

# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

435

11 / 4606 / 11  
4606

מסר רוקה

יוסף מפיני

אורקה

18/5/88 - 27/5/88

מחלקה



שם תיק: היתוך המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה ביטוי: 4606/11-א

מזהה פריט: R0003404

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-7 תאריך הדפסה: 10/08/2020

תיק מס'

11

תיק מס'



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

## טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות\*

חטיבה מס': 43.5  
מיכל מס': 4606/11  
תאריך התעודה: 23.5.1982  
שם מחבר התעודה: \_\_\_\_\_  
שם הנמען: \_\_\_\_\_  
סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

- מכתב ☒  
מברק ☐  
תזכיר או מיזכר ☐  
דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון ☐  
פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה ☐

\*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;  
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

27.5- 2 2770 8 1011  
JRP

We would be particularly appreciative if the Prime Ministry could be supportive of the action that the United States Government has taken with respect to Panama.

A detailed exposition of U. S. Government positions and background are provided in the attached papers.

-- Our objective since the start of this crisis has been to support the restoration of constitutional government and to put the democratization process back on track.

-- This objective requires that Noriega get out of power and out of Panama.

-- We are dealing with an individual who has sought to turn his institution into a uniformed crime syndicate and to reduce his nation's sovereignty into its shield.

-- We have negotiated repeatedly and patiently these hard-to-achieve results, but Noriega's behavior has made clear that he is not, as of today, willing to accept them.

-- His duplicity, corruption, and stalling have forced us to reconsider our options.

-- It should be clear to all concerned that we remain committed to the terms of and our obligations under the Panama Treaties of 1977.

-- For the sake of Panama and the hemisphere as a whole, we hope you will do everything you can to help Panama achieve early release from Noriega's venal hold on power. We seek your thoughts and advice on how to move ahead.



The major elements of the arrangement we had hoped to conclude were as follows:

- General Noriega was to announce his intention to retire from the PDR on August 12, 1988. He was to announce in a speech and press conference his plans regarding several additional matters:
  - A. A call for the National Assembly to change immediately the law governing the Panama Defense Forces to set a five-year limit to the term of any PDF Commander. (It is in this context that he was to announce his intention to retire on August 12, 1988, the date on which he is to complete five years as PDF Commander.)
  - B. A call for the National Assembly to act immediately to restore full civil and political liberties, including freedom of assembly and freedom of the press and a full amnesty for all persons accused of political offenses.
  - C. A call for all exiles to return home to Panama.
  - D. A call for the formation of a broadly based government of national reconciliation.
  - E. His intention to attend to personal affairs in the coming period rather than to involve himself in politics. He was to state that after his retirement, he intended to wrap up some personal matters in Panama and then to travel abroad until after Panama's May 1989 elections.
- To encourage the transition to democracy and to underline our support for the process, the U.S. was prepared to take the following steps:
  - A. The White House was to make an early announcement of the lifting of IEEPA sanctions on financial flows to Panama (the restrictions imposed earlier as a result of actions taken by President Delvalle were to remain in place until after the formation of the new government).
  - B. Following the lifting of IEEPA and Noriega's subsequent announcement, we would state publicly that we had no objection to other parties, e.g., other governments, banks, businesses, making deposits in the National Bank of Panama in order to quickly reestablish liquidity in Panama's banking system.

- C. Once General Noriega had retired from the PDF, the President would have instructed the Justice Department not to oppose motions to dismiss the two indictments against him which his attorneys have already filed.
- D. Finally, once these minimal conditions had been met, the U.S. would launch an activist program of support for economic recovery in Panama. In addition to restoring bilateral assistance, we would pull out the stops trying to enlist the international lending institutions, friendly foreign governments and the private sector in support of this economic recovery program. We would consult with the congress about additional economic support as well.
- E. We would continue to recognize President Delvalle as the constitutional president of Panama. We would continue to recognize him while a government of national reconciliation was to be formed, with support of all political forces in Panama, to begin the task of a true transition to democracy and civilian rule.

#### A. Evolution of Panama Situation

- On February 5, federal grand juries charged several persons, among them General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Commander of the Panama Defense Forces, with drug trafficking and money laundering.
- On February 25, Panama's President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, ordered Noriega replaced.
- In the early hours of February 26, the National Legislative Assembly, acting in only ten minutes under pressure from Noriega, took measures they claimed impeached President Delvalle. At 3:30 a.m., Manuel Solis Palma was sworn in to replace him.
- President Delvalle concluded that the so-called "impeachment" violated the letter of Panama's constitution and the spirit of democracy. He refused to go quietly into exile.
- On March 1, Delvalle issued a proclamation giving notice that all obligations owing to Panama should be made directly to his government and not to the Noriega regime.
- Panama's Ambassador to the United States began actions in U.S. courts to freeze Panamanian government accounts in behalf of President Delvalle's government.
- From the first day, the United States responded positively to the decisions of Panama's legitimate authorities to seek a return to decency.
- On February 26, a White House statement condemned "all efforts to remove President Delvalle from office."
- On March 1, the United States decertified Panama for lack of cooperation on drug interdiction.
- On March 11, responding to a formal request from Delvalle, the U.S. government announced Canal treaty obligations would be paid into an escrow account belonging to the legal government of Panama.
- The days and weeks that followed became a standoff.
- Despite widespread pressure for his resignation, including an extended general strike of three weeks' duration and an internal attempt to restore the integrity of the defense forces, Noriega dug in defiantly.
- On April 8, the United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to restrict cash transactions with Panama.



-- Intensive negotiations with Noriega and his representatives began in Panama on April 18 and continued until May 25.

B. Background on Negotiations:

-- Through one channel or another we have been negotiating with Noriega for six months.

-- In October 1987, former Noriega confidant Jose Blandon was authorized by Noriega to initiate talks with the political opposition, to which we were a party as observers. In early December, as a political solution began to take shape and as they reached a point of entering into firm commitments, Noriega backed off.

-- In late December, DOD Assistant Secretary Armitage visited Panama at Noriega's request to review the question of a resolution of the political crisis. Again Noriega proved unwilling to commit himself to any effort which would resolve the country's political crisis.

-- The lack of a willingness and commitment to deal with the basic issues needed to find a political solution to the crisis revealed unscrupulousness and bad faith on Noriega's part.

-- Other important efforts have been made to seek a resolution. An effort led by former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez attempted to develop a deal with Noriega for a March departure. The evidence is that Noriega never intended to leave and was playing for time to relieve pressures on his regime.

-- The President's decision during this latest negotiation that, once Noriega had resigned from power, the United States would not oppose his attorney's motion to dismiss the current indictments against him, underscored our willingness to seek agreement even at domestic political cost.

-- We started with forbearance and good faith, avoiding propaganda and seeking a dignified solution. Economic pressure became an indispensable complement to these intensive diplomatic efforts only after months of direct and indirect confidential talks last year failed.

-- Blame for damage to the Panamanian economy must be laid at Noriega's feet. In defying President Delvalle's legitimate order that he step down, Noriega placed his personal welfare over that of the country as a whole. He must accept responsibility for the consequences of what was in effect a coup d'etat.

-- The economy has been hurt. We do not, however, believe the damage to the Panamanian economy is irreversible. But it will not recover while Noriega remains.

-- Panamanians deserve our high admiration; they have not yielded to the regime's intimidation, but their freedoms have been curtailed as the regime has repressed its critics and sought to prevent strikes and popular demonstrations. They deserve relief.



Following is text of statement as given by Secretary Shultz on May 26:

The President has authorized me to recall United States negotiator Michael Kozak to the United States.

At the final moment in negotiations, Noriega would not carry through with the arrangements his representatives had negotiated. No further negotiations are contemplated. All proposals addressed during these negotiations have been withdrawn. No offers remain on the table.

Noriega imposes a heavy burden on the people of Panama. The burden is political -- repression of the freedom to speak, to assemble, to choose leadership and direction. The burden is economic -- fewer jobs, less pay, inability to benefit from a relationship with the economy of the United States. The burden is moral -- isolation in the hemisphere, as the corruption of the drug trade is rejected.

Noriega had a chance to lift these burdens as a result of reasonable terms worked out with the United States. Having authorized others to say he agreed to resign and leave, he has not been able to say so himself. He has put his own interests above those of the people of Panama.

The United States will continue to work for an opening to democracy to Panama and for the conditions that will lead to economic development. We will continue our all-out war on drugs, and we will continue to work with the people of Panama and democratic forces throughout the hemisphere to get Noriega out of power and out of Panama.

Feb. 11

1000 ft. 0.12

1000 ft. 0.12

1000 ft. 0.12

1000 ft. 0.12

1000 ft. 0.12

We would be particularly appreciative if the Prime Ministry could be supportive of the action that the United States Government has taken with respect to Panama.

A detailed exposition of U. S. Government positions and background are provided in the attached papers.

-- Our objective since the start of this crisis has been to support the restoration of constitutional government and to put the democratization process back on track.

-- This objective requires that Noriega get out of power and out of Panama.

-- We are dealing with an individual who has sought to turn his institution into a uniformed crime syndicate and to reduce his nation's sovereignty into its shield.

-- We have negotiated repeatedly and patiently these hard-to-achieve results, but Noriega's behavior has made clear that he is not, as of today, willing to accept them.

-- His duplicity, corruption, and stalling have forced us to reconsider our options.

-- It should be clear to all concerned that we remain committed to the terms of and our obligations under the Panama Treaties of 1977.

-- For the sake of Panama and the hemisphere as a whole, we hope you will do everything you can to help Panama achieve early release from Noriega's venal hold on power. We seek your thoughts and advice on how to move ahead.

The major elements of the arrangement we had hoped to conclude were as follows:

- General Noriega was to announce his intention to retire from the PDR on August 12, 1988. He was to announce in a speech and press conference his plans regarding several additional matters:
  - A. A call for the National Assembly to change immediately the law governing the Panama Defense Forces to set a five-year limit to the term of any PDF Commander. (It is in this context that he was to announce his intention to retire on August 12, 1988, the date on which he is to complete five years as PDF Commander.)
  - B. A call for the National Assembly to act immediately to restore full civil and political liberties, including freedom of assembly and freedom of the press and a full amnesty for all persons accused of political offenses.
  - C. A call for all exiles to return home to Panama.
  - D. A call for the formation of a broadly based government of national reconciliation.
  - E. His intention to attend to personal affairs in the coming period rather than to involve himself in politics. He was to state that after his retirement, he intended to wrap up some personal matters in Panama and then to travel abroad until after Panama's May 1989 elections.
- To encourage the transition to democracy and to underline our support for the process, the U.S. was prepared to take the following steps:
  - A. The White House was to make an early announcement of the lifting of IEEPA sanctions on financial flows to Panama (the restrictions imposed earlier as a result of actions taken by President Delvalle were to remain in place until after the formation of the new government).
  - B. Following the lifting of IEEPA and Noriega's subsequent announcement, we would state publicly that we had no objection to other parties, e.g., other governments, banks, businesses, making deposits in the National Bank of Panama in order to quickly reestablish liquidity in Panama's banking system.



- C. Once General Noriega had retired from the PDF, the President would have instructed the Justice Department not to oppose motions to dismiss the two indictments against him which his attorneys have already filed.
- D. Finally, once these minimal conditions had been met, the U.S. would launch an activist program of support for economic recovery in Panama. In addition to restoring bilateral assistance, we would pull out the stops trying to enlist the international lending institutions, friendly foreign governments and the private sector in support of this economic recovery program. We would consult with the congress about additional economic support as well.
- E. We would continue to recognize President Delvalle as the constitutional president of Panama. We would continue to recognize him while a government of national reconciliation was to be formed, with support of all political forces in Panama, to begin the task of a true transition to democracy and civilian rule.

#### A. Evolution of Panama Situation

- On February 5, federal grand juries charged several persons, among them General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Commander of the Panama Defense Forces, with drug trafficking and money laundering.
- On February 25, Panama's President, Eric Arturo Delvalle, ordered Noriega replaced.
- In the early hours of February 26, the National Legislative Assembly, acting in only ten minutes under pressure from Noriega, took measures they claimed impeached President Delvalle. At 3:30 a.m., Manuel Solis Palma was sworn in to replace him.
- President Delvalle concluded that the so-called "impeachment" violated the letter of Panama's constitution and the spirit of democracy. He refused to go quietly into exile.
- On March 1, Delvalle issued a proclamation giving notice that all obligations owing to Panama should be made directly to his government and not to the Noriega regime.
- Panama's Ambassador to the United States began actions in U.S. courts to freeze Panamanian government accounts in behalf of President Delvalle's government.
- From the first day, the United States responded positively to the decisions of Panama's legitimate authorities to seek a return to decency.
- On February 26, a White House statement condemned "all efforts to remove President Delvalle from office."
- On March 1, the United States decertified Panama for lack of cooperation on drug interdiction.
- On March 11, responding to a formal request from Delvalle, the U.S. government announced Canal treaty obligations would be paid into an escrow account belonging to the legal government of Panama.
- The days and weeks that followed became a standoff.
- Despite widespread pressure for his resignation, including an extended general strike of three weeks' duration and an internal attempt to restore the integrity of the defense forces, Noriega dug in defiantly.
- On April 8, the United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to restrict cash transactions with Panama.



-- Intensive negotiations with Noriega and his representatives began in Panama on April 18 and continued until May 25.

#### B. Background on Negotiations:

-- Through one channel or another we have been negotiating with Noriega for six months.

-- In October 1987, former Noriega confidant Jose Blandon was authorized by Noriega to initiate talks with the political opposition, to which we were a party as observers. In early December, as a political solution began to take shape and as they reached a point of entering into firm commitments, Noriega backed off.

-- In late December, DOD Assistant Secretary Armitage visited Panama at Noriega's request to review the question of a resolution of the political crisis. Again Noriega proved unwilling to commit himself to any effort which would resolve the country's political crisis.

-- The lack of a willingness and commitment to deal with the basic issues needed to find a political solution to the crisis revealed unscrupulousness and bad faith on Noriega's part.

-- Other important efforts have been made to seek a resolution. An effort led by former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez attempted to develop a deal with Noriega for a March departure. The evidence is that Noriega never intended to leave and was playing for time to relieve pressures on his regime.

-- The President's decision during this latest negotiation that, once Noriega had resigned from power, the United States would not oppose his attorney's motion to dismiss the current indictments against him, underscored our willingness to seek agreement even at domestic political cost.

-- We started with forbearance and good faith, avoiding propaganda and seeking a dignified solution. Economic pressure became an indispensable complement to these intensive diplomatic efforts only after months of direct and indirect confidential talks last year failed.

-- Blame for damage to the Panamanian economy must be laid at Noriega's feet. In defying President Delvalle's legitimate order that he step down, Noriega placed his personal welfare over that of the country as a whole. He must accept responsibility for the consequences of what was in effect a coup d'etat.

-- The economy has been hurt. We do not, however, believe the damage to the Panamanian economy is irreversible. But it will not recover while Noriega remains.

-- Panamanians deserve our high admiration; they have not yielded to the regime's intimidation, but their freedoms have been curtailed as the regime has repressed its critics and sought to prevent strikes and popular demonstrations. They deserve relief.

Following is text of statement as given by Secretary Shultz on May 26:

The President has authorized me to recall United States negotiator Michael Kozak to the United States.

At the final moment in negotiations, Noriega would not carry through with the arrangements his representatives had negotiated. No further negotiations are contemplated. All proposals addressed during these negotiations have been withdrawn. No offers remain on the table.

Noriega imposes a heavy burden on the people of Panama. The burden is political -- repression of the freedom to speak, to assemble, to choose leadership and direction. The burden is economic -- fewer jobs, less pay, inability to benefit from a relationship with the economy of the United States. The burden is moral -- isolation in the hemisphere, as the corruption of the drug trade is rejected.

Noriega had a chance to lift these burdens as a result of reasonable terms worked out with the United States. Having authorized others to say he agreed to resign and leave, he has not been able to say so himself. He has put his own interests above those of the people of Panama.

The United States will continue to work for an opening to democracy to Panama and for the conditions that will lead to economic development. We will continue our all-out war on drugs, and we will continue to work with the people of Panama and democratic forces throughout the hemisphere to get Noriega out of power and out of Panama.



ה'תשנ"ב - 3/1/81

~~ה'תשנ"ב~~  
1/81



ע. גרנציי ק"א

(להתכתבות פנימית במשרדי הממשלה)

מזכר

אלו	אברהם וצבי, א"ל ליהמ	התאריך	א"ל (א"ל)
מאת	א"ל ב"ר, א"ל, א"ל, א"ל	תיק מס	
הנדון:			

רצ"ה העניין א"ל ה' קאליקריס, בקשתו

אליהו ז"ל יצק א"ל, א"ל הסכמה

א"ל

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

12

אל: המשרד

657

1/3

✓

אל : מנהל הטברה

1. ראהנא מברק ה"אמריקן פרינדס סרביס קומיני" (קויקרים) שנשלח לרוה"מ, שה"ח, שרה"ב ולשגריר ארד.

2. מבקשים לדעת אם נוסחה ונשלחה תשובה ועל ידי מי .

3. אני מציע שתהיה תשובה אחת מהשגרירות .

4. אנא הצעת נוסח .

מחנה  
אשר נעים

12

סיה 2  
אנא 3  
אנא 1  
בירן 1  
אנא 2  
אנא 1  
הסגן 2

ט ו ס ט  
ד...3...ד...  
סווג בטחוני ג.ל.ט.ל.ס.  
דחיסות  
תאריך וז"ח. 14:00. 26.5.88.

לימים חתום מס' מברק

213 657 2/3  
RCV: 011M/1.00005 Line: 1

MEMISRAEL WSH

WU INFOMASTER 1-018055A140 05/19/88  
ICS IPMWGWD WSH  
ZCIC 02011 05-19 0720P EST  
TLX 892337 MEMISRAEL WSH  
BT

1-017457A140 05/19/88  
ICS IPMRYNN AND  
04451 RENO NV 05-19 0345P PDT RYNN  
ICS IPMWGWS

1-167836G140 05/19/88  
ICS IPMIHA 1188  
1188 F M RCA 13 1640  
PMS WASHINGTON DC  
WUB3029 RMN3549 QAG3181 FFG89090W 247559AFSCUR  
URIX CO UR88 337  
PHILA., PA. 337/303 13 1552  
MOSHE ARAD  
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
3514 INTERNATIONAL DR, NW WASHINGTON, DC20008  
ISRAELI DEPORTATION POLICY  
TO: YITSHAK SHAMIR  
YITZHAK RABIN  
MOSHE ARAD, AMBASSADOR TO UNITED STATES  
CC: GEORGE SCHULTZ

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S  
CONTINUED USE OF DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS AS A MEANS FOR  
SUPPRESSING OPPOSITION TO MILITARY OCCUPATION ON THE WEST BANK AND  
IN THE GAZA STRIP. WE CALL UPON THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO RESCIND  
IMMEDIATELY ALL PENDING DEPORTATION ORDERS, TO CEASE ITS POLICY OF  
DEPORTATION AND TO CONFORM TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS  
CONCERNING MILITARY OCCUPATION.



657- 3/3

THE DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS AND ACTIVISTS BY THE ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES VIOLATES BOTH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION (ARTICLE 49) AND INFLECTS EXTREME HARDSHIP ON BOTH DEPORTEE AND FAMILY LEFT BEHIND. DEPORTATION IS CLEARLY A FORM OF INTIMIDATION AND PUNISHMENT, INTENDED TO MAKE EXAMPLES TO OTHER PALESTINIANS WHO MIGHT OPPOSE MILITARY OCCUPATION. THE MOST RECENT DEPORTATION ORDER, THAT AGAINST MUBARRAK AWAD, FOUNDER OF

THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NONVIOLENCE, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY FORM OF OPPOSITION TO ITS OCCUPATION, PEACEFUL OR OTHERWISE.

WE BELIEVE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS CAN LIVE SIDE-BY-SIDE AND AT PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. WE SUPPORT BOTH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT FOR ALL TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. THE AFSC DEPLORES AND ANGUISHES OVER THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE THAT HAS CAUSED SUCH DEEP SUFFERING AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS ALIKE. THIS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WILL NOT BE BROKEN BY AN "IRON-FIST" REPRESSION OF OPPOSITION. THE END TO VIOLENCE CAN ONLY COME THROUGH A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. TRAGICALLY, THE DEPORTATION POLICY OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS SERVED ONLY TO REMOVE POTENTIAL PARTNERS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION.

ASIA BENNETT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

COL 3514 DC20008 49)

NNN

1724 EST

1754 EST

NNNN

1930 EST

MEMISRAEL WSH

Time: 14:56 05/19/88 ???

Connect Time : 467 seconds

END

ר י צ מ      ט פ י ט

דף 8 מתוך 21 דפים

סיוג בטחוני חרדי

דחיפות 5227

תאריך / ז"ח 26.16.70

מס' מברק

672

1/2

777

ה'תשנ"ב : 58

ע"ב : סמך 5555

לשכת מנכל מדינת

הנדרש : שיחה עם נד וולקר, (25.5).

הנ"ל מחליטו של וילקוקס, כסגן עוזר מזכיר באגף מז"ת הממונה על ישראל ושכנותיה, ערך ביקור בימוסין בזמנו בשגרירות ומאחר שבאותה עת הייתי בארץ, הלכתי להציג עצמי בפניו. חרף העובדה שפגשתי במספר ארועים.

להלן תמצית הנקודות העיקריות מהשיחה :

בקשר לבריה"מ ולתהליך, אשר שניסו לקבל כוסח ההתבטאות הסובייטית במדריד הן מהסובייטים והן מהאינטרנציונל ונאמר להם שאין בנמצא כוסח כתוב. הדברים, אמר, כאילו לא נאמרו מעולם. אין הם מצפים לדיון מקיף בענין המצ"ת בפסגה וסביבתה, <sup>א</sup>אם יועלה ע"י הסובייטים הם מוכנים לו והרי יהיה שם אחד המעורבים הגדולים בענין, המזכיר עצמו ולידו יהיה רוס מה - NSC. לדעתו של וולקר אין צורך כל התפתחות דרמטית מצד הסובייטים כי הסובייטים יהיו בפני ועידה של המפלגה ( ? ) שמהקיימת כשבוועידים לאחר הפסגה ואיש לא יעז לעשות צעד בפני ועידה כזו מה גם שגורבצ'וב עצמו יעמוד במבחן בוועידה זו.

בקשר לתהליך, אמר שלדעתו כל מטרת המזכיר הוא שלא ירוצח חלל נפש וכי מעל לכך נסיונו של וולקר במז"ת אינו מאפשר לו להיות יותר אופטימי. אם יושג דבר-מה הרי שישמח להיות מופתע.  
מכל מקום הדעה היא שהם מתכוונים להשאיר גם בעזרת הביקור תשתיות כרווך להמשך הפעולה.  
הוא מסכים שמצבה של ירון בענין הוא "ירוד" ולכן אין להניח שהמלך ירצה לסכן עצמו לכניסה ללא שוהפים. בעבר היו עליות וירידות במעמדה של ירון בישי"ע אלמאג האמצעי הלא איתנה  
9/10-100 ק.

ביוזמתו, העלה ענין אע"ב ואמר שהוא מוטרד מאד מהפעלתנות המצרית. הוא אמר שהמצרים תרצו לו זאת באומן שלא סכנע אותו. ציידתי לו ההתקלות עם המזכיר השלישי המצרי בסמינר על הצלב האדום (על כך דיווחתי במכתב) ואמר שאכן קשה לתרץ עמדת המצרים, גם לא ברצונם להתקבל חזרה אליהם.

$u \dots 1/2 \dots 4 \quad 1 \quad 2 \quad 1 \quad 1 \quad 3 \quad -136 -3 \quad 2$   
 juk p<sub>2</sub> 2nd 50nd 1032 juk 1012 102 100 100 100 100





ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בסיווגי

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

672 2/2

גם הוא וגם הירש שהשתתף בשיחה (וגם אהירן שפגשתי בנפרד) לא היו נכבדים (בלשון המעטה)  
 שזה שדר' ביילין התייחס לשליחות אהירן כאילו נעשתה מאחורי גבו של משה"ח ושבו וצוינו  
 שחלק מפגישותיו נערכו ע"י משה"ח. אמרתי שבדאי היתה כאן אי-הבנה או שיכחה ואין הדבר  
 מכורן. הירש הוסיף שגם העובדה שהפגישה עם שיפטר אצל מרפי, שהיתה אמורה להיות חסויה,  
 פורסמה בתקשורת על ידינו היה עדוף שלא תתפרסם כלל.

נד וולקר התייחס כביטול לידיעה שפורסמה בר' פוסט על ש"פ וישראל סיני בנושא הטילים  
 ואמר שהמבוע מוכר לו ואינו מהימן עליו. הוא אמר שכל הענין החל בשמועות כחוגים  
 כלכליים אמריקנים בסעודיה שאין לו על מה להתבסס.

מתני

1

2

3





1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/2

673

141

ד. אהירן הדגיש כוונתם לא לטפל עמנו על כל מקרה בודד אלא רצונם לדון עמנו על תפסות  
 ( Perceptions ) או גישות ( Patterns ) או איטרפרטציה לא-נכונה בשטח של  
 מדיניות שנקבעה. מסרתי לו שעליהם גם להקפיד ולוודא שהתלונות המוגשות אכן יש להם יסוד  
 וציינתי כדוגמה את העלילה על שפיכת המים הרוחמים על ילדה שקרוביה ייחסו אותה בזדון  
 על חיילי צה"ל.

מתני

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק גלוי

אל: השגריר, וושינגטון

דף 1 מחוד 5 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: שטור

דחיפות: מדידי

תאריך וזמן רישום: 1034  
מס. מברק: 1034

לשימוש  
מח'  
הקשר

רצ"ב תשובות רה"מ למכתבי הסנטור פל וקורטה קינג,  
בענין מובראכ עוואד. *אנא הצהיר אלוה איצניק. האלקי קדש.*  
(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב)

אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ

*שם החג לא חתן ג'בא איאוי לצעיר סיבא ג'בא*

השולח: *אוריאל* אישור מנהל המחלקה *אוריאל* אישור לשכת המנכ"ל:  
תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא עיי השולח)

(לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)



9/5

1034 71

ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Mrs. King,

Thank you for your telegram of May 10 regarding the case of Mubarak Awad.

As you know, your late husband is greatly admired and revered in Israel. We see in him one of the great apostles of freedom, justice and peace; a great moral leader in the Judeo-Christian tradition whose message is as compelling as it is universal. We know you have been dedicating your life to keeping this message alive.

That is why I was deeply distressed by your telegram on behalf of Mubarak Awad. Mr. Awad is not a man of peace. Side by side with protestations of non-violence he has asserted repeatedly and consistently, in public speeches and in writing, that he supports the aims of the PLO. Those aims are explicit and clear: the destruction of the State of Israel. After establishing his Center for the Study of Non-violence in Jerusalem he wrote in the Journal of Palestine Studies that the tactic of non-violence does not "constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle" - a standard PLO euphemism for terrorism. During the riots here, he has participated in the preparation and distribution of leaflets that incite the population to acts of violence not only against Israelis but against Arabs serving in civil service posts. In a recent interview he said, "our activities complement those of the PLO".

Obviously, Mr. Awad does not intend non-violence to replace violence but to abet it. And I cannot help but feel that his description of himself as a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King is not only an Orwellian inversion of language but a gross insult to the memory of your great husband.


/2.

Mrs. Coretta Scott King  
The Martin Luther King Federal Holiday Commission  
449 Auburn Ave. N.E.  
ATLANTA GA 30812

Mr. Awad is an American citizen and a visitor to this country whose visa has expired. Every country reserves the right to determine who will enter its borders, and no country allows visitors to participate in political activity, even when it is harmless. Many Arab-Americans who come here as visitors stay after their visas expire. We do not exercise our right to expel them as long as they do not act against the State. In Mr. Awad's case we are convinced his presence poses a danger to the country's security and to the safety of its inhabitants.

Mr. Awad is neither an Israeli citizen nor a permanent resident. He could have been summarily deported. Instead, he has been granted the right of appeal. His case is now before the Israel Supreme Court, whose independence and impartiality are unimpeachable. We shall be bound by its decision.

Sincerely,

  
Yitzhak Shamir



4/5 1034 J

ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Senator Pell,

Thank you for your message regarding Mubarak Awad, which was relayed to me by Ambassador Pickering.

I deeply appreciate your concern for Israel's public image. It is a concern we all share, and I know your message is that of a friend and supporter. But I find your calling Mubarak Awad a 'pacifist' rather puzzling. Mr. Awad is not a man of peace. Side by side with protestations of non-violence he has asserted repeatedly and consistently, in public speeches and in writing, that he supports the aims of the PLO. Those aims are explicit and clear: the destruction of the State of Israel. After establishing his Center for the Study of Non-violence in Jerusalem he wrote in the Journal of Palestine Studies that the tactic of non-violence does not "constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle" - a standard PLO euphemism for terrorism. During the riots here, he has participated in the preparation and distribution of leaflets that incite the population to acts of violence not only against Israelis but against Arabs serving in civil service posts. In a recent interview he said, "our activities complement those of the PLO".

Obviously, Mr. Awad does not intend non-violence to replace violence but to abet it. And I cannot help but feel that his description of himself as a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King is not only an Orwellian inversion of language but a gross insult to the memory of those great leaders.

/2.

The Hon. Senator Claiborne Pell  
Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate  
Washington DC

Mr. Awad is an American citizen and a visitor to this country whose visa has expired. Every country reserves the right to determine who will enter its borders, and no country allows visitors to participate in political activity, even when it is harmless. Many Arab-Americans who come here as visitors stay after their visas expire. We do not exercise our right to expel them as long as they do not act against the State. In Mr. Awad's case we are convinced his presence poses a danger to the country's security and to the safety of its inhabitants.

Mr. Awad is neither an Israeli citizen nor a permanent resident. He could have been summarily deported. Instead, he has been granted the right of appeal. His case is now before the Israel Supreme Court, whose independence and impartiality are unimpeachable. We shall be bound by its decision.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir





שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

17

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיד

תאריך/ז"ח 251600 מאי 88

מס' מברק

619

אל : ממכל מצפ"א

דוקים.

להלן מפגישה עם מזלין אולברייט יועצת המועמד לעניני חוץ.

א. התענינה בשיחות ממראה"מ והממשל וכן בנושא יחסינו עם ברה"מ, לאחר שקראה המאמר היום בו וושינגטון פוטט.

ב. סיפרה שבשל הלחץ של ג'יסי ג'קסון הם שוקלים לדרוש שארה"ב תפעל להכריז על דרא"פ כמדינה טרוריסטית. אמרה גם ששמעה שאחת הסיבות שמנעו את ארה"ב לעשות זאת עד כה הם יחסי ישראל-דרא"פ.

ג. חזרה על מה שכבר ידוע לנו שדוקים לא מתכוון לסטות מעמדותיו הידועות בנושא מז"ח וכי הם מקוים ש"עמדותינו לא יובנו שלא כהלכה".

ערן

סדרה 2  
2 3 1 1 3 2  
ג'אן 1  
ג'אן 2  
ג'אן 3  
ג'אן 4  
ג'אן 5

MAY.25 '88 09:18 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL HOUSTON

P.03

21

## CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

ONE GREENWAY PLAZA EAST, SUITE 722

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77045-0196



קונסוליה כללית של ישראל

היוסטון, טקסס

PHONE: (713) 627-3780

היוסטון	
34	גר
25.5.88	תאריך
17	שעה

אל: י-ם  
מאת: יוסטוןאל: מצפ"א  
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א  
הסברה  
מאת: הקונסול, יוסטון

החלטות אנטי ישראליות בועידות מחוזיות של המפלגה הדמוקרטית באזורנו

1. מקורות בקהילה היהודית באלבוקרקי ניו מקסיקו מסרו לנו על נסיונות להעברת החלטות אנטי ישראליות בועידות אזוריות של המפלגה הדמוקרטית בניו מקסיקו.

הנסיונות נעשים ביוזמתם של חוגים ממוצא ערבי במדינה. להערכת המקורות הנ"ל יש להחלטות סיכוי סביר להתקבל תודות לקואליציה אפשרית של גורמים כושים היספנים רדיקליים ואנטישמיים לבנים בועידות הנ"ל.

גורמים בקהילה שהם גם בעלי משקל במפלגה הדמוקרטית מנסים להגיע לגוסחת פשרה עם החוגים הפרו ערבים שתעקור את הנימה האנטי ישראלית מן ההחלטות (אם כי עצם הדיאלוג עם גורמים אלה הוא מדאיג לכשעצמו).

2. התופעה דלעיל אופיינית גם למדינות נוספות באזורנו (ראה מברקנו 5 מ-11/4).

3. כדאי לעקב ולראות אם קיימים נסיונות להעברת החלטות אנטי ישראליות בועידות המפלגה הדמוקרטית בחלקים אחרים של ארצות הברית.

יש לזכור כי החלטות הועידות האזוריות מועברות לועידות המדינתיות ומוצגות, כעמדת הועידה המדינתית, בועידה הארצית.

בן שמואל

2 1 1 2 3 3 2  
סג"ח סג"ח סג"ח סג"ח סג"ח סג"ח סג"ח  
248 248 248 248 248 248 248

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ר פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג במחוני סודי

המשרד + בטחון

505 609

תאריך: 25.5.88 11:00

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: מקט"ח - משהב"ט

קונגרס: סטלינגרס למפרץ  
למבוקנו 88 מה- 6.4

להלן מתוך שיחה עם עוזרר של הסנטור דה-קונסיני:

סוף סוף המועצה לבטחון לאומי מסרה שני הדוחות כמתחייב בהתאם לחוק (החלטת ההמשך)  
- הראשון על הפצת טילים מדגם סטינגר בידי מדינות המפרץ, והשני על בקשת בחריין לקבל  
סטלינגרס, שני הדוחות מסווגים סודי ולכן נבצר מהעוזר למסור על התוכן אך הגדירם  
כ- **HOARSESHIT** (כדבריו) ובלתי רציניים. כתוצאה מכך דה-קונסיני נוטה להתמיד בהתנגדותו  
לאספקת סטלינגרס לכל מדינות המפרץ - ואף דאג לכך שלא יוכנסו שינויים או חריגים  
לחוק במסגרת הדיונים בסנט ואף בבית הנבחרים בהצעות לחוק כספי הפנטגון ולחוק תקציב  
הפנטגון (עד כה בבית הנבחרים בלבד) **1989**

למדן

שנה 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3  
שנה 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3  
14143



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סווג בטחון שמור

דחיות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 0900 25 מאי 88

מס' מברק

606

המשרד

ל: מצפ"א - מאו"ר

מאת: דני בלור, וושינגטון

משלחת פעילי בחירות

מתארגנת משלחת נוספת של פעילי בחירות משתי המפלגות. כל ההוצאות על חשבון המארגנים. (בראשות דיויד איבשיין). כל האחריות לתכנית היא, ללא יוצא מן הכלל, בידי המשרד. התאריך האפשרי היחידי מבחינתם הוא לאחר ועידות המפלגות ולפני פתיחת מערכת הבחירות הכלליות. הגעה לאו"ם ב-26/8 ויציאה ב-1/9. שלד התכנית כמו בקבוצות הקודמות. אני מציע לשריין טנטיבית 20 חדרים במלון המלך דוד. (זהו הגבול המכסימלי של משתתפים ומלווים).

בין האנשים שכבר הודיעו על נכונותם להשתתף מן הצד הדמוקרטי - בוב בקל, תום דונלדסון וביל דיילי ומן הצד הרפובליקני אד רולינסט, דיויד קין ובוב קיטט (מידעיו הפרלויטיים של ג'ים ביוקר). בשלב זה נראה כי ההרכב יהיה המרשים ביותר שכל המשלחות. אבל, כמובן, בשל המערכת הפוליטית כאן יהיו בוודאי שינויים בהרכב עד הרגע האחרון.

בנוסף למקובל בסיורים אלה בעבר, אני מציע להוסיף ביקור במטות בחירות של המפלגות בארץ, ובמקום הפגישות השגרתיות עם רוח"מ וממ' רוח"מ, אולי להצטרף לסיור בחירות של כל אחד מהם ולקיים את השיחה במהלך הסיור או בסיומו.

אנא, אשרו עקרונית, את המועד המוצע.

  
דני בלור

סהר רבד גנל גלגל אביסל גללל  
2 3 3 1 1 2 1



## טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך דפים  
סוג בטחוני: שמור  
דחיפות: מידי  
תאריך וז"ח: 25.5.88 16:30  
מס' מברק:

אל: המשרד + בטחון

557 633

אל: מצפ"א  
דע: מקש"ח - משהב"ט

שיחת השגריר עם הסנטור וורנר (24.5)

1. במסגרת שיחותיו השוטפות בגבעה נפגש השגריר אחמול עם הסנטור ג'ון וורנר (רפובליקאי מווירג'יניה, בכיר המיעוט בועדה לשירותים מזוינים).

2. השגריר עדכן את הסנטור על תהליך השלום תוך מסירת פרטים על העמדה הסובייטית כפי שהיא עולה מנייר ששג' ברה"מ העביר בשבוע שעבר לידי השר. וורנר גילה עניין וכן ידידות רבה - העיר שהוא רוכש אהדה רבה "לעמד" בשלב הנוכחי של המאבק (קרי, לנוכח האירועים בשטחים). הצביע על כך שלא חתם על אף מכתב ששוגר בחודשיים האחרונים (הווה אומר, מכתב 30 הסנטורים ומכתבם של עשרת הסנטורים השמרנים) - וזאת בגלל שאינו סבור שיש לתת עצות שאיש לא ביקש ("FREE ADVICE"). לדעתו הנוגעים בדבר בשטח - המ - יכולים לפתור את בעיותיהם.

3. הועלו שני נושאים מבצעיים:

א. הסנטור בכתבה שהתפרסמה ב"וושפוסט" ביום ב' (23.5) כאילו ישבאלים עזרו לסינים לפתח את מנגנון ההנחיה של טילי ה"איסט-וינד" שנמשכן לידי הסעודים. השגריר הצביע על ההכחשה שהתפרסמה אצל "אחמול בעמוד פנימי של העיתון. וורנר טען שאין די בכך, כי איש אינו שם לב לידיעה קטנה זו שנבלעה בתוך העיתון, אל לנו להסתפק בהכחשה קצרה ועלינו לצאת בהסבר מלא ומנומק אם ברצוננו לנטרל את הכתבה המקורית שיש בה כדי להזיק לנו קשות במספר מישורים. השגריר הסכים והבטיח להעביר דעתו של וורנר לנוגעים בדבר בארץ.

ב. תיקון ברי. הח"מ הצביע על תיקון ממאיר זה והציע שוורנר יתן גיבוי למאמצים לרכז אותו אם יתברר שניתן לחזור לנושא במסגרת הקונפרנס על חוק כספי הפנטגון. וורנר הביע נכונות והציע שנבהיר את העניין עם עוזריו. (הערה: מבירור ראשוני היום נראה שהסיכויים של דיון חוזר בנושא (בקונפרנס) קלושים אך נמשיך לחפש דרך לטפל בבעיה).

למדי  
2 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 4  
2-21-  
4 14145 4

17

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מחוד דפיםסוג בטחוני גלוידחופות מיידתאריך/ז"ח 25.5.88מס' מברק

604

1/3

המשרד


אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח, לשכת השר

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

המשלחת הקונסולרית

להלן ספורו של גלן פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ב"וושינגטון פוסט".

  
 וס/ו  
 יוסי גל

2 1 1 3 3 2  
 2 1 1 3 3 2  
 2 1 1 3 3 2  
 2 1 1 3 3 2



# Israelis To Visit Moscow

## *Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides*

By Glenn Frankel  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

Peres, on the other hand, has cautiously welcomed Moscow's new interest in the region and has accepted the proposal for an international peace conference in which the Soviet Union presumably could play a major role.

While in Washington last week, Peres met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dubinin and said afterward

See ISRAEL, A27, Col. 1

2/3

2/3

604

3/3

3/3

604

## Soviet Union Approves Visit By Israeli Consular Officials

ISRAEL, From A21

that he was "encouraged" by what the Soviet diplomat said. But Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of Shamir's office, in a radio interview yesterday, accused Peres of "constant theatrics" in portraying Moscow as shifting toward a more favorable policy toward Israel. Ben-Aharon insisted there had been no change in Soviet policy favoring the Arab states.

Behind the scenes, officials say, each of the two leaders separately is seeking through intermediaries to persuade the Soviets to invite him to visit Moscow this year.

For Peres, the more dovish of the two, the trip might give a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Shamir's side has told the Soviets they would accomplish more by meeting with the man who polls suggest is most likely to be prime minister after the November elections.

Earlier this month Peres visited Hungary, the first time an Israeli foreign minister has gone to an East Bloc country other than Romania in 21 years.

A Soviet consular delegation arrived here last July, the first official Soviet diplomatic group to visit Israel since Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, except Romania, severed ties after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Israeli officials then said they expected to send a reciprocal delegation to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets delayed for several months, contending that the Israelis had no citizens or state-owned property and therefore no consular interests in the Soviet Union.

Officials here said that when the Soviets sought to renew visas for their consular delegation in February, they were given four-month extensions but were warned that the visas would not be reissued unless an Israeli consular mission was approved.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol said Tarasov had told Novick that the visas would indeed be issued and that "within the next few days" a date would be set for the delegation's travel.

Other officials said Novick had been cautioned that the mission would be allowed to deal only with consular issues. The warning left open the question of how much involvement the diplomats would be allowed to have in the other major issue—besides Middle East peace—that stands between Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet refusal to allow Jews to emigrate freely.

Israeli leaders recently approved a policy that would deny Israeli visas to Soviet Jews who do not plan to settle here. Israel has initiated negotiations with Moscow to fly Soviet Jews directly to Tel Aviv via Bucharest, rather than allowing them to go to Vienna. Israeli leaders hope this would reduce the high dropout rate of Soviet Jews who stay in the West rather than going to Israel.

The Soviets have indicated a willingness to consider direct flights. But many Soviet emigres living in Israel object strongly to the decision to deny Israeli visas to potential "dropouts." All Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union should be aided by Israel regardless of their likely destinations, these Soviet Jewish leaders have argued.





ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך דפים

סוג מסמך

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2/4

631

באותה מידה, הוסיפה הסורים לא יכנסו עמו לדואלוג, אם כי הודתה שאין לה בטחון באשר למהלכי דמשק. (ב) מימוש תהליך הבחירות נראה לה כאופציה ריאלית יותר. אין לה ספק שהסורים אכן ימקדו עצמם בכך. אמנם לפי שעה שורר קפאון באשר לתהליך ובעיקר באשר למועמד, אך תוך חודש, להערכתה, משהו יתחיל לזוז. לעובדה שרשימת המועמדים ההולכת וגדלה אין משמעות שכן העובדה היא שאין מועמד טבעי. יצאה בשצף קצף בגד מישל עון מפקד הצבא באשר למדיניות שנוקט הצבא בהתרחשויות מאז רצח כראמה. לא חסכה ביקורת גם מדני שמעון שהודה בפניה, ע"פ דבריה, שהוא לא מאמין שלמועמדותו ישנו סיכוי כלשהו. לשאלתי מי נותר אם כן השיבה שהיתה רוצה לראות מועמד מסוגו של פרנג'יה אך אין לכך סיכוי בגלל מצב בריאותו. לכל אחד מן המועמדים ישנו אותו סיכוי (קלוש) אף כי מוקדם מדי לקבוע מסמרות. בסופו של דבר עשוי להתברר שיוצא מועמד של פשרה, הגם שפיראן רב.

3. לשאלתי בדבר השפעת המאבק הנוכחי בבירות עם החזבאללה, השיבה שהשורה התחתונה היא שסוריה לא תכנס בכח לפרבריס הדרומים של בירות ושתזוז הצבא הסורי היתה למנוע השתלטות החזבאללה על נקודת המפתח באזור המוזיאון. הסיבות לאי שמוש סורי בכח נובעת לדעתה מסיבה מיידית ושתי עקרונות (א) העיתוי הנוכחי גרוע. אסד לא ירפיע בפסגה באלג'יר כשידיו מגואלות בדם. (ב) העלות הרבה בכ"א, הסורים גם יצטרכו לרכך את ההתנגדות ע"י הרעשת האזור (ג) משבר ביחסי החוץ שלה. לאיראן אין תחליף לא רק כלכלי (נפט) אלא בעיקר פוליטי. אסד לא יצור חלל ריק בהנתקת מאיראן מבלי שתהיה לו אלטרנטיבה פוליטית שתאזן את הכוחות ותאפשר לסוריה להמשיך להיות צלע חשובה במקבילית הכוחות במחנה הערבי.

הסורים נעבים בפרשת החזבאללה בפני שתי בעיות מרכזיות (א) המעורבות האיראנית זו מוגדרת ע"י גלספי כ - PAIN IN THE NECK עבור סוריה. השמועות שאיראן מפוצה בדבר מתן מעמד לה בכל הסדר, לרבות סורים משותפים להוצאתו לפועל שכל הסדר מדיני בדרום ביירות, הם לצנינים בעיני דמשק וככל שנמשכות גורמות לסוריה אבדן תדמית על שכביכול נאלצת לשרותיו של גורם שלישי (זר) להכנסת סדר בסוגיה. ההתרוצצות של השליחים האיראנים שיין אלאסלאם ובשראף ממחישות נחישות איראן לקבלת דריסת רגל בהסדר על אף העובדה שעד עתה הם העלו חוס בחתם. (ב) מניעת מתן גושפנקא מדינית להישגי החזבאללה בשטח. הסורים ע"פ גלספי בדה שאסור שהישגים אלה יתרגמו למעשים פוליטיים כגון ע"י הפיכת החזבאללה לצד בהסכם כלשהו.



ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

3/4

631

דרך מחשבה זו מבזאה את הסורים לכך שיש לנתב את ההסדר לאפיק הצד של ההיבט הבטחוני של המצב בפרברים. ההתאפקות חסורית מוסברת גם בסלח הרבה שיש להם ע"מ להשיג זאת, אם כי אין בטחון בכך לנוכח העובדה שבינתים החזבאללה יצרה עובדות בשטח. המפוכחות הסורית לדעתה מכוונת להגיע למצב בו יגיעו להסדר בטחוני ברמה של החזרת הסדר הציבורי, מתן ערבויות לאוכלוסיה וכד' שיתבסס על נסיגה מסוימת של החזבאללה ובאותה מידה תאפשר הכנסה מוסכמת של כוחות סורים שיפקחו על ההסדר. הסורים גם מספיק מפוכחים של לתבוע החזרת הסטטוס קוו דוגמאת דרישת אמ"ל שכן הדבר פשוט לא מעשי. החזבאללה מנגד מבקשים ליצור זיקה בין בירות לדרום. הם מוכנים ככל שידוע לה להסגה מסוימת של כוחות אך תמורת החזרת הסטטוס קוו *Uj* באזור צידון טרם השתלטות כוחות אמ"ל שם. הסורים מתנגדים לכך או לכל זיקה בין שני האזורים. אמ"ל לדעתה לא מהווה גורם בעל חשפעה על סוריה השוקלת את המצב ע"פ איטרסיה היא. לשאלתי כיצד מתייחסת לראיון שהעניק פד'אללה השיבה בביקורת חלקית על הודעת דובר מחמ"ד שדיבר על הלה בחיוב. "זה היה משגה ממדרגה ראשונה של זריזות חול בעיניים". הדובר נפל בפח ללא ידיעת העובדות בשטח. לשאלה איזה משקל בסוגיה יש לנושא בני הערובה השיבה שישנה הפרזה בהצגתה. ראשית ארה"ב לא העלתה הנושא עם הסורים ולא קשרה זאת למשבר בבירות, אף שעמדתה ידועה לכל הגורמים. שנית, לסוגיה יהיה משקל קטן במערכת השיקולים הסורים לשימוש בכח צבאי.

4. ירדן. רואה את התבטאויותיו האחרונות של חסין במסגרת אכזבתו מארה"ב. טענתו המרכזית כלפי האמריקאים היא שלא עשו מספיק ע"מ שעמדתו של מט' רה"מ ושה"ח פרס תתקבל בישראל, נאומיו משקפים הדאגה שבהעדר תהליך לשלום עליו להיות מובא בנושא אש"פ, סוריה וכד'. עם זאת הוא לא שינה עמדותיו הבסיסיות באשר לשקידתו על טיפוח תהליך כזה והוא מוגדר על ידי כ - **FAVORABLE** לעצם הנושא ונאמן למה שהוסכם על ידו. מודאגת מנושא הפסגה הערבית באלג'יר. המבחן באשר לכיווניה תלוי בהסבה בשאלת השתתפות מצרים. היא עצמה אינה אופטימית כלל, אך תוצאות הוויכוח והמאמצים לצרפה יקבעו לאן הרוח נושבת. הסכנה היא שטריות הדלתות נוסח ח'רטום עשויה לחזור על עצמה. האמריקאים חזרו והבהירו בפני הגורמים הערבים מחויבותם לתהליך של שלום ושמבחינתם הנושא "חי מאד", אך ללא כל אשליות, המפתח יהיה בידי שלושת הגורמים נפרדים. (א) סוריה. השאלה היא האם תכונן קואליציה רדיקלית עד כדי חסימת הדרך בפני התקדמות כלשהי בטווח המידוי, מתן דרור ליצר ההרס שלה ע"מ להתייצב בעמדת מנהיגות או שמא תתגבר על יצר זה מתוך שיקול דעת במישור היחסים עם ארה"ב שהיא אינה מסגירה עניינה בהם.

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 4 מתוך דפים

סווג בסיווג

דחופות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

4/4

631

(ב) עיראק. לא ברור איזה משקל יהווה צדאס חסין בפסגה. האם יהיה זה במישור המפרצי בלבד או שטא יחלץ לסיידע לחוטיידן. זאת מתוך הנחה שסעודיה, שלדעתה תיוצג ע"י עבדאללה, והמפרציות לא יצאו מחפירת המגן שלהם ככל שמדובר במהלך השלום ובודאי לא מול הרכב הכולל את סוריה אש"פ ואלג'יריה.

(ג) אלג'יריה. לבן ג'ייד כמארח ובעל משקל סגולי בעולם הערבי תהיה השפעה לא קטנה באשר ללוגיסטיקה, דהיינו בכל הקשור לפרוצדורה על פי תתנהל הפסגה ובאשר לאסט' לפיה יציב עצמו באשר לתכנן הפסגה. גלספי מעניקה לאלג'יריה אשראי רב באשר לניהול הדיונים, אך שאלת המפתח באשר לעמדות שתנקוט נשארת פתוחה.

אלי אבידן

k/c





12

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 251600 מאי

מס' מברק

אל : המשרד

620

אל : מנהל מצפ"א

סגן הנשיא בוש.

אחמול (24.5) ערכו סגן הנשיא בוש ורעייתו קייפ למועדון הנשיאים לרגל שנת ה-40 למדינת ישראל. נכחו השגריר והח"מ.

בדבריו הקצרים ציין בוש את התנגדותו למדינה פלשתינאית ולכפיית פתרון על ישראל. כמו-כן ציין את שייפ האסטרטגי בין שתי המדינות ומבצע חלוץ יהודי אתיופיה.

1311  
ערן

סה"כ 2  
הבדל 3  
גנא 3  
ג/גנא 1  
בין גנא 2  
גנא 1

23.



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מתוך 1 דפיםסוג בטחוני שמורדחיפות מיידתאריך/ז"ח 25.5.88מס' מברק

624

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: עחונות

צלצל ידיד בעל מעמד בקהילה לספר כי בעחונות הגדולה (וושינגטון פוסט, ניו-יורק טיימס והלוס-אנג'לס הרלד אקזמינר) מתכוונים לפרסם טעויות על מתח בין הקהילה היהודית ומערכת הבחירות של דוקקיס. חלק מן המתח נובע מהאשמות גורמים במחנה דוקקיס כאילו איפאק וגורמים בכירים במחנה היהודי התגייסו לסייע לבוש במערכת הבחירות. ככל הידוע לו לא נכנסת ישראל כגורם ישיר בספורים העתידיים.

י/ס גל

2 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 2  
הסדרה גל א.כ.א. גלסון דין א.א.א. א.א.א. א.א.א. א.א.א.  
הסדרה

שמו

דצא

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

הוצא: 5,17824

אל: דוש/803

מ-: המשרד, תא: 250588, זח: 1738, דח: ד, טג: שג

תח: ג: משרדים

נד: ג

שמו/דח

אומן

קבוצת רונלד יאנג

לשלן 461, טעין 4.

א. במועד הראשון - יוני בן-אהרון לא יהיה בארץ.

ב. במועד השני - אלי רובינשטיין מוכן לפגוש את הקבוצה  
ביום ג' 14.6 ב-1200 במשרד.

אנא אשר.

לשכת מנכ"ל דה"מ

א.ש.צ.

תפ: שהח, דהח, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, בירן, מצמא, כנסיות, מזכיר הממשלה



ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

מיידי דחופות

תאריך/ז"ח 25.5.88

מס' מברק

1/2

526 610

המשרד, בטחון

אל: מנהל מע"ת, מצפ"א  
דע: יועץ רות"מ לתקשורת  
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת  
מאת: עתונות

נסיעת המזכיר

להלן רשימת הכתבים הנלווים למזכיר המדינה בנסיעתו הקרובה למז"ת.

יוסי גל

2 שיה 3 רחל 3 גטס 3 ג'אנס 2 ביץ 2 ג'נס 1 סנר 1 אביסל 1 גס

2/2

610 -P'

526 -67

LIST OF PRESS TRAVELING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ:  
MAY 25, 1988:

ABC	Jack McWethy
AP	Barry Schweid
CBS	Wyatt Andrews
CNN	Ralph Begleiter
Hearst	John Wallach
LA Times	Norm Kempster
Mutual BR	Jim Slade
NBC	John Cochran
NY Post	Eli Tyber
NYT	Robert Pear
Reuters	Tony Barber
Time	Ricardo Chaviro
UPI	Bob MacKay
VDA	Roger Wilkison
USIA	Russ Dipsig
WP	John Goshko

\*

17

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מתוך דפיםסוג בטחוני גלוידחופות מיידיתאריך/ז"ח 25.5.88מס' מברק

604

1/3

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח, לשכת השר

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

המשלחת הקונסולרית

להלן ספורו של גלן פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ב"וושינגטון פוסט".

  
 יוסי גל

2 1 1 3 3 2  
 2 3 1 1 3 2  
 2 3 1 1 3 2  
 2 3 1 1 3 2



# Israelis To Visit Moscow

## *Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides*

By Glenn Frankel  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

Peres, on the other hand, has cautiously welcomed Moscow's new interest in the region and has accepted the proposal for an international peace conference in which the Soviet Union presumably could play a major role.

While in Washington last week, Peres met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dubinin and said afterward

See ISRAEL, A27, Col. 1

2/3  
2/3  
604

3/3

3/3

604

## Soviet Union Approves Visit By Israeli Consular Officials

ISRAEL, From A21

that he was "encouraged" by what the Soviet diplomat said. But Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of Shamir's office, in a radio interview yesterday, accused Peres of "constant theatrics" in portraying Moscow as shifting toward a more favorable policy toward Israel. Ben-Aharon insisted there had been no change in Soviet policy favoring the Arab states.

Behind the scenes, officials say, each of the two leaders separately is seeking through intermediaries to persuade the Soviets to invite him to visit Moscow this year.

For Peres, the more dovish of the two, the trip might give a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Shamir's side has told the Soviets they would accomplish more by meeting with the man who polls suggest is most likely to be prime minister after the November elections.

Earlier this month Peres visited Hungary, the first time an Israeli foreign minister has gone to an East Bloc country other than Romania in 21 years.

A Soviet consular delegation arrived here last July, the first official Soviet diplomatic group to visit Israel since Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, except Romania, severed ties after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Israeli officials then said they expected to send a reciprocal delegation to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets delayed for several months, contending that the Israelis had no citizens or state-owned property and therefore no consular interests in the Soviet Union.

Officials here said that when the Soviets sought to renew visas for their consular delegation in February, they were given four-month extensions but were warned that the visas would not be reissued unless an Israeli consular mission was approved.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol said Tarasov had told Novick that the visas would indeed be issued and that "within the next few days" a date would be set for the delegation's travel.

Other officials said Novick had been cautioned that the mission would be allowed to deal only with consular issues. The warning left open the question of how much involvement the diplomats would be allowed to have in the other major issue—besides Middle East peace—that stands between Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet refusal to allow Jews to emigrate freely.

Israeli leaders recently approved a policy that would deny Israeli visas to Soviet Jews who do not plan to settle here. Israel has initiated negotiations with Moscow to fly Soviet Jews directly to Tel Aviv via Bucharest, rather than allowing them to go to Vienna. Israeli leaders hope this would reduce the high dropout rate of Soviet Jews who stay in the West rather than going to Israel.

The Soviets have indicated a willingness to consider direct flights. But many Soviet emigres living in Israel object strongly to the decision to deny Israeli visas to potential "dropouts." All Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union should be aided by Israel regardless of their likely destinations, these Soviet Jewish leaders have argued.



77

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט פ ס מ ב ד קדף 1 מתוך דפיםסוג בטחוני גלוידחיפות מיידתאריך/ז"ח 25.5.88מס' מברק

604

1/3

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, לשכת השר

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

המשלחת הקונסולרית

להלן ספורו של גלן פרנקל היום (25.5.88) ב"וושינגטון פוסט".


 ו'ס'ל  
 יוסי גל

2 1 4 1 3 3 2  
 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032  
 2 1 2 1 2 1 2





# Israelis To Visit Moscow

## *Soviets Allow Trip By Consular Aides*

By Glenn Frankel

Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, May 24—Israel's Foreign Ministry announced tonight that the Soviet Union has agreed to allow the first official Israeli consular delegation in 21 years to visit Moscow following next week's U.S.-Soviet summit conference.

The move was seen here as a signal of Soviet flexibility near the eve of the meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, and as a small political gift to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

It was disclosed to his political adviser, Nimrod Novick, by Vladimir Tarasov, assistant director of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East department, at a meeting in Geneva yesterday, Israeli officials said.

Reflecting divisions in Israel over policy toward the Soviets, the move was announced by Peres' Foreign Ministry and hailed by a senior ministry official as "another step in the direction of understanding and flexibility," while the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir said it had no immediate comment.

Shamir is Peres' chief political rival within Israel's fractious coalition government and has sounded pessimistic warnings about Gorbachev's publicly stated desire to play a new role in the Middle East peace process.

Peres, on the other hand, has cautiously welcomed Moscow's new interest in the region and has accepted the proposal for an international peace conference in which the Soviet Union presumably could play a major role.

While in Washington last week, Peres met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dubinin and said afterward

See ISRAEL, A27, Col. 1

2/3  
2/3  
604

3/3

3/3

604

## Soviet Union Approves Visit By Israeli Consular Officials

ISRAEL, From A21

that he was "encouraged" by what the Soviet diplomat said. But Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of Shamir's office, in a radio interview yesterday, accused Peres of "constant theatrics" in portraying Moscow as shifting toward a more favorable policy toward Israel. Ben-Aharon insisted there had been no change in Soviet policy favoring the Arab states.

Behind the scenes, officials say, each of the two leaders separately is seeking through intermediaries to persuade the Soviets to invite him to visit Moscow this year.

For Peres, the more dovish of the two, the trip might give a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Shamir's side has told the Soviets they would accomplish more by meeting with the man who polls suggest is most likely to be prime minister after the November elections.

Earlier this month Peres visited Hungary, the first time an Israeli foreign minister has gone to an East Bloc country other than Romania in 21 years.

A Soviet consular delegation arrived here last July, the first official Soviet diplomatic group to visit Israel since Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies, except Romania, severed ties after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Israeli officials then said they expected to send a reciprocal delegation to the Soviet Union, but the Soviets delayed for several months, contending that the Israelis had no citizens or state-owned property and therefore no consular interests in the Soviet Union.

Officials here said that when the Soviets sought to renew visas for their consular delegation in February, they were given four-month extensions but were warned that the visas would not be reissued unless an Israeli consular mission was approved.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol said Tarasov had told Novick that the visas would indeed be issued and that "within the next few days" a date would be set for the delegation's travel.

Other officials said Novick had been cautioned that the mission would be allowed to deal only with consular issues. The warning left open the question of how much involvement the diplomats would be allowed to have in the other major issue—besides Middle East peace—that stands between Moscow and Jerusalem: Soviet refusal to allow Jews to emigrate freely.

Israeli leaders recently approved a policy that would deny Israeli visas to Soviet Jews who do not plan to settle here. Israel has initiated negotiations with Moscow to fly Soviet Jews directly to Tel Aviv via Bucharest, rather than allowing them to go to Vienna. Israeli leaders hope this would reduce the high dropout rate of Soviet Jews who stay in the West rather than going to Israel.

The Soviets have indicated a willingness to consider direct flights. But many Soviet emigres living in Israel object strongly to the decision to deny Israeli visas to potential "dropouts." All Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union should be aided by Israel regardless of their likely destinations, these Soviet Jewish leaders have argued.



ט ו פ ס מ ב ד ק

דף ו מחוד ו דפים

סוג בטחוני בל מ"ס

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח 18:00 - 24.5.88

מס' מברק

אל : המשרד, בטחון, מש"מ

597 590 69

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מנכ"ל אוצר

מקשי"ח, משחבי"ט

רמשי"ן

בית הנבחרים : סיוע חוץ .

מליאת הבית תקיים מחר (25) הדיון בהקצבות לסיוע.

קצ"ח/הקצל  
פולק

ש"מ 2 ח"מ 3 ג"מ 3 א"מ 1 ח"מ 1 ג"מ 2 א"מ 3

ט ו פ ס מ ב ד ק

דף ו מתוך ו דפים

סוג בטחוני חודש

דחיות חודש

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

587

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

מנכ"ל

התהליך.

מדניס רוס.

הוא יצא למסקנה כמז"תניק היחיד. ינהל שיחותיו הנורמליות במסגרת הקבוצה של דיק סלומון (מנהל התכנון המדיני), אך מניח שיהיו לו שיחות בלתי פורמליות עם אנשי הצוות הסובייטי העוסקים במז"ת.

גם מרוס וגם מדג'ריג'יאן, שרואים שינויים מועטים אם כי לא בלתי חשובים בנוסח שנמסר על-ידי דובינין (דירקובסקי) בהשוואה למה שתסובייטים אמרו במפגש באפריל. רוס הוסיף שהוא מתכוון לשאול הסובייטים במפורש למשמעויות השונות של הנאמר בנייר שנמסר לנו, מתוך בסיון להגיע לרמת הבהרה גבוהה יותר.

לידיעתכם שעד כה לא קיבלו האמריקאים את הדברים שנשא זוטוב במדריד, ומדג'ריג'יאן הבנתי שהסובייטים לא רוצים להת כל נייר שבידיהם שממנו זוטוב קרא נאומו.

ער

2 1 3 1 3 2  
ס'ה ר'ה ס'ה ס'ה ס'ה ס'ה  
א'ר'ה ר'ה ר'ה ר'ה ר'ה  
4 3 2 1 4 1

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

טופס מברק  
דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים  
סוג בטחוני, שמור  
דחיפות: מיידי  
תאריך וז"ח: 10.00: 20 מאי 88  
מס' מברק:

521

אל: המשרד

אל: י. בן אהרן, מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ.  
מאת: מנהלה, ושינגטון.

מלון בועידת הדמוקרטים באטלנטה.

דיברתי עם KENNETH WOLLACH האחראי על נושא בתי המלון  
לועידה שהודיעני שרק בעוד כשבועיים ימים יוכל להודיעני  
שם המלון וכתובתו.  
בכל מקרה הם מזמינים את המלון וההוצאות חלות על האורח.  
לידיעתך וחג שמח.

אב א/נז"ס.

גד/צמח

רה"ג  
3



1/2

529

המשרד

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דוקקיס.

קונגרסמן מל לוין. סטו איזנשטדט ומרטין אינדיק תדרכו ב-17.5 את דוקקיס  
בנושא המזה"ת על-פי בקשתו.  
סטו איזנשטדט דבר על התמונה הפוליטית הפנימית בישראל. דוקקיס נתן להבין כי ישמח  
לעבוד עם כל ממשלה שהיא בישראל והתייחס לאפשרות שאם הליכוד יזכה הוא יוכל, אם  
הוא עצמו יבחר, לקדם את נושא הסדרי הביניים.  
באשר למדינה הפלשתינאית דוקקיס אמר שהוא מרגיש בנוח בעמדתו המשאירה את כל  
האופציות פתוחות והוא אינו רואה כל צורך פוליטי או אתר לשנות עמדתו. הוא חזר  
ואמר שאין כוונתו לכפות פתרון. על אף שנאמר לו שהרוב בישראל דוחה מדינה פלשתינאית  
והוא סוטה באי התנגדותו מעמדת הממשלים שקדמו לממשל הבא הוא סרב לשנות גישתו.  
לא היתה התייחסות בתדרוך לאש"ף. גם בארועים בשטחים לא דובר כמעט.  
על ברה"מ אמר שחשוב מאד לערבה בתהליך ובמיוחד את גורבצ'וב. דוקקיס התעניין  
מאד לגבי מה שקרה בשיחות בין שולץ ושברדנדזה. חזר ואמר שצריך לדבר עם הסובייטים.  
הדגיש שהוא אינו רומנטיקן בנושא הקובייטי וכאשר נאמר לו שצריך לגבות מהם מס  
כניסה לאזור, אמר שהסובייטים מעורבים בו במילא.  
דוקקיס דיבר על חשיבות האו"ם וגם במסגרת הפתרון לסכסוך במזה"ת. הוא ער  
למגבלות ולחוסר הפרודוקטיביות של הארגונים הבינלאומיים אך כדאי לנסות את המסגרת  
הבינלאומית וזאת גם בנושא הגבלת מרוץ החימוש במזה"ת.  
התרשמות אחד המתדרכים היתה שהמדובר באיש הסומך מאד על שיקול דעתו הוא ועל  
האינסטינקטים הפוליטיים שלו. ההתרשמות לגבי המדינה הפלשתינאית היא שהמדובר לא  
בעמדה התומכת בה אלא המשאירה אינטלקטואלית את כל האופציות פתוחות.

2/...  
2 3 1 1 3 3 2

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

529  $\frac{2}{2}$

יצויין שבתדריך היה אמור להשתתף גם קונגרסמן לי המילטון שהחליט לוותר בשל הצבעות שנערכו בעת ובעונה אחת בבית הנבחרים. המילטון מוזכר כאחד המועמדים לתפקיד של מזכיר המדינה במקרה שדוקקיס יבחר.

הערה: משתתפים בתדריך שמסרו לי עליו בקשו שלא לתת פרסום לאמור במברק, על-מנת שלא לפגוע ביכולתם להמשיך ולעמוד בקשר עם המועמד.

  
ערן

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

12

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 0830 19 מאי 88

מס' מברק

435 483

המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה

סמנכ"ל צפ"א

לשכת שהביט

שטחים.

דיק שיפטר התקשר על-מנת להודיע כי יצטרף לביקור המזכיר בארץ וישהה בישראל בין ה-6/6-3. יציגו את ביקורו כמיועד לדווח על הפסגה ועניין יהודי ברה"מ, אך כמובן שירצה לנהל גם שיחות בנושאים שהועלו עמנו לפניו בעת ביקור שהיח והמנכ"ל המדיני.

מב314  
ער

שהיה יהודי גנל גנל ביון גנל  
2 3 1 2

קאפי, 3.3.88, אייבן, ~~משרד~~ (משרד) אייבן

END





2

## MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Committee notes that this year marks the fortieth anniversary of the independence of the state of Israel.

The United States played a key role in the creation of the state of Israel forty years ago. That role implies and requires a commitment to assure the security of the state which America helped bring into existence. That commitment exists today and it will exist into the future.

With that obligation comes a concurrent obligation to help shape events in the Middle East in a way that encourages policies on the part of all peoples in the region which maximize opportunities for justice and minimize the chance for tragedy and conflict.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the recent events that have taken place in the Middle East, including the violence and killing on the West Bank and in Gaza, terrorist attacks in Israel, and continued conflict, death and destruction in Lebanon. The present turmoil in the Middle East is not just a Palestinian problem; it is a Middle Eastern problem that requires the just resolution of questions of human rights and national security.

The United States cannot determine the conduct of Israeli, Palestinian, or Arab individuals, governments or organizations. However, the U.S. has a special obligation, as the principal guarantor of Western values, as the leader of the Western alliance, and as the closest friend of Israel, to work to help shape events in a way that will do three things; maximize justice; help friends; and avoid the unraveling of what stability there is in the Middle East before that unraveling threatens Western interests in that part of the world.

The United States must display a maximum commitment to use all the influence and wisdom it can muster to move Israel and its Arab neighbors to meaningful and well thought out negotiations about both short-term and long-term changes that will assure Israel's security and bring a just and humane approach to resolving the Palestinian plight. Weak action or inaction on our part is no favor to anyone; it is simply a guarantee that all of us will slide into tragedy.

The Committee believes that commitment of the United States to Israel's security and the obligation to continue to provide assistance for that security is inviolate. The Committee also believes that the U.S. has a commitment to American taxpayers to make sure that assistance is provided within the context of American policies which will move the Arab world toward its obligation to recognize the right of Israel to exist within secure borders and to move the Israeli government and its Arab neighbors toward the ne-

cessity to recognize and deal with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Committee believes that it is time for friends to sit down with friends and work to change the status quo which threatens to bear such bitter fruit.

515  
460  
64  
2/8

3

515/460/64  
3/8

## U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON

The Committee notes with dismay that another American was taken hostage in Lebanon earlier this year. This brings the total number of American hostages in Lebanon to nine. The longest held hostage, Terry Anderson, was taken captive more than three years ago.

The most recent kidnapping is especially disturbing. The captive was a United States military colonel serving in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The Committee is deeply concerned that there was an American serving in the UN Truce Supervisory Organization who was vulnerable to abduction.

The Committee believes that this was a very serious and untenable situation and urges the Administration to assure that no military or civilian personnel serve in any multilateral peacekeeping force in Lebanon as long as the violence continues and Americans remain special targets for Lebanese terrorists.

The Committee urges that the Administration explore all reasonable options to locate and release the remaining U.S. hostages held in Lebanon.

The Administration is to keep the Committee informed on what steps are being taken and what progress is being made on the hostage situation.



Fiscal year 1988 level.....	\$3,188,320,000
Fiscal year 1989 request.....	\$3,268,500,000
Committee recommendation.....	\$3,248,500,000

#### ISRAEL

The Committee has earmarked \$1,200,000,000 in economic support funds for Israel, the full Administration request. Because of the importance in following through on Middle East peace agreements and the strategic importance of relations between Israel and the United States, the Committee has recommended that Israel be funded at the FY 1989 request level. The Committee has also recommended that these funds be provided to Israel as a cash grant within thirty days of the signing of the FY 1989 bill or by October 31, 1988, whichever is later.

The Committee has earmarked not less than \$815,000,000 in Economic Support Funds for Egypt. Of this amount \$115 million may be provided as a cash transfer with the understanding that Egypt will undertake significant economic reforms which are in addition to those undertaken in previous fiscal years.

The Committee believes that long-term economic viability in Egypt can best be achieved by fundamental economic reform. The Committee encourages the Egyptian government to undertake a comprehensive reform program, and believes the composition of economic assistance, including the amounts of each transfer, should be designed to help meet requirements generated by implementation of such a comprehensive economic program.

The Committee expects that provision of a cash transfer will only be used in conjunction with significant economic reforms, and will review carefully any reprogramming notifications to ensure that the reform process is moving ahead.

The Committee has also earmarked \$200,000,000 of the \$815,000,000 provided for Egypt for Commodity Import Program assistance. The Committee believes a significant portion of these funds should be used to strengthen the private sector in Egypt.

#### NON-MILITARY EXPORTS

The Committee has included the provision from last year's bill requiring that the President determine, in providing cash transfer assistance to Egypt and Israel, that the level of such assistance does not cause an adverse impact on the total level of non-military exports from the United States to each such country.

#### CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

The Committee has included bill language that indicates that it is the sense of Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Israel and Egypt are based in great measure upon their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.

The Committee is pleased to note the improved relations that have developed between Israel and Egypt over the past year, especially the return of the Egyptian Ambassador to Tel Aviv and the reaching of an agreement on negotiations for resolving the Taba dispute.

The Committee hopes that further progress in the relationship will continue between these two important friends of the United States.

#### earmarking

The Committee has earmarked much of the ESF account as indicated in the following paragraphs. The Committee has taken this action, unlike past years, in the context of providing 99.3 percent of the Administration's total request for ESF and in following through the freeze concept of the bill. With few exceptions the amounts provided to specific countries are identical to the amounts earmarked in last year's bill. The only notable diversions from this

515  
460  
64  
4/8

5

principle are for the countries included in the drug initiative and the West Bank earmarks. In each case, as explained earlier in the report, these earmarks are in conjunction with significant policy initiatives. Finally, the unallocated portion of the funds remaining after all earmarks are taken into consideration is greater than the unallocated amount remaining in FY 1988, thereby giving the Administration more flexibility than they had last year.

515  
462  
04  
5/p

#### OTHER COUNTRY EARMARKS

The Committee has provided earmarks at "not less than" the following amounts for the following countries:

Pakistan.....	\$220,000,000
Philippines.....	124,000,000
Sub-Saharan Africa.....	90,000,000
Honduras.....	85,000,000
Portugal.....	40,000,000
Tunisia.....	10,000,000
Cyprus.....	15,000,000

The Committee has provided earmarks for the following countries at the amount specified:

Costa Rica.....	\$90,000,000
El Salvador.....	185,000,000
Guatemala.....	80,000,000
Morocco.....	20,000,000

#### ISRAELI REFUGEES

The Committee's earmark of \$27,500,000 for the resettlement of Soviet, Eastern European, and other refugees resettling in Israel is in response to the increased number of refugees resettling in Israel.

#### FOREIGN MILITARY SALES DEBT REFORM INTEREST RATE REDUCTIONS

The Committee continues to believe that the approach to FMS debt reform, which provides the greatest benefits to the widest range of military debtors at the least cost to U.S. taxpayers is the "buying down" of interest rates directly. The Congress last year provided an advance appropriation of \$270,000,000 for that purpose subject to a Presidential budget request. Unfortunately, the Administration has chosen to make no request in FY 1989. Consequently,

to avoid budgetary scoring of potentially unused authority in FY 1989, the Committee has provided the same advance appropriation for FY 1990. The Committee strongly urges the Administration to follow this approach to maintaining the financial integrity of the Federal Financing Bank in the future.



6

515  
460  
64  
6/8

## SEPARATE ACCOUNTS

The Committee has again included language requiring separate dollar and local currency accounts for ESF cash transfers. The Committee continues to believe that it is the responsibility of the United States government to be able to ensure that tax dollars spent on foreign assistance can be clearly and easily accounted for. This need for accountability requires careful financial and program controls and the clear separate identification of U.S. funds from transfer to final end use. The Committee feels this strict accountability is necessary in order to ensure that the U.S. government is certain that its foreign assistance funds are being used for their intended purposes.

The Committee is pleased with the consultation with the Administration that has been occurring on this new requirement. The Committee recognizes that this requirement is a major shift in Ex-

ecutive responsibilities within the foreign assistance program and will take some time to be fully implemented.

The Committee is concerned that on occasion ESF cash transfers have been made without full compliance with this provision. This requirement is a financial management responsibility and that no cash transfers should be approved by financial officers until full compliance has been ensured. The Committee is aware that cash transfer-like assistance is being provided under other AID programs. The Committee has expressed its intentions to have AID programs fully auditable with no commingling of funds. The Committee is fully ready if necessary to legislate separate accounts for other programs if Executive actions are not in compliance with its intentions.

The Committee continues to believe that this requirement can be used by AID to encourage foreign governments to improve their central financial management practices for economic decision-making purposes and avoidance of corruption.



7

\$15  
460  
64  
7/8

#### WEST BANK AND GAZA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The Committee has earmarked \$34 million for Jordan under the Economic Support Fund Account. Of this amount, \$11 million is for Jordan and \$23 million is for U.S. support of Jordan's development program for the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, the Committee has earmarked \$7.5 million for United States direct assistance to the West Bank and Gaza through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) under the Asia and Near East Regional program.

The Committee has earmarked this total of \$30.5 million for development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza because it believes that it is important for the United States to help improve the economic and social conditions of the 1.5 million Palestinian people who live in this area. The Committee believes that this assistance expresses the concern of the United States for the Palestinian people and helps support progress toward peace in the region.

Jordanian programs in the West Bank and Gaza will provide financing for infrastructure improvements and social services. They will support development and quality of life activities in the areas of health, water and small road construction. U.S. direct assistance through PVOs in the West Bank and Gaza focuses on the improvement of living conditions and the expansion of employment and income generation activities for Palestinians living in these areas.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the recent events and violence that have taken place in the West Bank and Gaza. The Committee believes that, while these programs can contribute to the well being of the Palestinian people and can contribute towards peace, they cannot be a substitute for progress in the peace process that is crucial for all of the people in the region.

#### GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ASHA GRANTS

The Committee held an extensive hearing on the ASHA program this year and reviewed individual project grants approved over the past several years. It appears that the program has been unduly concentrated geographically. The Committee feels that the ASHA program needs more focus on emerging opportunities in Asia and Latin America. The Committee expects that in providing ASHA grants in FY 1989 additional focus will be given to these areas of the world.

8

515  
460  
64  
8/p

## THIRD PARTY TRANSFER AMENDMENT

The Committee has included a new general provision, Section 577, amending the Arms Export Control Act to close a loophole that now enables the purchaser of American weapons to transfer them to a third country more easily than the U.S. Government itself can make direct sales to the same country. This provision does

this by permitting the Congress to prevent such third-party sales simply by passing a joint resolution, rather than a law as is now required. Under this provision, joint resolutions to disapprove third party sales will receive the same expedited procedures in the Congressional process that resolutions disapproving direct sales now receive. The provision follows:

SEC. 577. Section 3(d)(2)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act is amended by striking out "law" and inserting in lieu thereof "joint resolution, as provided for in Sections 36(b)(2) and 36(b)(3) of this Act."

## MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Committee has amended Section 558, which required that not less than \$500,000 of funds appropriated under the heading "Economic Support Funds" be made available for scholarships for Israeli students studying in Arab countries and not less than \$500,000 be made available for Arab students studying in Israel, by striking the phrases "not less than" and replacing them with "up to" in both cases.

The Committee recognizes the importance of the Middle East Regional Cooperative Program and urges continuing AID support for this program. Of particular importance to the Committee is AID's ability to use the funds appropriated freely, in order to best support those programs that have been proven successes in fostering scientific and social exchange between Israel and Arab countries.

9

515

460

64

9/8

**ISRAEL**

The Committee has earmarked a total FMS program of \$1,800,000,000 in forgiven loans for Israel. The Committee has also recommended \$1,200,000,000 in Economic Support Funds, for a total security assistance program of \$3,000,000,000.

The Committee has included bill language that allows, to the extent requested by the Government of Israel, funds to be used for credits made available for advanced fighter aircraft programs or for other advanced weapon systems. Up to \$150,000,000 in the funds provided to Israel are available for research and development in the United States and not less than \$400,000,000 shall be available for procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense services, including research and development.

**EGYPT**

The Committee has earmarked a total FMS program for Egypt of \$1,300,000,000 in forgiven loans. Under the Economic Support Fund portion of the bill a total of \$815,000,000 has been recommended, bringing the total security assistance program for Egypt to a level of \$2,115,000,000.

**PAKISTAN**

The Committee has earmarked an FMS program of \$240,000,000 in forgiven loans for Pakistan.

**STINGERS IN THE PERSIAN GULF**

The Committee has amended Section 566, which prohibits the Administration from providing in any manner Stinger antiaircraft

missiles to any country other than Bahrain in the Persian Gulf region, by extending the provisions of this section through Fiscal Year 1989.



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ז פ ס מ ב ר קדף 1 מתוך 3 דפיםסווג בטחוני גלוידחיפות מיידיתאריך/ז"ח 19.5.88מס' מברק

1/3

100 448 501

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ח, הסברה

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות

דו"ח תקשורת - 19.5.88 - 13.5כללי

מגוון רחב של נושאים מז"תים העסיק את התקשורת בשבוע שחלף, אם כי מרביתם לא זכו לכותרות בעמודים ראשונים.

"מלחמת הכוכבים" של הג' רייגן בדונלד ריגן והפסגה הקרבה בין ברה"מ לארה"ב, שלווה במאמרי רקע רבים על החיים בארץ הסובייטים בעתונות ובתקשורת האלקטרונית, תפסו את מרבית הענין העתונאי, יחד עם מערכת הבחירות כאן.

הפגוע בקפריסין זכה לכסוי טלוויזיוני ניכר ולכותרות ראשיות בצרוף תמונות במרבית העתונים אך לא עורר ענין רב וירד כעבור יום.

המצב בשטחים ממשיך להעסיק את העתונות, פחות את הטלוויזיה, וזוכה לכמות כמעט קבועה של כסוי, חלקו עדיין בעמודים ראשונים, הנוטה יותר ויותר לעסוק בהחבטות של המרי האזרחי מול הירידה היחסית בארועים אלימים.

ביקור שה"ח פרס עורר התענינות, מאמרי פרשנות בעתונות והודעות קצרות בחדשות הטלוויזיה.

מלחמת המיליציות שהביאה כוחות סורים אל פרברי בירות בנסיון להביא להפסקת אש בין הצדדים, עוררה ענין רב וזכתה לכותרות ראשיות בצרוף תמונות.

מלחמת איראן-עיראק הופיעה בדרך כלל בהקשר של מדיניות ארה"ב במפרץ ולוותה בפרשנויות רבות.

ביקורו העתידי של שולץ במו"ח זכה אף הוא לכמה מאמרי פרשנות.

אתמול התפרסם ספור המשפט שנערך לחולית טרוריסטים הקשורה לסוריה שחצתה לפני כמה חודשים את הגבול מקנדה לארה"ב, דרך וורמונט, ונתפסה כשומרי נפץ בכליה.

2

7-10 + 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000



2/3

213

100 448 501

שני מאמרי אופ.אד. עסקו בטיפול החד-צדדי של המדיה האמריקאית בישראל מאז החלה האינתיפאדה. ראוי לציון מאמרו של אלאן דרשוביץ ("ווישינגטון טיימס", נשלח בנפרד) שהראה את הפער בין האופן בו הובאו לידיעת הצבור האמריקאי נושאים שונים ובין המציאות. הצבור האמריקאי, אליבא דדרשוביץ, מולך שולל ע"י המדיה לא כלכך בעקבות מה שראה, אלא בעיקר בעקבות מה שהוסתר ממנו.

אחרים עסקו ב"פלסטינאים כאינדיאנים של ישראל", מודעות המפנות את תשומת לב הצבור למעורבות האמריקאית בדיכוי העם הפלסטיני, תדרך לשלום ע"פ קייסינג'ר (נשלח בנפרד), ירידה בסטנדרטים המוסריים של ישראל כתוצאה מהכבוש, הסרובניקים בלנינגרד וכן מאמר בזכות חכנית הטרינספר של כהנא, שתוארה כדרך ההומנית האמיתית להפסיק את סבל הפלסטינים הנאנקים תחת עול הכיבוש...

ידיעה אחת בלבד עסקה בהרשעתו של מו"ל קנדי בהפצת דבר שקר ושמועות כזב על שטען כי השואה לא התקיימה. האנטישמיות בשיקגו מתחילה לקבל כסוי בעתוננים.

### ביקור ממרוה"מ ושה"ח

החל בקול דממה תקשורתית וצבר לא מעט ענין כעבור יום-יומיים. במרבית העתוננים זכה פרס לכסוי אישי אוהד ותואר כאדם שפעל רבות לקידום השלום אותו שם בראש מעייניו. למאמרים צורפו תמונות רבות. ארוחת הצהרים בבית השגריר וברכתו האוחדת של שולץ דווחו בתקשורת הכתובה, כולל פירוט שמות המשתתפים, תוך דגש על הצורך בשינוי הסטטוס קוו. ההנחה היא שזה לא ישתנה ללא מעורבות ארה"ב.

הודעת הבית הלבן הרואה בפרס תומך השלום ומזהירה את סרבניו, המתנגדים לשטחים תמורת שלום, כי יצטרכו לתת את הדין לפני עמיהם, פורשה כאן ע"י ה"ווישינגטון פוסט" (ג'ון גושקו) כאזהרה לרוה"מ ותומכיו כי הממשל לא יסוג מתכניתו. גם השיקגו טריביון תאר את רוה"מ כמכשול העיקרי בפני הועידה הבינ"ל. פרס צוטט כמי שמקווה כי נושא הועידה יעלה בפסגה הקרובה. מאמר המערכת היחיד בנושא (CSM) ראה קשיים רבים ניצבים בפני שולץ: חזית סרוב פלסטינאית - לא עוד משלחת ירדן-פלסטינים, והתקשחות הקו של רוה"מ בנושא שטחים תמורת שלום.

נאומו של השר בפני ועידת AIPAC שודר מספר פעמים ברשת C-SPAN. כמו כן הופיע שה"ח בראיון לתכנית מקביל-לר של רשת PBS, בחדשות של CNN וב- Today Show. (טקסטים הועברו בנפרד).

פגישת ביילין-שיפטר דווחה במספר עתוננים תוך הדגשת דאגתו העמוקה של הראשון מפני הפיכתם של ה"חריגים" בשטחים לבנומה, וכי הכאות, השפלות, סגירת עתוננים ומעצרים בלא משפט הפכו לכלל ולא ליוצא ממונו.



3/3  
100 448 501

# המצב בשטחים

עמד בסימן המהומות בעקבות יום-ירושלים (חג ליהודים, אסון לערבים) וסיום צום הרמדן, וקיבל את "מנת הכסוי" הקבועה שלו - כמה ספורים בעמודים ראשונים והרבה דווחים ופרשנות מהנעשה בשטח בעמודים פנימיים.

מאמר האופ.אד. היחיד (NYT) חאר את "מחיר הכיבוש" : התערעורת האידון המוסרי, שיפוטי וערכי של הכובשים, הרס שיטתי של הדמוקרטיה הישראלית.

נראה שלא היה ארוץ, ולו הפעוט ביותר, שהתחולל בשטחים ולא זכה לכיסוי במדיה האמריקאית. לדוגמה: המעצרים המנהליים כנשק נגד הכיבוש (גלן פרנקל), שינוי פני המאבק מאלימות למרי אזרחי, מכוח של תלמידי תיכון לעצורים במחנה מעצר, בעיות מזון, עוצר וכו'.

הודגשה גאוותם של הפלסטינים בהתארגנותם העצמאית ותפקידה המיוחד של האישה בעולם בו גברים כה רבים עצורים. נראה שהבטוי החברתי של ההתקוממות חשוב הרבה יותר מזריקת אבנים. המאמר האוהד היחיד בנושא הוקדש לשמאל הישראלי המודאג מהפיכתה של ישראל לדרום-אפריקה והמנסה להשיב לארץ את "ערכיה הישנים".

עתונים רבים דווחו על ה"משפט המשונה" שערכה ישראל לשני אנשי חזבללה שתקפו את צד"ל ובראיון עם מירון בנכנישתי (WT) צוירה תחזית אפוקליפטית של מלחמה מתחדת בשטחים כתוצאה משגיאות שני הצדדים.

על אף שמרבית המאמרים נושאים אופי דווחי, הביקורת הרבה נשמעת בין השיטין.

בידיעה קצרה, מפי סוכנות רויטר, דווח על השבת תעודת העיתונאי לפרנקל והמשך השעייתה של תעודת פלטשר.

הסקירה הוכנה ע"י אורית גובר.

של  
התאחדות



סורג בטחוני:

טופס מברק

4: תחור:

191000

תז"ח:

(הוצאה לטחון)

א ל : מגיל לשכת השר, מע"ת, מצ"א

נר :

ר צ : יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשחב"ס, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה

0 0525

1167 47

עיתונות, כיו יורק

A6

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1988

# Israelis Say U.S. Praise of Peres May Backfire

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, May 18 — The unusually warm praise of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres by the White House on Tuesday, and the indirect criticism of his chief political rival, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, set off partisan pickering here today. But on at least one point both sides seemed to agree.

Senior officers from the Likud bloc as well as the Labor Party said that while praise from President Reagan might please Mr. Peres now, "it could boomerang in Israeli public opinion," as an official close to the Foreign Minister put it. "Maybe to a lot of peo-

ple it will look like the Americans have him in their pocket," the official added.

A senior Likud ally of Mr. Shamir said: "This is going to backfire. It will help Shamir in the elections."

After Mr. Reagan met with Mr. Peres for half an hour on Tuesday, the White House issued a statement praising him for showing a "positive attitude toward peace," adding that the Foreign Minister was "creative and has the courage and wisdom to say yes when real opportunities arise."

At the same time, the statement denounced "those leaders who are negative, consistently reject new ideas" and "make progress impossible."

2 1 2 1 3 2  
 מה גש אלה בין אלהים גש  
 מה גש אלה בין אלהים גש  
 מה גש אלה בין אלהים גש

איוור:

שם השולח: יפגז חזקיה

19.5.88

תאריך:

2/4

0 0525 / 47

Mr. Peres, the head of the Labor Party, has endorsed Secretary of State George P. Shultz's Middle East peace initiative, while Mr. Shamir, the Likud chief, has tried to deflect it.

Publicly, the Prime Minister's office said, "When the White House refers to foreign leaders with a negative attitude toward peace, they must be referring to Arab leaders who refuse to negotiate with Israel." But behind the scenes, Likud politicians close to the Prime Minister said they knew the statement alluded to Mr. Shamir.

"The Likud Cabinet ministers are enraged," an official said. "It's tantamount to meddling in Israel's interior

problems. And it shows the Foreign Minister using his official visit to Washington to get the American support for him in the political campaign."

Mr. Peres, interviewed from the United States by the Israeli radio, said that "I gratefully appreciate" the White House statement, adding, "It came as a pleasant surprise."

Israel elects a new government in November, and the central campaign issue is almost certain to be what should be done with the occupied territories, where Palestinian protests are in their sixth month.

One Palestinian was killed and nine were wounded today when villagers from the West Bank town of Abwein attacked an army patrol with stones and slingshots and soldiers opened fire, army and hospital officers said. The death brings the total killed to 169.



# Correcting the Record on Israel

It certainly looked as though President Reagan was trying to influence the Israeli election next fall. During Tuesday's White House visit he unstintingly praised Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, whose "positive attitude toward peace" he contrasted with the negativism of other, unnamed world leaders who "consistently reject new ideas."

What the President in fact was tilting toward is the policy that Secretary of State Shultz has lately worked so hard for — an internationally supported peace settlement.

No haruspex is needed to divine that Mr. Reagan had in mind Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Mr. Peres's coalition rival, who has intractably resisted any proposal to exchange land for peace. Some corrective tilt was called for in any case, given Mr. Shamir's behavior after his visit to the United States in March.

He was received with elaborate courtesy at the White House but gave not an inch on the U.S. proposals for negotiations. He met with American Jewish leaders and urged them to silence doubts about Israel's harsh crackdown on the Palestinian uprising in occupied territories. "When unity breaks down," he pleaded, "then our enemies exploit every critical statement to their own end."

*New York Times  
Editorial  
May 19, 1988*

0 0525 / 47

3/4



0.0525) 47

4/4

Returning to Jerusalem, the Prime Minister received a hero's welcome from his supporters, whose placards praised his opposition to any negotiations for any change in the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza. He then assured his country that he had America's full support despite differences on peace moves. "It became clear," he said, "that the stories that American Jews are divided are not true. Except for isolated, irregular voices that do not identify with the majority of the people, all American Jewry stands behind us."

Thus Mr. Shamir magnified White House politesse into a policy endorsement, and having told American Jews to shut up, he translated their silence into a standing ovation. Americans are united in rejecting dogged Palestinian rejection of Israel, but there's no such consensus on Israel's indefinite occupation of the territories.

Besides, given their unusual interconnection, there's no way that the U.S., Israel and American Jews concerned about Israel can stay wholly insulated from each other's politics. Israelis of all parties see nothing wrong with lobbying Congress against arms sales to Arab states. In this instance, by praising Mr. Peres, President Reagan restated a broadly supported American view. Yes, he tilted — toward American policy.



422

VI





: 454

2/2

PERES TOAST: AMBASSADOR ARAD'S RESIDENCE: MAY 16, 1988:

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Senators, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for coming - something which has shown us that your friendship for the State of Israel and for the cause of peace. I know some people are complaining about the division that exists in Israel. But at least on one issue we are united. And that is on our appreciation and thankfulness for the United States of America. We know that there are many in America who are divided on some issues but we are so happy that only on the State of Israel that there is a union between the parties, the administration, the President, the Secretary, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the people of the United States; for us it is also of such great importance.

Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, played an immense important role on all three domains which are very important to Israel, their strategic strengths of the country, the economic health of it supported by the Defense Department, supported by the two parties - the Senate and the House. And they're very demanding given the circumstances, given the trying time of the budgetary consideration and we are very grateful for it. Now on two we succeeded with the great cooperation and on the economic recovery. Now we have to succeed on the fare of achieving peace. There is no reason to hide that the way of peace is flooded with a lot of difficulties accepting peace. But it is not with all the difficulties but the way that should bring our momentum forward. I always remember that the wise Frenchman was approached by a friend of his and he says, "Sir, life is so difficult." And the French philosopher was there replied, "Compared to what?" May I say that peace is so difficult. May I say compared to what. The other alternative will be more complicated. May I say that without the US initiative without the very strong support of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, the Secretary, the Senate..., the Middle East today might have been torn because not only is this a conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, but in the Arab world, there is a conflict between a fundamentalism which may destroy the future of Arabs and the structure of peace which may bring promise to the young generation of children. I know that we can achieve a perfect pessimism in our life and an imperfect optimism in our life as far as I'm concerned. I prefer the imperfection of optimism to the perfection of pessimism and I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war.

On the background of my country, of my people, for the ? to understand friendship, support, from this most unusual experiment of human ? to reassemble the treaty and to go back to the ??? will go back to their heritage and demonstrate in the eyes of the rest of the world that freedom is strength and friendship is influence and a country like America is unprecedented in history in freedom and democracy can demonstrate success and can influence hope to all. Please join me.

\*







PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(May 18, 1988)

2/11  
477

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO BE BACK WITH YOU FOR ONE OF OUR PERIODIC UPDATES IN OPEN SESSION OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

AT THE WEEKEND I RETURNED FROM GENEVA, FROM THE FIFTH U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIAL SO FAR THIS YEAR. PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT CONTINUE IN FULL GEAR. WE VIEW THE MOSCOW MEETING NOT ONLY AS AN "EVENT" -- THOUGH IT SURELY WILL BE THAT -- BUT ALSO AS AN INTEGRAL STEP IN THE PROCESS UNDERTAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONSTRUCT A STABLE, SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. OUR APPROACH IS GROUNDED IN A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE BASICALLY COMPETITIVE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTING STABILITY TO THAT COMPETITION, AND ALSO THE POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGES CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET UNION. OUR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE MOST OF ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT CHANGE MAY PROVIDE.

AT MOSCOW, AS IN THE PREVIOUS TWO SUMMITS, THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO PURSUE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF OUR BROAD AGENDA, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL MATTERS. HIS POLICY AND PROGRAM HAVE YIELDED SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS AND HE PLANS TO

¥

3/11  
477  
- 2 -

BUILD ON THEM, BOTH IN MOSCOW AND IN THE REMAINING MONTHS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION.

WE HOPE THE TWO LEADERS WILL BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY IN MOSCOW.

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING A BALANCED, VERIFIABLE 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WE WILL WORK TO MAKE AS MUCH ADDITIONAL PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

WE HAVE ALSO REGISTERED SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES: AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE HAVE BEGUN NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE WORKING IN THE CSCE CONTEXT TO DEVELOP A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS.

WITH THE APRIL 14 SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, SOMETHING HAS BEGUN WHICH MANY THOUGHT UNTIL RECENTLY WOULD NEVER OCCUR -- THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES CONTINUES. WE WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CAMBODIA, AND OTHER AREAS WHERE CONFLICT HAS BROUGHT TENSION TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT PRESENTS IT, OUR OBJECTIVE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES IS "TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY." ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER AND SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN WILL MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE SUMMIT TO DISCUSS SOUTHERN AFRICA.

80



- 3 -

477

4/11

RECENTLY THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SUMMIT PROCESS IN GENEVA IN 1985, WE HAVE SEEN THE RESOLUTION OF MANY INDIVIDUAL CASES, SOME WELL-KNOWN, OTHERS NOT. WE HAVE SEEN, FROM THE 1985 STARTING POINT, SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN EMIGRATION. AS OF TODAY, THE MONTHLY RATES ARE WELL OVER 2000 FOR ETHNIC GERMANS, OVER 1000 ARMENIANS, AND ABOUT 1000 SOVIET JEWS.

BUT THOUSANDS MORE WANT TO LEAVE, AND THEY ARE FRUSTRATED BY AN ARBITRARY SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT, IN PRACTICE, RECOGNIZE THE BASIC RIGHT TO EMIGRATE. SO MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE, FOR INDIVIDUALS AND FOR CATEGORIES (POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE,) TO REMOVE THE ARBITRARINESS. WE ARE WORKING FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES.

A RECENT DOWNTURN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, THE ARRESTS OF GRIGORYANTS AND AYRIKYAN, IS A CURRENT CONCERN. WE HOPE THESE REVERSES WILL BE RIGHTED BY THE TIME OF THE SUMMIT.

U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES HAVE EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. WE'LL CONTINUE TO PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO BROADEN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ONE ANOTHER AND BREAK DOWN OLD STEREOTYPES.

WE ARE WORKING ON A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD BE SIGNED DURING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. THE AIM IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST TO TAKE MUTUAL BENEFIT FROM AREAS OF SHARED INTEREST.

#### THE ALLIANCE

WE COULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN WHERE WE ARE WITH THE SOVIETS

✱



- 4 -

5/11  
477 WITHOUT A STRONG ALLIANCE, AND A STRONG ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, BEHIND US. WHEN I LAST APPEARED BEFORE THIS SUB-COMMITTEE, I SHARED WITH YOU SOME OF THE HOPES WE HAD FOR THE MARCH NATO SUMMIT. LET ME NOW SAY A WORD ABOUT THE ACTUAL RESULTS.

I WAS TAKEN, AS I KNOW THE SECRETARY WAS, BY THE SENSE OF COMMON PURPOSE WHICH WE ENCOUNTERED IN BRUSSELS. THE INF EXPERIENCE WAS REALLY A VERY IMPORTANT LESSON FOR ALL OF US ON THE NEED TO STICK TO BASIC PRINCIPLES. IT WAS THE DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN OUR DETERRENT STRENGTH, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REMAINING OPEN TO DIALOGUE, WHICH BROUGHT THE SOVIETS TO THE BARGAINING TABLE AND MADE THE INF TREATY POSSIBLE. THE SUMMIT DECLARATION MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WILL REMAIN OUR APPROACH TO THE EAST.

THE DECLARATION WAS EQUALLY CLEAR REGARDING THE ALLIANCE COMMITMENT TO BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE EAST TO REMOVE THE BARRIERS TO FREEDOM WHICH CURRENTLY CHARACTERIZE LIFE IN THOSE SOCIETIES. IN THAT REGARD, WE AND THE ALLIES ARE COMMITTED TO A BALANCED OUTCOME TO THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA -- AND WE ARE WILLING TO REMAIN AT THE TABLE UNTIL WE GET ONE.

THE NATO SUMMIT ALSO PRODUCED A CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. ON THIS SCORE, WE AND THE ALLIES AGREED THAT SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY IS THE MOST DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE ATLANTIC SECURITY EQUATION. WE HAVE CHALLENGED THE SOVIETS TO WORK WITH US IN VIENNA TO REACH A MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A MORE STABLE BALANCE AT LOWER AND EQUAL LEVELS IN

- 5 -

477

6/11

EUROPE. WE AND THE ALLIES WILL NOT NEGLECT ONGOING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR OWN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES WHILE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS.

OVER THE YEARS, NATO HAS BEEN BLESSED WITH EXCEPTIONAL LEADERS. AT THE JUNE 9-10 NATO MINISTERIAL IN MADRID, WE WILL BE SAYING GOOD-BYE TO ONE OF THEM.. PETER CARRINGTON, SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS, WILL BE MOVING ON IN JULY. HE HAS DONE AN ABSOLUTELY MAGNIFICENT JOB AT NATO IN AN HISTORIC PERIOD OF SEVERE CHALLENGE AND EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY. FORMER GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER MANFRED WOERNER WILL BE TAKING OVER THE REINS AT NATO. WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING AS CLOSELY WITH HIM AS WE HAVE WITH LORD CARRINGTON.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK: MATURING PARTNERSHIPS AND BASE NEGOTIATIONS

ACROSS NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK, WE HAVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH SEVERAL ALLIES CHARACTERIZED BY MATURING PARTNERSHIPS, WITH A RANGE OF DEEPENING AND BROADENING TIES. IN ALL OF THESE THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO MISSIONS REMAINS IMPORTANT, EVEN AS IT TAKES ACCOUNT OF CHANGING TIMES. IN TWO COUNTRIES, AS YOU KNOW, BASE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS ON OUR FUTURE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS.

WE ARE WORKING TOWARD THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN. WORKING GROUPS ARE CONTINUING TO LABOR TO NEGOTIATE FINAL TEXTS TO REPLACE THE OLD ACCORD, WHICH EXPIRED LAST WEEK. ALTHOUGH OUR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES REMAIN PROTECTED FOR ONE YEAR, WE WISH TO WRAP THIS UP SOON. MAJOR ELEMENTS, SUCH AS CONTINUED USE OF ROTA NAVY BASE, BARDENAS

X



- 6 -

477  
7/11  
REALES BOMBING RANGE AND OTHER SPANISH INSTALLATIONS WERE  
AGREED LAST JANUARY. HOWEVER, MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO  
REACH A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION. THE NEW ACCORD'S LONGER EIGHT  
YEAR TERM, AN END TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AND PLANNING  
FOR USE OF SPANISH BASES TO REINFORCE NATO IN TIME OF CRISIS OR  
WAR, ARE ALL MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS. WE REMAIN DISAPPOINTED BY THE  
SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S DECISION THAT OUR F-16 WING MUST LEAVE  
SPAIN WITHIN THREE YEARS.

WE APPRECIATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO  
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING THE 401ST TACTICAL  
FIGHTER WING SHOULD NATO SO RECOMMEND. THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE  
OF ITALY'S BROAD RANGE OF SUPPORT FOR WESTERN SECURITY  
INTERESTS. THE FATE OF THE 401ST IS UP TO NATO. WE HAVE SOME  
IMPORTANT DETAILS YET TO WORK OUT. BUT I AM REASONABLY  
CONFIDENT THE UNIT CAN REMAIN FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER CONDITIONS  
ACCEPTABLE TO US AND TO CONGRESS.

OUR CURRENT BASE AGREEMENT WITH GREECE IS TERMINABLE ON  
DECEMBER 20, 1988. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS WE EXPECT THE  
GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE THE REQUIRED NOTICE OF TERMINATION  
FIVE MONTHS BEFORE THAT DATE. WE HAVE BEGUN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A  
NEW POST-1988 AGREEMENT. THE LAST ROUND WAS HELD HERE MAY 9 -  
13. THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE TO BE MARKED BY ORDERLY PROGRESS  
AND A PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE. THE SEVENTH ROUND OF  
NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN ATHENS THE WEEK OF JUNE 20.

IN FEBRUARY, AS YOU KNOW, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT RATIFIED  
THE EXTENSION OF OUR 1980 DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION  
AGREEMENT THROUGH 1990. THE CONTINUING MODERNIZATION OF

✱



- 7 -

477 TURKISH FORCES AND THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF  
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE  
UNITED STATES, NATO AND TURKEY.

8/11 ADDITIONALLY, AS YOU KNOW FROM PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER  
CAVACO SILVA'S VISIT HERE IN FEBRUARY, THE PORTUGUESE HAVE  
REQUESTED CONSULTATIONS ON OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE OPENING,  
PROCEDURAL ROUND TOOK PLACE IN LISBON ON APRIL 29. ALTHOUGH A  
FORMAL AGENDA HAS YET TO BE AGREED UPON, WE EXPECT THE  
CONSULTATIONS TO REVIEW OUR BILATERAL COOPERATION EFFORTS AND  
EXPLORE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN AND BROADEN COOPERATION IN LIGHT OF  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1983.

WHILE THE TALKS WILL ADDRESS SECURITY COOPERATION MATTERS,  
WE ALSO ANTICIPATE EXAMINING PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING  
NON-SECURITY ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. IN REQUESTING THE  
CONSULTATIONS, PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER CAVACO SILVA HAS  
STRESSED THAT PORTUGAL DOES NOT INTEND TO REDUCE U.S. ACCESS TO  
MILITARY FACILITIES ON PORTUGUESE SOIL, BUT INSTEAD TO IDENTIFY  
AND OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE  
RELATIONSHIP. WE SHARE THAT APPROACH.

#### EASTERN EUROPE

CHANGE IS THE WORD TODAY IN EASTERN EUROPE. AGING  
LEADERSHIPS, A CHRONIC SENSE OF ILLEGITIMACY, AND DECLINING  
ECONOMIES ARE CREATING A MORE FLUID SITUATION. PRESSURE FROM  
THE SOVIET UNION TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT ECONOMICALLY ADDS TO  
THE INDIGENOUS PRESSURES FOR CHANGE, AS DOES THE EXAMPLE OF  
GORBACHEV'S REFORM PROGRAM.

80



- 8 -

9/11 477 EASTERN EUROPEAN REGIMES ARE FEARFUL OF RAPID CHANGE AND SEE OPENNESS AS A THREAT TO THEIR STABILITY. MOST LEADERSHIPS WANT BETTER FUNCTIONING ECONOMIES, BUT NOT AT THE COST OF LOSING CONTROL.

THE SITUATION IN POLAND CONFIRMS THE RISKS INHERENT IN TRYING TO MOVE ON ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT ACQUIRING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM. THE STRIKES WERE SPONTANEOUS AND INDICATED PENT-UP FRUSTRATION WITH THE AUSTERITY ELEMENT OF REFORM MEASURES. THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN POLAND MUST OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT, AND MUST ENGAGE IN A PROCESS OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION, AND BROAD REFORM, IF ECONOMIC REFORM IS TO HAVE A CHANCE.

WE WITNESS IN HUNGARY AN AMAZINGLY OPEN DEBATE ON REFORM. THE AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO FEARFUL OF PUBLIC REACTION TO ECONOMIC REFORMS WHICH WILL BRING AUSTERITY. THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT TOO MUST SEEK POPULAR SUPPORT.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA ARE MAKING MOTIONS TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORM BUT GIVE NO CONCRETE INDICATION OF POLITICAL REFORM. ROMANIA REJECTS REFORM ALTOGETHER.

THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE PRESENT THE UNITED STATES WITH BOTH CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES. OUR INFLUENCE IS LIMITED, BUT THERE ARE NEW OPENINGS TO PROMOTE WESTERN VALUES AND ENCOURAGE GENUINE REFORM. WE HAVE SEEN CHANGE COMING FOR TWO YEARS NOW, AND HAVE ADOPTED A MORE ACTIVE AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH WITH CHANGE IN MIND. DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD HAS NOW VISITED THE AREA FOUR TIMES AND WILL BE GOING AGAIN IN JUNE.

✓

- 9 -

10/11 477 WITH EVERY COUNTRY WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE A KIND OF "CHALLENGE PROGRAM" OF PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE TO MUTUAL BENEFIT IF OUR PARTNERS ARE WILLING TO TAKE OUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. WITH MOST WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS. THEY HAVE IN GENERAL BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH. THE TOPICS DIFFER FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, BUT IN EVERY CASE THEY INVOLVE GREATER DIALOGUE, GREATER OPENNESS, MORE CONTACTS, MORE EFFICIENT MEANS OF SOLVING PROBLEMS.

WHILE THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WANT POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CULTURAL TIES, AND WE MEAN TO PURSUE THESE, WHAT THEY WANT MOST FROM US IS ECONOMIC SUPPORT. WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND ECONOMIC AND TRADE TIES IN NON-STRATEGIC AREAS, BUT WE ARE NOT WILLING TO LET TRADE GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE REST OF OUR AGENDA, AND WE RECOGNIZE WESTERN ECONOMIC SUPPORT WILL BE SQUANDERED WITHOUT MEANINGFUL REFORM AND SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE.

OUR POLICY IS WELL-SUITED TO THE CHALLENGE. HOLDING TO A REALISTIC, SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR RELATIONS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO WEATHER THE INEVITABLE UPS AND DOWNS WHILE PURSUING OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THIS WILL REQUIRE PATIENCE AND A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE.

#### OECD MINISTERIAL

OF LATE, WE'VE TALKED TOGETHER ABOUT NATO SUMMITS AND U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS. THERE IS A THIRD SUMMIT AHEAD OF US ON THE CALENDAR, WHICH ALSO TOUCHES ON VITAL U.S. INTERESTS. AS WE SPEAK, SECRETARIES BAKER, VERITY, LYNG, AMBASSADOR YEUTTER, CHAIRMAN SPRINKEL AND DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD ARE



477

- 10 -

11/11 PARTICIPATING IN THE ANNUAL OECD MINISTERIAL IN PARIS, A MEETING WHICH TRADITIONALLY SETS THE STAGE FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, THIS YEAR IN TORONTO JUNE 19-21. AS IS EVIDENT FROM OUR CABINET-LEVEL DELEGATION, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT SESSION. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES TO MAKE A COLLECTIVE STATEMENT ON THE DIRECTION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE POLICIES WE ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE TO MEET TODAY'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES -- AND TOMORROW'S.

I BELIEVE WE WILL FIND BROAD AGREEMENT AMONG MINISTERS ON FUNDAMENTALS. OECD ECONOMIES HAVE PROVEN RESILIENT AFTER THE OCTOBER MARKET CRASH AND ARE GENERALLY PERFORMING WELL, BUT WE DO FACE IMPORTANT CHALLENGES -- STRENGTHENING OUR OPEN TRADING SYSTEM, REDUCING STRUCTURAL RIGIDITIES IN AND AMONG OUR ECONOMIES AND, FOR EUROPE, TACKLING HIGH LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. THESE LAST TWO ISSUES ARE CLOSELY TIED AND THE LINKAGE IS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZED BY OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

THERE IS LESS CONSENSUS WHEN WE MOVE TO THE SPECIFICS OF TRADE AND AGRICULTURE. THE U.S. IS SEEKING IN PARIS A STRONG IMPETUS FOR PROGRESS AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER IN MONTREAL. AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA IS LONG-TERM, MARKET-ORIENTED AGRICULTURAL REFORM, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO END COSTLY AND INEFFICIENT FARM PROGRAMS AND ELIMINATE CONSTANT DEBILITATING TRADE DISPUTES WITH EUROPE. OUR PARTNERS TAKE A MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH, BUT I BELIEVE WE WILL CLOSE THE MEETING TOMORROW WITH A STRENGTHENED COMMITMENT TO CONCRETE RESULTS IN DECEMBER.

ט פ ו ס מ ב ק

57 ו. מתוך 5 דפים

סיווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות      מי ידוי

תאריך/ז"ח 1130 18 מאי 88

מס' מברק

490

אל : ה ם ש ר ד

בני-י-יורק

97

אל: מבכ"ל מדיני

מבכ"ל ראה"מ

מנכ"ל

סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דע: השגריר ארד, ניו-יורק

להלן מפגישת המזכיר עם ממראהימ ושהיח (17.5).

שולץ פתח בדברי הערכה לשה"ח. אמר שיחזור מהפסגה הישר לאזור ויוכל לדווח עליה. המזכיר פנה לשיפטר על-מנת שידווח על ההתפתחויות האחרונות בנושא היהודי. שיפטר אמר כי באפריל נתנו 1,400 אישורי יציאה. בשנה שעברה היו בין 8,000-9,000 אישורי יציאה ואילו השנה היה ממוצע בחדשים שלפני אפריל כ-1,000 אישורים לחודש ומשום כך 1,400 אישורים מהווים עליה משמעותית. שיפטר ציין גם כי קיימת הצטברות של בין 1,600 ל-3,200 בקשות שעדיין בטיפול ובהיותו במוטקבה נמסר לו על תורים ארוכים של מבקשים הממתינים לעתים לילה שלם לפני משרדי האו"ם. לדבריו של שיפטר הסובייטים נענים לדיון בבקשות השונות שארה"ב מעלה. כוונתם להמשיך ולתקוף את הסובייטים בנושאים של מגבלות בשל עודיות והגבלות יציאה על-ידי תורים. הסובייטים רמזו שיהיו מוכנים לגלות גמישות בשני נושאים אלו, ואחמול כבר נתנו רשימה של 10 מקרים בקטגוריה הראשונה שבהם הקלו על המגבלות.

שה"ח עבר לשיחותיו בהונגריה ואמר כי אנשי שיחו הסבירו שההחלטה על ביטול היחסים ב-1967 היתה קולקטיבית, אבל בנושא חידושם יש מרחב תמרון אינדיבידואלי מסוים. ההונגרים הסבירו כי ברצונם להדק היחסים עם ארה"ב וישראל, ולא הסתירו כי אחד המניעים הוא הרצון לשפר סחר החוץ. ההונגרים הבהירו גם שכל מי שרוצה לצאת יוכל לעשות זאת, וכי הם מעוניינים בהרחבת התיירות. שה"ח גם ציין כי ביהכ"נ הגדול בבודפשט זקוק לשיפוץ דחוף.

בנושא הסובייטי אמר שה"ח כי הופתע להיווכח שאנשי שיחור במוסקבה, שהם בעיקר אנשי מז"ת, עוסקים גם בנושא היהודי - דבר המצביע על הרצון הסובייטי לפעול במקביל בשני הנושאים האלו. להערכת שה"ח רוצים הסובייטים לזכות בתמיכת הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב.

2/...

[illegible]



ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מחוך 5 דפים

סיוג בטחוני ס ו ד י

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

480/97  $\frac{2}{5}$

והביא כראיה נכונות הסובייטים להתיר ביקורים הדדיים של רבנים מארה"ב וברה"מ. במהלך השיחות אמרו גם שהם מתכוונים להרחיב חופש הפולחן לכנסייה הפרובוסלבית והדבר עשוי גם להתאים להקילה היהודית.

באשר למזי"ח הסובייטים טוענים שהם מגלים נכונות אך ארה"ב מחזקת (שולץ בחיור): אני יכול להיות עקשן). במהלך שתי הפגישות ובהצהרה הפומבית שהם נתנו באינטרנציונל הסוציאליסטי עלו הנקודות הבאות:

- הגורמים למרוץ החימוש ולהחמרה שחלה בו כתוצאה מהשילוב של טילים ונשק כימי. במפגשים בין המעצמות נידון העניין לדבריהם, אך ללא מסקנות.
- הם מאז רציניים ברצונם לכונן שלום במזי"ח והרחיקו לכת באמנם שאם יצטרכו לוותר על מעמדם במזי"ח לטובת השלום - יעשו זאת.
- הודו שיש להם קשיים בהשגח תמיכה לעמדותיהם בין בנות בריתם במזי"ח, וציינו את העמדה הקישחת של סוריה.
- הפנו חשומת לבנו פעם נוספת לדברי גורבצ'וב לערפאת.

שהי"ח הוסיף כי בדבריו לסובייטים נאמר -

- אין אנו מעוניינים בוועידה בינלאומית ואנו מוכנים לקבלה אך ורק אם תוכל לסייע בקידום ההליך. בוודאי שלא נוכל להסכים לוועידה בינלאומית כופה.
- אין בישראל אומן בברה"מ משום שהיא ספקה את כל כמויות הנשק האזירות שגרמו למלחמות באזור.

בחשובה לאמירה הסובייטית כי נקטו בשורה של צעדים דרמטיים, נאמר להם כי עדיין מורגשת אצלם תחושת החשש מהתגובה הערבית וכי ערפאת הכחיש כי אכן נאמרו לו הדברים שפורסמו אח"כ. ירון הסכימה לוועידה שאיננה כופה ולכך למעשה הסכימו כל אלו שהסכימו לוועידה, ולכן מדוע מחזקת ברה"מ ומדוע צריכים כל המעורבים להתאים עצמם לגישה הסובייטית דווקא? לכך השיבו הסובייטים שאין להם מידע על "מסמך לונדון".



ס פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מחוז 5 דפים

סוג בטחוני ס ו ד י

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

480/97 3/5

- בנושא הטריטוריאלי אמרו הסובייטים שצריך לטפל בו לפני הנושאים הפוליטיים ואפשר להבין מכך, לפי שה"ח, שהסובייטים אינם רוצים בנוכחות אש"ף בעת הטיפול בנושא הטריטוריאלי. בכלל, הוסיף שה"ח, היתה התייחסות מועטה בדברי הסובייטים לאש"ף.

- שה"ח הוסיף שאמר לסובייטים שאינו מבין מדוע הסובייטים מתעקשים שיהיה תנאי מוקדם לפיו יוכלו המשתתפים החיצונים להגיש הצעות. הלא לברת"מ אין כל בעיה והיא יכולה לבטא דעות ולהציע הצעות מעל דפי העהונות, למשל, הפיכת הדבר לתנאי מוקדם רק מסבך את הדברים.

שה"ח פנה לשולץ בקריאה שלא לתת לתהליך השלום לגווע. יש לשמור על תהליך השלום. התהליך זוכה לתמיכה זו-מפלגתית באוה"ב מדוע צריך לקבוע? שה"ח הוסיף כי שרי החוץ אמריקאים בעבר "אטפו" חשבוות שליליות אך המזכיר לא "הצליח" בכך. אם הסובייטים יבטלו את דרישותיהם הכלת הגיוניות ויוותרו רק הבדלים שוליים והם יסכימו ליורו"ת משותפת הרי שיחכן ונתן לקדם התהליך. שה"ח הביע תקוותו כי הפסגה לא תיצור את הרושם שהתהליך גווע. שה"ח הזכיר גם האפשרות של מעין "פסגה קטנה" בין המזכיר לשורדנזזה בעוד כחוזשים-שלשה. הדבר החשוב מכל מקום הוא לא להניח לתהליך לגווע בפסגה הקרוב. אי שמירתו של התהליך עלול להביא להתפתחויות טרגיות וחיזוק השפעותיהם של הפונדמנטליזם והטרור.

שה"ח ציין את חשיבות כנונה של שגרירות ישראל בברית"מ ואת העובדה שהסובייטים עצמם מבינים את המשמעות מבחינה של הקהילה היהודית שם.

באשר למשלחת הקונסולרית הרי שהסובייטים עדיין לא נתנו תשובה מדויקת ואמרו שיוזיעו לנו. נוביק הוסיף שאנשי שיחם שלא היו אנשי משה"ח הוזיעו שהחשובה תבוא ממשרד החוץ אחד למשנהו. שה"ח ציין כי משפחת טופלר שהיתה בין האחרונות הרפיוזניקים קיבלה אישור יציאה.

לבקשת שה"ח תאר נוביק השיחות עם זוטוב ואמר שבשיחות אלו הסביר זוטוב את העמדות שהשמיע בפומבי. בהסברים אלו אמר שחשוב להתקדם לקראת השלום וכי הכל פתוח למו"מ. המשתתפים בועידה הבינלאומית יהיו 5 החברות הקבועות במועבי"ט, הצדדים לסכסוך וערבים-פלסטינאים כאשר הוא אינו מתייחס לאש"ף. מאידך זוטוב התייחס לאש"ף בדברו על ההזמנות לועידה, היינו שהייתה שתי הזמנות אך שתיהן משלחת משותפת ירדנית-פלסטינאית. בדברו על תוצאות

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 4 מתוך 5 דפים

סוג בטיחוני ס ו ז י

דחיפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

480/97  $\frac{4}{5}$

המו"מ זוטוב אמר שהיא צריכה להיות בצוע 242 ומתן הגדרה עצמית לפלשתינאים כאשר הערבים הם שיחליטו מה הפרוש המעשי של הגדרה עצמית.

זוטוב גם אמר שהם מקבלים בעקרון את הגישה ההדרגתית ובקונטקסט הזה ציין שהענין הטריטוריאלי וענין הגבולות יטופלו לפני ההגדרה העצמית. כאמור ההגדרה העצמית הוא ענין בין-ערבי לועז בריה"מ, קרי ענין ירדני-פלשתינאי. לדברי נוביק לטוביטיס ברור שלא כל הערבים מקבלים הפרשנות שהגדרה עצמית הן מלות קוד למדינה פלשתינאית.

באשר לועידה הבינלאומית זוטוב אמר שזו תפגש *regularly but not frequently*. המזכיר אמר שהיה רוצה לקרא את הטקסט המדויק של ההצהרה הפומבית של זוטוב במדריד, להציגו בפני הסוביטים ולקבל מהם תשובות ברורות האם הוא משקף עמדותיהם.

שה"ח התייחס לירדן ואמר שיתכן וישנם אנשים הרואים בהתנהגות המלך לאחרונה כוונות על הגדה אך החרשמותו היא שלא כך פני הדברים. למלך יש זכרונות ושאיפות. הזכרונות הם של אבדן השטחים ורצון עז לקבלם חזרה. יש לו שאיפות לשיפור חוסנה הכלכלי של ארצו. יש לו גם חשדנות כלפי מספר ישראלים וערפת הרוצים להפוך את ירדן עצמה ל- *Homeland* של הפלשתינאים.

האינתיפאדה פועלת במידה מסוימת כנגד חוסיין כי מופיעות בה בימות אנטי-ירדניות. מאידך, אין לאינתיפאדה סדר-יום ומטרות מוגדרות ולכן האפקט אינו כה חמור מבחינת המלך. ישראל מתכוונת למנוע כניסת כסף הבא ממקורות אשי"פ או מיועד לשמוש לחבילותיו. המקור הגדול ביותר הוא עדיין עבודה בישראל המכניסה כ-600-700 מיליון דולר ואשי"פ לא יוכל להחליף מקור זה. הערבים התגלו עד כה כטובים במס שפתיים אך לא בסיוע ממשי. מאידך אפשר לסייע לירדן להיות יותר פעילה בצד הכלכלי בתנאי שהכסף לא יצונן דרך הקרן הירדנית-הפלשתינאית המשותפת שכן דרכה יוכל אשי"פ להעביר כספים למטרותיו הוא. יש רצון רב בקרב האזרופאים וגם היפנים להשתתף בפרוייקטים כלכליים.

להערכת שה"ח נמצא עתה המלך חוסיין בעמדת המחנה כאשר המסר שלו לאשי"פ הוא שאם יוכל להשיג מטרותיו בכוחותיו הוא שינסה לעשות זאת כאשר הוא מניח שישראל לא

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

ד 9 מתוך 5 דפים

סווג בטחוני ס ו ד י

דחופות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

480/97  $\frac{5}{5}$

לא תסכים בשום אופן למו"מ עם ערפאח. האחרון זכה אולי בכמה נקודות בביקורו בזמשק אך גרם בעת ובעונה אחת למורת רוח בקהיר. ובבגדאד. ועידת הפסגה המתוכננת גורמת לדאגה ולכן דרוש מאמץ לבטלה או להפחית בערכה ולהורידה לדרג נמוך ככל האפשר.

בסיום דבריו חזר שה"ח על דבריו שאסור להניח לתהליך לגזוע בפסגה במוסקבה. במקביל יש להמשיך בדיאלוג עם המלך ולחזק בו את הידיעה שלא נניח לאש"פ דריסת רגל בתהליך.

המשך השיחה היה בא"צ מטעם המזכיר שתכנה כבר הוברק אליכם.

השתתפו בשיחה מצד ארה"ב המזכיר, מרפי, שיפטר, הולמס, הירש, ווקר. מצד ישראל שה"ח, המנכ"ל המדיני בילין, השגריר ארד, ג. נוביק, א. סביר, מ. שילה והח"מ.

3318  
ע ר ו



20

שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים

סוג כסחוני גלני

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 18.5.88

מס' מברק

453

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

להלן ראיון ממרוה"מ ושה"ח לתכנית Today Show של NBC 18.5.88

י.ס.י.  
גל

2 2 1 3 3 2  
מחמד ג'אליד א/א/א  
הסברה ג'אליד  
2

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

NNNN

.EOF&lt;&lt;FN45&gt;&gt;

NNNN

7@

453

NBC'S "TODAY SHOW" 3  
WITH BRYANT GUMBEL  
AND GUEST: SHIMON PERES,  
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1988

BRYANT GUMBEL: On Close-up this morning, Shimon Peres. Israel's Foreign Minister has been in Washington this week talking peace prospects with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. Mr. Peres has now moved on to Toronto from where he joins us this morning. And Foreign Minister Peres, good morning.

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Good morning.

MR. GUMBEL: You talked with President Reagan about discussing Mideast peace prospects with Mikhail Gorbachev at the upcoming summit. What's realistic expectations for that?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think that there is a fair chance that the Russians will make some moves in the direction of the United States proposal, which is the only one, I believe, acceptable to all parts on both sides of the Middle East, or most of them. I'm not sure if they will be able to reach a conclusion, but even if they will reach some progress, it will be of importance and great meaning.

MR. GUMBEL: Do you welcome the participation of Mr. Gorbachev or is it a view that it's not going to go anywhere unless he's part of it?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: The problem is not his participation, but the nature of his participation. You know, it depends very much on the Russian policy. If they won't try to impose a solution or to intervene in our negotiations, yes, why not? On the other hand, if there will be the slightest attempt to try and teach us a lesson or to impose a solution, I think, all parties will refuse. Now the Russians recently did some very constructive positions, and I hope they will do it this time again.

MR. GUMBEL: On the heels of your Washington meetings, a close aide to Yitzhak Shamir -- an unnamed aide, I might add -- on Tuesday, accused you of trying to turn President Reagan against the Prime Minister. What's your reaction to that charge?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think this guy's a little bit unemployed; otherwise he wouldn't do it.



3/4 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED . 453

\*COPYRIGHT IS NOT CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS A PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.

?

NBC/PERES-05/18/88

-2-

MR. GUMBEL: Well, let me read exactly what happened. After the meeting, Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, quote, "These leaders who are negative and reject new ideas make progress impossible." Does that description not fit Mr. Shamir?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Not necessarily. I know some leaders who are a stumbling block all the time on the road to peace, not necessarily in Israel, and I don't think one should attribute it necessarily to Mr. Shamir.

MR. GUMBEL: I guess what I'm saying is, given that statement and the President's rather lavish praise of you, can you not understand the possibility that he would view this as an attempt by the White House to inject itself into Israeli politics?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I think a similar statement was issued when Mr. Shamir was visiting Washington -- there is nothing new. And I know the positions of some of the leaders in the Middle East are not really constructive enough. But, I would take it really as a support for the peace process and nothing too much of a personal nature.

MR. GUMBEL: You've talked about the peace process and noted that the present Mideast climate is too filled with suspicion, too filled with hatred, in order to gain offensive momentum or energy. How do you suggest that climate be cooled?

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: I don't suggest to submit to the difficulties. I don't have the slightest illusion that the road to peace is a long one. There are many obstacles, setbacks, confusions, suspicions, as we have said. It is the task of all of us to try to overcome them and to negotiate an open road to peace. I think it is a need for all parties concerned, and I don't expect that we should open the road overnight or by one push. But, whoever such as -- that because of the suspicion they have to stop the peace momentum is, I'm afraid, offering an alternative that it doesn't seek, because if the peace initiative will be cut-off, what are the alternatives? A return to the arms race, to the cold war, to the hatred, to the other difficulties and dangers. So, I believe for all of us without exception, we have to continue our efforts to pave the way to a political settlement and a peaceful solution.

MR. GUMBEL: With elections scheduled for November in your country and ours, is it realistic to think anything will happen on the peace initiative front this year?

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

?

\*



NBC/PERES-05/18/88

4-4

453

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Let me say that I will try, first of all, that something will not happen, and that is the death of the peace momentum or the hope for peace. Yet, I wouldn't exclude that there will be some advancements which will make the peace a more realistic prospect. You know, when you say "no," it is clear and simple, but when you have to say "yes," you have to collect so many "yeses" from so many parties and the different minds and impressions that it makes it surely much more complicated than difficult. Yet, all of us without exception must be careful not to bury the hope for peace, not to open another road which, I believe, is detrimental to all parties.

MR. GUMBEL: Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. We thank you very much, sir. Safe travels.

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

?

NNNN

.EOF&lt;&lt;FN55&gt;&gt;

NNNN

28

\*





2/4

MACNEIL-LEHRER NEWSHOUR  
INTERVIEWS  
THE HONORABLE SHIMON PERES  
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1988

455

MS. WOODRUFF: Next tonight a Newsmaker Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Peres arrived in Washington yesterday for two days of talks with top Administration officials. His visit comes in the midst of continuing Reagan Administration unhappiness with Israel's treatment of Palestinians, and just days before President Reagan travels to Moscow for a summit with the Moscow. When I talked with Peres earlier this afternoon at a Washington hotel, I began by asking him if anything had come out of his meetings that would affect the search for peace in the Middle East.

MINISTER PERES: The most important message is that both of them are determined not to let the peace process fade away, and certainly not to die -- because the minute [that] this will happen, or a perception to that effect will occur, we shall have an entirely different process in the Middle East which will look bleak in the eyes of everybody concerned.

MS. WOODRUFF: But what gives you, what gives the Reagan Administration hope that you can salvage this process?

MINISTER PERES: Basically because all parties concerned are in need of it because the alternative to it is so complicated and dangerous to the Arabs, to the Israelis, to the United States, to the Soviet Union. And I think we are mature enough people to understand that the road that leads to peace is not a simple one. And we must be patient. The Middle East can turn in a moment into again a region of belligerency, of arms race, of cold war, of threats, of ugly military coalitions. And then what?

MS. WOODRUFF: Why did you come to Washington? Why this trip?

MINISTER PERES: I came, I think, basically to see what are the best ways to continue with the peace process. And then we are very much aware -- when I say "we" I mean both as a Jewish people and Israeli state -- of the importance of the summit meeting which is going to take place in Moscow between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev. It concerns us in many ways -- in the way of the future of Jewish life in the Soviet Union, which is top in our consideration; in the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
COPYRIGHT\* (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

\*COPYRIGHT IS NOT CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK  
PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS A  
PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES.





MACNEIL-LEHRER/5-17-88  
PERES

-2-

3/4  
455

and Israel; and the peace process in the Middle East. So, for us, it is more than an important subject.

MS. WOODRUFF: On the issue of the Soviets, you've said today that you understand that they will get involved in the peace process; that they will make some sort of a declaration during the Moscow summit. What is your understanding of that?

MINISTER PERES: What the Soviets told us is, "We are a responsible country; we are serious on this. It is important for us to see peace in the Middle East. Watch us what we did in Afghanistan. Watch us what we did in the INF. We are a serious minded people. You should trust us." And they even went as far as to say that what took place between the Soviet Union and Israel

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MACNEIL-LEHRER/05-17-88  
PERES

2-1

is almost a drama. I told him maybe it's a drama but you're aware politics are not dramatic. Everything he did was so slow, so limited, so late, so stingy that it really didn't open a wide enough avenue so peace can go on without real obstacles.

When it comes to peace, we need American diplomacy and American diplomats to help us on it. But we are just one side of the story. There is another side which is the Arab side, and some of the Arab clients are very much connected with the Soviet Union. And unless they will see the Soviet Union moving in the direction of peace, they may remain in their old belligerent position which was so costly to them and quite dangerous to us.

MS. WOODRUFF: Don't you find it odd that Israel -- what you're saying is that Israel should now rely on the Soviets to influence the Arabs to participate. I mean, in a way you're -- you're expecting the Soviets to help you when in the past they have not been your friend.

MINISTER PERES: Oh, don't exaggerate. We don't rely upon the Soviet Union. We rely upon the lack of opposition of the Soviet Union. We think that the Soviet Union tried its hands by supplying arms to the Arab countries, by supporting their very militant position to discover that it leads no where but to defeat. Israel, to start with, relies upon ourselves -- upon ourselves. I think we are strong, we can defend both our country and our policy. We have the strength to defend openly our land and to resolve peace. And I feel very strongly that if people are saying we have to negotiate out of strength, don't forget to negotiate when you're strong. And I think we are strong and we have to negotiate because the ultimate purpose is really to live in peace with the Arabs. We don't hate

4/4  
them. They're not our enemies. We would like to see their children waking up in the morning without fear as I would like to see our own children waking up in the morning without fear. And we do lead a peace process out of deep conviction not out of fear and not even out of experience.

455

MS. WOODRUFF: The United States government has objected to your government's policy of expelling many moderate Palestinians, particularly most recently Mubarak Awad. Your government is holding him now. What is going to happen to this gentleman?

MINISTER PERES: Moderate Palestinians were never expelled. Only militant Palestinians were expelled and Palestinians who are trying to worsen the situation. The right to deport a person is a British law that was handed over to the Jordanians, and the

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400

COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVEDMACNEIL-LEHRER/05-17-88  
PERES

2-2

Jordanians have handed it over to us. Now we have changed a little bit of the law because a person who is condemned for deportation has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel. There is a judicial process. And occasionally the Court has decided to annul the deportation. Now we have a difficult choice -- you know, if we would use the capital punishment, nobody would say, "Well, let's face it. Is a capital punishment or more, more humane?" Israel in her forty years of existence didn't put a single person to the gallows. The only man that was executed is Eichmann and there were terrible terrorists. So what we are doing is not because we are blood thirsty. What we are doing is really a major attempt to save the life of people.

MS. WOODRUFF: But is this now a major method for dealing with the Palestinians?

MINISTER PERES: No, not a major -- we're talking about maybe ten, twenty or twenty-five cases -- that's all. We are not talking about mass deportation. Awad, by the way, is a different story. He's not a Palestinian, he's a tourist.

MS. WOODRUFF: Have you in any way found U.S. support for Israel diminished because of the way Israel has responded to the uprisings in recent months?

MINISTER PERES: No, I've found that some people are making critical remarks in a timely manner, and I take it in good faith. We don't expect that our friends will agree with us 100 percent -- 100 percent of the time, and we take it with grace and understanding if some people differ from our view. So we are answering to the criticism, and our answer is a very simple one. Without alternatives, what should we do?

END OF INTERVIEW

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400

COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION







215

CNN "INTERNATIONAL HOUR"  
INTERVIEW WITH SHIMON PERES, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1988

428

BERNARD SHAW: Joining us now on the International Hour here in Washington, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres. Welcome, Mr. Minister, and first, a political question since you have national elections coming up in November. In your wildest dreams, can you see your Labor party gaining an all-out majority in the Knesset?

MINISTER PERES: Well, I don't think it's such a wild dream. I think it is a dream, and we are dreaming it, and I wouldn't exclude it because for the first time in the Israel political experience, there is a very large undecided vote that may give a party -- I hope my party -- a fair chance to create a coalition with a program for the future.

MR. SHAW: Will your national elections in effect be a referendum on land for peace?

MINISTER PERES: It will be a referendum in my judgment between the existing situation, the status quo, and a plan to move ahead in the direction of peace, which will include a territorial compromise -- what you call "land for peace".

MR. SHAW: Do you envision that compromise having Palestinians live on that land? Or do you envision that land to be a demilitarized area?

MINISTER PERES: Demilitarized. We shall not force anybody to move from his place. We are a democratic people, we are a free people, we have respect for every human being, for his rights, for his land, for his properties. And I really think the problem is not so much a problem of land, but a problem of people. Namely, not necessarily just how to divide the land, but how to establish a relationship of people based on mutual respect and peace for all



people and all children concerned.

315 428

MR. SHAW: Mr. Minister, I have to ask you this question. If -- if you had the power, would you have prevented the assassination of Abu Jihad?

MINISTER PERES: Well there, it's a little bit -- excuse me for saying so -- a loaded question. I am not the address to this particular issue, and I don't think I am in a mood or a readiness to discuss it.

MR. SHAW: Why do you think my question was loaded, sir?

MINISTER PERES: Well any way I would answer, I would take responsibility for something that I don't take responsibility for.

MR. SHAW: Moving on to the Palestinians, do you think that King Hussein's effectiveness in influencing the Palestinians has been reduced by tensions, the uprising?

MINISTER PERES: For a while, yes. I think the uprising on the West Bank and Gaza has a clear anti-Hussein underlining; it was the King. It doesn't make us happy. But when the Palestinians will have to sum up their position and get over their achievements, which were basically a media achievement, and to try to think in hard political terms, they will discover, I believe, what we have discovered, that the real partner to find a peaceful solution is King Hussein, his Jordanian government, together with the Palestinian delegation. I do not see any real or realistic alternative to it.

MR. SHAW: And Secretary of State Shultz, once again he's preparing to pack his bags and pursue the US peace plan. Does it have a chance realistically?

MINISTER PERES: Realistically if he won't do it, and the chances for peace will evaporate and fade away, what would you think will happen in the Middle East? I see all the terrible alternatives that may take place. I think Secretary Shultz is making a supreme effort not to permit the peace initiative to die in the face of so

\*



415

428

many difficulties, because the moment that the chances for peace will disappear, another situation will be created, a return to an arms race, to a "cold war", to threats, to escalations, to military coalitions, and nobody will be then able to repair the situation. So the maintenance of a peace momentum, the administration of a peace hope is essential for all parties concerned. And if it calls for another trip, let's have another trip. And if there will be needed an additional trip, an additional trip. Because I believe that it is such a dangerous situation to raise our hands and say nothing can be done, and create an invitation to the most destructive situation in the Middle East. 4/5

MR. SHAW: President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev will be discussing the Middle East among other things -- (pauses) --

MINISTER PERES: Yes.

MR. SHAW: -- when their summit begins in Moscow.

I'm keeping an eye out at the White House because I think the President will be along shortly. (Referring to a Presidential press conference about to begin at the White House and carried live by CNN.)

But these two leaders will be discussing the Middle East. My question to you, sir, is how can Moscow have influence and credibility with your government when it does not recognize your government diplomatically?

MINISTER PERES: It's a question the Russians have to answer. Surely, how can they try and contribute to peace between the Arabs and ourselves when they didn't make fully peace with us? And we keep telling it to the Russians. They have to reestablish their diplomatic ties with Israel and then the Soviet Union has to adapt itself to the wishes of the people in the Middle East and not to try and force the countries in the Middle East to adapt themselves to whatever philosophy may be produced in Moscow.

MR. SHAW: So clearly you regard the Shultz plan, the United States plan, as much more acceptable than that being offered by Moscow?

MINISTER PERES: One hundred percent. I think that the Shultz plan is in reference with the wishes and the needs, and the need for a compromise in the Middle East. I don't think this is an American whim. I don't think this is an American dictate. I think this is an American conclusion about the best contribution that your great country can offer to our region.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

\*

↓



CNN/PERES-05/17/88

21 5/5 428

MR. SHAW: Is the presence of Chinese Silkworm missiles in the Middle East destabilizing?

MINISTER PERES: Very much so. It is a new toy given in the hands of some immature people. It may serve as a temptation, again, to try their hands and use force. It is not just who bought the missiles, but who is offering them. And I do not believe that the Chinese are limiting themselves only to Saudi Arabia. They may offer it to some more countries, and again renew an unnecessary arms race in the Middle East. Spare resources and money from education, from health, from economy, and spend it again on this very expensive weaponry. You know, a single missile that the Chinese are supplying to the Saudis costs \$12 million. Imagine what can be done with this money for schooling, for health, for economy.

MR. SHAW: Mr. Minister, we thank you very, very much for joining us on the International Hour. Thank you.

MINISTER PERES: Thank you.

MR. SHAW: Shimon Peres, the Foreign Minister of Israel.

END OF INTERVIEW

\*

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

18

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 8 דפים

סוג בסחוני גלוי

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 18.5.88

מס' מברק

1/8

448

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

להלן נאומו של ממררה"מ ושתי"ח פרס בועידת AIPAC (16-5-88).

101  
עתונות

2 1 2 1 3 3 2  
הסברה גלוי אביטל גלוי בי"ח גלוי מ"מ ש"מ  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
2



2/8

448

REMARKS OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHIMON PERES  
BEFORE THE AMERICAN-ISRAEL POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

MONDAY, MAY 16, 1988

FOREIGN MINISTER PERES: Thank you, Bob. Thank you, Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Johnston. Thank you, Senators, and Representatives of the House, for the moving support you have shown to our people and to my country. You are the dearest and the most profound friends that a nation can hope for, in the largest democracy history has ever known, the United States of America. (Applause.)

I would also (inaudible) in recognizing the presence of the representative of Egypt among us. (Applause.) You know, for 4,000 years, (speaks in foreign language, presumably Hebrew), what makes this evening different from all others, and we meant exodus from slavery, this night we mean exodus from belligerency. (Applause.) And if some people may feel that the peace between Egypt and Israel is not a perfect one, well, I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war. (Applause.)

I know that you are worried about the fact that we are divided in Israel. You would like to see us united. (Scattered applause.) Just a minute. (Laughter.) If we shall be united, I wonder if we should remain Jewish. (Laughter.) I mean, it doesn't fit us to be united really in many ways. But may I say that we are also united. First of all, we are united on one great issue: our friendship and thankfulness to the United States of America. We are the only country on earth where America doesn't serve a dividing factor, but a uniting one. And we are very proud about it, to see your great nation, that made freedom a promise, generosity a trait, and peoplehood a mission for a better world. We are proud to belong to this great tradition, to this great spirit, to this part of humanity. (Applause.)

But we are united in another way, too. Actually, to be democratic is to be pluralistic. I am thinking about the 40 years of Israel. We were attacked at least five times. The countries that did attack us were united. We who were attacked were divided, yet we won the wars, they lost it, which shows that to be free and democratic is not necessarily to be weak, but to be strong as well. (Applause.)

We may be divided in our positions, but we are always united in our fronts. We may have different views, but we are capable of acting together, of dreaming together, of hoping together. This is the salt (?) of the best combination between freedom and togetherness. Think as you wish, act as you need, and that will typify our future as well.

\*



3/8

448

Yes, we think that 40 years of the existence of Israel made things, which looked like unbelievable, a reality, unprecedented in history. Never before did the people that has lost their land, went into exile, dispersed on the four corners of the earth, come together again and become one people; one people, all of us are again, as Americans, as a contribution to human experience, to come together, to a town, to a land that was destroyed and burned down, dry and poor, and make it flourish again; to come again to a language that was forgotten but in the prayers, and make that language the language of our children, who play in the same words that our prophets visualized the future -- to that (?), to fight wars and win them, to keep an honest judicial system, to build industry and agriculture, and while fighting, building, and while building, arguing, and while arguing, dreaming and hoping. And one of the greatest things that happened to us is the togetherness of the Jewish people.

My very dear friends, Israel would never be what she is without you. And you probably would never be what you are without us. (Applause.) I want also to say a word about AIPAC. This is a unique organization. I know that many nations are jealous of Israel, because we enjoy the dynamic, imaginative and constructive work of your organization. Yet I know that you are not for hire, and we are not going to trade you for anything, neither for land or peace. We need you as you are, as the strongest bridge between the American people and the state of Israel. That's what you are, and that's what we need, of course. (Applause.) Please continue with this great work, which is not controversial, but agreeable on both sides of the oceans, in both sides of the dream and the need (?).

Now the 40th anniversary of Israel is not an occasion just to mark important achievements, but to renew our dream again. I was so pleased to see here so many young delegates -- young women, young men. They came not just to praise our achievements, but to share our vision and our dream. And we have to make our vision and our dream clear to them, clear to us. And when we are dreaming, we have to do it on a double track; one concerning the past, and the other concerning the future.

The past calls for a strong Israel, for a secure Israel, never to be light-minded about the strengths we need to defend our land and to defend our lives. Surely a person like myself, who went through those 40 years, most of them at the management of war and peace, most of it in serving the defenses of our country, I can remember so many occasions. You know, now people are interviewing and say, "What were the happiest days in your life in the 40 years?" That's not too important. I remember what were the most difficult lives, times, days in those 40 years.

\*

4/8

448

The first surely .....??????????  
in the wake of the Second World War, when we have discovered the dimension of the Holocaust. We couldn't believe it. We couldn't understand it. Still we can't believe, and still we cannot understand. Surely we cannot forget. Then I remember days of war, of dangers. I remember the night in the Yom Kippur war, sitting all day, all night at the Cabinet session, and trying to make a decision if we have to cross the Canal. Without crossing, we were in danger. The crossing was a danger. And the girl that took the stenography of the meeting all of a sudden started to cry. Her husband was at the front,

and I knew how dangerous and how difficult it was. How can I forget the night of Entebbe, when our boys were in there, where over a hundred people were in danger, and our planes were 4,000 miles away from home without any communication? On the 4th of July, they were waiting the result and knowing that the distance between success and failure is so small and so thin.

So, we have to take our security as serious as a people should. But then, I also know that we have to translate our strength and experience into a peaceful Middle East. Peace is our future. The past calls for an immensely strong Israel -- the future calls for an immensely dedicated Israel for peace in the Middle East. (Applause.)

We shall do it, not because we are weak, neither because we are criticized, even not because this is an Arab demand. We shall do it because this is an answer to our heritage, to our inclination as a nation, to our moral call as a

people that have never dominated another people, as an obligation to our own children, to their children, to let them wake up in the morning where they won't have to worry time and again about stones, or knives, or bombs or missiles; and they can start their day in an air of peace and hope.

I feel that Israel, after 40 years, is free, is strong, is peaceful. And we are determined to keep the state of Israel as a Jewish state numerically, and as a Jewish state morally. (Applause)

X



5/8

448

We are in very close relations with the United States. I have expressed already my appreciation for the most unusual support we got in this country. But may I also say that we are different from some other countries. We have never asked the United States to send soldiers to help to defend our country, but we have always asked the United States to send diplomats to help us to make peace.  
(Applause)

Our defense and a joint diplomacy for peace. When dealing with peace and remembering the need to keep our country strong, I would say that Israel generally, when it will come to negotiations, will say "no" to every proposal for peace that may harm security; and we shall say "yes" to every proposal for peace that may enhance the security of all the people in the Middle East without exception.  
(Applause)

Permit me to say what are our "nos" and what are our "yesses." There are things that we shall say "no", all of us, and on that again all of our people are united. We shall say "no" if somebody will suggest to divide the capital of Israel, Jerusalem.  
(Applause). On that, all of our people without exception know that Jerusalem is not just the center of our prayer, but the capital of our land forever. We shall say "no" if somebody will suggest us to return to the '67 frontiers. (Applause). We cannot permit ourselves to create not only a weakness in our defenses, but a temptation in the minds of other countries that may have the wish to try their hands again in their military strategies.

I can say very clearly, I for one, would give every right to the Palestinian people, but the right to attack us. This is the only right that we shall not hand over to anybody. (Applause). The Jordan River, holy and important to all of us, will be the line where no foreign army will be permitted to cross it and reach the heart of our narrow land and create a menace in the gates of Jerusalem. (Applause). We shall not support the creation of a Palestinian state and a Palestinian army that may be equipped with Russian weapons and assisted with Russian experts.

We think the best solution, and on that again I believe most of us are united, to solve the Palestinian people, and we respect the Palestinian people and we wish them well --

X



6/8

448

our enemies are neither a people nor a religion, the only enemy we have is war and belligerency -- and we feel the best solution is to enable the solution of the Palestinian problem within a Jordanian/Palestinian framework. (applause) since most of the Jordanians are anyway Palestinians, and since all of the Palestinians, without exception, on the West Bank are Jordanian citizens, and Jordan is their legitimate government. (Applause)

But then we have clear "yesses". First on the line, we tell to our Arab neighbors the way to solve the problem is by peaceful negotiation. There is no military but a political solution to the conflict; and we call for negotiations. We shall surely say "yes" to any renouncement of violence and terror passing or continued, on a small scale or a large scale.

We shall not censor the minds of the Arabs, but we shall not permit anybody to come

with a stone or a knife or a bomb in his pocket. We shall stop violence, so violence will not stop us, to maintain a policy of peace. (Applause.) Better (?) do it peacefully. We want to disarm the conflict, to demilitarize places of controversy. And we recognize, as we have stated already in the Camp David agreement, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements, and we are serious on that. (Applause.)

We are ready to negotiate, and I want to say a word about the way to negotiations. My dear friends, to be very open, I am very much in doubt if, under the present climate, we can reach an agreement. It's too loaded with suspicion. It is too full of hatred. It is too agitated by very militant forces. So we have to change the climate. The way to change the climate is by the introduction of negotiations. When we shall start to negotiate, we may discover there are more options for peace and solution than we think to get today.

We would like to negotiate directly with the Arabs. We can understand that the one Arab country with whom we would like to start the negotiations, and to change the climate, is Jordan. The Jordanians say, we cannot come in without having an international opening, for Arab reasons, not for Israeli reasons. We do not need the international conference, but we need the Jordanians. And if we can have a conference that will not impose a solution, that will not dictate the negotiations, that will not veto the agreements, we are ready to consider it and not to postpone it. Whoever has criticisms about it, and I can understand why, whoever is skeptical about it, and again I can see the reasons for it, must think about the major issue -- what are the alternatives?

X

7/8

448

We intend to lead the region in peace. We are strong to do so, we are ready to do so. We do not want to harm, to insult, anybody else, but to keep Israel Jewish and the Middle East peaceful. We are ready -- this is another yes, if necessary, to enter into interim agreement so to allow for time to pacify wounds which today are so painful, on so many places on the bodies, of all the parties concerned.

We are ready to compromise even, if the Arabs will compromise. We are ready to recognize their wishes, not just as individuals, but also as a people, but they have to recognize that, when it comes to the security of Israel, they must meet us halfway. We would like to dream together about a Middle East that doesn't spend so much money on arms, that has a common market, that has open frontiers, that is ready to compete economically, not militarily, and to see who can be best in the campuses, in the research institutions, in industry and agriculture, and not on the battlefield. We know that we can win the wars, but we are looking for the greatest of the victory, and that is not to fight with arms, but to compete in freedom, so to advance the whole of the people in the Middle East.

(Applause.)

Now, let me say, for all of us, we have to ask ourselves, how would we like to view the Middle East, or ourselves in the Middle East? Israel, as I have said, is strong, and in many ways prosperous.

I, as an Israeli, wouldn't like to see our country just as an island of success in a sea of poverty. It is so Jewish and so becoming to see the whole region being developed differently, not to see children in countries neighboring us suffering from poverty and want and fear. We surely share the Arab fear, so (?) fundamentalism will not win the day.

Fundamentalism is a danger, not only to the Arab and the Muslim countries, but for every enlightened person, for every enlightened nation. We would see -- like to see the Arabs winning a different future, and not being thrown in the fanaticism, in the narrowness, in the darkness that the Khomeini-like system is trying to introduce in the midst of our life.

We would like to see our countries, all of us, watered, green. We would like to see the greening of the Middle East. We would like

X



8/8

448

to see all children enjoying the new offers of modern education and science, and to cooperate as so many other nations do.

In the past we used to give examples from Europe. We would like, so we used to say, to see the Middle East becoming a sort of a Scandinavia -- a Scandinavian relationship among us. But today let's have a look, it is not just Scandinavia, the same has happened to Taiwan, to Korea, to Singapore. A small island like Taiwan has today a surplus of \$70 billion which they have gained by their industry and devotion. Why not the Middle East? And we would like, in the years to come, to become really what we are longing for such a long time -- not just a fighting nation, but a contributing nation; to contribute as much as we can, not out of choice, but because this is our choice.

May I tell you that what you and us -- for the United States of America is the largest democracy, and Israel is a small democracy; you are larger in size, but we're equal in spirit. What we did is so great

and so promising, and so unbelievable, and so unprecedented. Let's not stop dreaming. Let's not stop believing. Let's not bend to the skepticism which fills, on so many occasions, days of our life. It is vision and hope and devotion that led us to this point. Let's thank heaven for what we have achieved to compensate for the suffering of our fathers and forefathers, for the cost of holocaust and wars. Let's thank heaven that we can return to our land and heritage, to our language and values. And while thanking, let's also pray together for security of our people, for the friendship with the great democracies, for peace for all children, Jewish and Arabs, Moslem and Christians, and we shall contribute(?) together in a great way.

Thank you. (applause)

END



ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, May 18, 1988.

Dear Senator Humphrey,

It is some time since I received your letter of April 26 addressed to Ambassador Moshe Arad, and redirected to me. At the time I had only recently returned from an official visit to the United States, and since then we have been preoccupied with the continuation of the Peace Process, with our security problems and, happily, also with our Anniversary celebrations.

Moreover, your request was being carefully studied and considered.

We are of course familiar with the projects for which you requested our assistance, and greatly appreciate the efforts that you and your colleagues are making on their behalf. I wish we could respond positively to your request.

Regrettably this is not possible. As you know, we have made extraordinary efforts to strengthen our economy; to stop and reduce the inflation. In fact, one of the principal reasons for creating a Government of National Unity was this great economic challenge. It was obvious that we would have to introduce tough measures and that we would demand economic sacrifices from our people. Therefore it was felt that the two major political parties should work together and seek the cooperation of the Histadrut Trade Union in order to present a united front.

/2.

The Hon. Senator  
Gordon J. Humphrey  
United States Senate  
Washington DC 20510

The effort can be regarded as successful. You know that we have managed to bring down the inflation, and there are encouraging signs of improvement in our economy.


One of the key factors in producing these results is the agreement between the two parties to introduce severe budget cuts in all departments. We have not deviated from that decision in the administration of our health services, because if we depart from the general rule the whole system of economic constraints could break down.

I am sure you will understand, dear Senator, that, in the circumstances, we are unable to assist the institutions to which you referred in your letter.

Please accept my appreciation and good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



18

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

1/2

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 18.5.88

454

המשרד

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: לשכת רווח"מ

מאת: עתונות

להלן דברי הברכה שנאמרו ע"י ממרוה"מ ושה"ח בעת ארוחת הצהרים שנערכה לכבודו  
בבית השגריר.

10/1  
עתונות

2 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 2  
שהיה ההגד גשגש / אנא ח'רן גלסוי אביטל גמ הסברה גמ



: 454

2/2

PERES TOAST: AMBASSADOR ARAD'S RESIDENCE: MAY 16, 1988:

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Senators, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank you for coming - something which has shown us that your friendship for the State of Israel and for the cause of peace. I know some people are complaining about the division that exists in Israel. But at least on one issue we are united. And that is on our appreciation and thankfulness for the United States of America. We know that there are many in America who are divided on some issues but we are so happy that only on the State of Israel that there is a union between the parties, the administration, the President, the Secretary, the Senate, the House of Representatives and the people of the United States; for us it is also of such great importance.

Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, played an immense important role on all three domains which are very important to Israel, their strategic strengths of the country, the economic health of it supported by the Defense Department, supported by the two parties - the Senate and the House. And they're very demanding given the circumstances, given the trying time of the budgetary consideration and we are very grateful for it. Now on two we succeeded with the great cooperation and on the economic recovery. Now we have to succeed on the fare of achieving peace. There is no reason to hide that the way of peace is flooded with a lot of difficulties accepting peace. But it is not with all the difficulties but the way that should bring our momentum forward. I always remember that the wise Frenchman was approached by a friend of his and he says, "Sir, life is so difficult." And the French philosopher was there replied, "Compared to what?" May I say that peace is so difficult. May I say compared to what. The other alternative will be more complicated. May I say that without the US initiative without the very strong support of the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, the Secretary, the Senate..., the Middle East today might have been torn because not only is this a conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, but in the Arab world, there is a conflict between a fundamentalism which may destroy the future of Arabs and the structure of peace which may bring promise to the young generation of children. I know that we can achieve a perfect pessimism in our life and an imperfect optimism in our life as far as I'm concerned. I prefer the imperfection of optimism to the perfection of pessimism and I prefer an imperfect peace upon a perfect war.

On the background of my country, of my people, for the ? to understand friendship, support, from this most unusual experiment of human ? to reassemble the treaty and to go back to the ??? will go back to their heritage and demonstrate in the eyes of the rest of the world that freedom is strength and friendship is influence and a country like America is unprecedented in history in freedom and democracy can demonstrate success and can influence hope to all. Please join me.



)b

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ד קדף 1 מתוך 1 דפיםסוג בטחוני שמורדחיפות מיידיתתאריך/ז"ח 18.5.88מס' מברק

464

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: עתונות

אבו-ג'יהאד - וויטהאד

לשלכם 502

לשאלתנו את משרד דובר NEA במחמ"ד אם נוכל לקבל טקסט של דבריו של וויטהאד בטונים נענינו כי הם יכולים ל מסור לנו רק את הטקסט כפי שהופיע בדווחי הסוכנויות. הטקסט שנשלח לנו (רויטר) כולל את האמירה -

"The US very much regretted this incident and found it a reprehensible action on the part of Israel."

לשאלה האם הוא מאשים ישירות את ישראל השיב -

We've not heard denials, so we can only assume

יוסי גל

2 1 2 1 1 3 3 2  
מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד מחמ"ד  
אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד אבו-ג'יהאד