

מדינת ישראל

משרדיה הממשלת

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אלכס ראהן
אלכס נגין
אונחה
18/5/88 - 27/12/88



שם תיק: היוטר המכדי לראש הממשלה - אריה יב

כזה פיזי:

א-4606/11

כזה פירט: R0003404

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-7

תאריך הדפסה: 10/08/2020

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ארכון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקומ להוצאה תעוזות יחידות*

תיק מס' 11

חטיבה מס' 43.5

מיכל מס' 4606/10

תאריך התעודה: 23.5.1988

שם הנמען:

שם מחבר התעודה:

סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקומות המתאים):

מכתב

מבrik

תזכיר או מזכיר

דין וחשבון או ذכרון דברים משיחה או דין

פרוטוקול של שיחה, דין או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקומות התעודה שהוצאה;
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

245-3 2/17/64 8:00
JCL

We would be particularly appreciative if the Prime Ministry could be supportive of the action that the United States Government has taken with respect to Panama.

A detailed exposition of U. S. Government positions and background are provided in the attached papers.

-- Our objective since the start of this crisis has been to support the restoration of constitutional government and to put the democratization process back on track.

-- This objective requires that Noriega get out of power and out of Panama.

-- We are dealing with an individual who has sought to turn his institution into a uniformed crime syndicate and to reduce his nation's sovereignty into its shield.

-- We have negotiated repeatedly and patiently these hard-to-achieve results, but Noriega's behavior has made clear that he is not, as of today, willing to accept them.

-- His duplicity, corruption, and stalling have forced us to reconsider our options.

-- It should be clear to all concerned that we remain committed to the terms of and our obligations under the Panama Treaties of 1977.

-- For the sake of Panama and the hemisphere as a whole, we hope you will do everything you can to help Panama achieve early release from Noriega's venal hold on power. We seek your thoughts and advice on how to move ahead.

The major elements of the arrangement we had hoped to conclude were as follows:

- General Noriega was to announce his intention to retire from the PDR on August 12, 1988. He was to announce in a speech and press conference his plans regarding several additional matters:
 - A. A call for the National Assembly to change immediately the law governing the Panama Defense Forces to set a five-year limit to the term of any PDF Commander. (It is in this context that he was to announce his intention to retire on August 12, 1988, the date on which he is to complete five years as PDF Commander.)
 - B. A call for the National Assembly to act immediately to restore full civil and political liberties, including freedom of assembly and freedom of the press and a full amnesty for all persons accused of political offenses.
 - C. A call for all exiles to return home to Panama.
 - D. A call for the formation of a broadly based government of national reconciliation.
 - E. His intention to attend to personal affairs in the coming period rather than to involve himself in politics. He was to state that after his retirement, he intended to wrap up some personal matters in Panama and then to travel abroad until after Panama's May 1989 elections.
- To encourage the transition to democracy and to underline our support for the process, the U.S. was prepared to take the following steps:
 - A. The White House was to make an early announcement of the lifting of IIEPA sanctions on financial flows to Panama (the restrictions imposed earlier as a result of actions taken by President Delvalle were to remain in place until after the formation of the new government).
 - B. Following the lifting of IIEPA and Noriega's subsequent announcement, we would state publicly that we had no objection to other parties, e.g., other governments, banks, businesses, making deposits in the National Bank of Panama in order to quickly reestablish liquidity in Panama's banking system.

- C. Once General Noriega had retired from the PDF, the President would have instructed the Justice Department not to oppose motions to dismiss the two indictments against him which his attorneys have already filed.
- D. Finally, once these minimal conditions had been met, the U.S. would launch an activist program of support for economic recovery in Panama. In addition to restoring bilateral assistance, we would pull out the stops trying to enlist the international lending institutions, friendly foreign governments and the private sector in support of this economic recovery program. We would consult with the congress about additional economic support as well.
- E. We would continue to recognize President Delvalle as the constitutional president of Panama. We would continue to recognize him while a government of national reconciliation was to be formed, with support of all political forces in Panama, to begin the task of a true transition to democracy and civilian rule.

A. Evolution of Panama Situation

- On February 5, federal grand juries charged several persons, among them General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Commander of the Panama Defense Forces, with drug trafficking and money laundering.
- On February 25, Panama's President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, ordered Noriega replaced.
- In the early hours of February 26, the National Legislative Assembly, acting in only ten minutes under pressure from Noriega, took measures they claimed impeached President Delvalle. At 3:30 a.m., Manuel Solis Palma was sworn in to replace him.
- President Delvalle concluded that the so-called "impeachment" violated the letter of Panama's constitution and the spirit of democracy. He refused to go quietly into exile.
- On March 1, Delvalle issued a proclamation giving notice that all obligations owing to Panama should be made directly to his government and not to the Noriega regime.
- Panama's Ambassador to the United States began actions in U.S. courts to freeze Panamanian government accounts in behalf of President Delvalle's government.
- From the first day, the United States responded positively to the decisions of Panama's legitimate authorities to seek a return to decency.
- On February 26, a White House statement condemned "all efforts to remove President Delvalle from office."
- On March 1, the United States decertified Panama for lack of cooperation on drug interdiction.
- On March 11, responding to a formal request from Delvalle, the U.S. government announced Canal treaty obligations would be paid into an escrow account belonging to the legal government of Panama.
- The days and weeks that followed became a standoff.
- Despite widespread pressure for his resignation, including an extended general strike of three weeks' duration and an internal attempt to restore the integrity of the defense forces, Noriega dug in defiantly.
- On April 8, the United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to restrict cash transactions with Panama.

-- Intensive negotiations with Noriega and his representatives began in Panama on April 18 and continued until May 25.

B. Background on Negotiations:

-- Through one channel or another we have been negotiating with Noriega for six months.

-- In October 1987, former Noriega confidant Jose Blandon was authorized by Noriega to initiate talks with the political opposition, to which we were a party as observers. In early December, as a political solution began to take shape and as they reached a point of entering into firm commitments, Noriega backed off.

-- In late December, DOD Assistant Secretary Armitage visited Panama at Noriega's request to review the question of a resolution of the political crisis. Again Noriega proved unwilling to commit himself to any effort which would resolve the country's political crisis.

-- The lack of a willingness and commitment to deal with the basic issues needed to find a political solution to the crisis revealed unscrupulousness and bad faith on Noriega's part.

-- Other important efforts have been made to seek a resolution. An effort led by former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez attempted to develop a deal with Noriega for a March departure. The evidence is that Noriega never intended to leave and was playing for time to relieve pressures on his regime.

-- The President's decision during this latest negotiation that, once Noriega had resigned from power, the United States would not oppose his attorney's motion to dismiss the current indictments against him, underscored our willingness to seek agreement even at domestic political cost.

-- We started with forbearance and good faith, avoiding propaganda and seeking a dignified solution. Economic pressure became an indispensable complement to these intensive diplomatic efforts only after months of direct and indirect confidential talks last year failed.

-- Blame for damage to the Panamanian economy must be laid at Noriega's feet. In defying President Delvalle's legitimate order that he step down, Noriega placed his personal welfare over that of the country as a whole. He must accept responsibility for the consequences of what was in effect a coup d'etat.

-- The economy has been hurt. We do not, however, believe the damage to the Panamanian economy is irreversible. But it will not recover while Noriega remains.

-- Panamanians deserve our high admiration; they have not yielded to the regime's intimidation, but their freedoms have been curtailed as the regime has repressed its critics and sought to prevent strikes and popular demonstrations. They deserve relief.

Following is text of statement as given by Secretary Shultz on May 26:

The President has authorized me to recall United States negotiator Michael Kozak to the United States.

At the final moment in negotiations, Noriega would not carry through with the arrangements his representatives had negotiated. No further negotiations are contemplated. All proposals addressed during these negotiations have been withdrawn. No offers remain on the table.

Noriega imposes a heavy burden on the people of Panama. The burden is political -- repression of the freedom to speak, to assemble, to choose leadership and direction. The burden is economic -- fewer jobs, less pay, inability to benefit from a relationship with the economy of the United States. The burden is moral -- isolation in the hemisphere, as the corruption of the drug trade is rejected.

Noriega had a chance to lift these burdens as a result of reasonable terms worked out with the United States. Having authorized others to say he agreed to resign and leave, he has not been able to say so himself. He has put his own interests above those of the people of Panama.

The United States will continue to work for an opening to democracy to Panama and for the conditions that will lead to economic development. We will continue our all-out war on drugs, and we will continue to work with the people of Panama and democratic forces throughout the hemisphere to get Noriega out of power and out of Panama.

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
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סַבָּאִי קָרְבָּן

(לחות כתובות פימית במתוחדי המשלולן)

מִזְכָּר

התאריך	אל
תיק מס'	מארה חנוכה

כִּי תְּהִלֵּל אֶת כְּלֵלֵינוּ

לְבָנֵינוּ וְלְבָנֵי בָּנֵינוּ

וְרָן ✓

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: חמישרד

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13

✓

אל : מנהל הסברה

ראהנא מברך הי' אמריקן פראינדס סרבייס קומינגי (קוינקרים) שבשלח לדרוה'ם, שהחיח, שרה'יב ולשאגריב ארבע.

ג. מבקשים לדעת אם גוסחה וכשלחה תשובה ועל ידי מי.

5. אמי מציע שתנית תשובה אחת מהשגרירות.

א. אנה חצעת כוותח.

הארץ אשר נעים

3207 85.01 1.03A 11.5 50/1A 51A 272
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Rev: 011M/1.00000 Lines: 1

MEMISRAEL WSH

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ICS IPMWGHD WSH
ZCZC 02011 05-19 0720P EST
TLX 892337 MEMISRAEL WSH
BT

1-017457A140 05/19/88
ICS IPMRYNN RND
04451 RENO NV 05-19 0345P PDT RYNN
ICS IPMWGWS

1-167836G140 05/19/88
ICS IPMIIHA IISS
IISS F M RCA 13 1840
PMS WASHINGTON DC
WUB3029 RMN3549 QAG3181 FF0930300 247559AFSCUR
URIX CO UR88 337
PHILA., PA. 337/303 13 1852
MOSHE ARAD
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
3514 INTERNATIONAL DR, NW WASHINGTON, DC20008
ISRAELI DEPORTATION POLICY
TO: YITZHAK SHAMIR
YITZHAK RABIN
MOSHE ARAD, AMBASSADOR TO UNITED STATES
CC: GEORGE SCHULTZ

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S
CONTINUED USE OF DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS AS A MEANS FOR
SUPPRESSING OPPOSITION TO MILITARY OCCUPATION ON THE WEST BANK AND
IN THE GAZA STRIP. WE CALL UPON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RESCIND
IMMEDIATELY ALL PENDING DEPORTATION ORDERS, TO CEASE ITS POLICY OF
DEPORTATION AND TO CONFORM TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
CONCERNING MILITARY OCCUPATION.

657 33

2. THE DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS BY THE ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES VIOLATES BOTH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION (ARTICLE 43) AND INFILCTS EXTREME HARDSHIP ON BOTH DEPORTEE AND FAMILY LEFT BEHIND. DEPORTATION IS CLEARLY A FORM OF INTIMIDATION AND PUNISHMENT, INTENDED TO MAKE EXAMPLES TO OTHER PALESTINIANS WHO MIGHT OPPOSE MILITARY OCCUPATION. THE MOST RECENT DEPORTATION ORDER, THAT AGAINST MUBARAK AWAD, FOUNDER OF THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NONVIOLENCE, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY FORM OF OPPOSITION TO ITS OCCUPATION, PEACEFUL OR OTHERWISE.

WE BELIEVE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS CAN LIVE SIDE-BY-SIDE AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. WE SUPPORT BOTH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT FOR ALL TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. THE AFSC DEPLORES AND ANGUISHES OVER THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE THAT HAS CAUSED SUCH DEEP SUFFERING AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS ALIKE. THIS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WILL NOT BE BROKEN BY AN "IRON-FIST" REPRESSION OF OPPOSITION. THE END TO VIOLENCE CAN ONLY COME THROUGH A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. TRAGICALLY, THE DEPORTATION POLICY OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS SERVED ONLY TO REMOVE POTENTIAL PARTNERS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION.

ASIA BENNETT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

COL 3514 DC200008 43)

NNN

1724 EST

1734 EST

NNNN

1830 EST

MEMISRAEL WSH

Time: 14:56 05/19/88 777
Connect Time : 467 seconds

END

סינס אברט

דף ג' מתוך יי' דפים

סינוג בטהווני – מגדלי

דוחי פלות בגבב

האריך/ן י"ח 26.16.30

מג'ס' מבלק

672

1/2

המישר

נְצָרָן :

דע : סמאנטיק צפ"א

לטכנת מנכ"ל מז'יגב

הגדון : שיכחה עט כד ונולך,

הנ"ל מחליפו של נילקוקס. כסוגן עוזר מזכיר בагף מ"ת הממונח על יישראאל ושבגנותיה, עיר ביקור ניטוסין בזמנך בשגרירות ומאתר שבאותה עת הילתי הארץ, הлечתי לחזיב עמי בפנינו, מabit העובדה שפראטציג במתפר ארוועיט.

לහלן תמצית הנקודות העיקריות מהשיטה:

ב乾坤 לבריה"מ ולתחליך, אמר שAVISו לקבל כוסח החתובתארת הסובייטית כמדידת حق טהסלביגיטים
וthon מהאינטראנסוונל ובנאמר להם שם שAVIS בכםעא כוסח כתוב. הדברים, אמר, כאלו לא נאמרו שולט.
אין הם מוכנים לדיזון מיקום בענין המז"ת בפסגה דסביבה, אם ירullaה ע"ג הסובייטים הם מוכנים
לו וררי יჩיה שם אחד המתרגשים הגדולים בענין, המזכיר עצמן ולידיו יהיה ריש מה - NSC.

בוקר למהליך, אמר שלדעתנו כל מטרת המזקיר היא שלא גורוצר חלל למי וכי מעל לכך נסיבותו טל גולקר גמ"ת איזג' מאפשר לו להיות יותר אופטימר. אם יושג זכר-פה הרוי שימסת להיות מדרשת. מכל מקום הדעה היא שתה מתקווים למאתיך גם בעדרת הביקור מסתית וכורוך לחומר הפעולה. הוא מסכים שמצוות של ירדן בענין הינו "ירודד" ולכן אין להניח שוחטלו ירצה לסכך עצמו לכוון לא שוחפים. בעבר היו עליות ורכידות בוגרמות של ירדן ביש"ג הוירגן גל היל זיין 9-6/ם.


ביזמתו, הquila ענין ע"ב ואמר שהיה מושך מחד מהפעלתנות המצלחת. הוא אמר שהמעדרים תרצו לו זאת באופן שלא סכין אותו. צידבתי לו התקלות עם המזיכיר שהלישר המצרי בסמיינר על העלב האדים על נס דוחותי במכבב) ואמר שכך קשה לתרע עדמת המצרים, גם לא בראונס למתבל חזרה ליגנה.

פ 0 פ 5 מ ב ר 6דפ 7 מתיו 1/2 דפיםס 1 1 1 1 ב ט ה ו נ יד ח י פ ו ות א ר י 0 / 2 " Hמ ס ' מ ב ר ק

672 2/2

גם הוא וגם תירש שהשתתף במשכה (וגם אהירן שפגשתי בנספרד) לא היו ניכרים (בלשון הפטמה) מזה שדר' ביגלון מתייחסו אהירן באילו נקמתה מאחוריו גבו של משה' ר' שביר וציננו שלק מפיגי'ותתו נערכו ע"ד משה' ח. אמרתי שבודאי היתה כאן איז-היכנה או שיכחה ראיין הדבר מכוגן. הידש הוסיף שרג' העורבה שהפגישה עם שיפטר אצל מרפי, שתימתה אמרה להיות מסוויה, פורסמה בתקורת על פדינן היה עדי' שלא תפרנס כלל.

נד זולקר חתימת בבטול לידיהם שפורסמה ברו' פושט על ש"פ' י. ש. ש. סינדי בנוסח הטילים ואמר שהמבוגר מוכך לו ואינו מאמין עלייך. הוא אמר שכל הנקין היל בטענות כחוגים כלכליים אמריקניים בסעודיה שאין לו כל מה להתבסס.



מ.ת.ג.י

שגדידות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט' ו' פ' ס' מ' ב' ר' ק'

77 מתוך 2 דפים

סוויג בטחון ג'טמורי

דוחיפות מילדי - טפ

תנאריך/ז"ה 26 מאי 1730 מס' 88

עמ' מברך

112

141

673

המשרן + גיא גורק

אל: מנהל ארכ'ל 2

דעת: ביאר/כין זולק

מאת: ג'עדי-ג'ונען, ורשי נגטונן

מזהם - 7

במקביל שוחחת אתמלול (25.5') עם דינ. ארכנוז. ארכנוז. פיט. באבא גו-תנתקת. ותמי. ותמי.

א. תוא אמר שופטן ירצה להשאר זמן-מה אחורי עזיבת המזקיר כדי לדוחה באהורה מפורט על החתפותחוויות במוסקבה. אהירן אמר שבמקביל לשגרירות בתיא יפנו גם אלינור וצעינגר את ממי ירבעם שופטן לפוגן.

(24.5)

ב. ביגנתיים, נפגש הפגדריך עם שופט ברום ג'. בפגישת חזר על טענותם שאנשי הפגדריות
בכת"א ובראשם פירקרינגן חסום שאין שמיים לבקש מהשגות ולפנויות שלחם לקבלת מידע על פעילות
עה"ל ועל ארכווטס חרזגים בשטחים. כאשר באותם המקרים שללטוונות עה"ל משבים, הם עושים
זאת כדי לצעת ידי חובה ולא תמיין הנושאים נבדקים כיסודותיות. בקשתם היא שיריקבנ' גראם
מושכם שיכל לחשיב ביסודות ובמהירות. הנושא בודאי וועלה ע"י המזוכיר בפיגישתו הקרווב
עם שחב"ט,

Credentials

לשגרור שגנית אריאה בסתינו כאשר מתחילה ליטר כרך החומר לדוח ז"א ל-8890 והוא כמובן יזקיענו

במדוריך המרעדיהם.

שגרירות ישראל / וויסינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ג ג
דף 2 מתוך 2סולם בטחונידוחיםתאריך/ז"המס' מברך

2/2

673

141

ג. אחרין הדגיש בוגרתם לא לטפל עטנו על כל מקרה בלבד או רצונם לדון עטנו על תפיסות (*Perceptions*) או גישות (*Patterns*) או אידיאופרטזיה לא-נכונה בשיטה של מדיניות שנקבעה. מסרתי לו שعليهم גם לחקפיד ולורוד שהתלויות המודגשתות אכן ייש لهم בסוד ויעידני בדוגמה את העיליה על שפיקת המים הרווחחים על ידה שקרובינה ייחוס אזהה בזדון על חיללי זה"ל.



משרד החוץ - מחלקות הקשדטופס מברך גלוי

דנ 5 מתחז 5 דפים
 סיווג בטחוני: שיטור
 דחיפות: מגדי
 תאריך וזמן רישום: 10/10/1960
 מס. מברך: 1034

לשימוש
סוכן
הקשר

אל: האגירר, ווטינגן דן

רצ"ב תשובה רה"מ למכתבי הסנטור פל וקורטה קיננא,
 בעניין מובהך עוזאד. ט"ו אצטיל 10/10/1960. כלא גזע,
 (קשר - أنا הרצ"ב)

אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ

ט"ו אצטיל 10/10/1960 נס"מ ס.ג.) גזע

השוויה: ט"ו אצטיל אישור מנהל המחלקה ט"ו אצטיל
 לאירוע תאריך וזמן העבורה לקשרו

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח)

2/5 1034 71

ראש ממשלת
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Mrs. King,

Thank you for your telegram of May 10 regarding the case of Mubarak Awad.

As you know, your late husband is greatly admired and revered in Israel. We see in him one of the great apostles of freedom, justice and peace; a great moral leader in the Judeo-Christian tradition whose message is as compelling as it is universal. We know you have been dedicating your life to keeping this message alive.

That is why I was deeply distressed by your telegram on behalf of Mubarak Awad. Mr. Awad is not a man of peace. Side by side with protestations of non-violence he has asserted repeatedly and consistently, in public speeches and in writing, that he supports the aims of the PLO. Those aims are explicit and clear: the destruction of the State of Israel. After establishing his Center for the Study of Non-violence in Jerusalem he wrote in the Journal of Palestine Studies that the tactic of non-violence does not "constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle" - a standard PLO euphemism for terrorism. During the riots here, he has participated in the preparation and distribution of leaflets that incite the population to acts of violence not only against Israelis but against Arabs serving in civil service posts. In a recent interview he said, "our activities complement those of the PLO".

Obviously, Mr. Awad does not intend non-violence to replace violence but to abet it. And I cannot help but feel that his description of himself as a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King is not only an Orwellian inversion of language but a gross insult to the memory of your great husband.

/2.

Mrs. Coretta Scott King
The Martin Luther King Federal Holiday Commission
449 Auburn Ave. N.E.
ATLANTA GA 30812

Mr. Awad is an American citizen and a visitor to this country whose visa has expired. Every country reserves the right to determine who will enter its borders, and no country allows visitors to participate in political activity, even when it is harmless. Many Arab-Americans who come here as visitors stay after their visas expire. We do not exercise our right to expel them as long as they do not act against the State. In Mr. Awad's case we are convinced his presence poses a danger to the country's security and to the safety of its inhabitants.

Mr. Awad is neither an Israeli citizen nor a permanent resident. He could have been summarily deported. Instead, he has been granted the right of appeal. His case is now before the Israel Supreme Court, whose independence and impartiality are unimpeachable. We shall be bound by its decision.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

45 1034 2

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Senator Pell,

Thank you for your message regarding Mubarak Awad, which was relayed to me by Ambassador Pickering.

I deeply appreciate your concern for Israel's public image. It is a concern we all share, and I know your message is that of a friend and supporter. But I find your calling Mubarak Awad a 'pacifist' rather puzzling. Mr. Awad is not a man of peace. Side by side with protestations of non-violence he has asserted repeatedly and consistently, in public speeches and in writing, that he supports the aims of the PLO. Those aims are explicit and clear: the destruction of the State of Israel. After establishing his Center for the Study of Non-violence in Jerusalem he wrote in the Journal of Palestine Studies that the tactic of non-violence does not "constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle" - a standard PLO euphemism for terrorism. During the riots here, he has participated in the preparation and distribution of leaflets that incite the population to acts of violence not only against Israelis but against Arabs serving in civil service posts. In a recent interview he said, "our activities complement those of the PLO".

Obviously, Mr. Awad does not intend non-violence to replace violence but to abet it. And I cannot help but feel that his description of himself as a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King is not only an Orwellian inversion of language but a gross insult to the memory of those great leaders.

/2.


The Hon. Senator Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington DC

Mr. Awad is an American citizen and a visitor to this country whose visa has expired. Every country reserves the right to determine who will enter its borders, and no country allows visitors to participate in political activity, even when it is harmless. Many Arab-Americans who come here as visitors stay after their visas expire. We do not exercise our right to expel them as long as they do not act against the State. In Mr. Awad's case we are convinced his presence poses a danger to the country's security and to the safety of its inhabitants.

Mr. Awad is neither an Israeli citizen nor a permanent resident. He could have been summarily deported. Instead, he has been granted the right of appeal. His case is now before the Israel Supreme Court, whose independence and impartiality are unimpeachable. We shall be bound by its decision.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



2723 0010

דפ' מחותן דפים

סוויג בטחונן, שמור

דוחיפות מיידי

תלאוריך/א"נ 251600 מאי 88

מס' מברק

שגרירות ישראל / זושינגטון

12

אל : המשרד

619

אל : מקהל מופיע

דוקקינס.

להלן מפגישה עם מדין אולברייט יועצת המומחה לענייני חוץ.

א. התענוגה בשיחות מראה"מ וההמשל וכן בגורשו יחסינו עם ברה"מ. לאחר שקרה המאמר
היום בירושינגן פוטט.

ב. סיפורה שבשל הלחץ של גיסי ג'קטרון הם שוקלים לדרוש שארה"ב מפעל להכricht על זרא"פ
כמדיינה טורייקטיט. אמרה גם ששמעה שאחת הקיבות שמכנוו את ארה"ב לעשות זאת עד כתה
הם יחמי ישראל-זרא"פ.

ג. מדרה על מה שכבר ידוע לנו שdoneקייט לא מוכיח לטוטה מעמדותינו במידענות הבושא מכך וכי הם מקוים שי' יעדותינו לא יובנו שלא כמלכתי.

ערן

P. 83

1

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
ONE GREENWAY PLAZA EAST, SUITE 722
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77046-0126



ՀԱՆՊՈԼԻԱ ԲԱՀԻԱ ՏԵՂ ԻՍՐԱԵԼ
ԳԻՈՒԹԵՄ, ՊԵՏԵ
PHONE: (718) 637-3780

הוּא כָּלֵב	
34	72
25.5.88	ט' א' תשמ"ח
19/11/88	21.2.88

אל: י-ם
מאת: יוסטוֹן

אל: מצפ"א
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א
הסברת
מאתה הקרפסול, יומסנו

ב-ARING ארכונט ג'נארקיזט בונידות מחרוזות של המפלגה הדמוקרטית באזרנו

1. מקורות בקהילה היהודית אלברטקי ניו מקסיקו מסרו לנו על נסironות העברת החלטות אנטישראליות בועידות איזוריות של המפלגה הדמוקרטית בניו מקסיקו.

הנחיות נמשים בירוחם של חוגים מוצא ערבי במדינה, להערכות המקורות הניל יש החלטות סיכורי. סביר להת铿 תודות לכוון אפשרות של גורמים כושים היספניים רדייליס ואנטישמיים לבנים בועידות הניל.

גורמים בקהילה שם גם בעלי משקל במפלגה הדמוקרטית מנסים להציג לגנטחת פשרה שם החוגים הפרו ערביים שתמוך את הנימה האכתי ישראליות מוחלטות (אם כי עצם הדיאלוג עם גורמים אלה הוא מודיעג לכשעמו).

2. התופעה דלעיל אופיינית גם למדיניות נוספות באיזורנו (ראה מברקנו מ-11/4).

3. כדי לעקב ולראות אם קיימים נסיבות להעברת החלטות אנטישראליות בנסיבות המ foregoing בדמונגרטיה בחלוקת אחריות של ארצות הברית.

יש לציין כי החלטות הוועידות האזרחיות מועברות לוועידות המדיניות
ומזאות. בשפתה הרווחה המדינית, בועידה הארץית.

בנ שמר אל

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

סינפס מבדק

דב מתיוז דפים

סוווג במחוזות אידי

25.5.88 - 11:00 AM 7/7/2014

מס' מברק

525 609

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקט"ח - משחוב"ט

קונגרס: סטינגרים למפרץ

6.4 מה- 88 למבדקנו

להלן מתרך שיחה עם עוזרו של הסנטור דה-קורנסיני:

בסוף סוף המועצה לבתוחן לאומי מסכה שני הדוחות במתחריב בהתאם לחוק (חchlת החמשה) הראשון על הפעלת טיללים מוגם סטינגר בידי מדיניות המפרץ, והשנאי על בקשת בחריין לקבל סטינגרים. שני הדוחות מסודרים סודיו ולכז נבער מהעוזר למסור על התוכן אך הגדרות **ב-30.1.1.1 Horsegear** (בדבוריו) ובלתי רציניות. כתועאה מכר דה-קונסינ-גוטה להתמיד בהתקנות לאספקת סטינגרים לכל מדיניות המפרץ - וכך דאג לכך שלא יוכנסו שינוריות או חריגים לחוק במסגרת הדינוניס בסנט ואפ בביית הנבחרים בהתאם לחוק כספי הפנטגון ולוחם תקיעת הפנטגון (עד כה בביית הנבחרים בלבד) גלאס 1989.

טנש מוא. 1705

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט נ פ ס מ ב ג

דפ' מתייד ז' ז

סוויג בטחון שמאור

דוחיפות רגיל

1000

606

המגילה

מגפ"א - מאן?

מאת: דבי בלול, וושינגטן

משלחת פעילי בחירות

מתארגנת משלחת נוספת של פעילי בחריות משתי המפלגות. כל ההצעות על חשבונם המארכנים, (ברשותו דיריד איבשין), כל האחריות לתכנית היא לא ידעת מכך כלל, בידי המטרד. התאריך האפשרי היחידי מבחןת הוא לאחר ועידות המפלגות ולפניהם פתיחה מערכת לבחירות הכלליות, הגעה לארץ ב-8/26 ויציאה ב-9/1. שלד המכנית כמו בקביעות הקודמות. אני מציע לשדרין עטטטיבית 20 חדרים במילון המלך זוד. (אחד הגבול המכסיימי של משתתפים ומלוויים).

בין מאנשיים שכבר הודיעו על נכונותם להשתתף מטעם הצעד הדמוקרטי - בוב בקל, חום דונצ'ילון ווביל דילגוי ומן הצעד הרפובליקני אד רולינס, דילגוי קין וబוב קיטט (מיועצינו הפליטים של ג'ים בירקר). בשלב זה נראה כי ההרכב יהיה המרשים ביותר מכל המשלחות. אולם, כאמור, בשל המעדצת הפוליטית כאן יתעורר בורלאדי שינגדירם במדבב עד הרגע האחרון.

בוגרונות למקובל בסיפורים אלה בעבר, אני מעדיף להוסיף ביקור במתות בחריות של המפלגות בארץ, ובמקומם הפגישות השגרתיות עם רוח"מ וממ' רוח"מ, אולי להאטרפ' לסיפור בחריות של כל אחד מהם ולקיים את תשיחת מהלך הסיפור או בסיפורו.

אנא, אשדר עקרונית, את המועד המוצע,

דני בלון

1 1 2 1 1 3 3 2

טופס מברך

דף 1 מתוך דפים
סרווג בטוחוני: שמור
דוחיפות: מיידי
תאריך וז"ח: 25.5.88 16:30
מס' מברך:

אל: המשרד + בטוחנו

556 633

אל: מCAF'A
דע: מקש"ח - משבב"ט

שיחת השגריר עם הסנטור וורנר (5.24.88)

1. במסגרת שיחותיו השוטפות בגבעה נפגש השגריר את מול עם הסנטור ג'ו וורנר (רפובליקאי מוריירג'יניה, בכיר המיעוט בזעדה לשירותים מדו"ניים).

2. השגריר ערך את הסנטור על תחילה השלום תוך מסירת פרטיהם על העמדה הסובייטית כפי שהיא עולה מנוייר שגן' ברה"מ העיר בעקבות שבר לידי השר. וורנר גילה עניין בכך ידידות רבה - העיר שהוא רוכש אהדה רבה "לעמד" בשל הנוכחות של המאבק (קרוי, לנוכח הארוועים בשטחים). הצביע על כך שלא חתום על אף מכתב שורגר בחודשי מ' האחוריונים (הוותה אומר). מכתב 30 הסנטוראים ומכתבם של עשרת הסנטוראים השמרניים) - וזאת בגלל שאינו סבור שיש לחת עצות שאיש לא בקש ("FREE ADVICE"). לדעתו הנוגעים בדבר בשטח הסנטור יכולם לפטור את בעיותיהם.

3. הועלו שני נושאים מבצעיים:

הסנטור בכתבה שהtrapסמה ב"ירושפרסט" ביום ב' (5.23) כאילו ישראליים עזרו לסינים לפתח את מנגנון ההנחתה של טילי ה"איסט-וינט" שנמצן ליד הטעדים. השגריר הצביע על ההכחשה שהtrapסמה הסנטור את מול בעמוד פנימי של העיתון. וורנר טען שאינו די בכך, כי איש אינו שם לב לדייעה קטנה זו שנבלעה בתחום העיתון. אל לנו להסתפק בהכחשה קצרה ועלינו לcatch בהסביר מלא ומנווקם אם בראונבו לנטרא את הכתבה המקורית שיש בה כדי להזיק לנו קשות במספר מישורים. השגריר הסכים והבטיח להעביר דעתו של וורנר לנוגעים בדבר בארץ.

ב. תיקון בר. רח' מ הצביע על תיקון ממאיר זה והציג שורנר יתן גיבור למאיצים לרך אותו אם יחבר שגיתן לחוזר לנושא במסגרת הקונפרנס על חוק כספי הפטנגוון. וורנר הביע נוכנות והציג שבחair את העניין עם עוזזריר. (הערה: מבירור ראשוני היום נראה שהסיכון של דיוון חוזר בירושא(בקונפרנס) קלושים אך נMISSIR לחפש דרך לטפל בבעיה).

טופס מברך
אל: המשרד + בטוחנו
דע: מקש"ח - משבב"ט
הסנטור וורנר (5.24.88)
למ"ד 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 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שגרירות ישראל / ירושינגטן

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דַּף 1 מִתּוֹךְ דָּפִים

סְלָוָג בְּתַחְנוּנִי גָּלוּי

דְּחִיפּוֹת מִינִידִי

חָרִידָה/י"ח" 25.5.88

מִסּוּס מִבְּרַק

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המשרדים

אל: מצפיה, מע"ח, לשכת שר


דעת: לשכת דוחה ים

מחאת: עתונות

השלחת הקובוסולרית

להלן ספורה של אלון פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ביישובינגטן פוטטי.


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אלון פרנקל



Israelis To Visit Moscow

Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

Peres, on the other hand, has cautiously welcomed Moscow's new interest in the region and has accepted the proposal for an international peace conference in which the Soviet Union presumably could play a major role.

While in Washington last week, Peres met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dubinin and said afterward

See ISRAEL, A27, Col. 1

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Soviet Union Approves Visit By Israeli Consular Officials

ISRAEL, From A21

that he was "encouraged" by what the Soviet diplomat said. But Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of Shamir's office, in a radio interview yesterday, accused Peres of "constant theatrics" in portraying Moscow as shifting toward a more favorable policy toward Israel. Ben-Aharon insisted there had been no change in Soviet policy favoring the Arab states.

Behind the scenes, officials say, each of the two leaders separately is seeking through intermediaries to persuade the Soviets to invite him to visit Moscow this year.

For Peres, the more dovish of the two, the trip might give a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Shamir's side has told the Soviets they would accomplish more by meeting with the man who polls suggest is most likely to be prime minister after the November elections.

Earlier this month Peres visited Hungary, the first time an Israeli foreign minister has gone to an East Bloc country other than Romania in 21 years.

A Soviet consular delegation arrived here last July, the first official Soviet diplomatic group to visit Israel since Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, except Romania, severed ties after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Israeli officials then said they expected to send a reciprocal delegation to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets delayed for several months, contending that the Israelis had no citizens or state-owned property and therefore no consular interests in the Soviet Union.

Officials here said that when the Soviets sought to renew visas for their consular delegation in February, they were given four-month extensions but were warned that the visas would not be reissued unless an Israeli consular mission was approved.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol said Tarasov had told Novick that the visas would indeed be issued and that "within the next few days" a date would be set for the delegation's travel.

Other officials said Novick had been cautioned that the mission would be allowed to deal only with consular issues. The warning left open the question of how much involvement the diplomats would be allowed to have in the other major issue—besides Middle East peace—that stands between Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet refusal to allow Jews to emigrate freely.

Israeli leaders recently approved a policy that would deny Israeli visas to Soviet Jews who do not plan to settle here. Israel has initiated negotiations with Moscow to fly Soviet Jews directly to Tel Aviv via Bucharest, rather than allowing them to go to Vienna. Israeli leaders hope this would reduce the high dropout rate of Soviet Jews who stay in the West rather than going to Israel.

The Soviets have indicated a willingness to consider direct flights. But many Soviet emigres living in Israel object strongly to the decision to deny Israeli visas to potential "dropouts." All Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union should be aided by Israel regardless of their likely destinations, these Soviet Jewish leaders have argued.

סינטס מבחן

דף 1 מתוך 4

סיניג באנון, סינדי

למחמות מיגדי

טערידן/זעטן 25.1.1445 מאי 88

מס' מברך

631

המשרד

אל: פמ"ד, סוריה/לבנון, ערב 2, מז"תים

מאת: אלן אבידן, נושינגטונ

לברנץ

משיחה עם אפריל גלסקי

סיפורה שהקדישה את מירב מאמציה במסעה האחרון לכידות ולדמשק לחילופי דיפות עם גורמים שיעים וסודים. אחת הביעות הלוגיסטיות היא חוסר קומוניקציה בין הגדודים הנ"ל עד כדי כך שנאלצה להעביר מסרים בינויהם במלחק של-שני רחובות. זו נזבנת מנהה ומתחסדים אוישים בינויהם המלווים בחשכנות ובטן כוונות לכל מילה הינוצאת מפייהם. התזואה היה שארה"ב מזעמת עטמת יותר ויזותר במעט של מזעיה ומביא דברים. רוב הגורדים עטם שוחחה (הנשייה, יוז"ר הפרלמנט, רת"מ בפועל ועוד) בקשר טוורבות גדולות יותר ביחס לדמשק, הלשון שחזרה ונשנה היתה "יְהוָה" ודברו עט הסורים. ארה"ב, הדגישה גלפסי, פוזלת מכח העקרון שלא להציג מומדים (לנשיאות) ושלא לנוקוט טמדה בשאלות השנויות בחלוקת המקייפות כמעט כל נושא. לאלה"ב אין "פטנט דשות" כדי לעדרים את המומנטום החדרני בלבנון. כל צד מעביר את הבדור למשנהו, כשהסורים ממשיעים מילדים יפות אך חסרות תבלת אוד מוש. הרגשות היא שפועלת בחלל ריק אך היא נחושה להמשיך בכך. מעא לשוב נסוף בכידות דטוק והפעם גם לירושלים בעת שhort המזcid באזר. המשר המרכדי שליח חייה שיט לאפשר את קיומו של תהליך הבחירה לבנון. ארה"ב שוללת גימות של ספרדים וחילוקת לבנון המגיעה מהאזר (נווירים). רוץ להבטיח שישראל יהיה בראה בגדוז.

2. מעשית היה ראה שני **טסרים** העשויים **להגיע** את המערכת (א) בחרבת ממלכת חדשה. לדעתה
זוהי האפשרות המודגשת, אך סקפתית ביותר באשר למימושה. זאת מכיון הערכה שראשם גורמים הרו
בחיליך זה בלי לשרותם. לבקשתך לפרט השיבת השמדובר בראש ובראשונה בנסוא. הלה רוזה באפשרון
זאתفتح למגנו ראש ממלכה **שימורה** חומרת גוטי לעדכינו, או בנסיבות הטוב סוכן שודcia לפועל
תכניותיו. לسئلתי האם הולה כוונת להאריך תקופת נשיאותו השיבת **שאמין** מטעון חכם כדי שלא
להשלות נושא זה בפניהם, אך כי אין לה ספק שמהרחר בכם, שכן ידועה לא זמן מה לילית של

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19.11.1993 גן חיות טבריה מזמין ליום רביעי 21.11.1993 מפגש בוגרים בוגרים מ-1968

טוויס מבחן

דב מבחן דפים

סילוג במחנה

דוחות

תדריך/דוח

מס' מבחן

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באותה מידת, הוסיף הסורדים לא יכנסו עמו לדיאלוג, אם כי חodata שאין לה ביחס
באשר למחלפי דשך. (ב) מימוש תהליכי הבדיקה בראה לה כאותציה דיאלית יותר. אין לה
ספק שהסורדים אכן ימקדו עצם בכך. אולם לפחות שנה שורה קפוא באשר לתהליכי רכזק-באשר
לטוען, אך תוך חודש, להברכה, שהוא יתחיל לזרז. לעובדה שרשות המומדים הולכת
וגדלה אין טשטחות שכן העובדה היא שלם מועמד טבוי. יעצה בשפע קצף בגדי מיטל עון מפקד
העבא באשר למציגיות שנדקע העבא בתרחשות מז רצח בראמה. לא חסכה בזקירות גם מנגנוני¹
שמפון שהזדה בפניה, ע"פ דבריה, שהוא לא-טמיין שלמעמדות לשנו סיכוי כלשהו. לא-אלתמי²
מי נותר אם כן השיבה שהיתה רוצח לראות מועמד מסובבו של פרנגייה אך אין בכך סיכוי בغالל מצע
בריאותו, לכל אחד מן המומדים ישנו אותו סיכוי (קלות) אף כי מוקדם מדי לקבוע
מסירות. בסופו של דבר עשוו להבדר שיצוץ מועמד של פשרה, הגם קזואין רב.

ג. לא-אלתי בדבר השפעת המאבק הנוכחי בבירות עם החזבאללה, השיבה שהזרה מתהוויה
היא סורדים לא תכנס בכך לפרבריות הדרומיים של בירות ושתודת העבא הסורי הימה
למנוע השטלוות החזבאללה על גדרת המפתח באזורי המזיאון. השיבות לאו טמו סורדי בכת
גודעת לדעתה מיזידית ושתי עקרונות (א) העיתוי הנוכחי גרווע. אסד לא ירפייע
בפוגה באלב'יר בטידי מוגנאותם בדם. (ב) העלות הרבה בכ"א, הסורדים גם דעתרכו לרוכך
את ההתנגדות ע"י הרשות האזורי (ג) שבר ביחסו חונע שלם. לא-אלתמי אין תחילה לא רק
כלכלי (נפט) אלא בעיקר פוליטי. אסד לא יעור חלל ריק בחנטיקות מאיראן מבלתי שתהיה לו
אלטרנטיבת פוליטית שתאזר את הכוחות ומאפשר לسورדים למשיך להדאות על חשובה במקבילית
הכוחות במחנה הערבי.

הسورדים נעצדים בפרש החזבאללה בפניו שתי בעיות מרכזיות (א) המעודבות האיראנית זו מוגדרת
ע"י גלפסי כ - PAIN IN THE NECK עבורי טיריה. השמונות טאייראן מפיעת
בדב מתן מעמד לה בכל הסדר, לרבות סיורים משותפים להרצאות לפועל שככל הסדר מידי נזרום
בিירות, הם לענייניהם בעיבוי דשך וככל שנטבות גודמות לسورדים אבדן תדמית על שכיבודן נאלצת
לשורתיהם של גורם שליטי (זר) להכנסת סדר בסוגיה. התדרוצות של השליחים האיראנים טירין
אלסלאם ובנראע מתחייבות נחירות איזראן לקבלת דרישת רג'ל בסדר על אף העובדה שעד
עתה הם העלו חוט בחתם. (ב) מנידת מתן גושפנקא מדינית להישג החזבאללה בשעתם. הסורדים
ע"פ גלפסי בדעה שאסור שהישגים אלה יתרגםו למשמעות פוליטיים כבון ע"י הפיכת החזבאללה לעצ
במסכם כלשהו.

ס. פ. ס. מ. ב. ד. ק.

ד. 3 מ. ת. ד. פ. מ.

ס. 11. ג. ב. ת. ח. ו. ג.

ד. ח. י. פ. ו. ו.

ת. מ. ר. י. ד. ז. ו. ו.

מ. מ. ב. ר. ק.

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דרך מחשבה זו מבדאה את הסורדים לכך שיש לנתק את התסדר לאפיק העץ של החיבת הבתווני של המעב בפדרדים. ההתפקיד חסוריית מוסברת גם קסטילג חרבת שיש להם ע"מ להציג דוח, אם כי אין בוחן בכך לנוכח העובדה שביוגנדיות החזבאללה לצורה פובדנות בשעה. המפוזחות חסוריית לדעתה מכובנת להציג מעב בו יגעו להסדר בוחני בrama של החזרת הסדר העיבורי,แทน ערבותיות לאוכלוסייה דכד', שיתבסס על נסיגה מסויימת של החזבאללה ובאותה מידה תאפשר הכנסה מוסכמת של בוחנות סורדים שיפקחו על התסדר. הסורדים גם מספיק מפומחים על לתבוע החזרת הסטוס קדו דרגמת דרישת אמ"ל שכך, הדבר פשוט לא מעשי. החזבאללה מנגד מבקשים ליעזר זיקה בין ביריות לדודם. הם מוכנים ככל שידוע לה להציג מסויימת של בוחנות אן תסורת המזרת הסטוס קדו על באזרע צידון טרם השטלוות כוחות אמ"ל שם. הסורדים מתבגדים בכך או לכל זיקה בין שני האזרדים. אמ"ל לדעתה לא מהרינה גבורם בעל השפעה על טוריה השוקלת את המצע ע"פ איטרסיה היא. לשאלתי כיצד מתייחסת לראיון שהעניקה פד' אללה השיבת בביוקרט על הוועת דובר מחר"ז שדיבר על הלה בחודב. "זה היה מנהג מדרגה ראשונה של זריזות חול בעיניהם". הדובר נפל בפח ללא זדעת העורבות בשעה. לשאלת ארה"ב לא העלה הנושא עם הסורדים בגין העורבה השיבת שיננה הפרזה בהעגה. לשאלת ארה"ב לא העלה הנושא עם הסורדים ולא קשלה זאת למשבר בכוורות, אף שעדותה ידועה לכל הגורמים. שנית, לסוגיה דהה מסקל קטן במערכת השיקולים הסורדים לטעות בכם צבאי.

4. זרן. דראה את התבאותו האהרוניות של חסין במסגרת אכזבונו מארה"ב. טענתו המרכזית כלפי האמריקאים היא שלא עשו מספיק ע"מ שעתה של מט. דה"מ ושה"ח פרם מתקבל בפדראל, נאותו מ阡פים הדאגה שבHUD תחליך לשלוות לעדו לחירות מודאג בנוסא אש"פ, סורדים וכו'. עם זאת הוא לא שינה עמדותיו הבסיסיות באשר לשקיידתו על טיפולת תחליך כזאת דהוא מוגדר על ידה כ - FAVORABLE לעצם הנושא ונאמן למה שהוסכם על ידו. מודאגת מנוסא הפסגה הדריבית באלה"ר, המבחן באשר לכירוניה תלוי בהבנה בשאלת השתפות מערבים. היא עצמה אינה אופטימית כלל, אך תוצאות הוריכות והמאטעים לעדרה יקבעו לאז הרוח נושבת. המבנה היא שטריקת הדלות נסח ח'רטום עשויה לחזור על עצמה. האמריקאים חזרו ובחדרו בפבי הגורמים העדרים מחוויותיהם לתחליך של שלום ושמביחנות הנושא "ח' מ"א", אך לא כל אשליות, המפתח להזיה בידיו שלוש גורמים גורדים. (א) סורדים. השאלה היא האם תכונן קואליציה דילקטלית עד כדי חסימת הדן בפני התקומות כלשהי בסודות המודיעין, מトン דודר ליציר הרים שלח ע"מ להתייעץ בעמדת מנהיגות או טמא תתגבור על יער זה מתוך שיקול דעת במישור היחסים עם ארה"ב שהיה איבנה מסדרת עניינה בהם.

ס 6 פ ס מ ב ו גד 6 4 מ ת ו ו ד ו י מס 1 1 ג ב ש ו ו נד ח י פ ו ות א ר י ז ז י ימ ס מ ב ר ק

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(ב) עידראק. לא ברוור איזה שקל יחוות עצם חסין בפסגה. האם יהיה זה בძקנות המפרציז
בלבד או שמא יחולק לסכין לחסידיין. זאת מתווך הנחה שטווידיה, שלאעתה מיזעג ע"י פבדאללה,
והםפרציזות לא יעצדו מתחיון המגן שלהם ככל שמדובר בתהילין השלום ובוודאי לא מזל הרכוב
הכולל את סדרה אש"פ ואלג'דריה.

(ג) אלג'דריה. לבן ג'דריד כמארח ובעל שקל סגולית בפועל הערבי תהיה המשעה לא קסנה
באשר לנטזטיקה. דמייננו בכל הקשור לפדרוזדורה על פי תנתן הפסגה ובאשר לאנט' לפיה
יעירב עצמו באשר לתוכנה הפסגה. גלטטי מתקדמת לאלג'דריה אשראי רב באשר לניהול הדינונים,
אך שאלת המפתח באשר לументות שעריקות נושאת פתיחה.

אלג'דריד

.h.lc

טינס מאכיד

דפ' מתחדש ופחים

סיווג בסטונוגרפיה בלמ"ס

דוחייפות מדדי

חארלי/^{ז"} נס 25 1700 מאי 88

מס' מברך

80 556 632

המשרד + משבב"ט + מס"ל + אוניב-הבריאות

ט' נצט"מ ר"

דע: מקש"ח/משתב"ט

ענכ"ל אוצר/משרד האוצר

רמ"ט

בגדת פיברוצרטיים: המאזנות לשינוע

לשלג מאטמול

מליליאת בית הנבחרdem אישרה (90-288) אחרי דיוון ס/מ בלבד עד העת הסיווע שגיבש מיליאת ועדת הקצבות בשבע שuber ובכללה מלאה הסיווע לישראל.

ה- Rule אנקבע לדיזון חיich סגור למדוי וחלק נכבד ממעט שעות הדיזון הקדישו רפובליקנים לקובלנות על שימוש לדרעה כעננטם שהמנחיזגות עוזה בכללי הדיזון העומדים לרשوتה. במלחלה הדיזון במעט ולא היה ויזכה, ולא התקיימה חכבהה שמית על אף אחד ממעט התקיוננים שהגיבו לדיזון (כאליש מהמספר הקטן בלבד כי שואטר לדיזון).

למגע הרקורד החטודד: ג' ג'ים טרפיקנט מאוחידו, שאדרג חוכב נלהב של סיוע חוץ, חתכווד להציג העת קיעוץ אחידת בשער עשרה אחדז או לחייבת חמיטה אחוץ, בשלואובד הדיתה תרכניתה מגירה חליפית שהציגת מחייבת פתרון בקונפראנס. בכל מקרה עצם הדיוו (וכמוכן החעבה) נמנעו חדיוו התקדם מהר מהעופרי, טרפיקנט נעד כטהגייע תורו וכשחזר, לא קיבל הסכמתה להציג את שלו אלא רק לחתולוונ על הגובל.

ברבות,

טובה הרצל

טוֹבָה הַרְצָל

23

12
שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןטוויסט מברקדפ' מתקוד דפיםסוווג בטחוני שמורדחיפות מיידיתאריך/ז"ה 251600 מאימס' מברק

620

אל : המשרד

אל : מנהל מצפיה

סגן הנשיא בוש.

אתמול (24.5) ערכו סגן הנשיא בוש ורעייתו קיפ למועדון הנשיים לרצל שנת ה - 40 למדינת ישראל. נכחו השגריר וחו"מ.

בדבוריו הקצרים ציין בוש את התנגדותו למדינה פלשתינאית ולכפיות פתרון על ישראל. כמו כן ציין את שיפ האסטרטגי בין שתי המדינות ומצע חלוץ יהודי אמרופיה.

131
ערן

טבון רגב בוט אגרט חיון גאנז

-23-

14

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטן

ט ו ט ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוויג בטחוני שמור

דחייפות מידי

25.5.88 ז"ה אדר'יך

מבחן, מבחן

624

המשרד

אל: מצפיא
מאת: עתונאות

בכל הידוע לו לא נכונם ישראל כגורם ישיר בסיפורים העתידיים. במחנה היהודי התגלו לסייע לבוש במערכת הנחיות. חלק מן המתה נובע מהאשמות גורמים במחנה דוקקיט כאילו איפאך וגורמים בכירים טיעים וחלוס-אנג'לט הרולד אקדמייר) מתחוונים לפרטם טפוריט על מתח בין הקהילה היהודית ומערכת הבחירה של דוקקיס.

John 1011
28 2012

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הזרם: 5,17824
אל: דוד/803/803
מ-: המשרד לקליטה
תח: 8 גן: משרדי
כדו: 9

שמדר/דוחון

אולדן
זבראום גראנד גאנט

ל. 77-461 ס. 1344

א. בחרוד דראגן - דמיון בראונר לא מופיע במאמר.

ב-במזרע השמי - אלו רובי-כטבנדיין מרכז לבגורש את הקבוצה
ב-בבבון ג' 14-6 ב-2000 ומעלה

NCL NUL

לאכת חכבל רוחה ים

302

הה: אהה, רגע, מכם לנצח, בירנו מארח, בברית, מארח בירנו מארח

שגרירות ישראל / נושינגטון

ט נטס מברק

67. מתוד 2 דףים

סוווג בטחוני גלווי

מִזְדֵּה

25.5.88 חאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברך

112

526 610

המשרד, בטחון

אל: מנהל מע"ת, מצפ"א
דעת: יועץ רוחני לתקשות
יועץ שביעי לתקשות
אמת:UCHOCOT

נסיעת המזכיר

לפלו רשותם הכתבים הנלוויים למצויר המדינה בנסיבות הקרובות למועד.

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610 -P'

526 -67

LIST OF PRESS TRAVELING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ:
MAY 25, 1988:

ABC	Jack McWethy
AP	Barry Schweid
CBS	Wyatt Andrews
CNN	Ralph Begleiter
Hearst	John Wallach
LA Times	Norm Kempster
Mutual BR	Jim Slade
NBC	John Cochran
NY Post	Eli Tyber
NYT	Robert Pear
Reuters	Tony Barber
Time	Ricardo Chaviro
UPI	Bob MacKay
VOA	Roger Wilkison
USIA	Russ Dipsig
WP	John Goshko



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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטןס. ו. פ. ס. מ. ב. ג. ק.ד. 7 מ. ת. ו. ד. פ. י. מ.ס. ו. ג. ב. ט. ח. ו. נ. ג. א. ל. ו. י.ד. ח. י. פ. ת. מ. ג. י. ד. י.ת. א. ר. י. 7. 25. 88מ. ס. מ. ב. ר. ק.

604

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המשרד

אל: מצפיה, מע"ח, לשכת הש"ר




דעת: לשכת דוחה ים

מאת: עתונות

השלחת הקונסולרית

להלן ספоро של גלו פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ביושינגטן פוטו.


 10/5
גלו פרנקל


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גלו פרנקל

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גלו פרנקל

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גלו פרנקל

Israelis To Visit Moscow

Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

Peres, on the other hand, has cautiously welcomed Moscow's new interest in the region and has accepted the proposal for an international peace conference in which the Soviet Union presumably could play a major role.

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See ISRAEL, A27, Col. 1

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604

Soviet Union Approves Visit By Israeli Consular Officials

ISRAEL, From A21

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For Peres, the more dovish of the two, the trip might give a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Shamir's side has told the Soviets they would accomplish more by meeting with the man who polls suggest is most likely to be prime minister after the November elections.

Earlier this month Peres visited Hungary, the first time an Israeli foreign minister has gone to an East Bloc country other than Romania in 21 years.

A Soviet consular delegation arrived here last July, the first official Soviet diplomatic group to visit Israel since Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, except Romania, severed ties after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Israeli officials then said they expected to send a reciprocal delegation to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets delayed for several months, contending that the Israelis had no citizens or state-owned property and therefore no consular interests in the Soviet Union.

Officials here said that when the Soviets sought to renew visas for their consular delegation in February, they were given four-month extensions but were warned that the visas would not be reissued unless an Israeli consular mission was approved.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol said Tarasov had told Novick that the visas would indeed be issued and that "within the next few days" a date would be set for the delegation's travel.

Other officials said Novick had been cautioned that the mission would be allowed to deal only with consular issues. The warning left open the question of how much involvement the diplomats would be allowed to have in the other major issue—besides Middle East peace—that stands between Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet refusal to allow Jews to emigrate freely.

Israeli leaders recently approved a policy that would deny Israeli visas to Soviet Jews who do not plan to settle here. Israel has initiated negotiations with Moscow to fly Soviet Jews directly to Tel Aviv via Bucharest, rather than allowing them to go to Vienna. Israeli leaders hope this would reduce the high dropout rate of Soviet Jews who stay in the West rather than going to Israel.

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שגרירות ישראל / ווושינגטןס. פ. ס. מ. ב. ג. דלפ. 1 מתיו דפיםס.ו.ו.ג. ב.ט.ה.ו.ג.י. ג.ל.ו.יד.ח.י.ט.ו.ת. מ.י.ד.ד.יח.א.ר.י.ן / 1" פ. 88מ.ס. מ.ב.ר.ק

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
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
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
מ.את: ע.ח.ו.נ.ו.ת

המשלחת הקונסולרית

להלן ספоро של ג'לן פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ביוזשינגטן פושטי.


 ג'לן פרנקל
 10/1
 ג'לן פרנקל


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Israelis To Visit Moscow

Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

2732 סינס

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סוווג בטהוּנוּ בְּלֵמָה

דוחיפות מ. ז. י

24.5.88 - 18:00 ח'אייר/ז"ח

מבלט, 550

אל: המשרד, נסן

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אל : מ א פ "

דע : מככיל אוצר

מקשווים, משבחים

רמשין

בית הנבחרים : סיום חוץ .

מליאת הבית תקיים מחר (25) הדיוון בהקצבות לסייע.

טוויה חנצל

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סנוג כתהוני חנוך

דוחיפות תיכוני

עמ' מתרב

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המארד

אָלָה מִיכְאֵלָה מִיכְאֵלָה

מיכאל ראהי

מבבייל

הזהליין.

מדניאס רום.

הוא יצא למוסקבה כמו"תניך היחיד. ינהל שיחותיו הנורמליות במסגרת הקבוצה של דיק סלומון (מנהל התכגרון המדיני), אך מניה שיחיו לו שיחות בלתי פורמליות עם אנשי גזות פוטובייגט פאונדייט גטו"ת.

ההנפקה של אול-היברדי ארגנטינאי (Argentina) בפברואר 1992, מחייבת לפחות שנתיים גיבובנות אתרבו בחפכו באחריותו.

רוט הוסיף שהוא מתכוון לטעול הסובייטים במפורש למשמעות השוכנות של הנאמר בנייר שנ批评 לבנו. מתווך נציגו להגיע לרמת הבירה הגבוהה יותר.

בוגרי שטחובניאטונג לא הגיעו לסתור כל נציג שטחובניאטונג שמתגתו נוטה ברה באותו.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברך
דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים
סרווג בטחוני, שמור
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך: 20.10.00 מאי 88
מס' מברך:

521

אל: המשרד

אל: י. ב. אהרון, מנכ"ל משרד רוח"מ.
מאת: מנהלה, וושינגטון.

מלוך בועידת הדמוקרטיים באטלנטה.

דיברתי עם **KENNETH WOLLACH** האחראי על נושא בתி המלוון
לroudidea שהודיעני שرك בעוד שבועיים ימים יכול להודיע עני
שם המלוון וכתובתו.
בכל מקרה הם מזמינים את המלוון וההוצאות חלות על האורח.
ליודיעך ותג שמח.

ה' 2/5/88.

ג' נסן

ר.ה.ב
3

טוויפס מברק

דף מודפס

סינוג במדוניה סודיה

דוחיתנות מיפוי

האריך/ת"ת 1015 מאי 20 88

מס' מברך

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529

המשרד

אל: סטנכיאל אפּייא

דוקקִים.

הנוגראטן מל לוין, סטו איזנשטיין ומרטין אינדייק תדרכו ב-5.17 את דוקקינס

ה. גראם בטזבוניות אל-פי בקשנותו:

לעבוד עם כל ממשלה שהיא בישראל והתייחס לאפשרות שאם הליכוד יזכה הוא יוכל, אם סטו איזנשטיין דבר על התמונה הפוליטית הפנימית בישראל. דוקקיס נתן להבין כי ישמש בוגוטה המזהה ע"פ בקוטרנו.

באשר למדיינה הפלשתי נאית דוקקיקס אמר שהוא מרגיש בכך במעמדו משאירה את כל הוא עצמו יבחר, קודם לסתור וסדרו היביגיט.

הארופזיות פתוחות והוא איננו רואה כל צורך פוליטי או אחר לשבות עמדתו. הוא חזר על אף טבאמר לו שהרוב בישראל דוחה מדיננה פלישתינאית

והוא סוטה בא מוגדרות מטעם המשלים רקומו למושל הבא הוא סרב לשנות גימתו. ואמר שאין כוונתו אכפאות פונזון. כי אם מושל אחד מושל אחר לא יכול לשבור גימתו.

על ברה"מ אמר שחייב מאי לערבה בתהילך ובמיוחד את גורבאיכוב. דוקקניש התעכניין לא ניתנה התייחסות בתדרוך לאשיפ. גם בארועים בטשחין לא זוזן נטמען.

הציגו שטח איבר רומנטיקון בנוסחה הקובייטי וכך אמר לוי שצריין לא בוט מטמא לא בגין מה שקרה בשיחות בין שלץ ושבודנזה. חז"ר ואמר שצריין לוי בוט מטמא

דוקקם דיבר על חשיבותו והזמין לאם במאגרו למגבנות ולחנוך הפורטודוקטיביות של הארגונים הבינלאומיים אך כדי לנחות את המטריה של מלחמות הפתוחה.

הברשות אחד המתודדים היה שמדובר באיש הסומר מאי על שיקול דעתו הוא ועל הביגלאומית וזאת גם בנוסח הגלמת מרוץ החימוש במוחה-היה.

סודם מס' מברך

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סודם במחוזי

דוחיפות

תאריך/ז"ה

מס' מסך

ט 529 8

צווין שבתדריך היה אמור להשתחף גם קונגרסמן לי המילטון שחליט לוותה בשל האבעות שנערכו בעת ובזונה אחת בבית הנבחרים. המילטון מוזכר כאחד המועמדים לתפקיד של מזכיר המדינה במקרה שדוקקיס יבחר.

הערה: משתתפים בתדריך שטרכו לי עליו בקשו שלא לחתם פורסום לאמור בברוך, על-מנת שלא לפגוע ביכולתם להמשיך ולעמור בקשר עם המועמד.

עוז

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטןט ג פ ס מ ב ד גט ג 1 מתחדש 1 דפיםסוווג בטחוני טורידחיפות מידיתאריך/ז"ה 08.30. 19 מאי 88ממ' מברק**483 435**

המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני
 סמנכ"ל צפ"א
 לשכת שחבייש

שטחים.

דיק שיפטר התקשר על-מנת להודיע כי הצטרף לביקור המזביר בארץ וישתת בישראל בין ה-6/6-3. יציגו את ביקורו כמיועד לדוח על הפסגה ועבידין יהודי ברתמיים, אך כמובן שירצת לנמל גם שיחות בנושאים שהוועלו עמנו לפני ביקורו, שתיחי ותמנכ"ל המדיני.

*ט 31/1 ערץ**ט 31/1 מילא מילא מילא מילא מילא**ט 31/1 מילא מילא מילא מילא מילא*

גַּדְעָן

דף א' מהווים צפויים

בְּלָמָ"ס בְּנֵי בְּנֵי

דוחי אונן מיכאל

תלמוד/ז"ט 19 1630 מאי 88

מכ' מבדך

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המשרדים ומשהכ"ט

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח/משחוב"ט, רמש"ג

מנכ"ל אוצר/משרד האוצר

בית הנבחרים: הצביעות

ראש ח - **OMB** וב' ורג' שולץ מכתבם ליר' רידם בשלה הענת החלטה.
MARK כתבו ג' גינמס מילר
 (נוסח "תבגעו ימי המשיח") - לא חיה דיזון. לקדמתה ח - **up**

טלייהת בית הנכבדים תקיים חדיון שבוע הבא, והכוונה היא לקבוע כללים "סגורדים" ככל האפשר.

פিילוט חסיעפים - ביחסן. בדף, חעט חוק ודו"ח הלוואן שנדונן, בינה מילוי, מספר קטעים מתוך דוח חלוגאש.

טובה חרצל (טביה הילט)

2

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Committee notes that this year marks the fortieth anniversary of the independence of the state of Israel.

The United States played a key role in the creation of the state of Israel forty years ago. That role implies and requires a commitment to assure the security of the state which America helped bring into existence. That commitment exists today and it will exist into the future.

With that obligation comes a concurrent obligation to help shape events in the Middle East in a way that encourages policies on the part of all peoples in the region which maximize opportunities for justice and minimize the chance for tragedy and conflict.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the recent events that have taken place in the Middle East, including the violence and killing on the West Bank and in Gaza, terrorist attacks in Israel, and continued conflict, death and destruction in Lebanon. The present turmoil in the Middle East is not just a Palestinian problem; it is a Middle Eastern problem that requires the just resolution of questions of human rights and national security.

The United States cannot determine the conduct of Israeli, Palestinian, or Arab individuals, governments or organizations. However, the U.S. has a special obligation, as the principal guarantor of Western values, as the leader of the Western alliance, and as the closest friend of Israel, to work to help shape events in a way that will do three things; maximize justice; help friends; and avoid the unraveling of what stability there is in the Middle East before that unraveling threatens Western interests in that part of the world.

The United States must display a maximum commitment to use all the influence and wisdom it can muster to move Israel and its Arab neighbors to meaningful and well thought out negotiations about both short-term and long-term changes that will assure Israel's security and bring a just and humane approach to resolving the Palestinian plight. Weak action or inaction on our part is no favor to anyone; it is simply a guarantee that all of us will slide into tragedy.

The Committee believes that commitment of the United States to Israel's security and the obligation to continue to provide assistance for that security is inviolate. The Committee also believes that the U.S. has a commitment to American taxpayers to make sure that assistance is provided within the context of American policies which will move the Arab world toward its obligation to recognize the right of Israel to exist within secure borders and to move the Israeli government and its Arab neighbors toward the ne-

cessity to recognize and deal with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Committee believes that it is time for friends to sit down with friends and work to change the status quo which threatens to bear such bitter fruit.

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U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON

The Committee notes with dismay that another American was taken hostage in Lebanon earlier this year. This brings the total number of American hostages in Lebanon to nine. The longest held hostage, Terry Anderson, was taken captive more than three years ago.

The most recent kidnapping is especially disturbing. The captive was a United States military colonel serving in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The Committee is deeply concerned that there was an American serving in the UN Truce Supervisory Organization who was vulnerable to abduction.

The Committee believes that this was a very serious and untenable situation and urges the Administration to assure that no military or civilian personnel serve in any multilateral peacekeeping force in Lebanon as long as the violence continues and Americans remain special targets for Lebanese terrorists.

The Committee urges that the Administration explore all reasonable options to locate and release the remaining U.S. hostages held in Lebanon.

The Administration is to keep the Committee informed on what steps are being taken and what progress is being made on the hostage situation.

Fiscal year 1988 level.....	\$3,188,320,000
Fiscal year 1989 request.....	3,268,500,000
Committee recommendation.....	3,248,500,000

ISRAEL

The Committee has earmarked \$1,200,000,000 in economic support funds for Israel, the full Administration request. Because of the importance in following through on Middle East peace agreements and the strategic importance of relations between Israel and the United States, the Committee has recommended that Israel be funded at the FY 1989 request level. The Committee has also recommended that these funds be provided to Israel as a cash grant within thirty days of the signing of the FY 1989 bill or by October 31, 1988, whichever is later.

The Committee has earmarked not less than \$815,000,000 in Economic Support Funds for Egypt. Of this amount \$115 million may be provided as a cash transfer with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms which are in addition to those undertaken in previous fiscal years.

The Committee believes that long-term economic viability in Egypt can best be achieved by fundamental economic reform. The Committee encourages the Egyptian government to undertake a comprehensive reform program, and believes the composition of economic assistance, including the amounts of each transfer, should be designed to help meet requirements generated by implementation of such a comprehensive economic program.

The Committee expects that provision of a cash transfer will only be used in conjunction with significant economic reforms, and will review carefully any reprogramming notifications to ensure that the reform process is moving ahead.

The Committee has also earmarked \$200,000,000 of the \$815,000,000 provided for Egypt for Commodity Import Program assistance. The Committee believes a significant portion of these funds should be used to strengthen the private sector in Egypt.

NON-MILITARY EXPORTS

The Committee has included the provision from last year's bill requiring that the President determine, in providing cash transfer assistance to Egypt and Israel, that the level of such assistance does not cause an adverse impact on the total level of non-military exports from the United States to each such country.

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

The Committee has included bill language that indicates that it is the sense of Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Israel and Egypt are based in great measure upon their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.

The Committee is pleased to note the improved relations that have developed between Israel and Egypt over the past year, especially the return of the Egyptian Ambassador to Tel Aviv and the reaching of an agreement on negotiations for resolving the Taba dispute.

The Committee hopes that further progress in the relationship will continue between these two important friends of the United States.

EARMARKING

The Committee has earmarked much of the ESF account as indicated in the following paragraphs. The Committee has taken this action, unlike past years, in the context of providing 99.3 percent of the Administration's total request for ESF and in following through the freeze concept of the bill. With few exceptions the amounts provided to specific countries are identical to the amounts earmarked in last year's bill. The only notable diversions from this

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principle are for the countries included in the drug initiative and the West Bank earmarks. In each case, as explained earlier in the report, these earmarks are in conjunction with significant policy initiatives. Finally, the unallocated portion of the funds remaining after all earmarks are taken into consideration is greater than the unallocated amount remaining in FY 1988, thereby giving the Administration more flexibility than they had last year.

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OTHER COUNTRY EARMARKS

The Committee has provided earmarks at "not less than" the following amounts for the following countries:

Pakistan.....	\$220,000,000
Philippines.....	124,000,000
Sub-Saharan Africa.....	90,000,000
Honduras.....	85,000,000
Portugal.....	40,000,000
Tunisia.....	10,000,000
Cyprus.....	15,000,000

The Committee has provided earmarks for the following countries at the amount specified:

Costa Rica.....	\$90,000,000
El Salvador.....	185,000,000
Guatemala.....	80,000,000
Morocco.....	20,000,000

ISRAELI REFUGEES

The Committee's earmark of \$27,500,000 for the resettlement of Soviet, Eastern European, and other refugees resettling in Israel is in response to the increased number of refugees resettling in Israel.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DEBT REFORM INTEREST RATE REDUCTIONS

The Committee continues to believe that the approach to FMS debt reform, which provides the greatest benefits to the widest range of military debtors at the least cost to U.S. taxpayers is the "buying down" of interest rates directly. The Congress last year provided an advance appropriation of \$270,000,000 for that purpose subject to a Presidential budget request. Unfortunately, the Administration has chosen to make no request in FY 1989. Consequently,

to avoid budgetary scoring of potentially unused authority in FY 1989, the Committee has provided the same advance appropriation for FY 1990. The Committee strongly urges the Administration to follow this approach to maintaining the financial integrity of the Federal Financing Bank in the future.

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6/8**SEPARATE ACCOUNTS**

The Committee has again included language requiring separate dollar and local currency accounts for ESF cash transfers. The Committee continues to believe that it is the responsibility of the United States government to be able to ensure that tax dollars spent on foreign assistance can be clearly and easily accounted for. This need for accountability requires careful financial and program controls and the clear separate identification of U.S. funds from transfer to final end use. The Committee feels this strict accountability is necessary in order to ensure that the U.S. government is certain that its foreign assistance funds are being used for their intended purposes.

The Committee is pleased with the consultation with the Administration that has been occurring on this new requirement. The Committee recognizes that this requirement is a major shift in Ex-

ecutive responsibilities within the foreign assistance program and will take some time to be fully implemented.

The Committee is concerned that on occasion ESF cash transfers have been made without full compliance with this provision. This requirement is a financial management responsibility and that no cash transfers should be approved by financial officers until full compliance has been ensured. The Committee is aware that cash transfer-like assistance is being provided under other AID programs. The Committee has expressed its intentions to have AID programs fully auditable with no commingling of funds. The Committee is fully ready if necessary to legislate separate accounts for other programs if Executive actions are not in compliance with its intentions.

The Committee continues to believe that this requirement can be used by AID to encourage foreign governments to improve their central financial management practices for economic decision-making purposes and avoidance of corruption.

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WEST BANK AND GAZA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Committee has earmarked \$34 million for Jordan under the Economic Support Fund Account. Of this amount, \$11 million is for Jordan and \$23 million is for U.S. support of Jordan's development program for the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, the Committee has earmarked \$7.5 million for United States direct assistance to the West Bank and Gaza through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) under the Asia and Near East Regional program.

The Committee has earmarked this total of \$30.5 million for development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza because it believes that it is important for the United States to help improve the economic and social conditions of the 1.5 million Palestinian people who live in this area. The Committee believes that this assistance expresses the concern of the United States for the Palestinian people and helps support progress toward peace in the region.

Jordanian programs in the West Bank and Gaza will provide financing for infrastructure improvements and social services. They will support development and quality of life activities in the areas of health, water and small road construction. U.S. direct assistance through PVOs in the West Bank and Gaza focuses on the improvement of living conditions and the expansion of employment and income generation activities for Palestinians living in these areas.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the recent events and violence that have taken place in the West Bank and Gaza. The Committee believes that, while these programs can contribute to the well being of the Palestinian people and can contribute towards peace, they cannot be a substitute for progress in the peace process that is crucial for all of the people in the region.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ASHA GRANTS

The Committee held an extensive hearing on the ASHA program this year and reviewed individual project grants approved over the past several years. It appears that the program has been unduly concentrated geographically. The Committee feels that the ASHA program needs more focus on emerging opportunities in Asia and Latin America. The Committee expects that in providing ASHA grants in FY 1989 additional focus will be given to these areas of the world.

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THIRD PARTY TRANSFER AMENDMENT

The Committee has included a new general provision, Section 577, amending the Arms Export Control Act to close a loophole that now enables the purchaser of American weapons to transfer them to a third country more easily than the U.S. Government itself can make direct sales to the same country. This provision does

this by permitting the Congress to prevent such third-party sales simply by passing a joint resolution, rather than a law as is now required. Under this provision, joint resolutions to disapprove third party sales will receive the same expedited procedures in the Congressional process that resolutions disapproving direct sales now receive. The provision follows:

SEC. 577. Section 3(d)(2)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended by striking out "law" and inserting in lieu thereof "joint resolution, as provided for in Sections 36(b)(2) and 36(b)(8) of this Act."

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Committee has amended Section 558, which required that not less than \$500,000 of funds appropriated under the heading "Economic Support Funds" be made available for scholarships for Israeli students studying in Arab countries and not less than \$500,000 be made available for Arab students studying in Israel, by striking the phrases "not less than" and replacing them with "up to" in both cases.

The Committee recognizes the importance of the Middle East Regional Cooperative Program and urges continuing AID support for this program. Of particular importance to the Committee is AID's ability to use the funds appropriated freely, in order to best support those programs that have been proven successes in fostering scientific and social exchange between Israel and Arab countries.

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ISRAEL

The Committee has earmarked a total FMS program of \$1,800,000,000 in forgiven loans for Israel. The Committee has also recommended \$1,200,000,000 in Economic Support Funds, for a total security assistance program of \$3,000,000,000.

The Committee has included bill language that allows, to the extent requested by the Government of Israel, funds to be used for credits made available for advanced fighter aircraft programs or for other advanced weapon systems. Up to \$150,000,000 in the funds provided to Israel are available for research and development in the United States and not less than \$400,000,000 shall be available for procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense services, including research and development.

EGYPT

The Committee has earmarked a total FMS program for Egypt of \$1,300,000,000 in forgiven loans. Under the Economic Support Fund portion of the bill a total of \$815,000,000 has been recommended, bringing the total security assistance program for Egypt to a level of \$2,115,000,000.

PAKISTAN

The Committee has earmarked an FMS program of \$240,000,000 in forgiven loans for Pakistan.

STINGERS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

The Committee has amended Section 566, which prohibits the Administration from providing in any manner Stinger antiaircraft missiles to any country other than Bahrain in the Persian Gulf region, by extending the provisions of this section through Fiscal Year 1989.

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המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

אל: מצפיה, מעת, הסברת
דע: יועץ רוחני לתקורת, יועץ שחבייט לתקורת
מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק
מאת: עתונות

דו"ח תקורת - 13.5.88

כללי

מגון רחוב של נושאים מז"תים העסיק את התקורת בשבועו שחלף, אם כי מרביתם לא זכו לכותרות בעמודים ראשוניים.

"מלחמת הכוכבים" של האג' ריאגן בדונלד ריאן והפוגה הקרבה בין ברה"ם לאראיה, שלותה במאמרי רקע רבים על החיים בארץ הסובייטים בעיתונות ובתקורת האלקטרונית, תפסו את מרבית העניין העתוני. יחד עם מערכת הבחירות כאן.

תפוגע בקוריסין זכה לכינוי טלוויזיוני ניכר ולכותרות ראשיות בצווף חמוןויות במרבית העונינים אך לא עורר עניין רב וירד בעבר יום.

המצב בשטחים ממשיך להעסיק את העיתונות, פחות את הטלוויזיה, וזכה לכמות כמעט כMutם קבוצה של כסוי. חלקו עדיין בעמודים ראשוניים, הנonta יותר ויותר לעסוק בהחaskell של תמרי האזרחי מול הירידה היחסית בארועים אלימים.

ביקור שהייח פרט עורר התעכבות, מאמרי פרשנות בעיתונות והודעות קצרות בחדשות הטלוויזיה.

מלחמת המיליציות שחבייה כוחות טוריים אל פרברי בירות בנסיוון להביא להפסקת אש בין הצדדים, עוררה עניין רב וזכה לכותרות ראשיות בצווף חמוןויות.

מלחמת איראן-עיראק הופיעה בדרך כלל בקשר של מדיניות אראיה במרחב ולוחות בפרשניות רבות.

ביקורו העתידי של שולץ במו"תזכה אף הוא לכמה מאמרי פרשנות.

אתמול חתפס ספור המשפט שנערר לחולית טרוריסטים התקורת לטוריה שחצתה לפני כמה חודשים את הגבול מקנדה לאראיה, ורך וורמונט, ונחפה כוחמרי נפץ בכליה.

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שנוי מאמרי אופ.א.ד. עסקו בטיפולה החד-צדדי של המדינה האמריקאית בישראל מאז חלה האינטיפאדה. ראוי לעזון מאמרו על אלאן דרשוביץ ("וושינגטון טיים", נשלח בンפרד) שהראה את הפער בין האופן בו הובאו לידיים הצבור האמריקאי גושאים שונים ובין המזיאות. הצבור האמריקאי, אליבא דרשוביץ, מולך שולל עיי' המדינה לא כלכ' בעקבות מה שראה, אלא בעיקר בעקבות מה שהושתר ממו.

אחרים עסקו ב"פלשטיינאים" כאינדיינאים של ישראל", מודעות המפנות את תרומת לב הצבור למעורבות האמריקאית בדיכוי חם הפלשיני, תדרך לשולם ע"פ קיסינגר (נשלח בンפרד), ירידת בטבדרים המוסריים של ישראל כתוצקמן הכבוש, הסרובניזם בלינינגרד וכן מאמר בזכות חכנית הטרנספר של כהנא, שתווארה כדרך ההומניט האמיתית להפסיק את סבל הפלשינים הנאנקם תחת עול הכיבוש...

ידיעה אחת בלבד עסקה בהרשעתו של מוויל קנדி בהפעת דבר שקר ושמועות בזב על שטן כי השואה לא התקימה.

האנטישמיות בשיקגו מתחילה לקבל כסוי בעזוניות.

ביקורת ממראהיהם ושהיות

חחל בקהל דמה תקשורתית וצבר לא מעט עניין כבעור יום-יומיים. במרבית העזונים זכה פרט לכינוי איש אוחד ותואר כאדם שפועל הרבה לקידום השלום אותו שם בראש מעיינינו. למאמרים צורפו תמונות רבות.

ארוחת הצהרים בבית השגריר וברכתו האותדת של שולץ דוחחו בתקשורת הכתובה, כולל פירוט שמות המשתתפים, תוך דגש על הצורך בשינוי הסטטוס קוו. ההנחה היא שדה לא השתנה ללא מעורבות אריה"ב.

הודעת הבית הלבן הראה בפרש תומך שלום ומצירה את סרבנינו, המתנגדים לשטחים תמורים שלום, כי יצטרכו לחת את הדין לפני עמיהם, פורשה כאן עיי' הי"וושינגטון פוטטי" (גון גושקו) כאזהרת לרווחם ותומכו כי הממשל לא יסог מתקניתו. אם השיקגו טריביון תאר את רוחם מכשול העיקרי בפני הוועידה הבינ"ל. פרט צוטט כמו שמקווה כי נושא הוועידה יעלם בפסגת הקרובה. מאמר המערכת היחיד בנושא (אלפ"ס) ראה קשיים רבים ניצבים בפני שולץ: חזית סרוב פלטינאית - לא עוד משלחת ירדן-פלשיניים, והתקשות פקו של רוחם בנושא שטחים תמורים שלום.

נאומו של השר בפני ועידת AIPAC שודר מספר פעמים בראש C-SPAN. כמו כן הופיע שהוא בראיון לתוכנית מקניל-לזר של רשת PBS. בחדשות של CNN וב- "Today Show" (קסטיטס הועברו בンפרד).

פגישת בילין-שייפר דוחה במספר עזונים תוך הדגשהaggerה העמוקה של הראשו מפנ' הפיכתם של היחריאיסי בשטחים לנורמה, וכי הכוות, השפלות, סגירות עזונים ומעצרים ללא משפט הפכו לככל ולא ליזועה ממו.



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המצב בשטחים

עמד בטימן המהומות בעקבות יום-ירוסלים (חג ליהודים, אסון לערבים) וסיום צום הרמדן, וקיים את "מנת הכספי" הקבועה שלו - כמה ספורים בעמודים ראשוניים ורבות דוחות ופרשנות מהגעה בשטח בעמודים פנימיים.

מאמר האופ. אד. היחיד (TZA) מאר את "מחיר הכבוש" : התערערות האיזון המוסרי, שיפוטי וערבי של הכווצים, הרט שיטתי של הדמוקרטיה הישראלית.

בראה שלא היה אروع, ولو חפאות ביותר, שהחולל בשטחים ולא דכה לכיסוי במידה האמריקאית. לדוגמה: המעצרים המנתלים כנשך נגד הכבוש (אלון פרנקל), שינוי פנוי המאבק מלאימות למרי אזרחי, מכות של תלמידי תיכון לעצורים במחנה מעצר, בעיות מזון, עורך וכו'.

הודגשה גורוותם של הפליטים בהתרגנותם העצמאית ותפקידה המיחודה של האיש שבעלם בו גברית כה רבים עצורים. בראה שהבטוי החברתי של ההתקוממות חשוב הרבה יותר מזריקת אבניים. המאמר האوحد היחיד בנושא הוועד הישראלי המודאג מהפיכת השם ישראל לדרום-אפריקה והמנסה להשב לארץ את "עירכיה הישנים".

עתונאים רבים דוחו על הי"מ שפט המשורנה" שערכה ישראל לשני אבשי חזבלה שת Kapoor את צדייל ובראיון עם מירון בנבנישטי (ZAA) אווירה חזית אפוקליפטית של מלחמה מוגמת בשטחים כחוצה מגאיות בני הצדדים.

על אף שמרבית המאמרים נושאים אופי דוחתי, חביבות הרבה נשמעה בין השיטו.

בידיעה קצרה, מפי סוכנות רווייר, דוח על השבת חעודת העיתונאי לפרנקל והמשך השעיניתה של תעודת פלטר.

חקירה הוכנה ע"י אוריית גובר.

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עתונאות, ניו יורק

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1988

Israelis Say U.S. Praise of Peres May Backfire

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, May 18 — The unusually warm praise of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres by the White House on Tuesday, and the indirect criticism of his chief political rival, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, set off partisan bickering here today. But on at least one point both sides seemed to agree.

Senior officers from the Likud bloc as well as the Labor Party said that while praise from President Reagan might please Mr. Peres now, "it could boomerang in Israeli public opinion," as an official close to the Foreign Minister put it. "Maybe to a lot of peo-

ple it will look like the Americans have him in their pocket," the official added.

A senior Likud ally of Mr. Shamir said: "This is going to backfire. It will help Shamir in the elections."

After Mr. Reagan met with Mr. Peres for half an hour on Tuesday, the White House issued a statement praising him for showing a "positive attitude toward peace," adding that the Foreign Minister was "creative and has the courage and wisdom to say yes when real opportunities arise."

At the same time, the statement denounced "those leaders who are negative, consistently reject new ideas" and "make progress impossible."

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טופס מברך לע"מ, דו"ג, דס"ח, מזכיר ח' ממשלה

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19.5.88

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Mr. Peres, the head of the Labor Party, has endorsed Secretary of State George P. Shultz's Middle East peace initiative, while Mr. Shamir, the Likud chief, has tried to deflect it.

Publicly, the Prime Minister's office said, "When the White House refers to foreign leaders with a negative attitude toward peace, they must be referring to Arab leaders who refuse to negotiate with Israel." But behind the scenes, Likud politicians close to the Prime Minister said they knew the statement alluded to Mr. Shamir.

"The Likud Cabinet ministers are enraged," an official said. "It's tantamount to meddling in Israel's interior

problems. And it shows the Foreign Minister using his official visit to Washington to get the American support for him in the political campaign."

Mr. Peres, interviewed from the United States by the Israeli radio, said that "I gratefully appreciate" the White House statement, adding, "It came as a pleasant surprise."

Israel elects a new government in November, and the central campaign issue is almost certain to be what should be done with the occupied territories, where Palestinian protests are in their sixth month.

One Palestinian was killed and nine were wounded today when villagers from the West Bank town of Abwein attacked an army patrol with stones and slingshots and soldiers opened fire, army and hospital officers said. The death brings the total killed to 169.

Correcting the Record on Israel

It certainly looked as though President Reagan was trying to influence the Israeli election next fall. During Tuesday's White House visit he unstintingly praised Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, whose "positive attitude toward peace" he contrasted with the negativism of other, unnamed world leaders who "consistently reject new ideas."

What the President in fact was tilting toward is the policy that Secretary of State Shultz has lately worked so hard for — an internationally supported peace settlement.

No haruspex is needed to divine that Mr. Reagan had in mind Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Mr. Peres's coalition rival, who has intractably resisted any proposal to exchange land for peace. Some corrective tilt was called for in any case, given Mr. Shamir's behavior after his visit to the United States in March.

He was received with elaborate courtesy at the White House but gave not an inch on the U.S. proposals for negotiations. He met with American Jewish leaders and urged them to silence doubts about Israel's harsh crackdown on the Palestinian uprising in occupied territories. "When unity breaks down," he pleaded, "then our enemies exploit every critical statement to their own end."

*New York Times
Editorial
May 9, 1988*

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Returning to Jerusalem, the Prime Minister received a hero's welcome from his supporters, whose placards praised his opposition to any negotiations for any change in the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza. He then assured his country that he had America's full support despite differences on peace moves. "It became clear," he said, "that the stories that American Jews are divided are not true. Except for isolated, irregular voices that do not identify with the majority of the people, all American Jewry stands behind us."

Thus Mr. Shamir magnified White House politesse into a policy endorsement, and having told American Jews to shut up, he translated their silence into a standing ovation. Americans are united in rejecting dogged Palestinian rejection of Israel, but there's no such consensus on Israel's indefinite occupation of the territories.

Besides, given their unusual interconnection, there's no way that the U.S., Israel and American Jews concerned about Israel can stay wholly insulated from each other's politics. Israelis of all parties see nothing wrong with lobbying Congress against arms sales to Arab states. In this instance, by praising Mr. Peres, President Reagan restated a broadly supported American view. Yes, he tilted — toward American policy.

שגדירות ישראל / וושינגטן

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דפ' 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוווג בטחוני גלויה

דוחיפות מיני

18.5.88 ז"ח חאליך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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המישר

אל: מיפוי, מעית, הסברה

דע: לשכת רוחאים

מאת: עתובות

להלן דברי הברכה שנאמרו עיי' ממרוחים ושהיה בעת ארוחת הצהרים שבערכה לכבודו בביתו השגריגן.

ריכחה לכבודו
עthonoth
ויליאם

להלן דברי הברכה שנאמרו עיי' ממרוחה'ם ושהיה בעת ארוחת הצהרים שנערכה לכבודו בביתו של שגריר.

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PERES TOAST: AMBASSADOR ARAD'S RESIDENCE: MAY 16, 1988:

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Senators, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for coming - something which has shown us that your friendship for the State of Israel and for the cause of peace. I know some people are complaining about the division that exists in Israel. But at least on one issue we are united. And that is on our appreciation and thankfulness for the United States of America. We know that there are many in America who are divided on some issues but we are so happy that only on the State of Israel that there is a union between the parties, the administration, the President, the Secretary, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the people of the United States; for us it is also of such great importance.

Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, played an immense important role on all three domains which are very important to Israel, their strategic strengths of the country, the economic health of it supported by the Defense Department, supported by the two parties - the Senate and the House. And they're very demanding given the circumstances, given the trying time of the budgetary consideration and we are very grateful for it. Now on two we succeeded with the great cooperation and on the economic recovery. Now we have to succeed on the fare of achieving peace. There is no reason to hide that the way of peace is flooded with a lot of difficulties accepting peace. But it is not with all the difficulties but the way that should bring our momentum forward. I always remember that the wise Frenchman was approached by a friend of his and he says, "Sir, life is so difficult." And the French philosopher was there replied, "Compared to what?" May I say that peace is so difficult. May I say compared to what. The other alternative will be more complicated. May I say that without the US initiative without the very strong support of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, the Secretary, the Senate..., the Middle East today might have been torn because not only is this a conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, but in the Arab world, there is a conflict between a fundamentalism which may destroy the future of Arabs and the structure of peace which may bring promise to the young generation of children. I know that we can achieve a perfect pessimism in our life and an imperfect optimism in our life as far as I'm concerned. I prefer the imperfection of optimism to the perfection of pessimism, and I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war.

On the background of my country, of my people, for the ? to understand friendship, support, from this most unusual experiment of human ? to reassemble the treaty and to go back to the ??? will go back to their heritage and demonstrate in the eyes of the rest of the world that freedom is strength and friendship is influence and a country like America is unprecedented in history in freedom and democracy can demonstrate success and can influence hope to all. Please join me.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטן

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דפ' 1 מחולך דפים

סוווג בטהוּנִי בְּלָמִ"ד

דחייתו

חגיגת זכייה - 18.5.88

מג' מברך

אל : הַמִּשְׁרָד

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אל : מzap"א

ד"א : קמ"ד, אירופה, מזא"ר, פר"ז

רידגווין בוגדת החוץ

עוזרת המזכיר לעניבי אירופה הופעה תיום (8ו) בפנוי וועדת המשנה לאירופה
ומז'ית בבית חכרים לדוח על פגישות שולץ-שווינדנדזה בשבוע שעבר. מצורפת
עדותם בכתובה.

בין היתר נשללה על ייחסי ישראל-תונגרית ועל התיחסויות מרחבי לפ██ת מהלך
שיכוןינו בروسיהגטן. פירוט בהמשך.

גנאה גן
טבורה פראל

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(MAY 16, 1988)

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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO BE BACK WITH YOU FOR ONE OF OUR PERIODIC UPDATES IN OPEN SESSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

AT THE WEEKEND I RETURNED FROM GENEVA, FROM THE FIFTH U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL SO FAR THIS YEAR. PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT CONTINUE IN FULL GEAR. WE VIEW THE MOSCOW MEETING NOT ONLY AS AN "EVENT" -- THOUGH IT SURELY WILL BE THAT -- BUT ALSO AS AN INTEGRAL STEP IN THE PROCESS UNDERTAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONSTRUCT A STABLE, SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. OUR APPROACH IS GROUNDED IN A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE BASICALLY COMPETITIVE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTING STABILITY TO THAT COMPETITION, AND ALSO THE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGES CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET UNION. OUR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE MOST OF ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT CHANGE MAY PROVIDE.

AT MOSCOW, AS IN THE PREVIOUS TWO SUMMITS, THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO PURSUE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF OUR BROAD AGENDA, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL MATTERS. HIS POLICY AND PROGRAM HAVE YIELDED SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS AND HE PLANS TO

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BUILD ON THEM, BOTH IN MOSCOW AND IN THE REMAINING MONTHS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION.

WE HOPE THE TWO LEADERS WILL BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY IN MOSCOW.

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING A BALANCED, VERIFIABLE 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WE WILL WORK TO MAKE AS MUCH ADDITIONAL PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

WE HAVE ALSO REGISTERED SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES: AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE HAVE BEGUN NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE WORKING IN THE CSCE CONTEXT TO DEVELOP A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS.

WITH THE APRIL 14 SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, SOMETHING HAS BEGUN WHICH MANY THOUGHT UNTIL RECENTLY WOULD NEVER OCCUR -- THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES CONTINUES. WE WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CAMBODIA, AND OTHER AREAS WHERE CONFLICT HAS BROUGHT TENSION TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT PRESENTS IT, OUR OBJECTIVE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES IS "TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY." ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER AND SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN WILL MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE SUMMIT TO DISCUSS SOUTHERN AFRICA.

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477 RECENTLY THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO ENGAGE IN
DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE
SUMMIT PROCESS IN GENEVA IN 1985, WE HAVE SEEN THE RESOLUTION
OF MANY INDIVIDUAL CASES, SOME WELL-KNOWN, OTHERS NOT. WE HAVE
SEEN, FROM THE 1985 STARTING POINT, SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN
EMIGRATION. AS OF TODAY, THE MONTHLY RATES ARE WELL OVER 2000
FOR ETHNIC GERMANS, OVER 1000 ARMENIANS, AND ABOUT 1000 SOVIET
JEWS.

BUT THOUSANDS MORE WANT TO LEAVE, AND THEY ARE FRUSTRATED
BY AN ARBITRARY SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT, IN PRACTICE, RECOGNIZE
THE BASIC RIGHT TO EMIGRATE. SO MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE,
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FOR CATEGORIES (POLITICAL ACTIVISTS,
RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE,) TO REMOVE THE
ARBITRARINESS. WE ARE WORKING FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES.

A RECENT DOWNTURN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, THE ARRESTS OF
GRIGORYANTS AND AYRIKYAN, IS A CURRENT CONCERN. WE HOPE THESE
REVERSES WILL BE RIGHTED BY THE TIME OF THE SUMMIT.

U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES HAVE EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. WE'LL
CONTINUE TO PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO BROADEN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF
ONE ANOTHER AND BREAK DOWN OLD STEREOTYPES.

WE ARE WORKING ON A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH
COULD BE SIGNED DURING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. THE AIM IS TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST TO TAKE MUTUAL BENEFIT
FROM AREAS OF SHARED INTEREST.

THE ALLIANCE

WE COULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN WHERE WE ARE WITH THE SOVIETS

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WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE, AND A STRONG ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, BEHIND US. WHEN I LAST APPEARED BEFORE THIS SUB-COMMITTEE, I SHARED WITH YOU SOME OF THE HOPES WE HAD FOR THE MARCH NATO SUMMIT. LET ME NOW SAY A WORD ABOUT THE ACTUAL RESULTS.

I WAS TAKEN, AS I KNOW THE SECRETARY WAS, BY THE SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE WHICH WE ENCOUNTERED IN BRUSSELS. THE INF EXPERIENCE WAS REALLY A VERY IMPORTANT LESSON FOR ALL OF US ON THE NEED TO STICK TO BASIC PRINCIPLES. IT WAS THE DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN OUR DETERRENT STRENGTH, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REMAINING OPEN TO DIALOGUE, WHICH BROUGHT THE SOVIETS TO THE BARGAINING TABLE AND MADE THE INF TREATY POSSIBLE. THE SUMMIT DECLARATION MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WILL REMAIN OUR APPROACH TO THE EAST.

THE DECLARATION WAS EQUALY CLEAR REGARDING THE ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE EAST TO REMOVE THE BARRIERS TO FREEDOM WHICH CURRENTLY CHARACTERIZE LIFE IN THOSE SOCIETIES. IN THAT REGARD, WE AND THE ALLIES ARE COMMITTED TO A BALANCED OUTCOME TO THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA -- AND WE ARE WILLING TO REMAIN AT THE TABLE UNTIL WE GET ONE.

THE NATO SUMMIT ALSO PRODUCED A CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. ON THIS SCORE, WE AND THE ALLIES AGREED THAT SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY IS THE MOST DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE ATLANTIC SECURITY EQUATION. WE HAVE CHALLENGED THE SOVIETS TO WORK WITH US IN VIENNA TO REACH A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A MORE STABLE BALANCE AT LOWER AND EQUAL LEVELS IN

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EUROPE. WE AND THE ALLIES WILL NOT NEGLECT ONGOING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR OWN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES WHILE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS.

OVER THE YEARS, NATO HAS BEEN BLESSED WITH EXCEPTIONAL LEADERS. AT THE JUNE 9-10 NATO MINISTERIAL IN MADRID, WE WILL BE SAYING GOOD-BYE TO ONE OF THEM.. PETER CARRINGTON, SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, WILL BE MOVING ON IN JULY. HE HAS DONE AN ABSOLUTELY MAGNIFICENT JOB AT NATO IN AN HISTORIC PERIOD OF SEVERE CHALLENGE AND EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY. FORMER GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER MANFRED WOERNER WILL BE TAKING OVER THE REINS AT NATO. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING AS CLOSELY WITH HIM AS WE HAVE WITH LORD CARRINGTON.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK: MATURING PARTNERSHIPS AND BASE NEGOTIATIONS

ACROSS NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, WE HAVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH SEVERAL ALLIES CHARACTERIZED BY MATURING PARTNERSHIPS, WITH A RANGE OF DEEPENING AND BROADENING TIES. IN ALL OF THESE THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO MISSIONS REMAINS IMPORTANT, EVEN AS IT TAKES ACCOUNT OF CHANGING TIMES. IN TWO COUNTRIES, AS YOU KNOW, BASE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS ON OUR FUTURE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS.

WE ARE WORKING TOWARD THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN. WORKING GROUPS ARE CONTINUING TO LABOR TO NEGOTIATE FINAL TEXTS TO REPLACE THE OLD ACCORD, WHICH EXPIRED LAST WEEK. ALTHOUGH OUR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES REMAIN PROTECTED FOR ONE YEAR, WE WISH TO WRAP THIS UP SOON. MAJOR ELEMENTS, SUCH AS CONTINUED USE OF ROTA NAVY BASE, BARDENAS



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REALES BOMBING RANGE AND OTHER SPANISH INSTALLATIONS WERE AGREED LAST JANUARY. HOWEVER, MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO REACH A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION. THE NEW ACCORD'S LONGER EIGHT YEAR TERM, AN END TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND PLANNING FOR USE OF SPANISH BASES TO REINFORCE NATO IN TIME OF CRISIS OR WAR, ARE ALL MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS. WE REMAIN DISAPPOINTED BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION THAT OUR F-16 WING MUST LEAVE SPAIN WITHIN THREE YEARS.

WE APPRECIATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING THE 401ST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING SHOULD NATO SO RECOMMEND. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF ITALY'S BROAD RANGE OF SUPPORT FOR WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. THE FATE OF THE 401ST IS UP TO NATO. WE HAVE SOME IMPORTANT DETAILS YET TO WORK OUT. BUT I AM REASONABLY CONFIDENT THE UNIT CAN REMAIN FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO US AND TO CONGRESS.

OUR CURRENT BASE AGREEMENT WITH GREECE IS TERMINABLE ON DECEMBER 20, 1988. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS WE EXPECT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE THE REQUIRED NOTICE OF TERMINATION FIVE MONTHS BEFORE THAT DATE. WE HAVE BEGUN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW POST-1988 AGREEMENT. THE LAST ROUND WAS HELD HERE MAY 9 - 13. THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE TO BE MARKED BY ORDERLY PROGRESS AND A PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE. THE SEVENTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN ATHENS THE WEEK OF JUNE 20.

IN FEBRUARY, AS YOU KNOW, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT RATIFIED THE EXTENSION OF OUR 1980 DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT THROUGH 1990. THE CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF



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TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES, NATO AND TURKEY.

8/11 ADDITIONALLY, AS YOU KNOW FROM PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER
CAVACO SILVA'S VISIT HERE IN FEBRUARY, THE PORTUGUESE HAVE
REQUESTED CONSULTATIONS ON OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE OPENING,
PROCEDURAL ROUND TOOK PLACE IN LISBON ON APRIL 29. ALTHOUGH A
FORMAL AGENDA HAS YET TO BE AGREED UPON, WE EXPECT THE
CONSULTATIONS TO REVIEW OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION EFFORTS AND
EXPLORE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN COOPERATION IN LIGHT OF
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1983.

WHILE THE TALKS WILL ADDRESS SECURITY COOPERATION MATTERS,
WE ALSO ANTICIPATE EXAMINING PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING
NON-SECURITY ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. IN REQUESTING THE
CONSULTATIONS, PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER CAVACO SILVA HAS
STRESSED THAT PORTUGAL DOES NOT INTEND TO REDUCE U.S. ACCESS TO
MILITARY FACILITIES ON PORTUGUESE SOIL, BUT INSTEAD TO IDENTIFY
AND OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE
RELATIONSHIP. WE SHARE THAT APPROACH.

EASTERN EUROPE

CHANGE IS THE WORD TODAY IN EASTERN EUROPE. AGING
LEADERSHIPS, A CHRONIC SENSE OF ILLEGITIMACY, AND DECLINING
ECONOMIES ARE CREATING A MORE FLUID SITUATION. PRESSURE FROM
THE SOVIET UNION TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT ECONOMICALLY ADDS TO
THE INDIGENOUS PRESSURES FOR CHANGE, AS DOES THE EXAMPLE OF
GORBACHEV'S REFORM PROGRAM.

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EASTERN EUROPEAN REGIMES ARE FEARFUL OF RAPID CHANGE AND SEE OPENNESS AS A THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY. MOST LEADERSHIPS WANT BETTER FUNCTIONING ECONOMIES, BUT NOT AT THE COST OF LOSING CONTROL.

THE SITUATION IN POLAND CONFIRMS THE RISKS INHERENT IN TRYING TO MOVE ON ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT ACQUIRING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM. THE STRIKES WERE SPONTANEOUS AND INDICATED PENT-UP FRUSTRATION WITH THE AUSTERITY ELEMENT OF REFORM MEASURES. THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN POLAND MUST OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT, AND MUST ENGAGE IN A PROCESS OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, AND BROAD REFORM, IF ECONOMIC REFORM IS TO HAVE A CHANCE.

WE WITNESS IN HUNGARY AN AMAZINGLY OPEN DEBATE ON REFORM. THE AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO FEARFUL OF PUBLIC REACTION TO ECONOMIC REFORMS WHICH WILL BRING AUSTERITY. THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT TOO MUST SEEK POPULAR SUPPORT.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA ARE MAKING MOTIONS TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORM BUT GIVE NO CONCRETE INDICATION OF POLITICAL REFORM. ROMANIA REJECTS REFORM ALTOGETHER.

THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE PRESENT THE UNITED STATES WITH BOTH CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. OUR INFLUENCE IS LIMITED, BUT THERE ARE NEW OPENINGS TO PROMOTE WESTERN VALUES AND ENCOURAGE GENUINE REFORM. WE HAVE SEEN CHANGE COMING FOR TWO YEARS NOW, AND HAVE ADOPTED A MORE ACTIVE AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH WITH CHANGE IN MIND. DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD HAS NOW VISITED THE AREA FOUR TIMES AND WILL BE GOING AGAIN IN JUNE.

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477 WITH EVERY COUNTRY WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE A KIND OF "CHALLENGE PROGRAM" OF PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE TO 10/11 MUTUAL BENEFIT IF OUR PARTNERS ARE WILLING TO TAKE OUR CONCERNs INTO ACCOUNT. WITH MOST WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS. THEY HAVE IN GENERAL BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH. THE TOPICS DIFFER FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, BUT IN EVERY CASE THEY INVOLVE GREATER DIALOGUE, GREATER OPENNESS, MORE CONTACTS, MORE EFFICIENT MEANS OF SOLVING PROBLEMS.

WHILE THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WANT POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CULTURAL TIES, AND WE MEAN TO PURSUE THESE, WHAT THEY WANT MOST FROM US IS ECONOMIC SUPPORT. WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND ECONOMIC AND TRADE TIES IN NON-STRATEGIC AREAS, BUT WE ARE NOT WILLING TO LET TRADE GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE REST OF OUR AGENDA, AND WE RECOGNIZE WESTERN ECONOMIC SUPPORT WILL BE SQUANDERED WITHOUT MEANINGFUL REFORM AND SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE.

OUR POLICY IS WELL-SUITED TO THE CHALLENGE. HOLDING TO A REALISTIC, SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR RELATIONS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO WEATHER THE INEVITABLE UPS AND DOWNS WHILE PURSUING OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THIS WILL REQUIRE PATIENCE AND A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE.

OECD MINISTERIAL

OF LATE, WE'VE TALKED TOGETHER ABOUT NATO SUMMITS AND U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS. THERE IS A THIRD SUMMIT AHEAD OF US ON THE CALENDAR, WHICH ALSO TOUCHES ON VITAL U.S. INTERESTS. AS WE SPEAK, SECRETARIES BAKER, VERITY, LYNG, AMBASSADOR YEUTTER, CHAIRMAN SPRINKEL AND DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD ARE

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PARTICIPATING IN THE ANNUAL OECD MINISTERIAL IN PARIS, A MEETING WHICH TRADITIONALLY SETS THE STAGE FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, THIS YEAR IN TORONTO JUNE 19-21. AS IS EVIDENT FROM OUR CABINET-LEVEL DELEGATION, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT SESSION. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES TO MAKE A COLLECTIVE STATEMENT ON THE DIRECTION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE POLICIES WE ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE TO MEET TODAY'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES -- AND TOMORROW'S.

I BELIEVE WE WILL FIND BROAD AGREEMENT AMONG MINISTERS ON FUNDAMENTALS. OECD ECONOMIES HAVE PROVEN RESILIENT AFTER THE OCTOBER MARKET CRASH AND ARE GENERALLY PERFORMING WELL, BUT WE DO FACE IMPORTANT CHALLENGES -- STRENGTHENING OUR OPEN TRADING SYSTEM, REDUCING STRUCTURAL RIGIDITIES IN AND AMONG OUR ECONOMIES AND, FOR EUROPE, TACKLING HIGH LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. THESE LAST TWO ISSUES ARE CLOSELY TIED AND THE LINKAGE IS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZED BY OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

THERE IS LESS CONSENSUS WHEN WE MOVE TO THE SPECIFICS OF TRADE AND AGRICULTURE. THE U.S. IS SEEKING IN PARIS A STRONG IMPETUS FOR PROGRESS AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER IN MONTREAL. AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA IS LONG-TERM, MARKET-ORIENTED AGRICULTURAL REFORM, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO END COSTLY AND INEFFICIENT FARM PROGRAMS AND ELIMINATE CONSTANT DEBILITATING TRADE DISPUTES WITH EUROPE. OUR PARTNERS TAKE A MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH, BUT I BELIEVE WE WILL CLOSE THE MEETING TOMORROW WITH A STRENGTHENED COMMITMENT TO CONCRETE RESULTS IN DECEMBER.

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סוווג בטחוני ס. ג. ג.

דוחי פנות

מארין/ז"ה 18 1130 מאי 88

מס' מברך

אל: מנכ"ל מדיבגי
מנכ"ל ראה"ת
מנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דעת: השגריר ארד, ניואכ'ורק

להלן מפגישת המזכיר עם מראיהם ושהיה (17.5).

שולץ פתח בזררי הרכבה לשתייה. אמר שיחזור מהפסגה היישן לאזרען וריכבל לדזוזה עליה. המזכיר פנה לשיפט על מנת שיזדוזה על המפתחות. האחרזות בנווא הדרוזי.

1,600 ל-2,000, 3 בקשרו שעדין בטיפול ובהתו מוטקבה נומר לו על חורדים ארוכים של מבקשים המתכוונים לעתים ליליה שלם לפניו משרד האובייר. לדבריו של שיפטר הסובייטים

ונעכית לדין בנסיבות השונות שארה"ב מעלה. כוונתם להמשיך ולמקוף את הנטבויות בנסיבות של מגבלות בשל טודיות והגבלה צפאה על-ידי הורית. הנטבויות רמזו شيء מוכני לאלו מהלומות ותמיון בשני גישאות אלו. ואנחנו בפוגם בשאלה של זו אגדת הנטבויות הטעינה

שהיות עבר לשיחותינו בהונגריה ואמר כי אבשי שימושו הסבירו שההשלטה על ביטול היחסים
שבהם הקלו על המגבלות.

ההונגריים הסבירו כי בראונם לחקק היחסים עם אריה'ב וישראל, ולא הסבירו כי אחד המבקרים בוא בראונם לשפר מצב החרוא. בברוגרדיום בברוגראם גות שבל מ-30 שבועות לאראן גולדל לנטגון ואר

וכי הפט מעוניינים בהרחבת תמיירות. יהיה גם ציון כי ביהכין האזול בכוונפת זוקק לשיפורו דוחוף.

בנושא הטובייטי אמר שהיה כי הופעתה להיווכח שאנשי שיחו במוסקבה, שם עיקר אנשי מד"ת, עומדים גם בנושא היהודי - דבר המצביע על הרצון הטובייטי לפעול במקביל בתני בדינאיים הללו. לעומתם שפעה בזאת בוגרdom של יצירם בתרבות התרבות בוגרdom באביה

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סוכס מברק

דף 2 מתוך 5 דפים

סיג בטהני ס. ו. ז. ז.

דביפוח מ. י. ז. ז.

תאריך/ז"ה

מס' מברק

7/9/48

והביא כראיה נוכחות הסובייטים להתר ביקורים הדדיים של רבני מארה"ב וברה"ם, במלר השיחות אמרו גם שם מתכוננים להרחב חופש הפולחן לכנסיה הפרובוסלבית והדבר עשו גם להתאים לקהילה היהודית.

באשר למשת הסובייטים טועני ס שם מגלים נוכחות אך אריה"ב מתקשת (אולץ בחירות: אני יכול להיות עקשן). במלר שתי היפות ובהצהרה הפומבית שם נתנו באינטראקציונל הסוציאליסטי על הנקודות הבאות:

- הגורמים למרוץ החימוש ולהחמרה שחל בז כחוצה מהשלוב של טילים ונשך כימי. במפגשים בין המעצמות בידון העדין לדברים, אין ללא מסקנות.
- הם מוד רציניים ברצונם לבונן שלות במדיה והרחקו לכת באמרים שם יצרכו לוותר על מעמדם במדיה לטובה השלו - יעשו זאת.
- הווד שיט להם קשיים בהשגת תמיכת לעמודותם בין בנות בריתם במדיה, וצינרו את העמדה הקישחת של טוריה.
- הפכו חטומת לבנו פעם נוספת לדורי גורבצ'וב לרפאת.

שהיה הוסיף כי בדבריו לסתובייטים נאמר -

- אין לנו מעוניינים בזועידה בinalgומית ואנו מוכנים לקבל אך ורק אם תוכל לסייע בקידום המהילך. בזודאי שלא תוכל להסביר לזועידה בinalgומית כופה.
- אין בישראל אמון בברה"ם מטעם שהיה שפקה את כל כמות הנש האזרחות שגרמו למלחמות גזרו.
- בטענה לאמירה הסובייטית כי נקטו בשורה של צדים דרמטיים, נאמר להם כי עדיין מורגשת אצל מחותח החש מהתגובה העורביה וכי ערפאת החייב כי אכן נאמרו לו הדברים שפוזרתו אח"כ. ירדן הסבימה לזועידה שאיננה כופה ולכך למעשה הטענו כל אלו שהסבירו לזועידה, ולכן מזעע מתקשת ברה"ם ומדו צריכים כל המעורבים להתאים עצם לגישת הסובייטים דזוקא? אך השיבו הסובייטים שאין להם מידע על "טטן לונדון".

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סוזן בטחוני סודין

דוחייפות מ. י. ד. י

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- בקשר ההיסטורייאלי אמרו הסובייטים שצריך לטפל בו לפני הנושאים הפליטיים ואפשר להבינו מכך, לפי שהייח, שהסובייטים אינם רואים בעוכחות אש"ף בעית הטיפול בנדשא ההיסטורייאלי. בכלל, הוסיף שהייח, הימה התייחסות מועטה לדברי הסובייטים לאש"ף.

שהיה הוסיף לומר לסובייטים שאבינו מבין מודיעין הסובייטים ממעקשיים שהייתה תבאי מוקדם לפיו יוכלו המשתתפים החיצוניים להציג הצעות. לא לבראיהם אין כל בעיה והוא יכול לבטא דעתו ולהציג הצעות מעיל דפי העותונות, למשל, הפעלת הדבר לתבאי מוקדם רק מסך את הדבריהם.

שהיה פנה לשולץ בקריאה שלא תחת מההילך שלום לגוזע. יש לשמור על תהליך השלום. התהיליך זוכה לתמיכת דו-טפלותם באורה"ב מוצע צרייך לקברור שהייח הוסיף כי שרי החוץ אמריקאים בעבר "אספו" חשיבות שליליות אך המזכיר לא "הצליח" בכך. אם הסובייטים יבטלו את דרישותיהם הבלתי האיגוניות ויוותרו רק הבדלים שוליים והם יסכימו ליזורוית משותפת הרדי שיתכן וננתן לפחות התהיליך. שהייח הביע תקוותו כי הפסגה לא תיצור את ראשן מההילך גוזע. שהייח המזכיר אם האפשרות של מעין "פסגה קטנה" בין המזכיר לשורנדבזזה בעוד כחודשיים-שלשה. הדבר החשוב מכל מקום הוא לא להניח לתהיליך לגוזע בפסגה הקרוב. אי שמייתו של התהיליך עלול להביא לסתונות טראגיות וחיזוק השפעותיהם של הפונדמנטליים והטורים.

באשר לשלוחת הקונסולריות הרדי שהטובייטים עוזרין לא נתנו תשובה מדויקת ואמרו שיווזענו לנו. נוביק הוסיף שיחם שלא היו אנשי משהיח הרודיאו שהחשובה תבוא משרד החוץ אחד למשנהו. שהיה ציין כי משפחת טופול טהיתה בין האחרונות הרפיזוניקים קיבלה אישור יציאה.

לביקת שהיית תאר נובייק השיחות עם זוטוב ואמר שבשיחות אלו הסביר זוטוב את העמדות שהשטיין בפזומבי. בהטנורים אלו אמר שחייב לתקדם לקרהת הטלות וכי הכל פתוח למויים. המשתתפים בועידה הבינלאומית יהייו 5 החברים הקבועות במועבידייט, האזרדים לסכוך וערביים-פלשטיינאים כאשר הוא איננו מתייחס לאשי"פ. מאידך זוטוב התיחס לאשי"פ בדברו על ההזדמנות לועידה, היינו שההיא נגה שתי הזדמנות אך שנהיה משלחת משוחפת רדנית-פלשטיינאית. בדברו על תוכנות

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המו"מ זוטוב אמר שהוא צורכה להיות בצו"ע 242 וממן הגדרה עצמית לפלשתינאים כאשר העربים הם שיחליטו מה הפרוש המעשית של הגדרה עצמית.

זוטוב גם אמר שהוא מקבלים בעקבו את האגישה ההדרגתית ובקובנטקסט זהה ציין שעבini הטרייטורילי ועבini הגבולות יטופלו לפניהם הגדרה העצמית. כאמור הגדרה העצמית הוא עניין בין-ערבי לדעת בריה"מ, קרי עניין ירדני-פלשתינאי. לדברי נוביק לשוביטים ברור שלא כל העربים מקבלים הפרשנות שהגדרה עצמית הן מלוות קודם לモיננה פלשתינאית.

באשר לו עיידה הבינלאומית זוטוב אמר שדו הפגש *regularly* *and frequently*. המזכיר אמר שהיה רוצה לקרוא את הטקסט המדויק של ההצהרה הפומבית של זוטוב במדריד, להציגו בפני הסובייטים ולקבל מהם תשובה ברורות האם הוא משקף עמדותיהם.

שהיות מתיחס לירדן ואמר שיתacen וישנם אנשיים הרואים בהתחנחות המלך לאחראונת כוותור על הגדרה אך המושמות היא שלא כך פנוי הזרבים. מלך יש ذכרונות וشاءיפות. הדכוונות הם של אבדן השטחים ורצו עד לקבלם חזורה. יש לו שאיפות לשיפור חוסנה הכלכלי של ארצו. יש לו גם שאיפות כלפי מספר ישראליים וערפת הרוצים להפוך את ירדן עצמה ל- *Homeland* של הפלשתינאים.

האינטריפאדה פועלת במידה מסוימת כנגד חוסין כי מופיעות בה נימוח אנטו-ירדניות. מאידן, אין לאינטיפאדה טר-יוס ומטרות מוגדרות ולכך האפקט אינו כה חמור מבחינה המלך. ישראל מתכוונה לבנות בוניסט בטענה מטענה אשיפ או מיועד לשימוש למלחמותיו. המקור הגadol ביותר הוא עדיין עבודה בישראל המכנית כ-600-700 מיליון דולר ואשיפ לא יכול להחליף מקור זה. העربים התגלו עד כה כטוביים ממש שפטים אך לא בסיו"ע ממש. מאידן אפשר לטיען לירדן להיות יותר פעילהצד הכלכלי בתחום שהcaption לא יצונר דרך הקרכו היורדת-הפלשתינאית המשותפת שכן דרך יכול אשיפ להעביר כספים למטרותיו הוא. יש רצון רב בקרב האזרופאים וגם היפנים להשתתף בפרויקטים כלכליים.

להערכתם שהו"מ במאע עתה המלך חוסין בעמדת המנהה כאשר המטר שלו לאשיפ הוא שאם יוכל להציג מטרותיו בכוונותיו הוא שיבסה לעשות זאת כאשר הוא מניה שישראל לא

סולם מביך

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סולם במחוגה סוד

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לא תסכים בשום אופן למו"מ עם ערפאת. האחרון זכה אולי בכמה נקודות בבדיקה
בدمשך אך גרט בעת ובזעונה אחת למורת רוח בתקהיר. ובבגדאד. נזעימת הפטגה המתוכננת
גוזמת לדאגה ולכך דרוש מאמץ לבטלה או להפחית בערכה ולהורידיה לדרga נמוך ככל
האפשר.

בסיום דבריו חזר שהוא על דבריו שאסור להניח למתהילן לאירוע בפסגת בוטוסקבה.
במקביל יש להמשיך בדיאלוג עם המלך ולחזק בו את הידיעה שלא בכח לאשייפ דריסת
rangle בתהילן.

המשך השיחה היה בא"צ מטעם המזכיר שתכנה כבר הובך אליהם.

השתתפו בשיחה מצד ארה"ב המזכיר, מרפי, שיפטר, הולמס, הירש, וווקר.
מצד ישראל שהייח, המנכ"ל המדיני בילין, השגריר אוד, ג. כוביק, א. סביר, מ. שילוח
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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

אל: מצפיה, מעית

דע: ליטכת רוחניים

מאנע תזונות

לහלו ראיון ממוריהם ושה"ח לתוכנית Today Show של NBC

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NBC'S "TODAY SHOW" 3
 WITH BRYANT GUMBEL
 AND GUEST: SHIMON PERES,
 ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1988

BRYANT GUMBEL: On Close-up this morning, Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister has been in Washington this week talking peace prospects with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. Mr. Peres has now moved on to Toronto from where he joins us this morning. And Foreign Minister Peres, good morning.

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Good morning.

MR. GUMBEL: You talked with President Reagan about discussing Mideast peace prospects with Mikhail Gorbachev at the upcoming summit. What's realistic expectations for that?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think that there is a fair chance that the Russians will make some moves in the direction of the United States proposal, which is the only one, I believe, acceptable to all parts on both sides of the Middle East, or most of them. I'm not sure if they will be able to reach a conclusion, but even if they will reach some progress, it will be of importance and great meaning.

MR. GUMBEL: Do you welcome the participation of Mr. Gorbachev or is it a view that it's not going to go anywhere unless he's part of it?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: The problem is not his participation, but the nature of his participation. You know, it depends very much on the Russian policy. If they won't try to impose a solution or to intervene in our negotiations, yes, why not? On the other hand, if there will be the slightest attempt to try and teach us a lesson or to impose a solution, I think, all parties will refuse. Now the Russians recently did some very constructive positions, and I hope they will do it this time again.

MR. GUMBEL: On the heels of your Washington meetings, a close aide to Yitzhak Shamir -- an unnamed aide, I might add -- on Tuesday, accused you of trying to turn President Reagan against the Prime Minister. What's your reaction to that charge?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think this guy's a little bit unemployed; otherwise he wouldn't do it.

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MR. GUMBEL: Well, let me read exactly what happened. After the meeting, Presidential Spokesman Marlin FitzWater said, quote, "These leaders who are negative and reject new ideas make progress impossible." Does that description not fit Mr. Shamir?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Not necessarily. I know some leaders who are a stumbling block all the time on the road to peace, not necessarily in Israel, and I don't think one should attribute it necessarily to Mr. Shamir.

MR. GUMBEL: I guess what I'm saying is, given that statement and the President's rather lavish praise of you, can you not understand the possibility that he would view this as an attempt by the White House to inject itself into Israeli politics?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think a similar statement was issued when Mr. Shamir was visiting Washington -- there is nothing new. And I know the positions of some of the leaders in the Middle East are not really constructive enough. But, I would take it really as a support for the peace process and nothing too much of a personal nature.

MR. GUMBEL: You've talked about the peace process and noted that the present Mideast climate is too filled with suspicion, too filled with hatred, in order to gain offensive momentum or energy. How do you suggest that climate be cooled?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I don't suggest to submit to the difficulties. I don't have the slightest illusion that the road to peace is a long one. There are many obstacles, setbacks, confusions, suspicions, as we have said. It is the task of all of us to try to overcome them and to negotiate an open road to peace. I think it is a need for all parties concerned, and I don't expect such as -- that because of the suspicion they have to stop the peace momentum is, I'm afraid, offering an alternative that it doesn't seek, because if the peace initiative will be cut-off, what are the alternatives? A return to the arms race, to the cold war, to the hatred, to the other difficulties and dangers. So, I believe for all of us without exception, we have to continue our efforts to pave the way to a political settlement and a peaceful solution.

MR. GUMBEL: With elections scheduled for November in your country and ours, is it realistic to think anything will happen on the peace initiative front this year?

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FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Let me say that I will try, first of all, that something will not happen, and that is the death of the peace momentum or the hope for peace. Yet, I wouldn't exclude that there will be some advancements which will make the peace a more realistic prospect. You know, when you say "no," it is clear and simple, but when you have to say "yes," you have to collect so many "yeses" from so many parties and the different minds and impressions that it makes it surely much more complicated than difficult. Yet, all of us without exception must be careful not to bury the hope for peace, not to open another road which, I believe, is detrimental to all parties.

MR. GUMBEL: Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. We thank you very much, sir. Safe travels.

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW

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
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MACNEIL-LEHRER NEWS HOUR
INTERVIEWS
THE HONORABLE SHIMON PERES
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1988

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MS. WOODRUFF: Next tonight a Newsmaker Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Peres arrived in Washington yesterday for two days of talks with top Administration officials. His visit comes in the midst of continuing Reagan Administration unhappiness with Israel's treatment of Palestinians, and just days before President Reagan travels to Moscow for a summit with the Moscow. When I talked with Peres earlier this afternoon at a Washington hotel, I began by asking him if anything had come out of his meetings that would affect the search for peace in the Middle East.

MINISTER PERES: The most important message is that both of them are determined not to let the peace process fade away, and certainly not to die -- because the minute [that] this will happen, or a perception to that effect will occur, we shall have an entirely different process in the Middle East which will look bleak in the eyes of everybody concerned.

MS. WOODRUFF: But what gives you, what gives the Reagan Administration hope that you can salvage this process?

MINISTER PERES: Basically because all parties concerned are in need of it because the alternative to it is so complicated and dangerous to the Arabs, to the Israelis, to the United States, to the Soviet Union. And I think we are mature enough people to understand that the road that leads to peace is not a simple one. And we must be patient. The Middle East can turn in a moment into again a region of belligerency, of arms race, of cold war, of threats, of ugly military coalitions. And then what?

MS. WOODRUFF: Why did you come to Washington? Why this trip?

MINISTER PERES: I came, I think, basically to see what are the best ways to continue with the peace process. And then we are very much aware -- when I say "we" I mean both as a Jewish people and Israeli state -- of the importance of the summit meeting which is going to take place in Moscow between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev. It concerns us in many ways -- in the way of the future of Jewish life in the Soviet Union, which is top in our consideration; in the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union

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PERES

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and Israel; and the peace process in the Middle East. So, for us, it is more than an important subject.

MS. WOODRUFF: On the issue of the Soviets, you've said today that you understand that they will get involved in the peace process; that they will make some sort of a declaration during the Moscow summit. What is your understanding of that?

MINISTER PERES: What the Soviets told us is, "We are a responsible country; we are serious on this. It is important for us to see peace in the Middle East. Watch us what we did in Afghanistan. Watch us what we did in the INF. We are a serious minded people. You should trust us." And they even went as far as to say that what took place between the Soviet Union and Israel

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is almost a drama. I told him maybe it's a drama but you're aware politics are not dramatic. Everything he did was so slow, so limited, so late, so stingy that it really didn't open a wide enough avenue so peace can go on without real obstacles.

When it comes to peace, we need American diplomacy and American diplomats to help us on it. But we are just one side of the story. There is another side which is the Arab side, and some of the Arab clients are very much connected with the Soviet Union. And unless they will see the Soviet Union moving in the direction of peace, they may remain in their old belligerent position which was so costly to them and quite dangerous to us.

MS. WOODRUFF: Don't you find it odd that Israel --- what you're saying is that Israel should now rely on the Soviets to influence the Arabs to participate. I mean, in a way you're --- you're expecting the Soviets to help you when in the past they have not been your friend.

MINISTER PERES: Oh, don't exaggerate. We don't rely upon the Soviet Union. We rely upon the lack of opposition of the Soviet Union. We think that the Soviet Union tried its hands by supplying arms to the Arab countries, by supporting their very militant position to discover that it leads no where but to defeat. Israel, to start with, relies upon ourselves -- upon ourselves. I think we are strong, we can defend both our country and our policy. We have the strength to defend openly our land and to resolve peace. And I feel very strongly that if people are saying we have to negotiate out of strength, don't forget to negotiate when you're strong. And I think we are strong and we have to negotiate because the ultimate purpose is really to live in peace with the Arabs. We don't hate

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them. They're not our enemies. We would like to see their children waking up in the morning without fear as I would like to see our own children waking up in the morning without fear. And we do lead a peace process out of deep conviction not out of fear and not even out of experience.

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MS. WOODRUFF: The United States government has objected to your government's policy of expelling many moderate Palestinians, particularly most recently Mubarak Awad. Your government is holding him now. What is going to happen to this gentleman?

MINISTER PERES: Moderate Palestinians were never expelled. Only militant Palestinians were expelled and Palestinians who are trying to worsen the situation. The right to deport a person is a British law that was handed over to the Jordanians, and the

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MACNEIL-LEHRER/05-17-88
PERES

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Jordanians have handed it over to us. Now we have changed a little bit of the law because a person who is condemned for deportation has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel. There is a judicial process. And occasionally the Court has decided to annul the deportation. Now we have a difficult choice -- you know, if we would use the capital punishment, nobody would say, "Well, let's face it. Is a capital punishment or more, more humane?" Israel in her forty years of existence didn't put a single person to the gallows. The only man that was executed is Eichmann and there were terrible terrorists. So what we are doing is not because we are blood thirsty. What we are doing is really a major attempt to save the life of people.

MS. WOODRUFF: But is this now a major method for dealing with the Palestinians?

MINISTER PERES: No, not a major -- we're talking about maybe ten, twenty or twenty-five cases -- that's all. We are not talking about mass deportation. Awad, by the way, is a different story. He's not a Palestinian, he's a tourist.

MS. WOODRUFF: Have you in any way found U.S. support for Israel diminished because of the way Israel has responded to the uprisings in recent months?

MINISTER PERES: No, I've found that some people are making critical remarks in a timely manner, and I take it in good faith. We don't expect that our friends will agree with us 100 percent -- 100 percent of the time, and we take it with grace and understanding if some people differ from our view. So we are answering to the criticism, and our answer is a very simple one. Without alternatives, what should we do?

END OF INTERVIEW

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המשרד

אל: מצפיה, מעית, הסברת

דע: לשכת רוחים

מאנע: תובנות

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לפלו גאנז פפֿרְוַהִים וְשַׁחַיִם לְאַנְסָן

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General and Social Inequality in the Global Economy
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CNN "INTERNATIONAL HOUR"
INTERVIEW WITH SHIMON PERES, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1988 428

BERNARD SHAW: Joining us now on the International Hour here in Washington, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres. Welcome, Mr. Minister, and first, a political question since you have national elections coming up in November. In your wildest dreams, can you see your Labor party gaining an all-out majority in the Knesset?

MINISTER PERES: Well, I don't think it's such a wild dream. I think it is a dream, and we are dreaming it, and I wouldn't exclude it because for the first time in the Israel political experience, there is a very large undecided vote that may give a party -- I hope my party -- a fair chance to create a coalition with a program for the future.

MR. SHAW: Will your national elections in effect be a referendum on land for peace?

MINISTER PERES: It will be a referendum in my judgment between the existing situation, the status quo, and a plan to move ahead in the direction of peace, which will include a territorial compromise -- what you call "land for peace".

MR. SHAW: Do you envision that compromise having Palestinians live on that land? Or do you envision that land to be a demilitarized area?

MINISTER PERES: Demilitarized. We shall not force anybody to move from his place. We are a democratic people, we are a free people, we have respect for every human being, for his rights, for his land, for his properties. And I really think the problem is not so much a problem of land, but a problem of people. Namely, not necessarily just how to divide the land, but how to establish a relationship of people based on mutual respect and peace for all



people and all children concerned.

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MR. SHAW: Mr. Minister, I have to ask you this question. If -- if you had the power, would you have prevented the assassination of Abu Jihad?

MINISTER PERES: Well there, it's a little bit -- excuse me for saying so -- a loaded question. I am not the address to this particular issue, and I don't think I am in a mood or a readiness to discuss it.

MR. SHAW: Why do you think my question was loaded, sir?

MINISTER PERES: Well any way I would answer, I would take responsibility for something that I don't take responsibility for.

MR. SHAW: Moving on to the Palestinians, do you think that King Hussein's effectiveness in influencing the Palestinians has been reduced by tensions, the uprising?

MINISTER PERES: For a while, yes. I think the uprising on the West Bank and Gaza has a clear anti-Hussein underlining; it was the King. It doesn't make us happy. But when the Palestinians will have to sum up their position and get over their achievements, which were basically a media achievement, and to try to think in hard political terms, they will discover, I believe, what we have discovered, that the real partner to find a peaceful solution is King Hussein, his Jordanian government, together with the Palestinian delegation. I do not see any real or realistic alternative to it.

MR. SHAW: And Secretary of State Shultz, once again he's preparing to pack his bags and pursue the US peace plan. Does it have a chance realistically?

MINISTER PERES: Realistically if he won't do it, and the chances for peace will evaporate and fade away, what would you think will happen in the Middle East? I see all the terrible alternatives that may take place. I think Secretary Shultz is making a supreme effort not to permit the peace initiative to die in the face of so



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many difficulties, because the moment that the chances for peace will disappear, another situation will be created, a return to an arms race, to a "cold war", to threats, to escalations, to military coalitions, and nobody will be then able to repair the situation. So the maintenance of a peace momentum, the administration of a peace hope is essential for all parties concerned. And if it calls for another trip, let's have another trip. And if there will be needed an additional trip, an additional trip. Because I believe that it is such a dangerous situation to raise our hands and say nothing can be done, and create an invitation to the most destructive situation in the Middle East.

MR. SHAW: President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev will be discussing the Middle East among other things -- (pauses) --

MINISTER PERES: Yes.

MR. SHAW: -- when their summit begins in Moscow.

I'm keeping an eye out at the White House because I think the President will be along shortly. (Referring to a Presidential press conference about to begin at the White House and carried live by CNN.)

But these two leaders will be discussing the Middle East. My question to you, sir, is how can Moscow have influence and credibility with your government when it does not recognize your government diplomatically?

MINISTER PERES: It's a question the Russians have to answer. Surely, how can they try and contribute to peace between the Arabs and ourselves when they didn't make fully peace with us? And we keep telling it to the Russians. They have to reestablish their diplomatic ties with Israel and then the Soviet Union has to adapt itself to the wishes of the people in the Middle East and not to try and force the countries in the Middle East to adapt themselves to whatever philosophy may be produced in Moscow.

MR. SHAW: So clearly you regard the Shultz plan, the United States plan, as much more acceptable than that being offered by Moscow?

MINISTER PERES: One hundred percent. I think that the Shultz plan is in reference with the wishes and the needs, and the need for a compromise in the Middle East. I don't think this is an American whim. I don't think this is an American dictate. I think this is an American conclusion about the best contribution that your great country can offer to our region.

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MR. SHAW: Is the presence of Chinese Silkworm missiles in the Middle East destabilizing?

MINISTER PERES: Very much so. It is a new toy given in the hands of some immature people. It may serve as a temptation, again, to try their hands and use force. It is not just who bought the missiles, but who is offering them. And I do not believe that the Chinese are limiting themselves only to Saudi Arabia. They may offer it to some more countries, and again renew an unnecessary arms race in the Middle East. Spare resources and money from education, from health, from economy, and spend it again on this very expensive weaponry. You know, a single missile that the Chinese are supplying to the Saudis costs \$12 million. Imagine what can be done with this money for schooling, for health, for economy.

MR. SHAW: Mr. Minister, we thank you very, very much for joining us on the International Hour. Thank you.

MINISTER PERES: Thank you.

MR. SHAW: Shimon Peres, the Foreign Minister of Israel,

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נקה: עתרכות

להלן נאומו של ממרוח"ם ושת"ח פרט בזעידה (16-5-88). AlPAC

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REMARKS OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHIMON PERES
BEFORE THE AMERICAN-ISRAEL POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

MONDAY, MAY 16, 1988

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Thank you, Bob. Thank you, Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Johnston. Thank you, Senators, and Representatives of the House, for the moving support you have shown to our people and to my country. You are the dearest and the most profound friends that a nation can hope for, in the largest democracy history has ever known, the United States of America. (Applause.)

I would also (inaudible) in recognizing the presence of the representative of Egypt among us. (Applause.) You know, for 4,000 years, (speaks in foreign language, presumably Hebrew), what makes this evening different from all others, and we meant exodus from slavery, this night we mean exodus from belligerency. (Applause.) And if some people may feel that the peace between Egypt and Israel is not a perfect one, well, I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war. (Applause.)

I know that you are worried about the fact that we are divided in Israel. You would like to see us united. (Scattered applause.) Just a minute. (Laughter.) If we shall be united, I wonder if we should remain Jewish. (Laughter.) I mean, it doesn't fit us to be united really in many ways. But may I say that we are also united. First of all, we are united on one great issue: our friendship and thankfulness to the United States of America. We are the only country on earth where America doesn't serve a dividing factor, but a uniting one. And we are very proud about it, to see your great nation, that made freedom a promise, generosity a trait, and peoplehood a mission for a better world. We are proud to belong to this great tradition, to this great spirit, to this part of humanity. (Applause.)

But we are united in another way, too. Actually, to be democratic is to be pluralistic. I am thinking about the 40 years of Israel. We were attacked at least five times. The countries that did attack us were united. We who were attacked were divided, yet we won the wars, they lost it, which shows that to be free and democratic is not necessarily to be weak, but to be strong as well. (Applause.)

We may be divided in our positions, but we are always united in our fronts. We may have different views, but we are capable of acting together, of dreaming together, of hoping together. This is the salt (?) of the best combination between freedom and togetherness. Think as you wish, act as you need, and that will typify our future as well.

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Yes, we think that 40 years of the existence of Israel made things, which looked like unbelievable, a reality, unprecedented in history. Never before did the people that has lost their land, went into exile, dispersed on the four corners of the earth, come together again and become one people; one people, all of us are again, as Americans, as a contribution to human experience, to come together, to a town, to a land that was destroyed and burned down, dry and poor, and make it flourish again; to come again to a language that was forgotten but in the prayers, and make that language the language of our children, who play in the same words that our prophets visualized the future -- to that (?), to fight wars and win them, to keep an honest judicial system, to build industry and agriculture, and while fighting, building, and while building, arguing, and while arguing, dreaming and hoping. And one of the greatest things that happened to us is the togetherness of the Jewish people.

My very dear friends, Israel would never be what she is without you. And you probably would never be what you are without us. (Applause.) I want also to say a word about AIPAC. This is a unique organization. I know that many nations are jealous of Israel, because we enjoy the dynamic, imaginative and constructive work of your organization. Yet I know that you are not for hire, and we are not going to trade you for anything, neither for land or peace. We need you as you are, as the strongest bridge between the American people and the state of Israel. That's what you are, and that's what we need, of course. (Applause.) Please continue with this great work, which is not controversial, but agreeable on both sides of the oceans, in both sides of the dream and the need (?).

Now the 40th anniversary of Israel is not an occasion just to mark important achievements, but to renew our dream again. I was so pleased to see here so many young delegates -- young women, young men. They came not just to praise our achievements, but to share our vision and our dream. And we have to make our vision and our dream clear to them, clear to us. And when we are dreaming, we have to do it on a double track; one concerning the past, and the other concerning the future.

The past calls for a strong Israel, for a secure Israel, never to be light-minded about the strengths we need to defend our land and to defend our lives. Surely a person like myself, who went through those 40 years, most of them at the management of war and peace, most of it in serving the defenses of our country, I can remember so many occasions. You know, how people are interviewing and say, "What were the happiest days in your life in the 40 years?" That's not too important. I remember what were the most difficult lives, times, days in those 40 years.

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The first surely ??????????
in the wake of the Second World War, when we have discovered the dimension of the Holocaust. We couldn't believe it. We couldn't understand it. Still we can't believe, and still we cannot understand. Surely we cannot forget. Then I remember days of war, of dangers. I remember the night in the Yom Kippur War, sitting all day, all night at the Cabinet session, and trying to make a decision if we have to cross the Canal. Without crossing, we were in danger. The crossing was a danger. And the girl that took the stenography of the meeting all of a sudden started to cry. Her husband was at the front,

and I knew how dangerous and how difficult it was. How can I forget the night of Entebbe, when our boys were in there, where over a hundred people were in danger, and our planes were 4,000 miles away from home without any communication? On the 4th of July, they were waiting the result and knowing that the distance between success and failure is so small and so thin.

So, we have to take our security as serious as a people should. But then, I also know that we have to translate our strength and experience into a peaceful Middle East. Peace is our future. The past calls for an immensely strong Israel -- the future calls for an immensely dedicated Israel for peace in the Middle East.
(Applause.)

We shall do it, not because we are weak, neither because we are criticized, even not because this is an Arab demand. We shall do it because this is an answer to our heritage, to our inclination as a nation, to our moral call as a

people that have never dominated another people, as an obligation to our own children, to their children, to let them wake up in the morning where they won't have to worry time and again about stones, or knives, or bombs or missiles; and they can start their day in an air of peace and hope.

I feel that Israel, after 40 years, is free, is strong, is peaceful. And we are determined to keep the state of Israel as a Jewish state numerically, and as a Jewish state morally. (Applause)

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We are in very close relations with the United States. I have expressed already my appreciation for the most unusual support we got in this country. But may I also say that we are different from some other countries. We have never asked the United States to send soldiers to help to defend our country, but we have always asked the United States to send diplomats to help us to make peace.

(Applause)

Our defense and a joint diplomacy for peace. When dealing with peace and remembering the need to keep our country strong, I would say that Israel generally, when it will come to negotiations, will say "no" to every proposal for peace that may harm security; and we shall say "yes" to every proposal for peace that may enhance the security of all the people in the Middle East without exception.

(Applause)

Permit me to say what are our "nos" and what are our "yesses." There are things that we shall say "no", all of us, and on that again all of our people are united. We shall say "no" if somebody will suggest to divide the capital of Israel, Jerusalem. (Applause). On that, all of our people without exception know that Jerusalem is not just the center of our prayer, but the capital of our land forever. We shall say "no" if somebody will suggest us to return to the '67 frontiers. (Applause). We cannot permit ourselves to create not only a weakness in our defenses, but a temptation in the minds of other countries that may have the wish to try their hands again in their military strategies.

I can say very clearly, I for one, would give every right to the Palestinian people, but the right to attack us. This is the only right that we shall not hand over to anybody. (Applause). The Jordan River, holy and important to all of us, will be the line where no foreign army will be permitted to cross it and reach the heart of our narrow land and create a menace in the gates of Jerusalem. (Applause). We shall not support the creation of a Palestinian state and a Palestinian army that may be equipped with Russian weapons and assisted with Russian experts.

We think the best solution, and on that again I believe most of us are united, to solve the Palestinian people, and we respect the Palestinian people and we wish them well --

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our enemies are neither a people nor a religion, the only enemy we have is war and belligerency -- and we feel the best solution is to enable the solution of the Palestinian problem within a Jordanian/Palestinian framework. (applause) since most of the Jordanians are anyway Palestinians, and since all of the Palestinians, without exception, on the West Bank are Jordanian citizens, and Jordan is their legitimate government. (Applause)

But then we have clear "yeses". First on the line, we tell to our Arab neighbors the way to solve the problem is by peaceful negotiation. There is no military but a political solution to the conflict; and we call for negotiations. We shall surely say "yes" to any renunciation of violence and terror passing or continued, on a small scale or a large scale.

We shall not censor the minds of the Arabs, but we shall not permit anybody to come

with a stone or a knife or a bomb in his pocket. We shall stop violence, so violence will not stop us, to maintain a policy of peace. (Applause.) Better (?) do it peacefully. We want to disarm the conflict, to demilitarize places of controversy. And we recognize, as we have stated already in the Camp David agreement, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements, and we are serious on that. (Applause.)

We are ready to negotiate, and I want to say a word about the way to negotiations. My dear friends, to be very open, I am very much in doubt if, under the present climate, we can reach an agreement. It's too loaded with suspicion. It is too full of hatred. It is too agitated by very militant forces. So we have to change the climate. The way to change the climate is by the introduction of negotiations. When we shall start to negotiate, we may discover there are more options for peace and solution than we think to get today.

We would like to negotiate directly with the Arabs. We can understand that the one Arab country with whom we would like to start the negotiations, and to change the climate, is Jordan. The Jordanians say, we cannot come in without having an international opening, for Arab reasons, not for Israeli reasons. We do not need the international conference, but we need the Jordanians. And if we can have a conference that will not impose a solution, that will not dictate the negotiations, that will not veto the agreements, we are ready to consider it and not to postpone it. Whoever has criticisms about it, and I can understand why, whoever is skeptical about it, and again I can see the reasons for it, must think about the major issue -- what are the alternatives?

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We intend to lead the region in peace. We are strong to do so, we are ready to do so. We do not want to harm, to insult, anybody else, but to keep Israel Jewish and the Middle East peaceful. We are ready -- this is another yes, if necessary, to enter into interim agreement so to allow for time to pacify wounds which today are so painful, on so many places on the bodies, of all the parties concerned.

We are ready to compromise even, if the Arabs will compromise. We are ready to recognize their wishes, not just as individuals, but also as a people, but they have to recognize that, when it comes to the security of Israel, they must meet us halfway. We would like to dream together about a Middle East that doesn't spend

so much money on arms, that has a common market, that has open frontiers, that is ready to compete economically, not militarily, and to see who can be best in the campuses, in the research institutions, in industry and agriculture, and not on the battlefield. We know that we can win the wars, but we are looking for the greatest of the victory, and that is not to fight with arms, but to compete in freedom, so to advance the whole of the people in the Middle East.

(Applause.)

Now, let me say, for all of us, we have to ask ourselves, how would we like to view the Middle East, or ourselves in the Middle East? Israel, as I have said, is strong, and in many ways prosperous.

I, as an Israeli, wouldn't like to see our country just as an island of success in a sea of poverty. It is so Jewish and so becoming to see the whole region being developed differently, not to see children in countries neighboring us suffering from poverty and want and fear. We surely share the Arab fear, so (?) fundamentalism will not win the day.

Fundamentalism is a danger, not only to the Arab and the Muslim countries, but for every enlightened person, for every enlightened nation. We would see -- like to see the Arabs winning a different future, and not being thrown in the fanaticism, in the narrowness, in the darkness that the Khomeini-like system is trying to introduce in the midst of our life.

We would like to see our countries, all of us, watered, green. We would like to see the greening of the Middle East. We would like

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to see all children enjoying the new offers of modern education and science, and to cooperate as so many other nations do.

In the past we used to give examples from Europe. We would like, so we used to say, to see the Middle East becoming a sort of a Scandinavia -- a Scandinavian relationship among us. But today let's have a look, it is not just Scandinavia, the same has happened to Taiwan, to Korea, to Singapore. A small island like Taiwan has today a surplus of \$70 billion which they have gained by their industry and devotion. Why not the Middle East? And we would like, in the years to come, to become really what we are longing for such a long time -- not just a fighting nation, but a contributing nation; to contribute as much as we can, not out of choice, but because this is our choice.

May I tell you that what you and us -- for the United States of America is the largest democracy, and Israel is a small democracy; you are larger in size, but we're equal in spirit. What we did is so great

and so promising, and so unbelievable, and so unprecedented. Let's not stop dreaming. Let's not stop believing. Let's not bend to the skepticism which fills, on so many occasions, days of our life. It is vision and hope and devotion that led us to this point. Let's thank heaven for what we have achieved to compensate for the suffering of our fathers and forefathers, for the cost of holocaust and wars. Let's thank heaven that we can return to our land and heritage, to our language and values. And while thanking, let's also pray together for security of our people, for the friendship with the great democracies, for peace for all children, Jewish and Arabs, Moslem and Christians, and we shall contribute(?) together in a great way.

Thank you. (applause)

END

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Senator Humphrey,

It is some time since I received your letter of April 26 addressed to Ambassador Moshe Arad, and redirected to me. At the time I had only recently returned from an official visit to the United States, and since then we have been preoccupied with the continuation of the Peace Process, with our security problems and, happily, also with our Anniversary celebrations.

Moreover, your request was being carefully studied and considered.

We are of course familiar with the projects for which you requested our assistance, and greatly appreciate the efforts that you and your colleagues are making on their behalf. I wish we could respond positively to your request.

Regrettably this is not possible. As you know, we have made extraordinary efforts to strengthen our economy; to stop and reduce the inflation. In fact, one of the principal reasons for creating a Government of National Unity was this great economic challenge. It was obvious that we would have to introduce tough measures and that we would demand economic sacrifices from our people. Therefore it was felt that the two major political parties should work together and seek the cooperation of the Histadrut Trade Union in order to present a united front.

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The Hon. Senator
Gordon J. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington DC 20510

The effort can be regarded as successful. You know that we have managed to bring down the inflation, and there are encouraging signs of improvement in our economy.

One of the key factors in producing these results is the agreement between the two parties to introduce severe budget cuts in all departments. We have not deviated from that decision in the administration of our health services, because if we depart from the general rule the whole system of economic constraints could break down.

I am sure you will understand, dear Senator, that, in the circumstances, we are unable to assist the institutions to which you referred in your letter.

Please accept my appreciation and good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

שגדירות ישראל / ווישינגטון

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סוווג בטחוני – אלוני

לחייבות מידי

18.5.88 ז"ה חאליך/ז"ה

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המשר

אל: מצפיה, מעית, הסברה

דע: לשכת רוחים

מזה: עתובות

להלן דברי הברכה שנאמרו עיי ממרוחה ים ושהי' בעת ארוותה הצהרים שנערכה לכבודו

בבית השגריר.

עתובות

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PERES TOAST: AMBASSADOR ARAD'S RESIDENCE: MAY 16, 1986:

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Senators, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for coming - something which has shown us that your friendship for the State of Israel and for the cause of peace. I know some people are complaining about the division that exists in Israel. But at least on one issue we are united. And that is on our appreciation and thankfulness for the United States of America. We know that there are many in America who are divided on some issues but we are so happy that only on the State of Israel that there is a union between the parties, the administration, the President, the Secretary, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the people of the United States; for us it is also of such great importance.

Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, played an immense important role on all three domains which are very important to Israel, their strategic strengths of the country, the economic health of it supported by the Defense Department, supported by the two parties - the Senate and the House. And they're very demanding given the circumstances, given the trying time of the budgetary consideration and we are very grateful for it. Now on two we succeeded with the great cooperation and on the economic recovery. Now we have to succeed on the fare of achieving peace. There is no reason to hide that the way of peace is flooded with a lot of difficulties accepting peace. But it is not with all the difficulties but the way that should bring our momentum forward. I always remember that the wise Frenchman was approached by a friend of his and he says, "Sir, life is so difficult." And the French philosopher was there replied, "Compared to what?" May I say that peace is so difficult. May I say compared to what. The other alternative will be more complicated. May I say that without the US initiative without the very strong support of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, the Secretary, the Senate..., the Middle East today might have been torn because not only is this a conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, but in the Arab world, there is a conflict between a fundamentalism which may destroy the future of Arabs and the structure of peace which may bring promise to the young generation of children. I know that we can achieve a perfect pessimism in our life and an imperfect optimism in our life as far as I'm concerned. I prefer the imperfection of optimism to the perfection of pessimism and I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war.

On the background of my country, of my people, for the ? to understand friendship, support, from this most unusual experiment of human ? to reassemble the treaty and to go back to the ??? will go back to their heritage and demonstrate in the eyes of the rest of the world that freedom is strength and friendship is influence and a country like America is unprecedented in history in freedom and democracy can demonstrate success and can influence hope to all. Please join me.

סינטס מב Rak

דפוס מתיוזד 1

סלוג בטחוני שמור

דוחי פותח מיידי

18.5.88 ז"נ תאריך/ז"נ

מס' מברך

464

המשרד

אל: מיפוי
מת: עלות

אבו-גיהאד - ווינטהאָד
לשלכם 502

לשאלתנו את משרד דוברו **הסנאט** במחמ"ד אם נוכל לקבל טקסט של דבריו של וויטהאד בטובניש בעניינו כי הם יכולים למסור לנו רק את הטקסט כפי שהופיע בדוחות הסוכנויות. הטקסט שנשלח לנו (רוייטר) כולל את האמירה -

The US very much regretted this incident and found it a reprehensible action on the part of Israel."

לשאליה חאם הוא מASHIM ישירות את ישראל השיב -

We've not heard denials, so we can only assume

וְאֶל

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