwait has indicated it fully intends to take up that responsibility, and wishes to do so with help from us. This attests to the improved political relations which have resulted from the close cooperation of the past year or so, particularly in the military field.

Kuwait wants to purchase the F-18 package from the U.S. as the logical follow-on to its obsolescent A-4's. It wants an advanced aircraft that will meet its needs in the next century. We are the first choice of all potential suppliers of the new aircraft Kuwait will order this year, the Prime Minister has stated. However, let me emphasize an awkward but inescapable reality: when we cannot or will not sell needed defensive equipment to our friends, their requirements do not disappear. And we do not have a monopoly on sophisticated weapons systems. Our friends will seek similar systems elsewhere. The USSR, France, and the United Kingdom have aircraft and missile systems as advanced as the F-18 and Maverick, which they are already selling to states in the

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area. They are only too willing and able to accommodate would-be purchasers. So our unwillingness to provide such equipment not only has the short-term negative impact on our bilateral relations which we have experienced with several countries in the region in recent years, but it undermines and diminishes our influence in the region over the long-term. It also impacts negatively on our own domestic economy in contracts foresworn and jobs forfeited.

The recently announced arms agreement between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia is a concrete reminder that the Arab Gulf states have and will exercise alternatives in meeting their defense needs, if their first choice, the U.S., declares itself unavailable to them. One small silver lining of Saudi Arabia's shifting supply relationship is that it is toward a close U.S. ally -- the United Kingdom. The U.S. is generally supportive of the sales program as presented to us by the British Government. The program addresses the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia. We have informed the British Government of our need to review each sale to determine whether the U.S. components can be included when the British systems are sold to the Saudis. Of course, we would have preferred that the potential \$30 billion, long-term security and political relationship, and estimated 50,000 jobs that were lost had come to this country.

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Such unwillingness on our part also undermines our credibility in the region -- making it more difficult, not less, to deal with Iran and Iraq in the new circumstances created by Iran's acceptance of 598.

#### U.S.- IRAN RELATIONS

There has been much comment and speculation on U.S.-Iran relations since the USS Vincennes regrettably downed Iran Air 655. Our position and policy on relations with Iran have been public and consistent and have not changed. We are ready for direct talks with authoritative official Iranians designated by the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and have so told the Iranians -- publicly and privately. We have welcomed Iran's categorical acceptance of 598.

The US-Iranian relationship is deeply emotional for both sides. Iranian behavior continues to fall short of that required of a responsible state. Iran's decision to accept 598 is an important step. But if Iran wants to be treated as a respected member of the international community, it must end its intimidation of its Gulf neighbors, negotiate a just and lasting settlement of its war with Iraq, and end its support for terrorism and hostage-taking, now, immediately. In the meantime, our offer to talk is on the table.

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THE PEACE PROCESS

Unfortunately, I have no comparable breakthrough or dramatic development to report on the Middle East peace process. There have been some positive signs for the future. Our initiative received sound support from our allies, most recently at the Toronto Summit. The Arab League Summit in Algiers left the door open for movement and, after three trips by Secretary Shultz to the region since January, the parties in the region continue to urge us to pursue our efforts.

A potentially significant development was the distribution at the Algiers Summit of an article entitled "Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement." It was distributed unsigned, but PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif later declared himself to be the author. We are struck by its constructive tone and the positive points it raises, such as its emphasis on the existence of Israel and on the ultimate goal of the Palestinians being to attain lasting peace in which there is security for Israelis and for the Palestinian people. We also note its flat assertion that the conflict can only be solved by direct talks. The paper remains silent, however, on the issue of terrorism, and simply restates the PLO's equivocal position on acceptance of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. It remains to be seen whether this article is authoritative and represents

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the position of the PLC. Yasir Arafat has declined to support the article officially. Salah Khalaf and others have denounced it. This illustrates one of the problems with the PLC. Nonetheless, should events prove this article to have marked the beginning of a responsible, reliable, authoritative and realistic approach by the PLO to the peace process, then it would be welcomed.

Soviet positions on important issues affecting the region, including ties with Israel, emigration levels for Soviet Jewry and on the shape of an international conference, seem to be evolving in a positive direction, although the Soviets have not yet revealed to us their thinking in any detail. I will be meeting with my Soviet counterpart next week to explore their latest thinking on developments in the region, including the peace process.

In the coming months we will remain actively engaged in the peace process. We must do no less. The status quo is unacceptable and shows no sign of improving either in terms of the arms race between regional states or the standoff between Israelis and Palestinians. Progress toward resolving conflicts in Afghanistan and between Iran and Iraq demonstrate that even the most bitter conflicts can be resolved.

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First and foremost we will endeavor to convince the parties to the conflict that their present policies are a dead end street. Our initiative remains compelling. It constitutes a realistic and constructive framework for positive progress by addressing the key principles that must guide the search for peace: UNSC Resolution 242 which embodies the principle of land for peace; the legitimate rights, including political rights, of Palestinians; and security for all states in the region. We have created an opportunity which the parties must seize if they want to resolve the conflict.

Nothing more clearly demonstrates the need for a realistic reassessment of positions by the parties than the situation in the West Bank and Gaza which continues to exact a heavy toll on both Palestinians and Israelis. The uprising, now in its eighth month, shows no signs of ending despite the human, moral and material costs. Violent confrontations continue. The number of deaths and injuries continues to mount. We have repeatedly called for both sides to exercise restraint and to avoid actions that exacerbate tensions. We acknowledge Israel's legitimate security concerns and the need for the preservation of order. At the same time we have raised with the Government of Israel our opposition to excessively harsh practices for humanitarian reasons and also because they are counterproductive to efforts at reconciliation.

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We have no doubt that the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza was caused in large part by a sense that the peace process had stalled.— An end to the violence can best be achieved through the early stages of negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We shall continue to follow developments in the West Bank and Gaza closely and continue our active efforts with the parties to bring about movement toward peace.

#### LEBANESE ELECTIONS

Finally, we are closely following the build-up to the presidential election in Lebanon, where a new president is scheduled to take office September 23. We have been engaged in a dialogue with the Syrian and Lebanese governments to promote elections and reforms. The Administration strongly supports a timely and orderly election so that an orderly, legitimate transition can occur. We are not supporting any specific candidate. We believe the new president, whoever he is, should represent all Lebanese. The new president should also build on the efforts that have been made to reform the Lebanese constitution and promote national reconciliation.

Many Lebanese believe the election offers the last, best chance to end over thirteen years of conflict. The election

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can play a major role in helping restore Lebanon's unity, but the election alone will not be enough. To restore Lebanon's unity sovereignty, and territorial integrity, Lebanon's various militias must disband and all foreign forces must withdraw. This said, a successful election is the first crucial step to restoring stability to Lebanon.

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(Mr. R) A

IRAN'S DECISION SEEN AS VINDICATION OF U.S. POLICY  
(NESA: Text of Murphy congressional statement)

Washington -- America's "steadfastness and toughness" have paid off with Iran's acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, Richard Murphy, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, told Congress.

Murphy, in an appearance before the House Middle East subcommittee July 27, also credited the "pressures brought to bear on Iran by many countries" for getting Iran to negotiate the end of the eight-year-long Gulf war.

He cautioned, however, that "we will have to watch and assess carefully what comes next."

Murphy was confident that Iran means business with its acceptance of Resolution 598. Iran's decision does not appear to be a stalling device, he said, "but rather a strategic choice to end the war." Nevertheless, he stated, "the war is not over. Difficult negotiations lie ahead."

Murphy also commented on:

-- The U.S. Gulf Role: "We will maintain a naval presence in the Gulf as long as our interests require it."

-- U.S. Arms Sales: Referring to a Resolution of Disapproval in the House of Representatives on the Reagan Administration's bid to sell an arms package to Kuwait, Murphy said, "When we cannot or will not sell needed defensive equipment to our friends, their requirements do not disappear...Our friends will seek similar systems elsewhere."

-- U.S.-Iran Relations: "We are ready for direct talks with authoritative official Iranians designated by the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime."

-- The Peace Process: Murphy alluded to the article ("Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement") written by Bassam Abu Sharif, spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization, "We are struck by its constructive tone and the positive points it raises." He also stated: "In the coming months we will remain actively engaged in the peace process. The status quo is unacceptable and shows no sign of improving either in terms of the arms race between regional states or the stand-off between Israelis and Palestinians."

-- Lebanese Elections: "We are not supporting any specific candidate."

Following is the text of Murphy's prepared statement for the subcommittee:

(begin text)

I am pleased to come before you once again for this update. We have significant new regional developments to discuss -- particularly in the Gulf. I believe that the consistent and steady U.S. policy there over the past eighteen months has begun to bear fruit. I want to also bring you up to date on our efforts toward Arab-Israeli peace and will welcome any other questions of interest to you.

#### IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 a week ago represents a watershed in the history of the Gulf War. With the personal approval



of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's willingness to seek a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war is the authoritative signal which the outside world has been waiting for. In the year since the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 598, there has been extended debate and controversy over the question of Iran's aims -- which really came down to the basic question: was Iran ready for peace? There have been differences of opinion, but we have held that Iran's public, explicit and authoritative acceptance of 598 was required to demonstrate a real commitment to negotiation. We now have that confirmation.

Because of the special interest which this Subcommittee has shown toward our Gulf policy, I would like briefly to step back and review the reasons I believe Iran has finally made this dramatic -- and historic -- move. I submit that U.S. steadfastness and toughness, in combination with pressures brought to bear on Iran by many countries, played a significant role in creating an environment in which the top Iranian leadership decided to opt for a negotiated peace.

It is safe to infer from Ayatollah Khomeini's lengthy statement, as well as other public comments by senior Iranians, that Iran's internal deterioration -- military, political and economic -- had reached such a state that they assessed that continued pursuit of the war would place the Islamic revolution at risk. They presumably still hope and intend to export the revolution -- but by non-military means.

The impact of this Iranian decision will have a ripple effect in the region -- both in the Gulf and in Lebanon as well as other areas of the world where post-revolutionary Iran has sought to spread its worldview. We will have to watch and assess carefully what comes next, but there seems little doubt the Khomeini statement marks a watershed.

The two-track policy we have been following paid dividends. First, there was our active diplomatic effort aimed at ending the war -- launched in the U.N. Security Council in January 1987. The first phase of this effort culminated in the historic, mandatory Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987. Secretary of State Shultz represented the U.S. at the meeting and the President contacted heads of state from other UN Security Council members to secure their support. Then began for us a year-long phase of trying to get Iran to accept 598 and all that it signified: an end to the war and negotiations which addressed the basic concerns of both belligerents.

When it became clear that Iran would not accept 598, we pressed for a follow-up resolution -- to penalize Iran through an arms embargo for its unwillingness to accept and implement 598. The Soviet Union and China, however, delayed, and would not agree to join in an arms embargo. Nonetheless, our campaign -- maintained through our own arms embargo, Operation Staunch -- encouraged other governments to press Iran to negotiate and kept the diplomatic focus on Iran's unwillingness to negotiate. And it helped the Secretary General's effort to flesh out his own plans for the implementation of 598.

On a second track along with this sustained diplomatic effort, the President put our Navy on the line in the Gulf escorting U.S. flag vessels. This arrangement, initially controversial to some of the Congress and elements of the American public, gradually won general acceptance. Our leadership and steadfastness inspired other NATO allies to play a role in the Gulf to the point where their vessels

came to outnumber our own. In coordination with five European Allies and the Gulf Cooperation Council states we stood firm against Iranian provocations -- including minelaying in international waters, missile and gunboat attacks -- all part of a more generalized effort by Iran to intimidate and coerce governments friendly to us.

Following both tracks, we demonstrated that the U.S. was a dependable friend and ally. We succeeded. Not only did Iran not dare to use its Silkworm missiles at the Strait of Hormuz and scale back its reported plans for laying mines, but over the past four months the number of Iranian ship attacks fell to half what it was in the first three months of the year. Our friends and allies took risks along with us, and we can say today that the risks have paid off.

#### NEXT STEPS

To secure implementation of Resolution 598 is a complex challenge. 598 establishes a solid and fair basis for a negotiated settlement. It is not an anti-Iranian platform. It promises to meet Iranian needs as long as Iran is sincere in looking for a negotiated and comprehensive end to the war.

598 demands a cease-fire on all fronts -- land, sea and air and a withdrawal of forces to international borders. It also calls for an exchange of prisoners, the establishment of an impartial body to investigate responsibility for the conflict, and efforts to begin the task of reconstructing and rehabilitating the economies of Iran and Iraq. 598 also calls for negotiations between Iraq and Iran to "achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues."

Iran's acceptance last week of Resolution 598 does not appear to be a tactical decision designed to buy time, but rather a strategic choice to end the war. Nevertheless, the war is not over. Difficult negotiations lie ahead. We support the efforts of the Secretary General to get these negotiations started and will use our influence to bring about a comprehensive peace. During the negotiations, there is a provision for U.N. observers to help maintain the cease-fire. A U.N. survey team has already been sent to prepare for such an observer force. We strongly support it and are examining together with the U.N. and other governments means of financing it.

598 must be implemented as an integral whole. We do not support a temporary cease-fire. We support a full accounting for all prisoners of war on both sides and their voluntary repatriation as soon as possible. Iran's decision to drop its demand that Iraq be condemned for initiating the conflict as a precondition for implementation of the resolution is deeply significant. We believe the impartial body called for in 598 should be established and should begin to inquire into responsibility for the conflict in a balanced and deliberate manner. Finally, we are urging Iraq to exercise military restraint so that this opportunity is not lost.

#### U.S. GULF ROLE

We intend to stay the course in the Gulf. We have always said that the size of our naval deployment in the Gulf is a reflection of the ongoing threat to civilian shipping. We want to return to our traditional presence in the Gulf. Until the cease-fire is established and sustained, we will continue to escort U.S.-flag vessels and under



certain circumstances we will assist friendly, neutral vessels in distress.

The same vital national interests which dictated the commitment of our large naval deployment to the Gulf argue that our disengagement be gradual and directly linked to a reduction in the level of tension and anxiety. I want to underscore, however, that our strategic interests in the Gulf are long-term and require active engagement. We will maintain a naval presence in the Gulf as long as our interests require it.

Those interests also dictate that we sustain the current high level of cooperation with friendly Gulf Arab states, continue to improve our relations with Iraq and, over time, re-establish a more normal relationship with Iran. We can pursue all these efforts simultaneously but success will depend on our ability to meet the security needs of our friends. Insecurity and anxiety will stay at high levels in the Gulf region for the foreseeable future.

#### U.S. ARMS SALES TO GULF STATES: KUWAIT F-18s

This brings me to a subject of special interest to this Subcommittee. Many of you heard directly the views of a senior Gulf Arab leader, the Prime Minister of Kuwait, two weeks ago when he discussed the war, the U.S.-Kuwait relationship and Kuwait's desire to purchase fighter aircraft from the U.S. You have before you for markup and referral to the full House Foreign Affairs Committee a Resolution of Disapproval which seeks to bar the sale to Kuwait of nearly 1.9 billion dollars in F-18 aircraft, associated munitions and services. I wish to underscore emphatically the view of the Reagan Administration that passage of this Resolution would undermine our national interests in the Gulf region over the long-term, as well as have an immediate negative impact upon relations with Kuwait.

You are familiar with the justification for the sale. You know of Kuwait's role in the face of Iranian intimidation, and direct attacks over the past several years. You know of the political and logistical support Kuwait has given to our naval deployment in the Gulf. You know of Kuwait's admirably strong record on counter-terrorism. You know of our important financial relations with Kuwait and the prospects for increased trade. You heard the Kuwaiti Prime Minister's direct public endorsement of our current efforts at creating the negotiating context for Arab-Israeli peace talks. This is consistent with Kuwait's long record of advocating diplomacy and moderation to resolve disputes.

The only new element for your consideration is whether the Iranian acceptance of Resolution 598 eliminates the projected threat environment for which Kuwaiti defense planners -- and the United States -- must be prepared. First, even if 598 takes hold permanently, Kuwait will be faced with potential threats. These are well-known and based on familiar history and geography. The fact is that Kuwait has very valuable, strategically located territory to protect and has larger, potentially threatening neighbors. The Government of Kuwait has clearly demonstrated its determination to protect its territory, particularly over the last eighteen months. Second, if we are able, as anticipated, to drawdown our naval forces as the 598 process takes hold, it will be even more important for moderate states to be their own first line of defense. Kuwait has



indicated it fully intends to take up that responsibility, and wishes to do so with help from us. This attests to the improved political relations which have resulted from the close cooperation of the past year or so, particularly in the military field.

Kuwait wants to purchase the F-18 package from the U.S. as the logical follow-on to its obsolescent A-4's. It wants an advanced aircraft that will meet its needs in the next century. We are the first choice of all potential suppliers of the new aircraft Kuwait will order this year, the Prime Minister has stated. However, let me emphasize an awkward but inescapable reality: When we cannot or will not sell needed defensive equipment to our friends, their requirements do not disappear. And we do not have a monopoly on sophisticated weapons systems. Our friends will seek similar systems elsewhere. The USSR, France and the United Kingdom have aircraft and missile systems as advanced as the F-18 and Maverick, which they are already selling to states in the area. They are only too willing and able to accommodate would-be purchasers. So our unwillingness to provide such equipment not only has the short-term negative impact on our bilateral relations which we have experienced with several countries in the region in recent years, but it undermines and diminishes our influence in the region over the long-term. It also impacts negatively on our own domestic economy in contracts foresworn and jobs forfeited.

The recently announced arms agreement between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia is a concrete reminder that the Arab Gulf states have and will exercise alternatives in meeting their defense needs, if their first choice, the U.S., declares itself unavailable to them. One small silver lining of Saudi Arabia's shifting supply relationship is that it is toward a close U.S. ally -- the United Kingdom. The U.S. is generally supportive of the sales programs as presented to us by the British government. The program addresses the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia. We have informed the British government of our need to review each sale to determine whether the U.S. components can be included when the British systems are sold to the Saudis. Of course, we would have preferred that the potential 30 billion dollar, long-term security and political relationship, and estimated 50,000 jobs that were lost had come to this country.

Such unwillingness on our part also undermines our credibility in the region -- making it more difficult, not less, to deal with Iran and Iraq in the new circumstances created by Iran's acceptance of 598.

#### U.S.- IRAN RELATIONS

There has been much comment and speculation on U.S.-Iran relations since the USS Vincennes regrettably downed Iran Air 655. Our position and policy on relations with Iran have been public and consistent and have not changed. We are ready for direct talks with authoritative official Iranians designated by the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and have so told the Iranians -- publicly and privately. We have welcomed Iran's categorical acceptance of 598.

The U.S.-Iranian relationship is deeply emotional for both sides. Iranian behavior continues to fall short of that required of a responsible state. Iran's decision to accept 598 is an important step. But if Iran wants to be treated as a respected member of the international community, it must end its intimidation of its Gulf neighbors, negotiate a just and lasting settlement of its war with



Iraq, and end its support for terrorism and hostage-taking, now, immediately. In the meantime, our offer to talk is on the table.

#### THE PEACE PROCESS

Unfortunately, I have no comparable breakthrough or dramatic development to report on the Middle East peace process. There have been some positive signs for the future. Our initiative received sound support from our allies, most recently at the Toronto summit. The Arab League Summit in Algiers left the door open for movement and, after three trips by Secretary Shultz to the region since January, the parties in the region continue to urge us to pursue our efforts.

A potentially significant development was the distribution at the Algiers Summit of an article entitled "Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement." It was distributed unsigned, but PLO spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif later declared himself to be the author. We are struck by its constructive tone and the positive points it raises, such as its emphasis on the existence of Israel and on the ultimate goal of the Palestinians being to attain lasting peace in which there is security for Israelis and for the Palestinian people. We also note its flat assertion that the conflict can only be solved by direct talks. The paper remains silent, however, on the issue of terrorism, and simply restates the PLO's equivocal position on acceptance of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. It remains to be seen whether this article is authoritative and represents the position of the PLO. Yasir Arafat has declined to support the article officially. Salah Khalaf and others have denounced it. This illustrates one of the problems with the PLO. Nonetheless, should events prove this article to have marked the beginning of a responsible, reliable, authoritative and realistic approach by the PLO to the peace process, then it would be welcomed.

Soviet positions on important issues affecting the region, including ties with Israel, emigration levels for Soviet Jewry and on the shape of an international conference, seem to be evolving in a positive direction, although the Soviets have not yet revealed to us their thinking in any detail. I will be meeting with my Soviet counterpart next week to explore their latest thinking on developments in the region, including the peace process.

In the coming months we will remain actively engaged in the peace process. We must do no less. The status quo is unacceptable and shows no sign of improving either in terms of the arms race between regional states or the standoff between Israelis and Palestinians. Progress toward resolving conflicts in Afghanistan and between Iran and Iraq demonstrate that even the most bitter conflicts can be resolved.

First and foremost we will endeavor to convince the parties to the conflict that their present policies are a dead-end street. Our initiative remains compelling. It constitutes a realistic and constructive framework for positive progress by addressing the key principles that must guide the search for peace: UN Security Council Resolution 242 which embodies the principle of land for peace; the legitimate rights, including political rights, of Palestinians; and security for all states in the region. We have created an opportunity which the parties must seize if they want to resolve the conflict.

Nothing more clearly demonstrates the need for a realistic reassessment of positions by the parties than the situation in the West Bank and Gaza which continues to exact a heavy toll on both Palestinians and Israelis. The uprising, now in its eighth month, shows no signs of ending despite the human, moral and material costs. Violent confrontations continue. The number of deaths and injuries continues to mount. We have repeatedly called for both sides to exercise restraint and to avoid actions that exacerbate tensions. We acknowledge Israel's legitimate security concerns and the need for the preservation of order. At the same time we have raised with the Government of Israel our opposition to excessively harsh practices for humanitarian reasons and also because they are counterproductive to efforts at reconciliation.

We have no doubt that the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza was caused in large part by a sense that the peace process had stalled. An end to the violence can best be achieved through the early stages of negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We shall continue to follow developments in the West Bank and Gaza closely and continue our active efforts with the parties to bring about movement toward peace.

#### LEBANESE ELECTIONS

Finally, we are closely following the build-up to the presidential election in Lebanon, where a new president is scheduled to take office September 23. We have been engaged in a dialogue with the Syrian and Lebanese governments to promote elections and reforms. The Administration strongly supports a timely and orderly election so that an orderly, legitimate transition can occur. We are not supporting any specific candidate. We believe the new president, whoever he is, should represent all Lebanese. The new president should also build on the efforts that have been made to reform the Lebanese constitution and promote national reconciliation.

Many Lebanese believe the election offers the last, best chance to end over thirteen years of conflict. The election can play a major role in helping restore Lebanon's unity, but the election alone will not be enough. To restore Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, Lebanon's various militias must disband and all foreign forces must withdraw. This said, a successful election is the first crucial step to restoring stability to Lebanon.

(end text)

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(Following FS material not for publication)

ADD NEWS ROUNDUP, JULY 27

WEAPONS USED IN CRUISE SHIP ATTACK CAME FROM LIBYA --

The Greek government July 27 confirmed news stories that the weapons used by terrorists to attack a Greek day cruise ship two weeks ago came from Libya. The Greek government, however, does not hold the Libyan government responsible, the Greek public order minister said.

The minister, Anastassios Sehiotis, said that the Beretta automatic pistols found on the ship were sold to Libya by the Italian manufacturer in 1975 and 1976. A Browning revolver linked to the attack on City of Poros was sold to Libya by Belgium in 1980, the minister said.

Greek police said earlier that Hejab Jeballa, who was identified as the leader of the terrorists, was traveling on a Libyan passport. Greece announced that it is setting up an anti-terrorist squad of 200 men to combat terrorism aboard Greek cruise ships. Nine people were killed and 80 wounded in the attack on the City of Poros.

DOW OFF 20.27 POINTS --

The Dow Jones average of 30 industrials was down 20.27 points to close at 2,053.70 July 27.

(Preceding FS material not for publication)

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דחיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
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כס' פרוק: הפסיד:		דע:
554		כא: דני בלור, וושינגטון

## בחירות 88

במשאלים נוספים שלאחר הועידה הדמוקרטית גול הפער לטובת דוקקים עד ל - 17%. משאל גאלופ האחרון מראה על 54% תומכים בדוקקים ו-37% בבוש. קרוב ל-60% סבורים שבחירת בנטסן לסגן נשיא היא בחירה טובה, ו-48% סבורים שדוקקים נהג בצורה נבונה בג'קסון 17% סבורים שויתר לג'קסון יותר מידי ו-15% סבורים שויתר לנ פחות מידי.

בינתיים התחיל בוש בחפוש רשמי אחר מועמד לסגן-נשיא. הוא לא יראיין אישית את המועמדים, כיוון שהוא מכיר את כולם היטב, אלא ינהל תחקיר באמצעות עוזרים ויועצים, וכן יערכו עבורו סקרים כדי לבחון מידת פופולריות שלחם באזורים ומגזרים שונים. מטה בוש לא פרט רשמית את רשימת הכבדקים, אך אל השמות שהוזכרו במבוקי אתמול (קמפ, רוברט דול, אליזבט דול, אלן סימפסון והמושל דוקמינג'יאן) יש להוסיף את מושל ניו-המפשייר ג'ון טאנונו והסנאטורית ננסי קסנבאום, אם כי סיכוייהם לא נחשבים כגדולים. המושל טאנונו ידוע כמקורב לארגונים הערכיים ואף סירב לחתום על הצהרה בגנות החלטת האכ"ס על עירנות-גזענות.

הרפובליקנים גם מודאגים מהגידול בפער לטובת דוקקים, כמה מיועציהם סבורים שעל בוש לא לחכות עד הועידה הרפובליקנית ולהתחיל לבנות את תדמיתו העצמאית באופן אקטיבי. הם גם מקווים להתפתחויות דראמטיות בזמן הקרוב שיעזרו לבוש, כגון שחרור בכי הערובה האמריקניים בלבנון.

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תפוצה: 23









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פתוק: 1		סוג: ש מ ו ר
אל: מ צ פ " א		תאריך וזמן תגובה: 26.7.88 - 19:00
דף: 1		פס' פדוק: הפסד:
פאת: ק ו נ ג ר ס		546

פגישת השגריר - הסנטור ביל כהן 26.7.

רפובליקני ממין, חבר בוועדה לשירותים מזוניים, נכח עוזרו קריסטופר מלון.

החל <sup>הפגיש</sup> לסקור ארועי תחודשים האחרונים וכשצלצל פעמון ההצבעות שהעיד על קיצור הפגישה ביקש כהן לשנות את הנושא.

לדבריו, אין כעת בעיה בין ישראל לארה"ב בכל הנוגע לטיפול בטרוריסטים אך יש נושא מעיב אחר והוא - נשק למדינות ערב. מצטיירת תמונה ולפיה איפא"ק מנהל את הקונגרס. ע"י העדר אבחנה לגבי איום על ישראל, יוצאים כולם מופסדים, ויש לנושא פוטנציאל לתקוע טריז בין המדינות. לכן צריך למנוע את התגובה הרפלקסיבית השלילית לכל עסקה - כאשר יצרני הנשק יעמדו בפני פיתורים המוניים, יאשימו את ישראל. זה לא יקרה בשבועות הקרובים אך יש להתמודד עם הבעיה - אם אלו התחששות בקונגרס, הן יתפשטו.

השגריר העיר שאנחנו רגישים לנושא וכהן המשיך שתהליך מחוץ לשליטתנו - נוצרת דינמיקה הפועלת מאליה. השגריר השיב שמתוך הכרה בהתפתחות זו ובהיות לארה"ב אינטרסים אחרים, הוא עבור שיש למצוא דרך להבהיר עמדות ישראל.

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תפוצה: 23



דחיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: ש מ ר		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן חצור: 26.7.88 - 20:00		אל: מ צ פ " א
כס' פרוק: הפסד: 547	1/3	דע:
		כאת: ק ו נ ג ר ס

שיחת השגריר-הסנטור פול סרביינס, 26.7.

הנ"ל, דמוקרט ממרילנד, יו"ר ועדת המשנה למז"ת, ממוצא יווני וחבר קרוב של מייקל דוקקיס מימי לימודיהם המשותפים בהרברד. השיחה נסבה על הועידה הדמוקרטית והמועמד סרביינס התבטא בחופשיות ודבריו מובאים בפרוט, השיחה שנמשכה קרוב לשעה, בנוכחות עוזרו לענייני חוץ, דיאנה אולבאום.

בחושה לשאלת השגריר האם ובאיזו מידה עלינו <sup>אולי מוצאם להיות</sup> הועידה השיב סרביינס שמקור הדאגה צריך להיות ממה שקדם לה - האופן שבו דוגבי ושות' פעלו במדינות; אין זה נכון שהיו זוכים לו היתה הצבעה - להיפך, התבוסה היתה צפויה להיות גדולה מאשר לגבי הנושאים האחרים. אין להסיק שיש מקום לשינוי בסיסי אך יש מקום לפעולה ב- grassroots באיזורים שהוזנחו בעבר. המושל ואנשיו התנגדו לכל שינוי במצע, לרבות חצעה שדממה לק.ד. כי עצם השינוי היה מתפרש כנצחון לאנשי ג'קסון. הכוחות הפרו-ערבים פעלו בחכמה כאשר ביקשו לכלול במצע לשון שאחד הארגונים היהודים ניצל בהתבטאות פומבית. אין ספק שתפקוד הכוחות הללו חשפת, אם מעצמם או מייעוץ משופר, אך הקובע הוא הנשיא בשיתוף הקונגרס ובממשל דוקקיס הנושא שלנו will firm up: דוקקיס "חזק" בנושא הזה, כמו מקורביו בקונגרס.

אולם כל תקרית ובה נהוגים אנשים מצריכה שוב התמודדות. הפתרון הקל הוא לומר שיש להתמקד לבחירות בשתי המדינות, אולם לא יהיה טוב אם המצב יימשך אח"כ. לדברי השגריר ולפיהם יש להניח שכל ממשל עתידי ינסה להתמודד עם הנושא בדחיפות מסויימת ובעדיפות השיב המארח שזו עמדה נכונה אם בהתייחסות עם ישראל יראה כצעד נכון. פרופיל גבוה בלא תוצאות אינו רצוי, עלול להעמיד את ישראל באור עיקש. נראה לו שבישראל הקו הדוגל ביד חזקה גובר, ואולי עדיף להיות כנים ולומר מראש מה השורה התחתונה. כך לדוגמא לגבי ירושלים ועמדת דוקקיס - יתכן והעמדה תקשה על הגעה

תפוצה: 23 - שם החלף לשם א"א ב"ן 1031 חלופה אחת

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דחיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
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למו"מ אך אם תוודע מלכתחילה תקל על התקדמותו. ארה"ב תמיד נטתה להשאיר תביעות הקשות למו"מ, ואולי אין זה דרך נכונה.

סרביינס שב בדבריו לוועידה. תהה האם הטיפול היה נכון - שומר מאד התרגש במליאה ולרבים מצירי ג'קסון חסרה השכלה כך שהם רואים רק את הנסוח "הגדרה עצמית", מבלי לראות הסכנה לישראל. כאמור, הנזק לא מאד גדול אבל יש חשש מפגיעה ביחסי שחורים-יהודים וחשוב לטפח הקבוצות העוסקות בדו-קיום במישור זה. זה מתקשר לענין הדראפ"י: אין הבנה לאילנצי היות שם אוכלוסיה יהודית וישראל אמנם נקטה צעדים (השגריר - כמו אירופה) אולם זהו נושא מרכזי בקהילה? ממשל דוקקים יפעל כלפי האפרטהייד ותעולם השלישי, ויתכן שבכך יהיה כלי לישראל לחזור למדינות הללו.

לשאלת השגריר על תפקיד אפשרי לג'קסון השיב סרביינס שכעת אין לו. בהנחה שימלא תפקיד פעיל במרוץ לבחירות יש להניח שיקבל. יש שהיו רוצים לראות אותו מקבל תפקיד ~~בממשלה~~ <sup>בממשלה</sup> ~~עסקים~~, אין להניח שדוקקים יפעל כלפי פלג כה גדול באוכלוסיה רק באמצעות מנהיג שהכתיר עצמו כאשר יש אחרים (מנה את הקונגרסנים רנגל וגריי וראשי עיר - ברדלי, יאנג) שהם מנהיגים נבחרים. ג'קסון לא יוכל לפעול נגד מעמד שדוקקים יקנה להם, שכן יעורר עליו מחשבות כמי שפועל רק למען עצמו ולא למען הקהילה. דוקקים היה מאד זהיר ותקיף באטלנטה והסכימו שלקבוצה רק קפטן אחד. עם היתר יצטרכו להתמודד אחרי הבחירות, אבל אז נקודת המוצא תהיה אחרת. ברונסט הוא *tough negotiator*, ונאמן למייקל, שלו יכולת רבה ולעיתים אין מעריכים אותו דיו.

כהוכחה לכך הביא את נאום המושל במליאה, שהפתיע, גם אותו, את סרביינס, מאשימים אותו סגנון פוליטי כמו את דוקקים: *reserved and low key* וגם הוא עצמו יכול לשאת נאום רגשני. אך יש לזכור שבתיותם סטודנטים בשנות הוואשינגטון לימודי הסטוריה הוקדשו לצמיחת הטוטליטריות בעשורים הקודמים, למדו שצריך להזהר.

תפוצה:

דף: 3	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זחילות: מ י ד י
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אל:		תאריך וזמן מעור:
דע:		כס' פרוק:
כאח:	3/75	הפסד:

מ- *emotion and passion* (חזר על הביטוי מספר פעמים) הנתפסים כאוייבי הדמוקרטיה, וההגיון יודו.

לשאלת השגריר כיצד, בוכה הנ"ל, נראה נאום ג'קסון השיב דוקקיס שהנאום היה חזק אך לא פוליטי. זהו נאום של *preacher* והוא תמה שהעיתונות אינה מבקרת על כך. הופעת ילדיו היתה מרשימה.

לגבי ג'קסון, דוקקיס די חכם שידע לנצל הכוח הטמון בג'קסון אך כאמור, הקונגרסמן גריי נראה כבחירה טבעית לממשל ואם אמנם יקבל המעמד הראוי לו, הדרישה להעניק לג'קסון תפקיד חרד. תומכיו בגבעה יהיו שבעי רצון אם יקבל תפקיד הקשור לסמים. הוא סבור שה- *leverage* של ג'קסון היה בשיא בעת הועידה. המתיחויות ימשכו, אך בלי האיום. ג'קסון עצמו מרגיש מחויבות לזוגבי ושות', שתמכו בו מתחילה.

השגריר ציין שהמצב יחייב אותנו להשקיע מאמצים מסוג חדש וסרביינס הגיב שעל ישראל להיות יותר *anticipatory* - להעריך מגמות צפויות ולהערך בהתאם. בתום השיחה שאל סרביינס על מצב ההגירה מברית"מ והשגריר השיב קצרות.

טובה הרצל  
טובה כיצ

תפוצה:



- ש מ ר -

הקונסוליה הכללית של  
ישראל בניו יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL  
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

י"ב באב תשמ"ח  
26 ביולי 1988  
893-1

800 SECOND AVENUE  
NEW YORK N.Y. 10017

OXFORD 7-5500

77

אל : מנהל מצפ"א

מאת : שרה בראור, ניו-יורק

הנדון: ועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית באטלנטה - 18-21/7

נפגשתי עם מיכאל מילר, ה-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, של ה-JCRC, שהשתתף במשלחת יחד עם איפ"ק וה-NJCRC, במשלחת היהודית לאטלנטה.

אמנה כמה מהתרשמויות והערות<sup>16</sup> על ההתארגנות היהודית בניו-יורק בכל הקשור בגיבוש מצע המפלגה בדנבר בראשית החודש; שנית, אמסור את האובסרבציות שלו על מה שהתרחש באטלנטה במהלך הועידה.

לגבי גיבוש מצע המפלגה, האיש המרכזי למתן אינפורמציה למחנה דוקאקיס מטעם הקהילה היהודית בניו-יורק היה הפרקליט היהודי ROBERT ABRAMS. קשר נוסף היה נשיא רובע מנהטן דוד דינקס וקונגרסמן צארלס רינגל, אך לדעתו של מילר אלה שיחקו משחק כפול. האיש המקורב מאד לדוקאקיס הוא קונגרסמן שומר. גם שאר ארבעת אנשי הקונגרס מניו-יורק שימשו כלוביסטים אבל, מילר לא יכול לפרט בדיוק מה היתה תרומתם.

לגבי הועידה עצמה. לדעת מילר ל-AME ZOGBY, שהוא EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR של ה-ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, היתה תשומה מרשימה ביותר. הוא הצליח להבריג עצמו להיות COCHAIRMAN FOR J. JACKSON CAMPAIGN, נעשה חבר קרוב של ג'קסון והאיש שמימן את הבחירות המוקדמות שלו, אף כי אין ראיות לאמירה זו, אין איש מטיל ספק בכך.

באשר לאובסרבציות שלו על שנעשה בוועידה. כמה הערות: ראשית לדעתו ג'ימס אובי הצליח לקצור את הזרע ששתל. הפעילות הערבית דרך מחנה ג'קסון היתה שקטה אינטנסיבית וכשהיה צריך אגרסיבית. הקהילה היהודית היתה עסוקה במלחמות היהודים כמו ויתור על שטחים, ועידה בינ"ל ולא הבחינה במתרחש. האג'נדה של זוגבי חילחלה בכוח הרטוריקה של ג'קסון והפכה לנחלתם של רבים חברי האיגודים המקצועיים.



הנורא ביותר התרחש באולם בעת שהועלה הנושא המזהה"י. סנטור אינוי וקונגרסמן שומר נאצו לרדת מהכמה בשל קריאות הכוז המאורגנות של אוהדי ג'קסון-זוגבי, ולא יכלו להשמיע את העמדה המצדקת בישראל.

שלישית, את אנשי המפלגה הדמוקרטית העסיק נושא אחד, UNITY - הם רצו הצגה שבו הימין, המרכז והשמאל משתלבים בהרמוניה למען הצגת האחדות לקראת בחירת נשיא דמוקרטי בנובמבר. כל שאר נושאי המחלוקת נפתרו בפשרות בחדרי חדרים או בהצבעה או דחיה באולם.

באשר לאישיותו של ג'קסון והאפשרות שהוא יתבקש לחשוף מקורות המימון שלו והקשר עם הערבים האמריקאים אמר לי מילר, העתונאים מפחדים להטפל אליו פן יאשמו בגזענות.

הפרדיקציה לעתיד של מילר היא, שהחבילה שנקשרה באטלנטה בחוטים גסים בין הקוטבים האידיאולוגיים בנסון, ג'קסון דוקאקיס לא תחזיק מעמד - ג'קסון ימרוד. מה אז? הוא לא ירצה לחזות. יתכן שהקהילה היהודית תקבל חזרה מעט מן החשיבות שאבדה לה. עוד בענין העתיד. ג'קסון לא יעלם ולא יאלם גם אחרי הבחירות. לדעת מילר אחד ההבטחות שקיבל מדוקאקיס הוא שתהיה לו גישה לבית הלבן, לדוקאקיס אישית, ומתן אפשרות להשפיע על עוזריו. לדבר ישירות ולעשות LOBY לנושאים שהוא הטיף להם. אם לא יקבל טיפול של P.R. עשויה לעשות צרות בעיקר באירגון קמפיה תקשורתית - אחרי הכל בין שני המתמודדים המשעממים הוא מה שהם קוראים נותן <sup>fav</sup>... אפשרות להשתעשע.

על בנסון לא ידע וציבה. הקרובה ביותר אליו היא אשתו B.A. אתה הוא מיקר ואתה הוא מתיעץ. איש סגור ומרוחק. פוליטיקאי בעל נסיון רב במכוכות וושינגטון. אני מצ"ב כאן רקורד שהופיע עליו בעתונות. כולם מציינים את העובדה שהוא לא אידיאולוג הוא מחליט לגופם של עניינים ולא לטובת חברים. מניחים שבנושאי חוץ דוקאקיס יתיעץ אתו. אנשי הקבינט והמועצה לבטחון לאומי יבואו כנראה מהרואץ והסביבה. אלה יהיו לא רק בעלי כושר איטלקטואלי, אלא גם אנשי ביצוע מעולים.

ב ב ר כ ה

שרה בראור  
לנה קיאלר

העתק: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן  
לשכת השר  
לשכת המנכ"ל  
לשכת ראש המרכז  
הקונכ"ל כאן

# The Democrats: Insured by Lloyd of Texas?

DAVID FRIEDMAN

WASHINGTON

**S**en. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas), whom Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis, named Tuesday as his vice presidential running mate, is considered to have been largely sympathetic to the concerns of the Jewish community during his 18 years in the Senate, although he has supported arms sales for Arab countries.

The announcement was made by Dukakis in Boston just six days before the Democratic National Convention opens in Atlanta. With Bentsen and his wife Beryl Ann at his side, Dukakis praised the Texas senator for his "deep commitment to civil rights that goes back to the 1940s."

The selection of Bentsen ends the speculation about the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who only Monday night said he would accept the vice presidential nomination if offered it.

At a press conference in Washington Tuesday, Jackson was noncommittal, saying only that Dukakis selected Bentsen in accordance with the governor's campaign strategy, which was his right. While he refused to comment on the selection, he did say, "Dukakis will make a good president," and "I no doubt will support the ticket that the convention elects."



Sen. Lloyd Bentsen

Jackson said he was not told of Bentsen's selection personally by Dukakis, but learned of it from a reporter at National Airport Monday night.

The 57-year-old Bentsen is considered a supporter of the close relationship between the United States and Israel and the struggle of Soviet Jewry, but he has not been in the forefront of these issues. His leadership role in the Senate has not been in foreign affairs but in economic matters, especially taxation. He is chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

Bentsen has a mixed record on foreign aid, occasionally voting against legislation enabling it, although his opposition was seen by sources as being more against aid in general, rather than the amount going to Israel.

He did not cosponsor the bill in the Senate to create the U.S.-Israel free trade agreement, but voted for the bill when it was overwhelmingly approved by the Senate.

Bentsen cosponsored the legislation to close the Palestine Liberation Organization offices, he supported Senate ratification of the Genocide Convention, and is a cosponsor of the current bill, waiting Senate action, to implement the convention by making genocide a federal crime.

In 1984, Bentsen was cosponsor of the Senate

Continued on page 33

*The Jewish Standard July 15, 1988*



## Bentsen

Continued from page 1

resolution to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also supported the bill to allow persons in the military to wear yarmulkes and was one of a group of senators who in 1985 unsuccessfully urged President Reagan not to visit the military cemetery in Bitburg, West Germany, where members of the Waffen SS are buried.

Perhaps Bentsen's most controversial vote as far as the Jewish community is concerned came in June 1986, when he was the only Democrat to switch his vote and voted to uphold Reagan's veto of a joint congressional resolution rejecting a weapons sale to the Saudis. The Senate failed to override the veto by one vote and the sale went ahead.

In 1984, he opposed the sale of Stinger missiles to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and in 1985 he cosponsored the resolution to deny advanced weapons to Jordan until it would begin peace negotiations with Israel. Nevertheless, in 1987 he was not one of the 68 senators who signed a letter opposing the sale of 1,600 Maverick missiles to the Saudis which eventually caused Reagan to remove the missile from the arms package.

Most recently, he was not among the 21 senators who signed a letter, initiated by Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) this month, urging the administration not to submit a proposed \$1.9 billion arms sale to Kuwait.

On domestic issues, Bentsen voted for a constitutional amendment that would have permitted prayer in the public schools, but has supported allowing women to have the choice of abortions, voting against an amendment that would have forbidden the District of Columbia to use district or federal funds to pay for abortions.

"Lloyd Bentsen's long Congressional career indicates considerable understanding and sympathy for many issues of particular interest to the Jewish community—the U.S.-Israel relationship, Soviet Jewry, the genocide treaty," David Harris, Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee said.

"While there may be some concern about some of Sen. Bentsen's vote with respect to arms sales to Arab countries that remain technically at war with Israel, overall we view him as a friend with whom we have enjoyed a close working relationship."

David Brody, Washington representative of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, noted that Bentsen has had good relations with the Jewish community in Texas. He said he has been a strong supporter of Israel and in a recent letter to constituents stressed the fact that the United States supports Israel "and in the process advances the cause of peace in the Middle East."

Brody said Bentsen has also emphasized the need to take strong measures against terrorism. Bentsen has also urged the need for an energy policy to lessen dependence on Middle East oil.

Dukakis, in presenting Bentsen, noted the parallel to 1960 when the Democratic ticket also contained a presidential candidate from Massachusetts, John Kennedy, and a vice presidential candidate from Texas, Lyndon Johnson.

Not mentioned was another parallel to that election. Bentsen benefits from a Texas



דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	1
סוג: ש מ ר	טופס פבוק	2
תאריך וזמן מעור: 26.7.88 - 18:00	אל: מ צ פ " א	
כס' פבוק:	דע:	
הפסד: 1/2		
548	קונגרס	פאת:

פגישת השגריר - תסנטור פיט דומניצי 26.6.

רפובליקני מניו מקסיקו בכיר המעוט בועזת הכספים, השתתף עוזרו הוטיק לענייני תקציב צ'ארלי פליקנר.

בפתח הישיבה הודיע דומניצי שכבר שנח עם אשתו על ביקור בארץ עוד השנה אחרי  
הבחירות - רודי בושביץ מאד לוחץ עליו לבקר בחסותו. השגריר הודה לו על תרומתו  
לקידום נושא הסיוע, למרות אילוצים מבית, ודומניצי תאר תפיסת עולמו לפיה  
לארה"ב תפקיד חשוב בקידום המדיניות המתבססת על הפרט בעולם, (אולי תבנה כאן  
מנהל, בהן התגורר ה"א"י ה"א"י).

מכאן ביקש להעלות ביוזמתו נושא מכירות הנשק: העסקה הסעודית-בריטית, ופעולת הקונגרס כלפי הטילים לכווית. הוא אישית לא מוטרד מהאבזן הכספי אולם חושש שהעניין יביא לפגיעה ביחסי שתי המדינות, כפי שבעבר חשש כלפי האינתיפאדה, לכן מבקש לדעת האם ישראל עומדת מאחורי הפעילות כלפי כווית, או ש"הקבוצה המייצגת את האינטרסים שלכם".

בחשובתו התייחס השגריר לאיום הכולל העומד מולנו זה ארבעים שנה המביא לעמדת המסורתי כלפי עסקות נשק עם מדינות הרואות עצמן במצב מלחמה איתנו, בד בבד עם מודעותנו למכלול האינטרסים האמריקנים באזור והצורך שלנו להתמודד עם מסקנותיהם.

דומיניצי שאל האם אפשר להביא להתבטאות ממשלת ישראל כלפי מאמצי איפא"ק (שאת שמו השתדל להמנע מלהזכיר במהלך השיחה). כעת יש אמביבלנטיות - האם דברי איפא"ק מייצגים את האינטרס הישראלי?

במענה לנקודה זו אמר השגריר שבמישור יחסים בין הממשלות וגם כלפי ארגונים יהודים אנו מבטאים עמדתנו, אבל שיקול הדעת כיצד לנהוג נתון בידי איפא"ק.

תפוצה: - 2 - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

קל: <u>2</u>	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחיפות: מ י ד י
פתוך: <u>2</u>		סוג: ס ו ד י
אל:		תאריך ושכח חבור:
דע:		כס' פרוק:
		<u>הפסד:</u>
כאח:		548

פליקנר הציע בתגובה שאולי לתבא יבדקו ישירות עם השגרירות מה העמדה הישראלית (יצוין שבעודנו ממתינים לסנטור תהה פליקנר באוזנו האם חובה על איפא"ק להגיש לחברי הארגון הישג רציני כל שנה ובכל מחיר או אולי מוטב שבשנים "טובות", יסתפקו בהישגים הבאים בלי מאבק, וגם התבטא לגבי המאבקים הפנימיים והנפשות הפועלות בארגון). הסנטור מאז יעריך את האפשרות לעשות כך. <sup>לע</sup> הפעם האיתותים לא היו ברורים, ויש מעמיתיו הסבורים שישראל לא היתה ממליצה לפעול כפי שעשה זה-קונסיני. הוא מבין עמדה השגריר לפיו אינו מנחה את איפא"ק.

השגריר המשיך שמדובר בקבוצה מטורה ומקצועית שיחסי המדינות ובטחון ישראל קרובים לליבה. התבטאויותיה והחלטותיה נתונות בידיה. בכל מקרה, אנחנו מעריכים הידידות שאתה ועמיתך רוחשים לנו, כבת ברית, ולא כתכתיב. <sup>9/10/79</sup> שש התחשבות במכלול האינטרסים האמריקנים ידידיכם כאן מתבטאים לעתים מהר מדי. הפעולה האחרונה פעלה כבומרנג - לאחרונה שמע שישראל רואה האיום בפרויקטציה. לכן השיב השגריר שבמקרה ותעלה בניח עסקת אפ. 16 עם ירדן, תתנגד ישראל. <sup>10/10/79</sup> בראותה אותה <sup>11/10/79</sup> ככנה. <sup>12/10/79</sup> 18. <sup>13/10/79</sup> <sup>14/10/79</sup> <sup>15/10/79</sup> <sup>16/10/79</sup> <sup>17/10/79</sup> <sup>18/10/79</sup> <sup>19/10/79</sup> <sup>20/10/79</sup> <sup>21/10/79</sup> <sup>22/10/79</sup> <sup>23/10/79</sup> <sup>24/10/79</sup> <sup>25/10/79</sup> <sup>26/10/79</sup> <sup>27/10/79</sup> <sup>28/10/79</sup> <sup>29/10/79</sup> <sup>30/10/79</sup> <sup>31/10/79</sup> <sup>1/11/79</sup> <sup>2/11/79</sup> <sup>3/11/79</sup> <sup>4/11/79</sup> <sup>5/11/79</sup> <sup>6/11/79</sup> <sup>7/11/79</sup> <sup>8/11/79</sup> <sup>9/11/79</sup> <sup>10/11/79</sup> <sup>11/11/79</sup> <sup>12/11/79</sup> <sup>13/11/79</sup> <sup>14/11/79</sup> <sup>15/11/79</sup> <sup>16/11/79</sup> <sup>17/11/79</sup> <sup>18/11/79</sup> <sup>19/11/79</sup> <sup>20/11/79</sup> <sup>21/11/79</sup> <sup>22/11/79</sup> <sup>23/11/79</sup> <sup>24/11/79</sup> <sup>25/11/79</sup> <sup>26/11/79</sup> <sup>27/11/79</sup> <sup>28/11/79</sup> <sup>29/11/79</sup> <sup>30/11/79</sup> <sup>1/12/79</sup> <sup>2/12/79</sup> <sup>3/12/79</sup> <sup>4/12/79</sup> <sup>5/12/79</sup> <sup>6/12/79</sup> <sup>7/12/79</sup> <sup>8/12/79</sup> <sup>9/12/79</sup> <sup>10/12/79</sup> <sup>11/12/79</sup> <sup>12/12/79</sup> <sup>13/12/79</sup> <sup>14/12/79</sup> <sup>15/12/79</sup> <sup>16/12/79</sup> <sup>17/12/79</sup> <sup>18/12/79</sup> <sup>19/12/79</sup> <sup>20/12/79</sup> <sup>21/12/79</sup> <sup>22/12/79</sup> <sup>23/12/79</sup> <sup>24/12/79</sup> <sup>25/12/79</sup> <sup>26/12/79</sup> <sup>27/12/79</sup> <sup>28/12/79</sup> <sup>29/12/79</sup> <sup>30/12/79</sup> <sup>31/12/79</sup> <sup>1/1/80</sup> <sup>2/1/80</sup> <sup>3/1/80</sup> <sup>4/1/80</sup> <sup>5/1/80</sup> <sup>6/1/80</sup> <sup>7/1/80</sup> <sup>8/1/80</sup> <sup>9/1/80</sup> <sup>10/1/80</sup> <sup>11/1/80</sup> <sup>12/1/80</sup> <sup>13/1/80</sup> <sup>14/1/80</sup> <sup>15/1/80</sup> <sup>16/1/80</sup> <sup>17/1/80</sup> <sup>18/1/80</sup> <sup>19/1/80</sup> <sup>20/1/80</sup> <sup>21/1/80</sup> <sup>22/1/80</sup> <sup>23/1/80</sup> <sup>24/1/80</sup> <sup>25/1/80</sup> <sup>26/1/80</sup> <sup>27/1/80</sup> <sup>28/1/80</sup> <sup>29/1/80</sup> <sup>30/1/80</sup> <sup>31/1/80</sup> <sup>1/2/80</sup> <sup>2/2/80</sup> <sup>3/2/80</sup> <sup>4/2/80</sup> <sup>5/2/80</sup> <sup>6/2/80</sup> <sup>7/2/80</sup> <sup>8/2/80</sup> <sup>9/2/80</sup> <sup>10/2/80</sup> <sup>11/2/80</sup> <sup>12/2/80</sup> <sup>13/2/80</sup> <sup>14/2/80</sup> <sup>15/2/80</sup> <sup>16/2/80</sup> <sup>17/2/80</sup> <sup>18/2/80</sup> <sup>19/2/80</sup> <sup>20/2/80</sup> <sup>21/2/80</sup> <sup>22/2/80</sup> <sup>23/2/80</sup> <sup>24/2/80</sup> <sup>25/2/80</sup> <sup>26/2/80</sup> <sup>27/2/80</sup> <sup>28/2/80</sup> <sup>29/2/80</sup> <sup>30/2/80</sup> <sup>31/2/80</sup> <sup>1/3/80</sup> <sup>2/3/80</sup> <sup>3/3/80</sup> <sup>4/3/80</sup> <sup>5/3/80</sup> <sup>6/3/80</sup> <sup>7/3/80</sup> <sup>8/3/80</sup> <sup>9/3/80</sup> <sup>10/3/80</sup> <sup>11/3/80</sup> <sup>12/3/80</sup> <sup>13/3/80</sup> <sup>14/3/80</sup> <sup>15/3/80</sup> <sup>16/3/80</sup> <sup>17/3/80</sup> <sup>18/3/80</sup> <sup>19/3/80</sup> <sup>20/3/80</sup> <sup>21/3/80</sup> <sup>22/3/80</sup> <sup>23/3/80</sup> <sup>24/3/80</sup> <sup>25/3/80</sup> <sup>26/3/80</sup> <sup>27/3/80</sup> <sup>28/3/80</sup> <sup>29/3/80</sup> <sup>30/3/80</sup> <sup>31/3/80</sup> <sup>1/4/80</sup> <sup>2/4/80</sup> <sup>3/4/80</sup> <sup>4/4/80</sup> <sup>5/4/80</sup> <sup>6/4/80</sup> <sup>7/4/80</sup> 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ט/אה הי"ז  
טובה הרצל

תפוצה:



דמיפות: דגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	זר: _____
סווג: שמור		מתוך: _____
תאריך וזמן חצור: 1988 26 ביולי 1530		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פבוק: הפסד: 513		דע:
		פאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

### בחירות 88

הסקרים לאחר הוועידה הדמוקרטית מראים יתרון של 10-15% לדוקקים מול בוש, אך, כמובן, זהו חלק מהמומנטום הטבעי הבא לאחר הוועידה.

אך מעניין במיוחד הוא סקר שנערך בטקסט והמראה על תמיכה של 50% לדוקקים מול 40% לבוש, בין לבנים בוש זוכה ליתרון 47 מול 42. אך בין שחורים דוקקים מקבל 88 ובוש 8, ובקרב היספאנים לדוקקים 68 ולבוש 25. בין דמוקרטים שחצביעו לרייגן ב-1984, 84% תומכים בדוקקים רק 11% בוש.

### לפי איווה

סגני - נשיא לבוש: הספקולציות בווינגטון רבות, וכמו אצל דוקקים איש אינו יודע בברור מה כוש עצמו חושב. אך ההערכה הכללית בחוגים הפובליקנים היא כי הרשימה "הקצרה" של בוש כוללת שמות אלה (הסדר אינו מחייב): ג'ק קמפ, רוברט דול, הסנטור אלן סימפסון מויומינג (שמרן, פופולארי במערב, נואם טוב, בעל חוש הומור) מושל קליפורניה דוקמינג'יאן (המושל עצמו טוען כי אינו מעוניין בתפקיד) ואליזבט דול (המקורות ספקנים אם בוש יעז לקחת אשה לתפקיד).

  
דני בלור

שם החתם 2  
שם החתם 3  
שם החתם 2  
שם החתם 1  
שם החתם 2  
שם החתם 1  
שם החתם 2  
שם החתם 1

תפוצה: 23





26

דמיפות: מיידי לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: ס ו ד י	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 1
תאריך וזמן חצור: 26.7.88 - 18:30		אל: מנכ"ל ראה"מ מנכ"ל מנהל ממ"ד
כס' פבוק: הפסד: 527		דע: 1
		כאח: ה צ י ר

משיחה עם דג'רג'יאן - (סגנו של מרפי) .

א. קיבלו היום באופן מוסמך שהמלך חוסיין מתכוון לשאת נאום ביום ה' הקרוב בו יודיע על התנתקות מהגדה המערבית ופיזור הפרלמנט במגמה לבטל היצוג של אזור זה. ארה"ב מודאגת מכיוונת המלך והדברים יובאו לידיעת המלך מחר בבוקר.

ב. בשיחות מרפי-פוליאקוב יועלו מצב המלחמה בין איראן ועיראק, תהליך השלום ונושא הטק במזה"ת. בנושא התהליך ינסו שוב לקבל תמונה יותר מפורטת על עמדות הסובייטים לגבי מהות הנעידה ודרכי תפקודה.

ג. הערכתם הראשונית לגבי סיום המלחמה בין איראן ועיראק כוללת את האלמנטים הבאים :

1) הנצחון של עיראק הופך אותה כמובן לגורם דומיננטי במזה"ת ובמיוחד באזור המפרץ. תופעה זו צריכה להדאיג כמובן את שכנותיה של עיראק במפרץ נאה סוריה.

2) דוקא הדאגה מפני עיראק עשויה לאזן את סוריה אם מדינות המפרץ יסכימו להזק את סוריה על מנת שלא להפר את המאזן שבין עיראק וסוריה.

3) עם סיום המלחמה במפרץ ישוב הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי למקומו המרכזי בעולם הערבי וגם אותו תוכל סוריה לנצל מתוך הסתמכות על מרכזיותה בסכסוך.

4) יחד עם זאת הוא מצביע על זהות אינטרסים פרדוכסלית כביכול בין ישראל וסוריה אם אכן יחליטו איראן ועיראק להגביר פעילותן החתרנית בדרך שתראה לסוריה כמאימת על האינטרס שלה.

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the word "ערי" and various initials and numbers.

תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, אבידן, מתני, ארכיב

דף: <u>1</u>	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס כבוק	דמיפות: מידי
כתוב: <u>1</u>		סוג: שמור
אל:	מצפ"א	תאריך וזמן חבור:
דע:		1988 0830 25 יולי
כאת:	ציר - ע. ערן	כס' כבוק:
		הפסרד:
		464

### ועידה דמוקרטית.

מדלין אולברייט הופיעה בפני קבוצה של יהודים במהלך הוועידה. בפני תמשתתפים הונח ספר עבה המפרט את עמדותיו של המועמד הדמוקרטי בעניינים הקשורים לישראל ויהודים. תמציתו הוברקה בנפרד על-ידי קצין העתונות. אולברייט הוסיפה שלדעתה המשאל של טאט שלפיו 70 אחוז מהצירים תומכים במדינה שלשתינאית הוא עורבא פרח. החלטת דוקקים לאפשר דיון במליאת נבעה מרצונו למנוע הפיכת חנושא סלע מחלוקת בינו לבין ג'קסון. אולברייט הוסיפה שמאד חופתע אם במסגרת שילובם של אנשי ג'קסון במטה הבחירות של דוקקים, ישבו גם אנשים העוסקים בענייני חוץ. כמו כן רמזה שהמועמד פנה לסינים בעניין הטילים.

8/3/88  
ערן

ע"ה 2  
ח"ה 3  
ח"ה 2  
ח"ה 1  
ח"ה 2  
ח"ה 1  
ח"ה 2

תפוצה:

- 83 -

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

17491

תאריך : 27.07.88

דף 1 מתוך 2

עו"תק 3 מתוך 30

נכנס

סודי ביותר

\* חוזם: 7,17491 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* מ-: וווש, נר: 525, תא: 260788, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סב \*

\* תח: @ גס: מצפא \*

\* נד: @ \*

\* סודי ביותר/מיידי \*

\* אל: מצפא. \*

\* דע: לשכת רהמ'.

\* פגישת המזכיר-פלדמן.

\* דר' שי פלדמן, המסיים כאן שנת שבתון ב'מרכז וילסון', הוזמן  
\* לפני ימים מספר לארוחת צהרים אישית עם מזכיר המדינה שולץ.  
\* הפגישה אורגנה ביזמת המזכיר, שהעתק עבודתו המדעית של פלדמן  
\* (האסטרטגיה רבתי של ישראל-דוד בן גוריון), הגיעה לידי דרך  
\* צ'רלי היל.

\* ארוחת הצהריים התקיימה היום, ובנוסף לשניים נכח גם היל.  
\* לדבריו של פלדמן קרא המזכיר את עבודתו בשלמותה, והרבה  
\* להתייחס לנקודות מתוכה במהלך הארוחה.

\* להלן דוות ראשוני שקבלנו מדר' פלדמן:

\* מזכיר המדינה התעניין בתהליכים כוללים ובתפישות יסוד לגבי  
\* המתרחש באזורנו, ובעיקר לגבי אפשרויות השנוי בתפישות אלה.  
\* הוא מסתכל על פתרון הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי (בטווח הארוך)  
\* במונחים של שינוי התפישות הקלאסיות של מושג הרבונות,  
\* ומתעניין מאד ביכולת לשלב גורמים כלכליים בהסדרים בטחוניים  
\* עתידיים.

\* המזכיר גילה גם עניין בתהליכים הפוליטיים הפנימיים בארץ.



# משרד - החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2  
עותק 3 מתוך 30

\* במסגרת הדיון על האופציה הירדנית, אמר המזכיר כי הירדנים  
\* עומדים להודיע מחר על נסיגה מהאפיק הקודם בהקשר הכולל של  
\* מחויבותם ואחריותם לגדה המערבית, כולל אולי אפילו בנושא  
\* תשלומי המשכורות.

\* \*  
\* בצעד זה מנסה חוסיין, לפי הפרשנות האמריקאית, לנקוט במהלך  
\* שמטרתו TO CORNER את אשף, ולאצו להחליט על כך שהאפיק  
\* היחיד לפתרון כולל את ירדן. האמריקאים, לעומת זאת, חוששים כי  
\* לצעד כזה יכול להיות אפקט הפוך לחלוטין.

\* \*  
\* לטווח הארוך, אמר שולץ, מוכרחים להיות אופטימיים. ישנה  
\* תזוזה, אך היא מאד איטית.

\* עד כאן.

\* עוד נקבל דווח מפורט יותר.

\* יוסי ג

\* מט

\* תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, בירן, מצפא

מדידת: מדידת	שגרירות ישראל/וויטינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 1/2
סודי: סודי		סתות: 2
תאריך וזמן תיכור: 1430 26 ביולי 88	סמנכ"ל צפ"א	אל:
פס' פרוק: הפסד:	המנכ"ל מנהל מצפ"א - (איש)	ד':
526	השגריר	פאת:

### פגישה עם ברט לאנס

- נפגשתי עם ברט לאנס באטלאנטה ביום האחרון של ועידת המפלגה הדמוקרטית. הפגישה התקיימה בביתו של אד אלסון מראשי הוועד היהודי האמריקני ומידידו הקרובים של לאנס. הפגישה באה בעקבות שיחות שקיימנו לפני מספר שבועות כאשר עמדה על הפרק אפשרות ביקורו של לאנס בארץ. כידוע לכם לאנס משמש עתה כאחד מיועציו הקרובים של ג'סי ג'קסון ומראשי תומכיו בדרום.
  - לאנס ביקש לדעת מה ניתן לעשות כדי להביא להדברות ולהבנה טובה יותר בין ישראל והיהודים לבין ג'קסון.
- השבתי כי אינני יכול לדבר בשם הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב אך מתוך מגעי עם אישים יהודים בארה"ב - ברור כי ג'קסון חשוד כבעל דעות והתבטאויות אנטישמיות - בעבר, ועליו יהיה לעמוד קשה כדי לתקן אי-האמון והחשדות כלפיו. התבטאויותיו ב-1984 - כאשר קרא לניו יורק HYMIE-TOWN וסרובו להסתייג פומבית מדבריו של פאראחאן זכורים היטב לציבור היהודי בארה"ב וגם לנו כישראלים.
- לאנס ציין כי אלו התבטאויות מהעבר וכי ג'קסון עשה כסיון כנה בחדשים האחרונים להתרחק מפאראחאן והיה זהיר בהתבטאויותיו.
- צינתי כי כנציגה של ישראל ברצוני להבהיר כי אנו רואים בג'קסון אדם שאיננו מגלה רגישות כלשהי לבעיות האסטרטגיות של ישראל ולבעיית הקיומיות שלנו. הוא אמנם הזכיר את ירושלים בנאומו בוועידה הדמוקרטית כדוגמה למרכז של שלושת הדתות - אך התעלם מהעובדה שירושלים משמשת מרכז כזה רק בזכות שלטונה של ישראל המעודדת והמקיימת חופש פולחן לכל הדתות.

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דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 2
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בהמשך הוספתי כי לא נוכל לראות בג'קסון מנהיג אשר מגלה הבנה לבעיותינו כל עוד הוא מנסה לקדם רק ענינם של הפלשתינאים - כפי שבא לידי ביטוי בנסיון תומכיו להביא לשינוי במצע המפלגה הדמוקרטית. באותה עת לא שמענו דבר או חצי דבר או קריאה ממנו לפלשתינאים להכיר בלגיטימיות ובזכותה של ישראל כמדינה יהודית עצמאית אשר זכאית להכרת הערבים והפלשתינאים. עמדתו זו מצביעה על גישתו החד-צדדית. מזה 13 שנה קיבל האו"ם החלטה המשווה הציונית לגזענות. התנועה הציונית היא התנועה לשחרור לאומי של העם היהודי וכל היהודים הן אלו בישראל והן אלו שבארה"ב רואים בתנועה הציונית תנועה לשחרור לאומי של העם היהודי. האיש שמרבה לדבר ולהתבטא בזכות הגדרה עצמית וזכויותיהם של עמים מדוכאים לא מצא לנכון לומר מילת-בקורת אחת על החלטה זו של עצרת האו"ם.

לאנס שמע ולא ניסה להגיב פרט להערות קצרות כי הוא מאמין שג'קסון מעוניין עתה בקיום דיאלוג עם הקהילה היהודית ועם ישראל.

השבתי כי אני ודאי לא צריך לסייע לו ביצירת הקשר עם הקהילה היהודית, מנהיגיה ומוסדותיה; הוא מכיר אותם היטב. באשר לישראל - אשמח להבהיר עמדותינו בכל עת שיהיה מעוניין בכך.

אתמול צלצל ברט לאנס וציין כי לאחר שדיווח לג'קסון על שיחתנו- הביע ג'קסון עניין להפגש עמי. לא בקבע עדיין מועד כלשהו.

א. ד. ס.

תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, ארכיב



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# For Jews From Arab Lands, New Views of Israel's Future

By JOEL BRINKLEY  
Special to The New York Times

MIGDAL HAEMEK, Israel — Growing up in Morocco 35 years ago, Shaul Amor said, he "lived with Arabs as neighbors from the day I was born."

"They were our friends," he said. "They cried when we left for Israel."

But at the same time, even now, Mr. Amor, who is 47 years old, repeats an ethnic stereotype in the form of an aphorism used among Moroccan Jews back then: "Don't ever trust an Arab, even when he's been in the ground for 40 years."

While Mr. Amor was growing up in Morocco, Yitzhak Ben-Gad was a child in Libya, and he remembers what his grandmother used to say.

"Respect and double suspect them," he said. "Even if an Arab is 40 years in the grave, he still might get up and kill you."

## A Mayor in Galilee

Today Mr. Ben-Gad, 46, is Deputy Mayor of Netanya, north of Tel Aviv, and Mr. Amor is mayor of Migdal Haemek, a small town in Galilee.

Mr. Amor is also a Likud candidate for Parliament, a member of the new generation of Israeli politicians born in Middle Eastern and North African countries and now beginning to rise to positions of leadership in the Israeli Government.

Mr. Amor, Mr. Ben-Gad and the other Jews in Israel with origins in Arab countries are known as Sephardim, a reference to the ancestry of many of them among the Jews of medieval Spain. Long this nation's underclass, they will this year, for the

first time, outnumber the voters of European or other Western origin in the national elections about three months from now. And for the first time this year, both major political parties are scrambling to include Sephardim among their Parliamentary candidate lists — or saying why not.

The Sephardic candidates themselves are saying Israel will be a very different place, if and when the day comes that they govern the country. If they are right, it will result from both their origins in the Arab world and the discrimination most of them believe

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including names and dates.



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they suffered on arrival in Israel.

On the Arab question, Mr. Amor like many others has mixed memories.

"We lived side by side as neighbors, friends," he said of his life in Morocco. But he added: "At the same time, I remember Aug. 21, 1955. There were Arab demonstrations across the country. My grandfather left the house to pray at the synagogue. Everybody said, 'Don't go; it's dangerous,' but my grandfather said, 'I have no problems with Arabs.'"

"Down the street, six Arabs attacked him with hatchets, killed him, cut him up."

"In spite of that," Mr. Amor said, "I still think it is possible for men to talk."

Almost every Sephardic Jew in Israel has a similar story to tell, though perhaps not so gruesome. Even with his conflicting emotions and memories of Arabs, Mr. Amor, like many other Sephardic Jews, says he understands the Arabs in a way this nation's current leaders do not. If the Sephardim finally do reach positions of real political power, many of them say, they could bring peace to this troubled region.

## 'We Can Be a Bridge In the Peace Process

"I know the Arabs," said Eli Dayan, the Mayor of Ashkelon, who moved here from Morocco in 1963. Fervent, eyebrows arched, he leaned forward in his chair and added: "Israel is making a mistake not using Jews who grew up in Arab countries for the peace process. We can be a bridge." Mr. Dayan, too, is a candidate for Parliament, from the Labor Party. Both Mr. Dayan and Mr. Amor have positions on their respective parties' lists of candidates for Parliament that are high enough that they are virtually assured of election under Israel's system of proportional representation.

Another Sephardic Labor candidate, Amir Peretz, the Mayor of Sderot, a development town — a planned community established to aid development of a remote area — on the edge of the Negev, says that when he was a child in Morocco, "there was no indication of hate for Arabs in our house."

"When my mother couldn't breast feed, we were nursed by local Arab women," he said. "We know the Arabs. We could bring a lot to the peace process."

During the 1950's and 60's, Jews from Moslem nations poured into this country in such large numbers that

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they came to be known here as "the second Israel." The "first Israel" referred to the Jews of European and Soviet origin who established a foothold in Palestine early in this century, founded the state and set the new nation on its present course, accounting for more than 75 percent of the population in 1948.

The Jews from Islamic countries often came with large families, little education and almost no money. For many years a common attitude among the European Jews — the Ashkenazim — was sneering condescension toward the new immigrants who, in some cases, had never seen a flush toilet.

## In the Early Days: Tents and Small Flats

As many Sephardim recall with bitterness today, they were shuttled to tent camps and impoverished developments in the desert or other remote spots where no one wanted to live.

"They wanted us out of sight," said Shalom Halevy, the Likud candidate for Mayor of Sderot. His parents walked to Israel from Yemen.

"In some of the worst cases," he added, "they put families with 10 or more people in a 40- or 50 square-meter apartment." This is about 500 square feet.

The Labor Party controlled the Government then, and as the Sephardim continued arriving, resentment grew.

"It was a protest looking for a party," Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, said on a visit to Sderot this spring. "They feel I turned my face away from the problems on the ground. But what we did was really done for the good, and there wasn't the slightest sense of discrimination. I hope they know that."

But few seem to appreciate his point of view. Many Sephardim still say they remember with pain the time when West Germany started paying reparations to Israeli victims of the Holocaust in Europe. With that money the Ashkenazim moved out of the immigrant camps into better homes, leaving the Sephardim behind in tattered tents.

## As Population Grows, Changes Are Sought

Still, the Sephardic communities continued to grow until finally they made up more than half the population. Angry and alienated, they turned to the opposition parties, primarily Likud, bringing Manachem Begin to power in 1977. Likud began redressing some of the social disparities. The party became the Sephardic Jews' home.

"Still today, 'the feeling for Likud is very strong,'" said Hanoeh Smith, a political analyst and poll taker. "They feel that Likud helped them make the transition from lower class to middle class. The difference in voting patterns between Ashkenazim and Sephardim is like the difference between New England Republicans and Southern blacks."

Yitzhak Dabush, a dark-skinned gardener in Ashkelon who wears a knitted skull cap and a gold Star of David around his neck, said, "You can see how much improvement we've made under Likud." He emigrated from Libya as a child. "Now we have a car, food to eat, a television, a video," Mr. Dabush said, sipping Turkish coffee in a street cafe. "In the time of the Alignment," he said, referring to the Government of the Labor Party and its allies, known as the Labor Alignment, "we didn't even have a radio."

## Likud or Labor Party: Why There's a Choice

Realizing it may never regain power if nearly all the Sephardim remain in the Likud camp, the Labor Party for the first time this year elected its candidates for Parliament instead of appointing them. Among those elected were several prominent Sephardim — Mr. Peretz and Mr. Dayan, among others.

Some of their Sephardic friends and relatives don't understand why these men chose Labor.

"Still people ask, 'Why don't you come to Likud?'" Mr. Dayan says. "It's very easy to be Likud. If I were



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Likud I could be mayor for another 30 years. But my view is, we've punished Labor for 20 or 30 years. Now we should stop talking about punishment; it's the future of the state that matters."

"Don't forget the red book!" Mr. Peretz says people shout at him, taunting. Years ago, only people with red Labor Party membership books could get certain jobs. Not many Sephardim had them.

"The Labor Party still has to prove to the Sephardim that they are worthy," Mr. Peretz says. "I'm confident they will. But if they don't I will recommend voting against Labor."

If Labor wins, a senior Labor strategist said, Mr. Dayan and Mr. Peretz will almost certainly be given Cabinet positions, though neither of them has held national office before.

Herut, the largest faction of Likud, already has several well-known Sephardic members, including some who are in the present Cabinet. But the party did not recruit notable new Sephardic candidates this time, to the consternation of many.

## Upward Mobility More Certain Than Ever

Whatever happens in this election, almost everyone agrees that Sephardic Israelis will inevitably begin moving into important leadership positions in the coming years. Many Israelis wonder whether that might change the nature of this country, and in what ways.

"I believe a Sephardic government would be more moderate, more tolerant, particularly on religious issues," Mr. Dayan said. Sephardim are well known in Israel for being both religious and tolerant. For example, Sephardim generally are not among those who throw rocks at the cars of people driving on the Sabbath.

"If you look at the real extremists in this country — Meir Kahane and others — they are all Ashkenazi," said Mr. Shitrit.

Mr. Shitrit recently became treasurer of the Jewish Agency, the huge semi-public bureau that acts as a go-between for Israel and the rest of the world's Jews, and he boasts that "I'm the first Moroccan to go to the Jewish Agency."

With Sephardim in power, Mr. Shitrit said, the Government would stress social issues, "improve the quality of life, improve education, health, housing," issues that have been the Sephardim's traditional grievances. "I think we'd put education before defense."

Although surveys show that most Israelis — both Sephardic and Ashkenazi — believe the social gap between the two groups is gone, in fact Mr. Smith's studies show that is not true.

"Economically, in education, in professional attainment, there is still a huge lag for the Sephardim, though it is narrowing," he said. So that may explain why Sephardim believe the Government under their leadership would stress social improvement.

## Knowing Arab Culture: Sephardic Way of Life

At the same time, every Sephardim interviewed said he was utterly certain that a Sephardic government would be better suited to deal with the Arabs.

"We eat the same food, listen to the same music," Mr. Shitrit said. "We have the same mentality, the same chemistry. It would be very easy."

"The simple Sephardic guy on the street knows the Arab culture in a way that even a professor of Eastern culture in a university can never learn," Mr. Amor said.

But even with that understanding, Sephardim generally loathe the Arabs.

Mr. Peretz said: "It's difficult to explain how the hatred came to be, but if you have somebody below you, it gives you some legitimacy, even if you have people above you too. It's easier."

One of his constituents in Sderot, Mordechai Azzan, who emigrated from Morocco, said: "The truth is the Mayor shouldn't have gone to Labor. Labor supports the left and loves the Arabs."

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In Ashkelon, Mr. Dabush said his Mayor, Mr. Dayan, "changed language in a place where you don't change language. Labor is the party that hurts the workers and helps the Arabs."

Mr. Amor said that if he were running the country, "I would try to talk to the Arabs respecting the need to give them honor. The Ashkenazi political leaders now relate to the Arabs in an elitist way and insult them. They don't understand how important honor is to them."

"My wife used to be a midwife for Arab women in Morocco," he went on. "She still visits Morocco and comes back bringing us candy they gave her. That's the thing about them; there's sweets on one side, danger on the other."

"That's the tragic thing, the thing that we Sephardim understand."



The New York Times, July 23, 1988

Migdal Haemek is one of a number of towns where Sephardim have gained political prominence.

## Jewish Roots

Countries of origin, as of Jan. 1, 1987, for Israeli Jews who were born abroad or whose parents were born abroad. (There are 695,000 native Israelis whose parents are also native-born.)

<b>Europe, the Americas,</b>	
<b>other .....</b>	<b>1,336,700</b>
Poland .....	302,100
Soviet Union .....	293,200
Rumania .....	278,500
Germany, Austria ....	91,300
Czech., Hungary ....	86,700
Bulgaria, Greece ....	64,800
U.S., Canada, Australia, Latin America, other .....	220,100

<b>Africa .....</b>	<b>781,700</b>
Morocco .....	483,000
Algeria, Tunisia .....	124,900
Libya .....	77,100
Egypt, Sudan .....	65,300
Other Africa .....	31,400

<b>Asia .....</b>	<b>747,600</b>
Iraq .....	266,900
Yemen, Southern Yemen ....	165,000
Iran .....	126,200
Turkey .....	91,400
India, Pakistan, other Asia .....	98,100

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics



דחיסות	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	ר"ח 10
סוג בטחוני שמו	טופס מברק	מחור
תז"ח 221530	המשרד	אלו
נר 0 0523		רעו
	נאוו"ם, ניו-יורק	מאת

אל: מנהל מז"תים. מנהל ארבי"ל 2.  
מאת: מ. יופה.

איגרת מחנא סבירה למזכ"ל האו"ם באמצעות גולדינג  
לשלי 510 מח-22.7.88

רצ"ב רשימת הנפגעים.

נאוו"ם

*מ. יופה*

*שם גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל  
אביאל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל גל*

תאריך: 22.7.88  
טפ השולח: מ. יופה  
אישור: *מ. יופה*

MARTYRS UNDER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OR INDIRECT OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY

#	Name	Residence	By	Context	Date
1.	Issam Hamoudi, 29	Jabalya RC/GAZA	S	Crushed by army semi-truck	Dec 8
2.	Taleb Abu Zeid, 46	Mghazi RC/GAZA	S	" " "	Dec 8
3.	Kamaal Hamoudi, 23	Jabalya RC/GAZA	S	" " "	Dec 8
4.	Shaaban Nabhan, 26	Jabalya RC/GAZA	S	" " "	Dec 8
5.	Abdallah Abdul Nabi, 70	Old Askar RC/NABLUS	M	Argued with soldiers on his roof, fell down stairs & suffered heart attack	Dec 25
6.	Nabil Abu Orti, 25	Shati RC/GAZA	?	Body found on beach; may have drowned, but not season for swimming	Feb 20*
7.	Atef Fayad, 30	Khan Yunis/GAZA	?	Said to have died from explosion while preparing bomb	Feb 23*
6.	Salah alAtaar, 22	Rafah RC/GAZA	?	" " on 14 Mar	Mar 15*
7.	Abdul Nasser Abu Shamaleh, 24	GAZA	S	Hit by private truck	Mar 27
8.	Abdul Rub Abu Shamaleh, 30	GAZA	S	" " "	Mar 27
9.	Fayeq Abu Shamaleh, 28	GAZA	S	" " "	Mar 27
10.	Na'im I'd	GAZA	S	" " "	Mar 27
11.	Salah Khader Damuni, 60	Qabatiya/JENIN	M	Forced by army to move large stones; taken to Jenin Hosp.; died 2 days later (in siege)	Mar ?
12.	Ma'mun Jarad, 15	TULKARM	?	Apparently fell while hanging flag on wire; may have been shot at; no village witness	Apr 3
13.	Ibrahim Mahmud Rai Zeid, 28	Qalqiliya/TULKARM	M	Died in Ramleh Prison after 8 Mos. in solitary; signs of beating on body; under invest.	Apr 11
14.	Badriyeh Sader Shahin, 55 (wife of Khadon Abdul Haq)	NABLUS	M	Stopped in car to clear stones from road; intervened to prevent son's arrest; brain hemorrhage	Apr 15*
15.	Hassan Abdu Buhi, 80	EinBeitalMa/NABLUS	?	Shot in legs, sitting in front of his house !!	May 2
16.	Nidal Abu Shomar, 17	Beit Wazzan/NABLUS		Electrocuted hanging flag	May 2
17.	Moh'd Saleh Qaadan, 38(son)	Deir Ghusoun/TULKARM	S	Burned in car; reported also shot	May 21
18.	Shamseh alQade', 60(mother)	Deir Ghusoun/TULKARM	S	" " "	May 21
19.	Majdi Abu Safaka, 12	TULKARM		Roadblock barrel fell on him	Jun 1
20.	Rawhi Moh'd alLahalin, 40	Sa'ir/KHALIL		Car stoned at army roadblock near Dheishe RC; army may have forced him to use his car for their shield; heart attack	Jun 9
21.	Ahmed Tawfiq Sha'alan, 13	Dheishe RC/BETHLEHEM		Bruised body found in well; he is deaf-mute	Jun 12*
22.	Khadra Abdallah Awwad, 21	Turmos Aya/RAMALLAH		Heart attack when heard Judah was killed; died after open heart surgery	Jun 26

!! - On June 14, a charge sheet against some camp residents was submitted in Nablus military court, charging that the residents had accidentally shot him in the head, then shot him in the legs to make it look like soldiers shot him. Buhi was also known as a collaborator.



## PALESTINIAN MARTYRS SHOT DURING THE UPRISING

10/07/88

#	Name, Age	Residence	By	Context	Date
1.	Hatem Sissi, 15	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in heart	Dec 9*
2.	Wahid Abu Salem, 13	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in head	Dec 10*
3.	Ibrahim Ekeik, 18	NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in head	Dec 10*
4.	Sahar Jirmi, 19	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in chest	Dec 11*
5.	Ali Isma'il Abdallah, 13	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in head	Dec 11*
6.	Suhaila Ka'bi, 53	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	Watching Demo/shot in chest	Dec 11*
7.	Hassan Moh'd Jarhun, 22	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in chest	Dec 14*
8.	Abdul Malek Abu Hussein, 23	Khan Yunis RC/GAZA	M	Demo 12 Dec/shot in neck	Dec 15*
9.	Khaled Abu Taqiyeh, 22	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in head	Dec 15*
10.	Ibrahim Mahmud Sakleh, 25	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Donating blood at Shifa Hosp.	Dec 15*
11.	Talal Hweih, 17	Beit Hanoun/GAZA	S	Shot in neck on street	Dec 15*
12.	Nafez Iktafan, 75-16	Deir Balah/GAZA	M	Demo/	Dec 15
13.	Atwa Abu Samhadneh, 20	Rafah/GAZA	M	Shot in leg; died in hospital	Dec 16*
14.	Abdul Salaam Iftekha, 29	Breif RC/GAZA	M	Demo/	Dec 18*
15.	Maisara Hamdan Batniji, 26	Shuja'iyeh/GAZA	M	Demo/shot:head/neck/genitals	Dec 18*
16.	Raed Shihadeh, 16	Shati RC/GAZA	M	Demo 9 Dec/shot in mouth	Dec 21*
17.	Nazek Ahmad Suwafta, 17	Tubas/JENIN	M	Demo/shot in chest	Dec 21*
18.	Bassem Faisal Suwafta, 19	Tubas/JENIN	M	Demo/shot in chest & arm	Dec 21*
19.	Yusef Moh'd Ararawi, 24	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	Demo/shot in abdomen + beaten	Dec 21*
20.	Mahmoud Qeisi, 19	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	Demo/shot in neck	Dec 21*
21.	Khaled Taleb Hameed, 20	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in eye & neck by CA	Dec 21*
22.	Mustafa alBeik, 19	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Demo 22 Dec	Dec 29
23.	Haniyeh Chazawneh, 25	Ram/JERUSALEM	M	On veranda of house	Jan 3*
24.	Ali Moh'd Dahlan, 19	Khan Yunis RC/GAZA	M	Demo/shot in heart	Jan 5*
25.	Mazen Ismail Musalam, 17	Maghazi RC/GAZA	M	Demo/	Jan 7*
26.	Khaled alAwawdi, 22	Breif RC/GAZA	M	Demo/	Jan 8*
27.	Bassem Khader Abu Musalem, 27	Khan Yunis RC/GAZA	M	Food distrib/shot 3X in liver	Jan 9*
28.	Khalil Isma'il Abu Luli, 54	Rafah/GAZA	M	Demo 16 Dec	Jan 9*
29.	Touqan Misbeh, 32	Shuja'iyeh/GAZA	M	By his house/ in abdomen!!	Jan 10*
30.	Naji Hassan Ali (Kamil), 43	Qabatya/JENIN	M	Left home 31 Dec, found	Jan 10*
31.	Bassel Yazuri, 23	Rafah RC/GAZA	M	Protest 9 Jan/shot in head	Jan 11*
32.	Mohammad Fayad, 20	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	Demo 16 Dec	Jan 11*
33.	Atta Mustafa Khdeir, 26	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	Demo/Shot in head & heart	Jan 11*
34.	Rabeh Ghanaam Hamed, 17	Bittin/RAMALLAH	S	Settler attack from road	Jan 11*
35.	Mohammad Yusef Yazuri, 30	Rafah/GAZA	M	Stabbed soldier	Jan 12*
36.	Hussein Mustafa Ma'ali, 19	Kufr Ni'meh/RAMALLAH	M	Demo/shot in heart & chest	Jan 13*
37.	Ramadan Sobeih, 14	Beit Lahiya/GAZA	M	Shot in food convey in Beit	Jan 13
38.	Ahmad Ali Ibayyat Ta'amreh, 43	Qissan/BETHLEHEM	M	Civil Admin. shot him while	Jan 13
39.	Ibrahim Abu Nahel, 31	Sheikh Radwan/GAZA	M	confiscating his sheep	Jan 13
40.	Moh'd Ramadan Tubaza, 18	Nuseirat RC/GAZA	M	On house; shot many times	Jan 15*
41.	Murad Bassem Hamdallah, 17	Anabta/TULKARM	M	Demo/	Jan 15
42.	Mu'ayyad Moh'd Sha'ar, 21	Anabta/TULKARM	M	Demo/shot in chest	Feb 1*
43.	Asmaa Ibrahim Sabbubeh, 25	Anabta/TULKARM	M	Demo/shot in chest	Feb 1*
44.	Ibrahim Mansour, 26	Balaa/TULKARM	M	Demo 1 Feb/shot in head	Feb 2*
45.	Thamer Jalal Disuqi, 10	Burqa/NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in chest; bled to	Feb 3*
46.	Asmaa Moh'd Sharif, 18	Aroub RC/KHALIL	?	death in military custody	Feb 6*
47.	Asmaa Moh'd Sharif, 18	Aroub RC/KHALIL	?	Shot in house 3 Feb/in head	Feb 6*
48.	Asmaa Moh'd Sharif, 18	Aroub RC/KHALIL	?	Shot in home/stomach & heart	Feb 6*

11 - Soldier en route to duty convicted of manslaughter in this case, May 1988



#	Name, Age	Residence	By	Context	Date
47.	Imad Khader Sabarneh, 26	Beit Ommar/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot in heart	Feb 7*
48.	Moh'd Ibrahim Shweiha Adl, 18	Beit Ommar/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot in chest	Feb 7*
49.	Tayseer Abdallah Awad, 18	Beit Ommar/KHALIL	M	Demo/2 bullets in heart	Feb 7*
50.	Abdul Basset Juma', 27	Kufr Qaddum/NABLUS	S	Settler picking up workers shot him in head & neck	Feb 8*
51.	Nabil Abu Khalil, 14	Attil/TULKARM	M	Shot by 3 bullets in heart	Feb 9*
52.	Emad Hamalawi, 20	Mghazi RC/GAZA	M	Shot in neck 5 Jan; died in Soroka Hosp.	Feb 10*
53.	Ahmad Abu Sabil, 37	Tulkarm RC/TULKARM	M	Shot in street	Feb 11
54.	Bashar Ahmad alMa'di, 20	NABLUS	M	March from mosque; (heart)	Feb 12*
55.	Basem Taysir alJitan, 14	NABLUS	M	" " ; 12X in head	Feb 12*
56.	Isma'il Halaiqa Mashni, 22	Shyukh/KHALIL	M	Protesting siege of village; shot in heart	Feb 17*
57.	Abdallah Atta Ataya, 19	Kufr Ni'meh/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in head in Ramallah	Feb 20*
58.	Nasrallah AbdalQader Nasrallah, 12,	Tulkarm RC/TULKARM	M	Shot in street during curfew	Feb 20
59.	Kamal Moh'd Darwish, 23	Deir Ameer/RAMALLAH	S	Shot standing on hill, in artery & vertebrae	Feb 21*
60.	Ragheb Sleiman AbuAmmarra, 19	NABLUS	M	Demonstration; shot in heart	Feb 21*
61.	Rawda Lutfi Najib Hassan, 13	Baka Sharqiyeh/TULK	S	Shot in heart by her house	Feb 22*
62.	Mahmud Numan Hushiyeh, 13	alYamun/JENIN	M	Demonstration	Feb 23
63.	Mohammad Qassem Abu Zeid, 4	Qabatya/JENIN	C	Shot by collaborator	Feb *
64.	Issam Abu Khalifeh, 18	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	Demo/under left eye	Feb 25*
65.	Sami Chaleb Dayeh, 19	NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in heart	Feb 25*
66.	Fuad Ayoub Sharawi, 47	KHALIL	M	Demonstration; shot in head	Feb 26
67.	Rashiq Musleh Daraghme, 63	Tubas/JENIN	M	Shot several times; lost blood	Feb 26*
68.	Hassan Mohammad AbuKheiran, 22	Aroub RC/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot raising flag	Feb 26*
69.	Eyad alAshqar, 12	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Demonstration	Feb 26
70.	Nihad AbdulGhaffar Khmour, 20	Aroub RC/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot in heart	Feb 27*
71.	Baker Abdallah Bo, 17	Halhoul/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot in heart & chest	Feb 27*
72.	Majed Moh'd Atrash, 22	Halhoul/KHALIL	M	Demo/shot in heart & stomach	Feb 27*
73.	Raed Mahmud Awad Barghuthi, 17	Aboud/RAMALLAH	S	Settler nightraid on village;	Feb 27*
74.	Ahmad Ibrahim Barghuthi, 21	Aboud/RAMALLAH	S	evacuation prevented by Mil.	Feb 27*
75.	Ahmad Dhiab Bitawi, 30	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	Shot in head 25 Feb	Feb 27*
76.	Yasser Daoud AbdulJabbar Abd, 17	Borin/NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in neck	Feb 29*
77.	Moh'd Ahmad Hussein Salah, 18	Khader/BETHLEHEM	M	Demo; shot in head	Mar 4*
78.	Bakr Latif Shiboni, 17	Araba/JENIN	M	Demo; shot in stomach	Mar 4
79.	Rasem Mudhahi Khadirat Atlul, 28	Dhahariyeh/KHALIL	M	Demo; shot in chest	Mar 5*
80.	Mahel Musbah Waridat, 30	Dhahariyeh/KHALIL	M	Demo; shot in heart	Mar 5*
81.	Mohammad Sa'afin, 22	Breij RC/GAZA	M	Shot in thigh 4 Mar	Mar 6
82.	Khaled Ibrahim alArda, 18	Askar RC/NABLUS	M	Shot in head	Mar 6*
83.	Ayman Salim Ajaq, 17	Mazraa Sharqiya/RAM	M	Flag day/Shot in heart	Mar *
84.	Khader Mohammad Hamideh, 41	Mazraa Sharqiya/RAM	S	Shot; died in Ramallah Hosp.	Mar 9*
85.	Najeh Hassan Hijaz, 18	Turmus Aya/RAMALLAH	S	Shot in heart by settlers	Mar 9*
86.	Moh'd Othman Hamad, 17	Silwad/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in mouth	Mar 9*
87.	Bassam Ibrahim Badarin, 18	Samou'/KHALIL	M	Shot in heart	Mar 9
88.	Yusef Ibrahim Ali Abu Eid, 22	Biddu/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in eye on 9 Mar after beaten/thrown on burning tire	Mar 12*
89.	Alan Said Nasrallah Sadaqa, 16	Anza/JENIN	M	Shot in chest	Mar 15*
90.	Arafat Abdul Aziz Hweih, 22	Ein Yabroud/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in demo in the head in Deir Jarir	Mar 15*
91.	Omar Yassin Hamasheh, 25	Yaabad/JENIN	M	Shot in chest	Mar 16
92.	Ashraf Mahmud Ibrahim, 22	Nur Shams RC/TULKARM	M		Mar 16



## MARTYRS SHOT DURING UPRISING, continued

#	Name, Age	Residence	By	Context	Date
93.	Hisham Daud alLush, 23	Nazlit Issa/TULKARM	M		Mar 16
94.	Sabri Abu Sharar, 25	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	Shot in heart; died in Asqalan hospital	Mar 17*
95.	Hani Ibrahim Abu Hammam, 23	Shati RC/GAZA	M	Demo/Shot in liver	Mar 18*
96.	Namek Ahmad Hadj Hussein Milhem, 30	Kufr Dan/JENIN	M	Shot in head	Mar 20
97.	Khaled Moh'd Taher, 29	Nazlit Issa/TULKARM	M	Shot on 14 Mar; died in hosp.	Mar 20
98.	Adel Ahmed Jaber, 18	Rafah/GAZA	M	Shot in heart	Mar 21*
99.	Hikmat Daraghme, 26	Tubas/JENIN	M	Found shot in head & other	Mar 21*
100.	Majed Sawalmeh (Msaad), 21	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	2 bullets in chest	Mar 24*
101.	Muhammed Ali Abu Zur, 20	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	Shot in neck	Mar 24*
102.	Walid Abdul Fatah Fatafta, 18	Tarkumia/KHALIL	M	Shot in chest	Mar 25
103.	Khaled Hassan Muraktam, 18	Tarkumia/KHALIL	M	Shot in liver	Mar 25
104.	Ayad Turki Salah(Khalil), 21	Zawateh/NABLUS	M	Shot in heart 25 Mar	Mar 26
105.	Majed Hussein Dhieb, 19	Kufr Thaleth/TULKARM	M	Shot in heart	Mar 26
106.	Awad Qassem Ibrahim, 30	Kufr Thaleth/TULKARM	M	Shot in chest	Mar 26
107.	Chassan Qassem Awad Na'rat, 17	Maythaloun/JENIN	M	Shot in neck in night clashes	Mar 27
108.	Omar Mahmoud Hamad Rabai'ah, 23	Maythaloun/JENIN	M	Shot in chest	Mar 27
109.	Fahim Mah. Moh'd Daoud Na'rat, 27	Maythaloun/JENIN	M	Shot in chest	Mar 27
110.	Yasser Assad Ibrahim Khirbawi, 15	Salfit/NABLUS	M	Shot in chest	Mar 27
111.	Hussein Kamel Odeh, 19	Salfit/NABLUS	M	Shot 27 Mar(IN AMBULANCE)	Mar 28
112.	Wajiha Yusef Rabi', 55	Deir Abu Mash'al/RAM	M	Shot in leg; then in neck	Mar 30*
113.	Shaker Ali Moh'd Shaker, 26	Deir Izb'at/RAMALLAH	M	Shot by sniper in chest	Mar 30*
114.	Khaled Moh'd Aref Qassem Salah, 22	Burqa/NABLUS	M	Shot in chest	Mar 30*
115.	AbdulKarim Moh'd Halaika, 24	Shyukh/KHALIL	M	Shot in chest; fell on head	Mar 30*
116.	Hussein Mahmud Hussein, 25	Yamoun/JENIN	M	Shot in head	Mar 30*
117.	Sleiman Ahmad Awwad Jneidi, 18	Yatta/KHALIL	M	Shot in abdomen	Mar 31*
118.	Moh'd Fares Hamed Ziben, 29	Yamun/JENIN	M	Shot on 30 Mar	Mar 31*
119.	Jamal Khalil Tumeizi, 22	Ithna/KHALIL	M	Shot in head	Apr 1*
120.	Ishaq Nimer Silmiyeh, 18	Ithna/KHALIL	M		Apr 1*
121.	Salim Khalef Sha'er, 23	BETHLEHEM	M	Demo/Shot in head	Apr 2*
122.	Jihad Mustafa 'Assi, 18	Beit Liqya/RAMALLAH	M	Army raid/shot in mouth/chest; left to bleed to death	Apr 2*
123.	Khamis Hassan Ahmad, 38	Deir Sudan/RAMALLAH	M	Clash/shot in chest/throat	Apr 2*
124.	Jamil Rashed Kurdi, 55	Sabra/GAZA	M	Assault from van; Shin Bet &/or army; in keffiyehs	Apr 2*
125.	Ahmad Khamis Kurdi, 42-father	Sabra/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 2*
126.	Ala' Ahmad Kurdi, 21-son	Sabra/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 2*
127.	Ali Diab Abu Ali, 46	Yatta/KHALIL	M	Shot in neck 22 Mar	Apr 3*
128.	Hamed Abdul Muhidi Ze'dat, 20	Bani Na'im/KHALIL	M	Demo/	Apr 4*
129.	Hamzeh Ibrahim AbuShab, 20	Bani Sulheila/GAZA	M	Shot in stomach 30 Mar	Apr 4*
130.	Musa Saleh Daud Bani Shamsa, 20	Beita/NABLUS	S	Shot in head by settler tour bus armed guard; in village	Apr 6*
131.	Hatem Fayez Ahmad alJabber, 19	Beita/NABLUS	S	" "	Apr 6*
132.	Issam Abdul Halim Said, 16	Beita/NABLUS	M	Shot down in a field	Apr 7*
133.	Yusef Rabi', 75	Deir Abu Mash'al/RAM	M	Shot in abdomen & thigh 30 Mar; husband of #113	Apr 8*
134.	Jalal Moh'd Milhem, 21	Kufr Rai/JENIN	M	Shot in chest	Apr 11
135.	Moh'd Kamel AbdulQadr Yahia, 20	Kufr Rai/JENIN	M	Shot in back; died in hospital	Apr 11
136.	Fuad Aziz, 21	Kufr Rai/JENIN	M	Shot in head; died in hospital	Apr 11
137.	Wael Hassan Taha, 25	NABLUS	M	Demo/shot in heart	Apr 14*
138.	Nasser Hamed alLidawi, 22	NABLUS	M	Demo at Wael's funeral	Apr 14*



## MARTYRS SHOT DURING UPRISING, continued

#	Name, Age	Residence	By	Context	Date
139.	Jamal Hussein Shehadeh, 17	Breij RC/GAZA	M	Abu Jihad's assassination	Apr 16*
140.	Taysir alBoji, 17	Rafah/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 16*
141.	Atwa Abu Arada, 15	Rafah RC/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 16*
142.	Ayman Abu Amer, 22	Rafah/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 16*
143.	Abdul Muhsen Hanun, 19	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 16*
144.	Fikri Ibrahim alDaghmi, 22	Abasan/GAZA	M	" "	Apr 16*
145.	Bassam alHariri, 25	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	" "	Apr 16
146.	Saadah Karawi, 40	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	" "	Apr 16
147.	Hilmi Ibrahim Abdallah, 23	JENIN	M	" "	Apr 16
148.	Muhie Addin Sawalme, 20	Qabatya/JENIN	M	" "	Apr 16*
149.	Hala Awad Amiri, 20	Habla/TULKARM	M	" "	Apr 16
150.	Munir Ismail alTatari, 32	Jabalya/GAZA	M	Shot on 16 Apr	Apr 17
151.	Iman Omar Abu Kamar	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M		Apr 17*
152.	Farid Ahmad Abu Darras, 25	Khan Yunis/GAZA	M		Apr 17*
153.	Ayda Othman Tofah, 30	Zeitun/GAZA	M	Shot in the chest	Apr 18*
154.	Ahmed Musa Zurub Abu Eiyeh, 20	Rafah/GAZA	M	Shot in the back	Apr 18
155.	Nazaar Moh'd Massad, 26	Faqqa/JENIN	M	Shot after 2 houses demolished on Apr 18	Apr 19
156.	Moh'd Hassan Nassar, 20	Nuseirat RC/GAZA	M	Shot/chest at mock funeral	Apr 20
157.	Moh'd Fayez Abu Ali, 25	Bani Suheila/GAZA	M	Shot in head	Apr
158.	Faraj Ismail Yusef Farrajallah, 25	Idhna/KHALIL	M	Shot in chest	Apr 22
159.	Moh'd Ibrahim Abu Zeid, 16	Qabatya/JENIN	M	Demo/Shot in head	Apr 23*
160.	Ahmad Hassan Salem, 27	Beit Arroush/KHALIL	M	Shot in clashes	Apr 24
161.	Arij Sleiman Daud aDik, 13	Kfur aDik/NABLUS	M	Shot in head while carrying water for TG, on Apr 26	Apr 27*
162.	Sari Hillal, 35	Kfur Malek/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in neck during attack	Apr 28
163.	Naim Yusef AbuFarha, 22	Faqqa/JENIN	M	Commander suspended pending investigation for unnecessary shooting	May 1
164.	Omar Moh'd AbdulHamid Manasra, 18	Bani Naim/KHALIL	M	Shot in head	May 3*
165.	Nidal Salem Balut Manasra, 19	Bani Naim/KHALIL	M	Shot in head	May 3*
166.	Khaled Rafiq Abdul Qader Amira, 23	Balata RC/NABLUS	M	Shot through arms/torso	May 3
167.	Jamal Mahmud Madhun, 20	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Shot in neck; died in Ahli	May 4
168.	Rizek Hussein Sabah, 17	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Died in Ahli	May 4
169.	Judah Abdallah Taiyem, 28	Turmus Aya/RAMALLAH	S	Shot in head by Shilo settler, in his field	May 5*
170.	Ibrahim Moh'd Hussein, 34	Dheishe RC/BETHLEHEM	S	Shot in head in his house	May 7
171.	AbdulKarim Raja Atiyeh, 21	Asakra/BETH	M	Shot in spine 30 Mar	May 12
172.	Mufleh Mahmud Abu Zeid, 30	Qabatya/JENIN	M	Shot when M came to arrest	May 12
173.	Jihad Bassan alAba, 17	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Shot in head	May 16
174.	Ala'addin Moh'd Saleh, 15	Azmut/NABLUS	M	Shot in neck	May 16
175.	Majdi Mahmud Sleiman Hillal, 16	Abwein/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in heart	May 18
176.	Kawthar Khaled Mohammad, 23	Tulkarm RC/TULKARM	M	Shot in chest	May 21
177.	Moh'd Sadi alLulu, 40?	Breij RC/GAZA	M	Shot in heart	May 24
178.	Iyad Abdallah Shanaa, 16	Qalqilya/TULKARM	M	Injured on Feb. 7	May 27*
179.	Amin Rajab Abu Radaha, 14	Jalazon RC/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in head 25 May	May 27
180.	Ina'am Rafiq Ghanem, 25	Jaba'/NABLUS	M	Shot in heart	May 29

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## Martyrs Shot During Uprising, continued.

#	Name, Age	Residence	By	Context	Date
181.	Mustafa Ahmad Odeh Halaika, 20	Shuyukh/KHALIL	S	Car of settler youth entered village; shot him in heart	Jun 3
182.	Moh'd Issa Ghanem, 26	Deir Izb'ia~/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in Safa village	Jun 3
183.	Emad Hussan Hawari, 17	Sebastia/NABLUS	M	Shot in head + chest	Jun 9*
184.	Saed Moh'd alHaik, 18	EinSultan RC/JERICO	M	Shot in heart	Jun 12
185.	Bassem Issa Sabbagh, 21	Jenin RC/JENIN	M	Shot/hit by jeep/rel'd from hosp./arrested/found dead	Jun 12
186.	Deib mahmud Hussein, 42	Abwein/RAMALLAH	M	He is deaf-mute	Jun 13
187.	Nidal Ibrahim Abu Hassan, 20	Battir/BETHLEHEM	M	Soldier said he threw molotov	Jun 15
188.	Taysir hussein Blitat, 27	Beit Furiq/NABLUS	M	Army raid to demolish house	Jun 16
189.	Raed Khaled Yusef alHaj, 17	Khan Yunis RC/ GAZA	M	Shot in heart***	Jun 18
190.	Taalat Khalil Zaqqout, 16	Rafah RC/GAZA	M	Demo/Shot in head !!!	Jun 22
191.	Ibrahim Ghassan Aranqi, 15	Taibe/RAMALLAH	M	Demo/shot in stomach	Jun 29
192.	Arafat Ahmad Hanani, 16	Beit Furiq/NABLUS	M	Died in hospital from leg wound 16 Jun	Jun 30
193.	Fatmeh Yusef Sahwil, 27	Abwein/RAMALLAH	M	Shot in head 18 May	Jul 1
194.	Na'el Khameisi, 17	Zbuba/JENIN	M	Shot in head in Jenin demo	Jul 2
195.	Abdul Qader Hassan Abu Amr (Dababat), 22	Tubas/JENIN	M	Demo/Shot in stomach	Jul 9
196.	Fiyak Sleiman Hussein Radwan, 25	Jabalya RC/GAZA	M	Shot in heart	Jul 10
197.	Zuhdi Mansour Breiki, 17	Old Askar RC/NABLUS	M	Shot twice in thighs	Jul 10
198.	Hassan Ahmad Jabber Adis, 16	ANABTA / TULKARH	M	Shot several times; Skull-fractured	Jul 11
199.	Fares Anabtawi, 17	Nablus	M	(Hit in Hosp) shot	Jul 11

\*\*\*There were reports that he was shot, then choked to death. The case is under investigation.  
!!!His mother is in prison

\* = confirmed by fieldwork; in database

M = occupation forces (military, police, border guards, security services, civil admin. officials)  
S = settler acting in civilian capacity; C = collaborator; ? = unknown

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## PALESTINE HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION CENTER, JERUSALEM

## Uprising Martyrs: Beaten/Burned/Electrocuted/Stabbed

Name, Age	Residence	Context	Date
1. Subhiyeh Darwish Hashash, 55	Balata RC/NABLUS	Beaten 20 Dec; died from resulting complications	Jan 18*
2. Mohammad Mahmoud Ibeid, 28	Ram/JERUSALEM	Ordered out of car & beaten with clubs & gunbutts; died in Maqassad Hospital; official cause of death: heart attack	Jan 30*
3. Mohammad Mahmud Badran, 34	Jabalya/GAZA	Beaten on head 9 Dec and again in Feb	Feb 4
4. Rami Aklouk, 15	Deir Balah/GAZA	Beaten on head 6 Feb; died in Maqassad hospital	Feb 7
5. Ayad Mohammad Akel, 17	Breij RC/GAZA	Taken from home by soldiers & beaten on head; found hours later	Feb 8
6. Khader Elias Tarazi, 19	Gaza City/GAZA	Beaten in a home; strapped to jeep; reported dead at Soroka Hospital of head wound	Feb 9*
7. Anwar Amireh, 27	Bireh/RAMALLAH	Arrested, seen being beaten on 23 Feb; body found by police & returned to family 27 Feb	Feb 23*
8. Yusif Tawfiq alKilani, 21	Ya'abad/JENIN	Beaten; run over by military jeep	Feb 25*
9. Kamleh Mahmud Sharaf, 60	Breij RC/GAZA	Beaten on head in her house; army threatened family to report death by "natural causes"	Mar 11
10. Mohammad Skafi, 4 yrs.	Shuja'iyeh/GAZA	Soldier lobbed teargas into house which ignited stove; boy died from burns 4 hrs later	Mar 12*
11. Moh'd Mahmud Khaled, 19	EinBeitalMaa/NABLUS	Beaten on head; shot in leg**	Mar 18*
12. Moh'd Mahmud Abdul Rahman Hamed, 24	Silwad/RAMALLAH	Beaten on 4 Feb; died from apparent internal injuries; in hosp.	Mar 19*
13. Omar Hassan AbuMarahil, 27	Beit Lehiya/GAZA	Body found, with evidence of beating on head, near Beit Hanoun	Mar 21
14. Khalil Khamzawi, 18	Askar RC/NABLUS	Electrocuted while removing boots from power line; under army orders	Apr 3
15. Suad Ahmed Yusef, 90	Zeitun/GAZA	Beaten in home; died in Ahli Hosp.	Apr 12
16. Ibrahim Abu Aishe, 71	KHALIL	Apparently beaten by settlers on 12 May	May 15
17. Husni Moh'd Mahsiri, 40+	Beit Jala/BETHLEHEM (Duha)	Beaten body found in Moshav Beit Meir; suspected by settlers	May 16
18. Hussein Juma' AbuJalaleh, 20	Jabalya RC/GAZA	Died in hospital, 1 day after beaten on head during curfew lifting; also beaten 2 months earlier	Jun 7

\*\* = originally reported as shooting death, but medical report and field information indicates that the cause of death was the beating on the head; he was also shot in the leg.



## PALESTINE HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION CENTER, JERUSALEM

## UPRISING MARTYRS: TEARGAS RELATED

#	Name , Age	Residence	Context	Date
1.	Najwa Masri, 18	Beit Hanoun/GAZA	Hit by teargas cannisters in demonstration as she tried to help dying youth	Dec 15*
2.	Khalil Mahsiri, 76	Bireh/RAMALLAH	Teargassed after Friday prayers at alAqsa Mosque	Dec 18*
3.	Amal AbdulWahad Qseisa, 5d.	Jabalya RC/GAZA	Teargassed in home when camp curfewed; turned blue & probably died on 23 Dec, but death not reported until 25 Dec	Dec 23*
4.	Raed Obeid, 3 mos.	Jabalya RC/GAZA	Teargassed in home 15 Dec	Jan 1
5.	Mariam Abu Zahir, 81	Jabalya RC/GAZA	2 teargas cannisters landed in her house 1 Jan; she lost consciousness & died the next day	Jan *
6.	Wijdan Faris, 38 + 9 month fetus	Khan Yunis/GAZA	Teargassed in home; died in hospital	Jan 10*
7.	Amira Askar, 35 + 40 day fetus	Jabalya RC/GAZA		Jan 11
8.	Fayrouz Ahmad Shobaki, 11	Deir Amaar RC/RAMALLAH	Helicopters dropped teargas; overcome by gas, she was taken to hospital, but died on way.	Jan 13*
9.	Samer Ali Juma'a Badaha, 5m.	Deir Amaar RC/RAMALLAH	Same as above; died next day	Jan 14*
10.	Imad Hamdi Abu Asi, 15 d.	Zeitun Qtr/GAZA		Jan 14
11.	Moh'd Khaled Shahin, 75 d.	Zeitun Qtr/GAZA	In home; died in 5 hrs.	Jan 14*
12.	Moh'd Ramadan Tubbaza, 17	Nuseirat RC/GAZA	Heavily TGed at mosque 9 Jan, then beaten; foam in one lung	Jan 14*
13.	Amna Darwish, 72	GAZA		Jan 16
14.	Haitham Shqeiro, 4 m.	Qalqilya/TULKARM	Carried by mother on street when demo teargassed; died in hosp.	Jan 16*
15.	Abdul Fattah Maqawi, 2 mo.	Qalqilya/TULKARM	TG on 15 Jan, with immediate distress, but taken to hosp. next day; twin bro. in hosp. 12 days	Jan 16*
16.	Fatmeh Salman, 57	Beit Safafa/BETHLEHEM	Teargassed on street	Jan 23*
17.	Fatmeh alQidri, 1 day	Khan Yunis/GAZA	Pre-mature birth from teargas	Dec *
18.	Khaled alQidri, 14 days	Khan Yunis/GAZA	Fatmeh's twin	Dec 13*
19.	Omar Juma' alRa'i, 62	Shujaiyeh/GAZA	Teargassed 13 Feb	Feb 14
20.	Rana Mahmud Adwan, 3 mos.	Rafah RC/GAZA		Feb 17
21.	Arafat Moh'd Abu Rous, 6 mo.	Rafah RC/GAZA	TGed in home in am; died at night	Feb 17*
22.	Ranin Yusef Sfair, 3 mos.	Rafah/GAZA		Feb 21
23.	Ahmad Sadek Abu Salheia, 65	NABLUS	Hit by TG + RB by his shop	Feb 21*
24.	Fuad Aiyub Sha'rawi, 48	KHALIL	Teargas dropped into mosque by helicopter; hit in head	Feb 26*
25.	Suleiman Taher, 65?	Baka Sharqiyeh/TULKARM	Teargassed 26 Feb	Mar 2
26.	Khitam Sabri 'Aram, 8	Rafah/GAZA	In schoolyard demonstration	Mar 3*
27.	Salahaddin Nakeeb, 33	Askar RC/NABLUS		Mar 7
28.	Salim Moh'd Musa Amer, 43 d.	Khan Yunis/GAZA	TG in home; died next day; Nasr hosp. afraid to give death cert.	May 7*
29.	Khaled Mustafa Hawajreh, 2.5 m.	Breif RC/GAZA	TG Mar 7 under curfew; died in hospital Mar 8	Mar 8*
30.	Shirin AbdulMunem Elayan, 4 m	Deir Balah RC/GAZA		Mar 8



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 UPRISING MARTYRS: TEARGAS RELATED, continued  
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#	Name, Age	Residence/Region	Notes	Date
31.	Yusef Hassuna, 3 mos.	Deir Balah RC/GAZA		Mar 8
32.	Sanaar Samir Ebeid, 40 days	Khan Yunis RC/GAZA		Mar 9
33.	Yahia alMaghrabi, 2 mos.	Zeitun/GAZA	Teargassed Feb 13	Mar 13
34.	Salim al Yahia, 60	TULKARM	Teargas in house	Mar 16
35.	Juma' Ibrahim alTukhi, 55	alAmar RC/RAMALLAH	Teargassed 16 Mar	Mar 17*
36.	Ali Moh'd Abu Hajjar, 70	Jabalya RC/GAZA		Mar 18
37.	Alaa' Omar Abu Sharifa, 4 m.	Shati RC/GAZA		Mar 21
38.	Hussein Fares Iqmeil, 70	Qabatya/JENIN	Teargassed same day	Mar 21
39.	Mustafa Srur, 60	Shati RC/GAZA	Teargassed on 18 Mar/asmatic	Mar 23
40.	Nabila Ali Yajizi, 30	Sheikh Radwan/GAZA	Teargassed 24 Mar	Mar 26*
41.	Shirin Ali Maniarawi, 1 mo.	Rafah RC/GAZA	Teargassed 28 Mar	Mar 29*
42.	Hamid Abdallah Asmadi, 20 d.	Qabatya/JENIN	Died in Jenin hosp. 2 weeks after teargassed (21 Mar)	Apr 2
43.	Rajib Ahmad Sulaibi, 75	Shati RC/GAZA	Teargassed 3 Apr	Apr 4*
44.	Subhiyeh Rashid Mankush, 60	Shati RC/GAZA	Teargassed in demo; suffered from a heart disease	Apr 9*
45.	Hassan Mahmud Qaud, 22	Shati RC/GAZA	TG/helicopter, by house died in hosp. 5 hrs later	Apr 12*
46.	Wadfa Faraj Allah, 70	Jabalya RC/GAZA	Teargassed in her house	Apr 17*
47.	Jamal Hussein Alqam, 1 week	Shu'fat RC/JERUSALEM	Teargassed in home	Apr 17*
48.	Zeid Tawfiq Amarnah, 14	Yaabad/JENIN	Hit in head by TG cannister	Apr 17*
49.	Ismail Abu Sheikh, 50	Qalqilya/TULKARM	TG at home; had cancer	Apr 20*
50.	Naima Moh'd 'Adi, 55	Beit Ummar/KHALIL	Teargassed in home 23 Apr	Apr 24*
51.	Moh'd Atyan Hamad, 28	Silwad/RAMALLAH	Died in Kfur Yuna Prison from TG	Apr 23
52.	Moh'd Samhan AbdulQader Samhan, 52	RasKarkar/RAMALLAH		Apr 24*
53.	Khaled Hasan Najjar, 55	Shati RC/GAZA	TG in house; died in Shifa Hosp. Official autopsy showed no sign of "poison;" official cause of death = heart attack, but reeked of teargas at hospital	May 4*
54.	Dina Munir aSawafri, 3	Zaitoun/GAZA	Taken to Ahli Hosp.	May 27
55.	Abdallah Khaled Mubarak Khalaf, 27	Ezzariyeh/BETHLEHEM	Died in Maqassad hosp. one month after heart attack when hit by TG cannister & inhaled large amt	Jun 8*
56.	Maisa Jaffal, 40 day	Dhahiriyyeh/KHALIL	TG fell in room as her family visited in Dheishe RC	Jun 8*
57.	Khaled Sha'abelu, 35	Rafidiyyeh/NABLUS	TGed in town; heart condition	Jun 30
58.	Tawfiq Jaafer Malamha, 55	Qabatya/JENIN	TGed 27 Jun	Jun 3

\* = confirmed by fieldwork, with available documentation; others in process.  
 ! = Originally reported as a shooting death; confirmed that cause of death  
 was blow by TG cannister.

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שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

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בחירות 88

להלן הנוסח המלא של נאום ההסכמה של דוקקים בנעילת ועידת הדמוקרטים באטלנטה.

יוסי גל

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# Text of Dukakis Speech Accepting the Democratic Presidential Nomination

Special to The New York Times

ATLANTA, July 21 — Following is the text of the speech of acceptance of the Democratic Presidential nomination prepared for delivery by Michael S. Dukakis to the Democratic National Convention tonight:

My fellow Americans.

Sixteen months ago, when I announced my candidacy for the Presidency of the United States, I said this campaign would be a marathon. Tonight, with the wind at our backs, with friends by our side, with courage in our hearts, the race to the finish line begins.

And we're going to win this race.

We're going to win because we are the party that believes in the American dream.

A dream so powerful that no distance of ground, no expanse of ocean, no barrier of language, no distinction of race or creed or color can weaken its hold on the human heart.

I know, because I am a product of that dream.

A dream that brought my father to this country 76 years ago, that brought my mother and her family here one year later — poor, unable to speak English, but with a burning desire to succeed in their new land of opportunity.

And tonight in the presence of that marvelous woman who is my mother and who came here 75 years ago; with the memory in my heart of the young man who arrived at Ellis Island with only \$25 in his pocket, but with a deep and abiding faith in the promise of America; tonight, as a son of immigrants with a wonderful wife and four terrific children is a proud public servant who has cherished every minute of the last 16 months on the campaign trail, I accept your nomination for the Presidency of the United States.

My friends, the dream that carried me to this platform is alive tonight in every part of this country — and it's what the Democratic Party is all about.

Henry Cisneros of Texas, Bob Matsui of California, Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, Mario Cuomo of New York, Claude Pepper of Florida and Jesse Louis Jackson.

A man who has lifted so many hearts with the dignity and the hope of his message throughout this campaign; a man whose very candidacy says to every child — aim high to every citizen — you count; to every voter — you can make a difference; to every American — you are a full shareholder in our dream.

## A New Era Is About to Begin

My friends, if anyone tells you that the American dream belongs to the privileged few and not to all of us, you tell them that the Reagan era is over and a new era is about to begin.

Because it's time to raise our sights — to look beyond the cramped ideals and limited ambitions of the past eight years — to recapture the spirit of energy and of confidence and of idealism that John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson inspired a generation ago.

It's time to meet the challenge of the next American Frontier — the challenge of building an economic future for America that will create good jobs at good wages for every citizen in this land, no matter who they are or where they come from or what the color of their skin.

It's time to rekindle the American spirit of invention and daring, to exchange voodoo economics for can-do economics, to build the best America by bringing out the best in every American.

It's time to wake up to the new challenges that face the American family. Time to see that young families in this country are never again forced to choose between the jobs they need and the children they love; time to be sure that parents are never again told no matter how long they work or how hard their child tries, a college education is a right they can't afford.

It's time to ask why it is that we have run up more debt in this country in the last eight years than we did in the previous 200; and to make sure it never happens again.

It's time to understand that the greatest threat to our national security in this hemisphere is not the Sandinistas — it's the avalanche of drugs that is pouring into this country and poisoning our children.

I don't think I have to tell any of you how much we Americans expect of ourselves or how much we have a right to expect from those we elect to public office.

Because this election isn't about ideology. It's about competence. It's not about over-

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throwing governments in Central America; it's about creating good jobs in middle America.

It's not about insider trading on Wall Street; it's about creating opportunity on Main Street.

### Values, Not Meaningless Labels

It's not about meaningless labels. It's about American values. Old-fashioned values like accountability and responsibility and respect for the truth. And just as we Democrats believe that there are no limits to what each citizen can do, so we believe there are no limits to what America can do.

Yes, I know, this fall, we're going to hear a lot of Republican talk about how well some neighborhoods and some regions of this country are doing; about how easy it is for some families to buy a home or to find child care or to pay their doctor's bills or to send their children to college.

But maintaining the status quo — running in place — standing still — isn't good enough for America. Opportunity for some isn't good enough for America.

My friends, we're going to forge a new era of greatness for America.

We're going to take America's genius out of cold storage and challenge our youngsters; we're going to make our schools and universities and laboratories the finest in the world and we're going to make teaching a valued and honored profession once again.

We're going to light fires of innovation and enterprise from coast to coast; and we're going to give those on welfare the chance to lift themselves out of poverty; to get the child care and the training they need; the chance to step out into the bright sunshine of opportunity and of hope and of dignity.

We're going to invest in our urban neighborhoods; and we're going to work to revitalize small town and rural America. We're going to give our farm families a price they can live on, and farm communities a future they can count on.

And we're going to build the kind of America that Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas has been fighting for 40 years; the kind of America where hard work is rewarded; where American goods and American workmanship are the best in the world and where our workers have at least 60 days' notice when their plants or factories shut down.

Now, I know I have reputation for being a frugal man. In nine years, I've balanced nine more budgets than this Administration has and I've just balanced a tenth. And I've worked with the citizens of my state — worked hard to create hundreds of new jobs — and I mean good jobs, jobs you can raise a family on, jobs you can build a future on, jobs you can count on.

### Progress Through Community

I'm proud of our progress, but I'm even prouder of the way we've made that progress — by working together; by excluding no one and including everyone: business and labor; educators and community leaders and just

plain citizens — sharing responsibility; exchanging ideas; building confidence about the future.

And what we have done reflects a simple but very profound idea — an idea as powerful as any in human history.

It is the idea of community.

It is the idea that we are in this together; that regardless of who we are or where we come from or how much money we have — each of us counts. And that by working together to create opportunity and a good life for all — all of us are enriched — not just in economic terms, but as citizens and as human beings.

It is an idea that was planted in the New World by the first Governor of Massachusetts.

"We must," said John Winthrop, "love one another with a pure heart fervently. We must delight in each other, make each other's condition our own, rejoice together, mourn together, and suffer together. We must be knit together as one."

John Winthrop wasn't talking about material success. He was talking about a country where each of us asks not only what's in it for us, but what's good and what's right for all of us.

When a young mother named Dawn Lawson leaves seven years of welfare to become a personnel specialist in a Fortune 500 company in Worcester, Massachusetts — we are all enriched and ennobled.

When a Catholic priest named Bill Kraus helps homeless families in Denver not just by giving them shelter, but by helping them to find the jobs they need to get back on their feet, we are all enriched and ennobled.

When a high school principal named George McKenna and a dedicated staff of teachers and counselors create a real environment for learning at the George Washington Preparatory High school in Los Angeles; a high school that is 90 percent black and 10 percent Hispanic and has 80 percent of its graduates admitted to college; we are all enriched and ennobled.

### How We Are All Enriched

When a dedicated new management team and a fine union in Milwaukee work together to turn Harley-Davidson around and help it come back to life, we are all enriched and when a man named Willie Velazquez y cuando un Willie Velasquez can register tens of thousands of his fellow citizens as voters, puede inscribir decenas de miles de sus conciudadanos para votar and bring new energy and new ideas and new people brindando así nuevas energías, nuevas ideas, nuevas personas into courthouses and city halls and state capitals all across the Southwest a los gobiernos municipales y estatales a del suroeste — we are all enriched and ennobled todos nos enriquecemos y ennobecemos.

As President, I'm going to be setting goals for our country; not goals for our government working alone; I mean goals for our people working together. I want businesses to be wise enough and innovative enough to re-





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train their workers, to re-tool their factories, and to help rebuild their communities.

I want students and office workers and retired teachers to share with a neighbor the precious gift of literacy.

I want bricklayers and carpenters and developers and community action agencies to help create decent and affordable housing for every family, and to end the shame of homelessness in America.

I want our young scientists to dedicate their great gifts not to the destruction of life, but to its preservation; to wage war on hunger and pollution and infant mortality; and to win the war against AIDS, the greatest public health emergency of our lifetime, and a disease that must be conquered.

I want a new Attorney General to work with me and with law enforcement officials all over America to reclaim our streets and neighborhoods from those who commit violent crime.

And I want the members of Congress to work with me so that, at long last, we can make good on Harry Truman's commitment to basic health insurance for every family in America.

My friends, the dream that began in Plymouth 360 years ago; the spirit that survived that terrible winter at Valley Forge and triumphed on the beach at Normandy; the courage that looked Khrushchev in the eye during the Cuban missile crisis — is as strong and as vibrant today as it has ever been.

We must — we are — and we will be — militarily strong.

### Policy Based on Principle

But we must back that military strength with economic strength; we must give the men and women of our armed forces weapons that work; we must have a Secretary of Defense who will manage — and not be managed by — the Pentagon; and we must have a foreign policy that reflects the decency and the principles and the values of the American people.

President Reagan has set the stage for deep cuts in nuclear arms — and I salute him for that.

He has said that we should judge the Soviet Union not by what it says, but by what it does — and I agree with that.

But we can do a lot more to stop the spread of nuclear and chemical arms; we can do a lot more to bring peace to Central America and to the Middle East; and we can and we will do a lot more to end apartheid in South Africa.

John Kennedy once said that America "leads the ... world, not just because we are the richest or the strongest or the most powerful, but because we exert that leadership for the cause of freedom around the globe ... and ... because we are moving on the road to peace."

We must always be prepared to defend our freedom.

But we must always remember that our greatest strength comes not from what we

possess, but from what we believe; not from what we have, but from who we are.

I've been asked many times over the past 16 months if I have one very special goal for these next four years — something that reflects everything I stand for and believe in as an American.

The answer to that question is yes, I do.

Because four years from now, when our citizens walk along Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., or when they see a picture of the White House on television, I want them to be proud of their government; proud of a government that sets high standards not just for the American people, but high standards for itself.

We're going to have a Justice Department that isn't the laughing stock of the nation — we're going to have a Justice Department that understands that the word "justice" means.

We're going to have nominees to the Federal bench who are men and women of integrity and intelligence and who understand the Constitution of the United States.

We're going to have an Environmental Protection Agency that's more interested in stopping pollution than in protecting the polluters.

We're going to have a real war — not a phony war — against drugs; and we won't be doing business with drug-running Panamanian dictators.

We're going to have a Vice President who won't sit silently by when somebody at the National Security Council comes up with the cockamamie idea that we should trade arms to the Ayatollah for hostages; we're going to have a Vice President named Lloyd Bentsen who will walk into the Oval Office and say, "Mister President, this is nuts."

### Vow on Dukakis White House

And in the Dukakis White House, as in the Dukakis State House; if you accept the privilege of public service, you had better understand the responsibilities of public service. If you violate that trust, you'll be fired; if you violate the law, you'll be prosecuted; and if you sell arms to the Ayatollah, don't expect a pardon from the President of the United States.

Tuesday night, along with millions of other Americans, I was inspired by the powerful words of Jesse Jackson. And Monday night, I laughed and was moved by the wit and wisdom of Ann Richards.





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What stirred me most on Monday was a grandmother talking about her "nearly perfect" granddaughter; and what stirred me most on Tuesday were those fine handsome and proud and articulate Jackson children talking about their hopes and the future of this country.

You know, young Jacqueline Jackson goes to school in Massachusetts. And last month, she visited with me at the State House in Boston. She's a remarkable young woman, and I know her parents are very proud of her.

My thoughts tonight — and my dreams for America — are about Ann Richards's granddaughter Lily; about Jackie Jackson; and about the baby that's going to be born to our son, John, and his wife, Lisa, in January.

God willing, our first grandchild will reach the age that Jackie Jackson is now at the beginning of a new century. And we pray that he or she will reach that age with eyes as filled with the sparkle of life and pride and optimism as that young woman we watched together two nights ago.

Yes, my friends, it's a time for wonderful new beginnings.

A little baby.

A new Administration.

A new era of greatness for America.

And when we leave here tonight, we will leave to build the future together.

To build the future so that when our children and grandchildren look back in their time on what we did in our time; they will say that we had the wisdom to carry on the dreams of those who came before us; the courage to make our own dreams come true; the foresight to blaze a trail for generations yet to come.

And as I accept your nomination tonight, I can't help recalling that the first marathon was run in ancient Greece, and that on important occasions like this one, the citizens of Athens would complete their ceremonies by taking a pledge.

That pledge — that covenant — is, as eloquent and timely today as it was 2000 years ago.

"We will never bring disgrace to this, our country, by any act of dishonesty or cowardice. We will fight for the ideals of this, our country. We will revere and obey the laws. We will strive to quicken our sense of civic duty. Thus, in all these ways, we will transmit this country greater, better, stronger, prouder and more beautiful than it was transmitted to us."

That is my pledge to you, my fellow Democrats.

And that is my pledge to you, the American people.



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שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון  
טופס מברר

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מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

בחירות 88

להלן נייר המסכם הצהרותיו ועמדותיו של המועמד הדמוקרטי לנשיאות  
בנושאים שלנו.

י. יוסף גל

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MIKE DUKAKIS ON ISSUES OF CONCERN  
TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

*Summary of Key Points*

This section is a summary of Mike Dukakis's record and positions on various issues of concern to the American Jewish community.

PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL

>>> Israel and the United States. He believes there is a fundamental relationship between the United States and Israel which is broadly shared by the American people. "[T]he American people have understood that Israel's fate is our fate. That our security interests are linked. And that our historical and cultural bonds cannot and will not be broken. The first thing anyone must understand about the Middle East is that we will never let Israel down." [p. 1]

>>> Direct Peace Negotiations. He believes a lasting and secure peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors can only be achieved through direct negotiations. "Real progress toward peace will not be made until Arab leaders are willing to negotiate directly [with Israel]; until they accept Israel's right to exist, and to exist within borders that are secure and defensible." [p.1]

>>> Arms Sales. He believes arms sales to Arab nations which undermine Israel's security are unacceptable. "We will oppose arms sales that would endanger the security of Israel or her people...." [p. 2]

>>> Zionism and Racism. He believes the United Nations resolution 3379 equating Zionism and racism is "an expression of the world turned upside down." He signed a Commonwealth of Massachusetts proclamation condemning any linkage between the two and calling for repudiation of the resolution, "[which] should be considered bigotry and therefore inconsistent with the declared purposes of the United Nations." [p. 2]

>>> Israel's Borders. He believes A return to Israel's pre-1967 borders is unacceptable. "Israel needs room to breathe, and a return to the 1967 borders is out of the question." [p. 3]

>>> Soviet Union in the Middle East. He believes the United States should set stringent conditions on Soviet involvement in the Middle East peace process. "The next President must challenge the Soviets to use their influence with Syria to end that country's obstructionist approach to the peace process. He must press the Soviet Union to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Israel and...cease [its] support for resolutions seeking to expel Israel from the United Nations." [p. 3]

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>>> Jerusalem. He believes Israel should retain control over a unified Jerusalem, and that the United States should accept Jerusalem as Israel's capital. "If Israel wants its capital in Jerusalem, then, as far as I am concerned, its capital is in Jerusalem....That's their judgment to make....They say their capital is in X, then that's where we go." [pp. 3-4]

>>> Arab Boycott of Israel. He believes the Arab boycott of Israel is "morally reprehensible," and became the first governor in the nation to require companies doing business with the Massachusetts state government to agree not to participate in the boycott. "We are saying...that companies which want state business must make a choice -- compliance with the Arab boycott will mean the loss of state contracts." [p. 4]

>>> Aid to Israel. He believes generous levels of economic and military assistance to Israel and Egypt must be maintained. "[O]ur close working relationship with Israel...makes the Israeli component of our foreign assistance program beneficial and productive for the United States itself." [p. 5]

>>> Strategic Cooperation. He believes in shared United States-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation, and has repeatedly stated that, as President: "I will strengthen America's strategic relationship with Israel." [pp. 5-6]

>>> Negotiations with the PLO. He believes the PLO must be excluded from Middle East peace negotiations "until it renounces terrorism in word and deed; until it accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and until it clearly and explicitly renounces its own covenant...that peace can only come at the price of Israel's right to exist." [p. 6]

>>> Terrorism. He believes the United States must deal forcefully and unequivocally with terrorists. "We must never again make concessions to terrorists....And we must be willing to use force...to respond to or prevent terrorist attacks, and to apprehend those who have committed acts of terrorism...." [p. 6]

>>> Arab Recognition of Israel. He believes the refusal of Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist within secure and defensible borders has been the major obstacle to peace in the Middle East. "...[T]his situation wouldn't be a problem today if leaders of the Arab world had done what they should have 40 years ago or 20 years ago or 15 years ago, and that is to sit down and negotiate a permanent peace which recognizes Israel's right to exist." [p. 7]

>>> Palestinian State. He believes the issue of an independent Palestinian state is for the parties to resolve. "As a practical matter, if Israel and/or Jordan don't want an independent



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Palestinian state...you are not going to have an independent Palestinian state." He has also opposed resolutions calling for Palestinian self-determination proposed for the platforms of the Massachusetts Democratic Party (1985), the California Democratic Party (1988) and the national Democratic Party (1988). [pp. 7-8]

>>> U.S. Imposition of a Peace Settlement. He believes outside powers cannot impose a stable peace agreement in the Middle East. "The United States cannot and should not seek either to dictate a peace process, or to impose a peace settlement, in the Middle East. No proposed settlement that is unacceptable to Israel and Jordan will be acceptable to the United States." [pp. 8-9]

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ISRAEL

>>> Massachusetts-Israel Exchange. Under his leadership, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to enter into a comprehensive, formal agreement with the State of Israel to foster mutually-beneficial economic development projects in the areas of trade, science and technology, travel and tourism, education and medicine. [p. 10]

>>> Target Market. Massachusetts lists Israel as one of its international business target markets, along with Japan and the principal industrial nations of Western Europe. [p. 10]

#### ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE HOLOCAUST

>>> Anti-Semitic Violence. He believes racial, religious and ethnic intolerance are abhorrent, and, as Governor, he signed religious vandalism legislation, which put teeth in existing state laws prohibiting acts of harassment and vandalism motivated by such intolerance. "Intolerance of a person's race or religion or ethnic background is a terrible thing. When that intolerance is shown by senseless violence against churches, synagogues, schools or burial grounds, the good people of this state won't tolerate it..." [p. 11]

>>> U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Mike and Kitty Dukakis have been in the forefront of Holocaust awareness, and, in 1985, chaired a state dinner at the Massachusetts State House to benefit the construction of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. The first event of its kind in support of the Museum, the dinner raised over \$1 million. Kitty Dukakis was a member of the President's U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council. [pp. 11-12]

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>>> Annual Holocaust Service. Mike and Kitty Dukakis host the annual Holocaust memorial service at the Massachusetts State House. Mike Dukakis observed at the 1988 service: "...[H]ow many could have been saved if there was an Israel then -- that too we must contemplate, while, thankfully, there is an Israel now -- 40 years later -- that the United States will never let down." [pp. 12-13]

#### SOVIET JEWRY

>>> Political Intervention for Refuseniks. He has taken a leading role among American political leaders in seeking freedom for Soviet Jewish refuseniks. "The President of the United States is uniquely suited to achieve significant breakthroughs with the Soviet Union on behalf of [Soviet Jewish refuseniks], as part of a consistent and coherent approach toward this country's dealings with the Soviet leadership. As President, such efforts would be a major priority of my administration." [p. 14]

>>> Jackson-Vanik Amendment. He supports the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which makes "most favored nation" trade status for the Soviet Union dependent upon increased emigration from the Soviet Union. "I support the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We must continue to review carefully the policies of countries subject to Jackson-Vanik to ensure the greatest flow of emigration possible." [pp. 14-15]

>>> Freedom for Soviet Jews. He personally intervened in the successful efforts to gain freedom for the Fuchs-Rabinovich, Aronov and Charny families. [pp. 15-16]

#### CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION

>>> Separation of Church and State. He is firmly in the American political tradition of separation of church and state. "Jefferson's view of the desirability maintaining a 'wall of separation' between church and state is as valid today as when he pronounced it 200 years ago...I oppose attempts to introduce religion in our public schools. And I oppose vouchers or tuition tax credits for private schooling." [p. 17]

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דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן חשור:		אל:
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התוצאה המיידית מהמאבק הפרסונלי בין ג'קסון לדוקקיס היתה הפיכתם של כמה נושאים וביניהם תמז"ת לכלים במאבק. הארועים בשטחים והכיסוי התקשורתי הרחב הניחן להם בארה"ב הגביר את המודעות למצב במז"ת וכבר בשבועות שקדמו לוועידה קיבלנו אינדיקציות ברורות שבכמה מדינות חל סחף במעמדה של ישראל ובתמיכה בה.

יהיה ההסבר אשר יהיה לעובדה שאנשי דוקקיס חסכימו לחעלאת הנושא במליאת הוועידה באטלנטה - אי אפשר להתעלם מכך שזה קרה בפעם הראשונה ובמפלגה שאחוז הפעילים והמצביעים היהודים גבוה בה. אי אפשר להתנחט בעובדה שלא היתה הצבעה וגם לא בנימוק שאילו היתה הצבעה, מתנגדי תיקון ג'קסון היו זוכים ברוב מוחלט. להערכתי, הצבעה רק היתה מחמירה את המצב כי היא עלולה היתה להצביע על תמיכה של כשליש מהצירים לוועידה בתיקון של ג'קסון. גם כך רעש מחיאות הכפיים של אנשי ג'קסון והנפת הכרזות שלהם עלו בעצמתם על אלו של אנשי דוקקיס. חבר הקונגרס שומר שדיבר, יחד עם סנטור אינווייט כנגד התיקון, היה הנואם היחיד לאורך כל הוועידה שזכה לקריאות בוז מצירים לוועידה:

מתוך שיחות עם צירים לוועידה נראה מאידך שלרוב הצירים חסר מידע בסיסי על הסכסוך במז"ת ובמידה וקיימת הזדהות עם הנושא הפלשתינאי היא מבוססת ונובעת במידה רבה מעולם המושגים של זכויות אדם והגדרה עצמית יותר מאשר מתוך הבנת הנושא והיבטיו ההיסטוריים והפוליטיים. בשיחה עם דייוויד דיןקלינס, אישיות שחורה דומיננטית בניו-יורק ופעיל מרכזי במחנה ג'קסון, הסתבר שהוא לא מכיר את קמפ-דייוויד ואינו יודע שהוא נולד בתקופתו של נשיא דמוקרטי (אהוד למדי לפי תגובות קהל הצירים), וכי הוא בינתיים הבסיס שעל-פיו נטווגה ישראל משטח שכבושה ב-1967.

ערו

תפוצה:



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שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון  
טופס מברק

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בחירות 88

להלן נייר העמדה בנושאי המז"ת שהופץ על ידי משרדו של סגן הנשיא  
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# George Bush for President

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## MIDDLE EAST POSITION PAPER

### I. Overview

The U.S. believes that promoting the security of Israel and the pro-Western Arab states offers the best path to promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Few foreign policy objectives are more central given the region's chronic instability, strategic location, and central role in the world's long-term supply of energy.

International conflict, sub-national and trans-national terrorism, confessional strife, and the fruits of decades of Soviet ambition and massive supplies of weapons have made the region chronically unstable. This instability threatens America's interest by jeopardizing free nations and placing our access to the region at risk. Located at the confluence of three continents, the Middle East is linked to America's economic security interests in Europe, Africa and Asia. Possessing 75 percent of the free world's known petroleum reserves, the Middle East is vital in the long term to the economic prosperity of democratic regimes throughout the Western alliance.

America's strategic interests are clear; they are:

- The region should be stable, and its nations controlled by governments friendly to the U.S.;
- Israel must remain free, democratic, militarily secure, and economically strong;
- Freedom of the seas and free trade are American traditions. American and allied access to the sea lanes and petroleum resources of the region should be free from interference, whether from regional troublemakers, the Soviet Union, or terrorists.

We must pursue these interests energetically. We will continue to work with moderate Arab nations willing to co-exist with Israel. This should be done in concert with allies where appropriate and practical. But we should be prepared to support our interests in the region alone if necessary to protect the security of the U.S.

*[Handwritten mark]*



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## II. U.S.-Israel Relations: Partners in Freedom

The Bush Presidency will take advantage of the new relationship built with Israel during the Reagan/Bush Administration to enhance the prospects for regional peace and security.

Israel and America are both nations of immigrants. Both were founded by people fleeing religious persecution. Both were born of revolution. Both have a frontier heritage. Both are established in the values embodied in the Holy Scriptures. Both are democracies, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Both cherish the fundamental rights of man -- freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship.

The evolution of Israel's political status with the U.S. -- from that of a threatened dependent in the 1970s to that of an ally and regional partner of the U.S. in the 1980s -- is a crucial transformation. No longer is Israel simply a democratic nation which shares America's religious and immigrant origins, Israel shares our security burdens as well.

Israel is a strategic ally to the U.S. By virtue of its military capability and the values and political objectives it shares with the U.S., Israel buttresses the alliance in its most vulnerable area -- the southern region of NATO and the Eastern Mediterranean. By establishing appropriate policies and institutions, the goal of strategic cooperation with Israel has been achieved. It will be sustained through continued security and economic assistance to Israel, and expansion of existing elements of strategic cooperation including joint exercises, pre-positioning of dual-use stockpiles (including combat equipment, spare parts, and ammunition), intelligence sharing and contingency planning. These measures will serve to strengthen American military power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A joint U.S.-Israeli effort now underway will produce one of the free world's first anti-tactical ballistic missiles in the 1990s, at a time when the proliferation of ballistic missiles is creating new dangers. Joint development efforts now underway for advanced conventional weapon systems will bear the fruit of lower cost, but more effective defense for our two nations in the 1990s. The improved institutions supporting defense cooperation will enable us to jointly strengthen our armed forces in the region, thereby contributing to regional stability. This could only be accomplished by a President who possesses the courage to stand alone as Israel has so often done, to defend freedom and democratic institutions in the region. We will continue to maintain Israel's qualitative advantage over any adversary or coalition of adversaries.



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We will seek the assistance of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions where it will fit into a free nation's own diplomacy. But we will never allow the United Nations or any other multilateral institution to place Israel's or America's security interests at risk.

The domination of the United Nations by nations hostile to both the U.S. and Israel has diminished the usefulness of the organization in the region. The U.S. will not allow the United Nations Security Council to become a forum for one-sided resolutions against our allies, including Israel.

The continued existence of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 which equates Zionism with racism constitutes a fatal flaw in the ability of that organization to serve a useful purpose in the region. We will seek repeal of this Resolution. Failure to repeal that Resolution will justify attenuation of our support of the United Nations to reflect its diminished effectiveness in international affairs. Moreover, the U.S. will withdraw from the United Nations if Israel is ever denied membership.

We oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state; its establishment is inimical to the security interests of Israel, Jordan and the U.S. We will not support the creation of any Palestinian entity that could place Israel's security in jeopardy.

We are proud of the role America has played in the 1980s in encouraging the restructuring of Israel's economy which can lead it from one dominated by governmental institutions to one responding to free markets. The evolution of Israel's economy and the Free Trade Area agreement negotiated with Israel in 1985 will enable the Bush Presidency to bring Israel fully into the economic community of free nations for the long term benefit of both Israel and the U.S.

### III. Peace Process

The process of establishing an enduring peace in the region has evolved over many past Presidencies. The Camp David Accords established a model for the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute through direct negotiations with American assistance. The benefits of peace to both Israel and Egypt are substantial. Both Israel and Egypt are more militarily secure, and both are cooperating effectively with the U.S. in the region.

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The American role as an active, steadfast and fully engaged participant in the search for peace in the Middle East has rewarded the U.S. as well. By assisting both Israel and Egypt to negotiate directly and providing appropriate economic and military assistance subsequent to the Camp David Accords, the three countries have been able to limit the expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union in the region.

Ultimately, direct negotiations are the only viable means of securing peace between Israel and its neighbors. The U.S. cannot and will not impose a settlement, nor will we be a party to any effort to do so through a multilateral entity.

The U.S. will not support any role in the peace process for the PLO unless it recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, renounces terrorism and removes language from its charter demanding Israel's destruction.

The search for peace requires continuous creativity and innovation to adapt to the shifting political requirements in the region. Formulas which were useful points of departure in the past may not be suitable in the future. American diplomacy can remain flexible by building on the bedrock of the peace which now exists between Israel and Egypt. In the long run, the need for both peace and security in the region are not mutually exclusive -- they are mutually reinforcing. To achieve this end, the U.S. must remain powerfully engaged, and to assist in providing an environment where those most immediately concerned can negotiate directly and without fear or intimidation. President Reagan's September 1982 Middle East peace proposal provides a compelling basis for addressing the peace process as well as the Palestinian problem. We will build on this proposal to aid in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. We believe that the most hopeful course of ending the anguish of the Palestinians is to re-energize the peace process. We recognize that there will never be a lasting peace in the area until an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem is found and that the Palestinians must be involved in every step of the process.

Economic growth -- both in Israel and throughout the region can also contribute to peace. More jobs and more opportunities in the West Bank and Gaza, for example, could increase the confidence of Palestinians and make it easier for them to participate directly in shaping a negotiated peace. More jobs and more opportunities in adjoining countries might draw the energies of more young people into building a world for themselves rather than destroying someone else's.



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The U.S. should focus its economic development efforts in the region on critical resource issues. For example, the impending water crisis which will be faced by so many countries in the area -- but most particularly by Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Regional stability could also mean new foreign investment in sorely needed infrastructure projects such as road and electricity.

We will neither give up our hope for peace nor our commitment to helping achieve it. We have no illusions about the difficulties of trying to achieve peace. But the difficulties do not justify despair and should not be an excuse for indifference.

#### IV. U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Middle East

The next President of the U.S. will face a very dynamic situation in the Middle East. The conditions in this vital strategic region have become more satisfactory for Western interests during the Reagan/Bush years. Our strategic relationship with Israel has become firmly established. Acceptance by other Arab states of Egypt's relationship with Israel has been achieved and marked with a reduction in the effectiveness of the radical Arab states and Iran. But there are also new dangers as more and more nations gain access to more destructive long range weapons, and new sources of conflict arise. The Soviet Union we will have to deal with in the Middle East is more sophisticated and more active diplomatically and more credible than at any time in recent years. We would be foolish to ignore the extent to which many of our Middle East friends, including Israel and the pro-Western Arab countries, are making closer contacts with Soviet diplomats.

If the Soviet Union is to have a more constructive role in the region, important changes in its policies need to be made. Its arms export policies have frustrated efforts to end the Iran-Iraq War and have supplied the most violent terror-exporting nations in the region -- Libya and Syria -- with the means to threaten regional peace. The continued Soviet support for the position of the rejectionist Arab states, its refusal to establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, and its reflexive opposition to Israel at the United Nations and other international fora remain obstacles to peace.

This means we must remain strongly committed to those of our policies that have served us well in the past, including military support for our closest friends. But we must also present our own vision of a Middle East and South Asia that demonstrates our own concern about the need for a peaceful resolution of local conflicts and reflects our understanding of the complicated and interlocking trends which are at work throughout the region.



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#### V. Jerusalem

We believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with free and unimpeded access to all holy places by people of all faiths.

#### VI. Egypt

Egypt is the catalyst in the Arab world for advancing the cause of regional peace and security. As the only Arab nation to have formally made peace with Israel, it is reaping its benefits. With American economic and military assistance, Egypt has been increasingly integrated with the economic and defense-related institutions of the West. Egypt's support of the Camp David Accords and its subsequent acceptance into the Arab world demonstrates that an Arab nation can make peace with Israel, be an ally of the U.S., and remain in good standing in the Arab world. The Administration's formal designation of Egypt as a "major non-NATO ally" has served to strengthen American ties with Egypt and will provide the basis for further gains for America's ability to advance the prospects for regional peace and security during the Bush Presidency.

#### VII. Jordan

Jordan is an indispensable element of the Middle East peace process. Moreover, its posture of moderation has served to diminish the effectiveness of the radical rejectionist states of the region. Jordan's contribution to regional stability will be strengthened by continued U.S. encouragement of its economic development. Jordan deserves continued American support, particularly if it is to take the risks of pursuing peace in the Middle East.

#### VIII. The Gulf

Seventy-five percent of the free world's proven oil reserves are in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding Gulf states. It is imperative for the economic well being of Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. that friendly hands remain on the spigot of Arabian Peninsula oil and that the sea lanes and the Strait of Hormuz remain free and open. Our continued support of Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western states in the Gulf is an essential component of our policy. In support of these interests, the U.S. is correct in deploying a naval task force to join with other naval forces to keep the international waterways open during the Iran-Iraq War.



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Allied naval forces are sharing this responsibility by lending the same protection to their vessels that we are providing to U.S. ships and by helping in tasks such as mine sweeping. By doing so, we have led the way in which the burden is shared among our principal allies. Moreover, it has created political leverage for us which has countered Iranian coercion and helped to sober the Iranian leadership. In doing so, it has helped to create the conditions to help bring an end to the Iran-Iraq War.

Because of the critical importance of the Gulf region, now and for the long term, we will build on the increased security cooperation with the pro-Western Arab states of the Gulf achieved by the Reagan/Bush Administration to enhance their security while serving U.S. interests.

#### IX. Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a low point in America's international experience during the Carter Administration. Encouraged by the fall of Iran and the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Soviet Union took this action in the atmosphere created by the Democratic Administration's illusions about Soviet intentions and about world politics generally. We were then unable to respond effectively because of the unprecedented deterioration of our relationship with our traditional ally, Pakistan, that had taken place when President Carter controlled American foreign policy.

Forcing a Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was one of the greatest achievements of Reagan/Bush international policy. If the Soviet Union carries through the withdrawal, Afghanistan will join Grenada as one of the first countries where a communist dictatorship submitted to change. This result could not have been achieved without all three mutually-supporting elements of Reagan/Bush policy: negotiations, rebuilding our relationship with neighboring Pakistan, and military assistance to the freedom fighters to change the facts shaping Soviet intentions.

American resolve in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters has achieved its first objective -- forcing a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. This unprecedented event did not take place in a vacuum. Assisting Pakistan in modernizing its armed forces and reforming its economic system was no less important than providing assistance to the freedom fighters. The best guarantor of a free Afghanistan is a pro-Western, democratic, secure and prosperous Pakistan. The initial fruits of our efforts have strengthened our regional influence and enhanced the ability of a Bush Presidency to promote regional peace.

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When the U.S. is engaged in helping Pakistan help itself, we are assuring continued cooperation with Pakistan to create a free Afghanistan as well as advancing other regional objectives such as nuclear non-proliferation and an enduring peace on the Indian subcontinent. The outcome in Afghanistan is not yet irreversible and will continue to require active American engagement.

#### X. Lebanon

Continuing instability in Lebanon is not in the interest of the U.S. Until order is established, Lebanon will be a source of international terrorism and regional instability. Therefore, in order to re-establish normalcy in Lebanon, the U.S. must help to strengthen the hand of the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, who are committed to an independent, peaceful and democratic Lebanon.

In order to achieve this goal, the policy of the U.S. should be based on the principles of preserving the unity of Lebanon; supporting the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; recognition of and respect for the territorial integrity of Lebanon; the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of Lebanon; and finally, the reassertion of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the nation and recognition that its safekeeping must be the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon. We will strive to help Lebanon return to its days as a peaceful country where various religious groups lived in harmony with each other, where international commerce flourishes and international terrorism was non-existent. I have a personal, special investment in a Lebanon at peace.

#### XI. Iran-Iraq War

The U.S. maintains neutrality in the conflict and supports United Nations and other regional efforts to bring about an arms embargo, and a withdrawal of all military forces behind the pre-1980 boundaries, and a permanent peace settlement. The U.S. recognizes that neither an Iranian nor Iraqi military victory would be in the U.S. interest in the region.

#### XII. North Africa

Building upon historically close relations with Morocco and Tunisia, the U.S. should continue military and economic aid to these two countries and continue to be supportive of efforts to resolve the Western Saharan issue.

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In Algeria, the U.S. should seek to strengthen the currently friendly and correct relations to ensure access to oil and gas fields and support Algerian efforts to resolve peacefully the Western Sahara issue.

The U.S. should support all North African efforts aimed at peaceful regional cooperation.

#### XIII. Syria and Libya

Syria and Libya remain hostile and violence-prone elements in a region that yearns for peace and stability. It is unlikely that they will change their policies with the present leadership. However, it remains in our interest to take advantage of a genuine change in policy that would allow these two nations to work toward participating in a meaningful way in the regional peace process.

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### הנדון: עזרה לארה"ב בהקלת הבצורת

ביקר בשגרירות קולונל מנרצ'יק ממשרד סגן הנשיא בוש. הציע שישראל תשגר משלחת של אנשי מקצוע שכראשם תעמוד אישיות מוכרת ותקיים כאן שורה של מפגשים, בווינגטון ובשתיים-שלוש מהמדינות שנפגעו קשה בבצורת.

הפגישה היתה בבחינת גישוש ראשון. ברור שלסגן הנשיא יש עניין פוליטי בכך. אמרנו שעקרונית הדלת פתוחה, ואנחנו יותר מנשמח להגיש כל עצה, ולהעמיד לרשות ארה"ב את כל הידע הקיים ברשותנו. ציינו ששר החקלאות כבר הודיע על כך.

האופציות הקיימות במידה ואנחנו מעוניינים:

1. פנייה מסגן הנשיא בוש אל רוה"מ, ואז המפגש במידה ויתקיים, יהיה בחסות סגן הנשיא.
  2. לקיים את המפגש בחסות משרדי החקלאות של שתי המדינות. מנרצ'יק כבר קיים שיחה ראשונה עם משרד החקלאות האמריקאי, והגישה חיובית לקיום מפגש כזה.
- המשלחת תצטרך להגיע בסוף אוגוסט, עם תום הועידה הרפובליקנית. וושינגטון תהיה אז שוממה מפוליטיקאים, ייתכן שדווקא עובדה זו תתן כיסוי תקשורתי רחב יותר למשלחת.
- ערכה של משלחת כזו הוא בעיקר בתחום יחסי הציבור. היא גם תוכל לתת פרסום מוקדם לסמינר שאנחנו שוקלים לקיים כאן באוקטובר או נובמבר בנושא של חקלאות בתנאי חוסר מים.

באשר לכעיית המימון למשלחת, מנרצ'יק אמר שיוכל למצוא פיתרון.

הבטחתי לו תשובה לקראת המחצית השנייה של השבוע הבא.

י. שחורי, ד. מתני

תפוצה:

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ח' באב תשמ"ח  
22 ביולי 1988  
4-ארה 192

לכבוד  
מר זבולון אורלב  
מנכ"ל משרד הדתות  
ירושלים

הנדון: מכתבך ללשכת רה"מ מיום 11.7.87

רצ"ב החומר המבוקש.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אריה מקל  
יועץ מדיני לראש הממשלה



מדינת ישראל

18/7/88

תאריך

~~א. מ. ק.~~  
א. מ. ק.

~~הממשלה~~ אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש הממשלה.

אשר לטענת א/מ מדיקס ?  
\$ (הוא/היא דיצי).

איכ"ר



ב"ה, כ"ו בתמוז תשמ"ח  
11 ביולי 1988

הנהל - המנהל הכללי  
ישראל

לכבוד  
מר צחי הנגבי  
מנהל לשכת ראש הממשלה  
ירושלים

שלום וברכה,

קראתי בעתונות על בקשת 55 סנטורים לראש הממשלה להקציב 16 מיליון דולר למוסדות תורה.

כמשרד המופקד על הנושא אודה לך אם תוכל להעביר אלינו העתק מהפניה, ואת תשובת ראש הממשלה אם יש כזו.

בכבוד רב,  
זבולון אורלב  
המנהל הכללי





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EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Tel Aviv, Israel

July 21, 1988

Excellency:

Dr. Gene C. Smith, Clerk of the American Baptist Association, has asked me to forward to you the enclosed message on the occasion of Israel's fortieth anniversary.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas R. Pickering  
Ambassador

Enclosure: A/S

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister of the State  
of Israel  
Jerusalem

# Olive Street Baptist Church

DR. GENE C. SMITH, PASTOR

20TH AND OLIVE STREETS  
PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS 71601  
(501) 535-1404

July 12, 1988

The Honorable Yitchik Shamir  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Tel Aviv, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This letter comprises congratulations to your beloved nation, Israel, upon the celebration of your 40th Anniversary. These congratulations are conveyed by me to you from the churches comprising the American Baptist Association.

Please allow me to introduce myself to you and acquaint you with the American Baptist Association. I am the recording clerk of the stated association. The American Baptist Association is comprised of some three thousand churches in the United States of America, and hundreds of churches and missions in foreign countries. On June 21-23, 1988, the messengers or delegates from these said churches met in Albuquerque, New Mexico for our annual assembly. In the morning session on June 23, 1988 there was a formal motion made, seconded and carried unanimously to convey to you our congratulations on your 40th anniversary as a nation. Thus, I am carrying out what I was asked to do, and furthermore I deem it an honor to do so.

I have traveled in your country as have hundreds of my fellow ministers in this fellowship. We deem your nation the chosen nation of Almighty God, and we practice the admonition of Psalms 122:6 which states, "Pray for the peace of Jerusalem".

Again may we say "Congratulations" to your great nation and people on your 40th anniversary.

Sincerely,

*Gene C. Smith*

Dr. Gene C. Smith  
Clerk  
American Baptist Association

GCS:ms



"WHERE THE BIBLE IS PREACHED"

דראש הנמשלה  
ירושלים  
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please accept my congratulations  
on winning the nomination of the  
Democratic Party for the forthcoming  
Presidential election. It was another  
striking demonstration of American  
democracy in action, with which  
we have strong feeling of identification.

Your expressions of understanding  
and support for Israel and its  
quest for peace are much  
appreciated by our people.

י"ב כסלו תשנ"א  
ה' 16/10/73

# מדינת ישראל

האריך .....

אל:

מאת: דובר ראש הממשלה.





Handwritten signature or initials.



Handwritten Hebrew text: "אשר" (Asur) and "חל" (Chal).

With the Compliments  
of the  
Embassy of Israel

Handwritten Hebrew text: "אשר" (Asur).

Handwritten Hebrew text: "נבדק" (Nadok).

Handwritten Hebrew text: "אשר" (Asur).

P.O. BOX 2171,  
WELLINGTON







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Report of the  
Nature Conservation  
Council

for the year ended  
31 March 1988

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*Presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to  
Section 21 of the Nature Conservation Council Act 1962.*

Wellington

May 1988

Madam

I have the honour to submit, in terms of the Nature Conservation Council Act 1962, the annual report of the Nature Conservation Council for the year ended 31 March 1988.

Yours faithfully

Sir John Bennett, Chairman

The Hon. Helen Clark

Minister of Conservation

WELLINGTON

### Introduction

The Nature Conservation Council was established by Act of Parliament in November 1962 with legislation that has stood the test of time. The first report to Parliament contained a statement of the council's intent which included the words: "Its approach to all problems of conservation will be positive and constructive". Whether advising Ministers, government departments, or individuals, the council has operated in this way for 25 years. It has always tried to maintain a common-sense attitude and base its recommendations on a balanced consideration of all sides of an issue.

During the past year, the increasing uncertainty about its future has, at times, tested the council's resolve to remain positive. Nevertheless, it has continued to work in the way outlined in 1963, its constructive advice and comments being sought on a wide range of environmental issues, some of which are covered later in this report.

The year was punctuated by the need to respond to documents prepared as part of the government's "quango review". In August 1987, before producing a public draft document, the Department of Conservation invited the council to comment on a paper which contained broad issues for discussion. The subsequent publication, *Options for Conservation Quangos*, was released for public comment in December 1987, and again the council made a lengthy submission.

An independent analysis of the 468 submissions the government received revealed that 112 directly addressed the future of the Nature Conservation Council. Of these, 76% supported a continuing role for the council and many expanded their support by listing reasons for the council's retention. Such attributes as the council's independence in advocating and investigating conservation issues, its accessibility to the public, and its responsiveness to urgent issues were mentioned in the submissions.

In February 1988, the Department of Conservation produced its position paper, *Review of Conservation Quangos*. It recommended "that the Nature Conservation Council be dissolved, its previous functions taken over by the New Zealand Conservation Authority, the Department of



Conservation, and the Ministry for the Environment..." The council made its own views known to the Associate Minister of Conservation and also issued a press release.

The council saw flaws in the proposed structure which it felt bound to voice. For example, although the Department of Conservation now has responsibility for much of New Zealand's natural environment, it cannot act independently of government and so its advocacy on behalf of conservation before planning tribunals could be in conflict with that of other government interests. The council believed the main weakness with the proposed New Zealand Conservation Authority was the extent of its role. With 12 members drawn from a wide range of interests, it felt there would be a major loss of emphasis on indigenous flora and fauna. Also, the council believed that the proposed schedule of functions for the new authority would necessitate several standing committees, with the possibility that important tasks now performed by this council would not be possible at all.

In all its submissions on environmental restructuring the council has reiterated the need for an advisory body, independent of government, which would be specifically charged with looking after the interests of New Zealand's indigenous flora and fauna, its natural features, and natural beauty. In no way is this a desire to safeguard the council's own existence, but an expression of the need for an independent advisory body.

The council is now awaiting with interest the Cabinet decision on the future structure of conservation quangos.

### **Council Membership and Meetings**

There were no changes in council membership during the year. Current members had been asked to continue serving on the council until 31 March 1988, by which time it had been expected that the review of environmental advisory bodies would have been completed. Council members are listed below:

Sir John Bennett, Kt.Bach., QSO, Havelock North, Chairman  
Mr A.J. Black, CBE, Dunedin  
Assoc. Professor C.W. Burns, CBE, B.Sc. (Hons), Ph.D., Dunedin  
Mr R.W. Cleland, QSM, Pukerau  
Mrs A.L. Eagle, New Plymouth  
Mr E.A.J. Holdaway, OBE, DFC, JP, Auckland  
Mr P.H.C. Lucas, QSO, Wellington  
Miss L.H. Shand, Culverden  
Mr D.G. Thomson, ED, MICE, MIPENZ, Ashburton

Two-day meetings were held in Wellington in April, June, August, October, and December 1987, and in March 1988. An executive group was also convened frequently between meetings to deal with urgent matters.

There was liaison with officers of the Department of Conservation during the year, including a day-long session when individual directors were invited to address council members about their roles within the department.

Liaison between the Environmental Council and the Nature Conservation Council continued, with meetings of each council being attended by the other's executive officer.

### **Conservation New Zealand**

The national and executive committees of Conservation New Zealand met at regular intervals throughout the year to co-ordinate the eighteenth Conservation Week, held in August 1987, and to plan for the nineteenth. The first Conservation Week was organised by the Scout Association in August 1969, after which the council agreed to undertake responsibility for future campaigns, the group of representatives it brought together from relevant organisations becoming known as the National Conservation Week Campaign Committee.

Because its functions had widened, the committee's name was changed to Conservation New Zealand in 1981. Conservation New Zealand activities, and Conservation Week in particular, have now become an integral part of the school and youth group systems, as well as providing an annual focus for the wider community. An indication of how Conservation New Zealand has grown can be gained from the fact that the number of district representatives throughout the country has risen from 33 in 1972 to 103 in 1987. This number is augmented by other individuals and groups who help with the distribution of material and the organisation of activities. Distributing the thousands of copies of each item produced each year would not be possible without the invaluable assistance of everyone involved.

Conservation New Zealand is grateful to all those who contributed to the 1987 campaign. Particularly appreciated was the assistance given by many Department of Conservation officers who assumed responsibility for co-ordinating activities in their areas following the disestablishment of the Department of Lands and Survey, the New Zealand Forest Service, and the Wildlife Service at the end of March 1987.

In August 1987, to coincide with National Parks Centennial Year, the annual concentration of publicity and events took as its theme "What's in a Park?" Last year was also the centennial of Porirua Hospital, which was chosen as the venue for the opening of Conservation Week on 3 August. Both the Hon. Russell Marshall, Minister of Conservation, and the Hon. Margaret Shields, as Member for Kapiti, attended the function, which involved adults and children in tree planting in the hospital grounds.

Publicity and educational material on the parks theme was produced with the help of sponsors. At a function in the Beehive on 23 November 1987, sponsors and other organisations which had contributed to the campaign were presented with awards by the Hon. Helen Clark, who became Minister of Conservation following the August General Election.



The full list of sponsors is as follows:

ANZ Banking Group  
Ashton Scholastic  
Caltex Oil NZ Ltd  
Department of Conservation  
Ministry for the Environment  
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority  
New Zealand Nurserymen's Association  
Post Bank  
Radio New Zealand National Programme  
Roy McKenzie Foundation  
Scout Association  
Todd Foundation

In her speech to sponsors' representatives and other invited guests the Minister said that, without the generosity of sponsors, not only would we lose a week which has an important message to impart to the people of New Zealand, but we would also be without valuable resource material capable of being used by schools and other groups throughout the year and also in years to come.

Young Conservator Awards were presented to two individual students and three school groups in 1987. Justin Blacklock, Rangiora High School, received an award for his study of the freshwater crayfish, or koura, which illustrated the impact of human activity on wetlands. Daniel Wheeler, also of Rangiora High School, obtained his award for his study of introduced predators in the proposed Ashley River Reserve and their effect on endangered bird species nesting in the area. Ridgway School grounds committee, Wellington, earned an award for its ongoing plant programme that has involved all the pupils at the school in a "hands on" experience. An award was presented to Weedons School senior class, Rolleston, for extensive work in the school grounds, including plant propagation, tree planting and irrigation, and also field studies in the wider environment. The Oamaru Intermediate School environmental group's award was for extensive work in the school and local environment, including helping to develop habitat for the endangered yellow-eyed penguin.

In March 1988 conservation citations were presented to three Ashburton people, Mr Jim Ackerley, Mr Neville Adams and Miss Lynn Adams. All members of the Ashburton Branch of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society and Save the Rivers (Canterbury Branch), they have heightened local awareness of the natural values of the Ashburton Lakes and, in particular, have developed protection for endangered birds breeding on Lake Clearwater.

Work is now well under way for the 1988 Conservation Week campaign, "Between Land and Sea". Although sponsorship from the commercial sector has become more difficult to secure, enough has been

obtained to produce a poster, wall frieze, teachers' notes, activity sheets, bookmarks, and a car sticker.

The 1989 theme, "The Changing Land", will focus on land and how it is changed by natural forces and human activity.

### **Technical Advisory Committee on Mangroves**

The council's Technical Advisory Committee on Mangroves held four meetings during the year. It continued to contribute to the publication *Mangroves of New Zealand* and to work on the redrafting of a national mangroves conservation strategy. The committee is also in the process of producing a regional report on mangroves which will include information on the knowledge and understanding of the status and uses of mangroves in New Zealand for an update and review of IUCN's report on the Global Status of Mangrove Ecosystems.

The committee has also fulfilled international obligations through liaison with UNESCO and representation at meetings in Thailand and Western Samoa. Dr M. Vannucci, chief technical adviser to the UNDP/UNESCO Regional Project on Research and Training Programmes concerning mangrove ecosystems in Asia and the Pacific, held discussions with the council in April 1987. Following her visit, the Technical Advisory Committee was asked to fulfil the role of a National Mangroves Committee for the purpose of the Research Pilot Project on Mangroves and their Interaction with Other Coastal Ecosystems of Asia and the Pacific.

Other issues addressed by the committee included such matters as the need for estuarine scientists in the Department of Conservation, the degradation of mangroves by reclamations, and the possibility of waste oil being dumped in waterways.

### **Crown Land Allocation**

The Government's restructuring of environmental administration meant that Crown land had to be allocated to either the Department of Conservation or the State-Owned Enterprises, Landcorp and Forestcorp. This was a major exercise. After the initial allocations of land with obvious conservation values to the department and land with essentially productive values to Landcorp or Forestcorp, there were still large areas which were contentious.

With its limited and reduced resources, the council chose to concentrate its concerns on areas in which it believed it could make a worthwhile contribution. These were the Western Southland beech forests, the Eyre Creek-Cairnards block, and some Crown lands containing geothermal features. A final decision on the future of these areas was expected by 31 March 1988.

#### *Western Southland Beech Forests*

The Dean, Rowallan and Longwood State Forests of Western Southland comprise 67,000 hectares of lowland beech and rimu. They provide



habitat for nationally important but declining populations of yellowhead, kaka, and yellow-crowned parakeet, species which need extensive areas of diverse lowland forests with large old trees for nesting.

The council was concerned that, should the forests be allocated to the Forestry Corporation, they might be denied the long-term protection they deserve. It recommended to the Minister of Conservation, therefore, that Dean, Rowallan and Longwood Forests be allocated to the Department of Conservation or held by the residual Department of Lands until final land allocation decisions were made.

Current logging contracts for Dean and Rowallan Forests were to expire in July 1988. The council believed that, as interim protection, it was important to define clearly those areas available for logging so that damage to other areas with high natural values could be kept to a minimum. A joint Forestry Corporation/Department of Conservation monitoring programme was also suggested.

#### *Eyre Creek-Cairnard Block*

The council believed that the majority of the Eyre Creek-Cairnard Crown land block which backs onto Walter Peak and Cecil Peak Stations near Queenstown should go to the Department of Conservation. An ecological survey of the block early in 1987 had identified significant wildlife and conservation values in the area. These included largely unmodified, altitudinal tracts of native vegetation, alpine plants, two unusual species of mountain daisy, four populations of the rock wren, and a rare native land snail. About fifteen species of endemic plants occur only in the Eyre Mountain Range, with another thirty species reaching the limits of their distribution there. Much of the land is prone to erosion and has limited productive potential, but on the lower lands it has scope for grazing at current levels.

In pressing for the ungrazed portion of the Eyre-Cairnard block to be allocated to the Department of Conservation, the council submitted that, coupled with protected land in Eyre State Forest and retired lands on the adjoining stations, it would form a magnificent high country reserve of high ecological worth.

#### *Geothermal Features*

As Crown lands containing geothermal features were allocated to the State-Owned Enterprises, the council joined other organisations in seeking more secure protection for them.

In a detailed submission to the Ministry for the Environment the council said that some of the recently allocated lands should either be reallocated to the Department of Conservation or protected under covenant with appropriate management. This, the council believed, would provide a greater guarantee of protecting unique geothermal features that could be detrimentally affected by development.

The council has championed the cause of preserving New Zealand's distinctive geothermal features for more than 20 years. Efforts are still

required to protect worthy fields, honour the status of protected fields, and use geothermal energy in as efficient and sustainable a way as possible. Fields with cultural, scientific, biological, and tourism values to the local, regional, national, and international communities should be protected from any form of geothermal development. In this recent debate on the geothermal resource, the council urged the complete preservation of the Whakarewarewa and Waimangu fields and protection of Waioatapu, Orakeikorako, Waikite, and Ngawha.

### **South Westland**

Along with many New Zealanders, the council has always recognised the unique natural values of South Westland and has long awaited final decisions on the future management of the Crown land and State forests in the region that would follow the end of the logging moratorium in 1990. The council, as well as many other organisations and individuals, has continually pressed for the permanent protection of this region, particularly the area south of the Cook River, and has resisted inappropriate development there. It took the opportunity, therefore, to comment on the Secretary for the Environment's public discussion document, *South Westland South of the Cook River—Resource Management Study*.

The council regards South Westland as having a variety of special values which warrant protection. The area's rugged wilderness and largely unmodified natural features are outstanding and in many cases unique, making it highly suited to conservation, tourism, and recreation.

With one of the world's worst records for extinct, rare and endangered species, New Zealand has an international responsibility to retain a representative sample of its native species and, therefore, its remaining natural environments. The council believes the allocation of lands in South Westland provides the last opportunity to do this.

In considering resource management strategies for South Westland south of the Cook River, the council believes that production forestry is completely inappropriate and unjustifiable. The discussion document outlined three possible strategies for the State forests concerned: permanent protection, forest park protection, and mixed sustained yield/management protected areas. The council believes that the case for logging cannot be made and that those areas south of the Cook River, including the State forests, are special enough to warrant permanent protection under national park status and, ultimately, become part of a South-West New Zealand World Heritage Area. The council recommended, therefore, that an investigation be initiated by the National Parks and Reserves Authority to determine the area's suitability for designation as a national park.

The Ministry for the Environment's recommendations on the future of the State forests in South Westland will be made to the Government in December 1988. The council awaits with interest final decisions on this important area.



## **Town and Country Planning Issues**

Through involvement in regional and district schemes, preparing submissions on management plans, and appearing at hearings when appropriate, the council is able to put the nature conservation perspective on town and country planning matters. The following are some examples of the council's work in this area over the past year.

### *Forestry Provisions in District Schemes*

In 1987 the council was represented at two hearings which resulted in decisions crucial to the conservation of native forest on private land.

The first was a planning tribunal hearing on the Waimea County District Scheme. Earlier, Waimea County had allowed objections to the district scheme which sought to make logging and clearing of native forest a conditional rather than predominant use in rural zones. Forestry interests appealed this decision. The planning tribunal released an interim decision in November 1987 which upheld the use of planning controls over the clearance of native forest on private land and had the potential to establish a precedent in restricting logging of such areas. Forestry interests will be appealing this decision in the High Court.

The council appeared at a planning hearing on the Opotiki District Scheme Review and again submitted that more restrictive controls on indigenous production forestry should be incorporated into the district scheme. A decision was delayed until the outcome of the Planning Tribunal hearing on the forestry provisions of the proposed Waimea County district scheme was known. Following that decision, the Opotiki District Council recommended a number of amendments to its district scheme which accorded with the Nature Conservation Council's submission. In particular, the logging or clearing of any areas of native forest have now been made conditional uses over much of the district.

### *Regional Planning Schemes*

It was commendable that the Bay of Plenty United Council involved the Nature Conservation Council at appropriate stages in scoping its regional planning process and drafting the proposed first section of its regional planning scheme. Many of this council's recommendations were accepted, particularly those relating to geothermal and coastal resources.

A detailed submission was also made on the Aorangi United Council Regional Planning Scheme: Draft Section One (Principal Section) and the Nature Conservation Council was subsequently pleased to learn that many of its comments had been incorporated.

Other local body regional planning documents considered by the council included the Hawkes Bay United Council's Regional Planning Scheme, Draft Section One, and the Auckland Regional Authority's Draft Regional Policies for Marine Areas, Lakes and Rivers.

In addition, the council made a submission on the Bay of Plenty Catchment Commission and Regional Water Board's Draft Management

Plan for the Rotorua Geothermal Field, commented on Hawke's Bay Catchment Board and Regional Water Board Proposed General Authorisations, and considered the Auckland Regional Authority's Future Bulk Water Supply Study.

#### *Ashburton River Enhancement Study*

Following its inspection of the Ashburton Lakes and their associated wetlands in February 1987, the council has continued to press for suitable and appropriate protection of their high natural values. In its submission to the South Canterbury Catchment Board on the Ashburton River Enhancement Study the council said it was opposed to any water storage option that would involve modifying the lakes or their associated wetlands. The Catchment Board's response, the creation of a 520 hectare storage lake alongside Lake Emma, known as Lake Lambie, was favoured by the council as the most environmentally acceptable option.

The council was pleased to note that the Aoraki National Parks and Reserves Board is considering undertaking an assessment of the reserve potential of the area.

#### *Proposed Gondola Passenger Lift, Queenstown*

The council made a formal objection to an application to establish a gondola-style passenger lift between Kelvin Heights Peninsula and Queenstown Bay on the grounds that it would have an adverse visual impact on the local scenic environment and adversely affect recreation reserves.

A planning hearing before the Queenstown-Lakes District Council resulted in the application being declined. In reaching its decision, the district council said it had had regard to provisions in its district scheme relating to the conservation, protection, and enhancement of the physical environment and the preservation of the natural character of the margin of the lake and its protection from unnecessary development. The Nature Conservation Council welcomed this decision.

#### **Foreshore Recreation Reserve, Queenstown**

The council's involvement with Tourist Hotel Corporation hotel development on a site in Queenstown goes back to 1970, with the council consistently opposing the use of the adjoining Park Street Reserve for a hotel complex. In 1985 the proposal was rejected by the Planning Tribunal and the THC subsequently went ahead with a modified plan for a smaller hotel.

In 1987 the council again became involved when it received representations from local residents regarding proposed modification to the Foreshore Recreation Reserve between the hotel and the lake. The THC proposal involved making a contribution of \$66,000 to the Queenstown Lakes District Council for landscaping the foreshore area mainly to improve the view of the lake from the hotel. One of the key aspects of the THC proposal was the removal of some of the memorial grove of



mature silver birch trees along Marine Parade, which links the central business area with Queenstown Gardens.

In mid-September, in a detailed submission to the Queenstown-Lakes District Council, the reserve's administering body, it was recommended that, as required by the Reserves Act 1977, a draft management plan should be prepared and released for public comment before any landscaping was carried out. It was pointed out that there was a danger of a public reserve being modified to suit a commercial enterprise. In addition, the reserve could appear to be part of the hotel development, artificially enlarging the hotel's boundaries and overall dominance in the area.

The council was dismayed to learn in early November that its submission and those of many others had been ignored. Trees were already being cut down to make way for 'Ready Lawn' to be in place for the hotel's opening in December. The Queenstown-Lakes District Council subsequently called for public submissions on the future of the reserve, but the council still feels very strongly that this should have been done before the trees were removed.

### **Coastal Developments**

As there are often conflicting demands on the coastal environment's limited and fragile resources, its protection has been a conservation priority in New Zealand for some time.

During the past year, the council has produced sets of criteria for use in its assessment of marine farming, marina and reclamation proposals. The increasing number of applications for marine farming, in particular, has highlighted the need for careful planning and assessment of all the likely impacts of coastal development—long-term as well as short-term.

Thirty-two marine farming applications sent to the council by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries were assessed during the year. Twelve of the applications were for salmon farming and 20 for mussels, oysters and scallops.

The council had no objection to 13 of these applications going ahead, but recommended several measures to lessen their environmental impact. Most of the remaining 19 applications, including the 12 for salmon farming, were opposed as they contained insufficient information on which to assess the environmental impacts adequately.

The council first became concerned about the environmental implications of salmon farming in 1985 and made strong recommendations to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries regarding the development of policy and guidelines to safeguard natural values in salmon farming areas. Such measures were in fact formulated and came into effect in late 1987. Already, the Ministry's sea cage salmon farming policy has led to an improvement in the amount and type of information supplied with applications.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries' proposal to prepare a draft Aquaculture Bill was also seen as a positive move. The council submitted a number of points which it believed should be covered in any future legislation.

The council considered the Ministry was the logical controlling agency for aquaculture developments, but adequate liaison with other appropriate organisations was recommended. In particular, as planning for marine farming should be an integral part of district and regional schemes, liaison with local authorities was seen as essential. A national study of potential marine farming areas was also recommended.

The council believes that the public should be consulted throughout the whole aquaculture development, particularly marine farming proposals, where public space is essentially being alienated for long periods. The present length of tenure of 14 years, or longer if renewed, is of concern to the council, and it was suggested that this aspect of leasing and licensing should be studied.

As mentioned above, some applicants for marine farms have not supplied sufficient information with their applications. The necessity for them to do so at an early stage was pointed out in the council's comments. It was also recommended that a bond should be required from the marine farmer for use in restoring a site to its original condition and for any work the Ministry or other agencies need to carry out on behalf of the farmer.

The potential for conflict with Maori fishing grounds and techniques was pointed out by the council. It was suggested that a special effort should be made to seek the views of the tribes and groups within an area first. This is seen to be the preferred option rather than waiting for them to respond to the Ministry's advertising of an application.

Other aspects of aquaculture legislation mentioned by the council included water quality and the importation of exotic species, with a specific caution being expressed about the use of the fragile and productive tidal areas and wetlands.

The council looks forward to seeing a draft Aquaculture Bill and, ultimately, an Act which will provide adequate protection for marine resources.

## **Mining**

### *North-West Nelson Forest Park*

The council commented on an application for prospecting licences over two areas totalling over 5000 hectares, which included sections of the Cobb Valley, Peel Range, and Mount Arthur Tablelands, North-West Nelson Forest Park. It was concerned that the proposals would have potentially disruptive and intrusive effects on an area with important recreational opportunities and outstanding plant and wildlife values. The council recommended that the impacts be weighed carefully against any perceived advantages the development may bring.



The former Wildlife Service rated the North-West Nelson forest area as of outstanding wildlife value. This was based on the large, almost unmodified state of the area and its ability to support healthy populations of many endemic species now rare or diminishing in New Zealand. Among those which would be at risk are the forty or so sub-species of the large land snail, *Powelliphanta*, almost half of which are confined to the North-West Nelson area.

In its submission, the council also pointed out that the area under consideration for prospecting is part of a larger, important recreational resource, attracting many thousands of visitors annually. These outdoor recreational opportunities are valued highly, the attractions of the Mount Arthur Tablelands area featuring in promotional videos of the Nelson region.

Section 24 of the Mining Act contains provision for closing conservation areas to mining if they have important ecological and recreational values. The council suggested that this provision could be used in this particular case, but cautioned that, if this would be creating a precedent, careful consideration would need to be given to the possible ramifications.

#### *Waitekauri Valley, Coromandel*

An Environmental Impact Report on a gold and silver mining proposal at Waitekauri Valley near Waihi was commended by the council for its attention to detail and supporting technical information. The council considered that the impact of the project would be minimal provided the provisions listed in the EIR and supporting technical information were combined with a rigid monitoring programme.

Among its comments, the council drew attention to the presence of Archey's frog (*Leiopelma archeyi*). It believed that, as a documented rare species, Archey's frog warranted protection. Although only a small, much-modified habitat was present at the mining site, the council listed a number of protection options. The council also commented on the vegetation, particularly the importance of the area of swamp maire (*Syzygium maire*), and on aquatic biology, recreation, and the visual impact of the project area.

The council suggested that the Department of Conservation would be well placed to take over ownership of the land at the conclusion of the project and, following study and monitoring of revegetation with native forest, creation of wildlife habitat, and success of rehabilitation works, ultimately incorporate it into Coromandel Forest Park.

#### *Mining Guidelines*

The council has provided comments on many exploration, prospecting, and mining applications in the past, but is aware that the issue of mining in protected areas has not been adequately or consistently addressed. It was pleased, therefore, to see the Department of Conservation's draft mining guidelines and appreciated the opportunity to comment.

The possibility of mining taking place in protected areas is a major environmental issue at present. Besides making its views known when appropriate, the council is very supportive of the Minister of Conservation's existing powers of veto with respect to mining applications and would wish these to be retained.

### **Communications**

For over two decades the council has given advice on the environmental impact of public works. These included power schemes, major roading activities, transmission lines and communications installations. Over the last few years high impact activities such as power schemes and major roadworks have contracted considerably. During 1987 the council noted a marked decrease in new work in the communication field. Corporatisation of government communication agencies and the extent of radio coverage of the country were factors in this decrease.

Nevertheless, a number of significant proposals were looked at by the council. These included microwave stations in Northland and the Bay of Plenty, a television translator in Arthur's Pass National Park, a UHF radio station in Otago, an upgraded telephone service at Inangahua Junction, and a radio repeater on Kapiti Island, all of which involved considerable co-operation from the organisations concerned.

For the first time in dealing with such installations, however, the council failed to gain the co-operation of a government agency and influence the siting of the proposed repeater at an early stage. The New Zealand Fire Service lodged a requirement that provision be made in the Petone District Scheme for land in the Belmont Regional Park Zone to be redesignated Emergency Service Radio Communications Requirement so that a repeater could be installed on Belmont Trig. The council lodged an objection to this on the grounds of the installation's visual impact. A significant focal point of the Park, Belmont Trig is the culmination of a two to three hour walk and provides outstanding views of the Wellington region. The council also pointed out that the Statement of Evidence had not included any discussion of investigation into alternative sites and why they were deemed unsuitable. The council had considerable support for its view.

Following a planning hearing, the Petone Borough Council recommended that the requirement not be confirmed. This was mainly on the grounds that alternative siting arrangements should be discussed further. The New Zealand Fire Service accepted this recommendation and is continuing discussions with objectors on the location of the installation. The council is following the situation closely.

Although the above example was notable for lack of early consultation, the council wishes to acknowledge the excellent co-operation it has received for many years from agencies such as the New Zealand Post Office (now Telecom), New Zealand Electricity (now Electricorp), the New Zealand Police, the Ministry of Works and Development, the Broadcasting Corporation, the New Zealand Forest Service, and the newly-established Department of Conservation.



### **Importation of Exotic Biota**

The council has always been concerned about the potential damage that could be caused to New Zealand's indigenous flora and fauna by exotic biota. During the past year, this concern centred mainly on marron crayfish and, more recently, on red abalone. The council learned that the Minister of Fisheries had given approval for the importation of marron under the Animals Act 1967 without due and proper consideration of their possible impacts on native species and environmental values. Following investigations, the council concluded that marron had the potential to establish feral populations and interact with and prey on the native freshwater crayfish, the koura. Although an Environmental Impact Assessment had been prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1986, it had had very limited circulation. The council became concerned not only about the importation of marron but also about the whole process by which approvals are granted to allow new species into the country.

Following strong protests by the council and other bodies, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment agreed to investigate the issue. The investigations were to examine:

- whether the existing legislation was adequate to deal with the proposal to introduce marron;
- whether, in the case of marron, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries adequately applied its own guidelines on the importation of exotic species for aquaculture and the Government's environmental protection and enhancement procedures;
- whether the decision to allow the importation of marron was reasonable given the weight of scientific advice available on the environmental risk posed by that species

The Commissioner's conclusions had not been released by the end of March, but the council hopes that she will recommend changes in the procedures which will enable wide and considered debate to take place on any proposals to import exotic species.

Meanwhile, the council welcomed the initiative taken by the Ministry for the Environment in establishing a steering group to look at the whole question of exotic biota imports. The two major issues being considered are the control of the importation and subsequent management of exotic biota and the field testing and release of genetically modified organisms. The steering group will produce a discussion document for public comment which should, in time, lead to appropriate legislation.

### **Publications**

*Mangroves of New Zealand* is the culmination of many years of practical case work and educational efforts by the council to protect those margins of the northern sea coast where mangroves grow. The first book to be written about New Zealand's mangroves, it includes sections on the taxonomy, ecology, and natural values of mangrove environments, including their high biological productivity, traditional uses and

values, and threats and impacts. There is also a section on how to plant and grow mangroves, and who to approach for advice and information. Tribute is paid in the introduction to the invaluable work of two former council members, the late Professor Emeritus Val Chapman and Professor John Morton, to increase people's awareness of the wealth, interest and vulnerability of New Zealand's mangrove environments. An atlas of mangrove distribution and a selected bibliography are included. Completed early in 1988, *Mangroves of New Zealand* is due for publication early next year by the Government Printing Office.

*Landforms and Geological Features: A Case for Preservation* is the latest in the series of information leaflets and booklets produced by the council. The booklet looks at the different kinds of landforms and geological features found in New Zealand and the major threats which affect them. It advances a strong case for identifying and protecting a full cross-section of commonplace as well as unique or spectacular features.

Summaries of the criteria used by the council to evaluate the likely environmental impacts of marina and marine farming proposals were published last year as information leaflets 26 and 27. Draft criteria for reclamation proposals were published in Newsletter No. 66 and will also be published in their final form in a separate information leaflet.

Newsletters over the past year reflect the range of issues addressed by the council. The marine environment was again given a high profile with articles on marron crayfish, tri-butyl tin in anti-foulants, marina and marine farming applications, sewage disposal, the Port Ohope subdivision, and mangroves.

Newsletter 66 highlighted the plight of Western Southland's beech forests, while number 67 gave prominence to a national conference on Antarctica which the council helped to organize. The council's future was addressed in articles on the review by Government of the conservation quangos.

### **Conferences/Seminars**

The following conferences and seminars were attended by council members and staff during the year:

- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Infoterra System. Seminar organised by the Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 13 April 1987.
- Joint Campaign on Native Forests' Easter Gathering, Fox Glacier, South Westland, 17-20 April 1987.
- UNDP/UNESCO Regional Project on Mangroves, Regional Task Force Meeting, Thailand, 8-19 May 1987.
- Inaugural Conference of the New Zealand Association for Environmental Education, Christchurch Teachers College, 8-11 May 1987.
- Geothermal Co-ordination Meeting: Environmental and Planning Issues. One day national meeting organised by the Geothermal



Co-ordination Group, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Wairakei, 11 June 1987.

- Non-Market Valuation. Seminar organised by the Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 4-5 August 1987.
- Environment and Economics in an Election Year. Annual Conference of Environment and Conservation Organisations (ECO), Victoria University of Wellington, 1-2 August 1987.
- Tributyl tin-based anti-fouling paints. Two one-day national meetings organised by the Ministry for the Environment in Auckland and Wellington, 12 and 20 August 1987.
- 29th Working Session of the IUCN Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas, Taupo, 16-21 August 1987.
- National Seminar: 100 years of National Parks in New Zealand. Department of Continuing Education, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 24-28 August 1987.
- Policies on Ice—New Zealand's Antarctic Policy Choices. National Conference on Antarctica organised by the Environmental Council and the Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 26-27 September 1987.
- Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society Field Trip, Molesworth Station, 24-26 October 1987.
- 17th General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, San José, Costa Rica, 1-10 February 1988.
- UNDP/UNESCO Regional Mangroves Project Meeting, Apia, Western Samoa, 8-12 February 1988.
- Towards Integration—Landscape Management in New Zealand. Seminar organised by the Department of Horticulture and Landscape, Lincoln College, Canterbury, 11-13 February 1988.
- Forestry in the North Canterbury High Country. A workshop looking at needs, impacts, and benefits, organised by the Town and Country Planning Directorate, Ministry of Works and Development, Christchurch, 18 March 1988.
- Climate Change—the New Zealand Experience. Seminar organised by the Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 29-30 March 1988.

### International

Three council members attended the 17th General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources held in Costa Rica, 1-10 February 1988. Sir John Bennett represented the council, Professor Carolyn Burns attended as Regional Councillor for Australia and Oceania, and Mr P.H.C. Lucas was there as deputy chairman of the IUCN Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas.

Professor Burns was re-elected as one of the three councillors for Australia and Oceania, while Mr Lucas, having resigned as deputy chairman of CNPPA was invited to chair the interim Programme committee for the 1992 World Parks Congress.

The council's Technical Advisory Committee on Mangroves agreed to fulfil the role of a National Mangrove Committee for the purpose of the UNDP/UNESCO Research Pilot Project on Mangroves and their Interaction with Other Coastal Ecosystems of Asia and the Pacific. Through funding provided by UNESCO, council representation was possible at meetings in Thailand and Western Samoa.

The council has also continued as New Zealand's CONCOM representative on the AEC-CONCOM (Australia Environmental Council—Economics, Conservation and Environmental Network) Economic Contact Officer Network.

### **Appreciation**

In conclusion, on behalf of the council, I wish to acknowledge again the great co-operation received from government agencies and other conservation organisations. In particular, the Department of Conservation is to be commended for the excellent administrative services it has provided.

Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the staff for their sense of purpose and unflagging devotion to duty in a period of stress and strain caused by so uncertain a future that has faced the council in the period under review.

Ma Te Atua koutou katoa e manaaki, e tiaki.







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P.O. BOX 2171,  
WELLINGTON






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Report of the  
**NATIONAL PARKS AND  
 RESERVES AUTHORITY**

for the year ended  
 31 March 1988

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*Presented to the House of Representatives Pursuant to  
 Section 21 of the National Parks Act 1980*

The Hon. Helen Clark  
Minister of Conservation  
Wellington

Dear Helen Clark

I have the honour to submit, in terms of section 21 of the National Parks Act 1980, the annual report of the National Parks and Reserves Authority for the year ended 31 March 1988.

Yours sincerely

DAVID THOM, Chairman

### Introduction

For the National Parks and Reserves Authority and the twelve regional National Parks and Reserves Boards, 1987/88 has been an eventful year. Highlights were:

- The centennial of national parks
- The opening of Paparoa National Park
- The bestowal of World Heritage Site status on Mount Cook-Westland National Park
- The opening of the Kepler Track
- The opening of a walkway for disabled people in Arthur's Pass National Park
- The television programmes—Journeys in National Parks
- The establishment of the Department of Conservation
- The kakapo study and transfer, Stewart Island
- The encouraging results in the takahe release programme
- The publication "Heritage New Zealand"

The Authority and boards had their terms extended to provide continuity during the period of transfer from the Department of Lands and Survey to the Department of Conservation, and to retain boards in the planning, organisation and celebration of the national parks centennial year from 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1988.

The centennial year was heralded in February 1987 on Pipiriki Marae when Whanganui National Park was opened. The major event of the year was the celebration at Mount Ruapehu on 23 September 1987 of the hundredth anniversary of the gift of the mountains of Tongariro National Park by Te Heuheu Tukino. Little less impressive was the opening of Paparoa National Park on 5 December 1987. Both these events and many others increased public understanding of the values of the protected area system and illustrated the common appreciation of heritage land by Maori and European.



A third significant event was the unveiling of plaques marking the bestowal of World Heritage Site status on Mount Cook-Westland National Park.

The National Parks Centennial Commission will be reporting on the success of the centennial year. The support given by boards, particularly by their centennial committees, has been essential to that success.

The centennial undoubtedly helped the Department of Conservation in a trying inaugural year. From the Authority and board perspective the transition has been less difficult than anticipated and they are appreciative of the commitment that departmental officers have brought to new roles. The main problems identified by the Authority and boards derive from financial and resource allocations which appear to be insufficient to carry out the requirements of the Conservation Act 1987. In the view of the Authority it is of the utmost importance to the effectiveness of the department that these problems are addressed.

The Authority programmes and budgets its year of work in advance, allowing for modification if necessary. It endeavours to meet each board at three-yearly intervals.

The first meeting of the year was cancelled as the department, just established, could not provide the required preparation. Meetings were held in June, August, October, December of 1987, and February and March of 1988, the latter at the request of the Director-General of Conservation to facilitate planning of a tourist development at Milford Sound. The programme included meetings combined with inspections in the Bay of Islands, Westland National Park and Stewart Island. Other meetings were held in Wellington.

It is a long-established policy that the Authority maintains liaison with boards by the attendance of members at board meetings. The events associated with the centennial year have allowed further informal contact between Authority, board members and departmental officers. This is very necessary for an efficient system of administration.

An Authority member visited the Chatham Islands to renew contacts and assess the status of conservation there. This is referred to below.

Authority members attended the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Commission on National Parks and Protected Areas at Wairakei in August 1987. This meeting focussed on the Antarctic Realm.

The Authority has been represented on the National Parks Centennial Commission, the New Zealand Committee of IUCN Members, the Stout Trust and at the IUCN General Assembly in Costa Rica, February 1988.

A further event in a significant year was the Centenary Seminar organised in August 1987 by the North Canterbury National Parks and Reserves Board and the University of Canterbury. At this seminar a special attempt was made to consider the future of protected areas.

### **Membership**

For the year ended 31 March 1988 membership was as follows. Most of those listed have served since 1 April 1981 in two three-year terms, followed by an extension of one year.

Mr D. A. Thom, C.B.E., Auckland (Chairman)

Dr C. W. Burns, C.B.E., Dunedin

Dr R. K. Dell, Q.S.O., Wellington

Dr G. S. D. Heather, M.B.E., Hamilton

Mr M. J. Hollis, Wellington

Mr L. Hutchins, Manapouri

Mr A. I. R. Jamieson, Christchurch

Mr B. H. Jones, Taupo

Dr A. F. Mark, Dunedin

Dr L. R. Stewart, Queenstown

An appendix contains the members of the 12 national parks and reserves boards.

The headings which follow describe the functions of the Authority under the National Parks Act 1980. In reporting on these functions attention has been paid to the report of the Government Administration Committee 1987 which established certain reporting standards for annual reports by government departments. As far as possible the Authority's report deals with goals and achievements, major problems and issues, reasons for non-performance, and the factors influencing achievement.

### **To Prepare and Approve Statements of General Policy for National Parks in Accordance with Section 44 of the National Parks Act 1980**

The Authority's General Policy for National Parks which was adopted in 1983 as a result of public processes appears to be working well and to be in little need of amendment. The year has, however, presented two issues.

Between 1967 and 1982 the population of the takahe, found only in Fiordland, declined to 120 birds, much fewer than the 500 breeding birds required to sustain the species. The Wildlife Service had established a programme for increasing reproduction of the birds. Eggs were artificially hatched so that young birds could be released into the wild. The most suitable habitat for the release was in a designated wilderness area in Fiordland National Park. Section 14 of the National Parks Act prohibits the introduction of any animals into such an area. It was therefore necessary to uplift the wilderness designation so that the release could proceed.

It is encouraging to record that the release of the birds is showing promising results. As the National Parks Act 1980 did not anticipate the possibility of the re-introduction into appropriate habitat of endangered indigenous species, the Authority has asked the department to review



section 14. The review will also cover the introduction of organisms for controlling pests by approved biological means.

Biological control is the second issue of the year. It is an option in the control of weeds or animal pests. Organisms that attack a specific weed or pest are introduced from regions where both are native. An introduction of this nature is carried out under stringent conditions to avoid the possibility of transfer of attack to other, possibly indigenous, species.

Neither the National Parks Act nor the Reserves Act refers to the possibility of this form of control. Recognising that the method is target-specific and can lead to cheaper long-term control than mechanical or chemical methods, the Authority has accepted its use as an option for the control of weeds and pests in protected natural areas and has requested a legal opinion on the need to change general policy and/or legislation to enable biological control to be utilised.

As with the release of takahe, encouraging progress can be reported in another area that has been of long-standing concern. The Snares Islands National Reserve could be described as New Zealand's most wonderful wildlife reserve. As such it is particularly vulnerable to the introduction of rats. The Authority will continue to be concerned although it is encouraged by improved security measures and by the attention the department has given to implementing a policy for the Snares.

### **To Approve Management Plans and Changes to and Reviews of Management Plans for National Parks in Accordance with Section 48 of the Act**

The Authority considered two full revisions of national park management plans, the Aoraki and West Coast boards having completed work on, respectively, the Mount Cook National Park Management Plan and the Westland National Park Management Plan. After discussion with the boards the Authority referred the plans to the Minister for comment.

The Minister sought further information on the Nelson Lakes National Park Management Plan which is due to be approved early in the 1988/89 year.

The Urewera National Park Management Plan, received just before the year's end, is yet to be considered by the Authority. In the early stages of preparation is the plan for the new Whanganui National Park.

Work on the Arthur's Pass National Park plan has not proceeded since July 1987 due to other priorities in the Christchurch region. This example serves to illustrate the lack of planning resources available to the department.

Management planning is the most important function of boards, allowing the public to contribute to the administration of national parks. The Authority appreciates that the department is obliged to prepare management plans for all areas in the conservation estate but is also aware of the frustration caused to boards.

Tourist interests have been critical of the time taken for some development proposals to be considered, particularly when an amendment to a management plan is needed. The Authority and the tourist industry have established a liaison group to discuss matters of mutual interest. On the issue of management planning, problems identified are capable of resolution through a process involving public participation and designed to enable boards to make amendments under section 46 of the Act. Such a procedure will, of course, function only if the department has the necessary resources.

That the process can work successfully has been shown by both the takahe issue referred to above and the planning processes undertaken to remedy visitor congestion at Milford Sound. In the latter case the department began a process in October 1987 which involved public participation and culminated in a March 1988 recommendation to the Minister on a development proposal. This proposal, generally favoured by the Authority, the Southland National Parks and Reserves Board and the tourist industry, will relieve congestion and provide improved facilities at Milford Sound. Any necessary amendment to the Fiordland National Park Management Plan will be considered, together with other planning consents, in the first half of 1988/89.

Milford Road provides the access to Milford Sound and requires upgrading to do justice to the development of the Sound. The Authority has advised the National Roads Board of its concern that the up-grading be carried out with due regard to the environment. The Milford Sound project has made rapid progress at the expense of other areas of operation. The planning resources of the department are not adequate to meet the demands of the Act and the estate. Whatever steps are taken to remedy the situation, it must be resolved without reduction in public participation. The annual report of the North Canterbury National Parks and Reserves Board puts the problem in perspective. "DOC Canterbury has 500 individual management units for which it must prepare management plans. Quite clearly, to propose one plan for each unit would be totally impractical. If the Canterbury situation is extrapolated nationally, the task is immense."

### **To Advise the Minister or the Director-General on the Priorities for the Expenditure of any Money Appropriated by Parliament for the Purposes of the Act**

For a number of years now, the Authority has been able to advise the Director-General on priorities for capital expenditure on major developments in national parks.

This arrangement has worked to the satisfaction of the Authority although in previous annual reports it has expressed disappointment at the decreasing purchasing power available.

This has meant, for example, that the capital works programme for redevelopment of the Mount Cook National Park village has fallen several years behind the target originally accepted as appropriate for this work, in what is now a World Heritage Site.



The arrangement for advising on priorities for expenditure of maintenance and operating monies remained in a rudimentary form and has worked in an unsatisfactory manner.

This year, even the arrangement for advising on priorities for capital expenditure met with difficulties that, in hindsight, the Authority should have expected in the inaugural year of a new department as it developed an accounting system based on corporate objectives.

The Authority has been heartened by the proposal in the Review of Conservation Quangos that "The Director-General will consult with the New Zealand Conservation Authority on the objectives developed for the following year's departmental corporate plan, on the relative priority being accorded each objective and on the broad allocation of resources between objectives".

Prior to the department's establishment, the Authority sought, unsuccessfully, an independent audit of the reasonable financial needs of the national parks and reserves system.

The reason the Authority sought this audit was because it was convinced from contact with boards and staff, and from inspections of national parks and reserves, that the standards of maintenance in some areas of the system were falling to a level incompatible with the international status of our national parks. This situation was not helped by the lack of sufficient funds for some boards to carry out their statutory responsibilities.

It was with some alarm then that the Authority noted the burden placed on the department by the Conservation Act, and the size of the budget allocated. The Authority hopes that the interests of national parks and reserves will not suffer as a result of the other conservation interests for which the department is responsible.

The Authority was appreciative of the financial contributions from the Minister of Tourism which enabled the Kepler Track to be established, and the audio-visual auditorium at Franz Josef to be constructed.

This year the Director-General has sought the Authority's advice in preparing the department's revenue policy on cost recovery.

The Authority has no quarrel with the concept of partial cost recovery, provided that any policies (a) are in line with the public expectation of free access to national parks and reserves; (b) incorporate the Government's social policies; and (c) accommodate as a charge to the nation the cost of safety and hygiene for visitors to national parks and reserves.

With the introduction of any user-pays philosophy care must be taken to ensure that conditions applying to users and/or concessionaires are not so severe that public use would be inhibited, or useful services would not be provided.

### **To Review and Report to the Minister or the Director-General on the Effectiveness of the Administration of the General Policies for National Parks**

The situation pertaining to management planning has been noted but generally speaking the momentum of the centennial year has assisted the department in performing satisfactorily its administrative and management responsibilities in national parks and reserves. This has been achieved under circumstances which have demanded the devotion of much time and energy to establishment of the department.

The Authority has been aware that within the community there is concern that national parks may not be receiving the resources which they previously received. There is a perception that the demands of the conservation estate as a whole have resulted in a lower priority for national parks. There is also concern that park management might suffer in situations where administration of a national park is shared by more than one departmental district or region.

In the view of the Authority it is premature to attempt judgment on such issues. The Authority accepts that the management of national parks occurs within the context of the estate as a whole. The Department of Conservation contains a range and depth of expertise which the nation has not possessed in this form before and offers the prospect of superb management. The immediate problems are those of resources and priorities, together with the quality of managerial direction. In this situation it is vital that the department continues to seek guidance from that part of the community which has been involved in and concerned about national parks. The reputation which New Zealand has attained in its national park system will then be carried onward.

### **To Consider and Make Proposals for the Addition of Lands to National Parks and the Establishment of New National Parks**

For the past six years each report has recorded progress made on proposals for new national parks and additions to existing ones. This work has been based on identification and assessment by the pre-1981 National Parks Authority.

Following the opening the previous year of Whanganui National Park, Paparoa National Park was declared open by His Excellency the Governor-General on 5 December 1987. To the general public the best-known feature of this new park is the Pancake Rocks at Punakaiki, but inland the full splendour of the area is revealed. Tall lowland forest covers a massive limestone valley of gorges, caves, cliffs and sinkholes.

In June 1987 the Authority recommended the addition to Mount Aspiring National Park of the Haast Range above the 300' contour.

The Northland National Parks and Reserves Board and the Department of Conservation are conducting an investigation into ways of providing adequate protection and appropriate status for the kauri forests of North Auckland.



Investigation has continued into two major proposals reported on in the last report, and a third, the forests south of the Cook River in south Westland.

*The Proposed Red Hills Addition to Mount Aspiring National Park*

In October 1987 the Authority received a report from the Director-General of Conservation prepared in terms of section 8 of the National Parks Act 1980. The report unequivocally favoured national park status for the Red Hills.

The Authority had inspected the Red Hills the previous February, accompanied by representatives of the West Coast United Council, the Clutha-Central Otago United Council, Vincent County Council, Westland County Council, and the Otago National Parks and Reserves Board. The Authority is in full agreement that the area contains extremely high conservation values.

A total of 460 submissions were received, the vast majority of which supported national park status—96%. The exception to this was the response of territorial authorities and government departments where, of 9 submissions received, four supported, four opposed and one gave no indication either way.

Since receiving the Director-General's report the Authority has engaged in extensive consultations on social and economic implications of the proposal. These consultations have been thorough and often additional to the requirements of the National Parks Act.

In particular, the mineral issue has received close attention. A number of meetings have been held with united councils, the Ministry of Energy and mining and mineral exploration interests. Communication has been maintained with the Ngai Tahu Trust Board about the land claim being considered by the Waitangi Tribunal, and with the South Westland Working Party which is examining future options for forests south of the Cook River.

*The Proposed Waitutu (former State Forest) Addition to Fiordland National Park*

As with the Red Hills investigation, the proposal to add Waitutu State Forest to Fiordland National Park has a history that commenced long before the establishment of the Department of Conservation. The section 8 report of the Director-General of Lands identified high national park values in the area. The proposal was supported by over 1200 public submissions. The Authority has consulted with the Southland United Council, Wallace County Council, representatives of adjacent Maori incorporations and landowners, individuals with a strong interest in and knowledge of the area, and the Southland National Parks and Reserves Board. Of particular concern has been the implications for the future of the Tuatapere community. The Authority has requested the department to carry out further investigations into the recreation and

tourism potential of south-western Southland. The Authority's investigation is almost completed and a recommendation is anticipated early in the next reporting period.

#### *Forests South of the Cook River*

As indicated above the Authority has maintained communication with the working party convened by the Secretary for the Environment, which is to provide Government with options for the future of the State forest areas south of the Cook River. This liaison has ensured a mutual knowledge of progress and will help to avoid duplication of public procedures. The working party's South Westland South of the Cook River Resource Management Study includes designation of the land as a national park as a possible option. Aware that this is indeed an area of outstanding conservation importance the Authority has recorded its view that a prima-facie case exists for allocation of the land to the Department of Conservation and that the land meets the criteria for national park. In accordance with its statutory function, the Authority has requested the Director-General of Conservation to investigate appropriate land in terms of section 8 of the National Parks Act 1980. The investigation is programmed to contribute to the work of the Secretary for the Environment's working party.

#### **To Exercise Such Powers and Functions Relating to Such Reserves or Groups of Reserves as may be Notified by the Minister from Time to Time Under Section 9 of the Reserves Act 1977.**

The Authority has been delegated the role of setting general policy for national, scenic, scientific and nature reserves. In addition it determines the criteria by which reserves may be assessed as being of national, regional or local significance. It also reports on the effectiveness of the administration of reserves and keeps under review the development of a national system of representative reserves. Boards are responsible for the review and approval of management plans and also report on the effectiveness of policies for reserves.

Under this heading several major issues have arisen during the year.

#### *The Protected Natural Areas Programme*

This programme is aimed at providing New Zealand with a representative system of protected natural areas before the opportunity is lost. Authority annual reports since 1982 have emphasised the great importance of this programme which has been described as the most important conservation initiative of the 1980's. The PNAP will, more than any other conservation programme, ensure that New Zealand continues to possess a distinctive landscape as opposed to one which is a bland repetition of 'lived-in' places the world over.

Although the programme has enjoyed wide support from government departments and bodies such as the Queen Elizabeth II National Trust, the Nature Conservation Council and the Environmental Council,



together with conservation groups and agencies, its progress has been insufficiently rapid to combat losses of habitat throughout the country. The progress that has been made is due to the commitment of those involved rather than to the resources that have been available. The Authority is, however, pleased with the resolve of the department which has indicated its appreciation of the importance of the programme and given it high priority for completion.

Five surveys covering ten ecological districts are under way, adding to the 29 districts already surveyed. (There are 268 ecological districts.) Implementation of these surveys, hitherto lagging, has increased, with assistance from the Queen Elizabeth II Trust which itself has been assisted in its work by the programme.

#### *The Chatham Islands*

The Chathams and Stewart Island have been placed under the general direction of the Authority. Within New Zealand as a whole the Chatham Islands have an importance disproportionate to their size because of the degree of endemism of their biota which is a consequence of the Chathams' long period of isolation from the New Zealand mainland.

An Authority member, Dr Carolyn Burns, visited the Chathams to maintain contact with conservation promotion and development there. She noted local interest in the protection of specific natural areas. One of the most interesting existing reserves, the J. M. Barker (Hapupu) Reserve, contains a number of trees engraved with historic dendroglyph carvings. After consultation with the Historic Places Trust, the Authority has recommended that this reserve be declared a national reserve.

#### *Stewart Island*

The Authority visited Stewart Island in February 1988 to inspect the reserves and talk to local people about conservation issues. The Authority found that substantial progress had been made by administering departments since the visit of the National Parks Authority in 1980. It was pleasing to note increasing support in the local community for the protection of outstanding natural values.

#### *National Reserves*

Amongst the competing responsibilities of the department the designation of national reserves has received low priority. The reasons for this have been appreciated by the Authority. Progress is also delayed by a review of protected areas legislation. The review has meant that the Authority has been unable to complete its draft general policy for reserves. The policy is, however, being used as a basis for management planning.

The J. M. Barker (Hapupu) Reserve will be the third national reserve, the other two being Lewis Pass and the sub-antarctic islands. Another obvious candidate, the reserves of Te Pahi Farm Park, cannot be proceeded with until a Waitangi Tribunal decision is reached. Other candidates are Waimangu, Pegasus, Remarkables, Lake Taupo Reserves,

Kawarau/Shotover, and selected reserves from Hauraki Gulf Maritime Park. The Historic Places Trust is reviewing historic reserves which might meet the criteria for national reserve status.

#### *Lake Taupo Reserves*

The Authority and the Tongariro/Taupo National Parks and Reserves Board acknowledge the initiative taken by the Department of Conservation in preparing a conservation strategy for Lake Taupo and the surrounding lakeshore reserves. The Authority attaches great importance to the completion of the reserves scheme so that the lake is fully protected.

#### *Mavora Lakes Park*

For a number of years the Authority has recognised the high conservation values of the park and sought to obtain an appropriate level of protection for it. The Authority has encouraged the department to review the management plan and consider an extension to the park.

#### **To Give Advice to the Minister or the Director-General On any Other Matter Relating to any National Park**

Under this heading the Authority has pursued a number of matters which have relevance to the welfare, use and enjoyment of national parks and reserves.

#### *Wild Animal Control*

The Authority is aware that wild animals are increasing because of inadequate resources and a decline in live capture of deer. There is evidence of this in Urewera National Park and the East Coast National Parks and Reserves Board is concerned at the situation. Similar fears have been voiced by the Otago and North Canterbury boards.

In previous reports the Authority has stated its concern at the situation. Recreational hunting, while making a valuable contribution to the controlling of numbers, has less impact in remote areas.

The Northland National Parks and Reserves Board reports an increasing threat to coastal vegetation from opossum. The characteristic pohutukawa is at risk.

#### *Weeds and Wilding Trees*

The incursion of *Clematis vitalba* is noted with concern. The Department of Conservation is developing a strategy for coping with the plant which threatens the indigenous plant life in many protected areas.

Wilding trees continue to infiltrate the landscape. In Central Otago the original grassland may become dominated by trees. The effective method of controlling the problem would be to eliminate the seeding source but this requires more funding than is currently available. Unless the department receives sufficient funds for this work the Authority fears the situation will grow worse.



### *Historic Sites in Fiordland National Park*

The long, indented coastline of Fiordland carries the remains of many sites of historical interest. Their remote situation means that it is very difficult for park managers to provide adequate protection from souvenir hunters. The Authority and the department are aware of the problem but uncertain how effective physical protection can be given to support the legal defences available.

### *Scenic Highways*

The Authority fully supports the Nature Conservation Council in its co-ordination of an attempt to implement a scenic highways policy. This would provide many benefits for tourism in general and tourist attractions in particular.

### *Honorary Rangers*

The National Parks Act provides for the appointment by the Minister of honorary rangers. A national review of the role and functions of honorary rangers had been proposed for 1986 but has yet to occur. The result is that a substantial pool of qualified, enthusiastic people is virtually unused. The Authority would like to see the department give increased attention to the role of honorary rangers within the conservation estate.

### *World Heritage*

The World Heritage Convention aims to preserve the world's most significant testimonies of past civilisations as well as the most moving scenes of natural beauty. It is a tribute that Fiordland National Park and Mount Cook-Westland National Parks have been designated as World Heritage Sites. New Zealanders can take pride in the international judgment of their country's natural splendours. The accolade involves no weakening of sovereign rights. Sites continue to be managed in accordance with park management plans. World Heritage provides considerable enhancement of a country's attraction as a tourist destination.

### *Acknowledgements*

The Authority thanks all board members for the contribution they have made not only in their regions but, by interaction with the Authority, to the national scene. With terms extended, board and Authority members have been under considerable pressure in a time of upheaval and establishment for the department.

The department, and in particular those officers with whom the Authority has been most closely involved, is thanked for its contribution to the business carried out in this inaugural year. It is a reflection on the country's conservation administration that Mr K. W. Piddington, the first Director-General of Conservation, has been able to move on to a vital environmental role in the World Bank.

One of the important factors in an elaboration of a conservation ethic is the role of local and regional bodies. The Authority has engaged in

direct consultations with a number of councils and thanks them for the spirit in which these meetings have been conducted. Boards have reported growing and fruitful communication with local authorities and the degree of positive interest shown by them has been gratifying.

The Authority also pays tribute to the work of the department's Interpretation, Planning and Design Centre. This small unit has made an outstanding contribution to audio-visual and static displays throughout the country.

### **Conclusion**

At the beginning of this report were listed some of the highlights of the 1987/88 year. Not mentioned were the wider achievements beginning to emerge from the first year of the Department of Conservation, providing at last the basis for integrated management of New Zealand's protected areas.

The department is developing policies for the administration and protection of the estate from the sea to the mountains. This is a large task. Already the benefits are becoming apparent, showing the enormous potential of the department to enhance the conservation health of New Zealand. To assist it the department requires constructive support, not destructive criticism founded on self-interest. It needs an increased allocation of resources for management planning, marine administration and wild animal control. Most of all it would be helped by the understanding that its creation was a radical approach to a task of magnitude. It would be unwise to expect that under such circumstances the department could immediately perform to the satisfaction of all.

The review of environmental advisory bodies offers the opportunity for citizen groups with a role wider than the present National Parks and Reserves Authority and national parks and reserves boards to assist the department in formulating policies and carrying them out to the benefit of the country as a whole.



## APPENDIX

## National Parks and Reserves Boards

## Northland

Mr J. T. Brockliss  
Mr R. J. Drake  
  
Mr G. C. Eli  
Dr N. D. Mitchell  
Mr D. J. S. Ogle  
Mr T. Te P. B. Puriri,  
Q.S.O.  
Mr T. M. Ringer  
Mrs S. J. Ross  
Mr E. V. Sale  
Mr V. J. Trounson

Whangaparaoa  
Tangiteroria (Chair-  
man)  
Auckland  
Auckland  
Onerahi  
Paihia  
  
Whangarei  
Auckland  
Kaeo  
Dargaville

## Tongariro/Taupo

Dr H. Barr  
Mr R. F. Draffin  
Mr C. D. Forbes  
Mr J. M. Graham  
Mr K. R. Hackwell  
Mr R. H. Holyoake  
Mrs V. M. Jarvis  
Mr M. T. Parker  
Mr J. R. E. Ryan  
Sir Hepi Te Heuheu,  
K.B.E.

Wellington  
Auckland  
National Park  
Taupo  
Wellington  
Taupo (Chairman)  
Hamilton  
Upper Hutt  
Cambridge  
Taumarunui

## Waikato/Rotorua

Mr N. B. Church  
Mr P. L. Dimond  
Mr B. S. L. Graeme  
Mr K. N. Holmes  
Mr G. L. Mackersey  
Mrs N. M. Martelletti  
Mr B. J. Morrison  
Mr H. K. Taylor  
Mr R. J. Webb

Hamilton  
Waitomo  
Tauranga  
Hamilton (Chairman)  
Tauranga  
Tirau  
Paeroa  
Rotorua  
Hamilton

## Wellington

Mr C. K. Arcus  
Dr I. A. E. Atkinson  
Mr Te R. K. Bailey  
Mr E. H. Davison  
Dr Margot B. Forde  
Dr D. T. S. Grace  
Mr N. F. Hubbard,  
M.B.E.  
Mr S. J. V. Lane  
Ms S. B. M. Lysaght  
Mr G. Mollett

Otaki  
Plimmerton  
Wanganui  
Wanganui  
Palmerston North  
Wanganui  
Wanganui  
  
Masterton  
Wellington  
Waikanae (Chairman)

## East Coast

Mr A. D. Bull  
Mr T. G. Carter  
Mr J. F. Findlay  
Mr D. R. Herdman  
Mrs A. C. Hilson  
Mrs C. M. Jones  
Mr R. S. Paku  
Dr T. P. G. Purchas  
Mr M. Temara, Q.S.M.  
Mr E. G. Wilcox

Tolaga Bay  
Frasertown  
Dannevirke  
Whakatane  
Takapau  
Gisborne  
Wairoa  
Havelock North  
Ruatahuna  
Gisborne (Chairman)

## Nelson/Mariborough

Mr G. A. Carr  
Mr R. M. Elliffe  
Mr S. R. Kennington  
Mr I. Lash  
Mr P. H. Malone  
Mr L. A. Pigou  
Mr G. W. Thurlow  
Mr P. T. Timings  
Mrs J. S. Worley

Renwick  
Picton  
Seddon  
Nelson  
Nelson  
Blenheim  
Murchison  
Takaka  
Richmond  
(Chairperson)

## Taranaki

Mr T. W. Boon  
Mrs K. S. Bourke  
Dr B. D. Clarkson  
Mr N. V. Davies  
  
Mr R. J. Fisher  
Mr R. D. Fyfe  
Mr H. Raumati  
Mr R. W. Stokes  
Mr D. E. Walter  
Mr A. W. Willison

New Plymouth  
Hawera  
Rotorua  
New Plymouth (Chair-  
man)  
Ohura  
New Plymouth  
Waitara  
Stratford  
Stratford  
New Plymouth

## West Coast

Mrs M. E. C. Bryant,  
M.B.E.  
Dr R. M. Emberson  
Mr P. R. Fegan  
Mr W. S. Gilbertson  
Mr A. R. Groom  
Mr B. M. Horne  
Mr J. F. Keenan  
Mr R. G. McAuliffe  
Mr M. J. Sullivan  
Mr P. G. Wood

Hokitika  
  
Christchurch  
Franz Josef  
Greymouth  
Greymouth  
Franz Josef  
Hokitika (Chairman)  
Greymouth  
Fox Glacier  
Westport

## North Canterbury

Mr L. D. Bowring	Kaikoura
Mr I. Calvert	Christchurch (Chairman)
Mr W. G. Croll	Christchurch
Mr I. D. Gardiner	Christchurch
Dr D. R. Given	Christchurch
Mr A. M. Henderson	Oxford
Mr P. M. Johns	Christchurch
Ms L. H. Shand	Culverden
Mrs Te W. A. Stirling	Christchurch
Mr D. M. Williams	Christchurch

## Aoraki

Mrs F. M. Aubrey	Omarama
Mr H. W. Fisher	Timaru
Mr G. E. Hasell	Timaru
Mrs H. M. Heddell	Ashburton
Mr J. I. Innes	Timaru
Mr R. S. Newton	Christchurch
Mr J. E. Ross	Ashburton
Mr R. S. Tasker	Ashburton
Mr D. G. Thomson	Ashburton (Chairman)
Mr W. Torepe	Temuka

## Otago

Mr G. A. Anderson	Alexandra
Dr Barbara I. P. Barratt	Dunedin
Mr R. G. Barrowclough, M.B.E.	Dunedin (Chairman)
Mrs K. M. Beauchamp	Oamaru
Mr J. R. Burgess	Owaka
Mr W. A. Cameron	Wanaka
Mr R. G. Duffy	Mosgiel
Mr J. C. Manning	Dunedin
Mrs P. K. Mark	Dunedin
Mr G. C. Scott	Glenorchy

## Southland

Mrs B. H. Anglem	Invercargill
Mr A. A. Bradley	Te Anau
Mr H. G. Davidson	Tuatapere
Mr M. C. Kershaw	Stewart Island
Mr C. J. McFarlane	Hope
Mrs B. A. Robbie (Deceased)	Te Anau
Mr W. J. F. Somerville	Waimahaka (Chairman)
Mr R. A. M. Whaitiri	Bluff
Mr D. B. Wilson	Queenstown
Mr L. E. Wilson	Winton